COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission Nuclear Illustrative Programme Presented under Article 40 of the Euratom Treaty - Final (after opinion of EESC)
Date: 2017-05-12
Institutions: Directorate-General for Energy, European Commission
Subjects: energy production, investment, nuclear energy, nuclear policy, nuclear power station, nuclear safety, nuclear technology, radioactive waste, storage of waste

EN 

   EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 12.5.2017  SWD(2017) 158 final   COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission Nuclear Illustrative Programme Presented under Article 40 of the Euratom Treaty - Final (after opinion of EESC) {COM(2017) 237 final}  
 
 
Table of figures ...................................................................................................................................... 3 

1 

Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 4 

1.1 

Overview of the European nuclear industry ............................................................................ 4 

2  The front-end of the nuclear fuel cycle ........................................................................................ 6 

2.1 

2.2 

2.3 

2.4 

Demand for natural uranium .................................................................................................... 6 

Conversion ............................................................................................................................... 7 

Enrichment .............................................................................................................................. 7 

Fuel fabrication ........................................................................................................................ 8 

3  Nuclear new build ........................................................................................................................ 11 

3.1 

3.2 

3.3 

3.4 

3.5 

3.6 

Investment costs .................................................................................................................... 11 

Projection of installed capacity .............................................................................................. 13 

Estimated investments in new capacity for the period 2015-2050 ........................................ 14 

Licensing process .................................................................................................................. 15 

Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) .......................................................................................... 17 

Non-power applications ......................................................................................................... 20 

4  Long term operations .................................................................................................................. 21 

4.1 

4.2 

4.3 

Safety considerations ............................................................................................................. 21 

Economic considerations ....................................................................................................... 22 

Estimated investments in LTO for the period 2015-2050 ..................................................... 23 

5  The back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle ...................................................................................... 24 

5.1  Waste management ................................................................................................................ 24 

5.2 

5.3 

Decommissioning of nuclear power plants............................................................................ 30 

Financing the back-end activities .......................................................................................... 32 

6  Cost summary .............................................................................................................................. 40 

Bibliography ......................................................................................................................................... 42 

2 

 
 
 
Table of figures 
Figure 1 Share of nuclear in national (gross)  
  Figure 2 Share of nuclear in national energy ......................... 5 
Figure 3 Purchases of natural uranium by EU utilities by origin, 2006–14 (tU) (%) ....................................... 6 
Figure 4 Natural uranium included in fuel loaded by source - 2014 ................................................................... 7 
Figure 5 Providers of enrichment services delivered to EU utilities in 2014 ...................................................... 8 
Figure 6 LWR fuel fabrication capacity in Western Europe, in tons of heavy metal (tHM) .............................. 9 
Figure 7 Generic Overnight Construction Costs ............................................................................................... 11 
Figure 8 Estimated costs of new build projects under development or consideration ...................................... 11 
Figure 9 Illustration of financing costs as a % of overnight construction costs ................................................ 12 
Figure 10 Duration of NPPs construction in Europe ......................................................................................... 12 
Figure 11 Projection of nuclear installed capacity EU28 2015-2050 ................................................................ 14 
Figure 12 Projected investments in new nuclear capacity ................................................................................. 14 
Figure 13 Equilibrium carbon price (EUR/tCO2) .............................................................................................. 15 
Figure 14 Summary of the land-based SMR designs at most advanced stage of development......................... 18 
Figure 15 Age profile of the European nuclear power reactors ......................................................................... 21 
Figure 16 LTO and post Fukushima safety investments from 2000 to 2025 (EUR/kWe) ................................ 23 
Figure 17 Projected evolution of the existing fleet (GW) ................................................................................. 23 
Figure 18 Estimated investment needs in LTO ................................................................................................. 23 
Figure 19 Classification of radioactive waste .................................................................................................... 24 
Figure 20 Illustrative once-through (OT) cycle ................................................................................................. 26 
Figure 21 Illustrative PWR-MOX recycling cycle ............................................................................................ 26 
Figure 22 Commercial reprocessing facilities in Europe .................................................................................. 27 
Figure 23 Status of the projects to build geological repositories to dispose HLW ........................................... 29 
Figure 24 Nuclear reactors in shut down status per MS and technology .......................................................... 30 
Figure 25 Illustrative calculation of the decommissioning costs in relation to the price of electricity sold ...... 31 
Figure 26 Decommissioning strategies .............................................................................................................. 32 
Figure 27 Estimated costs of decommissioning NPPs ...................................................................................... 33 
Figure  28  Waste  management  estimates  reported  by  Member  States  (including  costs  for  the  building  of 
geological repositories) ..................................................................................................................................... 34 
Figure 29 Comparison of available funds to accomplished useful life ............................................................. 35 
Figure 30 Overview of Decommissioning and Waste management funds ........................................................ 37 
Figure 31 Illustrative impact of the discount rate in nuclear provisions ........................................................... 39 
Figure 32 Discount rates used in back-end provisions ...................................................................................... 39 
Figure 33 Summary of the estimated projections .............................................................................................. 40 
Figure 34 Comparison of cumulative investments in nuclear power capacity in Europe ................................. 40 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
1  Introduction  
This  Staff  Working  Document  has  been  prepared  to  support  the  analysis  of  the  Nuclear  Illustrative 
Programme  of  the  Commission  (PINC),  and  is  a  collection  of  factual  data  gathered  from  several  sources. 
Member  States  and  nuclear  operators  have  provided  some  data  through  questionnaires  prepared  by  the 
European  Commission  on  specific  matters  where  public  information  was  limited.  Information  on  future 
investments  in  nuclear  facilities  has  been  taken  from  notifications  received  by  the  Commission  in  the 
framework of Article 41 of the Euratom Treaty or in public statements issued by investors or Member States. 
Public sources and voluntary contributions that are listed in the bibliography have been used as well.  

This document focuses on nuclear power generation. Non-power applications of the nuclear energy and R&D 
activities  are  considered  in  the  framework  of  other  Communications.1  The  scope  of  the  analysis  includes 
Member  States  with  operational  or  shut-down  nuclear  power  reactors,  namely:  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Czech 
Republic,  Germany,  Spain,  Finland,  France,  Croatia,  Hungary,  Italy,  Lithuania,  the  Netherlands,  Romania, 
Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia and the United Kingdom. Poland has also been included since it has expressed its 
intention to potentially develop commercial nuclear power reactors in the future. 

The  document  is  structured  following  the  investment  needs  of  the  different  steps  of  the  nuclear  fuel  cycle, 
which may be broadly defined as the set of processes and operations needed to manufacture nuclear fuel, its 
irradiation in nuclear power reactors and storage, reprocessing or disposal of the irradiated fuel. The nuclear 
fuel cycle starts with uranium exploration and ends with disposal of the materials used and generated during 
the cycle. For practical reasons the cycle has been further subdivided into two stages: the front-end and the 
back-end. 

Unless otherwise stated, all figures are expressed in real terms in year-2015 EUR. 

1.1  Overview of the European nuclear industry  
Nuclear energy accounts for 28% of the domestic production of energy in the EU, and 50% of its low carbon 
electricity,2  with  129  nuclear  power  reactors  in  operation  in  14  EU  Member  States  managed  by  18  nuclear 
utilities.3 The contributions of nuclear energy to the gross electricity production and to the energy mix differ 
among Member States.  

Europe has gained a leading role in nuclear technology, built on more than 60 years of experience in nuclear 
power  while  developing  and  implementing  the  highest  nuclear,  radiation  and  waste  safety  standards  for  the 
protection  of  workers,  patients  and  the  general  public.  Europe  also  holds  a  significant  export  potential  in  a 
global market with investment estimates of EUR 3 trillion until 2050,4 and the industry, according to internal 
sources, currently supports 800 000 jobs5. 

There are currently four reactors under construction, located in France, Slovakia and Finland. Projects for the 
construction of nuclear power plants are facing a challenging regulatory and market environment.6 Additional 

1  For  example:  "Towards  an  Integrated  Strategic  Energy  Technology  Plan"  (C(2015)  6317  final);  and  "Energy 
Technologies  and  Innovation"  (COM(2013)  253  final).  The  specific  objectives  of  the  Euratom  Research  and  Training 
Programme can be found in http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/h2020-section/euratom. 
2 Source: Eurostat, May 2015. 
3 Source: Euratom Supply Agency, Annual Report (2014).  
4 Source: Nuclear Energy Agency, The economics of the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle (2013). FX rate used: 1 USD 
= 0,75 EUR. 
5 Source: FORATOM, Position paper regarding the PINC (2015). Avaliable at http://www.foratom.org/public/position-
papers/8650-nuclear-indicative-programme-pinc/file.html.  An  estimation  of  900  000  jobs  was  considered  during  the 
symposium  on  the  “Benefits  and  limitations  of  nuclear  fission  for  a  low-carbon  economy”  held  in  Brussels  on  26-27 
February 2013 (http://ec.europa.eu/research/energy/euratom/publications/pdf/study2012_synthesis_report.pdf).  
6 For further description of the investment perspectives in electricity markets, see Staff Working Document (2015)142 
accompanying  the  Communication  (2015)  340  “Launching  the  public  consultation  process  on  a  new  energy  market 
design”. 

4 

 
 
                                                      
pressure is being put on the costs side, since new build projects in Europe are experiencing significant delays 
and cost overruns. Under these conditions, returns on investments in nuclear generation are difficult to assess.  

Concerning  the  fleet  in  operation,  the  average  age  of  the  European  reactors  is  approaching  30  years  and 
questions  about  long  term  operation7  (LTO)  and/or  replacement  of  the  existing  capacity  are  gradually 
becoming more important for Member States and national safety authorities. Europe is furthermore moving to 
a phase where the back end of the fuel cycle will receive much greater attention.  

Figure 1 Share of nuclear in national (gross)  

electricity mix, 20138 

Figure 2 Share of nuclear in national energy  

 mix, 20139 

FR
SK
HU
BE
SE
CZ
FI
SI
BG
ES
RO
UK
DE
NL

74% 

55% 
52% 
51% 

43% 

35% 
33% 
33% 
32% 

20% 
20% 
20% 

15% 

3% 

42% 

35% 

24% 

22% 

20% 
19% 
19% 
18% 
17% 

12% 

FR
SE
SK
BG
SI
BE
CZ
FI
HU
ES
RO
UK
DE
NL

9% 
9% 
8% 

1% 

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

The role of nuclear energy in the European electricity system 

Nuclear  energy  is  a  source  of  low-carbon  electricity.  The  International  Energy  Agency  (IEA)  estimated  for 
example that limiting temperature rise below 2 °C would require a sustained reduction in global energy CO2 
emissions  (measured  as  energy-related  CO2/GDP),  averaging  5,5  %  per  year  between  2030  and  2050.  A 
reduction of this magnitude is ambitious, but has already been achieved in the past in Member States such as 
France and Sweden thanks to the development of nuclear build programmes.10 

Nuclear  energy  also  contributes  to  improving  the  dimension  of  energy  security  (i.e.  to  ensure  that  energy, 
including electricity, is available to all when needed), since:11  

a) fuel and operating costs are relatively low and stable;  
b) it can generate electricity continuously for extended periods; and  
c) it can make a positive contribution to the stable functioning of electricity systems (e.g. maintaining 
grid frequency).  

7  Operating  a  nuclear  power  plant  beyond  an  established  time  frame  set  forth  by,  for  example,  licence  term,  design, 
standards and/or regulations. 
8 Source: Eurostat; Gross electricity generation in nuclear power plants and gross electricity generation. Data extracted in 
April 2015. 
9 Source: Eurostat; Gross inland energy consumption by fuel type. Data extracted in April 2015. 
10 The nuclear power programmes resulted in a reduction in France’s energy-related CO2/GDP ratio averaging 5,4 % per 
year  between  1978  and  1988,  and  in  Sweden  averaging  6,2  %  between  1979  and  1989.  Source:  International  Energy 
Agency,  Energy  and  climate  change  (2015).  Note:  at  the  Paris  climate  conference  (COP21)  in  December  2015,  the 
governments agreed a long-term goal of keeping the increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-
industrial levels and to aim to limit the increase to 1,5°C. 
11 Source: International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook (2014).  

5 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
                                                      
Finally,  nuclear  can  play  an  important  role  in  reducing  the  dependence  on  fossil  fuel  energy  imports  in 
Europe.12 

2  The front-end of the nuclear fuel cycle 
Front-end processes involve uranium ore exploration and mining, processing, conversion and enrichment and 
finally, fabrication of fuel assemblies which are specific to each reactor type.  

The EU industry is active in all parts of the nuclear fuel supply chain. While uranium production in the EU is 
limited, EU companies have mining operations in several major producer countries. The EU nuclear industry 
also has significant capacities in conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication and spent fuel reprocessing, making 
it a global technology leader. 

2.1  Demand for natural uranium 

EU demand for natural uranium represents approximately one third of the global uranium requirements. It is 
obtained from a diversified group of suppliers, most important of which was  in 2014 Kazakhstan,  origin  of 
3 941 tons  of  uranium  (tU)  or  27 %  of  total  deliveries,  followed  by  Russia  with  an  18 %  share  or  2 649 tU 
(including  purchases  of  natural  uranium  contained  in  EUP)13  and  Niger  in  the  third  place  with  2 171 tU  or 
15 %. Australia and Canada accounted for 14 % and 13 % respectively.  
Figure 3 Purchases of natural uranium by EU utilities by origin, 2006–14 (tU) (%)14 

25.000

20.000

15.000

10.000

5.000

0

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Kazakhstan

Russia

Niger

Canada

Namibia

United States

EU

Other

Malawi

Australia

Uzbekistan

Ukraine

South Africa

HEU feed

Re-enriched tails

Deliveries  of  natural  uranium  to  EU  utilities  occur  mostly  under  long-term  contracts,  the  spot  market 
representing less than 5 % of total deliveries. 

12 Source: see note 11. The analysis shows that in the low nuclear scenario, energy self-sufficiency rates in countries that 
utilise  nuclear  power  are  reduced  compared  with  the  reference  scenario,  leaving  them  more  susceptible  to  supply 
disruptions and sudden increases in fossil fuel prices. 
13 EUP: Enriched Uranium Product, i.e. UF6 enriched, typically to between 3% and 5% U235 content. 
14 Source: Euratom Supply Agency, Annual Report (2014). 

6 

 
 
 
                                                      
In  terms  of  indigenous  production,  the  uranium  mined  in  the  Czech  Republic  and  Romania  covers 
approximately 2 % of the EU utilities' total requirements. 

Regarding security of supply, since the 1990's EU dependency on imported uranium has remained constant. 
Taking  all  fuel  loaded  into  EU  reactors  in  2014,  including  natural  uranium  feed,  reprocessed  uranium  and 
MOX fuel (mixture of uranium and plutonium oxides), the requirements amounted to 17 094 tU. The quantity 
of  natural  uranium  originated  in  EU  accounts  for  approx.  400  tU  per  year,  which  together  with  savings  in 
natural uranium resulting from MOX fuel and reprocessed uranium usage gives the quantity of feed material 
coming  from  indigenous  and  secondary  sources,  equivalent  to  12,5 %  of  the  EU’s  annual  natural  uranium 
requirements.  

Figure 4 Natural uranium included in fuel loaded by source - 201415 

Source 

Quantities (tU)  Share (%) 

Uranium originated outside EU 

14 955 

87,5 

Uranium originated in EU (approximate annual production) 

Reprocessed uranium 

Savings from MOX 

Total annual requirements 

400 

582 

1 156 

17 094 

2,3 

3,4 

6,8 

100 

Uranium inventories owned by EU utilities at the end of 2014 totalled 52 898 tU, an increase of 3 % from the 
end  of  2013  and  15 %  from  the  end  of  2009.  The  inventories  represent  uranium  at  different  stages  of  the 
nuclear fuel cycle (natural or reprocessed uranium and uranium in-process for conversion, enrichment or fuel 
fabrication), stored at EU or foreign nuclear facilities.  

