Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board
Date: 2017-09-20
Institutions: Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union, European Commission
Subjects: EU office or agency, credit institution, economic stabilisation, financial control, financial market, market supervision, monetary policy, operation of the Institutions

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   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 20.9.2017  COM(2017) 538 final 2017/0232 (COD)   Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board (Text with EEA relevance) {SWD(2017) 313 final}  
 
 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 

1. 

CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 

Reasons for and objectives of the proposal 

• 
Following the financial crisis1, the EU set up the European System of Financial Supervision 
(ESFS), built on a two-pillar system of macro-prudential and micro-prudential supervision.  

The  European  Systemic  Risk  Board  (ESRB),  established  in  December  2010,  is  the  macro-
prudential pillar of the ESFS. The ESRB is responsible for macro-prudential oversight of the 
financial system in the EU. Its tasks include: (i) contributing to the prevention or mitigation of 
systemic  risks  to  financial  stability  in  the  EU  that  arise  within  the  financial  system,  while 
taking  into  account  macroeconomic  developments,  so  as  to  avoid  periods  of  widespread 
financial distress; (ii) contributing to the smooth functioning of the internal market, ensuring 
that the financial sector has a sustainable contribution to economic growth.  

The ESRB has broad membership including national central banks, supervisors and European 
institutions.  It  has  specific  tools,  such  as  recommendations  and  warnings  to  shape  macro-
prudential  policy  in  the  EU.  The  ESRB's  system-wide  mandate  is  particularly  relevant  in 
monitoring  and  assessing  cross-sectorial  and  cross-border  risks  and  spillovers  and  its 
coordination role limits contagion risk. Also, by facilitating the recognition of national macro-
prudential  measures,  the  ESRB  ensures  that  cross-border  leaks  and  regulatory  arbitrage  are 
minimised.  As  a  result,  the  ESRB  has  a  direct  effect  on  the  effectiveness  of  EU  countries’ 
macro-prudential measures and in turn on the degree of financial stability in the EU. In this 
context, improving the ESRB’s functioning is expected to make macro-prudential policy more 
effective. 

Since its creation, the ESRB has:  

 

 

 

 

issued recommendations and warnings to a wide range of addressees;  

contributed  to  the  ongoing  development  of  a  macro-prudential  framework  in 
the EU;  

successfully used the resources and expertise provided by its broad institutional 
membership and the independent academic input from the Advisory Scientific 
Committee;  

played an important role in coordinating and assessing notifications of macro-
prudential measures in the EU.  

The ESRB’s importance is borne out by its work as a coordination platform and information 
hub, on monitoring risk from an EU-wide perspective and on setting guidance on the use of 
macro-prudential instruments.  

However,  the  recent  institutional  changes  related  to  Banking  Union  and  efforts  to  build  a 
Capital  Markets  Union,  make  the  context  in  which  the  ESRB  was  set  up  different  from  the 
one it now operates in. This has implications primarily for the ESRB’s composition and how 
it  is  organised.  Improvements  to  the  ESRB’s  composition  and  how  it  cooperates  with 

1 

The  de  Larosière  Report  (final  report  presented  on  25  February  2009)  recommended  establishing  a 
Union to oversee risk in the financial system as a whole. 

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European  institutions  are  needed  to  take  account  of  incremental  changes  to  the  macro-
prudential framework and the waves of regulatory developments that have taken place.  

In addition, changes are needed to ensure that the ESRB is able to perform macro-prudential 
oversight of the entire financial system as the importance of market-based financing increases, 
particularly with the establishment of the Capital Markets Union.  

Strengthening  the  ESRB's  efficiency  and  effectiveness  will  improve  coordination  of  macro-
prudential  policies  within  the  EU  and  enable  the  ESRB  to  better  fulfil  its  mandate.  The 
proposal is further explained in the effect analysis. 

