The integration of migrants and refugees : an EUI forum on migration, citizenship and demography.
Date: 2017-06-27
Institutions: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
Subjects: European citizenship, child of migrant, economic integration, immigration, integration of migrants, labour market, legal status, migration policy, naturalisation, refugee, social integration, terrorism

IN-DEPTH 
ANALYSIS ON 
“POTENTIAL AND 
CHALLENGES OF 
THE INTEGRATION OF 
EVOTING IN THE 
MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES
EUROPEAN UNION”
An EUI Forum on Migration, 
Citizenship and Demography

Editors: 
Rainer Bauböck
Milena Tripkovic

This work has been published by the European University Institute,  
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. 
© European University Institute 2017

Editorial matter and selection © editors  2017
Chapters © authors individually 2017

doi:10.2870/30835 
ISBN:978-92-9084-460-0
QM-02-17-060-EN-N

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THE 
INTEGRATION 
OF MIGRANTS 
AND REFUGEES
An EUI Forum 
on Migration, 
Citizenship and 
Demography

Editors:

RAINER BAUBÖCK

MILENA TRIPKOVIC

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE
Rainer Bauböck and Milena Tripkovic 
European University Institute

This  book  discusses  the  challenges  that  the 
contemporary refugee and migration crisis, which 
culminated with the arrival of more than 1 million 
asylum  seekers  in  2015,  poses  to  traditional 
approaches  to  immigrant  integration  employed 
by  the  European  countries  affected.1  These 
challenges  arise  from  a  host  of  factors  particular 
to  the  ongoing  patterns  of  immigration:  the 
unprecedented number of migrants and refugees 
that  have  recently  entered  Europe;  the  mostly 
unregulated  and  uncontrolled  nature  of  this 
new  immigration;  the  burden  that  this  puts  on 
European countries that had previously had very 
little experience with immigration and integration 
but also the opportunities it provides in terms of 
addressing the key social and economic challenges 
that  Europe  will  be  facing  in  the  next  30  years; 
the  desire  of  immigrants  and  refugees  to  settle 
in  specific  countries  (particularly  Germany  and 
Sweden);  and  the  security  concerns  that  have 
arisen  in  the  aftermath  of  terrorist  attacks.  The 
contributions,  both  individually  and  in  their 
entirety,  seek  to  explore  the  medium  and  long-
term impacts of these and other challenges on the 
debate  and  to  measure  the  success  of  immigrant 
integration. The book is divided into four sections, 
addressing  the  impact  of  this  new  wave  of 
immigration on: (I) access to citizenship and legal 
statuses, (II) educational integration, (III) labour 
market integration, and (IV) cultural integration. 

The  book  is  based  on  contributions  first  presented  at  a 
1 
conference  on  the  Integration  of  Migrants  and  Refugees  within 
the EUI Forum on Citizenship, Migration and Demography on 29 
and  30  September  2016.  The  Forum  series  was  initiated  in  2015 
by  former  EUI  President  J.H.H.  Weiler  and  the  Director  of  the 
Robert Schuman Centre Brigid Laffan. All the contributions to this 
volume have been revised after the conference. 

The new challenges
Even  before  the  current  refugee/migrant  crisis, 
towards  developed 
population  movements 
countries  had  been  steadily 
increasing  over 
time.  Since  2000,  the  immigrant  populations 
in  both  the  EU  and  the  OECD  have  grown  by 
30%.2  Although  research  shows  that  the  rise 
in  immigration  does  not  have  a  negative  effect 
on  the  success  of  integration,3  the  specificity  of 
the  current  crisis  might  pose  altogether  new 
challenges to ‘traditional’ integration mechanisms 
and processes. 

There are many reasons to think that circumstances 
are different this time round. First, the number of 
refugees and migrants currently entering Europe 
is unprecedented. In 2014, around 219,000 people 
crossed the Mediterranean, while the number grew 
to around one million in 2015.4 There were almost 
1.3 million asylum applications in the EU countries 
during  2015.5  The  high  number  of  refugees 
and  migrants  has  already  caused  difficulties  for 
both  transit  and  recipient  countries,  which  are 
struggling  to  provide  conditions  for  satisfying 
basic  needs  such  as  food,  shelter  and  healthcare. 
However, it is not only the numbers – the nature 
of  immigration  has  also  been  transformed  by 
becoming  much  less  regulated  and  controlled, 
thus  preventing  the  destination  countries  from 
predicting and planning the necessary resources to 
host the immigrants. The prospect of a persisting 

2 
OECD  (2015),  ‘Indicators  of  Immigrant  Integration 
2015: Settling In,’ available at: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-
issues-migration-health/indicators-of-immigrant-integration-
2015-settling-in_9789264234024-en  (last  accessed  August  22, 
2016).

3 

Ibid.

Hume,  T.  and  Pawle,  L.  (2015),  ‘Number  of  Migrants 
4 
Reaching  Europe  this  Year  Passes  1  Million’,  available  at:  http://
edition.cnn.com/2015/12/22/europe/million-refugees-enter-
europe/ (last accessed August 22, 2016).

Eurostat  (2016),  ‘Asylum  Statistics’,  available  at:  http://
5 
ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_
statistics (last accessed August 22, 2016).

1

PREFACE ~ Rainer Bauböck, Milena Tripkovicacross Europe by September 2017 is carried out as 
intended,10 many people will be sent to countries 
other  than  those  of  their  preference.  Refugee 
destinations  will  stop  being  a  matter  of  personal 
choice.  While  this  process  may  be  necessary 
for  the  sake  of  fair  burden-sharing,  it  will  most 
probably  negatively  influence  both  the  capacity 
and  willingness  of  immigrants  to  integrate  into 
their  new  communities  and  public  opinion  in 
countries  where  refugee  relocation  is  seen  to  be 
imposed by ‘Brussels.’ 

Third,  the  public  debate  on  how  to  handle  the 
crisis  has  steadily  been  shifting  towards  a  focus 
on the security threat posed by the uncontrolled 
influx of refugees and migrants. In the wake of the 
Paris terrorist attacks of November 2015, Poland 
withdrew  its  earlier  promise  to  accept  7,000 
individuals as part of the EU plan.11 Further terrorist 
attacks in Brussels and Nice have only deepened 
security  concerns.  The  massive,  apparently 
organised,  sexual  molestation  and  assaults  by 
Muslim-background  immigrants  on  women  on 
New Year’s Eve 2015 in Cologne soured the public 
mood  and  support  for  the  ‘culture  of  welcome’ 
for newly arriving refugees that had prevailed in 
Germany and Austria in summer 2015. Although 
civil  society  organizations  continue  to  provide 
crucial  support  for  newcomers,  public  opinion 
has  shifted  dramatically.  While  anti-migration 
rhetoric  and  the  securitization  of  the  crisis  had 
previously been the domain of right-wing populist 
parties  and  politicians,  the  very  real  security 
anxieties  arising  from  these  events  negatively 
influence the public attitude towards immigration 
and integration in all European states. 

These problems are only the three most apparent 
and immediate obstacles to proactive integration 

  European  Commission 

‘Relocation  and 
10 
Resettlement: Positive Trend Continues, but More Efforts Needed’, 
available 
at:  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2435_
en.htm (last accessed August 22, 2016).

(2016), 

Wall  Street  Journal  (2015), 

11 
‘Paris  Terror  Attacks 
Transform  Debate  Over  Europe’s  Migration  Crisis’,  available  at: 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/paris-terror-attacks-transform-
debate-over-europes-migration-crisis-1447608944  (last  accessed 
August 22, 2016).

flow of refugees and migrants in the coming years 
makes integration a crucial issue for the future of 
Europe.

Second,  both  demands  for  and  obstacles  to 
burden-sharing  between  EU  countries  through 
redistributing refugees and forced migrants from 
over-burdened  Greece  and  Italy  to  other  EU 
member states have increased dramatically. Many 
countries that have so far not had much experience 
with immigration – and immigrant integration – 
have been asked to accept significant numbers of 
newcomers.  This  has  already  triggered  negative 
reactions  and  explicit  hostility  in  some  Member 
States.  For  instance,  in  August  2015  Slovakia 
announced  that  it  will  only  accept  Christians,6 
while  Hungary’s  Prime  Minister  Viktor  Orbán 
stated  that  accepting 
immigrants  will  serve 
to  spread  terrorism7  and  called  a  referendum 
to  block  the  implementation  of  EU  decisions 
regarding the relocation of refugees.8 The lack of 
experience  of  such  countries  with  hosting  and 
integrating  immigrants,  combined  with  hostile 
attitudes towards them, compounds the problems 
in  countries  that  are  currently  overburdened 
and  does  not  augur  well  for  the  integration  of 
refugees  in  the  most  reluctant  host  states.  Most 
refugees/migrants  entering  Europe  before  the 
effective  closure  of  the  previously-open  Balkan 
route  since  November  2015  resolutely  aimed  for 
specific  destinations  and  mainly  wanted  to  settle 
in Germany or Sweden.9 However, if the EU plan 
which aims to relocate and resettle 160,000 people 

BBC  (2015), 

6 
‘Migrant  Crisis:  Slovakia  Will  Only 
Accept  Christians’,  available  at:  http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-33986738 (last accessed August 22, 2016).

Feher, M. (2015), ‘EU Migrant Distribution Will Spread 
7 
Terrorism,  Hungary’s  Orban  Says,’  available  at:  http://www.wsj.
com/articles/eu-migrant-distribution-will-spread-terrorism-
hungarys-orban-says-1447698602 (last accessed August 22, 2016).

The referendum of 2 October 2016 resulted in 98.36% of 
8 
the voters endorsing the government position but failed to reach 
the required turnout of 50%.

9 
Economist  (2015),  ‘Germany,  the  EU  Country  which 
Takes  the  Most  Asylum  Seekers,  is  Straining’,  available  at:  http://
www.economist.com/news/europe/21661941-wanting-burden-
shared-germany-eu-country-which-takes-most-asylum-seekers-
straining (last accessed August 22, 2016).

2

PREFACE ~ Rainer Bauböck, Milena Tripkoviccontributions  aim  to  take  the  nationally  specific 
impact of numbers of new arrivals and of public 
attitudes into account as an important context that 
requires specific strategies and policy responses. 

this 

integration  and  cultural 

Four dimensions of 
integration: citizenship, 
education, employment and 
culture
The  book  covers  four  dimensions  of  integration: 
citizenship  and  legal  statuses,  education,  labour 
integration. 
market 
On  each  of  these  topics  there  is  a  specially 
commissioned  keynote  paper  and 
is 
followed  by  shorter  commentaries  that  provide 
complementary views. A comprehensive overview 
of  pertinent  challenges  presented  by  the  current 
migration  and  refugee  crisis  is  set  out  in  the 
introductory chapter by Rainer Münz. It provides 
statistical  data  about  the  core  dimensions  of 
integration,  which  are  subsequently  discussed  in 
greater detail in other contributions. The chapter 
particularly  emphasizes  the  changes  in  Europe’s 
demography  that  have  come  about  as  a  result  of 
decreasing emigration and increasing immigration 
over  the  last  few  centuries.  Furthermore,  Münz 
gives  special  attention 
fundamental 
transformation  in  the  domain  of  immigration 
policy  –  the  fact  that  the  reasons  for  accepting 
newcomers  have  now  become  predominantly 
humanitarian,  which  has  critical  importance  for 
the development and application of new policies. 

the 

to 

In the section on citizenship and legal statuses, the 
contributions  focus  on  the  complex  relationship 
between  naturalisation  and  integration.  In  his 
keynote paper, Maarten Vink goes a step further 
than  merely  trying  to  establish  that  citizenship 
matters  for  integration  by  exploring  why,  under 
which  conditions,  and  to  whom  citizenship 
acquisition  matters.  This  perspective  allows  him 
to offer a more nuanced understanding of the link 
between citizenship and migrant integration and 
to  conclude,  for  example,  that  the  acquisition  of 

policies  for  refugees  and  migrants  in  the  host 
societies.  In  the  absence  of  realistic  prospects  of 
ending  the  violent  conflicts  that  are  the  cause  of 
the current refugee crises, disputes about burden-
sharing  and  a  pandering  of  politicians  to  hostile 
public opinion cannot change the fact that Europe 
will  become  the  new  permanent  home  for  most 
of the refugees. This makes it imperative to avoid 
repeating the mistakes of the past, when integration 
policies were delayed in order to encourage return 
and deter potential migrants, or were ineffective in 
preventing social segregation and discrimination 
of first- and second-generation immigrants.  

immigrant 

The current debates on the integration of refugees 
and  immigrants  therefore  need  to  consider  how 
the  new  circumstances  challenge  conventional 
societies 
wisdoms. 
‘Traditional’ 
have  experienced  and  solicited 
immigration 
for  many  decades  and  have  developed  a  set 
of  normative  ideas  on  how  to  best  achieve 
integration  and  social  cohesion.  In  the  1990s, 
the  academic  literature  distinguished  different 
national  models  or  ‘philosophies’  of  integration, 
often  categorized  into  exclusionary,  laissez-faire, 
assimilationist  and  multicultural  approaches.  In 
the  2000s,  the  internal  consistency  and  practical 
relevance of such national models has been widely 
questioned.12  The  uncontrolled  influx  of  a  high 
number  of  refugees  and  immigrants  provides 
a  new  context  for  this  debate,  confronting  host 
countries  with  similar  problems  –  even  if  the 
politics  of  immigrant  integration  still  largely 
depend  on  national  contexts,  such  as  previous 
immigration experiences or the electoral strength 
of right-wing populist parties. Instead of focusing 
on comparing national approaches, this book will 
therefore  be  structured  by  different  ‘sectors’  of 
integration.  Within  each  of  its  four  sections,  the 

12 
  See,  e.g.,  Christian  Joppke  (2007),  Beyond  national 
models:  Civic  integration  policies  for  immigrants  in  Western 
Europe,  West  European  Politics,  30  (1):  1-22;  Christophe  Bertossi 
and Jan Willem Duyvendak (2012), National models of immigrant 
integration:  The  costs  for  comparative  research.  Comparative 
European Politics 10 (3): 237–247.

3

PREFACE ~ Rainer Bauböck, Milena Tripkoviccitizenship  most  improves  the  opportunities  for 
those immigrants who need it the most (such as 
refugees and more generally immigrants from less 
developed  countries).  Restrictive  policies  thus 
have  a  particularly  negative  impact  on  those  in 
the most precarious situation. Even more nuances 
can  be  observed  –  as  Kees  Groenendijk  suggests 
–  if  we  take  into  account  how  laws  in  countries 
of origin and destination interact in determining 
access  to  legal  statuses.  Countries  of  origin  are 
particularly important as their laws and practices 
often interplay with those of the host country to 
create  difficulties  in  the  legalisation  of  irregular 
statuses.  Additionally,  Groenendijk 
identifies 
the  transition  from  the  status  of  temporary  to 
permanent  migrant  and  the  effects  that  this 
change  has  on  integration  as  an  important  topic 
for  further  research.  Vink’s  observation  that 
citizenship  is  of  great  importance  to  certain 
categories of immigrants even if acquisition rates 
are low is further developed by Ines Michalowski, 
who  examines  a  number  of  specificities  of  the 
acquisition of citizenship status by refugees. Most 
importantly,  these  concern:  the  lack  of  value  of 
their  original  citizenship;  a  number  of  obstacles 
which  do  not  necessarily  characterise  other 
categories of immigrants (lack of educational and 
professional skills and lack of financial resources); 
and citizenship conditions that are more difficult 
to  meet  for  refugees  (residence  and  language, 
income  and  civic  knowledge  tests).  Barbara 
Oomen’s contribution takes an additional angle on 
the mostly state-centric debate on the link between 
legal policies and integration by emphasising the 
role  of  sub-state  units  (particularly  cities).  These 
units often enhance the legal status of immigrants 
by  providing  them  with  additional  rights  and 
privileges which not only extend beyond but also 
above the state, as these entitlements are commonly 
couched in international human rights. 

The  section  on  the  educational  integration  of 
refugees opens with a keynote paper by Maurice 
Crul,  Elif  Keskiner,  Jens  Schneider,  Frans  Lelie 
and  Safoura  Ghaeminia.  It  compares 
four 
cases  (Sweden,  the  Netherlands,  Germany  and 

Turkey)  which 
reflect  different  approaches 
to  the  integration  of  the  children  of  refugees 
in  institutions  of  compulsory  education.  The 
contribution  by  Michael  Teutsch  recognizes  the 
difficulties  created  for  education  systems  by  the 
current  refugee  inflow:  the  number  of  refugees, 
the  high  percentage  of  new  arrivals  of  young 
people  who  are  still  in  need  of  compulsory 
education, the often low probability of them being 
accorded  refugee  status,  and  the  polarisation  of 
the  education  and  skill  levels  that  they  possess. 
However,  Teutsch  still  believes  that  challenges 
can  be  turned  into  opportunities  to  reform 
the  educational  sphere.  While  the  differences 
observed  by  Crul  et  al.  are  undeniable,  Teutsch’s 
contribution  also  sheds  light  on  some  positive 
changes (for instance, in Germany) and proposes 
a more flexible understanding of ‘success’ when it 
comes to educational achievement by recognizing 
that  for  some  groups  of  students  (particularly 
those  who  arrive  at  an  age  corresponding  to  the 
last few years of compulsory schooling) the clock 
cannot  be  turned  back  and  more  effort  ought  to 
be put into finding appropriate ways of engaging 
them in vocational training for jobs requiring less 
formal school education. Crul et al.’s contribution 
suggests  that  diverse  educational  philosophies 
identified  in  the  four  countries  covered  by  their 
analysis shape the professional destinies of refugee 
children  –  ranging  from  those  that  provide 
the  best  possible  educational  opportunities 
in  the  given  circumstances  in  Sweden,  where 
quick  mainstreaming  (also  secured  by  intensive 
language  teaching)  is  the  dominant  approach, 
to  those  where  the  outcome  is  often  to  divert 
refugee children into vocational tracks (less in the 
Netherlands and more so in Germany), and finally 
to  those  where  a  lack  of  resources  and  a  policy 
of  temporary  protection  rather  than  integration 
results  in  a  lack  of  access  to  public  schools  and 
substitute  education  geared  towards  return  to 
Syria, as is the case in Turkey. 

The  contributions  on  the  topic  of  labour  market 
integration  discuss  two  crucial  and  at  the  same 
time  contradictory  trends:  on  the  one  hand,  the 

4

PREFACE ~ Rainer Bauböck, Milena Tripkoviclong-term  economic  opportunities  for  ageing 
Europe  created  by  the  newly  arrived  migrants 
and  refugees  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  short-
term problems in providing effective employment 
opportunities  for  these  categories  of  newcomers. 
Klaus F. Zimmermann’s keynote chapter outlines 
how  and  why  the  influx  of  refugees  must  not 
only  be  perceived  as  a  problem  but  ought  to 
also  be  seen  as  an  opportunity.  He  suggests 
that  the  most  benefits  could  be  reaped  from 
early  profiling  of  refugees  and  their  allocation 
in  line  with  the  relocation  quota  system.  After 
this,  free  mobility  within  the  country  should  be 
permitted even before the recognition of refugee 
status, and recognized refugees should be free to 
move  to  other  EU  countries  if  they  have  a  work 
contract.  However,  this  positive  outlook  on  the 
opportunities created by contemporary migratory 
movements  is  overshadowed  by  a  number  of 
obstacles and on average refugees take as many as 
20 years to fully integrate into the labour market. 
Martin Ruhs identifies some of the problems: the 
size of the population concerned; the pressure that 
this puts on the receiving states; the (un)feasibility 
of particular policies in the host state; the fact that 
refugees might stay permanently; and the lack of 
cooperation  between  states.  To  this,  Alessandra 
Venturini  adds  another  dimension:  problems 
created  by  the  lack  of  any  cooperation  between 
the state of origin and the host state. Cooperation 
between  these  countries  is  one  of  the  best  tools 
for  a  speedy  and  comprehensive  integration  of 
immigrants.  In  the  case  of  refugees  it  is  clearly 
missing, but other (transit) states appear as actors, 
which complicates matters and makes integration 
more  difficult.  However,  some  positive  trends 
are described in the chapter by Iván Martín, who 
presents results of empirical research which reveal 
a clear policy trend in the majority of EU countries 
towards facilitation of the integration of migrants 
and  refugees,  as  opposed  to  the  previous  (pre-
2015)  trends  which  sought  to  introduce  barriers 
to their integration. A number of instruments are 
used to facilitate labour market integration, such 

as  skills  assessment,  introductory  programmes 
(cultural and other kinds of orientation), language 
learning, and job mediation services. 

conditions 

The  contributions  on  the  topic  of  cultural 
integration  clearly  recognize  a  trend  towards  the 
securitization  of  migration  and  a  shifting  of  the 
blame  for  any  failures  in  the  integration  process 
onto  the  newcomers.  Ruth  Wodak’s  keynote 
paper  discusses  both  the  different  dimensions  of 
integration  and the  culturalization of integration 
policies.  She  identifies  a  tendency  in  Europe 
for 
towards  more  demanding 
citizenship acquisition – primarily with regard to 
language  competence  and  civic  knowledge  tests. 
This trend is, at least to some extent, caused by a 
hostile political discourse which blames integration 
failure  on  the  newcomers’  unwillingness  to 
integrate. Instead of ethnic and national conflicts, 
religion  has  become  the  main  divisive  force  in 
contemporary  Europe,  as  Anna  Triandafyllidou 
argues in her paper. Rejecting members of other 
religions  coincides  with  natives  turning  towards 
the  nation-state  to  provide  them  with  security. 
Tamás  Szűcs’  contribution  shows  how  public 
opinion and the political discourse on immigrants 
have been moving towards considering migrants 
as  a  security  threat  and  demands  for  stronger 
borders  to  keep  the  migrants  out.  To  counter 
such  trends,  for  more  than  a  decade  the  EU  has 
consistently and coherently tried to also promote 
the  inclusion  of  newcomers  in  cultural  domains, 
such  as  the  arts  and  sports.  These  programmes 
provide  funding  for  creative  –  and  unobtrusive 
–  ways  of  integrating  immigrants.  However,  the 
extent to which Member States use opportunities 
of  EU  funding  for  such  initiatives  greatly  varies 
and  depends  on  their  general  approaches  to 
integration. 

A  particular  value  of  this  book  is  that  it  reaches 
a  number  of  cross-sectional  conclusions  that 
establish  links  between  different  domains  of 
integration,  making  the  success  of  integration 
in  one  domain  critical  for  outcomes  in  another. 

5

PREFACE ~ Rainer Bauböck, Milena TripkovicFor  instance,  Münz  and  Zimmermann  discuss 
importance  of  appropriate  educational 
the 
skills  for  the  full  labour  integration  of  refugees 
and  better  labour  market  outcomes.  Similarly, 
language  proficiency  is  considered  critical  for 
both  educational  prospects  (Crul  et  al.)  and 
for  labour  market  integration  (Martín).  Crul 
et  al.’s  contribution  argues  that  the  acquisition 
of  particular  statuses  –  such  as  the  recognition 
of  refugee  status  –  is  of  utmost  importance  for 
optimal educational opportunities and subsequent 
labour  market  integration.  Zimmermann  also 
argues that a proper legal status allows for quicker 
employment  integration  and  the  much-needed 
worker  mobility.  This  shows  that  all  integration 
domains interact with each other and that policies 
introduced in one area will affect other areas as well, 
which  calls  for  a  comprehensive  understanding 
and policies on immigrant integration.

In summer and autumn 2015, German Chancellor 
Merkel  and  the  leaders  of  the  EU  institutions 
emphasized  that  agreeing  on  a  common  policy 
on  refugee  admission  and  fair  burden-sharing 
between  the  Member  States  was  an  even  greater 
challenge than steering through the Euro crisis. At 
the end of 2016, the sense of urgency has become 
somewhat  weaker,  with  smaller  numbers  of  new 
inflows and other crises – such as that triggered by 
the Brexit referendum – occupying the minds of 
European policymakers. However, the difficulties 
raised  by  the 
long-term  task  of  integrating 
refugees and migrants for whose arrival European 
societies  had  been  unprepared  will  remain  high 
on the agenda for years to come. In the absence of 
innovative approaches, the resulting problems will 
feed  into  the  rise  of  nationalist  populism  that  is 
already shaking the foundations of the European 
building. 

Florence, 30 December 2016

6

PREFACE ~ Rainer Bauböck, Milena TripkovicTHE INTEGRATION 
OF MIGRANTS 
AND REFUGEES 
– A EUROPEAN 
SYNOPSIS
Rainer Münz 
EPSC, European Commission1

For  centuries,  Europe  was  a  continent  of 
emigration,  exporting  a  considerable  part  of 
its  growing  population.  Between  the  Age  of 
Discoveries  and  the  mid-20th  century,  some  70 
million  people  left  their  European  homelands 
for  overseas  destinations.  Among  them  were 
colonial  settlers,  adventurers,  labour  migrants 
and refugees.2  Since the 19th century, Europeans 
have also moved – and continue to move – from 
peripheries to urban areas and regions with higher 
economic  growth.  However,  a  fundamental  shift 
occurred in the 1980s. Three decades ago, for the 
first time in modern history the number of third-
country  nationals  entering  the  EU  started  to  be 
larger than the number of EU citizens leaving for 
overseas  destinations.  Only  since  that  time  can 
we truly speak of Europe and the EU as a region 
of  immigration.  It  took  even  longer  before  the 
integration of migrants and their children became 
an  issue  of  political  concern,  although  since  the 
1950s  many  countries  in  Western  Europe  had 
recruited  foreign  labour  and  accepted  refugees. 
Initially, most of these refugees were people fleeing 
communist regimes and socialist economies.   

1 
Rainer Münz is policy advisor at the European Political 
Strategy Centre, the in-house think tank advising the President of 
the European Commission. The analysis and proposals expressed 
in this text are the author’s personal views and do not necessarily 
represent positions of the European Commission.

See: 

http://www.european-emigration.com/; 

Bade 
2 
(2003).  The  peak  period  was  1840  to  1940,  with  55  million 
Europeans leaving (Tara 2016).

Migrants in Europe
Today,  some  57  million  citizens  and  residents  of 
the  EU  live  outside  their  country  of  birth.  They 
represent over 10% of the EU’s total population.3 
About  a  third  of  them  (2014:  36.9%,  Fig.  1)  are 
mobile  EU  citizens.4  The  others  have  come  as 
labour  migrants,  dependent  family  members, 
international  students  or  asylum  seekers  and 
refugees. Of these ‘others’, one in five is from Asia 
(2014:  20.6%),5  one  in  six  from  Africa  (16.9%)6 
and one in seven from other European countries 
(non-EU: 14.6%; Fig. 1). 

Fig. 1: Mobile EU citizens and non-EU born 
migrants by continent of origin

3 
 This number is calculated from stock data available for 1 
January 2015: 34.3 million people born outside of the EU-28 were 
living  in  an  EU  Member  State  on  1  January  2015  +  18.5  million 
persons  born  in  an  EU  Member  State  other  than  the  one  where 
they were resident = 52.8 million (Eurostat 2016c). Given the net 
inflows since January 2015, the total number on 1 January 2017 is 
likely to be 57 million. 

4 
sending countries (Eurostat 2016c).

With  Poland  and  Romania  being  the  most  important 

5 
Mostly  from  southern  Asia  (India,  Pakistan;  Eurostat 
2016c) and since 2015 also Afghanistan and Syria (Eurostat 2016a).

6 
Tunisia; Eurostat 2016c).

Mostly  from  the  Maghreb  (Algeria,  Morocco  and 

7

THE INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES – A EUROPEAN SYNOPSIS ~ RAINER MÜNZ

Fig. 2: Share of mobile EU citizens and non-EU born migrants in the total EU population, in the 
population aged 15-64, and in the economically active population aged 15-64 in 2014

Source: DG EMPL, EU-LFS 2014 ad-hoc module

In 2014,7 the share of non EU-born residents was 
6.7  percent  of  the  total  EU  population  and  7.9 
percent  of  economically  active  persons.  Mobile 
EU  citizens  constituted  3.5  percent  of  the  total 
population and 4.4 percent of economically active 
persons (Fig. 2).8 An estimated 6 percent belonged 
to  the  second  generation,  having  one  or  two 
foreign-born parents.9

In relative terms, Luxemburg, Cyprus and Ireland 
reported  the  largest  proportions  of  mobile  EU 
citizens,  while  Estonia,  Croatia,  Latvia,10  and 

  The  data  are  from  the  EU  Labour  Force  Survey  (LFS) 
7 
ad-hoc module 2014 covering mobile EU citizens and EU residents 
born outside the EU (including people admitted as asylum seekers 
or refugees prior to 2014). See Lien 2016.

  European  Commission  2016b.  The  large  inflow  of 
8 
irregular  migrants  and  refugees  during  the  years  2014-2016  has 
increased the size and share of the non-EU born population, but – 
so far – has had no lasting impact on the non-EU born workforce 
as the majority of them have not yet become economically active.

9 
  Precise  information  is  only  available  for  the  EU 
population of main working age (15-64). Among these, in 2014, the 
second-generation  totalled  18.4  million  people  (6.1%  of  this  age 
group), of which 13.3 million (4.4%) had at least one parent born in 
the EU, whereas 5.1 million (1.7%) had both parents born outside 
the  EU.  These  data  do  not  include  information  on  Denmark, 
Ireland and the Netherlands.                                                                                              

10 
 Most foreign-born residents of Estonia and Latvia moved 
prior to 1991 as Soviet citizens from other Soviet republics to the 
Baltics and only became ‘foreign-born’ when the Baltic countries 

Sweden hosted the largest shares of non-EU born 
migrants (Fig. 2).

Asylum seekers and refugees
In the years 2014-16, the focus of public attention 
was  on  the  irregular  entrance  gate  as  over  1.5 
million  irregular  migrants  and  refugees  entered 
Italy  and  Greece  via  the  Mediterranean  –  the 
majority of them moving on and asking for asylum 
in  various  northern  and  western  EU  countries.11 
This extra inflow – in addition to some 2 million 
first  residency  permits  issued  to  third-country 
nationals  arriving  in  a  regular  manner  –  was 
unprecedented in size. In fact, in the years 2000-
2013 the EU countries had only admitted less than 
4 million asylum seekers and refugees altogether, 
on average less than 300,000 per year.12 

Another difference also plays a role: between 2000 
and 2013 some 80 to 90 percent of all the newly 
arriving  third-country  nationals  entered  the  EU 

declared  independence.  A  considerable  proportion  of  them  were 
never naturalised and are now stateless or have meanwhile acquired 
Russian citizenship (Eurostat 2016c). 

11 
unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php .

See  http://migration.iom.int/europe/  and  http://data.

12 

Eurostat 2016a.

8

THE INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES – A EUROPEAN SYNOPSIS ~ RAINER MÜNZ

in  a  regular  manner  and  not  for  humanitarian 
reasons.13 In 2015 the share of those admitted for 
humanitarian reasons was over 35 percent.

•  Education 

•  Language and culture

•  Legal status and citizenship

Entrance gates
Over the last two decades the main ‘entrance gates’ 
to EU countries have been:

(a)  the  free  movement  of  EU  citizens 
within the EU; 

(b)  dependent  family  members  joining 
regular  migrants  and  refugees  already 
living in an EU country;                                                                                                                                       

(c) the recruitment of skilled and unskilled 
foreign labour;                                                                                                

(d)  the  admission  of  foreign  students 
(playing a somewhat smaller role);                                                                        

(e) admission for asylum and humanitarian 
protection  (playing  only  a  minor  role  – 
with the exception of 2014-2016).

From a quantitative point of view, free movement 
and  family  reunion  were  the  most  important 
’entrance gates’.

These  ‘gates’  define  the  initial  terms  of  residence 
and  they  clearly  create  selection  effects.  This  is 
not only relevant  when  migrants settle in an EU 
country  but  it  also  has  a  long-term  influence  on 
migrant integration.

Integration: Refugees vs. 
other immigrants
Integration only matters for migrants who intend 
to stay for a longer period of time or – in the case 
of refugees – are prevented from returning to their 
country  of  origin.  Although  the  integration  of 
migrants  and  their  children  is  multifaceted,  four 
dimensions stand out:

•  Labour market outcomes

13 

 Eurostat 2016c.

Data  that  would  allow  a  systematic  comparison 
between  regular  migrants  and  refugees  across 
Europe are not available for all four dimensions,14 
but  the  accessible  data  give  us  an  idea  of  the 
differences and similarities. Existing research also 
gives us an idea of the obstacles to integration that 
immigrants  and  their  European  host  countries 
have faced in the past. The main findings are:

•  The  economic  integration  of  migrants  takes 
time  and  has  –  on  average  –  become  more 
difficult in recent years.

•  This is particularly an issue for those admitted 
as  asylum  seekers/refugees  and  for  those 
joining parents or a spouse already established 
in  an  EU  country  (family  reunion).  It  takes 
seven to ten years until the employment rates 
of these groups of migrants reach 50 percent. 

•  High  educational  attainment  speeds  up  the 
integration process. Skilled migrants, however, 
face  systemic  barriers  in  access  to  work  for 
which they have initially been trained.

•  The  education  systems  of  countries  with 
larger  numbers  of  migrants  on  average  have 
difficulties  coping  with  children  that  have  a 
migrant  background.  They  have  significantly 
lower PISA scores and a much higher share of 
early  school  leavers.  In  the  EU  25  percent  of 
all young non-EU citizens leave the education 
system without graduating.

residing 

in  Europe 

•  Over  time  only  six  out  of  ten  third  country 
nationals 
acquire 
citizenship in an EU country. At the same time 
European citizenship does not necessarily lead 
to  a  full  identification  with  European  values 
and traditions

14 

 Eurostat 2011, 2016c.

9

THE INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES – A EUROPEAN SYNOPSIS ~ RAINER MÜNZ

Employment in the formal 
sector
Economic  activity  is  at  the  core  of  the  inclusion 
process.  This  key  variable  relies  on  the  ability  of 
migrants and refugees15 to generate income from 
gainful  employment.  This,  in  turn,  depends  on 
the  trajectory  defined  by  the  entrance  gates,  the 
personal skills of migrants, their duration of stay, 
the general economic and labour market situation 
and legal conditions in the receiving country.16 

It  is,  therefore,  no  surprise  that  those  admitted 
to an EU country as skilled or unskilled workers 
initially  have  the  highest  employment  rates  (0-4 
years of residence: 83%). Over time, some of these 
become unemployed or economically inactive and 
the rate drops with a longer duration of stay (20+ 
years: 65%). Third-country nationals admitted as 
students remaining in the EU after the end of their 
studies  only  reach  their  maximum  employment 
rates  about  ten  years  after  arrival  (10-14  years: 
80%) and usually remain economically active at a 
 The analytical part of this text is based on data gathered 
15 
before 2015. Many results are based on the EU Labour Force Survey 
ad-hoc  module  2014  (EU  LFS).  Irregular  migrants  and  asylum 
seekers  arriving  in  2014-2016  are  not  included  in  this  survey. 
When  speaking  of  ‘refugees’  the  text  refers  to  people  residing  in 
the EU who were admitted as asylum seekers or for humanitarian 
reasons prior to 2014.

16 
 For refugees, the possibility of accessing and competing 
in the labour market depends on the reception (and integration) 
policies adopted in the country granting asylum, such as whether 
they  provide  for  specific 
language  and  vocational  training 
programmes. In many countries, asylum seekers who are granted 
subsidiary protection face greater restrictions than those enjoying 
refugee status.

high level (Fig. 4). This is clearly related to the fact 
that – by definition – all of them are highly skilled. 

By contrast, migrants arriving for family reunion 
or  as  asylum  seekers  take  7-10  years  on  average 
before reaching an employment rate of 50% (Fig. 
4). In the case of refugees, this is related to several 
factors.  On  average,  they  have  lower  educational 
attainments than the citizens of the country which 
processes  the  asylum  claim.17  Access  to  labour 
markets is usually delayed by asylum procedures. 
Refugees  need  time  to  adapt,  learn  the  language 
of  the  receiving  country  and  get  their  skills 
evaluated,  recognised  or  upgraded.  The  more 
regulated labour markets are, the more difficult it 
is for refugees to find a job.18 

Over time, differences in labour market outcomes 
disappear.  Employment  rates  converge  for  those 
with more than 20 years of stay and the reason for 
which the initial residency permit was issued no 
longer plays a decisive role. 

The  overall  employment  rate  of  migrants  with 
non-EU backgrounds increases with the duration 
of their stay, rising from 51.1% for those residing 
in the country for less than five years to 68.3% for 
those who have already spent at least ten years in 
the EU. 

17 
  Among  recent  asylum  seekers  (2014-2016)  who  have 
come to Europe, only two groups include a relevant share of tertiary 
educated people: Syrians and Iranians (UNHCR 2015, Rich 2016).

18 

 OECD 2015.

Fig. 3: Labour market outcomes of non-EU-born persons by type of initial residency permit in the 
European Union.  Ages 15-64 in 2014

Source: OECD, EU-LFS 2014 ad-hoc module

10

THE INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES – A EUROPEAN SYNOPSIS ~ RAINER MÜNZ

Fig.4: Employment rates by type of initial residency permit and years of residence in the European 
Union. Ages 15-64 in 2014

Source: OECD, EU-LFS 2014 ad-hoc module

Labour  market  outcomes  are  also  strongly 
influenced  by  the  general  economic  situation. 
As  a  result  of  the  recent  financial  and  economic 
crisis, the employment chances of newly arriving 
non-EU  migrants  clearly  deteriorated  for  those 
arriving after 2006 (Fig. 5).19

Fig. 5: Employment rates of non-EU-born 
migrants by years of residence in the EU. Ages 
15-64, years of arrival: 2004-2013 

Source: DG EMPL, EU-LFS 2014 ad-hoc module

Labour market outcomes are strongly influenced 
by  educational  attainment  and  skills.  Tertiary 
educated refugees and other migrants of working 
age  have  employment  rates  that  are  about  25 
percentage  points  higher  than  those  of  refugees 
and  other  migrants  with  primary  education 
(Fig.  6).  This  is  true  for  both  regular  migrants 
19 

 European Commission 2016b.

and  refugees  who  have  come  more  recently  and 
for  those  with  longer  durations  of  stay.  The  gap 
reflects the demand for skills, which gives people 
with higher education better opportunities in the 
labour market. At the same time, it might be less 
challenging for people who have spent more time 
in the education system to learn the host country’s 
language,  which  in  turn  also  facilitates  labour 
market integration.  

Another  relevant  factor  is  work  experience. 
Eurostat‘s  Labour  Force  Surveys  (LFS)  do  not 
provide  information  on  this  issue,  but  a  recent 
study  by  the  German  Migration  and  Asylum 
Agency  (BAMF)  shows  that  three  in  four  (75%) 
male  asylum  seekers  arriving  in  the  year  2015 
were  employed  before  leaving  their  country  of 
origin but only one in three women (33%) seeking 
asylum in Germany during that year were.20

Outcomes also vary widely between countries. In 
Belgium, France, Italy and Croatia, those admitted 
as  refugees  fare  better  than  other  non  EU-born 
migrants.  Conversely,  in  Finland,  the  UK,  Spain 
and Portugal, the employment rate of recognised 
refugees is at least 10 percentage points lower.21 

20 

21 

 Rich 2016.

 OECD 2016b.

11

THE INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES – A EUROPEAN SYNOPSIS ~ RAINER MÜNZ

 
Fig. 6: Employment rates of regular migrants and refugees  in the EU by educational attainment. 
Ages 15-64 in 2014 in 2014

Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS 2014 ad-hoc module

By  far  the  largest  challenge  is  the  labour  market 
inclusion  of  refugee  women.  Their  average 
employment  rate 
is  45  percent  (some  17 
percentage points lower than that of refugee men). 
This is partly related to refugee status itself, which 
initially reduces employment chances (Fig. 4). To 
some extent these underwhelming labour market 
outcomes  are  related  to  the  fact  that  nearly  half 
of all refugee women residing in the EU in 2014 
had  a  low  level  of  education  or  no  education  at 
all  and  the  majority  had  no  work  experience,  a 
substantially higher share than that for any other 
migrant group.

In  this  context,  it  is  important  to  narrow  the 
gap  between  arrival  or  admission  and  economic 
integration.  It  is,  however  equally  important  to 
ensure that those entering Europe‘s labour markets 
find  opportunities  for  upward  mobility  and  that 
hidden barriers do not contribute to brain waste.

Unemployment
In  2014,  among  the  refugees  available  for  the 
labour market, one in five were unemployed (19%), 
of whom one in eight for more than a year (12%). 
In  comparison,  refugees  faced  unemployment 
rates  twice  as  high  as  that  for  natives  (10%,  Fig. 
3).  Unemployment  was  also  high  among  third-
country  nationals  (16%),  in  particular  among 
those coming from Africa and the Middle East.22 
 European Commission 2016b, OECD 2016b.
22 

The  unemployment  rates  of  refugees  differ 
significantly between EU countries, ranging from 
15 percent in the UK to more than 50 percent in 
Spain.  Although  other  non-EU  born  migrants 
also have higher unemployment rates (16%) than 
the  native  born  (10%),  at  least  in  Spain,  Finland 
lower 
and  Belgium  they  have  considerably 
unemployment rates.23

For  those  who  are  unable  to  find  gainful 
longer  period  of  time, 
employment  over  a 
other  forms  of  integration  need  to  be  explored 
– 
including  opportunities  to  contribute  via 
voluntary and non-paid work.24

Education
On  average,  third-country  nationals  who  have 
moved  to  the  EU  are  less  well  educated  than 
mobile  EU  citizens  and  EU  nationals  residing 
in  their  country  of  birth.  More  than  four  in  ten 
refugees (43%) and a little fewer than four in ten 
other  non-EU  citizens  (38%)  residing  in  the  EU 
only  have  primary  education,  compared  to  less 
than a quarter of EU nationals (23%; Fig. 7).25  

A quarter of (other) non-EU citizens (25%)26 have 
tertiary  education.  Among  refugees,  the  share 
23 

 OECD 2016b.

24 

25 

26 

 Papademetriou and Benton 2016.

 Referring to the population age 25+.

 Excluding refugees.

12

THE INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES – A EUROPEAN SYNOPSIS ~ RAINER MÜNZ

have  moved  with  their  parents  and  therefore 
belong to the first generation; others belong to the 
second generation. PISA test results clearly show 
that  children  with  a  migrant  background  have 
lower scores on average than native children in all 
three areas analysed in the OECD’s global study: 
reading, mathematics and IT problem solving. The 
average gap is in the 10-12% range and is almost the 
same for the first and the second generation (Fig. 
8). This reproduction of differences in educational 
attainment  across  generations  clearly  indicates 
that not only young migrants but also the children 
of  immigrants  will  face  a  certain  disadvantage 
when entering the labour market.

The  gap  is  aggravated  by  the  fact  that  one  in 
four  young  non-EU  citizens  growing  up  in  an 
EU  country  leaves  the  education  system  without 
graduating  (25%).  Among  native  children,  the 
proportion is only one in ten (10%). Under current 
labour  market  conditions  in  Europe,  a  large 
proportion of early school leavers are unlikely to 
find  a  proper  job.  As  a  result,  one  in  five  young 
non-EU  citizens  (21%)  are  neither  in  gainful 
employment  nor  in  education  nor  in  training 
(NEET). Among their native peers the NEET rate 
is only one in eight (12%; Fig. 9). 

The over-proportionally high rates of early school 
leavers with migrant background are aggravating 
existing  integration  problems  and  increasing  the 
risk of poverty and social exclusion. The high rate 
of NEET young migrants not only hints at a lack 
of  demand  for  unskilled  and  untrained  labour 
but will almost certainly translate into long-term 
exclusion from formal labour markets. 

is  only  one  in  five  (20%).27  The  share  of  tertiary 
educated refugees has decreased in recent years, as 
refugees who have arrived in the past 10 years are 
less likely to be tertiary educated than those who 
came 10-20 years ago.28 This will gradually change 
over time as some of the recently arrived refugees 
will complete their education in Europe.

The opposite trend is observed for other non-EU-
born migrants. Among these, the share of tertiary 
educated  persons  has  increased,  reaching  34% 
among those who have arrived in the EU during 
the period 2004-2014. This clearly shows a shift in 
the composition of immigrants: from less qualified 
labour  migrants  and  dependent  family  members 
joining them to better qualified workers and third-
country  nationals  completing  their  education  in 
Europe and remaining in the EU. 

Fig. 7: Educational attainment by place of 
birth. Ages 25+ in 2014

Source: EPSC, Eurostat, EU-LFS 2014 ad-hoc module

In  western  and  northern  Europe,  children  with 
a  migrant  background  constitute  a  growing 
proportion of all the children of school age. Some 

27 
  For  comparison,  among  recent  asylum  seekers  in 
Germany  (arriving  in  2014-2015),  18%  have  tertiary  education 
while  30%  have  low  or  no  education  (Rich  2016).  The  share 
of  tertiary  educated  asylum  seekers  is  highest  among  Iranians 
(35%)  and  Syrians  (27%).  The  share  of  asylum  seekers  with  low 
or no education is largest among Afghans (54%), Serbs (71%) and 
Macedonians  (67%;  Rich  2016).  This  is  partly  explained  by  the 
fact that many asylum seekers from the western Balkans belong to 
local Roma communities which are marginalised by the respective 
domestic education systems.  

28 

 OECD/EU 2015.

13

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Fig. 8: PISA scores of children aged 15 with 
native and migrant backgrounds in the EU in 
2012 

Source: OECD, PISA 2012

Belgium,  Germany  and  Sweden.29  At  the  same 
time, migrants with a university degree are over 10 
percentage points less likely to be in work relative 
to similarly educated natives in Belgium, France, 
Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden 
(OECD, 2015a).

Formal  over-qualification  has  partly  to  do  with 
the  fact  that  most  economically  active  refugees 
have obtained their degrees in education systems 
that  are  very  different  from  those  in  their  host 
countries,  possibly  resulting  in  lower  skills  at 
the  same  level  of  education.30  Employers  usually 
have difficulties in evaluating such skills. For this 
reason,  formal  over-qualification  is  more  closely 
related  to  the  origin  of  the  qualification  than  to 
the  origin  of  the  migrant.31  A  certain  number  of 
refugees also lack documents that would allow a 
proper specification of their degrees. This creates 
considerable  obstacles  in  the  formal  process  of 
recognition. Another reason for lower valuations 
of migrants’ qualifications is a lower proficiency in 
the host-country language (Fig. 10). 

Fig. 9: NEET population (aged 15-24) and early school leavers (aged 18-24) by citizenship in the 
EU in 2015

Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS 2015

On  the  other  hand,  qualifications  and  skills  do 
not  necessarily  translate  into  expected  labour 
market  outcomes.  Employed  refugees  are  much 
more likely to be over-qualified (60%) than other 
non-EU-born  migrants  (30%)  or  natives  (21%). 
The  differences  are  particularly  large  in  Austria, 

29 

 OECD 2016b.
 Bonfanti and Xenogiani 2014 assume that between 
30 
one-third  and  one-half  of  the  observed  level  of  over-
qualification of migrants compared with the native-born can 
be explained by lower skills at given qualification levels. Also 
see Damas de Matos and Liebig 2014.
31 

 Papademetriou and Benton 2016.

14

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Social welfare
The recent inflow of refugees and asylum seekers 
has  revived  the  debate  on  “welfare  migration”32 
suggesting  that  certain  categories  of  immigrants, 
in  particular  those  with  lower  skills,  are  more 
inclined 
to  choosing  countries  with  well-
established  welfare  systems  as  their  destination. 
The fact that most irregular migrants and refugees 
entering Europe in 2014-2016 choose  Germany, 
Sweden,  Austria,  France  and  Italy  to  launch 
their asylum requests33 seem to suggest that both 
the  accessibility  of  asylum  and  the  generosity  of 
related transfers seem to have a major influence.

If  these  dynamics  were  generally  true  for  labour 
migrants  and  dependent  family  members,  this 
could  constitute  a  major  obstacle  to  economic 
integration as it might discourage certain groups 
of  migrants  eligible  for  social  benefits  from 
entering the labour market. For migrants not using 
the asylum system as entrance gate the empirical 
evidence  is  rather  mixed.34  This,  however,  does 
not  prevent  a  larger  public  to  voice  concern  and 
to  assume  that  immigrants  –  as  well  as  mobile 
EU  citizens  –  receive  social  benefits  without 
sufficiently  contributing  to  the  welfare  system 
through taxes and contributions.35 

Language
Cultural  integration  is  not  easy  to  measure,  but 
language proficiency can be used as a proxy. In any 
case, migrant integration requires command of the 
main language spoken in the receiving country. In 
2014, less than half (45%) of the refugees residing 
in the EU reported having an advanced knowledge 

32 
1999.

33 

34 
2012.

 One of the economists starting this debate was G. Borjas 

 Eurostat 2016a.

  For  an  overview:  Barrett  2012;  Giulietti  and  Wahba 

35 
 A 2009 Eurobarometer survey showed that one in two 
adult  Europeans  did  believe  that  immigrants  do  not  contribute 
to taxes as much as they benefit from social services and welfare 
programs (European Commission 2010).

of  such  languages,  compared  with  two  thirds 
(64%) of other migrants from non-EU countries. 
As  empirical  data  show,  knowledge  of  the  host-
country language is partly influenced by selective 
migration,  e.g.  Latin  Americans  migrating  to 
Spain, natives of other former Yugoslav republics 
residing  in  Croatia  and  Slovenia,  and  Slovaks 
living in the Czech Republic. 

Literacy  and  command  of  the  host-country 
language tend to improve with a longer duration 
of  stay  in  a  particular  country.  It  is,  however, 
striking that only one in two refugees (49%) with 
more  than  ten  years  of  residence  in  the  EU  has 
acquired advanced knowledge of the host-country 
language,  while  the  share  is  69  percent  among 
other non-EU-born migrants with a long duration 
of stay.36 

Fig. 10: Advanced knowledge of host country 
language among refugees vs. other non-EU 
citizens. Ages 15-64 in 2014

Source: OECD, EU-LFS 2014 ad-hoc module                                                                                                                      

Literacy  also  matters.  The  ability  to  use  the  host 
country‘s  dominant  language  is  influenced  by 
the  ability  to  read  texts  written  in  the  language. 
The  OECD‘s  ‘Programme  for  the  International 
Assessment  of  Adult  Competencies’  (PIAAC) 
clearly shows that – depending on the EU country 

36 
  OECD  2016b.  Lack  of  motivation  and/or  opportunity 
to learn the host-country language can partly be explained by the 
presence  of  larger  diasporas  in  the  host  country,  which  makes 
resorting to the native language much easier.

15

THE INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES – A EUROPEAN SYNOPSIS ~ RAINER MÜNZ

 
and the structure of its migrant population – non-
EU-born  migrants  have  literacy  scores  that  are 
on average 35 points below those of natives. The 
gap  is  particularly  pronounced  in  Scandinavian 
countries. Mobile EU citizens seem to have fewer 
problems,  but  also  score  some  15  points  below 
natives (Fig. 11).

full and equal members of society. In reality, some 
mobile people show no interest in changing their 
citizenship  status  even  if  they  meet  all  the  legal 
requirements.  This  is  particularly  true  for  EU 
citizens residing in another EU country, who enjoy 
almost  the  same  rights  as  native  citizens.  Others 
are  reluctant  if  naturalisation  in  the  country  of 
residence requires them to renounce their original 
citizenship. 

Fig. 11: Difference in the literacy scores of mobile EU citizens (born in the EU), non-EU-born 
migrants and natives by region of birth (PIAAC 2012)

Source: OECD, PIAAC 2012, Bonfanti and Xenogiani 2014

Nationality and citizenship
In the context of migrant integration, citizenship 
is  primarily  about  rights  and  duties,  but  it  also 
creates  a  sense  of  belonging.  Between  2009  and 
2015 some 6 million people acquired  citizenship 
in  an  EU  country  through  naturalisation  – 
between  800,000  and  1  million  per  year.  The 
number and share of new EU citizens varies from 
county  to  country  depending  on  the  amount 
and  composition  of  non-nationals  theoretically 
qualifying  for  naturalisation  as  well  as  on  the 
respective  citizenship  laws  and  naturalisation 
practices. 

Ideally, naturalisation should be an integral part of 
migrant  inclusion,  as  non-citizens  never  become 

At  the  same  time,  depending  on  national  laws 
regulating access to citizenship, migrants who want 
to naturalise have to meet a series of requirements 
that  may  become  relevant  obstacles,  such  as 
uninterrupted  residency  of  5-10  years,  passing 
language  and  national  history  tests,  meeting 
required income levels, etc.37 As a result, in 2014 
only  2.8%  of  all  non-citizens  residing  in  the  EU 
naturalised.  The  rates  vary  substantially  across 
Europe,  with  some  countries  being  much  more 
restrictive than others. In 2014, Sweden, Portugal, 
the Netherlands and Spain naturalised some 4.4-
37 
 See http://eudo-citizenship.eu/ and Estramina et al. 2014. 
In 2014, over 60% of all refugees and 55% of all other non-EU-born 
migrants had been residing in their current host country for more 
than ten years and would therefore meet a basic requirement for 
naturalisation.

16

THE INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES – A EUROPEAN SYNOPSIS ~ RAINER MÜNZ

6.4 percent of their foreign resident populations.38 
During  the  same  year,  the  rates  were  below  1 
percent  in  Slovakia,  Austria  and  the  three  Baltic 
States (Fig. 12).39

In absolute numbers Spain had the highest number 
of  naturalisations  (2014:  206,000),  followed  by 
Italy  (130,000),  the  UK  (126,000)  and  Germany 
(111,000).40

Empirical data show that migrants who naturalise 
have  somewhat  better  labour  market  outcomes 
than  those  who  remain  citizens  of  their  country 
of  origin.  Some  call  this  a  citizenship  premium. 
However,  this  does  not  necessarily  constitute  a 
causal  relationship.  It  might  well  be  that  those 
who manage to acquire citizenship are also more 
successful in the labour market. As the difference 
disappears over time, it looks as if immigrants on 
the path to naturalisation enjoy faster integration 
rather than a permanent advantage on the labour 
market.

