COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Action plan to strengthen the European response to travel document fraud
Date: 2016-12-08
Institutions: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: Schengen Agreement, action programme, biometrics, data protection, external border of the EU, fight against crime, forgery of documents, passport, personal data

EN 

   EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 8.12.2016  COM(2016) 790 final   COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Action plan to strengthen the European response to travel document fraud   
 
 
I. 

INTRODUCTION 

The increasingly significant problem of travel document fraud has come under the spotlight in 
the  context  of  the  recent  terrorist  attacks  in  Europe  and  current  migration  flows.  Document 
fraud has become an enabler of terrorism and organised crime, and is linked to the trafficking 
of  human  beings1  and  migrant  smuggling.  It  is  vital  that  we  enhance  the  security  of  travel 
documents, including the underlying identity management infrastructure.  

In  its  Communication  on  Enhancing  security  in  a  world  of  mobility:  improved  information 
exchange  in  the  fight  against  terrorism  and  stronger  external  borders,2  the  Commission 
stressed  the  crucial  importance  of  secure  travel  and  identity  documents  wherever  it  is 
necessary  to  establish  beyond  doubt  a  person’s  identity  and  announced  that  it  would  be 
presenting an action plan to tackle the phenomenon of travel document fraud. An improved 
approach  will  rely  on  robust  systems  to  prevent  abuses  and  the  threats  to  internal  security 
arising from failings in document security. 

Most commonly, travel documents take the form of passports, but they also include national 
identity  cards  and  residence  permits  for  third  country  nationals  (when  used  within  the  area 
without controls  at  internal borders). EU citizens can  enter and leave  the EU, the Schengen 
area  and  certain  non-EU  countries  with  a  national  ID  card  issued  by  Member  States.  This 
means, for example, that foreign terrorist fighters may be able to travel between the EU and 
Turkey using just their national ID card.  

EU  travel  documents  are  in  high  demand  among  fraudsters.  At  least  three  quarters  of 
fraudulent documents detected at the external borders, but also in the area without controls at 
internal  borders,  purport  to  have  been  issued  by  EU  Member  States  and  the  Schengen 
associated  countries.3  According  to  recent  reports  from  the  European  Border  and  Coast 
Guard, less secure national ID cards issued by Member States are the most frequently detected 
false  documents  used  for  intra-Schengen  travel.  ‘Look-alike  fraud’  (where  the  holder  of  a 
document is simply a look-alike of its real owner) is still on the rise and remained the most 
frequently  reported  type  of  fraud  in  the  second  quarter  of  2016.  Obtaining  authentic 
documents  on the basis of false  ‘breeder’ documents (birth, marriage  and death certificates) 
remains one of the biggest threats, as it is very difficult to detect. 

Against this background, it is crucial that the EU and especially the Member States intensify 
efforts to improve the security of travel documents issued to EU and third country nationals. 
Travel  document  security  is  an  important  factor  in  better  border  protection  and  migration 
management and the move towards an effective and genuine Security Union.4 

The  nature of  travel  document  fraud  is  evolving  rapidly.  Criminal  networks  involved  in  the 
falsification  and  counterfeiting  of  travel  documents  are  now  more  specialised  and  are 
constantly developing new forms of forgery, such as the manipulation of anti-forgery devices 
and techniques to circumvent biometric checks, and new modus operandi.  

1   Staff  working  document  SWD(2016)  159  final  accompanying  the  Commission’s  Report  on  the  progress 

made in the fight against trafficking in human beings (2016). 

2   COM(2016) 602 final, 14.9.2016. 
3   In the second quarter of 2016, 74.33 % of false ID cards, 60.46 % of false residence permits and 17.11 % of 
false passports were EU documents (European Border and Coast Guard’s quarterly risk analysis report). 
4   Commission Communication on Delivering on the European Agenda on Security to fight against terrorism 

and pave the way towards an effective and genuine Security Union (COM(2016) 230 final, 20.4.2016). 

