REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL assessing the implementation of the measures referred to in Article 25 of Directive 2011/93/EU of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography
Date: 2016-12-16
Institutions: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: EU Member State, Internet, application of EU law, child pornography, child protection, criminal law, fight against crime, help for victims, paedophilia, sexual violence

EN 

   EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 16.12.2016  COM(2016) 872 final   REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL assessing the implementation of the measures referred to in Article 25 of Directive 2011/93/EU of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography   
 
 
Contents 

1. 

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 3 

1.1.  Objectives and scope of Article 25 .................................................................... 3 

1.2.  Purpose of this report and methodology ............................................................ 5 

2.  TRANSPOSITION MEASURES ............................................................................... 7 

2.1.  Removal (Article 25(1)) .................................................................................... 7 

2.1.1.  Content hosted in a Member State’s territory ...................................... 7 

2.1.2.  Content hosted outside a Member State’s territory ............................. 9 

2.2.  Blocking (Article 25(2)) .................................................................................. 10 

3.  CONCLUSION AND NEXT STEPS ....................................................................... 12 

2 

 
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION 

The Internet has brought about a dramatic increase in child sexual abuse in that: 

 

 

 

 

it facilitates the sharing of child sexual abuse material, by offering a variety of 
distribution  channels  such  as  the  web,  peer-to-peer  networks,  social  media, 
bulletin  boards,  newsgroups,  Internet  relay  chats  and  photo-sharing  platforms, 
among  many  others.  Sharing  is  also  facilitated  by  access  to  a  worldwide 
community of like-minded individuals, which is a source of strong demand and 
mutual support; 
it provides technical means and security measures that can facilitate anonymity;1 

as a consequence of the strong demand for child sexual abuse material, children 
continue  to  be  at  risk  of  becoming  victims,  while  anonymity  can  obstruct  the 
investigation and prosecution of these crimes; and 

new  child  sexual  abuse  materials  have  become  a  currency.  To  obtain  and 
maintain access to forums, participants frequently have to submit new materials 
on a regular basis, which encourages the commission of child sexual abuse. 

Online  child  sexual  abuse  is  a  nefarious  crime  with  long-term  consequences  for  its 
victims. Harm is caused not only when the abuse  is actually recorded or photographed, 
but  also  every  time  the  images  and  videos  are  posted,  circulated  and  viewed.  For  the 
victims,  the  realisation  that  the  images  and  videos  in  which  they  are  abused  are  ‘out 
there’ and that they could even encounter someone who has seen the material is a major 
source of trauma and additional suffering. 

There  are  indications  that  the  average  age  of  victims  of  child  sexual  abuse  material  is 
steadily  decreasing:  according  to  the  International  Association  of  Internet  Hotlines 
(INHOPE),2 around 70% of the victims in the reports that INHOPE hotlines processed in 
2014 appeared to be prepubescent.3 The Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) issued similar 
figures in 2015, adding that 3% of the victims appeared to be two years old or younger 
and a third of images showed children being raped or sexually tortured.4   

1.1.  Objectives and scope of Article 25 

The main objective of Article 25 of the Directive5 is to disrupt the availability of child 
pornography.6 Such provisions were first introduced with the Directive, as they were not 
included in the main legislative instruments in the area, i.e.: 

 

 

the Framework Decision7 that the Directive replaces; 

the  2007  Council  of  Europe  Convention  on  the  protection  of  children  against 
sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, from which the Directive draws inspiration 
in other areas; or  

1 e.g. the Onion Router (www.torproject.org). 
2 http://www.inhope.org/ 
3 http://www.inhope.org/tns/resources/statistics-and-infographics/statistics-and-infographics-2014.aspx 
4 https://www.iwf.org.uk/accountability/annual-reports/2015-annual-report 
5  Directive  2011/93/EU of 13  December  2011 on  combating  the  sexual  abuse  and  sexual  exploitation  of 
children and child pornography. Article 25 of the Directive covers 'measures against websites containing or 
disseminating child pornography'.  
6 As defined in Article 2(c) of the Directive. 
7 Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA of 22 December 2003 on combating the sexual exploitation 
of children and child pornography.  

