COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT BULGARIA : Technical Report Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on Progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism
Date: 2017-01-25
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Bulgaria, corruption, independence of the judiciary, judicial reform, organised crime, rule of law

EN 

   EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 25.1.2017  SWD(2017) 24 final   COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT BULGARIA : Technical Report Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on Progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism {COM(2017) 43 final}  
 
 
Benchmarks  to  be  addressed  by  Bulgaria  pursuant  to  Commission  Decision  of  13/XII/2006 
establishing a mechanism for cooperation and verification of progress in Bulgaria to address specific 
benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and the fight against corruption and organised crime: 

Benchmark  1:  Adopt  Constitutional  amendments  removing  any  ambiguity  regarding  the 
independence and accountability of the judicial system 

Benchmark  2:  Ensure  a  more  transparent  and  efficient  judicial  process  by  adopting  and 
implementing  a  new  judicial  system  act  and  the  new  civil  procedure  code.  Report  on  the 
impact of these new laws and of the penal and administrative procedure codes, notably on the 
pre-trial phase 

Benchmark  3:  Continue  the  reform  of  the  judiciary  in  order  to  enhance  professionalism, 
accountability  and  efficiency.  Evaluate  the  impact  of  this  reform  and  publish  the  results 
annually 

Benchmark 4: Conduct and report on professional, non-partisan investigations into allegations 
of  high-level  corruption.  Report  on  internal  inspections  of  public  institutions  and  on  the 
publication of assets of high-level officials 

Benchmark  5:  Take  further  measures  to  prevent  and  fight  corruption,  in  particular  at  the 
borders and within local government 

Benchmark  6:  Implement  a  strategy  to  fight  organised  crime,  focussing  on  serious  crime, 
money laundering as well as on the systematic confiscation of assets of criminals. Report on 
new and ongoing investigations, indictments and convictions in these areas 

2 

 
 
 
I  

INTRODUCTION 

This technical report summarises the information on which the Commission has based its assessment 
of the progress made by Bulgaria to up until the current date under the Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanism (CVM). The analysis is based on a variety of sources. First of all, the analysis relies to a 
large extent on information received from the Bulgarian authorities, both in written form and through 
ongoing contacts and meetings. In addition, the Commission is able to draw on a wealth of analysis 
and  independent  assessment  from  other  international  institutions,  civil  society  actors,  professional 
organisations,  other  EU  Member  States,  and  experts.  Commission  contacts  with  the  Bulgarian 
administration across the full range of EU policies also help to inform this work.  

As part of the preparation of the reports, the Commission has been in close contact with the relevant 
government  institutions  and  the  Bulgarian  judicial  authorities  active  in  the  fields  relevant  for  the 
CVM. These contacts also involve visits to Bulgaria by the Commission services several times a year, 
and  in  addition  the  Commission  maintains  a  presence  on  the  ground  in  Bulgaria.1  Once  a  year,  the 
Commission  includes  independent  experts  from  other  Member  States  –  judges,  prosecutors,  anti-
corruption  experts  –  in  its  visits.  Finally,  the  Commission  also  meets  with  non-governmental 
organisations  active  in  the  area  of  judicial  reform  and  anti-corruption  projects,  with  professional 
organisations  of  judges  and  prosecutors,  and  with  representatives  of  the  business  community.  This 
report remains the responsibility of the Commission services.  

The  Commission  supports  the  efforts  of  Bulgaria  in  achieving  the  CVM  objectives  through  funding 
under the European Structural and Investment Funds. In the 2007-2013 programming period Bulgarian 
judicial  reforms  have  been  supported  by  the  European  Social  Fund  (ESF)  co-funded  Operational 
Programme "Administrative Capacity" (OPAC) which has had as an overall objective to improve the 
functioning  of  the  public  administration,  but  also  to  enhance  the  professionalism,  transparency  and 
accountability of the judiciary.2 In the current programming period (2014-2020) the ESF is providing 
support  to  the  Bulgarian  judicial  reform  efforts  through  the  Operational  Programme  "Good 
Governance" (OPGG), which has its own Priority Axis dedicated to the judiciary-related interventions 
for  a  total  amount  of  EUR  30.2  million,  which  can  be  allocated  by  Bulgarian  authorities  to  projects 
promoting organisational reforms, e-justice, and training.  

The CVM Commission Decision  of 2006 defined six  benchmarks for Bulgaria.  The six  benchmarks 
were conceived in a particular context and their concrete wording reflected the specific situation at the 
time.  However,  the  underlying  issues  that  they  refer  to  have  remained  relevant  in  subsequent  years. 
The  first  three  benchmarks  relate  to  the  reform  of  the  judicial  system,  including  the  constitutional 
framework  (benchmark  1),  the  legislation  (benchmark  2),  and  the  improvement  of  the  day-to-day 
functioning of the judiciary (benchmark 3). The following two benchmarks concern the fight against 
corruption, both high-level corruption (benchmark 4) and corruption more generally including at local 
level  and  the  borders  (benchmark  5).  The  final  benchmark  concerns  measures  to  address  organised 
crime (benchmark 6).  

While  previous  reports  have  tended  to  focus  specifically  on  developments  in  the  course  of  the  year 
leading up to each report, the Commission decided on this occasion to take a longer time perspective. 
This analysis provides the basis for a more comprehensive assessment of the state of play with regard 
to  each  benchmark  in  a  timeframe  which  covers  the  ten  years  which  have  passed  since  Bulgaria's 
accession to the EU and the establishment of the CVM. In the following chapters, this report will be 

1   The Commission has a CVM resident adviser stationed at the Commission's Representation in Sofia 
2   Since 2007 there have been 24 calls for the amount of 51 MEUR or 28% of the OP budget. The biggest share 
of the committed funds went to measures for human resources management and improvement of skills (about 
27 MEUR) while the rest was split between measures related to transparency and effectiveness (8 MEUR), 
and  e-justice  (16  MEUR).  Due  to  the  budgetary  restrictions  of  courts  and  the  changing  priorities  of  the 
Prosecution Office, only some 25 MEUR have been contracted, some 16 MEUR have been disbursed and 57 
projects have been implemented.  

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looking  back  at  developments  in  relation  to  each  benchmark  as  well  as  the  many  recommendations 
contained in the Commission's reports over the years. While all the six benchmarks are interlinked and 
their  fulfilment  partially  interdependent,  the  presentation  below  goes  through  each  benchmark 
separately while focussing on the most relevant developments for each one.  

2.  

INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM 

Benchmark 1: Adopt Constitutional amendments removing any ambiguity regarding the independence 
and accountability of the judicial system 

The first benchmark reflected concerns about aspects of the judicial system in Bulgaria expressed by 
the  Council  of  Europe  Venice  Commission3  as  well  as  by  other  observers  and  independent  experts 
before Bulgaria's accession to the EU. Constitutional amendments adopted by the National Assembly 
of  Bulgaria  on  2  February  2007  sought  to  address  several  of  these  concerns  and  strengthen  the 
independence  and  accountability  of  the  judiciary.4  The  Supreme  Judicial  Council  (SJC)  was  given 
wide-ranging  powers  to  manage  the  judiciary  in  regard  to  appointments,  promotions,  demotions, 
transfer and removal from office of magistrates as well as the management of the budget. In addition, 
the immunity of  magistrates was limited  to actions  carried out when performing their official duties 
and an independent judicial inspectorate was created, which was to be elected by a 2/3 majority of the 
National Assembly and charged with the inspection of judicial bodies.5 The constitutional changes of 
2007  were  an  important  step  towards  establishing  fundamental  safeguards  for  the  independence  and 
accountability  of  the  Bulgarian  judicial  system.  During  the  following  years,  the  focus  of  the  CVM 
therefore turned to monitor their implementation and practical application. While formal constitutional 
rules play a key role in setting the legal parameters of the system, their implementation and practical 
application as well as the evolution of institutional norms and practices are equally important for the 
final  outcome.  Formal  rules  can  never  provide  a  complete  answer  to  the  challenges  facing  the 
judiciary, but have to be seen in the context of the actual practice.6  

This chapter provides first a general overview of the progress made by Bulgaria over the past ten years 
towards  creating  a  stable  system  of  independent  and  accountable  judicial  governance  (section  2.1.). 
This is then followed by a summary of the most recent actions taken by Bulgaria over the past year, 
since the last CVM report of January 2016 (section 2.2.).  

2.1.  

Overview of developments under the CVM 

The 2007 constitutional reform saw a strengthening of the independent role of the SJC in governing 
the judiciary as well as the creation of the new judicial inspectorate. While these changes were seen as 
having established the essential foundations for an independent and accountable judiciary in Bulgaria, 
they had not fully addressed all concerns raised. 

Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) 

The  Commission's  July  2012  report7  recalls  that  the  Venice  Commission  had  expressed  reservations 
about the prominent role of the Minister of Justice within the SJC, as well as the large number of SJC 

3   The Council of Europe's Venice Commission provides legal advice to countries in order to help bring their 
legal and institutional structures into line with European standards and international experience in the fields 
of democracy, human rights and the rule of law: 
 http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_Presentation&lang=EN  

4   SWD(2012) 232, p. 4.  
5   Constitution  of  Bulgaria,  Article  132a.  The  Inspectorate  with  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council  (ISJC)  is  an 
independent  institution,  but  it  reports  to  the  SJC  on  its  activities  and  the  two  institutions  work  closely 
together on disciplinary and other issues.  

6   Bulgaria  consistently  figures  among  the  EU  Member  States  with  the  lowest  perceived  independence  of 

justice. 2016 EU Justice Scoreboard, p. 35-36.  

7   COM(2012) 411, p. 11. 

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members  elected  by  the  National  Assembly.8  While  the  reform  of  2007  has  limited  the  role  of  the 
Minister to chairing the meetings of the SJC in a non-voting capacity and the power to present motions 
on some matters related to the career of magistrates, it was important to see how these powers would 
be exercised in practice.  

As noted by the Commission in 20129, the fact that the Minister of Justice retained a number of roles 
within the SJC had not in practice been highlighted  at the time as a matter of concern, as successive 
Ministers had in general tended to leave issues of management and careers to the SJC. In more recent 
years,  one  Minister  of  Justice  was  active  in  regard  to  a  limited  number  of  decisions  regarding 
significant  disciplinary  cases.10  However,  in  these  cases  the  Minister  appeared  to  be  acting  in  a 
capacity  of  last  resort  to  correct  perceived  failings  of  the  SJC  to  act  in  accordance  with  their 
responsibilities.11 These cases therefore rather illustrated checks and balances at work and were not the 
expression of a more systematic involvement in SJC decisions by the executive power.12  

While the role of the Minister therefore appeared less contentious in practice, the role of the National 
Assembly in electing  members of the SJC has been  the subject of increasing tension over the years. 
The  SJC  is  composed  of  25  members:  11  elected  by  the  National  Assembly,  6  elected  by  judges,  4 
elected by prosecutors, 1 elected by investigating magistrates, in addition to the chairs of the Supreme 
Court  of  Cassation  and  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court  as  well  as  the  Prosecutor  General,  all  of 
whom  are  ex  officio  members.  This  composition  has  been  criticised  by  the  Venice  Commission  and 
others on the grounds that the significant parliamentary quota could create a risk of political influence 
within the SJC.13 In addition, the procedure for electing judicial  members of the SJC has in the past 
taken  the  form  of  indirect  elections,  a  method  which  was  seen  as  giving  a  prevalent  role  for  court 
presidents in the selection of candidates. The July 2012 CVM report set out how the Commission had 
recommended the use of direct election in 2012.14 

Concerns about alleged undue influence on the decisions of the SJC have been a prominent theme in 
successive  CVM  reports15  and  were  given  additional  weight  by  separate  concerns  about  non-
transparent  decision-making,  an  issue  which  was  partly  linked  to  the  lack  of  a  proper  separation  of 
competences with regard to judges and prosecutors within the Council. According to critics, there was 
at least a perceived risk that undue influence could be exerted on judges in a context where the quota 
of  judges  elected  by  their  peers  constituted  only  a  small  minority  within  the  overall  college  of  the 
SJC.16  These  concerns  were  nourished  by  a  lack  of  transparency  and  in  some  cases  perceived 
arbitrariness in the decisions of the SJC on appointments and disciplinary proceedings.17 

In  2015  new  amendments  to  the  Constitution  were  brought  forward  by  the  Government  to  address 
these concerns. The objective was to further strengthen judicial independence through the creation of 
two separate chambers within the SJC, which would deal separately with career decisions for judges 
and  prosecutors.  Following  a  prolonged  period  of  political  negotiations,  a  compromise  was  reached 
and the amendments were adopted by the National Assembly on 16 December 2015. In addition to the 
establishment  of  two  separate  chambers  within  the  SJC,  the  final  package  of  amendments  included 
provisions to abolish the rule that votes in the SJC on staff matters were to be kept secret, while also 

8   Opinion  no.  444/2007  on  the  Constitution  of  Bulgaria  (CDL-AD(2008)009)2  See  also  Opinion  no.  515  / 

2009. 

9   SWD(2012) 232, p. 5. 
10   SWD(2016) 15, p. 8.  
11   In several of these cases the Minister acted in tandem with the Chair of the Supreme Court of Cassation and 

in some case was supported on appeal by rulings of the Supreme Administrative Court. 

12   This also has been confirmed by the fact that the next Minister of Justice did not take an active role in any 

new cases.  

13   SWD(2012) 232, p. 5. 
14   COM(2012) 411, p. 5.  
15   See e.g. COM(2016) 40, p. 3. 
16   The Bulgarian Judges Association has been particularly vocal in this regard.  
17   COM(2016) 40, p. 7. 

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introducing  a  2/3  majority  rule  for  the  election  of  SJC  members  by  the  National  Assembly  and 
requiring  direct  elections  of  the  judicial  quota  of  the  SJC  on  a  one-magistrate  one-vote  basis.18  The 
two  separate  chambers  within  the  SJC  are  competent  to  deal  with  staff  matters19  pertaining  to 
respectively judges and prosecutors as well as matters concerning the organisation and operation of the 
respective judicial bodies (courts and prosecutor's offices). The plenary of the SJC remains competent 
as regards the nomination of the Supreme Court Presidents and the Prosecutor General20, release from 
office  of  a  member  of  the  SJC  itself,  the  draft  budget  of  the  judiciary,  management  of  physical 
premises, judicial training, and organisational matters common to the judiciary as a whole.21  

The  separation  of  career  matters  in  two  separate  chambers  was  aimed  at  addressing  the  perceived 
vulnerability  of  judges  to  undue  pressure  through  the  SJC.  However,  concerns  over  the  possible 
constitutional  implications  of  a  more  far  reaching  change  meant  that  the  overall  composition  of  the 
SJC  was  left  untouched,  with  the  political  quota  elected  by  the  National  Assembly  retaining  its  11 
members. The distribution of this political quota between the two chambers proved a contentious issue 
at the final stage of the parliamentary process and was eventually decided through last minute changes 
to  the  amendments  before  the  final  vote,  which  saw  an  increase  of  the  political  quota  in  the  judges' 
chamber  and  a  reduction  in  the  prosecutorial  chamber  compared  to  what  was  set  out  in  the  original 
compromise.22 The judges' chamber now consists of 14 members, including the Presidents of the two 
Supreme Courts, 6  judges  elected  by their peers, and 6  members  elected  by the National Assembly. 
The  prosecutorial  chamber  in  turn  consists  of  the  Prosecutor  General,  4  prosecutors  elected  by  their 
peers,  an  investigating  magistrate  elected  by  the  peers,  and  5  members  elected  by  the  National 
Assembly.23 The two chambers are chaired by the President of the Supreme Court of Cassation and the 
Prosecutor General respectively, whereas the plenary continues to be chaired by the Minister of Justice 
in a non-voting capacity.24  

The  final  outcome  was  criticised  by  parts  of  the  magistracy  and  civil  society  and  also  by  the  then 
Minister  of  Justice  for  not  sufficiently  protecting  the  judges  against  political  influence,  while  at  the 
same time failing to provide a sufficient counterweight in the prosecutorial chamber to the Prosecutor 
General's  role  as  the  managerial  head  of  the  prosecution.25  However,  the  package  of  Constitutional 
amendments as a whole was recognised, including in the Commission's 2016 report26, as an important 
step towards a more independent and accountable judiciary. Following the vote on the constitutional 
amendments in December 2015, the changes were implemented in legislation through amendments to 
the Judicial Systems Act, and the two chambers were established within the SJC in spring 2016.  

Inspectorate to the SJC (ISJC) 

The second main institutional innovation introduced with the 2007 constitutional amendments was the 
establishment of an independent judicial Inspectorate with the SJC (ISJC), which was granted powers 
to  inspect  all  judicial  bodies,  including  courts,  prosecution  offices  and  the  investigating  services 
attached to the prosecution offices.27 The ISJC was established on 16 January 2008. It consists of an 
Inspector  General  and  ten  Inspectors,  elected  by  a  2/3  majority  in  the  National  Assembly,  and  is 

18   SWD(2016) 15, p. 6. 
19   These  include  appointments,  promotions,  release  from  office,  appraisals,  tenure,  disciplinary  matters  for 

ordinary magistrates as well as for heads of courts and prosecutor's offices. 

20   The  Chairs  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Cassation  and  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court  as  well  as  the 

Prosecutor General are appointed by the President of the Republic on a motion of the SJC.  

21   The Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, Article 130a.  
22   SWD(2016) 15, p. 5. 
23   The Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, Article 130a.  
24   The Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, Article 130b.  
25   The Minister of Justice resigned from office following the vote in the National Assembly.  
26   COM(2016) 40, p. 3. 
27   These are composed of investigating magistrates and form part of the judiciary.  

6 

 
 
                                                            
competent  to  act  ex  officio  as  well  as  on  alerts  from  citizens  or  public  institutions.28  The  detailed 
provisions are set out in the Judicial System Act.  

The  ISJC  is  supported  by  an  expert  staff,  carries  out  planned  and  ad  hoc  inspections,  and  issues 
recommendations  to  court  managers  and  other  institutions,  including  proposals  to  the  SJC  on  the 
opening  of  disciplinary  proceedings  in  cases  where  serious  malpractice  is  identified  during  its 
inspections. It publishes an annual report on its activities. In 2010 a joint Commission on the analysis 
and follow-up to the ISJC recommendations was set up within the SJC to ensure greater visibility and 
to  follow  up  on  the  findings  of  the  ISJC.  CVM  reports  have  generally  recognised  the  positive 
contribution  of  the  ISJC  towards  improving  judicial  discipline  and  accountability,  while  also 
encouraging it to develop its activities further in the direction of addressing systemic problems within 
the judiciary.29  

The  2/3  majority  requirement  for  the  election  of  the  inspectors  by  the  National  Assembly  should 
ensure that the inspectorate enjoys the support of a wide political majority. However, the election of 
the Inspector General proved to be a challenge when the mandate of the first incumbent ended in 2012 
without there being an agreement on a successor. As highlighted in the Commission's 2015 report, for 
an extended period of time this deprived the ISJC of the authoritative and independent leadership with 
which  it  had  been  endowed  by  the  Constitution.30  Eventually,  however,  the  impasse  was  overcome, 
resulting  in  the  election  of  a  new  Inspector  General  in  spring  2015,  followed  by  a  new  college  of 
Inspectors in 2016.  

In the context of the constitutional reform of December 2015 it was decided to strengthen the ISJC by 
granting it additional competencies with regard to the performance of checks for integrity, conflicts of 
interest  and  financial  disclosure  of  judges,  prosecutors  and  investigating  magistrates,  as  well  as  for 
ascertaining  actions  damaging  the  prestige  of  the  judiciary  or  violating  the  independence  of 
magistrates.31  These  new  provisions  entail  a  significant  increase  in  the  responsibilities  of  the  ISJC. 
Detailed legislative provisions were inserted in the Judicial System Act during Spring 2016 and came 
into effect in January 2017.  

2.2.   Developments since the last CVM report of January 2016  

In its 2016 CVM report, the Commission recommended Bulgaria to implement the reform of the SJC 
through amendments to the Judicial Systems Act (JSA), to develop a track record within the SJC of 
transparent appointments based on merit and integrity, and to provide the ISJC with the authority and 
resources to fulfil its new role safeguarding integrity within the judicial system. These elements were 
taken up by the Bulgarian government in the context of a wider judicial reform, which involved two 
separate  legislative  packages  of  amendments  to  the  JSA  adopted  by  the  National  Assembly  and 
promulgated in April and August 2016.  

Reform of the SJC 

The first package of JSA amendments  concerned the reform of the SJC. The amendments  introduce 
the two chambers for judges and prosecutors in line with the new provisions of the Constitution. They 
also define  more in detail the organisational implications of this in terms of a new structure of sub-
committees, most notably in regard to personnel issues where separate committees are established in 
each  of  the  two  chambers  respectively  for  appraisals  and  competitions  and  for  ethics.32  The  JSA 
amendments  also  clarify  the  voting  rules  in  relation  to  personnel  matters,  such  as  appointments, 

28   The Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, Article 132a. 
29   See e.g. COM(2012) 411, p. 7. 
30   COM(2015) 36, p. 4. In the absence of a successor, the incumbent stayed in the post until autumn 2013, after 

which the post remained vacant for 1 ½ year. 

31   The Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, Article 132a, para 6 as amended. 
32   JSA, Article 37.  

7 

 
 
                                                            
promotions, appraisals, granting of tenure, and disciplinary sanctions. 33 In such matters decisions are 
taken  by  an  absolute  majority  of  8  votes  in  the  judicial  chamber  (14  members),  6  votes  in  the 
prosecutorial  chamber  (11  members),  and  a  qualified  majority  of  17  votes  in  the  plenary  (25 
members).34 Other decisions are taken by a simple majority. A new provision also specifies that, as a 
rule, meetings of the SJC are public and shall be streamed live on the internet.35 It confirms that all 
decisions are to be taken by open ballot, whereas before the decisions on personnel matters were taken 
by secret voting.36 The increased transparency of decisions and votes within the SJC allows for closer 
scrutiny of such decisions by the public and interested stakeholders.  

Since the reorganisation, the two  chambers have decided on a number of organisational  matters and 
personnel issues. While the reform has brought more transparency in the functioning of the SJC, the 
changes have not been successful in significantly diminishing the level of controversy surrounding it 
or in dispelling allegations of undue influence on its decisions. In the judicial chamber, the decision-
making process has revealed strong tensions among the members. In some cases the judicial chamber 
has not been able to reach the required majority to decide on key appointments. Even when successful, 
decisions have often been taken in the context of a strongly divided chamber, with narrow votes even 
in cases where there was only a single candidate for the post, and in one case the chosen candidate has 
been the cause of wider controversy on integrity grounds.37 There have however also been examples of 
unanimous  decisions  on  high-level  appointments.38  In  the  prosecutorial  chamber,  in  turn,  decisions 
have  generally  seen  less  overt  controversy  but  have,  on  the  contrary,  generally  been  taken 
unanimously or nearly unanimously, often with only one candidate for the post.  

