COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on work-life balance for parents and carers and repealing Council Directive 2010/18/EU
Date: 2017-04-26
Institutions: Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, European Commission
Subjects: EU employment policy, equal treatment, flexible working hours, gender equality, integration into employment, labour law, labour market, leave on social grounds, sexual discrimination, working conditions

EN 

   EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 26.4.2017  SWD(2017) 202 final   COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  IMPACT ASSESSMENT  Accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on work-life balance for parents and carers and repealing Council Directive 2010/18/EU    {COM(2017) 253 final} {SWD(2017) 203 final}  
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

1. 

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 4 

2.  EU CONTEXT .............................................................................................................................. 18 

2.1.Legislative measures ................................................................................................................... 19 

2.2 Background of the 2008 proposal to revise the Maternity Leave Directive ................................ 21 

2.3 Enforcement and Evaluation of existing legislation .................................................................... 22 

2.4 Non-legislative measures ............................................................................................................ 26 

2.5 Other relevant initiatives at EU level .......................................................................................... 27 

3.  PROBLEM DEFINITION ............................................................................................................ 27 

3.1.Women's underrepresentation in the labour market .................................................................... 27 

3.2  The addressed driver: the unequal distribution of caring responsibilities between women and 
men .................................................................................................................................................... 29 

3.2.1. Root cause 1: Gender stereotypes and discrimination ............................................................ 32 

3.2.2 Root cause 2: Ill-designed work-life balance policies .............................................................. 34 

3.2.3 Reinforcing driver: economic disincentives for women to work .............................................. 40 

3.3 Consequences .............................................................................................................................. 42 

3.3.1Individual level ...................................................................................................................... 42 

3.3.2 Business level ....................................................................................................................... 44 

3.3.3 Societal level ......................................................................................................................... 45 

3.4 Summary Tree ............................................................................................................................. 47 

4.  BASELINE SCENARIO ............................................................................................................... 48 

5.  POLICY OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................................ 50 

5.1 General and specific objectives  .................................................................................................. 50 

5.2 Coherence with other EU policies ............................................................................................... 52 

6.  EU COMPETENCE AND ADDED VALUE ............................................................................... 54 

6.1.Legal right to act .......................................................................................................................... 54 

6.2.Compliance with the principles of subsidiarity ........................................................................... 54 

6.2.1 Necessity of Union action ..................................................................................................... 54 

6.2.2 EU added value .................................................................................................................... 56 

7.  POSSIBLE OPTIONS FOR EU-LEVEL ACTION ...................................................................... 56 

7.1.Family-related leaves .................................................................................................................. 56 

7.1.1 Maternity leave ..................................................................................................................... 57 

7.1.2.Paternity leave ...................................................................................................................... 60 

7.1.3 Parental leave ....................................................................................................................... 62 

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7.1.4 Carers' leave ......................................................................................................................... 65 

7.2.Flexible working arrangements for parents and carers ................................................................ 67 

7.3 Intervention logic of options ....................................................................................................... 70 

8.  EXPECTED IMPACTS OF THE DIFFERENT POLICY OPTIONS AND HOW THEY 
COMPARE ............................................................................................................................................ 71 

8.1 Maternity leave ............................................................................................................................ 72 

8.2 Paternity leave ............................................................................................................................. 78 

8.3 Parental leave .............................................................................................................................. 87 

8.4 Carers’ leave ................................................................................................................................ 98 

8.5.Flexible working arrangements ................................................................................................. 106 

8.6.Impact of the Combination of preferred options ....................................................................... 114 

9.  PROPORTIONALITY CHECK OF THE PREFERED OPTIONS AND COMBINATION ..... 118 

10.   MONITORING AND EVALUATION ....................................................................................... 119 

11. GLOSSARY ……………………………………………………………………………………...122 

ANNEXES ............................................................................................................................................. 123 

Annex 1. Procedural information ........................................................................................................ 123 

Annex 2. Stakeholder consultation ...................................................................................................... 130 

Annex 3: Who is affected by the initiative and how? ......................................................................... 138 

Annex 4. Methodology for quantitative impact analysis ..................................................................... 139 

Annex 5: Evaluation report of the existing WLB framework ............................................................. 157 

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Abstract  

I. POLICY CONTEXT  

The  ‘New  Start’  initiative  follows  the  withdrawal  of  the  Commission's  2008  proposal  to 
revise  Council  Directive  92/85/EEC  on  the  introduction  of  measures  to  encourage 
improvements  in  the  safety  and  health  at  work  of  pregnant  workers  and  workers  who  have 
recently  given  birth  or  are  breastfeeding  (hereinafter  the  Maternity  Leave  Directive). 
Following the withdrawal, the Commission announced its intention to prepare a new initiative 
that would undertake a broader approach taking into account the developments in society in 
the past  decade  whilst still promoting the objectives of the previous proposal and providing 
minimum protection1.  

The "New Start" initiative is more holistic and extends the scope of the previous proposal by 
offering a wider range of legislative and non-legislative measures that can help improve the 
protection of working parents and carers, allow them to better reconcile their professional and 
private life, and contribute to addressing  women's underrepresentation in the labour market2 
and  the  unequal  sharing  of  caring  responsibilities  between  women  and  men.  This  widened 
scope  is  in  line  with  calls  from  the  European  Parliament  as  well  as  many  Member  States, 
social partners and stakeholders.  It follows the alarming observation that in 2015 the gender 
employment gap still exceeds 11 percentage points and 18 percentage points when referring to 
full-time equivalent employment. 

While  women’s  underrepresentation  in  the labour  market  is  influenced by  a  combination  of 
drivers, the scope of the initiative is limited to modernising and adapting the current EU legal 
and policy framework  in  order to  ensure a more equal distribution of caring responsibilities 
between  women  and  men.  Evidence  shows  that  well-designed  policies  to  help  both  parents 
and  carers  reconcile  their  work  and  family  responsibilities  -  such  as  paid  leaves,  flexible 
working arrangements – can be very effective in reducing gender inequalities in employment.  

While many Member States have already planned policy measures in order to improve parents 
and  carers'  work-life  balance,  the  projections  on  the  baseline  scenario  show  that  the  above 
challenges  will  not  be  sufficiently  addressed  without  EU  action.  The  gender  gap  in  activity 
rates is expected to still amount to 9 percentage points in 2055. In addition, budget measures 
in the context of the economic and financial crises have affected family-related leave schemes 
and  led  to  cuts  in  the  public  or  publicly  subsidised  provision  of  childcare  services  in  some 
Member States.  

This  initiative  would  contribute  to  the  Treaty-based  goals  of  equality  between  men  and 
women  with  regard  to  labour  market  opportunities  and  equal  treatment  at  work  and  of 

1 See the European  Commission's 2015 Press Release: Delivering for Parents; Commission withdraws stalled 
maternity leave proposal and paves the way for a fresh approach 
2 See the European Commission  Roadmap, New Start to Address the Challenges of Work-Life Balance faced by 
working families, 2015 

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promoting  a  high  level  of  employment  in  the  EU.  It  would  equally  contribute  to  the 
Commission's  priorities  on  jobs  and  growth,  as  outlined  in  President  Juncker’s  political 
guidelines for the European Commission. This initiative will also be linked to the forthcoming 
European Pillar of Social Rights initiative, which seeks to strengthen the social dimension of 
Union and enhance Member States’ upward convergence in social performance. 

This  initiative  builds  on  the  existing  EU  legislative  and  non-legislative  frameworks.  With 
regards to EU legislation on family-related leaves, this initiative stems from an assessment of 
the limits of the Maternity Leave Directive (92/85/EEC) and of the Parental Leave Directive 
(2010/18/EU)3 in achieving the objectives set out by the co-legislator4, including the Parental 
Leave  Directive  objective  of  achieving  a  better  balance  of  caring  responsibilites  between 
women and men. In the field of flexible working arrangements, EU legislation currently only 
provides  a  right  for  parents  to  request  reduced  working  hours  and  flexible  schedules  when 
returning from parental leave (Directive 2010/18/EU) and to eliminate discrimination against 
part-time workers (Directive 97/81/EC)5. This initiative also has synergies with the EU acquis 
with  regards  to  protection  against  discrmination  and  dismissal  (in  particular  the  Gender 
Equality  Recast  Directive  2006/54/EC)6  and  working  time  (Directive  on  Working  Time 
2003/88/EC) 7. In addition to legislation, the EU has been addressing work-life balance issues 
and  obstacles  to  female  labour  market  participation  through  the  European  Semester8,  the 
European  Structural  and  Investment  funds,  and  policy  guidance,  but  this  has  not  been 
sufficient to achieve the Europe 2020 target of 75% employment rate for women and men.  

This initiative also builds on Member States' best practices in the area of work-life balance. 
For instance, with regards to family-related leaves, this initiative finds inspiration in Member 
States such as Sweden, where reserving parental leave to the father has led to a doubling in 
the  number  of  days  of  leave  taken  by  men  and  where  female  employment  is  among  the 
highest in the EU. This initiative is also inspired by the example of the 2007 parental leave 
reform  in  Germany,  where  ensuring  adequate  remuneration  has  led  to  a  rapid  increase  in 
father's  take-up9.  In  the  area  of  flexible  working  arrangements,  this  initiative  stems  from 

3   Council Directive 2010/18/EU of 8 March 2010 implementing the revised Framework Agreement on parental 
leave  concluded  by  BUSINESSEUROPE,  UEAPME,  CEEP  end  ETUC  and  repealing  Directive  96/34/EC, 
OJ L68, 18.3.2010, p.13-20.    

4   See Annexe 5 of the Impact Assessment 
5   Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the Framework Agreement on part-time work 

concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC, OJ L 14, 20.1.1998, p. 9 

6   Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation 
of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and 
occupation (recast) [Official Journal L 204 of 26.7.2006]. 

7 Directive 2003/88/EC of the European and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of 
the organisation of working time 
8   For more information, please see http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/making-it-happen/index_en.htm 
9 Recently published data by the Federal Statistics Office  showed that the proportion of fathers taking parental 
benefit has risen significantly and steadily since its introduction in 2007. For births in 2013, parental benefit was 
taken up by 32 % of fathers (compared to 3.5 per cent of fathers in 2006.  See: Statistisches Bundesamt [Federal 
Statistical  Office]  (2015)  Statistik  zum  Elterngeld.  Beendete  Leistungsbezüge  für  im  2.  Vierteljahr  2013 
geborene  Kinder  [Statistics  on  parental  allowance.  Completed  performance  bonuses  for  children  born  in  the 
second Quarter of 2013]. Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt.  

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examples from Member States such as Austria and The Netherlands who have taken measures 
to broaden such arrangements and tend to experience higher female employment rates. 

A roadmap for the new inititaive was published in August 201510  and this initiative has been 
included in the Commission's 2017 Work Programme. This initiative has been informed by an 
extensive  consultation  process.  In  line  with  the  Treaty,  the  Commission  completed  a  two-
stage  consultation  with  the  EU  social  partners  in  2015  and  2016.  There  was  no  agreement 
among social partners to enter into direct negotiations on any of the issues raised during the 
consultations. An open public consultation was also carried out to seek the views of different 
stakeholders and citizens on the issue, and the EU Advisory Committee on equality between 
women and men was also consulted11. 

2. PROBLEM DEFINITION 

As outlined in the Roadmap of this initiative, the problem to be addressed is women’s under-
representation  in  employment,  particularly  due  to  the  lack  of  equal  sharing  of  caring  and 
professional  responsibilities  by  parents  with  children  or  those  with  dependent  relatives.  In 
2015 the gender employment gap (age 20-64) in the EU amounted to 11.6 percentage points 
(pps). Considering this initiative follows the withdrawal of the Commission's 2008 proposal 
to revise Council Directive 92/85/EEC, it aims to address the unequal distribution of caring 
responsibilities between women and men, which is one of the main drivers of this problem. 

Gender  gaps  in  the  labour  market  are  most  acute  for  parents  and  people  with  other  caring 
responsibilities.  The  gender  employment  gap  has  been  shown  to  widen  substantially  after 
having children. On average in 2015, the employment rate of women with one child under 6 is 
8.8  pps  less  than  women  without  young  children  and  in  several  countries  this  difference  is 
over 30 pps12. Similarly, women are much more likely to assume the role of informal carers 
for elderly or dependent relatives than men13.  

In  addition  to  the  role  of  gender  stereotypes  and  discrimination  in  supporting  an  unequal 
sharing of caring responsibilities between women and men, one of the main reasons for this 
problem is inadequate work-life balance policies.  

The  availability,  or  lack-thereof,  of  leave  arrangements  can  strongly  influence  women’s 
decisions to stay at home or return to the labour market after assuming care responsibilities14. 
On the one hand, the availability and attractiveness of leave arrangements for fathers also has 
a considerable impact on the division of work and care between parents, and in turn on overall 
female employment outcomes. The use of leave arrangements by fathers can lead to a more 
equal distribution of care between parents, allowing for women’s  faster return to  the labour 
market after having children. Those Member States that have earmarked a significant portion 

10  http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/roadmaps/docs/2015_just_012_new_initiative_replacing_maternity_leave_directive_en.pdf 
11   See Annex for summary of stakeholders’ views 
12 Gender gaps in employment are 24.7 pp among those with 1 child below 6 years of age, 25.6 pp among those 
with 2 children (youngest below 6 years of age) and 35.4 pp for those with three children or more. 
13   See  for  instance  European  Commission  (2013)  Long  term  care  in  ageing  societies;  Eurofound  (2016)  The 

Gender Employment Gap: Challenges and Solutions 

14 See OECD (2012) Closing the Gender Gap 

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of leave to fathers and paid the leave at a relatively high replacement rate tend to experience 
higher take-up by fathers15 and positive results in terms of mothers’ employment outcomes16. 
For  example,  in  Sweden,  reserving  parental  leave  to  the  father  has  led  to  a  doubling  in  the 
number  of  parental  leave  days  taken  by  men17.  Currently  there  is  no  EU  legislation  on 
paternity  leave  and  the  EU  legal  framework  gives  very  little  incentives  for  fathers  to  take 
parental  leave  (the  Parental  Leave  Directive  does  not  foresee  compensation  and  allows  for 
most  of  the  parental  leave  to  be  transferable  to  the  other  parent)18.  On  the  ohther  hand,  the 
lack of adequate leave to take care of other dependent relatives also exacerbates the unequal 
sharing  of  caring  responsibilities  between  women  and  men.  Where  there  is  no  carers'  leave 
provision, it is generally women who will work part-time or drop out of the labour market in 
order  to  take  care  of  their  relative  for  a  short  period  of  time.    Currently  there  is  no  EU 
legislation on carers' leave. 

In  addition  to  inadequate  or  ill-designed  leaves,  the  unavailability  of  flexible  working 
arrangements can lead to some workers, particularly women, to drop out of the labour market 
altogether  when  taking  on  caring  responsibilities19.  Flexible  working  arrangements  include 
remote  working,  flexible  working  schedules,  and  reduced  working  hours  (part-time  work). 
Insufficient  availability  of  flexible  working  arrangements  can  also  lead  women  with  caring 
responsibilities  to  change  their  job  to  one  that  is  perceived  as  offering  more  flexibility  or 
reduced  working  hours,  which  is  often  below  their  skill  level  or  for  less  pay20.  This 
consequently  can  lead  to  or  foster  gender  wage  gaps  and  labour  market  segmentation. 
Currently  only  parents returning  from parental leave  have an entitlement to request reduced 
working hours and flexible work schedules21. 

Difficulties in accessing afforadable and quality formal childcare services can also lead many 
women  to  reduce  their  working  hours  or  drop  out  of  the  labour  market22.  The  Barcelona 
targets set by the EU in 2002 to improve the provision of formal childcare arrangements by 
201023 and reaffirmed in the European Pact for Gender Equality spanning until 2020, are still 

15  Escot  L.,  Castellanos  S.  (2016),  Do  Fathers  Who  Take  Childbirth  Leave  Become  More  Involved  in  Their 
Children's Care? The Case of Spain, Journal of Comparative Family Studies 
16 OECD, Policy Brief: Parental Leave, where are the fathers, 2016 
17 ibid 
18 Council Directive 2010/18/EU of 8 March 2010 implementing the revised Framework Agreement on parental 
leave concluded by BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME, CEEP end ETUC and repealing Directive 96/34/EC, OJ 
L68, 18.3.2010, p.13-20.    
19 Plantenga, J. and Remery, C. (2009) Flexible working time arrangements and gender equality 
20 Over-qualification among university graduates is higher for women than for men in countries such as Spain, 
UK, Italy, Belgium, France Germany and The Netherlands; Conde-Ruiz and Marra de Artíñano (2016) 
21 Council Directive 2010/18/EU of 8 March 2010 implementing the revised Framework Agreement on parental 
leave concluded by BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME, CEEP end ETUC and repealing Directive 96/34/EC, OJ 
L68, 18.3.2010, p.13-20.    
22 See, for instance, OECD (2012) Closing the Gender Gap 
23 In 2002, at the Barcelona Summit, the European Council set the targets of providing childcare to at least 33% 

of children aged 0-3 and 90% of children between 3 years old and the mandatory school age by 2010. 

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not reached today. The lack of formal long-term care arrangements can also lead many people 
with dependent relatives, most often women, to take on the role of informal carers24, and lead 
them to take long leaves of absence from the labour market or dropping out completely. 

Finally,  economic  disincentives  such  as  tax-benefit  disincentives,  which  discourage  second-
earners, often women, from entering the labour market, working more hours or remaining in 
the  labour  market,  as  well  as  the  gender  pay  gap  can  reinforce  the  unequal  distribution  of 
work  and  caring  responsibilities  by  putting  on  women  the  bulk  of  the  burden  of  caring 
responsibilities. 

These  challenges  have  negative  consequences  on  individuals,  companies  and  the  wider 
society. On an individual level, these problems reduce women's career opportunities and this, 
in  addition  to  their  longer  career  interruptions  and  concentration  in  lower  paid  jobs 
exacerbates  the  gender  pay  gap.  Women’s  underrepresentation  in  the  labour  market  also 
results  in  their  higher  risk  of  poverty  and  social  exclusion,  especially  in  old  age.  This  has 
negative  consequences  on  their  families  and  children,  who  are  under  higher  stress  and  at 
higher risk of poverty. Inadequate work-life balance policies also have negative consequences 
on  men,  who  tend  to  work  longer  hours  after  having  children.  On  a  company  level,  the 
underrepresentation  of  women  in  the  labour  market  leads  to  a  reduced  talent  pool  and  poor 
work-life balance impedes on workers' motivation and productivity. For the society, the costs 
of these inequalities between women and men in employment amounted to an estimated €370 
billion euros in  2013, equivalent to 2.8%  of EU-GDP25, and this is only exacerbated by the 
demographic challenge. 

3. POLICY OBJECTIVES 

The general policy objective of this initiative is to address women's underrepresentation in the 
labour market and to promote equality between men and women with regard to labour market 
opportunities  by  modernising  the  current  EU  legal  and  policy  framework  and  adapting  it  to 
today’s labour market to allow for parents with children or workers with dependent relatives 
to better balance caring and professional responsibilities26. 

The specific objectives of this initiative are therefore defined as follows: 

- 

- 

to  improve  access  to  work-life  balance  arrangements  –  such  as  leaves  and  flexible 
working arrangements 
to  increase  take-up  of  family-related  leaves  and  flexible  working  arrangements  by 
men. 

The specific objectives seek to respond to the drivers set out in the problem definition in the 
following way: 

24 The incidence of providing informal care to elderly relatives is highest among the 50 to 64-year-olds. Working 

women are up to 1.6 times more likely to be informal carers than working men. 

25   Eurofound (2016) The Gender Employment Gap: Challenges and Solutions 
26 Article 153(1) (i) TFEU: " equality between men and women with regard to labour market opportunities and 
treatment at work. 

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The  availability  of  leaves  and  flexible  working  arrangements  have  been  shown  to  strongly 
mitigate the effect of caring responsibilities on women’s employment outcomes. By providing 
parents  and  carers  with  tools  for  greater  choice  in  how  to  organise  work  and  caring 
responsibilities these measures avoid that they chose a job below their skill level and for less 
pay or that they drop out of the labour market altogether.  

Moreover,  the  use  of  work-life  balance  policies  by  men  (i.e.  family-related  leaves,  flexible 
working arrangements) can help in rebalancing the distribution of care within the household, 
which usually falls principally on women27. However, opportunities and incentives for men to 
make  use  of  work-life  balance  arrangements  are  generally  scarce,  and  their  take-up  is 
accordingly  low  in  most  Member  States.  Improving  the  gender-balanced  design  of  these 
arrangements can help address this. 

It should also be noted that other policy areas mentionned in the problem definition are not 
covered in this impact assessment. With regards to the provision of formal care services and 
'economic disincentives, this is due to the limited EU competence in these areas. Considering 
their significant influence on the addressed problem, the initiative could foresee measures to 
enhance current efforts in these areas, in particular in relation to the monitoring of Member 
States' policies in the EU Semester and to the use of EU funding in the case of formal care 
services. Furthermore, the options presented below are expected to indirectly mitigate some of 
the other drivers mentioned above such as gender stereotypes and the gender pay gap. 

4. SUBSIDIARITY 

This initiative respects the principle of subsidiarity and has a strong added-value in addressing 
the challenges mentioned in the problem definition. First, the current situation demonstrates 
that EU action has a strong influence on Member States' legal frameworks. In the policy area 
covered  by  this  initiative,  it  is  only  when  EU  legislation  is  in  place  (i.e.,  maternity  and 
parental leave) that there is legislation in place in every Member State. When Member States 
do have legal entitlements, variations between Member States with regard to length and the 
generosity  of  the  conditions  could  result  in  an  unbalanced  level  of  rights,  an  unequal 
protection for EU citizens across the EU and differences in the functioning of labour markets.  

Secondly, the projections based on the available information clearly demonstrate that only EU 
action  will  ensure  that  sufficient  progress  is  achieved  in  all  Member  States.  Employers, 
particularly small and medium-sized enterprises, may be hesitant to provide greater work-life 
balance  measures  on  their  own,  given  the  short-term  costs  and  administrative  burdens  that 
may result28. Member States may hesitate to correct such a failure through regulation in this 
area because they may perceive a risk of putting their own companies at a disadvantage with 
companies from other Member States. Considering that a significant percentage of EU firms' 
trade is intra-EU, EU-level action could mitigate such concerns and establish a level-playing 
field  while  taking  into  account  the  need  to  avoid  additional  burdens  on  businesses, 
particularly SMEs, and ensuring that all Member States move in the same direction.  

27 OECD (2013) Closing the Gender Gap 
28 OECD (2007) Babies and Bosses 

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Thirdly, EU-level intervention could mitigate trends in some Member-States to reduce work-
life  balance  provisions.  Indeed,  as  a  result  of  the  recent  crisis,  policy  priorities  diverge 
between Member States, and other issues (particularly those expected to produce short-term 
benefits) are focussing national authorities' attention.   

Finally,  there  is  a  clear  European  horizontal  dimension  to  the  issues  related  to  work-life 
balance  and  the  underrepresentation  of  women  in  the  labour  market.  Low  labour  market 
participation of women hinders the EU's goals in relation to gender equality, fighting poverty 
and supporting employment and growth. 

5. POLICY OPTIONS 

The  impact  assessment  outlines  possible  non-legislative  and  legislative  options  in  the 
following  areas:  maternity  leave,  paternity  leave,  parental  leave,  carers'  leave  and  flexible 
working  arrangements.  For  each  area,  key  parameters  are  identified  on  the  basis  of  the 
analysis of stakeholders' views. Tables presenting the assessed options can be found in section 
7 of the report. 

Maternity leave 

The following parameters have been considered: 

-  Arrangements to  enable breastfeeding mothers to work. Such measures  can  facilitate 

successful transitions between maternity leave and employment.  

-  The level of payment or allowance for part of the leave. Increasing pay for at least the 
compulsory  period  of  leave  is  also  considered  as  a  parameter  as  it  could  provide 
additional income protection  for women for whom this leave is  compulsory,  thereby 
supporting new mothers. 

-  The length: this parameter has been discarded because this consideration was one of 
the  most  contentious  aspects  in  discussions  among  Member  States  in  the  Council. 
Moreover, providing greater opportunities for women and men to share leaves would 
have  a  more  positive  effect  of  reducing  the  imbalance  in  caring  responsibilities 
between women and men. 

-  Dismissal protection: this parameter was discarded for legislative options because the 
evaluation of the Maternity Leave Directive29 shows that the issue of discrimination at 
the workplace is mainly due to the fact that all employers do not respect the legal rules 
transposed  by  the  Member  States  in  this  field  and  not  to  the  legal  provisions 
themselves 

Paternity leave 

The following parameters have been considered: 

-  The  length  as  this  determines  how  much  leave  men  can  take  to  get  involved  in 

29 See Annex 5 

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childcare at an early stage, also as this is important for how involved they will  be in 
caring throughout the child's life. 

-  Payment as it provides income protection for fathers after having children and has also 

been shown to increase the likelihood of fathers making use of this leave. 

Parental leave 

The following parameters have been considered: 

-  Payment  as  this  encourages  both  parents  to  make  use  of  their  parental  leave 

entitlements and as it is a strong factor in fathers’ take-up of parental leave.  

-  The degree of transferability of the parental leave between parents as making the leave 
non-transferable  can  encourage  a  greater  sharing  of  leave  arrangements  between 
parents and support women's faster return to the labour market after having children. 
-  The possibility to take leave on a flexible basis as this can facilitate the maintenance of 
parents' connections to the labour market during leave, and promote greater take-up of 
these leaves by fathers. 
Increasing the age of the child up to which parents can take leave from 8 to 12 years 
old  in  order to  give more possibilities  for parents  to  take part of their parental leave 
entitlement  when  their  children  grow  up.  This  parameter  has  not  been  taken  into 
account in the assessment of the quantitative impacts presented below but estimations 
of its impact on companies and Central governments can be found in the report. 

- 

-  The length but this parameter was discarded given that there is no definitive evidence 
that  a  longer  parental  leave  would  help  to  further  facilitate  women’s  labour  market 
participation. 

Carers' leave 

The following parameters have been considered: 

-  Length in order to represent the variety of provisions in place in EU Member States. 
-  The level of payment as this could increase the likelihood of carers in general and men 

in particular to make use of the leaves. 

-  The  possibility  to  take  leave  on  a  flexible  basis  as  this  can  help  workers  achieve  a 

better balance of their professional and caring responsibilities. 

Flexible working arrangements 

The following parameters have been considered: 

-  The  scope  of  the  right  thereby  extending  the  concerned  population  as  currently  this 
right  only  exists  under  the  EU  Parental  Leave  Directive  for  parents  returning  from 
parental leave. Parents, who are not on leave, or other types of workers with dependent 
relatives, could also strongly benefit from such increased flexibility in order to better 
balance work and care responsibilities. 

-  The  type  of  flexibility  (flexible  working  schedules,  remote  working  or  reduced 

working hours). 

-  An extension of the level of the right to request flexible working as an absolute right 
for employees was discarded as a parameter, as it would create serious restrictions for 
employers to determine how work is organised in a firm. 

11 

 
 
 
6. EXPECTED IMPACTS AND HOW THE OPTIONS COMPARE 

A  detailed  analysis  of  how  many  and  which  Member  States  would  need  to  adjust  their 
legislation can be found in Section 8 of the report. No clear East-West or North-South pattern 
emerges  in  relation  to  the  most  relevant  policy  changes  proposed.  Expected  impacts  are 
quantified  where  possible  and  details  on  the  methodology  used  are  provided  in  Annex  4. 
Important efforts have been undertaken to collect the necessary data in order to quantify the 
impact  on  companies  (including  SMEs),  Central  Governments  and  the  macro-economic 
impact of the options; however data available in this area is scarce. Many Member States do 
not collect administrative data on the use of various types of leave by sex and number of days. 
Data on the employment status of informal carers is also scarce. Nevertheless, data and robust 
evidence  are  available  for  several  countries  which  underpin  the  assessment  of  impacts  and 
allow  overcoming  certain  data  limitations,  either  by  extrapolating  data  or  by  using 
assumptions based on the relevant economic literature. The limitations of such assumptions, 
especially when behavioural (on increase in take-up of entitlement rates for example), should 
be  duly  noted  and  a  sensitivity  analysis  of  key  factors  such  as  lost  production  and  take-up 
assumptions as well as taking into account collective agreements is presented in the report. A 
qualitative  assessment  of  impacts  is  also  provided,  to  complement  the  quantitative  analysis 
where  necessary  and  give  a  more  complete  picture  of  the  overall  costs  and  benefits  of  the 
options outlined.  

Maternity leave 

The  non-legislative  Option,  which  includes  measures  to  enhance  the  enforcement  of  the 
current  Directive  in  the  area  of  dismissal  protection  and  policy  guidance  on  facilitating 
transitions  between  leave  and  employment,  has  been  identified  as  the  preferred  option.  The 
non-legislative  option  would  have  a  positive  impact  on  individuals  by  facilitating  mothers' 
return to employment after taking leave as well as a positive impact on companies and Central 
Governments. The non-legislative Option only entails limited costs on companies due to the 
potential  provision  of  breastfeeding  facilities  and  breaks.  It  also  entails  benefits  due  to  an 
increase in workers' productivity and a reduction in recruitment costs. In terms of its impact 
on Central Governments, the non-legislative Option does not foresee any additional payment 
of  maternity  benefits  but  does  foresee  savings  due  to  a  reduction  in  payment  of 
unemployment benefits and hence has a more positive impact on Central Governments than 
the  legislative  options  in  the  medium-term.  In  comparison,  Options  1  (legal  entitlement  to 
breastfeeding breaks and facilities) and 2 (breastfeeding provisions and first two weeks fully 
paid)  both  have  a  small  positive  impact  on  companies,  Option  1  has  a  positive  impact  on 
Central Governments due to a rise in tax revenues and a decrease in health care expenditures 
and  Option  2  has  a  negative  impact  on  Central  Governments  due  to  the  rise  in  payment  of 
benefits. In order to limit the costs due to introducing breastfeeding facilities and ensure that 
the decision of introducing such facilities takes into account employers' needs, the preferred 
option is the non-legislative Option. 

Paternity leave 

Option  3  (an  individual  entitlement  of  10  working  days  paternity  leave  paid  at  least  at  sick 
pay level) has been identified as the preferred option. Evidence of Member States' experiences 
suggests  that  where  leave  is  remunerated,  it  has  a  strong  positive  impact  on  its  take-up  by 

12 

 
 
 
men, as well as female employment outcomes. Options 2 (individual entitlement of 5 working 
days  paternity  leave  paid  at  least  at  sick  pay  level)  and  3  would  thus  have  a  much  higher 
individual  positive  impact  than  Option  1  that  does  not  foresee  pay  and  the  non-legislative 
Option.  Although Option 3 has the highest cost for companies, when disaggregated the cost 
represents only 14 € per company in 2030 and 43 € per company in 2050. Moreover, thanks to 
its longer duration, Option 3 is the option that best improves the possibilities for fathers to be 
involved in caring responsibilities directly following the birth of a child. Evidence also shows 
that the leverage effect on parental leave, which has highly positive impacts on GDP, labour 
force  participation,  employment  and  real  incomes  (see  below),  is  more  likely  to  occur  with 
paternity leave of 10 working days or more.   

Parental leave 

Option 3 (4 months non-transferable, paid at least at sick pay level, flexible uptake, rise of age 
of the child from 8 to 12) is identified as the preferred option for parental leave. As Option 3 
provides for an individual entitlement to remunerated leave for the full four-month period that 
is  non-transferable  between  parents,  it  entails  much  higher  take-up  by  men  and  hence  will 
have the highest positive impact on female employment. Significantly increasing the length of 
the non-transferable period has considerable benefits in terms of increased household incomes 
and  individual  well-being  (for  fathers,  mothers  and  children).  Option  3  is  more  costly  for 
companies  and  Central  Governments  than  Options  1  (flexible  uptake  but  no  change  on  pay 
and non-transferability) and 2 (flexible uptake, only one month paid and non-transferable, rise 
of age of the child from 8 to 12), but its higher costs remain modest in relative terms (88€ per 
company in 2030 and 145€ in 2050). In addition, it has much larger effects in terms of labour 
market participation as well as income security for workers taking leave. Furthermore, Option 
3 also has much higher positive macro-economic effects. This Option hence appears to rank 
higher than the other parental leave options assessed.  

Carers' leave 

Both Options 2 (4 weeks throughout the career paid at least at sick pay level, flexible uptake) 
and 3 (5 days/year/dependent paid at least at sick pay level) are expected to have high positive 
impacts  on  individuals,  enabling  them  to  take  a  short  period  of  leave  to  care  for  their 
dependent relatives with a limited earnings loss. The quantitative assessment for both options 
reveals a neutral impact when estimated per company in 2050 and a high positive impact on 
Central  Governments.  Option  2  has  slightly  more  positive  macro-economic  impacts  than 
Option 3. Option 2 may however entail a higher administrative burden for companies/central 
governments than Option 3, given the need to track a ‘bank’ of leave throughout a worker’s 
career. Option 3 therefore appears to rank slightly higher in efficiency than the other carers’ 
leave options assessed and is therefore identified as the preferred option. In order to further 
increase  the  efficiency  of  Option  3,  it  would  be  considered  to  limit  the  scope  of  the 
entitlement to 5 days per year per worker (and not per dependent relative). This would limit 
the disruption and complexity due to introducing such as measure for companies, as well as 
possibly reduce its costs. 

Flexible working arrangements 

Option 3 (right to request flexibility in place of work, flexible working schedules and reduced 

13 

 
 
 
working  hours,  employer  has  no  obligation  to  grant  the  request)  has  been  identified  as  the 
preferred  option.  While  the  quantitative  analysis  showed  high  positive  impacts  on  female 
employment and central governments for all legislative options, they are the highest in Option 
3.  This  is  especially  the  case  for  the  increase  in  employment  which  is  foreseen  to  be 
comparable in Options 1 (only flexibility in place of work) and 2 (only flexibility in working 
schedules) and much higher in Option 3 thanks to the right to request reduced working hours 
it entails. In consequence Option 3 is expected to lead to a large increase in tax revenues for 
Member  States.  Although  Option  3 has  the  highest  cost  for companies,  when  disaggregated 
the cost represents only 118 € per company in 2030 and 597 € per company in 2050. There 
can be mixed impacts on individuals, particularly in the use of part-time work because of the 
risk  of  women  making  much  higher  use  of  it,  which  is  why  it  would  be  important  to 
accompany  these  measures  with  awareness-raising  and  monitoring  to  facilitate  improved 
gender balance in the take-up of such arrangements. 

Combination of preferred options 

Policy Area 

Maternity 
Leave 

Paternity 
Leave 

Preferred Combination of Options 
Non-legislative  Option:  Policy  guidance  and  sharing  of  good  practices  on  facilitating 
leave  and  employment  (including  on 
successful 
breastfeeding breaks and facilities) 
Option 3: Individual right  to  two  weeks of  paternity  leave  compensated  at  least  at  sick 
pay level 

transitions  between  maternity 

Parental Leave  Option 3: Entitlement to flexible uptake, four months reserved for each parent, payment 

Carers Leave 

Flexible 
Working 
Arrangements 

at least at sick pay level for the four months, age of the child raised from 8 to 12 
Option  3:  Individual  entitlement  to  a  short-term  leave  of  5  days,  per  year,  per  child  or 
dependent relative, paid at least at sick pay level30   
Option  3:  Right  for  parents  (of  children  up  to  12)  or  carers  to  request  flexibility  in 
working  hours,  schedule  or  place  of  work  for  a  set  period  of  time,  automatic  right  to 
return  to  previous  working  hours,  the  employer  has  to  consider  the  request  but  has  no 
obligation to grant the requested change 

Expected impact of the combination of preferred options 

The  quantitative  analysis  shows  that  the  combination  of  preferred  options  has  a  positive 
impact on GDP (+ € 840 billion, NPV 2015-2055), employment (+ 1.6 million in 2050) and 
the labour force (+ 1.4 million in 2050). The analysis shows that the increases in employment 
and labour force participation will mainly concern women. Real incomes are also expected to 
increase by 0.52% in 2050. Although relatively small, the combination represents a cost for 
companies. However, the majority of this cost is driven by the flexible working arrangements 
option  which  assumes  a  very  high  level  of  demand  for  and  accommodation  of  flexible 
working  arrangements  although  employers  can  refuse  requests  for  flexible  working, 

30 It is to be noted that despite the fact in section 8 it is determined the preferred option would only consider 5 
days of carers' leave per worker (and not per dependent relative), the Option that has been used to calculate  the 
quantitative impact of the combination is Option 3 as described in section 7. 

14 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
particularly where it would cause a cost to the company. The total cost for companies of the 
combination could hence be significantly lower.  

 € 839.7 billion (0.21%) 

768 000/ 1 441 000 (0.32%/0.62%) 

1 094 000/1 597 000(0.46%/0.71%) 

- € 172.7 billion 
+ € 343.6 billion 

Total impact on companies, NPV 2015-2055 
Total impact on government/social security, NPV 
2015-2055 
Impact on GDP, NPV 2015-2055 
(change compared to baseline) 
Impact on labour force in 2030/2050 
(change compared to baseline) 
Impact on employment in 2030/2050 
(change compared to baseline) 
Impact on real incomes in 2030/2050 
(change compared to baseline) 
It should also be taken into account that the preferred options of the combination have strong 
synergies and that the costs of the combination of preferred options could be lower than the 
sum of the individual costs for each option. For example some costs linked to the provision of 
an  IT  system  to  monitor  leaves  and  flexible  working  arrangements  could  be  combined  for 
several preferred options and this would lead to a decrease in the burden for companies and 
Central  governments.  Conversely,  in  the  long-term  this  initiative  is  expected  to  have  wider 
positive impacts than those assessed in this report. Indeed, the measures presented above will 
facilitate  reaching  a  gender-balanced  sharing  of  care  responsibilities  between  women  and 
men, thereby giving women and men equal opportunities in the labour market.  

+ € 11.6 billion /+ € 120 billion (+0.09%/+0.52%) 

As mentioned in the problem definition, this would have a series of positive impact that were 
not  quantified  in  this  report.  These  include  increasing  the  pool  of  talents,  increasing  the 
motivation  of  workers,  increasing  the  number  of  women  in  management  positions,  etc.  The 
long-term effect of the positive impact on children's personal and cognitive development was 
also not quantified. 

15 

 
 
 
 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 

In  2015, the employment  rate of women aged  20-64 was 11.6 percentage points lower than 
that  of  men.  As  a  substantially  higher  proportion  of  women  work  part-time,  the  gender 
employment differences in full-time equivalents are even larger with a gap of 18.1 percentage 
points for the EU as a whole31. The gender employment gap is particularly acute for parents 
and  people  with  caring  responsibilities.  Upon  having  children  or  taking  on  caring 
responsibilities,  women  tend  to  reduce  their  working  hours,  take  long  leaves  of  absence  or 
drop out of the labour market altogether, while the opposite is true for men. On average across 
Europe,  the  employment  rate  of  women  with  children  is  8.8  percentage  points  lower  than 
women  with  no  children.  In  some  countries,  this  difference  is  greater  than  30  percentage 
points32.    This  trend  has  negative  consequences  on  women  and  their  families,  in  terms  of  
increased  stress,  lower  earnings  and  increased  risk  of  poverty.  It  also  has  negative 
consequences on employers and on the wider economy, as the gender employment gap in the 
EU estimated to cost 370 billion euros per year, or 2.8% of the EU’s GDP33. 

The  ‘New  Start’  initiative  therefore  aims  to  modernise  the  current  EU  legal  and  policy 
framework and  adapt it to  today’s labour market to  allow for parents  or  other  workers with 
dependent relatives to better balance caring and professional responsibilities. In doing so, the 
initiative would address women’s underrepresentation in the labour market. It would thereby 
contribute  to  the  Treaty-based  goals  of  equality  between  men  and  women  with  regard  to 
labour  market  opportunities  and  equal  treatment  at  work  and  of  promoting  a  high  level  of 
employment in the EU. This initiative is linked to the forthcoming European Pillar of Social 
Rights  initiative,  which  seeks  to  strengthen  the  social  dimension  of  Union  and  enhance 
Member States’ upward convergence in social performance. 

This  initiative  would  also  contribute  to  the  Commission's  priorities  on  jobs  and  growth,  as 
outlined  in  President  Juncker’s  political  guidelines  for  the  European  Commission.  Evidence 
shows  that  enhancing  work-life  balance  would  benefit  companies  through  improved  skill 
matching,  improved  productivity  and  increased  retention  of  workers.  Enhancing  women’s 
participation  in  the  labour  market  has  also  been  shown  to  be  a  key  driver  for  economic 
growth,  and  can  contribute  to  mitigating  the  negative  impact  of  demographic  ageing  on 
budgetary sustainability34. 

Following  the  withdrawal  of  the  Commission's  2008  proposal  to  revise  Council  Directive 
92/85/EEC  on  the  introduction  of  measures  to  encourage  improvements  in  the  safety  and 
health  at  work  of  pregnant  workers  and  workers  who  have  recently  given  birth  or  are 
breastfeeding  (hereinafter  the  Maternity  Leave  Directive),  the  Commission  announced  its 
intention  to  present  a  broader  initiative.  The  Commission  annouced  that  this  initiative  "will 
continue to promote the objectives of the previous proposal and provide minimum protection" 

31 Labour Force Survey (emp_a), Eurostat 
32 Labour Force Survey (hheredch), Eurostat 
33 Eurofound (2016) The Gender Employment Gap: Challenges and Solutions 
34  OECD (2013) Closing the Gender Gap 

16 

 
 
 
                                                      
while  taking  "into  account  the  developments  in  scoiety  over  the  past  decare  and  [using]the 
best mix of available policy tools to deliver results as effectively as possible"35.  

A roadmap for the new initiative was published in August 201536  and this initiative has been 
announced in the Commission's 2017 Work Programme. In addition, this initiative has been 
informed  by  an  extensive  consultation  process.  In  line  with  the  Treaty,  the  Commission 
completed a two-stage  consultation with  the EU social partners in  2015 and 2016. Between 
November 2015 and January 2016, the social partners were first invited to give their views on 
the possible direction of EU action. A second-stage consultation ran from July to September 
2016, in which social partners provided their views on a range of possible EU-level measures. 
There was no agreement among the social partners to enter into direct negotiations on any of 
the issues raised during the consultations. An open public consultation was also carried out to 
seek  the  views  of  different  stakeholders  and  citizens  on  the  issue,  and  the  EU  Advisory 
Committee on equality between women and men was also consulted37. 

Considering the evidence that shows that well-designed policies to help parents reconcile their 
work  and  family  responsibilities  can  be  very  effective  in  reducing  gender  disparities  in 
employment38, the 'New Start' initiative adopts a comprehensive approach which will include 
family-related  leaves,  flexible  working  arrangements  and  formal  care  services.  It  will  also 
consider the needs of women and men with caring responsibilities for ill, elderly or dependent 
relatives.  This  widened  scope  is  in  line  with  calls  from  the  European  Parliament  as  well  as 
many  Member  States,  social  partners  and  stakeholders,  who  felt  that  the  previous  proposal 
was  too  narrow  in  its  scope.  Finally,  this  initiative  would  fully  complement  and  reinforce 
existing  activities  to  enhance  female  employment,  such  as  the  European  Semester  country-
specific recommendations, the monitoring of progress to achieve the Barcelona targets in the 
area of childcare39 and EU funding. 

This  initiative  applies  to  all  workers  who  have  an  employment  contract  or  employment 
relationship as defined  in the Member States. The self-employed are not explicitly covered by 
this initiative due to very diverging national systems as regards the status of persons engaged 
in  a self-employed  activity. The decision on whether the self-employed should benefit  from 
this initiative should be left to the Member States. It needs to be noted, however, that there are 
already a number of existing instruments which cover self-employed activities40 Furthermore, 

35 See the European  Commission's 2015 Press Release: Delivering for Parents; Commission withdraws stalled 
maternity leave proposal and paves the way for a fresh approach 
36 European Commission (2015), Roadmap: A new start to address the challenges of work-life balance faced by 
working families 
37 See Annex 2 for summary of stakeholders’ views 
38 Relevant evidence is presented in the Problem Definition section (section 3) 
39 See http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-research/pdf/download_en/barcelona_european_council.pdf 
40  In  particular,  Directive  2010/41/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  7  July  2010  on  the 
application  of  the  principle  of  equal  treatment  between  men  and  women  engaged  in  an  activity  in  a  self-
employed capacity and repealing Council Directive 86/613/EEC, Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on 
the  progressive  implementation  of  the  principle  of  equal  treatment  for  men  and  women  in  matters  of  social 
security  and  Directive  2006/54/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  5  July  2006  on  the 
implementation  of  the  principle  of  equal  opportunities  and  equal  treatment  of  men  and  women  in  matters  of 
employment and occupation. 

17 

 
 
 
                                                      
in the context of the European Pillar of Social Rights initiative, the Commission will launch a 
first stage social partner consultation on access to social protection, with a focus on atypical 
contracts and on the self-employed.  

In  line  with  the  requirements  of  the  Better  Regulation  Guidelines,  the  Commission  has 
undertaken  an  impact  assessment  of  a  potential  range  of  legislative  and  non-legislative 
measures  in  the  areas  of  family-related  leaves  and  flexible  working  arrangements,  which 
could  enhance  work-life  balance  for  parents  and  carers.  While  formal  care  services  and 
economic  disincentives  are  two  very  relevant  areas  when  tackling  the  problem  of  the 
underrepresentation of women in the labour market, measures in these areas were not assessed 
in  this  report.  This  is  due  to  the  limited  EU  competence  in  these  areas.  Considering  their 
significant impact on the addressed problem, the initiative could foresee measures to enhance 
current  efforts  in  these  areas,  in  particular  in  relation  to  the  monitoring  of  Member  States' 
policies in the EU Semester and to the use of EU funding in the case of formal care services. 

2.  EU CONTEXT 

Equality  between  women  and  men  with  regard  to  labour  market  opportunities  and 
reconciliation  of  private  and  professional  lives  have  long  been  on  the  EU’s  agenda.  These 
issues are enshrined in EU primary law, and have been a longstanding part of the EU’s policy 
priorities.  

Work-life  balance  has  been  highlighted  as  a  key  policy  area  by  the  Member  States.  The 
Council  of  the  European  Union  has  repeatedly  stressed  the importance  of  work-life  balance 
policies in removing barriers to women’s participation in the labour market. The 2014 EPSCO 
Council Conclusions on Women in the Economy and most recently, the 2016 EPSCO Council 
Conclusions on Women in Poverty both called on Member States to step up work-life balance 
measures  and  allow  the  possibility  for  a  better  sharing  of  care  responsibilities  between 
parents. A number of earlier  commitments can  also  be recalled, including the 2000 Council 
Resolution on Balanced participation of women and men in family and working life41 and the 
1992 Council recommendation on childcare (1992/ 241/CEE) recommending Member States 
should  support  reconciliation  between  work  and  family  life  and  "a  more  equal  sharing  of 
parental responsibilities between women and men. 

The European Council also set targets to improve the provision of childcare, the ‘Barcelona 
targets’  in  200242.  They  aimed  to  provide  childcare  by  201043  to  at  least  90%  of  children 
between 3 years old and the mandatory school age, and to at least 33% of children under 3 
years of age44.  In the context of the economic crisis and of budgetary cuts in services, these 
targets were not reached by 2010 and the European Council reaffirmed them in the European 
Pact for Gender Equality 2011-2020. 

41 2000/C 218/02 
42   http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/71025.pdf 
43  Member  States  have renewed  their  commitment  to  these  targets  through  two  successive  European  Pacts  for 
equality between women and men putting a new end date to 2020. 
44 The Commission also sets targets in the area of early childhood education and care within the framework of 
Education and Training 2020. 

18 

 
 
 
                                                      
The European Parliament has also been extremely active in this area. Most recently, the 2016 
European Parliament Report, ‘Creating Labour Market Conditions Favourable for Work-Life 
Balance’  stressed  "the  need  to  eliminate  gender  inequalities  in  paid  and  unpaid  work"  and 
called  on  the  European  Commission  to  put  forward  a  comprehensive  package  of  legislative 
and non-legislative measures as part of the Commission Work Programme 2017. Many EU-
level stakeholders, including social partners and NGOs, also give high priority to the topic of 
work-life balance. An overview can be found in Annex 2 on Stakeholders consultations. 

Equality  between  women  and  men  is  a  fundamental  right  in  the  European  Union  and  an 
objective under the Treaty.45 The right to family and professional life is also recognised under 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.46 

EU legislation provides for individual rights for workers in relation to work-life balance. In 
particular,  several  EU  directives  are  relevant  for  family-related  leaves  and  flexible  working 
arrangements.  Non-legislative  support  measures  have  also  been  developed.  An  overview  of 
such measures is outlined below. 

2.1. Legislative measures 

The  Parental  Leave  Directive  (2010/18/EU)47,  which  incorporates  in  its  annexe  an 
agreement between the social partners, provides workers with an individual right to parental 
leave  of  at  least  four  months  on  the  grounds  of  birth  or  adoption  of  a  child,  until  the  child 
reaches  a  given  age    up  to  eight  years  (leaving  Member  States  the  possibility  to  specify  a 
lower  maximum  age).  Whereas  the  right  of  parental  leave  is  an  individual  right  and  in 
principle  non-transferable,  Member  States  are  allowed  to  make  part  of  it  transferable.  The 
social  partners had  agreed that  at least one month  should be provided on a non-transferable 
basis,  i.e.  could  not  be  transferred  to  the  other  parent  and  would  be  lost  if  not  taken48.  The 
Directive does not impose any obligations in relation to pay during parental leave. In addition 
it  is  up  to  Member  States  or  social  partners  to  define  the  detailed  conditions  and  rules  for 
parental leave – they are free to decide whether this leave can be taken on a full-time or part-
time  basis  or  whether  it  can  be  taken  in  a  piecemeal  way,  i.e.  in  several  blocks49.  When 
returning from parental leave, parents have the right to request changes to their working hours 
and/or patterns for a certain period of time and to have such requests duly considered by the 
employer, taking into account both employers’ and workers’ needs50. The Directive provides 
protection  against  dismissal  and  less  favourable  treatment  on  the  ground  of  applying  for  or 
taking  parental  leave51.  It  also  provides  that  workers  have  to  be  entitled  to  limited  time  off 

45 Articles 8, 10, 153 (1) (i), 157 TFEU; Article 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
46 Article 33 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
47   Council Directive 2010/18/EU of 8 March 2010 implementing the revised Framework Agreement on parental 
leave  concluded  by  BUSINESSEUROPE,  UEAPME,  CEEP  end  ETUC  and  repealing  Directive  96/34/EC, 
OJ L68, 18.3.2010, p.13-20.    

48 See Clause 2(2) of the Annex to the Directive. 
49 See Clause 3(1) of the Annex to the Directive. 
50 See Clause 6  of the Annex to the Directive. 
51 See Clause 5(4) of the Annex to the Directive. 

19 

 
 
 
                                                      
work  for  urgent  family  reasons  (force  majeure)  in  case  of  sickness  or  accident  making  the 
immediate presence of the worker indispensable52.  

The Pregnant Workers (Maternity Leave) Directive (92/85/EEC)53 sets out the basic rights 
of  all  female  workers  before  and  after  pregnancy.  The  general  objective  of  the  Pregnant 
Workers (Maternity Leave) Directive (92/85/EEC) is to implement measures to encourage 
improvements  in  the  health  and  safety  at  work  of  pregnant  women  in  the  workplace  and 
women  who  have  recently  given  birth  or  are  breastfeeding.  It  provides  for  maternity  leave 
paid at least at the level of sick pay for at least 14 weeks54. A minimum of two of those weeks 
are  compulsory.  The  Directive  also  grants  special  protection  against  dismissal  from  the 
beginning of the pregnancy until the end of the maternity leave. During that period dismissals 
are  in  principle  prohibited  and  admissible  only  in  exceptional  cases  not  connected  to 
pregnancy or  maternity leave which are permitted by national legislation and/or  practice. In 
the event of any such dismissal the employer has to cite duly substantiated grounds in writing.   

At  EU  level,  there  is  currently  no  individual  entitlement  to  paternity  leave  (Article  16  of 
Directive  2006/54/EC  only  provides  for  dismissal  protection  and    the  right  to  return  to  the 
same or equivalent job after having taken paternity leave in the Member States where it exists 
). With regards to carers' leave, there is only the right to time off for urgent family reasons in 
cases  of  sickness  or  accident  making  the  immediate  presence  of  the  worker  indispensable  
(Clause 7 of  Directive 2010/18/EU, "force majeure").  

In  relation  to  flexible  working  arrangements,  EU  legislation  provides  the  right  under  the 
Parental Leave Directive, for people returning from parental leave to request changes to their 
working  hours  and/or  patterns  for  a  certain  period  of  time  and  to  have  such  requests  duly 
considered  by  the  employer,  taking  into  account  both  employers’  and  workers’  needs.  The 
Directive  on  Part-Time  Work  (97/81/EC)55  has  the  purpose  of  eliminating  discrimination 
against part-time workers, the vast majority of which are women56, and improving the quality 
of  part-time  work.  The  social  partner  agreement  annexed  to  the  Directive  suggests  that 
employers  should  give  consideration,  as  far  as  possible,  to  requests  by  workers  to  transfer 

52 See Clause 7 of the Annex to the Directive. 
53 Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements 
in  the  safety  and  health  at  work  of  pregnant  workers  and  workers  who  have  recently  given  birth  or  are 
breastfeeding 
54   Directive 2010/41/EU on self-employed workers and assisting spouses also grants a maternity allowance that 
is sufficient to enable an interruption of occupational activities for at least 14 weeks for female self-employer 
workers or female spouses of self-employed workers., OJ L 180, 15.7.2010, p. 1–6. 

55  Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the Framework Agreement on part-time work 

concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC, OJ L 14, 20.1.1998, p. 9 

56  Such  protection  against  discrimination  already  being  provided  under  the  case-law  on  indirect  sex 
discrimination. See for an overview E. Traversa ‘Protection of Part-Time Workers in the Case Law of the Court 
of  Justice  of  the  European  Communities’,  International  Journal  of  Comparative  Labour  Law  and  Industrial 
Relations  Issue  2  (2003),  pp.  219-241;  See  also  for  example  Case  96/80  J.P.  Jenkins  v  Kingsgate  (Clothing 
Productions) Ltd. [1980] ECR 911; Case 170/84 Bilka - Kaufhaus GmbH v Karin Weber von Hartz [1986] ECR 
1607; Case 171/88 Ingrid Rinner-Kühn v FWW Spezial-Gebäudereinigung GmbH & Co. KG [1989] ECR 2743 
(Rinner-Kühn);Case  C-435/93,  Francina  Johanna  Maria  Dietz  v  Stichting  Thuiszorg  Rotterdam  [1996]  ECR 
5223  (Dietz);  Case  C-385/11  Isabel  Elbal  Moreno  v  Instituto  Nacional  de  la  Seguridad  Social  (INSS)  and 
Tesorería General de la Seguridad Social (TGSS) [2012] I-000 . 

20 

 
 
 
                                                      
from full-time to part-time work that becomes available in the establishment and to requests 
by  workers  to  transfer  from  part-time  to  full-time  work  or  to  increase  their  working  time 
should  the  opportunity  arise.  It  also  provides  for  protection  against  the  termination  of 
employment due to the refusal to transfer from full-time to part-time or vice versa.  

The  Directive  on  Working  Time  (2003/88/EC)57  provides  for  adequate  rest  periods  for  all 
workers  and  thereby  also  contributes  to  their  work-life  balance.  By  entitling  workers  to  a 
maximum weekly working time as well as daily, weekly and annual rest periods, the Directive 
provides  workers  with  greater  possibilities  to  balance  their  professional  and  caring 
responsibilities. 

Relevant EU legislation also exists in the area of equal treatment between women and men in 
employment  and  occupation.  The  Directive  on  Gender  Equality  in  Employment 
(2006/54/EC)58  guarantees  the  right  to  return  to  the  same  job  or  an  equivalent  job  after 
maternity  leave  (Article  15),  as  well  as  protection  against  dismissal  and  less  favourable 
treatment for workers taking paternity or adoption leave (Article 16), where such leaves are 
provided under the law of Member States.  

The  case-law  of  the  Court  of  Justice  in  relation  to  Directive  2006/54  (and  its  predecessors)  
has clarified that any less favourable treatment of a woman related to pregnancy or birth of a 
child  constitutes  prohibited  discrimination  on  grounds  of  sex59;  dismissals  for  such  reasons, 
even where they take place after the end of the period of maternity leave, are therefore also 
prohibited60. 

2.2 Background of the 2008 proposal to revise the Maternity Leave Directive 

In  2008,  the  Commission  proposed  a  revision  of  Directive  92/85/EEC  on  maternity 
protection61.    The  proposed  revision  included  an  increase  in  the  minimum  duration  of 
maternity  leave  from  14  to  18  weeks,  an  increase  in  the  mandatory  period  of  leave  from  2 
weeks  to  6  weeks,  to  increase  the  flexibility  for  women  to  decide  when  to  take  maternity 
leave, whether before or after birth and to improve employment protection for women on, or 
returning from birth. The proposal had a two-fold objective of strengthening health and safety 
and equal opportunities of women and men in the labour market; it sought to assist women in 

57 Directive 2003/88/EC of the European and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of 
the organisation of working time 
58   Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation 
of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and 
occupation (recast) [Official Journal L 204 of 26.7.2006]. 

59 See for example the case law C-177/88 Dekker, C-32/93 Webb and C-460/06 Paquay. 
60 C-460/06 Paquay, para. 42. 
61  Proposal  for  a  Directive  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  amending  Council  Directive 
92/85/EEC  on  the  introduction  of  measures  to  encourage  improvements  in  the  safety  and  health  at  work  of 
pregnant  workers  and  workers  who  have  recently  given  birth  or  are  breastfeeding  {SEC(2008)2595} 
{SEC(2008)2596} 

21 

 
 
 
 
                                                      
recovering after giving birth and to facilitate women's return to the labour market after having 
a child. 

In its position at first reading adopted on 20 October 2010, the European Parliament was in 
favour of revising the Directive to a greater extent than the Commission's proposal. It took the 
view that maternity leave should last at least 20 weeks, arguing that the period of 20 weeks is 
recommended by the World Health Organisation and that such a right should be accompanied 
by  full  pay.  The  Parliament  however  considered  a  "passerelle"  clause  when  Member  States 
where  maternity  leave  is  shorter  than  20  weeks  offer  family-related  leave  that  fulfills  the 
criteria set out in the Directive. The Parliament’s opinion also set out that the Directive should 
give an entitlement to at least two weeks' paid paternity leave. 

The Council Working Party on Social Questions held several meetings to discuss the file and 
the  Council  held  several  policy  debates  to  clarify  the  delegations'  views  on  the  Proposal. 
While all  delegations  supported in  general  the proposal’s objectives,  a large majority of the 
delegations  stressed  that  the  Community  rules  were  only  minimum  standards.  In  the  policy 
debate held on 6 December 2010, after the adoption of the European Parliament's opinion at 
first  reading,  it  was  clear  that  the  length  and  pay  for  maternity  leave  were  the  most 
controversial elements. Several Member States have stressed that extending leave entitlements 
only  for  women  could  risk  further  entrenching  women's  roles  as  primary  carers  and  have  a 
detrimental  impact  on  women's  employment  and  career  progression.  Furthermore,  in  the 
context of the economic crisis, a very large majority of delegations were not in a position to 
accept the Parliament's  amendment  extending minimum  maternity  leave to  20 weeks and to 
extend  the  minimum  payment  level  to  full  pay.  Many  delegations  also  rejected  certain 
amendments  in  the  area  of  prevention  of  discrimination/protection  against  dismissal,  which 
they considered to be adequately covered elsewhere in the EU legislation62.  

The Commission engaged in intensive efforts to break the deadlock and on several occasions 
urged  the  Council  to  re-enter  discussions  with  the  European  Parliament,  which  expressed  a 
will to compromise on its earlier position. However, in view of the lack of progress by the co-
legislators, and as the Latvian Presidency of the Council informed the Commission that there 
was no prospect for an agreement, the Commission decided to withdraw its proposal on 1 July 
2015,63. It stated that it wished to break the current stalemate and to open the way for a new 
initiative to lead to real improvements in the lives of working parents and carers. 

2.3 Enforcement and Evaluation of existing legislation 

2.3.1 Enforcement of existing legislation 

62  Council  of  the  European  Union  (2011)  Progress  report  on  the  Proposal  for  a  Directive  of  the  European 
Parliament  and  of  the  Council  amending  Council  Directive  92/85/EEC  on  the  introduction  of  measures  to 
encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently 
given birth or are breastfeeding  
63 See the European  Commission's 2015 Press Release: Delivering for Parents; Commission withdraws stalled 
maternity leave proposal and paves the way for a fresh approach 

22 

 
 
 
                                                      
In  its  role  of  Guardian  of  the  treaties,  the  European  Commission  monitors  the  state  of 
transposition of the existing directives and supporting enforcement at national level.  