3 

 
 
 
                                                 
 

the Council Decision to combat child pornography on the Internet,8 which was 
one of the first legal instruments at EU level that addressed child pornography. 

Article 25 is one of a number of provisions in the Directive to facilitate prevention and 
mitigate secondary victimisation. Together with provisions on the prosecution of crimes 
and protection of victims, they are part of the holistic approach required to tackle child 
sexual abuse, child sexual exploitation and child pornography effectively. 
Article 25 reads as follows:9  

1.  Member  States  shall  take  the  necessary  measures  to  ensure  the  prompt 
removal  of  web pages  containing or disseminating child  pornography  hosted in 
their  territory  and  to  endeavour  to  obtain  the  removal  of  such  pages  hosted 
outside of their territory.  

2. Member States may take measures to block access to web pages containing or 
disseminating child pornography towards the Internet users within their territory. 
These  measures  must  be  set  by  transparent  procedures  and  provide  adequate 
safeguards,  in  particular  to  ensure  that  the  restriction  is  limited  to  what  is 
necessary  and  proportionate,  and  that  users  are  informed  of  the  reason  for  the 
restriction. Those safeguards shall also include the possibility of judicial redress.    

It therefore: 

  obliges Member States to remove promptly material on websites hosted within 

their territory; 

  obliges  them  to  endeavour  to  secure  the  removal  of  material  on  websites 

hosted elsewhere; and 

  offers the possibility to block access to child pornography by users within their 

territory, subject to a number of safeguards. 

It  is  important  to  note  that  Article  25  refers  to  ‘measures’,  which  may  not  necessarily 
involve legislation. As recital 47 of the Directive states: 

"… The measures undertaken by Member States in accordance with this Directive 
in  order  to  remove  or,  where  appropriate,  block  websites  containing  child 
pornography could be based on various types of public action, such as legislative, 
non-legislative,  judicial  or  other.  In  that  context,  this  Directive  is  without 
prejudice to voluntary action taken by the Internet industry to prevent the misuse 
of its services or to any support for such action by Member States…" 

the  Directive 
therefore  considered 
Non-legislative  measures  are 
satisfactorily if they allow the outcomes specified in Article 25 to be achieved in practice. 

transpose 

to 

Cooperation between the private sector, including industry and civil society, and public 
authorities,  including  law  enforcement  agencies  (LEAs)  and  the  judiciary,  is  crucial  to 
implementing the measures under Article 25 and effectively fighting the dissemination of 
child sexual abuse material online. 

8 Council Decision 2000/375/JHA of 29 May 2000 to combat child pornography on the Internet. 
9 See also recitals 46 and 47 of the Directive concerning the measures referred to in Article 25. 

4 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
The parties involved in disrupting  the availability of child  sexual abuse material  online 
are: 

 

information  society  service  providers  (ISSPs),  including  providers  of  access, 
hosting  and  online  platforms.  As  criminals  abuse  the  services  and  the 
infrastructure  they  provide,  ISSPs  are  well  placed  to  cooperate  in  the 
implementation of Article 25. For example, hosting providers are ultimately able 
to remove material hosted on their servers and access providers such as internet 
service providers (ISPs) can block access;  

  Internet  users,  who  may  come  across  child  sexual  abuse  material  online 
(intentionally or unintentionally) and decide to report it to the ISSP directly if the 
technology to do so is in place, e.g. through a ‘report abuse’  button  on the web 
page  or  browser.  Users  may  also  report  to  a  dedicated  hotline  run  by  a  civil 
society organisation, or to the LEA responsible; 

  dedicated hotlines, usually run by an NGO or an association of ISSPs or media 
companies,  which  allow  anonymous  reporting  by  users  who  may  not  feel 
comfortable  reporting  to  the  police  and  cannot  or  do  not  wish  to  report  to  the 
ISSP  directly.  In  many  cases,  reports  received  in  one  country  refer  to  material 
hosted  by  providers  in  another.  Its  removal  requires  international  cooperation, 
which INHOPE facilitates; 

