COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the evaluation of the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) in accordance with articles 24 (5), 43 (3) and 50 (5) of Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 and articles 59 (3) and 66 (5) of Decision 2007/533/JHA
Date: 2016-12-21
Institutions: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: EU police cooperation, European security, Schengen Information System, border control, data collection, data protection, exchange of information, illegal migration, personal data

EN 

   EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 21.12.2016  SWD(2016) 450 final   COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND  THE COUNCIL  on the evaluation of the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) in accordance with articles 24 (5), 43 (3) and 50 (5) of Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 and articles 59 (3) and 66 (5) of Decision 2007/533/JHA  {COM(2016) 880 final}  
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

1. 

Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 6 

1.1   Overall evaluation (Art 50 (5) SIS II Regulation and Art 66 (5) SIS II Decision) ............. 6 

1.2 Alerts on refusal of entry or stay (Art 24 (5) SIS II Regulation) .......................................... 6 

1.3 Remedies (Art 43 SIS II Regulation and Art 59 SIS II Decision) ........................................ 7 

1.4 Scope  ..................................................................................................................................... 7 

1.5 Structure of the Staff Working Document ............................................................................ 7 

2.  Background to sis ii and Baseline ......................................................................................... 7 

2.1 Background to SIS II and Baseline ....................................................................................... 7 

2.2 The second generation of SIS (SIS II) .................................................................................. 8 

2.3 Intervention Logic ................................................................................................................. 8 

3.  The evaluation questions ..................................................................................................... 10 

3.1 The evaluation process ........................................................................................................ 10 

3.2 Evaluation questions ........................................................................................................... 11 

3.2.1 Evaluation of Central SIS II and the application of the Decision/Regulation in 

respect of Central SIS II ............................................................................................ 11 

3.2.2 Security of Central SIS II ............................................................................................. 11 

3.2.3 Alerts ............................................................................................................................ 12 

3.2.4 Other provisions of the SIS II legal instruments .......................................................... 12 

3.2.5 Use of Art 24 of the SIS II Regulation on refusal of entry or stay ............................... 12 

3.2.6 Bilateral and multilateral exchange of supplementary information between Member 

States ......................................................................................................................... 12 

3.2.7 Examination of results achieved against objectives and any implications for future 

operations .................................................................................................................. 13 

3.2.8 Assessment of the continuing validity of the underlying rationale .............................. 13 

3.2.9 Remedies ...................................................................................................................... 13 

4.  Method .................................................................................................................................. 14 

4.1 Timescale ............................................................................................................................ 14 

4.2 Methodology and data collection ........................................................................................ 14 

4.2.1 SIS II technical architecture ......................................................................................... 14 

4.2.2 Responsibilities of the ‘Management Authority’ (eu-LISA) for Central SIS II ........... 15 

4.2.3 SIS II security and data protection ............................................................................... 15 

4.2.4 SIS II alerts and procedures .......................................................................................... 15 

4.2.5 Alerts for refusal of entry or stay under Article 24 of the SIS II Regulation ............... 15 

4.2.6 Remedies ...................................................................................................................... 16 

5.  Findings of the evaluation concerning the central components of SIS II and the 

application of the legal instruments in respect of Central SIS II .................................... 16 

5.1 Central SIS II ....................................................................................................................... 16 

2 

 
 
5.2 SIS II Technical Assessment ............................................................................................... 17 

5.2.1 Identified issues ............................................................................................................ 18 

5.2.2 Future needs .................................................................................................................. 20 

5.2.3 Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 21 

5.3 The security of Central SIS II ............................................................................................. 21 

5.3.1 Coherence — network security .................................................................................... 22 

5.3.2 Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 22 

6.  The results achieved by sis ii against the original objectives and the continuing 

validity of the underlying rationale of sis ii ....................................................................... 22 

6.1 Number of valid (non-expired) records 2013-2015 ............................................................ 22 

6.2 The number of times SIS II has been accessed by end-users .............................................. 23 

6.3 Overall hits .......................................................................................................................... 24 

6.4 Main identities, aliases and misused identities .................................................................... 25 

6.5 Authorities having a right to access alerts ........................................................................... 25 

6.6 Institutional users: eurojust and europol ............................................................................. 26 

7.  Review of the application of alerts for the refusal of entry or stay under Article 24 

and 26 SIS II Regulation ..................................................................................................... 26 

7.1 A brief overview.................................................................................................................. 26 

7.2 Key themes emerging .......................................................................................................... 27 

7.3 Inconsistency with the Return Directive – coherence/consistency ..................................... 33 

7.4   Lack of harmonisation when entering entry bans in SIS II - effectiveness and 

coherence/consistency ...................................................................................................... 35 

7.5   Entering travel bans constituting a restrictive measure in SIS II - effectiveness and 

coherence/consistency ...................................................................................................... 36 

7.6   Creation of a European Border and Coast Guard Agency ................................................ 36 

7.7   Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 37 

8.  Alerts for arrest for extradition or surrender under Article 26 of the SIS II Decision  37 

8.1 Key themes emerging .......................................................................................................... 38 

9.  Alerts on missing persons under Article 32 of the SIS II Decision ................................. 38 

9.1 Key themes emerging .......................................................................................................... 38 

10.  Alerts on persons sought to assist with a judicial procedure under Article 34 of 

the SIS II Decision ............................................................................................................... 39 

10.1 Key themes emerging ........................................................................................................ 39 

11.  Alerts for discreet and specific checks under Article 36 of the SIS II Decision ............. 40 

11.1 A brief overview................................................................................................................ 40 

11.2 Use of SIS II for counter-terrorism purposes .................................................................... 40 

11.3 Key themes emerging ........................................................................................................ 42 

12.  Alerts on objects for seizure or use as evidence in criminal  proceedings under 

Article 38 of the SIS II Decision ......................................................................................... 43 

3 

 
 
12.1 A brief overview................................................................................................................ 43 

12.2 Key themes emerging ........................................................................................................ 44 

12.2.1 Alerts on vehicles, industrial equipment and licence plates ....................................... 44 

12.2.2  Checks carried out by the authorities responsible for issuing vehicle registration 

certificates ......................................................................................................................... 47 

12.2.3  Alerts on containers and boats .................................................................................. 48 

12.2.4 Alerts on issued and blank documents ....................................................................... 48 

12.2.5 Alerts on banknotes, securities and means of payment .............................................. 51 

12.2.6 Broadening the scope and use of object alerts ............................................................ 51 

13.  New functionalities in SIS II — challenges in implementation ....................................... 52 

13.1 Implementing functionalities............................................................................................. 52 

13.2 Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 52 

14.  Use of fingerprints in SIS II ................................................................................................ 53 

15.  Operational procedures ...................................................................................................... 54 

15.1 Key themes emerging ........................................................................................................ 54 

16.  SIRENE Bureaux and the exchange of supplementary information  between 

Member States ..................................................................................................................... 56 

16.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 56 

16.2 SIRENE communication ................................................................................................... 56 

16.3 SIRENE communication within a Member State ............................................................. 56 

16.4 Bilateral or multilateral SIRENE communication — the SIRENE Forms ....................... 57 

16.5 ‘Data Exchange Between SIRENEs (DEBS)’ .................................................................. 58 

16.6 SIRENE functional tests ................................................................................................... 58 

16.7  SIRENE workflows and workload — maintaining effectiveness, efficiency and 

coherence with requirements ............................................................................................ 58 

16.8  Structure of the SIRENE Bureaux .................................................................................... 59 

17.  SIS II- SIRENE training at European level ...................................................................... 60 

17.1 SIRENE CEPOL courses .................................................................................................. 60 

17.1.1 The SIRENE online module and SIRENE platform .................................................. 60 

17.1.2 Statistics on the SIRENE CEPOL trainings ............................................................... 60 

17.2 eu-LISA training ............................................................................................................... 61 

17.3 Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 61 

18.  SIS II governance — issues already addressed and harmonisation of procedures ....... 62 

18.1 Governance........................................................................................................................ 62 

18.2 Issues already addressed and the harmonisation of procedures ........................................ 63 

18.2.1 Issues addressed in the SISVIS Committee — EU added-value and effectiveness ... 63 

18.2.2 Interim reviews of the SIRENE Manual .................................................................... 64 

18.2.3 The Catalogue of Recommendations and Best Practice — EU added-value ............. 64 

4 

 
 
18.2.4 Factsheets — Effectiveness ........................................................................................ 64 

19.  Remedies ............................................................................................................................... 65 

19.1 The right of access............................................................................................................. 65 

19.2 Right to correction and deletion of data ............................................................................ 66 

19.3 Remedies: the right to complain to the data protection authority or to initiate a judicial 

proceeding ......................................................................................................................... 66 

19.4 Evaluation ......................................................................................................................... 66 

19.4.1 Questionnaire forwarded to the members of the SIS II Supervision Coordination 

Group ......................................................................................................................... 66 

19.5 The evaluations of certain Member States on the application of the Schengen acquis in 

the field of data protection ................................................................................................ 67 

20.  Overall cost efficiency of SIS II .......................................................................................... 70 

20.1 Building the ICT cost model ............................................................................................. 70 

20.1.1.  Operational costs ....................................................................................................... 70 

20.1.2  The costs of non-Schengen - efficiency .................................................................... 72 

21.  Conclusions ........................................................................................................................... 72 

Annex I - Findings and recommendations ................................................................................ 74 

Annex II - Sources ....................................................................................................................... 85 

Annex III - Meetings ................................................................................................................... 89 

Annex IV - Detailed statistics on complaints and remedies .................................................... 91 

5 

 
 
 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 

The  SIS  II  legal  instruments1  describe  the  system,  how  it  is  managed  and  how  it  must  be 
used. The legal instruments also specify which aspects of SIS II must be evaluated and the 
timescales  for  that  evaluation.  Due  to  the  wide-ranging  nature  of  this  evaluation,  covering 
legal, operational, procedural and technical issues, a large part of this document is dedicated 
to the overall evaluation as described in section 2.1. The objectives of the two more tightly 
focused areas on alerts for refusal of entry or stay and remedies are also described below and 
subsequently addressed in dedicated sections in the report. The summaries below set out the 
evaluation objectives of each subject area.   

1.1   OVERALL EVALUATION (ART 50 (5) SIS II REGULATION AND ART 66 (5) SIS II 

DECISION) 

Three years after SIS II is brought into operation and every four years thereafter, the 
Commission  shall  produce  an  overall  evaluation  of  Central  SIS  II  and  the  bilateral 
and multilateral exchange of supplementary information between Member States. This 
overall evaluation shall include an examination of results achieved against objectives, 
and  an  assessment  of  the  continuing  validity  of  the  underlying  rationale,  the 
application of this Decision in respect of Central SIS II, the security of Central SIS II 
and  any  implications  for  future  operations.  The  Commission  shall  transmit  the 
evaluation to the European Parliament and the Council. 

The evaluation objectives can be summarised as:  

  evaluation of Central SIS II;  
 

the  bilateral  and  multilateral  exchange  of  supplementary  information  between 
Member States;  

  an examination of results achieved against objectives;  
  an assessment of the continuing validity of the underlying rationale;  
  evaluation of the application of this Decision/Regulation in respect of Central SIS II; 

the security of Central SIS II;  
implications for future operations. 

 

1.2 ALERTS ON REFUSAL OF ENTRY OR STAY (ART 24 (5) SIS II REGULATION) 

The Commission shall review the application of this Article three years after the date 
referred to in Article 55(2). On the basis of that review, the Commission shall, using 
its right of initiative in accordance with the Treaty, make the necessary proposals to 
modify the provisions of this Article to achieve a greater level of harmonisation of the 
criteria for entering alerts. 

The evaluation objectives can be summarised as:  

 

review the application of this Article;  

1  

Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on 
the establishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) (OJ L 
381, 28.12.2006, p. 4). 
Council Decision 2007/533/JHA of 12 June 2007 on the establishment, operation and use of the second 
generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) (OJ L 205, 7.8.2007, p. 63). 
Although the evaluation is not covered in a third legal instrument its impact should also form part of the 
evaluation: Regulation (EC) No 1986/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 
2006 regarding access to the Second Generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) by the services in 
the Member States responsible for issuing vehicle registration certificates (OJ L 381, 28.12.2006, p. 1). 

6 

 
 
                                                 
 
 
  make  the  necessary  proposals  to  modify  the  provisions  of  this  Article  to  achieve  a 

greater level of harmonisation of the criteria for entering alerts. 

1.3 REMEDIES (ART 43 SIS II REGULATION AND ART 59 SIS II DECISION) 

The evaluation objectives can be summarised as to collate and review the provisions in each 
Member State on: (a) a person’s ability to bring an action before the courts or the authority 
competent under the law of any Member State to access, correct, delete or obtain information 
or  to  obtain  compensation  in  connection  with  an  alert  relating  to  him,  and  (b)  the  mutual 
enforcement of decisions in other Member States

. 

2

1.4 SCOPE 

This evaluation covers all Member States as they all use SIS II (25 MS), will join imminently 
(Croatia) or intend to use it in the future (Cyprus and Ireland). The UK started using SIS II 
during  the  evaluation  process  (13 April  2015).  The  evaluation  also  covers  four  associated 
countries which use SIS II (Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein) as well as the 
two agencies which are permitted access, namely EUROPOL and EUROJUST. 

1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

In  line  with  the  principles  of  Better  Regulation,  this  Staff  Working  Document  follows  the 
structure  set  out  in  Tool  #47  of  the  European  Commission's  Better  Regulation  Toolbox. 
Section 1 contains an Executive Summary. Section 2 introduces the purpose and scope of the 
overall evaluation  of SIS II and describes the structure of this  paper.  Section  3 sets out  the 
background of the initiative, its components and how they fit together. Section 4 explains the 
evaluation  concept  and  lists  the  evaluation  questions.  Section  5  provides  information  with 
regards to the method used in the overall evaluation. Sections 6 to 21 describe the answers to 
the  evaluation  questions.  Within  this,  Sections  14  and  15  set  out  particular  implementation 
challenges  highlighted  by  respondents,  related  to  the  new  functionalities  in  SIS  II  and  the 
Automated  Fingerprint  Identification  System.  This  maintains  the  internal  logic  of  the 
document. Finally, section 22 summarises the findings and conclusions of the SIS II overall 
evaluation and these are listed in full in Annex 1.  

2.  BACKGROUND TO SIS II AND BASELINE 

2.1 BACKGROUND TO SIS II AND BASELINE 

The Schengen area was established by the 1985 Schengen Agreement that set out the gradual 
abolition  of  checks  at  common  borders.  The  Agreement  was  supplemented  by  the 
1990 Schengen  Implementing  Convention  that  set  out  the  final  abolition  of  internal  border 
controls, as well as a series of necessary accompanying measures. The Schengen Agreement 
made  passport-free  travel  possible  for  over  400  million  Europeans.  From  the  initial  five 
Member  States,  the  Schengen  area  without  internal  border  controls  now  includes  26 
countries. The participating countries apply common rules for checks at the external borders 
of  the  Schengen  area,  as  well  as  rules  on  issuing  visas  and  cooperation  between  law 
enforcement and judicial services in criminal matters. 

In the absence of internal border controls, Member States had to address the issues of cross-
border  crime  and  irregular  migration.  This  included  assessing  the  most  effective  way  for 
Europe-wide  information  sharing  and  legal  assistance  for  the  carrying  out  of  national  law 
enforcement,  immigration  and  judicial  decisions.  It  was  clear  that  these  could  no  longer  be 

2   Note: Due to the date of entry into operation of SIS II it was not feasible to carry out this evaluation within 
the legally foreseen timescale. Accordingly, it is appropriate to include it in the overall evaluation.  

7 

 
 
                                                 
achieved with traditional bilateral agreements and mutual legal assistance requests, due to the 
rapid movement of criminals and the need to act promptly. In order to effectively maintain a 
high level of security, Member States had to create a tailor-made instrument to:  

  share  security-related  information  in  a  centralised,  structured  way  and  move  away 

from fragmented bilateral cooperation;  

  make  such  information  immediately  available  to  all  competent  national  authorities; 

and  

  empower competent authorities in other Member States to act on behalf of requesting 

Member States. 

However,  the  first  generation  of  the  Schengen  Information  System,  which  entered  into 
operation in the mid-1990s, was not able to serve the needs of increasing number of Member 
States of the EU after its enlargement. Due to this, and in order to benefit from the latest IT 
3
developments and to provide end-users with new functionalities
, it was decided that it was 
necessary  to  establish  a  new,  second  generation  Schengen  Information  System  (SIS  II).  As 
acknowledged  in  Decision  SCH/Com-ex  (97)  24  of  the  Executive  Committee  of  7  October 
1997, "only SIS II will be able to meet a certain number of essential operational demands"

.  

4

2.2 THE SECOND GENERATION OF SIS (SIS II) 

SIS II entered operations on 9 April 2013. New functionalities for operational end-users are: 

  Enhanced  alerts  on  persons  and  objects:  vehicles,  firearms,  issued  documents,  blank 

documents, bank notes. 

  New  categories  of  alert:  stolen  aircraft,  boats,  boat  engines,  containers,  industrial 

equipment, securities and means of payment. 

  The  ability  to  conduct  direct  queries  in  the  central  system,  as  opposed  to  the  previous 

practice of all queries being carried out in a national copy of the data. 

  Linking of alerts on persons, objects and vehicles (e.g. alerts on a wanted person and the 

stolen vehicle he/she is using). 

  Biometric data (fingerprints and photographs). 
  A  copy  of  the  European  Arrest  Warrant  (EAW)  attached  directly  to  alerts  for  persons 

 

wanted for arrest for surrender or extradition. 
Information on misused identity preventing the misidentification of the innocent party in 
identity fraud. 

Data on persons stored in SIS II are:  

 

 

the  data  necessary  to  locate  a  person  and  confirm  his/her  identity  (now  including  a 
photo and fingerprints, where available); 
relevant information about the alert (including the action to be taken).  

Fingerprints are currently used to confirm an identity but in the future they may also be used 
to establish the identity of a person.  

2.3 INTERVENTION LOGIC 

3  

4 

Council Regulation (EC) No 2424/2001 of 6 December 2001 on the development of the second generation 
Schengen Information System (SIS II) (OJ L 328, 13.12.2001, p. 4). 
Council  Decision  2001/886/JHA  of  6  December  2001  on  the  development  of  the  second  generation 
Schengen Information System (SIS II) (OJ L 328, 13.12.2001, p. 1). 
Decision  of  the  Executive  Committee  of  7  October  1997  on  the  development  of  the  SIS  (SCH/Com-ex 
(97) 24) (OJ L 239, 22.9.2000, p.442). 

8 

 
 
 
                                                 
 
As  set  out  in  the  SIS  II  legal  instruments,  the  purpose  of  the  system  is  to  contribute  to  the 
maintenance of a high level of security within the area of freedom, security and justice of the 
European  Union.  It  enables  law  enforcement  and  migration  authorities  to  enter  and  consult 
alerts  on  persons  and  objects  and  provides  end-users  with  new  functionalities  in  order  to 
facilitate their operational needs. Essentially, a significant increase in information exchange 
at  the  EU  level  has  been  witnessed  since  the  establishment  of  SIS  II.  The  system  has  also 
demonstrated 
the  dynamic  security  and  migration 
environments,  exacerbated  by  the  foreign  terrorist  fighter  phenomenon  and  the  migration 
crisis.  The  simplified  intervention  logic  diagram  below  explains  how  the  different 
components of SIS II fit together. 

in  responding 

its  flexibility 

to 

9 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simplified Intervention Logic 

3.  THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS 

3.1 THE EVALUATION PROCESS 

10 

    INPUTS - ALERTS On persons wanted for arrest for surrender or extradition purposes; For the location of missing persons, including children; For the location of persons sought to assist with a judicial procedure; To locate persons and objects for the purposes of prosecuting criminal offences and for the prevention of threats to public security; For the location of objects for seizure or use as evidence in criminal proceedings; On third-country nationals who are not entitled to enter into or stay in the Schengen area ACTIVITIES Actions by law enforcement and migration authorities. OUTPUTS Increase in hits in all alert categories; Increase in information exchange at the EU level IMPACTS Increased public safety EXTERNAL FACTORS Foreign Terrorist Fighter Phenomenon; Migration crisis   OTHER EU POLICIES European Arrest Warrant and judicial cooperation; Return decisions; The Schengen Borders Code  NEW FUNCTIONALITIES OF SIS II Enhanced alerts on persons and objects: persons, vehicles, firearms, issued documents, blank documents, bank notes; New categories of alerts: stolen aircrafts, boats, boat engines, containers, industrial equipment, securities and means of payment; Direct queries in the central system; Linking of alerts on persons, objects & vehicles (e.g.: alert on a person and a vehicle); Biometric data (fingerprints and a photograph); European Arrest Warrant can be attached directly to alert for persons wanted for arrest for surrender or extradition; Information on misused identity preventing the misidentification  Development of Central SIS II by the European Commission and National SIS II systems by Member States; Operational Management of Central SIS II and the communication infrastructure by eu-LISA   
 
 
The evaluation was carried out by Commission staff supported by external supporting studies 
in four areas: remedies, use of alerts for refusal of entry or stay and consultation procedures 
where  a  residence  permit  and  an  alert  for  refusal  of  entry  or  stay  may  co-exist  as  well  as 
about the role of the SIRENE Bureaux in the European police information exchange. The list 
of studies are set out in Annex II.  

The  evaluation  followed  an  iterative  process:  issues  were  raised  in  the  questionnaire  phase 
and  clarified  through  interviews  so  that  all  issues  could  be  raised  in  a  comprehensive  and 
transparent way. These issues were shared in dedicated meetings/workshops aiming to arrive 
at  a  shared  understanding  and  assessment.  Moreover,  the  Commission  has  set  up  an  Inter-
service  Steering  Group  with  the  participation  of  the  General  Secretariat,  DG  HOME,  DG 
JUST,  DG  HR  and  DG  DIGIT  which  monitored  the  evaluation  process  and  provided  the 
necessary guidance. The dates of the relevant meetings are attached in Annex III. 

The  analysis  was  based  on  both  qualitative  and  quantitative  evidence.  A  qualitative 
assessment  was  carried  out,  outlining  a  number  of  initiatives  designed  to  solve  issues  or 
improve guidance on the use of SIS II. Quantitative  data were collected in order to provide 
the statistics needed for the reports, benefiting from the fact that SIS II was designed legally 
and technically from the outset to provide statistics on its use and effectiveness, which is an 
unusual feature amongst law enforcement cooperation systems. 

The intention of many of the questionnaire elements was to establish effectiveness, relevance 
and  coherence,  with  a  view  to  identifying  potential  improvements  in  these  three  areas  and 
thereby  increase  EU  added-value.  Where  inefficient  procedures  were  identified  or  had 
already been eliminated, this was also highlighted. 

The evaluation made use of the extensive figures on the use of SIS II and the performance of 
the system itself, gathered and published (to a restricted audience) by eu-LISA. It also used 
Member State statistics on the exchange of supplementary information and hits on alerts.   

3.2 EVALUATION QUESTIONS 

3.2.1 Evaluation of Central SIS II and the application of the Decision/Regulation in 
respect of Central SIS II 
The  evaluation  of  the  technical  and  operational  management  aspects  of  SIS  II  incorporates 
5
. 
the findings of the report prepared by eu-LISA under Article 66(4) of the SIS II Decision
This  report  describes  the  technical  functioning  of  the  Central  SIS  II  and  the  network, 
including  the  security  thereof,  between  its  entry  into  operation  on  9 April  2013  and 
31 December 2014. It sets out how SIS II performed against expectations, addressing issues 
related to SIS II effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, coherence and EU added-value. 

3.2.2 Security of Central SIS II 
The evaluation of the security of Central SIS II was based on the eu-LISA report mentioned 
above and on relevant sections from a European Data Protection Supervisor audit carried out 
6
on Central SIS II in 2014

. 

5  
6  

eu-LISA document 2015-094 Rev 1. 
Report on inspection pursuant Article 47(2) of Regulation (EC) N. 45/2001 on the Schengen Information 
System II (SIS II) managed by the EU Agency for large-scale IT systems (eu-LISA) case reference: 2014-
0953. 

11 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3.2.3 Alerts 
The  questions  on  the  technical  and  operational  aspects  of  the  SIS  II  covered  the  following 
operational and legal issues: 
A.  What problems are experienced in operational work that are caused by the wording of 

the relevant Article? (What does not work as well as it might?) 

B.  What are the obvious gaps in operational capability that are not covered by the legal 

instruments? (What do you need to do but cannot?)   

C.  Which  concrete  proposals,  if  any,  could  improve  the  text  to  overcome  these  issues? 

(What do you propose to overcome these problems or gaps?)   

3.2.4 Other provisions of the SIS II legal instruments 
A.  What  problems  are  experienced  in  your  work  that  are  caused  by  the  wording  of  the 

relevant Article? (What does not work as well as it might?) 

B.  What  are  the  obvious  gaps  that  are  not  covered  by  the  legal  instruments?  (What  do 

you need to do but cannot?) 

C.  Which concrete proposals could improve the text to overcome these issues? (What do 

you propose to overcome these problems or gaps?) 

3.2.5 Use of Art 24 of the SIS II Regulation on refusal of entry or stay 
The  following  questions  were  addressed  to  the  Member  States  via  the  Commission-chaired 
European Migration Network.   

1.  Do Member States have statistics on how many entry bans are entered into SIS II due 
to  the  non-compliance  with  national  migration  laws  and  as  a  sanction  of  a  criminal 
offence (national grounds for the imposition of entry bans)? 

2.  What duration of overstaying on the territory of a Member State is sanctioned with an 

entry ban entered into SIS II? 

7

3.  What is the major ground for the consultation procedure pursuant to Section 4.5 of the 
SIRENE  Manual
  (namely  (i)  the  procedure  provided  under  Art.  25  (1)  of  the 
Schengen Convention, (ii) the procedure provided under Art. 25 (2) of the Schengen 
Convention,  (iii)  procedure  in  cases  falling  under  Art.  6(5)  (a)  of  the  Schengen 
Borders Code8, or (iv) procedure in cases falling under Art. 6(5) (c) of the Schengen 
Borders Code)?   

4.  Do Member States use the consultation procedure? 
5.  How many successful consultation procedures were conducted in 2013 and 2014? 
6.  What are the national deadlines for a consultation procedure? 
7.  What  sorts  of  difficulties  have  Member  States  encountered  with  the  consultation 

procedure? 

8.  Are there special procedures for such consultation with regard to persons enjoying the 

right of free movement? 

3.2.6 Bilateral and multilateral exchange of supplementary information between Member 
States 
This section was completed through:  

7  

Commission  Implementing  Decision  (EU)  2016/1209  of  12  July  2016  replacing  the  Annex  to 
Implementing  Decision  2013/115/EU  on  the  SIRENE  Manual  and  other  implementing  measures  for  the 
second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) (notified under document C(2016) 4283) (OJ L 
201, 28.07.2016, p.35). 

8    Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union 
Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (OJ L 77, 
23.3.2016, p. 1). 

12 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
  a  statistical  assessment  of  the  exchange  of  supplementary  information  between  the 

Member States;  

  a questionnaire survey to all Heads of SIRENE Bureau on their ability to comply with 

the requirements of the SIRENE Manual;  
identification of any gaps in operational needs which should be addressed; and  

 
  discussion  papers  addressed  at  workshops  in  Brussels  with  delegates  to  the  SISVIS 

Committee.   

3.2.7 Examination of results achieved against objectives and any implications for future 
operations 
This section was completed through:  

  a statistical assessment of the use by Member States of the categories of alerts and the 
hits  achieved  (this  included  the  use  of  SIS  II  by  the  Member  States’  authorities 
responsible for the registration of motor vehicles);  

  a questionnaire survey to all Heads of SIRENE Bureau on:  

 
 
 
 

the capacity of existing alert categories to meet operational needs 
the identification of under-used alert categories 
the reasons for under-use 
the  identification  of  operational  needs  which  are  not  met  by  current  alert 
categories 

  discussion  papers  addressed  at  workshops  in  Brussels  with  delegates  to  the  SISVIS 

Committee;  

  a statistical assessment on the implementation of alerts for refusal of entry or stay;  
  a  questionnaire  survey  to  the  relevant  authorities  in  each  Member  State  seeking  a 
description of national procedures leading to the creation of alerts for refusal of entry 
or stay and the ongoing management, updating and deletion of alerts. 

3.2.8 Assessment of the continuing validity of the underlying rationale 
This element was completed through:  

  a  questionnaire  survey  to  Heads  of  SIRENE  Bureau,  Heads  of  N.SIS  II

  and  other 
relevant authorities on aspects of the SIS II legal instruments which are viewed as not 
fully fit for purpose on whatever grounds;  

9

  discussion at workshops in Brussels with delegates to the SISVIS Committee; 
  a  conclusion  to  the  evaluation  report  which  answers  the  question  on  the  continuing 
validity  of  the  underlying  rationale  and  sets  out  concrete  proposals  from  the 
Commission. 

10

3.2.9 Remedies 
This  section  contains  the  key  points  of  the  report  provided  by  the  SIS  II  Supervision 
Coordination Group
 and the information gleaned from the targeted questionnaire. Detailed 
questions on specific areas were forwarded to the national contact points. 
1.  Please  describe  the  procedures  in  your  Member  State  for  any  person  to  bring  an  action 
before the courts or the authority competent under the law of any Member State to access, 
correct, delete or obtain information or to obtain compensation in connection with an alert 

9   N.SIS II is the term used for the national side of SIS II in each country connected to Central SIS II. 
10   Report  from  the  chair  of  the  SIS II  Supervision  Coordination Group on  the  exercise of  the  rights  of the 
data  subject  in  SIS  and  Guide  for  exercising  the  right  of  access  in  SIS  of  16 December  2014  -  Council 
document 16807/14 SIRIS 82 COMIX 668. 

13 

 
 
                                                 
 
relating to him. Include procedures: (a) within your country; (b) where the applicant is in 
another Schengen State; (c) where the applicant is in a third country. 

2.  In the cases described above (a-c), are there any fees or costs involved or implied for the 

applicant? 

3.  If the applicant is in a third country how do you verify their identity and right to make the 

application? 

4.  Please provide any available annual statistics covering 2013 and 2014 on the use of such 
remedies  by  any  person  (if  possible  the  total  number  of  cases  per  year;  the  number  of 
cases per year where the court or authority ruled in favour of the applicant; the number of 
cases per year where compensation was paid; the financial value, in total per year of the 
compensation paid). 

5.  Please describe your provisions for mutual recognition and enforcement of final decisions 
handed  down  by  the  courts  or  authorities  of  other  Schengen  States  on  alerts  created  by 
your country. 

The evaluation report outlines findings for areas where improvement is required on the basis 
of the exhaustive report and questionnaire. 

4.  METHOD 

4.1 TIMESCALE 

Due  to  the  need  to  evaluate  key  elements  of  the  functioning  of  SIS  II  after  three  years  of 
operation, the evaluation started in February 2015 and covers the period from April 2013 to 
the end of 2015. 

4.2 METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION 

The methodology for the evaluation followed a three phase approach:  

1.  a  design  phase  where  the  evaluation  team  structured  questions  and  activities, 
described in the evaluation mandate and presented to the inter-service steering group; 

2.  a data gathering phase to collect the evidence required; 
3.  the analysis, judgment and reporting phase, where the evidence was analysed in order 

to identify observations and recommendations. 

4.2.1 SIS II technical architecture 
In order to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the complex technical architecture of 
SIS II, a study was launched with the following objectives: 

  Assess  the  implications  for  efficiency  and  cost-effectiveness  of  the  national  ICT 
architectures  in  relation  to  Central  SIS  II,  with  a  view  to  making  observations  and 
recommendations  on  developments  at  central  level  which  could  make  the  national 
technical  implementation  of  SIS  II  more  efficient  and  cost-effective.  The  impact  of  the 
architecture  of  the  central  system  on  the  Member  States’  choice  of  technology  was 
assessed, without entering into an assessment of Member States’ chosen solutions as this 
was out of the scope of the evaluation. 

  Assess  the  existing  central  SIS  II  infrastructure  and,  in  particular,  its  interactions  with 
national systems, with a view to making recommendations to improve efficiency and cost 
effectiveness at both central and national level. 

Further work was carried out with an ICT impact assessment on possible improvements to the 
SIS  II  architecture.  The  assessment  studied  the  cost  and  complexity  of  possible  change 
scenarios by looking at the impact at central level and also in several Member States. 