On  9  December  large  numbers  of  judges  took  to  the  streets  of  Sofia  in  protest  against  the  allegedly 
unbalanced  approach  taken  by  the  SJC  in  regard  to  working  conditions  in  the  Sofia  courts.  The 
leadership  of  the  Sofia  Regional  Court,  supporting  the  protests,  decided  to  resign.  These  protests 
followed an SJC decision the previous day to launch inspections of the Sofia City Court and the Sofia 
Regional Court, based on an alert from the Prosecutor General about delays in the processing of cases 
within the two courts. However, judges contend that the delays are the result of years of inactivity on 
the part of the SJC in dealing with excessive workload in the two courts and that the decision to launch 
the two inspections effectively constitutes an interference by the Prosecutor's Office into the internal 
affairs  of  the  courts.39  These  allegations  reflect  continued  strong  concerns  among  judges  about 
politicisation of the decisions of the SJC.40  

The amendments to the Constitution of December 2015 also contained important changes to the way 
the SJC members will be elected in the future. These rules were further elaborated in amendments to 
the JSA in April 2016, which, in addition to specifying the detailed procedures for the direct election 
of  the  respective  quota  by  the  general  assemblies  of  the  judges,  prosecutors  and  investigating 
magistrates, also introduce some additional changes to the procedure for election of the political quota 

33   JSA, Article 33.  
34   The  plenary  is  competent  for  issues  related  to  the  Presidents  of  the  supreme  courts  and  the  Prosecutor 

General as well as for members of the SJC.  

35   Very limited exceptions exist, such as when discussions concern proposals for disciplinary sanctions.  
36   The SJC continues to use an electronic voting system but the votes are recorded and made accessible via a 

link inserted in the summary records of each meeting on the SJC website.  

37   In one case the Bulgarian Judges Association issued an open letter regretting the lack of scrutiny regarding 
corruption  allegations  concerning  the  chosen  candidate,  as  well  as  the  fact  that  "regardless  of  the  existing 
legal  guarantees  for  exercising  of  the  powers  of  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council  in  an  open  and  responsible 
manner,  this  body  and  in  particular  its  Judges  College  continue  to  take  non-transparent  and  suspicious-
looking decisions"  (Bulgarian Judges Association, Open Letter, 7 June 2016).  

38   One  such  example  was  the  appointment  in  January  2017  of  the  president  of  the  Specialised  Court  for 

organised crime, where the incumbent was the only candidate and was unanimously reappointed.  

39   On the same day, the SJC also decided to launch disciplinary proceedings against a prominent member of the 

Bulgarian Judges Association working at the Sofia City Court citing delays in dealing with cases.  

40   The Bulgarian Judges Association has published a series of open letters in the course of 2016 highlighting 

allegedly problematic practices of the SJC.  

8 

 
 
                                                            
by  the  National  Assembly.  The  nominations  are  examined  by  a  committee  within  the  National 
Assembly and shall be accompanied by "detailed reasons in writing on the professional standing and 
moral  integrity  of  the  candidates,  including  opinions  expressed  by  professional,  academic  and  other 
organisations".41  After  hearing  each  candidate,  the  competent  committee  shall  prepare  and  publish  a 
similarly "detailed and reasoned" report and thereby present each candidate for the vote in the plenary 
of the National Assembly.42 The plenary of the National Assembly shall elect each member of the SJC 
separately, by a majority of 2/3 of the National Representatives.43 As for the non-parliamentary quota, 
the new JSA provisions adopted in April 2016 clarify in detail the procedures through which members 
"shall  be  elected  directly  by  secret  ballot  by  the  judges,  by  the  prosecutors  and  by  the  investigating 
magistrates,  respectively".44  The  procedures  for  the  election  of  the  SJC  will  be  applied  for  the  first 
time in 2017, as the mandate of the current SJC ends in the early autumn.45  

Inspectorate of the SJC (ISJC) 

The other major change that was brought about by the constitutional amendments of December 2015 
concerned  the  role  of  the  ISJC.  The  Inspectorate  is  responsible  for  examining  the  operation  of  the 
judicial authorities without affecting the independence of judges, jurors, prosecutors and investigating 
magistrates  in  the  performance  of  their  functions.  In  accordance  with  the  new  constitutional 
provisions,  the  ISJC  will  in  future  conduct  checks  for  integrity  and  conflict  of  interest  of  judges, 
prosecutors and investigating magistrates, of the financial interest disclosure declarations, as well as 
for  ascertaining  any  actions  damaging  the  prestige  of  the  judiciary  or  violating  the  independence  of 
judges, prosecutors and investigating magistrates.46  

The very general formulations in the Constitution gave rise to difficult discussions in the context  of 
preparing  the  legislative  amendments  to  the  JSA  in  2016.  Eventually,  the  relevant  provisions  were 
included in the August package. The key provisions have entered into effect only in January 2017, so 
as  to  give  time  for  the  ISJC  to  adopt  implementing  rules  and  establish  the  necessary  organisational 
capacity to carry out these new and complex tasks. The ISJC itself submitted several written opinions 
to the Ministry of Justice in the course of the negotiations, insisting in particular on the need for clear 
procedures and rules set out in the law, as well as allocation of sufficient resources for the task.47 

The  new  provisions  on  the  ISJC  and  its  activities  related  to  the  above-mentioned  tasks  span  several 
chapters  of  the  amended  JSA.48  They  specify  that  judges,  prosecutors  and  investigating  magistrates 
shall  submit  to  the  ISJC  a  declaration  of  personal  property  and  interests.  Within  one  month  of  the 
expiry  of  the  deadline  for  submission  of  declarations,  the  ISJC  shall  upload  the  declarations  on  its 
website, together with a list of magistrates (if any) who failed to submit their declarations within the 
deadline.  Within 3  months  of  the  deadline  for  submission  of  a declaration,  the  ISJC  shall  verify  the 
authenticity of declared facts. Broad powers were granted to ISJC for access to sources of information 
regarding the circumstances subject to declaration in order to ensure effective control over Bulgarian 
magistrates’ property. The inspection is performed through comparing declared facts with the received 
information and ends in a report on compliance or non-compliance.   

The  ISJC  will  in  future  also  be  called  upon  to  perform  integrity  checks  and  to  establish  actions 
undermining the prestige of the judiciary or violating the independence of magistrates so as to ensure 

41   JSA,  Article  19.  The  pre-existing  procedure  already  required  the  provision  of  documents  related  to 

educational and professional attainment and incompatibility requirements. 

42   JSA, Article 19a.  
43   JSA, Article 19b.  
44   JSA, Article 20. The procedures are set out in detail in Section 1a of the JSA.  
45   Elections for the judicial quota will take place during spring and the members of the political quota should be 

elected by the National Assembly over the summer.  

46   Constitution, Article 132a.  
47   Information provided by the ISJC.  
48   Chapter  3,  section  III  (ISJC  powers)  and  Chapter  9,  sections  Ia  (verification  of  financial  interests)  and  Ib 
(integrity, conflicts of interest, actions damaging the prestige of the judiciary, impairment of independence). 

9 

 
 
                                                            
compliance  with  the  principles  laid  down  in  the  Code  of  Ethics.  Checks  can  be  initiated  upon  an 
alert49, on request of the magistrate concerned or ex officio by the ISJC. Checks are performed within 
two months from registering the alert and result in the drawing up of a reasoned report. In the course 
of inspections data relevant to the subject of the inspection shall be collected, and the inspected person 
shall be heard. The reports are adopted by the college of the Inspectorate and can result in a proposal 
to  the  respective  chamber  of  the  SJC  for  a  conflict  of  interest  to  be  ascertained  and/or  disciplinary 
proceedings  to  be  instituted.50  The  ultimate  decisions  for  disciplinary  and  other  consequences  are 
therefore taken by the SJC, based on analysis prepared by the ISJC.  

3. 

LEGAL FRAMEWORK 

Benchmark 2: Ensure a more transparent and efficient judicial process by adopting and implementing 
a new Judicial System Act and the new Civil Procedure Code. Report on the Impact of these new laws 
and of the Penal and Administrative Procedure Codes, notably on the pre-trial phase. 

The  second  benchmark  focuses  on  the  legal  and  procedural  framework  of  the  judicial  system.  The 
Judicial System Act (JSA) is the fundamental law governing the judiciary, setting out the institutional 
structures  and  division  of  competences  between  the  various  parts  of  the  judiciary.  The  procedural 
codes  in  turn  are  crucial  for  the  functioning  of  the  various  judicial  bodies.  Together  these  legal 
frameworks have an important bearing on the transparency and effectiveness of the judicial process. 
Stability and coherence of the legal framework is a precondition for a properly functioning judiciary. 

While legislation is a crucial topic of its own, it is also necessary to consider it in context, taking into 
account  the  way  it  is  implemented  in  practice.  This  benchmark  is  therefore  closely  linked  to 
benchmark  3,  which  is  discussed  in  the  next  chapter.  However,  the  formulation  of  a  separate 
benchmark  on  legislation  underlines  the  importance  that  was  attached  to  the  need  for  continued 
attention to be paid to the legal framework at the time of the accession. This reflected concerns over 
the  ability  of  courts  to  deal  with  cases  in  a  timely  and  transparent  manner  in  a  context  of  complex 
procedural rules. Special emphasis was given to the procedural rules governing pre-trial investigations 
in criminal cases, an issue which is closely related to benchmarks 4 and 6 concerning investigations 
into  high-level  corruption  and  organised  crime.  This  reflects  concerns  at  the  time  that  the  complex 
procedures in these areas were hampering an effective law enforcement response.   

3.1.   Overview of developments under the CVM 

The  years  following  Bulgaria's  accession  to  the  EU  have  seen  a  number  of  legislative  amendments 
being  enacted  in  order  to  address  the  CVM  benchmarks.  Some  of  these  concerned  the  JSA,  with 
amendments to implement the above mentioned constitutional changes affecting the SJC and the ISJC 
as well as to clarify broader issues in the functioning of the judicial system. Others have been directed 
towards improving the various procedural laws.  

Judicial System Act (JSA) 

In the immediate aftermath of accession in 2007 a new JSA was adopted in order to promote reform 
within the judiciary. The new law contained important improvements in addition to the strengthened 
independent  role  of  the  SJC  and  the  establishment  of  the  ISJC.  The  system  of  competitions  for 
appointment  to judicial offices was introduced, the principle of random allocation of cases in  courts 
was prescribed in the law, and the National Institute of Justice was established as the central institution 
responsible  for  the  training  of  magistrates.  The  JSA  was  amended  several  times  over  the  following 
years. Amendments in 2009 clarified the rules on the establishment of disciplinary panels within the 

49   Anonymous  alerts  are  not  admissible,  but  the  ISJC  is  required  to  put  in  place  procedures  to  ensure  strict 
confidentiality of both the whistle-blower and the affected magistrates in the course of the proceedings.  
50   After the entry into force of a decision establishing a conflict of interest, proceedings will also be launched 

for the inspection of the property status of the magistrate in question. 

10 

 
 
                                                            
SJC and gave the ISJC powers to appeal disciplinary decisions of the SJC. Subsequent amendments in 
2010 improved the framework for appraisals within the judiciary inter alia by establishing permanent 
appraisal  commissions  within  individual  courts  and  prosecutor's  offices.  The  2010  amendments  also 
further extended the managerial powers of the SJC. As noted in the Commission's 2012 report, the SJC 
had  by  then  been  vested  with  all  relevant  powers  to  properly  manage  human  resources  and  judicial 
structures  for  the  benefit  of  judicial  efficiency.51  In  2012  the  law  was  amended  again  to  introduce 
further  transparency  in  the  procedures  for  the  selection  of  members  of  the  SJC.52  While  several 
improvements  had  therefore  been  made  in  the  first  years  after  accession,  the  debate  continued, 
pointing to a need for further changes.  

In 2015 preparations were launched on yet another broad legislative reform, initiated in the context of 
a  judicial  reform  strategy  which  had  been  prepared  by  the  Minister  of  Justice  and  adopted  by  the 
government at the end of 2014, and endorsed with broad majority by Parliament at the beginning of 
2015. This wide-ranging reform of the JSA was adopted in the summer of 2016 after more than a year 
of extensive consultations with judicial bodies and other relevant stakeholders.53  

Criminal procedure  

A  new  criminal  procedure  code  entered  into  force  in  2006,  but  the  new  law  retained  important 
elements  of  the  previous  system.  As  a  result,  what  has  been  widely  seen  as  an  overly  formalistic 
procedural  tradition  was  perpetuated,  with  serious  consequences  for  effective  justice.  Past  CVM 
reports have referred to the challenges faced by Bulgarian prosecutorial and investigatory bodies under 
the  existing  criminal  procedure  code  and  their  consequences  in  terms  of  hampering  effective 
investigation and prosecution, notably in the context of especially complex cases related to high-level 
corruption  or  organised  crime.54  These  concerns  have  increasingly  come  to  the  fore  again  in  recent 
years,  as  reported  in  meetings  with  Bulgarian  authorities.  Concrete  problems  reported  by  Bulgarian 
pre-trial authorities include complex rules for the collection of evidence during the pre-trial stage and 
strict requirements for the content of indictments, which contribute to frequent referrals from the court 
back  to  the  prosecution  for  further  investigation.  These  challenges  cause  long  delays  in  trials  and 
complicate the pre-trial procedure, eventually leading cases to fail, partly due to statutory time-limits 
being reached or, more frequently, by a lack of evidence for key elements of the charges.  

The new criminal procedure code of 2006 was reported to have a limited positive effect, but did not 
entirely address the challenges. A number of further amendments were made to the criminal procedure 
code during the following years. In particular, amendments in 2010 extended the investigatory powers 
of  the  police55,  clarified  rules  on  accessibility  of  evidence,  allowing  certain  categories  of  police 
officers to testify in court, and introduced a provision allowing prosecutors to appeal court decisions 
which referred cases back for further investigation. Stricter requirements for medical certificates and a 
possibility  for  courts  to  assign  reserve  defence  counsels  were  also  introduced  to  deal  with  a 
widespread problem of absenteeism of defence lawyers.56  

The  2010  reform  also  established  a  specialised  court  and  prosecutor's  office  with  jurisdiction  over 
cases  involving  organised  crime,  which  became  operational  in  2012.  While  initially,  the  specialised 
court  was  intended  to  also  deal  with  high-level  corruption  cases,  this  element  was  not  accepted  by 

51   COM(2012) 411, p. 8. 
52   A  new  membership  was  selected  in  2012.  The  rules  underwent  a  thorough  reform  again  in  2016,  as  also 

referred to above in chapter 2.  

53   See section 3.2 below.  
54   COM(2008) 495, p. 4-5;  COM(2011) 459, p. 8; COM(2012) 411, p. 9. 
55   Previously the investigation of many serious crimes was carried out by investigating magistrates. These still 
exist and continue to be responsible for certain categories of investigations. There are still around 500 such 
investigators,  around  100  in  the  National  Investigation  Service,  operating  directly  under  the  Prosecutor 
General, and another 400 or so within investigation departments of the 28 District Prosecutor's Offices, the 
Sofia City Prosecutor's office, and the Specialised Prosecutor's Office for organised crime.  

56   SWD(2012) 232, p. 10.  

11 

 
 
                                                            
Parliament.  Corruption  cases  therefore  remained  within  the  remit  of  the  general  courts.57  The 
amendments  of  2010  have  had  some  positive  impact  but  did  not  deal  with  the  more  fundamental 
aspects of the formalistic criminal procedures.58  

Penal Code 

A  closely  related  topic  concerns  the  penal  code,  which  as  stated  in  the  Commission's  report  of 
February  2008,  "does  not  differentiate  sufficiently  between  different  degrees  of  crime  and  appears 
structurally  outdated".59  The  Bulgarian  penal  code  dates  from  1968  and  while  it  has  been  amended 
several times, some practitioners and experts have pointed to the need for a thorough reform, if not a 
complete replacement, of the code.  

Among the issues raised are the existence of apparent inconsistencies in levels of sanctions between 
offences, the presence of offences which  are less relevant in today's environment  or which could be 
better  addressed  through  administrative  sanctions,  and  the  formulation  of  offences  in  some  areas  – 
such  as  corruption  related  crimes  –  that  are  not  well  adapted  to  the  types  of  crime  faced  by  law 
enforcement  authorities  in  today's  Bulgarian  society.  Over  the  past  ten  years,  there  have  been 
numerous amendments of the code, some reflecting ad hoc issues on the political agenda60 and others 
reflecting  European  or  international  commitments  by  Bulgaria.61  However,  attempts  at  a  more 
thorough  and  systematic  reform  of  the  penal  code  have  proved  elusive.  In  2009  the  Bulgarian 
government adopted a new concept of criminal policy, which was meant to point the way for a reform 
of the penal code. Preparations were launched in cooperation with technical experts and stakeholders, 
leading to the publication of a new draft of the general part of the code in 2012, while working groups 
continued working on the specific parts of the code.62  

These initially promising efforts were continued over the subsequent years, leading to the publication 
of a complete draft for a new penal code in spring 2014. However, while the need for a new code was 
strongly supported by the prosecutor's office and other stakeholders, the draft received criticism from 
other  parts  of  the  judiciary,  including  the  Supreme  Court  of  Cassation,  and  faced  opposition  in  the 
National Assembly. Due to the dissolution of the National Assembly in July 2014, the draft was never 
voted on, and the following government, entering into office in November of the same year, decided 
not to pursue the adoption of the law. Instead a new reflection process was initiated with a view to the 
development of a penal policy which could clarify the extent to which a root-and-branch reform of the 
code was needed, or whether efforts should rather focus on more targeted amendments of the existing 
code.63  

Civil and Administrative procedures  

A revised civil procedure code was adopted in 2007 with the objective of speeding up proceedings and 
improving  enforcement  of  court  decisions.  The  new  provisions  have  been  monitored  by  the  ISJC, 
which has been able to give recommendations to court management and refer cases of contradictory 
jurisprudence  to  the  supreme  courts  for  adjudication.  The  new  code  appears  to  have  had  a  positive 
effect  in  terms  of  speeding  up  procedures.  Although  delays  remain  a  significant  problem  in  some 
courts this appears not primarily to be linked to problems in the procedural code.64  

57   Cases  related  to  ministers,  members  of  parliament,  magistrates  and  other  immunity  holders  are  within  the 

competence of the Sofia City Court.  

58   See chapters 4, 6 and 7 below for further details on challenges hampering criminal investigations in Bulgaria.   
59   COM(2008) 63, p. 4.  
60   A recent example is the proposals for a dramatic increase in penalties for driving speed offences in 2016.  
61   Examples  are  the  introduction  of  new  provisions  on  terrorist  offences  in  2015  and  revision  of  some 

corruption offences in light of GRECO recommendations in 2015.  

62   SWD(2012) 232, p. 9. 
63   SWD(2015) 9, p. 9-10; SWD(2016) 15, p. 11-12. 
64   This should be seen in the wider context of management of workload within the judiciary, see chapter 4.  

12 

 
 
                                                            
Amendments  of  the  administrative  procedure  code  were  adopted  in  2007  and  in  2011  in  order  to 
improve proceedings and re-organise the first-instance jurisdiction in a number of administrative cases 
from the Supreme Administrative Court to the district administrative courts.65 Early evaluations of the 
impact  of  the  reform  concluded  that  the  changes  had  been  positive,  although  there  were  also  some 
elements  which  could  require  further  improvement.66  One  of  the  challenges  raised  by  the  Bulgarian 
authorities as well as by independent experts relates to the role of the Supreme Administrative Court 
as  both  first  and  final  instance  court  with  jurisdiction  for  a  great  number  of  government  decisions, 
including  not  only  ministerial  decisions  and  decisions  of  the  SJC  but  also  decisions  of  a  number  of 
agencies,  where  jurisdiction  has  been  set  out  in  legislation.67  This  situation  for  example  can  create 
challenges  in  regard  to  the  management  of  court  panels  within  the  Supreme  Court  to  deal  with  the 
same  cases  both  at  first  instance  and  in  appeal  as  well  as  with  cases  appealed  from  the  regional 
administrative courts, as well as in the application of random allocation of cases.  

3.2.   Developments since the last CVM report of January 2016  

In its 2016 CVM report the Commission recommended Bulgaria to adopt amendments to the Judicial 
System Act and a reform of criminal policy in line with the government's judicial reform strategy, and 
to prepare a set of targeted amendments to address problems in criminal procedures. These elements 
were all taken up by the government in 2016, although with varying degree of progress made  in the 
course of the year.  

Judicial System Act  

In 2016 the Bulgarian Parliament adopted a broad package of amendments to the Judicial System Act. 
Elements have already been referred to above as they relate to the implementation of the constitutional 
amendments  of  December  2015.  In  addition  to  this,  the  package  amounts  to  a  broad  reform  of  key 
elements  of  judicial  management:  extending  the  role  of  judges  in  the  internal  governance  in  courts, 
decentralising some aspects of the organisation of prosecutor's offices, improving the system of career 
development for magistrates, and clarifying the rules on secondments, appointment of lay judges, and 
disciplinary proceedings, among other changes.  

One  important  aim  of  the  reform  is  to  provide  the  opportunity  for  individual  judges  to  take  a  more 
active part in the governance of their courts, for example by giving them a bigger say in the process of 
appointing  court  chairs.  General  assemblies  within  each  court  are  given  the  competence  to  formally 
nominate candidates for administrative head of the relevant court and to hear all candidates. While the 
final  decision  remains  with  the  SJC,  this  new  procedure  is  seen  by  its  proponents  as  an  important 
element of democratic governance within the judiciary.68 It is in line with the CVM recommendation 
of 2016 in favour of "reforms to give more say to individual judges and prosecutors".69  Furthermore, 
the  new  powers  of  court  general  assemblies  include:  hearing  the  candidates  for  deputy  chairs, 
nominated by the court chair, and expressing an opinion on the nominations; determining the number 
and  composition  of  the  divisions  within  the  court,  if  any,  and  their  specialisation  by  subject  matter; 
discussing  the  annual  report  on  the  court's  activity;  and  giving  opinions  on  matters  related  to  the 
working arrangements of the court.  

65   Bulgaria  has  28  administrative  courts  covering  the  provinces  and  a  single  Supreme  Administrative  Court 

located in Sofia, acting as appeal instance as well as first instance in some cases.  

66   SWD(2012) 232, p. 12.  
67   For example, disciplinary decisions of the SJC, if appealed, are first heard by a three judge panel of the SAC 

but can subsequently be appealed further to a five-judge panel.  

68   In connection with the procedure for election of the chair of the Supreme Court of Cassation in 2014, judges 
at  that court organised  informal  hearings of  the  respective  candidates,  a  practice  which became  recognised 
and extended to other courts under internal rules enacted by the SJC at the time. However, the fact that the 
procedure was not recognised in law meant that the status of these hearings remained unclear (SWD(2015) 9, 
p. 5-6). 

69   COM(2016) 40, p. 11. 

13 

 
 
 
                                                            
The  JSA amendments also  contained amendments to  clarify the internal organisation and strengthen 
the external accountability of the Prosecutor's Office.70 The amendments specify that prosecutors and 
investigating magistrates are to be directed by the administrative heads of their respective prosecutor's 
offices, which in turn refer to the Prosecutor General. The Prosecutor General is directly responsible 
for  the  organisation  of  the  supreme  prosecution  offices  and  the  national  investigation  service, 
including  the  appointment  of  staff  in  these  bodies.  Furthermore,  he  supervises  and  provides 
methodological guidance for the work of all prosecutors and investigators through written instructions, 
and  also  directs  the  internal  control  activities  within  the  prosecution  service,  which  includes 
performance evaluation, disciplinary procedures, monitoring of activity, ensuring the dissemination of 
best practices, and ensuring implementation of priorities.  

