REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL On Progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism
Date: 2017-01-25
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Bulgaria, corruption, independence of the judiciary, judicial reform, organised crime, rule of law

EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 

Brussels, 25.1.2017  
COM(2017) 43 final 

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
THE COUNCIL 

On Progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism 

{SWD(2017) 24 final} 

EN 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
  
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION  

The Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) was set up at the accession of Bulgaria 
to  the  European  Union  in  20071  to  address  shortcomings  in  judicial  reform  and  the  fight 
against corruption and organised crime. Since then, CVM reports have sought to help focus 
the  efforts  of  the  Bulgarian  authorities  through  specific  recommendations  and  have  charted 
the progress made by Bulgaria. With the CVM having reached its tenth anniversary this year, 
the  Commission  is  taking  stock  with  an  overview  of  the  achievements,  the  challenges 
outstanding, and the remaining steps needed to achieve the CVM's objectives.   
As repeatedly made clear by the Council,2 the CVM will end when all of the six benchmarks 
applying  to  Bulgaria  are  satisfactorily  met.  The  benchmarks  were  defined  at  the  time  of 
accession and cover issues essential to the working of Member States – judicial independence 
and efficiency, integrity and the fight against corruption and organised crime. To be met, they 
require a combination of legislative and institutional steps. In addition, such steps can only be 
fully assessed by looking at whether their intended effect is felt in practice, and whether they 
can be considered to be embedded in the legal and institutional framework of Bulgaria and to 
be  irreversible.  This  allows  citizens  to  have  confidence  that  decisions  and  practices  in 
Bulgaria  fully  respect  the  rule  of  law  and  provides  the  basis  for  the  mutual  trust  that  is 
required for effective implementation of EU law.  

Judicial  reform  and  the  fight  against  corruption  have  been  key  issues  for  Bulgarian  society 
over the past ten years.3 The CVM has an important role in Bulgaria as a driver for reform, as 
well as a tool  to  track progress. The Commission's conclusions and the methodology of the 
CVM  have  consistently  received  the  support  of  the  Council,  as  well  as  benefiting  from 
cooperation  and  input  from  many  Member  States.  Cooperation  has  also  been  reinforced  by 
support to Bulgaria under EU Funds and more recently from targeted assistance coordinated 
by the European Commission's Structural Reform Support Service (SRSS). 

Whilst tracking progress over the past 10 years, CVM reports have also noted that the pace of 
reform has varied, notably due to periods of political instability. A framework has gradually 
been put in place, including two important national strategies on judicial reform and the fight 
against corruption. Carrying  this through into progress in tackling  high-level corruption and 
organised crime has continued to be a challenge: for reform to be seen to have really taken 
root,  there  is  a  need  to  build  a  track  record  in  terms  of  bringing  high  level  cases  to  a 
successful conclusion in court. 

This report looks back at the developments in Bulgaria since 2007. As in previous years, the 
report  is  the  result  of  a  careful  analysis  by  the  European  Commission,  drawing  on  close 
cooperation  with  the  Bulgarian  authorities,  as  well  as  the  input  of  civil  society  and  other 
stakeholders, including other Member States.  

In  this  respect  it  is  important  to  be  clear  about  the  scope  of  the  CVM.  The  Decisions 
establishing the CVM set out the parameters of the CVM's scope on judicial reform and the 

1   Conclusions of the Council of Ministers, 17 October 2006 (13339/06); Commission Decision establishing a 
mechanism  for  cooperation  and  verification  of  progress  in  Bulgaria  to  address  specific  benchmarks  in  the 
areas of judicial reform and the fight against corruption and organised crime, 13 December 2006 (C (2006) 
6570 final). 

2   Most  recently  in  Council  Conclusions  in  March  2016,  which  urged  a  decisive  acceleration  of  efforts  to 
address 
report. 
(http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7118-2016-INIT/en/pdf).  For  relevant  documents  on  the 
CVM, see http://ec.europa.eu/cvm/key_documents_en.htm  

the  Commission 

recommendations 

2016 

out 

the 

set 

by 

all 

its 

in 

3   Flash  Eurobarometer  445:  The  Cooperation  and  Verification  Mechanism  for  Bulgaria  and  Romania, 

published on 25 January 2017 

2 

 
                                                            
fight  against  corruption  and  organised  crime.  These  parameters  will  determine  when  the 
benchmarks are met. However, the pace and depth of reform has necessarily been conditioned 
by  the  environment  in  which  the  specific  issues  covered  by  the  CVM  can  progress,  the 
characteristics  of  Bulgarian  society  and  its  governance.  For  example,  efforts  to  build 
administrative  capacity  in  recent  years  are  still  under  way,  having  consequences  for  the 
reform  process.  The  legislative  process  in  Bulgaria  has  not  provided  a  predictable  legal 
environment.4 The Bulgarian media environment is often characterised by low independence 
and  ineffective  enforcement  of  journalistic  standards,  which  has  a  negative  influence  on 
public debate on reforms.5 While these issues are outside the CVM remit, they have a direct 
bearing on the ability to deliver reform and have made it more difficult for Bulgaria to make 
progress.  

In the area of the CVM's work, this report also makes a number of recommendations for more 
intensive  reporting  and  transparency.  In  the  short  term,  this  would  help  the  Commission  to 
reach final conclusions; once the CVM comes to an end, it would also provide support to the 
sustainability of reform by helping accountability.   

