REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the evaluation of the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) in accordance with art. 24 (5), 43 (3) and 50 (5) of Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 and art. 59 (3) and 66 (5) of Decision 2007/533/JHA
Date: 2016-12-21
Institutions: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: EU police cooperation, European security, Schengen Information System, border control, data protection, exchange of information, illegal migration, information storage and retrieval, information technology, personal data

EN 

   EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 21.12.2016  COM(2016) 880 final   REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the evaluation of the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) in accordance with art. 24 (5), 43 (3) and 50 (5) of Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 and art. 59 (3) and 66 (5) of Decision 2007/533/JHA  {SWD(2016) 450 final}  
 
 
REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND  
THE COUNCIL  

on the evaluation of the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) in 
accordance with articles 24 (5), 43 (3) and 50 (5) of Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 and 
Articles 59 (3) and 66 (5) of Decision 2007/533/JHA 

1.    

INTRODUCTION 

1.1   THE  SCHENGEN  INFORMATION  SYSTEM  AND  ITS  ROLE  IN  FACILITATING  THE 

EXCHANGE OF DATA BETWEEN MEMBER STATES 

The  Schengen  Information  System  (SIS)  is  a  centralised,  large-scale  information  system 
supporting  checks  on  persons  and  objects  (such  as  travel  documents  and  vehicles)  at  the 
external  Schengen  borders  and  reinforcing  law  enforcement  and  judicial  cooperation  within 
29 countries throughout Europe. 

SIS was established in 1995, in the six signatory Member States of the Schengen Agreement, 
as  the  major  compensatory  measure  following  the  abolition  of  internal  border  controls,  in 
accordance with  the Convention Implementing  the Schengen Agreement.1 In the absence of 
such  controls,  Member  States  had  to  address  the  issues  of  cross-border  crime  and  irregular 
migration.  In  order  to  maintain  a  high  level  of  security,  Member  States  had  to  move  away 
from the traditional concept of bilateral agreements and legal assistance and establish a tailor-
made solution to locate: 

  Third-country nationals not allowed to enter the Schengen area. 
  Persons to be arrested for extradition or surrender. 
  Missing persons, in particular children. 
  Persons and certain objects for discreet or specific checks (travelling serious criminals 

and threats to national security). 

  Persons to assist with a judicial procedure. 
  Certain categories of lost or stolen objects for seizure or use as evidence. 

As  a  consequence,  SIS  was  established,  storing  alerts  on  wanted  persons  and  objects.  It  is 
directly  accessible  to  the  relevant  competent  authorities  (see  section  1.3)  in  the  Member 
States,  for  carrying  out  checks  and  creating  alerts.  It  includes  instructions  on  the  specific 
action  to  be  taken  when  the  person  or  object  is  located,  e.g.  to  arrest  a  person,  protect  a 
vulnerable missing person or to seize an object, such as an invalid passport or stolen car. SIS 
underwent  different  evolutions  throughout  the  years.  The  main  ones,  i.e.  SIS  1+  and 
SISone4all,  allowed  the  connection  of  new  countries  joining  the  Schengen  area  as  well  as 
enhanced technical performance. 

1   Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Government of the States of 
the  Benelux  Economic  Union,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  and  the  French  Republic  on  the  gradual 
abolition of checks at their common borders - 19 June 1990. 

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1.2   THE SECOND GENERATION OF SIS 
The  second  generation  of  the  system  (SIS  II)  entered  into  operation  on  9 April  2013.2  The 
operation  and  use  of  SIS  is  established  in  two  major  legal  instruments:  Regulation  (EC) 
No 1987/20063 relates to the use of SIS in checks on third-country nationals who do not fulfil 
the  conditions  for  entry  or  stay  in  the  Schengen  area  and  Council  Decision  2007/533/JHA4 
relates to the use of SIS for police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. 

In addition to the original features, SIS II now provides new functions and object categories: 

  New  categories  of  object  alerts:  stolen  aircraft,  boats,  boat  engines,  containers, 

industrial equipment, securities and means of payment. 

  The  ability  to  conduct  queries  in  the  central  system,  as  opposed  to  the  previous 

practice of all queries being carried out in a national copy of the data. 

  The possibility of linking alerts on persons and objects (e.g. alerts on a wanted person 

and the stolen vehicle he is using). 

  Biometric data (fingerprints and photographs) to confirm the identity of a person. 
  A copy of the European Arrest Warrant attached directly to alerts for persons wanted 

 

for arrest for surrender or extradition. 
Information on misused identity preventing the misidentification of the innocent party 
in identity fraud. 

Since May 2013, eu-LISA5 has been responsible for the operational management of Central 
SIS II, while Member States are responsible for the operational management of their national 
systems. 

1.3   ACCESS TO SIS II ALERTS 

Access  to  SIS  II  alerts  is  limited  to  the  authorities  responsible  for  border  control  and  other 
police and customs checks carried out at the external borders of the Schengen area or within 
the relevant Member State. National judicial authorities and their coordinating authorities may 
also access this data. 

SIS  II  alerts  for  refusal  of  entry  or  stay  and  blank  or  issued  identity  documents  may  be 
accessed by the authorities responsible for issuing visas and examining visa applications and 
those responsible for issuing residence permits and administering legislation relating to third-
country nationals relating to EU acquis on the free movement of persons.  A further access to 

2   The Council decided in 2001 on a second generation of the Schengen Information System which entered into 
operations only on 9 April 2013 for reasons set out in the Court of Auditors report of 19 May 2014 on lessons 
from the European Commission's development of the second generation Schengen Information  system (SIS II) 
(http://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR14_03/SR14_03_EN.pdf. 

3   Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on the 
establishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) (OJ L 381, 
28.12.2006, p. 4). 

4   Council  Decision  2007/533/JHA  of  12 June  2007  on  the  establishment,  operation  and  use  of  the  second 

generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) (OJ L 205, 7.8.2007, p. 63). 

5   European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security 

and justice (eu-LISA). 

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SIS II for administrative purposes is granted to the vehicle registration authorities6, who can 
only access alerts on stolen vehicles, number plates and vehicle registration documents.  

Member States must justify an authority’s access to the data in SIS. They annually provide a 
list  of  the  authorities  and  the  categories  of  alert  to  which  they  have  access  to  eu-LISA  for 
publication  as  required by  the  legal  instruments.  According  to  estimates,  there  are currently 
about two million end-users in Member States operating SIS II. 