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The  introduction  of  more  sophisticated  security  features,  production  methods  and  document 
inspection  systems  is  making  it  more  difficult  to  forge  or  counterfeit  identity  and  travel 
documents. In response, however, fraudsters are increasingly shifting from ‘traditional’ fraud 
– which focuses on the physical document, for example by altering the date of validity in a 
passport  (forgery)  or  producing  a  totally  fake  document  (counterfeit)  –  to  other  types  of 
document fraud, such as look-alike fraud. They are also targeting other types of documents, 
such as the breeder documents used to support applications for genuine travel documents.  

According  to  the  European  Border  and  Coast  Guard’s  2016  report,5  impostor  fraud  and  the 
fraudulent obtaining of genuine documents increased by 4 % and 76 % respectively between 
the  first  quarter  of  2015  and  the  first  quarter  of  2016,  whereas  fraud  with  counterfeit 
documents decreased (-8 %).  

This  Communication  sets  out  an  action  plan  to  improve  the  security  of  travel  documents. 
Security standards for travel documents and border control requirements6 are set at EU level, 
but Member States retain full responsibility for the breeder documents and actually producing 
and issuing travel documents. The action plan sets out measures which the Commission will 
take  and  makes  recommendations  for  Member  State  action  under  national  policies  on  all 
aspects of travel document security.  

The Commission and Member States have to ensure that fundamental rights in particular the 
right to personal data protection, will be guaranteed in all measures referred to in this action 
plan. 

As  guardian  of  the  Treaties,  the  Commission  will  continue  to  monitor  the  correct 
implementation  of  EU  law  and  use  its  powers  to  enforce  correct  implementation  where 
appropriate and necessary. 

II.  ACTION PLAN 

1.   Registration of identity 

Authentic documents established on the basis of a false identity are very difficult to detect at 
border  crossings  or  within  a  Member  State’s  territory.  Individuals’  identity  should  be 
established, and ‘breeder documents’7 issued, on the basis of population registers containing 
relevant  up-to-date  historical,  social  and  geographical  data.  Countries  with  a  biometric 
population register or travel document database can check a person’s identity each time s/he 
applies for a new travel document, so a person cannot apply for an authentic document using a 
false breeder document. 

While it can be legal for a person to change his or her name, close attention needs to be paid 
to  this  process  and  the  procedures  must  be  watertight.  Where  adults  are  registering  or 
applying  for  a  passport  for  the  first  time  (e.g.  following  naturalisation)  and  no  reliable 
registration  data  are  available,  the  authorities  responsible  should  conduct  face-to-face 
interviews and, as appropriate, look for additional evidence that the person actually uses the 
claimed identity, for example, via electoral rolls or  social security records.  

5   http://frontex.europa.eu/publications  
6   As  regards  border  control  requirements  see  Title  V,  Chapter  2  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the 

European Union (TFEU).  

7   Breeder  documents  are  birth,  marriage  and  death  certificates  used  to  support  applications  for  identity, 

residence and travel documents. 

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In addition, breeder documents should have a minimum security level to prevent falsification. 
The EU has contributed a total of EUR 16 million to research and development initiatives8 to 
ensure  more  secure  breeder  documents.  Future  Horizon  2020  work  programmes  on  Secure 
Societies 2018-2020 will support R&D on document security. 

Beyond the EU, there are projects in the framework of the new Partnership Framework under 
the European Agenda on Migration to develop biometric registration databases in key partner 
third countries with capacity to ensure functioning civil registries and fingerprint or biometric 
digitalisation. 

Europol  has  funded  the  development  of  a  handbook  on  the  detection  of  false  breeder 
documents. It contains samples and short descriptions of European ID documents and breeder 
documents, but it is not used as much as it should be.  

Electronic  identification  and  trust  services  for  electronic  transactions,9  can  also  help  in  the 
detection of false documents and enhance electronic document security by providing evidence 
of identity and preventing ID fraud through the mutual online validation of identity data. They 
would  also  support  the  facilitation  of  secure  online  applications  for  the  renewal  of  travel 
documents. 

