Ex-post evaluation of Regulation (EC) No 1071/2009 and Regulation (EC) No 1072/2009 : final report.
Date: 2016-11-24
Institutions: Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport
Subjects: access to a profession, administrative cooperation, carriage of goods, carriage of passengers, common transport policy, competition, international transport, organisation of transport, professional qualifications, recognition of diplomas, road transport, transport licence, transport regulations

Ex-post evaluation of 
Regulation (EC) No 
1071/2009 and  
Regulation (EC) No 
1072/2009 
Final report 

Study contract no. MOVE/D3/2014 - 254 

Gena Gibson, Elisabeth Windisch, Edina Lohr, Stephen Luckhurst (Ricardo Energy & Environment) 
Sara Moya, Miguel Troncoso Ferrer, Conchi Ruixo (GA&P)  
Alessio Sitran, Caterina Rosa, Enrico Pastori (TRT) 

December - 2015 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport 
Directorate D — Logistics, maritime & land transport and passenger rights 
Unit D.3 — Land transport 

Contact: Pedro Dias 

E-mail:  pedro.dias@ec.europa.eu  

European Commission 
B-1049 Brussels 

 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Ex-post evaluation of 
Regulation (EC) No 
1071/2009 and  
Regulation (EC) No 
1072/2009 
Final report 

Study contract no. MOVE/D3/2014 - 254 

Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport  

2015 

   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2016 

ISBN 978-92-79-63760-5  
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Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Table of Contents 

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................. 8 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................. 8 

1. 

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 15 

1.1.  Purpose of the evaluation ........................................................................... 15 
1.2.  Scope of the evaluation ............................................................................. 15 

2. 

BACKGROUND TO THE INITIATIVE ....................................................................... 16 

2.1.  Description of the initiative ......................................................................... 16 
2.2.  Baseline .................................................................................................. 16 
Intervention logic ...................................................................................... 18 
2.3. 

3. 

EVALUATION QUESTIONS ................................................................................... 21 

4.  METHOD/PROCESS FOLLOWED ............................................................................ 23 

4.1.  Method/process and limitations ................................................................... 23 

5. 

IMPLEMENTATION STATE OF PLAY (RESULTS) ........................................................ 28 

5.1. 
Implementation and state of play ................................................................ 28 
5.2.  Market context and development ................................................................ 33 

6. 

ANSWERS TO THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS ......................................................... 37 

6.1.  Effectiveness:  To  what  extent  are  compliance  levels  with  the  new  provisions 

satisfactory? ............................................................................................ 37 
6.2.  Effectiveness: To what extent are the new enforcement measures effective? ..... 55 
6.3.  Effectiveness: To what  extent are  the  measures on  administrative cooperation 

effective? ................................................................................................. 89 

6.4.  Effectiveness: To what  extent  have the Regulations contributed  to the smooth 

functioning of the internal market for road transport? .................................... 98 

6.5.  Effectiveness: To what extent has the legislation helped to increase the level of 

compliance with EU road transport social legislation? .................................... 116 

6.6.  Effectiveness:  To  what  extent  have  the  Regulations  had  an  impact  on  road 
safety,  particularly  in  terms  of  fatigue  of  drivers,  and  helped  to  address  the 
road safety concerns identified at the time of adoption? ................................ 129 

6.7.  Effectiveness:  Have  the  Regulations  led  to  any  positive  and/or  negative 
unintended effects (both in terms of impacts and results) other than mentioned 
in previous questions? .............................................................................. 134 

6.8.  Efficiency:  To  what  extent  have  the  Regulations  helped  to  reduce  costs  (i.e. 
compliance  and  administrative)  both  for  transport  undertakings  and  national 
authorities? ............................................................................................. 142 

6.9.  Efficiency: Are there costs related to the implementation of the new provisions? 

If so, are they proportionate to the benefits achieved? .................................. 147 

6.10.  Efficiency: To what extent have the Regulations been efficient in their objective 

of enabling enforcement of the existing rules? .............................................. 152 

6.11.  Relevance:  To  what  extent  are  the  operational  objectives  of  the  Regulations 

relevant and proportionate to address the problems of the sector? .................. 159 

6.12.  Coherence:  How  do  the  Regulations  interact  with  and  if  relevant,  have  an 

impact on the objectives of other related legislation? .................................... 164 

6.13.  Coherence: How do the effects of the two Regulations relate to the goals of EU 
transport policy and the wider economic, social or environmental challenges of 
EU policies? ............................................................................................ 185 

6.14.  EU  added  value:    To  what  extent  could  a  different  level  of  regulation  (e.g.  at 
national  level)  be  more  relevant  and/or  effective  and/or  efficient  than  the 
applicable one to ensure common rules? ..................................................... 188 

6.15.  EU added value: Is there any evidence that in certain cases a different level of 
regulation  could  have  been  more  relevant  and/or  effective  and/or  efficient  to 
achieve the objectives? ............................................................................. 192 
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Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

7. 

CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................. 194 

7.1.  Effectiveness ........................................................................................... 194 
7.2.  Efficiency ................................................................................................ 199 
7.3.  Relevance ............................................................................................... 200 
7.4.  Coherence .............................................................................................. 200 
7.5.  EU added value ....................................................................................... 201 

8. 

RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................................... 202 

8.1.  Measures to combat letterbox companies .................................................... 202 
8.2.  Clarification of cabotage rules .................................................................... 202 
8.3.  Guidance and sharing of best practice ......................................................... 203 
8.4.  Longer-term considerations ....................................................................... 204 

9. 

ANNEX A: SUPPLEMENTARY TECHNICAL ANALYSIS ................................................ 207 

9.1.  Monitoring data ....................................................................................... 207 
9.2.  Effectiveness:  To  what  extent  are  compliance  levels  with  the  new  provisions 

satisfactory? ........................................................................................... 213 
9.3.  Effectiveness: To what extent are the new enforcement measures effective? .... 217 
9.4.  Effectiveness: To what  extent are  the  measures on  administrative cooperation 

effective? ................................................................................................ 226 

9.5.  Effectiveness: To what  extent  have the Regulations contributed  to the smooth 

functioning of the internal market for road transport? ................................... 227 

9.6.  Effectiveness:  To  what  extent  have  the  Regulations  had  an  impact  on  road 
safety,  particularly  in  terms  of  fatigue  of  drivers,  and  helped  to  address  the 
road safety concerns identified at the time of adoption? ................................ 240 

9.7.  Effectiveness:  Have  the  Regulations  led  to  any  positive  and/or  negative 
unintended effects (both in terms of impacts and results) other than mentioned 
in previous questions? .............................................................................. 242 

9.8.  Efficiency:  To  what  extent  have  the  Regulations  helped  to  reduce  costs  (i.e. 
compliance  and  administrative)  both  for  transport  undertakings  and  national 
authorities? ............................................................................................. 243 

9.9.  Efficiency: Are there costs related to the implementation of the new provisions? 

If so, are they proportionate to the benefits achieved? .................................. 251 

9.10.  Relevance:  To  what  extent  are  the  operational  objectives  of  the  Regulations 

relevant and proportionate to address the problems of the sector? .................. 258 

10.  ANNEX B: SUMMARY OF STAKEHOLDER CONTRIBUTIONS ....................................... 259 

10.1.  Organisation of the consultation ................................................................. 259 
10.2.  National transport ministries ...................................................................... 260 
10.3.  Enforcement authorities ............................................................................ 271 
10.4.  Undertakings consultation ......................................................................... 289 
10.5.  High level consultation .............................................................................. 295 
10.6.  Summary of stakeholder consultation ......................................................... 301 

11.  ANNEX C: CASE STUDIES .................................................................................. 302 

11.1.  Denmark 302 
11.2.  Spain 
313 
11.3.  Germany 321 
11.4.  Poland  333 
11.5.  Romania 339 

12.  ANNEX D: INFRINGEMENT CASES ....................................................................... 346 

12.1.  Infringements at EU level .......................................................................... 346 
12.2.  INFRINGEMENTS AT NATIONAL LEVEL ........................................................ 347 

13.  ANNEX E: REFERENCES ..................................................................................... 349 

14.  ANNEX F: GLOSSARY......................................................................................... 356 

6 

 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

7 

 
 
 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

ABSTRACT 

This ex-post evaluation covers two Regulations that form part of the EU Road Transport 
Package:  Regulation  1071/2009  on  admission  to  the  occupation  of  road  transport 
operator,  and  Regulation  1072/2009  on  common  rules  for  access  to  the  international 
road  haulage  market.    The  results  show  that  the  Regulations  have  only  been  partially 
effective  to  date  in  terms  of  achieving  their  objectives.    There  have  been  neutral  or 
slightly  positive  impacts  against  the  objectives  to  improve  social  and  safety  conditions 
and reducing empty running.  Good progress has been made in terms of the objective to 
ensure  a  more  level  playing  field,  particularly  regarding  the  establishment  of  common 
minimum  requirements  for  stable  and  effective  establishment.    However,  this  objective 
has  not  been  fully  achieved  due  to  the  continuing  presence  of  letterbox  companies, 
differing  national  interpretations  of  the  rules  (including  rules  on  cabotage)  and  uneven 
monitoring/enforcement.    There  are  substantial  shortfalls  of  92-95%  against  the 
objectives  to  reduce  administrative  burdens.    This  is  mainly  due  to  the  incomplete 
implementation of requirements to interconnect national registers.    The Regulations are 
not  fully  coherent  with  other  transport  legislation;  discrepancies  in  definitions  were 
uncovered,  such  as with  the  Combined  Transport  Directive  92/106/EEC  and  the  Posting 
of Workers Directive 96/71/EC. The Regulations represent an EU added value compared 
to alternatives such as national or non-binding measures. 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Scope of the evaluation 

This  ex-post  evaluation  study  covers  the  following  Regulations,  which  form  part  of  the 
so-called EU Road Transport Package: 

  Regulation  1071/2009  on  admission  to  the  occupation  of  road  transport 
operator:  This  Regulation  sets  the  provisions  that  undertakings  must  comply 
with,  in  order  to  access  the  occupation  of  road  transport  operator,  as  well  as 
provisions to regulate and facilitate enforcement by Member States. 

  Regulation  1072/2009  on  common  rules  for  access  to  the  international 
road haulage market: This Regulation lays down the provisions to be complied 
with  by  undertakings  that  wish  to  operate  on  the  international  road  haulage 
market  and  on  national  markets  other  than  their  own  (cabotage1).  It  also  sets 
down  provisions  regarding  the  sanctioning  of  infringements  and  cooperation 
between Member States in such cases. 

The  evaluation  covers  the  period from  the  date  that  the Regulations  entered  into  force, 
i.e.  from  4  December  2011  (with  the  exception  of  the  rules  on  cabotage  which  applied 
since 14 May 2010). 

Evaluation methodology 

The  methodology  followed  the  standard  evaluation  framework  for  an  assessment  of 
legislation  and  the  key  evaluation  questions  related  to  effectiveness,  efficiency, 
relevance, coherence and EU added value.  

The main research tools used included: 

  Desk research and literature review. 

  Analysis  of  official  monitoring  data  collected  under  the  Regulations  (Article  26  of 

Regulation 1071/2009 and Article 17 of Regulation 1072/2009).  

  Exploratory interviews with six organisations. 

1 Cabotage is defined as national carriage for hire or reward carried out on a temporary basis in a 

host Member State. 

8 

 
 
   
                                          
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

  Four  tailored  surveys  targeted  at  the  following  stakeholder  groups:  national 
transport  ministries,  enforcement  authorities,  undertakings  and  general 
stakeholders  (such  as  associations  and  trade  unions).    Almost  200  responses  in 
total were received. 

Interviews with 54 stakeholders. 

 
  Case  studies  covering  five  countries:  Denmark,  Spain,  Germany,  Poland  and 

Romania. 

The main limitations of the research were due to a lack of quantitative data availability.  
This was variously due to the difficulty of monitoring certain key aspects (such as indirect 
impacts on social conditions), a lack of monitoring at the required level of detail, or a lack 
of data due to the relatively short time period since implementation (due in some cases 
to delayed implementation). These limitations were addressed to the extent possible by 
supplementing  with  qualitative  analysis  conducted  on  the  basis  of  the  literature  review, 
stakeholder engagement and collation of data from official monitoring sources. 

Evaluation results 

Effectiveness 

The  Regulations  had  general  and  specific  objectives  to  improve  the  level  of  road 
safety  and  to  improve  social  conditions  by  improving  compliance  with  EU  road 
transport  social  legislation.    The  achievement  of  Regulation  1071/2009  against  this 
general objective has been positive (although impossible to quantify).  The direct impacts 
of  Regulation  1072/2009  have  been  negligible,  whereas  the  indirect  impacts  caused  by 
increases  in  competition  are  likely  to  have  been  negative  in  terms  of  social  and  safety 
impacts.  Overall, the Regulations have been ineffective in significantly promoting social 
and safety improvements.   

Partial  progress  has  been  made  in  terms  of  ensuring  a  more  level  playing  field 
between  resident  and  non-resident  hauliers  regarding  the  establishment  of  common 
minimum  requirements  for  access  to  the  profession  and  to  the  international  haulage 
market.    This  has  been  achieved  especially  in  terms  of  improving  the  harmonisation  of 
definitions.  However, the general objective of achieving a level playing field for hauliers 
has  not  been  fully  achieved  due  to  the  continuing  presence  of  “letterbox  companies”2, 
differing national interpretations of the rules and uneven monitoring/enforcement.   

Improving  transport  market  efficiency  through  reducing  empty  running  were 
respectively general and specific objectives of Regulation 1072/2009.  It is unlikely that 
there  have  been  any  significant  positive  or  negative  impacts  on  the  transport  market 
overall, but the effects on individual carriers vary. 

As  specific  objectives,  both  Regulations  aimed  to  reduce  the  administrative  burden 
for  national  authorities  and  transport  undertakings  through  allowing  for  improved 
monitoring and administrative simplification.  These measures are still very much a work 
in progress, and as a result the objectives have still not been achieved. 

Regulation  1071/2009  had  a  specific  objective  to  ensure  a  higher  standard  of 
professional qualification.  The provisions may have contributed to an improvement in 
the  standards  for Member States where  previous  similar requirements  were not  already 
in place (more usually the EU-13 countries).  Potential weaknesses that may undermine 
the achievement of this objective are concerns over varying standards across the EU and 
related issues of diploma tourism, although no conclusive evidence of these effects could 
be found. 

A specific objective of Regulation 1072/2009 concerned the establishment of a better 
definition  of  the  temporary  nature  of  cabotage.    This  has  been  partially  achieved 
and progress can be considered positive.  Nevertheless, clarifications of specific  aspects 
may  still  be  needed  to  ensure  the  full  achievement  of  this  part  of  the  objective.    There 

2  This  term  refers  to  companies  "established"  in  a  Member  State  where  they  do  not  carry  out  their 

administrative functions or commercial activities, in violation of Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 1071/2009 

9 

 
 
                                          
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

was  insufficient  data  to  assess  the  achievement  of  the  second  part  of  the  objective 
in  compliance  with  the  cabotage  provisions.  
concerning 
Qualitatively, indications of difficulties around enforcement suggest that there is a risk of 
illegal cabotage activities, especially in heavily cabotaged Member States.  

improvements 

Efficiency 

Overall, the benefits experienced to date due to reductions in administrative cost are 
much lower (92-95% lower) than the amount originally anticipated.  Total savings from 
improved  monitoring,  requirements  of  financial  standing  and  harmonised  control 
documents  are  estimated  at  €8  million  to  €14  million  per  annum  to  date,  compared  to 
the  expected  savings  of  €175  million.    The  shortfall  is  mainly  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
ERRU  system  is  not  fully  functional  and  negligible  benefits  could  be  calculated  to  date, 
meaning that the expected benefits have not been achieved.   

The additional compliance costs are estimated at €15 to €34 million per annum, which 
is  broadly  comparable  to  the  ex-ante  estimates  of  €20  million  per  annum.    The  main 
uncertainty  is  the  extent  to  which  firms  have  been  affected  by  the  requirement  for  a 
designated transport manager in practice, considering the possible need to increase their 
salary commensurate with their increased responsibilities.  

The  only  provision  that  made  a  significant  contribution  to  implementation  costs  was 
the  setting  up  of  national  electronic  registers  and  their  interconnection.    Overall,  the 
estimated ex-post cost for these aspects was €22.1 million, which is around  70% lower 
than  the  ex-ante  cost  estimates  of  €73  million.    Current  estimates  of  the  benefit-cost 
ratio  are  around  0.2  (assuming  a  discount  rate  of  4%  and  a  time  period  of  10  years), 
indicating that the system has not been cost-effective so far.  This is largely because the 
benefits are assumed to be rather small, due to the incomplete status of interconnection 
– however, it was not possible to develop quantitative estimates of the expected benefits 
of the fully functioning system. 

As  for  ongoing  enforcement  costs,  indications  from  both  the  survey  responses  and 
literature  are  that  there  have  not  been  any  significant  changes  in  enforcement  costs, 
since most of the activities were already being carried out. 

Relevance 

Overall the Regulations are still considered relevant tools in order to meet the objectives 
of reducing competitive distortion, improving compliance with road social legislation and 
improving road safety.   

Concerning  the  relevance  of  the  Regulations  in  terms  of  reducing  letterbox  companies, 
the targeting of the objectives is appropriate/relevant to the problem, but further specific 
actions should enhance the measures and ensure that they are fully adequate to address 
the  needs  (i.e.  more  precise  definition  of  an  operating  centre  and  greater  cooperation 
between Member States).  The issue of divergent control and enforcement systems is still 
an  area  of  development  (e.g.  work  is  ongoing  to  harmonise  the  categorisation  of 
infringements).    However,  the  objectives  do  not  explicitly  aim  at  the  harmonisation  of 
controls, and hence this issue is not adequately targeted by the operational objectives.   

The  objective  to  address  high  levels  of  empty  running  is  still  relevant  in  the  context  of 
the  need  to  reduce  fuel  consumption  and  greenhouse  gas  (GHG)  emissions  from 
transport.  However, evidence is mixed as to the extent to which cabotage has been an 
adequate means to improve fill rates. 

Coherence 

Overall,  the  legal  framework  is  not  fully  coherent  concerning  interactions  with  other 
legislation.  There  are  certain  difficulties  in  the  correct  implementation  of  Regulations 
1071/2009  and  1072/2009  and  the  satisfactorily  achievement  of  their  objectives, 
considering the relation with the other EU legislation.  

10 

 
 
 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Concerning  Regulation  561/2006  and  Directive  2002/15/EC  on  driving,  rest  and 
working  time  for  road  transport  operators,  the  objectives  are  coherent  with  Regulation 
1071/2009 and 1072/2009, as they all aim to improve social and working conditions for 
transport  workers  in  Europe.    However,  there  are  possible  inconsistencies  where 
Regulation 1071/2009 does not contain a specific reference to Regulation 561/2006 or to 
Directive  2002/15/EC  –  e.g.  when  defining  in  Annex  IV  the  most  serious  infringements 
related  to  driving  and  working  time  limits.    Furthermore,  the  co-liability  principle 
established  by  Regulation  561/2006  is  not  provided  for  by  Regulations  1071/2009  and 
1072/2009. 

As  regards  Directive  2006/22/EC  which  contains  provisions  for  the  enforcement  of 
Regulation  561/2006,  there  are  differences  in  the  lists  of  infringements  contained  in 
Annex IV of Regulation 1071/2009 and Annex III of Directive 2006/22/EC and referring 
to the requirements on (i) good repute and (ii) driving time and rest periods.  There are 
also  certain  inconsistencies  between  Regulation  1071/2009  and  Directive  2006/22/EC 
concerning the requirements for monitoring the compliance with both provisions, as well 
as the types of cooperation between national authorities. 

Regulation  1071/2009  is  applicable  to  vehicles  with  a  laden  mass  of  more  than  3.5 
tonnes.  This  means  that  it  is  not  consistent  with  the  exemption  established  in 
tachograph  Regulation  165/2014,  which  is  applicable  to  vehicles  with  a  laden  mass 
not exceeding 7.5 tonnes. 

The  road  legs  of  combined  transport  operations  are  exempted  from  the  limitations  on 
cabotage  contained  in  Regulation  1072/2009  as  long  as  the  conditions  established  in 
Article  1  of  the  Combined  Transport  Directive  92/106/EEC  are  fulfilled.    However, 
some provisions may be outdated and its application gives rise to certain inconsistencies 
among  Member  States.    There  are  also  possible  disparities  between  the  documentation 
requirements for cabotage and combined transport.   

The  enforceability  of  the  Posting  of  Workers  Directive  96/71/EC  with  regard  to 
cabotage  operations  is  highly  questionable.  There  is  an  inherent  difficulty  in  checking 
whether drivers performing cabotage are granted the minimum conditions of the workers 
in the country where they perform cabotage and for the part of their trip where they are 
performing such cabotage. Furthermore, certain requirements of the Posting of Workers 
Directive,  such  as  the  existence  of  a  service  contract  between  the  employer  and  a 
recipient  in  the  host  state  may  impede  the  protection  granted  by  the  Directive  to 
transport workers.   

A  lack  of  coherence  between  Regulations  1071/2009  and  1072/2009  and  Rome  I 
Regulation has not been identified.  

In  relation  to  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  (TFEU),  there  have 
been  some  questions  raised  on  whether  interaction  with  the  Treaty  on  the  right  of 
establishment  actually  encourages  the  formation  of  letterbox  companies.    In  this  area 
there is no  contradiction with the Regulations in theory.   If an existing company that is 
doing business in one Member State wants to re-incorporate in a different Member State, 
but  without  the  intention  of  having  any  establishment  in  the  new  Member  State,  this 
transaction will not be protected by the freedom of establishment.   

EU added value 

Regulations  1071/2009  and  1072/2009  are  broadly  considered  to  have  led  to  positive 
effects  compared  to  the  situation  prior  to  when  they  entered  into  force.  The  analysis 
suggests  that  the  adoption  of  an  EU  Regulation  has  had  certain  advantages  in 
comparison  to  alternatives.    In  particular,  previous  efforts  using  Directives  as  well  as 
non-binding measures (e.g. guidance notes) have not been sufficient to ensure common 
rules  and  harmonisation.    Therefore  the  use  of  a  Regulation  appears  to  be  the  most 
appropriate, effective and relevant instrument to achieve the objectives.   

11 

 
 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Recommendations  

Measures to combat letterbox companies 

The recommendations to combat letterbox companies aim to directly target the problem 
areas identified, namely:  

  A  lack  of  clarity  over  how  to  define  an  operating  centre  should  be  addressed  by 
introducing a more precise definition as to what constitutes an operating centre at 
the European level  

  A  lack  of  effective  cooperation  between  Member  States  should  be  addressed  by 

introducing additional provisions on better cooperation.     

The  Enforcement  Directive of  the  Posting  of  Workers Directive  (2014/67/EU)  provides  a 
good  blueprint  of  measures  in  both  areas.    Concerning  the  infrastructure  needed  to 
ensure  cooperation,  the  current  priority  with  regards  to  ensuring  the  effectiveness  and 
efficiency  of  the  rules  should  be  to  ensure  that  full  implementation  of  the  existing 
provisions  (such  as  the  full  setting  up  of  European  Register  of  Road  Transport 
Undertakings,  ERRU)  is  achieved,  rather  than  attempting  to  introduce  additional 
measures.   

Clarification of cabotage rules 

The intended interpretations of the rules have already been clarified by the Commission 
in  the  Frequently  Asked  Questions  (FAQ)  document  on  cabotage.  However,  since  these 
are  not  legally  binding  the  interpretations  have  not  been  taken  up,  and  hence  a 
clarification of the provisions in the Regulations seems to be the only effective solution to 
differing national interpretations. 

The  practice  of  systematic  cabotage  is  not  strictly  prohibited  under  the  current  form  of 
the Regulations. If this is to be addressed, there additionally needs to be an amendment 
to the rules to allow some sort of waiting period. 

Guidance and sharing of best practice 

Additional guidance and sharing of best practices is recommended by the study team in 
several areas.  

For Regulation 1071/2009, the following areas were identified: 

  Stable and effective establishment: Provide guidance on the development of 

risk-rating indices in order to identify organisations at higher risk of infringing the 
requirements.   

  Financial standing:    

o  Guidance on procedures for verifying the financial standing of newly 

established enterprises.   

o  Guidance on how to monitor if the financial standing requirement is met 

continuously.  

o  Clarification of terms used in the Regulation, such as what can be 

considered as  “capital and reserves”  

  Good repute:  

o  Provide clearer definitions of whether administrative fines, arrangements 

out of court and on-the-spot payments should be counted as “penalties”.    

o  Provide examples of best practices for procedures to determine whether 

the loss of good repute would be disproportionate.   

o  Clearer definitions of who should be included in the list of relevant persons 
to be checked for good repute in addition to the transport manager.   

  Professional competence: guidance on examination formats / sample papers in 

order to address diverging levels of difficulty.   

12 

 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

  Transport manager:  

o  A more detailed list of the responsibilities/activities of the transport 

manager, to ensure that a “genuine link” is demonstrated.   

o  Guidance on methods to clarify the link between the transport manager 

and the undertaking.  

  Administrative cooperation: agreement on acceptable response times, along 

with a procedure for escalation if these timescales are not met.   

For Regulation 1072/2009, additional guidance could be provided in the following areas: 

  Best practice on specifically how to conduct cabotage checks effectively and 

efficiently, in particular how to use supplementary evidence from sources other 
than the CMR3 consignment note (such as tachograph data). 

  Encouraging Member States to provide information on their national cabotage 

rules, so that this can be provided on the Commission website.   

  More guidance on the harmonised categorisation of infringements, supplemented 

by explanations and participation in working group discussions.    

Longer-term considerations 

Switching to electronic documents and making use of digital tachograph data appears to 
be  an  attractive  solution  to  improve  the  effectiveness  of  cabotage  enforcement,  but 
currently  there  are  legal  and  technological  barriers  to  implementation  that  mean  this 
would not be effective in the short- and medium-run.  

Additional  measures  such  as  requiring  ERRU  to  be  made  accessible  to  roadside  officers 
could  be  considered.    At  the  moment,  Member  States  are  still  experiencing  technical 
difficulties and introducing additional requirements would only exacerbate such problems.  
Hence  the  consultants  recommend  the  priority  should  be  to  focus  on  implementation  of 
the existing provisions instead. 

The  unintended  effects  of  the  requirements  of  financial  standing  leading  to  greater  firm 
exits may be mitigated by extending the maximum permissible grace period to rectify the 
lack of financial standing to 12 months, instead of the current maximum of 6 months.   

The  problem  of  letterbox  companies  occurs  in  many  industries  and  there  have  been 
several  recent  actions  taken  in  other  areas  in  order  to  reduce  the  problem.    Extending 
liability to those who are responsible for setting up and managing the letterbox company 
may be a possible approach to consider. 

Another  area  of  work  is  the  harmonisation  of  sanctions.    Should  problems  persist  and 
additional guidance prove insufficient, a stronger approach could be via harmonisation in 
criminal law, where EU competence is established in the TFEU, Article 83.   

Certain  actions  could  be  taken  to  enhance  the  consistency  of  references  between  the 
Road  Transport  Package  and  the  road  social  legislation  (Regulation  561/2006,  Directive 
2002/15/EC and Directive 2006/22/EC).  In this respect, it could be recommended to: 

 

Include in Regulation 1071/2009 specific reference to Regulation 561/2006 and to 
Directive 2002/15/EC when establishing the requirements of driving time, rest 
periods and working time (Article 6) and when defining in Annex IV the most 
serious infringements related to driving and working time limits.  

  Ensure a harmonised list of categories, types and degrees of seriousness of 

infringements across all instruments. 

  Harmonise the rules on monitoring of compliance of social rules and 

cooperation between the national enforcers, considering that the rules contained 
in the enforcement Directive 2006/22/EC are more complete. In this sense, the 

3 Convention des Marchandises par Route 

13 

 
 
                                          
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

existing extension of the Directive 2006/22/EC risk rating system to Regulation 
1071/2009 could serve as a model for further synergies.  

 

It could also be advisable to analyse the possibility of amending Regulation 
1072/2009 in order to establish a co-liability regime.    

Finally, several recommendations were made to improve the coherence of the legislation.  
Regarding combined transport, there are several issues: 

  There is a need for a common definition as to how cabotage relates to 
combined transport: In certain Member States the first and final leg of a 
combined transport journey are considered as a cabotage operation and not as a 
combined transport operation.  A clearer definition of combined transport is 
needed that preferably avoids the term “as the crow flies”.  

  Improved documentation: In this respect, several stakeholders raised the issue 

of disparities between the documentation requirements for cabotage and 
combined transport.  The establishment of a single document for combined 
transport operations, similar to the CMR, could solve the current issues related to 
documentation.   

The enforceability of the Posting of Workers Directive with regard to cabotage operations 
is highly questionable. There is room for an amendment to the legislation, in line with the 
proposals made by the High Level Group to divide cabotage into linked (to international 
movements) and non-linked cabotage (Bayliss, 2012).  

To ensure a correct enforcement of the Rome I Regulation, non-compliance with Rome I 
Regulation  (i.e.  depriving  the  driver  from  the  law  that  better  protects  his/her  interests) 
should be included as one of the infringements that may lead to loss of good repute and 
withdrawal of the community licence.   

There are possible arguments for a supplementary enforcement Directive on the basis 
that enforcement is a sensitive issue for Member States and national authorities are 
organised differently. Greater cooperation between Member States could also be 
mandated if guidance and voluntary cooperation proves insufficient.   A parallel can be 
drawn with the control of compliance with the driving time rules (Regulation 561/2006), 
which is governed by Directive 2006/22/EC.  

14 

 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

1.  INTRODUCTION 

1.1.  Purpose of the evaluation 

This evaluation study has been commissioned by DG Mobility and Transport and focuses 
on the following Regulations: 

  Regulation  1071/2009  on  admission  to  the  occupation  of  road 
transport  operator:  This  Regulation  sets  the  provisions  that  undertakings 
must comply with, in order to access the occupation of road transport operator, 
as well as provisions to regulate and facilitate enforcement by Member States. 

  Regulation 1072/2009 on common rules for access to the international 
road  haulage  market:  This  Regulation  lays  down  the  provisions  to  be 
complied  with  by  undertakings  that  wish  to  operate  on  the  international  road 
haulage  market  and  on  national  markets  other  than  their  own  (cabotage4).  It 
also  sets  down  provisions  regarding  the  sanctioning  of  infringements  and 
cooperation between Member States in such cases. 

The Regulations were adopted as part of the “Road Transport Package”, which aimed to 
advance  the  completion  of  the  internal  market  in  road  transport,  and  contribute  to  the 
aim  of  a  more  efficient  functioning  of  the  road  haulage  internal  market.  They  aim  to 
achieve this by harmonising rules and simplifying the legal framework in place.   

The  purpose  of  this  evaluation  is  to  provide  insight  into  the  actual  performance  of  the 
Regulations  and  the  overall  impacts  (both  intended  and  unintended)  on  societal, 
economic and environmental issues. The evaluation report therefore aims to: 

  Establish  evidence-based  conclusions  on  the  effectiveness,  efficiency,  relevance, 
coherence and EU added value of the Regulations and the factors that may have 
resulted in the interventions being more or less successful than anticipated; 

  Communicate the achievements and challenges of the Regulations; and 

 

Inform  the  assessment  of  the  Regulations  under  the  Regulatory  Fitness  and 
Performance  (REFIT)  programme.  The  REFIT  programme  is  part  of  the 
Commission’s  commitment  to  Better  Regulation,  and  aims  to  ensure  that 
legislation is fit-for-purpose and does not impose unnecessary regulatory burdens. 

As well as evaluating the Regulations to date, it will also provide insights as to the extent 
to  which  the  Regulations  and  their  elements  can  be  considered  to  be  fit-for-purpose  in 
the future.   

1.2.  Scope of the evaluation 

Although  the  Regulations  entered  into  force  2009,  they  only  applied  from  4  December 
2011  (with  the  exception  of  the  rules  on  cabotage  which  applied  since  14  May  2010). 
Hence,  the  evaluation  will  cover  the  period  from  the  date  that  the  Regulations  entered 
into force.   

The two Regulations were adopted as part of a package along with Regulation 1073/2009 
on  access  to  the  international  market  for  bus  and  coach  services.  The  provisions  of 
Regulation 1073/2009 on passenger transport are excluded from the scope of this study.  

4 Cabotage is defined as national carriage for hire or reward carried out on a temporary basis in a 

host Member State. 

15 

 
 
 
 
 
                                          
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

2.  BACKGROUND TO THE INITIATIVE 

2.1.  Description of the initiative  

Regulations  1071/2009  and  1072/2009  were  adopted  as  part  of  the  so-called  EU  Road 
Transport Package, adopted in 2009.   

Regulation 1071/2009 repealed and took over certain provisions of Directive 96/26/EC 
in order to modernise the rules and to ensure those rules are applied more uniformly and 
effectively.  Additional provisions were also added, such as measures to facilitate cross-
border enforcement (notably the establishment of a European Register of Road transport 
Undertakings  -  ERRU).    Further  details  of  the  implementation  of  Regulation  1071/2009 
and its specific provisions are provided in Section 5.1.1. 

Regulation 1072/2009 lays down the provisions governing access to the market in the 
international  carriage  of  goods  by  road  and  the  conditions  under  which  non-resident 
hauliers  may  operate  within  a Member State.  It  consolidated  and  repealed  a  number of 
previous rules, including:  

  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  881/92  on  access  to  the  market  in  the  carriage  of 
goods by road within the Community to or from the territory of a Member State or 
passing across the territory of one or more Member States;  

  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  3118/93  laying  down  the  conditions  under  which 
non-resident carriers may operate national road haulage services within a Member 
State; and  

  Directive  2006/94/EC  on  the  establishment  of  common  rules  for  certain  types  of 

carriage of goods by road.   

Further details of the implementation of Regulation 1072/2009 and its specific provisions 
are provided in Section 5.1.2. 

2.2.  Baseline 

Regulations  1071/2009  and  1072/2009  were  proposed  in  order  to  address  the  lack  of 
clear  principles  for  consistently  applying  the  rules  laying  down  the  requirements  for 
accessing the profession and the international road transport market, and for performing 
the associated controls and monitoring. The main needs that were identified as a basis to 
justify EU-level action were as follows: 

  Heterogeneous requirements for stable and effective establishment: Each 
Member State previously imposed its own conditions of establishment, and there 
was a lack of minimum common requirements.  This disparity created competitive 
distortions  by  encouraging  undertakings  to  locate  in  Member  States  with  less 
stringent requirements and/or lower monitoring, without having a real operational 
in  the  country  of  registration  (“letterbox”  companies5)  (European 
base 
Commission, 2007a).  In addition, it is particularly challenging to check the good 
repute  of  letterbox  companies  with  respect  to  compliance  with  road  transport 
social  rules  (e.g.  working  time  rules)  –  hence  the  existence  of  such  companies 
created risks that the rules would be infringed (European Commission, 2007a). 

  Non-comparability  of  certificates  of  professional  competence  and 
requirements  for  financial  standing:  While  the  previous  Directive  96/26/EC 
established  requirements  for  financial  standing,  the  scope  of  what  the  minimum 
amounts were supposed to cover had been interpreted very differently (European 
Commission, 2007a). Directive 96/26/EC also required certificates of professional 
competence,  but  in  practice  the  level  of  training  and  experience  required  varied 
between  Member  States  (European  Commission,  2007c).  These  disparities  led  to 
competitive  distortion  and  unnecessary  administrative  burdens  (European 

5  This  term  refers  to  companies  "established"  in  a  Member  State  where  they  do  not  carry  out  their 

administrative functions or commercial activities, in violation of Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 1071/2009 

16 

 
 
                                          
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Commission,  2007a).  It  was  further  identified  that  it  is  necessary  for  road 
transport  undertakings  to  have  a  minimum  financial  standing  to  ensure  their 
proper launching and administration.  During stakeholder hearings at the time, it 
was emphasised that the most important issue with respect to these requirements 
was the need to better define and clarify the requirements, rather than raising the 
minimum standards (European Commission, 2007b). 

  Unclear  link  between  the  holder  of  a  certificate  of  professional  capacity 
(“transport  manager”)  and  the  undertaking  using  their  certificate  to 
obtain the licence giving access to the market: Some Member States allowed 
one-man companies to designate an external person as their transport manager; 
however  there  were  indications  that  this  option  was  used  excessively,  meaning 
that  the  requirement  for  professional  competence  was  difficult  to  enforce 
(European  Commission,  2007a).  The  unclear  relationships  between 
the 
undertaking  and  the  transport  manager  did  not  offer  guarantees  of  competence 
and reputation and created a lack of transparency in the contractual and liability 
chain. 

  Heterogeneity  of  a  number  of  control  documents:  Only  the  format  of  the 
original Community Licence was originally specified, leading to a lack of uniformity 
of  certified  copies  as  well  as  driver  attestations.    This  created  problems  during 
roadside  checks  regarding  verification  of  the  authenticity  of  the  control 
documents,  and  often  led  to  considerable  time  losses  for  operators  (European 
Commission,  2007a).    For  example,  the  previous  legislation  left  open  whether 
certified  copies  should  have  the  same  colour  and  whether  they  must  be  signed 
and/or  stamped.  Some  countries  had  issued  copies  with  “certified  copy”  printed 
on  them,  which  caused  problems  in  some  other  Member  States  (European 
Commission, 2006a). 

led 

  Unclear  definition  and  control  of  temporary  cabotage:  The  lack  of  a  clear 
definition  of  the  meaning  of  the  “temporary”  nature  of  cabotage  in  Regulation 
interpretative 
3118/93  eventually 
communication6 on the matter.  Nevertheless, some Member States saw a need to 
adopt  their  own  guidelines  or  national  rules  on  cabotage,  leading  to  legal 
uncertainty 
impeding  effective  enforcement  (European 
Commission,  2007a).  Furthermore,  stakeholders  confirmed  that  improving  the 
definition would provide for better use of capacity and improved efficiency in route 
planning (European Commission, 2007b). 

for  hauliers  and 

the  Commission 

to  adopt  an 

  Uneven  monitoring  of  compliance  and  lack  of  provisions  on  cooperation 
between Member States: Uneven monitoring of compliance and controls led to 
distortions of competition between operators who were compliant (and hence bore 
additional  compliance  costs)  compared  to  those  who  deliberately  exploited  the 
disparities  (European  Commission,  2007a).    This  lack  of  coordination  created 
the  credibility  and 
unnecessary  administrative  costs  and  undermined 
dissuasiveness of the withdrawal of licences (European Commission, 2007c).  

The  issues  outlined  above  affected  stakeholders  throughout  the  transport  chain.    Road 
transport  operators  were  confronted  with  distortion  of  competition  and  additional 
administrative burdens due to the unclear rules.  Loopholes in the rules made it possible 
for some negligent operators to poorly comply with the transport rules, in particular the 
social and road safety rules. This therefore had an impact on the working conditions and 
health  of  the  workers  in  road  transport  services.    Enforcement  authorities  had  to  cope 
with  complex  rules,  heterogeneous  control  documents  and  time-consuming  procedures 
related to processing information from various sources.  Final consumers may also have 
been  affected  by  the  poor  functioning  of  the  internal  market,  leading  to  less  efficient 
transport  and  higher  costs.    Finally,  wider  societal  impacts  arise  from  poor  compliance 

6  Commission  Interpretative  Communication  on  the  temporary  nature  of  road  cabotage  in  the  movement  of 

freight (2005/C 21/02), 26 January 2005 

17 

 
 
                                          
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

with  road  safety  rules,  since  negligent  companies  are  more  likely  to  be  involved  in 
accidents than others (European Commission, 2007a).    

As  such,  the  identified  problems  could  undermine  market  efficiency,  the  quality  and 
safety of road transport in general, and prevent customers from reaping the full benefits 
of the internal market in road transport (European Commission, 2007c).  Intervention at 
the EU-level was justified on the grounds that it would be impossible for Member States 
acting  alone  to  satisfactorily  solve  the  identified  problems  (European  Commission, 
2007c).   

In  the  absence  of  the  revised  rules,  it  was  anticipated  that  the  previous  system  of 
inconsistent  enforcement,  uneven  compliance,  uneven  playing 
field  and  high 
administrative costs would continue and that the identified problems could even become 
worse  if  as  cabotage  was  opened  up  to  all  Member  States  (European  Commission, 
2007a).    