• 

Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area 

This  proposal  should  be  seen  in  the  context  of  the  ongoing  review  of  the  European 
Supervisory Agencies (ESAs). The ESRB and the ESAs are the macro- and micro-prudential 
pillars of the ESFS.  

• 

Consistency with other Union policies 

The ESRB Review also takes place in the context of building a Banking Union and Capital 
Markets  Union.  The  expected  deepening  and  further  integration  of  EU  capital  markets 
requires commensurate adjustment of the oversight framework for systemic risks. 

2. 

• 

LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY 

Legal basis 

The legal basis for the proposed amendments is the same as that for the legislative act being 
amended, i.e. Article 114 TFEU. The Regulation establishing the ESRB is complemented by a 
Council Regulation giving the European Central Bank (ECB) the task of running the ESRB 
Secretariat.  

• 

Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence)  

The  ESRB  is  a  body  without  legal  personality.  It  has  responsibility  for  macro-prudential 
supervision of the financial system in the EU. The proposal’s aims to make the ESRB more 
efficient  and  strengthen  macro-prudential  coordination  in  the  EU  can  be  met  by 
supplementing already existing EU legislation, meaning that they can be best achieved at EU 
level rather than by different national initiatives. Furthermore, as the ESRB has a substantial 
contribution  to  the  reciprocation  of  national  macro-prudential  measures,  it  helps  national 
authorities to address systemic risks emerging at national level.  

• 

Proportionality 

The  proposal  amends  an  existing regulation.  The  changes  are  targeted and  aim  to  clarify  or 
strengthen  existing  provisions  and  are  hence  proportionate  to  the  problems  identified.  The 
underlying structure of the ESRB will remain broadly unchanged.  

• 

Choice of the instrument 

Amendment of existing regulation 

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3. 

• 

RESULTS 
CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS 

EX-POST 

EVALUATIONS, 

OF 

STAKEHOLDER 

Ex-post evaluations/fitness checks of existing legislation 

As  per  the  requirement  in  the  ESRB  Regulation,  the  Commission  carried  out  a  review  to 
determine  whether  the  ESRB’s  mission  and  organisation  need  updating.  The  first  review  of 
the ESRB Regulation was performed in 2014. 

• 

Stakeholder consultations 

Public consultation on the macro-prudential framework and a public hearing were organised 
in the second half of 2016. Stakeholders generally considered the ESRB’s mandate and tasks 
appropriate  to  ensure  the  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of  macro-prudential  policies,  and 
expressed some support for adjusting the ESRB’s working practices to make it more efficient. 
Most  respondents  supported  keeping  the  ECB  President  as  Chair  of  the  ESRB.  Some 
respondents  advocated  having  the  Single  Supervisory  Mechanism  and  of  the  Single 
the 
Resolution  Board  represented  on 
establishment of the Banking Union, but most did not see a need for extensive changes to the 
Board’s  composition.  Some  respondents  supported  strengthening  the  ESRB  Secretariat  and 
boosting the ESRB’s role in streamlining notification procedures at EU level.  

the  ESRB’s  General  Board 

to  acknowledge 

• 

Collection and use of expertise 

n.a. – via stakeholder consultation & public hearing, see above 

• 

Impact assessment 

The  Commission  has  carried  out  an  effect  analysis  of  the  proposed  changes  to  the  ESRB 
Regulation. A formal impact assessment has not been carried out, given the targeted nature of 
the changes introduced by the legislative proposal. 

• 

Regulatory fitness and simplification 

[n.a.] 

• 

Fundamental rights 

[n.a.] 

4. 

BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS 

The  budgetary  cost  for  the  ESRB  Secretariat  is  borne  by  the  ECB  and  has  no  direct 
implication for the EU budget. 

5. 

• 

OTHER ELEMENTS 

Implementation plans and monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements 

The Regulation will be reviewed after 5 years. 

• 

Explanatory documents (for directives) 

[n.a.] 