Finally,  it  should  also  be  underlined  that  the  distinct  nature  of  the  CVM's  scope  militates 
against  making  direct  links  with  other  policy  areas.  The  Commission  does  not  therefore 
consider that it is appropriate to link the CVM to decisions in other areas, such as eligibility 
for European Structural and Investment Funds or the access to the Schengen area.  

This report uses the longer-term perspective to identify the key remaining steps to realise the 
goals  of  the  CVM.  The  momentum  built  up  so  far  allows  the  focus  to  shift  to  the  key 
remaining steps which need to be taken. When the steps set out under the benchmarks in this 
report are taken, the respective benchmark will be considered provisionally completed. When 
this  applies  to  all  benchmarks,  the  CVM  will  be  closed.  The  recommendations  set  out  can 
therefore be considered as sufficient to meet this goal - except if developments were to clearly 
reverse  the  course  of  progress.  The  Commission  believes  that  this  should  also  bring  an 
acceleration  of  the  process  by  the  Bulgarian  authorities  and  by  the  EU  as  a  whole.  In  the 
benchmarks where it is considered that substantial progress has been made, the Commission 
considers  that  a  determined  implementation  while  maintaining  both  the  pace  and  the 
consistent direction of reform would allow those benchmarks to be closed quickly – for other 
benchmarks,  this  would  be  more  challenging.  The  Commission  therefore  intends  to  bring 
forward the next report to the end of 2017, and stands ready to provide further assistance to 
help  reinforcing  the  irreversibility  of  progress  and  therefore  bring  the  mechanism  to  a 
conclusion. 

2.  

ASSESSMENT  OF  PROGRESS  ON  THE  FULFILMENT  OF  THE 
BENCHMARKS SINCE THE START OF THE CVM 

As well as looking at progress on the recommendations made in the 2016 CVM report, this 
section makes an overall assessment of ten years of reforms. The most relevant developments 
and results are set out in detail in the accompanying technical report6. The six benchmarks can 
be  assessed  individually,  but  there  are  interconnections  among  them.  The  assessment  of 
progress  has  involved  looking  at  the  structural  conditions  (such  as  laws,  institutions,  and 

4   An  important  development  took  place  in  November  2016,  with  amendments  to  the  law  on  normative  acts 

which required impact assessment for new laws proposed by the government.  

5   Bulgaria  has  the  lowest  rank  of  all  EU  Member  States  in  the  2016  World  Press  Freedom  Index:  

https://rsf.org/en/ranking  

6   SWD (2017)24. 

3 

 
 
                                                            
resources);  at  the  results  and  track  record;  and  at  whether  progress  can  be  considered 
irreversible.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  since  the  time  when  the  CVM  benchmarks  were 
agreed, there have been major developments in the case-law of the European Court of Human 
Rights,  international  standards  and  best  practices,  and  comparative  information  on  national 
justice systems in the EU, which have guided the Bulgarian authorities in their reforms and 
also help to give an objective and comparable measure of the development of the Bulgarian 
judicial  system  and  fight  against  corruption  and  organised  crime  within  the  remit  of  the  six 
benchmarks. 

2.1 

Judicial reform 

Independence and accountability of the judiciary 

The  first  benchmark  relates  to  the  reform  of  the  judiciary,  focusing  on  establishing  a  stable 
constitutional framework for an independent and accountable judicial system. Over the past 
ten  years,  Bulgaria  has  twice  amended  its  Constitution,  improving  the  functioning  of  the 
Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) and putting in place an Inspectorate to the Supreme Judicial 
Council  (ISJC)  to  promote  good  management  of  judicial  bodies  and  uphold  integrity 
standards  in  the  magistracy.  The  first  changes  took  place  shortly  after  accession.  Further 
significant reforms were carried out with constitutional amendments adopted by the National 
Assembly  in  December  2015.  In  particular,  these  created  separate  chambers  in  the  SJC  for 
prosecutors  and  judges,  while  also  improving  the  transparency  of  decision-making  on 
personnel-related issues and in the election of SJC members, and strengthening the role of the 
inspectorate to the SJC in regard to integrity of magistrates. Some of these changes – such as 
the  "one  magistrate,  one  vote"  principle  in  elections  to  the  SJC  –  followed  up  on  previous 
CVM reports. The translation of these latest changes into law was finalised in the course of 
2016, so implementation needs to be completed before the full impact can be seen. So far it is 
clear that the reform of the Council has led to greater transparency in its decision-making, and 
increased democratisation will also feed into the elections to the Council in 2017. However, 
continued tension among members of the Council, amidst allegations of a lack of objectivity 
in  key  decisions,  has  remained  a  concern.  The  belated  and  incomplete  follow-up  to  the 
situation discovered at the Sofia City Court towards the end of 2014 was highlighted in the 
two last CVM reports and has further fuelled allegations of undue influence within the SJC. 
Overall, Bulgaria has made substantial progress on Benchmark One, but still needs to show a 
track record in terms of implementation of the latest constitutional changes. 