The  Impact  Assessment  underlying  the  Regulations  could  not  identify  quantitative 
indicators  that  could  be  used  to  establish  the  baseline.    Information  on  the  previous 
situation  was  also  sought  to  inform  this  study  from  stakeholders  and  literature,  but 
generalisable  results  could  not  be  obtained,  reflecting  the  difficulty  of  quantifying  many 
of the issues.  Hence, only a qualitative description of the baseline is possible.   

It was expected that in the absence of the revised Regulations, difficulties with checking 
letterbox  companies  would  continue  and  it  was  expected  that  their  numbers  would 
increase  in  line  with  the  growth  in  cross-trade,  leading  to  knock-on  effects  on  road 
safety,  social  rules  and  evasion  of  tax  (European  Commission,  2007a).    There  was  no 
estimate  of  the  number  of  letterbox  companies,  nor  any  guide  to  the  extent  of  the 
problem at the time.   

The  diverging  practices  with  respect  to  requirements  for  financial  standing  and 
professional  competence  were  expected  to  remain,  leading  to  unequal  competition 
and  unnecessary  financial  burden.    The  presence  of  a  few  operators  with  lower 
professional qualifications would continue to have a negative impact on the image of the 
profession,  whereas  companies  with  lower  financial  standing  would  continue  to  infringe 
the rules.   The continuing possibility that the “transport manager” may not actually be 
involved in  the  daily  management of  the transport  undertaking  would  be  detrimental  to 
fair competition, as well as prejudicial to the transparency in the contractual relationship 
with  shippers  and  a  good  compliance  with  road  safety  and  social  rules  (European 
Commission,  2007a).      Problems  with  the  legal  uncertainty  over  cabotage  would 
persist, and unnecessary administrative and compliance costs due to the difficult controls 
and  the  requirement  to  have  a  logbook  imposed  by  some  Member  States.    Finally,  the 
problems  regarding  the  authenticity  of  the  control  documents  would  remain  (European 
Commission, 2007a).     

2.3.  Intervention logic 

As general objectives, both Regulations aimed to support the completion of the internal 
market  in  road  transport  by  ensuring  a  level-playing  field  between  resident  and  non-
resident  hauliers.  In  particular,  Regulation  1071/2009  identifies  the  need  to  rationalise 
the  market  and  increase  market  efficiency.  The  Regulations  also  aimed  to  improve  the 
level  of  road  safety  and  to  improve  social  conditions  by  improving  compliance  with  EU 
road transport social legislation in the profession.  

As specific objectives, both Regulations aimed to reduce the administrative burden for 
transport undertakings and national authorities through allowing for improved monitoring 
and  administrative  simplification  via  the  introduction  and  interconnection  of  national 
registers, harmonisation of control documents and new provisions on financial standing. 
Through setting higher standards for the examination granting access to the occupation 
and conditions for good repute, Regulation 1071/2009 aimed to achieve a higher level of 
professional qualification of road transport operators. In turn, the increased knowledge of 
legislation  and  good  repute  of  operators, as well  as  improved  enforcement  of  the  rules, 
should  lead  to  increased  compliance  with  social  legislation.    In  addition,  Regulation 

18 

 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

1072/2009 aimed to better define the temporary nature of cabotage operations, in order 
to improve the clarity and eliminate legal uncertainty for Community hauliers. 

As operational objectives, the Regulations aimed to lay down common, simplified and 
clearer  rules  that  would  improve  the  enforceability.    Another  objective  was  to  better 
regulate certain aspects of the previous regime by reformulating provisions on cabotage 
and  community  licences.  Finally,  the  Regulations  also  aimed  to  propose  instruments  to 
ensure  the  enforcement  of  these  rules,  through  measures  to  simplify  administration,  as 
well as measures to ensure administrative cooperation between Member States.   

For any formal evaluation, the development of the policy’s intervention logic is useful in 
framing  the  analysis  to  be  undertaken.    The  intervention  logic  describes,  in  graphical 
form,  the  links  and  causal  relationships  between  the  problems  and/or  needs,  broader 
policy  goals,  the  general,  specific  and  operational  objectives  that  the  specific  policy 
measure  is  designed  to  address,  and  the  specific  actions  for  addressing  those  problems 
and/or  needs.    A  graphical  version  of  the  intervention  logic  is  shown  in  Figure  2-1 
overleaf. 

19 

 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Figure 2-1: Intervention logic diagram 

20 

 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

3.  EVALUATION QUESTIONS 

The  following  set  of  evaluation  questions  (and  sub-questions)  were  provided  in  the 
terms  of  reference  in  order  to  provide  focus  for  the  investigations  carried  out  in  this 
assignment.   

Effectiveness  

For  all  effectiveness  questions,  both  effectiveness  and  ineffectiveness  should  be 
assessed. If the conclusion is that the Regulations are ineffective, the main reasons for 
this should be analysed. If so, it would be relevant to determine how the situation and 
the current arrangement may be improved and at what costs. Furthermore, it should 
be determined whether these costs would be proportionate to the expected gains. 

1)  To what extent are compliance levels with the new provisions relative to stable and 

effective establishment of undertakings (Regulation (EC) No 1071/2009) and 
cabotage (Regulation (EC) No 1072/2009) satisfactory vis-à-vis the objectives of 
the Regulations?  

2)  To what extent are the new enforcement measures effective? Are the checks 

performed by the competent authorities carried out at an effective frequency and 
level of thoroughness? Are the requirements set in the two Regulations related to 
checks relevant and sufficient to ensure compliance? Are the penalty systems in 
place designed by Member States proportionate and persuasive?  

3)  To what extent the measures on administrative cooperation are effective? Is there 
a need for better administrative co-operation and administrative coordination (e.g. 
checks) between Member States and/or the Commission? 

4)  To what extent have the Regulations contributed to the smooth functioning of the 

internal market for road transport? Among others, to what extent have the 
provisions on cabotage helped to integrate the internal market for road transport 
and facilitate the access of non-resident hauliers to national markets? To what 
extent have the Regulations contributed to reducing the number of letterbox 
companies? How do the results compare between different EU Member States and 
regions (i.e. EU15 and EU12)? How do the results compare to the state of play 
prior to the adoption of the Regulations? Have the Regulations lead to any 
unintended negative and/ or positive effects with regards to competition on the 
road transport market? 

5)  To what extent has the legislation helped to increase the level of compliance with 
EU road transport social legislation? How do the results compare to the state of 
play prior to the adoption of the Regulations? How do the results compare between 
different EU Member States and regions (i.e. EU15 and EU12)? Have the 
Regulations lead to any unintended negative and/ or positive social effects?  

6)  To what extent have the Regulations had an impact on road safety, particularly in 

terms of fatigue of drivers, and helped to address the road safety concerns 
identified at the time of adoption? How do the results compare between different 
EU Member States and regions (i.e. EU15 and EU12)? 

7)  Have the Regulations lead to any positive and/or negative unintended effects (both 
in terms of impacts and results) other than mentioned in previous questions? If so, 
what is the extent of these effects and which stakeholders groups are affected the 
most? 

Efficiency  

8)  To what extent have the Regulations helped to reduce costs (i.e. compliance and 
administrative) both for transport undertakings and national authorities? In 
particular, were the expected impacts in terms of administrative simplification 
(€190 million) achieved? Have the Regulations created any unintended additional 
costs?  

21 

 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

9)  Are there costs related to the implementation of the new provisions, such as those 

related to stable and effective establishment, the European Register of Road 
Transport Undertakings and cabotage? If so, are they proportionate to the benefits 
achieved, in relation to the measures set out in the Regulations (e.g. setting up 
and interconnection of electronic registers, harmonisation of transport documents 
and checks of the establishment and cabotage provisions)?  

10) To what extent have the Regulations been efficient in their objective of enabling 

enforcement of the existing rules? Have the enforcement practices put in place by 
Member States created any savings or costs for national authorities and transport 
operators?  

Relevance  

11) To what extent are the operational objectives of the Regulations (i.e. to lay down 

sets of common rules on i.a. documentation, cabotage and requirements for access 
to the occupation, and the effective enforcement of these rules) relevant and 
proportionate to address the problems of: a) Distorted competition between 
resident and non-resident hauliers; b) Non-compliance with EU road transport 
social legislation; c) The road safety concerns identified at the time. 

Coherence 

12) How do the Regulations interact with and if relevant, have an impact on the 

objectives of the following acts: Directive 96/71/EC on posting of workers; 
Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 on contractual obligations ('Rome I Regulation'); 
Directive 92/106/EC on combined transport; Social provisions in road transport 
(Directive 2002/15/EC on working time of mobile workers, Regulation (EC) No 
561/2006 on driving time and rest periods, Directive 2006/22/EC on enforcement 
of social provisions in road transport, Regulation (EC) No 165/2014 on the digital 
tachograph)? Can inconsistencies of references and definitions, and overlaps of 
provisions be identified? Is there scope to streamline the regulatory framework in 
the transport sector?   

13)  In terms of their effects, how do the two Regulations relate to the goals of EU 
transport policy (as set out in the 2011 White Paper) and the wider economic, 
social or environmental challenges of EU policies? Have they contributed to these 
policy objectives? In particular, do Regulations contribute towards the 2020 Road 
Safety aims and to the general objective to reduce the GHG emissions (if so, to 
what extent)?  

EU added value  

14)  To what extent could a different level of regulation (e.g. at national level) be more 

relevant and/or effective and/or efficient than the applicable one to ensure 
common rules for: a) Admission to the occupation of road haulage operator, b) 
Access to the international road haulage market, c) The conditions under which 
non-resident hauliers may operate within a Member State other than the one of 
registration? To what extent could a different level of regulation (e.g. national 
regulation) improve the enforcement of these rules?  

15)  Is there any evidence that in certain cases a different level of regulation (e.g. at 
national level) could have been more relevant and/or effective and/or efficient than 
the  applicable  one  to  achieve  the  objectives  of:  a)  Reducing  distortions  of 
competition between resident and non-resident hauliers; b) Increasing compliance 
with EU road transport social legislation; c) Improving road safety levels? 

22 

 
 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

4.  METHOD/PROCESS FOLLOWED 

4.1.  Method/process and limitations 

This  section  provides  a  brief  overview  is  presented  of  the  research  tools  used  during 
this study. 

4.1.1.  Desk research 

The literature review covered various relevant reports, academic and scientific articles, 
databases,  as  well  as  reviewing  published  literature,  reports  and  results  of  EC  public 
consultations.    The  purpose  of  the  desk  research  was  to  provide  an  overview  of  the 
available  information  relevant  to  the  study  in  the  literature,  to  provide  background 
information for other research activities and to help triangulate the information found 
in the data collection, interviews and surveys.  Sources were primarily selected by the 
researchers, and supplemented by suggestions from stakeholders.  Almost 150 pieces 
of  literature  were  used  -  all  of  the  literature  is  referenced  throughout  the  report,  as 
well  as  in  Annex  E,  and  was  used  to  supplement  responses  from  stakeholders  and 
official data sources.   

An important data source to define the baseline for the Road Transport Package is the 
underlying  Impact  Assessment  document  (European  Commission,  2007a),  which  at 
the time quantified the impacts as far as possible.  There were however several impact 
categories  that  could  only  be  qualitatively  assessed  (i.e.  competitiveness  impacts, 
internal  market,  impacts  on  SMEs,  social  impacts,  compliance  with  safety  rules  and 
environmental  impacts),  and  the  same  limitations  apply  in  the  current  study  –  in 
particular, these relate to areas in which the Regulations have an indirect or secondary 
effect.    A  similar  limitation  was  also  found  in  other  literature,  which  contained  only 
very limited quantification of any impacts and was hampered by a lack of availability 
of data and the difficulty in collecting quantitative indicators (including cost reductions 
or  increases,  compliance  levels,  number  of  checks  etc).    Conclusions  emerging  from 
the desk research were supplemented by the information collected through the other 
means described below.   

4.1.2.  Analysis of official monitoring data 

Analysis of official monitoring data included information required under the monitoring 
provisions of the two Regulations: 

  Under Article 26 of Regulation 1071/2009, Member States must report every 
two years to the Commission on the activities of their competent authorities 
(provided in Annex A, Section 9.1.1).  

  Under Article 17 of Regulation 1072/2009, Member States must report every 
two years on the number of hauliers possessing Community licenses, on the 
number of certified copies in circulation, and on the number of driver 
attestations issued (provided in Annex A, Section 9.1.2).  

The  quality  and  availability  of  the  official  monitoring  data  is  often  limited,  despite 
efforts  to  substantiate  publically  available  statistics  with  stakeholder  engagement  via 
surveys  and  interviews.  This  is  due  to  several  issues  –  firstly,  due  to  the  relatively 
recent  implementation  of  Regulation  1071/2009,  there  has  only  been  one  reporting 
period  so  far  (from  4/12/2011  to  31/12/2012).    For  this  first  submission,  reporting 
from Member States was substantially incomplete (for example, six Member States did 
not provide any information).  This was in part due to the need to familiarise with their 
obligations, as well as difficulties in interconnecting national registers and difficulties in 
collecting  data  from  local  or  regional  authorities  responsible  for  enforcement 
(European  Commission,  2014a).    Furthermore,  there  is  usually  no  disaggregation  in 
the  relevant  statistics  (such  as  identifying  the  different  reasons  for  withdrawals  of 
licences  to  operate).  To  help  improve  the  quality  of  data,  representatives  of  the 
relevant  authorities  in  Member  States  were  asked  to  provide  further  breakdowns  in 

23 

 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

interviews and surveys, but typically they reported that they do not monitor this more 
detailed  information  and  so  were  unable  to  provide  further  disaggregation.  Where 
possible,  the  partial  data  collected  was  used  to  infer  conclusions  for  Europe  as  a 
whole, with the limitations that result.  

4.1.3.  Exploratory interviews 

Exploratory  interviews  were  carried  out  with  six  organisations  (two  EU-level  industry 
associations,  two  national  level  industry  associations,  a  national  trade  union  and  a 
ministry).    These  interviews  were  conducted  to  help  inform  the  development  of  the 
surveys (see also the next section), before the wider consultation activities took place.   

4.1.4.  Surveys 

Stakeholder  responses  are  clearly  identified  throughout  this  report,  and  used  to 
support the research and findings.  A summary of the responses is provided in Annex 
B. Significant effort was invested to ensure that the stakeholder engagement activities 
were  as  inclusive and  representative  as possible  through  extensive  email  campaigns, 
follow-ups, time extensions and recruiting associations to aid in the distribution of the 
surveys.  Tailored surveys were developed for several target groups, as follows: 

  National transport ministries: focussing on national implementation and 

interpretation of the Regulations, quantification of impacts and assessment of 
effectiveness of the Regulations at a national level; 

  Enforcement authorities: focussing on enforcement practice and challenges, 

interpretations of the provisions, estimations of costs and benefits, 
quantification of impacts and assessment of effectiveness; 

  Undertakings: focussing on impacts at the level of individual undertakings that 

might not be captured or adequately reflected in other sources; 

  High level (general) survey: Identification of high level, cross-cutting views on 
the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and added value of the Regulations. 

Due to the breadth and depth of issues that needed to be covered in the evaluation, 
the  questionnaires  were  necessarily  rather  long  and  complex,  and  may  have  been 
difficult  for  some  stakeholders  to  find  the  time  to  answer.    The  inputs  received  from 
those  stakeholders  that  responded  are  highly  appreciated.    Overall,  the  stakeholder 
response rate can be considered to be very good in light of the length and complexity 
of the questionnaires, and also considering the highly technical and specific nature of 
the Regulations.  Further details are given below, and in Annex B. 

Responses were received from the national transport ministries of 20 Member States, 
with  12  from  the  EU-15  and  eight  from  the  EU-13.    There  was  a  relatively  high 
response  rate  (see  Table  4-1),  and  the  surveys  that  were  received  typically  included 
some  effort  to  answer all  of  the  questions.    The  quality  of  the  responses  was  overall 
high  and  the  ministries  were  able  to  provide  answers  to  a  major  share  of  questions 
concerning national implementation.  Conversely, questions on the impacts and other 
quantitative questions were often unanswered or the “don’t know” option was chosen, 
reflecting a lack of data availability.  

A total of 20 different enforcement authorities responded to the survey.  15 responses 
were  received  to  the  first  part  on  Regulation  1071/2009,  including  authorities  from 
nine were EU-15 countries and five EU-13 countries.  There were 15 responses to the 
second part on Regulation 1072/2009, including authorities from five EU-15 countries 
and  six  EU-13  countries.    The  surveys  for  enforcement  authorities  aimed  to  gather 
much  of  the  quantitative  information  needed  to  answer  the  evaluation  questions 
(especially regarding the number of checks, number of infringements and costs).  This 
presented  particular  challenges  for  this  stakeholder  group  (detailed  quantitative 
questions tend to lead to low response rates, as reflected in the outcomes) and there 
were  a  high  number  of  responses  to  the  effect  that  no  data  were  available.    The 

24 

 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

quality  of  the  20  responses  was  considered  good  (within  the  limitations  of  data 
availability), and respondents appears to have invested substantial time and effort to 
attempt an answer all of the relevant questions.   

A breakdown of responses to the survey of transport undertakings is shown in Figure 
4-1.    A  total  of  122  responses  were  received  from  undertakings,  with  contributions 
from Germany and Romania respectively making up 30% and 24% of responses.  The 
majority  of  responses  were  from  small  and  medium  sized  enterprises  (SMEs)  with 
fewer than 10 employees.   

Figure 4-1: Breakdown of responses to the survey of transport undertakings 

The high level survey aimed to capture responses from stakeholders for which there is 
not  a  targeted  survey.    It  was  answered  by  a  total  of  37  organisations,  mainly 
associations of transport operators (14) and trade unions (12), with a small number of 
NGOs and other types of association.  A number of the trade unions and associations 
of  transport  operators  submitted  coordinated  responses  between  themselves.    We 
have  not  attempted  to  correct  for  this,  since  numerical  analysis  of  results  was  not 
used for this particular survey (rather, the objective was to gain high level indications 
of  the  main  problems  and  positive  impacts).    The  completeness  of  the  responses 
concerning qualitative answers was generally high, with extensive responses given in 
the comments sections, particularly for those stakeholders that submitted coordinated 
responses.    The  survey  contained  few  requests  for  quantitative  information,  as  this 
was primarily sought from other surveys/interviews. 

The activities are summarised in Table 4-1.    

Table 4-1: Summary of survey responses 

Type of stakeholder 

Approached 

Responded 

National transport ministries 

Enforcement authorities 

Undertakings survey 

High level (general) survey 

TOTAL (surveys) 

47 

78 
N/AA 
154 

20 

20 

122 
37B 
199 

% response 
rate 

43% 

26% 

- 

24% 

- 

Notes:  Stakeholder  engagement  activities  were  conducted  from  October  2014  until  July  2015.  
Response rates are approximate, as some organisations forwarded the request to participate to 
other organisations on our behalf. 
A)  Undertakings  surveys  were  distributed  via  national  associations,  hence  it  is  not  known  how 
many organisations were contacted.  B) A number of coordinated responses were received from 
trade unions and transport operator associations.   

For  all  surveys,  the  results  are  subject  to  well-understood  limitations  that  affect  the 
interpretation of results, namely that a relatively small sample was collected for some 
stakeholder groups, that responses were entirely voluntary and that the opinions are 

25 

 
 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

subjective.  To some extent, the reliability of the results can be improved by ensuring 
a good coverage of representative stakeholders (as attempted for this study), but the 
non-response bias cannot be corrected by increasing the survey size and hence results 
still need to be interpreted with care.  

4.1.5.  Follow-up interviews (follow-up from the surveys) 

The  purpose  of  the  follow-up  interviews  with  was  to  enrich  the  questionnaire 
responses that had been received and to fill remaining data gaps as far as possible.   

Since  the  data  requirements  of  the  study  were  very  extensive  and  not  everything 
could be included in the surveys without making the length unreasonable, building on 
the  survey  responses  already  received  via  interviews  was  the  most  effective  way  of 
expanding  the  data  collection,  as  well  as  to  further  elaborate  on  the  specific 
experience of stakeholders.  

Coverage  of  national  transport  ministries,  industry  associations,  trade  unions  and 
undertakings was considered in line with the planned distribution of interviews, since 
the  response  rate  was  relatively  higher  in  these  stakeholder  groups.    Securing 
adequate coverage of enforcement authorities proved challenging.  In the first stage, 
an  extensive  list  of  contact  points  in  each  Member  State  based  on  internet  searches 
was  gathered.  Stakeholders  (both  ministries  and  enforcement  authorities)  were  also 
asked  to  refer  us  to  other  relevant  departments  where  possible  in  order  to  augment 
the list.  Finally, every contact was invited to participate in the survey.  Having already 
approached  the  full  list  of  contacts  during  the  survey  stage,  those  that  had  not 
responded  had  already  shown  a  lack  of  interest  in  participation,  hence  the  potential 
list  of  interviewees  was  significantly  narrowed  to  those  that  had  responded  to  the 
survey. It is not possible to a minimum number of interviews as this is dependent on 
respondents  being  willing  to  participate.    Nevertheless,  it  was  initially  hoped  that  at 
least 25 respondents could be found, but only 13 interviews could be achieved in the 
end after following up with all 18 authorities that had shown interest.  

Table 4-2: Summary of interviews (not including exploratory interviews) 

Type of stakeholder 

Approached 

Responded 

National transport ministries 

Enforcement authorities 

Industry associations 

Trade unions 

Undertakings 

TOTAL (interviews) 

6 

18 

20 

12 

72 

128 

5 

13 

14 

6 

16 

54 

% response 
rate 

67% 

72% 

70% 

50% 

22% 

42% 

Notes:  Stakeholder  engagement  activities  were  conducted  from  October  2014  until  July  2015.  
Response rates are approximate, as some organisations forwarded the request to participate to 
other  organisations  on  our  behalf.  These  were  a  separate  tool  to  the  exploratory  interviews, 
which are reported separately.   

4.1.6.  Case studies 

The  case  study  investigations  were  carried  out  in  order  to  conduct  more  in-depth 
analysis  of  specific  situations,  which  would  not  be  possible  for  all  Member  States 
within the scope of this study.   The analysis was conducted for five Member States, as 
follows: 

1.  Denmark; 

2.  Spain; 

3.  Germany; 

4.  Poland; and 

5.  Romania. 

26 

 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

The  analysis  involved  a  detailed  review  of  national  legislation  and  enforcement 
practices,  a  study  of  issues/problems  encountered  by  each  country  and  a  review  of 
national  market  conditions  and  a  review  of  additional  datasets/reports  that  were 
available at the national level.  

Interviews were also conducted with stakeholders in each country, in order to confirm 
and  expand  upon  the  findings  of  the  desk  research.    These  interviews  included 
additional  case  study-specific  questions  in  order  to  clarify  details  found  in  the  desk 
research  and  gain  greater  insight  into  the  national  implementation  and  experience 
with the Regulations.   

The  interviews  are  reported  in  the  general  interview  programme  above  (Table  4-2), 
since  they  also  contained  the  same  general  questions  asked  of  other  stakeholders.  
The  consultants  aimed  to  conduct  a  minimum  of  four  interviews  with  stakeholders  in 
each  country.  This  was  achieved  for  all  countries  (10  interviewees  from  Germany,  6 
from  Denmark,  9  from  Spain,  4  from  Romania)  with  the  exception  of  Poland  (3 
interviews).    To  try  to  reach  4  interviews  in  Poland,  additional  effort  invested  in 
contacting Polish stakeholders (42 contacted in total); however, the response rate was 
unusually  low  (7%).    The  full  findings  of  the  five  case  studies  are  summarised  in 
Annex C. 

27 

 
 
 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

5.  IMPLEMENTATION STATE OF PLAY (RESULTS) 

5.1.  Implementation and state of play 

5.1.1.  Regulation  1071/2009  on  access  to  the  occupation  of  road  transport 
operator 

Article  2  defines  the  new  scope  which  is  consistent  with  the  other  road  transport 
legislation  by  including  all  vehicles  over  3.5  tonnes  and  limiting  the  exemptions  to 
certain transport operations clearly identified in other Community acts. 

The  core  requirements  for  engagement  in  the  occupation  of  road  transport  operator 
are summarised in Article 3(1) of Regulation 1071/2009 as follows: 

  Have an effective and stable establishment; 

  Be of good repute; 

  Have appropriate financial standing; and 

  Have the requisite professional competence. 

The aim of these requirements is to ensure that all companies are subject to the same 
level  of  monitoring  and  to  avoid  situations  where  some  are  not  monitored  by  the 
authorities in the Member States in which they are established (European Commission, 
2007c).  

Article  3(2)  of  the  Regulation  allows  Member  States  to  impose  additional 
requirements next to the four requirements given in Article 3(1), as long as these are 
proportionate  and  non-discriminatory.    In  specific  cases,  Member  States  have 
introduced  additional  requirements.  For  instance,  in  Estonia,  the  respondent  to  the 
survey  of  ministries  reported  that  a  licence  applicant  must  be  registered  in  the 
commercial  register;  Finland  requires  that  the  licence  applicant  is  of  legal  adulthood 
(18  years)  and  he/she  cannot  be  deemed  legally  incompetent.    In  Spain  there  is  an 
additional requirement that applicants must have three vehicles representing at least 
one  payload  of  60  tonnes,  although  this  is  currently  under  discussion  and  may  be 
removed  in  the  near  future  (see  Annex  C,  Spain  case  study).  Slovakia  added  a 
requirement defining the minimum age of a transport manager at 21 years (European 
Commission, 2014a)  An additional requirement in the Netherland for setting up as a 
transport  haulage  operator  includes  registering  with  the  Chamber  of  Commerce 
(AECOM, 2014a). 

In  order  to  combat  the  problem  of  “letter-box  companies7”,  transport  undertakings 
must  demonstrate  their  effective  and  stable  establishment.    Article  5  specifies 
that an undertaking must have an office in which it keeps its core business documents 
and an operating centre with the appropriate technical equipment and facilities in the 
Member State of establishment. Moreover, once an authorisation is granted, they need 
to have at least one vehicle at their disposal which is registered in that Member State.   
Most  Member  States  have  implemented  the  requirements  as  per  the  Regulation 
without  additions,  which  as  previously  mentioned  are  permitted  under  Article  3(2). 
The most common additional requirement at the national level is for a parking space, 
which is specified in Austria, Bulgaria, Ireland, Slovakia and the UK.  In Luxembourg, 
the  existence  of  a  parking  space  is  checked;  however  it  is  not  a  legal  requirement.  
Few Member States set specific requirements to own certain property – only in the UK 
are  licence  holders  required  to  provide  a  self-declaration  that  either they  themselves 
own the premises they intend to use as an operating centre or have permission from 
the  site  owner.    An  additional  requirement  in  Finland  is  that  an undertaking  must  be 

7  i.e.  companies  "established"  in  a  Member  State,  where  they  do  not  carry  out  their 
administrative functions or commercial activities, in violation of Article 5 of Regulation (EC) 
No 1071/2009 

28 

 
 
                                          
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

registered  in  Finnish  Trade  Register  and  its  municipality  of  residence  must  be  in 
Finland.    More  details  on  the  implementation  are  given  in  Evaluation  Question  4 
(Section 6.4).   

Under  Article  5(a), Member States  may  require  that  establishments  on  their territory 
also  have  other  documents  available  at  their  premises  at  any  time.    Few  Member 
States  mentioned  any  specific  provisions  in  this  regard  –  for  example,  the  Belgian 
respondent  to  the  ministries  survey  indicated  that  their  national  legislation  stipulates 
that the CMR8 documents must be available. 

Article  6  of  Regulation  1071/2009  sets  out  that  the  good  repute  of  transport 
managers  (or  undertakings)  is  conditional  on  their  not  having  been  convicted  of  a 
serious  criminal  offence  or  having  incurred  a  “penalty”  for  one  of  the  most  serious 
infringements  of  road  transport  rules.    Member  States  vary  in  whether  they  treat 
administrative  fines,  arrangements  out  of  court  and  on-the-spot  payments  as 
“penalties”  for  the  purposes  of  establishing  good  repute.    For  example,  Bulgaria, 
Croatia,  Cyprus  and  Luxembourg  do  not  consider  any  of  administrative  fines, 
arrangements  out  of  court  and  on-the-spot  payments  as  penalties.  Administrative 
fines are considered in Austria, Sweden, Lithuania, Belgium, Estonia, Germany, Poland 
and  Latvia;  Arrangements  out  of  court  are  considered  in  Denmark,  Germany,  Poland 
and  Estonia;  On-the-spot  payments  are  considered  in  France,  Belgium,  Finland, 
Germany and Poland.  The Regulation also provides a general list of the most serious 
infringements  in  its  Annex  IV.    The  Commission  is  currently  preparing  a  list  of 
infringements  that  (in  addition  to  those  set  out  in  Annex IV)  will  indicate  the 
categories,  types  and  degrees  of  seriousness  of  serious  infringements  of  Community 
rules that may also lead to the loss of good repute.   

The requirements to demonstrate appropriate financial standing were clarified and 
harmonised  in  Article  7.    Undertakings  must  show  that,  every  year,  it  has  at  its 
disposal  capital  and  reserves  totalling  at  least  €9,000  when  only  one  vehicle  is  used 
and €5,000 for each additional vehicle used.  It is relatively rare for Member States to 
require a higher level of capital and reserves per vehicle than the minimum levels set 
out  in  the  Regulations  (which  as  previously  mentioned  under  Article  3(2),  Member 
States  may  impose  additional  conditions  provided  they  are  proportionate).  One 
example is in Denmark operators must meet an initial financial capability requirement 
of 150,000 DKK (around €20,100). Austria and Denmark also require that a company 
does not have substantial arrears and in Ireland companies must prove that they are 
tax compliant.  More details are given in Evaluation Question 4 (Section 6.4).   

National ministries are permitted to agree or require that an undertaking demonstrate 
its  financial  standing  by  means  of  a  certificate  such  as  a  bank  guarantee  or  an 
insurance,  instead  of  certified  accounts.    Certified  accounts  and  bank  guarantees  are 
accepted in  most  Member States  with  few  exceptions  (respectively  Luxembourg9  and 
Lithuania).  The use of insurance is permitted in fewer countries, for example including 
Austria,  Germany,  Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Sweden  and  Italy. 
More details are given in Evaluation Question 4 (Section 6.4).   

According to Article 8, applicants for the position of transport manager must have the 
requisite  professional  competence,  and  must  provide  proof  of  high-quality 
professional  competence  (140  hours  of  training  and  an  examination  covering  the 
topics  laid  down  in  Annex  I  of  the  Regulation).    This  was  intended  to  raise  the 
standards of professional qualification in the sector.   

Exemptions  are  permitted  under  certain  conditions:  Under  Article  8(7),  a  Member 
State  may  exempt  the  holders  of  certain  higher  education  qualifications  or  technical 

8 Convention des Marchandises par Route, or consignment note 

9 The possibility to use certified accounts is currently being evaluated in Luxembourg 

29 

 
 
                                          
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

education qualifications issued in that Member State. Article 9 permits Member States 
to  grant  exemptions  from  the  examinations  for  persons  who  provide  proof  that  they 
have continuously managed a road haulage undertaking or a road passenger transport 
undertaking  in  one  or  more  Member  States  for  the  period  of  10  years  before 
4 December  2009.    Several  Member  States  report  that  they  do  not  give  any 
exemptions  from  the  examination  for any  reason  (Cyprus, Czech  Republic,  Denmark, 
Ireland, Latvia and Lithuania).  Others grant exemptions under a condition relating to 
previous  qualifications  (Austria,  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Estonia,  Finland,  France, 
Germany,  Luxembourg,  Sweden  and  the  UK).    Others  grant  exemptions  for  persons 
who  have  continuously  managed  a  road  haulage  undertaking  for  a  certain  period  of 
time,  e.g.  10  years,  including  Estonia,  France,  Germany,  Luxembourg,  Slovakia, 
Sweden  and  the  UK.    Professional  knowledge  shall  be  demonstrated  by  means  of  a 
compulsory  written  examination  which,  if  a  Member  State  so  decides,  may  be 
supplemented  by  an  oral  examination  –  an  option  taken  up  by  Member  States 
including  Austria,  Belgium,  Germany  and  Slovakia.  More  details  are  given  in 
Evaluation Question 4 (Section 6.4).   

Article  4  clarified  the  role  of  the  transport  manager.    This  person  has  to 
demonstrate  the  necessary  professional  competence,  must  manage  effectively  and 
continuously the transport activities of an undertaking and have a genuine link to the 
undertaking. A small number of Member States have introduced more specific criteria 
on  the  minimum  responsibilities  for  the  transport  manager,  including  Belgium  and 
Germany.  The  transport  manager  may  manage  the  transport  activities  of  up  to  four 
different  undertakings  with  a  combined  maximum  total  fleet  of  50  vehicles,  although 
Article  4(2)  allows  Member  States  to  lower  these  thresholds.    This  option  has  been 
exercised in France (an external manager is limited to two companies representing a 
total  of  20  vehicles);  Finland  and  Romania  (an  individual  may  act  as  transport 
manager  for  only  one  company  with  a  maximum  total  fleet  of  50  vehicles).  More 
details are given in Evaluation Question 4 (Section 6.4). 

Member  States  were  required  to  extend  the  risk  classification  system  established 
pursuant  to  Article 9  of  Directive  2006/22/EC,  in  order  to  carry  out  checks  targeting 
undertakings  that  are  classed  as  posing  and  increased  risk  (Article  12).    This 
provision  aimed  at  improving  monitoring  by  means  of  targeting  high-risk  companies 
(rather than more frequent systematic checks).  Only one Member State reported not 
having  such  a  system  in  place  (Bulgaria).  More  details  are  given  in  Evaluation 
Question 2 (see Section 6.2). 

Additional  provisions  required  that  Member  States  must  cooperate  in  the  task  of 
monitoring undertakings operating in several Member States. Article 16 required that 
the national competent authorities must set up national electronic registers of road 
transport  undertakings.    Member  States  shall  take  all  necessary  measures  to  ensure 
that  the  national  electronic  registers  are  interconnected  (Article  16(5))  and 
accessible throughout the Community through the national contact points defined in 
Article 18.  As  of  2015,  all  Member  States  except  Portugal  had  defined  a  national 
contact  point  and  reported  this  to  the  Commission.    The  interconnection  of  registers 
should simplify cross-border enforcement, making it more cost-effective, provided that 
all Member States are connected and that they effectively use the system exchanging 
high  quality  data  contained  in  their  databases.    However,  in  2014,  only  13  Member 
States  were  interconnected  via  ERRU,  8  were  in  testing  phase  and  7  Member  States 
were  in  infringement  procedures  launched  in  February  2014  (European  Commission, 
2014c).  Two  Member  States  (Belgium  and  Germany)  have  connected  in  early  2015. 
More details are given in Evaluation Question 3 (see Section 6.3). 

Article  26  requires  that  Member  States  must  draw  up  a  report  every  two  years, 
which shall include: 

a)  An  overview  of  the  sector  with  regard  to  good  repute,  financial  standing  and 

professional competence; 

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Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

b)  the  number  of  authorisations  granted  by  year  and  by  type,  those  suspended, 
those  withdrawn,  the  number  of  declarations  of  unfitness  and  the  reasons  on 
which those decisions were based; 

c)  The number of certificates of professional competence issued each year; 

d)  Core statistics relating to the national electronic registers and their use by the 

competent authorities; and 

e)  An overview of exchanges of information with other Member States pursuant to 
Article 18(2),  including  in  particular  the  annual  number  of  established 
infringements notified to other Member States and the replies received, as well 
as  the  annual  number  of  requests  and  replies  received  pursuant  to 
Article 18(3). 

The first report under Regulation 1071/2009 covers the period from 4 December 2011 
until 31 December 2012.  The reports are summarised in Annex A (see Section 9.1). 
The next reporting period will cover the full two-year timeframe from 1 January 2013 
till  31  December  2014.    The  data  reported  indicate  that  depending  on  the  national 
schemes,  there  is  a  range  of  scenarios:  an  authorisation  might  be  a  prerequisite  to 
obtain  a  licence  for  national  transportation  and/or  a  Community  licence  in  order  to 
carry  out  international  carriage,  it  might  be  an  equivalent  of  a  licence  for  national 
transportation  or  alternatively  it  might  mean  a  licence  for  national  and  international 
transport  granted  by  means  of  a  single  authorisation.  Conversely,  Regulation 
1071/2009  refers  to  an  “authorisation”  as  an  administrative  decision  that  authorises 
an  undertaking  that  satisfies  the  conditions  laid  down  in  Regulation  1071/2009  to 
pursue  the  occupation  of  road  transport  operator.    The  Commission  has  therefore 
requested  Member  States  prepare  an  outline  of  national  arrangements  in  order  to 
collect more consistent data for the next reporting period. Only twelve Member States 
provided  data  on  authorisations  granted  and  on  this  basis  around  171,000 
authorisations  were  granted  to  pursue  an  occupation  of  road  transport  operator  in 
passenger and goods transport.   

The  highest  number  of  withdrawals  of  authorisations  was  reported  in  Spain  (almost 
37,600  for  passenger  and  goods  transport)  and  France  (4,700),  Slovakia  (1,200), 
Sweden  (965)  and  the  Czech  Republic  (956).  Greece  reported  222  withdrawals  for 
passenger and goods transport, Poland (68), Latvia (58), Hungary (33), Italy (31) and 
other  Member  States  did  not  reach  more  than  10.    Most  Member  States  who 
submitted  data  on  number  of  declarations  of  unfitness,  stated  that  there  was  not  a 
single  case  recorded  during  the  reporting  period  for  both  passenger  and  goods 
transport  (Austria,  the  Czech  Republic,  Greece,  Malta,  the  Netherlands,  Poland  and 
Slovakia). 

5.1.2.  Regulation  1072/2009  on  access  to  the  international  road  haulage 
market 

Regulation 1072/2009 puts in place a harmonised standard of Community Licenses 
(Article  4)  and  driver  attestations  (Article  5).  International  carriage  shall  be 
carried  out  subject  to  possession  of  a  Community  licence  and,  if  the  driver  is  a 
national  of  a  third  country,  in  conjunction  with  a  driver  attestation  (Article  3).  
According to Article 4(2), the Community licence shall be issued for renewable periods 
of  up  to 10  years.    Member  States  typically  issue  licences  for  periods  of  5  years 
(Austria,  Belgium,  Cyprus,  Finland,  Ireland,  and  UK)  or  10  years  (Bulgaria,  Croatia, 
Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Germany,  Slovak  Republic,  and 
Sweden).  France reported a period of 5-7 years was used for the period of validity. 

Cabotage  provisions  are  stipulated  in  Article  8(2)  of  Regulation  1072/2009. 
Haulers  may  carry  out  three  cabotage  operations  in  the  host  Member  State  within 
seven days following an international journey – known shorthand as the “3 in 7 rule”. 
Within  that  period  hauliers  may  carry  out  the  three  cabotage  operations  in  any 
Member  State  transited  on  their  return  journey  under  the  condition  that  they  are 

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Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

limited  to  one  operation  per  Member  State  transited,  within  three  days  of  unladen 
entry  into  its  territory.  In  any  case,  cabotage  must  always  be  limited  to  three 
operations within seven days.   

In  order  to  further  clarify  the  interpretation  of  the  cabotage  provisions,  the 
Commission  organised  in  2011  a  committee  meeting  to  discuss  the  main  critical 
points,  and  subsequently  published  a  “frequently  asked  questions”  note.    Despite 
these clarifications, there are still different interpretations of specific issues concerning 
the  cabotage  regime  in  different  countries  (as  shown  in  Annex  A,  Table  9-8  and 
discussed further in Evaluation Question 4).  Some countries allow several loading and 
unloading  points  per  operation  (which  is  the  same  interpretation  the  European 
Commission  has  given  to  Regulation  1071/2009),  whereas  partial  loading  and 
unloading  is  regarded  as  a  separate  trip  in  other  countries  such  as  Germany  and 
Finland.    As  another  example,  some  Member  States  have  additional  provision  on  the 
degree to which a vehicle must be loaded/unloaded (e.g. in Germany cabotage starts 
only  after  the  complete  unloading  of  the  vehicle).    Finnish  law  imposes  a  further 
limitation  of  cabotage  to  ten  operations  in  a  three-month  period,  although  the 
Commission has asked Finland to revise this additional restriction10.  More details are 
given in Evaluation Question 4 (Section 6.4).   

