Analysis and summary of Member States’ reports on the implementation of Directive 96/82/EC on the control of major accident hazards involving dangerous substances : final report.
Date: 2017-06-15
Institutions: Directorate-General for Environment
Subjects: EU Member State, accident prevention, dangerous substance, directive (EU), environmental risk prevention, industrial hazard, industrial research, report, safety standard

Analysis and summary of 
Member States' reports on the 
implementation of Directive 
96/82/EC on the control of 
major accident hazards 
involving dangerous 
substances 

Final Report 

March 2017 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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European Commission Directorate-General Environment 

Analysis and summary of Member States’ reports 
on the implementation of Directive 96/82/EC on 
the control of major accident hazards involving 
dangerous substances 

Final report 

May 2017 

Amec Foster Wheeler Environment  
& Infrastructure UK Limited 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 

© Amec Foster Wheeler Environment & Infrastructure UK Limited 

Executive summary 

This report presents an analysis of the status of Member States’ implementation of Directive 96/82/EC (the 
Seveso II Directive) during the 2012-2014 period and a comparison with previous reporting periods. The 
findings in this report are primarily based on the information contained in the reports submitted by Member 
States for the fifth and last reporting period under the Directive. This report also presents a statistical 
analysis of the eMARS1 and eSPRIS2 databases.  In addition, this report provides initial groundwork to 
support the future evaluation of Directive 2012/18/EC (the Seveso III Directive), by considering possible 
benchmarking approaches and insights into understanding differences in outcomes in the EU and in selected 
other countries. Initial groundwork on possible indicators to monitor the implementation, and to assess the 
achievements, of the Seveso III Directive is also presented. 

Implementation of the Seveso II Directive 

The responses provided by Member States to the implementation questionnaire were mostly complete and 
clarifications were provided by most Member States (20 out of 24 requests) when requested. 

Overall implementation 

Overall the Seveso II Directive is mostly well implemented by the Member States. From the responses 
provided by Member States it appears that processes and structures are in place for implementing the 
Directive and only three Member States (Croatia, Greece and Italy) are considered to have difficulties 
relating to the implementation of key features of the Directive. 

External emergency plans 

An average of 88% of the upper-tier establishments had an external emergency plan at the end of the 2012-
2014 period.  This means that 407 upper tier establishments were not covered by an external emergency 
plan by the end of the 2012-2014 period. This marks a worsening since the last reporting period where an 
average of 93% of the upper tier establishments had an external emergency plan but an overall improvement 
since the beginning of the implementation of the Directive. This recent decline might be explained by the 
increase in the number of establishments and challenges for the competent authorities to keep up with this. It 
can also be explained in part due to newly classified establishments for which the deadline to adopt external 
emergency plans had not yet been reached. 

On average 75% of the external emergency plans had been tested during the reporting period. This is a 
slight improvement over the last reporting period. However, the variability between Member States remains 
high. The information reported seems to indicate that Member States are now more efficient at reviewing and 
testing those plans. 

Providing information to the public 

On average 81% of the upper tier establishments had made safety information actively available during the 
reporting period. This represents a slight decrease since the last reporting period and the differences 
between Member States remain. Part of the discrepancies are explained by upper-tier establishments being 
newly classified. 

Inspections 

Upper tier establishments: On average, inspections were undertaken annually for 58% of the upper tier 
establishments, with inspections at 86% at least once over the three-year period. When excluding those 
Member States that base inspections on systematic appraisal of hazards (where annual inspection is not 
mandatory), the share of annual inspections of upper tier establishments is 79% which shows an 

1 The Major Accident Reporting System, accessible at: https://emars.jrc.ec.europa.eu/  
2 Seveso Plants Information Retrieval System: https://espirs.jrc.ec.europa.eu/  

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improvement since the end of the last reporting period. However, it is important to note that, for some 
Member States, annual inspection levels were relatively low and there may be a need for more support in 
this area. 

Lower tier establishments: The inspection level of lower tier establishments has significantly improved with, 
on average, inspections undertaken in 77% of the lower tier establishments during the reporting period 
compared to 42% in the previous reporting period. 

Actions taken in case of non-compliance 

Enforcement instruments were reported as available but in practice these were used in limited instances 
during the reporting period.  The range of actions available included fines, remedial orders and closure 
orders. 

Analysis of establishment and major-accident data 

Major accidents 

Between 2000 and 2014 a total of 490 accidents (including major accidents, near misses and other) were 
reported to the eMARS database3. Out of these 490 accidents, the data for 389 accidents has been 
processed, confirmed and published online, while the remaining 101 accidents are still being processed and 
as such are considered as ‘unpublished’ data. Out of the 490 accidents, 421 were major accidents. On 
average, 33 new accidents have been reported in the eMARS database per year since 2000 based on all 
data. The average for major accidents is approximately 30 every year between 2000 and 2014. 4 

The figure below presents the evolution of the ratio of number of major accidents to the number of upper tier 
establishments. The chart is based on the data on major accidents recorded in eMARS (unpublished data) 
and the number of upper tier establishments reported by Member States through the triannual reporting.  

Overall, a decrease in the number of major accidents per establishment is noticeable during the 2005 – 2009 
period, followed by an increase in 2010 but it has not been determined that this a statistically significant 
trend. Because major accidents are reported in such small numbers, a variation in the number will 
exaggerate the impact. In addition, the latest data from 2014 are not considered complete so could represent 
an under-estimate. From the figure below it is impossible to conclude on whether there is an overall increase 
or reduction of major accidents, however it is possible to conclude that the numbers are relatively stable. 

3 eMARS was established by the first Seveso Directive (EC/105/82) and launched in 1984 as a voluntary 
reporting system.  In 1996 the new Seveso II Directive included the obligation for Member States to report 
major accidents to the European Commission at which time the Annex VI criteria was created, defining major 
accidents that fall under this obligation.  Annex VI criteria contains reporting thresholds for different 
categories of impact including deaths injuries, environmental and property damage, and transboundary 
effects. Since it was launched, more than 1,000 accidents have been reported to eMARS. 
4 Whenever possible the analysis in this report uses the complete dataset including unpublished data.  
Reports are not published until the Member State confirms all the information in the report.  Hence, since 
some data fields in the unpublished reports have not yet been verified (e.g., consequences) only the 
published reports have been analysed. 

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Source: eMARS database 
Note: The figure presents only major accidents occurring in upper tier establishments as the number of lower tier establishments is not 
available before 2009. The number of upper tier establishments used are from Member States’ reporting.  Number of major accidents 
from upper tier establishments are from eMARS data including unpublished data. 
Note 2: A total of 56 major accidents were reported between 2000-2014 as from establishments of ‘tier unknown’, these are not included 
in the figure above. These refer to reports submitted before Seveso II notifications were checked and finalised. 
Note 3: The uneven intervals (2005, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2014) are due to the different ways in which the data was reported by 
Member States in their reports. 

The eMARS data indicates that upper tier establishments have experienced more major accidents than 
lower tier sites between 2000 and 2014, with approximately 70% of major accidents occurring on upper tier 
sites and 17% on lower tier sites, while for 13% the tier is unknown. 

The accidents in Enschede, the Netherlands, 2000 (22 fatalities, 527 injuries) and Toulouse, France, 2001 
(31 fatalities and nearly 2,500 injuries) significantly increased the annual figures for fatalities and injuries in 
these years compared to subsequent years.  In 2012, a peak can be observed in the number of onsite 
injuries due to several releases of toxic gas during this year. Therefore, any trend needs to be considered 
with caution due to the short period of time (2000-2014), given that they are heavily influenced by major 
accidents such as those of 2000 and 2001.   

The release of toxic substances to air, ground or water appears to be the most frequent type of hazardous 
phenomenon associated with major accidents.  (For nearly half the accidents (226), a phenomenon was not 
indicated which may be partially due to the transition from the pre-2009 reporting system to the current 
eMARS system, in which some of the phenomena are classified differently). 

Analysis of establishments 

In 2014, on average 44% of all establishments were upper-tier (representing 5 018 establishments) and 56% 
lower-tier (representing 6 279 establishments). The complete EU28 data set reported for 2014 is presented 
in the figure below5. 

5 This report contains two separate sources of Seveso establishment information:  data provided by Member 
States for the purpose of this 2012-2014 implementation report and data from the European Commission’s 
eSPIRS establishment database, that Member States may update at any time and not necessarily at any 
fixed interval.  The 2012-2014 data from Member States in almost all cases is based on a different time 
period than that in the eSPIRS data.  The analyses in this report uses the 2012-2014 data provided in 
Member State reports, except when it is indicated that eSPIRS data were used.   

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Source: 2012-2014 Implementation reports 

When compared to the data reported at the end of 2011, by 2014 there was a net increase of 983 
establishments, most of which belong to the lower-tier establishment category (756). The increase is not 
easily attributable to economic growth, given that growth was quite low during the 2012-2014 period. As a 
result, this increase is perhaps unexpected.6.  Alternatively, economic restructuring in the EU may have 
increased the presence of hazardous industries in relation to other economic sectors, or possibly new hazard 
classifications or improvements in enforcement may have caused more sites to be recognised as Seveso 
sites. It may also be related to better enforcement.  This is not something that is evident from the 
questionnaire responses. 

When considering the information reported by Member States for the 2012-2014 period using the eSPIRS 
classification, the most common categories of activities for the Seveso establishments are general chemicals 
(12% of total establishments) and fuel storage (11%) although a miscellaneous group of ‘other activities’ is 
the single largest category (14%). 

The eSPIRS database has been used to view data on number of establishments per Member State and to 
compare this to GDP, population and surface (density of establishments per km2). The key conclusions are 
presented below: 

  Bulgaria, Latvia and Estonia lead with respectively 4.23, 2.67 and 2.53 Seveso establishments 
per billion € GDP. Germany, which has the most establishments overall, is ranked number 18 
out of the 28 Member States; 

  Finland has the most establishments per inhabitants, with 48.2 Seveso establishments per 

million inhabitants, followed by Estonia and Sweden. It has not been possible to establish within 

6 In 2012 less than half of the Member States reported economic expansion, in 2013 the EU-28 GDP grew 
by 0.2% and 1.5% in 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/National_accounts_and_GDP 

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this analysis whether this means that in these Member States the populations are more 
exposed to hazards from industrial installations; and  

  In terms of density of Seveso establishments, Malta has the highest concentration of Seveso 

establishments, with 34.8 establishments per 1000 km2. Then follow Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg and Germany.  20 of 27 Member States for which data are available in eSPIRS7 
have fewer than 3 Seveso establishments per 1000 km2. 

These data show that beyond the absolute number of establishments, in order to understand the significance 
of Seveso establishments for Member States, context is important. For example, the density by area and 
population are potentially important in relation to likely proximity to establishments, but these are relatively 
crude measures and further data would be required to better understand and compare amongst Member 
States. 

Benchmarking 

An initial review of existing databases in other countries was conducted in order to compare performance 
observed in the EU with those of other countries in terms of safety and major accidents. The review covered 
nine databases with a wide geographical coverage. 

It has been challenging to compare the data reported, in particular due to the fact that there are no countries 
outside the EU that have a similar national reporting requirements based on a common definition of a major 
accident.  From our analysis, it is not possible to conclude whether the EU is performing better than non-EU 
regions in reducing chemical accident risk.  In order to compare the trends and the impact of policy on 
chemical accident risk, it would be necessary to have equivalent reporting regimes at national level in non-
EU countries based on a similar definition of major accidents.  

Indicators 

In preparation for the upcoming evaluation of the Seveso III Directive, the Better Regulation guidelines8 
foresee the use of indicators to assess progress made by an EU intervention in achieving its objectives. As 
such a review of possible monitoring indicators was conducted in order to identify in particular data gaps and 
needs to address when considering the Better Regulation requirements. 

Our review considered the five evaluation criteria (effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, relevance and EU-
added value.) and identified a range of relevant indicators, which will need to be further reviewed and 
prioritised, with further work required in order to identify the needed data. 

7 Croatia did not contribute to the eSPIRS database in 2013 or 2014. 
8 European Commission, 2015, Better Regulation Guidelines http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/guidelines/docs/swd_br_guidelines_en.pdf  

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Contents 

1 
1.1 
1.2 

1.3 

2 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 

3 
3.1 
3.2 
3.3 

3.4 

3.5 

3.6 

3.7 
3.8 
3.9 

3.10 
3.11 

Introduction 

This report 

Study context 
1.2.1 
1.2.2 
1.2.3 
1.2.4 

Overview of the Directive 
Historical developments 
Reporting obligations 
eMARS and eSPRIS databases 

Structure of the report 

Analysis of the completeness of Member States’ reports 

Overview 

Methodology 

Remaining gaps 

Overall conclusions on completeness 

Analysis of Member State reports 

Overview 

Methodology 

Question 1: General information 
3.3.1 
3.3.2 
3.3.3 
3.3.4 

Changes to competent authorities (Question 1(a)) 
Data reported on number of establishments (Question 1(b)) 
Data reported on activities from establishments (Question 1(c)) 
Coherence between Seveso and IED (Question 1(d)) 

Question 2: Emergency Plans 
3.4.1 
3.4.2 
3.4.3 

Overview 
External emergency plans 
Informing the public (Question 2(d) 

Question 3: Information on safety measures 
3.5.1 
3.5.2 
3.5.3 
3.5.4 
3.5.5 

Informing the public on safety measures (Question 3(a)) 
Information made available during the reporting period (Questions 3(b) and 3(c)) 
Monitoring that information is made available (Question 3(d)) 
Information kept permanently available for upper tier establishments (Question 3(e) and 3(f)) 
Information kept up permanently available for lower tier establishments (Question 3(g)) 

Question 4: Inspections 
3.6.1 
Overview 
3.6.2 
Systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards in inspection programming (Question 4(a)) 
3.6.3 
Availability of inspection related information to the public (Question 4(b)) 
3.6.4 
Overview of actions resulting from accidents, incidents and non-compliance during reporting period (Question 
4(c)) 
Overview of inspections during the reporting period (Question 4(d), (e), (f)) 

3.6.5 

Question 5: Domino effects 

Question 6: Land-use planning 

Question 7: Further information (optional) 
3.9.1 
3.9.2 
3.9.3 

Lessons learned from accidents and incidents (question 7(a)) 
IT tools for monitoring implementation (question 7(b)) 
Seveso-like provisions for activities not under the scope of the Directive (question 7(c)) 

Comparison of reporting with previous reporting cycles 

Observations on reporting 

13 
13 
13 
13 
14 
16 
17 
17 

19 
19 
19 
19 
20 

21 
21 
21 
21 
21 
22 
23 
25 
26 
26 
26 
34 
36 
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Assessment of implementation of the Directive 

Overview 

Summary of implementation by Member State 
4.2.1 
Austria 
4.2.2 
Belgium 
4.2.3 
Bulgaria 
4.2.4 
Croatia 
4.2.5 
Cyprus 
4.2.6 
Czech Republic 
4.2.7 
Denmark 
4.2.8 
Estonia 
4.2.9 
Finland 
4.2.10  France 
4.2.11  Germany 
4.2.12  Greece 
4.2.13  Hungary 
4.2.14 
4.2.15 
4.2.16 
4.2.17 
4.2.18 
4.2.19  Malta 
4.2.20  Netherlands 
4.2.21  Poland 
4.2.22  Portugal 
4.2.23  Romania 
4.2.24  Slovakia 
4.2.25  Slovenia 
4.2.26  Spain 
4.2.27  Sweden 
4.2.28  United Kingdom 

Ireland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 

Additional information sources 
4.3.1 
4.3.2 
4.3.3 

Overview 
Review of infringement decisions 
Review of the implementation of the UNECE Convention 

Conclusions on the implementation of the Directive 
4.4.1 
4.4.2 
4.4.3 

Number of upper and lower tier establishments, evolution and distribution 
Incidents, near misses and major accidents 
Article by article conclusions 

Possible areas for improvement 

Analysis of major accident and establishment data 

Analysis of major accident data 
5.1.1 
5.1.2 
5.1.3 
5.1.4 
5.1.5 
5.1.6 
5.1.7 
5.1.8 
5.1.9 
5.1.10  Accidents and incidents by activity type 
5.1.11  Key statistical findings on reports 

Overview 
Methodology and data limitations 
Analysis of major accident data 
Overview 
Major accidents, near misses or other events reported in eMARS 
Reasons for reporting (link with Annex VI of the Directive) 
Injuries and fatalities 
Type of hazardous phenomenon involved 
Accidents by substances or substance categories 

Socio-economic consequences of the reported accidents 
5.2.1 
5.2.2 
5.2.3 
5.2.4 

Methodology 
Current situation 
Initiatives from Member States 
Perspectives 

Impact of the Directive and new trends 
5.3.1 
5.3.2 
5.3.3 

Key milestones related to the prevention of major accidents 
Trends from the EM-DAT database 
Trends in specific sectors: example of biogas 

Analysis of establishment data 
5.4.1 
5.4.2 
5.4.3 

Overview 
Methodology and limitations 
Upper and lower tier establishments in the period 2011 to 2014 

4 
4.1 
4.2 

4.3 

4.4 

4.5 

5 
5.1 

5.2 

5.3 

5.4 

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65 
65 
66 
66 
66 
67 
67 
68 
68 
68 
69 
69 
69 
69 
70 
71 
72 
72 
75 
77 
82 

83 
83 
83 
83 
85 
85 
85 
89 
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92 
94 
97 
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101 
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5.4.4 
5.4.5 
5.4.6 
5.4.7 
5.4.8 
5.4.9 
5.4.10  Key statistical findings from eSPIRS 

Upper and lower tier establishments in 2014, in each Member State, per Billion € GDP 
Upper and lower tier establishments in 2014, per million inhabitants 
Upper and lower tier establishments per 1000 km2 
Breakdown of the number of establishments by industry type 
Analysis of a typical Seveso establishment 
Potential impact of Seveso III Directive on number of establishments 

Benchmarking 

Overview 

Description of the methodology 
6.2.1 
6.2.2 
6.2.3 
6.2.4 
6.2.5 

1st step: Identification of the accident databases 
2nd step: Cleaning and compilation of the data 
3rd step: Consolidation of the number of reported major accidents 
4th step: Building of statistics 
5th step: Analysis of the statistics 

Results of the review of the database for the benchmarked countries and discussion 

Monitoring indicators 

Overview 

Methodology 

Review of technical requirements including Better Regulation guidelines 
7.3.1 

General considerations on regulatory performance assessment / evaluations 

Review, selection and analysis of guidelines on safety indicators 
7.4.1 
7.4.2 
7.4.3 

Review and selection of the guidelines 
Analysis of the guidelines 
Preliminary set of indicators identified 

6 
6.1 
6.2 

6.3 

7 
7.1 
7.2 
7.3 

7.4 

112 
113 
114 
115 
121 
122 
122 

124 
124 
124 
124 
125 
132 
133 
134 
136 

138 
138 
138 
139 
139 
142 
142 
144 
150 

Table 1.1  
Table 2.1  
Table 3.1  
Table 3.2  
Table 3.3  
Table 4.1  
Table 4.2  
Table 4.3  
Table 4.4  

Table 4.5  

Table 4.6  
Table 5.1  
Table 5.2  
Table 5.3  
Table 5.4  
Table 5.5  
Table 5.6  
Table 5.7  
Table 5.8  
Table 5.9  
Table 5.10  

Table 5.11  
Table 6.1  
Table 7.1  
Table 7.2  
Table 7.3  
Table 7.4  
Table 7.5  
Table 7.6  

14 
19 
35 
39 
54 
58 
59 
70 

Main requirements for operators and Member States competent authorities 
Overview of the traffic light assessment of completeness 
Alarm systems reported by Member States 
Overview of Member States means for making information available 
Overview of implementation status between the current and the previous reporting period 
Overview of implementation status for 2012-2014 
Overview of the implementation issues per Member States for 2012-2014 
Overview of relevant infringements proceedings 
Difference in total establishments reported in 2014 by Member States under implementation  reporting and 
73 
in eSPIRS 
Number of major accidents and total number of accidents reported in the 2000-2014 period  (aggregated in 
76 
3-year periods) 
78 
Conclusions on implementation by Article 
84 
eMARS data analysis assumptions and limitations 
85 
Number of reports (major, near miss and other accidents) in eMARS since 2000 
86 
Number of accidents (major, near miss and other) reported in eMARS since 2000 
99 
Ratio of major accident per establishment per category of activities 
103 
Average cost per site estimated by the HSE 
103 
Major accidents reported in MAHB since 2000 
104 
Costs associated with hazardous phenomena involved in accidents (€ million) 
111 
Summary of the limitations highlighted by MAHB for eSPIRS 
115 
Number of Seveso establishments in 2014 by Industry Type (Activity) 
Comparison of number of establishments held in eSPIRS database and reported to the 2012- 2014 
reporting 
Number of Seveso establishments in 2012, 2013 and 2014 by Industry Type (Activity) 
Overview of the databases identified 
Overview of documents reviewed and their usefulness 
OECD (2008) guidelines analysis 
UNECE Guidelines analysis 
INERIS guidelines analysis 
CCPS guidelines analysis 
Synthesis of the set of indicators suggested to approach Seveso III monitoring 

117 
119 
125 
142 
144 
145 
146 
146 
151 

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5 
6 
21 
23 
24 
26 
27 
28 
28 
30 
31 
32 
37 

Evolution of the number of major accidents per 1000 upper-tier establishments (2005-2014) 
Total number of Seveso establishments in the EU-28 (as of 2014) 
Figure 3.1 
Figure 3.2 
Figure 3.3 
Figure 3.4 
Figure 3.5 
Figure 3.6 
Figure 3.7 
Figure 3.8 
Figure 3.9 
Figure 3.10 
Figure 3.11 
Figure 3.12 

Responses from Member States on changes 
Total number of Seveso establishments in the EU-28 (as of 2014) 
Overview of the establishments’ activity according to eSPIRS category 
Establishments covered by Seveso and Industrial Emissions Directives 
Upper-tier establishments without a requirement for external emergency plans (Article 11(6)) 
External emergency plans not required in 2011 and 2014 (Article 11(6)) 
Upper tier establishments without external emergency plans 
External emergency plans not drawn up in 2005, 2008, 2011 and 2014 (% upper tier  establishments) 
External emergency plans tested as reported in 2014 
Evolution of the share of external emergency plans tested in 2005, 2008, 2011 and 2014 
Information made available for upper tier establishments 
Evolution of the share of upper tier establishments making information available in 2005, 2008,  2011 and 
41 
2014 
45 
Overview of most reported actions taken during the reporting period 
46 
Annual inspection of upper tier establishments during the reporting period 
47 
Inspection of upper tier establishments at least once during the reporting period 
Inspection of upper tier establishments in 2005, 2008, 2011 and 2014 (% of upper tier  establishments)  49 
49 
Inspection of lower tier establishments during the reporting period 
74 
Evolution total number of establishments reported under Seveso II Directive 
75 
Evolution of the total number of upper-tier Seveso establishments in the EU-28 since 2005 
76 
Evolution of the number of major accidents per 1000 upper-tier establishments (2005-2014) 
77 
Evolution of the number of deaths and injuries on-site since 2000 
79 
Evolution of external emergency plans drafting since 2005 
81 
Evolution of number of inspections reported over reporting periods 
88 
Number of major accidents over the period 2000- 2014 
88 
Share of upper tier and lower tier establishments reporting major accidents for 2000-2014  period 
89 
Reasons for reporting major accidents in eMARS for the period 2000-2014 
90 
Reasons for reporting major accidents in eMARS in 2012-2014 
91 
Number of fatalities in 2000- 2014 Onsite and Offsite in public eMARS 
91 
Number of injuries in 2000- 2014 Onsite and Offsite in public eMARS 
92 
Number of fires involved accidents reported in years 2000-2014 
93 
Number of explosions involved in accidents reported in years 2000-2014 
93 
Number of undeclared hazardous phenomena involved in accidents reported in years 2000- 2014 
94 
Number of toxic releases involved in accidents reported in years 2000-2014 
Number of times a single type of substance classification, or combination, recurs in a single  major accident, 
95 
in years 2000-2014 
96 
Recurrence of substance category classification recurring in accidents reported in years 2000- 2014 
97 
Number of accidents and incidents by activity type in years 2000-14 
98 
Number of accidents and other events per activity type (for n. acc. ≥ 10) for 2000-2014 
99 
Number of accidents and incidents per activity type and class of accident (for n. acc. ≤ 10) 
102 

Figure 5.12 
Figure 5.13 
Figure 5.14 
Figure 5.15 
Figure 5.16   Categorisation of dangerous accidents in ARIA database 
Figure 5.17 

Figure 3.13 
Figure 3.14 
Figure 3.15 
Figure 3.16 
Figure 3.17 
Figure 4.1 
Figure 4.2 
Figure 4.3 
Figure 4.4 
Figure 4.5 
Figure 4.6  
Figure 5.1 
Figure 5.2 
Figure 5.3 
Figure 5.4 
Figure 5.5 
Figure 5.6 
Figure 5.7 
Figure 5.8 
Figure 5.9 
Figure 5.10 
Figure 5.11 

Figure 5.18 
Figure 5.19 
Figure 5.20 

Figure 5.21 
Figure 5.22 
Figure 5.23 
Figure 5.24 
Figure 5.25 
Figure 6.1 
Figure 6.2 
Figure 6.3 
Figure 6.4 
Figure 6.5 
Figure 6.6 
Figure 7.1  
Figure 7.2 
Figure 7.3 

106 
107 
108 

Number of reported major accidents during the period 1982-2014 compared to the evolution  of the 
Directive 
Number of reported industrial accidents in the world during the period 1970-2016 
Number of reported industrial accidents in Europe during the period 1970-2016 
Trend of accidents in biogas production and upgrading collected in the present study compared  to primary 
production of energy from biogas 
Distribution with respect to time of events 
Map for number of Seveso Upper Tier, Lower Tier and total in 2014 
Number of Seveso Establishments in 2014 per Billion € GDP 
Number of Seveso Establishments in 2014 per Million inhabitants 
Number of Seveso Establishments in 2014 per 1 000 km2 
European scale of industrial accidents 
European scale of industrial accidents (continued) 
Consolidation of the databases for the benchmarked countries 
Number of reported major accidents by period 
Number of reported major accidents per million population per period 
Number of reported major accidents per GDP (thousands of billions of $) per period 
Intervention logic for evaluation in EU policy 
A causal map of regulation and its effects 
Mapping of the Better Regulation elements on OECD model 

109 
110 
112 
113 
114 
115 
128 
129 
132 
134 
135 
136 
139 
141 
147 

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Questionnaire for reporting period 2012-2014 

Appendix A 
Appendix B  Member State summary sheets 
Appendix C 
Appendix D 
Appendix E 
Appendix F 
Appendix G 

Remaining gaps in Member States’ reports 
Data reported by Member States 
Data on establishments – eSPIRS 
Major accidents database results 
Leaflet 

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1  Introduction  

1.1  This report  

This is the final report for contract 070201/2016/734452/SFRA/ENV.C4 between the European Commission 
and Amec Foster Wheeler Environment and Infrastructure UK Limited (“Amec Foster Wheeler”) in 
collaboration with EU-VRi and INERIS.  It concerns the “analysis and summary of Member States’ reports on 
the implementation of Directive 96/82/EC on the control of major accident hazards involving dangerous 
substances”.   

This report presents our analysis of the status of Member States’ implementation of the Directive 96/82/EC 
(Seveso II Directive) during the 2012-2014 reporting period and a comparison with previous reporting 
periods. The findings in this report are primarily based on the information contained in the reports submitted 
by Member States for the fifth and last reporting period under the Directive. This report also presents a 
statistical analysis of the eMARS9 and eSPIRS10 databases.  In addition, this report provides initial 
groundwork to support the future implementation of Directive 2012/18/EC (the Seveso III Directive), by 
considering possible benchmarking approaches and understand differences in outcomes in the EU and in 
selected countries. Initial groundwork on possible indicators to monitor the implementation and to assess the 
achievements of the Seveso III Directive is also presented. 

The work comprises six main tasks, some of which are interlinked, which are as follows: 

  Task 1 includes the review and analysis of the implementation of the Seveso II Directive for the 

2012-2014 period and a comparison with previous reporting periods; 

  Tasks 2 and 3 includes the review of the statistical data available in the eMARS and eSPIRS 

databases; 

  Task 4 includes initial research work onto possible benchmarking approaches in order to 

understand better the performance of the Seveso III Directive;  

  Task 5 includes initial research onto possible indicators to be used in the future assessment of 

the Seveso III performance; and  

  Finally, Task 6 aims at creating an information leaflet to showcase EU action on industrial 

accidents prevention and its benefits11. A draft version of the leaflet is presented in 
Appendix  G. 

1.2   Study context 

Directive 96/82/EC12 (commonly referred to as Seveso II) provides a benchmark for industrial accidents 
policy in the EU and beyond on the control of major industrial accidents involving dangerous substances. 
The aim of the Directive is to ensure the implementation of measures at establishment and Member State 
levels to prevent accidents and, where they do occur, to effectively minimise their consequences.  Annex I of 
the Directive includes two lists of chemicals and associated thresholds for quantities stored/handled above 

9 The Major Accident Reporting System, accessible at: https://emars.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ 
10 Seveso Plants Information Retrieval System 
11 Diverging from the Terms of Reference that require two leaflets, it was agreed with the European 
Commission that the deliverable should be one information factsheet. 
12 Council Directive 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involving 
dangerous substances, OJ L 010, 14.1.1997, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:01996L0082-20120813&from=EN  

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which Seveso II applied. This includes both a list of named substances and also a list of relevant hazard 
categories for health, physical, environmental and ‘other’ hazards. 

Prevention and control of accidents is achieved through specific requirements placed on operators storing or 
handling certain dangerous substances above a threshold quantity. There are requirements for both 
operators and Member State competent authorities, as listed in Table 1.1. 

Main obligations for operators 

Article*  Main obligations for Member State competent 

Article* 

authorities 

Notification of all establishments 

Major accident prevention policy 

6 

7 

External emergency plans for upper-tier 
establishments and ensuring the public is being 
consulted 

Land-use planning for the siting of establishments 

Provide information to the public on safety 
measures 

8, 11 
and 13 

Publication of relevant information on safety 
measures 

Safety report for upper-tier establishments 

9 

Internal emergency plan for upper-tier 
establishments 

Provide access to information on major 
accidents to the competent authority 

11 

14 

Ensuring that any necessary action is taken after an 
accident including emergency measures, actions to 
ensure that the operator takes any necessary 
remedial measures and informing the persons likely 
to the affected 

Submission of information on major accidents to the 
Commission 

Prohibition of unlawful use or operation of 
establishments 

Inspections 

Exchange of information on experience regarding 
the prevention of major accidents and limitation of 
their consequences 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

17 

18 

19 

Submission of implementation reports every 3 years 

19(4) 

*= as in Directive 96/82/EC. Note that the article numbering changed in Seveso III 

At the end of the previous reporting period (2011), the Seveso II Directive applied to more than 10 000 
industrial establishments, including both lower tier and upper tier establishments. At the end of the latest 
reporting period, ending in 2014, the Seveso II Directive applied to 11 297 establishments13. 

Seveso II was repealed by Directive 2012/18/EC14 (known as Seveso III) in 2012.  As such, the reporting 
period 2012-2014 is the final reporting period under Seveso II. 

Since first adopted, the Seveso Directive has been amended to incorporate lessons learned from major 
accidents as well as improvements identified in the implementation of the Directive.  It has also been 
amended to reflect, for example, changes in the EU's approach to classification and labelling of chemicals. 

Directive 82/501/EEC (the first Seveso Directive) was prompted by the impacts of an accident in a small 
chemical plant in the town of Seveso (northern Italy) in July 1976. The incident was triggered by the release 

13 Sum of establishments reported by Member States in their tri-annual reporting 
14 Directive 2012/18/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on the control of 
major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances, amending and subsequently repealing Council 
Directive 96/82/EC, OJ L 197, 24.7.2012, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1456909234840&uri=CELEX:32012L0018  

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of a toxic vapour cloud which resulted in death of livestock, skin lesions (i.e. chloracne) in the population and 
pollution of soil. The incident also resulted in an increase of cardiovascular mortality in residential 
populations15.  

The revision of Directive 82/501/EEC was undertaken following the statements of the fourth and fifth Action 
Programme on the Environment and in light of the consequences of the accidents at Bhopal (leakage of 
methyl isocyanate and other chemicals in 1984) and Mexico City (gas leak and subsequent fire at a gas 
terminal in 1984). The first Directive was replaced by Seveso II in 1996. 

The Directive was amended further in 200316, to incorporate lessons learned from industrial accidents that 
occurred after 1996 such as those in Baia Mare (cyanide spill, 2000), Enschede (fireworks explosion, 2000) 
and Toulouse (explosion of a fertiliser plant, 2001). 

Finally, Seveso III replaced Seveso II in 2012.  The new Directive had to be transposed in all Member States 
by 1 June 2015.  It incorporates the globally harmonised system (GHS) for classification and labelling of 
chemicals which is implemented through the Regulation on classification, packaging and labelling of 
chemicals (Regulation 1272/2008, the CLP Regulation), and also the changes to the regime on access to 
justice and information.  

This most recent revision of the Directive took into account the information from the implementation reports 
for the period 2006-200817 and was adopted after a proposal from the Commission18 and subsequent impact 
assessment19.   

Seveso III incorporates changes that are expected to improve the effectiveness of the Directive, namely: 

  Updating and aligning the list of substances covered by the Directive to the CLP Regulation; 

  Strengthening citizens’ rights on access to information, justice and on participation in decision-

making; 

 

 

Improving the way information is collected, managed, made available and shared; 

Introducing stricter standards for inspections, ensuring more effective implementation and 
enforcement; and 

  Clarifying and updating of provisions, including streamlining and simplification to reduce 

administrative burden. 

In parallel to European developments, international initiatives have focused on increasing the safety of 
industrial sites, in particular through the UNECE and the OCED.  These include: 

  The UNECE adopted a Convention on the transboundary effects of industrial accidents (TEIA) 
in 1992. Member States and the European Union are parties to this Convention. It aims at 
protecting human beings and the environment against industrial accidents by preventing such 
accidents, reducing their frequency and severity and mitigating their effects. The UNECE has 
issued a series of guidelines including for example on land-use planning, on the identification 
of hazardous activities and on the preparation and inspection of a safety report. The Working 
Group on Implementation of the Industrial Accidents Convention reviews and analyses the 
implementation reports of the Parties to the Convention. The actual national implementation 
reports from the Parties are not available beyond 2011, however the Working Group has 

15 Bertazzi, P., 1991, Long-term effects of chemical disasters. Lessons and results from Seveso, Science of 
the Total Environment 106, 5-20. 
16 Directive 2003/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2003 amending 
Council Directive 96/82/EC on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances, OJ L 
345, 31.12.2003 
17 Document C(2010) 5422 final 
18 Document COM(2010) 781 final 
19 Document SEC(2010) 1590 final 

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prepared summary analysis of the implementation, whose findings were included in our 
analysis20; and  

 

In 2013, the OECD marked 25 years of chemical accident prevention policy21.  In 1985 and in 
the aftermaths of the Bhopal and Schweizerhalle accidents, the OECD first mentioned the 
need to ‘ensure the existence of appropriate measures to control potentially hazardous 
installations’. This was followed by the establishment of a committee, the ‘High Level Meeting 
of the Chemicals Group’, that concluded in 1987 on the need for international action on 
chemical accidents. The following year, a high-level conference was organised which 
concluded with the creation of a Working Group to focus for the following three years on 
improving safety of chemical installations. Following this work, it was decided to formally adopt 
the Expert Group on Chemical Accidents (later renamed Working Group on Chemical 
Accidents). The latest group has been extended for the 2013-2016 period. The Working Group 
has issued several guidance documents on developing safety performance indicators, on 
guiding principles for chemical accident prevention, preparedness and response, and on 
integrated management systems.  

As described in Table 1.1 Member States have reporting obligations which allow the Commission and others 
to monitor the effectiveness of the Directive's implementation as well as to inform potential future policy. 
These are: 

  Reporting information on establishments covered by the Directive (article 19(1a)):  The 
Commission has set up a database known as the Seveso Plants Information Retrieval System 
(SPIRS), which contains restricted access information on establishments to individuals 
authorised by the Commission or by the competent authorities of the Member States. Member 
States are required to report information on number of establishments, distinguishing upper-tier 
and lower-tier, and the activities of these establishments; 

  Reporting major accidents (article 15): The Commission holds information in a database 

accessible by all Member States. Publicly available extracts of this information can be found on 
the eMARS database website22. Member States are required to report information on events 
that meet the thresholds defined in Annex VI listing the criteria for the notification of an 
accident to the Commission; and  

  Reporting on the implementation of the Directive (article 19(4)): Member States are 

requested to submit an implementation report on the basis of responses to a questionnaire 
provided by the Commission. The questionnaires are adopted as Implementing Decisions. The 
latest, covering the 2012-2014 period, was adopted in June 201123. The questionnaires cover 
all the key aspects of the Directive and request information on the status of implementation 
during the period. Under Seveso II this requirement occurred every three years24. 

In the 2006-2008 report, it was expected that the 2009-2011 period would be the last reporting period under 
Seveso II. However, the 2012-2014 period was ultimately covered by Seveso II as well, given that the 
deadline for transposition of Seveso III was in June 2015.   

20 Seventh report on the implementation of the Convention (2012–2013) Report by the Working Group on 
Implementation, http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/documents/2014/TEIA/COP__Gva__3-
5_Dec_14/ECE_CP.TEIA_2014.4.E.pdf 
21 OECD, 25 Years of chemical accident prevention at OECD, History and Outlook, 
https://www.oecd.org/chemicalsafety/chemical-accidents/Chemical-Accidents-25years.pdf 
22 https://emars.jrc.ec.europa.eu/  
23 Document C(2011)4598 final, Commission Decision of 30/06/2011 
24 Previous questionnaires were: Document C(2008)5088 final, Commission Decision of 19/09/2008; 
Document C(2005)3103 final, Commission Decision of 13/10/2005 and Document C(2002)2656 final, 
Commission Decision of 17/07/2002. 

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This study assesses the last implementation reports of Seveso II (for the period 2012-2014), giving the 
Commission an opportunity to evaluate the implementation of the Directive as a whole.  It will also assess 
the latest information reported on establishments and on major accidents. 

The Major Accident Reporting System (MARS) operated by the Major Accident Hazards Bureau (MAHB) of 
the Joint Research Centre was established to handle information on 'major accidents' submitted by Member 
States to the European Commission in accordance with the provisions of the Seveso Directives. Since 2008, 
this reporting is available online on the eMARS platform. The aim of eMARS is to facilitate the exchange of 
lessons learned from accidents and near misses involving dangerous substances in order to improve 
chemical accident prevention and mitigation of potential consequences. Currently, eMARS holds data on 
more than 750 events provided since 1984 by the Member States (including major accidents and near 
misses) but also non-EU OECD and UNECE countries (for which reporting is voluntary). The database 
includes information on accidents that are reported as required by the Seveso Directive, according to the 
criteria of Annex VI.  

This interim report contains information on the accident type, substances directly involved, and immediate 
sources of accident, immediate causes, immediate effects, emergency measures taken, and immediate 
lessons learnt. 

Information on the eMARS database is available at: https://minerva.jrc.ec.europa.eu/en/minerva and the 
database can be accessed via: https://emars.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ 

The Joint Research Centre also operates the “Seveso Plants Information Retrieval System” (SPIRS) 
database which allows easy visualisation with a Geographical Information System (GIS) tool of important 
hazard and risk related information from Seveso establishments in Europe. In 2012, the SPIRS reporting 
was updated and MAHB in consultation with DG Environment developed eSPIRS as a platform to present 
information on establishments that are considered to present major hazards due to the potential accident risk 
associated with the presence of dangerous substances as defined by the Seveso III Directive. eSPIRS 
currently holds information on more than 10,000 establishments in the EU 28, Iceland, Norway and 
Switzerland. 

In accordance with the requirements of article 21(3) of the Seveso III Directive, eSPIRS presents information 
on name (or trade name) of the operator, the full address of the establishment and the activity of the 
establishment. It is foreseen that the database will be made available to the public as of January 2017. 

Information on the eSPIRS database is available at: https://minerva.jrc.ec.europa.eu/en/espirs/content.  

1.3  Structure of the report 

The report is structured as follows: 

  Section 2 provides an overview of the completeness of the reports submitted by Member 

States; 

  Section 3 provides an analysis of the Member States’ reports, including an analysis of 

responses to each question at EU level; 

  Section 4 provides an analysis of the implementation of the Directive, including information 

from other sources and a summary of the implementation for each Member State; 

  Section 5 provides statistical analysis of data on major accident and number of establishments; 

  Section 6 provides analysis of possible benchmarking approaches;  

  Section 7 provides analysis of possible monitoring indicators; 

  Appendix A presents the questionnaire that Member States responded to reporting on the 

implementation of the Directive; 

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  Appendix B presents summary sheets detailing the analysis of implementation for each 

Member State;  

  Appendix C presents the remaining gaps identified in Member States implementation reports; 

  Appendix D presents some of the data on establishments from Member States reports; 

  Appendix E presents some of the data on establishments from eSPIRS; 

  Appendix F presents the detailed results of the analysis of the accident databases; and  

  Appendix G presents the project leaflet.  

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2  Analysis of the completeness of Member States’ 

reports  

2.1  Overview  

This section presents the findings related to the completeness of the information submitted in Member 
States’ reports.  First, the methodology is set out, followed by a description of remaining gaps in the 
information submitted by the member states and overall conclusions on completeness. 

2.2  Methodology 

This section provides a description of the methodology adopted for the completeness of Member State 
reports and further clarifications provided. 

For each of the seven questions, an assessment was made as to the extent to which the Member States 
have provided an adequate answer, or provided sufficient data in relation to the reporting requirements 
under the Directive and the Commission’s questionnaire.  

This assessment was conducted using a ‘traffic light’ approach. The definitions for each category are 
presented in the table below. 

Colour 

GREEN 

ORANGE 

RED 

Completeness level 

Response which fully answer the question or sub question 

Response which only partially meets the needs of the question or which suggests potential minor 
implementation gaps. 

Response has not been provided to questions that are not optional or where the response suggests 
potential serious implementation gaps. 

WHITE 

Questions where no response is expected either because it is optional or because it is not applicable 

The traffic light approach is to be considered as a range, some of the Member States rated as orange have 
only minor issues to take into account while others will have more important implementation gaps. More 
information on specific gaps are presented in the Member State summary sheets in Appendix B. 

2.3  Remaining gaps 

An overview of responses warranting further investigation was compiled and formed the basis of 
engagement with Member States’ competent authorities. 

  Clarifications were requested from: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Finland, France, Spain, Croatia, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia and the UK; and  

  Clarifications were received from: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 

Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Spain, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia and the UK.  

As a result, gaps and uncertainties remain for Croatia, Greece, Latvia, and Sweden. These are presented in 
Appendix C. This means that for these Member States and for the overall analysis, some limitations can be 

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observed due to the lack of data. These limitations are highlighted in our overall analysis and in the 
corresponding Member State summaries.  

2.4  Overall conclusions on completeness 

A response was provided by all Member States and to all questions (excluding optional questions).  Some 
clarifications had to be requested from several Member States, primarily related to questions requesting 
quantitative data. In particular, clarifications were often needed for: 

  Question 1.c which requests Member States to provide a list of establishments per activity. In 
several Member States, the sum of the establishments listed did not match the total number of 
establishments reported under Question 1.b. This was mostly due to reporting reflecting 
different time periods or to mistakes made on the classification of activities; 

  Question 3.c which requests a statistical breakdown to be provided for the entities making 

information available and the means by which the information is made available. The statistical 
element was often not included in the original responses. It appears that Member States may 
have been uncertain on how to respond to this request which was a new feature of the 2012-
2014 questionnaire; 

  Questions 4.d and 4.e which request Member States to report the number of upper tier 

establishments that were subject to on-site inspections every twelve months and those not 
covered by 4.d and inspected at least once in the last three years. For many Member States, 
the numbers reported in 4.d and 4.e did not match the total number of upper tier 
establishments reported. This was mostly due to annual variations in the number of 
establishments during the reporting period; and  

  Question 4.f which requests Member States to report the number of lower tier establishments 
that were subject to on-site inspections in the last three years. For some Member States, the 
numbers reported in response to 4.f was higher than the total number of lower tier 
establishments reported. This was mostly due to annual variation in the number of 
establishments during the reporting period. 

Clarifications also related to qualitative questions, in particular: 

  Question 2.d which requests Member States to provide information on the alert systems and 
how these are set up to provide information to the public. This was often not distinguished in 
Member State responses; and  

  Question 2.e which requests Member States to provide information on criteria used to 

determine whether external emergency plans are considered adequate. This was often not 
included in Member States’ responses. 

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3  Analysis of Member State reports  

3.1  Overview 

This section provides an overview of the status of the implementation of the Directive across the EU-28 for 
the reporting period 2012-2014.  First, the methodology is described, followed by analysis under each of the 
questions asked in the reporting questionnaire. 

3.2  Methodology 

The analysis presented in this section is based on the responses from Member States to the questionnaire25. 
A copy of the questionnaire is provided in Appendix A for reference. This section follows the structure of the 
questionnaire.  It draws conclusions on the common themes regarding implementation status and highlights 
any trends across the Member States, as well as exceptions to those trends.  

Furthermore, considering this reporting period is the last one for the Seveso II Directive, the analysis 
included when possible, a comparison with previous reporting periods and a commentary on the overall 
evolution of the implementation of the Directive.  

A Member State specific analysis of the responses to the questionnaire is presented in Appendix B.  

3.3  Question 1: General information 

Overall, the majority of Member States (20) have not reported any significant change to the main competent 
authorities during the reporting period. Figure 3.1 presents the responses from Member States. 

25 Document C(2011)4598 final, Commission Decision of 30/6/2011, available on CIRCA BC: 
https://circabc.europa.eu/webdav/CircaBC/env/seveso_seg/Library/reporting/reporting_2012_2014/Reports
%20of%20Member%20States%20and%20EEA%20countries/HR%20report%202012-2014.pdf 

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Of those reporting significant changes, the most frequently reported are: 

  Changes made to the authorities in charge of inspection (BE, BG, HU and RO); 

  Changes made to authorities in charge of the implementation of other Seveso-related 

measures (e.g. assessing safety reports, major accident prevention) (BG, SI and the UK); 

  Changes made to authorities in charge of permitting (HU, RO and the UK); and 

  Changes made to the supervising authority for environmental protection (LT and SI). 

Croatia, having been a member of the European Union since 2013, reported detailed information on its 
competent authorities in charge of the implementation of the Directive, namely the Ministry of Environmental 
and Nature Protection (MENP), the inspectorates, the National Protection and Rescue Directorate (NPRD) 
and the Croatian Environmental and Nature Agency (CENA) which are assisted by the Ministry of 
Construction and Spatial Planning (MCSP) and local government and regional self-government units. 

Finally, Estonia and Greece indicated that, while the authorities have not changed there have been some 
changes made to their names. For example in Estonia, the Competent Authority’s name has been modified 
from Technical Surveillance Authority to Technical Regulatory Authority. 

Considering this is the last reporting period for the Seveso II Directive, the fact that the majority of the 
Member States have not reported significant changes indicates that the structure and processes for the 
implementation of the Directive are already in place. 

Question 1.b requested Member States to report the number of upper-tier and lower-tier establishments 
covered by the Seveso II Directive on 31/12/2014 (i.e. the end of the reporting period).  

Based on the information provided by Member States it is apparent that data on numbers of establishments 
(both upper and lower-tiers) are widely held with all Member States providing figures for both categories. 
During the reporting period, the number of Seveso establishments increased with a total of 11 297 
establishments26 falling under the scope of the Seveso Directive. A significant share of these establishments 
was located in Germany (29%), France (10%), Italy (10%), the UK (8%) and Spain (7%).  

In terms of types of establishments, the share between upper-tier and lower-tier establishments was more or 
less equal during the reporting period, with on average 44% (representing 5 018 establishments) of all 
establishments being upper-tier and 56% (representing 6 279 establishments) lower-tier. The complete 
EU28 data set reported for 2014 is presented in Figure 3.2 and a table with the number of establishments 
per Member States is presented in Appendix D. 

26 Sum of total establishments reported by Member States 

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Source: 2012-2014 implementation reports 

When compared to the data reported for the last reporting period (i.e. the end of 2011) there has been in the 
2012-2014 period a net increase of 983 establishments, most of which are lower-tier establishments (756) 
and the remainder upper-tier (227). Considering that the 2012-2014 period had relatively low economic 
growth27, this increase is perhaps unexpected.  It may be due to an actual increase through there being more 
installations meeting the qualifying thresholds, or it may relate to changes in implementation of the Directive 
(for example related to substances receiving new hazard classifications and hence being subject to the 
provisions of the Directive); this is not something that is evident from the questionnaire responses.  Early 
implementation of the Seveso III Directive could also influence the increase in the number of establishments, 
due to some falling under the scope of the Directive for the first time. 

Question 1.c requested Member States to provide information on the activities of their establishments based 
either on the eSPIRS activity list or on the NACE classification28. While the majority of Member States 
provided SPIRS-based activity lists, NACE reporting was opted for by Belgium, Croatia, Germany, 
Netherlands, Sweden and the UK which account all together for more than 5 400 establishments. Poland 
reported using a national activity list very similar (but not identical) to the eSPIRS activity list. 

For the other Member States, the total number of establishments per eSPIRS category and the share of the 
total establishments reporting this activity is presented in Figure 3.3. Establishments for those Member 
States reporting using the NACE classifications are not included in the figure below. 

27 In 2012 less than half of the Member States reported economic expansion, in 2013 the EU-28 GDP grew 
by 0.2% and 1.5% in 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/National_accounts_and_GDP 
28 NACE classification is the reference system for statistical classification of economic activities and was 
established by Regulation 3037/90. 

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As can be observed, the most common specific categories of activities are general chemicals (12%) and fuel 
storage (11%) although “other activities” is the single largest category (14%). This trend can be observed in 
most Member States with a few variations as detailed below: 

  23% of Seveso establishments in Belgium and 30% of establishments in Slovakia are 

conducting wholesale and retail activities (vs 9% EU average); 

  14% of Seveso establishments in Bulgaria, 27% of Seveso establishments in Cyprus, 18% of 

Greece’s establishments, 20% of Poland’s establishments and 20% of Slovenia’s 
establishments are conducting LPG storage activities (vs 4% EU average); 

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  16% of Seveso establishments in Bulgaria and 12% of Seveso establishments in the Czech 

Republic are conducting activities related to the production, destruction and storage of 
explosives (vs 4% EU average); 

  18% of Seveso establishments in Ireland are conducting activities related to the production of 

pharmaceuticals (vs 1% EU average); 

  24% of Seveso establishments in Italy and 17% of Malta’s establishments are conducting 
activities of LNG production, bottling and bulk distribution (vs 8% EU average); and 

  15% of Seveso establishments in Poland are conducting activities of LNG storage and 

distribution (vs 1% EU average). 

The composition of the ‘other’ category is unclear, in particular it is unclear why such a large number of 
establishments are reported under this category. Given that the range of categories to choose from is 
diverse and specific without being restrictive it is worth considering why such a large number of 
establishments are classified as ‘others’. This may highlight difficulties of Member States to identify the 
relevant category for their establishments in which case more guidance could be appropriate. This may also 
reflect the situation of establishments conducting mixed activities, for example storage of other chemicals 
within a primarily pesticides handling establishment. 

No comparison with previous reporting period could be undertaken as this is the first time Member States 
were asked to report the number of establishments per category according to the eSPIRS classification. 
However, a comparison with the eSPIRS database reporting is presented in Section 5.4. 

For the first time, the questionnaire requested Member States to report on the relationship between the 
Industrial Emissions Directive29 (IED) and the Seveso regimes. Member States were asked to indicate how 
many of their establishments were also regulated under the IED. This question was optional and 11 Member 
States provided a response. 

From the information reported, a total of 307 Seveso establishments were also IED installations in 2014. This 
does not account for German and Dutch establishments where no numerical response was available but the 
competent authorities were aware that it was the situation of ‘a large share’ and ‘many’ establishments. The 
share of establishments covered by both the Seveso and the Industrial Emissions Directives ranged from 
17% to 44%. The details of the information reported is presented in Table 3.3.  

29 Directive 2010/75/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial 
emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:334:0017:0119:en:PDF 

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The second part of the question asked Member States to explain what impact in practice this overlap had on 
the way Seveso was applied. Again, 11 Member States provided a response to this question and from the 
responses received, it does not appear that the fact that both Directives are applicable is creating any 
notable impacts with five Member States (Cyprus, Ireland, Lithuania, Malta and the Netherlands) responding 
reporting no impacts which seems to indicate that in these Member States both regimes are coherent with 
each other’s and can be efficiently implemented. The Netherlands added that emissions and safety are 
distinct aspects which are assessed separately.  

Both Bulgaria and Germany indicated that in practice permit conditions are drafted to ensure compliance 
with both Directives. Germany also indicated that there are public consultation, monitoring and inspection 
processes of the IED that Seveso establishments have to comply with. This seems to indicate the 
compatibility of both regulatory regimes, and that for these Member States it was possible to integrate similar 
requirements from both Directives. In Croatia and Poland inspections are coordinated, so for example 
inspections conducted under the Seveso Directive also consider compliance with the conditions of the 
integrated permits in terms of major-accidents.  

For those reporting some impacts, inspections were the most often quoted feature of the implementation of 
both Directives where coherence could be improved by coordinating the different inspection services.  

3.4  Question 2: Emergency Plans 

Article 11 of the Seveso II Directive requires that competent authorities draw up an external emergency plan 
for upper-tier establishments on the basis of the information contained in the safety reports. The external 
emergency plans must establish the measures to be taken outside the establishment in case of 
emergencies.  

Article 11.6 of the Directive foresees that “the competent authority may decide, giving reasons for its 
decision, in view of the information contained in the safety report, that the requirement to produce an 
external emergency plan under paragraph 1 shall not apply”. The questionnaire asked Member States to 
report how many of their upper-tier establishments were in this situation. 

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A total of 13 Member States have made use of the flexibility included in Article 11(6) during the reporting 
period, and external emergency plans were not requested for some upper tier establishments in Austria, 
Czech Republic, Germany, Spain, France, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia and the UK. Overall, this concerns 187 establishments, which represents 4% of the existing upper-
tier establishments in the EU-28. The information reported is presented in Figure 3.5.  

Only a small percentage of upper-tier establishments have been exempted from this requirement.  The 
Czech Republic has the highest share of upper tier establishments for which the Competent Authorities 
decided that the external emergency plan was not required (20%).  

Cases where the requirements to produce an external emergency plan do not apply in accordance with 
Article 11.6 referred to establishments where the consequences of a major accident were not expected to 
exceed the site’s boundary. Where additional information was provided, the combination of the location of 
the establishment (remote, far from habitation) and the existing safety measures were the main factors used 
to decide that there was no need to prepare an external emergency plan. 

When compared to previously reported data30, the 2012-2014 reporting period display the same overall 
trends, with an average of 4% of the upper tier establishments applying Article 11(6) and the higher share of 
these establishments being located in Germany. However, in absolute numbers there has been a slight 
decrease in comparison to the previous reporting period where the requirement to produce an external 
emergency plan did not apply to 208 upper tier establishments (21 fewer establishments in the 2012-2014 
period). The figure below presents the evolution of the number of upper tier establishments for which 
external emergency plans were not required. Note that data are only available for the latest two reporting 
period for this particular aspect of the implementation of the Directive. 

30 Note that data on the number of upper establishment for which external emergency plans were not 
requested is available only for 2009-2011 and 2012-2014 reporting periods. 

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Note: Data on establishments for the year 2011 have been provided by Member States in the three-year implementation reports 
submitted to the Commission. 
Note 2: Total number of external emergency plans not required in 2009-2011: 208, in 2012-2014: 187 

The questionnaire requested Member States to report the number of upper tier establishments for which no 
external emergency plan had been adopted. By the end of the reporting period, 407 upper tier 
establishments were in this situation which represented 8% of the total upper tier establishments at EU level.  
Note that this excludes the 187 establishments for which the competent authorities decided an external 
emergency plan was not required (Article 11(6).  The figure below presents the data reported for each 
Member State on the number of upper tier establishments without external emergency plans and the share 
that these represent out of the total Member State upper tier establishments. 

Note: Croatia indicated that 6 of its regional authorities had not adopted external emergency plans, however there is no indication of 
how many of its 25 establishments are covered by these regional authorities. 

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The figure above shows that there are a lot of variations between Member States.  

For the purpose of monitoring implementation, it could be considered that those Member States with a share 
above a defined percentage of installations (e.g. 8% which is the EU average) could potentially be facing 
compliance difficulties and hence might be candidates for further support or investigation. The majority of 
Member States have a relatively low average share of upper tier establishments without an external 
emergency plan drafted. For example, in seven Member States (Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Finland, Latvia, 
Slovenia and Slovakia), all upper-tier establishments had an external emergency plan in place by the end of 
2014.  

However, for eight Member States the share of upper tier establishments without an external emergency 
plans is higher than 8%. This is the case for Belgium, Estonia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, Italy, Malta and 
Spain. There might be some merits in the Commission following up on this aspect with the Member States. 

In some instances, explanations were provided by to explain why external emergency plans had not been 
drawn up: 

  Belgium (9%), Luxembourg (13%), Italy (12%) and France (12%) indicated that either 

information to prepare the plans had been received with some delays or that the information 
was being processed, thus leaving no time to approve the external emergency plans before the 
end of the reporting period; 

  Malta (44%): the competent authorities are still within the deadline to adopt the external 

emergency plans as three out of the four outstanding external emergency plans are for new 
upper tier establishments classified in February 2014; 

  Spain (8%) and Greece (31%) did not provide further explanations to explain why the plans 

were not drawn up; and  

  Estonia (100% of the total) reported that up to now, there has only been one national 

emergency plan for all Seveso establishments drawn up by the Ministry of the Interior according 
to the Estonian Emergency Act. This does not seem to meet the requirements of the Seveso II 
Directive in relation to external emergency plans. However, Estonia added that remedial action 
was being taken. In 2015, the Estonian Rescue Board decided to produce regional external 
emergency plans for all upper-tier establishments. These were planned to be completed for 
2016.  

No share could be calculated by Croatia, as it indicated that 6 of its regional authorities had not adopted 
external emergency plans, however there is no indication of how many of its 25 establishments are covered 
by these regional authorities.  

In addition, Member States indicated that for establishments joining the upper-tier category during the 
reporting period, a certain period of time is needed between the receipt of the documents necessary for 
drafting external emergency plans, such as safety reports, and the finalisation of the process by competent 
authorities.  On this point, Hungary indicated that the authorities have 6 months to adopt the external 
emergency plans from the submission of the safety report while this delay is of 2 years in Malta.  Other 
Member States did not provide such information was provided (although it is important to note that this was 
not requested).  

The main conclusion that can be drawn from the information submitted by Member States is that overall data 
across the EU generally show general compliance with this requirement of the Seveso II Directive as only 
12% of establishments did not have an external emergency plan of which 8% were lacking such a plan and 
4% had been exempted in accordance with Article 11(6). For those where competent authorities had not 
drafted the external emergency plans, many Member States reported that these were in the process of being 
drawn up (e.g. having recently been classified as upper-tier establishments).  

The absolute number of upper-tier establishments without an external emergency plan (407 at the end of the 
2012-2014 period) has increased since the previous reporting period where 307 establishments were 
reported in this situation. In relative terms, this represents an increase from 6% of upper tier establishments 
without external emergency plans in 2011 to 8% in 2014. While this might indicate a possible compliance 
issue, it is more likely that this increase reflects the increase in the number of upper tier establishments for 

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which external emergency plans are still being developed.  The figure below presents the evolution of the 
share of external emergency plans not drawn up throughout the reporting periods.  

Note: Data on establishments for the years 2011, 2008 and 2005 have been provided by Member States in the three-year 
implementation reports submitted to the Commission. 
Note 2: Total external emergency plans not drawn in 2005: 1 099, in 2008: 392, in 2011: 307 and in 2014: 407 
Note 3: Estonia indicated in the 2012-2014 reporting that it adopted one general external emergency plan applicable to all its 
establishment and was in the process of adopting individual plans hence 100% of the plans considered as not drawn up. 

The questionnaire required Member States to provide information on the number of upper-tier 
establishments for which the external emergency plans had not been tested over the last three years. 
Overall, in 2014, this concerned 1,214 establishments.  

The detailed data on the share of external emergency plans tested during the reporting period is presented 
below. 

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Note: The percentage indicates the share of establishments that had their external emergency plans tested 

On average, 75% of the external emergency plans were tested during the reporting period. From the chart, it 
is clear that the proportion of establishments which had their external emergency plans tested during the 
reporting period varies significantly across the EU28. The share varies at Member State level with two 
Member States (Estonia and Luxembourg) reporting 100% of plans not tested, and 6 Member States 
reporting that all external emergency plans were tested (Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Hungary and 
Slovenia). For the remaining Member States, the results are varied with six Member States (Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Greece, Spain, Italy and Sweden) reporting between 20% and 60% tested, three Member States 
between 60% and 70 % (Malta, Netherlands and Portugal) while the remaining Member States (Austria, 
Germany, Finland, France, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) had more than 70% of 
external emergency plans tested. 

While this was not requested, some Member States provided additional explanations to support these 
numbers: 

  For those with the lowest share of external emergency plans tested: Luxembourg did not 

provide explanations and Estonia indicated that as individual external emergency plans were 
not available for individual establishments these could not be tested. However Estonia added 
that the general emergency plan covering all Seveso establishments (see Section 3.4.2.2) was 
tested during 10 crisis exercises during the reporting period and the competent authority 
carried out smaller exercises in cooperation with individual establishments; 

  For those Member States with a relatively low share of external emergency plans tested, the 

Czech, Greek and Spanish responses did not include further details to understand the situation 
of these upper tier establishments. Denmark indicated that its central authorities were 
investigating this to ensure that the plans are tested as soon as possible. Similarly, Italy 
indicated that for 302 of its upper tier establishments the external emergency plans were not 
tested, and the situation of 69 further establishments was being investigated. Furthermore, Italy 
indicated that a working group involving public authorities had been tasked with elaborating 
criteria and tools to support Competent Authorities with performing the tests on the external 
emergency plans. Sweden provided additional information indicating that steps were taken to 
develop a supporting tool to guide the drafting and testing of external emergency plans. As 
such it appears that for most of the Member States, improvements should be observed in the 
next reporting period; 

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  Finally, for other Member States with a higher share of external emergency plans tested, the 

delays were attributed to the following:  

  Revisions of the plans (Austria); 

  The three-year deadline to test the plan had not yet expired due to change of classification 

during the reporting period (Germany and Slovakia); 

  Impending change in the classification of the establishment was expected (Ireland, Portugal 
and the UK). The UK added that out of the 53 external emergency plans that were not tested 
by 2014, 18 were tested early in 2015 with a further 7 planned for tests. For 15 
establishments, there were no clear reasons known and the failure to test the plans was 
being investigated; and  

  Changes made to the establishments have delayed the testing of the plans (Latvia and 

Poland).  

When compared to previous reporting period, it was found that the latest reporting period is a slight 
improvement over the past reporting periods and more throughout the reporting under Seveso II Directive. In 
2006-2008 reporting period, 60% of the upper tier plans were reviewed and tested during the reporting 
period, in 2009-2011, this share increased to 73% and had reached 75% by the end of 2014. This seems to 
indicate that Member States are getting more efficient at reviewing and testing those plans. However, Figure 
3.10 shows that for some Member States the overall trend indicates a worsening of the situation, this is the 
case for Austria, Denmark, France, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Spain and the UK. 

Note: Data on establishments for the years 2011, 2008 and 2005 have been provided by Member States in the three-year 
implementation reports submitted to the Commission. 
Note: Total number of external emergency plans tested in 2003-2005: 1 151, 2006-2008: 2 553, 2009-2011:3 135, 2014: 3 776 

Member States were requested to provide information on the way external emergency plans are tested and 
considered adequate, as well as on the criteria used for carrying out these tests.  This question was asked in 
previous reporting period and it was noticeable that Member States provided in some instance more concise 
responses however no significant change could be identified in the way this provision is being implemented. 

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Similarly to the past reporting period, Member States have reported the use of several methods for testing 
external emergency plans. Some plans were tested on the basis of theoretical desktop exercises with 
simulations of procedures and actions, whereas other plans were tested, in whole or in part, through live 
exercises carried on site. Usually, full-scale live exercises involved the deployment on the ground of 
appropriate resources (e.g. emergency services, police and operators) in a simulation of their actual 
response to an incident. 

This reporting period, on the spot exercises (field training exercises involving some or all the actors involved) 
were reported by all Member States. In addition, table-top exercises (office based simulation) were also 
reported by all Member States with the exception of Austria and Latvia. Furthermore, some simplified 
exercises were reported in some Member States, involving only some of the resources usually involved in a 
response to an incident. For example, Belgium reported that since 2012 small-scale ‘Minimex’ tests have 
been practiced at local and national level. They test specific aspects of the emergency plans and allow 
practical lessons to be learned.  

In addition to reporting information on the way plans are rested, Member States were requested to provide 
information on the criteria for considering the plans adequate. Based on the responses received, the 
following categories of response can be identified: 

  No general criteria for adequateness: 

  Austria indicated that a general checklist is available but is short and contains mainly 

demonstrative examples; 

  Lithuania reported that there are no criteria per se, but rather a qualitative assessment of 

the results of the exercises; and  

  Luxembourg and Sweden indicated there are no criteria being used.  

  Criteria are multiple and included in a guidance document: 

  Belgium has an evaluation checklist available that assess the testing and allows the 

authorities to check that the objectives have been reached; 

  Finland has guidance and a collaborative platform tool for competent authorities that is 

used to review and update external emergency plans; 

  Portugal indicated that external emergency plans are considered adequate when they 

comply with the requirements described in the “Guideline for the preparation of external 
emergency plans” (Technical specification no7 available in www.prociv.pt); 

 

Italy has a checklist that the plan must be verified against, which is part of guidelines on 
planning for external emergencies in industrial establishments involving major-accident 
hazards; 

  Latvia, Slovenia and Slovakia reported that the criteria are included in their national 

legislation; and  

  Romania has a list of indicators against which the testing of the plan must be rated. 

  Criteria were described in the response: 

  Bulgaria’s criteria are the completeness, consistency, accuracy of the emergency plan; the 
adequacy of the equipment and facilities and their operability, especially under emergency 
conditions; and the competence of the staff carrying out the duties identified for them in the 
plan; 

  The Czech Republic’s criteria are the completeness, timeliness, accuracy and practical 

utility of the plan. In particular connectivity testing with regard to alarms and the availability 
of the services involved (e.g. police, emergency services) and measures included in the 
plan; the systems and methods of alerting and informing the public and the cooperation 
among institutions during the test; 

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  Germany deems the plans appropriate if they comply with the respective civil protection 

laws and appear to realistically guarantee to mitigate damages from the relevant accident 
scenarios; 

  Croatia, Denmark and Ireland assess the plan against legal requirements.  As long as it 

meets the minimum provisions of the legislation in terms of content and is tested frequently 
then it is deemed adequate; 

  Spain considers that a plan is adequate if it is suitable and operable; 

  France considers that the plan is adequate if the following aspects are functional: 

population is alerted and safely evacuated; the communications of the operator concerned 
are rapid and efficient; and the area is secured without interrupting all traffic; 

  Hungary considers that an external emergency plan can be regarded as adequate if it has 
envisaged adequate action to reduce all the harmful effects identified by the operator in 
order to protect the public and the environment; if there are sufficient resources and proper 
means specified in the external emergency plan that are proportionate to the volume and 
type of the harmful effects of a major accident involving dangerous substances; and if off-
site mitigation action can be completed within a realistic timeframe in accordance with the 
requirements to protect human life, health and the environment; 

  The Netherlands uses the following criteria: completeness, timeliness, accuracy and 

practical utility; 

  Poland indicated that the adequacy is judged according to whether the testing is done at 

least once every three years; the systems and methods of alerting and informing the public 
are adequate; and there is cooperation with other institutions and coordination of the 
emergency services involved; 

  Portugal assesses the operational availability and the implementation capabilities against 

the plan; and  

  The UK evaluates the completeness, consistency and accuracy of the emergency plan and 
other documentation used by organisations responding to an emergency; the adequacy of 
the equipment and facilities, and their operability, especially under emergency conditions; 
and the competence of staff to carry out the duties identified for them in the plan, and their 
use of the equipment and facilities. 

Overall, a variety of criteria have been reported being used by Member States, with a general focus on 
testing that the plans are: fit for purpose and can be applied in practice, allow for sufficient communication 
and coordination between the emergency services, the operator and the wider population. 

Member States were asked to provide information on their arrangements for providing the public with 
information related to alert systems, main response measures and arrangements to cope with any off-site 
effects from an accident. 

The information reported on the types of alert systems are presented in Table 3.1. 

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MS 

AT 

BE 

BG 

CY 

CZ 

DE 

DK 

EE 

EL 

ES 

FI 

FR 

HR 

HU 

IE 

IT 

LT 

LU 

LV 

MT 

NL 

PL 

PT 

RO 

SE 

SI 

SK 

UK 

Signals 
broadcasted 
on loud 
speaker 

Local and 
national alert 
sirens 

Radio 
broadcast 

TV broadcast 

Phone based 
alert systems 

Social 
networks (e.g. 
Twitter and 
Facebook) 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

Additional information was provided on alert systems, for example Cyprus and Ireland’s responses referred 
only to public alarms installed in the vicinity of Seveso establishments. Greece added that the sirens are 
tested once a year, the tests are carried out twice a year in Latvia.  

