The coverage rate of income support measures in the EU : measurement and challenges.
Date: 2016-11-28
Institutions: Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion
Subjects: labour market, minimum pay, social security, social-security benefit, subsistence level income, unemployment insurance, working population

ISSN: 1977-4125

The coverage rate of income  
support measures in the EU:  
measurement and challenges 

Working Paper 2/2016 

Isabelle Maquet, Virginia Maestri  
and Céline Thévenot 

Social 
Europe 

The coverage rate of income 
support measures in the EU: 
measurement and challenges 

European Commission 
Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 

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Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014 

ISBN 978-92-79-62625-8 
doi:10.2767/098751

© European Union, 2016 

Table of content 

Summay / abstract .................................................................................................................................. 2 

1 

2 

Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 3 
1.1  Focus on cash benefits for the working age ................................................................................ 3 
1.2  Focus on coverage ....................................................................................................................... 4 

A brief overview of income support schemes across Europe ......................................................... 7 
2.1  The main types of income support schemes ............................................................................... 7 
2.2  Different approaches to the measurement of coverage rates ................................................... 9 
2.3  The design of unemployment schemes and factors that impact on coverage ......................... 10 

3  Measurement of effective UB coverage rates .............................................................................. 15 
3.1  Proposal of effective coverage measurement based on existing tools .................................... 15 
3.2  Comparisons of existing tools ................................................................................................... 16 
3.3  Summary of coverage estimated with SILC and LFS .................................................................. 22 

4  Unemployment benefits coverage rates (based on LFS) .............................................................. 26 
4.1  Trends over time ....................................................................................................................... 26 
4.2  Coverage rate by duration of unemployment ........................................................................... 27 
4.3  Widely available unemployment benefits schemes do not discourage transitions to 
employment ...................................................................................................................................... 34 

5  Non-coverage of social benefits .................................................................................................... 36 
5.1  Definition of the target population ........................................................................................... 36 
5.2  Selection of benefits - An approach based on the whole set of benefits ................................. 38 
5.3  The definition of non-coverage ................................................................................................. 40 
Income sources of non-covered households ............................................................................ 41 
5.4 
5.5  Results ....................................................................................................................................... 42 
5.6  Lack of income support and households relying on pensions .................................................. 44 
5.7  Countries with the lowest levels of persistent poverty are those where the non-coverage of 
jobless and poor households is low .................................................................................................. 45 

6 

7 

8 

Final remarks ................................................................................................................................. 46 

References ..................................................................................................................................... 47 

Annex ............................................................................................................................................. 48 
8.1  Full extracts of Staff working Documents, EU2020 2014 .......................................................... 48 
8.2  Calculation of the coverage rate of unemployment benefits based on LFS data ..................... 51 
8.3  STATA code to compute the non coverage of social benefits. .................................................. 54 
8.4  Extracts from EU SILC SURVEY DESCRIPTION OF TARGET VARIABLE (DOC 065, Eurostat) ....... 58 

1 

Summay / abstract  

Coverage, or the capacity to reach persons in need, is an important element of the effectiveness of 
social  protection  schemes.  This  paper  deals  with  the  measurement  of  coverage  rates  for  income 
support  schemes  aimed  at  replacing  the  lack  of  primary  income  for  the  working  age  population, 
focusing on unemployment benefits and minimum income support.  

While a number indicators based on models or survey data are available to evaluate the  adequacy 
and incentive structure of cash benefits (such as risk of poverty of unemployed, replacement rates, 
net  income  of  benefit  recipients,  marginal  effective  tax  rates)  the  data  to  assess  the  coverage  of 
benefits is scarce and there is no consensus on how to measure it. This paper aims at clarifying the 
concepts  and  discusses  the  data  sources  and  options  for  the  measurement  of  coverage  of 
unemployment  benefits  and  "non-coverage"  of  minimum  income  support  ;  their  potential  use  is 
illustrated with examples of analysis. 

A review of the methodological challenges of measuring Unemployment Benefit coverage with the 
available data sources (administrative and survey based) at EU level indicates that indicators based 
on the Labour Force Survey provide the most comparable and timely estimates. 

Analysis  shows  that  the  coverage  of  unemployment  benefits  varies  across  Member  States  and 
population groups (age, educational level, gender). Low coverage results from a variety of reasons, 
linked  to  the  design  of  the  benefits,  the  structure  of  the  unemployed  population  and  the 
characteristics of the labour market. Prevailing reasons vary across countries. 

The paper also explores the issue of non-coverage of social benefits in working age, using SILC data 
as they include data on all benefits. The three main aspects to be decided are the definition of the 
target  population,  the  definition  of  coverage  and  the  selection  of  benefits.  After  performing  some 
sensitivity analyses, the proposed option focuses on the jobless poor as reference population, 10% as 
cut-off and all benefits received by working age persons excluding family/child benefits.  

The  results  show  that  non-coverage  of  people  in  need  of  last  resort  support  increased  during  the 
crisis and  that it is a considerable issue in countries such as Greece, Italy, Bulgaria and Romania. It 
also  shows  that  in  some  countries,  family  and  child  benefits  de  facto  play  the  role  of  last  resort 
schemes, as a significant share of jobless poor households rely primarily on such benefits, which are 
not linked to activation. 

2 

 
 
 
 
1 

Introduction  

Social protection smoothes and redistributes incomes over the life-cycle, insures people against the 
financial implications of social risks, such as ill health, old age or job loss, and contributes to prevent 
and  alleviate  poverty.  Support  is  provided  in  cash  to  replace  or  supplement  work  income 
(unemployment benefits, pensions, child benefits) or in kind through the provision of services such as 
health  care,  child  care,  training  or  job  search  assistance.  Beyond  income  smoothing,  well  designed 
social  protection  systems  also  aim  to  facilitate  participation  to  the  labour  market,  by  avoiding 
financial disincentives to work while providing enabling services such as child care. Social protection 
systems also contribute to the development of human capital and to a better allocation of the labour 
force by allowing workers to participate in education and training and devote time to search for a job 
matching their skills. 

Beyond  the  protection  of  individuals,  social  protection  plays  a  stabilising  role  for  the  economy 
(maintaining  incomes  in  case  of  unemployment  shocks)  and  an  investment  role  by  enhancing  the 
quality  and  allocation  of  human  capital.  For  all  three  functions  of  protection,  stabilisation  and 
investment, the performance of systems will depend to various degrees on  

- the adequacy of benefits (replacement rates),  

- the capacity of the system to reach all individuals in need of support (coverage), 

-  the  (dis)incentives  built  into  the  systems  that  may  facilitate/discourage  labour  market 
participation (unemployment or inactivity traps, conditionality), 

-  the  effectiveness  of  individual  programs,  including  the  quality  of  services  and  their 
interaction with other types of intervention.  

This  paper  focuses  on  the  measurement  of  coverage  rates  for  income  support  benefits  primarily 
aimed at replacing the lack of primary income for the working age population.  

1.1  Focus on cash benefits for the working age 

The function of income support measures is  

i)  to  replace  (or  supplement)  income  of  individuals  that  have  insufficient  or  no  access  to 
employment income temporarily (unemployment, illness, long-term exclusion)  

ii)  to  replace  (or  supplement)  income  of  individuals  that  have  insufficient  or  no  access  to 
employment permanently (old age, disability1). 

1 Disability is not always considered as a "permanent" status and may be reassessed over time. In addition, 
disability benefits usually contain an income replacement component aimed at providing income support to 
those who cannot work, and a "supplementary" income component aimed at compensating the specific costs 
related to disability, which is paid regardless of the employment status. 

3 

 
 
                                                            
1. 

iii) to supplement income to respond to specific needs, such as those linked to the presence of 
children  in  the  household  (family  benefits),  or  to  the  lack  of  access  to  affordable  housing 
(housing), or disability. 

In  this  paper,  we  focus  on  the  benefits  of  the  first  category,  namely  unemployment  and  social 
assistance benefits, that have as a primary aim to replace income while people are temporarily out 
of  work,  and  for  which  a  policy  objective  is  also  to  maintain  (or  establish)  a  link  to  the  labour 
market.  

The  specific  case  of  disability  benefits  and  of  "working  age"  pensions  will  be  discussed  along  the 
paper as they have an income replacement function that can interfere when we try to measure the 
coverage  rate  of  unemployment  benefits  (UB)  and  social  assistance  benefits  (SA),  but  they  are  not 
the focus of this paper as their primary aim is not to temporarily maintain employment incomes. 

We focus on unemployment and social assistance benefits for several reasons. At the individual level, 
the lack of replacement income during unemployment spells can translate into an increased risk of 
poverty,  with  a  potential  loss  of  human  capital  and  adverse  long-term  impacts,  for  example  on 
children.  They  also  play  a  key  role  in  stabilizing  the  economy,  by  evening  out  fluctuations  in 
household income. Income support may also improve the efficiency of the labour markets and the 
economy. It can improve skills matching in the labour market, as in the absence of benefits, people 
may accept jobs which do not match their skills (reservation wage) or rely on the informal economy 
(with adverse feedback on public finances and the access to social protection, such as pension and 
health). Moreover, well-designed income support schemes can enhance individuals' participation in 
training and job search through activation measures and support from public employment services.  

1.2  Focus on coverage 

A number of tools and indicators are available to evaluate the adequacy and incentive structure of 
cash  benefits  (risk  of  poverty of  unemployed,  replacement  rates,  net  income  of  benefit recipients, 
marginal  effective  tax  rates,  etc).  They  are  based  on  survey  data  (SILC)  and  models  (Euromod, 
EC/OECD tax and benefit model).  

However,  data  to  assess  the  coverage  of  benefits  is  scarce  and  there  is  no  consensus  on  the  best 
indicator and source to measure it. For instance,  Table 1 below illustrates that available sources of 
data  (LFS,  SILC,  administrative  data)  provide  quite  different  estimates  of  the  share  of  unemployed 
receiving benefits and indicate large country variations. It is thus important to review the concepts 
used and the data sources available, and to identify robust indicators that can be used to assess the 
coverage  of  benefits,  as  it  is  an  important  dimension  of  their  effectiveness,  besides  adequacy  and 
incentive structures. 

4 

 
 
Table 1: Unemployment benefit peudo-coverage rates, 2012 

SILC 

LFS 

Administrative 
data  
(all schemes) 
56 
144 
29 
265 
15 
27 
32 
83 
13 
57 
2 
90 
37 
44 
66 
20 
8 
11 
40 
28 
29 
37 
18 
20 
43 
25 
63 

Administrative 
data  
(excl. assistance) 
69 
144 
29 
37 
45 
24 
32 
69 
82 
57 
12 
24 
37 
44 
66 
20 
35 
11 
40 
28 
29 
37 
18 
20 
9 
25 
42 

AT 
BE 
CZ 
DE 
DK 
ES 
EE 
FI 
FR 
UK 
HU 
IE 
IT 
LU 
NL 
PL 
PT 
SK 
SI 
SE 
BG 
CY 
LT 
LV 
MT 
RO 
EUR18 
Source: EC/OECD database on benefit recipients (http://www.oecd.org/social/soc/recipients.htm ), SILC and 
LFS. (*) The administrative data is presented both including and excluding unemployment assistance schemes, 
which play an important role in some countries, e.g. Germany). See section3.2 for more detail on sources. 

84 
n.a. 
31 
90 
89 
44 
19 
77 
71 
40 
55 
n.a. 
33 
44 
42 
18 
32 
20 
29 
24 
16 
32 
38 
22 
42 
2 
n.a. 

54 
62 
22 
85 
52 
38 
16 
61 
41 
40 
33 
n.a. 
7 
30 
n.a. 
10 
33 
8 
26 
23 
9 
18 
20 
10 
26 
14 
n.a. 

Improving  information  on  coverage  rates  can  strengthen  the  monitoring  of  social  policy.  Table  2 
illustrates the importance of looking jointly at adequacy and coverage indicators when assessing the 
effectiveness of benefits. It reveals that, while some benefits offer relatively high replacement rates, 
they reach only a small share of the unemployed. For instance, the data suggests that low coverage 
rates partly explain why the risk of poverty of the unemployed is high in BG and IT, despite quite high 
replacement  rates.  Such  data,  together  with  more  detailed  information  on  the  characteristics  and 
performance  of  the  systems,  have  been  used  recently  by  the  Commission  to  underpin  "Country 
Specific  Recommendations"  to  improve  the  coverage  of  the  main  working  age  benefits  in  a  few 
Member States where it appeared especially low (see examples of CSRs and extracts of staff working 
documents in Annex).   

5 

 
 
Table  2  -  Adequacy,  coverage of  unemployment  benefits  and  poverty among  the  unemployed  in  the  EU 
(2013-14) 

Source: NRR: EC/OECD tax benefit model. Coverage rates: LFS; Risk of poverty: EU-SILC 

This  paper  aims  at  clarifying  the  concepts  and  discusses  the  data  sources  and  options  for  the 
measurement  of  coverage  and  "non-coverage".  It  discusses  ways  to  measure  the  coverage  of 
unemployment  benefits  as  well  as  the  non-coverage  of  working  age  benefits.  The  potential  use  of 
these indicators is illustrated with examples of analysis. 

Section  2  describes  the  main  characteristics  of  unemployment  benefits  and  the  availability  of  last 
resort schemes in EU Member States, with a focus on the features that are most likely to impact on 
coverage. This section presents the theoretical coverage of unemployment benefits for typical cases 
(e.g.  young  with  a  short  working  history  and  older  workers),  based  on  the  eligibility  criteria  and 
duration of unemployment benefits in each Member State. The discussion helps identifying potential 
6 

NRR of UB - after 6 monthsCoverage rate of the STUCoverage rate of the LTUUnemployed at-risk-of poverty2013201420142013BE83,059,169,846,2BG77,023,61,347,6CZ:37,90,444,5DK83,054,357,336,3DE59,083,786,769,3EE45,037,6:54,8IE51,0::34,1EL39,027,04,146,3ES56,038,827,344,7FR69,054,243,735,7HR47,025,04,543,2IT64,016,12,046,8CY:19,6:33,6LV42,029,5:55,9LT:31,520,461,0LU83,038,521,353,0HU:35,625,250,6MT47,019,643,649,6NL72,0::34,2AT55,060,561,745,8PL39,014,91,843,7PT68,037,629,840,3RO48,09,510,051,1SI65,025,49,846,2SK:17,81,543,8FI59,068,989,537,5SE64,028,318,342,4UK20,019,031,143,9EU2849,437,123,846,4 
 
weakness  of  Member  States  in  terms  of  coverage  (strong  requirement,  short  duration  of  benefits, 
labour market problems). Section 3 reviews and discusses existing data sources and the way they can 
be adapted to proxy effective coverage rates of unemployment benefits. It provides an overview of 
the pros and the cons of using each data source and discusses resulting definitions of coverage rates 
and necessary hypotheses. Attempts to combine the data sources are also considered and discussed. 
Section  4  provides  a  similar  approach  to  describe  gaps  in  income  support  for  those  out  of  work, 
body-able of working age (non-coverage of social benefits). The last section illustrates some of the 
possible uses of the indicators presented in this paper.  

2 

 A brief overview of income support schemes across Europe 

2.1  The main types of income support schemes 

Workers who lose their job or are looking for a job may have access to three main types of schemes, 
depending on the country:  

1 

2 

3 

unemployment insurance/allowance,  

unemployment assistance, 

social assistance.  

Table 3 summarizes the availability of the three tiers of income support in EU Member States.  The 
first  tier  intervention  in  case  of  job  loss  is  represented  by  unemployment  benefits,  which  are 
available under various forms in all Member States. The second tier of intervention (unemployment 
assistance) is targeted at the unemployed and is generally means-tested ; it is available in less than 
half of the countries. Almost all countries have social assistance schemes. The few countries which 
lack  social  assistance  schemes  (Greece  and  Italy),  introduced  pilot  projects  during  the  crisis  which 
may  still  be  weak  compared  to  other  countries.  In  Italy,  for  instance,  the  pilot  is  limited  to 
households with children with recent employment spells. 