Regulation  1072/2009  Article  10  re-established  existing  safeguard  procedures 
under which a specific geographic area may be temporarily excluded from its scope. In 
this  case,  the  Member  States  must  prove  that  this  regulation  has  caused  “serious 
disturbance  of  the  national  transport  market”.    The  Regulation  clarifies  the  term 
“serious disturbance” as “the existence on the market of problems specific to it, such 
that  there  is  a  serious  and  potentially  enduring  excess  of  supply  over  demand, 
implying  a  threat  to  the  financial  stability  and  survival  of  a  significant  number  of 
hauliers”. To date, this safeguard procedure has not been used. 

Mutual  assistance  under  Article  11  requires  Member  States  to  grant  reciprocal 
assistance  in  the  application  and  monitoring  of  the  Regulation,  and  to  exchange 
information  via  the  national  contact  points  established  pursuant  to  Article  18  of 
Regulation  1071/2009.    The  extent  of  information  exchange  between  Member  States 
is  rather  low  at  the  moment,  and  several  (e.g.  France,  Denmark)  have  reported 
difficulties in obtaining responses to queries made to other Member States (discussed 
further in Evaluation Question 3). 

The  Regulation  also  sets  down  in  Article  12  provisions  regarding  the  sanctioning  of 
infringements.    Sanctions  for  serious  infringements  or  for  any  misuse  of  driver 
attestations  are  decided  by  the  Member  State  of  establishment  of  the  haulier,  and 
could  potentially  lead  to  the  temporary  or  permanent  withdrawal  of  Community 
licence.  Under Article 13, host Member State authorities can impose penalties on a 
non-resident  haulier  who  has  committed  infringements  in  their  territory  during  a 
cabotage  operation.  Penalties  need  to  be  imposed  on  a  non-discriminatory  basis  and 
may,  inter  alia,  consist  of  a  warning,  or,  in  the  event  of  a  serious  infringement,  a 
temporary  ban  on  cabotage  operations  on  the  territory  of  the  host  Member  State 
where  the  infringement  was  committed.    In  practice,  there  is  very  wide  variation 
between  the  type  and  level  of  sanctions  for  infringements  of  EU  cabotage  provisions 
(discussed further in Evaluation Question 2). 

Serious  infringements  that  have  led  to  the  imposition  of  a  penalty  by  any  Member 
State  shall  be  recorded  by  the  Member  State  of  establishment  in  the  national 
electronic  register  of  road  transport  undertakings  (Article  14).  The  host  Member 
State  and  the  Member  State  of  establishment  shall,  within  6  weeks  of  their  final 
decision  on  the  matter,  transmit  the  information  regarding  the  infringement 
(description, type, penalties). 

10 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-4871_en.htm 

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Article  16  requires  Member  States  to  lay  down  the  rules  on  penalties  applicable  to 
infringements  of  the  Regulation  and  take  all  the  measures  necessary  to  ensure  that 
they are implemented.   

Article  17  requires  Member  States  to  report  every  two  years  on  the  number  of 
hauliers  possessing  Community  Licences,  the  number  of  certified  true  copies  in 
circulation,  the  number  of  driver  attestations  issued  in  the  previous  year  and  the 
number of driver attestations in circulation. The monitoring data provided according to 
Article 17 are shown in Annex A (see Section 9.1.2). At the end of 2014 there were a 
total of 286,883 hauliers possessing Community Licences in the EU-28 (an increase of 
5.3%  compared  to  2013)  and  1,839,711  certified  true  copies  in  circulation  (an 
increase  of  4.2%  compared  to  2013).    The  number  of  driver  attestations  issued  in 
2014 was 33,618 (an increase of 23.8% compared to 2013) and there were 41,602 in 
circulation (a reduction of 0.5% compared to 2013).   

5.2.  Market context and development 

5.2.1.  Road haulage activity and levels of trade 

Overall, road freight transport accounts for around 45% of freight moved in the EU-28 
(72%  excluding  intra-EU  sea  and  air  transportation),  a  share  which  has  remained 
largely unchanged over the past decade (DG MOVE, 2014). Around two thirds of road 
freight  movements  are  within  Member  States  and  one  third  is  between  Member 
States.  

The total volume of road freight transport in the EU-28 was around 1,720 billion t-km 
in  2013,  some  10%  less  than  during  its  peak  in  2007,  but  showing  a  small  increase 
compared  to  2009  (1,700  billion  t-km).  This  development  has  been  shaped  by  the 
global financial and economic crisis, which has had severe impacts on the EU.   

Most  national  transport  activities  are  carried  out  by  domestic  transport  operators 
(around  65%  in  2013  and  this  share  has  been  unchanged  since  2009  when  the 
Regulations were introduced) (Eurostat, 2014)Cross-trade11 has grown significantly in 
recent  years  due  to  the  fact  that  international  transport  activities  are  completely 
liberalised within the EU (European Commission, 2014b).   

Cabotage,  defined  as  the  execution  of  national  transport  operations  by  foreign 
operators, accounted for just over 2% of national transport activity in 2013. The share 
of cabotage has roughly doubled between 2004 and 2013, due in part to the lifting of 
special transitional restrictions in 2009 and 2012 on hauliers from most countries that 
joined  the  EU  in  2004  and  2007,  respectively  (European  Commission,  2014b). 
Cabotage grew by 20% between 2012 and 2013 alone, but overall still only accounts 
for  a  small  share  of  total  freight  activities  in  the  EU-28  and  is  concentrated  in  a  few 
countries West European countries, such Germany, France, Italy, the UK, Belgium and 
Sweden (accounting for 86% of total cabotage taking place) (Broughton et al, 2015).  
However, there have been suggestions that Eurostat statistics on cabotage operations 
fail to reflect the real extent of the practice in Europe (discussed further in Evaluation 
Question 1). Prior to the introduction of the Regulations, cabotage accounted for 0.9% 
of transport in Europe (European Commission, 2007a).  

Around  28%  of  all  cabotage  activity  is  carried  out  by  Polish  operators,  which  have 
displaced  Germany,  the  Netherlands,  and  Luxembourg  as  the  dominant  actors  in  the 
cabotage market (Broughton et al, 2015).  Two thirds of all EU-28 cabotage is carried 
out  in  Germany  and  France.  The  share  of  cabotage  carried  out  in  EU-13  states  is 

11  Freight  carried  by  vehicles  registered  in  third  countries,  i.e.  neither  the  loading  nor  the 

unloading country 

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virtually  zero12.    Half  of  all  cabotage  in  2013  was  carried  out  by  operators  from  the 
EU-13, up from a third in 2010 (Broughton et al, 2015) - see Figure 5-1.   

Figure 5-1: Split between national and international road freight movements: 
EU15 vs EU13 vehicle parc (2013) 

Source: Eurostat Dataset: “road_go_ta_tott” 
Notes: While it has been suggested that Eurostat data underestimates actual levels of cabotage 
(see  Evaluation  Question  3,  Section  6.3),  they  are  the  most  comprehensive  and  most 
comparable  data  available,  as  they  are  the  result  of  an  official  data  collection  carried  out  by 
National  Statistical  Offices  and  reported  to  Eurostat  according  to  agreed  standards  (European 
Commission, 2014b). 

Vehicles registered in the EU-15, however, still account for over four-fifths of the total 
t-km  generated  by  movements  between  EU-15  Member  States  (Broughton  et  al, 
2015).  

5.2.2.  Market structure  

In  total,  there  were  around  575,000  registered  road  freight  transport  and  removal 
enterprises  in  Europe  in  201213,  employing  around  three  million  people  (European 
Commission,  2014b).    At  the  time  the  Regulations  were  introduced,  there  were 
582,700 road freight transport undertakings, employing 2.7 million people (European 
Commission, 2007a).  

The market is broadly divided into two main segments.  The first are small firms that 
account for the vast majority of the total number of hauliers  - 90% of enterprises in 
the  sector  have  fewer  than  10  employees  and  account  for  close  to  30%  of  turnover 
(including  self-employed)  (Eurostat,  2015).    These  firms  tend  to  compete  mainly  on 
price, with labour costs being a key determinant of competitiveness (WTO, 2010). At 
the  time  the  Regulations  were  adopted,  95%  of  road  transport  firms  had  fewer  than 
10  employees  (European  Commission,  2007a),  reflecting  a  slight  trend  toward 
consolidation in recent years.  Even at the time of the Impact Assessment underlying 
the  Regulations,  it  was  recognised  that  a  proportion  of  small  companies  tend  to  be 
economically  dependent  on  larger  operators  who  prefer  to  subcontract  through 
exclusive  or  preferential  contracts  rather  than  to  invest  in  additional  vehicles 
(European Commission, 2007a). 

12 Eurostat Datasets “road_go_ca_hac” and “road_go_ca_c” 

13  Note  that  the  Eurostat  business  indicators  only  cover  hire  and  reward  road  transport 
businesses.  These  account  for  around  85%  of  all  t-km  while  own  account  transportation 
(transportation  carried  out  by  other  businesses  for  their  own  purposes)  accounts  for  15%.  
The transport activities for hire and reward are those carried out by the road haulage sector 
in the EU as defined in the business statistics while own account transport is carried out by 
other economic sectors for their own purposes. 

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The  second  segment  is  made  up  of  a  limited  number  of  large  firms  that  provide 
complex logistics services. Firms in this segment compete on price, range and quality 
of  the  services  offered  (WTO,  2010).    Since  economies  of  scale  are  more  important, 
there  is  also  a  higher  degree  of  market  concentration;  around  1%  of  enterprises  are 
enterprises  with  over  50  persons  employed,  these  account  for  around  40%  of  sector 
turnover.  

Subcontracting  plays  a  major  role  in  road  haulage,  and  there  has  been  a  strong 
increase  in  subcontracting  in  recent  years.    Overall,  the  European  road  haulage 
market can be characterised by a chain of hire and reward companies with large pan-
European  logistics  companies  at  the  top  controlling  the  largest  contracts  but 
subcontracting  much  of  that  down  the  chain.      Small  enterprises  and  owner  drivers 
either form small consortiums to obtain work, rely on subcontracting from larger firms 
or move loads identified through freight exchanges.   

In  the  past,  the  EU  road  haulage  market  has  been  highly  competitive  and  price-
sensitive  because  it  has  been  dominated  by  a  large  number  of  small  companies  and 
owner-operators.    Rapid  expansion  of  larger  operators  offering  integrated  logistic 
services was identified at the time the Regulations were introduced, along with intense 
corporate  restructuring  (European  Commission,  2007a)  –    the  importance  of  pan-
European logistics integrators has continued to grow in recent years (AECOM, 2014b).  
Large  multimodal  third  party  logistics  providers  (3PLs)  help  to  meet  the  demand  for 
high  quality,  reliable  and  predictable  door-to-door  truck  services  (AECOM,  2014b). 
Cost pressures for logistics providers means that many heavily rely on subcontracting 
less  profitable  operations  to  smaller  enterprises  and  owner-operators,  driving  the 
number of links in the logistics chain upward (AECOM, 2014b).   

A  long-term  trend  suggests  that  freight  integrators14  and  forwarding  agents  will  play 
an  important  and  growing  role  in  the  organisation  of  international  road  freight 
movements, helping to optimise the entire supply chain, improving vehicle usage and 
reducing empty running (AECOM, 2014b).   

5.2.3.  Cost structure 

At the time the Regulations were introduced, cost differentials between Member States 
were noted and it was found that road haulage costs can be almost double from one 
Member  State  to  another  (European  Commission,  2007a).    The  rising  cost  of  drivers 
and  fuel  costs  were  identified  as  having  an  important  impact,  depending  on  the 
Member State (European Commission, 2007a).   

During  the  economic  downturn,  profit  margins  have  contracted  within  the  logistics 
sector  as  well  as  in  the  road  haulage  sector  (European  Commission,  2014b).    A  key 
effect  has  been  the  substantially  increased  price  competition  created  within  road 
transport, which has then extended to the entire freight market (KombiConsult, 2015).  
On the trunk lines of European corridors, reported freight rates have fallen even below 
pre-boom prices in the years up to 2006 to as low as €0.7 per vehicle-km or less. This 
corresponds to a reduction of some 30% compared to previous market prices of about 
€0.9  to  €1.0  per  vehicle-km,  which  barely  covers  the  variable  costs  of  haulage,  let 
along the full cost of vehicle utilisation (KombiConsult, 2015). 

Cost levels are one of the key factors determining competitiveness in the road haulage 
sector.  As shown in Figure 5-2, the most important cost components are the driver’s 
wages  and  fuel,  followed  by  vehicle  purchase  costs.  While  in  absolute  terms,  labour 
costs in the Member States that joined in 2004 and 2007 remain lower than in the EU-
15, the gap is steadily narrowing (European Commission, 2014b).    

14 A freight forwarder is a person or company that organises shipments for individuals or firms. 

A forwarder is not typically a carrier, but is an expert in supply chain management. 

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Figure 5-2: Percentage of operating costs per hour in selected Member States 

Notes: Driver costs indicate wages; maintenance includes general vehicle maintenance and tyre 
replacement 
Source: (Bayliss, 2012) 

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6.  ANSWERS TO THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS 

This  section  sets  out  in  turn,  analysis  for  each  of  the  evaluation  questions  presented 
under  the  general  evaluation  headings  of  effectiveness,  relevance,  efficiency, 
coherence and EU-added value. 

6.1.  Effectiveness:  To  what  extent  are  compliance  levels  with  the 
new provisions satisfactory?  

To  what  extent  are  compliance  levels  with  the  new  provisions  relative  to  stable  and 
effective establishment of undertakings (Regulation (EC) No 1071/2009) and cabotage 
(Regulation  (EC)  No  1072/2009)  satisfactory  vis-à-vis  the  objectives  of  the 
Regulations?  

This evaluation questions focusses on the levels of compliance with two main areas of 
the  Regulations,  namely,  compliance  with  provisions  on  stable  and  effective 
establishment and with provisions on cabotage15.   

6.1.1.  Compliance  with  provisions  on  stable  and  effective  establishment 
(reduction of letterbox companies) 

6.1.1.1. 
with letterbox companies 

Provisions  on  stable  and  effective  establishment  and  the  link 

Regulation  1071/2009  introduced  a  requirement  for  all  transport  undertakings 
authorised  by  a  Member  State  to  have  stable  and  effective  establishment  in  that 
Member State16.  As described in Section  5.1.1, the minimum requirements of stable 
and  effective  establishment  have  been  implemented  by  all  Member  States,  with  only 
few examples of additional national requirements such as the need for a parking space 
(such  as  requirements  for  parking  spaces  in  Austria,  Bulgaria,  Ireland,  Slovakia  and 
the UK).  

Letterbox  companies  can  be  defined  as  a  company  that  is  formally  registered  in  a 
Member State, but none of the administrative or commercial activity of the company 
takes place in that Member State.  

The  link  between  the  requirement  of  stable  and  effective  establishment  and  the 
reduction in letterbox companies is therefore a direct one – since letterbox companies 
operate  without  undertaking  any  substantial  amount  of  business  in  the  country  of 
establishment  and  without  having  any  “real”  operational  base,  imposing  the 
requirement for having such a real operational base would reduce the number of these 
companies.  

As  a  result  of  this  requirement,  it  was  expected  that  the  number  of  so-called 
“letterbox  companies17”  would  be  reduced.    The  following  sections  analyse  firstly  the 

15 Meaning the national carriage of goods for hire or reward carried out by non-resident hauliers 

on a temporary basis in a host Member State. 

16 Article 5 specifies that an undertaking must have an office in which it keeps its core business 
documents  and  an  operating  centre  with  the  appropriate  technical  equipment  and  facilities 
in  the  Member  State  of  establishment.  Moreover,  once  an  authorisation  is  granted,  they 
need to have at least one vehicle at their disposal which is registered in that Member State 

17  The  term  “letterbox  company”  derives  from  the  practice  where  the  company  exists  as  little 
more than letterbox for collecting mail that is redirected to the country where the business 
is actually based in practice. 

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current levels of compliance, and secondly the trends over time, in order to establish 
whether the provisions of stable and effective establishment have been effective. 

6.1.1.2. 
letterbox companies 

Assessment  of  current  levels  of  compliance  and  extent  of 

The  number  of  infringements  of  the  provisions  on  stable  and  effective  establishment 
that are detected in each country should provide a direct indicator of the current levels 
of  compliance  that  have  been  achieved,  and  the  number  of  letterbox  companies 
detected.    The  official  reporting  requirements  under  Article  26  of  Regulation 
1071/2009  require  Member  States  to  report  on  the  number  of  authorisations 
suspended, those withdrawn, and the number of declarations of unfitness (see Annex 
A, Section 9.1.1.2).  However, Member States typically do not disaggregate their data 
according to the different types of infringement.   

In an effort to obtain the more detailed data needed, all enforcement authorities that 
responded to the survey were asked to disaggregate the data and identify how many 
were  due  to  infringements  of  the  requirement  of  stable  and  effective  establishment. 
Most  were  not  able  to  provide  this  information,  but  data  from  all  respondents  who 
were able to provide it are shown in Table 6-1.  Survey responses were supplemented 
by  detailed  interviews  in  order  to  try  to  understand  the  situation  in  more  detail, 
although most interviewees were only able to confirm the lack of data availability. 

Table  6-1:  Estimated  number  of  letterbox  companies  in  selected  Member 
States (2013 or a similar recent year) 

Member State 

Number of checks of 
stable and effective 
establishment 

Number of letterbox 
companies 
detected* 

Estimated actual 
number of letterbox 
companies 

Denmark 

Poland 

Bulgaria 

Romania 

Netherlands 

Latvia 

All applications 

2,351 

5,640 

7,110 

N/A 

1 

30 

0 

No data 

35 for 2013; 49 for 
2014 

35 for 2013; 49 for 
2014 

0 

0 

15 for 2014 

Less than 500 

No information 

0 

0 

*i.e. companies without stable and effective establishment 
Source: Survey of enforcement authorities 

The  figures  collected  indicate  a  detection  rate  of  around  1%  or  less  in  the  countries 
that  could  provide  data,  which  include  examples  of  both  EU-15  and  EU-13  Member 
States.    This  helps  to  confirm  in  official  statistics  that  companies  without  stable  and 
effective establishment have indeed been found to exist, while suggesting at the same 
time that the problem is at a low level, at least in these countries (from Table 6-1).   

However,  official  statistics  will  not  show  companies  that  are  evading  detection.  To 
cross-check  whether  the  data  reflected  the  real  situation,  all  respondents  to  the 
survey of enforcement authorities were asked specifically to estimate the total number 
of  letterbox  companies  in  their  country,  as  shown  in  the  last  column  of  Table  6-1.  
Most  respondents  (10  out  of  15)  were  not  able  to  give  an  answer.    The  respondents 
from Denmark, Romania, Bulgaria and Latvia indicated that they believe that letterbox 
companies are being detected effectively, whereas the response from the Netherlands 
indicates  the  authority  suspects  there  are  more  in  operation  that  have  not  been 
detected  (up  to  485  undetected).    The  lack  of  data  makes  it  difficult  to  extrapolate 
these conclusions to other countries. 

38 

 
 
  
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Considering next whether the problem could be much higher in other Member States 
must rely on indirect indications, since direct data is not available. The total number of 
withdrawals,  suspensions  and  declarations  of  unfitness  might  represent  the  upper 
bound  limit.    The  total  numbers  of  withdrawals,  suspensions  and  declarations  of 
unfitness that were obtained from Member States that provided reports were in most 
other  cases  relatively  small  (see  Annex  A,  Section  9.1.1.2).  For  instance,  total 
withdrawals are less than 100 in nine Member States18, whereas information could not 
be  found  for  a  further  eight19.    The  relatively  small  numbers  of  total  infringements 
reported in many Member States suggests in turn that the problem of non-compliant 
companies should also be small, provided that the enforcement practices are effective 
in  detecting  letterbox  companies.  Again,  these  figures  cannot  show  how  many 
companies might be evading detection.   

On  the  other  hand,  several  Member  States  showed  in  their  monitoring  data  (under 
Article 26) a relatively high number of total withdrawals, suspensions and declarations 
of  unfitness.    Member  States  reporting  more  than  1,000  cases  in  any  category 
included: Spain (37,595 withdrawals and 12,493 suspensions in 2012); France (3,344 
withdrawals  over  the  period  4/12/2011  –  31/12/2012);  Netherlands  (1,038 
withdrawals in 2012); Slovakia (1,219 withdrawals in 2012);  (European Commission, 
2014a).    The  available  evidence  suggests  that  these  are  due  to  other  infringements 
and  not  due  to  letterbox  companies:  In  the  main  monitoring  reports  it  appears  that 
the  figures  for  Spain  may  be  anomalously  high  because  all  applications/changes  in 
number  of  vehicles  or  variations  of  operating  premises  were  counted  as  requests  for 
authorisation,  while  failure  to  meet  any  requirement  was  counted  as  authorisations 
withdrawn20.  The  respondent  to  the  survey  of  enforcement  authorities  in  France 
reported  that  “few  cases  are  problematic”  with  respect  to  stable  and  effective 
establishment.    For  the  Netherlands,  it  was  indicated  by  the  respondent  to  the 
enforcement  authority  survey  that  the  majority  of  infringements  were  due  to  the 
requirement  of  financial  standing  whereas  only  15  were  due  to  stable  and  effective 
establishment.  

Considering  whether  official  statistics  accurately  reflect  the  issues  on  the  ground 
requires a more direct assessment of the extent and conduct of letterbox companies. 
This is challenging because there are no comprehensive statistics in the EU due to the 
inherent  difficulty  in  monitoring  them.    As  such,  data  is  typically  based  on  ad  hoc 
investigations  or  complaints,  making  it  difficult  to  assess  the  current  situation  or 
trends  over  time.    In  the  absence  of  comprehensive  statistics,  this  study  has 
attempted  to  triangulate  information  from  different  sources.    Reported  examples  of 
letterbox  companies  collated  from  literature  are  provided  in  Annex  A  (see  Section 
9.2.1),  which  summarises  a  number  of  reports  of  letterbox  companies  affecting 
various  European  countries.    While  these  anecdotal  examples  from  the  literature 
cannot be interpreted as evidence of a systematic or increasing problem, they do show 
that letterbox companies are still found to operate within the EU currently.   

The validity of these reports was explored in more detail via interviews carried out for 
this study.  The responses demonstrate how difficult it is to investigate and verify the 
existence  of  letterbox  companies.    As  an  example,  concerns  over  possible  letterbox 
companies set up by Danish firms in Germany were highlighted to the Commission in 
2013  and  2014  by  Danish  representatives  (Parliamentary  questions,  2013a).    In 
response,  the  Commission  requested  that  the  German  authorities  carry  out  an 
individual  check  to  verify  whether  the  undertaking  met  the  conditions  of  Regulation 
1071/2009  (see  Annex  A,  Section  9.2.1,  for  further  details).  During  interviews 

18 AT, EE, HU, IE, IT, LV, LT, MT, PL, RO  

19 BE, BG, CY, DK, FI, DE, LU, PT 

20 I.e., these withdrawals were due to failure to provide proof of meeting the conditions needed 
for an authorisation to be granted, on the request of an applicant or cease of operations 

39 

 
 
                                          
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

conducted for this study, German stakeholders were asked to comment on this issue 
and  in  general  appeared  to  recognise  there  were  some  problems  but  that  they  were 
probably  not  extensive:  the  German  ministry,  enforcers  and  a  trade  union  confirmed 
that the problem of letterbox companies in Northern Germany is well-known, although 
the  specific  companies  in  question  could  not  be  discussed.  A  German  industry 
association further recognised the issue of letterbox companies but suggested that it is 
a  very  local  problem.  Finally,  five  German  undertakings  interviewed  for  this  study 
believed that letterbox companies cannot exist long term in Germany as the controls 
by  the  BAG  (Federal  Office  for  Freight  Transport)  and  the  tax  office  are  too  frequent 
and thorough.  

Danish  stakeholders  were  similarly  asked  in  interviews  carried  out  for  this  study  to 
expand on the same issue described above of Danish letterbox companies in Germany. 
The  Danish  Ministry  and  Danish  enforcement  authorities  emphasised  that  these  were 
only  claims  and  that  there  is  not  established  proof  of  such  illegal  practices  taking 
place.  On the other hand, the Danish trade union claimed that they had photographic 
evidence  of  the  existence  of  these  letterbox  companies  that  had  been  forwarded  to 
relevant  authorities,  but  in  the  end  the  opinion  of  the  German  authorities  was  that 
these companies were legitimate.  The comments also eluded to difficulties in ensuring 
cooperation  between  Member  States,  which  are  further  discussed  and  analysed  in 
Evaluation Question 3 (see Section 6.3). 

Stakeholder  perceptions  gathered  via  the  surveys  also  support  the  conclusion  that 
there  are  indeed  some  continuing  problems  with  letterbox  companies,  but  that  the 
issue  is  affecting  only  some  countries.    Although  no  respondents  could  provide 
concrete  data,  100%  of  participants  in  the  high  level  survey21  felt  that  the  illegal 
practices  of  letterbox  companies  were  a  continuing  problem  in  Europe  today, 
indicating a strong feeling on this issue and indeed, this was one of the only areas that 
respondents agreed unanimously22.  Five national ministries out of the 20 consulted as 
part  of  this  study  reported  that  they  suspected  letterbox  companies  were  being 
established on their territory (these represented a mix of Eastern European countries 
and  high-wage  Central  European  countries:  Bulgaria,  Estonia,  Germany,  Luxembourg 
and Slovakia).  Only Luxembourg was able to quantify (informally) the impact due to 
letterbox  companies,  estimated  at  €30  million  per  year.  Five  Member  States  also 
identified  the  reverse  problem  -  that  they  suspected  companies  from  their  own 
countries  were  setting  up  letterbox  companies  in  other  Member  States  (Belgium, 
France,  Germany,  Slovakia  and  Sweden).    However,  none  of  the  respondents  were 
able  to  provide  further  quantitative  data  on  the  current  or  past  situation  due  to 
difficulties  in  monitoring.    Several  Member  States  were  able  to  recount  specific 
examples  of  companies  in  contravention  with  the  Regulations  (Sweden,  France, 
Estonia), although full details were not divulged due to confidentiality concerns.   

Finally, six Member States reported that they felt their country had not been affected 
by letterbox companies (Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Latvia, Poland and the UK).  
This supports the conclusion that the problem is not uniform across the EU. 

Overall,  the  statistics  on  infringements  show  that  there  are  still  companies  without 
stable and effective establishment being detected in Europe today, which is supported 
by reports of letterbox companies found in the literature and views from the different 
stakeholder  groups 
(trade  unions,  associations,  ministries  and 
undertakings).  This  indicates  that  the  problem  of  letterbox  companies  in  Europe  has 
not  been  completely  solved.  A  comprehensive  assessment  of  the  extent  of  the 
problem  is  hindered  by  a  lack  of  conclusive  data.  Official  statistics  gathered  from 

consulted 

21  Respondents  to  the  high  level  survey  included  mainly  trade  unions  and  associations  –  see 

Annex C for a full breakdown of respondents by group 

22  The  other  area  of  unanimous  agreement  was  on  that  a  lack  of  effective  enforcement  was  a 

very significant issue. 

40 

 
 
                                          
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

enforcement authorities suggest that the absolute number of companies infringing the 
requirement  of  stable  and  effective  establishment  being  detected  is  relatively  low, 
although  respondents  were  not  able  to  comment  on  the  extent  to  which  there  might 
be other companies evading detection.  

6.1.1.3. 

Assessment of the levels of compliance and the expected result 

The  next  step  of  the  analysis  is  to  determine  whether  the  Regulations  have 
contributed to a reduction in letterbox companies (the expected result).   

Turning to the question of whether the situation has improved or worsened over time, 
data  is  even  scarcer,  and  no  quantitative  data  was  available  from  the  Impact 
Assessment  to  the  Regulation  that  could  have  been  used  as  a  starting  point.  
Literature  searches  did  not  reveal  any  further  information  and  hence  stakeholders 
were the only remaining possible source.   

Enforcement  authorities  were  asked  to  provide  estimates  of  the  number  of  letterbox 
companies that existed currently and prior to the Regulations.  We received only one 
response  from  Finland,  which  estimated  that  there  were  previously  500  letterbox 
companies prior to the Regulations in 2008 compared to around 20 detected in 2014 
and an estimated 100 in the whole country.  Although this indicates an improvement 
in  Finland,  this  is  not  sufficient  information  to  conclude  for  the  whole  of  Europe  and 
hence  it  is  not  clear  from  the  data  whether  the  situation  has  improved  or  worsened 
overall.   

Triangulating this data is also challenging because other sources cannot reliably track 
developments  over  time.    Nevertheless,  there  does  appear  to  be  broad  agreement 
from different stakeholder groups, which lends some additional weight to their views.  
Opinions  gathered  from  the  high  level  survey  indicated  that  many  (around  half  of 
respondents)  felt  that  there  had  been  no  material  effect  on  the  number  of  letterbox 
companies  while  around  a  fifth  of  respondents  felt  there  had  been  a  slight  positive 
effect.    Conversely,  the  trade  unions  in  their  joint  response  report  an  increase  in 
letterbox  companies,  in  contrast  to  the  other  views  of  the  high  level  survey.  The 
responses to the survey of Member State ministries were slightly positive overall, with 
18% reporting a positive effect and 36% indicating that they felt the Regulations had 
no  material  effect,  whereas  a  similar  proportion  (32%)  did  not  know23.    The  most 
positive  response  was  received  from  the  undertakings  survey,  where  31%  strongly 
agreed and a further 17% slightly agreed that the requirement of stable and effective 
establishment has reduced the number of letterbox companies.  Overall, this indicates 
that stakeholders from various groups (association, ministries, undertakings) feel that 
the Regulations has had a neutral or positive impact in terms of reducing the number 
of letterbox companies, with only trade unions strongly disagreeing.   

As an alternative indicator, the development of market incentives that may be driving 
these  practices  can  be  examined.    International  road  transport  operators  conduct 
transport in many countries, so it is natural to consider where it is most appropriate to 
register  their  trucks  and  hire  their  workers  based  on  cost  differentials.    However, 
these  cost  differentials  (and  in  particular,  wage  levels)  can  also  create  incentives  to 
set up letterbox companies.  For instance, interview respondents (including ministries, 
associations,  trade  unions,  enforcers  and  undertakings)  were  unanimous  that  wage 
differentials were a key driver for the establishment of letterbox companies.  Evidence 
on the development of cost differentials) is described in Box 6-1 (noting that this is an 
external factor outside of the control of the Regulations). 

23  This  share  of  “don’t  know”  responses  was  relatively  high  compared  to  the  other  answer 
options (most of which did not receive any “don’t know” answers), indicating the difficulties 
in obtaining concrete data on the issue 

41 

 
 
                                          
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Box 6-1: Evidence on development of cost differentials in Europe 

Although  there  are  some  signs  of  labour  cost  convergence  across  Europe,  there  are  still 
considerable  differences  between  Member  States  (TRT,  2013).    For  example,  the  cost  of  a 
French  driver  is  1.3  times  higher  than  that  of  a  Spanish  driver,  and  2.4  times  higher  than  a 
Polish  driver  spending  three  weeks  per  month  outside  their  respective  domestic  markets24 
(SDG, 2013a).  Even taking into account possible differences in terms of skills and productivity, 
the  pay  gaps  are  sufficiently  high  to  conclude  that  there  are  still  substantial  differences  in  the 
labour  costs.    These  wage  differentials  between  countries  therefore  suggest  that  there  is  a 
continuing incentive for the establishment of letterbox companies. 

National taxation laws are another important driver.  Many national laws apply also to "visiting" 
foreign trucks through the principle of territoriality. A foreign-registered vehicle is subject to its 
host  country’s  legislation  in  terms  of  weights  and  dimensions,  payment  of  tolls,  etc.  The  main 
exceptions  are  the  taxation  of  the  transport  company  (in  the  absence  of  a  double  taxation 
agreement), the taxation of the vehicle in relation to its registration, and the driver's wage and 
social insurance contributions, which remain those of vehicle's country of origin.  For instance, 
differences  in  social  insurance  contributions  can  be  quite  substantial.    As  an  example,  the 
estimated  amount  of  the  employers’  mandatory  (net)  social  security  contributions  for  a  driver 
operating is €736 per month in France; €446-630 in Germany, €481-584 in Spain, as compared to 
€316 in Slovakia and €111 in Poland. 25 (CNR, 2013). 

The enlargement of the EU also probably increased these incentives  - if an area is enlarged to 
include  countries  or  regions  with  divergences  in  the  relevant  economic  conditions,  the  use  of 
these opportunities tends to increase (Kummer et al, 2014).  Specific factors may also increase 
the  incentives,  as  revealed  by  interviews  conducted  for  this  study  –  for  example,  a  German 
industry  association  believes  that  that  letterbox  companies  are  set  up  in  Schleswig  Holstein  in 
order  to  benefit  from  exemptions  to  the  truck  driving  ban  on  Sundays,  whereas  the  German 
ministry  believes  that  Eastern  European  letterbox  companies  are  frequently  established  in 
Germany  to get access to permits that allow  them to operate in  non-EU  countries  in  the East, 
such as Russia.  

There  is  good  agreement  between  different  sources  that  in  future  years  the  cost  differentials 
between  countries  are  likely  to  diminish,  since  pressure  for  convergence  will  be  exerted  by 
economic forces.  On the one hand, the European Commission reports that the cost difference 
has  been  constantly  decreasing  and  will  most  likely  continue  to  do  so  in  the  future  (European 
Commission,  2014b).    Others  are  more  conservative  in  their  estimations  and  suggest  that  the 
gap will only narrow slowly due to liberal labour immigration rules and a large number of non-
EU  citizens  willing  to  work  for  low  wages  (e.g.  Sternberg  et  al,  2014;  Ismeri  Europa,  2012), 
which  implies  that  the  existing  differentials  in  wages  and  other  costs  will  continue  to  provide 
strong  incentives  for  companies  to  establish  letterbox  companies.    Empirical  data  show  mixed 
results  on  labour  cost  convergence  in  Europe  (see  Annex  A,  Section  9.2.2  for  a  summary  of 
empirical  studies),  but  overall  provide  evidence  of  very  slow  labour  cost  convergence  between 
EU-12 and EU-15 countries.   

Overall, the development of the problem of  letterbox companies over time  is difficult 
to  track  directly  due  to  the  paucity  of  data.    The  development  of  market  forces  is 
considered as a proxy for the potential incentives for setting them up.  This shows that 
the  enlargement  of  the  EU  and  continuing  cost  differentials  between  countries  have 
created  greater incentives for the establishment  of  letterbox  companies  –  suggesting 
that  in  the  absence  of  the  Regulation  there  would  have  been  more  letterbox 
companies.    As  such,  the  problem  is  unlikely  to  have  resolved  by  itself  in  the  past 
years  –  nor  it  is  likely  to  resolve  in  the  near  future  without  effective  enforcement  of 
the  Regulation.    In spite of  these  market  incentives,  the weight  of  stakeholder views 

24 Converted on a PPP (purchasing power parity) basis, the wage differentials of French drivers 
reduce  to  1.27  for  Poland  and  to  1.25  compared  to  Spain,  indicating  that  there  are  still 
differences. 

25  On  a  PPP  basis:  approximately  €800  per  month  in  France;  €500-700  in  Germany,  €650-800  in 

Spain, as compared to €550 in Slovakia and €250 in Poland 

42 

 
 
 
                                          
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

(associations,  ministries  and  undertakings)  is  that  the  impact  of  the  Regulation  has 
been slightly positive or neutral.   

6.1.1.4. 
achieved and issues identified 

Assessment  of  extent  to  which  the  expected  results  were 

The introduction of the requirement for stable and effective establishment was meant 
to  reduce  the  number  of  letterbox  companies.    As  discussed  above,  on  balance  the 
evidence  suggests  that  the  problem  of  letterbox  companies  still  exists  but  it  lower 
than  it  might  otherwise  have  been  if  market  forces  (i.e.  elements  external  to  the 
Regulation)  had  been  left  unchecked  without  introducing  requirements  of  stable  and 
effective establishment.   

This  strongly  suggests  the  measures  put  in  place  by  the  Regulation  (linked  to  the 
operational objective of laying down common rules for access to the profession) have 
contributed  to  improving  the  situation  compared  to  the  counterfactual  of  having  no 
provisions in the Regulation, as was previously the case. 

In summary, although there have been some positive impacts, there is still room for 
improvement. It is important to control letterbox companies because there are various 
negative impacts that arise from their existence, discussed below.   

The impacts on companies occur due to unfair competition, since letterbox companies 
can  potentially  undercut  legitimate  businesses  by  avoiding  other  costs  such  as  social 
contributions  and  taxes.    An  often-cited  figure  from  the  literature  is  that  letterbox 
companies can save as much as 90-95% on labour costs and social contributions (ETF, 
2012a),  which  was  based  on  survey  data  collected  by  ETF,  although  the  underlying 
data  from  the  ETF  report  could  not  be  obtained  for  analysis  in  this  study.    To  cross-
check  this data  point,  undertakings  that  were  consulted  for  this  study  were  asked  to 
estimate  the  cost  advantage  that  letterbox  companies  have  compared  to  a  company 
that  fully  complies  with  all  road  transport  rules.    The  weighted  average  across 
respondents  from  all  countries  was  a  cost  advantage  of  31%  while  the  median 
category was 10-25% (indicating a positive skew, i.e. that a few very high estimates 
are  pulling  the  average  upward).    The  highest  estimates  were  from  Austrian 
respondents, who predicted an advantage of 40%, whereas respondents from Poland 
only estimated a 9% advantage – however, there was not a substantial difference in 
the  mean  or  median  when  respondents  were  grouped  into  EU-13  and  EU-15 
countries26.    Even  though  the  estimates  obtained  from  industry  for  this  study  are 
lower  than  the  literature  values,  within  a  highly  competitive  industry  such  as  road 
transport, this level of cost differential would be highly detrimental to companies that 
fully comply with the rules. The main contributing factors to this cost advantage were 
identified by the undertakings as the wages of drivers (the major factor), followed by 
taxes and social contributions, in agreement with the literature explained in Box 6-1.   

Relocation of businesses is not in of itself illegal and may contribute to the efficiency of 
the  internal  market  –  the  problems  arise  specifically  in  the  case  of  letterbox 
companies:  Firstly,  such  companies  are  often  (although  not  always)  associated  with 
criminal  or  dubious  activities  (Sørensen,  2015).    Secondly,  when  businesses  relocate 
from Member State A to Member State B in order to take advantage of lower taxes in 
Member State B, there is a fiscal loss to the government in Member State A.  This is 
an  economically  inefficient  outcome  if  Member  State  A  is  still  largely  responsible  for 
covering  the  economic  costs  associated  with  the  formally  (but  not  meaningfully) 
relocated company.   

26  The  average  cost  advantage  was  estimated  as  29%  across  all  EU-13  respondents  and  33% 
across all EU-15 respondents.  The median category for EU-13 and EU-15 respondents was 
the same (i.e. 10-25%) 

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Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Studies of potential fiscal losses due to relocation of businesses carried out in Austria 
(Kummer et al, 2014) and Sweden (Sternberg et al, 2015) find: 

  Fiscal losses per vehicle per annum (via loss of tax revenue on vehicles, 

insurance, corporate income and fuel) 

o  €6,183 in Austria 

o  €5,765 in Sweden 

  Labour-related losses per driver per annum (unemployment compensation, loss 

of income tax, loss of social insurance contributions and loss of spending 
power) 

o  €29,702 in Austria 

o  €40,100 in Sweden  

These estimates show that the losses per truck are substantial.   In addition, there are 
also  possible  social  consequences  arising  from  the  conduct  of  letterbox  companies, 
which are assessed further in Evaluation Question 5 (see Section 6.5).   

Given the above impacts, the reduction of letterbox companies should in turn help to 
improve  the  competitiveness  of  legitimate  operators  that  comply  with  road  transport 
rules,  by  creating  a  fairer,  more  level  playing  field.    As  such,  the  requirement  for 
stable and effective establishment is linked to the objectives of removing distortions of 
competition  and  to  improving  social  conditions.    The  available  evidence  described  in 
the  previous  section  suggests  that  the  Regulations  has  made  some  progress  against 
this  objective,  since  there  is  some  positive  impact  in  terms  of  reducing  the  overall 
number  of  letterbox  companies  compared  to  what  would  have  happened  in  the 
absence  of  the  rules.    Nonetheless,  it  has  not  removed  them  from  the  market 
completely.   