Discussions  with  Member  States  and,  if  necessary,  infringement  procedures,  have  ensured 
that national laws transpose correctly the EU Directives.64 This includes the requirement that 
discrimination based on applying for or taking existing leaves is prohibited65 and that national 
gender equality bodies are in place and have the competence and resources to be able to assist 
such victims of discrimination.66  

For  example,  infringement  proceedings  on  the  basis  of  non-conformity  with  Directive 
2002/73/EC67  were  launched  in  2006  against  23  Member  States.  Regarding  Directive 
2006/54/EC, questions were raised with 26 Member States on the conformity of their national 
legislation with the Directive’s novelties.68 

In  this  work  the  Commission  draws  on  the  expertise  and  assistance  of  a  network  of 
independent national legal experts.69  

The Commission participates also in cases referred to the Court of Justice, to assist the Court 
of Justice in ensuring that EU law providing for leaves and prohibiting related discrimination 
is properly interpreted.  

Moreover,  in  terms  of  supporting  enforcement  at  national  level,  the  Commission  funds 
ongoing  training  for  judges  and  legal  practitioners  to  ensure  enforcement  and  correct 
application at national level.70   

64 See, for example, the Report from the Commission on the implementation of council directive 92/85/EEC of 19 
October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the health and safety at work of 
pregnant  workers  and  workers  who  have  recently  given  birth  or  are  breastfeeding,  COM/99/100  final,  of 
15.03.1999,  which  explains  at  page  4  that  "Infringement  procedures  have  been  launched  against  a  number  of 
Member States for the incorrect implementation of certain provisions of the Directive".  
65 According to Articles 2(2)c) of Directive 2006/54/EC and Clause 5(4) of Directive 2010/18. 
66 As provided by Article 20 of Directive 2006/54/EC. 
67 Directive 2002/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 amending Council 
Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards 
access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions, OJ L 269, 5.10.2002, p. 15. 
Among other relevant provisions, this Directive established that "Less favourable treatment of a woman related 
to  pregnancy  or  maternity  leave  within  the  meaning  of  Directive  92/85/EEC  shall  constitute  discrimination 
within the meaning of this Directive" (new Article 2, paragraph 7 of Directive 76/207, introduced by Directive 
2002/73).  Directive  76/207,  which  was  amended  by  Directive  2002/73,  was  repealed  and  replaced  by 
Directive 2006/54 in July 2006. 
68  Report  on  the  application  of  Directive  2006/54/EC,  COM(2013)  861  final  of  6.12.2013,  at  page  3.  See: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/gender_pay_gap/com-2013-861-final_en.pdf 
69  http://www.equalitylaw.eu/.  The  current  "European  network  of  legal  experts  in  gender  equality  and  non-
discrimination"  resulted  from  the  merger  in  December  2014  of  the  former  network  of  legal  experts  in  gender 
equality and the network on non-discrimination. See, for example, the 2012 report on " Fighting Discrimination 
on 
found  here: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-
equality/files/your_rights/discrimination__pregnancy_maternity_parenthood_final_en.pdf   

the  Grounds  of  Pregnancy,  Maternity 

and  Parenthood"  which 

can  be 

23 

 
 
 
                                                      
The Commission supports the work of "Equinet", the EU network of Equality Bodies, on how 
to promote the enforcement of equality legislation and supports the sharing of best practices 
between equality bodies as well as between Member States.71  

The  Commission  has  also  invested  in  awareness-raising  activities,  including,  for  example, 
brochures  on  "Know  Your  Rights  in  Equality  and  Non-Discrimination"72  and  on  'How  to 
present  a  discrimination  claim",73  which  explain  in  simple  language  what  victims  of 
discrimination should do when their rights are violated.  

Nevertheless, as explained in detail below and in Annex 5, there is evidence that despite these 
efforts,  problems  of  discrimination  still  exist.  Moreover,  there  is  still  a  gender  employment 
gap and a gender pay gap, notably between women and men with caring responsibilties. 

2.3.2  Evaluation  of  existing 
(92/85/EEC) and  Parental Leave Directive (2010/18/EU))  

legislation  (Maternity  Leave  Directive 

The following section summarises some of the main findings of the Evaluation which can be 
found in Annex 5.  

The  objectives  of  the  maternity,  in  the  areas  relevant  to  this  initiative,  and  parental  leave 
Directive have not been fully reached. In the context of this initiative, the relevant maternity 
leave Directive objective is that the protection of the health and safety of pregnant women and 
women who have recently given birth should not lead to women's unfavourable treatment on 
the labour market nor work. The relevant parental leave Directive objectives are to facilitate 
the  reconciliation  of  parental  and  professional  responsibilities  for  working  parents74  and  to 
promote a more equal sharing of family responsibilities between women and men75. 

This evaluation has shown that the existing framework, e.g. the maternity leave and parental 
leave directives fulfil to some extent the objectives but to a large extent is not an effective 
and efficient tool to achieve the pursued objectives.  

Several factors contribute to this: with regard to maternity leave, despite the legal framework 
for dismissal protection, the evidence shows that all employers do not respect the legal rules 
transposed by the Member States in this field. Even though Member States did comply when 
transposing  the  provisions  of  the  Directive,  in  practice  the  transposed  EU  rules  are  not 

70https://era.int/cgi-
bin/cms?_SID=new&_sprache=en&_persistant_variant=/Our%20programme/Seminar%20series/EC%20Anti-
Discrimination%20Legislation&_bereich=artikel&_aktion=detail&idartikel=121643 
71 See, for example, the 2015 seminar of Equinet on "Work-Life Balance and Pregnancy and Parenthood related 
Discrimination": http://www.equineteurope.org/Work-Life-Balance-and-Pregnancy-682 
72 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/files/rights_against_discrimination_web_en.pdf 
73 This document was written for the Commission by Lilla Farkas of the European Network of Legal Experts in 
the non-discrimination field: 
 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/files/present_a_discrimination_claim_handbook_en.pdf, 
74 Clause 1(1) of  Directive 2010/18/EU 
75 Recital 12 of Council Directive 2010/18/EU 

24 

 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
achieving  the  objective  of  combatting  dismissal  and  discrimination  of  pregnant  women. 
Hence,  the  problem  of  dismissals  of  pregnant  women  remains  despite  the  initially  intended 
role of the dismissal rules by the legislators to serve as a mechanism that effectively prevents 
discrimination  and  dismissals  in  relation  to  pregnancy.  The  effectiveness76  of  the  dismissal 
protection rules is limited by the fact that some employers do not comply. This hampers this 
objective of the maternity leave  Directive,  even though  all Member States  comply  with  the 
transposition of these rules as laid down in the Directive. 

With  regard  to  parental  leave,  part  of  the  objectives  set  by  the  Directive  2010/18  are  not 
sufficiently met and addressed, such as the objective of achieving work-life balance through 
a better balancing of the caring responsibilities between women and men. The current design 
of the leave for parents leads in practice to an unequal uptake between women and men, with 
a vast majority of women taking leave. This was identified as being due to a lack of payment 
in  many  Member  States  and  rules  allowing  one  parent  to  transfer  his  or  her  individual 
entitlement to the other parent which all reinforce the take-up by women instead of reserving 
their individual entitlement to each parent. It can be observed that Member States have chosen 
various  models  for  their  legal  transposition  of  the  requirements  of  the  two  directives  under 
assessment,  while  these directives  included  the  core  substance  of  the  level  of  protection  for 
workers in the area of work-life balance.  

The assessment of efficiency for both Directives was hampered to some extent due to a lack 
of systematic European monitoring data. In order to be better able to assess the performance 
of legislation in this field, monitoring arrangements on EU and Member State level need to be 
strengthened in future.  

With  regard  to  parental  leave,  the  need  for  minimum  standards  as  such  remains  highly 
relevant today. EU action is also still relevant in the area of maternity leave, considering the 
need to ensure the principle of non-discrimination and a high level of protection for pregnant 
women in order to prevent still prevailing discrimination based on sex77. 

In  terms  of  coherence,  it  can  be  concluded  that  the  evaluated  directives  are  in  principle 
coherent. Both Directives are coherent78 both internally and with other EU policy actions. It 
is however recommended to reinforce the interaction between provisions within and between 
legal instruments in order to achieve coherent outputs. 

In terms of EU added value, it has to be underlined that, EU action as regards maternity and 
parental leave created additional value and triggered even further action in Member States that 
would  not  have  occurred  without  EU  intervention.  The  EU  added  value  can  be  seen  in  the 
causative  effects  of  EU  intervention  to  provide  all  working  parents  in  the  European  Union 
with family-related leaves such as maternity or parental leave79. 

76 See Section 5.1 for further details on effectiveness. 
77  See Section 5.3 for further details on relevance. 
78  See Section 5.4 for further details on coherence. 
79 See Section 5.5 for further details on EU added value. 

25 

 
 
 
                                                      
2.4 Non-legislative measures 

In addition to legislation, the EU has been addressing work-life balance issues and obstacles 
to parents’ labour market participation through the European Semester80, and country-specific 
recommendations (CSRs) have been issued to several countries with the greatest challenges. 
Such  recommendations  include  providing  affordable  and  adequate  childcare  and  long-term 
care  services  and  removing  economic  disincentives  to  work.  Moreover,  the  guidelines  for 
Member  States'  employment  policies  adopted  by  the  Council  in  October  2015  highlight  the 
importance  of  increasing  female  labour  market  participation  and  ensuring  gender  equality 
including equal pay, and refer specifically to the reconciliation of work and family life.  

The  European  Structural  and  Investment  (ESI)  Funds81,  in  particular  the  European  Social 
Fund (ESF) and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), have focused inter alia, 
on  the  reconciliation  of  private  and  professional  lives  and  supported  work-life  balance 
policies and investments to improve access and quality of childcare services. For instance, the 
reconciliation of work and family life is included in the 'Equality between women in men in 
all  areas"  investment  priority  for  the  ESF  programming  period  2014-2020  to  which 
approximately  1.5  billion  euros  are  allocated.  The  ERDF  is  additionally  supporting  the 
development of early childhood education and care infrastructure for children below 6 years 
of  age,  with  1.28  billion  euros  allocated  for  this  purpose  for  the  2014-2020  programming 
period. 

The EU has also set targets and provided some policy guidance in areas relevant to work-life 
balance.  The  1992  Council  Recommendation  on  Child  Care  encouraged  initiatives  for  an 
enhanced provision of childcare, special leaves for employed parents, parent-friendly working 
environments  and  a  more  equal  sharing  of  upbringing  responsibilities  between  women  and 
men.  In  1996,  the  European  Commission  Network  on  Childcare  and  other  Measures  to 
reconcile  Employment  and  Family  Responsibilities  presented  quality  targets  in  services  for 
young children.  The Commission’s Education and Training 2020 strategy includes a target on 
95%  participation  rate for children between  age 4 and the start of compulsory schooling by 
2020.  The  Commission’s  2013  Social  Investment  Package  (SIP)82  urged  Member  States  to 
remove  barriers 
labour  market  participation  by  addressing  workplace 
discrimination,  offering  reconciliation  measures  (such  as  childcare  services),  adapted 
workplaces, including ICT-based solutions and removing tax-benefit disincentives for second 
earners  to  work.  The  SIP  also  contained  a  Commission  Recommendation  on  Investing  in 
Children83, calling on Member States to support the employability and participation of parents 
– notably single parents and second earners -  in paid work, and to provide accessible quality 
early childhood education and care services (ECEC).84  

to  women’s 

80   For more information, please see http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/making-it-happen/index_en.htm 
81   For more information, please see http://ec.europa.eu/contracts_grants/funds_en.htm 
82   http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1444905511940&uri=CELEX:52013DC0083 
83   http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32013H0112   
84   Already in 1992, the Council gave a Recommendation on child care (92/241/EEC, OJ L 123,   
08/05/1992). 

26 

 
 
 
                                                      
The Commission has also worked to facilitate European consensus85 on approaches towards 
ECEC  and  steered  development  of  an  EU  Quality  Framework  for  ECEC86  representing  an 
agreement  between  experts  from  25  Member  States.  This  framework  covers  all  areas  that 
require action to improve access to and quality of early childhood education and care services. 
Moreover,  the  2014  Report  on  Adequate  social  protection  for  long-term  care  needs  in  an 
ageing  society,  prepared  by  the  Social  Protection  Committee  and  the  Commission  services, 
calls  on  Member  States  to  ensure  adequate  access  to  affordable  quality  care  and  to  make  it 
easier  for  people  taking  care  of  elderly,  dependent  or  frail  family  members  to  reconcile 
employment and care responsibilities. 

Finally, the Commission organises awareness-raising events and exchanges of good practices 
between Member States on reconciliation policies and female labour market participation87. 

2.5 Other relevant initiatives at EU level 

In addition to the frameworks agreement adopted by Council Decision on Parental Leave and 
Part-Time  work  mentioned  above,  social  partners  also  adopted  an  autonomous  framework 
agreement on Telework in 200288. Telework, a type of flexible working arrangement, can also 
contribute to parents and carers' reconciliation of professional and caring responsibilities. This 
autonomous  framework  agreement  defines  a  general  framework  to  facilitate  the  use  of 
telework  in  enterprises  and  was  implemented  through  social  partner  agreements,  collective 
agreements, national legislation, guides and codes of good practice89. 

3.  PROBLEM DEFINITION 

As  outlined  in  the  Roadmap  of  this  initiative90,  the  problem  to  be  addressed  is  women’s 
under-representation  in  employment  taking  into  account  the  reality  of  today's  societies 
where increasing numbers of women wish to work, the increasing number of elderly and other 
relatives  in  need  of  care,  and  the  fact  that  more  men  would  like  to  take  more  care 
responsibilities  in  their  families  but  don't  feel  encouraged  to  do  so.  There  is  a  strong 
connection  between  the  distribution  of  caring  responsibilities  between  women  and  men  and 
women’s under-representation in employment.  

3.1. Women's underrepresentation in the labour market 

85 Council Conclusions of 15 June 2011 on early childhood education and care: providing all our children with 
the best start for the world of tomorrow 
86   See 2014 Report of the Working Group on Early Childhood Education and Care under the auspices 

of the European Commission. 

87  See http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/other-institutions/good-practices/index_en.htm 
88 ETUC, UNICE, UEAPME, CEEP, European Framework Agreement on Telework, 2002 
89  ETUC,  UNICE,  UEAPME,  CEEP,  Press  Release:  European  Social  Partners  Present  the  Results  of  the 
Implementation of the European Telework Agreement, 2006 
90 European Commission (2015), Roadmap: A new start to address the challenges of work-life balance faced by 
working families 

27 

 
 
 
 
                                                      
Women  are  increasingly  well-qualified,  even  surpassing  men  in  terms  of  educational 
attainment in Europe today, yet remain considerably underrepresented in employment relative 
to men91. In 2015 the gender employment gap (age 20-64) in the EU reached 11.6 percentage 
points (pp) (see Figure 1).  

Figure  1:  Gaps  between  male  and  female  employment  rates  (ER)  and  employment  rates  in 
full-time equivalents (FTER)92 in 2015 

35

30

25

20

15

10

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B

T
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D

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A

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9
1
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M

FTER gap (men-women)

ER gap (men-women)

Source: Eurostat, LFS (lfsi_emp_a) and European Commission, own calculations. Note: data 
refer to women and men aged 20-64.   

There are gender differences in all Member States, with the gender employment gap ranging 
from 2.1 pp in Finland to 27.8 pp in Malta. The employment rate of women was 64.3% in the 
EU, compared to 75.9% for men.93At the current rate of change, female employment will only 
reach 75%, the current employment rate of men, by the year 203894.  

Women  tend  to  be  under-represented  in  management  positions95.  For  example,  in  business 
and finance 95% of chief executive officers of the 613 largest publicly listed companies in the 
EU28 are men, 85% of the senior executives and 75% of non-executives96. Women are also 
frequently working in jobs below their skill level. The probability of being over-qualified for 

91   In 2014, 42.3% of women (aged 30-34) had tertiary education or higher compared to 33.6% of men. 
92   Full time equivalents calculated with regard to the working time of a full-time full-year employee. 
93 All figures based on EU Labour Force Survey 2015, unless otherwise stated. 
94   European Commission (2014) Report on Progress on equality between women and men in 2013.  
95   See 
decision-making 

database 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/gender-decision-making/database/index_en.htm 

Commission 

European 

women 

on 

in 

positions 

96  http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/gender-decision-making/database/business-finance/executives-non-
executives/index_en.htm 

28 

 
 
 
  
 
                                                      
 
 
 
a job among university graduates is higher for women than for men in several countries97.  A 
substantially  higher  proportion  of  women  work  part-time  (31.3%  of  women  compared  to 
8.3%  of  men).  As  a  result,  the  gender  employment  differences  in  full-time  equivalents  are 
even larger, with a gap of 18.1 percentage points for the EU as a whole (see Figure 1 above).98  

This initiative aims to address the problem of the underrepresentation of women in the labour 
market  by  addressing  one  of  its  main  drivers,  which  is  the  unequal  distribution  of  caring 
responsibilities between women and men. Additional drivers such as economic disincentives, 
including  the  pay  gap,  are  also  discussed  below  as  they  tend  to  reinforce  the  unequal 
distribution  of  caring  responsibilities  between  women  and  men.  Other  drivers  are  not 
addressed by this initiative, which seeks to preserve the intention of the Commission's 2008 
proposal  to  improve  the  reconciliation  of  work  and  family  life,  while  providing  minimum 
protection99.  

3.2  The addressed driver: the unequal distribution of caring responsibilities between 

women and men 

Parenthood  and  other  caring  responsibilities  appear  to  be  an  important  driver  for  the 
employment differences between women and men. In nearly all Member States, the gender 
employment  gap  widens  substantially  after  having  children100.  On  average  in  2015,  the 
employment  rate  of  women  with  one  child  under  the  age  of  6  is  8.8  percentage  points  (pp) 
lower than for women without young children, and in several countries this difference is over 
30 pp101. Mothers tend to be less represented in the labour market than non-mothers across all 
educational levels and household types. The employment gender gap is particularly high for 
low-skilled women and  single parents102. Conversely,  parenthood has  the opposite effect on 
the employment rates of men. In all EU Member States, fathers of one child under 6 are more 
likely to be employed than non-fathers. In 2015, the employment rate of fathers of one child 
under 6 was on average 12.2 pp higher than non-fathers, and in some countries this difference 
exceeded  18  pp  (see  Figure  2).  The  gender  gap  in  part-time  work  is  also  more  acute  for 
parents, with 38.9 % of  mothers working part-time as compared to 5.8% of fathers. Fathers 
tend  to  work  more  hours  than    non-fathers,  despite  the  fact  that  many  men  report  that  they 

97   This is the case, for example, in Spain, UK, Italy, Belgium, France Germany and the Netherlands, see Conde-

Ruiz and Marra de Artíñano (2016) Gender Gaps in the Spanish Labour Market 

98  See  European  Comission  (2016),  European  Semester  Thematic  Factsheet:  Labour  Force  Participation  of 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/european-semester_thematic-factsheet_labour-force-
Women, 
participation-women_en.pdf. 
99 See the European  Commission's 2015 Press Release: Delivering for Parents; Commission withdraws stalled 
maternity leave proposal and paves the way for a fresh approach 
100 Miani and Hoorens (2014) Parents at work: men and women participating in the labour force 
101 Gender gaps in employment are 24.7 pp among those with 1 child below 6 years of age, 25.6 pp among those 
with 2 children (youngest below 6 years of age) and 35.4 pp for those with three children or more. 
102  See European Commission (2016) The efficiency and effectiveness of social protection systems over the life 

course, chapter 3.2. in Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2015 

29 

 
 
 
                                                      
want  to  work  fewer  than  their  actual  hours,  and  this  is  specifically  related  to  the  jobs 
interfering with family life103.  

Figure  2:  Employment  impact  in  percentage  points  of  parenthood  for  one  child  under  6  on 
men and women (age 20-49), 2015 

Source: EU Labour Force Survey 2015 

Women are much more likely to assume the role of informal carers for elderly or dependent 
relatives  than  men104.  In  all  Member  States,  the  majority  of  informal  carers  for  people  with 
long-term  care  needs  are  women,  ranging  from  71%  in  Hungary;  66-64%  in  Estonia,  Italy, 
Poland,  Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden  and  the  Czech  Republic;  62-60%  in  France,  Austria, 
Germany,  Slovenia  and  Belgium;  58-57%  in  the  Netherlands  and  the  UK;  and  54%  in 
Denmark105.  When  informal  care  is  provided,  it  is  most  typically  performed  by  spouses, 
daughters  or  daughters-in-law106.  Informal  caring  responsibilities  strongly  decrease  the 
likelihood  of  remaining  in  employment107.  This  phenomenon  is  likely  to  increase  further  in 
the context of demographic ageing108. 

103  Kanji and Robin (2015) Male Breadwinning Revisited: How Specialisation, Gender Role Attitudes and Work 
at: 

Characteristics 
http://soc.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/08/25/0038038515596895. 

Underwork 

Overwork 

available 

Europe, 

Affect 

and 

104  See  for  instance  European  Commission  (2013)  Long  term  care  in  ageing  societies;  Eurofound  (2016)  The 

in 

Gender Employment Gap: Challenges and Solutions 

105  European  Commission  and  Social  Protection  Committee  (2014)  Adequate  social  protection  for  long-term 
care needs in an ageing society 
106 Ibid 
107  European  Social  Policy  Network  (2016)  Work-life  balance  measures  for  persons  of  working  age  with 
dependent relatives in Europe. Moreover, Pickard,L.,King,D. , Knapp, M. and M. Perkins ((2012),   
Overcoming Barriers to Unpaid Care and Employment in England suggest that a key threshold at which carers 
aged 50 and over are at risk of losing their employment can occur when care is provided for only 10 or more 
hours a week. 
108 
Interlinks 
http://www.euro.centre.org/data/1278594816_84909.pdf 

long-term  care  system.  European  Overview  Paper. 

Informal  care 

(2010) 

the 

in 

30 

 
 
 
 
                                                      
Overall,  the  disproportionate  share  of  caring  responsibilities  taken  by  women  leads  them  to 
take more and/or longer leaves of absences compared to men, reduce their working hours, and 
in some cases drop out of the labour market altogether109. Looking after a child or dependent 
relative is reported by women as the biggest reason for their inactivity in the labour market, 
while it is among the less frequently reported reasons for men (see Figures 3 and 4 below). 

Figure 3: Reasons for women's inactivity in percentage  of total women inactivity (aged 20-
64), EU 28 

Looking after children or incapacitated adults

Retired

Own illness or disability

Other

In education or training

Other family or personal responsabilities

Think no work is available

Awaiting recall to work (on lay-off)

Source: EU Labour Force Survey 2015 

0,0 2,0 4,0 6,0 8,0 10,0 12,0 14,0 16,0 18,0 20,0

109  See for instance, OECD (2012) Closing the Gender Gap;  Conde-Ruiz and Marra de Artíñano (2016) Gender 

Gaps in the Spanish Labour Market 

31 

 
 
 
  
 
                                                      
Figure 4: Reasons for men's inactivity in percentage  of total men inactivity (aged 20-64), EU 
28 

Own illness or disability

Retired

In education or training

Other

Think no work is available

Other family or personal responsabilities

Looking after children or incapacitated adults

Awaiting recall to work (on lay-off)

0,0

5,0

10,0

15,0

20,0

25,0

30,0

Source: EU Labour Force Survey 2015 

The  underlying  causes  for  why  caring  responsibilities  impact  women  and  men's 
employment outcomes differently are a mix of attitudes and policy factors. The existence 
of gender stereotypes and discrimination clearly have an effect on women and men's roles 
in the workplace and at home. That being said, the design of work-life balance policies can 
have a strong impact in reinforcing or mitigating the influence of caring on the employment 
outcomes of women. An explanation of these different root causes is detailed below. It is also 
explained  how  these  root  causes  interact  -  gender  stereotypes  and  discrimination  can  be 
reinforced  through  policy  design, while  policy  reform  can  play a role  in  changing  attitudes. 
Economic  disincentives,  which  are  most  acute  for  parents  and  carers,  can  further  reinforce 
the unequal sharing of caring responsibilities by women and men. 

3.2.1. Root cause 1: Gender stereotypes and discrimination 

Part  of  the  reason  for  why  parenthood  and  caring  responsibilities  affect  the  employment  of 
women and men differently is due to expectations of which gender should be engaged in 
caring/household  work  and  which  gender  should  remain  in  formal  employment.  In  a 
2014 Eurobarometer survey on gender equality110, a majority of respondents agreed that ‘on 
the whole, family life suffers when the mother has  a full-time job’. That  being  said, gender 
stereotypes have evolved over recent decades. A larger share of both women and men report 
today that both genders should contribute to household income and fewer respondents agreed 

110  European Commission (2014) Special Eurobarometer 428: Gender Equality 

http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/documents/eurobarometer_report_2015_en.pdf 

32 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
 
that men’s job is to earn money and a woman’s job is to look after the home. This evolution in 
attitudes over recent years has been accompanied to some degree by increased female labour 
force participation, however the shifts in attitudes and in labour force participation has been 
incremental and tempered by policy factors, as described later on. 

Gender stereotypes are also closely linked to gender discrimination in the workforce. There 
is  evidence  that  women  can  face  various  forms  of  discrimination  at  different  stages 
throughout  their  career,  often  linked  to  the  assumption  that  as  a  current  or  potential  parent, 
they  would  not  be  sufficiently  committed  to  their  job  in  comparison  with  men111.  Such 
discrimination  can  act  as  a  barrier  for  women  trying  to  enter  a  certain  sector/job  or  in 
retaining  a  job  once  having  a  child  or  reaching  an  age  when  care  responsibilities  for  other 
relatives may arise112.  

The  lack  of  effective  protection  against  discrimination  and  dismissals  for  women  returning 
from  maternity  leave  strongly  affects  their  participation  in  the  labour  market.  Although 
dismissal  protection  is  provided  under  EU  law  through  the  Maternity  leave  Directive,  the 
Gender Equality (Recast) Directive and the Parental Leave Directive113, dismissal of women 
upon  return  from  maternity  leave  and  unfavourable  tratment  has  been  reported  in  many 
Member States114. One of the most fundamental reasons is that very often existing legislation 
is  circumvented  in  practice115.  The  crisis  has  exacerbated  this  situation  which  de  facto 
deprives  many  women  of  the  possibility  to  exercise  their  rights.  The  lack  of  effective 
protection  against  discrimination  and  dismissals  has  also  an  indirect  impact  on  inferring  on 
men's  perceptions  regarding  the  risks  for  their  careers  of  using  their  entitlements  to  family-
related leaves. 

While  gender  stereotypes  and  discrimination  can  reflect  individual  or  collective 
attitudes, they also strongly interact with policies116. For instance, unavailable or relatively 
low paid family leave for fathers makes it more likely for women to take leave and care for 
the  children.  This  may  also  lead  to  employers  discriminating  against  women  due  to  the 
expectation  that  they  will  take  leave  after  giving  birth,  as  opposed  to  fathers  who  can  be 
expected  to  stay  in  employment  after  having  a  child  and  possibly  even  increase  their  work 

111 European Network of Legal Experts in the Field of Gender Equality (2012) Fighting Discrimination on the 

Grounds of Pregnancy, Maternity and Parenthood 

112  Eurofound (2016) The Gender Employment Gap: Challenges and Solutions 
113      As  explained  in  the  EU  context  section,  the  Maternity  Leave  Directive  ensures  that  during  the  period  of 
leave dismissals are in principle prohibited and admissible only in exceptional cases not connected to pregnancy 
or maternity leave which are permitted by national legislation and/or practice. In the event of any such dismissal 
the employer has to cite duly substantiated grounds in writing. The Gender Recast Directive guarantees the right 
to  return  to  the  same  job  or  an  equivalent  job  after  maternity  leave,  as  well  as  protection  for  workers  taking 
paternity or adoption leave when such leaves are provided under the law of Member States. The Parental Leave 
Directive provides that Member States and/or social partners shall take the necessary measures to protect against 
dismissal and less favourable treatment on the ground of applying for or taking parental leave. The Directive on 
Part-Time Work protects part-time workers from discrimination. 
114 See Annex 5 
115 idem 
116  International  Monetary  Fund  (2016)  Individual  Choice  or  Policies?  Drivers  of  Female  Employment  in 
Europe. Working Paper. 

33 

 
 
 
                                                      
effort. Even in cases where fathers have access to paid leave arrangements or flexible working 
arrangements, employer attitudes as well as personal attitudes can lead fathers not to take up 
these  measures117.  This,  in  turn,  can  reinforce  the  expectations  of  women  being  the  main 
carer, and can negatively impact their return to employment 

3.2.2 Root cause 2: Ill-designed work-life balance policies 

The provision of policies to facilitate the reconciliation of work and family life has a strong 
impact  in  reinforcing  or  mitigating  the  assumption  that  women  will  carry  the  bulk  of  the 
burden caring reponsibilities and hence can impact on the influence of caring responsibilities 
on the employment outcomes of women. In many Member States, the persisting deficiencies 
of  work-life  balance  policies  are  exacerbating  the  female  employment  challenge,  while  in 
other  Member  States,  well-designed  measures  are  serving  to  remove  barriers  to  women's 
participation in the labour market. Such policies can include family-related leaves for children 
and other dependents, flexible working arrangements, and formal care services.  

The availability, or lack-thereof, of leave arrangements can strongly influence women’s 
decisions  to  stay  at  home  or  return  to  the  labour  market  after  assuming  care 
responsibilities.  Inadequate  leave  arrangements  can  make  it  harder  for  parents  to  reconcile 
work and care. As a result, many women end up dropping out of the labour market entirely in 
order  to  care  for  children  or  other  dependents,  rather  than  return  to  work  too  early118. 
Conversely, the provision of paid leave tends to boost female labour market participation by 
allowing women some time off to care for a child or dependent relative while strengthening 
their attachment to the labour market119 immediately after child birth as well as several years 
later120. Minimum standards on the length of leave are set out in the Maternity and Parental 
Leave  Directives,  and  while  there  are  minimum  requirements  in  terms  of  pay  for  maternity 
leave, no requirements exist for pay of parental leave. There is no EU-level provision on the 
right to paternity leave. 

That  being  said,  excessively  long  family-related  leaves  can  also  have  scarring  effects  on 
women’s careers, and make it more difficult for them to re-enter employment after very long 
leaves  of  absence121.  The  duration  of  what  constitutes  excessively  long  leave  is  subject  to 
some  academic  debate.  Some  academic  research122  has  found  that  the  positive  effects  of 
parental leave tend to diminish after 20 weeks. Other academics123 have found that there is a 
fairly strong case for leave for approximately six months, after which leave may begin to have 
an adverse effect on women’s return to the labour market, a negative impact on wages, and on 
career prospects124. The OECD has cautioned against leaves longer than two years because of 

117  Eurofound (2015) Promoting uptake of parental and paternity leave among fathers in the European Union  
118  See OECD (2012) Closing the Gender Gap 
119  OECD (2004) Economic Studies No. 37 2003/2 
120 Roslin-Slatter (2017) Maternity and Family Leave Policy, IZA Institute of Labor Economics 
121 See Thevenon (2013) Labour market effects of parental leave in OECD countries 
122  Jaumotte (2003) Female labour force participation: Past trends and main determinants in OECD countries 
123  Akgündüz and Plantenga (2013) Labour market effects of parental leave in Europe; Mandel and Semyonov 
(2005) Family Policies, Wage Structures, and Gender Gaps: Sources of Earnings Inequality in 20 Countries 

124  Plantenga (2015) Searching for welfare, work and gender equality  

34 

 
 
 
                                                      
skill deterioration and large gaps in women’s CVs which make it more difficult for them to 
re-enter employment125. In this context, the possibility to take leave on a flexible basis (e.g., 
part-time or in blocks), extending the age of the child up to which parents can take leave, as 
well  as  providing  breastfeeding  breaks  and/or  facilities  in  the  workplace  can  be  effective 
measures helping the transition of mothers back into the workplace126.  

The availability  and attractiveness of  leave arrangements for fathers, ie. paternity and 
parental leaves, also has a considerable impact on the division of work and care between 
parents,  and  in  turn  on  overall  female  employment  outcomes.  The  use  of  leave 
arrangements by fathers can rebalance the distribution of care between parents, allowing for 
women’s faster return to the labour market after having children. Moreover, fathers’ take-up 
of leave arrangements has a positive impact on their involvement in bringing up children later 
on127,  reducing  the  relative  amount  of  unpaid  ‘family’  work  undertaken  by  women  and 
leaving women  more time for formal employment.  This is true for parental leave, thanks to 
which the father has the time to effectively engage in the upbringing of the child, but also for 
paternity leave.  While  paternity leave is  often short  and has  a  minimal direct impact on the 
sharing of caring responsibilities between women and men, it has a strong leverage effect on 
the  take-up  of  parental  leave  by  fathers128  and  can  therefore  in  the  long  run  have  a  strong 
impact  leading  fathers  to  take  on  caring  responsibilities.  In  Portugal,  where  entitlements  to 
paternity  leave  have  been  significantly  strengthened  in  recent  years  (including  the 
introduction  of  an  element  of  compulsory  leave),  data  from  the  social  insurance 
administration  show  that  80%  of  fathers  who  take-up  paternity  leave  go  on  to  use  at  least 
some of their parental leave. In Slovenia, data from the Ministry of Labour show that the take-
up  of  parental  leave  increased  from  2.2%  in  2003  to  6.3%  in  2009,  following  the  gradual 
stepping-up in paternity leave entitlements129. 

That being said, the opportunities and incentives for fathers to take leave range considerably 
across Member States. In 23 Member States130, new fathers are entitled to a paternity leave. 
In those countries where such leave exists, it is usually well-paid, with levels of pay ranging 
from 70% to 100% of their previous salary. However, the length of leave is typically short, 
between one day and one week in seven Member States131, between 1 and 2 weeks in a further 
seven  Member  States132.  All  Member  States  provide  both  mothers  and  fathers  at  least  4 
months  of  parental  leave,  in  line  with  the  Parental  Leave  Directive.  However,  in  six133 
Member States, parental leave is unpaid, and in many other countries it is paid at a low level, 

125  OECD (2012) Closing the gender gap 
126  Vaganay,  Canónico,  Courtin  (2016)  Challenges  of  work-life  balance  faced  by  working  families:  review  of 

Costs and Benefits, LSE Evidence Review 

127  Escot  L.,  Castellanos  S.  (2016),  Do  Fathers  Who  Take  Childbirth  Leave  Become  More  Involved  in  Their 
Children's Care? The Case of Spain, Journal of Comparative Family Studies 
128 Taskula, S, (2007). Parental leave for fathers? Research Report no 166. Finland. National Research and 
Development Centre for Welfare and Health 
129 See Supporting Study 
130 BE, BG, DE, DK, EE, EL, ES, FI, FR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SE, SI, UK,  
131 IT, MT, EL, LU, HU, NL, RO 
132 SE, UK, PL, BE, DK, EE, LV 
133 EL, ES, IE, MT, NL, ES 

35 

 
 
 
                                                      
making it less likely that fathers make use of these entitlements. In fifteen Member States134, 
parents have the possibility to transfer at least part of their parental leave entitlements to the 
other  parent,    which  contributes  to  longer  absences  of  women  from  the  labour  market  and 
creates difficulties for their labour market reintegration later on. The current Parental Leave 
Directive  facilitates  this,  as  it  only  requires  that  at  least  one  month  of  leave  should  be  non-
transferable between parents.  

Those Member States that have earmarked a significant portion of leave to fathers and 
paid the leave at a relatively high replacement rate tend to experience higher take-up by 
fathers135  and  positive  results  in  terms  of  mothers’  employment  outcomes136.  For 
example, in Sweden, reserving parental leave to the father has led to a doubling in the number 
of parental leave days taken by men137. Female employment is among the highest in the EU in 
Sweden, and mothers with young children are more likely to be employed than non-mothers, 
whereas  in  the  EU28  on  average,  mothers  are  far  less  likely  to  be  in  employment138.  In 
Germany, a 2007 reform introducing pay for parental leave and bonuses to incentive fathers’ 
take-up led to a significant and steady increase in the proportion of fathers taking leave139 as 
well  as  improved  female  labour  market  participation  and  increased  household  income140.   
Portugal  has  introduced  a  bonus  to  couples  where  both  parents  take  some  parental  leave,  
resulting in the percentage of  fathers taking  parental leave  increasing from 0.5%  in  2005 to 
28.3% in 2013141. However overall, fathers' take-up of parental leave is low and, when fathers 
take  leave,  periods  of  leave  are  usually  short.142  In  contrast,  mothers  generally  make  much 
wider use of parental leave options, as shown in Figure 5 below. 

134 AT, BG, CY, CZ, DK, EE, FI, HR, IT, LT, PL, PT, RO, SI, SE 
135  Escot  L.,  Castellanos  S.  (2016),  Do  Fathers  Who  Take  Childbirth  Leave  Become  More  Involved  in  Their 
Children's Care? The Case of Spain, Journal of Comparative Family Studies 
136 OECD, Policy Brief: Parental Leave, where are the fathers, 2016 
137 ibid 
138 Source:  Eurostat_ lfst_hheredch 
139  Recently published data by the Federal Statistics Office  showed that the proportion of fathers taking parental 
benefit has risen significantly and steadily since its introduction in 2007. For births in 2013, parental benefit was 
taken up by 32 % of fathers (compared to 3.5 per cent of fathers in 2006.  See: Statistisches Bundesamt [Federal 
Statistical  Office]  (2015)  Statistik  zum  Elterngeld.  Beendete  Leistungsbezüge  für  im  2.  Vierteljahr  2013 
geborene  Kinder  [Statistics  on  parental  allowance.  Completed  performance  bonuses  for  children  born  in  the 
second Quarter of 2013]. Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt.  
140 Kluve, J., Schmitz, S. (2014) Social Norms and Mothers' Labor Market Attachment: The Medium-Run Effects 
of  Parental  Benefits;  Huebener,  Muller,  Spies  and  Wrohlich  (2016)  The  parental  leave  benefit:  a  key  family 
policy measure, one decade later. 
141 Eurofound (2015), Promoting uptake of parental and paternity leave among fathers in the European Union 
142 OECD (2012) Closing the gender gap 

36 

 
 
 
                                                      
Figure 5: Level of take-up of parental leave by country and gender 

Source: ICF national research and calculations143  

The lack of adequate leave to take care of other dependent relatives also exacerbates the 
unequal  sharing  of  caring  responsibilities  between  women  and  men.  Where  there  is  no 
carers'  leave  provision,  it  is  generally  women  who  will  work  part-time  or  drop  out  of  the 
labour market in order to take care of their relative for a short  period of time.  No EU-level 
minimum  standards  exist  for  workers  with  dependent  relatives,  except  for  a  limited  right 
under  the  Parental  Leave  Directive  to  take  time  off  on  grounds  of  force  majeure  for  urgent 
family reasons144. Most Member States go beyond the minimum requirements and have some 
form of leave for people with dependent relatives.  These can mainly be classified into three 

143 Figures are based on administrative or survey data made available by national competent bodies in AT, CZ, 
DE, DK, EE, FI, IT, NL, PT, UK (from various years between 2010-2015). Data from other countries (where 
available)  have  been  calculated  by  ICF  on  the  basis  of  estimates  provided  by  competent  authorities  and 
stakeholders of the overall number of beneficiaries and the split between male and female beneficiaries. These 
numbers are subject to a certain level of uncertainty. 
144 Clause 7 of Directive 2010/18/EU which stipulates rules on time off from work on grounds of force majeure. 

37 

 
 
 
 
                                                      
main kinds of carers’ leave. Many Member States145 provide for a short term leave which can 
allow  care  for  a  relative  in  an  emergency  situation  (beyond  the  force  majeure  provisions  of 
contained in the Parental Leave Directive) or to make arrangements for care. A fewer number 
of Member States provide for longer leaves of several weeks or months to directly care for a 
relative146  and  some  Member  States  provide  for  palliative  care  leave147.    The  level  of 
remuneration  also  widely  varies across  Member  States:  half  of  the countries  do  not  provide 
any compensation for at least some of the forms of carers’ leave (usually longer leaves)148 and 
9 Member States provide for leave paid at more than 90%149.  In general, compensation rates 
are lower than for other family-related leaves150. 

In  addition  to  inadequate  or  ill-designed  leaves,  the  unavailability  of  flexible  working 
arrangements  can  lead  to  some  people,  particularly  women,  to  drop  out  of  the  labour 
market  altogether  when  taking  on  caring  responsibilities151.  Flexible  working 
arrangements  include  remote  working,  flexible  working  schedules,  and  reduced  working 
hours  (part-time  work).  Insufficient  availability  of  flexible  working  arrangements  can  also 
lead women with caring responsibilities to change their job to one that is perceived as offering 
more  flexibility  or  reduced  working  hours,  which  is  often  below  their  skill  level  or  for  less 
pay152.  This  consequently  can  lead  to  or  foster  gender  wage  gaps  and  labour  market 
segmentation.  

Although flexible working arrangements, in particular telework, are easier to provide thanks 
to  modern  technology  and  have  been    shown  to  improve  workers  overall  work-life  balance 
and productivity153, the organisation of work tends to remain fixed around on-the-job presence 
for  full  working  hours  or  more.  Eurofound  has  reported  that  an  overwhelming  share  of 
mothers would be willing to work if they could better choose working hours, and more than 
half  of  the  inactive  mothers  would  prefer  to  work  part-time154.  That  being  said,  while  such 
measures can be useful in allowing some women to remain in the labour market after having 
children, large gender differences in their take-up can result in wider gender gaps in terms of 
earnings  and  career  progression  opportunities,  as  well  as  pension  entitlements  later  on,  in 
particular for part-time work155. 

145 For instance AT, BG, CZ, DE, EL, ES, FI, HR, IE, LT, LV, LU, NL, PL, PT, SI, SK and UK 
146 For instance  DK, FR, HU, RO and SE 
147 For instance  AT and SE 
148 BE (leave for urgent reasons), CY, DE (caring leave), EL, ES, FI, FR, HU, IE148, IT, LT, NL, PT, UK 
149 90%: DE (short-term caring leave); 100%: AT, DK (leave to look after disabled relative), ES (short term care 
leave), IT, LI, LU, NL (emergency leave), SE149 
150 See supporting study 
151 Plantenga, J. and Remery, C. (2009) Flexible working time arrangements and gender equality 
152 Over-qualification among university graduates is higher for women than for men in countries such as Spain, 
UK, Italy, Belgium, France Germany and The Netherlands; Conde-Ruiz and Marra de Artíñano (2016) 
153 Eurofound (2017) Working anytime, anywhere: The effects on the world of work 
154  Eurofound (2014) Quality of life in Europe: Families in the economic crisis 
155 This was shown to be particularly the case for UK, NL,AT and LU in the report: EU Expert Group on Gender 
and Employment (2013) Flexible working time arrangements and gender equality 

38 

 
 
 
                                                      
Flexible  working  arrangements  are  commonly  regulated  at  company  or  sectoral  level,  often 
through  collective  agreements,  and  tend  to  be  prevalent  when  there  is  an  underlying 
consensus  amongst  the  social  partners  or  employers  that  flexibility  is  valuable  and  a 
workplace culture exists that is supportive of flexible working156.  

Some  regulation  on  these  arrangements  also  exists  at  EU  and  national  level.  The  Parental 
Leave Directive provides that parents can request changes to their working hours or patterns 
for  a  set  period  of  time  and  their  request  needs  to  be  duly  considered  by  the  employer. 
However, this right is limited in time as they can only request that flexibility upon return from 
parental  leave.  Some  Member  States  have  gone  further,  extending  such  rights  to  all  parents 
and carers or even all workers.  Those Member States, such as Sweden, the Netherlands and 
Austria,  who  have  taken  measures  to  broadly  enhance  access  to  such  arrangements  tend  to 
experience higher female employment. However, women tend to be the main users of flexible 
working arrangements and in particular part-time work. As mentionned above, in average in 
the  EU,  31.9%  of  women  work  part-time  compared  to  8.3%  of  men.    This  leads  to  large 
differences in earnings and pension entitlements between women and men157.  

Difficulties in accessing formal childcare services can also lead many women to reduce 
their working hours or drop out of the labour market158. These difficulties are particularly 
acute for young families and single parents159. The availability is however a problem, as  the 
demand  for  these  services  outstrips  the  supply  of  childcare  places  in  nearly  all  Member 
States160. Moreover, often a large gap exists between the end of maternity/parental leave and 
the moment when a childcare place becomes available for parents, compelling parents to find 
informal  solutions  where  possible  in  order  to  be  able  to  both  return  in  employment. 
Affordability can also be a major barriers to the use of these services;  53% of mothers who 
declare  that  they  do  not  work  or  that  they  work  part-time  for  reasons  linked  to  formal 
childcare services consider the costs to be an obstacle, and this figure is higher than 70% in 
some Member States161.  

The  accessibility  of  these  services  in  terms  of  physical  distance,  perceived  low  quality  of 
these services, and the lack of opening hours that are compatible with parental employment 
can also present obstacles to female employment. For school-age children, school hours and 
holidays  are  often  incompatible  with  parents’  full-time  employment:  a  lack  of  provision  for 
out-of-school hours162 may also lead to women working fewer hours.  Poor quality of services 
is also a barrier that needs to be adressed urgently with almost one third of parents not using 
childcare  services  due  to  their  unacceptably  low  quality.  Expansion  of  places,  improving 

156  OECD  (2016)  Policy  Brief  on  Flexible  Working  Arrangements  in  OECD  Family  Database;  Eurofound 

(2016) The Gender Employment Gap: Challenges and Solutions 

157 See Eurostat, EU-SILC 
158 See, for instance, OECD (2012) Closing the Gender Gap 
159 See for instance, European Commission (2014) Single parents and employment 
160 Eurydice (2014) Early childhood education and care 
161  European  Commission  (2016)  The  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of  social  protection  systems  over  the  life 

course, chapter 3.2. in Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2015 

162 These services provide a range of activities to children in pre-schools and primary schools before, between 

(lunch) and after school hours, as well as during school holidays. 

39 

 
 
 
                                                      
quality and providing information  on the benefits  of early childhood education and care are 
also needed to  bridge the childcare services to all  families, including  vulnerable families163.  
The  EU  set  targets  in  2002  to  improve  the  provision  of  formal  childcare  arrangements  by 
2010164 and reaffirmed in the European Pact for Gender Equality spanning until 2020, given 
that a majority of Member States have still not achieved them165.  

A lack of formal long-term care arrangements can also lead many people with dependent 
relatives, most often women, to take on the role of informal carers166, and lead them to take 
long leaves of absence from the labour market or dropping out completely. At national level, 
formal  long-term  care  services  are  very  under-developed  in  many  Member  States,  to  the 
detriment of women’s employment167.  

Some Member  States offer extensive medical and social services to  older people in need  of 
long-term care and devote a significant share of GDP to this, while other Member States rely 
heavily  on  the  informal  provision  by  families  and  have  little  public  spending168.  In  general, 
few  Member  States  (Denmark,  Finland,  the  Netherlands  and  Sweden)  have  extensive  long-
term care systems based on public provision. Some Member States like Italy and Austria rely 
largely  on  cash  benefits  which  older  people  can  use  to  organise  or  purchase  long-term  care 
services including informal care from family members. EU-level action in this area has been 
mainly  to  promote  exchange  and  mutual  learning  on  the  issue  through  the  social  Open 
Method  of  Coordination.  As  the  share  of  dependent  individuals  is  expected  to  increase 
significantly  in  the  coming  years169  work-life  balance  challenges  for  people  with  dependent 
relatives  can  be  expected  to  further  increase  and  could  be  expected  to  further  negatively 
impact female employment unless formal care services are further developed.  

3.2.3 Reinforcing driver: economic disincentives for women to work 

Finally,  economic  disincentives,  which  discourage  second-earners,  often  women,  from 
entering  the  labour  market,  working  more  hours  or  remaining  in  the  labour  market,  can 
reinforce the unequal distribution of work and caring responsibilities by putting on women the 
bulk of the burden of caring responsibilities. 

163 Eurofund, 2015 Early childhood Care : Accessibility and quality of services 
164 In 2002, at the Barcelona Summit, the European Council set the targets of providing childcare to at least 33% 

of children aged 0-3 and 90% of children between 3 years old and the mandatory school age by 2010. 

165 FI, SI, ES, FR, NL, PT, LU, BE, SE, DK have reached the Barcelona target for the youngest children while 
SI,  IT,  ES,  EE,  SE,  DK,  FR,  BE,  MT  reached  it  for  the  oldest  children  (irrespective  of  the  hours  of 
attendance) . 

166  The  incidence  of  providing  informal  care  to  elderly  relatives  is  highest  among  the  50  to  64-year-olds. 

Working women are up to 1.6 times more likely to be informal carers than working men. 

167  European  Social  Policy  Network  (2016)  Work-life  balance  measures  for  persons  of  working  age  with 

dependent relatives 

168  European  Commission  and  Social  Protection  Committee  (2014)  Adequate  social  protection  for  long-term 
care needs in an ageing society 
169 Projection is based on the Ageing Working Group (AWG) reference scenario as it is used in the multilateral 
budgetary surveillance at EU level. A peak in the provision of caring time is generally observed in the age group 
45-64 and in 2060 one potential carer (i.e. a person aged 45-64) is expected for 5.1 persons of 80 years old or 
more. 

40 

 
 
 
                                                      
Some Member States have tax-benefit systems - through joint taxation systems, transferable 
tax credits or deductions for single earner households - that create high marginal effective tax 
rates on the second earner in a household, the woman in the majority of couples170, thereby 
discouraging  them  from  entering  employment  or  increasing  working  hours171.  Large  fiscal 
disincentives  exist  for  second  earners  to  increase  their  work  intensity  in  seven  Member 
States172,  while  a  much  larger  number  of  Member  States  appear  to  have  some  form  of  tax-
benefit disincentive when factoring in allowances and childcare costs.173 

Figure 7: Inactivity trap for second earners (2014) 

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

K
S

L
E

T
M

L
N

K
U

G
B

E
S

I
F

E
E

S
E

T
L

E
I

T
I

T
A

Z
C

O
R

R
F

U
L

L
P

T
P

V
L

U
H

R
H

E
D

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D

Source : OECD, European Commission calculations 

Note :  Inactivity  trap  for  second  earner  in  two-earner  couple  with  two  children,  principal 
earner with 100% of average wage, second earner with 67 % 

The gender pay gap, by favouring  that women rather men take unpaid family leave, also has 
a negative influence on women’s employment outcomes by disincentivising women to enter 
or remain in the labour market or increase working hours174. That being said, the pay  gap is 
also  to  some  degree  a  consequence  of  gender  discrimination  as  well  as  women’s  greater 

170 Data at the household level show that men' salaries on average account for two thirds of the income in the 
couple. The man earns more than the woman or is the sole earner in the majority of couples in all Member 
States (and in more than 60% of the couples in 26 Member States). These calculations are based on Eurostat 
data (EU-SILC). 

171  Plantenga (2015) Searching for welfare, work and gender equality 
172  ES, SI, DE, LU, NL, MT, PT  
173  European Commission (2015) Secondary earners and fiscal policies in Europe  
174  International  Monetary  Fund  (2016)  Individual  Choice  or  Policies?  Drivers  of  Female  Employment  in 
Europe. Working Paper. 

41 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
interruptions  in  their  careers  and  lower  career  progression  due  to  care.  This  is  explained 
further in Section 3.3. below. 

In  addition  to  re-inforcing  the  unequal  distribution  of  care  responsibilities  between  women 
and men, economic disincentives tend to be more acute for those with care responsibilities, as 
such disincentives can interact with other work-life balance policies. For instance, high out-
of-pocket costs for childcare and long-term care services coupled with high marginal effective 
tax  rates  for  a  second  earner  in  a  household  can  magnify  the  financial  disincentives  for 
women  to  enter  work  or  increase  their  working  hours175.  Moreover,  as  men  earn  more  than 
women in the majority of couples, the financial incentives for the man to take leave when it is 
not  well-remunerated,  or  to  reduce  their  working  hours  with  a  proportional  reduction  of 
income is limited. It often makes more financial sense for the woman in a couple to make use 
of these arrangements because the reduction in household income will be less than if the man 
would  do  so.  Such  economic  incentives  reinforce  a  gendered  division  of  work  and  care. 
Moreover,  the  provision  of  cash-for-care  arrangements  –whereby  parents  may  stay  at  home 
and receive an allowance in order to care for their child directly, rather than use formal care 
services – can create economic disincentives for many women to re-enter employment after 
having children, especially when out-of-pocket childcare costs are high176. 

3.3 Consequences 

Women's  lower  participation  in  employment,  higher  concentration  in  part-time  work  and  in 
jobs  below  their  skill  level,  and  greater  gaps  than  men  in  their  careers,  largely  due  to  an 
unequal  sharing  of  caring  responsibilities  between  women  and  men,  have  negative 
consequences at the individual, firm, and societal levels. 

3.3.1 Individual level 

For  women  themselves,  these  problems  reduce  their  career  opportunities  and  their 
economic independence. When women return to the labour market after having children, their 
longer leaves of absence due to care relative to men can lead to wage penalties, reduced career 
progression  opportunities177  and  women  dropping  out  of  the  labour  market  altogether.  In 
addition  these  problems  lead  to  women  self-selecting  into  occupations  where  they  will  be 
better  able  to  balance  work  and  family  life,  which  are  typically  lower-paid  occupations. 
Women's  greater  career  interruptions,  concentration  in  lower-paid  work  and  lower 
career  progression  also  exacerbate  the  gender  pay  gap178  (which  stands  at  16.7%  on 
average  in  the  EU179).  In  turn,  the  gender  pay  gap  reinforces  the  problem  drivers,  as  it 

175  European Commission (2015) Secondary earners and fiscal policies in Europe 
176  
177  Mandel and Shalev (2009) How Welfare States Shape the Gender Pay Gap: A Theoretical and Comparative 

European Commission (2015) Secondary earners and fiscal policies in Europe 

Analysis   

178  Costa  Dias,  Elming  and  Joyce  (2016)  The  gender  wage  gap,  Joseph  Rowntree  Foundation. 
http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/8428 
179 The unadjusted Gender Pay Gap (GPG) represents the difference between average gross hourly earnings of 
male  paid  employees  and of female  paid  employees  as  a  percentage of  average  gross  hourly earnings of  male 
paid employees. 

42 

 
 
 
                                                      
constrains the individual choice to take parental leave: economically speaking, it often makes 
more sense for fathers to continue working, especially if parental leave is unpaid or is paid at 
much lower rates than previous earnings. If it is women who take parental leave, the impact 
on  the  household  budget  is  often  more  moderate.  This  is  compounded  by  the  fact  that  the 
period around childbirth is often a time of considerable stress on household budgets.  

Women’s underrepresentation in the labour market also results in their higher risk of poverty 
and social exclusion, especially in old age. Their reduced earnings, higher concentration in 
part-time work and gaps in careers lead to lower social security contributions, translating into 
reduced  or  non-existent  pension  entitlements.  On  average,  women’s  pensions  are  40%  less 
than those of men (gender pension gap180). Evidence in the UK shows that over a career of 
52 years, female employees earn £298,064 less than male employees181. In average in the EU 
women without children earn 36% more than women with children182. Women in old age are 
consequently at a much higher risk of poverty and social exclusion (20.2% of women 65+) as 
compared  to  men  (14.6%).  Women’s  underrepresentation  in  the  labour  market  also  has 
negative  consequences  on  their  children.  Children  living  in  jobless  and  single-earner 
households are at a much higher risk of poverty (on average up to 5 times) than in dual-earner 
households183. 

Beyond women’s economic independence, there are also negative consequences on women 
and their families. Without adequate policies to help women to remain and progress in the 
labour market after having children, some women or families choose not to have children or 
have  fewer  children  than  desired184.  A  lack  of  arrangements  to  help  women  reconcile  work 
and  care  commitments  for  children  and  other  dependent  relatives  has  also  been  shown  to 
place substantial stress on women and their families185 and can also have adverse impacts in 
terms  of  physical  and  psychological  health186.  The  prevalence  of  mental  health  problems 
among  carers  is  20%  higher  than  among  non-carers187.  Moreover,  evidence  shows  that 
women's  greater  number  of  hours  of  unpaid  care  and  household  work  contribute  to  women 
experiencing substantially greater stress than men. Of that work, the hours spent on caring for 
elderly relatives are among the most stressful188. Finally, the lack of affordable and accessible 
quality early education and care places have strong negative consequences on children's skills 

180  European Commission and Social Protection Committee (2015) Pension Adequacy report: current and future 

income adequacy in old-age in the EU 

181 The Guardian, Gender Pay Gap: women earn £300 000  less than men  over working life, 07.08.2016 
182 Commission calculations based on 2014 EU-SILC microdata. The figure is based on the difference in gross 
employee cash or near cash income for all women aged 25-49. It reflects differences in (1) employment rate; (2) 
work-intensity (part-time vs. full-time) and (3) hourly wages. 
183  Findings based on OECD Income Distribution Database (2016) 
184  See for instance, Del Boca D., Aaberge R., Colombino U., Ermisch J., Francesconi M., Pasqua S., Strøm S. 
(2005) Labour Market Participation of Women and Fertility: the Effect of Social Policies ; Conde-Ruiz and 
Marra de Artíñano (2016) Gender Gaps in the Spanish Labour Market 

185  See for instance, Harper and Leicht (2007) Exploring Social Change: America and the World 
186  OECD (2007) Babies and bosses: Reconciling work and family life 
187  Colombo et al. (2011); Lilly et al. (2007), after: Social Protection Committee and the European Commission 

(2014) Adequate social protection for long-term care needs in an ageing society 

188  MacDonald,  Phipps  and  Lethbridge  (2005)  Taking  Its  Toll:  The  Influence  of  Paid  and  Unpaid  Work  on 

Women's Well-Being 

43 

 
 
 
                                                      
and  competencies  levels.  International  data189  (PISA)  shows  that  students  who  have  not 
attended  pre-primary  education  have  3  times  higher  changes  of  being  low  performers  than 
those who have for more than 1 year.  

There  are  also  negative  consequences  for  men.    Many  men  wish  to  take  on  more  caring 
responsibilities,  particularly  for  their  children.  However  the  design  of  work-life  balance 
policies  in  many  Member  States  still  discourages  many  men  to  take  leave  and  instead 
encourages women. Men, in turn, tend to increase their working hours after having children. 
Overall  men  are  more  likely  to  work  very  long  hours  than  women,  even  though  this  is  not 
necessarily desirable for them190. In some cases men have been shown to report even higher 
levels  of  work-life  balance  conflicts  than  women191.  Inadequate  work-life  balance  solutions 
for  men  also  affects  their  children.  Evidence  also  shows  that  fathers  taking  parental  leave 
establish stronger bonds with their children that have lasting effects throughout the childrens' 
lives, and also have positive effects on childrens’ cognitive development192.  

3.3.2 Business level 

Women’s under-representation in the labour market has negative consequences on business. 
Especially as women tend to be higher educated than men, having more skills, diplomas and 
qualifications193,  their  drop-out  of  the  labour  force  reduces  the  available  talent  pool,  which 
can make it difficult for employers to find the skills that they need194. This also exacerbates 
existing  skill  shortages  for  many  occupations195.    Failure  to  re-design  work-life  balance 
policies  in  an  adequate  way  does  not  only  make  European  companies  less  attractive  for 
female and male talents, it also leads to women, especially higher-educated women, choosing 
to delay or forego motherhood, which will further reduce the skills base available to business 
in the long term.  

It  may  also  lead  to  a  difficulty  retaining  workers  who  make  a  positive  contribution  to  a 
company,  leading  to  costly  staff  turnover196  and  reduced  productivity,  as  the  replacing 
employee  might  require training and  building  in  experience before  being  as  effective  as  the 
replaced one. Failure to retain knowledgable and trained workers undermines firms' specific 

189 OECD, (2016)Low-performing students: why they fall behind and how to help them succeed 
190  Overall, the percentage of male employees working very long hours (above 50 hours per week) across OECD 

countries is 17%, compared with 7% for women. 

191  See for instance U.S. Department of Labor (2015); The cost of doing nothing. The price we pay without paid 
leave  policies  to  Support  America’s  21st  Century  Working  Families;    Eurofound  2016  Sixth  European 
Working  Conditions  Survey  :  Men  are  more  likely  to  say  that  their  working  hours  do  not  fit  with  their  private 
commitments than women: 20% of men declare this compared to 16% of women. 

192  OECD  (2013)  Fathers’  Leave,  Fathers’  involvement  and  Child  Development:  Are  they  Related?  Evidence 

from four OECD Countries  

193 See for instance European Commission  (2016) Education and Training Monitor 
194  IMF (2013) Women, Work, and the Economy: Macroeconomic Gains from Gender Equity  
195 Such as for doctors, nurses, midwives and teachers, see Cedefop (2016) 
196  Australian Workplace Gender Equality Agency (2013) The business case for gender equality 

44 

 
 
 
 
                                                      
human  capital  and  can  be  a  serious  burden  as  staff  turnover  typically  has  high  costs  for 
employers197.  