The legal framework 

The second benchmark focusses on the legal framework in terms of key legislation affecting 
the judicial system and judicial procedures. Substantial developments have taken place over 
the last ten years, notably in relation to the Judicial Systems Act and in the improvement of 
civil  procedures.  Wide-ranging  changes  to  the  Judicial  Systems  Act  were  enacted  in  2016, 
following up on the comprehensive judicial reform strategy developed by the government and 
endorsed in the National Assembly in 2015. These amendments, which were carried through 
in close consultation with stakeholders and professions7, seek to improve the legislation in a 
number  of  areas,  ranging  from  the  career  development  for  magistrates  to  the  internal 
governance  of  courts.  Together  with  earlier  reforms,  these  changes  represent  a  significant 
further step in the reform of the Bulgarian judiciary.  

In  the  area  of  criminal  procedures,  developments  have  been  less  marked,  and  important 
challenges  still  remain  to  be  addressed.  In  spite  of  important  improvements  in  the  years 

7   The Government established a consultative council on judicial reform under the Ministry of Justice, which 

played a central role in the finalisation of the legislative proposals.  

4 

 
                                                            
following EU accession, criminal procedures in Bulgaria continue to present serious problems 
for  the  effective  prosecution  of  complex  cases,  which  include  those  related  to  high-level 
corruption  and  serious  organised  crime.  A  number  of  concrete  issues  have  been  identified 
over  the  years,  and  some  of  these  issues  have  been  addressed  through  legislative  action. 
However,  the  formalism  of  criminal  procedures  remains  a  challenge  for  the  Bulgarian  legal 
system.  Further  legislative  proposals  have  recently  been  in  preparation,  some  of  which  –  in 
combination with appropriate organisational measures – could have an important impact.  

The  criminal  code  has  also  been  identified  as  a  source  of  problems  in  the  prosecution  of 
serious  crimes  and  it  has  been  the  subject  of  continued  discussion  under  successive 
governments.8  In  2015  the  government  launched  a  new  reflection  process  on  a  broader 
criminal policy reform, which was taken forward in 2016 with a technical assistance project 
involving  independent  experts.  This  aimed  at  a  comprehensive  reform,  which  will  require 
careful analysis  and  preparation,  involving broad  consultation within  the judiciary  and legal 
professions. It seems evident that any general reform of the criminal code would be a long-
term process. Nevertheless, such a process would not rule out more immediate changes which 
could  have  a  positive  impact  in  regard  to  the  prosecution  of  corruption  or  organised  crime. 
Overall, Bulgaria has made some progress on Benchmark Two, but important issues are still 
outstanding, notably in terms of addressing formalistic criminal procedures and improving the 
legal framework for the investigation and prosecution of corruption and organised crime.  

Continued reform of the judiciary 

The  third  benchmark  focuses  on  the  reform  of  the  judiciary  to  improve  its  professionalism, 
accountability, and efficiency.  The ten years' perspective has clearly shown the  difficulty of 
progressing if judges or prosecutors do not share a consensus. Over the years, there have been 
major improvements in various areas, including training of magistrates, the random allocation 
of  cases  within  courts,  and  the  analysis  of  workload  of  judicial  bodies  and  individual 
magistrates. Steps have also been taken in areas like e-justice. The willingness of magistrates 
–  as  well  as  civil  society  –  to  speak  out  in  support  of  reform  has  been  a  key  factor  in 
facilitating this progress.  However, it has proved difficult to take decisions in sensitive areas 
like  the  restructuring  of  courts  and  prosecutors'  offices  as  part  of  an  overall  reform  of  the 
judicial  map.  Whilst  sensible  managerial  decisions  –  such  as  reallocating  positions  year  by 
year – have gone some way to mitigate such gaps, the Supreme Judicial Council has not been 
able  or  willing  to  drive  reform  ahead  in  such  areas.  This  has  contributed  to  a  workload 
imbalance  for  the  larger  courts  in  the  country,  with  a  negative  impact  on  the  overall 
performance  of  the  Bulgarian  judiciary.  At  the  same  time,  there  has  been  little  progress  in 
establishing fairness and transparency in the disciplinary proceedings of the Supreme Judicial 
Council. 

The reform of the prosecution service is another area which has proven highly sensitive and 
complex  in  Bulgaria.  The  Bulgarian  Prosecutor's  Office  forms  part  of  the  judiciary  and  is 
independent  of  the  executive  power.  At  the  same  time,  it  plays  a  central  role  not  only  in 
criminal  procedures  but  also  in  monitoring  the  administration  more  generally.  This  lack  of 
distinction  between  its  functions  and  the  executive  tends  to  exacerbate  suspicions  of  undue 
influence and criticisms of a lack of overall accountability of the prosecution. In addition to 
the heated debate over what is seen by critics as an overly powerful prosecution service, the 
prosecution is also at the centre of the debate over Bulgaria's continued lack of a convincing 
track  record  of  convictions  in  cases  concerning  high-level  corruption  or  serious  organised 
crime.  Over  the  past  ten  years,  the  prosecution  service  has  seen  several  rounds  of 

8   A draft reform of the criminal code prepared by a previous government in 2014 was not successful, as it did 

not meet expectations and the National Assembly was dissolved shortly after its presentation.  

5 

 
                                                            
reorganisation  as  well  as  legislative  and  other  measures  to  improve  its  effectiveness. 
Nevertheless,  in  spite  of  these  efforts,  the  results  show  that  significant  challenges  remain.9 
This was the background for the Bulgarian decision in 2016 to request the assistance of the 
SRSS  and  experts  from  a  number  of  other  Member  States  in  a  project  to  present  an 
independent analysis of the Bulgarian prosecution service. It adds to previous analysis carried 
out  over  the  years.  Bulgaria  still  needs  to  draw  the  conclusions  from  all  these  analyses  and 
chart a way forward on this important issue. Overall, though Bulgaria has again made some 
progress on Benchmark Three, important challenges still remain to be addressed. 