  LEAs,  whose  work  is  supported  by  reports  passed  on  by  hotlines  and  directly 
from  Internet  users.  They  also  share  reports  with  each  other  in  Europe  (directly 
and through Europol and its European Cybercrime Centre)10 and beyond (through 
Interpol);11 and 

 

the  judiciary,  which  ensures  application  of  the  law  in  each  Member  State.  In 
some  countries,  court orders are needed  to  remove or  block material.  Eurojust12 
helps coordinate judicial cooperation in criminal matters across Member States.  

1.2.  Purpose of this report and methodology 

Article  27  of  the  Directive  requires  Member  States13  to  bring  into  force  the  laws, 
regulations  and  administrative  provisions  necessary  to  comply  with  the  Directive  and 
communicate them to the Commission by 18 December 2013. 

This  report  responds  to  the  requirement  under  Article  28(2)  of  the  Directive  for  the 
Commission to submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council assessing the 
implementation  of  the  measures  referred  to  in  Article  25  of  the  Directive.14  The  report 
aims to  provide a  concise yet informative overview of the main transposition measures 
taken by Member States. 

10 https://www.europol.europa.eu/ec3 
11 http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Crimes-against-children/Crimes-against-children 
12 http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/ 
13 From this point onwards, ‘Member States’ or ‘all Member States’ refer to the Member States bound by 
the Directive (i.e. all EU Member States except Denmark). In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol 
22 on the Position of Denmark, Denmark did not take part in the adoption of the Directive, nor does the 
Directive  apply  to  it.  However  Council  Framework  Decision  2004/68/JHA  continues  to  be  applicable  to 
and  binding  upon  Denmark.  In  accordance  with  Article  3  of  Protocol  21  on  the  position  of  the  United 
Kingdom and Ireland, both took part in the adoption of the Directive and are bound by it. 
14 In accordance with Article 28(1) of the Directive, the extent to which the Member States have taken the 
necessary  measures  to  comply  with  the  Directive  is  assessed  in  a  separate  report  (COM(2016)  871) 
published jointly with this one. 

5 

 
                                                 
By the transposition deadline, only 12 Member States had notified the Commission that 
they  had  completed  transposition  of  the  Directive.  The  Commission  therefore  opened 
infringement  proceedings  for  non-communication  of  national  transposition  measures 
against the others: BE, BG, IE, EL, ES, IT, CY, LT, HU, MT, NL, PT, RO, SI and the 
UK.15 All these infringement proceedings had been closed by 8 December 2016. The late 
adoption  and  notification  of  national  transposition  measures  delayed  the  Commission’s 
analysis and publication of the transposition reports. 

The  description  and  analysis  in  this  report  are  based  on  the  information  that  Member 
States provided by 1 November 2016. Notifications received after that date have not been 
taken into account. Beyond the issues identified in this report, there may be both further 
challenges  in  transposition  and  other  provisions  not  reported  to  the  Commission  or 
further  legislative  and  non-legislative  developments.  Therefore,  this  report  does  not 
prevent the Commission from further evaluating some provisions, to continue supporting 
Member States in the transposition and implementation of Article 25. 

15 Member States in this document are abbreviated according to these rules: 
http://publications.europa.eu/code/en/en-370100.htm 

6 

 
                                                 
2.  TRANSPOSITION MEASURES 

2.1. Removal (Article 25(1)) 

2.1.1. Content hosted in a Member State’s territory  

Member States have adopted two types of measures to ensure the prompt removal of web 
pages  containing  or  disseminating  child  pornography  hosted  in  a  Member  State’s 
territory:  measures  based  on  Directive  2000/31/EC16  (E-commerce  Directive),  and 
measures based on national criminal law.  

1.  Measures based on the E-commerce Directive  

The E-commerce Directive defines the liability limitations of an Internet intermediary 
providing  services  consisting  of  mere  conduit,  caching  and  hosting.  In  particular,  a 
hosting provider cannot be held liable if:17 

a.  it has neither knowledge of nor control over the information that is transmitted or 

stored, and 

b.  upon  obtaining  actual  knowledge  or  awareness  of  illegal  activities,  it  acts 

expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information concerned.  