Productivity  can  also  be  compromised  due  to  increased  workers’  stress  and/or  lack  of 
motivation due to lack of adequate solutions in place to balance work and care.  This stress is 
mainly  related  to  worries  about  child  and  back-up  care  arrangements  and  frequently  occurs 
when  workers  are  confronted  to  high  demands  combined  with  low  control198.  Greater 
satisfaction at work is also linked with fewer absence days from work. Both impacts have a 
positive effect on productivity and ultimately economic competitiveness. In 2010, an average 
of 6.2 working days were lost per worker due to sickness in the EU28. This figure was lowest 
in Greece (2), Ireland and Romania (3), and highest in Croatia, Finland, Poland and Slovenia 
(9). 

the 

Finally,  women’s  underrepresentation 
their 
in 
underrepresentation in decision-making positions. This in turn has costs for businesses, as 
it  can  lead  to  sub-optimal  decision-making  with  negative  economic  consequences,199  where 
decision-makers are not those with the highest potential to do the job and where the pool of 
available  candidates  has  been  reduced.  Evidence  suggests  that  companies  with  female 
managers/board members could benefit from a higher diversity in perspectives, and could also 
be better-positioned to serve female-dominated consumer markets200. 

labour  market 

leads 

to 

3.3.3 Societal level 

Women’s lower labour market participation also has significant economic consequences for 
the  society  as  a  whole.  Women’s  underrepresentation  in  the  workforce  represents  a  sub-
optimal  allocation  of  skills  and  competences  acquired  by  women,  leading  to  an  insufficient 
return on education, which is often publicly subsidised, and thus a waste of public resources.  

It  also  translates  into  increased  pressure  on  public  finances  due  to  lower  available  labour 
supply,  reduced  tax-revenue,  and  increased  social  transfers  in  order  to  address  female  and 
child poverty. Teignier and Cuberes (2014) have sought to estimate the effects of the gender 
employment  gap  in  terms  of  aggregate  productivity  and  income  per  capita,  finding  that  in 
Europe, the average income loss represents around 10%201. Eurofound has calculated that the 
total  cost  of  women’s  lower  employment  in  terms  of  foregone  earnings  and  tax  revenue  as 
well  as  spending  on  social  transfers.  The  costs  of  these  inequalities  between  women  and 
men in employment amounted to an estimated €370 billion euros in 2013, equivalent to 
2.8%  of  EU-GDP202.  The  lifetime  cost  of  a  woman’s  exclusion  from  employment  is 

197 There are significant business costs to employee turnover, Boushey and Glynn, November 2012. 
198  OECD (2007) Babies and bosses: Reconciling work and family life 
199  See  Impact  Assessment  On  Costs  And  Benefits  Of  Improving  The  Gender  Balance  In  The  Boards  Of 
Companies Listed On Stock Exchanges, SWD(2012) 348 final, p. 44.  
200  IMF (2013) Women, Work, and the Economy: Macroeconomic Gains from Gender Equity  
201  Cuberes and Teignier-Baqué (2014) Aggregate Costs of Gender Gaps in the Labor Market: A Quantitative 

Estimate, available at: http://www.marcteignier.com/research_files/GGLMAP_CT.pdf 

202  Eurofound (2016) The Gender Employment Gap: Challenges and Solutions 

45 

 
 
 
 
                                                      
estimated between €1.2 million and €2 million depending on her educational level, with the 
cost being higher for women with higher educational attainment.  

Reduced productivity at business-level also translates into reduced competitiveness, reduced 
productivity  for  the  overall  economy,  as  well  as  reduced  growth.  Moreover,  lower  fertility, 
exacerbates the demographic challenge of increased ageing and puts even further pressure 
on the sustainability of public finances203. Between 2013 and 2060, the share of the elderly to 
the working-age population is expected to increase substantially, from having four working-
age people for every person aged over 65 years to only two working-age persons.204. One of 
the main drivers behind lower fertility rates is the choice of women to delay or forsake having 
children altogether because of difficulties reconciling work and care205. 

203  OECD (2013) Closing the Gender Gap 
204 European Commission (2015) Ageing Report  
205 See for instance, Del Boca D., Aaberge R., Colombino U., Ermisch J., Francesconi M., Pasqua S., Strøm S. 
(2005)  ‘Labour  Market  Participation of Women  and Fertility:  the  Effect of  Social  Policies’  ;  Oláh  and Fahlén 
(2013) Childbearing, Women’s Employment and Work-life Balance Policies in Contemporary Europe 

46 

 
 
 
                                                      
3.4 Summary Tree 

Unequal distribution of caring responsibilities between women and men 

Ill-designed work-life balance policies 

Root causes: 

 Insufficient and gender unbalanced design of leaves 

and FWA 

 Insufficient take-up by men of leaves and FWA 
 Limited availability of flexible working arrangements 
 Lack of affordable quality of formal care 

Gender stereotypes 
and discrimination 

Reinforcing driver: 

Economic 
disincentives for 
women to work 

Women’s underrepresentation in the labour market 

 Women are more likely than men to interrupt their careers or drop out of the labour market 
 Overrepresentation of women in low-intensity (part-time) jobs 
Concentration of women in less-paid and lower-skilled jobs 

Lower representation of women in management positions  


opportunities, 

Individual level 
Women’s lower earnings, reduced career 
progression 
lower 
pensions,  and  higher  risk  of  poverty 
(women and their families) 
Men  are  discouraged  in  taking  caring 
responsibilities even if they wish to do so 
Children's 
development 
personal 
affected 
Dependent 
affected 

well-being 

relatives' 

Business level 

Societal Level 

47 

Difficulty to find skills 
needed, reduced retention of 
workers, reduced 
productivity 

Waste/sub-optimal 
allocation of human 
resources, increased 
pressure on public finances, 
reduced productivity, 
competitiveness and overall 

S
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4.  BASELINE SCENARIO 

Member States have planned policy measures which will affect the baseline situation in 
the coming years206..  

Positive  examples  of  recent  reforms  include  the  introduction  of  paid  parental  leave  for 
fathers  in  the  United  Kingdom,  a  small  increase  in  paternity  leave  for  Italy,  increased 
flexibility for taking parental leave in Germany and the extension of childcare services in 
Malta.  An  overview  of  the  forthcoming  provisions  can  be  found  in  Annex  1  of  the 
supporting study. 

However,  in  the  context  of  the  recent  economic  and  financial  crisis  some  structural 
reforms have even gone in the opposite direction, making for instance households with 
children  one  of  the  groups  the  most  affected  by  the  crisis207.  There  is  evidence  of 
decreasing  replacement  rates/payment  levels  for  leave  in  several  countries.  For  instance, 
fiscal consolidation measures have affected paternity leave schemes in Estonia, Spain and 
the Czech Republic208. While public or publicly subsidised provision of childcare services 
has  undergone  less  drastic  cuts  than  monetary  allowances,  some  Member  States  such  as 
Estonia and the Netherlands still experienced social expenditure retrenchments. The crisis 
has  also  led  to  an  increase  of  dismissals  related  to  taking  maternity/parental  leave  in  a 
number of Member States. In Greece, the number of disputes on gender equality at work in 
which the Labour Inspectorate was called to intervene increased from 11 in 2007 to 79 in 
2010.  The  primary  reason  for  intervention  is  illegal  dismissals  of  pregnant  and  breast-
feeding women. In Italy, in 2008-2009, 8.7% of women aged 15 to 64 declared that they 
had  been  dismissed  or  forced  into  a  position  where  they  resigned  because  of  pregnancy 
during their working life course209. 

This  section  focusses  on  projections  regarding  trends  in  measurable  indicators  such  as 
future female labour force participation, employment and GDP trends to assess how these 
would evolve  in  the absence of actions at EU level (but taking into account forthcoming 
developments in the baseline). It has not been possible to project some relevant indicators 
such as likely trends in the gender pay gap due to the absence of relevant data.  

Projections on employment  

Projections  for  the  analysed  countries  indicate  a  likely  further  decline  in  employment 
(following on from the job losses during the economic crisis) until 2055 with a further loss 
of  215,000  jobs  on  average  in  the  EU  (with  losses  in  some  Member  States  and  gains  in 

206  ICF  (2016)  Study  on  the  costs  and  benefits  of  possible  EU  measures  to  facilitate  work-life  balance  for 
parents and care givers 
207  Frazer  H.,  Marlier  E.,  (2011),  Social  Impact  of  the  Crisis  and  Developments  in  the  Light  of  Fiscal 
Consolidation, EU Network of Independent Experts on Social Inclusion  
208 In Spain, the extension of paternity leave from 2 to 4 weeks was delayed to January 2017 
209  Bettio,    Corsi,    D’Ippoliti,    Lyberaki,  Lodovici  and  Verashchagina  (2012)  The  impact  of  the  Economic 
Crisis on the Situation of Women and Men and on Gender Equality Policies 

48 

 
 
 
                                                      
others)210. The employment loss is projected to be more marked in Poland and Romania, 
with  a  loss  of  approximately  4  million  and  2  million  jobs  respectively.  Germany  is  also 
projected to loose over 9.5 million jobs, remaining however one of the countries with the 
highest number of employed, with over 32 million people in employment in 2055. On the 
other hand, France and the UK are expected to gain the greatest number of jobs.  

Projections on gender gap in employment rates 

Available data and relevant projections from the supporting study show overall that, while 
some  ongoing  improvements  in  female  labour  market  participation  can  be  expected  to 
continue  even  without  further  EU  action,  this  will  happen  at  a  slow  and  uneven  pace. 
While  in  2055,  the  gender  gap  in  activity  rates  is  projected  to  narrow  in  the  majority  of 
European  countries,  significant  differences  in  male  and  female  activity  and  employment 
rates will remain in most countries.  The remaining average gender gap in activity rates in 
the  EU  will  be  around  9  pp.,  with  gaps  at  or  above  10  pp.  in  13  Member  States.211  In 
Greece, the gap is projected to grow and remain at over 15 pp., in Italy it will remain close 
to  20  pp.  and  in  Malta  it  will  exceed  25  pp.    Fertility  rates  are  also  projected  to  remain 
insufficient  to  reach  replacement  rates,  thus  further  increasing  dependency  ratios.  Other 
key gender gaps, such as in the sharing of unpaid time are also likely to remain generally 
unchanged, impacting female labour market participation in future.   

Projections on absence from work  

Absence rates are relevant as insufficient work-life balance measures have been shown to 
impact  on  (particularly  women’s)  absence  rates  from  work  (see  also  section  3  above). 
There  are  two  reasons  for  this.  One  is  that  inadequate  work-life  balance  measures  mean 
that carers (who, in current patterns or caring are mostly women) are forced to be absent 
from work when caring requirements arise and the second is linked to satisfaction at work 
–  an  indicator  which  is  also  linked  to  a  sense  of  being  able  to  achieve  a  good  balance 
between  work  and  family  life.  The  estimated  monetary  value  of  absence  from  work  has 
been calculated by multiplying the average daily labour cost in each country by the number 
of people employed and the number days absent from work. In total, in the absence of new 
policy measures, the cost of absence from work is estimated to be €267 billion in 2015, and 
€665 billion in 2055.  

Projections for GDP growth  

GDP projections until 2055 were estimated using the E3ME model212. According to these 
projections, the average GDP growth rate over the years 2015-2055 in EU28 is 1.6%. As 
will  be  shown  in  section  8  below,  such  growth  rates  could  be  significantly  enhanced 

210 Employment projections until 2055 were estimated through the E3ME model which is based on Eurostat 
and Ageing Report data.  
211 AT, CY, CZ, EL, HU, IE, IT, MT, NL, PL, RO, SK and UK 
212 More information on the E3ME model can be found in Annex 4 

49 

 
 
 
                                                      
through the implementation of work-life balance measures encouraging the higher labour 
market participation of women.  

Overall, considering the developments of socio-economic indicators, the ‘no change in 
policy’ scenario for EU-level action is unlikely to be sufficient to address the problems 
identified above. Furthermore, taking into account the recent developments due to the 
economic crisis in a number of Member States, it seems that there is a risk that without EU 
level action divergence between the Member States will increase. Moreover, the persisting 
gender gap in employment is also expected to constrain economic growth. This has been 
recognized by many international organisations, such as the OECD, the International 
Monetary Fund, the ILO and the World Bank.213 The OECD has shown that increasing 
women’s labour market participation would drive productivity, reduce the economic drag 
of adverse demographics and substantially improve the skill mix of the global economy214. 
They estimate that halving gender gap in labour market participation would lead to an 
additional gain in GDP of 6% by 2030, and a 12% gain if complete convergence is 
achieved215.  

5.  POLICY OBJECTIVES 

5.1. General and specific objectives 

As outlined in its Roadmap216, the general policy objective of this initiative is to  address 
women's  underrepresentation  in  the  labour  market  and  to  promote  equality  between  men 
and  women  with  regard  to  labour  market  opportunities  by  modernising  current  EU  legal 
and  policy  framework  and  adapting  it to  today’s  labour  market  to  allow  for  parents  with 
children  or  workers  with  dependent  relatives  to  better  balance  caring  and  professional 
responsibilities217. 

While women’s underrepresentation in the labour market is a product of several drivers, as 
demonstrated in the problem definition above, this initiative will focus on addressing some 
of the key policy factors that can mitigate or reinforce gender divisions in work and care:  

213  OECD  (2014)  Promoting  inclusive  labour  markets  in  G20  countries:  potential  returns  and  obstacles, 
background report prepared by the OECD for the G20 Task Force on Employment, in collaboration with 
the  ILO  and  the  World  Bank  Group;  IMF  (2013)  Women,  Work,  and  the  Economy:  Macroeconomic 
Gains from Gender Equity 

214 See OECD (2012) Closing the Gender Gap 
215  OECD  (2012)  Effects  of  Reducing  Gender  Gaps  in  Education  and  Labour  Force  Participation  on 

Economic Growth in the OECD 

216 European Commission (2015), Roadmap: A new start to address the challenges of work-life balance faced 
by working families 
217 Article 153(1) (i) TFEU: " equality between men and women with regard to labour market opportunities 
and treatment at work. 

50 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
leaves  and  flexible  working  arrangements.  It  should  be  noted  that  these  policies  also 
receive  heightened  focus  over  other  relevant  areas  that  influence  women’s  employment 
(e.g., tax-benefit disincentives) given the existing EU legal framework in this field.218. 

It  should  also  be  noted  that  other  policy  areas  present  in  the  problem  definition  are  not 
covered  in  this  impact  assessment.  With  regards  to  the  provision  of  formal  care  services 
mentioned within root cause 2 'ill-designed work-life balance policies' and the supporting 
driver  'economic  disincentives',  this  is  due  to  the  limited  EU  competence  in  these  areas. 
Considering their significant impact on the addressed problem, the initiative could foresee 
measures  to  enhance  current  efforts  in  these  areas,  in  particular  in  relation  to  the 
monitoring of Member States' policies in the EU Semester and to the use of EU funding in 
the case of formal care services. However, the limited EU competence does not allow the 
EU  to  go  beyond  strengthening  existing  non-legislative  measures.  In  the  absence  of  a 
substantial  choice  of  options,  extending  the  Impact  Assessment  coverage  to  those  areas 
would  have  therefore  been  disproportionate.  Finally,  the  options  presented  below  are 
expected to indirectly mitigate some of the other drivers mentioned above such as gender 
stereotypes and the gender pay gap. 

The specific objectives of this initiative are therefore defined as follows: 

 

 

to  improve  access  to  work-life  balance  arrangements  –  such  as  leaves  and 
flexible working arrangements 
to increase take-up of family-related leaves and flexible working arrangements 
by men 

Such objectives alone would complement and reinforce other activities taking place at EU-
level to support women's labour market participation (see Coherence section below). The 
specific  objectives  seek  to  respond  to  the  drivers  set  out  in  the  problem  definition  in  the 
following way: 

The availability of leaves and flexible working arrangements have been shown to strongly 
mitigate  the  effect  of  caring  responsibilities  on  women’s  employment  outcomes.  By 
providing  parents  and  carers  with  tools  for  greater  choice  in  how  to  organise  work  and 
caring  responsibilities  these  measures  avoid  that  they  drop  out  of  the  labour  market 
altogether.  

Moreover,  the  use  of  work-life  balance  policies  by  men  (i.e.  leaves,  flexible  working 
arrangements) can help in rebalancing the distribution of care within the household, which 
usually  falls  principally  on  women219.  However,  opportunities  and  incentives  for  men  to 
make  use  of  work-life  balance  arrangements  are  generally  scarce,  and  their  take-up  is 

218  See  the  European    Commission's  2015  Press  Release:  Delivering  for  Parents;  Commission  withdraws 
stalled maternity leave proposal and paves the way for a fresh approach 
219 OECD (2013) Closing the Gender Gap 

51 

 
 
 
                                                      
accordingly  low  in  most  Member  States.  Improving  the  gender-balanced  design  of  these 
arrangements can help address this. 

Through its general and specific objectives, this initiative also seeks to remedy the negative 
consequences  of  women’s  underrepresentation  in  the  labour  market  on  individuals, 
businesses and on the wider society. It will seek to contribute to women’s higher earnings 
and  career  progression,  tackling  the  gender  pay  gap,  pension  gap  and  earnings  gap,  and 
enhance well-being for women, men and their children and dependants. It will equally seek 
to improve businesses’ ability to attract and retain workers, reduce skill mismatches, and 
improve  productivity.  Finally,  this  initiative  will  seek  to  increase  labour  supply,  ensure 
greater  sustainability  of  public  finances,  improve  competitiveness  and  foster  overall 
economic growth. 

Finally,  it  should  be  clarified  that  the  scope  of  this  initiative  is  limited  to  workers  with 
children  or  dependent  relatives,  and  thus  the  special  situation  of  the  self-employed  in 
balancing work and family life is not considered. That being said, another initiative in the 
Commission's 2017 Work Programme seeks to address the imbalance in social protection 
rights  between  different  categories  of  people  in  employment,  which  is  to  be  delivered  in 
the context of the Pillar of Social Rights220. 

5.2. Coherence with other EU policies 

An initiative on to enhance work-life balance and female employment would contribute to 
the Treaty-based objectives in the area of equality, employment and social cohesion, and 
would  be  fully  in  line  with  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the  EU  according  to 
which  equality  between  men  and  women  must  be  ensured  in  all  areas,  including 
employment, work and pay. 

Such an initiative is coherent with the Commission’s political priorities. The first priority 
for  the  Juncker  Commission,  as  stated  by  the  President  in  his  Political  Guidelines  at  the 
beginning of the mandate, is to strengthen Europe’s competitiveness and give a new boost 
to jobs, growth and investment. By addressing women's underrepresentation in the labour 
market, this initiative aims at promoting higher employment, productivity, competitiveness 
and  overall  economic  growth.  Evidence  shows  that  higher  participation  of  women  in  the 
labour  market  would  increase  GDP  per  capita.  For  instance,  halving  the  gender  gap  in 
labour force participation in the OECD would lead to an additional gain of 6% of EU GDP 
by 2030221. It will also contribute to the President’s commitment for greater social progress 
and for Europe to be dedicated to being triple-A on social issues, as much as it is to being 
triple-A in the financial and economic sense. 

This initiative would also be fully consistent with other EU-level initiatives including the  
forthcoming European Pillar of Social Rights initiative of which it is part, which seeks to 

220 See Annex 1 of the Commission's 2017 Work Programme, point 11 (COM(2016) 710 final) 
221 OECD (2013) Closing the Gender Gap 

52 

 
 
 
                                                      
strengthen  the  social  dimension  of  Union  and  enhance  Member  States’  upward 
convergence  in  social  performance.  It  would  also  help  to  deliver  on  the  Europe  2020 
strategy,  notably  the  targets  to  increase  employment  and  reduce  poverty  and  social 
exclusion. 

The  European  Semester  process  has  already  given  prominence  to  the  issue  of  work-life 
balance  and  female  employment.  Most  recently,  the  2017  Annual  Growth  Survey 
highlighted the importance of increasing female labour market participaton, closing gender 
pay gaps and enhancing work-life balance. Similarly, the 2017 Joint Employment Report 
stressed that: "The employment gap between women and men remains wide, in particular 
for  mothers  and  women  with  caring  responsibilities.  This  is  compounded  by  financial 
disincentives faced by women when entering the labour market or wanting to work more. A 
significant pay gap is observed in several Member States. Combined with shorter careers, 
this  often  translates  into  lower  pensions  for  women.  This  indicates  that  a  comprehensive 
integration  of  work-life  balance  considerations  into  policy  making  is  needed.  Access  to 
affordable and quality childcare and other care services, leave and flexible working time 
arrangements, and tax and benefit systems free of disincentives for second earners to work 
or to work more is of key importance in order to move towards a full equal treatment of 
women  and  support  upward  social  mobility.’  Finally,  the  guidelines  for  the  employment 
policies  of  the  Member  States  for  2015  (Council  Decision  2015/1848),  maintained  for 
2016, also stressed that “female participation in the labour market should be increased and 
gender equality must be ensured, including through equal pay. The reconciliation between 
work and family life should be promoted (…).  

Work-life balance policies' key role in the European Semester is also demonstrated by the 
increasing  number  of  Country-Specific  Recommendations  (CSRs)  on  the  topic.  In  2016, 
CSRs  were  addressed  to  10  Member  States  with  regard  to  women’s  participation  in  the 
labour market222 in particular to address availability of affordable childcare, to address full-
time  childcare,  to  improve  the  provision  of  long-term  care  services  and  to  take  action  to 
narrow the gender pay and pensions gaps.  

Work-life  balance  also  features  prominently  in  the  EU's  work  on  gender  equality.  The 
Strategic  Engagement  on  gender  equality  2016-2019223  recalls  that  "coordinated  efforts 
will  be  required  to  facilitate  women’s  labour-market  participation.  (…)  This  will  involve 
making  it  easier  to  balance  caring  and  professional  responsibilities.  It  also  requires  a 
more  equal sharing  of  time  spent  on  care  and  household  responsibilities.  The  Barcelona 
targets  on  childcare  must  be  attained  and  reflection  undertaken  with  Member  States  on 
ways  of  making  them  more  ambitious  and  extending  them  to  cover  care  of  other 
dependants should be considered." 

Finally,  work-life  balance  is  also  relevant  to  the  Commission’s  work  to  address  child 
poverty. The 2013 Commission Recommendation on Investing in Children emphasised the 

222  
223  

AT, CZ, DE, EE, ES, IE, IT, RO, SK, and UK.  
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/documents/160111_strategic_engagement_en.pdf 

53 

 
 
 
                                                      
importance of supporting parents’ access to employment, including through the promotion 
of  ‘a  quality,  inclusive  employment  and  a  working  environment  that  enables  parents  to 
balance  their  work  and  parenting  roles  on  an  equal  footing,  including  through  parental 
leave,  workplace  support  and  flexible  working  arrangements’  as  well  as  measures  to 
enhance access to affordable, quality, early childhood education and care services224.  

6.  EU COMPETENCE AND ADDED VALUE  

1.1. Legal right to act  

The Union’s specific right to act in this field is set out in detail in Title X of the TFEU. 
Article 153  (2)  (b)  TFEU  empowers  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  to  adopt 
minimum  requirements,  among  others  in  the  field  of  equality  between  men  and  women 
with regard to labour market opportunities and treatment at work (Article 153(1)(i) TFEU). 

1.2. Compliance with the principles of subsidiarity  

The  principle  of  subsidiarity  requires  that  the  Union  shall  act  only  and  insofar  as  the 
objectives of the proposed actions cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, 
either at central level or at regional and local level,  but can rather, by reasons of scale or 
effects of the proposed action, to be better achieved at Union level (Article 5(3) TEU).  

6.2.1 Necessity of Union action  

There  is  already  an  EU  legislative  framework  in  place  in  relation  to  work-life  balance 
policies, illustrating the common agreement that EU level action in this area is necessary 
and  in  general  in  line  with  the  principle  of  subsidiarity.  In  addition,  the  non-legislative 
dimension of EU policy making is of great importance, in particular where there is no EU 
competence to legislate (e.g. with regard to childcare). However, both legislative and non-
legislative measures proved inadequate and incomplete for dealing with the challenges of 
managing work and family life in today's economic and social environments. Furthermore, 
the  existing  framework  is  not  adequate  to  address  the  challenges  of  tomorrow,  which 
include demographic ageing and an increased number of people with long-term care needs, 

Inefficiencies in the labour market continue to persist with many women, especially those 
with  caring  responsibilities,  either  not  in  paid  work  or  working  in  jobs  below  their  skill 
level due to difficulties in balancing work and family life. The burden of caring still falls 
generally  on  women.  The  substantial  difference  in  women's  employment  rates  between 
Member States shows that the current set of available measures may not be sufficient, not 
sufficiently  implemented  and/or  enforced  in  a  way  that  triggers  a  significant  and 
sustainable  change  in  the  labour  market  patterns  and  individual  behaviours  as  regards  a 
better share of family responsibilities. 

224  

2013/112/EU 

54 

 
 
 
                                                      
The modernisation of the existing EU legal framework guaranteeing a level playing field 
for  work-life  balance  policies  can  only  be  achieved  by  EU-level  action,  rather  than  by 
individual  Member  States  alone.  The  data  presented  in  in  this  report  indicates  wide 
differences between Member States regarding the policies in place to allow for a work-life 
balance for working parents and caregivers.  

Employers,  particularly  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises,  may  be  hesitant  to  provide 
greater  work-life  balance  measures  on  their  own,  given  the  short-term  costs  and 
administrative burdens that may result225. This is often reinforced by an under-valuation of 
the  long-term  benefits  for  the  companies  of  work-life  balance  measures  such  as  a  wider 
pool  of  talents,  a  more  attractive  work-place  and  an  increased  productivity  of  workers. 
Such undervaluation or lack of knowledge can lead to a market failure226. Member States 
may however hesitate to correct such a failure through regulation in this area because they 
may perceive a risk of putting their own companies at a disadvantage with companies from 
other  Member  States  if  the  work-life  balance  benefits  offered  to  employees  are  more 
generous  than  in  other  Member  States.  Considering  that  a  significant  percentage  of  EU 
firms' trade is intra-EU, EU-level action could mitigate such concerns and establish a level-
playing field while taking into account the need to avoid additional burdens on businesses, 
particularly SMEs, and ensuring that all Member States move in the same direction.  

If  no  action  is  taken  at  EU  level,  women  will  continue  to  face  limitations  on  their 
involvement  in  the  labour  market.  This,  in  turn,  may  have  a  negative  impact  on  some 
Member States' public finances. This is a matter of common concern in an internal market 
and an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), particularly having regard to the economic 
and  fiscal  challenges  of  the  ageing  population  and  demographic  change.  Tackling  the 
obstacles to women's employment in Member States could support greater economic and 
social  convergence  in  Europe  and  positively  contribute  to  the  realisation  of  the  single 
market and EMU. 

EU  action  can  therefore  also  help  to  avoid  the  risk  of  downward  competition  between 
Member States due to concerns about cost-competitiveness and to safeguard the Treaty’s 
objectives  of  upward  convergence  of  employment,  living  and  working  conditions227.  In 
addition,  a  coherent,  adequate  and  complete  legal  framework  at  Union  level  would 
facilitate  the development and growth  of cross-border  businesses and the mobility of EU 
workers, thereby contributing to the growth and consolidation of the internal market. 

225 OECD (2007) Babies and Bosses 
226 Ibid. 
227  Article  151  of  TFEU  sets  out  that  the  Union  and  Member  States  shall  have  as  their  objectives  the 
‘promotion  of  employment,  improved  living  and  working  conditions,  so  as  to  make  possible  their 
harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained.’ 

55 

 
 
 
 
                                                      
6.2.2 EU added value  

EU action has a strong added-value in addressing the challenges mentioned in the problem 
definition. 

First, the current situation demonstrates that EU action has a strong influence on Member 
States' legal frameworks. In the policy area covered by this initiative, it is only when EU 
legislation is in place (i.e., maternity and parental leave) that there is legislation in place in 
every  Member  State.  On  the  contrary,  in  relation  to  paternity  leave,  carers'  leave  and 
flexible  working  arrangements  for  parents  and workers  with  caring  responsibilities,  there 
are  many  Member  States  where  there  are  either  no  measures,  or  measures  that  are  not 
sufficient  to  achieve  the  objectives.  Thus,  EU  action  would  add  value  as  a  catalyst  for 
change  and  encourage  Member  States  to  focus  on  the  long-term  bigger  picture  and  the 
major socio-economic challenges that lie ahead. 

 Furthermore, when Member States do have legal entitlements, variations between Member 
States  with  regard  to  length  and  the  generosity  of  the  conditions  could  result  in  an 
unbalanced  level  of  rights,  an  unequal  protection  for  EU  citizens  across  the  EU  and 
differences  in  the  functioning  of  labour  markets.  Moreover,  as  EU  action  stems  from  a 
comparative  analysis  of  Member  States'  experiences,  by  acting  at  EU  level  there  is  a 
possibility  to  build  on  Member  States'  recognised  good  practices  and  to  create  a 
momentum for Member States to advance together towards better outcomes. 

Secondly,  EU-level  intervention  could  mitigate  trends  in  some  Member-States  to  reduce 
work-life  balance  provisions.  Indeed,  as  a  result  of  the  recent  crisis,  policy  priorities 
diverge between Member States, and other issues (particularly those expected to produce 
short-term  benefits)  are  focussing  national  authorities'  attention.    As  presented  in  the 
Baseline section, evidence shows that in some cases, work-life balance policies have been 
reduced,  with  a  negative  impact  on  female  employment228.  In  such  a  context,  EU  action 
could safeguard a common long-term perspective. 

7.  POSSIBLE OPTIONS FOR EU-LEVEL ACTION 

This  section  outlines  non-legislative  and  legislative  options  assessed  in  this  report.  For 
each area, the key parameters are identified and a table summarises the baseline scenario as 
well  as  potential  options  of  varying  levels  of  ambition.  A  summary  chart  explaining  the 
intervention logic for the different options identified is provided at the end of this section. 
An assessment of the costs and benefits of the various options is presented in Section 8. 

1.1. Family-related leaves 

228 European Commission (2013) The impact of the economic crisis on the situation of women and men 
and on gender equality policies 

56 

 
 
 
                                                      
7.1.1 Maternity leave  

Further EU-level action in the area of maternity leave is considered, since the provision of 
leave after birth has been shown to be important in allowing new mothers to reconcile their 
work  and  caring  responsibilities  for  their  new  child,  and  help  to  ensure  that  they  do  not 
drop out rather than return to work too early.  

A  non-legislative  Option  could  include  measures  to  prevent  against  discrimination  and 
unjustified  dismissals  for  mothers  returning  from  maternity  leave  could  be  considered. 
While legislation in this area is currently provided for under EU law, evidence shows that 
women continue to experience less favourable treatment and dismissal by employers on the 
ground  of  maternity.  Such  treatment  can  also  serve  as  a  general  barrier  for  parents  and 
carers  to  exercise  their  rights  to  work-life  balance  policies,  as  they  may  fear  negative 
repercussions for using them. Such Option could include enhanced enforcement of current 
legislation and  measures to  promote awareness-raising among employers and  employees, 
also with a stronger involvement of equality bodies and social partners, leading to a higher 
degree  of  enforcement  and  effectiveness  of  existing  dismissal  protection  legislation. 
Sharing  of  good  practices  between  Member  States  could  be  another  element  of  non-
legislative  action.  This  non-legislative  option  was  favoured  by  the  employers  during  the 
social partner consultation.  

This  non-legislative  Option  could  also  provide  EU-level  policy  guidance  and  promote 
better  awareness-raising  and  the  sharing  of  good  practices  on  facilitating  successful 
transitions  between  maternity  leave  and  employment,  for  instance  by  encouraging 
employers to introduce "keep-in-touch" days and breastfeeding facilities at the workplace. 
This  non-legislative  option  stems  from  the  employers’  responses229  to  the  second-stage 
social  partner  consultation  in  which  they  presented  their  doubts  on  the  need  for  further 
legislative action in this area.  

Several  options  for  additional  legislative  action  have  also  been  considered.  Overall,  the 
following parameters have been considered: 

  arrangements to enable breastfeeding mothers to work;  
 
the level of payment or allowance for part of the leave  
 
length (discarded) 
  dismissal protection (discarded for legislative options) 

A first parameter consists in measures to facilitate successful transitions between maternity 
leave and employment. Such transitions can sometimes prove difficult, especially when a 

229 See for instance Business Europe (2016) Addressing the challenges of work-life balance faced by working 
parents and caregivers- BusinessEurope’s response to second stage social partners’ consultation, UEAPME 
(2016), UEAPME Reply to the second stage consultation of the social partners on possible action addressing 
the challenges of work-life balance faced by working parents and caregivers and CEEMET (2016) CEEMET 
Response, Second Stage Social Partner Consultation on Possible action addressing the challenges of work-
life balance faced by working parents and caregivers 

57 

 
 
 
                                                      
mother returns to work while still breastfeeding, which can hamper female participation in 
the labour market. Such measures were called for by trade unions230. 

Increasing pay for at least the compulsory period of leave is also considered as a parameter 
as  it  could  provide  additional  income  protection  for  women  for  whom  this  leave  is 
compulsory,  thereby  supporting  new  mothers.  This  parameter  stems  from  the  European 
Parliament’s  call231  on  the  Commission  and  the  Member  States  to  strengthen  women’s 
social and economic independence and avoid them being financially penalised for having 
children. 

A third parameter that is relevant but has been discarded from further analysis is the length 
of  maternity leave.  In  its response to the second stage  social  partner consultation, ETUC 
has  stated  that  it  is  in  favour  of  an  extension  of  the  length  of  the  leave  from  14  to  18 
weeks232. In this context, it is useful to recall the 2008 Commission proposal to extend the 
length of maternity leave from 14 to 18 weeks. As mentioned earlier in this document233, 
the consideration of length was one of the most contentious aspects in discussions among 
Member States in the Council. Several Member States, including Sweden234, as well as EU 
employers  have  stressed  that  extending  leave  entitlements  only  for  women  could  risk 
further  entrenching  women's  roles  as  primary  carers.  Providing  greater  opportunities  for 
women  and  men  to  share  leaves  would  have  a  more  positive  effect  of  reducing  the 
imbalance  in  caring  responsibilities  between  women  and  men,  and  could  have  a  positive 
effect on mothers’ employment. Therefore this document sets out new options that would 
allow for a better sharing of care responsibilities.  

Another  parameter  that  has  been  discarded  from  further  analysis  on  EU-level  legislative 
action  is  dismissal  protection.  As  already  mentioned  in  the  EU  context  section,  various 
Directives  provide  for  protection  against  dismissals  and  unfavourable  treatment  on  the 
ground of maternity leave and other family-related leaves. While many stakeholders show 
that discriminatory practices on the basis of taking maternity leave are still present in the 
EU235,  the  evaluation  of  the  Maternity  Leave  Directive236  shows  that  this  is  mainly  a 
problem  of  compliance  as  not  all  employers  respect  the  legal  rules  transposed  by  the 
Member  States  in  this  field  rather  than  a  problem  with  the  legal  provisions  themselves. 

230 ETUC (2016) Proposal for an ETUC Position on the Second Stage Consultation of the social partners at 
European level under article 154 TFEU on possible action addressing the challenges of work-life balance 
faced by working parents and caregivers 
231 European Parliament (2016) Report on creating labour market conditions favourable for work-life balance 
(2016/2017 (INI)) 
232 ETUC (2016) Proposal for an ETUC Position on the Second Stage Consultation of the social partners at 
European level under article 154 TFEU on possible action addressing the challenges of work-life balance 
faced by working parents and caregivers 
233 See Section 2.2 
234 Letter from the Government of Sweden to Commissioner Ms Vera Jourovà, "Parental leave-Swedish 
perspective on the key principles for the way ahead", 08.06.2015 
235 See for instance ETUC (2016) Proposal for an ETUC Position on the Second Stage Consultation of the 
social partners at European level under article 154 TFEU on possible action addressing the challenges of 
work-life balance faced by working parents and caregivers 
236 See Annex 5 

58 

 
 
 
                                                      
Furthermore, the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union has clarified that 
preparatory  measures  for  dismissal  and  dismissals  for  reasons  of  pregnancy  or  maternity 
leave, even after the period of maternity leave, are prohibited237. While the extension of the 
level  of  protection  related  to  maternity  leave  via  legislative  change  is  considered 
unnecessary as relevant provisions are already in place, non-legislative measures, including 
policy guidance and awareness-raising measures, to support the enforcement of the current 
legislation could be effective in addressing the problem mentioned above. Therefore only 
non-legislative measures are presented in the field of dismissal protection. This addresses 
the doubts and reservations raised by employers during the social partner consultation on 
whether  further  EU  legislation  is  needed  to  enhance  the  protection  of  employees. 
Employers  considered  further  legislative  action  unnecessary  given  that  there  is  already 
existing  legislation  in  this  area  and  it  could  risk  in  creating  additional  administrative 
burden for companies. 

Options under assessment: 

Baseline 

Non-legislative 
option  

Option 1 

Option 2 

Same as Option 1, 
plus: 

First two weeks 
(compulsory period) 
to be fully paid  

Directive 92/85: 

Baseline, plus: 

Baseline, plus: 

- 14 weeks 

- Paid at least at the 
level of sick pay 

- Dismissal 
protection from the 
beginning of their 
pregnancy until the 
end of maternity 
leave  

Directive 2006/54: 
Prohibition of 
discrimination of 
pregnant workers or 
mothers  because 
they were pregnant 
or took maternity 
leave 

Case-law of the 

Enhanced 
enforcement of 
current legislation 
on dismissal 
protection 

Entitlement for 
breastfeeding 
mothers to breaks of 
at least 1 hour per 
full working day  

Requirement for 
employers to 
provide facilities for 
breastfeeding   

Policy guidance and 
awareness-raising 
on dismissal 
protection of 
pregnant women 

Policy guidance and 
sharing of good 
practices on 
facilitating 
successful 
transitions between 
maternity leave and 
employment 
(including on 
breastfeeding 

237 See notably Case C‑460/06 Paquay , 11 October 2007, ECLI:EU:C:2007:601. 

59 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
breaks and 
facilities) 

Court of Justice: 
Prohibition of 
preparatory 
measures for 
dismissal and 
dismissal for 
reasons of 
pregnancy or 
maternity leave, 
even after the 
period of maternity 
leave  

7.1.2.Paternity leave   

Further  EU-level  action  in  the  area  of  paternity  leave  is  considered,  given  that  paternity 
leave has been shown to be a useful tool in helping fathers engage in caring responsibilities 
around  the  time  of  the  arrival  of  a  new  baby.  It  can  hence  participate  in  reducing  the 
unequal division of work and care between parents.  

In terms of a non-legislative option, EU policy guidance could acknowledge the impact of 
paternity leave on gender equality in the labour market and set out key parameters for its 
successful implementation of leave at national level238. Policy guidance on paternity leave 
could  be  accompanied  by  enhanced  coverage  in  the  European  Semester.  Such  a  non-
legislative option is considered in light of the employers’ opposition to the introduction of 
an  EU  wide  paternity  leave  entitlement239  and  their  support  of  non-legislative  initiatives 
encouraging  a  change  in  societal  perceptions  regarding  caring  responsibilities240.  They 
consider  that  the  absence  of  paternity  leave  in  some  Member  States  does  not  imply  that 
fathers do not have the opportunity to make use of an appropriate leave entitlement (such 
as  parental  leave)  to  participate  in  family  responsibilities  and  that  an  EU  wide  provision 
could lead to unnecessary additional costs for companies. 

238 The parameters are described below in the section on potential legislative proposals. 
239 See for instance Business Europe (2016) Addressing the challenges of work-life balance faced by working 
parents and caregivers- BusinessEurope’s response to second stage social partners’ consultation, UEAPME 
(2016), UEAPME Reply to the second stage consultation of the social partners on possible action addressing 
the challenges of work-life balance faced by working parents and caregivers and ECEG (2016) ECEG’s 
response to the second-stage consultation of the social partners at European level under Article 154 TFEU 
on possible action addressing the challenges of work-life balance faced by working parents and caregivers 
240 See for instance CEEMET (2016) CEEMET Response, Second Stage Social Partner Consultation on 
Possible action addressing the challenges of work-life balance faced by working parents and caregivers 

60 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
Several legislative options have also been considered, all of which would introduce a legal 
entitlement  to  paternity  leave.  The  following  parameters  have  been  considered  for  such 
options: 

 
 

length 
the level of payment or allowance 

The  length  determines  how  much  leave  men  can  take  to  get  involved  in  childcare  at  an 
early stage, also as this is important for how involved they will be in caring throughout the 
child's life. Payment is also considered as a parameter, as it provides income protection for 
fathers after having children and has also been shown to increase the likelihood of fathers 
making  use  of  this  leave.  While  the  European  Parliament  calls  on  the  Commission  to 
propose a paternity leave directive with a minimum of a compulsory two-week fully paid 
leave241,  trade  unions  consider  it  should  be  paid  at  the  same  rate  as  earnings-related 
maternity  leave  or  earning-related  income  replacement  for  women  on  maternity  leave, 
which is referred to below as “sick pay level”242.  

Options under assessment: 

Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 3 

Individual right 
to one week of 
paternity leave  

Unpaid 

right 
Individual 
to  one  week  of 
paternity 
leave 
(5 working days) 

Compensated  at 
least  at  sick  pay 
level 

right 
Individual 
to  two  weeks  of 
leave 
paternity 
(10 
working 
days) 

Compensated  at 
least  at  sick  pay 
level 

Baseline 

to 
right 
No 
paternity  leave 
at EU level 

Non-
legislative 
Option 

Policy 
guidance on 
key parameters 
for the 
successful 
implementation 
of paternity 
leave 

Enhanced 
European 
Semester 
coverage on 
paternity leave 
entitlements 
and take-up  

241 European Parliament (2016) Report on creating labour market conditions favourable for work-life balance 
(2016/2017 (INI)) 
242 See for instance ETUC (2016) Proposal for an ETUC Position on the Second Stage Consultation of the 
social partners at European level under article 154 TFEU on possible action addressing the challenges of 
work-life balance faced by working parents and caregivers 

61 

 
 
 
                                                      
7.1.3 Parental leave   

Further EU-level action could be considered in the area of parental leave, given that this 
type of leave has been shown to be very beneficial in allowing parents to reconcile work 
and  family  life.  A  balanced  use  of  this  leave  between  parents  has  been  shown  to  have 
positive impacts on the distribution of care in the household and, in turn, supports female 
employment.    However  in  several  Member  States,  leave  is  unpaid  or  paid  at  a  very  low 
level,  making  it  difficult  for  some  parents  to  afford  making  use  of  their  parental  leave 
entitlements.  Moreover,  fathers  are  far  less  likely  to  use  the  leave  than  mothers  when  it 
does not provide a sufficient level of pay or when the leave is not reserved for them, which 
can  lead  to  the  majority  of  caring  responsibilities  to  fall  upon  women,  and  in  turn 
negatively impact their employment outcomes. 

As a non-legislative option, EU policy guidance could acknowledge the impact of parental 
leave  on  gender  equality  in  the  labour  market  and  determine  key  parameters  for  its 
successful  implementation  at  national  level243.  Such  policy  guidance  on  parental  leave 
could  be  accompanied  by  specific  benchmarks,  for  instance  on  the  take-up  of  family-
related leaves by women and men or payment levels/replacement rates. Such benchmarks 
could be coupled with enhanced monitoring in the European Semester. This non-legislative 
option  stems  from  the  employers’  statement  that  the  current  design  and  content  of  the 
Parental Leave Directive are flexible enough to be adapted at national level244.  

Several options to improve the legislative provisions on parental leave at EU level could be 
considered245.  Such  options  could  be  focussed  on  better  enabling  parents  to  make  use  of 
their  rights  to  leave  and  introducing  greater  incentives  for  fathers  to  make  use  of  their 
entitlements. The following parameters have thus been considered: 

the level of payment or allowance  

 
  degree of transferability between parents 
  possibility to take leave on a flexible basis 
  maximum age of the child  

243 The parameters are described below in the section on potential legislative proposals. 
244 See for instance Business Europe (2016) Addressing the challenges of work-life balance faced by working 
parents and caregivers- BusinessEurope’s response to second stage social partners’ consultation, UEAPME 
(2016), UEAPME Reply to the second stage consultation of the social partners on possible action addressing 
the challenges of work-life balance faced by working parents and caregivers and ECEG (2016) ECEG’s 
response to the second-stage consultation of the social partners at European level under Article 154 TFEU 
on possible action addressing the challenges of work-life balance faced by working parents and caregivers 
245 The current level of existing rights currently available to working parents shall be maintained and future 
legislative action shall not reduce the general level of protection afforded to workers in the field covered by 
the Parental Leave Directive 2010/18/EU. 

62 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
 

length (discarded) 

Payment enables parents to make use of their parental leave entitlements and, as shown in 
the  German  example  of  the  introduction  of  paid  parental  leave  in  2007  mentioned 
earlier246,  it  is  a  strong  factor  in  fathers’  take-up  of  parental  leave.  With  this  aim,  trade 
unions  have  called  for  adequate  pay  or  salary  replacement  for  parental  leave247.  The 
European  Parliament  has  also  stressed  the  need  for  an  adequate  level  of  income 
replacement in order to incentivise men to take leave248. 

As  mentioned  in  the  problem  definition,  when  leave  is  non-transferable  (i.e.,  earmarked 
for each parent), it can encourage a greater sharing of leave arrangements between parents 
and support women's faster return to the labour market after having children. As shown in 
the problem definition, Member States,  such  as Sweden, that  have  ear-marked leaves for 
fathers  have  the  highest  take-up  rates  of  parental  leave  by  men.  In  this  context,  trade 
unions  have  called  on  the  Commission  to  increase  the  current  non-transferable  period  of 
leave249. The European Parliament also reiterates that a significant part of the leave should 
be non-transferable.250 

Giving the choice for parents to take leave on a part-time or piecemeal basis can also give 
parents  greater  flexibility  in  balancing  work  and  care  responsibilities,  facilitate  the 
maintenance of parents' connections to the labour market during leave, and promote greater 
take-up  of  these  leaves  by  fathers.  Trade  unions  and  the  European  Parliament  stress  that 
parents should be given flexibility in the use of parental leave. 

Allowing parents to take parental  leave up to when their children are 12 years old gives 
more  possibilities  for  parents  to  take  part  of  their  parental  leave  entitlement  when  their 
children  grow  up,  for  example  to  cover  school  holidays  or  other  periods  when  children 
would need care. This would also increase the general flexibility for parents as to when and 

246 See Section 3.2.2 Root cause 2: Ill-designed work-life balance policies 
247 See for instance ETUC (2016) Proposal for an ETUC Position on the Second Stage Consultation of the 
social partners at European level under article 154 TFEU on possible action addressing the challenges of 
work-life balance faced by working parents and caregivers, CEMR (2016) CEMR Response to the Second-
stage consultation of the social partners at European level under article 154 TFEU on possible action 
addressing the challenges of work-life balance faced by working parents and caregivers and CESI (2016) 
Answer to second-phase social partner consultation, Challenges of work-life balance faced by working 
parents and caregivers. 
248 European Parliament (2016) Report on creating labour market conditions favourable for work-life balance 
(2016/2017 (INI)) 
249 See for instance ETUC (2016) Proposal for an ETUC Position on the Second Stage Consultation of the 
social partners at European level under article 154 TFEU on possible action addressing the challenges of 
work-life balance faced by working parents and caregivers, CEMR (2016) CEMR Response to the Second-
stage consultation of the social partners at European level under article 154 TFEU on possible action 
addressing the challenges of work-life balance faced by working parents and caregivers and CESI (2016) 
Answer to second-phase social partner consultation, Challenges of work-life balance faced by working 
parents and caregivers. 
250 European Parliament (2016) Report on creating labour market conditions favourable for work-life balance 
(2016/2017 (INI)) 

63 

 
 
 
                                                      
for how long to take parental leave; it could encourage more fathers to take parental leave, 
as  the  period  during  which  they  can  take  leave  would  be  longer.  It  would  also  support 
parents who would prefer to take shorter periods of parental leave over time, rather than a 
longer period when their child is young. The age limit of 12 years was chosen because it 
allows parents to accompany their children in a crucial period of their life: when they gain 
greater autonomy and integrate into secondary school.  

The  length  of  leave  was  not  considered  as  a  relevant  parameter  given  that  there  is  no 
definitive  evidence  that  a  longer  parental  leave  would  help  to  further  facilitate  women’s 
labour market participation. The combined period of EU minimum standards for parental 
leave period (4 months) and maternity leave period (14 weeks) already exceed 6 months, 
and  some  evidence  shows  that  the  positive  effects  of  leave  on  women’s  labour  market 
participation begin to diminish after such a period251.  

Options under assessment: 

Baseline 

Individual right 
to four months’ 
parental leave 
per parent, per 
child 

For  parents  of 
children  up  to 
an 
age 
determined  by 
the  Member 
States  up 
to 
eight years 

One month in 
principle non-
transferable 

Non-
legislative 
Option 

Policy 
Guidance on 
key parameters 
for the 
successful 
implementation 
of parental 
Leave 

Benchmark on 
gender-
balanced take-
up of parental 
leave 

Enhanced 
European 
Semester 
coverage on 
parental leave 
entitlements 
and take-up by 
women and 

Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 3 

Baseline, 
plus: 

Entitlement 
to flexible 
uptake 
(part-time, 
full-time, 
time-credit, 
one or more 
block)  

Entitlement to 
flexible uptake: 
same as option 1 

Payment for one 
(non-
transferable) 
month  paid  at 
least  at  sick  pay 
level  

Rise 
maximum 
of 
the 
from 8 to 12 

of 
age 
child 

Entitlement to 
flexible uptake: 
same as option 
1 

Four months 
reserved for 
each parent  

Payment at least 
at sick pay level 
of the four 
months 

of 
Rise 
maximum  age 
of 
child 
the 
from 8 to 12 

251 Plantenga (2015) Searching for welfare, work and gender equality 

64 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
men 

7.1.4 Carers' leave  

Carers'  leave  can  be  helpful  in  improving  work-life  balance  for  workers  with  an  elderly, 
disabled  or  ill  relative  (children,  parents  and  spouses),by  allowing  them  to  take  a 
temporary leave of absence in order to provide support or care for them, or have time to 
arrange formal long-term care services. It reduces the risk of workers dropping out of the 
labour market altogether due to caring obligations, especially for women. 

As a non-legislative option, EU policy guidance could acknowledge the impact of carers' 
leave  on  gender  equality  in  the  labour  market  and  determine  key  parameters  for  its 
successful  implementation  at  national  level252.  Policy  guidance  on  carers'  leave  could  be 
accompanied by enhanced coverage in the European Semester. The non-legislative option 
on carers’ leave takes into account employers’ views that new provisions on carers’ leave 
might create new hurdles for employment and push more women out of the labour market 
as they would be the first users of such leaves253. 

Several legislative options have also been considered, all of which would introduce a legal 
entitlement  to  carer's  leave.  This  follows  calls  from  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
European  Advisory  Committee  for  equal  opportunities  between  women  and  men  for  an 
EU-level  carers’  leave  entitlement  in  order  to  give  workers  more  flexibility  in  order  to 
better  balance  their  professional  and  caring  responsibilities254.  Trade  unions  also  support 
the project of introducing carers’ leave at EU-level255. The following parameters have been 
considered for such options: 

 
 

length 
the level of payment or allowance 

252 The parameters are described below in the section on potential legislative proposals. 
253 See for instance Business Europe (2016) Addressing the challenges of work-life balance faced by working 
parents and caregivers- BusinessEurope’s response to second stage social partners’ consultation and 
UEAPME (2016), UEAPME Reply to the second stage consultation of the social partners on possible action 
addressing the challenges of work-life balance faced by working parents and caregivers 
254 European Parliament (2016) Report on creating labour market conditions favourable for work-life balance 
(2016/2017 (INI)) and see Annex 2 on stakeholders consultations 
255 See for instance ETUC (2016) Proposal for an ETUC Position on the Second Stage Consultation of the 
social partners at European level under article 154 TFEU on possible action addressing the challenges of 
work-life balance faced by working parents and caregivers, CEMR (2016) CEMR Response to the Second-
stage consultation of the social partners at European level under article 154 TFEU on possible action 
addressing the challenges of work-life balance faced by working parents and caregivers and CESI (2016) 
Answer to second-phase social partner consultation, Challenges of work-life balance faced by working 
parents and caregivers. 

65 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
  possibility to take leave on a flexible basis. 

The different length options presented below represent the variety of provisions in place in 
EU  Member  States256.  Remuneration  of  leave  could  increase  the  likelihood  of  carers  in 
general and men in particular to make use of the leaves. EU trade unions call for carers’ 
leave  to  be  designed  as  much  as  in  a  gender-neutral  way  as  possible,  which  financial 
support could help to ensure. Unions have also stressed that such a type of leave should be 
as  flexible  as  possible  for  the  workers  to  truly  be  able  to  balance  their  professional  and 
caring responsibilities257. This is why the possibility to take carers’ leave on a flexible or 
part-time basis is also considered as a parameter in the options presented below.  

In all options, this leave would be a conditional right subject to an appropriate justification, 
to be decided by Member States and/or social partners (e.g., medical certificate).  

Furthermore,  in  line  with  other  family-related  leaves,  a  standard  provision  on  the 
protection  of  the  employment  rights  of  workers  taking  such  leave  against  any  less 
favourable treatment on this ground would also apply. Considering the short length of the 
leave options provided below, the risk of less favourable treatment was estimated as low 
and  this  parameter  was  not  included  in  the  quantitative  assessment.  However,  such  a 
standard  provision  would  ensure  policy  coherence  between  all  the  family-related  leave 
measures at EU level. 

Options under assessment: 

Baseline 

Non-legislative 
Option 

Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 3 

to 
Entitlement 
time off work on 
grounds  of  force 
for 
majeure 
urgent 
family 
reasons  in  cases 
of  sickness  or 
accident  making 
the 
immediate 
presence  of  the 
worker 
indispensable 

Policy Guidance 
on key 
parameters for 
the successful 
implementation 
of carers' leave 

Individual 
entitlement to 
12 weeks’ leave 
per worker 
throughout the 
career 

Enhanced 
European 
Semester 
coverage on 
carers' leave 
entitlements and 

Unpaid 

Entitlement to 
flexible uptake 
(part-time, full-
time, time 

Individual 
entitlement to 
4 weeks’ 
leave per 
worker 
throughout 
the career 

Paid  at  least 
at  sick  pay 
level   

Entitlement 

Individual 
entitlement to 
a short-term 
leave of 5 
days, per year, 
per child or 
dependent 
relative  

Paid  at  least  at 
sick pay level   

256 See legal baseline in section 2.1.6 of the supporting study 
257 See for instance CESI (2016) Answer to second-phase social partner consultation, Challenges of work-life 
balance faced by working parents and caregivers. 

66 

 
 
 
                                                      
 
take-up by 
women and men 

credit, one or 
more blocks) 

to 
flexible 
uptake  as  in 
option 1 

1.2. Flexible working arrangements for parents and carers 

Flexible  working  arrangements,  such  as  flexible  working  schedules,  remote  working 
arrangements  and  part-time  work,  have  been  shown  to  be  useful  in  allowing  parents  and 
people  with  caring  responsibilities  to  reconcile  work  and  family  responsibilities  and  in 
retaining many women with children or dependent relatives in employment. 

A non-legislative option on flexible working arrangements is considered. This option could 
contain  EU-level  policy  guidance  to  promote  improvements  in  entitlements  to  flexible 
working  arrangements  and  also  promote  a  balanced  take-up  of  these  arrangements  by 
women and men, to ensure that they do not reinforce gender-biased practices. Such policy 
guidance  could,  as  Business  Europe  proposes258,  build  upon  the  EU  social  partners' 
agreement  on  telework259  as  a  basis.  Policy  guidance  could  be  accompanied  by  specific 
benchmarks, for instance on the take-up of flexible working arrangements by women and 
men and enhanced monitoring in the European Semester.  

to 

improve 

Several  options 
legislative  provisions  for  flexible  working 
arrangements, currently provided for under the Parental Leave Directive and in the area of 
protection against discrimination under the Part-Time Work Directive, are also considered. 
The following parameters have been considered for such options: 

the  EU 

 

 

the  scope  of  the  concerned  population  (e.g.,  parents,  people  with  dependent 
relatives) 
the type of flexibility (e.g., flexible working schedules, remote working, part-time 
work)  

  extension of the level of the right to request as an absolute right (discarded) 

It  could  be  considered  to  extend  the  scope  of  the  right  to  request  flexible  working 
arrangements  currently  provided  for  by  the  Parental  Leave  Directive  and  have  the  right 

258 Business Europe (2016) Addressing the challenges of work-life balance faced by working parents and 
caregivers- BusinessEurope’s response to second stage social partners’ consultation 
259 ETUC, UNICE, UEAPME, CEEP, European Framework Agreement on Telework, 2002 

67 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
duly considered, as currently this right only exists in EU legislation for parents returning 
from  parental  leave.  Parents  who  are  not  on  leave,  or  other  types  of  workers  with 
dependent relatives, could also strongly benefit from such increased flexibility in order to 
better balance work and care responsibilities. 

The  type  of  flexibility  is  also  important  to  consider  in  the  different  options.  Enhancing 
flexibility  in  working  patterns  and  in  the  place  of  work  (i.e.,  remote  working)  could  be 
helpful in retaining some parents and carers, particularly women in full-time employment. 
Part-time  work  is  also  a  popular  form  of  flexible  work  among  many  parents  and  carers; 
however  as part-time work is  disproportionately used  by women, and  is  accompanied by 
reduction in earnings, it is not foreseen for all of the different options. 

An extension of the level of the right to request flexible working as an absolute right for 
employees  was  not  considered  as  a  parameter,  as  it  would  create  serious  restrictions  for 
employers  to  determine  how  work  is  organised in  a  firm.  This  is  in  line  with  employers' 
responses to the social partner consultation on work-life balance260, as well as discussions 
held with SME representatives261.  The options below therefore foresee the right to request 
such  arrangements  and  to  have  the  request  duly  considered  by  the  employer,  in  order  to 
preserve a balance between employees' and employer's needs.  

Under  all  the  options,  workers  requesting  flexible  working  arrangements  would  be 
protected against discrimination on this ground.  

Options under assessment: 

Baseline 

Right for parents 
to request 
flexible working 
arrangements 
when returning 
from parental 
leave by 
requesting 
changes to their 

Non-
legislative 
Option 

Policy 
Guidance on 
key 
parameters 
for gender-
balanced 
take-up of 
flexible 
working 

Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 3 

Right for parents 
of children up to 
age 12 or 
carers262 to 
request 
flexibility in 
place of work 
for a set period 

Right for parents 
of children up to 
age 12  or 
carers263 to 
request 
flexibility in 
working 
schedule for a 
set period of 

Right for 
parents of 
children up to 
age 12 or 
carers264 to 
request 
flexibility in 
working hours, 
schedule or 

260 See for instance UEAPME (2016), UEAPME Reply to the second stage consultation of the social partners 
on possible action addressing the challenges of work-life balance faced by working parents and caregivers 
261 See Annex 2 on stakeholders consultation for more information. 
262 Defined for purpose of evaluation as parents of children up to the age of 12 and carers in the situations 
that also give rise to carers’ leave. 
263 Idem 
264 Idem 

68 

 
 
 
                                                      
working hours 
and/or 

Patterns for a set 
period of time 
and have such 
requests duly 
considered by the 
employer, taking 
into account both 
employers' and 
workers' needs 

arrangements  

of time 

time 

In line with 
current 
provisions, the 
employer has to 
consider the 
request and 
reply, no 
obligation to 
grant the 
requested 
change 

In line with 
current 
provisions, the 
employer has to 
consider the 
request and 
reply, no 
obligation to 
grant the 
requested 
change 

Enhanced 
European 
Semester 
monitoring 
on the take-
up of flexible 
working 
arrangements 
by women 
and men 

Benchmark 
on gender-
balanced 
take-up of 
flexible 
working 
arrangements 

place of work 
for a set period 
of time 

Automatic right 
to return to the 
previous 
working hours 

In line with 
current 
provisions, the 
employer has to 
consider the 
request and 
reply, no 
obligation to 
grant the 
requested 
change 

69 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.3 Intervention logic of options (The non-legislative measures in the areas of formal care services and economic disincentives were not 

assessed in this report, see section 5.1) 

PROBLEM 

Underrepresentation of women 
in the labour market 

DRIVER OF THE PROBLEM 
ADDRESSED BY THIS INITIATIVE 

Unequal distribution of caring 
responsibilities between women 
and men 

ROOT CAUSES OF THE DRIVER 

  Discrimination and stereotypes 

Ill-designed work-life balance 
policies 

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES OF THE 
INITIATIVE 

Improve access to work-life 
balance policies 

Increase take-up of family-
related leaves and flexible 
working arrangements by men 

70 

POSSIBLE OPTIONS TO FULFILL 
THE OBJECTIVES OF THE 
INITIATIVE 

 New family-related leaves (paternity and carers' 
leave) 

Improved transitions between leave and 
employment (breastfeeding facilities) 

Improved payment level of leave (maternity, 
paternity, parental and carers' leave) 

Right to request flexible working arrangements 
for parents and carers 

Enhanced enforcement of dismissal protection 

Introduction of paternity leave 

Remuneration of parental leave 

Non-transferability of parental leave 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.  EXPECTED IMPACTS OF THE DIFFERENT POLICY OPTIONS AND HOW 

THEY COMPARE 

Expected impacts  are quantified where  possible and details  on the methodology used  are 
provided  in  Annex  4.  Important  efforts  have  been  done  to  collect  the  necessary  data, 
however  data  available  in  this  area  is  scarce.  Many  Member  States  do  not  collect 
administrative data on the use of various types of leave by sex and number of days. Data 
on the employment status of informal carers is also scarce. Nevertheless, data and robust 
evidence are available for several countries which underpin the assessment of impacts and 
allow  overcoming  certain  data  limitations,  either  by  extrapolating  data  or  by  using 
assumptions  based  on  the  relevant  economic  literature.  The  limitations  of  such 
assumptions, especially when behavioural (on increase in take-up of entitlement rates for 
example), should be duly noted265.  