2.2 

Corruption 

The  fourth  and  fifth  benchmarks  relate  to  the  fight  against  corruption,  both  high-level 
corruption  and  corruption  more  generally,  in  particular  at  local  level  and  at  the  borders.  In 
both areas, the ten years' perspective brings out the challenges Bulgaria has faced in the effort 
to slowly build up the necessary laws and institutions to tackle an evident credibility deficit 
seen in Bulgarian public opinion. So far, Bulgaria has a very limited track record of concrete 
cases leading to final convictions in court regarding high-level corruption, the clearest way to 
show that the fight against corruption is a genuine priority. Bulgaria continues to rank among 
the EU Member States with the highest perceived level of corruption,10 and corruption is still 
considered as an important problem by citizens11 and business12. High-profile scandals, such 
as  that  surrounding  the  conflict  of  interest  commission  in  201313,  do  not  see  clear  and 
determined  follow-up.  The  problems  have  been  the  subject  of  extensive  analysis  over  the 
years and candidates for explanations include outdated provisions in the criminal code, lack of 
capacity within the key institutions, disorganised or fragmented structures, and cumbersome 
procedures, issues which all take time, commitment and determination to address. In the early 
years after accession, Bulgaria undertook a number of legislative and institutional measures to 
address  corruption.  However,  while  early  results  seemed  promising  in  some  respects,  these 
efforts have not brought about the necessary step-change in the fight against corruption. The 
government made a further effort in 2015 and 2016, centred on putting in place a unified anti-
corruption agency with powers to conduct administrative investigations and to check conflicts 
of interest and personal property of high-level officials. But the anti-corruption law designed 
to  put  this  body  in  place  has  failed  to  reach  agreement  in  Parliament,  illustrating  a  general 
lack of political consensus behind the efforts.  

The  overall  institutional  set-up  to  fight  corruption  in  Bulgaria  remains  fragmented  and 
therefore largely ineffective. As a consequence, generalised problems of corruption at lower 
levels  in  the  public  administration  also  remain  a  challenge.14  The  government's  2015  anti-
corruption strategy provided valuable analysis of the problems. However, the implementation 

9   The  challenges  are  not  limited  to  the  internal  workings  of  the  prosecution,  but  involve  all  the  institutions 

concerned in the different steps of criminal procedures.  

10   Transparency  International's  corruption  perceptions  index  2015  ranks  Bulgaria  69  out  of  168  countries 

worldwide, the worst score of any EU Member States (Transparency International CPI, 2015).  

11   Flash  Eurobarometer  445:  The  Cooperation  and  Verification  Mechanism  for  Bulgaria  and  Romania, 

published on 25 January 2017. 

12   The World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2016–2017 ranks corruption as the single most 
problematic factor when doing business in Bulgaria. Global Competitiveness Report 2016–2017, p. 130. 
13   Its  chairman  was  charged  with  abuse  of  powers  in  2013  and  later  given  a  suspended  prison  sentence. 

However, the post of Chairman of this body remains unfilled. 

14   Surveys based on experience as well as perceptions of corruption as well as international studies consistently 
point to corruption as a major challenge in Bulgaria, holding back the economy and undermining trust in the 
proper functioning of public institutions.  

6 

 
                                                            
of  this  strategy  is  still  only  at  an  early  stage.15  Overall,  Bulgaria's  progress  on  Benchmarks 
Four  and  Five  has  been  limited,  with  major  challenges  still  outstanding  in  regard  to  the 
institutional and legal framework as well as the establishment of a track record.  

2.3  Organised crime 

The  final  benchmark  focusses  on  the  fight  against  organised  crime.  This  benchmark  was 
motivated  in  part  by  the  prevalence  in  post-transition  Bulgaria  of  large  and  powerful 
organised crime groups, connected to significant levels of violence. The Bulgarian authorities 
see  an  evolution  in  the  years  since  accession,  with  a  more  fragmented  pattern  of  organised 
crime, and with the problem more comparable to the situation in some other Member States. 
Nevertheless, fulfilment of this benchmark also requires Bulgaria to show the capacity of its 
law enforcement authorities to efficiently fight organised crime and develop a track record in 
this area. Bulgaria has introduced important institutional changes over the years, notably with 
the setting up in 2012 of a specialised court and prosecutor's office for organised crime and an 
independent  Asset  Forfeiture  Commission  with  a  mandate  for  non-conviction  based 
confiscation of illicit assets. The Commission in particular has established a track record that 
shows  how  significantly  this  aspect  of  reform  has  been  embedded.  However,  Bulgaria  has 
been slow to develop a track record in terms of final convictions in serious organised crime 
cases.  In  recent  years,  political  decisions  to  reorganise  the  key  investigatory  authorities 
dealing  with  organised  crime  have  interrupted  progress  and  had  a  detrimental  impact  on 
results. This has now stabilised, though a further change was recently agreed, extending the 
competences of the anti-organised crime directorate (GDBOB) to corruption, cybercrime and 
migrant  smuggling  and  allowing  them  to  engage  earlier  in  criminal  investigations.  
Consequently,  the  current  institutional  framework  still  needs  time  to  show  a  track  record. 
Furthermore,  as  mentioned  above,  the  effective prosecution of organised crime continues to 
be  hampered  by  a  formalistic  legal  framework.  Overall,  Bulgaria  has  made  substantial 
progress on Benchmark Six, although challenges still remain.  

