JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Elements for an EU Strategy for Syria
Date: 2017-03-14
Institutions: European Commission, European External Action Service
Subjects: EU financial instrument, European neighbourhood policy, Syria, civil war, democratisation, economic recovery, establishment of peace, human rights, humanitarian aid, the EU's international role

EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 

HIGH REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE UNION FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
SECURITY POLICY

Strasbourg, 14.3.2017  
JOIN(2017) 11 final 

JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE 
COUNCIL 

Elements for an EU Strategy for Syria 

EN 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
  
 
Introduction 

The war in Syria, one of the worst humanitarian crises the world has faced since World War 

II,  continues  to  have  devastating  and  tragic  consequences  for  its  people.  Last  year's 

destruction of Aleppo was the latest chapter in the grim and, so far unending history of this 

conflict. In addition, it is also having an increasingly destabilising impact on the wider region, 

through the displacement of people, the spread of terrorism, the exacerbation of political and 

sectarian differences.  

The aim of the EU strategy for Syria, called for by President Juncker in his State of the Union 

speech in September 2016, is to define how the EU can play a bigger role in contributing to a 

lasting  political  solution  in  Syria  under  the  existing  UN-agreed  framework  and  help  build 

stability  and  support  post-agreement  reconstruction  once  a  credible  political  transition  is 

underway.  The  High  Representative  of  the  Union  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  Security  Policy 

(‘the High Representative’) and the Commission are seeking endorsement of the strategy on 

the eve of the Brussels conference 'Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region' of 5 April 

2017 as an EU contribution to two of the three broad themes of that conference: support for 

the political process; and support for reconciliation and stabilisation. The third theme of the 

conference, support for the region, is separately addressed through the EU’s London pledge 
and  the  implementation  of  EU  compacts  with  Jordan1  and  Lebanon2  and  of  the  Facility  for 
Refugees in Turkey3. 

The strategy is also a review of the Syrian aspects of the EU Regional Strategy for Syria, Iraq 
and the fight against ISIL/Da’esh, last reviewed and updated by the Council in May 2016.4  It 

is necessary to review the EU’s role and what it can do to help promote a political solution, 

1 http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12384-2016-ADD-1/en/pdf (See annex) 

2 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/11/pdf/st03001_en16_docx_pdf/ (See annex) 

3 https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/frit_factsheet.pdf 

4 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/news/20150206_JOIN_en.pdf 

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/05/23-fac-syria-iraq-daesh-conclusions/ 

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based on UN Security Council Resolution 2254 that works for all Syrians, enabling them to 

live in freedom and dignity, securely and safely. 

Bilateral  cooperation  with  the  Syrian  government  was  suspended  after  the  regime’s  violent 

repression of the civilian uprising in 2011. The EU has, nevertheless, continued to support the 

Syrian  people,  through  humanitarian  assistance  to  save  lives,  as  well  as  aid  to  provide 

essential  services  and  support  civil  society.  Enhanced  coordination  between  EU  Member 

States and EU institutions, and their respective financial instruments is vital for the effective 

implementation of this strategy. 

1. Situation in Syria 

1.1 Political and security context 

The military reaction of the Syrian regime to the peaceful political uprising in 2011 led to a 

protracted  civil  war  supported  and  exacerbated  by  a  number  of  external  actors.  The 

continuation of the war is creating a patchwork of segregated and competing regions run by 

different armed groups and enabling Da'esh to thrive. 

In spite of successive UN-led peace talks, the Geneva Communiqué of 20125 and the efforts 

of the International Syria Support Group and its working groups, no agreement between the 

parties in conflict has been reached to put an end to the war. The fourth round of intra-Syrian 

talks in Geneva in February 2017 has identified three baskets for future negotiations, in line 

with  UNSCR  2254  –  governance,  constitution,  and  elections  –  plus  an  additional  ad-hoc 

basket in which counter-terrorism could be discussed.  

Meanwhile the escalation of violence on the ground has been systematically pursued by the 

Syrian regime and its allies, as well as by violent extremist groups and elements of the armed 

opposition.  This  has  led  to  the  increased  vulnerability  of  the  Syrian  people,  demographic 

engineering  through  forced  evacuations,  and  gross  violations  of  human  rights  and 

international humanitarian law. 