14 

 
 
4.2.2 Responsibilities of the ‘Management Authority’ (eu-LISA) for Central SIS II 
The SIS II legal instruments require eu-LISA to submit a report on the technical functioning 
of  Central  SIS  II  and  the  network,  including  security,  and  on  the  bilateral  and  multilateral 
exchange  of  supplementary  information  between  Member  States
.  The  first  report  was 
.  To  complement  this  information,  the  Commission  requested  an 
published  in  June  2015
amended set of information from eu-LISA specifically for the evaluation. However, it should 
be noted that as eu-LISA is the subject of separate evaluation mechanisms, its evaluation was 
out of scope for this document.   

12

11

4.2.3 SIS II security and data protection 
The security provisions relating to the processing of personal data for the Central SIS II are 
set out in Article 16 of both the SIS II Regulation and Decision. The legal instruments set out 
the  responsibilities  of  the  European  Data  Protection  Supervisor  (EDPS)  with  regard  to 
checking that the personal data processing activities carried out by eu-LISA are in accordance 
with  the  legal  instruments.  The  EDPS  ensures  that  personal  data  processing  activities  are 
audited  at  least  every  four  years  in  accordance  with  international  auditing  standards.  The 
EDPS audit was taken into consideration in addition to the report from eu-LISA. 

4.2.4 SIS II alerts and procedures 
The most important source of information for evaluating the use of SIS II by Member States 
is the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism. Since the entry into operations of SIS II, the use of 
SIS  II  and  the  functioning  of  the  SIRENE  Bureaux13  has  been  evaluated  in  18 Member 
States14 under this mechanism. 

Member States were consulted through the SISVIS Committee, which includes the Member 
States’ representatives on both operational SIRENE and technical matters on SIS II and the 
related  SIRENE  application.  21 Member  States  responded  (of  the  28 Member  States  and 
Associated  Countries  using  SIS  II  at  the  time  of  distributing  the  questionnaire;  the  UK 
commenced use on 13 April 2015).   

4.2.5 Alerts for refusal of entry or stay under Article 24 of the SIS II Regulation 
Different sources of data were used: 

  Questionnaire to the delegates of the SISVIS Committee. 
  Two  queries  launched  by  the  European  Migration  Network  (EMN):    No 2014.628  on 
registering  entry  bans  in  the  SIS  II  (20  responses  received)  and  No 2015.662  on  entry 
bans  entered  into  the  SIS  II  and  consultation  procedures  in  the  Member  States  (25 
responses received). 

  Data  collected  within  the  context  of  the  external  study  on  the  use  of  SIS  II  for  return 
purposes.  The  study  set  out  to  analyse  the  feasibility  and  the  legal,  operational  and 
practical implications of the incorporation of return decisions and all entry bans in SIS II. 
Although  the  study  is  a  forward-looking  exercise  it  revealed  information  on  the  current 
application of Article 24 of the SIS II Regulation. 

11   Articles 66 (4) of the SIS II Decision and 50 (4) of the SIS II Regulation. 
12  

eu-LISA document 2015-094 Rev 1 
http://www.eulisa.europa.eu/Publications/Reports/SIS%20II%20Technical%20Report%202015.pdf 
SIRENE stands for Supplementary Information Request at the National Entries. Each state operating the 
SIS  II  has  established  a  national  SIRENE  Bureau,  operational  24/7,  which  is  responsible  for  any 
supplementary information exchange and coordination of activities connected to SIS II alerts. 

13  

14   Old  mechanism:  Slovenia,  Malta,  Slovakia,  the  Czech  Republic,  Hungary,  Poland,  Estonia,  Latvia, 
Lithuania, Switzerland, the United Kingdom. New mechanism (Council Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013 of 
7 October 2013): Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg and Italy. 

15 

 
 
                                                 
  Statistics collected by eu-LISA and Eurostat. 
  Synthesis  Report  for  the  EMN  Focused  Study  2014.  Good  practices  in  the  return  and 
reintegration  of  irregular  migrants:  Member  States’  entry  bans  policy  and  use  of 
readmission agreements between Member States and third countries. 

  Evaluation  on  the  application  of  the  Return  Directive  (2008/115/EC).  Final  Report. 

European Commission — DG Home Affairs. 22 October 2013. 

4.2.6 Remedies 
In December 2014, the Chair of the SIS II Supervision Coordination Group presented a report 
to the Council (doc 16807/14) on the exercise of the rights of the data subject in SIS II and a 
guide  to  the  right  of  access.  The  report  provided  a  comprehensive  overview  on  rights  of 
access, correction and deletion of data and the right to have data checked in SIS II. To update 
the report with more recent information, the members of the SIS II Supervision Coordination 
Group were consulted in June 2015. 

5.  FINDINGS OF THE EVALUATION CONCERNING THE CENTRAL 

COMPONENTS OF SIS II AND THE APPLICATION OF THE LEGAL 
INSTRUMENTS IN RESPECT OF CENTRAL SIS II 

5.1 CENTRAL SIS II  

Effectiveness 
The key mechanism for checking data consistency between Central SIS II and national copies 
of  SIS  II  data  works  effectively  but  is  a  relatively  heavy  mechanism,  largely  due  to  the 
differences in implementation at national level causing inconsistencies. Approximately 15 % 
of data consistency campaigns with the Member States ran without any discrepancy on both 
alerts and links between related alerts. Some Member States have no issue; this confirms that 
it is possible to  reach zero discrepancies and the design of the system,  i.e. having a central 
database  and  national  copies,  is  not  the  root  cause  per  se.  An  update  to  the  analysis  and 
reporting  mechanism  resulted  in  more  accurate  identification  of  discrepancies  and  a  lower 
overall total. This made the data consistency monitoring more effective and efficient to both 
eu-LISA  and  Member  States,  as  Central  SIS  II  had  the  means  to  detect  and  repair 
discrepancies  found  during  data  consistency  campaigns.  This  allows  a  good  level  of 
confidence  in  the  accuracy  of  alerts  in  the  national  copies  of  a  large  majority  of  Member 
States.  Central  SIS  II  is  reaching  the  limits  to  its  capacity  to  carry  out  data  consistency 
campaigns, as the architecture only permits one campaign with one Member State at a time.   

eu-LISA has outlined eleven technical options and three procedural options to improve data 
consistency.  Some  of  these  have  only  minimal  financial,  technical  and  procedural  impact, 
while  some  are  quite  radical.  Given  that  the  impacts  will  always  be  balanced  and  shared 
between all the SIS stakeholders, a study would be the best vehicle to assess which option or 
combination of options would improve the data consistency process. 

Due  to  Central  SIS  II’s  ability  to  report  on  data  discrepancies,  there  has  been  no  need  to 
restore a national copy. 

The provision of a back-up site for Central SIS II has demonstrated effectiveness due to the 
ability  to  switch  operations  during  either  maintenance  or  incidents.  Since  the  entry  into 
operations  five  switchovers  have  taken  place:  four  were  planned  due  to  upgrades  to  the 
central system and one was unplanned, after a database upgrade. These switchovers covered, 
in total, 97 hours of operational time. Effectiveness could be improved; the current technical 
set-up requires the passive back-up site to be started and shut down. As a result, any month 
that  requires  a  switch  to  the  back-up  site  risks  taking  the  system  below  its  availability 

16 

 
 
requirement of 99.99 % availability to the Member States. An active-active technical set-up 
with the back-up site running constantly in the background would be more effective.  

Efficiency 
A few Member States still need to improve their national technical implementation in order to 
reach zero discrepancies. Much of this could be achieved by the Member States in question 
implementing  the  technical  specifications  (the  Interface  Control  Document  —  ICD)  as 
envisaged.  This  would  allow  data  consistency  campaigns  to  run  more  smoothly  against  a 
frozen snapshot of the data in order to avoid detecting ‘false discrepancies’ caused by alert 
updates taking place in the middle of a consistency campaign. This situation still leads to an 
inefficient  and  unexpected  burden  for  monitoring  the  campaigns  and  the  repair  activity  to 
ensure synchronisation between national and central systems. The persistence of this issue in 
some  Member  States  requires  eu-LISA  to  plan  additional  resources  to  support  them.  The 
variation in interpreting the ICD at Member State level is a major cause of this inefficiency. 
For example, some Member States send a deletion notification to Central SIS II but then only 
carry  out  the  deletion  later  that  day  in  a  batch.  This  can  represent  nearly  60 %  of  the 
discrepancies  in  a  data consistency check,  causing  unproductive  work at  both  eu-LISA  and 
national level.  

Central SIS II has a functionality which corrects the inconsistencies. However, this does not 
prevent investigation after the repair to seek an avoidance of repetition.   

Due to the diversity of national systems, a standardised solution to resolve all national data 
consistency issues cannot be put in place. This is a logical outcome of the choice to pursue 
different technical solutions at Member State level. eu-LISA has increased efficiency at both 
central and national levels, by raising issues with Member States when automatic reports for 
restoring  consistency  have  not  been  acted  upon.  Through  consistently  pursuing  each  issue, 
Member  States  repaired  the  elements  of  their  national  systems  which  had  prevented  repair. 
This type of incident has now been eradicated. 

Relevance 
Given the detailed description of the work carried out in order to support the three key roles 
of Central SIS II, the relevance of the legal instruments remains high. 

Coherence/Consistency 
Variations  in  interpreting  the  technical  specifications  at  national  level  cause  some  internal 
inconsistency which could be reduced or removed. 

EU added-value 
The architecture of SIS II, i.e. having a central database and national copies, has a substantial 
EU added value as due to the centralised solution Member States can perform one query via 
Central SIS II and it does not need to send queries to all other Member States which would be 
necessary  in  case  of  a  decentralised  system.  Moreover  national  copies  ensure  business 
continuity in case of the unavailability of Central SIS II or the network.  

5.2 SIS II TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT 

Although it has been a significant operational success, SIS II is perceived by some Member 
States  as  being  a  complex  system  that  is  difficult  to  use  efficiently  and  requires  high 
development  and  operational  costs.  One  of  the  primary  reasons  for  this  complexity  is  the 
flexibility  offered  to  Member  States  in  implementing  their  national  solutions.  This  has 
resulted in diverse systems that require an increased support overhead and pose concerns with 
regards to business continuity. In addition, expected future needs, especially with regards to 
increased  use  of  the  system,  might  benefit  from  the  current  architecture  being  adapted  to 
address  issues  in  a  forward-looking  manner.  This  technical  assessment  identifies  the  key 

17 

 
 
current issues and future needs that should be addressed, identifying concerns with regards to 
maximising business continuity and ensuring that the overall architecture can adapt to meet 
increasing capacity requirements. 

5.2.1 Identified issues 
Business continuity — effectiveness, efficiency and coherence/consistency with the legal base 
In the past years of operation of SIS, loss of business continuity has been experienced rarely, 
and has been related primarily to failover issues at the national level.  Cases where Central 
SIS II has been unavailable are primarily due to network issues, whereas planned upgrades of 
Central  SIS  II  are  largely  transparent  to  the  Member  States  with  the  effect  limited  to 
increased alert processing time for the duration of the Central Unit (CU) and Backup Central 
Unit (BCU) switchover. Certain types of planned upgrades however are foreseen to cause full 
unavailability  of  Central  SIS  II  resulting  in  both  the  CU  and  BCU  being  unavailable  for 
limited periods. In such cases the main impact is on the N.SIS II without a national data copy, 
resulting in complete loss of business  continuity, with a more limited, but still considerable 
effect  on  the  N.SIS  II  with  partial  data  copies  or  partial  query  functionality.  National 
implementations with full data copies are affected to the extent of data desynchronisation that 
is later addressed through the message queue handling, albeit with delayed processing. Albeit 
infrequent,  potential  business  continuity  loss  is  recognised  as  a  key  area  where  all  possible 
solutions are considered taking into account the critical nature of SIS. 

requirements  are 

Data consistency— effectiveness, efficiency and coherence/consistency with the legal base 
There are no significant problems with regards to data consistency between central data and 
national  copies.  Cases  where  Data  Consistency  Check  (DCC)  campaigns  have  resulted  in 
extensive  synchronisation 
to  specific  national 
implementations, indicating a localised problem. The causes of failed consistency checks are 
investigated  by  eu-LISA,  in  discussion  with  the  national  authorities.  National  DCC 
campaigns  are  an  area  with  potential  for  improvement.  This  depends  entirely  on  national 
implementations  and  is  outside  central  control.  One  area  that  should  be  considered  in 
particular  is  the  overall  complexity  of  the  DCC  campaigns.  Even  though  the  campaigns  do 
not currently suffer from technical problems, they are perceived as being complex to set up 
and follow up, and are a potential bottleneck if SIS II data increase significantly. 

typically 

isolated 

Data  consistency  problems  do  occasionally  appear  between  the  alert  data  recorded  in  the 
Central  SIS  II  and  their  representation  in  national  source  systems  (e.g.  law  enforcement 
systems). This may be due to incomplete implementation in the N.SIS II where updates to a 
national  source  system  may  not  trigger  alert  updates  in  SIS,  and  inversely,  where  updates 
received from the Central SIS II related to data recorded in the national source system (i.e. 
not limited to a national SIS copy) are not correctly reflected in the national source system. 

Inefficient handling of biometric data — efficiency 
Fingerprints and  photographs  are currently stored in  the Central  SIS II to  allow them to  be 
included  in  relevant  query  responses.  Apart  from  being  used  in  responding  to  queries 
however,  biometric  image  data  recorded  in  this  way  cannot  be  otherwise  analysed  for 
matching purposes. A specialised biometric data handling system such as an AFIS would be 
more  appropriate.  An  additional  consideration  regarding  biometric  data  is  the  large  storage 
capacity that would be required in the Central SIS II database if biometric data use increases, 
especially  for  any  future  use  of  photographs  for  facial  recognition,  if  legally  permitted.  An 
increase in use of biometric data is expected, making the necessity of processing and storing 
in a more effective manner, increasingly important. 

18 

 
 
  
Data quality — effectiveness and coherence/consistency with the legal base 
Data  quality  problems  have  been  cited  by  numerous  Member  States  as  a  frequent  and 
recurring issue. Example cases that have been raised include:  

  basic information missing from alerts such as a person’s gender or date of birth;  
 

inconsistent encoding of information, such as placing a date of birth in the name field 
or using the text ‘Unknown’ for missing values;  

  problems  regarding  the  consistent  transliteration  of  textual  information,  notably 
person  names,  with  respect  to  ICAO  standards  to  allow  effective  searching  of  non-
Latin characters by Member States where they are not supported;  
the  image  quality  of  fingerprints  and  photographs  that  impairs  biometric  data 
matching. 

 

Incomplete national ICD implementation — effectiveness and coherence/consistency with the legal 
base 
The SIS Interface  Control  Document  (ICD)  details the data exchange between  the N.SIS II 
and    Central  SIS  II,  driving  the  implementation  of  national  solutions.  The  interpretation  of 
this  technical  document  offers  a  degree  of  flexibility  to  Member  States  with  regards  to  the 
implementation of their N.SIS II. This can result in inconsistent national implementations that 
do  not  cover  fully  some  features  in  Central  SIS  II,  such  as  complex  search  options.  This 
results in potentially missed opportunities when carrying out queries.  

National  systems  with  local  copies  that  are  configured  to  use  the  Central  SIS  II  for  certain 
searches  effectively  rely  on  Central  SIS  II  for  the  full  set  of  SIS  features,  with  no  back-up 
scenario  in  case  of  Central  SIS  II  unavailability.  A  case  where  this  is  considered  currently 
unavoidable is the fuzzy searching of alerts where query results depend on the specific tool or 
algorithm  used.  The  possibility  of  national  implementations  using  central  services  should 
ideally  be  a  source  of  flexibility  to  Member  States  in  balancing  their  query  needs  between 
Central  SIS  II  and  N.SIS  II.  An  incomplete  national  ICD  implementation,  however,  would 
mean that this flexibility could manifest itself as a loss of business continuity if the Central 
SIS II becomes unavailable. 

Excessive query logging at national level — efficiency and coherence/consistency 
Article 12(3) of the SIS II Decision stipulates that all searches performed on alerts need to be 
logged, including the data that was used for the search. This has implications for both Central 
SIS II and the N.SIS II, in terms of additional processing to record the log entry but also in 
terms of storage capacity to maintain the log information. Several Member States have raised 
the  concern  that  with  solutions  that  perform  large  numbers  of  automated  queries  such  as 
Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR), the number of queries can reach the level of 
millions per day. It is clear that maintaining a log of all such automated queries will increase 
storage requirements for the N.SIS II and, even if performed asynchronously, will affect their 
overall processing capacity. 

Alert history logging at national level — efficiency and coherence/consistency 
As with the logging of queries, Article 12(3) of the SIS II legal instruments requires N.SIS II 
to log the history of alerts. As all alert modifications are channelled through Central SIS II, 
the  alert  history  log  is  also  maintained  centrally.  Article  9(2)  nonetheless  stipulates  that  an 
N.SIS  II  holding  a  national  data  copy  needs  to  ensure  it  is  identical  to  the  central  data. 
Maintaining  national  copies  of  the  alert  history  log  increases  storage  capacity  requirements 
and  processing  for  the  N.SIS  II,  leading  to  suggestions  from  Member  States  that  the  alert 
history should be recorded and queried at central level only. However, a national alert history 
copy  currently  represents  a  key  information  source  for  national  data  protection  authorities. 

19 

 
 
Removing the alert history at national level would require an alternative means of obtaining 
the required information when carrying out data protection checks at national level. 

Consistent network management — efficiency 
The  SIS  II  legal  instruments  split  network  management  between  the  Commission  and  eu-
LISA along the lines of financing and contracting versus supervision, security and provider-
relations.  It  is  advisable  to  confer  the  sole  responsibility  to  eu-LISA  for  managing  the 
network  as  the  entity  in  charge  of  the  operational  management  of  Central  SIS  II  and  the 
communication infrastructure..  Furthermore, it is advisable that network decisions are made 
commonly, covering the possibility of a common network access point for additional systems 
including  VIS  and  EURODAC.  Consolidating  network  responsibilities  is  expected  to 
streamline  network  management,  provide  a  single  point  of  contact  to  Member  States,  and 
allow for more effective reactions to networking problems. 

Inefficient change management procedure — efficiency 
The  change  management  procedure  for  SIS  II  has  been  raised  on  several  occasions  in  the 
SISVIS  Committee  meetings.  One  of  the  main  issues  relates  to  when  and  how  the  SISVIS 
Committee  is  involved  in  the  change  management  process,  notably  regarding  initiating  and 
endorsing changes before changes are implemented and ensuring that interest of the end-users 
is duly taken into account throughout the process. The analysis of the change requests from 
technical  point  of  view  is  carried  out  by  eu-LISA  assisted  by  Member  States  in  the  SIS  II 
Advisory  Group  and  in  particular  in  its  sub-group,  the  Change  Management  Group.  The 
recommendations of the Change Management Group must be adopted with consensus by the 
Advisory  Group.  The  SISVIS  Committee  must  deliver  an  opinion  on  the  changes  which 
require  national  implementation.  Strong  coordination  is  required  from  eu-LISA  and  the 
Commission to ensure the full consistency of the process.  

Moreover, the change management process must remain flexible concerning SIS by allowing 
changes  to  be  made  rapidly  if  operational  needs  require  so.  During  the  operation  of  SIS  II 
changes  related  to  foreign  fighters  have  been  implemented  very  quickly  by  eu-LISA  and 
Member States, other changes (e.g. adding laissez-passer issued by the European Union to the 
code tables, shortening the expiry date for credit card alerts, etc.) however, very subject of a 
very  long  procedure.  An  additional  challenge  of  the  process  relate  to  the  complexity  of 
making changes in SIS II at national level which requires national systems and relevant end-
user  applications  to  be  updated  in  addition  to  the  central  system.  Therefore,  it  is  rather 
difficult  to  set  a  target  date  when  all  Member  State  can  implement  the  change  at  the  same 
time.  It  necessitates  strong  coordination  and  discipline  from  eu-LISA  as  well  as  from 
Member States. 

5.2.2 Future needs 
The key future technical challenge is the expected increase in use of SIS II. This increased 
use could be the result of expansion of its user base, e.g. including national immigration and 
naturalisation  service  authorities  that  are  responsible  for  decisions  regarding  requests  of 
admission and naturalisation of third-country nationals, or wider access for Europol as well as 
a  new  access  to  the  European  Border  and  Cost  Guard  Agency.  The  addition  of  an  AFIS 
would increase the number of transactions; for example, visa applicants would be checked in 
SIS II using fingerprints as well as name and date of birth to ensure that they have not tried to 
use an alias. 

The  highest  source  of  use  for  SIS  II  is  expected  to  come  from  automated  checks  such  as 
automatic ANPR, and facial recognition (if legally permitted) at border control points such as 
airports.  Automated  checks  such  as  these  generate  millions  of  queries  per  day  and  huge 
increases in query requests can be experienced when Member States introduce such systems. 

20 

 
 
The  underlying  concern,  however,  for  the  future  capacity  of  SIS  II  is  the  need  to  increase 
storage capacity. 

Increased alert information — effectiveness and efficiency 
Future changes are expected to increase the amount of information held in alerts. As well as 
including additional information, alerts will also include coding that allows the national and 
central systems to treat information differently. This will:  

  provide  as  much  information  as  possible  in  the  alert,  minimising  supplementary 

information exchange through SIRENE forms;  

  allow alerts to be better categorised (e.g. on missing person cases); and  
 

improve alert flagging so that alerts can be temporarily suspended or deleted. 

Extended use of biometric data — effectiveness and efficiency 
One of the new functionalities in SIS II is the use of biometric data, including the impending 
automatic matching of fingerprints and, later, facial recognition (if legally permitted).   

Extension of automated tasks on alerts — efficiency 
As part of the feedback provided to the evaluation, Member States commented on additional 
automation  in  handling  alerts.  This  includes  the  automatic  update  of  alerts  (for  missing 
person  cases  when  a  child  becomes  an  adult)  and  automatic  deletion  (when  the  executing 
Member State  forwards a valid address to the issuing Member State in relation to  alerts on 
persons sought to assist with a judicial procedure). Automated processes and scheduling are 
already  implemented  in  SIS  II;  the  extension  of  these  is  not  considered  likely  to  have  an 
effect on the overall system architecture. 

5.2.3 Conclusions 
This assessment began by establishing a baseline of issues to consider in developing technical 
solutions, drawing on currently  highlighted issues and expected future  needs with  technical 
implications.  The  key  needs  identified  in  this  process  are:  (i)  ensuring  maximum  business 
continuity, taking all possible steps to address current limitations and (ii) ensuring that SIS II 
is capable of handling the increased usage, especially in terms of querying, expected in the 
near future. 

Central SIS II and overall architecture 
  The ‘read capacity’ and performance of Central SIS II should be increased. 
  There  should  be  a  back-up  site  update  and  upgrade  process  to  ensure  minimal  business 

continuity loss. 

  There should be increased central system test capabilities. 
  There  should  be  the  possibility  to  develop  N.SIS  II  implementations,  shared  between 

Member States. 

National optimisation and harmonisation (a distinct N.SIS II developed by each Member State) 
  The logs on alert history, retained at national level should be optional. 
  Query  logging  should  be  selective,  especially  in  cases  such  as  ANPR,  and  subject  to 

standardised rules. 

  XML  messages  should  be  replaced  with  JSON  objects  (technical  change  on  data 

exchange format). 
ICD national implementation should be complete implementation of the ICD. 

 
  National copies (partial) for N.SIS II should be mandatory. 
  Each N.SIS II should have a mandatory back-up system. 
  There should be a common blueprint for consistent N.SIS II configuration.  

5.3 THE SECURITY OF CENTRAL SIS II 

21 

 
 
ISO/IEC  27 001  and  CD(2006)3602.  While  all  of 

The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) carried out a security audit in relation to 
SIS  II  (the  subject  was  also  covered  in  the  evaluation  of  eu-LISA).  This  made 
recommendations that, when addressed by eu-LISA, will improve overall SIS II security and 
compliance  with 
the  EDPS 
recommendations are important, recommendations on ‘security policy’ and ‘risk assessment’ 
should  be  implemented  as  a  priority.  No  recommendations  were  made  in  relation  to  the 
architecture  of  SIS  II  and  the  services  offered  by  the  central  unit  of  the  system,  although 
several  procedural  issues  were  highlighted.  eu-LISA  should  make  sure  that  when 
implementing the EDPS recommendations, it covers all provisions relating to the security of 
Central SIS II, which are mentioned in Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 

5.3.1 Coherence — network security 
Security is provided effectively and is consistent with the legal instruments. The Commission 
asked  eu-LISA  to  provide  a  detailed  breakdown  of  the  most  critical  network  incidents 
affecting  the  availability  of  the  SIS  II  between  its  entry  into  operations  and  the  date  the 
information was provided.   

Overall breakdown of the incidents by their severity 

5.3.2 Conclusions 
No  recommendations  were  made  in  relation  to  the  architecture  of  SIS  II  or  the  services 
offered  by  Central  SIS  II.  Taken  together  with  the  results  of  the  analyses  of  incidents  in 
Central  SIS  II  and  the  network,  which  showed  that  there  had  been  no  incidents  where  the 
integrity  of  SIS  II  data  was  compromised,  the  overall  conclusion  is  that  Central  SIS  II 
security is highly effective. 

6.  THE RESULTS ACHIEVED BY SIS II AGAINST THE ORIGINAL OBJECTIVES 

AND THE CONTINUING VALIDITY OF THE UNDERLYING RATIONALE OF SIS 
II 

6.1 NUMBER OF VALID (NON-EXPIRED) RECORDS 2013-201515 

Distribution and trends 
In  2014  and  2015,  the  competent  authorities  of  the  Member  States  created  more  than  13 
million  alerts,  a  clear  demonstration  of  the  system’s  importance  for  border  control  and 
facilitating  law enforcement cooperation  within the Schengen area and, thus, its EU added-
value. It would have been impossible to achieve these results at regional or national level. 

15  Valid (non-expired) records are the alerts in SIS II which can be searched by end-users. 

22 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2013 

2014 

861 900 

797 764 

2015 

793 878 

3 241 809 

3 298 541 

3 401 517 

Alert 

Person 

Vehicle 

Aircraft 

Boat 

Boat engine 

Container 

Firearm 

Banknote 

265 968 

Blank document 

768 620 

7 

1 046 

1 691 

18 

10 

267 123 

981 211 

3 288 

9 735 

96 

431 121 

457 059 

Industrial equipment 

4 252 

42 783 

19 

271 893 

1 107 569 

6 608 

19 815 

302 

486 154 

84 426 

Issued document 

39 836 478 

43 552 428 

48 357 109 

Licence plate 

2 157 328 

2 470 227 

Security 

Vehicle 
document 

394 918 

1 432 409 

registration 

2 314 233 

2 657 355 

2 786 092 

3 123 969 

3 035 305 

Total alerts 

50 279 389 

55 970 029 

63 474 656 

6.2 THE NUMBER OF TIMES SIS II HAS BEEN ACCESSED BY END-USERS 

The  legal  instruments  require  statistics  to  be  kept  on  the  number  of  times  SIS  II  data  were 
accessed by end-users in the Member States.  

Queries  in  SIS  II  cover  all  checks  of  persons  and  objects.  Most  people  will  think  of  a  law 
enforcement  officer  or  border  guard  carrying  out  a  check  on  a  person,  a  document  or  a 
vehicle;  a  manual  check.  However,  there  are  situations  where  checks  are  carried  out  in  an 
automated  fashion.  This  can  be  carried  out  on  the  licence  plates  of  vehicles  by  ANPR 
systems,  on  cruise  ship  manifests  or  on  lists  containing  Passenger  Name  Records.  Member 
States can report on these automated checks, if their computer systems allow such separation. 

In 2013 an overall figure per Member State was recorded but it became clear that this picture 
did not provide sufficient detail to assess how SIS II was being used. As a result, the SISVIS 
Committee  agreed  to  a  more  detailed  break-down  of  the  annual  statistics.  The  statistics  for 
2014 and 2015 show queries carried out in SIS II, 'create, update and delete' transactions for 
alerts and transactions which change the expiry date of an alert, thereby prolonging its life in 
SIS II.  

23 

 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
The  usefulness  of  SIS  is  diminished,  however,  that  in  certain  Member  States  the  national 
police or immigration databases are not searched in parallel with SIS therefore the SIS search 
must be carried out with a separate search transaction depending on the consideration of the 
end-users. It has been noticed in the course of Schengen evaluations that the number of SIS 
searches  was  significantly  lower  if  the  SIS  was  not  incorporated  in  a  parallel  search 
mechanism. In such cases the cross-border dimension of a crime may be missed. 

6.3 OVERALL HITS 

A hit on an alert is defined in the SIRENE Manual as follows: 

A hit occurs in SIS II when: 
(a) a search is conducted by a user, 
(b) the search reveals a foreign alert in SIS II, 
(c) data concerning the alert in SIS II matches the search data, and 
(d) further actions are requested as a result of the hit 

The figures used reflect the hits achieved by Member States on their own territory on alerts 
issued by other Member States. 

HITS 
Art  26  of  the SIS  II 
Decision 
Art  24  of  the SIS  II 
Regulation 
Art  32  of  the SIS  II 
Decision 
Art  34  of  the SIS  II 
Decision 

2013 
5 777 

2014 
8 774 

2015 
11 156 

TOTAL 
25 707 

22 702 

25 888 

30 501 

79 091 

2 667 

3 961 

5 713 

12 341 

18 068 

31 255 

34 511 

83 834 

24 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Art  36  of  the SIS  II 
Decision 
Art  38  of  the SIS  II 
Decision 
Total 

14 169 

23 942 

34 313 

72 424 

23 439 

34 115 

40 253 

97 807 

16

86 822 

127 935 

156 447 

371 204 

Note: In this report when counting hits, the figures used are those reported by Member States on hits achieved on their individual territories 
on alerts issued by another Member State. This provides the most reliable data. Due to the entry into operations  of SIS II on 9 April 2013, 
the figures for 2013 are part-year figures. Accordingly, percentage increases will only be calculated on the difference between 2014 and 
2015 in order to avoid distortion. The raw figures for the 267 days of 2013 when SIS II was running have been provided.   

6.4 MAIN IDENTITIES, ALIASES AND MISUSED IDENTITIES 

There was an increase in the total number of all identities. Given the overall fall in the total 
number  of  alerts  on  persons  and  a  3 %  drop  in  main  identities,  this  figure  indicates  an 
increase  in  the  use  of  additional  identities.  These  are  either  an  alias  (a  false  identity)  or  a 
misused  identity  (a  potentially  innocent  person’s  real  identity  being  misused  by  another 
person; although it has been  known for co-conspirators to re-use  one identity, based on the 
availability of documents for unlawful use). The number of aliases increased by almost 19 %. 

Main identities 
Alias 
Misused identities 
TOTAL 

2014 
756 391 
244 272 
115 
1 000 778 

2015 
737 515 
290 443 
142 
1 028 090 

6.5 AUTHORITIES HAVING A RIGHT TO ACCESS ALERTS 

Access to data entered in SIS II and the right to search such data directly or in a copy of SIS 
II data is reserved to the authorities responsible for border control, other law enforcement and 
customs checks carried out within the Member State concerned, and the coordination of such 
checks by designated authorities. National judicial authorities, including those responsible for 
launching  public  prosecutions  in  criminal  proceedings  and  for  judicial  inquiries  prior  to 
charge,  may  also  access  these  data  in  carrying  out  their  tasks,  as  provided  for  in  national 
legislation, as can their coordinating authorities.  

The right to access and directly search data entered in SIS II and data on documents relating 
to persons entered in accordance with Article 38(2)(d) and (e) of the SIS II Decision may be 
exercised by:  

 
 
 

the authorities responsible for issuing visas;  
the central authorities responsible for examining visa applications and  
the authorities responsible for issuing residence permits and administering legislation 
relating  to  third-country  nationals  when  applying  the  EU  acquis  relating  to  the 
movement of persons. 