7 

 
 
Table 3 - Availability of income support schemes 

Source: MISSOC extraction at 1/7/14. 

Access  to  each  of  the  three  schemes  is  based  on  different  eligibility  criteria,  with  social  assistance 
targeting  a  broader  pool  of  people  (generally  based  on  citizenship  and  means-testing)  than 
unemployment  benefits,  which  are  reserved  to  people  with  eligible  work  histories.  The  eligibility 
criteria are also reflected in the contributory nature of benefits: 

a)  First tier: Unemployment insurance is based on the payment of social security contributions 
on a compulsory or voluntary base, as in Denmark. In FI and SE, there is a voluntary scheme 
to top up a compulsory flat-rate allowance.  While unemployment insurance benefits 
generally depend on previous earnings, in countries such as the UK, MT and IE 
unemployment allowance is flat-rate (it may vary according to other circumstances such as 
age and marital status). It is traditionally restricted to employees, but an increasing number 
of countries are extending it to self-employed. 

b)  Second tier: Unemployment assistance is usually based upon citizenship, means-tested and 

increasingly linked to activation measures. 

c)  Third  tier:  Social  assistance  benefits  can  be  viewed  as  last  resort  schemes  for  unemployed 
who  lost  their  entitlement  to  unemployment  benefits,  although  past  employment  is  not 
necessary and are generally available to a larger segment of the population.  

8 

1st tier2nd tierlast tiertypemeans-testinsurance typemeans-testname translationconditionsdurationAustriainsurancecompulsoryXXNeeds-oriented guaranteed minimum resourcesresidencyunlimitedBelgiuminsurancecompulsoryRight to social integrationnationalityunlimitedBulgariainsurancecompulsorySocial Assistance…unlimitedCroatiainsurancecompulsorySocial AssistanceunlimitedCyprusinsurancecompulsorySocial Welfare ServicesunlimitedCzech RepublicinsurancecompulsoryAllowance for LivingunlimitedDenmarkinsurance+basic allowancevoluntarcompulsorySocial AssistanceunlimitedEstoniainsurancecompulsoryXXSubsistance benefitunlimitedFinlandinsurance+basic allowanceoptional+compulsorcompulsoryXXSocial AssistanceunlimitedFranceinsurancecompulsoryXXActive solidarity incomeresidency3 months, renewable?GermanyinsurancecompulsoryXXAssistance towards living expensesunlimitedGreeceinsurancecompulsoryNo scheme, but pilot programme-HungaryinsurancecompulsoryBenefit for persons of active age + old-age allowanceunlimitedIrelandinsurancecompulsoryXXSupplementary Welfare AllowanceunlimitedItalyinsurancecompulsorysocial allowance + pilot for familiesage>65variesLatviainsurancecompulsoryguaranteed minimum incomeunlimitedLithuaniainsurancecompulsorySocial AssistanceunlimitedLuxembourgallowancenon-contributorcompulsoryGuaranteed minimum income unlimitedMaltainsurancecompulsoryXXSocial SecurityunlimitedPolandinsurancecompulsorySocial AssistanceunlimitedPortugalinsurancecompulsoryXXSocial integration income unlimitedRomaniainsurancecompulsoryGuaranteed Minimum IncomeunlimitedSlovakiainsurancecompulsoryAssistance in material needunlimitedSloveniainsurancecompulsoryFinancial Social AssistanceunlimitedSpaininsurancecompulsoryXXno general, various specific (e.g. Unemployment assistance, invalidity pension etc.)unlimitedSwedeninsurancevoluntarcompulsory+allowanceSocial AssistanceunlimitedThe NetherlandsinsurancecompulsorySocial AssistanceunlimitedUnited KingdomallowanceXcompulsoryXXIncome Supportunlimited 
 
 
2.2  Different approaches to the measurement of coverage rates  

Coverage can be measured in terms of A) potential or B) effective beneficiaries.  

A)  According  to  a  first  approach,  coverage  can  be  assessed  as  the  share  of  the  population  or  the 
labour  force  potentially  covered  (but  not  yet  unemployed)  based  on  existing  formal  rules  (legal  or 
protective  approach).  This  approach  is  useful  for  a  first  round  assessment  of  the  availability  of 
income support for working age individuals in case of job loss. Nevertheless, the legal or protective 
approach  has  some  drawbacks.  First,  the  composition  of  the  employed  population  varies 
considerably  across  countries,  with  various  shares  of  employees,  self-employed  and  precarious 
workers who may benefit from different degrees of income support2. Second, it does not reflect the 
fact that all employed persons do not face the same risk to be unemployed. It is often those with the 
weakest  protection  who  are  also  facing  greater  risk  of  unemployment  (precarious  workers).  Third, 
the  duration  of  benefits  is  not  taken  into  account.  This  is  especially  an  issue  for  the  long-term 
unemployed.  Fourth,  it  does  not  inform  on  the  number  of  people  entitled.  Figure  1  and  Figure  2 
below present some data based on this approach.  

Figure 1 - Coverage rates of UB based on the potential approach - I 

Source: ILO 

2 To cope with this issue, protective coverage rates can be computed on the basis of a labour force adjusted 
principle (see Esser et al. 2013). 

9 

 
 
                                                            
Figure 2 -Coverage rates of UB base on the potential approach (2010) – II  

Source: Esser et al. (2013), Social Policy Indicator Database (SPIN). 

Note: This indicates the proportion of the labour force that is covered under an unemployment insurance that 
would entitle them to a future insurance benefit should they become unemployed. It is enough to be covered 
by a basic benefit to be included as long as the basic benefit is paid without means- or income-testing. A caveat 
of  this  approach  is  that  it  might  include  double  counting,  and  doesn't  allow  to  check  whether people  would 
actually be eligible to a benefit. 

B)  The  second  approach  measures  the  proportion  of  people  actually  receiving  benefits  among  a 
defined  relevant  population  (ILO-unemployed,  for  example,  for  UB  coverage).  This  measure  goes 
beyond potential legal entitlements and is a picture of the actual coverage of a certain population at 
a  given  point  in  time.  Compared  to  the  other  approach,  the  effective  approach  reflects  also  the 
duration  of  benefits,  the  previous  working  history  and  possible  non-take-up  of  benefits  of  the 
defined  target  population.  This  approach  is  particularly  relevant  as  the  stabilization  function  of 
benefits  and  their  effect  on  incomes  and  poverty  depend  on  effective  and  not  on  theoretical 
coverage.  

This  paper  focuses  on  the  measurement  of  coverage  following  the  effective  approach.  However, 
effective coverage is sensitive to the choice of the relevant population (in the measure used in this 
paper, for instance, we exclude from coverage working people who may be receiving benefits). 

2.3  The design of unemployment schemes and factors that impact on coverage 

The effective coverage of unemployment benefits (which includes insurance and assistance) depends 
on: 

1  The strictness of the eligibility rules (or qualifying conditions), 

2  The duration of UB (minimum and maximum) and availability of second resort schemes, 

3  The  labour  market  situation  and  corresponding  regulations  in  UB  schemes  (share  of  self-

employment, pattern of working histories, type of work contracts), 

10 

 
 
 
 
4  The non-take-up rate,  

5  Other factors. 

Table  4  summarises  the  main  characteristics  of  unemployment  benefits  in  EU  Member  States  in 
terms  of  eligibility  and  duration  of  UB  and  Table  3  summarizes  the  availability  of  second  resort 
schemes. 

1  The  eligibility  for  unemployment  benefits  generally  depends  on  previous  periods  of 
contributions in a given reference period, which vary considerably among Member States. In 
terms of eligibility, Slovakia has the most stringent regulation with a requirement of having 
worked  at  least  2.2  years  (in  the  last  3.3  years),  while  Greece  has  formally  the  most 
accessible unemployment benefits requiring a bit more than 4 months of past employment 
in the last 15 months. Table 4 (OECD) reports a broader set of characteristics of UB and their 
strictness,  with  Portugal,  Slovakia  and  Romania  having  the  most  stringent  system  and 
Austria,  Cyprus  and  Finland  having  the  most  relaxed.  While  in  Finland  and  Slovakia  the 
strictness of UB is consistent with their coverage rate (respectively, very high and very low), 
it  is  not  necessarily  the  case  for  other  countries.  For  instance,  Portugal  has  the  strictest 
system  but  a  coverage  rate  almost  double  than  Cyprus,  which  has  one  of  the  least  strict 
system of UB. 

2 

In terms of basic entitlements (minimum duration of unemployment benefits), Denmark has 
the  most  generous  duration  of  unemployment  benefits  (2  years),  with  the  exception  of 
Belgium  where  the  duration  of  UB  was  unlimited  in  2014,  while  Slovenia  has  the  shortest 
(only  2  months).  The  duration  of  unemployment  benefits  generally  depends  on  previous 
working history and, in a smaller number of countries, on age and other factors. Therefore, a 
more realistic indication of the duration of unemployment benefits, which affects coverage, 
can be estimated for typical workers. This allows comparing the entitlement and duration of 
unemployment  benefits  for  similar  workers  across  countries.  We  consider  two  cases:  a  24 
year-old with a previous working experience of 11 months and a 40 year-old with a previous 
working  experience  of  17  years.  Table  4  shows  that  the  24  year-old  is  not  entitled  to 
unemployment  benefits  in  most  Member  States,  due  to  his  short  working  history  in 
comparison  to  the  eligibility  requirements.  Finland  (in  principle)  provides  the  longest 
unemployment benefits for young people with short working histories. The 40 year-old with 
a  longer  work  record  is  covered  in  most  Member  States,  although  the  duration  of  the 
unemployment  benefits  varies  widely,  with  the  longest  duration  available  in  Belgium 
(unlimited) and in the Netherlands. Figure 3 shows the gap between the maximum duration 
of  unemployment  benefits  and  the  effective  duration  for  these two  cases  (young  and  old). 
While the duration of UB in some MSs can be low, in some of these, unemployed may access 
unemployment assistance which prolong de facto the duration of unemployment insurance. 
While Finland combines an equal treatment of young and older people with a high coverage 
rate of unemployment benefits (see Table 4), in other Member States (e.g. Cyprus) this equal 
treatment does not help in explaining the low coverage rate. 

3  The eligibility criteria and duration of UB are not necessarily sufficient to identify which MS 
have  potentially  the  highest  coverage  rates  as  it  also  depends  on  some  labour  market 

11 

 
characteristics and how these interplay with the legal framework of Unemployment Benefits. 
For  instance,  high  shares  of  self-employment  affects  the  coverage  on  unemployment 
benefits  and  the  ability  of  social  protection  to  reduce  poverty,  as  generally  self-employed 
have weaker entitlements to benefits than employees, in particular for UB. Table  6 reports 
the  share  of  self-employment  in  each  MS  and  whether  and  at  which  conditions  UB  are 
accessible also to self-employed. In some countries where the share of self-employed is high 
they are not covered by UB (RO, BG, IT), while in others where it is already low they are also 
covered (e.g. SE). The types of jobs, and especially the extent of temporary employment may 
affect  the  average  tenure  in  the  job  of  some  categories  of  workers  and  their  capacity  to 
accumulate  the  necessary  work  history  to  be  eligible  for  benefits.  The  social  security 
coverage of temporary workers is lower than for permanent workers, all other things being 
equal.3  

4  Non-take up of benefits also affects the observed coverage of benefits. Non-take up is linked 
to multiple factors, such as the amount and duration of the expected benefit4, information 
and transaction costs of applying for social assistance and factors affecting individual stigma 
or  its  perception  (see  IZA  (2010)5  and  Eurofound  (2015)6).  Several  studies  underline  the 
difficulty of measuring non-take up but all conclude to quite significant  levels. Estimates of 
take-up  rates  are  available  in  Eurofound  (2015)  and  in  Social  Situation  Monitor  (2013)7.  In 
Italy, for instance, the non-take up of UB is estimated to be as high as 89%, in UK 37%, while 
for social assistance it is estimated to be above 60% in Belgium, Germany and Lithuania.  

5  Other factors include the reason for becoming unemployed.  For instance, Matsaganis et al. 
(2014) show that in most MS those who were dismissed are more often covered than those 
who became unemployed because their temporary job came to an end (50% versus 36% at 
EU level). In some MS (e.g. IT, SK, BG, PL, LV) this deficit in covering people on temporary job 
is considerable. A few exceptions to this general observation are represented by DK, AT and 
HU. Strict conditionality of unemployment benefits on activation may also reduce coverage 
rates.  

3 Alphametrics (2009), ‘Flexicurity: Indicators on the coverage of certain social protection benefits for persons in flexible 
employment in the European Union’, 
4 In countries where the benefits is set at a flat rate, or capped at a low level in comparison to the average wage (e.g. UK, 
PL, MT, DK, BE) the incentive to claim the benefit is low for high wage earners, especially if they expect to quickly find a job 
again. 
5 Bargain, Himmervol, Viitamäki, "No Claim, No Pain: Measuring the Non-Take-up of Social Assistance Using Register Data"; 
IZA DP No. 5355, December 2010 
6 Dubois and Ludwineck; Eurofound (2015), Access to social benefits: Reducing non-take-up, Publications Office of the 
European Union, Luxembourg. 
7 Matsaganis, Ozdemir, Ward (2014) "The coverage rate of social benefits" - SSM Research note 9/2013  

12 

 
                                                            
Table 4 - Characteristics of unemployment benefits in the EU 

Source: MISSOC extraction at 1/7/2014. 

13 

CountryQualifying periodDurationweeksdepending onweeks workedreference periodminmaxworking historyage otherAustria521042052xshorter qualifying period for age <25extended during training periodsBelgium6291unlimited--job search activityBulgaria39651752x--Croatia381041264x--Cyprus26-2222---Czech Republic521042147-xextended during training periodsDenmark52156104104---Estonia521562551x-allowance availableFinland261217171--bridging to pension possibleFrance1712117156xxreference period depends on age, assistance availableGermany5210426104xxallowance availableGreece176052xspecial rule for under 30 year oldslast 2 months are excluded from reference period; additionally for 1st time claimants: 80 days of work per year during previous 2 yearsHungary511561 day12x--Ireland39522233xx1st conditionand 104 total2nd conditionItaly521044269-x1st conditionand 104 total2nd condition13526.526x-Additional benefits system with laxer requirements.Latvia39523939--1st conditionand socially insured for 522nd conditionLithuania781562639xxsome exceptionsLuxembourg265252104-x-Malta501042222x-but no more days than weeks contributed (70 weeks worked = 70 days UB, reduced by sick days)Poland52782652xxarea unemployment rate, spouse employment status, children agePortugal5110421111xxassistance availableRomania521042652x-no qualifying period for graduatesSlovakia1041563039x-longer qualifying period  for temporary contractsSlovenia361048108xx-Spain5131317104x--Sweden26524264---480 hours52-Netherlands263613165x--UKbased on contribution (roughly 50 2 tax years2626--contribution 
 
Figure 3 – Legal and effective maximum duration of UB by previous working history and age 

Source: based on MISSOC (version 1/7/2014). 
Note: for the computation of the maximum unemployment duration we consider two cases: 1) a 24 year old who 
becomes  unemployed  after  working  for  47  weeks  with  no  previous  employment  or  benefits;  2)  a  40  year  old 
with17 years of employment before becoming unemployed. * The 24 year old would have received benefits had 
he worked 12 months. ** If the unemployed is graduated is entitled to 26 weeks. + Missing or unclear information. 
Belgium has unlimited maximum duration. 