5 http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Syria/FinalCommuniqueActionGroupforSyria.pdf 

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There  has  been  no  attempt  at  dialogue  on  the  part  of  the  regime:  the  message  is  clearly 

‘submit  or  leave.’  Such  a  repressive  approach  can  never  become  a  stable  basis  for  a  future 

united and inclusive Syria.  

1.2 Humanitarian context 

Six  years  of  conflict  have  taken  an  enormous  toll  on  the  civilian  population  in  Syria.  Life 

expectancy  has  decreased  by  20  years.  The  economic  and  human  development  of  Syria  has 

been reversed by 40 years, leading many Syrians to leave their country. The Syrian economy 

has collapsed and has been replaced by a war economy, which benefits only a small minority. 
13.5 million people,6 almost three quarters of the remaining population,7 are in dire need of 

humanitarian assistance, including more than six million internally-displaced people and more 

than five million people in besieged and hard-to-reach areas. 

The almost daily violations of international humanitarian law, such as the continued deliberate 

attacks on civilian infrastructure, including water distribution systems, medical facilities and 

schools,  have  led  to  severe  shortages  of  essential  services.  At  the  same  time,  access  and 

delivery  of  humanitarian  assistance  have  been  severely  hampered  by  an  increased 

politicisation of aid. 

1.3 State of play of EU assistance as of January 2017 

Since  the  outbreak  of  the  war  in  2011,  the  EU  has  collectively  (EU  and  Member  States) 

mobilised more than EUR 9.4 billion in response to the Syrian crisis both inside Syria and in 

the region, making it the largest donor. 

Inside Syria, the EU has mobilised more than EUR 900 million. More than EUR 600 million 

of  this  has  been  used  to  provide  humanitarian  assistance.  This  funding  has  responded  to 

people’s  needs  across  the  ‘Whole  of  Syria’  and  prioritised  multi-sectoral,  life-saving 

operations, particularly in under-served, contested and besieged areas.  

The EU’s humanitarian assistance has reached millions of people in need inside Syria and in 

neighbouring  refugee-host  countries.  Inside  Syria,  our  assistance  has  allowed  our  partner  to 

6 http://www.unocha.org/syria 

7 http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/syria-population/ 

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provide  food,  emergency  health  support,  shelter,  drinkable  water  and  hygiene  items  to 

millions  of  people,  particularly  the  most  in  need  and  has  supported  the  UNICEF  polio 

immunisation campaign for 2.7 million children. Though the focus of this Communication is 

on inside Syria,  the EU has also mobilised substantial support to neighbouring refugee-host 

countries  (Turkey,  Jordan,  Lebanon)  where  more  than  1.15  million  Syrian  refugees  in  the 

region  have  been  provided  with  life-saving  health  and  medical  assistance,  as  well  as 

psychosocial support and protection. 

The EU has also provided EUR 327 million in non-humanitarian assistance through various 
instruments:  The  European  Neighbourhood  Instrument8  has  funded  actions  within  Syria  in 

various sectors, such as education, support to livelihoods, local governance, health and civil 

society support.  

This  funding  aims  to  maintain  Syrian  human  capital,  facilitate  people’s  access  to  basic 

services  and  enhance  the  capacities  of  local  civilian  institutions.  Under  the  Instrument 
contributing to Stability and Peace9 and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human 
Rights,10  the  EU  is  supporting  Syrian  civil  society  and  human  rights  defenders.  The 
Development  Cooperation  Instrument11  also  supports  projects  inside  Syria  to  increase  the 

food security of the Syrian population. 

The EU has created a Facility for Refugees in Turkey, with a total budget of EUR 3 billion for 

the  period  2016-2017,  to  support  longer-term  livelihoods,  socio-economic  and  educational 

perspectives of refugees in Turkey.  

The EU has also created a Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian crisis12 that includes 

EUR 932 million of contributions from 22 Member States and Turkey. This is in addition to 

8 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014R02 32&from=EN 

9 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/documents/140311_icsp_reg_230_2014_en.pdf 

10 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014R02 35&from=EN 

11 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014R02 33&from=EN 

12 https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20161220-eutf-syria_0.pdf 

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direct financing from the EU budget, that has been used to date in the region, in order to help 

Syrians and hosting communities in neighbouring countries. 