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• 

Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the proposal 

Chair 

In the current set-up, the ESRB is chaired by the ECB President. As Chair, the ECB President 
confers authority and credibility on the ESRB and ensures that it can effectively build and rely 
on the ECB’s expertise in the area of financial stability. It is therefore proposed that the ECB 
President serve as ESRB Chair on a permanent basis. 

ESRB Secretariat 

As the ESRB General Board has no full-time members, including no full-time Chair or Vice-
Chairs,  there  is  no  member  who  can  devote  all  his/her  time  to  ESRB-related  matters  and 
duties.  In  addition,  the  official  tasks  of  the  Head  of  the  ESRB  Secretariat  are  limited.  This 
may limit the visibility of the ESRB’s work, despite the ESRB Chair’s regular participation in 
Parliament hearings.  A larger role for the Head of the ESRB Secretariat  would increase the 
impact and effectiveness of warnings and recommendations.  

The  proposal  here  is  to  introduce  a  consultation  procedure  in  which  the  General  Board 
assesses the candidates proposed by the ECB for the post of Head of the ESRB Secretariat, in 
particular their qualities and experience necessary to manage the Secretariat. Parliament and 
Council  would  be  informed  of  the  procedure.  This  would  keep  the  link  with  the  ECB  and 
maintain the Secretariat Head’s accountability to the General Board. It would also make the 
process  more  transparent,  while  raising  the  profile  of  the  Head  of  the  Secretariat.  It  is 
proposed  to  further  specify  the  tasks  conferred  to  the  Secretariat  Head,  including  the 
possibility for the Chair to delegate to it the task of representing the Chair externally. 

ESRB composition  

The  proposal  updates  the  ESRB  Regulation  to  take  account  of  the  creation  of  the  Banking 
Union  and  to  add  the  Single  Supervisory  Mechanism  and  the  Single  Resolution  Board  as 
voting members of the ESRB General Board. Corresponding adjustments should also be made 
to the Advisory Technical Committee and the Steering Committee.  

Addressees of ESRB warnings and recommendations 

It  is  also  proposed  to  include  the  ECB  as  a  possible  addressee  of  ESRB  warnings  and 
recommendations  for  ECB  tasks  conferred  to  it  by  the  Single  Supervisory  Mechanism 
Regulation  (Regulation  (EC)  No  1024/2013),  i.e.  for  supervisory  tasks  not  pertaining  to  the 
conduct  of  monetary  policy.  This  would  address  the  current  asymmetry  whereby  national 
authorities  can  receive  such  warnings  and  recommendations  as  members  of  the  General 
Board, but these are not sent to the ECB as the competent or designated authority at Banking 
Union level.  

Better Regulation 

In  line  with  Better  Regulation  principles  and  where  appropriate,  the  ESRB’s  advisory 
committees are expected to consult stakeholders such as market participants, consumer bodies 
and experts on its opinions, recommendations and decisions. 

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2017/0232 (COD) 

Proposal for a 

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 

amending Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 on European Union macro-prudential 
oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board 

(Text with EEA relevance) 

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 

Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union,  and  in  particular 
Article 114 thereof, 

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission, 

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments, 
Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee2, 

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, 

Whereas: 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

In accordance with Article 20 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/20103 (ESRB Regulation), 
the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council,  on  the  basis  of  a  report4  from  the 
Commission, have examined the ESRB Regulation to determine whether the mission 
and  organisation  of  the  ESRB  needed  to  be  reviewed.  The  modalities  for  the 
designation of the Chair of the ESRB have also been reviewed. 
The 2017 Commission report on the mission and organisation of the ESRB5 concludes 
that, while the ESRB is generally well-functioning, improvements on certain specific 
points are necessary. 

The  broad  membership  of  the  General  Board  of  the  ESRB  is  a  major  asset.  Recent 
developments in the financial supervisory architecture of the Union, and in particular 
the  set-up  of  a  Banking  Union,  are  however  not  reflected  in  the  composition  of  that 
General Board. For that reason, the Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB and the 
Chair  of  the  Single  Resolution  Board  should  become  members  with  voting  rights  of 
the  General  Board  of  the  ESRB.  Corresponding  adjustments  should  also  be  made  to 
the Steering Committee and to the Advisory Technical Committee, respectively. 

