do-me/EUR-LEX huggingface dataset:
Case C-511/17: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Fővárosi Törvényszék (Hungary) lodged on 21 August 2017 — Lintner Györgyné v UniCredit Bank Hungary
Date: 2017-08-21
Institutions: Court of Justice
Subjects: consumer protection, lawyer, unfair terms of contract








C_2017402EN.01001101.xml










27.11.2017   


EN


Official Journal of the European Union


C 402/11





Request for a preliminary ruling from the Fővárosi Törvényszék (Hungary) lodged on 21 August 2017 — Lintner Györgyné v UniCredit Bank Hungary
(Case C-511/17)
(2017/C 402/12)
Language of the case: Hungarian

Referring court

Fővárosi Törvényszék

Parties to the main proceedings


Applicant: Lintner Györgyné

Defendant: UniCredit Bank Hungary

Questions referred









1.


Must Article 6(1) of the Unfair Terms Directive (1) — having regard also to the national legislation requiring legal representation — be interpreted as meaning that it is necessary to examine each of the clauses of a contract individually in the light of whether it may be regarded as unfair, irrespective of whether an examination of all the terms of the contract is actually necessary in order to rule on the claim made in the action?












2.


If not, is it necessary, contrary to the suggestion in question 1, to interpret Article 6(1) of the Unfair Terms Directive as meaning that, in order to find that the clause on which the claim is based is unfair, all the other terms of the contract must also be examined?












3.


If the answer to question 2 is affirmative, does that mean that it is in order to be able to establish that the clause at issue is unfair that it is necessary to examine the entire contract, that is to say that it is not necessary to examine each part of the contract individually for unfairness, independently of the clause disputed in the action?






(1)  Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).
Case C-509/17: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Arbeidshof Antwerpen (Belgium) lodged on 21 August 2017 — Christa Plessers v Prefaco NV, Belgische Staat
Date: 2017-08-21
Institutions: Court of Justice
Subjects: labour law, transfer of businesses, worker consultation, worker information








C_2017374EN.01001901.xml










6.11.2017   


EN


Official Journal of the European Union


C 374/19





Request for a preliminary ruling from the Arbeidshof Antwerpen (Belgium) lodged on 21 August 2017 — Christa Plessers v Prefaco NV, Belgische Staat
(Case C-509/17)
(2017/C 374/27)
Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Arbeidshof Antwerpen

Parties to the main proceedings


Applicant: Christa Plessers

Defendants: Prefaco NV, Belgische Staat

Question referred

Is the right of option for the transferee under Article 61(4) (now Article 61(3)) of the Belgian Law of 31 January 2009 on the continuity of undertakings, as part of Chapter 4 of Title 4 of that law under which the ‘judicial reorganisation by transfer under judicial supervision’ is regulated, in so far as that ‘judicial reorganisation by transfer under judicial supervision’ is applied with a view to maintaining all or part of the transferor or its activities, consistent with Council Directive 2001/23/EC (1) on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses, in particular with Articles 3 and 5 of that directive?


(1)  Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 (OJ 2001 L 82, p. 16).
Case C-504/17: Action brought on 21 August 2017 — European Commission v Ireland
Date: 2017-08-21
Institutions: Court of Justice
Subjects: fuel tax, motor fuel, pleasure craft, tax exemption, tax law, tax relief








C_2017347EN.01002201.xml










16.10.2017   


EN


Official Journal of the European Union


C 347/22





Action brought on 21 August 2017 — European Commission v Ireland
(Case C-504/17)
(2017/C 347/29)
Language of the case: English

Parties


Applicant: European Commission (represented by: F. Tomat, J. Tomkin, Agents)

Defendant: Ireland

The applicant claims that the Court should:







—


declare that by not ensuring the application of the minimum levels of taxation for motor fuels prescribed by Council Directive 2003/96/EC (1) of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity, Ireland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 4 and 7 of that Directive;










—


declare that by allowing the use of marked fuel for the purposes of propelling private pleasure craft, even where such fuel has not been subject to any exemption or reduction of excise duty, Ireland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Directive 95/60/EC (2) of 27 November 1995 on fiscal marking of gas oils and kerosene;










—


order Ireland to pay the costs.





Pleas in law and main arguments

The Commission considers that the system by which Ireland imposes and collects excise duties on fuel used to propel private pleasure craft is incompatible with its obligations under Council Directive 2003/96/EC (the ‘Energy Taxation Directive’) and Directive 95/60/EC (the ‘Fiscal Marking Directive’).
Concerning the payment of excise duties, it is apparent that only a very small minority of owners of pleasure-craft actually submit returns to pay the full rate of tax duty. The Commission further considers that permitting the sale of marked fuel for uses that are subject to a full rate of excise duty is fundamentally incompatible with the Fiscal Marking Directive. The obligation to mark fuel that has been subject to a reduced rate of excise duty is intended specifically to ensure that those fuels are readily distinguishable from fuel in respect of which full duty has been paid. However, the effect of the national measure is that where marked fuel is found in a tank of a private pleasure craft that has been refuelled in Ireland, it is not possible to determine by reference to the marking, whether or not the fuel used was subject to a full or discounted rate of excise duty.


(1)  OJ 2003, L 283, p. 51.