The  impact  on  companies  and  Central  governments  are  presented  in  Net  Present  Value 
over  the  2015-2055  period  in  order  to  take  into  account  the  impact  on  long-term  trends 
such as increases in take-up due to reinforced incentives to take leave (e.g. compensation). 
In general it should be noted that while the costs of work-life balance policies arise in the 
short  to  medium  term  (payment  of  benefits,  lost  production  due  to  leave  or  reduced 
working  hours,  administrative  costs,  etc.)  the  benefits  take  more  time  to  materialise 
(reduced  absence  from  work,  reduced  cost  of  healthcare,  reduced  recruitment  costs, 
increase in tax revenues and decrease in payment of unemployment benefits, etc.). Despite 
the fact that the below calculations show that the annual cost per business are expected to 
be moderated, they  might impose a burden in the short-term for the smallest enterprises.   

A  qualitative  assessment  of  impacts  is  also  provided,  to  complement  the  quantitative 
analysis where necessary and give a more complete picture of the overall costs and benefits 
of the options outlined. This is because the immediate costs in a quantitative cost-benefit 
analysis  are  often  better  known  than  the  benefits,  such  as  increased  production  arising 
because of increased female labour market participation and thus employment, production 
and  income.  In  addition,  the  benefits  will  typically  take  longer  to  materialise,  e.g.  the 
positive  impact  of  increased  female  labour  market  participation  in  economic  growth. 
Hence, there can be a tendency that more costs are quantified than benefits, or that costs 
can be more easily and precisely quantified than benefits, so there could be a bias towards 
a negative result.  

Non-legislative options have been assessed only qualitatively as their impacts will depend 
on  the  degree  in  which  Member  States  follow  the  corresponding  EU  guidance  or 
recommendations. 

The  assessment  is  presented  for  the  various  stakeholders:  individuals,  companies  and 
Member States. This assessment (including the calculations of the financial impact) results 

265 A simulation taking into account an alternative take-up scenario in relation to parental leave can be found 
in section 8.3.3 

71 

 
 
 
                                                      
from  ICF's  overview  of  existing  provisions  in  each  Member  State  and  the  legal  gap 
analysis  that  was  achieved  in  the  supporting  study  of  this  report  (See  table  at  the  end  of 
section  8  summarising  ICF's  legal  gap  analysis  and  Annexes  1  and  2  of  the  supporting 
study).  The  introductory  paragraphs  to  each  sub-section  reflect  the  Commission's 
understanding and best knowledge of the legal gap analysis for each assessed option.  The 
following assessment also results from a series of evidence-based assumptions (see Annex 
3 of the supporting study). This section presents the impact of the measures on the EU in 
general  and  on  clusters  of  Member  States  defined  according  to  the  degree  in  which  they 
reach the requirements of the options266. The impact of the measures on individual Member 
States can be found in Annex 8 of the supporting study. 

In  many  Member  States,  particularly  those  with  a  strong  tradition  of  cross-sectoral  or 
sectoral  collective  bargaining,  collective  agreements  can  play  a  significant  role  in 
enhancing  leave  or  flexible  working  arrangements  provided  in  law.  For  example,  in 
Denmark,  many  collective  agreements  provide  for  100%  payment  of  salary  during 
paternity leave. However, it should be noted that this assessment is based on the existing 
legal  provisions  only  and  does  not  take  into  account  the  collective  agreements  that  may 
exist  in  the  Member  States.  Also,  in  some  Member  States  entitlements  vary  between  the 
public and the private sectors.  In Portugal for example, while carers’ leave is unpaid in the 
private sector, public sector employees receive 65% of their previous salary. In these cases 
this assessment is based on the rights of workers in the private sector. Therefore, the legal 
gap analysis for some Member States is stricter than the reality of a majority of workers' 
entitlements  and  in  consequence  the  impacts  of  the  measures  are  most  likely  over-
estimated267.  The  assessment  is  first  made  by  policy  area  and  then  for  a  combination  of 
measures across different areas.  

8.1 Maternity leave  

The  non-legislative  option  would  not  require  Member  States  to  change  their  maternity 
leave  legislation.  Option  1  would  require  some  Member  States268  to  introduce 
breastfeeding  breaks  and  a  majority  of  Member  States269  to  introduce  a  requirement  for 
employers  to  provide  facilities  for  breastfeeding.  In  addition  to  the  changes  required  in 
Option 1, Option 2 would require Member States to slightly increase their level of payment 

266 The clusters of Member States are defined for each option in each area. Member States are distributed as 
follows: Countries which meet or exceed the requirements of the option; Countries which fall somewhat 
below the requirements of the option; Countries which have no current provisions or fall significantly below 
the requirements of the option. More information on the approach to clustering the Member States can be 
found in Annex 13 of the supporting study. 
267 A simulation taking into account collective agreements in NL in relation to parental leave can be found in 
section 8.3.3 
268 This could require changes in Member States such as DK, FI, MT, UK  
269  This could require changes in Member States such as  CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, EL, ES, FI, HR, HU, IT, LT, 
LU, MT, PL, PT, SE 

72 

 
 
 
                                                      
(all Member States have provisions in place providing for pay at least at the level of sick 
pay)270.  

8.1.1 Impacts on individuals 

With the non-legislative option, more women would be expected to remain employed after 
maternity leave compared to the baseline, due to facilitated transitions between leave and 
employment.  Encouraging  Member  States  to  put  in  place  measures  to  support  new 
mothers'  return  to  employment,  such  as  installing  breastfeeding  facilities  in  companies, 
could help limiting the period of time during which women are out of the labour market. 
This is because improved breastfeeding provisions would reduce work-life balance conflict 
and  support  a  return  to  work  at  the  end  of  maternity leave  when  it  is  desired, as  women 
who  wish  to  breastfeed  for  a  longer  period  would  not  be  compelled  to  take  leave  while 
breastfeeding271. This will hence positively influence their career progression and decrease 
their  chances  of  dropping  out.  This would  promote  equality  between  women  and  men  in 
the labour market, and also improve the income security of families and their well-being. 

The non-legislative option would also be expected to support women's participation in the 
labour  market  due  to  a  better  enforcement  of  the  EU  legal  framework  on  dismissal  and 
discrimination protection of workers taking maternity leave. 

With  Option  1,  more  women  would  remain  employed  after  maternity  leave  compared  to 
the baseline and the non-legislative option, as its binding nature will lead to an increased 
implementation  of  two  measures,  which  can  facilitate  transitions  between  and  leave  and 
employment: breastfeeding breaks and breastfeeding facilities. Introducing legal provisions 
would  lead  to  a  higher  impact  on  promoting  equality  between  women  and  men  in  the 
labour  market,  and  improving  the  income  security  and  well-being  of  the  concerned 
families. 

Option 2 would have slightly higher benefits on individuals compared to the other options 
due  to  the  provision  of  full  pay  for  the  compulsory  period  of  maternity  leave  (2  weeks). 
This would lead to an increase in income security, with real incomes increasing by 0.01% 
by 2050. 

By  helping  women  to  return  to  employment  after  having  children,  all  EU  action  options 
would  have  a  positive  impact  on  reducing  poverty  risks  of  women  and  their  families272. 
While  Option  2  provides  for  additional  income  replacement  for  the  first  two  weeks  (full 
pay  instead  of  sick  pay  level),  given  the  short  period  it  is  unlikely  that  it  will  lead  to  a 
substantial additional poverty risk reduction vis-à-vis the other options. 

270 This could require changes in Member States such as BE, BG, CY, CZ, DK, EL, FI, HU, IE, IT, LV, RO, 
SE, SK, UK 
271 Vaganay Canónico, Courtin (2016) Challenges of work-life balance faced by working families: review of 
Costs and Benefits, Evidence Review, London School of Economics. 
272  European Commission (2016) Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2015 

73 

 
 
 
                                                      
All EU action options could also have a positive impact on children's health and well-being 
as breastfeeding is facilitated. 

8.1.2 Impact on companies 

Relative to the baseline, both the non-legislative option and Option 1 are expected to lead 
to  higher  productivity,  as  skilled  workers  would  be  more  likely  to  return  to  employment 
after maternity leave, and to lower recruitment costs, as companies avoid the costs related 
to  having  to  hire  and  train  new  workers.  Companies  would  also  benefit  from  mothers 
taking less absence from work due to the impact of breastfeeding provisions on health. For 
Option  1  there  would  be  an  adjustment  cost  to  purchase  equipment  to  facilitate 
breastfeeding (e.g., fridges) estimated at € 40 per business in the first year of legislation. 
However after this initial cost the benefits are estimated to outweigh the costs. There could 
be  an  additional  cost  of  reserving  space  for  a  room  for  breastfeeding.  If  a  room  of  2.5 
square  meters  was  needed  exclusively  for  breastfeeding,  the  cost  to  businesses  would  be 
€521  million  per  year  (using  2015  prices).  However,  it  has  been  assumed  that  the  room 
with facilities for breastfeeding can be used for other purposes as well, and that therefore 
there  is  no  additional  real  estate  cost  linked  to  the  presented  Options.  This  leads  to  an 
average net benefit of €8 per business in 2050 for Option 1 compared to the baseline.  In 
total  in  the EU,  Option  1  would  result in  a  net  benefit  for  companies  of  €  1  029  million 
over the 2015-2055 period. 

As  the  additional  maternity  benefits  payments  will  be  borne  by  Member  States/Social 
security partners, Option 2 would have similar impacts on companies as Option 1. In total 
in  the  EU,  both  Options  would  result  as  well  in  a  net  benefit  for  companies  of  €  1  029 
million over the 2015-2055 period as well.  

In  both  Options  1  and  2  overall  benefits  arise  to  business  from  these  policy  changes  (€ 
1029  million).  Member  States  which  do  not  have  related  provisions  or  fall  significantly 
below the requirements of the options273 make up 11% of this positive impact in Option 1, 
and 9% of this positive impact in Option 2. 

An assessment of the cost for micro-businesses shows that the cost of both policy options 
represents  a  very  small  share  of  the  companies'  total  turnover  (equal  or  under  0.5%  of 
turnover in all countries except for NL where it is 1.2%)274, and very close to the level of 
cost  under the  baseline.  Therefore  the  policy  options  do  not  disproportionately  affect  the 
performance of SMEs. 

273 In Option 1: DK, FI, MT in Option 2: CZ, DK, FI, HU  
274 The costs as a percentage of turnover for microbusinesses (with fewer than 10 employees) is presented in 
Annex 9 of the supporting study 

74 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
Table 1: Estimated impact of maternity leave options on companies, relative to the baseline 
(EU)275 

Retention of workers 
Less absence from work  
Purchase of fridge 
Total  impact on companies, 
NPV 2015-2055 
Total impact/company in 
2030/2050 

Option 1 
+ € 1667 million 
+ € 133 million 
- € 771 million 

Option 2 
+ € 1667 million 
+ € 133 million 
- € 771 million 

+ € 1029 million 
+ € 4/+ € 8 

+ € 1029 million 
+ € 4/+ € 8 

8.1.3 Impact on Member States 

Option  1  would  have  a  small  positive  budgetary  impact  on  Central  Governments 
compared  to  the  baseline  through  reductions  in  unemployment  benefit  payments  and 
increased  taxes,  which  are  driven  by  higher  employment  and  earnings.  In  both  options, 
breastfeeding  provisions  are  assumed  to  support  breastfeeding,  which  provides  health 
benefits  to  mothers  and  children.  Option  2  entails  a  rise  in  maternity  leave  benefit 
payments  for  two  weeks  in  some  Member  States276  and  hence  has  a  small  negative 
budgetary impact on Central Governments.  

There  is  no  change  in  administrative  burden  for  central  governments  or  social  security 
providers under any option, as there would be no change in maternity leave take- up.  

The  total  impact  on  Central  Government  and  social security  providers  is  a  net  benefit  of 
€5.8  billion  in  Option  1,  as  positive  impacts  on  health  care  systems  and  improved  tax 
revenues exceed any costs arising from increased unemployment benefit payments, and a 
net cost of €2.4 billion in Option 2 (mainly arising from additional benefit payments). In 
terms of the impact on the different clusters of Member States, in Option 1, the Member 
States  which  do  not  have  no  currently  provisions277  account  for  7%  of  the  benefit  to 
Central  Government  budgets.  The  Member  States  which  fall  somewhat  below  the 
requirements278  make  up  a  further  67%  of  the  benefit.  In  Option  2  the  Member  States 
which already meet the requirement279 only have a (significant) positive impact on Central 
Governments budgets. The other Member States register costs to the State.  

275 The increased retention of workers and the decrease in absence from work are due to the measures to 
facilitate work for breastfeeding measures 
276 BE, BG, CY, CZ, DK, EL, FI, HU, IE, IT, LV, RO, SE, SK, UK 
277 DK, FI, MT  
278 CY, CZ, DE, EE, EL, ES, HR, HU, IT, LT, LU, PL, PT, SE, UK  
279 AT, FR, NL, SI  

75 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
Table  2:  Estimated  impact  of  maternity  leave  options  on  Member  States,  relative  to  the 
baseline (EU)280 

Healthcare 
Changes in tax revenue 
Payment of unemployment benefits 
Payment of maternity benefits  
Total impact on 
government/social security, NPV 
2015-2055 

Option 1 
+ € 3.3 billion 
+ € 4 billion 
- € 1.5 billion 
€ 0 

Option 2 
+ € 3.3 billion 
+ € 5.5 billion 
- € 1.8 billion 
- € 9.5 billion 

+ € 5.8 billion 

- € 2.4 billion 

In  terms  of  macroeconomic  effects,  all  options  would  result  in  an  increase  in  labour 
market  participation  and  in  an  increase  in  working  hours,  due  to  improved  breastfeeding 
provisions for working mothers.  

Compared to the baseline, in 2030, the provisions foreseen in Options 1 and 2 would result 
in  a  small  increase  in  total  employment  ranging  between  4  000  (Option  1)  and  5  000 
(Option  2).  The  increase  in  employment  and  increase  in  pay  for  women  whilst  on  leave 
would lead to an overall increase in real incomes by between €0.2 billion (Option 1) and € 
0.8 billion (Option 2) in 2030. Women’s full-time employment after maternity leave would 
also be expected to improve.  

Employment increases due to provisions for breastfeeding that facilitate mothers return to 
employment  after  taking  maternity  leave.  There  is  a  further  multiplier  effect  due  to  the 
increase  in  incomes  and  consumer  expenditure  which  leads  to  an  increase  in  output  and 
GDP.  Over  the  2015-2055,  the  positive  impact  of  the  measures  on  GDP  is  estimated  to 
range  between  €  8.3  billion  in  Option  1  and  €  13.3  billion  in  Option  2.  For  Option  2, 
around 81% of the positive impact on GDP would be concentrated in Member States which 
fall somewhat below the requirements of this option and represent 71% of MS281. Around 
9% of the GDP increase will be concentrated on the 4 countries where measures ranked as 
currently falling substantially below the requirements282.  

Both options have a positive impact on competitiveness. In both options in 2030 increase 
in net exports is estimated at € 0.1 billion and domestic prices would decrease by 0.1%  

280 The decrease in healthcare expenditure is due to the breastfeeding provisions which enable more mothers 
to continue breasteeding while working, the increase in tax revenue is due to an expected decrease in women 
dropping out of the labour market after having a child thanks to the breastfeeding provisions and the increase 
in pay of the compulsory period of maternity leave and the increase in unemployment benefits is due to a 
higher increase in labour force than employment. 
281 BE, BG, CY, DE, EE, EL, ES, HR, IE, IT, LT, LU, PL, PT, SE, UK   
282 AT, FR, NL, SI ( 

76 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
Table 3: Estimated macro-economic impact of maternity leave options  

Impact on GDP, NPV 2015-2055 
(change compared to baseline) 
Impact on labour force in 
2030/2050 
(change compared to baseline) 
Impact on employment in 
2030/2050 
(change compared to baseline) 
Impact on real incomes in 
2030/2050 
(change compared to baseline) 

Option 1 
+ € 8.3 billion (+0.002%)  + 

Option 2 

8 000/10 000 (0.00%) 

13.3 

€ 
(+0.003%) 
11 
(0.00/0.01%) 

000/13 

billion 

000 

4 000/6 000 (0.00%) 

5 000/8 000 (0.00%) 

+  €  0.2  billion  /+  €  1.1 
billion (0.00%) 

+  €  0.6  billion  /+  €  1.5 
billion (0.00/0.01%) 

In both options the rate of employment growth and growth in earnings would be slightly 
higher among women than men, thus a slight narrowing of the gender gap in employment 
would be  expected. In  2050, it is  foreseen that with  Option 1 female  employment would 
increase  by  8000  (compared  to  -2000  for  male  employment)  and  in  Option  2  by  11000 
(compared to -2000 for male employment). 

Stakeholder  views:  The  European  Parliament  has  called  for  effective  protection  for 
pregnant  and  breastfeeding  women  and  single  mothers.  In  the  EU  social  partner 
consultation,  EU  trade  unions  have  called  for  marked  improvements  in  the  areas  of 
transition into work, protection against dismissal and in the area of pay. Employers are not 
in  favour  of  EU-level  action,  as  they  consider  that  further  legislative  action  could  carry 
strongly  negative  financial  implications  on  companies  and  creating  obligations  for 
companies  to  put  in  place  measures  to  facilitate  mothers'  transitions  back  to  work  from 
leave would be very difficult for SMEs.. 

8.1.4 Comparing the Options 

Effectiveness:  The  non-legislative  option  could  carry  some  benefits  to  women's 
participation  in  the  labour  market  by  supporting  their  faster  return  to  work  after  taking 
leave.  Options  1  and  2,  by  introducing  legal  provisions,  would  have  a  higher  a  higher 
impact  than  the  non-legislative  option.  While  Option  2  would  provide  some  additional 
support  for  women  while  on  leave,  the  effectiveness  of  this  measure  in  addressing  the 
problem outlined compared to Option 1 is limited.  

Efficiency: All options would have positive impacts on individuals and companies. Except 
for option 2, all options would have a positive impact on Member States as well. A non-
legislative option would avoid some of the costs linked to the binding obligations (e.g. the 
full pay requirement). Moreover, in contrast to Option 1, the non-legislative option would 
grant Member States and businesses more flexibility regarding the introduction of practices 

77 

 
 
 
 
 
 
facilitating  transition  from  maternity  to  work.  The  introduction  of  full  pay  for  the 
compulsory  period  of  maternity  leave  (two  weeks)  in  Option  2  could  entail  substantial 
costs  on  Member  States,  while  having  a  limited  impact  on  women’s  return  to  the  labour 
force after taking leave. 

Coherence: All options improve the situation of pregnant women. In particular, the options 
would  facilitate  the  exercise  of  the  rights  recognised  in  Article  33  of  the  Charter  of 
Fundamental  Rights,  which  specifically  refers  to  the  reconciliation  of  family  and 
professional life. 

Options 
Baseline 

Non-legislative 
Option 

Option 1 

Option 2 

Effectiveness 

Efficiency 

Coherence 

0 

0  

+++ 

0  

+  

+ Increased retention of women 
in the labour market 

Very limited costs and 
positive impacts on 
companies and Member 
States 

Positive impact on 
fundamental rights of 
pregnant women.  

++ 
Strong increase in the retention 
of women in the labour market 

++ 
 Positive impacts on 
companies and Member 
States 

++ 
High positive impact on 
fundamental rights of 
pregnant women.  

++ 
Strong increase in the retention 
of women in the labour market 

+/- 
Positive impacts on 
companies and negative 
on Member States 

++  
Highest positive impact on 
fundamental rights of 
pregnant women.  

The non-legislative Option has been identified as the preferred option for Maternity Leave. 
The  non-legislative  option  would  have  a  positive  impact  on  individuals  by  facilitating 
mothers' return to employment after taking leave as well as a positive impact on companies 
and  Central  Governments.  The  non-legislative  Option  only  entails  limited  costs  on 
companies  due  to  the  potential  provision  of  breastfeeding  facilities  and  breaks.  It  also 
entails benefits due to an increase in workers' productivity and a reduction in recruitment 
costs. In terms of its impact on Central Governments, the non-legislative Option does not 
foresee  any  additional  payment  of  maternity  benefits  but  does  foresee  savings  due  to  a 
reduction in payment of unemployment benefits and hence has a more positive impact on 
Central Governments than Option 2 in the medium-term. The non-legislative Option hence 
appears to be the most efficient maternity leave option to support female participation in 
the labour market.  

8.2 Paternity leave  

The  non-legislative  Option  would  not  require  Member  States  to  change  their  national 
legislation to introduce paternity leave or change the existing provisions. Option 1 would 

78 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
require  Member States to introduce paternity leave or to extend the duration of paternity 
leave to one week283. Option 2 would have an additional impact on the Member States that 
currently  do  not  provide  for  pay  at  sick  pay  level284.  Option  3  would  require  Member 
States to introduce leave or extend the duration of leave to 2 weeks285.  

8.2.1 Impacts on individuals 

Option  1  would  reserve  a  period  of  leave  to  fathers,  and  therefore  rebalance  the  leave 
provisions  that  are  reserved  respectively  to  women  and  men  when  they  become  parents. 
The impact on take-up by fathers in Member States where there is currently no entitlement 
would be limited because, as shown in the problem definition, when leave periods are not 
paid,  fathers  choose  not  to,  or  are  unable, to  use  their  entitlement.  Therefore  Option  1  is 
likely  to  have  a  limited  impact  in  terms  of  facilitating  a  more  equal  distribution  of  work 
and caring responsibilities, and therefore on female employment 286.  

Option  2  would  have  more  impact  on  take-up  of  leave  than  Option  1  because  providing 
pay would enhance the real possibilities for fathers to make use of the leave.287 This would 
give  the  opportunity  for  fathers  to  spend  more  time  with  their  child  and  play  a  greater 
caring role. This would have a direct positive impact on the work-life balance of fathers. It 
would support their taking of a greater share of care responsibilities, and therefore have an 
indirect positive impact on female employment.  

Some effects would materialise in the future: when fathers take paternity leave, there are 
changes to the assumption that women will always be the (only) parent absent from work 
after  having  a  child.  Furthermore,  paternity  leave  is  estimated  to  have  a  further  leverage 
effect288  on  parental  leave,  which  further  alters  the  sharing  of  unpaid  care  work  among 
parents and supports female employment. This effect is driven by the timing of paternity 
leave, around the birth of the child, which is when new caring responsibilities arise and can 
begin to be shared between parents.  

Option  2  is  also  expected  to  have  a  positive  impact  on  the  quality  of  life  of  mothers, 
children, and fathers themselves. This can be significant at the individual level as research 
shows  increased  wellbeing  and  child  health  in  families  where  the  father  is  present  in  the 
early  weeks  following  a  child’s  birth.  If  fathers  participate  more  in  childcare  and  family 

283 This could require changes in Member States such as AT, CY, CZ, EL, HR, IT, LU, MT, SK 
284 This could require changes in Member States such as CY, CZ, HR, NL, SK 
285 This could require changes in Member States such as AT, CY, CZ, EL, HR, HU, IT, LU, MT, NL, RO, 
SK 
286 For illustration purposes, 3 days is a usual period when employed can be on sick leave without producing 
a medical certificate. 
287 O’Brien (2009), Eurofound (2015). 
288 Duvander, A.Z., Jans, A.C. (2008)  Consequences of fathers’ parental leave use: evidence from Sweden.   
Paper presented to Workshop on Diversity and Leave Policies 2008, Amsterdam. Taskula, S (2007). Parental 
leave for fathers? Research Report no 166. Finland. National Research and Development Centre for Welfare 
and Health, COWI (2012) Study on the costs and benefits of possible EU measures on paternity leave, OECD 
(2016) 

79 

 
 
 
                                                      
life, children enjoy higher cognitive and emotional outcomes and physical health289 and it 
has  been  shown  that  fathers  who  care  for  children  early  tend  to  stay  more  involved  as 
children grow up.290 Fathers who engage more with their children tend to report greater life 
satisfaction and better physical and mental health than those who care for and interact less 
with  their  children291.  Mothers  also  are  better  off,  in  particular  they  experience  quicker 
recovery  and  they  have  a  lower  risk  of  post-partum  depression  when  their  partner  takes 
paternity leave.292 

Option  3  would  have  similar  effects  as  Option  2,  but  as  a  longer  period  of  leave  is 
provided, the impacts would be stronger, in terms of supporting father’s taking of a greater 
share  of  care  responsibilities,  and  therefore  female  employment.  The  leverage  effect  on 
parental leave referred to above is more likely to occur with paternity leave of 2 weeks or 
more293. Option 3 would also have a stronger impact on bonding between father and child, 
by giving the opportunity for fathers to spend more time with their child.  

By facilitating a more equal distribution of work and household responsibilities, and thus 
contributing to female employment, all options could indirectly contribute to the reduction 
of  poverty  among  women  and  their  families,  given  that  dual-earner  households  are  at  a 
lower risk of poverty294.   

The  non-legislative  Option  would  have  similar  positive  impacts  on  individuals  but  the 
extent  of  these  impacts  would  depend  on  the  degree  of  implementation  of  the  non-
legislative instruments. 

8.2.2 Impacts on companies 

The  benefits  of  the  non-legislative  option  and  the  three  legislative  options  derive  from  a 
stronger  commitment  to  the  organisation  and  the  profession  from  new  fathers,  who  can 
spend some time with their family around the time of the birth of a child; this can retaining 
staff and also reducing absenteeism.295 These benefits, however, cannot all be quantified.  

289 OECD (2016) Brief on parental leave 
290 OECD (2016)  
291 OECD (2016) 
292  Conversely,  the  women  whose  partner  took  no  paternity  leave  were  significantly  more  likely  to  report 
depression than women whose partners took the standard two weeks leave (Redshaw and Henderson, 2013). 
Similarly, Sejourné et al. (2012) find a low level of paternal involvement in infant care (no paternity leave) is 
significantly  associated  with  maternal  postpartum  depression.  See  also  LSE  literature  review  (2015) 
presenting consistent evidence in the literature. 
293  Taskula  (2007)  suggests  that  longer  paternity  leave  can  be  related  to  a  longer  period  of  parental  leave 
subsequently used, based on a survey that showed that fathers who took three weeks of paternity leave also 
took more parental leave. 
294 European Commission (2016) Employment and Social Developments in Europe 
295 Vaganay, Canónico, Courtin (2016) Challenges of work-life balance faced by working families: review of 
Costs and Benefits, Evidence Review, London School of Economics. 

80 

 
 
 
 
                                                      
In  contrast,  the  costs  have  been  quantified  in  great  detail  and  they  consist  of  a  small 
potential  loss  of  production  when  more  fathers  take  these  short  periods  of  paternity 
leave296,  the  payment  of  additional  paternity  benefits  in  Member  States  where  they  are 
required to, and administrative burden to process paternity leave applications. Due to the 
leverage effect of paternity leave, more fathers will take parental leave. This will lead to a 
cost in those cases where employers choose to replace these individuals while they are on 
parental leave.  

Estimates  suggest  that  while  the  average  annual  cost  per  company  is  higher  than  in  the 
baseline situation in the three options, the difference is small, see table below. In 2050, the 
average cost would be € 3 higher than the baseline for option 1, €14 for option 2 and €43 
for option 3.  

The estimated costs for microbusinesses are equal or below 0.1% of turnover297 and very 
close  to  the  level  of  cost  under  the  baseline.  Therefore  the  policy  options  do  not 
disproportionately  affect  the  performance  of  SMEs.  Some  short-term  negative  effects 
cannot however be discarded as clarified above (e.g. the leverage effect on a greater take-
up of parental leave)  

Employers report298 that they perceive paternity leave as an easy process, as it concerns a 
short  period,  it  can  be  anticipated  and  it  is  generally  considered  to  be  similar  to  annual 
leave in organisational terms for the company, so it can be reasonably assumed that none 
of  the  options  assessed  would  lead  to  significant  implementation  costs  or  disrupt  the 
organisation of work. There is also anecdotal evidence that some companies already offer 
paid paternity leave to their employees 299. 

296 Employers typically do not replace fathers taking paternity leave (due to the short duration of the leave), 
which leads to an increase in the amount of lost production. 
297 The costs as a percentage of turnover for microbusinesses (with fewer than 10 employees) is presented in 
Annex 9 of the supporting study 
298 Vaganay, Canónico, Courtin (2016) 
299  For  example,  the  Norwegian  employers  association  was  a  key  supporter  of  the  introduction  of  paid 
paternity leave in Norway; in the Spanish subsidiary of Orange, a mobile network operator, employees can 
extend  their  paternity  leave  up  to  four  weeks;  in  Italy,  Nestle  promoted  paternity  leave  among  their 
employees  in 2012  through  the  extension of  the  legal  three  days  to  two weeks’ paternity  leave  with 100% 
wage compensation. 

81 

 
 
 
                                                      
Sensitivity analysis on lost production 

It  also  needs  to  be  noted  that  the  estimated  of  lost  production  included  in  the  total  costs 
figures  assume  that  for  the  entire  period  a  father  is  on  paternity  leave  the  employer  will 
lose 100% of his productive value. However, in reality some of this production could be 
taken up by other staff already employed, through a redistribution of tasks or by the father 
when  he  comes  back  from  leave.  Therefore,  the  negative  impact  on  businesses  reported 
above and in Table 4 is most probably overestimated, as the lost production cost calculated 
corresponds  to  the  maximum  loss  for  a  business  when  a  father  takes  paternity  leave.    If 
20%  of  the  lost  production  is  absorbed  either  by  labour  force  adjustment  or  simply 
compensates  for  temporary  under-utilisation,  the  value  of  lost  production  due  to  fathers 
taking paternity leave would be sensibly lower. Thus, the cost for the whole period 2015-
2055  would  be  of  €162  million  over  the  entire  period  up  until  2055  (compared  to  €359 
million if 100% of the production is assumed to be lost) in Option 1, € 661 million instead 
of  €  1707  million  under  Option  2  and  €  2527  million  instead  of  €  5756  million  under 
Option 3. 

Table 4: Estimated impact of paternity leave options on companies, relative to the baseline 
(EU)300 

Option 1 
- € 2 million 
- € 93 million  
- € 368 million  

Option 2 
- € 46 million 
- € 649 million 
- € 1.9 bn  

Leave request processing 
Payment of paternity benefits 
Lost production 
Total  impact on 
companies, NPV 2015-
2055 
Total impact/company in 
2030/2050 
Note: These calculations include an estimation of the leverage effect of paternity leave on father's 
take-up  of  parental  leave.  Costs  due  to  leave  request  processing  and  lost  production  take  into 
account the costs due to a higher take- up of parental leave. 

- € 464 million 

- € 14/ - €43 

- € 4/ - €14 

- € 1/ -  €3 

- € 2.6 bn 

- € 7.8 bn 

Option 3 
- € 59 million  
- € 1.8 bn  
- € 5.9 bn  

8.2.3 Impacts on Member States 

The  budgetary  impacts  for  all  options  on  Central  Governments  are  limited.  There  are 
small  changes in employment, earnings and labour  market participation in  all options, as 
they affect leave options for a small subset of the working population (new fathers) over a 
period  of  1-2  weeks,  so  changes  in  tax  receipts  and  unemployment  benefit  payments  are 

300 The cost of processing leave request is due to an increase in take-up of paternity leave and in 
administrative costs to process it and the costs of lost production are due to the fact that fathers will not work 
while on leave. 

82 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
small  too.  Where  there  are  employment  impacts,  the  gender  employment  and  pay  gaps 
narrow slightly. It is also expected that the level of healthcare provision changes, as fathers 
who  take  paternity  leave  are  more  supportive  to  their  partners,  which  reduces  the 
healthcare requirements for new mothers.  

The budgetary costs are relatively small under all options. The cost related to payment of 
paternity  benefits  and  the  administrative  burden  is  marginal,  as  the  level  of  payment  for 
paternity  leave  (due  to  the  relatively  short  duration)  is  low  and  the  change  in  take-up  in 
most countries is small. The majority of this increase in benefit payments is assumed301 to 
fall on public budgets. The absolute changes in administrative burden are relatively small. 

The  impact  on  the  state  in  different  country  clusters  is  as  follows:  in  Option  1,  Member 
States  which  fall  significantly  below  the  requirements302  make  up  1%  of  the  cost  to  the 
State in this option, whereas those which fall only somewhat below the requirements303 are 
responsible  for  53%  of  the  costs.  Although  the  impact  in  terms  of  legislative  change  is 
large  for  countries  not  yet  offering  paternity  leave,  as  the  leave  is  unpaid,  the  impact  is 
relatively  small.  In  Option  2,  Member  States  which  fall  significantly  below  the 
requirements304 make up 12% of the cost to the State in this option. In Option 3, Member 
States  which  fall  significantly  below  the  requirements305  make  up  8%  of  the  cost  to  the 
State. 

Table  5:  Estimated  impact  of  paternity  leave  options  on  Member  States,  relative  to  the 
baseline (EU)306 

Option 1 
+ € 40 million 
+ € 1 million 
- € 154 million  
- € 966 million  
- € 4 million  

Option 2 
+ € 154 million 
+ € 12 million 
- € 688 million  
- € 357 million  
- € 72 million  

Payment of unemployment benefits 
Change in hospital admissions 
Payment of benefits  
Change in tax revenues 
Leave request processing 
Total impact on 
government/social security, 
NPV 2015-2055 
Note: These calculations include an estimation of the leverage effect of paternity leave on father's 
take-up  of  parental  leave.  Costs  due  to  leave  request  processing  and  lost  production  take  into 
account the costs due to a higher take- up of parental leave 

- € 951 million 

- € 2.4 billion 

- € 1.1 billion 

Option 3 
+ € 203 million 
+ € 15 million 
- € 2.2 billion  
- € 291 million  
- € 88 million  

301 Where there were no previous paternity benefit payments in a Member States, it is assumed that the 
Central Government would pay. 
302 CZ, HR, CY, SK  
303 EL, IT, LU, MT, AT  
304 CZ, HR, CY, SK  
305 CZ, HR, CY, SK  
306 The decrease in payment of unemployment benefits is due to the expected increase in employment, the 
rise in take-up of paternity leave leads to a decrease in hospital admissions because the father can support the 
mother and the child around the time of the birth, the change in tax revenues is due to the increase in 
employment and the cost of processing leave request is due to an increase in take-up of paternity leave and in 
administrative costs to process it 

83 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
The macroeconomic effects of the paternity leave options are small. There is also a small 
longer term effect through paternity leave take up increasing the take-up of parental leave 
among fathers. The increase in employment and reduction in working hours have opposite 
effects which cancel  each other: the small  increase  in employment of temporary  workers 
(through the leverage effect of paternity leave on fathers taking parental leave) leads to an 
increase in income, consumption and GDP. Counteracting this effect is a small reduction in 
working  hours  for  fathers  with  young  children,  which  marginally  reduces  the  productive 
capacity of the economy, leading to a small reduction in output and GDP. Estimates show 
no impact on  competitiveness  (in terms of net  exports  and domestic prices)  for all three 
options. 

In  Option  1,  the  slightly  negative  GDP  impact  only  marginally  arises  from  changes  in 
member  States  which  have  no  current  provisions  or  fall  significantly  below  the 
requirements307  (1%)  with  Member  States  which  fall  only  somewhat  below  the 
requirements  making  up  68%  of  the  impact308.  In  Option  2,  the  impact  of  the  legislative 
change  on  Member  States  which  fall  significantly  below  the  requirements309  is  positive 
whereas  the  overall  impact  remains  slightly  negative.  In  Option  3,  both  the  cluster  of 
Member States which fall somewhat below the requirements310 and the cluster of Member 
States  which  fall  significantly  below  the  requirements311  register  GDP  benefits,  with  the 
slightly negative/neutral GDP impact mainly resulting from a very slightly negative impact 
in Member States which already meet the requirements312. 

307 CZ, HR, CY, SK  
308 EL, IT, LU, MT, AT  
309 CZ, HR, CY, SK  
310 EL, IT, LU, HU, MT, NL, AT, RO  
311 CZ, HR, CY, SK  
312 BE, BG, DK, DE, EE, IE, ES, FR, LV, LT, PL, PT, SI, FI, SE  

84 

 
 
 
                                                      
Table 6: Estimated macro-economic impact of paternity leave options  

Impact on GDP, NPV 
2015-2055 
(change compared to 
baseline) 
Impact on labour force 
in 2030/2050 
(change compared to 
baseline) 
Impact on employment 
in 2030/2050 
(change compared to 
baseline) 
Impact on real incomes 
in 2030/2050 
(change compared to 
baseline) 

Option 1 
-  €  2.4  billion  (-
0.001%) 

Option 2 
-  €  0.4  billion  (-
0.0001%) 

Option 3 
 -  €  0.2  billion  (-
0.00005%) 

0 to -1000 (0.00%) 

0 
to 
(0.00%) 

-1000 

0 to -1000 (0.00%) 

0 to -1000 (0.00%) 

0 to 1000 (0.00%)  1000 (0.00%) 

-  €  0.1  billion  /-  € 
0.2 billion (0.00%) 

 € 
0.0 
(0.00%) 

billion 

€ 
0.0 
(0.00%) 

billion 

Stakeholder  views:  The  European  Parliament  has  called  for  an  EU  directive  providing  a 
minimum of a two-week, fully paid, compulsory paternity leave. EU trade unions are also 
in favour of paid paternity leave at EU level. EU employer organisations are not in favour 
of EU action. The Advisory Committee on equal opportunities between women and  men 
recommends  including  incentives  for  men  to  take  leave  in  the  form  of  non-transferable 
rights, pay and other financial incentives. In their reply to the public consultation, ES and 
EE  mentioned  they  are  in  favour  of  a  European  paternity  leave.  NGOs313  called  for  the 
Commission to introduce paternity leave, of at least two weeks fully paid. 

8.2.4 Comparing the Options 

limited  effectiveness 

imply  barely  any 
Effectiveness:  A  non-legislative  option  would  most  probably 
improvement vis-à-vis the baseline scenario and, therefore, not be very effective. Option 1 
would  have 
improving  work-life  balance  and  women’s 
participation in the labour market because men are unlikely to make use of the entitlement 
if  it  is  not  compensated.  Option  2  would  be  more  effective  than  Option  1  as  the  leave 
would be paid but to a lesser extent than Option 3. Option 3 would be the most effective in 
facilitating  women’s  employment  as  the  literature  suggests  that  “leverage  effects”  on 

in 

313 AGE Platform Europe, COFACE Families Europe, ENIL, European Women's Lobby, Eurocarers, 
Eurochild, Make Mothers Matter (2017), Europe's Last Chance, Work-Life Balance: time to bring work and 
welfare policies in line with the 21st century 

85 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
future take-up of parental leave are more likely to occur with a longer paternity leave of 2 
weeks or more, so the positive long-run impact on women in the labour market would be 
largest.  It  is  also  slightly  more  effective  in  terms  of  supporting  a  balanced  use  of  leave 
between parents as fathers take up of leave would increase.  

Efficiency:  Although  limited,  Option  3  has  the  highest  costs  on  companies  and  central 
governments. Option 2 would have fewer costs than Option 3 because of the shorter period 
of  benefit  payment.  A  non-legislative  measure  would  have  limited  costs  given  the 
uncertain implementation by Member States. 

Coherence: All options have positive impacts on parents and positive impacts for children 
as they enhance the rights of the child to be cared for by his/her two parents and are fully 
consistent  with  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights,  while  enhancing  some  of  the  rights 
enshrined therein, in particular the respect for private and family life (Article 7).  

Options 

Baseline 

Effectiveness 

0 

Efficiency 

Coherence 

0 

0  

Non-legislative 
Option 

Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 3 

+ 
Limited effects 

+  
Marginally achieves the objective of 
the initiative in terms of work-life 
balance and fathers' take-up of leave 

++ 
Achieves the objective by having 
direct positive impact on work-life 
balance and father's up-take of leave, 

+++   
Strongly achieves the objective by 
having direct positive impact on 
work-life balance and father's up-
take of leave 

-  
Limited costs 

- 
Low costs on 
companies and 
Central 
Government 

- 
Higher costs on 
companies and 
lower on Central 
Government  than 
Option 1 
--  
Highest  costs  on 
companies and 
Central 
Government 

+  
Marginal positive impact 
on fundamental rights  
+ 
Some impact on parents 
and carers and positive 
impacts for children  no 
negative impact on other 
FRs 
++ 
Positive impact on parents 
and carers and positive 
impacts for children no 
negative impact on other 
FRs 
+++ 
Highly positive impact on 
parents and carers and 
positive impacts for 
children no negative 
impact on other FRs 

Option 3 (an individual entitlement to two weeks paternity leave paid at least at sick pay 
level)  has  been  identified  as  the  preferred  option.  As  mentioned  above,  evidence  of 
Member  States'  experiences  suggests  that  where  leave  is  remunerated,  it  has  a  strong 
positive impact on its take-up by men, as well as female employment outcomes314. Options 

314 OECD (2013) Closing the Gender Gap 

86 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
2 and 3 would thus have a much higher individual positive impact than Option 1 and the 
non-legislative  Option.    Although  Option  3  has  the  highest  cost  for  companies,  when 
disaggregated the cost represents only 14 € per company in 2030 and 43 € per company in 
2050. Moreover, thanks to its longer duration, Option 3 is the option that best improves the 
possibilities for fathers to be involved in caring responsibilities directly following the birth 
of a child. Evidence also shows that the leverage effect on parental leave, which has highly 
positive  impacts  on  GDP,  labour  force  participation,  employment  and  real  incomes  (see 
below), is more likely to occur with paternity leave of 2 weeks or more.  Option 3 hence 
appears to rank higher in efficiency compared to the other paternity leave options assessed. 

8.3 Parental leave 

Based on the available information, the non-legislative Option would not require Member 
States  to  change  their  national  legislation  to  change  their  existing  provisions  on  Parental 
Leave. Option 1 would only require one Member State315 to change its legal framework to 
allow for flexibility in taking parental leave. Option 2 would require the same adjustments 
as Option 1. It would additionally require that Member States guarantee payment at least at 
the  level  of  sick  pay  for  the  one  non-transferable  month.316  Option  3  would  require  the 
same  adjustments  as  Option 1.  In  addition  to  Option  1,  Member  States317  would  have  to 
guarantee payment at least at level of sick pay for the 4 months period of leave. Increasing 
the non-transferable period to 4 months would also be required318. In addition, it should be 
ensured  that  this  non-transferable  period  is  compensated  at  least  at  sick  pay  level319.  An 
increase in the maximum age of the child up to which parents can take parental leave from 
8  to  12  years  old  would  also  require  some  Member  States  to  change  their  national 
legislation320. 

8.3.1 Impacts on individuals 

Option 1 would facilitate the use of parental leave by both parents through the entitlement 
to  flexibility,  which  would  allow  them  to  choose  when  and  how  to  use  the  leave.  For 
example, for parents who may be unwilling or unable to stop work completely, flexibility 
can help minimise the negative financial impact of taking leave.  321 Flexibility can allow 
workers  to  maintain  the  benefits  of  a  connection  to  the  workplace,  minimise  the 
interruption of work and maintain their skills. The decision of fathers to take parental leave 
depends to some extent on flexibility of leaves.  

315 RO. 
316 This could require changes in Member States such as: BE, EL, ES, FR, IE, IT, LV, MT, NL, PT, SK, UK. 
317 This could require changes in Member States such as: BE,, EL, ES, FR, IE, IT, LV, MT, NL, PT, SK, UK. 
318 This could require changes in Member States such as: AT, BG, CZ, EE, EL, FI, HR, IE, LT, PL, PT, RO, 
SE, SI. 
319 This could require changes in Member States such as: DE, DK 
320 These Member States could include: BG, CY, DK, HR, IE, LV, MT, NL, SE. 
321  
The  flexibility  and  simplicity  of  leave  arrangements  have  been  shown  to  influence  take-up  by 
fathers,  see  Eurofound (2015)  Promoting uptake  of parental  and  paternity  leave  among  fathers  in  the  EU, 
Van Belle (2016). 

87 

 
 
 
                                                      
For Option 2, the introduction of the requirement for pay for part of the period would have 
an additional direct positive impact on the take-up of leave. In addition, introducing a pay 
requirement  would  enhance  the  effectiveness  of  parental  leave  in  facilitating  work-life 
balance for parents  with low and  middle incomes,  who  most likely cannot afford  to  take 
unpaid leave. Such a measure could therefore also reduce the risk of poverty in households 
with  children.  Option  2  also  provides  an  incentive  for  fathers,  as  well  as  mothers,  to 
increase their take-up of leave. This has a direct positive impact on their work-life balance 
and  it  also  supports  fathers’  taking  a  greater  share  of  care  responsibilities,  which  can 
extend beyond the period of parental leave taken. As a consequence, it should increase the 
availability of women for increased labour market participation. Supply of female labour is 
stimulated as women are more available to remain in the job once they have children, and 
as demand for female labour is also stimulated because when more men use leave322, this 
mitigates  the  assumption  that  women  are  the  parent  taking  leave.  Option  2  would  also 
result  in  more  women  returning  earlier  to  employment,  and  having  shorter  career 
interruptions.  The  level  of  employment  is  expected  to  rise  as  are  average  earnings.  This 
will  lead  to  an  increase  in  average  household  incomes  and  have  a  positive  effect  on  the 
number of households in poverty. Option 2 is also estimated to have a beneficial effect on 
the  health  of  women  and  children  and  would  result  in  positive  impacts  for  children’s 
cognitive and social development, as referred to in the problem definition. Four weeks of 
parental  leave  by  fathers  are  found  to  increase  children’s  performance  in  school.323 
Therefore, additional positive impacts would materialise in the future. 

Option  3  would  have  similar  beneficial  effects  in  terms  of  the  health  and  well-being  of 
women and children, but it would also have even greater benefits regarding fathers’ take-
up than Option 2. As all four months of the leave would be paid as well as reserved for the 
fathers,  take-up  and  length  of  leave  by  fathers  is  likely  to  increase,  given  the  evidence 
suggesting  that  fathers  are  more  likely  to  make  use  of  their  entitlements  when  they  are 
adequately paid and reserved for them324. There is a stronger incentive for fathers to take 
leave325, the stigma  of doing  so is  reduced326 and  it legitimises the  idea  of fathers taking 
leave, thereby easing  potential  objections from employers327. Therefore, a more balanced 

322  Research shows that countries where men take 1 to 3 months of paternity or parental leave experience 
more gender equality in the labour market, and lower discrimination against pregnant women and women in 
the child-rearing age (Tavistock Institute). 
323 Cools, S., Fiva, J. H. and L.J. Kirkebøen (2015), Causal Effects of Paternity Leave on Children and 
Parents. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, volume 117, issue 3. 
324  OECD (2016) Parental Leave: Where are the fathers? 
325 The literature shows that fathers are more likely to use the leave available when it is reserved for them, in 
the  form  of  an  individual  entitlement  and  paid,  see    O’Brien  (2009),  Fathers,  parental  leave  policies  and 
infant quality of life: international perspectives and policy impact; Eurofound (2013), Moss, P. (2015), 11th 
International review of leave policies and related research; Cabrita, J. and F. Wohlgemuth (2015), Promoting 
uptake  of  parental  and  paternity  leave  among  fathers  in  the  EU,  Eurofound;  Council  of  Europe  (2005) 
Parental  Leave  in  Council  of  Europe  Member  States;  Van  Belle  (2016),  Tavistock  Institute  (2011), 
Additional paternity leave unlikely to have an impact. 
326  Winkler,  E.A.  (2016)  Women’s  labor  force  participation  -  Family-friendly  policies  increase  women’s 
labor 
IZA, 
http://wol.iza.org/articles/womens-labor-force-participation/long   
327  

force  participation,  benefiting 

families, 

society 

large, 

them, 

their 

and 

at 

88 

 
 
 
                                                      
share of caring responsibilities between women and men can be expected, with a positive 
impact  on  equality  between  women  and  men  in  the  labour  market.  Increasing  non-
transferability for the full four-month period in Option 3 would lead to some adjustments 
in  the  arrangements  between  parents  to  decide  who  takes  the  leave  on  the  basis  of  the 
personal  or  financial  situation.  It  might  also  reduce  the  overall  period  of  parental  leave 
women take, given the evidence that men tend to transfer their share of leave on to women. 
However  by  limiting  the  possibility  for  fathers  to  transfer  their  leaves  on  to  mothers,  it 
would  reduce  the  risk  of  women’s  extended  absences  in  the  labour  market  after  having 
children  relative  to  men,  which  would  limit  the  negative  scarring  effects  on their  careers 
and  enhance  their  professional  prospects.  Improving  the  likelihood  of  women’s  return  to 
the labour market would also reduce the risk of poverty among women and their families, 
since dual-earner households tend to be at a lower risk of poverty. Moreover, by providing 
payment  for  the  full  four-months  of  leave,  this  option  would  provide  increased  income 
security for families and could substantially reduce the risk of poverty among households 
with  children.  As  mentioned  in  Option  2,  Option  3  is  also  expected  to  have  positive 
impacts  on  women  and  children  health  as  well  as  children's  cognitive  and  personal 
development. 

In addition to the parameters which compose the three options assessed above, increasing 
the  maximum  age  of  the  child  to  12  years  old  would  also  have  a  positive  impact  on 
individuals  as  it  would  increase  the  flexibility  for  parents  to  take  parental  leave  and  will 
likely increase the length of their take-up of the leave, with all the associated benefits on 
parents and children described above. 

The  non-legislative  Option  would  have  similar positive  impacts  on individuals similar to 
those described above but they are expected to be weaker giving the non-legal character of 
that option. 

8.3.2 Impacts on companies 

The impacts of the considered options for companies include a temporary potential loss of 
production, the costs where employers  choose to replace existing  staff who take  parental 
leave328 (recruitment costs of possible replacement staff), and there can be an increase in 
administrative  burden  in  processing  increased  numbers  of  parental  leave  applications. 
There will also be benefits to companies, as individuals taking parental leave are expected 
to take fewer days off work due to sickness (or sickness of the child), and are more likely 
to return to the same job after taking parental leave, which reduces recruitment and training 
costs and in turn increases productivity, as skilled staff are retained. 

An indirect increase in the demand for female employees can be expected due to changes 
in the notion that the ‘costs’ of childrearing are strictly associated with mothers. Employers 
could start anticipating that men, and not only women, may take leave after having a child. 

328 A worker taking parental leave on a part-time basis would still be present at work and this provides more 
possibilities for internal reorganisation. If the employee is on leave only part-time or in short blocks at a time, 
in many cases, they may not have to find and hire a replacement worker, as compared to a longer absence. 

89 

 
 
 
                                                      
This  could  function  as  a  ‘signalling’  tool  for  employers  and  employees  and  reduce 
disincentives  to  hire  women  of  childbearing  age329.  The  quantitative  analysis,  however, 
does not include such indirect impacts.  

Overall,  the  costs  related  to  increasing  numbers  of  men  taking  short  periods  of  leave  or 
part-time leave for certain periods are inferior to the costs of women taking longer leaves, 
due to the reduced need to find replacement and the lesser skills depreciation. Moreover, 
flexible use of parental leave should not have any strong disruptive effect on companies. 
Employers would benefit from retaining qualified employees on the job instead of hiring 
and  training  new  employees330,  with  benefits  particularly  high  for  employers  in  female-
dominated sectors  

The quantitative analysis suggests that impacts on companies are mixed in all options. For 
all of them, there is an increase in take up of parental leave. This leads to an increase in 
administrative  burden  for  employers,  largely  due  to  the  requirement  to  process  more 
applications for leave. The total increase in administrative burden to employers in the EU 
is estimated to be of € 48 million in option 1, € 402 million in option 2 and €844 million in 
Option  3  for  the  period  2015-2055.  The  increase  in  the  take  up  of  parental  leave  is 
estimated to lead to a temporary  loss of production for companies, which is  discussed in 
the box below. 

The increase in take up of parental leave leads to employers having to consider whether to 
recruit  more  workers  to  temporarily  replace  workers  who  have  taken  parental leave.  The 
cost of this recruitment process is estimated to be highest in option 3, with the cost being 
an additional €833 million compared to the baseline scenario.  Around 62% of this cost is 
borne by the employers in the three countries in the cluster considered to fall significantly 
below the requirements of option 3331. This needs to be seen together with the lower needs 
to recruit more workers in the future, as companies are retaining workers who take parental 
leave.  

This staff retention benefit is estimated to be largest in option 3, with an estimated benefit 
of  €426  million  to  businesses.  This  is  driven  by  more  workers  feeling  able  to  take  leave 
and  return  to  their  job,  rather  than  having  to  leave  their  job  to  care  for  children.  All  the 
costs and benefits are recurring (they are incurred annually) and there are no one-off costs 
for reasonable adjustment. Around 60% of this benefit will be found in the countries in the 
cluster most affected by policy option 3332.  

329 In contract theory, signaling is the idea that one party credibly conveys some information about itself to 
another  party.  In  this  case,  it  is  about  facilitating  the  reading  of  (potential)  employees  signals  about  their 
ability  level  for  the  employer,  by  diminishing  the  incentives  for  employers  to  take  into  consideration 
(potential) caring responsibilities as a signal of low ability. 
330 European Parliament (2010) Costs and benefits of maternity leave and paternity leave 
331 EL, ES, UK 
332 EL, ES, UK  

90 

 
 
 
                                                      
A higher parental leave uptake is also expected to reduce the number of days of absence 
workers  take.  The  benefit  businesses  get  from  a  reduction  in  absence  from  work  is 
expected to reach up to € 566 million in Option 3 for the period 2015-2055. Around 72% 
of this benefit will be experienced in the countries of the cluster experiencing the largest 
legislative impact333. 

As  a  result,  the  total  cost  on  businesses  for  the  period  2015-2055  of  the  introduction  of 
legislation is of € 233 million in option 1, € 10.4 billion in option 2; and € 39.8 billion in 
option 3. The cost per company is slightly higher than in the baseline. It is estimated to be 
€110 in 2030 in the most generous option (Option 3). This is estimated to be below 0.4% 
of  business'  turnover  in  all  countries  in  all  policy  options.  Member  States  which  fall 
significantly below the requirements334 make up over 20% of the total cost in Option 3.  

An assessment of the cost for micro-businesses shows that the cost of all policy options 
represents  1%  or  less  than  1%  of  companies'  total  turnover  in  almost  all  Member  States 
and very close to the level of cost under the baseline. Where the costs represent more than 
1%  (2%  in  Austria  for  example),  the  existing  legislation  incurs  a  similarly  high  cost  to 
microbusinesses.  Therefore  the  policy  options  do  not  disproportionately  affect  the 
performance of SMEs335. Some short-term negative effects cannot however be discarded as 
clarified above (e.g. those related to an increased take-up of parental leave).  

Sensitivity analysis on lost production 

It  also  needs  to  be  noted  that  the  estimated  of  lost  production  included  in  the  total  costs 
figures assume that for the entire period a parent is on parental leave the employer will lose 
100% of his productive value. However, in reality some of this production could be taken 
up by other staff already employed, through a redistribution of tasks or by the parent when 
he/she  comes  back  from  leave.  Therefore,  the  negative  impact  on  businesses  reported 
above and in Table 7 is most probably overestimated, as the lost production cost calculated 
corresponds  to  the  maximum  loss  for  a  business  when  a  parent  takes  parental  leave.    If 
20%  of  the  lost  production  is  absorbed  either  by  labour  force  adjustment  or  simply 
compensates  for  temporary  under-utilisation,  the  value  of  lost  production  due  to  parents 
taking parental leave would be sensibly lower. Thus, the cost for the whole period 2015-
2055  would  be  of  €68  million  over  the  entire  period  up  until  2055  (compared  to  €189 
million if 100% of the production is assumed to be lost) in Option 1, € 1.4 billion instead 
of € 3.5 billion under Option 2 and € 3.2 billion instead of € 13.3 billion under Option 3. 

333 EL, ES, UK  
334 EL, ES, UK  
335 Ibid 

91 

 
 
 
 
                                                      
Table 7: Estimated impact of parental leave options on companies, relative to the baseline 
(EU)336 

Retention of workers 
Less absence from work 
Leave request processing 
Payment of parental benefits 
Recruitment  
Lost production 
Total  impact on 
companies, NPV 2015-
2055 
Total impact/company 
in 2030/2050 

Option 1 
+ € 53 million 
€ 0 
- € 48 million 
- € 1 million 
- € 48 million 
- € 189 million 

Option 2 
+ € 168 million 
+ € 153 million 
- € 402 million 
- € 6.3 billion 
- € 479 million 
- € 3.5 billion 

Option 3 
+ € 426 million 
+ € 566 million 
- € 844 million 
- € 25.9 billion 
- € 833 million 
- € 13.3 billion 

- € 233 million 

- € 10.4 billion 

- € 39.8 billion 

 € 0/ - € 1 

- € 29/- € 40 

- € 110/ - € 150 

8.3.3 Impacts on Member States 

The  negative  budgetary  impacts  are  expected  to  be  driven  primarily  by  changes  in 
payments  made  for  parental  leave  benefits,  and  to  a  smaller  degree,  by  increases  in 
administrative burden under all options, driven by an increase in take up of parental leave.  

In  Options  2  and  3  changes  in  employment  and  pay  will  have  budgetary  impacts  by 
altering  benefit  payments  and  taxes  received.  As  employment,  fertility  rates  and  average 
earnings are estimated to increase, there is an expected positive impact on the tax received. 
All  three  Options  increase  the  level  of  payment  of  benefits  by  the  Central  Governments 
(from € 1 million in Option 1 to € 13.1 billion in Option 3 over the 2015-2055 period) and 
Social Security Partners (from € 15 million in Option 1 to € 41.4 billion in Option 3 over 
the 2015-2055 period). 

It is also expected that the level of healthcare provision will change under the options, as 
fathers  who  take  parental  leave  are  more  supportive  to  their  partners,  which  reduces  the 
healthcare requirements for new mothers and children.  

As  a  result,  over  the  2015-2055  period,  the  overall  impact  is  expected  to  be  positive  in 
Option 2 (+ € 785million) and negative in Options 1 (- € 1.9 billion) and 3 (-€ 4.2 billion). 

336 The benefit linked to the retention of workers is due to the fact that less women are expected to drop out 
of the labour market because leave entitlement would be more gender balanced and they would take shorter 
leaves than they do now, the benefit linked to less absence from work is due to a more motivated workforce 
which can better reconciliate professional and caring responsibilities, the cost of processing leave request is 
due to an increase in take-up of parental leave and in administrative costs to process it, the recruitment costs 
are due to an expected increase in take-up and the need to replace the additional workers taking leave and the 
costs of lost production are due to the fact that parents will not work while on leave. 

92 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
In  Option  2,  Member  States  which  fall  significantly  below  the  requirements337  make  up 
98% of this positive impact. In Option 3, the Member States which fall significantly below 
the requirements338 are responsible for the overall negative impact. 

Table  8:  Estimated  impact  of  parental  leave  options  on  Member  States,  relative  to  the 
baseline (EU)339 

Payment of unemployment benefits 
Healthcare 
Changes in tax revenue 
Payment of parental benefits  
Leave request processing 
Total impact on 
government/social security, 
NPV 2015-2055 

Option 1 
- € 240 million 
+ € 106 million 
- € 1.7 billion 
- € 16 million 
- € 21 million 

Option 2 
+ € 11.2 billion 
+ € 539 million 
+ € 7.1 billion 
- € 17.7 billion 
- € 316 million 

Option 3 
+ € 10.2 billion 
+ € 2.3 billion 
+ € 38.6 billion 
- € 54.5 billion 
- € 820 million 

- € 1.9 billion 

+€ 785 million 

- € 4.2 billion 

The macroeconomic effects of parental leave vary from one option to another. In the short 
term  and  the  medium  term,  the  improvements  to  parental  leave  provisions  lead  to  an 
increase in the number of parents that participate in the labour force. The increase in the 
number of women in the active labour force is estimated to be larger than the increase in 
men for all options. In the longer term, there is, in addition, an increase in labour supply as 
a result of the higher fertility rate (as the additional children born approach working age). 
By  2050,  the  impact  on  the  labour  force  ranges  from  16  000  in  Option  1  to  106  000 
additional active individuals in Option 3. By 2050, the employment impact ranges from 5 
000 to 134 000. The increases in employment are highest in Option 3.  