Each year the Prosecutor General presents an annual report on the operation of his services. The report 
is  made  public  and  is  to  be  the  subject  of  a  hearing  at  the  SJC  as  well  as  a  general  debate  at  the 
National Assembly.71 With regard to the autonomy of individual prosecutors, while prosecutors work 
under the supervision of their superiors and their decisions may be revoked by a reasoned decision of a 
superior  prosecutor's  office,  a  new  provision  seeks  to  ensure  that  "verbal  orders  and  directions  in 
connection with work on cases and case files shall be inadmissible". Furthermore, a prosecutor whose 
decisions are revoked by a superior may lodge an objection with a superior prosecutor's office.72   

Amendments  are  also  introduced  with  regard  to  the  preparation  of  decisions  within  the  SJC  on 
appraisals and promotions, including the introduction of additional criteria for the appraisal of judges 
and prosecutors.73 Furthermore, a centralised committee is set up in connection with each chamber of 
the  SJC,  composed  of  members  of  the  respective  chamber  of  the  SJC,  as  well  as  members  selected 
from among active magistrates, which are appointed for a one-year term by the general assemblies of 
the  supreme  courts  and  of  the  supreme  prosecutor's  offices  and  national  investigation  service.74  The 
committees  for  appraisals  and  competitions,  together  with  the  committees  on  ethics,  will  play  a  key 
role in preparing decisions of the two chambers on personnel issues.75  

The ethics committees are charged with conducting enquiries and with drawing up opinions regarding 
the moral integrity of candidates for judicial offices, including future heads and deputy heads of courts 
and  prosecutor's  offices.  The  committees  on  appraisals  and  competitions  in  turn  will  draft  proposals 
for the consideration of the respective chambers of the SJC on appointments and promotions and other 
personnel  matters.  In  regard  to  disciplinary  proceedings,  the  ability  of  the  members  of  the  SJC  to 
initiate such proceedings for ordinary magistrates is abolished. Disciplinary proceedings are instituted 
by  a  decision  of  the  SJC  at  the  proposal  of  the  immediate  administrative  head,  a  superior 
administrative head, the ISJC or the Minister of Justice.76  

70   JSA, Articles 136 ff.  
71   JSA, new Article 138a.  
72   JSA, Article 143. 
73   JSA, Article 199. 
74   The candidates need to have the rank of magistrates of these institutions, but several of the chosen members 
were  sitting  judges  in  lower  courts.  Heads  and  deputy  heads  are  excluded.  The  external  members  were 
chosen in the course of the spring and summer. Following some discussion on the merits of part time versus 
full time members, it was decided that sitting magistrates elected to the committee will be relieved of other 
tasks during their one-year tenure. 

75   This will also include the development of general methodologies, for example on performance assessment of 

magistrates.  

76   JSA, Article 312. Previously, five members of the SJC could initiate a disciplinary procedure, which raised 
questions  about  the  impartiality  of  the  process,  as  the  same  members  could  subsequently  sit  on  the 
disciplinary  panels  and  also  take  part  in  the  final  vote  when  the  decision  was  taken  in  plenary  on  the 
disciplinary  sanction,  something  which  happened  often  in  the  past.  The  possibility  of  members  to  initiate 
proceedings is retained however with regard to members of the SJC itself, in which case five members of the 
plenary or three members of the respective college is required. In addition, the new provisions allow 1/5 of 

14 

 
 
                                                            
 
Criminal procedures and penal code reform 

In  2016  a  package  of  draft  amendments  to  the  criminal  procedure  code  was  prepared  in  a  working 
group involving experts of the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Prosecutor's Office. Among other 
issues, these draft amendments are intended to address the problem of frequent referrals of cases back 
to the prosecution on procedural grounds. It is proposed to introduce a separate preliminary hearing at 
the first instance court in which any procedural violations during the pre-trial phase are to be finally 
identified  and  corrected.  Following  the  preliminary  hearing,  it  would  no  longer  be  possible  for  the 
court to refer the case file back to the prosecution, which should discipline both the prosecution and 
the defence at an early stage of the procedure.  

Under the current rules, cases reportedly tend to be allowed to continue to court and even to the appeal 
stage in spite of the presence of procedural or other flaws, although both parties know that raising the 
issues at a later stage can oblige the court to refer the case back to the prosecution with instructions for 
correction  of  the  errors  found.77  Such  referrals  constitute  one  important  explanation  for  delays  in 
criminal cases. Moreover, besides the delay itself, this phenomenon is also seen as a possible reason 
for cases to fail in court, as the late discovery of flaws in the initial construction of an indictment by 
the prosecutor or in the conduct of the investigation can often be difficult to remedy at the time when 
the issue is eventually raised, which may even happen several years later during the proceedings at the 
appeal instance. As could be expected, the problem of cases being returned by the court is particularly 
serious in regard to complex cases such as those involving corruption and organised crime.78  

Another  significant  element  of  the  proposals  concerns  the  inclusion  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Specialised  Court  and  Prosecutor's  Office  for  Organised  Crime  of  high  level  corruption  cases 
involving  ministers,  members  of  parliament,  magistrates,  and  incumbents  of  certain  other  high  level 
offices. The stated objective is to ensure a higher degree of specialisation of competence in high level 
cases79,  while  leaving  other  corruption  cases  with  the  general  courts  and  prosecutor's  offices. 
However,  some  observers  were  critical  of  the  proposals  which  were  not  seen  as  being  based  on  a 
proper  prior  assessment  and  debate.80  Further  amendments  aim  at  simplifying  procedures  for  the 
investigation of less serious crimes, more flexible rules for the application of expedited procedures in 
complex  cases81,  new  possibilities  for  remote  questioning  of  expert  witnesses  by  phone  or  video 

the members of the National Assembly and 1/5 of sitting judges, prosecutors or investigating magistrates to 
propose the release of office of a member of the SJC from the political and judicial quota respectively.  

77   An analysis carried out by the Prosecutor's Office shows that in more than 60 per cent of the cases where the 
file was returned by the courts to the prosecution in 2015, the decision was due to errors during the pre-trial 
investigation  or  deficiencies  in  the  preparation  of  the  indictment,  which  were  largely  obvious,  or  caused 
problems during the trial which were to a great degree predictable, and which could have been avoided  by 
meticulous work on the part of the investigating authorities and the supervising prosecutor. Around 10 per 
cent  of  the  cases  were  in  turn  due  to  the  court  deviating  from  the  prevailing  case  law,  setting  unjustified 
requirements  or  applying  excessive  formalism.  Annual  report  of  the  prosecutor's  office  for  2015,  p.  9-10 
(English translation).  

78   Almost one-third of organised crime cases and almost one-fifth of corruption cases brought to court in 2015 
were returned by the court for correction of procedural or formal errors in the indictments. Op cit., p. 52. 
79   Most  of  these  cases  are  currently  with  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Sofia  City  Court  (competent  for  all  criminal 
cases  against  government  ministers  and  holders  of  immunity  including  MPs,  magistrates,  etc.)  or  with  the 
general  courts  (all  other  cases),  unless  they  involve  an  element  of  organised  crime,  in  which  case  the 
Specialised court is competent.  

80   Civil society organisations  criticised  the  timing  of  the proposals,  without  any  impact  assessment  or further 
analysis,  only  two  months  prior  to  the  finalisation  of  a  major  evaluation  of  the  Specialised  Court  for 
organised crime by the Supreme Court of Cassation. Ultimately, the said evaluation proved to be critical of 
the specialised court in several respects (see also chapter 7 below).  

81   Under Chapter 26 of the Criminal Procedure Code, if the case is still under investigation after two years, the 
defence can ask for the court to set a deadline for the prosecutor to bring the case to court. Failing this, the 
case is closed. Currently the deadline is invariably three months and the court has no discretion on this. The 
amendments to this provision reportedly aim to give the court some discretion in light of an assessment of the 
circumstances surrounding the concrete case.  

15 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
conference,  more  clarity  about  deadlines  for  publishing  the  reasoning  for  court  decisions,  stronger 
safeguards for the presumption  of innocence during  pre-trial proceedings82, and swifter  execution of 
decisions of the Supreme Court of Cassation involving prison sentences.83  

The  draft  amendments  were  published  for  consultation  and  also  discussed  in  the  Judicial  Reform 
Council84 in September 2016. The final endorsement and submission of the draft amendments to the 
National  Assembly  is  however  still  pending,  and  the  prospect  and  possible  timing  of  their  eventual 
adoption  and  entering  into  force  therefore  remains  uncertain.  If  passed,  the  amendments  could 
contribute  to  addressing  a  number  of  key  problems  identified  in  CVM  report  as  affecting  criminal 
procedures in Bulgaria. It is however likely that some of the proposals will solicit further debate. In 
particular, as mentioned above, concerns were raised from among stakeholders and experts about the 
proposed  transfer  of  jurisdiction  in  high-level  corruption  cases  from  the  Sofia  City  Court  to  the 
Specialised Court, in particular if such a transfer was carried out without a careful prior analysis of the 
possible impact in terms of staff resources needed and without sufficient measures taken to avoid any 
potential disruption or delay in ongoing cases.  

Some stakeholders also considered that further amendments could be needed in order to address more 
directly  the  core  issues  of  the  very  formalistic  criminal  proceedings  in  Bulgaria.  Prosecutors  in 
particular  have  pointed  to  issues  such  as  strict  requirements  for  the  content  of  indictments  and  very 
complex  rules  on  collection  of  evidence.85  Such  more  fundamental  reforms  would  call  for  careful 
analysis  to  assess  the  balance  between  expediency  and  procedural  safeguards.  Also,  some  of  the 
challenges could be linked to an overly strict interpretation in some instances, rather than problematic 
rules per se. While the Bulgarian rules as such may not necessarily be fundamentally different from 
those  in  some  other  Member  States,  their  application  appears  to  be  particularly  cumbersome. 
Furthermore,  some  prosecutors  have  complained  about  inconsistent  practices  in  different  courts  and 
even within the same court with regard to the interpretation of certain procedural requirements.86  

Finally,  with  regard  to  the  reform  of  the  penal  code,  the  Bulgarian  government  in  2015  initiated  a 
reflection process with a view to preparing a general reform of the code in regard to the definition of 
offences  and  penalties.  The  government  underlined  its  intention  to  ensure  that  the  reform  should  be 
based on the best European and international practice, while avoiding decisions based on immediate 
political considerations, by basing the reform on a broader conception of a new penal policy prepared 
in cooperation with experts and stakeholders. International expert assistance was also drawn upon in 

82   It  is  reportedly  envisaged  that  names  of  suspected  perpetrators  would  no  longer  be  announced  in  the  act 

opening the pre-trial investigation, so as to prevent press stories pre-judging the investigation result.   

83   The last element is related to criminals evading prison by absconding after the announcement of the sentence, 
an issue which has been mentioned in previous CVM reports. Amendments to the criminal procedure code in 
2015 aimed to address this problem at lower courts, but some issues remained with regard to appeals at the 
Supreme Court. SWD(2016) 5, p. 30.  

84   The Judicial Reform Council was set up by the Minister of Justice at the beginning of 2016 as a forum for the 
finalisation of legislative proposals in consultation with the relevant stakeholders within the judiciary as well 
as civil society actors and experts. This strategy proved particularly successful in connection with the Judicial 
System  Act  amendments,  which  saw  intensive  negotiations  before  they  were  presented  in  the  National 
Assembly.  

85   Concrete challenges which have been raised include issues such as heavy procedures in connection with the 
hearing  of  witnesses  and  collection  of  evidence,  official  documents  from  public  authorities  not  being 
admissible  as  evidence,  and  the  lack  of  possibilities  for  the  prosecution  and  court  to  prioritise  relevant 
evidential material. Such issues should be seen in combination with formalistic requirements for the content 
of indictments, resulting in very long documents which also need to be read out in court during trial.  

86   Even in simple cases (such as a simple theft) prosecutors have reported that at times, they are called upon to 
describe in such detail the events surrounding the crime that compliance required the prosecutors to create a 
story around events rather than sticking to the facts. At times, though, such excessive requirements could be 
reversed on appeal (prosecutors can appeal such court decisions remitting cases for further work).  

16 

 
 
                                                            
this context. Given the apparent need for careful preparation, a general reform of the penal code now 
appears less likely to take place in the short term.87  

4. 

 CONTINUED REFORM OF THE JUDICIARY 

Benchmark  3:  Continue  the  reform  of  the  judiciary  in  order  to  enhance  professionalism, 
accountability and efficiency. Evaluate the impact of this reform and publish the results annually. 

Reform is a continuous process and the adoption of changes to constitutional or legislative provisions 
needs to be taken forward to implementation. Ultimately the assurance that the judiciary is working in 
a professional, accountable and efficient way requires a competent management, as well as a culture 
based on these values to permeate the entire structure of judicial authorities. This is the background for 
the third CVM benchmark, which calls for Bulgaria to continue its reform efforts, including through 
continuous evaluation and transparency about impacts. Bulgaria has framed its efforts in this direction 
in  the  context  of  broad  judicial  reform  strategies  put  forward  at  political  level.  The  first  one  was 
adopted  in  2010,  and  a  more  recent  update  was  adopted  at  the  end  of  201488  and  endorsed  by  the 
National  Assembly  in  January  2015.  In  more  concrete  terms,  the  responsibility  for  reform  lies  to  a 
large  extent  with  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council  (SJC)  to  which  the  Constitution  has  given  broad 
powers to manage the judiciary in more operational terms, without interfering with the independence 
of individual judicial bodies.89 In addition, the heads of the various judicial bodies carry independent 
managerial  responsibilities,  not  least  the  Presidents  of  the  two  Supreme  Courts  and  the  Prosecutor 
General,  who  not  only  manage  their  respective  institutions  but  also  sit  on  the  SJC  as  ex  officio 
members.90  

This  chapter  will  first  give  a  general  overview  of  the  developments  over  the  past  ten  years  before 
proceeding to the more recent developments over the past year.  

4.1.   Overview of developments under the CVM 

The evolution of the Bulgarian judiciary over ten years is evidently a vast topic and cannot be covered 
comprehensively  in  the  context  of  this  report.  What  follows  therefore  focusses  on  the  main 
developments  related  to  judicial  reform  in  areas  which  have  been  highlighted  in  past  CVM  reports. 
Important  topics  in  this  regard  include  the  general  system  of  personnel  management,  disciplinary 
proceedings,  judicial  training,  allocation  of  cases  in  courts,  the  judicial  map,  transparency  and 
accessibility (e-justice), and the reform of the prosecution.  

Many of these topics concern directly or indirectly the quality and transparency of work in the SJC as 
the main governing body of the Bulgarian judiciary.  

Role of the SJC 

Decisions  of  the  SJC  have  continued  to  be  a  contentious  issue  over  the  years  and  this  has  led  to  a 
number of improvements in procedures. Many of the changes focussed on formal steps. In the period 
immediately following accession, steps were taken to improve transparency in the work of the SJC by 

87   The  Prosecutor's  Office  has  however  pointed  to  some  areas  where  targeted  amendments  could  make  a 
difference in the short term, notably in corruption cases where challenges are reported in regard to providing 
proof of intent and purpose or the damages incurred in relation to offences such as abuse of office (Article 
282) and bribery (Articles 301-307) as well as other similar corruption related offences (e.g. Article 220 on 
disadvantageous transactions).  

88   Updated Strategy to Continue the Reform of the Judicial System, adopted by the Council of Ministers on 17 
December  2014.    An  English  version  is  available  at  the  website  of  the  Bulgarian  Ministry  of  Justice:  
https://mjs.bg/Files/UPDATED_STRATEGY_EN_ADOPTED__EN_635576978036934663.pdf  

89   SWD(2016) 15, p. 12; SWD(2015) 9, p. 2. 
90   In addition, following the most recent reform of the SJC, the President of the Supreme Court of Cassation 
and the Prosecutor General chair the meetings of the two specialised chambers for judges and prosecutors.  

17 

 
 
                                                            
making the meetings public and publishing its decisions on a website. This has recently been followed 
up  by  granting  public  access  to  voting  records  on  personnel  issues.  Over  the  years  there  have  been 
many  changes  to  rules  of  procedure  to  clarify  proceedings  in  various  matters,  which  has  also  been 
combined with the establishment of specialised committees. Since 2011, the work of the SJC has been 
facilitated  by  specialised  committees  within  individual  judicial  bodies  focusing  on  appraisals  and 
promotions  as  well  as  on  ethics  and  integrity.  These  local  committees  were  mirrored  by  specialised 
committees within the SJC. As mentioned in chapter 3 above, these structures saw further reforms in 
2016. In 2011 the SJC also established a special committee to ensure closer cooperation with the ISJC 
on  disciplinary  issues,  and  the  SJC  adopted  a  set  of  internal  rules  on  the  conduct  of  disciplinary 
proceedings in 2014. In order to enhance transparency, the SJC set up an associated 'civic council' in 
2012 gathering a number of civil society actors and professional associations to follow and deliberate 
on  topics  under  consideration  by  the  SJC.  This  was  followed  up  in  2015  with  a  broader 
communication strategy aimed at increasing transparency around the work of the judiciary in general, 
including the SJC.  

In spite of the many improvements made over the years in institutional terms, the functioning of the 
SJC  has  remained  controversial  in  a  number  of  areas.  Notably  issues  such  as  transparency  and 
accountability  of  the  SJC  have  continued  to  be  raised  by  stakeholders,  further  underlined  by  the 
decision of several of the relevant organisations to leave the SJC civic council over the years91, as well 
as the frequent  public criticism by professional associations and NGOs of decisions taken. Tensions 
within the Council were one of the reasons for the 2015 constitutional amendments and the subsequent 
reform of the SJC already outlined in chapter 2 above.  

Personnel management within the judiciary 

A  key  issue  in  any  organisation  is  the  allocation  and  management  of  staff.  In  the  judiciary,  this 
includes  issues  such  as  appointments,  appraisals,  promotions  and  granting  of  tenure.  Appointments 
have already been touched upon in chapter 2 above as far as high-level appointments are concerned. 
As  for  more  standard  appointments,  Bulgaria  early  on  introduced  the  principle  of  competitive 
appointments,  meaning  that  positions  within  the  judiciary  are  filled  through  competitive  procedures. 
Overall,  this  system  appears  to  be  now  well-established.92  There  also  exists  a  separate  path  into  the 
service for experienced lawyers. The system for obtaining tenure is also well established.  

Performance assessment of magistrates is an issue which has been raised in past reports. The present 
system  has  been  described  as  based  on  a  rather  formal  exercise  which  does  not  allow  for  a  proper 
dialogue or a reasoned assessment of the individual judge or prosecutor.93 An additional aspect of this 
issue  has  been  the  indirect  link  with  disciplinary  proceedings.  The  latter  appears  to  some  extent  to 
have been applied as a mechanism to address efficiency problems within courts. This issue has most 
commonly  been  associated  with  the  problem  of  delays  in  the  publication  of  reasons  for  court 
decisions,  which  has  at  times  also  been  addressed  through  the  opening  of  disciplinary  proceedings. 
While  the  use  of  disciplinary  proceedings  can  be  relevant  in  the  event  that  delays  appear  to  be 
deliberate on the part of the magistrate concerned, decisions or proposals for disciplinary proceedings 

91   SWD(2015) 9, p. 3. 
92   The principle has however not always been consistently followed over the years. Due to the complexity of 
the competitive process, there has been a tendency to fill positions through secondments, which are on the 
one  hand  a  less  bureaucratic  alternative  but  also  are  seen  as  a  risk  due  to  the  less  stable  position  of 
magistrates  appointed  in  this  way.  These  problems  have  been  sought  addressed  through  various 
improvements in the system of competitions and the latest JSA amendments have introduced stricter rules on 
secondments.  

93   It has been noted in the past that the Bulgarian system tends to give similar grades to most magistrates (good 
or very good) and be based on rather formal criteria. According to a recent survey of Bulgarian magistrates 
73% of prosecutors and 65% of judges do not find that performance evaluation provides an objective and fair 
evaluation of the work of magistrates in general, although they tend to have a more positive attitude towards 
their  own  personal  evaluation  (with  ¾  considering  it  as  fair).  Attitudes  of  the  magistrates  on  the  judicial 
system reforms in Bulgaria, Bulgarian Institute for Legal Initiatives (BILI), 2016.  

18 

 
 
                                                            
have in many cases been met by the argument that the delays in question rather reflected a problem of 
workload  management  within  the  respective  court.  Such  arguments  have  also  in  some  cases  been 
given  credit  by  rulings  of  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court.  In  fact,  the  use  of  disciplinary 
proceedings  for  issues  which  should  in  many  cases  rather  be  addressed  as  a  matter  of  performance 
assessment could have many reasons. In the Bulgarian context one element appears to have been the 
lack  of  effective  mechanisms  to  appropriately  assess  the  personal  performance  of  magistrates.94 
Performance assessment is one of the areas addressed in the 2014 judicial reform strategy, which led 
to the introduction of new provisions in the Judicial Systems Act in 2016 and is currently the object of 
a  process  to  formulate  a  new  methodology  for  appraisal  and  promotion  of  magistrates.95  More 
generally  on  disciplinary  proceedings,  as  also  mentioned  in  chapter  2  above,  the  use  of  disciplinary 
proceedings has been a frequent source of controversy in Bulgaria, with critics of the SJC arguing that 
disciplinary  rules  are  being  used  in  a  non-transparent  manner  and  possibly  for  ulterior  motives.  It 
should be noted, however, that before 2007 disciplinary proceedings against magistrates were reported 
to  be  virtually  non-existent.96  While  the  SJC  has  struggled  to  develop  a  transparent  and  consistent 
practice in this area, there has been a clear change since 2007 in the sense that a system now exists to 
hold magistrates disciplinarily accountable for flagrant misconduct in connection with the execution of 
their  duties.  The  system  was  reinforced  with  the  introduction  of  a  code  of  ethics  for  magistrates  in 
2009. 

Linked to the issue of appraisals and disciplinary proceedings is another topic of high relevance in the 
Bulgarian  context,  namely  that  of  workload  management.  This  issue  has  been  identified  as  a  major 
issue in successive CVM reports in relation to appraisals and disciplinary proceedings as well as the 
broader  discussion  on  the  overall  system  for  allocation  of  staff  to  individual  judicial  organs.97  A 
significant  amount  of  work  has  taken  place  within  the  SJC  over  the  past  years  in  order  to  develop 
objective  standards  for  the  assessment  of  workload,  taking  into  account  the  relative  complexity  of 
different types of cases.98 By 2016 this work was completed for both prosecution offices and courts, 
resulting in a 'workload standard', which can provide the basis for a more objective assessment of the 
workload for the individual magistrates.99 In parallel with the more long-term work undertaken by the 
SJC to establish objective workload standards, the SJC has taken measures over the years to address 
the  most  flagrant  inequities  in  workload  between  judicial  bodies.100  In  spite  of  these  measures, 
however,  there  appears  to  be  a  continued  serious  problem  of  uneven  workload  in  some  courts.  In 
particular, some of the larger courts appear to continue to experience serious problems in this regard. 
At  the  same  time,  there  are  judicial  bodies  with  very  low  relative  workload,  from  which  resources 
could  be  reallocated  to  those  with  heavier  workload.  With  the  new  workload  standards  it  should  be 
possible  for  the  SJC  to  take  informed  decisions  on  this  issue  and  perhaps  move  more  quickly  to 
address some of the most serious unevenness between courts.   

Judicial map, e-justice and transparency 

An issue linked to that of personnel management concerns the overall structure and number of judicial 
bodies  and  their  respective  jurisdiction,  the  'judicial  map'.  Another  closely  related  subject  is  the 
introduction of new IT tools to improve the accessibility and transparency of justice. The discussions 

94   This  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  disciplinary  proceedings  for  delaying  cases  are  unlawful.  On  the 
contrary, the law foresees the use of disciplinary proceedings for actions causing delays in court proceedings, 
which can be entirely appropriate in cases where such delays are deliberate or flagrant. The attention of the 
Commission has been drawn to the existence of such cases.  