EUROPOL and EUROJUST have access to certain alert  categories in SIS II reflecting their 
responsibilities. 

1.4   TERRITORIAL SCOPE OF SIS II 

Although  SIS  II  is  currently  in  operation  in  29 Schengen  countries,  its  territorial  scope  of 
application  varies,  as  not  all  Member  States  participating  in  SIS  fully  apply  the  Schengen 
acquis (the collection of Schengen legislation). 26 countries fully apply the Schengen acquis 
and use SIS II for all purposes set out in the Regulation and Decision: 

  22  EU  Member  States:  Belgium,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Germany,  Estonia, 
Greece,  Spain,  France,  Italy,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Luxemburg,  Hungary,  Malta, 
Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden; 

  4  non-EU  Schengen  Associated  Countries:  Iceland,  Liechtenstein,  Norway  and 

Switzerland. 

Bulgaria and Romania currently do not yet fully apply the Schengen acquis but they operate 
SIS II for law enforcement cooperation. They will use SIS for external border control as soon 
as the decision on lifting internal border checks has entered into effect. 

Cyprus  and  Croatia  do  not  yet  fully  apply  the  Schengen  acquis  and  it  has  not  yet  been 
verified that the necessary conditions for the application of all parts of the acquis have been 
met. They are currently carrying out preparatory activities to integrate into SIS. 

Due  to  its  partial  participation  in  the  Schengen  acquis,  the  United  Kingdom  operates  SIS  II 
only within the scope of law enforcement cooperation.  Ireland is preparing to integrate into 
SIS II for the purpose of law enforcement cooperation. 

1.5   HOW THE MEMBER STATES OPERATE SIS II 

In  order  to  search  the  data,  Member  States,  depending  on  their  technical  implementation  of 
SIS II at national level, can carry out queries in either the Central SIS, in their national copy, 
or  in  both.  SIS  II  is  generally  available  to  its  end-users  via  their  national  systems.  For 
example, law enforcement or border control authorities within a Member State will search for 
a wanted person or object in the relevant national databases, and in parallel, also in SIS II. In 
most Member States, this takes place through a single search interface. This integration into 
the daily working lives of end-users results in the very high use of SIS II7. This has brought 
about considerable operational success across the territories of the Member States connected 
to SIS II8, all on the simple basis of making information available across national borders. 

6   Regulation  (EC)  No 1986/2006  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  20 December  2006 
regarding  access  to  the  second  generation  Schengen  Information  System  (SIS  II)  by  the  services  in  the 
Member States responsible for issuing vehicle registration certificates (OJ L 381, 28.12.2006, p.1). 

7   Section 7.2 Commission Staff Working Document. 
8   Section 7.3 Commission Staff Working Document. 

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The data on persons stored in SIS II is that which is necessary to locate a person and confirm 
his/her  identity  (now  including  a  photo  and  fingerprints  where  available)  as  well  as  other 
relevant information about the alert (including the action to be taken). As soon as it becomes 
technically possible, fingerprints may also be used to establish the identity of a person on the 
basis of the biometric identifier (in the first instance, fingerprints) instead of the current use 
merely to  confirm an identity. A project to introduce an automated fingerprint identification 
system (AFIS) to Central SIS II is in progress to facilitate this. 

2.  

EVALUATION OBJECTIVES 

In  accordance  with  Regulation  (EC)  No 1987/20069  and  Council  Decision  2007/533/JHA10 
three  years  after  SIS  II  was  brought  into  operation  on  9 April  2013,  the  Commission  has 
produced  a  wide-ranging  overall  evaluation  in  line  with  the  following  objectives  for  each 
subject area.   

2.1   ARTICLE  50  (5)  OF  REGULATION  (EC)  NO 1987/2006  AND  ARTICLE  66  (5)  OF 

COUNCIL DECISION 2007/533/JHA) 

The evaluation targets Central SIS II; the bilateral and multilateral exchange of supplementary 
information  between  Member  States;  an  examination  of  results  achieved  against  objectives; 
an  assessment  of  the  continuing  validity  of  the  underlying  rationale;  evaluation  of  the 
application of this Decision/Regulation in respect of the Central SIS II; the security of Central 
SIS II and implications for future operations. 

2.2   ARTICLE  24  (5)  OF  REGULATION  (EC)  NO 1987/2006  (ALERTS  ON  REFUSAL  OF 

ENTRY OR STAY) 

The  evaluation  targets  the  review  of  the  application  of  this  Article;  making  necessary 
proposals to modify the provisions of this Article to achieve a greater level of harmonisation 
of the criteria for entering alerts. 

2.3   ARTICLE  43  OF  REGULATION  (EC)  NO 1987/2006  AND  ARTICLE  59  OF  COUNCIL 

DECISION 2007/533/JHA (REMEDIES) 

The evaluation targets the collation and review of the provisions in each Member State on: (a) 
a person’s ability to bring an action before the courts or the authority competent under the law 
of  any  Member  State  to  access,  correct,  delete  or  obtain  information  or  to  obtain 
compensation in connection with an alert relating to him, and (b) the mutual enforcement of 
decisions in other Member States. 

3.  

THE EVALUATION PROCESS 

DG HOME carried out the evaluation internally via statistical reports, studies, questionnaires, 
interviews as well as in dedicated meetings and workshops.  

In addition to the statistics needed for public reporting, eu-LISA collects statistics on the use 
of  SIS  II  and  the  performance  of  the  system  itself.  Member  States  collect  statistics  on  the 

9   Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on the 

establishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II). 

10  Council  Decision  2007/533/JHA  of  12 June  2007  on  the  establishment,  operation  and  use  of  the  second 

generation Schengen Information System (SIS II). 

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exchange  of  supplementary  information  and  hits  on  alerts.  SIS  II  was  designed  legally  and 
technically from the outset to provide statistics on its use and effectiveness. 