The use of SIS II by customs authorities varies. A questionnaire sent out on 11 January 2016 
to  the  experts  on  the  SISVIS  Committee  showed  that,  in  most  Member  States,  customs 
officers have read-only access to SIS II. In many Member States, SIS II is mainly used within 
the course of a customs-related criminal investigation. SIS II is not systematically consulted 

16   Part-year figures. 

25 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
by  customs  officers  performing  surveillance  and  customs  control  tasks.  Checks  against  the 
SIS  II  are  only  carried  out  manually.  No  Member  State  applies  automated  processes  for 
cross-checking  customs  information  systems  with  SIS  II,  even  though  it  is  clear  that  some 
categories of object alerts (such as containers, vehicles, firearms, boat engines and industrial 
equipment) fall largely within the competence of customs control at the external border. 

There  is  significant  EU  added  value  to  the  transparency  requirement  for  Member  States  to 
forward to eu-LISA for publication the list of national authorities empowered to search and 
insert alerts to SIS II, as it facilitates the rights of individuals to access their data and allows 
the monitoring of the purpose limitation of those authorities. 

6.6 INSTITUTIONAL USERS: EUROJUST AND EUROPOL 

Eurojust and Europol are granted access to SIS II data under Article 41 of the SIS II Decision 
(Europol) and Article 42 (Eurojust). 

  Europol has access to alerts under the following Articles:  

  26 — alerts for arrest;  
  36 — alerts for discreet and specific checks;  
  38 — objects sought for the purposes of seizure or use as evidence in criminal 

proceedings.  

  Eurojust has access to alerts under the following Articles:  

  26 — alerts for arrest;  
  32 — alerts on missing persons;  
  34 — persons sought to assist with a judicial procedure;  
  38 — objects for seizure or use as evidence in criminal proceedings.  

Both agencies can carry out queries in the central SIS II, but neither has a copy of SIS II data. 
Equally, neither agency can create alerts in SIS II. The two agencies are not covered by the 
evaluation framework on the use of SIS II. Therefore, in order to assess use of the system the 
Commission carried out a fact-finding visit. The findings are set out in a specific section of 
Annex 1. 

7.  REVIEW OF THE APPLICATION OF ALERTS FOR THE REFUSAL OF ENTRY 

OR STAY UNDER ARTICLE 24 AND 26 SIS II REGULATION 

7.1 A BRIEF OVERVIEW 

This category of alert is only applicable to third-country nationals. 

Where a competent court or authority has decided that a third-country national should not be 
allowed  to  enter  or  stay  in  the  Schengen  territory  (generally  for  criminal,  state  security  or 
migration/visa irregularity reasons), the authority either must or may enter an alert in SIS II 
with  EU/Schengen-wide  effect.  Upon  a  hit,  the  person  will  be  refused  entry  at  the  external 
border or will be removed from the Schengen area if found on the national territory of any 
Member  State.  Due  to  the  duration  of  the  refusal  of  entry  or  stay,  this  category  of  alert  is 
retained in SIS II after a hit as the ban is still active up to its date of expiry. Article 24(2) and 
(3)  describe  the  two  grounds  for  issuing  an  alert:  Article  24(2)  relates  to  third-country 
nationals  who  pose  a  threat  to  public  or  national  security,  whereas  Article  24(3)  relates  to 
third-country nationals who have not complied with immigration legislation. Article 26 of the 

26 

 
 
 
 
  
 
 
SIS  II  Regulation  establishes  that  SIS  II  must  also  contain  alerts  relating  to  third-country 
nationals who are the subject of a restrictive measure. 

Alerts  under  Article  24  are  only  used  by  the  26  EU  Member  States  which  are  part  of  the 
Schengen area without internal border controls. Romania and Bulgaria are allowed to see but 
not to enter refusal of entry alerts and they are not obliged to give effect to alerts issued by 
other MS. The UK receives a notification of refusal of entry alerts issued by other Member 
States if it wants to create an alert on the same person which would be incompatible with an 
existing refusal of entry alert. 

The  number  of  alerts  has  decreased  since  SIS  II  began  operating,  falling  from  623 203 
(31 December  2013)  to  492 727  alerts  (31 December  2015)  –      a  decrease  of  21 %.  The 
reasons for this decrease are that certain Member States have regularised many of the third-
country nationals who were subject of a refusal of entry alert and they granted them residence 
permits.  Other  Member  States  have  started  with  a  systematic  quality  control  targeting  this 
specific  alert  category  as  it  happened  that  several  authorities  in  the  same  Member  State 
created a refusal of entry alert on the same person as they did not consult the system or were 
negligent. 

Alerts in SIS II 
Third-country  nationals  to  be  refused  entry  or  stay  into  the 
Schengen Area  

2013 
623 20
3 

2014 
547 49
2 

2015 
492 727 

Hits 

2013 
22 702 

2014 
25 888 

2015 
30 501 

In accordance with Appendix 5 of the SIRENE Manual the following are considered a hit for 
refusal of entry alerts:  

(a)  refusals of entry at the external border as a result of a foreign alert;  
(b) following  a  hit  on  a  foreign  alert  for  refusal  of  entry  under  Article  24,  refusals  to 
issue a short-stay visa (including at embassies and consulates) or a residence permit, 
withdrawals of a residence permit or a long-stay visa. 

7.2 KEY THEMES EMERGING 

Legal aspects 
An  alert  for  refusal  of  entry  issued  by  one  Member  State  applies  throughout  the  Schengen 
area. The legal consequences of the presence of the alert in SIS II within the context of border 
checks on persons are laid down in two other EU instruments that are part of the Schengen 
acquis: 

17

  Schengen Borders Code (SBC)

: the existence of an alert in SIS II for the purposes 
of refusing entry is a ground for refusing entry to the Schengen area, in accordance 
with  Article  6(1)(d)  and  14(1)  of  the  SBC.  Consultation  of  SIS  II  is  therefore  a 
mandatory  part  of  the  entry  border  checks  on  third-country  nationals,  as  set  out  in 
Article 8(3)(a)(vi) of the SBC. 

17   OJ L 77, 23.3.2016, p. 1. 

27 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
  Visa Code: Article 32(a)(v) of the Visa Code

 states that a short stay visa shall be 
refused to a person for whom an alert has been issued in SIS II for the purpose of 
refusing entry. 

18

The EU-wide effect of the alerts is not unconditional as, in particular circumstances, a person 
subject to a refusal of entry alert may still be allowed to enter. These circumstances include: 

  Article 32 (1) of the Visa Code establishes that a visa with limited territorial scope may be 
issued  despite  the  existence  of  a  refusal  of  entry  alert,  on  humanitarian  grounds,  for 
reasons of national interest or because of international obligations. 

  Article 6(5)(a) of the SBC allows Member States to authorise transit for a person subject 
to an alert who holds a residence permit or long stay visa issued by another Member State. 
In  this  situation,  a  consultation  procedure  should  be  initiated  under  Article  25(2)  of  the 
Schengen Implementing Convention. The Member States that issue the alert nevertheless 
retain the right to include the third-country national on their national list of alerts and to 
refuse him/her entry at their external borders. 

  Article 6(5)(c) of the SBC provides that a Member State may, despite the alert, authorise a 
person  to  enter  its  territory  on  humanitarian  grounds,  on  grounds  of  national  interest  or 
because of international obligations. In these cases, consultation with the Member State(s) 
that issued the alert is not required but the latter must be informed by the Member State 
authorising the entry. 

There is no EU legislation laying down the EU-wide effect of a refusal of entry or stay alert 
for third-country nationals who are staying on a Member State's territory. This might result 
from several situations: 

  A third-country national is staying illegally on a Member States territory and is the 
subject of an alert in SIS II. In accordance with Article 6(1) of the Return Directive, a 
return decision needs to be issued. However,  the executing Member State may  grant  the 
person  the  right  to  stay  in  accordance  with  Article  6(4)  of  the  Return  Directive  for 
compassionate, humanitarian or other reasons. In this case, Article 25(1) of the Schengen 
Implementing  Convention  (SIC)  applies.  It  states  that  that  where  a  country  considers 
issuing a residence permit to a third-country national for whom an alert has been issued for 
the purposes of refusing entry, it must first consult the country that has issued the alert and 
take account of its interests. The residence permit can only be issued for serious reasons, 
in  particular  cases  of  a  humanitarian  nature  or  arising  from  international  obligations. 
Where the Member State decides to grant a residence permit, the other Member State must 
withdraw its SIS II alert but may nevertheless put the person in question on its national list 
of alerts. 

  A third-country national is staying illegally on a Member State territory but holds a 
residence permit issued by another Member State. In accordance with Article 6(2) of 
the  Return  Directive,  the  executing  Member  State  shall  require the  person  to  go  back  to 
the  Member  State  that  issued  the  residence  permit  or  authorisation  to  stay,  unless  the 
person’s immediate departure is required for reasons of public policy or national security. 
In  case  of  non-compliance,  the  executing  Member  State  shall  issue  a  return  decision  in 
accordance  with  Article  6(1)  of  the  Return  Directive.  Article  25(2)  of  the  SIC  applies 
when the person is subject to a return decision, while holding a residence permit or other 
authorisation to stay from another Member State, and an alert for refusal of entry or stay is 
issued. This Article states that the country issuing the alert must consult the country which 

18   Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing 

a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code) (OJ L 243, 15.9.2009, p. 1). 

28 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
issued  the  residence  permit  to  determine  whether  there  are  sufficient  reasons  for 
withdrawing  the  residence  permit.  If  the  residence  permit  is  not  withdrawn,  the  country 
issuing the alert must withdraw the alert but may nevertheless put the person in question 
on its national list of alerts. 

  A  third-country  national  is  the  subject  of  an  alert  in  SIS  II  but  holds  a  residence 
permit  issued  by  the  Member  State  where  he  is  staying.  In  this  case  the  Return 
Directive  does  not  apply,  as  the  person  is  not  staying  illegally  on  the  Member  State 
territory. Article 25(2) of the SIC applies in this situation and the consultation procedure 
described in the previous bullet point needs to be carried out. 

The decision to grant a residence permit always takes priority over the decision to issue an 
alert  for  refusal  of  entry  or  stay  as,  in  all  situations  under  Article  25 of  the  SIC,  the  alert 
needs  to  be  withdrawn  if  it  is  decided  to  allow  the  residence  permit  to  continue.  This 
obviously has an impact on the alert's effectiveness. 

Lack of comprehensive statistics - effectiveness  
A lack of comprehensive EU-wide statistics makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of 
Article  24.  Hit  numbers  cover  situations  in  which  the  alert  has  taken  effect,  but  not  the 
situations in which entry was allowed or a right to stay was granted despite the existence of 
an alert. Furthermore, there is no distinction in the statistics between hits achieved during an 
application process for a visa, at an external border or on the Member State territory. Member 
State  statistics  collected  by  Eurostat  in  2014  show  that  12 205  third-country  nationals  were 
refused entry on the basis of an alert in SIS II in 2014. The overall hit number for 2014 was 
25 888. This might indicate that fewer than half the hits occur at an external border. 

Cases in which the required action was not taken 
The measure's effectiveness can be partly demonstrated using SIRENE G and H forms. A ‘G 
form’ is sent when the required action is taken in the event of a hit. An ‘H form’ is sent when 
the action was not taken (either at the external border or within the territory). However, the 
figures  relating  to  the  forms  unfortunately  do  not  disclose  a  complete  picture  as  Member 
States  may  choose  not  to  be  informed  about  hits  on  their  Article  24  alerts.  Therefore,  the 
number of G forms sent does not correspond to the number of hits reported and the number of 
H forms does not reflect the total number of cases where the action was not taken at entry or 
on the territory. 

2014 

Number of outgoing G forms  11 623 
Number of outgoing H forms  7 056 
Total 

18 679 

2015 
12 007 
7 264 
19 271 

In  both  years,  G  forms  accounts  for  approximately  60 %  of  cases  and  H  forms  account  for 
approximately 40 %. This can be used as an indication of the ratio of cases where the alert has 
taken effect in comparison to the cases where the alert has not taken effect. The table below 
demonstrates  that,  in  comparison  with  other  alert  categories  on  persons,  the  number  of  H 
forms compared to the number of G forms is very high – i.e. that the number of cases where 
action is not taken is comparatively high with this kind of alert. 

2015 

forms 

G 
sent 

Alert 
refusal 
entry 
12 00
7 

for 
of 

Alert 
arrest 

62 %  9 804 

for 

Alert 
missing 
person 
96 %  4 923 

on 

94 %  24 02

for 
Alert 
discreet 
or 
specific check 
99 % 

Alert 
judicial 
procedure 
26 200 

for 

99 % 

7 

29 

 
 
 
 
 
forms 

H 
sent 
Total 

7 264 

38 %  450 

4 % 

337 

6 % 

233 

1 % 

270 

1 % 

19 27
1 

10 25
4 

5 260 

24 26
0 

26 470 

The simultaneous increase in the number of G forms and H forms in 2015 may indicate that 
the increase in the number of hits in 2015 is not due to improved effectiveness but rather to 
an increase in the number of checks and improved data quality for Article 24 alerts leading to 
more positive matches. 

Use of the consultation procedure - effectiveness, efficiency and coherence/consistency - 
Article  25  of  the  SIC  sets  out  a  mechanism  for  ensuring  that  Member  States  consult  each 
other  and  take  into  account  each  other’s  assessment  when  deciding  whether  to  grant  a 
residence permit and for avoiding situations in which an alert co-exists with a valid residence 
permit.  Article  25(1)  sets  out  the  process  to  follow  if  an  alert  exists  in  SIS  II  but  another 
Member State is considering granting a residence permit. Article 25(2) sets out the process if 
an alert has been issued for a person who already holds a valid residence permit. The table 
below shows the number of outgoing and incoming consultations reported by Member States 
within the context of an SIS II alert: 

Number of outgoing consultations 
Number of incoming consultations 
Total 
Note: the numbers do not completely tally as it may occur that one consultation is sent to several Member States. 

2014 
5 945 
6 884 
12 829 

2015 
6 043 
6 608 
12 651 

In  an  ad  hoc  query  launched  by  the  EMN  at  the  request  of  the  Commission,  all  Member 
States confirmed their use of the consultation procedure in cases falling under Article 25(1) 
of the SIC. Member States reported some examples of when they had used the consultation 
procedures  through  SIS  II.  Nine  Member  States  out  of  26  provided  statistics  on  successful 
consultation  procedures.  The  statistics  include  consultations  made  to  other  Member  States 
and the replies sent to Member States who had made their own requests. These nine Member 
States reported a total of 5 352 successful consultation procedures. Statistics on the use of the 
consultation procedure should be considered in conjunction with statistics on the exchange of 
SIRENE N and O forms. In the SIRENE Manual the consultation procedure is implemented 
as follows: 

  Procedure  under  Article  25(1):  If  a  Member  State  that  is  considering  granting  a 
residence  permit  or  visa  discovers  that  the  applicant  concerned  is  the  subject  of  an 
alert  for  refusal  of  entry  or  stay  issued  by  another  Member  State,  it  shall  consult  the 
issuing  Member  State  via  the  SIRENE  Bureaux.  The  Member  State  considering 
granting a residence permit or visa shall use an N form to inform the issuing Member 
State  about  the  decision  to  grant  the  residence  permit  or  visa.  If  the  Member  State 
decides  to  grant  the  residence  permit  or  visa,  the  alert  shall  be  deleted.  The  person 
may,  nevertheless,  be  put  on  the  issuing  Member  State’s  national  list  of  alerts  for 
refusal of entry. 

  Procedure  under  Article  25(2):  If  a  Member  State  that  entered  an  alert  for  refusal  of 
entry or stay finds out that the person who is the subject of the alert has been granted a 
residence  permit  or  visa,  it  shall  instigate  a  consultation  procedure  with  the  Member 
State that granted the residence permit or visa, via the SIRENE Bureaux. The Member 
State  which  granted  the  residence  permit  or  visa  shall  use  an  O  form  to  inform  the 
issuing  Member  State  about  the  decision  whether  or  not  to  withdraw  the  residence 
permit or visa. If this Member State decides to maintain the residence permit or visa, 

30 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the  alert  shall  be  deleted.  The  person  can,  nevertheless,  be  put  on  a  Member  State’s 
national list of alerts for refusal of entry. 

Number of N forms sent 
= number of outgoing consultations under Article 25(1) SIC 
Number of O forms sent 
= number of replies to consultations under Article 25(2) SIC 
Total 

2014 
2015 
5 277  4 666 

2 232  2 145 

7 509  6 811 

These figures may indicate that:  

a)  most  consultations  take  place  within  the  context  of  Article  25(1)  of  the  SIC.  This  is 
confirmed  by  the  replies  to  the  ad  hoc  query  by  the  EMN:  11 Member  States  reported 
mostly using the consultation procedure under Article 25(1) of the SIC, while 8 Member 
States reported applying mainly Article 25(2) of the SIC;  

b)  in at least 5 000 cases per year, a Member State considered granting a residence permit 

despite the existence of an alert;  

c)   in at least 2 000 cases per year, there was a situation where a residence permit co-existed 
with a refusal of entry alert. This number may be much higher as an M form or H form 
may  also  be  used  in  such  cases.  It  should  be  noted  that  these  figures  do  not  cover  the 
situation  under  Article  6(5)(c)  of  the  SBC,  where  an  H  form  will  be  sent  if  entry  was 
granted despite the existence of an alert. 

Need for additional data in the alert to allow field officers to take the requested action - 
effectiveness  
In their replies to the questionnaire, several Member States mentioned as a weakness of the 
system that the information contained in the alert does not reflect the specific reasons it has 
been issued. The SIS II Regulation provides for four possible reasons: 

1.  Article 24(2)(a): ‘conviction’; 
2.  Article 24(2)(b): ‘security threat’; 
3.  Article 24(3): ‘illegal stay’; 
4.  Article 26: ‘restrictive measure’. 

It may also be useful to indicate whether an alert relates to a third-country national who has 
the right of free movement within the EU (Article 25 of the SIS II Regulation). 

Member States expressed the opinion that additional information in the alert would increase 
efficiency  and  allow  quick  and  correct  decision-making.  The  following  responses  to  the 
questionnaire were received: 

  Sub-division of the categories of alerts for refusal of entry, suggesting a clear distinction 
between  refusals  of  entry  based  on:  i)  national  security;  ii)  criminal  reasons;  iii) 
immigration law. Such a move would facilitate the gathering of statistics on reasons for 
refusals of entry and provide an indication to the officer on the ground of the background 
to a case when a hit is achieved.   

  The inclusion of a remark on the underlying reason for a refusal of entry alert. 
  The  alert  itself  should  hold  the  information  of  the  basis  of  the  decision  underlying  the 
alert, that is, a field indicating whether the alert was created due to criminal conviction, 
non-respect  of  visa/migration  procedures,  against  a  person  benefiting  from  the  right  of 
free movement or due to restrictive measures. 

31 

 
 
 
 
 
  The importance of knowing whether the alert subject had been informed of the refusal of 

entry alert or not (when the person is in a third country it is not always feasible).   

  A copy of the refusal of entry notice to be attached to the alert. 
  More information in the alert to reduce exchange of supplementary information. 

The consultation procedure and delays in the exchange of information - efficiency - 
In their replies to the questionnaire and the EMN ad hoc query, Member States reported many 
flaws  in  the  exchange  of  supplementary  information  and  the  consultation  procedure.  A  key 
issue is the delay in receiving information from other Member States, including after a hit on 
the  reason  for  the  alert.  Responses  routinely  do  not  arrive  within  the  12-hour  deadline 
required  by  the  SIRENE  Manual.  In  order  to  be  able  to  answer  within  the  timeframe, 
SIRENE Bureaux should have direct access to the relevant national databases. 

Quality of information - effectiveness  
It is difficult to gather evidence to identify an individual (fingerprints, photos, copies of ID 
documents  or  residence  permits)  from  other  Member  States.  Documents  provided  in  the 
system  are  sometimes  not  of  good  quality.  This  causes  difficulty  in  identifying  the  third-
country national, especially when names are written in other alphabets. 

Difficulties with the consultation procedure - effectiveness and efficiency 
Member States reported specific operational difficulties with the SIC consultation procedure: 

  Responses  to  consultation  procedures  do  not  provide  enough  detail,  such  as  the  reasons, 
validity and duration of the alert or of the residence permit/visa to be granted. Introducing 
common  guidelines  on  the  compilation  of  a  response  to  consultation  procedures  may  be 
useful. 

  Requests  to  delete  an  SIS  II  alert  after  issuing  a  residence  permit  to  the  concerned 

individual are often not processed or are delayed by the competent Member State. 

  There are cases where one Member State imposed an entry ban on a third-country national 

while another Member State had issued him/her a residence permit. 

  Complexity of the N and O Schengen forms used in the consultation procedure. Revision 
of  the  forms  used  for  consultation  between  the Member  States  would  assist,  as  different 
procedures adopted by Member States in completing the forms cause delays and problems 
in  consultation.  Standardised  procedures  are  already  set  out  in  the  SIRENE  Manual. 
Revising the N and O forms in line with harmonised procedures would also simplify the 
considerable workload of the SIRENE Bureaux in their role as a conduit for consultation. 

Similar issues were reported to the EMN for the purpose of the 2014 study. In one Member 
State,  authorities  have  experienced  problems  when  wanting  to  impose  an  entry  ban  on  an 
individual who poses a risk to public security, but who holds a residence permit in another 
(Member) State. In these cases, information provided does not always lead to withdrawal of 
the residence permit. 

Lack of harmonisation in the deadlines for the consultation procedure - effectiveness, efficiency 
and coherence/consistency - 
  Long  waiting  periods  for  responses  are  experienced  by  most  Member  States,  even  after 
several reminders. This may delay administrative procedures for issuing residence permits. 
A  binding  response  time  for  consultation  procedures  would  assist.  An  example  of  two 
weeks was given. 

  Member  States  have  different  provisions  with  regard  to  deadlines  for  consultation 
procedures  through  SIS  II.  Most  of  them  do  not  provide  for  a  deadline.  However,  some 
Member  States  reported  that  the  reply  to  a  consultation  procedure  is  normally  expected 
within a short timeframe. One Member State sets a limit of 24 hours. 

32 

 
 
 
  Only a few Member States set deadlines for SIS II consultation procedures, either by law 
or  by  administrative  practice.  Some  of  them  set  a  deadline  for  replies  to  launched 
consultations corresponding  to the deadline in the procedure to issue a residence  permit. 
One Member State replied that responses to consultation requests are sent within 24 hours. 

Finding new models for the exchange of supplementary information - effectiveness and efficiency 
In many Member States the immigration authorities are the competent authorities for issuing, 
updating and deleting refusal of entry or stay alerts.  They also take decisions on the return 
and  removal  of  third-country  nationals  apprehended  on  the  Member  State  territory.  The 
exchange  of  supplementary  information  (notification  of  a  hit,  request  for  supplementary 
information to confirm the identity of a person etc.) between Member States takes place via 
the SIRENE Bureaux, which are usually situated within the structure of the police authorities. 
As  a  consequence,  when  information  is  being  exchanged  on  Article  24  alerts,  the  SIRENE 
Bureaux  function  mainly  as  letter  boxes  between  the  relevant  immigration  authorities.  This 
brings two major risks: (1) unnecessary delays in information exchange (as the information 
source is outside SIRENE control) and, as a result, the decision-making process; (2) a loss of 
efficiency  of  SIRENE  communication  could  cause  other  channels  of  communication  to  be 
used. 

The Commission launched a study on the use of SIS II for return purposes. One of the tasks 
carried  out  in  the  study  was  to  analyse  two  models  for  organising  the  exchange  of 
information  on  migration-related  SIS  II  alerts  more  efficiently  and  allowing  immigration 
authorities  to  be  directly  involved.  In  the  study,  two  models  were  examined:  seconding 
migration officers to the SIRENE Bureau (model A); or setting up a separate single point of 
contact (SPOC) (model B).  

The main findings of the study were:  

(a)  Costs would be higher for model B. The model would require the implementation of 
new infrastructure(s), including IT, while model A would require only minor changes 
to the current infrastructure and IT system;  

(b) As  model  B  would  require  new  infrastructure,  it  would  probably  take  more  time  to 

implement than model A;  

(c)  If  model  B  were  chosen,  field  officers  would  need  to  determine  which  of  the  two 
coordinating  authorities  (SIRENE  Bureau  or  new  migration  SPOC)  should  be 
contacted.   

Member States did not express a clear preference for either of the proposed models, as any 
preference will depend on the division of responsibilities at national level. 

7.3 INCONSISTENCY WITH THE RETURN DIRECTIVE – COHERENCE/CONSISTENCY 

The Return Directive provides the EU with common standards and procedures for returning 
persons staying illegally on Member States territories. It determines that Member States may 
not tolerate third-country nationals staying illegally on their territory but must either issue a 
return decision or grant them a right to stay. A return decision is sometimes accompanied by 
an entry ban, prohibiting entry into or stay on EU territory for a specified period. An entry 
ban is always issued if: (1) no period of voluntary return has been granted, or (2) the person 
has not complied with the return decision within the granted period of voluntary departure. In 
other situations, an entry ban is optional. Entry bans issued under the Return Directive have 
EU-wide  effect  and  are  binding  on  all  Member  States  bound  by  the  Return  Directive.  The 
length of entry bans issued under the Return Directive is determined on a case-by-case basis 
but must not exceed five years, unless the person represents a serious threat to public policy, 

33 

 
 
 
 
public  security  or  national  security.  If  that  is  the  case,  entry  bans  issued  under  the  Return 
Directive may exceed five years. An entry ban forms the basis for issuing a refusal of entry or 
a stay alert in SIS II. 

There  are  links  but  also  inconsistencies  between  the  SIS  II  Regulation  and  the  Return 
Directive: 

Article 24 of the SIS II Regulation has a broader scope than the entry bans under the Return 
Directive 
According to the Return Directive, an entry ban relates to third-country nationals who have 
stayed  illegally  on  a  Member  State's  territory,  and  is  always  linked  to  a  return  decision.  A 
refusal  of  entry  alert  under  Article 24  (2)  of  the  SIS  II  Regulation,  on  the  other  hand,  may 
also cover third-country nationals who are not present on the Schengen territory. The Return 
Directive also offers, in Article 2(2), the option of not extending its provisions to:  

(a)  third-country  nationals  who  are  the  subject  of  a  refusal  of  entry  in  accordance  with 
Article  13  of  the  SBC,  or  who  are  apprehended  in  connection  with  irregular  border 
crossing and  

(b) third-country  nationals  who  are  subject  to  a  removal  procedure  as  a  criminal  law 

sanction under domestic law. 

There are no clear links between both instruments, in either the Return Directive or the SIS II 
Regulation 
Recital 18 of the Return Directive states that Member States should have rapid access to 
information on entry bans issued by other Member States and that this information-sharing 
should take place in accordance with the SIS II Regulation. Recital 14 of the Return Directive 
makes clear that entry bans have a European dimension, as they should prohibit the entry into 
and stay on the territory of all Member States. There is no obligation laid down in the Return 
Directive to enter all entry bans in SIS II, thereby causing incoherence with the goal of the 
measure. 

Legally and practically, an entry ban can only be effective in other Member States if accompanied 
by a SIS II alert 
The entry ban can only achieve its EU-wide effect if it is inserted as a refusal of entry or stay 
alert in SIS II, as only the alert – not the decision itself – forms the basis for refusing entry in 
accordance with the SBC or for refusing a short stay visa in accordance with the Visa Code 
(see  above). A complication  occurs when considering the geographical scope of the Return 
Directive  and  the  SIS  II  Regulation.  All  Member  States  and  Associated  Countries 
participating in the provisions of the Schengen acquis are bound by the Return Directive, and 
the SIS II Regulation. There is, however, a particular situation in Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus 
and Croatia.  

These EU Member States already apply the provisions  of the Return Directive but they are 
not yet part of the border-free Schengen area. This means that they cannot issue any alerts in 
SIS  II  for  refusal  of  entry  or  stay. These  Member  States  cannot  create  EU-wide  entry  bans 
through SIS II. 

There is no obligation in the Return Directive to enter all entry bans as an alert in SIS II 
The  SIS  II  Regulation  only  requires  an  alert  to  be  issued  in  some  circumstances:  when  the 
underlying decision is based on a threat to public policy, public security or national security 
(Article 24(2)) an alert is required (subject to the general proportionality principle of SIS II); 
if the decision is based on non-compliance with immigration legislation (Article 24(3)) there 
is  no  such  requirement.  In  their  2014  study,  the  EMN  came  to  the  conclusion  that  ‘not  all 
(Member)  States  systematically  enter  an  alert  into  the  SIS  following  the  imposition  of  an 
entry  ban.  If  not  informed  about  the  entry  ban  imposed  on  a  specific  individual,  (Member) 

34 

 
 
States will not be able to ban entry of that individual into EU territory. The entry ban thereby 
essentially  loses  its  effect  and  will  in  practice  only  apply  to  the  territory  of  the  (Member) 
State that imposed it.’. 

The  evaluation  of  the  application  of  the  Return  Directive  (October  2013)  concluded  that 
‘almost all Member States register every entry ban decision in SIS. However, there are a few 
exceptions. According to a government body, there is some variation among different police 
districts.  In  some  police  districts  the  entry  bans  are  not  systematically  registered  in  SIS. 
Moreover,  in  another  Member  State  not  all  entry  ban  decisions  are  registered  in  SIS.  In 
another  Member  State,  entry  bans  are  issued  on  a  national  level  and  also  on  a  Schengen 
level. Only those entry bans that are applicable to the whole Schengen area are registered in 
SIS.’ 

The maximum retention period of a refusal of entry or stay alert in SIS II does not correspond to 
the maximum length of an entry ban issued in accordance with the Return Directive 
Alerts  can  be  retained  for  three  years,  whereas  an  entry  ban  lasts  for  up  to  five  years  (and 
potentially longer in cases of threats to public policy, public security or national security). A 
SIS II alert may be prolonged after a re-assessment. The maximum retention period set out in 
the  SIS  II  Regulation  should  be  harmonised  with  the  length  of  an  entry  ban  in  the  Return 
Directive.   

There is an inconsistency in terminology between the Return Directive and Article 24 of the SIS II 
Regulation 
An entry ban is defined in Article 3(6) of the Return Directive as an administrative or judicial 
decision  or  act prohibiting  entry into  and stay  on the territory of the Member States  for a 
specific period, accompanying a return decision. Article 24 on the other hand covers alerts for 
the purpose of refusing entry or stay. 

The Return Directive does not include provisions on direct enforceability of alerts for refusal of 
entry or stay 
The same conclusion was reached in the feasibility study on creating a new alert category in 
SIS  II  for  return  decisions.  The  study  concluded,  among  other  issues,  that  the  EU-wide 
follow-up  and  enforcement  of  return  decisions  and  entry  bans  could  more  successfully  be 
achieved with a system of mutual recognition of return decisions and entry bans.   

7.4   LACK OF HARMONISATION WHEN ENTERING ENTRY BANS IN SIS II - EFFECTIVENESS 

AND COHERENCE/CONSISTENCY 

When considering the grounds for issuing alerts laid down in Article 24, a distinction should 
be  made  between  alerts  relating  to  third-country  nationals  who  pose  a  threat  to  public  or 
national  security  (Article  24(2))  and  alerts  relating  to  third-country  nationals  who  have  not 
complied  with  immigration  legislation  (Article  24(3)).  There  is  limited  quantitative  data 
available  on  the  volume  of  alerts  split  along  these  lines,  due  to  the  fact  that  the  alert  itself 
does  not  contain  this  information.  In  the  EMN  query,  only  five  Member  States  reported 
making a distinction between these categories in their national statistics. 

Member States reported the following issues with registering entry bans in SIS II: 

Not all Member States systematically register all entry bans in SIS II 
An entry ban is intended to have an EU-wide effect and the only way of achieving this effect 
is to enter the ban in SIS II. One Member State pointed out that the wording of Article 24 (3) 
is  unhelpful  in  that  it  proposes  that  an  alert  ‘may’  be  entered.  Different  national 
interpretations of this text have resulted in some Member States entering alerts whilst others 
do not, even though this negates the EU-wide effect. The text should be modified to ‘an alert 
shall be entered’. 

35 

 
 
There are different practices with regard to the timing of registration of entry bans in SIS II 
In eleven Member States, entry bans can only be registered in SIS II once the decision is final 
or  immediately  enforceable.  Three  Member  States  also  require  that  the  person  leaves  the 
territory before recording the entry ban. In another Member State, the decision imposing the 
entry ban may be registered in SIS II and enforced before it is final and non-appealable, if the 
third country national does not have the right to stay during the appeals process, e.g. because 
s/he did not have a residence permit prior to the decision or because s/he represents a danger. 