The likely reasons for the continuing existence of letterbox companies, as well as how 
the Regulations were intended to target this issue, are summarised in Figure 6-1.  The 
main  mechanism  is  through  the  provisions  on  stable  and  effective  establishment, 
which  is  the  explicit  focus  of  this  evaluation  question.    This  requirement  is  also 
supported  by  wider  provisions  on  cross-border  collaboration  in  order  to  better  detect 
infringements through the European Register of Road Transport Undertakings (ERRU). 
However, ERRU has not yet been fully accomplished, as explained further in Evaluation 
Question 3 (see Section 6.3). The diagram indicates reasons why the  intended result 
has  not  been  achieved  (explained  further  below),  namely  that  checks  of  compliance 
with  the  provisions  on  stable  and  effective  establishment  are  not  functioning 
effectively.  Furthermore, the effectiveness of checks may be hampered by insufficient 
cooperation  between  Member  States,  as  explained  further  in  Evaluation  Question  3 
(see Section 6.3). Differentials in wages and other costs are an external driving factor 
(outside  the  scope  of  the  Regulations),  as  discussed  above,  which  may  diminish 
gradually over time.  

44 

 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Figure 6-1: Overview of impacts of the Regulations with respect to letterbox 
companies  

Identified problem: Lack of clarity over how to define an operating centre 

One  of  the  main  indications  of  difficulties  experienced  was  around  the  lack  of  clarity 
over  how  to  define  an  operating  centre:  Article  5  specifies  that  an  undertaking  must 
have an office in which it keeps its core business documents and an operating centre 
with  the  “appropriate”  technical  equipment  and  facilities  in  the  Member  State  of 
establishment.  

Member State ministries were asked whether there were any parts in those provisions 
that led to difficulties or inconsistencies in interpretation.  Respondents from Belgium, 
Estonia, Bulgaria, Finland and Germany mentioned a lack of clarity over how precisely 
to  define  an  operating  centre,  which  makes  it  difficult  to  define  when  a  transport 
undertaking  does  not  satisfy  the  requirement  on  stable  and  effective  establishment, 
which hampers the clarity of the rules.     

These  views  on  the  perceived  vagueness  of  the  provisions  are  supported  by  actions 
taken by Member States in an attempt to define more specific criteria themselves – in 
the  UK,  the  additional  requirements  were  seen  favourably  by  an  industry  association 
interviewed  for  this  study,  as  they  help  to  maintain  a  more  positive  image  for  the 
industry.  Efforts to improve the definition in Poland by amending the law in 2013 (see 
the Polish case study, Annex C, Section 11.4) have reportedly improved enforcement.  
In  Luxembourg,  the  respondent  to  the  survey  of  ministries  indicates  that  the 
establishment has to be appropriate to the size of the company; the manager has to 
be  present  on  a  regular  basis;  and  the  existence  of  a  parking  space  is  checked 
although it is not a legal requirement.   

Comparing the provisions in Regulation 1071/2009 to legislation in other sectors also 
shows  that  there  could  be  more  detail.    For  instance,  the  recently  adopted 
Enforcement  Directive  of  the  Posting  of  Workers  Directive  (2014/67/EU)  lists 
conditions  that  are  more  extensive  than  those  provided  in  Regulation  1071/2009. 
They were introduced because the Posting of Workers Directive itself requires that the 
posting undertaking has to be “established” in a Member State, but did not set specific 
criteria  in  order  to  determine  if  there  is  a  genuine  link.    Under  Article  4  of  Directive 
2014/67/EU,  Member  States  are  under  the  obligation  to  check  that  the  employer  is 
not  a letterbox  company.  In  particular,  Member States are  required  to  check that  an 

45 

 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

undertaking  “genuinely  performs  substantial  activities,  other  than  purely  internal 
management and/or administrative activities“  

Although  the  elements  stated  are  not  exhaustive,  they  seek  to  identify  where  the 
activities  that  are  central  to  most  service  companies  are  actually  exercised.  Such 
elements may include in particular: 

(a)  the  place  where  the  undertaking  has 
its  registered  office  and 
administration,  uses  office  space,  pays  taxes  and  social  security  contributions 
and,  where  applicable,  in  accordance  with  national  law  has  a  professional 
licence or is registered with the chambers of commerce or professional bodies; 

(b)  the  place  where  posted  workers  are  recruited  and  from  which  they  are 
posted; 

(c)  the  law  applicable  to  the  contracts  concluded  by  the  undertaking  with  its 
workers, on the one hand, and with its clients, on the other; 

(d)  the  place  where  the  undertaking  performs  its  substantial  business  activity 
and where it employs administrative staff; 

(e) the number of contracts performed and/or the size of the turnover realised 
in the Member State of establishment, taking into account the specific situation 
of, inter alia, newly established undertakings and SMEs. 

Potential solutions to this issue are discussed in the summary and conclusions to this 
section.      Other  factors  may  relate  to  lack  of  effective  cooperation  between  Member 
States, which will be discussed further in Evaluation Question 3. 

6.1.2.  Compliance with cabotage provisions 

6.1.2.1. 
cabotage 

Assessment of current levels of compliance and extent of illegal 

Cabotage is governed by Regulation 1072/2009.  Non-resident hauliers must produce 
clear evidence of the incoming international carriage and of each consecutive cabotage 
operation carried out, as detailed in Article 8(3).  

In  order  to  assess  the  levels  of  compliance  with  the  cabotage  provisions,  it  is 
necessary to evaluate the available data.   

Firstly,  it  is  worth  noting  that  statistics  on  total  cabotage  activity  (both  legal  and 
illegal)  are  poor,  due  to  the  difficulty  in  collecting  such  data.  In  this  sense,  Eurostat 
data  is  the  main  source  for  statistics  on  road  freight  transportation,  including 
cabotage.  The  data  collection  for  Eurostat  cabotage  statistics  is  not  complete  -  for 
example,  some  statistics  are  non-disclosed,  and  some  countries  lack  routines  for 
collecting  haulage  data.    This  is  in  part  due  to  the  methodology  used  to  gather 
information  -  Member  States  gather  statistics  on  cabotage  through  postal  surveys. 
Although  efforts  are  made  to  discourage  them  from  doing  so,  it  is  possible  for 
operators to cover up transport operations by claiming the vehicle was idle during the 
period in question (Eurostat, 2011).   

Attempts  to  estimate  the  extent  of  total  cabotage  activity  by  other  means  do  indeed 
suggest that actual activity may be significantly higher than that reported by Member 
States to Eurostat.  Although there are no comprehensive EU-wide studies, examples 
from several Member States are as follows: 

 

In Denmark, a study was conducted using large-scale data collection based on 
a smartphone app, carried out by 8,000 volunteers, and validated using GPS 
tracking.  The study estimated that the total cabotage carried out in Denmark 
accounts for a minimum of 4.6% of the total domestic market, with a feasible 
market of at least 8.5%.  This is compared to the Eurostat figure of 2.7% in 
2012 (Sternberg et al, 2014).   

46 

 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

 

 

In the Netherlands, it is claimed that the share of cabotage could be up to 21% 
(PRC, 2013), while another study estimated the level to be around 10% 
(Panteia, 2013) compared to Eurostat figures of 5.2%.  

In Sweden, Eurostat data suggested that cabotage was limited to 5% of the 
for-hire-and-reward transport market. Using volunteer data collection, 7,641 
license plates were observed in Sweden in 2013 of which an estimated 1,590 
were engaged in cabotage (around 20%) (Sternberg et al, 2015).   

Some  stakeholders  and  reports  suggest  that  the  inaccuracy  of  Eurostat  data  is 
indicative  of  a  wider  problem  with  illegal  cabotage  activities  –  for  instance,  ETF 
(2012b)  state  that  “Statistics  circulated  by  the  European  Commission  on  an  annual 
basis  show  an  inexplicably  low  rate  of  growth  in  cabotage  within  the  internal  market 
transport  activity.  This  is  precisely  because  only  few  operators  engaged  in  cabotage 
play by the law and therefore declares cabotage activities in the host Member State”.  

However,  it  is  very  important  to  note  that  the  existence  of  a  gap  between  official 
Eurostat  statistics  and  the  actual  level  of  cabotage  does  not  automatically  imply  that 
there  are  substantial  amounts  of  illegal  cabotage.    Rather,  this  merely  suggests  that 
both  legal  (and  potentially  illegal)  cabotage  may  be  under-reported  in  official 
statistics.    As  explained  above,  this  is  due  to  the  limitations  of  the  data  collection 
techniques  used.    Hence,  to  establish  whether  and  to  what  extent  there  might  be  a 
problem  of  illegal  cabotage,  we  must  examine  alternative  sources  of  data  in  more 
detail.     

The  second  part  of  the  analysis  on  data  quality  is  to  look  at  statistics  specifically  on 
illegal  cabotage.    Data  specifically  on  the  levels  of  illegal  cabotage  is  rather  sparse, 
and  previous  studies  have  confirmed  the  difficulty  in  gaining  data,  stating  that  “the 
phenomenon of illegality of cabotage is really a “grey zone” and actually finding official 
figures  is  very  difficult”  (AECOM,  2014c).    Some  statistics  could  be  obtained  for  this 
study,  which  are  typically  provided  by  enforcement  authorities  based  on  their 
enforcement  activities.    Although  all  respondents  to  the  survey  of  enforcement 
authorities  were  asked  for  detailed  data  on  cabotage  checks  and  infringement  rates, 
few  were  able  to  do  so.    Survey  responses  were  supplemented  with  evidence  from 
literature,  shown  in  Table  6-2.    The  figures  suggest  that  the  problem  of  illegal 
cabotage  detected  by  checks  is  not  of  a  significant  size  in  most  countries  for  which 
data were available.  

Table 6-2: Number of violations of cabotage rules in different Member States 

Country 

Period 

Number of detected 
infringements 

Infringement rate 

Germany 

2014 

1,520 out of 183,200 checks 

2013 

2012 

2011 

UK 

March 2012 – 
March 2013 

Poland 

2013 

January 2012 
– October 
2012 

727 out of 186,214 checks 

536 out of 207,120 checks 

612 infringements out of 
118,009 inspections 

229  

12 infringements out of 
233,118 inspections 

3 infringements out of 
157,000 inspections 

0.83% 

0.39% 

0.26% 

0.52% 

0.2% 

0.01% 

0.002% 

Lithuania 

No data 

No data 

3% of all controls have led to 
fines for lack of 
documentation 

47 

 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Country 

Period 

Number of detected 
infringements 

Infringement rate 

Italy 

January 2012 
– October 
2012 

205 infringements issued 
following 220,965 roadside 
checks 

France 

2010-2011 

50,928 

0.1% referring to crimes 
against rules around 
International transport, of 
which cabotage is included 

7% of vehicles stopped for 
cabotage controls were issued 
an infringement. 

Denmark 

2014 

Ireland 

2012  –  July 
2013 

2013 

2013 

Netherlands 

1 case out of 78 checks 

0.5%  

1.3% 

3 breaches out of 185 checks 

1.6% 

163 inspections 

6.1% (official monitoring 
data) 

2.4% (estimated) 

Source: European Parliament (2013a); (Sternberg et al, 2014) - Denmark; (Dáil debates, 2013) 
-  Ireland;  survey  of  enforcement  authorities  -  Netherlands  official  monitoring  data;  (Francke, 
2014) – Netherlands estimated data. Statistics for Germany provided by BAG 

These  relatively  low  levels  of  detected  infringements  in  turn  suggests  that  overall 
illegal  cabotage  may  not  be  a  significant  problem,  at  least  in  the  Member  States  for 
which data are available.   However, the infringement rate reported in controls cannot 
necessarily  be  taken  as  representative  of  the  whole  fleet.    As  such,  it  is  worth 
investigating  the  accuracy  of  these  statistics  in  more  detail.    The  main  weakness  of 
reported infringement rates is of course that they cannot reflect infringements that go 
undetected.    In  this  sense,  the  true  accuracy  of  the  official  statistics  on  illegal 
cabotage appears to vary, as discussed below.   

In  some  cases,  the  official  data  appear  to  be  truly  representative  of  the  situation  in 
that country. For instance, the low infringement rates in  Denmark appear to be due 
to  genuinely  low  levels  of  illegal  cabotage,  and  not  due  to  (for  example)  ineffective 
detection. On the one hand, several claims have been made by trade organisations of 
illegal  cabotage.  For  example,  the  Danish  Transport  and  Logistics  Association  (DTL) 
reports  that  one  of  the  main  problems  is  where  foreign  drivers  use  the  so-called 
‘zeroing solution’ to drive in Denmark on a permanent basis. This means that foreign 
drivers  simply  drive  across,  for  example,  the  German–Danish  border  with  a  load  of 
empty  pallets  or  empty  containers  and  then  continue  their  internal  journeys  in 
Denmark.  The  DTL  and  the  Danish  Transport  Federation  insist  there  is  need  for 
greater  control  of  foreign  drivers  on  national  roads,  as  there  have  been  many 
instances  where  they  have  not  adhered  to  the  maximum  of  three  internal  transport 
journeys within the permitted seven days (Parliamentary questions, 2012).  However, 
claims  of  illegal  cabotage  in  Denmark  have  not  been  confirmed  by  the  enforcement 
authorities,  who  believe  that  there  are  few  incentives  for  such  behaviour  given  the 
high penalties, frequent enforcement and the small size of the country (see Evaluation 
Question  2  for  more  details).    Nor  have  the  claims  been  verified  in  independently 
gathered  wide-scale  data  collection  in  Sternberg  et  al  (2014),  although  “systematic 
cabotage” does appear to be taking place (see Evaluation Question 7 for more details).  
On  the  basis  of  nearly  40,000  observations  provided  by  volunteers,  Sternberg  et  al, 
(2014)  gives  no  indication  of  any  legal  infringements  of  the  cabotage  rules  in 
Denmark, meaning that none of the observations indicate any trucks making a fourth 
trip  after  an  international  trip.    The  data  was  cross-checked  through  accessing  the 
legal  documentation  of  one  haulier,  which  showed  several  fines  for  violations,  all  of 
which  were  due  to  documentation  errors  (e.g.  failure  to  get  a  signature  on  the 
consignment  note).    Hence,  the  actual  data  collected  in  Denmark  does  not  provide 

48 

 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

evidence  of  the  existence  of  anything  but  administrative  infringements  (Sternberg  et 
al, 2015). 

On  the  other  hand,  statistics  in  other  Member  States  may  not  be  as  representative. 
One  study  in  Sweden  suggests  that  official  cabotage  infringement  rates  may 
underestimate  the  actual  level  of  infringements,  which  were  estimated  information 
provided  by  volunteers.    An  app  for  smartphones  was  developed  to  report  foreign 
trucks in Sweden and downloaded by 5,000 people. The registration number and the 
geographical  position  was  reported  via  the  app  during  a  one  month  period  in  2013.  
Data  collected  suggested  that  there  were  1,590  trucks  engaged  in  cabotage,  and 
potentially  379  engaged  in  illegal  cabotage  (24%  of  trucks  engaged  in  cabotage  and 
around 5% of all trucks (Sternberg et al, 2015).  The data indicated that a majority of 
trucks doing cabotage in Sweden, only make 1 cabotage trip per visit to Sweden – on 
the other hand, a significant number of trucks do not, according to the data available, 
leave the country.   

AECOM  (2014c)  attempted  to  model  the  amount  of  potential  cabotage  based  on 
bottom-up  estimates  of  contestable  markets.    This  showed  potentially  large 
discrepancies  (more  than  2,000  million  t-km)  between  cabotage  levels  reporting  in 
Eurostat  and  the  expected  activity  for  Germany,  Austria  and  Italy.    However,  the 
official  statistics  obtained  for  Germany  and  Italy  (see  Table  6-2)  suggest  very  low 
infringement  rates  respectively  of  0.45%  and  0.1%,  alongside  a  high  number  of 
checks.  The  apparent  disagreement  here  may  be  because  the  unreported  activity  in 
the model includes both flagging out27 (the dominant cause) as well as illegal activity 
(that may be viewed as legitimate flagging out by some companies) (AECOM, 2014c). 

To  some  extent,  the  higher  infringement  rates  reported  in  some  countries  could  also 
be a result of targeted checks, which result in higher detection rates, in which case the 
infringement rates overestimate the total extent of the problem.  Since risk-rating is 
used to target checks based on aiming to control vehicles with a higher infringement 
risk,  the  overall  infringement  rate  cannot  be  obtained  by  extrapolating  the  results 
from vehicle controls to the total fleet (since the infringement rate is not reflective of 
the  entire  fleet).    For  example,  a  2014  report  from  the  Environment  and  Transport 
Inspectorate  (ITL)  in  the  Netherlands  indicates  that  out  of  163  vehicles  checked,  36 
were  engaged  in  cabotage,  of  which  10  were  found  to  be  “illegal”  (around  6% 
infringement  rate  -  all  of  which  from  Eastern  European  Member  States)  (Francke, 
2014).    However,  this  is  a  relatively  small  sample.    Alternative  estimates  based  on 
analysis of Weight in Motion data of Polish trucks, estimated the illegal cabotage rate 
was 2.4% (Francke, 2014).  

Hence,  some  national  statistics  appear  to  give  an  accurate  reflection  of  overall 
infringement  rates  (Denmark).    At  the  same  time,  there  are  instances  of  the  official 
statistics  both  under-estimating  (Sweden  and  Ireland)  and  over-estimating  the  likely 
true extent of illegal cabotage activities (Netherlands).   

There are regional differences too, even within a single Member State.  Areas around 
ports  appear  to  feature  more  often  in  reports  of  illegal  cabotage  operations. 
Eyewitness  accounts  from  Italy  suggest  that  trailers  are  brought  into  the  port  of 
Trieste by sea and attached on site to motor vehicles that are waiting in the port area. 
The  vehicles  are  all  registered  in  non-EU  countries  and  mainly  driven  by  Turkish 
drivers. According to drivers’ testimonies, 60% of trips seem to be (illegal) cabotage, 
mainly  within  Italy,  while  the  rest  is  international  transport  within  the  EU  (ETF, 
2012a).  A  similar  practice  has  been  reported  in  France,  at  the  port  of  Toulon  (TRT, 
2013), as well as around Foynes Port in Ireland (Dáil debates, 2013).   

27 The formal relocation of a road haulage business from one Member State to another, or the 
establishment of a subsidiary in another Member State.  The practice of flagging out is legal, 
as compared to setting up letterbox companies (that do not involve any “real” establishment 
in the host Member State). 

49 

 
 
                                          
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

It is difficult to determine the true extent of illegal cabotage operations in connection 
with these eyewitness reports.  On the one hand, hauliers may indeed be conducting 
illegal cabotage, as suggested by these reports.  On the other hand, the reports may 
overestimate  the  prevalence  of  illegal  operations  as  they  may  not  be  able  to 
differentiate between any legal operations).  These reports may also be affected by an 
observation  bias  –  as  demonstrated  by  a  study  of  cabotage  in  Denmark,  where 
volunteers were more willing to report trucks from new Member States, leading to an 
over-representation of these trucks in the data (Sternberg et al, 2014).   As a cross-
check  of  this  viewpoint,  one  study found  that  selective (risk-based)  inspection  of  the 
vehicles  reached  a  6%  detection  in  the  area  around  the  port  of  Rotterdam  (Panteia, 
2013), compared to an estimated infringement rate of 2.4% for the Netherlands as a 
whole (Francke, 2014). While this level of detection is not representative of the extent 
of illegal cabotage in the Netherlands in general, it does again suggest that the official 
statistics  overestimate  the  pervasiveness  of  illegal  cabotage.    On  the  basis  of  the 
available  evidence,  it  appears  that  overall  the  areas  around  ports  may  be  more 
vulnerable  to  illegal  cabotage,  but  the  problem  is  not  necessarily  widespread  and  it 
very likely varies by location.   

The available evidence supports the conclusion that there are likely problems of illegal 
cabotage in specific Member States.  It appears that national and geographical factors 
are  likely  to  determine  the  risk  of  problems  with  illegal  cabotage  in  a  country.    For 
instance,  studies  appear  to  suggest  that  the  low  infringement  rates  in  Denmark  are 
genuinely low. Since Denmark is a small country with frequent enforcement controls, 
it  is  believed  that  there  are  few  incentives  and  high  risks  for  hauliers  to  take  part  in 
illegal cabotage (Sternberg et al, 2014).  Hauliers may find it relatively easy to leave 
the  country  and  return  in  compliance  with  the  “3  in  7”  rule.    Other  national  factors 
include the level of enforcement, since infrequent controls can translate to a low risk 
of being caught.  This is examined further in the next Evaluation Question.   

The  amount  of  cabotage  penetration  also  has  a  bearing  on  the  likely  importance  of 
illegal  cabotage  in  a  particular  country.    For  example,  cabotage  is  less  frequently 
carried out in the “new” Member States, meaning that infringements may also be less 
frequent in their territories. Qualitative responses from interviews carried out for this 
study  with  the  enforcement  authorities  in  Romania,  Poland,  Bulgaria,  Croatia  and 
Latvia  confirm  that  there  is  not  a  lot  of  cabotage  in  their  countries  and  hence  illegal 
cabotage  is  not  seen  as  a  priority  problem.    This  means  the  problems  are  likely 
concentrated in the heavily cabotaged EU-15 Member States, potentially to a greater 
extent  than  is  reflected  in  official  statistics  –  a  view  that  is  supported  by  bottom-up 
modelling estimates conducted in AECOM (2014c).   

6.1.2.2. 
achieved and issues identified 

Assessment  of  extent  to  which  the  expected  results  were 

The  link  between  compliance  levels  with  the  cabotage  rules  and  the  operational 
objectives  /  results  of  the  Regulation  is  illustrated  in  Figure  6-2.  The  outputs  of  the 
Regulations  were  revised  rules  on  cabotage,  which  are  linked  to  the  operational 
objective of laying down common rules for non-resident hauliers operating temporarily 
within  a  Member  State.    These  revisions  were  intended  to  result  in  clearer,  more 
harmonised  rules,  which  in  turn  was  expected  to  lead  to  easier  enforcement.    The 
actual outcomes shown in the diagram are that there are still different interpretations 
of  cabotage  that  hinder  the  achievement  of  common  rules  (see  Evaluation  Question 
4), as well as issues around the documentation required that may hinder enforcement 
(discussed  further  in  Evaluation  Question  2,  see  Section  6.2).    These  issues  may 
contribute to the observed levels of non-compliance (discussed further below).   

50 

 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Figure 6-2: Overview of impacts of the Regulations with respect to cabotage 
provisions 

The above diagram places the rules into context with the operational objectives.  The 
focus of this evaluation question is concentrated on whether or not compliance levels 
with  the  cabotage  rules  have  improved,  and  the  reasons  for  this,  whereas  the  other 
aspects are analysed elsewhere in this report.   

Attempts to establish trends over time encounter the same difficulties as when trying 
to  estimate  the  current  levels  of  compliance.    All  enforcement  authorities  that 
responded  to  the  survey  were  asked  to  estimate  previous  levels  of  cabotage 
infringements  prior  to  the  introduction  of  Regulation  1072/2009.    Only  Poland  was 
able to supply such data, indicating that 27 infringements of cabotage provisions were 
found  in  2008  compared  to  12  in  2013.  This  suggests  a  slight  reduction  in  cabotage 
infringements  (although  the  absolute  level  is  so  low  that  it  is  difficult  to  say  for 
certain),  but  this  result  cannot  be  extrapolated  to  other  countries.  The  supporting 
study to the Regulation also did not contain any quantitative data on illegal practices 
or infringements that could be used as a starting point for comparison (Ecorys, 2006).  

Trends over time were only available for a few Member States, although these data do 
not extend back as far as prior to the introduction of Regulation 1071/2009 and only 
apply to recent years:  

 

 

 

In Denmark, the ministry commented during interviews that although they had 
increased the amount of vehicles checked in recent years, fewer violations have 
been detected.  This suggests that the compliance rate has improved.   

In Germany, the infringement rate has remained consistently below 1% from 
2011-2014. 

In Poland, the infringement rate has remained less than 0.01% in 2012 and 
2013. 

Since  it  is  difficult  to  extrapolate  from  these  cases  to  the  rest  of  Europe,  it  is  worth 
also  considering  factors  that  might  lead  to  increased  risks  of  illegal  cabotage.    The 
main  drivers  for  intentional  non-compliance  are  economic  factors,  i.e.  cost  savings 
(Panteia,  2013;  AECOM,  2014c).    The  main  scope  for  gains  is  where  large  cost 
differentials exist between countries and crossing of borders is easier (AECOM, 2014c).  
There  are  very  low  levels  of  reported  cabotage  across  borders  where  international 
trade  is  strong  –  this  may  be  due  to  the  underreporting  in  official  statistics  as 
discussed  above,  but  also  due  to  activity  being  undertaken  through  flagging  out 
(which may not be reported as cabotage), or illegal activities (AECOM, 2014c).   

In this sense, many of the same developments in cost differentials outlined previously 
in Box 6-1 apply also to creating incentives for cabotage.  Alongside the higher levels 
of cabotage seen in the EU (the share of cabotage has roughly doubled between 2004 
and 201328), this implies that overall it could be expected that there would be higher 

28 Eurostat Dataset road_go_ta_tott 

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Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

absolute levels of cabotage, and in the absence of effective controls (discussed further 
in  Evaluation  Question  2,  see  Section  6.2),  this  would  likely  lead  to  higher  illegal 
cabotage.    

Other  factors  may  relate  to  unintentional  non-compliance,  i.e.  due  to  the  differing 
national interpretations in Member States (discussed further in Evaluation Question 4).  
These  create  complications  for  hauliers  trying  to  comply  with  the  rules,  especially  if 
information is difficult to find or there are language barriers.  The difficulties faced by 
hauliers  and  drivers  in  proving  legal  cabotage  are  discussed  further  in  Evaluation 
Question 7 (see Section 6.7.4). 

6.1.3.  Summary and conclusions for Evaluation Question 1 

6.1.3.1. 

Conclusions 

This Evaluation Question has focussed on analysing the specific new provisions of the 
Regulations regarding letterbox companies and cabotage.   

Stable and effective establishment 

The provisions related to letterbox companies considered in this question are those 
concerning  the  requirement  for  stable  and  effective  establishment.  Overall,  the 
available official statistics on infringements show that there are still companies without 
stable and effective establishment being detected in Europe today, which is supported 
by reports of letterbox companies found in the literature and views from the different 
stakeholder  groups 
(trade  unions,  associations,  ministries  and 
undertakings).  Official  statistics  gathered  from  enforcement  authorities  suggest  that 
the  absolute  number  of  companies  infringing  the  requirement  of  stable  and  effective 
establishment being detected is relatively low, although respondents were not able to 
comment on the extent to which there might be other companies evading detection.  

consulted 

Identifying any changes in the number of letterbox companies over time is difficult to 
track  directly  due  to  the  paucity  of  data.    The  development  of  market  forces  is 
considered as a proxy for the potential incentives for setting them up.  This shows that 
there  are  continuing  cost  differentials  between  countries,  which  create  strong 
incentives  for  the  establishment  of  letterbox  companies  –  suggesting  that  in  the 
absence  of  the  Regulation  the  problem  would  have  worsened.    As  such,  the  problem 
would have been unlikely to have resolved by itself in the past years – nor it is likely 
to resolve in the near future without effective enforcement of the Regulation.  In spite 
of  these  market  incentives,  the  weight  of  stakeholder  views  (associations,  ministries 
and undertakings) is that the impact of the Regulation has been slightly positive.  This 
suggests  that  the  Regulation  has  contributed  to  improving  the  situation  compared  to 
the counterfactual, although the problem has not been fully solved.  

There were two main problem areas identified.  Firstly, one of the main deficiencies in 
the provisions of the Regulation is a lack of a clear definition as to what constitutes an 
operating  centre.    This  leads  to  reported  difficulties  in  defining  when  an  undertaking 
does  not  satisfy  the  requirement  of  stable  and  effective  establishment.    Secondly, 
enforcers reported difficulties  in  gaining  support  from  authorities  in  different  Member 
States, which means that it is often not possible to confirm the existence of letterbox 
companies (discussed further in Evaluation Question 3).     

Cabotage provisions 

Turning  now  to  compliance  with  cabotage  provisions  laid  down  in  Regulation 
1072/2009,  again  the  availability  of  data  is  poor.    Data  specifically  on  the  levels  of 
illegal  cabotage  suggest  the  rates  of  infringements  detected  by  authorities  are 
relatively low in most countries (e.g. Denmark and Eastern European Member States), 
although  the  presence  of  illegal  cabotage  is  confirmed  in  others  (e.g.  Sweden, 
France).   

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Overall, the available evidence supports the conclusion that there are likely problems 
of  illegal  cabotage  concentrated  in  specific  Member  States,  particularly  concerning 
factors that affect the amount of cabotage penetration. This means the problems are 
likely  concentrated  in  the  heavily  cabotaged  EU-15  Member  States,  potentially  to  a 
greater  extent  than  is  reflected  in  official  statistics  –  a  view  that  is  supported  by 
bottom-up modelling estimates conducted in AECOM (2014c).   

Attempts  to  establish  trends  over  time  (and  to  conclude  on  the  contribution  of  the 
Regulation  to  reducing  illegal  cabotage)  encounter  the  same  difficulties  due to  a lack 
of  data.    There  was  little  evidence  in  the  literature  or  provided  by  stakeholders  that 
could  be  used  to  develop  robust  conclusions.  Indications  from  a  small  sample  of 
countries  (Denmark,  Germany,  Poland)  show  that  the  compliance  rate  has  slightly 
improved or remained consistently high in recent years, but it is difficult to extrapolate 
from these cases to the rest of Europe.   

In the absence of direct indicators of trends in illegal cabotage, it is worth considering 
factors  that  might  lead  to  increased  risks  of  illegal  cabotage.    The  main  underlying 
drivers for non-compliance and problems of illegal cabotage are: 

  For intentional non-compliance, the main driving force are the continuing cost 
differentials between Member States.  This type of non-compliance must be 
managed by effective enforcement (discussed further in Evaluation Question 2, 
see Section 6.2); 

  For unintentional non-compliance, the driver appears to be the differing 

national interpretations in Member States.  These create complications for 
hauliers trying to comply with the rules, especially if information is difficult to 
find or there are language barriers.  Unclear provisions and differing 
interpretations of cabotage are discussed further in Evaluation Question 4 
(Section 6.4), whereas the practical difficulties of proving legal cabotage are 
discussed in Evaluation Question 7. 

On the other hand, illegal cabotage is not likely to be an issue in Member States with 
low  levels  of  cabotage.    This  is  supported  by  the  bottom-up  modelling  of  AECOM 
(2014c),  and  also  validated  during  interviews  with  the  enforcement  authorities  in 
Romania, Poland, Bulgaria and Latvia who confirm that there is not a lot of cabotage 
in their countries and hence illegal cabotage is not seen as a priority problem.   

6.1.3.2. 

Recommendations 

The  recommendations  to  improve  the  implementation  of  the  requirements  on  stable 
and  effective  establishment  aim  to  directly  target  the  problem  areas  identified, 
namely: a lack of clarity over how to define an operating centre and a lack of effective 
cooperation between Member States.   

In the view of the study team,  a more precise definition as to what constitutes 
an  operating  centre  should  be  introduced  at  the  European  level,  in  keeping 
with  the  objectives  to  ensure  common  rules  on  access  to  the  profession.  In  our 
judgement,  the  Enforcement  Directive  of  the  Posting  of  Workers  Directive 
(2014/67/EU)  provides  a good  blueprint  of  more  detailed  criteria that  could  be used.  
The  elements  stated  seek  to  identify  where  the  activities  that  are  central  to  most 
service  companies  are  actually  exercised.  The  study  team  view  the  requirements  in 
the Posting of Workers Directive as a concrete example of how similar problems have 
been  tackled  in  related  legislation,  and  it  provides  a  good  blueprint  of  how  more 
precise requirements could be introduced.  It is therefore recommended that a similar 
approach be considered to amend Regulation 1071/2009 concerning the requirements 
on stable and effective establishment and cooperation between Member States. 

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Another  approach  that  could  be  transferred  from  other  legislative  areas  would  be  to 
hold liable those who are responsible for setting up and using letterbox companies in 
an  abusive  way.    Steps  have  been  taken  to  achieve  this  in  other  legislative  areas, 
which  may  help  to  prevent  abuse  of  the  rules.  For  example,  the  proposal29  for 
amending the Money Laundering Directive suggests that national or legal persons that 
do not comply with the disclosure requirement in Article 29 of the Directive should be 
subject to imposition of an effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalty (Sørensen, 
2015).  This is a more radical departure from the existing approach and could also be 
considered.  

The  recommendations  are  therefore  to  clarify  the  definition  of  an  operating  centre.  
This  recommendation  should  not  entail  substantial  additional  costs  to  enforcement 
authorities, since there are not any substantial changes to the actions that should be 
taken  already  –  i.e.  the  marginal  cost  of  checking  more  precise  criteria  should  be 
small. The Impact Assessment for the Enforcement Directive of the Posting of Workers 
Directive  assesses  precisely  the  administrative  burdens  of  introducing  more  detailed 
definitions of effective establishment, and concludes that “providing for more effective 
and  adequate  inspections  does  not  imply  an  increase  in  controls,  inspections  and 
respective costs or resources compared to the status quo… Member States, companies 
and  posted  workers  will  benefit  from  more  effective  and  adequate  inspection  since 
they will contribute to a better compliance with the Directive and a more level playing 
field”.  Since the recommendations of this study are to follow closely the revisions to 
the Directive, it is logical that the cost assessment will be similar.  

The  benefits  of  such  a  measure  would  be  in  the  form  of  avoided  losses  for 
stakeholders  –  specifically,  the  fiscal  and  labour  losses  per  truck  to  Member  States 
have been estimated at around €40,875 per year.  The benefits to legitimate firms will 
be in the form of income gains that were previously lost to letterbox companies, which 
were  estimated  command  a cost advantage of  around  10-30%.    The  majority  of  this 
cost  advantage  is  thought  to  be  due  to  wage  costs,  so  the  benefits  would  also  be 
shared with drivers.   

Considering  the  limited  costs,  and  the  support  for  such  measures  as  called  for  by 
Member  State  ministries,  alongside  the  significant  benefits  to  Member  States  and 
companies  arising  from  avoiding  the  unfair  conduct  of  letterbox  companies  (see 
Section  6.1.1.4),  the  benefits  associated  with  these  recommendations  appear  to  be 
proportionate to the costs.   

The recommendations following this Evaluation Question relate to the requirements of 
stable  and  effective  establishment  only.    The  issues  identified  with  respect  to  illegal 
cabotage and associated recommendations are linked to other Evaluation Questions, in 
particular  Evaluation  Question  2  on  enforcement  practices  (see  Section  6.2)  and 
Evaluation  Question  4  on  the  variations  in  the  interpretation  of  cabotage  provisions 
(Section 6.4). 

29 Parliament’s proposal adopted on 11 March 2014, (P7_TA(2014)0191). 

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6.2.  Effectiveness:  To  what  extent  are  the  new  enforcement 
measures effective?  

To  what  extent  are  the  new  enforcement  measures  effective?  Are  the  checks 
performed by the competent authorities carried out at an effective frequency and level 
of  thoroughness?  Are  the  requirements  set  in  the  two  Regulations  related  to  checks 
relevant  and  sufficient  to  ensure  compliance?  Are  the  penalty  systems  in  place 
designed by Member States proportionate and dissuasive? 

The effectiveness of the enforcement practices related to the Regulations needs to be 
assessed  from  several  angles  in  order  to  determine  the  underlying  reasons  for  any 
trends  observed. 
implementation  and  effectiveness  of  national 
enforcement  measures  are  assessed.    Secondly,  the  associated  penalty  systems  in 
place  are  reviewed  in  terms  of  whether  they  are  proportionate  and  dissuasive, 
considering the infringements they have been put in place to deter. 

  Firstly,  the 

6.2.1.  Regulation 1071/2009 

6.2.1.1. 

Implementation and national enforcement measures 

With regard to understanding the effectiveness of enforcement practices, the first step 
is  to  review  the  implementation  across  Member  States.    The  relevant  provisions  of 
Regulation  1071/2009  related  to  checks  are  contained  in  its  Article  12.    This  article 
requires  that  the  Member  States  control  whether  undertakings  continue  to  meet  the 
requirements  set  out  in  Article  3  (i.e.  stable  and  effective  establishment,  financial 
standing,  good  repute  and  professional  competence).    Until  the  end  of  2014,  the 
Member States must, at least every five years, check that the undertakings continue 
to meet the requirement.  Article 12 also requires that Member States shall carry out 
checks targeting those undertakings which are classed as posing an increased risk. For 
that purpose, Member States shall extend the risk classification system established by 
them pursuant to Article 9 of Directive 2006/22/EC.   

Concerning  the  extent  to  which  Member  States  have  been  able  to  fully  implement 
these requirements, some information was available in the official monitoring reports 
required under the Regulation.  Details for Estonia, Ireland, Latvia and Hungary were 
given (discussed further below).  In order to better understand how the enforcement 
systems  were  developed  and  applied  in  different  Member  States,  additional  details 
were sought via surveys and interviews carried out for this study – full details of the 
examples collected are given in Annex A (see Section 9.3.1).   

Precise  data  on  the  frequency  and  thoroughness  of  checks  carried  out  was  sought 
from  the  literature  and  also  from  stakeholders  via  the  surveys  and  interviews,  but  it 
proved  difficult  to  gather  consistent  information  across  different  Member  States.    In 
Latvia,  checks  of  compliance  with  financial  standing  are  performed  by  means  of 
information from the annual reports provided by the Register of Enterprises (European 
Commission, 2014a).  Hungary indicated the numbers of checks on conditions of good 
repute (11062), financial standing (7197) and professional competence (5329) during 
this  reporting  period  (i.e.  from  4/12/2011  –  31/12/2012)  (European  Commission, 
2014a).    Checks  of  all  requirements  with  respect  to  the  conditions  of  access  to  the 
occupation  were  confirmed  to  be  carried  out  by  the  authorities  interviewed  in  the 
course  of  this  study  from  Germany  and  Poland.    In  Denmark,  the  interviewee 
explained that checks are carried out for all new applications covering at least financial 
standing,  professional  competence  and  stable  and  effective  establishment  for  new 
applications – checks of good repute are only conducted if there are indications (e.g. 
from  the  police)  of  a  potential  problem.    Ireland  reported  that  checks  of  the 
requirements  of  the  Regulation  are  performed  at  least  every  five  years  during  the 
renewal process for each undertaking, with additional checks carried out on the basis 
of  risk  rating.    The  Romanian  authority  reported  that  if  a  company  opens  a  branch, 

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checks are done on its stable and effective establishment. They considered this to be 
an effective system.   

The  incomplete  data  received  means  that  we  cannot  confirm  whether  or  not  all 
Member States are meeting the requirement for checks of undertakings at least every 
five  years.    Further  information  could  not  be  found,  but  it  may  be  recalled  that  a 
similar  requirement  for  a  maximum  period  of  five  years  between  compulsory  checks 
has  been  in  place  long  before  the  Regulation  (i.e.  under  Directive  96/26/EC,  Article 
6(1)).  Bearing this in mind, it seems that there should not have been major changes 
to the systems already in place in most Member States.   

Most  Member  States  have  now  transitioned  to  using  a  risk  rating  system  directly 
because of the requirement of the Regulation (e.g. Romania, Latvia, Netherlands and 
Finland), whereas a smaller number reported via the surveys that they already had a 
system in place (e.g. France, Denmark and the UK).  

Further  details  on  the  application  of  the  risk  rating  systems  were  obtain  via  the 
interviews  conducted  for  this  study  (full  details  given  in  Annex  A,  Section  9.3.1).  
Many risk-rating systems operate in the manner prescribed by the Regulations (e.g. in 
Romania,  Finland,  Poland).  .  There  were  several  examples  of  the  risk  rating  system 
going  beyond  the  minimum  requirements  –  in  the  Netherlands,  risk  rating  is  used  to 
detect  transport  operators  that  are  in  risk  of  no  longer  fulfilling  the  requirement  of 
financial standing, as well as covering professional competence.  The UK’s Driver and 
Vehicle  Standards  Agency  has  had  a  system  known  as  OCRS  (Operator  Compliance 
Risk Score) since 2006 which was refined in 2012 to improve its predictive ability. The 
OCRS  goes  beyond  the  minimum  requirements  of  the  legislation  by  integrating 
information  on  roadworthiness  infringements,  which  are  correlated  with  other 
infringements (SDG, 2013a).   