2.2  Conversion 
All  the  European  conversion  services  are  located  in  France,  in  the  Comurhex  plants  (Malvesi  for  the 
conversion  of  uranium  concentrate  into  uranium  tetrafluoride,  or  UF4,  and  Pierrelatte  for  the  following 
conversion  into  uranium  hexafluoride,  or  UF6).  Their  combined  nominal  capacity  is  15  000  tU/y.  of  which 
about  70  %  was  utilised  during  2015.16  Other  plants  are  located  in  the  United  States,  Canada,  Russia  and 
China  (which  operates  a  conversion  facility  for  internal  demand).  It  is  worth  noting  that  two  thirds  of  the 
western  conversion  capacity  is  located  in  North  America,  whereas  two  thirds  of  the  western  enrichment 
capacity is in the EU. This situation puts some pressure onto the transportation system, especially given the 
limited number of ships and harbours that are permitted to handle nuclear materials. However, to date transit 
problems have not been noted. 

Regarding security of supply, the current EU capacity operated by AREVA would be sufficient to cover most 
of EU needs, if run at full capacity and if no exports were taking place. AREVA has invested an estimated 
EUR 1 billion17 in the past years to modernize its conversion facilities. 

2.3  Enrichment 

Most of the commercial nuclear power reactors operating or under construction require uranium enriched in 
the  U235  isotope  for  their fuel,  which  is  higher  than  the  level  that  can  be  found  in  mined  uranium,  making 
enrichment a critical step of the fuel cycle. There are four major enrichment producers on the global market 
(AREVA, URENCO, Rosatom and CNNC).  
Several governmental authorities have adopted measures affecting international trade in enriched uranium.18 
For  example,  governmental  policies  favouring  domestic  enrichment  make  access  of  foreign  suppliers  to  the 

15 Source: see note 14. 
16 Source: World Nuclear Association webpage, accessed on 25/10/2015. 
17 Source: AREVA, Contribution of AREVA to the preparation of the Nuclear Illustrative Programme (2015).  
18 Source: URENCO, Information on the uranium enrichment industry and market (2015). 

7 

 
 
                                                      
markets  for  enrichment  services  in  Russia  and  China  difficult.  Anti-dumping  restrictions  are  in place  in  the 
United States on imports of low-enriched uranium from France.19  

In  2014,  68%  of  the  EU  requirements  of  enrichment  services  were  met  by  the  two  European  enrichers 
(AREVA and URENCO) while 26% were delivered by Russian suppliers within the Rosatom group. 

AREVA  and  URENCO  jointly  own  the  Enrichment  Technology  Company  Limited  (ETC)  with  enrichment 
assets in the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands and the United States that account for 32% of the 
global  capacity.20  AREVA  has  recently  invested  an  estimated  EUR  4  billion  in  building  the  Usine  Georges 
Besse II in Tricastin. The project was designed in several modules, spreading construction and commissioning 
of the new capacity over several years; at the end of 2014, 88% of the final capacity was operational. The new 
facility supplies enriched uranium to all kinds of European reactors.21  

Regarding  security  of  supply,  the  EU-based  capacities  operated  by  AREVA  and  URENCO  would  be  more 
than sufficient to cover all EU needs if no exports were taking place. However, since EU companies are major 
suppliers for worldwide customers, a significant part of their production is exported. Maintaining idle reserve 
capacity  is  not  practical,  since  the  used  centrifuges  must  be  kept  continuously  in  operation,  which  also 
requires  energy.  Therefore,  centrifuge  enrichment  plants  are  operating  at  full  capacity,  although  part  of  the 
capacity may be used for below optimum activities, such as re-enrichment of depleted uranium, depending on 
market  conditions.  This  provides  some  margin  of  flexibility  for  increasing  output.22  In  addition,  capacity 
expansions can be achieved through the modular construction of centrifuge enrichment facilities, should the 
demand increase. 

Figure 5 Providers of enrichment services delivered to EU utilities in 201423 

Enricher 

AREVA/GBII and URENCO (EU) 

Rosatom (Russia) 

USEC (United States) 

Others (Note A) 

Total 

Quantities 
(tSW) 

Share (%) 

8 503  

3 197  

200  

624  

68 % 

26 % 

2 % 

5 % 

12 524  

100 % 

Note A: including enriched reprocessed uranium. 

2.4  Fuel fabrication 
In the EU, there are two distinct nuclear fuel procurement approaches:24  

  Utilities operating western design reactors usually enter into separate contracts with uranium mining 
companies,  conversion  service  providers,  enrichment  service  providers  and  finally  fuel  assembly 
manufacturers. This approach allows for diversification of all steps of the front end of the fuel cycle, 
and for bigger utilities it offers the possibility to maintain several suppliers at all stages.  

  Utilities operating Russian design reactors in most cases purchase their fuel as integrated packages of 
fuel assemblies, including the uranium and related services, from the same supplier (Rosatom). In this 
approach, there is no diversification, nor backup in case of supply problems. Whereas diversification 
of the conversion and enrichment services could be implemented immediately, for diversification of 

19  For  more  information  on  the  anti-dumping  procedure,  see  http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/france/2015-
23050.txt 
20 Source: see note 14. 
21 Source: see note 17. 
22 Source: COM(2014) 330 final, "European Energy Security Strategy". 
23 Source: see note 14. 
24 Source: see note 14. 

8 

 
 
 
                                                      
fuel assembly manufacturing to take place this would require some technological efforts because of 
the different reactor designs (water-water power reactors, or VVER, 440 and 1000).  

While the uranium itself can be purchased from multiple suppliers and easily stored, the final fuel assembly 
process  is  managed  by  a  limited  number  of  companies.  For  the  western  designed  reactors,  there  are  fuel 
fabrication facilities in Germany, Spain, France, Sweden and the United Kingdom.  

The average demand in Europe is 1 600  tU for pressurized water reactors, or PWR, and 300  tU for boiling 
water  reactors,  or  BWR,  per  year.25  Looking  at  the  light  water  reactor  (LWR)  fuel  fabrication  capacities  in 
place in Figure 6, these appear to be sufficient for the current demand.  

Figure 6 LWR fuel fabrication capacity in Western Europe, in tons of heavy metal (tHM)26 

Member State 

Company 

Site 

Conversion  Pelletizing  Rods / Assembly 

FR 

ES 

DE 

SE 

AREVA NP-FBFC  Romans 

1 800 

1 400 

1 400 

ENUSA 

Juzbado 

AREVA NP-ANF 

Lingen 

Westinghouse AB  Vasteras 

0 

800 

600 

500 

650 

600 

500 

650 

600 

TOTALS 

3 200 

3 150 

3 150 

There  are  reactors  depending  on  Russian  fabrication  services  in  Finland  (2  reactors),  Bulgaria  (2),  Czech 
Republic  (6),  Hungary  (4)  and  Slovakia  (4),  in  a  process  that  is  "bundled"  and  managed  by  one  Russian 
company  (TVEL/Rosatom)  currently  with  insufficient  competition  or  diversification  options.27  The  Russian 
industry is developing fuel assemblies for western-type pressurised water reactors as well, and could enter this 
commercial market by 2020.  

Regarding security of supply, the European industry would be able to cover all EU needs for western-design 
reactors,  and  in  principle  could  also  establish  the  production  capacity  needed  for  VVER  fuel  (i.e.  Russian 
design reactors) as it was already the case in the past.28 However, developing and licensing fuel assemblies for 
Russian design reactors would take a few years in normal circumstances (provided that a sufficient market is 
available  to  make  the  investment  attractive  for  the  industry),  since  the  licensing  of  reactor  fuel  assemblies 
manufactured by a new supplier requires a full range of safety evaluations for which R&D is to be carried out 
at EU level, involving industrial and regulatory experts.29 

While Finland also operates non-Russian design reactors with western fuel supplies, Bulgaria and Hungary are 
100% dependent on Russian nuclear fuels (uranium, conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication). Two other 
Member  States  (the  Czech  Republic  and  Slovakia)  are  close  to  the  same  level  of  dependence,  although  the 
former has domestic uranium mining and partly diversified enrichment supplies, and the latter has started to 
diversify enrichment supplies.  

In Romania, the two reactors in operation are based on the Canadian CANDU technology and the country is 
self-sufficient for its fuel needs as it produces uranium and masters the fuel fabrication process, because the 
uranium used in this type of reactors does not need to be enriched. 

Based  on  average  annual  EU  gross  uranium  reactor  requirements  (approximately  17 000 tU/year),  current 

25 Source: see note 17.  
26 Source: World Nuclear Association, Fuel market report (2013). 
27 Source: see note 14. 
28 Between 2001 and 2007, Westinghouse delivered a total of seven reload batches to unit 2 at Finland's Loviisa plant. 
Fuel  assemblies  were  fabricated  by  ENUSA  in  Spain.  Following  some  unsuccessful  fuel  tenders  in  2006  and  2007, 
Westinghouse  decided  to  exit  the  VVER-440  business.  Source:  Mark  Dye,  Jan  Höglund,  and  Ulf  Benjaminsson, 
Diversification of the VVER fuel market. Nuclear Engineering International. (2015). 
29  This  licensing  process  is  being  analysed  in  the  "European  supply  of  safe  nuclear  fuel"  initiative  funded  under  the 
Horizon 2020 framework. For more information see http://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/196993_en.html 

9 

 
 
 
 
                                                      
uranium  inventories  can  fuel  EU  utilities'  nuclear  power  reactors  for  approximately  3  years.30  Most  EU 
utilities  have  inventories  for  at  least  one  reload.  Most  vulnerable  in  terms  of  security  of  supply  are  those 
utilities that depend on Russian fabricated fuel assemblies (VVER reactors), which cannot be quickly replaced 
by fuel assemblies from another manufacturer. 

The Euratom Treaty has set up a common supply system for nuclear materials, in particular nuclear fuel. It 
also  established  the  Euratom  Supply  Agency  (ESA)  and  conferred  it  the  task  to  guarantee  reliability  of 
supplies of the materials in question, as well as equal access of all EU users to sources of supply. 
Box 1 - The role of the Euratom Supply Agency31 

Pursuant to Article 52.2.b of the Euratom Treaty, ESA has the exclusive right to conclude contracts for the supply of nuclear materials 
(ores, source material and special fissile materials) from inside or outside the Community. The Agency appears as a “single buyer”, 
whose task is to balance demand and supply and to guarantee the best possible conditions for the EU utilities. In practice, in normal 
circumstances of supply, the “simplified procedure” (introduced by Art. 5 bis of the Agency’s Rules) is used, by which commercial 
partners – inside or outside the EU – may negotiate their transactions between themselves with the obligation to subsequently submit 
their draft contracts to ESA for consideration and conclusion. In any case, even within the framework of the simplified procedure, the 
Agency  maintains the  right  to  object  to  (and  refuse  to  sign)  a  contract  likely  to  jeopardise  the achievement  of the  objectives of  the 
Treaty. For that reason, all supply contracts, submitted to ESA for conclusion, undergo a thorough analysis, in the light also of the EU 
common policy. 

The role of ESA is many-fold:  

 

 

 

 

ESA is actively promoting diversification of sources of nuclear fuel supply, with a view to preventing excessive dependence of 
EU users from any single, third-country source of supply. 

ESA  warns  individual  users  of  potential  excessive  dependence  from  a  single,  external  source  of  supply.  ESA  endeavours  to 
propose alternatives and / or remedial measures to the user concerned. 

In its market-monitoring role, ESA has responsibility for early identification of market trends likely to affect medium- and long-
term security of supply of nuclear materials and services in the EU market. In the event such trends were detected, the Agency 
will communicate, as appropriate, and consider relevant remedial action. 

In  the  event  of  a  sudden  deterioration  of  the  situation  in  the  market  requiring  a  quick  reaction  (in  particular,  if  external 
dependence  increases  significantly  in  a  short  period  of  time  or  if  imports  risk  to  distort  competition  within  the  EU  internal 
market), as well as in case a user fails to diversify its sources of supply or to implement remedial measures, ESA shall make use 
of its powers under Chapter 6 of the Treaty. 

Security of Supply conclusions of the 2014 ESA Annual Report32 

From  a  security  of  supply  point  of  view,  there  should  always  be  at  least  two  alternative  suppliers  for  each  stage  of  the  fuel  cycle, 
including fuel assemblies licensed for each reactor. The second best option is to have a diversified portfolio up to the fabrication stage 
and maintain a strategic stock of fabricated fuel. Ideally, all utilities should hold one or two reloads of fabricated fuel assemblies for 
each reactor, depending on the size of their reactor fleet and their other electricity generation assets.  

For bundled sales of fuel assemblies (i.e. including nuclear material, conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication), the supplier of fuel 
assemblies must allow the operator to purchase natural or enriched uranium from other sources as well. In particular for new reactors, 
the reactor constructor must enable the use of fuel assemblies produced by different fabricators by disclosing fuel compatibility data 
and  allowing  the  testing  of  alternative  fuel  assemblies.  Operators  should  ensure  that  fuel  supply  diversification  is  possible  for  their 
reactors at all stages of the fuel cycle.  

If an alternative fuel fabricator is not yet available, contacts should be established with potential fabricators interested  in developing 
the required fuel. In such situations, testing of alternative fuel elements can be started with lead-test assemblies. Both operators and 
national regulators of countries operating VVER reactors could benefit from cooperation in the development, testing and licensing of 
alternative fuel. 

30 Source: see note 14. 
31 Source: see note 22. 
32 Source:  see note 14. 

10 

 
 
                                                      
3  Nuclear new build 

Investment costs 

3.1 
The investment costs of a nuclear power plant (NPP) are composed of the overnight costs of construction and 
the financing costs or interests paid during the construction. 

3.1.1  Overnight construction costs 
The  overnight  construction  costs  are  calculated  as  if  the  full  expenditure  was  spent  ‘overnight’,  thus  at  one 
instance.  They  include:  a)  civil  and  structural  costs,  b)  mechanical  equipment  supply  and  installation,  c) 
electrical and instrumentation and control, d) project indirect costs (i.e. engineering, distributable labour and 
materials,  construction  management  start  up  and  commissioning),  e)  owners  costs  (development  costs, 
insurance, environmental studies, etc…) and a provision for contingency. 
The  study  for  the  European  Commission  "Synthesis  on  the  economics  of  nuclear  energy"33  calculated  a 
generic figure of overnight construction cost based on a sample of 137 data points collected from 28 different 
sources from 2007 to 2012 with the following results:  

Figure 7 Generic Overnight Construction Costs 

Type of project 

Number of reactors 

Site  

Overnight Construction Cost  

(note A) 

FOAK2 

FOAK2 

NOAK  

NOAK  

(note B) 

(note C) 

Single unit 

Brownfield 

4 138 to 5 379 EUR/kWe 

Twin unit 

Brownfield 

3 807 to 4 949 EUR/kWe 

Single unit 

Brownfield 

3 476 to 3 997 EUR/kWe 

Twin unit 

Brownfield 

3 145 to 3 617 EUR/kWe 

Note  A  "First  of  a  kind"  or  FOAK2  refers  to  a  technology  deployed  in  a  country  for  the  first  time  but  that  is  already  operational 
somewhere else. FOAK1 would represent a technology which is built for the first time ever, although in the projections presented in 
this report this case is not considered. "N" of a kind or NOAK refers to the 6th and subsequent reactors built for a particular technology 
in the same country, reflecting the development of an industrial expertise that reduces the estimated cost. 
Note B "Brownfield" refers to an existing nuclear site, as opposed to "greenfield" which is used to represent a new location. 
Note C Original figures in EUR2012. Actualisation done using the IHS CERA EPPCI index. 

The latest estimates made public on different European new build projects (see Figure 8) are in the high range 
of  the  calculations  presented  in  Figure  7  (although  it  has  to  be  taken  into  account  that  Olkiluoto  and 
Flamanville would correspond to FOAK1). 