The  EU  funding  has  contributed  to  improve  the  lives  of  the  refugees  in  particular  in  the 

education  sector.  For  instance,  663.000  Syrian  refugee  and  host  community  children  and 

youth in Turkey Lebanon and Jordan are provided with access to quality primary education, 

protective services and psycho-social care. In the higher education sector, the 'HOPES' project 

is offering scholarships, educational counseling and language training to some 250.000 Syrian 

refugee  and  host  community  youth  in  Jordan,  Lebanon,  Egypt,  Iraq  and  Turkey.  In  Turkey, 

interventions  in  the  area  of  education  include  the  construction  and  equipment  of  70  new 

schools. 

2. Risks and threats to EU core interests if the war continues 

The  continuation  of  the  war  in  Syria  could  lead  to  either  the  division  of  the  country  along 

sectarian lines which could further fuel violent extremism and terrorism, or the imposition of 

military control by the regime over the whole country. Both will lead to continued instability 

with wider disruptive consequences regionally and globally, including eroding the capacity of 

the international legal and institutional architecture to resolve other disputes. 

The repercussions of either of these options — continued conflict or continued autocratic rule, 

the alternatives to a negotiated political transition — would be contrary to the interests of the 

Syrian people, the region and the EU. They would include: 

− 

loss of life and aggravated human suffering, including from sieges, leading to further 

population displacement, notably large refugee flows across the region and to Europe; 

−  continued violence, radicalisation of armed groups and the spread of violent 

extremism; 

− 

the  spread  of  criminal  activities  resulting  from  a  war  economy,  including  arms  and 

human trafficking; 

−  continued economic decline with shrinking business and economic opportunities; 

− 

the  entrenchment  of  sectarian  differences,  rendering  efforts  to  pursue  a  national 

reconciliation process more difficult; 

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−  greater instability in neighbouring countries, including a hindering of the stabilisation 

of post-Da’esh Iraq, and further direct impact on Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey; and 

− 

further destruction of cultural heritage, including World Heritage sites, and trafficking 

of cultural goods. 

3. EU strategic goals 

The  EU’s  strategic  goals  on  Syria  align  with  its  core  interests  and  values  and  build  on  the 

Global  Strategy  for  the  EU’s  foreign  and  security  policy  and  the  European  Neighbourhood 

Policy: 

−  One Syria — a united and territorially integral country for all Syrian citizens. 

−  A democratic Syria — a legitimate government and a pluralistic political system with 

respect for the rule of law and individual rights-based on equal citizenship. 

−  A  diverse  and  inclusive  Syria  —  a  multi-cultural  country  in  which  all  ethnic  and 

religious groups feel that their identities are protected and that they have equal access 

to government. 

−  A  strong  and  secure  Syria  —  an  effective  state  with  functional  institutions,  with  a 

focus on citizens’ security and services, a single national army and accountable police 

and security forces. 

−  A  stable  Syria  —  a  stable  political  system  and  a  strong  economy,  providing  proper 

education  and  healthcare  to  its  population,  as  well  as  being  attractive  to  foreign 

investment,  maintaining good relations with all its neighbours and integrated into the 

international community as a constructive partner. 

As  these  strategic  goals  are  being  achieved,  this  will  enable  the  voluntary,  dignified 

and safe return of refugees and internally displaced persons. 

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4. EU objectives 

In order to achieve these strategic goals, the EU's objectives for Syria are:  

−  An end to the war through a political transition process negotiated by the parties to the 

conflict with the support of the UN Special Envoy for Syria and key international and 

regional actors. 

−  Promote  a  meaningful  and  inclusive  transition  in  Syria  through  support  for  the 

strengthening of the political opposition, in line with UN Security Council Resolution 

2254 and the Geneva Communiqué. 

−  Promote  democracy,  human  rights  and  freedom  of  speech  by  strengthening  Syrian 

civil society organisations. 