These  provisions  constitute  the  basis  for  the  development  of  notice  and  take  down 
procedures  for  illegal  content.  In  the  area  of  child  sexual  abuse  material,  these 
procedures take the form of mechanisms run by interested parties aimed at identifying 
illegal information hosted on the network and at facilitating its rapid removal.  

Member States have implemented notice and take down procedures through national 
hotlines, to which Internet users can report child sexual abuse material that they find 
online.  INHOPE  is  the  umbrella  organisation  for  the  hotlines.  Supported  by  the 
European  Commission’s  Safer  Internet  Programme18,  and  since  2014  by  the 
Connecting  Europe  Facility  framework,19  it  currently  represents  a  network  of  51 
hotlines in 45 countries, including all EU Member States.  

The  hotlines  have  memoranda  of  understanding  with  the  corresponding  national 
LEAs, which set out procedures for handling the reports received from Internet users. 
The different operating procedures include in general the following common actions 
for content hosted in the Member States:  

1)  Determine the hosting location.  

A hotline receives an Internet user’s report of a web address (URL) with possible 
child  sexual  abuse  material  and  determines  in  which  country  the  material  is 
hosted.  In  some  cases,  the  hotline  receives  the  report  from  another  INHOPE 
network member, which has already determined that the hosting location is in the 
country of the hotline in question.  

16  Directive  2000/31/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  8  June  2000  on  certain  legal 
aspects  of  information  society  services,  in  particular  electronic  commerce,  in  the  Internal  Market 
('Directive  on  electronic  commerce').  The 
in  2012: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/docs/communication2012/SEC2011_1641_en.pdf  
17 Article 14 of E-commerce Directive. 
18 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/safer-internet-better-internet-kids 
19 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/connecting-europe-facility 

last  implementation  report  was  published 

7 

 
 
 
                                                 
2)  Analyse content. 

If the material is hosted in the country, the hotline determines whether the URL 
has been reported previously. If so, the report is discarded. Otherwise, the hotline 
analyses  the  images  and  videos  on  the  URL  and  determines  whether  they  are 
known and whether they may be illegal in that country.  

3) 

Inform hosting provider. 

The hotline forwards the report and the analyses to the national LEA. Depending 
on the memorandum of understanding, the hosting provider is then informed by: 

 

the hotline, after the LEA has agreed that the material can be taken down, 
ensuring that this would not  interfere  with  an ongoing  investigation (AT, 
CZ, DE (eco and FSM hotlines), FR, HU, LU, LV, NL, PL, PT, RO, SE 
and the UK). The time between the hotline first informing the LEA and the 
hotline communicating with the hosting provider varies depending on the 
procedures agreed between the hotline and the LEA in each Member State. 
In any case, the LEA (instead of or in addition to the hotline) may choose 
to inform the hosting provider as circumstances require.  

 

the LEA only. In BG, DE (Jugendschutz hotline), EE, EL, FI, MT, SI and 
SK,  the  LEA  communicates  with  the  hosting  provider,  while  the  hotline 
monitors that the content is actually removed.  

In  CY  and  HR,  a  court  order  is  required  to  request  the  removal  of  the 
material.  In  both  countries,  access  to  the  website  is  temporarily  blocked 
until the court order is obtained.  

After being made aware of the existence of illegal material on its servers, the hosting 
provider  can  be  held  liable  if  it  fails  to  remove  it  in  accordance  with  the  national 
implementing  laws.  The  only  limit  to  the  attribution  of  liability  is  the  liability 
exemption under the E-commerce Directive as implemented by Member States (see 
above).  