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Member States provided information on other tools being used. For example in Belgium, the BE ALERT tool 
has been developed to target the population affected. It sends a message by phone or to mobile phones to 
alert the population of a danger. The tool was tested during the reporting period and was expected to be 
available by the end of 2015. Similarly, in Hungary the “MoLaRi” system provides integrated alert and 
information on potential hazards to support decision making by the competent authorities. Lithuania has had 
a mobile phone notification system since 2012 that allows message to be sent to all individuals located in the 
Lithuanian territory. 

Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Hungary, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and the UK added that 
information on communication means should be provided prior to any incident or accident. In these Member 
States the operators are required to provide information on the planned safety measures and behaviour to 
adopt in case of emergency. This information is either a letter or a leaflet sent to inhabitants around the 
Seveso establishments. This information must also be available on the website of the operators but also in 
the external emergency plans. 

The responses contained limited details on the arrangements to cope with off-site effects. Member States 
indicated that these would vary based on the incident or accident specifics and would be described in the 
internal emergency plans and the establishments’ safety reports. The competent authorities’ websites but 
also the establishments’ external emergency plans are used to provide information on response measures. A 
call centre with a dedicated number to call for information is also available in some Member States (Belgium, 
Netherlands). 

When compared with the previous reporting period responses it is noticeable that more phone based and 
internet based alarm systems are being reported by Member States as being used. 

3.5  Question 3: Information on safety measures  

The questionnaire requested Member States to provide general information about their national strategy, 
concepts and developments in the last reporting period on how the public and persons liable to be affected 
by a Seveso accident are informed about major accidents hazards, possible consequences and safety 
measures.  

The responses often included information on who is responsible for informing the public. In all cases, the 
operator has the main responsibility, sometimes shared with the competent authorities. 

Some responses described the national strategies regarding information on Seveso establishments. For 
example in Belgium, a national campaign of information is organised at least once every five years. The 
latest happened in 2012 and included TV adverts, leaflets, an educative game and a dedicated website with 
up-to-date information. 

Operators are requested to designate persons responsible for providing information on safety measures. The 
most commonly reported ways for providing information are: leaflets, establishments’ websites, information 
campaigns and by providing information through local media.  

Other ways of engaging with the public were reported such as: 

  Holding ‘open days’ visits for the general public (Austria, Finland and Slovenia); 

  Keeping safety reports available to the public at competent authorities’ offices and within 

upper-tier establishments (Bulgaria, Lithuania and Luxembourg); 

  Holding public meetings with the general public (Germany, Spain and Italy); 

  Providing information through Twitter and Facebook on conduct to follow in case of accident 

(Spain); 

 

Information on location of establishments and types of hazards available on the competent 
authority website (Estonia, France, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia); 

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  Training programmes for schools, healthcare providers and social welfare establishments 

focusing on risks and methods of coping with hazardous events (Poland); and  

 

Integrated system to allow for early detection and disaster management (Hungary). Hungary 
added that since the system was adopted in 2012, 576 public alert and general information 
notice have been issued. 250 000 persons can be alerted immediately through the MoLaRi 
system. 

Most Member States indicated some sort of preventive information is provided to the general public, mostly 
through leaflets. However Luxembourg indicated that public potentially affected by a Seveso accident is not 
provided information ahead of accident or incidents. Luxembourg reported that information on major 
accidents, consequences and safety measures are made available during the public consultation procedure 
prior to the authorisation of the establishment or when the permit needs to be amended following the 
modification of the establishments’ activity, and this information remains available in the competent 
authority’s office. It is recommended that this aspect be verified with the Member States, in particular 
whether this meet the requirements of Article 13(1) which requires information to be supplied regularly and 
without having to request it.  

Member States were requested to provide the number of upper tier establishments for which information was 
made actively available to the public at least once during the last five years. Overall 81% of the upper tier 
establishments had information made available and ten Member States (Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Croatia, 
Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Latvia, Romania and Slovakia) reported that the information was made 
available for all upper tier establishments.  

Note 1: The percentage indicates the share of upper tier establishments that made information available, some are over 100% 
(Romania and Slovakia) due to variations in the number of upper tier establishments during the reporting period. 
Note 2: Greece (EL) reported that no data was available. 

According to the data reported by Member States, only three Member States have made information 
available for a small share of their upper tier establishments: Malta (11%) and to a lesser extent Spain (46%) 
and Slovenia (48%).  

Some Member States provided explanations as to why information was not made actively available for some 
upper tier establishments: 

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  Cyprus: 3 establishments are in the process of informing the public and 1 became upper tier in 

2014; 

  Denmark: 9 establishments had information made available in 2015, for 1 establishment the 

information was last made available in 2009; 

  Germany: the following situations were present during the reporting period: the absence of 

people in a wider area that could be actively informed; the deadline for providing information 
had not yet expired for some establishments; and for others the updating of information took 
longer than expected and could not be concluded on time. The response does not include 
information on specific numbers of installations concerned for each of these situations; 
however it is clear that these should not be considered as failures to make information 
available; 

 

Ireland: This was applicable only to those establishments with an off-site public information 
zone so this was not applicable for 6 establishments; 

  Lithuania: One establishment whose operations started only in 2015; 

  Malta: The leaflets for four of its upper tier establishments were published and distributed in 
2009 but there had been no update because there had been no change to the operations of 
the establishments. For the other establishments, one operator made leaflets available in 2012, 
another one is finalising leaflets.  The final three upper-tier establishments were classified as 
such in February 2014 and had not yet prepared information for the public; and 

  UK: 27 establishments do not have to inform the public as they have no off-site risk31.  4 

establishments did not have external emergency plans in place, and the legislation requires 
information to be supplied to the public after the external emergency plan has been prepared.  
For the remaining 10 the information appears to be incomplete and is being investigated. 

It appears that there is only a minority of establishments failing to update the information provided to the 
public, and when this is the case Member States have reported monitoring the situation and pursuing it 
through inspections. 

The questionnaire also requested Member States to provide a statistical breakdown showing by whom and 
by which means the information was made available.  

In Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Ireland, Malta and Slovenia, operators are solely responsible for making 
information available. Conversely, in Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden, competent authorities are in charge of making information 
available. In the remaining Member States, the responsibilities are shared between operators and competent 
authorities. 

The part of the question related to the statistical breakdown of the means (of providing information) was one 
of the least well responded of the questionnaire with many member States not initially providing a statistical 
breakdown due to this information not being available. Furthermore, in several instances it was not clear 
whether the response was in general (e.g. in 10% of cases information is made available by email) or 
whether it covered the reporting period more specifically.  The overview of the means used to make 
information available is presented below while more information (including statistical breakdown where 
available) is presented in the Member States summary sheets. 

31 Note that these 27 establishments were not considered as instances where information was not made 
available. 

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MS 

Means reported by Member States 

AT 

BE 

BG 

CY 

CZ 

DE 

DK 

EE 

EL 

ES 

FI 

FR 

HR 

HU 

IE 

IT 

LT 

LU 

LV 

MT 

NL 

Flyers / leaflets / direct mail 
Placard at the entrance of the site 
Web-based information  
Combination with emergency response tests  
Local newspaper  
Open Day  

Information meetings where leaflets are distributed 
National information campaign held in 2012 (website, leaflet, TV adverts, press articles and online game) 
Belgium provided an estimate of the population reached during this campaign by the different means, 68% were 
deemed to have been reached by TV information, 29% by the press information and 8% of the population received 
a leaflet (with a total of 400 000 leaflets sent) 
Further local initiatives are organised. 

Flyers / leaflets / direct mail  
Website of the establishment 

Radios, torches and tape were distributed door-to-door to the citizens liable to be affected alongside an 
information leaflet. 

Flyers / leaflets / direct mail 

Flyers / leaflets / direct mail 
Public meetings 
Internet, operator‘s homepage, placards/bulletins, newspaper advertisements, official register, public display 

Competent authority’s website 
Following an assessment leaflets are sent out if relevant 

Competent authority’s website and leaflets distributed to persons liable to be affected by a major accident. 

Flyers / leaflets / direct mail  
Information given to students in all elementary and high schools in the greater area of Seveso establishments. 
Leaflets sometimes sent alongside electricity bills 

Flyers / leaflets / direct mail  
Information session/talks 
Twitter and Facebook 
Local radio and television 

 Flyers / leaflets / direct mail from both the operator and the competent authorities 

Authorities' websites, access to hard copies in regional and local authorities 

Authorities' and operators’ websites 

Extract of the safety report distributed to public 

 Flyers / Leaflet / direct mail  

‘active’ communication (public gatherings, meetings or conferences; Surveys and questionnaires);  
'passive' communication e.g.  information material at municipal offices, in newspapers, on websites and posters 

Flyers / leaflets / direct mail 

Online information available or can be ordered by the public by phone or mail. 

 Flyers / leaflets / direct mail 

Leaflets and instruction cards are available online on the operators' webpages but also distribute to all premises 
located within an agreed zone around each site 

The regional emergency broadcasters, websites, social media (Twitter) and national pool of crisis communication 
experts. 
NL-alert system 

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MS 

Means reported by Member States 

PL 

PT 

Flyers / leaflets / direct mail  
Website and operators’ open days  

Flyers / leaflets / direct mail  
Notices published by authorities  
Public consultation on external emergency plan 

RO 

Flyers / leaflets / direct mail  

SE 

SI 

SK 

10 county administrative boards, newspapers and radio,  
operators' and municipalities' websites 

Operator’s boards in their premises and operators’ websites 

Flyers / leaflets / direct mail 
Website  
Information in the establishment  
Radio/television 

UK 

Flyers / leaflets / direct mail 
Supplying information and supporting this with laminated emergency cards, fridge magnets.  

From the information reported a number of observations can be made. First, the diversity of the means 
reported beg the question of whether some means may be more efficient than others. It is unclear why some 
Member States rely on some means more than others and there would be value in gaining a deeper 
understanding of the efficiency of these information means, and the motivations behind the choices made by 
Member States. Secondly, for some of the means reported by Member States (e.g. information kept 
available in establishments) it is unclear how this fulfils the condition of article 13(1) that information should 
be available to the public ‘without their having to request it’. Finally, it is unclear whether those Member 
States reporting mostly using online means are reaching the whole spectrum of the population, in particular 
older sections of the population that may not be as comfortable with modern technologies and may be more 
vulnerable to accidents and incidents. 

When comparing the information reported over the reporting period, a decrease can be observed for the 
latest reporting period compared to the data reported during 2009-2011 period where in 2011, 87% of the 
upper tier establishments had made information available in the preceding five years. The figure below 
presents the evolution of the data reported on the share of upper tier establishments that made information 
available. 

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Note: Data on establishments for the years 2011, 2008 and 2005 have been provided by Member States in the three-year 
implementation reports submitted to the Commission. 

Member States were asked to explain briefly how they confirm that the information has been supplied and is 
available. 

For 15 Member States, this is verified during the inspection. This is the case for Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, 
Finland, Croatia, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia and the 
UK. 

Other approaches were also reported: 

 

 

 

 

 

In Belgium market research is being conducted in order to verify the efficiency, the quality and 
the effectiveness of the information campaign; 

In Germany, internal and external safety audits, and safety reports are checked for this 
particular point; 

In Spain the impact and effectiveness of the information provided is measured through surveys 
and polls. The number of visits to the webpages are also recorded and compared; 

Ireland and Malta make spot checks that information has been made available in the relevant 
areas; 

In Luxembourg, establishments are required to present the information that has been compiled 
during the inspection of the establishment, including information on major accidents, possible 
consequences from accidents and safety measures. This allows the Competent Authority to 
verify it; and  

  France and the Netherlands consider that, as the information is online, it is always available. 
Both of these Member States have reported other means as being used to make information 
available (for example in competent authorities’ offices), however it is important to consider that 
not all the population access information online and that availability of information online should 
be complemented by other means where necessary. 

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Greece did not have information available to respond to this question which prevented the analysis of the 
compliance with the requirement of the Seveso II Directive with regards to availability of information. 

This question was optional and was responded to by 11 Member States, of which 9 provided a numerical 
response (Czech Republic, Spain, Croatia, Ireland, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Poland and Slovakia). 

On average, a large share of upper-tier establishments has information available permanently, ranging from 
60% of Spain’s upper-tier establishments up to 100% for Croatia, Malta, Netherlands and Slovakia.  

Linked to this question, Member States were also asked to provide a statistical breakdown showing by whom 
and by which means the information is kept permanently available. Fewer responses were provided (from 
Bulgaria, Spain, Finland, Croatia, Ireland, Malta, Netherlands and Poland), and with the exception of Ireland, 
they all referred to websites being used to permanently provide available information.  

The last question on information on safety measures was optional and asked Member States to indicate how 
many lower tier establishments had up to date information kept permanently available. 

7 Member States responded: 

 

Ireland reported that this information is not available; 

  Croatia, Czech Republic, Malta and the Netherlands indicated this was the case for all their 

lower tier establishments; and  

  Finland and Poland indicated that this was the case for no lower tier establishments. 

3.6  Question 4: Inspections 

Question 4 requested Member States to provide information on their inspections, including whether these 
are based upon a systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards, the types of actions resulting from 
inspection but also accidents and incidents and data on the number of establishments. 

Member States provided varying responses and often focused on different elements of their inspection 
strategies (frequency, strategy, legislation, etc.) and, in that context, drawing conclusions on common 
features or best practices adopted across the EU is not possible. As such, this aspect of the questionnaire 
could be improved in future reporting periods. However, where possible, information from individual Member 
States’ responses has been integrated and summarised below. 

Member States were asked to indicate, for those where the programme of inspections is based upon 
systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards, the main criteria on which the systematic appraisal is based. 

Based on the information provided it appears that the following Member States have adopted such a system: 

 

In Belgium the programme covers upper and lower-tier establishments and is based on a ‘rapid 
ranking technique’. Based on the substance and activities two indicators are used, one for fire 
and explosion and one for toxicity. The combination of these indicators for each establishment 
lead to a score which corresponds to a level of danger. Inspections are decided upon in 
accordance with this score which each score corresponding to a minimum inspection 

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frequencies of either once per year, once every two years or once every three years, 
depending on the hazard category of the establishment; 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In Bulgaria a risk assessment is performed for each establishment before the adoption of the 
inspection plan. This takes into account data on the activities carried out on the Seveso site, 
the level of risk and complexity of the sites and the detection systems for preventing accidents 
and incidents at the establishment. Other criteria considered include the location, the results of 
previous inspections, the behaviour of the operator and its participation in voluntary schemes 
(e.g. EMAS), previous complaints or sanctions. As a result of the assessment each 
establishment is rated with a high, medium or low risk and inspections are prioritised 
accordingly; 

In Denmark the programme of inspections takes into account the size of the establishment and 
risk conditions, the nature of the surroundings and a number of other factors that are specific to 
the individual establishment; 

In Germany monitoring programmes are developed, defining the intervals and the extent to 
which inspections will be undertaken at individual sites; 

In Finland the criteria used include mainly the results from previous inspections (which are 
rated on a 0-5 scale) and the general safety of the establishment. In addition, the type and size 
of establishment and its surroundings are also considered; 

In Italy, an inspection system based on systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards has 
been introduced with the revision of the regulatory framework conducted in 2015. However this 
does not concern the reporting period considered in this report32; 

In the Netherlands, the inspection programme is determined based on the number of units, 
number of activities presenting safety risks, the nature of the substances present, ambient 
factors and the results of the last inspection; 

In Portugal, a risk analysis tool is used to support the inspection programming. It considers two 
sets of criteria: first the quantity of dangerous substances and their effects on physical and 
environmental health, and second general compliance of the establishment with the legislation, 
the organisation of the safety management system for preventing major accidents, inspection 
recommendations, fire safety measures and audits; 

In Romania, the inspection programme is based on the systematic assessment of accident 
hazards, the protection against hazards, the condition present in the installation and the 
surroundings; 

  Sweden’s inspection programme incorporates all sites and is based on the outcomes of 

previous inspections, history of sites and assessment of hazards at the particular 
establishment; and  

 

In the United Kingdom, the plan covers all establishments, with scope for inspections to focus 
on priority topics. Those are issues identified for priority inspection, complaints, management of 
ageing plant and process safety performance indicators. Plans for upper-tier establishments 
cover three year periods and are reviewed annually. 

Other Member States’ responses indicated that such appraisal is not considered and inspections are based 
on regular deadlines: 

  Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, France, Latvia, Poland, reported that establishments are inspected 

every year; 

 

In the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Slovakia, upper-tier establishments are inspected annually, 
while lower tier establishments are inspected once every three years; 

32 National legislation transposing the Seveso Directive D.lgs. 105/2015 

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 

 

In Latvia, upper-tier establishments are inspected annually, and lower tier establishments twice 
every three years; and  

In Hungary and Ireland lower tier establishments are inspected every two years and upper tier 
establishments annually. Ireland added that resource constraints meant that this was not 
achieved for the reporting period, and that inspections were prioritised according to the 
inherent safety of the establishments and the surrounding population. 

Finally, Croatia indicated that criteria for the evaluation of establishments are currently being developed 
using the IRAM tool developed as part of the IMPEL network. 

This question was optional asked what information if any from the programme of inspections and from the 
inspections report is available to the public.  It was responded to by 12 Member States. Out of these, the 
following categories can be identified: 

  Those Member States where such information is not made available to the public: Greece and 

Malta; 

  Those Member States where this information is fully made available to the public: Germany 

(upon request), Finland (upon request), France (upon request), Croatia, Latvia (for inspection 
programme, inspections report must be requested), Netherlands, Poland (upon request) and 
Slovenia. All these Member States indicated that confidential information can be removed 
before the report is made available to the public; and  

  One Member State where this information is only partially made available to the public: 

Slovakia (summary of the annual inspections performed). 

Member States were requested to provide information about the types of actions taken as a result of 
accidents, incidents and non-compliance during the reporting period. This question was interpreted 
differently by Member States with some providing general descriptions of types of actions available and other 
reporting information on actions actually applied in the reporting period. Our analysis focused on those 
actions taken during the reporting period which is the focus of the question.  

Actions reported by Member States 

Belgium issued 13 orders for corrective measures and in 4 instances opened judicial proceedings. This was out of a total of 460-500 
inspections conducted annually in the 2012-2014 period 

Bulgaria issued fines to establishments during the reporting period. One was for non-compliance with permit conditions (€5,000), 
another for an establishment that carried out changes without informing the competent authority (€10,000). These actions were taken 
following inspections. In addition, fines were issued following accidents for two upper tier establishments (€15,000). 

The Czech Republic issued some notices in 2013 in response to irregularities concerning documentation or the internal emergency 
plan. In 2014 administrative proceedings were initiated for fines for two establishments. 

Spain adopted several disclosure requirements, 16 disciplinary proceedings, a partial suspension of operation at one establishment 
and the total suspension of operations at another establishment. 

France issued corrective orders for 164 lower tier establishments and 307 upper tier establishments during the reporting period. In 
addition, activities were limited or suspended in 5 lower tier establishments and 11 upper tier establishments. 

Croatia issued administrative notices for 6 lower tier establishments and 13 upper tier establishments. 

Italy took 90 ‘actions’ as a result of accidents, incidents and/or non-compliance. 53 of these concerned upper-tier establishments, 
with most taken as a result of accidents, or following a negative assessment of the safety report or non-compliance with specific 
instructions imposed on the operators by the competent authorities. Italy added that remedial orders or technical upgrades were 
mostly decided upon as a result with rare need for penalties. There were two cases of partial restrictions on activity involving a ban 
on the operation of certain installations and areas of the establishment. The remaining 37 actions concerned lower tier 
establishments and were cases where the safety management system was found to be inadequate or non-compliant; specific 
requirements or remedial actions were imposed. 

Latvia issued 32 fines for breaches of fire safety provisions, and 4 warnings on the suspension or restriction of operations of an 
establishment 

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Poland issued 7 requirements for further testing, 401 corrective decisions for removing irregularities and 7 immediate decisions with 
suspension of activities until the change was made. In addition, 254 orders were issued for operators to ensure compliance with the 
legal provisions in force, and 31 penalties were issued. 

Portugal issued penalties for 2 upper tier establishments and 5 lower tier establishments. 

Romania issued 2,085 coercive actions including 1,537 written notices and 548 financial penalties. 

Slovenia took 7 actions in order to ensure operators complied with requirements linked to public information (6 instances) and 
updating of the environmental permit. 

Slovakia issued €38,100 worth of fines during the reporting period. Corrective measures were also taken alongside to remediate the 
failings (which concerned wrong categorisation of the establishment and failure to appoint a professionally competent person) 

Greece, Luxembourg, Malta, reported that no actions were taken in the last reporting period. 

The chart below presents the most often used actions during the reporting period. Note that the chart 
presents both actions taken following inspections and those following incidents and accidents are these were 
often not clearly distinguished in Member States’ responses. As such the data reported by Member States 
are not fully comparable, and whilst we have grouped similar actions together, it is possible that each 
Member State’s legal system has slightly different features leading to differences in actions available. 

Inspection is a key aspect of the implementation of the Directive as it is the opportunity for the competent 
authority to verify on site that the provisions of the Directive are in practice being applied. The Directive 
requires that upper tier establishments are inspected at least once per year. However, there is a flexibility 
included in the Directive which is that annual inspections are not required where the programme of 
inspections is based on a systematic assessment of major-accident hazards.  Member States were 
requested to provide information on how many of their upper tier establishments were inspected annually, 
and of those that were not, how many had been inspected in the last three years. Similarly, while the Seveso 
Directive does not require a minimum frequency of inspections for lower tier establishments, Member States 
were asked to indicate how many of these establishments were subject to on-site inspections in the last 
three years. Finally, the questionnaire requested that those Member States where the programme of 
inspections is based upon a systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards report the criteria on which the 
systematic appraisal is based. 

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It would be useful to introduce for future reporting a question requesting whether (i.e. yes/no) the programme 
of inspections is based upon a systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards as some responses are not 
as clear on this aspect. From the information reported it is clear that Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, 
Finland, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Sweden and the UK base their inspections’ programme on a 
systematic appraisal of hazards. Conversely, from the responses provided it is clear that Croatia, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, France, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, Poland, 
Slovenia have not adopted a programme of inspections based on systematic appraisal of major accidents 
hazards. Austria‘s response refers to a generic timetable for inspections which is interpreted here as not 
being a systematic appraisal. 

For some Member States there are uncertainties. Spain indicated that due to the competence of its 
autonomous regions in inspection matters it is unknown whether inspections are based on systematic 
appraisal or not. Slovakia indicated that legally established time period and systematic appraisals are being 
used together to decide on programme of inspections. For the purpose of the analysis these were accounted 
as not relying on systematic appraisal assessments. 

All Member States have reported that inspections were undertaken across the upper tier establishments 
during the reporting period. On average, inspections were undertaken in 58% of the upper tier 
establishments annually, with 86% inspected over the previous three years. However, this figure does not 
distinguish, for annual inspections, those Member States that have based inspection on a systematic 
appraisal of risks. When this is considered (i.e. when those Member States using the systematic appraisal 
approach are excluded), the percentage of upper tier establishments inspected annually is 79%. 

A programme of inspections based on systematic appraisal of major accident hazards means that Member 
States do not have to inspect establishments annually. However, certain situations were identified where 
some establishments were not inspected during the whole reporting period, and where the share of annual 
inspections was low. These are highlighted as possible compliance issues. It will be useful for the European 
Commission to follow this issue and verify whether more inspections should be encouraged. 

The figure below presents the number of annual inspection and the share of upper tier establishments for 
which annual inspections were held during the reporting period. Those Member States where annual 
inspections are not required, because they have adopted a system of systematic appraisal, are not included 
in the chart below.   

Note 1: BE, BG, DE, DK, FI, NL, PT, RO, SE and UK have adopted a programme of inspections based on systematic appraisal of major 
accidents hazards and as such annual inspections are not required. 
Note 2: The percentage present the share of upper tier establishments with annual inspection during the reporting period. 
Note 3: Total is higher than 100% for Poland due to variation in number of upper tier establishments during the reporting period. 

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It is noticeable that a large number of Member States have successfully applied the requirements of the 
Directive to undertake annual inspections. In Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, 
Poland and Slovenia all upper tier establishments were inspected annually. This is in line with Article 18 of 
the Directive, stating that Member States are to inspect upper-tier establishments every year, unless the 
programme for inspections is based on the systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards of 
establishments. 

A few Member States (Ireland, France, Lithuania and Hungary) are close to meeting this requirement with 
above 90% of the upper tier establishments inspected annually.  Ireland highlighted staff and financial 
constraints to explain not having inspected these establishments annually.  

However, it is also noticeable that some Member States have reported a very low share of annual 
inspections, in particular Italy, Slovakia, Croatia and Spain. 

For Spain, this might be explained by the fact that some autonomous regions might base the programme of 
inspections on systematic appraisal of major accidents hazards.  While requested, this information had not 
been provided by several regional authorities. In addition, Italy indicated that the low number of inspections 
was caused by organisational and financial constraints. Italy indicated that its national legislation was 
amended in order to address this issue in the future reporting period (i.e. under Seveso III) by redrafting the 
competence for inspection and by providing financing for the inspections through tariffs paid by the 
operators. For other Member States the reason for such a low inspection rate is unclear and warrants further 
investigation. 

Member States were required to provide data on the number of establishments inspected at least once 
during the reporting period. The data are presented in the figure below. 

Note: Total is higher than 100% for Croatia, Netherlands, Poland, Romania and Slovakia due to variation in number of upper tier 
establishments during the reporting period 

By the end of the reporting period the majority (86%) of upper tier establishments had been inspected at 
least once. When removing those Member States using a systematic risk assessment to define inspection 
programmes, the share of upper tier establishments inspected at least once during the reporting period 
reaches 97% of the upper tier establishments.  

It can also be observed that in some Member States, the share of upper tier establishments inspected at 
least once in the reporting period are lower than 100%. This is the case in particular for Austria (89%), 
Denmark (93%), Germany (86%), Finland (97%), Hungary (93%), Italy (20%), Lithuania (94%), Portugal 
(68%) and Spain (78%). Out of these Member States, Denmark, Germany, Finland and Portugal have 
reported information that suggest that they have adopted an inspection programme based on systematic 
appraisal of major accidents, which could explain a lesser frequency than annual. While this is in compliance 
with the requirements of the Directive, it might be worthwhile to verify that upper tier establishments do not 

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remain un-inspected for long periods of time. For the other Member States (Austria, Denmark, Hungary, Italy 
and Lithuania), it is unclear why inspections were not conducted as required. 

The question did not request further information from Member States to understand why upper tier 
establishments were not inspected as required by the Directive. The lack of inspections of every upper-tier 
establishment in a Member State can be explained by some of the following reasons: 

  Member States establishing a programme of inspections based on a systematic appraisal of 

major-accident hazards of the particular establishment as provided for in Article 18(2); 

  Time when the upper-tier site became a Seveso establishment – The Directive states that 

establishments must be inspected every 12 months. Therefore a new upper-tier Seveso site 
might not have been inspected the same year as it was established. For upper-tier sites which 
started operating in 2014, this means that they might not have been inspected in this reporting 
period as the deadline for inspection had not passed; and  

  Establishments not inspected were ceasing to, or did not start to, operate.   

It is not straightforward to compare inspections data with data from previous reporting periods. Previously 
inspections data were requested for each year of the reporting period. However, for the 2012-2014 reporting 
period data were requested annually and then for the whole period. Furthermore, the analysis distinguishes 
between those Member States using a systematic risk appraisal to set inspections frequency and others. As 
a reminder, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom are considered to have adopted such systems.  

On average, inspections were undertaken in 65% of upper-tier establishments during the 2009-2011 
reporting period. This figure was practically unchanged in comparison with the 2006-2008 period when the 
figure was 66% or 2005 when it was 69%. In the 2012-2014 period, an average of 58% of upper tier 
establishments were inspected annually and 86% over the reporting period. 

The figure below compares the share of upper tier establishments being inspected annually in each Member 
States as reported. However, when interpreting the data, care should be taken to bear in mind changes in 
inspection regimes occurring throughout the years. For example, it is clear that in Finland or Germany the 
diminution of the share coincides with the adoption of a system based on systematic appraisal. 

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Note: Data on establishments for the years 2005, 2008 and 2011 have been provided by Member States in the three-year 
implementation reports submitted to the Commission. 

All Member States have reported that inspections were undertaken across the lower tier establishments 
during the reporting period. On average, inspections were undertaken in 77% of the lower tier 
establishments.  

Figure 3.17 presents the number of inspections undertaken at lower-tier establishments in each Member 
State. 

Note 1: Total is higher than 100% for Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Romania due to variation in number of upper tier establishments 
during the reporting period. 
Note 2: The percentage presents the share of lower tier establishments that were inspected at least once during the reporting period. 

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A high share of lower-tier establishments were inspected in the last reporting period, with several Member 
States inspecting all of their lower tier establishments in particular Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia. 

In addition, two Member States (France and the UK) have inspected nearly all their lower tier establishments 
(above 90%). 

However, it is also noticeable that some Member States have a low share of lower tier establishments 
inspected, in particular Greece (12%), Latvia (35%) and Portugal (35%). No information is included in the 
Member States’ reports to understand why this is the case and here also some further investigation might be 
warranted. 

Data are available on lower tier establishments’ inspections only for the 2009-2011 period where, on 
average, 42% of the lower tier establishments were inspected. No data for inspections of lower-tier sites are 
available for previous reporting periods. As such, the figure of 77% for the 2012-2014 period represents an 
important improvement on lower tier establishments’ inspections. 

3.7  Question 5: Domino effects  

Article 8 of the Seveso II Directive requires Member States to ensure that the competent authority identifies 
establishments or groups of establishments where the likelihood and the possibility or consequences of a 
major accident may be increased because of the location and the proximity of such establishments and their 
inventories of dangerous substances. The questionnaire requested Member States to provide information on 
how the objectives of this article were ensured and to share their experience of applying Article 8 during the 
reporting period. 

Several Member States conveyed that the implementation of this article is now well established thanks to 
past experience. The identity and number of domino establishments are mostly reported as being well known 
and the requirements and aspects to take into account are also well developed.  

Domino establishments are identified during the initial permitting phase, when considering the extent of the 
risk zones, which are defined in the land use planning policies of several Member States (e.g. Greece, Spain 
and the UK). Establishments are notified when in proximity to other establishments leading to the possibility 
of domino effects and are required to exchange relevant information. 

The practices and experiences reported by Member States are noteworthy, in particular: 

  Belgium differentiates establishments that could create a domino effect and those that could be 
affected by a domino effect and organises meetings where operators of the establishments are 
present to discuss ways to reduce risks and hazards; 

  Bulgaria and Cyprus encourage operators concerned by domino effects to exchange 
information in writing so that a record can be kept and verified during inspections; 

  Finland has adopted and published guidelines for operators on how to co-operate with other 

establishments in case of domino effects; 

  France and Germany organise safety exercises for domino establishments and encourage 
operators to create common leaflets, information meetings and use common alert systems; 

  Lithuania’s experience was that for some domino establishments communication can be made 
more difficult when establishments are located very close and are competing commercially; 
and  

  Sweden provided an example of a strategy taking into account domino establishments. In an 
industrial park, in the northern part of Sweden, three upper tier Seveso establishments and 
other installations located have been designated as relevant for possible domino effects. There 
are large amounts of dangerous goods transported within the area but also storage facilities 
and pipelines. The establishments share some of the facilities, but they also display different 
safety cultures and levels of safety. In order to encourage communication, a forum for 
consultation on safety matters has been created. The local authorities have been a part of it 

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and presented their risk analyses. From their experience, it was noted that different operators 
make different assessments. For example, one operator may have identified possible 
interactions with several neighbouring operators while the others would not identify possible 
domino effects at all. 

3.8  Question 6: Land-use planning 

Article 12 of the Directive foresees that Member States should ensure that the objectives of preventing major 
accidents are taken into account in their land-use policies and other relevant policies. Member States were 
requested to provide information on how the objectives of the article were ensured during the reporting 
period and share their experiences with regards to land-use planning. 

All Member States have provided general background information on measures for fulfilling the objectives of 
Article 12 in general and, in particular, for ensuring the control of new developments around existing sites as 
well as at new sites. It is clear from the reports that Member States submitted that the objectives of 
preventing major accidents and limiting the consequences of such accidents are taken into account in their 
land-use policies. Similarly to domino effects, land use planning policies are well established and Member 
States are used to applying them. While some Member States provided long responses, often the content 
was very similar to responses provided in previous reporting period. 

In general, the authorisation process for building a new site or modifying an existing Seveso establishment 
requires the granting of a permit from the competent local authority. The exact procedures are specific to 
each Member State, but in essence they all focus on assessing the risks posed by the establishment to its 
surroundings and the environment. A range of authorities has been reported as being involved: 
environmental experts, fire supervision specialist, territorial planning authority and health authority. The 
planning procedure also involves actors at national, regional and local level and public consultation and 
participation was often highlighted as important. 

The practices and experiences reported by Member States during the last reporting period are noteworthy, in 
particular: 

  Cyprus has, during the reporting period, incorporated into development plans some land use 

provision policies in order to ensure the objectives of preventing major accidents are taken into 
account. Cyprus has also continued to implement its policy to transfer existing establishments 
into areas designated for industrial development specifically; 

  Denmark requires prior authorisation for the building, extension or modification of an 

establishment. Safety zones are defined and used to guide land-use decision. This ensures 
that land use is considered at any critical stage of the establishment; 

  Greece reported that as part of a pilot project funded by its Ministry of the Environment, a 
software system has been developed to assist decision making for land use planning 
associated with the risk of industrial installations. This was tested in the West Thessaloniki 
region which has many establishments conducting refining, petrochemicals, oil and gas storage 
and fertiliser and pesticides productions, all near populated areas; 

  Spain indicated that recently, there has been an increase in individual risk assessments based 
on quantitative risk analysis to support land use planning decisions. This is a change from the 
general trend which bases decision-making on deterministic risk analysis methods; 

  France adopts plans for preventing technical risks for a determined industrial area (beyond 
single establishments). Plans are drafted for any area that includes at least one upper tier 
establishment and are being used for land use planning decisions.  The aim of the plans is to 
manage historical industrial sites but also to prescribe technical measures to reduce the risks 
on existing infrastructure. The plans identify zones where further building is prescribed and 
where specific limitations on building can be imposed; 

 

Ireland’s planning authorities must seek advice from the Seveso competent authority when 
dealing with land use planning around establishments. There are generic consultation 
distances that are used to decide on this. Technical advice can then be provided either on a 

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generic or in a case-specific way. Generic advice is based on a 3-zones system. Ireland added 
that often environmental issues raised in the context of land use planning relate to appropriate 
containment measures. Technical advice was given for 696 cases during the reporting period; 

 

Italy conducted a survey in 2013-2014 to examine, at national level, urban planning in areas 
where establishments were located. Some problems were identified which required the update 
of urban planning regulations and which led to modification of the legislation; and  

  The UK’s competent authority has improved the arrangements for providing a quick 

consultation response and to providing improved early engagement through pre-application 
discussions during the reporting period. This has allowed the competent authority to support 
the government’s objectives of balancing public safety and protection with the need for growth. 
Safety zones are defined and used to guide land-use decision. In Northern Ireland, a specific 
body is consulted for all planning applications that are within a specified distance of a Seveso 
establishment.   

3.9  Question 7: Further information (optional) 

Member States were asked to share lessons learned from accidents and incidents. Only seven Member 
States provided a response to this question, including Malta which reported no accident or incident during 
the reporting period. The information shared by others included: 

  Germany has introduced a third category of reportable incidents in addition to accidents and 
incidents as defined under Seveso II and includes ‘serious disturbances of normal operations 
that have not yet led to serious accident’ in accident prevention. This addition was the result of 
lessons learned. The Central Reporting and Evaluation Office for Accidents and Incidents of 
the German Federal Environment Agency centrally registers all reported incidents and 
distributes relevant information to stakeholders and the general public. It analyses the data and 
provides suggestions for improving safety. The Environment Agency also organises a yearly 
exchange of experiences among authorities and jointly with the Federal States has initiated a 
research project on methods of incident reporting and analysis. It is unclear whether these 
events are reported to the European Commission, but they appear to correspond to the first 
criteria of Annex VI part II for reporting (i.e. type of substance involved); 

 

In Croatia, operators are required to list lessons learned, so as to improve major-accident 
prevention and safety management. The response does not include information on whether 
any lessons learned have been shared yet; 

  Latvia noted that many of the accidents that have happened were due to ‘human factors’ and 
that this has led to an emphasis on training and exercises for raising awareness of processes 
and procedures at Seveso establishments; 

  The Netherlands indicated that in order to learn more lessons, the competent authorities also 
investigate incidents that do not meet the criteria of Annex VI. It added that there are about 30 
such incidents each year. It is unclear whether these events are reported to the European 
Commission, but they appear to correspond to the criteria of Annex VI part II for reporting; and  

  Slovakia’s response included a description of a serious incident during the reporting period. 

The details are presented in the box below. 

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Lessons learned from serious incident in Slovakia – 2014 

On 26 August 2014 in a Seveso establishment with a phenol plant a serious accident occurred. Although it lasted only 4 
minutes, the accident resulted in one fatality. 

The accident occurred during the drawing off of phenol (heated to about 50°C) from a tanker lorry by pump into a phenol 
storage tank. After the drawing off started a crack formed in a pipe that was part of the lorry’s fittings, causing phenol to 
spray onto a concrete surface, the vehicle and the walls of the plant (about 12.8 t of phenol). The driver was present in the 
zone without using personal protective work equipment and could not be saved despite the fact that the emergency 
medical service was called immediately. 

The plant’s fire-fighting unit prevented any further leakage of phenol within 4 minutes and any further consequences for 
the environment, since a substantial part of the phenol leaked onto a concrete surface and then into a chemical drain 
which emptied into a waste water treatment facility in the industrial site. 

The establishment adopted measures to prevent recurrence of this or a similar type of accident, for example: 

 

 

 

 

familiarising all employees of the company with the findings of the Commission appointed to investigate the accident 
through an entry in their registration papers on safety and health protection at work, 

including in the Safety Regulation on Performance of Initial Training the “Familiarisation of all outside persons 
entering the site of the establishment” on the conditions for entering and moving around the site, on the risks and 
hazards at the site and on the use of personal protective work equipment, 

amending the general Visitors’ Entry Book to include the new details and ensure that they are translated into the 
necessary foreign languages, and  

updating the organisational guideline on safety at work to take account of the incident that occurred in the 
establishment; adding the possible risks and the methods of eliminating them to the organisational guideline 
concerning technical documentation. 

A total of eight Member States responded to this question which requested member states to provide 
information on IT tools used for monitoring implementation and for sharing data on the Directive. 

Malta indicated that no IT tool was available and Latvia reported that IT tools are used without providing 
further information. Other Member States reported the following: 

  Germany makes information is available to the general public from the Central Reporting and 
Evaluation Office for Accidents and Incidents as well as a database about the state of safety 
technology (DoSiS), via the Environment Agency’s “InfoSiS” portal33. Furthermore, various 
Federal States, sometimes jointly, have developed software systems to monitor the 
implementation of the Major Accidents Ordinance (which implements the Seveso Directive) and 
for the sharing of data between the authorities concerned; 

  Estonia does not appear to use a specific IT tool for implementation, but indicated that 

information on location and hazard type are available on its competent authority website34; 

  Spain has developed and launched a new database during the reporting period:  the National 
Chemical Hazard Database (Base de Datos Nacional de Riesgo Químico - BARQUIM). This 
database contains information on Seveso establishments and provides the bodies involved in 
implementing the Directive with the necessary knowledge regarding the parameters that define 
the danger faced by an establishment containing dangerous substances. At the same time, it 
serves as a tool for monitoring the measures adopted in order to prevent and control major 
accident hazards; 

  Croatia has software entitled CENA, designed for the reporting of information in accordance 
with the Seveso Directive. The data are published in the annual reports, on the website, and 
provided to European databases (eMARS and eSPIRS); 

33 http://www.infosis.uba.de/ 
34 Board Agency web map page: 
http://xgis.maaamet.ee/xGIS/XGis?app_id=MA11A&user_id=at&bbox=337406.132 
665832,6375000,767593.867334168,6635000&LANG=1 

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 

In the Netherlands the competent authorities involved share a joint inspection area where they 
record establishments subject to the Seveso Directive, the results of inspections and any 
follow-up to incidents or non-compliance events; and  

  Slovakia has an information system on the prevention of serious industrial accidents35 which is 

a tool used for collecting data and reporting information to relevant agencies. The information 
system has two versions/interfaces: one for the general public and another for competent 
authorities. The versions vary mainly in the scope of information, which is more comprehensive 
and more detailed in the case of the competent authorities. 

Four Member States provided a response to this question on Seveso-like provisions applied to activities not 
falling under the scope of the Directive such as pipelines, ports, marshalling yards and offshore installations. 
Malta indicated that no Seveso-like provisions are applied to other installations. Other Member States 
reported the following: 

  Finland indicated that inspections are carried out on some non-Seveso establishments every 
five years if the amounts of dangerous chemicals exceed about 1/5 of the lower tier threshold 
amounts. Internal emergency plans must also be drawn up for these installations. External 
emergency plans must be drafted and tested with operators for Ports and Marshalling Yards 
through which large amounts of dangerous substances are transported; 

  Hungary reported that, since 2012, its Seveso legislation covers also establishments under the 
threshold but at least above a quarter of the minimum threshold and which are considered as 
high priority facilities e.g. facilities transmitting dangerous substances and hazardous waste 
through pipelines off-site, including transmission lines and pump/compressor/distribution 
stations but excluding retail gas distribution lines and their facilities as well as hydrocarbon 
mining collector pipelines below a nominal diameter of 400 mm; establishments engaged in the 
disposal of hazardous waste, establishments where there is at least 1,000 kg of chlorine or 
ammonia; and  

  The Netherlands indicated that the safety policy also covers the licensing and spatial planning 

of other activities, for example pipelines. 

3.10  Comparison of reporting with previous reporting cycles 

The report on the period 2012-2014 is the last reporting by Member States on their implementation of the 
Seveso Directive.  While our analysis in section 2 includes comparisons and charts showing evolution 
through reporting periods, this section presents a short summary of the comparison of key aspects of the 
implementation.  Each aspect is compared to the main findings on similar aspects from the 2009-2011 
reporting period.     

Comparison with the previous reporting 
period (2009-2011) 

The overall conclusions of the past reporting 
period was toward an improvement of the 
information reported which seemed to 
indicate an improve implementation of the 
Directive when compared to previous 
reporting periods.  

Aspect  

Implementation status 2012-2014 

Overall 
implementation 

The overall implementation of the Directive appears to be 
satisfactory with limited cases of potential non-compliance 
identified.  
Considering this marks the last reporting under the Seveso II 
Directive, it is not surprising to find that the instrument is by 
now widely implemented. While there seem to be few 
outstanding issues (in particular in relation of adoption and 
testing of external emergency plants and inspections of upper 
tier establishments), often Member States have indicated that 
measures were being adopted or that cases were being 
investigated to ensure the Directive is implemented.  

35 http://www1.enviroportal.sk/seveso/informacny-system.php 

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Aspect  

Implementation status 2012-2014 

External emergency 
plans 

An average of 88% of the upper-tier establishments had an 
external emergency plan at the end of the 2012-2014 period. 
This includes 4% of upper tier establishments where the 
competent authorities considered that an external emergency 
plan was not required. This marks a worsening since the last 
reporting period where an average of 93% of the upper tier 
establishments had an external emergency plan. There are 
variations between Member States. It is considered that a 
share of more than 8% of upper tier establishments for which 
such plans were not drafted indicate implementation issues. 
This was observed in the reporting period in 10 Member 
States. 
On average 75% of the external emergency plans had been 
tested during the reporting period. This is a slight 
improvement over the last reporting period. However, the 
variability between Member States remains high. The 
information reported seems to indicate that Member States 
are now more efficient at reviewing and testing those plans. 

Comparison with the previous reporting 
period (2009-2011) 

An average of 93% of the upper-tier 
establishments had an external emergency 
plan at the end of the 2009-2011 period.  
Member States indicated that over 70% of 
these plans were tested in the period. This 
is an improvement compared to 2006-2008 
(60%) and 2003-2005 (40%) in previous 
periods. However, the variability between 
Member States is very high. 

Providing 
information to the 
public 

On average 81% of the upper tier establishments had made 
safety information actively available during the reporting 
period. This represents a slight decrease since the last 
reporting period and the inequalities between Member States 
remain. Part of the discrepancies are explained by upper-tier 
establishments being newly classified. 

The number of establishments for which 
information is provided to the public was 
around 87% of the Seveso upper-tier 
establishments, an increase from 80% in 
2008 and 72% in 2005. However, some 
Member States are well behind the top 
performers in this area. 

Inspections 

Upper tier: On average, inspections were undertaken in 58% 
of the upper tier establishments annually (2014), and 86% 
over the three years considered. However, when excluding 
those Member States that base inspections on systematic 
appraisal of hazards, the share of annual inspections of upper 
tier establishments is then 79% which shows an improvement 
since the end of the last reporting period. However, a direct 
comparison is not possible as previous reporting did not 
explicitly distinguish those Member States using systematic 
appraisal to plan inspections. However, it is important to note 
that, for some Member States, annual inspections levels were 
relatively low and there may be a need for more support in 
this area. 

Upper-tier: Inspections were undertaken in 
66% of the establishments in the final year 
of the reporting period (2011). The figure 
has been very similar since 2005.  

Lower tier: The inspection level of lower tier establishments 
has improved with on average, inspections undertaken in 
77% of the lower tier establishments during the reporting 
period. 

Lower-tier: Inspections were generally less 
frequent than in upper-tier establishments, 
with around 40% of them inspected in the 
2009-2011 period. These data were not 
available for previous reporting periods. 

Actions taken in 
case of non-
compliance, 
incidents or 
accidents 

Member States reported that options were available in case of 
non-compliance and that some cases arose during the 
reporting period.  This included fines, remedial orders and 
closure orders. 

These were used in all Member States, 
although criminal proceedings were not 
considered necessary. 

3.11 Observations on reporting 

In addition to the analysis of the implementation some useful points on improving practical reporting were 
noted. The questionnaire for the first reporting period under the Seveso III Directive36 (1st June 2015 – 31 
December 2018) was reviewed to indicate whether the issues identified are likely to arise in the next 
reporting period. 

36 Commission Decision C(2014/896/EU) establishing the format for communicating information from 
Member States on the implementation of Directive 2012/18/EU http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014D0896&from=EN 

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  Member States are no longer required to provide separate answers for each of the three years 
covered by the reporting period. Instead, only data reflecting the situation at31/12/2014 or 
covering the whole reporting period are requested. Several Member States have continued to 
provide data for every year which has led to the need to use average values for comparison 
purposes: 

  Data reported for each year of the reporting period allow a better understanding of the 

variation of data, in particular when reporting numbers of establishments inspected. Where 
data are reported only for the final year of the reporting period it can be more difficult to 
make sense of some results, for example the number of establishments inspected annually 
may not match the total number of establishments due to variation in numbers of 
establishments during the reporting period; 

  Another important point is to ensure that all Member States report data in the same way, 

otherwise this makes comparison of performance between Member States more 
complicated; and  

  The questionnaire for the next reporting period requires information ‘at the end of the 

reporting period’ however it is likely that some Member States will provide annual statistics, 
in particular when considering the inspection question. 

  Linked to the first point, the latest (2012-14) questionnaire does not provide Member States 

with a specific template to provide their numerical response. This has led to some confusion on 
whether numerical data were expected or not, in particular where questions requested a 
‘statistical breakdown’. This has also lead to some Member States reporting data for each of 
the year of the reporting period rather than as requested by the end of the reporting period. 
Inserting a reporting template where numerical data are required would improve consistency in 
the reporting. The next reporting period questionnaire does not include a reporting template for 
numerical data, so it is possible that similar issues will arise; 

  A number of questions have been deleted (e.g. sections on safety reports, on internal 

emergency plans, on exchange of information between Member States and on ports and 
marshalling yards) or simplified (e.g. no numerical figures are required regarding domino 
effects and only changes in competent authorities have to be reported). This has reduced the 
length of the responses, and allowed a focus from some Member States on the practical 
experiences gained during the reporting period. This was the case in particular for questions 
relating to land-use planning and domino effects. However, this was not the case for all 
Member States and some more emphasis on this point might be necessary in the next 
questionnaire. A possible way to help Member States in understanding the type of information 
that is requested would be to include examples of possible responses, or a mock response. 
Another alternative would be to ask Member States to report ‘changes in implementation’ so 
that the focus is on new elements; 

  Linked to the issue above, responses from Member States often varied in the details provided 
and aspects of the implementation they focused on when the question is of a general nature. 
For example, question 4 asks Member States to provide information on their inspections, and 
the responses included a range of elements related to inspections such as frequency, strategy, 
programmes and legislation but these elements were not consistently covered by all responses 
limiting their comparability. Similarly, the responses to question 4(c) on types of actions taken 
as a result of accidents, incidents and non-compliance varied with some providing information 
on actions available in general and others focusing on those actions that were actually applied 
during the reporting period. The questionnaire should make very explicit the aspects, for 
example by listing them in brackets that are expected to be covered by the Member States 
responses; 

 

It would be useful to introduce for future reporting a question requesting whether (i.e. yes/no) 
the programme of inspections is based upon a systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards 
as some responses are not as clear on this aspect; 

  New topics have been included in the latest version of the questionnaire. For example, Member 
States are required to provide a statistical breakdown summarising the activities of all Seveso 

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establishments using the eSPIRS activity list and to report on the number of establishments 
also covered by the Industrial Emissions Directive (2010/75/EU). This was only partially 
successful as some provided data based on the NACE classification (also allowed) which 
limited the ability to provide a comparison. This is also included in the next reporting 
questionnaire and we expect to note an improvement in the information reported; and  

  Finally, questions requested Member States to comment on their experiences applying the 
Directive or the lessons learnt. This was something highlighted as a gap in the previous 
analysis of the reporting (for period 2009-2011) where the quality of the data on lessons learnt 
was poor. The questions were optional and a minority of Member States responded.  However, 
the content of the responses was noted as relevant and interesting and further exchange 
should be encouraged. It is positive to note that this is also included in the next reporting period 
questionnaire. 

An interesting feature adopted by the UNECE is that the questionnaire requests Parties to first copy their 
response to the previous reporting period, and to then respond to the questions and indicate only if there has 
been a change during the reporting period. This is seen as a way to reduce reporting burden for the Parties 
but also to make the identification of progress or delays in implementation easier.  There might be merit in 
considering whether such a feature may reduce the reporting burden for Member States but also help 
improve the content of the information gradually by allowing Member States to reflect and improve upon their 
previous responses. 

A final suggestion would be to request Member States to provide feedback on the questionnaire itself and 
the reporting process, which might help to identify further ways in which the questions can be improved. 

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4  Assessment of implementation of the Directive 

4.1  Overview 

This section draws some conclusions on the implementation of the Seveso Directive, based on the last 
reporting period, previous reporting period and building on the statistical analysis of eMARS and eSPIRS. 
The conclusions are also informed by additional sources of information including, infringement cases from 
the European Court of Justice and conclusions from the Working Group on Implementation of the Industrial 
Accident Convention. 

4.2  Summary of implementation by Member State 

This section summarises the implementation in each Member State based on the detailed analysis of the 
Member State reports for the 2012-2014 period and taking into account the completeness exercise.   

The analysis focuses on:  

  Whether the information provided to complete the questionnaire allows a general assessment 

of the implementation; 

  The number of establishments in the Member States; 

  The proportion of inspected establishments related to the total number reported; and  

  Other relevant quantitative data related to the use of coercive instruments, the provision of 

information to the public and domino effects.  

A detailed summary of responses to the questionnaire submitted by each Member State are provided in 
Appendix B. 

Table 4.1 presents a summary of the implementation status for the reporting period for each Member State. 
As can be observed, the majority of the Member States (15) are in the ‘almost full implementation’ category. 
It is important to highlight that this middle category is a range and includes some Member States with minor 
implementation issues identified (e.g. only a few external emergency plans not tested) and some with 
potentially more serious issues. Only three Member States are considered to have more substantial 
implementation gaps. 

Implementation status 

Member States 

Implementation gaps 

Croatia, Greece and Italy.  

Almost full 
implementation 

Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain and Sweden. 

Full implementation 

Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and United Kingdom. 

Table 4.2 presents the issues identified in Member States reporting. The most common are the lack of 
external emergency plans and the lack of testing of those plans. To some extent these are linked as a 
missing external emergency plan cannot be tested. The low level of inspections reported was also an issue 
for eight Member States. 

It is important to refer to the respective Member States summaries in the sections below and in Appendix B 
for further details. For example, some member states lack external emergency plans for some 
establishments, in some cases this was because the classification of the upper-tier establishment was recent 

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and that as such the plans were not due yet (e.g. France). This should not be considered as a compliance 
issue but is flagged here in order to check progress on this specific aspect in future reporting. 

Furthermore, with regards to the inspection requirements it is important to consider that for those Member 
States that rely on a systematic appraisal of hazards to define inspection programmes, the fact that a low 
share of establishments was inspected annually or during the period as a whole may not be an issue. This is 
the case in particular for Finland, Germany, Portugal and Spain.  

External emergency plan not prepared 

External emergency plan not tested 

Lack of inspection of upper tier 
establishments (systematic appraisal of 
risk) 

Lack of inspection of upper tier 
establishments (no systematic appraisal 
of risk) 

Croatia, Estonia, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Romania, Spain. 

Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden. 

Finland, Germany, Portugal, Spain 

Austria, Croatia, France, Italy 

Implementation of provisions on domino 
effect provisions 

Croatia 

Lack of information made available to the 
public 

Luxembourg 

Overall, the response indicates that the provisions of the Seveso II Directive are mostly implemented, 
however there remain some issues with respect to annual inspections of upper tier establishments. 

In Austria, there were a total of 148 establishments subject to the provisions of the Seveso II Directive in 
2014, of which 72 (48% of the total) were upper-tier establishments.  

Austria reports that almost all upper-tier establishments apart from 3 were covered by an external emergency 
plan.  In these 3 cases, the authorities decided that an external emergency plan was not needed as 
permitted by Article 11.6 of the Directive.  

At the end of the reporting period, 10 upper tier establishments’ external emergency plans had not been 
tested, Austria indicated that the delays were due to pending revisions of the plans.  

Inspections were carried out at least once during the reporting period for 89% of upper-tier sites and 86% of 
lower-tier sites. Annual inspections were held in 47 upper-tier establishments, representing 65% of total 
upper-tier establishments.  

Overall, the provisions of the Seveso II Directive are fully implemented. 

In Belgium, there were a total of 383 establishments subject to the provisions of the Seveso II Directive in 
2014, of which 204 (53% of the total) were upper-tier.  

Belgium reports that almost all upper-tier establishments were covered by an external emergency plan, 
however, for 18 establishments, no plans had been drawn up by the end of the reporting period which 
corresponds to 9% of the upper-tier establishments. For 14 of these, the information had been received from 
the operators but the external emergency plans had not yet been finalised and for the remaining 4 the 

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assessment of the safety report was still ongoing. As such, it appears that this aspect of the Seveso II 
Directive is soon to be in compliance. 

At the end of the reporting period, 1 upper tier establishments’ external emergency plan had not been tested. 
No information was included in the response on the circumstances of this plan. 

Inspections are planned based on a systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards; as such there is no 
obligation to inspect upper-tier establishments annually. During the reporting period 137 upper tier 
establishments were inspected annually (representing 67% of total upper tier establishments). Authorities 
carried out, on average, at least one inspection during the reporting period in 100% of upper-tier sites and 
lower-tier sites.  

Overall, the provisions of the Seveso II Directive are fully implemented.  

In Bulgaria, there were a total of 195 establishments subject to the provisions of the Seveso II Directive in 
2014, of which 86 (44% of the total) were upper-tier establishments.  

Bulgaria reports that all upper-tier establishments had adopted external emergency plans. At the end of the 
reporting period, all upper tier establishments’ external emergency plans had been tested.  

Inspections are planned based on a systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards; as such there is no 
obligation to inspect upper-tier establishments annually. However, Bulgaria reported that all upper tier 
establishments were inspected annually. As a result, inspections were carried out at least once during the 
reporting period for 100% of upper-tier sites. In addition, 100% of lower-tier sites were inspected at least 
once during the reporting period.  

The information reported by Croatia on the implementation of the Seveso Directive indicates some gaps in 
relation to key provisions of the Directive, in particular the number of upper-tier establishments without an 
external emergency plan is unclear; it is also unclear how these plans are tested; and finally, a large number 
of upper-tier establishments were not inspected annually.  

In Croatia, there were a total of 57 establishments subject to the provisions of the Seveso II Directive in 
2014, of which 25 (43% of the total) were upper-tier establishments.  

Croatia reports that all upper-tier establishments had to produce an external emergency plan, however, it is 
unclear how many had actually drafted the plans. The response from Croatia refers to the number of local 
authorities for which external emergency plans had not been drafted and there is no information on the 
number of establishments covered by these local authorities.  

At the end of the reporting period, Croatia did not have information on the number of external emergency 
plans that had not been tested. 

Inspections are not planned based on a systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards, however Croatia 
reported that criteria for prioritising inspections are under development. During the reporting period 10 upper 
tier establishments were inspected annually (representing 40% of upper tier establishments). Inspections 
were carried out at least once during the reporting period for 100% of upper-tier sites and 88% of lower-tier 
sites. The lack of annual inspection for more than half of the upper-tier establishments constitutes should be 
further investigated in order to understand whether more support is needed by the Member State. 

Finally, the Croatian response was not very detailed on how the domino effects are being considered. 

Overall, the provisions of the Seveso II Directive are fully implemented.  

In Cyprus there were a total of 22 establishments subject to the provisions of the Seveso II Directive in 2014, 
of which 13 (59% of the total) were upper-tier establishments.  

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Cyprus reports that all upper-tier establishments had adopted external emergency plans. At the end of the 
reporting period, all upper tier establishments’ external emergency plans had been tested.  

Cyprus reported that all upper tier establishments were inspected annually. Furthermore, inspections were 
carried out at least once during the reporting period for 100% of upper-tier sites and 100% of lower-tier sites.  

From the information provided, the provisions of the Seveso II Directive are mostly implemented. The main 
issue identified relates to external emergency plans of a large number of upper-tier establishments that have 
not been tested every three years as required by Article 11.4 of the Directive. 

In the Czech Republic, there were a total of 207 establishments subject to the provisions of the Seveso II 
Directive in 2014, of which 117 (56% of the total) were upper-tier establishments.  

The Czech Republic reports that almost all upper-tier establishments apart from 23 had an external 
emergency plan, the authorities decided that a plan was not needed as permitted by Article 11.6 of the 
Directive. For an additional 2 upper-tier establishments external emergency plans had not been produced 
during the reporting period, even though these establishments had not been excluded from the requirement 
to produce an external emergency plan. 

At the end of the reporting period, 65 upper tier establishments’ external emergency plans had not been 
tested; such testing is required under Article 11.4 of the Directive.  

Inspections were carried out at least once during the reporting period for 100% of upper-tier sites and 100% 
of lower-tier sites. Annual inspections were held in all upper tier establishments. 

The Danish response indicates that the provisions of the Seveso II Directive are almost fully implemented. 
The main issues identified relate to the fact that a large number of external emergency plans are reported as 
not having been tested over the period. However, Denmark indicated that it is taking steps toward resolving 
this issue.  

In Denmark there were a total of 121 establishments subject to the provisions of the Seveso II Directive in 
2014, of which 54 (44% of the total) were upper-tier establishments.  

Denmark reports that almost all upper-tier establishments apart from 2 had an external emergency plan. One 
establishment without an external emergency plan had only been classified as upper-tier within the last year. 
As for the second establishment, the central authorities will contact the local authority concerned and ensure 
that an external emergency plan is drawn up or an assessment is carried out regarding whether a plan is 
needed. 

At the end of the reporting period, 27 upper tier establishments’ external emergency plans had not been 
tested, Denmark indicated that it will investigate this issue with the local authorities concerned in order to 
ensure compliance.  

Inspections are planned based on a systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards; as such there is no 
obligation to inspect upper-tier establishments annually. 

Inspections were carried out at least once during the reporting period for 93% of upper-tier sites and 75% of 
lower-tier sites. Annual inspections were held in 39 establishments, representing 72% of total upper tier 
establishments. Denmark also indicated that local authorities that failed to report inspections were being 
investigated. 

The Estonian response indicates that the provisions of the Seveso II Directive are mostly fully implemented. 
However, one main issue was identified due to the fact that during the 2012-2014 period establishments did 
not have individual emergency plans but instead were covered by one national emergency plan which is not 
in compliance with the requirements of the Directive. 

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In Estonia, there were a total of 64 establishments subject to the provisions of the Seveso II Directive in 
2014, of which 37 (57% of the total) were upper-tier establishments.  

Estonia reported that up to 2016 there was only one national emergency plan for all Seveso establishments 
drawn up by the Ministry of the Interior according to the Estonian Emergency Act. In 2015, the Estonian 
Rescue Board decided to produce regional external emergency plans for all upper-tier establishments. 
These were planned to be completed in 2016. The national emergency plan was tested during 10 crisis 
management exercises during the reporting period. 

Inspections were carried out at least once during the reporting period for 100% of upper-tier sites and 100% 
of lower-tier sites. Annual inspections were held in all upper-tier establishments. 

The Finish response indicates that the provisions of the Seveso II Directive are almost fully implemented. 
The main gap observed relates to the large number of upper-tier establishments that were not inspected 
annually, however this might not be an issue considering that Finland has adopted a systematic appraisal of 
major accident hazards to plan inspections.  

In Finland, there were a total of 300 establishments subject to the provisions of the Seveso II Directive in 
2014, of which 135 (45% of the total) were upper-tier establishments.  

Finland reported that all upper-tier establishments had an external emergency plan. At the end of the 
reporting period, 4 upper tier establishments’ external emergency plans had not been tested. Finland 
explained that these 4 plans had been tested in 2011 and were due to be tested in 2015. As such this does 
not appear to constitute a lack of compliance with the requirements of the Seveso II Directive.  

Inspections are planned based on a systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards; as such there is no 
obligation to inspect upper-tier establishments annually. Inspections were carried out at least once during the 
reporting period for 97% of upper-tier sites and 95% of lower-tier sites. Annual inspections were held in 34 
upper tier establishments, representing 25% of total upper tier establishments. The data reported on annual 
inspections are lower than in most Member States and it might reflect difficulties encountered in applying the 
requirements. 

The French response indicates that the provisions of the Seveso II Directive are mostly fully implemented, 
with some issues identified with key aspects of the Directive in particular the lack of external emergency 
plans for 75 establishments, the lack of testing of external emergency plans for 45 establishments and the 
lack of annual inspection in 28 upper tier establishments. 

In France, there were a total of 1 178 establishments subject to the provisions of the Seveso II Directive in 
2014, of which 639 (54% of the total) were upper-tier establishments.  

France reports that almost all upper-tier establishments apart from 23 had an external emergency plans. For 
these, the competent authorities decided that an external emergency plan was not needed in accordance 
with Article 11.6 of the Seveso II Directive. 

For an additional 75 establishments, no plan had been drawn up by the end of the reporting period, however 
the response indicated that the plans were either being produced or pending upon the submission of further 
information in order to determine the required protective measures. As such, it appears that this aspect of 
the Seveso II Directive is soon to be in compliance. 

At the end of the reporting period, 45 upper tier establishments’ external emergency plans had not been 
tested which does not appear to comply with the requirements of the Seveso II Directive. 

Inspections were carried out at least once during the reporting period for 100% of upper-tier sites and 98% of 
lower-tier sites. Annual inspections were held in 611 establishments, representing 96% of total upper tier 
establishments. The fact that 4% of upper tier establishments were not inspected annually is highlighted as 
an aspect of the implementation of the Directive that may warrant further investigations. 

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The German response indicates that the provisions of the Seveso II Directive are almost fully implemented. 
The main gap observed relates to the large number of upper-tier establishments that were not inspected 
annually, with some not inspected at all during the reporting period. Note that Germany uses a systematic 
appraisal of major accident hazards to plan inspections.  As such annual inspections are not required so this 
does not constitute a compliance issue but rather a potential issue that might need further checks. In 
addition, for 83 upper-tier establishments external emergency plans had not been produced at the end of the 
reporting period. 

In Germany, there were a total of 3 264 establishments subject to the provisions of the Seveso II Directive in 
2014, of which 1 141 (34% of the total) were upper-tier establishments. Germany reported that all upper-tier 
establishments apart from 165 had an external emergency plan. For 82 upper-tier establishments the 
German authorities decided that an external emergency plan was not needed based on strict criteria 
including quantities, properties and state of the hazardous substances and location of the establishment. For 
an additional 83 upper-tier establishments external emergency plans had not been produced at the end of 
the reporting period. The main reasons for plans not being produced include cases where establishments 
recently changed or were recently classified as upper-tier and where the production of the plans or the 
security report required previously are still in progress. Furthermore, Germany added that it is possible to 
partially impose upper-tier requirements on establishments which would, according to the Directive, only 
have to be classified as lower-tier. Such establishments have been listed as upper tier but would not be 
required to meet all the requirements of an upper-tier establishment, for example it may not be required to 
produce an external emergency plan. 

At the end of the reporting period, 16% of upper tier establishments’ external emergency plans had not been 
tested. Germany explained that for most of these establishments the 3-year deadline had not expired yet, 
because the establishments became newly classified as upper-tier during the reporting period. For others, 
the testing was being delayed due to changes to the establishments. As such this does not appear to 
constitute a lack of compliance with the requirements of the Seveso II Directive.  

Inspections are planned based on a systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards; as such there is no 
obligation to inspect upper-tier establishments annually. Inspections were carried out at least once during the 
reporting period for 86% of upper-tier sites and 68% of lower-tier sites. Annual inspections were held in 422 
establishments, representing 37% of total upper tier establishments. While not a compliance issue, the fact 
that 14% of upper tier establishments were not inspected over the reporting period is highlighted as an 
aspect of the implementation of the Directive that may warrant further investigations and the German 
competent authorities confirmed that this point would be investigated further.  

The Greek response indicates that the provisions of the Seveso II Directive are implemented but gaps with 
regards to key aspects of the Directive were identified. The main gaps observed relates to the large number 
of upper-tier establishments for which external emergency plans have not yet been produced. Furthermore, 
a large number of external emergency plans are reported as not having been tested over the 3-year period. 
From the data reported, a large number of upper-tier establishments were not inspected annually. Further 
compliance issues cannot be ruled out due to the incompleteness of the response.  

In Greece, there were a total of 193 establishments subject to the provisions of the Seveso II Directive in 
2014, of which 83 (43% of the total) were upper-tier establishments.  

Greece reported that all upper-tier establishments were required to have an external emergency plan. 
However, for 41 upper-tier establishments the plans had not yet been produced. The Greek response did not 
indicate the reason. At the end of the reporting period, 52 upper tier establishments’ external emergency 
plans (63% of the total) had been tested. Once again, there were no further information. 

Authorities carried out, on average, inspections at least once during the reporting period in 83 upper-tier sites 
(100%) and in 13 lower-tier sites during the reporting period. However annual inspections were held in only 
55 establishments, representing 66% of total upper tier establishments. The data reported on annual 
inspections are low which might reflect difficulties encountered in applying the requirements. 

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The Hungarian response indicates that the provisions of the Seveso II Directive are mostly fully 
implemented. The main issue identified is in relation to external emergency plans not being drafted for five 
establishments. 

In Hungary, there were a total of 239 establishments subject to the provisions of the Seveso II Directive in 
2014, of which 105 (43% of the total) were upper-tier establishments.  

Hungary reported that all upper-tier establishments apart from 18 had an external emergency plan. For 13 
upper-tier establishments it was decided that an external emergency plan was not needed. In addition, for 5 
upper-tier establishments no external emergency plan has been produced as required by Article 11.1.  

At the end of the reporting period, all the emergency plans drafted had been tested.  

Authorities carried out, on average, inspections at least once during the reporting period in 176 lower-tier 
sites during the reporting period. Annual inspections were held in 98 establishments, representing 93% of 
total upper tier establishments. However, Hungary added that in practice all establishments were inspected 
annually and that the percentage reflects the fluctuation of the number of establishments throughout the 
reporting period. For new establishments, the first annual inspection is due the year following the permitting 
year, so a difference in the total number of establishments and those inspected annually is not to be 
understood as a lack of compliance with the Seveso II Directive. Lower-tier establishments are inspected 
every two years and all were inspected at least once during the reporting period. 

The Irish response indicates that the provisions of the Seveso II Directive are fully implemented.  

In Ireland, there were a total of 96 establishments subject to the provisions of the Seveso II Directive in 2014, 
of which 48 (50% of the total) were upper-tier establishments.  

Ireland reported that all upper-tier establishments were required to adopt an external emergency plan and 
that one establishment had not adopted a plan as required. However, this was being corrected by the time 
Ireland was reporting on the implementation of the Directive. At the end of the reporting period, 2 upper tier 
establishments’ external emergency plans had not been tested. Ireland indicated that 1 establishment has 
applied to change category to lower tier and so is not tested anymore; the other is the establishment with the 
missing plan. 

