REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the application of, and delegation of power under, Regulation (EU) 98/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the marketing and use of explosives precursors
Date: 2017-02-28
Institutions: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: chemical product, civil defence, dangerous substance, explosive, illicit trade, labelling, marketing standard, terrorism, trade restriction

EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 

Brussels, 28.2.2017  
COM(2017) 103 final 

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
THE COUNCIL 

on the application of, and delegation of power under, Regulation (EU) 98/2013 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the marketing and use of explosives 
precursors 

EN 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
  
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION 

Regulation  (EU)  No  98/20131  on  the  marketing  and  use  of  explosives  precursors  (‘the 
Regulation’)  entered  into  force  on  1  March  2013  and  became  applicable  on  2  September 
2014. It establishes harmonised rules on the making available, introduction, possession and 
use  of  chemical  substances  and  mixtures  which  can  be  misused  for  illicitly  manufacturing 
home-made  explosives.  The  Regulation’s  controls  and  restrictions  apply  to  the  substances 
listed in its Annexes and to mixtures and substances containing them. 

Article 18(1) of the Regulation calls on the Commission to present a report to the European 
Parliament and to the Council, by 2 September 2017, examining any problems arising from 
the  application  of  this  Regulation,  as  well  as  the  desirability  and  feasibility  of  proposing 
legislative  changes  that  could  further  strengthen  and  harmonise  the  system.  These  include 
the  possibility  of  extending  the  scope  of  the  Regulation  to  cover  professional  users  and 
including non-scheduled explosives precursors in Annex II. 

In  addition,  Article  14(2)  requires  the  Commission  to  draw  up  a  report  in  respect  of  the 
delegation of power, conferred on it for a period of five years from 1 March 2013, ‘not later 
than nine months before the end of the five-year period,’ i.e. by 1 June 2017. 

This report aims to fulfil the requirements set out in the above two articles. In the interest of 
simplifying  the  reporting  exercise,  and  given  that  the  delegation  of  power  is  a  tool  for 
legislative change, the Commission considers it beneficial and pertinent to consolidate both 
reports  into  one.  This  report  also  seeks  to  communicate  information  that  would  improve 
compliance with the Regulation’s provisions by economic operators and national authorities, 
and to enhance the transparency of the Commission’s policy-making process. 

The Commission has prepared this report on the basis of the discussions and consultations in 
the Standing Committee of Precursors  (SCP), a Commission expert group2 comprising the 
competent  authorities  of  the  EU  Member  States  and  non-EU  countries  in  the  EEA  and 
representatives  of  the  chemical  and  retail  supply  chains,  and  on  the  basis  of  the 
Commission’s own considerations. 

2. 

BACKGROUND 

2.1. 

Status of compliance with the Regulation 

As of 1 January 2017, most Member States were in compliance with the requirements of the 
Regulation: 

•  All  Member  States  have  set  up  one  or  more  national  contact  points  with  a  clearly 
identified telephone number and e-mail address for reporting suspicious transactions 
and significant disappearances and thefts (Article 9(2)); 

•  23  Member  States  are  in  full  compliance,  having  laid  down  rules  on  penalties 
(Article  11),  regularly  disseminated  the  guidelines  prepared  by  the  SCP  (Article 
9(6))  and,  where  applicable,  notified  the  Commission  of  measures  taken  to 

1 OJ L 39, 9.2.2013, p.1. 
2 Group reference E03245, see under 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=3245&NewSearc
h=1&NewSearch=1. 

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implement exceptions under a licensing or registration regime (Articles 4(4)) or of 
pre-existing regimes (Article 13(4)); 

•  Five  Member  States  are  in  partial  compliance,  having  not  laid  down  rules  on 

penalties. 

In  an  effort  to  ensure  full  compliance  by  Member  States  with  the  Regulation,  the 
Commission  has  established  bilateral  discussions  on  compliance  concerns  and  initiated 
infringements  procedures3  with  some  Member  States,  and  will  continue  to  hold  these 
discussions as needed. 

