COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on preserving and strengthening Schengen
Date: 2017-09-27
Institutions: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: Bulgaria, EU police cooperation, Romania, Schengen Information System, border control, cross-border cooperation, external border of the EU, illegal migration, internal border of the EU

EN 

   EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 27.9.2017  COM(2017) 570 final   COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on preserving and strengthening Schengen  
 
 
1. 

Introduction 

The Schengen area is the largest free travel area in the world. It allows more than 400 million 
EU citizens,  as  well  as  visitors,  to  move  freely  and  goods  and  services  to  flow  unhindered. 
Schengen  is  one  of  the major  achievements  of  European  integration  and  the  Commission is 
fully committed to safeguard and preserve the free movement it ensures of persons.  

The absence of internal border control constitutes the very essence of Schengen. In an area 
without controls at internal borders, cross-border threats affecting public policy or internal 
security of that area are a matter of common interest. The absence of internal border controls 
in  the  Schengen  area  has  always  been  accompanied  by  measures  in  the  areas  of  external 
borders,  visa  policy,  the  Schengen  Information  System,  data  protection,  police  cooperation, 
judicial  cooperation  in  criminal  matters  and  drugs  policies.  In  an  area  where  persons  may 
move  freely,  the  reintroduction  of  border  control  at  internal  borders  is  the  exception.  The 
reintroduction of internal border control should be decided only as a measure of last resort, 
for a limited period of time and to the extent that controls are necessary and proportionate to 
the identified serious threats to public policy or internal security. 

Since its conception, the Schengen area has been confronted with different types of challenges 
and threats. The strength of  Schengen  also  comes from its capacity to  learn and adapt; the 
Schengen Borders Code has been amended on several previous occasions to ensure it remains 
fit for purpose. 

The  pressure  from  the  mass  irregular  migration  influx  and  the  multiplication  of  terrorist 
attacks  in  various  Member  States  exposed  shortcomings  in  the  Schengen  architecture  that 
required further action. The Commission took key steps to remedy them, such as the Back to 
Schengen Roadmap. In the field of border management and border security of the European 
common external borders, this meant a swift move towards a joint responsibility and action 
management and included notably the establishment of the new European Border and Coast 
Guard  Agency  and  the  introduction  of  systematic  checks  against  relevant  databases  on  all 
persons crossing the external borders. Real progress has been made in fighting terrorism by 
working  towards  an effective and genuine  Security Union. The revised  Schengen evaluation 
mechanism  implemented  since  2014  has  also  become  an  important  way  to  identify 
shortcomings, including in the Schengen architecture.  

It is now timely to assess the results yielded by the measures taken by the European Union to 
remedy the challenges faced by the Schengen area over the past two years. The Commission 
Communication  the  Delivery  of  the  European  Agenda  on  Migration1  adopted  on  27 
September,  on  the  one  hand,  takes  stock  of  the  main  achievements  and  shortcomings  in  the 
implementation  of  the  European  Agenda  on  Migration  and  on  the  other  hand  identifies  key 
priority  actions  to  be  taken  towards  a  more  efficient,  fair  and  stable  European  policy  on 
asylum  and  migration.  The  present  Communication  draws  the  conclusions  from  the 
implementation of the Back to Schengen Roadmap and proposes next steps for strengthening 
Schengen, including the adoption of a Recommendation on better application of the current 
rules and a proposal to update the Schengen Borders Code in light of the current challenges 
Europe is facing. 

1 COM(2017)558. 

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Moreover,  a  strengthened  Schengen  is  also  one  that  contributes  to  enhanced  security 
cooperation  and  mutual  trust  amongst  the  widest  circle  of  Member  States.  As  called  for  by 
President  Juncker  in  his  State  of  the  Union  Address  2017,  if  we  want  to  strengthen  the 
protection of our external borders, then we need to open the Schengen area of free movement 
to  Bulgaria  and  Romania  immediately,  followed  swiftly  by  Croatia  once  it  has  met  all  the 
criteria.  

2. 

State of play of the Schengen area 

In  an  area  without  internal  border  control,  the  temporary  reintroduction  of  internal  border 
control may only be decided in exceptional circumstances to provide a response to situations 
seriously affecting the public policy or internal security of that area, of parts thereof, or of one 
or more Member States. Overall, the use of temporary reintroduction of border control shows 
that  the  Member  States  apply  this  measure  in  a  responsible  manner.  The  costs  of  a  non-
Schengen  simulation  clearly  demonstrate  that  this  is  always  a  costly  decision  for  the 
economy2.  