Figure 8 Estimated costs of new build projects under development or consideration 

Member State 

Total capacity (MWe) 

Technology  Number of reactors  Estimated Overnight Construction Cost  

Finland – Olkiluoto34 

Finland – Hanhikivi35 

1 670 

1 200 

EPR 

VVER 

France – Flamanville-336  

1 670 

EPR 

1 

1 

1 

EUR / kWe 

5 100 

5 000 to 5 800  

(note A) 

6 287 

33 See: D'haeseleer, William D., Synthesis on the Economics of Nuclear Energy. European Commission (2013). Available 
at: https://www.mech.kuleuven.be/en/tme/research/energy_environment/Pdf/wpen2013-14.pdf 
34 Source: World Nuclear Association webpage, accessed October 2015. 
35 Source: World Nuclear Association webpage, accessed August 2015. 
36 Reuters, September 2015,  

11 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
Member State 

Total capacity (MWe) 

Technology  Number of reactors  Estimated Overnight Construction Cost  

Average FOAK single unit 

Czech Republic – 

 Dukovany & Temelin37 

Hungary - PAKS-II38  

Slovakia - Mochovce 3 & 439 

UK – Hinkley Point C40 

Average FOAK twin unit 

1 500 

2 400 

2 400 

940 

3 340 

2 270 

Not chosen 

VVER 

VVER 

EPR 

2 

2 

2 

2 

EUR / kWe 

5 460 

4 500 

5 000  

4 900 

6 755 

5 290 

Note A: The cost of this project has only been publicly disclosed including financing charges. Since the other estimates are reportedly 
overnight construction costs only, the lower range of Hanhikivi has been included in the calculation of the total average. 

3.1.2 

Interest during construction 

The interest during construction, or financing cost, is the cost of capital during construction, not only on the 
debt part, but also to provide an acceptable rate of return to equity investors. The financing costs depend on 
the number of years of construction and on the interest rate applied. Figure 9 presents a sensitivity analysis of 
what the interest during construction represents when compared to the overnight construction costs for a series 
of interest rates (columns) and years of construction (rows). 

Figure 9 Illustration of financing costs as a % of overnight construction costs41 

Construction 
time/ WACC 

5 years 

7 years 

10 years 

4% 

5% 

7% 

10% 

13% 

8% 

11% 

19% 

10% 

14% 

25% 

14% 

20% 

37% 

21% 

29% 

57% 

28% 

39% 

80% 

The impact of financing costs obviously increases with longer construction times. The innovation in nuclear 
technology into new generations of larger reactors has generally meant increased construction times, as can be 
seen in Figure 10. The average time elapsed between the beginning of the construction and the commercial 
operation in Europe has been 7,8 years.42 In our cost assumptions we have considered that there is margin for 
reducing  the  construction  time  (e.g.  through  standardisation  of  supply  chain  practices)  and  have  used  an 
estimation of 7 years of construction.  

Figure 10 Duration of NPPs construction in Europe43 

http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/09/03/edf-nuclear-flamanville-idUKL5N1190M820150903 

37 Source: World Nuclear Association webpage, accessed October 2015. 
38 Source: Financial Times, April 2015, 

 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/985b0cca-e82a-11e4-9960-00144feab7de.html#axzz3qj0j31t7 

39 Source: Platts' Nucleonics Week, 30 July 2015. 
40 Source: Financial Times, October 2015. FX rate used: 1 GBP = 1,41 EUR, 

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/912b70e4-683f-11e5-97d0-1456a776a4f5.html#axzz3rNX87Y00 

41 Based on internal calculation. 
42 Calculated from the same set of data used to prepare the graph in Figure 10. 
43 Source: International Atomic Energy Agency, Power Reactor Information System (2015).  

12 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
Regarding  actual  real  interest  rates  applicable  to  building nuclear  commercial  reactors,  these  depend  on  the 
financing  model  (own  funds,  vendor  loans,  commercial  loans,  etc…)  and  risk  associated  with  the  project. 
Based on different investment notifications received by the Commission under the scope of Article 41 of the 
Euratom Treaty and State Aid investigations, we have assumed an indicative range of between 7 to 10% in our 
cost estimations.  

Box 2 The impact of construction time in the cost of a nuclear power plant 

The ongoing constructions of European Pressurized Reactor (EPR) in Finland and France have experienced significant cost overruns 
(more than 3 times over original budget each). Even though these are first-of-a-kind models with expectedly higher unit costs, they are 
also consistent with the industry's historical trend of cost escalation. In France, for example, and in spite of some favourable conditions 
that include centralized decision making, high degree of standardization and regulatory stability, construction costs per MWe in 1974 
were 3 times lower than those of the units connected to the grid after 1990.44 

A  recent  study45  has  tried  to  determine  the  most  relevant  factors  behind  this  cost  escalation,  pointing  towards  the  importance  of 
reducing construction lead-times (i.e. latency between the project beginning and completion), which are considered to have a bigger 
impact on the profitability of nuclear investments than the associated financing costs. The study highlights the following:  

a)  The nuclear industry has tried to achieve economies of scale by building bigger reactors (e.g. France EPR's 1 650 MWe Vs 1 450 
MWe of the N4, 1 300 MWe of the P4 and 900 MWe of the CP series). However, scaling up the capacity of the reactor by 10% 
would  produce  increases  in  the  associated  lead-time  of  3%.  Economies  of  scale,  i.e.  reductions  achieved  in  the  cost  per  MWe 
when  increasing  the  size  of  the  reactor,  are  therefore  not  an  evident  conclusion  and  need  to  be  valued  considering  all  the 
implications. 

b)  There is a significant correlation between lead-times and long-term standardization strategies, which occur when a specific design 
is deployed a significant number of times by the same entity in charge of engineering, procurement and construction. The study 
also indicates that standardization practices at the level of supply chain have the potential of reducing costs, since constraints due 
to different component specifications may lead to construction delays.  
Innovation  in  nuclear  reactors  has  been  closely  linked  to  more  demanding  safety  requirements,  which  has  contributed  to  a 
situation where costs increase rather than decrease with accumulated experience. 

c) 

Finally, the study recommends focusing in standardization practices and vertical integration with the intention of reducing construction 
times.     

3.2  Projection of installed capacity 
Based on information collected from public sources as well as reported by Member States under Article 41 of 
the Euratom Treaty, projections were made regarding the evolution of nuclear power capacity (see Figure 11). 
46 These can be summarised as follows: 

44  Source:  Grubler,  A.  et  al,  The  French  Pressurized  Water  Reactor  Program.  Historical  Case  Studies  of  Energy 
Technology Innovation, in Chapter 24, The Global Energy Assessment. Cambridge University Press (2012). 
45  Source:  Michel  Berthélemy,  L.  E.,  Nuclear  reactors'  construction  costs:  The  role  of  lead-time,  standardization  and 
technological progress. Energy Policy (2015). 
46  This  evolution  is within  the  range of  the  analysis performed  by  the  Commission  during  the preparation of  the 2030 
Climate and energy framework, where nuclear capacity was projected to be between 80 GW and 108 GW in 2030, and 
between  78  and  140  GW  in  2050,  depending  on  assumptions  and  policies  considered  in  the  various  scenarios.  See 
SWD(2014)255 and SWD(2014)15. 

13 

010203040506070809010011002468101250s60s70s80s90s00sNumber of constructions (right axis)Years from construction to commercial operation (left axis) 
 
 
                                                      
  The importance of long term operations is expected to increase in the coming years,47 and by 2030 the 
majority  of  the  fleet  would  be  operating  beyond  its  original  design  life.  Long  term  operations  are 
expected to represent the majority of nuclear investments in the short to medium term.   

  New  nuclear  capacity  would  need  to  be  built  to  partially  offset  expected  shut-downs.  New  reactors 
could represent about 80 GW of capacity added by 2050, from which about two thirds could occur in 
only  two  Member  States  (France  and  United  Kingdom).  The  other  Member  States  where  nuclear 
plants  are  projected  to  be  built  are:  Poland,  Hungary,  Finland,  Czech  Republic,  Slovakia,  Bulgaria, 
Romania and Lithuania.48  

  The  projected  capacity  in  2050  is  between  95  and  105  GW  (down  from  121  GW  in  2015), 
contributing  17-21%  of  the  total  generation  of  electricity  (from  27%  today).  Out  of  this  nuclear 
capacity, 14 reactors with a total capacity of 15 GW that were already connected to the grid in 2015 
could  remain  operational  still  in  2050.  However,  there  is  of  course  a  high  degree  of  uncertainty  as 
regards long term projected nuclear capacity. In fact, only a small share of investments in LTO or new 
built included below have already been approved by national authorities.  

Figure 11 Projection of nuclear installed capacity EU28 2015-2050 

3.3  Estimated investments in new capacity for the period 2015-2050 
Taking the lower range of the projected capacity presented above (95 GW), between EUR 349 and EUR 456 
billion would have to be invested in new nuclear generation capacity by 2050 based on the costs estimated in 
section 3.1.  

Figure 12 Projected investments in new nuclear capacity  

(EUR billion) 

2015-2030  2031-2040  2041-2050 

Total 

Investments in new capacity 

152 – 207 

42 – 55 

142 - 177 

336 - 439 

47 Projecting the number of reactors that will be granted with lifetime extensions is subject to significant uncertainties, 
since  regulatory  procedures  are  different  reflecting  the  national  legal  framework.  Depending  on  the  Member  State, 
extensions  may  have  been  already  granted,  operators  have  expressed  their  intention  for  starting  the  procedure  or  the 
regulator has stated expected shut-down dates or scheduled a date for assessing the case. 
48 Projections of new build are similarly subject to several uncertainties. Member States where new nuclear capacity is 
considered have either stated their intention to have nuclear energy in their energy mix or notified investment projects in 
new nuclear power. Estimations will be consequently affected if those projects are not completed or if new projects are 
undertaken. 

14 

0%5%10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%50%02040608010012014020152020202520302035204020452050Gross electricity produced from nuclear energy (%)Installed Capacity (GW)Existing reactors operating without LTOReactors operating in LTOReactors built after 2015Shut-downs of the periodNuclear electricity as a % of the total generation  (right axis) 
 
 
                                                      
(EUR billion) 

2015-2030  2031-2040  2041-2050 

Total 

Replacement of shut-downs post 2050 (note A) 

- 

- 

13 - 17 

13 - 17 

Total 

152 – 207 

42 – 55 

155 – 194 

349 - 456 

Note A: The projection considers that after 2050 the contribution of nuclear energy to the total production of electricity will remain 
stable. To achieve that, the construction of several reactors will have to begin before 2050 in order to be connected to the grid after the 
cut-off date of 2050.  

In case of the higher end of the projection (105 GW), approximately EUR 385 – EUR 500 billion would have 
to be invested. These investments will depend of the evolution of the market environment49 and on the ability 
of  the  industry  to  reduce  costs,  with  current  constructions  such  as  Flamanville  and  Olkiluoto  experiencing 
significant delays and cost overruns that undermines the competitiveness of the EU nuclear power industry. 

Current investment conditions present a challenging environment for achieving the projections of nuclear new 
build that are disclosed in this section. There may be a funding shortage of a magnitude that will be mainly 
determined by the cost of the most competitive technology (taking into account the carbon prices set at the EU 
emissions trading system, or ETS) and the wholesale market price of electricity. Based on this assessment, the 
lower end of the projections is used as the reference in this SWD. 
A recent study by ICF International50 calculated the price carbon must fetch for a nuclear new build project in 
the  EU  to  break-even  and  thus  be  financed  based  on  market  conditions  alone.  The  conclusions  show  that, 
under current investment conditions, none of the carbon price scenarios succeed in making the construction of 
new nuclear power plants profitable before 2025. Beyond that horizon, the minimum carbon price from which 
new nuclear capacity would be deployed by means of private financing ranges from 43 to 72 EUR/tCO2 (see 
Figure 13). The 2013 EU Reference scenario51 projects ETS prices of between 35 EUR/tCO2 in 2030 and 100 
EUR/tCO2 in 2050.  

Figure 13 Equilibrium carbon price (EUR/tCO2) 

2020 

2025 

2030  2035  2040  2045  2050 

n.a. 

n.a. 

61 

45 

43 

48 

72 

3.4  Licensing process 
A licence is a legal document issued by the competent regulatory authority granting authorization to create a 
nuclear installation and to perform specified activities. The term ‘licensing process’ includes all licensing and 
authorization processes for a nuclear installation and its activities.52 

3.4.1  Differences between national regulations 
Licensing  nuclear  facilities  is  done  at  the  national  level.  The  goals  are  similar  across  Member  States,  since 
they  are  based  on  the  objectives  that  are  defined  in  the  Nuclear  Safety  Directive53  and  on  international 
guidelines  such  as  those  issued  by  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  (IAEA).  However,  there  are 
differences which could be classified in two categories: 

1.  Methodological differences:  

49  For  more  details  see  SWD(2015)  340  "Launching  the  public  consultation  process  on  a  new  energy  market  design". 
Further work on this issue will be done in the context of the energy market design, for which legislative proposals will be 
presented at the end of 2016. 
50 Source: based on the work performed by ICF International in the framework of the Impact Assessment of the Euratom 
Loan Facility coordinated by DG ECFIN, which is in progress at the date of drafting this SWD. This economic analysis 
does not consider system factors such as reliability or generation capacity adequacy. 
51 Source: EU Energy, transport and GHG emissions Trends to 2050 - Reference Scenario 2013. 
52 Source: International Atomic Energy Agency, Safety Guide SSS-G-12. (2010).  
53 OJ L 219, 25.7.2014, p. 42. 

15 

 
 
                                                      
a)  In a prescriptive approach, the regulator establishes relatively detailed requirements for functions and 

properties of systems, components and structures in a plant. 

b)  In a non-prescriptive/ goal-setting approach, the regulator establishes specific outcomes for licensees 

to attain but does not specify how to reach those goals.  

2.  Differences in the scope of the license:54  

In Europe there are generally at least two licensing steps (e.g. construction and operation) and sometimes 
up  to  four  (e.g.  a  siting  license  or  a  commissioning  license).  There  are  exceptions  where  a  one-step 
licensing process is in place (e.g. the United Kingdom).  

There  can  also  be  pre-licensing  steps.  In  the  United  States,  for  example,  the  regulatory  authority  gives 
generic approval for a design or a site so that subsequent projects with the same technology do not have to 
go again through the assessment  and evaluation phases. No Member State has developed such a legally 
binding  pre-licensing  process  in  Europe,  although  the  United  Kingdom  has  put  in  place  the  Generic 
Design  Assessment  (GDA) with the objective of clarifying the licensing  process by reviewing  potential 
designs and assess whether they would be licensed once site-specific factors have been taken into account.  
Similarly, France has developed the “review of safety options” process, by which the vendor presents to 
the regulator, at the basic design stage of the reactor, the main design characteristics and options defined 
in terms of safety. Although it is not binding, in practice the regulator would, in a subsequent licensing 
process, not contradict its own “review of safety options” statement unless there is a compelling reason to 
do so. 

Differences in scope and methodology have led to a situation where the outcome of the license process in a 
Member  State  has  a  limited  formal  impact  in  the  work  of  another  regulator  reviewing  the  same  technology 
(though regulators generally look at the requirements on which the design was originally based, in particular 
identifying  gaps  between  regulations).  Vendors  invest  a  significant  amount  of  resources  in  developing  their 
understanding of national regulations and they use this knowledge as a competitive advantage, understandably 
not sharing lessons learnt with other vendors.  

3.4.2  Common aspects 
Licensing  processes  also  present  some  common  aspects  among  Member  States.  Identifying  these  will 
contribute to bring safety improvements. The IAEA's International Nuclear Safety Group (INSAG) has stated 
that "the general safety goals and requirements for nuclear power plants in different countries, and the design 
solutions to meet them, have currently reached a state of reasonable harmony. Furthermore, the networks that 
currently  exist  have  brought  mutual  understanding  and  trust  among  national  regulatory  authorities.  It  is 
therefore the proper time to establish multinational cooperation among nuclear regulators for the safety review 
of new nuclear power plant designs which are intended for construction in their respective countries."55 

The benefits of multinational safety reviews listed by the INSAG are the following: 

  Multinational cooperation would help to harmonize the global safety approaches and increase safety 
in  general.  It  would  also  improve  the  clarity  and  transparency  of  nuclear  safety  regulations  across 
international borders. 

  A thorough safety review could be provided for the benefit of each participating country through  the 

coordinated use of the resources of both regulators and industry. 