On the technical and operational management aspects of SIS II, the report described in Article 
66(4)  of  the  SIS  II  Decision  and  provided  by  eu-LISA  was  incorporated  into  the  overall 
evaluation11. This report describes the technical functioning of Central SIS II and the network, 
including  the  security  thereof,  from  the  entry  into  operation  on  9 April  2013  until 
31 December 2014. Looking to the future, to identify solutions for a range of technical issues 
raised by the Member States, the Commission initiated a study12 on possible improvements to 
the SIS II architecture in order to seek cost efficiencies, improve business continuity, handle 
increased  use  of  the  system  and  the  different  types  of  transactions  that  will  be  needed, 
especially fingerprints. 

The security of Central SIS II was assessed through incorporation of the eu-LISA report on 
Central SIS II and relevant sections from the 2014 European Data Protection Supervisor audit 
of Central SIS13. 

The evaluation continued with open questions on the technical and operational aspects of the 
SIS  II.  The  questions  covered  operational  and  legal  issues  but  the  responses  were  also 
assessed and presented in terms of the five key evaluation criteria: effectiveness, efficiency, 
coherence, relevance and EU added-value.   

In  order to collect  data to  help evaluate  the use of alerts  on refusal of entry or  stay and the 
consultation  procedures,  a  series  of  questions  was  addressed  to  the  Member  States  via  the 
Commission-chaired European Migration Network.   

The sections on bilateral and multilateral exchange of information, the examination of results 
and  implications  for  future  operations  and  the  assessment  of  the  continuing  validity  of  the 
underlying  rationale  were  completed  using  statistical  analysis,  questionnaires  to  key 
stakeholders and discussion at face-to-face meetings with the national police authorities. 

The  section  on  remedies  contains  the  key  points  of  the  report  provided  by  the  SIS  II 
Supervision Coordination Group and the information gleaned from a targeted questionnaire. 
Detailed questions on specific areas were forwarded to the national contact points. 

The  extensive  evaluation  evidence  was  summarised  in  a  Commission  Staff  Working 
Document.  This  report  contains  references  throughout  to  the  more  detailed  information 
contained within the Staff Working Document. 

4.  

FINDINGS OF THE EVALUATION   

4.1  

INTRODUCTION TO THE KEY FINDINGS 

SIS  II  is  an  operational  system  which  cannot  remain  static  and  has  demonstrated  obvious 
success against a background of evolving and complex issues. Accordingly, the evaluation not 

11  eu-LISA’s technical report on the functioning of Central SIS II 

http://www.eulisa.europa.eu/Publications/Reports/SIS%20II%20Technical%20Report%202015.pdf 

12  European Commission FINAL REPORT — ICT Impact Assessment of Possible Improvements to the SIS II 

Architecture 2016. 

13  Report  on  inspection  pursuant  Article  47(2)  of  Regulation  (EC)  N.  45/2001  on  the  Schengen  Information 
System  II  (SIS  II)  managed  by  the  EU  Agency  for  large-scale  IT  systems  (eu-LISA)  case  reference:  2014-
0953.  

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only examined existing performance but also looked to the future to propose major evolutions 
in  technology,  managing  workload,  protecting  individual  rights  and  achieving  better 
operational outcomes. 

Notwithstanding  the  considerable  success  and  EU  added-value  achieved  through  the  use  of 
SIS  II  and  its  ongoing  relevance  to  the  serious  security  and  migration  challenges  faced  by 
Europe,  the Commission  has  identified certain points to  be addressed. The numerous points 
range  from  technical  detail  to  potential  changes  to  the  legal  instruments  and  therefore  this 
document will provide a broad overview.   

4.2   HAS SIS II ACHIEVED ITS OBJECTIVES IN BRINGING EU ADDED VALUE? 

4.2.1   Outcomes concerning the use of SIS II 

This section gives an overview of the results achieved through the Member States’ use of SIS 
II and subsequent cooperation via the SIRENE Bureaux since the entry into operations. This 
sheer  volume  of  positive  outcomes  could  simply  not  have  been  envisaged  through  bilateral 
cooperation. The competent authorities checked persons and objects against data held in SIS 
II  on  nearly  2.9  billion  occasions  in  2015  alone.  At  present,  the  system  contains  over  69 
million alerts. In order to create, update or delete alerts on persons or objects or to extend the 
lifetime of an alert, a further 20.7 million transactions took place in 2015. 

A ‘hit’ in SIS II means that the person or object has been found in another Member State and 
further action, specified in the alert, is requested. Between the entry into operation of SIS II 
on 9 April 2013 and the end of 2015 over 371 000 hits were achieved (an average of over 370 
hits per day). 

This equates to: 

  Over 25 000 people arrested to face justice in another Member State. 
  Over 79 000 people refused entry or stay in the Schengen area (having already been 

subject of a decision on refusal of entry or stay). 

  Over  12 000  missing  persons  found  having  crossed  a  border  into  another  Member 

State. 

  Over 83 000 people traced to assist with a criminal judicial procedure. Where the alert 
has  been  created  by  the  police  on  behalf  of  the  judicial  authorities,  following  a  hit, 
there is an ongoing issue of the alert not being deleted in a timely fashion. 

  Over  72 000  travelling  serious  criminals  and  other  people  posing  threats  to  security 

located. 

  Over  97 000  cases  solved  concerning  stolen  motor  vehicles,  misuse  of  identity  or 
travel  documents,  stolen  firearms,  stolen  number  plates  and  other  lost  or  stolen 
property.  However,  low  levels  of  success  were  noted  in  the  categories  banknotes, 
securities and means of payment, despite a high number of alerts. 

Furthermore, all the alert categories described above have seen steady increases in hits. In the 
single year 2014-15 SIS end-users achieved: 

  27 % increase in arrests for extradition or surrender. 
  18 % increase in locating people for refusal of entry or stay in the Schengen area. 
  44 % increase in finding missing persons. 
  10 % increase in tracing people to assist with a criminal judicial procedure. 

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  43 %  increase  in  locating  travelling  serious  criminals  and  people  posing  threats  to 

security. 

  18 % increase in solving cases concerning stolen motor vehicles, misuse of identity or 
travel  documents,  stolen  firearms,  stolen  number  plates  and  other  lost  or  stolen 
property14. 