Mass  influx  and  secondary  migratory  movements  coming  via  the  Eastern  Mediterranean 
route 
2015 witnessed unprecedented flows of migrants arriving in the European Union resulting in 
secondary  movements  of  non-registered  irregular  migrants.  This  situation  led  several  of  the 
exposed Member States to reintroduce temporary border controls at their internal borders, in 
line  with  the  Schengen  rules.  The  persistence  of  the  threats  to  public  policy  or  internal 
security  in  several  Member  States  resulting  from  the  secondary  movements  of  irregular 
migrants led the Commission to trigger for the very first time the specific procedure of Article 
29 of the Schengen Borders Code. This was one of the steps foreseen by the Commission in 
its roadmap back to a normally functioning Schengen area in its Communication of 4 March 
20163.  The  procedure  of  Article  29  may  be  used  in  exceptional  circumstances  where  the 
deficiencies  in  the  management  of  the  external  borders,  detected  during  a  Schengen 
evaluation,  put  the  functioning  of  the  entire  Schengen  area  at  risk.  On  12  May  2016,  the 
Council recommended4, on the basis of a Commission proposal5, that the five Member States 
most affected by the secondary movements coming from Greece reintroduce border controls 
at  specific  sections  of  their  internal  borders.  Despite  the  gradual  improvements  of  the 
situation,  the  pressure  on  the  five  Member  States  concerned  continued  and  justified 

2According  to  the  Commission  analysis  of  direct  economic  cost  of  non-Schengen  i.e.  the  situation  where  the 
border controls have been reintroduced for a longer period of time delays at the borders would have a substantial 
impact  on  cross-border  transport  (notably  through  road),  tourism,  public  administrations  and  cross-border 
workers and travellers. For those categories, the direct costs are estimated to range between €5 and €18 billion 
per year (or 0.06%-0.13% of GDP), depending on the time spent due to delays. The medium-term indirect costs 
of  non-Schengen  may  be  considerably  higher  than  those  direct  estimates,  as  the  impacts  on  intra-community 
trade,  investment  and  mobility  would  be  unprecedented  if  rolling-back  Schengen  puts  at  risk  the  economic 
integration. 
3  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  European  Council  and  the  Council 
"Back to Schengen – A Roadmap", COM(2016) 120 final. 
4  Council  Implementing  Decision  (EU)  2016/894  of  12  May  2016  setting  out  a  recommendation  for  temporary 
internal border control in exceptional circumstances putting the overall functioning of the Schengen area at risk  (OJ 
L 151, 8.6.2016, p. 8). 
5  Commission proposal of 4 May 2016  for a  Council Implementing  Decision  setting out a recommendation for 
temporary internal border control in exceptional circumstances putting the overall functioning of the Schengen area 
at risk, COM(2016) 275 final. 

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subsequent  prolongations  of  the  internal  border  controls6.  On  11 May  2017,  the  Council 
authorised7 these five Member States for the third and last time under this procedure to extend 
these controls until 11 November 2017. 

These  internal  border  controls  have  been  accompanied  by  strict  conditions:  border  controls 
were  reintroduced  only  at  the  specific  internal  border  sections  affected  by  the  secondary 
movements coming from Greece. Secondly, the five Schengen States concerned were obliged 
to  provide  monthly  reports  to  the  Commission  on  the  border  controls  performed  and  their 
outcome. These reports have allowed the Commission to closely monitor the situation in order 
to  verify  that  those  controls  remained  within  the  limits  set  by  the  Council.  With  each 
consecutive prolongation of the initial recommendation of 12 May 2016, the Council recalled 
the rule that border controls can only be used as a last resort measure and that Member States 
should instead favour the use of alternative measures such as intensified police checks in the 
border area in order to address the serious threats to public policy or internal security.  

The latest reports from the Schengen States under the third and last prolongation confirm the 
steady  trend  that  the  overall  situation  has  greatly  improved  since  the  beginning  of  the 
migration  crisis.  Today  the  numbers  of  daily  arrivals  in  the  Greek  islands  have  decreased 
significantly8 and the subsequent secondary movements from Greece to other Member States 
are limited. This is notably reflected by the downward trend observed in asylum applications 
received at the internal borders of the Member States concerned as well as in the low numbers 
of refusals of entry in these Member States.  

This is the result of the combined efforts of, the Commission, the Member States, the agencies 
and other players, such as IOM or UNCHR, involved in managing the challenges. 

The increased terrorist threats  

Terrorist  attacks  carried  out  in  seven  Member  States9  over  the  past  two  years  have  put  yet 
another strain on the Schengen area. Specifically, France has faced multiple terrorist attacks 
on its soil since January 201510. The increased threat and several terrorist attacks, combined 
with the organisation of several international events, have led France to introduce and carry 
out border controls at all its internal borders since November 2015, in line with the relevant 
provisions  of  the  Schengen  Borders  Code.  Steps  have  been  taken  to  address  this  challenge 
both at EU and national level, but the terrorist threat persists.  

6  Council  recommendations  (EU)  2016/1989  of 11 November 2016  and  (EU)  2017/246  of  7  February  2017for 
prolonging temporary internal border control in exceptional circumstances putting the overall functioning of the 
Schengen area at risk. 
7 Council recommendation (EU) 2017/818 of 11 May 2017 for prolonging temporary internal border control in 
exceptional circumstances putting the overall functioning of the Schengen area at risk. 
8 The number of irregular crossings stands at 78 per day on average between 21 March 2016 and 17 September 
2017. 
9 Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
10 In January and November 2015 in Paris, in June 2015 in Saint-Quentin-Fallavier, in August 2015 on board of 
a Thalys train, in January 2016 in Valence, in June 2016 in Magnanville, in July 2016 in Nice, in July 2016 in 
Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray, in February 2017 in Paris (machete attack in front of Louvre), in April 2017 again in 
Paris (attack at the Champs-Elysees). 