  Overlapping work resulting from the separate safety assessment processes of different countries could 

be minimized, and uncertainties in licensing could be reduced. 

  Consistent regulatory positions could be developed, thereby promoting international trade in nuclear 
equipment  and  bringing  cost  savings  to  all  parties  involved  in  the  nuclear  and  power  production 
industries. 

There is room for harmonization in the licensing practices, especially in the non-site specific steps such as the 
pre-licensing or the design certification. While experience shows that constant improvements are made to the 

54 Source: World Nuclear Association, Licensing and project development of new nuclear plants. (2015). 
55 Source: International Nuclear Safety Group. Strengthening the Global Nuclear Safety Regime (INSAG-21). (2006).  

16 

 
 
 
 
                                                      
design following the operating experience and the arrival of new technologies, a reactor's initial design which 
is  determined  to  be  safe  in  a  Member  State  should  not  have  to  be  substantially  modified  to  meet  licensing 
requirements  in  another.  Other  areas  of  interest  include  the  licensing  of  manufacturing  practices,  since  it 
would bring time savings and enhance competition in the nuclear supply chain. 

Progressing  towards  licensing  harmonisation  will  require  the  involvement  of  nuclear  power  vendors, 
regulators  and  technical  support  organizations.  Some  of  the  international  initiatives56  in  the  field  of  design 
harmonization are presented in Box 3.  
Box 3 Examples of international initiatives towards license harmonisation57 

1. Multinational Design Evaluation Programme58 

The Multinational Design Evaluation Programme (MDEP) is an initiative under the NEA (Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development) to develop innovative approaches to leverage the resources and knowledge of national 
regulatory authorities who are, or will shortly be, undertaking the review of new reactor power plant designs. The MDEP programme 
incorporates a broad range of activities including the increase of multinational convergence of safety goals, codes and standards. 

The  MDEP  Programme  structure  includes  two  groups  working  in  particular  towards  harmonisation  of  standards  and  associated 
documents: 

a) The issue specific Mechanical Codes and Standards Working Group (CSWG) pursues the goals of searching for ways to harmonise 
and converge national Codes, Standards, and Regulatory requirements and practices in this area while recognizing the sovereign rights 
and responsibilities of national regulators in carrying out their safety reviews of new reactor designs. Key stakeholders with whom this 
group  interacts  routinely  include  organisations  such  as  the  American  Society  of  Mechanical  Engineers  (ASME),  AFCEN,  the 
Canadian Standards Association (CSA), the Japan Society of Mechanical Engineers (JSME), Korea Electric Association (KEA), and 
NIKIET (Russia). The representatives of the participating organisations have already produced a comprehensive report on the Code 
comparison for Class 1 Nuclear Power Plant Components. 

b)  The  issue  specific  Digital  Instrumentation  and  Control  Working  Group  (DICWG),  to  which  IAEA  participates  and  to  which 
meetings IEEE and IEC are invited, prepared recommendations letters to those two standard organisations indicating its support to the 
already  engaged  collaboration  to  develop  common  dual  logo  standards  both  for  new  topics  to  be  covered  and  for  the  revision  of 
existing standards. 

2. CORDEL Working Group59 

The World Nuclear Association's (WNA) CORDEL Working Group was established with the aim of promoting the achievement of a 
worldwide regulatory environment where internationally accepted standardized reactor designs can be widely deployed without major 
design  changes.  Its  membership  consists  of  industry  specialists  in  reactor  licensing,  nuclear  law  and  reactor  safety  engineering, 
representing reactor vendor companies, utilities, technical support and consulting services and international organisations involved or 
directly interested in reactor licensing for new nuclear build. 

The  roadmap  defined  by  CORDEL  in  2010  described  three  steps,  the  last  of  which  was  "Issue  international  design  certification",  a 
procedure  upon which  a  design  could  be  certified by  a  team  of  national  regulators  so that  participating  countries  would  accept  this 
certification. CORDEL also specifies that in that step, "national regulators would remain responsible for assessing the adaptation of the 
internationally certified design to the local circumstances and for the supervision of construction, commissioning and operation."60 

3.5  Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) 
There are currently four SMRs under construction in the world, three water cooled reactors (CAREM-25 in 
Argentina, KLT-40S and ABV-6M61  in Russia) and one gas cooled reactor (HTR-PM in China).  
The  nuclear  industry  has  been  considering  the  deployment  of  commercial  SMRs  since  the  1950s,62  both  to 
supply energy to communities with little access to other sources or to address the difficulties of financing a 

56  In  addition  to  what  is  presented  here,  the  Western  European  Nuclear  Regulators  Association  is  working  towards 
harmonising safety requirements. More information can be found at http://www.wenra.org/harmonisation/  
57 Extracted from: CEN-CENELEC, Report of Focus Group on nuclear energy. (2012).  
58 For more information, see http://www.oecd-nea.org/mdep/ 
59 For more information, see http://www.world-nuclear.org 
60 Source: Cooperation in Reactor Design Evaluation and Licensing Working Group (CORDEL),  Strategic Plan 2014-
2018. (2014).  
61 The Russian models are floating power units.  

17 

 
 
                                                      
large  nuclear  power  plant.  In  recent  years,  with  large  new  nuclear  projects  advancing  more  slowly  than 
expected, costs rising above budget and an increased presence of intermittent sources in the energy mix and 
the progressive decentralization of the grid, opportunities in smaller scale nuclear power have become again 
under analysis.  

There are several developments to design nuclear power plants in the power range up to 300 MWe, consisting 
of factory-built modules.  

3.5.1  Design 
The  main  designs  for  SMRs  fall  under  three  categories:  light-water  reactors  (LWR),  high-temperature  gas 
cooled reactors (HTGR) and liquid-metal fast reactors (LMFR), with LWRs dominating in number amongst 
the designs that are most advanced.  
Figure 14 Summary of the land-based SMR designs at most advanced stage of development63 

Country  

Design 

Developer 

Capacity 
(MWe) 

Status 

USA 

NuScale (iPWR) 

NuScale Power Inc 

Westinghouse SMR 
(iPWR) 
Generation mPower 
(iPWR) 
HTR‐PM (HTR) 
ACP100 (iPWR) 

Westinghouse 

Babcock & Wilcox 

Chinergy 
CNNC 

China 

Argentina 

CAREM (iPWR) 

INVAP/CNEA 

50 

225 

180 

105 
100 

27 

Russian 
Federation 

SVBR-100 (LMFR) 

AKME-engineering 

100 

Korea 

SMART (iPWR) 

KAERI 

100 

Preparing for Design Certification 
Application (note A) 
Preparing for Design Certification 
Application (note B) 
Preparing for Design Certification 
Application (notes A and C) 
Under construction, Shidaowan unit-1 
Detailed Design, Construction starts in 
2016 
Under construction, near the Atucha-2 site 

License for placement of SVBR-100 in the 
Ulyanovsk region issued on 02/2015 

Standard Design Approval received 
07/2012 

Note A: Selected for US Government funding.  
Note B: In January 2014 Westinghouse suspended all works on SMRs due to inadequate demand. 
Note C: In early 2014 Babcock & Wilcox announced reduced spending due to lack of interest by investors and clients. 

3.5.2  Characteristics  
The IAEA defines as "small" those reactors with an electrical output lower than 300 MWe, and as "medium" 
those with an electrical output between 300 and 700 MWe.64 Essential features of an SMR are modularity and 
integrated design.  

Integrated design means that the reactor pressure vessel typically contains all primary components, such as the 
pressurizer, steam generators and reactor coolant pumps. Integrated design permits a modular construction of 
a NPP, as the reactor module can be manufactured in a separate factory, transported to the site by road or rail 
and  erected  on  the  site  as  a  single  block,  with  reduced  construction  time.  In  some  designs  the  idea  of 
modularity also means the 'splitting' of the power rating of one NPP unit to more than one standard module. 
Examples of this are provided by mPower, with its NPP consisting of two 180MWe modules, the HTR-PM 
with two 105 MWe modules and even more so, the NuScale project with its 12 modules of about 45 MWe 
each.  

(s.d.).  The  Forgotten  History  of  Small  Nuclear  Reactors.  Available 

62  Source:  Ramana,  M. 
http://spectrum.ieee.org/energy/nuclear/the-forgotten-history-of-small-nuclear-reactors. 
63 Source: Joint Research Centre, Current Status of Small Modular Reactors (land-based). (2015)  
64 Source: International Atomic Energy Agency 
https://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloadable/SMR/files/10_Clarification_on_the_use_of_SMR_terminology.pdf 

at 

18 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Modularity  together  with  smaller  unit  size  allows  more  room  for  serial  production,  as  more  units  will  be 
needed to cover a given need for generation capacity.  

Smaller  unit  sizes  have  other  benefits  that  are  linked  to  their  impact  in  the  electricity  system.  They  allow 
responding  gradually  to  increasing  power  demand,  which  is  a  positive  effect  due  to  the  requirements  that 
adding generation capacity puts on the power grid. Connecting a large new unit to the grid at a given point 
may require investing in strengthening the grid. Moreover, the required stand-by reserve capacity is likely to 
be  higher  for  one  large  unit  than  for  a  number  of  smaller  units  with  the  same  total  generation  capacity. 
Attention is also paid in SMR designs to the reactor being able to relatively rapidly respond to the changes in 
the  required  power  output.  Such  improved  load-following  capacity  could  allow  an  SMR  to  complement  an 
intermittent source of power.65  

Smaller unit size also favors additional uses for nuclear energy, apart from power generation. It is easier to 
find suitable heat load for cogeneration, such as for district heating, for smaller power ratings.  

Economics of SMRs compared to larger reactors 

The unit cost of investment (investment per kW) is likely to be higher with SMRs than with larger units. The 
loss of economies of scale can be eventually balanced by standardization, learning  effects, cost sharing  and 
modularization, although these are difficult to quantify due to the lack of existing examples.  

However, building multiple SMRs has some advantages when compared to building the same capacity in only 
one larger reactor:66 

a)  Protection against construction delays: Learning effect benefits would be more important due to the higher 
number  of  reactors  to  be  built.  In  addition,  the  project  can  be  split  in  different  autonomous  phases  that 
limit the exposure to delays. 

b)  Better  financial  profile:  due  to  the  fact  that  construction  periods  are  shorter  for  SMR,  the  incidence  of 
financial costs is lower. With the deployment of SMRs, nuclear power could become more accessible for 
smaller power companies and for private financing. 

Therefore, in uncertain scenarios the economics of SMR become  more comparable to that of building large 
reactors. Nevertheless, the technology is not mature enough to further conclude on the economics, with cost 
estimates varying widely, amongst others depending on the country of construction. Estimates for overnight 
cost  varying  between  3  850  EUR/kWe  and  7  750  EUR/kWe  for  one-unit  225  MW  LWR  plant  have  been 
reported,67  while  other  estimates  put  investment  cost  (i.e.  including  interest)  to  the  range  4  920–7  770 
EUR/kWe.68  

3.5.3  Safety and Licensing 
Thanks  to  relatively  low  power  density,  SMRs  can  be  designed  largely  relying  on  passive  safety  features. 
Residual  heat  after  reactor  shutdown  can  be  dissipated  without  forced  cooling,  with  long  grace  times, 
sometimes without operator intervention and for some design concepts with a very much reduced risk of core 
damage  or  radioactivity  release.  This  could  lead  to  improved  safety  through  simpler  design  and  higher 
reliability.  

There  are  some  areas  where  licensing  requirements  may  put  a  burden  to  SMR  when  compared  to  larger 
reactors. The IAEA identified a number of "key issues in licensing and design certification" for SMRs,69 e.g. 

65  See  David  Shropshire,  Arturs  Purvins,  Ioulia  Papaioannou,  Isabella  Maschio,  Benefits  and  cost  implications  from 
integrating  small  flexible  nuclear  reactors  with  off-shore  wind  farms  in  a  virtual  power  plant.  Joint  Research  Centre. 
(2012).   
66 Source: Ricotti, Sara Boarin and Marco E., An evaluation of SMR economic attractiveness. Science and technology of 
nuclear installations. (2014).  
67  Source:  Joint  Research  Centre  of  the  European  Commission,  Energy  Technology  Reference  Indicator  (ETRI) 
projections for 2010-2050. (2014).   
68 Source: National Nuclear Laboratory. Small Modular Reactors (SMR) – Feasibility Study. (2014). 
69  See  https://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloadable/Meetings/2011/2011-03-28-04-01-TWG-NPTD/Day3/Issues-
Challenges-SMR-Subki-20110330.pdf 

19 

 
 
                                                      
viability  of  multiple-modules  station,  proliferation  resistance  and  physical  security,  ergonomics  and  control 
room  staffing,  emergency  planning  zone  or  standardization  and  licenses  for  manufacturing  and  technology 
transfer and proprietary design protection. 

SMRs  using  LWR  technology  are  likely  to  have  a  shorter  licensing  process,  as  the  technology  is  already 
proven  and  existing  requirements  are  applicable.  However,  many  SMR  designs  are  novel  with  features  that 
have not been deployed before, even in the case of LWR-designs. Examples include the integration of primary 
system  components  into  the  reactor  pressure  vessel  and  the  use  of  passive  recirculation  modes  with  low 
coolant flows under operational and accident situations.70  

Licensing will be more complex for SMRs with other technologies, such as HTGR and LMFR, where much 
more development work, testing and demonstration of safety systems will be needed. At least in the medium 
term, only designs at the low end of the 0-300 MW power range with a high degree of simplicity would be 
likely to deliver significant savings in licensing time and cost.  

3.5.4  Cost of Decommissioning and Waste management 
At  the  current  stage  of  development  it  cannot  be  assessed  whether  the  decommissioning  and  waste 
management costs of SMRs will significantly differ from those of larger reactors. 

Due to the loss of economies of scale, the decommissioning and waste management unit costs of SMR will 
probably  be  higher  than  those  of  a  large  reactor  (some  analyses  state  that  between  two  and  three  times 
higher).71 On the other hand, the modular design is sometimes seen as a factor potentially helping to reduce 
the cost of decommissioning. It has been suggested that the reactor module could be transported from the site 
as one piece to a centralized factory for dismantling and recycling of components, thus lowering the overall 
cost. Such ideas are at least very far from becoming reality.  

3.5.5  Future 
The  industry  has  historically  favored  the  construction  of  large  reactors  looking  for  achieving  economies  of 
scale. Expected cost savings for SMRs due to modularity and standardized manufacturing would occur only 
when constructing a significant number of units. There is an opportunity to further investigate in this direction 
in the framework of a decentralized grid and as a complement of intermittent sources of energy. On the other 
hand, the absence of a licensed SMR design in the market is a major challenge. In the meantime, SMRs will 
be mostly used for testing innovative reactor designs and for attending niche markets. 

3.6  Non-power applications 
Five research/demonstrator reactors are being considered in the EU: MYRRHA72 in Belgium, PALLAS in the 
Netherlands,  ALFRED  in  Romania,73  ASTRID  in  France74  and  ALLEGRO.75  The  total  cost  of  developing 
these  reactors  is  estimated  to  be  in  the  range  of  EUR  8  to  9  billion,  with  some  of  them  replacing  aging 
installations  (e.g.  projects  in  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands).  In  addition,  there  are  projects  already  under 
construction such as a research reactor in France76 and the upgrading of specific research reactors77 for target 
irradiation destined to the production of medical radioisotopes.  

70 Source: see note 62. 
71 Source: Locatelli, G., Mancini, M, Journal of Engineering for Gas Turbines and Power, October 2010, Vol. 132. 
72 Multipurpose Hybrid Research Reactor for High-tech Applications. 
73 Advanced Lead Fast Reactor European Demonstrator. 
74 Advanced Sodium Technical Reactor for Industrial Demonstration. 
75 ALLEGRO is a Gas cooled fast demonstrator reactor. It is to be implemented in Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic or 
Poland.   
76  Jules  Horowitz  Reactor  (JHR)  is  a  100MW  boiling  water  reactor  for  research  purposes  being  built  in  Cadarache, 
France. Construction is expected to be finished during 2016 and the total cost estimated in EUR 0,8 billion.  
77 Such as Forschungs-Neutronenquelle Heinz Maier-Leibnitz (FRM II) in Munich, Germany. 