A recently adopted Regulation simplifying the circulation of public documents in the Union10 
establishes that birth and marriage certificates issued in one Member State can be accepted as 
authentic in another without an authentication stamp. This strengthens the fight against fraud 
by  introducing  administrative  cooperation  whereby  Member  States  communicate  with  each 
other,  via  the  Internal  Market  Information  (IMI)  system,  in  cases  of  doubt  as  to  the 
authenticity  of  a  public  document,  for  example,  to  check  the  authenticity  of  breeder 
documents. 

Member States should: 

Specific actions 

-  consider how best to avoid issuing authentic documents based on false identities, for 
example  through  reinforcing  procedures  in  cases  of  later-in-life  registration  of 
identity/first-time applications or name-changing;  

-  examine  how  their  breeder  documents  can  be  made  more  fraud-resistant,  e.g.  by 

adding security features;  

-  ensure  wide  distribution  of  the  Europol  handbook  on  breeder  documents  to  all 

8   Two  projects  funded  by  the  FP7  Security  Theme  relate  specifically  to  document  security  and  ID 
management: ‘Fast and trustworthy identity delivery and check with e-passports leveraging traveller privacy’ 
(Fidelity)  and  ‘Recommendations  for  reliable  breeder  documents  restoring  e-passport  confidence  and 
leveraging extended border security’ (Origins). The Horizon 2020 Secure Societies Challenge is funding the 
‘Reliable European identity ecosystem’ (Aries) project. 

9   Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic 
identification  and  trust  services  for  electronic  transactions  in  the  internal  market  and  repealing 
Directive 1999/93/EC (OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 73–114). 

10   Regulation (EU) 2016/1191 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 on promoting the free 
movement of citizens by simplifying the requirements for presenting certain public documents in the European 
Union and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 (OJ L 200, 26.7.2016, p. 1–136). 

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document-issuing authorities and promote its continued use; and 

- 

swiftly  implement  the  Regulation  on  promoting  the  free  movement  of  citizens  by 
simplifying the requirements for presenting certain public documents in the EU and 
exploit its potential to enhance public document security through use of the Internal 
Market Information system. 

The Commission will:  

-  assess the current situation in Member States, and facilitate discussion on biometric 
identifiers (facial image and/or fingerprints) in population registers, in full respect of 
EU data protection law and taking account of the national context in Member States; 

- 

facilitate discussion on how breeder documents can be made more secure, from the 
second quarter of 2017; 

-  work  with  key  partner  third  countries  to  promote  and  support  the  introduction  of 

biometric identifiers in their population registers; 

- 

strengthen  R&D  activities  in  the  area  of  breeder  documents  and  document 
verification,  including  the  evaluation  of  mobile  technologies,  in  the  framework  of 
the Horizon 2020 programme for Secure Societies 2018-2020; and 

-  monitor  implementation  of  the  Regulation  on  promoting  the  free  movement  of 
citizens  by  simplifying  the  requirements  for  presenting  certain  public  documents 
and assess its potential to further enhance electronic public document security. 

2.  

Issuance of documents 

At the Council meeting in December 2005, all EU Member States adopted conclusions  11 on 
minimum standards relating to the security of issuing processes for Member States’ identity 
cards.  This  was  followed  up  by  a  Resolution  in  200612.  The  recommendations  address  the 
issuance  of  ID  cards  to  be  used  as  travel  documents,  but  they  are  relevant  for  all  travel 
documents.  Nevertheless,  some  (for  instance,  requiring  applicants  to  apply  in  person  and 
monitoring the whole issuing process) are still not fully implemented.  

It  is  important  that  Member  States  exchange  best  practices  as  regards  both  biometrics 
enrolment  and  document  granting  and  issuing  procedures,  in  order  to  achieve  greater 
coherence  between  national  practices.  The  Commission  will  facilitate  this  by  organising 
workshops and ad hoc meetings. 

We know that decentralised issuance processes make it easier for fraudsters to steal and re-use 
blank documents. Centralising and monitoring/auditing issuing and personalisation processes 
(filling-in  of  blank  documents)  prevent  the  circulation  of  (in  particular,  blank)  stolen 
documents. 

11   Conclusions of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States on common minimum security 

standards for national identity cards (1-2 December 2005). 