3. 

KEY REMAINING STEPS  

Overall,  the  ten  years  perspective  shows  that  successive  governments  and  the  judicial 
institutions  have  made  important  efforts.  There  have  been  important  legislative  and 
institutional  developments,  notably  on  the  judicial  side.  However,  effective  progress  in 
carrying  this  through  to  a  track  record  has  been  slower  than  expected  when  the  CVM  was 
launched, with cases of reluctance to follow up on CVM recommendations for the institutions 
to  work  together  to  identify  common  shortcomings  and  apply  common  solutions.  Reform 
needs  to  be  continued  and  internal  structures  strengthened  to  ensure  the  satisfactory  and 
irreversible fulfilment of the benchmarks. This section therefore aims to set out the remaining 
steps needed to ensure that the objectives of the CVM are reached. 

15   A notable exception in this regard is the concrete measures taken over the past two years in the Ministry of 
Interior as part of an effort to stamp out corruption within the Ministry, including among the border police. 
There have also been serious efforts focusing on customs authorities. More generally, Bulgaria has also been 
implementing several improvements to its public procurement system in recent years, which is a sector with 
significant corruption risks, including at local level.  

7 

 
 
                                                            
3.1  

Judicial reform 

Independence and accountability of the judiciary 

As acknowledged in recent reports, the judicial reform strategy adopted by the government in 
2014  and  endorsed  by  the  National  Assembly  in  early  2015  provided  a  comprehensive 
blueprint for the reform of Bulgaria's judiciary. Since then, the government has followed up in 
a  number  of  areas.  Most  importantly,  the  amendments  to  the  Constitution,  adopted  in 
December  2015  and  carried  forward  in  legislative  amendments  to  the  Judicial  Systems  Act 
and  internal  procedures  in  2016,  represent  a  significant  step  towards  a  better  functioning 
Supreme  Judicial  Council  and  the  fulfilment  of  Benchmark  One.  Although  the  text  of 
Benchmark  One  focuses  on  constitutional  amendments,  full  reassurance  regarding  the 
independence and accountability of the judicial system can only be assessed in the light of the 
practical implementation of these changes. 

The  Supreme  Judicial  Council  is  the  key  institution  governing  the  Bulgarian  judiciary  and 
concrete  results  in  terms  of  judicial  reform  rest  heavily  on  a  well-functioning  SJC,  both  in 
terms of professionalism and transparency. Its work is key to determining whether the judicial 
system can command respect and to reassure the broader public that judicial independence is 
being defended. This needs to be accompanied by a broader commitment of all state actors to 
judicial  independence  and  loyal  cooperation  amongst  institutions.  A  non-political  and 
professional  working  climate  inside  of  this  institution,  focusing  on  the  priorities  of  judicial 
reform, is essential. The series of controversies and infighting that have marred the SJC over 
the past years have fuelled suspicion of external influence and affected public confidence in 
the judiciary.16 Therefore, one of the most significant tests for 2017 will be the election of the 
new  Council,  both  for  members  appointed  within  the  magistracy  and  those  appointed  by 
Parliament. It will be important that these elections are carried out, and seen to be carried out, 
in an open and transparent manner following a serious debate on the merits of the respective 
candidates.  Then  the  newly  elected  college  will  have  to  develop  a  track  record  of  impartial 
and professional decision-making in key areas. 

•  Recommendation: Ensure a transparent election for the future SJC, with a public hearing 
in the National Assembly before the election of the members of the parliamentary quota, 
and giving civil society the possibility to make observations on the candidates. 

One of the main functions of the SJC is the appointment of heads of courts and prosecutors' 
offices,  as  well  as  the  nomination  of  the  Presidents  of  the  three  highest  offices  in  the 
Bulgarian  judiciary,  the  Presidents  of  the  two  Supreme  Courts  and  the  Prosecutor  General. 
The conduct of such appointments in a merit-based and transparent fashion is a key test of its 
capacity  to  function  as  a  professional  and  independent  institution  which  can  command  the 
trust of the judiciary and of broader society.  A particularly important election which will take 
place in 2017 concerns the President of the Supreme Administrative Court 

•  Recommendation: Establish a track record of transparent and merit-based appointments 
to high–level  judicial  posts,  including the upcoming  appointment  of  a  new  President  of 
the Supreme Administrative Court. 

The Inspectorate of the Supreme Judicial Council (ISJC) has contribued to the accountability 
and efficiency of the Bulgarian judiciary through its regular inspections and reports. However, 

16   Bulgaria  consistently  figures  among  the  EU  Member  States  with  the  lowest  perceived  independence  of 

justice. 2016 EU Justice Scoreboard, p. 35-36.   

8 

 
                                                            
its potential has not been used to the full. As of January 2017, the powers of the Inspectorate 
have  been  extended  to  allow  it  to  investigate  conflicts  of  interest  and  other  integrity  issues 
among  magistrates,  and  the  government  has  provided  the  ISJC  with  additional  resources  to 
perform its new tasks. While ultimately leaving the decisions on disciplinary penalties to the 
SJC, the new provisions on the integrity of magistrates give the ISJC a more central role in 
the  essential  task  of  following  up  on  irregularities.  The  ISJC  needs  the  best  possible 
conditions for fulfilment of its new functions. In this regard, external expertise can be a useful 
element to support the efforts to enhance its organisational capacity.   