20 

 
 
                                                      
The Commission closely monitors developments related to radioisotope production in order to support reliable 
and secure supply, since the current capacity is fragile.78  

Particular attention should be given to the operational sustainability of the only European supplier of research 
reactor fuel and uranium targets (AREVA-CERCA), which is now performing an investment in the order of 
EUR 0,14 billion in an in-depth safety upgrades of its plant in Romans (France). 

4  Long term operations 
The average operating age of the nuclear fleet in Europe is 29 years, whereas the approved operating life of 
individual reactors varies from 30 to 50 years.79 When a nuclear power plant reaches the end of its approved 
lifetime, its license holder may request a lifetime extension from the regulator if the expected revenues from 
extending operations are bigger than the associated costs. The regulator will then assess this request based on 
safety considerations. This process is generally referred to as Long Term Operations, or LTO.80 The decision 
on whether or not to grant life-time extensions of a nuclear power plant is taken by national authorities.  

Figure 15 Age profile of the European nuclear power reactors81 

4.1  Safety considerations 
From a safety point of view, the responsible national authority will only grant permission for LTO following 
the operator's capacity to: 

  Demonstrate and maintain plant conformity to its currently applicable regulatory requirements, and 

  Enhance the plant safety as far as reasonably practicable. 

78 For more information, see SWD(2015) 179 final, "Report on the Security of Supply of Radioisotopes for Medical Use 
and the Council Conclusions of 6 December 2010 and 7 December 2012 ‘Towards the Secure Supply of Radioisotopes 
for Medical Use in the European Union’".  
79 In some Member States the license is granted for an unlimited period of time subject to Periodic Safety Reviews at 
least every 10 years. Under this approach, it is admitted that the fourth safety review (40 years) is an important point in 
time where specific issues need to be considered, in particular ageing survey and feed-back. 
80 From IAEA Safety Report Series No 57: "Long term operation of a nuclear power plant may be defined as operation 
beyond an established time frame set forth by, for example, licence term, design, standards, licence and/or regulations, 
which has been justified by safety assessment, with consideration given to life limiting processes and features of systems, 
structures and components". 
81 Source: Internal analysis based on Power Reactor Information System (PRIS) database as of September 2015. 

21 

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%NetherlandsFinlandSwedenBelgiumSloveniaSpainHungaryGermanyUKFranceBulgariaSlovakiaCzech RepublicRomaniaEU<1010-2020-3030-40>40291320232429292930303234353542Average Age 
 
 
                                                      
This implies that LTO programs always include safety upgrades, associated for example with modernisation 
or  replacement  of  equipment  such  as  instrumentation  and  control  or  the  addition  of  back-up  options  (e.g. 
diesel generators). LTO programs generally also include the replacement of large components of the nuclear 
island  (e.g.  steam  generators  or  the  head  of  the  reactor  pressure  vessel)  as  well  as  major  refurbishments  or 
replacements  on  the  conventional  islands  (such  as  the  turbo  generator,  the  condenser  or  the  transformers). 
Finally, LTO decisions are sometimes linked to achieving power uprates.  

The  Nuclear  Safety  Directive  requires  licence  holders  to  systematically  and  regularly  re-assess,  under  the 
supervision of the national regulator, the safety of nuclear installations specifically taking into account ageing 
issues. Therefore, Periodic Safety Reviews or Peer Reviews are performed regardless of LTO considerations. 
Potential decisions on lifetime extensions need to take such reviews into account.  

Finally,  extraordinary  events  or  accidents  can  trigger  a  targeted  response  including  specific  additional  plant 
modifications. This is the case after the Fukushima Daiichi accident. 

Box 4 Influence of the Fukushima accident 

The challenges faced in the field of nuclear safety and its governance were highlighted in the accident at the Fukushima reactors in 
Japan following the earthquake and the tsunami in March 2011. The accident resulted in unprecedented efforts to review the safety of 
nuclear installations in Europe and worldwide, with initiatives taken at national, regional and international level. 

All  countries  with  operating  NPPs  have  already  started  implementing  the  lessons  learnt  and  will  continue  to  do  so  within  their 
regulatory systems on a continuous basis, since the completion of the overall assessment of this accident may take several years. These 
include  significant  actions to  increase  robustness of  plants, as  presented  during the  two European  Nuclear  Safety  Regulators  Group 
(ENSREG) National Action Plan Workshops which were held in Brussels in 2013 and 2015.82 For example: provisions of additional 
mobile  equipment  to  prevent  or  mitigate  severe  accidents,  installation  of  hardened  fixed  equipment  and  the  improvement  of  severe 
accident management, together with appropriate staff training measures. 

Based on the information available from different sources, the cost of some major safety upgrades implemented on EU NPPs before or 
just after Fukushima can be estimated. For example, for Light  Water Reactors it can be quantified in the range between EUR 35 to 
EUR 140 million per unit depending of the necessary safety upgrades to be implemented. These may include: 

  Additional seismic investigations of NPP sites and assurance of seismic resistance of equipment, piping, buildings and structures 

Provision of alternative heat sink for the reactor and the Spent Fuel Pool  

important to safety. 
 
Improved protection against external events; 
 
Provision of (additional) alternative electrical power supplies 
  Autonomous power supply for the safety valves of the pressuriser 
 
  Hydrogen concentration monitoring system in containment  
 
 
 
 
  Accident monitoring system 
  New bunkered Emergency Control Room 
  Hardened safety core (FARN, for "Nuclear Rapid Action Force", mobile DGs and other systems) 

Installation of Passive Autocatalytic hydrogen Recombiners (PARs)  
Installation of Filtered Containment Venting System (FCVS) 
Provision of additional portable or fixed equipment (pumps, Diesel Generators, etc.) 
Plant modifications for In Vessel or Ex Vessel corium retention 

Compared to the cost considered for a typical LTO program, the post-Fukushima measures represent an increased cost of 5 to 25 %. 

4.2  Economic considerations 
Extending the useful life of a reactor is generally more attractive for the operator compared to building a new 
facility since it generally means a lower capital investment.  

Based on data publically available and on questionnaires addressed to the nuclear power plant operators, an 
overview  of  LTO  associated  costs  is  presented  in  Figure  16.  However,  it  is  not  always  easy  to  distinguish 
which  upgrades  or  modernisation  measures  are  directly  linked  to  LTO  programs  and  which  are  linked  to 
normal operation and periodic safety review of the plant.  

82 The summary reports of these two workshops were endorsed by ENSREG and made public on the ENSREG website 
(http://www.ensreg.eu/EU-Stress-Tests/Follow-up). 

22 

 
 
                                                      
Figure 16 LTO and post Fukushima safety investments from 2000 to 2025 (EUR/kWe)83  

Country  LTO investment  Post Fukushima investments 

Median 

Average 

571 

629 

34 

63 

Note: only median and average figures disclosed for confidentiality reasons 

4.3  Estimated investments in LTO for the period 2015-2050 
Considering the projected evolution of the currently operational nuclear capacity that will operate beyond its 
original lifetime (see Figure 17)84 and the costs calculated in the previous section, the estimated  investment 
needs in LTO for the period 2015-2050 are EUR 46,9 billion (see Figure 18). 

Figure 17 Projected evolution of the existing fleet (GW) 

Figure 18 Estimated investment needs in LTO 

2015-2030  2031-2040  2041-2050  Total 

EUR billion 

38,1 

8,5 

0,3 

46,9 

Box 5 The case of France 

There are 36 reactors in France that have been operating for more than 30 years, with a combined capacity of 34 GW. The French 
regulation does not foresee pre-defined operating licenses, but rather establishes comprehensive periodic safety assessment processes 
undertaken every 10 years,85 under the control of French Safety Authority (ASN). The results of these assessments, together with the 
correspondent profitability analysis carried out by the operator, will define the number of reactors that will be operating in LTO. The 
ASN has stated that potential requests for extending the lifetimes over 40 years of operation will be reviewed in the light of the safety 
objectives for new reactors such as the EPR.86  

83 Figures reported are the average of the Member State's NPPs reactors considered and have been converted to match a 
"representative"  1  000  MWe  Nuclear  Power  Plant  and  20  years  LTO  program  for  comparability  purposes.  Source: 
Questionnaires sent by the Commission to the EU NPP operators in June 2015.  
84 Projecting the number of reactors that will be granted with lifetime extensions is subject to significant uncertainties, as 
described in note 47. 
85 Law on transparency and nuclear energy safety (TSN) of 13 June 2006. 
86 
permanent-d-experts-pour-les-reacteurs-nucleaires-GPR/Seance-des-18-et-19-janvier-2012 

http://www.asn.fr/L-ASN/Appuis-techniques-de-l-ASN/Les-groupes-permanents-d-experts/Groupe-

Source: 

23 

 - 20 40 60 80 100 120 14020152020202520302035204020452050w/o extension of lifetimeoperating in LTO 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
The "Energy transition for green growth act" adopted by the French Parliament in August 201587 defines as one of its objectives the 
reduction of the nuclear energy contribution to the production of electricity to 50 % (from 74 % today).88 It also proposes a ceiling to 
nuclear installed capacity at the current level (63,2 GW). 

Title VI of the ""Energy transition for green growth act" foresees the creation of a "stricter regulatory framework for the continued 
operation of nuclear facilities that are over 40 years old."  

Implementing measures of the law are not completely defined yet. The projections presented in this Staff Working Document consider 
that the reduction in nuclear electricity will be achieved in line with the law (projecting that 52 % of the electricity production in 2025 
will come from nuclear plants). The projection further assumes that the share of nuclear energy in the electricity mix remains stable at 
50 % and considers NPPs load factors at 80 %. Consequently, the reduction in electricity production from current levels occurs via 
shut-down of some of the existing reactors at the end of their operating life. An alternative scenario where more reactors remain  in 
LTO  while  their  load  factor  is  significantly  reduced  has  not  been  considered,  since  their  profitability  would  be  severely  impacted 
probably leading to their closure for commercial reasons. 

5  The back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle 
The back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle encompasses all the activities following the irradiation in the reactor, 
which  differ  depending  on  whether  or  not  the  irradiated  fuel  is  reprocessed  and  the  nuclear  material  is 
recycled.  These  activities  are  divided  into  waste  management  and  decommissioning,  although  both  of  them 
are highly interconnected. Decommissioning refers to all administrative and technical actions taken to allow 
the  removal  of  some  or  all  of  the  regulatory  controls  from  a  facility.  Waste  management  refers  to  all 
administrative  and  operational  activities  involved  in  the  handling,  pre-treatment,  treatment,  conditioning, 
transport, storage and disposal of radioactive waste. 

5.1  Waste management 
Radioactive  waste  is  defined  as  material  for  which  no  further  use  is  foreseen  that  contains  a  level  of 
radioactivity greater than clearance levels as established by the competent regulatory authority. Although the 
exact  specifications  vary  among  Member  States,  these  typically  exclude  material  and  waste  with  very  low 
concentrations  of  radionuclides  and  those  that  contain  only  ‘natural’  concentrations  of  naturally  occurring 
radionuclides.  
In general, radioactive waste is classified according to two criteria:89 

-  its  level  of  radioactivity,  measured  in  Becquerel.  A  distinction  is  made  between  high-level  (HLW), 
intermediate-level (ILW), low-level (LLW) and very low-level waste (VLLW) 

- its lifespan, which corresponds to the rate of radioactive decay over time. Waste is classified based on the 
half-live of the elements, i.e. the period of time necessary for their radioactivity to be halved. A distinction is 
made between very short-lived waste (less than 100 days), short-lived waste (half-live of 30 years or less) and 
long-lived waste (half-live over 30 years). 
In  the  EU,  some  122  000  m3  of  radioactive  waste  is  generated  each  year.90  The  vast  majority  of  this 
radioactive waste originates from day-to-day activities at NPPs and other nuclear installations and is classified 
as low-level  and short-lived, for which waste  management  strategies are implemented on industrial  scale in 
nearly all EU Member States with a nuclear power programme.  

Figure 19 Classification of radioactive waste91 

87 For more information, see http://www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/joe_20150818_0189_0001_1_.pdf 
88 Source: Eurostat. 
89 Source: French Court of Auditors, The costs of the nuclear power sector. Thematic public report. (2012).  
90 Source: Internal data.  
91 Source: International Atomic Energy Agency, Classification of Radioactive Waste. (2009). 

24 

 
 
                                                      
5.1.1  High level waste (HLW) 
High level waste includes the radioactive liquid containing most of the fission products and actinides present 
in spent fuel and some of the associated waste streams; this material following solidification; spent fuel (if it is 
declared as waste); or any other waste with similar radiological characteristics.92   

Typical  characteristics  of  high  level  waste  are  concentrations  of  long  lived  radionuclides  exceeding  the 
limitations for short lived waste. This is waste with levels of activity concentration high enough to generate 
significant  quantities  of  heat  by  the  radioactive  decay  process  or  waste  with  large  amounts  of  long  lived 
radionuclides that need to be considered in the design of a disposal facility for such high level waste. Disposal 
in deep, stable geological formations is the generally recognized option for the disposal of high level waste.  

Around  3  200  tons  of  heavy  metal  (tHM)  of  spent  nuclear  fuel  is  generated  every  year,  together  with 
approximately  200  m3  of  high-level  waste.  As  of  the  end  of  2010,  there  were  about  53  300  tHM  (mostly 
uranium) in spent fuel in storage in the EU, most of it at reactor sites.  

Fuel cycle policy 

Choosing the ‘closed’ or ‘open’ fuel cycle is a matter of national policy, the difference being in how spent fuel 
is viewed – either as waste (open cycle) or a resource to be used further (closed cycle). Only a few Member 
States  have  consistently  committed  to  implementing  either  an  open  or  closed  fuel  cycle.  The  open  cycle 
strategy has been adopted by Sweden and Finland, where the encapsulated fuel is planned to be disposed of in 
a geological repository after 40 years interim storage. Also in Germany the open fuel cycle is currently used, 
resulting from a 2002 amendment of the nuclear energy act (subsequently, in 2011, a decision was taken to 
phase-out  nuclear  power).  On  the  other  hand,  France  is  working  towards  a  fully  closed  fuel  cycle  with  the 
development of fast neutron reactors and advanced reprocessing technology to recycle fissile materials.93  

5.1.1.1  Open cycle 
In the once-through or open cycle, the spent nuclear is directly disposed. The activities involved in this option 
are the following: 

1. 

2. 

interim storage of the spent fuel in the reactor pools for some years for the fuel to cool down by decay 
of short-lived radionuclides; 
if needed, transfer to a dedicated store at the reactor site or to a centralised storage facility. Spent fuel 
can be stored in pools (‘wet storage’) or in casks in a dedicated facility (‘dry storage’). 

3.  encapsulation of the fuel in a disposal container; and 
4.  disposal in a final repository. 

92 Source: International Atomic Energy Agency, Safety Glossary, Draft 2016 Revision. (2015). (IAEA , 2015) 
93 Source: European Academies’ Science Advisory Council, Management of spent nuclear fuel and its waste. (2014). 

25 

 
 
 
                                                      
Figure 20 Illustrative once-through (OT) cycle94 

(Partially) closed cycle 

5.1.1.2 
In a "closed" fuel cycle the spent fuel is recycled by extracting the main fissile components (plutonium and 
uranium). This process involves the following activities: 

1. 

interim storage of the spent fuel in the reactor pools for some years for the fuel to cool down by decay 
of short-lived radionuclides; transfer of the fuel to a reprocessing plant; 

2.  conditioning of the waste products (HLW) e.g. by vitrification, and transfer of the conditioned waste 

to a facility for interim storage, pending disposal; 

3.  reuse of the recovered plutonium and uranium for the fabrication of recycled fuel with the recovered 
plutonium and uranium in dedicated plants and re-use of these fuels in a thermal neutron reactor or in 
a fast neutron reactor; and 

4.  disposal of all the HLW and other long-lived radioactive waste in a final repository. 