The  data  available  also  suggest  that  migrants 
who were initially admitted as refugees are more 
likely to naturalise in the host country than other 
third-country  nationals.  In  2014,  61%  of  all  the 
refugees with more than ten years of residence in 
the EU had taken up the host-country nationality, 
compared  with  57%  of  other  non-EU-born 
migrants.  Among  refugees,  the  take-up  rate  was 
higher for women than for men.41 

Quite  a  few  EU  countries  have  both 
low 
naturalisation  rates  and  legal  provisions  that  do 
not extend citizenship to children of immigrants.42 
This creates a growing gap between the electorate 
(or  demos)  and  the  resident  population.  With 
gross  immigration  being  larger  than  the  annual 
number of naturalisations and a growing numbers 
of EU-born children becoming foreigners at birth, 
the  number  of  people  not  represented  in  our 
political  system  is  growing.  Whatever  long-term 
consequences  this  may  have,  it  is  definitely  not 
making integration more likely.   

Fig. 12: Annual naturalisation rates in EU Member States in 2014 as % of all non-citizens

Source: Eurostat 2016b, Acquisition of citizenship statistics

38 
  Hungary  also  reported  a  rate  above  6%,  but  this 
calculation is problematic as the vast majority of those acquiring 
Hungarian citizenship were non-resident ethnic Hungarians living 
in  neighbouring  countries  and  applying  for  naturalisation  from 
abroad. 

39 

40 

 OECD 2016b.

 Eurostat 2016b.

41 
 OECD 2016b. In this context, it should not be overlooked 
that  naturalisation  requirements  are  sometimes  less  strict  for 
recognised refugees than for other third-country nationals (http://
eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/modes-of-acquisition).

42 
eudo-citizenship.eu/).

 This is the norm in a majority of EU countries (http://

17

THE INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES – A EUROPEAN SYNOPSIS ~ RAINER MÜNZ

At  the  same  time,  we  see  that  a  certain  number 
of  naturalised  as  well  as  EU-born  citizens  with 
a  migrant  background  are  not  fully  identifying 
with  their  country  of  citizenship,  but  rather  see 
themselves  as  a  diaspora.  In  other  cases  there  is 
identification with radical interpretations of Islam. 
43  This  is  a  trend  which  apparently  affects  young 
EU-born  people  with  a  migrant  background,  i.e. 
the  second  generation  and  recent  converts  more 
than  the  first  generation  of  immigrants.44  Young 
European-born  Muslims  joining  radical  groups 
fighting in the Middle East and North Africa are 
the  most  extreme  cases.45  This  clearly  indicates 
that  European  citizenship  does  not  necessarily 
lead to a full identification with European values 
and traditions.

Large-scale  immigration  together  with  irregular 
entry  and  the  reaction  of  domestic  audiences  in 
several  receiving  countries  have  brought  back 
questions of national identity. A growing number 
of  natives  see  the  newcomers  as  a  challenge  or 
even  threat  to  their  national  identity.  This  is 
particularly true when a considerable number of 
those arriving in Europe become part of visible or 
religious minorities.

So 
far,  European  governments  have  had 
difficulties  establishing  a  clear  line  on  how  to 
best  address  the  cultural  and  civic  integration 
of  recent  newcomers.46  Approaches  range  from 
outright  restrictions47  to  more  liberal  forms  of 
accommodation.  In  any  event,  the  political, 
social  and  residential  segregation  of  ethnic  and 
religious communities can become both drivers of 
anxiety among natives and barriers for those cut 
off from social interaction, political inclusion and 
economic participation.

European Parliament 2015a.

http://www.cfr.org/religion/europes-angry-muslims/

Conclusions
Data that would allow for a systematic comparison 
between  regular  migrants  and  refugees  across 
Europe are not available for all dimensions,48 but 
existing data give us an idea about differences and 
similarities.

Employment  outcomes  depend  on  the  entrance 
gate,  skill  levels  and  gender.  The  situation  is 
more difficult for people admitted as refugees or 
for  family  reunion  and  in  particular  for  migrant 
women  with  lower  educational  attainment.  Over 
time,  newcomers  make  progress  in  entering  the 
labour  forces  of  receiving  countries.  However,  it 
takes 15 to 20 years before differences by entrance 
gate  fully  disappear.  Nevertheless,  throughout 
their  working  lives  immigrants  remain  over-
represented in low-skilled work. 

Skilled migrants often face entry barriers to jobs 
for which they would be qualified. Despite progress 
in  recognising  qualifications,  newcomers  face 
more  limited  opportunities  than  natives  hinting 
at  a  permanent  ‘brain  waste’  of  those  migrants 
with higher skills. The main exception is migrants 
arriving as students, finishing their degrees in an 
EU country and remaining in the host country. 

In  many  parts  of  Western  Europe,  a  quarter  or 
more  of  young  people  now  have  a  migration 
background.  The  education  systems  of  receiving 
countries  have  difficulties  in  coping  with  these 
children.  As  a  result,  they  are  more  susceptible 
to  leaving  school  early  and  to  then  not  being  in 
education,  employment  or  training  (NEET). 
The  consequences  are  obvious.  They  not  only 
have  significantly  lower  PISA  scores  but  are 
also  underrepresented  in  higher  education.49 
Consequently,  young  adults  with  a  migrant 
background  belonging 
to  visible  minorities 
generally display lower labour force participation 
levels.

See, for example: Jourova 2015; The Sufan Group 2015.

48 

Eurostat 2011, 2016c.

Papademetriou and Benton 2016.

For example, burkini bans in France.

49 
students.

Not  counting  newly  arriving  migrants  admitted  as 

43 

44 
p8218

45 

46 

47 

18

THE INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES – A EUROPEAN SYNOPSIS ~ RAINER MÜNZ

These empirical results are particularly problematic 
as  finding  work  is  the  most  important  route  to 
integration in general. It also plays a crucial role 
in ensuring that a majority of natives trust existing 
immigration and integration systems. Integration, 
however, is not a one-way street. It requires efforts 
on the part of immigrants and their children but it 
also requires that Europe’s receiving societies give 
newcomers a fair chance.

19

THE INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES – A EUROPEAN SYNOPSIS ~ RAINER MÜNZ

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SECTION 1 
CITIZENSHIP  
AND LEGAL 
STATUSES

CITIZENSHIP AND 
LEGAL STATUSES 
IN RELATION TO 
THE INTEGRATION 
OF MIGRANTS AND 
REFUGEES1

Maarten Peter Vink
Maastricht University 
European University Institute

1. Introduction
In  European  migration-receiving  countries,  the 
integration of migrants and especially refugees has 
traditionally  been  based  on  the  assumption  that 
their stay is temporary rather than permanent. As 
a result, integration policies have been ad hoc at 
best and have lacked a focus on the comprehensive 
immersion  of  migrants  in  the  host  societies. 
One of the best ways to become a full and equal 
member of society is by securing a route towards 
citizenship  through  naturalisation.  Citizenship  is 
an important measurement of integration because 
it  extends  rights  to  unconditional  residence  and 
political participation, and because naturalisation 
represents  a  deliberate  choice  by  immigrants  to 
link  their  future  with  that  of  the  host  country. 
Nevertheless,  citizenship  acquisition  rates 
in 
Europe  remain  relatively  low  –  with  significant 
variation between countries and between migrant 
groups  –  and  policies  outlining  comprehensive 

1 
The research discussed in this paper draws on ongoing 
collaboration within the European Union Democracy Observatory 
on Citizenship (EUDO CITIZENSHIP) and within the Maastricht 
Centre for Citizenship, Migration and Development (MACIMIDE), 
in particular with Floris Peters and Hans Schmeets. The paper also 
outlines  a  research  agenda  for  a  new  five-year  project  ‘Migrant 
Life  Course  and  Legal  Status  Transition’  (MiLifeStatus),  funded 
by  a  Consolidator  Grant  from  the  European  Research  Council 
(grant  no.  682626).  See  https://macimide.maastrichtuniversity.nl/
milifestatus/. 

pathways  towards  citizenship  are  the  exception 
rather than the rule. “Citizenship policies remain 
a  major  area  of  weakness  for  most  European 
countries,”  concludes  the  Migrant  Integration 
Policy Index (MIPEX). “The highly discretionary 
and  costly  path  to  citizenship  often  discourages 
rather  than  encourages  immigrants  to  apply  and 
succeed as new citizens.”2

Recent  comparative  research  on  citizenship  for 
immigrants  has  focused  on  issues  such  as  the 
conditions  for  acquiring  the  citizenship  of  the 
host  country, how they  differ between countries, 
how  they  change  over  time  and  how  they 
distinguish  various  classes  of  would-be  citizens. 
Recent  research  has  also  examined  the  overall 
effect  of  citizenship  and  naturalisation  policies 
on  various  integration  indicators  (Bauböck  et  al, 
2013; OECD 2011). The available evidence on the 
‘citizenship  premium’  for  integration  provides  a 
mixed  picture,  across  domains,  across  migrant 
groups and across countries. Generally, however, 
permanent  residence  and  ultimately  citizenship 
are  seen  as  crucial  opportunities,  especially  for 
those migrants who are most in need of a secure 
legal status and those who face the greatest hurdles 
along the way towards building a new life in the 
host society.

Regarding the long-term status of refugees that are 
currently entering Europe, the more immediately 
relevant question is that of what kind of legal statuses 
and protection the new refugees are offered. In this 
chapter,  I  reflect  on  the  relevance  of  citizenship 
acquisition  –  and  legal  status  transition  more 
broadly – for migrant integration. After reviewing 
the  literature  on  citizenship  and  integration,  I 
present and discuss existing evidence with regard 
to three questions. First, what do we know about 
the  variation  in  requirements  for  citizenship 
acquisition  across  European  countries?  I  focus 
especially  on  ordinary  naturalisation  procedures 
and compare them with those providing facilitated 

2 
Quoted 
[accessed 16 September 2016].

from 

http://mipex.eu/access-nationality 

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INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES ~ Maarten Peter Vink

access  to  citizenship  for  refugees.  Second,  what 
do  we  know  about  the  extent  to  which  migrants 
actually acquire citizenship? I present the available 
statistics and key findings from the literature with 
a  focus  on  cross-national  variation.  Third,  what 
do  we  know  about  how  citizenship  matters  for 
integration? I present and discuss the key findings 
from the literature and identify some notable gaps. 
I  conclude  the  chapter  with  a  reflection  on  how 
these findings can be used to contribute to current 
policy  debates  and  on  some  key  theoretical  and 
empirical challenges.

in 

2. Citizenship and immigrant 
integration
For  foreign-born  residents  and  their  children, 
obtaining  citizenship 
the  host  country 
confers  membership,  rights  and  participation 
sense  of 
opportunities,  and  encourages  a 
belonging  (Bloemraad  2006).  However,  whether 
and especially under which conditions citizenship 
stimulates  integration  remain  open  questions. 
Both  immigrant  naturalisation  rates  and  the 
associated integration outcomes are characterised 
by significant heterogeneity. To put it simply, not 
all  migrants  have  an  equal  interest  in  acquiring 
destination  country  citizenship,  and  even  when 
they naturalise this new status does not bring the 
same consequences for all. 

Citizenship  is  a  legal  status  and  a  relationship 
between  an  individual  and  a  state  that  entails 
specific  legal  rights  and  duties,  such  as  the  right 
to reside without restriction in the territory of the 
state  of  citizenship,  the  right  to  vote  in  elections 
and the right to hold public office or be employed 
in  selected  public  sector  jobs.3  If  migrants  hold 
the  citizenship  of  the  country  where  they  reside, 

 See, e.g., the EUDO CITIZENSHIP Citizenship Glossary 
3 
at 
http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/citizenship-glossary/
glossary#Cithip [accessed 13 September 2016]. In some countries, 
the  status  may  be  called  ‘nationality’  rather  than  citizenship  and 
persons  holding  the  status  are  referred  to  as  nationals  rather 
than  citizens.  For  the  sake  of  consistency,  I  refer  to  ‘citizenship’ 
throughout  the  paper,  except  when  citing  legal  documents  that 
directly refer to ‘nationality.’

this  is  commonly  viewed  as  the  most  advanced 
legal  status  they  can  obtain.  However,  a  range 
of  alternative  legal  statuses  may  be  available  to 
them,  either  related  to  the  grounds  on  the  basis 
of which they have been admitted to the territory 
of  the  state,  such  as  residence  permits  related  to 
work, study, family reunification or humanitarian 
grounds, or a residence status proving the right to 
permanent residence, such as the Green  Card in 
the US or the permit in the EU for so-called ‘long-
term resident third-country nationals’, i.e. persons 
without the citizenship of one of the EU member 
states “who have resided legally and continuously 
within  the  territory  of  a  member  state  for  five 
years immediately prior to the submission of the 
relevant application” (Directive 2003/109/EC, art. 
4, under 1).4

In this chapter, I understand integration in a broad 
sense as the process by which immigrants become 
accepted  into  society,  both  as  individuals  and 
as  groups  (Penninx  2003).  This  definition 
deliberately views integration as a process rather 
than as an endpoint and is also deliberately open 
as  to  what  precisely  determines  the  acceptance 
of  immigrants  in  a  society,  which  may  after  all 
vary  from  one  receiving  society  to  another.  In  a 
formal  sense,  the  acquisition  of  citizenship  itself 
may be viewed as the ultimate form of integration 
as  naturalised  migrants  acquire  a  status  that 
provides  (nearly)5  equal  rights  to  those  of  the 
majority population, such as the right of abode, of 
diplomatic protection, of political franchise and of 
access  to  public  sector  jobs  that  are  restricted  to 
citizens. In a practical sense, citizenship may not 
‘matter’ much, if naturalised immigrants continue 

4 
 Citizens of EU member states do not need a residence 
permit  and  have  the  right  to  move  and  reside  freely  within  the 
territory  of  the  member  states,  within  the  constraints  set  by 
Directive 2004/38/EC.

5 
 In some countries, the rights of naturalised immigrants 
may  be  restricted  in  that  some  selected  high  political  offices  are 
only  open  to  ‘natural  born’  citizens.  Countries  may  also  apply 
denaturalisation  rules,  which  allow  deprivation  of  citizenship 
within  a  certain  time  period  after  naturalisation  (e.g.  for  being 
convicted for major crimes or terrorist activities), which in practice 
leads to a form of conditional citizenship.

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INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES ~ Maarten Peter Vink

to face discrimination – e.g. in the labour market 
– or they lack the human capital to make full use 
of their newly acquired status. For some migrants, 
the security of residence and access to the labour 
market tied to permanent residence may provide 
sufficient legal security and opportunities, without 
them seeing a need to naturalise.

Investigating the relationship between citizenship 
and integration poses methodological challenges, 
as better-integrated immigrants are also more likely 
to  naturalise  (OECD  2011).  A  key  limitation  of 
existing studies is also that they mostly investigate 
these  relationships  within  only  one  societal 
context. This is problematic if one assumes, as I do 
(building on Yang 1994; Dronkers and Vink 2012; 
Vink,  Prokic-Breuer  and  Dronkers  2013;  Peters 
and Vink 2016; Peters, Vink and Schmeets 2016a, 
b), that: 

•  migrants have different motivations to natu-
ralise and these are partly associated with 
origin factors and the individual life course 
– hence demographic contexts and family 
situations matter greatly; 

•  pathways into citizenship are conditioned by 
the institutional contexts in both origin and 
destination countries with regard to accept-
ance of dual citizenship, length of required 
residence, language and integration require-
ments and the socioeconomic context; and 
the potential ‘integration premium’ associated 
with naturalisation is conditioned by the tra-
jectory into citizenship – especially the time 
to naturalisation. 

• 

Hence,  citizenship  does  not  matter  in  the  same 
way  when  it  is  acquired  by  a  young  immigrant 
of working age after only a few years of residence 
in the destination country as when it is acquired 
by  an  older  immigrant  near  the  end  of  her  or 
his  working  life  after  having  already  lived  in  the 
country  for  years.  Immigrants  naturalising  to 
secure  citizenship  for  their  children,  as  is  often 

necessary  in  Europe,  also  tell  a  different  story 
to  that  of  educated  immigrants  in  the  US  whose 
native-born  children  are  already  citizens  since 
birth  and  who  seek  better  employability  in  the 
public sector.   

From this perspective, the ambiguous findings in 
the  literature  on  the  consequences  of  citizenship 
are  hardly  surprising  (cf.  Peters  and  Vink  2016). 
For  example,  whereas  some  find  evidence  of  a 
positive  association  between  citizenship  and 
labour  market  integration  (Bratsberg  et  al  2002; 
Steinhardt  2012;  Helgertz  et  al  2014),  others 
find  no  such  effect  (Chiswick  1978;  Bevelander 
and  Veenman  2006;  Scott  2008).  Remarkably, 
however, these varying outcomes are often seen as 
undermining the overall significance of citizenship 
for  migrants,  with  some  scholars  and  decision-
makers arguing for the existence of a citizenship 
premium  and  others  against  it,  especially  in  the 
context  of  labour  market  integration.  However, 
rather than focusing on whether immigrant legal 
status  transitions  matter,  especially  those  from 
being  a  foreigner  to  being  a  citizen,  I  argue  that 
the  focus  should  be  on  why,  how  and  for  whom 
such transitions matter. 

There  are  two  key  implications  of  this  view  of 
naturalisation, which builds on recent applications 
of  the  sociological  life-course  paradigm  to  the 
literature on migration and integration (Wingens 
et  al  2011).  First,  we  should  think  about  the 
relevance of legal status transitions from a double-
context perspective: the relevance of naturalisation 
depends  both  on  the  institutional  context  under 
which  citizenship  (or  alternative  legal  statuses) 
is made available; and on the personal context of 
the country of origin and the life situation of an 
individual migrant. Second, viewing the relevance 
of  legal  status  transitions  within  the  life-course 
trajectory of migrants also means that we should 
think  less  of  citizenship  acquisition  as  a  one-off 
transition from foreigner to citizen, and more as a 
pathway or a ‘road to citizenship’ (Aptekar 2015). 

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Whereas  most  of  the  literature  is  focused  on 
the  citizenship  premium  in  the  labour  market, 
or  on  citizenship  and  political  participation, 
there  is  additional  –  though  patchy  –  evidence 
on  how  legal  status  transitions  matter  for  living 
conditions,  mobility  trajectories  and  educational 
outcomes among migrant children, among other 
things (see Bloemraad 2017 for a broad overview). 
The  remainder  of  this  section  will  briefly  review 
the state of the art in these various domains. 

Citizenship and socioeconomic 
integration6

labour  market  outcomes 

Given the structural challenges immigrants face in 
the labour market (Algan et al. 2010), citizenship 
provides  the  potential  to  mitigate  some  of  these 
disadvantages as it removes restrictions on public 
sector  jobs,  increases  employment  opportunities 
and  lowers  the  administrative  costs  of  hiring 
and  retaining  a  migrant  (Bauböck  et  al  2013). 
However,  the  sociological  life-course  approach 
points  to  a  hypothesis,  which  has  not  yet  been 
systematically tested, that the impact of citizenship 
acquisition  on 
is 
conditioned  both  by  the  institutional  setting  of 
the  destination  context  and  by  the  demographic 
composition  of  its  migrant  population.  Sweden, 
for  example,  houses  a  relatively  large  number  of 
refugees  who  are  highly  motivated  to  naturalise 
in  order  to  reinforce  their  legal  position  in  the 
host  country.  However,  refugees  are  particularly 
disadvantaged  in  the  labour  market  (Krahn  et 
al  2000),  which  may  go  some  way  to  explaining 
ambiguous  findings  on  the  relationship  between 
labour-market  integration  in 
citizenship  and 
Sweden.  Understanding  the  potential  impact 
of  a  life  event  such  as  naturalisation  requires  a 
biographical perspective. For example, Steinhardt 
(2012)  finds  that  naturalisation  offers  no  wage 
benefit to women, which may be understandable 
from  the  perspective  that  women  who  have 
chosen  to  remain  highly  active  in  the  labour 

6 

 This section builds on Peters and Vink (2016).

market in spite of alternative life-course patterns 
(part-time work or leaving the labour market) are 
positively selected. The challenge is thus to identify 
how  the  impact  of  naturalisation  is  mediated  by 
factors  (being  married  and  having  children,  and 
contextual factors that facilitate integration in the 
labour  market)  which  in  themselves  influence 
the  propensity  to  naturalise.  In  other  words, 
while recognising that naturalisation is a selective 
process and may be reversely influenced by labour 
market  performance,  both  individual-level  and 
contextual  factors  are  expected  to  mediate  this 
relationship. 

Citizenship and political 
participation

Beyond  work  and  income,  citizenship  is  closely 
tied to democratic participation, as naturalisation 
gives  access  to  rights  that  are  often,  though  not 
always,  exclusive  to  citizens.  Besides  voting, 
however,  citizenship  may  encourage  political 
participation  in  a  broader  sense.  Examples  of 
non-electoral  forms  of  political  participation 
include  conventional  acts  (such  as  contacting  a 
politician  or  government  official,  participating 
in  a  political  campaign  or  becoming  a  member 
of  a  political  party)  and  ‘unconventional’  types 
of  political  activity  (participating  in  protests 
and  boycotts,  and  signing  petitions).  In  liberal 
democracies, 
forms  of  non-electoral 
participation  are,  at  least  theoretically,  equally 
open to natives and immigrants (whether citizens 
or  non-citizens)  alike,  yet  one  would  not  expect 
all  residents  in  a  country  to  be  equally  active. 
A  number  of  individual  resources  are  typically 
viewed as prerequisites for political participation 
– time, money, civic skills, civic engagement and 
language skills – and differences would in the first 
place be expected on the basis of socio-economic 
background,  especially  educational  attainment. 
In  addition  to  such  factors,  immigrants  often 
come  from  countries  with  dramatically  different 
political  cultures  to  those  of  the  countries  of 

these 

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INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES ~ Maarten Peter Vink

destination.  For  them,  participation  in  political 
activities,  especially  those  that  go  beyond  the 
act  of  voting,  requires  additional  effort  and  is 
less  self-evidently  possible  than  for  natives.  It  is 
sometimes  argued  that  citizenship,  as  the  most 
secure legal status provided to immigrants and as 
it  includes  a  set  of  entitlements  providing  access 
to co-determining political decision-making in a 
country, may encourage immigrants to engage in 
political activism beyond the exercise of suffrage.

Previous research, however, has produced mixed 
results. Some North American studies (e.g. Verba 
et al. 1995; Barreto and Muñoz 2003, Levin 2013) 
have  found  little  correlation  between  citizenship 
status  and  participation,  while  others  (e.g.  Leal 
2002)  have  found  the  opposite.  In  Europe,  some 
single-country  or  limited  multi-country  studies 
suggest  the  existence  of  a  positive  relationship 
between citizenship and the non-electoral political 
participation of foreign-born residents (e.g. Giugni 
and Passy 2004; Bevelander and Pendakur 2011). 
On  the  basis  of  a  larger  comparative  study,  Just 
and Anderson (2012) reveal a positive relationship 
between  citizenship  and  non-electoral  political 
participation  among  foreign-born  residents,  but 
find  that  citizenship  is  a  statistically  significant 
determinant of political action only among those 
respondents  who  arrived  from  less  democratic 
countries,  and  only  for  non-institutionalized 
political acts. De Rooij (2012: 469) draws similar 
conclusions,  determining 
the  effect  of 
citizenship  on  unconventional  participation  is 
only significant for non-Western immigrants.

that 

Citizenship and living conditions

Employment  and  income  are  evidently  crucial 
to  the  societal  incorporation  of  immigrants  and 
reflect the relative success of migrants in this regard. 
However,  labour  market  outcomes  only  tell  part 
of the story. One important area that has received 
some attention in the literature, although mostly in 
the American context, is the role of citizenship in 

Improvements 

relation to immigrants’ living conditions. The key 
indicators in this area are, among others, quality 
of  housing  –  measured  in  terms  of  the  physical 
quality of accommodation and its location – and 
levels  of  home  ownership.  Research  consistently 
shows  better  outcomes  among  naturalised 
immigrants  (Borjas  2002;  Hutcheson  and  Jeffers 
2012).  However,  doubts  have  been  raised  as  to 
whether  citizenship  status  can  overcome  the 
broader  phenomenon  of  residential  crowding, 
net  of  increased  employment  opportunities  and 
income  premiums  associated  with  naturalisation 
(McConnell  2015). 
living 
conditions  are  likely  to  significantly  depend  on 
demographic  background,  life-course  stage,  the 
economic resources of individuals and contextual 
conditions,  such  as  public  sector  involvement  in 
housing  (Arbaci  2007).  Based  on  these  previous 
findings, it is expected that most upward mobility 
in  terms  of  living  conditions  can  be  explained 
by  positive  selection  into  naturalisation  and,  for 
selected groups (e.g. highly educated immigrants), 
by a citizenship premium in the labour market. For 
home ownership, which requires interaction with 
financial  and  legal  institutions,  one  may  expect 
an  additional  positive  impact  of  naturalisation 
for  these  groups.  These  hypotheses  have  so  far 
not been tested systematically in a cross-national 
context with appropriate longitudinal data. 

in 

Citizenship and out-migration

While  a  legal  status  transition  from  foreigner  to 
citizen  may  be  viewed  as  full  assimilation  in  the 
destination context, transnationalist theories point 
to a more complex reality where migrants do not 
either  settle  in  the  destination  country  or  return 
to their country of origin but may share intensive 
interactions in both contexts (Faist 2000). Rather 
than resulting in the stable settlement of migrants 
in  the  destination  contexts,  naturalisation  may 
encourage  return  migration  to  the  country  of 
origin  or  out-migration  to  another  destination. 
In  this  light,  having  dual  citizenship  provides 

28

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INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES ~ Maarten Peter Vink

opportunities  for  circular  mobility  (Alarian  and 
Goodman 2016). Return migration can be viewed 
as part of an optimal life-cycle residential location 
sequence  (Borjas  and  Bratsberg  1996).  However, 
the  naturalisation  literature  is  almost  completely 
focused  on  the  single  transition  from  foreigner 
to  citizen  rather  than  viewing  this  as  part  of  a 
larger  life-course  trajectory.  One  exception  is  a 
paper  by  Kuhlenkasper  and  Steinhardt  (2012), 
who  find  that  out-migrants  are  less  likely  to  be 
naturalised  German  citizens  and  on  average 
have  spent  fewer  years  in  Germany  than  their 
counterparts  who  stay  in  the  country.  The  study 
demonstrates the  need to consider  heterogeneity 
among immigrants, as this ‘negative mobility’ only 
applies  to  non-Turkish  immigrants.  It  is  unclear 
whether these findings can be generalised beyond 
the German context and, if so, whether the timing 
of  naturalisation  and/or  having  children  with 
destination  country  citizenship  matter  for  these 
out-migration decisions. 

Citizenship and the life course 
of migrant children

Citizenship also plays a crucial role in the lives of 
children, either directly through their citizenship 
status or indirectly through that of the parent(s). 
Granting citizenship at birth is ‘likely to exert an 
effect on children’s human capital because it raises 
the likelihood of a future in the host country and 
thus parents’ expectations about returns on specific 
host-country  human  capital  investments  (Saurer 
and  Felfe  2014:  8).  In  contrast,  growing  up  in  a 
country without being formally recognized as a full 
member of society can adversely affect assimilation 
processes  in  a  context  where  socioeconomic 
background  and  racial  discrimination  already 
challenge  modes  of  incorporation.  Nevertheless, 
the role of citizenship in the life course of native-
born descendants of immigrants (2nd generation) 
and  children  arriving  in  the  destination  country 
before adolescence (1.5 generation) has so far been 
largely  overlooked  in  the  literature.  Especially  in 

Europe, citizenship is predominantly attributed by 
descent from citizen parents (Vink and De Groot 
2010).  As  a  result,  children  of  second  or  even 
subsequent  immigrant  generations  only  acquire 
residence country citizenship at a later age, if at all. 
The most significant policy change in recent times 
has been in Germany, where since 2000 children 
born in the country automatically receive German 
citizenship under certain conditions. Studies show 
a positive impact of this introduction of birthright 
citizenship  on  educational  attainment  (Saurer 
and  Felfe  2014).  However,  comparative  research 
is  scarce.  Kilpi-Jakonen  (2014)  demonstrates 
that,  after  controlling  for  the  higher  propensity 
of immigrant children whose parents have higher 
education  to  have  citizenship,  second-generation 
students  with  Finnish  citizenship  are  more 
likely  to  choose  general  rather  than  vocational 
upper  secondary  education  compared  to  their 
peers  without  Finnish  citizenship.  Given  the 
potential occupational and earnings opportunities 
associated  with  citizenship,  the  naturalisation  of 
parents  also  impacts  the  educational  attainment 
of migrants’ descendants (Bean et al 2011). These 
hypotheses lack systematic comparative testing so 
far.

3. Access to Citizenship 
According  to  international  convention,  states 
are  sovereign  in  determining  their  constituent 
populations,  which  entails  that  within  certain 
limits  set  by  international  law  they  can  exclude 
populations inside their territory from citizenship 
or  include  others  beyond  their  borders.  As  a 
result, there is significant variation between states 
with regard to both the rules governing access to 
citizenship  and  its  loss  (see  Vink  and  Bauböck 
2013; Vink 2017).

For  access  to  citizenship,  on  the  one  hand  we 
can  distinguish  between  ascriptive  membership 
conceptions,  mostly  applicable 
the 
acquisition  of  citizenship  at  birth,  and  voluntary 
membership  conceptions,  which  imply  a  degree 

through 

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INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES ~ Maarten Peter Vink

of  openness  in  terms  of  individual  choice,  both 
regarding  acquisition  (e.g.  through  ordinary 
naturalisation) and loss of citizenship (e.g. through 
voluntary renunciation of the status). Most states 
in  Europe  prioritize  descent-based  transmission 
of  citizenship  but  use  territorial  access  to 
citizenship  to  prevent  what  is  generally  accepted 
as  the  undesirable  phenomenon  of  statelessness, 
as in the case of new-born babies whose descent 
cannot  be  established  found  in  the  territory  of 
a  state  (Vink  and  De  Groot  2010;  cf.  Vink  and 
De  Groot  2016).  In  contrast,  other  countries  – 
such  as  most  states  in  the  Americas  –  prioritize 
territorial access to citizenship but simultaneously 
maintain  rules  allowing  citizens  residing  outside 
the territory of the state to transmit citizenship to 
their  offspring,  with  varying  restrictions.  In  the 
sense  that  citizenship  for  most  people  is  tied  up 
with the mere fact of being born to citizens or in 
the territory of the ‘right’ country, there is a strong 
degree of arbitrariness in the way in which welfare 
entitlements  associated  with  citizenship  are 
distributed among the world population (Shachar 
2009). 

In addition to regulations determining citizenship 
at  birth,  states  also  maintain  a  variety  of  rules 
regarding the acquisition of citizenship after birth, 
such as by ordinary naturalisation or by facilitated 
naturalisation for the spouses of citizens, persons 
with a cultural affinity to the political community 
or refugees. Not only do rules on the acquisition 
of citizenship vary between states but so do rules 
on  the  loss  of  citizenship  too.  Due  to  limitations 
of  space,  I  focus  here  exclusively  on  rules  on 
the  acquisition  of  citizenship  after  birth,  and 
in  particular  provisions  related  to  ordinary 
naturalisation  and  facilitated  naturalisation  for 
refugees.7 

See 

http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/modes-of-
7 
acquisition  and  http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/modes-of-
loss for a comparative database of the existing regulations on the 
acquisition and loss of citizenship in 77 countries. 

Ordinary naturalisation

Ordinary  naturalisation  is  a  mode  of  acquisition 
after birth of a citizenship not previously held that 
requires  an  application  by  the  person  concerned 
or  his  or  her  legal  agent.  Whereas  naturalisation 
was  traditionally  conferred  with  a  discretionary 
act  granting  citizenship  by  a  public  authority, 
countries in Europe are increasingly adopting laws 
that provide for the nearly automatic acquisition 
of  citizenship  by  a  person  who  evidently  fulfils 
the eligibility criteria and is thus entitled to such 
acquisition  upon  application.  However,  only  7 
of  the  28  EU  member  states  currently  have  such 
an  entitlement  to  citizenship  in  their  ordinary 
naturalisation  procedures.8  Hence, 
in  most 
countries  the  acquisition  of  citizenship  remains 
based on a discretionary decision usually made by 
administrative  officials.9  Such  discretion  reflects 
a  contractual  view  of  citizenship,  where  explicit 
consent is required, both by the person applying 
for  citizenship  and  the  community  granting  it 
(Orgad 2017). 

Apart  from  the  legal  uncertainty  deriving  from 
discretionary  application  procedures,  a  key 
implication  of  the  contractual  view  –  which 
seems  widely  held  among  the  politicians  and 
electorates  designing  these  procedures  –  is  that 
the  way  in  which  the  eligibility  requirements  for 
naturalisation and other procedural requirements, 
such  as  fees,  are  designed  is  structurally  biased 
towards  the  ‘supply  side’,  i.e.  the  state  ‘supplying’ 
citizenship.10  In  other  words,  certainly  in  the 

8 
  See  http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/modes-of-
acquisition,  mode  A06  [accessed  15  September  2016].  Also  see 
Goodman  (2010)  for  a  comparative  report  on  naturalisation 
policies in Europe.

9 
 Until recently in Switzerland, some municipalities used 
referendums  to  decide  on  the  citizenship  applications  of  foreign 
residents.  Hainmueller  and  Hangartner  (2013),  using  an  original 
quasi-experimental design, demonstrate that discrimination on the 
basis of applicants’ origin-country characteristics had a significant 
impact on naturalisation rates among immigrant groups.

  A  further  consequence,  which  I  do  not  elaborate  on 
10 
here,  is  that  a  contractual  view  implies  conditional  allegiance  by 
both parties to the contract: ‘allegiance and protection are the quid 

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economically  most  developed  states  in  Europe, 
naturalisation  policies  reflect  a  seller’s  market 
where there is much demand but limited supply, 
and ‘buyers’ of citizenship are at the mercy of what 
‘sellers’ demand for it.11 Such asymmetry between 
the interests of the citizenship-granting state and 
the  citizenship-requesting  individual  is  at  odds 
with the ‘citizenship stakeholder’ principle, which 
assumes that the interests of the community and 
the  prospective  citizen  are  mutually  constitutive 
(Bauböck 2017a, 2017b). In this alternative view, 
naturalisation  policies  should  take  into  account 
not just supply-side concerns but also demand-side 
concerns and provide a pathway to citizenship to 
newcomers and their children as part of a general 
concern for democratic inclusion. 

pro quo of a mutual contract in which each is given in return for 
the other’ (Orgad 2017). The increasing popularity of citizenship 
deprivation rules can be viewed as a consequence of such a view: 
certain  (criminal  and  terrorist)  acts  are  seen  as  violating  the 
citizenship ‘contract’ and thereby constitute a legitimate ground for 
ending the contract.

The  ‘citizenship  for  sale’  or  ‘golden  visa’  provisions  in 
11 
some  countries  reflect  a  different  scenario,  where  states  seek  to 
attract  economic  investment  through  offering  facilitated  access 
to citizenship or residence (Dzankic 2012; Schachar and Bauböck 
2014).

The European Convention on Nationality (ECN), 
signed  by  29  states  and  ratified  by  20,  provides 
‘that  internal  law  should  contain  rules  which 
make  it  possible  for  foreigners  lawfully  and 
habitually resident in the territory of a State Party 
to be naturalised’ (Article 6, under 3). While the 
ECN  allows  considerable  discretion  for  states  to 
‘fix other justifiable conditions for naturalisation, 
integration’  (ECN, 
in  particular  as  regards 
Explanatory  Report,  Article  6,  paragraph  3),  it 
does  set  a  maximum  period  of  residence  which 
can  be  required  for  naturalisation,  namely  ten 
years (before the lodging of an application). When 
we look at the current residence requirements in 
all  28  member  states  of  the  EU,  we  see  that  no 
state exceeds the maximum of ten years, yet there 
is  considerable  variation  ranging  from  the  most 
common requirement of 5 years in 12 countries to 
a 10-year requirement in Austria, Italy, Lithuania, 
Slovenia  and  Spain  (Figure  1).  The  average 
residence requirement is 6.8 years.

Figure 1. Residency requirement for ordinary naturalisation in EU28 (in years)

Source: www.eudo-citizenship.eu (situation 1 January 2016)*
* Additional residence requirements may apply.

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The nominal residence requirements in citizenship 
laws  need  to  be  interpreted  with  great  care,  as 
additional  residence  requirements  often  apply, 
such  as  a  need  for  the  residence  period  to  be 
uninterrupted or the requirement of a permanent 
residence, either at the moment of application or 
even at the moment of starting to count the years 
of residence (Goodman 2010: 8-9). For example, 
although in Poland the citizenship law nominally 
requires 3 years’ residence, persons need to be in 
possession throughout this period of a permanent 
residence  permit  or  a  long-term  EU  residence 
permit, for which 5 years’ residence are required. 
Hence  the  minimum  residence  requirement  for 
ordinary naturalisation in Poland is 8 years in total. 
In  Portugal,  6  years’  legal  residence  is  required, 
without  any  need  to  have  permanent  residence. 
In  Denmark,  by  contrast,  9  years’  residence  is 
required with a permanent residence permit at the 
time of application. In Austria, by far the country 
with the strictest residence requirements, 10 years 
of continuous residence is required, of which the 
5  years  immediately  before  the  application  must 
be with a permanent resident permit. In practice, 
such additional residence requirements can have a 
significant impact on eligibility for naturalisation.12 

Access 
is  also 
to  ordinary  naturalisation 
conditioned by the existence of, among other things, 
a) language requirements, b) so-called integration 
requirements,  c)  economic  requirements,  d)  the 
fees  required  to  start  the  application  procedure, 
and  e)  a  requirement  to  renounce  one’s  previous 
citizenship.  Regarding 
language  requirements, 
we  find  that  most  EU  member  states  nowadays 
have  a  formalized  language  requirement,  either 
at  level  A2  (‘Can  understand  sentences  and 
frequently  used  expressions  related  to  areas  of 
most  immediate  relevance’)  or  level  B1  (‘Can 
understand the main points of clear standard input 
on familiar matters regularly encountered in work, 
school, leisure etc.’) from the Common European 
Framework  of  Reference  for  Languages  (CEFR). 
12 
 See EUDO CITIZENSHIP Observatory 2016 for a more 
detailed measurement of ‘citizenship law indicators’.

Some  states  maintain  high,  but  unstandardized 
language requirements, as is the case in Hungary, 
Italy, Malta, Romania, Slovakia and Spain (MIPEX 
2015).  Only  two  countries,  Ireland  and  Sweden, 
have no formal language requirements at all in the 
citizenship law (Figure 2). 

Figure 2. Language requirements for ordinary 
naturalisation in EU28

Source: MIPEX (2015)

While having language skills enables a person to 
participate  in  society,  for  example  in  the  labour 
market  and  in  political  decision-making  (e.g. 
elections),  and  thus  ensures  a  basis  for  active 
requirements  may 
citizenship,  overly  high 
also  provide  a  significant  barrier  to  accessing 
citizenship. The obstacles may relate both to literacy 
requirements  and  to  the  costs  associated  with 
acquiring  such  language  skills,  as  in  many  states 
it  is  up  to  the  immigrant  to  arrange  and  finance 
her  or  his  own  language  training.  According  to 
Goodman (2010), the number of countries with a 
formal language test increased from six in 1998 to 
sixteen in 2010.

Integration  requirements  also  vary  significantly 
between  states.  Such  requirements  demand 
sufficient  knowledge  of  a  country’s  history, 
the  habits  and 
political 
traditions  of  its  society  and  are  often  seen  as 
part  of  a  trend  towards  ‘fortifying  citizenship’ 
(Goodman  2012).13  They  may  be  found  either 

institutions  and/or 

13 
  How  to  categorise  and  measure  such  integration 
requirements  is  subject  to  considerable  controversy  (Goodman 

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as  requirements  for  permanent  residence  or  for 
citizenship, or for both. Whereas the argument for 
language skills is that they provide an important 
basis  for  a  migrant’s  integration  within  society, 
requiring migrants to obtain and reproduce such 
‘civic knowledge’ has been much more contested 
(e.g.  Bauböck  and  Joppke  2010).  According  to 
information from MIPEX (2015), in 2015 eleven 
EU28  states  required  a  formal  citizenship  test. 
Two  states,  Belgium  and  Luxembourg,  only 
required  applicants  to  have  taken  an  integration 
course,  whereas  in  six  states  integration  was 
assessed in an informal interview. Nine states had 
no formal integration requirement for citizenship 
acquisition.  Barriers  to  citizenship  relate  both  to 
intellectual requirements and the costs associated 
with  acquiring  sufficient  knowledge,  as  in  many 
states  it  is  up  to  the  immigrant  to  arrange  and 
finance  her  or  his  own  training.  Only  in  two 
countries  where  there  is  a  formal  test  (Estonia 
and  Germany)  does  the  state  provide  sufficient 
courses.  In  the  other  nine  countries  it  is  up  to 
the immigrant to arrange this for herself (MIPEX 
2015). 

and  sufficient  source  of  income,  or  some  similar 
type  of  requirement.  Other  states,  such  as  the 
Netherlands and the UK, do not have such income 
requirements but instead require applicants to pay 
a  considerable  fee.  In  the  Netherlands,  a  single 
application  for  naturalisation  costs  €855  and  an 
application  for  a  family  of  two  parents  and  two 
children would amount to €1343. Note that these 
fees  are  to  be  paid  irrespective  of  the  outcome 
of  the  application  and  do  not  include  additional 
costs  for  language  training  and  civics  courses.14 
In  the  UK,  the  fee  for  ordinary  naturalisation  is 
£1236 for each adult applicant and £936 for each 
child under the age of 18 (plus an additional £80 to 
cover the ceremony fee if the child turns 18 during 
the  application  process).15  According  to  MIPEX 
(2015), the average fee in the EU28 is around €250 
per  person,  yet  there  is  considerable  variation. 
Only  in  11  states  are  the  application  costs  below 
€100  per  person,  whereas  in  17  other  states  the 
fees  exceed  €100.  In  two  states  (Austria  and  the 
UK)  they  even  amount  to  more  than  €1000  per 
person.  This  makes  naturalisation  prohibitively 
costly.

Figure 3. Integration requirements for ordinary 
naturalisation in EU28

Figure 4. Fees (in euros) for ordinary 
naturalisation in EU28

Source: MIPEX (2015)

Source: MIPEX (2015)

In  terms  of  economic  requirements,  about  half  of 
the  EU28  states,  mostly  in  Central  and  Eastern 
Europe  plus  Austria,  Denmark  and  Italy,  require 
applicants to demonstrate that they have a stable 

2010; Michalowski and Van Oers 2012).

Additional  procedural  requirements  may  still 
discourage immigrants from applying or may lead 
14 
  See  https://ind.nl/EN/individuals/dutch-citizenship/
costs-income-requirements [accessed 26 January 2017].

15 
for-citizenship-applications [accessed 17 September 2016].

  See  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/fees-

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to rejections for those who do apply. For example, 
in  the  Netherlands  the  Research  Department 
of  the  Ministry  of  Security  and  Justice  recently 
investigated  why  so  few  migrants  whose  asylum 
applications had been rejected but who had been 
granted  regular  residence  status  as  part  of  an 
extraordinary regularization in 2007 had submitted 
an  application  for  naturalisation  (only  around 
30% have naturalised). Not being in possession of 
the  right  documents  from  the  country  of  origin 
was indicated as by far the main obstacle for the 
respondents to a survey (71% indicated they did 
not have the appropriate documents, even though 
nearly  all  said  they  had  tried  to  obtain  them). 
Whereas recognized refugees are exempted from 
such  identity  requirements,  as  they  cannot  be 
expected to return to the country from which they 
have fled, these ‘regularized migrants’ had to meet 
the  regular  identity  requirements,  even  though 
many cite opposition from authorities, difficulties 
traveling  to  the  country  of  origin  and  the  high 
costs  involved  in  trying  to  obtain  the  proper 
paperwork as the main problems they encounter. 
Under  current  regulations  in  the  Netherlands 
it  is  difficult  to  prove  that  one  cannot  get  the 
documents needed and exceptions are rarely made 
(WODC 2015). 

Finally,  whereas  most  states  in  the  EU  (and 
Denmark  as  one  of  the  most  recent  to  do  so  in 
2015) have now removed the somewhat outdated 
provision  of  asking  a  naturalising  immigrant  to 
renounce her or his previous citizenship, there are 
still eight states (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic,  Estonia,  Germany,  the  Netherlands 
and  Slovenia)  that  maintain  such  a  renunciation 
requirement.

Facilitated naturalisation for 
refugees

The  1951  Refugee  Convention  requires  that 
‘Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate 
the  assimilation  and  naturalisation  of  refugees. 
They  shall  in  particular  make  every  effort  to 

expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce 
as  far  as  possible  the  charges  and  costs  of  such 
proceedings’  (Article  34).  In  his  commentary  on 
the Convention, Grahl-Madsen (1963) emphasizes 
that ‘[n]aturalization in a country of refuge is one 
of the possibilities for putting an end to a person’s 
refugee character’ (comment 1 on Article 34). 

What  is  meant  in  Article  34  is  in  fact  the  laying 
of  foundations,  or  stepping  stones,  so  that  the 
refugee may familiarize himself with the language, 
customs  and  way  of  life  of  the  nation  among 
whom he lives, so that he – without any feeling of 
coercion – may be more readily integrated in the 
economic, social and cultural life of his country of 
refuge. 

Language courses, vocational adaptation courses, 
lectures on national institutions and social pattern, 
and  above  all  stimulation  of  social  contacts 
between refugees and the indigenous population, 
are but some of the means which may be employed 
for the purpose. 

By  facilitating  “assimilation”  the  Contracting 
State  is  to  a  certain  extent  also  facilitating  the 
naturalisation  of  refugees:  In  the  sense  the  word 
is  used  in  Article  34,  “assimilation”  is  “an  apt 
description of a certain stage in the development 
of the life of the refugee and of the general refugee 
problem”;  indeed  it  “clearly  corresponded  to  the 
conditions  the  refugee  should  fulfil  in  order  to 
qualify for naturalisation” (ibid., comment 3). 

Naturalisation  may  be  facilitated  in  a  number  of 
ways, for example by a ‘less rigid implementation 
of  financial  criteria’,  by  waiving  the  requirement 
to be released from one’s former citizenship, or by 
a  shorter  residence  requirement.  Grahl-Madsen 
argues that Article 34 of the Convention requires 
fair treatment of refugees, but no better treatment 
than that accorded to other aliens if that treatment 
is a favourable one (ibid., comment 4). 

A  comparable  requirement  to  facilitate  the 
acquisition of citizenship for ‘recognised refugees’ 
can be found in the ECN (Art. 6, under 4(g)). The 

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and  to  enable  their  full  integration  into  society’, 
namely  a  residency  requirement  not  exceeding 
five  years  (UNHCR  2009:  3).  UNHCR  is  also 
concerned  that  time  spent  by  refugees  prior  to 
determination of their application does not “slow 
down  refugees’  route  to  citizenship”  (ibid.).  In 
Ireland,  discretionary  exemption  from  residence 
and other requirements is possible and in practice 
refugees are exempted from income requirements, 
yet time spent in the country as an asylum seeker 
is  not  reckonable  for  the  purpose  of  making  an 
application, according to a High Court judgment 
(Becker and Cosgrave 2013: 4). 

4. Acquisition of 
Citizenship 
So  what  do  we  know  about  how  many  migrants 
acquire  citizenship  in  the  EU?  Overall,  based 
on  statistics  reported  by  the  member  states,  we 
know  that  on  average  around  850,000  persons  a 
year acquired the citizenship of one of the EU28 
member states between 2009 and 2014 (Eurostat 
2016). 

In  a  population  of  over  500  million  inhabitants, 
that  number  is  not  very  significant  (around  0.17 
percent).  Even  when  looking  at  the  citizenship 
acquisition  rate  among  the  resident  foreign 
population  (a  standard  measure  of  the  relative 
societal impact of the number of naturalisations), 
only 2.6 in a hundred resident non-nationals were 
granted  citizenship  in  one  of  the  EU’s  member 
states in 2014 (Figure 5). 

Explanatory  Report  clarifies  this  obligation  as 
follows:

In  order  to  comply  with  this  paragraph, 
it  is  sufficient  for  a  State  Party  to  ensure 
favourable  conditions  for  the  acquisition 
of  nationality  for  the  persons  belonging 
to  each  of  the  categories  of  persons 
listed  in  the  sub-paragraphs.  Examples 
include  a  reduction  of  the  length  of 
required residence, less stringent language 
requirements,  an  easier  procedure  and 
lower  procedural  fees.  States  Parties  still 
retain their discretion to decide whether to 
grant their nationality to such applicants. 
Where  the  generally  required  conditions 
are already very favourable (for example a 
short period of residence for all applicants 
for  naturalisation),  such  States  are  not 
required  to  take  additional  measures 
(Explanatory  Report  to  the  ECN,  Art.  6, 
paragraph 4, consideration 52). 

Looking at the existing regulations in EU member 
states,  it  is  remarkable  that  eight  states  have  no 
specific  provisions  related  to  refugees.  In  other 
states, facilitation is minimal. In the Netherlands, 
the  only  facilitation  mentioned  in  the  law  itself 
is  a  waiver  of  the  requirement  to  renounce 
the 
one’s  previous  citizenship  (additionally, 
naturalisation fee is lowered from €840 to €625). 
In Denmark, the residence requirement is lowered 
from  9  to  8  years.  Overall,  whereas  the  average 
number of years of residence required for ordinary 
naturalisation in the EU28 is 7 years, for refugees it 
is 4.5 years. While this amounts to a considerable 
facilitation,  in  7  member  states  the  residence 
requirement for naturalisation by refugees is still 
six years or more. One state (Lithuania) requires 
the same extraordinary length of time (10 years) 
for  both  ordinary  naturalisation  and  that  of 
refugees.  Such  requirements  clearly  violate  what 
the  UNHCR  considers  best  practice  ‘in  order 
to  restore  an  effective  nationality  to  refugees 

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Figure 5. Annual rate of acquisition of citizenship per 100 resident foreigners, 2014

Source: Eurostat (2016: Figure 5)
* These numbers may include naturalisations both by persons resident in the territory of a state and by persons resident abroad.

the 

rates  among 

citizenship 
More  meaningful  estimates  of 
acquisition 
foreign-born 
population  are  available  based  on  micro-data 
from  comparative  surveys.  For  example,  on  the 
basis of data from the 2008 Labour Force Survey 
Ad Hoc Module on the labour market situation of 
migrants  and  their  descendants  in  the  EU15,  we 
find that an average of only 19% of the immigrant 
population  had  acquired  citizenship  after  10 
years  of  residence  (Table  1).  Nevertheless,  there 
is  significant  variation,  with  up  to  60%  of  the 
immigrant  population  having  naturalised 
in 
Sweden but only 2% in Luxembourg. After twenty 
years  of  residence  the  average  acquisition  rate 
increased  to  45%  (and  85%  in  Sweden).  Among 
the  population  resident  longer  than  20  years,  on 
average 63% had naturalised in the EU15. While 
this is a significant percentage, it still means that 
there  was  a  group  of  nearly  40%  of  immigrants 
(and 80% in Luxembourg) who had not naturalised 
after residing over 20 years in a country. 

Table  1.  Cumulative  rate  of  acquisition  of 
citizenship  among  foreign-born  population  in 
EU15  (per  cohort  of  years  of  residence),  in  %, 
2008

Years of residence

6 to 10

11 to 19

AUSTRIA

BELGIUM

DENMARK

FRANCE

GERMANY

GREECE

IRELAND

ITALY

LUXEMBOURG

NETHERLANDS

PORTUGAL

SPAIN

SWEDEN

UK

Mean

18.90

24.07

14.36

18.54

28.72

7.57

12.01

7.98

2.05

36.70

3.93

13.26

60.94

26.30

18.81

41.60

50.40

52.13

36.91

56.97

25.61

32.78

17.66

8.22

70.22

31.45

31.77

85.40

51.70

45.40

20+

62.76

55.52

61.86

60.55

46.38

56.77

56.44

60.19

19.61

80.23

58.55

54.46

79.18

66.51

62.70

Source: Vink and Prokic-Breuer (2012)*
*  Data  from  LFS  Ad  Hoc  Module  2008.  No  data  available  for 
Finland

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Analysing  micro-level  survey  data  also  allows 
a  better  understanding  of  the  relevance  of 
individual-,  origin  country-  and  context-level 
factors to the acquisition of citizenship by migrants. 
The  following  paragraphs  summarize  the  results 
of  a  comparative  study  by  Vink,  Prokic-Breuer 
and Dronkers (2013) on the effects of citizenship 
policies in European countries on the propensity 
to  naturalise,  taking  into  account  not  only 
characteristics of individuals, but also their origin 
country  features.  In  particular,  the  study  looked 
at the relevance of destination country policies in 
the context of origin country features, such as the 
level  of  development  of  the  origin  country,  and 
dual citizenship policies. The study was based on 
a  sample  of  7,489  foreign-born  residents  in  16 
European  countries  collected  by  the  European 
Social  Survey.  The  study  was  innovative  because 
where  any  comparative  research  had  been  done 
on  the  effects  of  destination  country  policies  the 
conclusion  had  been  that  indeed  ‘policy  matters’ 
(Bloemraad  2002;  Reichel  2011;  Dronkers  and 
Vink 2012) but few scholars had investigated the 
question  of  to  whom  citizenship  policy  matters 
most (if at all). 

Vink et al (2013) first look at typical factors, such 
as  origin  country  and  individual-level  variables. 
The  level  of  human  development  of  countries 

of  origin  accounts  for  much  of  the  difference 
among the propensity of immigrants to naturalise. 
Immigrants in Europe coming from medium and 
under-developed  countries  are  on  average  2.5 
times  more  likely  to  have  citizenship  than  those 
originating  from  highly  developed  countries, 
including  EU  member  states  and  other  OECD 
countries.  These  findings  are  in  line  with  the 
literature and can be understood in terms of the 
perceived  payoff  attached  to  citizenship  (Jasso 
and  Rosenzweig  1986:  303;  Bueker  2005;  Logan 
et  al.  2012).  Acquiring  destination-country 
citizenship  has  a  much  higher  potential  pay-off 
for  immigrants  originating  from  low-income 
countries than for those coming from developed 
and more prosperous societies. 

Crucially, because large differences exist between 
immigrants in their motivation to naturalise, Vink 
et  al  (2013)  show  that  the  impact  of  citizenship 
policies  varies  for  the  above  two  groups  (Figure 
6). As discussed previously, the legal frameworks 
set by the citizenship laws in destination countries 
account for different naturalisation rates, but only 
for  immigrants  from  less  developed  countries. 
In  fact,  not  only  are  these  immigrants  twice  as 
likely  to  naturalise  in  countries  with  very  open 
citizenship  policies,  but  they  are  also  the  ones 
particularly affected by these policies.