The  impact  on  GDP  is  estimated  to  be  the  highest  in  Option  3  (+  €112  billion  over  the 
2015-2055  period).  The  positive  impact  on  GDP  is  driven  by  an  increase  in  real  income 
due to pay (in Options 2 and 3) and an increase in employment, which lead to an increase 
in consumption. The positive impact on GDP is also due to an increase in the labour force, 
leading to an increase in the productive capacity of the Member State. The GDP impact of 
Option 2 is positive due to the high level of positive impact in Member States  which fall 
somewhat  below  the  requirements340.  In  Member  States  which  meet  the  requirements341 
and  those  which  fall  significantly  below342  the  impact  is  negative,  with  the  latter  cluster 

337 IE, EL, ES, MT, NL 
338 EL, ES, UK  
339 The decrease in payment of unemployment benefits is due to the expected increase in employment, the 
rise in take-up of parental leave leads to a decrease in hospital admissions because the parents and the 
children's healths both benefit from the measure, the change in tax revenues is due to the increase in 
employment and the cost of processing leave request is due to an increase in take-up of parental leave and in 
administrative costs to process it 
340 CZ, DE, EE, FR, LT, LU, HU, AT, PL, PT, RO, SI, SK, FI, UK  
341 BE, BG, DK, HR, IT, CY, LV, SE  
342 IE, EL, ES, MT, NL  

93 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
making up 81% of this negative impact. In Option 3, on the other hand, the Member States 
which fall significantly below the requirements343 contribute to the positive impact of this 
option (at 37%, mainly due to assumptions around increased labour market participation by 
women as transferability is reduced). 

Competitiveness  would  be  marginally  affected  by  all  three  options.  While  net  exports 
would slightly decrease in 2030 (up to - €0.5 billion in Option 3), domestic prices would 
decrease by 0.01% in Option 3 in 2030 and not be affected by the other options.  

Table 9: Estimated macro-economic impact of parental leave options  

Impact on GDP, NPV 
2015-2055 
(change compared to 
baseline) 
Impact on labour Force in 
2030/ 2050 (change 
compared to baseline) 
Impact on employment in 
2050/2050 (change 
compared to baseline) 
Impact on real incomes in 
2030/2050 
(change compared to 
baseline) 

Option 1 
-  €  4.8  billion  (-
0.001%) 

Option 2 
+  €  24.2  billion 
(+0.01%) 

Option 3 
+  €  112  billion 
(+0.03%) 

8  000/16  000 
(0.00%/+0.01%) 

19  000/59  000 
(0.01%/+0.03%) 

46  000/106  000 
(0.02%/+0.05%) 

000/5 

2 
(0.00%) 

000 

49  000/64  000 
(0.02%/+0.03%) 

55  000/134  000 
(0.02%/+0.06%) 

- € 0.4 billion /- € 
billion 
0.4 
(0.00%) 

+ € 1.6 billion /+ € 
billion 
2.6 
(+0.01%) 

+ € 4.8 billion /+ € 
billion 
12.8 
(+0.04%/+0.05%) 

The  parental  leave  options  would  accelerate  the  narrowing  of  the  gender  pay  and 
employment gaps. The options will reduce the gender pay gap as female employment will 
increase  at  a  higher  rate  than  male  employment,  male  working  hours  will  decrease  and 
women are more likely to retain the same job as they held before taking leave rather than 
potentially taking a new job requiring lower skills. The greatest impact on gender pay and 
employment gaps is estimated to be in option 3. In 2050, it is foreseen that with Option 1 
female employment would increase by 7000 (compared to -2000 for male employment), in 
Option 2 by 46000 (compared to 18000 for male employment) and in Option 3 by 93000 
(compared to 41000 for male employment). 

343 EL, ES, UK  

94 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
Taking into account collective agreements 

In  many  Member  States,  particularly  those  with  a  strong  tradition  of  cross-sectoral  or 
sectoral  collective  bargaining,  collective  agreements  can  play  a  significant  role  in 
enhancing  leave  measures  provided  in  law.  In  countries  where  a  significant  part  of  the 
working  population  is  covered  by  collective  agreements,  this  can  therefore  mean  that  a 
significant share of workers can benefit from more generous provisions than those that are 
taken  into  account  in  the  legal  gap  analysis  performed  in  the  supporting  study,  thus 
potentially  overestimating  any  cost  (or  benefits)  arising  from  a  revision  of  legislative 
measures. While  such collective agreements can obviously be re-negotiated altering such 
provisions  (for  the  better  or  worse),  it  is  important  to  consider  the  impact  of  taking  into 
account  such  provisions  in  collective  agreements.    A  sample  calculation  was  therefore 
performed  in  relation  to  parental  leave,  using  the  example  of  just  one  country:  the 
Netherlands. According to a report by the Leave Network344, 10% of collective agreements 
in  the  Netherlands  provided  for  parental  leave  (which  according  to  law  is  unpaid)  to  be 
partly paid – between 40% and 75% for 13 weeks. As a basic calculation, it was therefore 
assumed  that  10%  of  the  workforce  receive  a  payment  of  57%  for  13  weeks  of  parental 
leave. This change  in the Netherlands alone leads to the overall  balance of costs 
and benefits to the State overall in the EU to reduce slightly from a benefit of €785 
million  in  option  2  to  a  benefit  of  €770  million.  At  the  same  time,  the  overall 
balance of costs and benefits to employers will reduce from a cost of €10.4 billion 
in option 2 to a cost of €9.7 billion and from €39.8 billion to €37.1 billion in option 3.  

Alternative take-up scenario 

Based  on  current  assumptions,  take-up  of  parental  leave  will  rise,  particularly  in  the 
Options  where  leave  is  better  compensated  and  where  non-transferability  is  increased. 
Take-up is expected to increase and reach a plateau in line with previous levels of take-up 
and the difference between the baseline provisions and the difference with the new options 
(i.e. greater increase in take-up is assumed in countries where the legal gap is greater).  
These  assumptions  about  take-up  rates  influence  the  quantitative  assessment.  If  the 
calculations assumed that take-up in all countries increased to a level similar to that already 
reached  in  a  country  with  relatively  high  level  provisions  (in  terms  of  pay  and  non-
transferability  in  particular,  e.g.  Sweden),  this  would  have  increased  positive  impacts  on 
female employment and labour force participation. In order to estimate the costs of such a 
scenario, an alternative scenario was calculated raising expected take up in all countries to 
increase  towards  the  level  already  found  in  Sweden  (based  on  the  gap  between  current 
legislation and the proposed measures). Calculations show that in Option 3, which provides 
for  the  greatest  non-transferability  and  the  highest  level  of  pay,  the  overall  costs  to  the 
state/social  security  providers  would  reach  €8.9  billion,  while  costs  to  employers  would 
rise to €41 billion. 

344 Den Dulk, L. (2016) "Netherlands country note"  in: Koslowski A., Blum S., and Moss P. (eds.) 
International Review of Policies and Research 2016 

95 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
Stakeholder views: The European Parliament has called for adequate income replacement 
and social protection, from four to at least six months; to increase the age of the child for 
which leave can be taken; and to give parents flexibility as to how to use the leave, with a 
significant  part  of  the  leave  non-transferable.  The  Advisory  Committee  on  equal 
opportunities between women and men recommend to include incentives for men to take 
leave in the form of non-transferable rights, pay and of other financial incentives. EU trade 
unions  have  stressed  the  importance  of  increasing  pay,  non-transferability,  flexibility  of 
uptake and the maximum age of the child up to which parents can take parental leave. EU 
employers’  organisations  are  not  favourable  to  further  EU-level  measures  in  the  area  of 
parental  leave.  In  its  reply  to  the  public  consultation,  France,  which  replied  in  favour  of 
improving  the  EU  legislative  framework,  mentioned  that  there  is  a  need  to  have  more 
convergence  as  regards  parental  leave.  NGOs  called  for  the  Commission  to  introduce 
minimum pay, flexibility as well as to increase the length of leave and the age of the child 
until which the leave can be taken345. 

8.3.4 Comparing the Options 

Effectiveness:  A  non-legislative  option  is  not  expected  to  be  very  effective  in  improving 
work-life  balance  and  women’s  participation  in  the  labour  market,  given  the  uncertainty 
around to which extent the policy guidance will be followed. Option 1 would have limited 
effectiveness  in  improving  work-life  balance  and  women’s  participation  in  the  labour 
market because the leave would still be designed in a way that favours take-up by second 
earners  (mostly  transferable  and  unpaid).  Option  3  would  be  the  most  effective  in 
facilitating  women’s  employment  as  the  introduction  of  pay  and  the  extension  of  non-
transferability  for  the  four-month  period  would  support  a  balanced  use  of  leave  between 
parents. Option 2 would somewhat support fathers’ increased take-up of leave due to the 
payment of the non-transferable period, but would not have a strong impact on balancing 
the take-up of leave between women and men. Option 3 has the highest positive impact on 
employment and labour force participation. 

Efficiency:  Option  3  would  entail  the  highest  direct  costs  for  employers  and  for  central 
government  budgets  because  of  the  payment  of  benefits  and  administrative  burden. 
However, these costs would be largely counter-balanced for central governments by  cost 
savings regarding unemployment benefits and healthcare, as well as increased tax revenue 
due to employment gains. Option 1 has the lowest costs for companies and Option 2 has a 
small  positive  impact  on  central  governments.  The  cost  of  implementing  the  non-
legislative  Option  would  depend  on  the  implementation  by  Member  States  and/or  social 
partners. 

345 AGE Platform Europe, COFACE Families Europe, ENIL, European Women's Lobby, Eurocarers, 
Eurochild, Make Mothers Matter (2017), Europe's Last Chance, Work-Life Balance: time to bring work and 
welfare policies in line with the 21st century 

96 

 
 
 
 
                                                      
Coherence:  All  options,  to  a  different  extent,  would  facilitate  the  exercise  of  the  rights 
recognised in Article 33 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which specifically refers to 
the  reconciliation  of  family  and  professional  life  and  states  that  everyone  shall  have  the 
right to (…) parental leave. In addition, they would facilitate the exercise of the rights set 
out  in  the  equality  title  of  the  Charter,  particularly  equality  between  women  and  men, 
which is to be ensured in all areas, including employment, work and pay (Article 23); the 
prohibition of discrimination based on sex (Article 21); and the rights of children to such 
protection  and  care  as  is  necessary  for  their  well-being  (Article  24).  They  would  also 
enhance the rights of children to be cared for by their two parents. There are no negative 
impacts on other Fundamental Rights. 

Options 
Baseline 

Effectiveness 
0 

Efficiency 
0 

Non-
legislative 
Option 

Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 3 

+ 

- 
Low impact on take-
up of leave and 
increasing female 
employment,  

+  
Slight impact on 
take-up of leave and 
increase in female 
employment 

+++  
High impact on take-
up of leave and 
increase in female 
employment 

+  

Limited costs 

-  
Low costs for companies and costs for 
Central Government budgets 

-/+ 
Costs for companies but benefits for 
Central Government budgets 

-- 
Higher costs for companies and Central 
Government budgets than in Options 1 
and 2 

Coherence 
0 

+  

Marginal positive impact 
on fundamental rights  
+  
Some positive impact on 
parents and positive 
impacts for children, no 
negative impact on other 
FRs 

++ 
Positive impact on parents 
and positive impacts for 
children no negative 
impact on other FRs 

+++ 
Very positive impact on 
parents and positive 
impacts for children no 
negative impact on other 
FRs 

Option 3 is identified as the preferred option for parental leave. As Option 3 provides for 
an individual entitlement to remunerated leave for the full four-month period that is non-
transferable between parents,  it entails  much higher take-up by  men and  hence will have 
the highest positive impact on female employment. Significantly increasing the length of 
the  non-transferable  period  has  considerable  benefits  in  terms  of  increased  household 
incomes  and  individual  well-being  (for  fathers,  mothers  and  children).  Option  3  is  more 
costly for companies and Central Governments than Options 1 and 2, but its higher costs 
remain  modest  in  relative  terms  (110€  per  company  in  2030  and  150€  in  2050).  In 
addition,  it  has  much  larger  effects  in  terms  of  labour  market  participation  as  well  as 
income  security  for  workers  taking  leave.  Furthermore,  Option  3  also  has  much  higher 
positive macro-economic effects. This Option hence appears to rank higher than the other 
parental leave options assessed.  

97 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.4 Carers’ leave 

The  non-legislative  option  would  not  require  Member  States  to  change  their  national 
legislation to introduce carers’ leave or change the existing provisions. For Option 1, some 
Member  States346  would  need  to  introduce  or  extend  carers’  leave  to  the  12-week 
minimum requirement. Some Member States would need to change their legal frameworks 
to provide carers’ leave on a flexible basis347. For Option 2, some Member States348 would 
need to introduce or extend carers’ leave to the 4-week minimum requirement, and some 
Member States349 would need to introduce or raise the allowance of carers’ leave to sick-
pay  level.  The  same  Member  States  would  need  to  change  their  legal  frameworks  to 
provide carers’ leave on a flexible basis as Option 1. For Option 3, a few Member States350 
would need  to  change their  legal frameworks in  order  to  provide  a  short term leave  of  5 
days/year to care for a sick child or dependent relative, and  some Member States would 
need to adapt their legal frameworks to ensure that the leave is paid at sick-pay level351. 

8.4.1 Impacts on individuals 

Option 1 would improve the work-life balance situation of employees who are caring for 
elderly, disabled or ill family members (children, parents and spouses), and would help to 
reduce workers’ stress and well-being. It would allow them to maintain an attachment to 
their jobs during periods of caring responsibilities. As women are more likely than men to 
provide informal care or to be the primary caregivers, Option 1 would allow in particular 
women  to  remain  in  employment,  rather  than  dropping  out  of  the  labour  market.  The 
flexible  design  of  leave  in  this  option  would  encourage  men  to  use  (part  of)  the  leave. 
However,  as  women  are  more  likely  than  men  to  take  unpaid  leave,  Option  1  can  have 
negative gendered impacts: if women are the main users of carers’ leave, this can weaken 
their position in the labour market in terms of employability, pay or career developments, 
as they would be more likely than men to take a career break due to care.  

Option  2  would  similarly  support  work-life  balance  for  workers  with  dependent  family 
members.  It  would  also  strengthen  the  attachment  of  workers’  to  their  jobs,  preventing 
them from dropping out of the labour market during periods of caring responsibilities. As it 
is paid Option 2 would incentivise more first earners (generally men) to make use of the 
entitlement.  Similarly  to  Option  1,  the  flexibility  present  in  Option  2  would  give 
possibilities  for  workers  to  choose  when  and  how  much  time  off  they  need  to  care  for  a 
dependant  or  ill  relative,  for  instance  making  arrangements  for  institutional  care,  or 
spending time with a terminally ill relative, while staying in employment. 

346 This could require changes in Member States such as CY, CZ, EL, ES, HR, LU, MT, SI, SK 
347  This could require changes in Member States such as CY, CZ, EE, EL, HR, IE, LV, MT, SI, SK 
348 This could require changes in Member States such as CY, CZ, ES, LU, MT, SI, SK 
349 This could require changes in Member States such as CY, EL, FR, HU, LT, MT, UK 
350 This could require changes in Member States such as CY, LU, MT 
351 This could require changes in Member States such as CY, ES, LT, MT, UK 

98 

 
 
 
                                                      
Option  3  would  support  reconciliation  of  private  and  professional  life  by  providing 
workers with additional flexibility, allowing them to take a short period of time off in order 
to  tend  to  children  or  ill/dependent  relatives  and/or  accompany  them  to  medical 
appointments. This option could therefore reduce workers’ stress and improve well-being. 
The relatively short period of leave would avoid large breaks in the workers’ career. That 
being said, the short period of leave might not be sufficient for workers with disabled or 
dependent  relatives  who  are  in  need  of  more  intensive  attention,  and  therefore  the 
provision  of  formal  care  services  in  addition  to  this  leave  would  be  crucial  for  work-life 
balance.  

By  facilitating  women’s  employment,  all  options  could  indirectly  contribute  to  the 
reduction of poverty among women and their families, given that dual-earner households 
are  at  a  lower  risk  of  poverty352.  Options  2  and  3  additionally  provide  an  income 
replacement during the period of leave, which could be beneficial in stabilising household 
income particularly for low income households. That being said, given that the period of 
leave is short for Option 3, the fact that the leave is paid is unlikely to have a strong impact 
on reducing poverty risk. 

The  non-legislative  Option  is  expected  to  have  some  positive  impacts  on  individuals 
similar  to  the  above  described.  The  significance  of  these  impacts  would  depend  on  how 
close the implementation by Member States and/or social partners of the considered policy 
guidance would be to the bidding measures presented in options 1 to 3. 

8.4.2 Impacts on companies 

The non-legislative  Option and  Option  1, would entail  costs for companies in  terms of a 
temporary  loss  of  production  for  individuals  who  take  carers’  leave,  and  existing  carers’ 
who  take  longer  carers’  leave  (where  employers  choose  to  replace  individuals  taking 
carers’ leave), The cost of recruiting staff to replace existing staff on carers’ leave (where 
they  are  replaced)  also  needs  to  be  considered,  as  well  as  the  administrative  burden  to 
process  carers’  leave  applications.  That  being  said,  companies  would  benefit  from 
enhanced  satisfaction  and  longer-term  productivity  at  work  of  employees  with  caring 
responsibilities. Moreover, if employees can take a period of leave and then return to work, 
instead  of  dropping  out  of  employment,  there  is  increased  retention  of  skilled  staff  and 
therefore  lower  staff  turnover  and  re-hiring  costs  which  can  translate  into  savings  for 
employers.  Carers’  leave  can  especially  contribute  to  staff  retention  for  employers  who 
employ a large number of people in the age group 54-65 (especially women), as they are 
the most likely group of employees to need to look after an ill or disabled relative (an aged 
relative  or  a  partner),  which  puts  their  employment  at  risk.  These  benefits  substantially 
offset many of the costs for Option 1, however the total impact of this option on companies 
remains negative (- € 304 million for the period 2015-2055). 

352 European Commission (2016) Employment and Social Developments in Europe 

99 

 
 
 
                                                      
Option  2  would  similarly  entail  costs  for  companies  in  terms  of  a  temporary  loss  of 
production,  although  for  a  much  shorter  period.  It  would  also  require  some  increase  in 
replacement costs, although less than Option 1 because of the substantially shorter period. 
As Option 2 requires the payment of the benefit at sick-pay level, this option would also 
entail some costs for companies in terms of benefit payments, though this would depend on 
the financing arrangements for this leave. Where businesses are responsible for paying for 
carers’  leave  (e.g.,  Spain  and  Italy),  there  is  an  increase  in  their  burden  in  paying  for 
carers’  leave  (€  390  million  in  Option  2  for  the  whole  EU  for  the  period  2015-2055). 
Companies  would  however  similarly  benefit  from  enhanced  satisfaction  and  productivity 
of work for employers with caring responsibilities, as well as increased retention of staff 
and reduced staff turnover and re-hiring costs.  

Option 3 would entail some costs for employers due to payment of benefits (depending on 
how the leave is financed), as well as some costs due to a temporary loss production. There 
would be benefits in terms of enhanced productivity and retention of workers with caring 
responsibilities, lower staff turnover and reduced hiring costs.  

Overall, the estimates suggest that Option 1 would have a negative impact (- € 304 million) 
and Options 2 and 3 a positive impact on businesses (respectively + € 295 million and + € 
1078  million)  as  savings  linked  to  staff  retention  are  significantly  higher  for  those  two 
options. Member States which fall significantly under the requirements353 make up 14% of 
the benefit to employers in Option 2 and 4% in Option 3.  While, in 2050 Options 1 and 2 
would lead to an additional cost per company of € 2 and € 1 relative to the baseline, Option 
3 would leave to a net benefit of € 5. In all cases, the cost is estimated to be below 0.2% of 
the average business turnover in all countries.  

The  estimates  of  the  costs  as  a  percentage  of  turnover  for  microbusinesses  (with  fewer 
than 10 employees) suggest that the costs on microbusinesses are at a low level of the level 
of  turnover in  all  countries  (equal  or  below  0.8%  of  microbusiness  turnover)354  and  very 
close  to  the  level  of  cost  under  the  baseline.  Therefore  the  policy  options  do  not 
disproportionately affect the performance of SMEs. Some short-term negative effects may 
occur, however, triggered by a temporary loss of production due to an increased take up of 
carers' leave. 

Sensitivity analysis lost production 

It  also  needs  to  be  noted  that  the  estimated  of  lost  production  included  in  the  total  costs 
figures  assume  that  for  the  entire  period  carer  is  on  carers'  leave  the  employer  will  lose 
100% of his productive value. However, in reality some of this production could be taken 

353 In Option 2: EL, CY, MT; in Option 3: EL, CY, LT, MT  
354 The costs as a percentage of turnover for microbusinesses (with fewer than 10 employees) is presented in 
Annex 9 of the supporting study 

100 

 
 
 
 
                                                      
up by other staff already employed, through a redistribution of tasks or by the carer when 
he/she  comes  back  from  leave.  Therefore,  the  negative  impact  on  businesses  reported 
above  and  in  Table  10  is  most  probably  overestimated,  as  the  lost  production  cost 
calculated corresponds to the maximum loss for a business when a carer takes carers' leave.  
If  20%  of  the  lost  production  is  absorbed  either  by  labour  force  adjustment  or  simply 
compensates  for  temporary  under-utilisation,  the  value  of  lost  production  due  to  carers 
taking  carers'  leave  would  be  sensibly  lower.  Thus,  the  cost  for  the  whole  period  2015-
2055  would  be  of  €277  million  over  the  entire  period  up  until  2055  (compared  to  €458 
million if 100% of the production is assumed to be lost) in Option 1, € 707 million instead 
of € 1.6 billion under Option 2 and € 22 million instead of € 214 million under Option 3. 

Table 10: Estimated impact of carers’ leave options on companies, relative to the baseline 
(EU)355 

Retention of workers 
Less absence from work  
Leave request processing 
Payment of carers' benefits 
Recruitment 
Lost production 
Total  impact on 
companies, NPV 2015-
2055 
Total impact/company 
in 2030/2050 

Option 1 
+ € 383 million 
+ € 83 million 
- € 95 million 
€ 0 
- € 218 million 
- € 458 million 

Option 2 
+ € 2798 billion 
+ € 746 million 
- € 426 million 
- € 390 million 
- € 853 million 
- € 1578 billion 

Option 3 
+ € 1328 million 
+ € 252 million 
- € 288 million 
€ 0  
€ 0 
- € 214 million 

- € 304 million 

+ € 295 million 

+ € 1078 million 

 € 0/- € 2 

+ € 1/ - € 1 

+ € 2 / + € 5 

8.4.3 Impacts on Member States 

The  budgetary  impact  on  Central  Governments  is  driven  in  part  by  changes  in 
employment. In view of anticipated demographic ageing, all options would facilitate that 

355 The benefit linked to the retention of workers is due to the fact that less carers are expected to drop out of 
the  labour  market  because  they  would  be  able  to  better  reconciliate  their  professional  and  caring 
responsibilities, the benefit linked to less absence from work is due to a more motivated workforce, which 
can better reconciliate professional and caring responsibilities , the cost of processing leave request is due to 
an increase in take-up of carers' leave and in administrative costs to process it, the recruitment costs are due 
to an expected increase in take-up and the need to replace the additional workers taking leave and the costs of 
lost production are due to the fact that carers will not work while on leave. 

101 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
 
increasing numbers of workers are retained in employment once they enter the ages when 
they face caring responsibilities towards elderly relatives. This in turn would be expected 
to positively contribute to tax revenue. The budgetary impact is also driven by payments 
made  for  carers’  leave  benefits,  in  the  cases  of  Options  2  and  3  (depending  on  how  the 
leave is financed). 

Option  2  is the  most  costly  option  in  terms  of  benefit  payments  (€  1  249  million  for  the 
central government and € 4073 million for the social security partners for the period 2015-
2055), but it also has the greatest positive impact of the change in tax received (€ 27 174 
million  for  the  same  period).  The  largest  decrease  in  unemployment  benefits  is  also 
estimated to be in Option 2 (€2.4 billion). Around 86% of this benefit is concentrated in the 
cluster  of 13 countries which are considered to fall  somewhat below the  requirements of 
this option356. The introduction of paid carers’ leave also creates additional administrative 
burden,  linked  to  the  processing  of  payments  and  an  increase  in  the  take  up  of  carers’ 
leave,  as  well  as  the  need  to  track  a  ‘bank’  of  leave  throughout  a  worker’s  career.  This 
administrative  burden  on  the  Central  Government  is  highest  in  Options  2  and  3  (€  404 
million under both options for the period 2015-2055). Improved worker health, particularly 
reductions in stress-related illnesses, also has  an impact as it reduces the costs for health 
insurance. 

The total impact on Central Governments and social security providers is estimated to be a 
benefit  of  €23.8  billion  under  Option  2  (67%  of  this  is  accounted  for  in  Member  States 
which  fall  somewhat  below  the  requirements357  and  2%  in  Member  States  which  fall 
significantly  below  the  requirements358),  nearly  €21  billion  in  option  3  (with  a  similar 
impact of the different clusters of Member States), and a negative impact of - €991 million 
in option 1. 

Table  11:  Estimated  impact  of  carers’  leave  options  on  Member  States,  relative  to  the 
baseline (EU)359 

Payment of unemployment benefits 
Changes in tax revenue 
Payment of carers' benefits  
Leave request processing 
Total impact on 
government/social security, 
NPV 2015-2055 

Option 1 
+ € 709 million 
+ € 527 million 
- € 2.2 billion 
- € 15 million 

Option 2 
+ € 2.4 billion 
+ € 27.2 billion 
- € 5.3 billion 
- € 466 million 

Option 3 
+ € 1.4 billion 
+ € 20.6 billion 
- € 857 million 
- € 414 million 

- € 991 million 

+ € 23.8 billion 

+ € 20.8 billion 

356 CZ, EE, IE, ES, FR, HR, LV, LT, LU, HU, SI, SK, UK  
357 CZ, EE, IE, ES, FR, HR, LV, LT, LU, HU, SI, SK, UK  
358 EL, CY, MT  
359 The decrease in payment of unemployment benefits is due to the expected increase in employment, the 
change in tax revenues is due to the increase in employment and the cost of processing leave request is due to 
an increase in take-up of carers' leave and in administrative costs to process it 

102 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
Carers'  leave  options  have  different  macro-economic  impacts.  While  Option  1  has  a 
negative impact on GDP (- € 0.3 billion), Options 2 and 3 have a significantly positive one 
(+  €  56.6  billion  and  +  €  45.6  billion  respectively).  The  changes  in  GDP  are  driven  by 
changes in employment and labour market participation, along with associated increases in 
productivity.  In  Option  2,  73%  of this  impact  is  driven  by the  Member  States  which  fall 
somewhat  below  the  requirements360  and  only  3%  by  Member  States  which  fall 
significantly below the requirements361. The situation is similar in Option 3 with 68% for 
the former cluster362 of Member States and 2% for the latter363. There is an overall increase 
in  net  exports,  as  higher  production  capacity  encourages  firms  to  reduce  prices  and 
increase production, with some of the additional production exported.  

There is an increase in the size of the labour force as a direct result of all the options. The 
provision  of  a  period  of  carers'  leave  prevents  some  individuals  from  falling  out  of  the 
labour market to care for their family members, so they can remain in the same job rather 
than having to leave and possibly try to return at a later date.364 This is through both the 
provision of leave in options 1 and through the paying of leave in Options 2 and 3, which 
encourage  a  higher  number  of  individuals  to  remain  in  the  labour  market.  This  is 
particularly  important  for  female  workers,  especially  older  female  workers.  In  2050  the 
improved  carers’  leave  provisions  lead  to  an  increase  in  labour  force  participation  that 
range from 1000 in Option 1 to 49 000 in Option 2.  

In 2050 the estimated increase in employment ranges from 6000 in Option 1 to 76 000 in 
Option  2. The increase in  employment will  also lead to an  increase in  the amount  of tax 
received.  The  options  are  also  expected  to  increase  real  incomes.  In  all  options,  this  is 
driven by the increase in employment; the introduction of paid carers’ leave in options 2 
and 3 also drive increases in real income.  

Competitiveness  would  be  marginally  affected  by  all  three  carer's  leave  options.  Net 
exports would decrease by a maximum of € 0.2 billion in Option 3 in 2050. While in 2030 
none  of  the  three  options  would  impact  domestic  prices,  Option  2  leads  to  the  highest 
decrease in domestic prices in 2050 (-0.3%).  

Table 12: Estimated macro-economic impact of carers' leave options  

Impact on GDP, NPV 
2015-2055 
(change compared to 
baseline) 

Option 1 
-  €  0.3  billion  (-
0.0001%) 

Option 2 
+  €  56.6  billion 
(+0.01%) 

Option 3 
+  €  45.6  billion 
(+0.01%) 

360 CZ, EE, IE, ES, FR, HR, LV, LT, HU, SI, SK, UK  
361 EL, CY, MT  
362 LU, UK  
363 EL, CY, LT, MT  
364 Flows from inactivity to employment, especially at similar skills levels, are likely to be difficult in the age 
cohorts above 55 years of age, who are the most likely to face care responsibilities. 

103 

 
 
 
 
                                                      
Impact on labour force 
in 2030/2050 
(change compared to 
baseline) 
Impact on employment 
in 2030/2050 
(change compared to 
baseline) 
Impact on real incomes 
in 2030/2050 
(change compared to 
baseline) 

2 
000/1 
(+0.00%/0.00%) 

000 

39 
000/49 
(+0.02%/0.02%) 

000 

21 
000/30 
(+0.01%/0.01%) 

000 

6 
000/6 
(+0.00%/0.00%) 

000 

45 
000/76 
(+0.02%/0.03%) 

000 

34 
000/52 
(+0.01%/0.02%) 

000 

+ € 0.1 billion /+ € 
0.1 billion (0.00%) 

+ € 1.8 billion /+ € 
billion 
7.9 
(+0.01%/0.03%) 

+ € 1.7 billion /+ € 
billion 
5.9 
(+0.01%/0.03%) 

Although the carers’ leave options provide benefits to both men and women in the labour 
market, they would affect women to a greater degree. Female labour market participation, 
employment  and  earnings  estimates  all  improve  by  a  larger  proportion  than  for  men,  so 
they  support  a  narrowing  of  the  gender  employment  gap  and  of  the  gender  pay  gap  (as 
female earnings increase faster than male earnings). In 2050, it is foreseen that with Option 
1 female employment would increase by 4000 (compared to 2000 for male employment), 
in Option 2 by 47000 (compared to 29000 for male employment) and in Option 3 by 30000 
(compared to 22000 for male employment). 

Stakeholder  views:  The  European  Parliament  has  called  for  an  EU  directive  on  carers' 
leave with an adequate remuneration and social protection for carers. EU trade unions are 
largely favourable to an EU directive on Carers leave but have cautioned that it needs to be 
framed in a way not to reinforce gender roles in caring. EU employers’ organisations are 
not  favourable  to  introducing  a  carers’  leave  at  EU-level,  suggesting  instead  that  further 
measures  be  taken  at  EU-level  to  support  the  development  of  formal  long-term  care 
services.  NGOs  called  for  the  Commission  to  introduce  a  carers'  leave  with  adequate 
standards for financial compensation365. 

8.4.4 Comparing the Options 

Effectiveness:  Option  1  has  a  low  impact  on  labour  force  participation  and  employment. 
Option  2  has  the  highest  impact  on  labour  force  participation  and  overall  employment, 
closely  followed  by  Option  3.  The  non-legislative  option's  effectiveness  in  improving 
work-life  balance  and  women’s  participation  in  the  labour  market  would  depend  on  its 
implementation but as a non-binding option, it is expected to be less effective. 

365 AGE Platform Europe, COFACE Families Europe, ENIL, European Women's Lobby, Eurocarers, 
Eurochild, Make Mothers Matter (2017), Europe's Last Chance, Work-Life Balance: time to bring work and 
welfare policies in line with the 21st century 

104 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
Efficiency:  Option  1  is  the  only  option  to  have  a  negative  impact  on  companies.  This  is 
largely due to lost production during the period of leave and higher replacement costs. This 
Option is also the only option to have a negative impact on central governments. Options 2 
and  3  have  comparable  positive  impacts  on  companies  and  central  governments  and  are 
therefore similarly cost-effective. 

Coherence: All options would facilitate the exercise of the rights recognised in Article 33 
of  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights,  which  specifically  refers  to  the  reconciliation  of 
family and professional life. Options 2 and Options 3 would have the highest impact given 
that income replacement during the leave period would allow them the financial support to 
effectively exercise the right in practice. 

Options 
Baseline 

Non-
legislative 
option 

Option 1 

Option 2 

Effectiveness 

Efficiency 

Coherence 

0 

0 

0 

+  
Limited impact on improving 
carers’ work-life balance 

-  
Limited costs 

+  
Marginal positive impact on 
fathers' fundamental rights  

+  
Slight positive impact on 
improving carers' work-life 
balance 

--  
Highest costs for 
companies and Central 
Governments 

+  
Positive impact on 
fathers' fundamental 
rights  

++   
High positive impact on 
improving carers' work-life 
balance and highest positive 
impact employment and 
labour force 

++  
Positive impact on 
companies and high 
benefit for Central 
Governments 

++  
High positive impact on 
fathers' fundamental 
rights 

Option 3 

++  
High positive impact on 
improving carers' work-life 
balance and higher positive 
impact on employment and 
labour force  

++  
High positive impact on 
fathers' fundamental 
rights 

+++  
Positive impact on 
companies and high 
benefit for Central 
Governments, less 
administrative burden 
on companies and 
Central Governments 
than Option 2 which 
entails a bank of leave 

Both Options 2 and 3 are expected to have high positive impacts on individuals, enabling 
them  to  take  a  short  period  of  leave  to  care  for  their  dependent  relatives  with  a  limited 
earnings loss. The quantitative assessment for both options reveals a neutral impact when 
estimated  per  company  in  2050  and  a  high  positive  impact  on  Central  Governments. 
Option 2 has slightly more positive macro-economic impacts than Option 3. Option 2 may 
however  entail  a  higher  administrative  burden  for  companies/central  governments  than 
Option 3, given the need to track a ‘bank’ of leave throughout a worker’s career. Option 3 

105 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
therefore appears to rank slightly higher in efficiency than the other carers’ leave options 
assessed and is therefore identified as the preferred option. 

In order to further increase the efficiency of Option 3, it would be considered to limit the 
scope  of  the  entitlement  to  5  days  per  year  per  worker  (and  not  per  dependent  relative). 
This  would  limit  the  disruption  and  complexity  due  to  introducing  such  as  measure  for 
companies, as well as possibly reduce its costs. 

1.1. Flexible working arrangements  

The  non-legislative  option  would  not  require  Member  States  to  change  their  national 
legislation to change the existing provisions. Option 1 would require a majority of Member 
States366  to  introduce  a  right  for  parents  of  children  up  to  12  and  carers  to  request 
flexibility  in  place  of  work.  Option  2  would  require  a  majority  of  Member  States367  to 
introduce  a  right  for  parents  and  almost  all  Member  States368  for  carers  to  request 
flexibility in schedule. Option 3 would in addition to the changes required by Option 1 and 
2,  also  require  many  Member  States369  to  introduce  a  right  for  parents  many  Member 
States370 for carers to request reduced working hours.  

8.5.1 Impacts on individuals 

Compared to the baseline, all three options would encourage employees to make a request, 
as even if the employer is under no obligation to grant the requested change, he/she will 
neverthless  need  to  give  it  due  consideration.  Therefore,  it  would  allow,  where  it  is 
mutually convenient for the employee and the employer, to agree on changes to the place 
of work (in Option 1), working schedules (in Option 2) or a reduction in working hours (in 
Option 3) for a set period of time.371 Greater use of flexible work arrangements would have 
a  positive  impact  in  better  balancing  work  and  family  life.  Individuals  are  expected  to 
benefit  as  their  quality  of  life  improves.  Additionally,  when  men  use  flexible  working 
arrangements,  this  leads  to  better  sharing  of  unpaid  work  between  men  and  women 
(although the percentage of employed men who reduce their working hours to take care for 
the child is generally very small372).  

366 This could require changes in Member States such as BE, BG, CZ, DK, DE, EE, IE, EL, ES, FR, HR, CY, 
LV, LT, LU, MT, AT, RO, SI, SK, FI, SE  
367 This could require changes in Member States such as, BG, DE, IE, EL, ES, FR, HR, IT, CY, LV, LT, LU, 
HU, MT,  AT, PL, PT, RO, SI, SK, FI, SE  
368 This could require changes in Member States such as BE, BG, CZ, DK, DE, EE, IE, EL, ES, FR, HR, IT, 
CY, LV, LT, LU, HU, MT, AT, PL, PT, RO, SI, SK, FI, SE  
369 This could require changes in Member States such as BG,  IE, EL, ES, HR, IT, CY, LV, LU, HU, MT, 
AT, PL, PT, RO, SI, SK, FI, SE  
370 This could require changes in Member States such as BE, BG, CZ, DK,, EE, IE, EL, ES, HR, IT, CY, LV, 
LT, LU, HU, MT, AT, PL, PT, RO, SI, SK, FI, SE  
371 Evidence from UK shows that a right to request and have it duly considered has an impact, as employees 
are more likely to request and employers to grant than in absence of such a right. 
372 It is below 5% in all Member States except Sweden (8.6%); in 14 Member States it is below 1%. 

106 

 
 
 
                                                      
In Option 1 and 2 flexibility in working schedule and place of work, when granted by the 
employer,  would  not  lead  to  a  loss  in  hours  worked.  In  Option  3,  the  additional  right  to 
request  reduced  working  hours,  in  contrast,  would  entail  reduced  pay  and  pension 
contributions  associated  to  the  reduction  in  hours  worked  for  workers  making  such  a 
request, so their income would be reduced accordingly. However, the availability of rights 
to request reduced working hours could potentially increase women's pay per hour among 
women part-timers, if women who wish to work reduced hours would be able to do so in a 
wider  range  of  occupations,  also  including  higher-paid  occupations.  While  there  are 
concerns that such arrangements would continue to be used disproportionately by women, 
if  men  were  to  make  use  of  such  rights,  then more  women  would  be  able  to  continue  in 
full-time work.  

Compared to the baseline, Options 1 and 2 would lead to improved employees' efficiency, 
derived  from  reduced  interruptions  at  work  and  better  concentration  when  carrying  out 
certain  tasks,  as  well  as  reduced  commuting  time,  if  flexibility  in  working  schedule  and 
place of work is enhanced. As a result, employees with caring responsibilities who would 
have otherwise dropped out of employment, or reduced their hours of work, can remain in 
employment.373  

Option 3 would also facilitate a reduction in working hours for a set period of time, thus 
giving  more  time  for  family  responsibilities.  The  direct  impacts  are  a  negative  financial 
impact  for  workers  who  choose  to  reduce  their  hours  (reduced  pay  and  pension 
contributions) and a positive impact in so far as it would facilitate remaining in the same 
job  instead  of  changing  to  a  different  job  with  shorter  hours  (as  part-time  jobs  are  often 
lower  paid).  The  indirect  impact  is  a  more  limited  access  to  training  during  the  spell  of 
part-time and lesser possibilities for career progression374.  

The impact of all three options as well as the non-legislative Option on the gender gap in 
hours and earnings will depend on whether men would start requesting, and being granted, 
reductions  in  hours  worked  for  reasons  of  care.  Currently,  women  are  much  more  likely 
than men to work part-time for care reasons, which contributes to women maintaining the 
bulk of caring responsibilities, as well as women’s lower income.375  

The  take  up  of  flexible  working  arrangements  by  men  would  lead  to  an  increase  in  the 
amount of unpaid work men carry out each week, which in turn reduces the amount of time 
women  spend  on  unpaid  work  and  increases  their  availability  for  labour  market 
participation.  

373 OECD (2016), Backgrounder: Be flexible!: How workplace flexibility can help European Employees to 
balance work and family. In particular, workplace flexibility in terms of schedules or place of work is found 
to allow high female employment and lower part-time rates among women. 
374 OECD (2010, 2012). 
375  Evidence  suggests  that  even  short  spells  of  part-time  work  can  have  a  negative  impact  on  career 
progression,  while  the  incidence  of  part-time  employment  among  working  women  is  negatively  associated 
with the share of women in senior corporate positions. 

107 

 
 
 
                                                      
The  impacts  of  flexible  working  arrangements  on  poverty  are  mixed.  By  facilitating 
women’s  employment,  all  options  could  contribute  to  the  reduction  of  poverty  among 
some  women  and  their  families,  given  that  dual-earner  households  are  at  a  lower  risk  of 
poverty376.  That  being  said,  as  women  would  more  likely  make  use  of  part-time  work 
solutions,  there  is  a  risk  that  the  above  options  could  also  result  in  women’s  reduced 
earnings as well as lower build-up of pension contributions, leading to lower pensions and 
increased poverty risk in old age. Thus, the promotion of a more balanced take-up between 
women  and  men  as  parents  and  caregivers  remains  important.  Moreover,  measures  to 
facilitate the transition to full-time work, as well as ensuring adequate minimum pensions, 
can help to mitigate associated poverty risks.  

8.5.2 Impacts on companies 

The impacts of the flexible working arrangements options on companies are mixed. There 
will be benefits to companies, as employees using flexible working arrangements are more 
likely to remain in the same job, which reduces recruitment costs, and are expected to be 
less  absent  from  work  due  to  sickness.  The  costs  for  companies  will  result  from  an 
administrative burden to process applications in all options, and in addition under Option 3 
to , a potential loss of production for employees reducing their working hours as well as an 
adjustment cost when having to adjust the workload or to assign workers to different jobs.  

In  Option  1  there  is  also  a  potential  adjustment  cost  for  companies  when  employees  are 
allowed  to  work  from  home  or  another  remote  location  as  organisational  changes  are 
involved.  Where  individuals  take  up  arrangements  to  work  at  a  different  geographic 
location, employers potentially have adjustment costs to ensure that workers can carry out 
their  work  elsewhere377.  However,  many  employers  who  are  able  to  offer  homeworking 
will already provide this equipment for employees (for example many  workers in offices 
already use laptop computers as standard) or workers will just use their own equipment. It 
has  been  estimated  that  this  will  be  the  case  for  50%  of  employers;  however  it  could  be 
more  in  practice.  Moreover,  employers  would  not  be  obliged  to  grant  the  request  for 
remote working, so there would be no risk to disproportionately burdening businesses. 

In Option 2 there is also a potential adjustment cost for companies when employees request 
to  change their  working  schedule,  as  organisational  changes  are  also  involved.  However, 
they  can  be  more  easily  accommodated,  in  particular,  when  the  workflow  is  not 
immediately dependent on consumer demand.378 

The benefit to employers through increased retention are assumed to reach € 33.1 billion in 
Option 1, € 59.4 billion in Option 2 and € 98.2 billion in Option 3 for the same period. For 

376 European Commission (2016) Employment and Social Developments in Europe 
377 This was estimated as the purchase of a computer and a suitable office chair, which is likely to 
overestimate the costs for businesses. 
378 OECD (2016), Backgrounder: Be flexible!: How workplace flexibility can help European Employees to 
balance work and family 

108 

 
 
 
 
                                                      
Option  3,  which  entails  the  right  to  request  reduced  working  hours,  the  costs  due  to  lost 
production are estimated to €129.8 billion for the period 2015-2055. This assumes a very 
high  level  of  demand  for  and  accommodation  of  flexible  working  arrangements,  since 
employers can, of course, refuse requests for flexible working, particularly where it would 
cause a cost to the company, so the actual costs would likely be significantly lower. 

The total impact on businesses of the introduction of legislation is estimated to be a benefit 
of  €  3.1  billion  in  Option  1,  €  11.7  billion  in  Option  2  and  a  cost  of    €  126.4  billion  in 
Option  3  due  to  the  impact  of  the  lost  production  linked  to  the  right  to  request  reduced 
working  hours.    In  Option  3,  Member  States  which  fall  significantly  below  the 
requirements379 account for 25% of this cost. 

The impact on businesses is similar for SMEs as it is for large employers, as the costs and 
benefits  relate  to  the  number  of  individuals  taking  flexible  working  arrangements  and 
SMEs will be able to refuse if flexible working is not workable for them. The estimates of 
the costs as a percentage of turnover for microbusinesses (with fewer than 10 employees) 
show that the costs of the policy options on microbusinesses is a low level of the level of 
turnover (equal or less than 1% except in NL where it is 1.6% ) and very close to the level 
of cost under the baseline. Therefore the policy options do not disproportionately affect the 
performance of SMEs380. In addition, OECD evidence shows that employees in small firms 
(with  10  workers  or  less)  have  relatively  more  access  to  certain  flexible  working 
arrangements. The closer interpersonal links that employees in small firms often develop 
and  the  associated  level  of  trust  seem  to  facilitate  greater  workplace  responsiveness  to 
worker needs, with benefits for the SMEs.381  

Sensitivity analysis lost production 

It  also  needs  to  be  noted  that  the  estimated  of  lost  production  included  in  the  total  costs 
figures  assume  that  for  the  entire  period  workers  do  not  work  because  their  reduced 
working  hours  the  employer  will  lose  100%  of  his  productive  value.  However,  in  reality 
some  of  this  production  could  be  taken  up  by  other  staff  already  employed,  through  a 
redistribution of tasks. Therefore, the negative impact on businesses reported above and in 
Table  13  is  most  probably  overestimated,  as  the  lost  production  cost  calculated 
corresponds  to  the  maximum  loss  for  a  business  when  a  worker  reduces  his/her  working 
hours.    If  20%  of  the  lost  production  is  absorbed  either  by  labour  force  adjustment  or 
simply compensates for temporary under-utilisation, the value of lost production due to the 
workers'  reduced  working  hours  would  be  sensibly  lower.  Thus,  the  cost  for  the  whole 
period  2015-2055  would  be  of  €  68.7  billion  over  the  entire  period  up  until  2055 
(compared to €129.8 billion if 100% of the production is assumed to be lost) in Option 3. 

379 IE, ES, LV, LT, LU, MT, RO  
380 The costs as a percentage of turnover for microbusinesses (with fewer than 10 employees) is presented in 
Annex 9 of the supporting study 
381 OECD (2016), Backgrounder: Be flexible!: How workplace flexibility can help European Employees to 
balance work and family. 

109 

 
 
 
                                                      
Table 13: Estimated impact of flexible work arrangements options on companies, relative 
to the baseline (EU)382 

Retention of workers 
Less absence from work  
Adjustment cost for telework 
FWA request processing 
Recruitment 
Lost production 
Total  impact on 
companies, NPV 2015-
2055 

Option 1 
+ € 33.1 billion 
+ € 5.6 billion 
- € 3 billion 
- € 32.5 billion 
€ 0 
€ 0 

Option 2 
+ € 74.6 billion 
+ € 15.2 billion 
€ 0 
- € 62.9 billion 
€ 0 
€ 0 

Option 3 
+ € 98.2 billion 
+ € 21.7 billion 
- € 3 billion 
- € 107.5 billion 
- € 6 billion 
- € 129.8 billion 

+ € 3.1 billion 

+ € 11.7 billion 

- € 126.4 billion 

8.5.3 Impacts on Member States 

The  non-legislative  option  and  the  three  legislative  options  have  a  positive  budgetary 
impact  on  central  governments,  which  ranges  up  to  +  €  309.1  billion  in  Option  3. 
Member  States  which  fall  significantly  below  the  requirements383  make  up  23%  of  this 
positive impact. The budgetary impact is driven by changes in employment and pay, which 
will alter benefit payments and taxes received. A benefit is estimated for all options, which 
is  largely  driven  by  changes  in  tax  receipts.  More  flexible  working  arrangements  are 
expected to lead to: an increase in labour market participation, a reduction in hours worked 
and  an  increase  in  productivity.  It  is  also  expected  that  individuals  who  use  flexible 
working arrangements are less likely to require the same volume of health care.  

382 The benefit linked to the retention of workers is due to the fact that less parents and carers are expected to 
drop out of the labour market because they would be able to better reconciliate their professional and caring 
responsibilities, the benefit linked to less absence from work is due to a more motivated workforce, which 
can better reconciliate its professional and caring responsibilities , the adjustement cost is due to the need for 
employers to buy the necessary IT equipement to make telework possible if not already available in the 
company, the cost of processing flexible working arrangement requests is due to an increase in take-up and to 
the  administrative costs to process it, the recruitment costs are due to an expected increase in take-up and the 
need to replace workers when they work reduced hours and the costs of lost production are due to the fact 
that some parents and carers while chose to work reduced hours. 
383 IE, ES, LV, LT, LU, MT, RO  

110 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
Table  14:  Estimated  impact  of  flexible  work  arrangements  options  on  Member  States, 
relative to the baseline (EU)384 

Payment of unemployment benefits 
Healthcare 
Changes in tax revenue 
Total impact on 
government/social security, 
NPV 2015-2055 

Option 1 
-  € 47.8 billion 
+ € 215 million 
+ € 128.9 billion 

Option 2 
- € 55.3 billion 
€0 
+ € 124.8 billion 

Option 3 
+ € 93 million 
+ € 215 million 
+ € 308.8 billion 

+ € 81.3 billion 

+ € 69.6 billion 

+ € 309.1 billion 

The  macro-economic  impacts  for  flexible  working  arrangements  options  are  high.  The 
positive  GDP  effects  are  much  larger  in  magnitude  than  the  other  options  in  relation  to 
leave that were modelled. This is because the flexible work arrangements apply to a larger 
number of individuals and take up is higher than under the other options. The quantitative 
assessment shows that all types of flexible working arrangements (homeworking, flexible 
schedules  and  reduced  working  hours)  would  have  significant  positive  impacts  on  GDP. 
The  impact  on  GDP  is  estimated  to  be  between  €  273.2  billion  (Option  2)  and  €  653.1 
billion (Option 3) over the 2015-2055 period. In Option 3, the Member States which fall 
significantly below the requirements385 make up 23% of the positive GDP impact. 

All  three  options  lead  to  a  boost  in  competitiveness,  as  increases  in  labour  force 
participation  puts  downwards  pressure  on  wages  and  prices  and  increases  the  potential 
productive capacity of the economy, leading to an increase in net exports (€ 9.9 billion in 
Option 3 in 2050) and a decrease in domestic prices (-0.63% in Option 3 in 2050). 

384 The impacts on the payment of unemployment benefits and tax revenues are due to the changes in 
employment rates and the cost of processing leave request is due to an increase in take-up of flexible working 
arrangements and to the administrative costs to process it, the rise in take-up of flexible working 
arrangements leads to a decrease in hospital admissions because the parents and the children's health both 
benefit from the measure 
385 IE, ES, LV, LT, LU, MT, RO  

111 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
Table 15: Estimated macro-economic impact of flexible working arrangements options  

Impact on GDP, NPV 
2015-2055 
(change compared to 
baseline) 
Impact on labour force 
in 2030/2050 
(change compared to 
baseline) 
Impact on employment 
in 2030/2050 
(change compared to 
baseline) 
Impact on real incomes 
in 2030/2050 
(change compared to 
baseline) 

Option 1 
 €  285.4  billion 
(0.07%) 

Option 2 
 €  273.2  billion 
(0.07%) 

Option 3 
 €  653.1  billion 
(0.2%) 

232  000/  481  000 
(0.1%/0.21%) 

272  000/558  000 
(0.11%/1.1%) 

15 
000/208 
000(0.01%/0.09%) 

14  000/232  000 
(0.01%/0.5%) 

704  000/1  337 
000 
(0.29%/0.58%) 

1  000  000/1  392 
000 
(0.42%/0.62%) 

- € 3.1 billion /+ € 
(-
billion 
48 
0.02%/+0.21%) 

- € 3.4 billion /+ € 
(-
48.2  billion 
0.03%/+0.21%) 

+  €  5.7  billion  /+ 
billion 
€ 
(+0.04%/0.44%) 

102 

Although  the  flexible  working  arrangement  options  provide  benefits  to  both  men  and 
women in the labour market, they would affect women to a greater degree. Female labour 
market  participation,  employment  and  earnings  estimates  all  improve  by  a  larger 
proportion than for men, so they support a narrowing of the gender employment gap and of 
the gender pay gap (as female earnings increase faster than male earnings). In 2050, it is 
foreseen that with Option 3 female employment would increase by 942000 (compared to 
450000 for male employment). 

Stakeholder  views:  The  European  Parliament  is  of  the  view  that  employees  should  be 
given the possibility to make use of flexible working arrangements. EU Trade Unions are 
cautious  about  a  right  for  parents  to  request  flexible  work  arrangement,  highlighting  the 
potential  usefulness  but  stressing  that  workers  should  have  a  right  to  return  to  full-time 
work afterwards as not to reinforce gender inequalities in the labour market. For employers 
while flexible working arrangements are essential for managing work-life balance, there is 
no  universal  approach  and  they  should  be  defined  at  company-level.The  Advisory 
committee is of the view that flexible working arrangements should be designed in a way 
to appeal to fathers and mothers to the same extent and should be used by them to the same 
extent in order not to perpetuate the status quo of unequal distribution of tasks in work and 
family lives.  

8.5.4 Comparing the Options 

Effectiveness:  a  non-legislative  option  should  improve  work-life  balance  and  women’s 
participation in the labour market but, giving its non-binding character, it is expected to be 

112 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
less  effective  than  Options  1  to  3.  Options  1  and  2  would  be  less  effective  in  improving 
work-life balance and  women’s participation in the  labour market than Option  3 because 
they only entail one type of flexible working arrangement. They would also have a smaller 
impact on employment than Option 3. 

Efficiency: Options 1 and 2 have  a positive impact on companies  due to the retention of 
employees and the avoided costs due to absence from work.  However, these two Options 
do  not  entail  a  right  to  request  reduced  working  hours,  which  has  been  shown  above  to 
have a strong impact on parents and carers' work-life balance. While Option 3 would bring 
the highest costs for companies, it will also bring the highest benefits for the States thanks 
to a high rise in employment and tax revenues.  

Finally, while environmental impacts appear to be of marginal relevance overall, an impact 
on  the  environment  can  be  reasonably  expected  from  Options  1  and  3  which  entail 
measures leading to  more employees changing their  place of work  who, as  result, would 
not  commute  or  would  commute  shorter  distances  on  given  days.  The  impact  would  be 
positive, albeit marginal. The other possible measures under consideration are not expected 
to raise positive or negative impacts on the environment. 

Coherence: Due to more flexibility in how to organize the working hours or the place of 
work, all the options would facilitate the exercise of the rights recognised in Article 33 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which specifically refers to the reconciliation of family 
and professional life. 

Baseline 

Effectiveness 
0 

Non-legislative option 

+ 

Efficiency 
0 

-  
Limited costs 

Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 3 

++  
High positive impact on 
employment and labour 
force. 
++ 
High positive impact on 
employment and labour 
force. 
+++ 
Highest positive impact 
on employment and 
labour force. 

++ 
Positive impact on 
companies and Central 
Governments 
++ 
Positive impact on 
companies and Central 
Governments 
+++ 
Highest benefit for 
Central Governments 
due to increased tax 
revenues 

Coherence 
0 

+  
Marginal positive impact 
on fundamental rights 
++  
Positive impact on 
parents and carers' 
fundamental rights 
++ 
 Positive impact on 
parents and carers' 
fundamental rights 
+++ 
Higher positive impact 
on parents and carers' 
fundamental rights 

On  the  basis  of  the  analysis  above,  Option  3  has  been  identified  as  the  preferred  option. 
While the quantitative analysis showed high positive impacts on female employment and 
central  governments  for  all  legislative  options,  they  are  the  highest  in  Option  3.  This  is 
especially the case for the increase in employment which is foreseen to be comparable in 
Options 1 and 2 (14 000 and 15 000 in 2030) and much higher in Option 3 (1 000 000 in 
2030)  thanks  to  the  right  to  request  reduced  working  hours  it  entails.  In  consequence 

113 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Option  3  is  expected  to  lead  to  a  large  increase  in  tax  revenues  for  Member  States. 
Although  Option  3  has  the  highest  cost  for  companies,  when  disaggregated  the  cost 
represents only 118 € per company in 2030 and 597 € per company in 2050. There can be 
mixed  impacts  on  individuals,  particularly  in  the  use  of  part-time  work,  which  is  why  it 
would be important to accompany these measures with awareness-raising and monitoring 
to facilitate improved gender balance in the take-up of such arrangements.  

1.2. Impact of the Combination of preferred options 

The  preferred  combination  of  options  is  presented  in  the  following  table.  It  gathers  all 
options considered the most effective, efficient and coherent for each policy area assessed 
above. The following table presents a summary of the legal gap analysis for the preferred 
options  in  the  areas  of  paternity  leave,  parental  leave,  carers'  leave  and  flexible  working 
arrangements.  A  more  detailed  legal  gap  analysis  can  be  found  in  Annex  2  of  the 
supporting study. 

Policy Area 

Maternity Leave 

Paternity Leave 

Parental Leave 

Carers Leave 

Flexible Working Arrangements 

Preferred Option 
Non-legislative  Option:  Policy  guidance 
and sharing of good practices on facilitating 
successful  transitions  between  maternity 
leave  and  employment 
(including  on 
breastfeeding breaks and facilities) 
Option 3: Individual right to two weeks  of 
paternity leave compensated at least at sick 
pay level 

Option  3:  Entitlement  to  flexible  uptake, 
four  months  reserved  for  each  parent, 
payment  at  least  at  sick  pay  level  for  the 
four months, rise in age of the child from 8 
to 12 
Option 3: Individual entitlement to a short-
term leave of 5 days,  per year,  per child  or 
dependent relative,  paid at least at sick pay 
level386   
Option 3: Right for parents (of children up 
to  12)  or  carers  to  request  flexibility  in 
working  hours,  schedule  or  place  of  work 
for  a  set  period  of  time,  automatic  right  to 
the 
return 

to  previous  working  hours, 

386 It is to be noted that despite the fact in section 8 it is determined the preferred option would only consider 
5 days of carers' leave per worker (and not per dependent relative), the Option that has been used to calculate  
the quantitative impact of the combination is Option 3 as described in section 7. 

114 

 
 
 
 
                                                      
employer has to consider the request but has 
no obligation to grant the requested change 

115 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legal Gap analaysis of Combination of preferred options387 

387 This table shows the legal gap analysis used to calculate the quantitative impact of the above measures by ICF. The Commission assessment is provided in Section 
8. This table does not include Maternity Leave because the preferred option is the non-legislative option.    

116 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
The qualitative analysis of the impact of the preferred options is described in the previous 
sections. A quantitative assessment of the cost and benefits of the combination of preferred 
options is presented in the table below.  

Table 16: Expected impact of the combination of preferred options 

on 

government/social 

Total  impact  on  companies,  NPV  2015-
2055 
Total 
impact 
security, NPV 2015-2055 
Impact on GDP, NPV 2015-2055 
(change compared to baseline) 
Impact on labour force in 2030/2050 
(change compared to baseline) 
Impact on employment in 2030/2050 
(change compared to baseline) 
Impact on real incomes in 2030/2050 
(change compared to baseline) 

- € 172.7 billion 

+ € 343.6 billion 

€ 839.7 billion (0.21%) 

768 000/ 1 441 000 (0.32%/0.62%) 

1 094 000/1 597 000(0.46%/0.71%) 

+  €  11.6  billion 
(+0.09%/+0.52%) 

/+  €  120  billion 

The  quantitative  analysis  shows  that  the  combination  of  preferred  options  has  a  positive 
impact on GDP (+ € 840 billion, NPV 2015-2055), This positive impact is spread among a 
large  group  of  evenly  geographically  distributed  Member  States  with  11  Member  States 
representing  each  in  absolute  terms  from  1  to  10%  of  the  overall  EU  impact.  The 
combination also has an positive impact on  employment (+ 1.6 million in 2050) and the 
labour  force (+ 1.4 million in  2050). Real  incomes  are expected to  increase by 0.52%  in 
2050. 

The combination represents a cost for companies (€172.7 billion in NPV 2015-2055 for the 
EU).  The  impact  is  also  widespread  among  the  Member  States  with  15  Member  States 
representing each in absolute terms from 1 to 10% of the overall EU impact. However, the 
majority of this cost is driven by the flexible working arrangements option which assumes 
a  very  high  level  of  demand  for  and  accommodation  of  flexible  working  arrangements 
although  employers  can  refuse  requests  for  flexible  working,  particularly  where  it  would 
cause a cost to the company. The total cost for companies of the combination could hence 
be significantly lower. 