The Regulation is EEA-relevant and therefore also applicable to Iceland, Liechtenstein and 
Norway.  The  EFTA  Surveillance  Authority  (ESA)  is  competent  for  monitoring  the 
application of the Regulation in those countries. Whereas Norway and Liechtenstein are in 
compliance  with  the  Regulation,  on  17  November  2016  ESA  brought  Iceland  before  the 
EFTA Court for that State's failure to take the measures necessary to make the Regulation 
part of its internal legal order.4 

Finally,  Switzerland  is  not  bound  by  the  provisions  of  the  Regulation  but  is  nevertheless 
considering adopting measures controlling and restricting explosives precursors at national 
level.  It  has  already  designated  a  national  contact  point  for  the  reporting  of  suspicious 
transactions and significant disappearances and thefts. 

2.2.  National implementing measures 

Under Article 4(1), the Regulation bans the making available, introduction, possession and 
use of restricted explosives precursors (listed in Annex I of the Regulation) to members of 
the general public. Member States can nevertheless establish and maintain licensing and/or 
registration  regimes  through  which  the  restricted  explosives  precursors  can  be  made 
available, in a controlled way, to members of the general public (Article 4(2) and (3)). 

As of1 January 2017, 16 Member States had licensing and/or registration regimes in place 
while the remaining 12 Member States maintain bans.5 The application of the Regulation to 
date  thus  shows  that  there  is  no  EU-level  consensus  over  whether  restricted  explosives 
precursors should be banned or made available in a controlled way. 

Among those Member States that maintain licensing regimes, there is significant variation in 
the processes for requesting licences, the criteria on which they are granted or refused, and 
the length and type of validity. Some Member States take the view that requests for a licence 
should  be  granted  unless  there  is  a  stated  reason  not  to,  while  others  apply  the  opposite 
approach, refusing licences unless there is a specific reason to grant them. As a result, the 
percentage  of  licences  granted  and  denied  in  Member  States  that  have  shared  information 
with  the  Commission  differs  greatly.  There  are  no  known  instances,  to  date,  of  Member 
States mutually recognising each other's licenses.  

Some Member States do, whenever possible, propose alternative substances or concentration 
levels  which  can  be  used  for  legitimate  purposes.  The  experiences  reported  by  Member 
States suggest that alternatives exist for many, if not most, known legitimate uses. 

3 Under Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
4 EFTA Court Case E-18/16. 
5 A list of measures is available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-
terrorism/explosives/explosives-precursors/index_en.htm. 

3 

 
                                                            
Some  Member  States  have  gone  beyond  the  minimum  requirements  determined  in  the 
Regulation  and  adopted  measures  which,  e.g.,  require  economic  operators  to  register  with 
the  competent  authorities  and  to  periodically  declare  all  transactions,  including  imports, 
extend  the  scope  of  the  Regulation  to  cover  professional  users,  determine  conditions  for 
storage,  foresee  the  exchange  of  relevant  cross-border  information  with  other  Member 
States, or establish a role for customs authorities.  

In  addition,  some  Member  States  apply  restrictions  and  controls  to  non-listed  explosives 
precursors, or tighter restrictions to substances that are listed. In all current cases, Member 
States had the restrictions and controls in place prior to the adoption of the Regulation. 

In parallel to the adoption and enforcement of their national measures, most Member States 
have  reportedly  conducted  awareness-raising  campaings  targeting  the  economic  operators 
involved in the supply chain of the listed explosives precursors. Campaigns aim to increase 
awareness about both the obligation to  restrict and to report suspicious transactions. Some 
Member States actively engage online suppliers and marketplaces.  

It  is  still  too  early  to  draw  conclusions  from  the  data  obtained  on  licences,  registration, 
reports of suspicious transactions and enforcement. In the future, the Commission will aim 
to collect and analyse relevant data to identify at EU level threat trends, good practices and 
potential areas that can be strengthened or harmonised. 