Inspections are planned based on a systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards; as such there is no 
obligation to inspect upper-tier establishments annually. Inspections were carried out at least once during the 
reporting period for 100% of upper-tier sites and 100% of lower-tier sites. Annual inspections were held in 47 
establishments, representing 97% of total upper tier establishments.  

The Italian response indicates that most of the provisions of the Seveso II Directive are implemented. 
However, there were issues identified with some of the key provisions of the Directive, related in particular to 
the large number of upper-tier establishments that were not inspected annually and the number of external 
emergency plans not adopted or tested. 

In Italy, there were a total of 1 112 establishments subject to the provisions of the Seveso II Directive in 
2014, of which 567 (50% of the total) were upper-tier establishments.  

Italy reported that all upper-tier establishments apart from 4 were required to have external emergency 
plans. Italy provided additional information to explain that these external emergency plans were not drafted 
because the competent authorities assessed that major accidents could not be reasonably foreseen (in 
accordance with Article 11.6 of the Directive). For 66 establishments, the external emergency plans, while 
required, were not drafted which does not comply with the requirements of Article 11.1. 

At the end of the reporting period, 302 upper tier establishments’ external emergency plans had not been 
tested. This represents more than half of the total number of upper-tier establishments in Italy (53%).  It is 
unclear why this requirement of the Seveso II Directive has not been implemented. 

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Inspections were carried out at least once during the reporting period for 20% of upper-tier sites and 49% of 
lower-tier sites. Annual inspections were held in none of the upper-tier establishments. The data reported on 
inspections are particularly low, especially considering that Italy is the Member State with the third highest 
number of Seveso establishments. It reflects difficulties encountered in applying the requirements of the 
Directive at national level and it may be necessary to investigate the need for additional support to Italy with 
these aspects. These difficulties were confirmed by the Member State competent authorities that indicated 
that steps were taken to address them. 

The Latvian response indicates that the provisions of the Seveso II Directive are fully implemented.  

In Latvia, there were a total of 63 establishments subject to the provisions of the Seveso II Directive in 2014, 
of which 29 (46% of the total) were upper-tier establishments.  

Latvia reported that all upper-tier establishments had an external emergency plan. At the end of the reporting 
period, only one upper tier establishments’ external emergency plan had not been tested. Latvia indicated 
that this was due to structural changes occurring in the 2012-2014 period and that this plan was tested in 
2011 and in 2015. As such this is not understood as a lack of compliance.  

Inspections were held at least once in all the upper-tier sites and in 36 of the lower-tier sites during the 
reporting period (representing 100% of the lower tier establishments). Annual inspections were held in all 
upper tier establishments. 

The Lithuanian response indicates that the provisions of the Seveso II Directive are fully implemented.  

In Lithuania, there were a total of 42 establishments subject to the provisions of the Seveso II Directive in 
2014, of which 18 (42% of the total) were upper-tier establishments.  

Lithuania reported that all upper-tier establishments were required to have an external emergency plan but 
that one was not drafted for one establishment. This concerned an establishment that started operating in 
2015 (after the focus of this analysis) and the plan was in the preparation phase when the implementation 
report was submitted. At the end of the reporting period, only one upper tier establishments’ external 
emergency plan had not been tested. Although Lithuania did not indicate this explicitly, this is presumably 
the same establishment for which the plan was not ready at the time of reporting. 

Inspections were carried out at least once during the reporting period for 100% of upper-tier sites and 100% 
of lower-tier sites. Annual inspections were held in all upper tier establishments. 

The response indicates that the provisions of the Seveso II Directive are mostly implemented, however there 
are some issues with key provisions of the Directive such as the testing of external emergency plans and the 
level of information provided to the public.  

In Luxembourg, there were a total of 18 establishments subject to the provisions of the Seveso II Directive in 
2014, of which 8 (44% of the total) were upper-tier establishments.  

Luxembourg reported that all upper-tier establishments apart from two had an external emergency plan. For 
one establishment, it was decided that the external emergency plan was not needed, however for the other 
establishment the lack of the plan is a gap and Luxembourg added that the plan is being developed.  

At the end of the reporting period, none of the upper tier establishments’ external emergency plans had been 
tested. This does not appear comply with the requirements of the Seveso II Directive.  

Luxembourg indicated that information on safety measures is only available to the public if they participate in 
the public consultation for Seveso authorisations or, in certain cases, online, although this does not cover all 
the information. It is unclear whether this fully responds to the requirements of the Seveso II Directive 

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Inspections were carried out at least once during the reporting period in all the upper-tier sites and in 9 
lower-tier sites. Annual inspections were held in all upper tier establishments.  

The response indicates that the provisions of the Seveso II Directive are fully implemented.  

In Malta, there were a total of 12 establishments subject to the provisions of the Seveso II Directive in 2014, 
of which 9 (75% of the total) were upper-tier establishments.  

Malta reported that all upper-tier establishments were required to have an external emergency plan. 
However, 4 of the 9 upper-tier establishments did not have an external emergency plan as required. Malta 
provided an explanation for this. Three of them became upper-tier establishments during 2014 and 
competent authorities have a period of time (2 years) to draw them up. The plan of the other establishment 
was being finalised when the Maltese authorities filled in the questionnaire. As such this is not understood as 
a lack of compliance with the requirements of the Directive. 

At the end of the reporting period, 3 upper tier establishments’ external emergency plans had not been 
tested. Malta indicated that these are the same establishments that became upper-tier in 2014 and for which 
the plans were not yet finalised.  

Inspections were carried out at least once during the reporting period for 100% of upper-tier sites and 100% 
of lower-tier sites. Annual inspections were held in all upper tier establishments. 

The response indicates that the provisions of the Seveso II Directive are mostly fully implemented. The main 
gap observed relates to the number of external emergency plans not tested during the reporting period. 

In the Netherlands, there were a total of 406 establishments subject to the provisions of the Seveso II 
Directive in 2014, of which 252 (62% of the total) were upper-tier establishments.  

The Netherlands reported that all upper-tier establishments apart from 13 were required to have an external 
emergency plan. Out of those required to have external emergency plans, all but 10 establishments had a 
plan. The Netherlands does not systematically draw up specific external emergency plans but rather disaster 
response plans that cover common accident scenarios. For 13 upper-tier establishments it was decided that 
an external emergency plan was not needed based on the technical safety data contained in the safety 
report. In addition, 10 upper-tier establishments were not covered by external emergency plan as required by 
Article 11.1. For 4 of these, safety reports were submitted which will be used to draw up the external 
emergency plans. For the remaining 6, the competent authorities were reminded to draw up the plans 
promptly. 

At the end of the reporting period, 93 upper tier establishments’ external emergency plans had not been 
tested. The Netherlands indicated that this is because some competent authorities adopt generic external 
emergency plans that set out basic scenarios which are then tested. It is unclear whether this meets the 
requirement of Article 11.4 of the Directive. The Netherlands added that the drawing up and testing of these 
generic external emergency plans is currently being coordinated at national level.  

Inspections are planned based on a systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards; as such there is no 
obligation to inspect upper-tier establishments annually. Inspections were carried out at least once during the 
reporting period for 100% of upper-tier sites and 88% of lower-tier sites. Annual inspections were held in 
90% upper tier establishments.  

The Polish response indicates that the provisions of the Seveso II Directive are fully implemented.  

In Poland, there were a total of 392 establishments subject to the provisions of the Seveso II Directive in 
2014, of which 180 (45% of the total) were upper-tier establishments.  

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Poland reported that all upper-tier establishments apart from 10 were required to have an external 
emergency plan. In addition, external emergency plans for 6 upper-tier establishments were not drafted as 
required. Poland indicated that this was the case of newly classified establishments for which it was deemed 
that there were no off-site risks. 

At the end of the reporting period, 3 upper tier establishments’ external emergency plans had not been 
tested. The reasons were (i) local floods that led to a delay in the scheduled date; (ii) a request from the 
operator due to a change to the technological process; and (iii) a delay due to the assessment of the 
operators’ documents. Poland explained that these external emergency plans were tested at a later date.  

Inspections were carried out at least once during the reporting period for 100% of upper-tier sites and 100% 
of lower-tier sites. Annual inspections were held in all upper tier establishments. In addition, 24 additional 
inspections of upper-tier establishments were carried out due to changes to the activities, substances or 
owner. 

The response indicates that gaps were identified in relation to key provisions of the Directive. The main 
issues were relating to the lack of external emergency plans for 3 establishments and the large number of 
upper-tier establishments that were not inspected annually, or in some cases at all, during the reporting 
period. 

In Portugal, there were a total of 183 establishments subject to the provisions of the Seveso II Directive in 
2014, of which 59 (32% of the total) were upper-tier establishments.  

Portugal reported that all upper-tier establishments were required to be covered by an external emergency 
plan but that three had not been drafted as required. No further information was included on this issue.  At 
the end of the reporting period, 18 upper tier establishments’ external emergency plans had not been tested. 
Portugal has provided an explanation for 8 of these establishments. According to them, 6 establishments 
have been or will be tested in other years (2 in each of 2011, 2015 and 2016). Also, one establishment 
became operational during 2014 and another one was in the process of being reclassified as lower-tier. As 
such the lack of testing of the external emergency plans is not considered to be a compliance issue. 

Inspections are planned based on a systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards; as such there is no 
obligation to inspect upper-tier establishments annually. Inspections were carried out at least once during the 
reporting period for 68% of upper-tier sites and 35% of lower-tier sites. This means that 32% of the upper tier 
establishments were not inspected at all in the three-year period. Annual inspections were held in none of 
the upper tier establishments. The data reported on annual inspections are particularly low. It might reflect 
difficulties encountered in applying the requirements of the Directive at national level and additional support 
with these aspects may be necessary. 

The response indicates that the provisions of the Seveso II Directive are mostly implemented with the only 
issue identified in relation to two external emergency plans not being adopted or tested.  

In Romania, there were a total of 303 establishments subject to the provisions of the Seveso II Directive in 
2014, of which 120 (39% of the total) were upper-tier establishments.  

Romania reported that all upper-tier establishments but 3 were required to have an external emergency plan. 
In addition, 2 establishments are not covered by external emergency plans but no further details were 
provided to understand why this is the case. At the end of the reporting period, 2 upper tier establishments’ 
external emergency plans had not been tested. It is likely that these are the two missing external emergency 
plans.   

Inspections are planned based on a systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards; as such there is no 
obligation to inspect upper-tier establishments annually. Inspections were carried out at least once during the 
reporting period for 100% of upper-tier sites and 100% of lower-tier sites. Annual inspections were held in 
119 out of 120 upper tier establishments. 

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The response indicates that the provisions of the Seveso II Directive are almost fully implemented, the only 
issue identified was in relation to 3 external emergency plans not being tested and potentially a low number 
of annual inspections. However, Slovakia indicated that inspections are planned based on a systematic 
appraisal of major accident hazards and as such this might not be an issue.  

In Slovakia, there were a total of 82 establishments subject to the provisions of the Seveso II Directive in 
2014, of which 44 (53% of the total) were upper-tier establishments.  

Slovakia reported that all upper-tier establishments apart from one had an external emergency plan. For this 
establishment, it was decided that an external emergency plan was not necessary due to the location of the 
site. At the end of the reporting period, 3 upper tier establishments’ external emergency plans had not been 
tested.  

Inspections are planned based partly on a systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards; as such there is 
no obligation to inspect upper-tier establishments annually. Slovakia indicated that its objective is to inspect 
upper tier establishments every 15 months but that in some instances it was increased to 18 months. 
Inspections were carried out at least once during the reporting period for 100% of upper-tier sites and 100% 
of lower-tier sites. Annual inspections were held in 4 upper tier establishments representing 9% of the upper 
tier establishments. The data reported on annual inspections are low and it might be useful to verify whether 
there are any difficulties encountered in applying the requirements of the Directive at national level. 
Considering that all upper tier establishments were inspected at least once during the reporting period this 
might not be the case but rather a reflexion of the inspection programme adopted by Slovakia. 

The response indicates that the provisions of the Seveso II Directive are fully implemented.  

In Slovenia, there were a total of 61 establishments subject to the provisions of the Seveso II Directive in 
2014, of which 33 (54% of the total) were upper-tier establishments.  

Slovenia reported that all upper-tier establishments had an external emergency plan, all of which were tested 
during the reporting period.  

Inspections were carried out at least once during the reporting period for 100% of upper-tier sites and 100% 
of lower-tier sites. Annual inspections were held in all upper tier establishments. 

The Spanish response indicates that the provisions of the Seveso II Directive are mostly implemented but 
gaps were observed in relation to key provisions of the Directive. The main gaps observed relate to the lack 
of an external emergency plan for 32 establishments, the low level of external emergency plans testing and a 
large number of upper-tier establishments not inspected annually or indeed at all during the reporting period. 

In Spain, there were a total of 832 establishments subject to the provisions of the Seveso II Directive in 
2014, of which 377 (45% of the total) were upper-tier establishments.  

Spain reported that all upper-tier establishments apart from 4 were required to have an external emergency 
plan. Plans had not been drafted for 32 establishments. There was no information provided to understand 
why this is the case. 

At the end of the reporting period, 210 upper tier establishments’ external emergency plans had not been 
tested. This does not appear to comply with the requirements of the Seveso II Directive.  

It is unclear whether inspections are planned based on a systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards or 
not. Authorities carried out, on average, inspections at least once during the reporting period in 78% of 
upper-tier sites and in 56% of lower-tier sites during the reporting period. Annual inspections were held in 
192 upper tier establishments, representing 51% of total upper tier establishments. This relatively low 
number of upper-tier establishments inspected annually may not be an issue (depending on how inspections 
are planned); however, it might be useful to verify this is the case. However, the fact that 22% of upper tier 

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establishments were not inspected at all during the reporting period might indicate difficulties encountered in 
applying the requirements of the Directive at national or regional level. 

The response indicates that the provisions of the Seveso II Directive are almost fully implemented. The main 
gap observed relates to the lack of external emergency plans for 9 establishments and the low level of 
testing of external emergency plans. 

In Sweden, there were a total of 400 establishments subject to the provisions of the Seveso II Directive in 
2014, of which 211 (52% of the total) were upper-tier establishments.  

Sweden reported that all upper-tier establishments were required to have an external emergency plan. 
However, these were not drafted for 14 upper tier establishments. Sweden added that one of these had 
closed and four were new establishments. For the remaining nine establishments, this appears to be a lack 
of compliance with the requirements of the Seveso II Directive.  At the end of the reporting period, 120 upper 
tier establishments’ external emergency plans had not been tested, which represents more than half of the 
upper tier establishment in Sweden. This appears to constitute a lack of compliance with the requirements of 
the Seveso II Directive.  

Inspections are planned based on a systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards; as such there is no 
obligation to inspect upper-tier establishments annually. Inspections were carried out at least once during the 
reporting period for 89% of upper-tier sites and 81% of lower-tier sites. Annual inspections were held in 30 
upper tier establishments, representing 14% of total upper tier establishments.  

The response indicates that the provisions of the Seveso II Directive are fully implemented.  

In the UK, there were a total of 924 establishments subject to the provisions of the Seveso II Directive in 
2014, of which 352 (38% of the total) were upper-tier establishments.  

The UK reported that all upper-tier establishments apart from 7 were required to be covered by an external 
emergency plan. In addition, for 20 establishments no external emergency plans were produced. The UK 
explained that 11 of them became upper tier during 2014 and that, for the remaining 9, the plans were due to 
be completed in 2015. As such this does not appear to constitute a lack of compliance with the requirements 
of the Seveso II Directive.  

At the end of the reporting period, 53 upper tier establishments’ external emergency plans had not been 
tested. Of these, 18 were tested at the beginning of 2015, with the other 7 due to be tested before the end of 
that year. 11 establishments became upper-tier in 2014 and their plans did not need to be tested until a year 
later. As such this does not appear to constitute a lack of compliance with the requirements of the Seveso II 
Directive. UK authorities stated that they were seeking information about the remaining (17) upper-tier 
establishments and would take the appropriate action once they have more information.  

Inspections are planned based on a systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards; as such there is no 
obligation to inspect upper-tier establishments annually. Inspections were carried out at least once during the 
reporting period for 100% of upper-tier sites and 92% of lower-tier sites.  Annual inspections were held on 
average in 87% of total upper tier establishments. 

4.3   Additional information sources 

A review of additional information sources to support the assessment of implementation was conducted.  
This includes review of infringement decisions and review of the implementation of the UNECE Convention,  

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Infringement decisions during the reporting period were consulted37. A total of 11 relevant proceedings were 
identified and are listed in the table below. Most of these cases relate to failure from Member States to 
implement Article 30 of Seveso III Directive that requires an amendment of the wording of Annex I. The 
remaining three procedures are notifications of closing of cases that were ruled prior to the reporting period. 
As such, formal compliance with the Seveso II Directive appears to be satisfactory during the reporting 
period. 

Procedure 
reference 

Date 

Member 
State 

0140240 

31/03/2014  Germany 

20140251 

31/03/2014  Croatia 

20140267 

31/03/2014  Slovenia 

20140234 

31/03/2014  Cyprus 

20140227 

31/03/2014  Austria 

20140242 

31/03/2014  Greece 

20140244 

31/03/2014  Spain 

20140248 

31/03/2014  France 

20140237 

31/03/2014  Czech 

Republic 

20140232 

31/03/2014  Bulgaria 

20140258 

31/03/2014  Luxemburg 

Type of 
infringement 
proceedings 

Formal notice 
Art. 258 TFEU  

Formal notice 
Art. 258 TFEU  

Formal notice 
Art. 258 TFEU  

Formal notice 
Art. 258 TFEU  

Formal notice 
Art. 258 TFEU  

Formal notice 
Art. 258 TFEU  

Formal notice 
Art. 258 TFEU  

Formal notice 
Art. 258 TFEU  

Formal notice 
Art. 258 TFEU  

Formal notice 
Art. 258 TFEU  

Formal notice 
Art. 258 TFEU  

Topic of the infringement proceeding 

CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS - SEVESO - Directive 2012/18/EU  

CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS - SEVESO - Directive 2012/18/EU  

CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS - SEVESO - Directive 2012/18/EU  

CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS - SEVESO - Directive 2012/18/EU  

CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS - SEVESO - Directive 2012/18/EU  

CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS - SEVESO - Directive 2012/18/EU  

CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS - SEVESO - Directive 2012/18/EU  

CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS - SEVESO - Directive 2012/18/EU  

CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS - SEVESO - Directive 2012/18/EU  

CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS - SEVESO - Directive 2012/18/EU  

CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS - SEVESO - Directive 2012/18/EU  

20072035 

26/04/2012  Portugal 

Closing of the 
case  

Seveso – bad application of Article 11 regarding external emergency 
plans 

20074717 

27/02/2012 

Italy 

Closing of the 
case  

Seveso - bad application of Art. 13(1) on information to the public 

20072038 

26/01/2012  Spain 

Closing of the 
case  

Seveso – bad application of Article 11 regarding external emergency 
plans 

Source: http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/applying-eu-law/infringements-proceedings/infringement_decisions/ 

37 http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/applying-eu-law/infringements-proceedings/infringement_decisions/ 

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The UNECE published in 2014 a report looking at the implementation of the Convention for the 2012-2013 
period38. The report is based on information submitted by the Parties and activities of the Working Group 
during the considered period. 

Out of the 41 Parties to the Convention, 34 had submitted their national implementation reports including for 
the EU: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and 
the UK. These reports are not available publicly. 

The implementation was assessed against several categories: 

  Policy for implementation of the Convention: the Working Group note that many Parties 
struggled with identifying indicators of success for the effectiveness of the policies on the 
implementation of the Convention and proposed to work on defining those indicators to support 
future reporting. Weaknesses identified the lack of experts or qualified personnel, the lack of 
financial and other resources and unclear division of responsibilities between authorities. The 
report does not single out any country in particular though so it is not possible to know if any 
Member State is concerned; 

 

Identification and notification of hazardous activities with the potential to cause 
transboundary effects: the report notes that 25 Parties have reported having identifying 
hazardous activities and only 12 have notified their neighbours about it. Czech Republic and 
Hungary were found to only partly notify neighbours while Slovenia did not notify at all. Finland, 
Lithuania and the Netherlands did not provide information on this point. This suggested that 
further efforts were needed to improve the procedures for notification of hazardous activities to 
neighbouring countries; 

  Prevention of industrial accidents: weaknesses in the prevention of accidents were identified 
such as human resources (Slovenia), the insufficient training of staff in authorities (Romania)), 
missed risk identification and assessment (Estonia and Lithuania), weak quality of safety 
reports and the lack of coordination between the authorities and the authorities and operators. 
The report does not provide further details on the weaknesses and whether there is any 
consequence for compliance with the Seveso Directive; 

  Emergency preparedness and response: While testing, updating and reviewing emergency 

plans seems to be at an acceptable level at national level, the UNECE noted some potential for 
improvement where it comes to cooperation with neighbouring countries. The Working Group 
concluded that Parties might benefit from common emergency plan guidelines to improve 
cooperation between neighbouring countries. Weaknesses identified included crises 
communication system (Netherlands) and uncertainties in the sharing of capabilities in 
response to emergencies (the UK). Countries that have addressed the collaboration between 
central and local government successfully (e.g. Germany) were encouraged to share their good 
practices with those for which this is still proven difficult (e.g. Lithuania). Here again the report 
does not provide further details on the weaknesses and whether there is any consequence for 
compliance with the Seveso Directive; 

  Mutual assistance: Most Parties have reported having identified an authority to act as point of 

contact for mutual assistance; 

  Scientific and technological cooperation and exchange of information: The cooperation 
between countries has been found to increase and Parties were encouraged to further share 
good practices; 

38 UNECE, Seventh implementation report from the Working Group on Implementation of the Industrial 
Accidents Convention, 2012-2013 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/documents/2014/TEIA/COP__Gva__3-
5_Dec_14/ECE_CP.TEIA_2014.4.E.pdf and 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/documents/2015/TEIA/WGI/E_cop.teia.2014.INF.1.pdf 

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  Participation of the public: Parties often have involvement of the public in emergency 

response and land-use planning procedures. However, the level of availability of procedures 
for involving the public varies amongst Parties and further efforts were highlighted as needed. 
The report does not single out any country in particular though so it is not possible to know if 
any Member State is concerned. The Working Group noted that with the implementation of the 
Seveso III, a presentation from the European Union on the changes entailed with regards to 
public information was needed; and  

  Decision making on siting: the Working Group noted that land-use planning often does not 

consider transboundary aspects fully and parties were called to improve their policies on these 
aspects. 

As can be seen from the above, the UNECE identified some weaknesses in Member States’ implementation 
of the Convention, in particular with regards to the availability of trained staff and resources for the 
prevention of human accident and with communication systems in crisis situations (Netherlands) or with 
other Member States (Lithuania). 

Another relevant conclusion from the Working Group was to recommend that the Parties use elements from 
the indicators and criteria contained in the document on benchmarks for the implementation of the 
Convention39 to report on the progress made in the implementation of the Convention. Similar guidance 
including indicators and criteria to benchmark the implementation of the Seveso III Directive could be 
developed, thus providing reference material for Member States when assessing their national 
implementation. 

The report also sets the priorities for the next reporting period, to cover 2015-2016. These are the 
elaboration of criteria or standards for safety and land-use planning incorporating long-term trends, the 
exchange of experience and good practices on bilateral exercises for preparedness and addressing the risk 
of complacency in ensuring prevention and maintaining a high level of safety. 

4.4  Conclusions on the implementation of the Directive  

The 2012-2014 reporting period marks the last implementation period under the Seveso II Directive. As such 
this provides an opportunity to reflect on the progress made on the implementation of the Directive beyond 
the latest reporting period. 

At the end of the reporting period there were 11 297 establishments reported by Member States and 9 998 
reported in eSPIRS. When comparing the number reported under the two reporting systems, differences can 
be observed in all Member States with the largest difference for the number of lower-tier establishments in 
Germany. It can be noticed that the numbers reported by Member States are almost systematically higher 
than those reported in eSPIRS40.   

Thus, most of the analysis is based on data reported by Member States to the implementation questionnaire 
(i.e. reported data). 

39 ECE/CP/TEIA/2010/6 
https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/teia/doc/AP/AP_Tools/Benchmarks_ece.cp.teia.2010.6.EN.pdf 
40 The Seveso II Directive (as with the Seveso III Directive) does not require Member States to update their 
data at specific intervals. As such, the data of Member States presented in eSPIRS could be from any year 
since 2008 depending on when the last update was conducted. Most Member States do partial updates of 
their data, which explains further discrepancies. For example, the 2014 reported data for Germany were 
found to match the latest update made in eSPIRS 2016 by the Member State. Croatia only updated its 
eSPIRS register late in 2016.  

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Lower-tier 
implementation 
reporting 

Upper-tier 
Implementation 
reporting 

Lower-tier 
eSPIRS 

Upper-tier 
eSPIRS 

AT 

76 

BE 

179 

BG 

109 

CY 

9 

CZ 

90 

72 

204 

86 

13 

117 

64 

170 

105 

6 

91 

80 

202 

76 

10 

104 

DE 

2 123 

1 141 

1 238 

1 160 

65 

25 

135 

371 

136 

553 

80 

47 

44 

25 

84 

260 

128 

553 

64 

47 

551 

586 

24 

9 

33 

5 

174 

193 

109 

17 

9 

30 

6 

221 

169 

58 

DK 

EE 

67 

27 

EL 

110 

ES 

455 

FI 

165 

FR 

539 

HR 

32 

HU 

134 

IE 

IT 

LT 

LU 

LV 

48 

545 

24 

10 

34 

MT 

3 

NL 

154 

PL 

212 

PT 

124 

54 

37 

83 

377 

135 

639 

25 

105 

48 

567 

18 

8 

29 

9 

252 

180 

59 

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Lower-tier 
implementation 
reporting 

Upper-tier 
Implementation 
reporting 

Lower-tier 
eSPIRS 

Upper-tier 
eSPIRS 

RO 

183 

SE 

189 

SI 

SK 

28 

38 

UK 

572 

120 

211 

33 

44 

352 

182 

168 

36 

39 

114 

194 

24 

42 

687 

395 

Total 

6 279 

5 018 

5 296 

4 702 

Since 2005, the number of establishments covered by the Seveso Directive has increased. As shown in 
Figure 4.1, both the number of upper tier and lower tier increased throughout the reporting period. Note that 
number of lower tier establishments is only reported since 2009. 

Source: Implementation reports from Member States 

Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom are the Member States with the most establishments during 
the  latest  reporting  period  but  also  throughout  the  reporting  period.  Data  on  the  number  of  upper-tier 
establishments has been reported since the first reporting period. Figure 4.2 presents for each Member State 
the  evolution  of  the  number  of  upper-tier  establishments  through  the  reporting  periods  and  shows  that 
increases can be observed in most Member States. 

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Note: Data on establishments for the years 2005, 2008 and 2011 have been provided by Member States in the three-year 
implementation reports submitted to the Commission. 

As for activities of the Seveso establishments, in 2014, the three most represented categories are: fuel storage, 
wholesale and chemical installations. The review of the sector of activities of the Seveso establishments shows 
that  the  Directive  covers  a  large  range  of  activities,  with  establishments  reported  in  38  industrial  activities, 
some of which includes less than 10 establishments (e.g. textiles manufacturing and leisure activities). 

More details are provided in section 3.3.3 and in Member States summary sheets in Appendix B. 

Data on incidents, near misses and major accidents were provided by the Major Accident Hazard Bureau 
spanning the 2000-2014 period. The analysis here focuses on major accident events which is the only 
compulsory reporting under Seveso II Directive. Information reported on incidents and near misses is 
voluntary and as such it is difficult to identify any trends as it reflects more on the reporting tradition of a 
specific sector or a Member State rather than providing information on the level of safety. 

Member States reported a total of 421 major accidents to MAHB between 2000 and 2014, with an additional 
69 accidents reported voluntarily for learning purposes (i.e. ‘near misses’ and ‘other’) giving a total of 490 
accidents reported. Out of the total 490, 389 have been published41.  

The number of major accidents is only partially helpful in understanding the impacts of the Directive. Major 
accidents are unpredictable, stochastic events, and reported in such small numbers that it is difficult to make 
statistical sense of the results. However, one possible reading is that the average number of accidents 
reported during 2012-2014 (39 accidents – unpublished data) is similar to the average number of accidents 
reported during 2009-2011 (37 accidents – unpublished data). For comparison, figures in previous three-year 
periods were 29 (2006-2008), 28 (2003-2005) and 30 (2000-2002). However, it is important to mention that 
this apparent increase is due to the increase in ‘near misses’ and ‘other’ events being reported (Table 4.5). 

41 Member States will usually start the reporting process shortly after an accident has occurred but on 
average it will take 3 or 4 years for reports to be published.  Reports are not published until they are 
confirmed as correct and complete by the Member State.  Accident investigation and analysis alone may 
take some months. In addition, enforcement procedures and litigation may significantly delay finalisation of 
reports. The need to translate reports into English (that must be ultimately also approved by the reporting 
country) also incurs some delay. 

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Period 

Number of major accidents reported  Total number of accidents reported 

2012-2014 

2009-2011 

2006-2008 

2003-2005 

2000-2002 

28 

30 

28 

27 

27 

39 

37 

29 

28 

30 

The figure below presents the evolution of the ratio of number of major accidents to the number of upper tier 
establishments. The chart is based on the data on major accidents recorded in eMARS (unpublished data) 
and the number of upper tier establishments reported by Member States through the triannual reporting.  

Overall, a decrease in the number of major accidents per establishment is noticeable during the 2005-2009 
period, followed by an increase in 2010 but it has not been determined that this is a statistically significant 
trend. The same limitations linked to the nature of major accidents are applicable. Because major accidents 
are reported in such small numbers, a variation in the number will exaggerate the impact. In addition, the 
latest data from 2014 are not considered complete so could represent an under-estimate. From the figure 
below it is also impossible to conclude on whether there is an overall increase or reduction of major 
accidents, however it is possible to conclude that the numbers are relatively stable. 

Note: The figure presents only major accidents occurring in upper tier establishments as number of lower tier establishments is not 
available before 2009. The number of upper tier establishments used are from Member States reporting, number of major accidents 
from upper tier establishments are from eMARS data including unpublished data. 
Note 2: A total of 56 major accidents were reported between 2000-2014 as from establishments of ‘tier unknown’; these are not included 
in the figure above. These refer to reports submitted before Seveso II notifications were checked and finalised. 
Note 3: The uneven intervals (2005, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2014) are due to the different way the data was reported by Member 
States in their reports. 

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The focus of the Seveso Directive is to prevent major accidents, but also to prevent their consequences 
when accidents do happen. As such a useful consideration would be to consider the evolution of the data 
reported to the MAHB on the number of injuries and fatalities from Seveso establishments.  

Since 2000, Seveso accidents have led to 208 deaths on site and 12 offsite. Over the same period, 373 
injuries were recorded onsite and 865 offsite.  The evolution of the number of deaths and injuries is 
presented in the chart below. 

Note: based on published data only (total 389 reports) 
It is noticeable that the number of deaths has peaked and reduced since 2003 while the number of injuries 
has remained relatively stable apart from a peak in 2012. The high numbers in 2012 are due to two major 
accidents: one chlorine leak at an electroplating plant leading to 39 injuries and a fire in a fertiliser store 
leading to 25 injuries. 

An overview of the conclusions on the implementation for each of the key article of the Seveso II Directive is 
presented below. 

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Article content 

Conclusions on implementation 

Article 1 

Article 8 

Article 9 

Article 11 

The aim of the Directive 
is the prevention of 
major accidents which 
involve dangerous 
substances and the 
limitation of their 
consequences for man 
and the environment 

Possible domino effects 
are to be identified and 
information to be 
exchanged as required 
between establishments 
to support cooperation 

Safety report to be 
produced to 
demonstrate that major 
accident prevention 
policy and safety 
management system 
have been put into 
effect. 
Safety report have to be 
reviewed and updated 
where necessary at 
least every five years 

Internal emergency 
plans to be drafted for 
upper-tier 
establishments 
External emergency 
plans to be drafted for 
upper tier 
establishments 
Both are to be reviewed, 
tested and revised if 
necessary at least every 
three years 

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The statistical analysis does not allow clear conclusions to be drawn on whether the Directive has contributed to an increase or a reduction of major 
accidents, however it can be observed that while the number of establishments has increased in the European Union and through successive 
enlargements, the number of major accidents reported annually has remained relatively stable. 
Furthermore, the number of deaths and injuries both onsite and offsite have gradually reduced since 2000. 

The information requested on domino effects has been mostly qualitative through the reporting periods. From the information reported, this provision of 
the Directive appears to be successfully implemented in all Member States.  

No information was requested on safety reports as part of the latest reporting period.  
The 2009-2011 reporting period concluded that Member States' replies indicate that, by 2011, only 2% (83) of the operators had not submitted a safety 
report to the competent authorities. This percentage has remained relatively stable over the three years: 2% in 2008, 2% in 2009 and 1% in 2010. This 
seems to indicate that maximum implementation level has been reached and that the few establishments for which safety reports were not submitted 
were due to new establishments, or establishments recently classified as upper tier. 

No information was requested on internal emergency plans as part of this reporting period. However, the previous reporting round (2009-2011) 
indicated that competent authorities mainly have proof of the existence of such plans through the examination of the safety report. In this sense, by the 
end of 2011, about 1% (67) of the upper-tier establishments had an internal emergency plan (compared to 1% in 2009). Here again it seems that the 
maximum implementation level has been reached. 

On informing the public, when compared with the previous reporting period responses it is noticeable that more phone based and internet based alarm 
systems are being reported by Member States as being used. While this is not prohibited by the Directive it is important to consider whether this is 
sufficient to reach all the potentially affected population, in particular elderly people who may be less comfortable with more modern communication 
means. 

The number of upper-tier establishments without an external emergency plan has increased since the previous reporting period where 307 
establishments were reported in this situation. When compared to the previous reporting period, it is interesting to notice that throughout reporting, the 
share of upper tier establishments for which external emergency plans had not been drafted by the Competent Authorities has varied, while it 
corresponds to 8% of the upper tier establishments by the end of the 2012-2014 reporting period, this represented 6% by the end of the 2009-2011 

 
 
                      
 
 
 
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Article content 

Conclusions on implementation 

period, 9% by the end of 2008 and 28% by the end of 2005. The fact that a gap remains between the number of upper tier establishments and the 
number of external emergency plans might be explained by the increase in the number of installations with which competent authorities have not 
caught up. Since 2008, the share of upper tier establishments not having adopted an external emergency plan has stabilised, however it is noticeable 
that the more recent figures show a clear improvement over the initial data reported in 2005. 

From the information reported, all Member States land use planning includes to some extent prevention of major accidents and ways of limiting the 
consequences of such accidents. 

Article 12 

Land use planning 
policies must take into 
account the prevention 
of major accidents and 
limit the consequences 
of such accidents 

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Article content 

Conclusions on implementation 

Information has been made available actively at least once during the last five years for 81% of the upper tier establishments. This represents a 
decrease on the share reported in the last reported period (87%).  However, it is important to note that the change in wording of the question may 
explain this decrease. The Directive requests information to be provided regularly and reviewed every three years and the question requests 
information on upper tier establishments that have provided information on safety measures in the last reporting period. The fact that they have not 
does not mean that they do not implement the requirements of the Directive. 

Article 13 

Information on safety 
measures to be 
provided regularly to all 
persons liable to be 
affected by a major 
accident originating in 
an upper tier 
establishments. 
Information is to be 
reviewed every three 
years. 
Safety report to be 
made available to the 
public 

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Article content 

Conclusions on implementation 

Article 18 

Inspections of upper tier 
establishments annually 
except for those 
Member States where 
the programme of 
inspections is based on 
the systematic appraisal 
of major accident 
hazard 

Inspection is a key aspect of the implementation of the Directive as it is the opportunity for the competent authority to verify on site that the provisions of 
the Directive are being applied in practice. The Directive requires that upper tier establishments are inspected at least once per year. However, there is 
a flexibility included in the Directive which is that annual inspections are not required where the programme of inspections is based on a systematic 
assessment of major-accident hazards.    
When comparing the evolution of the number of inspections during the reporting periods, it is noticeable that overall both the number of inspections of 
upper tier and lower tier increased the number of lower tier establishments inspected increased significantly (more than 50%). Note that the absence of 
data for lower-tier establishments’ inspections in 2005 and 2008 reflects the fact that Member States were not required to report this data.  

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4.5  Possible areas for improvement 

Throughout the review of the implementation, several areas for potential improvement have been identified.  
In particular: 

  Drafting and testing of external emergency plans has been identified as a potential compliance 
issue in several Member States (see Table 4.2). Delays were often reported as reasons for this 
by Member States which may reflect on staff and resources availability. This was also raised in 
the UNECE reporting, not only for external emergency plans, but as a limitation to the wider 
implementation of the Convention; 

  Inspections of upper tier establishments may benefit from further support. While Member States 
are allowed to set an inspection frequency that is less than annual when using systematic risk 
appraisal to plan inspection programmes, it is also important that upper-tier establishments are 
not left uninspected for a long time. There might be a need for further guidance on inspections, 
taking into account the flexibility allowed by the Directive; 

  Data reported to the MAHB are generally useful, but there are limited conclusions that can be 
drawn from the number of major accidents. As such it is important to consider other possible 
indicators to use in order to assess the progress made by the implementation of the Directive 
(and initial proposals are included in Section 7); 

  Furthermore while the Seveso Directive’s objective is to prevent major accidents, it also 

acknowledges that accidents may occur and that in this case, limiting the consequences of such 
accidents for human health and the environment is important. In order to better understand the 
progress made with regards to limiting the consequences of industrial accidents, it would be 
useful to encourage further reporting and research into environmental, human and socio-
economic impacts of accidents and to compare how these have evolved; 

  On reporting, it was noticeable that beyond major accidents, the reporting of incident and near-
misses are more a reflection of the reporting culture for a specific sector or a specific Member 
State. As this reporting is voluntary it is difficult to interpret it. A large number of near-misses 
may reflect on the hazardous practices of a sector but also on the diligence of reporting; 
similarly a low numbers of reported near-misses does not systematically mean safer practices; 

  When considering the activities of the establishments covered by the Seveso Directive, one 
interesting conclusion made was that a large number of establishments across all Member 
States were reported as conducting ‘other’ activities.  Given that the range of categories to 
choose from is diverse and specific without being restrictive it is worth considering why such a 
large number of establishments are classified as ‘others’. This may highlight difficulties for 
Member States in identifying the relevant category for their establishments, in which case more 
guidance could be appropriate; and  

  The 2012-2014 reporting period was the first time when Member States were requested to 

provide feedback on lessons learnt and experience in applying the Directive. This was found to 
be a valuable addition, in particular when considering the fact that the reporting of lessons learnt 
under eMARS was uneven.   

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5  Analysis of major accident and establishment data  

5.1  Analysis of major accident data 

The Major Accident Reporting System (eMARS) operated by the Major Accident Hazard Bureau (MAHB) of 
the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre was established to manage the information on 'major 
accidents' submitted by Member States of the European Union to the European Commission in accordance 
with the provisions of the Seveso Directive. The eMARS database resulted from provisions in the first 
Seveso Directive and has been collecting reports on major accidents from Member States since 1984 by the 
Member States and other countries42. Currently, eMARS has published more than 750 events reported by 
the Member States as required by the Seveso Directive, and in accordance with the criteria of its Annex VI. 
The information is collected using either a “short report” or a “full report”.43  There are approximately 300 
more accident reports that are still awaiting confirmation by the reporting Member States (and there is a lag 
time of 3-4 years in finalising reports). 

The reports typically contain information on the accident type, substances directly involved, sources of 
accident, immediate causes, immediate effects, emergency measures taken, and immediate lessons learnt, 
type of accident, the industry where the accident occurred, the activity being carried out, the components 
directly involved, the causative factors (immediate and underlying), the ecological systems affected and the 
emergency measures taken.  

Our analysis focuses on accidents reported between 2000 and 2014. 

The eMARS data analysed in this report covers the 2000-2014 period44, so that the situation for 2012-2014 
can be compared to the previous periods corresponding to the 3-year implementation intervals (2000-2002, 
2003-2005, 2006-2008 and 2009-2011). For continuity with the previous reports on eMARS, the following 
analyses have been performed.  The period covered for the data provided by the JRC is 2000-2014 unless 
otherwise mentioned below. In addition, for some analyses, the period covered by the data used is larger, 
and data available for the period prior to 2000 have been included when relevant and available. 

a)  Event types: number of major accidents for upper tier and lower tier establishments over the period 

2000-2014; 

b)  Reasons for reporting (aligned with Annex VI of the Directive), in the period 2000-2014 and the 

period 2012-2014;  

c)  Number of injuries and fatalities; 

d)  Type of hazardous phenomenon involved: release of toxic substances in the atmosphere, fire, 

explosion, spillage, etc.; 

e)  Number of accidents reported with lessons learned; 

f)  Number of accidents by named substance or substance category; 

42 For example, EEA countries and UNECE. https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/teia/doc/COP-
7/10.5_EMARS.pdf  
43 Now available at https://emars.jrc.ec.europa.eu.  This location will change later in 2017 to 
https://emars.ec.europa.eu. 
44 The JRC provided eMARS data for the analysis in this report. 

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g)  Number of accidents by activity type; and  

h)  Number of newly-created reports inserted during the period 2012-2014.  

A distinction has been made between accidents in upper-tier and lower-tier establishments for all cases, 
including a breakdown of accidents by substance categories and by type of establishment.  These statistics 
are available from the year 2000 although some accidents were still not reported in these two categories (i.e. 
lower and upper tier) in the early 2000s because at this time the status of some sites were uncertain during 
the transition from the Seveso I to the Seveso II Directive.  

The statistics presented in this report have been derived from eMARS based on published data from 
September 2016.  In addition, an update of certain unpublished data was provided by the JRC in February 
2017, to be used for certain analyses. 

The data analysis incorporates the following assumptions and limitations: 

Public data  

The data provided reflect the eMARS data as of 28/09/20016  
The data provided are based on the published data, the JRC indicated 
that the unpublished data have not been validated and hence cannot be 
considered as part of the analysis.  
Published and unpublished data consist of 490 accidents in total, 
published data consists of 389 accidents. 

Time limits: 

Data covers the 2000 – 2014 period 

Limits on establishments considered: 

Data extracted cover only Seveso I + II  

Statistics on reason for reporting: 

If an accident has more than one reason to be reported, the accident is 
counted as many times as there are reasons. 

Accident data by tiers 

Statistics on Fatalities and Injuries: 

"Tier not known" refers to report submitted before Seveso II notifications were 
checked and finalised.  In many countries, this occurred around 2000 or 2001, 
given that implementation effective date was 1999. 

Figures based on the free text interpretation of the field "Consequences" in 
eMARS.  
Only serious injuries are considered (i.e. hospitalised for at least 24 hours). 
Consequently, small, light injuries are not counted. Similarly, no ‘slight’ injuries 
and hospitalised under observation were counted. 

Impacts on contractors and external responders (e.g. fire brigades) are 
counted together as on-site personnel. 

Statistics on phenomena involved in 
accidents 

If an accident has more than one hazardous phenomenon involved, the 
accident is counted as many times as there are hazardous phenomena 
involved. 

Statistics on substance involved 

If an accident has more than one substance involved, the accident is counted 
as many times as there are substances involved. 

Socio-economic impact of accidents 

Socio economic impact is counted in number of accidents per year and where 
in the ‘consequence’ reporting it was indicated that there were either 
economic effects off-site, a transboundary effect or damage to the 
environment. 

It is important, when considering the statistical analysis, to keep these limitations in mind, in particular that 
unpublished data have not been validated and could change when the database is further updated.  

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This section presents the analysis of eMARS data for the period 2000-2014. In particular, the analysis has 
been performed with the intention to detect any trends regarding the types of accidents reported, the 
substance(s) involved, and the source of the accidents, the extension of the consequences, the measures 
taken and the lessons learned. 

Between 2000 and 2014, a total of 490 accidents (including major accidents, near misses and other) were 
reported to the eMARS database. Out of these 490 reports, the data for 389 reports have been processed, 
confirmed and published online, while the remaining 101 reports are still being processed and as such are 
considered as ‘unpublished’ data. Thus, there are two sets of data available, the ‘published’ data which 
include those 389 reports and the ‘unpublished’ data which also cover the 101 reports for which information 
is still being verified.  

Some data are unpublished because there is no specific deadline for Member States to complete and 
confirm publication of an accident report (for example legal issues pertaining to the accident can delay 
confirmation of the information).  Hence, some reports are only finalised a few years (sometimes longer) after 
the accident occurred.  It also means that some accidents occurring in 2012-2014, but not confirmed for 
publication, are not included in the ‘published’ statistics.  

Furthermore, in the 2012-2014 period, there were updates made from the previous 3-year reporting periods 
on accidents occurring before 2012. As a result, there should be caution when considering the data and 
trends since 2012.  On average, 4 to 5 years are needed before one can expect that most of the reports for 
that year have been submitted.   

Table 5.2 presents the number of reports (major accidents, other events and near misses) each year in 
eMARS and their status. It can be observed that for the 2012-2014 period, the number of annual reports 
based on the published data has decreased. However, it is important to note that this decrease could be due 
to the completeness of the datasets as described above rather than an actual diminution of the number of 
accidents.  

Year 

2000 

2001 

2002 

2003 

2004 

2005 

2006 

2007 

2008 

2009 

2010 

Newly created 

To be confirmed 

Confirmed 

On-line 
(published) 

Total 

29 

25 

36 

27 

24 

34 

33 

27 

24 

23 

34 

29 

25 

36 

27 

24 

34 

33 

28 

25 

30 

47 

1 

1 

7 

11 

2 

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Year 

2011 

2012 

2013 

2014 

Total 

Newly created 

To be confirmed 

Confirmed 

On-line 
(published) 

Total 

8 

7 

14 

12 

61 

6 

6 

11 

12 

37 

1 

1 

1 

3 

19 

31 

16 

7 

34 

45 

41 

32 

389 

490 

Note: The table presents both published and unpublished data 

The table below presents the number of event reported in eMARS between 2000 and 2014 distinguishing 
their types and from which category of establishments.  

Year 

Type 

Upper Tier 

Lower Tier 

Tier not known 

Total 

6 

2 

5 

1 

1 

1 

3 

6 

6 

2000 

2001 

2002 

2003 

2004 

2005 

2006 

2007 

2008 

Major 
Accident 
Near Miss 

Other         

Major 
Accident 
Near Miss 

Other         

Major 
Accident 
Near Miss 

Other         

Major 
Accident 
Near Miss 

Other         

Major 
Accident 
Near Miss 

Other         

Major 
Accident 
Near Miss 

Other         

Major 
Accident 
Near Miss 

Other         

Major 
Accident 
Near Miss 

Other         

Major 
Accident 
Near Miss 

16 

1 

8 

2 

2 

21 

3 

17 

1 

19 

21 

1 

1 

29 

1 

20 

17 

Other         

2 

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6 

11 

7 

8 

4 

10 

2 

29 

25 

36 

27 

24 

34 

33 

28 

25 

 
                      
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
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Year 

Type 

Upper Tier 

Lower Tier 

Tier not known 

Total 

2009 

2010 

2011 

2012 

2013 

2014 

Major 
Accident 
Near Miss 

Other         

Major 
Accident 
Near Miss 

Other         

Major 
Accident 
Near Miss 

Other         

Major 
Accident 
Near Miss 

Other         

Major 
Accident 
Near Miss 

Other         

Major 
Accident 
Near Miss 

Other         

16 

1 

4 

26 

5 

1 

24 

4 

23 

7 

3 

19 

6 

3 

18 

1 

1 

3 

3 

1 

1 

1 

6 

2 

9 

2 

1 

3 

5 

4 

1 

7 

2 

3 

11 

2 

30 

47 

34 

45 

41 

32 

Note: The table presents both published and unpublished data 

Figure 5.1 presents the number of reported major accidents in eMARS from 2000 to 2014. During this period 
490 events (including major, near misses and others) have been registered, of which 421 (85%) were 
identified as major accidents meeting the criteria for reporting as specified in Annex VI of the Seveso II 
Directive.  

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Source: European Commission JRC, 2016 

Note: These data are from the unpublished database and as such include a number of accidents reported whose information has not 
been confirmed. 

In addition, data is available on the split between upper tier and lower tier establishments reporting major 
accidents. This data was averaged for the whole 2000-2014 period and is presented below. In most cases, 
major accidents were reported by upper tier establishments.  

Note: These data are from the unpublished database and as such include a number of accidents reported whose information has not 
been confirmed. 

Furthermore, every year, the number of reported major accidents is greater for upper tier establishments 
than for lower tier establishments. This might be due to the fact that the number of upper tier establishments 

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is higher than the number of lower tier establishments, but could also be due to the fact that the hazard 
potential is likely to be higher in upper tier establishments. 

The next two figures present the reasons for reporting according to the criteria derived from Annex VI of the 
Seveso II Directive. The criteria for reporting can be summarized as follows: 

  Reason 1: Substances involved: greater than 5% of quantity in Column 3 of Annex I; 

  Reason 2: Injury to persons: >= 1 fatalities, >= 6 hospitalising injuries etc.; 

  Reason 3: Immediate damage to the environment (according to Annex VI); 

  Reason 4: Damage to property: on-site >2M €, off-site > 0.5M €; 

  Reason 5: Cross-border damage: transboundary accidents;  

  Reason 6: Interesting for lessons learned; and  

  No Criteria: No reason reported. 

Source: European Commission, JRC 2016 
Note: These data are from the unpublished databases 

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Source: European Commission, JRC 2016 
Note: These data are from the unpublished databases 

For the period 2000-2014, the main reasons for reporting are Reason 1 (substance involved), followed by 
Reason 2 (injury to persons and fatalities), and Reason 4 (damage to property).  

Criterion 1 is the most common selection because the most common type of major accident involves a 
release of a large volume chemical release that does not have serious impacts.  Given that workers and 
emergency responders onsite are sometimes in close proximity to accident impacts, it is not unexpected that 
the second most common reasons for reporting are associated with fatalities and injuries.  

For the period 2012-2014, the same main reasons for reporting appear again. It is notable that lessons 
learned increased in this period due to a deliberate effort on the part of the European Commission to 
encourage reporting of lessons learned from other accidents that do not meet the Seveso major accident 
criteria.  

The figures below present the evolution of the number of fatalities reported since 2000. The data are 
presented distinguishing onsite and offsite. In general, there is no visible trend signalling reduction or 
increase of accidents.  Where certain years have higher fatalities, it generally coincides with the instance of 
one or two multiple fatality accidents (e.g., Enschede, NL, 2000; Toulouse, FR, 2001; Gorni Lom, BG, 2014).  

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Source: European Commission, MAHB, 2016. Note: These data represent data in published accident reports only (389 reports). 

Source: European Commission, JRC, 2016.  These data represent data in published accident reports only (389 reports) 
Note: The Y-axis has been readjusted for presentational purposes, as the figure was distorted due to the high number of injuries 
reported in 2001 

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The figures above show that the numbers of on-site and off-site injuries and fatalities have been high for the 
period 2000 - 2003. Trends for both injuries and fatalities are similar, with a significant reduction from 2003 
for fatalities and from 2001 for injuries. In 2012, a peak can be observed in the number of onsite injuries due 
to several releases of toxic gas during this year. 

In 2014, the number of reported fatalities and injuries is low. However, to some extent this might be due to 
the data being used which are the published data (i.e. the data available in the eMARS database rather than 
the raw data reported by Member States).   

Also, it is important to mention that the lack of pre-2000 data makes it difficult to analyse the overall trend 
since the Directive was established. The data since 2000 is also distorted by the fact that there were two 
major accidents in 2000 and 2001. If the effects of these two accidents were excluded, the number of injuries 
and fatalities in these two years would have been 8 fatalities and 27 injuries in 2000; and 6 fatalities and 20 
injuries in 2001, which are comparable to the figures in 2002.  

Even though it is difficult to make a clear statement because of the short period of observation and the 
relatively small number of events, it seems there is a general reducing trend in the number of fatalities and 
injuries over the period 2000-14 and since 2004 no report of fatalities offsite.   

The figures below present the number of hazardous phenomena involved in the reports in the public eMARS 
in terms of toxic release, fire and explosion (and undeclared).  

Note that only published data were used as information on type of hazardous phenomenon involved are not 
considered complete and reliable until confirmed for publication by the Member State. 

While figures for each hazardous phenomenon are presented in the following pages there is no obvious 
trend that can be observed. Note that each phenomenon is counted separately if an accident entails more 
than one phenomenon. 

Note: These data represent data in published accident reports only (389 reports). 

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Note: These data represent data in published accident reports only (389 reports). 

Note: These data represent data in published accident reports only (389 reports). 

A breakdown is provided for the releases of toxic substances to air, ground and water in the next figure. 

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Note: Each phenomenon is counted separately if an accident entails more than one different phenomenon.  These data represent data 
in published accident reports only (389 reports). 

As can be observed, among releases, release to the atmosphere is the most frequently reported. 

As part of the reporting to eMARS, information on substances or categories of substances involved in the 
accident are included. The data reported with regards to substances involved in accidents is presented in the 
figure below.  

Note that only published data were used as information on substances involved are not considered complete 
and reliable until confirmed for publication by the Member State. 

It is not possible to compare the number of major accidents by substances with the number of 
establishments using these substances because there are no databases listing substances used per 
establishment that can be used as a reference. 

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Note: The chart above aggregates several classifications, for example, ‘flammable’ includes highly flammable and extremely flammable.  
These data represent data in published accident reports only (389 reports). 

In this figure, the bars show the number of times substances, their categories or combinations thereof have 
been involved in a single event reported in eMARS in the period 2000-2014.  

Substances that are flammable were the most reported with 237 single accident reporting flammable 
substances. It is followed by toxic substances (192 accidents). It is noticeable that ‘unknown’ substances’ 
classification is involved in a large number of accidents which may indicate a need for a more precise 
reporting of incidents. When considering the data not aggregated, the category “02 Toxic” was cited the most 
with 121 events referring to this category followed by “08: Extremely flammable” cited 105 times. 

The data related to groups in the above figure is split in the figure below.  Each combination of risk category 
is separated into single categories and each event may be counted many times where many single 
categories were involved. An event which involved a substance that is for example explosive and toxic is 
reported twice, once for explosive and once for toxic. 

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Source: European Commission, JRC, 2016 
Note: These data represent data in published accident reports only (389 reports). 

This graph shows that the total of flammable substances (flammable, highly flammable and extremely 
flammable) represent a total of 87 recurrence.  This observation correlates with the data provided in Figure 
5.13, that show that most accidents occur in fuel storage and petrochemical industry.  

To perform further analysis and identify the substances and the corresponding industry contributing the most 
to major accidents, it would be necessary to break down the generic categories. Further analysis would be 
required to review all the information on accidents for each named substance in order to identify why they 
are named. However, this was beyond the scope of the current study. 

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72313024201818139887755501020304050607080NOT PROVIDED- 08. EXTREMELY FLAMMABLE - note 3(c)- 02. TOXIC- 01. VERY TOXIC- 00. NAMED SUBSTANCE- 00. NAMED SUBSTANCE- 08. EXTREMELY FLAMMABLE - note 3(c)- 04. EXPLOSIVE - note 2(a)- 06. FLAMMABLE - note 3(a)- 07 b. HIGHLY FLAMMABLE - note 3(b)(2)- 02. TOXIC- 06. FLAMMABLE - note 3(a)- 07 a. HIGHLY FLAMMABLE - note 3(b)(1)- 00. NAMED SUBSTANCE- 02. TOXIC- 05. EXPLOSIVE - note 2(b)- 00. NAMED SUBSTANCE- 03. OXIDIZING- 03. OXIDIZING- 09 i. DANGEROUS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT - R50 
                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
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The figure below shows the number of reports in eMARS over the period 2000-2014 by activity type.  Note 
that these data are from unpublished accident reports (490 reports). 

Source: European Commission, 2016 
Note: These data represent data in published and unpublished accident reports (490 reports). 

The activities “Chemical Installations - other” and “Petrochemical / Oil Refineries” contribute most of the 
number of events reported. Overall, a total of 9 activity types have contributed to more than 10 events.  

The figures below provide a more detailed focus on the number of events reported by activity type, for the 
most-involved activities and for the least-involved activities. 

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Source: European Commission, JRC, 2016 
Note: the category “General chemicals manufacture (not included above)” refers to the general chemicals manufacture not covered by 
the other categories in the full list.  These data represent data in published and unpublished accident reports (490 reports). 

It is noticeable that the two categories with the most generic descriptions, that is to say ‘general chemicals 
manufacture’ and ‘other’ activities are two of the top three activities for which most accidents and other 
events are reported. Due to this high-level description of activities it is impossible to further analyse whether 
within these generic activities groups there are some recurring activities. Therefore, future reporting might 
benefit from a more precise reporting of activities and the removal of these ‘generic’ activities categories. A 
similar observation was made when reviewing the activities reported by Member States as part of the tri-
annual reporting. It might be that those establishments are conducting several activities and are unsure 
about which one to use as their ‘main’ reporting activity. If this is the case, it might be valuable to provide 
Member States with guidance on identifying the main activity of their Seveso establishments 

The figure below presents the activities with the least number of major accidents (below 10). 

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Source: European Commission, 2016 
Note: These data represent data in published and unpublished accident reports (490 reports). 

It is also important to read this data while considering major accidents separately from other events and near 
misses but also the total number of establishments in each category. For example, the “wholesale” category 
accounted for 831 establishments in 2014 and 15 major accidents over the 2000-2014 period, so a ratio of 
accident per establishment of 0.02.  In comparison, the “oil and petrochemical” category accounted for 69 
major accidents for the period 2000-2014 out of total 225 establishments in 2014, so a ratio of accident per 
establishment of 0.30. It can then be concluded that oil and petrochemical category is a higher risk category 
than wholesale, per establishment, over this period. 

The ratios for major accidents reported compared to the total number of establishments reported as part of 
the triannual reporting are presented in the table below. 

Total number of 
establishments in 2014 

Number of major 
accidents in 2000-2014 

Major accident per 
establishment 

Wholesale and retail storage and 
distribution (excluding LPG) 

General chemicals manufacture (not 
included above) 

Processing of metals using electrolytic 
or chemical processes 

Production, destruction and storage of 
explosives 

Plastic and rubber manufacture 

Other activity (not included above) 

Production and storage of pesticides, 
biocides, fungicides 

831 

698 

472 

452 

352 

298 

270 

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18 

106 

26 

12 

10 

34 

13 

0,02 

0,15 

0,06 

0,03 

0,03 

0,11 

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Total number of 
establishments in 2014 

Number of major 
accidents in 2000-2014 

Major accident per 
establishment 

Petrochemical / oil refineries 

225 

87 

0,39 

Note: These data represent data in published and unpublished accident reports (490 reports). 
Total number of establishments is in accordance with information reported by Member States to 2012-2014 reporting under Seveso II 
Directive. 

The key statistical conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis of the eMARS database for the period 
between 2000 and 2014 are as follows: 

  The reported events in the eMARS database are mainly those which meet the criteria of Annex 
VI of the Seveso II Directive, from Seveso establishments (i.e. major accidents). Considering 
the unpublished data (production database), the average number of accidents (major, near 
miss and other) for the period 2000-2014 is 33; 

  Most of the accidents reported are major accidents (421 out of the 490 total accidents 

reported); 

  Near misses and other events are much less reported, unless this information is sought out 

specifically from the JRC which was the case in year 2010 and 2012. A corresponding increase 
in the number of near misses reported is observed in 2010, 2012 and 2013, due to increased 
effort in Member States to report lessons learned from such incidents; 

  More accidents are reported from upper tier establishments than for lower tier establishments 
in the database for every year between 2000 and 2014. Upper tier establishments have 
generally higher hazard potential than lower tier establishments.  However, it should be noted 
that the risk equation takes account of exposure, such that a lower tier establishment in a 
highly populated area may be a higher risk than an upper tier site in an area with a much lower 
density of inhabitants; 

  There is no clear trend of either an increase or decrease in the number of accidents between 
2000 and 2014.  In large part, this is because the number of major accidents per year is 
relatively small.  This is a general limitation with all disasters in trying to measure performance 
by counting the number of major events.  Performance measurement often requires not only 
counting the disasters but to understanding the trends behind why accidents are still 
happening.  The number of accidents may not be changing greatly but the reasons why, or the 
impacts of the accidents, could be changing.  Some clues as to what causes major accidents 
with different substances and in different industry sectors can be found in the Lessons Learned 
Bulletins published by the JRC45.Among the hazardous phenomena involved in the accidents 
reported in eMARS, toxic release appears to be the most frequent, and of these, atmospheric 
releases are the most reported; 

  For the major accidents reported, the main substance categories involved, cited more at least 

20 times in a single accident, are: 

  08. Extremely flammable – note 3c, cited in 31 accidents; 

  02. Toxic, cited in 30 accidents; 

  01. Very toxic, cited in 24 accidents; and  

  00. Named substances, cited in 20 accidents.  

  There is no further information to understand the number of establishments at which these 

substances are used and whether some substances appear to be the source of relatively more 

4545 https://minerva.jrc.ec.europa.eu (currently) and soon to be https://minerva.ec.europa.eu sometime in 
2017. 

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accidents than others. The activities “Petrochemical / Oil Refineries” and “General Chemicals 
manufacture (not included above)” are the activities most often cited as the source of accidents 
reported. Similarly, general activity categories such as general chemical manufacture and 
‘other activities’ are in the top three activities reporting major accidents. This general 
classification does not allow for a full appreciation of the activities it encompasses. As a result, 
no further understanding of the sources of major accidents is possible. This might indicate a 
need for further guidance to Member States on classifying the activities of their Seveso 
establishments; and  

  The preparation, on-line publication and approval process of the reports recorded in the 

eMARS database may take 3 or more years on average.  Therefore, statistics from the last 3 
years should consider this limitation.   

From the data analysis, it became clear that to perform further analysis and identify the substances and the 
corresponding industry contributing the most to major accidents, it would be necessary to break down the 
generic categories and gain a deeper understanding on the substances and categories of substances used 
in different establishments.  This was not practicable within the scope of the current study. 

5.2  Socio-economic consequences of the reported accidents 

The aim of this part of the project was to establish a rough estimate of the socio-economic consequences of 
the reported accidents. Beside the monetary aspects, it was requested to depict the associated fatalities and 
injuries reported in eMARS.  

In the eMARS database, a total of 124 accident are reported with socio-economic impacts in the published 
database. Among them, 93 accidents refer to off-site economic impact while the remainder refer to 
transboundary effects (6 accidents) and environmental damage (25 accidents). 

The eMARS database includes some fields that enable the collection of information on socio-economic 
consequences, in the section related to the consequences of the accident. 

Good examples are the accident reports for the AZF explosion46 and the Buncefield explosion47. The AZF 
explosion accident report clearly includes the costs in the accident report, while for the Buncefield explosion, 
no figure is reported in the database. The lack of information for Buncefield accident is surprising because 
several reports and articles mention the costs related to the cleaning, the reconstruction and the value of the 
fuels that burned during the accident (all together valued at about €100 million 48). Other indirect costs are 
also reported for compensation to the companies located close to the plant, the aviation sector, the 
emergency response and the costs for investigation. The report from the Major Incident Investigation Board 
reports costs of more than £1 billion (around €1.2 billion). 

These two examples show that it is possible to collect more information on socio-economic consequences if 
sufficient resources are allocated to this task. 

46 
https://emars.jrc.ec.europa.eu/fileadmin/eMARS_Site/PhpPages/ViewAccident/ViewAccidentPublic.php?acci
dent_code=403  

47 
https://emars.jrc.ec.europa.eu/fileadmin/eMARS_Site/PhpPages/ViewAccident/ViewAccidentPublic.php?acci
dent_code=529 

48 http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/buncefield/buncefield-report.pdf, 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/buncefield/miib-final-volume1.pdf,  

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The British Petroleum Oil Rig Explosion (Deepwater Horizon) in 2010 may also be taken as an example49. At 
the time the leak was sealed, the spill had resulted in a net loss of approximately $61 billion to BP, $17 billion 
to partners, $13 billion to the drilling sub-industry, and $19 billion to other integrated oil and gas firms around 
the world including Europe. Besides the oil industry, an important number of local economic activities were 
badly impacted by the oil spill such as real estate, tourism industry and commercial fishing.  

Real estate values in surrounding areas of the Gulf fell to about 10 percent erasing about $4.3 billion in value 
and job losses were estimated to be likely to total 1 million by 2017.  Thousands of people whose livelihood 
depended on tourism or harvesting marine life remain unemployed as a moratorium was declared. Additional 
losses include loss of reputation for those involved in the accident. This and other factors are often not 
considered in the traditional understanding of socio-economic impacts in European databases.    

France and Germany have both introduced a field to provide information on socio-economic consequences 
in their database, respectively in ARIA and in ZEMA. Furthermore, the UK has adopted a specific 
methodology on estimating costs from industrial accidents. 

For example, in the ARIA database, the reported accidents are categorized according to four criteria as 
shown in Figure 5.16. 

Source: ARIA accident database, BARPI 

The four criteria are precisely described and they are useful for the assessment and ranking of the socio-
economic impact of the accidents in a consistent manner across Europe. 

The ZEMA database used in Germany provides information on the direct cost of the losses incurred as a 
result of accidents. 

The UK Health and Safety Executive has developed a methodology for modelling the economic impacts of 
an accident at major hazard sites”50 that takes into account the following components: 

49 Lee, Y., & Garza-Gomez, X. (2012). Market-based approximation of the cost of non-conformance 
associated with the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill. Total Quality Management, 23(2), 221-236. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14783363.2011.637812 
Aryee, A. (2013). Risks of Offshore Oil Drilling: Causes and Consequences of British Petroleum Oil Rig 
Explosion. Aquatic Science and Technology, Vol. 1, 101-118. http://dx.doi.org/10.5296/ast.v1i1.2843 
50 http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrpdf/rr1055.pdf  

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  Harm to people (non-financial human costs and financial costs); 

  Evacuation (immediate and long-term); 

  Building damage (residential and non-residential); 

  Business disruption (loss of business and relocation); and 

  Emergency services. 

The HSE approach can be applied in the context of the major accidents reported in eMARS to obtain a rough 
estimation of the costs of major accidents in the European Union. 

The table below presents an average cost per site for toxic release, fire and explosion as described in the 
HSE guidance. 

Phenomenon 

Toxic release 

Fire 

Explosion 

Cost per site (€ million) 

176 

83 

246 

If we take the information provided in the table below and the information reported to MAHB on number of 
major accidents, we can produce a first rough estimate of the average costs of the various types of accidents 
per site. 

Year 

Total Toxic Release 

Fire 

Explosion 

Total 

2000 

2001 

2002 

2003 

2004 

2005 

2006 

2007 

2008 

2009 

2010 

2011 

11 

10 

10 

9 

8 

16 

16 

19 

8 

17 

20 

12 

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16 

15 

17 

15 

8 

16 

16 

4 

10 

7 

11 

7 

10 

11 

20 

12 

10 

11 

12 

8 

8 

5 

15 

5 

37 

36 

47 

36 

26 

43 

44 

31 

26 

29 

46 

24 

 
                      
 
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Year 

Total Toxic Release 

Fire 

Explosion 

Total 

2012 

2013 

2014 

16 

6 

1 

8 

7 

2 

8 

3 

3 

32 

16 

6 

Note: these data are based on the published accident reports only (389 reports) 

Year 

2000 

2001 

2002 

2003 

2004 

2005 

2006 

2007 

2008 

2009 

2010 

2011 

2012 

2013 

2014 

Toxic Release  
(million €) 

Fire 
(million €) 

Explosion 
(million €) 

Total 
(million €) 

Total  
(billion €) 

1 932 

1 757 

1 757 

1 581 

1 405 

2 811 

2 811 

3 338 

1 405 

2 986 

3 513 

2 108 

2 811 

1 054 

176 

1 324 

2 459 

5 716 

1 241 

2 705 

5 703 

1 407 

4 918 

8 082 

1 241 

2 951 

5 773 

662 

2 459 

4 527 

1 324 

2 705 

6 840 

1 324 

2 951 

7 086 

331 

828 

579 

910 

579 

662 

579 

166 

1 967 

5 636 

1 967 

4 200 

1 230 

4 795 

3 689 

8112 

1 230 

3 917 

1 967 

5440 

738 

738 

2 371 

1079 

5.7 

5.7 

8.1 

5.8 

4.5 

6.8 

7.1 

5.6 

4.2 

4.8 

8.1 

3.9 

5.4 

2.4 

1.1 

As a preliminary conclusion, rough estimate figures can be derived and the cost associated with accidents, 
involving only those types in the HSE report, is in the order of a few billion Euro per year for the European 
Union.  

As indicated, the HSE data cover only: Harm to people (non-financial human costs and financial costs), 
evacuation (immediate and long-term), building damage (residential and non-residential), business disruption 
(loss of Business and relocation) and emergency services.  

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There are obviously significant uncertainties to keep in mind when considering these estimates such as:  

  The averaging of costs of different phenomena within each group (fire, toxic, explosion); 

  The impact on the activities of companies located in the vicinity of the accident due to 

cascading effects; 

  All the underlying uncertainties within the model and report by HSE; and 

  No account is taken of other impacts e.g. damage to the environment, the costs of remediation, 
the indirect impact on economic actors (for example business partners and market shares) and 
the loss of reputation. 