95   See also chapter 3 above.  
96   SWD(2012) 232, p. 15. 
97   COM(2012) 411, p. 8-9; COM(2015) 36 , p. 6; COM(2016) 40, p. 6.  
98   For  the  courts  in  particular  the  work  involved  a  comprehensive  process  of  estimating  typical  average 
workload associated with a large number of individual 'case types' based on assessments by practicing judges 
through surveys and focus groups.  

99   The result of this extensive work is now also being applied in the system for the random allocation of cases 

within courts, see below.  

100  SWD(2014) 36, p. 4-5; SWD(2015) 9, p. 14; SWD(2016) 15, p. 15-16.  

19 

 
 
                                                            
on the judicial map have proven very sensitive both within the judiciary itself and in wider society. In 
light of the need for broader support in society as well as within the ranks of the judiciary, the SJC has 
taken  a  cautious  approach  to  the  reform  of  the  judicial  map  over  recent  years.  Nevertheless,  among 
Bulgarian  authorities  both  at  political  level  and  within  the  judiciary  itself  there  seems  to  be  an 
understanding that the current system – with more than a hundred local courts, 28 regional courts and 
five  appellate  regions  for  a  population  of  7  million101  –  needs  a  comprehensive  reform.  102  A  first 
careful  step  was  taken  in  2014  with  a  minor  reform  of  the  military  courts.103  A  separate  process  to 
prepare  a  comprehensive  reform  of  the  local  courts  has  been  ongoing  for  several  years  and  in  2015 
reached  the  stage  of  general  consultations  on  a  number  of  draft  criteria  to  be  applied  for  the 
restructuring  of  those  courts.  The  debate  on  the  higher  level  courts  in  turn  has  only  started  rather 
recently.104  

An important issue to consider in the context of a reform of the court map is how to ensure adequate 
access to judicial institutions for citizens throughout the national territory. Here the development of e-
justice  could contribute  to the  solution,  an  issue  which  has  been  on  the  agenda  in  Bulgaria  over  the 
past ten years. Already at the time of the accession to the EU rules were put in place to require courts 
to publish court decisions online. The implementation of this requirement took some time to ensure in 
all instances, but is today general practice.105  

In  recent  years  electronic  case  management  systems  have  been  introduced  in  most  courts,  in  some 
cases also allowing for external communication.106 However, some courts still complain about lack of 
efficient IT based systems for the management of case files as well as for communication. A unified 
electronic system for the management of criminal cases has been implemented within the prosecution 
already  in  2014  but  has  not  yet  been  extended  to  the  courts.  Communication  between  prosecutor's 
offices and police also appears to be facing problems due to the lack of a common IT system, which 
may be a cause of delays in pre-trial proceedings.107 It is planned to address the challenges related to 
the introduction of electronic tools in the Bulgarian judiciary over the coming years in the context of a 
broader government e-justice strategy.108  

Allocation of cases in courts 

An area where Bulgaria has for many years had electronic systems in place concerns the allocation of 
cases to individual judges within courts. According to the law, the decision on which judge should be 
charged  with  a  particular  case  should  be  decided  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of  random 
allocation.109  The  system  of  random  allocation  of  cases  has  been  adopted  as  a  mechanism  for  the 

101  In addition, there are the separate 28 administrative courts as well as 3 military courts and a specialised court 

for organised crime, the latter two with additional separate appeal instances.  

102 The Prosecutor General in particular has been clear about the need to streamline the structure of prosecutor's 

offices, which generally follows the structure of courts.  

103  The number was reduced from five to three. More recently it is being considered to consolidate the remaining 
three  into  one.  It  is  interesting  that  the  reform  of  the  military  courts  was  proposed  to  the  SJC  by  the 
prosecutor's office rather than being the result of a discussion within the courts.   

104  SWD(2016) 15, p. 16-17. 
105  Keyword-searchable data bases as well as a system of systematic legal commentary are however areas where 

further development could be useful in the Bulgarian context.  

106  A limited number of 'pilot' courts have experimented with online access to case files for registered users and 

electronic summoning of the parties to court hearings.  

107  Apparently  it  can  in  some  instances  take  up  to  ten  days  for  a  case  file  to  be  transferred  between  the 
prosecutor  and  the  respective  investigator  within  the  Ministry  of  Interior.  (Meetings  with  Bulgarian 
authorities, September 2016.) 

108 The establishment of a common portal for the judiciary is planned in the context of a broader e-government 
roadmap.  This  should  partly  be  financed  by  the  European  Social  Fund  (ESF)  under  the  Operational 
Programme for Good Governance 2014-2020 (OPGG).  

109  "Cases  and  case  files  shall  be  distributed  in  the  judicial  authorities  on  the  basis  of  the  random  selection 

principle through electronic assignment in the order of their receipt." (JSA, Article 9.) 

20 

 
 
                                                            
prevention of undue influence and corruption in the courts, as the use of automatic, electronic systems 
was  supposed  to  remove  any  possible  human  interference  in  the  selection  of  the  judge  for  any 
particular case. However, as noted in successive CVM reports, allegations of incorrect or manipulated 
application of the principle of random allocation have been a recurrent theme of debate  in Bulgaria, 
with  consistent  and  widespread  criticism  that  these  systems  were  regularly  tampered  with  or 
circumvented  in  order  to  allow  certain  economic  or  political  interest  to  predetermine  the  judge 
handling the case and by this ultimately the outcome of certain cases.  

While  such  allegations  continued  for  several  years,  the  SJC  was  initially  slow  to  react  to  these 
controversies, in spite of the evident damage that this did to the overall reputation and credibility of 
the justice system and the perceived independence of the judiciary in Bulgaria. The problem seemed to 
be connected  to the existence of separate IT systems in different courts which seemed vulnerable to 
local  intervention.  In  2014  an  interim  solution  was  introduced  by  the  SJC  whereby  the  local  case 
allocation decisions were to be reported on a daily basis to a central server at the SJC. Alongside this 
effort, the SJC adopted a set of common rules for the application of the local systems whenever special 
situations arise, such as judges withdrawing from a case or having to be excluded from the selection 
due to absence or high workload. The application of these rules is checked during inspections by the 
ISJC. Meanwhile, towards the end of 2014 a major scandal broke out in relation to the allocation of 
two cases at the Sofia City Court: this prompted the SJC to take further action.110 The result was the 
development of a new software system for allocation of cases through a centralised server located at 
the  SJC,  which  was  eventually  introduced  in  October  2015.111  Following  the  introduction  of  this 
system, all courts carry out the allocation of cases directly through an online server located at the SJC, 
where all actions are systematically logged so that any intervention can be subsequently checked.  

On the basis of the December 2014 incident in the Sofia City Court, an inspection was carried out by 
the  SJC  in  spring  2015.  The  inspection  concluded  that  the  court  had  been  the  subject  of  serious 
mismanagement, but did not assign clear responsibility for the misconduct. Nevertheless, the incident 
did precipitate the replacement of the management of the Sofia City Court in spring 2015.112  

Judicial training 

Bulgaria has  a well-established institution  for judicial training, the National Institute of Justice. It is 
responsible  for  the  initial training  of  magistrates  which  is  obligatory  for  all  regular  appointees.113 In 
2010 the length of the obligatory initial training was  extended from 6 to 9 months114, and this is still 
the situation today.  

The training provided by the institute is generally recognised as being of a good quality, providing an 
adequate  basis  for  new  entrants  to  the  judiciary.  In  addition,  the  institute  provides  a  broad  range  of 
further training courses for magistrates, which is continuously widened to include new subject matters. 
After the initial training, however, there is no obligatory training of magistrates, which is left at their 

110  One case concerned the allocation of a case concerning the bankruptcy of a large bank where the reporting of 
the case allocation decision to the SJC server reportedly did not take place as provided for in the rules, raising 
questions  about  the  procedure  followed.  The  other  case  concerned  a  local  subsidiary  of  a  large  European 
company,  which  was  allegedly  'taken  over'  through  a  fraudulent  insolvency  procedure  with  a  view  to 
stripping its assets. Also in the latter case, there were allegations of irregularities in the allocation of the case 
to the judge concerned, who has subsequently been subject to criminal investigation.  

111  An EU funded project had already earlier been launched to develop such a software system to centralise the 
case allocation of all courts within a single IT system at national level, but the project was delayed due to a 
legal challenge against the tendering procedure and was eventually abandoned in December 2014. Instead the 
new system was financed with national funds.  

112  Disciplinary  proceedings  were  eventually  also  launched  against  the  former  Court  chair.  However,  as  the 
January  2016  CVM  report  notes,  the  response  of  the  SJC  "showed  a  reluctance  to  act  on  allegations  of 
serious wrongdoing" (COM(2016) 40, p. 4).  

113  Candidates taken on through the alternative route for experienced lawyers are exempt.  
114  SWD(2012) 232, p. 18.  

21 

 
 
                                                            
own discretion.115 Bulgarian authorities stress that training is generally available, but in some judicial 
bodies the existing workload can make it a challenge for some magistrates to attend courses to further 
develop their knowledge.  

The  National  Institute  of  Justice  has  a  formal  status  regulated  by  law  and  is  governed  by  a  board 
including  five  representatives  of  the  SJC  and  two  for  the  Ministry  of  Justice.116  Its  basic  funding 
comes from the national budget. However, as mentioned in past reports, the financing from the state 
budget has not been increased in line with the growing activities of the institute over the years, with 
the result that over half of the budget is being financed through various outside grants.117  

Reform of the prosecution services 

Under  the  Bulgarian  Constitution,  the  Prosecutor's  Office  is  part  of  the  judicial  system  and  as  such 
independent of the executive power.118 Over the ten years since Bulgaria's accession to the EU, there 
have been several reforms of the internal structure of the prosecution. Many of them have had to do 
with internal governance and management. Major structural reorganisations of the Prosecutor's Office 
have  been  launched  several  times,  typically  following  the  entering  into  office  of  a  new  Prosecutor 
General.119 A number of more targeted changes have been aiming to address concerns about lack of 
effectiveness in the prosecution of corruption and serious organised crime. In 2008 a specialised unit 
was established within the Sofia City Prosecutor's Office to prosecute cases related to EU funds fraud. 
In 2009 a specialised unit involving the Prosecutor's Office, the Ministry of Interior and SANS120 was 
set  up  to  focus  on  cases  involving  organised  crime.  This  was  followed  up  in  2012  with  the 
establishment of the Specialised Prosecution for organised crime, attached to the then newly-created 
Specialised  Court.  In  2012  a  structure  of  joint  teams  between  the  same  three  institutions  was 
established for the investigation of financial crimes and high-level corruption.  

More recent innovations have included specialised units for crimes committed by magistrates and for 
corruption  cases,  which  were  in  2015  merged  into  a  new  specialised  unit  for  high-level  corruption 
attached to the Sofia City Prosecutor's Office. Efforts were also made to improve the supervision of 
cases of special public interest through special procedures and reporting requirements. These measures 
were  further  strengthened  in  2014.  A  number  of  other  measures  have  been  taken  over  the  years  to 
improve training and general management within the prosecution service.  

A key issue, which continues to be raised, concerns the degree of supervision of individual case files 
by superior prosecutors, which is linked to a general impression  in wider society of the prosecutor's 
office as a very hierarchically structured and at times non-transparent organisation which is vulnerable 
to undue influence by politically or economically powerful interests. Some efforts have been made to 

115  See 2016 EU Justice Scoreboard, p. 27.  
116  JSA,  Chapter  11.  The  Minister  of  Justice  as  well  as  the  two  Supreme  Court  presidents  and  the  Prosecutor 
General  are  ex  officio  members  of  the  board.  While  the  institute  has  so  far  been  able  to  work  in  an 
autonomous and professional fashion, there have been concerns about attempts to micromanage aspects of its 
management, in particular the appointment of individual lecturers. Some individual examples of some such 
alleged  attempts,  which  have  been  successful,  have  been  pointed  out  to  the  Commission  in  meetings  with 
civil society actors. 

117  The  majority  of  this  outside  funding  is  extended  through  project  funding  under  the  European  Social  Fund 

programmes. The institute has in the past had a good record in managing these funds.  

118  At the same time, however, the prosecution is a much more politically exposed institution in the Bulgarian 
context  than  in  many  other  countries.  It  is  not  only  charged  with  leading  the  investigation  and  subsequent 
prosecution of crime in Bulgarian courts, but also plays a wider role in the control of the legality of public 
acts. This appears to be widely interpreted, with the consequence that the Prosecutor General is often seen to 
make statements on issues of wider political scope, rather than criminal justice alone. 

119  Major reorganisations were initiated in 2007 and in 2013. The last one followed a complete functional review 
of the entire organisation and was implemented through a comprehensive action plan, which was completed 
in spring 2015.  

120  State  Agency  for  National  Security,  created  in  2008  to  fight  high  level  corruption  and  threats  to  national 

security. The agency also incorporated the Directorate for Financial Investigations, the Bulgarian FIU.  

22 

 
 
                                                            
address  such  concerns  through  the  development  of  a  communication  strategy  and  legislative 
amendments with the objective to clarify the autonomy of individual prosecutors.121 However, the fact 
remains  that  professional  and  civil  society  actors  continue  to  express  concerns  about  the  role  of  the 
prosecution and the Prosecutor General in particular.122  

Another area identified early on in CVM reports as particularly problematic concerns the interaction 
between  the  prosecution  and  the  various  investigatory  agencies.123  These  concerns  have  led  to  the 
conclusion of a number of agreements between the prosecutor's office and other relevant institutions in 
order  to  clarify  working  relationships.  Nevertheless,  such  issues  have  continued  to  be  raised  in  the 
context of the investigation and prosecution of corruption and organised crime.124  

4.2.   Developments since the last CVM report of January 2016  

The January 2016 report recommended Bulgaria to adopt a reform of the judicial map for the regional 
courts and a roadmap for a more general rationalisation of the courts at all levels to improve overall 
quality and efficiency, including the reallocation of resources in light of an analysis of workload, to 
establish a timetable for the introduction of e-justice, to develop a practice of motivating disciplinary 
decisions in accordance with clear and objective standards and conduct an assessment of practice since 
2012,  to  establish  a  capacity  to  monitor  the  random  allocation  of  cases  in  courts  and  provide  the 
conditions for an impartial investigation into the allegations of high-level corruption within the Sofia 
City Court, and to launch an independent analysis of the prosecutor's office. These recommendations 
were taken up to various extents in 2016.  

General reform including the judicial map and e-justice 

Several  developments  have  taken  place  in  the  course  of  2016  in  these  areas,  partly  spurred  by  the 
reform of the JSA and partly by the maturation of projects already under way for some time within the 
SJC. The application of the new workload standards is being phased in and the experience gained so 
far is to be evaluated in spring 2017.125 Concerning the judicial map and e-justice, the SJC foresees a 
longer process, with any final decisions having to involve the next SJC to be elected in the course of 
2017.  The  SJC  has  presented  a  project  proposal  under  Operational  Programme  Good  Governance 
(OPGG) for the development of a model to optimise the judicial map  at the level of regional courts 
and  prosecutor’s  offices.  The  proposal  will  also  cover  the  preparation  of  a  unified  information  and 
case management system for the courts. It is also envisaged that a specialised information system for 
monitoring and analysis as well as a roadmap for the reform of the higher level courts will be prepared 
with the support of EU Funds.126  

The reform of the judicial map will involve both the courts and the prosecutors' offices. In 2016 the 
Prosecutor General submitted a request to the Constitutional Court for an interpretation of a provision 
of the Constitution, which has so far been cited as a barrier for a separate reform of the prosecutor's 
offices.  The  Prosecutor  General  has  explained  that  it  is  his  hope  that  the  ruling  of  the  Court  would 

121  See also chapter 3 above.  
122  The  Bulgarian  Judges  Association  is a  particularly  strong  critic  of  the role of  the  Prosecutor's  office  in  the 
SJC (see also chapter 2 above). Other civil society observers and critical journalists have focussed on the role 
of the prosecution in cases involving allegations of high-level corruption.  

123  COM(2011) 459, p. 5-6.  
124  See also chapters 5 and 7 below.  
125  An important separate element concerns the integration of the weights for different types of case in a module 
within the random allocation system, which should allow for the system to automatically take account of the 
workload of individual judges when allocating cases. However, the calibration of this system is still ongoing. 

126  Information received from SJC in December 2016. 

23 

 
 
                                                            
clarify the meaning of the provision in a sense which would allow for a merger of local prosecutors' 
offices to move ahead independently of the reform of the local courts to which they are attached.127 

Random allocation of cases, disciplinary proceedings, and the Sofia City Court 

On  random  allocation  of  cases,  the  SJC  reported  that  no  major  incidents  have  been  revealed  with 
regard  to  the  application  of  the  new  system.  An  evaluation  of  the  centralised  IT  system  is  yet  to be 
performed.  However,  the  ISJC  regularly  checks  the  application  of  the  system  in  the  courts  during 
inspections  and  the  reports  on  these  checks  are  submitted  to  the  SJC  for  consideration.128  On  the 
follow-up to the Sofia City Court incidents of 2014, it does not appear that any broader investigation 
has been conducted into the allegations of more systematic corrupt practices within the court under the 
previous management. Neither has a broader inquiry into the events been carried out. The subject re-
emerged in 2016 in the context of the publication of alleged recordings of a conversation between two 
of the implicated judges by an independent website for investigatory journalism.129 The SJC decided 
not to open an enquiry into the matter. In the meantime, criminal procedures have been launched on 
separate  charges  against  the  directly  implicated  judges,  who  have  also  been  subject  to  disciplinary 
proceedings.  

As  regards  disciplinary  proceedings  more  generally,  the  SJC  has  launched  a  project  to  develop 
standards ensuring clear and objective principles for disciplinary practice, as well as an analysis of the 
practice under the current SJC since 2012.130 As part of the project, it is envisaged that, once prepared, 
the  standards  will  be  subject  to  wide  public  consultation  and  training  will  be  provided  for  their 
subsequent application. This will however have to be followed up by the future SJC to be elected in 
the course of 2017.  

Analysis of the prosecution and improvement of criminal investigations 

In the 2016 CVM report the Commission recommended that an independent analysis be carried out of 
the  functioning  of  the  Bulgarian  Prosecutor's  Office.  The  Bulgarian  government  requested  the 
assistance of the Structural Reform Support Service (SRSS)131, and a project involving a small team of 
independent and experienced prosecutors from a few other Member States was launched in spring and 
concluded  with  a  final  report  in  December  2016.  132  The  study  contains  an  in-depth  analysis  of  the 
Bulgarian  Prosecutor's  Office  to  identify  possible  avenues  for  the  improvement  of  its  structure, 
independence and effectiveness. This analysis touches both upon the prosecution service in a narrow 

127  Article 126 of the Constitution states that: "The structure of the prosecuting magistracy shall correspond to 
the structure of the courts". This Article has in the past been interpreted to mean that every single local court 
also  needs  its  own  prosecutor's  office.  However,  pursuant  to  the  interpretation  now  supported  by  the 
Prosecutor General the requirement would only be that the prosecution should be in a position to serve the 
local courts, which could be done through larger regionalised offices covering several courts at a time.  

128  Meeting with the SJC, December 2016. It is notable that allegations are already circulating that the system 
can be circumvented through manipulation of the workload balances for individual judges when carrying out 
the case allocation, showing the level of distrust that exists in the wider public and highlighting the relevance 
of the recommendation contained in the January 2016 CVM report for a capacity to exist within the ISJC and 
SJC  to  follow-up  on  such  issues,  to  be  able  to  verify  them  and  where  relevant  dispel  any  unfounded 
allegations.  

129  Such  recordings  were  also  referred  to  in  the  January  2016  CVM  report  (COM(2016)  40,  p.  4-5).  More 
recently further recordings have been reported, resulting in the issue coming back on the public agenda.  

130  The project will be co-financed by the OPGG.  
131  The  SRSS  is  a  Commission  service  set  up  to  coordinate  and  provide  tailor-made  technical  support  for 

structural reforms in EU Member States. 

132  Senior  experts  from  DE,  NL,  UK  and  ES  participated  in  the  team.  The  analysis  is  based  on  an  intensive 
process  of  documentary  analysis  and  interviews  with  Bulgarian  prosecutors  and  other  stakeholders  in  the 
course  of  2016.  An  English  language  summary  of  the  main  conclusions  of  the  analysis,  drafted  by  the 
independent experts and published by the Bulgarian authorities, can be found on the website of the Bulgarian 
Ministry 
Justice: 
of 
http://www.mjs.bg/Files/Executive%20Summary%20Final%20Report%20BG%2015122016.pdf  

24 

 
 
                                                            
sense  and  on  the  wider  Bulgarian  system  for  criminal  justice  more  generally.  It  includes  a  range  of 
observations  and  recommendations  for  immediate  as  well  as  more  long-term  action  by  Bulgarian 
authorities in both legislative and organisational areas.  

Most  of  the  findings  have  a  direct  bearing  on  CVM  benchmarks,  including  in  particular  the 
investigation and prosecution of high-level corruption and serious organised crime. As regards overall 
structures, the report identifies a need for better internal supervision of cases by management in order 
to ensure accountability  for decisions taken, especially in  high level cases of public interest.133 As a 
counterweight to this stronger involvement by the organisational hierarchy, the report recommends a 
number of additional mechanisms for overall accountability of the Prosecutor's Office as a whole to 
the public, inter alia via the creation of a specialised committee in the National Assembly, a system of 
external inspections covering the quality of prosecutorial decisions and involving an enhanced judicial 
inspectorate,  and  the  introduction  of  special  procedures  allowing  for  an  investigation  into  any 
allegations  of  possible  wrongdoing  by  an  incumbent  Prosecutor-General.  As  for  the  conduct  of 
criminal proceedings, the report gives recommendations concerning a wide range of topics, including 
the conduct of preliminary inquiries, the possibility of judicial review of decisions to start (or not) pre-
trial proceedings or file an indictment, as well as of decisions to stop and restart cases, the role of the 
Prosecution in regard to non-criminal matters, training of prosecutors, and workload management.  

In regard to the prosecution of high-level corruption and organised crime, the report recommends that 
additional  resources  be  provided  for  the  respective  prosecutors'  offices  both  in  terms  of  prosecutors 
and investigators, and that steps be taken to improve the incentive for experienced prosecutors to apply 
for  these  positions,  as  well  as  for  specialised  training.134  The  low  number  of  high-level  corruption 
cases is noted as a matter of concern. In this regard, recommendations are made for a more proactive 
role in regard to suspicious transaction reports concerning politically exposed persons which are filed 
with  the  financial  investigations  directorate  at  SANS,  among  other  measures  to  ensure  effective 
financial investigations.  

In terms of the efficiency of proceedings, the report  contains observations on the formalism of court 
procedures, requirements on the content of indictments, the practices in regard to returning cases to the 
prosecution,  authorisations  for  the  use  of  special  investigatory  means,  the  use  of  expertise  in  court 
trials  and  for  investigations,  and  the  proper  management  of  court  trials  in  complex  cases  (to  avoid 
delays).  Against  this  background,  it  recommends  that  several  provisions  of  the  criminal  procedure 
code  be  reviewed  and  suggests  that  measures  could  be  taken  by  the  appropriate  authorities  (e.g.  the 
Supreme Court of Cassation) to issue practice guidance on certain procedural issues. 

