Case C-561/17 P: Appeal brought on 22 September 2017 by the Republic of Poland against the order of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) of 13 June 2017 in Case T-137/16, Uniwersytet Wrocławski v Research Executive Agency (REA)
Date: 2017-09-22
Institutions: Court of Justice
Subjects: labour relations, legal adviser, principle of legal certainty, rights of the defence, university, work contract








C_2018005EN.01001802.xml










8.1.2018   


EN


Official Journal of the European Union


C 5/18





Appeal brought on 22 September 2017 by the Republic of Poland against the order of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) of 13 June 2017 in Case T-137/16, Uniwersytet Wrocławski v Research Executive Agency (REA)
(Case C-561/17 P)
(2018/C 005/26)
Language of the case: Polish

Parties


Appellant: Republic of Poland (represented by: B. Majczyna, acting as Agent)

Other parties to the proceedings: Uniwersytet Wrocławski, Research Executive Agency (REA)

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:






—


set aside in its entirety the order of the General Court of the European Union (Eighth Chamber) of 13 June 2017 in Case T-137/16, Uniwersytet Wrocławski v Research Executive Agency (REA);










—


refer the case back to the General Court for reconsideration;










—


order that each party is to bear its own costs;










—


assign the case to the Grand Chamber, in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 16 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union.





Grounds of appeal and main arguments

First, the Republic of Poland alleges that the order under appeal infringes the third and fourth paragraphs of Article 19 of the Statute by reason of an incorrect interpretation of that article. The order under appeal, it submits, is based on case-law of the Courts of the European Union according to which the requirement for an independent lawyer, derived from Article 19 of the Statute, is necessarily connected with the absence of any employment relationship whatsoever between that lawyer and his client. In the Republic of Poland’s view, that case-law is fundamentally flawed and should be amended.
Moreover, the order under appeal, while being based on the existing case-law of the Courts of the European Union, at the same time goes beyond the limits established by that case-law. Thus, in the order under appeal the requirement of independence has been linked not only to the absence of any employment relationship, but also to the absence of any civil-law relationship and to the absence of any risk that the lawyer’s professional environment might influence the legal opinion which he expresses.
The result of such an approach is a far-reaching restriction of the right of parties to defend themselves before the Courts of the European Union. Moreover, that restriction is based on extremely vague and discretionary criteria which lack any clear basis in EU law and do not serve any conceivable purpose.
Second, the Republic of Poland argues that the order under appeal infringes the principle of legal certainty. The order under appeal introduces a new, indeterminate condition for the independence of legal representatives, namely that there must be no risk of influence from a legal representative’s professional environment; however, it provides no guidance as to how that risk might be assessed. As a result, the party concerned is not in a position to determine whether the legal representative whom it has selected satisfies the condition relating to independence and whether its action will be deemed admissible.
Third, the Republic of Poland alleges that the order under appeal lacks sufficient grounds for making it possible to understand why the General Court found that the legal representative does not meet the requirement for independence and why it dismissed the application signed by him.
In particular, the General Court failed to explain why a relationship such as that between the Uniwersytet Wrocławski and its legal representative had to be treated as equivalent to an employment relationship notwithstanding the absence of subordination. Furthermore, the General Court failed to explain on what general grounds it took into consideration circumstances other than those relating to the legal assistance provided by that legal representative. The General Court also failed to explain how the concept of professional environment should be understood in the case of a civil-law contract and what type of influence that environment might exert on that legal representative. Moreover, it is not apparent from the order under appeal what type of risk is involved with that type of contract and what constitutes the limitation of independence by reason of which it was necessary to exclude the legal representative.