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3. 

Actions taken to reinforce Schengen  

While  the  Schengen  area  faced  these  critical  and  unprecedented  challenges,  the  EU  and  its 
Member  States  have  worked  together  to  take  action  to  reinforce  the  external  borders  and 
ensure security and public order to secure the Schengen area of free movement. The ultimate 
objective  remains  to  go  back  to  a  normally  functioning  Schengen  area  without  controls  at 
internal  borders.  Within  the  framework  of  the  Security  Union,  a  series  of  actions  that 
contribute  to  security  within  the  Schengen  area  are  also  being  implemented.  This 
comprehensive approach is instrumental to address current and future threats and challenges, 
in all their forms, that could put at risk the functioning of the Schengen area.  

a) 

Measures taken at the external border 

Reinforced  external  border  management  with  the  tools  of  the  new  European  Border  and 
Coast Guard Regulation 

The new European Border and Coast Guard11 has reinforced capacities in terms of monitoring 
migratory  flows  towards  and  within  the  European  Union  and  in  terms  of  risk  analysis.  The 
new  legal  framework  brought  new  resources  and  tools  making  EU  external  border 
management more resilient to new challenges. This is notably the case with the mandatory 
vulnerability  assessments  and  their  follow  up  recommendations.  These  evidence-based 
vulnerability  assessments  are 
to  operational 
recommendations  addressed  to  the  Member  States  concerned  setting  concrete  measures  to 
eliminate identified vulnerabilities within a defined timeframe. They also help Member States 
and the Commission to better target the relevant EU funds, notably the Internal Security Fund, 
and  any  request  for  additional  emergency  funding.  The  full  implementation  of  those 
recommendations by the Member States concerned is therefore key in safeguarding the proper 
functioning of the Schengen area.  

result-oriented  as 

they  may 

lead 

The establishment of the Rapid Reaction Pool and of the Rapid Reaction Equipment Pool 
(Rapid  Reaction  Pools)  guarantees  the  availability  within  10  working  days  of  human 
resources  and  equipment  for  operational  support  upon  request  to  any  Member  State 
confronted  with  a  situation  at  the  external  borders  requiring  urgent  actions.  The  European 
Border  and  Coast  Guard  Agency's  strengthened  mandate  also  includes  the  possibility  to 
intervene  in  urgent  situations  either  at  the  request  of  a  Member  State  or  on  the  basis  of  a 
Council decision when a Member State is unable or unwilling to act. 

The Agency also has a reinforced mandate in assisting and developing further the operational 
cooperation among the Member States in the field of return. The three new pools of forced-
return  monitors,  forced-return  escorts  and  return  specialists  are  operational  and  can  now  be 
mobilised by forming European Return Intervention Teams, providing operational support to 
increase the capacities of Member States. 

As regards situational monitoring and risk analysis, the Agency is now able to prepare risk 
analysis  covering aspects relevant for a European Integrated Border Management, including 
risks that may affect the functioning or security of the Schengen area of free movement and 
its external borders. 

11  Regulation  (EU)  2016/1624  of  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  of  14  September  2016  on  the 
European Border and Coast Guard, OJ L 251, 16.9.2016, p. 1. 

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All these new operational tools contribute to reducing the risk of mass irregular arrivals and 
also secondary movements within the Schengen area, thus confirming progressively the need 
to phase out the current temporary internal border controls. 

Hotspots 

As  part  of  the  immediate  action  to  assist  frontline  Member  States  which  are  facing 
disproportionate migratory pressures at the EU’s external borders, the European Commission 
developed the hotspot approach.  

The  European  Asylum  Support  Office  (EASO),  the  European  Border  and  Coast  Guard 
Agency  (Frontex),  the  Police  Cooperation  Agency  (Europol)  and  the  Judicial  Cooperation 
Agency (Eurojust) work on the ground with the authorities of the frontline Member State to 
help  to  fulfil  their  obligations  under  EU  law  and  swiftly  identify,  register  and  fingerprint 
incoming irregular migrants. The hotspot approach also contributes to the implementation of 
the temporary relocation schemes.  Italy and Greece are the two Members States where this 
hotspot approach is currently being implemented. Other Member States can also benefit from 
the hotspot approach upon request. Based on the lessons learned from the implementation of 
the hotspots approach so far, the Commission will present later in autumn guidelines on the 
preparations and setting up of hotspots in Member States.    

Reinforced controls at the external borders in response to the terrorist threats  

To  reinforce  the  external  borders  following  an  explicit  call  from  the  Council12,  aiming  in 
particular  at  better  identifying  and  apprehending  'foreign  terrorist  fighters,  the  Commission 
proposed  an  amendment  to  the  Schengen  Borders  Code    introducing  systematic  checks 
against  relevant  databases  for  all  persons  crossing  the  external  borders13.  Since  the  entry 
into  force  of  this  new  legislation  on  7  April  2017,  the  same  rules  of  consulting  relevant 
databases apply to all travellers, including EU citizens and persons enjoying the right of free 
movement under Union law, subject to some possible derogation in justified cases14. The new 
rules  enhanced  the  use  of  databases  such  as  the  Schengen  Information  System  or  Interpol's 
Databases15. 