In  contrast,  in  six  Member  States,  entry  ban  alerts  are  inserted  in  SIS  II  as  soon  as  the 
decision is taken, without it needing to be final or enforceable. If the decision is repealed by 
the competent national authority or reviewed by a court, the alert will be also deleted from 
the SIS II. As explained above, an entry ban only can have EU-wide effect from the moment 
it  is  entered  as  an  alert  in  SIS  II.  Therefore,  the  moment  of  registration  in  SIS  II  should 
coincide with the moment the entry ban is enforceable. 

7.5   ENTERING TRAVEL BANS CONSTITUTING A RESTRICTIVE MEASURE IN SIS II - 

EFFECTIVENESS AND COHERENCE/CONSISTENCY   

Travel bans constituting a restrictive measure adopted as Council Decisions, including those 
issued by the United Nations, are given effect via the creation of a refusal of entry alert in SIS 
II. In accordance with Article 26(3) of the SIS II Regulation and section 4.1 of the SIRENE 
Manual,  alerts  are  created  in  SIS  II  by  the  Member  State  holding  the  Presidency  of  the 
Council of the EU. This Member State is also responsible for updating and deleting the alert 
as required. There are several practical problems with this, including: 

  Data  quality.  Travel  bans  are entered  in  SIS II  using  the  personal  data  set  out  in  in  the 
Annex to the relevant Council Decision. Usually it contains last name, first name, date of 
birth and place of birth, but sometimes the data available are not sufficient to enter an alert 
in SIS II (for example, if only the name of the person, or even an alias, is known). If this 
happens, the travel ban cannot be entered in SIS II, as the technical rules do not allow an 
alert to be created for a person without at least a last name and a year of birth. However, 
the SIS II Regulation waives the minimum data quality requirements for these alerts and 
so  there  is  an  inconsistency  between  the  legal  basis  and  the  technical  possibilities,  even 
though such minimal data will not lead to hits. Alerts created on the basis of only a name 
are  not  effective,  as  they  do  not  provide  sufficient  information  to  identify  a  person.  In 
these  cases,  Member  States  should  include  as  much  as  data  as  possible  (such  as 
photographs) in the alert in order to ensure that the travel ban can have effect. 

  Lack  of  coordination.  Each  Member  State  is  responsible  for  creating,  updating  and 
deleting alerts relating to restrictive measures adopted during the period of its presidency. 
Due  to  the  six  monthly  rotation  of  presidencies,  there  is  no  centralised  responsibility. 
Some Member States proposed a centralised solution for creating and following-up these 
alerts. 

7.6   CREATION OF A EUROPEAN BORDER AND COAST GUARD AGENCY 

On 14 September 2016, the European Parliament and the Council adopted the Regulation on 
a  European  Border  and  Coast  Guard  Agency19  establishing  a  European  integrated  border 

19   Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the 
European  Border  and  Cost  Guard  and  amending  Regulation  (EU)  2016/399  of  the  European  Parliament 
and  of  the  Council  and  repealing  Regulation  (EC)  No  863/2007  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 
Council,  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  2007/2004  and  Council  Decision  2005/267/EC  (OJ  L  251, 
16.9.2016, p.1). 

36 

 
 
 
                                                 
management and significantly strengthening the mandate of Frontex, renaming it a European 
Border  and  Coast  Guard  Agency.  The  enhanced  Agency  will  have  expanded  tasks  and 
responsibilities, including the possibility to deploy European Border and Coast Guard Teams 
on a Member State’s territory in case of an urgent situation and will have a stronger role in 
the return of irregular migrants. Within the scope of these competences, the Agency will need 
access to refusal of entry and (future) return decision alerts in SIS II. 

7.7   CONCLUSIONS 

There are many situations in which a Member State may decide to grant a person the right to 
enter into or stay on the territory despite the existence of an Article 24 alert issued by another 
Member  States.  As  a  consequence,  the  EU-wide  effect  of  alerts  is  not  systematically 
achieved.  Furthermore,  despite  the obligation  to  enter  refusal  of  entry  alerts  in  the  SIS,  the 
EU-wide effect of these alerts is not systematically achieved. .This limits the EU added value 
of the measure, as the Return Directive does not include provisions to directly enforce alerts 
for refusal of entry or stay. 

Incomplete statistics mean there is a lack of transparency on the effectiveness of the measure. 
An analysis of the G and H SIRENE forms demonstrates that refusal of entry or stay is the 
least  effective  alert  category  among  alerts  on  persons.  The  alert  achieved  its  effect  in  just 
60 % of cases, whereas for other alert categories on persons, this is true in more than 90 % of 
cases.  There  is  a  lack  of  comprehensive  statistics  on  the  use  of  the  consultation  procedure. 
However, it may be deduced that most consultation take place within the context of Article 
25(1)  of  the  SBC  and  that  there  are,  on  an  annual  basis,  at  least  2 000  cases  in  which  a 
residence permit coexists with a refusal of entry or stay alert. It is very difficult to avoid these 
situations as, in many cases, the Member State issuing the alert may even not be aware of the 
existence of a residence permit due to the lack of an EU-wide system. 

Member  States  reported  shortcomings  in  the  processes  for  and  quality  of  information 
exchange  on  alerts  for refusal  of  entry  or  stay,  especially  in  the  context  of  the  consultation 
procedure.  These  flaws  highlight  a  significant  procedural  weakness  as  the  deadline  for  all 
other forms of SIRENE response is twelve hours. It is clear that the lack of harmonisation in 
consultation  processes  and  tardy  responses  cause  operational  staff  and  the  individual 
concerned  considerable  problems.  In  some  cases,  the  need  to  exchange  supplementary 
information through the SIRENE Bureaux may be removed by adding additional data to the 
alert  itself,  leading  to  more  efficient  and  reliable  identification  and  decision-making 
processes. 

There are links but also inconsistencies between the provisions on entry bans (as set out in the 
Return Directive) and refusal of entry or stay alerts (as set out in the SIS II Regulation). Both 
instruments were drafted from different perspectives and therefore are not fully aligned. This 
leads  not  only  to  limits  on  the  EU-wide  effect  of  entry  bans  but  also  to  a  lack  of 
harmonisation  in  the  criteria  for  issuing  alerts.  More  harmonisation  could  be  achieved  by 
making  it  mandatory  to  enter  an  entry  ban  in  SIS  II  from  the  moment  the  decision  is 
enforceable. 

8.  ALERTS FOR ARREST FOR EXTRADITION OR SURRENDER UNDER ARTICLE 

26 OF THE SIS II DECISION 

Alerts in SIS II 
Arrest for extradition or surrender  

2013 
34 263 

2014 
34 651 

2015 
34 590 

37 

 
 
 
 
Hits 

2013 
5 777 

2014 
8 774 

2015 
11 156 

8.1 KEY THEMES EMERGING 

Non-disclosure of fact that a person has been located - efficiency 
The Commission should raise with the Member States the problem of creating SIS II alerts 
when the whereabouts of the subject of the alert are already known and confirmed. Member 
States should improve their procedures for ensuring that, when an EAW has been created for 
a  person  whose  whereabouts  are  known  and  confirmed,  the  correct  field  of  the  SIRENE  A 
form is  used to  highlight  that fact so  that needless  work on checking whether the person is 
known or present on the territory is avoided. 

Flagging and the need for coordination in multiple arrest cases - effectiveness 
The  legal  instruments  and  technical  specifications  of  SIS  II  should  be  amended  to  allow 
Member States to temporarily make an alert ‘non-searchable’ by end-users without the need 
to delete the alert. 
Increasing the amount of information held in the alert - effectiveness  
Alerts in SIS II carry sufficient information to identify a person or object and provide a text 
on  the  ‘action  to  be  taken’  by  the  officer  locating  the  person  or  object.  Additional 
information, such as fingerprints, photographs or a copy of the European Arrest Warrant can 
be attached  to  an alert. Any other  information  related to  the alert is  deemed supplementary 
information  and  is  held  in  the  SIRENE  Bureau,  having  been  exchanged  bilaterally  or 
multilaterally between the Bureaux. Several Member States, across the range of alerts, raised 
the  issue  of  including  more  information  in  the  alert  itself  for  the  benefit  of  the  operational 
officer on the ground. 

Post-hit procedures - EU added-value  
The Commission should raise with Member States the problems related to transfers, working 
with  judicial  and  law  enforcement  authorities  to  find  areas  where  common  practice  can  be 
established and procedures can be harmonised. 

9.   ALERTS ON MISSING PERSONS UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE SIS II 

DECISION 

2013 

Alerts in SIS II 
Missing persons (minors)   36 476 
Missing persons (adults)   24 344 
60 820 
Total Missing persons  

2014 
42 623 
24 552 
67 175 

2015 
56 886 
31 167 
88 053 

Hits 

2013 
2 667 

2014 
3 961 

2015 
5 713 

9.1 KEY THEMES EMERGING 

38 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The inability to create ‘preventive alerts’ for children at risk of abduction - effectiveness  
In the area of parental abduction, the current wording of the SIS II Decision only allows the 
creation of an alert once a child is missing. In the early stages of a case, the only fact that is 
known is that a child is missing. Accordingly, an alert should be created in the SIS II. Given 
that parental abductions often take place in highly planned circumstances, with the intention 
of rapidly leaving the legal jurisdiction under which custody arrangements had been agreed, 
the Member States pointed out that it is preferable to be able to have “preventive alerts” in 
the  SIS  II  so  that  a  border  guard  checking  a  child  leaving  will  see  that  the  child  has  been 
entered in SIS II as at risk of abduction and can inquire further into the circumstances of the 
child leaving the Schengen area.  Naturally, such an initiative would require very careful case 
management  and  re-structuring  of  the  information  within  the  alert  to  minimise  the 
possibilities of the child and parents being inconvenienced in situations which are perfectly 
ordinary and lawful.  It is always possible to delete an alert later once the child is found and 
legal proceedings (under The Hague Convention, for example) can take place. 

Categorisation of missing person cases - EU added-value and effectiveness  
Member  States  asked  about  the  possibility  of  receiving  more  information  in  the  alert  itself 
about  the  cases  they  face.  This  would  include  the  categorisation  of  missing  children, 
involving  the  use  of  concepts  such  as  ‘runaway’,  ‘abduction’,  so  that  officers  have 
information  about  the  background  to  a  case.  Although  SIS  II  is  not  primarily  a  statistics 
gathering  tool,  many  bodies  –      from  the  police  through  to  child  welfare  agencies  –  would 
wish to have an overview of the problem of cross-border missing children cases. At present, 
SIS II can only provide raw figures on the number but not the types of cases. Most Member 
States have a categorisation system but they are not harmonised. A respected categorisation 
has  been  developed  by  the  organisation  Missing  Children  Europe,  described  in  the  2013 
Commission report, Missing Children in the European Union — mapping, data quality and 
statistics. 

Repatriation of missing minors – coherence/consistency 
Historically, many vulnerable missing persons were citizens of the Member State issuing the 
alert. Accordingly, there was no question regarding costs of repatriation. However, in cases 
of  missing  illegal  migrant  children  or  trafficked  children  in  care  who  then  abscond, 
repatriation is not always requested by the issuing Member State and it may not even be in 
the  child’s  best  interests.  It  is  not  efficient  for  SIRENE  Bureaux  to  find  themselves  in  a 
situation where  the responsibility  for  the ongoing care and custody of a vulnerable missing 
person  is  in  dispute  with  another  Member  State.  It  would  be  more  efficient  to  review  the 
wording  of  the  action  to  be  taken  and  to  provide  more  background  information  on  cases 
where repatriation may not be sought. 

10. ALERTS ON PERSONS SOUGHT TO ASSIST WITH A JUDICIAL PROCEDURE 

UNDER ARTICLE 34 OF THE SIS II DECISION 

 Alerts in SIS II 
 Persons sought to assist with a judicial procedure  

2013 
102 517  101 918  108 988 

2014 

2015 

 Hits 

2013 
18 068 

2014 
31 255 

2015 
34 511 

10.1 KEY THEMES EMERGING 

39 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Failure to delete alerts at the national level - efficiency  
These  alerts  are  frequently  requested  by  judicial  authorities  to  finalise  court  cases  by 
providing an address for the service of judicial documentation. Although judicial authorities 
can access SIS II, the practice at national level is often that they ask the police to create the 
alert. There is a fundamental problem in this approach, in that the police officer entering the 
alert is not, in reality, the officer in the case. Even if it is clear that an alert should be deleted, 
the officer would need the agreement of the judge or prosecutor. Repeated hits and exchange 
of the same supplementary information are clearly inefficient — alerts which are still stored, 
despite  the  fact  that  this  is  obviously  unnecessary,  cause  needless  work  for  authorities  in 
Member States. 

11. ALERTS FOR DISCREET AND SPECIFIC CHECKS UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF 

THE SIS II DECISION 

11.1 A BRIEF OVERVIEW 

These  alerts  are  used  to  check the movements  of  serious  travelling  criminals  and  threats  to 
security.  They  can  be  used  for  a  person  and  for  related  modes  of  transport  (vehicle,  boat, 
plane or container). This category of alert is often kept in SIS II after a hit, due to the fact that 
the further movements of the person may be of interest. 

2015 

2013 
2014 
31 888  33 566  48 124 
11 103  13 451 
8 164 
3 744 
1 809 
1 042 
3 
4 201 
50 
41 097  46 528  69 520 

2013 
14 169 

2014 
23 942 

2015 
34 313 

Alerts in SIS II 
Discreet checks Art 36(2)  
Specific checks Art 36(2)  
Discreet checks for national security Art 36(3)  
Specific checks for national security Art 36(3)  
Total number of alerts for discreet and specific checks 

Hits 

Hits 
(breakdown) 
Persons 
Vehicles 
Boats 
Aircraft 
Containers 
Total  

2014 

2015 

18 394 
5 548 
0 
0 
0 
23 942 

27 810 
6 502 
0 
1 
0 
34 313 

Note: due to the different categorisation of objects in the 2013 statistical report, this and the following section compare results exclusively 
from 2014 and 2015. 

11.2 USE OF SIS II FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM PURPOSES 

Measures to increase use for counter-terrorism - effectiveness and EU added-value  
Since 2013, the Commission has undertaken intensive awareness-raising with Member States 
to  overcome  the  reluctance  of  the  national  security  services  to  use  SIS  II.  The  system  has 
been shown to be capable of holding confidential, sensitive information while disseminating 
this  information  to  law  enforcement  officers  and  border  guards  in  29 Schengen  States. 

40 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Following  these  initiatives,  SIS  II  is  now  the  sole  information  exchange  platform  through 
which the state security authorities cooperate. It is capable of offering a well-tailored solution 
to tackle persons (and related objects such as documents) travelling to conflict zones with a 
view  to  joining  terrorist  organisations.  The  Commission  has  encouraged  Member  States  on 
several occasions to use all possibilities of SIS II.  
There  are  several  actions  that  improve  use  of  SIS  II  in  these  cases.  First  of  all,  the  alert 
subjects should be sufficiently identifiable, therefore Member States should add photographs 
and  fingerprints,  when  available,  to  the  alerts.  Where  there  is  sufficient  evidence,  they  can 
issue  a  EAW  together  with  an  alert  for  arrest.  If  the  person  should  be  observed,  especially 
entering  the  Schengen  area,  a  discreet  check  alert  is  appropriate.  Such  an  alert  can  also  be 
issued on his or  her vehicle. If there is  an operational  need, the person's belongings can  be 
also searched if a specific check alert has been issued. If the suspect is still a minor, Member 
States should issue a missing person alert which will require officers on the ground to place 
the person under protection and question him or her. These procedures were included in the 
SIS II and SIRENE Catalogue of Best Practices and Recommendations

. 

20

In addition to awareness-raising, the Commission has made legal and technical improvements 
to SIS II to provide for real-time communication from the ground to the competent services 
in  other  Member  States  on  hits  on  persons  and  objects  that  are  the  subject  of  discreet  and 
specific  checks,  in  cases  requiring  special  urgency  and  attention.  These  measures  were 
introduced on 1 February 2015. In December 2015, there were 5 300 such alerts in SIS II, of 
which 5 200 were related to persons. As of 1 February 2015, SIS II also clearly displays if an 
identity document has been invalidated by the issuing Member State for travel purposes. This 
includes  passports,  ID  documents,  visa  stickers  and  residence  permits.  In  February  2016, 
there  were  over  9 000  such  alerts  in  SIS  II.  In  some  Member  States,  there  is  no  national 
legislation  allowing  for  the  invalidation  of  citizens'  personal  identification  documents.  The 
SIS  II  code  tables  were  updated  on  23 February  2015  to  display  the  ‘terrorism  related 
activity’  of  a  person.  Since  17 March  2016,  the  system  also  shows  this  information  for 
vehicles and other means of transport. 

The ability to link alerts in SIS II is key, as it allows a connection between two alerts to be 
identified, e.g. linking a discreet or specific check alert with an alert on the invalidated travel 
document or with an alert on the vehicle used by the suspect. 

To date there are more than 70 000 alerts for discreet and specific checks, a 300 % increase 
compared  to  the  situation  in  June  2013.  Of  these,  8 000  were  created  by  the  state  security 
services.  These  latter  alerts  must  be  accompanied  by  an  exchange  of  supplementary 
information  which creates significant extra workload for the SIRENE Bureaux, which have 
clear  capacity  difficulties.  New  amendments  in  the  SIRENE  Manual  will  be  introduced  to 
allow  discreet  and  specific  check  alerts  to  co-exist  with  other  alert  categories  –    this  is  not 
currently permitted. 

Legal, technical and operational challenges 
The Dutch Presidency issued a questionnaire to Member States (doc 15537/1/15) on the use 
of SIS II with regard to foreign terrorist fighters, to which 24 Member States and Schengen 
associated countries replied (doc 5722/1/16 REV1). SIS II has proven to be the most effective 

20   Commission  Recommendation  of  16  December  2015  establishing  a  catalogue  of  recommendations  and 
best practices for the correct application of the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) 
and  the  exchange  of  supplementary  information  by  the  competent  authorities  of  the  Member  States 
implementing and using SIS (C(2015) 9169). 

41 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
information exchange tool for counter-terrorism purposes with an immense EU added-value, 
allowing  national  security  services  to  cooperate  quickly,  confidentially  and  efficiently. 
Several issues,  as  listed  in  Section  12.3,  however,  hinder  more  effective  use  of  the  system, 
requiring further action by Member States and the Commission. 

11.3 KEY THEMES EMERGING 

Increasing the amount of information held in the alert - effectiveness  
Member  States  reported  that  it  would  be  helpful  to  include  more  information  in  the  alert 
itself, especially when the request is for a specific check. Where this is permitted by national 
law, a search of the person takes place. The alert currently does not specify what the grounds 
of the search might be nor what is being sought. During discussions in SISVIS Committee on 
the response to foreign terrorist fighters, it was agreed that the code table on ‘type of offence’ 
should  be  updated  and  its  use  extended  to  Article  36  alerts.  This  feature  could  be  further 
reviewed  to  provide  more  information  to  officers  on  the  ground  to  assist  them  in  their 
searches.   

The use of identity documents by criminals and persons posing threats to national security - 
effectiveness  
Although modes of transport connected to travelling criminals can be circulated as alerts, it is 
not  possible  to  create  alerts  on  identity  documents,  in  particular,  passports,  linked  to  them. 
Given that passports can be used by several people and can therefore ‘take on a life of their 
own’,  it  would  be  more  effective  to  be  able  to  create  alerts  monitoring  the  use  of  such 
documents when seizure is not the operational action required. A field relating to the identity 
document(s)  of  a  person  should  be  added  to  alerts  on  persons  so  that  documents  can  be 
queried too.   

Lack of provision on issuing alerts on persons in the framework of execution of criminal penalties - 
effectiveness  
The  current  wording  of  the  Article  does  not  allow  for  an  alert  to  be  issued  following  a 
measure  imposed  by  a  court,  e.g.  supervision  of  conduct  after  a  sentence  has  been  served, 
although Member States are using this alert category to trace dangerous criminals after they 
have served their sentence.  
Alerts on aircraft, containers, boats - effectiveness  
Police officers do not routinely check containers, boats and aircraft. When there is an alert for 
discreet or specific check on such an object, there is need to raise awareness, otherwise there 
is  little  likelihood  of  a  hit.  This  could  be  done  by  means  of  a  procedure  for  an  issuing 
Member State to inform one or more Member States of a request to check containers, boats or 
aircraft within the framework of these alerts. As noted previously, at the external border, it is 
much more likely that such checks would be carried out by a customs officer but more needs 
to be done on supporting customs checks in SIS II. 

Inability to detain a person who is subject of a discreet check - effectiveness  
In  many  circumstances  a  person  posing  a  significant  threat  to  national  security  may  be  the 
subject of an alert for a discreet check. In ideal circumstances, the person would be stopped 
by police or border guards and thoroughly checked and quizzed regarding his/her movements 
and  activities.  Sometimes  the  alert-issuing  Member  State  does  not  have  the  legal  ability  to 
create  an  alert  for  a  specific  check  (a  physical  search  of  the  person)  or  the  Member  State 
achieving the hit only has the legal power to carry out discreet checks instead of specific. In 
these cases, a discreet check will be carried out and the person rapidly allowed to continue. 
This is not ideal. It would be more effective for the person to be temporarily detained in order 

42 

 
 
 
 
 
 
to gain more information about their movements and activities — essentially, a check which 
is not as limited as a discreet check, but which does not involve a full physical search of the 
person solely on the basis of an alert. 

Indication of sexual offences in the SIS II code tables - EU added-value, efficiency and 
effectiveness 
One Member State issued discreet check alerts for persons previously convicted for serious 
sexual  offences.  These  alerts  were  issued  for  the  two  top  categories  of  sexual  offenders 
considered  to  continue  to  be  most  dangerous.  Due  to  discreet  check  alerts,  the  authorities 
ascertained  if  the  person  breached  travel  restrictions  and  could  warn  other  Member  States 
about  the  arrival  of  a  dangerous  sexual  offender  on  their  territories.  Since  the  SIS  II  code 
tables  do  not  specify  sexual  offences,  the  Member  State  sends  SIRENE  forms  to  the  other 
SIRENE  Bureau  describing  the  risk.  This  creates  additional  workload  for  the  Bureaux  and 
problems  on  potential  follow-up  to  the  notifications.  Therefore,  the  categories  of  offences 
displayed  should  be  updated  to  cover  sexual  offences  and  child  sexual  abuse  material.  It 
would  increase  the  effectiveness  of  SIS  II  by  informing  officers  on  the  ground  about  the 
nature  of  the  discreet  and  specific  checks  and  it  would  also  increase  the  efficiency  of  the 
system by reducing SIRENE communication. 

New category of alert for travel bans - EU added-value and effectiveness  
When  considering  the  use  of  alerts  to  combat  foreign  terrorist  fighters,  unless  a  European 
Arrest  Warrant  could  be  obtained,  the  SIS  II  legal  instruments  allow  the  use  of  alerts  for 
discreet or specific check to report on movements and of alerts for seizure (Art. 38 of the SIS 
II  Decision)  where  an  identity  document  had  been  invalidated  for  travel  purposes  and  its 
seizure  requested.  The  legal  provisions  however  do  not  allow  an  EU-wide  exit  ban  on  a 
person therefore exit bans can be imposed only concerning the territory of a certain Member 
State subject of national legislation. 

With regard to foreign terrorist fighters and children at risk, provision could be made for an 
alert on persons lawfully banned from leaving the Schengen area or their own Member State. 
This  would  require  mutual  recognition  of  national  exit  bans.  This  concept  requires  further 
exploration, as not all Member States may be able to take action on their territory regarding a 
national exit ban imposed by another Member State.   

12.  ALERTS ON OBJECTS FOR SEIZURE OR USE AS EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL 

 PROCEEDINGS UNDER ARTICLE 38 OF THE SIS II DECISION 

12.1 A BRIEF OVERVIEW 

Alerts in SIS II 
Alerts on vehicles (inc. trailers and caravans) 
Alerts on banknotes 
Alerts on firearms 
Alerts on issued documents 
Alerts on blank documents 
Alerts on licence plates 
Alerts on vehicle registration documents 

2013 
3 241 809 
265 968 
431 121 
39 836 478 
768 620 
2 157 328 
2 314 233 

2014 
3 298 541 
267 123 
457 059 
43 552 428 
981 211 
2 470 227 
2 657 355 

2015 
3 401 517 
271 893 
486 154 
48 357 109 
1 107 569 
2 786 092 
3 035 305 

43 

 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
New alert categories introduced by SIS II 
Alerts on aircraft 
Alerts on boats 
Alerts on boat engines 
Alerts on containers 
Alerts on industrial equipment 
Alerts on securities and means of payment 

7 
1 046 
1 691 
18 
4 252 
394 918 

10 
3 288 
9 735 
96 
42 783 
1 432 409 

19 
6 608 
19 815 
302 
84 426 
3 123 969 

registration 

trailers  and 

Hits 
Vehicles  (inc. 
caravans) 
Blank documents 
Vehicle 
certificates 
Number plates 
Issued documents 
Boats 
Aircraft 
Industrial equipment 
Boat engines 
Containers 
Firearms 
Securities  and  means  of 
payment 
Banknotes 
Total number 

2014 
14 103 

1 274 
773 

2 416 
14 793 
32 
1 
258 
27 
1 
213 
6 

218 
34 115 

2015 
15 288 

1 533 
1 378 

2 729 
18 558 
19 
0 
197 
75 
0 
296 
27 

153 
40 253 

12.2 KEY THEMES EMERGING 

12.2.1 Alerts on vehicles, industrial equipment and licence plates 
Distinguishing between industrial equipment and road vehicles - efficiency and effectiveness  
Regarding industrial equipment, another new category in SIS II, some Member States  have 
experienced  difficulty  in  distinguishing  between  road-going  industrial  equipment  and 
vehicles, especially as the registration of such objects is not harmonised across the Member 
States,  or  where  only  a  component  is  recovered.  During  Schengen  evaluations,  the 
recommendation is given to carry out multi-category searches in order to ensure hits can be 
achieved. Including a description of the original offence (if any) in the alert, would help the 
officer  finding  the  object  and  increase  their  ability  to  seize  the  object  requested.  It  would 
increase efficiency and effectiveness if guidelines clearly set out the category into which the 
road-going  industrial  equipment  falls,  so  that checks  stand  a  better chance  of  achieving  the 
objective of the alert. 

Deletion of vehicle alerts: lack of consistency - efficiency and coherence/consistency 
The  SIRENE  Bureaux  are  not  normally  responsible  for  repatriating  recovered  vehicles,  but 
they can find themselves involved in exchanging information on handing back vehicles and 
other  objects.  Due  to  a  lack  of  harmonisation  of  procedures  and  the  timing  of  deletion  of 
alerts,  alerts  may  be  deleted  shortly  after  a  hit,  upon  arrangement  to  recover  the  object  or 
upon  repatriation.  Deleting  alerts  on  repatriation  can  cause  problems  for  the  owner;  as  the 

44 

 
 
 
 
 
alert still exists in SIS II, when the vehicle arrives in the country, it can be re-seized from its 
legitimate owner.   

The most difficult cases arise when a stolen vehicle from one Member State is re-registered 
in  another  Member  State  and  then  sold  in  the  open  market.  These  ‘good  faith’  purchases 
cause significant problems which can  result in court  judgments in  the Member  State where 
the new owner resides. Where the new owner is awarded title to the vehicle, due to lack of 
mutual recognition of court decisions in such cases, the alert – created in the Member State 
where the original theft took place – can remain in SIS II. As a result, every law enforcement 
check on the vehicle will result in the vehicle being stopped and potentially seized, unless the 
new  owner  carries  the  court  decision  around  with  him/her.  The  inconvenience  is 
disproportionate to the goal of the alert. Some Member States, especially those which have 
been affected by such cases, have demanded a solution. One suggestion has been to flag the 
alert  in  the  Member  State  of  the  new  owner.  The  effect  of  this  would  be  to  make  the  alert 
invisible to the end-users in that Member State. This would reduce the inconvenience in that 
country,  but  not  if  the  person  crossed  a  border  as,  in  the  neighbouring  country,  the  vehicle 
would be seized.  

The  only  practicable  solution  is  to  introduce  stricter  alert  deletion  rules,  so  that  the  alert  is 
deleted  once  a  vehicle  or  other  object  is  recovered  by  law  enforcement  officers  in  the 
Member State achieving the hit or safe storage of the object has been arranged (some objects 
are very large or, in the case of a good faith purchase, the vehicle may indeed be left in the 
hands of the new owner pending a court case). As cases can take time, if the alert is deleted 
prematurely  and  there  is  a  need  to  communicate  on  the  recovery  of  objects,  the  SIRENE 
workflow systems should be amended to ensure that Schengen Identity Numbers of deleted 
alerts  are  still  recognised  and  SIRENE  forms  can  be  sent.  Several  Member  States  have 
introduced  this  functionality.  One  Member  State  asked  for  the  facility  to  ‘recall’  a  deleted 
alert in order to check the details in such cases. If this option were considered, access would 
have to be strictly limited in order to avoid errors by officers in the field. 

A Member State reported problems with disposal of seized property where it is not collected 
by the owner or insurer. A solution could be for national rules on disposal of property to be 
forwarded with the initial G form (report of a hit where the action has been taken), so that the 
deadline for recovery is made clear to the owner or insurer. 

With  regard  to  effectiveness,  the  lack  of  mutual  recognition  of  court  decisions  and the  fact 
that  every  law  enforcement  check  on  the  vehicle  might  lead  to  its  seizure  is  certainly 
inconvenient  for  the  owner  and  is  not  the  desired  effect  of  the  intervention.  This  situation 
causes inefficiencies and SIRENE Bureaux are involved in time-consuming activities, which 
are not their responsibility. 

Combating cloning of cars - effectiveness  
Just as human identity can be misused, the cloning of car identities is common. Where it is 
clear that this has happened, an equivalent of the misused identity extension to person alerts 
could be created for object alerts, in order to allow officers on the ground to distinguish the 
vehicles.  The  system  is  not  as  effective  as  it  could  be  in  responding  to  this  problem. 
Furthermore, a misused identity extension on object alerts would also render the system more 
efficient,  as  it  would  reduce  the  workload  of  the  SIRENE  Bureaux  who  currently  have  to 
carry  out  this  task  through  sending  SIRENE  forms.  Member  State  cooperation  is  crucial  in 
addressing  the  cloning  of  cars  and  SIS  II  can  support  greater  coordination  and,  potentially, 
more results in the field, demonstrating the EU added value in this situation. 

45 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vehicle parts - effectiveness  
The SIRENE Manual sets out the procedure for dealing with circumstances in which a stolen 
vehicle is dismantled and identifiable component parts are recovered by the law enforcement 
authorities, but the whole vehicle is not. There may be several hits on components from one 
stolen  vehicle,  recovered  over  time.  There  is  currently  no  provision  for  circulating  stolen 
vehicle components that have not ever been built into a vehicle. A new alert category or new 
fields  could  cover  readily  identifiable  vehicle  parts  such  as  the  engine  or  the  gearbox.  The 
lack of an alert category or fields for vehicle parts renders the system incapable of addressing 
a serious criminal activity and goes to the heart of its effectiveness. The circulation of stolen 
vehicle  components  must  be  addressed  appropriately  by  the  system,  as  this  issue  is  also 
critical  to  the  relevance  of  SIS  II  in  responding  to  this  type  of  criminal  activity.  At  the 
external  border,  customs  agencies  have  competence  for  checking  imported  or  exported 
vehicle parts. 

Updated definition of ‘motor vehicle’ – coherence/consistency 
The current definition of a motor vehicle in the SIS II is outdated, as it relies on a minimum 
50cc cylinder criterion. Electric cars do not meet this criterion, which should now be revised. 
It is crucial for SIS II to adapt to technological developments in order to remain relevant and 
effective. 

Post-hit procedures on vehicles and similar objects - EU added-value  
When an object, such as a vehicle, is seized by law enforcement authorities due to an alert in 
SIS  II,  the  post-hit  procedures  entail  a  SIRENE  G  form  (hit)  to  be  sent,  which  the  issuing 
Member  State  will  respond  to  with  a  SIRENE  P  form  (further  information  to  be  supplied 
when  a  vehicle  etc.  is  recovered).  The  two  mandatory  fields  in  the  section  ‘further 
information  concerning  the  alert’  describe  the  date(s)  or  period(s)  the  offence(s)  was/were 
committed  and  the  place(s)  of  offence(s).  This  information,  and  possibly  more,  could  be 
included in the alert itself, which might reduce the exchange of supplementary information. 
This  could  improve  efficiency.  The  impact  on  ease  of  access  for  the  end-user  to  the  extra 
information  that  would  be  entered  in  the  alert  would  need  to  be  considered.  More 
harmonisation on the extent of the responsibility of SIRENE, thereby setting expectations on 
the  exchange  of  supplementary  information,  would  help  maintain  the  efficiency  and 
effectiveness of the SIRENE Bureaux. 

Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) systems and SIS II - effectiveness and relevance 
Several  Member  States  have  implemented  camera-based  systems  which  can  scan  vehicle 
number plates and carry out a check against databases. These are usually databases of stolen, 
unregistered or uninsured vehicles or vehicles that are being sought by the law enforcement 
authorities in the course of investigations.   

A  key  concept  of  SIS  II  is  that  checks  on  objects  in  the  relevant  national  databases  should 
also check SIS II. As a result, the Commission recognised the potential for large numbers of 
searches  in  SIS  II  carried  out  automatically.  The  SIRENE  Manual  was  updated  to  include 
procedures  on  how  to  handle  the  exchange  of  supplementary  information  in  such  cases, 
especially as implementations vary widely between Member States. 

Several Member States pointed out that the provisions of Article 9.2, concerning logging of 
all queries, are difficult in the context of automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) systems 
and other solutions which carry out large numbers of automated queries. Such systems may 
carry out millions of queries per day, requiring considerable technical resource to store logs 

46 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of all checks. The Netherlands proposed that only hits should be logged. Belgium asked for 
clarity on ANPR as it is easier to make a technical copy of limited information on vehicles 
(such as  the vehicle registration  number)  for such  purposes rather  than all  the vehicle data. 
This  should  be  possible  under  current  legal  provisions  but  needs  to  be  clarified.  The 
Netherlands also requested further work on logs on the history of alerts, asking whether the 
central system logs and reports (such as ‘load history’) could be used instead of all Member 
States having to make such technical provision. Data quality itself remains the responsibility 
of the data's owner. It is inefficient to store all these data as logs, as a large amount will not 
be  needed  for  the  intervention.  The  current  provisions  of  Article  9(2)  of  the  SIS  II  legal 
instruments are not practicable when considering systems such as the ANPR, which carry out 
millions of automated queries per day. 

Use of vehicle licence plates to locate persons - effectiveness 
Law enforcement officers know that one of the most effective ways of finding a wanted or 
missing  person  is  to  circulate  details  of  the  person’s  vehicle.  It  is  not  currently  possible  to 
issue  an  alert  on  objects  with  the  purpose  of  finding  a  person  without  seizing  the  object  to 
secure property or evidence. This is an operational shortcoming. The suggested solution is to 
change the wording of Article 38(1) of the Council Decision, so that it reads: 

‘Data on objects sought for the purposes of: 
a) seizure or use as evidence in criminal proceedings; or 
b) establishing the whereabouts of a person for whom an alert has been issued on the 
basis of Art. 26, 32 or 34 of the Council Decision or Art. 24 (possibly Art. 25 (f)) of 
the Regulation shall be entered in SIS II.’ 

It would be operationally more efficient and effective for law enforcement officers to be able 
to locate people through sharing information which they already possess on licence plates, 
which they have used at national level to locate people for many years.   

12.2.2  Checks carried out by the authorities responsible for issuing vehicle registration 

certificates 

The SIS II legal instrument21 allowing direct or indirect access to certain SIS II data so as to 
avoid re-registering vehicles stolen in another Member State does not technically fall within 
the scope of this evaluation. However, as the Regulation's overall objective aligns it closely 
with the SIS II Decision, it was felt it would be an oversight to exclude it. 

Distribution and trends — Searches 
There  was  a  considerable  increase  in  the  number  of  searches  for  motor  vehicles  —  rising 
from 18.5 million in 2014 to 32.3 million in 2015, an increase of more than 75 %. Similarly, 
a  rise  can  be  seen  in  searches  for  number  plates  —  there  were  1 123 897  such  searches  in 
2014, compared to 13 355 236 in 2015, an increase rise of more than 1 080 %.  

It  is  important  to  stress  that  more  could  be  done  by  some  Member  States  with  regard  to 
implementing the Regulation and reporting statistics. For example, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Greece,  Iceland,  Norway,  Italy,  Switzerland  and  the  United  Kingdom  recorded  neither 
searches  nor  hits.  Germany,  Austria,  Slovakia  and  Slovenia  only  reported  hits,  not  the 
searches  that  were  carried  out.  Implementation  therefore  appears  to  be  incomplete.  As  a 
result, there may be potential for more success in tracing stolen vehicles. 

21   Regulation  (EC)  No  1986/2006  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  20  December  2006 
regarding  access  to  the  Second Generation  Schengen Information  System  (SIS  II) by the  services  in  the 
Member States responsible for issuing vehicle registration certificates (OJ L 381, 28.12.2006, p. 1). 

47 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Coherence/consistency 
Several Member States do not make use of the stolen vehicle number plate alerts, as the plate 
re-issued to the victim is identical to the stolen plate. Accordingly, the victim would be likely 
to be inconvenienced by being repeatedly stopped by the law enforcement authorities. This is 
certainly disproportionate to the objectives of the intervention and could therefore affect its 
effectiveness. 

Effectiveness 
The  checking  of  SIS  II  data  by  the  authorities  responsible  for  issuing  vehicle  registration 
certificates  has  resulted  in  over  37 000  hits  since  the  entry  into  operations  of  SIS  II.  This 
access  has  proved  highly  effective,  where  it  is  used.  The  lack  of  full  data  indicates  that 
implementation  is  incomplete  or  reporting  is  not  enforced.  This  suggests  that  effectiveness 
could be increased. 

EU added-value 
The  legislation  remains  coherent  with  its  goals  and  relevant,  given  the  ongoing  success 
generated.  SIS  II  has  addressed  the  issue  of  duplicate  licence  plates  and  the  intervention  is 
still  relevant,  given  the  extent  of  cross-border  vehicle  theft.  The  mechanism  to  share 
information  on  stolen  vehicles,  registration  and  number  plates  has  demonstrated  significant 
EU added value.   

12.2.3  Alerts on containers and boats 
National procedure for checking containers and boats - effectiveness 
The  Schengen  evaluation  on-site  visits  revealed  that  many  Member  States  do  not  have 
effective  procedures  in  place  to  carry  out  checks  on  containers  and  boats  in  SIS  II.  The 
contents  of  containers  and  boats  are  checked  based  upon  previous  information  or  risk 
assessment.  As  a  result,  the  new  object  categories  of  boat  and  container  cannot  be  used 
effectively  in  Member  States,  as  the  competent  authorities are  not  sufficiently  aware  of  the 
new  categories.  Customs  authorities  generally  have  competence  for  checking  maritime 
traffic,  even  traffic  between  Member  States  (where  the  EU-status  of  goods  needs  to  be 
verified). If customs authorities could use SIS II for daily routine checks, this could further 
increase the effectiveness of use of the system. 

12.2.4 Alerts on issued and blank documents 
Lack of harmonisation in seizure of documents – coherence/consistency and effectiveness 
Alerts on issued documents form the largest volume of alerts in SIS II. The action to be taken 
on alerts for documents is seizure. However, it is clear that this does not always happen, due 
to  lack  of  harmonisation  of  national  procedures.  A  common  scenario  is  that  a  person  loses 
their identity document, reports the loss and receives a duplicate. The person then finds the 
original  and  does  not  report  this  to  the  competent  authorities.  The  issue  of  the  duplicate 
document  automatically  triggers  the  creation  of  an  alert  in  SIS  II,  requesting  seizure  of  the 
document. Some Member States consider a reported lost/stolen document to be invalid once a 
duplicate  has  been  issued.  Problems  arise  when  the  person  uses  this  document  to  travel. 
Border  guards  in  several  Member  States  see  that  the  person  is  the  original  holder  of  the 
document  and,  not  wishing  to  spoil  the  person’s  travel  plans,  hand  back  the  document  and 
allow the person to proceed.  

This  will  remain  a  problem  whilst  there  is  no  harmonisation  on  the  seizure  or  not  of 
documents entered in SIS II. The Commission issued a factsheet to the Member States about 
the  national  laws  and  requirements  in  each  Member  State  in  respect  of  lost,  stolen  and 
invalidated documents. This helps border guards be informed about the legal situation for a 

48 

 
 
 
 
 
 
document reported in SIS II for seizure which is held by the lawful owner. They will be in a 
better position to decide whether to seize the relevant document.  

This lack of harmonisation harms the effectiveness of the system to address specific problems 
(the foreign fighter phenomenon is a good example) — certain objectives of the intervention 
cannot  be  achieved.  Steps  to  achieve  harmonisation  in  the  field  would  demonstrate  EU 
added-value.   

Counterfeit documents: proposal for a new category within the alert - effectiveness and EU added-
value 
There are some documents which do not fall under any of the existing categories as they are 
entirely  falsified,  i.e.  counterfeit  documents.  Sometimes  batches  or  part-batches  of  such 
documents  are  seized  by  law  enforcement  authorities.  This  allows  the  serial  numbers  to  be 
ascertained and checked. Once the authorities have decided that there are documents missing 
from  the  batch  seized,  they  should  be  able  to  enter  the  documents  in  SIS  II.    The  present 
system  is  not  as  effective  as  it  could  be  as  it  cannot  handle  counterfeit  documents.  The 
criterion of relevance should also be considered here — SIS II is currently not well-equipped 
to address this issue.  

A new option should therefore be created in this alert category to cover counterfeit blank and 
‘issued’ documents.  

Proposal to include details of identity chips in alerts - effectiveness and coherence/consistency 
Technical  developments  in  documents  need  to  be  reflected  in  SIS  II.  A  decision  should  be 
taken  on  whether  information  contained  a  document’s  identity  chip  should  be  included  in 
alerts.  The  inclusion  of  this  information  in  SIS  II  alerts  would  render  the  system  more 
effective in identifying the person and any potential misuse of documents. The ability to use 
SIS  II  to  check  that  the  document  holder  is  indeed  the  genuine  holder,  on  the  basis  of  the 
security features in the document, would make SIS II more consistent with the goal of better 
document security. 

Possible interconnection between SIS II documents section and SLTD - effectiveness and 
coherence/consistency 
Article  55  of  the  SIS  II  Decision  provides  for  a  connection  between  SIS  II  and  Interpol’s 
stolen  and  lost  travel  documents  (SLTD)  database.    This  would  allow  details  of  passport 
numbers, country of issue and document type for stolen, misappropriated, lost or invalidated 
passports entered in SIS II to be exchanged with Interpol members and Member States would 
be able to access the SLTD database through SIS II. A connection like this would ensure that: 
(1)  all  passport  data  available  in  SIS  II  are  also  uploaded  in  the  SLTD  database;  (2)  all 
consultations of passports in SIS II also consult the SLTD database.  

However,  there  are  a  number  of  preconditions  that  need  to  be  met  before  this  technical 
connection can be made, including an agreement between Interpol and the EU that the data 
shared will only be accessible to members of Interpol from countries that have an appropriate 
level  of  protection  of  personal  data.  The  Council  will  seek  the  Commission's  opinion  on 
Interpol's  protection  of  personal  data  and  respect  of  fundamental  rights  and  liberties  when 
automatically processing personal data, and that of countries that have delegated members to 
Interpol. 

49 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SIS II has not yet been connected to the SLTD database. On 31 March 2015, a questionnaire 
was sent out to 28 EU Member States and four Associated Countries, to which 29 responses 
were received. The results of the questionnaire revealed the following: 

 

the majority (17 out of 29) of respondents do not enter or modify data automatically 
through  one  transaction  in  their  national  database,  SIS  II  and  SLTD,  largely  due  to 
cost, technical or legal reasons;  

  a  large  majority  of  respondents  (28  out  of  29)  indicated  that  they  upload  data 
regarding  stolen  and  lost  travel  documents  into  Interpol’s  SLTD  database,  either 
automatically (16 MS), manually (nine MS) or semi-manually, using Interpol’s ‘Push 
& Pull’ solution (three Member States);  

  a large majority of countries (22 out of 29) are using Interpol’s FIND/MIND tools to 
check  travel  documents  through  a  single  automated  search  in  different  databases 
(national,  SIS  II  and  SLTD).  It  could  not  be  distinguished  whether  these  tools  are 
solely used for border checks or also for law enforcement checks on Member States’ 
territory.  

This  demonstrates  that  many  Member  States  have  implemented  national  solutions  ensuring 
that all passport data that are entered in SIS II are also entered in the SLTD database and that 
the SLTD database is consulted simultaneously with SIS II. 

In order to ensure that data on stolen or lost travel documents are entered in SIS II and the 
SLTD database at the same time, the following options could be considered: 

Option 1: Member States implement national solutions to simultaneously add and consult 
travel documents in SIS II, SLTD and national databases. 
Option 2: implement Article 55 of the SIS II Decision and exchange data between SIS II 
and the SLTD database. 

There are some difficulties with option 2:  

  The SLTD database covers travel documents including passports, identity documents 
and visas. Article 55 of the SIS II Decision is limited to passports. Limiting the data 
exchange to passports would be counter-productive, as it would not cover all types of 
travel documents that are now being entered in the SLTD database.  

  Only  the  country  which  issued  a  document  can  add  it  to  the  SLTD  database  -  this 

limitation does not exist for SIS II.  

  170  Interpol  members  contribute  to  the  SLTD  database.  It  is  not  clear  how  the 
Commission would be able to identify for each of those members the appropriateness 
of  their  protection  of  personal  data  and  respect  of  fundamental  rights  and  liberties 
when automatically processing personal data. It is also not clear how Interpol would 
be able to prevent access to EU documents in the SLTD database by members that do 
not provide an appropriate level of protection and respect. 

Therefore, option 1 seems to be more practicable. 

Based  upon  Council  Common  Position  2005/69/JHA  of  24 January  2005  on  exchanging 
certain  data  with  Interpol22,  Member  States  are  required  to  upload  travel  documents  to  the 
SLTD  database  and  search  it.  Thanks  to  the  FIND  search  software  Interpol  developed, 
Member States can search the SLTD database and their national systems in parallel. As there 

22   OJ L 27, 29.1.2005, p. 61. 

50 

 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
is  a  common  search  interface,  SIS  II  is  also  searched.  Member  States  are  the  largest 
contributors of alerts in the SLTD database. In addition, following several initiatives by the 
Commission  and  the  Council,  the  number  of  searches  in  the  SLTD  database  has  recently 
increased substantially. 

The  existing  mechanism  is  effective.  The  Commission  should  explore  the  potential  added 
value  of  linking  the  document  section  of  SIS  II  with  the  SLTD  database  at  central  level.  It 
should also address the technical and the legal difficulties identified and take action to ensure 
that document alerts are automatically entered in the SLTD database. 

12.2.5 Alerts on banknotes, securities and means of payment 
Counterfeit banknotes - effectiveness and relevance 
Article 38(2)(g) of the SIS II Decision states that alerts may be issued only on banknotes that 
are registered. In practice, alerts are also entered in SIS II on counterfeit money. There have 
been  few  or  no  hits  on  genuine  banknotes.  Operationally,  it  is  ineffective  to  limit  this  alert 
category  to real money,  and counterfeit should be included if the alert category is  retained. 
However, on the basis of hits achieved there appears to be limited value in retaining alerts on 
banknotes in SIS II.  

As a result, the Commission and Member States should consider whether alerts on banknotes 
should be deleted from the legal instruments and technical specification. If they are retained, 
the legal instruments and technical specifications should be updated in order to accommodate 
counterfeit banknotes. 

Securities and means of payment - relevance and efficiency  
The number of hits in this area has increased from six in 2014 to 27 in 2015. However, there 
are a very large number of alerts on securities and means of payment, and a very low number 
of  hits.  This  raises  issues  pertaining  to  the  added  value  of  including  them  as  separate  sub-
categories under Article 38 of the SIS II Decision and, whether this is efficient. As a result, 
the alert category ‘securities and means of payment’ should be deleted from the SIS II legal 
instruments and the technical specifications. 

12.2.6 Broadening the scope and use of object alerts 
Extension of the object alert categories - effectiveness 
Member States welcomed the extension of the categories of objects that can be entered in SIS 
II. Several Member States asked for further extension of the categories, to include technical 
or electronic equipment such as computers and smartphones. High value jewels and watches 
were  also  mentioned;  however,  this  would  require  a  method  for  uniquely  identifying  these 
objects as SIS II has always used serial numbers. Watches may have unique serial numbers 
(but  do  not  always),  but  photographs  are  more  effective  for  jewellery.  There  is  no  sub-
categorisation or search facility in SIS II to permit searches of photographs. 

Use of alerts when law enforcement measures are deemed ‘administrative’ not judicial - 
effectiveness and coherence 
Alerts  under  Article  38  of  the  SIS  II  Decision  concentrate  on  « alerts  on  objects  for  the 
purposes of seizure or use as evidence in criminal proceedings ». During procedures carried 
out by law enforcement personnel, administrative measures regularly take place before or in 
parallel  to  a  judicial  procedure  (such  as  an  exit  ban  from  the  national  territory  –    an 
administrative  measure).  To  ensure  the  effectiveness  of  such  procedures  operationally,  the 
text  of  the  Decision  should  clearly  spell  out  the  possibility  of  creating  SIS  II  alerts  on  the 

51 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
objects  covered  by  such  measures.  This  would  increase  consistency  with  the  goal  of  the 
judicial process. 

13.  NEW FUNCTIONALITIES IN SIS II — CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTATION 

13.1 IMPLEMENTING FUNCTIONALITIES 

This  section  sets  out  the  changes  in  the  use  of  new  features  in  SIS  II  —  the  inclusion  of 
fingerprints, photographs, copies of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) and links between 
alerts which are related (e.g. a wanted person in a stolen car could result in two alerts but with 
a link between them to give the officer on the ground the full picture). 

The inclusion of the European Arrest Warrant - efficiency and coherence  
All  alerts  for  arrest  resulting  from  an  EAW  must  contain  a  copy  of  the  EAW.  This  has 
required  enormous  efforts  by  Member  States  to  upload  copies  of  warrants  relating  to  the 
alerts that already existed before SIS II went live. Article 70 of the SIS II Decision provided 
for  a  three-year  transition  period  for  Member  States  to  ensure  compliance.  The  30 000 
EAW’s  held  in  SIS  II  in  January  2016  indicate  the  move  to  compliance.  We  are  only  now 
reaching the efficiency gain intended by this feature. Under previous provisions, each hit on 
an alert for arrest would have necessitated at least two SIRENE business transactions: upon 
arrest, a request for a copy of the EAW and, from the issuing Member State, the forwarding 
of that EAW. Given the number of EAW’s now in SIS II and over 11 000 hits on alerts for 
arrest  in  2015,  we  can  estimate  that  in  excess  of  20 000 SIRENE  business  transactions  per 
year can be avoided through this measure. 

 Fingerprints and photographs - efficiency and effectiveness 
Where  fingerprints  and  photographs  are  available,  they  must  be  added  to  an  alert.  The 
statistics show the move towards compliance. More must be done, on two fronts: 

1.  ensuring compliance with legal instruments, in that fingerprints and photographs are 

indeed uploaded; 

2.  ensuring  the  quality  of  the  fingerprints  and  photographs,  through  compliance  with 
existing standards and ensuring those standards are extended, especially in the light of 
the proposed automated fingerprint identification system in SIS II and any future need 
to use facial recognition technology.  

Efficiency  and  effectiveness  gains  based  on  fingerprints  will  not  be  realised  until  an 
automated  fingerprint  identification  system  has  been  installed  in  SIS  II.  In  those  Member 
States where end-users can see a photograph of the alert subject, the increase in effectiveness 
is clear. 

Links between alerts - effectiveness  
Member  States  choose  to  use  links  on  the  basis  of  operational  assessment.  The  Schengen 
evaluation mechanism checks on the use of links. One area for possible future development 
might be the ability for two or more Member States to cooperate on linking alerts. Currently, 
this is not legally or technically possible and a business case would be necessary. 

13.2 CONCLUSIONS 

52 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When  SIS  II  began  operating,  some  Member  States  had  not  implemented  the  new 
functionalities. By the time of writing this report, this situation had largely been resolved but 
it  is  too  early  to  fully  evaluate  the  effectiveness  of,  for  example,  the  introduction  of 
fingerprints,  as  the  technology  to  make  use  of  this  functionality  is  not  yet  in  place.  It  is 
currently  only  possible  to  report  on  the  use  of  new  functionalities,  as  no  statistics  are  yet 
available on results. 

14.  USE OF FINGERPRINTS IN SIS II 

It is becoming increasingly difficult to establish the identity of a person due to name-changes 
and the use of aliases or fraudulent documents. The use of document fraud is an increasing 
modus operandi to illegally enter and move around the Schengen area. The Frontex Annual 
Risk Analysis for 2015 reported that in 2014 there were around 9 400 detections of document 
fraud cases on entry to the EU/Schengen area from third countries, which represents a slight 
decrease  compared  to  the  previous  year.  By  contrast,  cases  reported  on  intra-EU  Schengen 
movements showed a marked increase from 7 867 in 2013 to 9 968 in 2014 (an increase of 
27 %). Document fraudsters not only undermine border security but also the internal security 
of the EU. The use of fingerprints would be an efficient way for both border guards and law 
enforcement  officials  to  identify  persons  sought  by  the  authorities  and  to  detect  cases  of 
document  fraud.  The  fraudulent  use  of  travel  documents  in  connection  with  the  recent 
terrorist attacks in Paris also confirms the necessity for a tool that provides the possibility of 
identification  of  persons  on  the  basis  of  fingerprints.  To  date  there  is  no  EU-wide  system 
which would allow the checking of persons on the basis of fingerprints. 

A new SIS II feature is the storage of fingerprints in Central SIS II. At present, prints are used 
to confirm the identity of a person located as a result of a search, usually on name and date of 
birth. This is a ‘one-to-one’ search — the person’s prints are compared to one set of prints 
stored  in  SIS  II.  However,  the  possibility  to  identify  a  person  on  the  basis  of  his/her 
fingerprints requires an evolution to the present law enforcement practice: the comparison of 
a  person’s  prints  to  all  sets  of  prints  —  a  ‘one-to-many’  search  —  to  identify  the  person 
solely  on  the  basis  of  fingerprints.  This  functionality  requires  the  implementation  of  an 
Automated  Fingerprint  Identification  System  (AFIS).  AFIS  has  been  successfully  used  in 
numerous national and cross-border cooperation databases. For the EU the obvious examples 
are the Visa Information System (VIS) and EURODAC. Articles 22(c) of the SIS II Decision 
and  the  SIS  II  Regulation  provide a  legal  basis  for  using AFIS.  Before  this  functionality  is 
implemented, the Commission was required to report on the availability and readiness of the 
required technology, on which the European Parliament should be consulted. 

On 29 February 2016, the Commission adopted a report23 in line with Article 22 (c) of the SIS 
II legal instruments about the availability and readiness of the technology to use fingerprint 
for search. eu-LISA has launched the concrete implementation of a centralised AFIS, the first 
phase of which will be introduced in 2017. AFIS can be used by the same authorities that are 
entitled to carry out checks in SIS and it can be used in the same control situations when a 
SIS  II  check  is  performed,  i.e  at  the  time  of  a  visa  application,  at  border  controls  and  at 
checks on the territory of a Member State.  

23   Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the availability and readiness 
of  technology  to  identify  a  person  on  the  basis  of  fingerprints  held  in  the  second  generation  Schengen 
Information System (SIS II) (COM/2016/093 final). 

53 

 
 
 
                                                 
Effectiveness and relevance 
SIS II, with only the ability to carry out alphanumeric searches, is currently not sufficiently 
effective as 28 % of the identities in SIS II are aliases. Many persons travel under different 
identities that cannot be revealed by searches only using a name and date of birth. Therefore, 
a  fingerprint  search  is  needed  to  increase  effective  law  enforcement,  allowing  people  to  be 
identified beyond any doubt. The SIS II AFIS would represent significant EU added value, as 
it  would  be  the  first  EU-wide  criminal  AFIS.  To  date,  there  is  no  such  functionality 
comparable  to  SIS  II's  geographical  coverage;  this  is  problematic  for  the  EU-wide  security 
screening of irregular migrants. Consistency should be ensured with the Prüm mechanism on 
the bilateral exchange of fingerprints. 

In  order  to  ensure  the  maximum  effectiveness  of  fingerprint  searches  it  is  necessary  to  set 
high  standards  for  data  quality.  To  this  end  on  4  August  2016  the  Commission  adopted  a 
Commission  Implementing  Decision  on  minimum  data  quality  standards  for  fingerprint 
records within the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II)24 pursuant to Art. 
22(a) of the SIS II legal instruments.  

15. OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES 

As  this  section  goes  right  to  the  heart  of  operations  it  brought  out  some  very  detailed 
comments on operational practices.   

15.1 KEY THEMES EMERGING 

Ensuring that end-users can gain full benefit from SIS II information - effectiveness and efficiency  
The SIS II legal instruments set out the categories of information which may be held in SIS 
II.  The  provisions  on  ‘additional  data’  in  Article 3(1)(c)  of  the  SIS  II  Decision25  state  that 
these  data  must  be  immediately  available  to  the  end-user,  while  the  arguments  for  making 
other  data  available  are  present  but  less  explicit.  Experience  from  Schengen  evaluation  on-
site  visits  shows  that  the  legal  instruments  should  be  more  explicit  on  making  SIS  II 
information available to end-users as, in some Member States, features such as photographs 
and links between alerts were not visible to the end-user. One Member State proposed that a 
third paragraph could be added to Article 9, stipulating that the authority designated pursuant 
to  Article 7(1)  (N.SIS  II)  is  responsible  for  ensuring  that  all  end-users  can  see  the  data 
provided to them via SIS II on their user interface.  

It  is  inefficient  and  ineffective  to  provide  enhanced  data  for  end-users  and  for  them  not  to 
have access to it. It is inconsistent to have explicit text on accessing data for some data but 
not others.   

Automation of data insertion - efficiency  
In order to ensure consistency with national police databases and improve data quality, when 
a national entry is created, it should be transferred automatically to SIS II without requiring a 
separate alert to be created in SIS II. This also applies to the update and deletion procedures. 

24   Commission  Implementing  Decision  (EU)  2016/1345  of  4  August  2016  on  minimum  data  quality 
standards  for  fingerprint  records  within  the  second  generation  Schengen  Information  System  (SIS  II) 
(notified under document C(2016) 4988) (OJ L 213, 6.8.2016, p. 15). 
‘additional  data’  means  the  data  stored  in  SIS  II  and  connected  with  SIS  II  alerts  which  are  to  be 
immediately  available  to  the  competent  authorities  where  a  person  in  respect  of  whom  data  has  been 
entered in SIS II is located as a result of searches made therein. 

25  

54 

 
 
 
                                                 
Single query to query the national systems and SIS II - efficiency and effectiveness 
SIS II is  a compensatory  measure that helps to  maintain  a high  level  of security within the 
area  of  freedom,  security  and  justice  by  supporting  operational  cooperation  between  police 
authorities  and  judicial  authorities  in  criminal  matters  (Decision  2007/533/JHA)  and  the 
implementation of policies linked to the movement of persons that are part of the Schengen 
acquis  (Regulation  1987/2006).  If  SIS  II  is  not  systematically  included  in  law  enforcement 
checks on a Member State’s territory, the Member State is unable to fully contribute to the 
very purpose of SIS II, as it will not access and act upon the information that is included in 
the  alerts.  This  means  that  there  is  a  flawed  application  of  SIS  II  which  could  constitute  a 
security gap in Europe. 

Improving use of ‘fuzzy’ or ‘any name’ searches to obtain more hits - effectiveness and efficiency 
Member States can configure their queries to seek exact matches against SIS II data or seek 
varying amounts of ‘fuzziness’, or permutations of a name, to cater for misspelling or partial 
details.  Exact  match  searching  is  only  realistic  in  very  controlled  environments,  such  as 
airport checks, but even this will not cater for misspelling in the original alert. Exact match 
searching is inefficient for detection purposes as, although it provides a rapid response, it may 
miss the potential hit. 

Flagging - effectiveness and coherence/consistency 
Flagging is an exception to the principle of mutual recognition, and should not therefore be 
used extensively. It is a suspension of validity of an alert at national level that may be added 
to  alerts  for  arrest,  alerts  on  missing  persons  and  alerts  for  discreet  or  specific  checks,  if  a 
Member  State  considers  that  giving  effect  to  a  particular  alert  is  incompatible  with  its 
national  law,  its  international  obligations  or  essential  national  interests.  When  the  alert  is 
flagged,  the  requested  action  is  not  taken  on  the  territory  of  this  Member  State.  Only  a 
potential  incompatibility  with  national  law  or  international  obligations  can  justify  a  flag. 
Formal errors in an EAW, such as the illegibility of a date or signature, cannot lead to a flag. 
A flag can only be added at the request of or by agreement with another Member State. 

Number of alerts with at least one flag (distribution and trends) 
There has been a substantial increase in the number of alerts with at least  one flag — there 
were slightly more than 10 000 such alerts in 2014, rising dramatically to 21 497 in 2015, an 
increase of more than 100 %.   

Total number of alerts with at 
least one flag 2014-2015 

2015
2014

0

10

20

30

Thousands 

Flagging is used when a Member State informs (using a SIRENE F form) the Member State 
which issued the alert that it cannot take the action requested on an alert. The existence of a 
high number of flags on a Member State’s alerts indicates that the Member State has a high 
number  of  requests  for  arrest  that  at  least  one  other  Member  State  cannot  act  upon.  This 
indicates  some  inconsistency  between  national  law  and  the  Framework  Decision  on  the 
European Arrest Warrant26 (applicable only to EU Member States, not associated countries). 

26 

  Council  Framework  Decision  of  13 June  2002  (2002/584/JHA)  on  the  European  arrest  warrant  and  the 

surrender procedures between Member States OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 1-20. 

55 

 
 
 
                                                 
Two  Member  States  ‘own’  51 %  of  all  alerts  against  which  at  least  one  flag  has  been  set. 
Although  no  further  conclusion  can  currently  be  drawn,  this  situation  is  statistically 
disproportionate  and  merits  further  investigation.  Extensive  use  of  flagging  reduces  the 
effectiveness  of  the  system,  as  end-users  will  not  act  upon  these  alerts.  Flagging  should 
therefore remain an exception. 

16.  SIRENE BUREAUX AND THE EXCHANGE OF SUPPLEMENTARY 

INFORMATION 
 BETWEEN MEMBER STATES 

16.1 INTRODUCTION 

SIS II only contains the information (i.e. alert data) required to allow a person or an object to 
be identified and the necessary action to be taken. In line with the SIS II legal instruments, 
Member  States  must,  either  on  a  bilateral  or  multilateral  basis,  exchange  supplementary 
information  related  to  the  alert  to  implement  certain  provisions  provided  for  in  the  SIS  II 
legal instruments, and to ensure that SIS II functions properly. 

The structure that has been built to deal with the exchange of supplementary information has 
been  given  the  name  ‘SIRENE’.  This  is  an  acronym  of  the  definition  of  the  structure  in 
English:  Supplementary  Information  Request  at  the  National  Entries.  Each  Member  State 
designates the authority which will host the SIRENE Bureau in their country. The Bureaux 
work in accordance with the provisions of the SIRENE Manual27, an annex to a Commission 
Implementing Decision.   

Supplementary information is exchanged via the SIRENE Bureaux for the following reasons:  

(i)  to allow Member States to consult or inform each other when entering an alert;  
(ii) following a hit, to allow the appropriate action to be taken;  
(iii)when the required action cannot be taken;  
(iv) when dealing with issues relating to the quality of SIS II data;  
(v) when dealing with the compatibility and priority of alerts;  
(vi) when dealing with rights of data subjects to access, correct or delete his personal data. 

The operation of SIS II is inseparable from the SIRENE Bureaux, as they are at the very heart 
of  SIS  II  communication.  The  SIRENE  Bureaux  are  the  single  contact  point  for  all  SIS  II 
communication within a Member State and between Member States. The Bureaux manage all 
background  information  on  a  SIS  II  alert,  which  is  indispensable  for  the  officers  on  the 
ground to confirm hits and carry out the required action. 