12   Resolution of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council on 4-5 
December 2006, on minimum security standards of identity cards valid for travel issued by Member States. 

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Member States should: 

Specific actions  

-  ensure full implementation of the 2006 Resolution on minimum standards as regards 

the security of issuing processes; 

-  exchange  information  on  best  practices  regarding  biometrics  enrolment  and 

document granting and issuance procedures; and 

- 

strengthen  the  monitoring  of  the  personalisation/issuance  of  identity  and  travel 
documents in order to limit the number of blank stolen items.  

The Commission will: 

- 

facilitate  the  exchange  of  best  practices  on  issuing  procedures  and  identity 
management by organising workshops from the first quarter of 2017.  

3.   Document production 

3.1   Security features in travel documents 

EU legislation has been adopted on standards for security features and biometrics in passports 
and  travel  documents  issued  by  Member  States13  and  on  uniform  formats  for  visas14  and 
residence  permits  for  non-EU  nationals.15  These  standards  are  also  used  for  local  border 
permits16  and  permits  issued  in  the  framework  of  the  legal  migration  acquis.  The  relevant 
technical specifications for documents are continuously updated to prevent fraud and it is thus 
important  that  documents  are  produced  in  full  conformity  with  the  latest  versions  of  these 
technical specifications. 

The  Commission  has  presented  two  proposals17  to  upgrade  security  features  and  establish  a 
new design for visa and residence permits for third country nationals. The rapid adoption of 
these proposals would help to reduce the use of forged documents to enter the area without 
controls at internal borders. 

Currently, security levels of national ID cards delivered by Member States and of residence 
documents for EU nationals residing in another Member State and their family members vary 
significantly, which increases the risk of falsification and document fraud as well as leading to 
practical difficulties for citizens when they seek to exercise their right of free movement. As a 
follow  up  to  the  2013  EU  Citizenship  Report  and  as  noted  in  the  Communication  of  2016 
"Enhancing  security  in  a  world  of  mobility",  the  Commission  launched  a  study18  to  further 
assess security issues, including a possible harmonisation of security features to enhance their 

13   Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 (OJ L 385, 29.12.2004, p. 1). UK and IE are not part of this measure. 
14   Regulation (EC) No 1683/95 (OJ L 164, 14.7.1995, p.1). 
15   Regulation (EC) No 1030/2002 (OJ L 157, 15.6.2002, p.1). 
16  Regulation (EC) No 1931/2006 (OJ L 405, 30.12.2006, p. 1). 
17   Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1683/1995 of 29 May 1995 laying down a uniform 
format for visas (COM(2015) 303 final); Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1030/2002 
laying down a uniform format for residence permits for third country nationals (COM(2016) 434 final). 
18   Study to support the preparation of an impact assessment on EU policy initiatives on residence and identity 

documents to facilitate the exercise of the right of free movement. 

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resistance against document fraud risks. Enhancing the security features of ID and residence 
documents  could  also  help  address  the  problem  noted  in  recent  reports  of  the  European 
Border  and  Coast  Guard  that  national  ID  cards  with  a  lower  security  level  are  the  most 
frequently detected false documents. 

In the context of the right to consular protection enjoyed by EU citizens whose Member States 
do  not  have  diplomatic  or  consular  representation  in  a  third  country,  another  Member  State 
might need to issue Emergency Travel Documents to such citizens. A Decision from 199619 
established a common format for such Emergency Travel Documents to enable the citizens  to 
travel  home.  Issuing  Emergency  Travel  Documents  constitutes  the  most  frequent  type  of 
consular assistance. After 20 years, this Decision is outdated20. Some Member States do not 
use  the  Emergency  Travel  Document  due  to  the  fact  that  it  is  considered  unsecure  against 
document fraud. In the context of this revision, the Commission will explore possibilities also 
to modernise security features of Emergency Travel Documents. 