As a consequence of the introduction of systematic checks, the overall number of hits in the 
Schengen Information System has, according to information provided by the Member States, 
increased and travelling to and back from war zones has now clearly become more difficult. 

12  In  particular  call of  the  Council of 20 November  2015  to  amend  the  Schengen  Borders  Code  further  to  the 
terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015. 
13  Regulation  (EU)  2017/458  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  15  March  2017  amending 
Regulation (EU) 2016/399 as regards the reinforcement of checks against relevant databases at external borders, 
OJ L 74, 18.3.2017, p. 1–7. 
14  The  possibility  to  derogate  from  the  systematic  checks  at  land  and  sea  borders  applies  with  regard  to  EU 
citizens  when  these  systematic  checks  disproportionally  impact  on  the  traffic  flows  and  following  a  risk 
assessment  guaranteeing  that  security  will  not  be  hampered  by  non-systematic,  targeted  consultation  of  the 
relevant  databases.  At  airports,  such  derogation  is  possible  in  principle  during  a  period  of  6  months  (until  7 
October 2017). After that date the Commission may authorise derogations at the airports facing infrastructural 
challenges during an additional period of 18 months.  
15 With the compulsory use of the Lost and Stolen Travel Documents database. 

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With  all  the  above-mentioned  actions,  measures  and  initiatives  taken at the  external  border, 
the EU is now better equipped to prevent and manage potential crisis situations, and thus to 
guarantee a higher level of security for its citizens.  

Stronger and smarter information systems for borders and security 

The  Schengen  Information  System  (SIS)  is  the  largest  information  exchange  system  that 
supports  external  border  control  and  law  enforcement  cooperation  in  the  Schengen  area.  In 
December  2016,  the  Commission  submitted  three  proposals  to  further  strengthen  the 
operational  effectiveness  and  efficiency  of  SIS  and  enhance  the  overall  security  in  Europe. 
The  proposals  introduce  technical  and  operational  improvements  to  the  SIS,  to  ensure 
continued effective information sharing between law enforcement officers and border guards 
across  Europe.  The  measures  particularly  focus  on  providing  better  tools  to  help  tackle 
terrorism  and  improving  the effective  return  of  third-country  nationals  who  do  not  have  the 
right to be in the Schengen area. 

important 

improvement 

Another 
the  Automated  Fingerprint 
Identification  System  (AFIS)  in  the  SIS,  which  will  help  to  identify  people  entering  the 
Schengen  area  more  reliably.  The  project  is  currently  ongoing  (no  legislative  changes  are 
needed for the implementation) and the AFIS will go live February 2018. 

the  deployment  of 

is 

Further  proposals  for  improvements  to  the  security  and  border  management  were  also  put 
forward by the Commission in 2016, with Commission proposals for two new large-scale IT 
systems,  the  Entry/Exit  System  and  the  European  Travel  Information  and  Authorisation 
System (ETIAS).  

The  Entry/Exit  System  aims  to  modernise  external  border  management  by  improving  the 
quality and efficiency of controls as well as the detection of document and identity fraud. The 
system  will  apply  to  all  third-country  nationals  who  are  admitted  for  a  short  stay  into  the 
Schengen  area  at  the  moment  they  cross  the  external  European  borders.  The  Entry/Exit 
System  will  facilitate  the  border  crossing  of  bona  fide  travellers,  detect  over-stayers  and 
identify undocumented persons in the Schengen area. The ancillary objective of the Entry/Exit 
System  is  to  reinforce  internal  security  and  the  fight  against  terrorism  and  serious  crime.  A 
political  agreement  on  the  establishment  of  the  Entry/Exit  System  was  reached  between 
Council and European Parliament in July 2017.   

The European Travel Information and Authorisation System will require nationals of visa-free 
countries  to  obtain  a  travel  authorisation  prior  to  their  arrival  in  the  Schengen  Area.  This 
would  help  to  identify  persons  who  may  pose  an  irregular  migration  or  security  risk  before 
they  arrive  at  the  border  and  significantly  enhance  the  security  of  the  external  borders. 
Travellers would have a reliable early indication of entry into the Schengen area which will 
thus substantially reduce the number of refusals of entry. 

The  Commission  plans  to  present  as  soon  as  possible  a  proposal  to  further  enhance  the 
interoperability  between  the  above  systems,  as  well  as  with  Eurodac,  Visa  Information 
System, European Criminal Record Information System and Europol data. This proposal will 
have the objective of ensuring that end-users have fast and seamless access to all information 
that  they  need  to  perform  their  tasks,  with  a  special  focus  on  access  by  law-enforcement 
authorities to non-law enforcement information systems, as well as to providing a solution to 
detect and combat identity fraud.   

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b)   Measures taken within the Schengen area 

The  use  of  proportionate  police  checks  and  cross  border  police  cooperation  to  increase 
security within the Schengen area 

Reintroducing internal border controls to remedy serious threats to internal security or public 
policy should not come as a first solution, as stressed in Article 25 of the Schengen Borders 
Code, even less so now that key steps have been taken to strengthen the external borders. In 
its Recommendation of 12 May 201716, the Commission expressed its views on how Member 
States  can  use  police  powers  under  national  law  and  carry  out  police  checks  in  the  entire 
territory, if needed and justified, including in the border area. 