4.2.2   The SIRENE Bureaux 

Amongst all forms of European law enforcement cooperation, communication related to SIS 
II alerts is by far the largest. SIS II stores sufficient data for front-line officers to identify a 
person or an object when he/she achieves a ‘hit’ on an alert. There is, however, another need 
for Member States to consult each other about the circumstances of the specific case and this 
communication is carried out by the SIRENE Bureaux15. Every country that operates SIS II 
has  a  SIRENE  Bureau,  established  as  a  single  national  contact  point  for  communication  on 
SIS  II  alerts.  These  SIRENE  Bureaux  provide  any  necessary  supplementary  information  on 
alerts and coordinate activities in relation to the alerts; generally through the use of structured 
electronic  ‘forms’,  using  strictly  regulated  procedures  and  a  secure,  dedicated  computer 
network.  

In  2015,  just  over  1.8  million  forms  were  sent  or  received  by  the  SIRENE  Bureaux16,  an 
increase  of  27 %  from  2014.  SIRENE  Bureaux  are  also  responsible  for  data  quality  and 
coordination of cross-border operations. 

The SIRENE Bureaux are at the very heart of SIS operation and play a key role in effective 
information  exchange.  Their  effectiveness  is  increased  by  ongoing  training  programmes  at 
national  and  European  levels.  The  operation  of  the  SIRENE  Bureaux  serves  as  a  model  for 
other law enforcement communication channels. 

Appropriate  staffing  levels  and  sufficient  technical  support  are  necessary  to  enable  the 
SIRENE  Bureaux  to  effectively  carry  out  the  bilateral  and  multilateral  exchange  of 
supplementary information between Member States, to communicate on hits and to handle the 
necessary procedures within the legal time-limit required (normally 12 hours, however in the 
case  of  discreet  and  specific  check  alerts  requiring  immediate  reporting,  this  must  be  done 
immediately). The evaluation noted a significant increase in the exchange of forms, due to a 
rise in hits and the extensive use of discreet and specific check alerts, especially with respect 
to terrorism-related activities. Whilst the number of exchanged forms substantially increased 
in 2015, staffing levels at SIRENE Bureaux remained unchanged. This forced certain Member 
States to prioritise their work and disregard the mandatory 12-hour response time, which has 
brought several SIRENE Bureaux to the limits of efficient operation17. 

4.2.3   Conclusion 

Subject to further detailed work with the Member States on refining the use of some alerts on 
objects where there is either little usage or little success, or where deletion of the alert is not 
carried  out  in  a  timely  manner,  the  Commission's  overall  conclusion  is  that  the  underlying 
rationale for SIS continues to be valid. There is very strong evidence of the achievement of 
results (hits) against stated objectives (alerts).  

14  Section 7 Commission Staff Working Document. 
15  SIRENE stands for Supplementary Information Request at the National Entry. 
16  Information can be sent bilaterally or multilaterally. As each SIRENE ‘form’ represents a task for both sender 

and recipient, when measuring workload both forms sent and received are counted. 

17  Sections 12.2; 17.4 Commission Staff Working Document. 

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SIS II constitutes significant EU added value, as cross-border law enforcement cooperation in 
such  high  volumes  could  not  take  place  without  this  database.  No  other  law  enforcement 
cooperation system generates as many positive outcomes or can handle as much information 
flow in real time with the result that, year on year, in all alert categories, hits have increased. 

4.3   HAS  SIS  II  ACHIEVED  ITS  OBJECTIVES  IN  AN  EFFECTIVE  WAY  AND  CAN  IT  MEET 

NEW CHALLENGES?  

The  underlying  principle  of  SIS  II  is  that  information  is  made  available  to  end-users,  with 
clear  instructions  on  what  to  do  and  where  to  go  for  round-the-clock  support  (SIRENE 
Bureaux). The Commission’s view is that the concept is highly effective.   

In  order to maintain  this level  of effectiveness the Commission has identified both  strategic 
and  detailed  findings  requiring  attention  and  improvement  in  technical,  organisational  and 
operational  spheres.  For  the  purposes  of  this  report  and  to  maintain  conciseness,  these 
findings are summarised under generic themes. 

4.3.1   SIS  II  must  remain  a  flexible  system,  capable  of  swiftly  addressing  new 

operational phenomena 

The SIS II legal instruments set the framework requirements for SIS II and  the principles of 
its operation;  the  detailed procedures, however, are laid down in  implementing  rules18. This 
provides  a  flexible  framework  which  has  already  allowed  effective  legal  and  technical 
interventions  to  enhance  information  exchange,  in  particular  on  travelling  terrorist  suspects 
and sexual offenders. Complexity emerges, however, in the change management process, as 
technical  changes  must  often  also  be  integrated  into  the  national  law  enforcement  or 
immigration systems. 

In conclusion, although the very swift implementation of changes related to terrorism was a 
considerable  success,  it  is  clear  that,  for  future  changes,  technical,  financial  and  contractual 
resources  must  be  made  available  at  central  and  national  levels  to  be  able  to  handle  the 
process in a more rapid and effective manner19. 

4.3.2   Business continuity must be further improved 

The  technical  architecture  of  SIS  II  gives  flexibility  to  Member  States  to  have  their  own 
national copy or to use Central SIS II20 for queries. Five Member States, not having national 
copies,  face  the  serious  risk  that  if  the  network  connection  breaks  down  or  Central  SIS  II 
becomes unavailable, they do not have a fall-back option and so access to SIS II alerts would 
be completely interrupted. Member States with a national copy should also ensure appropriate 
business  continuity  solutions,  either  by  having  a  back-up  system  or  by  allowing  their  end-
users to search Central SIS II directly.  

In conclusion, business continuity must be ensured at central level and downtime of Central 
SIS II should be avoided. Technical solutions will be explored to decrease the switchover time 

18  Such  as  the  Commission  Implementing  Decision  (EU)  2016/1209  of  12 July  2016  replacing  the  Annex  to 
Implementing  Decision  2013/115/EU  on  the  SIRENE  Manual  and  other  implementing  measures  for  the 
second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) (notified under document C(2016) 4283) (OJ L 201, 
28.07.2016, p.35) and in technical documentation (Detailed Technical Specifications and the Interface Control 
Document). 

19  Section 6.2.1 Commission Staff Working Document. 
20  CS-SIS is the technical support function containing the Central SIS II database. 