(2)  OJ 1995, L 291, p. 46.
Case T-566/17: Action brought on 21 August 2017 — Molina García v SRB
Date: 2017-08-21
Institutions: General Court
Subjects: Spain, abuse of power, aid for restructuring, company in difficulties, credit institution, damages, financial solvency, ownership, right to justice








C_2017374EN.01003902.xml










6.11.2017   


EN


Official Journal of the European Union


C 374/39





Action brought on 21 August 2017 — Molina García v SRB
(Case T-566/17)
(2017/C 374/59)
Language of the case: Spanish

Parties


Applicant: Jerónimo Molina García (Puente Genil, Spain) (represented by: A. Velasco Albalá, lawyer)

Defendant: Single Resolution Board

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that General Court should:






—


Annul the contested decision;










—


Accept the consequences of the decision of the Single Resolution Board which was adopted erroneously, either because of lack of transparency or because of failure to take prior preventive measures which would have avoided the loss of shareholders’ capital through its depreciation and, consequently, order the payment of compensation to the applicant in the amount of the loss resulting from the erroneous procedure and decision, namely EUR 7 805,29.





Pleas in law and main arguments

The pleas in law and main arguments are similar to those put forward in Cases T-478/17, Mutualidad de la Abogacía and Hermandad Nacional de Arquitectos Superiores y Químicos v Single Resolution Board, T-481/17, Fundación Tatiana Pérez de Guzmán el Bueno and SFL v Single Resolution Board, T-482/17, Comercial Vascongada Recalde v Commission and Single Resolution Board, T-483/17, García Suárez and Others v Commission and Single Resolution Board, T-484/17, Fidesban and Others v Single Resolution Board, T-497/17, Sáchez del Valle and Calatrava Real State 2015 v Commission and Single Resolution Board, and T-498/17, Pablo Álvarez de Linera Granda v Commission and Single Resolution Board.
Case C-503/17: Action brought on 21 August 2017 — European Commission v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Date: 2017-08-21
Institutions: Court of Justice
Subjects: action for failure to fulfil an obligation, excise duty, fuel tax, motor fuel, pleasure craft, tax relief








C_2017347EN.01002101.xml










16.10.2017   


EN


Official Journal of the European Union


C 347/21





Action brought on 21 August 2017 — European Commission v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
(Case C-503/17)
(2017/C 347/28)
Language of the case: English

Parties


Applicant: European Commission (represented by: F. Tomat, J. Tomkin, Agents)

Defendant: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

The applicant claims that the Court should:







—


declare that, by allowing the use of marked fuel for the purpose of fuelling private pleasure craft, the United Kingdom has breached its obligations under Directive 95/60/EC (1);










—


order the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to pay the costs.





Pleas in law and main arguments

The Commission considers that permitting the sale of marked fuel for propelling private pleasure craft is fundamentally incompatible with the Directive 95/60/EC (the ‘Fiscal Marking Directive’). The obligation to mark fuel that has been subject to a reduced rate of excise duty is intended specifically to ensure that those fuels are readily distinguishable from fuel in respect of which full duty has been paid. However, the effect of the national measure is that where marked fuel is found in a tank of a private pleasure craft that has been refuelled in the United Kingdom, it is not possible to determine by reference to the marking, whether or not the fuel used was subject to a full or discounted rate of excise duty.


(1)  Council Directive 95/60/EC of 27 November 1995 on fiscal marking of gas oils and kerosene (OJ 1995, L 291, p. 46).
Case T-567/17: Action brought on 21 August 2017 — Disney Enterprises v EUIPO — Di Molfetta (DiSNEY FROZEN)
Date: 2017-08-21
Institutions: General Court
Subjects: EU trade mark, clothing, footwear industry, registered trade mark, trade-mark law








C_2017347EN.01004601.xml










16.10.2017   


EN


Official Journal of the European Union


C 347/46





Action brought on 21 August 2017 — Disney Enterprises v EUIPO — Di Molfetta (DiSNEY FROZEN)
(Case T-567/17)
(2017/C 347/60)
Language in which the application was lodged: English

Parties


Applicant: Disney Enterprises, Inc. (Burbank, California, United States) (represented by: M. Graf, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Fabio Di Molfetta (Bisceglie, Italy)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO


Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Applicant

Trade mark at issue: EU figurative mark containing the word elements ‘DiSNEY FROZEN’ — Application for registration No 11 830 965

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 12 May 2017 in Case R 2342/2016-5

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:






—


annul the contested decision;










—


order EUIPO to pay the costs.





Plea in law







—


Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009.
Case T-572/17: Action brought on 21 August 2017 — UC v Parliament
Date: 2017-08-21
Institutions: General Court
Subjects: European official, damages, indemnification, rights of the defence, staff assessment, staff regulations (EU)








C_2017369EN.01003101.xml










30.10.2017   


EN


Official Journal of the European Union


C 369/31





Action brought on 21 August 2017 — UC v Parliament
(Case T-572/17)
(2017/C 369/43)
Language of the case: French

Parties


Applicant: UC (represented by: A. Tymen, lawyer)

Defendant: European Parliament

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:






—


declare the present action admissible and well founded




and consequently






—


annul the applicant’s staff report for 2015 and the decision to award him only two merit points for that year;










—


annul the decision of the appointing authority of 9 May 2017 rejecting the applicant’s complaint of 13 January 2017;










—


order the defendant to pay damages, to be fixed ex aequo et bono at EUR 9 000, to compensate the applicant for the non-material damage suffered;










—


order the defendant to pay all the costs.





Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.






1.


First plea in law, alleging, first, infringement of Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 25 of the Staff Regulations of Officials and, secondly, infringement of the obligation to state reasons and of the applicant’s rights of defence.










2.


Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the right to be heard and Article 41 of the Charter.










3.


Third plea in law, alleging a manifest error of assessment.