However, these figures show that it is important to try to better understand the socio-economic impact of 
major accidents and increase the relevance of the information provided by the Member States. With better 
information on the socio-economic consequences, it will be possible to measure and quantify the benefits of 
the Seveso Directive and the extent to which these benefits outweigh the costs.  This will be of value in any 
future evaluation of the success of the directive. 

The initiatives from Member States such as France and Germany to collect information on socio-economic 
consequences of accidents, combined with the model provided by UK HSE show that it is possible to learn 
more on this issue. 

The challenge remains the availability of data related to the direct damages and the indirect damages 
including the post-disaster period as different phases: (a) the emergency phase, (b) the rehabilitation phase 
and (c) the reconstruction phase. 

The “direct damages” refer to the loss of assets sustained directly as a result of the catastrophe.51 Such 
information is often relatively simple to obtain or evaluate. However, important disruptive events produce not 
only immediately-apparent damage, but also unleash after-effects that slowly emerge long after the disaster 
has occurred. These include “indirect impacts” such as diminished productivity resulting from the loss of 
infrastructure and assets as well as “secondary impacts” which relate to the degradation of larger 
macroeconomic aggregates, which manifest themselves in indicators such as GDP and unemployment rates. 
Estimations of indirect impacts may not be as straightforward, as they involve dynamic flows of effects that 
occur over time caused by the direct impacts of a disaster52. These key data issues further complicate the 
undertaking of informed rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts.  

There exists a growing body of literature devoted to the study of these underlying after-effects, the most 
widespread of which is the Handbook for Estimating the Socio-economic and Environmental Effects of 
Disasters53 published by the ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean).  

The Handbook notes that effects from disaster (to be understood as a wide category including man-made 
and natural accidents) include damage to economic and social infrastructure, environmental modifications, 
fiscal and foreign sector imbalances, price increases, modifications to demographic structures and changes 
in development priorities due to replacement or loss of damaged assets. This can often lead to the delay of 
planned projects, some of which would have been instrumental in addressing development need. 

The Handbook recommends that immediately after the emergency stage, an assessment is conducted of 
both the direct and indirect effects of the disaster and their consequences on the social well-being and the 
economic performance of the affected country or area. The methodology included in the latest version of the 
handbook (2003). It considers direct damages (occurring at the moment of the disaster or within the first few 
hours) but also notes that for slowly evolving or long-duration events direct damages may occur over an 

51 De Marcellis-Warin N, Peignier I, Mouchikhine V, Mahfouf M, 2013. A Socio-Economic Cost Assessment Regarding 
Damages to Underground Infrastructures, CIRANO Report, 2013 RP - 21 
52 Sharma, Suman K, 2010, Socio-Economic Aspects of Disaster’s Impact: An Assessment of Databases and 
Methodologies, Economic Growth Centre, http://www3.ntu.edu.sg/hss2/egc/wp/2010/2010-01.pdf  
53 United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2003, Handbook for Estimating the Socio-
economic and Environmental Effects of Disasters, http://www.preventionweb.net/files/1099_eclachandbook.pdf  

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extended period. Direct damages include destruction of infrastructure, buildings, installations, machinery, 
equipment, transport, damage to farmland and irrigation works and destruction of crops. This also considers 
value of loss life and injuries that can be based on valuation methods or willingness to pay methods. The 
Handbook recommends that indirect effects are assessed when estimating damages while noting that these 
are more difficult to measure in monetary terms. They cover goods and services that will not be produced 
due to the disaster over a five-year period. The methodology recommends also considering intangible 
damages such as human suffering, insecurity, solidarity, national security, etc. Finally, it notes that lost 
opportunities must be considered but are very difficult to calculate. 

Furthermore, it would be interesting to consider other source of information such as the data held by 
operators, trade association, and insurance or reinsurance bodies. 

5.3  Impact of the Directive and new trends 

One of the aims of this project was to go beyond the usual statistical analysis and investigate the impact of 
the Directive by correlating, if possible, the measures taken with the trends of reported accidents, and by 
comparing several industry sectors in terms of accidents and fatalities.  

A chart presenting the evolution of the number of major accidents over time against the key milestones of the 
Seveso legislation has been prepared.  The chart is illustrative, rather than an accurate representation, and 
includes a number of uncertainties, especially since the data in 1995 are an estimate only.  A correlation 
between the legislation and the evolution of major accidents cannot be established, due to the fact that the 
statistical population of major accidents is too small and the period covered is relatively short for measuring 
events that are in any case not high frequency. As such it is practically difficult to provide statistical evidence 
that chemical accident risk has been reduced over the evolution of the Seveso Directive.  However, more in-
depth analysis of selected accident cases, industry sectors and industry changes in industry practices, for 
example, might offer more insights along these lines.    

Note: Data presented are from the full unpublished database (490 reports) 

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This chart demonstrates that the simple indicator "number of accidents" is not suitable to depict success of 
Seveso. It points out that further work on policy indicators is necessary. 

An observation made in 2004 during the PHARE twinning projects in the field of the Seveso Directive is that 
the first perceptible impact of the adoption of the Seveso Directive was the reduction in the amount of 
hazardous substances on site. Indeed, before the adoption of the Directive, there was no incentive to limit 
the amount of hazardous substance present.  Following implementation of the Directive, plant operators 
often reduced quantities on site to escape coverage under the Seveso Directive. 

The EM-DAT database54 also provides information on the trends in disasters for different types of disasters, 
periods and regions of the world. 

The data provided in EM-Dat refer to disasters and when technological disasters are selected, they do not 
strictly correspond to the major accident definition used in the Seveso directive. We have selected the most 
relevant trends from the database to observe some general trends. 

Source: EM-Dat 

54 https://www.emdat.be/disaster_trends/index.html 

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Source: EM-Dat 
Note: Europe includes countries of the European continent so potentially Albania, Austria, Azores Island, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canary Island, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Russia, Serbia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine and the United Kingdom 

These data are difficult to interpret and do not suggest any perceptible trends in industrial disasters. We can 
only observe that after the adoption of the first Seveso Directive the number of disasters reported has 
increased due to the reporting requirements imposed by the Directive. 

The benchmark analysis presented in Chapter 6 provides more in depth information on the trends related to 
major accident reporting. 

In order to identify new trends in the type of major accidents occurring at Seveso establishments, the 
analysis of the data provided by eMARS was complemented with the review of the literature and accident 
analysis performed in specific sectors of the process industry. 

A recent study from Valeria Casson Moreno and Valerio Cozzani55 presents the trends in bioenergy 
production. This paper indicates that some recent accidents involving the bioenergy production and 
feedstock supply chain raised concern over the safety of such technologies. Casson Moreno and Cozzani 
have performed a survey of major accidents related to the production of bioenergy (intended as biomass, 
bioliquids/biofuels and biogas). They have built a data repository, based on past accident reports available in 
the open literature and in specific databases. The data analysis has shown that major accidents have 
increased in recent years and their number is growing faster than bioenergy production. The results obtained 
represent an early warning concerning the major accident hazard of bioenergies. 

55 Valeria Casson Moreno, Valerio Cozzani, Major accident hazard in bioenergy production. Journal of Loss 
Prevention in the Process Industries, Volume 35, May 2015, Pages 135-144  

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Valeria Casson Moreno et al. have also performed a detailed analysis of the biogas sector56. They show that 
the number of accidents in biogas production and upgrading is growing faster than the biogas production. 
The figure below illustrates this assertion.  

Source: Valeria Casson Moreno et al., 2016 

This academic research also mentions that about 12% of the reported accidents in the biogas field should be 
considered as major accidents according to the Seveso Directive.  

56 Valeria Casson Moreno, Salvatore Papasidero, Giordano Emrys Scarponi, Daniele Guglielmi, Valerio 
Cozzani, Analysis of accidents in biogas production and upgrading. Renewable Energy 96 (2016), Pages 
1127-1134 

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Source: Valeria Casson Moreno et al., 2016 

As a conclusion, it is important to follow these trends within the eMARS database and to pay attention to the 
apparent new trend in the bioenergy sector. 

New trends as illustrated with the biogas sector could be also identified for other types of accidents such as 
Natech accidents57, or accidents due to threat or malevolence, but this would need substantial further 
investigation which is outside the scope of the current study.  

5.4  Analysis of establishment data 

This section presents the analysis of the statistical information held in the eSPIRS database. eSPIRS, the 
database on "Seveso Plants Information Retrieval System", allows easy visualisation of important hazard 
and risk related information from Seveso establishments in Europe. The information and data are collected 
from the EU28 Member States and Norway, Iceland and Switzerland in accordance with the Seveso II 
Directive. The main objective of eSPIRS is to support the Member States in their risk management related 
decision making processes by giving an insight into the geographical component of risk from Seveso Plants. 

Several sets of data have been analysed: 

  The overview of the number of upper/lower tier establishments in the period 2011 to 2014, in 

each Member State, and for the year 2014, a graph and a map; 

  The number of upper/lower tier establishments in 2014, in each Member State, per Billion € 

GDP, a graph and a map; 

  The number of Upper/Lower Tier Establishments in 2014, in each Member State, per Million 

inhabitants, a graph and a map; 

57 Natural disaster triggering technological disasters 

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  The number of Upper/Lower Tier Establishments in 2014, in each Member State, per 1000 

km2, a graph and a map; and  

  The number of establishments by industry type in 2014, for all Member States. 

For the eSPIRS database, the following analyses have been performed as for the analysis on the previous 
reporting period: 

a)  The number of upper/lower tier establishments in each Member State, as a pie-chart on a map of 

Europe; 

b)  The same numbers as a) normalised to GDP and b) to the population of each Member State; 

c)  A breakdown of the number of establishments by industry type, using a representation of a pie with 

increasing size if the number increases; and 

d)  Growth in the number of establishments during the period for each activity type, per Member State. 

As for accidents statistics, a breakdown between lower tier and upper tier establishments has been given for 
all statistics. The only exception relates to point b) where the MAHB had indicated that the distinction of GDP 
per establishment category does not communicate anything meaningful.  

Concerning eSPIRS, the following limitations have been highlighted by the MAHB. 

Data extraction done yearly in late December 
Comparison data on GDP, POP, and SUP derived from EUROSTAT the 19/09/2016 

In the former reporting period, data on lower-tier establishments for Greece were not present 

The growing trend should consider also the contribution of the Member States that joined the EU as from 2000 
(enlargements in 2004, 2007 and 2013). Croatia did not contribute to the eSPIRS database in 2013. It is unclear why Croatia 
did not report from the date of its accession in 2013. As such data are only available for 27 Member States. 

Chemical activities have been grouped altogether in a single category as ‘other’ 

Some dis-homogeneity in the names has been corrected 

The NACE activities for Belgium have been normalised to the eSPIRS table 

The activity "Processing of non-ferrous metals (foundries, smelting, etc.)" has been renamed, as in the corresponding 
2014 activity “Processing of metals”. 

Tables are presented in Appendix D with the number of upper and lower tier establishments for each 
Member State as reported in eSPIRS, including a weighting by GDP and by population. When compared 
with the data reported by Member States at the end of the 2014 we noticed that while the number of 
establishments (lower and upper tiers) are similar, these are not identical. More information on this is 
presented in Table 4.4.  

Data held in eSPIRS on the number of upper tier and lower tier establishments in each Member State is 
presented below in a map of Europe with pie-charts increasing in dimension with the number of 
establishments. Germany has the highest number of Seveso establishments, with 1 160 upper tier and 1 238 
lower tier establishments. It is followed by France, Italy and the United Kingdom, each with about 1 100 
establishments. 

The tables with data used for the creation of the maps are presented in Appendix E. 

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The total number of Seveso establishments in 2014 was 9 998, which is an increase compared to the 
number in 2011 which was 9 449.  Note that these numbers differ compared to those in the member states’ 
reporting, as described earlier in this report. See Figure 4.1 for the evolution of the number of establishments 
in each Member State. 

Source: European Commission, JRC, 2016 
Note: Map format does not allow to present historic development on number of establishments 

The figure below presents the number of Seveso establishments per billion € GDP at market price in each 
country.  

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Source: European Commission, JRC, 2016 

Here Bulgaria, Latvia and Estonia lead with respectively 4.23, 2.67 and 2.53 Seveso establishments per 
billion € GDP at market price. Germany, which has the most establishments overall, is ranked number 18 out 
of the 27 Member States58.  

This graph shows that Member States with high GDP (i.e. DE, BE, IT, ES, NL, FR, UK) have proportionally 
fewer Seveso establishments than the countries with lower GDP It is not clear why this is the case, one 
possible explanation would be that the contribution of industrial activities in high GDP countries is relatively 
less important than the contribution from the service sector hence ranking lower. 

The figure below shows number of establishments per million inhabitants distinguishing between upper and 
lower tier establishments. 

58 Croatia did not contribute to the eSPIRS database in 2013. 

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Source: European Commission, JRC, 2016 

As can be observed, Finland leads with 48.2 Seveso establishments per million inhabitants, followed by 
Estonia, and Sweden.  

Germany which is the country with the highest number of establishments is ranked 7th.  France, Italy and the 
UK are respectively in positions 20, 19 and 16 among the 27 Member States59.  

Rather than comparing the establishments to population, it is would be valuable to consider the population 
density around Seveso plants and in the hazard zones of the plants. This would depict the actual population 
which is the most exposed to risk from Seveso establishments. However, there is no data available on this 
aspect. 

The figure below shows the number of Seveso establishments per 1000 km2 per Member State. 

59 Croatia did not contribute to the eSPIRS database in 2013. 

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Source: European Commission, MAHB, 2016 

Malta has by far the highest concentration of Seveso establishments, with 34.81 establishments per 1 000 
km2. It is followed by Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg and Germany.  For the majority of Member 
States (20 out of 2760) there are fewer than 3 Seveso establishments per 1 000 km2. 

Looking at Finland which was the country with the highest number of Seveso establishments in 2014 per 
million inhabitants, we see that here they are among the countries with the lowest density of Seveso 
establishments. Thus, it is difficult to derive from these statistics where people are most exposed to risk from 
Seveso sites. This would require a deeper analysis with a Geographic Information System (GIS) looking at 
the population in the hazard zones around Seveso establishments. 

The table below presents the number of establishments per activity. The top 6 activities contribute more than 
5% each, and together contribute almost 50% of the number of establishments. 

Industry Type 

Fuel storage (including heating, retail sale, etc.) 

Wholesale and retail storage and distribution (excluding LPG) 

Number of 
establishments 

% 

1 238 

831 

12.38% 

8.31% 

60 Croatia did not contribute to the eSPIRS database in 2013. 

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MTBENLLUDEUKITSIDKCZPTFRCYATELSKBGHUIEESTROPLEELVSEFILTUTvsSUP18.96.625.323.483.251.591.941.181.031.320.630.871.080.950.640.860.680.690.670.510.480.540.550.460.440.380.26LTvsSUP15.85.574.193.483.462.761.821.781.511.151.180.870.650.761.020.800.950.860.670.730.760.620.550.510.380.400.37TOTvsSUP34.812.19.516.966.714.353.762.962.542.471.811.751.731.721.661.651.631.551.351.251.241.161.110.980.830.780.6334.812.29.57.06.74.43.83.02.52.51.81.71.71.71.71.71.61.51.31.21.21.21.11.00.80.80.60.05.010.015.020.025.030.035.040.0NumberNumber of Seveso Establishments in 2014 per 1000 km2Elab. MAHB-JRC European Commission 2016 
                      
 
 
 
                                                           
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Industry Type 

Chemical installations  

General chemicals manufacture (not included above) 

LPG storage 

Power generation, supply and distribution  

Production of basic organic chemicals 

Processing of metals using electrolytic or chemical processes 

Production, destruction and storage of explosives 

LPG production, bottling and bulk distribution 

Plastic and rubber manufacture 

Other activity (not included above) 

Production and storage of pesticides, biocides, fungicides 

Petrochemical / Oil Refineries 

Handling and transportation centres (ports, airports, lorry parks, marshalling yards, 
etc.) 

Production and storage of fertilizers 

Processing of ferrous metals (foundries, smelting, etc.) 

Manufacture of food products and beverages 

Waste storage, treatment and disposal 

Production of pharmaceuticals 

LNG storage and distribution 

General engineering, manufacturing and assembly 

Agriculture 

Production and manufacturing of pulp and paper 

Production and storage of fireworks 

Processing of metals 

Water and sewage (collection, supply, treatment) 

Electronics & electrical engineering 

Ceramics (bricks, pottery, glass, cement, etc.) 

Manufacture of glass 

Wood treatment and furniture 

Mining activities (tailings & physicochemical processes) 

Medical, research, education (including hospitals, universities, etc.) 

Building & works of engineering construction 

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Number of 
establishments 

% 

804 

698 

662 

630 

479 

472 

452 

420 

352 

298 

270 

225 

220 

219 

206 

204 

181 

142 

134 

125 

116 

111 

107 

80 

69 

44 

43 

41 

29 

23 

22 

15 

8.04% 

6.98% 

6.62% 

6.30% 

4.79% 

4.72% 

4.52% 

4.20% 

3.52% 

2.98% 

2.70% 

2.25% 

2.20% 

2.19% 

2.06% 

2.04% 

1.81% 

1.42% 

1.34% 

1.25% 

1.16% 

1.11% 

1.07% 

0.80% 

0.69% 

0.44% 

0.43% 

0.41% 

0.29% 

0.23% 

0.22% 

0.15% 

 
                      
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Industry Type 

Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster 

Shipbuilding, shipbreaking, ship repair 

Textiles manufacturing and treatment 

Leisure and sport activities (e.g. ice rink) 

 Total 

Source: European Commission, JRC, 2016 

Number of 
establishments 

% 

14 

12 

7 

3 

0.14% 

0.12% 

0.07% 

0.03% 

9998 

100.00% 

A comparison was undertaken between the data held in eSPIRS database and those reported by Member 
States as part of the triannual report. As shown below, the numbers reported as part of the triannual 
reporting are consistently lower than those from the eSPIRS database but generally within the same range. 
The differences are thought to be from those Member States that chose the option to report activities using 
NACE categories rather than Seveso categories in their response to question 1.c (see further details in 
Section 3.3.3). Indeed, NACE reporting was opted for by Belgium, Croatia, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden 
and the UK which account all together for more than 5 400 establishments. 

Industry Type 

Number of 
establishments 
eSPIRS 

Number of establishments reporting using 
eSPIRS classification for 2012-2014 reporting 

Fuel storage (including heating, retail sale, etc.) 

1 238 

Wholesale and retail storage and distribution 
(excluding LPG) 

Chemical installations  

General chemicals manufacture (not included 
above) 

LPG storage 

Power generation, supply and distribution  

Production of basic organic chemicals 

Processing of metals using electrolytic or 
chemical processes 

Production, destruction and storage of 
explosives 

LPG production, bottling and bulk distribution 

Plastic and rubber manufacture 

Other activity (not included above) 

Production and storage of pesticides, biocides, 
fungicides 

Petrochemical / Oil Refineries 

Handling and transportation centres (ports, 
airports, lorry parks, marshalling yards, etc.) 

831 

804 

698 

662 

630 

479 

472 

452 

420 

352 

298 

270 

225 

220 

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650 

553 

298 

763 

233 

312 

53 

207 

242 

233 

120 

851 

156 

142 

99 

 
                      
 
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Industry Type 

Number of 
establishments 
eSPIRS 

Number of establishments reporting using 
eSPIRS classification for 2012-2014 reporting 

Production and storage of fertilizers 

Processing of ferrous metals (foundries, 
smelting, etc.) 

Manufacture of food products and beverages 

Waste storage, treatment and disposal 

Production of pharmaceuticals 

LNG storage and distribution 

General engineering, manufacturing and 
assembly 

Agriculture 

219 

206 

204 

181 

142 

134 

125 

116 

Production and manufacturing of pulp and paper 

111 

Production and storage of fireworks 

107 

Processing of metals 

Water and sewage (collection, supply, treatment) 

Electronics & electrical engineering 

Ceramics (bricks, pottery, glass, cement, etc.) 

Manufacture of glass 

Wood treatment and furniture 

Mining activities (tailings & physicochemical 
processes) 

Medical, research, education (including 
hospitals, universities, etc.) 

Building & works of engineering construction 

Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster 

Shipbuilding, shipbreaking, ship repair 

Textiles manufacturing and treatment 

Leisure and sport activities (e.g. ice rink) 

80 

69 

44 

43 

41 

29 

23 

22 

15 

14 

12 

7 

3 

156 

64 

96 

123 

75 

57 

44 

46 

56 

97 

52 

62 

19 

29 

20 

17 

26 

1 

3 

12 

5 

7 

0 

 Total 

9 998 

5 979 

Source: European Commission, JRC, 2016 

The table below presents the evolution of the number of Seveso establishments in 2012, 2013 and 2014 by 
Industry Type (Activity). 

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Industry Type 

Agriculture 

Building & works of engineering construction 

Ceramics (bricks, pottery, glass, cement, etc.) 

Nb 2012  % 2012 

Nb 
2013 

% 2013 

Nb 
2014 

% 2014 

Variation 
2012/2014 

68 

16 

50 

0.72% 

113 

1.13% 

116 

1.16% 

71% 

0.17% 

0.53% 

41 

47 

0.41% 

0.47% 

15 

43 

0.15% 

-6% 

0.43% 

-14% 

Chemical installations 

792 

8.37% 

810 

8.12% 

804 

8.04% 

2% 

Electronics & electrical engineering 

51 

0.54% 

45 

0.45% 

44 

0.44% 

-14% 

Fuel storage (including heating, retail sale, etc.) 

1083 

11.45% 

1231 

12.34% 

1238 

12.38% 

14% 

General chemicals manufacture (not included 
above) 

General engineering, manufacturing and 
assembly 

Handling and transportation centres (ports, 
airports, lorry parks, marshalling yards, etc.) 

Leisure and sport activities (e.g. ice rink) 

LNG storage and distribution 

LPG production, bottling and bulk distribution 

LPG storage 

Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster 

600 

6.34% 

694 

6.95% 

698 

6.98% 

16% 

131 

1.39% 

122 

1.22% 

125 

1.25% 

-5% 

149 

1.58% 

167 

1.67% 

220 

2.20% 

48% 

2 

124 

429 

696 

12 

0.02% 

3 

0.03% 

3 

0.03% 

50% 

1.31% 

132 

1.32% 

134 

1.34% 

8% 

4.54% 

420 

4.21% 

420 

4.20% 

-2% 

7.36% 

666 

6.67% 

662 

6.62% 

-5% 

0.13% 

13 

0.13% 

14 

0.14% 

17% 

Manufacture of food products and beverages 

205 

2.17% 

202 

2.02% 

204 

2.04% 

0% 

Manufacture of glass 

Medical, research, education (including 
hospitals, universities, etc.) 

Mining activities (tailings & physicochemical 
processes) 

Other activity (not included above) 

Petrochemical / Oil Refineries 

Plastic and rubber manufacture 

Power generation, supply and distribution 

Processing of ferrous metals (foundries, 
smelting, etc.) 

Processing of metals 

Processing of metals using electrolytic or 
chemical processes 

Production and manufacturing of pulp and 
paper 

46 

24 

20 

276 

238 

368 

479 

104 

184 

396 

0.49% 

0.25% 

39 

21 

0.39% 

0.21% 

41 

22 

0.41% 

-11% 

0.22% 

-8% 

0.21% 

22 

0.22% 

23 

0.23% 

15% 

2.92% 

285 

2.86% 

298 

2.98% 

8% 

2.52% 

234 

2.34% 

225 

2.25% 

-5% 

3,89% 

362 

3,63% 

352 

3,52% 

-4% 

5,07% 

625 

6,26% 

630 

6,30% 

32% 

1,10% 

112 

1,12% 

206 

2,06% 

98% 

1,95% 

174 

1,74% 

80 

0,80% 

-57% 

4,19% 

457 

4,58% 

472 

4,72% 

19% 

113 

119% 

112 

1.12% 

111 

1.11% 

-2% 

Production and storage of fertilizers 

Production and storage of fireworks 

219 

106 

2.,32% 

217 

2.17% 

219 

2.19% 

0% 

1.12% 

107 

1.07% 

107 

1.07% 

1% 

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Industry Type 

Nb 2012  % 2012 

Nb 
2013 

% 2013 

Nb 
2014 

% 2014 

Variation 
2012/2014 

Production and storage of pesticides, biocides, 
fungicides 

268 

2.83% 

270 

2.71% 

270 

2.70% 

1% 

Production of basic organic chemicals 

Production of pharmaceuticals 

Production, destruction and storage of 
explosives 

Shipbuilding, shipbreaking, ship repair 

Textiles manufacturing and treatment 

482 

147 

398 

12 

6 

5.10% 

479 

4.80% 

479 

4.79% 

-1% 

1.55% 

143 

1.43% 

142 

1.42% 

-3% 

4.21% 

423 

4.24% 

452 

4.52% 

14% 

0.13% 

12 

0.12% 

12 

0.12% 

0% 

0.06% 

7 

0.07% 

7 

0.07% 

17% 

Waste storage, treatment and disposal 

171 

1.81% 

179 

1.79% 

181 

1.81% 

6% 

Water and sewage (collection, supply, 
treatment) 

Wholesale and retail storage and distribution 
(excluding LPG) 

70 

0.74% 

69 

0.69% 

69 

0.69% 

-1% 

892 

9.43% 

895 

8.97% 

831 

8.31% 

-7% 

Wood treatment and furniture 

30 

0.32% 

29 

0.29% 

29 

0.29% 

-3% 

 Total 

9 457 

100.00% 

9 979 

100.00% 

9 998  100.00%  6% 

Source: European Commission, JRC, 2016 

In total, between 2012 and 2014, there has been an increase of 541 new establishments included in the 
eSPIRS database. The activities where the number of establishments is growing are (variation in %, and 
variation in absolute number): 

  Processing of ferrous metals (foundries, smelting, etc.): +98% (+102)61; 

  Agriculture: +71% (+48); 

  Fuel storage (including heating, retail sale, etc.): +14% (+155); 

  Production, destruction and storage of explosives: +14% (+54); 

  Handling and transportation centres (ports, airports, lorry parks, marshalling yards, etc.): +48% 

(+71); and  

  Power generation, supply and distribution: +32% (+151).  

The activities where the number of establishments is reducing are: 

  Processing of metals: -57% (-104) 63; 

  Ceramics (bricks, pottery, glass, cement, etc.): -14% (-7); 

  Electronics & electrical engineering: -14% (-7); and  

  Manufacture of glass: -11% (-5).  

From the above figures and data, it appears that the new Seveso establishments that have been created are 
mainly related to the production of energy (fuel storage and power generation) and agriculture. This in part 
reflects ongoing technological and legislative development of new energy sources such as biogas. In some 
Member States (e.g. Germany) recent legislation has contributed to the development of biogas 

61 These figures may not represent a substantive change, but rather are more likely to be a re-classification 
of existing installations from “Processing of metals” to “Processing of ferrous metals” by one or more 
countries. 

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establishments which may be reflected in these data.  Other factors will also affect the changes, including 
not only changes to the industry sectors themselves, but also changes to reporting. 

Part of the scope of work for this report is an analysis of the typical size of Seveso establishments, i.e. 
whether they are small, medium, large or multi-national enterprises.  The primary objective of this is to allow 
for a better assessment of whether more specific or different measures are necessary for SMEs and to better 
assess the related administrative burden.  It was originally envisaged that this data would be available from a 
centralised database; however, in practice no such database exists and therefore an alternative approach 
was required. 

There are few data available on the number of employees or financial data (e.g. turnover) of Seveso 
establishments. Neither of these are included in the reporting under eSPIRS or in other reporting. 

Undertaking a detailed survey of Seveso establishments was not considered feasible within the resources 
available for this study.  In any case, the practicalities of identifying an appropriate sample of establishments 
(across sectors, member states, etc.) and of obtaining information on their company size (employees, 
turnover, etc.) were identified as barriers to obtaining relevant information within the scope of this study.  
Therefore, a review of existing literature was undertaken in order to identify existing estimates. 

While no EU-wide information was identified, some sector-specific or Member State specific data were found 
on typical sizes of Seveso establishments. 

In 2008, a study led by EU-VRi on the effectiveness of the Seveso II Directive performed a survey of 
competent authorities and Seveso establishments62. The survey is thought to have covered around 800 
Seveso sites. It found that: 

  68% of operators responding were part of a large company with multinational sites; 

  16% of operators were SMEs; and 

  16% of operators were independent (i.e. not a multinational) but not SMEs. 

These data were used as part of the Impact Assessment prior to the adoption of the Seveso III Directive. 
This indicated that generally there was no link allowing one to conclude that lower tier establishments are 
typically or more likely to be SMEs. However, for the metal finishing industry, data was available from the 
industry association to show that most of these are upper tier and SMEs63. 

In the UK, an impact assessment was conducted in 2015 to assess the changes from the Seveso III 
Directive64. As part of the impact assessment a survey was conducted throughout the UK to understand the 
share of sites that were small, medium or large businesses. The survey found the following: 

  47% of the Seveso establishments are small (1-49 employees);  

  33% of the establishments are medium sized (50 – 249 employees); and  

  21% of the establishments are large sized (250 + employees). 

However, 72% of the sites surveyed also indicated that they were part of an organisation rather than being a 
unique site. As such, the UK refined the results of the survey and concluded that: 

  13% of the sites were genuinely small operators, with others being small sites but part of a 

multiple site business; 

  9% of the sites are genuinely medium sized, with others being medium sites part of a multiple 

site business; and 

62 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/seveso/pdf/seveso_report.pdf 
63 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/seveso/pdf/Seveso%20IA_Final%20report.pdf 
64 http://consultations.hse.gov.uk/gf2.ti/f/19778/527557.1/PDF/-/cd266.pdf).   

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  78% of the sites are from large companies. 

The above data appear to be in reasonable agreement, i.e. that around 80% of establishments are large 
companies and around 20% are small or medium sized.  However, more comprehensive data would allow for 
a more robust estimate of this.  

It is recommended that criteria related to the size of the Seveso establishments could be considered for 
inclusion in the new template for data collection for eSPIRS, so that exact figures might be derived from the 
future eSPIRS database.  

The impact assessment conducted when revising the Seveso II Directive and prior to the adoption of the 
Seveso III Directive considered potential impacts65. It concluded that the impact of Seveso III was expected 
to be quite limited and that the number of establishments affected by the change in classification ranges from 
400 to a maximum of 650 firms. In addition, it was estimated that a maximum of 350 new sites could be 
covered, and around 400 could fall out of scope. 

Unfortunately, there is no complete dataset available to understand the impact of the Seveso III Directive on 
the number of establishments across all Member States.  

Some partial estimates were identified in a recent study on ‘Analysis of the likelihood, risks and 
consequences of major accidents involving category acute toxic 3 dermal substances and assessment of the 
impact of covering this category under Seveso’66. The study attempted to estimate the number of these 
installations that were already covered by the Seveso II Directive and those that would be covered in 
addition due to the extension of the scope of the Directive. As part of the study data was requested from 
Member States and stakeholders which reported the following: 

  For Germany, an industry estimated 110 additional establishments could come under the scope 

of the Directive split evenly between lower and upper tier establishments; and  

  For UK, the competent authorities estimated that 55 establishments could come under the 

scope of the Directive. 

Furthermore, a recent study conducted on the evaluation of the CLP Regulation67 as part of the Fitness 
Check of the chemical legislation (except REACH) focused a case study on the Seveso Directive. 
Stakeholders were asked to share information on the impact of the changes made by the Seveso III 
Directive. Most reported that it was impossible to indicate whether there will be significant changes to the 
number of installations due to the introduction of CLP into Seveso III, while some stated that it is more likely 
that there will be an increase (rather than a decrease) due to new data on substances from REACH-
registrations resulting in reclassifications of some substances. 

The key statistical conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis of eSPIRS data for 2014, keeping in 
mind the important remarks made by MAHB, are as follows: 

  There were 9 998 Seveso establishments in the 27 Member States in 2014; of these 5 296 were 

lower tier establishments and 4 702 were upper tier establishments; 

65 Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment Accompanying document to the Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the control of major-accident hazards involving 
dangerous substances COM(2010) 781 final SEC(2010) 1591 final, /* SEC/2010/1590 final */ http://eurlex. 
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52010SC1590 
66 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/seveso/pdf/final%20report.pdf 
67 Study on the regulatory fitness of the legislative framework governing the risk management of chemicals 
(excluding REACH), in particular the CLP Regulation and related legislation, report by RPA for the European 
Commission DG Environment, 2017. 

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  Germany is the country with the highest number of Seveso establishments, with 1 160 upper 

tier and 1 238 lower tier establishments. It is followed by France, Italy and the United Kingdom, 
each with about 1 100 establishments; 

  If one takes the number of Seveso establishments per billion € GDP at market price in each 
country, Bulgaria, Latvia and Estonia lead with respectively 4.23, 2.67 and 2.53 Seveso 
establishments per billion € GDP. Germany, which has the most establishments overall, is 
ranked number 18 out of the 27 Member States; 

  Considering the number of Seveso establishments per million inhabitants, Finland has the most, 
with 48.2 Seveso establishments per million inhabitants, followed by Estonia, and Sweden; and  

  In terms of density of Seveso establishments, Malta has the highest concentration of Seveso 

establishments, with 34.81 establishments per 1000 km2. Then follow Belgium, The 
Netherlands, Luxembourg and Germany.  20 of 27 countries have fewer than 3 Seveso 
establishments per 1000 km2. 

Among the 49 activities used to categorise the Seveso establishments, 6 activities contribute almost 50% of 
the number of Seveso establishments. These 6 categories are: 

  Fuel storage (including heating, retail sale, etc.): 12.38%; 

  Wholesale and retail storage and distribution (excluding LPG): 8.31%; 

  Chemical installations: 8.04%; 

  General chemicals manufacture (not included above): 6.98%; 

  LPG storage: 6.62%; and  

  Power generation, supply and distribution: 6.30%. 

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6  Benchmarking  

6.1  Overview 

The purpose of this section is to assess the broader context of major accidents, by providing a brief 
comparison of the current situation and progress made in the European Union related to major-accident-
hazard policies and in particular prevention, with those in other major and emerging economies 

Within the OECD, and in particular the working group on Chemical Accidents, Europe has often been a 
pioneer and a leader for the development of legislation and the promotion of good practices for the 
prevention of major-accident-hazards. In that context, it is interesting and useful to review the progress made 
by the European Union in comparison to the progress made by other countries (including from the OECD). 

The assessment of European policy has to be put in the context of wider international legislation in order to 
assess the ambition and achievements of EU policies against those of similar economies and other countries 
that have developed rapidly in recent decades. Also, the general approach of the Seveso III Directive can be 
compared with that of other policies (i.e. goal setting and/or description of prevention/response techniques). 
This is of utmost relevance, especially considering that industrial accidents occurring in the EU may affect 
other countries and vice versa. In this respect, benchmarking EU policy on industrial accidents with other 
countries of the world facilitates the alignment with international initiatives such as the Convention on the 
Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents.  

This Task presents background research based on literature review and similar activities. The objective is to 
allow the Commission to have an initial idea of where European policy on the prevention of industrial 
accidents stands and to identify potential priority areas of attention for future work. 

6.2  Description of the methodology 

The benchmarking of major accidents within the EU and in other developed or developing countries required 
a high quality of data processing. However, the eMARS database is not exhaustive for the EU and such a 
database does not exist in other countries or regional federations. For comprehensiveness, the data from 
different accident databases have been cross-checked and compared. 

The methodology applied consisted of five steps: 

  1st step: Identification of the accident databases; 

  2nd step: Cleaning and compilation of the data; 

  3rd step: Compilation of the number of reported major accidents; 

  4th step: Building meaningful statistics; and  

  5th step: Analysis of the statistics.  

The main industrial accident databases throughout the world were reviewed and consulted. The most 
relevant criteria for describing an industrial accident database were selected, such as: the name and the 
acronym, the date of creation, the URL link of the database’s website, the author, the editor, the sources of 
information, the period of the data collection, the amount and the type of data.  

In total, nine industrial accident databases were selected and further considered for the study, because they 
provide data for the countries selected for the benchmarking. These nine databases are presented in the 
table below. 

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Name of the 
databases 

Description 

Geographical coverage 

The Analysis, Research and Information on Accidents Database (ARIA) 
operated by the French Bureau for Analysis of Industrial Risks and 
Pollutions (BARPI); 

http://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/rechercher-un-accident  

Mainly France and 
Europe, but well 
documented for accidents 
anywhere worldwide 

The Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation operated by the US 
Chemical Safety Board (CSB); 

Mainly USA 

http://www.csb.gov/investigations 

The Major Accident Reporting System (eMARS) operated by the EU Major 
Accident Hazards Bureau (MAHB); 

Mainly European Union 
and some OECD countries 

https://emars.jrc.ec.europa.eu/?id=4  

The Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) operated by the Centre for 
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED); 

Worldwide 

http://www.emdat.be/database  

The Failure and Accidents Technical Information System (FACTS) operated 
by Unified Fire Department (GB); 

Worldwide 

http://www.factsonline.nl/browse-chemical-accidents-in-database  

The Failure Knowledge Database (FKD) operated by Japan Science and 
Technology Agency (JST); 

Mainly Japan 

http://www.sozogaku.com/fkd/en  

The Relational Information System for Chemical Accidents Database 
operated by National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and 
Technology(AIST); 

Mainly Japan 

https://riscad.aist-riss.jp/?lang=en  

The Process Safety Incident Database (PSID) operated by the Center for 
Chemical Process Safety (CCPS). 

Mainly USA 

http://www.psidnet.com/  

The Central Reporting and Evaluation Office for Accidents and Incidents in 
Process Plant (ZEMA) operated by the German Federal Environment Office. 

Mainly Germany 

http://www.infosis.uba.de/index.php/de/site/12981/zema/index.html  

In order to obtain statistics on major accidents in the EU and the benchmarked countries between 2000 and 
2014, data from the selected industrial accident databases were collected.  

In order to allow the benchmark on reported major accidents in Europe (based on eMARS) and in the other 
countries, the key issue was to identify in the selected databases the major accidents. 

A “major accident” is defined according to Article 3.12 of the Seveso III Directive as: 

‘major accident’ means an occurrence such as a major emission, fire, or 
explosion resulting from uncontrolled developments in the course of the 
operation of any establishment covered by this Directive, and leading to serious 
danger to human health or the environment, immediate or delayed, inside or 
outside the establishment, and involving one or more dangerous substances’. 

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Practically, the quantitative criteria that are used to notify a major accident, as mentioned in Annex VI of the 
Seveso III Directive, are commonly used to characterise a major accident.  

Excerpt from the Seveso III Directive 

ANNEX VI 

Criteria for the notification of a major accident to the Commission as provided for in Article 18(1) 

I. Any major accident covered by paragraph 1 or having at least one of the consequences described in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 must 
be notified to the Commission. 

1. Dangerous substances involved 

Any fire or explosion or accidental discharge of a dangerous substance involving a quantity of at least 5 % of the qualifying quantity 
laid down in Column 3 of Part 1 or in Column 3 of Part 2 of Annex I. 

2. Injury to persons and damage to real estate: 

(a) a death; 

(b) six persons injured within the establishment and hospitalised for at least 24 hours; 

(c) one person outside the establishment hospitalised for at least 24 hours; 

(d) dwelling(s) outside the establishment damaged and unusable as a result of the accident; 

(e) the evacuation or confinement of persons for more than 2 hours (persons × hours): the value is at least 500; and  

(f) the interruption of drinking water, electricity, gas or telephone services for more than 2 hours (persons × hours): the value is at 
least 1 000. 

3. Immediate damage to the environment: 

(a) permanent or long-term damage to terrestrial habitats: 

(i) 0,5 ha or more of a habitat of environmental or conservation importance protected by legislation; 

(ii) 10 or more hectares of more widespread habitat, including agricultural land; 

(b) significant or long-term damage to freshwater and marine habitats: 

(i) 10 km or more of river or canal; 

(ii) 1 ha or more of a lake or pond; 

(iii) 2 ha or more of delta; and  

(iv) 2 ha or more of a coastline or open sea.  

(c) significant damage to an aquifer or underground water: 

1 ha or more. 

4. Damage to property: 

(a) damage to property in the establishment: at least EUR 2 000 000; and  

(b) damage to property outside the establishment: at least EUR 500 000. 

5. Cross-border damage 

Any major accident directly involving a dangerous substance giving rise to effects outside the territory of the Member State 
concerned. 

These criteria are only applied in the EU. So, a specific methodology has been developed for selecting only 
the major accidents from the other databases to compare with the content of eMARS. 

It is important to note that the major accidents reported in eMARS are the accidents corresponding to the 
criteria for reporting (Annex VI of the Directive) and that take place at industrial establishments that are in the 
scope of the Seveso Directive. 

eMARS (https://emars.jrc.ec.europa.eu/?id=4)  

The MARS (Major Accident Reporting System) database is held by the MAHB (EU Major Accident Hazards Bureau) and centralises 
major industrial accidents involving dangerous substances from the Member States of the European Union as defined by the 
SEVESO II directive in the EU. 

The Major Accident Reporting System (MARS and later renamed eMARS when it became available online) was first established by 
the EU’s Seveso Directive 82/501/EEC in 1982 and has remained in place with subsequent revisions to the Seveso Directive in 
effect today. The purpose of the eMARS is to facilitate the exchange of lessons learned from accidents and near misses involving 
dangerous substances in order to improve chemical accident prevention and mitigation of potential consequences. 

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eMARS contains reports of chemical accidents and near misses provided to the Major Accident and Hazards Bureau (MAHB) of the 
European Commission’s Joint Research Centre from EU, OECD and UNECE countries (under the TEIA Convention). Reporting an 
event into eMARS is compulsory for EU Member States when a Seveso establishment is involved and the event meets the criteria of 
a “major accident” as defined by Annex VI of the Seveso III Directive (2012/18/EU). For non-EU OECD and UNECE countries 
reporting accidents to the eMARS database is voluntary. The information of the reported event is entered into eMARS directly by the 
official reporting authority of the country in which the accident occurred. 

The Major Accident Reporting System (eMARS) has been used as our reference database for the 
benchmark. The access to the eMARS data was straightforward and easy since the database can be 
consulted online. 

The published data were used for the purpose of this analysis. 

Since eMARS is focusing on major accidents as part of the implementation of the Seveso Directive, it is 
straight forward to identify this type of accident. For the other databases, there is a need to apply criteria to 
extract the major accidents.

ARIA (http://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/find-accident/?lang=en)  

The ARIA (Analysis, Research and Information on Accidents) database operated by the BARPI (Bureau for Analysis of industrial 
Risks and PollutIons), an entity within the French Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy that is in charge of 
operating the Aria Database. Engineers and technicians are collecting, analysing and publishing information on industrial accidents. 

The French Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy lists the accidental events which have, or could have 
damaged health or public safety, agriculture, nature or the environment. These events are mainly caused by industrial or agricultural 
facilities that have been or are likely to be classified as hazardous, but also by transportation of hazardous materials and other 
events with lessons that also apply in this context. The list of accidents and incidents in France and abroad, which cannot be seen as 
exhaustive, together with analysis of them, has been in place since 1992. 

With all activities taken together, this database lists over 40,000 accidents and incidents, of which about 37,000 are in France. 
Foreign accidents are listed mainly due to the seriousness of their consequences or their value in terms of experience feedback. 

The inventory of French and foreign accidents is not exhaustive. Consequently, the ARIA database must not be used for “statistical” 
treatments without precaution. 

It was not easy to collect data relative to the major accidents especially for ARIA, because of the search 
criteria and the huge quantity of data (16 101 events in the benchmarked countries between 2000 and 2014). 
That is why a systematic analysis has been performed: 

  Firstly, the list of events “CLASSIFIED INSTALLATION (IC) - Accidents / Incidents inside a 

classified installation (or likely to be)” between January 1st, 2000 and December 31st, 2014, 
was created for each of the 34 benchmarked countries; 

  From this list of events, the selection of the “major accidents” was undertaken as follows: 

  ARIA uses its own “European scale of industrial accidents” which does not match with the 

criteria of Annex VI of the Seveso II Directive. So, the parameters of the European scale 
have been compared with the criteria of Annex VI of the Seveso II Directive; and  

 

In the following figures, the criteria that do not correspond to a major accident according to 
the Seveso Directive have been crossed in red (
). The criteria that require the reading of 
the description of the accident are framed in red dotted line ( 
might correspond to a major accident are framed in red line (

 ) and the criteria that 
).  

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Source: ARIA68 

68 See: http://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/information-tools/european-scale-of-industrial-
accidents/?lang=en 

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FKD (http://www.sozogaku.com/fkd/en/)  
On March 23, 2005, the Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST) started providing on its website an open reference resource, 
the "Failure Knowledge Database". The database showcases analyses of accidents and failures in science and technology fields, 
sorted into 16 categories that reflect the type of lessons learned from these failures. Its aim is to prevent similar accidents and 
failures from happening and to improve the reliability and safety of technology in society. As of May 13, there have been 1,135 case 
studies presented from the four industrial fields of machinery, materials, chemistry and construction. Points of interest can be 
searched for using key words, from the 16 categories of lessons learned, and also looked up through a "Failure Mandala" that 
systematically organises a failure scenario to show causes, action, and results. The JST database aims to help in preventing similar 
accidents or failures, as well as for technological education and training purposes. 

RISCAD (https://riscad.aist-riss.jp/?lang=en) 
The Relational Information System for Chemical Accidents Database (RISCAD) was developed and operates using data collected 
from the aftermath of fire, explosion, and leakage accidents related to chemical substances, chemical processes, high-pressure gas, 
and explosives. In RISCAD, some of the accident data are linked to the “Accident Progress FlowChart” (APFC), which shows the 
timeline and the cause analysis of each accident. In order to create these APFCs, an accident analysis called “Progress Flow 
Analysis” (PFA) is conducted. This analysis method is also useful for increasing company safety awareness. In this paper, the outline 
and development process of RISCAD are introduced, and the procedures and application related to PFA industrial safety are 
reported. 

For Japan, FKD (Failure Knowledge Database) and RISCAD (Relational Information System for Chemical 
Accidents Database) were consulted.  

Regarding FKD, the data were collected by reading the website pages related to the accidents in the 
“Chemistry”, “Food”, “Metals”, “Oil”, “Petrochemistry” categories. Eight major accidents were identified 
between 2000 and 2003 for Japan, and FKD did not collect data after 2003.  

The RISCAD database is operated by the Japanese Institute AIST and compiles several official data 
sources. We were able to use the data from these two databases for the accidents in Japan. 

CSB (http://www.csb.gov)  

The CSB is a US federal independent agency charged with investigating industrial chemical accidents. Headquartered in 
Washington, DC, the agency's board members are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. 

The CSB conducts root cause investigations of chemical accidents at fixed industrial facilities. Root causes are usually deficiencies 
in safety management systems, but can be any factor that would have prevented the accident if that factor had not occurred. Other 
accident causes often involve equipment failures, human errors, unforeseen chemical reactions or other hazards. The agency does 
not issue fines or citations, but does make recommendations to plants, regulatory agencies such as the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), industry organizations, and labour groups. Congress 
designed the CSB to be non-regulatory and independent of other agencies so that its investigations might, where appropriate, review 
the effectiveness of regulations and regulatory enforcement. 

The CSB investigative staff includes chemical and mechanical engineers, industrial safety experts, and other specialists with 
experience in the private and public sectors. Many investigators have years of chemical industry experience. 

After a CSB team reaches a chemical incident site, investigators begin their work by conducting detailed interviews of witnesses 
such as plant employees, managers, and neighbours. Chemical samples and equipment obtained from accident sites are sent to 
independent laboratories for testing. Company safety records, inventories, and operating procedures are examined as investigators 
seek an understanding of the circumstances of the accident. 

Over a course of several months, investigators sift through evidence, consult with Board members, and review regulations and 
industry practices before drafting key findings, root causes and recommendations. During the process, investigators may confer with 
plant managers, workers, labour groups, and other government authorities. The investigative process generally takes six to twelve 
months to complete, and a draft report is then submitted to the Board for consideration. Reports may be adopted through a written 
vote of the Board or in a formal public meeting near the incident site or in Washington, DC. 

In addition to investigations of specific accidents, the Board is authorized to conduct investigations of more general chemical 
accident hazards, whether or not an accident has already occurred. In 2002, the Board's first hazard investigation on reactive 
chemicals reviewed more than 150 serious accidents involving uncontrolled chemical reactions in industry. This investigation led to 
new recommendations to OSHA and EPA for regulatory changes. 

In 2003, the CSB launched investigations of three major industrial explosions involving combustible powders. These explosions - in 
North Carolina, Kentucky, and Indiana - cost 14 lives and caused numerous injuries and substantial property losses. The Board 
responded by launching a nationwide study to determine the scope of the problem and recommend new safety measures for facilities 
that handle combustible powders. The CSB issued its final report at a public meeting in Washington, DC, on November 9, 2006, 
calling for a new OSHA regulatory standard designed to prevent combustible dust fires and explosions. 

Both accident investigations and hazard investigations lead to new safety recommendations, which are the Board's principal tool for 
achieving positive change. Recommendations are issued to government agencies, companies, trade associations, labour unions, 

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and other groups. Implementation of each safety recommendation is tracked and monitored by CSB staff. When recommended 
actions have been completed satisfactorily, the recommendation may be closed by a Board vote. 

While some recommendations may be adopted immediately, others require extensive effort and advocacy to achieve 
implementation. Board members and staff work to promote safety actions based on CSB recommendations. In many cases, the 
lessons from CSB investigations are applicable to many organizations beyond the company investigated. Many CSB 
recommendations have been implemented in industry, leading to safer plants, workers, and communities. 

CSB (Chemical Safety Board in the USA) available data were collected for the accidents in the USA, since 
the accidents recorded and investigated by the CSB are closer to the definition of major accidents for 
Seveso establishments. As mentioned in the description of the CSB database, the mission of CSB is not to 
collect data about all accidents that occur in the USA, but it is to provide recommendations and improve 
lessons learned. Therefore, the exhaustiveness of the data is not an objective of CSB. Other sources might 
be combined, such as the US OSHA and US EPA data on accidents, in particular those related to the Risk 
Management Programme. There is no legislative requirement to report chemical accidents to the CSB.

ZEMA (http://www.infosis.uba.de/index.php/de/site/12981/zema/index.html)  
The ZEMA database (Zentrale Melde- und Auswertestelle für Störfälle und Störungen in verfahrenstechnischen Anlagen) centralises 
information on accidents in Germany. The database is in German. 
It gathers the data on accidents reported according to the legal requirements related to the transposition of the Seveso III Directive. 
The content of the database is organised in a way that is similar to the eMARS database, with information provided on the 
consequences of the accident on-site and outside the establishment. 

ZEMA (Evaluation Office for Accidents and Incidents in Process Plant in Germany) database was used to 
collect on major accidents for Germany. The reporting of accidents is mandatory according to the German 
regulation (12. BImSchV). Therefore, there is a high level of confidence in the exhaustiveness of the 
information available in ZEMA.  

EM-DAT (http://www.emdat.be)  
In 1988, the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) launched the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT). 
EM-DAT was created with the initial support of the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the Belgian Government. 
The main objective of the database is to serve the purposes of humanitarian action at national and international levels. The initiative 
aims to rationalise decision making for disaster preparedness, as well as provide an objective base for vulnerability assessment and 
priority setting. 
EM-DAT contains essential core data on the occurrence and effects of over 22,000 mass disasters in the world from 1900 to the 
present day. The database is compiled from various sources, including UN agencies, non-governmental organisations, insurance 
companies, research institutes and press agencies. 
Development and relief agencies have long recognized the crucial role played by data and information in mitigating the impacts of 
disasters on vulnerable populations. Systematic collection and analysis of these data provides invaluable information to governments 
and agencies in charge of relief and recovery activities. They are also crucial in the integration of health components into 
development and poverty alleviation programmes. 
Yet there is still no international consensus regarding best practices for collecting these data. Together with the complexity of 
collecting reliable information, there remains huge variability in definitions, methodologies, tools and sourcing. 
EM-DAT provides an objective basis for vulnerability assessment and rational decision-making in disaster situations. For example, it 
helps policymakers identify the disaster types that are most common in a given country and that have had significant historical 
impacts on human populations. In addition to providing information on the human impact of disasters - such as the number of people 
killed, injured or affected - EM-DAT provides disaster-related economic damage estimates and disaster-specific international aid 
contributions. 

EM-DAT available data were collected at the end of November 2016 and analysed with the same methodology 
as described for ARIA to identify the major accidents as defined in the Seveso III Directive. The main inputs 
from this database were for the accidents in China. 

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FACTS (http://www.factsonline.nl/browse-chemical-accidents-in-database)   
The Failure and Accidents Technical information System (FACTS) is an accident database which contains information on more than 
25,700 industrial incidents involving hazardous materials or dangerous goods that have happened all over the world during the past 
90 years. 
The main objective of the FACTS chemical accident database is to learn from accidents or incidents and to prevent them in the 
future. 
Not only analysed and documented accidents involving severe damage or danger, such as BLEVES, major spills, huge explosions 
and derailments, are included, but also near-misses. The quality of the information on recorded accidents is also related to their 
seriousness and impact. For the most serious accidents detailed information is known; 300,000 pages of background information is 
stored, most of it electronically and remains available for further research purposes. 
The FACTS chemical accident database was a product of TNO Industrial and External Safety. 
The exploitation of the database is no longer be done by TNO. The maintenance and exploitation of the database are continued by 
the Unified Industrial & Harbour Fire Department in Rotterdam-Rozenburg. 

PSID (http://www.psidnet.com/)  
The centre for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) developed the Process Safety Incident Database to collect and share process 
safety incident information and experiences among participating companies. 
The CCPS also publishes each month the CCPS Beacon. 
PSID tracks, pools, and shares process safety incidents among participating companies so process safety professionals can learn 
from the experiences of others, while minimizing the consequences of failures and corporate liability. 
PSID contains important lessons to be learned from incidents that did or could have resulted in fire, explosion, fatality, multiple 
injuries, significant release of hazardous materials, and other unique process safety incidents (including near misses). 

The websites of the FACTS and PSID databases did not provide useful data. The owners of the databases 
were contacted but, despite several attempts, we have not been able to access the data to include them in 
the analysis.  

The data collected have been consolidated by cross checking the number of reported major accidents in the 
various databases.  

The objective was to create a unique database of the reported major accidents representing the merging, i.e. 
the union (∪) of the databases (according to set theory). A detailed review of the data was done in order to 
make sure that the same accident does not appear several times. Each major accident was identified in each 
database by its location and its date in order to remove any duplication. This work was very time consuming 
but it was the only approach to verify the exhaustiveness of the databases. 

The figure below presents the consolidation of the database that was conducted to prepare the graphs 
presented in section 6.2.5.  

Database for Europe = ARIA ∪ eMARS ∪ ZEMA 
Database for Australia = ARIA 
Database for Brazil = ARIA 
Database for Canada = ARIA  
Database for China = ARIA  
Database for India = ARIA  
Database for Japan = ARIA ∪ FKD ∪ RISCAD  

69 The database for countries were derived by combining (∪) available database while removing duplicates 
as much as possible. For example the EU database comprises ARIA, eMARS and ZEMA (with duplicates 
removed). 

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Database for New Zealand = ARIA  
Database for Russia = ARIA  
Database for South Korea = ARIA  
Database for USA = ARIA ∪ CSB  

The number of major accidents is interesting information on which to base the comparison of countries, 
however it does not allow for variations due to level of industrialisation or size of the population. So in order 
to better compare the countries, the data had to be normalised.  

At first, in order to normalise the data, we tried to identify the number of establishments handling hazardous 
materials in the selected countries. However, this information was not available. Therefore, we have used 
other parameters reflecting the level of industrialisation, which are more readily available. Therefore, number 
of major accidents has been normalised with population and with GDP for the EU and the benchmarked 
countries, for each period: 2000-2002, 2003-2005, 2006-2008, 2009-2011 and 2012-2014. 

We applied the following equations: 

𝑵𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒎𝒂𝒋𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒐𝒑𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 

=  

𝑁𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦

  × 106 

𝑵𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒎𝒂𝒋𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑮𝑫𝑷 

=  

𝑁𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝐺𝐷𝑃

  × 1012 

The GDP and the population for the benchmarked countries were exported from the World Bank Open Data 
database70 which is the only database covering all countries selected for the benchmark. 

It would have been meaningful not only to consider the number of reported accidents but also their severity. 
Unfortunately, the information on the severity is presented in very disparate formats and is therefore not easy 
to incorporate. This work could be performed in a consequent study with more resources available.  

The full tables are presented in Appendix F. 

Important remarks on the statistics on the reported major accidents: 

1)  The work carried out to prepare the data was substantial. Despite the effort to collect and process the data, the 

exhaustiveness of the identification of all major accidents that have occurred in the considered countries is not guaranteed.  

This limitation is due to: 

2)  The quality of the reporting in the countries considered is difficult to analyse because the legal requirements for reporting 

major accidents to the authorities is different from those in force in the EU.  

3)  The application of the same criteria as those used in the EU to qualify an accident as a “major accident” is subject to 

interpretation of the information available. 
The definition of “major accident” in the context of the Seveso Directive refers to the type of establishment covered by the 
Seveso Directive; if an accident has consequences matching the criteria of annex VI of the Directive but if the 
establishment is not covered by the Seveso Directive, the accident is not considered as a “major accident” reported in 
eMARS.  
Some EU Member States record accidents that occur in establishments that are classified and monitored according to the 
national legal system, but that are below the threshold (or otherwise outside the scope) of the Seveso Directive. This is the 
case for France and Germany. This explains why the merging of the data recorded in the ZEMA, ARIA and eMARS 
databases gives a higher number of major accidents than the number of major accidents notified in eMARS 

70 http://data.worldbank.org/ 

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Graphical representations have been generated from the statistics prepared in the 4th step. As explained in 
section 6.2.3 there is a distinction between the data corresponding to “Europe” and “EU (eMARS)”. 

“Europe” data correspond to the collation and merging of the data from eMARS, ARIA and ZEMA concerning 
major accidents for the countries from the European Union, after the consolidation and cleaning as described 
in 6.2.3.  

“EU (eMARS)” data include only the data from the eMARS database (published data). 

250

200

150

100

50

0

Europe

Australia

Brazil

Canada

China

India

Japan

New Zealand

Russia

South Korea

USA

EU (eMars)

2000-2002

2003-2005

2006-2008

2009-2011

2012-2014

The number of reported accidents is higher for the Europe and EU (eMARS) data than for the other 
benchmarked countries, i.e. both with the data obtained from the merging of the consulted databases and 
from eMARS alone. This observation is believed to be the result of the more systematic and exhaustive 
accident reporting in the EU than in the other benchmarked countries, rather than there being more major 
accidents. 

For several data sets, there is a peak for the period 2003-2005 that cannot be explained easily. More 
investigation would be required to identify the reasons for this peak.  

This figure also shows a trend of a decrease in the number of reported major accidents in the EU; the same 
trend can also be observed in the other benchmarked countries, even if it is not so marked due to the low 
number of accidents reported. This trend has been further analysed by comparing with other indicators 
including population and GDP, since the number of reported major accidents is not very meaningful on its 
own. 

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0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0

Europe

Australia

Brazil

Canada

China

India

Japan

New Zealand

Russia

South Korea

USA

EU (eMars)

2000-2002

2003-2005

2006-2008

2009-2011

2012-2014

This figure presenting the number of major accidents per million population confirms the overall trend of a 
decrease of reported major accidents in the EU and in most of the benchmarked countries. However, we see 
an increase of reported major accidents for South Korea, Japan and Canada during the last period.  Again 
the higher numbers for the EU may be the result of more extensive data availability (and reporting) rather 
than an indication of there being more accidents in practice. 

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30

25

20

15

10

5

0

Europe

Australia

Brazil

Canada

China

India

Japan

New Zealand

Russia

South Korea

USA

EU (eMars)

2000-2002

2003-2005

2006-2008

2009-2011

2012-2014

This figure presenting the number of major accidents per GDP better reflects the level of economic activity in 
the countries than the ratio with the population. This figure also show a trend of decrease of the reported 
major accidents. 

For the EU (data from eMARS), the decrease is significant and continuous, while the GDP in the EU during 
the last three considered period was slightly increasing.  

With the ratio per GDP, we can observe that the number of reported major accidents in China and India were 
above all other countries for the period until 2008. 

For the last period, the increase of reported major accidents is confirmed for South Korea, Japan and 
Canada. 

6.3  Results of the review of the database for the benchmarked countries and 

discussion 

The figures and tables were analysed in order to derive the key conclusions that are presented in this 
section: 

  Remark #1: It is impossible to compare objectively the reported major accidents in the EU with 

the other countries based on the data available. 

It is impossible to compare the number of reported major accidents in the EU with the other countries 
because: 

  The lack of common definition of a major accident with the other countries; and  

  The difficulty to access the data in national language from the other countries. 

Regarding the first point, the comparison with other countries requires one to first treat the data to consider 
only the accidents that can be considered as major accidents according to the criteria of Annex VI of the 
Seveso II Directive (or other common metric). As an example, if we consider the data collected from the 

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USA, it tends to show the same decrease of reported major accidents as in Europe. However, it is almost 
certain that the number of accidents collected by CSB and ARIA for the USA is not exhaustive. 
Consequently, the comparison of the data collected in the European Union with the data concerning other 
countries is not possible. 

Regarding the second point, most of the national databases are available only in national language. For 
example, the Chinese database operated by the State Administration of Work Safety (SAWS) can be 
consulted only in Chinese.  This was a limitation given the resources available for the current study: 

  Remark #2: There is a significant and continuous decrease of the number of reported major 

accidents in the EU. 

Looking at the figures and graphs, the number of reported major accidents in Europe shows a significant 
trend to decrease with the ratio per GDP, which reflects the evolution of the level of economic activity. This is 
particularly interesting because for other countries such as South Korea, Japan and Canada we can observe 
an increase of reported major accidents during the last period. 

This significant and continuous decrease in relation to the EU GDP is highly likely to have been driven, at 
least in part, by the implementation of the Seveso Directive: 

  Remark #3: There is need to clarify the differences of reporting of major accidents in eMARS 

and the other databases. 

Considering that the eMARS database collects fewer data, while the number of major accidents reported in 
the other databases is not significantly less, it is suspected that for the last period, not all data are available. 
For the period 2000-2002, eMARS has 79 accidents reported, which is more than ARIA and ZEMA with 
respectively 73 and 77 accidents reported, and which represents 46% of the merged databases. For the 
period 2012-2014, there were some differences in the number of accidents reported in eMARS (published 
data) and the ARIA and ZEMA databases.  This is due to differences in the reporting criteria of these 
databases. The consultation of the MAHB on this issue has confirmed that there is a delay in having the data 
available in eMARS for the last period because the data have to be checked before they are made available 
in the eMARS online database. Another explanation is that there are accidents corresponding to the criteria 
of major accidents that are included in the databases like ARIA and ZEMA that are not Seveso 
establishments, and which are only covered by the national regulation (declaration or authorisation regimes): 

  Remark #4: There is a deficit of reporting of the major accidents for the other benchmarked 

countries. 

The figures show that more major accidents are reported in the EU than in other countries considered in this 
study. However, the potential deficit of reporting in all databases has to be taken into account. Indeed, the 
other databases provide very low statistics either due to the difficulty to access the databases themselves 
and/or because of the less extensive reporting into these databases: 

  Remark #5: The absence of a common definition at an international level of major accidents 

makes the comparison between countries very difficult. 

In order to compare the trends and the impact of the policies for the prevention of major accidents, it would 
be necessary to adopt a common definition and enable the classification of the accidents and incidents 
according to this definition in the accident databases. 

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7  Monitoring indicators 

7.1  Overview 

Article 29 of the Seveso III Directive requires that, by 2020, the Commission considers the implementation 
and efficient functioning of the Directive, including information on major accidents that have occurred within 
the Union and review whether there is a need to amend the scope of the Directive.  As such, the main 
objective of this section is to provide initial thoughts on indicators that could set the grounds of a long-term 
monitoring system in line with the Better Regulation requirements. The objectives of such indicators are not 
to measure the safety performance of individual establishments or sectors covered by the Seveso Directive 
but rather to satisfy the requirements of the Better Regulation guidelines that mandate the use of indicators 
to monitor the implementation but also the effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, relevance and EU added 
value of any EU legislative intervention.  

7.2  Methodology 

Regulatory performance assessment addresses both the very process of regulation elaboration as well as its 
impacts on the targeted system and is a common policy process adopted for EU policies (known as ex-post 
evaluation or simply “evaluation”).  

Evaluations are an essential part of the Commission’s policy cycle and decision-making process as 
highlighted in the Commission’s 2015 Communication on "Better regulation for better results - An EU 
agenda". The Better Regulation strategy emphasises the importance of assessing and evaluating after a 
policy or measure has been implemented to ensure it stays fit for purpose and delivers, at minimum cost, the 
desired changes and objectives.  

The evaluation of policies and measures and comparison against ex-ante estimates (e.g. impact 
assessments) is an important step in making future interventions more realistic and accurate, while 
understanding the factors that have made policies more or less effective and cost-efficient. The review of 
legislation can provide indications to policy makers of the types of instrument that proved to be most 
successful and most cost-effective in delivering the intended benefits. The EU Better Regulation guidelines71 
define a set of five evaluation criteria: effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, coherence and EU-added value 
that each focus on a specific aspect of an EU intervention (i.e. an EU policy or instrument, for example the 
Seveso III Directive) assessed. 

  Effectiveness: To what extent did the Directive cause the observed changes/effects? To what 
extent can these changes/effects be credited to the Directive? To what extent do the observed 
effects correspond to the objectives? 

  Efficiency: Were the costs involved justified, given the changes/effects which have been 

achieved? What factors influenced the achievements observed? 

  Coherence: To what extent is the Directive coherent with other interventions which have 

similar objectives? To what extent is the Directive coherent internally? 

  Relevance: To what extent do the (original) objectives (still) correspond to the needs within the 

EU? and  

  EU added value: What is the additional value resulting from the Directive, compared to what 

could be achieved by Member States at national and/or regional levels? 

 Relevance and coherence criteria are meant to assess the regulation content by respectively evaluating 
needs and objectives adequacy as well as complementarity with other EU regulations whereas EU added 
value, efficiency and effectiveness criteria focus on regulation results and impacts. The figure below presents 
the approach to evaluation as defined in the Better Regulation Toolbox. 

71 http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/toc_guide_en.htm 

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This section aims at presenting an overview of available indicators and potential new ones that could be 
further explored when considering the upcoming evaluation of the Seveso III Directive.  

The preliminary nature of this work is to be highlighted, and in several instances more work is necessary to 
understand whether indicators can be derived for specific aspects of the Seveso III Directive. It is possible 
that for some aspects, future work would conclude that it is neither possible nor meaningful to use indicators.   

Based on the review of the literature available, we selected a set of representative guidelines and documents 
addressing both safety as well as regulatory performance assessment to analyse further. Out of this 
analysis, we suggested:  

  A set of recommended indicators;  

  A set of optional ones; and  

  Potential future developments on indicators.     

7.3  Review of technical requirements including Better Regulation guidelines 

Regulatory performance assessment is interested in understanding the extent to which a given regulatory 
intervention has been conceived through efficient processes and achieves its objectives without generating 
secondary adverse effects. Correctly framing and performing this evaluation raises the following challenges: 

 

Implementation: Transposition into national laws of the member states; 

  Application: changes observed in the realisation of the main policy objectives; 

  Compliance and enforcement: extent of compliance by the different stakeholders; and 

  Contextual information: Any development that is not intentionally related to the policy 

intervention but is influenced by it. 

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For all these aspects evidence will have to be gathered.  This evidence can be assessed by linking 
objectives with indicators. The Better Regulation guidelines define three types of indicators: 

  Output indicators: relating to the specific deliverables of the intervention, for example reporting 

under eMARS and eSPIRS, adoption of MAPP; 

  Outcome / result indicators: matching the immediate effects of the intervention with the direct 
addressees, for example the number of upper tier establishments inspected annually; and 

 

Impact indicators: these are related to the intended outcome of the intervention in terms of 
impact on the wider economy, for example the reduction in the number and intensity of major 
accidents, incidents and near misses from industrial establishments. 

When considering future evaluations of the Seveso Directive, a first step in order to define relevant indicators 
will be to develop a tailored intervention logic. Its aim is to identify: 

  What ‘needs’ the legislation is intended to address;  

  What ‘objectives’ does the legislation put in place to try and help address the needs;  

  What ‘actions’ are undertaken to meet the objectives;  

  What ‘consequences’ (impacts and results) come from the actions; and 

  What are the ‘expected results’ which should fully resolve the needs.  

A full intervention logic should also consider external influences – other factors that influence the 
consequences that are outside the scope of the policy / legislation in question.  

The development of an intervention logic is out of the scope for this task, however it is useful to consider the 
context within which our preliminary investigation on possible monitoring indicators is being conducted. 

In addition to the Better Regulation guidelines, other literature sources are useful to consider. In particular 
the OECD (Coglianese, 2012) provides a detailed account of the various stages through which a regulatory 
intervention achieves its objectives.  

Figure 7.2 shows that a legislative intervention goes through a series of administrative procedures and 
practices leading to the proposal of the regulation of interest (ROI)72. The first impact expected is to influence 
the impacted stakeholders by triggering new behaviours. This evolution will in turn lead to intermediate and 
final outcomes. Some of these outcomes will be the very objectives expected by the regulator (Ultimate 
outcomes of concern) while others may be either positive or negative but definitely out of the initial 
regulator’s objectives (Other ultimate outcomes of concern). Taking the example of the Seveso III Directive, 
behavioural changes expected are for instance the development of expertise on public information among 
impacted industries and Member State competent authorities. An intermediate outcome of concern will be 
the increase of information available on Seveso establishments whereas the final outcome could be the 
improvement of safety through better sharing of information among stakeholders including the populations.  