It  should  also  be  taken  into  account  that  the  preferred  options  of  the  combination  have 
strong synergies and that the costs of the combination of preferred options could be lower 
than the sum of the individual costs for each option. For example some costs linked to the 
provision of an IT system to  monitor leaves and flexible working arrangements could be 
combined for several preferred options and this would lead to a decrease in the burden for 
companies  and  Central  governments.  Conversely,  in  the  long-term  this  initiative  is 
expected  to  have  wider  positive  impacts  than  those  assessed  in  this  report.  Indeed,  the 
measures  presented  above  will  facilitate  reaching  a  gender-balanced  sharing  of  care 
responsibilities  between  women  and  men,  thereby  giving  women  and  men  equal 
opportunities in the labour market.  

117 

 
 
 
 
As  mentioned  in  the  problem  definition,  this  would  have  a  series  of  positive  impact  that 
were not quantified in this report. These include increasing the pool of talents, increasing 
the motivation of workers, increasing the number of women in management positions, etc. 
The  long-term  effect  of  the  positive  impact  on  children's  personal  and  cognitive 
development was also not quantified. 

The  legislative  measures  presented  above  for  the  paternity,  parental,  carers'  leave  and 
flexible working arrangement options will be accompanied by accompanying measures to 
enhance current efforts in these areas (including in the EU Semester and EU funding). The 
quantitative  impact  of  these  measures  was  not  assessed  because  of  the  uncertainty 
surrounding  their  implementation.  However,  the  non-legislative  measures  foreseen  in  the 
preferred option for maternity leave as well as complementary non-legislative measures to 
the  other  options  are  expected  to  have  a  positive  impact  on  individuals,  companies  and 
Member States. 

Moreover, as mentioned in section 5 on the policy objectives, this impact assessment does 
not  cover  all  the  drivers  of  the  problem  that  will  be  addressed  by  this  initiative.  While 
formal care services and economic disincentives are two very relevant areas when tackling 
the problem of the underrepresentation of women in the labour market, measures in these 
areas were not assessed in this report. This is due to the limited EU competence in these 
areas.  However,  as  mentioned  in  the  Roadmap,  the  'New  Start'  for  work-life  balance 
initiative  is  foreseen  to  be  a  comprehensive  package  of  a  wide  range  of  legislative  and 
policy measures. Considering the significant impact of formal care services and economic 
disincentives  on  the  addressed  problem,  the  initiative  could  build  on  the  existing  EU 
framework outlined in section 2.4 and foresee measures to enhance current efforts in these 
areas. 

9.  PROPORTIONALITY CHECK OF THE PREFERED OPTIONS AND 

COMBINATION 

The  combination  of  preferred  options  allows  reaching  the  policy  objective  in  a 
proportionate manner, focusing on promoting gender equality and increasing female labour 
market participation. It respects well-established national arrangements and the margin for 
Member  States  and  social  partners  to  determine  the  details  of  modalities  of  applying  for 
leaves and flexible working arrangements.  

As  a  consequence  Member  States  would  have  to  transpose  the  minimum  standards  into 
national law. This would entail financial and administrative costs for some Member States 
as  well  as  businesses  but  would  also  bring  substantial  benefits,  as  explained  above.  In 
addition, these costs are minimised and commensurate with the objective to be achieved by 
the initiative.  

In addition, the proposal does not set specific levels to be directly translated into national 
legislation  but  lays  down  only  minimum  standards.  Member  States  who  have  more 
favourable  rules  for  parents  and  caregivers  already  in  place  do  not  have  to  change  their 
legislation and Member States may decide to introduce rules that go beyond the minimum 
standards set at EU level.  

118 

 
 
 
 
Moreover, many of the new provisions provided in this initiative are building upon existing 
provisions.  For  instance,  according  to  Directive  2010/18/EU  parental  leave  "should,  in 
principle, be provided on a non-transferable basis"388. Similarly, carers' leave is based on 
the  existing  right  to  "time  off  from  work  (…)  on  grounds  of  force  majeure  for  urgent 
family  reasons  in  cases  of  sickness  or  accident  making  the  immediate  presence  of  the 
worker indispensable"389. 

Therefore the planned Union action leaves as much scope for national decision as possible 
while  achieving  still  satisfactorily  the  objectives  of  increasing  female  labour  market 
participation.  The  principles  of  subsidiarity  and  proportionality  are  observed  considering 
the size and nature of the identified problems.  

10. MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

To assess the effectiveness in achieving the general and specific objectives of the initiative 
as  well  as  to  address  the  lack  of    comprehensive  data  monitoring  in  the  area,  which,  as 
mentioned  above,  hampers  the  efficiency  of  the  current  EU  framework390,  the  following 
core  progress  indicators  have  been  identified  to  monitor  successful  implementation.  The 
core indicators chosen below are mainly derived from comparative data sources (Eurostat, 
OECD)  but  where  indicators  do  not  exist,  information  can  be  taken  from  national  data. 
These indicators will be regularly monitored by the Commission and serve as the basis for 
the evaluation of the initiative. On the basis of the indicators listed below, the Commission 
could  regularly  report  progress  to  other  key  EU  institutions,  including  the  European 
Parliament, Council, and European Economic and Social Committee.  

Operational objectives   Core indicators 

Current EU situation 

Reduce the gender 
employment gap 

Reduce the gender gap 
in part-time 
employment 

Employment  rate  of  20-
64  years  old  by  sex 
(Eurostat_ lfsi_emp_a) 

Part-time employment 
rate of 20-64 years old by 
sex (Eurostat_ 
lfsq_eppga) 

The gender employment gap is 
of 11.6 % points (2015). 

The gender part-time 
employment gap is of 23.6 % 
points (Q1 2016). 

388 Council Directive 2010/18/EU of 8 March 2010 implementing the revised Framework Agreement on 
parental leave concluded by BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME, CEEP and ETUC and repealing Directive 
96/4/EC 
389 Council Directive 2010/18/EU of 8 March 2010 implementing the revised Framework Agreement on 
parental leave concluded by BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME, CEEP and ETUC and repealing Directive 
96/4/EC 
390 See section 2.3.1 on the Evaluation of existing legislation (Maternity Leave Directive (92/85/EEC) and  
Parental Leave Directive (2010/18/EU)) 

119 

 
 
 
 
                                                      
Reduce the impact of 
parenthood on women's 
employment rate  

Employment impact of 
parenthood on women 
and men for one child 
under 6 (Eurostat_ 
lfst_hheredch) 

- 8.8% points between mothers 
of one child under 6 and women 
without children (2015) 

Reduce the % of 
inactive women due to 
caring responsibilities  

Women inactivity due to 
caring responsibilities 
(Eurostat¬_ lfsa_igar + 
NEEDCARE) 

18.7% of inactive women are 
inactive due to caring 
responsibilities 

Reduce the gender gap 
in working part-time 
due to caring 
responsibilities between 
women and men 

Women and men part-
time employment due to 
caring responsibilities 
(Eurostat_ lfsa_epgar + 
NEEDCARE)  

Reduce women's risk of 
poverty and social 
exclusion 

People at risk of poverty 
or social exclusion (18-64 
years old) by sex 
(Eurostat_ ilc_peps01) 

Ensure a gender-
balanced  use of leave 
arrangements 

Take-up (use and 
duration) of parental and 
carers' leave by women 
and men and paternity 
leave by men (National 
administrative data + 
possible development of 
Eurostat data) 

26.2 % of women and 3.8% of 
men work part-time due to 
caring responsibilities (2015) 

26,2% of women aged 18-64 are 
at risk of poverty (2014) 

No EU average due to lack of 
comparative data 

The  table  above  presents  the  current  level  of  the  identified  indicators.  It  is  difficult  to 
foresee  how  Member  States'  situation  will  evolve  in  relation  to  all  those  indicators. 
However,  available  data  and  relevant  projections  show  that  in  the  absence  of  EU  level 
action,  while  some  ongoing  improvements  in  female  labour  market  participation  can  be 
expected  (following  existing  trends),  the  situation  remains  sub-optimal  with  a  remaining 
average gender gap in male and female activity rates in the EU of around 9%, with gaps at 
or above 10% in 13 Member States (AT, CY, CZ, EL, HU, IE, IT, MT, NL, PL, RO, SK, 
UK). In Greece, the gap is projected to grow and remain at over 15%, it Italy it will remain 
close  to  20%  and  in  Malta  it  will  exceed  25%.  No  projections  have  been  modelled 
regarding  the  other  indicators,  however,  on  the  basis  of  the  ICF  analysis,  not  significant 
changes are expected. 

As  already  mentioned  in  section  5,  the  objectives  of  this  initiative  are  fully  in  line  with 
broader EU-level initiatives such as the forthcoming European Pillar of Social Rights and 
the Europe 2020 Strategy. In this context, this initiative will be monitored in light of the 

120 

 
 
 
 
targets  determined  under  these  initiatives,  notably  the  objective  of  achieving  the  75%  of 
the  20-64  years  old  to  be  employed.  This  initiative  will  also  propose  non-legislative 
measures, including the announcement of the development of benchmarks on the take-up 
of the measures outlined above by women and men. These  benchmarks could be used in 
the  evaluation  of  the  implementation  of  the  initiative,  in  which  the  relevant  operational 
arrangements to assess this implementation will be established.  

121 

 
 
 
 
 
11. GLOSSARY 

Definitions: 

Maternity  Leave:  Leave  from  work  for  mothers  to  be  on  the  occasion  of  the  birth  of  a 
child. 

Paternity Leave: Leave from work for fathers to be taken on the occasion of the birth of a 
child. 

Parental Leave: Leave from work on the grounds of the birth or adoption of a child to take 
care of that child; 

Carers' Leave: Leave from work for workers providing personal care or support in case of 
a serious illness or dependency of a relative; 

Flexible  Working  Arrangements:  The  possibility  for  workers  to  adjust  their  working 
patterns, including through remote working arrangements, flexible working schedules and 
reduction in working hours. 

Country Codes: 

European Union (EU)  

Belgium  

(BE)   Greece   (EL)   Lithuania  

(LT)   Portugal  

Bulgaria  

(BG)  Spain  

(ES)   Luxembourg   (LU)   Romania  

Czech Republic  

(CZ)   France   (FR)   Hungary  

(HU)  Slovenia  

Denmark  

(DK)  Croatia   (HR)  Malta  

(MT)  Slovakia  

Germany  

(DE)   Italy  

(IT)   Netherlands  

(NL)   Finland  

Estonia  

(EE)   Cyprus   (CY)  Austria  

(AT)   Sweden  

(PT)  

(RO)  

(SI)  

(SK)  

(FI)  

(SE)  

Ireland  

(IE)   Latvia   (LV)  Poland  

(PL)   United Kingdom  

(UK)  

122 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEXES 

Annex 1. Procedural information 

 Organisation and timing  

Following  the  withdrawal  of  the  Commission’s  proposal  to  amend  the  Maternity  Leave 
Directive in July 2015, the Commission announced its intention to prepare a new initiative 
that  would  address  the  issue  in  a  broader  context.  The  Commission  published  a 
Roadmap391  for a ‘New Start Initiative for Working Parents and Carers’ in August 2015.  

A  Commission  inter-service  steering  group  (ISG),  jointly  chaired  by  the  Secretariat-
General was subsequently established in September 2015 for preparing this initiative. The 
following DGs and services were invited to the inter-service group included: Legal Service 
(SJ),  Economic  and  Financial  Affairs  (ECFIN),  Industry,  Entrepreneurship  and  SMEs 
(GROW), Education and Culture (EAC), Regional and Urban Policy (REGIO), Health and 
Food Safety (SANTE) and Migration and Home affairs (HOME). The ISG met 4 times in 
the period from September 2015 to December 2016 and an additional written consultation 
before the re-submission to the RSB was held in February 2017. 

During this period, the Commission undertook a two-stage consultation with the EU-social 
partners between November 2015-January 2016 and July 2016-September 2016. A broad 
public  consultation  also  took  place  between  November  2015  and  February  2016.  The 
Advisory Committee of Equal Opportunities between Women and Men was also invited to 
provide  an  opinion  on  the  initiative,  and  the  Committee  presented  their  views  in  a 
Committee meeting on 8 December 2016 (see Annex 2 on stakeholder views). 

The  Commission  has  announced  that  it  will  present  the  initiative  in  its  2017  Work 
Programme as a related initiative within the framework of the Social Pillar.  

Consultation of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board 

The Regulatory Scrutiny Board first delivered a negative opinion in January 2017 and then 
a positive opinion with reservation in March 2017. The tables below shows how this report 
takes into account the RSB comments. 

391 European Commission (2015), Roadmap: A new start to address the challenges of work-life balance faced 
by working families http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/roadmaps/docs/2015_just_xxx_maternity_leave.en.pdf 

123 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
1st RSB Opinion 

How and where comments have been addressed 

1. The context  

The report should provide a broader perspective of the issues at stake and 
how they fit into the legal and political context. The report should explain 
better why the earlier proposal on maternity leave was withdrawn, and 
describe current stakeholder support for the initiative.  
The report should review how national structural reforms and austerity 
measures have affected related work life balance provisions through altered 
employment law (in particular atypical employment and dismissal 
protection), social security systems and public investment in child care and 
long-term care.  

2. The scope  

The report should clarify the scope and ensure consistency throughout the 
text. In particular, it should make clear whether the main objective is to 
reduce women's underrepresentation in the labour market or to promote 
gender balance in caring responsibilities. The report should explain possible 
synergies with relevant labour law and employment legislation. It should 
clarify whether the initiative targets all workers including self-employed, 
management and executive levels, in the public and private sectors (in line 
with European Court of Justice case law).  

3. The definition of the problem and EU added value  

The report should identify any key provisions that are thought to lead to a 

124 

The background to the withdrawal of the Maternity Leave proposal 
is explained in the new section 2.2. The current stakeholder support 
for the initiative is more clearly presented and their views are now 
described in detail in sections 7, for each set of options, and in 
section 8, when describing the impacts of the options. 
The impact of structural reforms and austerity is discussed in section 
4 (on the baseline).  

The scope of the initiative is better defined, including in the revised 
Introduction chapter. The hierarchy of the objectives is also 
clarified, as the objective to balance caring responsibilities is more 
clearly presented as an intermediary (specific) objective to reach the 
overall objective of improving women's labour market participation. 
This reflects the new organisation of the problem definition in which 
it is made clear that the unequal sharing of caring responsibilities is 
the main driver of women's underrepresentation this initiative aims 
to address.  
The interlink with relevant labour law and employment legislation is 
explained in more detail in section 2.3 (e.g. Working Time 
Directive) and other initiatives (e.g. Telework agreement) are now 
referred to (section 2.5). The target of this initiative (i.e. workers 
with children or dependent relatives) is clarified in section 5.1 on the 
policy objectives. 

The problem definition (section 2) has been re-structured. The 
unequal sharing of caring responsibilities between women and men 

 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
fairer share of caring responsibilities within a household (e.g. length of leave, 
mandatory versus non-mandatory leave, compensated or not compensated 
leave, transferable versus non-transferable). Member States’ experience with 
legal protections and leave systems might be relevant in that respect. This 
would clarify the potential for improvement of EU legislation and better 
justify the need to act at EU level. The subsidiarity analysis should be further 
elaborated using relevant information from the second stage consultation of 
social partners.  
The report should specify to what extent the problem is due to poor design or 
enforcement of the existing legal framework, for example regarding 
dismissal protection during pregnancy or discriminatory behaviours when 
taking leaves. In the area of paternity leave and carer's leave where currently 
little or no legislation exists, the report should analyse in more depth the 
problem and its causes.  
In the absence of a full-fledged evaluation, an annex might consolidate and 
assess available information and pull together data and study results.  

4. Options  

The report should substantiate the choices of the options for each area and in 
combination, for instance by presenting what is known about what has 
worked and what has not, at EU and at Member State level. The report 
should clearly explain the reasons for discarding certain measures, such as 
provisions on the length of maternity leave, despite the fact that research 
outcomes throughout the report mention the relevance of combining length, 
compensation level and dismissal protection.  
The report should justify more convincingly the selection of the main 
provisions laid down in the options. In addition, it should present Member 

125 

is now the main driver for the problem that is addressed by this 
initiative. It is now clearly explained what the root causes are behind 
this driver: "stereotypes and discrimination" and "ill-designed work-
life balance" policies. Economic disincentives are presented as a 
reinforcing driver to the unequal sharing of caring responsibilities. 
Within the description of the root cause "ill-designed work-life 
balance", the key provisions that can have an impact on a more equal 
sharing of caring responsibilities and hence women participation in 
the labour market are described. Member States' experiences are 
used to a greater extent to illustrate the argumentation.  The 
subsidiarity analysis has been further elaborated in section 6.2. 
A discussion of the impact of discrimination on the problem was 
added to the problem definition (section 3.2.1) and Annex 5 on the 
evaluation of the existing legal framework was added to the report. 
The problem definition stresses the importance of making leave 
arrangements available for fathers. In this context it highlights the 
fact that although paternity leave provisions exist in many Member 
States, it is often very short. A separate paragraph concerning the 
relevance of carers' leave in addressing the problem has been added 
in section 3.2.2. 

In section 7, efforts have been made to better substantiate the choice 
of the option in the light of Member States experiences, evidence 
and stakeholders views. It is now more clearly explained why certain 
options were discarded (especially concerning the length of 
maternity leave in section 7.1.1). Member States views are reported 
in Section 8 in the "stakeholders' views" boxes. The retained 
combination, which includes all the previously determined preferred 
options, is now better justified in section 8.6.  

 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
States' views on the options.  
The choice of the preferred combination should be more convincingly 
justified, given that it does not seem to be the most cost-effective solution. 
The report could identify the legal and non-legal instrument(s) envisaged to 
carry out the initiative.  

5. Impacts  

The report should better substantiate the likely costs and benefits, in 
particular for companies, including SMEs, and (groups of) Member States, 
qualifying the estimates and explaining the methodology in more detail. 
Given the uncertainty of the estimates and the number of assumptions, 
efforts should be made to conduct a sensitivity analysis of the likely costs 
and benefits, which should be presented within ranges instead of exact 
numbers. The methodology focusses on the long term effects and tends to 
ignore short-term costs.  
The report should better rely on the outcomes of studies mentioned as 
references in the document as well as on the study carried out in the frame of 
this initiative to support its statements. The results of studies should be 
presented in a neutral tone to better differentiate between evidence and 
political judgment. Some of the assumptions regarding the estimation of 
benefits seem to be on the optimistic side. Therefore, the report should 
provide additional arguments to make these estimates more credible.  

6. Monitoring and evaluation  

Quantified estimates are now explained in greater detail and 
supported by qualitative arguments whenever possible. The revised 
text also more clearly discusses how sensitive the results are to 
certain assumptions (e.g. in relation to lost production). The 
potential impact of collective agreements is also discussed now. 

The the total impact on companies, Central Governments and GDP 
are disaggregated by clusters of Member States (those which meet 
the requirements, those which have provisions which fall somewhat 
below the requirements and those with provisions which fall 
significantly below the requirements).  

A more detailed presentation of the assumptions on which the 
calculations are based and a discussion of their limits was included 
in the methodological Annex, and when relevant, in section 8. 

Regarding the monitoring and evaluation indicators, the report should 
explain against which benchmarks success would be measured. 

Section 10 now includes more detail on how the initiative will be 
monitored.  

126 

 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RSB 2nd Opinion 
The report should clarify the difference between the comprehensive 
and wide scope of the 'New Start' initiative – in line with calls from 
the European Parliament, many Member States and stakeholders – 
and the more limited scope in the present initiative. 
The report should substantiate the need for action in the area of 
dismissal protection and its possible link with the structural reforms 
and austerity measures. It should further provide reasons for 
withdrawing child care and long-term care, given their link with 
women's under representation in employment. 

The report should justify the exclusion of self-employed from the 
scope, given that the maternity leave directive covers them. It should 
also clarify whether the initiative applies to all workers, 
independently of their contracts of employment or employment 
relationships, in the private and public sectors. 
Given that no legislation exists in the areas of paternity leave and 
carer’s leave, the report should further assess the specific problems 
at stake and their drivers, and the diversity of situations in the 
Member States. 
The report should substantiate the reasons for discarding more 
stringent legal provisions concerning dismissal protection, other 
than the response of employers' associations. It should explain why 
non legislative provisions would be (more) effective in providing a 
better protection for workers. The report should explain whether 
other alternatives have been considered and why they were 
discarded. 
However, the report should improve the presentation of the likely 
costs and benefits: for instance, the tables presenting the estimated 

How and where comments have been addressed 
The  limits  of  the  scope  of  the  impact  assessment  compared  to  the 
scope of the 'New Start' initiative and the reasons for these limits are 
now better identified in the Policy objectives section (section 5.1) 

The relevance of action in the area of dismissal protection is 
substantiated in the problem definition (section 3.2.1). 
As explained above in section 5.1, formal care services are not 
withdrawn but due to limited EU competence in the area, there will 
not be legislative action in this field and measures to enhance 
current efforts in this area have not been discussed in the impact 
assessment beyond the problem definition.  

The reason why the self-employed are not covered by this initiative 
is better substantiated in the introduction. Furthermore, it is clarified 
that the initiative applies to all workers who have an employment 
contract or employment relationship (Introduction). 

The rationale behind introducing paternity and carers' leave was 
strengthened in the problem definition (section 3.2.2), including 
through a more specific assessment of the situation in the Member 
States. 
The reasons for discarding more stringent legal provisions 
concerning dismissal protections were further developed and better 
substantiated in section 7.1.1. Furthermore, it is specified why non-
legislative measures are considered the better solution as opposed to 
legislative measures in the area of dismissal protection.   

The tables presenting the impacts in section 8 were revised in order 
to better inform on the costs and benefits leading to the overall 

127 

 
 
 
 
impacts should be more informative, calculations of the figures 
summarized and the likely impacts on competitiveness further 
developed. 
The impact per company results in very small average numbers 
(usually a couple of euros). 
However, the focus on the effects over a very long time period on 
the average company probably hides wide divergences between 
types of companies and over time. The report should, therefore, be 
more transparent on the impacts: 
- It could highlight that additional leave being taken by an employee 
in a micro enterprise can probably be more substantial in the 
concerned year and could then possibly have significant effects on 
the performance of the company. 
- It should justify the long time horizon chosen for the cost-benefit 
analysis and explain the asymmetry between costs and benefits over 
time. The costs of work life balance policies hit immediately while 
benefits in terms of higher productivity of the labour force stem 
from long term behavioural changes on the labour market. 
The report should better assess the impacts on (groups of) Member 
States, for example in the form of a table, that could mention for 
each Member State the legal changes at stake and indicate the 
expected impacts. 
The preferred package of options should more clearly identify the 
legislative and nonlegislative actions and their content. The analysis 
of its impacts should be further developed and include a break-down 
by (group of) Member States. 
Due to the length of the report, an abstract summarises the key 
elements of the IA. In order to better inform policy makers, the 
abstract should present more clearly the preferred combination of 
options and the related estimated costs and benefits. 

impact on companies and Central governments.  

The introduction of section 8 now clarifies that the impacts are 
presented in Net Present Value over the 2015-2055 period in order 
to take into account the impact of the measures on long-term trends 
but that some costs will occur in the short term while benefits will 
take more time to materialise. It is also mentioned that this might 
impose a burden on small companies.  

A table summarising the legal gap analysis by Member State for the 
all the legislative preferred options was introduced in section 8.6.  

Tables summarising the preferred combination of options and the 
related estimated impacts were added to the abstract. 

128 

 
 
 
Evidence and external expertise used 

The Commission awarded a contract to ICF international for the analysis of the costs and 
benefits of possible EU measures to facilitate work-life balance for parents and caregivers. 

The  Commission  additionally  drew  on  its  existing  contracts  to  gather  evidence  that  was 
used to support this impact assessment. This included: 

A thematic report prepared by the European Social Policy Network  on work-life  balance 
measures  for  people  with  dependent  relatives.  A  synthesis  report,  summarising  the  key 
findings, has been published along with in-depth country reports on the topic. 

A review of the available literature on the costs and benefits of work-life balance measures 
was undertaken by researchers at the London School of Economics. The review has been 
published. 

In addition, the European Network of Equality Bodies prepared a survey of their members 
on  reported  incidents  of  workplace  discrimination  and  dismissals  related  to  parenthood.

129 

 
 
 
 
 Annex 2. Stakeholder consultation 

Several steps have been taken to collect stakeholders views, they are summarised below : 

WHO 

HOW 

ON WHAT 

WHEN 

Consultations 

On the possible direction of EU 
action 

Nov 2015- 
Jan 2016 

Social partners 

Dedicated 
consultation 

On the content of the 
envisaged Commission proposal and 
on whether they wish to enter into 
negotiations as provided for by 
Article 154(4) TFEU. 

Public 

Online 
public 
consultation 

On the problem to be tackled 

On the solutions to address the 
problem (focus on non-legislative 
measures) 

July- Sept 
2016 

Nov 2015-
Feb2016 

Opinions 

Advisory 
Committee on 
Equal 
Opportunities 
for women and 
men 

Ad-hoc 
opinion 

The solutions to address the problem 
(particular focus on non-legislative 
measures) 

Dec 2016 

European 
Parliament 

Own-
initiative 
report 

On the problem to be tackled 

On the solutions to address the 
problem  

Events 

MS 
Representatives 

SPC 
thematic 
review  

Identification of challenges 

Sharing of best practices  

Sept-16 

Sept-16 

MS 
Representatives, 

Slovak 
Presidency 

Identification of challenges 

Sept-16 

130 

 
 
 
 
NGO, 
academics  

conference   Sharing of best practices  

Summary of the responses of the EU social partners 

In  line  with  the  treaty,  the  Commission  consulted  the  EU  social  partners  in  a  two-phase 
consultation process. A first-phase consultation with the social partners was held between 
November  2015  and  January  2016,  and  concerned  the  possible  direction  of  EU  level 
legislative action in the area of work-life balance and female employment. A second-stage 
social partner consultation took place between July and September 2016, which requested 
their  views  on  a  range  of  envisaged  EU-level  measures  in  the  areas  of  leaves,  flexible 
working  arrangements,  formal  care  services,  and  measures  to  reduce  tax-benefit 
disincentives. 

At cross-industry level, the trade unions that replied to the consultations were the European 
Trade  Union  Confederation  (ETUC),  Eurocadres  and  the  European  Confederation  of 
Executives  and  Managerial  Staff  (CEC)  as  well  as  the  European  Confederation  of 
Independent  Trade  Unions  (CESI).  It  should  be  noted  that ETUC's  reply  also  took  into 
account the view of 10 ETUC sectorial trade union organisations. 

On the side of the employers, replies to the consultations were sent by Businesseurope, the 
European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (UEAPME) and the 
European Centre of Employers and Enterprises providing Public Services (CEEP) as well 
as the Community of European Railway and Infrastructure Companies (CER), the Council 
of  European  Employers  of  the  Metal,  Engineering  and  Technology-Based  Industries 
(CEEMET), the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR), the European 
Chemical  Employers  Group  (ECEG),  the  Hotels,  Restaurants  and  Cafés  in  Europe 
(HOTREC), the Performing Arts Employers' Associations League Europe (PEARLE), the 
Retail, Wholesale and International Trade Representation to the EU (EuroCommerce).  

The social partners agreed, largely, with the Commission's objective of improving women's 
labour market participation and the Commission's  description of the challenges related to 
work-life  balance  and  female  employment.  The  trade  unions  and  the  employers' 
organisations however did not agree on the case for further EU-level legislative action in 
the  field  and  to  enter  into  direct  negotiations.  While  the  trade  unions  were  favourable  to 
new measures, the employers argued against further action.  

Possible improvements to the EU legal framework 

The  trade  unions  believed  that  the  EU  legal  framework  could  be  improved  to  provide 
strengthened protection against dismissal upon return from maternity leave. ETUC would 
additionally like to see an 18 weeks maternity leave guaranteed at full-pay level, coverage 
extended  to  all  workers  in  atypical  forms  of  employment  and  measures  to  facilitate 
breastfeading.  They  would  also  like  to  introduce  payment  and  flexibility  in  uptake  for 
parental leave and increase its non-transferable period and the maximum age of the child, 

131 

 
 
 
  
 
 
as  well  as  introduce  EU  legislation  for  paternity  leave.  CEC,  Eurocadres  and  CESI  were 
also  in  favour  of  improving  the  Parental  leave  directive  and  CEC  and  Eurocadreas 
supported  the  introduction  of  EU  legislation  for  paternity  leave.  ETUC,  CEC  and 
Eurocadres  appeared  favourable  towards  carers'  leave,  but  they  cautioned  that  the  latter 
should be designed so as not to reinforce expectations for women to provide informal care. 
ETUC considered that flexible working arrangements could be taken up at EU level whilst 
CEC,  Eurocadres  and  CECI  were  favourable  to  measures  to  facilitate  greater  flexible 
working. CESI is particularly in favour of further EU-level legislative action in the areas of 
flexible  working  arrangements,  part-time  work,  childcare  and  care  for  other  family 
members.  

Employers'  organisations, on the other hand, found the current EU-legislative framework 
in  the  area  of  work-life  balance  to  be  sufficient.  They  pointed  out  to  the  primarily 
responsibility  of  the  Member  States  and  social  partners  in  this  area.  Businesseurope, 
UEAPME, CEMR, HOTREC, CER, EuroCommerce and ECEG also warned that new EU-
level legislation in this field could create high costs for employers, which could adversely 
affect competitiveness and worsen unemployment. Two organisations specifically referred 
to the disproportionate burdens that SMEs could face (HOTREC, ECEG). 

Possible Non-legislative measures 

Although the second-stage consultation was mainly focused on legislative measures, it also 
presented a series of possible avenues for EU non-legislative action. Most social partners, 
both  trade  unions  and  employers,  were  favourable  to  EU-level  support  in  the  area  of 
childcare and long-term care services. CEEP, UEAPME, and CEEMET further insisted on 
the need for policy guidance to reduce tax-benefit disincentives for women to work and to 
change mindsets and tackle gender stereotypes related to care. 

The  social  partners  mentionned  a  wide  range  of  non-legislative  instruements  they  would 
like to see the EU put forward. These include strengthened EU policy guidance (including 
through  the  European  Semester),  EU-level  financial  support,  clearer  guidance  to 
national/regional/local  authorities  on  how  existing  EU  funds  can  be  used,  further 
awareness-raising  activities,  promoting  mutual  learning  and  the  exchange  of  good 
practices. 

Summary of the results of the public consultation 

The public consultation on possible action addressing the challenges of work-life balance 
faced by working parents and caregivers launched by DG Justice and Consumers together 
with  DG  Employment  and  Social  Affairs  run  from  18  November  2015  to  17  February 
2016. It received 785 contributions from across the EU including 229 from organisations 
and  557  from  individuals.  The  table  below  shows  the  proportions  of  responses  received 
from  organisations  by  type  of  organisation.  Non-Governmental  organisations  account  for 
28%  of  organisations  having  expressed  their  views,  employers’  organisations  for  17.5%, 
public authorities for 10.5% (including 10s Ministries at Member State level) and worker 
organisations  for  9.7%.    Responses  were  received  from  each  EU  Member  State  –  the 

132 

 
 
 
 
largest number of responses came from Belgium, followed by Germany, Italy, France and 
Portugal. 

Table 1: Number of responses, by type of organisation 

Responses by type of organisation 

Number  Percentage 

Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) 

Employer organisation 

Public  authority  (Central  govt.,  local,  regional,  equality  body, 
etc.) 

Worker organisation / trade union 

European network 

International Organisation 

Large organisation / company 

Think-tank / Consultancy 

Small or Medium-sized Enterprise 

Researcher / academic 

Other 

64 

40 

36 

22 

13 

11 

6 

3 

1 

1 

28.07% 

17.54% 

10.53% 

9.65% 

5.7% 

4.82% 

2.63% 

1.32% 

0.44% 

0.44% 

32 

14.04% 

An  overwhelming  percentage  of  organisations  (97.8%)  and  individuals  (93.3%)  agree  or 
partially  agree  with  the  description  of  the  challenges  laid  out  in  the  background 
document392,  while  85%  of  organisations  and  89%  of  individuals  agree  that  the  list  of 
policy  areas  to  focus  on  (childcare,  long-term  care  services,  family-related  leave 
arrangements  for  both  women  and  men,  flexible  working  arrangements  for  both  women 

392 The challenges listed by the background document included the under-representation of women in the 
labour market (women more likely to work part-time, and in low-productivity, low-skilled and low-paid 
sectors, on fixed-term contracts, and in jobs below their skills level), the gender pay gap, the greater risk of 
poverty & social exclusion for women, the lack of work-life-balance solutions, of available, accessible and 
quality childcare and long-term care services and the unavailability of flexible working and/or paid leave 
arrangements for fathers, all compounded by work disincentives (eg tax-benefit systems that encourage lower 
earners in a couple not to work). 

133 

 
 
 
 
                                                      
 
and men, tax-benefit systems that make work pay for both partners) is accurate and wholly 
or partially complete. 

When asked about the possible policy measures to improve work-life balance and female 
labour  market  participation  in  their  country,  organisations  responded  that  the  highest 
priority  is  the  availability  of  childcare,  followed  by  improving  the  possibilities  and/or 
incentives  for  men  to  take  up  caring  responsibilities  and  work-life  balance  measures  and 
improving the possibilities and/or incentives for parents and others with dependent family 
members  to  take  up  caring  responsibilities  and  work-life  balance  measures.  Individuals 
responded  that  the  highest  priority  is  improving  the  possibilities  and/or  incentives  for 
parents  and others  with  dependent  family  members to  take  up  caring responsibilities  and 
work-life balance measures, and improving the availability and affordability of childcare. 

77% of respondents replied that there is a need for further EU-level action to address work-
life  balance  challenges.  While  61%  of  respondents  support  legislative  options,  71% 
support  policy  guidance,  72%  support  the  development  of  EU-level  benchmarks,  73% 
support  increased  monitoring  by  the  EU  and  an  overwhelming  94%  support  the  idea  of 
more sharing of good practices. 

As  concerns  the  expected  effectiveness  of  new  EU-level  measures  in  addressing  the 
challenges of WLB, in each case there was large support for the measures, with them being 
labelled potentially effective or very effective. 

Finally,  when  asked  if  the  current  EU-level  funds  and  regulations  are  effective  in 
supporting  work-life  balance,  the  majority  of  participants  answered  that  they  don't  know 
(55%),  followed  by  no  (29.5%).  The  vast  majority  of  participants  (73%)  of  participants 
then  responded  that  it  would  be  useful  for  the  EU  to  provide  clearer  guidance  to 
national/regional/local  authorities  on  how  EU-funds  could  be  used  to  financially  support 
work-life balance. 

Ten  Central  governments  /  ministries  replied  to  the  public  consultation.  Below  are 
indications  of  their  views  on  the  need  for  further  EU  level  action,  as  formulated  in  their 
responses to the public consultation: 

In the view of MT, DE, NL and DK there is no need for further EU-level action nor 
o 
to improve the EU-level legislative framework in order to address the challenges of work-
life balance while CZ thinks there is a need for further EU level action but not to improve 
the EU level legislative framework. 

o 
RO, LV, FR, ES and EE are in favour of improving the EU legislative framework. 
For  FR  there  is  a  need  to  have  more  convergence  as  regards  parental  leave  and  its 
condition of access/ type of beneficiary and length. ES and EE are in favour of a European 
paternity  leave  while  RO  thinks  the  EU  legislative  framework  should  be  improved  to 
increase  the  women's  employment  and  better  share  responsibilities  between  women  and 
men. 

134 

 
 
 
 
Other stakeholders views 

a. European Parliament resolution on creating labour market conditions favourable 
for work-life balance393 

As  a  reaction  to  the  roadmap  and  the  public  consultation  on  the  New  Start  Initiative,  as 
well as to prompt the Commission to step up its work in this field, the European Parliament 
adopted  on  13  September  2016  a  resolution  on  creating  labour  market  conditions 
favourable  for  work-life  balance.  In  general,  the  resolution  welcomes  the  Commission's 
approach to work-life balance policies.  

The  resolution  calls  on  Member  States  to  put  in  place  proactive  policies  designed  to 
support  women  entering,  returning  to  and  staying  in  the  labour  market  with  stable  and 
quality  employment.  It  also  calls  for  measures  to  facilitate  a  greater  sharing  of  care 
responsibilities between women and men. The resolution further urges the Member States 
to  ensure  the  availability  of  and  universal  access  to  affordable  and  high-quality  early 
childhood education and care, as well as elderly and dependent care. It suggests increasing 
public expenditure on care services and incentivising employer contributions to care costs. 

The  resolution  calls  on  the  Commission  to  put  forward  a  proposal  in  the  context  of  the 
European Pillar of Social Rights, should an agreement between the social partners not be 
reached.  

In terms of changes to EU-level legislation, the resolution calls for: 

• 

• 
• 

• 

a proposal for a revised Pregnant Workers (Maternity Leave Directive) aiming 
to prolong paid maternity leave with a diverse formula of payment to allow for 
accommodation of specific needs and traditions in different Member States; 
a Paternity Leave Directive with a minimum of a two-week fully paid leave. 
a  Carers'  Leave  Directive  as  a  supplement  to  the  provision  of  affordable 
professional care and to enable workers to care for dependents.  
an implementation report for the Parental Leave Directive, as well as using the 
review clause to extend the minimum duration from four to six months, and to 
have the leave paid. 

In  terms  of  non-legislative  measures,  the  resolution  notably  calls  on  the  Commission  to 
develop: 

393 Motion for a European Parliament Resolution  on creating labour market conditions favourable for work-
life balance, (2016/2017(INI)), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A8-2016-0253+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN 

135 

 
 
 
 
                                                      
• 

• 

• 
• 

• 

initiatives  with  the  Member  States,  such  as  a  Child  Guarantee,  so  that  every 
child could have access to childcare (and free healthcare, free education, decent 
housing and adequate nutrition); 
specific  targets  on  long-term  care,  with  monitoring  tools  within  the  European 
Semester. 
quality standards for all care services. 
implementation of the Barcelona targets by 2020 and endorsement of the 2014 
quality framework on early childhood education and care.  
making  better  use  of  the  funds,  calling  also  for  a  revision  of  the  MFF  for 
investments in social infrastructure. 

b. Opinion of the Advisory committee on equal opportunities for women and men  

The  Advisory  committee  on  equal  opportunities  for  women  and  men  was  invited 
in December 2015  to  provide  an  ad-hoc  opinion  on  the  new  initiative  to  address  the 
challenges of work-life balance faced by working parents and caregivers. The opinion was 
adopted in Januray 2017. 

In  its  opinion,  the  Advisory  committee  highlighted  a  need  for  strong  policies  and 
legislation to create optimal conditions, incentives towards an equal contribution of women 
and  men  in  care  work  and  in  paid  economy.  The  committee  highlighted  the  existence  of 
discriminatory treatment of women and men in relation to parenthood, care provision and 
use of work-life balance measures.  

The  committee  emphasised  the  need  to  take  a  comprehensive  approach  to  address  the 
growing needs in terms of elderly and dependent care, including quality public and private 
care  services,  improving  working  conditions  and  quality  of  formal  home-based  care 
services, providing a right to carers leave and allowing flexible working arrangements.  

The  committee  noted  that  most  young  people  –  both  women  and  men  –  wish  to  equally 
share their employment and family responsibilities based on equal partnership. It recalled 
the  wishes  of  many  fathers,  i.e.  to  spend  more  time  with  their  children,  requires  suitable 
governmental and company-based framework conditions. It set out best policies to ensure 
that women and men share care responsibilities include incentives for men to take leave to 
care for their children in the form of non-transferable rights and pay. 

The  committee  acknowledged  that  gender  stereotypes  need  to  be  challenged  in  order  to 
encourage men to make use of work-life balance measures. Awareness raising campaigns 
at both EU and national level could help addressing unconscious gender bias.  

The committee acknowledged that so far the sharing of care responsibilities and domestic 
tasks between women and men is not part of the corporate culture in many companies. For 
this to change, a multi-dimensional approach is required addressing gender stereotypes on 
who  takes  care  of  family  and  domestic  tasks,  addressing  career  opportunities  and 
leadership positions for women, reducing the culture of presentism and avoiding blurring 
of work and private life with permanent availability. Knowledge should be developed on 
the costs and benefits of equal sharing of care responsibilities between women and men for 
companies, economies and societies.  

136 

 
 
 
In  its  Opinion,  the  committee  sets  out  that  Member  States  should  go  further  than  the 
Barcelona  targets  to  increase  childcare  provision,  by  committing  to  provide  childcare  by 
2020 to:  

at  least  50  per  cent  of  children  below  3  years  of  age,  as  well  as  possibly  33  per  cent  of 
children attending formal quality childcare arrangements for a duration of at least 30 hours 
per week;  

at  least  90  per  cent  of  children  between  3  and  the  compulsory  school  age.  As  well  as 
possibly  90  per  cent  of  children  attending  formal  quality  childcare  arrangements  for  a 
duration of at least 30 hours per week; and  

Focus could be put on out-of-school care services with the development of possible targets 
for  children  between  3  and  the  compulsory  school  age  and  school  age  children:  a 
percentage  of  children  attending  before/after  school  formal  arrangements271  (possibly 
50%  for  the  first  age  category  and  90%  for  the  second  one);  a  percentage  of  children 
attending formal care arrangements during school holidays (possibly 50% for the first age 
category  and  70%  for  the  second  one);  a  percentage  of  children  accessing  school  meal 
services (possibly 90% for both age categories).  

The committee also stressed that an EU benchmark on the quality of childcare provisions 
could operate alongside the Barcelona targets and could be in line with what is proposed in 
the EU-Quality Framework for Early Childhood Education and Care (2014) : "at least 90% 
of  ECEC  provision  is  of  good  quality  or  better  as  measured  by  the  national  or  regional 
criteria” 

137 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 3: Who is affected by the initiative and how? 

As  presented  in  Section  7,  the  impact  of  the  initiative  on  a  series  of  stakeholders  was 
assessed. This annex provides an overview of how Member States and companies will be 
affected by the preferred combination of options, as identified in Section 8.  

Member States 

In  order  to  implement  the  preferred  combination  of  measures  presented  in  Section  8, 
Member States will have to update their legislative framework. Considering on the basis of 
Directives  92/85/EEC  on  maternity  leave  and  2010/18/EC  on  parental  leave  that  all 
Member  States  already  have  a  system  to  manage  family-related  leaves,  the  change  in 
parameters (such as non-transferability and pay) should not create the need to create a new 
system but only an increase in work-flow (assuming an increase in take-up) and hence the 
increase in administrative burden should be limited. 

Companies 

Companies  will  be  required  to  make  organisational  changes,  as  more  of  their  employees 
can  be  expected  to  make  requests  to  use  available  measures.  However,  a  number  of  the 
requirements  already  exist,  and  the  proposal  would  provide  stronger  possibilities  and 
incentives for employees to use them. As for new requirements, the organisational changes 
are of a broadly similar nature than existing ones and hence existing procedures (including 
IT systems to manage the request for leaves and flexible working arrangements) could be 
adapted.  

138 

 
 
 
 
Annex 4. Methodology for quantitative impact analysis 

This  impact  assessment  is  based  on  ICF's  and  Cambridge  Econometrics'  "Study  on  the 
costs and benefits of possible EU measures to facilitate work-life balance for parents and 
care givers" This annex provides a brief description of the methodology used to estimate 
the  quantitative  impacts  of  the  each  policy  option,  as  presented  in  Section  7.  The  used 
methodology is two-fold: a cost benefit analysis to assess the impact of the policy options 
on different stakeholders and macro-economic analysis based on the E3ME model.  

1. Summary of Assumptions 

The calculations of the macro-economic and socio-economic impacts of the introduction 
of  potential  measures  to  promote  work  life  balance  are  underpinned  by  series  of 
assumptions and calculations presented in this section of the annex. A brief description of 
some of the key assumptions and methodological steps is provided here. 

The calculations include an assessment of the legal gap between the existing legislation in 
a  Member  State  and  the  proposed  legislation.  The  larger  the  gap  between  the  existing 
legislation  and  the  proposed  legislation  the  larger  the  impact.  This  legal  gap  multiplier 
takes  a  value  between  zero  and  one,  where  one  indicates  that  there  is  no  provision 
available in Member State.  

The calculations for most socio-economic impacts are based on the estimated take up and 
duration  of  leave  options  /  flexible  working  arrangements  under  each  option.  In  the 
baseline scenario, the take-up, average duration and value of benefit payments for leave 
options  has  been  collected  from  desk  research  for  each  Member  State,  and  not  from 
administrative data (which does not exist in some Member States). Therefore, the number 
of people taking leave and the value of benefit payments may differ from administrative 
data.  It  is  assumed  that  the  rate  of  take-up  of  leave  and  flexible  working  arrangements 
remains  constant  in  the  baseline  (in  the  absence  of  any  change  in  Member  State 
legislation).  In  the  policy  options,  where  there  is  assumed  to  be  a  change  in  take-up  or 
duration,  this  is  assumed  to  increase  in  a  linear  trend  for  a  ten  to  twenty  year  period 
(depending on the measure), at which point the take up and duration is assumed to reach 
its new sustainable level. 

The  macro-economic  impacts  have  been  estimated  using  the  E3ME  model.  The  inputs 
into  the  model  are  assumed  changes  to  labour  market  participation,  employment, 
productivity,  hours  worked,  earnings  and  population.  These  inputs  have  been  estimated 
using  findings  from  the  existing  literature,  an  assessment  of  the  legal  gap  between  the 
existing  legislation  and  the  proposed  legislation  and  the  take  up  rate  and  duration  of 
different leave options. The results from the E3ME model show the level of employment, 
the  level  of  unemployment  (which  subsequently  provide  estimates  for  the  value  of 
unemployment  benefit  payments),  tax  receipts,  GDP,  real  incomes  and  the  level  of 
competitiveness within the EU. It should be noted that even when the legislation does not 
change in a Member State, the macro-economic results for that Member State can change. 
This is due to changes in the employment, income and competitiveness of other Member 
States in the EU. 

139 

 
 
 
The  estimates  of  the  value  of  benefit  payments  (unemployment  benefit  payments  and 
payments  for  parents/carers  whilst  they  are  on  leave)  are  not  taken  from  administrative 
data.  The  estimated  value  of  these  payments  per  individual  have  been  estimated  from 
desk research conducted for each Member State which has gathered data on the level of 
benefit  paid  (usually  as  a  share  of  previousl  earnings),  the  value  of  average  earnings  in 
each  year  in  each  Member  State  and  the  estimated  number  of  people  receiving  these 
benefits and duration they are paid for. These benefit payments are calculated in the same 
way  in  the  baseline  scenario  and  all  subsequent  policy  options.  Therefore  the  value  of 
these benefit payments may differ from Member State administrative data. 

In  addition  to  assumptions  around  take-up  some  of  the  assumptions  used,  which  most 
impact the macro-economic and socio-economic impact data are as follows: 

  Replacement of workers on leave – replacements rates are conditioned by the length 
of leave taken and it is generally assumed that workers taking short leave (less than 
3  weeks)  are  no  replaced.  This  has  led  to  assumptions  around  replacement  rates 
which stand at 33% for women and 11% men, as women tend to take longer leaves. 
In  the  parental  leave  options,  where  the  length  of  male  take-up  is  assumed  to 
increase, these rates have been modified to reflect the detail of the policy option and 
its likely impact on the length of take-up of leave by men. 

  Assumptions  and  sensitivity  analysis  around  productivity  impact  and  loss  of 
production  –  a  range  of  assumptions  was  applied  to  loss  of  production  to  take 
account  of  the  fact  that  –  depending  on  the  sector  and  the  stage  in  the  economy 
cycle,  evidence  shows  that  productive  capacity  is  not  always  fully  utilised. 
Assumptions  of  100%,  80%  and  50%  of  loss  of  production  have  therefore  been 
calculated.  Assumptions  have  also  been  made  around  increased  productivity  of 
more satisfied workers and the productivity of replacement workers –the former is 
higher  with  increased  levels  of  satisfaction  whereas  replacement  workers  are 
assumed to be less productive than the worker on leave they are replacing. 

 

Impact of stricter requlation on recruitment decisions – Literature, including from 
the  OECD,  has  provided  some  evidence  of  the  impact  of  stricter  employment 
protection legislation on employment and labour market dynamism. An assumption 
has therefore been made to reduce the likely positive impact of measures on labour 
market participation to take account of these potential disincentive effects. 

  Assumptions  on  length  of  leave  taken  by  women  if  men  increase  their  take-up  of 
leave (and length of leave taken) – assumptions around the length of leave taken by 
women have been shaped around the policy option being assessed. For example, in 
options which increase the non-transferabilty of parental leave, the length of take-up 
of women is assumed to reduce proportionate to the increase in the length of take-
up by men. In other policy options, lower ratios are assumed. 

 

Impact  of  offering  paternity  leave  on  the  take-up  of  parental  leave  –  based  on 
literature from countries offering relatively generous paternity leave, it is assumed 
that  there  will  be  some  leverage  effect  from  the  take-up  of  paternity  leave  to  the 
take-up of parental leave (and its associated imacts). 

140 

 
 
 
Further  detail  on  the  assumptions  underpinning  the  modelling  (and  the  literature  which 
has informed these) is presented in this Annex. 

It  is  important  to  be  clear  that  the  purpose  of  macro-economic  and  socio-economic 
modelling is not to provide precise figures on likely costs and benefits arising of a policy 
option, but to provide an indicating of magnitude of impact, where relevant informed and 
modulated by a suitable sensitivity analysis. 

The model has been able to estimate the macro-economic impacts of the policy options, 
and some socio-economic impacts and costs to businesses. However, it has not been able 
to comprehensively model all the potential impacts of the policy options. Where it has not 
been possible to quantify these impacts, a qualitative discussion has been provided. The 
impacts which have not been quantified are: 

- Business profitability  and turnover. Some of the costs and benefits to businesses have 
been  captured.  However,  some  of  the  policy  options  have  an  impact  on  the  number  of 
people employed, earnings and therefore spending. This will affect business profitability 
and turnover. It has not been possible to capture these impacts. 

-  Clear  impacts  on  male  and  female  labour  market  participation  could  also  not  be 
calculated, but it is indicated that many of the employment and associated benefits arise 
for women. 

- Some of the policy options will promote a more equal sharing of unpaid work (such as 
housework,  childcare  and  caring  for  the  elderly).  However,  due  to  a  lack  of  reliable 
evidence and data, it has not been possible to model or monetise this impact. 

-  The  introduction  of  measures  to  promote  work-life  balance  also  aims  to  improve  the 
well-being of European citizens. However, due to a lack of reliable evidence or measures 
of  well-being  and  the  monetary  value  of  improvement  in  well-being,  it  has  not  been 
possible to estimate the value of this impact. 

2. Cost Benefit Analysis 

The  methodology  adopted  to  assess  the  direct  and  indirect  costs  and  benefits  of  the 
different legislative (and non-legislative) policy options is Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA).  

The inherent difficulty of CBA is its more limited ability to value non-monetary impacts, 
such as the impact on gender equality or the potential impacts on family cohesion if both 
men  and  women  are  able  to  take  care  of  children  and  ill,  disabled  or  impaired  family 
members.  In  this  analysis,  it  has  been  tried  to  overcome  this  problem  by  evaluating  the 
magnitude of these impacts where monetary values are not available. 

In order to assess the impact of the different policy options, an extensive literature review 
was  carried  out  to  collect  evidence  of  the  impact  of  the  policy  options  on  a  variety  of 
indicators.  The  literature  review  sought  to  define  and  quantify  relationships  between  key 

141 

 
 
 
 
variables to help quantify differences in impacts between the options. Where no evidence 
was  available  in  the  literature,  benchmark  countries  were  selected  and  impacts  were 
calculated using these baseline measures.  

The evidence collected from the literature was used to form assumptions and calculations 
to estimate the impacts of the policy options. The assumptions used in the calculations are 
based on the evidence collected from the literature, but are not always the exact multipliers 
presented in the literature. This is because the literature does not provide evidence on each 
individual policy option; it instead provides evidence of the impact of having any leave, or 
flexible working arrangements compared to having none, or the effect of duration or pay. 
Therefore the direction of travel has been taken from the literature for some impacts, and 
the  multipliers  adjusted  for  each  policy  option.  Detailed  information  on  the  assumptions 
used is presented in the annexes of the supporting study.  

Additionally, as each Member State has different legislation currently in place, the nature 
and scale of the impact for each Member State is different. Therefore, effect of the policy 
option will be different in each Member State, depending on the legal gap assessment for 
each leave option in each Member State (see section 5 of the supporting study). The level 
of the impact has also been varied through time. It is likely that the impacts will increase 
over time as more people get used to the new legislation and begin to use it. 

The  impact  on  SMEs  has  been  analysed  by  comparing  the  cost  of  the  policy  options  to 
businesses with SME turnover in each sector. The demographic profile of the workforce in 
each  sector  has  also  been  analysed,  to  show  if  there  are  sectors  where  workers  are  more 
likely  to  take  advantage  of  the  policy  options,  and  if  SMEs  in  these  sectors  are 
disproportionately affected by the policy options. 

The  Cost  Benefit  Analysis  evaluated  the  impacts  of  the  different  policy  options  on  the 
basis of the following parameters and calculating formulas: 

Number of individuals taking leave  

The number of individuals taking each type of leave has been estimated in a similar way 
for each type of leave. The assumptions consider that only employed individuals are 
eligible for each of the leave or flexible working arrangement options. This is summarised 
in the equation below.  

𝑇𝑈𝑐,𝑔,𝑡 =   𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑐,𝑡 ∗ (

𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑐,𝑔,𝑡
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑐,𝑔,𝑡

) ∗ 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑐,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑐,𝑔,𝑡 

For the carers and flexible working arrangement leave options, the equation is slightly 
different, as the equation applies to all individuals in the workforce, not just parents. The 
equation below summarises this: 

𝑇𝑈𝑐,𝑔,𝑡 =   (

𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑐,𝑔,𝑡
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑐,𝑔,𝑡

) ∗ 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑐,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑐,𝑔,𝑡 

142 

 
 
 
Where: 

TUc,g,t  :  the  number  of  individuals  taking  each  type  of  leave  or  flexible  working 
arrangement option in each country and time period, disaggregated by gender; 

Birthc,t : the number of live births in each country in each year; 

Emplc,g,t  :  the  number  of  people  employed  in  each  country  in  each  time  period, 
disaggregated by gender (taken from the E3ME modelling);  

Popi.g.t : the population aged 15 to 64 in each country in each time period, disaggregated by 
gender (taken from the E3ME modelling); 

Eligiblec,t  :  the  percentage  of  the  workforce  who  are  eligible  for  each  type  of  leave  or 
flexible working arrangement; and 

TURc,g,t : The take up rate for each type of leave and flexible working arrangement in each 
country, disaggregated by gender. 

The take up rate in each country varies between different policy options, and is the main 
driver behind the differences in take up rate between the different policy options. The take 
up rate for each policy option is calculated using the following formula: 

𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑐,𝑔,𝑡 = 𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑐,𝑔,𝑡,𝑏 + (∆𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑔,𝑝𝑜 ∗   𝐿𝐺𝐴𝑐,𝑔,𝑡) 

Where: 

TURc,g,t : The take up rate for each type of leave and flexible working arrangement in each 
country, disaggregated by gender; 

TURc,g,b,t  :  The  take  up  rate  for  each  type  of  leave  and  flexible  working  arrangement  in 
each country in the baseline scenario, disaggregated by gender; 

ΔTURg,po  :  the  change  in  take  up  rate  assumed  for  each  policy  option,  disaggregated  by 
gender; and 

LGAc,g,t  :  A  legal  gap  analysis  multiplier  for  each  country  in  each  time  period, 
disaggregated by gender. This multiplier takes a value between 0 and 1 based on the legal 
gap analysis, where 0 represents a country where the legislation already meets or exceeds 
the requirements  of the  policy  option,  and 1 represents  a country  where  no  measures are 
currently in place. 

Leave duration 

The average duration of leave arrangements (where appropriate) has been calculated in a 
similar  way  to  the  take  up  rate  described  above.  It  is  based  on  the  baseline  duration  of 

143 

 
 
 
leave, the assumed change in leave duration and the legal gap analysis. This is summarised 
by the following equation: 

𝐿𝐷𝑐,𝑔,𝑡 = 𝐿𝐷𝑐,𝑔,𝑡,𝑏 + (∆𝐿𝐷𝑔,𝑝𝑜 ∗   𝐿𝐺𝐴𝑐,𝑔,𝑡) 

LDc,g,t : The average duration of leave for each type of leave in each country, disaggregated 
by gender; 

LDc,g,b,t : The average duration of leave in each country in the baseline scenario, 
disaggregated by gender; 

ΔLDg,po : The change in duration assumed for each policy option, disaggregated by gender;  

LGAc,g,t : A legal gap analysis multiplier for each country in each time period, 
disaggregated by gender. This multiplier takes a value between 0 and 1 based on the legal 
gap analysis, where 0 represents a country where the legislation already meets or exceeds 
the requirements of the policy option, and 1 represents a country where no measures are 
currently in place. 

Administrative burden 

The average cost of the administrative burden is calculated using the number of individuals 
taking leave or a flexible working arrangement under each policy option and an estimated 
administrative  burden  unit  cost  per  person.  The  administrative  burden  falls  on  three 
separate groups: Central Government; Social Security partner organisations and employers.  

In order to calculate the administrative burden cost, the following assumptions have been 
used: 

  For  the  assessment  of  administrative  burden,  the  average  hourly  labour  cost  has 

been used to estimate the cost. 

  Where  benefits  are  paid  by  the  national  government,  an  administration  cost  is 
attributed to the national government – if the government does not make a payment 
for a benefit no administration cost is attributed to the government. The same is true 
for  social  security  providers.  An  administration  cost  is  attributed  to  employers 
whenever  an  individual  takes  leave  or  flexible  working  arrangements.  For 
governments the administration cost is assumed to be six hours (of average labour 
cost);  for  social  security  providers  two  hours  (at  average  labour  cost);  and  for 

144 

 
 
 
employers  it  is  assumed  to  be  four  hours  (at  average  labour  cost).  These  average 
costs in terms of hours are averages extrapolated from other studies394. 

The following formula summarises the approach used to calculate the administrative 
burden for each group:  

𝐴𝐵𝑐,𝑡,𝑖 =   𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖 ∗ 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑐,𝑡 ∗ ∑ 𝑇𝑈𝑐,𝑔,𝑡

𝑔=1

2

Where:  

  ABc,t,I : for total monetary value of administrative burden for each type of actor;  
 

i  :  the  different  types  of  actors  that  can  bear  the  administrative  cost  (government, 
social security and employers);  

  Admini :for number of hours spent on administrative tasks per person taking a leave 

option for different actors; 

  Labc,t : the average labour cost per hour in each country in each year; and 
 

 TUc,g,t : The number of people taking each leave or flexible working arrangement 
option  in  each  country  each  year  (the  total  administrative  burden  uses  the  sum  of 
male and female take up). 

Benefit payments 

The cost of the benefit payments made for each type of leave option was calculated using 
information on the take up of the different options, the average duration of leave and the 
average benefit payment made to individuals who take one of the leave options. As with 
the administrative burden, the benefit payments can fall on three separate groups: Central 
Government; Social Security partner organisations and employers. 

2

𝐵𝑃𝑐,𝑡,𝑖 = 𝐴𝐶𝑐,𝑡,𝑖 ∗   𝐿𝐷𝑐,𝑝𝑜,𝑡 ∗ ∑ 𝑇𝑈𝑐,𝑔,𝑡

𝑔=1

Where: 

  BPc,t,I : the total value of benefit payments for each type of actor in each country in 

each year;   

394 ICF (2015); Study measuring economic impacts of various possible changes to EU working time rules in 
the context of the review of Directive 2003/88/EC, Annex 3 Methodological assessment of administrative 
burden studies (study carried out in behalf of the European Commission; unpublished). 

145 

 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                      
 

i  :  the  different  types  of  actors  that  can  bear  the  benefit  cost  (government,  social 
security and employers);  

  ACc,t,I : the average daily cost of monetary benefits paid by actor in each country in 

each time period;     

  LDc,t : the average duration of leave in days for each country in each policy option 

per year;  

  Birth for number of live births;  
  Eligible for percentage of mothers eligible for maternity leave (assumed as 100%); 

and  

TUc,g,t : The number of people taking each leave or flexible working arrangement option in 
each country each year (the total administrative burden uses the sum of male and female 
take up). 

Lost production 

The costs of lost production for each of the policy options is assumed to fall on employers. 
The assumptions for the estimation of the value of lost production are: 

  Employees  who  are  on  leave  are  not  contributing  the  output  of  the  business, 
therefore they are not contributing to the businesses output. The duration of time an 
individual takes as leave multiplied by the level of output generated per worker in 
that period is estimated to be the level of lost production; 

  Some employees are replaced by employers to cover for the worker who is taking 
leave. The replacement rate is assumed to be 33% for women and 11% for men for 
all  types  of  leave  where  individuals  are  replaced  (maternity,  parental  and  carers’ 
leave395).  The  replacement  rate  for  women  is  assumed  to  be  higher  as  on  average 
women  take  longer  periods  of  leave,  and  are  therefore  more  likely  to  be  replaced 
temporarily; 

  Where a worker is replaced, the level of lost production is assumed to be zero; 

  Employers are assumed to make a saving for not paying the wages of individuals on 
leave that they do not replace. The saving is assumed to be wages. This has to be 
balanced against any commensurate loss in production. 

