REFLECTION PAPER ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN DEFENCE
Date: 2017-06-07
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: European defence policy, European security, area of freedom, security and justice, common security and defence policy, defence expenditure, international cooperation, military cooperation, peacekeeping, public safety

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   EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 7.6.2017  COM(2017) 315 final   REFLECTION PAPER  ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN DEFENCE     
 
 
Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence (2025) 

Foreword 

On  1  March  2017,  the  European  Commission  presented  a  White  Paper  on  the  future  of 
Europe. A series of reflection papers covering key topics for the future of the European Union 
with 27 Member States have been published subsequently. 

The  reflection  paper  on  the  future  of  the  European  Defence  is  the  fourth  in  this  series.  It 
outlines the main trends and challenges that will shape the future of our security and defence 
and on this basis, sets out options in three different scenarios for moving towards a Security 
and  Defence  Union.  While  not  mutually  exclusive,  these  scenarios  are  underpinned  by 
different levels of ambition for the EU in doing things together in security and defence. 

The  European  Union  has  brought  an  unprecedented  period  of  peace  to  our  continent. 
However,  the  rising  instability  in  Europe's  neighbourhood  as  well  as  globally  and  new 
emerging security threats stemming from economic, environmental and technological drivers 
present  important  challenges  for  our  security.  Citizens  feel  increasingly  concerned  about 
security  and  look  to  the  Union  for  protection.  If  we  want  to  deliver  on  their  expectations, 
security and defence must play a more prominent role in the future of the European project. 
This was acknowledged in the Rome Declaration which set out a vision of a safe and secure 
Union committed to strengthening its common security and defence. 

First ambitious steps towards a Security and Defence Union have been made. The Reflection 
paper  complements  the  ongoing  work  on  the  defence  package  endorsed  by  the  European 
Council in December 2016, consisting of the implementation of the EU Global Strategy in the 
areas  of  security  and  defence,  the  European  Defence  Action  Plan  and  our  cooperation  with 
NATO. These three building blocks are currently being translated into very concrete actions: 
we  are  reforming  our  Common  Security  and  Defence  Policy  structures,  developing  civilian 
and  military  capabilities  and  instruments,  deepening  European  defence  cooperation  and 
enhancing  our  partnerships  with  partner  countries  and  partner  organisations  such  as  the  UN 
and  NATO.  This  being  said,  more  needs  to  be  done  if  the  Union  is  to  take  greater 
responsibility for European security. 

Building  on  the  progress,  it  is  time  to  consider  the  concrete  ambitions  with  respect  to  the 
future role of the Union in security and defence. This reflection paper is the contribution of 
the European Commission to this debate which will continue across the 27 Member States. 

The stakes for Europe and our citizens are very high. It is our responsibility to deliver on the 
peace promise for the benefit of this and future generations. 

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"In these times of change, and aware of the concerns of our citizens, we commit to the 
Rome Agenda, and pledge to work towards: 
[…]  a  Union  ready  to  take  more  responsibilities  and  to  assist  in  creating  a  more 
competitive  and  integrated  defence  industry;  a  Union  committed  to  strengthening  its 
common security and defence, also in  cooperation and complementarity with the North 
Atlantic  Treaty  Organisation,  taking  into  account  national  circumstances  and  legal 
commitments […]." 

Rome Declaration 25 March 2017 

"I also believe that we need to work on a stronger Europe when it comes to security and 
defence matters. Yes, Europe is chiefly a ‘soft power’. But even the strongest soft powers 
cannot make do in the long run without at least some integrated defence capacities." 

Jean-Claude Juncker  
President of the European Commission 
Political Guidelines for the European Commission, 15 July 2014  

1.  Introduction 

Rising from the ashes of two World Wars that took 80 million lives, our Union was inspired 
by  a  vision  of  lasting  peace  on  the  European  continent.  More  than  sixty  years  on,  most 
Europeans  have  enjoyed  a  peace  spanning  three  generations  and  seven  decades,  the  longest 
period in Europe’s troubled history (see Figure 1). 

While  the  world  we  live  in  may  have  changed  profoundly  in  that  time,  our  commitment  to 
peace  remains  unshakeable.  Today  we  enjoy  unprecedented  opportunities  in  our  everyday 
lives, but we are also faced with new threats and challenges. Peace and security at home can 
no  longer  be  taken  for  granted  in  a  world  in  which  global  and  regional  powers  re-arm, 
terrorists  strike  at  the  heart  of  cities  in  Europe  and  around  the  world  and  cyber-attacks 
escalate.  

Faced  with  this  context,  the  European  Union  and  its  Member  States  have  a  duty  and 
responsibility  to  protect  citizens  and  promote  European  interests  and  values.  Security  has 
become one of the biggest concerns for Europeans. They look to their Union for protection. 
They demand, deserve and must be able to feel safe and secure in Europe.  

Protecting  our  societies  and  freedoms  is  a  joint  responsibility.  If  we  are  to  deliver  on  our 
peace  promise  to  the  next  generations  in  the  same  way  as  was  done  for  us,  security  and 
defence must play a more prominent role in the European project. Our Union is best placed to 
provide unique added-value when it comes to the future of European security and defence. 