3.2.   Enrolment of biometrics  

EU-level  guidelines  have  been  adopted  for  authorities  enrolling  biometric  identifiers  in 
passports and residence permits for third country nationals21. This is a very important task, as 
most non-matches at border control are caused by the faulty enrolment of data at the time of 
issue. Biometric quality is the most important parameter affecting the accuracy of automatic 
biometric  systems.  Biometric  vulnerabilities  such  as  ‘face-morphing’  and  ‘fingerprint 
spoofing’22 should also be addressed. 

The European Parliament and the Council should: 

Specific actions 

-  adopt as soon as possible the proposals on a more secure uniform format for visas 

and residence permits for  third country nationals to avoid further fraud. 

The Commission will: 

- 

in the first quarter of 2017, finalise the study on EU policy options to improve the 
security  of  EU  citizens’  ID  cards  and  the  residence  documents  of  EU  citizens 
residing in another Member State and of their non-EU family members in order to 
limit  the  risk  of  fraud  and  forgery.  The  Commission  will  evaluate  the  next  steps, 
options and their impacts, in  view of a possible legislative initiative  by the end of 
2017. 

-  examine whether there is a need to amend Regulation (EC) No 1931/2006 to ensure 
that the conditions for issuing local border traffic permits, and the security features 
of the permits, guarantee appropriate security risk assessments while not prejudicing 
in  any  way the  benefits  of  the  Regulation  and  the  Schengen  Borders  Code  for  the 

19   Decision of the representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council of 25.06.1996; OJ 

L168 of 6.7.1996. 

20   Also due to the entry into force of Directive 2015/637/EU on the coordination and cooperation measures to 

facilitate consular protection for unrepresented citizens of the Union in third countries. 

21   Commission Decision C(2011) 5499 of 4 August 2011. 
22   Face-morphing:  blending  two  facial  images  into  one  with  the  assistance  of  digital  programmes; 

fingerprint-spoofing: use of fake fingerprints by copying fingerprints onto rubber. 

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permit holders. 

-  develop further guidance/training for the correct enrolment of biometric identifiers, 
in  particular  to  address  biometric  data  quality  and  vulnerabilities  from  the  third 
quarter of 2017 and 

-  monitor the conformity of security features of travel documents issued by Member 

States against EU technical specifications. 

4.   Document control  

The Schengen Borders Code23 sets out procedures for checks on EU and non-EU nationals at 
the  external  borders.  Border  guards  have  to  perform  these  checks  quickly  and  rely  on 
technologies/databases, training and guidance tools to enable them to verify travel documents. 

4.1   Electronic checks on non-EU nationals’ travel documents 

The  electronic  verification  of  the  authenticity  of  non-EU  nationals’  travel  documents  is  an 
essential component of the future Entry/Exit System;24 it contributes to security, as it helps to 
detect and combat identity fraud and the misuse of travel documents. In addition, the system 
will  combat  identity  fraud  by  managing  non-EU  nationals’  biometric  identity,  in  much  the 
same way as the Visa Information System does for visa-holders. The two systems are closely 
interconnected for these purposes. 

Obtaining  certificates  from  non-EU  countries  (country  signing  certification  authorities)  to 
authenticate the travel document is a time-consuming and sensitive process, but it is necessary 
to  make  sure  that  the  chain  of  trust  from  the  ‘producer’  of  the  certificate  to  the  ‘consumer’ 
(user) is unbroken. The Commission started a pilot project in 2015 to explore how to collect 
non-EU country certificates, validate their trust level and subsequently share them in the form 
of a ‘masterlist’ complying with an International Civil Aviation Organisation specification.25 
As of 2017, this ‘masterlist’ could simplify and further promote the electronic authentication 
of non-EU country travel documents for all Member States. 

4.2   Database checks 

Document holders should immediately report the loss or theft of their documents. If Member 
States  enter  the  information  promptly  in  the  Schengen  Information  System  (SIS)  and 
Interpol’s  stolen  and  lost  travel  document  database,  as  they  are  legally  required  to  do,  it 
greatly  reduces  the  chances  of  identity  fraud.  As  of  24  November  2016,  there  were  over 
52 million SIS alerts on issued documents and 1 million for blank documents. In 2015, there 
were around 18 500 hits for issued documents.  