Table 5 - Unemployment benefits and self-employment 

Self-employed (in % of employed)  Entitlement to unemployment benefits 

EL 
RO 
BG 
IT 
PL 
SI 
CZ 
IE 
CY 
BE 
SK 
NL 
ES 
PT 
UK 
AT 
MT 
HR 
FI 
LV 
LT 
DE 
HU 
FR 
EE 
LU 
DK 
SE 

34.9 
31.8 
26.6 
23 
22.1 
18.9 
17.4 
17.3 
16.6 
16.5 
15.4 
15 
14.6 
14.1 
13.6 
13 
12.1 
12 
12 
11.9 
11.8 
10.7 
10.4 
9.7 
9 
6 
5.9 
5.1 

yes (since 2013) 
voluntary 
no 
no 
yes 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
no 
yes (if no employees) 
voluntary 
voluntary 
yes (if single contractor) 
yes (unemployment assistance only) 
voluntary 
no 
no 
voluntary 
voluntary 
yes 
voluntary 
yes 
voluntary 
no 
yes 
voluntary 
voluntary 

14 

 
 
  
Source:  LFS  data  for  the  share  of  self-employed;  MISSOC  database  (version  1/7/2014)  and  Matsaganis  et  al. 
(2014) for the information on entitlement to unemployment benefits. 
Note: data refer to 2013 for the share of self-employed. Information on entitlement refers to 2014. 

Table 6 - Overall strictness of eligibility criteria of UB  

Source:  Langenbucher,  K. (2015), "How  demanding  are  eligibility  criteria  for  unemployment  benefits, 
quantitative  indicators  for  OECD  and  EU  countries",  OECD  Social,  Employment  and  Migration  Working 
Papers, No. 166, OECD Publishing, Paris.  DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jrxtk1zw8f2-en   

3  Measurement of effective UB coverage rates  

3.1  Proposal of effective coverage measurement based on existing tools 

Estimating effective coverage rates for unemployment benefits requires computing the ratio 
between:  

1.  the population considered as in need of benefits (the unemployed or those in need of last 
resort schemes depending on the type of benefit considered). This population will be 
referred to as the target population.  

2.  the population actually receiving the benefits. This population will be referred to as the 

recipient population. 

15 

2011Employment and contribution requirementsSanctions in case of resignation from previous jobAvailability for work during participation in ALMPsDemands on occupational mobilityDemands on geographical mobilityOther valid reasons for refusing job offersProof of job-search activitySanctions for refusing job offers or ALMP participationSanctions for repeated refusal of job offers or ALMP participationOverall strictness of eligibiliy criteria2012 Coverage UBAustria3143214222.652Belgium4222313353.062Bulgaria2512243443.29Cyprus223233323.52.618Czech Republic3144533443.322Germany335535212.52.885Denmark31553.532152.852Estonia3553244153.616Greece2511331552.918Spain354235334.53.637Finland2333312252.661France24431.534122.842Croatia14Hungary3315353222.932Ireland4225152553.3Italy4544351553.67Lithuania4111354443.320Luxembourg2544332553.530Latvia10Malta3452454443.926Netherlands25522.554113.0Poland3445331443.110Portugal4514355554.433Romania3551554554.314Sweden3354331132.423Slovenia3533354554.126Slovak Republic5144535554.38United Kingdom23332.535233.240 
 
 
 
The following analysis will focus on individuals aged 18-59. Indeed, the age group aged 60-64 is more 
specific as a large part of individuals across Member states are already retired, and to varying extent 
over Europe, which makes the situation more difficult to assess. This point is left for future analysis. 

The  analysis  will  be  based  on  unemployment  spells  longer  than  3  months  only.  Indeed,  the  period 
before  3  months  of  unemployment  is  specific.  As  underlined  in  Matsaganis  et  al.  (2013),  coverage 
rates are often peaking up only after this duration. This might be due to several blurring factors, such 
as administrative delays in payments of benefits, but also large non take up during initial phases of 
unemployment (due to stigma, but also to trust in quick return to employment).  

3.2  Comparisons of existing tools  

In  the  case  of  unemployment  benefits,  for  varying  reasons,  target  population  and  recipients  are 
difficult  to  measure  through  existing  statistical  sources:  administrative  data,  the  EU  Labour  Force 
Survey (EU-LFS), and the EU-SILC survey. Each of them presents pros and cons.  Combining them to 
estimate the ratio would also be an issue as using the best data source to estimate the recipient and 
target population will not necessarily provide a reliable ratio.  

The target population should actually refer to those unemployed as defined by the commonly agreed 
International  Labour  Organization  (ILO)  definition.  The  only  data  source  allowing  this  estimation  is 
the Labour Force Survey. As regards the recipient population, the EU-LFS contains some information 
on unemployment benefits recipiency. However this information is self-declared and can be blurred 
by measurement issues. 

Administrative  data  on  unemployment  benefit  recipients  can  be  considered  as  the  best  source  to 
measure  recipient  population.  However,  it  does  not  allow  any  complementary  information  on  the 
beneficiaries,  especially  the  ILO  status.  It  does  also  not  include  any  information  on  non-recipients. 
This is an issue, as some unemployed according to the ILO-definition might not be registered in the 
administrative  data  (if  they  are  not  receiving  any  benefits,  for  example  if  they  are  not  entitled  to 
them) and more importantly some recipients of UB according the administrative data might not be 
considered as unemployed as from the ILO definition (for example if they are not available for a job 
within the next two weeks). 

The  EU-SILC  measures  both  benefits  recipiency  and  unemployment  status.  Howeveras  regards  the 
target  population,  the  EU-SILC  survey  does  not  measure  ILO-unemployed  but  self-declared 
unemployed.  As  regards  benefit  recipients,  the  EU-SILC  measure  provides  a  full  description  of 
incomes including unemployment benefits at individual level. However, income data in SILC refer to a 
whole  reference  year  with  no  monthly  breakdown.  This  is  an  issue  as  regards  the  duration  of 
benefits.  Indeed, one will  only  be able  to  identify unemployed having received some benefits  over 
the reference period. An 8 month unemployed not entitled to any benefits, but who still was entitled 
two  months  ago  would  be  considered  as  a  covered  unemployed.  Therefore,  the  link  between 
unemployment spells and benefit recipiency remains fragile.  

Table 7 summarises the pros and cons of using different sources to estimate the effective coverage 
of unemployment benefits 

16 

 
 
 
Table 7 - Pros and cons of available tools to estimate UB coverage 

Administrative data 

EU LFS 

EU SILC 

Target population 

(ILO unemployed) 

Not possible 

Best source 

Possible source  
(but self-declared 
unemployment status) 

Recipients population 

Best source 

Source: DG EMPL 

Possible source  
(weaknesses in benefit 
measurement, self 
declared). 

Good source but no 
infra-annual 
breakdown 

3.2.1  Administrative sources 
An  intuitive  idea  to  cope  with  the  drawbacks  would  be  to  combine  the  best  available  sources  to 
compute the ratio between target population (EU-LFS) and recipient population (administrative). So-
called  "pseudo-coverage  rates"  can  be  calculated  by  relating  the  number  of  benefit  recipients 
derived  from  administrative  records  to  the  number  of  unemployed  as  defined  by  the  ILO.  Table  8 
relates to unemployment insurance schemes only. Table 9 relates to both unemployment insurance 
and  unemployment  assistance  schemes  where  they  exist  (means-tested  and  received  only  when 
people are not entitled to unemployment insurance).  

"Pseudo-coverage  rates"  vary  greatly  across  countries.  When  excluding  unemployment  assistance 
schemes, rates vary from less than 15% in Hungary, Malta and Slovakia to more than 100% in some 
countries. Rates can exceed 100% in cases where some recipients continue to receive UB even if they 
work a little, or on the contrary if they are not working and declare that they are not available for 
work  or  not  searching  actively  for  work.  For  instance,  in  Italy  the  ratio  may  be  overerestimated  as 
benefits  recipients  include  a  non-negligible  number  of  employed  working  reduced  hours.  On  the 
other  hand, 
in  Germany,  the  Grundsicherung  für  Arbeitssuchende  covers  both  schemes 
"Arbeitslosengeld  II"  (unemployment  assistance)  and  "Sozialgeld"  which  is  very  similar  to  a  pure 
social assistance scheme even though it has an activation component.  

Table 8 - Pseudo coverage rates based on administrative records of benefit recipients (excluding means 
tested benefits)** 

Country 
AT 
BE 
CZ 
DE 
DK 
ES 
EE 
FI 
FR 
UK 

2007 
62 
163 
41 
30 
55 
42 
22 
55 
80 
46 

2008 
70 
163 
60 
29 
39 
42 
32 
66 
86 
63 

2009 
72 
150 
54 
35 
47 
39 
53 
72 
86 
61 

2011 
70 
156 
37 
33 
40 
27 
31 
62 
86 
60 

2012 
69 
144 
29 
37 
45 
24 
32 
69 
82 
57 

2010 
70 
139 
47 
35 
44 
31 
42 
64 
83 
55 

17 

 
 
 
31 
55 
36 
53 
77 
17 
44 
7 
33 
63 
25 
63 
28 
50 
13 
20 
49 

23 
29 
HU 
30 
93 
IE 
44 
38 
IT 
46 
51 
LU 
67 
72 
NL 
20 
20 
PL 
34 
41 
PT 
12 
9 
SK 
42 
37 
SI 
28 
43 
SE 
28 
31 
BG 
48 
60 
CY 
15 
27 
LT 
21 
36 
LV 
8 
15 
MT 
30 
20 
RO 
EUR18* 
45 
50 
Sources: EC/OECD http://www.oecd.org/social/soc/recipients.htm)  and LFS.  
*EUR18: excluding Greece  
**Number of beneficiaries of unemployment insurance schemes as a share of total ILO unemployed.  

36 
58 
43 
53 
73 
27 
42 
16 
51 
40 
49 
59 
33 
35 
13 
49 
51 

12 
24 
37 
44 
66 
20 
35 
11 
40 
28 
29 
37 
18 
20 
9 
25 
42 

27 
40 
42 
50 
68 
20 
41 
11 
40 
33 
38 
55 
21 
29 
10 
59 
47 

Table 9 - Pseudo coverage rates based on administrative records of benefit recipients (including means 
tested benefits)*** - Unemployment insurance + unemployment assistance pseudo-coverage rates** 

Country  2007 
AT 
BE 
CZ 
DE 
DK 
ES 
EE 
FI 
FR 
UK 
HU 
IE 
IT 
LU 
NL 
PL 
PT 
SK 
SI 
SE 
BG 
CY 

108 
327 
41 
231 
78 
77 
45 
122 
96 
46 
43 
130 
72 
105 
155 
17 
61 
15 
66 
63 
25 
125 

2008 
118 
326 
60 
249 
59 
70 
64 
137 
101 
63 
41 
180 
75 
103 
143 
20 
59 
17 
73 
43 
31 
119 

2009 
116 
299 
54 
244 
61 
64 
107 
139 
98 
61 
48 
132 
86 
107 
145 
27 
62 
31 
102 
40 
49 
118 

2011 
125 
313 
37 
287 
55 
57 
62 
137 
100 
60 
32 
120 
88 
92 
134 
20 
42 
23 
83 
28 
28 
96 

2010 
122 
279 
47 
263 
57 
65 
83 
132 
97 
55 
40 
126 
84 
101 
137 
20 
57 
22 
80 
33 
38 
109 

18 

2012 
125 
287 
29 
302 
60 
51 
65 
152 
96 
57 
14 
115 
74 
88 
131 
20 
43 
23 
79 
28 
29 
75 

 
21 
29 
49 
59 
119 

33 
35 
52 
49 
122 

27 
36 
41 
20 
135 

28 
50 
37 
20 
138 

LT 
LV 
MT 
RO 
EUR18 
Sources: EC/OECD (http://www.oecd.org/social/soc/recipients.htm ) and LFS.  
*EUR18: excluding Greece  
***Number of beneficiaries of unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance schemes (or other 
unemployment related means tested schemes) as a share of total ILO unemployed (countries concerned are 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Spain). The description of schemes and detailed number of recipients are 
available at http://www.oecd.org/social/soc/recipients.htm.   

18 
20 
52 
25 
105 

15 
21 
49 
30 
115 

However, computing such a ratio presents several drawbacks:  

  The  reference  periods  might  differ.  The  administrative  data  provide  estimates  of  the 
recipients  population  at  one  point  in  time  (generally  31/12)  while  the  recipients  data  are 
generally a yearly average. This is especially a matter of concern in times of rapid economic 
changes (or in case of seasonal fluctuations). 

  Such a method presents the risk to add up the measurement errors in both population sizes. 
This  might  be  an  issue  as  statistical  surveys  always  do  better  in  terms  of  estimating  a 
proportion rather than a population size. 

As a matter of fact, the results empirically suggest that there are some issues in particular since 
pseudo coverage rates are often higher than 100%. 

3.2.2  LFS 
Estimating  the  ratio  between  both  populations  within  a  single  data  source  avoids  the  statistical 
weakness linked to the combination of data sources.  

As discussed earlier, the LFS is the official source to measure ILO unemployment rates. Therefore, the 
measurement of the target population measurement (ILO unemployed) is good.  

Benefit  recipients  are  identified  in  EU-LFS  through  a  variable  indicating  whether  a  person  is 
registered or not at a public employment office and receives benefits or assistance8. Information on 
recipiency is measured jointly with unemployment duration. For a more detailed explanation of this 
variable and the calculation of the coverage of unemployment benefits based on LFS data see annex 
8.2 

Nevertheless,  the  LFS  explanatory  notes  mention  that  "in  this  context,  benefits  are  limited  to 
allowances linked with unemployment status (not other social benefits)" (see Annex). The difficulty is 
that the benefit which the unemployed report as receiving or not receiving is not defined but left to 
individual  respondents  to  interpret.  Consequently,  it  may  be  the  case  that  some  people  receiving 
benefits do not report on it because it is not labelled as unemployment benefit. 

8 REGISTER variable. 

19 

 
 
                                                            
Another issue relates to the fact that there are a few countries for which data are not available or at 
least not in a suitable form. These are Ireland (for which it is not available) and the Netherlands (for 
which it is not accurate). For the UK there was a problem with the relevant LFS variable (REGISTER) in 
2009  and  2010,  as  no  distinction  was  made  between  people  receiving  and    people  not  receiving 
benefits for those registered at a public employment office (Matsaganis et al., 2014) . 

3.2.3  SILC  
The  EU  SILC  survey  allows  getting  information  at  individual  level  on  unemployment  spells  and  the 
receipt of unemployment benefits over a year.  

Unemployment spells as measured in EU SILC: some censorship issues 

The  EU  SILC  also  contains  detailed  information  on  the  activity  status  on  a  monthly  basis  over  the 
reference year.  A retrospective calendar of activity describes for each month of the reference period 
whether the interviewee was working, unemployed or inactive9. This data structure makes it possible 
to  identify  the  duration  of  unemployment  spells  over  the  reference  period  (number  of  months 
consecutive spent in unemployment).  

In the methodology developed here, the longest unemployment spell over the year is extracted. This 
raises some issues that would deserve further investigation for the cases of repeated unemployment 
spells  over  the  year.  Indeed,  the  first  spell  could  result  in  eligibility  while  the  second  one  could 
correspond to non-eligibility without any chance to measure it with the data. We assume currently 
that these cases remain limited in the sample population. 

The calendar structure has also the major disadvantage of left and right censorship of the data linked 
to the beginning and end of the year. An individual unemployed from July y-1 to February y will not 
be identified as being 8 months' unemployed but as a 2 months' unemployed (since only year y data 
is  available).  Similarly,  an  individual  unemployed  from  September  y  to  March  y+1  will  not  be 
identified as being a 7 months' unemployed but as a 3 months' unemployed.  

Table  11  -  Illustration  of  possible  misclassification  of  long  term  unemployed  classified  as  STU  in  SILC 
through the calendar of activity. 

SILC measurement 

Short term unemployed 

Long term unemployed 

Reality 

Short term unemployed 

ok 

impossible 

Long term unemployed 

Yes (due to censoring) 

ok 

The  SILC  survey  is  the  reference  source  at  EU  level  to  describe  incomes  in  a  comparable  way.  It 
contains information on incomes at individual and household level over an income reference period.  