2.3.  The Standing Committee on Precursors (SCP) 

Since the SCP was established under the 2008 EU Action Plan on Enhancing the Security of 
Explosives,6 it has been actively working to enhance protection in Europe against the use of 
explosives precursors for manufacturing homemade explosives. 

Since  the  Regulation  was  adopted  in  2013,  the  SCP  has  met  regularly  to  facilitate  and 
monitor  its  implementation.  Most  importantly,  the  SCP  provides  a  platform  for  Member 
States  and  representatives  of  the  economic  operators  in  the  supply  chain  to  exchange 
information and views on the Regulation and its practical implementation. 

Other  SCP  achievements  include  the  adoption  and  regular  review  of  Guidelines7  and  the 
preparatory  work  for  three  delegated  acts  which  added  threat  substances  to  Annex  II  (see 
Section  4).  The  SCP  has  also  enabled  greater  cross-border  exchange  of  information  on 
reports of suspicious transactions, disappearances and thefts, and the granting and refusal of 
licences,  and  has  supported  awareness-raising  efforts  by  the  chemical  industry  and  retail 
sector.  In  2013-2015,  four  SCP  Members  co-led  the  EU-funded  Security  of  Sales  of  High 
Risk Chemicals project, which developed guidance materials for retailers, both in physical 
locations and on the internet, and for competent and law enforcement authorities. 

3. 

REVIEW 

‘Home-made  explosives  remain  a  preferred  weapon  of  terrorists,  along  with  conventional 
firearms, because of their availability, simplicity and effectiveness,’ according to Europol’s 
2016 EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. Nevertheless, this report and its 2015, 2014 
and 2013 versions all noted a decline in the use of improvised or home-made explosives in 
relation to the use of firearms and/or incendiary devices. 

6 Council Document 8311/08. 
7 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/explosives/explosives-
precursors/docs/guidelines_on_the_marketing_and_use_of_explosives_precursors_en.pdf. 

4 

 
                                                            
The  entry  into  force  of  the  Regulation  has  contributed  to  reducing  the  threat  posed  by 
explosives precursors in Europe. From meetings and consultations of the SCP, and a study 
carried out by independent expert consortium,8 it emerges that: 

−  The  amount  of  explosives  precursors  available  on  the  market  has  decreased. 
This  is  partly  because  many  economic  operators  are  applying  the  restrictions  and 
partly  because,  voluntarily,  some  manufacturers  have  stopped  making  them  and 
some  economic  operators  have  stopped  selling  them.  The  supply  chain  has  not 
reported any significant disturbances or economic losses as a result of this. Also, in 
some Member States that maintain licensing regimes, authorities have reported that 
the number of licence applications is currently significantly lower than it was during 
the  first  year  of  application  of  the  Regulation.  This  suggests  that  members  of  the 
general  public  have  successfully  adopted  alternative  (non-sensitive)  substances  for 
continuing with their legitimate non-professional activities. 

−  The  capacity  of  competent  and  law  enforcement  authorities  to  investigate 
suspicious  incidents  involving  explosives  precursors  has  increased.  Member 
States  have  reported  an  increase  in  the  number  of  reported  suspicious  transactions, 
disappearances and thefts due to greater awareness among economic operators who 
handle explosives precursors. In addition, some Member States have, on an ad hoc 
basis, exchanged information on reports and refused licences. Finally, the competent 
authorities  in  Member  States  that  maintain  licensing  regimes  have  a  better 
understanding of which members of the general public are in possession of restricted 
substances and the purpose they intend to use them for. 

It  is  not  yet  possible  to  assess  in  more  detail  the  impact  of  the  Regulation.  However,  a 
number  of  incidents  reported  by  Member  States  suggest  that  the  application  of  the 
Regulation  has  contributed  to  their  efforts  towards  preventing  terrorist  attacks  involving 
home-made explosives. 