Figure 6. The relation between citizenship policies and immigrant naturalisation rates, EU15 (by 
level of development of origin country)*

* HDI = Human Development Index

37

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Vink  et  al  (2013)  demonstrate  the  relevance  of 
policy by introducing an indicator that captures the 
openness  of  citizenship  policy  in  the  destination 
countries  for  first-generation  immigrants  with 
regard to residency and integration requirements 
for naturalisation (MIPEX Access to Nationality). 
They  observe  that  an  increase  of  1  unit  on  the 
MIPEX  scale  leads  to  a  2.4  percent  increase  in 
the  likelihood  of  having  destination  country 
citizenship.  However,  only 
the  case  of 
in 
immigrants 
from  under-developed  countries 
do  they  observe  a  sharp  increase  in  citizenship 
take-up  rates.  In  other  words,  immigrants  who 
are  highly  motivated  to  naturalise,  in  particular 
refugees  or  migrants  from  politically  unstable 
countries  more  generally,  are  especially  strongly 
affected  by  restrictive  access  to  citizenship.  For 
immigrants from highly developed and politically 
stable  countries  the  positive  relation  between 
citizenship  policy  and  naturalisation  rates  is 
weaker and not significant. 

individual  characteristics  of 

and  Hans  Schmeets,  we  analysed  population 
register data from the Netherlands for the period 
since 1995. In this analysis, we looked at foreign-
born  residents  in  the  Netherlands  and  included 
statistical  controls  for  the  country  of  origin  and 
immigrants 
the 
(Peters  et  al,  2016a).  We  found  that  a  restriction 
of  the  Dutch  citizenship  law  in  April  2003  had 
a  significantly  negative  impact  on  immigrant 
naturalisation  rates.  Among  immigrants  who 
arrived in the Netherlands in 1995, 1996 or 1997 
on  average  58  per  cent  were  naturalised  after  10 
years.  However,  among  the  cohorts  from  2000, 
2001 and 2002, only 42 per cent were naturalised 
after a similar period. These differences are even 
greater  if  you  look  at  the  groups  who  are  most 
in  need  of  citizenship,  such  as  immigrants  from 
less developed countries or those from politically 
unstable countries (Figure 7).

We compared immigrants from cohorts that could 

Figure 7. Cumulative acquisition rates (proportions not naturalised or foreign) among migrant 
cohorts 1995-1997 (a) and 2000-2002 (b), by political stability of origin country, in the Netherlands

Source: Peters et al (2016), Figure A1 

We  find  a  similar  differentiated 
impact  of 
citizenship  laws  on  naturalisation  rates  when 
looking  in  more  detail  at  longitudinal  data  from 
the  Netherlands.  In  research  with  Floris  Peters 

still naturalise under the pre-2003 legislation and 
those  who  could  only  do  so  under  the  stricter 
2003  law.  We  found  that  for  immigrants  from 
politically  stable  countries  the  propensity  to 

38

CITIZENSHIP AND LEGAL STATUSES IN RELATION TO THE INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES ~ 
Maarten Peter Vink

naturalise  is  virtually  the  same  for  the  pre-  and 
immigrants 
post-2003  cohorts.  However,  for 
from politically unstable countries the difference 
is  significant:  immigrants  from  cohorts  that  fall 
under the stricter 2003 legislation naturalise later 
and less often. In other words, we see that policy 
does matter, especially for those immigrants who 
are most interested in acquiring the citizenship of 
the country in which they live. It is not just that 
under  the  2003  law  these  immigrants  postpone 
naturalisation,  but  they  seem  to  be  put  off 
altogether.  As  a  result  of  the  demotivating  effect 
of the restrictive measures, we expect that the still 
high cumulative naturalisation rates measured in 
the  Netherlands  in  2008  (Table  1)  will  gradually 
decrease over time.

5. Pathways to Citizenship 
and Socio-Economic 
Integration 
In this section I provide some brief evidence from 
ongoing  research  with  Peters  and  Schmeets  on 
the  relationship  between  citizenship  acquisition 
and  socio-economic  outcomes, 
in  particular 
having paid employment, among migrants in the 
Netherlands. 

Anticipating citizenship (Peters 
et al, 2016b)

Can citizenship improve the economic integration 
of  immigrants?  In  this  paper  we  develop  the 
argument  that  migrants  anticipate  the  rewards 
of citizenship by investing in their human capital 
development,  such  as  by  acquiring  language 
skills.  In  line  with  a  life-course  approach  to 
immigrant naturalisation (Peters and Vink 2016), 
we hypothesize that this anticipation mechanism 
is reflected in improved labour market outcomes, 
not  so  much  –  or  certainly  not  only  –  after 
naturalisation, as assumed in most of the literature, 
but already before the acquisition of citizenship. 

To test this argument, we use micro-level register 
data  from  Statistics  Netherlands  from  1999  to 
2011  (N  =  94,320).  To  analyse  these  data  in 

further  detail,  and  in  line  with  contemporary 
studies  in  the  literature,  we  use  individual  fixed-
effects  regression  methodology  (Bratsberg  et 
al.  2002;  Helgertz  et  al.  2014;  Steinhardt  2012). 
The  main  reason  for  this  approach  is  that  it 
addresses  the  potential  bias  resulting  from  self-
selection inherent in the naturalisation process by 
controlling for differences between individuals in 
terms of unmeasured characteristics. 

The results show that immigrants who naturalise 
enjoy  a  one-off  boost  in  the  probability  of 
paid  employment  after  citizenship  acquisition, 
constituting an increase of 12 and 13 percent for 
men  and  women  respectively,  everything  else 
remaining  constant.  However,  consistent  with 
the  notion  of  anticipation,  their  labour  market 
performance already improves before the year of 
naturalisation  and  we  observe  a  steep  increase 
in  the  probability  of  having  paid  employment  as 
migrants approach the moment of naturalisation. 
Labour market performance peaks in the year of 
naturalisation for male immigrants, and the year 
after  naturalisation  for  female  immigrants.  At 
that point, both male and female immigrants are 
more than twice as likely to have paid employment 
compared  to  more  than  three  years  prior  to 
naturalisation.  This  confirms  that  naturalisation 
is  attractive  to  immigrants  who  struggle  in  the 
labour market. 

These  findings  contrast  with  the  traditional 
causal  theory  of  the  citizenship  premium  in  the 
literature, where positive labour market outcomes 
are assumed to be the direct result of citizenship 
acquisition  (OECD  2011;  Helgertz  et  al.  2014: 
344). The increase observed in the probability of 
having  paid  employment  in  the  period  leading 
up  to  the  moment  of  naturalisation  shows  that 
immigrants  anticipate  the  reward  of  citizenship 
and that employers recognize and respond to the 
developing skills of potential workers, rather than 
citizenship acquisition itself. As such, naturalised 
integration 
immigrants  enjoy  an  accelerated 
process  rather 
long-term 
than  a  sustained 
advantage in the labour market.

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The faster, the better (Vink et 
al, 2016)

In  a  second  paper,  we  argue  that  the  potential 
positive impact of citizenship acquisition on labour 
market outcomes is conditioned by the trajectory 
into  the  acquisition  of  this  legal  status,  and  we 
test  the  hypothesis  that  the  longer  the  waiting 
period  the  smaller  the  impact  of  citizenship  (cf. 
Bevelander  and  DeVoretz  2014).  In  line  with 
a  life-course  perspective  on  naturalisation,  the 
idea behind this hypothesis is that acquisition of 
citizenship no longer positively affects the labour 
market  outcome  after  an  immigrant  has  already 
resided in the destination country for a significant 
period. This is not to say that citizenship will not 
have specific benefits at that stage (e.g. it will offer 
more  flexible  mobility  and  may  facilitate  return 
migration) but we would not expect it to affect a 
migrant’s human capital development in the way 
that it would if the migrant naturalised after just 
a few years of residence (when it may encourage 
through 
a 
anticipation mechanisms, as demonstrated above).  

integration 

trajectory 

fast-track 

To test this argument, we use micro-level register 
data  from  Statistics  Netherlands  from  1999  to 
2011 (N = 197,245) and apply a logistic regression 
method  to  analyse  the  probability  of  having 
paid  employment.  We  include  a  1-year  lagged 
dependent  variable  in  the  module  to  control  for 
otherwise unobserved personal characteristics.

We  show  that  the  positive  impact  of  citizenship 
is especially visible in the early years of residence 
in the new country, but that after seven years the 
rewards diminish significantly (Figure 8). Migrants 
who naturalise within ten years of having arrived 
in  the  Netherlands  have  a  higher  propensity  to 
have paid employment. However, this propensity 
is  significantly  higher  when  migrants  naturalise 
relatively  early  on,  especially  in  the  fourth  year 
after arrival (59 per cent for men; 47 per cent for 
women).16 However, men who naturalise after five 
years of residence in the Netherlands (thus in the 
sixth year) still have a 20 per cent higher chance 
of having paid work compared to those migrants 
who  do  not  naturalise  at  all;  among  women  this 
propensity  is  even  32  per  cent  higher.  From  the 
eighth  year  of  residence,  naturalisation  has  a 
much lower impact (9 and 8 per cent for men and 
women respectively). From this perspective, there 
is  no  empirical  evidence  to  support  the  current 
legislative proposal (approved by the Lower House, 
pending discussion in the Senate) to increase the 
residence requirement from five to seven years (or 
even to ten years, as some parties are proposing in 
their current electoral manifestos). These findings 
chime  with  evidence  from  Hainmueller  et  al 
(2016),  who  find  that  lengthy  asylum  processes 

16 
  Under  Dutch  legislation,  these  will  be  migrants  with 
a  Dutch  partner,  who  are  allowed  to  naturalise  after  3  years  of 
marriage  or  civil  partnership.  We  include  a  statistical  control  for 
having a Dutch partner, either foreign-born or native-born, which 
has  an  independent  significant  positive  impact  on  having  paid 
employment.

Figure 8. Relative propensity of paid employment among naturalised immigrants in the 
Netherlands, cohorts 1999-2002, by years of residence at the moment of naturalisation

Source: Vink et al (2016)
Graph based on analyses controlling for years of residence, age at migration, partner status (foreign partner, foreign-born Dutch, native-
born Dutch, no partner), having young children in the household, country of origin (EU vs. third country) and a 1-year lagged dependent 
variable.

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decrease employment among refugees. For newly 
arriving  refugees,  what  matters  for  their  societal 
integration (through employment) is thus a clear 
pathway toward inclusion, both through a speedy 
asylum determination procedure and an accessible 
trajectory towards citizenship.

6. Concluding reflections
How  can  these  findings  inform  targeted  policy 
decisions  aimed  at  maximizing  the  settlement 
success  of  immigrants  and  their  children?  Both 
the  studies  discussed  in  the  previous  section 
illustrate that citizenship status relates significantly 
to  integration  outcomes  for  immigrants,  in  this 
case  with  regard  to  paid  employment,  but  that 
we  should  start  thinking  about  the  relevance 
of  legal  status  beyond  seeing  it  as  some  kind 
of  ‘magical  device’  that  may  provide  struggling 
migrants  with,  e.g.,  better  access  to  the  labour 
market.  Migrants  actively  plan  their  lives  and 
anticipate the potential rewards and opportunities 
of naturalisation by investing in their own futures. 
However, approaching citizenship as a ‘reward for 
integration’,  as  is  often  heard  in  political  circles, 
from this perspective is a self-defeating prophecy, 
as  integration  is  not  a  clearly  defined  end-state 
but  rather  a  process,  and  making  citizenship 
conditional  on  ever-stricter  criteria  makes 
‘becoming  more  accepted  in  society’  an  elusive 
ambition instead of a realistic goal.

Analysing how and under which conditions status 
transitions  affect  migrant  life-course  trajectories 
allows  us  to  better  inform  policymakers  on  the 
outcomes  of  immigrant  naturalisation  policies. 
These  policies  have  been  characterised  by  two 
developments over the past three decades: on the 
one  hand,  citizenship  has  become  increasingly 
instrumentalised  as  part  of  a  broader  immigrant 
integration  agenda;  on  the  other  hand,  these 
policies have also become increasingly politicised 
(Vink and De Groot 2010). These two trends clearly 
have  contradictory  effects  in  terms  of  whether 
they  make  citizenship  more  or  less  accessible  to 
migrants and their offspring.

While researchers have provided significant input 
for evidence-based policy-making in this domain, 
in Europe (OECD 2011) existing research does not 
facilitate informing decision-makers for two main 
reasons. First and foremost, by focusing research on 
the binary question of whether citizenship matters 
for immigrants, the literature overlooks significant 
heterogeneity and misses out on identifying why, 
under  which  conditions  and  to  whom  citizenship 
matters.  In  other  words,  whereas  heterogeneous 
outcomes  are  often  seen  as  undermining  the 
overall significance of citizenship for immigrants, 
scholars  should  recognize  and  communicate  to 
policymakers that what matters is the pathway into 
citizenship, not just the acquisition of the status as 
such. Researchers should also invest further efforts 
not just in sophisticated methodological strategies 
to deal with ‘the causality problem’ in citizenship 
and integration, but also in theoretical models that 
allow us to hypothesize these differential pathways 
in  a  broad  range  of  life-course  domains.  The 
examples  presented  in  Section  5  illustrate  such 
an  approach  in  the  most  commonly  investigated 
domain, of labour market integration, but as was 
outlined in the literature review in Section 2, these 
models can and need to be applied in other fields 
too.

Second,  partly  driven  by  the  high  demand  for 
longitudinal  data,  the  most  advanced  research 
in the field focuses on single countries or at best 
includes limited comparisons. As a result, existing 
research  does  not  facilitate  drawing  conclusions 
on  the  question  most  relevant  to  policymakers, 
that  of  the  variable 
impact  of  policies  on 
naturalisation  outcomes.  This  is  partly  because 
suitable  longitudinal  data  are  scarcely  available 
(although data derived from population registers 
as in the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries 
provide a promising starting point) or are under-
used  (intra-country  variation  over  time  is  not 
currently optimally utilised to analyse the impact 
of  policy  changes).  Moreover,  whereas  much  of 
the  research  focuses  on  the  symbolically  –  and 
arguably  in  practice  –  most  relevant  legal  status 

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transition,  i.e.  that  towards  citizenship,  there  is 
much less evidence on the relevance of other types 
of  legal  status  transitions,  such  as  from  asylum 
seeker  to  recognized  refugee,  or  from  ‘dead-end’ 
statuses  only  offering  temporary  protection  to 
being  an  immigrant  with  permanent  residence 
and eventually a citizen of the host country. Again, 
this is partly a reflection on the available data (e.g. 
in  surveys  and  population  registers  information 
on  citizenship  status 
included,  yet 
information  on  other  types  of  statuses  is  mostly 
lacking). Whereas increasingly better comparable 
data exist on citizenship and integration policies, 
how such policies affect the relevant outcomes still 
leaves much to be investigated.

is  often 

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Course Perspective. In G. Freeman and N. Mirilovic, eds, Handbook on migration and social policy. 
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INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES ~ Maarten Peter Vink

Peters,  F.,  M.  Vink  and  H.  Schmeets  (2016a).  The  ecology  of  immigrant  naturalization:  a  life  course 
approach in the context of institutional conditions. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 42(3) 359-
381.

Peters, F., M. Vink and H. Schmeets (2016b). Anticipating the citizenship premium: before and after 
effects  of  immigrant  naturalization  on  paid  employment.  Unpublished  manuscript  [available  upon 
request].

Poulain,  M.,  Perrin,  N.  &  Singleton,  A.  (2006).  THESIM:  Towards  harmonised  European  statistics  on 
international migration: Presses univ. de Louvain.

Reichel, D. (2011). Do legal regulations hinder naturalisation?: citizenship policies and naturalisation 
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Saurer, J. and C. Felfe (2014). Granting Birthright Citizenship – A Door Opener for Immigrant Children’s 
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Shachar,  A.  (2009).  The  Birthright  Lottery  :  Citizenship  and  Global  Inequality.  Cambridge:  Harvard 
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Shachar, A., & Baubock, R. (2014). Should Citizenship be for Sale? EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2014/01.

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Steinhardt, M. F. (2012). Does Citizenship Matter? The Economic Impact of Naturalizations in Germany. 
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Vink,  M.  (2017).  Comparing  Citizenship  Regimes.  In  A.  Shachar,  R.  Bauböck,  I.  Bloemraad  and  M. 
Vink, eds, Oxford Handbook of Citizenship. Oxford University Press (forthcoming).

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INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES ~ Maarten Peter Vink

Vink, M., T. Prokic-Breuer and J. Dronkers (2013). Immigrant naturalization in the context of institutional 
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Yang, P.Q. 1994. Explaining Immigrant Naturalization. International Migration Review 28(3):449-477.

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INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES ~ Maarten Peter Vink

CITIZENSHIP, 
DIVERSITY AND 
MOBILITY 
Kees Groenendijk  
Radboud University, Nijmegen

Maarten  Vink’s  paper  clearly  illustrates  how  a 
new methodological approach to an old question 
can  produce  new  insights.  Vink’s  longitudinal 
‘life  course  perspective’  and  his  combination  of 
information from different sources allow him to go 
beyond the old debate about the causal relationship 
between  naturalisation  and  integration  resulting 
from the more limited data used in the traditional 
binary  approach  to  this  issue.  His  research  also 
produces  results  that  are  highly  relevant  in  the 
current  political  debate  in  several  EU  Member 
States.  I  mention  two  examples.  His  findings 
that  the  labour  market  participation  of  migrants 
peaks before and not after naturalisation is highly 
relevant  in  the  debate  in  states  where  politicians 
propose extending the residence requirement for 
naturalisation. In the Netherlands, a bill is pending 
in the Senate which would extend the current five-
year residence requirement (in place since 1892) 
to seven years. In its electoral programme for the 
March  2017  parliamentary  elections,  the  largest 
current  government  party  (VVD)  announced 
plans  for  a  further  extension  to  ten  years.  The 
justification  for  these  proposals  is  that  they 
would support immigrant integration. The results 
from Vink’s research illustrate that the extension 
would have negative effects on the labour market 
participation  of  those  immigrants  who  are  most 
interested in acquiring citizenship. Moreover, his 
paper  makes  it  clear  that  five  to  ten  years  after 
their arrival considerable numbers of refugees are 
still living in the country of refuge, however much 
both they and the receiving societies would prefer 
an early return to their countries of origin.

My  first  question  is  whether  by  presenting 
aggregate data the author does not underestimate 
the  diversity  within  the  population  researched. 
The  migrant  population  in  his  data  is  composed 
of refugees, nationals of other EU member states, 
spouses  of  nationals,  economic  migrants  and  in 
some  cases  co-ethnics.  The  differences  within 
and  between  these  categories  remain  invisible  in 
aggregate quantitative data. For instance, the data 
presented in Figure 8 of Vink’s paper result from 
widely  different  behaviours  between  refugees 
and  nationals  from  other  EU  member  states, 
the  former  category  having  high  naturalisation 
rates  and  the  latter  generally  having  much  lower 
rates.  Vink  points  to  the  large  differences  in  the 
perceived  payoff  from  naturalisation  between 
the  different 
immigrant  groups.  However, 
within  certain  groups  the  payoffs  and  the  actual 
naturalisation  practice  also  vary  considerably. 
In  the  Netherlands,  the  naturalisation  rates  of 
nationals of southern and eastern Member States 
are far higher than among EU nationals from the 
northern and the neighbouring Member States.

Second, I doubt whether naturalisation generally 
reflects  a  deliberate  choice  by  the  migrant 
to  remain  and  integrate  in  the  society  of  his 
country  of  residence.  In  his  introduction,  Vink 
presents  naturalisation  as  “a  deliberate  choice  by 
immigrants to link their future with that of the host 
country.” This image often dominates the political 
and public debate. It may be true for the majority 
of applicants, at least at the time of naturalisation, 
but the reality is more diverse. The paper mentions 
out-migration after naturalisation. Recent data on 
the Netherlands give a first impression of the size 
and diversity of that out-migration. In 2009-2013 
a  total  of  44,000  persons  originating  from  nine 
refugee-producing  countries  were  naturalised. 
Within  two  years  of  their  naturalisation  14%  of 
these  new  Dutch  nationals  left  the  Netherlands. 
Some returned to their countries of origin, while 
others  migrated  to  other  EU  Member  States. 
Within two years of their naturalisation almost 40% 

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Kees Groenendijk

of  the  naturalised  former-refugees  from  Bosnia, 
Iran, Iraq and Sudan returned to their countries of 
origin. Among former refugees from Afghanistan, 
Sierra  Leone  and  Somalia  the  return  rate  was 
considerably  lower  (below  10%).  The  former 
refugees,  who  used  the  right  to  free  movement 
within  the  EU  attached  to  their  new  nationality, 
migrated  from  the  Netherlands  primarily  to  the 
UK (40%), to Belgium (9%) and to Germany (7%). 
More than half of the 6,000 new Dutch nationals 
who left the Netherlands within two years moved 
to these three EU Member States.1 Naturalisation 
enhances  the  mobility  of  new  nationals,  both  to 
their countries of origin and within the EU.

Apparently, refugees’ acquisition of the nationality 
of their country of refuge enables their return to 
the county of origin, because it reduces the risks in 
returning through the protection attached to the 
new  nationality.  It  also  grants  the  right  to  come 
back to the country of the new nationality if the 
country  of  origin  turns  out  to  not  yet  be  safe  or 
the  prospects  of  successful  re-integration  in  that 
country is not yet positive. From anthropological 
research,  it  appears  that  out-migration  to  other 
EU  Member  States  may  be  triggered  by  various 
factors: better labour market chances (perceived or 
real), easier access to self-employment in the UK, 
the  presence  of  family  members,  or  a  larger  and 
stronger community of co-ethnics.2 Naturalisation 
may  be  a  liberalisation  for  those  asylum  seekers 
who did not intend to migrate to the Netherlands 
but  were  trapped  in  the  Dublin  system.  In  these 
cases,  naturalisation  functions  as  a  correction  to 
that  system,  which  almost  completely  disregards 
the  well-founded  wishes  of  persons  seeking 
protection to go to a specific country in Europe.

These  data  indicate  that  it  may  be  promising  to 
1 
  Centraal  Bureau  voor  de  Statistiek,  Migatiegedrag  van 
personene met een specifieke herkomst die in de periode 2006-2013 
de Nederlandse nationaliteit hebben verkregen, www.cbs.nl, visited 
27 September 2016, and B. Meindersma, Deel vluchtelingen wacht 
op paspoort en vertrekt weer snel, http://nos.nl/artikel/2134178.

 Jill Ahrens, Melissa Kelly, Melissa and Ilse van Liempt, 
2 
(2014) Free movement? The onward migration of EU citizens born in 
Somalia, Iran and Nigeria, Population, Space and Place. ISSN 1544-
8444.

extend the life course perspective with a focus on 
the labour market position of new nationals who 
left  the  country  during  the  first  few  years  after 
their naturalisation. Moreover, information from 
longitudinal quantitative data should be combined 
with the results of empirical research focussing on 
the migrant perspective, rather than on the state 
perspective that is implicit in the data collected by 
government bodies.

In order to explain the naturalisation patterns of 
immigrants,  Vink’s  paper  looks  both  at  variables 
in  the  country  of  residence  and  in  the  country 
of  origin.  With  regard  to  the  latter  variables,  the 
focus  is  on  the  political  stability  and  the  stage 
of  economic  development.  But  I  would  suggest 
that  nationality  law  and  practice  in  the  country 
of  origin  may  be  another  relevant  variable 
explaining  the  inclination  of  immigrants  to 
apply  for  naturalisation.  In  the  1970s  and  1980s 
the  Dutch  rule  requiring  immigrants  who  could 
renounce  their  first  nationality  to  do  so  had  the 
effect  that  Moroccan  immigrants  applied  for 
naturalisation  because  they  could  not  renounce 
their nationality and thus were not obliged to do 
so, whilst immigrants from Turkey rarely applied 
because  under  the  Turkish  nationality  law  they 
could renounce that nationality and were therefore 
required to do so according to Dutch nationality 
law.  The  difference  between  the  naturalisation 
practices  of  Moroccan  and  Turkish  immigrants 
became  even  more  pronounced  when  in  special 
broadcasts  directed  at  Moroccan  immigrants 
the  head  of  the  naturalisation  department  of  the 
Ministry of Justice explicitly stated that acquiring 
Dutch  nationality  did  not  imply  that  applicants 
had  to  abandon  their  religion.  Only  after  the 
renunciation requirement was de facto abolished 
in  the  1990s  did  large  numbers  of  Turkish 
immigrants  start  to  apply  for  naturalisation, 
causing a peak in the Dutch naturalisation statistics 
in 1996. Naturalisation practice thus often results 
from the interplay between the nationality rules of 
the two countries concerned. 

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Kees Groenendijk

In  the  final  part  of  Vink’s  paper  it  is  rightly 
suggested that much research focuses on the effect 
on  immigrant  integration  of  transition  towards 
citizenship  and  less  so  on  other  types  of  legal 
status  transition,  such  as  from  asylum  seeker  to 
recognised  refugee  or  from  temporary  migrant 
to  migrant  with  permanent  status.  I  would 
suggest that the latter status transition is the most 
promising  focus  for  future  empirical  research. 
The  many  legal  barriers  to  integration  attached 
to the status of asylum seekers (limited access to 
the  labour  marker,  to  language  courses  and  to 
family  reunification)  and  their  relatively  short 
length  of  residence  in  the  country  of  refuge  will 
make it hard to identify the effects of granting the 
stronger  status  that,  on  paper,  allows  free  access 
to  the  labour  market.  Empirical  research  on  the 
transition from temporary to permanent residence 
status will offer a better possibility of identifying 
the  effects  of  status  transition  on  integration. 
Moreover,  it  will  allow  testing  of  the  hypothesis 
that  the  transition  towards  citizenship  “arguably 
in  practice  [is  the]  most  relevant  legal  status 
transition.” Here, I repeat my plea for longitudinal 
quantitative  research 
to  be  combined  with 
qualitative research focussing on the immigrant’s 
perspective.3  When  the  focus  of  research  is  on 
the  effects  of  transition  from  one  legal  status  to 
another, we should not forget that a stronger legal 
status  does  not  always  result  in  a  better  social 
position.  In  her  interesting  comparative  study 
of  different  groups  of  Polish  immigrants  in  the 
Netherlands,  Cathelijne  Pool  found  that  before 
Poland’s  EU  membership  immigrants  with  both 
Polish and German nationalities, who due to their 
status as EU citizens had the strongest legal status, 
nevertheless  in  practice  had  a  clearly  less  secure 
labour market and social integration position due 
to their lack of knowledge of a language that was 
understood  by  the  majority  population  (English 

3 
  Jill  Ahrens,  Suspended  in  Eurocrisis:  new  immobilities 
and semi-legal migrations amongst Nigerians living in Spain, Journal 
of  Mediterranean  Studies  (22)  2013  22,  pp.  115-140.  ISSN  1016-
3476.

or  German)4,  their  reliance  on  family  contacts 
and  their  dependency  on  private  employment 
agencies.5 
  Legal  status  is  only  one  among 
many  variables  influencing  the  integration  of 
immigrants.

  For  a  long  time  Poles  with  German  ancestry  living  in 
4 
Poland could acquire German nationality without being proficient 
in the German language.

5 
 Cathelijne Pool, Migration van Polen naar Nederland in 
een tijd van versoepeling van migratieregels, Nijmegen 2011 (Boom 
Juridische Uitgevers). 

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SECTION 1: CITIZENSHIP AND LEGAL STATUSES | CITIZENSHIP, DIVERSITY AND MOBILITYS ~  
Kees Groenendijk

TOWARDS A 
LIFE COURSE 
PERSPECTIVE ON 
NATURALISATION 
FOR REFUGEES
Ines Michalowski 
WZB, Berlin

According  to  the  life  course  perspective  on 
nationality  acquisition  developed  by  Maarten 
Vink,  naturalisation  rates  can  be  understood  as 
the  outcome  of  interactions  between  national 
citizenship  legislation  on  the  one  hand  and 
individual  decision-making  based  on  a  person’s 
life  course  on  the  other.  Drawing  on  Elder’s 
(1974)  sociological  life-course  paradigm,  Floris 
Peters and Maarten Vink (2016: 368) explain that 
“trajectories  are  periods  of  time  in  life  domains 
or  institutions,  such  as  education,  work  or 
health, in which transitions are embedded.” And 
“since  migration  and  integration  are  life-course 
processes,  the  act  of  citizenship  acquisition  can 
be  perceived  as  an  important  transition  –  from 
non-citizen  to  citizen  –  within  this  trajectory”. 
The precise shape of these trajectories, they argue, 
is  influenced  by  “societal  institutions,  such  as 
educational  and  occupational  systems”  (Peters 
and  Vink  2016:  367).  Thus,  the  researcher’s  first 
task when trying to predict citizenship acquisition 
should  be  to  identify  the  different  life  course 
trajectories that a particular individual is engaged 
in  or  has  concluded.  As  Peters  and  Vink  (2016: 
367) argue, “The key assumption here is that there 
is  a  temporal  dynamic  to  life  events,  where  past 
experiences and resources, as well as opportunities 
and  ambitions  for  the  future,  promote  or  stifle 
certain choices and developments.” Thus, a person’s 
citizenship acquisition may be more likely in some 
moments  of  the  life  course  than  in  others.  The 

researcher  will  have  to  identify  these  particular 
moments  where  citizenship  acquisition  could 
become  a  relevant  transition  within  a  trajectory, 
while also dealing with less predictable  “turning 
points” in life and its social character, captured in 
the notion of “linked lives” (Peters and Vink 2016: 
368). Thus, the life course approach to citizenship 
acquisition is able to relate the influence of nation-
specific institutions to individual decision-making 
that takes into account changes in the individual’s 
life over time (Peters and Vink 2016: 365).

In what follows, I will start to think through a life 
course perspective on the specificities of citizenship 
acquisition  by  refugees.  On  average,  refugees 
differ from most other migrants in terms of their 
higher naturalisation rates (e.g. for Germany, see 
Statistisches Bundesamt 2016). The most obvious 
explanation – which does not adopt a life course 
perspective  but  rather  a  utility  perspective,  as 
Peters  and  Vink  (2016:  363)  name  it  –  is  that 
refugees’ citizenship of origin is of little value. For 
example, it may be of little value for travelling to 
the country of origin, where the receiving country’s 
passport may be the safer choice (only, of course, 
if the origin country respects the rule of law). For 
refugees who oppose the political regime in their 
home country, acquiring a new passport and thus 
devaluing  their  origin  country  citizenship  may 
also  be  an  act  of  political  expression.  Moreover, 
in slightly more abstract terms, origin citizenship 
may  have  less  value  for  refugees  because  they 
have  fewer  hopes  of  ever  returning  to  their 
home  country  than  other  groups  of  immigrants. 
Whether  these  hopes  are  low  or  almost  non-
existent  certainly  depends  on  the  individual, 
but  it  may  also  depend  on  the  situation  in  the 
country of origin, and specifically on whether this 
country is involved in an international conflict, is 
undergoing a long civil war, or has had an abrupt 
and  successful  change  of  political  regime.  Hopes 
of returning may also depend on the position that 
a  particular  group  of  refugees  has  on  a  conflict. 
For  example,  attitudes  may  differ  between  those 

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FOR REFUGEES ~ Ines Michalowski

fleeing  from  a  successful  regime  change  (e.g. 
the  Iranian  Revolution,  or  the  unification  of  the 
Socialist  Republic  of  Vietnam)  and  those  fleeing 
a civil war but harbouring at least some sympathy 
for the independence movement (which may have 
been  the  case  for  some  Tamil  refugees  from  Sri 
Lanka).  Hope  of  returning  might  also  vary  as  a 
function of the length and stage of the conflict in 
the country of origin. However – and this is where 
Peters and Vink’s perspective comes in – if hope 
for return materializes too late in the refugee’s life 
course  in  the  receiving  country,  the  refugee  may 
decide to settle and acquire citizenship even if the 
situation in the country of origin improves. 

Generally  speaking,  and  despite  the  fact  that 
naturalisation  rates  may  vary  across  groups  of 
refugees  as  a  function  of  these  origin-country-
related  differences  (different  countries,  or  same 
country  at  different  moments  in  a  conflict),  the 
generally witnessed phenomenon is that refugees 
are more likely than many other groups to acquire 
host country citizenship. Given the above, this is 
logical but it is also surprising if we consider that 
citizenship acquisition is a somewhat demanding 
process.  Thus,  the  structural  motivation  for 
refugees  to  acquire  citizenship  must  be  so  much 
higher  than  that  of  other  migrants  that  they  are 
more  likely  to  start  and  finish  the  naturalisation 
process  even  though  they  may  have  fewer 
resources at hand.

Going  through  the  procedure  of  citizenship 
acquisition may be more cumbersome for refugees, 
first  because  the  life  course  of  refugees  is  likely 
to  be  more  disordered  than  that  of  many  other 
individuals.  Refugees  often  come  from  countries 
where  the  state  does  not  function  well  and  does 
not provide an infrastructure that institutionalizes 
trajectories.  If 
educational  and  professional 
in  educational  and 
refugees  have  engaged 
professional 
these  are  usually 
trajectories, 
interrupted by their flight. Without much doubt, 
the flight and the events that force an individual 
to  leave  his  or  her  country  can  be  classified  as  a 

turning  point  after  which  an  individual’s  life  has 
to  be  thought  through  and  rationalized  anew. 
This  reorientation  of  one’s  life  can  be  a  long 
and  difficult  process,  and  can  be  slowed  down 
further if psychological trauma is involved. After 
arriving  in  a  receiving  country,  refugees  often 
wait  for  months  without  work  and  individual 
housing.  This  waiting  period  also  involves  the 
insecurity of not knowing whether refugee status 
will  be  obtained,  which  Stewart  and  Mulvey 
(2014: 1028-1030) aptly describe as a struggle by 
refugees against a sense of temporariness. It does 
not  need  much  imagination  to  understand  that 
a  long  period  of  inactivity  is  detrimental  to  the 
integration process, which is a necessary condition 
for citizenship acquisition. Peters and Vink (2016: 
368)  also  underline  the  relevance  of  the  concept 
of  “linked  lives”  to  citizenship  acquisition.  This 
entails  that  naturalisation  decisions  are  often 
taken collectively or in view of the collective (e.g. 
to support children). In cases where refugees are 
separated from family members, this could result 
in increased efforts to integrate as the only activity 
that can help to prepare for the arrival of the family, 
but  worries  about  the  well-being  of  close  family 
members can also easily lead to a loss of focus on 
the  integration  process  in  the  receiving  context. 
Studies  have  shown  that  on  average  refugees  are 
less proficient in the host country language than 
labour and family migrants (Chiswick and Miller 
2001;  Van  Tubergen  and  Kalmijn  2005)  and  a 
study  on  refugees  in  the  Netherlands  found  that 
“language  skills  are  better  among  refugees  who 
only lived in a refugee reception center for a short 
while, who completed an integration course, who 
received  post-migration  education,  who  intend 
to  stay  in  the  host  country,  and  who  have  fewer 
health  problems“  (van  Tubergen  2010:  515).  In 
addition,  after  arriving  in  the  receiving  country 
refugees  usually  do  not  have  a  large  amount  of 
money at their disposal. This may be necessary for 
a costly integration and naturalisation procedure. 
Moreover, their labour market integration is slow 
–  studies  on  Germany  predict  at  least  ten  years 

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FOR REFUGEES ~ Ines Michalowski

before  the  majority  of  the  refugees  arriving  will 
have  integrated  in  the  labour  market  (Brücker 
et  al.  2015).  Thus,  refugees  will  find  more  value 
in  the  acquisition  of  host  country  citizenship 
as  an  important  (since  permanent)  transition 
into  a  new  professional,  educational  and  maybe 
political  trajectory  in  the  receiving  country,  but 
the particular difficulties that they face as refugees 
might  slow  down  the  process  of  settlement  and 
integration which is usually required for acquiring 
citizenship. 

Citizenship acquisition is a somewhat demanding 
administrative  act.  Beyond  the  fact  that  the 
candidate  needs  to  be  willing  and  able  to  go 
through a long bureaucratic procedure, there are 
many  conditions  that  have  to  be  met.  Usually, 
candidates  need  to  have  resided  in  the  receiving 
context for a certain number of years, sometimes 
they  need  to  have  a  specific  type  of  residence 
permit  to  request  citizenship,  and  usually  they 
should  have  no  criminal  record.  Candidates  for 
naturalisation  may  also  have  to  meet  income 
requirements,  speak  the  language  and/or  pass 
a  language  test,  pass  a  citizenship  test  and  pay 
naturalisation  fees.  Peters  and  Vink  (2016:  365) 
suggest  that  restrictive  citizenship  regulations 
disproportionately  affect  citizenship  acquisition 
among more vulnerable groups. Similarly, Kibreab 
(2003)  finds  that  citizenship  rights  which  are 
often  granted  to  refugees  in  developed  countries 
increase the likelihood of refugees settling in these 
countries,  whereas  the  denial  of  such  rights  that 
often  occurs  in  developing  countries  increases 
the likelihood of refugees returning after the end 
of  a  conflict.  Maarten  Vink  examines  the  efforts 
of  EU  member  states  to  alleviate  the  citizenship 
acquisition  procedure  for  refugees  by  means  of 
special  conditions.  His  findings  from  the  EUDO 
Citizenship Observatory show that among the 28 
member  states  eight  have  no  specific  provisions 
for  refugees  (Vink  2016:  15)  while  facilitation 
often  remains  modest  in  the  other  cases.  One  of 
the  most  substantial  forms  of  facilitation  in  the 

EU 28 is a reduction of the number of years of the 
residency requirement from an average of 7 years 
for  regular  migrants  to  4.5  years  for  refugees.  In 
addition,  some  countries  reduce  naturalisation 
fees or waive an income requirement for refugees. 
Vink  mentions  no  facilitations  in  terms  of 
integration requirements but Morillon (2001: 52) 
found a French administrative directive asking for 
benevolent  treatment  of  refugees’  naturalisation 
applications. 

these  explicit 

However,  beyond 
facilitations 
for  citizenship  acquisition,  other  institutional 
conditions  might  also  impact  the  citizenship 
acquisition of refugees and interfere with their life 
courses.  Here,  the  contradictions  regarding  the 
legal regulations for the reception and integration 
of  refugees  come  to  mind.  In  Europe,  refugees 
usually arrive as asylum-seekers and until a decision 
on their status is made it remains unclear whether 
they  will  settle  in  the  country  or  be  obliged  to 
leave it. This is a difficult policy problem for liberal 
democracies,  since  any  achievement  in  terms  of 
social integration reduces the legitimacy of future 
expulsions.  Short  procedures  of  a  maximum 
duration  of  three  months  would  be  the  way  out 
but are not easy to achieve. And while states want 
to impede the social integration of asylum-seekers 
during the asylum procedure, they seek to foster 
the  social  integration  of  recognized  refugees.  If 
we  think  of  the  importance  of  social  integration 
for citizenship acquisition it might be relevant to 
take into account how long an individual has been 
maintained in ‘non-integration-mode’. 

A  look  at  the  recent  changes  brought  about  by 
the new German Integration Law of 31 July 2016 
illustrates this trade-off between migration control 
and  social  inclusion.  The  German  government 
has found a more refined answer compared to its 
response  to  the  last  arrival  of  large  numbers  of 
refugees in the early 1990s. In fact, some 20 to 25 
years ago Germany, together with other European 
countries,  tried  to  deter  asylum-seekers  from 
settling down permanently by denying all asylum-

53

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FOR REFUGEES ~ Ines Michalowski

seekers the right to work, the right to move freely 
in  the  country  and  the  right  to  participate  in 
publicly-financed  language  courses.  In  the  new 
2016 law, the old logic of preventing the integration 
of asylum-seekers whose claims might be rejected 
and who might have to leave the country has not 
disappeared. However, German law now officially 
distinguishes  between  asylum-seekers 
from 
countries  classified  as  producing  asylum-seekers 
who  have  good  chances  of  acquiring  a  right  to 
stay  (gute  Bleibeperspektive)  and  those  without 
such chances, thereby anticipating its own asylum 
decision, which is delayed by lengthy procedures. 
It is current administrative practice that asylum-
seekers from countries with a previous recognition 
quota of above 50% are considered to have good 
prospects  (Thym  2016:  244).  Since  this  group 
receives  privileges  and  is  officially  “allowed  to 
integrate,” the non-inclusion of Afghani refugees, 
whose  previous  recognition  rate  has  been  just 
below  the  cut-off  mark,  has  been  the  subject  of 
lively  debate  (e.g.  Lehner  2016).  An  additional 
difficulty  for  this  group  is  that  in  early  2016  the 
average  asylum  procedure  for  them  lasted  for 
over a year, meaning that those who were finally 
allowed to settle in Germany were excluded from 
any  proactive  state-funded  integration  measures 
for the entire length of this period. This is easily 
perceived  as  an  injustice.  On  the  other  hand,  in 
2016, refugees from Syria, Iraq, Iran, Eritrea and 
Somalia were allowed to participate in state-funded 
integration  measures  even  while  their  asylum 
procedures were still ongoing. Nevertheless, this is 
an important improvement in the legal framework 
for refugees in Germany as compared to the 1990s. 
In a way, one of the central beliefs that has been 
introduced to European integration policies since 
the  turn  of  the  century  –  namely  the  idea  that 
integration has to start as early as possible – has 
finally made its way into regulations for refugees 
in Germany. 

Another  element  of  21st  century  integration 
policies has also made it into refugee integration 

measures:  the  work-for-welfare  principle.  This 
was initially introduced into German integration 
policy  with  the  2005  immigration  law,  which 
obliged new immigrants in Germany to participate 
in  language  and  civic  education  courses  that  are 
provided  by  the  state  (Michalowski  2009).  Thus, 
refugees  who  are  considered  to  have  a  good 
prospect  of  staying  in  Germany  are  offered  600 
to  900  hours  of  language  tuition  plus  100  hours 
of  civic  education  (40  more  hours  compared  to 
those  offered  to  other  immigrants)  even  if  their 
asylum procedure is still ongoing. Because of their 
lack of income, most refugees and asylum-seekers 
are  exempted  from  the  contribution  of  €1.95  an 
hour to the cost of these courses. Moreover, each 
year  100,000  refugees  can  participate  in  a  work 
for  welfare  programme  which  is  ‘remunerated’ 
at  a  rate  of  80  cents  an  hour  for  a  maximum  of 
30 hours a week and a maximum duration of six 
months. These measures are exclusively offered by 
state-run organizations and are mostly located in 
refugee camps, which raises questions as to their 
capacity to transfer to the real labour market. If a 
refugee fails to comply with the work for welfare 
measures  and/or  language  and  civic  integration 
the 
the  monetary  support 
measures, 
government can be cut entirely and the state will 
only guarantee for the individual to be able to eat, 
wash, dress and live in a heated place. To further 
facilitate the labour market integration of refugees, 
most  German  federal  states  have  abolished  the 
labour  market  test  for  refugees,  but  some  of  the 
16 federal states have decided to impose a three-
year  residency  requirement  even  for  recognized 
refugees  in  order  to  better  distribute  the  costs 
associated with refugee reception. However, there 
is  an  obvious  trade-off  in  terms  of  the  degree  of 
free movement that might be necessary for labour 
market  integration  (Brücker,  Möller  and  Wolff 
2016: 21). To address these concerns, a somewhat 
bureaucratic system of discretionary case-by-case 
decision-making  has  been  introduced.  Finally, 
contrary  to  the  2005  regulations,  permanent 
residence  can  only  be  acquired  after  a  period  of 

from 

54

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FOR REFUGEES ~ Ines Michalowski

three  years  if  the  refugee  demonstrates  German 
language  skills  at  the  C1  level  of  the  Common 
European  Reference  Framework.  To  acquire 
permanent residence after 5 years, refugees need 
language skills at the A2 level. Research findings 
from  the  UK  suggest  that  even  after  physical 
safety is acquired, refugees long for emotional and 
psychological  safety  and  stability,  which  can  be 
undermined by future revisions of their residence 
status (Stewart and Mulvey 2014: 1033-1034).

From  a  life  course  perspective,  the  German 
the 
example  raises  several  questions.  Does 
preferential  institutional  treatment  of  refugees 
who  are  considered  to  have  good  prospects  of 
staying  have  a  positive  influence  on  citizenship 
acquisition? Here, a comparison of refugees who 
fell under the two different regimes but were both 
granted refugee status would be very interesting. 
A  comparison  with  the  refugees  from  the  1990s 
might also be of interest. To get closer to the life 
course perspective, a very detailed analysis could 
try  to  answer  the  question  of  whether  specific 
groups of refugees – e.g. according to marital status, 
age,  educational  and  professional  background, 
number  of  children,  or  duration  of  separation 
from  family  members  –  are  particularly  affected 
by a long waiting period after arrival in terms of 
later citizenship acquisition. 

55

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FOR REFUGEES ~ Ines Michalowski

References
Brücker,  Herbert,  Joachim  Möller  and  Joachim  Wolff.  2016.  IAB  Stellungnahme.  Integration  von 
Geflüchteten. Nürnberg: IAB.

Brücker, Herbert, Andreas Hauptmann and Ehsan Vallizadeh. 2015. “Flüchtlinge und andere Migranten 
am  deutschen  Arbeitsmarkt:  Der  Stand  im  September  2015“.  IAB  Aktuelle  Berichte  14.  Institut  für 
Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, Nürnberg.

Chiswick, Barry R. and Paul W. Miller. 2001. “A Model of Destination-Language Proficiency Acquisition: 
Application to Male Immigrants in Canada.” Demography 38(3):391-409.

Elder, Glen H. (Ed.). 1974. Children of the Great Depression: Social Change in Life Experience. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.

Kibreab, Gaim. 2003. Citizenship Rights and Repatriation of Refugees, International Migration Review, 
37(1):24-73.

Lehner, Roman. 2016. “Gehen oder bleiben?” in VerfBlog, edited by Max Steinbeis.

Michalowski, Ines. 2009. Liberal states–privatised integration policies? Pp. 259-276 in Illiberal Liberal 
States. Immigration, Citizenship and Integration in the EU edited by Elspeth Guild, Kees Groenendijk 
and Sergio Carrera. Surren Ashgate.

Morillon, Anne. 2001. Les réfugiés politiques face à la naturalisation, no. 1234: 50-57.

Peters, Floris and Maarten Vink. 2016. “Naturalization and the socio-economic integration of immigrants: 
a life-course perspective.” Pp. 362-76 in Handbook on Migration and Social Policy, edited by Gary P. 
Freeman and Nikola Mirilovic. Northampton, Edward Elgar Publishing.

Statistisches  Bundesamt.  2016.  Bevölkerung  und  Erwerbstätigkeit.  Einbürgerungen  2015.  Fachserie  1 
Reihe 2.1., Wiesbaden.

Stewart, Emma, and Gareth Mulvey. 2014. “Seeking Safety beyond Refuge: The Impact of Immigration 
and Citizenship Policy upon Refugees in the UK.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 40(7): 1023-
1039.

Thym,  Daniel  2016.  “Integration  kraft  Gesetzes?  Grenzen  und  Inhalte  des  „Integrationsgesetzes“  des 
Bundes.” Zeitschrift für Ausländerrecht und Ausländerpolitik 8:241-51.

Van  Tubergen,  Frank.  2010.  “Determinants  of  Second  Language  Proficiency  among  Refugees  in  the 
Netherlands”, in: Social Forces 89(2): 515–534. 

Van Tubergen, Frank and Matthijs Kalmijn. 2005. “Destination-Language Proficiency in Cross-National 
Perspective: A Study of Immigrant Groups in Nine Western Countries.” American Journal of Sociology 
110(5):1412-57.

Vink,  Maarten.  2016.  “Citizenship  and  Legal  Statuses.”  in  The  Integration  of  Migrants  and  Refugees, 
edited by Rainer Bauböck and Milena Tripkovic. Florence: European University Institute.

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BEYOND THE 
NATION STATE? 
GLOCAL 
CITIZENSHIP AND 
ITS CONSEQUENCES 
FOR INTEGRATION
Barbara Oomen 
Utrecht University 
European University Institute

In September 2016, the mayors of Paris, London 
and  New  York  wrote  an  op-ed  in  the  New  York 
Times calling on “world leaders assembling at the 
United Nations to take decisive action to provide 
relief  and  safe  haven  to  refugees  fleeing  conflict 
and  migrants  fleeing  economic  hardship,  and  to 
support those who are already doing this work.”1 
In  making  this  plea  for  inclusivity,  they  set  out 
how they were already doing their part, providing 
services  and  programmes  to  all  those  residing 
immigrant 
in  their  cities, 
populations. One example put forward was that of 
the municipal ID programmes in Paris and New 
York, which provide every city dweller – whether 
undocumented,  homeless  or  otherwise  –  with 
certain rights and access to services. This instance 
illustrates the central point that I wish to make in 
response  to  Maarten  Vink’s  paper  on  citizenship 
and legal statuses – the importance of considering 
the  role  of  local  authorities  as  well  as  the  nation 
state in shaping citizenship, and thus the type of 
integration that citizenship status leads to.

including  diverse 

Vink’s  insightful  analysis  of  why,  how  and  for 
whom citizenship transitions matter adds nuance 
to citizenship studies but departs from a relatively 
binary understanding of citizenship – as a door to 
pass through to have access to full social, economic 

1 
  De  Blasio,  B.,  Hidalgo,  A.  &  Khansept,  S.  (2016,  20 
September 2016), Our Immigrants, Our Strength., New York Times. 

and political rights. This point of departure does 
not  recognize  the  degree  to  which  citizenship 
as  a  legal  status  with  specific  related  rights  and 
responsibilities  is  increasingly  given  its  formal 
content within other polities than the nation-state 
alone.2  There  is  the  ‘world  community,’  which 
bestows  rights  upon  all  individuals  via  an  ever-
expanding  system  of  international  human  rights 
treaties and monitoring mechanisms, thus giving 
meaning to cosmopolitan citizenship. There is the 
European Union and European citizenship, with a 
wide variety of rights attached that it has formally 
created  and  which  makes  the  added  value  of 
national  citizenship  differ  considerably  for  those 
who do or do not possess it. Additionally, although 
this has received less recognition in the literature 
to  date,  local  authorities  increasingly  formally 
bestow  rights  upon  those  living  within  their 
borders, creating a type of urban citizenship. All 
this leads to an interplay between local, national, 
regional  and  international  layers  of  government 
in  defining  and  recognizing  migrant  rights.  This 
is  called  ‘multilevel  constitutionalism’  by  lawyers 
and  ‘constitutional  pluralism’  by  anthropologists, 
adding  a  spatial  dimension  to  citizenship  that 
is  critical  to  understanding  of  its  relation  to 
migration.3 

Of all these polities shaping citizenship, the focus 
here will be on local authorities, such as cities. Over 
the recent years, cities have increasingly been given 
and have claimed formal powers to both recognize 
and  give  meaning  to  the  rights  of  those  residing 
within their boundaries, resulting in a wide range 
of divergent practices impacting directly upon the 
main markers of integration set out by Vink – the 

2 
 See, among a wide range of literature on the topic, Isin, 
E. F. & Nyers, P. (2014), Routledge Handbook of Global Citizenship 
Studies:  Routledge;  and,  for  instance,  Benhabib,  S.  (2008), 
Investigating  Citizenship.,  in  E.  F.  Isin,  P.  Nyers  &  B.  S.  Turner 
(Eds.), Citizenship between Past and Future (pp. 18-35), Abingdon: 
Routledge.

3 
  Pernice,  I.  (2015).  Multilevel  Constitutionalism  and 
the  Crisis  of  Democracy  in  Europe.,  European  Constitutional 
Law  Review,  11(03),  541-562;  Walker,  N.  (2002).  The  Idea  of 
Constitutional Pluralism., Modern Law Review, 65(3), 317-359. 

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ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR INTEGRATION ~ Barbara Oomen

 
labour  market,  education,  political  participation 
and access to housing. The following sections will 
briefly discuss the rise of local authorities as self-
acclaimed  key  players  in  the  field  of  integration, 
and will subsequently set out how this also affects 
the legal status of migrants and their integration. 
One interesting aspect of this development is the 
interplay between cosmopolitan and local norms 
– leading to a type of glocal citizenship. This leads 
to  a  final  reflection  on  how  these  developments 
could and should be taken into account in research 
on citizenship and migration. 

CITIES AS KEY ACTORS IN 
INTEGRATION
Over recent years, policy makers, scholars and – 
most importantly – cities themselves have come to 
recognize and explicate their key role in welcoming 
and  integrating  migrants.  Where  it  concerns 
refugees, for instance, movements all over Europe 
such as the International Cities of Refuge Network, 
the  Cities  of  Sanctuary,  the  Save  Me  campaign 
and the Eurocities network specifically assert the 
independent  role  and  responsibility  of  cities  in 
welcoming  refugees.  The  Global  Parliament  of 
Mayors,  initiated  by  Benjamin  Barber,  author  of 
the widely influential If Mayors Ruled the World, 
explicitly  chose  the  notion  of  ‘Cities  of  arrival: 
Migration and Refugees’ as the theme for its first 
plenary session during its inaugural conference in 
September 2016.4 More widely, the policy network 
of  Cities  for  Local  Integration  Policies  (CLIP) 
unites  30  European  cities  working  on  the  social 
and economic integration of migrants. 

The reasons for this rise of local authorities in the 
field  of  migrant  integration  are  manifold.  One 
is  that  a  general  trend  towards  decentralization 
has  led  to  more  local  government  autonomy, 
and  more  direct  responsibility  for  a  variety  of 
social  and  economic  challenges  heightened  by 
austerity  measures.  As  for  cities  as  such,  there 

4 
Nations, Rising Cities., Yale: Yale University Press.

 Barber, B. (2013) If Mayors Ruled the World: Dysfunctional 

is  also  the  general  influx  of  urban  population. 
Currently, more people live in the city than in the 
countryside, and cities are more diverse than ever. 
Scholars have also come to emphasize the degree 
to which cities are best suited as loci for migrant 
integration,  be  it  because  of  the  pragmatism  of 
local  policy-making  (the  local  pragmatist  thesis) 
or because of the differences between localities (the 
localist thesis).5 In all, recognition of the relevance 
of local authorities in migrant integration has led 
to a general local turn in migration studies, and a 
departure from ‘methodological nationalism.’6 

One  key  finding  in  this  general  literature  on 
local  governments  and  migration  is  the  degree 
to  which  local  governments  seek  to  depart  from 
national policies, a ‘decoupling’ between national 
and local policies.7 As national migration policies 
throughout  Europe  become  more  and  more 
restrictive,  cities  often  have  both  principled 
and  pragmatic  difficulties  with  such  policies 
and  seek  ‘room  for  manoeuvre’  to  steer  towards 
more  inclusive  policies.8  Simultaneously,  other 
local authorities witness protests against migrant 
influxes, particularly involving refugees, and yield 
by,  for  instance,  refusing  to  take  part  in  refugee 
reception.  One  result  of  the  way  in  which  local 
authorities  increasingly  claim  the  autonomy  to 
make these choices is a variation in the degree to 
which migrants can meaningfully access political, 
social  and  economic  rights,  irrespective  of  their 
legal citizenship status.

