Annual risk analysis 2017.
Date: 2017-03-09
Institutions: Frontex
Subjects: EU migration policy, EU visa policy, European security, border control, external border of the EU, migration control

Risk  
Analysis
for 2017

Risk Analysis for 2017

Frontex official publications fall into four main categories: risk analysis, training, operations and research, 

each marked with a distinct graphic identifier. Risk analysis publications bear a triangular symbol formed 

by an arrow drawing a triangle, with a dot at the centre. Meta phorically, the arrow represents the cyclical 

nature of risk analysis processes and its orienta tion towards an appropriate operational response. The tri­

angle is a symbol of ideal proportions and knowledge, reflecting the pursuit of factual exactness, truth and 

exhaustive analysis. The dot at the centre represents the intelligence factor and the focal point where informa­

tion from diverse sources converges to be processed, systematised and shared as analytical products. Thus, 

Frontex risk analysis is meant to be at the centre and to form a reliable ba sis for its operational activities. 

Plac Europejski 6, 00­844 Warsaw, Poland  

T +48 22 205 95 00 

F +48 22 205 95 01 

frontex@frontex.europa.eu 

www.frontex.europa.eu 

Warsaw, February 2017 

Risk Analysis Unit 

Frontex reference number: 2133  / 2017

Paper version: 

TT-AC-17-001-EN-C 

ISBN 978-92-95205-67-3 

ISSN 1977-4451 

doi:10.2819/94559

© Frontex, 2017 

PDF: 

TT-AC-17-001-EN-N 

ISBN 978-92-95205-68-0 

ISSN 1977-446X 

doi:10.2819/250349

All rights reserved. Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.

Cover photo: Registration of migrants in Sicily ©  Frontex, 2016  

All rights reserved. 

DISCLAIMERS 

This is a Frontex staff working document. This publication or its contents do not imply the expression of 
any opinion whatsoever on the part of Frontex concerning the legal status of any country, territory or city 

or its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. 

All maps and charts included in this report are the sole property of Frontex and any unauthorised use is 

prohibited. Frontex disclaims any liability with respect to the boundaries, names and designations used 

on the maps. 

The contents of open­source boxes are presented only to give context and media representation of irregu­

lar­migration phenomena without engaging Frontex responsibility. 

Throughout the report, references to Kosovo* are marked with an asterisk to indicate that this designation 

is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Ko­

sovo declaration of independence.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

The Frontex Risk Analysis for 2017 has been prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit. During the course of 

developing this product, many colleagues at Frontex and outside con tributed to it and their assistance is 

hereby acknowledged with gratitude.

2 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017Table of contents

1.  Preface  6

2.  Summary  8

3.  Introduction  11

4.  Methodology  12

5.   Situational picture in 2016  15

18

16

5.1.  Main trends 
5.2.  Surveillance: Overview 
5.3.  Border checks: Refusals of entry  21
5.4.  Border checks: Fraudulent documents  22
5.5.  Border checks: Clandestine entries  24
5.6.  Border checks: Illegal stayers, facilitators, asylum applications  25
5.7.  Cross-border crime  26
5.8.  In the EU: Secondary movements  28
5.9.  In the EU: Returns  30

6.   Featured analyses  31

 Long-range coast guarding operations in the Central Mediterranean  32

6.1. 
6.2.   Iranians travelling undetected into the EU with fraudulent documents – a case study  34
6.3.   Personal data for risk analysis – mixed methods analysis of smuggling networks in Libya  36
6.4.   Identifying return system vulnerabilities  38
6.5.   Safety and security situation in reception centres  40
6.6.   Prohibited goods with possible security impacts  42

7.   Conclusions  45

8.  Statistical annex  46

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Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017List of acronyms used

ALDO 

BCP 

Daesh 

EASO 

EDF 

EDF-RAN 

EEAS 

EMCDDA 

EPN 

EPS 

EU 

EU+ 

  Advanced Level Document Officer

 border­crossing point

 Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 

 European Asylum Support Office

 European Union Document­Fraud

 European Union Document­Fraud Risk Analysis Network

 European External Action Service

 European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction 

 European Patrols Network

 EASO’s Early warning and Preparedness System

 European Union

 28 EU Member States plus Norway and Switzerland

EUNAVFOR Med 

 European Union Naval Force Mediterranean

EURINT 

Eurodac 

Eurojust 

Europol 

Eurostat 

FRA 

FRAN 

Frontex 

FTF 

FYROM 

ICJ 

ICT 

ID 

 European Integrated Management Initiative

 European Dactyloscopy 

 European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit

European Police Office

 statistical office of the European Union

 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights

 Frontex Risk Analysis Network

 European Border and Coast Guard Agency (formerly European Agency for the Management of Operational  

Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union)

 foreign terrorist fighter

 former Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia;  the  definitive  nomenclature  for  this  country  will  be  agreed 

following current negotiations at UN level

 International Court of Justice

 information and communication technology 

 identification document

INTCEN 

 European Union’s Intelligence Analysis Centre

 International Organization for Migration

 Joint Operation

 Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre

 EU Member State

 non­governmental organisation

 organised crime group

 Processing Personal Data for Risk Analysis

 Frontex Risk Analysis Unit

 Schengen Associated Country

 search and rescue

 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea

 trafficking in human beings

 United Kingdom

IOM 

JO 

MRCC 

MS 

NGO 

OCG 

PeDRA 

RAU 

SAC 

SAR 

SOLAS 

THB 

UK 

4 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017UN 

UNDOC 

UNHCR 

UNSCR 

USD 

  United Nations

 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

 United Nations Security Council resolution

 United States dollar

5 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017Frontex assists Bulgarian authorities, 2016 
© Frontex

1.  Preface

In 2016, the EU experienced another year 

thorities in returning migrants who had 

within  Europe  continues  to  constitute 

of intense migratory pressure at its ex­

been issued return decisions.

a threat to Europe’s internal security. 

ternal borders. Member States reported 

While the number of migrants from 

Throughout the year, Frontex (since 

more than 511 000 detections of illegal 

Asia and the Middle East decreased, 2016 

October  2016  the  European  Border  and 

border­crossing,  which  corresponds  to 

was marked with an increase in migra­

Coast  Guard Agency)  consistently  de­

roughly  382  000  new  arrivals  from Af­

tory pressure from Africa, in particular 

ployed between 1 000 and 1 500 border 

rica, the Middle East and Asia. This was a 

on the route from Libya to Italy. Italy saw 

guards at the EU’s external borders. In 

significant decrease in comparison with 

the highest number of arrivals ever re­

its  maritime  operations  in  the  Central 

2015,  when  over  one  million  migrants 

corded  –  about  182  000,  with  a  signifi­

Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea, the 

came  to  the  EU.  However,  the  overall 

cant increase in the number of migrants 

Agency­deployed vessels rescued 90 000 

situation  at  Europe’s  external  borders 

from West Africa. Tragically, despite res­

migrants. At the same time, Frontex of­

remained challenging. 

cue efforts by Frontex, the Italian Coast 

ficers ensured the registration and iden­

The  decrease  in  arrivals  was  mainly 

Guard and Navy, Operation EUNAVFOR 

tification of thousands of newly­arrived 

caused  by  fewer  migrants  arriving  in 

Med, and the assistance of many NGO 

migrants in Greece and Italy. In Frontex 

Greece from Turkey. This drop was a re­

and  commercial  vessels,  several  thou­

operations in Italy, Greece, Spain, Hun­

sult of the EU­Turkey statement of March 

sands  of  migrants  making  the  cross­

gary,  Croatia  and  Bulgaria,  1  265  sus­

2016 and the introduction of strict bor­

ing  on  overcrowded  and  unseaworthy 

pected  people  smugglers  were  arrested 

der­control  measures  in  Western  Bal­

rubber  dinghies  lost  their  lives  in  the 

and more than 95 tonnes of illegal nar­

kan countries, which effectively closed 

Mediterranean. 

cotics confiscated.

the Balkan route. 

There  was  also  an  increase  in  peo­

In December 2015, the European Com­

As  a  result  of  the  EU­Turkey  state­

ple­smuggling activities, both on routes 

mission  proposed  the  creation  of  a  Eu­

ment,  migrants  who  arrived  on  the 

leading to and within Europe. Many of 

ropean  Border  and  Coast  Guard.  The 

Greek  Islands  after  20  March  could  be 

the  migrants  used  forged  documents, 

proposal  was  endorsed  by  the  Member 

returned to Turkey. Indeed, since April 

which  remains  a  challenge  for  border 

States and the European Parliament, and 

2016  Frontex  supported  the  Greek  au­

authorities.  Moreover,  a  large  number 

on  6  October  2016  the  European  Border 

of poorly documented migrants moving 

and Coast Guard Agency was launched. 

6 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017x
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t
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The Agency, built on the foundations of 

factors that affect migratory movements 

Frontex, with increased budget and, in 

within the EU but also conditions beyond 

the near future, with significantly more 

Europe’s borders. 

staff, is entrusted with more responsibil­

It is clear that cooperation with mi­

ities in the field of migration but also in­

grants’ countries of origin and transit is 

ternal security. The European Border and 

one of key elements of a successful mi­

Coast  Guard Agency  is  building  the  ca­

gration management. From exchange of 

pacity to deploy border and coast guard 

information to cooperation on returns, 

forces rapidly and efficiently, to support 

Frontex has been extending its reach be­

return measures, and to collect and pro­

yond Europe. In 2016, Frontex deployed 

cess  personal  data. All  of  these  efforts 

its  first  Liaison  Officer  to Turkey. This 

support Europe’s migration management 

year, Frontex Liaison Officers will be de­

process and foster closer cooperation with 

ployed to priority countries in Africa and 

key non­EU countries in areas related to 

the Western Balkans. 

migration. These  measures  have  a  sin­

Last year the Agency also significantly 

gle aim of preserving the free movement 

increased  its  activities  in  the  area  of 

within the Schengen area. 

returns,  returning  more  than  10  000 

strate that border management has an 

As  part  of  its  new  mandate,  Fron­

non­EU nationals with negative asylum 

important security component. National 

tex  created  a  rapid  deployment  pool  in 

decisions or no right to stay in the EU. 

authorities  discovered  that  several  for­

2016. These 1 500 officers can now be dis­

This compares with some 3 500 effective 

eign terrorist fighters had entered Europe 

patched  by  the Agency  to  border  areas 

returns in 2015. Returns remain a prior­

posing as migrants. As Daesh continues 

in need of urgent assistance. In its new 

ity in 2017, as the overall level of effective 

to lose territory, many of its fighters are 

role  regarding  coast  guard  functions, 

returns to non­EU countries has not in­

likely to attempt to move (or return) to 

Frontex also increased cooperation with 

creased significantly, despite the massive 

Europe. Together with the national au­

other  European  maritime  agencies.  In 

number of migrants arriving in the EU. 

thorities  and  European  partner  agen­

addition to its core tasks of border con­

To  help  address  the  returns  challenge, 

cies,  Frontex  remains  committed  and 

trol and management, the Agency initi­

a  newly­created  pool  of  return  experts 

vigilant in its efforts to ensure security 

ated multi­purpose operations, including 

is now at the disposal of Member States 

of Europe’s borders.

environmental and commercial fishing 

organising return operations.

monitoring. The Agency also began closer 

In 2016, in addition to migration man­

cooperation  with  Customs  authorities 

agement, Frontex started to collect and 

and  became  more  engaged  in  fighting 

process  personal  data  for  risk  analysis 

different types of cross­border crime, in­

purposes and in support of criminal in­

cluding arms trafficking. 

vestigations.  In  February,  during  the 

One of the key new tasks of the Agency 

Joint  Operation  Triton  in  the  Central 

is better assessment of vulnerabilities of 

Mediterranean, the Agency launched a 

Europe’s  national  border  authorities  in 

pilot  project  known  as  Processing  Per­

the light of potential challenges at their 

sonal Data for Risk Analysis (PeDRA). Its 

Fabrice Leggeri

external borders. In 2017, the Agency will 

aim is to process the personal data col­

Executive Director

conduct its first assessment of vulnerabili­

lected during interviews with migrants 

ties at the Member States’ external borders 

newly arrived in Italy.

and will issue recommendations on how 

The new mandate of the Agency puts 

these vulnerabilities need to be addressed. 

more emphasis on the collection of per­

The European Border and Coast Guard, 

sonal data. As a result, the PeDRA project 

made up of national border authorities 

has been extended to Frontex operational 

and Frontex, was designed to meet mi­

activities in Spain and Greece, and has 

gration  challenges  faced  by  the  EU. As 

recently become part of all Joint Opera­

migration management goes far beyond 

tions as a regular practice. It allows closer 

border  control,  only  a  comprehensive 

cooperation with Europol and the secu­

strategy will make it effective. In 2017, 

rity and law­enforcement agencies of the 

the Agency will propose an operational 

EU and the Member States. 

Integrated Border Management strategy 

The recent terrorist attacks in France, 

for the EU. It will take into consideration 

Belgium  and  Germany  clearly  demon­

7 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017 
2. Summary

In 2016, a drop in detections reported at 

Never before had detections been so 

the  external  borders  with Turkey  and 

high in the Central Mediterranean area, 

Western Balkan countries led to an over­

with 181 459 in 2016, which is 18% more 

all decrease in detections of illegal bor­

than in 2015. For the third consecutive 

der­crossing at EU level. However, with 

year, detections in the Central Mediter­

over half a million detections (511 371), 

ranean  Sea  have  exceeded  100  000. At 

the  figure  is  still  significantly  higher 

the same time, IOM data show that the 

than  any  yearly  total  between  2010 

number of deaths and missing persons 

(104 060) and 2014 (282 933). This means 

– a rough estimate due to the absence of 

that  the  pressure  on  the  external  bor­

passenger lists and the few bodies actu­

ders  of  the  EU  remained  exceptionally 

ally recovered – increased from 3 175 in 

high in 2016.

2015 to over 4 500 in 2016. The increase 

The  migratory  pressure  at  the  EU’s 

in fatalities occurred despite enhanced 

external  borders  with Turkey  has  been 

operational efforts and the fact that most 

easing  since  October  2015. An  impor­

rescue  operations  took  place  close  to, 

tant factor in this regard is the EU­Tur­

or  sometimes  within,  Libyan  territo­

als.  However,  many  arriving  migrants 

key statement, which came into force in 

rial waters.

were also disembarked outside Hotspot 

March 2016, in which Turkey agreed to 

A staggering 96% of newly­arrived mi­

areas, which undermined the uniform 

secure its maritime and land borders and 

grants interviewed in the Central Mediter­

application of registration rules. More­

accept the return of irregular migrants 

ranean region stated that they had used 

over, after having been registered in the 

from Greece. The statement has largely 

the services of smuggling networks to il­

Hotspots, many migrants simply left the 

removed  the  incentive  for  migrants  to 

legally enter the EU. This suggests that 

reception  centres  without  notification 

take irregular migration routes to Greece 

irregular migration via Libya is entirely 

or  proper  documentation.  It  should  be 

and has undermined the business model 

dependent on the services of the smug­

stressed that movement of people with­

of people­smuggling networks. Several 

gling networks. Therefore, any activity 

out  proper  documentation  within  the 

measures  introduced  to  prevent  illegal 

that would disrupt or deter these groups 

EU  carries  serious  implications  for  in­

border­crossing along the Western Bal­

could significantly curb the flow of irreg­

ternal security.

kan  route  have  also  discouraged  many 

ular migrants into the EU.

As  in  the  case  of  the  Central  Medi­

irregular migrants from making the dan­

The  increasing  number  of  vulnera­

terranean, never before had detections 

gerous sea crossing to the Greek Eastern 

ble persons moving through the Central 

on  the  Western  Mediterranean  route 

Aegean Islands.

Mediterranean,  in  particular  Nigerian 

been as high as in 2016, with more than 

Nevertheless, Greek Hotspots saw sev­

women, makes it very clear that effec­

10 000 detections. This is 46% more than 

eral riots last year resulting in injuries 

tive detection of people trafficked for sex­

in 2015 on the same route, and 21% more 

and material damage. Similar security 

ual exploitation, forced labour and other 

than in 2011, the previous record­break­

problems and overcrowding in Bulgaria 

purposes remains a major challenge for 

ing  year. As  in  the  Central  Mediterra­

reflected persistent tensions in reception 

border authorities.

nean, most migrants were from Africa, 

facilities and the precarious situation of 

The  establishment  of  Hotspots  in 

which indicates the growing pressure of 

migrants and refugees.

southern  Italy  helped  to  considerably 

illegal immigration from this continent 

improve  the  registration  of  new  arriv­

towards the EU.

8 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017SAR by Portuguese vessel off Lesbos, Poseidon Rapid Intervention, 2016 
© Frontex

In  terms  of  nationalities,  for  the 

ricans accounted for more than 100 000 

and  Schengen  Associated  Countries 

fourth  consecutive  year,  people  claim­

detections,  a  total  roughly  comparable 

(Germany,  Austria,  France,  Sweden, 

ing  to  be  Syrian  nationals  (17%  of  total 

with the number of migrants from the 

Denmark and Norway) introduced tem­

EU) represented the highest share of ir­

Middle East reported for illegally cross­

porary  controls  at  specific  border  sec­

regular migrants entering the EU in 2016. 

ing the border from Turkey. 

tions. These controls have been extended 

They were followed by Afghans (11%), who 

In 2016, more than 7 000 people were 

until the first months of 2017 amid con­

accounted for the second largest number 

detected with fraudulent documents at 

tinued concerns about managing spon­

of illegal border­crossings. The number 

the EU’s external borders. This represents 

taneous flows.

of  Iraqis  was  also  notable  representing 

a decrease of about 15% compared with 

Even though Turkey accepted a num­

more than 6% of detections. 

the previous year. However, as in 2015, 

ber of irregular migrants from Greece and 

Coinciding  with  an  increase  in  the 

the  number  of  people  detected  travel­

a greater number of failed asylum appli­

Central  Mediterranean  and  Western 

ling with fraudulent documents within 

cants were returned to Western Balkan 

Mediterranean,  detections  of African 

the EU proved higher than at the exter­

countries, the overall number of effective 

migrants reached a record high of over 

nal  borders  (almost  11  000  reported  in 

returns  at  EU  level  remained  relatively 

170 000 (+22% over 2015), compared with 

2016).  In  addition  to  the  smuggling  of 

stable in relation to 2015, with 176 223 ef­

the average of about 40 000 detections 

migrants,  document  fraud  emerged  as 

fective returns reported in 2016 (+0.6%). 

between  2009  and  2013. This  influx  re­

a key criminal activity linked to the mi­

With regard to returns, the main is­

veals a steady increase in migration pres­

gration crisis. Fraudulent documents can 

sue continued to be linked to the difficul­

sure from the African continent and, in 

be in fact used or re­used for many other 

ties in obtaining travel documents from 

particular,  from  West Africa.  Indeed, 

criminal activities. This will continue to 

countries of origin in time. This was par­

most  of  the  growth  over  2015  was  due 

represent a substantial threat to the se­

ticularly the case for some West African 

to a higher number of detections of Ni­

curity of the EU in 2017.

countries (e.g. Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea and 

gerians (+71%), Guineans, Ivorians and 

Within  the  Schengen  free­move­

Senegal)  that  have  a  limited  consular 

Gambians. Altogether in 2016, West Af­

ment  area,  several  EU  Member  States 

presence in the EU. These countries also 

9 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017showed the largest discrepancies between 

of  foreign  fighters,  including  EU  citi­

three theatres, it might encourage some 

the number of their citizens detected for 

zens, dual­nationality holders and third­

foreign fighters to return to their home 

illegal border­crossing (113 935) and those 

country nationals. At the beginning of 

countries  (among  others  EU  Member 

effectively returned (6 497) in 2016.