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between  Central  SIS  II  and  its  back-up  site  as  the  current  technical  possibilities  and 
procedures are not considered to meet the expected standards on system availability.21 

4.3.3   SIS  II  is  not  always  queried  automatically  when  the  national  system  is  queried 

but an additional transaction by the end-user is required 

Even though SIS II was accessed by the competent authorities 2.9 billion times in 2015, one 
billion times more than in 2014, the use is uneven. Annual statistics show that certain Member 
States  and  Member  States’  authorities  do  not  query  SIS  II  systematically  when  they  query 
their  national  police  or  immigration  databases,  which  means  that  they  need  to  search  SIS 
separately with an additional transaction which does not always happen. 

In conclusion, taking into account that crime has gained an increasingly European dimension, 
Member  States  must  ensure  that  every  time  they  check  their  national  databases  they  also 
include a parallel check in SIS II22. The Commission will ensure that the Schengen evaluation 
mechanism focuses on this issue. 

4.3.4   Checking SIS II at the external borders 
The Schengen Borders Code23 imposes an obligation to verify, in particular by consulting SIS 
II,  that  third-country  nationals  entering  the  Schengen  area  ‘are  not  likely  to  jeopardise  the 
public policy, internal security, public health or international relations of any of the Member 
States’24.  In  some  Member  States  border  guards  do  not  check  the  travel  documents  of  all 
third-country  nationals  against  the  databases  at  airports.  In  some  Member  States  it  was 
observed  that  the  border  guards  did  not  check  all  third-country  nationals  systematically  but 
employed  risk  assessments.  Only  the  checks  against  SIS  II  of  EU  citizens  entering  the  EU 
should  be  based  on  a  risk  assessment.25  26  27.  In  other  cases  technical  failures  of  the 
applications used by border guards can lead to the non-satisfactory checks in SIS II. 

In  conclusion,  Member  States  must  sufficiently  check  SIS  II  at  the  external  borders  in  line 
with  legal  expectations.  The  Commission  will  ensure  that  the  Schengen  evaluation 
mechanism focuses on this issue. 

4.3.5  New  categories  of  alert  or  the  new  functionalities  (fingerprints,  photographs, 
          European  Arrest  Warrant,  links,  misused  identity  extension)  are  not  fully 
          implemented  and  displayed  to  the  end-users,  contrary  to  the  SIS  II  legal 
          instruments28 

This shortcoming diminishes the effectiveness of the system since the end-users are not able 
to  establish  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case  and  might  even  miss  essential  information. 

21  Section 6.2.1 Commission Staff Working Document. 
22  Section 6.2 Commission Staff Working Document. 
23  Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code 
on  the  rules  governing  the  movement  of  persons  across  borders  (Schengen  Borders  Code)  (OJ  L  77, 
23.3.2016, p. 1). 

24  Article 8 (3) (a) (vi) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399. 
25  According to the currently applicable provisions of the Schengen Borders Code [Article 8 (2)]. 
26  The  Commission  nevertheless  adopted  on  15 December  2015  a  proposal  as  regards  the  reinforcement  of 
checks  against  relevant  databases  at  external  borders.  This  proposal  provides  in  particular  for  a  systematic 
check of individuals enjoying the right of free movement against the SIS II (COM(2015) 670 final). 

27  Sections 15.1 and 16.1 of Commission Staff Working Document. 
28  Parallel Articles 3 (a) and (c) read in conjunction with Articles 20 (3) of Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 and 

Council Decision 2007/533/JHA. 

10 

 
 
 
                                                 
Officers lose time by having to contact the SIRENE Bureau for the missing information. In 
many cases they do not have the right to detain the person subject to the alert and yet cannot 
properly  identify  him/her.  Some  Member  States  cannot  add  photographs  and  fingerprints  to 
their alerts29. 

In addition, given the rise in the use of false identities, in order to be able to move from the 
current  situation  where  fingerprints  are  only  used  to  confirm  the  identity  of  a  person,  to  a 
situation  where  the  identity  of  a  person  can  be  revealed  solely  from  his  fingerprints,  the 
planned automated fingerprint identification functionality should be added to SIS II with all 
due speed30. 

In  conclusion,  the  Commission  will  put  forward  a  proposal  to  ensure  that  all  appropriate 
functionalities are made available to the end-users. 

4.3.6   Poor data quality is a major issue for the use of SIS II  

When  creating  alerts,  Member  States  sometimes  enter  incorrect  or  incomplete  data  (for 
instance, an incomplete name or a name instead of a document number). The consequence of 
entering low quality data is that queries performed in the system may not locate the person or 
object or the person cannot be properly identified on the basis of such data. According to the 
SIS II legal instruments, Member States are responsible for data quality31. Member States are 
therefore  required  to  establish  an  effective  mechanism  at  national  level  for  data  quality 
controls but they have not all yet done so.   

The Commission will also seek to formalise the role of eu-LISA in highlighting common data 
quality problems. 

4.3.7   Many  Member  States  have  not  implemented  all  search  combinations  provided 

in Central SIS II 

Many Member States use ‘exact match’ queries (no fuzzy or partial query). Sometimes, this is 
due to national data protection legislation which requires Member States to always enter first 
name,  surname  and  date  of  birth  to  carry  out  a  query  on  a  person.  (This  is  the  case  in  two 
Member  States).  Therefore,  some  Member  States  are  not  able  to  find  alerts  where  the  first 
name or the date of birth is missing or incomplete. A similar problem applies to some queries 
for objects. In one Member State, end-users can only query on objects with exact parameters. 
This means that they will miss alerts where the recovered object’s identification number is not 
clear or attempts have been made to obliterate it32. 

The Commission will also put forward a proposal to ensure that the full query tool capability 
of Central SIS II is replicated at the national level. 

4.3.8   In certain Member States end-users cannot use SIS II to its full capacity 

This situation can occur when one or more of the following criteria are missing: 

  clear instruction for end-users on their screen on the action to be taken; 
  mandatory post-hit procedures, including the reporting of hits, and 

29  Section 16.1 Commission Staff Working Document. 
30  Section 6.1; 6.2.1; 6.2.2; 13.1; 14.1 Commission Staff Working Document. 
31  Article 34 (1) of Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 and Article 49 (1) of Council Decision 2007/533/JHA. 
32  Section 16 Commission Staff Working Document. 

11 

 
 
 
                                                 
  sufficient training on the use of the system33. 

In conclusion, the Commission will ensure that the Schengen evaluation mechanism focuses 
on the implementation of appropriate instructions, procedures and training. 