•  Recommendation: To  improve the practical functioning of the ISJC and the follow-up 
by the Supreme Judicial Council to the inspectorate's findings, in particular on integrity 
issues, consider soliciting external assistance, for example from the SRSS and/or Council 
of Europe. 

The legal framework 

In 2016, as part of the judicial reform strategy, the Bulgarian government took forward two 
substantial packages of amendments to the Judicial Systems Act. The preparation of these acts 
benefited from widespread debate and consultation with civil society. Implementation of this 
new legal framework will be a major challenge for the judicial bodies and will rest heavily on 
general  progress  on  judicial  reform  (Benchmark  Three).  In  line  with  the  judicial  reform 
strategy,  Bulgaria  should  continue  to  look  at  any  problems  raised  with  the  legal  framework 
and whether further amendments to the Judicial Systems Act would address such problems. 

An important package of amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code has been prepared by 
the Ministry of Justice, with the support of the judicial authorities and the prosecution. This 
would  substantially  improve  the  response  to  serious  crime,  notably  by  addressing  delays  in 
criminal proceedings and facilitating the prosecution of corruption offences. Further needs for 
amendment to criminal procedures have also been identified in recent analyses. So it will be 
important to take this process forward. 

A  full  revision  of  the  Criminal  Code  has  been cited  in  past  reports  as  important,  but  would 
require  a  broad  reflection  on  the  future  of  criminal  policy,  together  with  widespread  debate 
and careful preparation. It should be seen as a longer term project, also taking into account of 
the  administrative  capacity  of  Bulgaria.  The  priority  at  this  stage  should  be  to  implement  a 
number  of  targeted  amendments  in  areas  where  existing  provisions  create  operational 
difficulties in the prosecution of corruption or organised crime. 

•  Recommendation: Adopt amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code and the Criminal 
Code  to  improve  the  legal  framework  for  the  prosecution  of  high-level  corruption  and 
serious organised crime.  

Addressing  the  complex  challenges  affecting  criminal  procedures  in  Bulgaria  will  require 
efforts  and  prioritisation  by  the  new  Bulgarian  authorities.  However,  the  preparatory  work 
already  initiated  as  well  as  input  from  technical  assistance  projects,  including  the  recently 
finalised project coordinated by the Commission's Structural Reform Support Service (SRSS), 
provides  a  good  basis.  Implementing  the  recommendations  of  these  various  studies  should 
allow  Bulgaria  to  effectively  address  issues  both  under  Benchmark  Two  as  well  as  several 
issues under other Benchmarks, in particular those related to the fight against corruption and 
organised crime. 

9 

 
Continued reform of the judiciary 

The broader implementation of the judicial reform strategy will require continued effort and 
dedication  by  the  Bulgarian  authorities.  A  number  of  projects  have  already  been  completed 
and others are on the way or in preparation. The new IT system for the random allocation of 
cases in courts, which so far functions without controversy, is a promising step showing that 
long-standing problems can be addressed. The amended Judicial Systems Act should help to 
provide  swift  progress  towards  e-justice  solutions  in  order  to  improve  transparency  and 
accessibility  of  justice  throughout  the  country.  A  significant  amount  of  work  has  been 
completed  to  develop  workload  standards  for  the  assessment  of  workload  in  courts  and 
prosecutor's offices. This work can now be carried forward so that these standards become the 
basis  for  managerial  decisions  in  areas  such  as  appraisals,  promotions,  disciplinary 
proceedings and staff allocation.  

•  Recommendation:  Publish  a  report  for  public  consultation  detailing  the  progress  made 
implementing the national judicial reform strategy and setting out the remaining steps to 
be  taken.  Establish  a  mechanism  for  continued  public  reporting  of  progress  for  the 
remaining duration of the strategy's implementation.  

The  SJC  and  the  prosecution  have  initiated  preparations  for  broader  reforms  in  the  judicial 
map.  This  is  necessarily  a  long-term  process  as  it  will  require  time  for  coordination  and 
consensus  building  with  society  at  large.  In  the  short  term,  pragmatic  steps  can  already  be 
taken  to  address  uneven  workload  between  judicial  bodies  and  in  particular  to  improve 
working conditions in some of the largest and most busy courts – and until this is in place, it 
is difficult to see how issues of delays in motivations can be looked at on an objective basis. 
The  SJC  has  already  taken  incremental  steps  in  this  direction  in  previous  years,  but  on  the 
basis of the new workload standards, a more objective assessment can be made of the need to 
reallocate resources between courts.  

•  Recommendation: Address the workload situation in the busiest courts based on the new 
workload  standards,  and  agree  a  roadmap  for  the  reform  of  the  judicial  map  in  parallel 
with the development of e-justice.  

The structural limits to independence and accountability in the organisation of the prosecution 
is an issue that had been highlighted in the judicial reform strategy. The recent amendments to 
the Judicial Systems Act contain some elements aimed at addressing this situation. In addition 
to this, Bulgaria asked for the assistance of the SRSS to prepare an independent analysis of 
the  Prosecutor's  Office.  As  a  result,  a  report on  the  functioning  of  the  prosecution  has  been 
prepared  by  experts  from  Germany,  Spain,  The  Netherlands  and  the  United  Kingdom,  also 
proposing recommendations.  