Many  of  the  threats  we  face  today  do  not  respect  national  borders.  While  Member  States 
remain  on  the  front  line  and  are  responsible  for  deploying  security  and  armed  forces  when 
needed, these new types of threats are best prevented and tackled by working together.  

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That  cooperation  can  be  triggered,  facilitated  and  reinforced  by  the  EU  and  help  make 
collective action more effective. The Union can provide the framework and the incentives for 
EU countries to develop and maintain more and better defence capabilities. This can be done 
through  more  systematic  cooperation  and  the  joint  development  of  technologies  and 
capabilities needed to keep Europe safe.  

One of the major strengths of the EU's approach is its blend of soft and hard power. It uses 
security  and  defence  instruments  alongside  diplomacy,  sanctions,  development  cooperation 
and trade aimed at preventing conflict. It promotes peace, inclusive growth, human rights, rule 
of law, and environmental protection at home and abroad. While soft power alone may not be 
enough in an unstable world, this integrated approach lies at the heart of sustainable security.  

Our Union also provides a unique platform to coordinate security and defence policies with 
core  partners  such  as  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organisation  and  the  United  Nations.  An 
unprecedented momentum is currently drawing the EU and NATO closer together.  

In his 2016 State of the Union address, President Juncker called for a "Europe that protects 
and defends, at home and abroad". This reflection paper considers the issues that matter for 
the  future  of  our  security  and  defence.  It  does  so  by  looking  beyond  current  debates  and 
decisions.  Instead,  it  considers  underlying  structural  trends,  presents  different  scenarios  of 
possible  futures  for  European  security  and  defence  by  2025,  and  maps  our  possible  ways 
forward. 

Figure 1: War and Peace in European History 

Source: European Political Strategy Centre  

2.  Key Trends 

A  number  of  strategic,  political,  economic  and  technological  trends  suggest  the  time  is  ripe 
for a European step change in the security and defence field. 

Strategic drivers 

After decades of peace in Europe, new realities are emerging within and beyond our borders. 
To  our  east,  countries  are  facing  military,  economic,  political  and  energy-security  related 
threats  and  vulnerabilities.  Across  the  Mediterranean  and  parts  of  sub-Saharan  Africa,  the 
spread  of  ungoverned  spaces  and  conflict  has  left  a  vacuum  for  terrorists  and  criminals  to 
thrive.  Regional  rivalries  are  escalating  and  we  have  witnessed  a  dramatic  rise  in  civilian 
victims  and  refugees  across  the  world,  with  more  than  60  million  people  displaced.  Greater 

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connectivity  is  blurring  the  boundaries  between  internal  and  external  security.  And  climate 
change  and  resource  scarcity,  coupled  with  demographic  growth  and  state  fragility can  also 
drive conflict and instability around the world.  

At the same time, the Transatlantic relationship is evolving. The onus of improving European 
security  lies  first  of  all  in  European  hands.  The  resources  should  be  there:  collectively 
European  countries  are  the  second  largest  military  spender  worldwide.  Together  with  the 
United  States  and  others,  Europe  has  a  responsibility  for  global  peace  and  security.  While 
acting together with our partners will remain the EU's norm and preference, we should be able 
to act alone when necessary. 

In 2016, national governments stepped up their response to pressing security threats and the 
concerns of their citizens. Defence budgets were increased accordingly. But the road ahead is 
still  long.  Moving  towards  Europe’s  strategic  autonomy  requires  spending  more  on  our 
defences, as well as spending better and spending together (see Figure 2). The United States 
already  invests  more  than  twice  as  much  on  defence  than  all  Member  States  combined  and 
will increase its budget by almost 10% in 2018. China has increased its budget by 150% over 
the past decade, with a further rise of 7% expected in 2017, while Russia invested 5.4% of its 
GDP on defence last year. 

Figure 2: European Defence Spending in Comparative Perspective 

Source: Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (2016 data), Janes, 
European Political Strategy Centre  

Political drivers 

EU leaders have committed to strengthening European security and defence. And that is what 
citizens ask and expect of them. Opinion polls clearly show security has become the number 
one concern for most European citizens (see Figure 3), even if the reasons of insecurity differs 
across Member States. 

Europeans  also  agree  that  collective  action  between  EU  countries  is  indispensable  for  their 
security. Large majorities in all Member States would like to see “more Europe” in security 
and  defence  (Figure  3).  In  a  space  where  goods,  services,  money  and  people  move  freely, 
security  can  neither  be compartmentalised  nor  entirely  guaranteed  by  Member  States  acting 
alone.  The  message  from  Europeans  is  crystal  clear:  security  and  defence  should  be  an 
integral part of what our Union does.  

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Figure 3: Citizens’ Concerns and Demands 

Economic and technological drivers 

Source: Eurobarometer  

Today, defence markets are highly fragmented, creating a lack of interoperability and at least 
€30  billion  worth  of  opportunity  cost.  Compared  to  what  is  spent,  the  defence  capabilities 
produced  lag  woefully  behind  (see  Figure  4)  and  there  are  differences  in  Member  States' 
contributions to European defence.  