The  Recommendation  encouraged  Member  States  to  use  powers  concerning  police  checks 
within  the  territory  and  cross-border  police  cooperation  in  a  more  effective  way.  Member 
States have also been encouraged to assess whether enhanced police checks would not allow 
achieving  the  same  results  as  temporary  internal  border  controls,  before  introducing  or 
prolonging  such  controls. 
the 
Recommendations  under  Article  29  of  the  Schengen  Borders  Code17  in  which  the  Member 
States have been explicitly requested to first explore possibilities under police checks before 
deciding on the subsequent prolongation of internal border controls.  

the  Recommendation  built  upon 

respect, 

this 

In 

The  Member  States  positively  welcomed  the  Recommendation,  stressing  however  the  scale 
and intensity of current challenges. A number of Member States stated that the use of police 
checks  and  cross-border  operational  cooperation  cannot  substitute  the  reintroduction  of 
internal border control in the short term, but only complement it. To respond to these concerns 
and to assist Member States in implementing the Recommendation on time, the Commission 
is working closely with Member States' authorities18 to discuss the challenges related to the 
implementation of the Recommendation in practice, including by providing financial support 
and exchanging best practice.  

The  Commission,  together  with  the  Council,  will  continue  working  towards  improving  the 
cooperation  between  the  Member  States  in  this  area  with  a  view  to  create  an  environment 
where  effective  police  checks  would  be  implemented  in  the  first  place  rather  than  internal 
border controls when needed to address serious threats to public policy or internal security. 

Other measures to strengthen cross border police and law enforcement cooperation 

The Commission has also taken steps to further strengthen police cooperation as a key tool for 
common  response  to  cross-border  threats  affecting  the  public  policy  or  internal  security  of 
that area, working towards an effective and genuine Security Union.  

Effective  information  sharing  is  a  key  element  in  the  fight  against  criminal  threats. 
Information  exchange has  increased significantly and Member  States use  databases, such  as 

16 Commission recommendation of 12 May 2017 on proportionate police checks and police cooperation in the 
Schengen area, C(2017) 3349 final. 
17 Commission proposal of 25 October 2016 for a Council Implementing Decision setting out a Recommendation 
for prolonging temporary internal border control in exceptional circumstances putting the overall functioning of 
the Schengen area at risk, COM(2016) 711 final. 
18 Council standing Committee on operational cooperation on internal security (COSI) held an orientation debate 
on 20 June 2017 and a follow-up discussion on 10 July 2017.  

8 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
the Schengen Information System, much more often.  The EU Directive on  Passenger Name 
Record  data  was  adopted  in  2016,  essential  for  identifying  high  risk  travellers  previously 
unknown to law enforcement authorities. By collecting, sharing and analysing passenger data, 
law  enforcement  will  be  able  to  better  address  cross-border  crime.  The  Europol  Regulation 
strengthening Europol's mandate entered into force in May 2017, providing the agency with 
the  tools  to  become  more  effective,  efficient  and  accountable.  The  Agency  was  also 
reinforced with more resources. 

Based  on  this,  operational  cooperation  was  also  further  enhanced.  The  objective  of  the  so-
called  EU  Policy  Cycle  is  to  ensure  effective  cooperation  between  Member  States’  law 
enforcement  agencies,  EU  Institutions  and  EU  Agencies  that  should  lead  to  coherent  and 
robust operational action targeting the most pressing criminal threats facing the EU. The new 
priorities  for  the  years  2018-2021  have  been  recently  adopted.  They  will  be  implemented 
from 2018 onwards through annual operational action plans. 

To  help  improve  cross-border  law  enforcement  cooperation,  the  Commission  organised  two 
workshops this year dedicated to the practice of "cross-border hot pursuits"19 and to the use of 
cross-border  cooperation  tools  in  countries  where  internal  border  control  have  been 
reintroduced. The Commission plans to take certain findings of these two workshops forward 
with a number of further dedicated support actions.  

Strong quality control of the Schengen area with the new Schengen evaluation mechanism 

While  additional  measures  and  initiatives  have  been  implemented  to  further  protect  and 
preserve our area of free movement, the close monitoring of Member States' obligations and 
responsibilities according to the Schengen rules continues. This is done via the evaluation and 
monitoring  mechanism  to  verify  the  application  of  the  Schengen  acquis,  as  revised  by 
Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013. Each year, five to six Member States are evaluated on their 
application  of  the  Schengen  acquis  in  the  field  of  management  of  the  external  border,  visa 
policy,  the  Schengen  Information  System,  data  protection,  police  cooperation  and  return. 
These on-site evaluations take place on the basis of a multiannual programme for the period 
2014-2019, allowing the evaluation of all Schengen States by the end of the cycle.  