Three  respondents  to  the  survey  of  ministries  felt  that  the  risk  rating  system  had 
improved  the  effectiveness  of  checks  (Luxembourg,  Spain,  and  Finland).    There 
appear to be a small number of countries who still do not use a risk rating system  – 
only the Bulgarian respondents indicated that they did not have a risk-rating system: 
The Bulgarian authorities reported that they were waiting for the new classification of 
infringements from the Commission before establishing a system.   

The  examples  demonstrate  that  national  enforcement  practices  vary  in  terms  of  the 
functioning  of  the  risk  rating  system  (e.g.  whether  it  focusses  on  good  repute  or 
includes other requirements such as financial standing and professional competence).   

6.2.1.2. 

Effectiveness of enforcement measures 

The  next  question  to  examine  is  whether  the  enforcement  measures  in  place  are 
effective, and the extent to which different factors influence the outcomes.   

infringements 

found  against  different  requirements  was  requested 

Information on the number of checks carried out in different countries and the number 
of 
from 
enforcement authorities, but very little data was returned on this point.  An alternative 
indicator of how well the enforcement systems are operating is the rate of recidivism 
(re-offending within 2 years) among offenders.  That is, if the enforcement system is 
effective  and  dissuasive,  the  rate  of  re-offending  should  be  low.    All  enforcement 
authorities  were  asked  about  this,  but  only  two  were  able  to  provide  data.  The 
respondent from Finland indicated that they felt the rate of recidivism had fallen from 
10-15%  prior  to  Regulation  1071/2009,  to  around  8%  currently,  which  indicates  a 
positive trend.  Conversely, the respondent from Denmark estimated that the rate had 
not  changed  from  around  5%.  All  other  authorities  reported  that  they  did  not  have 
data.  The limited sample makes extrapolation to other Member States impossible.   

A  more  qualitative  indicator  of  the  effectiveness  of  enforcement  measures  is  to 
understand whether there are any areas that are widely considered to be “difficult” to 
enforce, since this may give an indication of areas that may not be working effectively 
or  not,  and/or  be  possible  areas  for  improvement.  To  explore  this,  enforcement 

56 

 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

officers  were  asked  about  any  areas  that  may  lead  to  difficulties  in  monitoring  and 
enforcement.    Figure  6-3  shows  that  most  provisions  of  Regulation  1071/2009  were 
not considered to cause any significant difficulties with enforcement.  The main area of 
contention  appears  to  be  the  obligations  for  cooperation  across  borders  (assessed 
further in Evaluation Question 3, see Section 6.3).  This was followed by the move to a 
use  of  a  risk  rating  system,  which  as  discussed  above  is  not  fully  implemented  in  all 
Member States.  The obligations for interconnection of national registers are known to 
have been subject to delays and are discussed further in Evaluation Question 3.   

Figure  6-3:  Responses  from  enforcement  authorities  to  the  question:  Are 
there  any  parts  of  the  provisions  in  Regulation  1071/2009  that  may  lead  to 
difficulties in monitoring and enforcement? 

Source: survey of enforcement authorities (N=15) 

Interviewees  were  asked  about  changes  to  their  enforcement  practices  and  any  best 
practices they felt were noteworthy.  In several countries, interviewees reported that 
the requirements of Regulation 1071/2009 were broadly similar to those they already 
had  in  place,  and  as such few  changes were  needed.   For  instance,  the provisions  in 
Regulation  1071/2009  were  confirmed  to  be  similar  to  the  existing  requirements  in 
Denmark, the UK and Spain.  It could be expected that EU-13 countries had to make 
bigger  changes;  however,  there  were  no  strong  indications  of  greater  difficulties 
reported  by  respondents  from  the  EU-13  or  EU-15,  with  most  respondents  indicating 
they faced some difficulties in one or two areas only.     

The main contributing factor to the difficulties was reported to be a lack of manpower 
to  carry  out  enforcement.    This  is  also  likely  to  be  related  to  the  second-most 
important  contributing  factor  identified  by  the  respondents:  lack  of  staff  with 
appropriate knowledge.  That is, it is important to have staff with a high level of skill 
due to the complexity of the legislation.   

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Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Figure  6-4:    Responses  from  enforcement  authorities  to  the  question:  What 
are  the  main  reasons  that  contribute  to  difficulties  in  enforcement  of 
Regulation 1071/2009? 

Source: survey of enforcement authorities (N=15) 

Other potential areas contributing to enforcement problems received a broadly similar 
ranking  overall,  with  around  40-50%  of  respondents  identifying  them  as  having  at 
least some contribution, which indicates that there are many different issues at work.  
Lack of manpower was identified as the factor making the most significant contribution 
by both EU-15 and EU-13 respondents.  There were small differences in the answers 
on  other  contributing  factors  between  the  EU-15  and  EU-13,  but  due  to  the  low 
number of respondents when split into two groups (10 from EU-15 and 5 from EU-13), 
these shares are strongly affected by the choices of each individual and do not provide 
a very robust insight into overall conditions for the two groups.    

A  review  of  the  literature  was  also  carried  out  to  help  frame  the  responses  from 
stakeholders obtained for this study.  The review identified only a few reports that are 
specific  to  the  requirements  of  Regulation  1071/2009,  whereas  most  reports  in  this 
area  concentrate  on  Regulation  1072/2009  (i.e.  cabotage)  or  the  enforcement  of 
driving  times  and  rest  periods.  In  general  terms,  AECOM  (2014a)  identifies  that 
discrimination in the enforcement of rules on road freight can be used as a barrier to 
the  cross  border  provision  of  freight  services,  and  relates  industry  concerns  over 
relatively  lax  enforcement  in  some  Member  States.    According  to  Hellemons  (2013), 
the  European  Traffic  Police  Network  (TISPOL)  recognises  issues  around  a  lack  of 
manpower, complexity  of the rules, there being many ways to escape from the rules 
and  highlights  a  lack  of  political  will  in  Member  States  to  deal  with  issues.    Bayliss 
(2012)  notes  that  achieving  appropriate  levels  of  enforcement  are  a  major  concern 
and  summarises  the  overall  difficulties  in  enforcement  of  European  regulations  in 
international transport as:  

 

It is a service sector and less easy to control than other sectors such as 
manufacturing;  

 

It is highly mobile in space and time;  

  Enforcement lies with individual Member States with their different standards, 

constraints, capabilities, cultures and objectives. 

In  order  to  more  precisely  build  up  an  understanding  of  the  enforcement  measures 
and their effectiveness, each of the requirements of Regulation is examined separately 
in  the  following  sections.  These  sections  focus  mainly  on  implementation  and  the 

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Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

presence of practical difficulties for enforcement authorities as an indicator of how well 
enforcement  is  functioning,  since  more  direct  indicators  of  the  effectiveness  of 
enforcement  and  its  impact  on  compliance  and  the  achievement  of  objectives  are 
often lacking.  This is due to two main factors: firstly, the relatively short period since 
the  Regulations  have  been  fully  in  force  (since  4  December  2011);  secondly,  where 
data is available there is often insufficient disaggregation.   

6.2.1.3. 

Checks of stable and effective establishment 

The information gathered with respect to checks of stable and effective establishment 
is  presented  in  Evaluation  Question  1,  which  found  that  the  number  of  checks  could 
only  be  identified  for  four  Member  States.    In  all  cases,  the  number  of  detected 
infringements  is  relatively  low  (close  to  zero  for  Denmark,  Romania  and  Latvia;  less 
than 50 for Poland, Bulgaria and the Netherlands).   

Despite  these  low  detection  rates,  Evaluation  Question  1  concluded that  the  problem 
of  letterbox  companies  still  exists  in  some  countries  and  hence  there  may  be  some 
that are evading detection. Evaluation Question 1 explored the issues concerning  the 
clarity  of  the  provisions  related  to  the  requirement  of  stable  and  effective 
establishment in the Regulation itself.   

The  focus  of  this  Evaluation  Question  is  on  the  enforcement  practices  put  in  place.  
That is, whether the checks being carried out are effective or not, and whether there 
is a need for additional actions.  Interviews were conducted in the course of this study 
to better understand the situation.   

The  feedback  received  from  some  of  the  surveys  indicates  that  checks  of  stable  and 
effective  establishment  in  particular  are  considered  to  be  rather  demanding  and 
resource-intensive;  in  particular  this  was  highlighted  by  enforcers  from  Bulgaria, 
Germany,  Finland  and  the  Netherlands.  Further  details  are  given  in  Annex  A  (see 
Section  9.3.1).  These  difficulties  particularly  relate  to  the  lack  of  administrative 
capacity  in  the  country  (e.g.  Bulgaria,  Germany,  Finland),  which  suggests  that  the 
provisions of the Regulations may not have been fully sufficient to ensure enforcement 
when taking into account the limited resources available.   

On a practical level, there are examples of some enforcement authorities (e.g. France, 
Finland  and  Denmark)  that  appear  to  have  tried  to  strike  a  balance  between  the 
thoroughness  of  checks  and  the  associated  enforcement  burdens.    In  France,  this  is 
achieved  by  combining  a  simple  verification  procedure  with  more  targeted  checks 
based on perceived risks.  The French enforcement authority noted that “verification of 
the  requirement  of  stable  and  effective  establishment  is  made  by  the  Administration 
on  the  basis  of  a  statement  completed  by  the  manager  of  the  company,  with  the 
limitations  that  result.  If  in  doubt,  a  controller  may  physically  verify  the  presence  of 
the  establishment,  but  few  cases  are  problematic.”    The  French  authority  has  also 
identified multiple indices to indicate a higher risk of non-respect for the requirement 
of  stable  and  effective  establishment,  which  highlight  a  higher  risk  potential  non-
compliance and may help to more effectively target scarce resources: 

  The place of establishment of these subsidiaries is  a building located in an 

urban residential area, and obviously does not include the local operating and 
facilities appropriate technology;  

  Transport operations from or to the establishment of the said Member State 

seem marginal in terms of all transactions.  

  The drivers rarely have the same nationality as the establishment said Member 

State..  

In  Denmark,  checks  on  stable  establishment  are  carried  out  for  new  applicants,  but 
not usually for established undertakings, since letterbox companies on Danish territory 
are not considered to be a problem.  In Finland, stable and effective establishment is 
checked during the application process.   

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The problem identified at the time that the Regulations were introduced was that there 
was a lack of minimum common requirements for stable and effective establishment. 
As  previously  noted,  minimum  requirements  have  now  been  established  in  Member 
States.    However,  in  terms  of  whether  the  Regulation  has  been  effective  in  ensuring 
compliance, it appears that several enforcement authorities seem to find that checking 
the  requirement  of  stable  and  effective  establishment  is  rather  demanding  (Bulgaria, 
Germany, Finland, Netherlands).  This, in combination with the findings of Evaluation 
Question 1 that highlighted the continuing existence of letterbox companies and a lack 
of  clarity  in  the  definition  of  an  operating  centre,  suggests  that  the  provisions  of  the 
Regulation  have  not  been  fully  effective.    An  important  limitation,  aside  from  the 
clarity  of  the  provisions  as  previously  discussed,  is  how  to  ensure  compliance 
considering  the  limited  resources  of  enforcement  authorities.    At  a  practical  level, 
several  authorities  have  developed  methods  that  aim  to  make  the  most  of  their 
enforcement  capabilities,  by  for  example  conducting  basic  checks  complemented  by 
general  risk-targeting  (Denmark,  France),  focussing  on  newly  established  firms 
(Finland), as well as developing more specific risk-targeting criteria for the conditions 
of stable and effective establishment (France). 

6.2.1.4. 

Checks of financial standing 

Regulation 1071/2009 states that undertakings must show that, every year, it has at 
its disposal capital and reserves totalling at least €9,000 when only one vehicle is used 
and €5,000 for each additional vehicle used.   

Specific  data  was  sought  from  enforcement  authorities  as  to  the  number  of 
infringements with respect to the financial standing requirements.  Data from the few 
authorities that were able to provide it are shown in Table 6-3.   

Table  6-3:  Number  of  withdrawals  due  to  not  meeting  the  requirement  of 
financial standing in selected Member States 

Member State 

Infringements of financial standing 
requirement 

Total withdrawals 

Bulgaria 

France 

Denmark 

Luxembourg 

Finland 

Austria 

964 

2,871 

50 

134 

450 

9 

No data 

3,344 

No data 

No data 

No data 

10 

Source:  Survey  of  enforcement  authorities;  Austria  data  inferred  from  (European  Commission, 
2014a). 

Table  6-3  shows  that  the  available  data  is  very  patchy,  but  on  the  basis  of  the 
countries shown it appears that infringements of the requirement of financial standing 
are  among  the  most  common.  The  share  of  withdrawals  due  to  not  meeting  this 
requirement  accounts  for  a  large  share  of  total  withdrawals  in  France  (85%)  and 
Austria (90% - i.e. 9 out of 10).  The French authority elaborated that is it difficult for 
undertakings  to  obtain  certificates  of  financial  standing  due  to  the  low  profitability  of 
the  sector  (the  consequences  of  this  are  examined  further  in  Evaluation  Question  7, 
Section  6.7).  The  Finnish  authority  noted  in  their  survey  response  that  financial 
standing  is  by  far  the  most  common  area  in  which  infringements  are  detected.  The 
official  monitoring  report  mentioned  also  that  in  the  Netherlands  “most”  withdrawals 
were caused due to no longer meeting the requirement of financial standing (European 
Commission, 2014a).     

This  suggests  that  checks  of  the  financial  standing  requirement  are  able  to  detect 
infringements effectively.  This conclusion is further supported by the response to the 

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Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

survey  of  enforcement  authorities,  where  87%  of  respondents  felt  there  were  no  or 
few difficulties to enforce this requirement.   

Although  for  the  most  part,  the  requirements  do  not  appear  to  be  considered  as  a 
source  of  enforcement  issues,  there  are  several  areas  that  cause  some  concerns.  
Firstly, there are inconsistencies  in the interpretation of  the provisions, such as what 
should  be  covered  by  “capital  and  reserves”.    These  are  examined  further  in 
Evaluation Question 4 (see Section 6.4).   

The  Regulation  does  not  define  a  consistent  approach  across  the  EU of  how  to  verify 
financial  standing  for  new  companies  –  an  issue  that  has  been  highlighted  by  the 
Lithuanian  ministry  in  their  survey  response.    Several  examples  can  be  found  to 
illustrate  working  practices.  Guidance  from  the  UK  authorities  indicates  that  in  those 
circumstances,  bank  statement  evidence  will  be  accepted,  so  long  as  the  requisite 
amount is available, and a finance condition will be put in place requiring a further set 
of  bank  statements  (Traffic  Commissioner  for  Great  Britain,  2015).    The  Irish 
authorities accept a current state of affairs for a new business.  

is  managed  by  more  than  a  hundred 

Secondly,  there  are  concerns  over  difficulties  encountered  when  verifying  compliance 
with  the  requirement  of  financial  standing  in  real  time.  This  problem  was  highlighted 
by  Italy  in  its  official  monitoring  report,  which  also  mentioned  the  fact  that  this 
responsibility 
independent  provincial 
administrations across Italy (European Commission, 2014a).  In their response to the 
survey of ministries carried out for this study, the Croatian ministry also felt that the 
mechanism of checking if transport undertakings are capable of meeting their financial 
obligations  throughout  the  business  year  is  problematic.    The  French  enforcement 
authority  mentioned  that  the  procedure  for  companies  not  complying  with  the 
requirement  of  financial  capacity  requires  regular  and  rigorous  monitoring,  and 
specialisation in the field.   

In  this  respect,  the  Dutch  enforcement  authorities  report  that  they  have  developed 
specific risk-rating to ensure the constant compliance with the requirement of financial 
standing (see Annex A, Section 9.3.1).    

Overall,  the  enforcement  of  the  financial  standing  requirements  appears  to  be 
effective.    The  available  evidence  on  the  basis  of  infringements  detected  shows  that 
checks  of  the  financial  standing  requirement  are  able  to  detect  infringements 
effectively  and  hence  the  Regulations  has  been  effective  in  allowing  the  enforcement 
of this provision.  This conclusion is further supported by the response to the survey of 
enforcement  authorities,  where  87%  of  respondents  felt  there  were  no  or  few 
difficulties  to  enforce  this  requirement.    There  is  some  variation  in  the  approach  to 
verify financial standing for new companies, and some concerns have been expressed 
by  authorities  from  Italy  and  Croatia  over  how  to  monitor  whether  firms  constantly 
meet the requirement in real time.  

6.2.1.5. 

Checks of good repute 

The  good  repute  of  transport  managers  (or  undertakings)  is  conditional  on  their  not 
having  been  convicted  of  a  serious  criminal  offence  or  having  incurred  a  penalty  for 
one of the most serious infringements of road transport rules, in its  Annex IV.  The 
Commission is currently preparing a list of infringements that (in addition to those set 
out  in  Annex IV)  will  indicate  the  categories,  types  and  degrees  of  seriousness  of 
serious  infringements  of  Community  rules  that  may  also  lead  to  the  loss  of  good 
repute.   A draft list has recently been under discussion and the European Parliament 
has  called  for  it  to  be  amended  to  include  additional  rules  such  as  infringements  of 
Regulation 1072/2009 (European Parliament, 2014a).   

Sufficient proof of good repute is, according to Article 19 of the Regulation, an extract 
from  a  judicial  record.  Failing  that,  an  equivalent  document  can  be  presented,  or  a 
declaration  on  oath.    Previous  studies  have  indicated  that  enforcers  find  checks  of 
such  documents  when  issued  in  Member  States  other  than  their  own  are  difficult  to 

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carry out (European Commission, 2013a).  This aspect was explored in more detail for 
this  study:  The  Lithuanian  ministry  noted  that  “at  present  it  is  not  even  clear  which 
institution  of  another  Member  State  should  be  recognised  as  appropriate  issuers  of 
such  documents.”    The  Finnish  ministry  commented  that  “the  key  question  is  always 
the  availability  of  information  -  when  a  Member  State  fines  an  undertaking,  the 
information  is  often  lost.  ERRU  was  to  be  the  main  solution  to  this  problem,  but  all 
Member States are still not linked in it.”  The progress of ERRU is therefore important 
to  ensuring  the  effectiveness  of  checks  of  good  repute,  and  is  discussed  further  in 
Evaluation  Question  3.    Aside  from  this,  general  language  barriers  were  mentioned 
although not specifically with regard to checks of good repute (see Figure 6-4).  

In  accordance  with  Article  14  of  Regulation  1071/2009,  when  a  transport  manager 
loses  its  good repute, the  competent  authority  should  declare  the  transport  manager 
unfit to manage the transport activities of an undertaking.  The number of declarations 
of unfitness should be reported to the Commission under Article 26.  However, data on 
declarations of unfitness were not provided by 16 Member States30, while eight others 
indicated  that  there  were  no  declarations  of  unfitness31.    Declarations  of  unfitness 
were also low in France (3) and Estonia (14), whereas in Hungary they were reported 
as 129 and in Italy 348.  In Hungary the delay or deficiency of the required 10-year 
periodic training of transport managers led to loss of good repute in some cases.   

Even  though  data  was  not  provided  for  all  Member  States,  the  available  monitoring 
data strongly suggests that there is variation in terms of the stringency with which the 
rules are applied (at least for those Member States covered).  Whilst a high number of 
withdrawals is not any sort of goal as such, the number of sanctions applied is a clear 
indicator  for  the  stringency  of  enforcement  –  which  in  the  case  of  very  lenient 
enforcement  show  ineffectiveness  of  the  provisions.    In  this  sense,  the  monitoring 
data  suggests  that  some  Member  States  taking  lenient  views  (i.e.  in  eight  Member 
States there were no withdrawals on the basis of loss of good repute).  This conclusion 
is  further  supported  by  the  comments  from  both  associations  and  trade  unions 
received  in  the  high  level  survey,  which  complained  about  the  lack  of  effective 
enforcement of the requirement of good repute due to inconsistent interpretations and 
“protectionism”  where  national  enforcement  bodies  were  reluctant  to  withdraw  good 
repute.   

Part of the reason for the variation in the stringency of enforcement is the perceived 
lack of clarity in definitions of precisely which infringements should lead to the loss of 
good  repute.    This  perception  is  confirmed  by  many  respondents  to  the  survey  of 
ministries  (Finland,  Germany,  Ireland,  Estonia,  Poland,  Slovakia,  Slovenia  and 
Bulgaria).  The Irish ministry responded that the inconsistency in the application of the 
Regulation  in  respect  of  determining  good  repute  is  a  possible  loophole  that  reduces 
its  effectiveness.  Trade  unions  that  responded  to  the  high  level  survey  warn  that 
companies  will  try  to  shift  to  Member  States  with  a  lenient  approach,  whereas  an 
association  responding  to  the  survey  also  noted  the  different  approaches  taken  in 
Member  States  was  an  issue.    Finally,  the  lack  of  clarity  can  also  been  confirmed 
because the definition of the categories is still being developed by the Commission.  

To  investigate  whether  certain  Member  States  considered  the  loss  of  good  repute  to 
be  disproportionate,  and  hence  whether  this  was  contributing  to  the  low  number  of 
withdrawals,  the  procedures  in  place  were  investigated.    Article  6(2)  states  that:  “If 
the  competent  authority  finds  that  the  loss  of  good  repute  would  constitute  a 
disproportionate response, it may decide that good repute is unaffected.” Although the 

30  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  Denmark,  Finland,  Germany,  Ireland,  Latvia,  Lithuania, 

Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK 

31 Austria, Czech Republic, Greece, Malta, Netherlands, Poland and Slovakia 

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Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

number  of  such  decisions  is  meant  to  be  reported  under  Article  26,  no  quantitative 
information could be found.   

Member  States  must  determine  whether  loss  of  good  repute  would  constitute  a 
disproportionate  response  to  an  undertaking  (or  relevant  person)  committing  a 
criminal  offense  or  one  of  the  most  serious  road  transport  offenses.    Some  Member 
States report that this is carried out on a case-by-case basis, and as such there is no 
specific  procedure  (e.g.  Bulgaria)  or  that  they  are  in  the  process  of  setting  up  the 
requirements  (e.g.  Italy).    Other  Member  States  have  defined  very  detailed 
procedures that comprise specific steps and the involvement of committees, including 
France and Estonia, which may be considered examples of best practice. Full details of 
the procedures in place are given in Annex A (see Section 9.3.2). The overall picture 
shows  that  the  implementation  of  this  requirement  is  incomplete,  and  the  national 
interpretations  also  vary.    Furthermore,  several  respondents  to  the  survey  of 
ministries  indicates  that  they  felt  the  requirements  to  develop  administrative 
procedures lacked precision (Romania and France).  The respondent to the survey of 
enforcement  authorities  from  Luxembourg  noted  that  the  loss  of  good  repute  would 
have a big financial impact for a large transport company.  The German ministry also 
pointed  out  potential  weaknesses  in  the  provisions  that  allow  authorities  to  consider 
whether revoking good repute would be disproportionate, criticising the wording of the 
Regulation for providing too much flexibility.  

To better understand how the checks of good repute are conducted on the ground, in-
depth interviews were carried out for this study. 

In  Spain,  there  has  not  been  a  single  case  of  an  operator  losing  their  good  repute.  
The  reasons  for  this  were  explored  in  detail  with  Spanish  stakeholders  representing 
different  interests.    A  Spanish  industry  association  confirmed  that  no  operators  had 
lost  their  good  repute,  and  considered  it  a  problem  because  of  the  disproportionate 
nature of the  loss of  good  repute.    To  further  elaborate,  they  described  an  example: 
for  a  company  that  owns  50  vehicles,  an  infraction  committed  by  one  single  driver 
would  be  sufficient  to  result  in  the  loss  of  good  repute  and  thus,  the  loss  of  the 
authorisation to operate. They explain that this lack of proportionality has meant that 
the  authorities  are  very  reluctant  to  withdraw  good  repute  in  practice.  In  order  to 
improve this situation, the interviewees proposed to centralise the system to recognise 
and withdraw the good repute at the European level. 

The  Spanish  ministry  explained  that  withdrawing  the  good  repute  is  not  always  an 
effective  sanction  since  the  company  may  simply  change  the  person  whose  good 
reputation  is  withdrawn  by  a  new  one  and  the  problem  would  be  solved  without  any 
other  consequence.    They  pointed  out  that  the  Spanish  law  had  been  amended  in 
2013, such that it now explicitly contains a provision to withdraw good repute in case 
of very serious infringements.  They expect that the first sanctions as a result of this 
amendment will be declared at the end of 2015.  A Spanish trade union discussed that 
in their view the good repute requirement in Spain was ineffective.  They felt that the 
requirement works properly in some countries, giving the examples of best practice as 
Belgium,  France  and  Germany,  which  avoids  a  situation  where  non-compliant 
operators continue to be active in the market.   

A German interviewee explained that in theory, a licence can be withdrawn in case of 
a  'most  serious'  infringement.  However,  if  there  is  an  undertaking  that  has  been 
operating  for  many  years  without  any  violations,  the  enforcer  might  judge  it  as 
disproportionate  to  withdraw  the  licence.  There  is  no  precise  rule  for  when  or  when 
not  such  a  withdrawal  is  to  be  enforced  -  the  enforcer  will  decide  this  on  a  case-by-
case  basis.  They  hence  suggest  that  it  would  be  helpful  if  there  were  a  guidance  to 
such  exemptions,  to  have  a  harmonised  approach  to  when  such  a  sanction  would  be 
disproportionate.   

In  summary,  the  official  monitoring  data  show  that  the  requirement  of  good  repute 
appears to be enforced inconsistently, with some Member States taking a very lenient 
approach.  In cases where enforcement is very lenient, i.e. it is very rare for operators 

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Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

to  lose  their  good  repute  despite  infringing  the  provisions,  this  suggests  that  the 
provisions of the Regulation are  ineffective in  ensuring the good repute of operators.  
Part of the reason for the variation in the stringency of enforcement is the perceived 
lack of clarity in definitions of precisely which infringements should lead to the loss of 
good  repute  (mentioned  by  Finland,  Germany,  Ireland,  Estonia,  Poland,  Slovakia, 
Slovenia  and  Bulgaria).    Another  part  of  the  underlying  issue  may  be  that  the 
procedure for determining whether the loss of good repute is disproportionate may be 
too  flexible,  allowing  some  Member  States  to  be  very  lenient.    A  very  detailed 
procedure  that  comprise  specific  steps  has  been  defined  in  some  countries  such  as 
France  and  Estonia.    These  include  points-ranking  of  infringements  based  on  the 
seriousness  of  the  offense,  the  size  of  the  company  and  whether  infringements  have 
been repeated or not, as well as the involvement of committees.   

6.2.1.6. 

Checks of professional competence 

Checks  of  professional  competence  were  identified  by  enforcers  responding  to  the 
survey  as  one  of  the  least  problematic  requirements,  with  87%  reporting  no  or  few 
difficulties.   

Only  a  few  specific  issues  were  found  with  the  enforcement  of  this  requirement.  
Article  21  requires  that  Member  States  recognise  certificates  of  professional 
competence  that  are  issued  in  other  Member  States  “by  the  authority  or  body  duly 
authorised for that purpose.”  The ministries  from Germany and Sweden commented 
that  there  is  no  consolidated  list  of  authorities  in  the  EU,  which  makes  the  audit  of 
certificates  more  difficult.    The  Slovakian  ministry  also  commented  that  they  have 
problems in this area.  

One  industry  association  interviewed  for  this  study  recounted  a  case  in  Norway  of  a 
manager  obtaining  documents  fraudulently,  and  claimed  there  was  no  system  to 
prevent people obtaining certificates illegitimately on the internet. The respondent also 
recognised that it is difficult to say how much this practice is occurring.  On the basis 
that this practice did not appear to be widespread (i.e. it was not mentioned by other 
respondents  and  enforcement  authorities  did  not  highlight  major  difficulties),  it  does 
not  appear  to  be  a  major  concern  among  stakeholders  –  rather,  there  were  greater 
concerns over the lack of harmonisation of the examination standards (see Evaluation 
Question 4 for more analysis on this point).  

More detailed analysis conducted via desk research, interviews and other surveys did 
not reveal any other specific issues with the practical enforcement of this requirement, 
which  is  done  on  the  basis  of  checks  that  the  transport  manager  has  the  requisite 
certificate. Overall therefore, the enforcement of this requirement does not appear to 
be  problematic,  as  reflected  also  in  the  responses  from  enforcers.    Hence  it  can  be 
concluded that the provisions of the Regulation appear to be implemented effectively, 
and there is no evidence of widespread problems in ensuring compliance.  

6.2.1.7. 

Transport managers 

Article  4  of  Regulation  1071/2009  clarified  the  role  of  the  transport  manager.    This 
person  has  to  demonstrate  the  necessary  professional  competence,  must  manage 
effectively  and  continuously  the  transport  activities  of  an  undertaking  and  have  a 
“genuine link” to the undertaking.  The transport manager may manage the transport 
activities of up to four different undertakings with a combined maximum total fleet of 
50  vehicles,  although  Article  4(2)  allows  Member  States  to  lower  these  thresholds.  
This  option  has  been  exercised  in  France  (an  external  manager  is  limited  to  two 
companies  representing  a  total  of  20  vehicles);  Finland  (the  manager  may  manage 
one  undertaking  with  a  maximum  total  fleet  of  50  vehicles)  and  Romania  (an 
individual may act as transport manager for only one company). 

The  implementation  of  enforcement  was  investigated  through surveys  and  interviews 
carried out for this study.  The survey of enforcement authorities revealed that 79% of 

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Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

respondents  felt  that  there  were  no  or  few  difficulties  with  respect  to  enforcing  this 
requirement.   

More  in-depth  research  showed  that  there  may  be  certain  practical  difficulties  in 
checking  the  requirement  for the transport  manager to  demonstrate  a  “genuine  link” 
with  the  undertaking.    For  example,  the  Danish  ministry  considered  that  it  is  still 
possible to become a transport manager without being employed by the undertaking, 
increasing the risk of “front men”.   

This aspect was explored in more detail via interviews. The Danish Transport Authority 
reports that, while external transport managers are required to have a “clear link” to 
the  company,  the  meaning  of  this  “clear  link”  is  defined  on  a  case-by-case  basis: 
Typically the transport manager has to be the owner or an employee of the company.  
An external transport manager that only owns a negligible share of the company will 
typically not be considered as being a lawful external transport manager. In practice it 
is  the  enforcement  officer’s  responsibility  to  judge  whether  the  link  of  the  transport 
manager to the company is sufficient.   

A  related  concern  that  was  uncovered  is  that  the  effectiveness  of  this  provision    is 
reduced because it is  relatively easy to change the transport manager after a loss of 
good  repute,  meaning  that  an  undertakings  could  continue  to  operate  with  little 
downtime after its transport manager loses their good repute simply by changing to a 
new manager.  

For  instance,  the  Finnish  ministry  commented  that  “it  is  rather  easy  to  change 
Transport manager after a loss of good repute, and in that sense it is doubtful if the 
provisions can have a real impact.”  The Finnish enforcement authority explained that 
it  is  often  quite  difficult  to  get  a  sufficient  proof  that  the  transport  manager  is  not 
operating  in  accordance  with  Regulation  1071/2009.    They  elaborated  that  is  it  not 
clear  how  to  consistently  control  the  actions  of  a  designated  transport  manager  (i.e. 
that  he/she  manages  an  undertaking  effectively  and  continuously).    The  Finnish 
licencing  authority  requires  a  written  contract  in  which  the  designated  managers’ 
responsibilities are clearly defined – however, these contracts come in all shapes and 
forms and it is not fully understood what the minimum responsibilities of a Transport 
Manager should be.  

A  Swedish  trade  union  also  commented  that  “We  have  a  lot  of  companies  where 
owners  get  barred  from  the  industry,  only  to  return  with  the  use  of  front  men.  They 
can start up the next day, with a new holder of the certificate.”  When asked about the 
reasons for these practices, the interviewee explained that the reasons were varied – 
it  could  be  to  sidestep  the  requirement  of  good  repute,  to  save  costs  or  to  hide 
criminal  activity.    There  were  no  quantitative  details  on  the  extent of  this practice  in 
Sweden.  

In  respect  of  the  difficulties  of  possible  “front  men”,  the  issues  overlap  with  the 
requirement of good repute and how to define who exactly should be checked for good 
repute.  Article  6  states  that  Member  States  shall  consider  the  conduct  of  the 
undertaking,  its  transport  managers  and  “any  other  relevant  person”  in  its 
assessment.    To  reduce  the  risk  of  “front  men”,  some  Member  States  require  other 
persons  to  be  checked,  for  example:  CEOs  and  general  partners  in  partnerships 
(Finland) or legal representatives of the undertakings (Latvia).   

The  Slovakian  ministry  commented  that  the  role  of  transport  manager  is  not  defined 
accurately,  and  particular  discrepancies  arise  in  practice.    The  French  ministry  also 
considers  that  designating  external  managers  can  lead  some  persons  holding  the 
certificate  of  professional  competence  for  “rent”,  so  as  to  allow  some  trucking 
companies to comply with the rule, without having to invest sufficiently in the current 
management of these companies.   

The view that the definition of the transport manager may be unclear is also supported 
in the literature by SDG (2013a), where it has been suggested that the EU shed light 
on  this  matter.    For  example,  by  adding  to  the  requirement  a  minimum  amount  of 

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time spent on the management of transport activities of a company (e.g. the Austrian 
requirement of min. 20 hours per week). 

Evidence is also substantiated by the actions taken by various countries to reduce this 
problem  by  limiting  the  number  of  companies/vehicles  that  an  external  transport 
manager  can  handle  (as  mentioned  above),  and/or  including  a  more  detailed  list  of 
responsibilities for the manager (e.g. the Finnish licencing authority requires a written 
contract in which the designated managers’ responsibilities are clearly defined).   

In  Romania,  a  transport  manager  is  only  permitted  to  manage  one  company.    The 
Romanian  enforcers  interviewed  for  this  study  explained  that  there  was  a  debate  in 
Romania  considering  whether  to  increase  the  number  of  companies,  but  it  was 
concluded  that  having  more  managers  can  result  in  having  "false"  managers.  In 
addition,  they  consider  that  a  single  manager  is  helpful  for  control  officers  as  well 
since it facilitate checks at the premises.  A Romanian industry association confirmed 
their  view  that  having  a  single  manager  ensures  higher  quality  of  services  and 
compliance  with  the  rules  than  this  would  be  the  case  if  they  were  permitted  to 
manage more.   

In France there is a stricter limit for external managers of handling two companies and 
a  total  of  20  vehicles  –  with  a  view  to  reducing  persons  holding  the  certificate  of 
professional competence for rent, so as to prevent companies from complying with the 
rule  without  having  to  invest  sufficiently  in  the  current  management.    The  ministry 
considered that the actual degree of involvement that external managers can have in 
the  management  of  a  company  could  be  called  into  question  if  they  were  able  to 
handle up to four companies. However, they note that it is too early to form a definite 
opinion since the Regulation has only been in force for a few years. 

The  Danish  enforcement  authority  explained  during  an  interview  conducted  for  this 
study that they do not allow external transport managers that do not have a clear link 
to  the  company.  What  this  clear  link  means  is  defined  on  a  case-by-case  decision: 
Typically the transport manager has to be the owner or an employee of the company. 
An external transport manager that only owns a negligible share of the company and 
claims  that  he  hence  has  a  'clear  link'  will  not  be  considered  as  lawful  external 
transport manager. However, there are no specific thresholds set. In the end, it is the 
responsibility  of  the  enforcers  to  judge  whether  the  link  of  the  transport  manager  to 
the company is sufficient or not. 

In  the  UK,  transport  managers  are  “added”  to  an  operating  licence,  making  the  link 
very robust.  In Spain there is further regulation in progress in order to: (i) concretely 
define  the  functions  of  the  manager  within  the  company;  (ii)  require clear  legal  links 
between the manager and the company.   

Based  on  the  above  evidence  from  surveys  and  interviews,  the  requirements  related 
to the transport manager do not overall appear to be a major cause of difficulties (e.g. 
79%  of  enforcement  authorities  responding  to  the  survey  felt  that  there  were  no  or 
few  difficulties  with  respect  to  enforcing  this  requirement).    Hence  the  requirements 
can  generally  be  considered  to  be  effective  in  terms  of  allowing  enforcement.    A 
possible risk to the effectiveness of the provisions is the use of  “front men” who rent 
out their good repute to companies without really managing the business.  The extent 
of this practice could not be quantified for any countries, but concerns were raised by 
stakeholders  in  Finland,  France  and  Sweden.  Steps  taken  to  reduce  the  use  of  front 
men  are  either  in  the  form  of  reducing  the  number  of  companies/vehicles  that  a 
transport  manager  is  allowed  to  manage  (France,  Finland,  Romania)  and/or  defining 
the role and the need for clear links with the undertaking in more detail (Finland, the 
UK). 

6.2.1.8. 

Penalty systems 

The analysis of systems in place across the EU shows wide variation in the typology of 
sanctions,  which  in  turn  gives  transport  operators  inconsistent  messages  on  the 

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gravity  of  such  infringements.  The  dissuasive  effect  of  sanctions  differs  enormously 
across  those  Member  States  that  have  qualified  infringements  of  commercial  road 
transport  as  criminal  offences  (see  Annex  A,  Section  9.3.3,  for  an  overview  of  the 
typology  of  sanctions  applied  in  Member  States  for  infringements  of  the  Road 
Transport Package).   

The differing level of sanctions applied in Member States has been identified in other 
studies,  including  European  Commission  (2009)  and  AECOM  (2014a).  Concerns  of 
industry  stakeholders  are  also  reflected  in  in  the  responses  to  a  web  survey  carried 
out for the High Level Group on road haulage, where many of the comments related to 
the issue of allocating responsibility for infringements between hauliers, shippers and 
freight  forwarders  (AECOM,  2014a).  In  their  responses,  a  number  of  industry 
associations  highlighted  the  problem  of  different  interpretation  of  the  basic  rules  and 
different levels of penalties in different Member States (AECOM, 2014a).  Additionally, 
in  an  effort  to  encourage  greater  harmonisation  of  enforcement  practices,  the 
Transport Regulators Align Control Enforcement (TRACE) was completed in 2012 and a 
follow-up project (CLOSER) was launched in 2014. 

According  to  a  2013  study  specifically  conducted  on  the  harmonisation  of  sanctions, 
only  some  Member  States  have  adopted  specific  sanctions  for the  infringements  that 
are  qualified  as  most  serious  infringements  of  EU  law  as  listed  in  Annex  IV  of 
Regulation  (EC)  No  1071/2009,  notably,  Bulgaria,  Germany,  Estonia,  Romania  and 
Spain (to a certain extent) (Grimaldi, 2013a).   The study confirms that the dissuasive 
effect  of  sanctions  differs  enormously  between  Member  States,  and  infringements 
categorised  at  the  same  level  may  attract  vastly  different  fines  (with  ten-fold 
differences  reported  in  some  areas  –  see  Annex  A,  Section  9.3.3,  for  examples).  
Fines  were  confirmed  by  legal  experts  in  the  study  team  to  be  tailored  to  the 
seriousness  of  the  offences  in  Spain,  Romania  and  Germany,  although  the  levels  of 
fines  imposed  are  different  32.    Further  details  are  given  in  Annex  A  (see  Section 
9.3.3). 

Work  towards  a  common  categorisation  of  infringement  types  has  been  going  on  for 
some  years.  Annex  III  of  Directive  2006/22/EC  as  amended  by  Directive  2009/5/EC 
contains  a  categorisation  of  infringements  against  Regulation  561/2006  and 
Regulation 3821/85, recommending which ones should be categorised as very serious, 
serious or minor.  

Enforcement  authorities  appeared  to  be  broadly  supportive  of  the  current  form  of 
Annex  IV  of  Regulation  1071/2009,  but  still  showed  some  uncertainty  of  the  clarity 
and appropriateness of the categories (Figure 6-5).   

32 On a PPP basis: for most serious infringements approx. €1,650-9,850 in Spain, €5,700-7,600 
in  Romania  and  up  to  €282,400  in  Germany.  For  serious  infringements  on  a  PPP  basis 
approx. €650-1,650 in Spain, €2,550-3,800 in Romania and up to €141,200 in Germany 

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Figure  6-5:    Responses  from enforcement  authorities  to  the  question:  Is  the 
way the Commission has described serious offenses and categorised the most 
serious offenses in Annex IV of the Regulation both clear and appropriate? 

Source: survey of enforcement authorities (N=15) 

When  split  by  EU-15 versus  EU-13  responses,  there  appears  to  be  significantly  more 
agreement  that  current  categories  and  descriptions  are  clear/appropriate  among  the 
EU-15  respondents  (Figure  6-6),  whereas  EU-13  respondents  tended  to  feel  the 
categories were less clear/appropriate and called for more guidance. 