In a connected, contested and complex world, Member States are simply too small to deliver 
on  their  own.  Continental-sized  powers  are  far  better  equipped  than  small-to-medium  sized 
States. Economies of scale matter more than ever to improve effectiveness and efficiency.   

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This is doubly important as pressure on national budgets remains high. The tension between 
fiscal  constraints  and  competing  public  policy  priorities  will  continue  to  characterise  the 
political  economy  of  many  Member  States.  At  the  same  time,  competition  among  global 
industrial players will rise, calling for a more efficient use of resources (circular economy). If 
Europe  is  to  compete  worldwide,  it  will  need  to  pool  and  integrate  its  best  industrial  and 
technological capabilities.  

Technological  change  is  also  dramatically  transforming  the  nature  and  face  of  security  and 
defence. Big data, cloud technology, as well as unmanned vehicles and artificial intelligence 
are revolutionising the defence sector. They are also increasing the technological edge of the 
civilian sector in the field of defence. However, having such relatively accessible technology 
also enables the rapid rise of non-conventional, transnational and asymmetric threats, such as 
hybrid,  terrorist,  cyber,  chemical,  biological  and  radiological  attacks.  The  surge  in  Internet 
users has made cybercrime and terrorist use of the web a new frontier of 21st century warfare.  

Moving forward, effective European security and defence will rest on efficient coordination 
of major research and development investments made by the EU and its Member States. This 
will help keep pace with new trends and generate the technological and industrial capabilities 
Europe needs to ensure its strategic autonomy.  

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Figure 4: Duplications in European Defence Spending 

Source: Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (2016 data), 
International institute for Strategic 
Studies(Military Balance 2017), 
European Political Strategy Centre 

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3.  Europe in 2025 – moving towards a Security and Defence Union 

Security threats are not far from our borders and citizens. Political leaders have already started 
responding to such trends. A set of initiatives are underway to implement the Global Strategy 
in the field of security and defence, to develop stronger relations between the EU and NATO 
and to enable Member States to engage in defence research and develop defence capabilities 
together.  

The foundations of a European Security and Defence Union are gradually being built. Only by 
advancing firmly along this path will our citizens feel and be safe. Achieving this will require 
progress in a number of areas: 

First,  having  stronger  and  more  sovereign  Member  States  in  a  globalised  world  requires 
having  more  cooperation  within  the  European  Union,  including  on  defence.  This  will  fully 
respect  each  country's  constitutional  rights  and  responsibilities.  In  fact,  systematic  defence 
cooperation  and  gradual  integration  will  contribute  to  the  preservation  of  their  national 
sovereignty. 

Second,  there  have  historically  been  differences  in  threat  perceptions  and  strategic  cultures. 
The  nature  of  threats  has  also  changed  over  time.  We  now  face  hybrid  and  transnational 
threats, as well as the significant impact of  conflicts in surrounding regions. A Security and 
Defence  Union  should  encourage  a  stronger  alignment  of  strategic  cultures,  as  well  as  a 
common  understanding  of  threats  and  appropriate  responses.  It  will  require  joint  decision-
making and action, as well as greater financial solidarity at European level.  

Third,  the  nature  of  the  Transatlantic  relationship  is  evolving.  More  than  ever,  Europeans 
need to take greater responsibility for their own security. As is currently the case, the EU and 
NATO would continue to coordinate their actions on both hard and soft security. In parallel, 
the EU would provide the framework within which the 27 Member States after Brexit – 21 of 
which  are  NATO  Allies  (see  Figure  5)  –  would  collectively  strengthen  their  defence  and 
address existing shortfalls. This would allow the EU27 to take charge of their own security to 
a  greater  extent  and  make  a  real  leap  forward  in  contributing  to  international  peace  and 
security.  

Fourth,  we  need  to  increase  the  scope  and  efficiency  of  defence  spending.  Duplications 
between Member States can affect the interoperability of their defence equipment. It can also 
lead to a lack of preparation and readiness of armed forces and gaps in defence capabilities. 
To address this, Member States’ defence spending should be better coordinated. The bulk of 
financial resources for defence will continue to come from national sources. However, an EU 
budget  reflecting  a  new  ambition  in  defence,  coupled  with  a  large-scale  European  Defence 
Fund, should enable Europeans to spend better and improve value for money. The European 
Council might consider how the current limitations to the common financing of EU military 
aspects can be overcome when progressing towards a common defence.  

Finally, systematic defence cooperation and integration in turn requires a true Single Market 
for  defence.  This  means  encouraging  industrial  competition,  cross-border  access  of  smaller 
industries  in  the  supply  chain,  specialisation,  economies  of  scale  for  suppliers,  optimised 
production  capacity,  lower  production  costs  and  security  of  supply.  A  Single  Market  for 
defence would also facilitate critical research and the emergence of start-ups to  develop the 
key  technologies  Europe  needs  to  address  its  security  challenges.  But  there  will  also  be 

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transition costs and legitimate concerns to address through appropriate measures and ensuring 
the protection of national security interests.  