3.1.  Challenges that have arisen from the application of the Regulation 

Despite the overall positive impact of the Regulation in reducing access to, and increasing 
control  over,  explosives  precursors,  its  application  has  given  rise  to  several  problems  and 
challenges.  The  examples  mentioned  in  this  section  do  not  necessarily  reflect  the 
experiences of all or most Member States and economic operators. However, they have had 
a  wide  enough  impact  for  them  not  be  attributable  to  the  special  circumstances  of  any 
individual Member State or operator. 

The  main  challenge  for  Member  State  competent  authorities  is  the  large  number  of 
operators  affected  by  the  restrictions  and  controls  of  the  Regulation.  Because  many  of  the 
chemical substances and mixtures concerned by the Regulation are household products, the 
supply  chain  is  significantly  larger  than  that  of  other  products  subject  to  specific  control 
provisions  (e.g.  drug  precursors).  Consequently,  it  has  been  challenging  for  competent 
authorities  to  reach  all  economic  operators  in the  supply  chain  of  explosives  precursors  to 
inform them of their duties. However, competent authorities have, in collaboration with the 
associations  that  represent  the  chemical  industry  and  retail  sector,  conducted  awareness-

8 Preparatory Study on the implementation of Regulation (EU) 98/2013 on the marketing and use of explosives 
precursors (November 2016). Coordinated by ENCO for the European Commission under the Framework 
Service Contract HOME/2014/ISFP/PR/CBRN/0025 – Lot 1. 

5 

 
                                                            
raising  campaigns  and  engaged  with  a  wide  range  of  operators  —  from  manufacturers  to 
retailers, big companies to small independent stores, and internet sellers to marketplaces. 

Another challenge for Member State authorities is to enforce the restrictions and controls on 
internet sales, imports and intra-EU movements. Products having a large volume are often 
transported and sold in greater quantities (e.g. fertilisers), and are therefore relatively easier 
to identify and control. Conversely, other products are sold in small quantities and volumes, 
and are thus more difficult to intercept when they are shipped or transported into and across 
Europe.  To  address  this  problem,  law  enforcement  and  customs  authorities  are  increasing 
their  efforts  to  identify  cases  of  illegal  acquisition  and  possession  by,  for  example, 
increasing inter-agency cooperation and exchanging information at EU level. 

A main challenge for economic operators, particularly those in the retail sector, has been to 
identify products that fall under the scope of the Regulation. Products containing restricted 
explosives  precursors  must  be  labelled  accordingly.  When  that  is  not  done  early  on  in  the 
supply  chain,  it  is  difficult  for  operators  at  retail  level  to  properly  verify  that  the  label  is 
affixed and that the restriction applies. In addition, the explosives precursors listed in Annex 
II of the Regulation that are not restricted do not have to be labelled. Economic operators, 
particularly  those  with  high  staff  turnover,  need  to  devote  considerable  time  resources  to 
identifying products of concern and training their staff appropriately. 

Economic operators that conduct business across intra-EU borders also face the challenge of 
having  to  adapt  to  the  specific  nature  of  the  different  regimes  in  each  Member  State.  The 
Regulation allows Member State authorities to define key aspects of its application in their 
territory. Consequently, economic operators must be aware of the type of regime that applies 
in the specific Member State the product is destined for, and must register the sale, verify a 
licence  or  ban  the  sale,  accordingly.  Some  companies  have  robust  due  diligence  internal 
procedures which facilitate compliance with complex regulatory frameworks. However, for 
companies  without  such  procedures,  often  smaller  companies,  this  is  a  time-consuming 
process. 

Finally, economic operators who sell to both members of the general public and other type 
of  end-users  have  reported  difficulty  in  assessing,  with  a  reasonable  degree  of  certainty, 
whether the person acquiring a restricted substance is acting for purposes connected with his 
trade, business or profession, or otherwise. Indeed, the Regulation does not specify criteria 
for evaluating what qualifies as professional or for checking professional credentials. These 
considerations  are  down  to  Member  State  authorities  and,  as  a  result,  criteria  may  differ 
across different territories. 