−  Promote  a  national  reconciliation  process  based  on  peace  building  efforts  and 

countering  violent  extremism  and  sectarianism, including an approach to transitional 

justice that should include accountability for war crimes. 

−  Save lives by addressing the humanitarian needs of the most vulnerable Syrians in a 

timely, effective, efficient and principled manner. 

−  Support  the  resilience  of  the  Syrian  population,  as  well  as  of  the  institutions  and 

Syrian society. 

These objectives are discussed in more detail under Section 5. 

5. The main lines of action in Syria to implement EU objectives 

5.1. An end to the war through a political transition process negotiated by the parties in 

conflict  with  the  support  of  the  UN  Special  Envoy  and  key  international  and  regional 

actors 

Any lasting solution to the war has to be centred on meeting the democratic aspirations and 

needs of the Syrian people, allowing an opening of the political and civic space to previously 

excluded groups and a democratic and genuine reform of state institutions. Given its interest 

in a negotiated political transition and using the tools at its disposal, the EU will play its part 

in full.  

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The  EU  will  continue  to  provide  its  direct  assistance  to  UN-brokered  talks  in  Geneva, 

including in technical discussions that could advance political negotiations to end the war and 

define  the  parameters  of  a  transitional  governing  body  in  line  with  UNSCR  2254  and  the 

Geneva Communiqué. The EU welcomes steps taken by Russia, Turkey and Iran in support of 

the ceasefire, as endorsed by UNSCR 2336, and as a means of preparing for intra-Syrian talks 

in Geneva.  

As the Syrian war is currently shaped to a large extent by the direct military engagement of a 

number of regional and global actors, the EU has launched, in full coordination with the UN, 

an initiative to develop political dialogue with key actors from the region to identify common 

ground for the end-state in Syria and the conditions for the reconciliation and reconstruction 

process. This work aims to further contribute towards an agreement in the intra-Syrian peace 

process. 

Peace  cannot  be  achieved  by  only  engaging  with  Syrian  stakeholders  at  the  macro-level.  It 

requires first of all a concerted effort directly aimed at Syrian civil society, communities and 

the  population  affected  by  the  war,  which  should  participate  in  the  process  of  defining 

transitional arrangements and the future of the Syrian political system. The EU Syria Peace 
Process  Support  Initiative13  is  developing  a  concrete  platform  to  support  the  peace  process 

and  ceasefire,  strengthen  the  opposition  parties  and  contribute  to  the  dialogue  with  civil 

society.  The  EU  will  continue  to  support  the  efforts  of  the  UN  Special  Envoy  for  Syria  to 

include civil society in his work through the Civil Society Support Room and the Women’s 

Advisory Board. 

The  EU  will  maintain  its  restrictive  measures  against  Syrian  individuals  and  entities 

supporting the regime as long as the repression of civilians continues. The measures targeting 

certain sectors of the Syrian economy will also be maintained as far as necessary. The current 

sanctions  will  be  extended  further  as  necessary.  The  EU  will  keep  the  impact  of  sanctions 

under  constant  review  and  will  regularly  consider  options  to  mitigate  any  unintended 

consequences. 

13 EU fund for Syria set up by the Instrument contributing to Peace and Stability. 

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5.2.  Promote  a  meaningful  and  inclusive  transition  in  Syria  through  support  for  the 

strengthening  of  the  political  opposition,  in  accordance  with  UN  Security  Council 

Resolution 2254 and the Geneva Communiqué 

A comprehensive and viable transition in Syria cannot be achieved without the representation 

and empowerment of all the main Syrian political groups. 

The  Syrian  opposition,  both  inside  and  outside  Syria,  needs  support  to  sustain  its  efforts  in 

transforming  itself  into  a  strong  and  sustainable  political  platform  capable  of  providing  a 

democratic  alternative  and  playing  a  significant  role  in  the  transition  and  post-transition 

phases  in  Syria.  The  EU  will  continue  to  build  on  its  existing  work  to  support  the  major 

political  opposition  groups  in  the  negotiation  process,  as  well  as  help  them  further  develop 

and adapt their vision of transition and the future of the Syrian state and society. 