16.2 SIRENE COMMUNICATION 

The SIRENE communication infrastructure operationally forms an integral part of SIS II and 
is operated by eu-LISA. The fact that SIS II is the most successful European security system 
is  largely  due  to  effective  SIRENE  communication,  based  upon  structured  information  and 
solid procedures. 

16.3 SIRENE COMMUNICATION WITHIN A MEMBER STATE 

End-users in a Member State must contact the SIRENE Bureau to: 

27   Annex  to  Commission  Implementing  Decision  (EU)  2016/1209  of  12 July  2016  replacing  the  Annex  to 
Implementing  Decision  2013/115/EU  on  the  SIRENE  Manual  and  other  implementing  measures  for  the 
second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) (notified under document C(2016) 4283) (OJ L 
201, 28.07.2016, p.35). 

56 

 
 
                                                 
 
 
  confirm whether a search in SIS II has produced a hit 
 
receive supplementary information and instructions 
 
report a hit.  

This  contact  can  take  place  by  telephone  (in  many  Member  States  the  end-user  interface 
displays  the  telephone  number),  in  a  free-text  message  or  via  a  dedicated,  structured  hit-
reporting  form.  To  ensure  that  supplementary  information  which  is  essential  to  take  action 
(e.g. the missing person needs immediate medication) is sent rapidly, Italy put in place pop-
up messages on the end-user screen which become visible only if there is a hit. This practice 
saves  precious  time  for  the  officers  as  they  have  the  necessary  information  immediately  at 
their  disposal.  Many  Member  States  have  already  implemented  structured  hit-reporting 
forms, which in some countries can be immediately transformed into a SIRENE G form. This 
saves time for the SIRENE Bureau and speeds up bilateral communication with the Member 
State  that  issued  the  alert.  Internal  hit  reporting  forms  allowing  structured  and  automatic 
communication between officers on the ground and the Bureau increase SIS II's effectiveness 
by  speeding  up  communication.  This  boosts  the  system's  overall  efficiency,  as  it  saves 
additional  resources  in  Member  States  if  this  form  is  transformed  automatically  or  semi-
automatically into a G form. 

16.4 BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL SIRENE COMMUNICATION — THE SIRENE FORMS 

Communication  mainly  takes  place  through  14 SIRENE  forms,  designed  for  specific 
purposes.  Supplementary  information  exchange  is  the  principal  means  of  ensuring  that 
outputs (hits) become successful outcomes, for example, the extradition of wanted people, the 
protection  of  the  vulnerable  and  the  correct  seizure  of  stolen  property.  Each  SIRENE  form 
sent or received represents a piece of work for the SIRENE Bureaux in the Member States. In 
2015,  nearly  1.8  million  forms  were  sent  or  received,  an  increase  of  27 %  on  2014.  This 
reflects  the  22 %  increase  in  hits  in  the  same  period.  The  Bureaux  carry  out  an  average  of 
11.6  pieces  of  work  per  hit  (incoming  or  outgoing  forms)  in  order  to  achieve  the  tasks 
detailed above (ensuring data quality, following up on a hit, consulting to ensure that alerts 
do not conflict or when an alert is particularly important). This appears remarkably efficient. 
The  key  question  remains:  are  such  efficiency  and  effectiveness  sustainable  in  the  face  of 
year-on-year workload increases? 

There  are  several  ways  of  approaching  statistics  on  the  exchange  of  supplementary 
information by SIRENE form. Since a form can be sent bilaterally from one Member State to 
another, this would count as one form sent and one received. This is most likely to happen 
when a hit is achieved and the executing Member State reports the hit to the issuing Member 
State  using  a  G  form.  However,  when  an  alert  for  arrest  is  created  an  A  form  is  sent 
multilaterally to all Member States, i.e. one form is sent, but 28 received. In these examples, 
the  G  form  represents  two  pieces  of  work  (one  Member  State  creating  a  form  and  one 
Member  State  receiving  and  processing  the  information  on  the  hit),  whereas  the  A  form 
represents  29  pieces  of  work  (one  Member  State  creating  a  form  and  28 Member  States 
receiving and processing the information). Statistics are therefore provided on what Member 
States generated (outgoing forms), what Member States had to process (incoming forms) and 
the total number of pieces of work which the Member States’ SIRENE Bureaux had to handle 
(incoming + outgoing forms).  

From  a  statistical  point  of  view,  the  growth  in  number  of  the  Schengen  states  will  have  an 
impact on the exchange of forms. This has always been so. At the end of 2014 and start of 
2015, all the existing Member States sent A forms for the existing 34 000 alerts for arrest to 
the UK for verification. A similar process will take place in 2016-17 for Croatia. However, 
even  if  the  base  were  stable,  there  is  a  year-on-year  workload  increase  for  the  SIRENE 

57 

 
 
 
Bureaux.  For  example,  while  the  number  of  alerts  for  arrest  has  remained  stable,  between 
2014  and  2015  there  was  a  27 %  increase  in  hits.  This  cannot  solely  be  explained  by  the 
addition of one Member State into SIS II and therefore must largely be due to an increase in 
operational  ‘productivity’  by  law  enforcement  and  judicial  authorities  in  Member  States. 
Although  very  welcome,  the  effect is  an  increase  in  work,  generally  without  an  increase  in 
resources.  This  is the major reason why the Commission asked Member States to  highlight 
areas of potential  inefficiency to  ensure  increases in  productivity do not have  a detrimental 
effect on the effectiveness and efficiency of the Bureaux. 

16.5 ‘DATA EXCHANGE BETWEEN SIRENES (DEBS)’   

SIRENE  forms  must  comply  with  a  set  of  technical  standards  in  order  for  the  correct 
information  to  be  entered  in  the  correct  sections  (fields)  of  the  forms  so  that  they  are 
universally  comprehensible.  In  2015,  the  SISVIS  Committee  agreed  that  responsibility  for 
ongoing  maintenance  of  DEBS  would  pass  from  the  Commission  to  eu-LISA,  in  order  to 
effectively incorporate DEBS updates into the SIS II change management process. To date, 
eu-LISA  has  not  acquired  sufficient  competence  to  manage  DEBS  and  it  is  still  highly 
dependent upon Member State expertise. Release 8 of the Central SIS II had to be postponed 
due to issues relating to DEBS. As changes in Central SIS II may have an effect on DEBS, 
appropriate  centralised  management  is  required  to  analyse  the  wider  impact  of  changes  to 
DEBS.  Centralised  management  of  DEBS  that  is  not  dependent  solely  on  Member  State 
expertise  is  required.  eu-LISA  taking  over  management  of  DEBS  has  had  a  substantial 
positive  impact  on  the  effectiveness  and  EU  added-value.  It  also  reflects  the  principle  that 
SIRENE communication is an integral part of SIS II.   

16.6 SIRENE FUNCTIONAL TESTS 

SIRENE functional tests examine the functioning of the national SIRENE technical solutions 
and exchange of information between SIRENE Bureaux through forms sent via the SIRENE 
Mail  infrastructure  according  to  the  specifications  provided  for  in  the  SIRENE  Manual. 
These  include  entering,  modifying,  flagging,  deleting  corresponding  alerts  in  SIS  II  and 
attaching/detaching  relevant  additional  information  to  SIS  II  alerts.  As  the  SIRENE 
functional tests cover both the exchange of forms and core SIS II operations, eu-LISA took 
over  the  overall  management  of  the  tests,  assisted  by  volunteer  Member  States.  So  far 
SIRENE  functional  tests  have  been  run  with  Poland,  Finland  and  the  UK.  Tests  on 
exchanging forms also had to be run as a consequence of Release 8 of the Central SIS II. eu-
LISA’s  stronger  engagement  in  the  SIRENE  community  helps  eu-LISA  to  understand  the 
nature of the business and the operational needs of SIS II end-users. 

16.7  SIRENE WORKFLOWS AND WORKLOAD — MAINTAINING EFFECTIVENESS, 

EFFICIENCY AND COHERENCE WITH REQUIREMENTS 

Other than installing automated workflow systems with the potential to significantly improve 
capacity,  the  formal  elements  of  SIRENE  information  exchange  must  be  respected.  It  has 
been  recognised,  in  the  framework  of  the  European  Information  Exchange  Model,  that 
SIRENE  Bureaux  can  work  at  high  levels  of  intensity  due  to  the  formalisation  of  their 
working  practices.  However,  even  those  Bureaux  which  have  installed  workflow  systems 
have  highlighted  that  the  workload  is  at  the  limits  of  capacity.  The  SISVIS  Committee  has 
worked on generic requirements for workflow systems. The Commission carried out a survey 
to identify the highest areas of pressure, the areas where the Bureaux consider themselves to 
be strong and what changes they would envisage. Staffing levels have not increased in line 

58 

 
 
 
 
 
 
with  the  rapidly  increasing  workload.  Better  case  management  systems  and  workflows  are 
required and procedures should be as automated as possible. 

16.8  STRUCTURE OF THE SIRENE BUREAUX 

Transparency 
The Commission published a list of N.SIS II Offices and the national SIRENE Bureaux in the 
Official  Journal  C10 3,  9.04.2013,  together  with  a  list  of  competent  authorities  that  are 
authorised  to  directly  search  the  data  in  SIS  II.  Updated  versions  were  published  by  the 
Agency in OJ C 278, 22.08.2014 and OJ C 208, 24.06.2015. Member States are responsible 
for  ensuring  that  their  SIRENE  Bureaux  are  fully  operational  on  a  24/7  basis.  The 
implementation of this requirement differs throughout the Member States.   

SIRENE Contact Person: solving problems — efficiency 
In  some  cases,  standard  procedures  may  be  insufficient.  The  SIRENE  Contact  Person 
(SIRCoP)  deals  with  files  on  which  progress  is  complex,  problematic  or  sensitive  and  a 
degree of quality assurance and/or longer term contact with another SIRENE Bureau may be 
required  in  order  to  resolve  the  issue.  The  SIRCoP  may  formulate  proposals  to  improve 
quality and set out options to resolve such issues in the longer term. An annual assessment is 
carried out as part of annual statistical reporting. There were 113 contacts initiated in 2014, 
rising to 167 in 2015 – an increase of almost 50 %. (No data on this were collected in 2013, 
therefore the statistics  cover only  2014 and 2015.) The low number of complex or  blocked 
files  requiring  SIRCoP  intervention  is  remarkable  when  compared  with  the  overall  level  of 
contact  and  information  exchange  between  Bureaux  and  the  total  number  of  successful 
outcomes achieved. 

Premature deletion of supplementary information and related issues — effectiveness and efficiency 
Not all Member States make use of the provisions of Article 53 of the SIS II Decision. These 
state that: 

2.   Personal  data  held  in  files  by  the  SIRENE  Bureau  as  a  result  of  information 
exchanged  shall  be  kept  only  for  such  time  as  may  be  required  to  achieve  the 
purposes for which they were supplied. They shall in any event be deleted at the latest 
one year after the related alert has been deleted from SIS II. 

3.   Paragraph 2 shall not prejudice the right of a Member State to keep in national 
files data relating to a particular alert which that Member State has issued or to an 
alert in connection with which action has been taken on its territory.  The period for 
which such data may be held in such files shall be governed by national law. 

In  some  Member  States,  the  national  system  is  configured  to  automatically  trigger  the 
deletion  of  any  supplementary  information  when  an  alert  is  deleted.  Any  subsequent 
exchange  of  information  between  the  Member  States  on  the  alert  is  hampered,  as  a  result. 
This  often  happens  in  missing  person  cases  and  follow-up  enquiries  on  recovered  objects. 
This  is  especially  problematic  when  a  Member  State’s  SIRENE  system  can  only  generate 
SIRENE forms relating to an existing Schengen ID number as the number will have ceased to 
exist.  

Member  States  should  therefore  reconsider  the  automatic  deletion  of  supplementary 
information,  especially  as  the  legislation  permits  longer  retention.  Alternatively,  Member 
States should reconfigure their SIRENE systems to be able to generate forms using Schengen 
ID numbers that no longer exist. 

59 

 
 
 
17.   SIS II- SIRENE TRAINING AT EUROPEAN LEVEL 

17.1 SIRENE CEPOL COURSES 

An enduring outcome of the 2008 French Presidency of the Council of the EU is the SIRENE 
Training Committee. With the growing number of Member States, training needed to become 
more structured and professional. Interested Member States and the Commission formed the 
Training  Committee.  Due  to  the  inseparable  link  between  interpretation  of  the  legal 
instruments  and  ensuring  that  operational  staff  receives  clear  explanations  of  the  legal 
instruments, the Training Committee, by common consent, came under the responsibility of 
the  SISVIS  Committee  when  SIS  II  became  operational  on  9 April  2013.  The  Committee 
decides  on  user  needs  for  training.  Through  a  partnership  with  CEPOL,  Member  States 
experts, the Commission and, more recently, eu-LISA (which has a statutory responsibility to 
provide training on technical aspects of SIS II, including to SIRENE staff and those involved 
in  Schengen  evaluations)  the  following  courses  are  listed  in  the  SIRENE  Training  Manual. 
They were developed by the three original partners. 

  SIRENE I (or Basic) — The SIRENE I course is intended for SIRENE operators who: 

  already have some SIRENE work experience (at least 6 months); or  
  have already worked for a longer time in a SIRENE Bureau but need to update 

their knowledge in light of developments; or  

  come from candidate countries and need to understand the SIRENE's work.  

Participants should have knowledge of the SIS II legal instruments and the SIRENE 
Manual,  and  they  should  be  able  to  apply  the  relevant  articles  within  their  national 
legislation. Usually, two courses are run per year. 

  SIRENE II (or Advanced) — This advanced training activity is aimed at experienced 
SIRENE  operators.  They  should  have  sound  knowledge  of  the  legal  framework  and 
operational  practice,  including  national  procedures.  Their  level  of  experience  and 
knowledge  should  enable  them  to  generate  creative  solutions  within  this  complex 
environment.  Outputs  from  these  seminars  include  discussion  documents  and 
factsheets  (see  section  9.9.1.3).  Usually,  one  course  is  held  per  year,  unless  the 
SISVIS  Committee  seeks  a  second  course  and  this  can  be  accommodated  within 
CEPOL's schedule. 

  SIRENE III (Train-the-Trainers) — This course is to provide SIRENE operators with 
some  knowledge  and  skills  in  training  methodology.  They  gain  an  understanding  of 
the difference between the two categories of SIRENE training, in particular their aims 
and  structure.  This  course  is  run  when  there  is  a  need  to  increase  the  number  of 
trainers. 

17.1.1 The SIRENE online module and SIRENE platform 
CEPOL, Member States and the Commission worked together to develop an online training 
module on SIS II and SIRENE. It is hosted on the CEPOL training platform, in a dedicated 
SIRENE  area.  Training  and  reference  materials  are  therefore  available  24/7  to  staff 
throughout  the  Bureaux.  The  platform  also  holds  all  pre-course  and  training  materials  for 
training  seminars.  In  parallel,  the  Commission  manages  the  uploading  and  update  of 
reference materials on the platform, such as the SIRENE factsheets and legal texts, which are 
useful for operational staff. 

17.1.2 Statistics on the SIRENE CEPOL trainings 

The trained SIRENE officers is 353 in total since 2013. 

60 

 
 
 
 
Divided per years: 

2013 - 133 Participants (3 courses) 

2014 – 64 participants (2 courses) 

2015 – 85 participants (3 courses) 

2016 – 71 participants (2 courses) - Still one course to be implemented in Latvia at 
the end of September 2016. 

These figures do not contain the number of persons participating in webinars hosted by 
CEPOL. The Commission organised since 2013 altogether 11 webinars. The number of 
participants varied between 50 and 220 depending on the subject matter.  

17.2 EU-LISA TRAINING 

eu-LISA's mandate in providing SIS II training is based on the eu-LISA Regulation. Training 
topics and target groups are specified in:  

  Recital 11: The Agency should perform tasks relating to training on the technical use 

of SIS II28;  

  Article 3(b): The Agency shall perform tasks relating to training on the technical use 
of  SIS  II,  in  particular  for  SIRENE  staff,  and  training  of  experts  on  the  technical 
aspects of SIS II in the framework of Schengen evaluation.  

By joining the existing partnership between the Commission, the Member States and CEPOL, 
eu-LISA has improved the training offered by increasing the opportunities for SIRENE staff 
to  learn  about  the  technical  aspects  of  SIS  II.  eu-LISA  regularly  delivers  targeted  training 
before  each  Schengen  evaluation  mission,  focusing  on  the  technical  performance  of  the 
Member  State  under  evaluation.  In  November  2015,  eu-LISA  organised  the  first  technical 
course  on  SIS  II  for  SIRENE  operators.  This  is  meant  to  close  a  gap,  as  efficient  SIRENE 
work cannot be separated from a basic technical understanding of the system. 

17.3 CONCLUSIONS 

Regular SIS II-SIRENE training is one of the core achievements of SIRENE cooperation at 
European  level  and  it  substantially  contributes  to  the  consistent  application  of  the  system 
throughout  the  Member  States.  Member  States  explored  the  possibility  of  applying  the 
SIRENE training model to other forms of European law enforcement cooperation, as regular 
training  activities  harmonise  procedures  and  improve  the  working  relationships  between 
SIRENE operators. Common European training activity therefore has a clear EU added value. 
Schengen evaluation missions have shown the different levels, however, of end-user training. 
This falls under the competence of Member States and to-date there is no common European 
training  curriculum.  SIS  II  is  less  effective  if  end-users  are  not  aware  of  the  different 
functionalities,  alert  categories  and,  most  importantly,  actions  to  be  taken.  Carrying  out 
discreet checks poses a particular challenge for end-users in particular at the external borders 
where  the  waiting  queues  are  long  therefore  the  border  guards  in  certain  Member  States 
disregard  the  discreet  nature  of  the  check  and  take  the  person  to  the  second  line,  in-depth 
check which jeopardises the secrecy of the check.  

28   And VIS, Eurodac and other large-scale IT systems that might be entrusted to the Agency in the future. 

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18. SIS II GOVERNANCE — ISSUES ALREADY ADDRESSED AND 

HARMONISATION OF PROCEDURES 

18.1 GOVERNANCE 

SIS II governance is provided by:  

the Commission;  
the SISVIS Committee;  

 
 
  eu-LISA;  
 
 

the eu-LISA Management Board; and  
the SIS II Advisory Group. 

Responsibilities of the Commission 
The  Commission’s  responsibility  relating  to  SIS  II  is  twofold:  firstly,  it  manages  any 
legislative initiative linked to SIS II and secondly, in its role as the guardian of the Treaties, 
ensures  the  correct  application  and  implementation  of  the  SIS  II  legal  framework.  The 
Commission takes a dual approach towards Member States to ensure that EU law is applied 
correctly. It pursues breaches of EU law via the ‘EU-Pilot’ procedure, with the further option 
of infringement, and it supports Member States’ in developing capacity to optimise the use of 
the system. The Commission also works together with the Member States on the correct use 
of  SIS  II,  as  described  later  in  this  document.  The  Commission  preserves  its  budgetary 
powers, as the EU general budget covers the costs of maintaining and operating the central 
system  and  the  communication  infrastructure,  including  continuous  synchronisation  with 
national systems. 

The  Commission's  participation  and  active  involvement  in  every  training  course  and 
conference organised on SIS II (a minimum of five times per year on regular courses) ensures 
the correct interpretation and provision of the most up-to- date information on SIS II. 

In  SIRENE-related  matters,  the  Commission  is  the  primary  point  of  contact  for  Member 
States, including for managing the SIRENE address book, organising meetings and managing 
and  maintaining  a  dedicated  website.  The  Commission  monitors  the  implementation  of  the 
SIRENE  Manual,  oversees  all  training-related  materials  and  products  to  ensure  they  are 
legally compliant and takes part in SIS II/SIRENE evaluation missions through the Schengen 
Evaluation mechanism. 

Responsibilities of the SISVIS Committee — EU added-value, efficiency and effectiveness 
The  SIS  II  legal  instruments  set  up  the  SISVIS  Committee  to  assist  the  Commission  in  a 
number  of  key  tasks.  The  committee  is  comprised  of  Member  State  delegations  (including 
one  technical  and  one  operational  expert)  and  is  chaired  by  the  Commission.  The 
Commission coordinates and steers the committee's work and prepares the draft measures on 
which  the  committee  is  asked  to  give  an  opinion  and  any  other  working  papers.  The 
committee meetings provide transparency and an opportunity to address issues of concern, to 
put pressure on Member States to fix problems and to exchange best practice. The committee 
has  evolved  to  become  the  main  forum  for  harmonising  operational  procedures,  supporting 
the effective application of the rules and the optimised use of SIS II. Implementing the SIS II 
legal  instruments  means  that  the  Commission  must  adopt  implementing  measures  with 
normative  effect  and,  as  set  out  in  the  SIS  II  legal  instruments,  it  is  assisted  in  this  by  the 
SISVIS Committee. Provisions with normative effect comprise mainly business rules on data 
processing, including biometrics, which have a direct impact on individuals whose data will 
be processed in SIS II, or rules which set or alter the underlying architecture of the system 
within the framework provided by the SIS II legal bases. 

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The  committee  originally  met  in  three  formations:  SIS  II  technical,  SIRENE  and  Visa 
Information  System  (VIS).  In  2015,  the  SIS  II  technical  and  SIRENE  formations  were 
merged, as  virtually all issues addressed had implications for both  operational business and 
IT.  The  SISVIS  Committee  is  can  create  working  groups  to  examine  particular  issues,  if 
needed.. The Training Committee (described above) is a sub group of the SISVIS Committee, 
and  previous  examples  include  the  Test  Advisory  Group  (TAG),  the  Change  Management 
Board (CMB) and the National Project Managers meeting. These tasks are now carried out by 
eu-LISA, with the involvement of the SIS II Advisory Group. 

There is significant EU added value, efficiency and effectiveness in providing a forum with a 
suitable and sufficiently broad legal basis to allow the end-users of SIS II, the Commission 
and  eu-LISA  to  meet  regularly  to  ensure  clarity  on  interpretation  of  EU  law,  identify 
operational  issues  and  technical  improvement.  The  Commission  is  kept  apprised  of 
operational and technical matters at Member State level and the Member States have ready 
access  to  the  Commission  for  interpretation  of  the  legal  instruments.  This  is  especially 
important in the fluid situations of migration and security. There is internal consistency and 
effectiveness in ensuring close ties between the interpretation of the law and the explanation 
of the law through training, all coordinated within the Committee structure. 

Responsibilities of eu-LISA 
While  the  Commission  develops  technical  rules  and  normative  procedures  (either  alone  or 
working with the SISVIS Committee, as described above), eu-LISA has responsibility for the 
operational management of the SIS II central system and its interconnection with the national 
systems.  In  order  to  ensure  the  highest  technical  and  budgetary  synergy  between  the 
activities, it is essential that the Commission works very closely with eu-LISA. 

Responsibilities of the Management Board 
The Management Board's role in SIS II governance is derived from the tasks reserved to the 
Board,  under  the  eu-LISA  legal  basis,  particularly  relating  to  the  annual  programming  and 
budgetary  cycles.  It  also  has  to  approve  the  final  release  plan  concerning  SIS,  VIS  and 
EURODAC. 

Responsibilities of the Advisory Group 
The  SIS  II  Advisory  Group  was  set  up  to  provide  the  Management  Board  with  expertise 
relating to the SIS II central system, in particular, relating to the annual work programme and 
the annual activity report. The Advisory Group comprises Member State representatives and 
the Commission. The procedures for the operation and cooperation of the Advisory Groups 
are laid down by the Management Board in eu-LISA’s rules of procedure. 

18.2 ISSUES ALREADY ADDRESSED AND THE HARMONISATION OF PROCEDURES 

18.2.1 Issues addressed in the SISVIS Committee — EU added-value and effectiveness 
The  Commission’s  2014  report  on  the  Study  on  the  implementation  of  the  European 
Information Exchange Model (EIXM) for strengthening law enforcement cooperation  stated 
that: 

Clear rules on data capturing, quality control, agreements on legal basis used when 
capturing and using the data, common procedures, etc. are not in place for all aspects 
relating to cross-border information exchange. SIS II and SIRENE were mentioned as 
a good example where detailed rules exist. 

The Commission convenes the SISVIS committee approximately every six weeks to address 
technical and operational matters. Accordingly, even while this evaluation report was being 
written,  progress  was  being  made  on  matters  of  common  interest  to  the  Commission  and 
Member  States.  As  an  operational  system,  SIS  II  is  under  continuous  review.  The  SIS  II 

63 

 
 
governance  model  created  a  highly  effective  structure,  able  to  respond  to  new  operational 
requirements  and  challenges.  The  structure  fosters  mutual  understanding  amongst 
stakeholders  and  facilitates  harmonisation  in  the  operation  of  SIS  II  and  SIRENE.  The 
Commission  and  eu-LISA  significantly  benefit  from  this  ongoing  feedback  from  Member 
States, allowing them to better understand operational practice and reality. It also provides an 
opportunity for the Commission to monitor SIS II on an ongoing basis and raise issues in a 
more informal and educative manner. 

18.2.2 Interim reviews of the SIRENE Manual 
The statistics on hits in SIS II and the exchange of supplementary information between the 
SIRENE Bureaux show that this sphere is highly operational and use of SIS II evolves to face 
new  operational  challenges.  As  a  result,  although  stability  in  the  legal  base  is  always 
desirable, periodic review is needed to ensure that the legal basis remains fit for purpose. No 
set of procedures will ever be perfect and from time to time, the SISVIS Committee needs to 
discuss common problems and adopt procedures to overcome these. Where necessary, these 
new procedures must be reflected in the SIRENE Manual. The need to respond to the issue of 
foreign terrorist fighters provided an opportunity, in 2014, to carry out an interim review of 
the  SIRENE  Manual  in  order  to  meet  operational  demands.  The  new  version  entered  into 
force on 29 January 2015. On 12 July 2016 the Commission adopted the revision of the alert 
compatibility rules by providing for the possibility of the waiver such rules in case of serious 
threat.  

18.2.3 The Catalogue of Recommendations and Best Practice — EU added-value 
In  2015,  a  Commission  Recommendation  was  adopted,  creating  a  catalogue  of 
recommendations and best practices for correctly using SIS II and exchanging supplementary 
information by the Member States implementing and using SIS II. The catalogue is used as a 
reference guide by Member States integrating into the SIS II, by Member States checking and 
reviewing their procedures, and by members of on-site teams carrying out evaluations under 
the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism. 

18.2.4 Factsheets — Effectiveness 
The  SIRENE  advanced  seminars  specifically  focus  on  implementing  SIS  II  and  SIRENE 
procedures and, when appropriate, produce factsheets to provide an overview of the state of 
play  in  the  Member  States.  The  Commission  checks  the  problem  statement  and  legal 
references, and the respective Heads of SIRENE Bureaux validate the national content. The 
factsheet initiative began under SIS I. With the go-live of SIS II, the Commission initiated a 
review  of  all  factsheets.  Several  issues  which  had  proved  problematic  under  SIS  I  were 
removed or reduced with the introduction of SIS II and, as a result, the factsheets could be 
amended  or  deleted.  The  factsheets  provide  an  interesting  fact-finding  exercise  in  that  they 
describe situations where national laws or procedures have an impact on the implementation 
of  the  SIS  II  legal  instruments  and  there  is  value  in  describing  these  situations  to  other 
Member  States,  in  order  to  avoid  lengthy  exchanges  of  messages.  Factsheets  are  not  static. 
They are revised, used as a basis for improving working procedures in the SIRENE Manual 
or  the  catalogue  of  recommendations  and  best  practice  (SIS  II  and  SIRENE),  and  they  are 
deleted when they have served their purpose. Factsheets are only retained in the longer term 
where national law and procedure are not harmonised at EU level, to explain differences in 
national  implementation.  The  factsheets  are  uploaded  by  the  Commission  onto  the  secure 
SIRENE  section  of  the  CEPOL  website,  where  other  reference  documents  are  placed  for 
access by end-users. 

The factsheets are effective as they highlight issues of national law or lack of harmonisation 
or  consistency.  They  also  provide  an  effective  basis  for  action,  as  demonstrated  by  the 
deletion  of  factsheets  once  issues  have  been  resolved.  Pending  deletion,  the  factsheet 

64 

 
 
provides a reference document to indicate national specificities which can reduce inefficiency 
caused by unnecessary correspondence. 

19.  REMEDIES  

Remedies  are  the  provisions  in  each  Member  State  that  allow  a  person  to  bring  an  action 
before the courts (or the authority competent under the law of any Member State) to access, 
correct,  delete  or  obtain  information  or  to  obtain  compensation  in  connection  with  an  alert 
relating to him and the mutual enforcement of decisions in other Member States. 

In accordance with data protection principles, all individuals whose data are processed in SIS 
II have the following specific rights under Article 41 of the SIS II Regulation and Article 58 
of the SIS II Decision:  

 
 

 

the right of access to data relating to them stored in the SIS II;  
the  right  to  correct  inaccurate  data  or  have  data  deleted,  if  they  have  been  stored 
unlawfully; and  
the right to bring proceedings before the courts or competent authorities to correct or 
delete data or to obtain compensation. 

Anyone exercising these rights can apply to the competent authorities in the Schengen State 
of his/her choice. This is possible because all copies of data in the national databases (N.SIS 
II)  are  identical  to  the  central  system  database  (CS.SIS  II).  Therefore,  these  rights  can  be 
exercised  in  any  Schengen  country,  regardless  of  who  issued  the  alert.  When  an  individual 
exercises  his/her  rights  of  access,  correction  of  inaccurate  data  and  deletion  of  unlawfully 
stored  data,  competent  authorities  must  reply  within  a  strict  deadline.  The  individual  must 
receive a reply as soon as possible and, in any event, not later than 60 days from the date on 
which he/she  applies for access,  or sooner if national  law so provides. The individual must 
also be informed as soon as possible of action taken to correct or delete data as requested, and 
in any event not later than three months from the date on which he/she applies for correction 
or deletion, or sooner if national law so provides. 

19.1 THE RIGHT OF ACCESS 

The right of access allows anyone, on request, to have knowledge of the information relating 
to him/her stored in a data file as referred to in national law. This is a fundamental principle 
of data protection which enables data subjects to exercise control over personal data kept by 
third  parties.  This  right  is  expressly  provided  for  in  Article  41  of  SIS  II  Regulation  and  in 
Article 58 of SIS II Decision. The right of access is exercised in accordance with the law of 
the Member State where the request is submitted. These procedures differ from one country 
to  another,  as  do  the  rules  for  communicating  data  to  the  applicant.  When  a  Member  State 
receives a request for access to an alert that it did not issue, it must give the issuing country 
the opportunity to state its position on disclosing the data to the applicant. The information 
must  not  be  communicated  to  the  data  subject  if  this  is  required  to  carry  out  the  legal  task 
connected to the alert, or in order to protect the rights and freedoms of other people. 

There are currently two types of system governing the right of access to data processed by 
law enforcement authorities, and thus which also apply to SIS II data. In some Member States 
the right of access is direct, while in others it is indirect. Direct access means the person 
applies directly to the authorities who process the data (police, gendarmerie, customs, etc.). If 
national law permits, the applicant may be sent the information relating to him/her. Indirect 
access means the person applies to the national data protection authority in the country where 

65 

 
 
the request is submitted. The data protection authority carries out the necessary checks to 
handle the request and replies to the applicant. 

19.2 RIGHT TO CORRECTION AND DELETION OF DATA 

People also have the right to correct factually inaccurate or incomplete personal data and to 
ask for personal data that have been unlawfully stored to be deleted. Only the Member State 
responsible for issuing an alert in the SIS II may alter or delete it. If the request is submitted 
in  a  Member  State  that  did  not  issue  the  alert,  the  competent  authorities  in  the  relevant 
countries work together on the case, exchanging information and carrying out the necessary 
checks.  The  applicant  should  provide  the  grounds  for  their  request  to  correct  or  delete  the 
data and any relevant information to support the request. 

19.3 REMEDIES: THE RIGHT TO COMPLAIN TO THE DATA PROTECTION AUTHORITY OR TO 

INITIATE A JUDICIAL PROCEEDING 

Articles 43 of SIS II Regulation and 59 of SIS II Decision set out the remedies available to 
individuals  if  their  request  has  not  been  complied  with.  Any  person  may  bring  an  action 
before  the  courts  or  the  authority  competent  under  the  law  of  any  Member  State  to  access, 
correct,  delete  or  obtain  information  or  to  obtain  compensation  in  connection  with  an  alert 
relating  to  him.  If  they  have  to  deal  with  a  complaint  with  a  cross-border  element,  data 
protection authorities should work with each other to guarantee the rights of the data subjects. 