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OJ C , , p. . 
Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on 
European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic 
Risk Board (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 1). 
Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  to  the  Council  on  the  mission  and 
organisation of the European Systemic Risk Board, COM(2014) 508 final. 
Commission Staff Working Document, Effect Analysis, Amendments to ESRB Regulation, COM(2017). 

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(4) 

(5) 

(6) 

(7) 

(8) 

(9) 

The  ECB  President  has  chaired  the  ESRB  for  the  first  5  years  of  its  existence,  after 
which the ECB President has continued to chair the ESRB on an interim basis. During 
that period, the ECB President has conferred authority and credibility to the ESRB and 
ensured that the ESRB can effectively build and rely on the expertise of the ECB in 
the area of financial stability. It is therefore appropriate that the ECB President chairs 
the ESRB on a permanent basis. 

To strengthen the visibility of the ESRB as a body that is separate from its individual 
members,  the  Chair  of  the  ESRB  should  be  able  to  delegate  tasks  related  to  the 
external representation of the ESRB to the head of the ESRB Secretariat.  
Article 3(2) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1096/20106 provides that the head of the 
Secretariat  of  the  ESRB  is  to  be  appointed  by  the  ECB,  in  consultation  with  the 
General  Board  of  the  ESRB.  To  raise  the  profile  of  the  head  of  Secretariat  of  the 
ESRB,  the  General  Board  of  the  ESRB  should  assess,  in  an  open  and  transparent 
procedure, whether the shortlisted candidates for the position of head of Secretariat of 
the  ESRB  possess  the  qualities  and  experience  necessary  to  manage  the  ESRB 
Secretariat.  The  General  Board  should  inform  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Council  about  the  assessment  procedure.  Furthermore,  the  tasks  of  the  head  of  the 
ESRB Secretariat should be clarified. 

In accordance with Article 5(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010, the first Vice-Chair 
of the ESRB has up until now been elected by and from the members of the General 
Council of the ECB, with regard to the need for a balanced representation of Member 
States overall and between those whose currency is the euro and those whose currency 
is  not  the  euro.  Following  the  creation  of  the  Banking  Union,  it  is  appropriate  to 
replace  the  reference  to  Member  State  whose  currency  is  the  euro  and  those  whose 
currency is not the euro with a reference to Member States that do participate in the 
Banking Union and those who do not. 
Given the amendments to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA)7, and 
in  particular  the  adoption  of  Regulation  (EU)  No  1092/2010  by  the  EEA  member 
states,  Article  9(5)  of  that  Regulation  is  no  longer  relevant  and  should  therefore  be 
deleted.  

To decrease costs and to enhance procedural efficiency, the number of representatives 
of  the  Commission  in  the  Advisory  Technical  Committee  of  the  ESRB  should  be 
reduced from the current two representatives to one representative. 

(10)  Article 16(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 requires that the ESRB warnings and 
recommendations  are  transmitted  to  the  Council  and  the  Commission  and,  where 
addressed to one or more national supervisory authorities, to the ESAs. To strengthen 
democratic  control  and  transparency,  those  warnings  and  recommendations  should 
also be transmitted to the European Parliament and to the ESAs. 

(11)  To  ensure  the  quality  and  relevance  of  the  ESRB  opinions,  recommendations  and 
decisions, the Advisory Technical Committee and Advisory Scientific Committee are 

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Council  Regulation  (EU)  NO 1096/2010  of  17 November  2010  conferring  specific  tasks  upon  the 
European  Central  Bank  concerning  the  functioning  of  the  European  Systemic  Risk  Board  (OJ  L 331, 
15.12.2010, p. 162). 
Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 198/2016 of 30 September 2016 amending Annex IX (Financial 
services) to the EEA Agreement [2017/275] (OJ L 46, 23.2.2017, p. 1). 