•  Recommendation: Establish a roadmap for the implementation of the recommendations 
of the SRSS report concerning the reform of the Prosecutor's Office and its interactions 
with other institutions, including a mechanism for the reporting of progress to the wider 
public.  

In May 2016, the Prosecutor General commissioned a study to analyse the judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights finding that Bulgarian authorities had failed to comply with 
their obligation to carry out an effective investigation17 and to propose remedies wherever the 

17   Systemic problem of ineffectiveness of investigations in Bulgaria ECHR 070 (2015)  

10 

 
                                                            
violations  remain  relevant.  The  analysis  was  completed  in  November  2016  and  makes  a 
number of valuable recommendations.  

•  Recommendation: Establish a roadmap for the implementation of the recommendations 
of the study, including a mechanism for the reporting of progress to the wider public.  

The completion of actions falling under Benchmark Three will require important efforts. The 
development of further technical assistance projects under the auspices of the SRSS in areas 
covered by Benchmark Three could be considered to assist the Bulgarian authorities in these 
efforts. 

3.2 

Corruption 

The fourth and fifth benchmarks for Bulgaria under the CVM concern the need for effective 
measures  against  corruption,  including  high-level  corruption  as  well  as  corruption  more 
generally in public  institutions.  The  development by the government of an updated national 
strategy for the fight against corruption was an important step, but the challenge remains to 
ensure its implementation, to adopt the necessary legal framework and to set up the envisaged 
institutions. A year on from the January 2016 report, further progress remains limited in this 
regard.  

High-level corruption 

The  government's  draft  anti-corruption  law  has  not  been  adopted  and  consequently  the 
proposed new unified anti-corruption authority has not been set up. This would be responsible 
for the control of conflicts of interest and property declarations of high-ranking officials and 
administrative investigations into possible corruption and illicit enrichment.  

The  adoption  of  a  law  to  put  in  place  an  effective  and  accountable  new  anti-corruption 
institution  will  be  a  key  test  of  Bulgaria's  resolve  in  2017.  However,  some  features  of  the 
envisaged  new  institution,  such  as  the  merging  of  the  Illegal  Asset  Forfeiture  Commission 
into the new structure, should be carefully considered. Given the track record established by 
the  Illegal  Asset  Forfeiture  Commission,  it  is  important  that  organisational  changes  do  not 
undermine  the  progress  already  achieved.  Some  less  controversial  elements  of  the  anti-
corruption  strategy  also  remain  to  be  implemented,  most  notably  a  strengthening  of  the 
administrative  inspectorates,  where  the  necessary  legislative  proposals  have  still  to  be 
presented.  

•  Recommendation: Adopt a new legal framework on the fight against corruption in line 
with the intentions set out in the anti-corruption strategy, and ensure its implementation. 
Set up an effective anti-corruption authority. 

•  Recommendation: Adopt and implement a reform of the law on public administration to 

strengthen the internal inspectorates in the public administration. 

Bulgaria's  reporting  of  new  cases  under  investigation  and  sent  to  court  has  progressed. 
However, ultimately any assessment of track record in tackling high-level corruption depends 
on final court decisions being concluded and enforced, given the pattern of high-level cases 
rarely  ending  in  successful  convictions.  Showing  to  the  public  that  transgressions  can  be 
identified  and  that  the  perpetrators  are  effectively  brought  to  justice  will  be  the  strongest 
evidence  for  the  success  of  the  anti-corruption  efforts.  Bulgaria  still  needs  to  show  such  a 
track record in terms of final results. Useful analytical work has been carried out in 2016 in 
various forms,  including  via  an analysis of past corruption cases by the Prosecutor's  Office, 
which can be taken as a basis for further concrete measures.  

11 

 
•  Recommendation: Building on the analysis of past cases, establish a roadmap between 
all  relevant  institutions  to  address  shortcomings  in  the  investigation  and  prosecution  of 
high-level  corruption  cases,  including  a  mechanism  for  the  reporting  of  progress  to  the 
wider public.  

•  Recommendation: Establish a mechanism for public reporting on progress in high-level 
cases which are in the public domain. General Prosecution to report – whilst respecting 
the  presumption  of  innocence  –  on  investigations  and  indictments.  Supreme  Court  of 
Cassation and Ministry of Justice to report on convictions as well as the enforcement of 
sentences. 

To  meet  Benchmark  Four  will  require  a  fresh  approach  by  the  Bulgarian  authorities,  most 
obviously  in  order  to  establish  a  track  record  on  high-level  cases.  The  preparatory  work 
already initiated could provide a good basis, although some proposals for changes to existing 
institutions would benefit from further analysis and careful assessment to avoid any possible 
adverse impact on performance.  

Corruption at local level and the borders 

Wider  efforts  to  address  corruption  at  lower  levels  are  needed  in  particular  in  terms  of 
measures  to  enhance  prevention,  which  should  be  introduced  in  combination  with  wider 
efforts  to  increase  transparency  and  professionalism  in  the  public  administration.  Public 
procurement is widely recognised as a particular risk area for corruption. Bulgaria has made 
progress on the implementation of the public procurement strategy since its adoption in 2014, 
including  through  the  introduction  of  risk  based,  in-depth  ex  ante  checks.  Now  it  needs  to 
show a track record of effective follow-up on these checks and introduce effective sanctions 
for any irregularities. 