2017,  the  main  jihadist  organisations 

States). As  some  of  them  may  pose  a 

Overall, there is an underlying threat 

(e.g.  Daesh)  have  experienced  consid­

threat  to  internal  security,  the  role  of 

of terrorism­related travel movements. 

erable  military  setbacks  in  Syria,  Iraq 

border  authorities  in  monitoring  their 

This  is  mainly  due  to  the  fact  that  the 

and  Libya.  Since  Daesh’s  military  de­

cross­border movements will be increas­

Syrian conflict has attracted thousands 

mise  is  now  increasingly  likely  on  the 

ingly important.

10 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017Registration of migrants in Sicily, 2016 
© Frontex

3. Introduction

Frontex  operational  activities  aim  at 

guard function and associated SAR opera­

This annual report is structured as fol­

strengthening border security through 

tions; the monitoring of migratory flows 

lows: (1) situational picture with empha­

the coordination of Member States’ ac­

towards and within the EU; the preven­

sis  on  identified  migratory  trends  and 

tions regarding the implementation of 

tion and detection of cross­border crime 

surveillance activities utilising a set of 

EU measures for the management of ex­

(i.e.  migrant  smuggling, THB  and  ter­

reliable  indicators  on  irregular  migra­

ternal borders. The coordination of op­

rorism); the analysis of risks for internal 

tion; (2) featured analyses on key risks 

erational activities contributes to more 

security and of threats affecting the secu­

affecting the security of the external bor­

efficient allocation of Member States’ re­

rity of the external borders; vulnerabil­

ders and / or internal security (e.g. smug­

sources and better protection of the area 

ity assessments; and return operations. 

gling networks in Libya, return system 

of freedom, security and justice. In this 

Clearly,  this  major  change  has  im­

vulnerabilities, and the situation at mi­

context,  the  Risk Analysis for 2017  concen­

portant  implications  for  the  analytical 

grant reception centres).

trates on the scope of Frontex operational 

work  performed  by  Frontex  as  its  risk 

The Frontex Risk Analysis Unit (RAU) 

activities and, in particular, on irregular 

analysis should cover all aspects of Inte­

would like to express its gratitude to all 

migration at the external borders of the 

grated Border Management and develop 

members  of  the  Frontex  Risk Analysis 

EU and Schengen Associated Countries. 

a  pre­warning  mechanism.  However, 

Network  (FRAN)  in  Member  States  for 

Since  the  new  Regulation  (EU) 

since  the  new  Frontex  regulation  only 

their  efforts  in  providing  data  and  in­

2016 / 1624 came into effect last October, 

entered into force in October 2016, the 

formation,  as  well  as  Europol,  the  Eu­

the mandate of Frontex has significantly 

Risk Analysis for 2017 cannot offer an exhaus­

ropean Asylum  Support  Office  (EASO), 

changed to ensure efficient implementa­

tive  analytic  coverage  of  all  new  tasks 

the European Union Agency for Funda­

tion of European Integrated Border Man­

and  operational  activities. These  new 

mental Rights (FRA), the European Com­

agement as a shared responsibility of the 

elements  will  be  integrated  in  future 

mission, the European External Action 

Union, the Agency and of the national au­

risk analyses. Nonetheless, the present 

Service (EEAS), EU Intelligence Analysis 

thorities. The integrated border manage­

analysis attempts to address as many of 

Centre (INTCEN), UNHCR, and all Fron­

ment has several key components. Some 

them as possible.

tex colleagues involved in the prepara­

of the most important ones are: the coast 

tion of this report.

11 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017Debriefing of migrants in Sicily, 2016 
© Frontex

4. Methodology

those officially published by national au­

thorities. Throughout 2016, some FRAN 

members performed backdated updates 

of  their  2015  statistics. These  updates 

A  coherent  and  comprehensive  analy­

turn  decisions;  effective  returns;  and 

have  been  accounted  for  in  this  docu­

sis of the risks affecting security at the 

passenger  flow  data  (when  available). 

ment, hence some data presented here 

external  borders  requires,  above  all, 

Data on asylum applications are still be­

may differ from those presented a year 

the  adoption  of  common  indicators. 

ing collected within the FRAN, but Fron­

ago in the Risk Analysis for 2016.

Consistent monitoring of these indica­

tex increasingly relies on data collected 

Member States were not requested to 

tors will allow effective measures to be 

by EASO, which has contributed to the 

answer specific questions in support of 

taken on the ground. The analysis needs 

dedicated section on asylum.

this analysis. Rather, bimonthly analyt­

to identify the risks that arise at the ex­

The  data  were  categorised  by  border 

ical reports and incident reports of Mem­

ternal borders themselves and those that 

type (land, air or sea) and those on land 

ber States routinely collected within the 

arise in third countries.

borders  were  additionally  grouped  by 

FRAN, as well as other Member States’ 

The  backbone  of  the  Risk Analysis for 

border section with neighbouring third 

contributions  submitted  in  2016  were 

2017 is the monthly statistics exchanged 

countries. The  data  exchanged  within 

important  sources  of  information,  es­

among Member States within the frame­

the FRAN are compiled and analysed on 

pecially as regards the analysis of routes 

work of the FRAN. For the Risk Analysis for 

a quarterly basis. Priority is given to the 

and modi operandi. Additionally, the out­

2017, the key indicators collected through 

use of the data for management purposes 

comes  of  debriefing  activities  carried 

the FRAN were: detections of illegal bor­

and to their fast sharing among Member 

out  in  the  framework  of  Joint  Opera­

der­crossing  through  the  green  border 

State border­control authorities.

tions  constituted  essential  analytical 

or at BCPs; refusals of entry; detections 

Member  States’  data  processed  by 

material. Open­source information was 

of illegal stay; detections of facilitators; 

Frontex are not treated as official statis­

also  effectively  exploited,  especially  in 

detections of fraudulent documents; re­

tics and thus may occasionally vary from 

identifying the main push and pull fac­

12 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017tors  for  irregular  migration  to  the  EU. 

Romania)  or  have  opted  to  stay  out  of 

in fact be an outcome of more resources 

Among  others,  these  sources  included 

it  (the  UK,  Ireland). Thus,  a  total  for 

made available to detect them. In excep­

reports issued by government agencies, 

Member  States  and  Schengen Associ­

tional  cases,  increased  resources  may 

international  and  non­governmental 

ated  Countries  as  a  whole  can  be  pre­

produce  a  rise  in  reported  detections 

organisations,  as  well  as  mainstream 

sented. It was not possible to make the 

while effectively masking the actual de­

news  agencies  and  official  EU  reports, 

aforementioned distinction for air and 

crease in the migratory flow, resulting 

such as the European Commission’s re­

sea  borders  because  Member  States  do 

from a strong deterrent effect.

ports on third countries.

not habitually differentiate between ex­

External borders refer to the borders 

tra­EU and intra­EU air and sea connec­

between Member States and third coun­

tions but tend to aggregate data for all 

tries. The borders between the Schengen 

arrivals per airport.

Associated Countries (Norway, Iceland, 

Consistent  with  other  law­enforce­

and Switzerland) and third countries are 

ment  indicators,  variation  in  admin­

also considered as external borders. By 

istrative  data  related  to  border  control 

contrast, the borders between the Schen­

depends on several factors. In this case, 

gen Associated Countries and Schengen 

the number of detections of illegal bor­

Member States are considered as internal 

der­crossing  and  refusals  of  entry  are 

borders. For the indicators on detections 

both functions of the amount of effort 

of facilitators, illegal stay and asylum, 

spent,  respectively,  on  detecting  mi­

statistics are also reported for detections 

grants  and  the  actual  flow  of  irregu­

at  the  land  borders  between  Schengen 

lar  migrants  to  the  EU.  For  example, 

Member States and those Member States 

increased  detections  of  illegal  border­

that  have  either  not  joined  the  Schen­

crossing might be due to a real increase 

gen area yet (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, 

in the flow of irregular migrants, or may 

13 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 20175.  Situational picture in 2016

SAR by Norwegian Siem Pilot, JO Triton, 2016 
© Frontex

Latest situation 2016  
Reported cases

(2015)
2016

(3 303)
2 028

(8 365)
7 044

Detections
of illegal 
border-crossing 
at BCPs

Detections 
of fraudulent 
document users

(12 023)
12 568

Detections 
of facilitators

(175 173)
176 223

Returns
(effective)

(139 151)
206 656

Refusals
of entry

(286 725)
305 365

Returns
(decisions)

Detections 
Detections 
of persons 
of persons 
staying illegally 
staying illegally 

Detections 
Detections 
of illegal 
of illegal 
border-crossing 
border-crossing 
between BCPs
between BCPs

(699 374)
491 891

(1 822 177)
511 371

5.1. Main trends

In 2016, the decrease of detections of ille­

ercise to pre­register asylum seekers in 

gal border­crossing was due to fewer de­

the  mainland  Greece,  providing  them 

tections reported at the external borders 

with asylum seeker cards valid for one 

with Turkey and Western Balkan coun­

year,  pending  the  full  lodging  of  their 

tries. However, with over half a million 

asylum application. Pre­registered per­

detections of illegal border­crossing, the 

sons  could  formally  lodge  their  appli­

figure is still significantly higher than 

cations  from  September,  triggering  an 

any yearly total between 2010 (104 060) 

and 2014 (282 933). This indicates that the 

pressure on the external borders of the 

increase in the number of applications 
filed in Greece.2 Italy, the second main 
receiving  country  after  Germany  (and 

EU remained exceptionally high in 2016.

before  France  and  Greece)  was  charac­

According  to  EASO,  the  number 

terised by a gradual rise in applications 

of  asylum  applications  made  in  2016 

for  international  protection,  reflecting 

dropped significantly after the unprec­

edented influx in the second half of 2015 

an  increase  in  arrivals  on  the  Central 
Mediterranean route.3

(with around 180 000 applicants recorded 

From  the  beginning  of  2016  till  the 

in  the  EU  Member  States  plus  Norway 

end of November, close to 150 000 appli­

and  Switzerland  in  October  2016),  yet 

cations were withdrawn, either explic­

still remained higher than in previous 

itly or implicitly. In 2016, almost one in 

years. In contrast to 2015, the large num­

three  withdrawn  applications  was  an 

ber of applications lodged was not fully 

explicit withdrawal, indicating a possi­

reflective of increased arrivals at the EU 

ble shift towards more voluntary returns 

external borders. More significant in this 

from important destination countries.

regard  were  initiatives  undertaken  in 

While activities linked to surveillance 

certain Member States to increase their 

received a lot of media attention, border 

registration capacity and better deal with 

checks are undoubtedly the core activities 

the  backlog  of  people  who  had  arrived 

of border­control authorities, with mil­

in  2015  but  had  not  been  able  to  lodge 

lions of checks on entry and exit carried 

their claim for international protection. 

out each year. At the macro level, two fac­

For  example,  both  Germany  and  Swe­

tors contributed to shape passenger flow 

den  developed  a  new  approach  to  the 

in recent past. The first is the visa liber­

asylum  procedure  in  order  to  make  it 
more efficient.1

alisation  policy  and  local  border  traffic 

agreements that resulted in higher pas­

Certain  countries  continued  to  see 

senger flows, mostly at the external land 

a  surge  in  applications  after  the  sum­

borders with Western Balkan countries. 

mer period. In June 2016, Greece, with 

The second is the growing overall num­

the cooperation of the European Asylum 

ber of passengers, in particular at air bor­

Support  Office  (EASO)  and  the  United 

Nations  High  Commissioner  for  Refu­

gees  (UNHCR),  set  up  a  large­scale  ex­

1  Contribution to EPS monthly data 
collection: Germany, Sweden

16 of 60

2  EASO, Joint Press Release: The pre-registration of 
asylum seekers in the Greek mainland is starting 
today, 8 June 2016, accessed 28 July 2016.

3  EASO’s contribution

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017ders, due to a greater number of available 

In 2016, a total of 206 656 refusals of 

Greece and there was some increase in 

flight connections and increased mobility.

entry were reported at the external bor­

the  number  of  migrants  returned  to 

Based on Eurostat data, in the course 

ders of the EU. This is 49% higher than 

Western  Balkan  countries  after  their 

of 2014 and 2015 (latest year with com­

the year before. The increase is partially 

asylum applications in the EU were re­

plete  statistics  available),  the  upward 

due to a change in reporting practice and 

jected. However, the overall number of 

trend  already  observed  in  passenger 

thus the comparison between years does 

effective returns at the EU level remained 

transport  by  air  in  previous  years  was 

not reflect the actual annual trend. Re­

relatively  stable  compared  with  2015, 

confirmed at EU­28 level. An increase of 

fusals of entry represented only a frac­

with about 176 223 effective returns re­

4.1% was recorded between 2013 and 2014 

tion of passenger flow, indicating that 

ported in 2016 (+0.6%).

and the figures for 2015 indicate a year­

the  overwhelming  number  of  passen­

on­year rise of 4.4% compared with 2014.

gers crossing the borders are bona fide 

At the land border, according to par­

travellers.

tial  information  from  Member  States, 

More than 7 000 people were detected 

the largest inward passenger traffic was 

in 2016 with fraudulent documents at the 

recorded  at  the  Croatian  external  land 

EU  external  borders. This  represented 

border, followed by entries from Morocco 

a  decrease  of  15%  compared  with  the 

to Spain through Ceuta and Melilla. En­

previous year. As in 2015, in 2016 there 

tries from Ukraine to Poland and from 

were more detections of persons travel­

the  Russian  Federation  to  Poland  and 

ling with fraudulent documents within 

Finland were also significant.

the  EU  than  detections  at  the  external 

In 2015, 14.3 million short­term uni­

borders, with almost 11 000 persons re­

form Schengen visas were issued, con­

ported during the year.

stituting a decrease of 9% compared with 

In  2016,  Member  States  reported 

2014. The  decrease  was  mostly  due  to 

491 891 detections of illegal stay, which 

fewer visas being applied for and issued 

represented a generally decreasing trend 

to Russian citizens, a trend attributed to 

compared with 2015 (­30%). As in previ­

the economic downturn. In contrast to 

ous  years,  Germany  continued  to  rank 

the large number of short­term uniform 

first,  which  reflected  its  status  as  the 

Schengen  visas,  the  number  of  long­

main destination for most migrants who 

term  visas  was  much  lower,  totalling 

have crossed the border illegally. France 

109 505 in 2015, a number that was de­

followed,  partly  due  to  the  fact  that  it 

creasing since 2011, when 322 034 long­

was a transit country for migrants who 

term visas were issued.

entered the EU illegally and intended to 

Migrant smugglers frequently abuse 

reach the UK.

legal channels to facilitate the entry of ir­

The  facilitation  of  illegal  immigra­

regular migrants to the EU or to legalise 

tion remains a serious threat to the EU 

their stay. The abuse of legal channels in­

and  many  facilitators  continue  to  op­

volves a variety of modi operandi including 

erate from third countries. Within the 

sham marriages, bogus paternity claims, 

EU, detections of facilitators rose from 

false employment contracts, fake invita­

12 023 in 2015 to 12 568 in 2016. The rise 

tion letters, false medical visas, and false 

was mostly due to increases reported in 

claims of being a refuge or a victim of hu­
man trafficking. In many cases, migrant 

Spain, France and Italy. Europol noted 
that organised crime groups (OCGs) in­

smuggling networks operate as legal busi­

volved  in  migrant  smuggling  have  be­

ness structures in the EU, such as travel 

come  more  flexible  and  sophisticated. 

agencies,  to  produce  fraudulent  paper­

Migrant  smugglers  anticipate  law­en­

work  which  allows  irregular  migrants 

forcement actions and prepare for policy 

to obtain work permits. These methods 

changes. Their countermeasures include 

have proven very successful for the net­

shifting routes, using forerunner cars or 

works involved and their use is expected 
to further increase in the future.4

travelling  by  less  frequently  controlled 

means of public transport.

4  Europol’s contribution

key in accepting irregular migrants from 

Some  progress  was  made  with Tur­

17 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 20175.2. Surveillance: Overview

Following the record figures of 2015, in 

EU  Member  States  also  reported  a 

factor  in  this  regard  is  the  EU­Turkey 

2016  Member  States  reported  a  lower 

large number of ‘not specified’ nation­

statement that came into force in March 

number of detections of illegal border­

als  (20%).  Most  of  these  were  recorded 

2016, in which Turkey agreed to secure 

crossing along the EU’s external borders. 

during  the  first  quarter  of  2016.  Later 

its  maritime  and  land  borders  and  ac­

A total of 511 371 detections was reported 

on in the year, as the number of arrivals 

cept  the  return  of  irregular  migrants 

by EU Member States in 2016, which rep­

decreased, EU Member States resumed 

from Greece. The statement has largely 

resented a 72% decrease compared with 

screening migrants  and  reported  their 

removed  the  incentive  for  migrants  to 

1.8 million detections in 2015.

claimed nationalities more consistently. 

take irregular migration routes to Greece 

The decrease was due to considerably 

and has undermined the business model 

fewer detections reported at the borders 

Eastern Mediterranean route

of people­smuggling networks.

with Turkey and Western Balkan coun­

Although the number of migrants re­

tries. However, with over half a million de­

The migratory pressure at the EU’s exter­

admitted from Greece to Turkey remained 

tections of illegal border­crossing in 2016, 

nal borders with Turkey eased off start­

relatively  modest,  readmissions,  com­

the figure is still significantly higher than 

ing  from  October  2015. An  important 

bined  with  a more  effective  prevention 

any yearly total between 2010 (104 060) 

and 2014 (282 933). This indicates that the 

Figure 1.  Detections of illegal border-crossing, by main nationalities (scale in 

pressure on the external borders of the 

absolute numbers, with labels showing percentages of total) in 2016 

EU remained exceptionally high in 2016. 

For the fourth consecutive year, per­

sons declaring to be Syrian (17% of total 

EU) represented the highest share of mi­

grants illegally entering the EU in 2016. 

They were followed by Afghans (11%).

Coinciding  with  the  increase  in  the 

Central and Western Mediterranean, de­

tections  of African  migrants  reached  a 

record high of over 180 000, compared 

with an average of about 40 000 detec­

tions between 2009 and 2013. This surge 

500 000

400 000

300 000

200 000

17%

4%

6%

7%

11%

22%

3%

3%

3%

4%

reveals  a  steady  increase  in  migration 

100 000

pressure  from  the African  continent, 

and in particular West Africa. 