Independently  of  the  SRSS  project,  the  Prosecutor's  Office  also  undertook  a  separate  exercise  to 
analyse  a  number  of  rulings  of  the  European  Court  on  Human  Rights  (ECtHR)  concerning  criminal 
investigations in Bulgaria and their possible implications for current practice. This was prompted by 
the  identification  in  2015  by  the  ECtHR  of  a  'systemic  problem'  in  Bulgaria  regarding  the  effective 
investigation  of  crime,  based  on  numerous  cases  that  had  reached  the  Strasbourg  court.135  The 
analysis136  covers  an  in-depth  assessment  of  54  judgements  of  the  ECtHR  concerning  the  lack  of 
effective  investigations  in  Bulgaria.137  The  analysis  reached  a  number  of  findings.  First,  the  report 

133  It is added that this hierarchical supervision should be appropriately recorded in all instances on the case file. 
134  Ultimately, if results are not forthcoming, the report recommends that more drastic measure be considered, 

with a reference to "neighbouring and other countries" (p. 21). 

135  The statement of the ECtHR is also referred to in the January 2016 CVM report (COM(2016) 40, p. 6).  
136  Report  on  the  results  from  the  study  and  analysis  of  judgements  of  the  ECtHR  finding  that  the  Bulgarian 
authorities have not complied with their obligation to carry out an effective investigation, as well as of the 
cases, in which they are rendered, and the measures required to remedy the established omissions, Bulgarian 
Prosecutor's Office, 2016 (English version). 

137  In the 54 cases 78 violations have been identified by the ECtHR within a time-period covering 1989-2012. In 
the  54  cases  under review  there  were violations related  to  completeness  of  the  investigation (51  cases),  its 
timeliness  (37  cases),  expiry  of  the  prescription  period  (12  cases)  impartiality  (28  cases),  accessibility  of 
remedies (15 cases), and supervision of the investigation by the prosecutor (29 cases). 

25 

 
 
                                                            
concludes that Bulgarian procedural law as such is in compliance with the standards required by the 
case-law  of  the  ECtHR  and  in  this  sense  does  not  suffer  legal  shortcomings  that  would  prevent 
prosecutors  and  pre-trial  authorities  from  carrying  out  their  work  in  such  a  way  as  to  satisfy  the 
requirements  of  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights.  Second,  the  deficiencies  that  have 
nevertheless  been  identified  in  the  reviewed  cases  concern  judicial  bodies  involved  in  the  entire 
criminal  procedure,  including  pre-trial  and  trial  procedure.  Third,  the  problems  identified  appear  to 
have  been  rooted  in  a  number  of  different  factors  of  both  subjective  (incompetence,  partiality)  and 
objective  nature  (including  the  legal  framework  at  the  time).  Fourth,  a  number  of  procedural 
challenges  are  still  considered  relevant  under  current  conditions.  These  include,  for  example,  the 
ineffectiveness  and  length  of  preliminary  inquiries138  which  delay  the  initiation  of  pre-trial 
proceedings, the use of inadequately substantiated decisions to terminate court proceedings and refer 
the case back to the prosecutor, and the insufficient access of the victim to investigation in cases where 
the prosecutor decides to terminate the proceedings before bringing formal charges.139  

The report also highlights the fact that the issues raised by ECtHR rulings have been the subject of a 
number  of  follow-up  actions  in  recent  years,  including  training  and  other  measures  to  draw  the 
attention of prosecutors to the problems identified. Finally, the report contains a number of concrete 
recommendations for further action, touching upon the need for further competence-building measures 
within  the  prosecutors'  offices,  improved  monitoring  of  cases  to  identify  problems  early  on,  proper 
regulation  of  preliminary  inquiries,  a  possible  review  of  the  conditions  for  the  initiation  (or  not)  of 
formal  pre-trial  proceedings140,  and  improving  the  work  of  the  supervising  prosecutor  and 
investigating agencies. The recommendations relate to both legislative and organisational measures.141  

Together, these two in-depth analyses carried out in the course of 2016 identify a wide range of areas 
for further possible measures to improve the effectiveness of Bulgarian pre-trial proceedings.  

5. 

HIGH-LEVEL CORRUPTION 

Benchmark  4:  Conduct  and  report  on  professional,  non-partisan  investigations  into  allegations  of 
high-level corruption. Report  on internal inspections of public institutions  and on the publication  of 
assets of high-level officials.  

Corruption  has  been  identified  as  a  serious  systemic  problem  in  Bulgaria.  This  is  confirmed  in 
international rankings by international organisations and observers142 as well as in opinion surveys.143 
Corruption  continues  to  be  regarded  as  a  major  obstacle  to  business  in  Bulgaria144  and  has  been 

138  Preliminary inquiries are not regulated as part of the criminal procedure and any information that is obtained 
(documents received, witnesses questioned) has to be collected again during the proper pre-trial procedure in 
order  to  be  admissible  as  evidence  in  court.  Nevertheless,  they  are  extensively  used  by  Bulgarian  law 
enforcement  in  order  to  prepare  criminal  proceedings.  Contrary  to  pre-trial  proceedings,  there  are  no 
deadlines for the completion of preliminary inquiries.  

139  In  addition,  a  number  of  non-procedural  problems  mentioned  include  lack  of  proper  investigation  by  the 
relevant authorities, lack of effective supervision by the responsible prosecutor, and unjustified extensions of 
deadlines.  

140  On the last point, the report cautions that this is a complex topic which would require careful analysis.  
141  Some aspects of the legislative recommendations appear to have been already included in the draft proposals 

on the criminal procedure code mentioned in chapter 3 above.  

142  The World Bank governance indicators rank Bulgaria last among EU Member States in control of corruption 
(World  Bank  governance  indicators,  2015).  The  same  picture  emerges  from  Transparency  International's 
corruption perceptions index 2015 which ranks Bulgaria 69 out of 168 countries worldwide, again the worst 
score of any EU Member State (Transparency International CPI, 2015).  

143  In  a  recent  survey  of  Bulgarian  citizens,  97  %  of  respondents  considered  that corruption  remained  a  fairly 
important (9%) or very important (88%) problem in Bulgaria. (Flash Eurobarometer 445: The Cooperation 
and Verification Mechanism for Bulgaria and Romania, published on 25 January 2017.)  

144  The World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2016–2017 ranks corruption as the single most 
problematic factor when doing business in Bulgaria. Global Competitiveness Report 2016–2017, p. 130. 

26 

 
 
                                                            
estimated  to  have  a  significant  economic  impact  on  the  Bulgarian  economy.145  CVM  reports  have 
consistently pointed to the need for stronger institutions in order to respond to the problems.146  

When  discussing  the  response  to  corruption,  it  is  important  to  distinguish  between  preventive  and 
repressive  steps.  Criminal  law  measures  should  act  as  an  ultimate  deterrent  against  corrupt  acts 
through effective investigation and a swift, efficient and fair follow-up whenever serious misconduct 
is  found.  However,  experience  makes  it  clear  that  an  element  just  as  essential  is  the  existence  of 
functioning  preventive  mechanisms,  such  as  procedures  for  administrative  investigation,  as  well  as 
raising awareness about corruption and how to tackle it, and measures to tackle specific issues such as 
conflicts of interest and illicit enrichment. While an important focus should be to avoid opportunities 
for corruption to develop in the first place, preventive measures cannot entirely replace effective law 
enforcement. The two are complementary.  

In  addition,  a  distinction  can  also  be  made  between  high-level  and  low-level  corruption.  High-level 
corruption  is  related  to  decision-makers  with  links  to  the  political  system  and  higher  offices  in  the 
public administration and the judiciary, and involves the abuse of office or trading in influence, often 
involving  important  economic  or  political  interests.  Low-level  corruption  tends  to  concern  frontline 
personnel in direct contact with citizens and small businesses, in sectors such as healthcare, police, or 
local administration. Perceived impunity for senior figures can set the wrong example for rank-and-file 
officials.  At  the  time  of  the  accession  of  Bulgaria  to  the  EU  in  2007,  both  high  level  and  low  level 
corruption was identified as important challenges still to be addressed in Bulgaria, which was reflected 
respectively  in  benchmarks  4  and  5.  The  focus  of  the  present  chapter  will  be  on  benchmark  4 
concerning high-level corruption.  

As in previous chapters, the presentation below presents first the developments over the past ten years 
before focusing on the more recent developments since the last CVM report of January 2016.  

5.1.   Overview of developments under the CVM 

In  2012  the  Commission  noted  that  over  the  previous  years,  some  100-200  cases  of  corruption  had 
been  brought  to  court  each  year  and  that  there  were  very  few  high-level  cases  among  them.147  The 
overall number remains within a similar order of magnitude in more recent years.148 Also, the situation 
remains unchanged in the sense that most of the cases concern relatively minor cases.149 A number of 
investigations have been launched into high-level corruption over the years, some of which have been 
brought  to  court.  However,  in  spite  of  the  frequent  announcement  of  significant  charges,  such  cases 
often  experience  long  delays  and  judicial  appeals,  and  finally  end  up  either  in  acquittals,  or  are 
dropped  due  to  lack  of  sufficient  evidence.  Consequently,  previous  reports  have  consistently  found 
that very few convictions for high-level corruption were confirmed by final court decisions.150  

145  The Cost of Non-Europe in the area of Organised Crime and Corruption, Research paper by RAND Europe, 

2016. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/579319/EPRS_STU(2016)579319_EN.pdf  

146  COM(2012) 411, p. 15 ; COM(2014) 36, p. 6-7; COM(2015) 36, p. 7-8; COM(2016) 40, p. 8. 
147  SWD(2012) 232, p. 20.  
148  In  2012  the  total  number  of  pre-trial  proceedings  brought  to  court  was  184  and  in  2013  it  was  166.  The 
picture for more recent years is blurred by a broadening of the definition used by the prosecutor's office to 
identify corruption cases in 2014. However, the numbers of the key specific types of cases (abuse of office, 
bribery) remain broadly at the same level in 2014 and 2015 compared to the previous two years.  (Statistics 
provided by the prosecutor's office in December 2015.) 

149  In  2015  six  out  of  ten  pre-trial  investigations  involving  bribery  concerned  minor  cases  of  active  bribery, 
many  of  which  were  connected  with  attempts  to  conceal  violations  under  the  road  traffic  act  (i.e.  bribing 
traffic police officers). Bribery cases constitute the single largest group of corruption related cases. (Source: 
Annual report of the Prosecutor's Office for 2015, p. 75 (English translation).) 

150  COM(2012) 411, p. 16;  COM(2015) 36, p. 8; COM(2016) 40, p. 9.  

27 

 
 
                                                            
Over the past ten years, Bulgaria has carried out a number of measures as part of an overall attempt to 
step up the fight against high-level corruption. Some of these measures were taken in the context of a 
strategy for the fight against corruption and organised crime adopted in 2009 and implemented over 
the  following  years.151  In  the  law  enforcement  area  the  focus  during  the  early  years  was  on  further 
specialisation  and  better  coordination  among  the  prosecution  and  investigatory  agencies  through  the 
establishment  of  specialised  units,  networks  and  teams,  methodological  guidance  and  cooperation 
agreements,  and  additional  training  for  prosecutors  and  investigators.  As  already  mentioned  above, 
some legislative measures were also taken to streamline criminal procedures in complex cases.  

In 2008 a new State Agency for National Security (SANS) was established through a merger between 
existing  security  services  and  the  financial  investigation  agency  and  tasked  with  investigating  high-
level  corruption,  as  well  as  threats  to  national  security.  SANS  originally  functioned  as  a  criminal 
intelligence  agency  with  powers  in  regard  to  financial  investigations  (incorporating  the  Bulgarian 
financial intelligence unit), but it underwent several significant reorganisations in more recent years, 
with the transfer from the Ministry of Interior of competences for the investigation of organised crime 
in 2013 and the transfer of the same competences back to the Ministry of Interior in 2015.152 Recurring 
wiretapping  controversies  have  revealed  flaws  in  the  system  for  authorisation  and  conduct  of 
surveillance,  with  significant  implications  for  the  authorities’  capacity  to  address  corruption.  The 
European  Court  of  Human  Rights  ruled  on  the  need  for  stronger  guarantees  against  the  risk  of 
surveillance abuses.153 

On the preventive side, a number of institutional mechanisms are in place. Since 2000, an increasing 
number  of  high-level  public  officials  have  been  required  to  submit  personal  property  declarations 
annually,  and  at  the  beginning  and  end  of  their  careers.  The  declarations  are  filed  with  the National 
Audit Office, which has the responsibility to cross-check the information with other public registers. 
In  case  of  discrepancies,  further  checks  can  be  carried  out  as  the  file  is  forwarded  to  the  National 
Revenue Agency (NRA) and SANS. While the system ensures a level of transparency around assets of 
high-level  officials,  a  number  of  weaknesses  have  been  identified  in  previous  Commission  reports, 
including  the  fact  that  the  National  Audit  Office  does  not  have  competence  to  carry  out  a  more 
proactive  investigation  or  identification  of  suspicious  cases.154  Nevertheless,  while  a  more  proactive 
analysis of the property declarations could be a more effective deterrence against illicit enrichment, the 
systematic publication and verification of property declarations provides an important element of an 
effective anti-corruption set-up by ensuring transparency around the assets of high-level officials.  

In  2009  a  law  on  the  prevention  of  conflicts  of  interest  came  into  force  and  a  separate  agency,  the 
Commission for the Prevention and Ascertainment of Conflicts of Interest (CPACI), was established 
in  2011.155  This  entity  is  competent  to  assess  concrete  cases  submitted  to  it  on  alleged  or  potential 
conflicts of interest as well as to issue orders for sanctions to be imposed on transgressors, including 
officials  who  have  not  submitted  their  conflicts  of  interest  declarations  on  time.  However,  the 
decisions  of  CPACI  are  subject  to  appeal  in  two  instances,  as  are  the  subsequent  penalty  decisions, 
raising  the  prospect  of  each  penalty  issued  by  CPACI  being  subject  to  a  total  of  four  court  rulings 
before  becoming  final.  As  noted  by  the  Commission  in  2012,  this  cumbersome  decision-making 
process raises questions about the effectiveness of the procedure.156 

151  SWD(2012) 232, p. 22.  
152  See also chapter 7 below.  
153  See  Case  of  Association  for  European  Integration  and  Human  Rights  and  Ekimdzhiev  v.  Bulgaria 
of  Hadzhiev  v.  Bulgaria 

http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-81323.  Case 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-114076. 

154  SWD(2012) 232, p. 21; SWD(2015) 9, p. 21.  
155  The  CPACI  was  created  through  separate  amendments  in  2010  which  created  the  centralised  system  and 
broadened  the  range  of  issues  covered.  The  law  also  abolished  the  need  to  prove  that  a  benefit  had  been 
obtained  in  connection  with  a  conflict  of  interest  in  order  to  impose  a  penalty  for  violation  of  the  law 
(Meeting with CPACI, December 2016). 

156  COM(2012) 411, p. 18.  

28 

 
 
                                                            
A  major  challenge  has  been  the  merit-based  selection  of  senior  management  for  anti-corruption 
institutions, as most clearly evidenced by the controversial nomination to the post of Director of SANS 
in  2013,  sparking  several  months'  of  public  protests  even  though  the  nomination  was  swiftly 
withdrawn.157  In  another  example,  CPACI  was  embroiled  in  a  scandal  in  2013  as  its  chairman  was 
forced to step down amidst charges of abuse of office. He was later convicted to 3½ years in prison, 
although this was finally commuted on appeal to a suspended sentence. The matter has given rise to a 
parliamentary  inquiry  followed  by  a  package  of  draft  legislative  amendments  which  would  have 
streamlined  procedures  and  improved  transparency.  However,  these  amendments,  which  were 
presented to the National Assembly in 2014, were never adopted.158  

In spite of the controversy surrounding the resignation of its chair, CPACI has continued functioning 
in  accordance  with  its  original  legal  set-up  and  under  an  acting  chair.159  In  addition  to  fulfilling  its 
mandate  as  an  arbiter  of  the  conflicts  of  interest  rules  in  concrete  cases,  it  has  also  over  the  recent 
years extended its work further into the preventive area by taking up awareness raising and training as 
a  separate  line  of  activity.  Unfortunately,  the  CPACI  has  in  the  main  only  been  able  to  establish 
conflicts of interest at the lower administrative levels. 

In  addition  to  the  institutions  mentioned  above,  a  network  of  internal  inspectorates  has  been 
established  within  the  State  administration,  with  a  General  Inspectorate  at  the  centre  working  under 
the  direct  authority  of  the  Prime  Minister.  These  agencies  carry  out  general  internal  control  and 
targeted inspections of the state administration and are also in charge of ensuring compliance with the 
law  on  conflicts  of  interest  in  the  work  of  the  respective  government  departments.  Previous  reports 
have  noted  a  number  of  weaknesses  and  recommended  a  strengthening  of  the  system  of  internal 
control.160  In  spite  of  the  weaknesses,  however,  the  inspectorates  have  been  recognised  as  making a 
useful overall contribution.  

A  review  of  the  first  anti-corruption  strategy  was  carried  out  in  2014-2015,  which  concluded  that  it 
had  suffered  from  a  lack  of  consistent  follow-up  and  that  further  actions  were  needed.161 
Consequently,  a  new  anti-corruption  strategy  was  adopted  by  the  government  in  spring  2015  which 
contained  a  number  of  concrete  initiatives.  Among  the  key  innovations  in  the  new  anti-corruption 
strategy  were  the  creation  of  a  specialised  unit  within  the  Prosecutor's  Office  to  lead  investigations 
into high-level corruption cases162, amendment  of the law on public administration to strengthen the 
independence  and  effectiveness  of  the  administrative  inspectorates,  a  proposal  on  sectorial  anti-
corruption  plans  to  be  developed  in  different  government  departments,  and  the  establishment  of  an 

157  As noted in the 2014 CVM report, the incident gave rise to concerns  about important public appointments 
being  decided  in  an  non-transparent  way  and  involving  strong  economic  and  political  interest  groups  and 
further compounded the general image of a prematurely implemented reform of SANS (COM(2014) 36, p. 3-
4 and 8). Integrity has since been made a key criterion for senior appointments to SANS. 

158  SWD(2015) 9, p. 23. 
159  After  more  than  three  years,  the  National  Assembly  has  still  not  elected  a  new  chair.  Neither  has  it  filled 
another  vacancy  in  the  commission,  with  the  result  that  the  institution  is  now  headed  by  a  board  of  three 
members, rather than five as provided for in the law.  

160  SWD(2015) 9, p. 21; COM(2015) 36, 11. Among the weaknesses identified were insufficient staff resources 
and attractiveness, lack of binding central coordination and methodological guidance, and risks of political 
influence due to weak separation from the political level. 

161  This was partly a follow-up to recommendations in previous CVM reports, which had recommended such an 
evaluation.  Another  recommendation  was  to  entrust  a  single  institution  with  the  authority  and  autonomy 
needed to coordinate and control the enforcement of the anti-corruption activities (COM(2012) 411, p. 21).  
162  The  specialised  anti-corruption  unit  was  established  in  spring  2015  in  connection  to  the  Sofia  City 
Prosecutor's  Office.  It  incorporates  two  pre-existing  units  established  in  2013  and  2014  respectively  to 
investigate crimes committed by magistrates and local corruption. In addition to the Prosecutor's Office and 
investigating magistrates, the unit also has participation from SANS and the Ministry of Interior.  

29 

 
 
                                                            
anti-corruption council and a post of Anti-corruption Coordinator at ministerial level to ensure follow-
up to the strategy.163  

The main initiative of the new anti-corruption strategy was the proposal to create a new unified Anti-
Corruption  Agency  to  ensure  a  coordinated  and  coherent  approach  to  the  checking  of  property  and 
conflicts  of  interest  of  high-level  officials,  as  well  as  to  carry  out  administrative  investigations  into 
allegations of misconduct among such officials. This last proposal led to the presentation of a draft law 
in spring 2015, which included the legal basis for the new agency as well as a thorough reform of the 
rules  on  property  declarations  and  conflicts  of  interest.  According  to  this  draft  law,  the  new  unified 
Anti-corruption  Agency  would  merge  several  institutions,  including  CPACI  and  the  part  of  the 
National Audit Office dealing with property declarations, within one single institution, while leaving 
responsibility  for  conflicts  of  interest  for  other  public  officials  to  the  relevant  public  institutions, 
including the administrative inspectorates.  

This  new  draft  law  envisaged  a  major  overhaul  of  the  entire  institutional  landscape  to  deal  with 
corruption prevention in Bulgaria. However, the proposal failed to receive the required endorsement of 
the National Assembly during its first reading vote in September 2015.164 Even though the government 
immediately  announced  its  intention  to  resubmit  the  law  in  a  revised  form  in  order  to  ensure  its 
adoption,  the  2016  CVM  report  noted  that  the  failure  of  the  National  Assembly  to  support  the 
government's  main  anti-corruption  initiative  underlined  a  lack  of  consensus  behind  the  reform 
process.165 The government presented a revised version in spring 2016, but has not been successful in 
securing  its  adoption.  Several  other  elements  of  the  national  Anti-Corruption  Strategy  are  also  still 
outstanding. As a result, while the strategy heralded a new more comprehensive and effective response 
to the challenges facing Bulgaria in regard to high-level corruption, Bulgaria has so far not been able 
to deliver on that commitment.  

5.2.   Developments since the last CVM report of January 2016  

In its last report the Commission recommended to Bulgaria to adopt a new anti-corruption law in line 
with the government's anti-corruption strategy, including the establishment of a unified anti-corruption 
agency with a strong independent mandate to fight high-level corruption, to adopt amendments to the 
law on public administration to enhance the powers and independence of the internal inspectorates, to 
monitor  the  progress  of  criminal  cases  involving  allegations  of  high-level  corruption,  including  the 
pre-trial and trial phase, and to implement measures to address the problems identified.  

High-level investigations by law enforcement 

The  prosecutor's  office  reports  that  a  number  of  high-level  investigations  were  launched  or  were 
ongoing in 2016, a number of which have been presented at the courts.166 The picture remained largely 
unchanged from previous years regarding the  limited number of convictions in high-level corruption 
cases.167  Where  convictions  are  handed  down  by  lower  courts,  past  experience  shows  a  systematic 

163  SWD(2016) 15, p. 19. 
164  SWD(2016) 15, p. 20-21. 
165  COM(2016) 40, p. 10. 
166  The cases reportedly involve former ministers, mayors, magistrates as well as officials in customs and other 

state agencies.  

167  During  2016  a  number  of  convictions  in  high-level  corruption  cases  have  been  reported  by  the  Bulgarian 
authorities,  including  for  example  two  municipal  counsellors  sentenced  to  4  ½  years  prison  each  for 
embezzlement, two judges convicted to 4 years firm and 3 years suspended respectively for receiving bribes, 
a  former  director  in  the  ministry  of  defence  sentenced  to  3  ½  years  for  embezzlement,  an  inspector  in  the 
road transport administration given a 2 years and 8 months suspended prison sentence for abuse of office and 
embezzlement, a director of a regional inspectorate for environment sentenced to 3 years suspended for abuse 
of office and extortion, a regional governor given a 1 year suspended prison sentence for misappropriation of 
funds, a mayor given a suspended sentence of 1 year for misappropriation of funds, a former head of customs 
office sentenced to 7 years prison for abuse of office aiding in the activities of an organised crime group, and 

30 

 
 
                                                            
 
pattern  of  cases  being  overturned  on  appeal  and  ending  up  in  acquittals  or  being  dropped.168 
Consequently,  very  few  final  convictions  have  been  reported  in  relation  to  high-level  corruption 
cases.169 The final report of the technical assistance project to the Prosecutor's Office coordinated by 
the  Commission's  Structural  Reform  Support  Service  also  notes  with  concern  the  lack  of  high-level 
corruption  cases.170  Regarding  EU  funds  fraud  cases,  the  EU  anti-fraud  service  OLAF  continues  to 
experience an apparent lack of proactive approach to cases with a potential corruption element brought 
to the attention of the Bulgarian authorities.  