4.3.9   Limitations to the effectiveness of SIS II in combatting illegal immigration 

Alerts  for  the  refusal  of  entry  or  stay  are  issued  for  third-country  nationals  who  are  not 
allowed  to  enter  or  stay  in  the  Schengen  area  following  a  decision  by  a  competent  national 
court or authority. The evaluation demonstrated that there are situations in which a  Member 
State  may  decide to  grant  a  person the  right  to  enter  into  or  stay  on  its territory  despite the 
existence of a refusal of entry alert issued by another Member State, and even where no legal 
exception applies. As a consequence, the EU-wide effect of such alerts is not systematically 
achieved.  In  addition, Member  States  reported  shortcomings  in  the  processes  and  quality  of 
information-exchange  concerning  these  alerts,  especially  in  the  context  of  the  related 
consultation procedure34.  

It  is  clear  that  both  the  lack  of  harmonisation  in  consultation  and  tardy  responses  cause 
operational staff and the individual concerned considerable problems. 

The  evaluation  highlighted  that  under  this  alert  category,  the  overall  number  of  cases  when 
the requested action cannot be taken, i.e. to refuse the entry or stay, is the highest amongst all 
alert categories in SIS II35. SIS II is effectively ‘identifying and finding’ the alert subjects but 
the  different  and  often  confusing  interpretations  of  the  legal  provisions  on  entry  bans  and 
residence  permits  undermine  its  efficiency  and  effectiveness  at  EU  level,  resulting  in 
incoherence. 

In conclusion, the Commission will put forward proposals on the harmonisation of procedures 
related to alerts for refusal of entry or stay. 

4.3.10  The  rules  on  data  protection  in  the  legal  base  need  to  be  reviewed  in  order  to 

reflect recent EU data protection reform36 

At the level of implementation, the evaluation shows that effective mechanisms are in place in 
Member States for the data subjects to access, correct, delete their personal data in SIS II or 
obtain  compensation  in  connection  with  inaccurate  data.  However,  there  is  a  lack  of 
standardised  information  regarding  remedies  at  national  level.  Although  the  procedures  to 
obtain remedies can include the activities of the data controller and the supervisory authority 
it especially pertains to the courts, where it is difficult to obtain information on the number of 
requests for recourse.  

Other areas to be improved include procedures and documentation related to data security - in 
line  with  recommendations  from  the  audit  carried  out  by  the  European  Data  Protection 

33  Section 17.3 Commission Staff Working Document. 
34  Pursuant to Article 25 (2) of Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006, where there is a hit for refusal of entry or stay on 
a  third-country  national  who  is  beneficiary  of  the  right  of  free  movement,  the  Member  State  executing  the 
alert should consult immediately the issuing member State through its SIRENE Bureau in order to decide on 
the action to be taken. 

35  Section 7.2 of the Commission Staff Working Document.  
36  (Regulation  (EU)  2016/679  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  27 April  2016  and  Directive 

(EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016). 

12 

 
 
 
                                                 
Supervisor  -  and  data  quality,  including  measures  at  the  level  of  Central  SIS  II  and 
harmonisation of national practices.37 

Moreover, the wording of the legal instruments will be reviewed so that it reflects the new EU 
data  protection  legislative  framework38.  The  Commission  will  propose  amendments  to  the 
legal instrument to require the development of a standardised annual statistics package. This 
will  allow  consistent  reporting  on  activities  on  remedies  at  national  level,  including  the 
activities  of  the  data  controller,  the  supervisory  authority  and  the  courts.  Additionally,  the 
Commission will scrutinise eu-LISA’s response to its security audit. 

4.3.11  Security of Central SIS II is provided effectively39 

The Commission asked eu-LISA to provide a detailed breakdown of the most critical network 
incidents  affecting  SIS  II  availability  since  its  entry  into  operation.  It  was  shown  that  there 
have been no incidents where data at the central level were at risk of compromise. 

In  conclusion,  subject  to  detailed  procedural  findings  in  the  security  audit,  the  overall 
conclusion on the security of Central SIS II is that it is highly effective. 

4.4  

IS SIS II COHERENT WITH OTHER PIECES OF RELEVANT EU LEGISLATION?  

SIS  II  can  only  be  effective  if  it  works  in  synergy  with  all  instruments  supporting  law 
enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. In this field three main issues have 
emerged: 

4.4.1   European Arrest Warrant (EAW) Framework Decision40 

When  the  whereabouts  of  a  person  wanted  for  extradition  are  known,  the  European  Arrest 
Warrant (EAW) Framework Decision permits direct transmission of the warrant between the 
relevant  judicial  authorities.  However,  some  judicial  authorities  insist  on  the  creation  of  an 
alert in SIS II, with the verification and validation processes to be carried out by all SIRENE 
Bureaux; this must be viewed as unnecessary and inefficient work. 

The SIRENE Bureaux are also involved in the surrender or extradition procedure. Throughout 
the procedure, close cooperation between the judicial authorities and the SIRENE Bureau is 
needed to align the legal and the operational aspects of the issue and execution of the EAW. 
The  mandatory  and  optional  grounds  for  the  non-recognition  of  an  EAW  and  the  flagging 
procedure concerning the alerts should also be further harmonised41. 

In conclusion, together with other matters related to the EAW, the Commission will raise with 
the Member States: 

37  Annex 1 Number 108 Commission Staff Working Document. 
38  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection 
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1) and Directive 
(EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons  with  regard  to  the  processing  of  personal  data  by  competent  authorities  for  the  purposes  of  the 
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, 
and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA (OJ L 119, 
4.5.2016, p. 89). 

39  Section 6.3 Commission Staff Working Document. 
40  Council  Framework  Decision  of  13 June  2002  (2002/584/JHA)  on  the  European  arrest  warrant  and  the   

surrender procedures between Member States OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 1-20. 

41  Section 9.1 Commission Staff Working Document. 

13 

 
 
                                                 
 

 

the problem of creating SIS II alerts when the whereabouts of the subject of the alert 
are already known and confirmed; and 
the  problems  related  to  transfers,  seeking  to  find  –  with  the  judicial  and  law 
enforcement  authorities  –  areas  where  common  practice  can  be  established  and 
procedures harmonised. 