The EU will continue to invest in the unification of the Syrian opposition through its efforts to 

strengthen  the  High  Negotiations  Committee,  as  well  as  its  two  main  political  components, 

the Syrian National Coalition and the National Coordination Body. 

The  EU  will  support  the  expansion  of  the  opposition’s  platform  for  negotiations  through 

dialogue with other Syrian opposition groups  who  have not been represented in the Geneva 

process. Furthermore, the EU is encouraging dialogue between opposition groups and Syrian 

stakeholders,  such  as  civil  society  organisations,  religious  and  tribal  leaders,  the  business 

community and women’s associations, with a view to incorporating their views into a political 

platform. 

The  EU  will  continue  to  support  the  cooperation  and  engagement  of  the  Syrian  political 

opposition with moderate armed groups with a view to strengthening their participation in the 

ceasefire and the preparations for a future political transition. 

5.3. Promote democracy, human rights and freedom of speech by strengthening Syrian 

civil society organisations 

The  EU  will  continue  to  provide  substantive  support  to  Syrian  civil  society  organisations, 

which  share  the  values  of  promotion  of  democracy,  human  rights  and  freedom  of  speech. 

Syrian  civil  society  will  need  to  play  a  prominent  role  in  a  post-conflict  Syria,  including 

helping the country to deal with the past, enabling efforts for local and national reconciliation, 

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intercultural  and  interreligious  dialogue,  and  contributing  to  the  monitoring  of  any  political 

agreement. 

In  particular,  the  EU  will  support  Syrian  civil society’s  aggregation  into  coherent  platforms 

that  can  better  promote  their  objectives  and  give  voice  to  the  widest  possible  spectrum  of 

Syrian society. It will work towards strengthening civil society’s capacity to engage with the 

public, articulating Syrian citizens' concerns. Support will be maintained for women’s, youth 

and minority rights organisations that promote an agenda for their participation in an inclusive 

and democratic Syria. 

Support for freedom of speech should include support to development of dynamic, free and 

independent  media  and  the  fostering  of  channels  for  open  and  tolerant  communication 

including through social media.   

5.4.  Promote  a  national  reconciliation  process  based  on  peace  building  efforts  and 

countering  violent  extremism  and  sectarianism,  including  an  approach  to  transitional 

justice that should include accountability for war crimes 

During and after the conflict, the EU will continue to support transitional justice initiatives to 

help ensure accountability for war crimes, human rights abuses and violations of international 

humanitarian  law.  This  includes  the  confirmed  use  of  chemical  weapons,  as  well  as  the 

support  for  the  investigation  of  war  crimes  at  both  national  and  international  level.  These 

efforts  will  be  done  in  conjunction  with  the  support  for  the  strengthening  of  psycho-social 

relief and reconciliation across the country. 

On  peacebuilding  efforts,  the  EU  will  assist  the  different  components  of  Syrian  society  to 

support  peaceful  co-existence  and  community  resilience  as  a  pre-requisite  for  building  a 

future  democratic  Syria.  Mediation  efforts  will  need  to  be  carefully  targeted  to  meet  the 

specific needs of local communities and the evolving context of the conflict. 

The  EU  will  support  work  on  the  identification  of  missing  and  disappeared  persons  and 

provide support to their families through counselling, legal advice and advocacy. 

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5.5.  Save  lives  by  addressing  humanitarian  needs  of  the  most  vulnerable  Syrians  in  a 

timely, effective, efficient and principled manner 

Delivering humanitarian aid inside Syria has become increasingly challenging. Approving or 

withholding humanitarian access has become a tactic of war used by all parties to the conflict 

for their own purposes. The EU will continue its practical engagement with the Government 

of  Syria  and  opposition  groups  to  reassert  the  need  to  comply  with  basic  humanitarian 

principles  by  all  parties  to  the  conflict  and  the  need  to  avoid  political  interference  in 

humanitarian aid delivery. The EU will maintain a principled, non-discriminatory and needs-

based approach to the delivery of aid through its partners. 