Figure  6-6:  Responses  from  enforcement  authorities  to  the  question:  Is  the 
way the Commission has described serious offenses and categorised the most 
serious offenses in Annex IV of the Regulation both clear and appropriate? 

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Source:  survey  of  enforcement  authorities  (10  respondents  from  EU-15  and  5  from  EU-13 
countries) 

Respondents  calling  for  additional  guidance  included  the  authorities  from  Poland, 
Romania, Latvia, Bulgaria, Netherlands, Denmark and Finland.   

The reasons for this were explored with stakeholders during interviews for this study.  
The responses of national authorities from the Netherlands, Ireland, France, Bulgaria, 
Finland  and  Germany  indicate  that  the  variations  are  due  to  national  factors  and  the 
flexibility  permitted  in  the  Regulation  in  particular  with  regards  classification  of 
breaches (see Annex A for further details).   

Overall  it  is  clear  that  there  are  wide  variations  in  the  penalty  systems  defined  by 
Member  States.    The  reasons  for  this  are  due  to  the  flexibility  permitted  in  the 
Regulations,  as  well  as  the  incomplete  progress  on  defining  the  categorisation  of  the 
level and types of offences that can lead to loss of good repute – although a draft list 
has  recently  been  under  discussion  (European  Parliament,  2014a).    Ministries  from 
EU-13 Member States in particular appear to also have some difficulty with the clarity 
and appropriateness of the existing categorisations/definitions under Annex IV.   

6.2.2.  Regulation 1072/2009 

6.2.2.1. 

Implementation and national enforcement practices 

Since  the  introduction  of  Regulation  1072/2009,  a  single  Community  licence  is 
accepted  in  all  Member  States,  the  harmonised  drivers’  attestation  has  been  put  in 
place and a clear indication of the documents to be shown to prove the legitimacy of 
cabotage operations has been provided.  Few issues have been identified with respect 
to  the  harmonised  control  documents  –  the  implementation  of  which  was  meant  to 
make it easier (and therefore quicker) to check licenses of non-resident hauliers.  Half 
of  the  respondents  to  the  survey  of  enforcement  authorities  confirmed  that  checks 
were  faster  now  (mainly  EU-13  respondents),  whereas  the  remaining  half  noted  that 
there  was  no  material  change  (mainly  EU-15  respondents).    A  small  number  of 
comments with respect to the harmonisation of documents were gathered during the 
interviews,  but  issues  do  not  appear  to  be  widespread:  The  Romanian  enforcement 
authority commented that there were some initial problems concerning the true copies 
of the licenses because they are personalised with the registration number of the plate 
of  the vehicle,  but  this has  now  been  solved.   The Polish  trade  union  interviewed  for 
this  study  commented  that  the  drivers  carry  extracts  of  the  licence,  which  are  not 
numbered and are also laminated. The result is that during the inspection, they show 
a copy of the document that cannot be verified and it is not known how many copies 
of the same extract have been made. Conversely, the Polish enforcers interviewed for 
this  study  felt  that  the  Regulation  had  made  checks  easier,  and  the  extent  of  the 
problem with copies of the document is not known.   
Consistent information on the number of checks under Regulation 1072/2009 was very 
difficult  to  identify,  despite  requesting  this  information  from  all  enforcement 
authorities  in  the  surveys  and  conducting  a  literature  review.  The  available  statistics 
on  the  number of  checks  of  cabotage  were  reviewed  in  Evaluation Question  1,  which 
showed  the  patchy  nature  of  the  information  available.    Reporting  required  under 
Article 17 of Regulation 1072/2009 only request information on the number of hauliers 
possessing  Community  licences  and  the  number  of  driver  attestations,  and  not  the 
enforcement practices.  Data on the number of checks of Community Licences Article 
6(1) of Regulation 1072/2009 were sought from enforcement authorities.  Article 6(1) 
requires verification whenever an application for a Community Licence (or a renewal) 
is made, to ensure that the requirements of access to the occupation are still met.  All 
enforcement  authorities  were  asked  to  estimate  the  number  of  Community  Licences 
checks, but consistent information was very difficult to obtain – only information from 
Slovenia  shed  some  light  on  the  national  implementation.    The  Slovenian  enforcer 

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indicated  that  in  2013  around  13,000  Community  Licences  were  checked,  and  their 
official  monitoring  report  indicates  that  13,135  Licences  were  granted  in  the  period 
from  4/12/2011  –  13/12/2012),  indicating  that  if  the  number  of  Licences  granted  in 
2013 were similar, they met the requirement of Article 6(1).  The sparse data on both 
the  number  of  Community  Licences  issued  and  the  actual  level  of  checks  makes  any 
quantitative assessment of this requirement impossible.   

Article  6(2)  requires  checks  each  year  covering  at  least  20%  of  the  valid  driver 
attestations  issued  in  that  Member  State,  to  ensure  that  the  haulier  holds  a  valid 
Community  Licence  and  lawfully  employs  the  driver.    According  to  official  monitoring 
data  (see  Annex  A,  Section  9.1.1),  many  Member  States  only  have  a  few  driver 
attestations  in  circulation  at  the  end  of  2014.    The  Member  States  with  the  highest 
numbers  are  Spain  (8.321),  Italy  (4,098),  Poland  (6,809),  Slovenia  (6,056)  and 
Lithuania (4,098).  All enforcement authorities were asked about the number of driver 
attestations  checked  -  only  Slovenia  provided  these  data,  estimating  1,000  were 
carried out in 2013 (around 18% of attestations in circulation in 2013 – possibly there 
is  a  rounding  issue  in  the  estimated  number  of  checks  provided  to  us).  The 
implementation of Article 6(2) in other Member States is not known.  

A literature review did not uncover information on these specific requirements either.  
DfT (2010) indicated that the transition to standardised certified copies of Community 
Licences  and  Driver  Attestations  would  not  result  in  any  significant  costs,  but  makes 
no specific reference to the procedure of verification/checks.  

An alternative indicator of how well the enforcement systems are operating is the rate 
of  recidivism  (re-offending  within  2  years)  among  offenders.    This  was  sought  from 
enforcement  authorities,  but  not  a  single  authority  was  able  to  provide  this 
information.   

The  lack  of  data  was  confirmed  explicitly  in  interviews  carried  out  for  this  study:  for 
example,  the  Bulgarian  authorities  report  that  no  institutions  in  Bulgaria  collect  data 
on  the  number  of  checks.    The  Polish  enforcers  noted  that  it  is  difficult  to  provide 
quantitative data on anything related to Regulation 1072/2009 since no research has 
been conducted on the issues.  The Latvian authority reported that they do not collect 
data on checked Community Licences. 

Due  to  this  lack  of  data,  more  qualitative  approaches  to  the  analysis  of  enforcement 
are used in the following sections.      

6.2.2.2. 

Effectiveness of enforcement practices 

Checks of cabotage are organised differently in different Member States, with checks 
primarily  carried  out  at  the  roadside,  although  they  may  be  supplemented  by  other 
checks  at  the  premises  in  order  to  verify  documentation  (SDG,  2013a).    The  bodies 
involved  and  the  degree  of  specialisation  vary  depending  on  the  Member  State.    For 
example, in Austria, controls mostly take place at the roadside and are carried out by 
the local police, but there is no specialised unit (SDG, 2013b).  In France, the Ministry 
reported during interviews conducted for this study that there is a specialised control 
body of around 500 “road transport controllers” who carry out roadside checks as well 
as checks in depots and receive specific training on cabotage legislation.  Controls  in 
Germany  are  directly  carried  out  by  staff  of  the  Federal  Office  for  Goods  Transport 
(also supported by customs and police), and may be carried out on a sample basis at 
the roadside/service areas.  These checks are sometimes supplemented by checks at 
the premises, and the German enforcement authority (BAG) also has powers to review 
all relevant documents and data, make copies or copy them to their own data storage 
devices,  if  these  actions  are  necessary  to  monitor  compliance  with  national  laws.    In 
the  UK,  an  interview  carried  out  for  this  study  with  the  national  enforcers  revealed 
that  roadside  checks  are  applied  both  for  Regulation  1071/2009  and  Regulation 
1072/2009  at  the  same  time  (as  well  as  other  legislation  such  as  roadworthiness).  
The  national  risk-rating  system  is  also  used  to  target  cabotage  checks,  but  is 

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considered  less  effective  compared  to  the  system  for  Regulation  1071/2009  since  it 
covers mainly non-domestic operators for which the level of information is lower. 

In  general,  the  literature  review  highlights  concerns  about  the  low  levels  of 
effectiveness  of  cabotage  checks.  For  instance,  over  two  thirds  of  stakeholders  from 
the road haulage industry answering the 2011 questionnaire of the High Level Group 
considered that controls aimed at ensuring compliance with the current cabotage rules 
were  not  effective  (European  Commission,  2013a).  Petitions  submitted  to  the 
European  Parliament  further  support  this  claim,  highlighting  irregularities  committed 
with  regard  to  illegal  cabotage  and  violations  of  road  transport  social  rules 
(enforcement of driving time and rest periods) (TRT, 2013); (ETF, 2012b).    

Responses  to  the  high  level  survey  also  highlight  significant  concerns  among 
stakeholders:  In  their  joint  response,  trade  unions  reported  that  “In  the  absence  of 
controls,  non-compliance  with  cabotage  rules  leaves  an  open  door  to  hauliers  who 
want  to  operate  low-cost  on  a  high-cost  domestic  transport  market  of  a  Member 
State.”   The trade unions considered that Regulation 1072/2009 was indeed effective 
in ensuring common rules for cabotage, but felt that the problem is that the rules are 
not enforced and respected.   Industry associations in their coordinated response also 
called  for  more  control  of  illegal  cabotage  -  more  enforcement  and  more  efficient 
enforcement  (such  as  immobilisation/confiscation  of  vehicle  and  goods  in  certain 
circumstances).   

The above evidence from the literature and stakeholder consultations conducted both 
for  this  study  and  others  (e.g.  the  2011  questionnaire  of  the  High  Level  Group) 
therefore indicate concerns over the effectiveness of controls of cabotage.  Combined 
with  the  evidence  from  Evaluation  Question  1  which  suggests  that  illegal  cabotage  is 
likely to be a problem in some countries, this indicates that enforcement is likely to be 
ineffective in some countries.  The consultants therefore explored the possible reasons 
that might lead to ineffective enforcement in the following sections.  

Responses  to  the  survey  of  enforcement  authorities  returned  answers  on  aspects  of 
the rules that were considered difficult to enforce, as shown in Figure 6-7. Significant 
difficulties were identified by at least some respondents in all areas, with the rules on 
multi-drops standing out at the most challenging area. 

Figure  6-7:  Responses  from  enforcement  authorities  to  the  question:  Are 
there  any  parts  of  the  provisions  in  Regulation  1072/2009  that  may  lead  to 
difficulties in monitoring and enforcement? 

Source: survey of enforcement authorities (N=14) 

Respondents  from  EU-13  countries  reported  overall  fewer  difficulties  in  enforcement 
across all of the categories – this is likely due to the fact that cabotage is less common 
in EU-13 countries, as discussed in Evaluation Question 1.   

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Figure 6-8: Responses split by EU-15 vs EU-13 from enforcement authorities 
to  the  question:  Are  there  any  parts  of  the  provisions  in  Regulation 
1072/2009 that may lead to difficulties in monitoring and enforcement? 

Source:  survey  of  enforcement  authorities  (7  respondents  from  EU-15  Member  States  and  7 
from EU-13 Member States) 

The contributing factors to any difficulties in enforcement were similar to those listed 
for Regulation 1071/2009, with lack of manpower identified as a leading factor.  The 
lack  of  clarity  in  provisions,  differing  interpretations  across  Member  States  and 
increasingly  sophisticated  means  of  evading  detection  were  identified  as  more 
important  factors  for  Regulation  1072/2009  compared  to  Regulation  1071/2009,  as 
well  as  difficulties  in  cross-border  cooperation.    A  lack  of  clarity  in  provisions  was 
identified  as  a  contributing  factor  by  61%  of  respondents  (this  is  explored  further  in 
Evaluation Question 4). 

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Figure  6-9:  Responses  from  enforcement  authorities  to  the  question:  Are 
there  any  parts  of  the  provisions  in  Regulation  1072/2009  that  may  lead  to 
difficulties in monitoring and enforcement? 

Source: survey of enforcement authorities (N=14) 

Overall, the profile of responses was not widely differentiated between EU-15 and EU-
13  respondents  –  lack  of  manpower,  differing  interpretations  and  a  lack  of  clarity  in 
the provisions were highlighted as the most major issues in both groups, with EU-13 
respondents reporting additional major issues (more than half reporting at least some 
contribution to problems) concerning language barriers.   

There  are  often  multiple  enforcement  bodies  within  one  Member  State  with 
responsibility - for example, in Belgium, six different bodies can in principle carry out 
cabotage enforcement (AECOM, 2014b).  In Hungary and Spain, regional police bodies 
are  tasked  with  roadside  checks  (AECOM,  2014a).  The  presence  of  multiple 
enforcement  bodies  has  been  highlighted  in  the  literature  as  one  of  the  contributing 
factors  to  enforcement  difficulties,  such  as  in  AECOM  (2014a)  and  SDG  (2013a).  
However  the  responses  from  enforcement  authorities  in  the  survey  for  this  study  did 
not indicate significant problems with cooperation between national bodies (as shown 
above  in  Figure  6-9,  where  it  was  only  identified  making  some  contribution  by 
France33).    The  inconsistency  between  the  answers  for  this  study  and  those  found  in 
the  literature  could  be  due  to  several  factors:  firstly,  the  countries  with  cooperation 
problems  may  not  have  been  included  in  the  survey  participants.    SDG  (2013a) 
reports  that  multiple  bodies  are  responsible  in  Belgium,  Italy,  Spain  and  Hungary  – 
the  only  overlap  in  respondents  with  this  study  is  Spain,  where  no  or  few  difficulties 
were  identified  by  the  participant.    In  Spain,  the  enforcement  is  overseen  by  the 
Ministry  of  Infrastructure  and  Transport  (Ministerio  de  Fomento),  with  national  police 
(Guardia Civil) and regional police.  It may be that previously identified problems with 
coordination  identified  in  the  literature  have  been  solved  –  for  example,  in  its  2015 
national  inspection  plan,  the  Ministry  of  Infrastructure  and  Transport  have  worked 
jointly  with  the  national  police  and  state  that  the  development  of  planning  will  be 
carried out with collaboration from all of the bodies with responsibility for surveillance, 

33  In  France,  the  Ministry  of  Transport  has  a  specialised  control  body  with  around  500 
controllers,  but  estimate  that  there  are  over  7,000  enforcers  in  total.    Other  bodies 
responsible for enforcement include the police and customs authorities are involved in traffic 
regulations  and  the  labour  ministry  is  responsible  for  checks  of  driving  hours  and  rest 
periods.  

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to  achieve  proper  coordination  of  controls  (Ministry  of  Infrastructure  and  Transport, 
2015c).    During  the  interview  with  the  Spanish  enforcers,  only  problems  of 
international cooperation and language barriers were mentioned.  Secondly, it may be 
that  previously  identified  problems  of  coordination  have  been  solved  –  for  example, 
SDG  (2013a)  also  reports  that  in  some  countries  the  problem  has  been  overcome 
through  ensuring  effective  cooperation  (e.g.  in  Poland,  the  specialised  Inspectorate 
(GITD)  has  laid  out  cooperation  arrangements  so  that  joint  patrols  and  checks  with 
police forces take place).  Alternatively, the literature did not identify the extent of the 
contribution of ensuring coordination to problems of enforcement, and it could be that 
the  contribution  exists,  but  is  relatively  minor.    The  real  underlying  reason  for  this 
inconsistency could also be a combination of the above-mentioned reasons.   

The possible lack of clarity in provisions and differences across Member States 
in  interpretation  is  assessed  further  in  Evaluation  Question  4.    The  issues  of 
cooperation  are  assessed  in  Evaluation  Question  3.  Of  the  remaining  areas,  the 
problems  of  enforcement  of  the  cabotage  rules  appear  to  relate  to  the  following 
broader categories: 

a)  A lack of enforcement capability / manpower: which is linked to the cost 

of enforcement and budgetary limitations 

b)  Issues related to the documentation required to prove lawful cabotage 

(typically the CMR consignment note): which is linked to the means of evading 
the rules and language barriers). 

These two points are considered in turn below. 

a) Lack of enforcement capability / manpower 

Concerning  the  lack  of  manpower,  further  details  were  gathered  through 
stakeholder  interviews  carried  out  for  this  study,  indicating  a  range  of  staffing  levels 
and degrees of satisfaction with these levels. As described earlier, checks of cabotage 
are  primarily  conducted  at  the  roadside.  In  particular,  enforcers  from  Bulgaria  (480 
staff  responsible),  Latvia  (28  staff  responsible),  Sweden  (160  staff  responsible)34, 
Ireland  (11  staff  responsible),  Spain  (400  traffic  agents  and  150  employees  of  the 
administrative  organs),  Romania  (317  staff  responsible)  and  the  Netherlands 
(unknown number of staff responsible) have indicated that they consider they have an 
insufficient number of staff (see Annex A for more details, Section 9.3.4).   However, 
the data shows here is no clear trend concerning any optimum size of staff, either in 
absolute terms or relative to the size of the cabotage market. For example, the UK has 
a  similar  ratio  of  staff  to  cabotage  market  size  as  Sweden  and  Spain  assesses  the 
number of staff being adequate, whereas Bulgaria who has the highest ratio of staff to 
cabotage market size does not.  

The main constraint identified  from the above comments  was the budgetary  issues 
associated  with  recruiting  more  staff.    On  the  other  hand,  the  level  of  staffing  was 
seen  as  adequate  in  other  countries  such  as  the  UK,  Poland  and  France.    There  are 
around  500  dedicated  control  officers  in  France,  are  supported  in  their  activities  by 
other  forces  totalling  more  than  7,000  people  in  total  making  controls  on  the  French 
roads.    The  French  ministry  explained  during  an  interview  conducted  for  this  study 
that “the number of control officers in France is seen as adequate and proportionate.” 
In  the  UK,  there  are  300  officers  in  the  DVSA  who  have  responsibility  for  checking 
cabotage  and  the  enforcers  estimate  there  are  600  people  making  checks  in  total. 
During an interview conducted for this study, the UK enforcers commented that they 
viewed  this  number  as  proportionate  since  there  are  no  critical  matters  emerging 

34   There are 450 officers in Sweden of which only 160 have specialist knowledge 

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Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

concerning  the  effectiveness  of  checks.    A  UK  association  interviewed  for  this  study 
noted  that  due  to  the  UK’s  fortunate  geography,  enforcement  is  made  easier.    In 
Poland,  lack  of  manpower  was  not  considered  a  problem  in  the  enforcers’  survey 
response,  and  the  authority  reported  that  there  are  around  400  road  transport 
inspectors responsible for performing roadside checks in full scope (with responsibility 
shared  with  the  General  Inspectorate  of  Road  Transport,  Police;  Border  Guards  and 
Customs).   

The  issue  of  staffing  levels  is  also  recounted  in  the  literature,  where  SDG  (2013a) 
reports that resourcing at national control bodies is of concern to stakeholders in the 
Netherlands  and  Spain.    The  report  also  mentions  that  stakeholders  in  several 
countries  (e.g.  Italy,  Spain,  and  Austria)  claimed  that  in  many  cases  enforcement 
bodies – such as the police - do not have the means to check for infringements.   

Overall, for the Member States that provided data there appear to typically be around 
300-500 staff (e.g. UK, Poland, Bulgaria, Sweden, Romania and Spain).  Problems of 
having a lack of resources have been reported in Bulgaria, Sweden, Ireland, Romania, 
the  Netherlands  and  Latvia  in  this  study,  as  well  as  Italy,  Spain  and  Austria  in  the 
literature.    Conversely,  the  level  of  resources  is  considered  adequate  by  enforcers  in 
the  UK,  France  and  Poland.  The  above  responses  indicate  that  there  is  a  lot  of 
variation  in  the  number,  types,  size  and  resources  of  national  bodies  responsible  for 
enforcement.    However,  the  data  shows  here  is  no  clear  trend  concerning  any 
optimum size of staff, either in absolute terms or relative to the size of the cabotage 
market.    For  example,  the  UK  (where  staffing  levels  are  considered  adequate)  has  a 
similar  ratio  of  staff  to  cabotage  market  size  as  Sweden  and  Spain  (where  there  is 
considered  to  be  a  lack  of  resources.    Bulgaria  has  the  highest  ratio  of  staff  to 
cabotage market size, yet considered there is a need for additional staff. 

b) Issues related to the documentation required to prove lawful cabotage 

As  previously  noted in  Figure  6-8, 57%  of  enforcement  authorities  responding  to the 
survey  indicated  some  or  significant  difficulties  in  the  provisions  regarding  required 
documentary proof and what use enforcers are permitted to make of other evidence.  
The clarification FAQs35 to the Regulation note that the required consignment note or 
bill  of  lading,  normally  in  the  CMR36  format,  should  provide  all  of  the  required 
information  in  order  to  prove  that  the  cabotage  rules  have  been  respected.  The 
Commission’s  clarification  note  on  the  cabotage  rules  further  states  that  the 
Regulations  do  not  prevent  control  authorities  from  using  other  evidence,  e.g.  the 
tachograph data, to establish whether a cabotage operation is carried out according to 
the rules.   

A review of the literature confirms certain issues related to cabotage documentation – 
SDG (2013a) finds that stakeholders in Germany, Italy, Spain and Austria claimed that 
enforcement  bodies  do  not  have  the  means  to  check  for  infringements.    Particular 
difficulties were highlighted in the study with respect to verifying the start of cabotage 
operations,  its  link  to  international  carriage,  the  calculation  of  the  7-day  period  and 
the  identification  of  the  number of  journeys  carried  out  within  the  period.    According 
to SDG (2013a): “The controls of these aspects are based on the documentation made 
available in the international waybill by road hauliers and/or drivers, who might have 
an incentive to provide only partial – if not false – information.”  The German Federal 
Association of Road Haulage, Logistics and Disposal (BGL) was quoted as saying that 

35 

http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/road/haulage/doc/qa_the_new_cabotage_regime_201
1.pdf 

36 Convention des Marchandises par Route, or consignment note 

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Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

monitoring  compliance  with  the  regulation  only  through  the  review  of  the  necessary 
documentation is not sufficient, since illegal cabotage activities can be detected in only 
a  small  number  of  cases  due  to  a  mismatch  between  the  documentation  and  actual 
behaviour  (SDG,  2013b).    According  to  AECOM  (2014b),  “whilst  in  theory  the 
documentation  requirements  are  easily  enforceable  at  the  roadside,  the  burden  of 
proof of compliance has now shifted to the driver from the enforcer and there is some 
debate  about  the  efficacy  of  the  documentation  requirements”.    ETF  (2012a)  also 
claim that enforcement of cabotage rules is ineffective.   

These  findings  in  the  literature  were  cross-checked  during  interviews  conducted  for 
this study.  The French enforcement authority reported that “monitoring compliance of 
the period of three days is impossible to perform” and suggested that “the obligation 
to  mention  the  time  and  date  of  loading  and  unloading,  should  be  added  to  the 
evidence referred to in art. 8.3 of Regulation 1072/2009, since data are lacking for the 
controllers”.    The  French  ministry  also  confirmed  their  view  that  the  CMR  document 
does not include all key elements to control whether cabotage operations are correctly 
carried  out.  For  this  reason  other  documents  are  required  to  check  date  and  time  of 
loading / unloading operations. Nevertheless the ministry reports that this is complex 
and time-consuming.   

The determination of the date and the place of entry in the Netherlands is considered 
a  problem  by  the  respondent  to  the  survey  of  enforcement  authorities  from  the 
Netherlands, as well as determining the number of journeys in relation to loading and 
unloading in the Member State.  

The respondent to the survey of ministries from Bulgaria specifically identified a need 
for more guidance on what documents can be provided by a haulier in case cabotage 
operations are performed in a Member State. According to this stakeholder “Since no 
clear  rules  on  that  exist,  it  gives  hauliers  the  possibility  to  hide  information  and 
evidence for performed cabotage operations. This creates impediments for the work of 
control authorities during checks” 

The Italian ministry also identifies problems with documentation, noting that “the text 
of  the  Regulation  makes  it  possible  to  circumvent  the  rules  on  the  number  of 
transactions and makes the work of the supervisory bodies more difficult in relation to 
the  evaluation  of  the  documents  /  evidence  to  be  presented  by  the  carrier,  which  is 
insufficient”.  

SDG (2013b) also raised the potential issues of falsified documentation, which can 
only  be  detected by detailed controls  at  the hauliers’  offices,  but not  during  roadside 
checks.    However,  the  study  did  not  have  information  on  the  extent  of  such  issues. 
AECOM  (2014b)  also  reports  that  many  industry  representatives  voiced  the  opinion 
that  the  road-side  presentation  of  consignment  note  evidence  is  not  reliable  because 
documents can be hidden by drivers.  Although it is not possible to quantify the extent 
to which this may be taking place, when asked more specifically about any problems 
(e.g. the possibility of falsification, losing documents), several enforcement authorities 
responded during interviews that these problems were not frequent in their countries 
(Ireland,  Bulgaria).    Conversely,  the  Austrian  authority  felt  that  consignments  are 
often counterfeited, and considered that moving to electronic documents would help to 
address this. Industry reports in Spain identify checks in which some CMR documents 
were found to be counterfeited (FENADISMER, 2015). 

In  summary,  confirming  the  legality  of  cabotage  on  the  basis  of  only  the  CMR 
consignment note was highlighted as an issue due to two main factors: Firstly, some 
authorities  believe  that  the  CMR  document  does  not  contain  all  of  the  information 
necessary  to  verify  whether  a  cabotage  operation  is  in  compliance  with  the  rules 
(France, Germany, Netherlands, Italy).  Secondly, there is a possibility that documents 
are  falsified  or  hidden  (possible  issues  were  identified  for  example  in  Austria  and 
Spain).    Both  of  these  factors  were  emphasised  during  interviews  conducted  for  this 
study,  as  well  as  in  the  literature.  Recommendations  to  address  these  issues  are 
discussed in the final section of this document.    

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6.2.2.3. 

Penalty systems 

Regulation  1072/2009  requires  that  Member  States  define  the  penalties  to  be  levied 
for  violations.  Figure  6-10  shows  the  level  of  fines  applicable  to  cabotage 
infringements  –  it  demonstrates  that  there  is  not  a level  playing  field  when  the  fines 
are  viewed  across  countries.  Member  States  have  generally  laid  out  a  regime  of 
sanctions which varies according to the type of infringement.  In most cases, the lack 
of a community licence is sanctioned with a lower fine than the breaking of the “three 
operations within 7 days” rule. For example in Italy, if the relevant documentation has 
not  been  completed  correctly,  sanctions  range  between  €600  and  €1,800;  however 
infringements  relating  to  the  maximum  number  of  operations  can  be  fined  up  to 
€15,000. By contrast, in some Member States a fixed fine has been introduced (e.g. a 
fixed fine of €1,800 is in place in Belgium).  Converting the fines on a PPP basis (right-
hand graph) makes the discrepancies larger, indicating that socioeconomic differences 
between the Member States cannot explain the differences.    

Figure  6-10:  Financial  penalties  applicable  to  cabotage  infringements  in 
selected Member States (€, left and €PPP right) 

Source: (SDG, 2013a) and updated with responses to the stakeholder surveys 

Other  penalties  used in  connection  with  cabotage  infringements  are  outlined in  Table 
6-4.  This  shows  a  range  of  other  penalties  are  used  in  Member  States  and  that  the 
approaches are not harmonised.  

Table 6-4: Other penalties used in connection with cabotage infringements 

Penalty 

Applicable 

Not applicable 

Retention/immobilisation of 
vehicle 

Belgium, UK, Netherlands, 
France, Poland, Germany, 
Italy 

Norway, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Romania, Latvia 

Retention of trailer 

UK, Netherlands, France 

Retention of goods 

Norway 

Belgium, Norway, Germany, 
Bulgaria 

Belgium, UK, Netherlands, 
Germany, France, Bulgaria 

Other 

Belgium*, UK & France** 

* Belgium: require to return to the place of loading in order to unload the goods or require to 
reload the goods into another vehicle in order to continue the trip in a legal way 
**  This  may  be  enforced  in  France  and  in  the  UK,  in  the  form  of  a  one-year  ban  from 
performing cabotage 
Source:  (Trafikstyrelsen,  2013),  SDG  (2013a)  and  updated  with  information  from  surveys  of 
ministries and enforcement authorities 

Regulation  1072/2009  does  not  expressly  include  chain  of  command  responsibility  in 
its  scope.    The  principle  of  ‘chain  of  command’  responsibility  is  that  all  parties  to  a 
transport  contract  have  a  duties  regarding  compliance  and  can  be  held  liable  for 

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Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

infringements  that  they  have  in  some  way  contributed  to  causing.    Table  6-5  shows 
which  parties  can  be  considered  liable  in  connection  with  infringements  of  the 
cabotage  rules  –  again,  this  indicates  a  diverse  range  of  approaches  and  shows  that 
treatment of infringements is not equal across Member States.  It demonstrates that 
some Member States have been active in enshrining the concept of chain of command 
liability into their laws. 

Table 6-5: Who is liable in connection with infringement of cabotage rules 

Haulier 

Driver 

Forwarding agent 

Yes 

All 

No 

Belgium, Sweden, Norway, 
Germany 

Belgium, Sweden, Norway, 
France, Germany, Denmark 

UK, Netherlands 

UK, Netherlands 

Others 

Belgium* 

Sweden, UK 

*Belgium: Client, loader, and forwarding agent can be punished by a court decision in the same 
way as a haulier.  
Source:  (Trafikstyrelsen,  2013)  and  updated  with  information  from  surveys  of  ministries  and 
enforcement authorities 

To  understand  the  application  of  co-liability  principles  in  practice,  interviews  with 
stakeholders  were  carried  out.  The  German  ministry  explained  that  this  co-liability  is 
checked during checks at premises, but how and to what stringency this is verified will 
depend  on  each  single  case.    A  German  association  commented  that  it  would  be 
positive if this co-liability was introduced at a larger scale in other Member States.  All 
of  the  German  undertakings  interviewed  were  supportive  of  this  provision  and  three 
out of six also considered it would be useful to transfer this approach other countries.   

In  Denmark,  depending  on  the  circumstances,  a  freight  forwarder  will  be  able  to  be 
penalised  for  complicity  in  a  foreign  haulier’s  illegal  cabotage  operation.    However, 
experience  in  Denmark  shows  that  the  prosecution  of  freight  forwarders  is  often 
difficult  to  implement  in  practice,  since  there  are  considerable  challenges  in  proving 
they  have  knowledge  of  illegal  practices  (Trafikstyrelsen,  2013).    In  France,  the 
transport  principal  must  ensure  that  its  contracted  haulier  does  not  carry  out  more 
than three cabotage operations in any seven day period. The company does not need 
to  verify  that  the  requisite  international  transport  journey  has  been  carried  out  or  if 
other  cabotage  operations  have  been  made.  However,  the  principal  must  maintain  a 
record of all supporting documents for two years. In this way, transport principals are 
therefore obliged not to instigate transport operations that they know will be unlawful, 
and  they  are  required  to  keep  documentation  that  could  be  collated  along  with 
instructions  from  other  shippers  to  form  a  picture  of  a  particular  operator’s  activities 
(AECOM, 2014b).  According to AECOM (2014b), the Finnish Road Haulage Association 
has  adopted  a  joint  liability  provision.  This  has  increased  the  responsibility  of  the 
customer  and  they  are  now  obliged  to  verify  that  the  haulage  companies  they  work 
with have a clean record. In addition the transport company they are using must have 
a  valid  operators’  license  and  proof  that  its  employer  and  taxation  obligations  have 
been met.  According to SDG (2013a), several stakeholders Member States where co-
liability is not present in the law have spoken in favour of increasing the administrative 
controls  for  both  service  providers  and  customer  companies.    It  is  reported  that  the 
provisions  of  co-liability  are  rarely  implemented  in  practice  due  to  the  complex 
subcontracting arrangements in place that make it difficult to determine responsibility 
and  meet  the  burden  of  proof  (Barbarino  et  al,  2014).    The  possibility  of  introducing 
co-liability is considered further (along with recommendations) in Evaluation Question 
12, in the context of ensuring a coherent legal framework.  

Bayliss (2012) suggests that the differences have arisen because the penalty systems 
have evolved historically, and recommends a more uniform and effective enforcement 

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Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

of  road  transport  legislation  should  be  achieved  through  the  adoption  of  common 
definitions  of  infringements  and  the  harmonisation  of  controls,  complemented  by 
corresponding  action  in  the  area  of  sanctions.    SDG  (2013a)  noted  that  it  is  hard  to 
say that regulations are effectively the same across the EU if corresponding sanctions 
vary so greatly.  

Overall,  the  review  of  penalties  shows  that  there  is  not  a  level  playing  field  and  as 
such  it  cannot  be  concluded  that  the  dissuasiveness  (and  consequently  the 
effectiveness  of  enforcement)  is  the  same  across  the  EU.    In  particular,  in  some 
countries the level of sanctions could be considered so small that there is in effect no 
need  to  comply  with  the  relevant  rules,  making  the  dissuasiveness  low  and  the 
enforcement ineffective.  This also creates an incentive for business models exploiting 
regulatory  differences  across  the  EU  and  jeopardises  the  achievement  of  EU  policy 
objectives.   

6.2.2.4. 

Best practice examples and lessons learned 

Despite  the  various  reported  issues  with  enforcement  outlined  above,  some  Member 
States appear to have achieved very high compliance rates, whereas others appear to 
suffer problems of illegal cabotage (discussed in Evaluation Question 1).  

A combination of interviews and literature review was used to investigate the national 
enforcement  practices  in  more  detail,  and  to  try  to  identify  some  common  best 
practices or lessons learned.  In Denmark, the frequent controls and high fines lead 
to high risks for hauliers to take part in illegal cabotage and consequently a very low 
infringement  rate  (Sternberg  et  al,  2014).    There  are  “considerable  resources”  for 
controlling trucks, making Denmark well-known for extensive controls Sternberg et al, 
2014).  Further debates in Denmark have highlighted widespread support among the 
stakeholders 
improve  compliance 
(Trafikstyrelsen, 2013).   

following  measures 

in  order 

the 

for 

to 

  Greater use of tachograph data; 

  A hotline for the police; 

  Adjusted consignment note (voluntary) to ensure information is readily 

available; 

 

 

Increased penalties and differentiation of fines for more serious infringements; 

Increased information / monitoring. 

Since  these  measures  are  still  in  discussion,  it  is  not  possible  to  verify  their 
effectiveness. The Danish police report in 2014 that the rate of illegal cabotage is only 
0.5%  (Sternberg  et  al,  2014),  and  they  believe  that  increased  controls  (higher  fines 
and increased resources) have been effective in reducing illegal cabotage in Denmark 
(Report  to  the  Transport  Committee,  2014).  The  Danish  ministry  confirmed  that  the 
police  received  additional  funding  for  increasing  the  number  of  roadside  checks  in 
2013  and  2014.    They  report  that  although  the  number  of  vehicles  checked  had 
increased, fewer violations have been detected. This suggests that the non-compliance 
rate has decreased (Report to the Transport Committee, 2014).   

The  high  frequency  of  controls  is  also  thought  to  contribute  to  low  levels  of  illegal 
cabotage  in  Norway,  in  combination  with  the  often  harsh  local  weather  conditions 
that make the Norwegian market harder to access for foreign operators (Sternberg et 
al, 2015).   

Since  1  January  2015,  Sweden  introduced  new  higher  fines  for  illegal  cabotage 
(Sternberg  et  al,  2015).    Although  it  is  too  early  to  see  the  results  of  this  change, 
there is a relatively sparse level of controls and so it remains to be seen whether this 
new policy will be as effective as that in Denmark. According information provided to 
the  authors  in    Sternberg  et  al  (2015),  in  the  latest  large  scale  control  of  trucks  on 
Swedish  roads,  only  five  cabotage  transports  were  controlled,  of  which  three  were 

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Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

fined  for  illegal  cabotage.    An  enforcement  officer  specialised  in  control  of  trucks 
commented that part of the problem is understaffing, since there are only 450 officers 
of which only 160 have specialist knowledge (Sternberg et al, 2015).   

In  Ireland,  it  is  alleged  that  43%  of  foreign  trucks  entering  the  country  engage  in 
illegal  haulage  activity,  as  set  out  under  the  cabotage  rules,  but  that  these  are  not 
detected  due  to  a  lack  of  enforcement  capability  (Dáil  debates,  2013).    According  to 
figures from the Road Safety Authority only 78 vehicles were checked in 2012 to July 
2013,  and  only  a  single  breach  was  found  (Dáil  debates,  2013).    The  respondent  to 
the  enforcement  survey  indicated  that  185  vehicles  were  checked  in  2013  and  three 
breaches  are  being  processed.    The  authority  indicated  that  cabotage  is  checked  as 
part of standard inspections of out-of-state vehicles. 

Conversely, in France the interview with the authorities indicated that there are over 
7,000  control  officers  (a  level  thought  to  be  adequate  by  the  enforcement  authority) 
and  a  relatively  high  rate  of  illegal  cabotage  detected  (7%).      Previous  studies 
reported  that  in  order  to  address  the  concerns  of  French  hauliers,  the  Ministry  of 
Transport announced in June 2009 that cabotage checks would be strengthened, and 
the total number of annual checks increased by 14,000 in 2009 compared to 2008 and 
remained  at  that  level  in  2010  (European  Parliament,  2013b).    France  is  the  second 
largest market in Europe for cabotage operations as a result of its location making it 
an  important  transit  country  in  Europe.  SDG  (2013a)  reports  that  the  fines  for 
cabotage  infringements  in  France  are  up  to  €15,000,  whereas  failure  to  show  the 
relevant  documents  is  punishable  by  a  fine  of  up  to  €1,500.  Specific  requirements 
concerning the documentation are that it must include the date when the freight was 
unloaded and the registration number of the vehicle used for the cabotage operation – 
also, verification of tachograph information is used.  The French enforcement authority 
reported in their survey response that in 2013 there were 50,928 checks of cabotage.  

The  German  authorities  interviewed  for  this  study  confirmed  that  a  relatively  low 
number of cabotage infringements has been detected, but wondered whether it is due 
to  difficulties  in  enforcement.    A  German  enforcement  authority  explained  that  they 
face  problems  when  trying  to  reconstruct  the  transport  operations/trips  of  a  truck. 
They  also  commented  that  there  are  occasional  periods  during  which  checks  of 
infringements  on  cabotage  are  intensified,  and  during  these  periods  the  detection 
rates  are  slightly  higher.  In  a  Parliamentary  question  (2014),  claims  by  a  German 
association of lorry drivers are discussed of abuse of cabotage rules.  According to this 
source,  a  typical  case  is  where  “a  lorry  is  used,  for  example,  to  carry  out  cabotage 
operations in Germany for a week. After a week, a replacement driver arrives by car, 
bringing  a  new  number  plate  plus  the  relevant  registration  certificate  and  other 
documents.  In  the  lay-by  where  the  changeover  of  drivers  takes  place,  the  lorry's 
identity  is  changed,  with  the  digital  tachograph  card  also  being  replaced  in  order  to 
modify  all  relevant  data”.    The  level  of  fines  is  relatively  high,  set  at  €1,000-20,000 
according to the survey respondent from the German enforcement authority.  

From  the  examples  found,  there  is  no  consistent  recipe  to  determine  the  most 
effective enforcement techniques; however, it appears that for most countries, both a 
high frequency of controls and dissuasive level of penalties are needed.  In countries 
where  the  enforcement  of  cabotage  is  a  political  priority  (e.g.  France  and  Denmark), 
penalties are relatively high, budgets for control have been increased in recent years 
and  issues  of  a  lack  of  manpower  do  not  appear  to  be  a  current  concern  in  these 
countries.  Controls  in  France  also  rely  on  documentation  that  identifies  the  date  of 
loading/unloading  of  the  vehicle  and  verification  of  tachograph  data,  since  the 
enforcers  do  not  view  the  information  in  the  CMR  documents  as  sufficient  for 
verification of cabotage activities.  A group discussion held at Euro Contrôle Route also 
supports this conclusion, where is was found that there are very diverse practices, but 
in  their  view  it  is  “clear  that  cabotage  is  enforceable,  but  requires  a  significant 
investment  in  manpower  and  budget  as  well  as  coordination  with  the  labour 
inspectorate.” (ECR, 2013).  SDG (2013a) also confirms that the amount of roadside 

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checks undertaken by enforcement bodies is not uniform across the EU, which implies 
that the risk of being caught is very different between Member States.   