The  track  record  on  high-level  corruption  has  therefore  so  far  been  very  limited,  given  the  apparent 
scale  of  the  problem.  While  apparent  reasons  can  be  found  in  a  combination  of  legal  or  procedural 
hurdles,  an  important  part  of  the  picture  also  seems  to  be  a  lack  of  capacity  or  motivation  among 
investigatory and prosecutorial authorities to handle complex cases in an effective manner. According 
to the Bulgarian  authorities, there are a number of reasons why corruption is a particularly complex 
crime  to  solve.  Often  corruption  concerns  decisions  taken  by  collective  bodies,  which  makes  it 
difficult to assign responsibility for the decisions made and prove the link to any particular decision-
maker. Witnesses may often be working closely with the corrupt officials, often in an inferior position, 
or  they  themselves  have  been  involved  in  the  scheme.  Relevant  documentary  evidence  is  normally 
stored within the organisations with a direct interest in the case, which can lead to attempts to destroy 
or  withhold  such  evidence  when  the  existence  of  an  investigation  is  revealed.  Corruption  schemes 
often  concern  complex  decisions  as  a  results  of  which  external  expertise  is  required  to  assess  the 
economic benefits or damages accruing to one part or the other as a result of corrupt decisions. Such 
expertise may be expensive or simply unavailable in some areas.171 While such factors may complicate 
the prosecution of corruption in any country, Bulgaria faces particular challenges. For these reasons, 
successful  corruption  investigations  generally  require  exceptional  perseverance  on  the  part  of  the 
investigatory  authorities,  and  this  again  requires  an  environment  which  motivates  investigators  and 
prosecutors to pursue such cases with the necessary vigour and determination.  

In 2016 the Prosecutor's Office carried out an analysis of a broad sample of corruption cases processed 
since 2013, with a view to identifying common challenges and problematic practices to which failings 
in such cases could be attributed.172 The analysis is a follow-up to a similar analysis conducted in 2013 

a  former  head  of  a  national  security  agency  sentenced  to  10  years  prison  for  embezzlement  (although  this 
sentence  has  recently  been  annulled  at  the  Supreme  Court  of  Cassation  and  the  case  referred  back  to  the 
military appeal court for review). Most of these are not final sentences, however, and may be appealed.   
168  This pattern continued in 2016. Some recent cases include the annulment of a conviction concerning a former 
head of a national security agency charged with embezzlement (see also above; in the meantime, the same 
person  was  reportedly  indicted  again  on  a  new  set  of  charges),  abandonment  of  a  money  laundering  case 
against  a  former  deputy  speaker  of  the  National  assembly  which  fell  due  to  the  two  year  deadline  for  the 
completion of the investigation (another case for the same person concerning tax fraud ended in acquittal at 
the Supreme  Court of Cassation later in the year), the acquittal of a former head of the road infrastructure 
agency  charged  with  abuse  of  office  in  connection  with  allegedly  fraudulent  tendering  procedures,  the 
acquittal  of  a  former  prime  minister  in  a  case  involving  the  disappearance  of  confidential  documents,  the 
acquittal  of  a  former  social  affairs  minister  and  several  high  level  officials  in  an  embezzlement  case  from 
2009, and the final acquittal of all defendants in an nine-year old emblematic EU funds fraud case. In 2015 
there were several cases of high public interest against former ministers which ended in acquittal after several 
years  of  court  proceedings.  It  should  be  underlined  that  it  is  not  objectionable  per  se  that  individual  cases 
result in acquittals, notably if the evidence is insufficient. What is relevant here is the wider pattern of a high 
number of cases concerning serious charges being overturned in court.  

169  In 2016 Bulgaria has for example reported final convictions concerning a judge who was sentenced to 4 years 
in  prison  for  bribery,  a  former  mayor  given  a  2  years  suspended  sentence  for  abuse  of  office,  a  former 
executive  director  of  a  state  agency  given  a  suspended  3  year  sentence  for  embezzlement,  and  a  regional 
governor given a 1 year suspended sentence for misappropriation of funds (see also footnote above).   

170  See chapter 4 above.  
171  Annual report of the prosecutor's office for 2015, p. 75 (English translation). 
172  Report on the Analysis of corruption cases prosecuted by the  prosecutor's office in the period 01.03.2013- 

01.03.2016, Supreme Prosecutor's Office of Cassation of Bulgaria, 2016 (English translation).  

31 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
on similar cases over the period since the beginning of the CVM in 2007. It shows that, while some of 
the issues identified in the previous analysis had in the meantime been addressed through legislation or 
various  organisational  efforts,  other  problems  remain  and  new  additional  ones  have  appeared  which 
also require attention. The analysis confirms the frequent prolongation of pre-trial proceedings173 and 
provides  a  number  of  insights  into  problems  hindering  effective  corruption  investigations  in  the 
Bulgarian context. 174  

Problems highlighted in the study include a range of managerial issues such as cost restrictions leading 
to  a  lack  of  access  to  necessary  external  expertise,  the  complexity  of  high-level  corruption 
investigations not being taken properly into account in the assessment of workload of magistrates, and 
a  need  for  training  in  various  specialised  fields175  and  joint  training  between  prosecutors  and 
investigators.176 Sometimes, supervision of investigations has not been proactive enough, resulting in 
late discovery of errors or delays in the investigation. There has also been a tendency in some cases to 
automatically grant  prolongation  of investigations without sufficient  justification,  sometimes leading 
to expiry of the limitation period and cases being dropped.  

The  study  recommends  some  organisational  changes  in  the  direction  of  further  specialisation  and 
better  cooperation  with  investigatory  agencies,  for  example  through  the  establishment  of  specialised 
departments  within  appellate  regions  to  deal  with  corruption  cases.  The  establishment  of  the 
specialised  anti-corruption  unit  in  the  Sofia  City  Prosecutor's  Office  is  seen  by  the  Bulgarian 
Prosecutor's Office as a step forward in this respect, in particular the close cooperation with SANS and 
the Ministry of Interior.177  

Lack of effective cooperation between the prosecution and investigatory services appears to be a major 
issue in corruption investigations. A number of challenges are highlighted by the study in this regard. 
Often preliminary steps are taken in order to provide or confirm indications of a crime before the pre-
trial stage is launched, which can jeopardise subsequent collection of evidence further on in the formal 
investigation. Sometimes an incorrect or overly-broad definition of the crime in the decision to open 
the pre-trial investigation leads to unnecessary investigatory efforts to collect irrelevant evidence. One 
possible result of this can be the superficial interrogation of an excessive number of witnesses due to a 
lack of clarity about the objectives of the investigation. Important documentary evidence is not always 
collected, which sometimes leads to surprises later on in the trial phase when it is presented to court as 
new evidence. Important investigatory possibilities such as search and seizures are not utilised to the 
full, or are delayed unnecessarily, leading to a risk of useful evidence being concealed or destroyed.178 
When  this  is  combined  with  hasty  decisions  to  press  charges  without  collecting  all  the  necessary 
evidence, the predictable result is chaotic and prolonged investigations often ending in the termination 
of the proceedings because the evidence collected, despite its volume, is inadequate to substantiate the 

173  Only about 30 per cent of the reviewed pre-trial investigations were concluded within one year. Most were 
completed within two years, whereas nine of the 156  reviewed pre-trial investigations took more than five 
years.  

174  Many  of  the  conclusions  echo  the  ones  arrived  at  in  separate  analyses  of  ECtHR  cases  and  by  the  SRSS 

mission referred to in chapter 4 above.  

175  Corruption cases can touch upon diverse fields of law such as public procurement, concessions, forestry and 
agriculture, state and municipal property law, local administration, financial management and control in the 
public sector, rules regulating EU funds, etc.   

176  An  issue  often  noted  by  interlocutors  in  the  past  has  been  the  need  for  better  communication  between 

prosecutors and investigators.  

177  It is unclear how the proposed transfer of jurisdiction regarding certain high-level corruption cases from the 
Sofia City Court to the Specialised Court on organised crime would fit into this picture (see chapter 3 above), 
as the proposal has not been discussed in this analysis. What is clear is that the transfer would also apply to 
the  relevant  prosecutors'  offices  with  the  Sofia  City  Court  and  the  Specialised  Court  and  hence  have  an 
impact on the work of the specialised anti-corruption unit.  

178  Often the pre-trial bodies choose, at least initially, to request the relevant authorities or other entities to hand 
over  relevant  documentation  under  Article  159  of  the  criminal  procedure  code  rather  than  performing  – 
procedurally more cumbersome – search and seizure operations under Article 160 of the code.  

32 

 
 
                                                            
theory of the prosecution. As a general organisational point, the study points out that better use could 
be made of the expertise in higher-level prosecution offices to provide methodological guidance.  

The  study  also  concludes  that  cooperation  with  the  asset  forfeiture  commission  (CIAF)  could  be 
improved.  While  cases  are  automatically  notified  to  the  commission,  prosecutors  make  far  too  little 
use  of  the  possibilities  for  assistance  through  joint  teams,  resulting  in  useful  information  on  the 
property status of suspects not being utilised for the investigation. Finally, the analysis cites a number 
of problems in the criminal code, such as the difficulty of establishing proof of subjective elements of 
corruption crimes and other issues in the formulation of corruption offences in the criminal code.179  

The  report  concludes  with  a  number  of  concrete  recommendations  which  –  in  combination  with 
elements  discussed  in  chapters  3  and  4  above  –  cover  a  series  of  important  issues  to  improve  the 
prosecution of high-level corruption cases.  

Prevention of high-level corruption 

In April 2016 the government adopted and submitted a revised version of its draft anti-corruption law 
to the National Assembly. The assembly endorsed the draft at first reading at the end of June, allowing 
it to proceed to more detailed negotiations at the committee stage. The new draft proposal incorporated 
several changes compared to the first version, including a stronger role for the National Assembly in 
electing  the  leadership  of  the  new  proposed  anti-corruption  agency180  and  revised  provisions  on  the 
handling  of  anonymous  alerts.  The  latter  element  had  been  quoted  as  an  important  reason  for  the 
rejection of the first legislative proposal in 2015, and reportedly it remains a highly contentious issue 
among  Bulgarian  parliamentarians.181  Another  significant  change  from  the  first  proposal  was  the 
inclusion of asset forfeiture within the law, envisaging the merger of the Commission on Illegal Asset 
Forfeiture and the new Anti-corruption agency. This element of the new proposal was the subject of 
criticism from various sides focusing partly on the very different scope of action of the two types of 
institution  (high-level corruption  versus broader issues or organised crime, tax fraud etc.)  as well as 
the  risks  inherent  in  a  major  organisational  change  involving  the  asset  forfeiture  commission,  an 
institution which is seen as showing a stable track record within its existing remit of operations.182  

After  the  first  reading  vote,  a  very  large  number  of  proposals  for  amendments  of  the  draft  proposal 
were  submitted  by  members  of  the  various  parliamentary  groups,  setting  the  stage  for  complex 
negotiations  in  the  autumn.  Eventually,  however,  the  dossier  was  instead  put  on  hold  due  to  the 
uncertain  political  situation  from  November.183  The  debate  on  the  draft  law  and  proposed  agency  is 
therefore now expected to continue only after general elections expected in spring. Since the draft law 
touches  upon  a  wide  range  of  elements  in  the  current  anti-corruption  set-up,  merging  several 
institutions  and  changing  the  content  and  scope  of  the  underlying  substantive  law  on  conflicts  of 
interest  and  property  verifications,  the  practical  follow-up  will  be  of  crucial  importance  should  the 
draft law finally be adopted.  

179  See also chapter 3 above.  
180  Under the previous proposal the director and deputies would be appointed by the President of the Republic 
on  the  proposal  of  the  Government.  The  new  proposal  provides  that  they  are  elected  by  the  National 
Assembly.  

181  The ability of anti-corruption authorities to handle well-substantiated anonymous alerts is generally accepted 
practice internationally (see e.g. standards adopted by the European Partners against Corruption  / European 
http://www.epac-
contact-point 
(EPAC 
corruption 
eacn.org/downloads/recommendations/doc_view/1-anti-corruption-authority-standards) 
a 
became 
contentious in the parliamentary debate, perhaps due to a confusion between the separate issues of standards 
for opening administrative investigations and admissibility of evidence in courts.  

/  EACN) 

network 

against 

2011: 

but 

in 

182  Concerns have been raised with the Commission by both civil society actors and independent experts about 

this particular element of the new proposal.  

183  In December the Legal Affairs Committee of the National Assembly decided to postpone deliberations on the 
draft  law  amidst  expectations  of  early  elections  being  called  for  spring  2017.  Nevertheless,  efforts  have 
reportedly been made within the committee to reach compromises on several points in the draft text.  

33 

 
 
                                                            
Among its many consequences, the draft law would have an impact on the institutional set up for the 
verification of conflicts of interest, a subject which has been raised with some concern by CPACI184, 
which  is  currently  responsible  for  the  enforcement  of  a  coherent  approach  at  all  levels  in  the  entire 
public administration. With the draft law, this responsibility would be distributed among a multitude 
of public institutions and administrations, reverting to the situation before the establishment of CPACI 
in 2011. While the new proposed agency would be responsible for around 8,000 high level officials, 
new  responsibilities  would  have  to  be  borne  in  particular  by  the  municipalities  and  by  the 
inspectorates in the different departments and bodies of the State administration.  

In 2015, in continuation of the national anti-corruption strategy, the government started preparations 
on  a  legislative  initiative  to  strengthen  the  internal  inspectorates  in  the  state  administration.  The 
objective of the reform reportedly is to enhance the independence and powers of the inspectorates as 
administrative tools for corruption prevention, by entrusting them with the review of asset declarations 
of officials (those not covered by the new anticorruption agency) and work on corruption signals and 
by  reviewing  the  legislative  framework  with  regard  to  appointment  of  staff  in  the  inspectorates, 
transparency and accountability, and the definition and planning of tasks. An important element of the 
reform  would  be  to  further  strengthen  the  role  of  the  General  Inspectorate  with  the  Council  of 
Ministers,  by  empowering  it  to  coordinate  and  exercise  oversight  over  the  activities  of  the  sectorial 
inspectorates.185  Draft  proposals  for  necessary  changes  to  the  law  on  public  administration  were 
discussed  at  the  National  Anti-corruption  Council  already  in  the  summer  of  2015.  However,  by  the 
end of 2016 these proposals had still not been adopted by the Council of Ministers and submitted to 
the National Assembly.186  

In 2016 the inspectorates have continued carrying out their functions under their existing mandate and 
rules. The inspections cover the entire state administration including regional bodies. Inspections have 
led to several referrals of cases to the Conflict of Interest Commission (CPACI) or dismissals due to 
verified cases of conflict of interest. At the order of the Prime Minister a broad inspection of public 
procurement procedures carried out since January 2013 was performed by the inspectorates in spring 
2016  partly  based  on  work  of  the  National  Audit  Office.  The  analysis  revealed  a  wide  range  of 
irregularities on the basis of which recommendations were made in a number of cases.187  

While the inspectorates are responsible for internal control within the executive branch, working under 
the  authority  of  the  government,  the  National  Audit  Office  (NAO)  is  the  corresponding  external 
control agency. The NAO does not have independent sanctioning powers, but its analyses and reports 
can  provide valuable  input  not only  to the  public  at large  but  also  to  the  work  of  the  administrative 
inspectorates, as well as other bodies such as the State Financial Inspections Agency (SFIA), and in 
this way it plays a crucial role as an external watchdog.188 The NAO also plays another crucial role in 
respect of verifying the personal property declarations submitted by high-level officials under the law 
on transparency of property of public officials. In the second quarter of 2016 the NAO verified almost 
7,000  annual  declarations,  in  addition  to  around  400  initial  and  final  declarations  for  high-level 
officials  starting  or  leaving  service,  and  almost  1,000  declarations  for  newly  elected  or  outgoing 

184  The opinion of CPACI on the draft law on corruption prevention and forfeiture of illegally acquired assets 

was conveyed to the Government in a letter of 7 March 2016.  

185  National  Strategy  for  Prevention  and  Combating  Corruption  in  the  Republic  of  Bulgaria  2015-2020, 

Government of Bulgaria, April 2015, p. 7 (English translation).  

186  Bulgarian  authorities  explained  to  the  Commission  services  in  December  that  any  changes  to  the  law  on 
public  administration  need  to  go  through  a  very  thorough  vetting  process  and  that  the  proposals  had  been 
subject to two committee stages within the government apparatus in spring and autumn 2016 respectively and 
were  now  in  principle  ready  to  move  ahead  to  a  government  decision,  following  which  they  could  be 
submitted  for  consideration  by  the  legislator.  Reportedly,  no  significant  changes  had  been  made  to  the 
original proposals during the preparative process.  
187  Information provided by the General Inspectorate.  
188  The NAO management board is elected by the National Assembly and hence independent of the executive. 
This  has  not  prevented  controversy  at  the  time  of  the  election  of  the  board  however,  with  opposition 
politicians alleging that the respective parliamentary majorities place their own people in the board.  

34 

 
 
                                                            
members  of  municipal  councils  following  local  elections  in  the  autumn  of  2015.189  The  verified 
declarations are made public on the website of the NAO.190  

6. 

CORRUPTION AT LOWER LEVELS  

Benchmark 5: Take further measures to prevent and fight corruption, in particular at the borders and 
within local government. 

Corruption is often used as a catch-all concept but in fact it is useful to distinguish between different 
types of corruption. Whereas the discussion in chapter 5 above concerned high-level corruption within 
state institutions, another type of corruption, which, where present, is often much more directly visible 
and familiar to most people, is the 'everyday' corruption which meets citizens and business when they 
come into contact with public authorities at various levels. Most commonly identified with the act of 
bribery,  this  kind  of  corruption  has  been  identified  as  prevalent  in  a  number  of  areas  in  Bulgaria, 
covering sectors such as the police, customs, healthcare, education, and the administration of licenses 
and permits of various sorts. Low-level corruption affecting public licensing or control agencies191 can 
be  damaging  for  the  economy  as  it  creates  uncertainty  for  businesses.  Another  sector  in  which 
corruption can have high economic costs is public procurement, where corruption tends to raise costs 
and  lower  the  quality  of  public  services  while  diverting  tax  revenues  towards  corrupt  officials  and 
private individuals who may at the same time be involved in other types of organised crime.192 Finally, 
the question of corruption at the borders, already of high importance, has become even more sensitive 
in  the  context  of  the  current  migration  and  refugee  crisis  and  heightened  security  risks.  It  is  crucial 
from the perspective of mutual trust amongst Member States that there is confidence that the borders 
are  properly  protected,  which  implies  that  the  benchmark's  emphasis  on  possible  corruption  among 
border guards and customs officials remains a particular priority. 

Low-level corruption can in some sectors or societies become so widespread that it takes on a status of 
general  social  norm  or  expectation.  Under  such  circumstances  of  'endemic'  corruption,  law 
enforcement  is  often  not  very  effective  in  addressing  the  problem.193  A  change  of  culture  is  needed 
which  needs  preventive  measures  to  make  corruption  more  difficult,  combined  with  broader 
awareness-raising efforts to challenge the normative basis of entrenched practices. On the other hand, 
even  when  it  comes  to  such  situations,  law  enforcement  action  is  still  necessary  whenever  more 
serious cases of corruption are discovered. Avoiding any impression of impunity for gross violations is 
a necessity if efforts to change broader attitudes towards corruption are to be successful.  

At  the  time  of  Bulgaria's  accession  to  the  EU  in  2007,  low  level  corruption  was  identified  as  a 
widespread  problem  in  Bulgaria.  This  was  the  background  for  the  fifth  benchmark.  As  for  the 
benchmarks above, this chapter will first provide a general impression of the developments over the 
past ten years since accession and then take a more close-up look at the year that has passed since the 
last CVM report in January 2016.  

189  The verification is carried out automatically using a specialised IT system. Further checks can be carried out 
in  case  of  discrepancies,  including  a  full  tax  audit  where  relevant.  The  NAO  itself  carries  out  no  further 
proactive  assessment  of  the  information  contained  in  the  declarations  and  does  not  have  access  to  bank 
account data. 

190  See http://register.bulnao.government.bg/2016/index.html  
191  Including tax authorities.  
192  One  strand  of  revenue  for  organised  crime  is  the  fraudulent  acquisition  of  public  funds  through  public 
procurement  or  other  contracts.  In  such  schemes,  corruption  often  plays  a  role  in  facilitating  the  criminal 
activities. Collusion between organised criminal groups and public officials is also a risk in other sectors.  
193  Based on survey figures from Bulgaria, the Centre for the Study of Democracy has estimated that the share of 
bribery  transactions  which  lead  to  a  judicial  process  is  equal  to  around  0.0115  per  cent  (120-150  pre-trial 
cases  compared  to  an  estimated  1,300,000  persons  having  engaged  in  a  bribing  transaction  at  least  once 
during the year). State Capture Unplugged: Countering Administrative and Political Corruption in Bulgaria, 
Centre for the Study of Democracy (CSD), 2016, p. 17. 

35 

 
 
                                                            
6.1.   Overview of developments under the CVM 

While high-level corruption can be very difficult to quantify, it is easier to put at least a rough estimate 
on the degree to which a society is affected by low-level corruption. A particularly useful tool in that 
respect  is  the  survey  of  concrete  experiences  of  bribery  among  citizens.  Available  surveys  in  this 
respect indicate that low-level corruption remains a widespread problem in Bulgaria.194 It also appears, 
however, that Bulgarians are not per se very tolerant of the practice, in spite of its prevalence.195 While 
there was clear progress towards diminishing the problem in the years leading up to EU accession as 
well  as  in  the  years  immediately  following  accession,  there  is  evidence  that  the  last  few  years  have 
seen a reversal of these earlier trends, with levels of concrete experience of bribery moving back up to 
levels last seen before the EU accession ten years ago.196  

At  different  times  over  the  past  ten  years,  the  Bulgarian  authorities  have  taken  steps  to  address  the 
problem of low level corruption in various sectors. Some of these have already been touched upon in 
the  last  chapter,  such  as  the  establishment  of  the  Commission  for  Prevention  and  Ascertaining  of 
Conflicts  of  Interests  (CPACI)  in  2011  and  the  internal  inspectorates  in  the  State  administration. 
Indeed, these institutions have played an important role in terms of prevention and awareness-raising 
actions on corruption risks. Steps were taken already in the early years after accession to strengthen 
corruption prevention within the police and customs authorities, through such measures as rotation of 
police  officers,  abolishing  private  donations  to  law  enforcement  authorities,  and  awareness-raising 
campaigns. Ethics codes and local mediators were set up in local authorities, alongside a number of 
other  measures  launched  under  the  first  anti-corruption  strategy  adopted  in  2009.197  Some  of  these 
measures had a positive impact at the time. However, for results to be durable over time, a continued 
effort  is  needed.  The  figures  cited  above  suggest  that  this  pressure  did  not  succeed  in  triggering  the 
fundamental culture change required.  