The  EU’s  humanitarian  response  will  continue  to  cover  two  types  of  scenarios  —  first-line 

emergency response and post-emergency response — through an integrated approach of five 

key  sectors  of  intervention:  food;  health;  shelter  and  non-food  items;  water,  sanitation  and 

hygiene (WASH); and protection. Through its first-line emergency response, the EU and its 

humanitarian partners will prioritise areas where civilian population have no or limited access 

to humanitarian assistance. The EU supports the development of contingency plans, in order 

to anticipate and respond effectively to any deterioration of the humanitarian situation. 

The EU will also continue to provide life-sustaining assistance to the most vulnerable Syrians 

in  post-emergency  situations,  such  as  long-term  displacement  or  protracted  lack  of  basic 

services.  The  EU  will  further  strengthen  complementarity  between  humanitarian  aid, 

resilience and support to livelihoods. 

The EU, as part of its humanitarian diplomacy, will continue to demand that all parties to the 

conflict  ensure  the  protection  of  civilians,  allow  humanitarian  access  and  deliver  a 

humanitarian  response  in  line  with  international  humanitarian  law  and  accountability 

principles. The EU will maintain its support to a strong ‘Whole of Syria’ approach as the best 

way of addressing access constraints and delivering assistance to populations in need from all 

aid hubs, including both cross-line and cross-border operations in a consistent, principled and 

effective manner. 

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5.6.  Support  the  resilience  of  the  Syrian  population,  as  well  as  of  the  institutions  and 

Syrian society, in line with the Whole of Syria approach 

Building the resilience of the Syrian population according to the ‘Whole of Syria’ approach 

requires  the  provision  of  aid  to  affected  populations  throughout  the  country.  This  is 

increasingly  challenging  because  of  lack  of  access,  insecurity  and  the  capacity  of 

implementing  partners  to  work  in  a  conflict  environment.  This  approach  necessitates  a 

cautious,  conflict-sensitive  assessment and monitoring  of where and how EU  assistance  can 

be  delivered.  The  EU  has  therefore  taken  measures  to  mitigate  political  and  other  risks  of 

working inside Syria and has strengthened its presence in the region. 

The EU will continue to support the resilience of the Syrian civilian population. A particular 

focus  will  be  put  on  the  creation  of  jobs  through  community-based  and  locally-owned 

approaches  to  generate  revenue  and  promote  a  sense  of  empowerment.  The  EU  will  also 

continue to focus on the provision of education, including basic and higher education, skills 

development, vocational training and psycho-social support services for Syrian children and 

youth,  as  well  as  specific  actions  promoting  equal  access  to  education  for  girls.  This  will 

enable them to continue their schooling and studies, thereby providing them with the prospect 

of  a  better  future  and  to  equip  them  with  the  necessary  skills  to  contribute  to  Syria’s 

reconstruction. This will also encourage people, and in particular young people, to remain in 

or return to Syria post-conflict, and create alternatives to participation in or the influence of 

armed or violent extremist groups. 

The EU will work to avoid the collapse of the Syrian state administration. For a functioning 

state  it  is  necessary  to  ensure  the  linking  of  governance  structures  at  all  levels  across  the 

country.  The  EU  will  expand  the  support  it  has  been  providing  to  local  civilian  governance 

structures in opposition-held areas, such as local councils and other administrative entities, to 

improve their transparency, participation and accountability in the provision of services and to 

prevent  the  control  of  civilian  structures  by  military  actors.  The  EU  will  coordinate  closely 

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with  other  donors  and  Syrian  stakeholders,  including  the  Syrian  interim  Government14  to 

ensure harmonised and complementary approaches within and across different sectors. 

Under  the  ‘Whole  of  Syria’  approach,  the  EU  will  continue  to  provide  resilience  support 

throughout the country. This support is aiming at:  

(i) maintaining Syria’s human capital and the delivery of services, thereby paving the 

way for post-conflict recovery; and  

(ii)  providing  the  means  for  people  to  remain  in  their  homes  in  dignity  or  for 

internally-displaced persons to receive basic services, thus reducing migratory flows.  

This  ‘Whole  of  Syria’  approach  should  be  pursued  with  a  view  to  preparing  the  ground  for 

post-conflict  recovery  and  post-agreement  state  reform,  where  local  institutions  throughout 

the country are expected to play a key stabilisation role. 