6.2.3.  Summary and conclusions for Evaluation Question 2 

6.2.3.1. 

Conclusions 

Regulation 1071/2009 

Information  on  how  the  requirements  of  Regulation  1071/2009  (stable  and  effective 
establishment,  good  repute,  professional  competence  and  financial  standing)  are 
checked and verified is very scarce, despite efforts to collect such data from national 
ministries  and  enforcement  bodies.    From  the  information  that  could  be  obtained,  it 
appears that the requirements are verified for all new applicants in the Member States 
that  reported  information,  whereas  additional  checks  may  be  conducted  on  the  basis 
of  a  risk  rating  system  (e.g.  in  Denmark).    All  countries  that  reported  information 
indicated  that  they  had  a  risk  rating  system  with  the  exception  of  Bulgaria.    The 
functioning of the risk rating system varies across different countries (e.g. whether it 
focusses  on  good  repute  only,  or  includes  other  requirements  such  as  financial 
standing and professional competence).   

Due to a lack of quantitative data on the number of checks and infringements of the 
various provisions, a more qualitative approach was taken to establish how the checks 
of the individual requirements are conducted.  

Overall, responses to the survey of enforcement authorities reported that the majority 
(50%  or  more)  of  enforcers  faced  no  or  few  difficulties  to  enforce  most  of  the 
requirements  of  Regulation  1071/2009,  with  most  respondents  indicating  they  faced 
some  difficulties  in  one  or  two  areas  only.  The  main  areas  of  difficulty  were  the 
obligations for cooperation across borders (assessed further in Evaluation Question 3), 
followed by the move to a use of a risk rating system.   

Overall,  the  requirements  of  the  Regulation  are  generally  possible  to  enforce; 
however,  there  are  specific  details  of  the  provisions  that  cause  challenges  and/or 
reduce the effectiveness, which are explored in more detail below.  

The  specific  problems  of  enforcing  the  requirement  of  stable  and  effective 
establishment  arise  due  to  several  factors,  which  reduce  the  effectiveness  of  the 
provisions in terms of being able to reduce letterbox companies: 

  Firstly, the lack of a clear definition of an operating centre means that 

identifying companies without a stable and effective establishment in more 
difficult, thus leading to a problem of letterbox companies continuing to exist 
despite the checks (as discussed in Evaluation Question 1) 

  Secondly, a lack of cooperation between Member States makes cross-border 
investigations more challenging (as discussed in Evaluation Question 3) 

  Finally, a lack of resources and administrative capacity, combined with the 

more demanding nature of the checks of stable and effective establishment, 
makes the enforcement of the requirement for all undertakings a challenge.  At 
present it appears that several Member States (i.e. Bulgaria, Germany, and 
Finland) report that they find it difficult to implement the required checks of 
stable and effective establishment.   

The enforcement of financial standing appears to cause no or few difficulties for the 
majority  of  enforcement  authorities.    It  also  tends  to  be  the  area  in  which  most 
infringements  are  detected,  which  implies  that  checks  of  the  financial  standing 
requirement  are  able  to  detect  infringements  effectively  (and  hence  enforcement  is 
effective). There is some variation in the approach used to verify financial standing for 
new  companies,  and  some  concerns  have  been  expressed  by  authorities  from  Italy 
and  Croatia  over  how  to  monitor  whether  firms  constantly  meet  the  requirement  in 
real time.  

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The  official  monitoring  data  strongly  suggests  that  there  is  variation  in  terms  of  the 
stringency with which good repute is checked, with some Member States taking very 
lenient views (i.e. in many Member States there were no reported withdrawals on the 
basis  of  loss  of  good  repute).    This result suggests  that  in  some  Member States,  the 
enforcement  of the  provisions  is  not  effective,  since  operators are  not  at high  risk  of 
losing good repute regardless of their conduct. This conclusion is further supported by 
the  comments  from  both  associations  and  trade  unions  received  in  the  high  level 
survey, which complained about the lack of effective enforcement of the requirement 
of good repute.  There are two main issues with respect to the requirement, namely: 

  A perceived lack of clarity in definitions of precisely which infringements should 

lead to the loss of good repute (mentioned by ministries in Finland, Germany, 
Ireland, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Bulgaria).    

 

Inconsistent approaches and incomplete implementation concerning 
administrative procedures to determine whether loss of good repute would be 
disproportionate.  

issues  were  encountered  with  the  requirement  of 
No  specific  enforcement 
professional  competence,  and  hence  this  suggests  that  implementation  of  the 
provisions  has  been  effective.    There  is  no  evidence  to  suggest  that  there  are 
problems  experienced  in  enforcement,  which  in  turn  suggests  that  enforcement  is 
likely  to  be  effective.    One  industry  association  mentioned  a  case  where  documents 
had been obtained fraudulently, which is a concern, but the practice does not appear 
to be widespread.  

There  were  few  direct  issues  found  with  enforcement  of  provisions  relating  to  the 
transport  manager,  which  suggests  that  the  enforcement  of  the  rules  according  to 
the letter of the law is effective.  However, there appears to be a lack of clarity of the 
role of the transport manager and how to ensure that they demonstrate a genuine link 
to  the  undertaking.    This  causes  a  risk  of  the  use  of  “front  men”,  who  merely  lend 
their  good  repute  to  an  undertaking  without  really  managing  the  business  –  thereby 
reducing the effectiveness of the provision in terms of being able to ensure compliance 
of undertakings with the rules.  The extent of this practice could not be quantified for 
any  countries,  but  concerns  were  raised  by  stakeholders  in  Finland,  France  and 
Sweden. 

In terms of the penalties in place for infringements, the variation of financial penalties 
between Member States is often to a level that cannot be justified on grounds solely of 
socio-economic differences. Only some Member States have adopted specific sanctions 
for  the  infringements  that  are  qualified  as  most  serious  infringements  of  EU  law  as 
listed in Annex IV of Regulation 1071/2009, which were identified in a 2013 study as 
Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, Romania and Spain (Grimaldi, 2013a) – and confirmed to 
be up-to-date in case studies for this study in Germany, Romania and Spain (albeit at 
different  levels).  The  responses  from  enforcement  authorities  indicate  that  the 
variation  between  countries  may  be  because  the  current  categorisation  of 
infringements in Annex IV is not considered clear/appropriate by some Member State 
ministries,  and  the  need  for  further  guidance  was  highlighted,  especially  by  EU-13 
respondents.   

Regulation 1072/2009 

The review of quantitative information on controls across Europe was hampered by a 
lack of data, and most enforcement authorities were unable to provide information on 
the  number  of  checks  and/or  infringements  in  their  countries.    Falling  back  on 
alternative  sources  of  information  suggests  that  there  are  concerns  about  the  low 
levels of effectiveness of cabotage checks (highlighted in literature and by respondents 
to the high level survey).   

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Overall,  evidence from  the  literature,  petitions  submitted  to  the  European  Parliament 
and stakeholder consultations conducted both for this study and others (e.g. the 2011 
questionnaire  of  the  High  Level  Group)  indicate  concerns  over  the  effectiveness  of 
controls of cabotage.  It is not possible to verify the extent of such issues due to the 
limitations of the data on cabotage compliance (explored in Evaluation Question 1)  – 
the most important being that official enforcement statistics cannot indicate how much 
illegal cabotage might be going undetected.  The evidence from Evaluation Question 1 
suggests  that  illegal  cabotage  is  likely  to  be  a  problem  in  some  countries  (in  turn, 
indicating  ineffective  enforcement),  but  not  in  others.    The  consultants  therefore 
explored the possible reasons that might lead to ineffective enforcement.  

The most important contributing factor to difficulties in enforcement was identified as 
a lack of manpower.  However, responses to the enforcers’ survey indicated that many 
other factors also contributed to difficulties in enforcement, including a lack of clarity 
in  provisions,  differing  interpretations  across Member States,  as well  as difficulties  in 
cross-border cooperation.  This indicates that enforcement is considered challenging in 
many different circumstances and across diverse national situations.   

The lack of manpower has been discussed in literature, which highlighted concerns in 
the Netherlands, Spain, Italy and Austria.  Problems of having a lack of resources have 
been  reported  in  Bulgaria,  Sweden,  Ireland,  Romania,  the  Netherlands  and  Latvia  in 
this study, as well as Italy, Spain and Austria in the literature.  This shows that a lack 
of  manpower  (closely  linked  to  financial  constraints)  affected  many  Member  States.  
Conversely,  a  few  Member  States  felt  that  staffing  levels  were  adequate,  including 
Poland (400), UK (300) and France (500 controllers in the ministry, more than 7,000 
in total).  Overall, there is a lot of variation in the number, types, size and resources 
of national bodies responsible for enforcement.   

Confirming  the  legality  of  cabotage  on  the  basis  of  only  the  CMR  consignment  note 
was highlighted as an issue due to two main factors: Firstly, some authorities believe 
that  the  CMR  document  does  not  contain  all  of  the  information  necessary  to  verify 
whether  a  cabotage  operation  is  in  compliance  with  the  rules  (France,  Germany, 
Netherlands, Italy). Particular difficulties were mentioned around verifying the start of 
cabotage  operations,  its  link  to  international  carriage,  the  calculation  of  the  7-day 
period and the identification of the number of journeys carried out within the period.   
Secondly, there is a possibility that documents are falsified or hidden (possible issues 
were  identified  for  example  in  Austria  and  Spain).    Both  of  these  factors  were 
emphasised during interviews conducted for this study, as well as in the literature.  

The  level  of  fines  applicable  to  cabotage  infringements  varies  greatly  across  Member 
States,  as  well  as  the  possibility  of  other  penalties  (such  as  immobilisation  of  the 
vehicle)  and  liability  of  other  actors  in  the  transport  chain.  In  most  cases  there  is  a 
regime  of  sanctions  which  varies  according  to  the  type  of  infringement,  but  in  some 
countries there is a fixed fine (e.g. Belgium). The variation means that there is not a 
level playing field in Europe.  Moreover, in some countries the level of penalties is so 
low  that  it  could  not  be  considered  dissuasive,  thereby  rendering  enforcement 
ineffective.  A  review  of  the  literature  suggests  that  differences  have  arisen  because 
the penalty systems have evolved historically.  

Reviewing  enforcement  practices  across  different  Member  States  showed  a  range  of 
approaches  to  control  and  demonstrated  that  there  is  no  consistent  recipe  to 
determine  the  most  effective  enforcement  techniques;  however,  it  appears  that  for 
most countries, both a high frequency of controls and dissuasive level of penalties are 
needed.    In  countries  where  the  enforcement  of  cabotage  is  a  political  priority  (e.g. 
France  and  Denmark),  penalties  are  relatively  high,  budgets  for  control  have  been 
increased  in  recent  years  and  issues  of  a  lack  of  manpower  do  not  appear  to  be  a 
current concern in these countries. Controls in France also rely on documentation that 
identifies  the  date  of  loading/unloading  of  the  vehicle  and  verification  of  tachograph 
data,  since  the  enforcers  do  not  view  the  information  in  the  CMR  documents  as 
sufficient  for  verification  of  cabotage  activities.    A  group  discussion  held  at  Euro 

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Contrôle Route also supports this conclusion, where is was found that there are very 
diverse  practices,  but  in  their  view  it  is  “clear  that  cabotage  is  enforceable,  but 
requires a significant investment in manpower and budget as well as coordination with 
the labour inspectorate.” (ECR, 2013).   

6.2.3.2. 

Recommendations 

Regulation 1071/2009 

The  main  recommendations  with  respect  to  improving  enforcement  of  Regulation 
1071/2009 relate to the provision of clarifications and guidance.  This is because the 
main  problems  identified  related  to  a  lack  of  clarity  in  the  provisions  and/or 
inconsistency in approaches.  The implementation of guidance and clarifications would 
not  add  significant  costs  to  the  rules,  since  the  enforcement  activities  are  already 
being  carried  out.    Guidance,  rather  than  strict  rules,  would  allow  Member  States 
adjust the conditions to suit the national context and take best advantage of existing 
monitoring systems in order to keep the costs minimal.  The specific recommendations 
of areas that should be targeted by guidelines are as follows: 

  Stable and effective establishment: Provide guidance on the development 

of risk-rating indices, such as those used in France, in order to identify 
organisations at higher risk of infringing the requirements.  This would help to 
prioritise the scarce enforcement capability by targeting higher risk 
undertakings for more detailed checks.  

  Financial standing:  

o  Guidance on procedures for verifying the financial standing of newly 

established enterprises.  Examples of the approaches used were given 
for the UK and Ireland. 

o  Guidance on how to monitor if the financial standing requirement is met 
continuously. This could be based on the risk rating system developed in 
the Netherlands. 

o  Clarification of terms used in the Regulation, including what can be 
considered as capital and reserves (discussed further in Evaluation 
Question 4).  

  Good repute:  

o  Provide clearer definitions of precisely which infringements should lead 

to the loss of good repute. 

o  Provide examples of best practices for procedures to determine whether 
the loss of good repute would be disproportionate, to encourage a more 
consistent approach and help to avoid over-use of this provision.   

o  Clearer definitions of who should be included in the list of relevant 
persons to be checked for good repute in addition to the transport 
manager.  Examples from individual Member States suggests that the 
list of other relevant persons to be checked could include: CEOs and 
general partners in partnerships (Finland) or legal representatives of the 
undertakings (Latvia).   

  Transport manager:  

o 

Include a more detailed list of the responsibilities/activities of the 
transport manager, to ensure that a “genuine link” is demonstrated.  
This approach appears to have wide support amongst the ministries of 
several countries, including Germany, Finland, Slovakia and Sweden 

Determination  as  to  which  specific  approaches  should  be  included  in  such  guidance 
should  be  decided  in  a  way  that  ensures  the  interpretations  are  in  keeping  with  the 
intended interpretation of the rules.  In the context of this study, the consultants can 

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only  highlight  examples  of  approaches  taken  in  Member  States,  without  commenting 
on whether these would constitute the best approach for all countries – this next step 
would need to be the subject of more detailed discussions, such as in working groups.  

Another  approach  specific  to  the  problems  found  concerning  the  transport  manager 
and the use of “front men” would be to limit the number of companies and/or vehicles 
that an external transport manager can be responsible for, to a level below the current 
limit  of  four  companies  or  50  vehicles.    This  approach  has  been  taken  in  several 
countries, including France and Romania.  Although there are some merits to this, the 
study  team  consider  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  pursue  further  -  firstly,  because 
Member States already have an option under the Regulations to set lower limits if they 
choose.    Secondly,  stakeholders  in  other  countries  appear  satisfied  with  the  current 
limits  and  have  not  reported  issues  of  front  men  –  meaning  the  practice  may  affect 
imposing  EU-wide  rules  would  be 
some  countries  more 
disproportionate to solve the problem.  

than  others  and 

Some  stakeholders  have  called  for  more  frequent  checks  of  undertakings  in  order  to 
prevent letterbox companies (e.g. ETF (2012a) call for Member States to be required 
to  conduct  checks  every  2  years,  as  opposed  to  every  five  years).    However, 
conducting  proper  checks  of  stable  and  effective  establishment  is  a  demanding  task. 
In  the  view  of  the  study  team,  it  seems  unlikely  that  enforcement  authorities  could 
dedicate  the  necessary  resources  to  support  this  increase  in  frequency  of  checks 
without  compromising  the  thoroughness.    This  view  is  based  on  the  responses  from 
enforcement  authorities  to  the  effect  that  having  adequate  manpower  is  already  a 
concern.    Rather,  more  effective  risk-targeting  of  checks  as  recommended  above 
seems to offer a more proportionate solution.  

Enforcement  authorities  were  asked  for  suggestions  to  mitigate  enforcement 
difficulties.    Enforcement  authorities  from  France  and  Poland  called  for  greater 
cooperation: France further suggested strengthening exchanges with national partners 
(e.g.  transplants  commercial  courts,  chambers  of  commerce  and  industry,  court 
administrators  or  accountants).  Possible  provisions  for  greater  cooperation  are 
considered in more detail in Evaluation Question 3.  

Other  approaches  to  help  mitigate  problems  have  been  suggested  in  Hellemons 
(2013),  where  it  is  recommended  to  use  combination  of  more  targeted  (intelligence 
led) enforcement and a better use of technology.  This would allow the sparse human 
capacity  can  be  used  in  a  more  clever  way,  leaving  as  much  of  the  “dumb  work”  as 
possible for the technology. Further suggestions in Hellemons relate to the use of risk 
rating systems and ERRU to target high risk operators, which complement the use of 
intelligence-led enforcement.  Examples of such best practices can already be found in 
some  Member  States,  where  authorities  are  trying  to  make  the  best  use  of  limited 
staff and resources.  Since no clear cross-cutting best practices seem to emerge from 
the examples analysed in this chapter, the study team consider that this falls into the 
remit of sharing best practice between Member States (including through participation 
in existing efforts such as ECR) in order to maximise learning and synergies.  

Harmonising  sanctions  for  the  most  serious  and  very  serious  infringements  would 
help  to  provide  a  more  consistent  deterrent  for  operators  and  improve  alignment  of 
the sanctions applied to the same infringement.  This is still a work in progress and so 
the effectiveness of the current actions to revise Annex IV should be assessed before 
considering  greater  harmonisation.    Several  enforcement  authorities  call  for  more 
guidance  in  this  area,  which  would  be  a  first  step.    Nevertheless,  the  full 
harmonisation of national systems of control and penalties remains a difficult area to 
address  due  to  the  principle  of  subsidiarity,  as  well  as  due  to  differing  national 
administrative and cultural practices.  Introducing additional guidance may be helpful 
in  this regard,  although  it  does  not  carry  the  same  legal  force  as a Regulation.    This 
approach  would  be  respectful  of  different  national  legal  traditions,  while  still 
emphasising the need to tailor sanctions to the gravity of the different infringements.     

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If differences that threaten the effectiveness of the Road Transport Package measures 
continue  to  exist,  a  stronger  approach  could  be  envisioned.    This  could  be  to 
harmonise penalties in criminal law, where EU competence is established in the TFEU, 
Article  83.    This  allows  for  establishment  of  minimum  rules  in  areas  that  have  been 
subject to harmonisation measures if compliance with the principles of proportionality, 
necessity and subsidiarity is demonstrated. 

The necessity of adopting criminal measures to ensure effective enforcement of more 
serious  breaches  (such  as  the  most  serious  infringements)  would  however  need 
further  assessment.    Such  measures  could  be  justified  on  the  grounds  that  the  most 
serious  infringements  are  already  sanctioned  in  many  Member  States  with  criminal 
sanctions and all criminal systems foresee financial penalties as criminal sanctions.  In 
terms of  the  proportionality  of  this  course  of  action,  fixing  minimum  level  of  criminal 
sanctions  at  EU  level  does  not  seem  to  affect  substantially  the  sanctions’  systems  of 
Member  States,  as  all  criminal  systems  foresee  financial  penalties  as  criminal 
sanctions (Grimaldi, 2013a).   

Appropriate  levels  of  proportionate  and  dissuasive  minimum  levels  of  pecuniary  fines 
have been suggested by Grimaldi (2013a):    

  Most serious infringement: €2,000 for employees, €20,000 for employers; 

  Very serious infringement: €1,000 for employees, €10,000 for employers. 

The study team consider the recommendations from Grimaldi to be a starting point for 
negotiations, which would be needed to secure any progress in this area. However, it 
unlikely to be practical to fix maximum levels of fines, as some Member States apply 
sanctions  proportionate  to  the  wage  and  the  turnovers  of  transport  operators 
(Grimaldi,  2013a).    These  penalties  could  be  accompanied  by  sanctions  such  as 
confiscation  or  immobilisation  of  the  vehicle,  and  of  the  withdrawal  of  the  driving 
licenses  and  of  the  Community  licenses,  which  are  seen  as  effective  complementary 
measures,  because  they  do  not  allow  the  operators  to  gain  the  advantage  from 
infringements of the relevant rules.   

Regulation 1072/2009 

When  considering  potential  ways  to  improve  enforcement,  it  is  crucial  to  recognise 
that  the  enforcement  authorities  concerned  have  limited  resources,  and  although 
several  mentioned  that  they  would  like  to  increase  staffing  levels  this  would  not  be 
possible due to financial constraints.   

While no single solution can be completely effective, there is consistent support for the 
organisation  of  common  training  of  enforcement  authorities  and  greater international 
cooperation among respondents to the survey of enforcement authorities. Recognising 
that  budgetary  pressures  can 
limit  additional  efforts  by  already  stretched 
departments,  it  is  paramount  that  synergies  are  exploited  as  far  as  possible.    This 
concept  has  been  actively  pursued  in  other  areas  of  legislation,  most  notably  in  the 
enforcement  of  road  social  rules,  as  well  as  through  organisations  such  as  Euro 
Contrôle Route (ECR).   

In addition, although enforcement authorities may prioritise the control of compliance 
with social legislation (e.g. driving times), checks are often conducted in parallel with 
other  legislation.    In  this  regard,  a  similar  approach  to  that  used  in  Regulation 
561/2006  could  be  used,  under  which  the  organisation  of  common  training  of 
enforcement  authorities  and  greater  international  cooperation  is  foreseen,  and  the 
idea is valued by associations, enforcement authorities and Member States. This could 
also  take  the  form  of  collecting  and  disseminating  information  on  procedures  across 
Member States, or facilitated exchanges with national partners.    

Issues with the documentation that needs to be carried to prove lawful cabotage have 
been  raised  with  respect  to  its  adequacy  in  revealing  illegal  activities.    This suggests 
that reliance on the consignment note alone may not be sufficient. The Regulations do 
not  prevent  control  authorities  from  using  other  evidence  to  establish  whether  a 

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cabotage operation is carried out according to the rules (e.g. the tachograph data).  In 
this  case,  best  practice  guidance  on  specifically  how  these  checks  can  be  carried  out 
effectively and efficiently may be beneficial.   

The  trade  unions  in  their  joint  response  to  the  high  level  survey  call  for  making 
mandatory  the  regular  automatic  recording  of  vehicle  location  (geo-positioning)  and 
the  use  of  digital  tachographs37.  These  suggestions  were  also  noted  in  the  literature 
(e.g.  AECOM,  2014b;  SDG,  2013a;  ETF,  2012a;  CLECAT,  2013b).  The  trade  unions 
further call for the mandatory retrofitting of fleets with the new digital tachographs. It 
is  worth  noting  in  this  sense  that  although  the  digital  tachograph  represents  a  more 
robust  and  tamper-resistant  recording  device,  the  analogue  tachographs  used  on 
vehicles registered before 1 May 2006 still represent a large part of the market.  The 
average  number  of  vehicles  equipped  with  digital  tachograph  that  were  controlled  in 
2011-2012 was around 56% (European Commission, 2014b).   A Swedish trade union 
agreed that the use of more documentation is needed so that enforcers can see where 
the vehicle is coming from and where it's going.  An Austrian trade union also agreed 
that the CMR document is not sufficient to check cabotage.   

Another  suggestion  was  to  move  towards  e-waybills  and  electronic  community 
licences,  possibly  in  conjunction  with  GNSS  (Global  Navigation  Satellite  System). 
Indeed,  some  countries  are  already  moving  towards  digitalisation.   For  example,  in 
Spain  the  Ministry  foresees  a  move  to  digital  community  licences  by  2017. 
Enforcement authorities were split over whether this would improve the effectiveness 
of  enforcement.    Two  respondents  strongly  agreed  that  this  would  be  an  effective 
solution (Germany, Slovenia), on the basis that it would help to avoid manipulation of 
records,  whereas  the  Spanish  authorities  strongly  disagreed.    The  other  respondents 
were neutral or did not volunteer a view.  The Irish authorities suggested that greater 
harmonisation  through  shared  training/exchanges  would  provide  enforcers  with  real 
life  experience of best practice  - and is probably more  likely to improve enforcement 
rather than using technology such as GNSS.  The French and Dutch authorities pointed 
out  the  significant  costs  involved.    Several  authorities  also  pointed  to  difficulties 
related to data protection (France, Netherlands), as well as noting that it would not be 
an effective solution in the short- and medium-term (Netherlands, Poland). The Dutch 
authorities  cautioned  against  seeing  this  as  a  silver  bullet.    The  Austrian  respondent 
noted  the  fact  that  extensive  tracking  of  vehicles  was  not  an  objective  of  the 
Regulation and felt that an extension of the Regulation should be avoided.    

In the view of the study team, greater recourse to electronic documents and the use 
of  data  from  digital  tachographs  could  provide  greater  certainty  and  could  be 
considered  a  good  solution  in  the  longer-term.  The  study  team  investigated  this 
possibility with enforcement authorities and received a mixed response as to whether 
this  would  constitute  a  desirable  solution.    One  of  the  suggestions  to  improve 
enforcement  was  a  move  to  electronic  documents  and  GNSS.    Currently,  electronic 
documents are already available in some cases and it is not expected that there would 
be resistance from stakeholders in terms of acceptability – the main barriers are of a 
legal  and  technological  nature  (Gomez-Acebo  &  Pombo,  2009).    It  has  also  been 
pointed  out  that  there  are  differences  in  technological  capability  between  Member 
States,  for  example  electronic  COTIF/CIM  consignment  notes  are  frequently  being 
printed out when crossing the border between Austria and Hungary  (Gomez-Acebo & 
Pombo,  2009).    These  challenges  were  confirmed  in  interviews  with  enforcement 
authorities,  who  note  that  the  costs  of  implementation  (from  already  stretched 
budgets) would be significant.   

On  the  other  hand,  AECOM  (2014b)  reports  that  telematics,  GNSS  and  digital 
tachograph  technology  already  provides  the  capability  for  the  remote  tracking  and 

37  On-board  recording  equipment  fitted  to  the  vehicles  regulated  by  the  provisions  of  the 

Tachograph Regulation 165/2014. 

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recording of cabotage activity. They suggest that in order to future-proof the likely on-
going  need  to  control  and  enforce  the  cabotage  market,  measures  to  better  monitor 
activity  in  relation  to  cabotage  should  be  properly  represented  in  the  Commission’s 
revisions to digital tachograph requirements – such as obliging drivers to record their 
location by GNSS at the start and end of each transport operation.   

Overall,  the  study  team  consider  that  the  use  of  electronic  documents,  digital 
tachographs  and  GNSS  would  be  a  good  long  term  solution  (provided  cabotage 
continues  to  be  restricted)  but  would  not  solve  problems  in  the  short-  and  medium-
run.  As such, the study team consider that a move to electronic documents or greater 
use of digital tachograph data should be a matter for Member States to opt in to (as 
should  already  be  possible  within  the  provisions  of  the  Regulation),  rather  than 
making it mandatory.  This is due to the barriers described, taken in context with the 
fact that illegal cabotage does not appear to affect all Member States equally countries 
(as  discussed  in  Evaluation  Question  1)  –  meaning  that  the  measure  would  likely  be 
disproportionate to  the  benefits  in  these countries.      The  study team also agree  with 
the suggestion in AECOM (2014b) to ensure that possible measures are considered in 
future revisions of digital tachograph requirements.   

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6.3.  Effectiveness:  To  what  extent  are 
administrative cooperation effective?  

the  measures  on 

To what extent the measures on administrative cooperation are effective? Is there a 
need  for  better  administrative  co-operation  and  administrative  coordination  (e.g. 
checks) between Member States and/or the Commission? 

This  section  assesses  the  provisions  of  the  Regulations  concerning  administrative 
cooperation, in terms of the status of implementation, how well they are working and 
whether there is a need for better cooperation and coordination measures. 

The main aspects concerned in this section concern:  

  The interconnection of national registers; and  

  Related  provisions  on  data  exchange  and  administrative  cooperation  between 

Member States.   

6.3.1.  Interconnection of national registers 

In  order to  facilitate the  monitoring  of  the  road transport  undertakings,  Article  16(1) 
of  Regulation  1071/2009  required  Member  States  to  set  up  national  electronic 
registers  of  road  transport  undertakings  that  have  been  authorised  by  a  competent 
authority designated by it to engage in the occupation of road transport operator.   

The national registers were intended to be interconnected from 31 December 2012, as 
laid down in Article 16(5) of Regulation 1071/2009.  The linked-up database is known 
as the European Register of Road transport Undertakings (ERRU).   Further details on 
the development of ERRU are given in Annex A (see Section 9.4).   

The  analysis  of  the  effectiveness  must  first  establish  the  extent  to  which  Member 
States  have  implemented  the  requirements  of  the  Regulation.    In  March  2013  the 
Commission  opened  21  EU-Pilot  (pre-infringement)  cases  against  those  Member 
States  who  failed  to  carry  out  the  necessary  interconnection  actions  by  that  time, 
showing  that  the  process  has  been  considerably  delayed.    By  2014,  only  13  Member 
States  were  interconnected  via  ERRU  (European  Commission,  2014c).    By  2015,  this 
has risen to 20 Member States38, showing that interconnection is still incomplete.  

To  understand 
in  more  detail  what  the  difficulties  involved  in  establishing 
interconnection were, national ministries in all Member States were invited to describe 
any issues they faced. The reasons for delays in interconnection given mainly related 
to technical issues (see Annex A for more details). 

Similar problems were also found in the literature. Bayliss (2013) reports that efforts 
to  link  separate  Member  State  registers  were  initially  affected  by  connectivity 
problems, and it was eventually decided that the software deployed for the task was 
not suitable.  According to ICF (2014), in Ireland, the introduction of a new computer 
licensing  system  and  online  application  facility  was  subject  to  a  number  of  technical 
difficulties.  As  a  result,  the  implementation  of  this  requirement  was  delayed.  This 
situation  also  applied  to  Hungary  and  the  Netherlands  that  observed  delays  in  the 
introduction  of  the  system  (ICF,  2014).    The  UK  authorities  duly  noted  that  the  ICT 
adaptations  needed  much  longer  to  implement  than  foreseen  in  the  Regulation  (with 
the  original  deadline  of  31st  December  2012),  which  made  compliance  with  the 
requirement  very  difficult.    ICF  (2014)  concluded  that  obstacles  or  difficulties  were 
experienced  in  three  main  areas:  the  financial  burdens  of  the  national  registers; 

38  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Cyprus,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Ireland, 
Latvia,  Lithuania,  Malta,  Netherlands,  Romania,  Slovak  Republic,  Slovenia,  Spain,  Sweden 
and the UK 

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technical difficulties in linking national registers to ERRU; and delayed implementation 
of the systems which slows down the monitoring of road transport undertakings.   

Despite the above-mentioned delays, the number of Member States connecting to the 
system  has  been  increasing  gradually.    Interconnection  is  expected  to  lead  to  more 
interventions  because  of  a  better  flow  of  data  on  infringements  when  vehicles  are 
operating outside their home Member State.   

The next question to consider is the extent to which the system has been effective in 
achieving  these  effects  in  practice.    To  evaluate  this,  Member  State  ministries  were 
asked  about  the  impact  of  participating  in  ERRU  on  the  effectiveness  of  their 
cooperation so far.  Encouragingly, many Member States that are currently connected 
have  reported  that  they  feel  the  effectiveness  has  improved  (Belgium,  Ireland, 
Sweden, Estonia, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus),  even though the system is not 
fully  functional  –  however,  they  were  not  able  to  quantify  the  impact.    Qualitative 
views received express support for the overall  conclusion that there have been some 
benefits  to  date  and  that  progress  is  in  the  right  direction,  for  example:  the  Belgian 
ministry noted that “although there's still much room for improvement, the obligation 
to  set  up  a  register  that  has  to  be  interconnected  can  be  considered  a  huge  step 
forwards.”  The Latvian ministry appreciated the faster exchange of information about 
Most Serious Infringements, while the French ministry state that “the implementation 
of the interconnection of national registers… is a first step in cross-border cooperation 
is to be welcomed”.   

On  the  other  hand,  the  Austrian  ministry  commented  that  “running  ERRU  means 
heavy  stress  for  authorities  without  any  substantial  effects  so  far”.    The  remaining 
respondents  were  split  between  those  who  report  that  they  have  not  noticed  any 
effect  (UK,  France,  Germany,  Denmark),  and  those  that  did  not  know  (Finland, 
Slovakia). 

It is also worth recognising that the full benefits of ERRU would only be realised once 
the  interconnection  is  completed,  meaning  that  the  current  performance  does  not 
reflect the full potential of the existing provisions.  This state of affairs is also reflected 
in the usage statistics, which are low at the moment compared to other systems that 
are also used as exchange mechanisms for connection with other Member States.  To 
put this in context, more than 150,000 requests through ERRU were forwarded to the 
Member  States  in  2013  (  Bausà  Peris  et  al,  2014).    By  comparison,  17  million 
enquiries  were  made  in  the  first  half  of  2013  through  the  European  Car  and  Driving 
Licence Information System (EUCARIS) and 1 million requests from January to August 
2013  were  made  through  the  Tachograph  Network  (TACHOnet)  (  Bausà  Peris  et  al, 
2014).    By  way  of  comparison,  the  level  of  usage  envisioned  in  the  TUNER  project 
once the system was fully connected were of similar orders of magnitude – estimated 
to  be  a  maximum  of  9.6  million  search  requests  per  year  and  up  to  11.6  million 
infringement notification and response messages (Wilson et al, 2009).   

The relatively low levels of usage indicates that the system is not being used to its full 
potential  (reflecting  the  incomplete  status  of  interconnection)  and  hence  its 
contribution to achieving the objectives of the Regulation for the time being is limited 
(i.e. in terms of ensuring more efficient and effective monitoring).  It is therefore also 
worth  considering  how  the  ERRU  is  expected  to  function  once  it  is  completed  and 
determine whether the ex-ante estimates of the benefits were realistic.   

Views  on  the  expected  impacts  were  collected  from  ministries.    Most  ministries 
consulted  were  hopeful  that  improvements  in  control  should  be  achieved  (Bulgaria, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France and Sweden), indicating a high level of support for 
the  measures.    The  respondents  from  Belgium  and  Germany  noted  that  it  was  too 
early  to  tell.    Conversely,  only  the  Austrian  ministry  reported  that  they  still  did  not 
expect  any  substantial  impacts.    They  explained  that  language  barriers  impede 
information  sharing  between  Member  States,  since  Member  States  must  report 
infringements  in  the  language  of  the  host  Member  State.    They  consider  that 
translation would be “far too much administrative burden” and considered that it does 

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not  add  anything  to  road  traffic  safety.    Responses  from  the  high  level  survey  from 
both  trade  unions  and  industry  associations  called  for  the  completion  of  ERRU  as  a 
matter of urgency. 

A  literature  review  was  also  conducted  in  order  to  substantiate  this  conclusion. 
Quantification  of  the  improvements  in  efficiency  (see  Evaluation  Question  9)  also 
indicate that at least some Member States (UK, Latvia, Hungary) have achieved small 
reductions  in  costs,  mainly  due  to  the  switch  away  from  paper-based  systems, 
whereas other Member States report no savings so far (ICF, 2014).  ICF (2014) also 
includes  comments  from  Estonian  authorities  that  information  exchange  with  other 
Member  States  not  connected  to  ERRU  takes  place  by  mail,  which  is  considered 
burdensome.   

In  order  to  consider  whether  further  actions  might  be  needed,  stakeholders  were 
asked for their opinions on how ERRU could be made more efficient or effective. The 
Estonian  and  Swedish  ministries  also  called  for  ERRU  to  be  made  accessible  in  real 
time  to  authorities  conducting  roadside  inspections,  such  that  it  would  allow 
authorities making roadside checks to confirm the validity of the certified true copy of 
the  Community  Licence.    Trade  unions  also  supported  this  in  their  coordinated 
response,  highlighting  that  the  data  registered  in  the  ERRU  is  not  accessible  to 
enforcement authorities. Making it available would facilitate enforcement of Regulation 
1071/2009,  as  well  as  controls  of  labour  and  social  legislation.    The  French  ministry 
highlighted  their  view  that  cross-border  administrative  cooperation  should  not  be 
limited  to  the  interconnection  of  registers,  but  also  consider  it  appropriate  to  go 
further on a number of issues such as harmonisation of control policies and auditing of 
the way the national authorities enforce the regulations in their territory.  

In conclusion, the system of ERRU has clearly been subject to significant delays mainly 
due to technical issues.  As a result, the expected benefits in terms of more efficient 
and effective monitoring have not yet been realised and there is a continuing need for 
better cooperation/use of the system as it is gradually completed.  Nevertheless, some 
Member States indicate that there have been some improvements in the effectiveness 
of  monitoring  even  with  the  partial  functioning  of  the  system  and  there  is  support 
among  ministries,  enforcement  bodies,  trade  unions  and  associations  for  the 
completion  of  the  system.    These  are  promising  signs  that  indicate  there  will  be 
benefits in the future once the system is working fully. The effectiveness will also be 
improved by the participation of Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, who 
will also participate in the ERRU (although participation from any other third country is 
not  foreseen)  (ERRU  working  group,  2011).    Once  the  system  is  completed,  there 
appears  to  be  support  for  extending  it  to  allow  roadside  officers  to  access  the 
information during checks.  

6.3.2.  Administrative cooperation and coordination 

Under  Regulation  1071/2009,  Article  18,  Member  States  are  obliged  to  exchange 
information via national contact points (designated contact points who are responsible 
for  the  exchange  of  information  with  other  Member  States)  on  infringements  and  on 
transport  managers  declared  to  be  unfit.    Article  18  further  requires  that  Member 
States  forward  to  the  Commission  the  names  and  addresses  of  the  national  contact 
points by 4 December 2011.  As of July 2015, only Portugal had not provided contact 
details39.  

Article 24 of Regulation 1071/2009 further states that Member States shall “cooperate 
closely  and  shall  give  each  other  mutual  assistance  for  the  purposes  of  applying  this 
Regulation.    They  shall  exchange  information  on  convictions  and  penalties  for  any 

39  The 

latest 

list  of  contact  points 

is  available  on 

the  Commission  website  at 

http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/road/access/doc/list-of-national-contact-points.pdf 

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serious  infringements,  and  other  specific  information  liable  to  have  consequences  for 
the  pursuit  of  the  occupation  of  road  transport  operator,  in  compliance  with  the 
provisions  applicable  to  the  protection  of  personal  data.”    Finally,  mutual  assistance 
under Article 11 of Regulation 1072/2009 calls for Member States to assist each other 
with monitoring and to exchange information.  

According  to  Article  26  of  Regulation  1071/2009,  Member  States  should  include  in 
their monitoring  reports  an  overview  of  exchanges  of  information  with  other  Member 
States pursuant to Article 18(2).  This should detail in particular the annual number of 
established infringements notified to other Member States and the replies received, as 
well as the annual number of requests and replies received pursuant to Article 18(3).  
According  to  the  first  monitoring  report,  some  Member  States  such  as  Cyprus, 
Lithuania,  Malta,  the  Czech  Republic,  the  Netherlands  and  Slovakia  indicated  that 
there  was  no  exchange  of  information  (European  Commission,  2014a).    Information 
was exchanged in Bulgaria, Estonia, France, Ireland, Poland, Romania and Spain.  No 
further  details  are  given  in  the  official  monitoring  report,  so  further  information  was 
sought from stakeholders.   

The  limited  quantitative  data  that  could  be  retrieved  is  shown  in  Table  6-6,  which 
shows  the  estimated  number  of  additional  checks  and  infringements  that  were 
possible as a result of cooperation with other Member States.  The share of the total 
number  of  checks  of  infringements  conducted  as  a  result  of  tip-offs  from  other 
Member  States  ranged  from  zero  in  Denmark  to  33%  in  Luxembourg,  whereas  the 
number  of  additional  infringements  reached  as  high  as  16%  of  all  infringements 
(Bulgaria).   

Table  6-6:  Estimated  number  of  checks  of  compliance  with  Regulation 
1071/2009 conducted due to information provided by other Member States 

Member State 

% of total number of checks that 
were conducted as a result of 
information from other Member 
States 

Detected infringements as a 
result of information from 
other Member States 

Romania 

Bulgaria 

Netherlands 

Denmark 

Luxembourg 

Germany 

7% 

17% 

16% 

0% 

33% 

1% 

No data 

16% of all infringements 

22 additional infringements 
found  

0 

5% of all infringements 

3 additional infringements found  

Source: Survey of enforcement authorities  

This indicates that at least in some Member States, the effectiveness of enforcement 
has been improved due to cooperation with other Member States, and there has been 
some progress towards achieving the objectives of the Regulations.  At the same time, 
the data strongly suggests that implementation and progress towards achieving more 
cooperative and effective enforcement is unequal across the Member States.     