A  continuous  challenge  for  the  Commission  is  to  keep  abreast  of  the  evolving  security 
threat.  In  order  to  adapt  the  Regulation  to  the  use  of  new  chemical  substances,  or  of  new 
concentrations of the listed substances, the Commission relies on information and data from 
Member  States.  In  2016,  efforts  channelled  through  the  SCP  have  led  to  three  threat 
substances being added to Annex II (see Section 4). 

Addressing  the  above-mentioned  challenges  is  a  matter  of  priority  for  the  Commission.  In 
close cooperation with the SCP, the Commission will use the tools at its disposal (including 
legislative  acts,  guidance  documents  and  practical  support)  to  improve  the  capacity  of 
Member  State  authorities  and  economic  operators  to  carry  out  their  responsibilities  in  full 
confidence. 

3.2.  Desirability and feasibility of further strengthening and harmonising the system 

6 

 
The threat posed by the use of explosives precursor chemicals in manufacturing homemade 
explosives  by  terrorists  remains  high  and  is  continuously  evolving.  The  Commission’s 
priority, beyond full implementation of the existing provisions, is to consider what measures 
and actions could strengthen the system in the future.9  

Changes  to  the  Regulation  may  bring  about  additional  burdens  for  public  authorities, 
economic operators, and consumers. To ensure that burdens are not disproportionate to the 
objectives sought, the Commission will in 2017 assess the impact, as well as the costs and 
benefits for all stakeholders and any potential for simplification, of measures aiming to: 

−  Tighten  restrictions  and  controls,  by  adding  new  substances  of  concern  to  the 
scope  of  the  Regulation  and  by  strengthening  restrictions  on  substances  that  are 
already covered.  

−  Increase the capacity of the Member State competent authorities to monitor the 
sale and possession of explosives precursors. Competent  authorities  should know 
who are the economic operators that are making available explosives precursors on 
the market and which individuals are acquiring, possessing and using the restricted 
explosives precursors. These individuals include members of the general public and 
those  acting  for  purposes  connected  with  their  profession.  With  this  objective  in 
mind,  the  Commission  will  examine  the  impact  of  measures  such  as  requiring 
economic operators to register with their competent authority and to regularly submit 
their registry of transactions to the competent authorities. The Commission will also 
consider  the  impact  of  establishing  common  criteria  for  licences,  to  harmonise 
conditions  for  granting  and  refusing  requests  and  to  facilitate  mutual  recognition 
between Member States. 

−  Increase  the  capacity  of  the  Member  State  competent  and  law  enforcement 
authorities  to  detect  and  investigate  possible  violations  of  the  Regulation.  The 
Commission will consider measures to strengthen the system of reporting suspicious 
transactions,  disappearances  and  thefts  by,  for  example,  ensuring  that  information 
which  could  have  cross-border  relevance  is  shared.  The  Commission  will  also 
consider measures to strengthen the system as regards the introduction of explosives 
precursors from third countries (i.e., import) and the operational role of the customs 
authorities at the external borders of the Union. 

−  Increase  the  capacity  of  economic  operators  along  the  supply  chain.  The 
Commission  will  consider  measures  to  improve  the  transmission  of  information 
along the chemical and retail supply chain by, for example, re-assessing the labelling 
provision  in  the  Regulation.  Wherever  possible,  the  Commission  will  also  seek  to 
reduce legal uncertainties for economic operators. 

In  parallel,  the  Commission  will  re-examine  the  transfer  of  ammonium  nitrate-related 
provisions from REACH (EC 1907/2006)10 to the Regulation,11 and, as indicated in its First 
progress  report  towards  an  effective  and  genuine  Security  Union,12  will  also  examine  the 
results of EU-funded research projects which have the potential to reduce the threat posed by 

9 COM(2015) 624 final. 
10 OJ L 396, 30.12.2006, p. 1. 
11 The Commission’s views on the transfer were requested under Article 18(2) of the Regulation and laid out in 
COM(2015) 122 final. 
12 COM(2016) 670 final. 