6. EU engagement in early planning for reconstruction and transition 

6.1 Post-Agreement Planning 

The EU has been clear that it will not be able to assist with the reconstruction of the country 

until  a  comprehensive,  genuine  and  inclusive  political  transition  is  under  way.  EU 

engagement in reconstruction is therefore linked to a political solution to the conflict based on 

UNSCR 2254 and the Geneva Communique. In addition, special responsibility for the costs of 

reconstruction  should  be  taken  by  those  external  actors  who  have  fuelled  the  conflict. 

Nevertheless, in order to be ready to act quickly and effectively at the appropriate moment, 

preparations  have  to  start  in  advance.  Investment  needs  will  be  extremely  substantial  and  a 

global effort will be required.   

The  EU  will  continue  to  engage  and  contribute  to  the  post-agreement  planning  exercise 

conducted by the UN Inter-agency Task Force that will detail the multi-sectoral interventions 

that will be needed in the first 6 months following a peace agreement to support the political 

process and the transitional government structures. Work is also ongoing to expand existing 

14 The Syrian Interim Government has been created in 2013 by the Syrian National Coalition and is working to 
establish functional local governance structures inside Syria in opposition areas that are able to provide services 
to the population. 

14 

 
 
                                                            
joint EU-UN assessments of damage and needs in a number of Syrian cities and to ensure that 

the needs of the population are tackled in reconstruction efforts. The EU will seek to integrate 

similar, parallel efforts of the World Bank.  This work will prepare the ground and reduce the 

time  needed  post-agreement  for  the  conduct  of  a  joint  Recovery  and  Peace  Building 

Assessment between the EU, the World Bank and the United Nations, in support of the longer 

term recovery and reconstruction plans of the transitional government structures.  

The  EU  is  already  engaged    in  increasing  the  coordination  of  EU  Member  States  and  key 

donors  in  Syria.  In  this  regard,  the  EU  has  already  hosted  nine  core  donor  meetings  since 

October  2012  in  order  to  improve  international  coordination  of  non-humanitarian  recovery, 

resilience and development aid and forward planning for the response to the Syria crisis. In 

preparation  for  a  post-agreement  phase,  the  EU  will  engage  with  Syria's  neighbouring 

countries,  the  Arab  International  Financial  Institutions  and  other  relevant  third  parties  to 

discuss  ways  in  which  Syria's  neighbours  and  regional  actors  can  contribute  to  Syria's 

reconstruction as well as how a safe, voluntary and dignified return of refugees and internally 

displaced persons could be supported. 

6.2 EU role in Syria's reconstruction  

Once  a  genuine  political  transition  in  accordance  with  UNSCR  2254  and  the  Geneva 

Communiqué is underway, the EU could take steps in support of reconstruction. Such steps 

will be undertaken in an incremental way, and only in response to concrete and measurable 

progress:  

−  Lifting  restrictive  measures:  the  EU  could  review  the  current  restrictive  measures 

against Syria to support early recovery and reconstruction. 

−  Resuming co-operation:  the EU could resume bilateral co-operation relations with the 

Syrian  Government  and  mobilise  appropriate  tools  under  the  EU  Neighbourhood 

Policy  and  other  programmes  to  boost  the  economy  and  tackle  governance  and 

accountability challenges. 

−  Mobilisation of funding: when a genuine and comprehensive political transition starts, 

the EU will be ready to contribute to the reconstruction of Syria, as well as to mobilise 

and leverage funding from other international donors. The EU Regional Trust Fund in 

15 

 
 
response to the Syria Crisis should play an important role in pooling and channelling 

EU and Member States' as well as other contributors' funding.  

Without  prejudging  the  results  of  consultations  with  post-agreement  Syrian  counterparts 

that will need to define their own reconstruction priorities, the EU could provide support 

in the following sectors:  

−  Security:  the  need  for  security  will  be  paramount  in  implementing  any  political 

agreement. In the immediate post-agreement phase, the EU could fund demining and 

removal  of  unexploded  ordinance  and  support  local  or  international  mechanisms  to 

oversee  and  monitor  the  cessation  of  hostilities.  A  transition  in  Syria  will  only  be 

successful if security institutions are reformed to become accountable and focussed on 

citizens' safety and security. This will require civilian oversight at local and national 

levels.  The  EU  could  support  Security  Sector  Reform  and  demilitarisation, 

demobilisation  and  reintegration  of  former  combatants  into  civilian  life  or  reformed 

security  services.  The  EU  may  fund  other  relevant  aspects,  including  disposal  of 

chemical agents and the tracking and disposal of small arms and light weapons.  