At  the  time  of  writing,  most  Member  States  have  hotlines  that  are  capable  of 
assessing  reported  content  to  implement  notice  and  take  down  procedures,  except 
BE, ES and IT:  

  BE  notified  recently  adopted  legislation  that  allows  an  INHOPE  hotline  to 
operate in the country and handle reports according to the general procedure 
described  above.  At  the  time  of  writing,  the  Belgian  police  and  judiciary 
were  negotiating  with  the  hotline  a  memorandum  of  understanding  and  the 
operating protocols.   

  The  situation  in  ES  requires  closer  examination  with  regard  to  the  hotline 

situation.  

  IT has two INHOPE hotlines, but the current legislation does not allow them 
to check the content of reports received from Internet users or other hotlines. 
Therefore, they simply forward the reports to the LEA (the National Centre 
for  Combatting  Online  Child  Pornography,  CNCPO),  without  checking  the 
content. 

2.  Measures based on national criminal law 

  Member  States  have  notified  two  types  of  criminal  law  provisions  which  also  allow 

the removal of illegal content hosted in their territory:   

8 

 
a.  general  provisions  that  allow  the  seizure  of  material  relevant  to  criminal 
proceedings, e.g. material used in the commission of an offence: AT, CZ, HU, IT, 
LU, NL, SE and SK; and 

b.  specific provisions on the removal of child pornography: CY, EE, EL, ES, SE, and  

UK (Gibraltar).  

The legislation in  CZ, EL, HU and UK (Gibraltar)  makes explicit reference to the 
requirement of prompt removal: ‘without undue delay’ (CZ), ‘executed immediately’ 
(EL), ‘within 12 hours’ (HU) or ‘prompt removal’ (UK (Gibraltar)).  

Other  Member  States  transpose  this  requirement  through  the  notice  and  takedown 
procedures described above, which may lead to the criminal law channels being used 
only  in  an  ancillary  way to  deal with cases  where notice and takedown mechanisms 
encounter  difficulties  (e.g.  for  lack  of  cooperation  of  the  hosting  provider)  or  where 
material  is  linked  to  an  ongoing  criminal  investigation.  In  Member  States  without 
functional notice and take down mechanisms or where criminal law does not specify 
prompt removal, more information is needed on the measures taken to transpose this 
requirement.    

2.1.2. Content hosted outside a Member State’s territory 

All Member States except BE, ES and IT have transposed this provision through a fully 
operational  hotline  (i.e.  a  hotline  authorised  to  assess  the  material)  and  the  following 
operating procedure to endeavour to remove content hosted outside their territory:  

1)  once  the  operators  of  the  hotline  that  has  received  the  report  determine  that  the 
hosting  location  is  outside  of  the  Member  State,  they  verify  whether  there  is  an 
operational INHOPE hotline in the hosting country; 

2)  if  the  hosting  country  has  an  INHOPE  hotline,  the  report  is  sent  to  it  through  the 
internal  INHOPE  information  exchange  system,  so  that  it  can  process  the  report 
according to the national procedure for content hosted in the country; 

3)  if the hosting country does not have an INHOPE hotline, the report is sent to the LEA 
of  the  country  in  which  it  was  received,  which  forwards  it,  usually  via  Europol  or 
Interpol, to the LEA of the hosting country.  

Although  the  procedures  across  hotlines  follow  in  general  a  similar  pattern,  there  are 
some specificities depending on what has been agreed between the hotline and the LEA. 
For example, some hotlines (e.g. in DE, LT and LV) notify the hosting provider abroad 
if no action has been taken after a certain time. Some hotlines (e.g. in AT, CZ, DE, FR, 
LU,  MT)  inform  the  LEA  of  their  country  when  they  forward  a  report  to  a  hotline 
abroad, while others (e.g. in HU, NL, PL, SE and the UK) generally do not. Finally, if 
there is no INHOPE hotline in the hosting country, some hotlines (e.g. in  EE, LU, and 
the UK) contact non-INHOPE hotlines there, if they exist.  

Member  States  without  a  fully  operational  hotline  (BE,  ES  and  IT)  transpose  this 
provision by arranging for the exchange of information, usually via Europol or Interpol, 
between the LEA in the country in which the report originated and that of the country in 
which the material is hosted. In this case, more information is needed on the transposition 
of the provision through this mechanism, in particular in relation to cases where the web 
pages hosted abroad are not linked to any criminal proceedings in that Member State and 
are not the object of any request for mutual legal assistance (MLA). 