20%

d
e
ﬁ
i
c
e
p
s

t
o
N

a
i
r
y
S

n
a
t
s
i
n
a
h
g
f
A

a
i
r
e
g
N

i

q
a
r
I

a
e
r
t
i
r
E

n
a
t
s
i
k
a
P

a
e
n
u
G

i

e
r
i
o
v
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’
d
e
t
ô
C

i

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m
a
G

s
r
e
h
t
O

0

18 of 60

Black Sea route(68)1Eastern borders route(1 927)1 349 Western African route(874)671Detections of illegal border- crossing at the EU’s external borders, 2016511 371Western Mediterranean route(7 004)10 231Guinea 2 184Algeria 1 760Côte d’Ivoire 1 646Eastern Mediterranean route(885 386)182 277 Syria  84 585Afghanistan  43 120Iraq  27 978Route(in 2015)in 2016Top three      X XXXnationalities   YYYin 2015               ZZZWestern Balkan route(764 038)130 261Not speciﬁed  102 430Afghanistan  10 620Pakistan 5 583Circular route from Albania to Greece(8 932)5 121Central Mediterranean route(153 946)181 459 Nigeria  37 554Eritrea 20 721Guinea 13 550(1 822 177 in 2015)Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017 
 
of  departures  from  the Turkish  coast, 

Table 1.  Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs 

resulted in a significant drop in arrivals 

Detections reported by routes and top three nationalities at the external borders

Share of 2016 
total

% change 
on previous 
year

even  during  summer  months.  Several 

measures  introduced  to  prevent  illegal 

border­crossing along the Western Balkan 

route have also discouraged many from 

making  the  dangerous  sea  crossing  to 

reach the Greek Eastern Aegean Islands.

With  fewer  options  to  continue  to 

other EU Member States, many migrants 

Routes

Eastern Mediterranean route

Sea

Syria

Afghanistan

Iraq

Other

applied  for  asylum  in  Greece,  where 

Land

asylum  applications  increased  signifi­

cantly in 2016. However, many centres 

remained  overcrowded  leading  to  ten­

sions among migrants as well as between 

migrants and local residents. There were 

persistent riots and demonstrations on 

Lesbos, Chios and Samos islands.

At the Greek and Bulgarian external land 

Syria

Iraq

Afghanistan

Other

Central Mediterranean route

Nigeria

Eritrea

Guinea

Other

borders with Turkey, detections totalled over 

Western Balkan route

6 000, fewer than in 2015, with relatively 

similar numbers of detections reported from 

Greece and Bulgaria. Despite the decreased 

number of detections at the border, more 

migrants were staying in camps in Bul­

garia. This was the result of stricter meas­

ures against illegal stayers in the country, 

as well as more effective prevention of exit 

Not specified

Afghanistan

Pakistan

Other

Western Mediterranean route

Guinea

Algeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Other

through the border to Serbia.

Circular route from Albania to Greece

Western Balkan route

As the flow of migrants across the West­

ern  Balkans  continued  to  reflect  the 

influx  on  the  Eastern  Mediterranean 

route, detections in the region decreased 

sharply from 764 038 in 2015 to 130 261 in 

Albania

Afghanistan

Syria

Other

Eastern borders route

Vietnam

Afghanistan

Ukraine

Other

2016. The decline was steady throughout 

Western African route

2016,  from  more  than  60  000  in  Janu­

ary to less than 2 000 detections start­

ing from September.

The main migratory movement across 

the Western Balkans was the flow from the 

Greek land border with the former Yugoslav 

Republic of Macedonia towards the Hun­

garian land border with Serbia. In addi­

Côte d'Ivoire

Guinea

Morocco

Other

Black Sea route

Belarus

Afghanistan

Syria

Other

tion, higher detections were also reported 

Other

Russian Federation

Serbia

Egypt

Other

Total

on exit by Romania and Bulgaria at their 

respective land borders with Serbia, mostly 

involving migrants who had illegally en­

tered Bulgaria from Turkey and then tried 

to reach other EU Member States. This took 

place in a context of a decreasing number 

of detections at the land border between 

Bulgaria and Turkey, thereby suggesting 

a higher risk of migrants crossing this bor­

der section undetected.

In Hungary, a new law was passed in 

July 2016 allowing the authorities to re­

turn all migrants detected up to 8 km in­

2012

37 224

4 370

 906

1 593

 47

1 824

32 854

6 216

 987

7 973

17 678

15 151

 449

1 889

 28

12 785

6 391

 39

1 665

 861

3 826

6 397

 261

2 015

 101

4 020

5 502

5 398

 0

 0

 104

1 597

 158

 200

 92

1 147

 174

 0

 2

 104

 68

 1

 0

 0

 0

 1

 0

 0

 0

 0

 0

2013

24 799

11 831

5 361

4 080

 57

2 333

12 968

7 366

 372

2 049

3 181

2014

50 834

44 057

27 025

11 582

 382

5 068

6 777

4 648

 483

 893

 753

2015

2016

885 386

182 277

873 179

174 605

489 011

212 286

90 130

81 752

12 207

7 329

2 591

1 349

 938

81 570

41 775

26 573

24 687

7 672

3 015

1 405

1 345

1 907

45 298

170 664

153 946

181 459

2 824

10 398

 331

31 745

19 951

 38

2 174

3 072

8 233

33 559

1 360

21 914

38 791

2 716

37 554

20 721

13 550

127 512

90 525

109 634

43 357

764 038

130 261

556 258

102 430

 153

8 342

 368

53 237

17 057

14 667

34 494

137 486

10 620

5 583

11 628

10 231

2 184

1 760

1 646

4 641

5 121

4 996

 45

 25

 55

7 243

 715

 752

 338

5 438

8 841

8 757

 0

 0

 84

7 004

1 946

1 193

 609

3 256

8 932

8 874

 0

 0

 58

1 275

1 927

1 349

 257

 209

 126

 683

 276

 16

 50

 52

 158

 433

 0

 261

 14

 158

 10

 4

 1

 0

 5

 461

 491

 102

 873

 874

 136

 365

 42

 331

 68

 0

 5

 42

 21

 2

 2

 0

 0

 0

 399

 161

 138

 651

 671

 194

 174

 94

 209

 1

 1

 0

 0

 0

 1

 1

 0

 0

 0

6 838

 142

1 436

 46

5 214

8 728

8 592

 20

 0

 116

1 316

 149

 149

 130

 888

 283

 5

 12

 104

 162

 148

 0

 62

 80

 6

 4

 0

 0

 2

 2

36

96

47

24

15

14.1

4.2

39

18

18

24.9

35

21

11

7.5

60.4

25.5

79

8

4.3

9

2.0

21

17

16.1

45.4

1.0

98

1

0

1

0.3

30

12

10.2

48

0

29

26

14

31

0

n.a.

0

0

0.0

0

100

0

0

0

72 437

107 365

282 933 1 822 177

511 371

100

-79

-80

-83

-80

-71

-70

-37

-59

-46

0

103

18

71

-47

399

21

-83.0

-82

-80

-67

-92

46

12

48

170

43

-43

-44

n.a.

n.a.

-5

-30

-13

-67

35

-25

-23

43

-52

124

-37

-99

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

-50

-50.0

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

-72

19 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017side the country to specially designated 

persons – a rough estimate due to the ab­

used for illegal crossing, left abandoned 

transit  zones  at  the  country’s  external 

sence of passenger lists and a small num­

on the Spanish shores.

borders. Once they arrive in the transit 

ber of bodies actually recovered – increased 

areas, migrants must wait for registra­

from 3 175 in 2015 to over 4 500 in 2016. The 

Western African routes

tion and legal admission into Hungary 

death toll increased despite enhanced oper­

(at a rate of 30 per day) or voluntarily re­

ational efforts and the fact that most rescue 

The number of detections on the Western 

turn  to  Serbia. This  legislative  change 

operations took place close to, or some­

African route, which connects Senegal, 

also impacted Hungary’s reporting stand­

times within, Libyan territorial waters.

Mauritania and Morocco with the Canary 

ards, resulting in fewer reported detec­

The  establishment  of  Hotspots  in 

Islands in Spain, continued at a low level, 

tions of illegal border­crossing. However, 

southern  Italy  helped  to  considerably 

even though since 2015 the total has been 

information gathered in the framework 

improve  migrant  registration  process. 

higher than the average in the period be­

of Joint Operations showed that the pres­

However,  many  migrants  continue  to 

tween 2010 and 2014 (less than 300), In 

sure at this border section persisted, de­

arrive  outside  Hotspot  areas,  thus  un­

2016, as in 2015, most departures were re­

spite a larger number of officers deployed 

dermining the benefits of uniform ap­

ported from Morocco. This low number 

and reinforcement of technical obstacles 

plication of registration rules.

is attributed to the Memorandum of Un­

put in place along the border.

derstanding between Spain, Senegal and 

Although the total volume of migrants 

Western Mediterranean route

Mauritania,  which  includes  joint  sur­

considerably decreased in 2016, it was also 

veillance activities and effective return 

more difficult for border authorities in the 

As in the Central Mediterranean, never 

of those detected crossing the border il­

region to stay abreast of the development of 

before  had  detections  on  the  Western 

legally. The low number of departures re­

the migratory flows. The majority of people 

Mediterranean route been so high, ex­

sulted in relatively few casualties.

crossing the EU’s external border illegally 

ceeding 10 000. The number represented 

remain stranded in Greece. However, law­

an increase of 46% in relation to the pre­

Eastern land border route

enforcement authorities cannot always 

vious  year,  and  of  21%  compared  with 

trace the whereabouts of groups that de­

2011, the previous record­breaking year. 

The  eastern  land  border  route  is,  in 

cided to bypass the border barriers to reach 

As in the case of the Central Mediterra­

effect,  an  amalgam  of  illegal  border­

their destinations in Western and North­

nean  route,  most  migrants  were  from 

crossing detections reported by Finland, 

ern Europe. Consequently, the migrant 

Africa,  indicating  a  growing  pressure 

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slo­

routes running through Europe, and in 

of illegal immigration from this conti­

vakia, Hungary and Romania. Despite 

particular through the Western Balkans, 

nent towards the EU.

the considerable total length of all the 

are getting more diversified, dynamic and 

Nevertheless,  the  situation  differed 

border sections, detections on this route 

dangerous. Also, more migrants are now 

considerably at the land and sea border. 

tend to be lower than on other routes, 

more likely to cross undetected.

At the land borders of Ceuta and Melilla, 

possibly  due  to  the  long  distances  be­

Central Mediterranean route

record low of about 1 000. However, in 

of origin. Also, irregular migrants trav­

yearly  detections  near  the  fences  hit  a 

tween major hubs and many countries 

the  last  month  of  2016,  some  400  sub­

elling on this route tend to make use of 

Detections  had  never  been  so  high  in 

Saharan African migrants – the biggest 

visa fraud and counterfeit border­cross­

the  Central  Mediterranean  area,  with 

group in a decade – forced their way into 

ing  stamps  rather  than  risk  an  illegal 

181 459, or 18% more than in the previ­

Ceuta. So far sub­Saharans had tended to 

border­crossing between BCPs.

ous year. Since 2014, the number of de­

try and climb over the fence to Melilla. 

About a quarter of these detections in­

tections  in  the  Central  Mediterranean 

By contrast, detections at the sea border 

volved nationals from neighbouring coun­

Sea has exceeded 100 000.

had never been so high (at over 8 000). 

tries, mostly Ukrainians, Russians and, 

This increase indicates that the route 

The detected migrants departed from the 

to a lesser extent, from Belarus and Mol­

faces  persistent  pressure  as  migrants 

Moroccan  and Algerian  coasts  towards 

dova. Their illegal movements were fo­

continue  to  arrive  in  Libya,  which  is 

the southern shores of Spain. Most de­

cused mostly on the Polish and Romanian 

the main departure country towards Eu­

tections were reported around the Strait 

land border with Ukraine. The majority 

rope  with  a  well­established  presence 

of Gibraltar, where the majority of mi­

of these cases was associated either with 

of smuggling networks. As in previous 

grants opted for small rubber dinghies to 

smuggling or other reasons not related to 

years, most migrants were Africans (91% 

make the crossing, some equipped with 

migration.

of the detections on this route), mostly 

a small engine. This is a very dangerous 

Non­regional  migrants,  mostly Af­

from West Africa. A growing number of 

modus operandi, especially amid more dif­

ghans and Vietnamese, constituted 74% 

migrants, also predominantly Africans, 

ficult weather conditions. In contrast to 

of  the  detected  cases.  While Vietnam­

was reported departing from Egypt, add­

vessels  used  in  the  Central  Mediterra­

ese citizens mostly targeted the Latvian­

ing to the pressure on this route.

nean, the boats used to reach Spain from 

Russian  border, Afghans  were,  by  and 

For the third consecutive year, detec­

Morocco typically carry fewer migrants. 

large, detected at the Hungarian­Ukrain­

tions  on  this  route  exceeded  150  000, 

However, a large number of attempts re­

ian section. Irregular migration was the 

compared with an annual average of just 

ported also indicates that some of these 

main reason for crossing the border ille­

30 000 detections between 2008 and 2013. 

boats  are  likely  to  pass  undetected.  In­

gally for both Vietnamese and Afghans.

At the same time, IOM data show that the 

deed,  reports  from  the  JO  Indalo  men­

estimated number of deaths and missing 

tion the discovery of boats, most probably 

20 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017Refusals of entry, 2016
(only values higher than 1 000 are stipulated)

206 656 (139 151)

Number in parenthesis is for 2015

Land 
151 167 (86 945)

Air
48 268 (46 897)

Sea
7 221 (5 309)

Number in parenthesis is for 2015

Number in parenthesis is for 2015

Number in parenthesis is for 2015

Poland

Lithuania

United 
Kingdom

Hungary

France

Croatia

Greece

Spain

Germany

Italy

Trend of the total   

Land

2015

86 945

2016

151 167

5.3. Border checks: Refusals of entry

Italy

Sea

5 309

7 221

Air

46 897

48 268

In 2016, a change in reporting require­

than in the previous year, but due to the 

which  is mostly  composed  of  commut­

ments  was  introduced,  clarifying  that 

change  in  reporting  requirements,  the 

ers  and  low­budget  travellers.  Indeed, 

the reports should specify the number of 

comparison  between  years  does  not  re­

border­control  authorities  face  differ­

refusals of entry issued rather than the 

flect  the  actual  annual  trend.  Refusals 

ent  challenges  during  border  checks  at 

number of people refused. Indeed, one 

of  entry  represented  only  a  fraction  of 

air and land borders.

person may be refused several times. How­

passenger flow, indicating that the over­

A very significant increase (of around 

ever, for border management purposes, it 

whelming number of passengers cross­

170%) in the number of refusals of entry 

is better to capture the number represent­

ing the borders are bona fide travellers.

was  reported  at  the  Polish  land  border 

ing the workload for border­control au­

Most refusals of entry were reported 

with Belarus. Most of the refusals were 

thorities, hence the focus on the number 

at the land border (151 167, or 73% of the 

issued to Russian nationals of Chechen 

of refusals of entry rather than on persons.

total),  even  though  the  volume  of  pas­

origin and also, to some extent, Tajiks, 

In  2016,  a  total  of  206  656  refusals 

senger  flow  at  the  land  border  is  lower 

refusals to whom started to increase in 

of  entry  were  reported  along  the  exter­

than at the air border. This is linked to 

February to reach a peak of over 17 000 in 

nal borders of the EU. This is 49% higher 

the nature of the flow at the land border, 

August. This situation resembles a simi­

Figure 2.  Refusals of entry to Russians and the number of Russians applying 

2013, when migrants showed up without 

lar phenomenon at this border section in 

for asylum in Poland in 2016

20 000

18 000

16 000

14 000

12 000

10 000

8 000

6 000

4 000

2 000

0

POL - Refusals of entry 
POL - Asylum applications 
DEU - Asylum applications 

Jan 

Feb 

Mar 

Apr 

May 

Jun 

Jul 

Aug 

Sep 

Oct 

Nov 

Dec 

visas and then applied for asylum. Later 

on, they also applied for asylum in Ger­

many, which the vast majority of them 

was denied. Indeed, at EU level in 2015, 

about 80% of first­instance applications 

of Russians were rejected. The situation 

repeated itself at the beginning of 2016, 

when Poland and Germany reported co­

incided increased numbers of asylum ap­

plications  from  Russian  nationals. The 

applications  peaked  over  the  summer, 

and since then the number of refusals of 

entry and asylum applications of Russian 

nationals in Poland decreased.

2 000

1 800

1 600

1 400

1 200

1 000

800

600

400

200

0

21 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017Type

Nationality of users

Fraudulent documents, 2016

Document fraudsters, 2016

8 267 (9 680)

7 044 (8 365)

Number in parenthesis is for 2015

Number in parenthesis is for 2015

5.4. Border checks: Fraudulent documents

In  2016,  more  than  7  000  people  were 

detected  using  8  267  fraudulent  docu­

output and has also prompted the crea­
tion of new print shops.1

Istanbul Atatürk remains the 
top departure airport

ments on entry at the external borders 

Out of the 128 nationalities detected us­

of  the  EU. This  represented  a  decrease 

ing fraudulent documents to illegally en­

As in the previous year, most detections 

of 16% compared with the previous year.

ter the EU or Schengen area from a third 

of fraudulent documents were reported 

Smugglers  frequently  provide  mi­

country,  the most  commonly  detected 

on air routes. At 620 detections, the num­

grants  with  fraudulent  travel  and 

were Ukrainians (1 208), Moroccans (752), 

ber of document fraud cases from Istan­

identity  documents  as  a  part  of  their 

Iranians (375), Albanians (386) and Iraqis 

bul Atatürk  increased  by  17%  compared 

‘services’. Fraudulent documents allow 

(273). Compared with 2015, Syrians were 

with  2015.  Istanbul Atatürk  airport  re­

irregular  migrants  to  enter  and  move 

reported in much lower number due to 

mained the main last departure airport 

within  the  EU  as  well  as  to  regularise 

fewer detections on arrival from Turkey 

of  fraudulent  document  users  detected 

their  residence  status  under  false  pre­

and Morocco. The number of Nigerians 

on arrival in Member States. Annual de­

tences or by using fake identities.

detected using fraudulent documents de­

tections associated with flights from Is­

Both the quantity and the quality of 

creased  significantly, mostly  at  the  air 

tanbul Atatürk airport increased for the 

the  fraudulent  documents  circulating 

borders. One of the reasons for this drop 

first time since 2013.

in the EU have improved over the recent 

might be the relatively high price of fraud­

The second most reported last depar­

years. In most cases, migrant smugglers 

ulent documents compared with other 

ture airport was Dakar International Air­

obtain counterfeit documents from ex­

modi operandi used to enter the EU, for ex­

port in Senegal. However, the measures 

pert counterfeiters who normally work 

ample illegal border­crossing on the Cen­

implemented by Portugal, such as the de­

with several smuggling networks at the 

tral Mediterranean route. Within the EU, 

ployment of Portuguese document experts 

same  time. The  sustained  demand  for 

Nigerians were more often detected with 

in Dakar, led to a decrease of detections in 

fraudulent documents has prompted es­

fraudulently obtained border stamps pre­

the second half of 2016.

tablished counterfeiters to increase their 

venting them from overstaying, especially 

Compared with 2015, more detections 

in the UK.