In addition, considering that this process is being conducted in open systems, external influences are to be 
expected with impacts on every phase from behavioural change to final outcomes of concerns.  

72 Note that ‘regulation’ is used generically to designate legislative intervention rather than a specific 
legislative instrument 

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Source: Coglianese, 2012 

In addition to these elements, our literature review identified the following set of best practices: 

 

If the focus is on assessing the level of objectives achievement, indicators will be exclusively 
oriented towards observable results (e.g. reduction in environmental impact of major 
accidents). However, if the decision maker is interested in understanding why the objectives 
have or have not been achieved, it is necessary to focus also on intermediate outcomes and 
behavioural changes within impacted stakeholders through well calibrated indicators. For 
instance, indicators described in Figure 3.13 (overview of the most reported actions taken 
during the reporting period) and in Figure 3.15 (Number of inspections of upper-tier 
establishments during the reporting period) are intermediate indicators that discuss behavioural 
evolutions against the requirements of the directive in terms of number and content of Member 
States enforcement and inspections. For this, the interpretation of the results requires the 
combination of different types of indicators, some focusing on objectives achievement while 
others on the intermediate stages described in Figure 7.2; 

  Systems subject to regulations can also be impacted by other existing regulations either at EU 
or at national level. It may therefore become difficult to attribute any success or failure to a 
specific regulation rather than a combination of regulations. For instance, following the 
Toulouse catastrophe in 2001, France issued (in 2003) a regulation whose scope and 
objectives are very close to those of the Seveso II and III Directives. It is therefore important to 
consider, extent to which the legislation considered has contributed to (qualitatively and 
quantitatively) the achievement of the objectives. This aspect is considered under the 
‘effectiveness’ criterion and to some extent under the ‘coherence’ criterion; and  

  Regulations may have impacts that go far beyond the targeted objectives. In the case of 

Seveso III, impacts on companies’ competitiveness or regulatory agencies staffing for instance 
may be significant. Accordingly, a thorough evaluation of a legislative instrument not only 
addresses achievement of targeted objectives, it also needs to detect and monitor other 

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unintended outcomes including costs to various stakeholders. This aspect would be considered 
under both the ‘effectiveness’ criterion (unintended effects) but also the ‘efficiency’ criterion.   

7.4  Review, selection and analysis of guidelines on safety indicators 

A wide range of guidelines was screened and reviewed including review of safety indicators guidelines, 
which has focused on the following sources: OECD73, UNECE74, CCPS75, the UN and INERIS76. Out of 
these, only a few were selected for a more in-depth review as detailed in Table 7.1. 

A first observation is that, with the exception of the OECD documents, none of these sources tackles the 
issue of evaluating a safety oriented regulation. They either discuss the terms of regulation monitoring 
(UNECE) or of safety monitoring (CCPS and INERIS). As a result, instead of looking into each of these 
documents to review “ready for use” indicators for Seveso III, our analysis considered whether each of these 
sources could provide a relevant piece of knowledge to guide our recommendations.    

Publishing 
organism 

OECD 

Title of the guideline 

Description of the guideline 

OECD guiding principles for 
chemical accident prevention, 
preparedness and response 
(OECD, 2003) 

Guidance on the relevant content 
each industrial safety policy should 
include. 
No indicators suggested.  

OECD guidance on developing 
safety performance indicators 
for public authorities and 
communities/public (OECD, 
2008). 

Measuring Regulatory 
Performance. Evaluating the 
impact of regulation and 
regulatory policy. (Cognilanese, 
2012). 

Benchmarks for the 
implementation of the 
convention on the 
Transboundary effects of 
industrial accident (UNECE, 
2010b) 

Dedicated guidelines on industrial 
safety indicators for regulatory 
bodies.  

No indicators suggested. It is rather 
an expert paper setting the 
methodological grounds for regulatory 
performance evaluation. 

Self-evaluation approach to assess 
how countries have included 
transboundary issues in their 
industrial safety policies. 
Examples of indicators: 
-  Existence of a mechanism for the 

collection of data; 

-  Existence of a mechanism for the 

analysis and validation of the data; 
and  

-  A mechanism for the 

review/revision of data. 

UNECE 

Judgement on suitability for further 
analysis 

The quality control process through 
which Seveso III content is evaluated 
being out of the scope of our work, this 
document has not been selected for 
further analysis. 

Document selected for further analysis. 

Document selected for further analysis. 

This benchmark is interested in 
ensuring that member states’ policies 
incorporate best practices like the 
identification of hazardous activities or 
public information and inclusiveness. 
These aspects relate to the content of 
regulations which goes beyond the 
scope of this work. 
As such, this document has not been 
selected for further analysis.  

Guidelines on the setting of 
targets, evaluation of progress 
and reporting (UNECE, 2010a). 

Methodology for identifying targets 
and indicators in the case of water 
policy. 
Indicators suggested are oriented 
towards water policy evaluation. 
Example of indicators: 

Full methodology of indicator 
development in the case of water 
policy. Hardly reusable in the case of 
industrial safety. This document has 
thus not been selected for further 
analysis. 

73 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
74 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. 
75 Center for Chemical Process Safety 
76 Institut National de l’Environnement Industriel et des Risques. 

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Publishing 
organism 

Title of the guideline 

Description of the guideline 

Judgement on suitability for further 
analysis 

UNECE online Guidelines for 
the Application of Environmental 
Indicators. 
http://www.unece.org/env/indica
tors.html  

-  Population coverage with access 
to improved water supply and 
sanitation technologies; and  

-  Existence of country-wide 

monitoring system that covers 
major pollutants. 

Detailed set of ready for use 
environmental indicators. 
Aspects of environmental policies 
covered are:  
-  Air pollution and ozone depletion; 
-  Climate change; 
-  Water; 
-  Biodiversity; 
-  Land and soil; 
-  Agriculture; 
-  Energy; 
-  Transport; 
-  Waste; and  
-  Environmental financing. 

No dedicated work on industrial safety 
indicators so not selected for further 
analysis. 

UNECE Strategy for education 
for sustainable development 
(ESD). Guidance for reporting 
(UNECE, 2007b) 
UNECE Indicators for education 
for sustainable development 
(ESD). Annex 1 (UNECE, 
2007a) 

Process safety performance 
indicators. Guidelines for 
industry (INERIS, 2016). 

INERIS 

CCPS 

Process Safety Leading and 
lagging Metrics (CCPS, 2011) 

UN 

Sendai Framework for Disaster 
Risk Reduction (DDR) 2015-
2030 
Report of the open-ended 
intergovernmental expert 
working group on indicators and 
terminology relating to disaster 
risk reduction77 

Two complementary documents 
providing a full account of: 
the typology of indicators used for 
policy evaluation and  
the type of targets to be addressed in 
policy evaluation. 

Although ESD remains far from Seveso 
III concerns, this work comprises a 
general reflection on the use of 
indicators for policy evaluation that we 
believe is useful.     
Documents selected for further 
analysis. 

Indicators suggested are industry 
oriented. However, the methodological 
background regarding the development 
and use of industrial safety indicators is 
relevant for the study. 
The document is therefore selected for 
further analysis. 

Indicators suggested are industry 
oriented. However, the methodological 
background regarding the development 
and use of industrial safety indicators is 
relevant for the study. 
The document is therefore selected for 
further analysis 

Only draft work initiated, however 
interesting to consider the development 
of indicators being undertaken. 

In depth analysis of methodological 
frameworks associated with the use 
of indicators for industrial safety. 
Examples of indicators suggested: 
-  Percentage of satisfactory sub-

contractors audit; and  

-  Evolution of total maintenance 

budget within the establishment. 

Development and use of indicators 
for process safety. 
Examples of indicators suggested: 
-  Percentage of safety related 

procedures reviewed and updated; 
and  

-  Percentage of individuals who 

successfully completed Process 
Safety management training 
sessions. 

Work through the open-ended 
intergovernmental expert working 
group: indicators78. 
Indicators are defined in accordance 
with the global target of the Sendai 
framework. For example, for target g: 
Substantially increase the availability 
of and access to multi hazard early 
warning systems and disaster risk 
information assessment to the people 
by 2030 the indicators considered 
are: 
- 

Number of countries that have 
multi-hazard early warning 
systems; 

77 http://www.preventionweb.net/files/50683_oiewgreportadvanceuneditedversion.pdf 
78 http://www.preventionweb.net/drr-framework/open-ended-working-group/indicators/ 

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Publishing 
organism 

Title of the guideline 

Description of the guideline 

Judgement on suitability for further 
analysis 

UN 

Sustainable Development Goal 
indicators79 

- 

- 

Number of countries that have 
multi-hazard monitoring and 
forecasting systems; and  
Number of people per 100,000 
that are covered by early 
warning information through 
local government or through 
national dissemination 
mechanisms. 

No guideline available yet but 
recently there have been discussions 
on increasing the coherence between 
the Sendai DRR and the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) indicator 
frameworks. Indicators are being 
developed under the SDG framework 

Would be interesting to consider 
whether indicators on Seveso III 
Directive could contribute to the SGD 
indicators development. 

Each of the documents indicated as selected for further analysis in Table 7.1 has been analysed according 
to the following items: 

 

Is the document suitable for public users which are the expected users of the guidelines? 

  What is the typology of indicators? The very meaning and the way indicators are suggested to 

be used can vary from one guideline to another; and  

  Targets and what is being measured? The set of aspects or dimensions each guideline 

suggests to monitor when it comes to regulatory ex-post evaluation. In other terms, targets 
discuss the issue of “what should be monitored through indicators?” 

The analysis of each guideline is presented in the tables below. 

OECD GUIDANCE ON DEVELOPING 
SAFETY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
FOR PUBLIC AUTHORITIES AND 
COMMUNITIES/PUBLIC, 2nd EDITION. 
(OECD, 2008) 

Description of the guidelines 

Relevance for our work 

Public 

Public authorities, elected officials, 
emergency response personnel, general 
public. 

Yes 

Two categories of indicators 
Leading or activity indicators 
Assess whether organisations are taking 
actions believed necessary to lower risks. 
Lagging or outcome indicators 
Assess whether safety related actions are 
achieving their desired results. 

Usually deployed for industrial systems. 
Poorly informative when it comes to 
regulatory assessment  

Internal organisation and policy 
Assessment of the organisation internal 
capabilities (readiness, staffing…) to 
elaborate a safety regulation.  

Assessment of EU capabilities to 
elaborate relevant policies is out of the 
scope of the study. 

Typology of indicators 

Targets 

79 http://unstats.un.org/sdgs/ 

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OECD GUIDANCE ON DEVELOPING 
SAFETY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
FOR PUBLIC AUTHORITIES AND 
COMMUNITIES/PUBLIC, 2nd EDITION. 
(OECD, 2008) 

Description of the guidelines 

Relevance for our work 

Legal framework 
Propensity of the regulation to address all 
aspects of chemical accident prevention 
and preparedness including land use 
planning, safety reports, permits… 

The evaluation of Seveso III content is out 
of the scope of the study. 

External cooperation 
Cooperation and communication among 
public and private stakeholders interested 
in / impacted by the regulation. 

Could be of interest when it comes to 
discuss behavioural changes triggered by 
Seveso III. 

Accident/near miss reporting and 
investigation 
Mechanisms to detect, analyse and learn 
from incidents and accidents. 

Although already in place before Seveso 
III implementation, this may be a relevant 
target to assess the final level of industrial 
safety in Europe (ultimate outcome of 
concern). 

UNECE Strategy for education for 
sustainable development (ESD). 
Guidance for reporting (UNECE, 
2007b); UNECE Indicators for 
education for sustainable 
development, Annex 1 (UNECE, 2007a). 

Description 

Relevance for our work 

Public 

Regulators, inspection authorities. 

Yes 

Four categories of indicators 
Checklist indicators 
Information on initial policy, legislation 
and governance structures taken by 
government in order to implement the 
strategy.  
Input indicators 
Information about activities taking place 
(money invested, staffing…). 
Output indicators 
Results of the regulation. 
Outcome indicators 
Impacts of the regulation on the outcomes 
of concern. 

This typology is fully adapted to regulatory 
purposes. 

Ensure that governance structures exist 
at national levels to support the promotion 
of the policy.  

Governance structures in charge of 
Seveso III implementation are well 
identified in all EU member states.  
Out of the scope of the study 

Promote =sustainable development 
through formal, non-formal and informal 
learning 

Not relevant for this work. 

Equip educators with the competence to 
include sustainable development in their 
teaching. 

Competence development issues may be 
of interest for the implementation of 
Seveso III directive. 

Ensure that adequate tools and materials 
are accessible for users. 

National level tools may be required for 
updating plants classification according to 
CLP. 

Research on sustainable development is 
promoted. 

Not relevant for this work. 

Typology of indicators 

Targets 

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Process safety performance 
indicators. Guidelines for industry 
(INERIS, 2016). 

Description 

Relevance for our work 

Public 

Industries 

Partial. 

Typology of indicators 

Targets 

Three categories of indicators 
Results indicators 
Information on objectives achievement.  
Functioning indicators 
Information on activities deployed to 
achieve objectives. 
Eco-system indicators 
Information on the human and 
organisational context within which 
activities are deployed. 

The guidelines suggest a method to 
support each organisation investigating its 
own targets. No predefined targets 
suggested.  

Relevant proposals in terms of combining 
different types of indicators to develop not 
only descriptive abilities (objective 
achieved or not?) but also comprehensive 
ones (why did we succeed or fail?) 

No relevant contribution to this work. 

Process Safety Leading and lagging 
Metrics (CCPS, 2011) 

Description 

Relevance for our work 

Public 

Industries 

Partial. 

Typology of indicators 

Targets 

Two categories of indicators 
Leading or activity indicators 
Assess whether organisations are taking 
actions believed necessary to lower risks. 
Lagging or outcome indicators 
Assess whether safety related actions are 
achieving their desired results. 

CCPS suggests focusing monitoring on 
Loss of Primary Containments (LOPC) 
and classifies their leading and lagging 
capacities according to the level of 
consequences (the lower are the 
consequences the more leading is the 
LOPC with regard to a possible major 
accidental release). 

Very similar to OECD typology. 
More adapted to industrial needs than to 
regulatory applications. 

LOPC is a widely used indicator within 
industry to assess process safety 
performance. This information being 
available, it may be interesting to consider 
it in monitoring evolutions of safety levels 
under Seveso III regulation. 

The OECD and UNECE guidelines display both differences and complementarities with European Better 
Regulation guidelines. Differences are particularly visible when it comes to the targets to be monitored. 
These differences can be explained by the extremely large variety of countries that the OECD and UNECE 
address in terms of cultures, languages and governance structures. For instance, the variety of governance 
structures and maturity that the UNECE can experience within its members fully justifies the need to question 
and monitor the existence of nationally dedicated capabilities to translate and implement international 
policies. These issues are of a lesser interest at the European level where a much higher uniformity can be 
observed in terms of governance structures and reasonable hypotheses can be drawn on their positive 
capabilities to transpose EU legislation. 

In terms of complementarities, it may be noted that the Better Regulation guidelines do not discuss the issue 
of combining different types of indicators so to enhance decision makers’ abilities to achieve comprehensive 
analysis of observed results. All other guidelines, including OECD and UNECE, tackle this issue by 
suggesting various typologies.  

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Despite its industry oriented approach, the CCPS guideline provide a noteworthy contribution by inviting one 
to go beyond counting major accidents which are statistically hardly representative of any reality. In fact, 
safety levels may decrease long before a major accident occurs, thanks to human abilities to compensate for 
systems deviation or simply because of luck (i.e. aleatory aspects of accidents). It is therefore recommended 
when evaluating safety levels to rely on small events monitoring so to detect safety deteriorations before 
major accidents occur.  

A very similar approach is already implemented at the European level through the accident severity index 
which may also serve as a metric of safety. Still, and as already discussed, this measure needs to be 
combined with other indicators to help the decision maker in getting the global picture.      

If the UNECE and OECD (2008) documents are of little help to select targets, the OECD model presented in 
Figure 7.3 (Coglianese, 2012) is much more informative at this level. One may easily retrieve the targets 
already suggested by the Better Regulation guidelines while offering a much broader view to those 
interested in deepening performance evaluation. 

Finally, Figure 7.3 presents all elements suggested by Better Regulation guidelines:  

 

Implementation (box I);  

  Application (boxes III and IV in the sense that application relates to the changes observed in 
the realisation of the objectives or outcomes of concern; either intermediate or ultimate);  

  Compliance (box II that discusses how new behaviours have emerged among 

impacted/interested stakeholders to comply with the regulation); and 

  Contextual information (box V describes other ultimate outcomes of concerns referring to the 

consequences that were not intentionally related to the regulation).  

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The selection of indicators relies on two basic constraints: 

  The specificities of the object one wants to measure, in this case, the effectiveness, efficiency, 

relevance, coherence and EU-added value of the Seveso III Directive; and  

  The limited resources one may invest on such monitoring and the limited availability of data to 

conduct this measurement. 

Regarding the first constraint, our analysis has led us to suggest the model in Figure 7.3 with a selection of 
indicators that fit the Better Regulation requirements. These are to be considered as the minimum set of 
indicators to consider if one wants to address all the requirements of the Better Regulation guidelines. The 
others suggested in the model may serve as guidelines for further investigation based on the priorities of the 
European Commission.  Accordingly, we used the following category of indicators for our analysis: 

 

Implementation and enforcement. This first category addresses the extent to which the 
Seveso III Directive has been transposed into Member States national legislation and how 
capacity building (especially well trained inspectors staffing) is achieved to support 
implementation. This is transient in the sense that it remains relevant as long as not all Member 
States achieved its transposition and its full implementation. When both are achieved, this 
target can be removed, or its priority can be lowered; 

  Compliance (behavioural change). This second category focuses on the extent to which the 
Seveso III Directive has generated expected changes in terms of behaviour amongst the 
concerned stakeholders. Comparatively to Seveso II, we have identified the following expected 
changes: 

  Changes in industrial status with establishments moving in and out of the two Seveso 

categories (upper and lower tiers);  

 

Introduction of exemption procedures (article 4); 

  Development of public information to meet the requirements of the Aarhus Convention; 

  Additional requirements applicable to lower tier establishments (e.g. Major Accident 

Prevention Policy and internal emergency plans); and 

  Minimal requirements for inspection plans by Member States Competent Authorities. 

 

Intermediate outcomes of concern. While the ultimate outcome of concern is the 
improvement of industrial safety in Europe, it is also interesting to consider the evolution of 
incidents and materials release as an intermediate outcome of concern. An increase of 
incidents, both in terms of numbers or severity, is a signal of safety deterioration, even if the 
number of major accidents did not significantly evolve. 

At this level, this may be one among many various possible outcomes of concern. However, an 
exhaustive analysis of such a list goes beyond the scope of this work and should probably be 
considered as a candidate for future analysis80; and  

  Final outcomes of concern. As stated previously, the Seveso III Directive final outcome of 

concern is the improvement of industrial safety in Europe. 

Depending on expectations and available resources for data collection and indicators interpretation, each 
and every category described above may be approached by a more or less large number of indicators.   

80 This list could include for instance but not exhaustively: impacts on employment, access of population to risk information, impacts on 
public health and minimised environmental impacts 

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As an example, transposing Seveso III seems to be a straightforward target to measure. A simple metric 
based on the percentage of countries having achieved full transposition of Seveso III Directive can be used. 
However, this metric does not provide the decision maker with the following information: 

 

If the percentage is below 100%, why do some countries still struggle with the transposition of 
this Directive? Is it a matter of political choice, of resources availability or of regulation’s 
effectiveness? 

This simple example shows how several metrics may be required to explore one specific target. However, 
this can lead to complexity making the whole assessment unmanageable.  

In order to shape a set of balanced, applicable and cost effective indicators, we suggest to move from the 
classical typology of leading/lagging indicators that had been widely criticised81 in literature in particular for 
the purpose of industrial installations (Hopkins, 2009) to the following best practices synthesized in INERIS82 
(2016).   

  Engage in an exercise where possible indicators are explored without any consideration for 
constraints of resources or information availability. This first step is vital as it informs the 
decision maker of the large variety of possible metrics and the consequences of adopting or 
rejecting some of them on overall monitoring capabilities; 

  Select a subset of metrics that complies with the following criteria: 

  Privilege metrics requiring already available input data and/or easy to calculate; 

  The metrics considered altogether should cover as much as possible all the selected 

categories of indicators. This implies that each is informed by at least one indicator. Such a 
practice is suggested to counter some natural inclination of organisations to favour easy-to-
get indicators (because they are already available for other purposes or because input data 
collection is more affordable) instead of relevant but costly indicators; 

 

In our case, it is for instance particularly important to combine indicators of final outcomes 
(have levels of safety evolved?) with compliance ones (is the regulation well implemented 
in practice?). The cross interpretation of these metrics should allow the decision maker to 
understand whether the levels of safety have evolved or not and why this evolution did or 
did not occur; 

  This second criterion is a complement to the first one. It implies that to better balance the 
set of selected indicators, it may be necessary to engage in using indicators which may 
require modifications to information system to collect new data; 

  Each of the metrics selected should be described according to an informative model83 
(INERIS, 2016) that provides the decision maker with extensive information on the 
strengths and limitations of the selected metric; and  

  The relevance of a set of indicators evolves. What is considered informative and applicable 
today may become useless or even misleading in the future. Indicators should be regularly 
reviewed to ensure they still meet expectations. 

81 Two particular critics have been raised in literature regarding the leading/lagging indicators. The first is the 
ambiguous character of the leading/lagging distinction which raises several interpretations depending on the 
safety model one may have in mind. The second is the idea that one may anticipate accidents (through 
leading indicators) which conflicts with the complex and to some extent aleatory character of accidental 
mechanisms.  
82 Based on a large literature review and a compilation of best practices when it comes to indicators 
identification. 
83 The set of descriptive variables that should be used to ensure that the indicator is fully characterized. 
These variables could be the formula, interpretation terms, input data required, stakeholder(s) in charge of 
providing input data, terms of communication associated to the indicator… 

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Table 7.6 provides an account of suggested candidate indicators for each category of indicators and 
organised according to the Better Regulation evaluation criteria. This proposal is a starting point that will 
require several iterations in order to reach the optimal indicators’ list taking into account preferences and 
priorities.  Further work after the completion of the present study is therefore recommended. 

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Possible candidate indicators    

Quantitative / 
Qualitative 

Associated comments (e.g. data availability, 
assessment of the indicator) 

Data sources 

Effectiveness 

1 - Implementation and enforcement  

Percentage of Member States having 
achieved full transposition of Seveso III 
Directive (with transposition check being 
completed). 

Court cases against Member States due to 
non-transposition 

Quantitative 

Easy to collect input data and to calculate. 

Information from EUR-
Lex and National 
Implementation 
Measures 

Quantitative 

Easy to collect input data and to calculate. 

Information from Curia 

Level of implementation of the Directive in 
Member States 

Qualitative 

Judgment on the basis of the expert analysis 
implementation of the provision of the Directive in each 
Member States and at EU level. Consideration of evolution 
of the Directive 

Information from 
implementation reports 

Court cases against Member States due to 
incorrect implementation 

Number of upper tier establishments and 
evolution since adoption of the Directive 

Quantitative 

Easy to collect input data and to calculate. 

Information from Curia 

Quantitative 

Easy to collect input data and to calculate. 

Number of lower-tier establishments and 
evolution since adoption of the Directive 

Quantitative 

Easy to collect input data and to calculate. 

2- Compliance 

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Percentage of safety reports updated (by the 
operator) and examined (by the competent 
authority) safety reports 

Quantitative 

Assess the amount of upper tier establishments satisfying 
safety reports requirements. 
Emergency planning  

Information from 
implementation reports 

Percentage of external emergency plans 
achieved by competent authorities 

Quantitative 

Assess competent authorities’ abilities to satisfy regulatory 
requirements regarding external emergency plans. 

Information from 
implementation reports 

Information from 
implementation reports 
Information from 
eSPIRS 

Information from 
implementation reports 
Information from 
eSPIRS 

 
                      
  
  
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
  
 
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Possible candidate indicators    

Quantitative / 
Qualitative 

Associated comments (e.g. data availability, 
assessment of the indicator) 

Data sources 

Number of external emergency plans 
exercises performed per year divided by the 
number of upper tier establishments in the 
Member State 

Quantitative 

Assess efforts deployed by authorities to ensure 
emergency plans are operational and effective. 

Information from 
implementation reports 

Percentage of Lower tier establishments with 
MAPP examined (by the competent authority)  

Quantitative 

Assess the amount of lower tier establishments satisfying 
MAPP requirements 

Information from 
implementation reports 

Quality of MAPP implementation means 
adopted by lower tier establishments 

Qualitative 

Total number of substances for which Article 
4 procedures have been triggered (ongoing 
and closed) multiplying the average time 
required to close an exemption procedure 
(from its reception to its closure by the 
European Commission).  

Quantitative 

Percentage of assessment procedures under 
Article 4 being successful.  

Quantitative 

Percentage of Seveso establishments for 
which competent authorities have ensured 
that the information referred to in Annex V is 
made available and updated to the public  

Quantitative 

Quality of information made available to the 
public. 

Qualitative 

This issue should be treated qualitatively by adding a 
specific item in the questionnaire filled every four years  by 
Member States and fostering Member State exchanges of 
best practices 
Information held by competent authorities 

No data source 
identified 

Assess the amount of efforts as well as administrative 
congestion generated by the procedure. 
Does not include time spent by industries.  
Data held by competent authorities and the European 
Commission 

No data source 
identified 

Investigate the more or less complex character of such a 
procedure and the opportunity to modify it. 
Based on data being provided 

No data source 
identified 

Depends on Member States abilities to monitor and report 
on these elements. 
Data held by competent authorities 

No data source 
identified 

Hardly appreciable through an indicator 
Better approaches through complementary analysis 
(through sampling for instance). 
Data held by competent authorities 

Information from 
implementation reports 

Number of inspection staff fully trained on 
Seveso III Directive per establishment in 
each Member State 

Quantitative 

Assess the adequacy of staffing availability and training 
required for full and successful implementation. This metric 
considers the availability level of inspectors per 
establishment. 

No data source 
identified 

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Possible candidate indicators    

Quantitative / 
Qualitative 

Associated comments (e.g. data availability, 
assessment of the indicator) 

Data sources 

Share of upper tier establishments inspected 
annually (taking into account those Member 
States using systematic appraisal for defining 
inspection programme) 

Share of lower tier establishments inspected 
once over three years (taking into account 
those Member States using systematic 
appraisal for defining inspection programme) 

Quantitative 

Assess that a core requirement of the Directive is being 
met 

Information from 
implementation reports 

Quantitative 

Ensure that minimal number of inspections are performed 
for each establishment.  

Information from 
implementation reports 

Suitability of the information available to 
guarantee comparable inspections are made 
throughout the EU 

Qualitative 

Better addressed through annual questionnaire to member 
states. Question more particularly (i) the availability of 
national guidelines on upper and lower tie inspections and 
(ii) the way inspection items are selected and performed 
(so to enhance collective learning and exchange of 
experience among Member States). 
Data held by competent authorities 

No data source 
identified 

3- Intermediate outcomes of concern 

Number of Loss of Primary Containment 
incidents multiplying their respective severity 
level as calculated by CCPS (2011)  

Quantitative 

Relying on incidents reporting prevents the European 
Commission from relying on weak statistical significance of 
extremely rare major accidents. 

No data source 
identified 

Number of incidents/accidents multiplying 
their level of consequences per type of 
effects (human, environment, dangerous 
materials released, monetary) according to 
the EU accident severity scale. 

CCPS related metric will provide a global index that 
aggregates all type of consequences. 
The metric based on the EU severity index will provide a 
calculation per type of effect (no final score aggregated). 

No data source 
identified 

Number of major accidents reported in 
eMARS database and evolution throughout 
the Directive's lifetime 

Quantitative 

Provide another view on accident and incidents. 
Absolute number to be contextualised by number of 
establishments / sector information 

No data source 
identified 

Number of incidents reported in eMARS 
database and evolution throughout the 
Directive's lifetime 

Quantitative 

Provide another view on accident and incidents 
Absolute number to be contextualised by number of 
establishments / sector information 

Number of near misses reporting in eMARS 
database and evolution throughout the 
Directive's lifetime 

Quantitative 

Provide another view on accident and incidents  
Absolute number to be contextualised by number of 
establishments / sector information 

Data from eMARS 

Data from eMARS 

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Possible candidate indicators    

Quantitative / 
Qualitative 

Associated comments (e.g. data availability, 
assessment of the indicator) 

Data sources 

4 - Ultimate outcomes of concern  

Achievement of a high level of protection of 
human health 

Qualitative 

Combination of data / information to assess the 
achievement of the objectives of the Directive 

Achievement of high level of protection of the 
environment 

Link between the implementation of the 
Directive and the achievements of its 
objectives 

Qualitative 

Qualitative 

Combination of data / information to assess the 
achievement of the objectives of the Directive 

No data source 
identified 

No data source 
identified 

Combination of data / information to assess the 
achievement of the objectives of the Directive 

No data source 
identified 

Matching of the achievements observed and 
the original objectives of the Seveso Directive 

Qualitative 

Combination of data / information to assess the 
achievement of the objectives of the Directive 

No data source 
identified 

Efficiency 

Overall costs associated with the 
implementation of the Directive 

Quantitative 

A key aspect of the efficiency of the legislation is its 
capacity of meeting the objectives within proportionate 
costs. 

No data source 
identified 

Distribution of the costs between operators 
and competent authorities 

Quantitative 

In particular important to verify that the burden is not overly 
on operators or on competent authorities 

No data source 
identified 

Overall benefits (monetary and non-
monetary) of the implementation of the 
Directive 

Quantitative / 
Qualitative 

Requires one to quantify / monetise the benefits, a 
possible approach is to monetise 'avoided costs' of 
accidents by estimating the socio-economic costs of 
accidents. 

Some initial data in this 
report and in some 
Member States 

Proportionality (cost-effectiveness) of costs 
and benefits from the Seveso III Directive 

Affordability of the costs when considering 
different stakeholder groups, for example 
SMEs. 

Quantitative 

Costs and benefits are balanced 

No data source 
identified 

Quantitative / 
Qualitative 

Important to consider that the Directive does not affect 
disproportionately a specific group of stakeholders 

No data source 
identified 

Differences between costs and benefits 
observable throughout Member States 

Quantitative 

Require a level of detail of costs and benefits data at 
Member State level. Several factors could influence both 
costs and benefits, for example geographic area, 
additional national requirements, additional uses made 
from the information generated. 

No data source 
identified 

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Possible candidate indicators    

Quantitative / 
Qualitative 

Associated comments (e.g. data availability, 
assessment of the indicator) 

Data sources 

Good practices for the efficient 
implementation of the Directive 

Qualitative 

Examples from Member States 

Some initial information 
in implementation 
reports 

Comparability of the costs of the Seveso 
regime with other regimes 

Quantitative / 
Qualitative 

Comparability with other UNECE / OECD countries and 
the costs incurred for their equivalent regimes 

No data source 
identified 

Elements of the Directive to be simplified 

Qualitative 

Indication on the regulatory burden 

Element of the Directive to be optimised (e.g. 
getting more from existing information 
reported under eMARS on lessons learnt) 

Qualitative 

Indication on the regulatory burden 

No data source 
identified 

No data source 
identified 

Current needs addressed by the Directive 

Qualitative 

Assess that a core requirement of the Directive is being 
met 

Impact assessment 
reports 

Comparison of the current needs with the 
original needs of the Directive 

Qualitative 

Assess that a core requirement of the Directive is being 
met 

Impact assessment 
reports 

Flexibility allowed in the Directive to adapt to 
technical and scientific progress 

 Qualitative 

Assess that a core requirement of the Directive is being 
met 

Impact assessment 
reports 

Elements where adaptation to progress has 
been made 

Qualitative 

Assess that a core requirement of the Directive is being 
met 

Impact assessment 
reports 

Relevance of the Seveso Directive in the 
wider international context e.g. UNECE and 
OECD 

Qualitative 

Assess that a core requirement of the Directive is being 
met 

Initial information from 
UNECE ad hoc working 
group 

Provisions of the Directive which are 
outdated and irrelevant 

Qualitative 

Assess that a core requirement of the Directive is being 
met 

Impact assessment 
reports 

Elements of the Seveso Directive that are not 
internally coherent 

Qualitative 

Assess that the Directive is fully coherent 

No data source 
identified 

Relevance 

Coherence 

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Possible candidate indicators    

Quantitative / 
Qualitative 

Associated comments (e.g. data availability, 
assessment of the indicator) 

Data sources 

Elements of the Seveso Directive that are not 
externally coherent (considering other 
industrial emissions legislation and wider 
environmental legislation) 

Qualitative 

Assess that the Directive contributes to wider EU 
objectives 

No data source 
identified 

Elements of the Seveso Directive that are not 
externally coherent (considering international 
legislation and guidance) 

Qualitative 

Assess that the Directive contributes to wider EU 
objectives 

No data source 
identified 

Contribution of the Directive to supporting the 
EU internal market 

Qualitative 

Assess that the Directive contributes to wider EU 
objectives 

Contribution of the Directive to supporting 
competition 

Qualitative 

Assess that the Directive contributes to wider EU 
objectives 

No data source 
identified 

No data source 
identified 

Contribution of the Directive to supporting 
industrial innovation (e.g. number of 
employees in research and development for 
industrial health and environmental safety) 

Contribution of the Directive to supporting 
employment (number of employees in 
Seveso establishments) 

Quantitative / 
Qualitative 

Assess that the Directive contributes to wider EU 
objectives 

Possible data in 
Eurostat 

Quantitative / 
Qualitative 

Assess that the Directive contributes to wider EU 
objectives 

Possible data in 
Eurostat 

Additional benefits delivered by the Seveso 
Directive in comparison to national initiatives 

Qualitative 

Assess that an EU level Directive is still justified 

Value of the continued action under the 
Seveso Directive 

Consequences of stopping / repealing 
Seveso Directive 

Qualitative 

Assess that an EU level Directive is still justified 

Qualitative 

Assess that an EU level Directive is still justified 

No data source 
identified 

No data source 
identified 

No data source 
identified 

EU added value  

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The set of indicators presented in the table above prompt the following complementary remarks: 

  Usually, the act of building a set of indicators requires several rounds of interactions with the 
decision maker and experts involved in the implementation of the legislation so to gradually 
refine the proposals according to preferences and specific agenda. This is why this work needs 
to be considered as a first step that may help the decision maker to better formulate 
expectations and launch accordingly a better oriented analysis; 

  Out of this analysis, we suggested a range of qualitative and quantitative indicators. Several 

are considering similar aspects but from different point of views; and  

  We indicated where possible current sources of data / information we were aware of, note that 
for those were no information or data is readily available this does not necessarily prevent the 
indicator from being selected. Rather this indicates area where additional data collection, 
through review of literature, consultation of stakeholders concerned, is necessary. 

In terms of further possible developments, we suggest the following recommendations:  

  The term “candidate indicators” refers to the need to further refine this first suggestion by 

exploring how the suggested metrics adequately balance final users’ needs on the one hand 
and available input data on the other hand. This process is inclusive in nature as it should 
ensure that both data providers, data users and stakeholders impacted fully understand and 
agrees on the meanings and terms of interpretations to be associated to the final set of 
selected indicators; 

  The long-term and incremental nature of the indicator development should be highlighted. It 

might be found useful to start working on a set of basic indicators, using readily available data 
while noting further data needs to work on more elaborated indicators and continue 
development over time should more data become available; 

  Adequate incentives should be put in place to encourage data collection.  However it is also 

important to understand how the data will be used. An absolute number of major accidents (as 
already highlighted in section 5) is not statistically significant and does not allow conclusions to 
be drawn on the effectiveness of the Directive. Wider information on incidents and near misses 
would be useful, providing a more complete picture and here mechanisms to ease the reporting 
of such events in possibly anonymous ways and across wide industrial sectors will provide an 
improved means of assessing the Seveso III Directive and identifying means of improvement; 
and  

  Adequate resources and staffing should be dedicated to cross interpretation of indicators as 

well as other performance assessment means. In practice, numbers are rarely self-explaining 
and should never be considered as fully representative of a reality for which complexity 
remains intractable by simple figures. Accordingly, we recommend information collected 
through indicators or Member State questionnaires to be used as means to discuss Seveso III 
performance with all affected stakeholders and collectively explore means of improvement and 
collective cooperation. In doing so, we move performance assessment from a perspective of 
conformity to standards and objectives to one of a collective learning dynamic where constant 
improvement is the collective shared objective of all parties. 

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Appendix A  
Questionnaire for reporting period 2012-2014 

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EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Brussels, 30.6.2011 
C(2011) 4598 final 

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING DECISION 

of 30.6.2011 

on the questionnaire 2012-2014 relating to Council Directive 96/82/EC on the control of 
major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances 

(Text with EEA relevance) 

 
 
  
 
 
COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING DECISION 

of 30.6.2011 

on the questionnaire 2012-2014 relating to Council Directive 96/82/EC on the control of 
major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances 

(Text with EEA relevance) 

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 

Having regard to Council Directive 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-
accident hazards involving dangerous substances1 and in particular Article 19(4) thereof, 

Whereas:  

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

Article  19(4)  of  Directive  96/82/EC  requires  the  Member  States  to  report  on  the 
implementation of this Directive on a three-year basis. 

 This report has to be established on the basis of a questionnaire or outline drafted by 
the  Commission  in  accordance  with  the  procedure  set  out  in  Article  6  of  Directive 
91/692/EEC  of  23  December  1991  on  standardising  and  rationalising  reports  on  the 
implementation of certain Directives relating to the environment. 

The three-year period should cover the years 2012 to 2014 inclusive. 

 The measures envisaged by this Decision are in accordance with the opinion expressed 
by the Committee in accordance with Article 6 of Directive 91/692/EEC. 

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:  

The questionnaire 2012-2014 relating to Council Directive 96/82/EC is hereby adopted. 

Article 1 

Member States shall draw up a report covering the period 2012 to 2014 in accordance with 
the questionnaire set out in the Annex.2  

Article 2 

1 

OJ L 10, 14.1.1997, p.13 

EN 

2 

   EN 

 
 
                                                 
Member States  shall provide the Commission with that  report by 30 September  2015  at the 
latest. 

Article 3 

Article 4 

This Decision is addressed to the Member States. 

Done at Brussels, 30.6.2011 

For the Commission 
Janez POTOČNIK 
Member of the Commission 

ANNEX  

2 

Available also at this website of the European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/seveso/ 

EN 

3 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
ANNEX  

Part 1 -Questionnaire 2012-2014 

Questionnaire for the three year report referred to in Article 19(4) of Directive 96/82/EC 
on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances (SEVESO II) 

1. General information 

a) 

b) 

c) 

d) 

Have any significant changes been made to the main competent authorities responsible 
for the enforcement of the SEVESO II Directive or to their main tasks?  

On 31/12/2014, how many establishments were subject to the provisions transposing 
Article  6  and  9  (all  Seveso  establishments),  which  of  those  to  the  provisions 
transposing  Article  6  (so-called  lower-tier  establishments),  and  which  of  those  to 
Article 9 (so-called upper-tier establishments)? 

Provide  a  statistical  breakdown  summarising 
the  activities  of  all  Seveso 
establishments as at 31/12/2014 using the SPIRS activity list in Part 2 of this Annex3.  

This question is optional: How many of the Seveso establishments are covered by 
or  consist  of  installations  covered  by  Directive  2010/75/EU  (IED)  succeeding 
Directive 2008/1/EC? Where establishments or parts thereof fall under both Seveso 
and IED, what impact in practice does this have on the way Seveso is applied by the 
competent authorities for the establishments concerned? 

2. Emergency Plans  

a) 

b) 

c) 

d) 

e) 

3 

For how many upper-tier establishments have the Competent Authorities decided, in 
view  of  the  information  contained  in  the  safety  report,  that  the  requirements  to 
produce an external emergency plan should not apply, as foreseen by Article 11.6? 

For  how  many  upper-tier  establishments  (of  those  to  which  the  requirements  to 
produce  an  external  emergency  plan  apply)  the  designated  Authorities  have  not 
drawn up an external emergency plan, as referred to in Article 11.1 (c)? 

On 31/12/2014, for how many upper-tier establishments has the external emergency 
plan not been tested over the last three years as required by Article 11.4? 

Provide  information  about  the  main  arrangements  for  providing  the  public  with 
specific 
and 
systems,  main 
arrangements to cope with any off-site effects from an accident). 

response  measures 

information 

(alert 

Give  a  brief  explanation  of  the  way  external  emergency  plans  are  tested  (e.g.  part 
test, full test, involving emergency services, desk top etc.) and considered adequate. 

A reply to this question can be fully or partially replaced by referring to and attaching a SPIRS report 
for 31/12/2014 (Reporting obligation under Article 19 1a). Member States that use for this SPIRS report 
the NACE codes for classification of type of industry may continue to use these codes to describe the 
activities instead of the SPIRS activity list.  

EN 

4 

   EN 

 
                                                 
Specify the criteria used for considering that an external emergency plan is adequate 
and that an external emergency plan has been tested. 

3. Information on safety measures 

a) 

b) 

c) 

d) 

e) 

f) 

g) 

4. 

a) 

b) 

c) 

d) 

e) 

f) 

Provide general information about your national strategy, concepts and developments 
in the last three years on how the public and persons liable to be affected by a Seveso 
accident  are  informed  about  major-accidents  hazards,  possible  consequences  and 
safety measures. 

For  how  many  upper  tier  establishments  has  information  been  made  actively 
available to the public, at least once during the last five years (2010-2014)?  

Provide  a  statistical  breakdown  showing  by  whom  (operator,  authorities)  and  by 
which means (for example operators' or authorities leaflets, flyers, emails, SMS) the 
information under 3b) is made available. 

Please  provide  a  brief  explanation  of  the  systems  in  place  to  monitor  that  the 
information has been supplied/is available. 

This  question  is  optional:  For  how  many  upper-tier  establishments  is  up  to  date 
information kept permanently available, at 31/12/2014? 

This  question  is  optional:  Provide  a  statistical  breakdown  showing  by  whom 
(operator,  authorities)  and  by  which  means  (for  example  operators'  or  authorities 
notices, websites) the information under 3e) is kept permanently available. 

This  question  is  optional:  For  how  many  lower  tier  establishments  is  up  to  date 
information kept permanently available, at 31/12/2014.  

Inspections 

For  those  Member  States  where  the  programme  of  inspections  is  based  upon  a 
systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards, what are the main criteria on which 
the systematic appraisal is based?  

This  question  is  optional:  What  information  if  any  from  the  programme  of 
inspections and from the inspections report is available to the public? 

Please  provide  general  summarising  information  about  the  types  of  actions  (e.g. 
prohibitions  of  use,  sanctions  or  other  measures)  taken  as  a  result  of  accidents, 
incidents and non-compliance during the reporting period. 

How many upper tier establishments were subject to on-site inspections every twelve 
months? 

How  many  upper  tier  establishments  not  covered  by  4d)  were  subject  to  on-site 
inspections in the last three years? 

How  many  lower  tier  establishments  were  subject  to  on-site  inspections  in  the  last 
three years? 

EN 

5 

   EN 

 
5. Domino Effects 

Please provide non-numerical answers on how the objectives of Article 8 on Domino 
Effects  have  been  ensured  and  describe  your  experience  of  applying  this  Article 
during reporting period 2012-2014. 

6. Land-Use Planning 

Please provide non-numerical answers on how the objectives of Article 12 on Land-
Use  Planning  have  been  ensured  and  describe  your  experience  of  applying  this 
Article during reporting period 2012-2014. 

7. Further information 

This  question  is  optional:  Please  provide  any  additional  Seveso-related  general 
information, implementation experience, reports etc. that could be of interest and can 
be shared with the public, other Member States and the Commission on the following 
points  

Lessons learned from accidents and incidents to prevent a recurrence; 

IT  tools  used  for  monitoring  the  implementation  of  the  Directive  and  for  data 
sharing; 

If  relevant,  any  Seveso-like  provisions  applied  to  installations  and  activities  not 
covered by this directive, for example on pipelines, ports, marshalling yards, offshore 
installations, gas exploration, exploitation, etc. 

a) 

b) 

c) 

EN 

6 

   EN 

 
Part 2 - List with Seveso Activities  

Agriculture  

Building & works of engineering construction  

Ceramics (bricks, pottery, glass, cement, etc.)  

Chemical installations - ammonia  

Chemical installations - carbon oxides 

Chemical installations - chlorine  

Chemical installations - fluorine or hydrogen fluoride  

Chemical installations - hydrogen  

Chemical installations - Industrial gases  

Chemical installations - inorganic acids  

Chemical installations - nitrogen oxides  

Chemical installations - other fine chemicals  

Chemical installations - sulphur oxides, oleum 

Electronics & electrical engineering  

Fuel storage (including heating, retail sale, etc.)  

General chemicals manufacture (not included above)  

General engineering, manufacturing and assembly  

Handling  and  transportation  centres  (ports,  airports,  lorry  parks,  marshalling  yards, 
etc.)  

Leisure and sport activities (e.g. ice rink)  

LNG storage and distribution  

LPG production, bottling and bulk distribution  

LPG storage  

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23  Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster  

24  Manufacture of food products and beverages  

25  Manufacture of glass  

EN 

7 

   EN 

 
26  Medical, research, education (including hospitals, universities, etc.)  

27  Mining activities (tailings & physicochemical processes)  

28 

29 

30 

31 

32 

33 

34 

35 

36 

37 

38 

39 

40 

41 

42 

43 

44 

Other activity (not included above)  

Petrochemical / Oil Refineries  

Plastic and rubber manufacture  

Power generation, supply and distribution  

Processing of ferrous metals (foundries, smelting, etc.)  

Processing of metals  

Processing of metals using electrolytic or chemical processes  

Processing of non-ferrous metals (foundries, smelting, etc.)  

Production and manufacturing of pulp and paper  

Production and storage of fertilizers  

Production and storage of fireworks  

Production and storage of pesticides, biocides, fungicides  

Production of basic organic chemicals  

Production of pharmaceuticals  

Production, destruction and storage of explosives  

Shipbuilding, shipbreaking, ship repair  

Textiles manufacturing and treatment  

45  Waste storage, treatment and disposal  

46  Water and sewage (collection, supply, treatment)  

47  Wholesale and retail storage and distribution (excluding LPG)  

48  Wood treatment and furniture  

EN 

8 

   EN 

 
 
  B1 

© Amec Foster Wheeler Environment & Infrastructure UK Limited 

Appendix B 
Member State summary sheets 

Member State summary sheets have been prepared for each Member State and based on the information 
reported for the 2012-2014 reporting period. The summary sheets present some of the key features of the 
implementation of the Seveso II for the reporting period. For more details, the complete reports from Member 
States are available on CircaBC1. 

1 https://circabc.europa.eu/w/browse/53cadc98-1907-414d-82d5-d25308b7886e 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
  B2 

© Amec Foster Wheeler Environment & Infrastructure UK Limited 

1.  Member State summary sheet – Austria 

AUSTRIA                                                                                                                                                                           

Overview of Austria 

Austria provided a complete response. 

Number of establishments: 

Status of overall implementation: 

The Austrian response 
indicates that the 
provisions of the Seveso II 
Directive are almost fully 
implemented. 

Main issues identified: 
A large number of upper-tier establishments 
were not inspected annually. 

Overview of the information reported 

Question 1 - General information 

1.a) Significant changes made to competent authorities or their tasks  
None were reported by Austria. 

1.b) Establishments subject to Seveso  
There were 148 Seveso establishments in Austria 
at the end of 2014, down from 158 in 2011. This is 
due to a decreasing number of upper-tier 
establishments. 

As shown in the chart to the right, Austria exhibits 
fewer establishments per capita and fewer 
establishments per km2 than the EU average. 

.

1.c) Activities of Seveso establishments  
The activities with the highest number of establishments at the end of the reporting period in Austria were  

- 
- 
- 
- 

“Other activities” (10%); 
Fuel storage (9%); 
LNG production, bottling and bulk distribution (7%); and  
LPG storage (7%). 

“Other activities” and fuel storage are the two most common activity amongst EU Seveso establishments (14% and 12% of all 
establishments respectively). LNG production, bottling and bulk distribution; and LPG storage represent 8% and 4% of all EU 
establishments respectively. 

1.d) Seveso establishments covered by the IED (optional) 
Austria has not answered this optional question. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  B3 

© Amec Foster Wheeler Environment & Infrastructure UK Limited 

AUSTRIA                                                                                                                                                                           

Question 2 - Emergency plans 

2.a) & 2.b) Upper-tier establishments without 
external emergency plan 
For 3 upper-tier establishments the Austrian 
authorities decided that an external emergency plan 
was not needed as permitted by Article 11.6 of the 
Seveso II Directive, however the specific reason was 
not specified in the Austrian response. This 
corresponds to 4% of upper-tier establishments, the 
same percentage as across the whole EU-28.  For 
all upper-tier establishments for which external 
emergency plans are required, these have been 
drawn up by the designated Authorities in Austria. 

2.c) Upper-tier establishments without external 
emergency plan tested  
At the end of the reporting period, 10 upper-tier 
establishments’ external emergency plans had not 
been tested (14% of the upper-tier establishments in 
Austria), mostly due to pending revisions of the 
plans. 

Note: Total 72 upper-tier establishments 

2.d) Arrangements for providing information to the public: 

- 

- 

- 

There is a federal siren alarm system with consistent signals for the whole country. The public is kept informed about 
these alarm signals. Furthermore local sirens at the establishment may be used; 
Those liable to be affected by a Seveso accident are contacted individually by the operator which provides information 
according to the specific hazards; and  
Information is provided by radio information initiated by the alarm chain or in local newspapers or similar means. 

2.e) Testing external emergency plans 
Tests are carried out according to the specific local situation and cover in most cases certain parts of the structure. Local 
governmental bodies (community and region) are responsible for external emergency plans so there is a widespread variation of 
practices. National guidance published in 2008 serves as checklist for evaluation and defines minimum criteria, in addition to 
expert judgement afterwards.  Emergency plans are tested using: 

- 
- 
- 

On-the-spot exercises to test the technical or organisational measures; 
Staff communication exercises; and  
Emergency response services assume own scenarios for their purposes. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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AUSTRIA                                                                                                                                                                           

Question 3 – Information on safety measures 

3.a), 3.b), 3.c), 3.d) Information made actively available 
In Austria the operator is responsible for informing the public. The usual strategy is to offer basic information on-site with access 
for the public, supplemented by other means such as “open days” and nomination of responsible persons to give more 
information if requested. In most cases web-based information is also provided. In 58 upper-tier establishments (over 80% of total 
number of upper-tier establishments in Austria) information has been made actively available to the public at least once during the 
reporting period (2010-2014). The following shows a statistical breakdown of the means that have been used: 

Placard at the entrance of the site: 75%; 

-  Mailed leaflets or similar: 50%; 
- 
-  Web-based information: 40%; 
- 
- 
- 

Combination with emergency response tests: 20%; 
Local newspaper: 20%; and  
"Open Day": 10%.  

Note that usually the information is provided in more than one way.  Therefore the sum of percentages of the various means is 
more than 100%. 

3.e), 3.f), 3.g) Information kept permanently available (optional) 
Not answered. 

Question 4 - Inspections 

4.a) Systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards 
In Austria a generic table for defining the inspection intervals 
was in use during the reporting period (2010-2014). 

4.b) Programme of inspections available to public 
(optional) 
Not answered. 

4.c) Actions taken in the event of accidents, incidents and non-compliance 
The instruments comprise administrative fines (financial penalties) and in severe cases prohibition of activities. However, so far 
the degree of non-compliance has mostly not been significant enough to make use of these instruments.  

4.d), 4.e), 4.f)  Data on on-site inspections 
47 upper-tier establishments (65% of the total number of upper-tier establishments) were inspected annually. Another 17 (24%) 
were inspected at least during the last reporting period, but the remaining upper-tier establishments weren’t inspected at all during 
2012-2014. In addition to this, 65 lower-tier establishments were inspected (86% of the total number of lower-tier establishments).  

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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AUSTRIA                                                                                                                                                                           

Question 5 – Domino effects 

There were six groups of establishments exhibiting risks of domino effects during the reporting period (2012-2014) in Austria. In all of 
these cases the establishments within the group had previously been one establishment that was subsequently split into different 
establishments with different owners. The respective requirements on domino effects were therefore reportedly well-established and 
included in the relevant documents (safety reports etc.) and taken into account in emergency response tests and provision of 
information to the public. 

Question 6 – Land-use planning 

The Communities are the Authorities responsible for Land-Use planning in Austria. They are provided with the locations of Seveso 
establishments by their Permitting Authorities and additional relevant information from the operators as required by regional building 
legislation. 

There are slight differences amongst the various regional provisions but in general any proposed planning in the vicinity of a Seveso 
site is subject to a consultation process. Based on an assessment of substance properties of concern, the amount present and the 
threshold quantity of the Seveso II Directive, a consultation distance is defined in the planning documents and the local building plan 
concept. In complicated cases, a case-by-case study is carried out, based on a table of agreed scenarios. The decision as to what is 
allowed within the distance depends on specific criteria, respecting the principles of Article 12 of the Seveso II Directive.  Certain 
forms of development are allowed and thus there is no zone without any allowed use at all. 

Experiences so far showed that the relevance of Article 12 was sometimes misinterpreted by local authorities and by the public in the 
vicinity. No further details on the nature of this misinterpretation was provided in Austria’s response, but then it was indicated that 
nevertheless the general direction of reducing the residual risk around major accident sites is respected. 

Question 7 – Further information (optional) 

No response was provided to this optional question. 

                      
 
 
 
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2.  Member State summary sheet – Belgium 

BELGIUM                                                                                                                                                                           

Overview of Belgium 

Belgium provided a complete response. 

Number of establishments: 

Status of overall implementation: 

The Belgian response 
indicates that the 
provisions of the Seveso 
II Directive are fully 
implemented. 

Main issues identified: 
None 

Overview of the information reported 

Question 1 - General information 

1.a) Significant changes made to competent authorities or their tasks  
None were reported by Belgium. 

1.b) Establishments subject to Seveso  
There were 383 Seveso establishments in 
Belgium at the end of 2014, just two more than in 
2011. During this interval, the number of lower-tier 
establishments has decreased, while the number 
of upper-tier establishments has increased. 

As shown in the chart to the right, Belgium 
exhibits more establishments per capita and 
especially much more establishments per km2 
than the EU average. Hence, there is a 
particularly high density of Seveso establishments 
in Belgium. 

1.c) Activities of Seveso establishments  
The activities with the highest number of establishments at the end of the reporting period in Belgium were:  

- 
General chemicals (38%);  
-  Wholesale and retail (23%); and  
- 

“Other activities” (20%).  

While these activities are also common throughout the EU-28, they account for much smaller shares of the total number of total 
EU establishments (12%, 9% and 14%, respectively), than in Belgium.  

1.d) Seveso establishments covered by the IED (optional) 
Belgium has not answered this optional question. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
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BELGIUM                                                                                                                                                                           

Question 2 - Emergency plans 

2.a) & 2.b) Upper-tier establishments without 
external emergency plan 
The Belgian authorities decided that the 
requirement to produce an external emergency 
plan applied to all upper-tier establishments. 
However, for 18 establishments, no plan had been 
drawn up by the end of the reporting period 
(31/12/2014). This corresponds to 9% of upper-tier 
establishments, compared to 11% across the whole 
EU-28. 

In Belgium, the information required for the 
emergency plan has to be submitted, with the 
safety report, by the operator.  The external 
emergency plan is not produced until after the 
safety report has been assessed. 

For 14 of the 18 establishments without an external 
emergency plan, the information had already been 
received from the operators, but the external 
emergency plans had not been finalised. For the 
other 4 establishments, the assessment of the 
safety report had not been finalised or not all 
necessary information had been submitted as of 
31/12/2014. 

2.c) Upper-tier establishments without external 
emergency plan tested 
At the end of the reporting period, external 
emergency plans had been tested for all but one 
upper-tier establishment during the previous three 
years. This corresponds to less than 1% of 
emergency plans not tested, compared to 27% on 
average in all Member States.  

Note: Total 204 upper-tier establishments 

2.d) Arrangements for providing information to the public: 

- 
- 

- 

There is a network of electric sirens managed by the federal authority and made available to local authorities; 
Information can be provided via the following means: police, fire or civil protection vehicles with loudspeakers, radio, 
television, websites and social media, call centres, telephone, teletext; and  
Currently, the system “BE ALERT” is being tested. It has been developed by the federal authority to directly warn and 
better inform the population affected in cases of emergency. It allow the authority responsible for crisis management to 
send alarm messages via multiple channels, such as voice messages to phones, SMS, e-mails, fax, twitter and 
facebook. Launch of the system was scheduled for the end of 2015 (http://be-alert.be/).   

2.e) Testing external emergency plans 
Provincial authorities are responsible for testing external emergency plans in Belgium. The extent of tests can range from only key 
crisis management staff to all the emergency services and their resources in the field. Furthermore, there are tests on a strategic 
level, for instance regarding alert sirens and multidisciplinary alert systems, as well as partial tests (“minimex”) focusing on a 
specific component of the external emergency plans. 
Tests are assessed by the security unit and their frequency is specified in the external emergency plans, unless it is subject to 
specific legislation in some cases. A multidisciplinary working group has laid down the general rules for the tests in a manual, 
which includes assessment lists, specifications of stakeholders’ roles and a typology of tests. 
In summary, the types of tests used are: 
Table top exercises; 
Command post exercises ; and 
Field training exercises. 

- 
- 
- 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
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© Amec Foster Wheeler Environment & Infrastructure UK Limited 

BELGIUM                                                                                                                                                                           

Question 3 – Information on safety measures 

3.a), 3.b), 3.c), 3.d) Information made actively available 
A comprehensive information campaign under the responsibility of the interior ministry was launched in Belgium in 2012. The 
campaign has covered all upper-tier establishments and included multiple means of communication. While due to the nature of 
the holistic campaign, a breakdown of which means has been used for how many establishments is not possible, detailed figures 
on how many people have been reached by the different means is available: 

National TV spots and documentaries: 68% of the population reached; 
Print media: 12 daily newspapers, 29% of the population reached; 
Leaflets: 400,000 distributed, 8% of the population reached; 

- 
- 
- 
-  Website Seveso.be (in 4 languages): 33,142 visitors in the first two months online ; 
- 
- 
- 

Educational game “Seveso The Game : Be The Ultimate Survivor”: no figures on reach available; 
Information in schools: no figures on reach available; and  
Local information sessions and leaflets: no figures on reach available. 

3.e), 3.f), 3.g) Information kept permanently available (optional) 
No information was provided. 

Question 4 - Inspections 

4.b) Programme of inspections available to public 
(optional) 
Not answered. 

4.a) Systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards 
In Belgium, all establishments (lower and upper-tier) are 
classified in one of three danger categories based on the “Rapid 
Ranking Technique” developed by TNO on the basis of the Dow 
Fire and Explosion Index. Two indicators (“fire and explosion” 
and “toxicity”) are calculated from the substances’ flammability, 
toxicity, reactivity and conditions of use (pressure, temperature, 
chemical reaction, etc.). Based on the indicators, equipment is 
assigned a danger category. Frequency of inspections ranging 
from yearly to once every three years is then assigned to each 
establishment based on the highest danger category of any of its 
equipment. 

4.c) Actions taken in the event of accidents, incidents and non-compliance 
The inspection teams are authorised to issue verbal and written suggestions, warnings and orders in case of potential violations. 
In case such warnings etc. are not followed by corrective measures, or in cases of gross shortfalls, more severe actions can be 
taken. In 2012-2014, in 13 cases orders of corrective actions were issued and in 4 cases legal proceedings were opened, all of 
which were due to non-compliance (i.e. not due to accidents). 

4.d), 4.e), 4.f)  Data on on-site inspections 
137 upper-tier establishments (73% of the 187 establishments that were upper tier for the whole reporting period) were inspected 
annually. Note that Belgium applies systematic appraisal to determine inspection schedules (see 4.a) and as such it is it is not 
required to inspect all establishments annually. The remaining upper-tier establishments were inspected at least once during the 
last reporting period. In addition to this, all lower-tier establishments were inspected.  

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
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BELGIUM                                                                                                                                                                           

Question 5 – Domino effects 

Domino effects between establishments are systematically analysed semi-quantitatively in the safety reports (upper-tier) and in the 
framework of permit requests (upper and lower-tier). The main effects analysed include heat radiation and overpressure. In case 
domino effects appear possible according to the semi-quantitative analysis (Flemish region) or quantitative analysis (Walloon and 
Brussels-Capital regions), the need for additional safety measures and daily information exchange are assessed.    

Question 6 – Land-use planning 

New establishments and changes to existing establishments are regulated through the environmental permitting procedure. 

The Flemish spatial planning and environmental regulation specifies that external safety has to be assessed for every spatial 
implementation that includes industrial land on which new Seveso establishments can be created or that is in the vicinity of existing 
establishments. Permitting procedures follow advice from the coordinating public services and consider information from safety 
reports and studies. In Wallonia, and Brussels, zones vulnerable to risks are defined around Seveso establishments. All permit 
procedures in such zones must be advised by the Risk and Major Accident Unit in Wallonia and the Bruxelles Environment (IBGE) in 
Brussels.  These take into account the risk posed by the Seveso installation and the consequences of any development of that risk. 
Risks from Seveso-establishments are then included in the respective decisions regarding the spatial developments to limit 
consequences of any potential major accidents. 

Question 7 – Further information (optional) 

No response was provided to this optional question. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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3.  Member State summary sheet – Bulgaria 

BULGARIA                                                                                                                                                                         

Overview of Bulgaria 

Bulgaria provided a complete response. 

Number of establishments: 

Status of overall implementation: 

The Bulgarian response 
indicates that the 
provisions of the Seveso 
II Directive are fully 
implemented. 

Main issues identified: 
None  

Overview of the information reported 

Question 1 - General information 

1.a) Significant changes made to competent authorities or their tasks  
Some significant changes regarding the responsible authorities have taken place according to the Bulgarian Environmental 
Protection Act (hereinafter “EPA”) in 2013. An overview of competent authorities and their tasks in Bulgaria is provided in the table 
below. 

Authority 
Ministry of Environment and Water 

Ministry of the Interior 

Executive Agency “General Labour 
Inspectorate“ under the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs 
Regional Inspection of Environment and 
Water (RIEW) 

Local Authorities 

Key tasks and responsibilities related to Seveso as of 2013 
• in charge of the coordinated implementation and enforcement of Directive 2012/18/EC [“Seveso 
III”] at national level; 
• designated as a central body of the state administration in the area of major accidents prevention; 
• evaluates safety reports for permitting of upper-tier establishments; 
• evaluates the final reports on the occurrence and consequences of major accidents; 
• evaluates the results of inspections; 
• transboundary effects of industrial accidents; and  
• domino effects. 

• internal emergency plans, safety measures on explosives, ammunitions and pyrotechnics; 
• emergency planning at national level; 
• evaluates the documentation for permitting of upper-tier establishments; and  
• keeps records of written notifications and final reports on occurrences and consequences of major 
accidents. 
• safety at work aspects; and  
• evaluates the documentation of the operators submitted for permitting of upper-tier 
establishments. 
• environmental aspects, in charge of the coordinated enforcement, incl. preparation of inspection 
plans and reports, interlinkages with environmental impact assessment and strategic environmental 
assessment procedures, and land-use planning requirements; 
• evaluates the documentation submitted for permitting of upper-tier establishments; 
• evaluates the major accident prevention policy reports of lower-tier establishments; and 
• organises, coordinates, participates in and reports on inspections of all Seveso establishments. 
• preparation and testing of the external emergency plans; and  
• evaluates the documentation submitted for permitting of upper-tier establishments and takes part 
in inspections of all establishments.  

                      
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
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BULGARIA                                                                                                                                                                         

1.b) Establishments subject to Seveso  
There were 195 Seveso establishments in 
Bulgaria at the end of 2014, up from 164 in 2011.  

As shown in the chart to the right, there are more 
establishments per capita but fewer 
establishments per km2 in Bulgaria compared to 
the EU average. 

.

1.c) Activities of Seveso establishments  
The activities with the highest number of establishments at the end of the reporting period in Bulgaria were  

- 
- 
- 

Fuel storage (24%);  
Production, destruction and storage of explosives (16%); and 
LPG storage (14%).  

These activities are also common among the EU average, but they account for much smaller shares of the total number of total 
EU establishments. Fuel storage is the third most common activity amongst the EU Seveso establishments (11% of all 
establishments), destruction and storage of explosives and LPG storage represent 4% of EU establishments each. 

1.d) Seveso establishments covered by the IED (optional) 
19 upper-tier and 19 lower-tier establishments are covered by (or consist of installations covered by) Directive 2010/75/EU (IED), 
accounting for 22% of all upper-tier and 17% of all lower-tier establishments. For these establishments, the competent authority 
sets conditions for safety measures and emergency planning in the IED (or formerly IPPC) permit. 

Question 2 - Emergency plans 

2.a) & 2.b) Upper-tier establishments without 
external emergency plan 
The Bulgarian authorities decided that the 
requirement to produce an external emergency 
plan applied to all upper-tier establishments and 
during the reporting period emergency plans have 
been produced for all upper-tier establishments. 

Note: Total 86 upper-tier establishments 

                      
  
 
 
 
 
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BULGARIA                                                                                                                                                                         

2.c) Upper-tier establishments without external 
emergency plan tested  
No deviations from the testing requirements have 
been reported by the local authorities. 

2.d) Arrangements for providing information to the public: 

- 

- 

Operators are obliged to build and maintain local alert systems for warning the population in the potentially endangered 
settlements and to integrate them with the National Early Warning System. No further information on the nature of the 
alert system was provided by the response; and  
Letters to the mayor with information on the planned safety measures and actions in case of emergency and to the 
neighbouring establishment(s) on the level of the expected effects/damages in case of major accident, as well as 
brochures, leaflets and information on the website of enterprises. 

2.e) Testing external emergency plans 
The types of tests used in Bulgaria are: 

- 
- 
- 
- 

Full test (participation of establishment employees, rescue forces, state and local administration and general public); 
Part test (establishment employees, rescue forces and part of the state and local administration); 
Desk top exercises (only few staff from the Seveso site and the emergency services participate); and  
Planning discussions and exercises may also be sufficient. 

Criteria according to which the external emergency plan is considered appropriate and according to which option is selected for 
testing are: real accidents occurred in enterprises in past years; permits issued to establishments to perform production activities; 
reported errors in real simulation of the plan with the participation of emergency workers in the enterprise; and adjustments made 
in the inspections carried out by interagency committees in the enterprise. 
If necessary, the emergency plans need to be updated according to findings from the tests. 

Question 3 – Information on safety measures 

3.a), 3.b), 3.c), 3.d) Information made actively available 
In Bulgaria, the operators are responsible for informing the public and have actively done so for all upper-tier establishments at 
least once during the reporting period. 
Information on the safety measures planned and on the requisite behaviour in the event of an accident has to be submitted by the 
operators to all sites that serve public purposes (hospitals, schools, kindergartens, hospices, etc.; it has not been further specified 
in the response by which means) and via one or more of the following channels: mail, placards/bulletins, operator’s website, mass 
media. The following shows a statistical breakdown of the means that have been used: 

-  Website of the establishment: 75%; 
- 
- 
- 

Official letters: 10 %; 
Leaflets 10%; and  
Flyers 5%.  

The quality and accuracy of the information as well as its submission are controlled during the inspections. 

3.e), 3.f), 3.g) Information kept permanently available (optional) 
All upper-tier establishments are required to keep permanently available up to date information on recommended safety 
measures and behaviour in case of emergency. This has to be provided through copies in paper or electronically and publication 
of information on the website of the company and/or the operator. The place on the premises where this information is available 
has to be publicly announced. Compliance with these specifications is controlled during inspections. 

                      
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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BULGARIA                                                                                                                                                                         

Question 4 – Inspections 

4.b) Programme of inspections available to public 
(optional) 
Not answered. 

4.a) Systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards 
Regional Inspectorates for Environment and Water are 
responsible for the planning, preparation, execution and 
reporting of inspections. By the end of each calendar year an 
inspection plan for each of the districts is prepared and 
endorsed by the Minister of Environment and Water. Risk 
assessment is performed for each establishment during 
preparation of the inspection plan and programmes based on 
the following criteria: Activities carried out; quantity and type of 
hazardous chemicals; the level of risk due to the processes’ 
complexity; detection systems in terms of prevention of 
accidents and/or incidents; and location. 

4.c) Actions taken in the event of accidents, incidents and non-compliance 
Proportionate to the risk from the site, formal orders can be issued to prohibit of use any site in order to prevent or stop 
emergency situations, hazards for the environment or human health and breaches of the legislation. These orders can be 
appealed in court, but the appeal does not stop their implementation. 
In case of non-compliances detected during inspections, all inspectors issue compliance notices which include the actions to be 
undertaken in order to achieve compliance. In case of non-compliance with the notices or violations to other provisions of the 
Seveso legislation, fines of up to €10,000 can be imposed. If an operator is running a Seveso site without a permit the penalty 
can be fines up to €50,000 or criminal prosecution.  
During the reporting period, fines between €5,000 and €15,000 have been imposed on a small number of establishments (at 
least 4). 