19.4 EVALUATION 

The  evaluation  is  based  on  a  questionnaire  to  the  members  of  the  SIS  II  Supervision 
Coordination Group in June 2015 and evaluations by Member States on the application of the 
Schengen acquis in the field of data protection. 

19.4.1 Questionnaire forwarded to the members of the SIS II Supervision Coordination 
Group 
The questionnaire forwarded to the members of the SIS II Supervision Coordination Group in 
June  2015  sought  responses  to  the  questions  described  previously  in  Section  4.2.9.  Sixteen 
responses were received. 

Several  Member  States  provided  an  overview  of  the  initial  subject  access  enquiry  process 
(direct to the data controller or indirect to the DPA), the possibilities for seeking redress via 
the  national  data  protection  authority  (DPA)  and  the  appeal  process  through  a  tribunal  or 
administrative court. In general, the approach adopted is that the DPA receives requests for 
rights of access, correction, deletion and obtaining of information relating to an alert on the 
data  subject.  The  DPA  then  contacts  the  data  controller  to  check  the  details  of  the  subject 
access enquiry and ensure any corrective action is taken. If the alert was entered by another 
Member State, the DPA contacts its counterpart in that Member State. The views of the other 
Member  State  are  sought  prior  to  any  disclosure  of  information  to  the  data  subject.  Many 
Member  States  said  that  the  subject  access  enquiry  process  is  the  same  regardless  of  the 
location  of  the  applicant.  They  described  the  list  of  identification  information  and  identity 
documents required to establish the identity of the subject access enquirer. 

The  services  of  the  DPA  or  the  data  controller  are  provided  free  of  charge  in  all  Member 
States  that  responded.  Lithuania  highlighted  that  one  free  right  of  access  is  provided  in  a 
calendar year. However, where a data subject decides to seek redress or appeal to the court, 
there are usually court fees to be paid. Even then, several Member States described schemes 
whereby  those  in  financial  need  could  apply  for  a  fee  waiver.  If  the  applicant  is  in  a  third 
country,  Member  States  generally  require  the  data  subject  to  apply  in  person  unless  he/she 

66 

 
 
 
provides sufficient proof of authorising a third party e.g. a lawyer, to carry out the request. 
The  data  subject  must  provide  sufficient  proof  of  identity,  such  as  a  copy  of  a  passport  or 
national identity card. Poland does not require the attachment of identity documents. 

The amount of statistics available varies. This was a key finding of the questionnaire, as the 
inconsistency of statistics hindered effective evaluation of the measures. The detailed replies 
provided by Member States on the number of complaints and remedies are set out in Annex 
IV. 

There  are  several  approaches  to  mutual  recognition  and  enforcement  of  final  decisions 
handed  down  by  the  courts  or  authorities  of  other  Schengen  States.  Some  Member  States 
considered that the provisions of Article 59(2) of the SIS II Decision or Article 43(2) of the 
SIS  II  Regulation  are  sufficient,  stating  that  national  courts  are  obliged  to  enforce  such 
decisions. 

19.5 THE EVALUATIONS OF CERTAIN MEMBER STATES ON THE APPLICATION OF THE 

SCHENGEN ACQUIS IN THE FIELD OF DATA PROTECTION 

The  evaluation  and  monitoring  mechanism  for  verifying  the  application  of  the  Schengen 
acquis,  as  established  by  Council  Regulation  (EU)  No 1053/2013  of  7 October  201329, 
provides  for  a  multi-annual30  evaluation  programme  and  more  detailed  annual  evaluation 
programmes31.  This  analysis  takes  into  account  the  evaluations  carried  out  by  the  time  of 
drafting  the  evaluation  report.  Generally,  Member  States  evaluated  to  date  implement  and 
apply the EU’s Schengen acquis in line with the data protection requirements. Examples of 
points for improvement and best practices are listed below. 

Right of access, correction of inaccurate data and deletion of unlawfully stored data 
Article 58 (6) of the SIS II Decision and Article 41(6) of the SIS II Regulation state that the 
time limit for replying to requests for access to data should be ‘as soon as possible’ and in 
any event ‘not later than 60 days’ from the date of the request. In certain Member States the 
national legislation provides for longer periods for the reply than 60 days. In several Member 
States,  access  requests were  free  of  charge.  A best  practice  example  was  that  multiple  data 
subject access requests can be exercised free of charge, with no limit on the number of access 
requests that can be made by a data subject. Other Member States, however, limit requests to 
one  per  year  per  requestor  for  a  set  of  data,  unless  the  data  subject  submits  relevant 
justification, which does not seem to be the most suitable tool for guaranteeing the exercise of 
the data subject’s rights. 

Public awareness regarding data protection 
It was noted in certain cases that the information provided to the public is not entirely up to 
date and could be more extensive and coordinated. 

Supervision of N.SIS II 
Article 44(1) of the SIS II Regulation and Article 60(1) of the SIS II Decision state that the 
authority or authorities designated in each Member State who have the powers referred to in 
Article 28 of Directive 95/46/EC (the ‘National Supervisory Authority’) must independently 
monitor the lawfulness of:  

29     OJ L 295, 6.11.2013, p. 27. 
30   Commission 

Implementing  Decision  of  18.6.201,  establishing 

the  multi-annual  evaluation 
 programme  2014-2019  in  accordance  with  Article  5  of  Council  Regulation  (EU)No 1053/2013  of 
7 October 2013 (C(2014) 3683). 

31   Commission  Implementing  Decision  of  30.10.2014  establishing  the  first  section  of  the  annual 
evaluation  programme  for  2015  in  accordance  with  Article  6  of  the  Council  Regulation  (EU) 
No 1053/2013 of 7 October 2013 (C(2014) 7781). 

67 

 
 
                                                 
 
 
 

the processing of SIS II personal data on their territory; 
transmission of those data from that territory; and  
the exchange and further processing of supplementary information.  

An audit of the data processing operations in its N.SIS II should be carried out in accordance 
with  international  auditing  standards  at  least  every  four  years.  Member  States  must  ensure 
that their National Supervisory Authority has sufficient resources to fulfil the tasks entrusted 
to  it  under  the  SIS  II  legal  bases.  SIS  II  must  be  audited  by  9 April  2017.  This  will 
necessarily  cover  all  the  data  protection  aspects  of  the  structure  and  functioning  of  SIS  II, 
including  the  quality  of the  data  entered into the  system.  Regular  comprehensive  checks  of 
SIS II alerts, especially on the basis of log  file analysis,  are required. These must  take into 
account that SIS II related logs are kept just for one year. In several Member States, a lack of 
human resources in general and particularly for SIS II supervision is an issue. In one Member 
State, no specific supervision and monitoring of SIS II has been carried out. The main reason 
given for not carrying out checks and audits after SIS II came into force is limited human and 
financial  resources  coupled  with  the  fact  that  the  supervision  of  SIS  II  has  not  been 
considered a priority. A considerable weakness was noted regarding the lack of access to log 
records from the N.SIS II by the SIS II data controller. 

A best practice example was where the mandatory Data Protection Officer worked as an in-
house advisor, legally empowered to assist and monitor data processing activities within the 
police forces and formally incorporated in the legal system, ensuring independence and legal 
protection.  This  helped  support  an  optimal  enforcement  of  the  applicable  data  protection 
rules. In another Member State, each police unit has a privacy officer. Together with the Data 
Protection Authority for the national police, they have set up a Privacy Platform as a forum to 
discuss  all  privacy-related  issues  and  where  privacy-by-design  solutions  are  going  to  be 
developed. 

Effectiveness 
All Member States have well-developed frameworks allowing any person to bring an action 
before  the  courts  or  the  authority  competent  under  the  law  of  any  Member  State  to  access, 
correct,  delete  or  obtain  information  or  to  obtain  compensation  in  connection  with  an  alert 
relating to him. Many Member States said that the subject access enquiry process is the same, 
regardless  of  the  location  of  the  applicant.  They  described  the  list  of  identification 
information  and  identity  documents  required  to  establish  the  identity  of  the  subject  access 
enquirer. 

Member States were asked to provide available annual statistics covering 2013 and 2014 on 
the use of such remedies (the total number of cases per year; the number of cases where the 
court or authority ruled in favour of the applicant; the number of cases where compensation 
was  paid;  the  financial  value,  in  total  of  the  compensation  paid).  In  this  sphere  there  is 
significant variation in the amount of statistics available. In order to be able to check on the 
use of recourse in Member States it is necessary to be able to receive statistics on data subject 
enquiries  and  subsequent  actions  from  the  data  owner,  the  data  supervisor  and  the  Courts. 
This  is  not  possible  in  all  Member  States  and  is  ineffective  in  gaining  an  overview  of  the 
issues at the EU level. 

Serious problem of non-recognition of court decisions is described in Section 13.2.1, second 
point concerning alerts on vehicle purchased by a third party acting in good faith. 

Efficiency 
Member States vary in their ability to provide  statistics. In order to be able to check on the 
use of recourse in Member States, statistics on data subject enquiries and subsequent actions 
from the data owner, the data supervisor and the Courts must be available. Proper statistical 

68 

 
 
reporting would increase the efficiency to monitor the implementation of the data protection 
rules. 

Relevance 
The  right  to  access  one’s  personal  data  and  the  right  to  correction  of  inaccurate  data  or 
deletion when data have been unlawfully stored are key principles of EU data protection law. 
In the context of processing personal data such as in the SIS II, it is imperative that rules are 
in place at EU level to ensure the data subject’s rights. Additionally, given the reported use of 
the rights of subject access enquiry, the rules in place are highly relevant. 

Coherence/Consistency 
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection  of  individuals  with  regard  to  the  processing  of  personal  data  and  on  the  free 
movement of such data32 applies to the processing of personal data carried out in application 
of  this  Regulation.  This  includes  the  designation  of  the  controller  and  the  possibility  for 
Member  States  to  provide  for  exemptions  and  restrictions  to  some  of  the  rights  and 
obligations provided  for in  that Directive, including  the rights of access and information of 
the individual concerned. The principles set out in Directive 95/46/EC are supplemented or 
clarified  in  the  SIS  II  legal  instruments,  where  necessary.  The  same  applies  to  Regulation 
(EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the 
protection  of  individuals  with  regard  to  the  processing  of  personal  data  by  the  Community 
institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data. 

During  the  overall  evaluation  and  in  SISVIS  Committee  meetings,  some  Member  States 
raised  the  issue  of  ‘good  faith’  acquisition  of  motor  vehicles  which  turn  out  to  have  been 
stolen in another Member State and re-registered. As acquisition in good faith can take place 
in  many  Member  States,  but  there  is  a  problem  when  a  prosecutor  in  one  Member  State 
insists  on  leaving  an  alert  for  a  stolen  vehicle  in  SIS  II  even  though  a  court  in  another 
Member  State  has  awarded  ownership  to  the  new  owner.  The  impact  of  the  continued 
existence  of  the  alert  is  disproportionate  as  the  new  owner  risks  being  stopped  by  the  law 
enforcement authorities every time the car is used (see recommendations on alert deletion). 

EU added-value 
It is not always obvious to an alert subject which Member State has created an alert related to 
him/her.  The  mutual  recognition  and  procedures  in  place  to  allow  a  person  to  commence  a 
subject access enquiry in any Member State provide considerable EU added value. 

32   OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31.  

69 

 
 
 
                                                 
20.  OVERALL COST EFFICIENCY OF SIS II 

As a follow-up to the technical assessment a further study was commissioned to assess: 

 
 

the current operational costs of SIS II incurred by Member States; and 
the ICT impacts of proposed improvements to the SIS II architecture. 

20.1 BUILDING THE ICT COST MODEL 

This  study  assesses  substantive  compliance  costs,  according  to  the  ICT  cost  categories 
specified in the Value Assessment Tool (VAST33) guidelines of the European Commission. 

20.1.1. Operational costs 
The technical architecture of SIS II has to be considered when calculating SIS development 
and operational costs incurred by the EU and the Member States, in particular the fact that it 
consists  of  the  three  major  components:  a  central  system,  national  systems,  and  a 
communication infrastructure.  

This section provides an overview of the current operational costs incurred firstly by Member 
States  and  secondly  by  the  EU  for  the  Central  SIS  II.  For  the  purpose  of  this  study,  the 
authors carried out a total costs of ownership (TCO) assessment to calculate the operational 
costs  of  SIS  II  incurred  by  Member  States.  This  includes  total  one-off  costs  in  terms  of 
development  and  capital  investment  in  hardware  and  software  until  N.SIS  II  came  into 
operation in 2013, plus ongoing costs of infrastructure (hardware and software) maintenance, 
support,  hosting  facility  and  training  for  subsequent  years  (i.e.  2013,  2014,  and  2015).  The 
project team was able to draw on results received from ten sample Member States. It should 
be noted that, due to the flexibility in national implementation (e.g. whether a copy of SIS II 
data is kept at national level), costs can vary significantly between Member States. 

Total one-off costs until N.SIS enters into operation 

Initial one-off costs in terms of development and capital investment in hardware and software 
for N.SIS II until it began operating in  2013 average out at approximately €12 000 000 per 
Member State, based on the ten Member States examined in this study. 

Total  one-off  costs  include  the  initial  cost  for  updating  the  integration  between  national 
policing systems and N.SIS II application and the acquisition of a onetime software licence. 
The total one-off costs from the EU budget for development of Central SIS II between 2002 
and the system going live in 2013are €152 961 319. 

33   Value Assessment Tool guidelines, European Commission, Directorate-General for Informatics, 2010. 

70 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
In  addition  to  one-off  costs,  the  national  systems  and  Central  SIS  II  incur  yearly  ongoing 
maintenance  costs.  The  chart  below  shows  the  annual  ongoing  costs  for  N.SIS  II  for  the 
period 2013-2015. 

One year ongoing costs for maintaining N.SIS II for the period 2013-2015 

In  the  ten  Member  States  considered  during  this  study,  these  ongoing  costs  average  out  at 
approximately €1 509 000. They include annual software licence fees and software updates, 
annual  network  costs,  maintenance34  of  the  N.SIS  II  infrastructure,  user  support  (i.e.  help 
desks), costs of the data centre facility (e.g. security, electricity, power supply), and costs for 
training  end  users.  Annual  maintenance  costs  of  the  Central  System  amounted  to 
€7 794 732.35 in 2014 and €5 631 826.58 in 2015. 

The chart below gives an overview of the total cost of ownership of N.SIS II, including one-
off  costs  for  2007  until  it  came  into  operation  in  2013,  and  the  sum  of  the  yearly  ongoing 
costs for the subsequent years (i.e. 2013, 2014 and 2015). Overall, the total cost of ownership 
of N.SIS II including one-off and ongoing costs in the ten Member States considered in the 
study average out at approximately €16 628 000. 

Total Cost of Ownership of N.SIS II 

There are two broad ranges of TCO, with half of the interviewed countries (i.e. Italy, Finland, 
Germany,  Romania,  and  Hungary)  having  TCO  higher  than  €15 000 000  (averaging  out  at 
approximately  €24 000 000)  and  the  other  half  of  the  interviewed  countries  (i.e.  Lithuania, 
Spain,  Netherlands,  Poland,  and  Slovenia)  having  TCO  lower  than  €15 000 000  (averaging 
out at approximately €9 000 000). 

34   Maintenance includes activities related to both corrective maintenance and evolving maintenance. (Source:    

VAST  —  Value  Assessment  Tool  Guidelines  of  the  European  Commission,  Directorate-General  for 
Informatics, 2010). 

71 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
The  overall  TCO  (including  one-off  and  ongoing  costs)  summing  up  the  ten  analysed 
Member States considered in this study is €166 280 508. 

20.1.2  The costs of non-Schengen - efficiency 
Development and operational costs incurred by the EU and Member States in respect of SIS 
II  have  been  calculated  taking  into  consideration  the  technical  architecture  of  the  system, 
mainly the fact that it consists of the three major components: SIS II central system (CS-SIS), 
national systems and a network.   

The  costs,  however,  had  to  be  analysed  taking  into  consideration  that  SIS  II  is  the  main 
compensatory measure for the abolition of internal border controls within the Schengen area. 
Without  SIS  II,  keeping  an  area  with  no  internal  borders  would  be  hardly  feasible.  The 
Commission  clearly  stated,  in  its  Communication  on  the  roadmap  ‘Back  to  Schengen’  of 
4 March  201635,  that  reintroducing  temporary  border  controls  not  only  hampers  the  free 
movement  of  persons,  but  also  comes  with  significant  economic  costs.  The  Commission 
estimated that:  

 

full  re-establishment  of  border  controls  within  the  Schengen  area  would  generate 
immediate direct costs of €5 billion to €18 billion annually. 

  Member States such as Poland, the Netherlands or Germany would face more than €500 
million  of  additional  costs  for  the  road  transport  of  traded  goods.  Spain  or  the  Czech 
Republic would see their businesses paying more than €200 million in additional costs.  

  Border controls would cost the 1.7 million cross-border workers between €1.3 billion and 

€5.2 billion in terms of time lost.  

  At least 13 million tourist-nights could be lost, with a total impact of €1.2 billion.  

  Between  €0.6  billion  and  €5.8  billion  of  administrative  costs  would  have  to  be  paid  by 

governments, due to the need for increased staffing for border controls. 

21.  CONCLUSIONS 

SIS II operates against a background of serious concerns about security, cross-border crime 
and  irregular  migration.  When  considering  the  five  key  areas  of  evaluation,  the  following 
broad strategic conclusions can be drawn: 

  SIS  II  is  highly  effective,  as  it  achieves  significant  operational  outcomes  in  the  areas 

covered by the alerts. 

  SIS  II  is  highly  efficient,  as  it  achieves  these  outcomes  via  the  simple  expedient  of 
information sharing and with limited follow-up communication between Member States. 
  SIS II is broadly coherent, with some notable exceptions, with the overall policies at EU 

level in security, judicial cooperation and irregular migration. 

  SIS  II  is  highly  relevant  to  operational  need,  having  demonstrated  its  ability  to  address 

existing issues and evolve to meet new needs. 

  SIS  II  provides  significant  EU  added  value  as  the  key  compensatory  measure  for  the 
removal  of  internal  borders  between  the  Member  States,  in  a  way  that  could  not  be 
achieved without a pan-European approach. 

35   COM(2016) 120 final. 

72 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
This  study  has  identified  a  series  of  conclusions  and  findings  for  further  consideration  and 
reflection. The complete listing appears in Annex 1. 

73 

 
 
 
 
      ANNEX I - FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

The  evaluation  methodology  as  well  as  the  specific  questions  are  described  in  Section  3  of 
this  Staff  Working  Document;  the  sources  are  listed  in  Annex  II  and  Annex  III  and  these 
form the basis of the following findings and recommendations. 

All proposals marked with an asterisk (*) will require a legislative amendment to the existing 
legal bases; Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 and/or Council Decision 2007/533/JHA. 

SIS II Technical Assessment 

Note: In the light of information also provided by eu-LISA to the evaluation and based upon 
Report  ICT  Impact  Assessment  of  Possible  Improvements  to  the  SIS  II  Architecture36,  the 
following recommendations should be viewed as a start point for further discussion with all 
stakeholders as any solutions will be predicated upon a balance of the amount of flexibility 
Member States require, the capabilities of SIS II to carry the load of transactions and the cost 
both at Member State and central system level. 

Proposals for the central system and overall architecture 

1. 
2. 

3. 
4. 

The central system’s read capacity and performance should be increased. 
There should be a backup site update and upgrade process to ensure minimal business 
continuity loss*. 
There should be increased central system test capabilities 
There should be the possibility to develop N.SIS II implementations, shared between 
Member States*. 
Proposals for national optimisation and harmonisation (option — distinct N.SIS II)* 
The logs on alert history, retained at national level should be optional* 

5. 
6. 
7.  Query logging should be selective, especially in cases such as ANPR, and subject to 

standardised rules*. 

ICD national implementation should be complete implementation of the ICD*. 

8.  XML messages should be replaced with JSON objects. 
9. 
10.  National copies (partial) for N.SIS II should be mandatory*. 
11.  Each N.SIS II should have a mandatory backup system*. 
12.  There should be a common blueprint for consistent N.SIS II configuration.* 
13.  There should be a common N.SIS II implementation in the Member States* 

Authorities empowered to enter and search SIS II alerts 

14. 

It should be considered to grant administrative access to authorities responsible for the 
registration of boats and aircraft to enable them to check the status of the craft prior to 
re-registration* 

15.  The Commission, together with the Member States, should investigate how the use of 
SIS II by customs shall be carried out more systematically, to achieve reinforcement 
of the capacity to detect all types of risks and analysis of trends involving all types of 
illegal movement of goods and cash, brought by persons crossing the external border 

16.  Member States should ensure that the statistical reporting on the SIS II checks carried 

out by vehicle registration services and the resultant hits is more efficient* 

36

 European Commission, Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs — Report ICT Impact 

Assessment 
    of Possible Improvements to the SIS II Architecture 20 April 2016. 

74 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
17.  Harmonisation  of  licence  plate  design  is  outside  the  scope  of  this  report.  The 
Commission  should  highlight,  to  the  competent  national  authorities,  the  problems 
linked to stolen licence plates and the success achieved by both law enforcement and 
vehicle  registration  authorities  in  detecting  stolen  licence  plates.  This  should  be 
viewed  in  the  context  of  incomplete  implementation  of  procedures  or  provision  of 
statistics concerning SIS II checks on imported vehicles presented for re-registration 

EUROJUST and EUROPOL 

18.  Eurojust and Europol should fully implement the SIS II functionalities as foreseen in 

the SIS II Decision 

19.  Europol should develop a batch searching tool to allow SIS II to be queried to cross-
check  information  received  from  non-SIS  II  using  countries  and  third  party 
operational organisations. Each query in the batch must be capable of being justified. 
In principle, in the longer term perspective, coherence and complementarity between 
SIS  II  and Europol  data  must  allow  for  appropriate instruments  to  pro-actively  seek 
links and fill identified gaps in either of the data repositories at any time 

20.  Europol  should  extend  the  functionality  of  its  end-user  interface  to  allow  access  to 
fingerprints  included  in  alerts  and  to  download  the  prints  for  comparison  in  the 
Europol AFIS 

21.  Europol should describe its logging processes for SIS II queries especially in order to 
remedy the situation where log information has been considered unlawful copying of 
SIS II data* 

22.  During the proposals on the update of the SIS II legal instruments the wording of the 
data  protection  provisions  of  Europol  and  Eurojust  should  be  revised  to  allow  both 
agencies  to  effectively  log  their  queries  and  carry  out  their  core  business  without 
being at risk of suggestions of unlawful downloading and processing of data* 

23.  Europol should receive full access to all alert categories of SIS II, including data on 
missing  persons  and  third-country  nationals  whose  entry  or  stay  is  refused  in  the 
Schengen area* 

24.  Europol and Eurojust should carry out internal training in order to raise awareness on 

the improved SIS II functionalities and services available 

Alerts on refusal of entry or stay under Article 24 SIS II Regulation 

25.  A review should be carried out on the collecting and reporting of statistics on all hits 
on  refusal  of  entry  alerts  both  at  border  crossing  points  and  on  a  Member  State 
territory   

26.  The Commission should make a proposal on a standardised statistics package on the 
use  of  the  consultation  procedure  for  completion  by  the  Member  State.  This  should 
include definitions and counting rules 

27.  The legal instruments and technical specifications should be updated to improve the 
possibilities for identifying a person, for example through the inclusion of details of 
identity documents* 

28.  The  SIS  II  legal  instruments  and  technical  specifications  should  be  updated  so  that 
additional information on the reasons for issuing the alert is immediately available to 
the  end-user.  The  statistics  on  the  volume  of  alerts  should  distinguish  between  the 
different categories in accordance with the reason for issuing the alert*   

29.  The Commission should assess the findings of the study on alternative models for the 
exchange  of  supplementary  information  on  refusal  of  entry  or  stay  alerts  with  the 
purpose of increasing its efficiency 

75 

 
 
 
 
 
 
31. 

30.  The  Commission  should  propose  a  review  of  the  consultation  procedure  and  should 
makes  proposals  for  the  harmonisation  of  use  of  the  related  SIRENE  forms  and 
describe the simplification of the procedures and the forms 
In  line  with  the  review of  the  consultation  procedure,  the  Commission  should  make 
proposals  on  a  binding  time  limit  for  Member  States  to  respond  to  a  request  for 
consultation.  If  the  SIRENE  Bureau  remains  the  conduit  for  such  consultation  the 
staffing  and  access  to  systems  should  be  ensured  to  achieve  a  response  within  12 
hours 
In line with the review of the consultation procedure, staffing and access to systems 
should be ensured so that alerts which need to be deleted are deleted without delay 
It should be mandatory for Member States to enter all entry bans issued in accordance 
with  the  Return  Directive  as  a  refusal  of  entry  alert  in  SIS  II  from  the  moment  the 
decision becomes enforceable* 
In  the  SIS  II  Regulation  it  should  be  implemented  as  a  legal  obligation  to  issue  an 
alert  in  SIS  II  when  the  underlying  decision  is  related  to  a  failure  to  comply  with 
national immigration legislation* 

33. 

32. 

34. 

35.  The Commission should make a proposal on a standardised procedure and timing for 
the  entry  of  alerts  on  refusal  of  entry  or  stay.  Given  that  the  creation  of  an  alert 
implies that action is requested as specified in the alert, the basis of the timing of the 
entry should be that the alert is enforceable* 

36.  The retention period for refusal of entry or stay alerts in SIS II should be aligned with 

the maximum length of entry bans as established in the Return Directive* 

37.  The  Commission,  in  the  context  of  inter-institutional  discussions,  should  seek 
agreement  on  more  efficient  and  effective  procedures  for  the  insertion  and 
maintenance of alerts based on restrictive measures against third countries 

38.  Also  for  alerts  issued  under  Article  26  of  the  SIS  II  Regulation  there  should  be  a 
requirement  to  enter  all  available  data  for  identification  purposes  (such  as 
photographs)  to  the  alert  beyond  the  data  that  are  strictly  mentioned  in  the  act 
constituting the restrictive measure* 

39.  For  the  effective  performance  of  its  task  in  the  monitoring  of  returns,  organising 
return operations and conducting return interventions, the European Border and Coast 
Guard Agency should receive access to alerts on third country nationals subject to a 
refusal of entry alert or a return alert (in the future)* 

Alerts for arrest for extradition or surrender under Article 26 SIS II Decision 

40.  Together  with  other  matters  related  to  the  EAW,  the  Commission  should  raise  with 
the Member States the problem of creating SIS II alerts when the whereabouts of the 
subject of the alert are already known and confirmed 

41.  Member States should reinforce their procedures for ensuring that, when an EAW has 
been  created for a  person whose  whereabouts are known and confirmed, the correct 
field  of  the  SIRENE  A  form  is  used  to  highlight  that  fact  so  that  needless  work  on 
checking whether the person is known or present on the territory is avoided 

42.  Together  with  other  matters  related  to  the  EAW,  the  Commission  should  raise  with 
Member States the problems related to transfers, seeking to find, with the judicial and 
law  enforcement  authorities,  areas  where  common  practice  can  be  established  and 
procedures harmonised 

43.  The  legal  instruments  and  technical  specifications  of  SIS  II  should  be  amended  to 
allow  Member  States  to  temporarily  make  an  alert  ‘non-searchable’  by  end-users 
without the need to delete the alert* 

76 

 
 
 
 
44.  The Commission should make a proposal on additional fields to be added to alerts for 
arrest  for  extradition  or  surrender  in  order  to  reduce  the  amount  of  information 
exchange via supplementary information but avoiding information that is not essential 
for officers carrying out the arrest 

Alerts on missing persons under Article 32 SIS II Decision 

45.  The  wording  of  the  legal  instruments  should  be  amended  in  order  to  provide  the 
opportunity to create preventive alerts on people who are at serious risk of abduction. 
The wording should be such that over-use of such alerts is controlled in order to avoid 
inefficiencies  and  inaccuracies  in  alerts.  The  correct  action  to  be  taken  must  be 
determined* 

46.  The  legal  instruments  and  technical  specifications  should  be  updated  to  permit  end-
users to mandatorily enter a category of missing person, not only for children but also 
to indicate vulnerability in adults. This is to ensure a correct first response by officers 
on the ground and follow-up care but also to give policy makers an overview of the 
phenomenon of missing persons* 

48. 

47.  The  Commission  should  make  a  proposal  on  the  categories  of  missing  person  cases 
which  should  be  entered  in  SIS  II  and  those  which  should  not  in  order  to  avoid 
situations where officers are tasked to investigate cases where legally the person is not 
considered missing on that national territory 
In  line  with  the  initiative  on  categorisation  of  missing  person  cases,  the  options  for 
action to be taken should be expanded to clearly indicate cases where repatriation is 
not sought as it should not be assumed that this would be in the best interests of the 
child.  This  includes  repatriation  to  the  alert-issuing  Member  State,  another  Member 
State or a third country 

49.  The SIS II technical specifications should be updated so that upon achieving the age 
of eighteen the reason for request and action to be taken automatically change to those 
relevant  for a  missing  adult.  The  end-user  should  have  the option  of  specifying that 
the person remains vulnerable. This is to cope with cases where competent authorities 
have concerns about the person regardless of age. Alternatively, the alert can be set to 
expire on the eighteenth birthday* 

Alerts on persons sought to assist with a judicial procedure under Art 34 SIS II Decision 

50.  Together  with  other  matters  related  to  judicial  procedures,  the  Commission  should 
raise  with  Member  States  the  problems  related  to  non-deletion  of  alerts  on  persons 
sought to assist with a judicial procedure* 

51.  The prompt deletion of alerts where a valid address has been provided is paramount. 
Once a valid address has been provided by a Member State and the alert not deleted, 
that  Member  State  should  not  be  obliged  to  report  further  hits.  In  order  to  prevent 
repeated work by officers on the ground the wording of the legal instruments should 
be  amended  to  permit  flagging  of  alerts  on  persons  sought  to  assist  with  a  judicial 
procedure  in  circumstances  where  a  hit  has  been  achieved  in  a  Member  State  and  a 
valid address forwarded to the issuing Member State. The effect of the flag would be 
to make the alert non-searchable by end-users* 

52.  Regular  training  should  be  provided  to  the  judiciary  on  the  use  of  SIS  II  with 

particular regard to alert updating procedures and alert deletion 

Alerts for discreet and specific checks under Article 36 SIS II Decision 

77 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
53.  The Commission should make a proposal on fields/extensions to fields that should be 
added to alerts for discreet and specific checks in order to provide more information 
to the officer on the ground carrying out a check, especially a specific check 

54.  The wording of the legal instruments should be updated to allow the creation of alerts 
for discreet and specific checks on the  basis of an identity or  travel document only; 
that is, the alert is on a document which is not necessarily linked to a specific person* 
55.  As  some  criminal  penalties require supervision to  ensure  that  they  are respected  the 
Commission should amend the wording of the legal instruments to include ‘executing 
criminal penalties’ within alerts for discreet and specific checks* 

56.  Even though specific checks are less discreet than a discreet check it is important not 
to  unnecessarily  divulge  information  on  the  existence  of  the  alert.  The  Commission 
should propose new wording to be incorporated in the ‘action to be taken’ on specific 
checks to avoid improper divulging of the existence of the alert to the alert subject as 
required by Article 37.3 of the SIS II Decision* 

57.  The Commission should discuss with the Member States the ability of Member States 
to  issue  travel  bans  on  their  citizens  and  secondly,  the  mutual  recognition  of  such 
travel bans. On the basis of these discussions, depending on the outcome, the wording 
of  the  legal  instruments  should  be  updated  in  order  to  add  a  new  category  of  alert 
‘people  subject  of  a  national  exit  ban  who  are  to  be  prevented  from  leaving  the 
Schengen area’*   

58.  The  Commission  should  discuss  with  the  Member  States  whether  the  field  ‘type  of 

59. 

offence’ should become mandatory for alerts for discreet and specific checks 
In at least eleven Member States no specific checks can be performed. Member States 
should  adopt  legislation  to  allow  specific  checks.  Under  the  SIS  II  Decision  the 
alternative action for a specific check, in case it cannot be performed under national 
law, is a discreet check. The Commission should consider defining another option for 
action which does not contain the same element of secrecy as the discreet check* 
60.  The Commission should increase the effectiveness of discreet and specific check on 
boats  and  containers  and  to  this  end  should  make  a  proposal  for  a  procedure  for  an 
issuing Member State to inform one or more Member States of a request to check for 
containers, boats and aircraft within the framework of alerts for discreet and specific 
checks 
It  is  advisable  to  revise  code  table  028  concerning  the  ‘type  of  offence’  by  adding 
child pornography and sexual offence 

61. 