Figure 5: EU Members and NATO Members (2017) 

Source: European Political Strategy Centre  

Depending  on  the  political  will  of  Member  States  to  make  progress  on  these  issues,  three 
scenarios can be envisaged as we look forward to 2025.  

The scenarios are all incremental steps in the same direction. They all take into account the 
different  trends  and  strategic  drivers  listed  above.  The  building  blocks  in  the  different 
scenarios  are  neither  exhaustive  nor  mutually  exclusive.  They  rather  highlight  different 
elements  of  different  levels  of  ambition  for  the  Security  and  Defence  Union,  in  terms  of 
solidarity,  operations,  capabilities,  industry  and  use  of  financial  resources.  The  scenarios 
illustrate the extent to which the EU's potential added-value can be unlocked depending on the 
appetite  of  Member  States.  Some  of  the  elements  mentioned  in  the  scenarios  are  currently 
already  examined  or  implemented.  The  three  scenarios  are  illustrative  in  nature  and  do  not 
prejudge the final legal and political position of the Commission. 

(a) Security and Defence Cooperation 

In  this  scenario,  the  EU27  Member  States  would  cooperate  on  security  and  defence  more 
frequently than in the past. 

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Such cooperation would remain largely voluntary, and would depend on ad-hoc decisions as 
and when a new threat or crisis emerges. While an increasingly complex and unstable world 
would  warrant  greater  cooperation  than  in  previous  decades,  Member  States  would  not  be 
bound  –  politically  or  legally  –  by  a  common  direction  of  travel  in  security  and  defence. 
Solidarity would be interpreted and expressed on a case-by-case basis by each Member State. 

The  European  Union  would  continue  to  be  able  to  deploy  civilian  missions  and  relatively 
small-scale  military  missions  and  operations  aimed  at  crisis  management.  It  would  mainly 
engage  in  capacity  building  missions  to  strengthen  and  reform  the  security  and  defence 
apparatuses of partner countries, reinforcing the EU’s own resilience in the process. Larger-
scale  and  more  complex  operations  would  be  spearheaded  by  the  most  capable  Member 
States. In each case, the Union’s strategic margin of manoeuvre would depend on the level of 
agreement between Member States.  

The EU would complement the efforts of individual Member States and of our core partners. 
In  particular,  cooperation  with  NATO  would  continue  to  intensify  in  areas  such  as  hybrid 
threats, cyber and maritime security, where effective responses require a combination of hard 
and soft power. However, where both the EU and NATO are present, NATO would continue 
to  rely  on  the  deeper  military  capabilities  at  its  disposal,  whereas  the  EU  would  exploit  its 
broader toolbox and link up its “softer” tools, instruments and actions to its targeted military 
missions and operations.  

Responses to non-conventional threats that straddle the internal-external policy divide such as 
terrorism,  hybrid  or  cyber,  would  remain  largely  national  but  would  become  more  effective 
through greater support at EU level. The European Union would facilitate more information 
sharing to improve awareness and enhance the resilience of Member States. National security 
and intelligence services would exchange information more systematically to help better, and 
collectively,  understand  external  threats.  Member  States  would  increase  their  exchange  of 
information  on  cyber-threats  and  attacks,  allowing  them  to  develop  more  effective  national 
strategies, capabilities and responses. The Union would also contribute directly to enhancing 
the resilience of critical infrastructures, supply chains, and societies, in areas such as energy 
and space. The European Border and Coast Guard would help monitor and protect the EU's 
external borders.  

Defence  cooperation  would  remain  a  political  goal.  There  would  be  more  collective  work, 
notably  on  the  development  of  select  critical  technologies  or  on  the  logistical  enablers  of 
military  operations.  An  increase  in  cooperation  would  be  driven  mostly  bottom-up  by  the 
economic  and  technological  drivers  discussed  above.  It  would  also  result  from  an  effort  to 
increase the transparency of Member States’ defence planning, the creation of an EU defence 
research  programme  and  the  establishment  of  the  European  Defence  Fund  to  develop  new 
capabilities together. These initiatives would promote Europe’s strategic autonomy in critical 
technologies and would mark an increase in the value for money of defence spending. 

However,  Europe’s  defence  industry  would  remain  fragmented.  The  bulk  of  defence 
capabilities, particularly complex platforms, would continue to be developed and procured on 
a national basis. The slight increase in defence spending by Member States would generally 
not be spent collaboratively. As a result, very few  – if any – EU countries would retain full 
spectrum armed forces. EU security and defence actions would continue to rely on voluntary 
national  contributions,  leading  to  insufficient  cooperation  in  critical  areas  such  as  high-end 
capabilities. This would limit the EU’s ability to engage in the most demanding missions.  

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(b) Shared Security and Defence 

In this scenario, the EU27 Member States would move towards shared security and defence.  
They  would  show  far  greater  financial  and  operational  solidarity  in  the  field  of  defence, 
building  on  a  broader  and  deeper  understanding  of  respective  threat  perceptions  and 
convergence of strategic cultures.  