 Emilsson, H. (2015) A national turn of local integration 
5 
policy: multi-level governance dynamics in Denmark and Sweden., 
Comparative  Migration  Studies,  3(1);  Scholten,  P.  &  Penninx,  R. 
(2016) The Multilevel Governance of Migration and Integration., 
Integration Processes and Policies in Europe (pp. 91-108): Springer.

6 
 Schiller, N. G. & Çağlar, A. (2009), Towards a comparative 
theory of locality in migration studies: Migrant incorporation and 
city scale., Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 35(2), 177-202. 

7 
  De  Graauw,  E.  &  Vermeulen,  F.  (2016),  Cities  and 
the  politics  of  immigrant  integration:  a  comparison  of  Berlin, 
Amsterdam, New York City, and San Francisco., Journal of Ethnic 
and Migration Studies, 42(6), 989-1012. 

8 
  Gebhardt,  D.  (2016).  Re-thinking  urban  citizenship 
for immigrants from a policy perspective: the case of Barcelona., 
Citizenship Studies, 1-21; Eurocities (2016), Refugee reception and 
integration in cities., Brussels: Eurocities.

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ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR INTEGRATION ~ Barbara Oomen

An  illustration  of  the  variation  in  access  to 
the  labour  market,  to  housing  and  to  safety  in 
general  between  local  authorities  is  offered  by 
the  ‘migration  location  index’  put  together  by 
the  Economist.9  The  index  is  based  on  an  equal 
weighting  of  job,  housing  and  safety  data  from 
different  German  local  authorities,  and  thus 
identifies  the  localities  most  suitable  for  newly 
arriving  refugees.  Whereas  the  jobs,  houses  and 
general  security  available  to  migrants  in  a  given 
location result from a variety of factors, it is safe to 
assume that local policies pertaining to migration 
partially determine the variation that is revealed.

THE FORMAL DIMENSION OF 
LOCAL POLICIES
Cities thus form the space in which the citizenship 
legal 
that  “gives  substance  and  meaning  to 
standing”  practically  takes  shape.10  Additionally, 
9 
The  Economist  Migration  Location  Index,  “Refugees 
might be seeking asylum in the wrong places”, published on 25 April 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/04/
2016, 
daily-chart-8

10 

Staeheli,  L.  A.  (2003),  Cities  and  citizenship.  Urban 

there have been more and more recent examples of 
cities actually expanding the rights that come with 
a  particular  legal  status,  for  instance  by  granting 
refugees  certain  rights  before  formal  recognition 
of  their  status.  The  city  of  Utrecht,  for  instance, 
seeks to connect asylum seekers to the city from 
the  day  of  arrival.11    By  offering  them  language 
lessons, lessons in entrepreneurialism and general 
education,  the  city  departs  from  the  general 
Dutch  policy  of  only  offering  education  to  those 
who  have  already  received  a  formal  status.  The 
city  of  Münster,  to  give  another  illustration,  has 
rejected the notion of centralized asylum centres 
and  immediately  provides  decentralized  housing 
to those waiting for formal status.12 

Even more far-reaching are developments towards 
the creation of a formal urban citizenship explicitly 
destined  to  all  living  in  the  city,  thus  breaking 
down  the  divide  between  citizens  and  non-
citizens.  Paris,  for  example,  recently  introduced 
a  carte  citoyenne  which  gives  all  Parisians  access 
to  municipal  services,  and  which  “carries  the 
values of Paris, liberty, diversity and tolerance and 
connects  Parisians  to  municipal  life.”13   The  card 
is  modelled  on  the  NYCID,  the  New  York  City 
ID  card  that  is  recognized  for  interactions  with 
the police (such as reporting crimes), for opening 
bank  accounts,  and  that  gives  all  city  dwellers 
–  including  undocumented  migrants  and  the 
homeless  –  access  to  public  services  and  also  to 
museums.  New  York  is  only  one  of  the  ‘cities  of 
sanctuary’ in the US that through such practices 
enable  those  without  citizenship  status  to  still 
exert political, social and economic rights.14

Geography, 24(2), 98. 

11 
De Volkskrant, 27 April 2016.

Huisman, C. (2016). Utrecht: asielzoeker direct binden. 

12 
html

  http://www.stadt-muenster.de/zuwanderung/startseite.

13 
2016, http://www.paris.fr/cartecitoyenne

“Paris lance une carte de citoyen”, Europe 1¸ 10 February 

14 
Lippert,  R.  &  Rehaag,  S.  (2012),  Sanctuary  Practices 
in  International  Perspectives:  Migration,  Citizenship  and  Social 
Movements.,  Routledge.  See,  for  instance,  www.citiesofmigration.
ca 

59

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ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR INTEGRATION ~ Barbara Oomen

show  how 

CITIES, CITIZENSHIP AND 
INTEGRATION
The  examples  quoted,  and  the  developments 
mentioned 
the  actual  benefits 
associated  with  ‘national’  citizenship  depend  on 
its relationship and interplay with regional (EU), 
international  and  also  local  understandings  of 
citizenship. For a variety of reasons, reaching from 
the general strengthening of cities as political actors 
to local discomfort with national policies, there is 
an  increasing  divergence  between  local  policies 
with regards to migrants in general and refugees in 
particular. This divergence impacts on all the main 
markers of integration – from access to housing, 
education  and  work  to  political  participation  – 
and thus also affects the added value of citizenship 
status. This means that any understanding of how, 
why and for whom citizenship transitions matter 
should  also  include  a  spatial  understanding  of 
where – at the subnational level – this is the case. 
It  could  well  be,  after  all,  that  the  advantages  of 
acquiring  citizenship  differ  more  between,  for 
instance,  Paris  and  Perpignan  than  between 
France and Belgium.

GLOCAL CITIZENSHIP
One interesting aspect of the way in which cities 
shape  citizenship,  also  in  a  formal  sense,  is  the 
degree to which they often refer to cosmopolitan 
norms,  such  as  international  human  rights  law, 
in setting out and defending their positions. The 
mayor of Palermo, for instance, is a strong advocate 
of  the  recognition  of  mobility  as  an  inalienable 
human  right.15  Palermo’s  ‘International  Human 
Mobility  Charter’  serves  as  the  basis  for  migrant 
welcome and integration in this Sicilian city facing 
a large influx of refugees.16

More widely, these policies are in line with a trend 
of  increasing  numbers  of  human  rights  cities, 
which  base  their  urban  policies  on  international 
human rights law, often taking a more progressive 
stance  than  national  governments.17  In  Europe, 
for instance, 400 cities have signed the European 
Charter for the Safeguarding of Human Rights in 
the  City.  Forerunners,  such  as  Graz,  Barcelona 
and  Nuremberg,  have  human  rights  offices  and 
engage  in  human  rights  monitoring,  thus  basing 
their urban policies on cosmopolitan norms. The 
way  in  which  citizenship  in  a  given  locality  and 
the  rights  that  it  has  to  offer  become  shaped  in 
the  permanent  interplay  between  international, 
national and local authorities can be called ‘glocal 
citizenship.’18

15 
of Palermo 2015.  

Citta di Palermo, International Human Mobility Charter 

16 
Kirgaessner,  S.,  (2015),  From  mafia  city  to  a  haven  for 
refugees: Palermo moves on from its criminal past, The Guardian, 
27 December 2015.

17 
Oomen, B., Davis, M. & Grigolo, M. (2016). Global Urban 
Justice:  the  Rise  of  Human  Rights  Cities.  Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press.

18 
See, for instance, Papisca, A. (2011), Relevance of human 
rights  in  the  glocal  space  of  politics:  how  to  enlarge  democratic 
practice beyond state boundaries and build up a peaceful world., 
in K. De Feyter, S. Parmentier, C. Timmerman & G. Ulrich (Eds.), 
The  Local  Relevance  of  Human  Rights  (pp.  82-108),  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.

60

SECTION 1: CITIZENSHIP AND LEGAL STATUSES | BEYOND THE NATION STATE? GLOCAL CITIZENSHIP AND  
ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR INTEGRATION ~ Barbara Oomen

SECTION 2 
EDUCATION

NO LOST 
GENERATION? 
EDUCATION 
FOR REFUGEE 
CHILDREN.A 
COMPARISON 
BETWEEN SWEDEN, 
GERMANY, THE 
NETHERLANDS AND 
TURKEY

Maurice Crul, Vrije University Amsterdam 
Erasmus University Rotterdam 
Elif Keskiner, Erasmus University Rotterdam 
Jens Schneider, IMIS, Universität Osnabrück 
Frans Lelie, Vrije University Amsterdam 
Safoura Ghaeminia, Saxion University of Applied 
Sciences, Enschede1

“Despite  broad  agreement  on  the  fundamental 
role of schools, varied standards of reception for 
newly arrived students, which result from a lack of 
policy, guidelines, and resources, are undertaken, 
and  they  seem  to  be  an  endemic  problem  that 
transcends national borders” 

(Jenny Nilsson and Nihad Bunar, 2016, 400)

Introduction
The research debate covering the so-called ‘refugee 
crises  in  Europe’  has  largely  been  addressing 
issues  like  border  control,  EU  policies  –  or  the 
lack  thereof  –  and  the  political  backlash  in  the 
form  of  anti-immigrant  sentiments.  Follow-up 
questions  about  the  integration  of  refugees  and 

1 
We  would  like  to  thank  Alireza  Behtoui  for  helping  us 
find relevant English language literature on Sweden for this paper. 

their children into society, education and work are 
now slowly appearing on the agenda too. 

Although  the  current  attention  to  the  issue 
of  the  integration  of  the  children  of  refugees 
into  education  is  recent,  several  researchers  in 
Europe have addressed the question for previous 
waves  of  refugees.  The  findings  of  one  of  the 
largest  European  studies  on  the  topic,  Integrace, 
a  comparative  study  which  includes  Sweden  and 
the Netherlands among other EU Member States, 
will figure prominently in this paper. Next to this 
study there are smaller national and local studies 
that  are  often  descriptive  or  evaluate  examples 
of  so-called  good  practice  in  cities  and  schools. 
We  do  not  claim  to  have  a  full  overview  of  the 
studies conducted, but our first impression is that 
compared  to  the  huge  number  of  studies  on  the 
education of the children of immigrants, attention 
in  education  has  been 
to  refugee  children 
somewhat limited and often refugee children are 
not  distinguished  separately  (Bloch  et  al.  2015).  
While, for instance, data on the school results of 
the  children  of  immigrants  are  usually  readily 
available at a national or city level, this sort of data 
is lacking for refugee children. Sometimes groups 
can be identified because of their national origin, 
knowing that most of the people in that particular 
group  came  as  refugees.  The  limited  data  show 
that  refugee  children  usually  face  more  barriers 
than the children of immigrants (Mc Brien 2009; 
Bloch et al. 2015; Suárez-Orozco et al. 2011). 

A  further  observation  is  that  most  studies  on 
refugee children fail to differentiate between those 
who  are  born  in  the  country  of  migration  and 
those who came during the compulsory schooling 
period  (the  in-between  generation).  However, 
education  research  has  shown  time  and  again 
that this distinction is important when seeking to 
explain variations in outcomes, both within groups 
and between them (Bloch at al. 2015, 15; Crul et al. 
2012; Heath and Brinbaum 2007; Holdaway et al. 
2009; OECD 2010). Furthermore, there seems to 
be a lack of attention to the development of school 

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SECTION 2: EDUCATION | NO LOST GENERATION? EDUCATION FOR REFUGEE CHILDREN. A COMPARISON BETWEEN SWEDEN, GERMANY, 
THE NETHERLANDS AND TURKEY ~ Maurice Crul, Elif Keskiner, Jens Schneider, Frans Lelie and Safoura Ghaeminia

careers over time. Often researchers take a snapshot 
of  the  treatment  of  refugee  children  in  so-called 
welcome,  introduction  or  submersion  classes.  Of 
course, this is a crucial element for these children 
to  be  able  to  successfully  start  in  education,  but 
it only tells part of the story. What happens after 
these  classes  is  equally  fundamental.  Into  what 
sort  of  educational  track  are  they  admitted?  Do 
they  still  get  second  language  support  or  other 
additional support? Are they allowed to continue 
their  studies  after  compulsory  education?    An 
overview of the literature shows that most studies 
do not answer many of these crucial questions.

Furthermore,  this  paper  is  an  attempt  to  draw 
away  from  what  Nilsson  and  Bunar  (2016, 
401)  call  singular  factors,  such  as  trauma  or 
individual  background  factors.  Instead,  we  will 
focus  on 
influence 
institutional  factors  that 
the  opportunities  that  refugee  children  have  in 
education at the macro, meso and micro levels (for 
studies on the children of immigrants, see Crul et 
al. 2012; Crul et al. 2013; Keskiner 2013; Schnell 
2012).  We  analyse 
institutional  educational 
arrangements  comparatively  across  countries  as 
formulated  in  Integration  Context  Theory  (Crul 
and  Schneider  2010;  Crul  and  Mollenkopf  2012; 
Crul et al. 2012; Crul et al. 2013; Crul 2016). This 
theory has its roots in research into the effects of 
differences  in  school  systems  on  the  educational 
and  labour  market  careers  of  the  children  of 
immigrants. We make a cross-country comparison 
of seven important institutional arrangements that 
we identify as having an influence on the school 
careers  of  refugee  children:  (1)  entrance  into 
education;  (2)  so-called  welcome,  submersion  or 
introduction classes; (3) pre-school arrangements; 
(4)  second  language  instruction;  (5)  additional 
support; 
(7)  education  after 
(6) 
compulsory schooling. 

tracking; 

We identify both similar and different institutional 
arrangements  at  work  in  the  case  of  refugee 
children. Institutional arrangements differ because 
of  differences  in  school  systems,  the  time  lapse 

before entering formal education, the specific legal 
arrangements  in  terms  of  accessing  pre-school, 
and the options for attending school after reaching 
the age when compulsory schooling ends. 

For our analysis of the impact of these institutional 
arrangements  we  make  a  literature  overview, 
looking  specifically  at  Sweden,  Germany,  the 
Netherlands  and  Turkey.  We  choose  the  three 
European countries because they have received the 
highest numbers of refugees and thus also have the 
highest numbers of refugee children entering their 
education  systems.  In  addition,  they  have  very 
different institutional arrangements for integrating 
refugee  children  in  education.  This  makes  it 
interesting  to  compare  them.  We  additionally 
choose Turkey because we wanted to broaden the 
perspective beyond Europe by including a country 
that  has  also  received  thousands  and  thousands 
of  refugee  children  over  the  past  few  years.  It  is 
important to note that most refugee children that 
fled  Syria,  Afghanistan,  Eritrea  or  Iraq  reside 
outside  Europe,  and  are  entering  –  or  not  –  the 
education  systems  in  Jordan,  Lebanon,  Ethiopia, 
Pakistan  and  Turkey.  Whether  Turkey  is  able  to 
cater for the educational needs of refugee children 
is  of  crucial  interest  to  a  European  audience 
considering the Turkey-EU deal, which enhanced 
Turkey’s responsibility as a receiving country.  

This chapter addresses the importance of the seven 
institutional  arrangements  we  have  identified 
as  key  in  separate  sections.  In  the  discussion  at 
the end we try to tie together their effects on the 
school careers of the children of refugees. 

The  challenges  that  the  four  countries  face  are 
very  different  in  scope. The  numbers  of  refugees 
entering  Turkey  and  Germany  are  much  higher 
compared  to  those  arriving  in  Sweden  and  the 
Netherlands. To exemplify this with some numbers 
on  the  Syrian  refugees  in  Turkey,  according  to  a 
report by HRW (2015) as of October 2015 more 
than  1.9  million  Syrian  asylum  seekers/migrants 
were  registered  in  Turkey,  of  whom  nearly  1.7 
million reside outside the refugee camps. Children 

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SECTION 2: EDUCATION | NO LOST GENERATION? EDUCATION FOR REFUGEE CHILDREN. A COMPARISON BETWEEN SWEDEN, GERMANY, 
THE NETHERLANDS AND TURKEY ~ Maurice Crul, Elif Keskiner, Jens Schneider, Frans Lelie and Safoura Ghaeminia

from  5  to  17  years  old  make  up  around  780,000 
of  this  population.2    While  in  the  refugee  camps 
90  percent  of  the  children  attend  school,  these 
children  only  represent  13  percent  of  the  Syrian 
children of school age living in Turkey. The huge 
influx has resulted in much greater demands on the 
existing  school  facilities  and  in  many  temporary 
solutions to deal with the reality on the ground.

Different  refugee  populations  have  come  to  the 
four  countries,  creating  different  challenges  for 
education. In Sweden, for instance, an additional 
challenge is that about half of the refugee children 
are unaccompanied minors (Rydin et al. 2012, 185; 
Çelikaksoy  and  Wadensjö  2015).  Children  from 
different  countries  of  origin  also  differ  because 
some  children  have  not  been  going  to  school 
for  two  or  three  years  before  reaching  Europe. 
Integrating  these  children  into  schools  requires 
additional measures. In addition to learning a new 
language  of  instruction  and  adapting  to  a  new 
curriculum,  they  also  need  to  adapt  to  being  in 
a  school  environment  again.  Furthermore,  they 
often lag behind in school subjects relative to their 
own age cohort, which means that they have to be 
in classes with children that are sometimes up to 
two or three years younger. 

A  proper  comparison  would  therefore  require  a 
comparison of similar groups that arrived in the 
same time period with similar educational histories 
in the countries of origin. Such detailed studies are 
not yet available for the countries studied in this 
paper.3  We  are  aware  of  these  limitations  but  at 
the same time we think this should not prevent us 
from looking into differences across countries in 
terms  of  both  the  opportunities  and  the  barriers 
that school systems and legal regulations present. 

Before  the  war  in  Syria  broke  out,  the  primary  school 
2 
participation rate was 99 percent, for secondary school the rate was 
82 percent. Participation was equal for male and female students. 
Today,  according  to  UNICEF,  approximately  3  million  Syrian 
children in and outside Syria cannot go to school. 

3 
refugee group in France, the UK and Switzerland. 

See  Bloch  at  al.  (2015)  for  a  comparison  of  the  same 

Entrance into Compulsory 
Education
Compulsory schooling covers different age groups 
in  the  four  countries  under  comparison.  In  the 
Netherlands,  compulsory  schooling  targets  four- 
to  sixteen-year-olds,  but  if  students  at  the  age  of 
sixteen have not obtained a minimum lower post-
secondary  vocational  education  yet  they  have 
to  stay  in  education  until  the  age  of  eighteen.  In 
Germany  and  Sweden  compulsory  education 
covers  the  age  range  between  six  and  sixteen. 
The right of entrance into compulsory education 
in  all  three  European  countries  is  guaranteed  by 
law. All three of these countries have a policy that 
children of compulsory schooling age should have 
access to education as soon as possible. European 
regulations  stipulate  that  children  should  be 
included in education within three months (article 
14  paragraph  1  European  Regulations  2003/9/
EG).  Sweden  has  put  a  further  time  limit  of  one 
month after arrival as the legally binding limit for 
entrance  into  school  (Rydin  et  al.  2012,  193).  In 
Germany  and  the  Netherlands  no  such  further 
legal  binding  limits  exist.  In  practice,  the  time 
lapse between entering the country and entering 
school  ranges  from  three  months  to  even  half  a 
year in all three countries (for Sweden, see Rydin 
et al. 2012, 199). Especially in the last two years, 
when many refugee families have been housed in 
temporary  shelters  and  camps  and  people  have 
had to move several times before being housed in 
more permanent asylum seeker centres, education 
for children of school age has often been arranged 
in an improvised manner. 

In  the  Netherlands,  participation  in  education  is 
compulsory  for  refugee  children  of  compulsory 
school  age  regardless  of  their  status.  In  Sweden 
and  Germany,  however,  there  is  no  obligation  to 
attend school for those who are still in the process 
of  status  definition  and  who  therefore  do  not 
yet  have  a  residence  permit  (Rydin  et  al.  2012, 
191;  Bourgonje  2010,  47),  although  in  Germany 
language  courses  in  the  reception  centres  are  in 

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THE NETHERLANDS AND TURKEY ~ Maurice Crul, Elif Keskiner, Jens Schneider, Frans Lelie and Safoura Ghaeminia

   
theory obligatory. This results in small groups of 
children  not  attending  school  in  Germany  and 
Sweden (for Sweden, see Rydin et al. 2012, 193) but 
it also affects the quality and amount of schooling 
children receive in these two countries (idem).  In 
Germany, for instance, in some cases children will 
receive  language  education  for  only  a  few  hours 
a  day  in  the  asylum  seeker  centres  rather  than 
going to a regular school for regular school hours. 
Nilsson  and  Bunar  report  that  also  in  Sweden 
children  who  are  still  in  the  asylum  procedure 
are often offered 10 to 50 percent less schooling, 
and  often  only  for  a  more  limited  number  of 
school subjects than regular school children study 
(Nilsson and Bunar 2016, 403). 

law  governing  Turkey’s  de 

Turkey is also legally bound to provide schooling 
to  refugee  children,  irrespective  of  their  status.4 
Moreover,  in  October  2014  a  new  regulation 
was  published  called  the  Temporary  Protection 
Regulation  (TPR),  which  became  the  main 
domestic 
facto 
temporary  protection  of  Syrian  refugees  in  the 
areas  of  education,  health  and  social  protection. 
TPR  should  ease  the  process  of  enrolment  in 
schools,  allowing  refugee  children  who  are 
registered in Turkey to enrol in public schools and 
in  temporary  education  centres  established  for 
Syrian children (ÇOÇA 2015).5 However, research 
shows  that  most  of  the  Syrians  are  not  well-
informed about their children’s right to education 
(idem).  Furthermore,  the  registration  procedure 
does  not  always  run  smoothly  due  to  a  lack  of 
infrastructure and many refugees are not able to 
register  themselves.  Because  of  lack  of  financial 

Turkey  is  party  to  the  United  Nations  Convention  on 
4 
the  Rights  of  the  Child,  where  article  22  obliges  the  signatory 
countries to provide protection and schooling to all asylum seeking 
and refugee children. In addition, Turkish law (5395) obliges the 
Turkish  state  to  provide  education  and  protection  to  minors, 
irrespective of their nationality.

5 
Local  authorities  are  held  responsible  for  monitoring 
the registration of Syrian refugees in public schools to ensure their 
access to education (ÇOÇA 2015). In order to enrol, the children 
have to be registered with the local police office or the Disaster and 
Emergency Management Presidency, the state institution running 
the majority of the refugee camps for Syrians.

support,  the  majority  of  the  Syrian  refugee 
families  experience  severe  economic  hardship, 
which  forms  one  of  the  major  impediments 
against Syrian children participating in education 
(HRW 2015). The fact that Syrian refugees do not 
have permission to work has created a huge black 
labour market in Turkey, and this, in combination 
with the poverty of the families, has resulted in a 
situation where child labour has become common 
among Syrian children (Mutlu et al. 2015). 

Welcome, Submersion, 
Preparation, International 
or Introduction Classes
As  the  title  of  this  section  reflects,  the  names 
used  for  the  classes  in  which  refugee  children 
are  placed  before  going  to  regular  classes  differ 
between  countries  and,  over  time,  also  within 
countries.  The  actual  pedagogical  practices  also 
differ greatly. When the children enter education 
they usually do not yet have any command of the 
national language. In all three European countries 
special provisions allow them to learn the second 
language,  either  in  special  classes  or  in  special 
schools. 

In  the  Netherlands,  during  the  period  when  the 
children  are  still  in  the  asylum  procedure,  they 
are  often  taught  in  a  special  elementary  school 
established  on  the  premises  of  an  asylum  seeker 
centre (Ingleby and Kramer 2012, 263). Depending 
on how long they are in the procedure for being 
granted legal status as recognized asylum seekers, 
this can take up to two years. In other cases, for 
instance in the case of small-scale asylum seeker 
centres or when the centre is not located in a remote 
area  but  within  a  city  or  larger  village,  they  will 
attend a regular elementary school. Depending on 
the number of refugee children in the school, they 
will  first  go  to  an  immersion  class  for  one  year, 
although  for  some  children,  depending  on  their 
second  language  progress,  this  can  be  extended 
to two years. The timing of entering education is 
crucial, as in the Netherlands children are selected 

65

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THE NETHERLANDS AND TURKEY ~ Maurice Crul, Elif Keskiner, Jens Schneider, Frans Lelie and Safoura Ghaeminia

for different school tracks at age twelve. Children 
older  than  twelve  are  directed  to  international 
transfer classes (ISK) in a local secondary school 
for  one  or  two  years  (Ingleby  and  Kramer  2012, 
263; Stavenuiter et al. 2016, 7). 

In Germany, children attend so-called preparation 
or introduction classes for one or two years before 
they are transferred to regular classes. Depending 
on the Land, city, or even the school, this can be 
followed  by  more  assistance  with  German  as  a 
second language if their German proficiency still 
lags  behind.  There  are  some  preparation  classes 
attached  to  Gymnasiums,  but  in  general  pupils 
attending preparation classes in secondary school 
are  in  Hauptschule  or  Realschule,  i.e.  lower-  and 
middle-level vocational education. In Germany in 
the  past  two  years,  the  sheer  number  of  refugee 
children has been overwhelming and the task at the 
Länder and city levels has therefore been gigantic. 
In  Hamburg,  for  instance,  about  400  additional 
young  children  had  to  be  placed  in  education 
each  month  up  to  the  summer  of  2015.  Also  at 
the level of secondary vocational education, every 
month four to five new classes had to be added in 
Hamburg alone. Over a period of about a year, 143 
new teachers had to be hired to teach the children 
in these new vocational classes (Pressestelle Senat 
Hamburg, November 2015).  

The  situation  in  Sweden  varies  between  schools. 
However, the general policy in Sweden is to keep 
children  in  international  or  immersion  classes 
for only a very short period. Examples of schools 
keeping  children  in  such  classes  for  only  two  or 
three  weeks  are  described  as  ideal  cases  (Rydin 
et  al.  2012,  204).  Pupils  are  then  transferred  as 
quickly  as  possible  to  regular  classes,  often  with 
additional courses in second language education. 
This  is  partly  enabled  by  the  fact  that  Swedish 
schools  offer  second  language  education  as  a 
regular subject from elementary school up to the 
end of upper-secondary school, making it easier to 
incorporate students with a migration background 
– both refugees and others – into regular classes 
after a short period of time.

In Turkey, temporary education centres have been 
established to provide education to Syrian children 
both inside and outside the refugee camps (HRW 
2015).    Although  these  centres  began  as  private 
initiatives,  some  have  signed  a  protocol  with  the 
Turkish government and receive financial support 
and are free of charge, while others remain private 
with low fees, which are nevertheless unaffordable 
for  many  Syrians  struggling  with  economic 
hardship.  Furthermore,  the  temporary  education 
centres  are  insufficient  in  number  and  capacity 
to  cater  for  migrants’  educational  needs.  Of  the 
81  municipalities  where  refugees  are  registered, 
the  centres  only  exist  in  19  cities.  According  to 
the  HRW  report  (2015),  in  the  academic  year 
2014-2015  there  were  34  centres  inside  and  232 
centres  outside  the  refugee  camps.  Operating  at 
the primary and secondary school levels, in 2014-
2015 more than 170,000 students were enrolled in 
temporary education centres, as opposed to only 
around  36,000  in  Turkish  public  schools.  This 
shows that the majority of Syrian refugee children 
receive their education in these centres. However, 
due  to  lack  of  sufficient  funding  many  centres 
face  closure,  since  the  Syrian  refugee  population 
is not able to pay for the courses. For example, 19 
schools opened in Reyhanli in 2014 but only three 
were  left  by  August  2015  due  to  lack  of  funding 
(Amos  2015).  The  centres  follow  an  almost 
identical  curriculum  to  that  of  Syrian  schools  – 
and  the  pupils  receive  classes  in  Arabic  –  which 
is  prepared  in  cooperation  between  the  Syrian 
Interim Government’s Ministry of Education and 
the Turkish Ministry of National Education (HRW 
2015). It is unclear how the students who attend 
these  centres  will  be  integrated  into  the  Turkish 
education system to further their education. 

Pre-school Arrangements 
For  very  young  refugee  children  it  is  important 
how access to pre-school is arranged. Compulsory 
schooling  starts  at  different  ages  in  the  three 
European  countries:  in  Sweden  at  seven;  in 

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SECTION 2: EDUCATION | NO LOST GENERATION? EDUCATION FOR REFUGEE CHILDREN. A COMPARISON BETWEEN SWEDEN, GERMANY, 
THE NETHERLANDS AND TURKEY ~ Maurice Crul, Elif Keskiner, Jens Schneider, Frans Lelie and Safoura Ghaeminia

Germany  at  six;  and  in  the  Netherlands  at  four. 
Especially in Sweden and Germany, access to pre-
school is therefore very important because of the 
larger age group –  and thus  larger numbers –  of 
young refugee children affected. 

In  Germany,  the  development  of  pre-school 
facilities  for  disadvantaged  children  and  the 
children  of 
immigrants  has  been  strongly 
stimulated  in  the  last  decade.  However,  as  far 
as  we  know  there  are  no  figures  available  on 
the  inclusion  of  refugee  children  in  pre-school 
facilities.  As  soon  as  parents  receive  official 
asylum  status  they  are  treated  like  other  parents 
in Germany and have access to pre-school under 
the  same  conditions.  Costs  for  child  care  differ 
between Länder and even between cities. A special 
effort is made to include children in the last year 
before compulsory school starts at age six. In some 
Länder  you  can  enrol  your  child  in  pre-school 
during this last year without any cost. 

In  the  Netherlands,  pre-school  education  is 
generally  organised  very  differently  to  that  in 
Sweden  or  Germany.  Middle  class  families  with 
both parents working usually send their children 
to  either  private  or  publicly  founded  pre-school 
facilities  five  days  a  week  for  the  full  day.  The 
considerable  costs  of  attending  these  pre-school 
or  so-called  crèche  facilities  are  paid  partly  by 
the parents and partly by the employer. Children 
from disadvantaged families, many of them with 
an  immigrant  background,  can  attend  special 
subsidized pre-school facilities with an emphasis 
on  second  language  learning  three  mornings  or 
afternoons  a  week.  This  means  that  they  spend 
many  fewer  hours  a  week  in  day  care  and  are 
also mostly segregated from children whose first 
language is Dutch. Places in these subsidized pre-
school facilities, which also only exist in the larger 
cities,  are  limited.  It  is  not  known  how  refugee 
families can secure places for their young children 
in these facilities. 

In  Sweden,  refugee  children  of  pre-school  age, 
regardless  of  their  status,  are  treated  equally  to 

children who have Swedish citizenship (Niemeyer 
2014,  17).  This  is  interesting,  since  in  Germany 
and  the  Netherlands  access  is  linked  to  legal 
status. If a pre-school age child arrives in Sweden, 
he/she may attend what is called open pre-school, 
which  is  free  of  charge.    In  the  larger  cities  with 
a  high  proportion  of  children  with  a  mother 
tongue other than Swedish, there are special pre-
schools focusing specifically on Swedish language 
acquisition (Rydin et al. 2012, 197). However, not 
all refugee parents are aware of this option to send 
their children to pre-school without paying. 

In Turkey, pre-school is mostly private and in our 
literature review we have not been able to find any 
provisions for refugee children. 

Second Language Instruction    
language 
The  provision  of  regular  second 
instruction 
is,  again,  very  different  across 
countries.  In  the  Netherlands,  refugee  children 
in  elementary  school  attend  welcoming  classes 
and children in secondary school in international 
classes get intensive training in Dutch as a second 
language  for  one  or  two  years  (Stavenuiter  et  al. 
2016,  7).  In  most  cases,  this  takes  place  in  small 
classes (15 children) and the teacher is trained in 
second  language  education  and  special  teaching 
material is used. When the children are transferred 
to regular classes in elementary school, some extra 
second language instruction is often still provided 
by  the  regular  teacher.  In  regular  secondary 
education,  however,  second  language  instruction 
is  not  available.  This  obviously  has  negative 
consequences  for  the  further  school  career  (Van 
Hasselt and De Kruyf 2009, 9). 

In  Germany,  there  is  second  language  support 
in  elementary  school  (up  to  age  ten  or  twelve, 
depending  on  the  Land).  Niemeyer  (2014,  57) 
emphasizes that “it is nowhere stated that German 
as  a  second  language  has  to  be  taught  in  school.” 
The  Mercator  Foundation  recently  released  a 
report  saying  that  teacher  training  in  second 

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SECTION 2: EDUCATION | NO LOST GENERATION? EDUCATION FOR REFUGEE CHILDREN. A COMPARISON BETWEEN SWEDEN, GERMANY, 
THE NETHERLANDS AND TURKEY ~ Maurice Crul, Elif Keskiner, Jens Schneider, Frans Lelie and Safoura Ghaeminia

language education is still insufficient in Germany 
(also see Niemeyer 2014, 47). Study methods and 
techniques  for  second  language  education  were 
often lacking in the past (Niemeyer 2014, 48). In 
some German schools there is a separate second 
language  teacher  available;  in  others,  school 
teachers  are  given  additional  training  in  second 
language  teaching  but  this  training  usually  lasts 
for  only  one  day  (idem).  In  daily  practice,  it  is 
these  regular  teachers  with  little  training  that 
provide  additional  second  language  instruction 
in  the  classroom  (Niemeyer  2014,  57).  However, 
new  programmes  of  second  language  education 
are quickly expanding. In 2014, second language 
teacher  training  was  only  compulsory  for  school 
teachers  in  one  Land.  Today,  this  is  true  for  five 
Länder. 

In Sweden, Swedish as a Second Language (SSL) is 
offered in both elementary and upper-secondary 
school  (up  to  age  18).  The  head  teacher  decides 
which  students  need  to  study  SSL  (Rydin  et 
al.  2012,  196).  The  fact  that  second  language 
education  is  also  offered  in  upper-secondary 
schools  is  particularly  important  for  refugee 
children who arrive aged twelve or more. This age 
group  attends  regular  classes  with  extra  support 
in  Swedish  as  a  second  language  very  soon  after 
entering  the  education  system.  Because  regular 
second language instruction is absent in secondary 
education  in  Germany  and  the  Netherlands, 
these  pupils  are  taught  in  special  submersion  or 
introduction  classes,  which  sets  them  back  with 
their  academic  options.  It  is  important  to  note 
that in Sweden Swedish as a second language is a 
subject with separate teaching materials (syllabus) 
and  instruction,  equal  to  teaching  Swedish  as 
a  first  language  (Bourgonje  2010,  48  and  50), 
and  SSL  is  taught  by  specially  trained  teachers 
(Nilsson  and  Bunar  2016,  409).  Some  reports, 
however, stipulate that the status of these teachers 
is  considered  lower  than  that  of  regular  teachers 
of Swedish as a first language (Bourgonje 2010, 50; 
Nilsson and Bunar 2016, 409).  However, one can 

choose to take Swedish as a second language as an 
exam subject in Gymnasium and the mark for the 
subject is counted as a normal entrance mark for 
university (Rydin et al. 2012, 196). In Germany and 
the  Netherlands,  second  language  instruction  is 
seen as additional to regular language instruction. 
As  a  result,  the  extent  to  which  extra  materials 
are used and the quality and number of hours of 
second language instruction differ from school to 
school and from teacher to teacher. 

For Turkey, our literature review shows that, next 
to  economic  hardship  forcing  many  children 
into  the  black  labour  market,  lack  of  language 
proficiency  is  the  main  obstacle  Syrian  children 
face  in  accessing  education.  While  the  Turkmen 
ethnic  minority  speak  Turkish,  Syrian  refugee 
children  do  not;  the  most  common  languages 
among  them  are  Arabic  and  Kurdish.  The  only 
possibility  of  receiving  education  in  Arabic  is  at 
the temporary education centres discussed above. 
For  the  rest,  the  Turkish  education  system  is 
highly centralised and leaves no room for public 
schools  to  cater  for  the  urgent  need  for  Turkish 
language 
language 
training.  Some  Turkish 
courses  seem  to  be  provided  at  the  local  level 
through  initiatives  by  municipalities  or  NGOs, 
but  these  efforts  remain  very  limited.  In  theory, 
Syrian  children  have  the  right  to  enrol  in  public 
schools,  but  there  is  no  infrastructure  for  them 
to learn Turkish or attend any form of transition 
classes. In a report by the Istanbul Bilgi University 
Children Studies Department on the educational 
situation  of  Syrian  children  in  Istanbul  (where 
more than 300,000 Syrians reside), the researchers 
found  three  schools  in  three  districts  where  no 
Turkish  language  courses  were  provided  for  the 
limited  number  of  Syrian  children  attending  the 
schools (ÇOÇA 2015).  This situation also leads to 
differential results for younger and older children. 
In its 2015 report, HRW underlined that younger 
Syrian children learn Turkish faster (and hence do 
better at school and are integrating faster), while 
the lack of language proficiency of older children 

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SECTION 2: EDUCATION | NO LOST GENERATION? EDUCATION FOR REFUGEE CHILDREN. A COMPARISON BETWEEN SWEDEN, GERMANY, 
THE NETHERLANDS AND TURKEY ~ Maurice Crul, Elif Keskiner, Jens Schneider, Frans Lelie and Safoura Ghaeminia

leads to their isolation in classrooms, dropping out 
of school, or even not being accepted for enrolment 
in the first place. Many of these older children end 
up  entering  the  labour  market  working  in  very 
poorly  paid  and  difficult  conditions.  Therefore, 
the  HRW  2015  report  called  for  more  flexible 
administration  procedures  to  cater  for  the  needs 
of refugee students (such as enrolling a 10th grader 
in  9th  grade)  and  emphasized  the  urgency  of 
launching Turkish language courses on a national 
scale.6

Additional Support       
Most  educational  research  has 
focused  on 
gaps  in  the  cognitive  and  language  skills  that 
the  children  of  refugees  suffer  from  because  of 
the  disruption  of  their  school  careers  in  their 
countries of origin and during their – sometimes 
long  –  travels  to  the  destination  country.  They 
need  to  learn  a  new  language,  adapt  to  a  new 
curriculum and sometimes also to a new learning 
style.  Additionally,  refugee  children  have  often 
experienced  traumatic  events  and  sometimes 
lost  close  relatives  and  friends.  A  recent  study 
showed that 79 percent of the Syrian children in 
a Turkish refugee camp had lost someone in their 
family in the war, and more than 60 percent had 
seen  someone  being  kicked,  shot  or  otherwise 
physically  hurt.  Nearly  half  (45  percent)  of  the 
children  surveyed  experienced  PTSD  symptoms 
(Sirin  and  Rogers-Sirin  2015,  13).  Emotional 
and  psychological  help  is  often  provided  on  an 
individual  basis  through  the  regular  health  care 
system, both within and outside schools (for the 
Netherlands, see Ingleby and Kramer 2012, 266).  

It  is  important  that  there  are  staff  members  in 
schools that act as confidants for refugee children 
to help and support them. This person can be the 
assigned class mentor, a specially assigned member 
of the school staff, a social worker or a guardian 
in  the  case  of  an  unaccompanied  minor.  In  all 
three  European  countries,  a  person  performing 

6 

 HRW 2015

this particular role can usually be identified. These 
people  usually  intervene  when  school  results 
drop  or  fail  to  meet  expectations,  when  pupils 
show emotional or psychological problems, when 
important decisions need to be made about school 
or subjects in the curriculum need to be chosen, 
or,  most  importantly,  when  legal  factors  hinder 
access to schooling opportunities. 

In  Germany  and  the  Netherlands,  there  is  no 
obligation  for  schools  to  assign  such  a  support 
person  to  refugee  children.  Support  therefore 
varies  and  is  dependent  on  the  regular  existing 
support structure in schools.  In Germany, it seems 
that this role is often taken by a teacher (Niemeyer 
2014, 47), while in the Netherlands it is either the 
school mentor, someone from the school’s support 
staff or, in the case of an unaccompanied minor, 
the guardian. 

In Sweden, a person is assigned to support pupils 
that have attended an international class. Schools 
are  obliged  to  allocate  this  additional  support  in 
the form of a support teacher. The support teacher 
starts giving support once pupils are transferred to 
a regular class (Bourgonje 2010, 48-50; Niemeyer 
2014, 23 and 55). This could be individual support 
or support in a small group or even in the regular 
class  (Niemeyer  2014,  23).  Although  this  comes 
across  as  the  ideal  situation,  reports  note  that  in 
practice  support  teachers  often  lack  the  time  to 
give proper guidance (idem).

In  Turkey,  counselling  facilities  are  available  in 
public schools, but these facilities do not seem to 
be equipped to support Syrian children who have 
suffered  serious  traumas.  The  study  by  Istanbul 
Bilgi  University  Children  Studies  Department 
shows  that  the  language  barrier  and  a  lack  of 
motivation  or  qualifications  of 
the  already 
overloaded  student  counsellors  are  the  major 
reasons for lack of support (ÇOÇA 2015). While 
school staff stated that they expected such help to 
be  provided  outside  the  school  by  NGO  groups, 
none  of  the  Syrian  students  who  participated  in 

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SECTION 2: EDUCATION | NO LOST GENERATION? EDUCATION FOR REFUGEE CHILDREN. A COMPARISON BETWEEN SWEDEN, GERMANY, 
THE NETHERLANDS AND TURKEY ~ Maurice Crul, Elif Keskiner, Jens Schneider, Frans Lelie and Safoura Ghaeminia

the study mentioned receiving any support outside 
school.  Nevertheless,  focus  groups  with  Syrian 
children and students underlined the necessity of 
psychological support because of the serious war 
traumas experienced (idem). 

Tracking
The  way  the  various  school  systems  track  pupils 
in  secondary  school  is  very  different  across  the 
three  countries.  The  effects  of  tracking  have 
been  extensively  documented  for  children  of 
immigrants (see Crul et al. 2012; Crul et al. 2013). 
The  strongly  stratified  German  school  system 
with early selection makes it much more difficult 
for  children  of  disadvantaged  immigrant  origin 
to  pursue  an  academic  track  which  prepares  for 
higher  education.  The  more  open  meritocratic 
school system in Sweden with its late selection and 
less  selective  tracking  system  offers  many  more 
possibilities of continuing into some sort of post-
secondary  or  higher  education.  The  Netherlands 
lies in between, with rather early selection at age 
twelve  and  a  tracking  system  that  is  comparable 
with  the  German  system,  but  with  ample 
opportunities  to  move  from  a  vocational  track 
to  an  academic  track  through  alternative  routes. 
Turkey  has  a  comprehensive  education  system, 
slightly  similar  to  the  Swedish  one,  where  there 
is  no  overt  form  of  tracking  in  the  compulsory 
education system. However, there are differences 
in  prestige  between  selective  and  non-selective 
educational  institutions  in  both  the  public  and 
private domains which act as a covert stratification 
system with regard to access to higher education. 

The  starting  situation  of  refugee  children  is 
crucial because of the effects of tracking and early 
selection. In general, it can be said that age at arrival 
determines how much these children are blocked 
by the general institutional arrangements of early 
selection and tracking. Students who arrive in the 
Netherlands  at  age  twelve  or  later  have  already 
missed  the  crucial  national  test  that  determines 
their  tracking  advice.  They  are  placed  in  an  ISK 

submersion class for one or two years (Dourelijn 
and Dagevos 2011, 95; Stavenuiter et al. 2016, 7). 
By  the  time  they  are  admitted  to  regular  classes 
they  often  lag  far  behind  in  terms  of  their  level 
of  instruction  in  subjects  in  the  academic  track. 
Regardless of their intellectual capacities, this will 
de facto mean placement in one of the vocational 
tracks  in  year  3  or  4.  Year  4  is  the  exam  year. 
Because of the short period they spend in regular 
classes, most of these pupils are then assigned to 
one  of  the  lower  levels  of  vocational  education. 
According  to  a  recent  survey,  70  percent  of  the 
children attending ISK submersion classes go from 
there to the lowest forms of vocational education. 
For  the  average  student  of  Dutch  descent,  the 
proportion is the inverse: only 30 percent attend 
this  lowest  track  (VO  raad  2016;  for  similar 
results on ISK classes from an earlier period, see 
Van  Hasselt  and  De  Kruyf  2009,  6).  These  levels 
only  give  access  to  short  one-  or  two-year  post-
secondary vocational tracks aimed at making the 
transition  to  manual  jobs  in  the  labour  market. 
In  the  Netherlands,  children  with  learning  or 
behavioural  problems  are  commonly  assigned  to 
these  tracks  and  they  are  known  for  high  levels 
of disruptive behaviour in class and high dropout 
rates.  In  certain  tracks,  the  dropout  rates  reach 
40  or  50  percent.  This  school  climate  is  hardly 
conducive for refugee children, who often have to 
deal with trauma and whose intellectual capacities 
often far exceed those of the other children in these 
tracks.  Among  those  who  are  already  older  than 
15 or 16 and cannot enter secondary education, 80 
percent enter the lowest forms of post-secondary 
vocational  education  (VO  raad  2016;  for  similar 
results on ISK classes from an earlier period, see 
Van Hasselt and De Kruyf 2009, 7). These one- or 
two-year tracks  aim at  direct transit to unskilled 
jobs  in  the  labour  market.  One  of  the  factors 
related to poor educational outcomes is a lack of 
second language teaching after the students have 
been  transferred  from  the  international  classes 
to the regular classes (Van Hasselt and De Kruyf 
2009, 9). Another problem is that the international 

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SECTION 2: EDUCATION | NO LOST GENERATION? EDUCATION FOR REFUGEE CHILDREN. A COMPARISON BETWEEN SWEDEN, GERMANY, 
THE NETHERLANDS AND TURKEY ~ Maurice Crul, Elif Keskiner, Jens Schneider, Frans Lelie and Safoura Ghaeminia

classes  continually  take  in  new  students,  which 
disrupts  the  learning  environment  (idem,  11). 
A  broader  study  on  refugee  groups,  not  only 
those  who  have  been  to  an  international  class, 
shows  the  same  poor  educational  outcomes  for 
refugee groups. Less than half of the young Iraqi 
and  Afghani  adults  between  the  ages  of  20  and 
34  studied  obtained  a  diploma  for  short  post-
secondary  vocational  education.  The  majority  of 
the  remaining  students  did  not  even  manage  to 
obtain what are considered the lowest vocational 
certificates.  Of  the  Somali  refugees  in  this  age 
group, only about a quarter attained this very low 
level  of  education  (Dourelijn  and  Dagevos  2011, 
93), making their prospects in the labour market 
very  bleak.  The  good  news  is  that  the  younger 
cohorts  who  started  their  educational  careers  in 
the  Netherlands  in  elementary  school  (after  an 
introduction  class)  do  much  better.  Children  of 
Afghan and Iraqi origin are now almost on a par 
with  children  of  Dutch  descent  when  it  comes 
to  attending  academic  tracks  (idem,  98).  This 
only  goes  to  show  that  it  is  particularly  refugee 
children entering the Netherlands around or after 
age  twelve  who  are  getting  crushed  between  the 
tracking wheels of the Dutch school system. 

the  exception  of 

In  Germany,  the  situation  is  similar  to  the 
Netherlands,  with 
some 
Länder  where  selection  happens  even  earlier  at 
age  ten.  Most  of  the  refugee  children  arriving 
after  elementary  school  age  will  be  placed  in 
Hauptschule  or  Realschule,  the  two  vocational 
tracks. A brochure for unaccompanied minors in 
Germany is quite telling:

“In  Germany  all  children  and  teenagers 
under  the  age  of  sixteen  have  the  right 
and  duty  to  go  to  school.  This  is  called 
you 
compulsory  attendance.  Usually 
would  start  off  with  the  “Hauptschule” 
where  you  have  the  possibility  of  getting  a 
“Hauptschulabschluss”  (secondary  school 
qualification).  

Only  a  small  proportion  of  pupils  of  German 
descent  go  to  Hauptschule  and  many  German 
parents  will  avoid  this  school  at  all  costs.  In  the 
case  of  refugee  children,  however,  for  many 
teachers  and  policymakers  this  seems  to  be  the 
highest aim (see also Niemeyer 2014, 46).      

At  age  sixteen,  and  in  some  cases  even  a  year 
earlier, Hauptschule and Realschule pupils should 
enter  an  apprenticeship  track.  However,  second 
language difficulties often impede refugee children 
from  finding  an  apprenticeship.  For  children  of 
immigrants  who  were  born  in  Germany  (the 
second generation), discrimination in finding an 
apprenticeship has already been clearly established 
(Crul  et  al.  2012).  For  refugee  children,  who 
are  mostly  not  born  in  Germany,  the  chances  of 
finding  an  apprenticeship  place  are  often  even 
lower  because  of  German  language  weaknesses, 
lack of experience with the system and the resulting 
poor  grades  (Niemeyer  2014,  16).  Furthermore, 
there  is  competition  for  apprenticeship  places 
among  students  who  have  diplomas  at  different 
levels.  It  comes  as  no  surprise  that  those  who 
have  a  Gymnasium  diploma  are  most  favoured 
by  employers,  followed  by  those  who  have  a 
Realschule diploma. Children with a Hauptschule 
diploma  have  the  least  chances  of  getting  an 
apprenticeship  position  (Crul  et  al.  2012).  The 
negative  consequence  is  that  students  who  leave 
school  without  doing  an  apprenticeship,  in  a 
system  that  relies  so  heavily  on  apprenticeships, 
also have great difficulties in entering the labour 
market and finding a steady job. More often than 
not, apprenticeships are the door to the first paid 
job. 

In Sweden, the first selection point is at age fifteen, 
when  students  choose,  or  are  recommended  to 
take,  different  programmes  within  Gymnasium. 
Although the choice made here limits options in 
further  education,  all  programmes  give  access 
to  higher  education.  However,  the  students 
who  at  fifteen  go  to  more  vocationally  oriented 
programmes  often  continue  a  form  of  post-

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SECTION 2: EDUCATION | NO LOST GENERATION? EDUCATION FOR REFUGEE CHILDREN. A COMPARISON BETWEEN SWEDEN, GERMANY, 
THE NETHERLANDS AND TURKEY ~ Maurice Crul, Elif Keskiner, Jens Schneider, Frans Lelie and Safoura Ghaeminia

secondary vocationally oriented education which 
is not part of the higher education system at age 
eighteen.  A  report  by  Çelikaksoy  and  Wadensjö 
focusing  on  unaccompanied  minors  presents 
some  educational  outcomes  of  refugee  children. 
The  group  of  unaccompanied  minors  is  more  at 
risk  than  children  who  came  with  their  parents. 
Nevertheless, even for them the educational results 
for refugee children far exceed those in Germany 
and  the  Netherlands.  Among  19-year-olds,  77 
percent of females still follow education in Sweden 
and 88 percent of males (Çelikaksoy and Wadensjö 
2015,  15).  Even  among  21-year-olds,  about  half 
of  this  group  are  still  in  education.  Among  men 
aged between 24 and 27, about 40 percent are in 
undergraduate  training  and  another  third  are  in 
adult education. Among women, about a quarter 
are in undergraduate education and about a half 
in adult education (idem, 16). These figures show 
that  a  considerable  proportion  of  these  refugee 
children, who are to be considered highly at risk, 
reach higher education in Sweden.           

Since the Swedish system is geared towards getting 
as many students as possible into higher education 
by  keeping  opportunities  open  until  the  age  of 
eighteen,  those  who  do  not  manage  to  get  into 
higher education, or fail in higher education, often 
find themselves in a precarious situation. They have 
two options to choose from: either continuing in 
adult schools (Komvux) or participating in some 
of  the  courses  provided  by  employment  offices 
to  learn  some  practical  skills  to  enter  the  labour 
market.  In  Germany  and  the  Netherlands,  many 
of  those  unable  to  access  an  academic  track  are 
able to follow apprenticeship tracks offering them 
entrance  to  the  labour  market.  They  can  show  a 
potential  employer  their  apprenticeship  track 
record.  And,  again,  many  indeed  get  their  first 
paid job via an apprenticeship. 

In  Turkey,  the  newly  adopted  4+4+4  system, 
requires  young  people  to  go  to  school  until 
the  age  of  eighteen.  While  the  system  has  no 
specific  tracking  moment  as  in  the  Netherlands 

or  Germany,  there  are  significant  distinctions 
between  selective  and  non-selective  educational 
institutions  and  the  quality  of  education,  both 
in  the  private  and  the  public  domains.  These 
distinctions  become  crucial  when  gaining  access 
to  higher  education.  The  studies  reviewed  for 
this chapter only mention participation by Syrian 
children in non-selective public education and in 
temporary education centres (ÇOÇA 2015; HRW 
2015; Mutlu et al. 2016). While the experience of 
Syrian children varies in individual cases, younger 
children seem to have a more positive experience 
as  they  learn  Turkish  faster  than  older  children, 
who seem to suffer more from the lack of Turkish 
language  courses  and  problems  of  adaptation 
(ÇOÇA  2015).  The  studies  underscore  how 
Syrian children suffer from serious stigmatization 
and  discrimination  by  other  pupils,  and  also 
occasionally by school staff and other parents. The 
studies call for increasing awareness that education 
should be perceived as a ‘right’ for Syrian children 
rather than a ‘favour’ (Mutlu et al. 2015) and that 
school staff need further assistance in dealing with 
conflicts  between  pupils  and  providing  a  more 
peaceful  school  environment.  Given  these  harsh 
conditions,  the  very  few  Syrian  children  who 
manage  to  attend  a  non-selective  public  school 
might face serious difficulties in accessing higher 
education.