7 

 
                                                            
home-made  explosives  by,  for  example,  neutralising  the  explosive  properties  of  certain 
substances and products.  

The Commission will also consider non-legislative actions which can further strengthen the 
system. It will do this, for example, by strengthening Europol’s role, setting up ad hoc sub-
groups of the SCP to discuss specific challenges (e.g. the availability and control of internet 
sales or the role of customs), facilitating meetings of national contact points and supporting 
efforts to improve cooperation at regional level. 

3.3.  Desirability  and  feasibility  of  extending  the  scope  of  the  Regulation  to  cover 
professional users 

The restrictions imposed by the Regulation apply only to ‘members of the general public.’ 
Persons  acting  for  purposes  connected  with  their  trade,  business  or  profession  (commonly 
referred  to  as  ‘professional  users’)  can  continue  to  access  restricted  explosives  precursors 
without restrictions. 

The exemption awarded to professional users either 1) carries the assumption that this type 
of  user  would  not  make  illicit  use  of  explosives  precursors  to  manufacture  homemade 
explosives,  and/or  2)  considers  it  would  be  disproportionately  burdensome  for  economic 
operators to extend the restrictions to this type of user. 

The Commission nevertheless sees a possible security gap in the exemption of professional 
users  from  the  restrictions  imposed  by  the  Regulation.  The  Commission  will  therefore 
consider  the  impact  of  new  measures  that  extend  the  scope  of  the  Regulation  to  cover 
professional  users,  while  closely  examining  the  burdens  imposed  on  economic  operators. 
For  example,  economic  operators  may  have  to  register  all  transactions  involving 
professional users and keep records available for inspection by the competent authorities. 

The  above  would  provide  the  competent  and  law  enforcement  authorities  with  a  better 
picture of who is accessing which precursors and for what purpose. It would also facilitate 
early investigation into, and prosecution of, instances of alleged misuse.  

In  addition,  the  Commission  will  consider  introducing  a  harmonised  definition  for 
‘professional user’ and common criteria for determining who qualifies as professional or for 
checking professional credentials.  

3.4.  Desirability and feasibility of including non-scheduled explosives precursors in 
the provisions on the reporting of suspicious transactions, disappearances and thefts 

The Commission does not envisage applying the provisions on the reporting of suspicious 
transactions, disappearances and thefts to the general category of ‘non-scheduled explosives 
precursors.’  Doing  so  would  impose  a  disproportionate  burden  and  an  unjustified  level  of 
uncertainty on economic operators, who do not necessarily know which chemical substances 
can be used, at a given time, as explosives precursors. 

Nonetheless,  the  Commission  considers  it  essential  to  update  Annex  II,  as  often  as 
necessary, to add specific substances which pose a threat as explosives precursors, and has 
already used its power to adopt delegated acts to do so (see Section 4). 

In addition, the Commission will assess the relevance of adding categories of substances to 
Annex II. For example, it will assess the impact, including from an economic perspective, of 
including all hydrates of the listed nitrate salts in a similar way to what Regulation (EC) No 

8 

 
273/2004  does  for  drug  precursor  salts13,  as  well  as  all  fertilisers  with  a  high  nitrogen 
content. 

The above additions would close current gaps in the Regulation and may also facilitate the 
task  of  economic  operators  by  simplifying  the  guidelines  on  which  substances  are  of 
concern. The Commission will nonetheless assess the exact impact of the additions on the 
supply chain before adopting any proposal. 

4. 

EXERCISE OF THE POWER TO ADOPT DELEGATED ACTS 

In  accordance  with  Article  12  of  the  Regulation,  the  Commission  is  empowered  to  adopt 
delegated acts concerning changes to the limit values in Annex I to the extent necessary to 
accommodate developments in the misuse of substances as explosives precursors or on the 
basis  of  research  and  testing.  It  can  also  adopt  delegated  acts  concerning  the  addition  of 
substances to Annex II, where it is necessary to accommodate developments in the misuse of 
substances as explosives precursors. 