4.4.2   Return Directive42 

The evaluation indicated that there are links but also inconsistencies between the provisions 
on entry bans as set out in the Return Directive and alerts for refusal of entry or stay as set out 
in  Regulation  (EC)  No 1987/2006,  even  concerning  the  expiry  date  of  entry  bans  in  SIS  II. 
This  not  only  leads  to  limitations  to  the  desired  EU-wide  effect  of  entry  bans,  but  also  to  a 
lack of harmonisation in the criteria for issuing alerts. More harmonisation could be achieved 
by making it mandatory to enter all entry bans in SIS from the moment they are enforceable, 
but  the  effectiveness  of  the  envisaged  changes  in  SIS  II  could  be  increased  by  a  minimum 
level of harmonisation across Member States when dealing with persons who are subject of a 
return decision or entry ban issued by another Member State43. 

In  conclusion,  the  Commission  will  put  forward  a  range  of  proposals  on  exchange  of 
information and harmonisation of processes. 

4.4.3  Schengen Borders Code 

SIS  II  provides  significant  added  value  if  it  is  checked  more  intensively.  Member  States 
should  be  encouraged  to  fully  apply  the  provisions  of  the  Schengen  Borders  Code  which 
provide the obligation to directly consult SIS II as part of the border checks on third-country 
nationals. Member States should systematically query SIS II, i.e. carry out a 100 % check. 

This conclusion is also reflected in section 4.3.4. 

4.5   HAS SIS II BEEN RELEVANT IN VIEW OF ITS OBJECTIVES?  

SIS II is today the most important and widely used information-sharing instrument in Europe, 
as  underlined  by  the  European  Agenda  on  Security44.    Only  in  2015  Member  States 
exchanged 1.8 million forms in the SIRENE Bureaux including SIS II related information45 
which clearly demonstrates the huge volume of information exchange carried out based upon 
SIS II alerts which makes SIS II the most relevant security platform in Europe. 

The European Council and the Justice and Home Affairs Council have repeatedly pointed to 
the high relevance of SIS II for exchanging data on and tracking down terrorist suspects and 
foreign  terrorist  fighters  and  stated  that  all  possibilities  of  SIS  in  the  fight  against  terrorism 
should be exploited.  

Indeed, in June 2014, the Council called upon Member States to make full use of SIS II for 
counter-terrorism  purposes.  On  30 January  2015,  following  the  terrorist  attack  against  the 
French newspaper Charlie Hebdo in Paris, the Justice and Home Affairs Ministers also stated 

42  Directive  2008/115/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  16 December  2008  on  common 
standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals OJ L 348, 
24.12.2008, p. 98-107. 

43 Section 8 Commission Staff Working Document. 
44 COM(2015) 185. 
45 Section 16.4 Commission Staff Working Document. 

14 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
that the potential of SIS II should be better used46.  In its Conclusions of 20 November 2015, 
following  the  terrorist  attacks  in  Paris,  the  Council  drew  attention  to  the  importance  of  the 
systematic consultation of SIS II when carrying out security checks on third-country nationals 
illegally entering the Schengen area and when performing border checks on EU nationals. The 
role of SIS II as a source for intelligence and investigation by Europol was emphasised. 

The  Council  also  highlighted  SIS  II  several  times  as  an  instrument  to  enhance  European 
return  policy.  The  European  Council  considered47  that  the  scope  of  SIS  II  should  be 
developed  to  also  include  return  decisions48.  On  14 September  2015  the  Council  adopted 
conclusions on more efficient use of SIS II for refusing entry and stay to irregular migrants. 
On 8 October 2015, the Council stated that it looked forward to proposals by the Commission, 
based  on  a  feasibility  study,  on  making  it  obligatory  to  enter  all  entry  bans  and  return 
decisions  in  SIS  II,  notably  to  enable  their  mutual  recognition  and  enforcement,  as  soon  as 
possible. Furthermore the European Parliament also considered SIS II as a key instrument in 
the  exchange  of  information  on  terrorist  radicalisation  and  preventing  departure  as  well  as 
anticipating  return  in  its  Resolution  on  prevention  of  radicalisation  and  recruitment  of 
European citizens by terrorist organisations49. 

In conclusion, in light of the security and migration issues faced and the consequent increased 
and broader usage of SIS II with significant results, the view of the Commission is that the 
underlying rationale of SIS II continues to be valid. As highlighted in section 4.3.1, to achieve 
this  SIS  must  remain  a  flexible  system,  capable  of  swiftly  addressing  new  operational 
phenomena. 

4.6   HAS  SIS  ACHIEVED  ITS  OBJECTIVES  IN  AN  EFFICIENT  WAY?  –  THE  COSTS  OF 

NON-SCHENGEN

50

Notwithstanding several findings which would improve efficiency in technical operations and 
working practices, SIS II is primarily an operational system and therefore an evaluation would 
largely  expect  findings  in  the  fields  of  effectiveness,  relevance,  EU  added-value  and 
coherence with other EU initiatives. However, in such an environment, efficiency must also 
be studied at the strategic level. As the key compensatory measure for the removal of internal 
borders  in  the  Schengen  area,  the  question,  ‘Could  we  continue  without  SIS?’  must  be 
addressed.   

Development and operational costs incurred by the European Union and the Member States in 
respect of SIS II have to be calculated taking into consideration the technical architecture of 
the system, mainly the fact that it consists of three major components: central system, national 
systems and a communication infrastructure. 

The total amount spent from the EU budget on building Central SIS II during the period 2002 
to 2013 was €152 961 319 , although initially an even higher amount, of more than €175 352 
417, had been allocated. 

46 Riga Joint Statement following the informal meeting of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers in Riga on 29 and 

30 January. 

47 European Council Conclusions of 25 and 26 June 2015 (ST 22 2015 INIT). 
48 Council Conclusions on alerts in the SIS II for the purpose of refusing entry and stay pursuant to Article 24 of  

the SIS II Regulation upon a return decision (ST11648/15). 

49 Resolution of 25 November 2015 (2015/2063(P8_TA(2015)0410). 
50  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  European  Council  and  the  Council 

Back to Schengen — A Roadmap. Brussels, 4.3.2016 COM(2016) 120 final. 