Education after Compulsory 
School  
three  European  countries  differ  when 
The 
compulsory  schooling  ends 
(at  sixteen  or 
eighteen),  but  they  also  differ  in  terms  of  rights 
and  opportunities  to  continue  studying.  The 
Netherlands provides an extensive loan system for 
studying after compulsory schooling. The right to 
a  study  loan  applies  to  all  whose  asylum  request 
has  been  granted  and  who  have  official  refugee 
status. For others who do not have an official status 
yet, the right to study ends at age eighteen. Those 
who  do  not  yet  have  the  (temporary)  residence 

72

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permit granted with refugee status at age eighteen 
cannot start to study in post-secondary or higher 
education.  The  process  of  obtaining  this  status 
takes  up  to  a  year  or  more,  depending  on  the 
country of origin, after requesting asylum. Many 
of  the  refugees  who  started  late  in  the  Dutch 
education  system  are  in  level  one  of  a  two-year 
post-secondary vocational track, finishing it when 
they  are  around  eighteen  years  old.  If  they  have 
not obtained their status yet, they lose their right 
to further education. Even if they obtain the right 
to study again in the near future, it disrupts their 
studies and prospects. Another potential obstacle 
is  the  Dutch  system  of  study  loans.  Youngsters 
get a study loan when they attend post-secondary 
vocational  training.  By  the  time  they  can  finally 
climb up from post-secondary vocational training 
to higher vocational education (four or five years 
later)  their  student  loan  credit  is  already  mostly 
or  completely  used  up,  meaning  they  can  only 
continue  their  studies  by  relying  on  their  own 
resources.  In  practice,  this  means  they  have  to 
work at the same time as studying, which increases 
the chances of dropping out.     

Students  who  want  to  study  in  higher  education 
first  have  to  complete  four  language  courses  to 
obtain  a  Dutch  language  certificate  at  the  level 
of  academic  Dutch  (B2).  This  means  that  on 
average students can only start their studies after 
two  or  more  years  (Ingleby  and  Kramer  2012, 
266). Taking into consideration that much of the 
curriculum  nowadays  is  in  English,  especially  in 
Masters’ programmes, this seems an obstacle the 
students could do without.                                        

In  Germany,  compulsory  schooling  ends  at  the 
age  of  sixteen.  For  those  who  arrive  later  and 
do  not  have  a  high  school  diploma,  most  of  the 
possibilities are in the field of vocational training. 
In  most  Länder  there  are  now  programmes  to 
open  more  opportunities  for  these  youngsters  to 
be  included  in  vocational  education.  The  most 
problematic part is finding enough internship and 
apprenticeship  places  in  the  private  sector,  since 

this practical part is an important element in the 
so-called  ‘dual  system’  of  vocational  training  in 
Germany. 

In  Sweden,  compulsory  education  ends  at  age 
sixteen, but pupils who are still in upper-secondary 
school when they turn seventeen or eighteen have 
the right to continue their education like regular 
students, even when they do not have recognized 
asylum  seeker  status.  This  is  important,  because 
particularly 
often 
arrive  between  the  ages  of  fifteen  and  seventeen 
(Çelikaksoy and Wadensjö 2015, 14). Young adults 
arriving after the age of eighteen can attend general 
adult education or Swedish for Immigrants (FSI), 
i.e. classes for adults to learn basic Swedish.

unaccompanied  minors 

is  an 

important  route 

Adult  education 
to 
educational qualifications for students who arrive 
at  a  later  age.  In  the  Netherlands,  this  route  is 
often used by students who are too old to thrive 
in  common  secondary  education  but  need  a 
diploma  from  an  academic  track  before  they 
can  enter  higher  education.  Adult  education  in 
the  Netherlands  is  quite  marginal  compared  to 
mainstream education. Many refugee children and 
students are therefore not aware of the possibilities 
it can offer them. The big advantage is that in adult 
education they are often the younger students in 
the  class,  instead  of  being  much  older,  and  they 
meet people who are equally motivated to succeed.

In  Germany  too,  there  are  plenty  of  possibilities 
of  programmes  for  adult  education,  including 
ones leading to school qualifications and language 
certificates.  The  main  problems  in  the  German 
system are a lack of information and costs. In the 
face  of  the  refugee  crisis,  many  adult  education 
institutions  have  started  to  offer  free  courses,  at 
least  at  the  basic  level,  but  sometimes  the  costs 
are  also  covered  by  the  government.  Especially 
the  state-owned  Volkshochschulen  have  played 
an important role in this – as they did before for 
previous waves of immigrants and refugees. There 
has  been  a  quite  new  initiative  by  universities 

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to  offer  free  language  courses  to  refugees  (often 
organized  by  student  organizations),  to  provide 
voluntary  help  to  refugees  as  internships,  and 
to  establish  mechanisms  for  the  recognition  of 
foreign diplomas and school certificates. 

In  Sweden,  adult  education  is  a  much  more 
mainstream  institution  than  in  the  Netherlands 
and Germany. Awareness of this option is therefore 
much greater. In the past too, adult education was 
an  important  entrance  route  into  the  education 
system 
for  migrants.  Many  first-generation 
Turkish  and  Yugoslavian  migrants  went  to  adult 
education to learn Swedish as a second language. 
Therefore,  adult  education  in  Sweden  is  now 
very  much  attuned  to  the  needs  of  new  arrivals. 
An adult education diploma can be used to enter 
higher  education  or  a  form  of  post-secondary 
education. 

In our literature review, we have not come across 
adult  education  opportunities  for  Syrians  in 
Turkey  since  the  existing  research  concentrates 
mainly on the pressing situation concerning (the 
lack of) education for Syrian children. Regarding 
higher  education  in  Turkey,  there  are  provisions 
which allow Syrian university students to enrol in 
seven higher education institutions near the Syrian 
border with a ‘special student’ status. According to 
the Turkish Higher Education Institutions (YÖK), 
in  the  academic  year  2014-2015,  3397  male  and 
2163  female  Syrian  students  were  enrolled  in  a 
higher  education  institution  (Mutlu  et  al.  2016, 
42).  Participation  by  Syrian  university  students 
in  Turkish  higher  education  is,  however,  not 
widespread  and  these  developments  are  merely 
seen as first steps, despite difficulties.

Conclusion and Discussion
This overview of the differences in these seven key 
institutional  arrangements  and  their  effects  on 
school outcomes shows a clear distinction between 
institutional 
favourable  and 
arrangements.  High  quality  continuing  second 

favourable 

less 

language instruction offered at all school levels – 
by properly trained teachers and using specifically 
developed  teaching  materials  –  is  probably  the 
most important institutional arrangement. Apart 
from  this,  accommodating  access  to  all  types 
of  educational  tracks  (regardless  of  the  age  you 
enter  education)  is  important.  As  we  have  seen, 
in Germany and the Netherlands only vocational 
tracks are open to many refugee children. For very 
young refugee children, immediate open and free 
pre-school arrangements are especially important. 
For  refugees  in  the  age  group  around  the  end  of 
compulsory  schooling,  adult  education  –  which 
also  gives  access  to  pre-academic  secondary 
school diplomas and thus to higher education – is 
especially important.   

In  a  way,  the  most  difficult  group  to  integrate 
into the education system of the host country are 
pupils  arriving  at  the  end  of  elementary  school 
or  during  secondary  education.  This  is  the  time 
when  important  tracking  decisions  are  made. 
School  systems  characterized  by  early  selection 
and  a  strong  stratification  seem  to  waste  much 
talent,  because  they  direct  the  majority  of  these 
pupils along a vocational route. Because of second 
language  problems,  these  children  are  often 
streamed towards the lower end of the vocational 
training  system  –  a  track  that  hardly  suits  the 
majority of these students given their intellectual 
capacities. Also in comprehensive systems, such as 
in Turkey, a lack of second language training denies 
children  the  full  participation  in  the  education 
system they need to realize their potential. 

To  evaluate  the  impact  of  different  institutional 
arrangements  it  is  important  to  see  them  in 
relation  to  each  other,  for  instance  the  more 
poorly  organized  second  language  instruction 
in  Germany  and  the  Netherlands  (compared  to 
Sweden)  in  relation  to  the  early  selection  and 
tracking  that  results  in  an  over-representation 
of  refugee  children  in  vocational  tracks.  These 
factors in combination create an accumulation of 
disadvantage.  This  also  means  that  the  Swedish 

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good  practice  of  limiting  the  time  in  immersion 
classes cannot be transplanted as such to Germany 
or  the  Netherlands.  In  Sweden,  the  transfer  to 
regular  education  is  combined  with  continued 
instruction  in  the  second  language.  Since  this  is 
not  offered  in  Germany  and  the  Netherlands, 
children  would  be  destined  to  fail  if  they  were 
transferred to regular classes too quickly.

It seems that there is also an important difference 
across  countries  in  terms  of  their  vision  of  what 
it takes to include newly arrived refugee children 
in  education.  In  Sweden,  it  is  clearly  stated  that 
the  ambition  is  to  give  refugee  pupils  an  equal 
chance  to  reach  school  outcomes  on  a  par  with 
children  of  native  descent.  This  means  that  the 
aim  should  be  for  refugee  children  to  also  reach 
higher  education,  of  course  depending  on  their 
intellectual capacities. 

In  Germany  and  the  Netherlands,  the  aim 
seems  much  more  limited  and  short-term.  Most 
policy measures are aimed at, and limited to, the 
transition or immersion phase. The fact that most 
refugee students end up in the (lowest) vocational 
tracks  as  a  result  of  how  things  are  organized 
within  the  school  systems  seems  to  be  more  or 
less  accepted  as  a  given.  In  Germany,  however, 
there  is  a  hopeful  recent  development  of  also 
accommodating  refugee  children  in  immersion 
classes in Gymnasium schools. 

In  Turkey,  an  excruciating  two  thirds  of  refugee 
children do not participate in education. Among 
those  who  do,  the  majority  attend  temporary 
education  centres  where  they  follow  a  Syrian 
curriculum. This shows that Turkey does not yet 
wish to see the refugees and their children as long-
term inhabitants who must be enabled to build a 
future.  Of  the  780,000  Syrian  refugee  children, 
only around 36,000 attend public schools. Studies 
on  these  public  schools  show  that  education  is 
seen  more  as  a  ‘favour’  to  these  children,  rather 
than there being the aim of providing them with 
equal chances to participate in education. 

The  Swedish  example,  although  not  perfect, 
shows that support has to be given throughout the 
school career – the clearest example being second 
language  instruction.  Sweden  has  formulated 
ambitions  for  second  language  learning  in  the 
standard  curriculum  starting  at  pre-school  and 
continuing  all  the  way  up  to  the  end  of  upper-
secondary  school  and  even  into  adult  education. 
In  the  Netherlands  and  Germany,  the  ambitions 
are much more limited, with only a little amount 
of  additional  training  in  pre-school,  elementary 
school and during the immersion or introduction 
year  in  secondary  school.  However,  to  learn  a 
language to an academic level, one or two years of 
additional instruction are usually not enough.  

To expect governments to fundamentally change 
the school systems they have in place because of 
this relatively small group of pupils is, of course, 
unrealistic. Both in Germany and the Netherlands, 
alternative  scenarios  have  to  be  developed  to 
accommodate 
this  particular  group.  Adult 
education  could,  for instance,  play  a  much more 
prominent role in preparing talented students for 
high school exams. In post-secondary vocational 
education,  shorter  and  faster  routes  could  be 
offered  to  accommodate  students  that  have  the 
ambition to continue into higher education. Pre-
school education should be made available to the 
very  youngest  group  (0-4)  of  refugee  children 
immediately,  regardless  of  their  status,  so  that 
they are already fluent in Dutch or German before 
entering  elementary  school.  Secondary  schools 
should  be  offered  the  opportunity  to  extend 
the  time  they  give  additional  second  language 
instruction to bring it up to the level of academic 
Dutch  or  German.  These  measures  can  be  taken 
keeping  some  of  the  Swedish  good  practice  in 
mind.    

A last observation is that more researchers seem 
to  be  working  on  the  topic  of  refugee  children 
in  education  in  Sweden  than  in  Germany  or  the 
Netherlands,  and  they  are  also  more  critical  of 
the  specific  educational  policies  developed  in 

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Sweden  than  their  German  and  Dutch  peers. 
Swedish  researchers  critique,  for  instance,  the 
segregation  of  refugee  children  and  the  fact  that 
not all pupils who have the right to mother tongue 
teaching  receive  it  (see,  for  instance,  Nilsson 
and  Bunar  2016).  The  irony  is  that  in  Germany 
and  The  Netherlands  mother  tongue  teaching 
is  simply  unavailable  and  therefore  also  mostly 
remains  undiscussed  in  research.  In  Germany 
and  the  Netherlands,  refugee  children  are  far 
more  often  segregated  from  regular  pupils  and 
for  a  much  longer  period  than  in  Sweden  but 
researchers seem far less critical about it than in 
Sweden. What is considered normal in a country’s 
policy  also  seems  to  extend  to  what  researchers 
find normal. In Turkey, the studies we have been 
able to find on Syrian children are critical of the 
government.  These  studies  do  acknowledge  the 
difficulty  in  accommodating  the  sheer  numbers 
of  Syrian  refugee  children,  but  nevertheless  they 
also critique the gaps and provide concrete policy 
suggestions to improve the schooling situation. By 
comparing  the  four  counties  in  detail  both  gaps 
and  successful  interventions  become  apparent. 
This is precisely why comparisons across countries 
are so valuable.  

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Table 1: Overview of Educational Institutional Arrangements for Refugee Children in Sweden, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Turkey.

Sweden

Access to school Within 1 to 3 

Pre-school

Separate classes

Second language 
instruction

Second language 
teachers

Extra Support

Tracking

Access after com-
pulsory school 
age

months and 
unlimited ac-
cess regardless of 
status
Open and free of 
cost
Short 

Prolonged and 
from pre-school 
until upper-sec-
ondary school
University trained 
teachers and 
specific subject 
materials and 
exams
Special support 
teacher

Late tracking and 
sustained second 
language support 
results in more 
access to higher 
education
Unlimited access 
to upper second-
ary school, adult 
education and 
university train-
ing

Mostly for primary 
school children. 
Most children, how-
ever, are not able to 
attend
Unknown

Mostly in separate 
Arabic language 
schools 
Mostly no second 
language instruction

Not applicable

Psychological health 
support organiza-
tions
Limited second lan-
guage support results 
in early school leav-
ing

Limited access to 
secondary school 
and universities

Germany
Within 3 months 
and limited to 
compulsory 
schooling age

The Netherlands Turkey
Within 3 months 
and limited to 
compulsory 
schooling age

Limited 

Limited

1-2 years

1-2 years

For a limited pe-
riod and varying 
between Länder

For a limited 
period 

Only short train-
ing and not all 
teachers are 
trained

Mostly regular 
teacher support 

Early track-
ing and limited 
second language 
support results 
in tracking into 
vocational tracks
Limited access 
to apprentice-
ship training 
programmes 
(depending on 
Länder) and ac-
cess for univer-
sity students with 
refugee status

Special but lim-
ited extra teacher 
training. Special-
ized materials 
available
Support staff in 
school and/or 
regular teacher
Early track-
ing and limited 
second language 
support results 
in tracking into 
vocational tracks
No access after 
age 18 if refugee 
status not yet ob-
tained. Access to 
universities after 
Dutch language 
exam 

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EDUCATION 
OPPORTUNITIES 
FOR RECENTLY 
ARRIVED MIGRANTS1

Michael Teutsch 
European Commission

have  identified  many  examples  of  successful 
policies and practices (OECD 2015). Nevertheless, 
decision makers and key stakeholders in European 
education  systems  are  still  struggling  with  the 
inclusion  of  migrants  in  education.  Similarly, 
most discussions on the implications of the 2015 
refugee crisis for European education systems have 
highlighted the challenges, the need for particular 
efforts and the difficulties to be overcome. 

1. Introduction
The large number of people arriving in Europe from 
the Middle East and Africa in 2015 represented a 
serious political and policy challenge. With around 
1.25  million  arrivals,  the  number  of  first-time 
asylum applications in the EU in 2015 was twice 
the numbers of 2014 and about three times higher 
than  in  2013.  Due  to  the  uneven  distribution  of 
migrants  among  Member  States,  the  countries 
which  received  the  highest  numbers  of  asylum 
applications in 2015 registered figures around 1% 
or even 1.5% of their populations in only one year.

However, despite the 2015 crisis in which a high 
number  of  refugees  arrived  in  a  short  timespan, 
it  should  be  recalled  that  during  recent  decades 
migration has become an important characteristic 
of  most  European  societies.  There  are  currently 
20  million  non-EU  nationals  residing  in  the  EU, 
which  corresponds  to  4%  of  the  Union’s  total 
population. Migrants come to work, study or for 
family reunification. The international protection 
of  refugees  and  asylum  are  only  a  part  of  the 
migration  phenomenon,  and  in  most  Member 
States migration is not a new phenomenon either. 
There  has  been  notable  migration  for  decades 
and  we  have  also  already  seen  large  numbers  of 
refugees arriving before, such as during the Balkan 
wars in the 1990s.

Over  the  years,  policymakers  and  practitioners 

This chapter reflects the personal views of the author. The 
1 
European Commission cannot be held responsible for any use of 
the information contained herein.

the 

it  sees 

in  these  countries 

The  chapter  in  this  ebook  by  Crul  et  al.  also 
emphasises  institutional  obstacles  to  integration, 
in  particular  in  the  case  of  Germany  and  the 
Netherlands,  while 
institutional 
conditions  as  particularly  favourable  in  Sweden. 
Their  analysis  of  the  traditional  institutional 
framework  conditions 
is 
certainly  correct.  This  chapter,  however,  argues 
that  policy  learning  based  on  decades  of  past 
experience with more or less successful practices 
in education policy has created a basis for policy 
change. This, together with the nature of the policy 
challenge  –  the  sheer  size  of  the  recent  inflow 
of  migrants  and  refugees  in  need  of  education 
–  has  led  to  policymaking  on  the  ground  that  is 
more  innovative  and  flexible  than  traditional 
institutional frameworks suggest. The most recent 
developments  may  eventually  also  accelerate 
changes in institutional settings as we know them.

In the next section, this contribution sets out the 
nature of the education policy challenge related to 
integrating the  recently  arrived  migrants. It then 
presents  the  European  Union’s  policy  response 
and  an  analysis  of  recent  policy  developments 
in  Germany,  the  Netherlands,  and  Sweden, 
before  finally  discussing  the  role  of  traditional 
institutional  settings  and  the  incidence  of  policy 
change.

2. The policy challenges
The  first  key  point  characterising  the  policy 
challenge  discussed  here  is  the  strong  increase 
in  the  number  of  first-time  asylum  applications 
between  2013  and  2015.  The  numbers  also 

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remained high in the first eight months of 2016, 
despite  a  lower  number  of  new  arrivals,  which 
may  partly  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  some 
people  who  arrived  during  the  second  half  of 
2015 only filed their asylum applications in 2016. 
Germany received  35% (442,000)  of  all  EU first-
time applications in 2015, Hungary 14% (174,000), 
Sweden  12.4%  (156,000),  Austria  6.8%  (85,000), 
Italy 6.6% (83,000) and France 5.6% (70,500). The 
share compared to the overall population was the 
highest  in  Hungary  (1.8%)2  and  Sweden  (1.5%), 
followed  by  Austria  (1%),  Finland  (0.6%)  and 
Germany (0.5%). The share in the Netherlands was 
0.25% (European Commission 2016: 21; Eurostat, 
online code [migr_asyappctza], 2015).     

A  second  characteristic  of  the  policy  challenge 
is  the  prevalence  of  young  people  of  school  age 
and prime working age among the newly arrived 
migrants. Almost every fifth newly arriving person 
was younger than 14, another 10% were between 
14 and 17, and 53% between 18 and 34 years old 
(European Commission 2016: 21). In Sweden, in 
particular, the number of unaccompanied minors 
rose  sharply  from  7,000  in  2014  to  more  than 
35,000 in 2015.

Third,  the  prospects  of  the  recently  arrived 
refugees from the Middle East and certain African 
countries  of  being  recognised  as  asylum  seekers 
are very good. In Germany, for example, between 
January  and  October  2016  the  great  majority  of 
the  asylum  requests  from  Syrian  (98%),  Eritrean 
(94%) and Iraqi (71%) citizens were accepted. In 
contrast, almost all the requests by citizens of the 
western Balkan countries were rejected. The rate 
for Afghan citizens stood at 51% (IAB 2016). 

Fourth, national studies conducted by the public 
employment  services  in  Germany  and  Austria 
(IAB 2016, AMS 2016) show a polarisation of the 

2 
The  high  number  of  first-time  asylum  applications  in 
Hungary  has,  however,  not  translated  into  a  major  integration 
challenge  in  the  country  as  many  of  the  refugees  were  registered 
in Hungary and then travelled on to other countries, and because 
about  85%  of  the  asylum  applications  in  Hungary  in  2015  were 
rejected (Eurostat figures).

education  and  skills  levels  of  the  newly  arrived 
migrants.  According  to  a  recent  survey  carried 
out in Germany, a significant share have attended 
school for ten years or more, i.e. a level comparable 
with upper secondary education in Europe (55% 
among refugees compared to 88% of the German 
population). Almost one in five have participated 
in higher education (19%), and 13% have acquired 
a  higher  education  degree.  At  the  other  end  of 
the  spectrum,  10%  have  only  attended  up  to  six 
years of primary education, 9% have never gone to 
school, and 26% hold no school leaving certificate. 

According  to  the  above  study,  the  greatest 
difference  with  respect  to  the  host  population 
can  be  found  at  the  medium  qualifications 
level.  Only  a  few  of  those  who  have  worked  in 
technical  professions  or  crafts  also  hold  formal 
qualifications, which can mainly be explained by 
the fact that the respective countries of origin have 
not developed vocational education and training 
systems  delivering  such  qualifications.  Another 
challenge in this area is that due to different levels 
of  economic  and  technological  development, 
the types of skill acquired in such work may not 
match  what  is  required  in  similar  professions 
in  advanced  European  economies.  At  the  same 
time,  the  German  survey  found  a  high  level  of 
motivation  to  participate  in  education  among 
refugees (IAB 2016).

Finally,  it  is  important  to  stress  that  the  policy 
challenge is not only defined by the characteristics 
of  the  incoming  migrant  population,  but  also 
by  European  experiences  in  dealing  with  past 
migration. Empirical data show that people with 
a migrant background have greater difficulties in 
making  their  way  through  European  education 
and training systems than their native peers. The 
early school leaving rate is higher for the foreign-
born  population  than  the  native-born  in  all  EU 
Member  States  except  the  United  Kingdom  and 
Ireland.3 In addition, young people from outside 

3 
The  ratios  between  native-  and  foreign-born  youths 
are  1:2  in  Belgium,  the  Czech  Republic,  Spain,  France,  Italy, 

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the EU have a higher early school leaving rate than 
those with an EU migrant background in Belgium, 
Greece,  Italy,  Austria,  and  Sweden  (European 
Commission 2016b: 40). Similarly, in the OECD’s 
PISA studies the results of immigrant students also 
lag behind those of non-immigrant students. The 
performance  of  immigrant  students  is  correlated 
with their socio-economic status, which explains 
some of their disadvantage, but not all (European 
Commission  2016f:  20).  In  addition,  even  after 
decades  of  migration,  in  international  surveys 
such  as  the  OECD’s  TALIS  and  national  studies 
a high share of teachers respond that teaching in 
a  multicultural  or  multilingual  setting  is  among 
the areas where they have a most critical need for 
continual  professional  development  (European 
Commission 2014: 63, Mercator/SVR 2016).

Taken together, the characteristics of the incoming 
migrants  combined  with  knowledge  of  the 
difficulties that European education and training 
systems  have  in  providing  migrants  with  equal 
opportunities to succeed have made policymakers 
recognise a strong challenge and a need to act in 
order to deal with the consequences of this recent 
influx.

3. Policy response at the EU 
level
During the first months of the 2015 refugee crisis, 
the  main  attention  was  on  providing  shelter  to 
the newly arrived, border control, fighting human 
trafficking and relocation. The European Agenda 
for  Migration  (European  Commission  2015) 
set  out  immediate  actions  for  saving  lives  at  sea, 
targeting criminal smuggling networks, relocation, 
resettlement and partnership with third countries. 
The Agenda also announced support to Member 
States  in  promoting  integration  –  primarily 
financial  support  through  European  funds  –  but 
at this stage did not yet set out specific measures. 

In  the  European  Union,  both  integration  and 
education are Member State competences. Member 

Luxembourg and Sweden, 1:3 in Austria and 1:4 in Greece, Cyprus 
and Slovenia.

States have to respect the minimum standards for 
newly  arrived  asylum  seekers  laid  down  in  the 
Reception  Conditions  Directive  (2013/33/EU), 
such as the obligation to grant minors access to the 
education system no later than three months after 
the  lodging  of  an  asylum  application.  However, 
actual policymaking on integration happens at the 
national, regional or local levels. 

The  EU  nevertheless  supports  Member  States  in 
this area. Common basic principles on immigrant 
integration policies in the EU were adopted by the 
Council in 2004. Moreover, in the context of the 
recent crisis the European Commission set out its 
priorities in its Action Plan on the integration of 
third  country  nationals  of  June  2016  (European 
Commission  2016).  This  action  plan  includes 
education  as  one  of  its  pillars,  alongside  pre-
departure measures, employment, access to basic 
services, active participation and social inclusion. 

The  action  plan  emphasises  the  importance  of 
immediate action being taken as early as possible 
upon  arrival  (e.g.  providing  support  in  language 
learning and assessing skills). It stresses the need 
for  measures  allowing  refugees  and  migrants 
to  succeed  in  education  on  an  equal  footing 
with  the  native  born  in  the  medium  term  (e.g. 
teacher training, promoting participation in early 
childhood education and care). Finally, it sets out 
actions promoting active participation and social 
inclusion (including informal learning and sports). 
The action plan announces EU support to Member 
States  through  policy  support  and  funding,  the 
implementation of which has since started. Policy 
support mainly takes the form of peer learning (e.g. 
about welcome classes and language assessment) 
and  the  development  of  guidance  tools  (e.g.  for 
early childhood education, and the recognition of 
skills and qualifications). EU funding is provided 
by  the  Erasmus+  programme  (e.g.  for  online 
language courses and policy cooperation between 
countries  and  education  institutions)  and  the 
European  Funds  (ESIF  and  AMIF).  In  sum,  EU 
actions promoting integration through education 

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put a strong emphasis on mutual learning across 
Member  States,  which  can  provide  a  basis  for 
policy innovation and development. 

4. Comments on the situation 
in Germany, the Netherlands 
and Sweden 
Crul et al. emphasise the institutional differences 
between  Germany,  the  Netherlands  and  Sweden 
and  argue  that  these  explain  the  much  better 
chances  refugees  have  of  success  in  Sweden  as 
compared to the Netherlands and Germany. More 
recent  developments  and  data  may,  however, 
give  rise  to  some  optimism  that  the  institutional 
obstacles in Germany and the Netherlands can be 
overcome.  At  the  same  time,  Sweden  also  seems 
to  be  struggling  with  the  integration  challenge 
despite its favourable framework conditions. 

In Germany, empirical data show a strong influence 
of socioeconomic status on education results, but 
an  important  improvement  over  recent  years, 
and  in  particular  an  improved  performance  by 
low achievers (OECD 2016a). Generally, both the 
participation rate and the education outcomes of 
those with a migrant background have improved 
over  the  last  decade.  About  90%  of  4-  to  5-year-
olds  with  a  migration  background  participate  in 
early  childhood  education  and  care  (ECEC),  an 
increasing proportion which is getting close to that 
of  the  native  population.  Participation  in  ECEC 
by those under 3 with a migrant background has 
doubled  to  22%  since  2009. This  is  also  positive, 
even  though  native-born  children  of  the  same 
age  still  have  a  significantly  higher  rate  (38%  in 
2015).  An  important  factor  in  this  increase  has 
been the establishment of a right to a place in early 
childhood  education  and  care,  in  a  first  stage  as 
of age 3 and now as of age 1. A German national 
education report emphasises that students with a 
migrant background are not a homogeneous group 
and that the participation in education of students 
with  a  migrant  background  very  much  varies 
according to country of origin and socioeconomic 

background. One of the key challenges is creating 
learning  German 
sufficient  opportunities  for 
as  a  second  language,  with  the  system  facing  a 
shortage  of  teachers  who  are  competent  in  this 
area  (Autorengruppe  Bildungsberichterstattung 
2016,  Massumi  2015,  European  Commission 
2016).

From  a  European  comparative  perspective,  the 
Netherlands  perform  well  when  it  comes  to 
ensuring  equitable  outcomes  in  its  education 
system. The participation rate in early childhood 
education and care is higher than the EU average 
and the early school leaving rate has been declining, 
while  the  impact  of  socio-economic  background 
on  PISA  results  is  similar  to  the  German  results 
in  PISA  2015.  The  national  authorities  identify 
challenges  to  the  participation  of  low-income 
families  in  early  childhood  education  and  care, 
and  related  to  educational  inequality.  As  in 
Sweden, the municipalities are largely responsible 
for the education provided to asylum seekers and 
they work with schools to deliver it. The trend is 
to provide part-time introductory classes focused 
on learning Dutch as a second language combined 
with  part-time  mainstream  education.  Schools 
with asylum seekers are eligible for various types 
of financial assistance and can apply for additional 
funds from the Ministry when these do not suffice 
(European Commission 2016d).

In Sweden, the performance gap between foreign-
born  and  native-born  students  continues  to  be 
large  despite  the  positive  institutional  setting.  In 
PISA  2015,  41%  of  students  with  an  immigrant 
background  performed  below  the  baseline  level 
in  science,  as  compared  to  17%  of  the  native 
population.  The  proportion  of  low  achievers  is 
even  higher  for  first-generation  migrants  (50%), 
but second-generation immigrants partially catch 
up  (33%,  also  see  OECD  2016b).  The  transition 
between  compulsory  and  upper  secondary 
schooling is a particular hurdle for many foreign-
born  students.  While  the  national  average  for 
students  who  qualify  for  a  ‘national  programme’ 

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at  upper  secondary  level  is  nearly  90  %,  only  52 
% of students who migrated after the age of seven 
qualify. The age at arrival is crucial, as the above-
mentioned figure drops to 28% for those arriving 
in  the  last  four  years  of  compulsory  schooling 
(aged 12-15). 

Since  2006  school  outcomes  have  steadily 
deteriorated  among  those  born  abroad.  The 
Swedish  national  agency  for  education  attributes 
this  to  a  higher  proportion  of  students  arriving 
in  Sweden  at  an  older  age  and  to  the  fact  that 
those who immigrated after the age of seven have 
increasingly  come  from  countries  with  a  weaker 
school  system.  Research  evidence  also  suggests 
that their performance has been negatively affected 
by  physical  and  organisational  separation  from 
mainstream education, poor mapping of students’ 
previous  knowledge  and  a  lack  of  individualised 
support (European Commission 2016e).

School segregation is also a challenge in Sweden. 
A  two-year  limit  for  introductory  classes  was 
introduced  through  legislation  in  early  2016 
because  too  many  students  stayed  in  separate 
classes too long, and because physical separation 
of  integration  classes  from  mainstream  classes 
strengthened educational segregation. Residential 
segregation  adds  to  the  challenge.  Sweden  has 
taken  many  actions  to  tackle  this  problem,  such 
as obliging municipalities to take socio-economic 
background into account in school financing and 
the  new  government  regulation  that  came  into 
force on 1 January 2016 reforming the process of 
receiving  and  schooling  newly  arrived  students 
(European  Commission  2016g).  In  addition, 
following  the  disappointing  2006  to  2012  PISA 
results,  significant  measures  were 
to 
support  the  continual  professional  development 
of teachers such as a series of “Boost for Teachers” 
programmes, “Boost for Mathematics”, “Boost for 
Reading” and a career development reform, which 
contributed to a reversal of the trend in PISA 2015 
(European Commission 2016f). 

taken 

More  generally,  as  regards  the  pros  and  cons  of 
organising  so-called  welcome  or  introduction 
classes  as  compared  to  immediate  integration 
into  mainstream  classes,  the  policymakers  who 
participated  in  a  peer  learning  event  organised 
by  the  Swedish  Ministry  of  Education  jointly 
with  the  Commission  in  April  2016  found  that 
organisational  models  were  less  important  but 
that  emphasis  should  be  put  on  the  individual 
needs  of  newly  arrived  migrants,  i.e.  quick  skills 
assessment,  language  and  literacy  support,  etc. 
The participants found it important to have high 
expectations  and  that  integration  was  not  only 
seen  as  an  issue  to  be  accomplished  by  second 
language  teachers  but  by  all  teachers  and  the 
school community at large (i.e. including support 
staff,  parents,  municipalities,  youth  services  and 
civil society). Like Crul et al., the participants in 
this  peer  learning  event  referred  to  the  transfer 
to  mainstream  education  and  the  continued 
availability of support in mainstream education as 
a main point of attention (European Commission 
2016e). In practice, the decision on the model to 
follow (direct integration or introductory classes) 
has recently seemed to depend less on pedagogical 
preferences than on the number of newly arriving 
children  to  be  taught.  In  Germany,  the  pattern 
seems to be that the federal states (‘Länder’) which 
have  received  lower  numbers  of  refugees  opt  for 
direct  integration  while  integration  classes  are 
chosen where there are many. 

As  for  tracking,  it  is  indeed  often  seen  as  an 
institutional obstacle to the educational mobility of 
socially disadvantaged children. However, it is not 
clear to what extent it explains the comparatively 
lower performance of refugee students arriving at 
the age of twelve compared to those who arrive at 
younger ages. The earlier a child arrives in a host 
country, the greater his or her chances are to learn 
the  language  of  the  host  country  and  to  start  a 
successful education pathway. This fact is also true 
in systems which do not foresee early tracking in 
lower secondary education. As mentioned above, 

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during the last few years Sweden has also seen a 
downward trend in the education results of migrant 
children,  which  national  experts  have  attributed 
to a higher proportion of students arriving in the 
country at an older age and to the characteristics 
of the school systems in the countries of origin.

In  terms  of  defining  educational  success,  Crul 
et  al.  put  great  emphasis  on  access  to  higher 
education.  In  countries  such  as  the  Netherlands 
and  Germany,  vocational  education  and  training 
can,  however,  also  be  the  start  of  a  successful 
education  pathway  and  professional  career. 
Children  arriving  at  a  young  age  should  indeed 
have the same opportunities to succeed as natives, 
including  in  terms  of  their  chances  to  gain  a 
qualification providing access to higher education. 
Nevertheless,  for  young  migrants  arriving  at  an 
age of 12, 14 or 16 who, in addition, might have 
only  been  to  school  in  their  home  country  for  a 
few years, other education pathways should also be 
considered a success. Some of these teenagers will 
make their way to higher education if adequately 
supported. For others, the priority will be to ensure 
that they reach a school education certificate and 
that they acquire the skills necessary to succeed in 
an apprenticeship, instead of ending up as unskilled 
workers in low paid and insecure jobs. In countries 
such as Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark and 
Austria,  the  successful  completion  of  vocational 
training provides good access to the labour market 
and opens opportunities for further learning. This 
is all the more true since for demographic reasons 
vocational education and training programmes in 
Germany are currently facing problems in filling 
all the available apprenticeship places with suitable 
candidates.

5. Conclusions 
For  countries  like  Sweden,  the  Netherlands  and 
Germany, immigration is not a new phenomenon. 
Nevertheless,  migrants  still  tend  to  have  worse 
education  results  and  some  of  the  challenges 
identified 20 years ago are still relevant today. For 

example,  a  recent  study  in  Germany  found  that 
neither  in  teachers’  initial  training  nor  in  their 
continual  professional  development  is  teaching 
in  multilingual  and  multicultural  classrooms 
systematically provided or demanded by students 
in  all  federal  states  (‘Länder,’ 
and  teachers 
Mercator/SVR 2016). While this is disappointing, 
the  good  news  is  that  policymakers  know  very 
well what needs to be done. Among experts and 
policymakers in the field there seems to be broad 
agreement  on  the  appropriate  policy  solutions, 
notably early access to education, language learning 
and  support,  skills  assessment,  individualised 
support, teacher and staff training, and approaches 
involving actors in and around the school in school 
(European  Commission  2015, 
development 
2016a; OECD 2015). Some of these measures have 
already been implemented in recent years, such as 
promoting access to early childhood education and 
early  language  support.  The  PISA  data  illustrate 
that  such  measures  can  indeed  produce  positive 
results in the medium term. Finally, the 2015 crisis 
also led to a strong mobilisation of policymakers, 
practitioners,  and  civil  society.  In  the  countries 
most affected, for example, the number of schools 
involved  in  integrating  newly  arrived  migrants 
is  unprecedented,  also  including  schools  on  the 
academically oriented education tracks.

It is still too early to judge, but in this perspective 
the  recent  influx  of  refugees  and  the  pressure  it 
has created on education systems to provide viable 
solutions is also an opportunity to innovate and to 
overcome traditional obstacles. The extraordinary 
pressure  that  European  societies,  policymakers, 
schools,  and  teachers  are  faced  with,  on  the  one 
hand, combined with the knowledge about viable 
policy solutions, on the other hand, provides the 
basis  for  policy  development  in  all  the  countries 
discussed  in  this  paper  even  under  divergent 
institutional  conditions.  This  dynamic  may 
eventually  also  spur  the  development  of  more 
inclusive education systems in the medium to long 
term. 

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References
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Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung (2016): Bildung in Deutschland 2016, Ein indikatorengestützter 
Bericht mit einer Analyse zu Bildung und Migration, Bielefeld.

Crul  et  al.  (2016):  No  lost  generation?  Education  for  refugee  children.  EUI  Forum  on  Migration, 
Citizenship and Demography in Florence.

European Commission (2014): Education and Training Monitor 2014, Luxembourg.

European Commission (2015): A European agenda on migration, COM(2015) 240 of 13.5.2015

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European Commission (2016a): Action Plan on the integration of third country nationals, COM(2016) 
377 of 7.6.2016.

European Commission (2016b): Education and Training Monitor 2016, SWD(2016)334.

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European Commission (2016d): Education and Training Monitor 2016, Netherlands.

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European  Commission  (2016g):  Reception  of  newly  arrived  migrants,  and  assessment  of  previous 
schooling Highlight report from the Peer Learning Activity in Stockholm 5-7 April 2016. 

IAB  (2016a):  Flucht,  Ankunft  in  Deutschland  und  erste  Schritte  der  Integration,  IAB-BAMF-SOEP-
Befragung von Geflüchteten, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, Nürnberg.

IAB (2016b): Zuwanderungsmonitor November 2016, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, 
Nürnberg. 

Massumi et al. (2015): Neu zugewanderte Kinder und Jugendliche im deutschen Schulsystem, Mercator 
Institute, Cologne.

Mercator Institut/SVR (Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration) (2016), 
Lehrerbildung in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft. Qualifizierung für den Normalfall Vielfalt, Berlin.

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SECTION 3 
LABOUR MARKET 
INTEGRATION

REFUGEE AND 
MIGRANT 
LABOUR MARKET 
INTEGRATION: 
EUROPE IN NEED 
OF A NEW POLICY 
AGENDA
Klaus F. Zimmermann
Princeton University and UNU-MERIT

1. Introduction
Until  recently,  many  Europeans  had  only  seen 
images  of  large  refugee  camps  and  desperate 
families  trying  to  cross  borders  on  TV  screens. 
However,  the  unprecedented  influx  of  refugees 
into Europe over the last two years, the largest since 
World War II,1 has made refugee scenes a reality 
for  many  European  neighbourhoods.  Feelings 
of  empathy  and  shock  have  been  increasingly 
accompanied by worries about the consequences 
that the refugee crisis will have for society, welfare 
institutions and labour markets. In almost all the 
EU member states these worries have influenced 
public  opinion  and  political  action,  causing 
temporary  closings  of  Schengen  borders  and 
resistance  to  a  fair  allocation  of  refugees  across 
Europe. 

The  refugee  crisis  soon  became  a  political  crisis 
that  gave  rise  to  populist  parties.  The  topic  was 
increasingly  conflated  with  other  migration 
issues:  economic  or  educational  migration, 
welfare  migration  and  even  internal  EU  labour 
mobility. Brexit, the unexpected vote of the British 
to leave the European Union, was also apparently 
1 
See, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/global-
migration-hits-highest-level-since-world-war-ii.aspx.

influenced by migration concerns. The migration 
topic  is  suddenly  determining  the  results  of 
elections  in  EU  member  states  and  resulting  in 
strong  disagreements  about  how  to  deal  with 
the  crisis.  Hence,  the  migration  issue  is  acting 
like a catalyst in the European Union’s endgame, 
although  it  is  only  misused  in  the  face  of  weak 
political structures. 

The current crisis can be seen as a crisis of Europe 
and  its  institutions  rather  than  one  of  European 
migration. Refugees and internal labour mobility 
have not been the cause of the crisis. On the contrary, 
scientific evidence demonstrates that most of the 
current worries are unfounded. Recent empirical 
studies (Kahanec and Zimmermann 2009 & 2016; 
Zimmermann,  2014a;  Blau  and  Mackie  2016) 
point  to  the  economic  opportunities  provided 
by  immigration  and  suggest  how  Europe  could 
achieve a fair and effective allocation of migrants 
that  would  preserve  European  principles  and 
European  unity.  These  empirical  findings  should 
be taken into account by European political actors 
in  a  spirit  of  evidence-based  policymaking  in 
their efforts to establish a functioning integration 
policy.

The  following  considerations  will  therefore  put 
the  so-called  European  migration  or  refugee 
crisis into perspective. On the one hand, there are 
undoubtedly  enormous  challenges  which  affect 
core  values  of  the  European  Union  that  are  the 
basis of the European idea. But on the other hand, 
the current crisis also offers great opportunities for 
a shrinking and aging Europe – especially in terms 
of enhanced labour mobility – as a basis for future 
growth and welfare. The analysis will mainly focus 
on the employment aspect of migration. To what 
extent  are  migrants,  whether  they  are  workers 
or  refugees,  able  to  find  jobs  or  become  self-
employed, finance their lives and contribute to the 
economic success of their host country? Are they 
harmful  or  beneficial  for  native  workers?  And 
which  policies  can  foster  and  manage  the  inflow 
effectively?

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In  Section  2  the  chapter  first  investigates  the 
challenges (and opportunities) related to migrant 
and  refugee  inflows.  Section  3  then  reviews 
some  of  the  labour  market  effects,  both  for  the 
migrants and for natives. Finally, Section 4 studies 
major  policy  approaches  to  ensuring  the  best 
performance of the host labour markets in Europe.

2. Challenges to face: those 
present and those to come2
Who  should  be  taken  care  of?  From  a  legal, 
political  and  social  viewpoint,  work  migrants, 
family  migrants,  educational  migrants,  asylum 
seekers and refugees are quite different categories.3 
Nevertheless,  all  of  these  categories  may  have  a 
strong  interest  in  seeking  work,  either  through 
employment or self-employment, for at least some 
time. Hence, we cannot rule out economic motives 
for any type of migrant and neither should this be 
an  argument  for  excluding  them  from  a  debate 
about  optimal  integration  into  labour  markets. 
The current practice of many countries of limiting 
asylum  seekers’  access  to  their  national  labour 
markets is problematic.4 Under the 1951 Refugee 
Convention  recognized  refugees  are  allowed  to 
work immediately. However, since all EU member 
states have their own migration policies, the labour 
mobility  of  third-country  nationals  between  EU 
countries  remains  restricted,  including  for  those 
who have official refugee status. 

2 

Also see Hinte et al. (2015); Zimmermann (2014a).

3 
Asylum  seekers  and  refugees  are  both  special  types  of 
migrants,  whereas  in  a  legal  sense  asylum  seekers  or  asylees  are 
those who have formally filed an asylum application and refugees 
are  those  who  have  been  granted  refugee  status  (Constant  and 
Zimmermann,  2016).  These  terms  are  often  used  much  more 
broadly  in  the  public  debate,  with  refugees  being  considered  to 
include all those fleeing unpleasant conditions in the home country 
(not necessarily applying for asylum, still waiting or preparing for 
the application, or not receiving formal status but still staying in the 
country) and asylum seekers those who plan to file an application. 
Here,  we  follow  the  more  general  interpretation  while  making  it 
clear in the context when we focus on the legal terms. 

See  Constant  and  Zimmermann  (2016)  for  a  detailed 
4 
analysis of the current labour market access rights of legal asylum 
seekers in the EU member countries.

Some  argue  that  an  early  integration  of  asylum 
seekers into the labour market would make it harder 
to  maintain  the  distinction  between  economic 
migrants  and  refugees  since  it  would  incentivize 
migrants  with  purely  economic  motivations  to 
apply for asylum. However, it is the current system 
itself that has corrupted this distinction. It could 
be made more successfully if there were (i) a well-
immigration 
defined  Europe-wide  economic 
channel outlined in an immigration law and (ii) a 
rigorous  and  effective  asylum  application  system 
with early profiling, fast decisions and deportation 
when necessary. 

Why is labour mobility economically beneficial? It 
contributes to an optimal allocation of resources, 
and therefore generates higher and better output 
and more welfare. It supports a quick adjustment 
of  labour  markets,  particularly  after  asymmetric 
regional shocks, and hence reduces unemployment. 
For a long time, visionary European leaders have 
been  pushing  to  complete  the  Single  European 
Labour Market, but it is still incomplete. 

Free movement of labour represents a core value 
of  the  European  Union,  as  established  in  the 
Maastricht  Treaty  in  1993.  Already  in  1951,  the 
Treaty  of  Paris  allowed  for  free  movement  of 
workers  in  the  coal  and  steel  industries,  and  in 
1957  the  Treaty  of  Rome  established  the  right 
of  free  movement  of  workers  throughout  the 
European  Economic  Community.  Since  then, 
the  consensus  in  the  European  Union  has  been 
that by fostering growth through a more efficient 
allocation of labour between countries with labour 
surpluses and those with labour shortages, the free 
movement of labour can create greater economic 
welfare, 
social-cultural 
integration,  and  strengthen  a  shared  European 
identity. 

increase  European 

However, recent developments clearly demonstrate 
that  this  consensus,  if  not  already  broken,  is 
in  imminent  danger.  Even  before  the  current 
situation,  EU  states  tended  to  view  any  large-

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scale  international  migration  as  a  threat  to  the 
sovereignty of their national and regional borders, 
their economies and their societies. Most member 
states  have  reacted  in  a  backward-looking  way 
to  influxes  of  refugees  by  tightening  controls  on 
irregular  access  to  their  territories  and,  in  some 
cases,  on  legal  channels.  However,  as  one  might 
have expected, the increasing restrictions have not 
been effective in avoiding or controlling the influx 
of refugees and other migrants. Instead, they have 
resulted  in  migrants  making  increased  efforts  to 
reach  Europe,  which  in  turn  exposes  vulnerable 
migrants to greater risks.

The rising concerns about mobility in the political 
debates  before  and  after  the  Brexit  vote  in  many 
European member states demonstrate insufficient 
understanding  of  the  substantial  benefits  of 
migration  to  the  performance  of  the  economy 
and  a  convoluted  understanding  of  the  value  of 
a  European  Union  of  28  member  states.  Despite 
the  refugee  crisis,  it  is  still  not  too  much  labour 
migration but too little mobility of workers that is 
at the core of the European migration challenge. 
Both  migration  across  regions  within  a  country 
and  between  countries  within  Europe  has  been 
declining  over  recent  decades.  Interregional 
migration  has  played  a  much  smaller  role  in 
economic  adjustments  in  Europe  than  in  the 
United  States,  where  it  has  been  an  important 
component of the relative success of the American 
economy  for  many  years.  It  is  only  recently  that 
Europe has become more flexible, while the United 
States labour market has become less flexible. This 
has been partly a consequence of the EU Eastern 
enlargements  and,  more  recently,  a  consequence 
of the economic divergence of European countries 
during  and  after  the  Great  Recession.  Migrants 
from  outside  the  EU  are  typically  more  mobile 
and  they  also  play  a  significant  role  in  internal 
EU  mobility  (Jauer  et  al.  2016).  Workers  in  the 
euro-zone  countries  have  become  more  mobile 
than those in countries outside this zone (Arpaia 
et al., 2014). Nonetheless, internal mobility in the 

EU is far below the optimum level that could be 
achieved.

On  the  one  hand,  migration  reacts  to  economic 
differences,  namely  wages  and  unemployment, 
but  only  slightly  to  welfare  benefits.  Ethnic 
networks play a dominant role, however. Migrants 
often  select  destinations  because  others  of  the 
same  ethnic  or  local  origin  have  chosen  them 
before  and  can  assist  them  in  finding  jobs  and 
accommodation.  The  most  important  cause  of 
immobility, on the other hand, is a lack of foreign 
language  skills.  Other  major  causes  are  rising 
female 
less 
mobile double-income households, an increase in 
the home ownership rate, the continued existence 
of barriers to the transferability of social security 
entitlements,  insufficient  recognition  of  formal 
qualifications,  insufficient  transparency  of  the 
European  job  market  and  online  search  engines, 
and  persistent  long-term  unemployment,  which 
leads to the increased relevance of social networks 
in overcoming individual and cultural barriers.

labour  market  participation  and 

A  further  European  challenge  is  demography 
and  the  shift  in  demand  from  low-skilled  to 
highly-skilled  workers.  The  UN’s  Population 
Division currently estimates that 3% of the world’s 
population are international migrants – a number 
that  has  been  very  stable  for  decades,  but  all 
developed economies face a strong and increasing 
excess demand for skilled labour. This is brought 
about  by  technological  change,  population  aging 
and, in the case of Europe, by a substantial future 
decrease in the native European workforce. 

Europe as a whole is thus increasingly drawn into 
a competition to provide the institutional settings 
for  its  companies  to  attract  skilled  international 
labour to fill the gaps. However, unlike traditional 
immigration countries, such as the United States, 
Canada  and  Australia,  Europe  has  no  standing 
in  the  international  labour  market  for  highly-
skilled  people.  Phenomena  like  immigration, 
return migration, onward migration and circular 

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migration  are  new  challenges  that  Europe  will 
rapidly  need  to  learn  to  deal  with  in  this  phase 
of  the  internationalization  of  the  labour  market. 
How do refugees fit into this picture? Refugees can 
help  alleviate  Europe’s  demographic  disruptions, 
at least in the long run.

Can  we  manage  migration  and  control  our 
borders effectively? The correct answer is probably 
negative. The potential for migration is enormous. 
For instance, about 86% of the 14 million refugees 
in 2014 live in developing countries (World Bank 
2016)  and  few  have  so  far  migrated  to  highly 
developed countries. One obvious approach is to 
impose  immigration  restrictions:  through  legal 
measures,  by  tightening  border  controls  or  even 
by  building  fences  and  walls.  A  better  approach 
would be to reach agreements with neighbouring 
states to collaborate on monitoring and managing 
migration flows. Such measures are being discussed 
in  the  context  of  protecting  borders  in  southern 
Europe.  However,  if  the  factors  that  contribute 
to  migration  persist,  political  and  geographical 
realities suggest that it will be difficult to control 
external borders sufficiently in the long run.

Furthermore,  a  common  empirical  finding  in 
many  countries  is  that  imposing  immigration 
restrictions  often  achieves  opposite  outcomes 
(more  or  different  migrants)  to  those  that  were 
intended (fewer or other migrants).5 This is because 
efforts  by  immigrants  to  enter  countries  illegally 
tend  to  increase:  if  legal  entry  becomes  difficult, 
workers who are highly motivated by push or pull 
factors will try to enter illegally. In addition, once 
they are in a country, workers will tend to stay or 
stay  longer  because  returning  is  so  difficult.  As 
a  result,  return  and  onward  migration  collapse. 
And  migrants  who  cannot  easily  move  into  and 
out  of  the  host  country  are  more  likely  to  bring 
family members with them when they migrate, or 
to bring them in later when they realize that they 
cannot move back and forth. 

5 
For  an  analysis  of  border  control  issues,  see  Massey 
and  Pren  (2012),  Orrenius  (2014),  Massey  et  al.  (2016)  and 
Zimmermann (2014b). 

There  are  numerous  examples  of  immigration 
restrictions  that  have  backfired.  A  prominent 
example  in  the  United  States  is  the  Bracero 
programme.    Under  this  free  labour  mobility 
programme, which began in 1942, workers from 
Mexico,  mainly  men,  could  travel  into  three 
US  states  along  the  border  for  temporary  jobs  – 
working  primarily  for  growers  in  California  and 
agricultural  employers  in  Texas.  The  immigrants 
relied  heavily  on  social  networks  that  connected 
workers  in  Mexico  with  employers  in  the  US. 
Although the programme was an effective system 
of  circular  labour  migration  aimed  at  temporary 
work, it was officially terminated in 1964 amidst the 
rise of the civil rights movement. As a result (and 
due  to  other  restrictive  immigration  and  border 
policies),  Mexican  workers  and  their  families 
started  to  migrate  into  the  US  ‘illegally.’  Massive 
and  costly  increases  in  border  enforcement  had 
little deterrence effect on undocumented migrants. 
On  the  contrary,  return  migration  decreased 
because the militarization of the border increased 
the costs and risks for Mexican migrants, so they 
stayed longer once they had managed to cross the 
border.  In  addition,  they  brought  their  families 
throughout 
and  began  settling  permanently 
the  US.  Thus,  barriers  that  were  installed  to 
reduce  labour  migration  from  Mexico  to  the  US 
backfired and transformed a successful temporary 
migration scheme into a flow of a similar number 
of  undocumented  migrants,  who  eventually 
became de facto permanent residents in the US. 

Some  recent  research  confirms  these  earlier 
findings. For example, a study that examines the 
period after the 1986 adoption by Congress of the 
Immigration  Reform  and  Control  Act  finds  that 
for  every  million-dollar  increase  in  the  border 
patrol’s  budget,  the  odds  that  a  migrant  would 
return home to Mexico in any given year dropped 
by 89% (Massey et. al 2015). 

As  Zimmermann  (2014b)  shows,  similar  effects 
could  be  observed  in  Europe  when  guestworker 
recruitment ended in 1973. Turks, unlike most of 

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the other recruited ethnicities that originated from 
other  member  states  of  the  European  Economic 
Community,  did  not  enjoy  free  mobility.  While 
for  other  guestworkers  whose  countries  became 
EU  members  the  stock  of  immigrants  decreased 
or  stagnated,  the  numbers  of  Turkish  nationals 
rose  substantially.  This  occurred  because  the 
guestworkers  stayed,  brought  their  families  to 
Germany, and had high fertility. 