1 

 Europol’s contribution

were reported of passengers flying from the 

two Kiev airports in 2016, mostly Ukrainian, 

Tajik and Uzbek nationals using fraudu­

22 of 60

NumberNote: values under 10 are not represented30050Type of fraudulent document detected, by main countries of issuance, 2016PassportsID cardsResidence   permitsVisasStampsPolandSpainItalyFranceGermanyLithuaniaBelgiumGreeceLatviaSwedenRomaniaUnited KingdomBulgariaSyriaAlbaniaIndiaHungaryNetherlandsMoroccoSlovakiaClaimed nationality of persons detected with fraudulent documents, 20161 013Not speciﬁedUkraineMoroccoSyriaChange from 2015 to 2016:200100increase (over 25%)stable (between 25% and −25%)decrease (less than  −25%)Number(only highest values are stipulated)Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017lently obtained Latvian and Lithuanian 

visas. The Polish authorities also reported 

Document fraud trends at Greek Hotspots

frequent use of fraudulently obtained Pol­

ish visas by Ukrainians.

In order to mitigate the risks associated with identity and document fraud, 

At land and sea borders, most 
detections of document fraud 
from Ukraine and Morocco

Frontex deployed Advanced Level Document Officers (ALDOs) at the migration 

Hotspots during the last quarter of 2015. These experts assist in the identifi­

cation of fraudulent documentation held by arriving migrants. The current 

lower  numbers  of  arriving  migrants  from Turkey  permits  a  more  compre­

hensive examination of documentation to be undertaken at the Hotspots.

In  2016,  most  of  the  document  fraud 

Frontex has been collecting detailed weekly reports drafted by ALDOs de­

cases at land borders were again reported 

ployed at Greek Hotspots since October 2016. This has allowed for a better un­

at the land borders between Ukraine and 

derstanding of the extent of document fraud during the registration process.

Poland, mainly involving Ukrainian na­

On Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Leros and Kos, many migrants are still arriving 

tionals  holding  fraudulently  obtained 

undocumented. Among those who present travel documents, a variety of doc­

Polish  visas. A  large  number  of  docu­

uments are being used, but mostly documents from Syria, Iraq and Afghani­

ment fraud cases was also reported from 

stan. Passports, ID cards and driving licences are most commonly used. Most 

the Spanish­Moroccan land and sea bor­

of the cases of document fraud detections at the Hotspots are associated with 

ders, with Moroccans often presenting 

one of these documents.

fraudulent  Spanish  ID  cards  on  entry 

Between weeks 39–46 of 2016, some 

to the EU.

Overall decrease of document 
fraud detections on intra-EU / 
Schengen movements

1  500  documents  were  examined  by 

Frontex ALDOs at the five Hotspots. 

Two­thirds of them were Syrian doc­

uments. Around 5% were reported as 

fraudulent. The  highest  number  of 

examined  documents  was  detected 

In 2016, the number of detections of doc­

on  Samos.  Of  these,  only  3%  or  17 

ument fraud within the EU (over 11 000 

documents  were  identified  as  being 

x
e
t
n
o
r
F
©

in  2016)  was  lower  than  in  2015  (about 

fraudulent.  Most  were  poor­quality 

Good­quality counterfeit of 

13 000), which is consistent with fewer 

counterfeit  Syrian  identity  cards. 

the biodata page in the Syrian 

detections  of  illegal  border­crossing 

However,  a  few  high­quality  docu­

passport detected on Samos

along  the  EU’s  external  borders.  How­

ments were detected (see picture).

ever, as in 2015, there were more fraud­

ulent document users detected travelling 

within the EU than those reported at the 

external borders.

Member States, the number of persons 

According to Europol, in addition to 

travelling with fraudulent documents on 

the smuggling of migrants, document 

intra­EU / Schengen movements towards 

fraud is one of the most common crimi­

Germany nearly doubled, amounting to 

nal activities linked to the migration cri­

almost 1 200 detected cases in 2016. The 

Less secure EU ID cards still 
prevail on intra-EU / Schengen 
movements

sis. Fraudulent documents can be used 

number of detections on the routes to­

EU Member States’ ID cards with fewer 

or  re­used  for  many  other  criminal  ac­

wards Germany reached its highest level 

security features remained the most of­

tivities.  The  provision  of  fraudulent 

since the beginning of 2013. The vast ma­

ten fraudulently used travel documents 

documents will continue to represent a 

jority  of  cases  were  detected  on  arrival 

on  intra­EU / Schengen  movements,  in 

serious threat to the security of the EU.

from Greece, in particular from the air­

particular those issued by Italy, Greece, 

Within  the  EU,  most  persons  using 

ports of Thessaloniki, Athens and Herak­

Romania and Bulgaria. Less secure travel 

fraudulent documents were detected on 

lion. The cases were almost exclusively 

documents can be more easily forged and 

entry to the UK. Most of the detections 

related to Syrian, Iraqi, Afghan and Ira­

so are more vulnerable than well­secured 

were reported on the sea and land route 

nian  nationals. This  pattern  indicated 

ones. However, they may also be more 

between France and the UK, where Alba­

that  after  the  closure  of  the  Western 

easily detected by border­control authori­

nian and Ukrainian document fraudsters 

Balkan route, a proportion of migrants 

ties than well­secured documents, which 

were the most detected nationalities, de­

stranded in Greece used fraudulent docu­

may go largely undetected.

spite a steep decline compared with 2015. 

ments on intra­Schengen flights to reach 

By contrast, detections of Iraqi and Ira­

their desired final destination.

nian fraudsters remained stable.

In contrast to the decreasing trend on 

the routes towards the UK from other EU 

23 of 60

Claimed nationality of persons detected with fraudulent documents, 20161 013Not speciﬁedUkraineMoroccoSyriaChange from 2015 to 2016:200100increase (over 25%)stable (between 25% and −25%)decrease (less than  −25%)Number(only highest values are stipulated)Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017 
5.5. Border checks: Clandestine entries

In 2016, the number of detections of clan­

destine entries (people hiding in vehicles 

to avoid border control) at BCPs remained 

much lower than the number of detec­

tions of illegal border­crossing between 

BCPs. However, this indicator is not uni­

formly reported by all Member States and 

it is likely that the total number of de­

tections reported for 2016 (2 028) under­

estimates the actual situation.

The rather low number of detections 

of clandestine entry along the external 

borders contrasts with the larger num­

ber  of  detections  of  clandestine  entry 

reported at the internal borders. For ex­

ample, the UK Chief Inspector of Borders 

and  Immigration  reported  in  July  2016 

that over 6 400 migrants were found in 

Figure 3.  Hungarian police officer sets a sensor of a heart beat detector and 

the back of lorries or cars in Britain be­

a flexible camera to search for irregular migrants during control of a lorry at 

tween  1 April  and  30  September  2015, 
more than double the number of 2014.1
Most of the 2 028 detections along the 

the border between Hungary and Serbia near Röszke

migratory flow transiting Turkey is chan­

external  borders  were  reported  at  the 

nelled. The Bulgarian BCPs most affected 

land border between Bulgaria and Tur­

by clandestine entries were Kapitan An­

key, through which a large share of the 

dreevo and Lesovo. The Greek authorities 

1 

 http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/
wp­content/uploads/2016/07/ICIBI­report­
on­Lorry­Drops­210716.pdf

started reporting detections of clandes­

tine entry in June 2016.

24 of 60

n
o
i
s
s
i

m
m
o
C
n
a
e
p
o
r
u
E
©

BulgariaSpainGreeceHungaryCroatia2 028 (3 303)Number in parenthesis is for 2015Detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs (people hiding in vehicles), 2016200Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017 
 
Illegal stayers

5.6. Border checks: Illegal stayers, facilitators, asylum applications

Illegal stayers

Facilitation services related to the il­

Asylum applications

legal immigration to the EU and second­

In 2016, Member States reported 491 891 

ary movements between Member States 

In 2016, 1.1 million applications for inter­

detections  of  illegal  stay,  which  repre­

are  in  high  demand  and  generate  sig­

national protection were recorded in the 

sented a generally decreasing trend com­

nificant profits for facilitators involved. 

28 EU Member States plus Norway and 

pared  with  2015. As  in  previous  years, 

The facilitation of illegal immigration is 

Switzerland  (EU+). This  number  came 

Germany continued to rank first, which 

a  growing  market  prompting  existing 

close to the 1.23 million applications re­

reflected its status as the main destina­

criminal groups to adapt their business 

ported for 2015, the highest level received 

tion for most migrants who had crossed 

models and shift to the facilitation of il­

in the EU since EU­level data collection 

the border illegally. France followed, due 

legal immigration.

began in 2008. 96% of these applications 

to its status of a transit country for the 

An increase in the number of irreg­

accounted for persons applying for the 

migrants  who  entered  the  EU  illegally 

ular  migrants  reaching  the  EU  as  part 

first time in the EU.

with the intention to reach the UK.

of  mixed  migration  flows  will  sustain 

Further  implementation  of  the  relo­

In terms of nationalities, the consid­

and  increase  the  demand  not  only  for 

cation mechanism set up in September 

erable number of Syrians, Afghans, Ira­

facilitation of entry to the EU, but also 

2015 will be necessary for alleviating the 

qis and Eritreans is artificially inflated 

services associated with legalisation of 

pressure in Greece and Italy.

by detections of people not meeting re­

stay. The latter include the use of forged 

quirements for legal stay before they ap­

identity or supporting documents, mar­

ply for asylum.

Facilitators

riages of convenience to obtain residence 

permits  and  the  abuse  of  asylum  pro­

visions  in  order  to  temporarily  obtain 

leave to remain.

The facilitation of illegal immigra tion re­

mains a significant threat to the EU. De­

tections of facilitators rose from 12 023 in 

2015 to 12 568 in 2016. The rise was mostly 

due  to  increases  reported  in  Spain,  It­

aly, France.

25 of 60

Number of detected cases of illegal stay, 2016 50 000491 891 (699 374)Number in parenthesis is for 2015(only highest values are stipulated) FranceItalyGermanyAustriaSwitzerland815713263218Frontex · Risk Analysis for 20175.7. Cross-border crime

For years, Frontex has been promoting 

Civil, 19 tonnes of hashish were seized 

ful, such as the establishment of joint 

European  border  management  with  a 

on a cargo ship and 12 persons arrested 

customs and border guard teams to iden­

special  focus  on  irregular  migration 

in the operational area of the JO Indalo. 

tify couriers. However, stricter controls 

flows.  Based  on  its  new  mandate,  the 

Regarding herbal cannabis, Turkey has 

on selected high­risk air routes tended 

Agency will develop an operational strat­

been seizing larger quantities of herbal 

to lead to the use of alternative routing.

egy in line with the concept of Integrated 

cannabis than all EU countries combined 

Border Management. An important el­

over the past few years.

Heroin from Afghanistan, Iran and 

ement  of  border  management  is  sup­

Pakistan

porting  Member  States  in  combating 

Cocaine from South America

organised crime at the external borders, 

According  to  the  EMCDDA,  the  overall 

including  the  smuggling  of  goods  and 

According to EMCDDA’s calculations for 

quantity  seized  in  the  EU  and  Norway 

trafficking in human beings.

2014,  1%  of  the  general  population  and 

has  declined  from  around  8  tonnes  in 

Smuggling of illicit drugs

EU. However, seizures, increasing from 

creased again to 8.9 tonnes in 2014. No­

2%  of  young  adults  used  cocaine  in  the 

2009 to 5.6 tonnes in 2013, but then in­

the mid­nineties till 2007, have been de­

tably, there has been a rapid increase in 

clining since 2009. Most of the cocaine 

the  size  of  individual  shipments,  with 

Cannabis from the Western Balkans 

is seized by Spain, but trafficking routes 

seizures of more than 100 kg, exceeding 

and North Africa

According  to  the  EMCDDA  European 
Drug Report 20161, more than 75% of drug 
seizures in Europe were of cannabis, Mo­

to Europe have been diversifying and sei­

zures were recently made in ports of the 

Eastern Mediterranean, Baltic and Black 

even the total quantity of heroin seizures 
reported in 2013.2 Most of the heroin con­
sumed in the EU is produced in Afghan­

Sea. However, according to available data, 

istan and transported along a variety of 

these  routes  remained  of minor  impor­

routes,  including  through Turkey  and 

rocco being the main provider, although 

tance.  Moreover,  cocaine  is  smuggled 

Balkan  countries,  the  Northern  route, 

its  production  is  in  decline.  Spain  re­

on pleasure boats and through container 

which  heads  through  Central Asia  and 

ported  around  two­thirds  of  the  total 

shipments, where it is often hidden un­

the Russian Federation, and the Southern 

quantity of cannabis resin seized in Eu­

der legitimate goods, and in air freight.

route via the Persian Gulf by sea, some­

rope. In addition, Spain, together with 

At the air border, organised criminal 

times including passages through Africa.

Greece and Italy, has also reported large 

networks often apply ‘swarming tactics’, 

The latest annual statistics on seizures 

increases in seizures of cannabis herb in 

consisting in ‘flooding’ planes with doz­

showed that more heroin was seized in 

recent  years.  In  September  2016,  in  an 

ens of couriers per flight in the expecta­

Turkey  than  in  all  EU  Member  States 

operation  coordinated  by  the  Guardia 

tion  that  a  sufficient  number  of  them 

combined, and the gap in large seizures 

1  EMCDDA (2016), European Drug Report: 

would slip through controls. As shown 

by examples from the Netherlands, some 

2  EMCDDA (2016), European Drug Report: 

Trends and Developments, p. 65.

countermeasures  have  proven  success­

Trends and Developments, p. 84.

26 of 60

Smuggling ofNumber of incidentsCross-border crime incidents reported in the framework  of Frontex Joint Operations, by border section, 2016CannabisExcise goodsHeroin> 300 incidents> 100> 50Stolen vehiclesWeaponsFrontex · Risk Analysis for 2017within most countries of South­Eastern 

There are tenuous links between mi­

Greece freed two asylum seekers, a Syr­

Europe points to a number of undetected 

grant smuggling and terrorism involving 

ian  and  an  Iraqi  man,  who  had  been 

shipments. On this route, heroin is of­

the use of migrant smuggling networks 

locked in a room for more than a week 

ten smuggled into the EU by criminals 

and their logistics to support or fund ter­

for failing to pay transit fees after being 

posing as individual travellers in small 

rorism related activities. At this point, 

smuggled across the border from Turkey.

and medium amounts. Regular coopera­

however, there is no concrete evidence 

tion between border guards and customs 

that terrorist groups maintain sustained 

Exit of stolen motor vehicles

authorities  is  of  particular  importance 

engagement with OCGs involved in mi­

for the detection of drugs smuggled in 

grant smuggling. Nevertheless, it cannot 

According to Eurostat, the total number 

this way.

be ruled out that terrorists may be using 

of vehicles including cars, motorcycles, 

migrant smugglers’ resources to achieve 

buses, lorries, construction and agricul­

Smuggling of weapons

their goals.

tural vehicles stolen in the EU was stead­

ily falling between 1998 and 2013. Among 

The  terrorist  attacks  in  France  in  2015 

Trafficking in human beings

the reasons for the decline were the ad­

demonstrated that the effective control 

vanced anti­theft technologies developed 

of firearms is indispensable to fight ter­

The rise in irregular migration between 

by the producers and intensified inter­

rorism. The perpetrators of the terrorist 

2015 and 2016 also led to a greater num­

national law­enforcement cooperation.

attacks  of  January  2015  on  the  Charlie 

ber  of  people  (including  minors  and 

Only a small share of the vehicles sto­

Hebdo office and a kosher supermarket 

women) who can be easily exploited by 

len in the EU is detected at its external 

in  Paris  and  of  November  2015  on  the 

smugglers  and  traffickers. According 

borders, often in the context of Frontex 

Bataclan theatre reportedly used weap­

to  a  recently  published  UNODC  analy­

Joint Operations.

ons from the Western Balkans.

sis of global country­level data on THB 

Police  investigations  have  generally 

victims and recently arrived regular mi­

Smuggling of excise goods

shown  a  wide  availability  of  military­

grants, trafficking in persons and regu­

grade arms including AK­47s, rocket­pro­

pelled  grenade  launchers  on  European 

illicit markets, especially in the dark net, 

lar migration flows in the case of some 
destination countries broadly coincide.3
Some  irregular  migrants  are  kid­

The majority of excise goods smuggled 

across the EU’s external borders are to­

bacco products. According to estimates 

which is a network that is not accessible 

napped, held for ransom, or forced to work 

of the European Commission, the illicit 

through  conventional  search  engines. 

against their will to repay their debts to 

trade  in  tobacco  products  costs  the  EU 

Many  of  these  weapons  are  illegally 

smugglers. For instance, Nigerian irreg­

and its Member States EUR 10 billion a 

traded from former conflict regions such 

ular migrants rely on migrant smugglers 

year  in  lost  tax  revenues.  It  should  be 

as  the Western  Balkans,  where  around 

to reach the EU. At the same time, hu­

stressed that it is not only individual con­

800 000 weapons are estimated to be in 

man traffickers frequently lure Nigerian 

sumers and small­scale smugglers from 

illegal civilian possession in Bosnia and 

women to Europe for sexual exploitation.

economically weak border regions that 

Herzegovina alone. A closer cooperation 

Many irregular migrants become vic­

try  to  take  advantage  of  existing  price 

and information exchange between Euro­

tims of forced labour or sexual exploita­

differences. In fact, also large­scale crim­

pean law­enforcement authorities (both 

tion at some stage during their journey 

inal businesses illicitly import cigarettes 

inland  and  at  the  external  border)  and 

to the EU. This particularly affects irreg­

from  as  far  away  as Asia,  especially  to 

customs authorities is crucial in the effec­

ular migrants travelling on the Central 

Western European markets.

tive fight against trafficking of firearms.

Mediterranean  route  via  Libya  and,  to 

In 2016, seizures of 28 000 000 illicit 

Links between migrant 
smuggling and other cross-
border crimes

a  much  lesser  extent,  those  migrating 

cigarettes  were  reported  in  the  frame­

along the Eastern Mediterranean route. 

work of Frontex JOs. Half of this num­

Some irregular migrants who try to reach 

ber was reported from Greece, more than 

the EU are forced to work at each leg of 

11 million cigarettes were seized at the 

their journey to pay migrant smugglers. 

eastern  borders,  about  1.2  million  on 

Many  OCGs  are  involved  in  migrant 

Higher prices of facilitation services also 

the  Western  Balkan  route  and  almost 

smuggling  as  their  main  criminal  ac­

increase the risk of exploitation in coun­

300 000 at the Spanish border.

tivity.  However,  according  to  Europol, 

tries of transit and arrival.

many of the OCGs involved in migrant 

So far, irregular migrants do not ap­

smuggling are poly­criminal and so en­

pear  to  be  subject  to  systematic  abuse 

In  2016,  during  Frontex  JOs,  96 

gage in other criminal activities, includ­

once they reach the EU, even though in­

tonnes  of  drugs  and  36  tonnes  of 

ing document counterfeiting, trafficking 

dividual cases were reported. For exam­

smuggled  cigarettes  were  seized. 

in human beings, property crime, drug 

ple, in December 2016, police in northern 

Several  incidents  of  illegal  fishery 

trafficking, excise fraud, firearms traf­

ficking,  and  trafficking  in  counterfeit 

goods. Other OCGs previously involved 

in these criminal activities have added 

migrant smuggling to their portfolio.