As a result, the EU would enhance its ability to project military power and to engage fully in 
external crisis management and in building partners’ security and defence capacities. It would 
also improve its ability to protect Europe in areas straddling the internal-external divide such 
as counterterrorism, countering of hybrid and cyber threats, border control and maritime and 
energy security.  

The  EU’s  cooperation  with  NATO  would  further  increase.  The  EU  and  NATO  would 
systematically cooperate and coordinate in mobilising the full range of their respective tools 
and  instruments.  Externally,  the  EU  and  NATO  would  enhance  coordination  of  their  crisis 
management  and  capacity  building  actions,  for  instance  through  coordinated  surveillance 
operations, interventions against terrorist groups, or  maritime security and border protection 
missions.  At  the  point  where  internal  and  external  security  meets,  the  EU  would  take  more 
decisive  action  in  dealing  with  threats  and  challenges  falling  below  the  threshold  of  the 
collective defence clause of the Washington Treaty.  

On crisis management, the EU would significantly step-up its ability to project military force 
externally, enabling it to conduct high intensity operations in the fight against terrorism and 
hybrid  threats.  EU  capacity  building  missions  –  civilian  and  military  –  would  be  scaled  up, 
helping to make countries in surrounding regions and further afield more resilient. This would 
be facilitated by more effective and robust crisis management structures. It would also need a 
greater  willingness  from  Member  States  with  the  strongest  armed  forces  to  execute 
demanding crisis management missions and operations together on behalf of the Union in line 
with Article 44 of the Treaty on European Union. Greater ability to act would be matched by 
the  political  will  to  do  so.  Decision-making  would  become  quicker  and  would  match  the 
speed of the rapidly changing strategic context. The EU would ultimately become a stronger 
and more responsive security provider, with the strategic autonomy to act alone or alongside 
its core partners. 

In this scenario, the EU would be more directly engaged in the protection of Member States 
and  citizens  in  case  of  significant  attacks  or  disruptions  against  a  country  and/or  its  critical 
infrastructures.  The  EU  would  enable  cooperation  between  Member  States  on  systematic 
reporting  on  cyber-attacks.  It  would  help  increase  resilience,  step  up  cyber  exercises  and 
include a defence dimension  to them. Stronger cooperation and effective prosecution would 
increase  the  ability  to  find  and  punish  criminals,  thus  providing  a  stronger  deterrent  against 
cyber-attacks.  Member  States’  intelligence  (threat  analysis  and  assessments)  would  be 
systematically shared and merged, and the Union would maintain a strong focus on the fight 
against  terrorist  financing,  organised  crime  and  money  laundering.  A  further  strengthened 
European  Border  and  Coast  Guard,  utilised  to  its  maximum  would  monitor  and  protect  the 
EU’s external borders, working in synergy with defence forces. The Union would also step up 
its work to diversify energy sources, develop and promote energy safety standards, coordinate 
preparedness  for  health  threats,  and  improve  customs  risk  management.  Finally,  the  Union 
would  further  develop  its  space  programmes,  providing  additional  services  for  security  and 
defence,  including  border  and  maritime  surveillance,  search  and  rescue  functions,  or  secure 

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government  communication.  The  scope  of  the  surveillance  and  tracking  support  framework 
could  be  extended  to  address  cyber  threats  or  other  threats  to  satellites  or  ground 
infrastructures. 

systems,  maritime 

remotely  piloted  aircraft 

On  defence,  cooperation  between  Member  States  would  become  the  norm  rather  than  the 
exception.  National  defence  planning  would  become  far  more  aligned,  facilitating  Member 
States’  cooperation  on  the  acquisition  and  maintenance  of  capabilities,  thus  improving 
interoperability.  Duplications  between  Member  States  would  be  drastically  reduced.    The 
development  and  procurement  of  complex  platforms  would  be  run  cooperatively. 
Spearheaded  by  an  ambitious  European  Defence  Fund,  Member  States  would  develop 
multinational  capabilities  in  several  fields  more  systematically,  including  in  strategic 
satellite 
transport, 
communications, as well as offensive capabilities. These multinational capabilities would be 
supported  by  joint  planning  and  command  structures  at  EU-level,  as  well  as  logistics. 
Specifically, standby multinational force components as well as a medical and an EU-wide air 
transport command would provide effective support to EU missions and operations, while a 
shared  European  military  culture  would  be  fostered  through  joint  education,  training  and 
large-scale exercises. In addition, critical technologies would be developed through European 
intelligence,  bio-technology  and 
programmes,  notably 
supercomputing. A European observatory could be set up to screen foreign direct investment 
in  these  critical  technologies  and  analyse  their  potential  impact.  Europeans  would  become 
more  capable  through  interoperable  land,  air,  space  and  maritime  defence  capabilities. 
Furthermore, there would be a more rational use of resources thanks to the economies of scale 
reaped by a consolidated defence industry operating in an EU-wide defence equipment market 
and favourable financing conditions across the supply chain towards small and medium-sized 
enterprises.  

field  of  artificial 

surveillance  and 

the 

in 

(c) Common Defence and Security 

In this scenario, Member States would deepen cooperation and integration further towards a 
common defence and security. Such a Security and Defence Union would be premised on the 
global  strategic,  economic  and  technological  drivers,  as  well  as  a  political  push  from 
European citizens for common European security and defence.  