The Schengen evaluation mechanism, in force since November 2014, sets clearer procedural 
rules for reports, recommendations and follow-up of identified deficiencies (including a close 
monitoring  and  follow-up  of  the  implementation  of  the  recommendations),  as  well  as 
unannounced visits. On-site visits, conducted by evaluation teams, consisting of Commission 
and  Member  States'  experts  and  an  observer  from  the  relevant  agencies,  result  in  concise 
evaluation  reports  with  findings  qualified  as  "compliant",  "compliant  but  improvement 
necessary"  or  "non-compliant"  with  the  provisions  of  the  Schengen  acquis  as  well  as 
recommendations  to  remedy  the  deficiencies  identified.  The  provision  by  the  evaluated 
Member State of an action plan to remedy the deficiencies identified in an evaluation report 
and  of  follow-up  reports  ensures  close  monitoring  of 
the 
recommendations.  Moreover,  depending  on  the  seriousness  of  the  deficiencies  identified, 
revisits can be organised.  

implementation  of 

the 

19 These are pursuits (typically by car) of suspects, which start in the internal border areas by law enforcement 
officers of one Member State and continue into the territory of a neighbouring Member State. 

9 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
Since the Schengen evaluation mechanism reform, the on-site teams observed in most cases 
overall  compliance  with  the  essential  provisions  of  the  Schengen  legal  framework. 
Nonetheless, several specific and some cross-cutting shortcomings were noticed in all policy 
fields,  which  needed  to  be  remedied  in  order  to  ensure  high  uniform  standards  in  the 
application  of  the  Schengen  acquis  in  practice  and  to  maintain  a  high  level  of  mutual  trust 
between  those  Member  States  that  form  part  of  the  area  without  border  control  at  internal 
borders.  

The mechanism has led to substantial improvements in the implementation of the Schengen 
acquis in the Member States and has already proven its added value in ensuring the efficient 
functioning of the Schengen area: the coordinated introduction of border controls at selected 
internal border sections pursuant to Article 29 of the Schengen Borders Code was the result of 
the  unannounced  Schengen  evaluation  visit  carried  out  in  Greece  at  the  end  of  2015.  This 
mechanism  allowed  to  identify  and  to  remedy  swiftly  serious  deficiencies  in  the  external 
border  management  in  Greece,  while  the  subsequent  action  plan  and  monthly  follow-up 
reports submitted by Greece showed the actions taken by Greece to increase the security of 
Europe’s external borders. The 'regular' evaluation of the Greek external border management 
conducted in 2016 confirmed the progress made by the Greek authorities.  

The Schengen Evaluation has also led to concrete improvements in the implementation of the 
Schengen  acquis  in  the  evaluated  Member  States.  Examples  include:  improvements  to  the 
implementation of the Schengen Information System, establishing national integrated border 
management strategies by the Member States, or increasing the staff levels at specific border 
crossing points to improve the management of the external border.  

All these experiences demonstrate the importance of ensuring the full implementation of the 
Schengen  evaluation  mechanism  in  the  entire  Schengen  area.  All  Member  States  should 
follow  up  closely  on  the  lessons  learned  from  the  Schengen  evaluations,  and  take  the 
appropriate measures to ensure the effective and efficient application of the Schengen acquis 
in their own countries. 

The Schengen quality control mechanism is a constantly developing system. The vulnerability 
assessments  carried  out  annually  by  the  European  Border  and  Coast  Guard  Agency  now 
complement  the  Schengen  evaluation  mechanism,  constituting  together  a  fully-fledged 
Schengen  quality  control  system.  Enhancing  synergies  and  close  coordination  between 
vulnerability  assessments  and  Schengen  evaluations  will  bring  significant  improvements,  as 
Schengen evaluations will in future also be able to draw upon and integrate the main findings 
of  the  vulnerability  assessments  and  ensure  that  the  recommendations  resulting  from  both 
mechanisms will be mutually reinforcing. In this respect, the Commission and the European 
Border  and  Coast  Guard  Agency  maintain  close  contact  to  ensure  the  highest  degree  of 
security at external borders.  

Finally,  a  stronger  link  between  the  Schengen  quality  control  system  and  the  use  of  EU 
funding is essential. Already in accordance with Article 12 of Regulation (EU) 514/2014, the 
Member  State  concerned  shall  examine,  together  with  the  Commission  and  the  European 
Border  and  Coast  Guard  Agency,  how  to  address  within  the  framework  of  its  national 
programme  under  the  Internal  Security  Fund  the  findings,  including  any  deficiencies, 
identified under the Schengen evaluations. 

10 

 
 
 
A strong and resilient Schengen framework 

The Schengen  rules  contain  a certain degree  of  flexibility and have  thereby allowed to  deal 
with both major and less major crisis situations; the Schengen framework of rules have been 
successfully  used  to  safeguard  the  wider  functioning  of  the  Schengen  system.  The  past  10 
years demonstrate that, in the vast majority of cases, the current provisions of the Schengen 
Borders Code on the temporary reintroduction of internal border controls, including the time 
frames  set,  are  sufficient  to  tackle  the  identified  serious  threats.  Between  2006  (the  date  of 
adoption  of  the  Schengen  Borders  Code)  and  2015,  temporary  border  controls  have  been 
reintroduced 36 times and have hardly ever been prolonged, usually carried out only for a few 
days  or  weeks.  Moreover,  the  exceptional  procedure  of  Article  29  of  the  Schengen  Borders 
Code that was used for the first time following the migration crisis has demonstrated that the 
Schengen legal framework has tools to deal with this challenge. 