15 

 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
In addition, Central SIS II incurs annual maintenance costs, which amounted to €7 794 732.35 
in 2014 and €5 631 826.58 in 2015. 

Since  the  Member  States  are  responsible  for  setting  up,  operating  and  maintaining  their 
national  systems,  they  are  also  required  to  cover  the  one-time  costs  in  terms  of  developing 
their N.SIS II51 and annual maintenance costs. In accordance with the cost model developed 
in  a  study  on  possible  improvements  to  the  SIS  II  architecture,  the  average  total  cost  of 
ownership  of  national  second  generation  SIS  II  implementations,  including  one-time  and 
ongoing costs in a representative sample of ten Member States studied, was €16.628 million 
per Member State52.  

The costs, however, have to be analysed taking into consideration that SIS II is the principle 
compensatory measure for the abolition of internal border controls within the Schengen area. 
Without SIS II, an area with no internal borders would be hardly feasible. The Commission 
stated, in its communication ‘Back to Schengen — a Roadmap'53, that reintroducing internal 
border controls on a sustained basis within the EU would not only hamper the free movement 
of persons, but also would impose significant economic costs.  

The Commission has estimated that:  

 

full  re-establishment  of  border  controls  within  the  Schengen  area  would  generate 
immediate direct costs of between €5 billion and €18 billion annually.  

  Member  States  such  as  Poland,  the  Netherlands  or  Germany  would  face  more  than 
€500 million in additional costs for the road transport of traded goods, whilst others, 
such  as  Spain  or  the  Czech  Republic,  would  see  their  businesses  paying  more  than 
€200 million in additional costs.  

  border  controls  would  cost  between  €1.3  and  €5.2  billion  in  terms  of  time  lost  for 

cross-border workers (1.7 million workers in the EU) and other commuters.  

  at least 13 million tourist nights could be lost, with a total impact of €1.2 billion for 

the tourism sector.  

  between €0.6 billion and €5.8 billion in administrative costs would have to be paid by 

governments due to the need for increased staffing at border controls.  

In the medium term, reintroducing border controls within the EU would entail indirect costs 
which may be considerably higher, given the unprecedented impact on intra-community trade, 
investment and mobility. 

In conclusion, the costs incurred in developing and maintaining SIS II, and therefore having a 
well-functioning  area  without  internal  border  controls,  are  far  outweighed  by  the  costs  that 
would be incurred if SIS II were not in place and border controls were to be re-introduced. 

5.  

CONCLUSION AND NEXT STEPS  

SIS II operates against  a background of the  most  serious  concerns on security, cross-border 
crime and irregular migration – some of the greatest global challenges. The overall evaluation 
confirms  the  outstanding  operational  and  technical  success  of  the  system.  It  is  clear  that  no 
operational  system,  nor  its  legal  base,  will  be  perfect  and  in  this  spirit  of  continuous 

51 N.SIS II is the technical and legal term for the national SIS technical implementation. 
52 Study carried out for the European Commission: ICT Impact Assessment of Possible Improvements to the SIS 

II Architecture. 

53 COM(2016) 120 final. 

16 

 
 
                                                 
improvement  the  Commission,  together  with  the  observations  and  support  of  the  Member 
States  and  eu-LISA,  has  identified  opportunities  for  further  enhancing  the  effectiveness, 
efficiency,  relevance,  coherence  and  EU  added-value  of  SIS  II,  both  at  central  level  and  in 
some  Member  States  where  technical  and  operational  implementation  could  be  improved. 
These include the further development of the legal framework to reflect better the operational 
challenges  in  the  field  of  security,  a  stronger  harmonisation  of  the  rules  in  the  use  of  the 
system to address irregular migration as well as the better monitoring of the compliance with 
the data protection via statistical reporting.   

SIS  II  achieves  effective  operational  outcomes  that  can  only  be  gained  through  European 
cooperation  at  both  strategic  and  operational  levels.  Using  all  the  tools  available  from  the 
Treaties  and  the  relevant  legal  instruments,  the  Commission  takes  a  twin-track  approach 
towards Member States: it strongly supports Member States’ capacity to optimise the use of 
SIS II. The motivation and practical cooperation displayed between all stakeholders has led to 
increased  and  more  harmonised  use  of  the  system.  In  cases  of  serious  deficiencies  in  the 
implementation of SIS II the Commission is also pursuing breaches of EU law, via the ‘EU-
Pilot’ procedure with the further option of infringement.  

There are other ways in which the Commission works together with the Member States on the 
correct use of SIS: 

  The Schengen evaluation mechanism is a major opportunity to verify the functioning 
and the actual use of the system on-site, which also helps to improve the situation in 
the evaluated Member States. An on-site evaluation re-visit is a tool available where 
serious deficiencies have been identified in the evaluated Member State. 

  Regular  meetings  of  the  SISVIS  Committee  (seven  times  per  year).  The  delegations 
include one technical and one operational expert per Member State. This Committee 
assists  the  Commission  in  implementing  the  SIS  legal  instruments  and  provides  the 
best opportunity to address all issues of concern. The meetings provide transparency 
and a certain pressure on Member States to remedy any deficiencies. 

  Active  involvement  of  the  Commission  in  every  training  course  and  conference 

organised on SIS II (a minimum of five times per year). 

  The  adoption  of 

the  ‘Catalogue  of 
the  Commission  Recommendation  on 
Recommendations  and  Best  Practices  on  the  use  of  SIS  II54  on  16 December  2015, 
which contributes to the harmonisation of procedures and is used as a major reference 
document by all stakeholders. 

In  addition,  in  order  to  address  those  issues  highlighted  by  the  evaluation  which  require 
legislative change, the Commission, using its right of initiative in accordance with the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union, intends to present a proposal to amend the legal 
basis for SIS by the end of December 2016. The Commission will also take into account the 
outcome of the deliberations of the High Level Expert Group established by the Commission 
Communication  on  Stronger  and  Smarter  Information  Systems  for  Borders  and  Security55 
which may result in a second proposal in June 2017.   

54 Commission recommendation establishing a catalogue of recommendations and best practices for the correct 
application  of  the  second  generation  Schengen  Information  System  (SIS  II)  and  the  exchange  of 
supplementary information by the competent authorities of the Member States implementing and using SIS II 
[C(2015)9169/1]. 
55 COM(2016) 205 final. 

17