3  UNODC Global Report on Trafficking in 

Persons 2016; available at http://www.
unodc.org/documents/data­and­
analysis/glotip/2016_Global_Report_on_
Trafficking_in_Persons.pdf

and  pollution  at  sea  were  detected 

during  maritime  JOs,  as  well  as  a 

number of stolen vehicles at the land 

borders.

27 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 20175.8. In the EU: Secondary movements

lar migrants from Africa seem to confirm 

this change. Whereas the number of per­

sons entering Germany from Austria de­

creased, more detections were made at 

the border with Switzerland.

Obstacles on the way to a better 
situational picture of intra-
Schengen secondary routes

ern Mediterranean and Western Balkan 

France  was  also  affected  by  a  grow­

route was far lower than in 2015 – even 

ing number of migrants arriving on sec­

though secondary routes became more 

ondary migration routes from Italy. The 

diverse.

number of French Eurodac hits in rela­

Also in 2016, Europe saw massive move­

In 2016, Hungary reported more than 

tion to a prior asylum application or ille­

ments of people who crossed the external 

25 000 illegal border­crossings from Ser­

gal border­crossing in Italy (about 11 000) 

border of the EU illegally and decided to 

bia, which is a significant decrease from 

increased by more than 156% compared 

move on to other Member States. Mov­

around  200  000 migrants  that  crossed 

with  the  same  period  of  the  previous 

ing  within  the  EU,  irregular  migrants 

this border section in 2015. Croatia, which 

year. The vast majority of these hits was 

use a variety of modi operandi and means 

became  the main  transit  country  of  ir­

related to migrants who had arrived on 

of transport, which makes the strategic 

regular migration after Hungary, built a 

the Central Mediterranean route.

analysis  of  intra­Schengen  secondary 

technical obstacle at its border with Ser­

movements extremely difficult.

bia in September 2015. It led to a signifi­

The effect of the migration 
crisis of 2015–2016 on secondary 
movements

cant decline in irregular migration, from 

more than 500 000 illegal border­cross­

ings in 2015 to just over 100 000 in 2016.

Substantial secondary flows 
from Hungary to Italy and 
France

Most of these migrants, after having 

In  addition,  Member  State  reports  in 

transited Hungary or Croatia, continued 

2016,  especially  Eurodac  data,  point  to 

Large migration flows, as witnessed dur­

to travel to Austria and further on to Ger­

an important corridor of intra­Schengen 

ing  the  crisis  of  2015–2016,  made  sec­

many. In fact, Germany reported most 

movements along the Eastern Mediterra­

ondary routes more visible for strategic 

detections of intra­Schengen movements 

nean and then Western Balkan route to­

analysis. The  concerted  efforts  of  the 

of nationalities typically coming through 

wards Italy. In 2016, the country reported 

countries  along  the  Western  Balkan 

the  Eastern  Mediterranean  route  near 

over 10 000 Eurodac hits related to ille­

route to close their borders and to end the 

the Austrian border. At this location, in 

gal border­crossings or prior asylum ap­

facilitated travel through their territories 

2016, most irregular migrants were de­

plications in Hungary. They were mainly 

resulted in reducing the visible flow of 

tected travelling by train and, to a lesser 

triggered  by  Pakistani  and Afghan  na­

people on the most frequented second­

extent,  in  private  vehicles  provided  by 

tionals. Moreover, Eurodac hits in Italy 

ary route through the former Yugoslav 

facilitation networks.

Republic  of  Macedonia,  Serbia,  Croa­

tia / Hungary  and  further  on  to Austria 

and  Germany.  However,  detections  re­

ported from Member States showed that 

these movements continued after March 

Southern route: increasing 
importance of Switzerland as a 
transit country

related  to  Greece  increased  to  around 

5  000. The  reported  Eurodac  numbers 

clearly point to a smaller branch of the 

Western Balkans route leading to Italy.

Also,  intra­Schengen  FRAN  data  re­

ported  by  France  showed  an  increase 

2016, although at a lower level and in a 

In May 2016, when Austria upgraded the 

in  asylum  applicants  who  had  previ­

more covert way. The reinstatement of 

controls  of  its  national  border  with  It­

ously  been  fingerprinted  in  Hungary. 

controls at the internal borders of some 

aly, the Austrian authorities started to 

Compared  with  the  previous  year,  the 

Member States led to a diversification in 

stop migrants at this internal border and 

number of Eurodac hits decreased to over 

routes and modi operandi. Also, the rise in 

arranged for their readmission to Italy. 

6 000 in 2016.

migration pressure at the Central Medi­

Because of these measures, many irreg­

terranean route brought about changes 

ular migrants who had arrived in Italy 

in the extent to which certain Member 

via  the  Central  Mediterranean  Sea  de­

States  were  affected  by  the  migration 

cided to bypass Austria in their attempt 

Western route: increase in 
secondary movements

of undocumented persons on secondary 

to  reach  their  desired  destinations  in 

While detections at the EU’s external bor­

routes within the EU and Schengen area.

Northern Europe.

ders along the Western Mediterranean 

South-Eastern route: reported 
attempts to bypass Austria

who primarily entered the EU through 

2015, French data also point to increases 

the  Central  Mediterranean  route  sig­

on the secondary routes from Spain and 

The number of African illegal stayers 

route  increased  by  46%  compared  with 

nificantly  decreased  in Austria,  while 

Portugal. The number of French Eurodac 

In 2016, the level of intra­Schengen mi­

at the same time grew in Switzerland. 

hits related to prior detections of illegal 

gration of persons coming from the East­

German detections of travelling irregu­

border­crossings or asylum applications 

28 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017Figure 4.  Four main entry routes for secondary movements in Europe

in Spain and, to a lesser extent, in Por­

tugal increased by 14% (to 1 198) between 

Eastern route: number of 
Russian nationals rising

2015 and 2016.

migrants travelled by train from Minsk 

and  entered  the  Schengen  area  in  the 

Polish city of Terespol, from where many 

Analysis of open sources reveals that 

In 2016, the German authorities detected 

continued their journey to Germany.

the migrants who reached Spain on the 

about 2 000 irregular migrants on intra­

Both  Poland  and  Germany  detected 

Western Mediterranean route often con­

Schengen movements from Poland. Al­

a large proportion of Russian nationals 

tinued to Central and Northern Europe 

though the number was lower than in 

in private vehicles, travelling along the 

travelling in private cars provided by fa­

2015,  other  reports  point  to  increasing 

European  Route  E30,  which  connects 

cilitators in return for a fee.

flows  from  Belarus  and  Poland  to  Ger­

Terespol (at the Belarusian border) with 

many, mainly of Russian nationals of re­

Warsaw and Berlin.

portedly Chechen origin. Many of these 

29 of 60

!P!P!P!P!P!P!P!P!P!P!P!P!P!!P!P!P!P!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!LondonAthensParisMilanOsloStockholmMunichMadridBarcelonaRomeFrankfurtBrusselsHamburgViennaCopenhagenWarsawB!P!P!PudapestHelsinkiCalaisPassau ££££eeeImportant air routes Secondary movements from main entry routes: Transport hubWesternEasternSouth-EasternSouthern!PFrontex · Risk Analysis for 2017Iraq

Ukraine

28 464
11 870

Iran 6 998

2 701

Others 

100 699
66 077

24 649
20 970

Pakistan

16 038
6 378

18 181
27 201

Morocco 

22 441

9 289 Albania

Afghanistan

34 396

India 8 359

8 404

Syria

9 849
1 215

Algeria 9 494

3 611

Russian Fed. 5 016
3 680

Nigeria 

6 446
3 353

Return decisions
305 365 (286 725)

Effective returns
176 223 (175 173)
Number in parenthesis is for 2015

Return decisions

Effective returns

xxx
xxx

Brazil

5 023
2 796

Tunisia

4 673
2 997 Somalia

4 639
262

The number of effective returns may sometimes be larger than that of return decisions, as a return decision issued in a given month may be effectively enforced at a later date. Also, return decisions may be issued without 
prejudice to the person’s right to apply for asylum. Readmissions between Member States are not included (for example between France and Italy). Effective returns do not necessarily mean returns to the country of origin and, 
for example in the case of Syrians, they include returns of persons to third countries considered to be safe (for example from Hungary to Serbia)

5.9. In the EU: Returns

those effectively returned. Indeed, many 

detections  of  illegal  border­crossing  or 

even  detections  of  illegal  stay  concern 

In 2016, Member States reported 305 365 

untarily do not materialise as the persons 

migrants who will apply for asylum and 

return decisions issued to third­country 

decide  to  stay  illegally.  Some  Member 

thus are not returned.

nationals  as  a  result  of  an  administra­

States reported that, over time, several 

The European Commission noted in its 

tive  or  judicial  decision,  which  repre­

return decisions have been issued to the 

communication on return policy that data 

sented  a  6.5%  increase  compared  with 

same individuals. Although it is not pos­

on basic parameters (such as the average 

2015. The absolute total number of mi­

sible  to  quantify  the  phenomenon,  as 

length of detention, grounds for deten­

grants subject to return decisions is still 

data at EU level are anonymised, it illus­

tion, number of failed returns, and use 

underestimated by this indicator, as data 

trates the difficulty to effectively imple­

of entry bans) proved to be only available 

on decisions were unavailable from Aus­

ment a return decision.

from a limited number of Member States. 

tria, France, the Netherlands and Swe­

Finally,  return  decisions  may  also 

Moreover, common definitions and ap­

den till April 2016, which only reported 
effective returns1 but presumably issued 
a high number of decisions.

concern voluntary returns that are not 

proaches concerning data collection are 

registered. In fact, for voluntary return, 

frequently absent, impacting on the com­

only  few  Member  States,  such  as  the 

parability of such data across the EU.

As in previous years, the number of 

Netherlands, apply a policy of controlled 

return decisions was much larger than 

departure. Under these circumstances, it 

the total number of effective returns to 

is difficult to ascertain that a return de­

third countries (176 223). The main rea­

cision has effectively been implemented.

sons  for  non­return  relate  to  practical 

Within  the  number  of  effective  re­

problems in the identification of return­

turns  to  third  countries,  52%  were  re­

ees and in obtaining the necessary docu­

ported  to  be  on  a  voluntary  basis  and 

mentation from non­EU authorities. In 

45%  were  forced  returns,  while  for  the 

addition, many decisions to return vol­

rest, the type of return was not specified.

1  These Member States do not distinguish 
between decisions and effective returns 
and reported all as effective returns. 

In  terms  of  nationalities,  there  is  a 

striking difference between the nation­

alities detected crossing the border ille­

gally or staying illegally in the EU, and 

30 of 60

5 419Frontex · Risk Analysis for 20176.  Featured analyses

Frontex assists Bulgarian authorities, 2016 
©  Frontex

6.1.  Long-range coast guarding operations in the Central 

Mediterranean

In 2016, the Central Mediterranean saw 

Figure  5,  more  than  half  of  all  rescue 

Life at Sea (SOLAS), and associated SAR 

the highest number of migrant arrivals 

operations  were  initiated  in  this  man­

as well as humanitarian assistance ef­

ever recorded from sub­Sahara, West Af­

ner. From June until October 2016, how­

forts, turning it into a distinct tactical 

rica and the Horn of Africa (181 459 mi­

ever, the pattern was reversed. Satellite 

advantage. This  is  not  a  new  strategy, 

grants,  increase  of  18%  compared  with 

phone  calls  to  MRCC  Rome  decreased 

but the scope of the problem is alarming.

2015). This  trend,  which  is  consistent 

sharply  to  10%  and  NGO  rescue  opera­

In this context, it transpired that both 

with  previous  year­on­year  increases, 

tions  rose  significantly  to  more  than 

border  surveillance  and  SAR  missions 

shows  that  the  Central  Mediterranean 

40% of all incidents.

close to, or within, the 12­mile territo­

has become the main route for African 

Since June 2016, a significant number 

rial  waters  of  Libya  have  unintended 

migrants to the EU and it is very likely 

of boats were intercepted or rescued by 

consequences.  Namely,  they  influence 

to remain so for the foreseeable future. 

NGO vessels without any prior distress 

smugglers’  planning  and  act  as  a  pull 

Specifically,  89%  of  migrants  arrived 

call and without official information as 

factor  that  compounds  the  difficulties 

from Libya, making Italy the main en­

to  the  rescue  location.  NGO  presence 

inherent  in  border  control  and  saving 

try point to the EU. As a result, most of 

and activities close to, and occasionally 

lives at sea. Dangerous crossings on un­

the EU, civilian and NGO vessels in the 

within, the 12­mile Libyan territorial wa­

seaworthy and overloaded vessels were 

region focused their Search and Rescue 

ters nearly doubled compared with the 

organised with the main purpose of be­

(SAR) activities on migrant boats depart­

previous year, totalling 15 NGO assets (14 

ing detected by EUNAVFOR Med / Frontex 

ing from Libya.

maritime and 1 aerial). In parallel, the 

and NGO vessels.

Important  changes  were  observed 

overall  number  of  incidents  increased 

Apparently,  all  parties  involved  in 

on  this  migratory  route  in  2016.  Dur­

dramatically.

SAR operations in the Central Mediter­

ing 2015, and the first months of 2016, 

The  statistical  data  show  that  the 

ranean unintentionally help criminals 

smuggling groups instructed migrants 

criminal networks behind illegal border­

achieve  their  objectives  at  minimum 

to make satellite phone calls to the Mari­

crossings  along  the  Central  Mediterra­

cost,  strengthen  their  business  model 

time Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) 

nean route continued to exploit criminal 

by  increasing  the  chances  of  success. 

in Rome to initiate targeted rescues on 

business  opportunities  by  handling  a 

Migrants and refugees – encouraged by 

the  high  seas.  SAR  operations  were 

great demand for smuggling services and 

the stories of those who had successfully 

mainly  undertaken  by  Italian  law­en­

thus posed formidable challenges for EU 

made it in the past – attempt the dan­

forcement, EUNAVFOR Med or Frontex 

border control. Libyan­based smugglers, 

gerous crossing since they are aware of 

vessels with NGO vessels involved in less 

in  particular,  heavily  relied  on  the  In­

and rely on humanitarian assistance to 

than  5%  of  the  incidents. As  shown  in 

ternational Convention for the Safety of 

reach the EU.

Closely  related  issues  are  the  safety 

Figure 5.  Monthly comparison between rescue operations performed by 

of migrants and refugees and, most sig­

NGOs and rescue operations initiated via satellite phone calls of migrants in 

nificantly, the increasing number of fa­

distress at the Central Mediterranean

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

Satellite phone calls
NGO SAR operations

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

talities. According  to  UNHCR  and  IOM 

estimates, 2016 saw the largest number of 

migrant deaths on record in the Mediter­

ranean (5 083 compared with 3 777 in 2015 
and 3 279 in 2014).1 These, however, are 
only  estimates,  which  also  include  the 

number of missing persons, since there 

is no system of recording the exact num­

ber of those who perish at sea. The esti­

mated total of dead and missing persons 

in  the  Central  Mediterranean  area  was 

1 

IOM’s Missing Migrants Project data 
retrieved on 26 January 2016

32 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017SAR by Norwegian Siem Pilot, JO Triton, 2016 
© Frontex

4 579.2 The increasing number of migrant 
deaths, despite the enhanced EUNAVFOR 

creasing challenge. The more active role 

tween all stakeholders to minimise the 

of NGO vessels carries important impli­

number of fatalities at sea as well as the 

Med / Frontex surveillance and NGO rescue 

cations for border surveillance and SAR 

unintended effects of operating so closely 

efforts, seems paradoxical at first glance. 

activities. 

to Libyan territorial waters (pull factor). 

The rising death toll mainly results from 

It is worth noting here that the West­

Specifically,  all  SAR  operations  should 

criminal activities aimed at making profit 

ern African  route  –  perhaps  the  most 

follow the same procedures, e.g. when it 

through the provision of smuggling ser­

dangerous migration route – was closed 

comes to the disposal of the vessels after 

vices at any cost. Libya­based smuggling 

thanks  to  an  effective  combination  of 

the migrants have been rescued. Finally, 

groups  became  emboldened  organising 

border surveillance, return operations, 

since the reactive nature of long­range 

dangerous crossings on a daily basis us­

and  joint  law­enforcement  work  with 

border  surveillance  and  humanitarian 

ing  dilapidated  vessels.  Parallel  smug­

countries  of  origin / departure.  This 

missions does not address the causal fac­

gling  operations  continued  during  the 

model  represents  one  of  the  best  ways 

tors underpinning migratory and refu­

winter in bad weather conditions expos­

to  prevent  a  future  migratory  crisis  in 

gee movements, the situation calls for 

ing migrants to even greater risks. Ruth­

the Central Mediterranean.

more sustainable policies and measures – 

less criminal behaviour disregarded even 

In  conclusion,  SAR  efforts  will  con­

in African countries of origin and transit 

the most basic safety concerns exacerbat­

tinue as long as the migratory crisis per­

(especially Libya) – to provide safer and 

ing the difficulties inherent in conduct­

sists  in  the  Central  Mediterranean  not 

legal routes to refugees and reduce mi­

ing rescue operations in the unforgiving 

only because they relate to international 

gratory flows towards the EU.

maritime environment.

legal obligations, but also because they 

The  coordination  of  all  parties  in­

stem from European values. SAR, how­

volved  in  SAR  efforts  represents  an  in­

ever, requires increased coordination be­

2 

Idem

33 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 20176.2.  Iranians travelling undetected into the EU with fraudulent 

documents – a case study

Despite the lifting of international sanc­

riving at UK airports. The use of various 

Approximately 28% of Iranian nation­

tions, the asylum claims lodged in 2016 

air routes and multiple documents indi­

als detected on arrival to the EU  /  Schen­

by Iranian nationals in the EU increased 

cates  the  involvement  of  criminal  net­

gen  area  in  possession  of  fraudulent 

by  50%  compared  with  2015  with  Ger­

works.  Based  on  EDF  data,  document 

documents  travel  via  third  countries. 

many and the UK reporting the major­

and identity fraud by Iranian nationals 

This  share  is  declining  compared  with 

ity  of  applications.  Significantly,  the 

remains high despite a slight temporary 

the  number  of  detections  on  intra­

number of Iranian asylum claims has ex­

decrease between May and August 2016. 