Full recycling remains for the moment a long term prospect and is in principle only feasible with the use of 
fast  neutron  reactors,  which  can  be  optimised  to  consume  the  plutonium  and  uranium  efficiently  and/or  to 
incinerate  long-lived  minor  actinides.  Due  to  several  uncertainties  around  the  deployment  of  this  type  of 
reactors, including their high capital costs, the possibility of closing the fuel cycle has not been  foreseen  in 
this Staff Working Document.  

Since the technology for fast-breeder reactors is not currently deployed in the EU, countries that considered 
the closed fuel cycle turned to a ‘partially closed cycle’ where plutonium is recycled in MOX fuel that is then 
loaded  into  nuclear  reactors.  Spent  MOX  is  currently  intended  for  disposal,  although  it  could  be  further 
recycled. 

Figure 21 Illustrative PWR-MOX recycling cycle95 

94 Source: see note 4. 
95  Source:  see  note  4.  Notes:  UOX:  Uranium  Oxide.  REPU:  Reprocessed  Uranium.  REPUOX:  Reprocessed  Uranium 
Oxide. 

26 

 
 
 
 
                                                      
5.1.1.3  Overview of existing spent fuel policies 
In  2014,  MOX  fuel  was  used  in  a  number  of  reactors  in  Germany,  France  and  the  Netherlands.  In  other 
Member States the situation has varied over the years: fuel has been reprocessed and partially recycled and 
direct disposal is envisaged, at least for part of the fuel.  

A  list  of  the  commercial  reprocessing  facilities  is  presented  in  Figure  22,  with  only  France  and  the  United 
Kingdom operating facilities at  the  moment. Belgium, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain  and Sweden have  been 
customers of France’s reprocessing services (with Spain being a former customer of UK's services as well), 
while  the  Netherlands  still  is.  The  Czech  Republic,  Slovakia,  Germany,  Finland  and  Hungary  are  former 
customers  of  the  reprocessing  services  provided  by  Russian/Soviet  facilities,  whereas  Bulgaria  continues  to 
send spent fuel to Russia for reprocessing.96 

Figure 22 Commercial reprocessing facilities in Europe97 

Country 

Facility Name 

Status 

Scale 

Start of Operation 

End of Operation 

BE 

FR 

FR 

FR 

FR 

DE 

IT 

UK 

UK 

Eurochemic  

Decommissioning 

60 t HM/year 

Areva NC La Hague - 
UP2-400 

Areva NC La Hague - 
UP2-800 

Areva NC La Hague - 
UP3 

Decommissioning 

400 t HM/year 

In operation 

1 000 t HM/year 

In operation 

1 000 t HM/year 

Marcoule - UP1 

Decommissioning 

600 t HM/year 

Karlsruhe Reprocessing 
Plant 

Decommissioned 

35 t HM/year 

Eurex SFRE  

Decommissioning 

10 t HM/year 

(Oxide – pilot plant) 

NDA Magnox 
Reprocessing 

In operation 

1 500 t HM/year 

NDA Thorp 

In operation 

900 t HM/year 

1966 

1966 

1996 

1990 

1958 

1971 

1980 

1964 

1994 

1975 

2004 

1997 

1991 

1990 

2018 

2018 

96 Source: International Panel on Fissile Materials, Plutonium separation in nuclear power programs. (2015).   
97 Source: webpage of the Nuclear fuel cycle information system, accessed on 22/10/2015.   

27 

 
 
 
 
  
  
 
                                                      
In  the  international  context,  the  United  States  follows  the  policy  to  pursue  centralised  interim  storage98  and 
ultimate disposal for the current inventory of spent nuclear fuel without further treatment. However, a Mixed 
Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility is being built in by a consortium including AREVA. The main objective of 
this facility is the reduction of weapon-grade plutonium stocks. The latest cost estimate is EUR 18 billion.99 
The facility will have a recycling capacity of 3,5 tons of plutonium into MOX each year. Japan, Russia, India 
and China also have commercial or pilot reprocessing facilities. 

Factors affecting the choice of a nuclear fuel cycle strategy 

The choice between an open cycle or a recycling strategy is made in each case by the individual Member State 
based on diverse considerations, among which some of the most relevant are the following: 

a)  Sustainability – Reprocessing spent fuel optimizes the existing reserves of uranium and contributes to the 
security  of  supply dimension,  since  it  replaces  uranium  that  otherwise  would  have  to  be  imported  from 
outside the EU. In 2014, savings in natural uranium due to the use of MOX fuel represented 6.8% of the 
total  uranium  loaded  into  European  reactors,  as  shown  in  Figure  4.  Moreover,  interim  storage  of  the 
irradiated MOX assemblies can further constitute a reserve of plutonium to feed fast-breeder reactors in 
the future.100 

b)  Radioactive waste management - The Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste Management Directive considers 
both strategies (direct disposal and  reprocessing) as possible options. Reprocessing reduces the volumes 
of  high-level  waste  and  therefore  the  size  of  the  spent  fuel  storing  facilities  needed.  Nevertheless, 
whatever  choice is  made,  there will be  always be a  need  to build a final disposal repository, albeit  at  a 
significantly smaller scale if the fuel is recycled.101  

c)  Non-proliferation – The use of nuclear materials for solely civil purposes is controlled worldwide by the 
application of IAEA safeguards, acting under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Within the EU, the control is 
complemented by Euratom Safeguards that verify the declared uses of nuclear materials. A reprocessing 
strategy  has  to  be  accompanied  by  appropriate  safeguards  arrangements  which  take  into  account  the 
plutonium separation facilities.102  

d)  Economics  –  Cost  estimations  are  subject  to  several  uncertainties  such  as  the  price  of  uranium  and  the 
schedule for building a final disposal facility. Other important parameter that influences the economics of 
the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle is the size of the nuclear fleet, reflecting economies of scale and the 
fact that spent fuel management in a Member State with few reactors would differ significantly from the 
case of a very large nuclear programme with tens of reactors.103 

With the decision of the United Kingdom of shutting down their reprocessing facilities in 2018, France is the 
only Member State with a decided industrial policy towards recycling. A number of other Member States are 
still deliberating.  

5.1.1.4  Final disposal facility 
Regardless  of  the  fuel  cycle  strategy  chosen,  it  is  acknowledged  that  in  the  long  term  Member  States  with 
nuclear  capabilities  will  be  required  to  find  a  permanent  solution  for  the  HLW/  Spent  Fuel  generated.  The 
construction of a geological repository is the commonly accepted option.  The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in 

98 Source: U.S. Department of Energy’s Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level 
Radioactive Waste. 
99 Source: Platts Nuclear News Flashes. 20/08/2015.  
100  Nevertheless,  at  the  current  rate  of  consumption  existing  resources  of  uranium  are  considered  to  be  sufficient  to 
support  the  continued  use  of  nuclear  power  (the  identified  resource  base  would  be  sufficient  for  over  150  years  of 
supply).  See:  OECD  Nuclear  Energy  Agency  and  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency,  Uranium  2014:  resources, 
production and demand. (2014). 
101 In addition to volume considerations, other relevant factors to compare the different scenarios include decay heat and 
radio-toxicity. See: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The future of the nuclear fuel cycle. (2011).   
102 Source: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The future of nuclear power. (2009).   
103 Source: see note 4.  

28 

 
 
                                                      
Carlsbad, New Mexico, USA, is the only geological facility for HLW104 functioning in the world (in operation 
since 1999 to dispose of waste produced in the US nuclear defence programme)105. No civil deep geological 
repository  has  yet  been  built  yet.106  In  Europe,  Finland,107  Sweden  and  France  have  the  most  advanced 
programmes, with most of the other Member States having no plans of starting the construction in the short-
term.  Meanwhile,  long  term  storage  facilities  are  being  built  for  a  lower  cost,  although  these  are  not 
substitutes of the geological facility. 

Developing  a  deep  geological  repository  offers  possibilities  of  cooperation  between  Member  States  and 
research  programs  are  being  conducted  at  European  level.  The  "Implementing  Geological  Disposal 
Technology  Platform  (IGD-TP)"108  plays  an  important  role  in  this  regard.  Regional  initiatives  to  share  the 
costs  are  also  possible  (for  example,  Croatia  and  Slovenia  share  the  ownership  of  the  Krško  NPP  and  will 
have to coordinate their approach to dispose the spent fuel). 

Figure 23 Status of the projects to build geological repositories to dispose HLW109 

Member State 

Status 

Planned start of operations  Estimated cost110 

BE111 

BG 

CZ 

DE 

ES112 

FI 

FR113 

HR 

HU 

IT 

LT 

NL 

Preliminary studies 

 Not disclosed 

Preliminary studies 

Preliminary studies 

Preliminary studies 

Preliminary studies 

Construction license granted 

Stakeholders consultation 

Not disclosed 

2065 

2050 

2062 

2020 

2025 

Preliminary studies 

Not disclosed 

Site selection 

2064 

Preliminary studies   

Not disclosed 

Preliminary studies 

Preliminary studies 

2066 

2130 

(EUR billion) 

3,2 

4,5 

10,0 (note A) 

Not disclosed 

3,6 

25,9 

0,4 

2,4 

2,5 

2,6 

Not disclosed 

104 The HLW in this facility differs to the HLW produced in the civil cycle – i.e. vitrified heat-generating waste –, since it 
rather corresponds to materials contaminated with transuranics. 
105 Source: webpage of the US Department of Energy (http://www.wipp.energy.gov/wipprecovery/about.html) accessed 
on 22/10/2015. 
106 Source: see note 4. 
107 The Finnish government granted a construction license to Posiva for a spent fuel repository on November 2015. The 
facility is expected to be completed by 2023. Source: Platts Nuclear News Flashes, 12/11/2015. 
108  The  IGD-TP  technology  platform  was  set  up  in  2009  with  the  aim  of  better  targeting  research,  development  and 
demonstration  (RD&D)  programmes  and  ensuring  improved  research  between  Member  States.  Its  role  is  to  boost 
confidence in the safety and implementation of radioactive waste disposal solutions in deep geological formations. 
109 Source: National reports under Council Directive 2011/70/Euratom unless otherwise specified. 
110 Figures include operational and decommissioning costs. 
111  There  is  no  national  policy  concerning  geological  disposal  in  Belgium.  The  estimated  costs  were  obtained  from: 
ONDRAF/NIRAS, Cost evaluation of geological disposal of category B&C waste for the long term fund. (2013). 
112 Source: Spanish Court of Auditors, Informe Nº 1075. (2015). 
113 Note: On 15 January 2016 the French Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy issued a Ministerial 
Order  updating  the  cost  associated  with  the  implementation  of  the  long-term  management  solutions  for  long-lived 
medium and high-level radioactive waste related to the Cigéo project at EUR 25 billion under 2011 economic conditions. 

29 

 
 
                                                      
Member State 

Status 

Planned start of operations  Estimated cost110 

PL 

RO 

SE 

SI114 

SK 

UK 

TOTAL 

Preliminary studies 

Preliminary studies 

Construction license requested 

Preliminary studies 

Preliminary studies 

Preliminary studies 

2050 

2028 

2065 

2065 

2075 

(EUR billion) 

Not disclosed 

2,2 

3,2 

0,4 

3,7 

13,1 

77,7 

Note A:  includes the estimated total investment in Morsleben and Gorleben diposal facilities. 

5.2  Decommissioning of nuclear power plants 
The  decommissioning  of  nuclear  power  plants  will  become  an  increasingly  important  activity  for  the 
European nuclear industry in the coming years due to the ageing of the fleet. However, experience in this field 
is  rather  limited.  There  were  90  power  reactors  shut-down  in  the  EU  as  of  January  2016,  but  only  three  of 
them have been completely decommissioned (all in Germany). The international perspective does not provide 
much  more  experience:  although  there  are  147  reactors  in  shutdown  mode  worldwide,  only  13  have  been 
completely  decommissioned  in  addition  to  the  three  mentioned  in  Europe,  all  of  them  in  the  United  States. 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom account for 78% of the nuclear power reactors in shutdown mode 
in Europe. 

Figure 24 Nuclear reactors in shut down status per MS and technology115 

BWR    FBR    GCR    HTGR   HWGCR 

LWGR  

PHWR  

PWR    SGHWR 

Total 

BE 

BG 

DE 

ES 

FR 

IT 

LT 

NL 

SE 

SK 

UK 

9 

1 

2 

1 

2 

Total 

15 

1 

2 

2 

5 

2 

1 

8 

1 

27 

37 

2 

1 

1 

1 

3 

1 

1 

4 

14 

1 

1 

1 

2 

2 

2 

2 

23 

1 

1 

4 

28 

3 

12 

4 

2 

1 

3 

3 

30 

90 

114 The National Program did not disclose the estimated costs. We have used the information provided by the Croatian 
party, since the ownership of the NPP is shared at 50/50. 
115  Source:  Power  Reactor  Information  System  (PRIS)  consulted  on  January  2016.  The  list  includes  experimental 
reactors. 

BWR  -  boiling  water  reactor,  FBR  –  fast-breeder  reactor,  HTGR  -  high  temperature  gas  cooled  graphite  moderated 
reactor,  GCR  -  gas  cooled reactor, HWGCR  -  heavy water  moderated gas  cooled reactor,  LWGR  -  light water  cooled 
graphite moderated reactor, PHWR - pressurized heavy water reactor, PWR - pressurized water reactor, SGHWR - steam 
generating heavy water reactor.  

30 

 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
The significance of the decommissioning activities when compared to the full nuclear fuel cycle costs depends 
of  the  temporal  perspective.  The  illustrative  calculation  presented  in  Figure  25  shows  the  impact  of  the 
decommissioning  costs  per  kWh  of  electricity  produced  by  a  generic  nuclear  power  plant  throughout  its 
operating life.  

Figure 25 Illustrative calculation of the decommissioning costs in relation to the price of electricity sold116 

Overnight 
Construction Costs 
(EUR million) 

Decommisioning costs 

Estimate 

EUR million 
(A) 

Estimated 
production 
GWh  (B) 

Decommissioning costs in 
EUR per kWh produced = 
A/B 

Decommissioning costs as 
% of electricity prices 

8 500 

15% 

1 275 

702 202 

0,0018 

4% 

Estimations of the costs of decommissioning  commercial nuclear  power reactors vary significantly between 
Member  States,  technologies,  size  and  location  of  the  reactor  and  dismantling  strategy  chosen.  Given  the 
ageing  status of the European reactors,  the capability of the industry  and the regulators to develop  safe and 
cost effective decommissioning programs will affect the future of the nuclear commercial power in Europe. 
This  includes  greater  transparency  in  cost  estimates  and  further  collaboration  between  Member  States  to 
identify best practices.  

Several  international  projects  have  been  recently  undertaken  in  order  to  provide  more  clarity  on 
decommissioning cost estimations, such as the joint IAEA/EC/NEA project on the “International Structure for 
Decommissioning  Costing  (ISDC)  for  Nuclear  Installations”,  or  the  publications  by  the  Radioactive  Waste 
Management Committee (RWMC) of the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA).  

5.2.1  Decommissioning strategies 
According to the IAEA Safety Standards,117 there are two possible decommissioning strategies:  

1)  Immediate  Dismantling:  decommissioning  actions  begin  shortly  after  the  permanent  shutdown  of 
operation. Equipment and structures, systems and components of a facility containing radioactive material 
are  removed  and/or  decontaminated  to  a  level  that  permits  the  facility  to  be  released  from  regulatory 
control  for  unrestricted  use,  or  released  with  restrictions  on  its  future  use.  This  strategy  has  the  main 
advantage that personnel involved in the operating phase is available, providing a good knowledge of the 
plant history. In addition, the site may become available for future use and this strategy is normally better 
accepted  in  the  public  opinion.  On  the other  hand,  it  requires  the use  of  interim  storage  facilities  (if  no 
final disposal facility is available) and levels of radioactivity in the reactor are higher than in the case of 
deferred  dismantling.  This  means  that  greater  precautions  must  be  taken  during  dismantling  and  that 
larger volumes of decommissioning waste will be classified as radioactive. This strategy also requires an 
earlier disbursement of cash.  