More  recently,  the  renewed  anti-corruption  strategy  adopted  in  2015  set  out  a  number  of  further 
strands  of  work  aiming  to  address  low-level  corruption.  The  measures  envisaged  include  the  above-
mentioned strengthening of the internal control bodies in the state administration as well as measures 
to limit corruption risks in administrative services through the use of IT tools, enhanced structures to 
check conflict of interest and property declarations within administrative bodies, standard methods for 
signals on corruption to be received by public institutions including anonymous signals, developing a 
methodology  for  the  use  of  integrity  tests,  and  the  elaboration  of  sectorial  anti-corruption  plans  for 
high-risk  sectors.198  The  sectorial  anti-corruption  plans  would  consist  of  a  mixture  of  organisational 
and  managerial  measures,  including  all  of  the  above  in  different  combinations  depending  on  the 
specific characteristics of the policy sector concerned. The development of these plans was envisaged 
in a number of policy sectors including education, healthcare, agriculture, transport, energy, customs 
and taxation. In the end, however, it was in the Ministry of Interior that these efforts first took hold 
with  a  broad  range  of  specific  and  general  measures  implemented  within  the  broader  context  of  a 

194  The  level  of  reported  involvement  in  bribery  in  Bulgaria  for  2015  appears  to  be  comparable  to  that  of 
Western  Balkan  countries  such  as  Serbia,  Kosovo,  Bosnia-Herzegovina  and  Macedonia  and  higher  than  in 
Croatia or Turkey, but lower than in Albania. Shadow power: assessment of corruption and hidden economy 
in southeast Europe, Centre for the Study of Democracy (CSD), 2016, p.18.  

195  In a recent study, 88 per cent of Bulgarians considered it likely or very likely that they would meet corruption 
pressure  in  their  contacts  with  public  officials,  which  is  the  highest  percentage  among  the  South-East 
European countries covered by the survey (just ahead of Serbia). However, Bulgarians were also found to be 
the least tolerant of such pressure among the countries covered. Only 20 per cent of Bulgarians found such 
pressure acceptable. Shadow power, p. 19 and 21.  

196  In 2016 more than one out of five Bulgarians surveyed had personally paid a bribe in the previous year and 
one out of four had been asked for one. Similar but declining figures were seen in the years leading up to EU 
accession. In 2010-2011 the levels had halved to around one in ten having given a bribe, but then increased 
again to reach a maximum of three out of ten in 2014. State Capture Unplugged, p. 11-12.   

197  SWD(2012) 232, p. 22-26. 
198  National  Strategy  for  Prevention  and  Combating  corruption  in  the  Republic  of  Bulgaria  2015-2020,  April 

2015, p. 11-13 (English version). 

36 

 
 
                                                            
general reorganisation of the ministry and reform of its statutes.199 These efforts within the Ministry of 
Interior were continued into 2016 and appeared to have a real impact.  

Public  procurement  is  generally  recognised  as  being  prone  to  corruption  risks,  and  Bulgaria  is  no 
exception.  In  2015,  nearly  60  per  cent  of  businesses  in  Bulgaria  (the  highest  percentage  in  any 
Member State) considered that corruption had prevented them from winning a public tender within the 
last three years.200 There was only one bidder in 27 % of public procurement procedures.201 Past CVM 
reports have also highlighted the challenges faced by Bulgaria in this area.202 As part of its accession 
conditions, Bulgaria transposed the European legislation in the public procurement area with a major 
overhaul of the law in 2006, but in the following years the legislation remained subject to numerous 
and  frequent  amendments.  The  resulting  lack  of  stability  and  transparency  of  the  legal  framework 
constituted  a  barrier  to  efficient  procurement  procedures  and  was  further  compounded  by  a  lack  of 
administrative  capacity  among  contracting  authorities.  The  lack  of  administrative  capacity  became 
increasingly problematic as the previously rather centralised system of public procurement in Bulgaria 
moved  in  the  direction  of  further  decentralisation,  with  municipalities  playing  a  greater  role  for 
example in the implementation of EU funded projects. The legal uncertainty created by the complex 
and  ever  changing  legislation  also  led  to  a  tendency  of  frequent  appeals  which  delayed  procedures, 
with negative financial and policy consequences.203  

Over the years Bulgaria has gradually strengthened its policy framework on public procurement.204 In 
addition  to  the  introduction  of  ex  post  checks  carried  out by  the State  Financial  Inspections  Agency 
(SFIA) and the National Audit Office (NAO), the Public Procurement Agency (PPA) was mandated to 
carry  out  ex  ante  control  of  EU  fund  procedures  and  this  was  later  extended  to  all  standard 
procurement procedures.205 In 2014 Bulgaria adopted a comprehensive strategy for the development of 
the public procurement sector. The strategy includes a range of measures with concrete deadlines to 
address  the  problems  faced,  including  simplified  and  codified  legislation  and  centralised  guidelines 
which  aim  at  the  correct  transposition  of  the  new  EU  public  procurement  directives;  enhanced 
administrative  capacity  at  the  various  levels  of  the  public  administration;  comprehensive  and  non-
formalistic ex ante controls combined with rationalised ex post controls; and greater transparency via 
gradual  introduction  of  electronic  procurement  and  more  efficient  review  procedures.206  The  2015 
Anti-Corruption Strategy also mentions strengthening the control of public procurement procedures.207  

 6.2.   Developments since the last CVM report of January 2016  

In its 2016 CVM report the Commission recommended that Bulgaria provide the Public Procurement 
Agency with the legal authority and organisational capacity to perform risk-based, in-depth checks on 
public procurement procedures, to continue the efforts to address low-level corruption in the Ministry 
of Interior, and to launch similar efforts in other risk sectors within the public administration.  

199  SWD(2016) 15, p. 22-23.  
200  Businesses’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU: Summary, Flash Eurobarometer 428, 2015, p. 26.  
201  Single Market Scoreboard: 

http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/performance_per_policy_area/public_procurement/index_en.
htm 

202  COM(2012) 411, p. 19; COM(2015) 36, p. 11; COM(2016) 40, p. 12.  
203  Such delays created significant problems in connection with the implementation of EU funded programmes 

and are also a barrier to the effective implementation of public policy decisions in many instances.  

204  SWD(2012) 232, p. 27-29; SWD(2015) 9, p. 23-24. 
205  Until recently the checks have however been of a rather superficial format, focusing on the legal compliance 
rather than deeper analysis of the technical specifications set out in the calls. The coexistence of ex ante and 
ex  post  controls  by  different  bodies  in  turn  created  problems  of  inconsistency,  probably  also  reflecting  the 
complex and changing legal environment which created opportunities for divergent interpretations.  

206  National  Strategy  for  the  Development of  the  Public  Procurement  Sector  in  Bulgaria  for  the  period  2014-

2020, Government of Bulgaria, June 2014.  

207  National Strategy for Prevention and Combating corruption, p. 7 (English version). 

37 

 
 
                                                            
Public procurement 

In  the  public  procurement  area  there  have  been  important  developments  in  2016.  In  January,  the 
National Assembly adopted amendments to the legislation with a view to transposing two out of the 
three  recently  adopted  European  public  procurement  directives.208  Among  other  changes,  new 
provisions  were  introduced  to  strengthen  the  ex  ante  checks  of  tender  procedures  performed  by  the 
Public Procurement Agency (PPA).209 While previously such checks covered all procedures and were 
of a rather general character, the new rules envisage a risk-based and more in-depth check on a sample 
of procedures, notably including also a check of the technical specifications for the tender. The checks 
will  be  performed  in  two  steps,  both  at  the  initial  preparation  of  the  tender  and  at  the  time  of  the 
publication of the call. The PPA's recommendations are published. Where the PPA considers that there 
is  a  considerable  risk  of  irregularities,  it  may  appoint  observers  (belonging  to  the  PPA  staff)  to 
participate  in  the  evaluation  committee  set  for  the  tender  concerned.  While  the  recommendations  of 
the PPA are therefore not binding upon the contracting authorities, it can exert considerable pressure 
on  authorities  which  choose  to  disregard  its  advice.  Ultimately,  it  is  also  foreseen  that  the  PPA  can 
notify ex post control bodies (the SFIA and NAO) about concrete procedures, for example on the basis 
of reports produced by the observers that it sends to evaluation boards. 

The new model for ex ante control of public procurement procedures appears to be an important step 
forward.  If  properly  implemented,  it  could  bring  the  double  advantage  to  increase  ownership  from 
contracting  authorities  while  allowing  the  PPA  to  dedicate  more  time  and  resources  to  improve  the 
quality of its controls. However, the real impact will have to be seen in practice and may need further 
development in light of experience.210 An important issue concerns the degree of scrutiny that will be 
applied in practice in the context of the new checks performed by the PPA.  

To  be  truly  effective,  these  checks  need  to  cover  an  assessment  of  the  technical  specifications  for 
tenders, a task which can be highly demanding and requiring the PPA to employ technical expertise in 
a  number  of  areas.  Another  essential  issue  concerns  the  reliability  of  the  sampling  method  for  the 
selection  of  procedures  subject  to  the  random  ex-ante  checks  and  its  adaptability  to  evolving  risks. 
Such methods should ensure that controls remain unpredictable from the point of view of individual 
contracting  authorities, focused on sectors at risk  while keeping all contracting authorities under the 
threat of a potential control regardless of the financial volume of their procedures. The follow-up on 
concrete cases where suspicions appear of conflicts of interest or other undue influence on tendering 
procedures is also crucial. As the PPA does not have any sanctioning powers and does not carry out 
checks on the outcome after the fact, the cooperation with ex post control bodies will be essential in 
this respect.211 In addition, ex post controls of public procurement procedures need to be undertaken in 
such  a  manner  as  to  allow  meeting  the  legally  stipulated  deadlines  for  imposing  sanctions  for  any 
unveiled irregularities.  

208  Although the Classical directive 2014/24/EU and the Utilities directive 2014/25/EU were thus transposed in a 
timely  manner,  the  Concessions  directive  2014/23/EU  was  not  part  of  the  package  and  still  needs  to  be 
transposed.  

209  According  to  the  Public  Procurement  Act  the  Public  Procurement  Agency  performs  risk-based  random 
controls and systemic controls (over negotiated procedures without prior notice, certain exemptions from the 
scope of the law, control in case of amendment of a contract for public procurement). An additional "market 
monitoring" control function was also entrusted to the PPA on the basis of relevant secondary law provisions. 
210  Concrete  implementation  only  started  in  September  2016.  To  ensure  capacity  to  carry  out  the  additional 
control,  it  is  planned  to  assign  in  2017  additional  personnel  to  the  PPA.  The  level  of  salaries  within  the 
Agency  has  recently  been  increased.  Also,  the  PPA  has  been  moved  under  the  Ministry  of  Finance. 
Previously it was under the remit of the Ministry for Economic Affairs. 

211  As  mentioned  above,  such  cooperation  has  been  an  issue  in  the  past  where  different  interpretations  of  the 
public  procurement  rules  led  to  divergences  between  approaches.  To  address  such  issues  in  the  future,  a 
Methodology  Council  has  recently  been  established  to  work  on  harmonised  approaches  to  various 
methodological issues. This council can play an important role in unifying practices, law interpretation and 
guidance, which requires a systematic approach, including the adoption of an annual work programme and/or 
performance indicators to regularly assess the progress achieved. 

38 

 
 
                                                            
The strengthened control by the PPA should also be seen in the context of the broader implementation 
of  the  National  Public  Procurement  Strategy  2014-2020,  where  a  number  of  planned  measures  will 
have  a  positive  impact  in  terms  of  limiting  corruption  risks.  These  include  among  others  the 
introduction  of  a  unified  guidance  document,  standards  templates  for  tendering  documents, 
standardised  contract  clauses,  centralised  purchasing  platforms,  increased  professionalisation  of 
contracting authorities, improved remedies and the eventual extension of e-procurement to all stages 
of  the  procedures.212  The  successful  implementation  of  this  reform  agenda  will  depend  to  a  great 
extent  on  the  PPA's  organisational  capacity  and  ability  to  adapt,  as  it  is  faced  with  new,  still  more 
demanding  tasks  in  relation  to  the  overall  public  procurement  system.  Overall,  the  National  Public 
Procurement Strategy seems to start bearing some fruit and procurement procedures tend to be clearer 
and  more  streamlined.  Notwithstanding  this,  public  procurement  still  presents  significant  problems, 
often  related  to  weaknesses  in  institutions  and  in  the  public  administration.  A  trend  towards 
irregularities becoming more complex over time is likely to further increase the challenges for control 
authorities. 

Improvements in the procurement system also need to go hand in hand with efforts to address conflicts 
of  interest  and  corruption  risks  more  broadly,  especially  at  the  local  level.  A  particularly  sensitive 
issue in this regard concerns the use by contracting authorities of ad hoc experts in the preparation of 
technical specifications for tenders, as well as on evaluation committees charged with the assessment 
of  bids  by  potential  contractors.  This  is  an  obvious  area  of  risk  for  conflicts  of  interest,  and,  while 
these  external  experts  are  required  by  law  to  submit  conflicts  of  interest  declarations,  they  are  not 
covered by the CPACI's remit of competence, which means that the assessment of compliance with the 
law falls on the contracting authorities themselves and that no sanctions can be applied for violations 
under the conflicts of interest law.213 CPACI has carried out a number of preventive activities in 2016 
with regard to conflicts of interest at the local level. These activities have included a series of training 
events for mayors, chairs of municipal councils, and members of local conflicts of interest committees, 
which  was  organised  in  cooperation  with  the  Bulgarian  National  Association  of  Municipalities. 
CPACI  also  carried  out  a  campaign  to  verify  compliance  of  the  municipal  registries  on  conflict  of 
interest  declarations,  as  well  as  a  campaign  of  systematic  checks  on  the  timely  submission  of 
compatibility  and  conflicts  of  interest  declarations  by  the  newly  elected  mayors  and  municipal 
councillors following local elections in October 2015.214  

Sectorial anti-corruption measures in the Ministry of Interior and other sectors 

As part of a long-term concept for the combatting of corruption in the Ministry of Interior until 2020, 
the  ministry  adopted  annual  anti-corruption  plans  for  2015  and  2016.  The  plans  contain  a  range  of 
practical and organisational measures to target corruption risks in all parts of the ministry's activities, 
including training and prevention as well as law enforcement measures. An important element is the 
introduction of new technology. In July 2016 a portal for electronic services to citizens and businesses 
became  functional  which  provides  more  than  30  electronic  services,  for  example  in  relation  to  the 
payment  of  traffic  fines,  issuance  of  ID  documents,  and  obtaining  licences  to  enter  private  security 
services,  as  well  as  permits  related  to  firearms.  Software  is  in  the  process  of  being  introduced  to 
monitor  internal  systems  and  databases  against  unauthorised  access.215  A  plan  is  being  implemented 
for  the  furnishing  of  traffic  control  vehicles  with  remote  access  workstations216,  which  allow  for 
central  monitoring  including  through  video  recording  of  activities.  Traffic  police  officers  are  also 

212  Bulgaria has an extensive registry of procurement procedures online with public access, but all phases of the 

e-procurement are not yet implemented.  

213  Meeting with CPACI, December 2016. 
214  The latter checks led to 113 administrative proceedings for late declaration. CPACI points out that this is a 
vast  improvement  in  comparison  with  the  results  of  the  similar  exercise  in  2011  which  revealed  that  3000 
local councillors had not submitted their compatibility declarations on time.  

215  Reportedly,  the  privileged  access  of  staff  to  Ministry  of  Interior  databases  has  created  a  market  for  petty 

corruption.  

216  250 have been supplied so far.  

39 

 
 
                                                            
rotated  on  a  regular  basis  and  are  subject  to  regular  inspections.  A  pilot  on  body  worn  cameras  has 
been  launched.  In  combination  with  the  new  system  of  electronic  payment  of  fines,  these  and  other 
measures are reported to have dramatically reduced the risk of bribery in this sector.217  

In  the  area  of  border  control,  officers  working  in  corruption  risk  zones  are  rotated  regularly.  A  risk 
register is maintained on personnel and regular police operations are carried out by mobile control and 
monitoring groups with participation of relevant law enforcement services.218 An email and telephone 
hotline  has  been  made  available  to  citizens  who  experience  irregularities  at  the  border.  Video 
surveillance  has  been  introduced  at  the  border  which,  aside  from  controlling  movements  over  the 
border,  should  also  limit  the  opportunities  for  corrupt  activities.  With  regard  to  training  and  human 
resource management, measures were taken to incorporate anti-corruption content in all courses of the 
MoI Academy. An  integrity test procedure was  developed for use in the initial selection  of staff for 
appointment at the Ministry of Interior. In October 2016, the National Assembly adopted amendments 
to the Ministry of Interior Law which will provide the legal basis for the introduction of inspections of 
integrity  and  for  the  assessment  of  personal  property  declarations  of  ministry  personnel  based  on 
information  from  public  registries.219  The  anti-corruption  plan  of  the  Ministry  of  Interior  is 
implemented  in  the  context  of  a  broader  reform  of  the  ministry  and  appears  to  be  a  serious  and 
determined effort to stamp out low-level corruption in one of the sectors most notorious for it.  

A concrete example of similar efforts in another related area is the customs office, which has adopted 
a  sectorial  anti-corruption  plan  for  2016,  under  which  workshops  have  been  carried  out  on  the 
prevention  of  corruption.  A  methodology  for  corruption  risk  assessment  has  been  approved  by  the 
customs service in March 2016, based on the methodology recommended by the General Inspectorate 
with the Council of Ministers. A system of secondment of customs offices to other districts is in place, 
so as to address the risk  of corrupt cultures developing in individual offices. Inspections of customs 
stations are regularly performed, both planned and on the basis of signals received from citizens.220 A 
number  of  inspections  and  raids  by  law  enforcement  in  recent  years  have  resulted  in  disciplinary 
proceedings, dismissals, and in some cases judicial follow-up. As mentioned, the 2014 anti-corruption 
strategy  envisaged  such  plans  to  be  implemented  in  high-risk  sectors  across  government.  Other  risk 
sectors where such plans are reportedly under way include sectors providing control functions for the 
state,  such  as  the  tax  authorities221,  sectors  handling  large  contracts  or  EU  funds,  such  as  energy  or 
agriculture, as well as sectors providing services directly to citizens or businesses, such as healthcare, 
education  or  transport.  But  the  general  picture  appears  to  be  that  these  efforts  are  still  much  less 
advanced than in the Ministry of Interior. 

7. 

ORGANISED CRIME 

Benchmark  6:  Implement  a  strategy  to  fight  organised  crime,  focussing  on  serious  crime,  money 
laundering as well as on the systematic confiscation of assets of criminals. Report on new and ongoing 
investigations in these areas.  

Organised crime was identified at the time of accession as a serious problem in Bulgaria. Although its 
visible presence has diminished since an apparent peak in the 1990s and the early years of this century, 

217  There has reportedly also been a dramatic exodus of officers from service in the traffic police, mostly on a 
voluntary basis and sometimes through reassignment to other parts of the ministry, but in some cases also due 
to actual or potential disciplinary or criminal follow-up to transgressions.  

218  The national police, customs and the organised crime directorate of the Ministry of Interior are involved. The 
objective in these operations is two-fold: both to minimise corruption risks and to strengthen the response to 
smuggling and contraband.  

219  This  system  is  to  cover  managerial  staff.  The  Ministry of  Interior  has  made  an  agreement  for  the  use  of  a 

version of the methodology applied by the NAO for high level officials (see chapter 5 above).  

220  These  include  'road-stop'  controls  behind  the  borders  by  mobile  customs  groups  to  verify  the  work  of  the 

customs at the border.  

221  In the National Revenue Agency such measures form part of broader efforts against tax evasion. 

40 

 
 
                                                            
organised crime has continued to constitute a significant threat to Bulgarian society and the economy 
during the years following Bulgaria's accession to the EU. The challenge is partly a reflection of the 
geographic  location  of  Bulgaria  on  some  of  the  most  important  trafficking  routes  for  illicit  goods 
between Europe and the Orient, including the most important route for heroin trafficking running from 
Central Asia to Europe. According to an UNODC222 analysis based on estimates for the years 2009-
2012,  heroin  trafficking  alone  through  Bulgaria  produced  annual  revenues  for  organised  crime 
equivalent to around 1.22 per cent of Bulgaria's GDP on average.223 A recent study of illicit markets in 
Europe estimated the illicit revenues from a selection of other criminal activities – in particular illicit 
tobacco, VAT fraud, and counterfeiting – to around 1.6 per cent of Bulgaria's GDP.224 The 2012 CVM 
technical  report  cites  an  overall  estimate  of  organised  criminal  activities  of  close  to  5  per  cent  of 
GDP.225  

While these estimates are naturally subject to great uncertainty, such figures can give a general idea of 
the  importance  that  organised  crime  has  played  in  the  Bulgarian  economy  in  recent  years. 
Furthermore,  as  noted  in  the  July  2012  CVM  report,  an  important  additional  factor  has  been  the 
violence  connected  with  organised  crime  in  Bulgaria,  including  frequent  contract  killings  to  which 
little judicial and law enforcement follow-up could be reported.  

The general background  for the sixth benchmark under the CVM was the assessment that organised 
crime played a unique role in Bulgarian society, with organised criminal groups exerting considerable 
influence over economic activities in the country as well as potentially the political system and state 
institutions.226  

7.1.   Overview of developments under the CVM 

This  section  focuses  on  the  changes  that  have  taken  place  since  Bulgaria's  accession  to  the  EU  in 
respect to organised crime as well as the Bulgarian law enforcement and judicial response to it.  

Evolution in organised crime 

Bulgarian  authorities  report  that  over  the  past  ten  years  there  has  been  a  significant  change  in  the 
nature of organised crime in the country. While organised criminal activity still exists, according to the 
Bulgarian authorities the picture described in the introduction, with large and hierarchically organised 
criminal organisations having a strongly felt presence (and notably resorting to open use of violence) 
throughout significant parts of the territory, is no longer the reality. Today's organised crime landscape 
is  much  more  comparable  to  the  situation  in  other  Member  States  in  the  sense  that  it  is  more 
fragmented,  with  smaller  groups  or  individuals  linked  through  flexible  networks.  Many  of  the 
criminals of the earlier era – if they have not been killed in inter-gang rivalries – have been reported to 
have  left  the  country  or  retired  from  high-risk  criminal  activities,  having  previously  laundered  and 
redirected their illegally-earned assets into the legal economy. The result, according to the Bulgarian 

222  United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime.  
223  Next  after  Afghanistan,  Albania  and  Iran,  Bulgaria  had  the  highest  ratio  to  GDP  of  illicit  revenues  from 
heroin  trafficking  on  the  entire  Balkan  route  (defined  as  including  the  production  countries  as  well  as  the 
main  consumer  countries  in  Europe).  Drug  Money:  the  illicit  proceeds  of  opiates  trafficked  on  the  Balkan 
route, UNODC 2015, p. 47.   

224  From Illegal Markets to Legitimate Businesses: the portfolio of organised crime in Europe, Organised Crime 
Portfolio,  2015,  p.  35-37.  The  figure  does  not  cover  revenues  from  significant  areas  of  organised  criminal 
activity  such  as  trafficking  in  human  beings,  extortion,  usury,  and  cybercrime.  Neither  does  it  cover  the 
heroin trafficking revenues cited earlier.  