While the Member States  concerned have  followed the coordinated  approach to  reintroduce 
internal  border  controls  under  Article  29,  this  has  been  without  prejudice  to  the  possibility 
available to them to  temporarily reintroduce internal  border controls in the event of another 
serious threat to public policy or internal security.  

The  current  provisions  of  the  Schengen  Borders  Code  prohibit  the  prolongation  of  the 
reintroduced internal border controls beyond, respectively, two months (Article 28  – in case 
of events requiring immediate action) and six months (Article 25 – for foreseeable events).  

It should also be recalled that the Schengen rules require that internal border control is used 
only  as  a  last  resort  measure.  Member  States  should  first  consider  the  use  of  measures 
alternative to border control, such as police checks, to address the identified threat. Member 
States are free to decide how to carry out police checks in internal border areas, provided that 
such  checks  do  not  have  an  effect  equivalent  to  border  checks.  It  is  only  when  alternative 
measures,  such  as  police  checks, are not  sufficient  to  remedy the threat that  Member States 
can opt for temporary internal border controls. 

4. 

Adapting Schengen to the current and future challenges 

The strength of the tools within the Schengen legal framework, as detailed above, has allowed 
stemming  irregular  flows  of  migrants  to  the  EU  and  secondary  movements,  which  were  a 
cause of great concern for many Member States and citizens.  

The threats that Schengen has to face are also constantly evolving. The recent terrorist attacks 
in several Member States show that building on the progress made, the European Union must 
also be stronger and properly equipped in fighting terrorism. 

To  secure  the  effectiveness  of  the  EU  efforts  to  enhance  security  and  to  strengthen  the 
Schengen area, it is crucial to ensure that the Schengen rules are and remain fit for purpose in 
the light of these new realities and are followed by all Member States concerned. 

A proposal for an amendment to the Schengen Borders Code  

The  rules  governing  the  temporary  reintroduction  of  border  control  at  internal  borders  have 
proven  sufficient  in  the  vast  majority  of  cases.  However,  evolving  and  new  security 

11 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
challenges  have  arisen  in  the  past  years,  as  demonstrated  by  repeated  terrorist  attacks.  The 
Commission has concluded that there is a need to update these rules.  

Member  States  are  responsible  for  choosing  the  most  appropriate  measures  to  address  the 
identified threats and protect their public policy and internal security. To that end, where the 
threat  still  persists  despite  all  efforts,  it  is  justified  to  adjust  the  applicable  time  limitations, 
while  at  the  same  time  introducing  better  procedural  safeguards  to  limit  controls  at  internal 
borders  to  what  is  strictly  necessary,  so  as  to  preserve  the  area  without  controls  at  internal 
borders. 

To  this  end,  the  Commission  is  tabling  today  a  proposal20  reviewing  the  current  rules 
governing  the  general  framework  for  the  temporary  reintroduction  of  border  controls  at 
internal borders under Articles 25 and 27 of the Schengen Borders Code.  

The proposal modifies the general deadlines for temporary reintroduction of border control at 
internal  borders  in  case  of  foreseeable  events.  However,  as  the  scope  and  duration  of  the 
temporary  reintroduction  of  border  control  at  internal  borders  should  not  exceed  what  is 
strictly necessary to respond to the serious threat, the Commission oversees the actual length 
of such controls and may issue an opinion in this respect. In case of concerns related to the 
necessity  or  proportionality  of  the  reintroduced  border  controls,  or  when  border  control  at 
internal borders is carried out for more than six months, the Commission will always issue an 
opinion.  

Any  reintroduction  or  prolongation  of  border  controls  will  be  subject  to  a  detailed  risk 
assessment  which  shall  also  contain  a  detailed  report  of  the  coordination  which  will  have 
taken place with Member States concerned. The Commission will share the risk assessment as 
appropriate with the Agencies having the expertise to assess the information submitted by the 
Member States, namely the European Border and Coast Guard Agency and Europol.  

The proposal also introduces a possibility exceptionally to prolong internal border control if 
the  same  threats  persist  beyond  one  year,  but  only  if  the  serious  threat  to  public  policy  or 
internal  security  is  specific  enough  and  corresponds  to  commensurate  exceptional  national 
measures, such as a state of emergency. Any further prolongation on this basis is capped at 
two years. In view of the extraordinary nature of such further prolongation, it would require 
an opinion by the Commission followed by a recommendation of the Council setting, where 
appropriate, the conditions for cooperation between the Member States concerned, and which 
would constitute a prerequisite for any prolongation. 

The proposal strengthens the principle that reintroducing controls at internal borders must be a 
last  resort  measure.  The  requirement  to  present  a  risk  assessment  demonstrating  that  the 
intended  reintroduction  or  prolongation  of  border  controls  is  a  last  resort  measure  should 
further  encourage  Member  States  to  consider  the  use  of  alternative  measures,  such  as 
reinforced police measures.  