2)  Long Term Safe Enclosure (deferred dismantling): after removal of the nuclear fuel from the facility, all 
or part of a facility containing radioactive material is either processed or placed in such a condition that it 
can  be  put  in  safe  storage  and  the  facility  maintained  until  it  is  subsequently  decontaminated  and/or 
dismantled. This strategy may involve early dismantling of some parts of the facility and early processing 
of some radioactive material and its removal from the facility, as preparatory steps for the safe storage of 
the  remaining  parts.  Time  provides  the  advantage  of  reducing  the  radioactivity,  which  makes  the 
decommissioning works easier, and of postponing the cash disbursements. However, there is an impact on 
the available knowledge of the plant that may be irreversible.  

Entombment,  in  which  all  or  part  of  the  facility  is  encased  in  a  structurally  long  lived  material,  is  not 
considered  a  decommissioning  strategy  and  is  not  an  option  in  the  case  of  planned  permanent  shutdown.  It 

116 Source: Internal calculation. Overnight Construction Cost (OCC) obtained from  the high-range disclosed in section 
3.1.1of this report. Estimation of decommissioning costs as % of OCC obtained from Nuclear Energy Agency, Projected 
Costs of Generating Electricity, (2015). Production of the NPP calculated as follows: 1 670 MWe x 24 hours x 365 days 
x 60 years x 80% availability factor. Average wholesale baseload electricity price in France for the first quarter of 2015 
was 45,1 EUR/MWh - Source: (Market Observatory for Energy - DG ENER, 2015). 
117 International Atomic Energy Agency, Decommissioning of Facilities, General Safety Requirements No. GSR Part 6. 
(2014). 

31 

 
 
                                                      
may  be  considered  a  solution  only  under  exceptional  circumstances  (e.g.  following  a  severe  accident). 
Immediate decommissioning is the preferred strategy indicated by the IAEA Safety Standards. It is also in line 
with the objectives of the Radioactive Waste Management Directive:118 "It should be an ethical obligation of 
each Member State to avoid any undue burden on future generations in respect of spent fuel and radioactive 
waste  including  any  radioactive  waste  expected  from  decommissioning  of  existing  nuclear  installations". 
However,  there  may  be  situations  in  which  immediate  dismantling  is  not  a  practicable  strategy  when  all 
relevant factors are considered. 

Figure 26 Decommissioning strategies119 

Immediate dismantling 

Deferred dismantling 

No preferred option 

Finland (Olkiluoto) 
Hungary 
Netherlands (Dodewaard) 
Romania 
United Kingdom 

  Czech Republic 

Germany 

Belgium 
Bulgaria  
Spain  
Finland (Loviisa) 
France 
Croatia 
Italy (Note A) 
Lithuania 
Netherlands (Borssele) 
Sweden 
Slovenia 
Slovakia (Note B)  

Note A Italian NPPs have been formally under an operating mode status for many years after stopping producing electricity.   
Note B Decommissioning plans for JE V2 have not been decided and consider both options as possible. Source: (Slovakian National 
Nuclear Fund, 2014). 

5.3  Financing the back-end activities 
Most of the cash disbursements related to waste management and decommissioning activities will occur once 
the related nuclear power plant has stopped generating revenues. To ensure that there will be enough funds to 
pay for back-end activities, regulators require nuclear licensees to set up funds which are built up during the 
plant operation. Nuclear operators are also deemed to be compliant with International Accounting Standards 
(IAS), under which provisions for one-off events (such as environmental clean-up) are measured at the most 
likely amount [IAS 37.40].  

In  most  Member  States,  nuclear  regulators  specifically  define  the  method  for  constituting  and  securing 
decommissioning  and  waste  management  funds.  In  other  cases,  the  regulator  refers  to  the  accounting 
principles and commercial law and does not require additional funding measures.120  

5.3.1  Estimation of the total charges 
An adequate coverage of the funding needs is based on an accurate estimation of what the decommissioning 
and  waste  management  costs  will  be.  This  estimation  is  affected  by  several  uncertainties  that  have  already 
been  described  in  this  report,  linked  for  example  to  the  lack  of  experience  in  the  field.  Early  closures  or 
extensions of the operating lifetimes of nuclear plants have also a significant effect. 

118 OJ L199, 2.8.2011, p. 48. 
119 Source: Responses submitted by members of the Decommissioning Funding Group to the questionnaires designed to 
update information on individual Member States alignment to the Commission Recommendation (2006/851/Euratom) on 
the management of financial resources for the decommissioning of nuclear installations, spent fuel and radioactive waste, 
except  the  cases  of  the  UK,  where  information  was  obtained  from  public  sources  available  at  the  Nuclear 
Decommissioning  Authority  webpage  and  Finland,  where  information  was  complemented  with  the  National  Program 
referred in note 122. Note: not all Member States have issued a National decommissioning strategy. For those cases, we 
have reflected the expected/ preferred strategy, if any.  
120 As it is the case in Germany. However, the government has asked a commission to make recommendations on how to 
safeguard the funding of the decommissioning by the end of February 2016. A public trust, which would safeguard the 
nearly EUR 40 billion in provisions set aside so far by the utilities, is one option under discussion.  

32 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
All national bodies exercise periodic controls of decommissioning costs estimates. The frequency of checks is 
at least every five years, while often there are more frequent controls.121 

Decommissioning  estimates  per  unit  vary  within  Member  States,  as  can  be  seen  in  Figure  27.  However,  a 
direct comparison is  misleading  because they relate  to several technologies, are frequently reported  under  a 
different  scope  of  activities  and  there  are  different  regulatory  regimes.  Moreover,  these  estimations  refer  to 
future  payments  only,  which  has  to  be  considered  when  comparing  Member  States  where  significant 
decommissioning  funds  have  already  been  disbursed  to  others  where  the  bulk  of  the  decommissioning 
activities will occur in the future. Estimates should therefore be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. 

Figure 27 Estimated costs of decommissioning NPPs122 

MS 

BE123 

BG124 

CZ 

DE 

ES 

FI125 

FR 

HR 

HU 

IT 

LT 

NL 
RO126 

SE 

SI127 

Estimated 
Decommissioning 
costs 
(EUR billion, note A) 

Total NPPs  

Units 

Capacity 
(MWe) 

Average 
capacity 

Estimated cost of 
decommissioning  
(EUR billion per unit) 

Estimated cost of 
decommissioning  
(EUR billion per GWe) 

4,6 

2,3 

1,5 

34,0 
(note B) 

4,5 

1,0 

22,6 

0,2 

1,2 

3,9 

1,4 

0,5  

1,4 

3,4 

0,2 

7 

6 

6 

36 

10 

4 

70 

0,5 
(note C) 
4 

4 

2 

2 

2 

5 921 

3 558 

3 904 

26 375 

8 188 

2 752 

66 919 

344 

1 889 

1 423 

2 370 

537 

1 300 

13 

10 861 

0,5 
(note C) 

344 

846 

593 

651 

733 

819 

688 

956 

344 

472 

356 

1 185 

269 

650 

835 

344 

0,7 

0,4 

0,3 

0,9 

0,5 

0,3 

0,3 

0,3 

0,3 

1,0 

0,7 

0,3 

0,7 

0,3 

0,3 

0,8 

0,6 

0,4 

1,3 

0,5 

0,4 

0,3 

0,4 

0,6 

2,7 

0,6 

0,9 

1,1 

0,3 

0,4 

121 COM(2013) 121 final, Use of financial resources earmarked for the decommissioning of nuclear installations, spent 
fuel and radioactive waste. 
122  Sources:  Responses  submitted  by  members  of  the  Decommissioning  Funding  Group  (DFG)  to  the  questionnaires 
designed  to  update  information  on  individual  Member  States  alignment  to  the  Commission  Recommendation 
(2006/851/Euratom)  on  the  management  of  financial  resources  for  the  decommissioning  of  nuclear  installations,  spent 
fuel and radioactive waste, unless otherwise specified. Power Reactor Information System accessed on October 2015.  
123 The response submitted by the member of the DFG corresponded to the provisions registered by the operator as of 
December 2014 (measured in net present value). The figure reported in this SWD was provided by the Belgian Ministry 
of Economy following the publication of the draft PINC. 
124 The response submitted by the member of the DFG did not include the estimated costs of decommissioning Blocks 5 
and 6 of the Kozloduy NPP. These are estimated in EUR 1,9 billion at the "Revised strategy for spent nuclear fuel and 
radioactive waste management" approved by the Council of Ministers on 2 September 2015.  
125 Figure obtained from the National Program submitted under Directive 2011/70/Euratom. 
126 See note 125. 
127  The DFG  did not provide  any  figure.  It has  been  considered  to  be  the same  amount  as  the  one reported  in  the  HR 
questionnaire. 

33 

 
 
                                                      
MS 

SK128 
UK129 

Totals 

Estimated 
Decommissioning 
costs 
(EUR billion, note A) 

Total NPPs  

Units 

Capacity 
(MWe) 

Average 
capacity 

Estimated cost of 
decommissioning  
(EUR billion per unit) 

Estimated cost of 
decommissioning  
(EUR billion per GWe) 

3,1 

36,9 

122,7 

9 

45 

3 665 

13 598 

221 

153 948 

407 

302 

697 

0,3 

0,8 

0,6 

0,8 

2,7 

0,8 

Note A: Considering reactors currently in operation and in shut-down mode. Reactors under construction have only been included in 
the estimation from Slovakia (Mochovce EMO1/2). 
Note  B:  Includes  estimation  of  waste  management  costs,  excluding  the  final  disposal  facility.  Figure  obtained  from  the  National 
Program submitted under Directive 2011/70/Euratom. 
Note C: Croatia and Slovenia share ownership of the Krško Nuclear Power Plant. 

Waste management estimates also show discrepancies between Member States, mainly due to the significant 
uncertainties existing around the costs of building a final disposal facility. A summary is presented in Figure 
28. The average result of 3,2 EUR per MWh is higher than what was estimated in recent studies (in the level 
of 1,5 EUR per MWh).130 

Figure 28 Waste management estimates reported by Member States (including costs for the building of geological 
repositories)131 

MS 

Estimated Waste 
Management costs 
(EUR billion) 

Lifetime electricity supplied from NPPs [TWh] 

Average lifetime 
load factor132 

Actual electricity 
supplied as of Sep 
2015 

Estimated future 
electricity supplied133 

Total 

Estimated cost of 
waste 
management 
(EUR per MWh) 

BE134 

BG 

CZ 

DE 

ES135 

FI 
FR136 

HR 

HU 

9,2 

0,9 

4,6 

11,6  
Note A 
10,2 

5,6 

46,9 

0,6 

4,3 

84% 

65% 

82% 

88% 

85% 

91% 

73% 

84% 

86% 

1 399 

518 

515 

4 836 

1 829 

697 

11 873 

78 

389 

349 

288 

819 

398 

619 

344 

9 203 

60 

234 

1 748 

807 

1 334 

5 234 

2 448 

1 041 

21 076 

138 

624 

5,3 

1,1 

3,4 

2,2 

3,3 

5,4 

2,2 

4,4 

6,9 

128 See note 126. 
129 Figure obtained from the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority Annual Report and EDF Energy Financial Statements. 
It  corresponds  to  the  decommissioning  of  the  MAGNOX  plants  (EUR  19,1  billion)  and  the  plants  operated  by  EDF 
Energy (EUR 15,9 billion). FX rate used: 1 EUR = 0,7234 GBP. 
130 See note 33. 
131  Sources:  National  reports  submitted  by  Member  States  under  Council  Directive  2011/70/Euratom  unless  specified 
otherwise.  
132 Only reactors in operation are considered in the calculation of the average load factor. 
133 Considering LTO projections presented in section 4.3. 
134 See note 123. 
135 Source: see note 112. 
136  Souce:  Decommissioning  Funding  Group  and  update  of  the  Cigéo  project.  Note:  only  costs  related  to  the  fleet 
operated by EDF, including a share of 78% of the estimated costs of Cigéo. 

34 

 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                      
MS 

IT 

LT 

NL 

RO 

SE 

SI 

SK 

UK 

Totals 

Estimated Waste 
Management costs 
(EUR billion) 

Lifetime electricity supplied from NPPs [TWh] 

Average lifetime 
load factor132 

Actual electricity 
supplied as of Sep 
2015 

Estimated future 
electricity supplied133 

Total 

Estimated cost of 
waste 
management 
(EUR per MWh) 

2,5 

3,2 

Not available 

2,8 

7,8 

0,6 

5,0 

24,1 

139,9 

48% 

59% 

84% 

92% 

75% 

84% 

81% 

70% 

77% 

143 

311 

148 

133 

2 200 

78 

412 

2 629 

28 187 

0 

0 

54 

315 

1 186 

60 

295 

817 

15 719 

143 

311 

202 

448 

3 386 

138 

707 

3 445 

43 905 

17,5 

10,3 

NA 

6,3 

2,3 

4,4 

7,1 

7,0 

3,2 

Note A: Share of the NPP operators in the investments foreseen for waste disposal facilities, including the Konrad site.. 

5.3.2  Availability and sufficiency of funds 
Member States adopted different models for building up the required funds, with the following basic types:137  

  The segregated internal fund, kept by the operator of the installation but as a separate budget which 
can only be used for decommissioning and waste management purposes and under the control of the 
national body. Funds of this type exist for example in France and Belgium.  

  The  segregated  external  fund,  meaning  external  to  the  operator  of  the  installation,  exists  in  Finland 
and  Sweden,  where  it  is  also  external  from  the  state  budget,  and  Hungary,  Romania,  Slovakia  and 
Bulgaria, where the funds are somehow within the State budget.  

  Non-segregated internal funds exist in Germany, where the Commercial Law requires the companies 
operating NPPs to build up reserves in their balance sheets for the future decommissioning and waste 
management costs. 

In  most  Member  States,  a  single  financing  regime  is  intended  to  cover  both  waste  management  and 
decommissioning  activities  since  they  are  highly  correlated,  whereas  a  few  have  set  up  separate  funds.  An 
overview of the existing funds and the type of assets where they are invested is presented in Figure 30. 

An indicative comparison between the available funds and the total estimated needs is presented in Figure 29. 
As  of  2014,  European  nuclear  operators  had  dedicated  assets  that  would  cover  51  %  of  the  total  estimated 
decommissioning  and  waste  management  costs.  This  compares  to  the  useful  life  incurred  at  the  same  date, 
estimated at 64 %.  

It is important to note that the calculation of the total estimated needs is based on future costs only, whereas 
the  electricity  lifetime  supply  combines  past  and  future  production.  This  is  a  conservative  approach  in 
assessing  the  adequacy  of  the  existing  funds,  especially  for  those  Member  States  where  significant 
investments  have  already  been  made.  Nevertheless,  in  general  it  is  assumed  that  the  bulk  of  the  back-end 
expenses  will  occur  in  the  future,  e.g.  with  the  construction  of  centralized  storage  facilities  or  geological 
repositories. The calculation is further on the conservative side because it does not consider potential financial 
incomes  obtained  on  the  accumulated  funds.  Finally,  the  total  electricity  supplied  depends  of  course  on  the 
date when each plant will be shut-down, which is subject to the uncertainties described in note 47.  