The value of the lost production is calculated in three stages: the cost of the lost production 
is estimated, then the savings associated with not paying salaries is estimated. The cost of 
the lost production  is  estimated by subtracting the savings  from not  paying  salaries from 
the cost of lost production. This is summarised in the equations below: 

a) To calculate the costs to employers of absence from work: 

395 Due to the relatively short duration of paternity leave, it is assumed and workers will not be replaced. 

146 

 
 
 
                                                      
2

𝑇𝐿𝑃𝑐,𝑡 =   ∑(1 − 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑅𝑔) ∗ 𝐿𝐷𝑐,𝑔,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑐,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑈𝑐,𝑔,𝑡

𝑔=1

b) To calculate savings associated with not paying salary: 

2

𝑆𝑊𝑐,𝑡 =   ∑(1 − 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑅𝑔) ∗ 𝐿𝐷𝑐,𝑔,𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑐,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑈𝑐,𝑔,𝑡

𝑔=1

c) To calculate the estimated net cost to businesses: 

𝐿𝑃𝑐,𝑡 = 𝑇𝐿𝑃𝑐,𝑡 −   𝑆𝑊𝑐,𝑡 

Where: 

TLPc,t : the total lost production through individuals taking leave in each country in each 
time period; 

RepRg : the level of replacement for individuals on leave, differentiated by gender; 

LDc,g,t : the average leave duration for each country, in each time period, disaggregated by 
gender; 

Labc,t : the average labour cost per hour in each country in each year;  

TUc,g,t : The number of people taking each leave option in each country each year, 
disaggregated by gender; 

SWc,t : The total savings through not having to pay salaries to workers on leave; 

Earnc , t : The average earnings in each country in each time period; and 

LPc,t : the net value of lost production to employers in each country in each time period. 

Cost of recruiting replacement workers 

Where  employers  replace  staff  who  have  taken  leave,  there  is  a  cost  to  the  recruitment 
process.  The  cost  per  person  recruited  to  temporarily  replace  an  individual  on  leave  is 
estimated to be the equivalent of five days of output (35 hours). This is based on the time 
required  to  advertise,  process  applications  and  interview  replacement  workers.  The  costs 
are  estimated  to  fall  on  businesses.  The  formula  below  summarises  how  the  cost  was 
estimated: 

2

𝑅𝑅𝑊𝑐,𝑡 =   ∑(1 − 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑅𝑔) ∗ 𝑇𝑈𝑐,𝑔,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑐,𝑡 ∗ 35

𝑔=1

147 

 
 
 
 
  
 
Where: 

RRWc,t  :  the  total  cost  for  the  recruitment  of  temporary  replacement  workers  where 
employees are on leave in each country in each time period; 

RepRg : the level of replacement for individuals on leave, differentiated by gender; 

Labc,t : the average labour cost per hour in each country in each year; and 

TUc,g,t  :  The  number  of  people  taking  each  leave  option  in  each  country  each  year, 
disaggregated by gender. 

Retention of workers 

The policy options encourage workers to remain in the same position when they complete 
their leave period. This is done either through legal protection or because employees feel 
that  they  can  take  leave  therefore  they  are  less  likely  to  leave  their  job.  This  provides  a 
monetary benefit to employers, as workers who remain with a business are estimated to be 
more productive than new recruits. The value of this benefit has been estimated using the 
formula below:  

2

𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑐,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑇𝑈𝑐,𝑔,𝑡 ∗   ∆𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑝𝑜 ∗ 0.2 ∗   𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑐,𝑡

𝑔=1

Where: 

Retc,t  :  the  monetary  value  to  businesses  of  individuals  remaining  in  their  role  in  each 
country and each time period; 

TUc,g,t  :  The  number  of  individuals  taking  each  type  of  leave  or  flexible  working 
arrangements in each country in each time period, disaggregated by gender; 

ΔRetpo : the change in the proportion of individuals who remain in their role as a result of 
each policy option; and 

Earnc,t : the average earnings in each country and time period. 

Absence from work 

The  policy  options  are  predicted  to  have  an  impact  on  the  number  of  days  absent  from 
work taken by workers who have access to leave options or flexible working arrangements. 
The cost of absence from work is assumed to be the value of the labour cost for the period 
a worker is absent (workers are assumed to work for seven hours per day). Therefore, the 
benefit of reducing absence from work is the additional time a worker spends at work due 
to  having  access  to  the  leave  options.  The  value  of  the  change  in  absence  from  work  is 
summarised in the formula below: 

148 

 
 
 
 
   
2

𝐴𝐹𝑊𝑐,𝑡 =   ∑∗ 𝑇𝑈𝑐,𝑔,𝑡 ∗   ∆𝐴𝐹𝑊𝑝𝑜 ∗ 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑐,𝑡 ∗ 7

𝑔=1

Where: 

AFWc,t : the total benefit from the reduction in absence from work by country and time 
period; 

ΔAFWpo : the change in the number of days absent for individuals taking leave or flexible 
working arrangements for each policy options; 

Labc,t : the average labour cost per hour in each country in each year; and 

TUc,g,t : The number of people taking each leave option or flexible working arrangement in 
each country each year, disaggregated by gender. 

Reasonable adjustment 

Some  reasonable  adjustment  costs  have  been  calculated.  These  are  where  businesses  are 
required  to  spend  money  to  adjust  their  premises  or  purchase  equipment  for  their 
employees in line with the new policy options. The reasonable adjustment costs are only 
for  the  maternity  leave  and  flexible  working  arrangements  (working  from  home)  policy 
options. 

For the maternity leave option, there were two ways in which a reasonable adjustment cost 
was  calculated.  The  first  was  associated  with  the  rental  cost  of  space  for  a  separate 
breastfeeding room, and the second was for the purchase of a fridge for the breastfeeding 
room.  It  has  been  assumed  that  50%  of  businesses  would  already  comply  with  the 
legislation  in  the  policy  options.  The  estimate  of  these  two  costs  is  summarised  in  the 
formulas below: 

a) The costs per annum associated with the cost of space for the room  

𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑐,𝑡 =   𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑐,𝑡 ∗ 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑐 ∗ 𝐿𝐺𝐴𝑐 ∗ 0.5 

Where: 

  Spacec,t  :  the  total  annual  cost  for  employers  of  providing  a  room  for  mothers  to 

breast feed in each country in each time period; 

  Rentc,t  :  the  rental  price  per  annum  for  2.5  square  meters  in  each  country  in  each 
year.  The  rental  prices  are  based  on  studies  on  2012/13  prices  and  are  inflated  to 
reflect 2015 prices. This is a proxy measure for the value of space for all employers; 

149 

 
 
 
 
 
  Businessest,t : the number of businesses in each country; 

  LGAc  :    A  legal  gap  analysis  multiplier  for  each  country  in  each  time  period, 
disaggregated by gender. This multiplier takes a value between 0 and 1 based on the 
legal gap analysis, where 0 represents a country where the legislation already meets 
or exceeds the requirements of the policy option, and 1 represents a country where 
no measures are currently in place. 

b) The costs associated with purchasing a fridge for the room 

𝐶𝐹𝑐 =   𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑐 ∗ 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑐 ∗ 𝐿𝐺𝐴𝑐 ∗ 0.5 

Where: 

  CFc : the total cost for employers of providing a fridge in each country; 

  Fridgec : the costs of a ‘table model’ fridge (i.e. no freezer, not built-in). The costs 
are based on a fridge from a Dutch consumer’s organisation (the median cost of a 
list of well-performing fridges396).  Costs were then adjusted for each Member State 
using the Eurostat price level index for household appliances397; 

  Businessesc : the number of businesses in each country; 

  LGAc  :    A  legal  gap  analysis  multiplier  for  each  country  in  each  time  period, 
disaggregated by gender. This multiplier takes a value between 0 and 1 based on the 
legal gap analysis, where 0 represents a country where the legislation already meets 
or exceeds the requirements of the policy option, and 1 represents a country where 
no measures are currently in place. 

For  the  flexible  working  arrangements  policy  options,  introducing  working  from  home 
leads to costs for employers. The employer has to provide equipment and the means for an 
employee to work from home. This has been assumed to be the cost of purchasing a laptop 
computer and office chair for each additional worker who works from home. The cost of 
this  adjustment  for  employers  is  assumed  to  continue  every  year  until  2040,  when  the 
increase  in  home  working  due  to  the  policy  option  is  expected  to  plateau.  The  formula 
below summarises the method to calculate the cost to employers 

𝑅𝐴𝑐,𝑡 =   (𝐶𝐶𝑐,𝑡 +   𝐶𝑂𝐶𝑐,𝑡) ∗ ∆𝑊𝐹𝐻𝑐,𝑡 

396 Available from: https://www.consumentenbond.nl/koelkast/beste/vrijstaande-koelkast-zonder-vriezer 
(some content requires log in) 
397 Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Comparative_price_levels_of_consumer_goods_and_services 

150 

 
 
 
 
                                                      
Where: 

  RAc,t : the total cost for employers for providing a computer and chair for employers 

to work at home in each country in each time period; 

  CCc,t : the cost of purchasing a laptop computer in each country in each time period;  

  COCc,t : the cost of purchasing an office chair in each country in each time period;  

  ΔWFHc,t : the change in the number of people working from home as a result of the 

legislation in each country in each time period. 

Unemployment benefit payments 

The  number  of  people  who  are  unemployed  in  each  policy  option  has  been  estimated 
through the E3ME model. In order to estimate the value of unemployment benefits paid by 
each country, the estimated number of unemployed individuals has been multiplied by the 
average  value  of  unemployment  payments  made  in  each  country.  The  value  of 
unemployment  benefit  payments  is  expressed  as  a  percentage  of  earnings,  and  this 
percentage  is  assumed  to  remain  constant  over  the  entire  period  analysed.  This  is 
summarised by the formula below: 

𝑈𝐵𝑃𝑐,𝑡 =   𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑐,𝑡 ∗ 𝐵𝑃𝑅𝑐 ∗   𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑐,𝑡 

Where: 

UBPc,t : the value of unemployment benefit payments in each country each year; 

Unempc,t : The number of people unemployed in each country each year; 

BPRc : the benefit payment rate in each country, expressed as a percentage of earnings; and 

Earn c,t : The level of earnings in each country in each time period. 

Hospital discharges 

The provision of leave options and flexible working arrangements is expected  to have an 
impact  on  the  health  and  wellbeing  of  parents  and  children.  One  way  to  measure  this 
impact is through the use of healthcare services. This is a proxy measure for overall health. 
However, in conjunction with information on the level of quality of life among individuals, 
it allows estimates to be made of how different policy options affect individuals’ health.  

Data  on  health  service  utilisation  was  taken  from  Eurostat  for  the  number  of  hospital 
discharges (hospital inpatient admissions and hospital day cases). The baseline number of 
hospital discharges includes all health conditions which were found to have a relationship 

151 

 
 
 
 
with  the  provision  of  leave  options  or  flexible  working  arrangements.  A  full  list  of 
conditions is provided in Annex 11. The number of hospital discharges for these conditions 
was divided by the population, to estimate the rate of hospital discharges. The number of 
hospital discharges was extrapolated to 2055 using this rate and population projections.   

The cost of hospital admissions for the conditions listed above was estimated using World 
Health  Organisation  (WHO)  country  specific  unit  costs  of  healthcare.  This  allowed  an 
estimate to be made of the cost of an inpatient stay in each country, based on the average 
duration  of  an  inpatient  stay  in  that  country  and  the  cost  per  bed  day  from  the  WHO 
estimates.  The  cost  of  a  day  case  is  assumed  to  be  26%  of  the  cost  of  an  inpatient 
admission. The unit cost of hospital discharges have been estimated for future years using 
the  same  methodology  as  for  labour  costs  and benefit  payments,  and  can  be  summarised 
using the formula below: 

𝑈𝐶𝐼𝑐,𝑡 = (1 +

(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑐,𝑡 −   𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑐,𝑡−1)
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑐,𝑡−1

) 𝑈𝐶𝐼𝑐,𝑡−1 

Where: 

UCIc,t : the unit cost of a hospital inpatient admission in each country in each time period; 

Earnc,t : The average earnings in each country in each year; 

Earnc,t-1 : The average earnings in each country in the previous year; and 

UCIc, t-1 : the unit cost of a hospital inpatient admission in each country in the previous 
year. 

The number of hospital discharges in each policy option were calculated by multiplying 
the number of hospital discharges by the unit cost of a hospital discharge (calculated 
separately for inpatient admissions and day cases). This is summarised in the formula 
below: 

𝐻𝐷𝑐,𝑡 =   (∆𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑐,𝑡 ∗   𝐿𝐺𝐴𝑐,𝑝𝑜 ∗   𝑈𝐶𝐼𝑐,𝑡) + (∆𝐷𝐶𝑐,𝑡 ∗   𝐿𝐺𝐴𝑐,𝑝𝑜 ∗   𝑈𝐶𝐷𝐶𝑐,𝑡) 

Where: 

HDc,t : the monetary value of hospital discharges in each country in each time period; 

UCIc,t : the unit cost of a hospital inpatient admission in each country in each time period; 

UCDCc,t : the unit cost of a hospital day case in each country in each time period; 

ΔInpatc,t : the change in the number of inpatient admissions in each country in each time 
period; 

ΔDCc,t : the change in the number of day cases in each country in each time period; and 

152 

 
 
 
LGAc,po  :  A  legal  gap  analysis  multiplier  for  each  country  in  each  time  period.  This 
multiplier  takes  a  value  between  0  and  1  based  on  the  legal  gap  analysis,  where  0 
represents a country where the legislation already meets or exceeds the requirements of the 
policy option, and 1 represents a country where no measures are currently in place. 

Social care provision 

The level of social care from the state or private providers is assumed to reduce as a result 
of  carers’  leave  provision  being  extended.  The  decrease  in  social  care  requirements  has 
been estimated as the number of additional days of carers leave taken in each country each 
year (compared to the baseline scenario). 

153 

 
 
 
3. The E3ME model 

An econometric modelling approach has been used to model potential labour market and 
other gender equality impacts of the proposed options. E3ME is an econometric model of 
the  global  economy  that  covers  each  Member  State.398  The  model  includes  a  detailed 
representation  of  the  European  and  global  labour  market,  including  econometrically 
estimated  equations  for  labour  market  participation,  employment  and  wage  rates  at  a 
sectoral  and  regional  level399.  The  structure  of  E3ME  is  based  on  the  system  of  national 
industry 
accounts  and 
interdependencies.  More  detail  on  the  model  can  be  found  in  Annex  5  of  the  supporting 
study. 

input-output  framework 

the  model  uses  an 

to  deduce 

For each set of options, analysis was undertaken to assess the direct impacts for mothers, 
fathers  and  carers  of  introducing  measures  to  facilitate  work-life  balance.  The  direct 
impacts formed exogenous inputs to E3ME. They include: 

  An increase in labour market activity rates 

  An increase in the fertility rate 

  An increase in demand for care services 

  A change in hours worked 

  An increase in labour productivity 

  An increase in employment 

  An increase in pay and benefits 

The figure below shows the key linkages in E3ME for the assessment of work-life balance 
options. As a simplified representation there are still some linkages that are not shown in 
order to reduce complexity. These modelling interlinkages are explained in the text below. 

398 E3ME has been widely used to assess the macroeconomic and labour market impacts of policy scenarios 
at a European level. E3ME is used in producing CEDEFOP’s annual skills projections and has recently been 
applied in studies for EIGE, to assess the macroeconomic effects of measures to improve gender equality, for 
DG EAC, to assess possible economic imbalances resulting from educational outcomes, and for DG 
Employment, to assess the economic feasibility of a European unemployment benefit system. 
399 It is noted that, to model the effects of these scenarios in E3ME, we used some exogenous employment 
and labour inputs (based on analysis of the likely direct impacts on employment and participation of mothers, 
fathers and carers). Secondary effects on employment and participation, following changes to economic 
output, GDP, prices and wages were modelled endogenously in E3ME. 

154 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
The key linkages in E3ME for the assessment of work-life balance options 

Increases in labour market activity rates and increases in the working age population will 
lead to an increase in the effective labour supply, as more people are willing and able to 
work. As a result, there will be an increase in the size of the potential productive economy 
leading  to  an  increase  in  output  and  GDP  and  lower  price  inflation.  The  impact  on 
employment and wages will depend on regional labour market conditions in the baseline. 
In regions where there is low unemployment and labour shortages, there could be an initial 
increase in employment, as existing vacancies are filled. In regions where unemployment 
is  higher  in  the  baseline,  an  increase  in  the  labour  supply  is  likely  to  lead  to  an  initial 
increase  in  unemployment.  In  the  long  run,  the  increase  in  labour  supply  will  put 
downwards pressure on wage rates and eventually this will lead to an increase in demand 

155 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
for  labour.  When  the  increases  to  the  working  age  population  are  due  to  higher  fertility 
rates,  it  is  important  to  account  for  the  lag  in  potential  outcomes;  it  will  take  around  20 
years for additional births to translate to a higher working age population. 

Increases in labour productivity and hours worked will also affect the potential productive 
capacity of the economy and is  likely to  lead to an increase in  output and  a reduction in 
prices, as firms pass on some of the productivity gains by lowering prices for consumers. 
Lower  prices  will  lead  to  higher  demand  (although  possibly  after  some  time)  and  higher 
production  levels,  so  we  would  not  expect  to  see  higher  productivity  leading  to  lower 
levels of employment. 

Some of the options also considered a small increase in real wage rates and paid leave. In 
these cases, there will be a direct increase in real incomes and consumption, which lead to 
further  macroeconomic  gains  through  the  multiplier  effect.  However,  the  higher  pay  and 
benefits  while  on  leave  will  add  to  employer  costs  which  could  lead  to  eventual  price 
increases  that  could  reduce  real  incomes  and  have  a  small  negative  effect  on 
competitiveness and net exports. 

156 

 
 
 
 
 
Annex 5: Evaluation report of the existing WLB framework 

1. Introduction 

This Annex serves the purpose of consolidating and assessing the available information on 
the  functioning  of  the  current  framework  on  Work-Life  Balance,  namely  the  Pregnant 
Workers  (Maternity  Leave)  Directive  (92/85/EEC)400  for  aspects  related  to  work-life 
balance  for  pregnant  workers  and  new  mothers,  and  the  Parental  Leave  Directive 
(2010/18/EU)401.  The  Directives  are  evaluated  in  terms  of  effectiveness,  efficiency, 
coherence, relevance and EU added value402.  

2. Background at EU level 

At EU level, two directives  address issues that are relevant  for  work-life balance and set 
minimum standards in areas such as parental leave and maternity leave. The following 
graph shows the intervention logic including general and specific objectives: 

400  Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given 
birth or are breastfeeding (tenth individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16 (1) of Directive 
89/391/EEC), OJ L 348, 28.11.1992, p. 1–7 
401  Council Directive 2010/18/EU of 8 March 2010 implementing the revised Framework Agreement on 
parental leave concluded by BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME, CEEP and ETUC and repealing Directive 
96/34/EC (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 68, 18.3.2010, p. 13–20. 
402 It is based on relevant data, study results and national surveys. 

157 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
158 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Having  been  adopted  under  the  health  and  safety  provisions  of  the  Treaty,  the  general 
objective  of  the  Pregnant  Workers  (Maternity  Leave)  Directive  (92/85/EEC)  is  to 
implement  measures  to  encourage  improvements  in  the  health  and  safety  at  work  of 
pregnant  women  in  the  workplace  and  women  who  have  recently  given  birth  or  are 
breastfeeding. The recital of the Directive clearly postulates the specific objectives that the 
protection of their safety and health should not lead to women's unfavourable treatment on 
the labour market nor  work to  the detriment of  directives concerning  equal treatment for 
men  and  women  and  reduce  discrimination  and  dismissals  related  to  maternity.    It 
provides  for  maternity  leave  paid  at  least  at  the  level  of  sick  pay  for  at  least  14  weeks 
(Article  8)403.  A  minimum  of  two  of  those  weeks  are  compulsory  for  health  and  safety 
reasons.  The  Directive  also  provides  for  special  rules  relating  to  dismissal  during  the 
period  from  the  beginning  of  the  pregnancy  until  the  end  of  the  maternity  leave  (Article 
10).  During  that  period  dismissals  are  prohibited  in  principle  and  admissible  only  in 
exceptional  cases  not  connected  to  pregnancy  or  maternity  leave  which  are  permitted  by 
national legislation and/or practice. In the event of any such dismissal the employer has to 
cite duly substantiated grounds in writing.  

As  outputs,  the  Directive  sets  out  the  basic rights  of  all  workers  who are  pregnant,  who 
have recently given birth or who are  breastfeeding. The expected impacts of the Directive 
in  this  respect  were  to  lower  the  risk  of  pregnancy-related  discrimination  and  dismissals 
and also thereby promote a safer and healthier working environment for pregnant workers 
and new mothers. 

The  key  goal  and  objective  of  the  Parental  Leave  Directive  (2010/18/EU)  404,  which 
implemented  the  revised  Framework  Agreement  on  Parental  Leave  concluded  by  the 
European  social  partners  on  18  June  2009    was  in  general  to  1)  ‘facilitate  the 
reconciliation  of  parental  and  professional  responsibilities  for  working  parents…’  
and more specifically 2) to promote equal opportunities and equal treatment between men 
and women  by achieving a more equal sharing of family responsibilities between men 
and women405 and 3) by increasing the take up by fathers of parental leave406.  

As  outputs,  the  Parental  Leave  Directive  provides  workers  with  an  individual  right  to 
parental leave on the grounds of birth or adoption of a child (Clause 2(1)). The leave shall 
be  granted  for  at  least  a  period  of  four  months  and,  to  promote  equal  opportunities  and 
equal  treatment  between  men  and  women,  should,  in  principle,  be  provided  on  a  non-

403  
Directive 2010/41/EU on self-employed workers and assisting spouses also grants a maternity 
allowance that is sufficient to enable an interruption of occupational activities for at least 14 weeks for 
female self-employer workers or female spouses of self-employed workers.   
404  
Council Directive 2010/18/EU of 8 March 2010 implementing the revised Framework Agreement 
on parental leave concluded by BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME, CEEP end ETUC and repealing Directive 
96/34/EC, OJ L68, 18.3.2010, p.13-20.    
405  Recital 12. 
406  Clause 2(2) 

159 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
transferable  basis,  i.e.  it  cannot  be  transferred  from  one  parent  to  the  other  parent.  To 
encourage a more equal take-up of leave by both parents, at least one of the four months 
shall be provided on a non-transferable basis (Clause 2(2)). 

The leave is to be provided until the child reaches a given age, up to eight years, leaving 
Member  States  the  possibility  to  specify  a  lower  maximum  age  but  also,  according  to 
Clause  8(1),  the  possibility  to  introduce  more  favourable  provisions.  The  Directive  does 
not impose any obligations in relation to pay during parental leave. It leaves it to Member 
States, or where implemented through collective agreements, to  social  partners, to define 
the detailed conditions and rules for parental leave  – they are free to decide whether this 
leave  can  be  taken  on  a  full-time  or  part-time  basis  or  whether  it  can  be  taken  in  a 
piecemeal way, i.e. in several blocks.  

When  returning  from  parental  leave,  parents  have  the  right  to  request  changes  to  their 
working hours and/or patterns for a certain period of time (Clause 6(1))407. The reason was 
that access to flexible working arrangements makes it easier for parents to combine work 
and  parental  responsibilities  and  facilitates  the  reintegration  into  work,  especially  after 
returning from parental leave. However, they are not entitled to such changes; employers 
are  only  obliged  to  consider  and  respond  to  such  requests  taking  into  account  both 
employers’ and workers’ needs.  

The  Directive  provides  protection  against  dismissal  and  less  favourable  treatment  on  the 
ground  of  applying  for  or  taking  parental  leave  (Clause  5(4))408.  It  also  provides  that 
workers  have  to  be  entitled  to  limited  time  off  work  for  urgent  family  reasons  (force 
majeure)  in  case  of  sickness  or  accident  making  the  immediate  presence  of  the  worker 
indispensable (Clause 7).  

The  main  expected  impacts  of  the  Directive  were  to  effectively  enable  both  parents  to 
reconcile  their  private  and  professional  lifes,  involving  more  fathers  in  the  uptake  of 
parental  leave  and  distributing  more  equally  the  caring  responsibilities  between  women 
and men. 

407  In order to promote better reconciliation, Member States and/or social partners shall take the necessary 
measures to ensure that workers, when returning from parental leave, may request changes to their working 
hours and/or patterns for a set period of time. Employers shall consider and respond to such requests, taking 
into account both employers’ and workers’ needs. 
408  In order to ensure that workers can exercise their right to parental leave, Member States and/or social 
partners shall take the necessary measures to protect workers against less favourable treatment or dismissal 
on the grounds of an application for, or the taking of, parental leave in accordance with national law, 
collective agreements and/or practice 

160 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
Relevant EU legislation also exists in the area of equal treatment between women and men 
in employment and occupation. The Gender Equality Recast Directive (2006/54/EC)409 
has  as  its  objective  to  ensure  the  implementation  of  the  principle  of  equal 
opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and 
occupation  and  guarantees  the  right  to  return  to  the  same  job  or  an  equivalent  job  after 
maternity leave, as well as protection for workers taking paternity or adoption leave, where 
such leaves are provided under the law of Member States. It further clarifies, following the 
well-established  case-law  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union  (CJEU),410  that 
any  less  favourable  treatment  of  a  woman  related  to  pregnancy  or  maternity  leave 
within  the  meaning  of  the  Maternity  Leave  Directive  constitutes  prohibited 
discrimination. 

3. Evaluation criteria and method 

3.1 Evaluation criteria 

The following available literature and evidence has been compiled and assessed in light of 
the  evaluation  criteria  which  inform  the  choices  for  EU  measures  to  be  taken.  A  critical 
look has been taken on the performance of relevant provisions up to the date of the planned 
EU  intervention.  The  relevant  evaluation  criteria  identified  are:  Effectiveness  (1), 
efficiency (2), relevance (3), Coherence (4), EU added value (5). 

3.2 Method 

Sources of findings 

The evaluation is based on three main building blocks: 

1)  a  study  by  the  external  contractor  ICF  ('the  study')  -  commissioned  mid-2016  for  the 
purposes of preparing the Impact Assessment as well as a light evaluation of the Work-Life 
balance framework. The revised version of the final report of this study including the light 
evaluation was completed in February 2017.  

2)  The  available  evidence  such  as  implementation  and  expert  reports  of  the  European 
Commission  and  other  European  Institutions  as  well  as  the    European  Network  of  Legal 
Experts  on  behalf  of  the  Commission  and  where  available,  national  reports,  information 

409  
Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the 
implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of 
employment and occupation (recast) [Official Journal L 204 of 26.7.2006]. 
410  
460/06 Paquay. 

See, for example, cases C-177/88 Dekker, C-32/93 Webb, and more recently in the same context C-

161 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
compiled by Equality bodies, reports on the practical implementation of the Directives as 
well as other relevant research.  

3)  Data  collection  through  mapping  of  Work-Life  Balance  legislation  at  Member  State 
level in the context of the impact assessment, as well as collection of stakeholders' views in 
the framework of the public and social partner consultations on the direction of EU level 
action carried out at both EU and Member State level. 

3.3 Limitations and robustness of findings 

There  are  some  clear  data  limitations  in  the  area  of  Work-Life  Balance  which  make  a 
thorough  assessment  of  some  of  the  evaluation  criteria  difficult.  For  example,  the 
quantification of the specific effects of the intervention is a challenging task, requiring very 
specific input data to be developed for this purpose over time.  

The  assessment  of  efficiency  is  hampered  by  a  lack  of  systematic  European  monitoring 
data on costs involved. In order to be able to conduct a thorough analysis in the future, this 
challenge needs to be taken into account in any future work and monitoring arrangements. 

4. TRANSPOSITION AND IMPLEMENTATION STATE OF PLAY 

4.1 Transposition and implementation of the anti-discrimination provisions of the 
Maternity leave Directive 92/85/EEC 

This  section  presents  the  situation  as  to  the  extent  to  which  Member  States  meet  the 
requirements  of  the  Directive  in  relation  to  legal  protection  from  discrimination  and 
dismissal  protection  during  pregnancy  or  maternity  leave411.  It  presents  whether  the 
relevant legal provisions laid down in the Directive are ‘met’, ‘not met’ or ‘exceeded’ by 
the  transposing  laws  of  the  Member  States  (+  EFTA  countries),  also  taking  into  account 
subsequent case law by the European Court of Justice.  

All Member States ‘meet’ or ‘exceed’ the legal requirement to prohibit dismissals during 
pregnancy  and  maternity  leave.  In  fact,  23  Member  States  (plus  Norway)  ‘exceed’  this 
requirement by not only prohibiting dismissals during pregnancy and maternity leave but 
also stipulating further requirements within their legal framework to protect women for a 
specific period after their return from maternity leave.  

13  countries412  have  further  legal  provisions  in  place  to  also  protect  women  against 
preparatory  measures  for  dismissals  during  maternity  leave.  This  partly  stems  from  case 

411  The scope of the evaluation only addresses the issues of non-discrimination and dismissal protection, as 
Health and Safety issues of the Maternity Leave Directive are subject of a separate Ex-post Evaluation. 
412  BE, CY, CZ, DE, DK, ES, FR, IE, IT, LT, LV, PT, SI 

162 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
law of CJEU which clarified that the prohibition to dismiss a pregnant woman or women 
on  maternity  leave  is  not  limited  to  the  notification  to  dismiss  an  employee  but  also  the 
preparation for dismissal. The European Court of Justice interpreted Article 10 of Directive 
92/85 as prohibiting not only the notification of a decision for dismissal but also the taking 
of  preparatory  steps  for  such  a  decision,  such  as  searching  for  and  finding  a  permanent 
replacement for the relevant employee413.  

Nearly all Member States have a legal requirement to substantiate grounds for dismissal in 
writing. Only in Italy and Sweden this is not explicitly stipulated in relevant laws, and in 
Ireland employers are obliged to do so at the request of the employee.  

Legal compliance with the Directive and relevant case law  

Source:  ICF  research  on  the  basis  of  information  in  Masselot  et  al.  (2012)  Fighting 
Discrimination on the Grounds of Pregnancy, Maternity and Parenthood. DG JUST. 

This  shows  that  generally  speaking,  Member  States  (+  EFTA  countries)  do  have 
comprehensive legal provisions in place to protect women against pregnancy and maternity 
related discrimination at work, with some countries going further than others.  

413 Case C-460/06 Paquay v Societe d'architectes Hoet and Minne SPRL [2007] ECR I-8511, para 33. 

163 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
4.2 Transposition and implementation of the Parental Leave Directive 2010/18/EU 

Most  countries  already  complied  fully  or  at  least  partially  with  the  provisions 
introduced by the Directive, or were in the process of introducing similar rights when the 
Framework Agreement was concluded: 

  Approximately  a  third  of  study  countries  (nine  Member  States  plus  Iceland  and 
Norway) already met the requirements when the Directive was first introduced and 
thereby did not require formal implementation.  

  A further 11 Member States made amendments to existing legislation so as to meet 
the  specific  requirements  of  the  Directive,  for  example,  in  terms  of  minimum 
duration of parental leave414 and the right to request a temporary change in working 
patterns following return from the leave.  

  A  formal  transposition  was  completed  in  the  remaining  eight  Member  States  and 

Liechtenstein.  

Baseline analysis; extent to which legal transposition was required after the transposition 

deadline has expired. 

Source: ICF on the basis of information from European Network of Legal Experts in the 
field of gender equality (2015) The implementation of Parental Leave Directive 2010/18 in 
33 European countries. DG JUST.  

Note: The Directive has not been transposed in Switzerland  

No systemic shortcomings have been detected in the implementation of the requirements of 
the Directive415 (individual entitlement to parental leave of four months – of which at least 

414 BE, EL (private sector), IE, HR, LI, LU, MT, UK 
415 European Network of Legal Experts in the field of gender equality (2015) The implementation of Parental 
Leave Directive 2010/18 in 33 European countries. By a review of the European Network of Legal Experts in 
the field of gender equality.  

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one month should be non-transferable (Clause 2(1)); a right to request changes to working 
time  /  working  patterns  upon  return  (Clause  6(1));  protection  from  discrimination  on  the 
grounds of taking parental leave (Clause 5(4)) and a right to request leave on grounds of 
force  majeure  for  family  reasons  (Clause  7)).  Many  countries  not  only  meet  but  exceed 
many  of  the  requirements  of  the  Directive.    However,  some  countries  do  currently  fall 
short  of some  of the provisions of the Directive, particularly in  relation to  parental leave 
being  an  individual  entitlement,  with  parental  leave  remaining  a  family  entitlement. 
Moreover, even though not required technically by the Directive, but only in principle, a 
significant  number  of  Member  States  still  allow  the  transfer  of  a  large  share  of  parental 
leave  entitlements  from  one  parent  to  the  other  parent,  which  usually  means  that  many 
women  continue  to  take  significantly  long  leaves,  while  most  men  do  not  take  parental 
leave or  take a short period of leave, thus hampering the equal treatment of women on the 
labour  market  and  having  a  negative  effect  on  the,  their  labour  market  participation  and 
career opportunities and progression. 

165 

 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Answers to the evaluation criteria 

5.1 Effectiveness 

- To what extent have the objectives been achieved?  

- What have been the (quantitative and qualitative) effects of the intervention?  

- What factors influenced the achievements? 

a) Non-discrimination and dismissal protection, Directive 92/85/EEC  

aa) The achievement of the objectives in relation to discrimination and dismissal 
protection 

This  evaluation  assesses  the  extent  to  which  the  original  objectives  (see  background 
above) of the Pregnant Workers’ Directive (Directive 92/85/EEC) have been reached, with 
a  particular  focus  of  its  impact  on  preventing  less  favourable  treatment  of  women  in  the 
workplace (particularly in the form of dismissal linked to pregnancy/maternity)416.    

Scope of the evaluation 

to 

Having  been  adopted  under  the  health  and  safety  provisions  of  the  Treaty417,  the  general 
objective  of  Directive  92/85/EEC  was 
to  encourage 
improvements in the health and safety at work of pregnant women in the workplace 
and women who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding418. This general objective of 
improving  safety  and  health  at  work  has  been  achieved,  as  there  are  minimum 
requirements to ensure the health and safety and there is paid maternity leave of at least 14 
weeks in  all Member States.  No  major problems  are reported in  relation to  the existence 
and  the  possibility  as  such  to  take  maternity  leave  which  is  available  in  all  the  Member 
States.  Even though  some stakeholders  argue for an  extension of the length419, nearly all 

implement  measures 

416  The scope of the evaluation only addresses the issues of non-discrimination and dismissal protection, as 
Health and Safety issues of the Maternity Leave Directive are subject of a separate Ex-post Evaluation. 
417  Article 153 (1) (a) ((ex Article 137 TEC) TFEU. 
418  Article 1. 
419  ETUC (2016) Proposal for an ETUC Position on the Second Stage Consultation of the social partners at 
European level under article 154 TFEU on possible action addressing the challenges of work-life balance 
faced by working parents and caregivers 

166 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
Member  States  go  already  beyond  the  minimum  length  stipulated  by  the  directive. 
Therefore this will not be further discussed here in detail.  

The element of pay420 will not be evaluated in detail neither. Nearly all Member States go 
already beyond the minimum requirement of payment (at least at the level of sick pay) and 
provide  for  a  payment  of  100%  of  the  previous  income421.  Some  stakeholders  argue  that 
paying  the  compulsory  weeks  of  maternity  leave  could  generate  an  additional  income 
protection  for  women,  thereby  supporting  new  mothers  and  the  family422.  However,  the 
specific aim of the Directive was merely to provide mothers and families with a minimum 
income of at least sick-pay level for the duration of 14 weeks and not to increase or better 
pay mothers during the compulsory period. 

The recital of the Directive postulates the specific objective that the protection of the safety 
and  health  of  should  not  lead  to  women  being  treated  unfavourably  on  the  labour 
market nor work to the detriment of directives concerning equal treatment for men 
and women. The focus in the present assessment is therefore particularly on aspects of the 
Directive  aimed  at  eliminating  unfavourable  treatment  and  pregnancy  related 
dismissals  at  the  workplace  of  mothers/pregnant  women  and  women  returning  from 
maternity leave. Despite the provision423 prohibiting that women are dismissed from work 
because of their pregnancy for the period from the beginning of their pregnancy to the end 
of  the  period  of  maternity  leave  there  is  no  considerable  reduction  in  the  number  of 
dismissals  following  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Directive  and  numerous  cases  of 
discrimination and dismissals remain in place across many Member States. With regard to 
the requirement of providing substantiated grounds for dismissal in writing, the available 
evidence is rare and indicates that there is a lack of substantiation of grounds of dismissals 
in  writing  by  employers.  In  all  Member  States  women  are  able  to  pursue  their  claims  in 
court if they have been wrongfully treated by failure to comply with the obligations arising 
from the Directive. However, there remain issues in relation to the awareness of such rights 
among employees and employers and thereby preventing dismissals from happening in the 
first place, as well as barriers to accessing remedies after the event.  

420 Article 11(2)(3) of Directive 92/85/EEC. 
421 European Parliament, Infographic, Maternity and paternity leave in the EU: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2014/545695/EPRS_ATA(2014)545695_REV1_EN.
pdf 
422  European Parliament (2016) Report on creating labour market conditions favourable for work-life 
balance (2016/2017 (INI)) 
423  Article 10 of Directive 92/85/EEC. 

167 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
The current levels of pregnancy-related discrimination, as suggested by Equinet and survey 
evidence by different Equality bodies424 and the continued need to make employers aware 
of  the  dismissal  protection  rules  contained  in  the  EU  acquis  still  justify  the  need  for  the 
dismissal  rules  of  the  maternity  leave  Directive.  The  EU  dismissal  rules  of  the  Directive 
have  been  transposed  and  implemented  in  the  Member  States  and  legally  speaking 
compliance with the EU acquis across the EU is generally good. However, the problem of 
women being dismissed in relation to their pregnancy remains.  

Effectiveness of the measures related to discrimination and dismissal protection  

The  available  statistical  evidence  shows  that  the  incidence  and  the  number  of  pregnancy 
related  discrimination  and  dismissals  in  relation  to  pregnant  women  at  work  still  exists 
despite  specific  legal  provisions  in  place  at  EU  level  since  1992425.  Interestingly,  the 
different stakeholders consulted in the framework of the Equinet survey426 expressed their 
views  that  the  dismissal  protection  rules  are  not  achieving  their  aims  and  do  not  suffice 
alone  to  improve  the  effective  application  of  the  dismissal  protection  rules.  In  that 
sense,  the  available  evidence  shows  that  the  Directive  is  effective  in  granting  a  certain 
level of protection in theory but not enough to guarantee avoiding situations of dismissals 
and discrimination in practice427.   

Studies in relation to Directive 2006/54/EC428, highlight that information regarding cases 
of unlawful dismissals is still scarce, but underline that the existing data demonstrates the 
vulnerability of the employment status of the workers returning to work after using family-
related  leave,  such  as  parental  leave429.  Consequently,  this  stream  of  research  rightly 
recommends  a  careful  monitoring  of  the  situation  of  these  employees  and  taking  further 
steps  to  introduce  an  efficient  system  of  employment  protection  for  working  parents430. 
Regrettably, a lack of comparable data in terms of numbers of dismissals or pregnancy 
related  discrimination  in  Member  States  or  statistics  of  all  the  Member  States  bodies 
receiving complaints means that it is not possible to compare the performance of countries 
exceeding the standards set in the Directive with those applying the basic acquis, in terms 

424  Equinet Survey on Pregnancy and Maternity Leave Related Discrimination (2016); Adams, L. et al 
(2015) Pregnancy and maternity-related discrimination and disadvantage. Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills and the Equality and Human Rights Commission;  Commissie Gelijke Behandeling 
(2012) Hoe is het bevallen? Onderzoek naar discriminatie van zwangere vrouwen en moeders van jonge 
kinderen op het werk  
425  Based on Equinet Survey on Pregnancy and Maternity Leave Related Discrimination (2016) 
426  Based on Equinet Survey on Pregnancy and Maternity Leave Related Discrimination (2016) 
427  This is confirmed by information from regular meetings and exchanges between Equinet, Equality bodies 
and the European Commission services. 
428    Article  14(1)(c)  of  Directive  2006/54  contains  provisions  on  the  prohibition  of  discrimination  in 
employment  and  working  conditions,  including  dismissals.  Article  15  of  the  same  Directive  has  foresees 
rules in relation to the return from maternity leave. 
429  D. Szelewa, p. 5. 
430 D. Szelewa, p. 5. 

168 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
of  the  continued  experience  of  unfavourable  treatment  of  pregnant  women  in  the 
workplace.  As  evidenced  by  academic  and  policy-orientated  national,  European  and 
international studies and reports431, unfavourable treatment of women due to pregnancy is 
widespread in many countries and different contexts. Despite the fact that, as shown above, 
all Member States comply with Article 10 of the Directive, there are enforcement issues432 
and the rights introduced by the Directive are not respected by all employers433. Moreover, 
a  lot  of  discrimination  remains  ‘hidden’  because  often  it  is  not  reported  to  the  relevant 
authorities and the affected women do not have the means, information, knowledge or the 
necessary support to enforce their rights.  

It can be agreed with the existing literature that significant compliance and enforcement 
issues  remain  and  with  the  conclusion  that  although  the  Directive  prohibits  pregnancy 
discrimination,  the  failure  of  employers  to  observe  national  laws  implementing  the 
Directive  have  led  to  lower  than  anticipated  impacts  in  terms  of  the  effectiveness  of  the 
Directive  for  addressing  pregnancy  discrimination434.  Evidence  from  the  UK  shows  that 
"almost  half  of  the  440  000  pregnant  women  in  Great  Britain  experience  some  form  of 
disadvantage  at  work  for  being  pregnant  or  taking  maternity  leave"  and  predicts  that  if 
"current trends continue, over the next five years a million British women will experience 
workplace discrimination directly as a consequence of becoming pregnant"435. Employers 
and employees alike find the current rules at national level unclear and confusing436. The 
contribution of the current maternity leave Directive has therefore been limited due to the 
way in which it has (not) been enforced in Member States, leading to the conclusion that 
legislation alone is insufficient to address the difficulties of less favourable treatment and 
fighting dismissals.  

In  what  follows,  we  firstly  assess  existing  evidence  of  the  current  scale  (prevalence)  of 
pregnancy-  and  maternity-related  discrimination  and  its  scope  (nature)  before  looking  at 
the incidence and root causes of persistent discrimination in recruitment decisions. In terms 

431 Cited in detail below 
432 EOC, Greater Expectations, available at: http://www.eoc.org.uk; EOR Number 
138/4 February 2005; EOC, Tip of the iceberg; interim report of the EOC’s investigation into discrimination 
against new and expectant mothers in the workplace, available at: http://www.eoc.org.uk; EOR Number 
133/7 September2004; European Commission, Report on Pregnancy, Maternity, Parental and Paternity 
Rights Commission's Network of legal experts in the fields of employment, social affairs and equality 
between men and women, p. 124: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-
equality/files/2007report_pregnancy_en.pdf 

433  Equinet Survey on Pregnancy and Maternity Leave Related Discrimination (2016) 
uality/files/2007report_pregnancy_en.pdf 
435  EOC, Greater Expectations, available at: http://www.eoc.org.uk; EOR Number 
138/4 February 2005; EOC, Tip of the iceberg; interim report of the EOC’s investigation into discrimination 
against new and expectant mothers in the workplace, available at: http://www.eoc.org.uk; EOR Number 
133/7 September2004; 
436  Ibid. p. 124. 

169 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
 
of effectiveness, the available and reviewed evidence shows that there is still a prevalence 
of pregnancy- and maternity-related discrimination.  

It has to be highlighted that no European level study or survey is available to determine the 
scale  of  pregnancy-  and  maternity-related  discrimination  in  the  EU  as  a  whole. 
Therefore, due a lack of other available data, the evidence in this section is derived from 
national  surveys  and  studies  covering  a  wide  variety  of  countries437.  This  information  is 
neither  comprehensive  nor  comparative,  thus  not  allowing  for  detailed  cross-country 
comparisons,  and  only  indicative  conclusions  can  be  drawn.  However,  considering  the 
variety  of  countries  with  different  legal  and  cultural  traditions,  the  surveys  can  be 
considered as representative for the purposes of this evaluation.  

The  evidence  from  recent  surveys  from  four  different  countries  (Denmark,  Finland,  the 
Netherlands and the UK) shows that 45-77% of women surveyed report they have been 
discriminated against in the workplace due to pregnancy / maternity438. According to 
these  surveys,  nearly  half  of  working  mothers  or  future  mothers  have  been  subjected  to 
such unfavourable treatment at work in Denmark and the Netherlands and three out of four 
women  in  the  UK  have  been  subject  to  unfavourable  treatment  and  report  that  such 
unfavourable  treatment  has  had  a  long  lasting  negative  impact  on  their  careers. 
Discriminatory  treatment  is  in  many  cases  reported  to  begin  from  the  moment  the 
pregnancy is signalled to the employer. One in five women, according to the UK survey, 
have experienced for example harassment or negative comments as a result of pregnancy, 
motherhood or requesting family related leave or flexible working439. The Danish survey 
concluded  that  18%  of  pregnant  women  have  seen  a  deterioration  in  working  conditions 
following a pregnancy announcement. Also, one in ten women feels that their relationship 
with  their  manager  deteriorated  following  the  announcement  of  the  pregnancy.  Overall, 
50% of surveyed women in the UK reported a negative impact on opportunity, status or 
job  security.  One  in  ten  (11%)  felt  forced  to  leave  their  job  following  pregnancy  or 
maternity. Of the 11%, 9% were treated in such a way that they felt they had to leave, 1% 

437  Warming,  K.  (2016)  Diskrimination  af  forældre  –  oplevelsen  af  diskrimination  i  forbindelse  med 
graviditet  og  barselsorlov.  Institut  for  Menneskerettigheder  [Danish  Institute  of  Human  Rights]  A 
representative? survey of 1,589 people, interviews with 18 parents or expecting parents and interviews with 
six  employer  representatives  from  large  enterprises;  TRAL  (2012)  Tradenomit  ja  työelämän  tasa-arvo.  A 
survey carried out by trade union TRAL in 2009 and again in 2012;  Commissie Gelijke Behandeling (2012) 
Hoe is  het bevallen? Onderzoek naar discriminatie van zwangere vrouwen en moeders van jonge kinderen 
op  het  werk  Based  on  an  online  survey  of  1,000  women,  6  in-depth  interviews/case  studies  with  working 
women  and  19  with  employers/personnel  managers.  The  statistics  refer  to  answers  from  women  who  had 
given birth to a child in the previous 4 years (2007-2011); Adams, L. et al (2015) Pregnancy and maternity-
related  discrimination  and  disadvantage.  Department  for  Business,  Innovation  and  Skills  and  the  Equality 
and Human Rights Commission. The study is based on a survey of 3,254 mothers and 3,034 employers. 
438 See for example, Warming, K. (2016) Diskrimination af forældre – oplevelsen af diskrimination i 
forbindelse med graviditet og barselsorlov. Institut for Menneskerettigheder. 45% in Denmark and the 
Netherlands and 77% in the UK.  
439  Adams, L. et al (2015) Pregnancy and maternity-related discrimination and disadvantage. Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills and the Equality and Human Rights Commission. 

170 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
were  made  compulsorily  redundant  (whereas  no  other  employees  were  made  redundant) 
and 1% of women were dismissed.   

In  terms  of  the  types  of  tasks  and  duties  to  which  workers  have  returned  following 
maternity (or parental) leave, under half (45%) of women surveyed in Finland returned to 
similar  duties.  8%    returned  to  different  duties  at  a  lower  level,  with  35%  returning  to 
different  duties  at  the  same  or  higher  level.  Employment  was  terminated  in  12%  of  the 
cases  following  return  to  work  after  maternity  leave.  In  Denmark,  6%  of  the  returners 
reported that they had been demoted440. 

It  is  difficult  to  carry  out  a  trend  analysis,  as  most  relevant  surveys  were  carried  out  in 
one-off  studies,  but  overall  the  available  survey  evidence  suggests  that  the  level  of 
discrimination  has  increased  (e.g.  Austria,  Belgium,  Cyprus,  Greece,  France,  UK). 
Notably  the  financial  crisis  has  aggravated  the  problem  in  relation  to  the  dismissal  of 
pregnant  women441.  For  example,  the  Irish  Human  Rights  and  Equality  Commission 
recorded  a  continuous  increase  in  queries  related  to  maternity  leave  and  dismissal 
protection  between  2010  and  2013442.  In  the  framework  of  a  survey  conducted  between 
2007  and  2009,  30  %  of  women  reported  unfair  treatment  during  pregnancy  and  5% 
reported dismissal443. 

The  observed  levels  of  discrimination  reported  in  the  surveys  could  be  related  to  the 
protection and its enforcement by the national regulatory framework. Despite the fact 
that  data  is  only  available  from  some  countries,  it  is  nevertheless  notable  that  all  the 
countries that have surveyed women meet or exceed the legal requirements as required by 
the maternity leave Directive. However, in all these countries high levels  of pregnancy-
related discrimination persist. In view of the long time period between the adoption of 
the Directive and the date of the surveys, it can be concluded that national legislation alone 
transposing  the  Directive  has  not  been  sufficiently  effective  in  avoiding  unfavourable 
treatment  and  dismissals  of  women.  For  instance,  an  evaluation  of  the  extent  to  which 
employers  provide  appropriately  substantiated  grounds  for  dismissals  in  writing 
(Article 10(2)) is based on a limited number of responses from national equality bodies to 

440 It is interesting to note that the Danish survey indicates that men are also affected by such discrimination. 
The survey revealed that 23% of men have experienced discrimination for taking paternity leave. 
441  Bettio,  Corsi,  D’Ippoliti,  Lyberaki, Lodovici and Verashchagina (2012) The impact of the Economic 
Crisis on the Situation of Women and Men and on Gender Equality Policies. 
442 Russell, Watson and Banks (2011), Pregnancy at Work: A National Survey, HSE Crisis Pregnancy 
Programme and the Equality Authority notes a 25% increase between 2010 and 2011, a further 20% increase 
between 2011 and 2012, and reaching 1,278 queries by 2012, see 
https://www.ihrec.ie/download/pdf/pregnancy_at_work_a_national_survey.pdf  
443  Russell, Watson and Banks, Pregnancy at Work: A National Survey, p. XI; This survey report describes 
the experiences of 2,300 women who had a baby between July 2007 and June 2009. It documents their 
experiences at work during their pregnancy and examines patterns in maternity leave taken and return to 
employment. 

171 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
a questionnaire of the Equinet network444. Responses are mixed but generally suggest that 
despite of the rules being clear, in practice there is a lack of substantiation of grounds of 
dismissals in writing.  

Finland  is  the  only  country  where  a  study  found  that  discrimination  due  to  the  family 
situation  or  pregnancy  had  slightly  fallen  from  7%  to  4%,  in  2013.  According  to  the 
regular  working  conditions  survey  of  the  Finnish  Statistics  office445,  the  level  of 
discrimination in the workplace due to family situation or pregnancy, as measured by 
the  percentage  of  female  and  male  respondents  having  witnessed  such  discrimination  in 
1997, has fallen from 7%  to 5% in both 2003 and 2008, and 4% in 2013446. Even though 
this evidence from Finland suggests declining numbers, the problem still exists in reality. 
For  example,  in  2013,  there  are  still  6%  of  female  respondents  who  reported  having 
witnessed  discrimination  on  this  basis  (as  opposed  to  3%  of  men)  (down  from  10%  of 
women in 1997). Nevertheless, commentators447 have highlighted and identified significant 
case law in the area of pregnancy-related discrimination and dismissal protection. This can 
be partly explained by the occurrence of pregnancy-related discrimination which gives the 
opportunity  for  the  Court  of  Justice  to  interpret  and  clarify  European  Union  law  in  this 
regard. It also shows the need to give further guidance on how to apply the dismissal rules 
in Member States and potentially the need for further awareness-raising among employers 
and  employees  with  regard  to  the  existing  rights  of  pregnant  women  on  the  basis  of  the 
maternity leave Directive as well as the case law of the Court of Justice.  

Groups of women most affected by discrimination due to pregnancy at the workplace 

The  following  section  assesses  the  groups  of  women  most  affected  by  this  type  of 
discrimination, including by type of employer and the nature of discrimination related 
to  dismissals  during  protected  periods.  It  also  provides  existing  evidence  on  the 
experienced  discrimination  during  recruitment  (for  family  reasons,  or  as  a  result  of  the 
possibility  of  becoming  pregnant)  and  assesses  the  extent  to  which  employers  provide 
appropriately substantiated grounds for dismissals in writing. 

Those  most  at  risk  of  discrimination  are  female  workers  who  are  not  aware  of  their 
employment  rights  related  to  pregnancy  and  maternity  as  well  as  temporary  workers 
(for example those who are on fixed-term or project contracts and agency workers). Expert 
reports and ombudsmen from a number of countries report that agency workers are often 
dismissed upon announcement of the pregnancy and women on fixed-term contracts do not 
have their contracts renewed despite earlier promises to do so448. Other groups of women 

444 Equinet survey, Responses from Austrian, Cypriot, Finnish and Irish equality bodies to this question.  
445 The survey was carried out seven times since 1977 among 3 000-6 600 workers. 
446 Sutela, H., Lehto, A-M. (2014) Työolojen muutokset 1977-2013. Tilastokeskus 
447  In the framework of the study conducted by ICF. 
448  E.g.  Equinet  survey  on  Pregnancy  and  Maternity  Leave  Related  Discrimination,  Masselot  et  al.  (2012) 
Fighting Discrimination on the Grounds of Pregnancy, Maternity and Parenthood. DG JUST.  

172 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
disproportionally  affected  by  discrimination  include:  1)  those  who  are  frequently on  sick 
leave as a consequence of the pregnancy, 2) women with children who suffer from health 
problems449, and 3) women in social groups, countries or regions where particularly strong 
cultural stereotypes prevail regarding the role of women as caregivers. 

A  Dutch  study  on  pregnancy-related  discrimination  that  showed  that  45%  of  the  women 
who  became  mothers  and  worked  and/or  applied  for  a  job  in  the  period  2007  to  2011 
experienced a situation that involved possible discrimination also found that  higher- and 
lower-educated  workers  experience  different  types  of  unfavourable  treatment450. 
Higher-educated  women  suffer  more  often  with  respect  to  their  possibilities  for  career 
advancement  as  many  find  that  their  position  and  duties  have  changed  during  their 
maternity  leave  to  their  disadvantage.  Lower-educated  women  are  more  likely  to  suffer 
from temporary contracts of employment not being extended or dismissal while employed 
on temporary contracts of employment451. 

Evidence  shows  that  in  some  Member  States  like  Austria  and  Malta  there  is  less 
discrimination  against  women  in  the  public  sector  than  in  the  private  sector.    For 
example, UK survey evidence found that women working in public administration are less 
likely than those working in the private sector to report feeling forced to leave their jobs 
(3% compared to 11% on average) or to report financial loss resulting from pregnancy or 
maternity452.  This  is  partially  due  to  better  awareness  among  public  sector  managers  of 
employment rights of pregnant women, and they are also more likely to feel it is in the best 
interest  of  their  organisation  to  support  pregnant  women  and  those  on  maternity  leave 
(97%  compared to  84%  on  average).  Similar  findings,  albeit  of  a  more  anecdotal  nature, 
have been reported in Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic and Portugal453.  

There  is  some  evidence  that  suggests  the  prevalence  of  more  pregnancy-related 
discrimination  in  smaller  as  compared  to  larger  firms,  as  shown  by  the  Dutch454  and 

449 Commissie Gelijke Behandeling (2012) Hoe is het bevallen? Onderzoek naar discriminatie van zwangere 
vrouwen en moeders van jonge kinderen op het werk Utrecht March 2012 in Masselot et al. (2012) Fighting 
Discrimination on the Grounds of Pregnancy, Maternity and Parenthood. DG JUST 
450  More than 1,000 women were surveyed as part of the study and in-depth 
interviews were conducted with employers and women, Commissie Gelijke Behandeling (2012) Hoe is het 
bevallen?, https://mensenrechten.nl/publicaties/detail/9889 
451 Commissie Gelijke Behandeling (2012) Hoe is het bevallen? Onderzoek naar discriminatie van zwangere 
jonge  kinderen  op  het  werk  Utrecht  March  2012  available  at: 
vrouwen  en  moeders  van 
https://mensenrechten.nl/publicaties/detail/9889  
452 Adams, L. et al (2015) Pregnancy and maternity-related discrimination and disadvantage. Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills and the Equality and Human Rights Commission. 
453 On the basis of a review of country chapters included in Masselot et al. (2012) Fighting Discrimination on 
the Grounds of Pregnancy, Maternity and Parenthood. DG JUST 
454 Commissie Gelijke Behandeling (2012) Hoe is het bevallen? Onderzoek naar discriminatie van zwangere 
vrouwen en moeders van jonge kinderen op het werk Utrecht March 2012 

173 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
the UK studies455. The survey evidence further found that mothers who work for employers 
with a staff of less than 50 are more likely to indicate that they felt forced to leave their 
jobs as a result of pregnancy/maternity (13% compared to the average of 11%)456. 

bb)  Factors  that  influence  the  effectiveness  of  the  discrimination  and 
dismissal protection provisions of the maternity leave directive. 

With  regard  to  the  factors  improving  the  effectiveness  of  the  provisions  on  dismissal 
protection for pregnant women, it can be highlighted that awareness-raising campaigns 
and guidance by stakeholders and courts, as well as better data collection as regards the 
occurrence  of  discrimination  and  dismissals  related  to  pregnancy,  can  significantly 
improve  the  effectiveness  of  existing  EU  action.  The  report  prepared  by  the  European 
Network of Legal Experts on behalf of the Commission457 found that generally speaking, a 
good  level  of  awareness  of  rights  will  lead  to  a  higher  degree  of  enforcement  and 
effectiveness.  Sweden  and  Finland  were  identified  as  prime  examples  of  this  as  these 
countries are characterised by widespread awareness, which has then been followed by a 
considerable  amount  of  case  law  from  both  labour  courts  and  ombudsmen.  On  the 
contrary,  low  awareness  of  rights  among  both  employers  and  employees,  case  law  and 
procedural  EU  rules,  such  as  the  burden  of  proof  in  discrimination  cases,  translates  to 
fewer cases. This is evident, for example, in Croatia, Greece and Spain.  

In this regard, the work of the equality bodies is very relevant458. Many Equality Bodies 
see  this  as  one  area  of  core  focus.  It  often  emerges  as  a  priority,  the  dominant  issue 
including  litigation  work  which  usually  forms  part  of  the  strategy  by  equality  bodies  to 
combat  pregnancy-related  discrimination.  Many  Equality  Bodies  have  launched  formal 
investigations459  or  even  combined 
litigation  with  studies  on  pregnancy-related 
discrimination in order to secure publicity for cases on this issue. Norway460 has even gone 
further  in  addressing  the  issue  of  data  collection  on  pregnancy-related  discrimination, 
launching  a  campaign  on  under-reporting  of  pregnancy-related  discrimination  and  also 
conducting a survey on the extent of the issue. 

455     Adams, L. et al (2015) Pregnancy and maternity-related discrimination and disadvantage. Department 
for Business, Innovation and Skills and the Equality and Human Rights Commission. 
456  Adams, L. et al (2015) Pregnancy and maternity-related discrimination and disadvantage. Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills and the Equality and Human Rights Commission. 
457 Masselot et al. (2012) Fighting Discrimination on the Grounds of Pregnancy, Maternity and Parenthood. 
DG JUST. 

174 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
   
 
 
The  UK  Equal  Opportunity  Commission  found  that  another  factor  that  improves  the 
effectiveness of dismissal protection is the availability of flexible work practices which 
resulted in better treatment of pregnant workers461. These  findings  suggest that there  is a 
higher  chance  of  women  experiencing  problems  with  their  employer  concerning  their 
pregnancy and maternity leave in firms without flexible working arrangements. According 
to the evidence, the availability and acceptance of flexible working arrangements is "likely 
to indicate that the employer is aware of the competing demand facing employees outside 
of  work  and  may  also  suggest  a  greater  concern  for  employees’  welfare  more 
generally".462  

Factors contributing to the effectiveness of enforcement 

  With  regard  to  the  factors  impeding  the  effectiveness  of  the  provisions  on 
dismissal protection for pregnant women, several factors can be highlighted. 