Better  implementation  of  the  Schengen  Borders  Code  provisions  related  to  temporary 
reintroduction of border control at internal borders 

Pending the adoption of the targeted changes to the Schengen Borders Code as detailed above, 
it  cannot  be  excluded  that  Schengen  Member  States  will  seek  to  invoke  the  current  rules 

20 COM(2017) 571. 

12 

 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
related to temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders under the Schengen 
Borders Code.  

On  the  basis  of  the  existing  rules  and  in  light  of  the  spirit  of  the  proposed  changes,  the 
Commission  considers  that  further  guidance  is  needed  to  ensure  that,  if  a  Member  State 
invokes the existing rules, this is done in a way to safeguard better the common interest. In 
particular, the Member State concerned should prioritise the use of alternative measures and, 
where the reintroduction of temporary internal border control is necessary in line with Article 
26 of the Schengen Borders Code, take measures limiting as much as possible the impact on 
free  movement  and  cooperate  closely  with  its  neighbours.  For  example,  this  cooperation 
should include a constant review and adaptation of the border controls to the evolving needs 
and impact on the ground. To that end, the Commission has adopted today a Recommendation 
on  the  implementation  of  the  provisions  of  the  Schengen  Borders  Code  on  temporary 
reintroduction of border control at internal borders in the Schengen area21. 

Enlarging Schengen to those countries that are ready and committed 

As  Member  States  are  confronted  with  increased  threats,  it  is  by  being  united  and  standing 
together that the EU and its Member States can ensure a stronger Schengen area. 

Following the positive evaluations carried out in 2009 and 2010 which demonstrated that both 
Romania and Bulgaria fulfil the conditions necessary to join Schengen, the Commission has 
been advocating the full accession of these two Member States to the Schengen area.  

It  is  now  high  time  that  Bulgaria  and  Romania  become  full  Schengen  members.  The 
Commission  considers  that  the  Council  should  now  take  the  decision  opening  the  way  for 
lifting  controls  at  the  internal  borders  between  these  two  Member  States  and  their  EU 
neighbours. Allowing  Bulgaria  and  Romania  to  join  Schengen  will  further  contribute  to  the 
mutual  trust  between  all  Member  States.  As  stated  by  President  Juncker  is  his  State  of  the 
Union speech of 13 September 2017, "We have common borders but Member States that by 
geography  are  the  first  in  line  cannot  be  left  alone  to  protect  them.  Common  borders  and 
common  protection  must  go  hand  in  hand".  Furthermore,  a  swift  decision  on  the  full 
application  of  the  Schengen  acquis  to  Romania  and  Bulgaria  would  allow  the  inclusion  of 
Bulgaria and Romania to fully contribute to the Schengen Information System.  

With  regard  to  the  accession  of  Croatia, a  Schengen  evaluation  verifying  that  the  necessary 
conditions  for  the  application  of  all  relevant  parts  of  the  Schengen  acquis  has  taken  place 
throughout  2016  for  most  of  the  areas  of  the  Schengen  rules.  For  some  areas,  it  has  been 
concluded that Croatia meets the necessary conditions for joining the Schengen area while for 
others,  further  improvements  are  required.  The  evaluation  of  the  Schengen  Information 
System  still  needs  to  be  completed  by  October  2017,  and  a  re-visit  in  the  field  of  external 
borders will take place in November 2017. After that, if all conditions are met, the accession 
of Croatia to the Schengen area will be decided upon by the Council on a proposal from the 
Commission.  Croatia  should  also  become  a  full  Schengen  member  once  it  meets  all  the 
criteria. 

21 C(2017) 6560. 

13 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
As regards Cyprus, as soon as it notifies, a Schengen evaluation will take place in all relevant 
areas. 

5. 

Conclusions for the next steps to strengthen the Schengen area   

The Back to Schengen Roadmap of 4 March 2016 set out the measures necessary to lay the 
foundations for a return to a normally functioning Schengen area. Since then, much has been 
achieved in addressing the identified challenges and ensuring a coordinated approach, in line 
with the rules of the Schengen system.  

Schengen  continues  to  face  evolving  and  new  challenges.  Therefore  we  need  to  ensure  that 
the  current  Schengen  rules  are  applied  and  its  tools  are  used  in  full  while  improving  those 
rules which have proved to be insufficiently adapted.  

At  the  same  time  we  now  need  to  integrate  fully  Bulgaria  and  Romania  into  Schengen 
because  it  is  only  by  being  united  and  standing  together  that  we  can  ensure  a  stronger 
Schengen area.   

The Commission invites: 

1.  the  Council  to  endorse  the  approach  of  the  Commission  Recommendation  on  the 
implementation  of  the  provisions  of  the  Schengen  Borders  Code  on  temporary 
reintroduction of border control at internal borders in the Schengen area; 

2.  the European Parliament and the Council to swiftly agree on updating the provisions 

of the Schengen Border Code as proposed by the Commission;  

3.  the  Council  now  to  take  the  decision  enabling  the  full  application  of  the  Schengen 
acquis  in  Bulgaria  and Romania  and  abolition of  checks  on  persons  at  internal  land, 
sea and air borders. 

14