EU / Schengen  movements.  In  the  pe­

ceeded the number of illegal border­cross­

Nevertheless,  the  long­term  increase 

riod  January­October  2016  many  cases 

ings by Iranians in the last two years.

in document fraud detections observed 

of  Iranian  nationals  with  fraudulent 

It is worth noting that Iranian nation­

since EDF data collection began in 2009, 

documents were reported by Spain, Aus­

als represent one of the largest groups of 

has become more pronounced since the 

tria, Germany, Italy and Denmark. Re­

inadequately documented passengers ar­

last quarter of 2015.

gardless  of  their  final  EU  destination, 

Figure 6.  An example of a complex itinerary used by Iranians to get to the EU: via the Middle East and South America

34 of 60

IranTurkeyDubaiBrazilBoliviaSpainParaguayFrontex · Risk Analysis for 2017Examination of documents, 2016 
© Frontex

most  Iranians  with  fraudulent  docu­

Approximately  70%  of  all  Iranian­

Apart  from  the  UK,  an  increasing 

ments departed either from Iran or Tur­

related  document  fraud  cases  in  2016 

number of Iranian holders of fraudulent 

key. Many detections at smaller Spanish 

involved secondary (i.e. intra­EU / Schen­

documents detected on intra­EU / Schen­

airports indicate that Iranian nationals 

gen) movements, the majority of which 

gen  routes  were  heading  to  Germany. 

did not reach these airports directly from 

were  detected  between  the  Schengen 

This  pattern  is  consistent  with  the  re­

Iran but indirectly via Turkish airports or 

area and the UK. Member States detected 

cord  number  of  Iranians  who  have  ap­

via more complex and expensive routes 

around  500  Iranians  on  their  way  to­

plied  for  asylum  in  Germany  over  the 

transiting,  for  example,  South Ameri­

wards the UK. 

past few months.

can countries.

35 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 20176.3.  Personal data for risk analysis – 

mixed methods analysis of smuggling 
networks in Libya

lia, on the other hand, were equally ea­

ger to get to Germany, Italy or Sweden. 

Overall, Syrians tended to be headed for 

Germany,  especially  the  well­educated 

ones. Such clear preference towards cer­

tain final destination countries are likely 

In  February  2016,  Frontex  launched  a 

est migrants tended to be from Guinea 

to be linked to already established dias­

Pilot Project (called Processing Personal 

and Mali (22 years old on average) and the 

poras acting as a pull factor.

Data  for  Risk Analysis  –  PeDRA)  in  the 

oldest were from Syria and Palestine (~31 

framework  of  the  EPN  JO Triton  2016, 

and ~36, respectively). Nearly all inter­

People-smuggling networks

with the aim of processing information 

viewed migrants claimed to have friends 

containing personal data collected dur­

or family who were already in the EU.

In  total,  a  staggering  96%  of  newly­ar­

ing  interviews  with  newly  arrived  mi­

grants in the Central Mediterranean. In 

The migration process

2016, some 2 400 newly arrived migrants 

rived migrants interviewed in the Cen­

tral  Mediterranean  region  stated  that 

they  had  used  the  services  of  smug­

were  interviewed  in  Italy  by  Frontex 

Nearly two­thirds of all migrants inter­

gling networks to enter the EU illegally 

Guest Officers deployed from EU Mem­

viewed  in  the  Central  Mediterranean 

(Fig. 7). This is significant because it sug­

ber States.

region claimed to have left their home 

gests that irregular migration via Libya 

Quantitative data analysis

remainder citing conflict as their main 

vided by the smuggling networks. Given 

country for economic reasons, with the 

is entirely dependent on the services pro­

push  factor.  Correspondingly,  most  of 

the very high number of arrivals in 2016, 

The sample

the interviewed migrants were coming 

it  is  not  unreasonable  to  assume  that 

to the EU for economic reasons and em­

smuggling networks are amassing vast 

In 2016, nearly 50 nationalities of newly­

ployment  possibilities,  followed  by  ac­

financial capital, averaging USD 5 000 

arrived migrants were interviewed after 

cess to the asylum procedure.

per migrant in peak months. It is also 

arriving  in  Italy,  which  demonstrates 

The most common final destination 

an important finding because it implies 

the variety of source countries contrib­

country was Italy, followed by Germany, 

that any activity that would disrupt or 

uting  to  the  migration  flow. The  most 

France,  Spain  and  the  UK.  Some  na­

deter the smuggling networks could re­

commonly  interviewed  migrants  were 

tionalities  expressed  very  clear  prefer­

sult in a vastly reduced flow of irregular 

unmarried (68%) males (92%) travelling 

ences. For example, the most commonly 

migrants into the EU.

alone (59%) from countries such as Eri­

claimed final destination country for Er­

Moreover,  70%  of  migrants  inter­

trea and the Gambia, followed by Sudan, 

itreans was the UK, whereas most inter­

viewed  within  the  EPN  JO Triton  2016 

Somalia and Nigeria – together account­

viewed  Nigerians  quoted  Italy  as  their 

specifically  stated  that  the  reason  why 

ing for 44% of all interviews. The young­

final destination. Migrants from Soma­

they decided to enter the EU illegally via 

Figure 7.  A staggering 96% of interviewed migrants newly arrived in the Central Mediterranean region (JO Triton 2016) 

claimed to have been facilitated. Note differences in sample sizes

Yes 

No 

Unknown 

POSEIDON 2016
(n=82) 

TRITON 2016
(n=2 400) 

HERA 2016 
(n=28) 

INDALO 2016
(n=211) 

MINERVA 2016
(n=35) 

100% 

96% 

97% 

72% 

64% 

0% 

10% 

20% 

30% 

40% 

50% 

60% 

70% 

80% 

90% 

100% 

36 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017Figure 9.  A network diagram showing the strength of relationships between 

nationalities of migrants (blue) and nationalities of their human smugglers 

(red). The thickness of the connecting lines illustrates the frequency in which 

services were provided, according to interviews of newly-arrived migrants. 

The network shows that Syrian migrants were facilitated almost exclusively 

Libya was the availability of smuggling 

by Libyan smugglers, whereas Senegalese migrants mostly used the services 

services in that country (Fig. 8). This per­

of compatriot Senegalese smugglers

centage rose to nearly 80% for migrants 

from  far­afield  countries,  such  as  Pa­

kistan and Iraq, who are clearly choos­

ing to target the EU from Libya because 

of the readily available facilitation ser­

vices. Even though several thousand mi­

grants were interviewed, not one spoke 

about difficulties in locating smuggling 

Cameroon

Turkey

Senegal

Côte d'Ivoire

Eritrea

Ethiopia

networks. On the contrary, they tended 

Gambia

to be inundated with offers from differ­

ent networks.

The correlation between the nation­

alities  of  the  migrants  and  of  the  peo­

Guinea

ple smugglers they used is illustrated in 

Morocco

a network diagram in Figure 9. The dia­

gram is predictably dominated by Libyan 

people smugglers. As a result, almost all 

migrants were facilitated to some extent 

by  Libyans,  and  Syrian  migrants  were 

almost exclusively facilitated by Libyan 

Palestinian
Territory

Senegal

people  smugglers,  probably  because  of 

Somalia

the  shared  language.  Other  nationali­

ties  tended  to  use  compatriots  such  as 

Sudanese migrants facilitated by Suda­

Sudan

Syria

Egypt

Cameroon

Sudan

Pakistan

Nigeria

Mali

Morocco

Libya

Gambia

Guinea

nese  people  smugglers;  similar  trends 

tating irregular migration from a wide 

Libya but also in Ethiopia and Sudan. By 

can be seen for Moroccans and Gambi­

range of locations towards Libya and on­

contrast, Sudanese and Nigerian people 

ans. The exception was migrants from 

wards to the EU. Somalian people smug­

smugglers only appeared to be active in 

Somalia who were more commonly fa­

glers were reported to be active not only 

Libya and their home country. What is 

cilitated  by  people  smugglers  from  Su­

in their home country and in Libya but 

clear is that a very wide range of nation­

dan than by their compatriots.

also in Ethiopia, South Sudan and even 

alities are involved in facilitating irregu­

It is clear that a very large number of 

in Kenya and Uganda. Similarly, Eritrean 

lar migration towards Libya and onwards 

people smugglers are involved in facili­

people smugglers were active not only in 

to the EU in numerous locations.

Figure 8.  Some 70% of interviewed migrants newly arrived in the Central Mediterranean area, stated that access to 

facilitation services was the reason for entering the EU via this route. Note differences in sample sizes

Facilitation 

Border topography 

Price 

Safety 

Low risk of detection 

Lack of surveillance 

Frontex operation 

Absence of readmission agreement 

TRITON 2016 
(n=2 400) 

POSEIDON 2016 
(n=82) 

HERA 2016 
(n=28) 

MINERVA 2016 
(n=35) 

INDALO 2016 
(n=211) 

70% 

65% 

47% 

30% 

29% 

0% 

10% 

20% 

30% 

40% 

50% 

60% 

70% 

80% 

90% 

100% 

37 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 20176.4.  Identifying return system 

vulnerabilities

kan nationals accounted for 90% of these 

effective  returns.  However,  other  mi­

grant  nationalities  with  high  first­in­

stance  asylum  rejection  rates  were 

seriously  underrepresented  as  regards 

In its preamble, the new European Bor­
der and Coast Guard Regulation1 stipu­
lates that the Agency should step up its 

increased significantly. The number of 

the number of effective returns. For ex­

people effectively removed from the EU 

ample, a two­digit number of Pakistani 

remained stable with a monthly average 

nationals was returned from Germany in 

assistance to Member States in returning 

of  less  than  15  000  in  2016,  which  is  a 

2016, while the reported number of Pa­

third­country nationals to whom nega­

level similar to previous years. In fact, 

kistani asylum applications doubled to 

tive asylum decisions have been issued or 

the  monthly  figures  and  their  break­

over  14  000  and  the  first­instance  asy­

who have no right to stay. In particular, 

downs did not show any change at the 

lum  rejection  rate  of  Pakistani  nation­

the Agency shall coordinate and organ­

beginning of 2016, when many of the mi­

als was high.

ise return operations from one or more 

grants or asylum seekers who had arrived 

In 2016, Sweden was among the coun­

Member  States  and  organise  and  con­

in 2015 became subject to return (due to 

tries with the most significant increase 

duct  return  interventions  to  reinforce 

a failed asylum claim or illegal stay).

in  effective  returns  with  a  55%  growth 

the  return  systems  of  Member  States. 

In  spite  of  a  rapidly  rising  number 

compared  with  2015. The  change  was 

Moreover, the general and tailored risk 

of negative asylum decisions following 

mainly due to a more than six­fold in­

analyses conducted by the Agency shall 

the irregular migration peak of 2015, the 

crease in returns of Iraqi nationals and 

also extend to the field of return.

number of return decisions issued by EU 

a  15­fold  increase  in  effective  returns 

Level of returns nearly unchanged 
in spite of migration crisis

Member States in 2016 increased by only 

of Afghan  nationals  to  approximately 

6.5% compared with a year before. 

1 000. Also, Poland substantially accel­

However, substantial differences were 

erated  its  effective  returns  –  especially 

noticed between Member States. Greece 

those of Ukrainian nationals – to more 

In spite of the massive irregular move­

and Italy, being the main entry points 

than 15 000 (a 50% increase).

ments into the EU between September 

for  irregular  migration  to  the  EU,  re­

2015 and March 2016, the overall level of 

ported numbers of effective returns that 

effective returns to third countries per­

were  approximately  10%  lower  than  in 

formed  by  EU  Member  States  has  not 

2015. At the same time, main EU desti­

1  Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the 

European Parliament and of the Council 
of 14 September 2016 on the European 
Border and Coast Guard

nation countries of the irregular migra­

tion flows in 2016 reported substantially 

higher numbers than in 2015. In 2016, 

Germany increased its effective returns 

to third countries by 24%. Western Bal­

Figure 10.  Monthly detections of illegal stayers vs effective returns of Western Balkan nationals, 2013–2016

12 000

10 000

8 000

6 000

4 000

2 000

0

Effective returns of Western Balkan nationals
Illegal stay by Western Balkan nationals

n
a
J

b
e
F

r
a
M

r
p
A

y
a
M

n
u

J

l

u

J

g
u
A

p
e
S

t
c
O

v
o
N

c
e
D

n
a
J

b
e
F

r
a
M

r
p
A

y
a
M

n
u

J

l

u

J

g
u
A

p
e
S

t
c
O

v
o
N

c
e
D

n
a
J

b
e
F

r
a
M

r
p
A

y
a
M

n
u

J

l

u

J

g
u
A

p
e
S

t
c
O

v
o
N

c
e
D

n
a
J

b
e
F

r
a
M

r
p
A

y
a
M

n
u

J

l

u

J

g
u
A

p
e
S

t
c
O

v
o
N

c
e
D

2013

2014

2015

2016

38 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.  Monthly detections of illegal border-crossing vs effective returns of West African nationals, 2013–2016

20 000

18 000

16 000

14 000

12 000

10 000

8 000

6 000

4 000

2 000

0

Effective returns of West African nationals
Illegal border-crossing by West African nationals

n
a
J

b
e
F

r
a
M

r
p
A

y
a
M

n
u

J

l

u

J

g
u
A

p
e
S

t
c
O

v
o
N

c
e
D

n
a
J

b
e
F

r
a
M

r
p
A

y
a
M

n
u

J

l

u

J

g
u
A

p
e
S

t
c
O

v
o
N

c
e
D

n
a
J

b
e
F

r
a
M

r
p
A

y
a
M

n
u

J

l

u

J

g
u
A

p
e
S

t
c
O

v
o
N

c
e
D

n
a
J

b
e
F

r
a
M

r
p
A

y
a
M

n
u

J

l

u

J

g
u
A

p
e
S

t
c
O

v
o
N

c
e
D

2013

2014

2015

2016

Differences in return levels 
between different regions of 
origin

cedures to process asylum applications and 

return decisions; and difficulties in collab­

orating effectively with the countries of or­

Development of solutions to 
improve the return system 
requires advance time

igin in the identification process.

Moreover,  EU­wide  data  on  effective 

This is particularly relevant for smaller 

A  common  element  of  the  aforemen­

returns  show  substantial  differences 

West African  countries,  which  have  a 

tioned solutions is that they require con­

between regions of origin of irregular mi­

rather limited network of consular offices 

siderable time for planning and practical 

grants. This is clearly illustrated through 

in the EU. The return procedure is thus 

implementation. For this reason, regu­

a comparison between nationalities from 

slowed down due to numerous practical 

lar and detailed analysis of the EU return 

the  Western  Balkans  and  West Africa. 

obstacles, especially difficulties in obtain­

system with a view to forecasting future 

Nationals of both regions show average 

ing adequate travel documents from the 

return  priorities  would  accelerate  the 

first­instance asylum rejection rates of 

authorities of countries of origin. Return 

necessary preparatory work and help im­

more than 70% and a comparably high 

agreements between Member States and 

prove cooperation with countries of or­

irregular migration pressure to the EU.

countries of origin are an essential pre­

igin in a timely manner. Also, it would 

As illustrated by Figure 10, the rising 

condition for implementing effective re­

assist  in  identifying  best  practices  in 

number of irregular migrants from the 

turns. Since cooperation of countries of 

regard to their legislative and adminis­

Western Balkans detected in the EU seems 

origin may be problematic, certain Mem­

trative framework, international coop­

to have led to a slightly increased number 

ber States have developed special strate­

eration,  and  voluntary  return  projects 

of effective returns. This could be due to a 

gies and operational measures. These best 

and  in  sharing  them  among  Member 

relatively good level of cooperation with 

practices include setting up task forces; 

States. Moreover, it would help identify 

Western Balkan countries in terms of legal 

developing  cross­departmental  cooper­

vulnerabilities in the EU return system.

and practical return requirements. In ad­

ation  frameworks;  and  implementing 

The analysis of return data reveals sig­

dition, the fact that a number of EU Mem­

practical  initiatives  with  partner  coun­

nificant differences between national re­

ber States and the European Commission 

tries such as the European Integrated Re­

turn systems, especially in terms of their 

have designated Western Balkan countries 

turn Management Initiative (EURINT).

performance  in  dealing  with  specific 

as ‘safe countries of origin’ has contributed 

Yet another effective practice is iden­

countries of origin with high asylum re­

to the acceleration of return procedures.

tification missions. They involve the is­

jection rates. Return data also show that 

By contrast, the strong increase in il­

suance  of  necessary  documentation  by 

irregular migrants with low chances for 

legal border­crossings of West African na­

officials of countries of origin based in 

a positive asylum decision already exploit 

tionals in 2016 did not lead to an increase 

Member States to returnees of their own 

the existing gaps in Member States’ re­

in effective returns. The fact that peaks in 

nationality. Since enhanced cooperation 

turn systems, such as a lack of bilateral 

irregular migration are not fully reflected 

between  Member  States  is  indispensa­

cooperation and readmission agreements 

in the number of returns can be associated 

ble in dealing with countries of origin, 

with the respective countries of origin.

with: gaps in Member States’ regulations 

Member States share identification mis­

and legislative frameworks; national pro­

sions to ensure effective readmissions.

39 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.5.  Safety and security situation in 

reception centres

makeshift camps). Hence, there exists 

a pressing need for additional reception 

centres, as the current capacity has been 

exceeded considerably.

The  accommodation  of  significant 

The unprecedented migratory flows to the 

tion centres and the protection of migrants 

numbers of people in Hotspots and other 

EU via the Eastern and Central Mediterra­

and refugees is an exclusive responsibility 

reception  centres  has  drawn  attention 

nean routes over the past two years have 

of EU Member States.3

led to a dramatic increase in the number 

As shown in Table 2, Greek Hotspots 

to  the  safety  and  security  concerns  in 
these  sites.6  Statistical  data  regarding 
the safety and security situation in EU 

of detections of illegal border­crossings 
(503 700 in 2016 and 1 820 000 in 2015)1 and 
first­time asylum seekers applying for in­

ternational protection (1 255 640 in 2015 
compared with 562 680 in 2014)2 – the main 
nationalities being Iraqi, Afghan and Syr­

ian. The ongoing migratory crisis has been 

particularly challenging for Greece and It­

have significantly larger capacity than 

Italian  ones,  which  is  consistent  with 

Hotspots,  and  other  hosting  facilities, 

the migratory patterns over the last two 

are not systematically collected. Never­

years. According  to  the  Greek  authori­

theless, Frontex as well as UNHCR and 

ties, the actual number of migrants ac­

NGOs have been regularly reporting on 

commodated  on  the  five  islands  at  the 
end  of  2016  was  15  431.4 This  reflects  a 
dynamically changing situation as the 

reception conditions identifying various 

weaknesses. Many, if not all, of the iden­

tified  issues  have  some  bearing  on  the 

aly, as they are the main entry points for 

migrants  and  refugees  accommodated 

safety and security situation.

the massive irregular migration flow to­

in these sites stay until the completion 

As a case in point, several riots took 

wards the EU. To address these challenges, 

of  registration  and  processing  of  their 

place in Greek Hotspots in 2016 resulting 

the ‘Hotspot’ approach was adopted as a 

asylum requests. Out of the total, 9 918 

in injuries and material damage. Among 

more orderly way to manage dispropor­

(64%)  were  accommodated  in  Hotspots 

others, the riot and fire at Moria Hotspot 

tionate migratory pressures at the EU’s 

and 4 787 (31%) in UNHCR and other non­

on Lesbos Island on 19 September 2016 re­

external borders. Hotspot centres serve 

governmental facilities.

quired intervention by the anti­riot po­

the purpose of identification, registration, 

On four of the Greek Hotspot islands 

lice to restore order and the fire brigade 

fingerprinting, debriefing, processing of 

(with  the  exception  of  Leros)  insuffi­

to  extinguish  the  fire. Tensions  in  the 

asylum requests and return operations. 

cient capacity to cater for the actual ac­

facility arose in connection to its over­

In the performance of these tasks, front­

commodation needs was reported. The 

crowding. At the time, it accommodated 

line Member States are assisted by EASO, 

situation on Chios was particularly chal­

more than 4 000 people, which was way 

Frontex and Eurojust. It should be empha­

lenging, as the overall number of persons 

beyond its maximum capacity. 

sised here that the management of recep­

in  governmental  and  non­governmen­

Bulgaria’s largest Harmanli Refugee 

tal reception facilities was three times 

Camp  and  other  camps  it  Elhovo,  Ly­

Table 2.  Hotspots in Italy and Greece

higher  than  the  existing  Hotspot  ca­

ubmets  and  Sofia  experienced  similar 

pacity.  Overall,  62  784  people  were  ac­

security  and  capacity  problems.  On  24 

Italy

commodated  in  reception  sites  in  the 

November 2016, unrest broke out in Har­

Lampedusa Pozzallo

Porto 
Empedocle

Taranto

Trapani

Total 
capacity

500

300

300

300

400

1 900

Greece

Lesbos

Chios

Samos

Leros

Kos

Total 
capacity

1 500

1 100

850

1 000

1 000

5 450

Source: European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs.3 

1  Frontex Risk Analysis for 2016
2  Eurostat data; available at 

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/
documents/2995521/7203832/3­04032016­
AP­EN.pdf/. It is noted that 2016 data 
were not available at the time of 
publication. According to EASO, 1 100 000 
asylum applications were recorded in 
the 28 Member States plus Norway and 
Switzerland until October 2016.