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expected to consult stakeholders, where appropriate, at an early stage and in an open 
and transparent manner. 

(12)  Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 should therefore be amended accordingly, 

HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 

Article 1 

Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 is amended as follows: 

(1)  Article 4 is amended as follows: 

(a) 

the following paragraph 2a is inserted: 

“2a.  When consulted on the appointment of the head of Secretariat of the ESRB 
in  accordance  with Article 3(2) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1096/2010*,  the 
General Board, following an open and transparent procedure, shall assess whether 
the  shortlisted  candidates  for  the  position  of  head  of  Secretariat  of  the  ESRB 
possess  the  qualities  and  experience  necessary  to  manage  the  ESRB  Secretariat. 
The General Board shall inform the  European Parliament and the Council about 
the consultation procedure. 

* 
Council  Regulation  (EU)  No  1096/2010  of  17  November  2010  conferring  specific  tasks 
upon the European Central Bank concerning the functioning of the European Systemic Risk Board 
(OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 162).”; 

_______________________________________________________________________________ 

(b) 

the following paragraph 3a is inserted: 

“3a.  When giving directions to the head of Secretariat of the ESRB in accordance 
with Article 4(1) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1096/2010, the ESRB Chair and 
the Steering Committee may in particular address the following: 

(a) 

the day-to-day management of the ESRB Secretariat; 

(b) 

any administrative and budgetary issues related to the ESRB Secretariat; 

(c) 

(d) 

(e) 

the coordination and preparation of the work and the decision making of the 
General Board; 

the  preparation  of 
implementation; 

the  annual  ESRB  programme  proposal  and 

its 

the preparation of the annual report on the ESRB activities and the reporting 
to the General Board on its implementation”; 

(2)  Article 5 is amended as follows: 

(a) 

paragraphs 1 and 2 are replaced by the following: 

“1.  The ESRB shall be chaired by the President of the ECB. 

The  first  Vice-Chair  shall  be  elected  by  and  from  the  members  of  the 
2. 
General Council of the ECB for a term of 5 years, with regard to the need for a 
balanced  representation  of  Member  States  overall,  and  between  those  which  are 
participating Member States as defined in Article 2(1) of Council Regulation (EU) 
No 1024/2013**, and those which are not. The first Vice-Chair may be re-elected 
once. 

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__________________________________________________________________ 

** 

Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the 
European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).”; 

(b)  paragraph 8 is replaced by the following: 

“8.  The  Chair  shall  represent  the  ESRB  externally.  The  Chair  may  delegate 
tasks  related  to  the  external  representation  of  the  ESRB  to  the  head  of  the 
Secretariat.”; 

(3)  Article 6 is amended as follows: 

(a) 

paragraph 1 is amended as follows: 

(i) 

the following points (fa) and (fb) are inserted: 

“(fa)  the Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB; 

(fb) 

the Chair of the Single Resolution Board;”; 

(ii)  point (g) is replaced by the following: 

“(g)  the Chair of the Advisory Scientific Committee;”; 

(b)  paragraph 2 is amended as follows: 

(i) 

point (a) is replaced by the following: 

“(a)  one high-level representative per Member State either of the national 
competent authorities or of the national authorities designated for the 
application  of  measures  aimed  at  addressing  systemic  or  macro-
prudential risk, in accordance with paragraph 3;"; 

(c) 

paragraph 3 is replaced by the following: 

“3.  With regard to the representation of the national authorities referred to under 
paragraph 2(a), the respective high-level representatives shall rotate depending on 
the  item  discussed,  unless  the  national  authorities  of  a  particular  Member  State 
have agreed on a common representative.”; 

(4) 

in Article 9, paragraph 5 is deleted;  

(5)  Article 11 is amended as follows: 

(a) 

paragraph 1 is amended as follows: 

(i) 

point (c) is replaced by the following: 