225  SWD(2012) 232, p. 29 (footnote 127). 
226  COM(2012) 411, p. 13-14; SWD(2012) 232, p. 29-30.  

41 

 
 
                                                            
law  enforcement  authorities,  is  a  less  malign  –  less  violent  –  organised  crime  picture  in  today's 
Bulgaria, than was the case in the past.227  

The  image  of  a  more  fragmented  situation  with  regard  to  organised  crime  appears  to  have  some 
validity in as far as the imprint of organised crime on everyday life has become relatively less visible 
in recent years. The level of violence, although it cannot be said to have disappeared entirely228, also 
seems to have abated compared to the early years of the CVM.229 Bulgarian authorities do not claim 
this  development  is  only  (or  even  mostly)  due  to  effective  law  enforcement  efforts  on  their  part. 
However,  even  if  Bulgarian  law  enforcement  arguably  failed  to  tackle  the  serious  organised  crime 
problems that were present in the country at the time of accession to the EU230, this does not mean that 
there has not in the meantime been a change in the overall crime picture. On the surface at least, such a 
change  does  indeed  seem  to  have  taken  place.  Neither  does  it  mean  that  organised  crime  has 
disappeared, even in its traditional form, active in diverse trafficking activities, in drugs, cigarettes and 
– more recently – migrants, as well as trafficking in human beings.231 However, the overall picture is 
now  less  dominated  by  the  traditional  organised  criminal  gangs,  and  has  been  replaced  by  a  more 
diverse  scenario,  in  which  smaller  groups  of  the  traditional  kind  co-exist  with  more  sophisticated 
criminal networks, active for example in cybercrime or fraud to non-cash  means of payments, some 
with a closer link to the legitimate economy and altogether focusing on less risky and less visible types 
of criminal activity.232  

Institutional developments in response to organised crime 

trend 

international 

227  In  terms  of  concrete  criminal  markets,  Bulgarian  authorities  report  a  number  of  changes  since  the  years 
around the EU accession. Violence has diminished with less reliance on extortion as a criminal activity. The 
former hierarchical groups have been split up in smaller, local entities. Trans-border crime has become more 
prevalent with more involvement of foreign groups, using local criminals in subcontracting roles. Organised 
criminals  are  increasingly  penetrating  the  legitimate  economy  and  becoming  more  flexible,  using  modern 
technology.  The 
towards  multi-crime  groups,  with  organised  crime  focusing 
opportunistically  on  different  markets,  is  also  present  in  Bulgaria.  Drug  trafficking  remains  a  major  issue. 
Amphetamines  and  methamphetamines  and  cannabis  production  has  taken  over  from  other  markets.  There 
has been a reduction in domestic heroin consumption and the production of synthetic drugs has increasingly 
moved to the Middle East. Designer drugs constitute an increasing problem. However, drugs dealing is no 
longer  nationally  organised  but  fragmented  in  local  markets.  Trafficking  in  women  used  to  be  a  major 
activity for Bulgarian organised crime and very often associated with violence. This is still the case, but on a 
smaller scale. There has been a dramatic reduction in contraband illicit cigarettes, which was also one of the 
main  organised  crime  group  activities.  Growing  areas  of  concern  on  the  other  hand  include  trafficking  in 
cultural  artefacts,  cybercrime,  as  well  as  tax  fraud  where  more  complex  schemes  have  developed  since 
accession  to  the  EU.  There  are  continued  signs of  collusion  between organised  crime  and  magistrates,  law 
enforcement  officials  and  politicians,  including  at  local  level.  (Source:  Meetings  with  Bulgarian  law 
enforcement authorities, December 2016.)  

228  Incidents noted in recent reports include a shooting of a witness in a high-level organised crime case in 2014 
and  a  grenade  fired  on  an  armoured  vehicle  in  central  Sofia  in  2015.  In  June  2016  a  large  scale  shooting 
incident  involving  two  competing  local  gangs  momentarily  broke  the  holiday  atmosphere  at  a  popular 
vacation spot on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast.  

229  GDBOB reports that the number of murders and kidnappings has diminished in recent years. Kidnappings 

remained a major issue in the first years after accession to the EU. 

230  Most of the emblematic cases followed under the CVM did not come to a successful conclusion, with final 
enforced convictions. Some of the most notorious crime bosses have absconded, probably abroad. Some have 
suffered a violent death. Others have reinvested their assets in the legitimate economy. In any case, they have 
effectively evaded any legal consequences.  

231  The  traditional  gangs  still  exist,  but  are  more  local  in  character,  according  to  Bulgarian  law  enforcement 

authorities.  

232  Indeed, the changes described are in line with tendencies identified internationally, away from hierarchically 
organised criminal gangs and towards looser networks. This trend is often associated with the development of 
the "crime as a service" model and enabled by new technologies and the internet.  

42 

 
 
                                                            
As  mentioned,  at  the  time  when  Bulgaria  joined  the  EU,  its  law  enforcement  institutions  appeared 
incapable  of  tackling  the  organised  crime  challenge  which  had  emerged  in  the  1990s  following  the 
transition.  Since  then  there  have  been  a  number  of  institutional  developments.  The  most  important 
institutions for the fight against organised crime are the specialised directorate (GDBOB) within the 
Ministry  of  Interior233  and  the  Specialised  Court  and  Prosecutor's  Office  for  organised  crime 
established in 2012. The third institution with a direct bearing on organised crime investigations is the 
Commission for Illegal Asset Forfeiture (CIAF).  

The  Specialised  Court  and  Prosecutor's  Office  for  organised  crime  were  established  in  2012  in  the 
context  of  a  broader  reform  of  the  criminal  procedure  code.234  The  original  idea  was  to  create 
specialised institutions to handle high-level cases of serious organised crime and corruption. The final 
outcome of the legislative process was a more limited model covering organised crime235, and some 
other specific types of cases, such as offences involving officials at the Ministry of Interior or security 
firms.236  The  specialised  court  and  prosecution  provided  a  possibility  for  a  stronger  approach  to 
organised crime, not least due to the fact that the new institutions' mandate covered the entire country, 
which  was  key  in  a  situation  where  local  law  enforcement  and  judicial  institutions  were  seen  as 
vulnerable to pressure from organised criminal groups.  

The new specialised institutions needed some time to become established. During the first years, their 
work was hampered by a lack of capacity237 as well as a high number of relatively minor cases being 
referred  to  them,  due  to  what  turned  out  to  be  a  rather  broad  interpretation  of  their  jurisdiction.238 
Other  transitional  issues  also  led  to  delays  during  the  first  years.239  These  various  issues  were 
gradually  cleared  away  through  legislative  or  organisational  action.  For  example,  legislative 
amendments  to  the  criminal  procedure  code  in  2015  reduced  somewhat  the  scope  of  the  court's 
jurisdiction by repealing some specific types of offences from its remit, in order to allow it to better 
focus on more significant organised crime cases, and a specialised tax crimes unit was set up within 
the Specialised Prosecutor's Office to enhance its capacity in this type of cases.240  

The  Bulgarian  authorities  report  that  the  recent  years  have  seen  a  gradual  improvement  in  the  track 
record  in  terms  of  bringing  serious  organised  crime  cases  to  finalisation  in  court,  in  several  cases 
resulting in significant prison sentences for crimes such as drug dealing. It should be noted, however, 
that  a  significant  number  of  cases  also  continue  to  be  finalised  through  plea  bargaining  agreements, 
which results in rather less severe sentences.241 Such agreements are essentially pursued because they 

233  This service has existed for many years but has been reorganised many times.  
234  See also chapter 3 above.  
235  SWD(2012) 232, p. 32. 
236  The latter reflected the peculiar situation in Bulgaria where, as a result of the legacy of very strong security 
services  under  communism  combined  with  the  way  reforms  were  undertaken  in  the  early  1990s,  links 
continued to exist between organised crime and elements within the police and private security agencies.  
237  The  new  institutions  were  not  initially  seen  as  very  attractive  workplaces.  Apart  from  the  complex  and 
arguably  dangerous  subject  matters  they  were  to  deal  with,  some  observers  have  pointed  out  that  the 
challenge  of  recruiting  experienced  staff  was  also  compounded  by  a  political  environment  where  the 
opposition had cast them as a pet project of the government in power at the time, creating uncertainty about 
long-term continuity.  

238  The penal code defines an organised criminal group as "the permanent structured association of three or more 
individuals intended for the agreed perpetration … of a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than three 
years" (Article 93). The substantive provisions on organised crime also refer to "anyone who agrees with one 
or more individuals to commit" such crimes (Article 321). In practice, the jurisdiction of the court turned out 
to cover many relatively minor cases.  

239  For example when ongoing organised crime cases were referred back to lower courts or to the prosecutor's 
office,  this  created  uncertainty  as  to  which  court  or  prosecutor's  office  should  handle  the  follow-up.  An 
interpretative  ruling  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Cassation  was  necessary  to  clarify  which  courts  were 
competent, which led to the reassignment of a number of cases.  

240  SWD(2016) 15, p. 26-27. 
241  Many cases end up in suspended sentences. Op cit, p 24 and p. 27.  

43 

 
 
                                                            
can ensure a swift conclusion of the case with a final sentence, something which is otherwise difficult 
to achieve in the Bulgarian system. Nevertheless, the Prosecutor's office has argued that the provisions 
can  be  too  lenient  and  could  in  some  cases  allow  serious  offenders  to  obtain  relatively  minor 
sentences.242  

In spite of the advances made by the Specialised Court and Prosecutor's Office over the recent years, 
Bulgaria still faces challenges in ensuring that these institutions reach their full potential. In December 
2016 the Supreme Court of Cassation published an analysis made by four working groups of judges 
from the court on the work of the two instances of the Specialised Court on organised crime for the 
period  2012-2015.243  The  report  concludes  that  the  competences  given  by  the  legislator  are  'non-
precise and arbitrary' and that the specialised structures were created without a vision for the type of 
specialisation  and  the  subject  of  its  competency.244  Consequently,  the  court  is  effectively  not 
functioning  as  the  specialised  structure  to  fight  organised  crime  it  was  meant  to  be.  Because  of  the 
legal vagueness, the court is overloaded with penal cases of a private character in the pre-trial phase, 
of  which  only  a  small  part  lead  to  fully-fledged  penal  cases.  Only  around  10  percent  of  the  cases 
processed  by  the  court  concern  penal  cases  against  organised  criminal  groups,  according  to  the 
analysis. The analysis also notes excessive formalism at the appeal level. Furthermore, the report finds 
that the court and its magistrates have a relatively low workload245 and that a relatively high number of 
terminated cases and cases that are returned for further investigation raise questions about the efficient 
functioning of the court. Workload is unevenly distributed amongst the judges. As for the track record 
during the first four years of its existence (2012-2015), the analysis shows that the Specialised Court 
has processed 636 organised crime cases in total, of which 19 per cent have resulted in a conviction 
and 31 per cent have been concluded through plea-bargaining. Approximately half of the cases have 
been  terminated  for  one  reason  or  another.  Overall,  the  analysis  shows  that  challenges  still  exist  in 
respect of the effective functioning of the Specialised Court, although the conclusions should also be 
seen in the context of a four year period. It should be noted that past CVM reports have noted that the 
specialised  structures  appeared  charged  with  a  heavy  caseload,  in  particular  the  Specialised 
Prosecutor's Office.246  

If the Specialised Court and Prosecutor's Office have needed time to settle in their roles and begin to 
produce  results,  in  other  cases,  political  decisions  have  hampered  the  effective  functioning  of  long-
established institutions. One example of this was the decision in 2013 to transfer the functions of the 
organised crime directorate (GDBOB) from the Ministry of Interior to the State Agency for National 
Security (SANS), which led to several months of disruption in the investigation of organised crime.247 
The new entity was a hybrid between a criminal law enforcement authority and an intelligence agency, 

242  Article  58a  of  the  criminal  code  specifies  a  mandatory  1/3  reduction  of  the  sentence  under  the  plea 
bargaining procedure (based on the charges to which the defendant has confessed), which can be regarded as 
unjustified in some cases where serious offenders have not helped in the investigation but merely confessed 
to (parts of) the charges. On this background, the Prosecutor's Office has proposed that the degree of leniency 
could instead be adapted to each case by the court. See annual report of the prosecutor's office for 2015, p. 17 
(English translation).  

243  The report is available online:  http://www.vks.bg/Docs/analiz_spec_sud_2012-2015.pdf  
244  P. 81 
245  Here it should be noted that in a meeting with the Commission the leadership of the court said it disagreed 
with some of the findings of the analysis regarding low workload in the court, which they did not find took 
adequate  account  of  the  high  level  of  complexity  of  the  cases  concerned,  and  it  had  sent  comments  to  the 
Supreme Court of Cassation. 

246  SWD(2014) 36, p. 28. As mentioned above, legislative amendments in 2015 have partly addressed this issue. 
On the other hand, possible plans to transfer complex high-level corruption cases the Specialised Prosecution 
and Court could further add to the demands placed on these structures. It is notable that the SRSS-supported 
technical assistance project referred to in chapter 4 above also comes to the conclusion that the Specialised 
Prosecutor's Office is overburdened and need additional resources (see above).  

247  Moreover, as also mentioned in chapter 5 above, the new strengthened SANS was from the beginning tainted 
by  the  decision  of  the  then  government  to  appoint  a  controversial  member  of  parliament  as  its  director,  a 
decision which was quickly reversed amidst massive public protests in the streets of Sofia.  

44 

 
 
                                                            
with  functions  both  in  terms  of  covert  intelligence  operations  and  in  formal  criminal  investigations 
under  the  criminal  procedure  code.248  This  double  character,  together  with  the  purely  practical 
challenges linked to changes in personnel and files, led to concerns over international cooperation and 
the  effectiveness  of  criminal  investigations.249  Eventually,  under  a  new  government  in  2015,  it  was 
decided  to  move  the  functions  back  to  the  Ministry  of  Interior.  This  time  care  was  taken  to  avoid 
excessive disruption, by moving the files with the personnel into the new organisation.  Nevertheless, 
the  transfers  of  GDBOB  to  SANS  and  back  had  a  negative  impact  in  the  short  term  on  the 
investigation  of  organised  crime  cases.250  GDBOB  also  came  out  of  the  changes  as  a  greatly 
diminished  structure,  having  lost  a  large  part  of  its  personnel.251  Furthermore,  in  2015  the  GDBOB 
faced  a  number  of  challenges  linked  to  the  delimitation  of  its  competences  relative  to  other  police 
departments as set out in the Ministry of Interior Act.252  

The Commission for Illegal Asset Forfeiture (CIAF) constitutes the third core element in the system to 
fight organised crime in Bulgaria. The current organisation was formally set up in 2012 but was based 
on a pre-existing institution, established several years before Bulgaria's EU accession. The new legal 
framework  that  entered  into  force  in  2012  was  notable  for  the  introduction  of  a  procedure  for  non-
conviction based confiscation of illicit assets. The law was controversial at the time of its adoption in 
the National Assembly, and the eventual outcome included several last-minute changes compared to 
the original draft.253 Some of the changes have been recognised early on as producing challenges for 
the  effective  functioning  of  the  seizure  and  confiscation  of  illegal  assets.254  This  was  the  case  for 
example  with  the  monetary  threshold  for  the  initiation  of  proceedings,  which  is  very  high  for 
Bulgarian  standards.255  Others  have  more  recently  been  identified,  such  as  the  changes  which  were 
introduced  in  regard  to  the  basis  for  launching  proceedings:  where  the  original  draft  was  clear  that 
proceedings could be launched independently of any criminal procedure, the final outcome included a 
more complex formula according to which the launch of proceedings was in some cases linked to the 
launch  of  a  criminal  procedure.  This  led  courts  in  some  instances  to  conclude  that  if  the  original 
criminal charges upon which the proceedings were based were to be dropped, this would also lead to 
the  suspension  of  the  confiscation  proceedings.256  In  2015  the  CIAF  produced  a  set  of  concrete 

248  The  new  SANS  had  access  both  to  covert  means  of  intelligence  gathering  and  staff  with  criminal 

investigatory powers.  

249  A  possible  advantage  on  the  other  hand  was  to  shorten  the  lines  of  communication  between  criminal 

intelligence and law enforcement activities, now situated within one and the same agency. 

250  According  to  data  received  from  GDBOB,  the  number  of  pre-trial  investigations  under  Article  321  of  the 
penal code (organised crime) fell from 44 in 2012 to 16 in 2013 after which it increased to 29 in 2014 and 
further to 63 in 2015. However, the figures should be interpreted with caution. Towards the end of 2015 the 
Prosecutor's Office complained that most of the cases it received related to low-level criminal activities. This 
has  reportedly  improved  in  2016  where  there  has  also  been  a  further  significant  increase in  the  number  of 
pre-trial proceedings (124 until November). Source: Meeting with GDBOB in December 2016.  

251  Also, the change brought out some of the advantages that had come with the merger with SANS, chief among 
them  the  higher  salaries  that  went  with belonging  to  the national  security  agency.  The  Ministry of  Interior 
reported concerns over staff turnover and lower motivation after the change.  

252  SWD(2016) 15, p. 29. These challenges were addressed through legislative changes in 2016, see below. 
253  The original draft had been developed in line with recommendations of GRECO. 
254  SWD(2012) 232, p. 34-35. 
255  CIAF  shall  launch  proceedings  where  a  reasonable  presumption  exists  that  assets  have  been  acquired 
unlawfully, which is the case when there is a lack of correspondence between the assets and the net income 
of a person over the period under examination of more than  BGN 250,000 (Article 22 in conjunction with 
supplementary provision §1(7) of the law on illegal asset forfeiture). (BGN 1.0 equals EUR 0.5). 

256  CIAF has challenged this interpretation in a case which is currently before the Supreme Court of Cassation 
for an interpretative ruling, and appears to be confident that it will be successful. However, should it lose this 
case, there would be serious consequences in a number of similar cases, which reportedly make up about 20 
per cent of all cases under the CIAF. These are currently awaiting the ruling of the Supreme Court.  

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legislative amendments which would provide it with a more effective legal framework under which to 
perform its functions, which it presented for the consideration of the National Assembly.257  

7.2.   Developments since the last CVM report of January 2016  

The  January  2016  CVM  report  recommended  Bulgaria  to  monitor  the  progress  of  criminal  cases 
involving serious organised crime, to address the legal problems identified in regard to the competence 
and functioning of the organised crime directorate within the Ministry of Interior while providing the 
directorate with organisational stability to carry out its work, and amend the law on asset forfeiture to 
allow the asset forfeiture commission to work effectively.  

Progress on track record 

As  stated  above,  Bulgaria  is  beginning  to  build  a  track  record  with  regard  to  organised  crime.  The 
number of cases delivered by the main organised crime agencies (GDBOB/SANS) saw a dip following 
the reform in 2013 but this negative impact has recently been reversed and replaced by a more positive 
trend. Data from the Prosecutor's Office show a steady increase in the number of newly initiated pre-
trial proceedings on organised crime, a trend which has however not yet resulted in a similar increase 
in  the  number  of  convictions.258  As  noted  above  though,  a  large  number  of  cases  at  the  Specialised 
Court  are  settled  through  plea-bargaining,  which  is  not  reflected  in  these  figures.  In  addition,  the 
simple  numbers  are  not  necessarily  representative  in  terms  of  the  seriousness  of  the  offences 
concerned  or  the  finality  of  sentences.259  Overall,  the  picture  that  emerges  is  that  there  is  now  a 
number of final convictions also leading to long prison sentences, and more cases appear to be in the 
pipeline,  many  of  which  concern  serious  offences.260  At  the  same  time,  there  have  also  been  some 
surprising  failures.261  In  terms  of  operational  work,  as  noted  above,  GDBOB  continues  to  make 
progress in increasing the number of investigations into organised crime. The directorate appears to be 
improving its capacity for analysis as well as operational work. Cooperation with other Member States 
and  within  Europol  in  fighting  organised  crime  groups  for  example  engaged  in  drugs  and  cigarette 
smuggling is also considered satisfactory.  

When it comes to confiscation of illicit assets, CIAF has continued reporting significant successes in 
the seizure and confiscation of assets.262 While on the surface, this would appear to counter concerns 
that the new legal framework would weaken the effectiveness of CIAF, it is however important to note 
the temporary dip in the amounts confiscated in 2015, as well as the fact that a large amount in 2016 is 
linked  to  a  single  case.  In  addition,  some  uncertainty  remains  as  to  the  outcome  of  the  pending 

257  SWD(2016) 15, p. 31. 
258  The number of newly initiated pre-trial investigations has been rising gradually from 40 in the first half of 
2014 to 89 in the first half of 2016, whereas the number of convictions fell from 74 in the first half of 2014 to 
23 in the second half of 2015 before increasing again to 44 in the first half of 2016. Over the same period 
there has been a gradual decline in indictments being filed in court as well as what appears to be a temporary 
spike both in the number of cases returned by the court and in the number of acquittals in the second half of 
2015. (Source: Bulgarian Prosecutor's office, December 2016.) 

259  Just as corruption cases, organised crime cases have in the past been prone to reversals in appeal.  
260 Information provided by the Bulgarian prosecutor's office.  
261  For example a recent much publicised case involving 11  police officers arrested in 2011 for having run an 
organised  extortion  scheme  on  a  highway,  taking  bribes  in  return  for  not  fining  drivers,  in  which  the 
defendants were acquitted at the Specialised Court in November 2016. The prosecution considered this to be 
a solid case.  

262  Total  amounts  confiscated rose  steadily  from  BGN  7.5  million  in  2010,  over 9.4  million in 2011  and 12.4 
million in 2012, to 13 million in both 2013 and 2014. In 2015 the amounts fell to around BGN 6.4 million, 
but in 2016 the figure is likely to reach around 20 million. The latter is partly related to one single major case 
where the CIAF has filed claims for the forfeiture of a record BGN 2.2 billion. Source: Information provided 
by CIAF. (One BGN is equal to 0.5 euro.) 

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interpretative ruling of the Supreme Court of Cassation regarding cases where the criminal case used 
as the basis for initiation of proceedings is dropped.263  

Institutional developments  

In  October  2016  legislative  amendments  were  adopted  to  the  Ministry  of  Interior  law  to  address  a 
number of  challenges identified  in 2015 in connection to the legal framework, notably by clarifying 
the competences of GDBOB in relation to corruption, cybercrime and migrant smuggling, in line with 
the recommendations of the 2016 CVM report. On a more organisational level, the reduction in staff 
numbers and lack of equipment remain important challenges for GDBOB. However, the Ministry has 
had some success with project funding for training, equipment and vehicles.264 Also, additional staff 
has recently been assigned both at headquarters and in regional units along the borders. In regard to 
combatting  contraband,  a  specialised  centre  has  been  established  to  strengthen  cooperation  with 
Turkey and Greece.  

Draft amendments to the law on asset forfeiture have been submitted to the National Assembly where 
they have completed the second reading process in the legal affairs committee and are now awaiting 
the  plenary  vote.  The  draft  changes  would  significantly  improve  the  work  of  CIAF,  reducing  the 
threshold  for  investigations  from  BGN  250,000  to  BGN  150,000  and  introducing  a  de  minimis 
threshold which would reduce the number of small cases reported by the Prosecutor's Office, the initial 
verification of which is currently drawing scarce resources away from more important cases. The draft 
amendments  would  also  endow  CIAF  with  competence  to  take  evidence  from  private  individuals, 
allowing  it  to  work  independently  of  the  prosecutor's  office.265  CIAF  reports  that  it  has  well-
functioning  cooperation  agreements  with  all  counterparts  which  leave  almost  no  gaps  in  terms  of 
access to necessary information.266 The draft amendments will furthermore allow it to use information 
received from the tax authorities directly as evidence in its investigations. Finally, the draft provides 
for  30  per  cent  of  revenues  from  confiscated  assets  to  be  allocated  to  social  purposes.  Due  to  the 
changes in the parliamentary situation at the end of 2016 the final outcome with regard to these draft 
amendments remains uncertain.   

263  Proceedings are still ongoing.  
264  The projects are supposed to address needs such as cars for operative work, equipment to analyse data from 

mobile phones, as well as IT and communications equipment, and amount to several million euro.  

265  Currently it relies on joint teams for such interrogations, but the new law would allow more independence for 
CIAF. The draft amendments will however stop short of granting it more intrusive investigatory powers such 
as search and seizure.  

266  One of the more recent developments will be the setting up of a centralised register of bank accounts at the 
Bulgarian National Bank to which CIAF will have direct access, which is expected to greatly facilitate the 
process of gaining access to bank account data in connection with investigations.  

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