From  a  global  perspective,  additional  long-term 
challenges arise. With the inescapable progress of 
globalization  in  general,  and  given  the  advances 
in  human  mobility  in  particular,  labour  markets 
will inevitably become more integrated. In many 
countries the impending demographic disruptions 
will  set  in  with  full  force  in  the  coming  years. 
Climate  change,  natural  disasters  and  the  rise 
of  the  BIC  countries  (Brazil,  India  and  China) 
will  pose  additional  labour  market  challenges. 
Expansion  of  the  resources  available  to  the 
developing world and a strong increase in human 
capital  will  generate  more  opportunities  for 
global mobility. All of these factors will eventually 
require a global reallocation of resources. This will 
force  international  and  domestic  labour  markets 
to undergo major adjustment processes. A strong 
demand  for  skilled  workers  together  with  the 
fight  against  extreme  economic  inequality,  the 
creation of ‘good’ jobs, and increased employment 
of  specific  groups  (such  as  the  young,  the  old, 
females, low-skilled and ethnic minority workers) 
will need scientific monitoring and evaluation and 
a rising interest on the part of policymakers.  

3. Work integration 
experiences
There  is  now  a  large  literature  about  the  labour 
market consequences of immigration for all parts 
of  the  world,  including  Europe.  Here,  I  provide 
a  brief  but  focused  overview.  The  questions  of 
interest  are:  How  do  migrants  integrate  into  the 
labour  force  and  how  quickly  do  they  begin  to 
perform  in  the  education  and  economic  systems 

of the host country? Do they affect the jobs, wages 
or  educational  chances  of  natives?  And  what  is 
their take-up of welfare benefits? 

Some state of the art is covered in the handbooks 
by  Chiswick  and  Miller  (2015)  and  Constant 
and  Zimmermann  (2013).  Assimilation  to  the 
economic status of natives has been shown to be 
very slow, and it is sometimes not even achieved 
by the second generation. Although theoretically 
possible, migrants typically do not take jobs away 
(Constant  2014),  do  not  depress  the  wages  of 
natives (Peri 2014) and do not abuse the welfare 
system  (Giulietti  2014). The  ‘natural  experiment’ 
of the EU’s Eastern enlargement in 2004 broadly 
confirmed  these  findings  (see  Kahanec  and 
Zimmermann,  2009,  2016).  Migrants  from  the 
new  member  states  mostly  found  work  without 
having  a  relevant  negative  impact  on  the  labour 
market  outcomes  of  natives.  In  spite  of  the 
negative  public  migration  debate  in  the  context 
of  the  Brexit  campaign,  these  findings  were  also 
confirmed for the UK. Labour migration induced 
by  EU  enlargement  was  also  beneficial  for  this 
country (Wadsworth et al. 2016), which received 
the  largest  additional  inflow  of  migrant  workers 
after immediately opening up its labour market to 
the new EU member states. A recently published 
report  by  a  highly  ranked  commission  of  the 
National Academies of the US (Blau and Mackie 
2016) confirms the same positive outcome there: 
in general, migrants are good for the US economy 
and seldom harm the natives.

How do refugees fit into this picture? A number 
of  studies  have  investigated  the  labour  market 
integration  of  refugees  or  have  compared  their 
chances across different types of entry categories.6 

6 
For  Denmark  and  Germany,  see,  e.g.,  Constant  and 
Zimmermann  (2005a,  2005b),  who  look  at  entry  categories  and 
also study self-employment. See Devoretz et al. (2005) for Canada; 
Cobb-Clark  (2006)  for  Australia;  Aydemir  (2011)  for  Canada; 
Bevelander  and  Pendakur  (2009)  for  Sweden;  Hartog  and  Zorlu 
(2009) for The Netherlands; Foged and Peri (2016) for Denmark; 
and  Ceritoglu  et  al.  (2015)  and  Balkan  and  Tumen  (2016)  for 
Turkey.  Hatton  (2013)  and  Tumen  (2015)  provide  insightful 
literature reviews covering some of these studies. 

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Asylum  seekers  and  refugees  may  be  younger 
and  better  motivated  than  other  non-economic 
migrants, but they integrate slowly, have problems 
finding  employment,  have  more  difficulties  in 
organizing self-employment and hence also suffer 
from  lower  earnings.  This  is  mainly  a  result  of 
insufficient  or  lack  of  schooling  and  low  host-
country  language  proficiency.  A  recent  OECD 
(2016)  report  on  refugees  supports  this  general 
picture  for  25  EU  countries  using  the  pre-crisis 
2014 Ad Hoc Module of the European Labour Force 
Survey. According to the report, 80% of all refugees 
are clustered in four member states (Germany, the 
UK,  Sweden  and  France).  A  remarkable  20%  of 
the working-age refugees have tertiary education. 
However,  their  allocation  varies  much  across 
Europe  and  the  size  of  this  group  has  decreased 
with  recent  cohorts.  About  42%  have  at  most 
lower  secondary  education.  In  general,  “refugees 
represent  one  of  the  most  vulnerable  groups  of 
migrants in the labour market…. It takes refugees 
up to 20 years to have a similar employment rate 
as the native-born” (OECD 2016, pp. 5-6).

Refugees  and  asylum  seekers  often  perform 
comparably  to,  but  generally  still  worse  than, 
migrants  who  came  as 
family  members. 
Immigration  through  a  work  status  mostly  leads 
to  a  superior  integration  path  thereafter.  These 
findings suggest that there are long-lasting effects 
of the legal status at entry into the country on the 
labour market potential of immigrants (Constant 
and  Zimmermann,  2005a,  2005b).  Hence,  a 
selective  immigration  policy  might  be  helpful  to 
ensure individuals who can be more successful in 
the labour market are attracted. Such a selection 
might  even  be  possible  for  asylum  seekers  and 
refugees  when  executed  in  a  European  context 
(see Section 4 of this chapter). 

The  allocation  of  migrants  and  refugees  within 
countries and among EU member states is an issue 
of  substantial  concern.  Countries  like  Germany 
have for a long time had an internal quota system 
to  allocate  refugees  and  asylum  seekers  across 

states  (‘Länder’),  a  strategy  also  applied  in  other 
countries, such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and the UK (Hatton, 2013). 
Migrants were often placed outside major cities in 
local areas, which could cause social tensions and 
keep  them  away  from  attractive  labour  markets 
and  ethnic  networks.  These  regulations  entailed 
no work permit being issued until refugee status 
was  recognised.  As  a  consequence,  the  medium-
term  employability  of  refugees  was  likely  to 
be  negatively  affected  since  major  integration 
mechanisms were excluded. 

These policies were questioned and only recently 
have they been somewhat relaxed (Constant and 
Zimmermann,  2016).7  Early  integration  policies 
should  be  able  to  ensure  a  much  better  labour 
market integration of refugees. Such policies also 
need to deal with the fact that by their very nature 
many refugees are at first only temporary migrants 
and  may  wish  to  return  to  their  home  countries 
after the situation there has improved, or to move 
to  another  country  for  family  or  labour  market 
reasons.  Moreover,  refugees  move  in  ethnic  and 
family  networks  and  pursue  economic  interests 
when  searching  for  a  place  to  stay.  This  creates 
an  opportunity  to  mobilize  the  diaspora  for 
integration. Thus, refugees can also help moderate 
Europe’s  demographic  disruptions  and  meet 
the  needs  for  mobile  workers.  However,  this  is 
much more difficult to achieve than is sometimes 
suggested  in  public  debates  and  will  take  much 
more  time  and  many  more  integration  efforts. 
The  main  advantage  of  refugees  is  that  they  are 
typically young and highly motivated. 

Given  the  slow  labour  market  integration  of 
refugees, it is obviously unlikely that they will offer 
much competition to native workers. At worst, it 
is  the  group  of  the  low-skilled  natives  and  other 
migrants that can expect a negative impact. Tumen 
(2015) studies some of the major publications on 
the labour market consequences of refugee inflows 

7 
market access of asylees, see Constant and Zimmermann (2016).

For an overview of the current legal details of the labour 

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from the perspective of ‘natural experiments.’ The 
argument  he  finds  is  that,  unlike  normal  labour 
demand-driven migration that is endogenous and 
selective, a strong, fast and unexpected inflow of 
refugees may be considered exogenous and hence 
can  more  convincingly  identify  the  true  impact 
of  migratory  movements  on  the  labour  market 
outcomes of native workers. A counter-argument 
is that refugees may not be close enough in their 
profiles  and  reactions  to  labour  migrants  for  it 
to  be  possible  to  learn  much  about  the  topic  in 
general.  Typically,  the  key  empirical  studies  find 
no  effects  on  wages  and  a  negative,  albeit  small, 
effect  on  employment,  largely  in  the  unskilled 
sector.8 

The actual impacts of large refugee inflows depend 
on  local  institutional  settings.  For  example,  a 
study analysing the effects of the recent inflow of 
Syrian refugees into southeast Turkey shows that 
while wage levels were unaffected, the influx did 
in fact increase unemployment among the Turkish 
residents (Ceritoglu et al. 2015). However, a closer 
look  reveals  that  the  locals  who  lost  their  jobs 
mainly  worked  in  Turkey’s  large  informal  sector. 
There,  the  refugee  inflows  reduced  the  informal 
employment  ratio  by  approximately  2.2%.  The 
authors conclude that the prevalence of informal 
employment  in  Turkey  amplified  the  negative 
impact of Syrian refugee inflows on native labour 
market outcomes. For unrecognized refugees, the 
informal  sector  is  the  only  place  where  they  can 
find  work,  as  the  Turkish  government  has  not 
provided them with work permits.9

The Turkish case therefore shows the importance 
and necessity of considering granting immigrants 
access  to  local  labour  markets.  Many  refugees 

8 
See  Card  (1990)  for  Cuba  to  the  US;  Hunt  (1992)  for 
Algeria  to  France;  Carrington  and  Lima  (1996)  for  Angola  and 
Mozambique  to  Portugal;  Friedberg  (2001)  for  the  Soviet  Union 
to Israel; Maystadt and Verwimp (2014) for Burundi and Rwanda 
to Tanzania; Foged and Peri (2016) for Denmark; and Ceritoglu et 
al.  (2015)  for  Turkey.  See  Borjas  and  Monras  (2016)  for  a  recent 
confirmation of these findings.

9 
labour market access for Syrian war refugees.

In  the  meanwhile,  the  Turkish  government  has  relaxed 

have usable skills and professional qualifications, 
and  are  committed  to  work.  Nevertheless,  until 
not so long ago they were effectively barred from 
seeking  employment.  Germany  has  also  recently 
eased its restrictions on labour market access for 
asylees  (Constant  and  Zimmermann  2016).  This 
gives  them  a  chance  to  earn  their  own  living,  to 
develop  their  professional  skills  further,  and  to 
achieve social integration.

Foged and Peri (2016) take up another important 
aspect  of  the  refugee-native  relationship.  They 
study the massive influx of refugees to Denmark 
during  the  period  1991-2008  and  its  impact  on 
the labour market outcomes of low-skilled Danes. 
Contrary  to  popular  belief,  they  do  not  find  an 
increase  in  the  probability  of  unemployment  for 
the  unskilled  Danish  population.  Instead,  the 
findings  suggest  that  the  immigrants,  who  were 
mainly refugees from former Yugoslavia, Somalia, 
Afghanistan  and  Iraq,  caused  an  ‘occupational 
upgrading  and  specialization’  of  native  Danish 
employees. 

The  story  behind  these  results  is  quite  similar 
to  what  happened  in  Germany  when  the  ‘guest 
workers’  arrived  in  the  1960s  (Zimmermann 
1996).  While  immigrants  are  initially  restricted 
to  occupations  and  jobs  consisting  of  manual 
tasks because of language problems, natives leave 
these  jobs  by  specializing  into  more  complex 
occupations  with  a  primarily  interactive  task 
content.  Accordingly,  the  influx  of  guestworkers 
had a positive effect on wages and the mobility of 
the native low-skilled population, who climbed up 
the job ladder.

4. Policy approaches
The  above  review  has  shown  that,  according  to 
global  evidence,  migration  is  largely  beneficial, 
although  there  may  be  significant  differences 
between different types of immigration channels. 
in 
Roughly 
particular when they are screened by immigration 

speaking,  economic  migrants, 

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policies,  are  naturally  easier  to  integrate  into  the 
labor  market  than  refugees  and  asylum  seekers, 
who are forced to migrate abruptly. But destination 
countries  do  not  have  much  choice  between  the 
two  kinds  of  migrants.  International  laws  and 
the Geneva Refugee Convention of 1951 (signed 
by 144 nations) specify humanitarian obligations 
to  refugees  and  asylum  seekers.  It  outlines  the 
obligations  of  the  host  countries  to  protect 
refugees  and  provides 
for  non-refoulement, 
meaning that refugees should not be returned to a 
country in which their lives or freedom would be 
threatened.  In  the  absence  of  clear  international 
norms  for  “burden  sharing”  in  the  admission  of 
refugees, foreign policy needs to achieve an earlier 
and  better  allocation  between  Europe  and  the 
world and within the EU. This is obviously not an 
easy task. A closed border policy for real refugees 
and asylum seekers is not only inhuman but also 
largely  impossible  to  impose.  It  will  only  create 
misery, illegal migration and substantial economic 
and  social  costs.  Similarly,  there  might  be  better 
policy  approaches  than  simple  border  controls 
against illegal economic migration.

Given  the  substantial  economic  potential  that 
migration  has,  the  resistance  against  human 
mobility  results  from  a  misunderstanding  of  the 
facts, as well as ignorance or misuse of the topic 
for  political  purposes.  Scientists  certainly  have  a 
duty  to  share  their  knowledge  with  the  broader 
public,  the  media  and  policymakers.  Reports 
of  Academies  of  Sciences  like  the  National 
Academies of the United States (Blau and Mackie 
2016)  are  important  for  the  debate.  Those  who 
understand  have  to  stand  up  against  political 
pressures  and  communicate  by  using  the  media 
properly. To do this, one has to deal with attitudes 
against migrants and refugees. Negative attitudes 
are often concentrated in parts of a country or in 
countries without a large number of migrants or 
refugees, or among people who misjudge the true 
impacts  on  the  labour  market  and  the  economy 
(Bauer  et  al.  2000;  Dustmann  2007;  van  Noort 

2016).  Communication  strategies  to  inform  the 
public about these impacts and to profile successful 
individuals  or  contexts  might  help  to  moderate 
such attitudes. The inability of the political class to 
execute such a strategy is partly responsible for the 
currently perceived refugee or migration crisis. It 
is more a crisis of political leadership.

Managing migration is a somewhat difficult task. 
As  pointed  out  in  Section  2,  economic  research 
has  shown  that  limiting  labour  migration  does 
not  necessarily  stop  immigration,  particularly 
circular  migration,  as  previous  experiences  (US-
Mexico,  Europe  after  1973)  have  shown.  It  may 
even  result  in  more  migration  due  to  a  decline 
in  return  migration  and  induced  family  and 
social migration, which change the nature of the 
process.  In  general,  the  relevance  of  emigration 
is  typically  misunderstood  and  underestimated 
in public debates. Labour migrants mostly return 
or move on when jobs are no longer available or 
when  better  alternatives  appear.  Refugees  too 
can  either  return  if  the  situation  in  the  home 
country improves or move further on when other 
opportunities  come  up.  Point  systems  provide 
transparency  for  migrants  and  the  host  country 
and  have  been  shown  to  be  effective  to  screen 
and  guide  mobility.  The  criteria  may  explicitly 
include integration indicators, such as education, 
language proficiency, job characteristics and social 
activities. An even better, but more controversial, 
approach is to use the labour market as a filter for 
migration. Those who have a job offer can come 
and stay, as long as the work relationship persists. 
Those who can no longer find a job have to leave, 
at  least  after  a  transition  period,  if  they  do  not 
obtain  a  permanent  residence  permit.  Circular 
migration  contracts  between  countries  may  ease 
such relationships, which are very useful to meet 
demands  for  flexibility  in  host  countries.  Those 
who  stay  illegally  may  lose  their  right  to  return 
when  a  new  job  offer  arrives.  After  a  transition 
period, a world-wide regime of free labour mobility 
would probably only result in a modest increase in 

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labour mobility, as migration experiences suggest. 
Offering successful students the option of staying 
if they find a job after some transition period is the 
most effective long-term immigration policy.

Immigration  regulations  on  asylum  seekers 
and  refugees  are  partly  responsible  for  their 
weak  performance  in  the  labour  market,  as  was 
discussed in the previous section. For instance, a 
refugee  or  asylum  seeker  could  receive  the  right 
to move to the employment channel in a points-
based  admission  system  as  soon  as  she/he  gets 
a  decent  job  offer.10  They  should  be  allowed  to 
work as quickly as possible and not be restricted 
to a particular region within the country, or after 
recognition as a refugee even in their initial host 
EU  state.  This  would  improve  their  long-term 
labour market attachment. It is a well-known fact 
about  long-term  unemployment  that  being  out 
of  a  job  is  detrimental  to  re-entry  into  regular 
employment; this also holds true for refugees and 
asylum seekers.

The  objections  against  free  labour  mobility  for 
asylum  seekers  and  recognized  refugees  are  that 
asylum procedures cannot be carried out if asylum 
seekers can freely move to other locations, and a 
fair distribution of refugees across member states 
presupposes that secondary migration is restricted. 
To clarify, the asylum procedure should be carried 
out in the country where the application was filed. 
However,  this  should  not  prevent  job  mobility 
within  the  country,  as  is  now  the  practice  in 
countries such as Austria and Germany (Constant 
and  Zimmermann,  2016).  Otherwise,  taking  up 
work is somewhat difficult for those not allocated 
to vibrant economic areas. Furthermore, Europe-
wide fairness comes into the initial allocation and 
asylum procedure. Asylum seekers can be seen as 
a burden, and it is considered that they should stay 
in the host country. However, it is in the interest of 
the whole EU area that refugees be able to move to 

While refugees are temporary migrants, in special cases 
10 
this  could  also  lead  to  a  permanent  residence  permit  and  even 
citizenship of the host country.

where  they  are  most  productive  and  can  finance 
themselves,  on  the  condition  that  they  have  a 
work  contract.  If  non-working  refugees  were  to 
distribute themselves in a substantially unbalanced 
way, one could introduce compensation payments 
between  countries.  The  profiling  of  refugees 
and  asylum  seekers  in  special  arrival  centres  at 
Europe’s borders, directly organized and financed 
by the European Union, would take the heat out 
of the public debate and define a special role for 
countries such as Greece, Italy, Malta and Spain. 
The  kind  of  profiling  known  from  the  work 
of  labour  offices  can  help  to  better  predict  the 
opportunities for migrants in host countries and 
their potential, in particular for the labour market. 
Profiling and integration need new institutions and 
procedures.  For  allocation  to  take  place  already 
at  the  borders  one  needs  an  initial  temporary 
quota  system  across  European  member  states 
guaranteeing  a  balanced  distribution  of  asylum-
seekers across the EU following acceptable criteria, 
such  as  population  size,  GDP,  unemployment 
rates,  and  existing  related  diasporas  (Rinne  and 
Zimmermann  2015).  European  solidarity  still 
needs  to  be  developed  to  execute  either  such  a 
quota  system  or  compensation  payments.  Since 
2015,  Sweden,  Hungary,  Austria  and  Germany 
have registered above-average numbers of asylum 
applications,  both  per  capita  and  in  absolute 
sizes.  In  absolute  terms,  Germany  took  nearly 
half  of  the  newly  registered  2.3  million  asylum 
applications from 2015 to September 2016. Other 
larger countries such as Italy, France and the UK 
have  been  much  more  reluctant.  However,  while 
the  number  of  asylum  applications  in  Germany 
further  increased  in  2016,  restrictive  policies  in 
Austria, Hungary and Sweden led to substantially 
reduced  numbers  there.  Hungary  even  seems  to 
encourage  registered  asylum  seekers  to  leave  the 
country;  its  recognition  rate  in  2015  declined  to 
practically zero (UNHCR, 2015).  

As  an  alternative  to  such  quotas,  Moraga  and 
Rapoport  (2015)  have  recently  proposed  an  EU-

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wide  market  for  tradable  refugee  quotas.  While 
offering  asylum  to  refugees  with  valid  claims 
is  considered  an  international  public  good,  it 
constitutes  a  significant  financial  burden  on  the 
particular receiving country. A market mechanism 
could efficiently distribute immigrants to countries 
with  the  lowest  costs,  including  the  direct  costs 
of  accommodation  and  administration,  and  also 
those of social and political distress. Furthermore, 
a  market  mechanism  could  be  designed  to  take 
into account the preferences of the asylum seekers 
themselves, for example in terms of cultural and 
linguistic proximity. The resulting solution could 
therefore  lead  to  a  fair  distribution  of  costs  and 
may also increase public acceptance.

Integration  courses  and  language  classes  need 
to  be  given  early  attention,  if  possible  already 
in  the  profiling  phase.  Free  mobility  within  the 
quota  country  should  already  be  allowed  before 
recognition of refugee status as early as possible; 
after  recognition,  mobility  should  be  free  across 
member  countries  provided  that  there  is  a 
concrete work contract. Like all migrants, refugees 
also  generally  migrate  in  ethnic  networks.  This 
offers the opportunity to mobilize a diaspora for 
integration.

Another strategy involves neighbourhood policies 
such  as  those  currently  developed  with  Turkey, 
Egypt  and  Libya.  Circular 
labour  migration 
contracts  between  the  EU  and  African  countries 
(like  that  between  Spain  and  Morocco)  could 
also be effective. In addition, in the long run a re-
vitalization  of  the  EU-Mediterranean  Economic 
Partnership concept could create a buffer zone of 
prosperity that filters the migration pressure.

5. Conclusions
Current  events  clearly  indicate  that  Europe  in 
general  and  the  European  Union  in  particular 
have arrived at a crucial stage in their history. The 
refugee  crisis  serves  as  a  catalyst  revealing  that 
the  ‘old  continent’  is  truly  at  a  crossroads. There 

will either be more integration, coordination and 
common  responsibility  or  the  European  Union 
could break apart.  

At  this  stage,  the  answer  to  any  crisis  must  be 
‘more  Europe.’  Recent  developments  have  clearly 
shown that more integration is needed to address 
the  economic,  social  and  demographic  problems 
of  our  time.  If  anything,  the  refugee  crisis  gives 
Europeans another opportunity to strengthen and 
modernize  their  bonds.  Europe  must  certainly 
revisit its overall immigration policy; nevertheless, 
it  must  not  lose  its  democratic  ideals  and  the 
European idea. 

integration.  It 

The  free  movement  of  EU  citizens  and  workers 
is  one  of  the 
within  the  European  Union 
cornerstones  of  European 
is 
enshrined in the European Treaties. In a free and 
integrated  Europe,  there  is  no  place  for  first  and 
second-class citizens. Any intentions of restricting 
the  free  movement  of  labour  as  a  fundamental 
right  stand  against  Europeans’  well-understood 
interests  in  a  dynamic  and  prosperous  economy. 
Free  labour  mobility  serves  as  a  means  to  better 
allocate shrinking human capital capacities within 
the EU. In short, the free movement of labour can 
foster  economic  dynamism,  promote  economic 
growth and advance competitiveness. 

Europe  therefore  needs  to  join  forces  to  expand 
the European dream, rather than stifle it or narrow 
it down well before it has reached its real potential. 
It  currently  seems  that  many  EU  member  states 
want a ‘free ride,’ but the benefits of the EU come at 
a price. The current refugee crisis could therefore 
mark  the  dawn  of  a  new  era,  but  it  also  has  the 
potential  to  mark  the  end  of  the  European  idea. 
Europe must now act jointly and seize the chance 
to reinvent itself to ultimately become the ‘United 
States of Europe.’ Only this model will put it on a 
level  playing  field  with  the  US  and  China  in  the 
long term.  

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Acknowlegements 
This work was begun when I was a John F. Kennedy Memorial Policy Fellow at the Center for European 
Studies at Harvard University and was completed as a Visiting Faculty member at the Department of 
Economics at Princeton University and its Industrial Relations Section. I am grateful to these institutions 
for their effective support. I also thank Rainer Bauböck, Amelie F. Constant and Milena Tripkovic for 
very valuable comments on various drafts of the paper.

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EUROPE AND 
THE ‘REFUGEE/
MIGRATION 
CRISIS’:STARTING 
POINTS FOR 
POLICY DEBATES 
ABOUT PROTECTION 
AND INTEGRATION1

Martin Ruhs
University of Oxford

Introduction
Global  forced  displacement  (internal  and  across 
borders)  is  now  estimated  to  exceed  63  million 
(UNHCR 20162), a record high since the Second 
Word  War.    The  Syrian  conflict  alone  has  led  to 
the displacement of over ten million people (just 
under  half  of  Syria’s  total  population),  including 
6.5 million internally displaced people and almost 
5  million  refugees  across  borders  (UNHCR 
20163).  As  is  the  case  with  most  geopolitical 
shocks and displacement crises around the world, 
the  great  majority  of  Syrian  refugees  (over  three 
quarters)  are  in  neighbouring  countries:  Turkey 
(an  estimated  2.7  million),  Lebanon  (1  million), 
Jordan  (656,000),  Iraq  (228,000)  and  Egypt 
(115,000). 

The ongoing conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan 
and  many  other  countries  have  also  contributed 
to  sharply  rising  numbers  of  people  arriving  in 
high-income  countries  to  claim  asylum,  mainly 

1 
This chapter draws on a forthcoming working paper by 
the author: Ruhs, M (2016) ‘High-income countries and the global 
refugee crisis: Assessing alternative pathways to protection.’   

2 
unhcrstats/576408cd7/unhcr-global-trends-2015.html 

See http://www.unhcr.org/uk/statistics/

3 
syrianrefugees/regional.php 

For  the  most  recent  data,  see  http://data.unhcr.org/

but  not  only  in  Europe.  The  legal  pathways  for 
people  fleeing  conflicts  to  reach  high-income 
countries for the purpose of claiming asylum are 
either non-existent or are extremely limited. As a 
consequence,  forced  migrants  who  are  trying  to 
claim  asylum  in  high-income  countries  must  do 
so by engaging in illegal migration – defined here 
as  the  unauthorised  crossing  of  national  borders 
– which often involves dangerous journeys across 
land and/or sea.  

Over  one  million  people  (half  of  whom  were 
Syrians  and  a  quarter  children)  crossed  the 
Mediterranean  in  2015.4  While  this  number 
continues  to  be  dwarfed  by  the  much  larger 
in  countries 
numbers  of  refugees  arriving 
neighbouring  conflict  zones  (e.g.  only  ten  per 
cent of Syrian refugees are currently in Europe), it 
constitutes a very large increase in recent historical 
experience  (e.g.  216,000  people  crossed  the 
Mediterranean in 2014 and only 59,000 in 2013). 
In the first eleven months of 2016, 350,000 people 
reached Europe via the Mediterranean (a quarter 
of whom were Syrian), a considerable drop from 
2015. At the same time, however, the number of 
people dying/going missing while trying to cross 
the Mediterranean rose from 3,800 in 2015 to over 
4,700 in 2016. 

European and other high-income countries have 
struggled and, it is widely agreed, largely failed to 
find effective policy responses to the large inflow 
of  refugees  and  migrants  and  to  the  growing 
refugee populations in the countries neighbouring 
Syria and other conflict zones. As a consequence, 
we  are  witnessing  major  humanitarian  refugee 
crises,  both  in  the  conflict  regions  and  in  some 
high-income  countries  (e.g.  Greece),  and  major 
political  crises  in  many  high-income  countries 
about  how  to  deal  with  the  issue.  The  increased 
inflows of refugees and other migrants have been 
a major driver of the rise of right-wing parties in a 
range of European countries in recent years.  

4 
mediterranean/regional.php 

For  the  most  recent  data,  see  http://data.unhcr.org/

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This short paper aims to establish realistic starting 
points  for  debates  about  more  effective  policy 
responses  by  European  and  other  high-income 
countries  to  the  displacement  caused  by  the 
Syrian  conflict  and  other  global  refugee  crises.  
This  may  seem  like  a  modest  contribution,  but 
given  the  current  state  of  many  policy  debates 
about  the  protection  and  integration  of  refugees 
and  migrants,  greater  agreement  on  basic  facts 
and  starting  points  would  already  constitute 
considerable progress. 

Starting points
I  argue  that  to  have  a  realistic  chance  of  success 
any  debate  about  new  and  more  effective  policy 
approaches  by  European  and  other  high-income 
countries  to  what  has  become  widely  known  as 
the  ‘refugee/migration  crisis’  needs  to  accept  the 
following starting points. 

First,  the  policy  challenge  will  not  go  away 
anytime  soon.  The  scale  of  the  forced  internal 
and  international  displacement  caused  by  many 
of the world’s current violent conflicts is unlikely 
to  decline  drastically  in  the  near  future. There  is 
no meaningful end in sight to the conflicts in the 
countries  that  are  currently  among  the  largest 
refugee-producing  states,  such  as  Syria,  Iraq, 
Afghanistan,  and  Eritrea.  To  deal  with  this  ‘new 
normal’ more effectively, there is a clear need for 
policy approaches that move from ‘emergency’ ad-
hoc  responses  to  more  considered  and  regulated 
responses  based  on  a  realistic  understanding  of 
the  likely  long-term  nature  of  the  issue,  its  root 
causes  (rather  than  symptoms  such  as  irregular 
migration  and  people  smuggling)  and  the  often 
enduring drivers of forced displacement. 

A  second  and  related  starting  point  is  that  the 
scale  and  nature  of  the  policy  challenges  in 
high-income  countries  and  the  countries  in  the 
region  (‘first  countries  of  asylum’)  are  closely 
linked.  The  numbers  of  refugees  who  risk  their 
lives  to  seek  asylum  in  high-income  countries 

depends,  at  least  to  a  considerable  degree,  on 
the  quality  of  protection  and  opportunities  for 
human  development  provided  in  the  countries 
neighbouring  the  conflict.  While  protection 
‘in  the  region’  will  surely  continue  to  play  an 
important and, arguably, central role in addressing 
forced displacement and refugee crises, unless this 
protection provides opportunities for employment 
including  education 
and  access 
(especially for children, who constitute about half 
of  all  the  refugees  in  the  world),  many  refugees 
fleeing countries experiencing protracted conflicts 
will choose to seek protection and ‘better lives’ in 
high-income countries instead.            

to  services 

Third, large-scale migration flows that were initially 
caused by conflict will inevitably lead to a ‘mixed 
migration’ of people with a range of different and 
sometimes  multiple  motivations  from  a  variety 
of  different  countries  (and  not  necessarily  only 
from countries where conflicts are taking place). 
This  includes  refugees  seeking  protection  but 
also  many  others  whose  primary  reason  for 
migration  may  be:  ‘economic’  (e.g.  to  escape 
economic  destitution  or  simply  to  access  better 
employment opportunities that improve their and 
their  families’  economic  situations  and  human 
development); family-related (e.g. people seeking 
to join family members who are already in high-
income  countries);  and/or  related  to  education 
and  study  (e.g.  people  wishing  to  gain  access 
to  better  education).  Although  classifying  and 
distinguishing between different types of migrants 
based  on  fixed  categories  (refugees, 
labour, 
family  and  study)  is  theoretically  problematic 
and  often  highly  contested  in  practice,  it  is  clear 
that  a  significant  share  of  the  people  arriving  in 
Europe  by  boat  over  the  past  few  years  are  not 
moving for the primary reason of protection. This 
is not surprising given the huge inequalities both 
across  and  within  many  countries.  The  primary 
reason  why  only  three  per  cent  of  the  world’s 
population are migrants despite these inequalities 
is that the restrictive immigration policies of high-

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income countries have kept most people out. Any 
perception  of  increased  opportunities  for  legal 
or  illegal  migration  to  high-income  countries 
can,  therefore,  encourage  a  range  of  people  with 
different motivations and from different countries 
to make the journey. While this reality of mixed 
migration is not surprising, it does present high-
income  countries  with  important  and  difficult 
issues  of  selection  and  removal/deportation  of 
migrants  who,  for  whatever  reasons,  have  not 
been granted permission to stay. Any realistic new 
policy proposal needs to consider and put in place 
measures that address this selection dilemma. 

As  a  fourth  starting  point  for  debate,  it  needs  to 
be  recognised  that  the  policy  responses  of  high-
income  countries  to  people  fleeing  conflicts  are 
driven  by  a  range  of  objectives  relating  to  the 
national interest (however defined at a particular 
point  in  time),  which  often  take  priority  over 
the  objective  of  protection.  While  international 
laws  and  norms  demand  that  policies  toward 
asylum  seekers  and  refugees  need  to  be  guided 
by  humanitarian  considerations, 
in  practice 
there  is  a  ‘domestic  politics  of  protecting  forced 
migrants’  in  high-income  countries,  which  can 
and  does  vary  across  countries  and  over  time. 
The  implication  is  that  any  realistic  new  policy 
proposal  needs  to  seriously  consider  its  political 
feasibility  in  different  high-income  countries. 
What  is  and  is  not  politically  feasible  at  any 
given  time  in  a  particular  country  is  obviously 
not  clear  and  can  be  debated.  Taking  account  of 
political  feasibility  does  not  mean  simply  giving 
in  to  populist  arguments,  public  anxieties  and 
the  rise  of  the  far  right,  which  can  be  observed 
in some countries partly as a result of the refugee 
crisis; it means recognising that policy makers are 
operating under certain constraints that need to be 
considered in any realistic policy debate. Calling 
for  greater  leadership  and  vision  by  politicians 
without  paying  attention  to  the  structural  and 
institutional factors that can act as variable policy 
constraints  across  countries  is  unlikely  to  result 

in the implementation of new, more effective and 
sustainable policy solutions to the refugee crisis. 

Fifth,  the  protection  provided  to  people  fleeing 
conflicts  and  violence  must  remain  a  central 
criterion  for  assessing  potential  policy  responses 
to forced displacement within and across borders. 
It  is  helpful  –  and  important  –  to  distinguish 
between  at  least  three  dimensions  of  protection. 
The  first  dimension  is  the  scale  of  protection 
provided,  i.e.  how  many  people  are  protected  by 
the  policy?  The  second  dimension  relates  to  the 
selection  of  the  beneficiaries,  i.e.  who  receives 
protection under the policy, who is excluded and 
why?  A third important dimension of protection 
relates to the conditions and quality of protection 
provided.  At  the  most  basic  level,  one  can 
distinguish  between  temporary  and  permanent 
protection.  Compared  to  full  refugee  status 
under the Geneva Convention, the different types 
of  subsidiary/temporary  protection  status  are 
typically associated with significantly fewer rights 
and more insecurity for refugees. Different policy 
responses  may  involve  trade-offs  between  these 
different dimensions of protection. For example, a 
policy (e.g. temporary protection) may offer basic 
physical  protection  to  a  large  number  of  people 
but the quality of protection (e.g. opportunities for 
longer-term human development and integration) 
may be limited, so there may be a trade-off between 
the scale and quality of protection provided.

The  sixth  important  point  is  that  a  considerable 
share  of  the  refugees  who  have  arrived  in  recent 
years  will  stay  in  Europe  permanently.  The 
precise  share  will  depend  on  a  range  of  factors, 
including  whether  refugees  are  given  permanent 
or  temporary  protection  status.  However,  even 
many  of  those  admitted  under  a  temporary 
protection regime may not be able to return home 
and will therefore seek to stay in the host country 
permanently.  All  this  means  that  the  admission 
and protection of refugees always raises important 
questions about integration. As the contributions 
to  this  e-book  discuss,  ‘integration’  relates  to  a 

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wide range of issues and policy spheres including, 
for example, the labour market, education, culture 
and  citizenship  rights.    The  admission  and  the 
integration  of  refugees  are  not  separate  issues. 
They  are  interrelated  policy  challenges  that  need 
to be analysed and addressed together.       

cooperation 

Seventh, 
among  high-income 
countries  in  their  policy  responses  to  the  global 
displacement  crisis  is  important  but  cannot  be 
assumed.  The  failure  of  European  countries  to 
agree  to  implement  a  more  effective  common 
policy approach to people fleeing from Syria and 
other conflict areas over the past few years shows 
that,  in  practice,  the  degree  of  solidarity  and 
responsibility-sharing among EU countries is fairly 
low  (at  least  in  this  area  of  refugee  protection). 
This does not mean that more cooperation cannot 
be  achieved  but  it  cannot  simply  be  assumed  as 
the precondition for new policies. Countries need 
to  be  given  incentives  and  reasons  to  cooperate, 
as  appeals  for  greater  solidarity  to  address  this 
global humanitarian crisis have, at least so far, not 
been enough to foster greater supranational and/
or global cooperation in practice. 

Finally,  it  should  be  clear  at  the  outset  of  any 
policy  debate  that  no  single  policy  will  on  its 
own  be  sufficient  to  ease  the  humanitarian  and 
political  crises  and  reduce  the  uncontrolled 
migration  flows  caused  by  conflict  and  forced 
displacement. More effective policy responses will 
require a package of policies and a comprehensive 
approach  that  includes  new  policy  interventions 
in and outside the region of conflict. In this sense, 
any major displacement crisis such as the one we 
are currently witnessing in Syria requires a global 
solution that includes both high-income countries 
and the nations in the conflict region. 

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FROM REFUGEES TO 
WORKERS’: WHAT 
CHALLENGES?
Iván Martín 
European University Institute

In  his  keynote  contribution,  Prof.  Zimmermann 
highlights  the  difficulties  in  the  labour  market 
integration of refugees. He refers to a recent OECD 
study1 based on the 2014 EU Labour Force survey 
ad hoc module on the labour market situation of 
migrants  and  their  immediate  descendants.  This 
study  concludes  that  “the  employment  outcomes 
of  refugees  improve  over  time,  as  they  integrate 
more  into  the  labour  market  and  society,  but  it 
takes  them  up  to  20  years  to  catch  up  with  the 
native-born  (65%)”  (page  21).  Figure  1  below 
summarizes  this  statistical  evidence.  However, 
even  though  these  labour  market  integration 
difficulties are well-researched and there is ample 
evidence  of  them,2  it  is  still  worth  shedding  a 
critical light on this statement. 

First,  it  implicitly  assumes  that  refugees  are 
(unemployed) workers very much like the native-
born  of  working  age  (15-65),  but  this  is  not  the 
case.  Because  of  their  traumatic  experiences  (in 
their countries of origin or during their journeys 
to  their  countries  of  asylum),  because  of  their 
lack of language and cultural knowledge of their 
host  societies,  and  because  of  their  different 
educational or work experiences (if any) in their 
countries  of  origin,  refugees  have  a  different 
psychological,  social  and  even  legal  status,  and 
they  cannot  be  easily  compared  with  workers  in 
destination countries. They must first be activated, 
and  this  activation  can  take  several  years,  very 
much  as  it  takes  several  years  to  socialize  and 
‘activate’  a  young  European  to  become  a  young 
European worker. As a matter of fact, it is not pure 
coincidence  that  the  labour  market  integration 
performance  of  refugees  is  only  comparable  to 
that  of  family  reunification  beneficiaries  who 
arrive in the European Union: they too take up to 
20  years  to  reach  employment  and  activity  rates 
similar to those of the native-born and other legal 
migrants  (see  Figure  1  above).  This  can  best  be 

Figure 1. Employment rate by reason of migration and years of residence in the European Union, 
15-64, 2014

Source: OCDE (2016), p. 21. The data cover 25 EU countries.

 European Commission/OECD (2016), “How are refugees 
1 
faring on the labour market in Europe?, Working Paper 1/16, https://
www.oecd.org/berlin/publikationen/Arbeitsmarktintegration-
von-Fluechtlingen-EK-OECD-Arbeitspapier-092106.pdf. 

  See  Martín,  Iván  et  alia  (2016),  From  Refugees  to 
2 
Workers. Mapping Labour Market Integration Support Measures for 
Asylum-Seekers  and  Refugees  in  EU  Member  States,  Bertelsmann 
Stiftung and Migration Policy Centre, pp. 16-17, http://cadmus.eui.
eu/handle/1814/43504. 

explained because they too, upon arrival, cannot 
be considered workers even if they are of working 
age.  On  the  other  hand,  53%  of  these  recently-
arrived refugees are between 18 and 34 years old, 
i.e. they have practically all their active lives ahead 
of them, so investing in their activation is also a 
good investment for the host societies. 

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Another  important  qualification  to  the  ‘20-year 
lag’ relates to the reference year used to underpin 
this  statement.  The  EU  LFS  ad  hoc  module  was 
implemented  in  2014,  when  there  were  only  1.8 
million refugees having arrived in Europe over the 
last 25 years in the 25 EU countries covered by the 
survey. In 2015, 1.3 million persons claimed asylum 
in  Europe,  and  there  were  more  than  592,000 
additional  ones  in  the  first  six  months  of  2016. 
This means that between 2015 and 2016 European 
countries  received  the  same  number  of  asylum-
seekers as over the last 25 years. Obviously, drawing 
conclusions on their labour market integration on 
the basis of how refugees arriving over the last 25 
years fared up to 2014 risks comparing situations 
which are not comparable. Not only has the scale 
of the challenge dramatically increased but policies 
have also changed. In the very title of his keynote 
contribution, Prof. Zimmermann underlines that 
Europe is “in need of a new policy agenda.”  

The  review  of  national  policies  undertaken  in 
the  framework  of  the  study  ‘From  Refugees  to 
Workers,’3  carried  out  by  the  Migration  Policy 
Centre  of  the  EUI,  reveals  a  clear  policy  trend 
within  the  European  Union  (with  the  notable 
exceptions  of  France  and  the  United  Kingdom) 
to  facilitate  the  integration  of  asylum  seekers 
and  refugees  into  national  labour  markets.4  This 
is a dramatic departure from the common policy 
pattern  before  2015,  when  most  of  the  countries 
instead tried to prevent or delay the labour market 
integration of asylum-seekers. 

Many of these countries are investing substantial 
resources  in  facilitating  and  speeding  up  this 
integration, and are designing and implementing 
all  kinds  of  measures  to  support  the  process. 
The nine country case studies carried out for the 
study  ‘From  Refugees  to  Workers’5  inventoried 

3 

4 

 Ibid.

 Ibid., 42-43.

5 
 See the country case studies for Austria, Denmark, France, 
Germany,  Italy,  the  Netherlands,  Spain,  Sweden  and  the  United 
Kingdom in Volume II of the study. http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/
handle/1814/43505/Study_fromRefugeesToWorkers_2016_Vol_2.
pdf?sequence=1. 

94  of  these  measures  in  the  fields  of  skills  and 
needs  assessment,  skills  development  (including 
language courses), job intermediation, recognition 
of  skills  and  qualifications  and  incentives  for 
economic  integration,  together  with  a  plethora 
of integrated programmes putting together many 
of  these  measures.  The  comparative  analysis  of 
these measures suggests the emergence of a kind 
of  ‘standard’  labour  market  integration  package. 
The four key elements in this package are: 1) early 
skills assessment; 2) an ‘introduction’ programme 
including  general  cultural  orientation,  but 
sometimes also socio-professional orientation and 
even some training; 3) intensive language courses; 
and  4)  access  to  general  job  intermediation 
services. Evidence on the effectiveness and impact 
of  these  measures  is  not  yet  available.  The  study 
just  managed  to  identify  some  success  factors 
based  on  the  perceptions  of  the  actors  involved 
(see  pages  44-50).  What  is  clear,  however,  is 
that there is no quick fix, that the labour market 
integration  of  refugees  (precisely  because  they 
are  not  workers  on  their  arrival)  is  a  complex 
and  gradual  process,  and  that  there  is  no  model 
of success to build on anywhere in the European 
Union.  However,  assuming  that  the  measures 
implemented  and  the  resources  mobilised  have 
at  least  some  impact  over  the  short  to  medium 

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term, they will fundamentally change the context 
and process of refugee labour market integration 
in  Europe  with  respect  to  what  we  knew  before 
2015,  and  hopefully  they  will  reduce  the  above-
mentioned 20-year period. 

Nevertheless,  many  challenges  remain,  including 
in  terms  of  policy  interventions  to  facilitate  the 
labour  market  integration  of  refugees  (which 
we  call  REFMISMES  –  Refugee  Labour  Market 
Integration  Support  Measures).  The  study  ‘From 
Refugees to Workers’ identifies the following main 
ones:

Fragmentation of REFMISMES 
A  general  overview  of  REFMISMES  in  all  the 
countries  studied  shows  a  plethora  of  new 
initiatives by all kinds of public and private actors 
but a high degree of fragmentation and a thorough 
lack  of  coordination  in  their  implementation. 
There  are  too  many  actors  taking  initiatives  and 
intervening at the local, regional and national levels 
without  any  kind  of  coherent  strategy  or  actual 
exchange of information, and there is a desperate 
need  for  coordination  across  government  levels 
and between actors. 

Need for multilevel 
governance mechanisms
This  dispersion  and  fragmentation  of  labour-
market integration support measures for refugees 
and  asylum  seekers  highlights  the  need  for 
powerful  multilevel  governance  mechanisms  to 
deal with current challenges in an integrated way 
(and this might also include the European level). 
The labour-market and more generally the social 
integration  of  refugees  and  asylum  seekers  take 
place at the local level, and initiatives to facilitate 
the  process  are  often  taken  and  implemented  by 
local and regional actors. However, asylum policy 
is largely national, and this creates a tension that 
must be addressed with appropriate exchanges of 
information,  coordination  mechanisms,  resource 
transfers and integration across actions.

Huge administrative 
obstacles remain
Even  once  they  are  entitled  to  work,  asylum-
seekers  and  refugees  face  huge  administrative 
obstacles  to  accessing  the  labour  market.  These 
are  linked  to  the  structure  of  the  benefits  they 
receive,  a  lack  of  long-term  residence  permits,  a 
need  to  implement  labour  market  tests  before 
offering them jobs (as in the UK and France) or 
assignment  to  specific  regions  of  residence.  This 
is obvious, for instance, in the mismatch between 
the geography of labour-market demand and the 
territorial  distribution  of  refugees  and  asylum 
seekers highlighted in several of the country case 
studies: e.g. Germany, Denmark and Austria.

their 

The need for specific 
tailor-made measures
One  consensual  finding  emerging  from  the 
country  case  studies  is  that  asylum  seekers  and 
refugees have specific needs, profiles and incentive 
systematic 
explain 
structures  which 
underperformance in the labour market in relation 
not only to the population in general but also to 
other  migrants.  Their  labour-market  integration 
therefore  requires  specific 
targeted  support 
measures,  in  particular  for  specific  groups  such 
as women (often with children). ‘Mainstreaming’ 
refugees – i.e. referring them to the general active 
labour  market  policies  and  support  measures 
offered by public institutions to national workers – 
is not enough, even if this is the most widespread 
policy implemented so far in this field. 

An increase in resources is 
required commensurate with 
the social and economic 
stakes 
Despite 
the 
the  difficulties  encountered 
comparative  analysis,  one  clear  preliminary 
conclusion for most of the nine countries studied 
is  that  more  financial  human  and  institutional 

in 

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information  on  refugees  and  asylum  seekers, 
on their qualifications and skills, on their per-
sonal  and  professional  profiles,  and  on  their 
spatial  distribution  (in  relation  to  the  distri-
bution  of  labour  demand  across  the  labour 
market). This can only be done through repre-
sentative surveys of current and past refugees; 
those carried out to date among refugees have 
been too partial and too scattered. 

•  There is also a need for more studies tracking 
refugees, following up on their professional re-
cords and their labour-market outcomes over 
time.

•  Finally, there is a need for more (comparative) 
case studies of REFMISMES, with deeper and 
wider  analysis  of  different  kinds  of  labour-
market integration support measures. It would 
be extremely useful to extend the comparative 
country  case  approach  to  more  EU  Member 
States, and also to non-EU countries with dif-
ferent  but  relevant  experiences  of  integrating 
refugees into their labour markets.

•  For  the  refugees  who  arrived  in  2015  and 
2016,  becoming  workers  is  certainly  the  best 
first step towards becoming new citizens and 
new Europeans. Therefore, although the ques-
tion  of  labour  market  integration  support 
measures for refugees and asylum-seekers and 
their impacts may seem technical, it will prove 
crucial for Europe’s future.

resources  need  to  be  dedicated  to  promoting 
the  labour-market  integration  of  refugees  and 
asylum  seekers.  Even  if  all  the  countries  have 
approved  successive  budget  increases  in  the  last 
year  or  so,  the  resources  available  do  not  match 
the  magnitude  of  the  economic,  social  and  even 
political  stakes.  Extraordinary  challenges  require 
extraordinary responses. 

More information is required
Another  element  common  to  all  the  country 
case  studies  is  an  emphasis  on  the  gap  between 
the  available  collected  information  on  refugees 
(both  individually  and  as  a  group)  and  the 
information  required  to  design  effective  labour-
market  integration  measures  and  policies.  A 
typical  example  of  this  is  the  ad  hoc  module  on 
migrants in the EU Labour Force Survey, which is 
only conducted every six years (in 2008 and 2014 
so  far).  If  no  decision  is  taken,  we  will  have  to 
wait until 2020 to have some statistical overview 
of  the  labour  market  performance  of  this  last 
wave  of  refugees.  In  order  to  ensure  a  learning 
curve  across  Europe  on  this  key  development, 
more  systematic  collection  of  information  on 
actions  is  needed.  However,  there  is  also  a  need 
for more systematic evaluation (in terms of impact 
and  cost-effectiveness)  of  all  these  actions  and  a 
specific follow-up on the labour market outcomes 
for this specific group of workers.

Further research needs
Researchers  also  have  an  important  role  to  play 
in  facing  the  challenges  set  by  the  arrival  of  an 
unprecedented  number  of  refugees  in  Europe. 
The  ‘From  Refugees  to  Workers’  study  was  only 
conceived as a first step aiming at an inventory of 
existing REFMISMES in a number of EU Member 
States  and  at  undertaking  a  very  preliminary 
analysis  of  them.  However,  there  is  much  more 
that  can  be  done  in  terms  of  research  on  better 
policies in this field:

•  There is an acute need for more data and more 

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WHERE AND WHEN 
TO START THE 
INTEGRATION 
PROCESS? 
Alessandra Venturini  
European University Institute

The  attention  of  the  media  and  politicians  is 
focused  on  the  integration  of  refugees  and, 
more  generally,  on  the  integration  of  all  foreign 
migrants.  Studies  looking  for  the  most  efficient 
policies suggest the need for better skill-matching 
and  a  rapid  transition  to  employment  to  avoid 
periods  of  isolation,  which  reduce  integration 
capabilities.  Labour-market  integration  research 
shows, however, that migrants tend to congregate 
in ‘migrant jobs’ and also tend to remain there, with 
very little probability of exiting (Strom et al 2013). 
Thus,  policies  which  advocate  a  rapid  labour-
market  transition  should  also  offer  continuing 
training (one day a week, two days a month etc.) to 
help asylum-seekers and migrants really integrate 

into the labour market. However, this debate only 
focuses attention on the last phase of the migrant 
integration  process  on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the 
asylum  process,  which  already  starts  before  the 
move, on the other hand.  

The phases and actors that influence the process of 
integration for labour migrants are numerous but 
the  sequence  is  clear.  The  multilateral  nature  of 
responsibilities means that the level of governance 
of asylum and refugee admission systems should 
be much broader and more complex. International 
coordination is needed to help nation-states face 
this human, economic and governance challenge.

The  migration  process  starts  in  the  sending 
country.  The  first  actors  that  influence  migrant 
performance  are,  therefore,  the  government, 
private  organisations  and  associations  and  the 
families of the migrants in the country of origin. 
Their  actions  (e.g.  signing  bilateral  agreements) 
can  reduce  the  cost  of  migration  and  can  favour 
integration  by  providing  accurate  information 
(not  least  pre-departure  training)  on  the  labour 
market,  languages  courses,  and  the  social  rules 
prevailing in the destination country.

Figure 1: The actors and instruments of integration for labour migrants

From INTERACT: Venturini A., 2016.

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in 

the  country  of  destination 

Then, 
the 
institutional  actors  who  produce  and  implement 
the  legislation  that  determines  admission  to  the 
country, the acquisition of citizenship and access 
to welfare affect the migrant-integration process. 
They produce a self-selection because they affect 
the  migration-destination  choice.  However,  they 
can also produce an active selection affecting the 
quality  of  inflows.  The  cap  on  the  H1B  visa  for 
STEM workers in the U.S. and the EU Blue Card 
Directive are examples of this.

In  addition,  there  are  also  labour-market  actors 
in  the  destination  country.  Firms,  trade  unions 
and welfare institutions all play a very important 
role in the labour-market integration of migrants. 
Their  actions  are  not  so  much  at  the  national 
as  at  the  local  level.  If  the  integration  process  is 
not  successful,  other  local-level  actors  provide 
integration  policies  (language  courses,  training, 
support  measures  etc.)  which  should  favour  a 
return to work.

The integration process briefly described above is 
impacted by all these actors and actions and varies 
enormously  according  to  the  laws  implemented   
and    the  functioning  of  the  labour  market,  in 
addition  to  the  quality  of  the  migrants.  The 
same  legislation  that  defines  the  rules  for  entry 
into  a  country  can  produce  full  labour-market 
integration  in  one  case  and  low  integration  in 
another.  Take  Germany  and  Italy.  The  former 
has  4%  unemployment,  the  latter  12%  (with 
more  than  double  this  figure  in  the  south  and 
among the young). Therefore, the same selection 
at  entry  will  not  produce  the  same  result  in 
the  two  different  labour  markets.  There  are, 
however,  some  national  groups  which  show 
very  high  labour  force  employment  rates1  in  all 
destinations.  Take,  for  instance,  the  Filipinos, 
where the efforts of the Filipino community before 
departure  and  their  support  at  destination  spur 

1 
We refer here to a probability of being employed equal 
to 1.  See Di Bartolomeo A., Kalantaryan S. and Bonfanti  S., 2015, 
Measuring  the  Integration  of  Migrants:  a  Multivariate  Approach, 
Interact Research Report 2015/1 http://hdl.handle.net/1814/34679

employment  integration.  Thus,  the  integration 
of  labour  migrants  is  a  long  process  that  starts 
in  the  sending  countries  before  departure,  and 
the  destination  countries  should  invest  in  it 
with  bilateral  agreements  and  compulsory  pre-
departure training to smooth the passages in the 
following phases. Labour migration is thus mainly 
an  international  bilateral  phenomenon  which  is 
impacted by the actions of both the sending and 
destination countries.

The  forced  migration  of  asylum  seekers,  instead, 
is  much  more  complex:  it  is  not  simply  an 
international  and  a  bilateral  problem.  The  move 
starts in an area of conflict and, depending on the 
management of the phenomenon, many different 
actors  intervene.  These  include  the  countries  of 
first asylum, the arrival countries, the countries of 
final destination and the countries of resettlement. 
Their  interventions  affect  the  final  integration  of 
the refugees in the country of destination. Thus, it 
is a multilateral phenomenon.