40 of 60

Greek  mainland  and  on  the  islands  by 

manli in response to the imposition of 

the end of 2016. However, according to 

a quarantine on the camp following an 

UNHCR  data,  the  overall  accommoda­

outbreak  of  an  infectious  skin  disease 

tion capacity of the country amounts for 
approximately 35 000 people only.5 This 
means  that  a  large  number  of  persons 

and  concerns  about  its  possible  spread 

among  the  local  population. This  site 

has a capacity of 2 700 and at the time 

were staying in other than government­

housed 3 000 residents. During the riot, 

run hosting facilities (e.g. apartments, 

2  000  refugees  clashed  with  the  police 

buildings, hotels, hosting families, and 

leaving 24 officers injured. These events 

3  https://ec.europa.eu/home­affairs/

sites/homeaffairs/files/what­
we­do/policies/european­agenda­
migration/press­material/docs/
state_of_play_­_hotspots_en.pdf 

4  http://media.gov.gr/
5  UNHCR Accommodation – Relocation 

Update; available at http://data.unhcr.
org/mediterranean/country.php?id=83

in Greece and Bulgaria highlighted the 

tense and unstable situation in reception 

6  European Parliament (2016) 

On the frontline: the Hotspot approach 
to managing migration; available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/556942/
IPOL_STU%282016%29556942_EN.pdf

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017sites and the precarious situation of mi­

cates  the  need  to  take  special  pro­

may  vary  between  reception  sites. 

grants and refugees.

tection  measures  to  protect  these 

These factors exacerbate tensions re­

The aforementioned issues were not 

vulnerable groups from gender­based 

sulting in violent acts, material dam­

limited to the main entry points at the 

violence, THB and sexual crimes (e.g. 

ages and serious harm.

EU’s external borders, but also affected 

separate  accommodation,  provision 

 ▪ Reception facilities attract the atten­

other sites along the main routes lead­

of  medical  and  psychological  assis­

tion of people smugglers, human traf­

ing  to  the  final  destination  countries. 

tance). According  to  UNHCR  data, 

fickers and terrorist recruiters. Since 

Many security incidents, widely reported 

37% of all arrivals in Greece (includ­

this  carries  serious  implications  for 

in  the  media,  took  place  in  makeshift 

ing  2  300  unaccompanied  children) 

public order, the authorities need to 

camps at specific extra­ and intra­EU bor­

and 16% in Italy in 2016 involved chil­

exercise  constant  vigilance  to  pre­

der sections (e.g. Idomeni camp close to 

the border between Greece and the for­

mer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia bor­

dren,  while  the  percentages  for  fe­
males were 21% and 13%, respectively.7
 ▪ Riots  and  fights  between  groups  of 

vent and suppress criminal and ter­

rorist  radicalisation  activities. The 

case of Anis Amri, a rejected asylum 

der, ferry and Channel Tunnel terminals 

migrants  and  refugees  frequently 

seeker from Tunisia who carried out 

in  Calais,  France)  and  hosting  sites  in 

take  place  in  Hotspots.  Such  inci­

a terrorist attack in Berlin, Germany 

certain destination countries (e.g. Ger­

dents  are  mainly  triggered  by  frus­

on 19 December 2016, is indicative of 

many) requiring constant police presence 

tration over substandard conditions, 

how problems can arise affecting the 

and interventions to restore and main­

prolonged registration and processing 

internal security of Member States.

tain  order. As  a  result,  refugee  camps 

of asylum requests, spreading of ru­

 ▪ Finally,  the  situation  within  recep­

such  as  the ‘Jungle’  in  Calais  and  Ido­

mours and uncertainty about their fu­

tion  centres  coupled  with  concerns 

meni  in  Northern  Greece  were  eventu­

ture. During these events, the safety 

about large migratory flows can also 

ally shut down by the authorities.

of  Hotspot  staff  and  deployed  guest 

influence  the  perceptions  and  atti­

In  general,  the  control  of  reception 

officers  is  at  risk. Another  cause  of 

tudes  of  the  general  public  towards 

centres poses significant challenges for 

clashes among migrants involves the 

migrants  and  refugees.  Improving 

the following reasons:

mixing  of  different  ethnicities  and 

the safety and security in these sites 

 ▪ The large influx of migrants and ref­

cultures.  In  particular,  as  a  group 

could go a long way in improving re­

ugees creates, among others, a need 

with distinct socio­cultural and reli­

lations with local communities and 

for  public­order  policing  and  crowd 

gious background, Afghan migrants 

preventing any xenophobic reactions 

control  that  falls  outside  the  remit 

were over­represented among nation­

and hate crimes against migrants and 

of border­control authorities, which 

als involved in incidents in the recep­

refugees.

are neither equipped nor trained for 

tion centres.

In conclusion, the current situation 

such actions. In certain cases, there is 

 ▪ Reception conditions that do not meet 

in  frontline  Hotspots  and  other  host­

a need to deploy special police units to 

minimum standards (e.g. poor san­

ing  facilities  needs  improvement  be­

enforce order, avoid spill­over effects 

itation, hygiene, heating, food, and 

cause  it  affects  the  safety  of  migrants 

and alleviate feelings of fear among 

overcrowding) represent the most fre­

and refugees as well as the internal se­

local populations.

quent causes of unrest. Even within 

curity of Member States. Overall, better 

 ▪ The arrival of numerous children (ac­

the  same  country  living  conditions 

management of reception centres is re­

companied and unaccompanied) and 

quired as an integral part of EU migra­

female  migrants  and  refugees  indi­

7  UNHCR Accommodation – Relocation 

tion management.

Update; available at http://data.unhcr.
org/mediterranean/country.php?id=105

41 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 20176.6.  Prohibited goods with possible 

security impacts

were  found  hidden  in  common  train 

compartments or abandoned in the vi­

cinity of borders thus they could not be 

linked to specific individuals.

The Frontex Risk Analysis Unit together 

plosive material were detected. Hence, 

with participants of the Western Balkans 

the number of detections was quite low 

Large-scale case reported in the 
media

Risk Analysis Network agreed to engage 

given  the  total  length  of  regional  bor­

in regular data collection regarding fire­

der areas.

According to open source information, 

arms  possession  and  smuggling  cases 

With regard to firearms, there were 

the Serbian national police arrested ten 

detected by the respective border police 

62 handguns (i.e. pistols, revolvers), 43 

individuals  in  relation  to  a  major  fire­

forces. The data collection aims to create 

long  rifles  (or  shotguns)  and  10  auto­

arms  case  in  the  towns  of Apatin  and 

a  better  understanding  of  the  interna­

matic weapons. Out of the 38 gas weap­

Sombor. The police seized 100 hand gre­

tional dimension of firearms smuggling 

ons  detected,  there  were  33  handguns 

nades, 30 kilograms of explosives, two 

and  come  up  with  more  efficient  solu­

(no  details  available  on  the  remaining 

anti­armour grenades, 12 rocket launch­

tions through a coherent and concerted 

five detections).

regional approach. This is the first such 

ers, eight assault rifles, a heavy machine 

gun, 6 000 ammunition pieces, as well 

initiative amongst the risk analysis net­

Most detections occurred at BCPs

as detonators and semi­automatic rifles. 

works coordinated by Frontex that sets in 

This was the largest seizure of weapons 

motion a statistical data exchange mech­

In the 10­month reporting period, most 

in Serbia in 15 years.

anism on firearms detections.

detections  occurred  at  BCPs. These  in­

Provisional  definitions,  indicators 

cluded  12  863  rounds  of  ammunition 

and  a  standardised  reporting  template 

(mainly  at  the  borders  between  Serbia 

were  created  to  collect  relevant  infor­

and Hungary, Albania and Kosovo*, Ser­

mation on cases of firearms detections. 

bia and the former Yugoslav Republic of 

Subsequently, information covering the 

Macedonia, and between Serbia and Cro­

year 2015 was collected at a special work­

atia), 100 firearms (mainly at the border 

shop. The process then continued with 

sections  of  Serbia­Croatia,  Bosnia  and 

monthly reporting by participating coun­

Herzegovina­Croatia,  Serbia­Hungary 

tries throughout 2016.

and  Serbia­Bulgaria),  25  gas  weapons 

Generally low detections at the 
borders in 2016

(mostly at the border sections of Serbia 

with  Hungary  and  Bulgaria),  one  con­

verted weapon and a rifle scope.

The  authorities  also  detected  eight 

In  the  first  ten  months  of  2016,  the 

firearms, 13 gas weapons and 298 pieces 

border  police  forces  of  the  six  Western 

of ammunition in their jurisdictions but 

Balkan  countries  continued  to  detect 

not  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  their 

weapons  (i.e.  firearms,  gas  and  con­

borders. Also, two firearms and 53 am­

verted) and ammunition.

munition  pieces  were  reported  at  the 

Specifically,  the  regional  reporting 

green border (likely linked to unlicensed 

covered  134  cases  in  which  154  weap­

hunters). Moreover, five firearms and 529 

ons (i.e. 115 firearms, 38 gas weapons, 
and one converted) and 13 741 rounds of 

rounds of ammunition were detected by 
border  police  forces  outside  their  area 

ammunition were detected. Compared 

of responsibility (i.e. more than 30 km 

with the same period of 2015, there were 

inland).

approximately  34%  more  ammunition 

During the first ten months of 2016, 

pieces, 77% more firearms and 36% less 

130 persons were detected in possession 

gas weapons. In 2016, only one converted 

of the prohibited items. The majority (82) 

weapon and one optical targeting device 

were  citizens  of  Western  Balkan  coun­

were detected (no grenades or explosive 

tries,  followed  by  EU  nationals  (29), 

material) whereas in 2015 six converted 

Turks  (12)  and  third­country  nation­

weapons, two optical targeting devices, 

als  (5). The  nationality  of  two  persons 

two grenades and 3.45 kilograms of ex­

was unknown. In seven cases, the items 

42 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017Austria

Hungary

Slovenia

Croatia

Romania

Bosnia & 
Herzegovina

Serbia

Montenegro

Kosovo*

Bulgaria

FYROM**

Greece

Italy

Albania

Ammunition top border sections affected

Weapons/explosives/parts
top border sections affected

Firearms 

Weapons powered by compressed gas 
but no gunpowder

Ammunition 

*  This designation is without prejudice to positions 
on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the 
ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of 
independence.

**  former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;

the deﬁnitive nomenclature for this country will be 
agreed following currentnegotiations at UN level

Figure 12.  Detections of particular types of prohibited goods in the Western 

Balkans, January–October 2015 and 2016, by border section 

Turkey

43 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017Greece, JO Poseidon, 2016 

©  Frontex

7.  Conclusions

Given the sustained migratory pressure 

toring and analytical purposes, thus the 

at the external borders, it is evident that 

improved availability of infor mation is 

the pressing challenge for border­control 

of  critical  importance.  How ever,  with 

authorities is to solve the conundrum of 

a greater amount of information comes 

reconciling  two  vexing  issues.  On  the 

a greater challenge in utilising it effec­

one hand, there is a need for increased 

tively. This  is  especially  true  in  emer­

SAR operations, which unwittingly cre­

gency  situations  when  large  amounts 

ate  conditions  whereby  smugglers  are 

of information are available but time is 

putting migrants’ lives at risk to boost 

scarce. Therefore,  data  and  situational 

their  profits.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is 

information are some times not enough, 

necessary to introduce effective preven­

so authorities will require the analysis 

tion measures to relieve the pressure at 

and  intelligence  de rived  from  them  to 

the  borders.  While  concrete  measures 

make fully in formed decisions. The man­

will  ultimately  depend  on  the  types  of 

agement of this knowledge­generation 

migratory flows and the political situa­

process is critical.

tion in the last country of departure, the 

Regular passenger flows across exter­

solution  will  require  a  combination  of 

nal borders will also grow signifi  cantly 

rapid and efficient coast guard actions, 

in the coming years, in particu lar at the 

measures  in  and  with  third  countries, 

air border, due to increased global mo­

as well as enhanced return operations. 

bility. Visa liberalisation processes and 

With the difficulties associated with 

local border traffic agreements also lead 

proper  screening  and  registration  of  a 

to greater responsibility for border­con­

large number of arrivals, there is a risk 

trol authorities. Movements across ex­

that persons posing a security threat may 

ternal air borders are managed through 

be en tering the EU. Several tragic events 

a  layered  approach,  where  the  border 

within  the  EU  have  also  demonstrated 

is  divided  into  four  tiers.  In  this  con­

that border management has an impor­

text,  the  physical  border  is  gradually 

tant security component.

becoming a second ary layer for risk as­

Second­line  checks  on  arrival  are  a 

sessment, meaning that checking and 

crucial step in the identification process. 

screening  start  well  before  passengers 

They also provide an important source of 

cross  border­control  posts  at  airports. 

information which can be further used 

Border management will be increasingly 

for  intelligence  and  risk  analysis  pur­

risk­based to en sure that interventions 

poses.  Improving  intelligence  and  an­

are focused on high­risk movements of 

alytical  capacities  is  thus  also  of  great 

people,  while  low­risk  movements  are 

significance.

processed smoothly.

The increased number of reported vul­

Col laboration  with  Customs  vary 

nerable persons at the border also makes 

widely across EU Member States  but is 

it very clear that the effective detection 

essential in tackling a range of criminal 

of people trafficked for sexual exploita­

activities, from detecting migrants con­

tion, forced labour and other purposes 

cealed in vehicles, to preventing smug­

remains  a  major  challenge  for  border 

gling  of  excise  goods,  weapons  and 

authorities. In fact, victims themselves 

drugs.  In  addition,  collaboration  with 

are often not aware of their fate when 

police and judicial au thorities is also im­

they arrive in the transit or destination 

portant to develop more effective and ef­

countries.

ficient border­control activities.

Greece, JO Poseidon, 2016 
©  Frontex

One  improvement  which  has  been 

evident in the preceding years is the in­

creasing pool of sources of informa tion 

and data from the external borders. In­

formation  is  key  for  situational  moni­

45 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 20178. Statistical annex

LEGEND

Symbols and abbreviations:  n.a.  not applicable

:  data not available

Source:  FRAN and EDF­RAN data as of 23 January 2017, unless otherwise indicated

Note:  

 ‘Member States’ in the tables refer to FRAN Member States, including 

both 28 EU Member States and three Schengen Associated Countries

46 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex Table 1.  Illegal border-crossing between BCPs

Detections by border type and top ten nationalities at the external borders

2013

2014

2015

2016

Share of  
total

% change  
on prev. year

All Borders

Not specified

Syria

Afghanistan

Nigeria

Iraq

Eritrea

Pakistan

Guinea

Côte d'Ivoire

Gambia

Others

3 489

25 546

9 494

3 386

 537

11 298

5 047

 648

 451

2 817

44 652

Total all borders

107 365

Land Border

Not specified

Afghanistan

Pakistan

Syria

Albania

Iraq

Iran

Kosovo*

Turkey

Morocco

Others

Total land borders

Sea Border

Syria

Afghanistan

Nigeria

Iraq

Eritrea

Guinea

Côte d'Ivoire

Gambia

Pakistan

Senegal

Others

Total sea borders

3 469

4 392

3 211

8 601

8 833

 413

 214

6 350

 297

 693

10 719

47 192

16 945

5 102

2 870

 124

10 953

 487

 150

2 722

1 836

1 391

17 593

60 173

 309

78 887

22 132

8 706

2 109

34 586

4 115

2 156

2 000

8 725

119 208

282 933

 189

9 445

 555

12 189

9 268

 938

 262

22 069

 361

 43

7 426

556 434

594 059

267 485

23 605

101 275

40 349

43 310

5 174

5 010

8 874

176 602

1822 177

556 284

55 077

17 444

97 551

9 450

10 135

1 548

23 792

 494

 243

16 345

103 953

88 697

54 385

37 811

32 069

21 349

17 973

15 985

14 300

12 927

111 922

511 371

102 440

12 171

6 519

5 920

5 316

4 041

 997

 927

 921

 832

5 909

20

17

11

7.4

6.3

4.2

3.5

3.1

2.8

2.5

22

100

70

8.3

4.5

4.1

3.6

2.8

0.7

0.6

0.6

0.6

4.0

62 745

788 363

145 993

100

66 698

12 687

8 490

1 171

34 323

1 810

1 794

8 642

3 560

4 769

76 244

220 188

496 508

212 408

22 666

91 140

39 774

4 569

4 635

8 699

25 866

5 999

121 550

82 777

42 214

37 759

28 028

21 284

15 363

14 189

12 854

11 454

10 378

89 078

23

12

10

7.7

5.8

4.2

3.9

3.5

3.1

2.8

24

1033 814

365 378

100

-81

-85

-80

60

-68

-47

-59

209

185

46

-37

-72

-82

-78

-63

-94

-44

-60

-36

-96

86

242

-64

-81

-83

-80

67

-69

-46

236

206

48

-56

73

-27

-65

*   This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

47 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017Annex Table 2.  Clandestine entries at BCPs

Detections reported by border type and top ten nationalities at the external borders

2013

2014

2015

2016

Share of  
total

% change  
on prev. year

Border Type

Land

Sea

Top Ten Nationalities

Syria

Guinea

Afghanistan

Iraq

Morocco

Algeria

Albania

Pakistan

Ukraine

Congo (D.R.)