Solidarity  and  mutual  assistance  between  Member  States  in  security  and  defence  would 
become the  norm, building on the full  exploitation of  Article 42 of  the Treaty  on European 
Union which includes the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy, leading to 
common defence.    

In full respect of the obligations of Member States which see their common defence realised 
in the North Atlantic Treaty organisation, the protection of Europe would become a mutually 
reinforcing responsibility of the EU and NATO. Complementing NATO, Europe's Common 
Security and Defence would enhance Europe's resilience and protect against different forms 
of aggression against the Union, as well as provide reassurance that our citizens expect.  

The  EU  would  be  able  to  run  high-end  operations  to  better  protect  Europe,  potentially 
including  operations  against  terrorist  groups,  naval  operations  in  hostile  environments  or 
cyber-defence actions.  

Security threats would be systematically monitored and assessed jointly, in close cooperation 
with national security and intelligence services. Contingency planning would be carried out at 

13 

 
 
 
 
European level, bringing internal and external security closer together. The interconnection of 
national security interests would lead to genuine European security interests. 

The increased ability to act at EU level would be underpinned by a greater level of integration 
of  Member  States’  defence  forces,  further  strengthening  solidarity  among  Member  States. 
Such forces would be pre-positioned and be made permanently available for rapid deployment 
on  behalf  of  the  Union.  They  would  engage  in  regular  joint  military  exercises,  and  receive 
regular  training  in  European  Defence  Colleges  to  facilitate  the  convergence  of  strategic 
cultures. 

Internally, the EU would enhance its resilience and that of its Member States through sectoral 
policies in areas such as cybersecurity, the protection of critical infrastructure, or countering 
violent extremism. On cyber-security, the EU would coordinate response scenarios and action 
in  case  of  cyber-attacks  or  external  interference  in  Member  States'  democratic  processes, 
including  through  systematic  information  sharing,  technological  cooperation  and  joint 
doctrines. The European Border and Coast Guard would rely on standing European maritime 
forces  and  on  European  intelligence  assets  such  as  remotely  piloted  aircraft  systems  or 
satellites. A European civil protection force would be established to rapidly react to natural or 
man-made disasters. Fixed arrangements among Member States would allow rapid movement 
of military equipment across Europe. 

Member  States’  defence  planning  would  become  fully  synchronised,  and  national  priorities 
for  capability  development  would  account  for  agreed  European  priorities.  Such  capabilities 
would  be  subsequently  developed  on  the  basis  of  close  cooperation,  even  integration  or 
specialisation.  

Capabilities  in  areas  such  as  space,  air  and  maritime  surveillance,  communication,  strategic 
airlift  and  cyber  would  be  commonly  procured  by  Member  States  with  the  support  of  the 
European  Defence  Fund  to  ensure  immediate  responses.  Europe  would  be  able  to  deploy 
detection  and  offensive  cyber-capabilities.  Collaborative  multinational  development  and 
procurement  programmes  would  be  scaled  up  significantly  in  areas  like  transport  aircraft, 
helicopters,  reconnaissance  assets  or  CBRN  defence  capabilities.  All  this  would  be 
underpinned by a genuine European defence market, with a European mechanism to monitor 
and  protect  key  strategic  activities  from  hostile  external  takeovers.  A  dedicated  European 
Defence  Research  Agency  would  support  forward-looking  defence  innovation  and  help 
translate  it  into  the  military  capabilities  of  tomorrow.  Cutting  edge  knowledge  would  be 
pooled,  enabling  critical  research  and  start-ups  to  develop  key  technologies  to  address 
Europe’s security challenges. Efficient defence spending and more and better defence outputs 
would  be  achieved  through  the  right  mix  of  competition  and  consolidation,  specialisation, 
economies  of  scale,  the  sharing  of  expensive  military  assets  and  technological  innovation 
aimed at getting the best value for money spent. 

Principles 

Actions 

Capabilities 

Efficiency 

Scenario (a) 
Security & 
Defence 
cooperation 

The EU 
complements 
Member State 
efforts, solidarity 
remains ad hoc and 
interpreted 
individually by 

Capacity-
building 
missions, small 
crisis 
management 
operations, 
greater exchange 

Developing select 
key technologies at 
EU level, but 
difficulties in 
retaining full 
spectrum 
capabilities; 

Initial economies of scale.  

14 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
limited use of the 
European Defence 
Fund. 

Joint financing of 
key capabilities 
and joint purchase 
of multinational 
capabilities 
supported by the 
European Defence 
Fund;  
Common planning 
and development 
of value chains. 

Considerable economies of 
scale in defence market at 
European scale, favourable 
financing conditions across 
the defence supply chain. 

Common financing 
and procurement 
of capabilities 
supported by the 
EU budget. 
Technological 
independence. 