−  Governance, reforms and service delivery: in the immediate post-agreement phase, the 

EU could support the provision of peace dividends by rapidly restoring basic services 

delivery  at  local  level  (education,  health,  water,  electricity,  rubble  removal,  waste 

management,  etc.),  especially  for  areas  hosting  large  numbers  of  the  displaced  or 

returnees.  In  the  longer-term,  the  EU  could  support  the  post-conflict  reform  of  state 

institutions, 

including 

efforts 

to  overcome 

the 

existence  of  different 

practices/administrations,  reinforce  the  coherence  of  service  delivery  and  bring 

divided  communities  back  together.    The  EU  could  support  the  drafting  of  a  new 

constitution  and  the  organisation  of  elections,  notably  through  assistance  to  election 

management and an EU electoral observation mission. It could also scale up its service 

delivery support through state and local institutions, thereby reinforcing the legitimacy 

of  reformed  and  accountable  state  and  local  institutions  throughout  Syria.  The  EU 

could support Syria in combating financial crimes by implementing Financial Action 

Taskforce (FATF) recommendations. 

−  Social  cohesion,  peace-building  and  reconciliation:  in  the  immediate  post-agreement 

phase, the EU could support inclusive local-level reconciliation processes to reinforce 

16 

 
 
the peace-agreement and prevent relapse into conflict.  It could also provide support to 

the transitional authorities in dealing with the most pressing issues (former detainees 

and  missing  persons,  housing  and  land  property  dispute  resolution,  etc.),  working 

closely  with  civil  society.    The  EU  is  also  willing  to  play  a  role  in  preparing  and 

supporting the safe, voluntary and dignified return of refugees and internally-displaced 

persons to their homes, and their inclusion into Syrian society. In the longer-term this 

will  need,  among  other  things,  a  rights-based  and  victim-centred  transitional  justice 

mechanism  and  measures  to  encourage  national  and  local  reconciliation,  such  as  a 

national dialogue, alongside profound judicial reform. 

−  Human  capital:  the  EU  can  build  on  existing  initiatives  to  develop  and  maintain  the 

human capital that will be needed for the reconstruction of Syria. To this end, relevant 

EU  sectorial  policy  instruments,  such  as  the  Horizon  2020  Programme,  could  be 

mobilised. 

−  Economic recovery: in the immediate post-agreement phase, the EU could increase its 

livelihoods support to the population, notably for the most vulnerable, young people, 

and displaced persons. In the longer-term, peace and the reconstruction of Syria will 

only be achieved through a re-launch of the Syrian economy, which has been severely 

damaged by six years of war. Creating jobs and business opportunities for all Syrians 

(in particular for returning refugees, the displaced, communities affected by war and 

former  fighters),  including  those  offered  by  the  reconstruction  process,  will  be 

important  for  economic  recovery.  In  order  to  maximise  the  effectiveness  of 

international  support,  it  will  be  essential  for  the  international  community  to  work  in 

one direction  and in  a fully  coordinated manner. In this context, once the conditions 

allow  and  depending  on  requirements,  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  could 

take the lead in a macroeconomic stabilisation effort, in conjunction with World Bank 

loans  and  advice  on  structural  and  sectoral  reform  policies.  EU  macro-financial 

assistance  could  be  available  to  Syria  in  a  post-conflict  scenario,  subject  to  the 

existence of a disbursing IMF programme and the relevant preconditions – respect for 

democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, the rule of law 

and  respect  for  human  rights.  In  line  with  their  respective  mandates,  the  European 

Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 

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(EBRD)  could  leverage  their  expertise  in  infrastructure  financing  and  private  sector 

development, including support to small-scale entrepreneurs through micro-credit.  

18