First of all, asylum seekers show up as illegal arrivals 
in  the  most  proximate  region.  However,  this  is 
not only a regional problem because migrants go 
where it is easiest to arrive, typically to the nearest 
safe  regions.  The  countries  of  destination  can 
be  divided  into  two  groups:  countries  of  arrival 
and  transit,  where  migrants  arrive  irregularly  by 
land  or  sea;  and  then  the  asylum  seekers’  final 
destination  countries.  The  policies  implemented 
by the transit countries affect the numbers, quality 
and  timing  of  entries  in  the  country  of  final 
destination.  However,  the  policies  implemented 
by the country of final destination (i.e. national or 
skill selection) affect the integration process in the 
arrival country too, and can transform integration 
into  a  permanent  or  a  temporary  phenomenon. 
In addition, the countries of arrival invest most of 
their public and private resources in first assistance, 
while  the  countries  of  permanent  settlement  are 
mainly  left  to  deal  with  the  integration  process. 
This  issue  is  in  part  articulated  in  the  debate  on 
intra-EU  solidarity  and  on  the  mechanisms  for 

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implementing  migrant  relocation  among  EU 
countries, but the strong implications for asylum 
integration are mostly neglected.

However,  refugees  are  not  a  regional  problem 
but  a  global  one.  This  process  is  also  affected  by 
other  potential  countries  of  resettlement.    If  the 
resettlement  ability  of  UNHCR  improved  and 
if  it  were  settling,  say,  a  million  Syrians  in  2016, 
instead  of  100,000  as  they  did  in  2015,  things 
would  change.  The  pressure  on  the  border 
countries  of  arrival  would  be  reduced,  many 
lives  would  be  saved  and  the  integration  process 
simplified. While spontaneous arrivals only affect 
nearby  countries,  resettlement  policies  cover 
distant  countries  too.  Asylum  responsibility  is 
global  because  political  conflicts  are  distributed 
around  the  world  (Petterson  and  Wallensteen 
2015). When Vietnamese boat people fled through 
China in 1970, it was perceived as an international 
problem.  The  Middle  East  refugee  crisis  is  not 
only  a  European  responsibility.  The  number  of 
countries interested in the resettlement of asylum 
seekers  could  also  increase  and  might  include 
China and Russia, which are important actors in 
the  international  political  and  economic  arenas. 
After all, many of these problems have economic 
roots. 

The actions of countries of first asylum determine 
the EU asylum pressure on border countries.  In 
the  case  of  Syria,  it  is  well  known  that  Lebanon 
–  a  small  country  with  4.3  million  citizens  – 
hosts  1,200,000  Syrian  refugees,  and  Jordan 
–  another  small  country  –  hosts  850,0002. 
  When  Lebanon  decided  to  close  its  border, 
Turkey  accumulated  some  2,500,000  refugees 
in  less  than  a  year.    During  the  same  period, 
Greece  received  about  800,000  asylum  seekers3 
 and the flow only decreased when the EU made 
an agreement to finance first assistance in Turkey4. 

2 

3 

IOM 2015.

IOM 2015.

4 
release_MEMO-15-5860_en.htm

EU-Turkey  agreement  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-

  International  solidarity  versus  putting  all  the 
burden on the countries of first asylum should be 
the question at the centre of the debate and at the 
heart of the actions of other destination countries.

EU countries concentrate on intra-EU solidarity, 
namely  the  redistribution  of  asylum  seekers  and 
the  redistribution  of  the  cost  of  first  assistance, 
or  on  the  best  job-matching  policies  to  spur  the 
social and economic integration of asylum seekers 
in the societies and labour markets of destination 
countries.  These  problems  are  of  a  manageable 
size,  but  more  attention  should  be  devoted  to 
the  process  of  forced  migration,  to  supporting 
countries of first asylum, and to dealing with their 
increased  impoverishment  and  growing  regional 
instability. 

An important tool to favour coordination would 
be better forecasting of the asylum dynamic. This 
would  help  to  provide  timely  assistance,  avoid 
deaths on the journey to a safe land and optimize 
human and economic resources in the destination 
areas.  To  some  extent,  the  modelling  of  future 
asylum dynamics is possible. The estimates by Tim 
Hatton (2016) of previous refugee flows are a point 
of departure and an attempt at forecasting should 
be  tried.    A  monitoring  unit  could  be  attached 
to  UNHCR,  which  is  the  agency  best  placed  to 
understand how many internally displaced people 
(IDP) will move. Asylum outflows could then be 
forecast on the basis of IDP information (see the 
growth rate in Fig. 3). Bilak et al. (2015) estimate 
the global number of asylum seekers to have been 
37 million in 2015. The newly displaced amount 
to  3.8  million  in  the  Middle  East,  3  million  in 
Central Africa, 1.4 million in South Asia, 1 million 
in West Africa, 700,000 in Europe, the Caucasus 
and Central Asia, 400,000 in East Africa, 400,000 
in the Americas and 200,000 in South-East Asia. 
Therefore, the whole world has its crises and there 
will  be  others.  Think,  for  example,  of  a  North 
Korean refugee event.

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Figure 2: Internally Displaced People in the World

According to the IOM, 86% of internally displaced 
people live in developing countries, i.e. countries 
of first asylum, and are potential asylum seekers. 

Political conflicts are by no means limited to the 
Middle East, although the largest increase in the 
last ten years took place there (see Figure 3). The 
rest  are  distributed  around  the  world  and  for 

Figure 3: Changes in IDP figures over the last decade

Ref: UNHCR, 2014

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that  reason  our  approach  has  to  be  global  and 
governance needs to be multilateral.

Better management of the refugee process would 
also allow policies tailored to the needs and desires 
of different refugee groups to be implemented – to 
those who wish to stay for a short time and to those 
who instead want to resettle or to become citizens of 
the destination country. This kind of management 
will  solve  many  integration  policy  dilemmas. 
What  should  have  priority?  Language  courses, 
civilization courses, cultural courses, professional 
training  courses  or  only  labour-market  skill 
matches at the lowest level? The complexity of the 
actors  involved  in  the  asylum  process  risks  only 
emphasising  labour-market  integration  before  a 
minimum of social integration is assured. Without 
strong  coordination,  differentiated  integration 
according  to  the  country  of  destination’s  ‘model’ 
will prevail. This is because the actors who define 
migration  policies  at  the  national  level  and  the 
functioning  of  the  labour  market,  which  differs 
from  one  country  to  another,  will  dominate  the 
entire process.

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References
Bilak,  A.,  M.  Caterina  and  G.  Charron,  2015,  Global  Overview  2015:  People  Internally  Displaced  by 
Conflict and Violence, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Geneva.

Di  Bartolomeo  A.,  Kalantaryan  S.  and  Bonfanti    S.,  2015,  Measuring  the  Integration  of  Migrants  a 
Multivariate  Approach Interact Research Report 2015/1 http://hdl.handle.net/1814/34679

Hatton, T.J., 2016b, “Refugees and Asylum seekers, the crisis in Europe and the future of policy,” Discussion 
Paper, No. 11271, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London.

Internal  Displacement  Monitoring  Centre  and  Norwegian  Refugee  Council,  2015,  Global  Overview 
2015. People internally displaced by conflict and violence. http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/
library/Media/201505-Global-Overview-2015/20150506-global-overview-2015-en.pdf

IOM (International Organization for Migration), 2015, “How the world views migration,” IOM Report, 
International Organization for Migration, Geneva.

Pettersson, T. and P. Wallensteen, 2015, “Armed conflicts, 1946–2014,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 52, 
No. 4, pp.536–50.

Strom S, Venturini A. and Villosio C., 2013, Wage assimilation: migrants versus natives, internal migrants 
versus foreign migrants, MPC-RSCAS 2013-30.

Venturini,  A.,  2016,  “Assimilation  of  migrants  in  the  labor  market:  What  is  missing  in  the  economic 
literature,” in P. Fargues and A. Weinar, eds, INTERACT Project in print.

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SECTION 4 
CULTURAL 
INTEGRATION

INTEGRATION AND 
CULTURE: FROM 
‘COMMUNICATIVE 
COMPETENCE’ TO 
‘COMPETENCE IN 
PLURALITY’ 
Ruth Wodak  
Lancaster University

1. Introduction:  
Integration and Otherness

1.1. Integration

“Integration is a reciprocal process in which 
the  efforts  of  those  who  are  permitted  to 
remain  in  Austria  must  without  doubt 
be  greater  because  the  basic  values  of 
Austrian  society  are  non-negotiable  and 
must  therefore  be  followed”  (S.  Kurz 
Integrationsbericht 2016, 5).

“A static and essentialist notion of culture 
would  not  do  justice  to  the  reality  of  a 
pluralistic and changing migration society. 
Indeed,  at  the  “end  of  the  road”  there 
awaits  us  neither  a  perfectly  assimilated 
society, nor a patchwork of diverse social 
groups  that  has  become  estranged  from 
itself,  but  a  plural  togetherness  that  must 
continually be re-negotiated” H. Fassmann 
Integrationsbericht 2016, 85).

The  two  quotes  taken  from  the  same  report  on 
immigrant  integration  in  Austria  indicate  two 
significantly  different  positions  on  a  continuum 
from total rejection of the ‘other’ to total acceptance 
of  the  ‘other’.  In  between,  we  detect  many  other 
approaches to culture and integration: ‘integration’ 

legal 

understood as ‘assimilation,’ ‘integration as living 
in  parallel  societies,’  ‘integration  as  respect  for 
the  other’  and  so  forth.  Importantly,  the  second 
quote,  written  by  a  so-called  Austrian  expert 
committee on integration (Expertenrat) consisting 
of an interdisciplinary group of scholars in various 
fields specializing in migration studies (linguists, 
demographers, 
scholars  and  political 
journalists,  architects  and  urban 
scientists), 
planners,  as  well  as  various  NGOs,  emphasizes 
the  danger  of  essentializing  culture  as  static  and 
homogeneous,  as  a  discrete  category,  something 
which  you  possess  or  do  not,  something  which 
one can acquire as an ‘entity,’ or cannot. According 
to  Heinz  Fassmann,  chair  of  the  Expertenrat, 
integration  should  be  perceived  as  negotiating 
and  co-constructing  a  pluralist  society  whose 
practices are always open to change. By contrast, 
the Austrian Minister for Integration (and Foreign 
Affairs),  Sebastian  Kurz,  who  commissioned  the 
report,  argues  that  immigrants  are  obviously 
required  to  invest  more  work  in  coping  with 
the  norms  and  values  of  the  host  society.1  Thus, 
learning  and  accepting  the  constitutive  values 
of  the  host  society  becomes  the  sine  qua  non  of 
successful integration. 

As  David  Miller  (2016,  9)  maintains,  “In  earlier 
times … immigrants were left to their own devices 
so long as they did not become involved in illegal 
or  antisocial  behaviour.”  Nowadays,  Miller  (ibid, 
9ff.) argues,

the contemporary democratic state cannot 
take  such  a  hands-off  view:  it  wants 
and  needs  immigrants  to  become  good, 
upstanding  citizens.  And  achieving  this 
may involve encouraging or even requiring 
them to shed some of the cultural baggage 
they bring with them. 

It  is  obvious  that  such  requirements  cannot  be 
easily  translated  into  policies.  Which  cultural  or 

Also see “50 Punkte Plan zur Integration” (2015) of the 
1 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Integration (file:///C:/Users/RW/
Downloads/50_Punkte_Plan_zur_Integration%20(1).pdf)

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religious beliefs are perceived as not being fit for 
Western societies or actually clash with common 
and  widely  accepted  routines  and  knowledge? 
While  this  paper  cannot  address  the  important 
political and philosophical debates on this matter 
(but see Miller, 2016), it is important to emphasize 
that  perceptions  of  rights  and  obligations  (apart 
from  fundamental  human  rights)  on  the  part  of 
immigrants and the host society are often strongly 
influenced  by  contextual  factors  (such  as  the 
number of immigrants, their countries of origin, 
levels of xenophobia in the host country, time since 
arrival, levels of education, gender politics and so 
forth). This is why I will first discuss some models 
elaborating the many dimensions of ‘integration.’ 
I  will  then  proceed  to  the  currently  observable 
culturalisation  of  integration  policies.  Moreover, 
I  will  focus  on  two  Europe-wide  tendencies: 
the  implementation  of  ever  more  and  stricter 
language  and  citizenship  tests;  and  secondly  on 
the discourse about an ‘unwilligness to integrate,’ 
which shifts the blame for current complex socio-
political problems on to the strangers arriving.

Integration  can  obviously  not  be  reduced  to 
a  cultural  dimension.  Ager  and  Strang  (2008) 
introduce  a  useful  conceptual  framework  that 
defines the core domains of integration (pp. 169–
70)2  (Fig.  1,  below).  In  this  model,  they  propose 
four  dimensions.  First,  they  distinguish  between 
markers and means (such as employment, housing, 
education  and  health),  defined  as  key  aspects  of 
integrating into a society. 

In  this  context,  also  see  Carvill  et  al.  (2016),  Delanty 
2 
et  al.  (2011),  Krzyżanowski  &  Wodak  (2009),  Messer  et  al. 
2011),  Penninx  et  al.  (2008)  and  Schmiederer  (2013),  who  all 
discuss different models and forms of political, legal and cultural 
integration.  Moreover,  I  also  rely  on  the  Migration  Policy  Index 
2015 (MIPEX), but I have to restrict myself to cultural – and, even 
more  specifically,  linguistic-communicative  –  integration  in  this 
paper due to reasons of space and expertise.

Figure 1: Integration Model (adapted from Ager 
& Strang 2008, 170).

The  second  dimension  in  this  model  relates  to 
social connection, i.e. investigation of the processes 
that mediate between foundational principles and 
public  outcomes  in  the  first  dimension  (markers 
and  means).  In  other  words,  how  do  feelings  of 
‘belonging’  evolve,  when  are  migrants  accepted 
and  when  do  they  feel  accepted  in  communities 
in  practice?  For  example,  while  analysing  data 
from 48 focus groups with migrants from different 
ethnic  origins  in  eight  European  member  states 
in  the  EU-funded  project  XENOPHOB,  Delanty 
et al. (2011) were able to illustrate in much detail 
that foundational rights (such as having acquired 
citizenship),  fluency  in  the  host  language  and 
so  forth  do  not  necessarily  imply  access,  respect 
and acceptance. Access to housing and the labour 
market  remains  difficult  due  to  prejudices  and 
discriminatory beliefs. Social bonds, social bridges 
and social links are viewed as essential mediators in 
transcending  various  thresholds  and  gatekeepers 
in  the  complex  process  of  integration  (Ager  & 
Strang 2008, 179–81). 

The  third  dimension  in  this  model  is  what 
Ager  and  Strang  call  ‘facilitators.’  These  include 
language  and  cultural  knowledge  and  conditions 
of  safety  and  stability.  Such  facilitators  were 
studied,  for  instance,  in  a  recent  ethnography  of 
a  Pakistani  family  moving  to  the  UK  (Capstick, 
2015). The study was carried out over several years 
and  included  the  entire  trajectory  from  applying 
for  language  tests,  visas,  residence  permits  and 

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work  permits  up  to  settling  in  a  small  town  in 
Lancashire.  Capstick  (2015,  228)  concludes  his 
study by stating: 

everyday 

in  order 

By  employing  the  concept  of  ‘cultural 
brokerage’  to  emphasize  the  bridge  it 
provides  between  dominant  and  non-
dominant knowledge, the decisive role of 
brokers  in  negotiating  the  links  between 
non-dominant 
individuals’ 
literacies  and  dominant 
institutions’ 
bureaucratic literacies enables researchers 
to explore issues of power when examining 
the  relationship  between  local  and  global 
contexts  in  migration.  This  is  because 
literacy  events  like  completing  a  visa 
form  invoke  broader  cultural  patterns 
of  literacy  practices,  such  as  registering 
marriages,  and  provide  opportunities 
for  migrants  to  appropriate  bureaucratic 
literacy  practices 
to  make 
successful  visa  applications.  For  example, 
immigration 
Pakistani 
the  British 
solicitor  in  Preston  understands  both 
the  Mirpuri  tradition  of  providing  work 
for  spouses  of  family  members  as  well  as 
the  British  government’s 
immigration 
and  employment  law  relating  to  visa 
requirements  and  visa  sponsors’  salaries. 
The literacy events which instantiate these 
practices,  such  as  the  completion  of  visa 
forms by a cultural broker who is able to 
draw  on  her  understanding  of  dominant 
and non-dominant contexts, are shaped by 
the priorities of individuals who have much 
to lose if visa applications fail. Thus, when 
bureaucratic 
literacies  have  significant 
personal as well as practical consequences 
for  the  whole  family,  migrants  are  able 
to  draw  on  wider  community  networks 
which  allow  them  to  comply  with  the 
institutional requirements which shape the 
family’s lives in both the UK and Pakistan. 

It  becomes  apparent  that  without  cultural  and 
literacy  brokers  this  family  would  never  have 
been able to enter the UK legally and successfully.  
Alongside these cultural and linguistic facilitators, 
perceptions of safety and stability are particularly 
relevant if, for instance, refugees have encountered 
traumatic events during their flight. 

The  fourth  and  final  dimension  in  the  model  is 
about  citizenship  and  rights,  which  Ager  and 
Strang  consider 
foundation 
the  constitutive 
for 
integration.  Of  course,  the  meaning  of 
citizenship varies across settings, due to national 
traditions,  policies  and  identity  politics  (p.  176). 
It  also  becomes  apparent,  however,  that  the  four 
dimensions  in  the  model  discussed  above  are 
connected  and  related  with  each  other  in  very 
intricate,  complex  and  context-dependent  ways, 
which have to be investigated both quantitatively 
(through surveys, document and policy analysis, 
and 
(through 
focus  groups,  ethnography,  online  ethnography, 
discourse  and  semiotic  analysis  of  images  and 
other genres, and so forth) in order to be able to 
assess positive and negative forms of integration. 

interviews)  and  qualitatively 

1.2.  Negotiating culture

When following the dominant political and media 
debates across Europe and the EU (and beyond), 
one  is  struck  by  a  quite  consistent  hierarchy  of 
values, which is presented as the hegemonic value 
system of the West. Apart from the central role of 
the national language which needs to be acquired 
(Wodak  2011,  2012,  2015a,  90ff;  see  below), 
specific  areas  are  highlighted  and  perceived  as 
salient  for  ‘us,’  for  democratic  secular  European 
states  which  have  signed  the  Human  Rights 
Conventions and other international treaties (such 
as  the  1951  Geneva  Refugee  Convention)  and 
which  have  also  –  it  is  assumed  –  implemented 
gender  equality,  anti-discrimination  laws,  high 
standards  of  justice  and  education,  and  so  forth. 
Subsequently, a huge Manichean contrast emerges 

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(a 

between  (an  educated,  liberal  and  progressive) 
retarded,  undemocratic  and 
West  and 
uneducated) East, two solidified and homogenous 
blocs  with  nothing  in  between.  Accordingly,  we 
observe  a  culturalization  of  discourse  (Yilmaz 
2016, 17) through which a right such as freedom 
of  speech  is  transformed  into  a  cultural  value, 
although  rights  have  certainly  not  developed  via 
cultural evolution but rather as a result of political 
struggles, revolutions and abrupt breaks with the 
past (e.g. Chanock 2000). Indeed, as Soysal (2009, 
5) argues, culture has become the dominant frame 
for political issues and policies such as citizenship, 
security, the economy and so forth. It seems that 
culture can be defined as a floating/empty signifier 
onto which politicians, media and lay persons are 
able  to  project  whatever  problems  or  categories 
they choose (Yilmaz 2016, 18ff.).

It  is  important,  therefore,  to  discuss  culture  in 
more  differentiated  terms.  Miller  (2016,  141ff) 
draws  a  line  between  public  and  private  culture. 
He  argues  that  we  can  distinguish,  on  the  one 
hand,  the  culture  of  the  wider  society  (i.e.  its 
language,  symbols  and  institutions)  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  different  religions,  forms  of  art  and 
literature,  a  variety  of  cuisines  and  respective 
mother tongues. But where, how and when should 
this thin line be drawn? Immigrants will probably 
wish to retain many symbols of their own culture 
and integrate them with the host culture. The host 
society,  however,  expects  identification  with  its 
national identity and (banal) symbols (Billig 1995; 
Rheindorf & Wodak 2016). A problem arises most 
vehemently  –  as  can  be  observed  across  Europe 
and  beyond  –  in  the  case  of  religion,  i.e.  when 
specific religious beliefs and practices collide with 
elements of the host society’s culture. Miller (2016, 
ibid, 149) concludes that

[f]ull  cultural  integration  requires  that 
members  of  the 
indigenous  majority 
understand  why  the  private  cultures  of 
immigrants  need  to  be  accommodated 

and  offer  ungrudging  support  for  the 
measures needed, and that the immigrants 
themselves  understand  and  embrace  the 
public  culture  of  the  society  they  have 
joined.

In view of the highly controversial debates about 
the burqa and the headscarf as metonymic tropes 
for  Muslim  and  indeed  Islamist  religion  and  a 
related  oppression  of  women,  Miller’s  proposals 
might  be  considered  rather  utopian  (Wodak 
2015b, 151 ff.).

Reviewing anti-Muslim rhetoric in the 1990s and 
the  first  decade  of  the  21st  century  reveals  that 
specific iconic images of the ‘female’ have become 
the  ultimate  ‘other.’  Countless  political  debates 
have  surrounded  and  continue  to  surround  the 
so-called ‘headscarf ’ (hijab: a scarf that covers the 
hair and sometimes the shoulders) and the burqa 
and niqab (both of which cover the hair, the face 
except for the eyes and the entire body) as symbols 
of  uncivilised  barbaric  Islam  and  of  oppressed 
women who should be liberated by the values of 
Western  culture.  In  this  enterprise,  interestingly, 
right-wing  populist  movements  have  aligned 
with  some  left-wing  intellectuals  and  parties, 
together  with  many  feminists,  all  assuming  and 
presupposing  that  all  veiled  Muslim  women 
are  forced  to  cover  their  hair,  faces  or  bodies 
and  that  the  West  faces  a  twofold  challenge  and 
responsibility: to protect the secular nature of the 
public  sphere  by  banning  ostentatious  religious 
liberate  oppressed  Muslim 
symbols  and 
women.  In  this  context,  Hammerl  (2016)  points 
to many hypocritical, contradictory and fallacious 
arguments: the niqab is accepted if worn by rich 
Saudi  tourists,  but  the  burqa  is  not  accepted  if 
worn  by  poor  Afghan  refugees;  the  liberation  of 
Muslim women is called for by right-wing populist 
politicians who, simultaneously, campaign against 
Free Choice or equal pay for women and men. 

to 

Furthermore, I argue that the debate about culture 
and  Islam  is  primarily  fought  in  an  attempt  to 

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discipline  the  female  body  (Wodak  2015b). 
This  anti-Muslim  discourse  is  instrumentalised 
to  cover  up  other  socio-political  and  –  most 
importantly  –  socio-economic  agendas.  Indeed, 
appeals  to  liberate  women  from  ‘textual-sexual 
oppression’  (Amin  2015)  unite  more  voters 
around a right-wing populist agenda than do anti-
modernisation  and  anti-globalisation  agendas. 
Such  a  dichotomisation  renders  it  very  difficult, 
if not impossible, for progressive Muslim women 
to  criticize  fundamentalist  patriarchal  positions. 
Marsdal  (2013)  convincingly  deconstructs  in 
detail  the  traditional  left-right  cleavage  with 
respect to a change in voting behaviour related to 
social  class.  Analysing  developments  in  Norway, 
he emphasizes that votes for (moral) values have 
replaced votes for parties: 

  …[c]lass  issues  are  shoved  into  the 
background and value issues come to the 
fore. Tensions over economic distribution 
and  fairness  are  demobilized.  This  takes 
place,  however,  at  the  top  level  of  party 
politics,  and  not  in  society.  In  society, 
economic  and  social  inequalities  and 
tensions  have  been  rising  over  the  last 
decades, not only in Norway or Denmark, 
but  also  all  over  Europe.  The  political 
demobilizing  of  class  conflicts  does  not 
take place because most voters have come 
to  emphasize  value  issues  more  than 
class  issues,  which  they  do  not  have,  but 
rather because, under the neo-liberal élite 
consensus  on  class  issues,  confrontation 
on moral and cultural issues (‘values’) has 
become the only available means of party-
political and ideological demarcation […]. 
Economic policy debates are dull and grey. 
Then, someone says something about the 
Muslim  veil  and  media  hell  breaks  loose 
(ibid, 51–52).

This  observation  provides  evidence  for  Yilmaz’s 
claim about a ‘hegemony of the cultural paradigm’ 

(Yilmaz  2016,  19):  “[T]he  culturalization  of 
discourse  has  changed  the  understanding  of 
politics  as  the  site  where  problems  caused  by 
cultural encounters are handled” (ibid, 18).

Next to religion, language and language skills have 
played a major role as markers of cultural difference 
in contexts of immigrant integration. In contrast 
with  religion,  however,  language  competence  is 
used  less  to  demonstrate  unalterable  otherness 
and  more  as  a  test  of  immigrants’  capacity  and 
readiness to assimilate. 

to 

term 

term 

integrate’).  This 

In  the  following  section,  I  first  provide  a  brief 
overview  of  multilingualism  policies 
in  the 
European  Union  as  the  broad  context  for  the 
subsequent  implementation  of  national  language 
and KoS (Knowledge of Society) tests in the form of 
NAPs (National Action Plans). I draw primarily on 
surveys conducted by the Council of Europe. I then 
summarise two empirical case studies which serve 
to  illustrate  some  complex  challenges  to  cultural 
integration. First, I present the results of a study of 
Austrian political and media discourse (2015/16) 
Integrationsunwilligkeit 
regarding 
the 
(‘unwillingness 
is 
employed in order to legitimize punitive measures 
for migrants and refugees already living in Austria 
if  they  are  perceived  to  reject  ‘our  values’.  This 
discourse  emerged  as  a  reaction  to  the  terrorist 
attacks in Paris in January 2015; some politicians 
linked  potential  terrorism  and  radicalization  to 
Integrationsunwilligkeit  allegedly  manifested  by 
male  Muslim  adolescents.  Consequently,  debates 
about  positive  measures  for  integration  became 
less  important  and  less  prominent  in  the  public 
sphere. Second, I discuss the results of an ongoing 
study  –  INPUT  –  about  language  acquisition  by 
children with and without a Turkish background in 
correlation with parental linguistic input. INPUT 
provides  evidence  that  socio-economic  status 
overrides  ethnic  origin,  i.e.  children  who  receive 
more support from their parents and grow up in 
HSES (high socio-economic status) families learn 
German  faster  than  children  from  LSES  (lower 

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socio-economic  status),  regardless  of  migrant 
background. These results put into question many 
school curricula designed specifically for migrants 
(children  and  adults)  while  neglecting  other 
relevant socio-economic variables. 

2.  Language competence and 
language tests

2.1. EU multilingual vs. national 
monolingual policies

European multilingualism has been defined as an 
essential  component  of  the  future  construction 
of a European identity, or of European identities 
in  the  plural,  and  for  the  preservation  of 
national,  regional,  local,  societal  and  individual 
multilingualism.  The  importance  of  language 
learning, for example, has been repeatedly stressed 
by various European authorities in declarations of 
political intent on matters of language, education 
and  pedagogy  (e.g.  Article  2  of  the  European 
Cultural  Convention,  19  December  1954; 
‘Recommendation  814  on  Modern  Languages  in 
Europe’  from  the  Council  of  Europe,  5  October 
1977;  the  final  KSZE  document  of  1  August 
1975).  In  the  2000  Maastricht  and  Amsterdam 
treaties,  the  EU  committed  itself  to  European 
multilingualism. This was echoed by the Council 
of  Europe’s  Resolution  from  the  Committee  of 
Ministers  and  Parliamentary  Assembly  (PACE) 
‘Recommendation concerning modern languages 
(98).’  The  last  of  these  warns  explicitly  “of  the 
dangers that might result from marginalisation of 
those who lack the skills necessary to communicate 
in  an  interactive  Europe”  (ibid.)  and  states,  inter 
alia, that

[S]teps  should  be  taken  to  ensure  that 
there  is  parity  of  esteem  between  all  the 
languages  and  cultures  involved  so  that 
children in each community may have the 
opportunity to develop oracy and literacy 
in  the  language  of  their  own  community 
as  well  as  to  learn  to  understand  and 

appreciate the language and culture of the 
other (ibid, Appendix 2.2).

The recommendations also stress that governments 
should  “[c]ontinue  to  promote  bilingualism  in 
immigrant areas or neighbourhoods and support 
immigrants  in  learning  the  language  of  the  area 
in  which  they  reside”  (ibid,  Appendix  2.3.).  It 
is  important  to  emphasise  that  the  Council  of 
Europe  endorses  a  more  nuanced  notion  of 
plurilingualism  than  does  the  European  Union 
(i.e.  the  Commission).  Nevertheless,  in  a  ‘White 
Paper  on  Education  and  Training’  issued  by 
the  European  Commission  it  is  stated  that  “[l]
anguages  are  also  the  key  to  knowing  other 
people. Proficiency in languages helps to build up 
the  feeling  of  being  European  with  all  its  cultural 
wealth  and  diversity  and  of  understanding 
between  the  citizens  of  Europe”  (European 
Commission  1995,  67,  my  emphasis).  Between 
2005  and  2007,  the  EU  recognised  the  relevance 
of  language  and  multilingualism  to  policy  by 
adding  a  multilingualism  portfolio  to  the  remit 
of  the  Union’s  Commissioner  on  Education  and 
Culture. The key document of that period – ‘The 
new  framework  strategy  for  multilingualism’ 
(European  Commission  2005)  –  sets  out  the 
Commission’s  “commitment  to  multilingualism 
in  the  European  Union”  (ibid.  1)  and  its  aim  of 
“promoting multilingualism in European society, 
in  the  economy  and  in  the  Commission  itself ” 
(ibid).  By  arguing  that  multilingualism  is  not 
only  good  for  the  European  economy  but  also 
for  a  ‘social  Europe’  and  the  democratisation  of 
the  EU,  it  places  multilingualism  between  major 
EU  discourses:  that  on  democratisation  and  that 
on  the  knowledge-based  economy.  In  the  same 
period, the EU also proposed – for the first time 
– a policy-relevant definition of multilingualism: 
“multilingualism  refers  to  both  a  person’s  ability 
to  use  several  languages  and  the  co-existence 
of  different 
in  one 
geographical area” (ibid, 3). The document states 
that: 

language  communities 

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2.2. Language Requirements for 
Access to Legal Status

The  current  28  member  states  of  the  European 
Union  (EU)  determine  who  belongs  or  does 
not  belong  to  the  European  Union,  and  thus 
who  remains  ‘outside’  and  who  is  allowed  to 
venture 
‘inside,’  via  naturalisation  regulations 
(e.g.  Bauböck  &  Goodman-Wallace  2012). 
Naturalisation  conditions  pertaining  to  language 
knowledge  vary  enormously.  In  1998,  only  six 
states  had  citizenship  and/or  language  tests;  by 
2010, the number had grown to 18; and by 2014 to 
23 (see Table 1; note, however, that the situation is 
constantly changing). Moreover, the requirements 
and  the  content  of  tests  also  vary.  Orgad  (2010, 
69–70)  rightly  states  with  respect  to  German 
citizenship tests that they

…mirror  not  only  what  German  culture 
is,  but  also  what  the  Germans  want  it  to 
be ... Although the Länder tests have been 
replaced  by  a  federal  test,  they  indicate 
an  ideological  concept  of  Kulturnation. 
By  adopting  these  policies,  Germany 
embraces  a  strict  rule  of  forced  cultural 
assimilation.

Many  European  countries  are  promoting  a  re/
nationalisation  with  respect  to  language  and 
culture – in spite of being part of the multilingual 
and  multicultural  EU.  The  concept  of  ‘language 
competence  in  the  host  country’s  language’  as  a 
salient prerequisite for belonging has become part 
and  parcel  of  new  citizenship  laws,  regulations 
and  requirements,  and  is  advocated  or  even 
championed not only by the far right but also by 
mainstream political parties in government.

The  European  Union 
is  founded  on 
‘unity  in  diversity’:  diversity  of  cultures, 
customs and beliefs – and of languages ... 
It is this diversity that makes the European 
Union  what  it  is:  not  a  ‘melting  pot’  in 
which  differences  are  rendered  down, 
but a common home in which diversity is 
celebrated,  and  where  our  many  mother 
tongues  are  a  source  of  wealth  and  a 
bridge  to  greater  solidarity  and  mutual 
understanding (ibid, 2).

In  2007,  however,  in  discourses  related  to  the 
Lisbon  Strategy  of  the  early  2000s,  we  witness  a 
(return  to)  rhetoric  oriented  towards  skills  and 
competences  (Krzyżanowski  &  Wodak  2011; 
Wodak 2011a, b). The European Multilingualism 
Strategy has recently adopted a new and broader 
understanding  of 
the  social,  political  and 
economic role of languages and multilingualism. 
Sadly, in the wake of the 2008 crisis and because 
of the transfer of the Multilingualism Portfolio of 
the European Commission to Education, Culture 
and  Youth  in  2010,  most  of  the  key  provisions 
of  the  policies  elaborated  above  have  not  yet 
been  implemented.  It  is,  however,  clear  that 
multilingualism and support for both individuals’ 
and collectives’ language identities form part and 
parcel of European language policies. 

These  policies  –  as  will  be  illustrated  below  – 
contradict national language policies in some EU 
member states in many respects. National policies, 
however, exert a major influence on the language 
requirements for migrants from non-EU countries. 
In fact, many national politicians endorse the so-
called Leitsprachenmodell (a model which proposes 
that the language of the majority should serve for 
all  communicative  purposes),  thus  contradicting 
the European language policies mentioned above, 
which emphasise multilingualism, the equality of 
languages and diversity. As sociolinguist Michael 
Clyne  famously  stated,  “[E]uropean  integration 
was never intended to mean homogenization. One 
of its aims has always been unity within diversity 
and this should be one of its contributions to the 
world” (Clyne 2003, 40). 

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Table 1: Countries that participated in the 2007, 2009 and 2013 surveys and reported language 
requirements for residence and citizenship (no comparative data exist for earlier periods) (LIAM 
Survey Report 2014, 57)

Table A14:   Countries that participated in the 2007, 2009 and 2013 surveys and reported language 

requirements for residence and citizenship  

Residence  

200716 

2013 

Austria 

Belgium – French 
community  

Czech Republic 

Denmark 

Estonia 

France 

Germany 

Greece 

Ireland 

Italy 

Liechtenstein 

Luxembourg 

Norway 

Netherlands 

Poland 

San Marino 

Spain 

Sweden 

Switzerland (cantons) 

United Kingdom 

N = 20 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X  

10 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

13 

Citizenship  

2013 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

200717 

X  

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

11 

16 

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16 Interpretation of data on slide 5, PowerPoint presentation by Claire Extramiana, Language requirements for adult migrants in 
Council of Europe member state: report on a survey, 26 June 2008 (Council of Europe Seminar – www.coe.int.lang-migrants  
 Events). 

17 Ibidem.  

Council of Europe, 2014 

56 

Report on 3rd LIAM survey 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Table 2: Citizenship and language requirements in selected EU countries between 2007 and 2013 
(and changes planned or envisaged) (A indicates a language test before entering; B a language test 
required for a work permit; C a language test required for citizenship) (LIAM survey report 2014, 
63)3

Table B2: Changes between 2009 and 2013 and changes planned or envisaged on 14 member states 

Denmark 

Abolition of A1- 
introduced in 2010 

STATES 

Albania 

Austria 

Belgium 

Bosnia and Herzegovina 

Cyprus 

Czech Republic  

France 

Greece 

Luxembourg 

Netherlands 

Norway 

 Poland 

United Kingdom 

Total no of changes: 
18 actually in place  
and 9 planned 

PRIOR TO ADMISSION TO 
THE COUNTRY 
Since 2008 interview 
(students) 
Change planned 

Since 2011  
Language level A1 
for certain residence permits 

RESIDENCE 

CITIZENSHIP 

Since 2008 interview 
Change planned 

Since 2006  A2 for renewal of 
residence permits, since 2011  
B1 for long-term residence 

Since 2011 B1 certificate 
 (A2 in 2006) 

Since 2012 A2 

Language requirement 
Level not indicated (2012) 

Language requirement 
Level not indicated (2012) 

Since 2010 A1-A2 
Since 2009 A1 
envisaged in 2015: A1 test long-
term residence, A2 test 
permanent residence 
Since 2012 A1- for a residence 
permit on the ground of spousal 
reunification, level A1- for 
religious ministers and level A2 
written/B1 oral for permanent 
residence 
(A2/B1/B2 in 2003) 
Since 2007 A1.1; envisaged: A1 
reception and integration 
contract and A2 renewal 
residence permit 
Since 2010 courses are no longer 
compulsory for  
long term residence 

Since 2010 A2 
(2007: Old migrants A1/A2; 
New migrants A2) 
300h of compulsory courses 
As from 2014 600h (3000h 
possible) and test for permanent 
residence necessary for 
citizenship 

Envisaged 
Since 2013 B1 
(progression by one level up to 
B1 in 1971) 

Interview since 1993 
B1 test and society in 2014 

B1/B1 plus oral in 2013 
(B2 and society test in 2006) 

B1 oral since 2012 
(interview in 1993) 

As from 2014: 600h of lessons. 
Aiming Level B1 but A2 for 
exemption from courses 
(in 2005 300h) 

Since 2013 B1 
(progression by one level up to B1 
in 1971) 

40h since 2008 
Change planned 

A1.1 planned in 2009, not 
adopted in 2013 

A1 oral for spouses (2011) 
(points system from 2007 
to 2010) 

3 actually in place   
and 2 envisaged 

8 actually in place  
and 5 envisaged 

7 actually in place  
and 2 planned 

3 
coe.int/lang-migrants), by Claire Extramiana, Reinhilde Pulinx and Piet Van Avermaet.

Final Report on the 3rd Council of Europe Survey 2014, Linguistic Integration of adult migrants (LIAM): Policy and practice (www.

Council of Europe, 2014 

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62 

Report on 3rd LIAM survey 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the following, I summarize some results from a 
survey conducted in 36 European countries (thus 
including more than the 28 EU member states) by 
the Working Group Linguistic Integration of Adult 
Migrants  (from  the  Language  Policy  Division 
of  the  Council  of  Europe;  LIAM)  in  2013/14. 
This  survey  illustrates  the  variation  across  the 
countries  investigated  and  draws  a  comparison 
between the surveys conducted in 2007 and 2009 
(see Tables 1 and 2; 20 countries responded to all 
three surveys). The key document opens with the 
following mission statement:

The  findings  reported  here,  considered 
in  the  context  of  Recommendations  and 
Resolutions of the Committee of Ministers 
and 
the  Parliamentary  Assembly  of 
the  Council  of  Europe,  underline  the 
constant  need  to  reflect  critically  on  the 
appropriateness  and 
effectiveness  of 
aspects of our language integration policies 
while  taking  fully  into  consideration  the 
implications  for  human  rights,  the  rule 
of  law  and  participation  in  the  life  of 
democratic  society.  This  is  a  logical  and 
necessary  step  in  the  continuous  process 
of ensuring that any requirements enacted 
and  accompanying  language  provision 
actually correspond to the real needs and 
capacities  of  migrants  in  their  diversity, 
and  that  they  reinforce  their  motivation 
to develop their plurilingual profile within 
integration. 
a  continuing  process  of 
While of course language is an important 
instrument in this process, in itself it is not 
an indicator of how successful integration 
actually is. (p.1) 

More  than  half  of  the  participating  countries 
(20/36) indicated that knowledge of the language is 
required for purposes other than entry, residence 
and citizenship. For 12 countries, other purposes 
included obtaining a work permit/gaining access 
to  the  labour  market.  In  six  other  countries  a 

language  requirement  had  to  be  met  to  obtain  a 
long-term  residence  permit,  often  in  the  case  of 
family  reunification.  Two  countries  attached  a 
language  requirement  to  higher  education  and 
training  programmes.  Nine  countries  reported 
a  pre-entry  language  requirement  (usually  A1, 
only one country requires A2).4 These are Austria, 
Albania, Germany, Finland, France, Liechtenstein, 
the Netherlands, Poland (only in the case of certain 
regulated professions) and the UK. 

Several  states  offer  significantly  more  than 
others  in  terms  of  language  lessons  and  second 
language acquisition: migrants are obliged to take 
a  language  course  in  12  of  the  23  countries  that 
attach  a  language  requirement  to  the  granting 
of  a  residence  permit.  Of  the  22  participating 
countries  that  attach  a  language  requirement  to 
obtaining  a  residence  permit,  14  provide  official 
language  courses.  Attendance  is  compulsory  in 
four  countries  and  optional  in  eight.  The  CEFR 
reference levels range from A1 to C2. The shortest 
course lasts 75 hours, the longest 3,000. To bring 
learners to level A2, one country provides a course 
lasting  75  hours,  another  180  hours,  and  a  third 
a  364-hour  course.  Language  courses  for  adult 
migrants are provided by adult education centres, 
schools, institutions of HE and institutions funded 
by  Ministries  of  Culture,  Internal  Affairs  or 
Employment – or by NGOs or volunteers. 

In  26  countries,  migrants  are  legally  obliged  to 
demonstrate  a  specified  level  of  competence  in 
a/the  language  of  the  host  country  in  order  to 
obtain citizenship. Nineteen countries that attach 
a language requirement to citizenship also attach 
one to residence. In 2007, 12 of the 20 countries 
that participated in all three surveys indicated that 
they  had  such  legislation;  by  2013,  17  countries 
had language requirements (A) prior to entry, (B) 
for residence and/or (C) for citizenship.  

4 
  Council  of  Europe.  Common  European  Framework  of 
Reference  for  Languages:  Learning,  Teaching,  Assessment.  (CEFR) 
Council  of  Europe/CUP,  2001  (available  in  38  languages).  www.
coe.int/lang-CEFR and www.coe.int/lang-migrants  

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Moreover,  18  countries  organise  a  knowledge-of-
society  (KoS)  programme  for  migrants  seeking  a 
residence permit. Attendance is obligatory in eight 
countries  and  optional  in  11.  In  nine  countries 
migrants are required to take a KoS test. In almost 
all  cases,  KoS  tests  for  citizenship  are  in  written 
form.  Four  countries  (Germany,  Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania  and  the  UK)  have  multiple-choice 
tests;  three  countries  (Germany,  the  Netherlands 
and  the  UK)  have  computer-based  ones.  In 
Greece,  the  test  is  part  of  an  oral  interview  with 
a  representative  of  the  Naturalisation  Council. 
In  Switzerland,  some  cantons  have  a  written  test 
(possibly computer-based), while others examine 
KoS in an oral interview. In Lithuania, the written 
test  can  be  replaced  by  an  oral  test  in  cases  of 
special need.

legal 

In sum, the following states require language for 
residence  and  citizenship:  Austria  since  2011, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, France and the Netherlands 
since  2012,  Denmark  and  the  UK  since  2013. 
Altogether  there  were  18  changes  between  2009 
and  2013  with  no  further  ones  planned  in  2013. 
Furthermore, if one considers the 42 states which 
participated  in  at  least  one  of  the  three  surveys, 
15  states  have 
language 
introduced  a 
requirement since 2008. In most cases, knowledge 
of  the  language  is  required  for  residence  and 
the  acquisition  of  citizenship.  This  applies  to  19 
countries,  mostly  in  Western  Europe.  Another 
notable  trend  is  an  increase  in  the  amount  of 
language  requirements 
legislation  concerning 
from  2009  to  2013  compared  with  2007–2009. 
From 2007 to 2009, 11 new laws were passed; in 
the period from 2009 to 2013, 18, with nine new 
ones planned after 2013. Lastly, a distinction exists 
between  the  so-called  interventionist  countries  in 
northern  Europe  and  more  permissive  policies 
in  the  south,  but  there  are  also  less  demanding 
countries alongside these two groups. In Eastern 
Europe, the issue of migration management is less 
important, given the low levels of immigration. 

The authors of the survey conclude that 

The ability of a democratic state to integrate 
migrants  depends  equally  on  their  own 
willingness – which needs to be supported 
as regards language learning – and on the 
intercultural sensitivity of the community 
of  citizens.  This  must  be  enhanced  by 
educating  all  citizens  in  linguistic  and 
cultural  diversity,  which  has  proven  to 
be  an  invaluable  source  of  enrichment 
throughout European history (ibid, 33).

The  Goethe  Institute  (Germany)  has  quickly 
responded  to  the  obvious  necessity  of  teaching 
German to refugees from the current war zones in 
the Middle East. In this way, both language teachers 
and volunteers have been involved with children 
and  adults  aiming  at  level  A1  immediately  after 
the refugees have applied for asylum (see https://
www.goethe.de/en/spr/flu.html). As advertised on 
the Goethe Institute’s homepage, 

Self-learning  courses,  speaking  exercises, 
videos  and  information  on  dealing  with 
authorities,  in  everyday  life  or  in  finding 
a job. All offers work on smartphones and 
tablets. An interactive vocabulary training 
in 16 languages, which   can be used without 
any  prior  knowledge;  many  offers  are 
helpful as an adjunct to classroom courses.

The  British  Council  adapted  its  programmes  for 
incoming  refugees  in  2016  (see  https://www.
britishcouncil.org/voices-magazine/english-
language-teaching-migrants-refugees). In Austria, 
German courses are offered by the City of Vienna 
and  the  Ministry  of  Integration  (https://www.
wien.gv.at/english/social/integration/learning-
german/young-people.html).  Moreover, 
the 
Ministry of Integration delivers obligatory ‘value 
courses’ (one day for 8 hours), which every refugee 
whose  application  for  asylum  has  been  accepted 
has  to  attend.5  In  these  courses,  the  participants 
5 
  See  https://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/the-ministry/press/
announcements/2016/03/the-ministry-for-integration-the-public-

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are  taught  Western  values.  Intercultural  aspects 
related  to  religion,  gender  politics  and  so  forth 
are  discussed.  Sweden  also  provides  courses  for 
Swedish  language  after  the  arrival  of  refugees 
(http://www.thenewbieguide.se/just-arrived/the-
refugee-guide-to-sweden/swedish-for-refugees/). 
No  numbers  or  statistics  exist  to  date  about  the 
quantity  of  language  courses  available  (both 
official and voluntary) and about their effects and 
success across European member states.6

2.3. The Culturalisation of 
Discourse about Linguistic 
Integration

Detailed linguistic analyses illustrate how the term 
Integrationsunwilligkeit  came  to  briefly  dominate 
Austrian  political  and  media  discourse.  To  trace 
the  ‘life  history’  of  this  term,  we  combined 
qualitative and quantitative linguistic methods to 
show  its  frequency,  collocates,  contextualization 
and  instrumentalization  in  legitimizing  ever-
stricter  policies  (see  Rheindorf  2016  and  Wodak 
2015a for extensive analyses and discussion). 

integration 

is  represented 
The  discourse  on 
by  a  corpus  of  3,200  texts  compiled  from 
11  national  newspapers  in  Austria  (i.e.  Der 
Standard,  Die  Presse,  Heute,  Kleine  Zeitung, 
Kronen  Zeitung,  Kurier,  Oberösterreichische 
Nachrichten,  Österreich,  Salzburger  Nachrichten, 
Tiroler  Tageszeitung,  Wiener  Zeitung)  and  four 
magazines (Profil, News, Biber, Die Zeit). In early 

employment-service-austria-and-the-austrian-integration-forum-
present-austria-wide-cooperation-in-providing-values-courses-
for-refugees/. 

  Also  see  http://www.eaea.org/en/policy-advocacy/
6 
adult-education-and-the-refugee-crisis.html, https://ec.europa.eu/
epale/en/content/erasmus-offers-free-language-courses-refugees 
and 
https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/news/austria-
multiplication-of-guidebooks-and-courses-for-refugees-on-
austrian-society 
(accessed  20/11/2016).  Obviously,  official 
institutions largely depend on support from civil society and many 
people  who  offer  their  help  voluntarily.  Some  countries  allow 
refugees and asylum-seekers to access language classes immediately 
upon arrival; others demand official asylum status before access is 
allowed.

2015,  the  discourse  on  integration  converges 
with  two  other  discourses,  that  on  educational 
reform (which focuses on teachers taking on new 
responsibilities  with  respect  to  the  integration 
of  children  with  migrant  backgrounds)  and  that 
on  terrorism  (focusing  on  so-called  Islamic  State 
as  an  initially  external  but  increasingly  internal 
threat embodied by radicalized young adults and 
schoolchildren  sympathizing  with  or  joining  the 
terrorist  group).  The  convergence  of  these  three 
discourses  constitutes  the  immediate  discursive 
context  of  the  term  Integrationsunwilligkeit  in 
Austrian political discourse.

schools  acting 
tried 

‘Integration’ is primarily discursively constructed 
linguistic 
as  cultural  and,  more  specifically, 
assimilation  (Permoser  &  Rosenberger  2012). 
Among other things, this has meant that language 
policy  in  Austria  regarding 
languages  other 
than  German  and  the  constitutionally  protected 
linguistic  minorities 
(Croatian,  Romanès, 
Slovakian,  Slovenian,  Czech,  Hungarian  and 
Austrian  Sign  Language)  is  somewhat  restrictive 
(de  Cillia  2012;  de  Cillia  &  Vetter  2013).  For 
example, 
individually  have 
to  prohibit  children  with 
repeatedly 
migration  backgrounds  from  speaking  their  L1 
(mother  tongue,  native  language)  during  breaks 
while on the school grounds (de Cillia 2012; e.g. 
Van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999). Disciplining those 
who  do  not  comply  has  been  an  integral  part  of 
related  discourses  for  decades,  most  notably  in 
the form of the ‘Integration Agreement’ – a part of 
Austrian  residence  law  (since  2003,  amended  in 
2005 and 2011). The provisions of the Integration 
Agreement  only  apply  to  immigrants  from  non-
EU states, who must sign it if they want to obtain 
a  right  of  residence.  Its  language  requirements 
specify  three  stages:  A1  before  immigration,  A2 
within  two  years  under  penalty  of  deportation, 
and B1 within five years of residence in Austria. 

discourse 

The 
Integrationsunwilligkeit 
comprises  280  texts  from  the  aforementioned 
sources,  published  between  20  January  and  5 

on 

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February  2015.  Its  onset  is  marked  by  three 
in  the  regional 
events:  a  resolution  passed 
parliament of Styria explicitly linking the terrorist 
attacks  in  Paris  to  “a  lack  of  integration”  and 
calling  for  a  legal  definition  of  “Tatbestände,” 
–  i.e.  punishable  offences  under  the  heading 
of  Integrationsunwilligkeit  (Resolution  3237/6, 
20.01.2015)  –  and  two  subsequent  newspaper 
interviews  promoting  the  concerns  of  the  said 
resolution. The two interviews were given on the 
same  day  by  two  prominent  politicians  of  the 
centre-left  SPÖ,  Franz  Voves  and  Hans  Niessl, 
then Governors of the Austria Federal Provinces 
of Styria and Burgenland respectively. Both were 
campaigning in regional elections and were faced 
with  declining  electoral  support  and  increasing 
pressure  from  the  right-wing  populist  Freedom 
Party  (FPÖ)  propagating  a  politics  of  fear  and 
securitization (Wodak 2015a, b). The supposedly 
divergent  behaviour  they  identified  as  indicative 
of 
from 
class  at  school,  wearing  a  ‘headscarf,’  speaking  a 

‘unwillingness’  comprised  absences 

language other than German in school breaks and 
disrespecting female teachers. 

The  measures  suggested  to  counteract  these 
undesirable  behaviours  can  only  be  qualified  as 
punishments,  ranging  from  community  service 
to  severe  fines  of  €1,000  to  (on  failure  to  pay) 
imprisonment, loss of welfare, loss of citizenship 
or  even  deportation.  It  is  not  surprising  that  the 
two interviews triggered a strong response, more 
so than the resolution itself, because the latter had 
not included any specific suggestions of punishable 
behaviours  or  punishments.  To  indicate  the 
terminological  effect  that  these  interviews  had 
on  discourses  on  migration  and  integration  in 
general, and in the Austrian media in particular, 
Figure 2 shows the average frequency/week of the 
term  Integrationsunwilligkeit  on  the  World  Wide 
Web  (Austrian  domains  only)  and  in  Austrian 
newspapers for the past decade. Figure 3 focuses 
on  the  same  data  for  a  more  narrowly-defined 
period  centred  on  the  discourse  strand  analysed 
here. 

Figure 2: Average use/week on the Web (Google Analytics for Austrian domains) and in national 
newspapers of the term Integrationsunwilligkeit (2005–2015)

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Figure 3: Average use/week on the Web (Google Analytics for Austrian domains) and in national 
newspapers of the term Integrationsunwilligkeit (2014–2015)

Both figures indicate that the gradually increasing 
use  of  the  term  on  the  Web  was  not  matched 
by  a  corresponding  use  in  the  Austrian  media. 
Indeed,  the  term  and  its  derivatives  remained  a 
marginal  phenomenon  up  until  the  interviews 
and subsequent reporting, when their use peaked. 
At least in the short run, the interviews established 
the term as a fixture in the Austrian media and, by 
implication, public discourse.

This discourse strand stands out from the overall 
discourse on integration by articulating the alleged 
lack of integration or unwillingness to integrate in 
terms of (a) schoolchildren, (b) Islamist terrorism 
and (c) punishments. Those suspected and accused 
of being ‘unwilling’ are mainly schoolchildren, also 
referred to as boys and sons more frequently than 
as  girls  and  daughters.  Indeed,  familial  relations 
play  an  important  role  as  this  group  is  also 
represented as families and parents, fathers more 
frequently than mothers. The third most common 
form  of  representation  is  linked  to  a  topos  of 
difference, emphasizing their alleged difference as 
migrants, immigrants, Turks, foreigners, Muslims 
or  minorities.  The  fourth  most  common  way  of 

representing this group is by reducing them to the 
quality  of  being  the  ‘unwilling’  in  a  nominalized 
form. Less frequent are neutral representations as 
(fellow) human beings, women and men.

This,  then,  marks  a  notable  shift  in  the  political 
discourse on integration, which is now informed 
by three main argumentative patterns:

• 

• 

• 

the 

Integration through achievement: if Austrians 
are  an  industrious  and  diligent  people  and 
foreigners  are  not,  then  to  be  successful  (by 
demonstrating  such  qualities)  is  to  become 
(more)  Austrian.  Note  that  the  seemingly 
liberal  evocation  of 
‘entrepreneurial 
migrant’ is embedded in a strictly paternalistic 
view of integration in which migrants must be 
pushed  if  not  forced  for  their  own  good  (de 
Cillia & Preisinger 2012).
Integration  through  language  competence:  if 
the  national  language  of  Austria  is  German, 
then  to  acquire  language  competence  in 
German is to become (more) Austrian. 
if 
through 
Integration 
noncompliance  with  desirable  behaviours 

punishment: 

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is  indicative  of  (cultural)  otherness,  any 
means  of  enforcing  compliance  will  help 
the  offenders  become  (more)  Austrian  and 
prevent radicalization.