“(c)  four other members of the General Board who are also members of the 
General  Council  of  the  ECB,  with  regard  to  the  need  for  a  balanced 
representation of Member States overall, and between those which are 
participating  Member  States  as  defined  in  Article  2(1)  Regulation 
(EU) No 1024/2013 and those which are not. They shall be elected by 
and  from  among  the  members  of  the  General  Board  who  are  also 
members of the General Council of the ECB, for a period of 3 years;”; 

(ii) 

the following points (ga) and (gb) are inserted: 

“(ga) the Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB; 

(gb)  the Chair of the Single Resolution Board;”; 

(6)  Article 12 is amended as follows: 

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(a) 

paragraph 5 is replaced by the following: 

“5.  Where  appropriate,  the  Advisory  Scientific  Committee  shall  organise 
consultations  with  stakeholders  at  an  early  stage  and  in  an  open  and  transparent 
manner, while taking into account the requirement of confidentiality.”; 

 (7)  Article 13 is amended as follows: 

(a) 

paragraph 1 is amended as follows: 

(i) 

point (f) is replaced by the following: 

“(f)  a representative of the Commission;”; 

(ii) 

the following points (fa) and (fb) are inserted: 

“(fa)  a representative of the Supervisory Board of the ECB; 

(fb)  a representative of the Single Resolution Board;”; 

(b) 

the following paragraph 4a is inserted: 

“4a.  Where  appropriate,  the  Advisory  Technical  Committee  shall  organise 
consultations  with  stakeholders  at  an  early  stage  and  in  an  open  and  transparent 
manner, while taking into account the requirement of confidentiality.”; 

(8)  Article 16 is amended as follows: 

(a) 

in paragraph 2, the first sentence is replaced by the following: 

“Warnings or recommendations issued by the ESRB in accordance with points (c) 
and (d) of Article 3(2) may be of either a general or a specific nature and shall be 
addressed  in  particular  to  the  Union,  to  one  or  more  Member  States,  to  one  or 
more of the ESAs or to one or more of the national competent authorities, or to the 
ECB for the tasks conferred to the ECB in accordance with Articles 4(1), 4(2) and 
5(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.”; 

(b)  paragraph 3 is replaced by the following: 

“3.  At  the  same  time  as  they  are  transmitted  to  the  addressees  in  accordance 
with  paragraph  2,  the  warnings  or  recommendations  shall  be  transmitted,  in 
accordance  with  strict  rules  of  confidentiality,  to  the  Council,  the  European 
Parliament, the Commission and to the ESAs.”;  

(9) 

in Article 17, paragraphs 1 and 2 are replaced by the following: 

“1. 
If  a  recommendation  referred  to  in  Article  3(2)(d)  is  addressed  to  the 
Commission, to one or more Member States, to one or more ESAs, or to one or 
more  national  competent  authorities,  the  addressees  shall  communicate  to  the 
European  Parliament,  the  Council  and  to  the  ESRB  the  actions  undertaken  in 
response  to  the  recommendation  and  shall  substantiate  any  inaction.  Where 
relevant, the ESRB shall, subject to strict rules of confidentiality, inform the ESAs 
of the answers received without delay.”; 

2. 
If the ESRB decides that its recommendation has not been followed or that 
the addressees have failed to provide adequate justification for their inaction, the 
ESRB  shall,  subject  to  strict  rules  of  confidentiality,  inform  the  addressees,  the 
European Parliament, the Council and the relevant ESAs thereof.”; 

(10)  Article 20 is replaced by the following: 

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“No sooner than five years after [OJ, please insert the date of entering into force], the 
Commission shall carry out an evaluation of this Regulation and present a Report on the 
main findings to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and 
Social Committee.”  

This Regulation shall enter into force on the […] day following that of its publication in the 
Official Journal of the European Union. 

Article 2 

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. 

Done at Brussels, 

For the European Parliament 
The President 

For the Council 
The President 

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