Efficient defence spending 
through more economies of 
scale, specialisation, sharing 
of expensive military assets 
and technological innovation 
aimed at reducing defence 
costs, and becoming better 
equipped to face international 
competition. 

Member States. 

Scenario (b) 
Shared 
Security and 
Defence 

EU supplements 
Member State 
efforts, operational 
and financial 
solidarity between 
Member States 
becomes the norm. 

Scenario (c) 
Common 
Defence and 
Security 

Solidarity and 
mutual assistance, 
common defence as 
foreseen by the 
Treaty.  

of intel, EU 
support to 
Member State 
resilience. EU-
NATO 
cooperation 
continues as it is 
now. 

Crisis 
management, 
capacity-building 
&protection at 
internal-external 
nexus. Member 
States 
monitor/assist 
each other on 
cyber & share 
intel, European 
Border and Coast 
guards protect 
external borders. 
EU-NATO 
coordinate on 
full spectrum of 
hard/soft security 
areas. 

Demanding 
executive EU-led 
operations; joint 
monitoring/asses
sment of threats 
and contingency 
planning. EU 
level cyber 
security; 
European Border 
and Coast 
Guards rely on 
standing 
maritime forces 
and European 
intelligence 
assets such as 
drones/satellites; 
European civil 
protection force. 
Complementing 
NATO, Europe's 
Common 
Security and 
Defence would 
enhance Europe's 
resilience and 
protect against 
different forms 
of aggression 
against the 
Union. 

15 

 
 
Figure 6: The Elements of a European Security and Defence Union 

4.  The way forward  

Enhancing European security is a must. Member States will be in the driving seat. They will 
define and implement the European level of ambition, with the support of EU institutions. The 
initiatives  currently  underway  indicate  clearly  that  Member  States  and  EU  institutions  have 
already embarked upon this road. But how quick do Member States want to build a genuine 
European Security and Defence Union? To which extent are they willing to anticipate rather 
than to react to the strategic context? How far do they consider that the European security is a 
European responsibility? 

Old caveats are known and need to be overcome. The future of the European Union as a peace 
project for generations to come now rests also on the foundation of a Security and Defence 
Union:  looking  at  2025,  Member  States  will  decide  the  path  and  speed  they  want  to  go  to 
protect our citizens. 

16 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 

Treaty on European Union 
Provisions on the Common Security and Defence Policy 

Article 42 

1. The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign 
and  security  policy.  It  shall  provide  the  Union  with  an  operational  capacity  drawing  on 
civilian  and  military  assets.  The  Union  may  use  them  on  missions  outside  the  Union  for 
peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with 
the  principles  of  the  United  Nations  Charter.  The  performance  of  these  tasks  shall  be 
undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States. 

2.  The  common  security  and  defence  policy  shall  include  the  progressive  framing  of  a 
common  Union  defence  policy.  This  will  lead  to  a  common  defence,  when  the  European 
Council,  acting  unanimously,  so  decides.  It  shall  in  that  case  recommend  to  the  Member 
States  the  adoption  of  such  a  decision  in  accordance  with  their  respective  constitutional 
requirements. 

The  policy  of  the  Union  in  accordance  with  this  Section  shall  not  prejudice  the  specific 
character  of  the  security  and  defence  policy  of  certain  Member  States  and  shall  respect  the 
obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North 
Atlantic  Treaty  Organisation  (NATO),  under  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  and  be  compatible 
with the common security and defence policy established within that framework. 

3. Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union  for the 
implementation  of  the  common  security  and  defence  policy,  to  contribute  to  the  objectives 
defined  by  the  Council.  Those  Member  States  which  together  establish  multinational  forces 
may also make them available to the common security and defence policy. 

Member  States  shall  undertake  progressively  to  improve  their  military  capabilities.  The 
Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments 
(hereinafter  referred  to  as  "the  European  Defence  Agency")  shall  identify  operational 
requirements,  shall  promote  measures  to  satisfy  those  requirements,  shall  contribute  to 
identifying  and,  where  appropriate,  implementing  any  measure  needed  to  strengthen  the 
industrial  and  technological  base  of  the  defence  sector,  shall  participate  in  defining  a 
European  capabilities  and  armaments  policy,  and  shall  assist  the  Council  in  evaluating  the 
improvement of military capabilities. 

4. Decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a 
mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a 
proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
or an initiative from a Member State. The High Representative may propose the  use of both 
national resources and Union instruments, together with the Commission where appropriate. 

5. The Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of 
Member States in order to protect the Union's values and serve its interests. The execution of 
such a task shall be governed by Article 44. 

17 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.  Those  Member  States  whose  military  capabilities  fulfil  higher  criteria  and  which  have 
made  more  binding  commitments  to  one  another  in  this  area  with  a  view  to  the  most 
demanding  missions  shall  establish  permanent  structured  cooperation  within  the  Union 
framework.  Such  cooperation  shall  be  governed  by  Article  46.  It  shall  not  affect  the 
provisions of Article 43. 

7.  If  a  Member  State  is  the  victim  of  armed  aggression  on  its  territory,  the  other  Member 
States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, 
in  accordance  with  Article  51  of  the  United  Nations  Charter.  This  shall  not  prejudice  the 
specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. 