4.d), 4.e), 4.f)  Data on on-site inspections 
All upper-tier establishments were subject to on-site inspections every twelve months and lower-tier at least once during the 
reporting period in Bulgaria. 

Question 5 – Domino effects 

For the operators of upper tier establishments, the competent authority sets permit conditions related to potential domino effects, for 
example - the operator is obliged to exchange information about the nature and extent of the danger of an accident with subsequent 
"domino effect" for emergency planning and evacuation routes with sites located in close proximity to the establishment. 

The establishments or groups of establishments where domino effects could occur are identified by the Ministry of Environment on 
the basis of risk assessment data submitted by the operators of all Seveso establishments, especially on the calculations/predictions 
for the aerial distribution of the expected negative consequences, particularly explosions and fires (overpressure, missile and thermal 
radiation effects). 

                      
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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BULGARIA                                                                                                                                                                         

Question 6 – Land-use planning 

The Bulgarian Law on Spatial Planning stipulates that the Minister of Environment and Water is asked for consent when 
development projects are evaluated by the competent authorities. For developments around existing sites, land development plans 
are developed as measures to prevent major accidents and limit their consequences for human health and the environment. 

Question 7 – Further information (optional) 

No response was provided to this optional question. 

                      
  
 
 
 
 
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4.  Member State summary sheet - Croatia 

CROATIA                                                                                                                                                                            

Overview of Croatia 

Croatia’s response was almost complete but 
unclear with regards to a number of key 
issues, which are summarised below. 

Status of overall implementation: 

Number of establishments: 

The response submitted 
by Croatia indicates that 
while most of the 
provisions of the 
Directive have been 
implemented, there are 
gaps regarding key 
provisions of the 
Directive    

Main issues identified: 
The number of upper-tier establishments 
without an external emergency plan is unclear. 
It is also unclear how these plans are tested. 
A large number of upper-tier establishments 
were not inspected annually. 
It is not entirely clear how compliance with the 
specifications regarding domino effects is 
ensured. 

Overview of the information reported 

Question 1 - General information 

1.a) Significant changes made to competent authorities or their tasks  
Croatia became a member of the EU during the reporting period (1st July 2013). As a result, it is the first implementation report 
submitted by Croatia. The country has provided a detailed overview of the Competent Authorities responsible for the 
implementation and enforcement of the Directive and their tasks.  
This indicates that the following Croatian competent authorities: 

-  Ministry of Environmental and Nature Protection (MENP); 
National Protection and Rescue Directorate (NPRD); and  
- 
Croatian Agency for the Environment and Nature (CAEN); formerly: Croatian Environmental Agency (CEA). 
- 

Furthermore there are cooperating institutions: The Ministry of Construction and Physical Planning (MGPU) and the local 
governments and regional government. 

1.b) Establishments subject to Seveso  
The number of establishments covered by the 
Seveso II Directive in Croatia on 31 December 
2014 was 57. As Croatia joined the EU only in 
2013, no comparison to numbers from previous 
reporting periods can be made.  

As shown in the chart to the right, Croatia exhibits 
a low density of establishments with fewer 
establishments per capita and much fewer 
establishments per km2 than the EU average. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
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CROATIA                                                                                                                                                                            

1.c) Activities of Seveso establishments  
No statistical breakdown using the SPIRS categories was available.  

1.d) Seveso establishments covered by the IED (optional) 
Croatia reported that 19 establishments were also covered by the IED. The Competent Authorities responsible for both Directives 
have agreements for conducting coordinated inspections.  

Question 2 - Emergency plans 

2.a) & 2.b) Upper-tier establishments without external 
emergency plan 
Croatia reported that all upper-tier establishments are obliged 
to have an external emergency plan. The number of them that 
had not drafted such a plan at the end of the reporting period is 
unclear, as Croatia has only reported the number of “self-
Government divisions” (6) for which external emergency plans 
had not been drafted. 

2.c)  Upper-tier establishments without external 
emergency plan tested  
Croatia stated that the majority of external emergency plans 
were drafted during 2014. Croatia does not have data on the 
plans that have been tested yet. 

The figure cannot be represented as the data is unavailable 

The figure cannot be represented as the data is unavailable 

2.d) Arrangements for providing information to the public: 

- 
- 
- 

Internal operator warning systems, public warning system (not described); 
Information broadcasted in the media about measures to take in case of a major accident; and  
General measures in case of a major industrial accident are available online2. 

2.e) Testing external emergency plans 
Croatia has indicated external emergency plans have to be tested at least once every three years. Also, Croatia stated that 
external emergency plans are tested alongside the potential participants (emergency services) in the case of a major accident. 
However, the methods for testing and determining whether a plan is adequate have not been stated. 

Question 3 – Information on safety measures 

3.a), 3.b), 3.c), 3.d) Information made actively available 
The safety reports of all Seveso establishments of Croatia are available on the website of the Ministry of Environmental and 
Nature Protection3. The Croatian EA publishes the location of all establishments online alongside other relevant information. 
There are quarterly and annual reports that are also available to the public (though it is unclear how). Upper-tier establishments 
are also obliged to provide the public potentially affected by a major accident in their establishment with a copy of the external 
emergency plan. These potentially affected persons can participate in the approval of these plans through public consultation. 
Operators are also obliged to publish relevant information on their websites. Croatian Authorities ensure that this information is 
provided as part of their inspections of Seveso establishments. 

3.e), 3.f), 3.g) Information kept permanently available (optional) 
Information on all establishments (upper and lower tier) is kept up to date and permanently available through a website that the 
competent authorities are in charge of maintaining. Also, operators have to publish relevant information on their websites, along 
with keeping the information provided to the Competent Authorities up to date.  

2 http://www.duzs.hr/news.aspx?newsID=14637&pageID=134  
3 http://www.mzoip.hr/hr/okolis/rizicna-postrojenja.html  

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
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CROATIA                                                                                                                                                                            

Question 4 - Inspections 

4.a) Systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards 
The inspection system in Croatia is not based on a systematic 
appraisal. Croatia reported that the criteria for establishing 
inspection priorities were under development in 2015. 

4.b) Programme of inspections available to public 
(optional) 
The results of the inspections for individual operators are 
published quarterly on the MENP website. An annual report is 
also published in the same website.  

4.c) Actions taken in the event of accidents, incidents and non-compliance 
Croatia reported taking measures in relation to non-compliance of 6 lower-tier establishments and 13 upper-tier establishments. 
Croatia did not specify which measures were taken, but provided the range of measures that may be imposed in general, namely: 
order to cease the operation of the installation of part of it, cease of the activities, cease a specific manufacturing process, cease 
handling dangerous substances, order to take preventive and remedial measures, draft a safety report as obliged by the law.  

4.d), 4.e), 4.f)  Data on on-site inspections 
10 upper-tier establishments (40% of the total number of upper-tier establishments) were inspected annually. All upper-tier 
establishments were inspected at least in the last reporting period and 28 lower-tier establishments were subject to on-site 
inspections in the last three years (88%). 

Question 5 – Domino effects 

Establishments relevant for consideration of domino effects are designated by the competent authority. These establishments are 
informed of this and of the requirements they have to comply with as part of a Domino Group. No further information as to how this is 
achieved has been provided by the Croatian response. 

Question 6 – Land-use planning 

Competent Authorities draft and approve spatial planning documents with special conditions in the process of issuing site permits in 
accordance with threat assessments and protection and rescue plans.  

Local and regional (regional) governments in a special excerpt from the assessment, entitled "protection and rescue requirements in 
spatial planning documents", identify and prescribe preventive measures the implementation which will mitigate the consequences 
and effects of the natural and anthropogenic disasters and major accidents at critical infrastructure and increase the level of safety of 
the population, material goods and the environment. This excerpt forms an integral part of spatial planning documents of local and 
regional self-government units, as required by the Rules on the methodology for the preparation of threat assessments and 
protection and rescue plans.  

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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CROATIA                                                                                                                                                                            

Question 7 – Further information (optional) 

7.a) Lessons learned from accidents and incidents 
Croatia reported that the legislation requires operators reporting a major accident to provide a list of “lessons learned”. This is 
used by operators and Competent Authorities to improve major accident prevention and mitigation measures. 

7.b) IT tools used for monitoring the implementation and data sharing 
The Croatian Environment Agency has a reporting tool that is used by operators. The data obtained is fed into the annual 
reports on Seveso establishments published in the country and the information reported to e-MARS and e-SPIRS.  

7.c) Seveso like provisions applied to other installations and activities (e.g. pipelines, ports, marshalling yards, 
offshore)  
Croatia has not replied to this optional question.  

                      
 
 
 
 
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5.  Member State summary sheet – Cyprus 

CYPRUS                                                                                                                                                                        

Overview of Cyprus 

Cyprus provided a complete response. 

Number of establishments: 

Status of overall implementation: 

The Cypriot response 
indicates that the 
provisions of the Seveso 
II Directive are fully 
implemented. 

Main issues identified: 

None 

Overview of the information reported 

Question 1 - General information 

1.a) Significant changes made to competent authorities or their tasks  

None were reported by Cyprus 

1.b) Establishments subject to Seveso  

There were 22 Seveso establishments in Cyprus at the end of 
2014, a significant increase compared to 2011 (16). 

As shown in the chart to the right, Cyprus exhibits more 
establishments per capita but fewer establishments per km2 
than the EU average. 

1.c) Activities of Seveso establishments  

There are 6 fuel storage and LPG storage establishments each in Cyprus. Together these establishments account for more than half 
of the establishments in Cyprus. These activities are also common among the EU average with fuel storage being the third most 
common activity amongst the EU Seveso establishments (11% of all establishments) and LPG storage representing 4% of EU 
establishments. 

Further activities in Cypriot Seveso establishments are: 

-  Mining, power generation (3 establishments each); 
- 
- 

Production, destruction and storage of explosives (2 establishments) as well as; and  
Industrial chemicals and wholesale and retail (1 establishment each). 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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CYPRUS                                                                                                                                                                        

1.d) Seveso establishments covered by the IED (optional) 

2 lower-tier establishments and 2 upper-tier establishments in Cyprus are also covered by Directive 2010/75/EU (IED). There is no 
significant impact on the way Seveso is applied by the competent authorities for the establishments concerned. 

Question 2 - Emergency plans 

2.a) & 2.b) Upper-tier establishments without 
external emergency plan 
The Cypriot authorities decided that the 
requirement to produce an external emergency 
plan applied to all upper-tier establishments and 
during the reporting period Cyprus’ Civil Defence 
has drawn up emergency plans for all the upper-
tier establishments, following the instructions of 
the Department of Labour Inspection. 

Note: Total 13 upper-tier establishments 

2.c) Upper-tier establishments without 
external emergency plan tested 
Cyprus Civil Defence tested all the external 
emergency plans through an exercise during the 
reporting period.  

2.d) Arrangements for providing information to the public: 

- 

- 

Specific information is transmitted by a local radio station in case of emergency. Small radios have been 
distributed to the public for free; and  
In the context of a national information campaign, leaflets were distributed. 

2.e) Testing external emergency plans 

- 
- 

Table top exercises (main test method); and  
Full scale exercises including Seveso establishments and all the services involved.   

Before every exercise, independent observers/ evaluators are identified to assess the exercise and its outcomes. Upon the 
completion of the exercise an evaluation meeting is organised, coordinated by the observers/ evaluators. The outcomes of 
this meeting are recorded in order to help the competent authorities take any corrective measures. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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CYPRUS                                                                                                                                                                        

Question 3 – Information on safety measures 

3.a), 3.b), 3.c), 3.d) Information made actively available 
In Cyprus, operators of each upper-tier establishment are obliged to supply (e.g. by hand, by mail, by e- mail) the necessary 
information. The safety report of each upper-tier establishment is available to the public at the offices of the Department of 
Labour Inspection or at the offices of each upper-tier establishment. Compliance with these specifications is monitored in the 
inspections of the establishments and the Department of Labour Inspection actively participates in the information campaigns. 

In 9 of 13 upper-tier establishments information has been made actively available to the public at least once during the reporting 
period (2010-2014). The remaining establishments are in the process of informing the public and persons liable to be affected by 
a Seveso accident, or have recently been classified as upper-tier establishment (and hence this action is pending). 
The means used to inform the public are listed below: 

- 

Door-to-door distribution of operators’ leaflets as well as radios, torches, tape etc. to the citizens liable to be affected 
by a Seveso accident: 100%. 

3.e), 3.f), 3.g) Information kept permanently available (optional) 
No response was provided to this optional question 

Question 4 - Inspections 

4.a) Systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards 
All establishments are inspected at least once a year by the 
inspectors of the Department of Labour Inspection. Besides 
planned inspections, site visits may be initiated for a number of 
purposes, for example investigation of accidents or complaints, 
thematic inspections, formal assessment of safety reports, 
interim assessment of performance and so on. 

4.b) Programme of inspections available to public 
(optional) 
No response was provided to this optional question 

4.c) Actions taken in the event of accidents, incidents and non-compliance 
Improvement notices, prohibition notices and prosecutions can be issued or initiated in case of violations. However, no such 
cases were identified during the reporting period except for minor breaches, for which about 50 letters have been sent to 
operators across all Seveso establishments. No further information with regards to why such a large number of letters 
(considering there are 22 establishments) has been sent was provided by the response. 

4.d), 4.e), 4.f)  Data on on-site inspections 
All establishments are inspected at least once a year in Cyprus, both upper and lower tier. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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CYPRUS                                                                                                                                                                        

Question 5 – Domino effects 

In Cyprus, establishments are considered part of a domino group either if they share a common boundary, or if a buffer zone subject 
to potential impact from thermal, overpressure or toxic effects of one establishment overlaps with the physical boundaries of others. 
Affected establishments are obliged to exchange relevant information in writing and review or take measures to limit the 
consequences for their site. Compliance is checked by the authorities through inspections and review of safety reports (upper-tier 
establishments) or major accident prevention policy (lower-tier establishments). 

Question 6 – Land-use planning 

The Cypriot Town and Country Planning Law ensures prevention of major accidents and limitation of their consequences during the 
preparation or amendment of development plans and for the examination of planning applications.  

Development plans need to consider risks from major accidents as well as appropriate distances between existing establishments 
and other establishments, residential areas, buildings, other areas of public use and major transport routes, recreational areas and 
areas of particular natural sensitivity or interest. 

Planning applications for new developments around existing establishments implement strict conditions regarding distances between 
establishments and other developments, and have to undergo a consultation procedure with the Department of Labour Inspection 
and other responsible governmental departments. As a result there have been cases during the reporting period in which 
applications were rejected or subjected to strict conditions. 

New establishments and modifications to existing establishments additionally require a technical report on the risk from the 
establishment and public notification of the application. New establishments will be sited in areas designated for industrial 
development which are separated into categories and sub-areas able to accommodate such developments. 

Question 7 – Further information (optional) 

.7.a) Lessons learned from accidents and incidents 
No information was provided. 

No response was provided to this optional question. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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6.  Member State summary sheet – Czech Republic 

CZECH REPUBLIC                                                                                                                                                          

Number of establishments: 

Overview of Czech Republic 

Czech Republic provided a complete 
response. 

Status of overall implementation: 

The Czech Republic 
response indicates that 
the provisions of the 
Seveso II Directive are 
almost fully 
implemented. 

Main issues identified: 
According to the response, external 
emergency plans of a large number of upper-
tier establishments have not been tested 
every three years as required by Article 11.4 
of the Directive. 

Overview of the information reported 

Question 1 - General information 

1.a) Significant changes made to competent authorities or their tasks  
None were reported by the Czech Republic. 

1.b) Establishments subject to Seveso  
207 Seveso establishments were reported for the 
Czech Republic at the end of 2014, up from 197 in 
2011. This is mostly due to a decreasing number 
of lower-tier establishments. 

As shown in the chart to the right, Czech Republic 
exhibits fewer establishments per capita and just 
slightly more establishments per km2 than the EU 
average. 

.

1.c) Activities of Seveso establishments  
The dominant activities of Seveso establishments in the Czech Republic are: 

- 
- 
- 

General chemicals manufacture (17% of all establishments); 
Production, destruction and storage of explosives (12% of all establishments); and  
Fuel storage (12% of all establishments).  

General chemicals manufacture and fuel storage are also among the most common activities across all of the EU representing 
12% and 11% of EU establishments, respectively. Production, destruction and storage of explosives is less common making up 
4% of EU establishments. 

1.d) Seveso establishments covered by the IED (optional) 
No information was provided for this optional question. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
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CZECH REPUBLIC                                                                                                                                                          

Question 2 - Emergency plans 

2.a) & 2.b) Upper-tier establishments without 
external emergency plan 
The Czech authorities decided that an external 
emergency plan was not required for 23 upper-tier 
establishments in view of the information contained 
in the safety report. No further information on the 
specific reasons why such a relatively high number 
of establishments had been excluded from this 
requirement was provided by the response. For an 
additional 2 upper-tier establishments external 
emergency plans have not been produced during 
the reporting period, even though these 
establishments had not been excluded from the 
requirement to produce an external emergency 
plan. 

2.c) Upper-tier establishments without external 
emergency plan tested  
According to the Czech response, external 
emergency plans of 65 upper-tier establishments 
(56% of all upper-tier establishments) have not 
been tested every three years as required by Article 
11.4 of the Directive. 

Note: Total 117 upper-tier establishments 

2.d) Arrangements for providing information to the public: 

- 

- 

Links with the mass media such as texts or recordings containing information to be provided by television and radio in 
the event of an emergency; and  
All of these measures are specified in each emergency plan, alongside further information such as ways to verify 
whether emergency information has been received, alternative means of informing the public, the distribution of 
responsibilities for communicating, as well as organisational and material support. 

2.e) Testing external emergency plans 
Types of tests used in Czech Republic are: 

- 
- 

Field exercises, in which all rescue services work together; and  
Desktop exercises and exercises at the site of the accident. 

The results of the exercises are used to improve the external emergency plans. This is based on the criteria of the completeness, 
timeliness, accuracy and practical utility of the plans. The criteria used for carrying out tests on external emergency plans include 
mainly connectivity testing with regard to alarms and the availability of the measures included in the plan; the systems and 
methods of alerting and informing the public; and the cooperation among institutions in case of an accident. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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CZECH REPUBLIC                                                                                                                                                          

Question 3 – Information on safety measures 

3.a), 3.b), 3.c), 3.d) Information made actively available 
In the Czech Republic, the regional authority is required to prepare and provide information on the risk of occurrence of a major 
accident to the public situated in the emergency planning zone. Subject to negotiations, the operator is involved in the information 
process. Information includes the possibility of a domino effect on preventive safety measures, mitigation measures and 
behaviour in the event of a major accident. For 90% of upper tier establishments in the Czech Republic, information has been 
actively distributed in the five years from 2010 to 2014. 
The means used to inform the public are listed below: 

- 
- 

Brochures or flyers and to businesses or public buildings via data boxes if available; and  
Otherwise in paper form. 

A statistical breakdown was not available. 

3.e), 3.f), 3.g) Information kept permanently available (optional) 
Up to date information on safety measures has been kept permanently available for all establishments (upper and lower-tier) 
during the reporting period in the Czech Republic, but no information regarding how it has been permanently kept available was 
provided. 

Question 4 - Inspections 

4.a) Systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards 
The programme of inspections is not implemented on the basis 
of a systematic appraisal of major accidents in the Czech 
Republic, but in accordance with the control plan: Upper-tier 
establishments are inspected annually, lower-tier establishments 
every three years.  

4.b) Programme of inspections available to public 
(optional) 
Not answered. 

4.c) Actions taken in the event of accidents, incidents and non-compliance 
In 2013, a number of shortcomings were detected. These related to irregularities concerning documentation or the internal 
emergency plan. Some establishments did not have insurance policies in force and measures were imposed to rectify this 
situation. In 2014, administrative proceedings were initiated in four cases on the grounds of the infringement of the provisions of 
this Act on the basis of checks carried out in 2013. In three cases fines of about EUR 2 000 were imposed, and in one case a fine 
of about €13,000. 

4.d), 4.e), 4.f)  Data on on-site inspections 
All upper-tier establishments were subject to on-site inspections every twelve months and lower-tier at least once during the 
reporting period in the Czech Republic. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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CZECH REPUBLIC                                                                                                                                                          

Question 5 – Domino effects 

Where the probability of occurrence or consequences of a major accident may be increased due to a domino effect is determined by 
the regional authority on the basis of the notifications and protocols of the classification of establishments as lower or upper tier. The 
regional authority then obliges operators of identified establishments to provide the necessary information for risk management in the 
establishment. The operator is required to use this information for the risk assessment, the safety programme for the prevention of 
major accidents, safety reports, the internal emergency plan and the documentation for drafting the external emergency plan. 

Question 6 – Land-use planning 

The regional authority ensures that the objectives of preventing major accidents and limiting the consequences of such accidents are 
taken into account in relation to the siting of new establishments and facilities, modifications to existing establishments and 
maintaining safe distances between the establishments and residential areas, buildings and locations frequented by the public, major 
transport routes, recreational areas and areas protected under special laws. In the case of existing establishments and facilities, the 
regional authority will, if necessary, adopt additional measures on reducing the risk of a major accident. 

Upon initiation of the land-use proceedings, the regional authority contacts the building authority, which conducts the land-use 
proceedings and carries out an analysis and assessment of the risk of a serious accident based on information to be submitted by 
the operator. 

Question 7 – Further information (optional) 

No response was provided to this optional question. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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7.  Member State summary sheet – Denmark 

DENMARK                                                                                                                                                                          

Overview of Denmark 

Denmark provided a complete response. 

Number of establishments: 

Status of overall implementation: 

The Denmark response 
indicates that the 
provisions of the Seveso 
II Directive are almost 
fully implemented. 

Main issues identified: 
A large number of external emergency plans 
are reported to not having been tested over the 
last 3 years. The central authorities will contact 
the local authorities concerned and either 
obtain confirmation that the emergency plans 
were tested or ensure that they are tested as 
soon as possible. 

Overview of the information reported 

Question 1 - General information 

1.a) Significant changes made to competent authorities or their tasks  
None were reported by Denmark. 

1.b) Establishments subject to Seveso  
There were 121 Seveso establishments in 
Denmark at the end of 2014, almost the same 
number as in 2011. 

As shown in the chart to the right, Denmark 
exhibits almost the same number of 
establishments per capita as the EU average, but 
more establishments per km2 than the EU 
average. 

.

1.c) Activities of Seveso establishments  
Fuel storage establishments account for 36% of all establishments in Denmark. This activity is also one of the most common 
activities across the EU, though it is not as dominating in an EU-wide context, accounting for 11% of all establishments. 
Other common activities in Denmark include: 

- 
- 

Chemical installations manufacturing ammonia and industrial gases (6% of installations each); and  
“Other activities” not included in any other category (7%). 

1.d) Seveso establishments covered by the IED (optional) 
No information was provided for this optional question. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
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DENMARK                                                                                                                                                                          

Question 2 - Emergency plans 

2.a) & 2.b) Upper-tier establishments without 
external emergency plan 
52 upper-tier establishments have an external 
emergency plan, while two do not. One 
establishment without an external emergency plan 
has only been classified as upper-tier within the last 
year. As for the second establishment, the central 
authorities will contact the local authority concerned 
and ensure that an external emergency plan is 
drawn up or an assessment is carried out regarding 
whether one is needed. 

2.c) Upper-tier establishments without external 
emergency plan tested  
27 emergency plans were not tested over the three-
year period. 41 establishments have tested their 
emergency plan at some point in time. It is possible 
that inaccurate reports were submitted by local 
authorities. The central authorities will contact the 
local authorities concerned and either obtain 
confirmation that the emergency plans were tested 
or ensure that they are tested as soon as possible. 

Note: Total 54 upper-tier establishments 

2.d) Arrangements for providing information to the public: 
If a major incident occurs at a risk establishment which could have consequences for the local population and risk establishments 
nearby: 

Information will be provided to the public via the local police force's website; 
If necessary, via an emergency warning accompanied by a siren; and  

- 
- 
-  When the risk has passed, the all-clear will be given.  

2.e) Testing external emergency plans 
Emergency plans are tested using: 

- 
- 

Theoretical desktop exercise; and  
Physical exercise in whole or in part. 

It is assessed locally whether the minimum provisions of the law are met with respect to the content of the plan and testing 
frequency. 

Question 3 – Information on safety measures 

3.a), 3.b), 3.c), 3.d) Information made actively available 
In Denmark, the municipal council (as the local emergency service) and the police draw up the external emergency plans for 
upper-tier establishments. The police also informs the public of safety measures and the requisite behaviour in the event of 
incidents. The police made information available to the public for about 49 of the 54 upper-tier establishments during the last five-
year period (2010-2014). In 9 of these cases, the information was actually provided in 2015. In one of the other cases, the 
information was last made available to the public in 2009. The information is available on the local police force's website, and a 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
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DENMARK                                                                                                                                                                          

specific assessment is also made regarding whether the information about the particular establishment should be made available 
by other means, e.g. by sending out leaflets. A statistical breakdown of the means used was not available. 

In the case of lower-tier establishments, the police also evaluates whether there is a specific need to draw up an external 
emergency plan. 

There is a guide for the police and the emergency services regarding drawing up the plans, which, amongst other things, outlines 
how the work should be coordinated. In order for the Environmental Protection Agency to be able to compile its reports to the EU, 
every authority concerned must also report on their publishing of information. 

3.e), 3.f), 3.g) Information kept permanently available (optional)  
Not answered. 

Question 4 - Inspections 

4.a) Systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards 
The inspection of establishments is organised jointly by the risk 
authorities based on a systematic appraisal taking into account 
the establishments' production and risk conditions, the nature of 
the surroundings and a number of other factors that are specific 
to the individual establishment. 

4.b) Programme of inspections available to public 
(optional) 
Not answered. 

4.c) Actions taken in the event of accidents, incidents and non-compliance 
In Denmark the following sanctions can be applied: Recommendations and warnings where the legal circumstances remain 
unchanged, and enforcement notices and prohibitions where there are changes to the legal circumstances, e.g. the notification of 
new conditions of risk. Non-compliance with conditions or legislation may lead to prosecution by the police or the courts, whereby 
fines or custodial sentences may be imposed. 

4.d), 4.e), 4.f)  Data on on-site inspections 
39 upper-tier establishments (72% of the total number of upper-tier establishments) were inspected annually. Note that Denmark 
applies systematic appraisal to determine inspection schedules (see 4.a) and as such it is it is not absolutely required to inspect 
all establishments annually. Another 11 (20%) upper-tier establishments were inspected at least during the last reporting period. 
In addition to this, 50 lower-tier establishments were inspected (75% of the total number of lower-tier establishments).  

The relevant local authorities of the establishments that were not inspected have been contacted by the national authority. 

Question 5 – Domino effects 

Based on the safety documentation submitted by an establishment, the local risk authorities assess whether domino effects might 
occur. The risk authorities may also become aware of factors that could trigger domino effects when inspecting an establishment's 
surroundings. The inspection of establishments is organised jointly by the risk authorities and takes account of the establishments' 
production and risk conditions. This ensures that possible domino effects are taken into account in the establishment's safety work. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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DENMARK                                                                                                                                                                          

Question 6 – Land-use planning 

Under Danish law, an establishment may not be set up, extended or modified in a way that leads to increased risk without prior 
authorisation. Under the Planning Act, the municipal councils, which are responsible for overall planning in the municipality, must 
review the general planning document, referred to as the municipal plan, every four years. The location of a new establishment is, as 
a rule, subject to local land use planning and an environmental impact assessment. 

In Denmark, the issue of land use planning is addressed in a circular from the Minister for the Environment to all municipal councils. 
It requires municipal councils to take into account the risk of a major incident before any land use provision is made in a municipal or 
local plan affecting areas within 500m of an establishment. Furthermore, the local planning authority must issue an opinion before 
the notification for an establishment is sent by the coordinating environmental authority to the other authorities. 

Question 7 – Further information (optional) 

No response was provided to this optional question. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
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8.  Member State summary sheet – Estonia 

ESTONIA                                                                                                                                                                         

Overview of Estonia 

Estonia provided a complete response. 

Number of establishments: 

Status of overall implementation: 

The Estonian response 
indicates that the 
provisions of the Seveso 
II Directive are almost 
fully implemented. 

Main issues identified: 
Estonia indicated that establishments do not 
have individual emergency plans but instead 
are covered by one national emergency plan 
which is not in compliance with the 
requirements of the Directive. 

Overview of the information reported 

Question 1 - General information 

1.a) Significant changes made to competent authorities or their tasks  
No significant changes have been made to the main competent authorities, nor to their main tasks. However, the name of one of 
the main competent authorities has changed from Technical Surveillance Authority to Technical Regulatory Authority. The other 
competent authority is, as previously, the Rescue Board. 

1.b) Establishments subject to Seveso  
There were 64 Seveso establishments in Estonia 
at the end of 2014, up from 51 in 2011. Especially 
the number of upper-tier establishments has 
increased significantly during that period from 28 
to 37. 

As shown in the chart to the right, Estonia exhibits 
much more establishments per capita but fewer 
establishments per km2 than the EU average. This 
means while the average density of 
establishments in Estonia is fairly low, there are a 
lot of Seveso establishments in Estonia for a 
country of this population. 

.

1.c) Activities of Seveso establishments  
28 establishments in Estonia are classified as fuel storage establishments, far more than any other category. They account for 
42% of all establishments. This activity is also one of the most common activities across the EU, though it is not as dominant in an 
EU-wide context, accounting for 11% of all establishments. 
Other common activities in Estonia include: 

- 
- 
- 

General chemicals manufacturing (6 establishments); 
Power generation (5 establishments), as well as; and  
Production and storage of fertilisers (5 establishments). 

1.d) Seveso establishments covered by the IED (optional) 
No information was provided for this optional question. 

                      
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
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ESTONIA                                                                                                                                                                         

Question 2 - Emergency plans 

2.a) & 2.b) Upper-tier establishments without 
external emergency plan 
In Estonia, currently there is one national 
emergency plan for all Seveso establishments 
drawn up by the Ministry of the Interior according to 
the Estonian Emergency Act. In 2015, the Estonian 
Rescue Board decided to produce regional external 
emergency plans for all upper-tier establishments. 
These are planned to be completed in 2016. 

Note: Total 37 upper-tier establishments 

2.c) Upper-tier establishments without external 
emergency plan tested  
The Emergency Act emergency plans were tested 
in 10 crisis management exercises between 2012 
and 2014. Additionally, the Rescue Board carried 
out smaller exercises in cooperation with 
establishments. 

2.d) Arrangements for providing information to the public: 

- 
- 

- 

Upper-tier establishments have sirens and some towns have municipal siren systems; 
People in the affected areas have been trained on response measures when sirens start to sound through leaflets, 
information on the establishments’ webpages and on local governments’ webpages. All Seveso establishments have to 
provide information to the public; and  
The Estonian Rescue Board is responsible for crisis communication at the time of an accident. 

2.e) Testing external emergency plans 
Emergency plans are tested using: 
Desk top exercises; and  
Field exercises.  

- 
- 

According to the Emergency Act, emergency plans are tested in crisis management exercises that include desk top and/or field 
exercises and all responsible authorities. All exercises are evaluated and the evaluation report that also includes a budget report 
is submitted to the Crisis Commission and the Ministry of the Interior. Additionally, the Rescue Board carry out smaller exercises 
in cooperation with the establishment operators. 

                      
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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ESTONIA                                                                                                                                                                         

Question 3 – Information on safety measures 

3.a), 3.b), 3.c), 3.d) Information made actively available 
In Estonia, informing the public and people liable to be affected by major accidents is the responsibility of the operators of all 
establishments, upper and lower-tier. The Rescue Board controls compliance with the information requirements. 30 of the 37 
upper-tier establishments have made all required information publicly available and handed it out to persons liable to be affected 
by major accidents during the last five years (2010-2014). A statistical breakdown of the means used was not available. 
Furthermore, guidance for the public and operators’ information links are available on the Rescue Board webpage.  Information 
about the location, the hazard type and possible hazardous area of all establishments, upper and lower-tier, are presented in a 
map on the Land Board Agency webpage. 

3.e), 3.f), 3.g) Information kept permanently available (optional) 
Information about the hazards and adequate behaviour in case of an accident needs to be permanently available on the 
establishment and operator’s webpage. 

Question 4 - Inspections 

4.a) Systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards 
All upper-tier establishments are subject to on-site inspections 
every twelve months. 

4.b) Programme of inspections available to public 
(optional) 
Not answered. 

4.c) Actions taken in the event of accidents, incidents and non-compliance 
In case of infringement, compliance orders are issued according to the Administrative Procedure Act. If the order is not complied 
with in time, a coercive measure (substitutive enforcement or penalty payment) may be applied according to the Substitutive 
Enforcement and Penalty Payment Act. 
In case of a severe infringement or stopping the authorities’ inspection, the Code of Misdemeanour Procedure can be applied 
imposing penalty payments or detention. 
When operators provide false information, repeatedly infringe safety requirements causing acute accident hazard, fail to give 
notice of significant changes to the establishment or their activity has substantially damaged the public interest, the Technical 
Surveillance Authority can prohibit the operation of the establishment by cancelling the operator’s permit according to the 
Chemicals Act. 

4.d), 4.e), 4.f)  Data on on-site inspections 
All upper-tier establishments were subject to on-site inspections every twelve months and lower-tier establishments at least once 
during the reporting period in Estonia.  

                      
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Question 5 – Domino effects 

Information about the neighbourhood of Seveso establishments and their notification system in case of an accident needs to be 
included in an establishment’s risk analysis, safety report and internal emergency plan. These documents are submitted to and 
assessed by the competent authorities. Information exchange among establishments is ensured by the competent authorities’ 
inspections. 

In practice, additional information exchange and cooperation is also initiated by the port management as the identified groups of 
establishments with the risk of domino effects are located in port territory. 

Question 6 – Land-use planning 

The Estonian Chemical Act and Planning Act requires that preventing major accidents and limiting the consequences of such 
accidents are taken into account land-use planning. 

For planning and constructing processes for new establishments, modifications to existing establishments and developments in the 
area around establishments, local governments have to consult with the Rescue Board. The Rescue Board assesses the 
developments’ impact on the probability and consequences of major accidents and planned safety measures and gives 
recommendations. The recommendations are based on the risk assessments from the establishment, environmental impact 
assessments, and an approach defining zones in which specific developments may or may not be allowed. 

Public notification, consultation and participation are required throughout the planning process. 

Question 7 – Further information (optional) 

7.a) Lessons learned from accidents and incidents 
No information was provided. 

7.b) IT tools used for monitoring the implementation and data sharing 
Information about the location, the hazard type and the possible hazardous area for all establishments (upper and lower tier) are 
publicly available on the Land Board Agency web map page.4 

7.c) Seveso like provisions applied to other installations and activities (e.g. pipelines, ports, marshalling yards, offshore)  
No information was provided. 

4 
http://xgis.maaamet.ee/xGIS/XGis?app_id=MA11A&user_id=at&bbox=337406.132665832,6375000,767593.867334168,6635000&
LANG=1 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
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9.  Member State summary sheet - Finland 

FINLAND                                                                                                                                                                             

Overview of Finland 

Overall, Finland provided a complete response. 

Number of establishments: 

Status of overall implementation: 

The Finish response 
indicates that the 
provisions of the Seveso II 
Directive are almost fully 
implemented with only 
minor aspects outstanding. 

Main issues identified: 
A large number of upper-tier establishments 
were not inspected annually. Note that Finland 
uses a systematic appraisal of major accident 
hazards to plan inspections, as such annual 
inspections are not required so this does not 
constitute a compliance issue but rather a 
potential issue that might need further checks. 

Overview of the information reported 

Question 1 - General information 

1.a) Significant changes made to competent authorities or their tasks  
None were reported by Finland. 

1.b) Establishments subject to Seveso  
There were 300 Seveso establishments in 
Finland at the end of 2014, up from 276 in 
2011. 

It is worth noting that Finland exhibits the 
highest number of establishments per capita 
but the second lowest number of 
establishments per km2 (after Lithuania) of all 
EU Member States.   

1.c) Activities of Seveso establishments  

According to the statistical breakdown provided by Finland, the most common activities among the establishments covered by the 
Seveso II Directive were: 

- 
- 
- 

“Fuel storage” (12%); 
“Production, destruction and storage of explosives” (11%); and  
“Power generation” (11%).  

Fuel storage is one of the most common activities at EU level (12% of all Seveso establishments in Europe). On the other hand, 
power generation and production, destruction and storage of explosives are relatively uncommon (5% and 4% of all Seveso 
establishments in the EU, respectively). In fact, Finland is the EU Member State with the highest number of Seveso 
establishments in the “production, destruction and storage of explosives” category; and the second highest number of 
establishments in the “power generation” category, after Spain.  

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
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FINLAND                                                                                                                                                                             

1.d) Seveso establishments covered by the IED (optional) 
Finland has not replied to this optional question. 

Question 2 - Emergency plans 

2.a) & 2.b) Upper-tier establishments without 
external emergency plan 
Finland has reported that all the upper-tier 
establishments in the country have an external 
emergency plan. 

Note: Total 135 upper-tier establishments 

2.c) Upper-tier establishments without external 
emergency plan tested  
Finland stated that 4 upper-tier establishments’ 
external emergency plans had not been tested at the 
end of the reporting period. Finland has explained 
that these 4 plans had been tested in 2011 and were 
due to be tested in 2015. This represents 3% of the 
upper-tier establishments of the country. By 
comparison, the EU average is 25%.  

2.d) Arrangements for providing information to the public: 

- 
- 

- 

Public warning siren network (the public has been given instructions on how to act when this siren is activated); 
Dynamic and static high volume loudspeakers (i.e. installed in rescue vehicles or at the site where the accident has 
occurred); and  
Information given via radio and TV. 

2.e) Testing external emergency plans 
External emergency plans are tested using full tests, which can be: 

- 
- 

Field exercises involving part or all the authorities that would take part in case of an accident; and  
Desk-based exercises involving part or all authorities as above.  

The lessons learned from the results are used to improve external emergency plans. The Ministry of Interior published a guide and 
a platform for external emergency plans in 2010 to support the review of the plans. Another guide was published in 2014 on how to 
test the plans. The Regional States’ administrative agencies are in charge of ensuring that the plans have been drafted and tested. 
These agencies report on the testing of external emergency plans to the Ministry of Interior once a year.  

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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FINLAND                                                                                                                                                                             

Question 3 – Information on safety measures 

3.a), 3.b), 3.c), 3.d) Information made actively available 
In Finland, information is made actively available using two main channels: operators (leaflets to people in the surroundings of 
their upper-tier establishments and open days) and authorities (leaflets). Finland has reported that information was made 
available for all of the upper-tier establishments, A statistical breakdown of how this was done is presented below: 

- 
- 

Operators’ leaflets: 85%; and  
Authorities' leaflets: 15%.  

Competent authorities make sure that the information is provided as part of inspections. 

3.e), 3.f), 3.g) Information kept permanently available (optional) 
Finland stated that information is kept permanently available for “only some” of their upper-tier establishments, without specifying 
a number. This is done via the operators’ websites.  

Question 4 - Inspections 

4.a) Systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards 
Finland reported having an inspection programme based on a 
systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards based on the 
following criteria: 

4.b) Programme of inspections available to public 
(optional) 
Inspection reports are available to the public on request with 
the exception of confidential information. 

- 

- 
- 
- 

The results of previous inspections (with a rating 
system from 0-5); 
Occurrence of previous accidents; 
Type and size of the plant; and  
Surroundings.  

4.c) Actions taken in the event of accidents, incidents and non-compliance 
In the case of “severe non-compliance (i.e. in cases of a significant danger of an accident), competent authorities prohibit the 
use of part or the whole of the plant. Competent authorities also decide upon the remedial action to be taken by the operator. 
Should the operator refuse to take action, a penalty is imposed. Operators are also obliged to take remedial action in case of 
accidents, which may be followed by an inspection before restarting operation  

4.d), 4.e), 4.f)  Data on on-site inspections 
The Finnish authorities reported that 25% of their establishments were inspected annually during the last reporting period. Note 
that Finland applies systematic appraisal to determine inspection schedules (see 4.a) and as such it is it is not absolutely 
required to inspect all establishments annually. Nevertheless, the numbers of inspections of upper-tier establishments appear 
relatively low. 97% of upper-tier establishments were inspected at least once during the 2012-2014 period.  

As regards lower-tier establishments, 95% were inspected at least once during the 3-year reporting period. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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FINLAND                                                                                                                                                                             

Question 5 – Domino effects 

Finland reported having identified all the establishments with possible Domino Effects. Competent authorities have also prepared 
guidelines for operators explaining how to cooperate in such cases. The cooperation includes exchanging information on the risks 
and potential accidents and include the risks of the other establishments of the Domino Group when preparing external emergency 
plans and safety reports.  

Question 6 – Land-use planning 

All Seveso establishments are surrounded by a so-called consultation zone (0.5-2 km). In case of any developments within this zone, 
spatial planners have to request competent authorities’ opinion about the possible risks and take this into account.  

Question 7 – Further information (optional) 

7.a) Lessons learned from accidents and incidents 
Finland did not respond to this optional question. 

7.b) IT tools used for monitoring the implementation and data sharing 
Finland did not respond to this optional question.  

7.c) Seveso like provisions applied to other installations and activities (e.g. pipelines, ports, marshalling yards, 
offshore)  
Finland reported that periodic inspections are carried out on certain non-Seveso establishments (those which exceed 1/5 of the 
lower-tier threshold) every 5 years. These non-Seveso establishments are required to have an internal emergency plan. Also, 
the operators of those Ports and Marshalling Yards through which large amounts of dangerous substances are transported need 
to draw up internal emergency plans and safety reports, and the emergency services are required to draft external emergency 
plans.  

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
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10.  Member State summary sheet – France 

FRANCE                                                                                                                                                                              

Overview of France 

France provided a complete response. 

Number of establishments: 

Status of overall implementation: 

The French response 
indicates that the 
provisions of the Seveso 
II Directive are almost 
fully implemented. 

Main issues identified: 
External emergency plans for 45 upper tier 
establishments have not been tested during 
the reporting period. 
For 75 establishments no plan had been drawn 
up by the end of the reporting period. 

Overview of the information reported 

Question 1 - General information 

1.a) Significant changes made to competent authorities or their tasks  
None were reported by France. 

1.b) Establishments subject to Seveso  
France is the country with the second largest 
number of Seveso establishments in the EU. It 
accounts for about 10% of all establishments in 
the EU. There were 1178 Seveso establishments 
in France at the end of 2014, which is slightly less 
than the 1196 reported for 2011. This is due to a 
decreasing number of lower tier establishments, 
while upper-tier establishments have increased in 
numbers. 

As shown in the chart to the right, France exhibits 
fewer establishments per capita and fewer 
establishments per km2 than the EU average. 
Hence, despite the large overall number of 
establishments in France, the number is relatively 
low for a country of France’s size. 

.

1.c) Activities of Seveso establishments  
The activities of most of the establishments in France are classified as “other activities” (i.e. not included in any of the more 
specific categories). They account for 42% of all establishments. At an EU-wide level, “other activities” account for 14% of all 
establishments. 

Other common activities in France include: 

-  Wholesale and retail (8% of establishments, compared to 9% across EU); and  
- 

General chemical manufacturing (7% of establishments, compared to 12% across the EU). 

1.d) Seveso establishments covered by the IED (optional) 
No information was provided for this optional question. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
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FRANCE                                                                                                                                                                              

Question 2 - Emergency plans 

2.a) & 2.b) Upper-tier establishments without 
external emergency plan 
For 23 upper-tier establishments the French 
authorities decided that an external emergency 
plan was not needed as permitted by Article 11.6 of 
the Seveso II Directive. However, for an additional 
75 establishments no plan had been drawn up by 
the end of the reporting period (31/12/2014). This 
corresponds to 12% of upper-tier establishments, 
compared to 11% across the whole EU-28. 
According to the response, the plans were in the 
process of being produced, pending the submission 
of further information in order to determine the 
required protective measures. 

2.c) Upper-tier establishments without external 
emergency plan tested  
According to the French response, external 
emergency plans of 45 upper-tier establishments 
(3% of all upper-tier establishments) have not been 
tested every three years as required by Article 11.4 
of the Directive. 

Note: Total 639 upper-tier establishments 

2.d) Arrangements for providing information to the public: 

- 
- 

Industrial and municipal sirens sounding the national alarm signal; and  
If necessary, further information can be transmitted by other means through automated calls, text messages and 
emails, alerts from vehicles of the civil security services, radio and television broadcasts and various signs and 
messages in publicly visible spaces. 

2.e) Testing external emergency plans 
External emergency plans are tested in the framework of exercises of the civil security services and assessed by the prefect of 
the respective Department (French administrative division) in accordance with the methodological guide on the management of 
general civil security and crisis management from 2009. A formal evaluation is required for every exercise, aimed at improving 
the emergency plans. Tests can take the shape of: 
General (full) exercises; and  
Thematic (part) exercises.  

- 
- 

Specific areas tested include warning of the public, especially for the case of rapid impacts from accidents, the sheltering of the 
population, cooperation and coordination with the operator, as well as the implementation of the road closures without 
necessarily interrupting traffic. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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FRANCE                                                                                                                                                                              

Question 3 – Information on safety measures 

3.a), 3.b), 3.c), 3.d) Information made actively available 
In France, the public and persons liable to be affected by a Seveso accident are informed about major-accidents hazards, 
possible consequences and safety measures mainly by means of public consultations and websites. 

Permits, inspection and monitoring reports, minutes of relevant meetings, and general information about establishments (including 
their address, risk classification, activity and substances used) are available at the dedicated national government websites 
“L’inspection des Installations Classées” and “Géorisques”. Furthermore, the website Prim.net hosts information on risks and 
technological risk prevention that has to be provided in every real-estate transaction.  

Permit requests for Seveso establishments (including impact assessments), external emergency and technological risk prevention 
plans are subject to public consultations. Public consultations are organised locally and may include for instance leaflets, “open 
days” and public debates. The relevant information is also published on regional or local government websites, such as those of 
the Regional Environment Departments, the Prefectures or the municipalities. 

3.e), 3.f), 3.g) Information kept permanently available (optional) 
Not answered. 

Question 4 - Inspections 

4.a) Systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards 
Upper-tier establishments are inspected at least once every 
year, lower-tier establishments at least once every three years. 

4.b) Programme of inspections available to public 
(optional) 
Information on the latest inspection for each establishment is 
available upon request from the responsible Regional 
Environment Department. 

4.c) Actions taken in the event of accidents, incidents and non-compliance 
French authorities can take a range of corrective actions, including issuing orders (for instance, order to comply, suspension 
orders, closing or suppression orders), imposing administrative fines, closing and sealing establishments and penalties to be 
paid until compliance is achieved. However, in 2012-2014, compliance orders were the main action taken (over a hundred cases 
per year), with consignation orders (13 cases, operators have to provide a deposit until compliance is achieved) and suspension 
orders (3 cases) having occurred occasionally during these three years. 

4.d), 4.e), 4.f)  Data on on-site inspections 
611 upper-tier establishments (96% of the total number of upper-tier establishments in France) were inspected annually. All 
remaining upper-tier establishments were inspected at least during the last reporting period in France.5 In addition to this, 528 
lower-tier establishments were inspected (98% of the total number of lower-tier establishments). 

5 The number of upper-tier establishments inspected during the last reporting period reported in this question exceeded 
the total number of upper-tier establishments reported in other questions above. Therefore, it is assumed that all upper-
tier establishments were inspected during the last reporting period. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
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FRANCE                                                                                                                                                                              

Question 5 – Domino effects 

The identification of domino effect risks is achieved mainly through inspections, based on the inspectors’ knowledge of the 
establishments and their environment. Communication between neighbouring establishments is required by a ministerial decree from 
2000, which specifies that any relevant information on the risks and hazards of major accidents has to be submitted by the operators 
to the neighbouring establishments and the authorities. This information is also included in the permits issued by the regional 
prefectures and in internal emergency plans. 

In addition, operators communicate through meetings and correspondence and in the framework of site monitoring committees and 
permanent secretariats for the prevention of Industrial pollution. Operators can cooperate on alert systems, intervention measures, 
informing the public and testing of external and internal emergency plans. 

Question 6 – Land-use planning 

Around industrial areas containing at least one upper-tier establishment, so-called plans for the prevention of technological risks are 
implemented. According to these plans, first every possible measure to minimise the risk posed from the establishment is 
considered. If vulnerable populations are still at risk and no other means are available to reduce that risk, the plans allow different 
zones to be defined in which a right of first refusal or right of abandonment can be established, new construction can be prohibited, 
buildings can be expropriated, or technical protective measures can be prescribed for the affected buildings. 398 plans for the 
prevention of technological risks have been elaborated to date, 84% of which are approved so far. 

For creating new upper-tier establishments, the French law provides a method of analysis and control of risks in which all zones 
potentially affected by the risk from the establishment, even if owned by the operator, are subject to the rules specified in the spatial 
plans in place. For lower-tier establishments, the French authorities inform the planning authorities of areas subject to technological 
risks in which new developments shall be prohibited or regulated, based on information from the establishments’ safety reports. 

Question 7 – Further information (optional) 

No response was provided to this optional question. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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11.  Member State summary sheet – Germany 

GERMANY                                                                                                                                                                         

Overview of Germany 

Germany provided a complete response. 

Number of establishments: 

Status of overall implementation: 

The German response 
indicates that the 
provisions of the Seveso II 
Directive are almost fully 
implemented with only 
minor aspects outstanding 

Main issues identified: 
No compliance issue has been identified, 
rather it was unclear why a share of upper tier 
establishments (14%) were not inspected 
during the reporting period. Note that Germany 
uses a systematic appraisal of major accident 
hazards to plan inspections, as such annual 
inspections are not required so this does not 
constitute a compliance issue but rather a 
potential issue that might need further checks. 
For an additional 83 upper-tier establishments 
external emergency plans had not been 
produced at the end of the reporting period. 

Overview of the information reported 

Question 1 - General information 

1.a) Significant changes made to competent authorities or their tasks  
None were reported by Germany. 

1.b) Establishments subject to Seveso  
29% of all Seveso establishments in the EU-28 
were located in Germany at the end of the 
reporting period, far more than any other Member 
State. The number of establishments in Germany 
increased rapidly from 2 405 in 2011 to 3 264 in 
2014, mostly due to a rapid increase of lower-tier 
establishments. 

As shown in the chart to the right, Germany 
exhibits much more establishments per capita and 
especially much more establishments per km2 
than the EU average. Hence, there is a 
particularly high density of Seveso establishments 
in Germany. 

.

1.c) Activities of Seveso establishments  
Germany has opted for presenting activities using the NACE codes classification rather than using the Seveso Plants Information 
Retrieval System (SPIRS) classification of activities. Therefore a presentation of activities by SPIRS codes and a comparison with 
the EU averages is not available. The NACE breakdown shows that the majority of establishments belong to the manufacturing 
sector and the energy supply sector (“Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Conditioning supply”). These two sectors each account for 
34% of all establishments. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
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GERMANY                                                                                                                                                                         

1.d) Seveso establishments covered by the IED (optional) 
Quantitative data about the share of Seveso establishments that are also covered by the IED are not available for Germany as a 
whole. However, the German response indicated that a large share of establishments is affected, especially of upper-tier 
establishments. 

This has practical consequences for the implementation of both Directives in these establishments, including permitting, public 
consultation, monitoring and inspection processes. These consequences vary significantly across Federal States, but include at 
least coordination and information exchange between the relevant authorities. Further cooperation, such as e.g. common 
inspections, depends on the potential synergies evaluated on a case-by-case basis and varies by Federal State. 

Question 2 - Emergency plans 

2.a) & 2.b) Upper-tier establishments without 
external emergency plan 
For 82 upper-tier establishments the German 
authorities decided that an external emergency 
plan was not needed based on strict criteria 
including for instance quantities, properties and 
state of the hazardous substances and location of 
the establishment. This corresponds to 7% of 
upper-tier establishments, which is higher than the 
4% EU average. 

For an additional 83 upper-tier establishments 
external emergency plans had not been produced 
at the end of the reporting period, which is a lower 
share of upper-tier establishments (7%) than the 
EU average (11%). 

Main reasons for plans not being produced include 
cases where establishments recently changed or 
were recently classified as upper-tier, where the 
production of the plans or the security report 
required previously are still in progress. 
Furthermore, it is possible to partially impose 
upper-tier requirements on establishments which 
would according to the Directive only have to be 
classified as lower-tier. Such establishments have 
been listed as upper tier but may not be required to 
produce an external emergency plan.  

2.c) Upper-tier establishments without external 
emergency plan tested  
At the end of the reporting period, for 16% of the 
upper-tier establishments in Germany the external 
emergency plans had not been tested (compared to 
27% across the EU). 

Main reasons include the 3-year deadline for 
testing not having passed yet because 
establishments have been changed during the 
reporting period, testing being delayed by changes 
to the establishments, or establishments being 
decommissioned but still counting as Seveso 
establishments. 

Note: Total 1141 upper-tier establishments 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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GERMANY                                                                                                                                                                         

2.d) Arrangements for providing information to the public: 

- 

- 

Arrangements vary regionally, but typically consist of some type of alarm signal that prompts citizens to behave in a 
certain way, e.g. to turn on the radio for further information. Sirens owned by the communities exist in some Federal 
States and can be used to broadcast messages such as “turn on radio”. In other states the civil protection agencies 
have their own warning systems available; and  
Possible means to provide information include: Radio and loudspeaker (on police and fire fighter vehicles) 
announcements, telephone hotlines, internet announcements, prepared print media, social media, warning apps for 
smart phones and SMS. 

2.e) Testing external emergency plans 
Testing of external emergency plans is planned and carried out usually by the counties (Landkreise und Kreisfreie Städte) 
based on the civil protection laws of the Federal States. The lower civil protection authorities are responsible for their 
evaluation and use (for instance) the following criteria: functioning of alarm channels; accessibility of accident sites; extent and 
intensity of safety measures of establishments; availability of relief units and materials; and information exchange across 
various stakeholders. External emergency plans are deemed appropriate if they comply with the respective civil protection laws 
and appear to realistically guarantee to mitigate damages from the relevant accident scenarios. Emergency plans are tested 
using: 
- 

Full exercise: Cooperation of all management levels and practical testing of emergency measures, rescuing, medical 
care, communication and reporting; 
Staff exercise: Cooperation of all management levels and manufacturers or managers of communication and 
reporting; assessment of required material, staff and other conditions; and  
Plan discussions and exercises: Analysis and evaluation of enacted or fictitious scenarios using e.g. maps or 
models, assessment of required material, staff and other conditions across relevant agencies and authorities. 

- 

- 

Question 3 – Information on safety measures 

3.a), 3.b), 3.c), 3.d) Information made actively available 
In Germany the operator is responsible for informing the public. However, the information is coordinated with the civil protection 
and other relevant authorities and can cover multiple Seveso establishments at once. The following shows a statistical breakdown 
of the means that have been used: 

- 
- 
- 
- 
- 

Operator's leaflets: 82%; 
Authorities' leaflets: 3%; 
Flyers: 7%; 
Direct mail to citizens, public meetings: 10%; and  
Internet, operator‘s homepage, placards/bulletins, newspaper ads, official register, public display: 3%. 

In addition to the above, sometimes announcements via local radio stations and/or “open days” in Seveso establishments are 
used. Hospitals, medical practices, schools and kindergartens are targeted specifically for information and sometimes information 
booths are placed in public places on weekends. Furthermore, safety reports can be viewed in the establishments. In one Federal 
State, information is distributed via a comprehensive brochure for all establishments in the state. 

In 802 upper-tier establishments (over 70% of total number of upper-tier establishments in Germany, compared to 76% EU-wide) 
information has been made actively available to the public at least once during the reporting period (2010-2014). Note that this is 
lower than the sum of percentages listed in the statistical breakdown of the means of information above, because usually the 
information is provided in more than one way. Main reasons for information to not have been made actively available include no 
public to be informed being present, even in the wider vicinity of the establishment; the 5-year deadline for informing not having 
passed yet because establishments have been changed during the reporting period; and establishments that are only partially 
classified as upper tier, as mentioned under question 2.a) and 2.b). 

Content, quality and distribution of the information is ensured through internal and external security audits, as part of the on-site 
inspections or assessment of the security report. Furthermore, as the information is coordinated with the relevant authorities, it is 
also given final approval by the authorities prior to publication. 

3.e), 3.f), 3.g) Information kept permanently available (optional) 
Not answered. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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GERMANY                                                                                                                                                                         

Question 4 - Inspections 

4.a) Systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards 
Inspection schedules are based on systematic appraisal based 
mainly on the following criteria: 

- 

- 
- 

Establishment-related criteria such as quantity and 
type of hazardous substances, type and complexity of 
the process and the handling of hazardous 
substances, accident-relevant operating parameters, 
safety-related standard of Seveso operation and 
possibility of detection of releases; 
Sensitivity of the local environment; and  
Operator-related criteria such as quality and 
organisation of self-monitoring, substantiated 
complaints, compliance history as well as results and 
evaluation of past inspections and EMAS certification. 

4.b) Programme of inspections available to public 
(optional) 
The inspection programmes and reports have not been 
published but are accessible to the public upon request 
subject to the specifications of the Environmental Information 
Act. 

4.c) Actions taken in the event of accidents, incidents and non-compliance 
There is a high degree of cooperation between operators and authorities.  Ordering follow-up actions from operators when any 
deficiencies are detected is the only action that has been taken. However, the law provides a range of more severe actions that 
can be taken by authorities, including fines, prohibitions, withdrawal of permits, imprisonment, withdrawal of EMAS certification 
and others.  

4.d), 4.e), 4.f)  Data on on-site inspections 
422 upper-tier establishments (37% of the total number of upper-tier establishments) were inspected annually. Another 559 (49%) 
were inspected at least during the last reporting period, while the remaining upper-tier establishments were not inspected at all 
during 2012-2014. Note that Germany applies systematic appraisal to determine inspection schedules (see 4.a) and as such it is 
it is not absolutely required to inspect all establishments annually. Nevertheless, the numbers of inspections of upper-tier 
establishments appear relatively low. In addition to this, 1436 lower-tier establishments were inspected (68% of the total number 
of lower-tier establishments).   

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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GERMANY                                                                                                                                                                         

Question 5 – Domino effects 

Groups of establishments posing a risk of domino effects are identified by the relevant authorities in two steps in Germany: 

1. All upper-tier establishments not further than 500m away or lower-tier establishments 200m away from any installations or 
activities of another establishment, as well as establishments where there are any specific indications of a risk of domino effects are 
taken forward for step 2. 

2. On a case-by-case basis, additional information is analysed such as location and environment of the establishment, specific risks 
from activities and installations of the establishment and the hazardous substances present. 

When a risk of domino effects is identified, safety concepts, safety management systems, safety reports and internal emergency 
plans are exchanged between the affected establishments to establish a common risk management approach. Regular safety 
meetings and joint exercises are held. The exchange of information is coordinated by the major accidents officers of the 
establishments, or a common officer is established. Some establishments prepare a common emergency plan or coordinate their 
plans. Some plans also have a common alarm centre, or in the case of industrial areas with a high density of establishments working 
groups on factory manager level. Compliance is checked and supported by the relevant authorities in inspections. 

Question 6 – Land-use planning 

The German Imission Act contains a segregation principle, according to which spatial planning zones dedicated primarily to living 
and other areas in particular need of protection are as much as possible to be segregated from areas at risk of being affected by 
major accidents. Furthermore guidelines for the implementation of this segregation in both spatial planning and permitting have been 
published in 2010 and updated regularly since. The emission authorities are involved in any spatial planning or relevant construction 
projects and they determine the required distance between zones or construction projects and establishments based on the above 
guidance and inform the construction permitting and planning authorities. 

Question 7 – Further information (optional) 

7.a) Lessons learned from accidents and incidents 
Due to lessons learned, Germany has introduced a third category of reportable incidents in addition to accidents and incidents as 
defined under Seveso II, in order to include serious disturbances of normal operations that have not yet led to serious accident in 
accident prevention. The Central Reporting and Evaluation Office for Accidents and Incidents of the German Federal Environment 
Agency centrally registers all reported incidents and distributes relevant information to stakeholders and the general public. It 
analyses the data and provides suggestions for improving safety. 

The Environment Agency also organises a yearly exchange of experiences among authorities and jointly with the Federal States 
has initiated a research project on methods of incident reporting and analysis. 

The German government also has an Advisory Board on Plant Safety which includes a wide range of relevant stakeholders and 
two committees regularly discussing reported incidents and experiences to provide suggestions for improvement of safety. 

7.b) IT tools used for monitoring the implementation and data sharing 
Information is available to the general public from the Central Reporting and Evaluation Office for Accidents and Incidents as well 
as a database about the state of safety technology (DoSiS), via the Environment Agency’s “InfoSiS” portal 
(http://www.infosis.uba.de/). 

Furthermore, various Federal States, sometimes jointly, have developed software systems to monitor the implementation of the 
Major Accidents Ordinance (which implements the Seveso II Directive) and for the sharing of data between the authorities 
concerned. 

7.c) Seveso like provisions applied to other installations and activities (e.g. pipelines, ports, marshalling yards, offshore)  
No information was provided. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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12.  Member State summary sheet – Greece 

GREECE                                                                                                                                                                           

Overview of Greece 

Number of establishments: 

Greece provided a partially incomplete response with 
the following gaps observed: 

Criteria used for considering that an external 
emergency plan is adequate and that an external 
emergency plan has been tested. 

Number of establishments for which information has 
been made available to the public and how the 
distribution of information is monitored. 

Actions taken against operators in the event of 
accidents, incidents and non-compliance. 

Lack of clarity on the frequency of inspections in 
upper-tier establishments. 

How the objectives of Article 12 on Land-Use 
Planning have been ensured nation-wide. 

Status of overall implementation: 

The Greek response 
indicates that the 
provisions of the Seveso 
II Directive are not fully 
implemented. 

Main issues identified: 

For a large number of upper-tier establishments, 
external emergency plans have not yet been 
produced. 

A large number of external emergency plans are 
reported as not having been tested over the last 3 
years. 

A large number of upper-tier establishments were not 
inspected annually. 

Further compliance issues cannot be ruled out due to 
the incompleteness of the response. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Overview of the information reported 

Question 1 - General information 

1.a) Significant changes made to competent authorities or their tasks  
None were reported by Greece. 

1.b) Establishments subject to Seveso  
There were 193 Seveso establishments in Greece 
at the end of 2014, significantly less than in 2011 
(223). This is due to a decreasing number of 
lower-tier establishments. 

As shown in the chart to the right, Greece exhibits 
fewer establishments per capita and fewer 
establishments per km2 than the EU average. 

1.c) Activities of Seveso establishments  
The activities with the highest number of establishments at the end of the reporting period in Greece were: 

- 
- 

Fuel storage (28% of total number of establishments); and  
LPG storage (18%).  

.

Across the rest of the EU, fuel storage is also the third most common activity (11% of all establishments), while LPG storage 
represents 4% of EU establishments. 

Other common activities in Greece include: 

- 
- 

Production, destruction and storage of explosives (10%); and  
Power generation (9%). 

1.d) Seveso establishments covered by the IED (optional) 
Greece has not answered this optional question. 

Question 2 - Emergency plans 

2.a) & 2.b) Upper-tier establishments without 
external emergency plan 
The Greek authorities decided that an external 
emergency plan was needed for all upper-tier 
establishments in Greece.  
However, for 26 upper-tier establishments (31% of 
the total number of upper-tier establishments) the 
plans have not yet been produced. The Greek 
response did not indicate the reason. 

Note: Total 83 upper-tier establishments 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
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2.c) Upper-tier establishments without external 
emergency plan tested  
There are 52 upper-tier establishments (63% of the 
total number of upper-tier establishments) that have 
had an external emergency plan tested over the last 
three years. The Greek response did not indicate 
the reason. 

2.d) Arrangements for providing information to the public: 

- 

Sirens are available to alert the public in case of a major accident. These are tested by the General Secretariat of Civil 
Protection once a year; and  

-  Main response measures are referred to in many electronic and hard copy publications of the General Secretariat of 

Civil Protection authority, which have not been specified further in the response. 

2.e) Testing external emergency plans 
There are specific accident scenarios (fully described in the existing Safety Report) taken into consideration for every test. 
Authorities participating in each test are: the local fire brigade, ambulances, the local hospitals, police, as well as the regional and 
municipal authorities. The nature of the tests has not been further specified in the response. 

Question 3 – Information on safety measures 

3.a), 3.b), 3.c), 3.d) Information made actively available 
Regional Civil Protection Authorities request short reports (2-3 pages) from operators, containing all relevant information for the 
public according the Seveso II Directive. This information is then distributed to all Regional and Municipal Councils to distribute it 
to citizens in the neighbourhood. A statistical breakdown of the means used is shown in the following: 

- 

- 

Leaflets and flyers by the authorities in the envelopes with electricity bills to houses in the neighbouring area of 
Seveso establishments: 100%; and  
Information given to students in all elementary and high schools (in each class) in the area of Seveso establishments: 
100%.  

This only refers to establishments for which information has been made available at least once during the reporting period. No 
information was provided in the Greek response on the number of establishments for which information has been made 
available and how the distribution of information is monitored. 

Additionally one Regional Civil Protection Authority distributed a publication of the Ministry of Environment providing guidance 
on what to do in case of an industrial emergency situation to the citizens living in the neighbourhood of a petroleum refinery. 

3.e), 3.f), 3.g) Information kept permanently available (optional) 
Not answered. 

Question 4 - Inspections 

4.a) Systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards 
In Greece, the programme of inspections is not based upon a 
systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards, but on a yearly 
basis. 

4.b) Programme of inspections available to public 
(optional) 
So far, no information has been given to the public from the 
programme of inspections and from the inspection reports. 

4.c) Actions taken in the event of accidents, incidents and non-compliance 
During the 2012-2014 period there was not any major industrial accident in Greece, so no actions had to be taken in response. 
No information on what the possible actions in the event of accidents would be, or on actions in the event of other incidents and 
non-compliance, was provided by the Greek response. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
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4.d), 4.e), 4.f)  Data on on-site inspections 
The Greek response is inconsistent with regards to the frequency of inspections in upper-tier establishments. However, it appears 
that 55 inspections in upper-tier establishments have been carried out between 2012 and 2014. 13 lower-tier establishments were 
inspected in the same timeframe. 

Question 5 – Domino effects 

To determine groups of establishments at risk of domino effects, in the accident scenarios for each establishment three protection 
zones and one domino zone in the form of concentric circles are estimated and drawn on a map of the establishment and its 
neighbourhood. 

The permitting authority informs all the neighbouring establishments about the results of the Safety Report by sending copies of the 
results including the domino zones of all accident scenarios, in order to allow for the consideration of all existing hazards of the 
specific establishment. 

Question 6 – Land-use planning 

A pilot project called "Industrial Risk and Planning - Spatial Intervention" funded by the Ministry of Environment developed a software 
system to assist decision-making in land use planning associated with the risk of Seveso establishments. The system is based on a 
Geographic Information System (GIS) and a computational module incorporating the results of multi-criteria analysis and calculating 
risk and vulnerability indicators where appropriate. 

The pilot project is being implemented in a selected region of Western Thessaloniki where many Seveso establishments (petroleum 
refinery, petrochemicals, oil and gas storage establishments, fertiliser and pesticides) are very near to densely populated areas. 
The Greek response has not indicated how preventing major accidents and limiting the consequences of such accidents are taken 
into account in their land-use and/or other relevant policies. 

Question 7 – Further information (optional) 

7.a) Lessons learned from accidents and incidents 
No information was provided. 

7.b) IT tools used for monitoring the implementation and data sharing 
An application called "e-per" has been uploaded on the web site of the Ministry of Environment. All upper and lower-tier Seveso 
establishments in Greece are presented on a Geographic Information System (GIS). 
There is also an application with all existing information about all the establishments (addresses, contact information, dangerous 
substances, Seveso compliance issues, Safety Report, External Emergency Plan, public information, inspections, evaluation of 
the Safety Reports, Notifications, etc.). 

7.c) Seveso like provisions applied to other installations and activities (e.g. pipelines, ports, marshalling yards, offshore)  
No information was provided. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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13.  Member State summary sheet - Hungary 

HUNGARY                                                                                                                                                                           

Number of establishments: 

Overview of Hungary 

Overall, Hungary provided a complete 
response 

Status of overall implementation: 

Hungary’s response 
indicates that the 
provisions of the Seveso 
II Directive are almost 
fully implemented. 

Main issues identified: 
Five establishments have failed to adopt an 
external emergency plan as per Article 11.1 

Overview of the information reported 

Question 1 - General information 

1.a) Significant changes made to competent authorities or their tasks  
During the reporting period, the two Competent Authorities that performed implementation and enforcement duties in Hungary 
changed. The inspection duties that used to be carried out by a specialised agency were integrated into the other Competent 
Authority (National DG for Disaster Management of the Ministry of Interior). Then, the duties of the latter were transferred to the 
Regional Governments, in order to simplify procedures and make them more efficient.  

1.b) Establishments subject to Seveso  
There were 239 Seveso establishments in 
Hungary at the end of 2014, a significant increase 
from 169 in 2011. This is due to an increase in the 
numbers of both lower and upper-tier 
establishments. 

As shown in the chart to the right, Hungary now 
exhibits more establishments per capita and 
slightly more establishments per km2 than the EU 
average. 