9 See Annex for more information. 

20 

 
 
 
                                                            
The reference period for both income and taxes is the previous calendar year for all countries except 
for the United Kingdom (centred around the interview date), Belgium (fixed 12-month period is used) 
and Ireland  (12 months prior to the interview date)10. Income information cannot be broken down 
into shorter durations than one year11. 

Household income is built on the basis of several income sources, as described in the table below. 
Some are collected at individual level and others at household level.  Unemployment benefits, is of 
course of particular interest in this exercise. Its precise definition is provided in annex. 

Table 12 - Types of social benefit in EU-SILC 

Type of benefit 

Unit 

HY050 

Family/ children related allowances 

HY060 

Social exclusion not elsewhere classified 

Household 

HY070 

Housing allowance 

PY090 

Unemployment benefits 

PY100 

Old age benefits 

PY110 

Survivor's benefits 

PY120 

Sickness benefits 

PY130 

Disability benefits 

Individual 

PY140 

Education-related allowances 

Source: Eurostat, Doc 65, Description of Target Variables 

Estimation of coverage rates of unemployment benefits with EU-SILC 

A natural strategy to estimate the coverage rate with EU-SILC is to compare the target population 
and the recipient's population measured as:  

  Those unemployed over the reference period (target population) 

  Those unemployed over the reference period and receiving some unemployment benefit 

during the income reference period (recipients). 

This implies however some problems, in particular since it is implicitly assumed that an unemployed 
person is covered by unemployment benefits if he/she received some benefits over the reference 
period (e.g. a person who is unemployed for 10 months, actually covered during the first 3 months 
but not during the last seven months, will be identified as a covered person). Furthermore, the 

10 See 2010 COMPARATIVE EU INTERMEDIATE QUALITY REPORT Version 3 – October 2012, latest information 
available; 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/income_social_inclusion_living_conditions/documents/t
ab9/2010_EU_Comparative%20Intermediate_QR_Rev%202.pdf  

11 See doc 065 from Eurostat for a detailed discussion on the pro and cons of the income reference period. 

21 

 
 
 
                                                            
eligibility rules cannot be checked for each individual. Therefore, this indicator does not allow to 
distinguish between non take-up12 or non-eligibility.  

3.3  Summary of coverage estimated with SILC and LFS 

Table  12  recaps  the  pros  and  cons  of  each  data  source.  Given  the  larger  number  of  advantages  of 
using  LFS  data  to  estimate  coverage  of  UB,  we  prefer  to  choose  this  data  source  to  estimate  the 
coverage rate of UB. On the other hand, SILC data represents the only source to assess the coverage 
of a wider set of benefits. The measurement of non-coverage of social benefits using SILC is discussed 
in section 5. Moreover, LFS data have a better timeliness than EU-SILC and larger sample size. 

Table 12- Summary assessment of SILC and LFS as sources for the measurement of unemployment 
benefit coverage 

Pros (+) and 
cons (-) 

- 

LFS 

Pros (+) and 
cons (-) 

Unemployed during 
the past 4 weeks 
(ILO) 

Target population 
identified as… 

Beneficiaries 
identified as… 

Coverage 

definition of LTU 

Recurring spells of 
unemployment 

Range of schemes 
covered 

SILC 

individuals with at 
least 3 months of 
consecutive 
unemployment over 
the past year (*) 

individuals receiving 
some of UB over the 
past year  

might be 
overestimated as 
benefits are 
considered over a 
whole year 

Weak because of 
censorship (some LTU 
defined as STU)  

problematic as 
benefits captured on 
an annual basis 

Wide range: UB, but 
also SA, family, 
housing. 

+ 

+ 

+ 

+ 

+ 

+ 

(-, 
overestimation) 

Recipient of UB 

- 

(-) 

- 

+ 

ok  

Ok 

Only the latest spell 
will be counted  

only UB 

12 This distinction can be made through the Euromod tool. See Matsaganis et al. 2010, Barton and Riley 2012, 
for further information on the non take-up.  

22 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
The ranking of Member States in terms of the coverage rate of unemployment benefits is generally 
consistent between LFS and SILC measures. For a number of countries (DE, EE, EL, ES, HR, PT, SE, SI, 
UK)  SILC  and  LFS  estimates  are  very  close.  As  explained  above  estimates  based  on  SILC  tend  to  be 
higher than the coverage rate estimates based on LFS (see Figure 4), with the exception of Croatia 
and, especially, Romania.  

This can be explained by several factors and in particular exhaustion of rights is better  captured in 
the method using LFS than in the one relying on EU SILC. Indeed, an unemployed receiving benefits 
at  an  early  stage  during  the  year  will  be  considered  as  covered  during  the  whole  year  (because 
benefits  are  available  on  an  annual  basis  only  in  SILC).  Similarly,  individuals  experiencing  several 
spells  of  unemployment  over  the  year  might  be  covered  during  the  first  spell,  but  not  during  the 
following ones as they might have exhausted their rights.  

Figure 4 - Coverage rates of UB measured through SILC (2012) and LFS (2012). 

Source: DG EMPL, 2012 EU-LFS; 2012 EU_SILC own calculations. 

When  looking  at  the  estimates  overtime  (see  Table  13  and  Table  14),  both  sources  show  limited 
volatility,  and  provide  consistent  trends  with  the  exception  of  some  countries  (Austria,  Czech 
Republic, Cyprus, Finland and Sweden). These cases would need to be investigated further. 

Table 13 - Estimates of coverage rates based on EU-SILC – 2009-2013 

2009 
61 
88 

2010 
72 
89 

2011 
77 
87 

2012 
84 
83 

2013 
84 
82 

AT 
BE 

23 

 
 
 
n.a. 

n.a. 

18 
40 
47 
87 
67 
45 
31 
50 
90 
64 

10 
37 
34 
89 
57 
17 
28 
47 
88 
62 

16 
33 
32 
90 
83 
18 
19 
42 
86 
63 
12 
55 
74 
34 
23 
44 
21 
41 
39 
11 
32 

BG 
CY 
CZ 
DE 
DK 
EE 
EL 
ES 
FI 
FR 
HR 
HU 
IE 
IT 
LT 
LU 
LV 
MT 
NL 
PL 
PT 
RO 
SE 
SI 
SK 
UK 
Source: EU-SILC UDB EMPL own calculations 

20 
31 
37 
89 
82 
31 
20 
56 
89 
60 
12 
58 
65 
36 
17 
46 
30 
36 
42 
12 
36 
28 
33 
29 
25 
35 

57 
55 
31 
15 
47 
20 
37 
11 
12 
30 
19 
24 
15 
21 
13 

59 
65 
34 
16 
53 
39 
40 
38 
13 
42 
29 
25 
28 
29 
22 

30 
29 
20 
39 

2  n.a. 

17 
36 
29 
91 
72 
25 
19 
52 
87 
62 
12 
43 
69 
35 
22 
49 
20 
38 
42 
10 
32 

33 
29 
15 
42 

Table 14 - Estimates of coverage rates based on EU-SILC – 2007-2014 

EU-28 
EUR19 
AT 
BE 
BG 
CY 
CZ 
DE 
DK 
EE 
ES 
FI 
FR 
EL 
HR 
HU 

2007 
37 
44 
61 
68 
8 
24 
19 
76 
47 
11 
27 
59 
42 
18 
11 
40 

2008 
36 
42 
59 
67 
7 
26 
18 
76 
40 
19 
31 
55 
42 
18 
14 
42 

2009 
35 
43 
55 
67 
12 
25 
30 
75 
52 
35 
40 
59 
44 
22 
19 
45 

2010 
33 
41 
55 
66 
12 
23 
22 
76 
53 
28 
42 
63 
40 
23 
20 
44 

2012 
33 
36 
54 
62 
9 
18 
22 
85 
52 
16 
38 
61 
41 
18 
14 
33 

2013 
32 
34 
57 
65 
9 
16 
24 
84 
53 
24 
34 
62 
45 
13 
14 
28 

2014 
29 
33 
59 
63 
8 
10 
21 
83 
48 
21 
32 
65 
46 
10 
12 
30 

2011 
34 
38 
56 
66 
9 
22 
28 
84 
51 
17 
38 
58 
38 
21 
16 
43 

24 

 
 
IT 
LT 
LU 
LV 
MT 
PL 
PT 
RO 
SE 
SI 
SK 
UK 
Source: EU-LFS EMPL own calculations 

5 
13 
30 
22 
26 
8 
36 
12 
33 
26 
5 
33 

7 
28 
31 
24 
25 
15 
42 
16 
31 
34 
10 

5 
19 
38 
18 
27 
10 
35 
12 
26 
25 
5 

33  n.a. 

n.a. 

7 
22 
32 
18 
23 
13 
42 
19 
27 
34 
9 

6 
18 
29 
10 
27 
11 
32 
16 
22 
33 
8 
41 

7 
20 
30 
10 
26 
10 
33 
14 
23 
26 
8 
40 

7 
22 
31 
14 
25 
10 
34 
14 
23 
19 
6 
40 

7 
26 
31 
17 
29 
9 
31 
10 
22 
17 
6 
29 

In  general,  both  estimates  are  in  line  with  the  figures  estimated  by  ILO  (2014)  for  most  countries, 
with a higher coverage rate in Germany, Belgium and Denmark and lower coverage in most Eastern 
European countries (see Figure 5). 

Figure 5 - Effective coverage of unemployment benefits: unemployed who actually receive cash benefits, 
latest available year (percentages) 

Source: ILO 

25 

 
 
 
4  Unemployment benefits coverage rates (based on LFS) 

4.1  Trends over time 

While  unemployment  expenditure  increased  in  the  first  phase  of  the  crisis  mostly  due  to  the 
increased number of unemployed, since 2011 it has declined due to a fall in average expenditure per 
unemployed. This can be explained by the end of stimulus measures put in place at the beginning of 
the crisis, the tightening of benefits calculation rules and the phasing out of benefits for long-term 
unemployed (see ESDE 2014 and 2013). These factors contribute in explaining the fall in the coverage 
rate over the crisis. 
Many countries took bold measures to expand unemployment benefit coverage in order to mitigate 
the effect of the crisis. However, others adopted fiscal consolidation measures including a tightening 
of entitlement conditions for unemployment benefits even in the early stages of the global crisis (ILO, 
2012).  Between  2007  and  2014  a  few  Member  States  (Finland  and,  more  importantly,  Ireland) 
tightened  the  qualifying  conditions  for  UB,  while  some  others  (Denmark,  France,  Latvia  Portugal, 
Slovenia  and,  more  considerably,  Italy  and  Slovakia)  relaxed  these  qualifying  conditions  (see 
ILO,Social  security  world  report).  The  UK  relaxed  the  wealth  ceiling  for  the  means-test.  Some 
countries  extended  coverage  to  workers  previously  excluded,  such  as  non-regular  workers  in 
Germany, the self-employed in Austria (Bonnet, Saget and Weber, 2012). Italy introduced in 2014 a 
scheme  (Mini  Aspi)  aimed  at  covering  young  unemployed  with  a  discontinuous  working  history, 
which  characterized  the  relatively  high  share  of  atypical  workers.  Duration  was  increased  in  Latvia 
and  Spain  and  reduced  in  Portugal  and  Czech  Republic  (ILO,  2012).  As  for  the  duration  of  UB  for 
persons  with  the  lowest  entitlement,  only  Italy  extended  the  duration,  while  Ireland,  Romania, 
Poland,  France,  Czech  Republic,  Portugal  (depending  on  age  and  working  history)  and,  especially, 
Denmark) reduced it (ESDE, 2014). Some countries (e.g. Spain and UK) strengthened the activation of 
unemployment benefits (ILO, 2012).  

Between  2007  and  2013  coverage  of  UB  increased  in  the  majority  of  MS  (see  Chart  XX),  including 
those who extended coverage to non-regular workers such as Germany (for Italy the potential impact 
of  the  reform  is  not  visible  yet  in  these  data  as  they  refer  to  2013).  In  some  others,  coverage 
decreased,  for  instance,  in  Portugal  where  both  the  entitlement  and  duration  of  benefits  were 
tightened.  

26 

 
 
 
 
Figure 6 - Coverage rate of unemployment benefits measured with LFS, 2007 and 2013 

Source: EU-LFS Notes: for BE data for 2012. 

4.2  Coverage rate by duration of unemployment 

The coverage rate of unemployed is generally decreasing with time spent in unemployment (Figure 7 
and Figure 8). In Member states with short duration (such as Slovakia, Poland, the Czech Republic), 
the  coverage  is  decreasing  rapidly  with  time  spent  in  unemployment.  In  Belgium,  Finland  and  to 
some extent Germany and the UK, where unemployment insurance or unemployment assistance is 
not limited in duration, the coverage rate tends to increase over time13.  

13 For some MS the coverage rate of LTU is higher than for STU. This may be explained by the fact that in systems where UB 
is set a basic level (not proportional to wage, or capped at low level: BE, FI, UK, MT, DK), many unemployed who are likely 
to find a job quickly do not claim the benefit. In such cases, STU coverage may be lower than LTU coverage. 

27 

 
 
 
                                                            
Figure 7 - Unemployment benefits coverage by unemployment duration estimated through LFS, 
Short-term unemployed (<12 months) 2014 

Source: EU-LFS 

Figure 8 - Unemployment benefits coverage by unemployment duration estimated through LFS, Long-
term unemployed (>12 months) 2014 

Source: EU-LFS 

28 

 
  
 
Figure 9 - Unemployment benefits coverage by unemployment duration estimated through LFS, Short-
term (<12m), Long-term (>12 m) and Very long-term unemployment (>24m) 2014 

Source: LFS. 

One average across EU countries, women tend to be less covered than men. In 2013, Malta reports a 
significantly lower coverage rate for women (Figure 10). In some Member States, women are more 
covered  than  men,  especially  in  Estonia.  This  may  depend  by  the  distribution  of  women  and  men 
across  different  sectors  (e.g.  public  and  private),  type  of  employment  (e.g.  self-employment)  or 
contract (precarious versus permanent), etc. 

Figure 10 - Coverage of UB by gender, 2013 

Source: LFS. 

29 

 
 
 
The level of education has a different impact on coverage rates depending on Member States (Figure 
11).  In  some  countries  (especially  in  the  periphery)  low-skilled  tend  to  be  better  covered,  while  in 
others (especially in Finland and Denmark) high skilled are better covered. This again may depend by 
the  distribution  of  different  educational  across  different  types  of  jobs  and  by  the  decision  to 
contribute to unemployment benefits in voluntary schemes.  

Figure 11 - Coverage rates of UB by level of education, 2013 

UB coverage by level of education 

low medium high

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

IT HR SI LT MT ES PT HU UK

EL CY CZ SE LU FR BE DE

SK BG PL RO LV EE DK FI

low skilled better covered 

medium skilled better covered 
better covered 

         high skilled 

Source: LFS 

Coverage is generally lower for the young unemployed (15-24 years) as compared to for instance 25-
34 or 35 years old or more (Figure 12). This probably reflects shorter work records and as a result a 
lower share of eligible unemployed to benefits. The lower coverage rate for 35 years old and more 
compared  to 25-34 years old probably  reflects a higher share of long term unemployed in this age 
bracket. 

30 

 
 
Figure 12 - Coverage rates of UB by age, 2013 

Source: LFS. 

31 

 
 
  
 
Box 1 - The low coverage in Sweden and Italy – cautious interpretation 

Sweden 

The level of the estimated coverage for Sweden is low. A possible reason pertains individuals in 
activation,  as  their  benefits  might  not  be  self-declared  as  unemployment  benefits  or  assistance 
but treated as wages, while those individuals can be counted as unemployed. This is confirmed by 
the table below: administrative recipients of UB are estimated at 141 240 in 2010, divided by ILO 
unemployed estimated at 423 700 (33% of coverage, a bit higher than SILC/LFS estimates of 25%). 
ILO (2014) provides similar figures, with a coverage rate below 33%. 