Commitments  and  cooperation  in  this  area  shall  be  consistent  with  commitments  under  the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains 
the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation. 

Article 43 

1. The tasks referred to in  Article 42(1), in  the course  of which the Union  may use  civilian 
and  military  means,  shall  include  joint  disarmament  operations,  humanitarian  and  rescue 
tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks 
of  combat  forces 
including  peace-making  and  post-conflict 
stabilisation.  All  these  tasks  may  contribute  to  the  fight  against  terrorism,  including  by 
supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories. 

in  crisis  management, 

2. The Council shall adopt decisions relating to the tasks referred to in paragraph 1, defining 
their  objectives  and  scope  and  the  general  conditions  for  their  implementation.  The  High 
Representative  of  the  Union  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  Security  Policy,  acting  under  the 
authority  of  the  Council  and  in  close  and  constant  contact  with  the  Political  and  Security 
Committee, shall ensure coordination of the civilian and military aspects of such tasks. 

Article 44 

1. Within the framework of the decisions adopted in accordance with Article 43, the Council 
may entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and 
have  the  necessary capability for such a task. Those Member States, in association with the 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall agree among 
themselves on the management of the task. 

2.  Member  States  participating  in  the  task  shall  keep  the  Council  regularly  informed  of  its 
progress on their own initiative or at the request of another Member State. Those States shall 
inform the Council immediately should the completion of the task entail major consequences 
or  require  amendment  of  the  objective,  scope  and  conditions  determined  for  the  task  in  the 
decisions  referred  to  in  paragraph  1.  In  such  cases,  the  Council  shall  adopt  the  necessary 
decisions. 

Article 45 

1. The European Defence Agency referred to in Article 42(3), subject to the authority of the 
Council, shall have as its task to: 

18 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) contribute to identifying the Member States' military capability objectives and evaluating 
observance of the capability commitments given by the Member States; 

(b)  promote  harmonisation  of  operational  needs  and  adoption  of  effective,  compatible 
procurement methods; 

(c) propose multilateral projects to fulfil the objectives in terms of military capabilities, ensure 
coordination  of  the  programmes  implemented  by  the  Member  States  and  management  of 
specific cooperation programmes; 

(d) support defence technology research, and coordinate and plan joint research activities and 
the study of technical solutions meeting future operational needs; 

(e)  contribute  to  identifying  and,  if  necessary,  implementing  any  useful  measure  for 
strengthening  the  industrial  and  technological  base  of  the  defence  sector  and  for  improving 
the effectiveness of military expenditure. 

2. The European Defence Agency shall be open to all Member States wishing to be part of it. 
The  Council,  acting  by  a  qualified  majority,  shall  adopt  a  decision  defining  the  Agency's 
statute, seat and operational rules. That decision should take account of the level of effective 
participation  in  the  Agency's  activities.  Specific  groups  shall  be  set  up  within  the  Agency 
bringing  together  Member  States  engaged  in  joint  projects.  The  Agency  shall  carry  out  its 
tasks in liaison with the Commission where necessary. 

Article 46 

1.  Those  Member  States  which  wish  to  participate  in  the  permanent  structured  cooperation 
referred  to  in  Article  42(6),  which  fulfil  the  criteria  and  have  made  the  commitments  on 
military capabilities set out in the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation, shall notify 
their intention to the Council and to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy. 

2. Within three months following the notification referred to in paragraph 1 the Council shall 
adopt  a  decision  establishing  permanent  structured  cooperation  and  determining  the  list  of 
participating Member States. The Council shall act by a qualified majority after consulting the 
High Representative. 

3. Any Member State which, at a later stage, wishes to participate in the permanent structured 
cooperation shall notify its intention to the Council and to the High Representative. 

The  Council  shall  adopt  a  decision  confirming  the  participation  of  the  Member  State 
concerned which fulfils the criteria and makes the commitments referred to in Articles 1 and 2 
of  the  Protocol  on  permanent  structured  cooperation.  The  Council  shall  act  by  a  qualified 
majority after consulting the High Representative. Only members of the Council representing 
the participating Member States shall take part in the vote. 

A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union. 

4. If a participating Member State no longer fulfils the criteria or is no longer able to meet the 
commitments  referred  to  in  Articles  1  and  2  of  the  Protocol  on  permanent  structured 

19 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
cooperation,  the  Council  may  adopt  a  decision  suspending  the  participation  of  the  Member 
State concerned. 

The Council shall act by a qualified majority. Only members of the Council representing the 
participating Member States, with the exception of the Member State in question, shall take 
part in the vote. 

A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union. 

5. Any participating Member State which wishes to withdraw from permanent structured 
cooperation shall notify its intention to the Council, which shall take note that the Member 
State in question has ceased to participate. 

6. The decisions and recommendations of the Council within the framework of permanent 
structured cooperation, other than those provided for in paragraphs 2 to 5, shall be adopted by 
unanimity. For the purposes of this paragraph, unanimity shall be constituted by the votes of 
the representatives of the participating Member States only. 

20