With  regard  to  the  promptness  and  effectiveness  of  removal  through  the  hotlines, 
according to their data, 93% of the child sexual abuse material processed by the hotlines 

9 

 
in  Europe  and  91%  of  the  material  processed  by  the  hotlines  worldwide  was  removed 
from Internet public access in less than 72 hours.20 

2.2. Blocking (Article 25(2)) 

About half of the Member States (BG, CY, CZ, EL, ES, FI, FR, HU, IE, IT, MT, PT, 
SE  and the  UK)  have  chosen  to  apply  optional blocking  measures under Article  25(2). 
The variety of the measures reflects the wording of recital 47 of the Directive (legislative, 
non-legislative, judicial or other, including voluntary action by the Internet industry). 

One  way  to  classify  the  measures  is  according  to  whether  a  court  order  is  required  to 
block a website. A court order is: 

 

required in EL, ES and HU; 

  not mandatory in  

o  CY, FR, IT and PT, where ISPs are required by law to comply with the 
request of the authorities (i.e. the LEA or the national regulator) to block 
the site; and  

o  BG,  CZ,  IE,  FI,  MT,  SE,  and  the  UK,  where  ISPs  are  not  explicitly 
required  by  law  to  comply  with  the  authorities’  request  but  do  so 
voluntarily. 

Blacklists of websites containing or disseminating child pornography are commonly used 
in the implementation of blocking measures. Blacklists are typically prepared by national 
authorities  (i.e.  the  LEA  or  the  regulator)  and  transmitted  to  the  ISPs.  Some  Member 
States (EL, HU, IT, FI and FR) notified legislation that governs this process.  
BG uses Interpol’s ‘Worst of List’,21 while the UK uses IWF’s URL list.22 ISPs in CZ 
also use the IWF list on a self-regulatory basis.  

Information  received  from  Member  States  was,  in  general,  not  conclusive  as  to  the 
number of webpages included in blocking lists, or the number of attempts blocked.   

The  Directive  requires  that  measures  taken  to  block  access  to  websites  containing  or 
disseminating  child  pornography  provide  for  transparent  procedures  and  adequate 
safeguards. Recital 47 states that: 

Whichever basis for action or method is chosen, Member States should ensure that 
it  provides  an  adequate  level  of  legal  certainty  and  predictability  to  users  and 
service providers. Both with a view to the removal and the blocking of child abuse 
content,  cooperation  between  public  authorities  should  be  established  and 
strengthened, particularly in the interests of ensuring that national lists of websites 
containing child pornography material are as complete as possible and of avoiding 
duplication of work. Any such developments must take account of the rights of the 
end users and comply with existing legal and judicial procedures and the European 
Convention  for  the  Protection  of  Human  Rights  and  Fundamental  Freedoms  and 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 

Specifically, Article 25(2) refers to the following requirements: 

20http://www.inhope.org/Libraries/Statistics_Infographics_2014/INHOPE_stats_infographics_for_2014.sfl
b.ashx 
21https://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Crimes-against-children/Access-blocking/The-INTERPOL-
%22Worst-of%22-list 
22 https://www.iwf.org.uk/members/member-policies/url-list/blocking-faqs#WhatistheIWFURLlist 

10 

 
                                                 
1.  transparent procedures; 
2.  limitation to what is necessary and proportionate; 
3.  information to users on the reasons for restriction; and  
4.  possibility of judicial redress.  