Whether  such  outcomes  reflect  problems  in  the  coverage  of  unemployment  benefits  is  not 
straightforward. However, recent changes in policy rules as from 2007 lead to a lower number of 
people covered by unemployment insurance.  

This shortcoming in the definition of benefits in the LFS suggests a re-definition of the REGISTER 
variable in order to include also such cases. 

Table 15 - Programmes included in SOCR - Sweden 

Unemployment 

Basic unemployment insurance 

2009 

2010 

12 058 

10 043 

Complementary income-related insurance 

151 406 

131 197 

Unemployment Total 

In-work 

Activity support programs 

Part-time and temporary work loose 

In-work Total 

Other-Social 

Other-Social Total 

Social allowance 

Incapacity 

Care  Allowance 

Disability Allowance 

163 464 

141 240 

88 442 

124 696 

85 649 

77 930 

174 091 

202 626 

299 897 

309 627 

299 897 

309 627 

42 093 

61 661 

42 984 

61 509 

Sickness 
Disability Pension) 

/  activity  compensation 

(Former 

498 301 

442 812 

Incapacity Total 

602 055 

547 305 

Source:  OECD.  Comment:  Unemployment  figures  are  annual  averages.  Disability  pensions  and  social 
assistance  stocks  reflect  the  situation  at  31  December.  Totals  by  branch  are  not  adjusted  for  double 
counting. 

Italy 

For Italy, coverage rates are low and the difference between SILC and LFS estimates is very large: 
33%  and  7%,  respectively,  in  2012  (this  value  is  much  lower  than  the  estimates  based  on 
administrative  data).  Both  the  low  level  of  coverage  and  the  large  difference  between  the 
estimates  based  on  SILC  and  LFS  data  can  be  explained  by  a  peculiar  type  of  income  support 
measure (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni), which represents a considerable share of unemployment 
spending  in  Italy.  This  type  of  income  support  aims  at  compensating  incomes  for  reducing 
working  hours  and  is,  in  fact,  a  partial  unemployment  benefit.  People  receiving  partial 
unemployment benefits do not need to be registered at a public employment office. Therefore, 
the  variable  used  in  the  LFS  for  the  calculation  of  coverage  (REGISTER)  does  not  capture  these 
people.  The  low  values  obtained  even  with  SILC  data  are  explained  by  the  fact  that  the 
32 
denominator used for the measurement of coverage (unemployed) excludes most people actually 
receiving (partial) unemployment benefits. However, our chosen indicator of coverage still signals 
that a large share of unemployed are not receiving income support. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Drivers of low coverage 

As illustrated in section 1 some MS have strict legal requirement for the eligibility of UB and a short 
duration of benefits, especially for young people who normally have a short working history. In some 
other MS, while the overall legal framework of UB is not particularly stringent the low coverage may 
be  explained  by  a  legal  framework  which  is  particularly  strict  in  particular  for  people  with  a  short 
working  history.  In  some  other  MS,  while  the  legal  framework  of  UB  is  not  particularly  strict  the 
coverage of  unemployed  is  still  low.  In  some of  these  countries  the  explanation can  be  due to  the 
characteristics  of  the  labour  market,  for  instance  to  an  important  share  of  self-employed  workers 
who  are  generally  not  entitled  or  not  to  the  same  extent  as  employee  to  UB.  Table  below 
summarizes the principal drivers of low coverage of UB in EU countries. 

Low  coverage  is 
an issue? 

Primary reason 

Austria 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Germany 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Greece 
Spain 
Finland 
France 
Croatia 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Latvia 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Sweden 
Slovenia 
Slovak Republic 
United Kingdom 
Source: MISSOC 

yes 
yes 
yes 

yes 
yes 

yes 
yes 

yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 

yes 

yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 

self-employment 
self-employment 
self-employment, legal framework esp. for young 

legal framework esp. for young 
self-employment, legal framework esp. for young 

? 
legal framework esp. for young 

self-employment 
lega esp. for young 
? 
legal framework esp. for young 
legal framework 

self-employment, legal framework esp. for young 
legal framework 
legal framework 
other reason (measurement) 
legal framework 
legal framework 

33 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3  Widely  available  unemployment  benefits  schemes  do  not  discourage  transitions  to 

employment 

Unemployment benefit systems are intended to provide income replacement and resources for the 
unemployed to enable them to both maintain acceptable living standards and search for adequate 
job  matches.  However,  higher  levels  of  benefits  can  also  carry  financial  disincentives  to  work,  as 
illustrated  in  the  form  of  high  marginal  effective  tax  rates  (unemployment  traps  indicators).  The 
following  analysis  shows  that  broad  coverage  and  relatively  high  net  replacement  rate  of 
unemployment benefits are in fact associated with lower rates of entries into poverty and that they 
do not prevent, and even in certain circumstances facilitate, returns to employment, and thereby are 
associated with better exits from poverty. 

There seems to be no relationship between the level of financial disincentives (as measured by the 
average unemployment trap) and the chances to get back to work for the unemployed. Figure 12 and 
Figure  13  show  the  extent  of  diversity  that  exists  across  the  Member  States.  Countries  that,  by 
combining relatively broad coverage with high income replacement rates, such as Denmark, Austria 
and the Netherlands, tend to achieve low rates of entry into poverty, high returns to employment, 
and high exit rates out of poverty.  

In  Bulgaria,  Poland  and  the  UK,  the  low  coverage  and  low  net  replacement  rates  of  their 
unemployment benefit schemes are associated with larger entries into poverty. However, returns to 
employment  and  exit  rates  from  poverty  are  much  higher  in  the  case  of  the  UK14  than  they  are  in 
Poland or Bulgaria. The case of Spain  stands out in that there is a high rate of entries into poverty 
despite rather high replacement rates and a medium level of coverage.  

Figure 12 - Coverage and adequacy of unemployment benefits limit entries into poverty 

Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat, EU-SILC 2009–10–11 longitudinal data 
Note: EU-SILC — transitions in/out of poverty refer to yearly 2008–10 averages 

: 

14 See also ESDE 2012, Chapter 2, on the large turn-over of poverty in the UK. 

34 

 
                                                            
Figure 13 - Higher coverage and adequacy of UB do not prevent returns to employment  

Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat, EU-SILC 2009–10–11 longitudinal data and OECD-EC 
tax-benefit model 

Note: EU-SILC — transitions in/out of poverty refer to yearly 2008–10 averages 

35 

 
 
 
 
5  Non-coverage of social benefits 

As  the  crisis  years  extended,  an  increasing  number  of  workers  lost  their  entitlements  to 
unemployment  benefits,  or  did  not  acquire  enough  rights  to  become  eligible.  In  most  countries, 
means-tested "last resort" schemes are available to support financially the working age people that 
have insufficient access to resources, and are not entitled to other benefits. These individuals have 
insufficient access to market income, because themselves or their partner do not work (or work very 
little) and they do not have assets on which to rely. However, it appears that a significant number of 
such individuals who would "in principle" be in need of some form of income support do not receive 
any kind of benefit. In such cases, in the absence of social transfer, they are likely to rely on family 
solidarity (multi-generation households, inter-household transfers) or on the informal economy. Such 
situations are likely to undermine efforts to bring the workers back to (formal) employment, as there 
are no incentives to participate in training or to actively search for a job. 

During the crisis, a number of national and international reports alerted on the growing importance 
of the problem, due to rising long-term unemployment, and in some cases to the tightening of the 
eligibility criteria of minimum income schemes. However, there is no established indicator measuring 
the extent of the phenomenom. 

This section aims to measure the extent of the "non-coverage" of social benefits primarily aimed at 
replacing/supplementing the income of the working age population, and to document the different 
sources of income on which the non-covered population tend to rely. 

For the estimation of the non-coverage rate of social benefits we use the EU-SILC data, which contain 
information on a broad range of social benefits. In order to estimate non-coverage we need to make 
three choices:  

A)  on the definition of the target population;  
B)  on the selection of social benefits to be considered;  
C)  on the definition of the concept of non-coverage.  
D)  We  also  analyse  the  income  sources  of  non-covered  people  in  order  to  have  a  better 
understanding of the population in need and possibly refining our definition of non-coverage. 

5.1  Definition of the target population 

From a policy point of view, what matters is the share of the working age population in need that is 
left  uncovered  by  social  benefits.  Working  age  people  with  no  job  may  be  a  first  target  of  social 
benefits. However, many jobless people can rely on the income of other members of the household.  
While  eligibility  for  unemployment  benefits  is  in  most  cases  mainly  depending  on  the  individual 
situation of the worker, benefits such as social assistance are means-tested, and often take account 
of the total income and potential assets of the household. In order to define the population in need, 
several options can be envisaged: 

  Option 1 is to concentrate on jobless households (households with a very low work intensity) 
and possibly on those among them who are poor (see remark below on how to define the 
poor).  This  option  concentrates  on  the  income  replacement  function  of  benefits.  In  this 
option, the definition of insufficient access to resources is centered around the lack of work 

36 

 
income, and could be refined by further excluding those who rely on other types of primary 
income – e.g. property income (see section 5.4). 

  Option  2  would  be  to  also  include  working  age  individuals  living  in  households  with  higher 
work  intensity  who  may  also  be  poor  and  in  need  of  income  support  to  supplement  low 
earnings. This option would take account of the fact that some benefits are also designed to 
supplement  insufficient  income.  In  this  option,  insufficient  access  to  resources  is  the  main 
criteria, and results will be sensitive to the choice of the proxy to define what level of income 
is insufficient (e.g. AROPE, AROP or SMD).  

Figure 14 reports the sensitivity of the non-coverage rate to the definition of the target population. 
As  the  definition  of  poverty  in  based  on  disposable  income  after  social  benefits,  some  welfare 
systems  may  pull  some  households  in  need  out  of  our  definition  of  the  target  population.  For  this 
reason,  we  also  consider  jobless  poor  before  social  transfers.  Non-coverage  is  generally  higher 
among  people  at-risk  of  poverty  or  exclusion  (AROPE),  followed  by  severely  deprived,  jobless  and 
poor  before  social  transfers,  jobless  poor  and  jobless.  In  some  MS  (CY,  EL,  BG,  IT,  RO)  the  non-
coverage measures is very sensitive to the choice of the target population, while in others it is not 
very sensitive (e.g. in FI, FR, LU, NL).  

A further issue linked to the definition of the target population is the sample size in the EU-SILC data. 
In some MS (in particular in those with fewer people "in need"), restricting too much the population 
in need shrinks too much the sample size and make results non reliable. 

We  decided  to  define  the  target  population  as  working  age  jobless  poor  (option  1).  The  lack  of 
replacement income for such people would suggest a lack of effectiveness of the benefit system in 
reaching  a  first  round  assessment  of  vulnerable  jobless.  However,  this  measurement  does  not 
consider  the  coverage  of  in-work  poor,  an  important  factor  highlighted  also  by  Matsaganis  et  al. 
(2014). 

Figure 14 - Sensitivity of non-coverage to the definition of the target population 

Source: EU-SILC, DG EMPL calculations. 

37 

 
 
5.2  Selection of benefits - An approach based on the whole set of benefits 

Contrary to unemployment benefits, in the case of social assistance, neither the target population of 
those  in  need  of  a  last  resort  scheme  nor  those  who  are  eligible  can  be  precisely  defined  in 
comparative  way.  Moreover,  the  individual  may  receive  other  benefits  than  social  assistance  that 
provide adequate resources.  

The suggested indicator refers to all benefits received at an individual level by household members 
as  measured 
in  EU-SILC  (unemployment,  sickness,  disability,  education-related  allowances, 
family/children benefits,  and  old  age  and  survivors’ benefits  received by  household members  aged 
less  than  60).  We  are  interested  in  benefits  which  are  linked  to  working  age  individuals  and  may 
possibly  allow  activating  them.  For  this  reason,  we  consider  family/child  allowances  and  pension 
received by other members of the household separately. This means that a non-working household 
that  would  only  receive  child  or  housing  benefits  as  the  main  source  of  income  support  is  not 
considered covered, because such income support is not primarily meant as income replacement and 
is not likely to be linked to activation. We nevertheless calculate the indicator including child benefits 
separately, to illustrate that in some countries child and housing benefits act, de facto, as last resort 
schemes (see above). 

Chart  reports  non-coverage  rates  with  and  without  family/child  benefits.  In  some  MS  (notably  RO, 
BG, IE, HR, MT) the inclusion of family/child benefits makes a considerable difference in the extent of 
non-coverage.  In  these  MS  the  income  support  of  poor  and  jobless  households  is  mainly  through 
child benefits, while in MS like DK or FI the non-coverage rate is quite insensitive to the inclusion of 
family/child benefits.  

Figure 15 - Non-coverage with/without family/child benefits 

Source: 2012 EU-SILC UDB, DG EMPL calculations. 

Pensions (old age and survivors’ benefits) received  by individuals aged less than 60 are included in 
the scope of benefits, as they provide income support and are sometimes used as safety nets despite 

38 

 
 
 
this not being their original aim. Pensions received by the elderly present in the household are not 
included in the calculation, since they are not received by working age adults, and their primary aim 
is not to alleviate poverty in working age; they are considered as a separate income source (Part 3). 
Figure  16  illustrates  the  composition  of  income  support  of  working  age  jobless  poor  by  type  of 
benefit.  From  this  chart,  it  is  possible  to  check  the  relative  importance  of  specific  benefits  in 
supporting jobless poor. In DK, for instance, educational allowances have a considerable importance 
(also  due  to  the  importance  of  young  single  households).  In  the  UK  housing  benefits  also  have  a 
considerable importance.  

Figure  16  -  Composition  of  income  support  received  by  working  age  people  living  in  poor  jobless 
households, by type of benefit. In % of disposable income 

Source: 2012 EU-SILC UDB, DG EMPL calculations. 

39 

 
 
Table 16 - Types of social benefit in EU-SILC 

Source: Eurostat  

5.3  The definition of non-coverage 

We suggest to consider that individuals are non-covered if they receive only weak income support. 
For example, we suggest considering the limit of 10% of annual net disposable income coming from 
income support. 

Figure  17  reports  the sensitivity  of  the non-coverage  rate  by  three different thresholds  (10%,  20%, 
30%). Consistently with previous sensitivity tests, in some MS measurement of non-coverage is quite 
robust  to  the  choice  of  definitions  (DK,  FI),  while  in  others  the  choice  of,  for  instance,  different 
thresholds makes a considerable difference (as in HU, BG and FR). 

40 

Measurement Unit (individual/ household)Type of benefitReferred in the chapter as…Family/ children related allowances (HY050)Social exclusion not elsewhere classified (HY060)Housing allowance (HY070)Unemployment benefits (PY090)Old age benefits (PY100)Survivor's benefits (PY110)Sickness benefits (PY120)Disability benefits (PY130)Education-related allowances (PY140)HouseholdIndividualPensions if perceived by household member aged60+Social benefit if perceived by household member aged 18-59Social benefitsSocial benefits 
 
 
Figure 17 - Different definitions of non-coverage 

Source: EUSILC 2012 UDB own calculations. Notes: the target population is jobless poor. 

5.4 

Income sources of non-covered households  

Figure 18 reports the level and composition by income source of covered and non-covered people. 
This  chart  helps  to  shed  some  light  on  how  non-covered  people  live  and  to  better  assess  the 
population  in  need.  We  can  identify  three  groups  of  countries.  In  the  first  (DK,  FI,  NL,  SE)  a  large 
component  of  income  of  non-covered  derives  from  rent,  so  from  an  underlying  asset.  These 
households may be excluded from benefits by means-testing. In the second group there is a strong 
dependence from family benefits (e.g. IE, HU) and pensions of older members (e.g. SI, LT, LU). In the 
third group of countries non-covered people strongly depends on inter-household transfers (AT, DE, 
UK).  