1.c) Activities of Seveso establishments  
At the end of the reporting period, the most common activities among the establishments covered by the Seveso II Directive in 
Hungary were: 

-  Wholesale and retail (13%); 
- 
- 

Production and storage of fertilisers (11%); and  
Fuel storage (8%).  

Whereas fuel storage and wholesale and retail are relatively common (11% and 9% of the Seveso establishments of the EU, 
respectively), production and storage of fertilisers only accounts for 3% of the establishments covered by the Seveso II Directive. 
Hungary has the second highest number of establishments in this category.   

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
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HUNGARY                                                                                                                                                                           

1.d) Seveso establishments covered by the IED (optional) 
Hungary has not replied to this optional question.  

Question 2 - Emergency plans 

2.a) & 2.b) Upper-tier establishments without 
external emergency plan 
For 13 upper-tier establishments it was decided that 
an external emergency plan was not needed. In 
addition, 5 upper-tier establishments failed to 
produce an external emergency plan as required by 
Article 11.1.  

Hungary has reported that these were under review 
at the end of the reporting period.  

Note: Total 105 upper-tier establishments 

2.c) Upper-tier establishments without external 
emergency plan tested  
The only upper-tier establishments without external 
emergency plan tested were those mentioned in 2.a) 
and 2.b) above. Therefore, all the plans that have 
been drafted have been tested in Hungary.  

2.d) Arrangements for providing information to the public: 

-  Monitoring and public alert and information system (the ‘MoLaRi system’) in the vicinity of establishments; and  
National risk map, safety region website, municipality website, regional emergency broadcasters, Twitter.  
- 

2.e) Testing external emergency plans 
In Hungary, external emergency plans are tested as follows: 

- 
- 

Partial practical exercises every year; and  
Full tests every three years.  

The practical exercises are preceded by training. The plans are considered adequate if the actions envisaged are suitable for 
reducing the harmful effects identified in the safety report. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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HUNGARY                                                                                                                                                                           

Question 3 – Information on safety measures 

3.a), 3.b), 3.c), 3.d) Information made actively available 
According to Hungary, the information for all upper-tier establishments has to be made available during the 5-year period stated 
in question 3b (2010-2014). Competent Authorities are in charge of providing information on Seveso establishments in Hungary. 
“Active” provision of information includes leaflets prepared by the Competent Authority and the mayors of the municipalities 
likely to be affected. In the case of upper-tier establishments, the publication of the leaflet is the responsibility of the mayors of 
these municipalities. The leaflet has to be updated with modifications at least within 3 years of these modifications and in any 
case every 5 years. “Passive” information is provided in the form of public notices when the safety reports are drafted. 
Competent Authorities must make the report available to any interested party within 21 days of publication of the notice. The 
information provided to the public is also available online on the websites of each regional authority. Also, brochures are 
disseminated to each household in the areas potentially endangered by upper-tier establishments. Hungary has also described 
the MoLaRi (abbreviation of monitoring and public alert and information system, in Hungarian) alert system, which can warn up 
to 250,000 people immediately of a major accident. The National Competent Authority is also in charge of checking that this 
information is provided. 

3.e), 3.f), 3.g) Information kept permanently available (optional) 
Hungary has not provided this optional information.  

Question 4 - Inspections 

4.a) Systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards 
The length and frequency of inspections are not based on a 
systematic appraisal, but are pre-defined. Lower-tier 
establishments are inspected every two years and upper-tier 
establishments at least annually.  

4.b) Programme of inspections available to public 
(optional) 
Hungary has not provided this information. 

4.c) Actions taken in the event of accidents, incidents and non-compliance 
Hungary has provided a very detailed breakdown of the actions taken annually during the reporting period. These were: 
restricting a hazardous activity (8 establishments during the period 2012-2014), procedural fines (1), disaster management fines 
(12), removal and disposal of dangerous substances (1), orders to revise the safety report (12).  

4.d), 4.e), 4.f)  Data on on-site inspections 
In Hungary, all (105 at the end of 2014) upper-tier establishments should be inspected annually. During the last reporting period, 
there were 98 annual inspections (93%). Hungary has clarified that the number of these establishments fluctuates every year 
and that new upper-tier establishments are not included in the statistics. As for lower-tier establishments, there were 176 
inspections during the reporting period (55 in 2012, 50 in 2013 and 71 in 2014). However, it is not clear whether some lower-tier 
establishments were inspected more than once. Hungarian authorities reiterated (4a) that the frequency of inspections for lower-
tier establishments is every 2 years.  

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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HUNGARY                                                                                                                                                                           

Question 5 – Domino effects 

Establishments relevant for consideration of domino effects are designated by the competent authority, following the information 
available in the safety reports, which have to designate domino effects using the “Belgian/Walloon” method*. These establishments 
are required to exchange information on the effects of accidents and information on emergency plans. If they decide not to 
cooperate, Competent Authorities can enforce this requirement by issuing an order.  

“*”=‘Methodology, guidelines and technical appendices to the study of domino effects’, in: C. Delvosalle, F. Benjelloun, C. Fiévez, 
Ministère Fédéral de L’emploi et du travail (Belgique), Administration de la sécurité du travail, Inspection technique, CRC/WPS/07/97 

Question 6 – Land-use planning 

The land-use planning provisions of the Directive are implemented based on the general regulations on urban planning and in 
accordance with the specific rules laid down in the legislation implementing it. Under the Hungarian legislation, in order to limit the 
consequences of major accidents, on the basis of the safety report or the safety analysis, the authority demarcates a danger zone 
around the establishment (the operator may propose what that zone should be). 

Question 7 – Further information (optional) 

7.a) Lessons learned from accidents and incidents 
Hungary did not answer this question. 

7.b) IT tools used for monitoring the implementation and data sharing 
Hungary did not answer this question.  

7.c) Seveso like provisions applied to other installations and activities (e.g. pipelines, ports, marshalling yards, 
offshore)  
During the last reporting period, Hungary extended the coverage of the legislation implementing Seveso to establishments under 
the threshold (those with high priority facilities or those at or “above a quarter of the minimum threshold”). These have provisions 
that are less strict but may be obliged by authorities to prepare certain documents or implement certain measures. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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14.  Member State summary sheet - Ireland 

IRELAND                                                                                                                                                                             

Overview of Ireland  

Ireland provided a complete response. 

Number of establishments: 

Status of overall implementation: 

Ireland’s response 
indicates that the 
provisions of the Seveso 
II Directive are fully 
implemented. 

Main issues identified: 
None 

Overview of the information reported 

Question 1 - General information 

1.a) Significant changes made to competent authorities or their tasks  
None were reported by Ireland. 

1.b) Establishments subject to Seveso  
There were 96 Seveso establishments in Ireland 
at the end of 2014, up from 85 in 2011. This is 
due to an increasing number of upper-tier 
establishments. 

As shown in the chart to the right, Ireland exhibits 
slightly fewer establishments per capita and 
much fewer establishments per km2 than the EU 
average. 

1.c) Activities of Seveso establishments  
According to the Irish implementation report, the most common categories were: 

- 
- 
- 

Fuel storage (19%); 
Production of pharmaceuticals (18%); and  
Power generation (11%).  

Whereas fuel storage is a common activity at EU level (11% of all establishments), the other two activities are relatively 
uncommon (1% and 5%, respectively). In the case of production of pharmaceuticals, Ireland is the country with the highest 
number of establishments in this category in the EU.  

1.d) Seveso establishments covered by the IED (optional) 
Ireland reported that 42 establishments were also covered by the IED. As the Competent Authorities responsible for the 
implementation and enforcement of Seveso are different to those responsible for the IED, there is not reported to be any impact 
of this. No further information has been provided by Ireland. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
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IRELAND                                                                                                                                                                             

Question 2 - Emergency plans 

2.a) & 2.b) Upper-tier establishments 
without external emergency plan 
All upper tier establishments were required to 
adopt an external emergency plan. Competent 
Authorities reported that one upper-tier 
establishment did not have a plan drafted as 
required. It is stated that a draft was being 
prepared at the time of completion of the 
implementation report. 

2.c) Upper-tier establishments without 
external emergency plan tested  
Ireland stated that all plans have been tested 
except in one case where the upper-tier 
establishment has applied for a change of 
category (to lower-tier). This seems to be a 
different establishment than the one mentioned 
in 2.b) above. As a result, the external 
emergency plans of 46 out of 48 
establishments were tested during the reporting 
period. 

Note: Total 48 upper-tier establishments 

2.d) Arrangements for providing information to the public: 

- 
- 
- 

Siren system; 
Leaflets within designated areas, consultation when the external emergency plans are drafted; and  
Consultation of the off-site arrangements when external emergency plans are drafted.  

2.e) Testing external emergency plans 
External emergency plans are tested as follows: 

Desk based exercises when the external emergency plans are drafted and as part of the standard tests; 

- 
-  Multidisciplinary field exercises; and  
- 

Exercises conducted at the establishment by the disaster management coordinating teams.  

Inspectors and Competent Authorities are sometimes invited to the tests. Plans are considered adequate when they comply with 
the criteria set out in the government publication “A Framework for Major Emergency Management”6 

6 http://www.mem.ie/guidancedocuments/a%20guide%20to%20seveso%20obligations.pdf  

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
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IRELAND                                                                                                                                                                             

Question 3 – Information on safety measures 

3.a), 3.b), 3.c), 3.d) Information made actively available 
In Ireland, operators inform the persons liable to be affected directly, by leaflet. The Competent Authority carries out ‘spot 
checks’ with the potentially affected public to confirm that this information has been received. The information content of the 
leaflet is assessed as part of the evaluation of the safety report and adoption of the external emergency plan, and following 
confirmation that the local competent authorities are satisfied with the contents. Irish authorities indicated that this information is 
actively available for those establishments with public within their area of potential influence (40 out of 48, 83%).  

3.e), 3.f), 3.g) Information kept permanently available (optional) 
Ireland indicated that the information is not kept permanently available for any establishment.  

Question 4 - Inspections 

4.a) Systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards 
Ireland aims at inspecting all upper-tier establishments once a 
year and all lower-tier establishments once every two years. 
When this is not possible, they follow a systematic appraisal 
based on the nature of the hazard, surroundings of the 
establishments and the quality of the safety management 
system in place.  

4.b) Programme of inspections available to public 
(optional) 
Ireland has not answered this question.  

4.c) Actions taken in the event of accidents, incidents and non-compliance 
Ireland reports the use of written advice (321 cases), notices imposing requirements or restrictions (17 cases), prohibitions (5 
cases) and prosecutions (5 cases). Prosecutions may involve fines up to €3,000 and/or 12 months imprisonment.  

4.d), 4.e), 4.f)  Data on on-site inspections 
47 out of 48 upper-tier establishments were inspected annually, the remaining one at least once during the reporting period. 
Additionally, all lower-tier establishments were inspected at least once over the 3-year reporting period.  

Question 5 – Domino effects 

Establishments relevant for domino effects were identified based on an assessment by the Competent Authorities of the information 
contained in the notification and the safety report and feedback from inspectors. Inspectors ensured appropriate information was 
exchanged between operators and encouraged operators to cooperate in informing the public and local competent authorities. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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IRELAND                                                                                                                                                                             

Question 6 – Land-use planning 

In Ireland, Competent Authorities provide technical advice to planning authorities on request. These requests are compulsory within 
the “consultation distance” i.e. safety distances from the establishments (or the potential location of new establishments), called. The 
advice can be generic or specific. Generic advice is based on a 3-zone risk-based system7. A total of 696 requests for technical 
advice have been reported by Ireland during the 2012-2014 period.  

Question 7 – Further information (optional) 

7.a) Lessons learned from accidents and incidents 
Ireland has not responded to this question. 

7.b) IT tools used for monitoring the implementation and data sharing 
Ireland has not responded to this question. 

7.c) Seveso like provisions applied to other installations and activities (e.g. pipelines, ports, marshalling yards, 
offshore)  
Ireland has not responded to this question. 

7 A detailed description is available in: 
http://www.hsa.ie/eng/Your_Industry/Chemicals/Control_of_Major_Accident_Hazards/Approach_to_LUP_under_Comah_
Regs.pdf  

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
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15.  Member State summary sheet - Italy 

ITALY                                                                                                                                                                                  

Overview of Italy 

Overall, Italy provided a complete response. 

Number of establishments: 

Status of overall implementation: 

Italy’s response indicates 
that most of the 
provisions of the Seveso 
II Directive have been 
implemented but issues 
with some key aspects of 
the Directive are 
noticeable 

Main issues identified: 
Low level of testing of external emergency 
plans. 

Low level of inspections. Only 20% of the 
upper-tier establishments were inspected 
during the whole period and none were 
inspected once a year. 

Overview of the information reported 

Question 1 - General information 

1.a) Significant changes made to competent authorities or their tasks  
None were reported by Italy. 

1.b) Establishments subject to Seveso  
Italy is the Member State with the third highest 
number of Seveso establishments after 
Germany and France, with almost 10% of the 
Seveso establishments in the EU. There were 
1112 Seveso establishments in Italy at the end 
of 2014, a marginal increase from 1101 in 
2011. While the number of lower-tier 
establishments has decreased during that 
period, upper-tier establishments have 
increased in numbers. 

As shown in the chart to the right, Italy exhibits 
fewer establishments per capita but 
significantly more establishments per km2 than 
the EU average. 

1.c) Activities of Seveso establishments  
The most common activities in Italy are: 

LNG production, bottling and distribution (24% of the establishments); 

- 
-  General chemicals (24%); and  
- 

Processing of metals with electrolytic or chemical processes (11%). 

Italy is the Member State with the highest number of Seveso establishments in these three activities. Two of them are relatively 
common (general chemicals with 12% of all Seveso establishments in Europe and LNG production, bottling and distribution with 
8%), whereas “processing of metals with electrolytic or chemical processes” accounts for 3% of EU establishments (above half of 
them are located in Italy).   

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
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ITALY                                                                                                                                                                                  

1.d) Seveso establishments covered by the IED (optional) 
Italy has not provided an answer to this optional question. 

Question 2 - Emergency plans 

2.a) & 2.b) Upper-tier establishments without 
external emergency plan 
For 4 upper-tier establishments the Italian authorities 
decided that an external emergency plan was not 
needed considering that major accidents with effects 
outside the boundary of the establishments were not 
reasonable foreseen. Also, 66 establishments’ 
external emergency plans were not drafted as 
required.  

Note: Total 567 upper-tier establishments 

2.c) Upper-tier establishments without external 
emergency plan tested  
At the end of the reporting period, 302 
establishments’ external emergency plans had not 
been tested as required. That is more than half of the 
total number of upper-tier establishments in Italy. 
Furthermore, it represents a significant proportion 
(above a fifth) of the establishments without an 
external emergency plan in the EU. Italy has a 
significantly weaker testing system compared to the 
average proportion of upper-tier establishments 
without an external emergency plan tested at EU 
level (25%), Italian authorities stated that 69 more 
cases were under review for verification. 
Furthermore, Italy indicated that a working group 
involving public authorities had been tasked with 
elaborating criteria and tools to support Competent 
Authorities with performing the tests on the external 
emergency plans. 

2.d) Arrangements for providing information to the public: 

- 
- 

- 

Sirens in the upper-tier establishments; 
Alert via TV, radio, SMS, email, social media. Where relevant, local amateur radio associations are also warned and 
asked to cooperate; and  
Communication from operator to the Fire Brigade, communication from the Mayors of the potentially affected 
municipalities to the population, communication of the accident to the central Governments. These are done through the 
channels described above (TV, radio, SMS, etc.). 

2.e) Testing external emergency plans 
External emergency plans are tested as follows: 

- 
- 
- 
- 

‘Joint’ trials (on-site, with the involvement of operational staff but not the general public); 
‘Full-scale’ trials (on-site, with the involvement of operational staff and the general public); 
‘Command-post’ trials (without the involvement of staff, facilities and the general public); and  
Trials to check the audibility of alarm systems (with the involvement of staff, civil protection officials and the general 
public). 

External emergency plans must include the following: analysis of land vulnerability, the outline of the intervention model, the 
location and functioning of alarm systems and availability of information to the public. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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ITALY                                                                                                                                                                                  

Question 3 – Information on safety measures 

3.a), 3.b), 3.c), 3.d) Information made actively available 
In Italy, municipalities are in charge of distributing information on hazards of Seveso establishments to the public and workers 
potentially affected. There are guidelines with criteria on the most appropriate way of disseminating this information, but the 
ultimate decision is made by the Mayor. This information is submitted to the provincial Government for updating the external 
emergency plans, at least once every 5 years. Normally, the forms of communication are brochures, posters and manuals, and in 
some cases through dedicated web pages, organisation of public meetings or the use of public information spaces and local radio 
or television channels. The costs are borne by municipalities, with collaboration from operators in some cases. Italy stated that 
this is done for all (567) upper-tier establishments in the country. The statistical breakdown provided by Italy is as follows: 

“Active way” 
40% (gatherings and meetings or completing a 
questionnaire distributed by municipalities) 

“Passive way” 
60% (brochures, posters and manuals, webpages, flyers) 

Municipalities (100%) 

As municipalities are in charge of providing this information, the Government is responsible for making sure that this is actually the 
case. Italy mentions a survey in which the Government assessed this alongside other issues (such as the active/passive 
communication split mentioned above).  

3.e), 3.f), 3.g) Information kept permanently available (optional) 
Italy did not answer these optional questions.   

Question 4 - Inspections 

4.a) Systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards 
Italy reported that their inspection system is not based on a 
systematic appraisal. Italy has not specified the timescales of 
their inspection system but judging by their response to other 
questions, less than half of the upper-tier and lower-tier 
establishments were inspected during the 3-year period. 

4.b) Programme of inspections available to public 
(optional) 
Italy has not provided this information 

4.c) Actions taken in the event of accidents, incidents and non-compliance 
Italy took action on 90 cases, 53 of which were related to upper-tier establishments and the rest to lower-tier establishments. In 
the case of upper-tier, most of the actions were orders imposing technical upgrades or changing procedures within a specific 
deadline. In four cases, there were formal notices (2 of which resulted in partial restrictions and one in a full suspension of 
activities). As for lower-tier, the non-compliances were deemed as not critical. Italy has provided some examples to explain this. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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ITALY                                                                                                                                                                                  

4.d), 4.e), 4.f)  Data on on-site inspections 
Italy reported that none of the upper-tier establishments is inspected once a year. Around 20% of the upper-tier establishments 
and 49% of the lower-tier establishments were inspected during the 3-year period. This is particularly low, especially considering 
that Italy is the Member State with the third highest number of Seveso establishments. Italy indicated that the low number of 
inspections was caused by organisational and financial constraints. Italy indicated that its national legislation was amended in 
order to address this issue in the future reporting period (i.e. under Seveso III) by redrafting the competence for inspection and by 
providing financing for the inspections through tariffs paid by the operators. 

Question 5 – Domino effects 

The Ministry of Environment identifies groups of establishments which are potentially subject to “domino effects” using the 
information provided by the Competent Authorities in each region. These Regional Authorities have the opportunity of assessing this 
in two instances: evaluation of safety reports (every 5 years), or for assessments related to changes at establishments that are 
deemed to increase the level of risk. The Ministry ensures that Regional Competent Authorities have all the necessary information to 
enforce measures to prevent domino effects in these establishments, such as facilitating information exchange, drafting contingency 
plans or conducting integrated safety studies.  

Question 6 – Land-use planning 

Italy has specific legislation which requires all land use planning to take into account the risk associated with establishments handling 
dangerous substances. Among other measures, it defines the safety distances between these establishments and residential areas. 
A risk assessment has to be undertaken and operators are not given authorisation to build and operate the site if they do not comply 
with all the requirements. The legislation also identifies the Competent Authorities and the role of the central, regional, province and 
local Governments. The Italian Government stated that it conducted a survey to identify land-use planning issues related to Seveso 
establishments and implemented legislative measures following the findings of the survey. 

Question 7 – Further information (optional) 

No response was provided to this optional question. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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16.  Member State summary sheet - Latvia 

LATVIA                                                                                                                                                                               

Overview of Latvia 

Latvia provided an almost complete response 
with a few minor gaps. 

Number of establishments: 

Status of overall implementation: 

According to their 
response, Latvia has fully 
implemented the 
provisions of the Seveso 
II Directive.  

Main issues identified: 
None 

Overview of the information reported 

Question 1 - General information 

1.a) Significant changes made to competent authorities or their tasks  
None were reported by Latvia. 

1.b) Establishments subject to Seveso  
There were 63 Seveso establishments in Latvia 
at the end of 2014, the same number as in 
2011. 

As shown in the chart to the right, Latvia 
exhibits more establishments per capita but 
much fewer establishments per km2 than the 
EU average. 

1.c) Activities of Seveso establishments  
The most common activities in Latvia are: 
Fuel storage (51%); 
LPG storage (13%); and  
Production and storage of fertilisers (8%).  

- 
- 
- 

Whereas fuel storage is one of the most common activities at EU level (11%), LPG storage and storage and fertilisers are 
infrequent (4% and 3%, respectively). Latvia is not a significant contributor to any of the categories.   

1.d) Seveso establishments covered by the IED (optional) 
Latvia did not reply to this optional question.  

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
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LATVIA                                                                                                                                                                               

Question 2 - Emergency plans 

2.a) & 2.b) Upper-tier establishments without 
external emergency plan 
Latvia indicated that all upper-tier establishments 
have an external emergency plan. 

Note: Total 29 upper-tier establishments 

2.c) Upper-tier establishments without external 
emergency plan tested  
At the end of the reporting period, Latvian competent 
authorities had tested the external emergency plans 
of all establishments except one. Latvia stated that 
the establishment was not tested due to the structural 
changes occurring in it during the 2012-2014 period. 
That establishment was tested in 2011 and 2015.  

2.d) Arrangements for providing information to the public: 

- 

- 

Civil alert and notification system tested twice a year (the implementation report does not provide a description of this 
system, only that it is regulated by Cabinet Regulation No 530 of 7 August 2007/ The text implies that sirens are one of 
the components but no additional detail was provided); and  
Public consultation on the external plans; information on what the public has to do in case of alert; publication of 
external emergency plans on the local authority webpage.  

2.e) Testing external emergency plans 

- 

Practical civil protection exercises in compliance with the legislation.  

The criteria for evaluating the exercises are described in Annex 3 of Cabinet Regulation No 772 of 22 September 2008 on types 
of civil protection exercises and the procedures for organising them. However, the implementation report does not enumerate or 
describe the actual criteria.  

Question 3 – Information on safety measures 

3.a), 3.b), 3.c), 3.d) Information made actively available 
Operators prepare and distribute publications for residents with safety measures and what to do in case of an accident However, 
it is not stated how this is done (e.g. leaflets, flyers, visits…). Public consultations on the establishments’ civil protection and 
external emergency plans are run. Also, local authorities publish the external emergency plans online. Monitoring of how the 
information material is distributed is conducted by the State Fire and Rescue Service as part of annual fire safety and civil 
protection inspections. 

3.e), 3.f), 3.g) Information kept permanently available (optional) 
Latvia has not provided information on this.   

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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LATVIA                                                                                                                                                                               

Question 4 - Inspections 

4.a) Systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards 
Latvia has partially answered this question but it seems that it 
does not use a systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards. 
All upper-tier establishments have to be inspected at least once 
a year, whereas the rest have to be inspected at least twice 
every 3 years.  

4.b) Programme of inspections available to public 
(optional) 
Not answered.  

4.c) Actions taken in the event of accidents, incidents and non-compliance 
Latvia stated that between 2012 and 2015, administrative penalties were imposed 32 times. Also, four warnings were issued 
during the same period.  

4.d), 4.e), 4.f)  Data on on-site inspections 
Latvia indicated that all upper-tier establishments (29) are inspected once a year. Also, a total of 36 inspections of lower-tier 
establishments were undertaken (an average of 12 per year).  

Question 5 – Domino effects 

The groups of establishments or installations where domino effects could be produced are identified by the Competent authorities on 
the basis of the information provided in establishments’ submissions, prevention programmes and safety reports. Authorities take 
into account the characteristics of those hazardous substances present at the establishments, staff, equipment technical plan, other 
risk factors (e.g. other establishments which do not fall under Seveso II but involve the handling of hazardous substances.   

Question 6 – Land-use planning 

Requirements on land use planning related to the establishments covered by Seveso II are laid down in Latvian regulations covering 
land use planning (in general) as well as other laws covering buffer zones (the names and codes are available in the implementation 
report submitted by Latvia). Land use planning procedures also cover the organisation of public consultations as part of a specific 
planning process. The Law on buffer zones lays down specific requirements limiting the development of residential areas and the 
planning of other activities in the vicinity of dangerous establishments, and placing restrictions on dangerous activities close to 
vulnerable zones. Latvia has provided a real example of how land use planning around Seveso establishments is managed with a 
link to the relevant documents.  

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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LATVIA                                                                                                                                                                               

Question 7 – Further information (optional) 

7.a) Lessons learned from accidents and incidents 
Latvia has reported that many accidents occurred due to a human error. As a result, it was highlighted that training is very 
important so that staff comply with procedures and are also aware of all the internal protocols in place.  

7.b) IT tools used for monitoring the implementation and data sharing 
Latvia reported the use of IT tools for monitoring the implementation of the Directive and for data sharing. The characteristics or 
format of these tools has not been explained.  

7.c) Seveso like provisions applied to other installations and activities (e.g. pipelines, ports, marshalling yards, offshore)  
Latvia has not replied to this question.  

                      
 
 
 
 
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17.  Member State summary sheet – Lithuania 

LITHUANIA                                                                                                                                                                           

Overview of Lithuania 

Lithuania provided a complete response. 

Number of establishments: 

Status of overall implementation: 

The response submitted 
by Lithuania indicates 
that the provisions of the 
Seveso II Directive are 
fully implemented. 

Main issues identified: 
None 

Overview of the information reported 

Question 1 - General information 

1.a) Significant changes made to competent authorities or their tasks  
Lithuania reported one significant change during the reporting period. In 2014, a new authority was established (State 
Environmental Protection Service), which is currently responsible for implementing and enforcing Seveso II.  

1.b) Establishments subject to Seveso  
There were 42 Seveso establishments in 
Lithuania at the end of 2014. Except for one 
more lower-tier establishment, there has been 
no change in numbers compared to 2011. 

As shown in the chart to the right, Lithuania 
exhibits fewer establishments per capita and 
much fewer establishments per km2 than the 
EU average. In fact, Lithuania has the lowest 
density of Seveso establishments per km2 of all 
EU Member States. 

1.c) Activities of Seveso establishments  
The most common activities in Lithuania are: 

- 
- 
- 

Fuel storage (26%); 
Handling and transportation centres (14%); and  
Production and storage of fertilisers (14%).  

Whereas fuel storage is one of the activities with the highest number of Seveso establishments (11%), the other 2 are relatively 
minor, with 2% and 3% of EU establishments, respectively.  

1.d) Seveso establishments covered by the IED (optional) 
Lithuania stated that 11 Seveso establishments fall under the IED and that the inspection systems are integrated (inspections 
inform the implementation of several Directives at the same time) and that increases the efficiency of implementation of all the 
Directives involved. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
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LITHUANIA                                                                                                                                                                           

Question 2 - Emergency plans 

2.a) & 2.b) Upper-tier establishments without 
external emergency plan 
Lithuania did not exempt any upper-tier 
establishment from having an external emergency 
plan. However, an external emergency plan was not 
drafted for one establishment. This is an 
establishment that started operating in 2015 and the 
plan was in the preparation phase when the 
implementation report was submitted.  

Note: Total 18 upper-tier establishments 

2.c) Upper-tier establishments without external 
emergency plan tested  
For one establishments the external emergency plan 
had not been tested during the reporting period. 
Although Lithuania did not indicate it, this is 
presumably the same establishment for which the 
plan is not ready (see above).  

2.d) Arrangements for providing information to the public: 

- 
- 

- 

Sirens installed in state institutions, relevant and tall buildings; 
A Cell Broadcasting system for residents near to Seveso establishments has recently been put in place (which sends a 
message to mobile phones without the need for registration); and  
Announcements through the local radio and TV channels.  

2.e) Testing external emergency plans 
External emergency plans are tested as follows: 
Full exercises (every 3 years); 
“Functional” exercises (every 2 years, without coinciding with full exercises); and  
Table top exercises (every year except when the above are organised).  

- 
- 
- 

There are criteria on how these exercises should be organised, but there are not established criteria for determining that a plan is 
adequate.  

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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LITHUANIA                                                                                                                                                                           

Question 3 – Information on safety measures 

3.a), 3.b), 3.c), 3.d) Information made actively available 
The information was made actively available for 17 out of 18 upper-tier establishments. In Lithuania, operators and municipalities 
(those municipalities where establishments are and those bordering them) are obliged to prepare informative materials about the 
activities, possible hazards of an establishment, and recommendations on safety measures in case of a major accident. The 
information was provided as leaflets/flyers in all cases and online (operators’ and/or municipalities’ websites). Also, the Competent 
Authority publishes non-confidential information on Seveso establishments. Lithuania provided a statistical breakdown of how the 
information is provided: 

Authorities monitor that this is done through inspections and continuous monitoring of its quality and accuracy.  

3.e), 3.f), 3.g) Information kept permanently available (optional) 
The information for 17 out of 18 upper-tier establishments is permanently available. Lithuania has provided a statistical 
breakdown of how this is done: 

Operator 
29% 

Competent Authority  Notice 
94% 

18% 

Emails 
- 

Websites (Op)  Websites (CA) 
100% 

76% 

Question 4 - Inspections 

4.a) Systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards 
The inspection system is not based on a systematic appraisal. 
Upper-tier establishments are inspected once a year, whereas 
lower-tier establishments are inspected once every 3 years 

4.b) Programme of inspections available to public 
(optional) 
The inspection programme is a legal document and is 
therefore publicly available. Inspection reports are available 
upon request.  

4.c) Actions taken in the event of accidents, incidents and non-compliance 
Lithuania has provided data on the type and number of actions taken in each of the years of the reporting period. These have 
been mandatory instructions (179 in total), notices (27 in total), financial penalties (144 in total), and prohibition of use (2). The 
use of all instruments decreased or was the same in 2014 compared to 2012, except “mandatory instructions”, which increased 
around 40%.  

4.d), 4.e), 4.f)  Data on on-site inspections 
In line with their reply to question 4.a), Lithuania stated that all upper-tier establishments were inspected at least once a year, with 
the exception of one, which became operational in 2015 and was due to be inspected then. All lower-tier establishments were 
inspected at least once during the 2012-2014 period (higher than the EU average of 74%).  

                      
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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LITHUANIA                                                                                                                                                                           

Question 5 – Domino effects 

Competent authorities are responsible for identifying domino effects. Currently, there is only one domino group identified (3 
establishments). Although they have exchanged information on the substances and possible hazards (which is monitored by 
competent authorities), Lithuania highlighted that operators have not been proactive in cooperating with each other (e.g. arranging 
joint exercises). According to Lithuania, this is complicated due to the commercial conflict of interest between the establishments 
involved. 

Question 6 – Land-use planning 

Land use planning with regard to Seveso establishments is implemented by separate legislation. Two main laws control the location 
of Seveso establishments, the stakeholders to be involved in spatial planning, and the process to be followed, including the 
authorisation process (which involves a risk assessment and a public consultation). Lithuania has provided an example of where this 
has been done in practice.  

Question 7 – Further information (optional) 

No response was provided to this optional question.7.a) Lessons learned from accidents and incidents 
Lithuania has not responded to this question.  

No response was provided to this optional question. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
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18.  Member State summary sheet - Luxembourg 

LUXEMBOURG                                                                                                                                                                           

Overview of Luxembourg 

Overall, Luxembourg provided an almost 
complete response with a few minor gaps. 

Number of establishments: 

Status of overall implementation: 

Luxembourg’s response 
indicates that there are 
issues with key 
provisions of the Seveso-
II Directive.  

Main issues identified: 
No tests of any external emergency plan in the 
whole reporting period.  
Luxembourg stated that the majority of its 
emergency staff are volunteers. Although this 
is not an issue in itself, it is uncertain whether 
they are adequately prepared to respond to a 
Seveso accident. 

Luxembourg does not make available 
information on safety measures for the public 
likely affected by a major accident. Also, the 
information is only available to the public if 
they participate in the public consultation for 
Seveso authorisations or, in certain cases, 
online, although this does not cover all the 
information. 

Overview of the information reported 

Question 1 - General information 

1.a) Significant changes made to competent authorities or their tasks  
None were reported by Luxembourg. 

1.b) Establishments subject to Seveso  
There were 18 Seveso establishments in 
Luxemburg at the end of 2014, two (lower-tier) 
establishments less than in 2011. 

As shown in the chart to the right, despite the 
low overall number there are more 
establishments per capita and much more 
establishments per km2 in Luxembourg than 
the EU average. Thus Luxembourg exhibits a 
high density of Seveso establishments. 

1.c) Activities of Seveso establishments  
Luxembourg has indicated all relevant activities, for each establishment, instead of indicating only the main activity, resulting in a 
number (30) that is higher than the total number of establishments (18). The most common activities are: 

- 
- 
- 

Fuel storage with 7 establishments; 
“Other facilities” (4 establishments); and  
A number of activities with 3 establishments each.  

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
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LUXEMBOURG                                                                                                                                                                           

Both fuel storage and “other activities” are common activities at EU level, with 11% and 14% of all Seveso establishments in the 
EU.  

1.d) Seveso establishments covered by the IED (optional) 
Luxembourg has not answered this (optional) question.  

Question 2 - Emergency plans 

2.a) & 2.b) Upper-tier establishments 
without external emergency plan 
For one establishment it was decided that an 
external emergency plan was not needed. 
Also, the external emergency plan was not 
prepared for another establishment as 
required. Luxembourger authorities are aware 
of the latter and stated that the plan is under 
development. 

Note: Total 8 upper-tier establishments 

2.c) Upper-tier establishments without 
external emergency plan tested  
Luxembourg indicated that it had not tested 
any of the external plans. The reason behind 
this is explained in 2.e) 

2.d) Arrangements for providing information to the public: 
Communication via radio, SMS or sirens in vehicles. 

- 

e- Arrangements to cope with off-site effects from an accident are specific to each establishment and depend on the type of 
substance.  

2.e) Testing external emergency plans 
Whereas Luxembourg states that internal emergency plans are tested by the operators in coordination with local emergency 
services, external emergency plans are not tested. Most of the emergency services are composed by volunteers in Luxembourg 
and this makes it difficult for tests to be organised, according to the Luxembourger authorities. The fact that the emergency 
services are composed by volunteers is not an issue in itself, since it depends on their formation as emergency staff. The way the 
answer to the questionnaire is written implies that competent authorities are unsure of the preparedness of emergency services. 
Therefore, this would need to be assessed. Luxembourg stated that there are no defined criteria for determining whether the 
plans are adequate because the number of upper-tier establishments with such plans is low (7). The plans are assessed on a 
case by case basis.  

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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LUXEMBOURG                                                                                                                                                                           

Question 3 – Information on safety measures 

3.a), 3.b), 3.c), 3.d) Information made actively available 
Information on the safety measures taken by operators, dangers and possible consequences of a major accident is made 
available as part of the authorisation of a new Seveso establishment or the modification of an existing one. This information is 
available online on the competent authority webpage alongside the inventory of hazardous substances and other documents such 
as the safety reports. Sometimes, the online information may be available to the general public and other times it may only be 
available in the operators’/Authorities’ intranet. If the latter is the case, the information can be made available upon request. The 
provision of this information is monitored via inspections and also when any Seveso establishment is opened or modified 
(authorisation). It should be noted that the public likely to be affected by a major accident is not preventatively informed of the 
appropriate security measures in Luxembourg. 

3.e), 3.f), 3.g) Information kept permanently available (optional) 
Luxembourg has not answered these questions.  

Question 4 - Inspections 

4.a) Systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards 
Luxembourg stated that inspections are done regularly (once a 
year for upper-tier) for all establishments. As a result, there is 
not a systematic approach to inspections.  

4.b) Programme of inspections available to public 
(optional) 
Luxembourg has not answered this question. 

4.c) Actions taken in the event of accidents, incidents and non-compliance 
Luxembourg has provisions for administrative sanctions (operating ban) and criminal sanctions (fines or imprisonment). During 
the reporting period, Luxembourg indicates that the only non-compliance issue was an operator that had purchased inadequate 
equipment. The operator was requested to change this equipment.  

4.d), 4.e), 4.f)  Data on on-site inspections 
All upper-tier establishments were inspected annually and 9 out of 10 lower-tier establishments were subject to on-site inspections 
in the 2012-2014 period.   

Question 5 – Domino effects 

All new establishments and all modifications of existing establishments go through an authorisation process, in which domino effects 
are assessed. The operators of neighbouring establishments have to assess the impact of these new or modified establishments on 
their premises. . The Luxembourger authorities recognise that they have a good overview of the domino effects in the country since 
the number of Seveso establishments is very low.  

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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LUXEMBOURG                                                                                                                                                                           

Question 6 – Land-use planning 

For all Seveso establishments that may have an impact on their vicinity, safety distances have been defined and communicated to 
the competent authorities. These are taken into account by competent authorities when authorising new or modifications of Seveso 
establishments or neighbouring establishments.  

Question 7 – Further information (optional) 

No response was provided to this optional question.7.a) Lessons learned from accidents and incidents 
Luxembourg did not respond to this optional question.  

No response was provided to this optional question. 

                      
 
 
 
 
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19.  Member State summary sheet - Malta 

MALTA                                                                                                                                                                                

Number of establishments: 

Overview of Malta 

Malta provided a complete response with 
answers to all the compulsory and optional 
questions. 

Status of overall implementation: 

Malta’s response 
indicates that the 
provisions of the Seveso 
II Directive are fully 
implemented. 

Main issues identified: 
None 

Overview of the information reported 

Question 1 - General information 

1.a) Significant changes made to competent authorities or their tasks  
None were reported by Malta. 

1.b) Establishments subject to Seveso  
There were 12 Seveso establishments in Malta at 
the end of 2014, one more than in 2011. While the 
number of lower-tier establishments decreased 
during that period, upper-tier establishments 
increased in number. 

As shown in the chart to the right, Malta exhibits 
more establishments per capita and especially 
much more establishments per km2 than the EU 
average, which reflects a very high density of 
establishments in Malta. 

1.c) Activities of Seveso establishments  
Only four activities are reported as the main activities for the Seveso establishments in Malta. These are: 

- 
- 
- 
- 

fuel storage (7 establishments); 
power generation (2); 
LNG production, bottling and bulk distribution (2); and  
LNG storage (1).  

Two of these activities (fuel storage and LNG production, bottling and bulk distribution) are relatively common amongst European 
Seveso establishments (11% and 8%, respectively of all the Seveso establishments in the EU).  

1.d) Seveso establishments covered by the IED (optional) 
Malta reported that 2 establishments are also covered by the IED, with no impacts reported in practice.  

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
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MALTA                                                                                                                                                                                

Question 2 - Emergency plans 

2.a) & 2.b) Upper-tier establishments 
without external emergency plan 
For none of the upper-tier establishments in 
Malta was it decided that an external plan 
was not needed. However, 4 of the 9 upper-
tier establishments did not have an external 
emergency plan as required. Malta provided 
an explanation for this. Three of them became 
upper-tier establishments during 2014 and 
competent authorities have a period of time (2 
years) to draw them up. This is period is 
longer in Malta than in other Member States. 
The plan of the other establishment was 
being finalised when Maltese authorities filled 
in the questionnaire. 

2.c)  Upper-tier establishments without external 
emergency plan tested  
At the end of the reporting period, the external 
emergency plans of three establishments had not 
been tested. This represents 33% of the upper-tier 
establishments in Malta (compared to 25% at EU 
level). According to Malta, these are the same three 
establishments that became upper-tier in 2014 and 
have 2 years to complete their external emergency 
plans. 

Note: Total 9 upper-tier establishments   

2.d) Arrangements for providing information to the public: 

-  Most upper-tier establishments (number not stated) have a siren. Radio alerts; and  
- 

Leaflets with measures in case of emergency are distributed in the areas that could be potentially affected by a major 
industrial accident. The leaflets also include contact numbers and radio frequencies.   

2.e) Testing external emergency plans 
External emergency plans are tested as follows: 

-  Multidisciplinary field exercises involving the different rescue services; and  
- 

Desk based exercises. 

An analysis is carried out after each exercise with inputs from the entities taking part. Recommendations for improvements based 
on lessons learnt are made.  

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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MALTA                                                                                                                                                                                

Question 3 – Information on safety measures 

3.a), 3.b), 3.c), 3.d) Information made actively available 
The information (electronic and printed) was agreed with the members of the Competent Authority. Once agreed, it was 
distributed to the public by means of leaflets that were distributed door to door The operators of 4 upper tier establishments 
publish the information on their websites. The leaflets for 4 upper-tier establishments were finalised and distributed during 2009. 
Malta stated that it has not been necessary to change them since the information is still valid. One operator published a leaflet 
during 2012 and another one was preparing a leaflet in 2014. Finally, three upper-tier establishments were classified as such 
during 2014 and have not published leaflets. Operators are in charge of distributing this information and bear the costs. 
Competent authorities are in coordination with operators when they are preparing the leaflets. Also, they make spot checks to 
monitor whether these leaflets have been distributed.  

3.e), 3.f), 3.g) Information kept permanently available (optional) 
Information for all establishments’ (upper and lower tier) is kept up to date and permanently available through the competent 
authorities. Also, four operators publish the information on their webpages.   

Question 4 - Inspections 

4.a) Systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards 
Malta does not apply systematic appraisal of major accident 
hazards for inspections as all establishments (upper-tier and 
lower-tier) are inspected at least once a year.  

4.b) Programme of inspections available to public 
(optional) 
The inspection programme was not made available to the 
public during the reporting period. According to Malta, there 
were no disclosure requests.  

4.c) Actions taken in the event of accidents, incidents and non-compliance 
There were no major accidents during the period 2012-2014. No ‘prohibition of use’ orders were issued. Following each 
inspection, a detailed report listing all the findings is prepared and agreed upon by the Competent Authority. A letter is then sent 
to the operator, giving a description of the issues identified, the measures to be taken and target dates for implementation. 

4.d), 4.e), 4.f)  Data on on-site inspections 
All upper-tier and lower-tier establishments were inspected at least once a year in the last reporting period. 

Question 5 – Domino effects 

Establishments relevant for consideration of domino effects are designated by the competent authority if their consultation zones 
overlap. These establishments are required to exchange information on the effects of potential accidents and information on 
emergency plans. Malta’s implementation report describes an example of one of the cases. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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MALTA                                                                                                                                                                                

Question 6 – Land-use planning 

The provisions of Article 12 are fulfilled through supplementary guidance regarding accident hazard and hazardous substances. 
These guidelines set out policies on new hazardous installations, modifications to existing establishments and developments in the 
vicinity of existing establishments. The Land-Use Planning requirements are mainly based on the UK’s land-use planning 
methodology. For four specific establishments which have storage facilities of hazardous substances, three zones were established 
(inner, middle and outer), with different level of urbanisation/developments permitted and different control levels. 

Question 7 – Further information (optional) 

7.a) Lessons learned from accidents and incidents 
No accidents were reported.  

7.b) IT tools used for monitoring the implementation and data sharing 
No specific IT tool was used during the reporting period.  

7.c) Seveso like provisions applied to other installations and activities (e.g. pipelines, ports, marshalling yards, 
offshore)  
No Seveso-like provisions were applied to other installations not falling under Seveso II.  

                      
 
 
 
 
 
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20.  Member State summary sheet - Netherlands 

NETHERLANDS                                                                                                                                                                           

Overview of the Netherlands 

Overall, the Netherlands provided an almost 
complete response with a few minor gaps. 

Number of establishments: 

Status of overall implementation: 

The Netherlands 
response indicates that 
the provisions of the 
Seveso II Directive are 
almost fully implemented.  

Main issues identified: 
The external emergency plans of 37% of the 
upper-tier establishments were not tested 
during the reporting period. Also, the 
Netherlands did not provide a statistical 
breakdown of Seveso establishments. 

Overview of the information reported 

Question 1 - General information 

1.a) Significant changes made to competent authorities or their tasks  
None were reported by the Netherlands. 

1.b) Establishments subject to Seveso  
There were 406 Seveso establishments in the 
Netherlands at the end of 2014, down from 416 
in 2011. This is due to a decreasing number of 
lower-tier establishments, while upper-tier 
establishments have slightly increased in 
numbers during that period. 

As shown in the chart to the right, the 
Netherlands exhibit slightly more 
establishments per capita and much more 
establishments per km2 than the EU average, 
reflecting a high density of establishments. 

1.c) Activities of Seveso establishments  
No statistical breakdown using the SPIRS categories was available. The Netherlands applies a national classification of 
establishments. A statistical summary is not available.  

1.d) Seveso establishments covered by the IED (optional) 
The Netherlands does not have detailed data on this, but considers that ‘many’ establishments are also covered by the IED. 
However the competent authority considers safety and emissions control to be distinct aspects. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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NETHERLANDS                                                                                                                                                                           

Question 2 - Emergency plans 

2.a) & 2.b) Upper-tier establishments without 
external emergency plan 
For 13 upper-tier establishments it was decided that 
an external emergency plan was not needed based 
on the technical safety data contained in the safety 
report. In addition, 10 upper-tier establishments failed 
to produce an external emergency plan as required 
by Article 11.1.  

For 4 of these, safety reports were submitted which 
will be used to draw up the external emergency 
plans. For the remaining 6, the competent authorities 
were reminded to draw up the plans promptly. 
The Netherlands does not systematically draw up 
specific external emergency plans but rather disaster 
response plans that cover common accident 
scenarios. 

2.c) Upper-tier establishments without external 
emergency plan tested  
At the end of the reporting period, 93 upper-tier 
establishments’ external emergency plans had not 
been tested (this represents 37% of the upper-tier 
establishments in the Netherlands, which compares 
to 25% at EU level). 
This is because some competent authorities adopt 
generic external emergency plans that set out basic 
scenarios which are then tested. The drawing up and 
testing of these generic external emergency plans is 
currently being coordinated at national level 

Note: Total 252 upper-tier establishments 

2.d) Arrangements for providing information to the public: 

- 

- 

- 

Operational crisis communication preparedness plans based on a regional crisis plans; national siren network (WAS); 
nationwide system for alerting public via mobile phone alert (NL-alert); 
Information to the public on risks and options for action are available through the  national risk map available on 
www.risicokaart.nl, the competent authorities websites and municipal websites; and  
Information through the regional emergency broadcasters, regional and municipal websites and social media (Twitter).  
National pool of crisis communication experts.  

2.e) Testing external emergency plans 
External emergency plans are tested using: 

-  Multidisciplinary field exercises involving the different rescue services; 
- 
- 

Desk based exercises; and  
Exercises conducted at the establishment by the disaster management coordinating teams.  

The results of these exercises are used to improve the external emergency plans. Their adequacy is assessed taking into account 
the completeness, timeliness, accuracy and practical utility of the external emergency plan. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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NETHERLANDS                                                                                                                                                                           

Question 3 – Information on safety measures 

3.a), 3.b), 3.c), 3.d) Information made actively available 
The location of all Seveso establishments is available online8 including safety advice to the public. 
In case of accident, the public is warned by the competent authority by means of sirens and mobile phone alerts. Information on 
safety measures is also provided. 

Between 2010 and 2014, information from upper-tier establishments was actively made available to the public during 13 instances 
of major accidents reported via eMARS. No further information was provided on the approach taken with regard to other instances 
of major accidents. 

The Netherlands did not include any statistical breakdown as requested in the questionnaire nor information on ‘by whom’ the 
information on upper-tier establishments is made available. Based on previous responses, it is assumed to be the competent 
authorities. The information means used for informing the public and persons liable to be affected by a Seveso accident  has been 
described in question 2.d) above. . Furthermore online information is permanently available and competent authorities are in 
charge of keeping the websites updated. 

3.e), 3.f), 3.g) Information kept permanently available (optional) 
Information on all establishments (upper and lower tier) is kept up to date and permanently available through a website that the 
competent authorities are in charge of maintaining.  

Question 4 - Inspections 

4.a) Systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards 
The length and frequency of inspections are based on the 
systematic appraisal of the following criteria: 

- 
- 
- 
- 
- 

Number of units; 
Number of activities presenting safety risks; 
Nature of the substances present on site; 
Ambient factors; and  
Results from the previous inspection.  

4.b) Programme of inspections available to public 
(optional) 
The inspection programme is made available to the public 
online9 and summaries of inspection reports have been 
published since 2014. 

4.c) Actions taken in the event of accidents, incidents and non-compliance 
Remedial actions and penalties can be imposed. In immediate risk situations, the authority can order partial or complete cessation 
of activities. However the response from the Netherlands does not indicate whether any of these actions were taken during the 
reporting period. 

4.d), 4.e), 4.f)  Data on on-site inspections 
90% of upper-tier establishments were inspected once every 12 months. The Netherlands reported data for each of the years of 
the reporting period. 

Upper-tier annual inspection 

Total upper-tier 

2012 

224 

250 

Percentage of upper-tier with annual inspection 

90% 

2013 

229 

254 

90% 

2014 

226 

252 

90% 

Note that The Netherlands apply systematic appraisal to determine inspection schedules (see 4.a) and as such it is it is not 
absolutely required to inspect all establishments annually. 
The remaining 32 upper-tier establishments were inspected at least once in the 2012-2014 period. In addition, 136 lower-tier 
establishments (88% of the total number of lower-tier establishments) were subject to on-site inspections in the last three years. 

8 www.risicokaart.nl 
9 www.brzoplus.nl 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
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NETHERLANDS                                                                                                                                                                           

Question 5 – Domino effects 

Establishments relevant for consideration of domino effects are designated by the competent authority. These establishments are 
required to exchange information on the effects of accidents and information on emergency plans. 

Question 6 – Land-use planning 

The Netherlands indicated that its national legislation on spatial consideration for the purpose of land use planning is perceived as 
being complex and is based on safety perimeters around Seveso establishments. The competent authority (Ministry of Infrastructure 
and Environment) is currently working on simplifying the spatial considerations in the decision making process. 

Question 7 – Further information (optional) 

7.a) Lessons learned from accidents and incidents 
The Netherlands reports that all incidents are examined even those that do not meet the criteria of Annex VI, as lessons can be 
learned from them and recurrence can be prevented. Approximately 30 such incidents occur every year. No further information 
was provided.  

7.b) IT tools used for monitoring the implementation and data sharing 
The Netherlands has a joint IT platform used by competent authorities facilitating their collaborations (Gemeenschappelijke 
Inspectireruimte). On the platform they record upper-tier establishments and their inspections as well as any coercive and follow-
up actions. 

7.c) Seveso like provisions applied to other installations and activities (e.g. pipelines, ports, marshalling yards, offshore)  
Pipelines and other non-Seveso activities are covered by the Dutch safety policy. No other activities was included in the response 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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21.  Member State summary sheet - Poland 

POLAND                                                                                                                                                                             

Overview of the Poland 

Overall, Poland provided a complete response. 

Number of establishments: 

Status of overall implementation: 

Poland’s response 
indicates that the 
provisions of the Seveso 
II Directive are fully 
implemented. 

Main issues identified: 
None 

Overview of the information reported 

Question 1 - General information 

1.a) Significant changes made to competent authorities or their tasks  
None were reported by Poland. 

1.b) Establishments subject to Seveso  
There were 392 Seveso establishments in Poland 
at the end of 2014, up from 360 in 2011. This is 
due to an increasing number of both lower and 
upper-tier establishments. 

As shown in the chart to the right, Poland exhibits 
much fewer establishments per capita and much 
ewer establishments per km2 than the EU 
average, reflecting a relatively low density of 
Seveso establishments. In fact, Poland exhibits 
the lowest number of establishments per capita of 
all EU Member States. 

1.c) Activities of Seveso establishments  
The most common activities in Poland were: 

-  Wholesale and retail storage and distribution (45%);  
-  General chemicals (18%); and  
- 

Petrochemicals / oil refineries (7%).  

1.d) Seveso establishments covered by the IED (optional) 
Poland stated that 135 of the 392 Seveso establishments are also covered by IED. Poland states that major accident prevention 
is assessed as part of the inspection of the integrated permits and there are no conflicts between the implementation of the IED 
and that of Seveso. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
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POLAND                                                                                                                                                                             

Question 2 - Emergency plans 

2.a) & 2.b) Upper-tier establishments without 
external emergency plan 
For 10 upper-tier establishments Poland decided that 
an external emergency plan was not needed. Poland 
has not commented on this (6% of all the upper-tier 
establishments in Poland and 5% of all the 
establishments in this situation in the EU. This 
compared to 4% at EU level). Also, the external 
emergency plans of 6 other upper-tier establishments 
were not drawn up as required (3% of the upper-tier 
establishments in Poland, which compares to 9% at 
EU level). Poland has explained that this has 
happened in the case of new establishments and for 
those for which it was deemed that there were no off-
site risks.  

2.c)  Upper-tier establishments without external 
emergency plan tested  
At the end of the reporting period, 3 upper-tier 
establishments’ external emergency plans had not 
been tested (2% of the upper-tier establishments in 
Poland, which compares to 25% at EU level). The 
reasons were local floods that led to a delay in the 
scheduled date, a request from the operator due to a 
change to the technological process and a delay due 
to the assessment of the operators’ documents, 
respectively. Poland explained that these external 
emergency plans were tested at a later date. 

Note: Total 180 upper-tier establishments 

2.d) Arrangements for providing information to the public: 

- 

Alert system based on mobile telephones (text message system) and mass media, in connection with warning systems 
on the premises of the establishments; and  

-  Other arrangements are regular updates: Information on safety measures and methods of coping with major accidents 
to educational and social welfare institutions, healthcare establishments and other entities specified in the list included 
in the internal emergency plan of the establishmen`t, as well as to other entities and institutions serving the public, 
which may be affected by the consequences of such accidents and to make this information available to the public. 

2.e) Testing external emergency plans 
In Poland, external emergency plans are tested as follows: 

- 
- 

Tactical exercises with the involvement of emergency services and local governments; and  
Follow-up assessment on the basis of the results of the tests.   

These tests are carried out at least once every three years. The areas assessed are the suitability of alert systems, the 
cooperation with other institutions during an accident, the availability of emergency services and measures included in the plan. 
The results are used to improve the plans. Costs are borne by Competent Authorities and operators.  

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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POLAND                                                                                                                                                                             

Question 3 – Information on safety measures 

3.a), 3.b), 3.c), 3.d) Information made actively available 
The information for 48 of 59 (81%) upper-tier establishments was made actively available during the reporting period. The 
regional Fire Service, Competent Authorities and the operators are in charge of providing information to the public and persons 
likely to be affected by a Seveso accident. Each regional representative of the State Fire Service has to provide an annual list of 
upper-tier establishments and dangerous substances in each of them within their territorial jurisdiction. Other information made 
available by the State Fire Service on its webpage is the decisions taken with regard to Seveso establishments, information on 
approved safety reports and external emergency plans, and instructions on emergency procedures. Operators are also obliged to 
inform those persons and institutions likely to be affected by a major accident at their establishments, usually in the form of open 
days, brochures and publications on their websites. Finally, local governments are obliged to inform the public (safety measures in 
the case of an accident), usually in the form of official announcement. Some local governments submit information on the risks 
and possible measures to schools, healthcare and social welfare institutions. Poland has not provided a statistical breakdown. 
Authorities check that the information is provided as stated above through inspections and when external emergency plans are 
tested (as the way the public is informed is described in them).  

3.e), 3.f), 3.g) Information kept permanently available (optional) 
Poland stated that up-to-date information is permanently available for 87% of the establishments. The information is provided by 
the State Fire Service (notices, websites) and the operators (website, notices on the establishments’ boards and in writing if 
requested by any member of the public).   

Question 4 - Inspections 

4.a) Systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards 
In Poland, the frequency of inspection is fixed and is therefore 
not based on a systematic appraisal of major accident hazards. 
Upper-tier establishments are inspected once a year and lower-
tier establishments are inspected once every two years.  

4.b) Programme of inspections available to public 
(optional) 
The information on inspection results, except data subject to 
the protection of personal data or constituting company 
secrets, is made available upon request.  

4.c) Actions taken in the event of accidents, incidents and non-compliance 
Poland reported that the following actions were taken during the reporting period: decisions ordering tests (7), decisions ordering 
the removal of irregularities detected within a period of time (401), immediately enforceable decisions (7), orders to ensure 
operating compliance (254), cautions (133), financial penalties (31) and post-inspection recommendations.  

4.d), 4.e), 4.f)  Data on on-site inspections 
All upper-tier establishments were inspected in the last reporting period on an annual basis. Also, 24 additional inspections of 
upper-tier establishments were carried out due to changes to the activities, substances or owner. The total number of inspections 
reported is higher than the total number of upper-tier establishments. Polish authorities have clarified that this happened because 
the total number of these establishments during the reporting period was higher than at the end. As regards lower-tier 
establishments, they were all inspected annually. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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POLAND                                                                                                                                                                             

Question 5 – Domino effects 

Competent authorities designate groups of establishments on the basis of the extent of the hazard and consequences described in 
the major accident scenarios built with the information obtained from the establishments (safety reports and notifications). Ten 
establishment groups were designated during the last reporting period.   

Question 6 – Land-use planning 

The Polish Environmental Protection Law includes the consideration of Seveso establishments in spatial planning. As a result, the 
location of new establishments must comply with local land use plans, which prohibits their construction in the vicinity of inhabited 
areas. The expansion of existing facilities is limited to areas where it is deemed that there is no risk. All establishments must have a 
certain distance to residential areas. Also, the Competent Authorities regularly inform local governments of the existence of these 
establishments so they can consider it in spatial planning.  

Question 7 – Further information (optional) 

No response was provided to this optional question.7.a) Lessons learned from accidents and incidents 
Poland has not provided information on this.  

No response was provided to this optional question. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
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22.  Member State summary sheet - Portugal 

PORTUGAL                                                                                                                                                                            

Overview of Portugal 

Overall, Portugal provided a complete 
response. 

Status of overall implementation: 

Number of establishments: 

Portugal’s response 
indicates that most of the 
provisions of the Seveso 
II Directive are 
implemented but gaps are 
observed with regards to 
key provisions of the 
Directive.  

Main issues identified: 
A large number of upper-tier establishments 
were not inspected annually or during the 
reporting period. 
3 external emergency plans were not adopted. 

Overview of the information reported 

Question 1 - General information 

1.a) Significant changes made to competent authorities or their tasks  
None were reported by Portugal. 

1.b) Establishments subject to Seveso  
There were 183 Seveso establishments in 
Portugal at the end of 2014, slightly less than in 
2011 (189). This is due to a decreasing number 
of upper-tier establishments. 

As shown in the chart to the right, Portugal 
exhibits fewer establishments per capita and 
fewer establishments per km2 than the EU 
average.  

1.c) Activities of Seveso establishments  
The most common activities in Portugal at the end of the reporting period were: 

- 
- 
- 

LPG storage (20%); 
general chemicals (19%); and  
LNG storage and distribution (15%).  

Two of these activities (LPG storage and LNG storage and distribution are not particularly common in the EU (4% and 1%, 
respectively of the EU establishments). In fact, Portugal has over 40% of the EU establishments dedicated to LNG storage and 
distribution. As for general chemicals, it is a relatively common activity (12% of all EU establishments).  

1.d) Seveso establishments covered by the IED (optional) 
No information was provided.  

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
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PORTUGAL                                                                                                                                                                            

Question 2 - Emergency plans 

2.a) & 2.b) Upper-tier establishments without 
external emergency plan 
Portugal did not decide to exclude the requirement 
for preparing an external emergency plan for any of 
the establishments. Three establishments (5% of the 
upper-tier establishments) failed to produce an 
external emergency plan as required. Portugal has 
not provided an explanation of why this is. 

2.c) Upper-tier establishments without external 
emergency plan tested  
At the end of the reporting period, 18 upper-tier 
establishments’ external emergency plans had not 
been tested (31% of total, slightly higher than the 
25% at EU level).  
Portugal has provided an explanation for 8 of these 
establishments. According to them, 6 establishments 
have been or will be tested in other years (2 in each 
of 2011, 2015 and 2016). Also, one establishment 
became operational during 2014 and another one 
was in the process of being reclassified as lower-tier.  

Note: Total 59 upper-tier establishments 

2.d) Arrangements for providing information to the public: 

- 
- 
- 

System with sirens; 
Cars with megaphones; and  
Announcements on the radio. 

2.e) Testing external emergency plans 
External emergency plans are tested as follows: 

-  Multidisciplinary field exercises involving the different rescue services; and  
- 

Desk based exercises which aim at assessing the plans without mobilising staff and equipment on the ground.  

External emergency plans are considered adequate when they comply with the requirements described in the “Guideline for the 
preparation of external emergency plans” (Technical specification no7 available in www.prociv.pt). This is assessed by the 
Municipal Commission of Civil Protection and the National Civil Protection Authority. Plans are approved by the National 
Commission for Civil Protection.  

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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PORTUGAL                                                                                                                                                                            

Question 3 – Information on safety measures 

3.a), 3.b), 3.c), 3.d) Information made actively available 
In Portugal, the municipal civil protection service produces and sends information regarding the steps to be taken after an 
accident to the persons potentially affected by an accident in upper-tier establishments. Also, municipalities inform citizens via 
their websites and through awareness campaigns at schools. Additionally, approved external emergency plans are published 
online. Operators also provide leaflets and reports with information, in connection with the testing of external emergency plans. 
During the last reporting period, the information from 81% of the upper-tier establishments was made available. Portugal has not 
provided any statistical breakdown of how the information is provided, but stated that authorities are in charge of doing so via 
public consultations (when preparing external emergency plans), their websites, official boards and campaigns at schools.  

3.e), 3.f), 3.g) Information kept permanently available (optional) 
No information was provided.   

Question 4 - Inspections 

4.a) Systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards 
The length and frequency of inspections are based on the 
systematic appraisal of the following criteria: 

4.b) Programme of inspections available to public 
(optional) 
Portugal has not answered this optional question.  

- 

- 
- 
- 

- 

Results of previous inspections or establishments not 
previously inspected; 
Higher frequency for upper-tier establishments. 
Number of previous accidents; 
Priority given by Competent Authority due to the 
location, type of substances or quantities; and  
Existence of significant changes to the 
establishments. 

Also, Portugal has developed a new tool which will derive 
inspection priorities for 2016 and beyond. This is based on the 
quantity of dangerous substances, surroundings, domino effects, 
complexity of the facilities, compliance, inspection results, staff 
training and availability 

4.c) Actions taken in the event of accidents, incidents and non-compliance 
During the reporting period, Portugal imposed penalties on two upper-tier establishments and five lower-tier establishments.  

4.d), 4.e), 4.f)  Data on on-site inspections 
Portugal has reported that none of the upper-tier establishments were inspected annually. 40 (68%) upper-tier establishments and 
44 (35%) of the lower-tier establishments were inspected during the last reporting period (2012-2014). Note that Portugal applies 
systematic appraisal to determine inspection schedules (see 4.a) and as such it is it is not absolutely required to inspect all 
establishments annually. Nevertheless, the numbers of inspections of upper-tier establishments appear relatively low.  

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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PORTUGAL                                                                                                                                                                            

Question 5 – Domino effects 

Portuguese authorities identify establishments which are potentially subject to domino effects on the basis of the distance between 
them, quantity and hazard of substances and scenarios for potential major accidents.  

These establishments are obliged to exchange information on the activities they undertake, the substances handled and how 
hazardous they are, and mapping of the upper-tier establishment’s accident scenarios.  

Question 6 – Land-use planning 

Portugal indicated that spatial planning legislation includes the concept of “compatibility of the site” for operators that wish to 
establish a new Seveso establishment or make changes to an existing one. The system is designed to maintain an adequate 
distance between existing establishments and vulnerable elements. Also, the EIA and SEA laws have incorporated the consideration 
of Seveso establishments. Municipal spatial planning strategies are also required to take this into account, for which they are 
provided with technical support.  

Question 7 – Further information (optional) 

No response was provided to this optional question. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
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23.  Member State summary sheet - Romania 

ROMANIA                                                                                                                                                                            

Number of establishments: 

Overview of Romania 

Overall, Romania provided a complete 
response. 

Status of overall implementation: 

Romania’s response 
indicates that the 
provisions of the Seveso 
II Directive are mostly 
implemented. 

Main issues identified: 
The only issue identified in relation to two 
external emergency plans not adopted nor 
tested  

Overview of the information reported 

Question 1 - General information 

1.a) Significant changes made to competent authorities or their tasks  
The two competent authorities in charge of Seveso implementation and enforcement were abolished and replaced. The 
implementation and enforcement of the Seveso II Directive is the responsibility of County Environmental Protection Agencies and 
by the County Commissariat of the National Environmental Guard as of 2014. 

1.b) Establishments subject to Seveso  
There were 303 Seveso establishments in 
Romania at the end of 2014, slightly up from 
295 in 2011. 

As shown in the chart to the right, Romania 
exhibits fewer establishments per capita and 
much fewer establishments per km2 than the 
EU average. 

1.c) Activities of Seveso establishments  
The most common Seveso activities in Romania at the end of 2014 were: 

- 
- 
- 

Fuel storage (15%); 
LNG production, bottling and bulk distribution (13%); and  
Production, destruction and storage of explosives (11%).  

Fuel storage is also one of the three most common activities among Seveso establishments in the EU (11% of the EU total). As 
regards LNG production, 8% of EU establishments were dedicated to this activity at the end of the reporting period. Romania is 
the EU Member State with the third highest number of establishments in this activity (8% of all EU establishments in this activity). 
A similar trend was observed for the production, destruction and storage of explosives. 4% of EU establishments belonged to this 
activity, while Romania is the country with the second highest number of establishments dedicated to this (13% of all EU 
establishments in this activity).  

1.d) Seveso establishments covered by the IED (optional) 
Romania did not reply to this optional question.  

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
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ROMANIA                                                                                                                                                                            

Question 2 - Emergency plans 

2.a) & 2.b) Upper-tier establishments without 
external emergency plan 
For 3 upper-tier establishments (2%) it was decided 
that an external emergency plan was not needed 
based on safety reports and internal emergency 
plans (it was deemed that there would not be 
consequences beyond the establishments’ 
boundaries). Also, 2 establishments (2%) that should 
have prepared one have not done so. Romania did 
not provide further details on the latter.  

2.c) Upper-tier establishments without external 
emergency plan tested  
At the end of the reporting period, 2 upper-tier 
establishments’ external emergency plans had not 
been tested. This is 2% of Romanian upper-tier 
establishments, which can be considered a low 
proportion compared to the EU average of 25%. 
Romania has not provided further comment. 

Note: Total 120 upper-tier establishments 

2.d) Arrangements for providing information to the public: 

- 
- 

TV, radio announcements; and  
Specific response measures are described in each external emergency plan.  Romania did not provide any example of 
this. 

2.e) Testing external emergency plans 
In Romania, external emergency plans are tested as follows: 

- 
- 
- 

Notification exercises; 
Partial tests with emergency services and decision makers; and  
Full tests at least once every 3 years involving authorities, public forces, private staff from the establishments, other 
operators (domino effect). 

Romanian authorities apply criteria to test establishments based on periodicity (at least once every 3 years), risk at source, and 
training of staff or population. The suitability of the plan is evaluated assessing the following: informational flow, authorities’ 
compliance with their duties, inter-institutional collaboration, operators’ cooperation, response from the emergency services 
forces, availability of the resources required for intervention and organisation of public information.  

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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ROMANIA                                                                                                                                                                            

Question 3 – Information on safety measures 

3.a), 3.b), 3.c), 3.d) Information made actively available 
During the reporting period, the Romanian National Environmental Protection Agency developed and started operating the 
Integrated Environment System through which any interested person may obtain information on major accident risks, possible 
consequences and safety measures. As a result, this information is available for all the upper-tier establishments in Romania. A 
statistical breakdown of how this information was made available was provided by Romania: 

- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 

Operator's leaflets (47.28%); 
Authorities' leaflets (48.53%); 
Operator's flyers (43.41%); 
Authorities' flyers (45.59%); 
Operator's E-mails (9.31%); 
Authorities' E-mails (3.67%); and  
Authorities' SMS (2.21%).  

Note that usually the information is provided in more than one way.  Therefore the sum of percentages of the various means is 
more than 100%. 

The Romanian Government has a system in place for operators and authorities to report annually on this matter. Also, local 
authorities are in charge of monitoring Seveso operators monthly, including the submission of this information. 

3.e), 3.f), 3.g) Information kept permanently available (optional) 
Romania has not replied to this question.   

Question 4 - Inspections 

4.a) Systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards 
The length and frequency of inspections are based on the 
systematic appraisal of the following criteria: 

4.b) Programme of inspections available to public 
(optional) 
Romania has not replied to this question. 

- 
- 
- 
- 

Characteristics of a possible accident.  
Available protection against hazards 
Conditions of the installation 
Surroundings 

4.c) Actions taken in the event of accidents, incidents and non-compliance 
During the reporting period the Competent Authorities applied 2085 coercive instruments: 1537 written notices and 548 financial 
penalties. Romania has not reported prohibitions of use or suspending of regulatory acts for Seveso establishments. 