Member  States  which  opted  to  transpose  this  provision  have  done  so  incorporating  a 
variety of transparent procedures and safeguards: 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

in EL, the Hellenic Telecommunication and Post Commission notifies orders of 
the  competent  authorities  to  providers  of  Internet  access  services  and  urges 
immediate  content  blocking  and  the  provision  of  relevant  information  to  users. 
The owner of the webpage  may appeal against the order within a period of two 
months;  

in  ES,  during  the  criminal  proceedings,  the  judge  may  order  the  closure  of  a 
website containing child pornography as a precautionary measure,  which can be 
contested. The service provider is obliged to provide the necessary information to 
customers;  

in  FI, the police may  establish, maintain and update a  list of child  pornography 
sites. Where a website is blocked, the police have to issue a statement giving the 
reasons  for  the  blocking  which  must  be  displayed  every  time  access  to  a  site  is 
blocked. Appeals against decisions by the police to add a site to the blocking list 
can be lodged with an administrative court;  

in  FR,  Internet  providers  must  block  access  to  the  Internet addresses  concerned 
within 24 hours. The list of websites is reviewed by a qualified person from the 
National  Commission  on  Computing  and  Freedoms.  Users  trying  to  reach  the 
service to which access is denied are redirected to an information address of the 
Ministry  of  Interior,  stating  the  reasons  for  denial  of  access  and  the  available 
redress procedures before the administrative court; 

in HU, access can be blocked temporarily or permanently. Requests are received 
by the Minister of Justice and, where appropriate, submitted to the Metropolitan 
Court  of  Budapest.  The  obligation  to  block  access  rests  with  the  ISP  providing 
connectivity. The transparency of the procedure is ensured as the decision of the 
court is served by way of publication and is thus accessible to the public. Judicial 
appeal is available against an order of permanent blocking;  

in  IT,  the  National  Centre  for  Combating  Child  Pornography  on  the  Internet 
provides ISPs with a list of child pornography sites, to which they prevent access 
using filtering tools and related technology. The sites to which access is blocked 
will display a ‘stop page’ indicating the reasons for blocking; and 

in the UK (England/Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland), measures to block 
access to such webpages are taken through IWF, which works as a private self-
regulatory body that makes recommendations to have content blocked or filtered. 
There is an appeals process whereby anyone with a legitimate association with or 
interest in the content in question can contest the accuracy of the assessment. In 
the UK (Gibraltar), the Gibraltar Regulatory Authority may, in conjunction with 
IPSs, block access to web pages that contain or disseminate child pornography to 
users in Gibraltar. Such measures must be transparent, limited to what is strictly 
necessary, proportionate and reasoned.  

In BG, CY, CZ, IE, MT, PT and SE the information provided on safeguards applicable 
to blocking measures was not conclusive and will require further examination.  

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3.  CONCLUSION AND NEXT STEPS 

The Commission acknowledges the significant efforts made by the Member States in the 
transposition of Article 25 of the Directive.  

There is still room, however, to use its potential to the full by continuing to work on its 
complete and correct implementation across Member States. Some key challenges ahead 
include ensuring that child sexual abuse material in Member States’ territory is removed 
promptly and that adequate safeguards are provided where the Member State opts to take 
measures  to  block  access  to  Internet  users  within  its  territory  to  web  pages  containing 
child sexual abuse material.     

Therefore, for the time  being, the Commission  has  no plans to  propose amendments to 
Article 25 or complementary legislation. It will instead focus its efforts on ensuring that 
children  benefit  from  the  full  added  value  of  the  Article,  through  its  complete 
transposition and implementation by Member States.  
That  said,  in  its  recent  Communication  on  Online  Platforms,23  the  Commission 
highlighted  the  need  to  sustain  and  develop  multi-stakeholder  engagement  processes 
aimed at finding common solutions to voluntarily detect and fight illegal material online 
and committed to reviewing the need for formal notice and action procedures. 

The  Commission  will  continue  to  provide  support  to  Member  States  to  ensure  a 
satisfactory  level  of  transposition  and  implementation.  This  includes  monitoring  that 
national  measures  comply  with  the  corresponding  provisions  in  the  Article  and 
facilitating the exchange of best practices. Where necessary, the Commission will make 
use of its enforcement powers under the Treaties through infringement procedures. 

23  Communication  on  Online  Platforms  and  the  Digital  Single  Market  Opportunities  and  Challenges  for 
Europe (COM/2016/288), of 25 May 2016. 

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