Others

Total

 558

 41

 181

 4

 128

 12

 33

 48

 3

 30

 7

 0

 153

 599

2 972

 80

1 091

 66

1 022

 85

 16

 120

 13

 63

 18

 8

 550

3 052

3 288

 15

1 673

 66

 966

 304

 8

 72

 8

 90

 0

 3

 113

3 303

1 896

 132

 650

 360

 232

 152

 130

 126

 73

 56

 30

 26

 193

2 028

93

6.5

32

18

11

7.5

6.4

6.2

3.6

2.8

1.5

1.3

9.5

 100

-42

780

-61

445

-76

-50

n.a.

75

n.a.

-38

n.a.

n.a.

71

-39

48 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017Annex Table 3.  Facilitators

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities

2013

2014

2015

2016

Share of  
total

% change  
on prev. year

Place of Detection

Inland

Not specified

Land

Sea

Land Intra EU

Air

Top Ten Nationalities

Not specified

Morocco

Albania

Spain

Italy

France

Bulgaria

Pakistan

Romania

Syria

Others

Total

5 057

 267

 695

 394

 566

 273

 692

 366

 279

 241

 675

 271

 211

 227

 225

 172

3 893

7 252

6 967

 318

1 214

 585

 811

 339

 653

 959

 413

 510

 487

 417

 322

 263

 275

 398

4 669

3 655

1 413

1 137

 872

 277

 702

1 138

 611

 613

 370

 469

 426

 349

 413

 533

5 262

3 249

1 971

 962

 879

 245

1 969

1 232

 686

 638

 503

 490

 419

 364

 330

 317

5 537

10 234

6 399

12 023

5 620

12 568

42

26

16

7.7

7.0

1.9

16.0

9.8

5.5

5.1

4.0

3.9

3.3

2.9

2.6

2.5

45

 100

13

-11

39

-15

0.8

-12

180

8.3

12

4.1

36

4.5

-1.6

4.3

-20

-41

-12

4. 5

49 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017Annex Table 4.  Illegal stay

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities

2013

2014

2015

2016

Share of  
total

% change  
on prev. year

Place of Detection

Inland

Air

Land

Land intra-EU

Between BCPs

Not specified

Sea

Top Ten Nationalities

Afghanistan

Iraq

Syria

Morocco

Ukraine

Eritrea

Albania

Pakistan

Algeria

Iran

Others

Total

253 103

31 007

17 910

3 216

 574

 38

1 396

14 221

4 454

16 414

25 707

12 346

5 975

15 639

14 036

14 122

5 396

178 934

307 244

366 467

33 793

15 511

3 929

2 160

2 372

 901

22 365

5 802

53 630

28 416

15 786

32 477

21 248

12 804

14 778

5 682

212 145

425 133

632 453

41 179

18 527

5 763

 720

 51

 681

95 784

61 462

140 336

29 731

22 652

39 338

28 926

23 179

14 948

13 918

229 100

699 374

403 387

50 347

28 341

5 938

1 680

1 620

 578

50 746

31 883

31 632

30 038

28 996

24 655

24 124

19 573

17 272

15 247

217 725

491 891

82

10

5.8

1.2

0.3

0.3

0.1

10

6.5

6.4

6.1

5.9

5.0

4.9

4.0

3.5

3.1

44

 100

-36

22

53

3.0

133

n.a.

-15

-47

-48

-77

1.0

28

-37

-17

-16

16

9.5

-5.0

-30

50 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017Annex Table 5.  Refusals of entry

Refusals reported by border type and top ten nationalities at the external borders

2013

2014

2015

2016

Share of  
total

% change  
on prev. year

Border Type

Land

Air

Sea

Top Ten Nationalities

Russian Federation

Ukraine

Albania

Tajikistan

Serbia

Belarus

Not specified

Morocco

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Armenia

Others

Total

78 606

44 785

5 844

22 698

16 380

11 564

 216

8 181

4 572

2 087

5 372

3 523

1 728

64 512

46 358

4 894

10 825

17 312

13 008

 258

8 659

5 428

1 827

4 439

4 007

1 315

86 945

46 897

5 309

16 732

21 763

15 030

3 652

6 971

6 196

1 750

4 348

3 785

3 742

52 914

129 235

48 686

115 764

55 182

139 151

151 167

48 268

7 221

70 901

27 861

19 551

7 170

6 876

5 975

5 574

4 683

4 107

3 878

50 080

206 656

73

23

3.5

34

13

9.5

3.5

3.3

2.9

2.7

2.3

2.0

1.9

24

 100

74

2.9

36

324

28

30

96

-1.4

-3.6

219

7.7

8.5

3.6

-9.2

49

51 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017Annex Table 6.  Reasons for refusals of entry

Reasons for refusals of entry reported at the external borders by top ten nationalities

Total Refusals

Reasons for refusals of entry (see description below)

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

n.a.

Top Ten Nationalities

Russian Federation

Ukraine

Albania

Tajikistan

Serbia

Belarus

Not specified

Morocco

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Armenia

Others

Total

70 088

26 159

18 301

6 870

6 125

5 578

5 118

4 378

3 835

3 653

63

105

143

0

157

63

543

837

959

18

56 551

206 656

2 660

5 548

19

168

103

4

44

8

159

56

4

3

950

64 901

7 934

287

6 571

360

2 181

91

815

205

3 316

15 111

1 518

101 772

35

27

8

2

9

3

14

56

0

26

639

819

1 300

10 015

6 279

100

931

586

1 686

1 435

1 306

173

343

1 439

912

2

2 301

308

31

72

82

7

17 544

3 132

552

2 067

4 378

50

821

1 020

2 340

130

1 098

33

4 428

165

1 029

5 264

6

1 464

244

174

494

121

8

3 078

917

162

182

4

34

661

7

421

59

2

773

295

2 811

860

7

21

517

79

83

13

16

41 355

8 629

16 917

12 047

3 222

16 319

208 146

11 617

59 932

Total  
Reasons

68 590

25 757

18 416

6 746

6 142

5 591

5 124

4 399

3 847

3 602

Descriptions of the reasons for refusal of entry:
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
I 

has no valid travel document(s);
has a false / counterfeit / forged travel document;
has no valid visa or residence permit;
has a false / counterfeit / forged visa or residence permit;
has no appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay;
has already stayed for three months during a six months period on the territory of the Member States of the European Union;
does not have sufficient means of subsistence in relation to the period and form of stay, or the means to return to the country of origin or transit;
is a person for whom an alert has been issued for the purposes of refusing entry in the SIS or in the national register;
 is considered to be a threat for public policy, internal security, public health or the international relations of one or more Member States of the European Union;

52 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017Annex Table 7.  Document fraudsters - external borders

Persons detected using fraudulent documents at BCPs on entry to the EU or Schengen area, by border type and top ten nationalities claimed

2014

2015

2016

Share of  
total

% change  
on prev. year

Border Type

Air

Land

Sea

Not specified

6 509

2 484

 409

 1

Top Ten Nationalities Claimed

Ukraine

Morocco

Not specified

Albania

Iran

Iraq

Syria

Turkey

Russian Federation

Congo (D.R.)

Others

Total

 519

 767

 733

 572

 263

 338

1 447

 294

 48

 142

4 280

9 403

5 331

2 671

 359

 4

1 186

 867

1 010

 424

 340

 243

 745

 114

 51

 148

3 237

8 365

4 368

2 325

 351

 0

1 208

 752

 710

 386

 375

 273

 234

 210

 143

 123

2 630

7 044

62

33

5.0

17

11

10

5.5

5.3

3.9

3.3

3.0

2.0

1.7

37

100

-18

-13

-2.2

n.a.

1.9

-13

-30

-9.0

10

12

-69

84

180

-17

-19

-16

53 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017Annex Table 8.  Fraudulent documents

Detections of fraudulent documents on entry from third countries to EU or Schengen area by country of issuance and type of documents

2014

2015

2016

Share of  
total

% change  
on prev. year

Country of Issuance

Poland

Italy

Spain

France

Germany

Lithuania

Belgium

Greece

Latvia

Sweden

Others

Type of Document

Passports

Visas

ID cards

Residence permits

Stamps

Other

Total

 489

1 153

1 019

1 163

 396

 49

 383

 917

 27

 298

4 859

4 949

1 617

1 400

1 507

1 047

 233

10 753

1 011

 931

 973

 906

 476

 96

 477

 472

 32

 162

 882

 852

 839

 775

 466

 426

 288

 273

 142

 127

4 144

3 197

4 065

1 934

1 203

1 383

 903

 192

9 680

2 770

2 115

1 177

1 166

 833

 206

8 267

11

10

10

9.4

5.6

5.2

3.5

3.3

1.7

1.5

39

34

26

14

14

10

2.5

100

-13

-8.5

-14

-14

-2.1

344

-40

-42

344

-22

-23

-32

9.4

-2.2

-16

-7.8

7.3

-15

Highest share

Type of Document

Visas (84%)

ID cards (37%)

ID cards (36%)

Passports (32%)

Visas (45%)

Visas (72%)

Residence permits (43%)

Residence permits (23%)

Visas (94%)

Visas (41%)

Passports (66%)

Type of Fraud

Impostor (29%)

Fraudulently obtained (59%)

Counterfeit (37%)

Counterfeit (42%)

Counterfeit (85%)

Counterfeit (77%)

54 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017Annex Table 9.  Return decisions issued

Decisions issued by top ten nationalities

2013

2014

2015

2016

Share of  
total

% change  
on prev. year

Top Ten Nationalities

Afghanistan

Iraq

Ukraine

Morocco

Albania

Pakistan

Syria

Algeria

India

Iran

Others

Total

9 301

3 517

9 242

12 486

17 983

16 567

12 599

8 732

10 193

2 726

120 950

224 296

11 861

3 292

11 026

19 843

21 287

13 717

26 489

7 790

8 860

2 202

125 619

251 986

18 655

16 093

17 709

22 360

26 453

12 777

27 937

6 832

8 287

3 417

126 205

286 725

34 396

28 464

24 649

22 441

18 181

16 038

9 849

9 494

8 359

6 998

126 496

305 365

11

9.3

8.1

7.3

6.0

5.3

3.2

3.1

2.7

2.3

41

100

84

77

39

0.4

-31

26

-65

39

0.9

105

0.2

6.5

55 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017Annex Table 10.  Effective returns

People effectively returned to third countries and top ten nationalities

2013

2014

2015

Top Ten Nationalities

Albania

Ukraine

Iraq

Morocco

India

Kosovo*

Serbia

Pakistan

Afghanistan

Russian Federation

Others

Total

20 544

7 763

2 584

6 758

8 958

4 535

6 564

12 127

3 415

8 216

78 954

160 418

26 442

9 582

1 932

8 595

7 609

4 743

6 243

9 609

3 050

6 652

76 845

161 302

30 468

14 995

4 829

8 158

9 419

10 144

7 482

8 089

1 804

4 591

75 194

175 173

2016

27 201

20 970

11 870

9 289

8 404

7 618

6 882

6 378

5 419

3 680

68 512

176 223

Share of  
total

% change  
on prev. year

15

12

6.7

5.3

4.8

4.3

3.9

3.6

3.1

2.1

39

100

-11

40

146

14

-11

-25

-8.0

-21

200

-20

-8.9

0.6

*   This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

56 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017Annex Table 11.  Effective returns by type of return

People effectively returned to third countries by to type of return and top ten nationalities

2013

2014

2015

2016

Share of  
total

% change  
on prev. year

Type of Return

Forced

Enforced by Member State

Not specified

Enforced by Joint Operation

Voluntary

Others

IOM-assisted

Not specified

Not specified

Total

Top Ten Nationalities

Forced

Albania

Morocco

Kosovo

Serbia

Tunisia

Algeria

Ukraine

Pakistan

FYROM**

Nigeria

Others

Total Forced Returns

Voluntary

Ukraine

Iraq

India

Albania

Pakistan

Afghanistan

Russian Federation

Kosovo*

Serbia

Iran

Others

87 465

76 062

9 832

1 571

64 588

34 615

16 035

13 938

8 365

69 399

50 417

17 014

1 968

63 890

37 483

11 324

15 083

28 013

72 839

54 408

15 878

2 553

82 032

54 464

14 391

13 177

20 302

79 608

58 097

16 219

5 292

92 082

61 510

19 673

10 899

4 533

160 418

161 302

175 173

176 223

19 296

2 943

2 265

3 363

3 123

2 617

1 390

8 369

 728

2 707

40 664

87 465

6 248

1 493

6 032

1 171

3 663

1 016

6 715

2 270

3 168

 671

32 141

6 306

7 158

2 707

3 164

3 048

2 811

1 345

2 942

 689

2 488

36 741

69 399

8 122

1 094

5 111

2 013

3 507

 738

5 018

2 035

3 020

 670

32 562

63 890

10 258

19 482

7 017

4 743

4 051

2 268

2 246

1 860

2 067

1 084

2 315

34 930

72 839

13 054

3 648

7 400

4 647

4 479

 694

3 644

5 401

3 375

 589

35 101

82 032

7 506

4 916

4 347

2 730

2 609

2 044

1 812

1 676

1 561

30 925

79 608

18 904

10 630

6 888

5 526

4 268

4 069

2 724

2 701

2 529

1 933

31 910

92 082

45

73

20

6.6

52

67

21

12

2.6

100

24

9.4

6.2

5.5

3.4

3.3

2.6

2.3

2.1

2.0

39

45

21

12

7.5

6.0

4.6

4.4

3.0

2.9

2.7

2.1

35

52

9.3

6.8

2.1

107

12

13

37

-17

-78

0.6

90

7.0

3.6

7.3

20

16

9.9

-12

55

-33

-11

9.3

45

191

-6.9

19

-4.7

486

-25

-50

-25

228

-9.1

12

Total Voluntary Returns

64 588

*   This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
**  former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; the definitive nomenclature for this country will be agreed following current negotiations at UN level.

57 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017Annex Table 12.  Passenger flow on entry

Data reported (on voluntary basis) by border type and top ten nationalities

Air 

Land

Sea

Total

2015

2016

2015

2016

2015

2016

2015

2016

Share  
of total % change on

Top Ten Nationalities

Not specified

EU MS / SAC

Croatia

Ukraine

Russian Federation

Poland

Belarus

Romania

Serbia

Hungary

Total

110 515 319

138 880 213

26 638 297

35 378 188

13 810 330

15 834 458

150 963 946

190 092 859

5 264 816

5 424 615

10 244 412

9 793 871

1 445 091

1 586 511

16 954 319

16 804 997

468 717

286 567

1 377 837

4 092 140

147 439

304 874

35 349

13 219

521 888

378 083

1 586 352

4 820 006

139 865

487 481

45 773

326 825

14 535 866

15 568 235

12 180 800

14 260 645

7 551 496

3 174 743

4 451 191

3 319 891

2 715 939

82 237

8 003 452

2 872 817

4 968 733

4 562 678

3 470 271

1 765 699

19 503

52 348

253 076

32 318

2 700

332

3 770

25

52 006

56 722

269 758

36 833

2 872

515

5 418

586

15 024 086

16 142 129

12 519 715

14 695 450

9 182 409

7 299 201

4 601 330

3 625 097

2 755 058

95 481

9 859 562

7 729 656

5 111 470

5 050 674

3 521 462

2 093 110

66

5.8

5.6

5.1

3.4

2.7

1.8

1.7

1.2

0.7

26

-0.9

7.4

17

7.4

5.9

11

39

28

n.a.

128 264 637

160 653 122

90 575 281

110 413 189

16 209 398

18 628 408

235 049 316

289 694 719

100

23.2

58 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017Notes on FRAN data sources and methods 

The term ‘Member States’ refers to FRAN 

plicable for land­locked Member States 

include land Intra­EU detections on exit 

Member States, which includes the 28 

including Austria, the Czech Republic, 

at the border with Hungary. 

Member States and the three Schengen 

Hungary,  Luxembourg,  Slovakia  and 

For  the  data  concerning  detections 

Associated Countries (Iceland, Norway 

Switzerland. 

of  illegal  stay  (FRAN  Indicator  3),  data 

and Switzerland). For the data concern­

In addition, data on detections of il­

on  detections  on  exit  are  not  available 

ing detections at the external borders of 

legal border­crossing at land, air and sea 

for  Ireland,  Italy  and  the  UK.  Data  on 

the EU, some of the border types are not 

BCPs  (1B)  are  not  available  for  Iceland, 

detections  of  illegal  stay  inland  have 

applicable to all FRAN Member States. 

Ireland and Spain, and in Greece these 

not been available from the Netherlands 

This  pertains  to  data  on  all  FRAN  in­

detections  are  included  in  the  data  for 

since 2012. 

dicators  since  the  data  are  provided 

indicator 1A. 

Data  on  refusals  of  entry  (FRAN  In­

disaggregated by border type. The def­

Data on detections of illegal border­

dicator 4) at the external EU borders are 

initions  of  detections  at  land  borders 

crossing between sea BCPs (1A) are not 

not  disaggregated  by  reason  of  refusal 

are therefore not applicable (excluding 

available for Ireland. For 2013, data from 

for Ireland and the UK. 

borders with non­Schengen principali­

Slovenia include detections at the EU ex­

The data on passenger flow (shared on 

ties) for Belgium, the Czech Republic, 

ternal borders only until June 2013. 

voluntary basis) are not available for Aus­

Denmark,  France,  Germany,  Iceland, 

Data  on  apprehension  (FRAN  Indi­

tria, Ireland, Sweden and the UK. Data 

Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the 

cator  2)  of  facilitators  are  not  available 

on passenger flow at the air border are 

Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Swit­

for  Ireland  and  UK.  For  Italy,  the  data 

not available according to the definition 

zerland  and  the  UK.  For  Cyprus,  the 

are  not  disaggregated  by  border  type, 

for Spain. Data at the sea border are not 

land  border  refers  to  the  Green  Line 

but are reported as total apprehensions 

available for Cyprus, Malta, Spain, the 

demarcation  with  the  area  where  the 

(not  specified).  Data  for  Italy  and  Nor­

Netherlands, Romania and Denmark. 

Government of the Republic of Cyprus 

way also include the facilitation of ille­

For all indicators, data from Croatia 

does not exercise effective control. For 

gal stay and work. For Romania, the data 

are available only starting with July 2013. 

sea borders, the definitions are not ap­

59 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 201760 of 60

Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2017Plac Europejski 6 
00-844 Warsaw, Poland

T +48 22 205 95 00 
F +48 22 205 95 01

frontex@frontex.europa.eu 
www.frontex.europa.eu

For Public Release

Risk Analysis Unit

Reference number: 2133 / 2017

Paper version: 
TT-AC-17-001-EN-C 
ISBN 978-92-95205-67-3 
ISSN 1977-4451 
doi:10.2819/94559

PDF: 
TT-AC-17-001-EN-N 
ISBN 978-92-95205-68-0 
ISSN 1977-446X 
doi:10.2819/250349

Warsaw, February 2017