Counter-terrorism 

62.  The Commission should consider introducing a specific alert and action for entering 
into SIS II a person under ‘terrorism related activity’ which would allow the detention 
and the specific check of a person for a limited period of time without a formal arrest* 
63.  The  criteria  for  using  the  new  ‘immediate  reporting’  should  be  harmonised  and  it 

64. 

should be made clear in which cases this option should be used 
In  cases  requesting  immediate  reporting  the  occurrence  of  a  hit  should  be  reported 
without delay to the SIRENE Bureau that issued the alert 

65.  A post-hit procedure should be agreed in order to clarify if the hit information should 
be  sent  only  to  the  issuing  Member  State  or  to  all  Member  States.  Member  States 
should share hit information with Europol allowing further analysis on terrorist travel 
routes and movements (in line with the "three tier information approach") 
It  is  necessary  to  enhance  national  training  activities  on  SIS  II  counter-terrorism 
measures  for  the  SIRENE  staff,  national  state  security  services  as  well  as  the  end-
users 

66. 

78 

 
 
 
 
67.  There should be an automated notification mechanism between the SIRENE Bureau 

and the national security services 

Alerts on objects for seizure or use as evidence in criminal proceedings under Article 38 SIS 
II Decision 

68.  The  wording  of  the  legal  instruments  should  be  updated  to  include  ‘technical 
equipment’  in  the  alerts  on  objects  for  seizure  or  use  as  evidence  in  criminal 
proceedings.  The  technical  specifications  should  be  updated  accordingly,  including 
fields  for  ‘type  of  technical  equipment’,  ‘technical  equipment  serial  number’  and 
‘make of technical equipment’. The latter two fields may have to be free text, firstly 
because  the  serial  numbers  will  not  be  of  a  standard  length  or  composition,  and 
secondly due to the very wide range of makes of equipment which simply could not 
be managed by a code table* 

69.  The alert category ‘securities and means of payment’ should be deleted from the SIS 

II legal instruments and the technical specifications* 

70.  The  Commission  should  make  a  proposal  that  all  road-going  industrial  equipment 

should be entered in SIS II as a vehicle (sub-category ‘industrial equipment’) 

71.  Member States should ensure that when vehicles or industrial equipment are checked 
the check takes place against both vehicles and industrial equipment categories in the 
SIS II in order to avoid circumstances where a potential hit is not achieved 

72.  The Commission should address the problem where a person is awarded ownership of 
an  object  by  a  competent  court  or  authority  and  yet  an  alert  for  the  seizure  of  the 
object remains in the SIS II. * 

73.  The  Commission  should  make  a  proposal  for  an  extension  to  object  alerts  that  will 
have the effect of providing more identification data on, for example vehicles, which 
will allow the identification of the vehicle even if it has been subject of cloning 
74.  The  Commission  should  make  a  proposal  to  address  the  issue  that  an  appropriate 
action, generally seizure, is consistently taken across the Member States in relation to 
the objectives of the alert 

75.  The technical specifications and legal instruments should be updated in order to allow 

Member States to enter alerts on counterfeit documents in SIS II* 

76.  On the basis of hits achieved, there appears to be limited value in retaining alerts on 
banknotes  in  SIS  II.  Accordingly,  the  Commission  and  Member  States  should 
consider whether alerts on banknotes should be deleted from the legal instruments and 
technical  specifications.  If  not,  the  legal  instruments  and  technical  specifications 
should  be  updated  in  order  to  accommodate  counterfeit  banknotes  within  this  alert 
category* 

77.  The  wording  of  the  legal  instruments  should  be  updated  to  ensure  that  when  law 
enforcement  officers  carry  out  actions  within  their  competence  they  should  not  be 
prevented  from  using  SIS  II  merely  because  the  national  legal  classification  of  the 
action is deemed administrative rather than criminal; an example would be the request 
for seizure of documents invalidated for travel purposes in support of a national exit 
ban.  To  this  end,  the  wording  of  Article  38.1  of  the  SIS  II  Decision  should  be 
reworded  to  read,  ‘Data  on  objects  sought  for  the  purposes  of  seizure  for  law 
enforcement purposes or use as evidence in criminal proceedings shall be entered in 
SIS II’* 

78.  The  SIS  II  technical  specifications  should  be  updated  to  allow  the  inclusion,  in 
document  alerts,  of  information  held  in  a  document’s  identity  chip.  This  would 
typically  include  the  full  contents  of  the  Machine  Readable  Zone,  fingerprints  and 

79 

 
 
 
 
photograph (if contained), and any other national specificity (such as national citizen 
register number, commune of registration) 

79.  The  legal  instruments  and  technical  specifications  should  be  updated  so  that 
significant, identifiable component parts of a vehicle can be entered as alerts in SIS II, 
instead of only complete vehicles being entered* 

80.  The legal instruments should be updated so that the definition of a motor vehicle is no 
longer dependent on it being equipped  solely with  an internal combustion engine as 
this no longer reflects reality* 

81.  The legal instruments and technical specifications should be updated so that, in order 
to be able to locate a person who is the subject of an alert under Articles 26, 32 or 34 
of  the  SIS  II  Decision  or  Art.  24,  25  or  26  of  the  Regulation,  there  should  be  the 
possibility of entering the details of a vehicle that is in possession of, or being used by 
the alert subject* 

82.  The  Commission  should  make  a  proposal  on  extra  information  fields  that  could  be 
added  to  an  alert  in  order  to  reduce  the  post-hit  exchange  of  supplementary 
information on object alerts 

83.  The  Commission  should  make  a  proposal  on  inclusion  in  SIRENE  G  forms  on  the 
national  rules  for  retention  of  property  in  police  storage  prior  to  the  disposal  of  the 
property. This is to prevent the unnecessary exchange of supplementary information 
on  reminders  to  collect  property  or  on  requests  for  property  disposal  deadline 
information 

84.  The Commission should make a proposal so that rules on mandatory fields in problem 
areas such  a non-standard VIN and  firearms  should  be reviewed to  make the use  of 
the system more efficient 

85.  Member  States  should  increase  the  awareness  of  the  competent  authorities  on  the 
possibility  to  check  boats  and  containers  in  SIS  II.  They  should  describe  the 
competence and responsibilities of the law enforcement authorities in this regard and 
put in place adequate procedures 

86.  The Commission should explore the added-value of a possible interconnection of the 
document section of SIS II with SLTD at central level. It should address the technical 
and  the  legal  difficulties.  The  Commission  should  also  address  the  automatic 
transmission of document alerts into SLTD* 

87.  The legal instruments should be updated to remove the requirement to log all queries 
on objects carried out through ANPR systems provided that a comparable solution is 
provided  to  trace  the  legality  of  queries.  At  the  Member  State  level,  when  a  hit  is 
achieved using ANPR, a full query in SIS II should be carried out (not least to check 
which category of alert is involved) and the query and its result logged* 

Biometric identifiers 

88.  There is no provision on checking latent fingerprints against SIS II fingerprint data.. 
The legal instruments should be updated to explicitly describe the storage and use of 
fingerprint  data  in  SIS  II.  This  should  include  the  checking  and  storage  of  latent 
fingerprints* 

89.  The  Commission  should  discuss  and  agree  with  the  Member  States  the  quality 
standards for fingerprint files in SIS II. eu-LISA should then implement a ‘checker’ of 
submitted files at the central level as an early action in the implementation of a central 
SIS  II  Automated  Fingerprint  Identification  System  (AFIS)  in  order  to  detect  sub-
standard fingerprint files 
In  order to ensure  the effectiveness of SIS II at the external borders while  checking 
EU citizens, SIS II should include a functionality to compare the facial image of the 

90. 

80 

 
 
person against the facial images stored in SIS (facial recognition). This would be also 
compliant with border checks carried out via electronic gates* 

Operational procedures 

91.  The legal instruments should be updated to clarify the term ‘use of data for purposes 

other than the purpose set out in the alert’* 

92.  Police  officers  at  the  national  level  should  be  trained  to  deal  with  cases  of  misused 

identity in alerts for discreet checks 

93.  The legal instruments and technical specifications should be updated to permit more 
personal identification information to be included in the misused identity extension of 
an alert* 

94.  Member States should implement, for each end-user, internal hit reporting forms on a 

mandatory basis 

95.  Member  States  should  reconsider 

the  automatic  deletion  of  supplementary 
information,  especially  as  the  legal  base  permits  longer  retention.  Alternatively, 
Member States should reconfigure their SIRENE systems to be able to generate forms 
on  Schengen  ID  numbers  that  no  longer  exist.  The  Commission  and  the  Member 
States should discuss whether the retention period should be more that the current one 
year* 

96.  The  legal  instruments  should  be  updated  so  that  all  Member  States  are  required  to 
have a back-up technical solution to ensure business continuity of their N.SIS II* 
97.  The  legal  instruments  should  be  updated  so  that  all  Member  States  are  required  to 
have  a  back-up  technical  solution  to  ensure  business  continuity  of  the  national 
SIRENE Bureau* 

98.  The legal instruments and technical specifications should be updated so as to make it 
clear  that  all  functionalities  of  SIS  II  are  implemented  in  the  Member  States  and 
available  to  the  appropriate  end-users  including  all  the  query  options  which  are 
available in the SIS II Central system* 

99.  The Commission should continue its work with other interested bodies and agencies 
in ensuring that end-users, through one query, receive the relevant information from 
the systems which they have the rights to access. In parallel, the Commission should 
continue to support the establishment of Single Points of Contact so that the end-users 
have  one  point  of  call  to  support  them  regardless  of  the  source  of  the  information 
upon which they have acted 

100.  The  Commission,  the  General  Secretariat  of  the  Council  and  the  Presidency  could 
represent the SIS II/SIRENE interests, possibilities and good practice at all meetings, 
where  issues  linked  with  SIS  II/SIRENE  are  discussed  (e.g.  search  for  persons  and 
objects,  executing  law  enforcement  and  other  checks  and  controls  including  border 
controls  at  external  border,  sharing  of  law  enforcement  information,  sharing  the 
intelligence,  law  enforcement  cooperation,  entry  ban  measures,  cooperation  in 
criminal matters, training of law enforcement officer for European tools, cooperation 
with Interpol) 

101.  The  Commission  should  present  on  a  permanent  basis  the  successful  stories  of  SIS 

II/SIRENE use 

102.  The  Commission,  the  General  Secretariat  of  the  Council  should  make  sure  that  in 
relevant  documents,  media  releases  and  publications,  SIS  II  and  SIRENE  are 
adequately  mentioned  and  described  (e.g.  publications  on  free  movement, 
publications on 25 years’ celebration of open borders) including the SIRENE logo 
103.  The  Member  States  should  perform  the  tasks  described  in  point  139)  to  141)  at 
national level and as well in international meetings including the use of SIRENE logo 

81 

 
 
 
 
104.  eu-LISA  will  actively  present  the  SIS  II  and  its  key  role  in  international  law 
enforcement  (and  judicial)  cooperation  in  its  documents,  media  releases,  at  relevant 
meetings and on its website (e.g. the SIS II statistics), but also mentioning the human 
interface — SIRENE 

105.  The  Commission,  the  General  Secretariat  of  the  Council  and  the  Presidency  should 
make sure eu-LISA may take part in all relevant meetings to represent the SIS II 
106.  The SIRENE logo plays a substantial role in any presentation and awareness-raising. 

The logo should be kept and exploited to the maximum extent 

107.  A  common  training  curriculum  should  be  set  up  at  European  level  for  end-users 
defining  minimum  standards  of  SIS  II  expertise  to  be  incorporated  into  the  national 
training programs 

Person related remark 

108.  The text of the legal instruments  should  be  amended  so that the content of the field 
‘person  related  remark’  is  no  longer  set  in  the  main  legal  texts  but  is  decided  as  an 
implementing or technical measure in order to reflect operational issues* 

109.  The  number  of  ‘person  related’  remarks  should  be  extended  with  a  view  to  protect 
end-users  from  the  imminent  threat  posed  by  the  alert  subject.  It  should  be  also 
considered to make the person related remark mandatory with the option to indicate 
‘Not Applicable’* 

110.  In  line  with  other  recommendations  on  the  field  ‘person  related  remark’  the  value 
‘terrorism  related  activity’  should  be  an  option  for  insertion  by  the  end-user.  Given 
the wide nature of terrorism there should also be the opportunity to include more than 
one person related remark in an alert so that if the person is also deemed to be armed 
or  violent,  for  example,  more  than  one  person  related  remark  can  be  included  in  an 
alert* 

111.  Member States with a high number of flags on their own alerts should start an internal 
analysis  on  the  reasons  of  non-recognition  of  their  alerts  by  other  Member  States. 
They should endeavor to eliminate the reasons leading to the non-recognition 

Governance 

Responsibilities of the Member States 

112.  The legal instruments should be updated to ensure that all the SIS II information that 
is intended for the end-user is made directly available to them by the N.SIS II Office 
which is deemed legally responsible for this task* 

113.  The legal instruments should be updated to ensure that all queries carried out in the 
national  databases  used  for  border  management  or  law  enforcement  purposes  also 
include a parallel query in SIS II* 

114.  In order to ensure the coherence with the national police database and data quality it is 
highly recommended that when a national entry is created it will be transferred in an 
automated  way  to  SIS  II  without  requiring  a  separate  alert  creation  in  SIS  II.  The 
same applies for the update and the deletion procedures 

115.  Member  States  should  increase  the  efficiency  of  end-users  in  handling  SIS  II  alerts 
and  the  related  procedures.  This  can  be  achieved  by  regular  end-user  training  and  a 
clear end-user interface describing the action to be taken and all information available 
in the alert. It should be considered to provide a consistent minimum standard of end-
user training via CEPOL 

116.  Member  States  should  improve  their  workflows  and  case  management  systems  to 

automate the operations and to reduce the necessity of human intervention 

82 

 
 
 
 
 
Responsibilities of the Management Authority 

117.  The  Commission  should  evaluate  the  data  protection  implications  of  removing  the 
requirement to carry out logging at the national level when a parallel log exists at the 
central  level.  This  should  include  the  legal  provisions  for  a  national  supervisory 
authority to call for a central log to carry out its national responsibilities* 

118.  The  legal  instruments  should  be  updated  so  that,  with  regard  to  the  network,  all 
responsibility  for  tasks  relating  to  implementation  of  the  budget;  acquisition  and 
renewal and contractual matters are handed to eu-LISA* 

119.  eu-LISA should develop a central monitoring tool for data quality and provide regular 
reports  to  the  Member  States  as  well  as  provide  a  statistical  overview  to  the 
Commission about the issues encountered and the Member States concerned* 

120.  The legal instruments should distinguish between public statistical and other reports, 

such as performance, and reports available upon request* 

121.  The  legal  instrument  should  specifically  refer  to  the  Commission’s  entitlement  to 
have access to the statistical reports of eu-LISA and to request such statistical reports 
which are available upon request* 

122.  Given the extensive use of the SIS II by Member States and the considerable success 
involved,  it  makes  sense  to  be  able  to  search  the  database  for  trends  and  statistical 
analysis  at  a  strategic,  not  personal,  level.  The  legal  instruments  and  technical 
specifications should be updated in order for this to be possible. The legal instruments 
should also describe which authority at EU level would have the responsibility for the 
analysis* 

123.  The legal instruments should be updated to permit the analysis of trends with regard 
to hits reported via supplementary information. Although currently problematic, due 
to the recording of hits at SIRENE Bureau level, this step would be relevant should 
the  exchange  of  supplementary  information  be  undertaken  in  another  way,  for 
example,  via  the  central  SIS  II.  The  legal  instruments  should  also  describe  which 
authority would have the responsibility for the analysis* 

124.  Taking  into  consideration  that  the  exchange  of  supplementary  information  is 
inseparable from the SIS II alerts and indispensable to ensure the effective action and 
follow-up  of  SIS  II  alerts  and  hits  on  the  ground,  eu-LISA  should  develop  further 
expertise  in  SIRENE  matters,  including  testing  activities,  updating  DEBS  and 
providing  training  to  SIRENE  staff  on  the  technical  use  of  SIS  II.  eu-LISA  should 
engage  stronger  in  SIRENE  activities  and  establish  a  closer  relationship  with  the 
SIRENE community* 

Right to access and retention of alerts 

125.  The legal instruments should be updated so that the maximum expiry date for alerts 

on persons and different categories of objects is described in the legal instruments* 

Data protection 

126.  The  SIRENE  Manual  should  describe  a  binding  time  limit  and  procedure  for 
deletion/modification of alerts containing unlawfully stored, inaccurate or out of date 
information.  This  is  to  permit  SIRENE  Bureaux  to  be  able  to  carry  out  their 
coordinating role in data quality verification 

127.  The  wording  of  the  legal  instruments  should  be  reviewed  so  that  it  reflects  the  new 

EU data protection directive and regulation once adopted* 

83 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
128.  The legal instruments should include a mandatory action for Member States to report 

security incidents affecting SIS II data* 

Liability and penalties 

129.  The rules on alert deletion should be reviewed and included in the legal instruments to 
ensure  that  it  is  clear  that  when  the  underlying  subject  or  object  of  the  alert  has 
entered another process, e.g. court procedure on ownership, the alert shall be deleted. 
Non-compliance  should  be  reported  to  the  Commission  for  consideration  of 
infringement procedures* 

Legal Remedies (including the rights of data subjects to access, correct or delete his 

personal data and the mutual recognition of judgments) 

130.  The legal instrument should be updated with a view to requiring the development of a 
standardised  annual  statistics  package  to  allow  consistent  reporting  on  activities  on 
remedies  at  the  national  level,  including  the  activities  of  the  data  controller,  the 
supervisory authority and the courts* 

84 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX II - SOURCES 

SIS II Legislation 

Regulation  (EC)  No 1986/2006  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of 
20 December 2006 regarding access to the Second Generation Schengen Information System 
(SIS  II)  by  the  services  in  the  Member  States  responsible  for  issuing  vehicle  registration 
certificates (OJ L 381, 28.12.2006, p. 1) 

Regulation  (EC)  No 1987/2006  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of 
20 December  2006  on  the  establishment,  operation  and  use  of  the  second  generation 
Schengen Information System (SIS II) (OJ L 381, 28.12.2006, p. 4) 

Commission  Decision  (2007/170/EC)  of  16 March  2007  laying  down  the  network 
requirements for the Schengen Information System II (1st pillar) (OJ L 79, 20.3.2007, p. 20) 

Commission  Decision  (2007/171/EC)  of  16 March  2007  laying  down  the  network 
requirements for the Schengen Information System II (3rd pillar) (OJ L 79, 20.3.2007, p. 29) 

Council Decision (2007/533/JHA) of 12 June 2007 on the establishment, operation and use of 
the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) (OJ L 205, 7.8.2007, p. 63) 

Commission  Decision  of  4 May  2010  on  the  Security  Plan  for  Central  SIS  II  and  the 
Communication Infrastructure (OJ L 112, 5.5.2010, p. 31) 

Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 
2011  establishing  a  European  Agency  for  the  operational  management  of  large-scale  IT 
systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (OJ L 286, 1.11.2011, p. 1) 

Commission  Implementing  Decision  2013/115/EU  of  26 February  2013  on  the  SIRENE 
Manual    and other implementing measures for the second generation Schengen Information 
System (SIS II) (OJ L 71 of 14.3.2013, p. 1) 

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/219 of 29 January 2015 replacing the Annex 
to  Implementing  Decision  2013/115/EU  on  the  SIRENE  Manual  and  other  implementing 
measures  for  the  second  generation  Schengen  Information  System  (SIS  II)  (OJ  L  44, 
18.2.2015, p. 75) 

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1209 of 12 July 2016 replacing the Annex to 
Implementing  Decision  2013/115/EU  on  the  SIRENE  Manual  and  other  implementing 
measures  for  the  second  generation  Schengen  Information  System  (SIS  II)  (notified  under 
document C(2016) 4283) (OJ L 201, 28.07.2016, p.35) 

Commission  Implementing  Decision  (EU)  2015/450  of  16 March  2015  laying  down  test 
requirements for Member States integrating into the second generation Schengen Information 
System  (SIS  II)  or  changing  substantially  their  directly  related  national  systems  (OJ  L  74, 
18.3.2015, p. 31) 

Additional sources 

Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 
on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen 
Borders Code) (OJ L 77, 23.3.2016, p. 1) 

85 

 
 
 
 
Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 
establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code) (OJ L 243, 15.9.2009, p. 1) 

Commission  Recommendation  of  16  December  2015  establishing  a  catalogue  of 
recommendations  and  best  practices  for  the  correct  application  of  the  second  generation 
Schengen Information System (SIS II) and the exchange of supplementary information by the 
competent authorities of the Member States implementing and using SIS (C(2015) 9169) 

Communication  of  4 March  2016  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the 
European Council and the Council — Back to Schengen — A Roadmap (COM(2016) 120) 

DATA EXCHANGE BETWEEN SIRENES (DEBS) — SIS II Version 1.3.2 12 July 2013 

Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 
on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-
country nationals (OJ L 348, 24.12.2008, p. 98-107) 

Council  Framework  Decision  of  13 June  2002  on  the  European  Arrest  Warrant  and  the 
surrender procedures between Member States (2002/584/JHA) (OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 1) 

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
individuals  with  regard  to  the  processing  of  personal  data  by  competent  authorities  for  the 
purposes  of  prevention,  investigation,  detection  or  prosecution  of  criminal  offences  or  the 
execution of criminal penalties, and the free movement of such data (COM/2012/010 final) 

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data (General Data Protection Regulation) (COM/2012/011 final) 

eu-LISA statistical reporting 

eu — LISA SIS II Statistics 2013 — June 2014 

eu — LISA SIS II Statistics 2014 — October 2015 (revised version) 

eu — LISA SIS II Statistics 2015 — March 2016 

Studies and Reports 

Council  document  doc  16807/14:  A  report  from  the  chair  of  the  SIS  II  Supervision 
Coordination  Group  on  the  exercise  of  the  rights  of  the  data  subject  in  SIS  and  Guide  for 
exercising the right of access in SIS — 16 December 2014 

European  Commission,  Directorate-General  for  Migration  and  Home  Affairs  —  Feasibility 
study on the use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) for return purposes 2016 

European Commission, Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs — Independent 
external evaluation of the European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT 
systems in the area of freedom, security and justice — eu-LISA — March 2016 

European Commission, Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs — Report ICT 
Impact Assessment of Possible Improvements to the SIS II Architecture 20 April 2016   

European  Commission,  Directorate-General  for  Migration  and  Home  Affairs  —  Report  on 
the technical functioning of Central SIS II and the Communication Infrastructure, including 
the security thereof and the bilateral and multilateral exchange of supplementary information 
between Member States by European Agency for the operational management of large-scale 
IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (eu-LISA) (2015-094 REV 1) 

86 

 
 
European  Commission,  Directorate-General  for  Migration  and  Home  Affairs  —  SIS  II 
technical assessment — 18 January 2016 

European Commission, Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs — Study on the 
implementation of European Information Exchange Model for strengthening law enforcement 
(EIXM) cooperation 

European Commission, Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs — Summary of 
European Migration Network (EMN) ad-hoc queries No 2015.662 on entry bans entered into 
the SIS and consultation procedures in Member States, and No 2014.628 on registering entry 
bans in the SIS — March 2015 

JRC  Science  for  Policy  Report  —  Fingerprint 
its 
implementation  in  the Schengen Information  System II (SIS-II)  — 2015 (EUR 27 473 EN) 
ISBN 978-92-79-51929-1 

technology  for 

identification 

Report  on  Inspection  Pursuant 
to  Article  47  (2)  of  Regulation  (EC)  Number 
45/2001 Schengen Information System II (SIS II) managed by EU Agency for large—scale 
IT systems (eu-LISA). EDPS case reference 2014 - 0953 

Study on Departure from the Schengen Agreement — Macroeconomic impacts on Germany 
and the countries of the European Union by Global Economic Dynamics 2016 

eu-LISA`s input for SIS II overall evaluation — February 2016 

Schengen Evaluation Reports 

Schengen  SIS/SIRENE  Evaluation  Report  of  Slovenia  (document  16704/13  (SCH-EVAL 
134, SIRIS 97, COMIX 627) of 22 November 2013) 

Schengen  SIS/SIRENE  Evaluation  Report  of  Malta  (document  16705/13  (SCH-EVAL  135, 
SIRIS 98, COMIX 628) of 02 December 2013) 

Schengen  SIS/SIRENE  Evaluation  Report  of  Slovakia  (document  17101/13  (SCH-EVAL 
142, SIRIS 100, COMIX 653) of 02 December 2013 

Schengen SIS/SIRENE Evaluation Report of the Czech Republic (document 17100/13 (SCH-
EVAL 141, SIRIS 99, COMIX 652) of 02 December 2013 

Schengen SIS/SIRENE Evaluation Report of Hungary (document 7599/14 (SCH-EVAL 28, 
SIRIS 19, COMIX 157) of 11 March 2014) 

Schengen SIS/SIRENE Evaluation Report of Poland (document 9369/1/14 (SCH-EVAL 50, 
SIRIS 33, COMIX 238) of 12 September 2014) 

Schengen  SIS/SIRENE  Evaluation  Report  of  Estonia  (document  7229/14  (SCH-EVAL  25, 
SIRIS 13, COMIX 130) of 04 March 2014 

Schengen  SIS/SIRENE  Evaluation  Report  of  Latvia  (document  7586/14  (SCH-EVAL  26, 
SIRIS 17, COMIX 154) of 11 March 2014) 

Schengen SIS/SIRENE Evaluation Report of Lithuania (document 7587/14 (SCH-EVAL 27, 
SIRIS 18, COMIX 155) of 11 March 2014) 

Schengen SIS/SIRENE Evaluation Report of Switzerland (document 12691/14 (SCH-EVAL 
82, SIRIS 49, COMIX 424) of 11 September 2014) 

Schengen  SIS/SIRENE  Evaluation  Report  of  the  United  Kingdom  (document  11780/15 
(SCH-EVAL 20, SIRIS 57, COMIX 381) of 19 November 2015) 

87 

 
 
Commission  Implementing  Decision  of  22 September  2015  establishing  the  report  of  the 
2015  evaluation  of  implementation  of  the  Schengen  acquis  in  the  field  of  the  Schengen 
Information System by Austria (COM(2015)6300) 

Commission Implementing Decision of 22 December 2015 establishing the report of the 2015 
evaluation  of  implementation  of  the  Schengen  acquis  in  the  field  of  the  Schengen 
Information System by Belgium (COM(2015)9000) 

Commission Implementing Decision of 01 February 2016 establishing the report of the 2015 
evaluation  of  implementation  of  the  Schengen  acquis  in  the  field  of  the  Schengen 
Information System by Germany (COM(2016)24) 

Commission  Implementing  Decision  of  11 April  2016  establishing  the  report  of  the  2015 
evaluation  of  implementation  of  the  Schengen  acquis  in  the  field  of  the  Schengen 
Information System by the Netherlands (COM(2016)5101) 

Draft Schengen Evaluation Report of the 2015 evaluation of implementation of the Schengen 
acquis in the field of the Schengen Information System by Liechtenstein 

Draft Schengen Evaluation Report of the 2016 evaluation of implementation of the Schengen 
acquis in the field of the Schengen Information System by Luxembourg 

Draft Schengen Evaluation Report of the 2016 evaluation of implementation of the Schengen 
acquis in the field of the Schengen Information System by Italy 

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ANNEX III - MEETINGS 

Meetings of the SISVIS Committee 

2013 

14 February 

29 May 

5 July 

5 September 

30 October 

10 December 

2014 

4 February 

28 March 

15 May 

15 July 

9 September 

3 November 

16 December 

2015 

6 February 

24 March 

19 May 

9 July 

8 September 

20 October 

14-15 December 

2016 

3-4-5 February 

17 March 

10-11 May 

30 June 

15 September  

Meetings of the Commission Inter-service Steering Group 

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17 April 2015 

6 July 2015 

6 November 2015 

14 March 2016 

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  ANNEX IV - DETAILED STATISTICS ON COMPLAINTS AND REMEDIES  

In this sphere there is variation in the amount of statistics available.  

 
 

 

 

 

 

In Finland, during 2013 and 2014 no SIS remedy cases were submitted to the DPA.   
In Belgium the DPA received 26 access requests to the SIS II in 2013 and 22 in 2014. 
There was one deletion of a registration in 2013 and 2 deletions in 2014. The Privacy 
Commission has no data at its disposal related to the courts decisions. 
In France the DPA received 260 access requests to SIS in 2013 and 262 in 2014. In 
2014,  310  individual  checks  on  records  were  led  by  the  "Commission  nationale  de 
l'informatique et des libertés" with the following outcomes: 
Person  unknown  (no  alert  in  SIS)  or  “became  unknown”  (alert  deleted  during  the 
process)  –  212  (SIS  alerts  on  22  people,  from  France  or  another  state,  were  deleted 
during the subject access procedure). 
Person known (SIS alert) – 98 (64 FR alerts, 34 alerts from other states).  
In  Malta  no  applicants  had  recourse  to  the  Court  as  the  data  controller  and  DPA 
handled all requests. 
In Slovenia the police received 88 access requests in 2013 and 89 in 2014. During this 
time the DPA received no complaints. 
In  the  Czech  Republic  the  DPA  received  9  access  requests  in  2013  and  10  in 
2014.   According  to  information  available  none  of  these  requests  resulted  in  Court 
action. The Supreme Administrative Court has heard one case where the applicant had 
not exhausted the remedies available to him, such as applying to the DPA. The Court 
ruled that it would not hear such a case as the applicant had not attempted to resolve 
the  issue  through  the  available  mechanisms.  The  DPA  has  no  information  about 
compensation awarded by the Courts or other rulings mainly due to the low number of 
cases and complaints received. 

  Similarly, Estonia reported that no court cases had taken place. 
 

In Denmark the DPA received 21 access requests to SIS in 2013. Most of the cases 
were  forwarded  to  the  data  controller,  the  national  police.  Following  appropriate 
action by the police no further action was necessary or requested. The police directly 
received 21 access requests and 10 cases regarding deletion. 
In 2014 the Danish DPA received 7 access requests. Most of the cases were forwarded 
to the data controller, the national police. Following appropriate action by the police 
no further action was necessary or requested. The police directly received 10 access 
requests and 5 cases regarding deletion. 

  During  2013  and  2014  the  Polish  DPA  did  not  directly  receive  any  remedies  or 

appeals concerning SIS.   

  Lithuania reported that there were no statistics in this area. 
  Hungary reported that in 2014 the SIRENE Bureau received 320 access requests and 
the DPA 10. At the date of receipt of the Hungarian response (September 2015) the 
SIRENE Bureau in 2015 had received 150 access requests and the DPA 10. 

  Sweden  reported  that  there  are  no  available  statistics  from  the  Courts  on  access, 
correction, deletion or compensation. The DPA estimated that it receives less than 10 
cases per year. In 2013 the police received 63 access requests. In one case information 
was  corrected  and  in  4  cases  it  was  deleted.  In  2014  the  police  received  52  access 
requests. In one case information was corrected and 14 cases information was deleted.  
  Latvia reported that its data inspectorate receives, on average, ten complaints per year. 
The  majority  of  the  complaints  are  forwarded  to  the  SIRENE  Bureau.  Due  to  the 

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actions carried out by the Bureau there have been no decisions taken regarding appeal 
as  the  Bureau  has  ensured  the  rights  of  the  data  subject.   There  is  no  information 
available on cases taken to Court for compensation. 
Iceland reported no cases in either 2013 or 2014. 

 
  The UK DPA does not hold information on cases taken to Court. 
  Switzerland  reported  that  there  has  only  been  one  appeal  against  the  Federal  Police 
for refusing to disclose information. This took place in 2009 with the Court ruling in 
favour  of  the  Police.  In  2013  information  was  refused  twice  and  no  appeal  was 
made.  Switzerland is able to provide comprehensive statistics on access requests.   

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