Member States should also pass on to Interpol data on lost, stolen or misappropriated travel 
documents  issued  by  non-EU  countries  so  that  it  can  enter  the  data  into  the  stolen  and  lost 

23   Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code 
on  the  rules  governing  the  movement  of  persons  across  borders  (Schengen  Borders  Code)  (OJ  L  77, 
23.3.2016, p. 1). 

24   COM(2016) 194 final, 6.4.2016. 
25   A masterlist combines the certificates of different country signing certification authorities and is published by 
one  country  which  has  verified  the  certificates  and  signed  the  list.  The  procedure  is  set  out  in  ICAO 
document 9303. 

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travel  document  database  where  possible.  This  is  particularly  important  in  relation  to 
fraudulently  obtained  Syrian  travel  documents,  for  example.  The  stolen  and  lost  travel 
document database contains over 68 million records, which were searched over 1 243 billion 
times between January and September 2016, resulting in over 115 000 hits. 

The proposed amendment of the Schengen Borders Code26 would make it obligatory to verify 
all travel documents, regardless of the holder’s nationality, against the SIS and the stolen and 
lost  travel  document  database.  This  would  make  it  easier  to  identify  lost,  stolen, 
misappropriated or invalidated documents and to seize them or preserve them as evidence. In 
addition,  the  proposed  European  travel  information  and  authorisation  system  (ETIAS)27 
should make it possible to check visa-exempt non-EU nationals’ travel documents against the 
SIS  and  the  stolen  and  lost  travel  document  database  prior  to  their  arrival  at  the  external 
borders.  The  High-Level  Expert  Group  on  Information  Systems  and  Interoperability28  is 
looking at how interoperability could contribute to improved document and identity checks.  

4.3   Training 

Member States, competent EU agencies and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe  (among  others)  have  developed  training  for  border  guards  on  the  detection  of 
document fraud. This needs constant updating, notably to focus on new forms of fraud, such 
as look-alike fraud, and to address all those involved in verifying documents, such as carriers, 
consular staff and local administrations.  

The  Carriers  Liability  Directive  provides  for  financial  penalties  for  carriers  who  transport 
non-EU nationals lacking the necessary documents for entry to the EU. Further consideration 
should be given to including suitable provisions on training for carriers in order to improve 
the detection of document fraud.  

4.4   Tools 

Available  tools  to  help  police  officers,  border  guards  and  others  to  detect  document  fraud 
include  the  false  and  authentic  documents  online  database  (FADO),  which  is  a  European 
image database with standardised descriptions, in the 24 official EU languages, of document 
security  features  and  falsification  techniques  and  several  link  option  functions  providing 
direct  access  to  other  document-related  databases,  as  well  as  national  and  commercial 
applications. 

FADO was set up in cooperation between Member States and should be brought within an EU 
legal  framework.  At  present,  Member  States  are  under  no  legal  obligation  to  upload 
documents  (whether  their  own  authentic  ones  or  falsified  ones  they  have  detected)  and  this 
results in wide variation in the extent of contributions as regards both their own and non-EU 
country documents. In addition, actual use of the database is still limited. An analysis should 
be carried out on the added value of the system and on whether improvements are necessary. 

26   The proposal for an amendment to the Schengen Borders Code (COM(2015) 670 final, 15.12.2015) will be 

formally adopted in the first quarter of 2017. 

27   Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  establishing  a  European  Travel 
Information  and  Authorisation  System  (ETIAS)  and  amending  Regulations  (EU)  No  515/2014, 
(EU) 2016/399, (EU) 2016/794 and (EU) 2016/1624 (COM(2016) 731 final). 

28   This  was  established  following  the  Commission  Communication  on  Stronger  and  smarter  information 

systems for borders and security (COM(2016) 205 final, 6.4.2016). 

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Apart from the police and border authorities, civil and private entities29 that need to perform 
identity  checks  for  various  reasons  also  rely  on  the  use  of  genuine  travel  and  identity 
documents.  The  ‘non-document-expert’  community  should  also  be  able  to  rely  on  simple 
authentication  mechanisms  that  do  not  require  expert  knowledge  or  specialised  equipment. 
Non-experts and the general public have access to a subsystem of FADO which provides less 
detailed information. Means should be explored of giving them wider access to lost or stolen 
document  alerts,  databases  on  genuine  documents  and  recent  alert  information  on  fraud 
trends. 