•  Recommendation:  Carry  out  an  external  review  of  the  ex  ante  checks  of  public 
procurement procedures and their follow-up, including ex post checks, as well as on cases 
of conflicts of interest or corruption discovered and remedial measures taken to address 
identified shortcomings.  

The  Ministry  of  Interior  has  put  in  place  a  range  of  concrete  anti-corruption  preventive 
measures (notably with the traffic and border police) in the context of a broader reform of the 
Ministry.  These  measures  should  be  continued  and  continuously  followed  up.  In  addition, 
plans to extend these efforts to other ministries should be stepped up.  

•  Recommendation:  Put  in  place  risk-based  measures  to  address  low-level  corruption  in 
high risk sectors within the public administration, taking inspiration from what has been 
done in the Ministry of Interior. Continue the efforts in the Ministry of Interior. 

•  Recommendation: Establish a mechanism for public reporting on the implementation of 
the  national  anti-corruption  strategy  covering  the  remaining  duration  of  the  Strategy's 
implementation. 

3.3  Organised crime 

The  sixth  CVM  benchmark  concerns  the  fight  against  organised  crime.  Analysis  of  the 
developments  over  the  last  ten  years  points  to  an  evolution  of  organised  crime,  which  has 
become  more  fragmented,  versatile  and  diversified,  developing  towards  legal  businesses,  as 
well as becoming less openly violent. Many Bulgarian interlocutors consider that Benchmark 
Six – as it has been agreed ten years ago – is therefore becoming less relevant, given that the 

12 

 
 
crime  picture  is  changing  into  something  which  is  more  comparable  to  that  of  some  other 
Member  States.  However,  Bulgaria  needs  to  show  it  has  a  functioning  system  to  fight 
organised  crime  by  establishing  a  track  record  showing  that  final  court  decisions  in  cases 
involving serious organised crime are reached and enforced. 

After  a  series  of  restructurings  in  recent  years,  the  anti-organised  crime  directorate  now 
appears to have largely recovered operational stability and capacity. However, the structural 
the  Criminal  Procedure  Code  mentioned  above,  which  complicate 
problems  with 
investigations, are still a source of concern. Moreover, there also are continued challenges in 
terms of operational capacity, training and equipment, which need to be further enhanced.  

The Specialised Court and Prosecutor's Office for organised crime are building a track record. 
An  assessment  of  the  performance  of  the  specialised  courts  by  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Cassation highlighted some critical issues, which need further consideration in the light of the 
broader issues considered in the context of Benchmarks Two and Three above. A proposal has 
been made to extend the competence of the Specialised Court to include high level corruption 
cases.  Such  changes  in  jurisdiction  need  to  be  carefully  prepared  and  accompanied  by 
appropriate  analysis  on  resource  needs  and  possible  legal  implications  of  the  changes.  It 
would need to be clear that there would be no unintended negative impact on organised crime 
cases. 

In general, it is important that the competent institutions and agencies dealing with organised 
crime are given the necessary stability to work on cases and bring them to conclusion in court. 
Bulgaria has shown the beginnings of a track record on organised crime cases. This positive 
trend should be continued and further reinforced.    

•  Recommendation: Establish a mechanism for public reporting on progress in high-level 
cases which are in the public domain. General Prosecution to report – whilst respecting 
the  presumption  of  innocence  –  on  investigations  and  indictments.  Supreme  Court  of 
Cassation and Ministry of Justice to report on convictions as well as the enforcement of 
sentences. 

Concerning  asset  forfeiture,  amendments  to  the  law  on  confiscation  of  criminal  assets  have 
been tabled in order to remedy a series of problems (lowering of the threshold for unjustified 
wealth  for  example).  However,  those  have  not  yet  been  adopted  by  the  National  Assembly. 
The  Illegal  Asset  Forfeiture  Commission  nonetheless  continues  to  produce  solid  results. 
However, its future as an independent structure remains unclear given pending proposals for 
its merging into the future unified anti-corruption authority. 

•  Recommendation:  adopt  the  necessary  amendments  to  the  law  on  confiscation  of 
criminal assets and ensure the Illegal Asset Forfeiture Commission continues to operate 
independently and efficiently. 

4. 

CONCLUSION  

The  Commission's  2015  and  2016  CVM  reports  were  able  to  acknowledge  important  steps 
taken by the Bulgarian authorities to put the reform process back on the agenda. During 2016 
Bulgaria  made  additional  significant  progress  in  the  implementation  of  the  judicial  reform 
strategy, while implementation of the national anti-corruption strategy still remains in an early 
stage. More generally, over the past ten years, overall progress has not been as fast as hoped 

13 

 
 
for and a number of significant challenges remain to be addressed. The new government will 
need  to  drive  reform  forward  to  secure  irreversible  results.  Therefore,  this  report  cannot 
conclude that the benchmarks are at this stage satisfactorily fulfilled. However it is possible to 
identify  a  limited  number  of  key  recommendations  to  lead  to  the  provisional  closing  of 
individual benchmarks, and then the conclusion of the CVM process.  

The  Commission  considers  that  the  CVM  objectives  can  be  achieved  by  following  up  the 
recommendations set out in this report. The speed of the process will depend on how quickly 
Bulgaria will be able to fulfil them in an irreversible way. The Commission therefore invites 
Bulgaria  to  take  action  to  fulfil  the  recommendations  contained  in  the  present  report.  The 
Commission will assess progress made towards the end of 2017. 

14