Figure 29 Comparison of available funds to accomplished useful life 

MS 

Funding (EUR billion) 

Lifetime electricity supplied from NPPs [TWh] 

137 Source: see note 121. 

35 

 
 
  
                                                      
Funds 
available 
(dedicated 
assets) 

Total 
estimated 
needs 

% 

Actual 
electricity 
supplied as 
of Sep 
2015  

Estimated 
future 
electricity 
supplied 

Total 
estimated 
lifetime 
electricity 
supplied 

BE 

BG 

CZ 

DE 

ES 

FI 

FR 

HR 

HU 

IT 

LT 

NL 

RO 

SE 

SI 

SK 

UK 

7,6 

0,5 

1,2 

38,0 
Note A 
4,3 

2,4 

23,0 

0,2 

0,8 

NA  

0,5 

0,1 

0,2 

6,2 

0,2 

1,5 

46,3 

13,8 

3,2 

6,1 

45,7 

14,7 

6,6 

69,5 

0,8 

5,5 

6,4 

4,6 

0,5 

4,2 

11,2 

0,8 

8,1 

61,0 

Totals 

132,9 

262,5 

55% 

15% 

20% 

83% 

29% 

36% 

33% 

23% 

14% 

NA 

8% 

29% 

4% 

56% 

24% 

18% 

76% 
Note B 
51% 

1 399 

518 

515 

4 836 

1 829 

697 

11 873 

78 

389 

143 

311 

148 

133 

349 

288 

819 

398 

1 297 

344 

9 203 

60 

234 

0 

0 

54 

315 

2 200 

1 186 

78 

412 

2 629 

60 

295 

817 

1 748 

807 

1 334 

5 234 

3 126 

1 041 

21 076 

138 

624 

143 

311 

202 

448 

3 386 

138 

707 

3 445 

% 

80% 

64% 

39% 

92% 

59% 

67% 

56% 

57% 

62% 

100% 

100% 

73% 

30% 

65% 

57% 

58% 

76% 

28 187 

15 718 

43 905 

64% 

Note A: The regulation in Germany does not require the constitution of specific dedicated assets, but rather refers to the commercial 
and  tax  laws  to  ensure  that  operators  have  "sufficient  reserves  as  liabilities  on  the  balance  sheet"  (Section  249  of  the  Commercial 
Code). Accounting provisions are backed up by physical assets, which may experience variations in value in the long term and  the 
German government recently commissioned an independent review which concluded that nuclear operators had sufficient funding to 
cover  the  costs  of  decommissioning  and  waste  management  activities.  Based  on  this  assessment  and  provided  that  the  on-going 
discussions  around  a  possible  externalization  of  the  fund  management  are  concluded,  we  have  assumed  in  our  calculation  that  the 
available funds are equal to the back-end accounting provisions registered by the nuclear operators as of December 2014.  

Note B: We have considered that the related NDA obligations are fully backed by existing funds, since these will be paid from the UK 
National  Budget  (Magnox  provision  of  EUR  20,8  billion  and  geological  disposal  facility  provision  of  EUR  13,1  billion).  The  total 
figure of funds further includes the balance of the Nuclear Liability Fund (EUR 12,4 billion) that is intended to cover the back-end 
activities linked to the fleet managed by EDF Energy.  

36 

 
 
Figure 30 Overview of Decommissioning and Waste management funds138 

MS 

Method of Collection 

Fund Management 

Internal 

External 

Non-
segregated 

Segregated 

Total funds 
available 

(EUR billion) 

Investment portfolio 

BE 

100% of the estimation's present value 

X 

7,6 

Loans to the operator and third companies: 80%; SICAV: 11% 
Belgian Sovereign bonds: 2%; Dedicated assets: 5% 
Corporate bonds and others: 2% 

BG  Annual fee based on income from NPPs 

X 

0,5 

State treasury account 

CZ 

100% of the estimation's present value 
(Decommissioning) 
Annual fee based on electricity 
produced from NPPs (Waste 
management) 

X  
(Decomm.) 

DE 

100% of the estimation's present value 

X 

ES 

Annual fee based on electricity 
produced from NPPs 

FI 

Annual fee based on waste produced 

FR 

100% of the estimation's present value 

X 

1,2 

X  
(Waste 
Mgt.) 

EUR 0,7 billion in the nuclear account. May be invested on 
financial markets in liquid state bonds, the Czech National Bank 
and securities of emitters selected by the Ministry of Finance. 
EUR 0,5 billion are undisclosed restricted funds in the balance of 
CEZ. 

38,0 

There are no specific requirements. Funds are assumed to equal the 
accounting provisions.  

X 

X 

4,3 

2,4 

23,0 

Debt instruments issued by European Member States. 

EUR 1,8 billion were lent back to the operators at Euribor plus 0.5 
EUR 0,6 billion were invested in debt issued by the State or other 
public bodies in Finland and in guaranteed investment instruments. 

The assets were mainly composed by investments in Equities 
(33%), Debt instruments (28%), participation in RTE (French 
Network operator – 11%) and receivables from the French 
government (CSPE - 22%). 

HR  Annual fee - fixed amount of EUR 14.5 

million per year 

X 

0,2 

138 Sources: 2013 and 2014 Financial Statements of applicable nuclear operators and sources detailed in note 122.. 

37 

 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
                                                      
MS 

Method of Collection 

Fund Management 

Internal 

External 

Non-
segregated 

Segregated 

Total funds 
available 

(EUR billion) 

Investment portfolio 

HU 

IT 

Annual fee based on electricity 
produced from NPPs 

Annual fee based on electricity 
produced 

X 

0,8 

State treasury account 

NA 

NA 

There is no specific fund. The State-owned entity that performs the 
activities (Sogin) submits its budget for approval to the National 
Parliament in an annual basis. 

LT  State budget and International assistance 

NA 

0,5 

program 

NL 

Provision following operator's schedule 

X 

 NA 

NA 

RO  Annual payments by operator with fixed 

rate per MWh 

SE 

SI 

SK 

UK 

Annual fee based on electricity 
produced 

Annual fee based on electricity 
produced 

Annual fee based on electricity 
produced and fixed % from total sales of 
electricity 

Fixed fee + variable fee based on tonne 
of uranium loaded into Sizewell B 
reactor 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

0,2 

6,2 

0,2 

1,5 

46,3 

38 

There is no specific fund. Activities are funded through 
contributions of the European Union and of the National 
Government. 

A foundation with separate legal form (i.e. protected from 
bankruptcy of the operator) has been created to own the funds set 
aside. No information available of the investment policy. 

State treasury account 

54% covered bonds, 16% Treasury Bonds, 26% Index-linked bonds 
and 4% cash 

53% Government bonds, 15% corporate bonds, 24% mutual funds, 
8% equities. 

State treasury account 

EUR 12,4 billion at the Nuclear Liability Fund was  invested in 
National Loans Fund (86% of the balance, providing 0.4% annual 
return) and other investments such as UK, North America or 
European equities. 
NDA activities are financed every year from the current budget. For 
the calculation, an availability rate of 100% has been applied. 

 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
5.3.3  Accounting provisions 
Accounting provisions and funds available are different concepts. Provisions are backed up by physical assets 
from the balance sheet with different degrees of liquidity and which may experience variations in value in the 
long term. They are defined by the international accounting standards. On the other hand, funds available are 
normally backed by dedicated assets with typically higher liquidity, follow a conservative investment strategy 
and are protected in case of bankruptcy. They are determined by the national regulator. 

The  analysis  performed  so  far  was  focused  in  the  funds  available.  Accounting  provisions  are  important 
because they influence the credit rating of the nuclear operators. These provisions are based on the same cost 
estimations that determine the required funding and in a discount rate that is applied to calculate the costs over 
time (i.e. translate a future capital investment into an equivalent present value).  

Nuclear back-end provisions are calculated as ∑

𝑛
𝑖=0

𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡i

(1+𝑑)i

.  

The higher the discount rate, the lower the present value of the provisions is. 

Figure 31 Illustrative impact of the discount rate in nuclear provisions139 

500

400

300

200

100

0

%
0
0

,

%
3
0

,

%
5
0

,

%
8
0

,

%
0
1

,

%
3
1

,

%
5
1

,

%
8
1

,

%
0
2

,

%
3
2

,

%
5
2

,

%
8
2

,

%
0
3

,

%
3
3

,

%
5
3

,

%
8
3

,

%
0
4

,

%
3
4

,

%
5
4

,

%
8
4

,

%
0
5

,

Provision

European nuclear operators have constituted provisions in their balance sheets related to future costs expected 
from  the  decommissioning  of  nuclear  power  plants  and  the  management  and  disposal  of  radioactive  waste. 
Small  variations  in  the  discount  rates  applied  would  have  a  significant  effect  in  these  provisions.  Discount 
rates differ among Member States and even among companies operating in the same Member State.  
Figure 32 Discount rates used in back-end provisions140 

BE 

BG 

CZ 

DE 

ES 

FI 

FR 

HR 

HU 

IT 

LT 

NL 

RO 

SE 

SI 

SK 

UK 

2,8% 

2,0% 

1,8% 

(note 

A) 

2,0% 
to  
2,8%  

1,5% 

3,5% 

2,9% 

(note C) 

3,0% 

(note B) 

(note B) 

2,5%  

(note C) 

(note 
A) 

(note 
A) 

2,0% 
to 
3,0%  

(note C) 

1,7% 

(note 
A) 

2,2% 
to 
3,0% 

Note A: Discount rates were reported in nominal terms. A 2% long-term inflation rate has been used to obtain the real discount rate for 
comparison purposes 
Note B: Italy does not have dedicated decommissioning and waste management funds. Lithuania's decommissioning project receives 
funding assistance from the EU  
Note C: Data not available 

139 Calculation for a generic cost of decommissioning one reactor of EUR 417 million with decommissioning activities to 
be started in 2028 and to last 7 years. 
140 Sources: see note 122.   

39 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
The  discount  rate  should  reflect  the  current  market  assessment  of  the  time  value  of  money  and  the  risks 
specific to the liability [IAS 37.45 and 37.47]. Some Member States, such as France, have decided to provide 
more clarity by imposing conditions so that the rate is: 

a)  Below a cap calculated in line with variable market conditions;  
b)  Lower than the expected rate of return on assets covering the liability (dedicated assets), and 
c)  Consistent in time. 

6  Cost summary 
Figure 33 Summary of the estimated projections 

Concept 

Nuclear new build 

Long term operations 

Decommissioning 

Waste management,  

    from which Final disposal facility 

(EUR billion) 

349 to 455 

47 

123 

140 

74 

Total 

659 to 765 

Comparison to the results of the World Energy Outlook 

a)  Investments in nuclear power capacity 

The  2015  World  Energy  Outlook  (WEO  2015)  provides  data  on  energy  projections  until  2040,  for  a  set  of 
three different scenarios:  

1.  The Current Policies Scenario takes into consideration only those policies for which implementing 
measures  had  been  formally  adopted  as  of  mid-2015  and  makes  the  assumption  that  these  policies 
persist unchanged. 

2.  The New Policies Scenario also takes account of other relevant intentions that have been announced, 

even when the precise implementing measures have yet to be fully defined.  

3.  The  450  Scenario  assumes  a  set  of  policies  that  bring  about  a  trajectory  of  greenhouse-gas  (GHG) 
emissions from the energy sector that is consistent with the international goal to limit the rise in the 
long-term  average  global  temperature  to  two  degrees  Celsius  (2  °C),  compared  with  pre-industrial 
levels. 

The  projections  of  nuclear  capacity  and  related  electricity  production  presented  in  the  PINC  fall  within  the 
range between the Current Policies and the New Policies scenarios, as can be seen in  Figure 34. In terms of 
investment, the WEO 2015 is below the lower end of the estimations from the PINC. This means that even 
though the final picture is similar, the cost assumptions used in the PINC are above those at the WEO. 

When considering the 450 Scenario, it can be seen that projections of nuclear power capacity from the PINC 
are very conservative, suggesting  that nuclear energy will have to play a more important role to achieve an 
objective of limiting the rise in the long-term average global temperature to 2 °C. 
Figure 34 Comparison of cumulative investments in nuclear power capacity in Europe141 

Investment in nuclear capacity 2015-2040  

(billion EUR) 

PINC 
projection 

241 – 309 

Note A 

New Policies 
Scenario 

Current Policies 
Scenario 

450 
Scenario 

222 

Not disclosed 

141 Source: International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook. (2015).  

40 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
Nuclear capacity by 2040 (GWe) 

Nuclear  contribution  to  the  gross  electricity 
production by 2040 

105 

19% 

110 

23% 

92 

17% 

126 

27% 

Note A: The WEO presents the combined investment in new build and in LTO of the current fleet. Therefore, the PINC figures are 
obtained by adding the results presented in sections 3.3 and 4.3. 

b)  Investments in decommissioning and waste management 

The  WEO  2015  does  not  report  estimations  on  nuclear  plants  decommissioning  and  waste  management 
activities.  However,  the  2014  version  included  a  specific  outlook  on  nuclear  power  where  the 
decommissioning  costs to 2040 were estimated in EUR 38 billion142 (compared  to the PINC  figure of EUR 
123 billion). There is a significant difference, even though the scope of the projection is to 2040 in the former 
and to 2050 in the later (with a significant number of NPPs being decommissioned in the last decade of the 
projection). Nevertheless, some of the reactions to the WEO2014 point towards a potential understatement of 
the decommissioning cost estimation.143 

The WEO2014 did not disclose the estimation of investments needed in waste management activities. 

Finally and for the sake of completeness, it's worth noting that the WEO 2015 estimates the total investments 
in  Power  Generation  in  Europe  until  2040  to  be  EUR  1  287  billion  (consequently,  investments  in  nuclear 
generation would represent 17% of the total), and the investments in Transmission and Distribution EUR 574 
billion. 

Comparison to the results of the EU Reference Scenario 2016 

The  EU  Reference  Scenario  focuses  on  the  EU  energy  system,  transport  and  GHG  emission  developments, 
including  specific  sections  on  emission  trends  not  related  to  energy,  and  on  the  various  interactions  among 
policies in these sectors. Its time horizon is up to 2050 and it includes all EU28 Member States individually. 

The objective of this periodic exercise is to provide a reference that acts as a benchmark of current policy and 
market trends. As such, it can help to inform future policy debate and policy making, pointing for example at 
areas  where  the  current  policy  framework  falls  short  of  reaching  the  EU's  climate  and  energy  objectives. 
Notably,  the  2016  EU  Reference  Scenario144  shows  that  current  policy  and  market  conditions  will  deliver 
neither the 2030 targets nor the long-term 2050 80-95 % GHG emission reduction objective. 

The projections  of the EU Reference Scenario 2016 regarding  nuclear power are in line with the low-range 
projections  presented  in  section  3  of  this  document.  However,  even  when  the  picture  projected  in  2050  is 
similar, the path to reach there slightly differs between both exercises: 

  Nuclear installed capacity in 2050 is projected to be 93 GW (vs 95 GW in the low range of the PINC), 

representing 17,8 % of the electricity mix (in line with the PINC). 

  The  EU  Reference  Scenario  projects  that  investments  will  be  needed  to  provide  for  the  following 

capacities in nuclear power until 2050: 

o  New build: 72 GW (vs 81 GW in the PINC); 
o  Extensions in the lifetime of existing plants (LTO): 87 GW (vs 72 GW in the PINC). 

The reason for this difference is mainly explained by the fact that the EU Reference Scenario only takes into 
consideration  the  agreed  policies  at  EU  and  Member  State  levels  until  December  2014,  particularly  leaving 
outside the scope the French "Energy Transition for Green Growth Act" adopted on July 2015 and which is 
considered in the PINC. 

Nuclear research priorities 

142 Source: see note 11. 
143  e.g.  indication  from  the  IEA's  head  of  power  generation  analysis  at  http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/01/19/us-
nuclear-decommissioning-idUSKBN0KS0R920150119 
144 https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/ref2016_report_final-web.pdf 

41 

 
 
 
                                                      
The  European  Commission  appreciates  the  benefits  from  the  increasing  interaction  between  European 
Technology  Platforms  (ETPs),  namely  the  ‘Sustainable  Nuclear  Energy  Technology  Platform’  (SNETP) 
incorporating  NUGENIA  (Association  on  research  and  development  of  nuclear  fission  technologies,  with  a 
focus on Generation II and III nuclear plants), ESNII Generation IV fast reactors, employing the closed fuel 
cycle, and NC2I Cogeneration of electricity and heat, the ‘Implementing Geological Disposal of Radioactive 
Waste  Technology  Platform’  (IGDTP),  the  ‘Multidisciplinary  European  Low  Dose  Initiative’  (MELODI 
association), the European Energy Research Alliance (EERA) Joint Programme in Nuclear Materials (JPNM) 
and  other  EU  stakeholder  forums  (ENEF,  ENSREG,  WENRA,  ETSON,  FORATOM,  etc.)  as  well  as 
OECD/NEA, GIF and IAEA at international level. 

Nuclear  research  and  innovation  have  an  important  international  dimension.  Nuclear  challenges,  being  of 
global  nature  (in  particular  nuclear  safety),  require  common  responses  at  an  international  level.  Science 
diplomacy and further global scientific collaboration with third countries in nuclear research is encouraged. 

42 

 
 
 
 
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