In 2016, the Commission exercised its power to adopt delegated acts to add three substances 
to Annex II: 

•  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) amending Regulation (EU) No 98/2013 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council as regards adding aluminium powder to 
the list of explosives precursors in Annex II;14 

•  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) amending Regulation (EU) No 98/2013 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council as regards adding magnesium nitrate 
hexahydrate to the list of explosives precursors in Annex II;15 and 

•  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) amending Regulation (EU) No 98/2013 of 

the European Parliament and of the Council as regards adding magnesium powder to 
the list of explosives precursors in Annex II.16 

The additions of the above-mentioned substances to Annex II were proposed to the SCP by 
Member  States.  When  preparing  the  delegated  acts  the  Commission  consulted  all  relevant 
stakeholders,  in  particular  the  chemical  industry  and  retail  sector,  as  required  under  the 
Regulation,  and  presented  an  analysis  demonstrating  that  the  additions  would  not  impose 
disproportionate burdens on economic operators or consumers. SCP members and observers 
discussed  and  broadly  supported  the  additions.  Before  adoption,  the  Commission  also 
submitted the draft delegated acts to a public consultation.17 Throughout the procedural and 
decision-making process, the Commission ensured the timely and appropriate transmission 
of relevant documents to the European Parliament and to the Council. 

During the period covered by this report, the Commission has not used its delegated power 
to change any of the limit values in Annex I. 

13 Regulation (EC) No 273/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 on drug 
precursors, OJ L 47, 18.2.2004, p. 1. 
14 C(2016) 7647 final. 
15 C(2016) 7650 final. 
16 C(2016) 7657 final. 
17 As part of its better regulation agenda, the Commission welcomes feedback from the public to draft 
legislation published at https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/share-your-views_en. 

9 

 
                                                            
Although the Commission has not, at the present moment, identified additional substances 
which  should  be  subject  to  the  reporting  requirement  or  restricted  explosives  precursors 
whose limit value should be changed, such needs may arise in the future and would need to 
be  addressed  rapidly  via  delegated  acts  to  safeguard  public  security.  Therefore,  the 
Commission  is  of  the  view  that  the  power  to  adopt  delegated  acts  conferred  on  it  by  the 
Regulation should be tacitly extended for a period of five years, in accordance with Article 
14(2) of the Regulation. 

5. 

CONCLUSION 

The  entry  into  force  of  Regulation  (EU)  98/2013  has  contributed  to  reducing  access  to 
dangerous  explosive  precursors  which  can  be  misused  to  manufacture  homemade 
explosives, because it has introduced restrictions and controls on key substances of concern. 
The  threat  posed  by  homemade  explosives,  however,  remains  high  and  is  continuously 
evolving. In a Union with free movement of persons, goods and services, European citizens 
and residents expect EU-level action against terrorism. Therefore, the Commission, Member 
States  and  the  supply  chain  of  explosives  precursors  in  Europe  must  jointly  step  up  their 
efforts to fully implement the existing provisions and identify measures and actions which 
strengthen the system around homemade explosives in the future. 

The  Commission,  in  close  collaboration  with  the  SCP,  has  already  started  revising  the 
Regulation  by  adding  three  explosives  precursor  substances  to  Annex  II.  This  is  an 
important step to better controlling threat substances. However, the practical implementation 
experience  gained  since  2  September  2014,  along  with  global  developments,  make  it 
imperative  to  consider  additional  changes  to  the  Regulation  to  increase  the  capacity  of  all 
actors  involved  in  implementing  and  enforcing  the  restrictions  and  controls.  With  this 
objective in mind, the Commission will carefully assess the impact of a number of possible 
new measures which may be proposed in the near future. 

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