The target population could be refined by excluding those households owning assets above a certain 
value. This is possible by setting absolute ceilings for the income from rent and interests. In order to 
take  also  into  account  the  main  residence  we  would  need  to  consider  imputed  rent.  Due  to  the 
methodological  problems  linked  to  imputed  rent,  in  particular  in  EUSILC  data,  we  decide  not  to 
implement this refinement of the target population. 

41 

 
 
Figure 18 - Composition of income of covered and non-covered household 

Source: EUSILC 2012 own elaboration. 

Notes: covered households are jobless poor receiving more than 10% of gross income from benefits (excluding 
child/family benefits). 

Following  these  sensitivity  analyses,  we  decided  to  define  the  non-coverage  rate  as  the  share  of 
individuals aged 18–59, who live in a jobless household and are at risk of poverty, but whose total 
benefits/allowances received is less than 10 % of their total household gross income.    

5.5  Results 

In 2013, 20 % of adults living in poor and jobless households receive less than 10 % of their income 
from social benefits, on average in the EU, when child benefits are included, and when child benefits 
are excluded the rate increases to 24 %. The non-coverage rate varies greatly between countries. It 
ranges from 2% in Finland to almost 60% in Greece (see Figure 19 and Table 3).  

42 

 
 
 
Figure 19 - Proportion of 18–59 individuals living in jobless households at-risk-of-poverty, whose 
total benefits received is less than 10 % of total net disposable household income 2013 

Source: Eurostat elaborations based on EU-SILC 2013 

Notes: 2012 data for IE. MS are sorted in ascending order in the non-coverage rate excluding child benefits. 

Non-coverage  increased  in  the  EU,  on  average,  over  the  crisis.  The  increase  in  jobless  poor  and 
tightening  of  benefits  in  some  Member  States  contribute  to  explain  this  trend.  Non-coverage 
increased particularly in CY and BG between 2008 and 2013 (above 10 pps). On the other hand, the 
share of non-covered household was substantially reduced in LT, ES and MT (by more than 10 pps) 
(see chart and table in Appendix). 

Figure 20 - Trend of non-coverage in selected EU member States, 2008-2013 

Source: from Eurostat elaborations based on EUSILC data. 
Note: coverage defined as before. Data for IE only until 2012. 

43 

 
 
 
5.6  Lack of income support and households relying on pensions 

Some  vulnerable  households  receive  little  support  from  the  state.  Beside,  in  some  countries, 
significant  shares  of  working  age  adults  tend  to  rely  more  heavily  on  pensions,  including  elderly 
pensions  received  by  other  household  members.  Such  situations  are  not  supportive  of  returns  to 
employment because they are not associated to any incentive structures (activation, conditionality, 
etc).  As  an  illustration,  a  significant proportion  of  households  contain household  members  over  60 
years of age who receive pensions which represent more than 25 % of the household income15.  

In the EU as a whole, 9 % of the people aged 18–59 and at-risk-of-poverty are living in a household 
where  more  than 25 %  of  the total  household  income comes  from the pensions  received  by  a  60+ 
year-old household member. In Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland and Germany, the share is very 
low — less than 1 %, but it is much higher in Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus, Spain and Poland (15–20 %).  

Figure 21 - Proportion of the 18–59 population living in a household where at least 25 % of annual income 
comes from pensions of 60+ year-old household members and the share of the population with 60+ year-
old household members (multigenerational households) 

Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat, EU-SILC 2011  

Figure  22  shows  that,  in  Member  States  with  low  coverage  rates  of  social  benefits,  the  share  of 
individuals at-risk-of-poverty who are relying on pensions from 60+ year-old household members is 
much larger. This is the case in Greece, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Poland and the Baltic States, as well as in 
Spain and Italy, while the incidence is very low in Continental and Northern Europe. 

As  illustrated  above,  a  large  proportion  of  individuals  not  covered  by  social  transfers  are  found  in 
countries  with  large  numbers  of  multi-generational  households.  This  may  be  explained  in  so  far  as 
individuals  rely  on  family  solidarity  in  the  absence  of  adequate  income  support.  This  may  not 
facilitate  the  return  of  working  age  people  to  employment,  as  those  without  individual  income 

15 These countries are generally those where a large proportion of working age adults are living in 
multigenerational households, which is especially the case for those living in jobless and poor households, see 
Figure 21. 

44 

 
 
                                                            
support  may  not  have  access  to  the  rights  and  obligations  associated  with  receiving  working  age 
benefits (job search requirement, training, etc.). Another coping ‘strategy’ that those without access 
to  income  support  may  adopt  is  to  seek  work  in  the  informal  economy.  This  cannot  be  observed 
directly  in  standard  statistics,  but  available  evidence16  tends  to  show  that  undeclared  work  is 
widespread in the countries indicated above.  

Figure 22 - Support from social transfers or intergenerational solidarity — share of the 18–59 population 
living in a jobless and poor household not covered by social transfers (>10 % of annual gross disposable 
income) and share of the 18–59 population living in a household where at least 25 % of annual income 
comes from pensions of 60+ year-old household members 

Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat, EU-SILC 2011  

5.7  Countries  with  the  lowest  levels  of  persistent  poverty  are  those  where  the  non-

coverage of jobless and poor households is low 

The  effectiveness  of  social  assistance  is  assessed  here  through  indicators  of  non-coverage  of  the 
jobless  and  poor  households,  the  net  income  of  people  living  on  social  assistance  relatively  to  the 
median income, and the effective marginal tax rate for inactive people taking up a job, the so-called 
inactivity trap. The results show that countries with the lowest levels of persistent poverty are those 
where  the  non-coverage  of  jobless  and  poor  households  is  low,  and  where  the  adequacy  of  social 
assistance benefits is high (see Figure 23).  

It has to be noted, that, in most countries, it is not social assistance in itself that lifts people out of 
poverty, since it is only in Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands that safety nets cover almost all 
those  living  in  jobless  and  poor  households,  and  provide  net  incomes  for  those  living  on  social 
assistance  that  are  above  the  poverty  threshold.  By  contrast,  Romania,  Greece  and  Bulgaria  are 

16 See Chapter 3 of ESDE 2013 on undeclared work. 

45 

 
 
 
                                                            
characterised by a very low coverage of the population living in jobless and poor households and very 
low adequacy of social assistance, resulting in very high rates of persistent poverty. Higher inactivity 
traps  are  associated  with  lower  persistence  of  poverty,  suggesting  that  such  theoretical  financial 
disincentives do not materialise into actual barriers to work. 

Figure 23  - Non-coverage and adequacy of social transfers and the dynamics of poverty  

Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat, EU-SILC 2009–10–11 longitudinal data 

6  Final remarks 

Consistently with recent CSR for some MS, this paper focuses on the importance of the coverage of 
UB and other income support measures, in order to complement other measures on the adequacy of 
benefits and their link to activation. 

The structure of income support schemes generally consist in two/three layers. UB schemes are quite 
different  across  MS,  with  some  imposing  more  stringent  requirements  for  eligibility  and  a  short 
duration. For young people, who normally have a short working history eligibility to UB is difficult in 
most MS, with exceptions such as in Cyprus and Finland. 

We  discussed  the  methodological  challenges  of  measuring  UB  coverage  with  the  available  data 
sources  at  EU  level  and  we  concluded  that  the  measurement  based  on  LFS  data  is  to  preferred, 
because ILO unemployed can only be identified with LFS data. 

The coverage of UB varies across population groups (age, educational level, gender) and by MS. Low 
coverage results from a variety of reasons, linked to the design  of the benfits, the structure of the 
unemployed population and the characteristics of the labour market. Prevailing reasons vary across 
countries. 

The paper also explores the issue of non-coverage of social benefits, using SILC data as they include 
data on all benefits. The three main aspects to be decided are the definition of the target population, 
the definition of coverage and the selection of benefits.  After performing some sensitivity analyses 
we chose jobless poor as reference population, 10% as cut-off and all benefits received by working 
age  persons  excluding family/child  benefits.  The results  show  that  non-coverage  of  people  in need 
increased during the crisis and it is a  considerable issue in countries such as  Greece, Italy, Bulgaria 
and Romania. 

46 

 
 
 
7  References 
European Commission (2013) ESDE 

Barton and Riley (2012) Income Related Benefits: Estimates of Take-up in 2009–10, Department for Work and 
Pensions. 

Dubois, H, Ludwinek, A (2014) Access to benefits, EUROFOUND Working Paper 

Esser, Ferrarini, Nelson, Palme & Sjoberg (2013) "Unemployment Benefits in EU Member States", study 
financed byt eh European Commission 

Matsaganis M., H.Levy, M. Flevotomou (2010) Non take up of social benefits in Greece and Spain, Euromod 
Working Paper 

Matsaganis M., Ozedemir E. and Ward T. (2014) The coverage rate of social benefits, Research note 09/2013, 
Social Situation Monitor, European Commission. 

World Social Protection report (2014-15) 

ILO and World Bank, 2012; Bonnet, Saget and Weber, 2012 (quoted by ILO p 40) 

47 

 
 
 
8  Annex 

8.1  Full extracts of Staff working Documents, EU2020 2014 

Table: Country specific recommendations & staff working documents related to coverage of 
income support made to Member states during the European semester, 2014 
Unemployment benefits 

Bulgaria 

CSR - "Improve the effective coverage of unemployment benefits and social assistance 
and their links with activation measures." 

SWD – "Overall, the coverage and efficiency of both unemployment benefits and social 
assistance is limited. Significant shares of unemployed are not covered by standard safety 
nets (unemployment benefits and social assistance) in Bulgaria and tend to rely on family 
solidarity or informal work. The rather strict and tightened eligibility criteria contribute to 
the low coverage, with those not receiving any benefits being also not easily reached by 
activation measures." 
CSR - "Consider increasing the period of eligibility for unemployment benefits, taking into 
account the average time required to find new employment and link to activation 
measures." 

Hungary 

SWD –"[T]here is a clear risk that the very short length of unemployment benefit 
deteriorates job prospects." 

SWD- "The short length of unemployment benefit (at three months) is in contrast with 
the average time required to find employment for job seekers (over one year). While 
lowering the level of unemployment benefit can enhance job search, such a short period 
of the entitlement could result in a low-income trap as well as labour market 
mismatches. It is because the unemployed, facing the limited benefit duration and not 
having adequate financial savings, may be forced as a last resort to join the public works 
scheme. As the outflow from this scheme to the open labour market is limited, the 
unemployed easily find themselves outside of the open labour market for long periods. To 
avoid this outcome, some of the unemployed may be forced to accept job offers which do 
not fit their qualifications, which results in inferior labour-market matching, or could be 
left without any social assistance." 

Italy 

CSR - "Work towards a more comprehensive social protection for the unemployed, while 
limiting the use of wage supplementation schemes to facilitate labour re-allocation." 

SWD – "[A] substantial increase in fixed-term temporary contracts in combination with 
still incomplete access to unemployment benefits, notably for semi-dependent, own-
account workers and the self-employed, suggest that segmentation remains a challenge 
for the Italian job market. Furthermore, the new unemployment benefit system is being 
put under strain by the increase in unemployment and is not supported by effective 
activation policies." 

48 

 
 
SWD – "The government intends to introduce additional measures on contractual 
simplification, active labour market policies, unemployment benefits, and disincentives to 
work. The government has also put forward a draft enabling law aimed at, inter alia: 
further streamlining the existing contractual forms, including by introducing a new 
permanent contract with increasing entitlements, extending the coverage and duration 
of unemployment benefits, strengthening conditionality and activation by better linking 
active and passive labour market policies, preventing moral hazard in the use of wage 
supplementation schemes (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni) by adjusting the contributions 
paid into such schemes to companies’ actual use of them (across and within industries). 
While many of the proposed actions appear adequate to address Italy's labour market 
challenges, their effectiveness will depend greatly on their design and subsequent 
implementation." 

Lithuania  CSR - "Improve coverage and adequacy of unemployment benefits and link them to 

activation." 

SWD –"There is scope for reviewing the adequacy and coverage of unemployment and 
social assistance benefits, which remain among the lowest in the EU. "  

Social assistance 

Italy 

CSR – "To address exposure to poverty and social exclusion, scale-up the new pilot social 
assistance scheme, in compliance with budgetary targets, guaranteeing appropriate 
targeting, strict conditionality and territorial uniformity, and strengthening the link with 
activation measures." 

SWD-"The share of people at risk of poverty and social exclusion is rising fast and the 
social protection system is not well equipped to address this problem. Italy has seen the 
number of people at risk of poverty and social exclusion increase from 17.1 million in 
2011 to 18.2 million in 2012, one of the largest increases in the EU, and to a level that is 
well above the 12.9 million Europe 2020 target. Also, the level of gross household 
disposable income further deteriorated. The share of people affected by severe material 
deprivation more than doubled between 2010 and 2012,32 particularly affecting children 
under 16 years. In-work poverty also increased in recent years.33 Social expenditure in 
Italy is largely oriented towards the elderly and dominated by pension expenditure, which 
represented 17% of GDP in 2012, the highest share in the EU. This leaves little scope for 
the other functions of social  rotection, namely to support families and children and 
address the risk of social exclusion and poverty. Social assistance expenditure is 
fragmented and there is no nation-wide minimum income scheme in place. As a result, 
Italy has the third highest share of people living in poor or jobless households that are not 
covered by social transfers, and a large share of the working age population is dependent 
on the pension income of a family member." 
SWD- "Following the 2013 country-specific recommendation, the steps taken towards a 
strengthened protection against poverty go in the right direction, but close monitoring is 
warranted. An updated and nationally harmonised criterion informing the means-testing 

49 

 
 
system was approved in December 2013 to improve the selection of those most in need 
of social assistance. The government has taken further action to facilitate access to 
housing for people in difficult economic conditions.34A new measure — Support for 
Active Inclusion —was also introduced as a pilot project to support those in the most 
disadvantaged situations by means of the ‘new social card’, already in use in the 12 
largest cities and in southern areas. It is expected to gradually replace the old support 
(purchase card) in force since 2008 with an approach combining monetary support with 
compulsory activation and social services programmes. The new scheme represents a 
significant step in the right direction. However, its strict eligibility requirements, which 
limit it to households with children and with recent employment spells, and the uneven 
quality of services provided by the public employment and social services across different 
regions, limit its effectiveness as a social safety net and activating tool. Given Italy's 
important budgetary constraints, the extension of this measure to the entire Italian 
territory, as announced in the national reform programme, requires adequate and 
efficient allocation of the available financial resources through a recalibration of the 
social expenditure and appropriate targeting of the beneficiaries, in particular families 
with children." 
CSR - "Improve the adequacy and coverage of social assistance while strengthening the 
link to activation"   
SWD – "In 2013, [severe material deprivation] affected more than a quarter of all 
Hungarian residents (more than a third of all children). Housing deprivation among 
children is growing and despite some improvement in 2013 the share of children living in 
low work intensity households is still higher than EU average. The stagnating economy is 
one cause. The other main causes were: the inability of the social protection system to 
respond to social needs; a persistent level of unemployment; frozen social transfers since 
2008; reduced amount of employment substitute benefit (HUF 22 800 per month) with 
tightened eligibility criteria; and a reduction in the maximum duration of unemployment 
benefit to three months (the shortest in the EU). Social assistance benefits are among the 
lowest in the EU, while the capacity of the social safety net to alleviate poverty decreased 
significantly between 2007 and 2012.38 This is reflected in increasing relative poverty 
rates after cash transfers are accounted for, despite decreasing relative poverty rates 
before cash transfers." 