The  former  two  arguments  have  been  employed 
to  legitimize  hegemonic  politics  implemented 
in  policies  for  a  considerable  time.  The  third 
argument, however, is a recent innovation tied to 
the discursive construction of religious and cultural 
tensions  between  a  homogenous  Self  (white, 
Christian,  German-speaking)  and  the  Other 
(coloured, Muslim, non-German-speaking) living 
within the Austrian borders, and thus an internal 
threat  to  national  integrity.  Where  previously 
policies had referred to both the need to integrate 
and to criteria with which to measure the success 
or failure of integration, the terminology has now 
obviously shifted to accommodate a vague blaming 
strategy  (scapegoating).  Moreover,  the  focus  of 
media and political attention seems to have shifted 
from ‘integration’ to an ‘unwillingness to integrate,’ 
providing  an  example  of  the  culturalisation  of 
discourse on integration.

2.4. The salience of social (in)
equality in (second) language 
acquisition

In  contrast  to  many  expert  opinions  and  much 
migration  research,  socio-  and  psycholinguistic 
research  confirms 
the  socio-economic 
that 
status  of  small  children  has  more  impact  on  the 
acquisition  of  language  (L1  and  L2)  than  ethnic 
origin.  Indeed,  this  is  not  surprising  as  these 
results confirm some sociolinguistic theories that 
have  been  foundational  since  the  1970s,  e.g.  by 
Basil  Bernstein  and  his  collaborators  (Bernstein 
1971a,  1971b).  When  Bernstein  wrote  about 
language  he  was  not  referring  to  systems  of 
grammar, syntax and vocabulary, the structures of 
language  systems,  but  to  the  social  relationships 
that  make  up  institutions,  such  as  families.  He 
was interested in the way social relationships align 

and order ideas, characterized as the grammar of 
the social in contradistinction to the grammar of 
linguistics. He argued that working-class children 
participate in different kinds of social interaction 
with  parents  than  middle-class  children  do  and, 
even  more  importantly,  that  fractions  within  the 
middle classes are oriented to meaning in different 
ways.

In  the  INPUT  project,  the  researchers  study  24 
parent-child dyads living in Vienna, Austria, i.e. in 
a  predominantly  German-speaking  environment 
(see Korecky-Kröll et al. 2015 for details). Half of 
the children are bilingual and mainly speak Turkish 
at home and mainly German in kindergarten, and 
the other half are monolingual German-speaking. 
Their ages range from 3 to 4 years. The groups are 
balanced in terms of socio-economic status (SES) 
and almost balanced in terms of gender: Austro-
Turkish  HSES  vs  LSES,  monolingual  HSES  vs 
LSES (Korecky et al., in press).7 The main caretaker 
was  identified  as  the  person  that  spent  the  most 
time with the target child or the person whom the 
child was most closely attached to (in all cases but 
one, this was the mother). Whereas HSES parents 
are  known  to  use  more  conversation-eliciting 
speech acts, LSES parents often show a behaviour-
directing  conversation  style.  The  most  salient 
interim results, among many, are that the cleavage 
between  HSES  and  LSES  input  and  output  is 
stronger  among  Austrian  monolingual  speakers 
than  among  Austro-Turkish  children,  and  that 
a  surprisingly  large  proportion  of  HSES  Austro-
Turkish  children  develop  some  of  their  German 
language skills earlier and faster than typical LSES 
native speakers of Austrian German. 

In  the  following,  I  focus  only  on  pragmatic 
variables  such  as  the  acquisition  of  speech  acts, 
although  the  project  has  been  investigating  a 
wide range of linguistic indicators (the data were 
collected  via  interviews,  participant  observation, 

7 
The  data  in  this  study  are  part  of  Project  SSH11-027 
“Investigating  Parental  and  Other  Caretakers’  Utterances  to 
Kindergarten  Children  (INPUT),”  which  is  supported  by  the 
Vienna Science and Technology Fund (WWTF). 

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story-telling, picture descriptions and competence 
tests). Directive speech acts in particular provide 
an 
interesting  testing  ground  for  exploring 
different conversation styles (e.g. Hoff et al. 2002). 
Parental conversation style is closely related to the 
socio-economic  status  of  families.  Parents  from 
HSES  backgrounds,8  who  mostly  have  a  broader 
knowledge  of  child  development  and  child  care 
issues (Rowe 2008), are more responsive to their 
children’s  verbalizations, 
initiate  and  sustain 
conversation with their children more frequently 
and encourage them more often to talk by asking 
them  questions  (Hoff  2003).  HSES  parents  also 
tend  to  formulate  requests  in  an  indirect  way, 
e.g. in the form of questions, such as “Why don’t 
you pick up the toys for me?” On the other hand, 
parents  from  LSES  backgrounds,  who  often 
experience greater social stress and are thus more 
focused  on  goal-directed  caretaking  settings 
than  on  play  situations,  reportedly  use  more 
behaviour-directing  speech  acts  (Hoff-Ginsberg 
1991) such as direct commands and prohibitions 
(e.g.  “Put  it  here!”,  “Don’t  touch  it!”).  Speech 
acts  are,  of  course,  important  characteristics  of 
parenting  styles  (Searle  and  Vanderveken  1985). 
Speech acts occurring in child speech and child-
directed speech are assertives (e.g. assertions and 
statements),  expressives  (e.g.  complaints,  praise 
and greetings), commissives (e.g. promises, offers 
and  threats)  and  directives  (e.g.  requests  and 
questions). 

Suffice it to state here that all groups of children 
prefer assertive speech acts, whereas all groups of 
parents use directive speech acts most frequently. 
Expressive  speech  acts  are  more  frequent  in 
child  speech  than 
in  child-directed  speech, 
but  commissive  speech  acts  are  rare  among 

SES was assessed via the highest level of education of the 
8 
main parental caretaker (cf. Czinglar et al. 2015). Children of parents 
that had obtained at least a high-school diploma according to the 
International  Standard  Classification  of  Education  (ISCED-97, 
cf.  OECD  1999)  were  classified  as  high  SES,  whereas  children  of 
parents that had lower levels of education (e.g. compulsory school 
or an apprenticeship) were classified as low SES. 

both  children  and  parents  from  both  language 
backgrounds.  In  monolingual  and  bilingual 
children,  we  find  similar  SES  differences:  HSES 
children  use  more  requests,  whereas  LSES 
children  use  more  real  questions.  This  SES 
difference is greater in bilingual than monolingual 
children.  Regarding  requests,  both  monolingual 
and  bilingual  HSES  children  use  more  indirect 
requests,  whereas  both  groups  of  LSES  children 
clearly  prefer  direct  requests,  but  here  the  SES 
difference is greater in the monolingual than the 
bilingual group. Hence, language acquisition (both 
L1 and L2) is highly dependent on the parents’ SES 
and their linguistic input (i.e. the family language 
environment).  LSES  children  (both  Austro-
Turkish  and  monolingual  children)  use  similar 
conversational styles and their progress is slower. 
In sum, HSES monolingual children do better than 
HSES Austro-Turkish children; all HSES children 
do better than all LSES children. Austro-Turkish 
LSES  children  perform  better  than  monolingual 
LSES children (e.g. Korecky-Kröll et al. 2015). 

The  following  two  explanations  might  play  a 
role.  On  the  one  hand,  families  that  have  taken 
the  initiative  to  migrate  from  one  country  to 
another in order to improve their living situations 
tend  to  show  greater  mobility  (including  social 
mobility)  and  higher  educational  aspirations 
than families that have always stayed in the same 
place, regardless of SES (Block 2016). On the other 
hand,  HSES  families  in  the  majority  population 
have well-established networks that help them to 
acquire good jobs and high-quality education for 
their children. HSES migrant families do not have 
these  relations,  they  have  to  focus  on  building 
them up successively, which may put them under 
greater  social  distress  than  autochthonous  HSES 
families.  These  results  confirm  new  theoretical 
sociolinguistic  and  psycholinguistic  approaches 
which  elaborate  both  Bernstein’s  class-centred 
sociolinguistic  theory,  such  as  Block’s  (2016) 
studies  on  ‘declassing’  and  ‘reclassing’  resulting 
transnationalism,  and 
from  migration  and 

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Pennycook’s insights into new urban developments 
in a globalised world, condensed in the concept of 
‘metrolinguistics’  (2015).  As  migrants  frequently 
lose their former class position in the host country 
and  have  to  resituate  themselves  in  a  new  social 
environment, they preserve “their multi-stranded 
relations  that  link  together  their  societies  and 
communities  of  origin  and  settlement”  (Block 
2016). Social divisions thus seem to be smaller in 
migrant  communities  than  in  the  host  country, 
i.e. in Austria. This fact together with the greater 
pressure  for  assimilation  that  is  experienced  by 
all  families  with  migration  backgrounds  may 
be  reflected  in  the  linguistic  input  that  they  give 
to  their  children.  It  is  obvious  that  these  results 
should be considered when devising new language 
policies, both for children and adults. Indeed, we 
could  assume  that  SES  differences  are  likely  to 
be even stronger among large groups of refugees 
escaping  from  war  zones,  as  families  are  usually 
able  to  escape  if  they  have  savings  and  can  pay 
people  to  smuggle  them  abroad.  Moreover,  we 
might ask how the results of the INPUT project can 
be applied when dealing with severely traumatised 
children,  regardless  of  their  SES.  Finally,  what 
happens if parents do not choose to leave but are 
forced to do so without much previous planning? 
Does  this  situation  have  any  specific  impact  on 
bilingualism among their children? 

3.  Conclusion
The  Council  of  Europe  (2016)  emphasizes  that 
linguistic  integration  depends  on  the  higher  or 
lower  value  accorded  to  the  languages  present 
in  their  repertoire  before  migrants  arrive  in  the 
host society. The degree of success in integrating 
languages  into  the  repertoire  is  obviously  not 
quantifiable.  Frequently,  linguistic  experts  are 
not  involved  in  designing  the  various  test  items, 
which are also not standardized across languages 
and  countries.  It  should  be  emphasized  that  the 
success of linguistic integration strongly depends 
on the motivation and attitudes of adult migrants, 

their SES, the time spent in the host country, their 
level  of  education,  their  religious  routines,  their 
gender  identities  and  their  access  to  work  and 
housing. Accordingly, migrants may

•  decide  to  not  change  their  repertoire,  i.e.  to 
not learn the main language of the host society 
systematically;

•  wish to change their repertoire, but be unable 
to do so due to lack of time or self-confidence;

• 

• 

aim to functionally rearrange their repertoire 
without  attempting  normative  adaptation 
as  part  of  a  single-identity  language  strategy 
marked by the migrant’s language of origin;

aim  to  rearrange  their  linguistic  repertoire 
in  order  to  achieve  ‘linguistic  naturalisation,’ 
involving a gradual dropping of the language 
of origin;

• 

aim  to  rearrange  their  functional  repertoire 
but with two joint languages of identity.

It is up to migrants to decide for themselves which 
of these language strategies is best suited to their 
goals in life and the management of their identity. 
In  any  case,  the  fact  that  migrants  may  wish  to 
choose  among  these  various  types  of  adaptation 
implies  that  arrangements  need  to  be  made  for 
listening to migrants’ views and for designing and 
managing tailor-made courses.

To acquire plural competence, both migrants and 
the host country have to invest much energy, work 
and money. This competence does not only consist 
– although it is certainly important – of acquisition 
of  the  majority  language.  Successful  integration 
implies knowledge of relevant language games in 
all domains of life, indeed for many people (both 
migrants  and  the  host  population)  a  Gestalt-
switch.  Motivation,  learning,  curiosity,  patience 
and  respect  are  necessary  prerequisites  for  being 
able to understand each other’s way of life, always 

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on  the  foundations  of  human  rights  and  the 
respective  societies’  constitutions.  As  mentioned 
above, the situation for refugees has to be analysed 
separately: some conclusions certainly refer to all 
newcomers  in  a  new  society  but  some  factors  – 
such as trauma – usually only refer to refugees.

With  respect  to  the  culturalisation  of  political 
debates,  i.e.  the  emphasis  on  cultural  differences 
the  host  society  and  newcomers, 
between 
specifically regarding religion and gender, results 
imply  that  much  work  will  have  to  be  invested 
in  order  to  convince  both  sides  that  living  with 
plurality  and  difference  should  be  encouraged. 
Of course, plurality should always remain within 
the boundaries of the respective constitution and 
human rights norms. Integration and competence 
in  plurality  obviously  imply  a  long  and  difficult 
process  over  many  years,  challenging  old  belief 
systems  and  traditional  ways  of  life.  As  Miller 
(2016)  suggests,  newcomers  will  have  to  shed 
‘some  cultural  baggage’  and  the  host  society  will 
have to offer support in this endeavour.

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FROM EASTERN 
ENLARGEMENT 
TO JIHAD: THE 
DOUBLE CHALLENGE 
FOR MIGRANT 
INTEGRATION IN 
EUROPE
Anna Triandafyllidou 
European University Institute

While the 1980s and 1990s were characterised by 
tensions and even terrorist violence or war along 
ethnic/national lines in Europe, during the last 15 
years religion has emerged as the main fault line 
along  which  people  are  divided.  After  decades 
of  Basque  or  Northern  Irish  terrorism,  the  war 
in  Yugoslavia  and  the  partition  of  the  country, 
and  related  concerns  that  the  situation  of  ethnic 
minorities  in  Central  Eastern  Europe  could 
become an unmanageable challenge, today we are 
witnessing a weakening of ethnic tensions. Ethnic 
and  national  minority  claims  for  more  political 
space  and  independence  are  channelled  through 
national institutions, e.g. the process of devolution 
in Britain and the Scottish referendum, or through 
international mediation and arbitration (see, e.g., 
the  EU  Roma  Strategy,  or  the  OSCE  Ljubljana 
principles). It is the religious claims of minorities 
that  are  now  seen  to  represent  the  most  difficult 
challenges  because,  it  is  argued,  they  go  against 
the  very  nature  of  secular  liberal  European 
democracies.

This is paradoxical, since religious minority claims 
do not challenge national sovereignty or territorial 
integration and could actually be accommodated 
in line with the path followed in each country in 
earlier  times  to  make  space  for  native  religious 
minorities.  Indeed,  European  societies  are  much 

less  secular  than  they  often  portray  themselves 
to  be  (several  countries  have  recognised  official 
religions; most countries have religious education 
integrated  in  their  national  education  systems; 
many allow or support religious schools; and many 
offer  support  to  religious  organisations).    How 
are  we  then  to  explain  this  paradox  that  ethnic 
and national minority challenges are seen as less 
problematic than those of religious minorities? 

Fear  and  suspicion  towards  religious  minority 
claims  are  coupled  with  a  renewed  emphasis 
important 
on  the  nation-state  as  the  most 
geopolitical  and  socioeconomic  unit.  As  the 
intensification  of  globalisation  and  the  erosion 
of  national  sovereignty  (particularly  in  Europe 
through the European integration process), along 
with  the  recent  global  financial  crisis  and  that 
of  the  Eurozone,  send  alarm  signals  to  citizens, 
the nation-state re-emerges as a safe haven in an 
uncertain, even if closely integrated, international 
environment. In the early 21st century, the nation-
state  becomes  a  last  refuge  from  the  storms  of 
European  and  global  crises.  Citizens  become 
increasingly  diffident  of  global  governance 
processes like the G8 and G20 and of EU policies 
generally  –  whether  those  on  public  finance  or 
migration  management  –  and  they  turn  to  their 
national institutions for socioeconomic security. 

We  are  thus  witnessing  a  contradictory  process 
where  on  the  one  hand  religion  is  perceived 
as  a  main  dimension  that  organises  social  and 
political life  at the global level, and on  the other 
hand  national  identity  and  the  nation-state  are 
re-emerging as the main community of allegiance 
and  belonging  in  a  post-industrial  society.  Both 
processes  find  their  roots  in  the  political  and 
symbolic  reorganisation  of  the  world  order  that 
emerged in 1989 after the collapse of communism. 
They are, of course, supported and fuelled by the 
recent  socioeconomic  crisis  in  Europe,  which 
has  intensified  inequalities  within  and  across 
countries,  making  citizens  increasingly  worried 
about their future.

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intensity 

The  societal  transformation  that  Bauman  (1998, 
2000)  and  Sennett  (1998)  already  described 
and  analysed  in  the  late  1990s  has  acquired 
a  particular  configuration  and 
in 
Europe  in  the  post-1989  period.  The  defeat  of 
communism  as  a  political  and  economic  system 
has  brought  with  it  the  reconnection  of  Europe 
(Spohn  and  Triandafyllidou  2003)  but  has  also 
led to a dominance (if not outright hegemony) of 
consumer culture and of the free market economy 
that Bauman and Sennett, among others, critically 
analysed  (Baumann  2000).  Differences  between 
left-wing  and  right-wing  ideologies  have  thus 
become  somewhat  vague,  and  citizens  have 
been  left  to  wonder  what  the  alternative  is.  In 
this  context,  the  European  Union  offered  an 
institutional  framework  to  reconnect  Europe 
and  overcome  the  legacies  of  World  War  II  and 
the  divisions  of  the  Cold  War.  The  notion  of 
European identity and European culture brought 
together the different nations of Europe and their 
minorities,  even  though  this  did  not  happen  on 
a  level  playing  field  since  cultural  hierarchies 
and  closures  towards  specific  minority  identities 
persisted (Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2015). 

Despite  the  important  economic  and  political 
challenges posed by the reconnection of Europe, 
the  1990s  were  characterised  by  a  certain 
ideological  enthusiasm  that  the  reconnection  of 
the  continent  ended  a  past  of  wars  and  division, 
and  that  the  European  Union  would  offer  a 
platform  for  both  economic  and  geopolitical 
identity  would 
integration,  while  European 
become 
identities, 
intertwined  with  national 
enriching and not replacing them. Not only were 
the 1990s a decade of European enthusiasm and a 
drive for unification, they were also characterised 
by  increased  attention  to  cultural  and  religious 
in  Europe.  Multiculturalism  was 
diversity 
celebrated  in  many  countries  (e.g.  the  UK,  the 
Netherlands and Sweden) as the most appropriate 
way  to  accommodate  cultural  and  religious 
diversity  and  build  an  inclusive  citizenship.  This 

pro-diversity  policy  also  extended  to  the  then 
newly independent states in Central and Eastern 
Europe,  which  were  strongly  encouraged  to 
recognise  their  national  minorities  and  provide 
appropriate guarantees of their rights, as provided 
for  in  relevant  European  and  international  legal 
instruments  (Triandafyllidou  and  Ulasiuk  2014). 
Indeed, the end of the Cold War and the implosion 
of  the  communist  Other  were  celebrated  in  the 
1990s,  both  as  a  liberation  from  Europe’s  past 
tragedies  and  as  the  start  of  a  new  global  era 
without deep ideological antagonisms – the “end 
of  history”  as  Francis  Fukuyama  called  it  in  his 
well-known book (Fukuyama 1992).

The  new  millennium  started,  however,  with  a 
profound  geopolitical,  cultural  and  existential 
shock  for  Europe  and  the  West.  The  terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 signalled the end of the post-1989 
euphoria.  While  the  US  government  proclaimed 
the War on Terror, intervened in Afghanistan and 
again attacked Iraq, Europe was facing important 
internal  and  external  challenges.  Urban  violence 
erupted in northern English cities in the summer 
of  2001,  and  French  suburbs  followed  suit  in 
2005.  National  grievances  of  second-generation 
children  who  were  failing  both  in  school  and 
the labour market were then coupled with global 
cultural crises like that over the Danish cartoons 
of Prophet Mohammad in 2006. While extremist 
and  jihadist  forms  of  Islam  were  emerging  as  a 
global  terrorist  threat,  more  moderate  versions 
of  Islam  and  European  Muslims  started  being 
portrayed as unfit to live in European liberal and 
secular societies. The Madrid (2004) and London 
(2005) bombs did nothing but reinforce this view: 
that  certainly  not  all  Muslims  are  terrorists,  but 
there  is  something  fundamentally  wrong  with 
Islam as a religion that makes it inappropriate for 
European democratic societies and impossible to 
accommodate in a secular state. 

forcefully  as  an 

Islam  emerged 
important 
‘civilizational’ dividing line within Europe during 
the same period in which the post-1989 European 

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re-unification  enthusiasm  started  to  fade  away. 
Indeed,  the  magnitude  of  the  economic  and 
political  challenges  of  the  transition  of  Central 
Eastern  European  countries  from  communism 
to  free  market  capitalism  and  liberal  democracy 
became  increasingly  felt  in  Europe  in  the  late 
1990s,  when  several  of  the  former  communist 
countries experienced a second round of economic 
and  political  decline.  Discussions  about  their 
integration  into  the  European  Union  seemed  to 
reach their objectives when the Helsinki summit 
of  1999  reaffirmed  the  political  will  of  the  EU15 
to  integrate  the  new  countries,  possibly  in  one 
big  enlargement  wave  by  2004.  Thus,  economic 
objectives  were  subsumed  to  the  overarching 
political  goal  of  re-uniting  Europe,  provided 
the  new  member  states  became  fully  fledged 
democracies  and  subscribed  to  European  values, 
which  included  the  accommodation  of  national 
minorities  and  the  abandonment  of  irredentist 
claims or border disputes. 

jihadist 

In  a  way,  it  was  the  very  success  of  Eastern 
Enlargement,  along  with  the  emergence  of 
international 
terrorism  and  urban 
tensions  among  post-migration  minorities  and 
native majorities, that paved the way for Islam to 
become the necessary European Other. Not only 
had communism collapsed and with it the overall 
Cold  War  geopolitical  and  symbolic  framework, 
but  the  Central  Eastern  European  countries 
were fully subscribing  to  the by-then hegemonic 
western  European  model.  The  communists  had 
been  successfully  ‘reformed’  –  there  was  a  need 
for a new Other at the European and global levels 
against  whom  a  united  Europe  and  Western/
European values could be reaffirmed.

Muslims  emerged  as  a  convenient  Other,  both 
internally  and  externally  –  they  were  accused 
of  creating  ‘parallel  societies’  within  European 
countries and they also posed a threat to European 
security  through  terrorism.  Indeed,  a  number 
of  thinkers  and  politicians  advanced  the  claim 
that  it  was  impossible  to  accommodate  Muslims 

in  European  societies  because  their  cultural 
traditions  and  religious  faith  were  incompatible 
with secular democratic governance. 

While  for  a  good  part  of  the  2000s  this  debate 
gained  momentum  and  actually  led  to  a  public 
repudiation  of  multiculturalism  by  a  number  of 
European  leaders  (Angela  Merkel  in  October 
2010,  David  Cameron  and  Nicolas  Sarkozy  both 
in  February  2011),  there  were  other  important 
developments in Europe which changed the course 
of things and shifted the focus from religion and 
Muslims to other ‘Others.’ Indeed, the debate on 
migration  and  diversity  was  further  complicated 
by  the  intensification  of  intra-EU  mobility  after 
the  2004  enlargement  and  the  2007  accession 
of  Bulgaria  and  Romania  in  the  context  of  a 
progressive lifting of restrictions on access by the 
new member states’ citizens to the labour markets 
of  the  old  member  states.  There  had  been  rising 
concern that intra-EU migration included welfare 
tourism. While the expulsion of (Romanian) Roma 
from France by Nicolas Sarkozy’s government in 
2009  caused  widespread  condemnation,  a  much 
broader  rejection  of  Central  Eastern  European 
immigrants  gained  high  currency  in  Britain  in 
the  2010s.  Such  discourses  were  initially  only 
promoted by extremist and populist parties, such 
as UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party), 
the  Front  National  (in  France)  and  the  party 
of  Geert  Wilders  in  the  Netherlands,  but  they 
gradually expanded into the mainstream political 
discourse.  What  was  initially  seen  as  mainly  an 
issue involving second-generation migrant youths 
and  Muslim  communities  had  become  a  wider 
anxiety  that  national  governments  and  national 
majority  groups  were  losing  control  over  their 
territories, labour markets and national identities. 
The European integration process thus shifted from 
being the epitome of Western cultural, economic 
and  political  dominance  over  communism  –  the 
victory of democracy over authoritarian rule – to 
posing a threat of national control over important 
social and economic issues being lost. The result of 

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the Brexit referendum in June 2016 can certainly 
be viewed through this lens too.

Today  we  are,  therefore,  faced  with  a  complex 
socio-political  reality  where  Muslims  and  Islam 
continue  to  be  stigmatised  as  unfit  for  secular 
and  liberal  democracy,  while  at  the  same  time 
fear  is  mounting  among  public  opinion  that  the 
European integration process is stripping states of 
their power and leaving their national populations 
unprotected from a cultural and economic invasion 
by  newcomers.  If  the  newcomers  are  Muslims 
they are seen as culturally dangerous and eroding 
our  way  of  life;  if  they  are  white,  Christian  and 
European, such as Poles or Romanians for instance, 
they are seen as welfare scroungers and as stealing 
our jobs. This leads to a divisive debate that cuts 
across religious and national lines. In a post-1989 
and  post-9/11  era,  but  also  a  post-enlargement 
era,  religion  and  the  nation  compete  with  one 
another to provide ontological and socioeconomic 
security  to  European  citizens,  with  both  offering 
a Manichean view of a world divided between Us 
and  Them  as  an  anchor.  Indeed,  extreme  events 
like the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris in January 
2016, the shootings and explosions, again in Paris, 
in November 2015, and in Brussels in March 2016, 
do nothing but confirm these discourses of fear, to 
use Ruth Wodak’s expression (Wodak 2016).

Concluding remarks
It was at the turn of the millennium that Zygmunt 
Bauman  warned  of  the  pitfalls  of  the  increased 
freedom  and  intensified  mobility  of  late  modern 
and post-industrial societies. Bauman pointed out 
that enhanced freedom and mobility were eroding 
stable reference points for identity,  such as class, 
kinship, ethnicity, religion  and even locality. The 
emancipation  of  the  individual  from  the  forces 
of  nature  was  reaching  a  new  level  where  this 
very  emancipation  was  again  put  in  jeopardy 
as  an  economic  logic  was  taking  precedence 
over  non-economic  challenges  (Bauman  2000). 
The  new  world  order,  according  to  Bauman, 

was  characterised  by  excessive  de-regulation, 
to 
liberalisation  and  flexibilisation, 
estrangement and uprootedness (see also Sennett 
1998). 

leading 

While  Bauman’s  analysis  certainly  holds  true  in 
that it presents the most important challenges that 
late  modernity  and  globalisation  set  to  citizens, 
what he did not foresee is that old solidities had not 
gone away but instead remained under the surface 
and  could  be  activated,  despite  today’s  changing 
circumstances  of  production,  life,  mobility  and 
(Atkinson  2008,  Lee  2011, 
communication 
Levitt  2007).  Indeed,  as  Castells  (2010a;  2010b) 
has  foreseen,  very  few  people  in  the  world  can 
afford to be, or feel they are, cosmopolitans. Most 
identify  with  their  urban  milieux,  while  others 
rediscover their anchoring in religion. Collective 
identifications  do  not  disappear  but  are  instead 
transformed  and  re-invented  in  this  fragmented 
yet networked society.

At this very moment in Europe, the old solidities 
of  nationalism  and  religion  are  re-emerging 
with  unexpected  strength.  This  process  has  to 
do with the ways in which European integration 
has moved from being a political and ideological 
project to one that is dictated by economic logic 
and  felt  to  be  detached  from  local  and  national 
realities. This  process  is,  however,  also  related  to 
the overall challenges that globalisation raises for 
citizens,  not  only  socioeconomic  ones  but  also 
existential ones. Thus, while national identity and 
the nation-state are seen to better respond to the 
socio-economic  vulnerability  of  the  European 
citizen  today,  animosity  towards  Europe’s  largest 
minority  religion  responds  to  a  necessity  for  a 
higher level of community that affirms European 
values and superiority in the world.

This  analysis  of  the  re-emergence  of  nationalism 
and religion is, of course, neither deterministic nor 
teleological. Even if people are in search of solidity 
in a liquid world, such solidity is not necessarily to 
be found in closure, discrimination and prejudice. 

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Indeed,  we  should  not  lose  sight  of  the  largely 
successful  integration  of  Muslims  in  different 
European countries today, and nor of new forms 
of transnational solidarity. Through the power of 
information  and  communication  technology  we 
now  feel  much  more  related  to  (and  are  actually 
more informed about) what is happening in other 
regions of the world (e.g. the Middle East, but not 
only  there)  and  how  this  affects  our  own  lives  – 
whether  through  a  surge  of  incoming  refugees 
or through a decrease in oil prices. International 
terrorism  and  foreign  fighters  from  European 
countries  joining  ‘Islamic  State’  in  the  last  two 
years  are  one  side  of  this  coin,  showing  how 
cultural and political globalisation can transform 
integration  problems  and  grievances 
local 
by 
them  with  geopolitics  breeding 
transnational  extremism.  At  the  same  time,  the 
various  Indignados  and  Occupy  movements 
across  Europe,  youth  mobilisation  in  support  of 
the Arab spring and Ghezi Park movements, and 
transnational  commemorations  of  the  victims 
of  international  terrorism  in  Paris  testify  that 
globalisation  can  also  reinforce  solidarity  and 
mobilisation  for  common  transnational  causes, 
such  as  peace,  equality  or  democracy,  across 
national boundaries.

linking 

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References 
Atkinson, W. (2008). All that was solid has not melted into the air (liquid): A critique on Bauman on 
individualization and class in liquid modernity, The Sociological Review, 56, 1, 1-17.

Bauman, Zygmunt (1998). Globalization. The Human Consequences. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bauman, Zygmunt (2000). Liquid Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bauman, Z. (2011). Collateral Damage. Social Inequalities in a Global Age, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Castells, M. (2010a). The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture. Vol. 1. The Rise of the Network 
Society. (2nd ed.) Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.

Castells, M. (2010b). The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture. Vol. 2. The Power of Identity. 
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Fukuyama, F. (1992). The end of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press

Lee, R. (2011). Modernity, Solidity and Agency: Liquidity Reconsidered, Sociology, 45, 4, 650-664.

Levitt, P. (2007). God needs no passport: immigrants and the changing American religious landscape, 
New York: The New Press.

Milward, Alan (1992). The European Rescue of the Nation State. London: Routledge.

Sennett,  R.  (1998).  The  Corrosion  of  Character:  The  Personal  Consequences  of  Work  in  the  New 
Capitalism, Boston: W. W. Norton and Company.

Spohn,  W.  and  Triandafyllidou,  A.  (eds.)  (2003).  Europeanization,  National  Identities  and  Migration: 
Changes in Boundary Constructions between Western and Eastern Europe, London: Routledge.

Triandafyllidou, A. and Gropas, R. (2015). What is Europe. London: Palgrave.

Triandafyllidou, A. and Ulasiuk, I. (2014). Diversity Partnerships. Towards a Common Framework for 
Migrants and Minorities. Green Paper, Global Governance Programme, Policy Workshop, March 2014.

Wodak, Ruth (2016). The Politics of Fear. London: Sage.

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THE CULTURAL 
INTEGRATION 
OF IMMIGRANTS 
AND REFUGEES: 
SHIFTING 
NARRATIVES AND 
POLICIES IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION1

Tamás Szűcs 
European Commission

The  unprecedented  flow  of  immigrants  and 
refugees since summer 2015 together with its only 
loosely  controlled  nature  pose  major  dilemmas 
to  the  potential  host  societies  and  to  the  new 
arrivals  themselves,  as  well  as  to  policy  makers 
and  to  academic  research.  An  abundance  of 
conceptual  frameworks,  integration  models  and 
interdisciplinary considerations have already been 
developed to meet this challenge “on a continuum 
from  total  rejection  of  the 
‘other’  to  total 
acceptance of the ‘other,’”2 while sustainable long 
term solutions are most likely to be found in the 
large space between these two poles. Their position 
within this spectrum and ability to be implemented 
depend  both  on  the  specific  histories,  traditions 
and  socio-economic  circumstances  of  the  host 
nations  and  the  various  ethnic  and  religious 
compositions of the newcomer communities. 

The role of culture in tackling the recent migratory 
and  refugee  crisis,  and  indeed  the  necessity  of 
cultural  integration,  has  been  moving  to  centre 
stage  even  beyond  the  academic  discourse,  both 
in  terms  of  public  debate  and  policymaking. 
1 
This chapter reflects the personal views of the author. The 
European Commission cannot be held responsible for any use of 
the information contained herein.

2 

See Ruth Wodak’s contribution in this volume. 

For  a  comprehensive  understanding  of  this 
phenomenon  it  is  worth  first  putting  these 
discussions in a broader perspective by reviewing 
the  recent  EU  approach  to  managing  migration 
in  general.  Second,  the  latest  concrete  initiatives 
to  integrate  and  promote  diversity  should  also 
be  examined  closely  in  this  light  to  see  what 
can  actually  be  realistically  expected  from  the 
various cultural integration projects in the current 
circumstances and the extent to which they fit into 
any theoretical approach.

The  present  contribution  will  first  outline  the 
shift  in  public  attitudes  to  migration  and  their 
impact on the stances taken by EU and Member 
State authorities. It will then show that there has 
been important continuity in the EU’s principles 
and  policies  regarding  the  management  of  legal 
migration since the adoption by the Council in 2004 
of  the  Common  Basic  Principles  for  Immigrant 
Integration  Policy.  The  chapter  concludes  with 
some  reflections  on  normative  political  theories 
on immigrant integration that could provide both 
critical and constructive perspectives from which 
to assess the EU’s efforts in this area and facilitate a 
more balanced political and public discourse.

Shifting narratives and 
declining public support for 
integration 
Since  late  last  year,  there  has  been  a  gradual 
but  clear  shift  in  public  and  political  discourse 
towards  considering  immigrants  as  a  security 
threat  rather  than  focusing  on  facilitating  their 
integration. This can be observed by looking at the 
various  formal  and  informal  European  Council 
conclusions and discussions and the media across 
Europe.  Most  recently  at  the  European  Council 
in  October,3  leaders  focused  almost  exclusively 
on reinforcing the protection of external borders, 
tightening  controls  on  all  routes  and  preventing 
illegal  migration.  The  informal  summit  of  27 

3 
2016

European Council conclusions on migration, 20 October 

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State of the Union speech delivered in the run-up 
to the Bratislava Summit, where the establishment 
of  a  European  Border  and  Coast  Guard  was 
announced.  This  was  followed  by  a  concrete 
legislative  proposal  in  October,  in  addition  to 
further  measures  against  terrorism  and  ones 
strengthening  the  EU’s  external  borders.  At  the 
same time, a new European Fund for Sustainable 
Development was also suggested for Africa and the 
Neighbourhood  countries  to  address  one  of  the 
root causes of migration. Its External Investment 
Plan may allow investments to increase by up to 
€88bn. 

The  shifting  narratives  also  reflect  the  prevailing 
public  mood,  which  has  changed  dramatically 
during the last few years. According to the latest 
Eurobarometer  figures  published  in  July  2016,8 
immigration  (48%)  and  terrorism  (39%)  remain 
the  top  two  concerns  of  European  citizens,  well 
ahead  of  the  economic  situation  (19%)  and 
unemployment (15%). 

Member  States  (the  first  without  the  UK)  in 
Bratislava  in  September4  was  dominated  by  a 
similar discourse and ended with the adoption of 
a ‘roadmap’5 for the future. Equally significant are 
the  changes  in  the  positions  of  the  traditionally 
most  open  host  countries.  After  Bratislava, 
Chancellor  Merkel  stated  clearly  that  “illegal 
immigration must be stopped” (although she still 
promised  that  Germany  would  take  “hundreds 
of  legal  refugees  every  month”  from  Greece  and 
Italy). Soon afterwards, on a visit to Africa (Niger, 
Ethiopia and Mali) to explore whether the Turkish 
model  could  be  used  there,  she  promised  an  aid 
package worth up to €77 million to fight against 
terrorism and human trafficking, and she warned 
young  Africans  not  to  undertake  the  dangerous 
journey to Europe without clear plans. A number 
of restrictive measures have also been introduced 
during  this  year  by  Sweden,  the  Netherlands, 
Denmark and others. At a ‘special summit’ for 13 
EU and Balkan leaders in Vienna,6 some Central 
and Eastern European leaders proposed that new 
migrant  hotspots  and  refugee  camps  for  asylum 
seekers should be built in Turkey, Libya or Egypt. 
The Visegrad 4 countries also coined a new phrase, 
“flexible  solidarity,”  with  which  they  are  trying 
to  block  the  adoption  of  a  new  permanent  crisis 
relocation  mechanism  under  the  Dublin  system7 
(with  tacit  support  during  Council  discussions 
from Austria, France, Spain and others).  

These developments prompted President Juncker 
to state that countries unable to participate in the 
redistribution of asylum seekers must participate 
more  in  the  reinforcement  of  the  EU’s  external 
borders.  Providing  protection,  preserving  the 
European  way  of  life,  and  defending  Europe  at 
home  and  abroad  were  also  key  elements  in  his 
4 
Statement  -  informal  meeting  of  the  heads  of  state  or 
government, 23 September 2015.

5 

 Bratislava Declaration and Roadmap.

6 
 Summit 24. September 2016 : Press : Federal …  invitation 
and President Tusk’s remarks : Remarks by President Donald Tusk 
before the summit on migration along the Balkan route.

7 
Dublin system: Proposal for a Regulation. 

  A  permanent  crisis  relocation  mechanism  under  the 

8 
The  Spring  2016  Standard  Eurobarometer  was 
conducted between 21 and 31 May 2016. A total of 31,946 people 
were  interviewed  in  all  EU  Member  States  and  in  the  candidate 
countries. The ‘First results report’ was published on 29 July and is 
available online here. 

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Table 1: Spring 2016 Standard Eurobarometer

In 20 Member States immigration is the number 
one  concern  for  the  EU  and  it  is  among  the  top 
two  concerns  in  all  countries  except  Portugal. 
Terrorism is the number one concern in 8 Member 
States  and  among  the  top  two  concerns  in  all 
countries except Greece. 

Partly  reacting  to  these  trends,  a  large  majority 
of EU governments appear to be keen to proceed 
quickly with implementation of the first two pillars 
of  the  European  Agenda  on  Migration,  adopted 
in  May  2015.9  Since  then,  many  Commission 
proposals  have  been  adopted  to  reduce  the 
incentives  for  irregular  migration  and  to  ensure 
better border management, and most of these have 
already  made  significant  headway.  In  September 
and October 2016 three major progress reports10 
and six new or follow-up initiatives were sent to 
the EP and the Council. At the same time, despite 

9 

A European Agenda on Migration 

10 
First  progress  report  on  the  Partnership  Framework 
with  third  countries  under  the  European  Agenda  on  Migration 
on  18  October  2016,  Communication  on  progress  towards 
an  effective  and  genuine  Security  Union  on  12  October  2016, 
and  a  Communication  on  the  Sixth  Report  on  Relocation  and 
Resettlement on 28 September 2016.

having  a  comprehensive  legislative  proposal11  on 
the  table,  the  Heads  of  States  and  Governments 
seem to be making somewhat slower progress on 
the  third  pillar  –  creation  of  a  strong  common 
asylum  policy  –  mainly  due  to  heated  internal 
disputes.  It  is  also  noticeable  that  there  is  an 
increasing  tendency  to  deal  with  migration 
and  security  together  as  well  as  to  “mainstream 
counterterrorism”  into  education  and  cultural 
policies.

Towards a new policy on 
legal migration 
Against this ‘securitized’ background, perhaps it is 
not surprising that less attention is paid – especially 
by the media – to the fourth pillar, the development 
of  a  new  EU  policy  on  legal  migration.  In  this 
domain, work had already started long before the 

11 
The proposal to reform the Common European Asylum 
System  (Dublin  reform)  was  adopted  in  May  2016:  Proposal  for 
a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council 
establishing  the  criteria  and  mechanisms  for  determining  the 
Member  State  responsible  for  examining  an  application  for 
international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a 
third country national or a stateless person (Recast)  

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migratory and refugee crisis. For several years the 
focus had already been on maintaining a Europe in 
demographic  decline  as  an  attractive  destination 
for immigrants by using targeted measures, many 
of  which  are  discussed  in  other  contributions  to 
this e-book. 

For this particular chapter, the most relevant recent 
measures to integrate diversity are in the European 
Commission`s  Action  Plan12  on  the  integration 
of  third-country  nationals  of  June  2016.  This  is 
actually  one  of  the  follow-up  proposals  to  the 
JHA Council’s mandate in 2014 which reaffirmed 
the EU Common Basic Principles for Immigrant 
Integration  Policy,  already  adopted  in  2004. 
These set out a common approach to  immigrant 
integration across the EU and it is worth noting that 
the Council decided to reaffirm these principles 10 
years  later.  They  were  basically  unchanged,  even 
though  at  the  time  of  their  adoption  they  were 
only  intended  to  be  an  “indicative  description 
which  should  be  further  developed.”  The  Action 
Plan also builds on the EC’s European Agenda for 
the integration of third-country nationals set out 
in  2011,  calling  for  a  strengthened  and  coherent 
approach  to  integration  across  different  policy 
areas and government levels. 

The  current  proposal  targets  the  more  than  20 
million  third-country  nationals  legally  residing 
in  the  EU,  irrespectively  of  the  reason  why  they 
migrated  or  for  how  long,  but  some  actions 
specifically target newly-arrived refugees who face 
specific  problems.  It  is  based  on  the  experience 
that integration policies work best when they are 
designed  to  ensure  coherent  systems  to  facilitate 
participation  and  empowerment  for  everyone 
in  society:  for  both 
immigrant  and  native 
communities. This means that integration should 
go beyond participation in the labour market and 
mastering  the  language,  and  become  a  dynamic 
two-way  process;  not  only  should  migrants  be 
expected to embrace fundamental EU values and 
learn  the  host  language,  but  they  should  also  be 

12 

Action Plan on the integration of third-country nationals 

offered  meaningful  opportunities  to  participate 
in  the  host  country’s  economy  and  society.  The 
involvement of migrants themselves in the design 
and  implementation  of  integration  policies  and 
projects  is  essential  to  improve  their  outcomes, 
but none of these actions should be at the expense 
of  measures  to  benefit  disadvantaged  groups  or 
minorities in the host countries. 

The Action Plan itself actually provides a common 
policy framework to help Member States to develop 
their national integration policies and it describes 
the potential support from the EC. Among its five 
main areas, in this chapter we shall only focus on 
that  of  active  participation  and  social  inclusion, 
which includes actions to support exchanges with 
the  receiving  society,  immigrant  participation  in 
cultural life and fighting discrimination. In general 
terms, this means that the Commission will (co-)
finance projects to promote intercultural dialogue, 
cultural  diversity  and  common  European  values 
through  culture,  films  and  the  arts  (Creative 
Europe)  and  also  projects  to  promote  social 
inclusion involving youth and sport (Erasmus+). 
A  number  of  other  funds/programmes  will  also 
be mobilised to promote participation in political, 
social  and  cultural  life  and  to  foster  better 
understanding  between  various  communities. 
An innovative element, also featured in President 
Juncker’s  2016  State  of  the  Union  speech,  is  that 
it  gives  greater  priority  to  activities  dedicated  to 
the  integration  of  refugees  within  the  European 
Voluntary Service.

By working together with the EP and the Council, 
Member  States  will  be  encouraged  to  strengthen 
their  integration  policies  to  increase  migrant 
participation  in  local  democratic  structures,  to 
invest in projects to fight prejudice and stereotypes 
and  to  implement  legislation  to  combat  racism, 
xenophobia and discrimination. Civic orientation 
programmes  are  also  encouraged 
foster 
integration and respect for EU values. Of course, 
the success of integration policies also depends on 
adequate funding. The EU has already supported 

to 

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funding  and 

integration actions in all Member States through 
the  Structural  and 
dedicated 
Cohesion Funds for a long time. In the previous 
cycle (2007-2013), €825 million were spent from 
the  dedicated  European  Integration  Fund,  and 
its  mid-term  evaluation  demonstrated  that  the 
projects  involved  would  not  have  been  carried 
out  otherwise  and  that  they  contributed  to  the 
reinforcement  of  NGO  and  local  activities.  In 
addition,  the  European  Social  Fund  (ESF)  co-
funded actions that reached more than 5 million 
people.13 This funding,  however, represented just 
part of the overall investment carried out within 
Member  States.  Under  the  current  Multiannual 
Financial  Framework  2014-2020,  €  765  million 
has  already  been  earmarked  for  the  dedicated 
fund,  but  as  this  would  mean  a  slight  decrease, 
the  EC  suggested  strategically  using  the  various 
shared management funds to support integration. 
Especially in the European Social Fund (ESF – €21 
bn)  and  in  the  European  Regional  Development 
Fund  (ERDF  –  €21.4  bn),  large  amounts  are 
available  to  potentially  promote  –  among  other 
goals – cultural integration.

Innovative paths in the 
latest concrete projects
The  capacity  to  implement  the  Action  Plan  in 
general  and  the  speed  with  which  it  happens  is 
in  the  hands  of  EU  leaders,  whose  visions  show 
a fair degree of variation. This is likely to have an 
impact  on  whether  and  how  the  available  funds 
will be used as, of course, it depends primarily on 
the  Member  States  themselves.  The  Commission 
on  its  part  decided  to  launch  an  innovative  call 
for  applications  in  the  framework  of  the  cross-
sectoral strand of the Creative Europe programme 
in  April  2016  as  a  follow  up  to  the  Culture 
Council  conclusions  from  November  2015  to 
support  cultural,  audio-visual  and  cross-sectoral 
projects facilitating the integration of refugees and 

 In 2014-15, other funds, such as Erasmus+, funded more 
13 
than  200  projects  dealing  with  refugees  or  addressing  challenges 
related to the inclusion of refugees.

enhancing  mutual  cultural  understanding.  The 
expectation  was  that  a  limited  number  (10  -12) 
of high quality consortia from the cultural sectors 
would be established to create and test initiatives 
–  “creative  partnerships.”  These  transnational 
projects were designed to help refugees to socialize 
and  express  themselves  even  without  them 
immediately being able to speak the host country 
language, to become learning platforms, to foster 
respect  for  diversity, 
intercultural  and  civic 
competencies,  and  to  help  host  country  citizens 
understand the values and cultures of refugees. 

This  call  eventually  attracted  274  applications  – 
more than three times the original expectation. 
Therefore,  the  initial  budget  (€1.6  million) 
was  increased  to  €  2.35  million,  with  which 
12  projects  will  be  (co-)financed  involving 
60  organizations  from  20  countries.14  As  can 
be  seen  from  Table  2,  Italy  and  Sweden  are 
the  best-represented  countries  with  17  and  9 
organizations  respectively.  The  table  also  gives 
a  certain  indication  of  the  degrees  of  interest 
of  various  actors  across  Europe.  Common 
threads in the winning projects were related to 
storytelling,  the  digital  arts  and  training  and 
workshops for participants. Each of the projects 
will  receive  an  average  of  just  under  €200,000 
and will run until 2018.

14 
Integration, Call EACEA 12/2016

Selection  results:  Creative  Europe/Support  for  Refugee 

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Table 2

Creative Europe: Culture

2016 - Support to Refugee Integration Projects - Demand by Country (project leader + partners) - Submitted/Selected projects

* Provisional code which does not prejudge in any way the definitive nomenclature for this country,
 which will be agreed following the conclusion of negotiations currently taking place under the auspices of the United Nations.

In  September  2016  a  regular  call  for  European 
cooperation  projects  was  also  launched  in  line 
with  the  EU  Common  Basic  Principles  referred 
to above15 (with a total budget of €35 million for 
2017)  and  one  of  its  priorities  is  specifically  to 
help the integration of refugees in the EU through 
showcasing and co-creating activities of a cultural 
and audio-visual nature across Europe. The focus 
of  successful  projects  should  be  on  fostering 
intercultural  and  inter-religious  dialogue,  and 
respect for other cultures. 

Political theory and the 
real world
One  may  legitimately  ask  whether  the  principles 
underlying  EU  policies  on  the  integration  of 
refugees and other newcomers are defensible and 
to what extent they concur with the reality on the 
ground.  These  are  questions  to  be  addressed  to 
15 
Call  for  proposal:  Support  to  European  Cooperation 
projects 2017 EACEA 45/2016.

normative  political  theorists.  While  historically 
immigration has not been a major topic in political 
philosophy, it has recently become the subject of 
an  increasingly  contentious  debate  which  so  far 
seems to have been dominated by a human rights-
based  cosmopolitan  approach  embodied  most 
eminently in the seminal work of Joseph Carens,16 
even  though  its  underlying  advocacy  of  open 
borders can be qualified as somewhat utopian in 
the current European and global political context. 
Especially  at  a  time  when  traditional  integration 
mechanisms  are  being  seriously  challenged  and 
critical  decisions  are  made  by  governments,  it 
would be useful to thoroughly consider the ‘realist 
approach,’ primarily represented by David Miller,17 
in  a  nation-state 
which  places 
context. He argues that “it is implausible to regard 

immigration 

16 
Press, 2013.

J. Carens, The Ethics of Immigration, Oxford University 

17 
Our Midst, Harvard University Press, 2016

Most recently in his latest book: D. Miller, Strangers in 

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global  equality  of  opportunity,  as  opposed  to 
global sufficiency, as setting limits to national self-
determination.”18 Of course, in such an immensely 
complex  and  politically  highly  sensitive  matter 
a  third  claim  that  “a  more  desirable  task  for  the 
political philosophy of immigration is to find ways 
in which the joint requirement of global equality of 
opportunity and collective self-determination can 
be  coherently  upheld”19  deserves  equally  careful 
assessment.

Notwithstanding  these  theoretical  debates,  and 
presumably  sometimes  even  without  awareness 
of them, the daily management of mass migratory 
movements  has  clearly  shifted  towards  a  fairly 
restrictive approach, not just in Europe (as shown 
above)  but  also  in  Australia  (which  was  already 
strict  but  is  becoming  even  stricter)  and  the  US 
as  well.  A  clear  distinction  between  refugees 
and  economic  migrants  remains  one  of  the 
cornerstones  for  each  regime.  At  the  same  time, 
if  we  examine  the  calls  for  the  above-mentioned 
latest  integration  projects  promoted  by  the  EU 
together  with  their  designs  and  results,  we  find 
that  they  aim  to  facilitate  the  kind  of  ideal  full 
cultural  integration  described  by  David  Miller: 
“full  cultural  integration  requires  that  members 
of  the  indigenous  majority  understand  why 
the  private  cultures  of  immigrants  need  to  be 
accommodated and offer ungrudging support for 
the  measures  needed,  and  that  the  immigrants 
themselves  understand  and  embrace  the  public 
culture  of  the  society  they  have  joined.”20  This 
approach  sits  easily  also  with  the  EU  Common 
Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy, 
which  in  practice  have  provided  very  useful 

18 
 In Miller, D, Migration and justice: a reply to my critics, 
Critical  Review  of  International  Social  and  Political  Philosophy, 
published online 09 September 2016. 

19 
  In  Kollár,  E.,  Global  equality  of  opportunity  and  self-
determination  in  the  context  of  immigration,  Critical  Review  of 
International Social and Political Philosophy, published online 04 
October 2016 

20 
Press, 2016, p 149.

  Miller, D., Strangers in Our Midst, Harvard University 

guidance21 during the implementation of cultural 
integration policies, even though the efficiency of 
these policies varies substantially across Member 
States, reflecting their specificities and dispositions 
towards migration in general.

One of the areas where Member States differ most 
concerns  the  limits  of  humanitarian  obligations 
and  the  reciprocal  relationship  between  values 
and fundamental rights in terms of the migration 
crisis.  This  also  relates  to  broader  academic 
debates on the culturalisation of civil and human 
rights  agendas  and  the  institutionalisation  of 
culture.22 One characteristic example where these 
differences  emerged  was  provided  during  the 
latest  Council  discussion  on  the  integration  of 
third-country nationals in the context of its 2016 
Annual  Dialogue  on  the  Rule  of  Law.23  While 
some  Member  States  argued  that  there  can  be 
no  limits  to  the  EU’s  humanitarian  obligations 
towards  refugees,  others  claimed  that  while  the 
right is not limited the capacity to offer protection 
is. All ministers agreed that European states and 
societies  as  a  whole,  including  migrants,  must 
adhere to fundamental EU values, but there was no 
consensus on whether or not reciprocity requires 
active  tolerance  and  obliges  Member  States  to 
accommodate cultural and religious diversity.

It remains to be seen whether, when and where on 
the ‘acceptance-rejection continuum’ a consensus 
can  be  formed  on  these  (and  a  wide  range  of 
other)  issues.  The  Common  Basic  Principles 
(since 2004) rest on the premise that “if the flow 
of legally residing immigrants is orderly and well 
managed, Member States may reap benefits.” Even 
though the premise does not hold in the current 
situation, the Principles have still proven relevant 

  Research on Migration: Facing Realities and Maximising 

21 
Opportunities, a policy review prepared by
Prof Russell King and Dr Aija Lulle for the EC, 2016, p 67.

22 
anthropology, Focaal 55, 2009, p7.

   Soysal, L., Introduction: Triumph of culture, troubles of 

  For  details  and  a  short  summary  of  the  session,  and 
23 
especially  the  Presidency  non-paper  for  the  Council,  see  http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/gac/2016/05/24/

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in the handling of the mass movements of refugees 
and  migrants  during  the  last  few  years.  Equally 
useful  has  been  the  invaluable  contribution  of 
academic research offering advice on devising and 
implementing concrete integration projects.24 The 
political and public discourse would also benefit if 
political theory could help to develop a coherent 
and  principled  response  to  cases  of  unregulated 
flows of refugees and migrants – a response which 
takes into account the possibilities and constraints 
of  the  ‘real  world,’  which  could  give  guidance 
to  policymakers,  and  which  could  facilitate  the 
achievement  of  public  consent  for  a  legitimate 
politically feasible and morally defendable cause.
24 
 Ample proof can be found in the 160-page comprehensive 
summary of EU-funded research projects Research on Migration: 
Facing Realities and Maximising Opportunities, A Policy Review, 
prepared by Prof Russell King and Dr Aija Lulle for the European 
Commission in 2016.

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doi:10.2870/30835 

ISBN:978-92-9084-460-0

PREFACE ~ Rainer Bauböck, Milena Tripkovic