4.5   Biometrics in travel documents 

Biometric identifiers are an important tool for detecting fraud. Border control officials can use 
them to establish identity, in particular by comparing the data on the chip with those on the 
document.  

In  order  to  check  the  electronic  components  of  e-passports  and  e-residence  permits,  the 
authorities  need  the  Member  State  that  has  issued  the  document  to  provide  them  with  the 
requisite certificates so that they can access the fingerprints stored on the chip. The systematic 
electronic checking of the chip data would lead to the detection of the most common cases of 
document  fraud,  such  as  manipulations  of  the  photo  of  the  holder.  Unfortunately,  not  all 
Member States exchange their certificates. 

The  SIS’s  potential  to  tackle  document  fraud  will  grow  with  the  implementation  of  a 
‘fingerprint search’ functionality. The first elements (the data-quality control mechanism) will 
be ready by mid-2017 and the work at central level will be completed in the fourth quarter of 
2017.  The  functionality  will  enable  the  successful  identification  (via  their  fingerprints)  of 
persons sought by the authorities. The automated fingerprint identification system (AFIS) will 
perform identity checks and contribute significantly to the detection of document and identity 
fraud. Member States will be phasing it in from the start of 2018. 

Stolen,  misappropriated,  lost  or  invalidated  passports,  identity  cards,  driving  licences, 
residence permits and travel documents can already be entered in SIS, but the Commission is 
envisaging  proposing  (as  part  of  the  revision  of  the  system’s  legal  basis)  that  falsified 
documents  should  also  be  entered.  This  will  enable  a  more  comprehensive  approach  to  the 
detection and seizure of such documents. 

29   e.g. postal services, banks, notaries, travel agencies, car rental firms, money transfer agencies. 

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Member States should: 

Specific actions 

- 

- 

systematically register all stolen, lost, misappropriated or invalidated documents in 
the  SIS  and  the  stolen  and  lost  travel  document  database  to  ensure  that  they  are 
seized and/or preserved as evidence for criminal proceedings if presented again by 
the holder, thus effectively taking them out of circulation; 

systematically feed Interpol databases with data on lost, stolen, misappropriated or 
invalidated travel documents issued by non-EU countries, where those countries do 
not do so themselves. 

-  ensure that border guards have better access to the relevant information systems; 
- 

improve data collection and information exchange on document fraud, especially on 
look-alikes, fraudulently obtained genuine documents and identity fraud; and 

-  accelerate the implementation of the fingerprint search functionality in the SIS. 

The Commission will: 

-  propose that the legal basis of the SIS be revised so that Member States can enter 

falsified travel documents in the system in December 2016;  

-  discuss  with  Member  States  how  to  improve  the  use  of  the  false  and  authentic 
documents  online  database  (FADO),  including  examining  options  for  its  future 
development, synergies and added value starting in the first quarter of 2017; 

-  provide  for  a  regularly  updated  list  of  certificates  needed  for  the  electronic 

authentication of travel documents during the third quarter of 2017; 

-  work  together  with  the  competent  EU  agencies  to  boost  training  activities  in  new 

areas of document fraud; 

-  explore  the  feasibility  of  including  training  requirements  in  the  Carriers  Liability 

Directive; 

-  examine how to improve the availability of information on new and false documents 

to the ‘non-document-expert’ community during the fourth quarter of 2017;  

-  continue to monitor the implementation of EU law on the use of biometric applications 
for document security and the exchange of certificates among Member States; and  
implement  a  ‘fingerprint  search’  functionality  at  central  level  in  SIS  in  the  fourth 
quarter of 2017.  

- 

III. 

FOLLOW-UP 

The  Commission  calls  on  Member  States  to  take  all  necessary  steps  to  ensure  the  swift 
implementation of this action plan. It will report to the European Parliament and the Council by 
the end of the first quarter of 2018 on the progress achieved. 

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