4.d), 4.e), 4.f)  Data on on-site inspections 
119 out of 120 upper-tier establishments were inspected annually in Romania during the last reporting period. Another 2 
(Romania has reported that it had 121 upper-tier establishments at some point during the period) were inspected at least once 
from 2012 to 2014. Also, all lower-tier establishments were inspected in the 2012-2014 period. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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ROMANIA                                                                                                                                                                            

Question 5 – Domino effects 

Based on the information received from the operators, competent authorities designate the establishments that are considered to 
have potential for domino effects. There are organised common exercises for testing the external emergency plans with all operators 
belonging to the same Domino group. There are protocols in place between operators in these groups for common intervention in 
case of emergency situations and for the provision of public information. Competent authorities request operators to exchange 
relevant information between themselves. This is monitored via inspections.  

Question 6 – Land-use planning 

Romanian land use planning laws take into account the location of Seveso establishments. Also, land use planning authorities are 
informed of the location and legal obligation of Seveso establishments. The issue is also taken into account during the EIA 
procedure, in which authorities, the Technical Committee for Analysis and the public participate.  

Question 7 – Further information (optional) 

No response was provided to this optional question.7.a) Lessons learned from accidents and incidents 
No Information was provided 

No response was provided to this optional question. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
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24.  Member State summary sheet - Slovakia 

SLOVAKIA                                                                                                                                                                           

Number of establishments: 

Overview of Slovakia 

Overall, Slovakia provided a complete 
response.  

Status of overall implementation: 

Slovakia’s response 
indicates that the 
provisions of the Seveso 
II Directive are almost 
fully implemented 

Main issues identified: 
3 external emergency plans not tested and 
potentially low number of annual inspections. 
However Slovakia indicated that inspections 
are planned based on a systematic appraisal of 
major accident hazards and as such these 
might not be an issue 

Overview of the information reported 

Question 1 - General information 

1.a) Significant changes made to competent authorities or their tasks  
None were reported by Slovakia. 

1.b) Establishments subject to Seveso  
There were 82 Seveso establishments in 
Slovakia at the end of 2014, compared to 80 in 
2011. 

As shown in the chart to the right, Slovakia 
exhibits fewer establishments per capita and 
fewer establishments per km2 than the EU 
average, reflecting a relatively low density of 
establishments in Slovakia. 

1.c) Activities of Seveso establishments  
The most common activities in Slovakia were: 
-  Wholesale and retail (30%); 
Fuel storage (10%); and  
- 
-  General engineering (9%).  

Fuel storage is also one of the three most common activities among Seveso establishments in the EU (11% of EU total). 
However, the other two activities with the highest number of establishments in Slovakia are relatively less common in the EU. 
Slovakia has 9% of the establishments categorised as “wholesale and retail” in the EU.  

1.d) Seveso establishments covered by the IED (optional) 
Slovakia indicated that 31 establishments (38% of total) are also covered by the IED. No negative impact has been reported in 
the implementation of either Directive in these cases.  

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
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SLOVAKIA                                                                                                                                                                           

Question 2 - Emergency plans 

2.a) & 2.b) Upper-tier establishments without 
external emergency plan 
For only one upper-tier establishment the Authorities 
decided that an external emergency plan was not 
necessary. The explanation provided is that the site is 
far from the population and any potentially 
damageable structure and that appropriate security 
measures are in place. The other 43 upper-tier 
establishments had an external emergency plan.  

2.c) Upper-tier establishments without external 
emergency plan tested  
At the end of the reporting period, three upper-tier 
establishments’ external emergency plans had not 
been tested, which is 7% of the upper-tier 
establishments in the country (as opposed to 25% at 
EU level).   

2.d) Arrangements for providing information to the public: 

Siren system in relevant locations; 
Local TV/radio and an “Information Point”; and  

- 
- 
-  Online inventory of information for the general public, notice board, leaflets. The information to be provided includes the 
source, scope and characteristics of the accident as well as measures to be taken and communication procedures. 
Although this last point was included as an answer to this question, it does seem to refer to preparatory or preventive 
information rather than response measures.  

2.e) Testing external emergency plans 
Plans are tested once every three years. These involve: 

- 

Staff and practical tests (part or full tests) based on selected scenarios, which may involve testing the emergency 
services. 

Tests are set up according to defined priorities in each region, although Slovakian Authorities have not specified what these are. 
Slovakia stated that the Regulation implementing the Seveso II Directive includes the figure of the “Analysis Group”, which is in 
charge of evaluating external emergency plans and draft an “evaluation document”, the content of which is defined in the 
Regulation.  

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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SLOVAKIA                                                                                                                                                                           

Question 3 – Information on safety measures 

3.a), 3.b), 3.c), 3.d) Information made actively available 
All upper-tier establishments’ operators have to inform the potentially affected public about the nature of their operations, the 
possible risks and measures for reducing them. The public potentially affected is also informed of actions to be taken in case of 
an accident. The operator shall send this information to the district authority, state administration authority in the field of fire 
protection and the municipality potentially affected. Operators must also ensure the permanent availability of information to the 
public, including an up-to-date list of dangerous substances of the establishment. District Authorities may choose to inform the 
public themselves if there are several upper-tier establishments located in a threatened area.  

Up to date safety information10 is available to the public. Confidential data is not included in this information. Slovakia has 
provided a statistical breakdown of the information provided: 

Official notice board of urban/municipal authority: 88.00%; 
Information in the establishment (e.g. information board at the entrance to the establishment): 62.50%; 
Leaflets: 62.50%; 

-  Website: 100.00%; 
- 
- 
- 
-  Written information (by post to the public affected): 37.50%; and  
- 

Radio/television: 37.50%.   

Note that usually the information is provided in more than one way.  Therefore the sum of percentages of the various means is 
more than 100%. 

Authorities verify that the information is actually available through inspections. 

3.e), 3.f), 3.g) Information kept permanently available (optional) 
All upper-tier establishments’ information is kept up to date and permanently available through a website.  

Question 4 - Inspections 

4.a) Systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards 
Slovakia has a mixed approach with legally-established 
inspection periods and a systematic approach based on major 
accident hazards. The inspection periods established are once a 
year for upper-tier (once every 1.5 years if authorities deem it 
necessary) and once every 3 years for lower-tier.  

The systematic approach is agreed between the environmental 
inspectorate and the competent authorities, with priorities being: 

- 

- 

The conclusions of previous risk assessments, 
documents and inspections; and  
The quality management system of the establishment.  

4.b) Programme of inspections available to public 
(optional) 
The inspection programme is made available to the public 
online. The results of inspections may also be downloaded 
from the website. Although a link has not been provided, 
previous responses (3a) indicate that it could be the one 
provided in footnote 10.  

4.c) Actions taken in the event of accidents, incidents and non-compliance 
During the reporting period, fines were imposed (the amounts are available in the implementation report). Also, corrective 
measures were imposed for administrative irregularities (i.e. documents not drawn up to the required standard) 

4.d), 4.e), 4.f)  Data on on-site inspections 
Four upper-tier establishments (9%) were inspected once every 12 months. The rest were inspected at least once during the 
reporting period. The average interval between two inspections at an upper-tier establishments was therefore 15 months (1.25 
years). As stated above, Slovakia aims at undertaking annual inspections. However, authorities may reduce the frequency to 
once every 1.5 years (18 months). In addition to that, 41 lower-tier establishments were also inspected. The number of lower-tier 
establishments inspected is higher than the total number of these establishments at the end of the reporting period. The Slovak 
authorities have clarified that this is because the number of lower-tier establishments was higher during the period than at the 
end. 

10 http://www1.enviroportal.sk/seveso/informacny-system.php  

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
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SLOVAKIA                                                                                                                                                                           

Question 5 – Domino effects 

Domino effects are prevented in Slovakia through several instruments: 

- 

- 

- 

Distribution of the safety reports submitted by the upper-tier establishments’ operators to all authorities relevant to 
industrial accident prevention for their review. These reports shall include information on other establishments in the 
surrounding area; 
Competent authorities have the option of reassigning the category of establishments (lower-tier to upper-tier) if they 
consider that the proximity of those sites to others increases the risk of an accident. Also, they can impose additional 
measures to reduce the risk, including the exchange of information; and  
Consideration of cumulative effects in the testing of external emergency plans. In this sense, seven of the emergency 
external plan tests involved including other establishments in the vicinity of the one being tested to assess the possibility of 
a domino effect.  

Question 6 – Land-use planning 

Slovakia stated that current spatial planning legislation includes the requirement to consider Seveso establishments. Also, authorities 
may require this when a permit is requested. Finally, when an operator intends to establish a new Seveso establishment or modify an 
existing one, an expert and public assessment is undertaken as per the relevant legislation on industrial accidents.  

Question 7 – Further information (optional) 

7.a) Lessons learned from accidents and incidents 
Slovakia reports an accident in a Seveso establishment in which a person died. A wide range of prevention measures was 
developed after that (full version available in the implementation report): 

- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 

The staff was updated with the results of the commission investigating the issue; 
Training; 
Informing all carriers that any person in the establishment had to know about these findings; 
Ensuring the control of vehicles weighting more than 3.5 tonnes; 
Securing the removal of selected contaminated soil from the plant; and  
Updating the organisational guideline on occupational safety.  

7.b) IT tools used for monitoring the implementation and data sharing 
The information system referred to in footnote 10  (question 3.a) is an IT platform operated by the Ministry of Environment and 
provides information on the Seveso establishments to the general public.  

7.c) Seveso like provisions applied to other installations and activities (e.g. pipelines, ports, marshalling yards, offshore)  
No response was provided. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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25.  Member State summary sheet - Slovenia 

SLOVENIA                                                                                                                                                                           

Number of establishments: 

Overview of the Slovenia 

Slovenia provided an almost complete 
response with only a minor gap. 

Status of overall implementation: 

The Slovenian response 
indicates that the 
provisions of the Seveso 
II Directive are fully 
implemented. 

Main issues identified: 
None 

Overview of the information reported 

Question 1 - General information 

1.a) Significant changes made to competent authorities or their tasks  
Slovenia reported changing one of the two Competent Authorities that have been mainly responsible for Seveso II 
implementation and enforcement. Due to a reorganisation in the Government, this will now be the Ministry of Environment and 
Spatial Planning (previously: Ministry of Agriculture and the Environment). The other Authority is the Ministry of Defence (it has 
been assumed this has not changed, although it is not specifically stated). The questionnaire response also lists the tasks for 
which both Authorities are responsible. Nothing indicates that this has changed during the reporting period.  

1.b) Establishments subject to Seveso  
There were 61 Seveso establishments in 
Slovenia at the end of 2014, the same number as 
in 2011. However, while in 2011 more than half of 
the establishments belonged to the lower tier, the 
balance has shifted to upper tier in 2014. 

As shown in the chart to the right, Slovenia 
exhibits a relatively high density of 
establishments with more establishments per 
capita and more establishments per km2 than the 
EU average. 

1.c) Activities of Seveso establishments  
The activities with the highest number of establishments at the end of the reporting period were: 

- 
- 
- 

LPG storage (20%); 
Fuel storage (18%); and  
“Other activities” (11%).  

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
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SLOVENIA                                                                                                                                                                           

“Other activities” is the category with the highest number of Seveso establishments in the EU (14%). Also, fuel storage is the 
third most common activity within the EU Seveso establishments (11% of all establishments). Also, the other main categories of 
activities in Slovenia is among the most common in the EU, as LPG storage represents 4% of EU establishments.  

1.d) Seveso establishments covered by the IED (optional) 
Slovenia stated that 25 Seveso establishments are also covered by the IED, without any reported impact.  

Question 2 - Emergency plans 

2.a) & 2.b) Upper-tier establishments 
without external emergency plan 
Slovenia reported that all upper-tier 
establishments (33) have an external 
emergency plan. 

Note: Total 33 upper-tier establishments 

2.c)  Upper-tier establishments without 
external emergency plan tested  
Slovenia stated that all external emergency 
plans were tested during the reporting period. 

2.d) Arrangements for providing information to the public: 

- 
- 

- 

A national public alarm system is in place in case the public cannot be warned by other systems;  
General instruction on how to act is available via the website of the Administration for Civil Protection and Disaster 
Relief (www.urszr.si). Also, national and regional information and notification centres ensure there is up-to-date 
information in case of an event through information bulletins and other media (TV, radio); and  
Procedures on how the public will be alerted are defined in the emergency plans of each establishment.  

2.e) Testing external emergency plans 
All plans have to be tested at least once every three years. The tests can be theoretical, practical or both and may cover one or 
more parts of the plans. Testing methods include: 

- 
- 

Rescue and relief tests involving emergency response staff; and  
Review/testing of contents according to the Regulation implementing the Seveso II Directive in Slovenia. 

The scope can be small (small number of staff covering something specific) or large (international exercises, defence protection 
exercises).  

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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SLOVENIA                                                                                                                                                                           

Question 3 – Information on safety measures 

3.a), 3.b), 3.c), 3.d) Information made actively available 
Operators of upper-tier establishments are responsible for informing the public potentially affected. They do so by sending 
information to them by post. Operators also organise open days for the public to visit their premises. These two ways of direct 
communication between the public and operators are believed to be effective by Slovenia. Because of this, competent 
authorities have not prepared nor distributed any other material about Seveso establishments during the last reporting period. In 
addition to direct communication, the operators’ websites and announcement boards (at their premises) also contain this 
information. As such, the statistical breakdown provided by Slovenia indicates that 100% of the information is provided by 
operators (leaflets sent to affected persons, website, and announcement boards). Slovenia stated that this information was 
made available for around half of the upper-tier establishments (that is, around 16). The supply of this information is monitored 
as part of the inspection controls in place. 

3.e), 3.f), 3.g) Information kept permanently available (optional) 
This question was not answered by Slovenia.  

Question 4 - Inspections 

4.a) Systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards 
Slovenia stated that their inspection system is not based on a 
systematic appraisal. In fact, all upper-tier establishments are 
inspected at least once a year, whereas lower-tier 
establishments are inspected once every 3 years.  

4.b) Programme of inspections available to public 
(optional) 
Inspection authorities publish an annual report which is 
available to the public. 

4.c) Actions taken in the event of accidents, incidents and non-compliance 
Slovenia reports having taken “corrective measures” against seven operators of Seveso establishments. These were requests to 
the operators to comply with certain administrative requirements, mainly related to the availability of information to the public. No 
action was taken as a result of accidents/incidents. 

4.d), 4.e), 4.f)  Data on on-site inspections 
All upper-tier establishments were inspected at least once a year in the last reporting period. Additionally, all lower-tier 
establishments were subject to on-site inspections in the three year period. 

Question 5 – Domino effects 

Establishments relevant for consideration of domino effects are designated by the Competent Authority based on data from the 
safety reports prepared by operators. Establishments within a distance of 700 m from each other are considered to have potential for 
domino effects. These establishments are required to exchange information on the potential effects of accidents and information on 
emergency plans, as well as on information provision to the public. This is monitored during inspections.  

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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SLOVENIA                                                                                                                                                                           

Question 6 – Land-use planning 

Slovenia included the minimisation of the effects of major industrial accidents in its spatial planning policy. According to national 
legislation, there is a buffer distance between Seveso establishments and residential areas called the “influence zone”. Scenarios to 
define this zone (and possible sub-zones therein) are described in the decree on criteria to determine minimum distance between an 
establishment and locations, frequented by the public, and infrastructure. The decree categorises types of buildings and establishes 
their vulnerability, which is then assessed alongside the influence zone of each establishment.  

Question 7 – Further information (optional) 

7.a) Lessons learned from accidents and incidents 
No information was provided. 

7.b) IT tools used for monitoring the implementation and data sharing 
No information was provided. 

7.c) Seveso like provisions applied to other installations and activities (e.g. pipelines, ports, marshalling yards, offshore)  
No information was provided. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
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26.  Member State summary sheet - Spain 

SPAIN                                                                                                                                                                                 

Number of establishments: 

Overview of Spain 

Spain has replied to the majority of the 
questions. However, it did not provide an 
answer to question 4a on inspections.  

Status of overall implementation: 

Spain response indicates 
that the majority of the 
provisions of the Seveso 
II Directive are 
implemented.  

Main issues identified: 
The level of external emergency plans testing 
is low with more than half of the plans have not 
been tested during the reporting period. A 
large number of upper-tier establishments 
were not inspected annually or during the 
reporting period. 

Overview of the information reported 

Question 1 - General information 

1.a) Significant changes made to competent authorities or their tasks  
None were reported by Spain. 

1.b) Establishments subject to Seveso  
There were 832 Seveso establishments in Spain 
at the end of 2014, up from 767 in 2011. Both 
lower and upper-tier establishments increased in 
numbers during that period. 

As shown in the chart to the right, Spain exhibits 
fewer establishments per capita and fewer 
establishments per km2 than the EU average. 
Hence, despite the large overall number of 
establishments in Spain, the number is relatively 
low for a country of Spain’s size. 

1.c) Activities of Seveso establishments  
Spain has provided a statistical breakdown of the activities covered by its Seveso establishments. This does not add up to 100% 
because 9% of the establishments are unclassified (Regional authorities did not provide this information to the national 
Competent Authority).  The most common activity among Seveso establishments in Spain are: 

- 
- 
- 

“Other activities” (16% of the total number of establishments covered by Seveso in Spain); 
LNG production (12%; and  
Bottling and bulk distribution and fuel storage (12%).  

These activities are relatively common at EU level. “Other activities” are the most common category in the EU with 14%, whereas 
fuel storage and LNG production, bottling and bulk distribution cover 11% and 8% of European establishments, respectively. In 
the case of LNG production, bottling and distribution, Spain is the second Member State with the highest number of 
establishments (19% of them) after Italy.   

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
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SPAIN                                                                                                                                                                                 

1.d) Seveso establishments covered by the IED (optional) 
Spain has not replied to this optional question.  

Question 2 - Emergency plans 

2.a) & 2.b) Upper-tier establishments without 
external emergency plan 
For 4 upper-tier establishments Spanish authorities 
decided that an external emergency plan was not 
necessary. Also, a plan was not drafted for 32 other 
upper-tier establishments. Therefore, the total 
amount of upper-tier establishments without an 
external emergency plan is around 10%. Spain did 
not provide an explanation for this.  

Note: Total 377 upper-tier establishments 

2.c) Upper-tier establishments without external 
emergency plan tested  
At the end of the reporting period, the external 
emergency plans of 210 upper-tier establishments 
had not been tested. This is above half of the total 
number of upper-tier establishments in Spain. This 
compares to 25% at EU level.   

2.d) Arrangements for providing information to the public: 

-  Multi-tonal sirens controlled by the Emergency Coordination Centre of each Region; 
- 
-  Warnings through radio and TV programmes as well as social media. 

Fixed public address systems and portable loudspeaker equipment belonging to public intervention services; and  

2.e) Testing external emergency plans 
External emergency plans are tested as follows: 

- 
- 

Desk-based analysis and assessment prior to approval of the plans; and  
Partial or full exercises involving part or all the rescue services.  

The suitability and operability of the plans is assessed after each exercise in evaluation sessions attended by all participants and 
observers. These sessions highlight areas for improvement and corrective measures. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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SPAIN                                                                                                                                                                                 

Question 3 – Information on safety measures 

3.a), 3.b), 3.c), 3.d) Information made actively available 
Competent Authorities are responsible for informing the public in Spain. This is done through face-to-face campaigns targeted at 
specific sectors of the public within the potentially affected area. These campaigns also include leaflets and audio-visual material. 
Spain indicated that there are efforts to keep this information permanently available through the websites of the civil protection 
bodies of each region. As such, the information for 175 (47%) of the upper-tier establishments was made actively available to the 
public at least once during the reporting period. Given that 100% of the information is provided by Competent Authorities, Spain 
has reported a further statistical breakdown of the information provided on the 175 establishments: 

- 
- 
- 
- 
- 

Leaflets/posters: 95%; 
Sessions/talks: 95%; 
Local TV/radio: 35%; 
Social media: 30%; and  
Personal letters: 20%.  

Note that usually the information is provided in more than one way.  Therefore the sum of percentages of the various means is 
more than 100%.The Authorities in charge of distributing the information assess its impact and effectiveness by means of surveys 
and polls. Also, they carry out an analysis of the number of visits to the web pages where the information is held and to the social 
media used. 

3.e), 3.f), 3.g) Information kept permanently available (optional) 
The information for 225 upper-tier establishments (60%) is kept permanently available.  As indicated above, Competent 
Authorities are in charge of publishing and maintaining this information in their websites.  

Question 4 - Inspections 

4.a) Systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards 
Spain stated that each Regional Competent Authority has its 
own inspection programme. Most of them did not provide 
information on the appraisal to inspections. As a result, Spain 
cannot confirm whether any of the Regions are using a 
systematic approach.  

4.b) Programme of inspections available to public 
(optional) 
Spain has not replied to this optional question 

4.c) Actions taken in the event of accidents, incidents and non-compliance 
Spain has adopted the following measures: disclosure requirements, disciplinary proceedings (16 in progress), partial operating 
ban of the establishment (1), and total suspension of operations of the establishment (1).  

4.d), 4.e), 4.f)  Data on on-site inspections 
192 upper-tier establishments (51% of the total number of upper-tier establishments) were inspected annually. Another 103 (27%) 
were inspected at least during the last reporting period. Note that while some of the Regional Competent Authorities in Spain may 
apply systematic appraisal to determine inspection schedules (see 4.a) in which case it would not be absolutely required to 
inspect all establishments annually, the numbers still appear relatively low. 
As for lower-tier establishments, Spain reported inspecting 255 (56%) during the 3-year reporting period.  

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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SPAIN                                                                                                                                                                                 

Question 5 – Domino effects 

Establishments relevant for consideration of domino effects are identified by the competent authority in each Regional Government, 
based on information from the establishments’ safety reports and on criteria established in the Spanish legislation (for details see the 
implementation report submitted by Spain). They communicate this to the Central Government and establishments in question. 
These establishments are required to exchange information on the effects of accidents and information on emergency plans. Also, 
the Regional Governments have promoted the creation of committees among operators involved in domino effects, in order to 
encourage information exchange and participation in joint exercises. 

Question 6 – Land-use planning 

In Spain, the Regional Governments adopt strategies or publish a report on spatial planning which covers this subject, the content of 
which is legally binding. The reports/strategies include risks that can be caused by new Seveso establishments located in populated 
areas and that of growing populations near industrial areas with Seveso establishments, as well as compatibility criteria. The criteria 
is stated to be based on international benchmarks and European guidelines on the subject matter, but no further details have been 
provided 

Question 7 – Further information (optional) 

7.a) Lessons learned from accidents and incidents 
None were reported by Spain 

7.b) IT tools used for monitoring the implementation and data sharing 
Spain reported the launch of an IT database called the National Chemical Hazard Database. This contains information on 
Seveso establishments and provides Competent Authorities with knowledge regarding risk parameters; preventive and control 
measures; provision of information to the public; external emergency plans; and lessons learned. 

7.c) Seveso like provisions applied to other installations and activities (e.g. pipelines, ports, marshalling yards, 
offshore)  
None were reported by Spain 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
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27.  Member State summary sheet - Sweden 

SWEDEN                                                                                                                                                                              

Number of establishments: 

Overview of Sweden 

Overall, Sweden provided a complete 
response. 

Status of overall implementation: 

Sweden’s response 
indicates that most of the 
provisions of the Seveso 
II Directive are fully 
implemented.  

Main issues identified: 
Missing external emergency plans for 9 
establishments 
Low level of tests of external emergency plans  

Overview of the information reported 

Question 1 - General information 

1.a) Significant changes made to competent authorities or their tasks  
None were reported by Sweden. 

1.b) Establishments subject to Seveso  
There were 400 Seveso establishments in 
Sweden at the end of 2014, up from 381 in 
2011. This is due to an increasing number of 
lower tier and to a smaller extent upper-tier 
establishments. 

As shown in the chart to the right, Sweden 
exhibits much fewer establishments per capita 
but much more establishments per km2 than 
the EU average. 

1.c) Activities of Seveso establishments  
No statistical breakdown using the SPIRS categories was available. 

1.d) Seveso establishments covered by the IED (optional) 
No information was provided.  

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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SWEDEN                                                                                                                                                                              

Question 2 - Emergency plans 

2.a) & 2.b) Upper-tier establishments without 
external emergency plan 
Swedish Competent Authorities did not decide 
that external emergency plans were not 
necessary in any case. However, these plans 
were not drawn up for 14 upper-tier 
establishments (7% of all upper-tier 
establishments in Sweden, as opposed to 9% at 
EU level). Sweden stated that one of them 
closed down and four were new, whereas the 
other nine should have met this requirement. 
Sweden did not indicate taking enforcement 
measures against them.  

2.c) Upper-tier establishments without 
external emergency plan tested  
At the end of the reporting period, 120 upper-tier 
establishments’ external emergency plans had 
not been tested (57% of the upper-tier 
establishments in Sweden, as opposed to 25% 
at EU level). Sweden did not provide any 
comment on this issue. 

Note: Total 211 upper-tier establishments 

2.d) Arrangements for providing information to the public: 

- 

Announcements on TV and radio, alarms. There are three types of messages: information, warning and ‘all clear’.  

2.e) Testing external emergency plans 
All plans are meant to be tested at least once every three years. Type of tests reported: 

- 

- 

Partial and full practical tests involving emergency response staff. Sometimes, these are at large scale, involving 
several establishments; and  
Partial and full desk based exercises reviewing decision routes and management.  

Small scale exercises may not be reported to Authorities, hence Sweden believes that the data on testing may be 
underestimated. There are not established criteria at national level to decide whether plans are adequate. Sweden is making 
efforts to improve its knowledge of inspection systems in order to improve and standardise these.  

Question 3 – Information on safety measures 

3.a), 3.b), 3.c), 3.d) Information made actively available 
Municipalities are in charge of providing information to the public that may be affected by a major industrial accident, although 
costs have to be borne by the operators. Brochures are sent to the public, and announcements are made in local newspapers and 
the radio. Information about what to do in the case of such an accident is permanently available online (operators’ and 
municipalities’ websites). In total, the information was made available for 143 upper-tier establishments (68%). Although a specific 
statistical breakdown was not provided, it can be calculated. In 100% of cases, authorities (municipalities) provided the 
information to the public, whereas operators contributed to 26%. This was complemented by announcements in 10 county 
administrative boards and permanent information on the operators’ and municipalities’ websites. The submission of information is 
verified as part of the inspection procedures. 

3.e), 3.f), 3.g) Information kept permanently available (optional) 
Information not provided.   

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
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SWEDEN                                                                                                                                                                              

Question 4 - Inspections 

4.a) Systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards 
The length and frequency of inspections are based on the 
systematic appraisal of the following criteria: 

4.b) Programme of inspections available to public 
(optional) 
No information was provided.  

- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 

Administrative data; 
Characteristics of the surrounding area; 
Type of substances and quantities handled; 
Risk conditions; 
Existence of preventive measures; 
Information supplied to the public; 
Date of external and internal emergency plans; 
Date of the last inspection; and  
Occurrence of accidents. 

This information is obtained from the safety reports.  

4.c) Actions taken in the event of accidents, incidents and non-compliance 
The main types of actions are injunctions and prohibitions. These can be combined with fines or penalties. The response does not 
indicate whether any of these actions were taken during the reporting period. 

4.d), 4.e), 4.f)  Data on on-site inspections 
30 (14%) of the upper-tier establishments were inspected at least once every 12 months. Another 159 were inspected at least 
once between 2012 and 2014. Note that Sweden applies systematic appraisal to determine inspection schedules (see 4.a) and as 
such it is it is not absolutely required to inspect all establishments annually.  
In addition to that, 154 lower-tier establishments were inspected during the reporting period (81% of the 189 lower-tier 
establishments at the end of 2014).  

Question 5 – Domino effects 

Operators are obliged to consider domino effects. These shall be identified in the environmental impact assessment (prior to the 
establishment of the site) and safety report. Inspection authorities can assist operators in identifying domino effects. In order to do 
this, authorities use safety reports and other general information. In the case of EIA, the EIA Regulations are linked with the 
regulations implementing the Seveso II Directive, ensuring that operators take domino effects into account when drafting the EIA, 
which has to be approved. The implementation report contains an example of how information on possible domino effects was 
exchanged between various upper-tier Seveso establishments and how local authorities were also involved. An issue identified in the 
example is the operators’ different risk awareness, as some may identify domino effects while others may not consider the existence 
of potential issues.  

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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SWEDEN                                                                                                                                                                              

Question 6 – Land-use planning 

Sweden stated that its national legislation on spatial planning and environment contains basic requirements for the consideration of 
suitable locations for each purpose. This is complemented by additional guidance on appropriate safety distances between major 
hazard sites and other developments prepared by the National Board on Housing, Building and Planning supported by other 
Authorities.  

Question 7 – Further information (optional) 

No response was provided to this optional question. 

                      
 
 
 
 
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28.  Member State summary sheet – United Kingdom 

UNITED KINGDOM                                                                                                                                                                           

Overview of the United Kingdom 

Overall, the United Kingdom provided a 
complete response. 

Number of establishments: 

Status of overall implementation: 

The United Kingdom 
response indicates that 
the provisions of the 
Seveso II Directive are 
fully implemented. 

Main issues identified: 
None 

Overview of the information reported 

Question 1 - General information 

1.a) Significant changes made to competent authorities or their tasks  
Two relevant changes were reported by the United Kingdom, namely the introduction of a new agency in Wales (Natural 
Resources Wales) and the transfer of the Health & Safety enforcement responsibility at nuclear licensed sites to the Office for 
Nuclear Regulation (ONR). 

1.b) Establishments subject to Seveso  
There were 924 Seveso establishments in the 
UK at the end of 2014, down from 1086 in 
2011. This is due to a decreasing number of 
lower-tier and to a lesser extent upper-tier 
establishments. 

As shown in the chart to the right, the UK 
exhibits fewer establishments per capita but 
more establishments per km2 than the EU 
average.  

.

1.c) Activities of Seveso establishments  
No statistical breakdown using the SPIRS categories was available. The UK has used a classification system based on NACE 
codes. 56% of the establishments in the UK were classified in the “manufacturing” section. 17% were classified under “wholesale 
and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles. A further 12% were classified in “transportation and storage”. More 
specifically: 

- 
- 
- 

15% (132) of establishments were classified under NACE class 46.71 (wholesale of solid, liquid and gaseous fuels); 
9% (85) of establishments were classified under NACE code 20.59 (manufacture of other chemicals); and  
9% (83) of establishments were classified under NACE class 52.10 (warehousing and storage). 

1.d) Seveso establishments covered by the IED (optional) 
The United Kingdom has not answered this optional question. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
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UNITED KINGDOM                                                                                                                                                                           

Question 2 - Emergency plans 

2.a) & 2.b) Upper-tier establishments without 
external emergency plan 
For 7 upper-tier establishments the UK authorities 
decided that an external emergency plan was not 
needed because their safety reports indicated that 
the consequences of a major accident would not 
extend beyond the sites’ boundaries. In addition to 
this, 20 upper-tier establishments failed to produce 
an external emergency plan. According to UK 
authorities, 11 of these establishments became 
upper-tier during 2014 and have one year to 
complete the plans. The remaining 9 establishments 
were due to complete them during 2015. 

2.c) Upper-tier establishments without external 
emergency plan tested  
At the end of the reporting period, 53 upper-tier 
establishments’ external emergency plans had not 
been tested (15% of the upper-tier establishments in 
the UK and 4% of the total number of upper-tier 
establishments in this situation in the EU).  
Of these, 18 were tested at the beginning of 2015, 
with other 7 due to be tested before the end of that 
year. 11 establishments became upper-tier in 2014 
and did not need to draft these plans until a year 
later. UK authorities stated that they were seeking 
information about the remaining upper-tier 
establishments and would take the appropriate action 
once they have more information.  

Note: Total 352 upper-tier establishments 

2.d) Arrangements for providing information to the public: 

- 
- 
- 

- 

- 

There is no centralised alert system in the UK. The UK stated that its guidelines recommend the use of on-site alarms; 
Local TV and radio companies distribute information in an event of an accident; 
The police is responsible for warning and informing the public in the initial stages. Arrangements for response are 
integrated in local emergency plans (the description of alert systems could be done at that level); 
Those liable to be affected by a Seveso accident (i.e. all addresses within a “public information zone”) are provided with 
information via a letter and leaflet sent to their addresses. This contains information on what action to take in case of a 
major accident (although this was responded under 2.d), it is a preparatory measure rather than a response measure); 
and  
Arrangements for coping with off-site effects from accidents are integrated with wider emergency planning, which 
involves the participation of various authorities, namely the police, firefighters, Local Authority Emergency Planners, 
hospitals, Public Health Authorities. Each authority has a different role in an event of an accident.  

2.e) Testing external emergency plans 
In the UK, external emergency plans are tested as follows: 

Full tests (live exercises); 
Table-top exercises based on scenarios identified in the safety report; 

- 
- 
-  Walk-through exercises including visiting appropriate facilities such as emergency control centres (ECCs); 
- 

Seminars facilitating discussion about the different organisations’ responses in particular circumstances during an 
emergency; and  
Control post exercises testing the communication arrangements during an emergency. 
Testing is agreed locally to maximise the benefit of Local Authorities. UK authorities expect each of the elements above 
to be tested at least once every three years, recognising that some (e.g. ‘control post exercises’) should be tested more 
frequently.  

- 

The elements to be tested are the completeness, consistency and accuracy of the plans as well as the adequacy and 
competence of the equipment, facilities and staff involved. Criteria used to consider whether the plans are adequate are: whether 
the plan complies with the relevant article and annex of the Directive, whether it is informed by the major hazard scenarios 
provided by the operator, whether the relevant statutory consultees have been consulted, and whether it is coherent with the 
internal emergency plan. Also, it is assessed whether local authorities have followed the best practice guidelines.  

                      
 
 
 
 
 
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UNITED KINGDOM                                                                                                                                                                           

Question 3 – Information on safety measures 

3.a), 3.b), 3.c), 3.d) Information made actively available 
Information on actions to be taken in the event of a Seveso accident are provided to all addresses in the public information 
zones (PIZ), which are determined according to the likelihood and effects of potential accidents at Seveso establishments. The 
information is supplied by the operator, which is informed by the authorities of the extension of its PIZ. Also, Local Authorities 
may distribute this information if agreed with the operator. The form and content is not specified, but it is expected that the text 
will be simple, understandable and accompanied by illustrations. If it is deemed necessary, authorities advise operators of the 
need for translating the information into other languages.  

The UK has stated that almost 90% of its upper-tier establishments provide information within their PIZ. The UK has provided 
explanations for the 41 that have not done so. 27 do not have to inform the public (as there is no off-site risk or no population 
within their PIZ), 4 did not have external emergency plan at the end of the reporting period, and for 10 it was not clear whether 
the information had been provided. The UK has provided a statistical breakdown of how the information was provided: 

- 
- 
- 
- 

Operator’s leaflets/flyers: 34%; 
Email / SMS / Telephone Alert: 5%; 
Safety Booklet / Newsletter: 33%; and  
Other: e.g. Emergency/Safety Card, calendars etc.: 28%.  

UK authorities ensure that this information is actually provided through their inspection procedures.  

3.e), 3.f), 3.g) Information kept permanently available (optional) 
No information was provided  

Question 4 - Inspections 

4.a) Systematic appraisal of major-accident hazards 
The length and frequency of inspections are based on the 
systematic appraisal of the following criteria: 

4.b) Programme of inspections available to public 
(optional) 
Not answered. 

- 

- 

Follow-up issues identified in the safety report or in a 
previous inspection; and  
Parameters such as the age of a plant, safety 
performance indicators, the prevention of loss of 
containment of dangerous substances or competence 
issues. 

Competent authorities have a system to assist local authorities 
in deciding inspection priorities and define the establishments 
that will be inspected. Plans assess operators’ risk management 
by sampling and testing in critical areas. 

4.c) Actions taken in the event of accidents, incidents and non-compliance 
The main actions used were prosecution (in the most serious cases), prohibition notices (which may be immediate or deferred), 
and improvement notices issued by inspectors. For minor breaches, verbal warnings, followed by a letter were used.  

4.d), 4.e), 4.f)  Data on on-site inspections 
Between 86% and 89% of upper-tier establishments were inspected annually during the last reporting period. The majority (>99%) 
of the upper-tier establishments were inspected at least once during 2012-2014. In addition to this, 526 lower-tier establishments 
were inspected.  Data was provided for each year in the reporting period. 

Upper-tier annual inspection 

Total upper-tier 

2012 

312 

352 

Percentage of upper-tier with annual inspection 

89% 

2013 

303 

352 

86% 

2014 

306 

352 

87% 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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UNITED KINGDOM                                                                                                                                                                           

Question 5 – Domino effects 

Domino sites are designated by the Health & Safety Executive (HSE) on behalf of each Competent Authority. A contour (consultation 
distance, CD) is allocated to each establishment for land use planning purposes and is the basis for defining domino groups where 
its physical boundaries overlaps with the CD of other sites. Authorities inform all ‘domino’ operators and encourage them to 
exchange information, often advising of the type of information that should be exchanged. The information should be incorporated in 
the safety report. Compliance with this is checked during the safety report assessment process. Also, authorities may require 
operators to inform them of the information that has been circulated to other members of the ‘domino’ group. Operators shall check 
whether action should be taken according to the new information received from other domino sites. Authorities shall check if the 
information has been incorporated in the review of the safety reports (upper-tier) and during inspections (lower-tier). The system has 
been in place for a number of years and is now being updated to incorporate additional requirements from Seveso III.  

Question 6 – Land-use planning 

Major accident prevention policy has been incorporated in land use planning through different Regulations applicable to each of the 
regions of the UK (England and Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland). In all cases, this was incorporated before 1996. Administration 
and enforcement lies with Hazardous Substances Authorities, which are often the Local Planning Authorities. They are in charge of 
giving consent to establishments willing to keep hazardous substances as well as to anyone interested in developing the land in the 
vicinity of Seveso establishments. HSE alone or with the relevant environmental authority (EA, NRW, SEPA, and NIEA) depending 
on the issues to be assessed determine the compatibility of the developments with their proposed location. For the developments, 
zones of influence of each establishments are defined (inner, middle, outer) and HSE has defined criteria of which are compatible 
within each zone. Authorities introduced an additional Development Proximity Zone (DPZ) at all sites with large-scale petrol storage 
tanks. 

Question 7 – Further information (optional) 

7.a) Lessons learned from accidents and incidents 
No information was provided. 

7.b) IT tools used for monitoring the implementation and data sharing 
No information was provided. 

7.c) Seveso like provisions applied to other installations and activities (e.g. pipelines, ports, marshalling yards, 
offshore)  
No information was provided. 

                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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© Amec Foster Wheeler Environment & Infrastructure UK Limited 

Appendix C  
Remaining gaps in Member States’ reports 

The following gaps were identified as remaining and no response was received from Member States at time 
of reporting.  

Question  Completeness 

Justification 

Information requested 

Impact 
of the 
gap 

level 

Greece 

1.c 

2.e 

3.b 

3.c 

3.d 

4.c 

4.d 

4.e 

May 2017 
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Greece has provided a list of all establishments 
based on the eSPIRS categories, however two 
establishments listed as: ‘chemical installations – 
solvents’ which category could not be match with 
eSPIRS. 

Can Greece check this and 
clarify to which eSPIRS sector  

Low 

The response does not include information / criteria 
used in order to assess that the external emergency 
plan are deemed adequate.  

Can Greece clarify its response 
to question 2.e? 

Medium 

Greece response is ‘no information available so far’, 
it is unclear whether this indicates that there is no 
information on how many upper tier establishments 
had information been made actively available or 
whether this is the response to the question 
indicating that no been made actively available. 

Greece has not provided a statistical breakdown as 
required in the question 

Can Greece clarify the meaning 
of its response to question 3.2 

Medium 

Medium 

Can Greece provide statistical 
breakdown as requested for:  
 

the entities (by whom) 
making information 
available and 
the means by which the 
information is made 
available 

 

Greece indicated that no information is available on 
the systems in place to monitor that information has 
been supplied. We will assume that this means there 
is no systems in place to monitor that the information 
has been supplied 

Can Greece indicate whether 
this assumption is not correct? 

Low 

Greece response indicates this is not applicable 
because they were no major accidents, however the 
question also asks about incidents and non-
compliance events. 

Can Greece confirm that there 
were no accident, incident or 
non-compliance during the 
reporting period 

Greece’s response indicates the number of upper 
tier establishments and the number of inspection 
carried out during the reporting period but not the 
number of establishments’ subject to on-site 
inspection every twelve months as requested. 

Can Greece indicate how many 
establishments’ were subject to 
on-site inspection every twelve 
months? 

Medium 

Medium 

The answer seems to respond to question 4.d, but 
also contradicts the information presented in 
response to 4.d (i.e. all upper tier establishment 
inspected, but 55 inspections for 83 upper tier 
establishments). 

Can Greece clarify this 
response and the response to 
4.d 

Medium 

 
                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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© Amec Foster Wheeler Environment & Infrastructure UK Limited 

Question  Completeness 

Justification 

Information requested 

level 

6 

Croatia 

2.a 

2.b 

2.d 

2.e 

4.d / 4.e 

Latvia 

2.e 

4.a 

Sweden 

3.c 

4.d/ 4.e 

Impact 
of the 
gap 

Medium 

The response from Greece describes a pilot project, 
however it does not include information on how the 
objectives of article 12 are usually ensured 

Can Greece complete its 
response to the question by 
adding information on how the 
objectives of article 12 are 
usually ensured 

The wording of the response is unclear, Croatia 
indicated that the need for external emergency plan 
applied to all upper tier installations. As a result we 
interpreted this as meaning the response to 2.a is:0 

The response from Croatia indicates the number of 
regional authorities that have not drafted plans yet 
but not the number of upper tier establishments 
concerned. 

The response does not contain information on alert 
systems. 

Can Croatia confirm that our 
understanding is correct? 

Low 

Can Croatia indicate the 
number of upper tier 
establishments for which the 
external emergency plan has 
not been drafted? 

Medium 

Can Croatia indicate whether it 
has any alert systems as part of 
arrangements for providing the 
public with specific information? 

Low 

The response does not include information on the 
criteria used for adequacy of the way external 
emergency plans in incomplete. 

Can Croatia indicate how the 
test is being considered 
adequate? 

The total numbers reported in response to 4.d and 
4.e (35) is higher than the total number of upper tier 
establishments (25). 

Can Croatia verify the data 
provided in response to 
question 4.d and 4.e 

The response indicates that the external emergency 
plans are tested according to a legislation.  

The response indicates that the criteria used are 
contained in the national legislation with no 
reference on the content of the legislation. 

Can Latvia provide details on 
the provisions of the legislation 
which are relevant to this 
question, including examples of 
criteria being used 

Can Latvia provide details on 
the provisions of the legislation 
which are relevant to this 
question, including examples of 
criteria being used 

The response provides data on information made 
available, however it is not clear whether this is 
information made available by the entity listed. 
Furthermore there is no information on the means by 
which the information is made available 

Can Sweden provide statistical 
breakdown as requested for:  
 

the entities (by whom) 
making information 
available and 
the means by which the 
information is made 
available 

 

Medium 

Medium 

Medium 

Medium 

Medium 

The total numbers reported in response to 4.d and 
4.e (189) matches the number of lower tier 
establishments whilst it leaves 22 upper tier 
establishments not accounted for. 

Can Sweden check that the 
data indicated in response to 
questions 4.d and 4.e relate to 
upper-tier establishments? 

Medium 

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© Amec Foster Wheeler Environment & Infrastructure UK Limited 

Appendix D  
Data reported by Member States 

The data reported by Member States in response to question 1(b) of the implementation questionnaire are 
presented in the table below.   

Member State 

Lower-tier 
establishments 

Percentage of 
lower-tier 
establishments 

Upper-tier 
establishments 

Percentage of 
upper-tier 
establishments 

Total 
establishments 

AT 

BE 

BG 

CY 

CZ 

DE 

DK 

EE 

EL 

ES 

FI 

FR 

HR 

HU 

IE 

IT 

LT 

LU 

LV 

MT 

NL 

PL 

PT 

RO 

SE 

76 

179 

109 

9 

90 

2 123 

67 

27 

110 

455 

165 

539 

32 

134 

48 

545 

24 

10 

34 

3 

154 

212 

124 

183 

189 

51% 

47% 

56% 

41% 

43% 

65% 

55% 

42% 

57% 

55% 

55% 

46% 

56% 

56% 

50% 

49% 

57% 

56% 

54% 

25% 

38% 

54% 

68% 

60% 

47% 

72 

204 

86 

13 

117 

1 141 

54 

37 

83 

377 

135 

639 

25 

105 

48 

567 

18 

8 

29 

9 

252 

180 

59 

120 

211 

49% 

53% 

44% 

59% 

57% 

35% 

45% 

58% 

43% 

45% 

45% 

54% 

44% 

44% 

50% 

51% 

43% 

44% 

46% 

75% 

62% 

46% 

32% 

40% 

53% 

148 

383 

195 

22 

207 

3 264 

121 

64 

193 

832 

300 

1 178 

57 

239 

96 

1 112 

42 

18 

63 

12 

406 

392 

183 

303 

400 

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© Amec Foster Wheeler Environment & Infrastructure UK Limited 

Member State 

Lower-tier 
establishments 

Percentage of 
lower-tier 
establishments 

Upper-tier 
establishments 

Percentage of 
upper-tier 
establishments 

Total 
establishments 

SI 

SK 

UK 

28 

38 

572 

EU-28 

6 279 

46% 

46% 

62% 

56% 

33 

44 

352 

5 018 

54% 

54% 

38% 

44% 

61 

82 

924 

11 297 

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© Amec Foster Wheeler Environment & Infrastructure UK Limited 

Appendix E  
Data on establishments – eSPIRS 

The tables below present the figures used to develop the charts describing the distribution of Seveso establishments, upper and lower tiers, per Member 
State. 

MS 

2012 

LT_12 

UT_12 

TOT_12  GDP_2012* 

POP_12* 

SUP_12 

Austria 

64 

80 

144 

317 117,0 

8 451 860 

83 879 

Belgium 

189 

192 

381 

387 447,0 

11 161 642 

30 528 

Bulgaria 

Cyprus 

Czech 
Republic 

Denmark 

Estonia 

59 

6 

91 

65 

25 

37 

10 

96 

16 

41 693,3 

7 284 552 

110 900 

19 468,9 

865 878 

9 251 

104 

195 

161 434,3 

10 516 125 

78 866 

44 

25 

109 

252 915,2 

5 602 628 

42 895 

50 

17 934,9 

1 320 174 

45 227 

Finland 

136 

128 

264 

199 793,0 

5 426 674 

338 432 

France 

553 

553 

1106 

2 086 929,0 

65 600 350 

632 834 

Germany 

1060 

1081 

2141 

2 758 260,0 

80 523 746 

357 137 

Greece 

135 

83 

83 

191 203,9 

11 003 615 

131 957 

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MS 

2012 

Hungary 

Ireland 

80 

53 

64 

34 

144 

98 972,8 

9 908 798 

93 024 

87 

175 753,6 

4 591 087 

69 797 

Italy 

562 

538 

1100 

1 613 265,0 

59 685 227 

301 336 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

33 

24 

Luxembourg  12 

Malta 

5 

30 

17 

9 

6 

63 

41 

21 

11 

21 982,7 

2 023 825 

64 562 

33 334,7 

2 971 905 

65 300 

43 574,1 

537 039 

2 586 

7 208,8 

421 364 

316 

Netherlands 

163 

221 

384 

645 164,0 

16 779 575 

41 540 

Poland 

194 

166 

360 

389 273,3 

38 062 535 

312 679 

Portugal 

109 

58 

167 

168 398,0 

10 487 289 

92 212 

Romania 

162 

115 

277 

133 511,4 

20 020 074 

238 391 

Slovakia 

Slovenia 

41 

36 

41 

24 

82 

60 

72 420,0 

5 410 836 

49 036 

36 002,5 

2 058 821 

20 273 

Spain 

371 

260 

631 

1 039 758,0 

46 727 890 

505 991 

Sweden 

168 

194 

362 

423 340,7 

9 555 893 

438 576 

UK 

687 

395 

1082 

2 065 736,8 

63 905 297 

248 528 

Source: European Commission, JRC, 2016 

9457 

500 904 699 

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© Amec Foster Wheeler Environment & Infrastructure UK Limited 

2013 

2014 

MS 

LT_13 

UT_13 

TOT_13  GDP_2013* 

POP_13* 

SUP_13 

LT_14 

UT_14 

TOT_14  GDP_2014* 

POP_14* 

SUP_14 

Austria 

64 

80 

144 

322 539,2 

8 506 889 

83 879 

64 

80 

144 

330 417,6 

8 576 261 

83 879 

Belgium 

179 

196 

375 

392 675,0 

11 203 992 

30 528 

170 

202 

372 

400 408,0 

11 208 986 

30 528 

Bulgaria 

Cyprus 

Czech 
Republic 

Denmark 

Estonia 

Finland 

France 

97 

6 

91 

65 

25 

136 

553 

169 

41 911,8 

7 245 677 

110 900 

105 

72 

10 

16 

18 064,6 

858 000 

9 251 

104 

195 

157 741,6 

10 512 419 

78 866 

44 

25 

109 

255 235,4 

5 627 235 

42 916 

50 

18 890,1 

1 315 819 

45 227 

76 

10 

181 

42 750,9 

7 202 198 

111 002 

16 

17 393,7 

847 008 

9 251 

104 

195 

156 660,0 

10 538 275 

78 867 

44 

25 

109 

260 581,6 

5 659 715 

42 921 

50 

19 758,3 

1 313 271 

45 227 

6 

91 

65 

25 

128 

264 

203 338,0 

5 451 270 

338 435 

136 

128 

264 

205 364,0 

5 471 753 

338 435 

553 

1106 

2 115 256,0 

65 889 148 

632 834 

553 

553 

1106 

2 139 964,0 

66 415 161 

633 187 

Germany 

1238 

1160 

2398 

2 826 240,0 

80 767 463 

357 168 

1238 

1160 

2398 

2 923 930,0 

81 197 537 

357 340 

Greece 

135 

84 

64 

34 

219 

180 389,0 

10 926 807 

131 957 

135 

144 

101 273,3 

9 877 365 

93 024 

87 

180 209,3 

4 605 501 

69 797 

80 

47 

84 

64 

47 

219 

177 559,4 

10 858 018 

131 957 

144 

104 239,1 

9 855 571 

93 024 

94 

193 159,6 

4 628 949 

69 797 

80 

53 

555 

588 

1143 

1 604 477,9 

60 782 668 

302 073 

551 

586 

1137 

1 611 884,0 

60 795 612 

302 073 

33 

24 

30 

17 

63 

41 

22 805,2 

2 001 468 

64 573 

34 962,2 

2 943 472 

65 300 

33 

24 

30 

17 

63 

41 

23 580,9 

1 986 096 

64 573 

36 444,4 

2 921 262 

65 300 

Hungary 

Ireland 

Italy 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

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2013 

Luxembourg  12 

Malta 

5 

9 

6 

21 

11 

46 541,1 

549 680 

2 586 

7 671,3 

425 384 

316 

2014 

9 

5 

9 

6 

18 

11 

48 897,5 

562 958 

2 586 

8 092,9 

429 344 

316 

Netherlands 

163 

221 

384 

652 748,0 

16 829 289 

41 540 

174 

221 

395 

663 008,0 

16 900 726 

41 540 

Poland 

194 

166 

360 

394 601,8 

38 017 856 

312 679 

193 

169 

362 

410 856,3 

38 005 614 

312 679 

Portugal 

109 

58 

167 

170 269,3 

10 427 301 

92 212 

109 

58 

167 

173 446,2 

10 374 822 

92 225 

Romania 

183 

114 

297 

144 253,5 

19 947 311 

238 391 

182 

114 

296 

150 230,1 

19 870 647 

238 391 

Slovakia 

Slovenia 

39 

36 

42 

24 

81 

60 

73 835,1 

5 415 949 

49 036 

35 917,1 

2 061 085 

20 273 

39 

36 

42 

24 

81 

60 

75 560,5 

5 421 349 

49 035 

37 332,4 

2 062 874 

20 273 

Spain 

371 

260 

631 

1 025 634,0 

46 512 199 

505 991 

371 

260 

631 

1 037 025,0 

46 449 565 

505 970 

Sweden 

168 

194 

362 

435 752,1 

9 644 864 

438 576 

168 

194 

362 

432 691,1 

9 747 355 

438 574 

UK 

687 

395 

1082 

2 048 328,0 

64 351 155 

248 528 

687 

395 

1082 

2 260 804,8 

64 767 115 

248 528 

Source: European Commission, JRC, 2016  

9979 

502 697 266 

9998 

13942040 

504 068 042 

4 407 477 

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LT_14 

UT_14 

TOT_14 

SUP_14 

LTvsSUP 

UTvsSUP 

TOTvsSUP 

316 

15,82 

18,99 

34,81 

State 

Malta 

Belgium 

5 

170 

Netherlands 

174 

Luxembourg 

9 

6 

202 

221 

9 

11 

372 

395 

18 

30 528 

5,57 

41 540 

4,19 

2 586 

3,48 

6,62 

5,32 

3,48 

3,25 

1,59 

1,94 

1,18 

1,03 

1,32 

0,63 

0,87 

1,08 

0,95 

0,64 

0,86 

0,68 

0,69 

0,67 

0,51 

0,48 

0,54 

0,55 

0,46 

0,44 

0,38 

0,26 

12,19 

9,51 

6,96 

6,71 

4,35 

3,76 

2,96 

2,54 

2,47 

1,81 

1,75 

1,73 

1,72 

1,66 

1,65 

1,63 

1,55 

1,35 

1,25 

1,24 

1,16 

1,11 

0,98 

0,83 

0,78 

0,63 

Germany 

1238 

1160 

2398 

357 340 

3,46 

United 
Kingdom 

687 

395 

1082 

248 528 

2,76 

Italy 

551 

586 

1137 

302 073 

1,82 

Slovenia 

Denmark 

Czech 
Republic 

Portugal 

France 

Cyprus 

Austria 

Greece 

Slovakia 

Bulgaria 

Hungary 

Ireland 

Spain 

Romania 

Poland 

Estonia 

Latvia 

Sweden 

Finland 

Lithuania 

36 

65 

91 

109 

553 

6 

64 

135 

39 

105 

80 

47 

371 

182 

193 

25 

33 

168 

136 

24 

24 

44 

104 

58 

553 

10 

80 

84 

42 

76 

64 

47 

260 

114 

169 

25 

30 

194 

128 

17 

60 

109 

195 

20 273 

1,78 

42 921 

1,51 

78 867 

1,15 

167 

92 225 

1,18 

1106 

633 187 

0,87 

16 

144 

219 

81 

181 

144 

94 

631 

296 

362 

50 

63 

362 

264 

41 

9 251 

0,65 

83 879 

0,76 

131 957 

1,02 

49 035 

0,80 

111 002 

0,95 

93 024 

0,86 

69 797 

0,67 

505 970 

0,73 

238 391 

0,76 

312 679 

0,62 

45 227 

0,55 

64 573 

0,51 

438 574 

0,38 

338 435 

0,40 

65 300 

0,37 

Source: European Commission, JRC, 2016 

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    F1 

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Appendix F  
Major accidents database results 

The table below presents the data from the analysis of the database and compared to EU data. 

Data 

2000-2002 

2003-2005 

2006-2008 

2009-2011 

2012-2014 

2000-2014 

Population (inhabitants) 

489 121 176 

494 228 687 

499 931 464 

504 416 388 

507 164 733 

GDP (thousands of billions of $) 

9,158 

13,298 

17,337 

17,429 

17,917 

Number of major accidents eMARS 

Number of major accidents ARIA 

Number of major accidents ZEMA 

Number of major accidents EM-DAT 

Merged databases* 

Merged databases per million population 

Merged databases per GDP (thousands of 
billions of $) 

Note *: this excludes duplicates as far as possible 

The table above shows that: 

79 

73 

77 

4 

169 

0,346 

18,454 

80 

97 

78 

2 

199 

0,403 

14,964 

79 

67 

74 

1 

174 

0,348 

10,037 

47 

76 

57 

1 

150 

0,297 

8,606 

25 

54 

56 

1 

121 

0,239 

6,753 

310 

367 

342 

9 

813 

  The numbers of major accidents reported in eMARS and reported in the other databases is not the same. There are major accidents recorded in 

ARIA and ZEMA that are not reported to eMARS. This observation might be explained by remark (2) on the previous page; and  

  There is a decrease in the number of reported major accidents since the 2003-2005 period, with a significant reduction of about 25 major 

accidents less reported during the three periods 2006-2008, 2009-2011 and 2012-2014 if we consider the consolidated database. It seems that 
for the two last periods in the eMARS database not all data collected have been made available. 

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    F2 

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Data 

2000-2002 

2003-2005 

2006-2008 

2009-2011 

2012-2014 

2000-2014 

Population 

489 121 176 

494 228 687 

499 931 464 

504 416 388 

507 164 733 

GDP (thousands of billions of $) 

9,158 

13,298 

17,337 

17,429 

17,917 

eMARS 

eMARS per million population 

eMARS per GDP (thousands of billions 
of $) 

79 

0,162 

8,626 

80 

0,162 

6,016 

79 

0,158 

4,557 

47 

0,093 

2,697 

25 

0,049 

1,395 

310 

Data 

2000-2002 

2003-2005 

2006-2008 

2009-2011 

2012-2014 

2000-2014 

Population (inhabitants) 

19 405 800 

20 139 200 

20 924 900 

22 021 158 

23 103 231 

GDP (thousands of billions of $) 

0,574 

0,706 

1,400 

2,163 

2,448 

Number of major accidents ARIA 

Merged databases* 

0 

0 

Merged databases per million population 

0,000 

Merged databases per GDP (thousands of 
billions of $) 

0 

Note *: this excludes duplicates as far as possible 

2 

2 

0,099 

2,831 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

2 

2 

0,000 

0,000 

0,000 

0 

0 

0 

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    F3 

© Amec Foster Wheeler Environment & Infrastructure UK Limited 

Data 

2000-2002 

2003-2005 

2006-2008 

2009-2011 

2012-2014 

2000-2014 

Population (inhabitants) 

178 417 143 

186 074 314 

192 750 819 

198 611 030 

204 246 286 

GDP (thousands of billions of $) 

0,574 

0,706 

1,400 

2,163 

2,448 

Number of major accidents ARIA 

Number of major accidents EM-DAT 

Merged databases* 

2 

0 

Merged databases per million population 

0,000 

Merged databases per GDP (thousands of 
billions of $) 

0 

Note *: this excludes duplicates as far as possible 

2 

2 

0,099 

2,831 

0 

0 

1 

0 

2 

0 

0,000 

0,000 

0,000 

0 

0 

0 

7 

0 

2 

Data 

2000-2002 

2003-2005 

2006-2008 

2009-2011 

2012-2014 

2000-2014 

Population (inhabitants) 

31 071 200 

31 994 333 

32 901 402 

33 992 208 

35 150 211 

GDP (thousands of billions of $) 

0,746 

1,028 

1,443 

1,591 

1,815 

Number of major accidents ARIA 

Number of major accidents EM-DAT 

Merged databases* 

4 

4 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

0 

0 

4 

4 

10 

1 

10 

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    F4 

© Amec Foster Wheeler Environment & Infrastructure UK Limited 

Data 

2000-2002 

2003-2005 

2006-2008 

2009-2011 

2012-2014 

2000-2014 

Merged databases per million population 

0,129 

Merged databases per GDP (thousands of 
billions of $) 

5,365 

Note *: this excludes duplicates as far as possible 

0,031 

0,972 

0,030 

0,693 

0,000 

0,000 

0,114 

2,204 

Data 

2000-2002 

2003-2005 

2006-2008 

2009-2011 

2012-2014 

2000-2014 

Population (inhabitants) 

1 271 631 667 

1 296 065 000 

1 317 853 333 

1 337 698 333 

1 357 448 333 

GDP (thousands of billions of $) 

1,333 

1,953 

3,604 

6,197 

9,434 

Number of major accidents ARIA 

Number of major accidents EM-DAT 

Merged databases* 

17 

14 

20 

29 

32 

55 

Merged databases per million population 

0,016 

0,042 

Merged databases per GDP (thousands of 
billions of $) 

15,002 

28,156 

Note *: this excludes duplicates as far as possible 

17 

23 

33 

0,025 

9,157 

16 

13 

24 

0,018 

3,873 

3 

10 

12 

0,009 

1,272 

82 

92 

144 

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    F5 

© Amec Foster Wheeler Environment & Infrastructure UK Limited 

Data 

2000-2002 

2003-2005 

2006-2008 

2009-2011 

2012-2014 

2000-2014 

Population (inhabitants) 

1 071 852 873 

1 126 371 730 

1 179 614 682 

1 230 870 899 

1 279 460 019 

GDP (thousands of billions of $) 

0,498 

0,725 

1,137 

1,630 

1,910 

Number of major accidents ARIA 

Number of major accidents EM-DAT 

Merged databases* 

12 

4 

13 

13 

8 

16 

Merged databases per million population 

0,012 

0,014 

Merged databases per GDP (thousands of 
billions of $) 

26,095 

22,078 

Note *: this excludes duplicates as far as possible 

2 

3 

5 

0,004 

4,396 

3 

2 

5 

0,004 

3,068 

3 

2 

5 

0,004 

2,618 

33 

19 

44 

Data 

2000-2002 

2003-2005 

2006-2008 

2009-2011 

2012-2014 

2000-2014 

Population (inhabitants) 

127 145 667 

127 750 667 

127 972 667 

127 978 092 

127 343 970 

GDP (thousands of billions of $) 

4,291 

4,510 

4,521 

5,481 

5,154 

Number of major accidents FKD 

Number of major accidents ARIA 

Number of major accidents RISCAD 

4 

4 

9 

4 

3 

3 

0 

1 

6 

0 

0 

0 

0 

3 

0 

8 

11 

18 

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© Amec Foster Wheeler Environment & Infrastructure UK Limited 

Data 

2000-2002 

2003-2005 

2006-2008 

2009-2011 

2012-2014 

2000-2014 

Merged databases* 

15 

Merged databases per million population 

0,118 

Merged databases per GDP (thousands of 
billions of $) 

3,496 

Note *: this excludes duplicates as far as possible 

12 

0,094 

2,661 

6 

0,047 

1,327 

0 

0,000 

0,000 

3 

0,024 

0,582 

36 

Data 

2000-2002 

2003-2005 

2006-2008 

2009-2011 

2012-2014 

2000-2014 

Population (inhabitants) 

3 895 567 

4 082 867 

4 222 733 

4 345 767 

4 453 300 

GDP (thousands of billions of $) 

0,058 

0,102 

0,127 

0,145 

0,189 

Number of major accidents ARIA 

Merged databases* 

0 

0 

2 

2 

Merged databases per million population 

0,000 

0,490 

Merged databases per GDP (thousands of 
billions of $) 

Note *: this excludes duplicates as far as possible 

0,000 

19,552 

0 

0 

0,000 

0,000 

0 

0 

0,000 

0,000 

0 

0 

0,000 

0,000 

2 

2 

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    F7 

© Amec Foster Wheeler Environment & Infrastructure UK Limited 

Data 

2000-2002 

2003-2005 

2006-2008 

2009-2011 

2012-2014 

2000-2014 

Population (inhabitants) 

145 959 562 

144 077 945 

142 865 655 

142 865 220 

143 509 385 

GDP (thousands of billions of $) 

0,361 

0,782 

1,394 

1,909 

1,863 

Number of major accidents ARIA 

Number of major accidents EM-DAT 

Merged databases* 

3 

1 

4 

7 

2 

8 

Merged databases per million population 

0,027 

0,056 

Merged databases per GDP (thousands of 
billions of $) 

11,090 

10,235 

Note *: this excludes duplicates as far as possible 

4 

3 

7 

0,049 

5,020 

7 

1 

7 

0,049 

3,667 

1 

2 

3 

0,021 

1,611 

22 

9 

29 

Data 

2000-2002 

2003-2005 

2006-2008 

2009-2011 

2012-2014 

2000-2014 

Population (inhabitants) 

47 329 217 

48 012 268 

48 639 432 

49 457 281 

50 216 022 

GDP (thousands of billions of $) 

0,568 

0,781 

1,046 

1,066 

1,313 

Number of major accidents ARIA 

Number of major accidents EM-DAT 

Merged databases* 

2 

2 

2 

2 

3 

1 

3 

0 

0 

2 

1 

2 

9 

2 

9 

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    F8 

© Amec Foster Wheeler Environment & Infrastructure UK Limited 

Data 

2000-2002 

2003-2005 

2006-2008 

2009-2011 

2012-2014 

2000-2014 

Merged databases per million population 

0,042 

Merged databases per GDP (thousands of 
billions of $) 

3,522 

Note *: this excludes duplicates as far as possible 

0,042 

2,560 

0,062 

2,869 

0,000 

0,000 

0,040 

1,523 

Data 

2000-2002 

2003-2005 

2006-2008 

2009-2011 

2012-2014 

2000-2014 

Population (inhabitants) 

284 918 853 

292 809 943 

301 235 028 

309 279 083 

316 479 140 

GDP (thousands of billions of $) 

10,628 

12,293 

14,351 

14,967 

16,722 

Number of major accidents CSB 

Number of major accidents ARIA 

Number of major accidents EM-DAT 

Merged databases* 

26 

60 

3 

78 

Merged databases per million population 

0,274 

Merged databases per GDP (thousands of 
billions of $) 

7,339 

Note *: this excludes duplicates as far as possible 

23 

27 

3 

38 

0,130 

3,091 

21 

34 

40 

0,133 

2,787 

18 

18 

2 

31 

0,100 

2,071 

7 

9 

3 

13 

0,041 

0,777 

95 

148 

11 

200 

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    G1 

© Amec Foster Wheeler Environment & Infrastructure UK Limited 

Appendix G  
Leaflet 

May 2017 
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200

20

50

100

200

20

50

100

Major Accident Hazards

from disasters to success

The use of large amounts 
of dangerous chemicals is 
unavoidable in some industry 
sectors which are vital for a 
modern industrialised society.
50

200

100

20

There are around 12 000 establishments 
in the EU subject to the legislation on major 
accidents involving dangerous chemicals

Major industrial accidents can cause death or injury to people and can harm the environment

200

20

50

100

60% of EU citizens consider 
that biodiversity is threatened 
by man-made disasters such as 
industrial accidents

Major accidents cause several 
billions of Euros of damage 
every year

77% of EU citizens consider that 
man-made disasters could 
have  negative impacts on the 
economic situation in their region

To minimise the associated risks, measures are necessary to prevent major accidents and to ensure 
appropriate preparedness and response should such accidents nevertheless happen.

Every year there are around  
30 major accidents in the EU

200

20

50

100

EU policy makes your life safer
Since 1982 the so-called Seveso Directive 
(named after the catastrophic accident in 
the Italian town of Seveso) has provided 
EU wide rules on the prevention of major 
accidents and the limitation of their 
effects. It was last updated by Directive 
2012/18/EU.

Considering the very high rate of 
industrialisation in the EU the Seveso 
Directive has contributed to achieving a 
low frequency of major accidents even 

Environment

though the current Directive covers more 
establishments than ever. Fewer accidents 
with accidents and lower impacts also 
contribute to sustainable economic and green 
growth and avoid loss of jobs.

As there are around 30 major accidents in the 
EU each year continued efforts are necessary 
to prevent major accidents and to limit their 
impacts on people’s health, the environment 
and the economy. EU action is also necessary 
because the impacts of major accidents do not 
stop at borders.

200

20

50

100

K
H
-
0
1
-
1
7
-
1
2
4
-
E
N
N

-

©
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
U
n
o
n

i

,

2
0
1
7

200

20

50

100

200

20

50

100

Did you know?

EU legislation is widely 
considered as a benchmark for 
industrial safety policy and has 
influenced legislation in many 
countries world-wide.

Learn from 
information 
generated
e.g. Accident reporting and data
analysis 

g
nin

r
a
e

l

n
o
s
s
e
L

200

20

50

100

Limit impact
e.g. Adoption and testing of 
emergency plans, communication 
of safety measures to the public

Establish rules
e.g. Legislation for establishments, 
inspection regimes and 
sharing of information

200

20

50

100

Prevention

Continuous 
improvement 
cycle to prevent 
major accidents

n
io
t
a
r
a
p
e
r
P

Response

Limit risk
e.g. Identification and 
management of risks 
through safety measures 
and land-use planning 

Have your say!

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Major accident hazards policy:
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/seveso

If you live in an area potentially affected by a major accident involving dangerous 
substances, EU legislation requires that you are involved in the decision making, 
even if the establishment concerned is located in a neighbouring EU country. 
You will be consulted when:
•  new establishments are planned
•  significant modifications are made to existing ones
•  new developments are planned around existing establishments
•  external emergency plans are drawn up for high risk establishments
Information on how you can protect yourself in case of an emergency 
needs to be made available by operators and the authorities.

EUEnvironment

EU_ENV

ISBN 978-92-79-66114-3
doi:10.2779/266361

 
 
 
 
 
HOW TO OBTAIN EU PUBLICATIONS 

Free publications: 

•  one copy: 

via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu); 

•  more than one copy or posters/maps: 

from the European Union’s representations (http://ec.europa.eu/represent_en.htm);  
from the delegations in non-EU countries 
(http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/index_en.htm);  
by contacting the Europe Direct service (http://europa.eu/europedirect/index_en.htm) 
or calling 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (freephone number from anywhere in the EU) (*). 

(*)  The information given is free, as are most calls (though some operators, phone boxes or hotels may 
charge you). 

Priced publications: 

•  via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu). 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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