Hungary 

Lithuania  CSR- "Ensure adequate coverage of those most in need and continue to strengthen the 

links between cash social assistance and activation measures" 

SWD – "A reform to social assistance benefits piloted in five municipalities has 
significantly reduced the number of people receiving benefits and thus also overall social 
expenditure. The effects of the reform on social activation and on poverty reduction are 
less clear however. Following a pilot project, the management of social benefit schemes 
has been moved to municipal level as of 2014. This allows municipalities to exercise 
discretion in granting social benefits, with a view to increasing efficiency. The effects of 
the reform may require careful monitoring to ensure that there is equal access to social 
assistance in all municipalities. As municipalities have the right to transfer unused funds 
allocated to social assistance to other programmes, adverse incentives may arise, which 

50 

 
could affect the most vulnerable in society. Only limited progress has been made in 
extending the coverage of activation measures. While these measures have been 
extended to recipients of benefits without children, the activation measures continue to 
be mainly focused on public service employment schemes and employment for socially 
useful activities and thus have only a limited impact on future employability." 

Latvia 

CSR – "Reform social assistance and its financing further to ensure better coverage, 
adequacy of benefits, strengthened activation and targeted social services. Increase 
coverage of active labour market policies. Improve the cost-effectiveness, quality and 
accessibility of the health care system." 

SWD – "The coverage and adequacy of social assistance is low and the incentives to work 
for some groups of social assistance recipients could be improved. Many benefit 
recipients face barriers to employment such as poor health, low skills, caring obligations, 
addictions, low regional mobility, and low motivation. The weak capacity of social 
services limits the success of bringing benefit recipients into active employment." 

Portugal 

CSR – "Increase the threshold for the eligibility for the minimum income scheme. Ensure 
adequate coverage of social assistance, while ensuring effective activation of benefit 
recipients." 

SWD – "The social protection system is characterised by a high non-coverage rate of 
jobless poor, which at 42.3% is the 4th highest after Italy, Greece (which have no national 
minimum income schemes) and Bulgaria. In particular, the income threshold for eligibility 
of the Minimum Income Scheme (Rendimento Social de Inserção) has been lowered in 
2010 and again in 201219, effectively reducing coverage especially for large families. In 
particular, since 2011. The income threshold for eligibility for unemployment assistance 
(Subsídio Social de Desemprego) has also decreased in 2010 as a consequence of a 
change in the equivalent scale." 

Source: Authors, based on http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/making-it-happen/country-specific-
recommendations/index_en.htm 

8.2  Calculation of the coverage rate of unemployment benefits based on LFS data 

The  coverage  rate  of  unemployment  benefits  is  calculated  as  the  ratio  between  the  number  of  a) 
persons registered or not at a public employment office and receiving benefits or assistance and the 
number of b) ILO unemployed. 

a) In the LFS data unemployment benefit recipients are identified through the variable REGISTER. The 
number of unemployment benefits recipient is calculated as the sum of people answering 1 or 3 to 
the REGISTER question (see box below). 

51 

 
 
Source: EU LABOUR FORCE SURVEY Explanatory Notes. 

52 

 
 
 
b) According to the ILOSTAT variable in LFS, unemployed persons comprise persons aged 15 to 74 
years who were:  

 

(1) not employed according to the definition of employment above;  

 

 

(2) currently available for work, i.e. were available for paid employment or self-employment 
before the end of the two weeks following the reference week;  

(3) actively seeking work, i.e. had taken specific steps in the four week period ending with 
the reference week to seek paid employment or self-employment or who found a job to start 
later, i.e. within a period of at most three months from the end of the reference week.  

For the purposes of point (3), the following are considered as specific steps:  

 

a) Having been in contact with a public employment office to find work, whoever 
took the initiative (renewing registration for administrative reasons only is not an 
active step),  

  b) having been in contact with a private agency (temporary work agency, firm 

specialising in recruitment, etc.) to find work,  

 

c) applying to employers directly,  

  d) asking among friends, relatives, unions, etc., to find work,  

  e) placing or answering job advertisements,  

 

f) studying job advertisements,  

 

g) taking a recruitment test or examination or being interviewed,  

  h) looking for land, premises or equipment,  

 

i) applying for permits, licenses or financial resources.  

53 

 
 
Source: EU Labour Force Survey Database User Guide. 

8.3  STATA code to compute the non coverage of social benefits. 

****************************************************************** 
* Programme prepared by: Virginia MAESTRI and Céline THEVENOT - Unit A2 
/* This program aims at computing share of those NOT covered by some Benefs 
among those jobless poor. */ 
****************************************************************** 
clear all 
set more off 
/// Variables that are being used in this work 
local myvariables YEAR COUNTRY PERS_ID HH_ID HX040 HX050 HX090 /*HX100*/ HY020 
/*RB170*/ RB090 RB240 RX010 RX020 /* 
*/ RB050 RB070 RB080 RB220 RB230 RB240 
RX050 RX060 RX070 PE040 /// 

54 

 
 
 
 
PH010 PH020 PH030 PH040 PH050 PH060 /// 
PL020 PL025 PL031 PL035 PL040 PL060 
PL100 PL120 PL140 PL160 PL170 
local income_var HX090 HY010 HX080 /// 
HY022 HY025 /// 
HY030G HY040G HY090G HY050G HY060G 
HY070G HY080G HY081G HY110G HY120G HY130G /// 
HY030N HY040N HY090N HY050N HY060N 
HY070N HY080N HY081N HY110N HY120N HY130N /// 
PY010G PY020G PY021G PY050G PY080G 
PY090G PY100G PY110G PY120G PY130G PY140G PY200G /// 
PY010N PY020N PY050N PY080N PY090N 
PY100N PY110N PY120N PY130N PY140N /*PY200N*/ /// 
local calendar_var PL080 PL211A PL211B PL211C PL211D PL211E PL211F PL211G 
PL211H PL211I PL211J PL211K PL211L 
use `myvariables' `income_var' `calendar_var' using "year-v_cross_idb.dta", 
clear 
drop if COUNTRY=="CH" |COUNTRY=="IS" |COUNTRY=="NO" 
recode RX010 (18/59=1) (60/90 =0) (00/17 =0) (.=.) , gen (WA_AD) 
*Summing "social transfers" at hh lev (social exclusion & housing) with and 
without fam benefits* 
egen incstrh = rowtotal(HY050G HY060G HY070G) if RX020>17 & RX020<60 
egen incstrh_nofam = rowtotal( HY060G HY070G) if RX020>17 & RX020<60 
egen incstrh60 = rowtotal(HY050G HY060G HY070G) if RX020>=60 
egen incstrh_nofam60 = rowtotal( HY060G HY070G) if RX020>=60 
*Summing "benefits" at individual level (pensions)* 
egen incpen1859 = rowtotal(PY100G PY110G) if RX020>17 & RX020<60 
egen incpen60plp = rowtotal(PY100G PY110G) if RX020>=60 
*Summing all ben at individual lev (UB, sickness, disability, edu allowance, 
pensions)* 
egen incstrp = rowtotal(PY090G PY120G PY130G PY140G incpen1859) if RX020>17 & 
RX020<60 
egen incstrp60 = rowtotal(PY090G PY120G PY130G PY140G incpen60plp) if RX020>=60 
*Computing hh income by summing the hh members' incomes 
bysort COUNTRY HH_ID: egen incstrph = total(incstrp) 
bysort COUNTRY HH_ID: egen incstrph60 = total(incstrp60) 
*Summing HOUSEHOLD & PERSONAL income components 
egen incstr = rowtotal(incstrh incstrph) 
non coverage SILC.do 
egen incstr_nofam = rowtotal(incstrh_nofam incstrph) 
egen incstr60 = rowtotal(incstrh60 incstrph60) 
*Computes share of (gross) benefits in total (gross) HH income 
* HY010 is th TOTAL HOUSEHOLD GROSS INCOME 
gen ben_share = incstr/HY010 
gen ben_share_nofam = incstr_nofam/HY010 
*other sources of income at pp lev* 
bysort COUNTRY HH_ID: egen privpen=total(PY080G) 
egen ywork=rowtotal(PY010G PY021G PY050G) 
bysort COUNTRY HH_ID: egen yempl=total(ywork) 
*other sources of income at hh lev* 
g famtr=HY080G-HY081G 
g privpen_s=privpen/HY010 
g rent_s=HY040G/HY010 
g famtr_s=famtr/HY010 
g interest_s=HY090G/HY010 
g yless16_s=HY110G/HY010 
g alimony_s=HY081G/HY010 
g yempl_s=yempl/HY010 
g ben60_s=incstr60/HY010 
g famben_s=HY050G/HY010 
*Computes dummies according to degree of benefits-dependency 
gen ben_10 = (ben_share<0.10) 
gen ben_10_nofam = (ben_share_nofam<0.10) 
gen ben_20_nofam = (ben_share_nofam<0.20) 
gen ben_30_nofam = (ben_share_nofam<0.30) 
*covered=0, non-covered=1* descriptive statisitcs of covered and non-covered 

55 

 
population* 
*income levels for covered and non-covered* 
sort COUNTRY 
by COUNTRY: egen ycov=mean(HY010) if HX080==1 & RX050==1 & ben_10_nofam==0 
by COUNTRY: egen ynon=mean(HY010) if HX080==1 & RX050==1 & ben_10_nofam==1 
by COUNTRY: egen ycov_1=max(ycov) if HX080==1 & RX050==1 
by COUNTRY: egen ynon_1=max(ynon) if HX080==1 & RX050==1 
by COUNTRY: g ratioy=ycov_1/ynon_1 if HX080==1 & RX050==1 
*new poverty line before benefits* 
g newy=(HY022+privpen)*HY025/HX050 
bysort COUNTRY: egen med_income=median(newy) 
g new_povline=med_income*0.6 
g newpoor=0 
replace newpoor=1 if newy<new_povline 
*dummy jobless poor* 
g lwipoor=0 
replace lwipoor=1 if HX080==1 & RX050==1 
g poor=0 
replace poor=1 if HX080==1 & RX050==0 
g lwi=0 
replace lwi=1 if HX080==0 & RX050==1 
g AROPE=1 
replace AROPE=0 if RX070==0 
sort COUNTRY 
g i=1 
by COUNTRY: egen n_lwipoor=count(i) if WA_AD==1 & RX050==1 & HX080==1 
by COUNTRY: egen n_lwinewpoor=count(i) if WA_AD==1 & RX050==1 & newpoor==1 
by COUNTRY: egen n_lwi=count(i) if WA_AD==1 & RX050==1 
by COUNTRY: egen n_poor=count(i) if WA_AD==1 & HX080==1 
by COUNTRY: egen n_dep=count(i) if WA_AD==1 & RX060==1 
*descriptive statistics* 
sort COUNTRY 
table COUNTRY if WA_AD==1, c(mean n_lwipoor mean n_lwinewpoor mean n_lwi mean 
non coverage SILC.do 
n_poor mean n_dep) format(%9,0f) 
table COUNTRY [aweight=RB050] if WA_AD==1, c(mean poor mean newpoor mean lwi 
mean lwipoor) format(%9,4f) 
table COUNTRY [aweight=RB050] if WA_AD==1 & HX080==1 & RX050==1 & ben_10==0, 
c(mean HX040 mean HX050 mean HY030G) format(%9,4f) 
table COUNTRY [aweight=RB050] if WA_AD==1 & HX080==1 & RX050==1 & ben_10==1, 
c(mean HX040 mean HX050 mean HY030G) format(%9,4f) 
table COUNTRY if WA_AD==1 & HX080==1 & RX050==1 & ben_10==0, c(n PERS_ID) 
format(%9,4f) 
table COUNTRY if WA_AD==1 & HX080==1 & RX050==1 & ben_10==1, c(n PERS_ID) 
format(%9,4f) 
table COUNTRY if WA_AD==1 & RX050==1 & ben_10==0, c(n PERS_ID) format(%9,4f) 
table COUNTRY if WA_AD==1 & RX050==1 & ben_10==1, c(n PERS_ID) format(%9,4f) 
table COUNTRY [aweight=RB050] if WA_AD==1 & HX080==1 & RX050==1 & ben_10==0, 
c(mean HY010) format(%9,4f) 
table COUNTRY [aweight=RB050] if WA_AD==1 & HX080==1 & RX050==1 & ben_10==1, 
c(mean HY010) format(%9,4f) 
***covered* 
table COUNTRY [aweight=RB050] if WA_AD==1 & HX080==1 & RX050==1 & 
ben_10_nofam==0, c(mean privpen_s mean rent_s mean famtr_s mean interest_s mean 
alimony_s) format(%9,4f) 
table COUNTRY [aweight=RB050] if WA_AD==1 & HX080==1 & RX050==1 & 
ben_10_nofam==0, c(mean yless16 mean ben_share_nofam mean ratioy mean yempl_s) 
format(%9,4f) 
table COUNTRY [aweight=RB050] if WA_AD==1 & HX080==1 & RX050==1 & 
ben_10_nofam==0, c(mean famben_s mean ben60_s) format(%9,4f) 
*non-covered* 
table COUNTRY [aweight=RB050] if WA_AD==1 & HX080==1 & RX050==1 & 
ben_10_nofam==1, c(mean privpen_s mean rent_s mean famtr_s mean interest_s mean 
alimony_s) format(%9,4f) 
table COUNTRY [aweight=RB050] if WA_AD==1 & HX080==1 & RX050==1 & 
ben_10_nofam==1, c(mean yempl_s mean yless16 mean ben_share_nofam mean ben60_s 

56 

 
mean famben_s) format(%9,4f) 
table COUNTRY [aweight=RB050] if WA_AD==1 & HX080==1 & RX050==1 & 
ben_10_nofam==1, c(mean ratioy) format(%9,4f) 
*yless16 mising as max 5 stat can be specified* 
/* find figures = working age adults, all benefits*/ 
table COUNTRY [aweight=RB050] if WA_AD==1 & HX080==1 & RX050==1 , c(mean ben_10) 
format(%9,4f) 
table COUNTRY [aweight=RB050] if WA_AD==1 & HX080==1 & RX050==1 , c(mean 
ben_10_nofam ) format(%9,4f) 
table COUNTRY [aweight=RB050] if WA_AD==1 & HX080==1 & RX050==1 , c(mean 
ben_20_nofam ) format(%9,4f) 
table COUNTRY [aweight=RB050] if WA_AD==1 & HX080==1 & RX050==1 , c(mean 
ben_30_nofam ) format(%9,4f) 
/*sensitivity*/ 
*jobless poor* 
table COUNTRY [aweight=RB050] if WA_AD==1 & HX080==1 & RX050==1 , c(mean 
ben_10_nofam) format(%9,4f) 
*jobless newpoor* 
table COUNTRY [aweight=RB050] if WA_AD==1 & newpoor==1 , c(mean ben_10_nofam) 
format(%9,4f) 
*only jobless* 
table COUNTRY [aweight=RB050] if WA_AD==1 & RX050==1 , c(mean ben_10_nofam) 
format(%9,4f) 
*only poor* 
table COUNTRY [aweight=RB050] if WA_AD==1 & HX080==1, c(mean ben_10_nofam) 
format(%9,4f) 
*severely materially deprived* 
table COUNTRY [aweight=RB050] if WA_AD==1 & RX060==1, c(mean ben_10_nofam) 
format(%9,4f) 
*AROPE* 
non coverage SILC.do 
table COUNTRY [aweight=RB050] if WA_AD==1 & AROPE==1, c(mean ben_10_nofam) 
format(%9,4f) 
* EU27 
gen un=1 
table un [aweight=RB050] if WA_AD==1 & HX080==1 & RX050==1 , c(mean ben_10 ) 
* eurozone aggregate 
table eurozone [aweight=RB050] if WA_AD==1 & HX080==1 & RX050==1 , c(mean ben_10 
) 

57 

 
8.4  Extracts  from  EU  SILC  SURVEY  DESCRIPTION  OF  TARGET  VARIABLE  (DOC  065, 

Eurostat)  

The  definitions  of  unemployment  benefits  and  main  activity  status  in  EU-SILC  data  are  described 
below  (source:  DESCRIPTION  OF  TARGET  VARIABLES:  Cross-sectional  and  Longitudinal  2013 
operation (Version May 2013)). 