461  Callender, C., Millward, N., Lissenburgh, S. and Forth, J. (1997) Maternity Rights and Benefits in Britain 
1996, London: Dept of Social Security, Research Report No. 61.; La Valle, I., Clery, E. and Huerta, M.C. 
(2008) Maternity Rights and Mothers’ Employment Decisions, Department of Work and Pensions.  
462  Equal Opportunities Commission (2005) Greater Expectations: Final report of the EOC’s investigation 
into discrimination against new and expectant mothers in the workplace, Manchester: Equal 
Opportunities Commission; La Valle, I., Clery, E. and Huerta, M.C. (2008) Maternity Rights and Mothers’ 
Employment Decisions, Department of Work and Pensions. 

175 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
The  main  factor  that  impedes  the  effectiveness  of  the  maternity  leave  Directive  is  the 
substantial and persisting gap that can be observed between the law and practice in most 
countries, often resulting from a lack of compliance and/or effective enforcement of the 
law  at  national  level.  This  is  due  to  many  factors  including,  for  example,  the  lack  of 
confidence and availability of support in making a claim or complaint. Many women are 
afraid  to  defend  their  rights  because  they  are  afraid  of  reputational  consequences 
(especially in small Member States, small sectors, etc.) and the impact on their chances of 
renewing their temporary or project contracts. Others are put off by high costs of litigation 
(e.g.  Norway,  Croatia)463,  lack  of  advice  (e.g.  Lithuania)  and  low  chances  of  achieving 
redress  (e.g.  Latvia)464.  Other  contributing  factors  are  the  length  of  the  procedure  (e.g. 
Greece, Ireland, Germany), the lack of case law and lack of transparency because cases are 
not  published  (Hungary,  Lithuania,  Liechtenstein,  Luxembourg),  and  generally  the 
difficulty of proving discrimination (e.g. Germany)465. 

In general, according to the French Défenseur des Droits, pregnancy and maternity leave 
are  a  constraint  in  professional  life  for  nearly  one  in  every  two  active  women466.  The 
evidence  base  on  the  prevalence  of  dismissals  during  the  protected  periods  of  maternity 
leave  and  after  return  from  maternity  leave  suggests  that  such  dismissals  take  place.  For 
instance,  according  to  the  office  of  the  Austrian  Ombudsman  for  Equal  Treatment,  such 
dismissals are particularly common after announcing a pregnancy during a  trial period or 
after  the  end  of  the  protected  period  following  return  from  leave467.  Dismissal  just 
following this  protected period  was also found to be fairly commonplace  in  Germany. A 
Spanish  study  indicates  that  as  many  as  25%  of  pregnant  women  are  dismissed  or 
encouraged  to  resign  voluntarily.  According  to  a  Danish  survey,  1  in  7  women  do  not 
return to the same employer following maternity or parental leave468.   

Another  problem  concerning  around  800  000  pregnant  women469  is  the  practice  in  some 
Member  States  like  Italy,  Croatia  or  Greece  for  example  to  make  women  sign  blank 
resignation  letters  when  they  prior  to  being  employed470.  According  to  a  recent 

463  Fighting Discrimination on the Grounds of Pregnancy, Maternity and Parenthood, p. 30. 
464  Fighting Discrimination on the Grounds of Pregnancy, Maternity and Parenthood, p. 30. 
465  Fighting Discrimination on the Grounds of Pregnancy, Maternity and Parenthood, p. 30. 
466  See page 2 of the "Avis concernant la proposition de loi n°2927 visant à prolonger la période légale 
d'interdiction de rupture du contrat de travail à l'initiative de l'employeur pour les femmes à l'issue de leurs 
congés liés à la grossesse et à la maternité." 
http://www.defenseurdesdroits.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ddd_avis_20160224_16-05.pdf  
467  Masselot et al. (2012) Fighting Discrimination on the Grounds of Pregnancy, Maternity and Parenthood. 
DG JUST 
468 Masselot et al. (2012) Fighting Discrimination on the Grounds of Pregnancy, Maternity and Parenthood. 
DG JUST 
469  "Resignation letters of this kind are mostly brought out when an employee informs her employer that she 
is pregnant. Statistics suggest that over 800 000 pregnant women are being forced to leave their jobs.", 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2012-000233&language=SV  
470  Fighting Discrimination on the Grounds of Pregnancy, Maternity and Parenthood, p. 17. 

176 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
Parliamentary Question, "In practice, when a female candidate is recruited, she is asked to 
sign  the  employment  contract  together  with  a  blank  resignation  letter  which,  being 
updated,  can  be  enforced  by  the  employer  whenever  he  or  she  might  decide."  471  An 
example  of  good  practice  can  be  reported  from  Portugal  where  this  "practice  of  white 
resignations has been eradicated by the legal requirement that resignations of contracts of 
employment need to be signed before a public authority and, should this not be the case, 
the worker can reverse the resignation in the first seven days after it was signed."472 

Some  women  returning  from  maternity  (or  parental)  leave  find  that  their  role  has  either 
disappeared or been transferred to someone else, with the consequence of some returnees 
losing  their  job  soon  after  returning  to  work.  This  phenomenon  seems  to  increase  in 
frequency during economic downturns as a result of the financial crisis, which has led to a 
rise of fixed-term contracts473.  Even though relevant case law of the  CJEU474 has stated 
that the refusal to extend a fixed-term contract of a pregnant worker constitutes unlawful 
direct discrimination on grounds of sex, it is very common that women employed on fixed-
term  contracts  or  working  through  agencies  do  not  have  their  contracts  renewed  even  if 
such  promises  were  made  before  the  announcement  of  the  pregnancy.  For  example,  the 
Dutch  survey  discussed  above  found  that  in  nearly  half  of  cases  (44%),  a  temporary 
contract was not renewed. 

Those identified shortcomings do not represent a lack of effectiveness as such of the EU 
legislative  framework  in  place.  Such  issues  could,  in  principle,  be  addressed  within  the 
current  legislative  framework  by  encouraging  Member  States  to  address  enforcement 
processes  and  increasing  guidance,  awareness  raising  and  dissemination  of  information 
about  existing  rights;  this  is  confirmed  by  available  evidence  from  stakeholders475. 
However,  broader  factors  are  at  play  which  influence  perceptions  and  action  which  can 
lead  to  discrimination  in  recruitment  decisions  and  in  the  treatment  of  employees 
(particularly those taking and returning from leave). Current patterns in the sharing of paid 
and unpaid work and the impact of the available leave guaranteed under EU and national 
law  on  such  patterns  influence  employer  perceptions  and  can  contribute  to  the  direct  or 
indirect discrimination of women in recruitment and career decisions.  

471 Stakeholders such as the European Parliament have raised this question: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2012-000233&language=SV 
472  Fighting Discrimination on the Grounds of Pregnancy, Maternity and Parenthood, p. 17. 
473  Bettio,  Corsi,  D’Ippoliti,  Lyberaki, Lodovici and Verashchagina (2012) The impact of the Economic 
Crisis on the Situation of Women and Men and on Gender Equality Policies. 
474 Cases C-109/00 Tele Danmark A/S v Handels- og Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund i Danmark (HK) 
[2001] ECR I-2785 and C-438/99 Maria Luisa Jiménez Melgar v Ayuntamiento de Los Barrios [2001] ECR 
I-6915. 
475 As suggested by the European Implementation Assessment of the European Parliament on Directive 
2006/54/EC, p. 20: "increase its knowledge about the scale of awareness on the rights of pregnant 
workers, and maternity leave and paternity leave and parental leave takers." 

177 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
cc) Nature of discrimination during recruitment 

In  terms  of  discrimination,  gender  equality  legal  experts  tend  to  agree  that  the  law 
prohibiting  discrimination  regarding  recruitment  of  pregnant  women  and  new  mothers  is 
“sufficient  and  satisfactory”476,  although  compliance  and  enforcement  issues  remain. 
However,  existing  maternity  leave  legislation  finds  it  more  difficult  to  prevent 
discrimination pre-pregnancy which can take place at the recruitment stage and can prevent 
women  of  childbearing  age  (whether  they  have  children  or  not)  to  enter  or  return  to  the 
labour market. 

By way of example, a third (35%) of surveyed women in Finland were asked about plans 
to  start  or  expand  family  during  a  job  interview,  and  16%  of  the  surveyed  women  in 
Denmark477. It is to be welcomed that the share of women who have been asked about such 
plans  has  declined  in  Finland,  from  42%  of  respondents  in  2009  to  35%  in  2012478. 
However, more alarming are the findings from Latvia, where according to a 2011 survey of 
the  Latvian  Ombudsman’s  office,  half  of  respondents  (50%)  had  been  asked  about  their 
family status by their (or potential) employer479.  

Such  findings  demonstrate  that  the  factors  leading  to  discrimination  and  the  under-
representation of women in the labour market go deeper than the issues directly addressed 
by the maternity leave Directive (although all these issues are interlinked). The behaviour 
of employers is conditioned by perceptions that women are likely to take long leaves and 
are  more  likely  than  men  to  be  absent  should  a  child  (or  an  older  relative)  require  care. 
These  perceptions  reflect  currently  observed  gender  gaps  in  paid  and  unpaid  work  and 
patterns  of  leave  taking,  which  would  be  more  effectively  addressed  by  measures  which 
support  both  parents  and  carers  in  achieving  better  work-life  balance  and  encourage  the 
greater sharing of caring responsibilities. In most countries, existing measures are currently 
insufficient to achieve this outcome. 

dd) Pregnancy and maternity related discrimination queries and cases 

National  equality  bodies  and  ombudsmen  deal  with  potential  discrimination  cases  in  the 
form of informal information queries as well as through formal investigations of potential 
discrimination  cases.  Data  gathered  at  this  level  can  therefore  shed  more  light  on  the 
prevalence  and  nature  of  reported  discrimination  cases  and  the  concerns  of  pregnant 

476 Masselot et al. (2012) Fighting Discrimination on the Grounds of Pregnancy, Maternity and Parenthood. 
DG JUST 
477 Warming, K. (2016) Diskrimination af forældre – oplevelsen af diskrimination i forbindelse med 
graviditet og barselsorlov. Institut for Menneskerettigheder  
478 TRAL (2012) Tradenomit ja työelämän tasa-arvo.  
479 Tiesībsarga 2011.gada ziņojums (Annual Report of Ombudsman for 2011), 
http://www.tiesibsargs.lv/files/gada_zi%C5%86ojumi/ties%C4%ABbsarga_gada_zi%C5%86ojums_2011.pd
f, accessed 17 September 2012. 

178 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
workers.  However,  because  not  all  such  bodies gather  or  publish  such  data,  or  data  does 
not  distinguish  between  different  types  of  discrimination,  it  is  difficult  to  provide 
comparisons between countries and to come to definite conclusions.  

That  being  said,  the  number  of  cases480  in  the  area  of  maternity  leave  discrimination  in 
relation  to  pregnancy  has  not  changed  significantly  since  those  provisions  have  been 
introduced481.  Between  1999  and  2008  the  Irish  Equality  Tribunal  and  the  Labour  Court 
dealt  with  54  cases  of  pregnancy-related  discrimination.  However,  the  magnitude  of  the 
problem is in reality much bigger considering the fact that the number of cases in courts 
does not capture the problems that have not been reported and addressed through a formal 
legal  procedure.  It  can  be  safely  assumed  that  the  number  of  cases  brought  is  only  a 
fraction of the number of occurrences of maternity discrimination, taking into account the 
general disincentives to pursuing a case in court, and the fact that women who are pregnant 
or who have recently given birth face even stronger barriers, as they may not want or have 
the possibility, time, energy or financial resources to launch a court procedure482. 

The  table  below  offers  a  summary  overview  of  findings  from  14  countries483.  These 
findings  are  fragmented  but  nevertheless  demonstrate  that  the  number  of  information 
requests and cases equality bodies investigate varies considerably. The number of queries 
received  per  year  ranges  from  just  one  case  or  two  to  hundreds.  There  is    no  direct 
correlation  with  the  size  of  the  country  (or  the  precise  nature  of  legal  provisions). 
Therefore, it is more likely to be an indication of the confidence of women to take action, 
awareness of their legal rights, understanding of complaints processes and accessibility of 
the system in terms of costs.  

Pregnancy- and maternity-related discrimination cases comprise between 2% and 50% of 
all discrimination cases handled, per country. They constitute a low share in countries like 
Poland (2%) and France (5%), and a very high share of up to 42% in Belgium and 50% in 
Latvia.  

480 As a matter of illustration an Irish case, where an award was given by the Equality Tribunal of €56,315 
against MBNA in a case of pregnancy related discrimination:  https://www.ihrec.ie/mbna-to-pay-e56315-for-
pregnancy-discrimination-and-victimisation/ 
481  https://www.ihrec.ie/two-important-decisions-protect-the-rights-of-women-workers/ 
482 Russel/Banks, Pregnancy and Employment: A Literature Review, p. 12, 
https://www.ihrec.ie/app/uploads/download/pdf/pregnancy_at_work_a_literature_review.pdf 
483 Based on Equinet 2016, on the basis of information from the Belgian Institute for Equality for Women and 
Men,  Cyprus  Office  for  the  Commissioner  for  Administration  and  Human  Rights,  German  Federal  Anti-
Discrimination  Agency  (FADA),  Finnish  Ombudsman  for  Equality,  Irish  Human  Rights  and  Equality 
Commission,  Malta  National  Commission  for  the  Promotion  of  Equality  (NCPE),  The  Slovak  National 
Centre  for  Human  Rights,  and  country  authors  of  Masselot  et  al.  (2012)  Fighting  Discrimination  on  the 
Grounds of Pregnancy, Maternity and Parenthood. DG JUST. 

179 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
Pregnancy-  /  maternity-related  discrimination  queries  and  cases  handled  by  equality 

bodies (based on information from 14 countries) 

Criteria 

Findings 

of 

Volume 
information 
queries 
and 
handled cases 

/ 

the 
of 

Baseline 
analysis; 
share 
potential 
pregnancy 
maternity 
related 
discrimination 
cases  from  all 
discrimination 
cases  handled 
by 
the 
equality 
bodies: 

Countries  with  a  high  number  of  queries  or  cases  in  relation  to  size  of 
population in last 5 years: Cyprus (120), Finland (181), Ireland (unknown 
for  the  past  5  years  but  1,278  queries  in  2012  alone),  Netherlands 
(unknown for the past five years but 62 cases in 2011 alone plus further 
288 information requests)  

Countries with a relatively medium or low number of queries or cases in 
relation  to  size  of  population:  France  (unknown  for  the  past  5  years  but 
126-618 case per year between 2008-2010), Germany (78), Hungary (5-7 
per year), Malta (8), Slovakia (6) 

Pregnancy  /  maternity  related  discrimination  cases  constitute  up  to  40-
50%  of  all  discrimination  cases  handled  by  relevant  equality  bodies  / 
ombudsmen (e.g. Belgium with 42% and Latvia with around 50%).  

In Denmark, such cases make up the largest share of discrimination cases 
related  to  workplace  and  in  Finland,  they  are  the  third  largest  group  of 
cases, after access to employment and pay related cases.  

In  Cyprus,  25%  of  discrimination  cases  are  related  to  maternity  and 
family  disputes  in  workplaces.  Their  share  from  all  work-related 
complaints has gradually increased from 18% in 2011 to 33% in 2015 and 
36% in 2016.  

Nearly half (45%) of sex discrimination cases handled by the Netherlands 
Institute for Human Rights are related pregnancy and motherhood (e.g. 62 
out of 139 sex discrimination cases in 2011).  

Pregnancy  /  maternity  related  claims  make  up  a  much  smaller  share  of 
claims  handled  by  the  equality  body  in  France,  where  such  claims 
represent less than 5% of all claims.  

In  Poland,  maternity  /  pregnancy  related  complaints  to  the  National 
Labour Inspectorate stand for just 2% of discrimination cases.  

Trend analysis 

Very limited trend data is available, but the limited data suggests that the 
number  of  cases  /  queries  is  on  the  rise,  either  through  increases  in  the 
total  number  of  cases  (e.g.  Ireland,  France)  or  as  a  share  of  all 
discrimination cases (e.g. Cyprus).  

180 

 
 
 
 
 
Criteria 

Findings 

In the case of Cyprus, the actual number of cases handled each year has 
gone down but their share from all work-related complaints has gradually 
increased  from  18%  in  2011  to  36%  in  2016.  The  former  Irish  equality 
body  saw  annual  increases  of  20-25%  in  queries  related  to  maternity 
leave  and  protection  between  2010  and  2012  (disaggregated  data  is  no 
longer available).  

Sources: Equinet 2016, on the basis of information from the Belgian Institute for Equality 
for Women and Men, Cyprus Office for the Commissioner for Administration and Human 
Rights,  German  Federal  Anti-Discrimination  Agency  (FADA),  Finnish  Ombudsman  for 
Equality, Irish Human  Rights and Equality Commission,  Malta  National  Commission for 
the  Promotion  of  Equality  (NCPE),  The  Slovak  National  Centre  for  Human  Rights. 
Country  authors  of  Masselot  et  al.  (2012)  Fighting  Discrimination  on  the  Grounds  of 
Pregnancy, Maternity and Parenthood. DG JUST. 

To  summarise  and  recall  the  main  findings  on  effectiveness  in  relation  to  dismissal 
protection  of  Directive  92/85/EEC,  it  can  be  observed  that,  although  all  Member  States 
meet or exceed the EU legal framework in place, the objectives of the Directive in relation 
to the prevention of discrimination on grounds of pregnancy and maternity (particularly in 
relation  to  dismissal)  have  not  been  sufficiently  reached.  There  are  several  factors  that 
influence  (improve  or  impede)  the  effectiveness  of  the  discrimination  and  dismissal 
protection provisions of the maternity leave directive.   While issues remain in relation to 
awareness  of  rights,  compliance  and  the  ability  to  enforce  such  rights484,  much  broader 
factors  prevail  in  conditioning  the  behaviour  of  employers,  which  cannot  be  addressed 
through  discrimination  provisions  alone.  Other  practices  such  as  the  signing  of  blank 
resignation letters, low awareness of rights among both employers and employees, lack of 
compliance  and/or  effective  enforcement  of  the  law  at  national  level  all  hamper  the 
effectiveness of the discrimination rules. 

the  nature  of  discrimination, 

Regarding 
that 
discrimination of women in the labour market go deeper than the issues directly addressed 
by  Directive  92/85/EEC  and  are  often  the  consequence  of  perceptions  and  stereotypes. 
Finally, the number of cases dealt with by Equality Bodies and national courts can be 
regarded as proxy to the real magnitude of the problem of dismissal protection, considering 
the problem of underreporting and refraining to launch court proceedings. 

the  above  findings  demonstrated 

484  See Equinet Survey. 

181 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
b) Directive 2010/18/EU 

As  mentioned  above,  the  general  objective  of  the  Parental  Leave  Directive  2010/18/EU 
was, first of all, and in general, to ‘facilitate the reconciliation of parental and professional 
responsibilities  for  working  parents…’485;  secondly,  more  specifically,  to  promote  equal 
opportunities  and  equal  treatment  between  men  and  women486  by  providing  for  positive 
incentives  for  the  take  up  by  fathers  of  parental  leave487;  and,  thirdly,  to  reduce  the 
inequality  in  distribution  of  caring  responsibilities  in  line  with  the  Treaty  obligation 
ensuring gender equality.  

As the Parental Leave Directive amended a previous Framework Agreement (and Directive 
96/34/EC)  on Parental Leave,  Member States had already  developed  basic parental leave 
frameworks, as part of a wider framework of work-life balance measures. 

 

Individual right to parental leave of at least four months (Clause 2(1)): There are no 
systematic  or  major  issues  with  regard  to  the  existence  of  parental  leave  being 
designed as an individual right. 

  Age of the child up to eight years (Clause 2(1)): Member States have provided for 
different  ages  in  their  legislation  until  when  parental  leave  can  be  taken  which 
ranges from 2 in Romania until 12 (BE, IT) and even up to 19 in the UK. 

  Non-transferability (Clause 2(2)): As many Member States are allowed to make the 
entitlement  partly  transferable,  in  practice  a  lot  of  fathers  still  transfer  their 
entitlement  to  parental  leave  to  mothers,  which  gives  very  weak  incentives  to 
fathers to take the leave. 

  Pay:  As  the  Directive  does  not  impose  any  obligations  in  relation  to  pay  during 
parental  leave,  not  all  Member  States  have  provided  for  pay  which  does  not  give 
sufficient incentives for men to take up the leave. 

  Flexibility (Clause 3(1)): Member States are free to decide whether this leave can 
be taken on a full-time or part-time basis or whether it can be taken in a piecemeal 
way, i.e. in several blocks488. 

485  Clause 1(1) of the Directive. 
486  Clause 2(2) of the Directive: "to promote equal opportunities and equal treatment between men and 
women, should, in principle, be provided on a non-transferable basis. To encourage a more equal take-up of 
leave by both parents, at least one of the four months shall be provided on a non-transferable basis." 
487  Recital 16 of the directive. 
488  See Clause 3(1) of the Directive. 

182 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
  Right to request flexible working arrangements (upon return) (Clause 6): The right 
to  request  changes  to  their  working  hours  and/or  patterns  for  a  certain  period  of 
time  and  to  have  such  requests  duly  considered  by  the  employer,  taking  into 
account  both  employers’  and  workers’  needs.  Most  Member  States  seem  to  have 
implemented the right to request changes to their working hours and/or patterns for 
a set period of time after the return from parental leave, by providing for specific 
working-time arrangements 489. 

  Protection  against  dismissal  and  less  favourable  treatment  on  the  ground  of 
applying  for  or  taking  parental  leave  (Clause  5(4)).  There  seem  to  be  no  major 
problems  with  the  provisions  concerning  the  protection  of  the  workers  against 
dismissal and against discriminatory treatment on the grounds of parental leave as 
they seem to have been implemented at national level by the Member States. 

  Force  majeure  leave  (Clause  7):  There  are  no  major  issues  with  the  provision  of 
force  majeure  leave  that  workers  are  entitled  to  limited  time  off  work  for  urgent 
family  reasons  in  case  of  sickness  or  accident  making  the  immediate  presence  of 
the worker indispensable. 

In terms of effectiveness, a striking difference remains between average take-up rates 
of  parental  leave  between  mothers  and  fathers.  It  was  already  observed  in  2000  in 
relation  to  the  "first"  parental  leave  directive490  that  even  though  legally  the  Directive 
brought  changes,  in  practice  there  was  a  minimal  effect  because  this  did  not  produce 
changes in society to change the behaviour of men leading to more men deciding to take 
parental  leave491.    This  scenario  is  still  confirmed  today  by  the  available  evidence  and 
stakeholders according to which "the differences in men’s and women’s uptake of parental 
leave  show  not  only  gender-based  discrimination  but  also  that  the  participation  rate  of 
fathers  in  parental  leave  in  the  Member  States  remains  low,  with  only  10  %  of  fathers 
taking  at  least  one  day  of  leave,  and  97  %  of  women  using  the  parental  leave  that  is 
available  for  both  parents"492.  Previous  Impact  Assessment  reports  prepared  by  the 

489  The Implementation of Parental Leave Directive 2010/18 in 33 European Countries, p. 20; According to 
this report this issue is not addressed at national level in some countries (France, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, 
Romania and Spain), but it can be settled by an agreement between the employer and the worker, and the 
collective agreements also deal with the subject (as for example in Italy). 
490  Council Directive 96/34/EC of 3 June 1996 on the framework agreement on parental leave 
concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC.  
491 Clauwaert/Hargern, ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PARENTAL LEAVE 
DIRECTIVE IN THE EU MEMBER STATES, p. 11. 
492  European Parliament resolution of 13 September 2016 on creating labour market conditions favourable 
for work-life balance, point U. 

183 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
Commission493 highlighted that the take-up rate has not been monitored systematically by 
Eurostat (at least until the publication of the IA report) and that data on fathers' share of 
parental leave exists only in some Member States494. Even if in general the Directive was 
successful to increase the total uptake of parental leave by parents, the Directive has only 
partly  met  the  objective  related  to  greater  involvement  of  fathers  and  a  more  equal 
sharing of caring responsibilities. As the Directive can only be considered to be effective 
when  the  objectives  have  been  attained,  this  suggests  that  the  current  provisions  at  EU 
level on parental leave are not enough to address the gap between policy and legal goals 
(related to work-life balance and reconciliation of professional and caring responsibilities) 
and practice.  

Reports495 identified different underlying reasons which  suggest that the overall  effective 
taking of the leave by women and men depends greatly on the level of payment496. While 
the Directive itself acknowledges the fact that "experiences in Member States have shown 
that the level of income during parental leave is one factor that influences the take up by 
parents, especially fathers"497, evidence also suggests that fathers are more likely to take 
parental  leave  if  it  is  well  remunerated498.  General  evidence  shows  that  paying  parental 
leave increases the likelihood of uptake especially by men499. Indeed, the take up rate of 
fathers  at  17.2%  in  countries  where  the  compensation  rate  varies  from  60%  to  100%  of 
income500 is nearly twice as high as the take up rate of 9.4% in countries where the level of 
compensation  varies  between  zero  and  60%501.  Compensation  also  has  an  impact  on  the 
duration of leave taken. When only a part of the parental leave is paid, mothers and fathers 
tend to limit the leave to the paid period.  

493  Maternity Leave proposal IA report, p. 47. 
494    The  IA  report  therefore  suggested:  "The  Commission  could  endeavour  to  improve  the  availability  of 
statistics  on  this  point.  Data  would  be  published  regularly.  If  figures  on  fathers’  take-up  rate  could  be 
determined, they could also be published regularly in the Commission’s annual report on equality between 
women and men." 
495  The Implementation of Parental Leave Directive 2010/18 in 33 European Countries, p. 25. 
496  European Parliament resolution of 13 September 2016 on creating labour market conditions favourable 
for work-life balance, point U: "available data confirms that unpaid or poorly paid family-related types of 
leave result in low participation rates". 
497 Recital 20. 
498  Maternity, paternity and parental leave: Data related to duration and compensation rates in the European 
Union (2015), p. 11, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/509999/IPOL_STU(2015)509999_EN.pdf ;  
https://www.theguardian.com/money/2016/apr/05/shared-parental-leave-slow-take-up-fathers-paternity;  
Eurofound (2015); Promoting uptake of parental and paternity leave among fathers in the EU  
499  If the parental leave is well paid, evidence suggests, that the uptake will even be higher, see OECD, 
Policy Brief: Parental Leave, where are the fathers, 2016; Recent evidence from California shows these 
effects, see Paid Family Leave, Fathers’ Leave-Taking, and Leave-Sharing in Dual-Earner Households, Ann 
Bartel, Maya Rossin-Slater, Christopher Ruhm, Jenna Stearns, and Jane Waldfogel, NBER Working Paper 
No. 21747, available at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w21747.pdf   
500 HR, LT, SI, EE, DK, NO, RO, SE, CZ, DE, FI, HU, LV 
501 AT, BE, BG, FR, IT, LU, PL, PT, SK, MT, EL, CY, IE, ES, CH, UK, NL, IS 

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In addition, some provisions – such as the provision on non-transferability502 set out in the 
Directive  (which  ensures  that  one  month  of  parental  leave  cannot  be  transferred  to  the 
other parent) are not effective in addressing gender imbalances. Stakeholders express that 
"entirely  or  partially  non-transferable,  properly  paid  parental  leave  supports  a  more 
balanced take-up by both parents and helps to reduce discrimination against women in the 
labour market"503. 

Furthermore, the requirement for parents to have taken parental leave before being able to 
request flexible working arrangements may reinforce the role of women as caregivers. As 
much  more  women  take  parental  leave,  only  they  can  profit  from  the  right  to  request 
flexible working arrangements504. This is notably linked to the existing patterns of take-up 
(higher up-take by women) which in turn is linked to compensation levels.  

In terms of achieving the objectives of better reconciliation between work and private life, 
the information on take-up rates505 show that the overarching goal of the Directive has not 
been  fully  achieved.  This  can  be  explained  by  the  lack  of  having  achieved  the  specific 
objectives,  e.g.  the  fact  that  father's  participation  in  childcare  improved  only  marginally. 
This can be explained by the fact that take up rates among men remain very low, and this 
affects  the  length  of  leave  taken  by  women  and  their  subsequent  employment 
opportunities.  

5.2 Efficiency 

- To what extent are the costs involved justified, given the changes/effects which have 
been achieved?  

-To what extent has the intervention been cost effective?  

502  See Clause 2(2): "to promote equal opportunities and equal treatment between men and women, should, 
in principle, be provided on a non-transferable basis. To encourage a more equal take-up of leave by both 
parents, at least one of the four months shall be provided on a non-transferable basis." 
503  European Parliament resolution of 13 September 2016 on creating labour market conditions favourable 
for work-life balance, point U. 
504  3 518 600 EU citizens took parental leave in 2010 of which only 94 800 (2.7 %) were men, 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do  
505 ICF (2016) Study on the costs and benefits of possible EU measures to facilitate work-life balance for 
parents and care givers, p. 39-40;  European Parliament Study for FEMM Committee, Maternity, paternity 
and parental leave: data related to duration and compensation rates in the EU (2015) 

185 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
- If there are significant differences in costs (or benefits) between Member States, what is 
causing them? 

a) Non-discrimination and dismissal protection, Directive 92/85/EEC 

The criterion of efficiency could not be assessed in a satisfactory way as thorough research 
showed insufficient data was available to carry out such an assessment. The lack of data is 
confirmed  also  according  to  the  judgement  of  the  evaluators  as  well  as  the  available 
opinions of stakeholders506 found during the research. 

However,  it  can  be  observed  that  the  costs  involved  in  order  to  transpose  the  Directive 
92/85/EEC  are  justified  in  order  to  fulfil  the  Treaty  obligations  of  combating 
discrimination  and  ensuring  equality  between  women  and  men  are  justified.  Therefore, 
given the  changes and effects which have  been achieved by creating  minimum standards 
for  the  Member  States  in  relation  to  non-discrimination  and  dismissal  protection  for 
pregnant women, the EU intervention was justified and cost effective as it was producing 
satisfactory results without costing the Member States more money than necessary in 
order to achieve the objectives of the Directive.  

Considering the analysis on the effectiveness of the Directive provided above, future cost 
savings  could  nevertheless  be  achieved  by  addressing  problems  in  relation  to  dismissal 
protection and discrimination by policy measures rather than new legislative changes in the 
area. This will decrease costs for businesses arising from discriminatory decision-making 
based  on  a  worker's  pregnancy  or  maternity  rather  than  her  ability  to  perform  her  work. 
Policy measures aimed at better prevention could reduce the costs of dismissals to Member 
States, and will not create new burdens in administrative and financial terms.  

b) Directive 2010/18/EU 

Due to limited data collection in relation to the costs entailed by the Directive, rather than a 
quantitative analysis,  the criterion of efficiency  is  mainly  assessed  based on a qualitative 
evaluation  of  the  costs  and  the  beneficial  outcomes.  Research  identifies  this  lack  of 
available data and suggests that there is a need for a stronger monitoring of the Directive’s 
implementation,  including  observations  of  the  directive's  impact  on  men’s  behaviour  in 
relation to parental leave507.  

Direct costs resulting from the application of the Directive are mostly borne by the national 
public  administrations  (i.e.  amendments  of  existing  laws,  monitoring  and  enforcement 
activities).  In  most  Member  States  businesses  or  citizens  are  not  required  to  take  any 

506  D. Szelewa, p. 5 
507  D. Szelewa, Maternity, paternity and parental leave, Research paper, p. 5.  

186 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
specific  actions  that  may  lead  to  a  cost  to  be  taken  into  account  for  the  purposes  of  this 
evaluation. 

Costs  which  arose  for  Member  States  can  be  mainly  grouped  into  three  categories:  (1) 
implementation  costs  (costs  relating  to  the  introduction  of  new  laws,  regulations, 
procedures,  etc.),  (2)  monitoring  costs  (costs  relating  to  the  personnel  employed  for 
monitoring  and  reporting  purposes)  and  (3)  enforcement  costs  (costs  associated  to  the 
introduction  of  new  mechanisms  for  claims.)  Any  differences  in  costs  (or  benefits)  and 
increases  in  costs  between  Member  States  depends  on  the  legislative  measures  that  have 
been in place prior to the EU action being implemented. Higher costs are caused in those 
countries with higher rates of up-take of parental leave.   

It can be observed that the assessment of efficiency for both Directives was hampered to 
some  extend  due  to  a  lack  of  systematic  European  monitoring  data. In  order  to  be better 
able to assess the performance of legislation in this field, monitoring arrangements on EU 
and Member State level need to be strengthened in future where possible. 

5.3 Relevance 

-To what extent are the relevant parts of the maternity leave directive and the parental 
leave directive still relevant?  

-How well do the original objectives still correspond to the needs within the EU? 

-How well adapted is the intervention to subsequent technological or scientific advances? 

- How relevant is the EU intervention to EU citizens? 

a) Non-discrimination and dismissal protection, Directive 92/85/EEC 

The  need  to  reduce  discrimination  and  dismissals  related  to  pregnancy  and  maternity 
remains relevant today, in that pregnancy- and maternity-related discrimination continues 
to  persist  in  all  Member  States,  which  means  that  women  continue  to  require  the 
maintenance  of  legal  protection  against  dismissal  and  other  forms  of    less  favourable 
treatment.  Studies  highlight  that  Maternity  Leave  provisions  are  "an  important  pillar 

187 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
among family leave for the reconciliation of work and family life as they protect the health 
of  mothers  and  children"508.  However,  as 
indicated  above,  pregnancy-related 
discrimination  measures  on  their  own  have  been  insufficient  in  addressing  the  persisting 
problem  of  dismissals  and  discrimination  of  pregnant  women509.  One  recent  evidence 
report states that "The fact that a platform of rights is available, however, does not mean 
that  problems  do  not  exist:  these  are  more  difficult  to  assess  as  they  are  often  ‘hidden’. 
One of the most fundamental findings of this report is the existence of a large gap between 
the  letter  of  the  law  and  its  practice.  In  other  words,  if  on  paper  the  law  exists  and  is 
comprehensive,  it  is  too  often  circumvented  in  practice  and  individuals  do  not  always 
attempt  to  enforce  their  rights."510.  This  assessment  is  confirmed  by  the  existing  case 
law511,  complaints  received  by  Member  States  Equality  bodies  by  the  European 
Commission  and  shows  the  continuing  relevance  of  the  legislative  framework  with 
supporting measures on the enforcement side512. 

EU intervention to address the issue of pregnant women being discriminated at work and 
being dismissed is very relevant to EU citizens513. Today there are still more mothers than 
fathers who avoid participation in the labour force when they become parents and instead 
take  predominantly  leave.  Because  of  this  employers  tend  to  perceive  women  as  less 
committed to their careers than men and will be less likely to employ women in the first 
place  and  invest  in  female  career  opportunities514.  This  is  supported  by  evidence  from  a 
survey  on  parental  leave  conducted  by  the  European  Foundation  for  the  Improvement  of 
Living and Working conditions and published in 2007515, which shows that mainly women 
– and not men – take long family-related leave periods and this in turn propagates gender-
related,  stereotypical  assumptions  about  the  sharing  of  care  responsibilities  and 
employment abilities516. There is research that suggests in Germany that 1/5 of firms have 
no  incentives  to  employ  young  women517  and  other  research  highlighting  employer's 

508  Study of the EP, Maternity, paternity and parental leave: Data related to duration and compensation rates in the European 
Union, p. 21 , available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/509999/IPOL_STU(2015)509999_EN.pdf 
509  Masselot et al., Fighting Discrimination on the Grounds of Pregnancy, Maternity and Parenthood, p. 12 
510  Masselot et al., Fighting Discrimination on the Grounds of Pregnancy, Maternity and Parenthood, p. 12 
511  See for example as a matter of illustration, Pregnancy discrimination cases in the Equality Tribunal and 
Labour Court, 1999 – 2008 (Banks & Russell, 2011: Between 1999 and 2008 in Ireland alone, 54 decisions 
have been issued by the Equality Tribunal and Labour Court on the sole ground of pregnancy Related 
Discriminatory Dismissal. 
512  Enforcement measures could be awareness raising campaigns, guidance or other forms of making 
employees and employers aware of their rights and obligations under European and national law. 
513  Evidence of the manifest problems still existing today for female EU citizens have been cited above in 
Section 5.1a) highlighting the continuing demand for this EU intervention. 
514  Babies and Bosses, Reconciling Work and Family life, OECD 2007, p. 59. 
515  Anxo, Fagan, Smith, Letablier, Perraudin, Parental leave in European Companies, European Foundation 
for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Survey on Working Time 2004/2005, 
Luxembourg 2007. 
516  Ibid, page 9. 
517  Janneke Plantenga & Chantal Remery, Reconciliation of work and private life, A comparative review of 

188 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
 
tendency  to  limit  the  costs  that  could  potentially  arise  due  to  pregnancy  related 
replacement for jobs518. In addition, the existing rules seem not to address sufficiently the 
cultural barriers which see women as main caregivers and men as providers. In addition to 
specific  leaves  for  fathers  (paternity  leave)  being  much  shorter  then  specific  leaves  for 
mothers (maternity leave), the transferability of parental leave only reinforces the idea that 
women will be out of the labour market for a much longer period of time.  

There  is  some  stakeholder  feedback  suggesting  that  the  needs  of  society  have  not 
fundamentally changed, for example trade unions believe that the EU legal framework is 
still  relevant  and  even  could  be  improved  by  providing  strengthened  protection  against 
dismissal  upon  return  from  maternity  leave519.  As  a  matter  of  illustration,  the  European 
Parliament  stresses  that  maternity  leave  must  be  accompanied  by  effective  measures 
protecting the rights of pregnant women520. 

Therefore  the  original  objective  of  the  maternity  leave  directive  to  ensure  non-
discrimination and dismissal protection for pregnant women still corresponds to the needs 
of the European society as shown by the existing problems521. Notably, as identified in the 
section  on  effectiveness,  the  problem  remains  despite  the  initially  intended  role  of  the 
dismissal  rules  to  serve  as  a  mechanism  that  effectively  prevents  discrimination  and 
dismissals in relation to pregnancy. 

The need to fight pregnancy related discrimination remains. EU action is highly relevant, 
given  that the  necessity  to  ensure  the  principle  of  non-discrimination  and  a  high  level  of 
protection for pregnant women in order to prevent still prevailing discrimination based on 
sex.  Employers  across  Europe  need  to  be  constrained  by  these  rules  but  still  need  to  be 
made  more  aware  of  the  obligations  which  are  imposed  on  them  by  the  EU  minimum 
standards transposed by national rules. The awareness of employers and attitudes regarding 
pregnancy discrimination and dismissal rights and their obligations still persist today and 
have not changed, as shown by a survey in the UK where 31% of employers reported low 

thirty European countries, EU Expert Group, European Commission, 2005, page 76. 
518  C. Ruhm, The Economic consequences of Parental leave Mandates: lessons from Europe, (1998) 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131, pp. 285-317 (288) with further reference to research carried out 
for Sweden. 
519  See Annex 3 of the Impact Assessment on stakeholders. 
520  European Parliament resolution of 13 September 2016 on creating labour market conditions favourable 
for work-life balance, point 27, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P8-TA-2016-0338  
521  The latest Annual report of the Belgian Equality Body of 2015, highlights the still existing problem of 
discrimination against pregnant women and young mothers, giving the following example:" Quand une mère 
a postulé à un emploi, sa candidature n’a pas été retenue et le message suivant lui a été adressé : « Nous 
n’avons pas retenu votre candidature. Votre rôle de mère doit primer sur votre carrière et nous 
recherchons une personne libre d’obligations familiales et pouvant travailler selon un horaire flexible. » 
Rapport d’activités 2015, p. 32, available at: http://igvm-iefh.belgium.be/sites/default/files/101_-
_rapport_dactivites_2015_fr.pdf 

189 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
awareness  of  rights  of  pregnant  employees522.  Enforcing  the  existing  rights  and 
additionally providing information is necessary in order to achieve the stated objectives. 

b) Directive 2010/18/EU 

In addressing the challenges of working families to reconcile private and working life, the 
Directive has laid down minimum standards and provided some harmonising effects on the 
availability  and  provisions  of  parental  leave  across  Europe  and  thereby  it  was  a  relevant 
approach to take to ensure that parents had access to leave arrangements to manage their 
caring  responsibilities.  However,  it  had  only  effects  to  a  limited  extent,  considering  that 
most countries already have different types of leave with the purpose of reconciling work 
and family life in their national frameworks. Approximately two-thirds of study countries 
either  already  met  the  requirements  when  the  Directive  was adopted  and  thereby  did  not 
require formal implementation or made some amendments  to existing legislation so as to 
meet  the  specific  requirements  of  the  Directive.  The  Directive  arguably  did  not  go  far 
enough  though  to  propose  legislative  changes  in  terms  of  compensation  levels  and  non-
transferability clauses; this had the effect of reducing its effectiveness, as discussed above. 

The  EU  intervention  in  the  area  of  work-life  balance,  notably  parental  leave,  is  still 
continuing to be relevant to EU citizens considering the revised parental leave agreement 
of the social partners has been adopted only a couple of years ago. This even if and despite 
latest statistics523 showing on average a slight decrease in working time524. The decrease of 
working time as such does not solve the underlying problem of unequal distribution of care 
between  women  and  men  and  the  persistent  problem  for  women  to  increase  their 
participation the labour market considering the burden that often lies with them to care for 
children and other dependent relatives525.   

The  above  analysis  showed  that  there  is  a  persisting  problem  and  still  the  need  for  the 
European  society  to  achieve  a  more  equal  distribution  of  care  related  activities  between 
women  and  men.    Stakeholder  feedback  indicates  that  there  is  a  need  for  introducing 
payment  and  flexibility  in  uptake  for  parental  leave  and  increase  the  non-transferable 
period and the maximum age of the child, as well as introduce EU legislation for paternity 
leave526. 

The  current  parental  leave  directive  foresees  the  possibility  to  request  changes  to  the 
working  hours  and/or  patterns  for  a  set  period  of  time.  However,  this  only  applies  to 
workers who have taken, and returned from, parental leave. The needs of parents and other 

526  See Annex 3 of Impact Assessment, Stakeholder consultation 

190 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
  
 
  
  
people with dependant relatives to access flexible working arrangements are not addressed, 
thereby  reducing  the  effectiveness  of  this  provision  due  to  its  narrow  personal  scope. 
Moreover, there are no provisions for workers to request changes to their working location, 
such as working from home or another location than their usual workplace; the absence of 
such a possibility is a failure in the potential relevance and effectiveness of the work-life 
balance framework, because it is not adapted to technological or scientific advances by 
including  the  possibility  for  telework  where  full  use  can  be  made  of  the  advances  of 
technology.   

To summarise, the Parental Leave Directive 2010/18 has thus provided some harmonising 
effects on the availability and modalities of parental leave across Europe and thereby it was 
a  relevant  approach  to  take.    However,  in  view  of  the  limited  results  of  the  Directive  in 
terms  of  balancing  caring  responsibilities  between  women  and  men,  it  can  be  concluded 
that the objectives of the initiative are still relevant today. 

5.4 Coherence 

-To what extent is the intervention coherent internally? 

- To what extent is the intervention coherent with other interventions with similar 
objectives ? 

- To what extent is the intervention coherent with wider EU policy? 

a) Non-discrimination and dismissal protection, Directive 92/85/EEC  

Regarding internal coherence, the various internal components of the intervention operate 
together to achieve its objectives e.g. the different articles of the legislation such as Article 
10 which guarantees that Member States shall take the necessary measures to prohibit the 
dismissal of workers, during the period from the beginning of their pregnancy to the end of 
the  maternity  leave  referred  to  in  Article  8  (which  lays  down  the  minimum  standards  of 
maternity leave of a least 14 weeks). Therefore, Article 8 enables mothers to effectively go 
on  maternity  leave  while  Article  10  strengthens  these  rights  by  ensuring  non-
discrimination of mothers due to the take-up of the leave. Consequently, this provision of 
non-discrimination  and  dismissal  protection  guarantees  and  complements  effective  and 
non-discriminatory up-take of maternity leave. 

The  non-discrimination  angle  of  the  Directive  ties  in  with  a  broader  framework  of  other 
EU  regulatory  and  policy  measures  in  the  area  of  gender  equality.    For  example,  it  is 
coherent with Art. 33(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, who 
stipulates that in order "to reconcile family and professional life, everyone shall have the 
right to protection from dismissal for a reason connected with maternity and the right to 
paid maternity leave." Another example is Directive 2006/54/EC which aims at ensuring 

191 

 
 
 
 
 
 
the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and 
women  in  matters  of  employment  and  occupation  and  foresees  in  Articles  14  and  15 
additional protection against discrimination based on sex as well as protection in relation to 
maternity  leave.  Ensuring  gender  equality  and  protecting  workers  of  both  sexes  from 
discrimination  with  regard  to  all  forms  of  leave  is  coherent  with  existing  EU  policies. 
Achieving coherence and non-discrimination requires the implementation of a broader set 
of  measures  to  address  all  the  drivers  underlying  the  discrimination  and  under-
representation of women in the labour market in order to be successful.  

The intervention is also coherent with other interventions which have similar objectives, 
such  as  Directive  79/9/EEC  on  the  progressive  implementation  of  the  principle  of  equal 
treatment for men and women in matters of social security. 

b) Directive 2010/18/EU 

The non-discrimination objective of the Directive tie in with a broader framework of other 
EU  regulatory  and  policy  measures  and  require  the  implementation  of  a  broader  set  of 
measures  to  address  all the  drivers underlying  the  unequal  take  up  of  family  leaves.  The 
intervention is in line and coherent with Art. 33(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union, who stipulates that in order "to reconcile family and professional life, 
everyone shall have the right to parental leave following the birth or adoption of a child." 
This is why it is important to look into the performance of the available framework and not 
only  individual  pieces  of  legislation.  The  analysis  shows,  that  at  EU  level  there  is  no 
paternity leave legislation, but only maternity leave. This means, that a shortcoming of the 
current framework is the non-availability of a father-specific leave which needs to be seen 
together in light of the parental leave rules that can have negative consequences for women 
as regards the uptake of childcare related tasks.  

Regarding internal coherence, the various internal components of the intervention operate 
together  to  achieve  its  objectives  e.g  the  provisions  defining  the  minimum  period  of 
leave527, the modalities of application which specify whether  parental leave is taken on a 
full-time or part-time basis, in a piecemeal way or in the form of a time-credit system for 
example528  or  the  provisions  which  foresee  non-discrimination  and  protect  against  less 
favourable  treatment  or  dismissal  on  the  grounds  of  an  application  for,  or  the  taking  of, 
parental leave529. 

Another aspect of coherence has been identified in relation to Directive 79/9/EEC on the 
progressive implementation of the principle of  equal treatment for men and women in 
matters of social security. Even though the directives are formally coherent, there could 

527  Clause 2(2) 
528  Clause 3 
529  Clause 5 

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be  an  area  where  indirect  discrimination  in  social  security  may  still  occur  due  to  the 
transferability of the parental leave. This is due to the fact that the parental leave directive 
allows in practice women to take over the biggest part of the time off work in order to care 
for their children and this is not only a problem for the equal uptake of the rights but it can 
be also detrimental for the acquisition of related social security rights. 

The Directive is also coherent with the Working Time Directive (Directive 2003/88/EC) 
although it does not target the reconciliation of work and family life and the equal sharing 
of caring responsibilities as such530.. 

The  intervention  was  and  is  also  coherent  with  other  wider  EU  policies  such  as  the 
Strategic Engagement on gender equality 2016-2019531 which recalls that "coordinated 
efforts  will  be  required  to  facilitate  women’s  labour-market  participation.  (…)  This  will 
involve  making  it  easier  to  balance  caring  and  professional  responsibilities.  It  also 
requires  a more  equal sharing  of  time  spent  on  care  and  household  responsibilities.  The 
Barcelona  targets  on  childcare  must  be  attained  and  reflection  undertaken  with  Member 
States on ways of making them more ambitious and extending them to cover care of other 
dependants  should  be  considered."  All  the  measures  mutually  reinforce  and  complement 
each other.  

5.5 EU added value 

- What is the additional value resulting from the EU intervention, compared to what could 
be achieved by Member States at national level?  

-To what extent do the issues addressed by the intervention require action at EU level? 

530  The Directive contributes to a positive work-life balance by limiting weekly working hours to a 
maximum of 48 hours in average (over 4, 6 or 12 months), providing a minimum of 4 weeks of paid annual 
leave, and imposing a daily rest of at least 11 continuous hours and a weekly rest of at least 35 hours. It also 
allows some flexibility in the arrangement of working time (e.g. working time can be averaged and 
annualised, and it is not required to be at the workplace)  . Nonetheless, these minimum standards aim for the 
protection of health and safety, they do not target work-life balance or sharing of caring responsibilities 
among parents as such and the Directive includes substantial possibilities for derogations . 
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/foundation-focus/2016/working-conditions-labour-market-
social-policies/work-life-balance-creating-solutions-for-everyone (E.g. when there is need for continuity of 
service, or in the case of shift work.) 
531  http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/documents/160111_strategic_engagement_en.pdf  

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- What would be the most likely consequences of stopping or withdrawing the existing EU 
intervention? 

a) Non-discrimination and dismissal protection, Directive 92/85/EEC 

The  European  added  value  of  the  Directive  partly  depends  on  the  different  legislative 
frameworks that were in place in Member States at the time it was adopted and transposed. 
With regard to the national legislative frameworks in place at the time of the Directive’s 
adoption several approaches can be identified. In the Member States where no legislation 
in the area of maternity leave enforcing the principle of equal treatment between men and 
women  (including  non-discrimination  and  dismissal  protection  for  pregnant  women)  was 
established, the Directive had and still has a clear European added value as it represents a 
key driver for the integration of the principle of equal treatment, the level of protection and 
the  setting  up  of  specific  national  legislation532.  Also,  in  the  Member  States  where  the 
principle of equal treatment was already integrated in the national legislation, the Directive 
reaffirmed  the  principle  and  contributed  to  the  development  of  specific  measures  in  the 
area of dismissal protection. This is also the case for the Member States that had already 
developed frameworks for non-discrimination and dismissal protection, sometimes with a 
scope going beyond the Directive’s provisions. 

The EU has been successful in establishing minimum standards against discrimination, as 
established by the transposition review carried out for the Directive. This has provided for 
a  more  harmonised  baseline  of  rights  than  exists  in  areas  of  family  leave  (and  access  to 
flexible  working  arrangements)  where  EU  measures  are  currently  absent.  The  current 
situation demonstrates that EU action has a very strong influence on Member States' legal 
frameworks. It is only when EU legislation is in place that there is legislation in place in 
every Member State. By way of contrast, in the area of paternity leave, there is no paternity 
leave provision at EU level and there is no comprehensive availability of paternity leave in 
all  Member  States.  EU  legislation  ensures  that  leave  arrangements  are  available  in  all 
Member States whereas without EU intervention there is no guarantee that this is the case. 
The  lack  of  more  harmonised  provisions  in  all  these  areas  contributes  to  limitations  in 
achieving some of the goals of the maternity leave Directive. As EU action compares and 
takes into account the different Member States' experiences and contexts, by acting at EU 
level there has been a possibility to build on Member States' recognised good practices and 
to create a momentum for Member States to advance together towards less pregnancy and 
maternity  related  discrimination.  EU-level  intervention  does  contribute  to  mitigate  trends 
of increasing levels of discrimination in some Member-States. EU level intervention leads 
to European Law on which basic questions of interpretation of European Law can be raised 

532  An example is the UK, which was relatively late with introducing minimum standards in the area of 
maternity leave and which as a result of the maternity leave directive introduced higher levels of protection 
for pregnant women, see for example: http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-
families/features/the-timeline-maternity-leave-2113236.html   

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by national judges. Art. 267 TFEU enables national judges to raise a legal issue regarding 
the interpretation of European law and receive clarification from the Court of Justice of the 
European  Union  in  the  framework  of  the  preliminary  ruling  procedure.  Thereby  EU 
intervention  contributes 
issues  of  pregnancy  related 
discrimination  which  would  not  be  the  case  without  EU  legislation.  Without  a  Directive 
existing in the field and mere national rules, this possibility to interpret and often extend 
the protection of pregnant women under EU law would not exist533. 

to  address  and  solve  vital 

As regards the maternity leave directive, changes in some Member States534 with regard 
to a minimum protection standard for pregnant women including dismissal protection can 
be reasonably assumed to be due to EU intervention rather than any other factors such as 
employers introducing widespread rules in this area on their own account. The situation in 
some Members States could be described as "patchy" and as a matter of illustration, in the 
UK  the  level  of  protection  varied  from  company  to  company535.  Another  example  that 
shows  how  the  EU  legislation  had  a  direct  impact  on  national  law  is  the  UK  which 
amended  their  laws  in  order  to  introduce  a  category  of  pregnancy  discrimination 
("unfavourable  treatment  because  of  pregnancy  or  maternity  leave"  in  the  Equality  Act 
2010).  This  change  in  UK  law  was  achieved  following  a  case  taken  against  the  UK 
government  by  the  old  Equal  Opportunities  Commission  relying  on  EU  law536.  The 
Directive  92/85  was  indeed  effective  and  succeeded  at  establishing  a  minimum  level  of 
legal protection for dismissal protection and in fact, many countries have introduced even 
more protective conditions than those stipulated by the Directive and relevant case law. 

b) Directive 2010/18/EU 

For parental leave, the EU has been relatively successful in harmonising and establishing a 
common  framework  for  the  provision  of  parental  leave  which  allows  for  the  sharing  of 
parental  responsibilities  and  enhancing  the  reconciliation  of  work  and  family  life.  The 
changes  introduced  by  the  minimum  standards  of  the  parental  leave  directive  notably  in 
relation  to  an  EU  wide  availability  regarding  provisions  on  some  form  of  non-
transferability  as  well  as  flexibility  in  relation  to  the  up-take  of  parental  leave  can  be 
reasonably assumed to be to a large extend due to EU intervention in this area rather than 
any other factors. For example in countries like Finland (and Norway for the EEA) where 
technically  no  transposition  was  considered  necessary,  as  they  already  fulfilled  the 
minimum standards, as a result of the Directive those countries took the opportunity to 

533 A good example is the extension of the protection of pregnancy related dismissal protection to include 
preparatory steps, Case C-460/06 Paquay v Societe d'architectes Hoet and Minne SPRL [2007] ECR I-8511, 
para 33.  
534  For example the UK 
535  http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/features/the-timeline-maternity-leave-
2113236.html 
536  Equal Opportunities Commission v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2007] IRLR 327 

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improve national parental leave legislation or introduced formal changes or in the case 
of Ireland indicated that new changes are being prepared537.  

However, current provisions and their implementation are insufficient in shifting the 
persisting  stereotypes  over  the  caring  roles  of  men  and  women,  leading  to  strong 
imbalances  in  take-up  rates.  This  can  partly  be  attributed  to  a  lack  of  provision  on  the 
payment of parental leave at EU level which results in some countries providing for paid 
parental  leave  and  others  only  enable  parents  the  minimum  standard  of  unpaid  parental 
leave required by the Directive. Another deficiency of the directive that can be identified is 
in particular the relative flexibility which is possible under the parental leave directive538. 
This has as a consequence that it is possible to transfer leave entitlements between parents, 
in practice mostly from the men to the woman539. As the right to request flexible working 
remains a procedural right in many countries and is limited to individuals returning from 
parental  leave  in  many  countries,  existing  patterns  of  leave  taking  encourage  take  up  of 
flexible working time options primarily by women, thus further impacting their career and 
earnings potential. 

The added value of EU measures as opposed to national intervention is the provision of a 
common  set  of  minimum  standards  that  are  applicable  in  the  whole  EU,  and  that  would 
also protect families moving from one Member State to another in the EU territory. During 
the public consultation conducted for the Work-Life Balance initiative some stakeholders 
such as companies highlighted the need for European wide and uniform rules for parental 
leave.  Further  value  is  added  by  EU  intervention  because  it  gives  EU  citizens  the 
possibility  to  profit  from  national  judges  raising  preliminary  questions  in  pending  court 
cases,  in  case  there  is  a  question  on  how  to  interpret  the  Parental  Leave  Directive.  This 
added  value  for  national  judges  and  the  possibility  to  extend  or  clarify  the  protection 
granted at national level only exists because of the EU intervention.    

In  light  of  the  above,  the  most  likely  consequences  of  stopping  or  withdrawing  the 
existing EU intervention, would not only send the wrong policy messages considering the 
importance  of  social  policy  developments  (for  example  the  European  Pillar  of  social 
rights).  In  legal  terms,  withdrawing  the  European  framework  that  exists  in  terms  of 
discrimination  and  dismissal  protection  for  pregnant  women  as  well  as  parental  leave 
would  lead  to  lower  levels  of  protection  for  pregnant  women  and  working  parents  as  it 
would enable Member States to decrease their level of protection and minimum standards 
that  have  been  established  by  the  Directives.  Withdrawing  the  existing  directive  would 
take  away  the  opportunity  for  European  Courts  to  interpret  EU  law  in  order  to  solve 
national cases of discrimination and improve the protection of workers under the Parental 

537 The Implementation of Parental Leave Directive 2010/18 in 33 European Countries, p. 8 
538 See clause 2(2) of the Directive on non-transferability. 
539  ICF (2017) Study on the costs and benefits of possible EU measures to facilitate work-life balance for 
parents and care givers, p. 35.  

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Leave Directive. As explained above, this would limit the possibility in the Member States 
to achieve better protection for workers which sometimes stems from the case law of the 
European Court of Justice in the framework of preliminary rulings540.    

540  Case C‑222/14, Maïstrellis, ECLI:EU:C:2015:473. In which case the ECJ found a violation of European 
law because a civil servant is not entitled to parental leave in a situation where his wife does not work or 
exercise any profession, unless it is considered that due to a serious illness or injury the wife is unable to 
meet the needs related to the upbringing of the child. 

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6. Conclusions and Recommendations 

The objectives of the maternity and parental leave Directive have not been fully reached.  

This  evaluation  has  shown  that  the  existing  framework,  e.g.  the  maternity  leave  and 
parental leave directives fulfil to some extent the objectives but to a large extent is not an 
effective tool to achieve the pursued objectives.  

Several  factors  contribute  to  this:  with  regard  to  maternity  leave,  despite  the  legal 
framework for dismissal protection, the evidence shows that not all employers do respect 
the legal rules transposed by the Member States in this field. Even though Member States 
did comply when transposing the provisions of the Directive, in practice the transposed EU 
rules  are  not  achieving  the  objective  of  combatting  dismissal  and  discrimination  of 
pregnant women. Hence, the problem of dismissals of pregnant women remains despite the 
initially intended role of the dismissal rules by the legislators to serve as a mechanism that 
effectively  prevents  discrimination  and  dismissals  in  relation  to  pregnancy.  The 
effectiveness of the dismissal protection rules is limited by the fact that some employers do 
not comply. This hampers achieving this objective of the maternity leave Directive, even 
though all Member States comply with the transposition of these rules as laid down in the 
Directive. 

With regard to parental leave, part of the objectives set by the Directive 2010/18 are not 
sufficiently  met  and  addressed,  such  as  the  objective  of  achieving  work-life  balance 
through  a  better  balancing  of  the  caring  responsibilities  between  women  and  men.  The 
current  design  of  the  leave  for  parents  leads  in  practice  to  an  unequal  uptake  between 
women and men, with a vast majority of women taking leave. This was identified as being 
due to a lack of payment in many Member States and rules allowing one parent to transfer 
his  or  her  individual  entitlement  to  the  other  parent  which  all  reinforce  the  take-up  by 
women instead of reserving their individual entitlement to each parent. It can be observed 
that  Member  States  have  chosen  various  models  for  their  legal  transposition  of  the 
requirements  of  the  two  directives  under  assessment,  while  these  directives  included  the 
core substance of the level of protection for workers in the area of work-life balance.  

The  assessment  of  efficiency  for  both  Directives  was  hampered  to  some  extent  due  to  a 
lack of systematic European monitoring data on costs. In order to be better able to assess 
the performance of legislation in this field, monitoring arrangements on EU and Member 
State level need to be strengthened in future. It is therefore recommended to address those 
shortcomings in future EU interventions. 

With  regard  to  parental  leave,  the  need  for  minimum  standards  as  such  remains  highly 
relevant today. EU action is also still relevant in the area of maternity leave, considering 
the  need  to  ensure  the  respect  of  the  principle  of  non-discrimination  and  a  high  level  of 
protection for pregnant women in order to prevent still prevailing discrimination based on 
sex. 

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In  terms  of  coherence,  it  can  be  concluded  that  the  evaluated  directives  are  in  principle 
coherent. Both Directives are coherent internally, and also with other EU policy actions. It 
is  however  recommended  to  reinforce  the  interaction  between  provisions  within  and 
between legal instruments in order to achieve coherent outputs. 

In terms of EU added value, it has to be underlined that, EU action as regards maternity 
and  parental  leave  created  additional  value  and  triggered  even  further  action  in  Member 
States that would not have occurred without EU intervention. The EU added value can be 
seen  in  the  causative  effects  of  EU  intervention  to  provide  all  working  parents  in  the 
European Union with family leaves such as maternity or parental leave. 

199