Unemployment benefits (PY090G) 

Unemployment  benefits  refer  to  benefits  that  replace  in  whole  or  in  part  income  lost  by  a  worker 
due to the loss of gainful employment; provide a subsistence (or better) income to persons entering 
or re-entering the labour market; compensate for the loss of earnings due to partial unemployment; 
replace  in  whole  or  in  part  income  lost  by  an  older  worker  who  retires  from  gainful  employment 
before the legal  retirement age  because  of  job reductions  for  economic reasons;  contribute to  the 
cost of training or re-training people looking for employment; or help unemployed persons meet the 
cost of travelling or relocating to obtain employment; 

It includes: 

– Full unemployment benefits: benefits compensating for loss of earnings where a person is capable 
of working and available for work but is unable to find suitable employment, including persons who 
had not previously been employed. 

– Partial unemployment benefits: benefits compensating for the loss of wages or salary due to formal 
short-time  working  arrangements,  and/or  intermittent  work  schedules,  irrespective  of  their  cause 
(business  recession  or  slow-down,  breakdown  of  equipment,  climatic  conditions,  accidents  and  so 
on), and where the employer/employee relationship continues. 

– Early retirement for labour market reasons: periodic payments to older workers who retire before 
reaching  standard  retirement  age  due  to  unemployment  or  to  job  reductions  caused  by  economic 
measures  such  as  the  restructuring  of  an  industrial  sector  or  of  a  business  enterprise.  These 
payments normally cease when the beneficiary becomes entitled to an old age pension. 

–  Vocational  training  allowance:  payments  by  social  security  funds  or  public  agencies  to  targeted 
groups  of  persons  in  the labour  force who  take part  in  training  schemes intended to  develop  their 
potential for employment. 

–  Mobility  and  resettlement:  payments  by  social  security  funds  or  public  agencies  to  unemployed 
persons to encourage them to move to another locality or change their occupation in order to seek 
or to obtain work. 

–  Severance  and  termination  payments  (benefits  compensating  employees  for  employment ending 
before the employee has reached the normal retirement age for that job) . 

58 

 
  
– Redundancy compensation: capital sums paid to employees who have been dismissed through no 
fault of their own by an enterprise that is ceasing or cutting down its activities. 

– Other cash benefits: other financial assistance, particularly payments to the long-term unemployed 

It excludes: 

allowances’ (HY050G)). 

Unemployment benefits (PY090N) 

d under ‘Family/children related 

The net income component correspond to the gross income components but the tax at source, the 
social insurance contributions or both ( if applicable) are deducted. 

Comments about unemployment benefits 

- There are two concepts related to vocational training allowance under the unemployment benefit 
function: 

The vocational training allowance, i.e. payment by social security funds or public agencies to targeted 
groups  of  persons  in the labour  force who  take part  in  training  schemes intended to  develop  their 
potential for employment. This is considered as benefit in cash and thus included in PY090. 

A  benefit  (in-kind)  related  to  vocational  training,  i.e.  payments  by  social  security  funds  or  public 
agencies  to  institutions  that  provide  training  courses  to  unemployed  people.  This  benefits  are 
excluded from EU-SILC. 

PL211A: Main activity on January  
PL211B: Main activity on February  
PL211C: Main activity on March  
PL211D: Main activity on April  
PL211E: Main activity on May  
PL211F: Main activity on June  
PL211G: Main activity on July  
PL211H: Main activity on August  
PL211I: Main activity on September  
PL211J: Main activity on October  
PL211K: Main activity on November  
PL211L: Main activity on December  

LABOUR INFORMATION (Calendar of activities)  
Longitudinal (see note below)  

59 

 
 
 
Reference period: income reference period  
Unit: selected respondent (where applies) or all current household members aged 16 and over  
Mode of collection: personal interview (proxy as an exception) or registers  
Values  
1 Employee working full-time  
2 Employee working part-time  
3 Self-employed working full-time (including family worker)  
4 Self-employed working part-time (including family worker)  
5 Unemployed  
6 Pupil, student, further training, unpaid work experience  
7 In retirement or in early retirement or has given up business  
8 Permanently disabled or/and unfit to work  
9 In compulsory military community or service  
10 Fulfilling domestic tasks and care responsibilities  
11 Other inactive person  
Flags  
1 filled  
-1 missing  
-3 not selected respondent  

This variable replaces, from the 2009 operation onwards, the variables PL210 defined in the EU-
SILC Regulation1  
1  
The status is self-defined and the same definitions as for variable PL031 apply (see PL031 for 
definitions and explanations). In particular, if the person combines different part-time jobs as 
employee leading to an equivalent full-time work, the person should consider his/herself as 
employee working full-time (code 1 should be ticked for the month).  
If more than one type of activities occur in the same month, priority should be given to economic 
activity (“main activity: work”) over non-economic activity and over inactivity. On the basis of 
this principle, the following rules may be used:  
- If the respondent worked, at least during 2 weeks of the month, then code 1, 2, 3 or 4 should be 
ticked for the month.  
- If more than one of the other codes apply in the same month, the respondent will select one on 
the basis of self-assessment. The criterion of most time spent may be useful where applicable.  

See also PL040  
Note  
For  those  MS  using  a  ‘rotational  panel’  as  well  as  those  MS  using  a  ‘pure  panel’  the  variables 
PL211A-PL211L will also be provided for EU-SILC cross-sectional component.  

60 

 
 
61 

 
 
Annex A: Overview of main characteristics of unemployment benefit schemes in the EU and other major OECD countries 

5.  Where weekly earnings while in employment were below certain amounts, reduced rates of payment are made. If dependent adult is employed, supplement is reduced or 
suppressed depending on income level. 
6.  For employees with a temporary reduction of working hours there is also the CIG scheme which pays benefits of 80% of average gross earnings for non-worked hours. 

62 

initialat end of legal entitlement periodNational currency% of AWNational currency% of AW[1][2][3][4][6][7][8][9][10][11][12]Eurozone countriesAustriaE+C: 1 year in 2.C (if earnings above threshold)09Net----16.31642No reduction for earnings up to EUR 4396, total loss if earnings greater.Each dependant: EUR 354.BelgiumE+C: 468 days in 27 months.C0Unlimited60 53.8 (after 1 year)Gross10.1592415.88738Maximum: limit of EUR 3872 for artistic employment.If dependants, minimum benefit is increased to EUR 12090 (29% of AW.EstoniaE+C: 12 months in 3 years.C7125040 (after 101 days)Gross26.10017Approx. 220000149None.--FinlandE: 34 weeks in 28 months,C: 10 months.V723Gross (excluding additional holiday pay) less SSC.----Working hours <75% of full time. Benefit reduced by 50% of gross income. Benefit plus income cannot exceed 90% of reference earnings.Supplements: EUR 1254, 1840, 2371 for 1, 2 and 3 or more children respectively.FranceC: 4 months in 28 months.C724Gross9.8292879.488228Income <70% of reference earnings, hours worked/month <110 and duration <15 months. Benefit reduced depending on income ratio to reference earnings.--GermanyE: 12 months,C: 12 months in 2 years.C012Net----38.88092 Total loss if working more than 15 hours/week.Rate increases by 7 percentage points if dependant children present.GreeceE+C: 125 days in 14 months or 200 days in 2 years.C612----------None.Benefit increased by 10% for each.MaltaC: 50 weeks, including 20 in last 52.C--5Fixed amount (21% of AW).----------Earnings must be below payment level.Additional 11% of AW if lone parent or maintaining a spouse.Ireland(5)C: 39 weeks in 1 year (or 26 "reckonable" contributions in 2 years).104 weeks contributions paid since starting work C312----------Benefit is not paid for any day or partial day of employment. Earnings are not assessed.Supplements of 5% of AW per qualifying child,  and 21% of APW per qualifying adult.Italy(6)C: 52 weeks in 2 years.C786050 after 6 months Average gross earnings of last3 months.----12.87946No benefits if receiving earnings from employment (except for CIG scheme).--  Unemployment insurance benefits, 2010For a 40-year old (where benefits are conditional on work history, the table assumes a long and uninterrupted employment record)Basic benefit (17% of AW) plus 45% of earnings exceeding basic benefit to 81% of AW then 20%.None57-7560Flat rate benefit (27% of AW).Fixed amount (32% of AW).Employment (E) and contribution (C)conditionsInsurance is voluntary(V) or compulsory(C) for employeesWaiting period(days)Maximum duration (months)Payment rate (% of earnings base)Earnings base(2)Minimum benefit (1)Maximum benefit (1)Permitted employment and disregardsAdditions for dependent family members[5]55 
 
 
Annex A: Overview of main characteristics of unemployment benefit schemes in the EU and other major OECD countries 

63 

initialat end of legal entitlement periodNational currency% of AWNational currency% of AW[1][2][3][4][6][7][8][9][10][11][12]Eurozone countriesLuxembourgE+C: 26 weeks in 1 year.C012Average gross earnings of last3 months.----39.58480Reduced if earnings exceed 10% of the earnings base used to calculate benefit.Replacement rate increases by 5 percentage points if dependent children present.NetherlandsE+C: 26 weeks in 36, plus 52 days in 4 of 5 years.C03875 70 (after 2 months)Gross12.8462836.13180If <5 hours/week, benefit reduced by 70% of gross earnings. If >5 hours/week, proportional reduction.Supplementary benefits for low-income households to bring income up to a minimum guaranteed level.Slovak RepublicE+C: 3 years in 4 years.C06Gross----13.208142No benefits if employed.--SloveniaE+C: 12 months in 18 months.C--97060 (after 3 months)Gross earnings  of last 12 months (incl. bonuses)4.0142412.04171A beneficiary who is seeking full-time work keeps receiving a proportional amount of UI if they get part-time work (up to 20 hours per week).--SpainC: 360 days in 6 years.C0247060 (after 6 months)Gross5.9642413.04653Benefits are reduced in proportion to hours worked.Increased minimum and maximum benefit if person has dependent children.Other EU countriesBulgariaE+C: 9 months in last 15.C--1260Gross1.56421----No benefits if employed--Czech RepublicE+C:12 months in 3 years.C--56550-45 (after 2 and 4 months) Net----Approx. 16700058 (4)Half of the minimum wage in a month is allowed without losing entitlement to unemployment benefits.--DenmarkE: 52 weeks in 3 years.C: membership fee.V024Gross less 8% SSC.160.41643195.51652Benefits are reduced in proportion to hours worked.--LatviaC: 9 months in 12 monthsC096532,5 after 7 monthsGross--------No benefits if employed--LithuaniaC: 18 months in 36 monthsC--940% + fixed amount of LTL 350 per month20 after 3 monthsGross4.200187.80033No benefits if employed--HungaryE+C: 365 days in 4 years.C096060% of mandatory minimum wageGross average earnings of last 4 calendar quarters529.200211.058.40042For short term (<90 days) and occasional/seasonal employment, the benefit is suspended. --PolandE+C: 365 days in 18 months and earnings > minimum wage.C712Fixed amount 30% of AW.(8)Fixed amount 23% of AW (after 3 months).(9)----------Gross income disregard of up to PLN 7902 (half the minimum pay).--RomaniaC: 12 months in 24C--12Fixed amount of 24% of AW plus 10% of earnings.Gross--------Can keep 30% of benefit if re-employed--SwedenE: 6 months in last year, C: been a member of an insurance fund for 12 months.V7358070 (after 9 months). 65 for Job and Development Guarantee(after 14 months).Gross83.20023 176.80048Benefits are reduced in proportion to days worked.--United KingdomC: 12 months in  2 years.C36----------Income over GBP 260 (520 for couples) reduces benefit by same amount.--Fixed amount (10% of AW).Employment (E) and contribution (C)conditionsInsurance is voluntary(V) or compulsory(C) for employeesWaiting period(days)Maximum duration (months)Payment rate (% of earnings base)Earnings base(2)Minimum benefit (1)Maximum benefit (1)Permitted employment and disregardsAdditions for dependent family members[5]805090 
 
 
Annex A: Overview of main characteristics of unemployment benefit schemes in the EU and other major OECD countries 

64 

initialat end of legal entitlement periodNational currency% of AWNational currency% of AW[1][2][3][4][6][7][8][9][10][11][12]Other non-EU countriesJapanE+C: 6 months in 1 year (at least 11 days each month).C79Gross earnings of last 6 months (excl. bonuses).----2.516.40053No benefits if employed.--Canada(3)E+C: 595 hours in 1 year.C1411Gross----23.76453Up to 40% of benefits or CAD 3900, whichever is higher.Family supplements depend on income plus age and number of children.United States (9)E: 20 weeks (plus minimum earnings requirement).C02353Gross6.0841318.82441Earnings less than gross benefit are deducted at 50% rate; Earnings exceeding gross benefit are subtracted from 1.5 times the gross benefit amount. Individuals earning more than 1.5 times their gross benefit amount are ineligible.USD 312 for each dependant.Minimum benefit (1)Maximum benefit (1)Permitted employment and disregardsAdditions for dependent family members[5]Insurance is voluntary(V) or compulsory(C) for employeesWaiting period(days)Maximum duration (months)Payment rate (% of earnings base)Earnings base(2)Employment (E) and contribution (C)conditions5550-80 
 
 
Table 17 - Trend of non-coverage rate 2008-2013 

Source: Eurostat elaborations based on EUSILC data 2008-2013. 

65 

Family/child benefits includedFamily/child benefits not includedFamily/child benefits includedFamily/child benefits not includedFamily/child benefits includedFamily/child benefits not includedFamily/child benefits includedFamily/child benefits not includedFamily/child benefits includedFamily/child benefits not included Family/child benefits includedFamily/child benefits not includedAT11%17%13%25%9%12%17%22%26%28%15%18%BE6%8%7%9%6%10%8%9%5%9%6%7%BG24%39%29%47%31%52%28%47%30%46%26%49%CH30%33%22%27%17%20%12%15%19%32%23%31%CY20%24%32%34%40%46%40%47%43%49%23%34%CZ7%21%5%15%7%16%13%22%9%15%13%16%DE10%14%12%15%10%12%9%12%9%14%11%15%DK12%15%14%15%15%17%11%11%11%11%6%6%EE23%30%22%30%19%30%21%28%19%28%19%30%EL45%51%47%51%54%60%53%57%65%70%50%59%ES32%36%30%32%26%27%26%27%31%32%23%24%FI2%3%2%2%2%2%2%2%2%2%2%2%FR4%6%3%4%5%7%6%8%7%7%10%12%HR21%30%24%33%22%32%29%37%HU5%12%4%12%4%16%5%14%4%13%11%20%IE3%20%3%24%3%19%1%15%2%15%IS8%24%21%21%17%17%13%21%31%31%19%26%IT56%59%52%56%50%54%48%51%47%51%47%51%LT31%38%32%35%37%49%25%30%18%21%16%21%LU8%11%6%11%5%13%6%8%6%6%6%8%LV30%40%36%48%32%41%29%40%31%38%32%39%MT22%25%10%14%15%22%13%18%11%21%6%13%NL1%2%8%14%6%12%3%4%7%7%11%11%NO16%20%12%14%6%8%7%8%6%8%10%15%PL12%18%11%15%15%18%18%26%23%30%18%25%PT20%27%16%20%18%23%20%24%26%33%21%25%RO27%39%27%36%15%32%15%37%27%46%32%44%SE10%13%11%11%7%8%7%8%9%11%5%7%SI15%15%13%14%5%7%9%9%8%9%7%9%SK6%10%7%12%5%9%6%12%8%14%5%10%UK6%13%9%12%10%14%11%14%13%15%12%14%EU2718%23%17%21%17%21%18%22%21%25%20%24%EU2817%21%18%23%21%25%20%24%200820092010201120122013HOW TO OBTAIN EU PUBLICATIONS 

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