Qualitative  responses  received  from  the  ministries  survey  (Figure  6-11)  indicate  that 
55%  of  respondents  felt  there  had  been  a  significant  or  slight  positive  impact  of  the 
Regulations  on  cooperation  between  enforcement  authorities  in  different  Member 
States,  whereas  no  respondents  felt  that  it  had  worsened  cooperation.  Respondents 
from  the  EU-13  returned  somewhat  more  positive  responses  overall.    The  Belgian 
ministry  commented  positively  that  there  was  almost  no  cooperation  prior  to  the 
Regulation  1071/2009,  and  considers  that  the  Regulation  has  contributed  to 
improvements in this area.   

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Figure 6-11: Responses to the question: How would you describe the effect of 
any  changes  as  a  result  of  Regulation  1071/2009  in  terms  of  improving 
cooperation between enforcement authorities in different Member States? 

Source: Survey of ministries (12 from the EU-15 and eight from the EU-13) 

Despite  the  positive  indications  from  these  qualitative  results,  it  is  also  clear  from 
Member State experiences that more work is required in this area.  In particular (and 
related to Evaluation Question 1), control of letterbox companies often involves cross-
border  situations  that  make  investigations  and  enforcement  more  difficult,  since  the 
Member  State  of  establishment  is  not  necessarily  the  one  that  is  affected  by  the 
activities of the letterbox company.    

As  a  specific  example  of  difficulties  in  ensuring  cooperation  between  Member  States, 
we  return  to  the  case  discussed  earlier  in  Evaluation  Question  1,  about  the  concerns 
over possible letterbox companies set up by Danish firms in Germany  (Parliamentary 
questions,  2013a).    During  interviews  conducted  for  this  study,  Danish  stakeholders 
were asked to expand on their experience.  A Danish trade union elaborated that there 
were  journalists  trying  to  go  investigate  the  issue  in  Flensburg,  who  sent  pictures  of 
the  letterbox  companies’  sites  to  the  Danish  administration:  they  claim  that  the 
photographs showed the establishment was a residential site, and that the information 
was  sent  to  the  Commission.  Their  understanding  of  the  most  recent  developments 
were  that  the  Commission  had  sent  a  letter  to  the  German  authorities,  who  in  turn 
had  confirmed  that  in  their  opinion  these  were  legitimate  hauliers  where  there  were 
actual  activities.    The  Danish  enforcement  authority  commented  that  they  must  rely 
on  the  German  authorities  for  further  information  in  this  case,  but  typically  they  do 
not receive any responses, although the further emphasised that they certainly did not 
blame their German counterparts.   

Respondents  to  the  surveys  have  provided  some  other  comments  on  problems  in 
gaining cooperation from other Member States in enforcement.  For example, the UK 
enforcer pointed out that some Member States are willing to authorise UK operators in 
their own  territory,  and  in  these cases  it  is very  difficult  to prove that  an  operator  is 
actually established in the UK when they have authority from another Member State.  
The  French  authorities  claimed  that  there  is  not  always  feedback  from  the  liaison 
offices of the various member countries.  Trade unions suggested in their coordinated 
response that the lack of administrative cooperation is due to a lack of political will in 
Member  States  rather  than  a  matter  of  legal  provisions.    Statistics  were  also  sought 
from enforcement authorities as to the frequency of contacts made with other Member 
States  concerning  the  enforcement  of  Regulation  1072/2009.    The  Polish  authority 
noted  that  in  2014,  one  of  the  Euro  Control  Route  “coordinated  control  weeks”  was 
devoted  to  performing  checks  of  cabotage.    The  Irish  authority  estimated  that  there 
had been 10 contacts in the last year and the Dutch authority stated that no contacts 
had  been  made.    All  other  authorities  could  not  provide  information  –  it  is  not  clear 
whether this indicates there were no contacts or if the data are not available.  Overall, 
the available data shows that cooperation is not being conducted in a systematic way. 

SDG (2013a) also noted that the exchange of information between Member States is 
still  too  weak  in  the  context  of  cabotage  enforcement.  This  makes  it  difficult  for  the 

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countries  of  establishment  of  road  hauliers  to  impose  sanctions  for  violations  of  EU 
rules  committed  abroad,  as  they  need  first  to  get  information  from  the  enforcement 
bodies  of  Member  States  hosting  cabotage  operations.  Moreover,  they  consider  that 
there is not sufficient exchange of best practices and lessons learnt  - a process that, 
at  present,  seems  not  to  be  effectively  coordinated  and  appears  to  rely  only  on  the 
willingness  of  each  single  enforcement  body  to  share  their  information  with  similar 
bodies  from  other  countries.    The  report  of  the  High  Level  Group  also  notes  the 
potential for cooperation to improve enforcement practices and calls for information to 
be  made  more  readily  available  between  national  authorities  and  that  operators 
participating in international operations and cabotage (Bayliss, 2012).  

Ministries  were  asked  about  how  the  minimum  requirements  for  administrative 
cooperation  across  borders  be  made  more  effective  or  efficient.    The  Danish,  French 
and  Irish  ministries  suggested  that  there  should  be  an  agreed  timeline  for  national 
points to respond to request from other Member States.  The Irish ministry further felt 
that there should also be an escalation protocol if this is not adhered to.   The same 
question  was  put  to  enforcement  authorities,  and  similar  suggestions  were  received.  
The Danish authority noted that it should be mandatory for Member States to answer 
inquiries and the Latvian authority suggested the development of a standard form for 
such  requests.    The  Romanian  and  Spanish  enforcement  authorities  considered  that 
administrative  cooperation  would  already  become  more  effective  under  ERRU.    The 
French  and  Dutch  enforcement  authorities  called  for  a  European  level  enforcement 
agency  to  coordinate  initiatives  and  share  best  practice  –  for  the  time  being  this  is 
carried  out  via  Euro  Control  Route  (ECR),  but  not  all  Member  States  participate.  The 
Irish  authority  also  mentioned  that  shared  training/ECR  exchanges  would  be 
beneficial.  

Although there appear to have been some benefits so far, it is clear that the progress 
on ensuring administrative cooperation has been uneven and is not working well for all 
Member States.  Good practices appear to be carried out in Bulgaria, the Netherlands 
took  place  and  additional 
and  Luxembourg,  where 
infringements were detected as a result.  In considering whether additional measures 
are needed, suggestions from stakeholders indicate that introducing timescales for the 
responses  to  requests  would  be  beneficial,  as  well  as  more  coordination  through 
European-level enforcement bodies such as ECR. 

information  exchanges 

6.3.3.  Summary and conclusions for Evaluation Question 3 

6.3.3.1. 

Conclusions 

It can be seen that the measures on administrative cooperation are still very much a 
work  in  progress,  and  as  a  result  the  benefits  to  date  have  been  hampered  by  the 
partial  functioning  of  the  system.    On  the  establishment  of  ERRU,  only  13  Member 
States  were  interconnected  in  2014,  despite  the  deadline  of  31  December  2012.  
Progress  has  been  rather  slow,  with  only  two  more  Member  States  connecting  as  of 
January  2015  (Belgium  and  Germany).    Many  of  the  difficulties  that  have  been 
reported are technical.   The incomplete implementation means that current levels of 
usage  are  rather  low  and  hence  its  contribution  to  achieving  the  objectives  of  the 
Regulation has been limited.   

Nevertheless, qualitative survey responses received from ministries indicate that there 
is  wide  support  for  full  interconnection.    Most  ministries  were  hopeful  that 
improvements  in  control  should  be  achieved  (Bulgaria,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Finland, 
France and Sweden), indicating a high level of support for the measures.  Responses 
from  trade  unions  and  industry  associations  also  urged  the  completion  of  ERRU  in 
order to facilitate control.   

Quantitative indicators of the status of cooperation suggest that information exchange 
is lacking in other areas.  Most enforcement authorities were not able to provide data 
on the number of checks they carried out as a result of information provided by other 

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Member  States,  or  indicated  that  it  was  rather  low  (Denmark,  Germany).    Good 
practices  appear  to  be  carried  out  in  Bulgaria,  the  Netherlands  and  Luxembourg, 
where  information  exchanges  took  place  and  additional  infringements  were  detected 
as a result. This shows that in some Member States, the effectiveness of enforcement 
has  been  improved  due  to  cooperation,  and  there  has  been  some  progress  towards 
achieving  the  objectives  of  the  Regulations  in  this  respect.    At  the  same  time,  the 
evidence  strongly  suggests  that  implementation  and  progress  is  unequal  across  the 
Member States.    Nevertheless, qualitative responses from national ministries indicate 
that  they  consider  the  current  situation  to  be  an  improvement  compared  to  the 
situation prior to the Regulations.   

Specific  examples  of  problems  in  achieving  cooperation  were  found  with  respect  to 
alleged  letterbox  companies  set  up  in  Germany  by  Danish  firms.    Comments  from 
ministries  in  other  Member  States  (UK  and  France),  which  seem  to  highlight  similar 
issues  to  do  with  the  difficulty  of  getting  information  confirmed.  The  lack  of 
information exchange has also been highlighted in the literature, which identifies this 
as contributing to the poor enforcement of cabotage rules.  

6.3.3.2. 

Recommendations 

Implementation  of  the  requirements  is  incomplete  for  both  the  measures  on 
interconnection  of  national  registers  and  cooperation  between  Member  States.    Yet 
there  is  generally  an  expectation  that,  when  the  systems  are  fully  connected,  the 
effectiveness of enforcement will be improved.  Taken in this context, the study team 
recommend  that  full  implementation  of  the  existing  provisions  is  prioritised.    Non-
connection  to  ERRU  is  not  just  a  problem  for  the  Member  States  that  are  not 
connected; until everyone is connected, the effectiveness of the system is undermined 
for  those  who  are,  since  they  have  no  notification  of  the  infringements  committed  in 
some Member States (i.e. there are network externalities).   

In  the  future,  additional  measures  such  as  requiring  ERRU  to  be  made  accessible  to 
roadside officers (as suggested by some stakeholders) could be considered.  The study 
team  consider  that  attempting  to  introduce  additional  measures  such  as  this  on  a 
mandatory basis while Member States are still experiencing technical difficulties would 
only exacerbate such problems, and hence recommend the priority should be to focus 
on  implementation  of  the  existing  provisions  instead.    Nevertheless,  making  ERRU 
accessible  to  roadside  officers  could  be  considered  at  a  national  level  by  interested 
authorities for implementation on a voluntary basis.   

A possible solution to the problem of insufficient coordination between Member States 
could be to involve more coordination from a central authority.  The French and Dutch 
ministries  suggested  a  European  control  agency  for  road  transport  could  allow 
coordinated initiatives and sharing of best practices.  Experiences to date in with the 
activities of Euro Control Route (ECR) were reviewed positively by several respondents 
to  the  enforcement  survey  (Ireland,  Netherlands,  and  France).    This  indicates  that 
either  greater  participation  in  ECR  or  a  separate  European  control  agency  would  be 
helpful  (ECR  is  voluntary  and  not  all  Member  States  are  involved).    In  our  view, 
encouraging  greater  participation  in  ECR  would  be  beneficial  given  the  positive 
experiences of participating Member States.  However, setting up a European control 
agency  as  a  mandatory  instrument  would  not  be  a  first  choice  and  should  be 
considered  further  in  the  frame  of  an  Impact  Assessment.    This  is  because 
enforcement has historically been  the competence of Member States and it would be 
politically difficult to justify moving away from this position.  

Cooperation  is  particularly  important  in  enforcement  that  requires  cross-border 
investigations, such as in the case of letterbox companies and also cabotage. In order 
to identify more precisely what provisions could be included in additional guidance or 
more  detailed  rules,  a  review  of  literature  was  carried  out  to  find  any  parallel 
examples from other legislation.  The issue of cooperation has come up in other areas 
as  well,  and  experience  shows  that  Member  States  so  far  have  taken  few  steps  to 

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the  Enforcement  Directive  of 

prevent  letterbox  companies  incorporated  in  that  Member  State  being  misused  for 
activities  in  other  Member  States40  (Sørensen,  2015).    These  problems  have  been 
recognised  and  as  such,  introducing  better  cooperation  was  one  of  the  objectives 
underlying 
the  Posting  of  Workers  Directive 
(2014/67/EU).  Normally the Member State where the posting takes place would start 
the  investigation.  However,  clearly  this  Member  State  may  have  difficulties  in 
conducting  the  investigation  on  its  own  as  the  investigation  requires  identification  of 
the activities taking place in the Member State in which the company is formed.  Thus, 
the  Directive  requires  Member  States  to  collaborate  on  these  investigations.  Article 
7(5)  of  the  Directive  allows  Member  States  to  request  the  Member  State  of 
establishment  “…  to  provide  information  as  to  the  legality  of  the  service  provider’s 
establishment,  the  service  provider’s  good  conduct,  and  the  absence  of  any 
infringement of the applicable rules.” 

The Enforcement Directive of the Posting of Workers Directive (2014/67/EU) provides 
a good and transferable example of a potential solution, since it targets cooperation in 
multiple  ways.    Member  States  are  urged  to  try  to  identify  who  is  behind  such 
letterbox  companies.  The  Directive  also  suggests  strengthening  enforcement  of 
sanctions  across  borders41.  It  requires  Member  States  to  collaborate  under  Article 
7(5), where one Member State can request the Member State of establishment “… to 
provide  information  as  to  the  legality  of  the  service  provider’s  establishment,  the 
service provider’s good conduct, and the absence of any infringement of the applicable 
rules.”  

The  Impact  Assessment  for  the  Enforcement  Directive  of  the  Posting  of  Workers 
Directive  assesses  precisely  the  administrative  burdens  of  cooperation  requirements.  
In this context, no significant administrative burdens were found for the requirements 
for  cooperation.    The  main  argument  of  the  revisions  is  that  increased  regulatory 
certainty  and  cooperation  between  Member  States  will  create  positive  effects  on  the 
development  of  the  single  market.    The  costs  are  considered  to  be  “relatively  small 
and  well-contained  while  the  benefits  are  significant.  The  identified  administrative 
burden  for  public  authorities  implied  by  improved  information  is  very  low  or  even 
meaningless for the majority of Member States. However, such action is instrumental 
in  reducing  the  probability  of  non-compliance  with  national  law.”  (European 
Commission, 2012b).   

Since  the  recommendations  of  this  study  are  to  follow  closely  the  revisions  to  the 
Directive, it is logical that the cost assessment will be similar and that there will not be 
substantial additional costs.   

The  benefit  of  improved  cooperation  would  be  a  general  improvement  of  the 
enforcement of the Regulations.  In particular, since detection of letterbox companies 
is particularly reliant on cross-border enforcement, it would result in a more effective 
control  and  reduction  of  letterbox  companies.    As  already  discussed  in  Evaluation 
Question 1, letterbox companies entail significant costs for industry and Member State 
authorities. It is also worth noting that the establishment of the electronic register and 
interconnection  to  ERRU  were  identified  as  the  most  significant  implementation  cost 
category  by  respondents  to  the  ministry  survey  (see  Evaluation  Question  9  for 
quantification  of  the  costs).    However,  these  are  sunk  costs–  hence  actions  that 

40 With a few exceptions: for example, according to Sørensen (2015), the UK wants to make a 
greater  effort  to  prevent  UK  letterbox  companies  from  being  used  for  different  types  of 
abuse, and likewise the Netherlands seem to take steps to avoid Dutch letterbox companies 
from being used for tax speculation. 

41  E.g.  Recital  42  of  the  preamble  states  that  in  cases  where  a  service  provider  is  not  really 
established  in  the  Member  State  in  which  the  company  is  formed,  Member  States  should 
investigate the matter to further establish the identity of the natural person or legal person 
who is responsible for the posting 

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improve  the  effectiveness  of  the  system  that  do  not  incur  significant  additional  costs 
should result in the cost-effectiveness/efficiency of the system being improved overall.   

Cross-checking  this  viewpoint  in  the  literature  shows  that  other  studies  also 
recommend increasing cooperation between different government bodies and amongst 
Member  States  as  a  means  of  improving  cost-effectiveness,  e.g.  ICF  (2014)  and 
Bayliss  (2012),  which  supports  the  view  that  such  measures  would  be  proportionate 
and improve cost-effectiveness overall.   

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6.4.  Effectiveness:  To  what  extent  have  the  Regulations  contributed 
to the smooth functioning of the internal market for road transport?  

To  what  extent  have  the  Regulations  contributed  to  the  smooth  functioning  of  the 
internal  market  for  road  transport?  Among  others,  to  what  extent  have  the 
provisions  on  cabotage  helped  to  integrate  the  internal  market  for  road  transport 
and  facilitate  the  access  of  non-resident  hauliers  to  national  markets?  To  what 
extent  have  the  Regulations  contributed  to  reducing  the  number  of  letterbox 
companies?  How  do  the  results  compare  between  different  EU  Member  States  and 
regions (i.e. EU15 and EU12)? How do the results compare to the state of play prior 
to  the  adoption  of  the  Regulations?  Have  the  Regulations  lead  to  any  unintended 
negative and/ or positive effects with regards to competition on the road transport 
market? 

6.4.1.  Provisions on cabotage 

6.4.1.1. 

Harmonisation of national cabotage rules 

Although the market for cabotage has been increasing (as described in Section 5.2.1), 
its  overall  volumes  are  small  compared  to  total  EU  road  transport.    The  ability  of 
Member  States  joining  the  EU  after  2004  to  perform  cabotage  was  previously 
governed  by  temporary  restrictions  set  at  national  level  through  pre-accession 
treaties.    These  effectively  limited  cabotage  activities  for most  EU-13 Member  States 
until  2009,  with  restrictions  for  Bulgaria  and  Romania  continuing  until  2012  in  most 
cases.  Hence the strong growth in cabotage activity in recent years is in part due to 
the lifting of special transitional restrictions. 

Regulation  1072/2009  was  implemented  to  replace  a  patchwork  of  national  rules  on 
access to the international road haulage market.  The revisions were intended to result 
in clearer rules, which would help to integrate the internal market and facilitate access 
by non-resident hauliers by ensuring more harmonised conditions of access.  That is, 
Regulation  1072/2009  was  intended  make  the  conduct  of  cabotage  and  its 
enforcement  easier  by  reducing  fragmentation  of  the  internal  market  (increasing 
harmonisation),  but  it  was  not  intended/expected  to  increase  the  overall  volumes  of 
cabotage  (over  and  above  that  being  achieved  by  lifting  temporary  restrictions  as 
described in the previous paragraph) (European Commission, 2007a).   

Council  Regulation  3118/93  was  the  legal  basis  for  cabotage  prior  to  Regulation 
1072/2009.    It  stated  that  any  non-resident  hauliers  holding  a  Community 
authorisation  provided  for  in  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  881/92  were  entitled  to 
operate, on a temporary basis, national road haulage services in another MS, without 
having  a  registered  office  or  other  establishment  in  that  Member  State.  However,  it 
had no definition of “a temporary basis”.  This created uncertainty among operators in 
the transport sector as to the exact scope of the cabotage operations, and there was a 
lack of harmonisation in terms of interpretation across Europe.  Some Member States 
did  not  add  any  specific  provisions  to  clarify  “temporary”,  others  applied  additional 
specifications.  For  example  in  2004,  Italy  limited  cabotage  operations  to  15  days  a 
month  for  a  maximum  of  five  consecutive  days,  whereas  France  restricted  cabotage 
for one vehicle to a limit of not more than 10 consecutive days, nor more than 15 days 
in any 60 day period (SDG, 2013a). 

Regulation 1072/2009 clarified the temporary nature of cabotage as being up to three 
cabotage operations within a seven-day period starting the day after the unloading of 
the international transport.  These requirements had not been included in the previous 
rules. The responses from national ministries indicate that the rules are a step in the 
right  direction:  National  ministries  were  asked  whether  they  felt  the  Regulation  had 
clarified the definition of the temporary nature of cabotage, and whether the rules had 

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helped  to  ensure  common  rules.    Both  questions  received  at  least  90%  positive 
responses, with strong support from respondents in both EU-15 and EU-13 countries.   

Figure 6-12: Responses from national ministries to the question: How would 
you describe the effect of any changes as a result of Regulation 1072/2009, 
compared to the situation prior to when it entered into force? 

Source: survey of ministries (12 respondents from EU-15 and 8 from EU-13) 

Trade  unions  in  their  joint  response  to  the  high  level  survey  also  agreed  that 
Regulation  1072/2009  had  helped  to  clarify  the  temporary  nature  of  cabotage  and 
ensure more common rules, but felt the main problem was in the lack of enforcement 
(as discussed in Evaluation Question 2).  

Several  industry associations  however in their coordinated response to the high level 
survey  highlighted  the  remaining  difficulties  concerning  the  interpretations  of  the 
cabotage  rules.  They  considered  that  there  was  a  lack  of  clarity  around  what 
constitutes  a  cabotage  trip,  i.e.  how  freight  with  different  destinations  (multi-drops) 
should  be  counted;  how  to  calculate  the  7  day  period;  how  to  apply  the  Posting  of 
Workers  Directive;  and  called  for  improvements  to  documentation.  A  summary  of 
variations  in  interpretation  in  selected  Member  States  is  shown  in  Annex  A  (Section 
9.5.1) and key points are discussed further below.  

Moreover, the lack of clarity in the legal provisions of the Regulation is evidenced by 
the  need  for  the  Commission  to  issue  further  clarifications  soon  after  the  provisions 
came  into  force.  In  in  2011,  the  Commission  organised  a  committee  meeting  to 
discuss  the  main  critical  points,  and  subsequently  published  a  “frequently  asked 
questions” note that provided guidelines for interpretation of key areas.   

National ministries consulted for this study were also asked specifically about areas in 
which  the  guidelines  were  considered  unclear.    The  responses,  shown  in  Figure  6-13 
suggest  that  there  is  still  confusion  over  many  of  the  provisions.    The  provision  that 
stands out in particular as having a high number of respondents identifying “significant 
ambiguities” is how to count the number of operations when there are several loading 
and  unloading  points  (multi-drops);  however,  all  of  the  provisions  attracted  at  least 
some responses that they were unclear.  

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Figure  6-13:  Responses  to  the  ministries  survey:  In  your  view  are  the 
European Commission’s guidelines clear in the following areas? 

Source: Survey of Member State ministries (N=18) 

When  asked  to  specify  the  areas  that  needed  further  guidance,  respondents  to  the 
survey  identified:  multi-drops,  i.e.  several  loading  and  unloading  points,  (Poland, 
Ireland),  documentation  issues  (Poland,  France,  and  Ireland),  the  7-day  period 
(Poland); combined transport (Netherlands, Ireland). 

As  previously  mentioned  in  Evaluation  Question  2,  61%  of  respondents  to  the 
enforcers’  survey  identified  a  lack  of  clarity  in  provisions  as  a  contributing  factor  to 
difficulties in enforcement. The French authority identified ambiguities with respect to 
provisions such as multi-drops, the number of operations and the start of a period of 
cabotage,  the  differences  in  interpretation  and  the  heterogeneity  of  controls  in  other 
Member  States.    The  respondent  from  the  Netherlands  highlighted  that  the 
determination  of  the  date  and  the  place  of  entry  in  the  country  is  also  considered  a 
problem, as well as the number of journeys in relation to loading and unloading in the 
Member  State.  Respondents  from  the  Netherlands  and  Ireland  also  pointed  out 
ambiguity as to whether an operator is permitted to produce documentation to show 
compliance with cabotage rules after a roadside check. 

This  chapter  will  further  develop  on  problems  of  multi-drops  and  empty  containers, 
while  issues  of  7-days  period,  unclear  documentation  are  discussed  under  Evaluation 
Questions  2  (Section  6.2.2)  and  combined  transport  is  discussed  in  Evaluation 
Questions 12 (Section 6.12.4). 

The  number  of  operations  is  counted  when  there  are  several  loading  and  unloading 
points  (multi-drops)  is  interpreted  differently  across  Member  States.    The  position 
from  the  Commission  stated  in  the  clarification  document42  is  that  “a  cabotage 
operation  can  involve  several  loading  points,  several  delivery  points  or  even  several 
loading  and  delivery  points,  as  the  case  may  be”.  That  is,  the  Commission  considers 
that  Article  8  of  Regulation  1072/2009  does  not  set  a  maximum  number  of  loading 
and/or unloading operations within the course of the same cabotage operation. 

According  to  an  interview  with  a  Swedish  association,  the  practice  of  transporting 
cargo from different clients is extremely common, making these differing requirements 
confusing.  Restricting the maximum number of loading and/or unloading operations in 
a cabotage operation also restricts the possibility for non-resident hauliers to organise 

42 

http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/road/haulage/doc/qa_the_new_cabotage_regime_201
1.pdf 

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their transport operations. Some countries such as Sweden allow several loading and 
unloading  points  per  operation  (which  is  the  same  interpretation  the  European 
Commission has given to Regulation 1071/2009).  Germany takes the view that each 
loading point or each client counts as one operation (HK Hamburg, 2015).  In France, 
partial  loading/unloading  is  regarded  as  a  cabotage  operation  (SDG,  2013a). 
According  to  the  Danish  interpretation,  cabotage  can  include  several  loading  or 
unloading places, but not both - in light of this, the Commission sent a letter of formal 
notice to the Danish Government because according to the definition laid down by the 
Commission,  a  cabotage  operation  can  include  several  loading  as  well  as  unloading 
places (Parlimentary questions, 2015). 

This  issue  has  previously  been  identified  in  the  literature  as  well.    The  AECOM  study 
(2014a)  found  similar  issues  when  they  asked  14  organisations  from  13  member 
states whether a single load with three delivery locations for a single customer within 
their state would constitute a single cabotage movement, three cabotage movements 
or  something  else.  In  10  Member  States  this  would  constitute  one  cabotage 
movement, in France it would constitute three cabotage movements if there are three 
consignment notes. In Estonia it would depend on the number of consignment notes, 
whereas the Romanian road haulage association stated that this was not specified by 
any  legal  requirement.    Therefore,  it  appears  that  some  in  some  Member  States  the 
number  of  consignment  notes  is  seen  as  equivalent  to  the  number  of  cabotage 
movements  where  as  in  others  the  number  of  loading  or  unloading  points  is  seen  as 
defining  the  number  of  cabotage  movements.    SDG  (2013a)  also  found  substantial 
variation in the interpretation of cabotage provisions.  

A further issue of contention is the transport of empty containers and empty returns 
(pallets,  flower  transport  stands  or  the  like).    Currently  this  does  not  give  access  to 
legally perform cabotage operations in Denmark, since they are not considered to be 
goods  for  consumption,  sale,  or  manufacture.    In  the  Commission  response  to  a 
question raised by Danish stakeholders, it is noted that “the international transport of 
empty  containers  and  pallets  with  the  only  purpose  of  justifying  a  subsequent 
cabotage  operation  would  not  be  in  line  with  the  regulation  since  the  transport 
operator  might  not  be  able  to  produce  clear  evidence  of  the  incoming  international 
carriage based on a contract of the sender and the haulier”. (Parliamentary questions, 
2012).  

By  contrast,  according  to  an  interview  conducted  for  this  study  with  a  Romanian 
enforcement  agency,  empty  pallets  will  count  as  a  transport  operation  in  Romania  if 
they  are  described  in  the  CMR  document,  otherwise  the  vehicle  will  be  considered 
empty.    According  to  the  German  ministry  interviewed  for  this  study,  the  operation 
must be an "economic activity"; there is however no threshold/guidelines on how full 
the  truck  has  to  be  loaded.      A  summary  of  how  other  Member  States  interpret  the 
carriage of empty pallets is provided in Annex A (Section 9.5.1). 

The  AECOM  (2014a)  study  found  that  transport  of  empty  pallets  did  not  count  as 
cabotage  in  Denmark  and  the  UK.  They  further  report  that  Transport  en  Logistiek 
Vlaanderen (TLV – Belgium) and Transport en Logistiek Nederland (TLN - Netherlands) 
felt  that  if  the  movement  was  to  order  then  it  should  count  as  cabotage,  if  it  was 
owned  by  the  transport  company  or  as  part  of  a  pallet  exchange  then  it  should  not. 
This  view  is  shared  by.  AEBTRI  of  Bulgaria  and  FNTR  of  France  stated  that  this 
situation was interpreted as meaning the inbound international operation had not yet 
finished so would not count as cabotage but a cabotage load could not be taken until 
this  operation  had  finished.  Sveriges  Åkeriföretag  (The  Swedish  Association  of  Road 
Transport Companies) felt that they were not sure but could see no reason as to why 
this  wouldn’t  be  treated  as  a  cabotage  operation.    Respondents  from  Romania, 
Germany,  Czech  Republic  and  Ireland  felt  that  this  did  not  constitute  a  cabotage 
movement.  

In  terms  of  the  actual  outcomes  therefore,  the  situation  is  certainly  improved 
compared to the patchwork of systems in place prior to the Regulations.  Nonetheless, 

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there  are  still  some  varying  interpretations  of  the  specific  provisions  among  Member 
States.  This  situation  makes  it  clear  that,  although  Regulation  1072/2009  is 
considered broadly among stakeholders to be a step in the right direction, the process 
of ensuring common rules is not complete.  The differences in interpretations indicate 
that the Regulation has not fully achieved its operational objectives to introduce more 
harmonised rules on cabotage, and suggests there is a lack of clarity in the provisions 
despite the efforts to improve them.     

6.4.1.2. 

Cabotage and imbalances of supply and demand 

According  to  stakeholder  responses  to  a  public  consultation  carried  out  by  the 
Commission,  seasonal  peaks  reportedly  occur  in  various  sectors,  such  as  agricultural 
demands  for  seeds,  fertiliser,  lime,  grain  storage  etc;  Christmas  shopping  and 
product-related peaks (European Commission, 2013a). In cases where subcontracting 
to domestic hauliers is not sufficient or cost-effective, cabotage restrictions may have 
an  impact  on  the  use  of  foreign  hauliers  and  thereby  limit  market  efficiency. 
Restrictions  may  also  affect  specialised  sectors  such  as  oversized  transport,  where 
operations may take more than seven days.   

This  possible  impact  of  seasonable  peaks  and  cabotage  restrictions  was  not  strongly 
reflected in the responses from ministries to the survey for this study.  The majority of 
Member  States  consulted  for  this  study  (13)43  felt  that  there  were  no  imbalances  of 
supply  and  demand  created  by  the  cabotage  provisions.    Most  others  provided  no 
opinion  (Cyprus,  Finland,  Luxembourg,  and  Sweden).  Ireland  and  the  UK  mention 
specific  problems  with  movement  of  new  cars  and  vans  during  the  peak  registration 
periods.    According  to  the  Irish  ministry,  this  requires  additional  transporters  from 
other Member States and therefore cabotage restrictions must be temporarily lifted to 
accommodate this specific operation. The UK ministry reports that national legislation 
has  been  amended  to  accommodate  the  peak  registration  periods  during  March  and 
September,  which  results  in  a  relaxation  of  the  cabotage  rules  for  non-GB  car 
transporters  during  the  periods  each  year.  According  to  a  DfT  report,  the  European 
Commission has confirmed that a Member State may selectively relax cabotage rules 
providing  that  the  relaxation  is  done  in  a  way  that  does  not  discriminate  between 
other  Member  States  (DfT,  2012),  and  the  Commission’s  own  report  confirms  that 
they were required to take an accommodating stance (European Commission, 2013a). 
The  ministry  from  Belgium  felt  that  small  countries  were  disadvantaged  because  a 
haulier can easily bypass these limitations by performing a new international transport 
after the three cabotage operations.   

In  the  event  of  “serious  disturbance(s)  of  the  national  transport  market”  that  occur 
due to (or are aggravated by) cabotage, Regulation 1072/2009 permits governments 
to refer to the Commission with a view to adopting safeguard measures, as per Article 
10(1). According to SDG (2013a), stakeholders from local industry groups in the Port 
of  Rotterdam  and  local  governments  in  the  Italian  region  of  Friuli  have  asked  their 
national governments to apply in order to protect their regional markets, but to date it 
appears that no Member States have requested an official safeguard procedure.   

When  asked  whether  they  felt  these  provisions  were  still  required,  Member  State 
responses were split – with nine Member States in favour of keeping them (Belgium, 
Croatia,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Sweden,  Italy)  and  five  in 
favour  of  dropping  them  (Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Ireland  [in  view  of  further 
liberalisation],  Lithuania,  Poland).    Those  in  favour  of  keeping  the  provisions  noted 
that  distortions  created  by  cabotage  are  a  highly  sensitive  matter  and  that  the 
provisions  should  be  kept  in  place  just  in  case.    Those  in  favour  of  dropping  the 
provisions commented that no clear definition on serious disturbance(s) of the national 

43   Austria,  Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Estonia,  France,  Germany,  Latvia, 

Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Italy. 

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transport  market  is  provided  and  considered  the  cabotage  provisions  were  already 
appropriate.  

The  responses  from  ministries  outlined  above  to  the  effect  that  in  most  cases  there 
are  no  serious  imbalances  in  supply  and  demand,  seem  to  indicate  that  this  is  not 
considered a major issue.  Specialised cases in the UK and Ireland involving seasonal 
peaks in new vehicle registrations have been dealt with through temporary relaxation 
of the cabotage rules during these periods.  

6.4.1.3. 

Efficiency of transport operations 

The current rules under Regulation 1072/2009 offer more flexibility than the previous 
ones  adopted  in  199344,  and  this  was  intended  to  support  the  goal  to  reduce  high 
levels of empty running.  Theoretically, removing or reducing restrictions should make 
it  easier  for  hauliers  to  combine  loads  and  use  return  trips  for  carrying  goods  rather 
than running empty.  Therefore, one of the objectives of the rules on cabotage was to 
reduce  empty  running  and  allow  for  improved  efficiency/environmental  impact  of 
transport operations (see the intervention logic, Figure 2-1).  

Eurostat data show that the levels of empty running in the Union have indeed reduced 
substantially after the cabotage restrictions on new Member States were lifted in 2009 
and  2012,  and  segments  exposed  to  competition  (cross-trade  and  bilateral 
international haulage) have much lower levels of empty running compared to market 
segments  with  restrictions  (e.g.  cabotage)  (European  Commission,  2014b).  In  the 
report on the state of the union road transport market, the Commission reason that, 
since  cabotage  trips  usually  involve  general  cargo  carried  out  with  curtain-sided 
trailers  or  containers,  the  high  level  of  empty  running  is  not  likely  to  be  due  to 
difficulties  in  finding  return  loads,  but  rather  due  to  the  restrictions  applicable  to 
cabotage  (European  Commission,  2014b).    This  reasoning  is  supported  by  some 
stakeholder  such  as  CLECAT,  a  freight  forwarder  association.  CLECAT  agrees  that 
there are still some restrictions on cabotage movements that lead to inefficiencies that 
may force operators to travel with empty vehicles, or prevent them from loading their 
vehicles  in  an  optimal  way  (CLECAT,  2013b).  Sternberg  et  al  (2014)  recognises  an 
inefficiency  under  the  current  regulations  is  that  a  haulier  first  has  to  complete  an 
international  trip  before  carrying  out  cabotage.    This  will  often  lead  to  unnecessary 
empty running, since the haulier is not allowed to pick up goods until the international 
trip is completed.   

Responses  from  the  different  stakeholder  groups  consulted  for  this  study  were 
contradictory.  Trade unions responding to the high level survey were of the view that 
there  was  no  material  effect  on  levels  of  empty  running.    Industry  associations 
provided  mixed  responses  with  no  clear  overall  agreement  on  whether  the  rules  had 
positive  or  detrimental  effects.    Responses  from  ministries  showed  that  the  overall 
impacts  are  difficult  to  discern,  with  45%  of  respondents  reporting  that  they  did  not 
know  if  the  rules  had  affected  empty  running.  20%  of  ministries  participating  in  the 
survey felt there had been no material effect, whereas 30% felt there had been some 
positive effect on reducing empty running.  

Undertakings  consulted  for  this  study  reported  an  overall  positive  opinion  that  the 
requirements  had  allowed  them  to reduce empty  running  when  looked at  as a whole 
(Figure  6-14).    Out  of  75  respondents,  47%  reported  a  significant  or  slight  positive 
effect,  compared  to  15%  reporting  a slight  or  significant  negative effect.  The  sample 
size is not large enough to be able to conclude on impacts at the European level, but 
when  quantitative  data  was  explored  more  in  interviews  with  undertakings,  the 
responses  varied  very  widely  -  indicating  a  diverse  range  of  impacts  on  businesses.  

44  Where  previously  Member  States  could  prevent  an  undertaking  from  performing  cabotage 

during one year after one month of cabotage operations. 

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For instance, a Polish haulier estimated that they had been able to reduce empty runs 
by  30%.  A  German  undertakings  felt  that  they  were  limited  by  the  restrictions 
applicable  to  cabotage  operations,  and  unable  to  organise  their  transport  operations 
efficiently, hence empty running had increased.   

Figure 6-14: Responses from undertakings to the question: what impact have 
the cabotage rules had in terms of allowing you to reduce empty running? 

Source: Survey of undertakings (49 respondents from EU-15 and 25 from EU-13) 

Existing  literature  provided  mixed  evidence  as  to  whether  or  not  cabotage  can 
increase  fill  rates.    Studies  have  shown  both  positive  environmental  impacts  from 
cabotage  (KiM,  2010;  Fernández,  2014)  and  negative  ones  (Ministerie  van 
Infrastructuur  en  Milieu,  2013;  Sternberg,  2013).    The  studies  indicating  a  negative 
impact  point  out  that  the  potential  modal  shift  or  increased  transport  demand  as  a 
result of lower prices could offset any positive environmental impacts.  A discussion of 
the potential impacts of cabotage on prices is discussed further in Evaluation Question 
5 (see Section 6.5.2).  A field study that tracked truck movements in Denmark based 
on 8,000 volunteers also did not suggest that cabotage improved fill rates (Sternberg 
et al, 2014).   

Overall, it seems that the relevance of cabotage to targeting environmental goals in a 
significant  way  is  questionable,  but  it  probably  does  not  have  substantial  negative 
impacts either.  Responses from trade unions, associations and ministries were mixed, 
with a large share of respondents from ministries indicating that they did not know – 
this  implies  that  the  effects,  if  any,  are  difficult  to  detect  and  measure.    Responses 
from undertakings indicate that on balance, they view the rules on cabotage as having 
a positive effect on fill rates even if the impacts on individual firms are very diverse.  
However, the literature suggests that even if fill rates are improving, overall emissions 
may  not  decrease  due  to  rebound  behaviour  (due  to  lower  prices  –  see  Evaluation 
Question 5) or modal shift.   

6.4.2.  Harmonisation of requirements on access to the profession (Regulation 
1071/2009)  

The contributions of the Regulations to the smooth functioning of the internal market 
can also be described in terms of ensuring common rules for access to the profession.  
The  level  of  harmonisation  has  important  implications  for  the  smooth  functioning  of 
the  internal  market,  as  without  common  rules  there  is  a  risk  that  firms  located  in 
Member States with lower standards will gain a competitive advantage over firms that 
are  more  efficient.      Harmonisation  of  enforcement  is  also  of  relevance  to  the 
functioning  of  the  internal  market  (this  has  already  been  assessed  in  Evaluation 
Question 2). 

There  is  some  support  from  stakeholders  on  the  achievements  of  the  Regulations  in 
terms of ensuring common rules (Figure 6-15).  The majority (65%) of Member State 
ministries consulted for this study reported that they felt the Regulations had resulted 
in significant or slight positive impacts in this regard, although one-third reported that 

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they felt there was no material impact.  Only the respondent from Germany indicated 
a  negative  effect  although  they  did  not  substantiate  their  answer.    The  respondents 
from the EU-13 show an overall more positive view on the effects.  

Figure 6-15: Responses to the question: How would you describe the effect of 
Regulation 1071/2009 in terms of ensuring common rules* on access to the 
profession, compared to the situation prior to when it entered into force? 

*i.e.  ensuring  common  rules  on  requirements  for  establishment  /  good  repute  /  financial 
standing / professional competence 
Source: Survey of ministries (11 respondents from EU-15, 9 respondents from EU-13 countries)  

The following sections provide a detailed review of the comparability of the individual 
requirements between Member States.  

6.4.2.1. 

Stable and effective establishment 

Prior to the introduction of Regulation 1071/2009, each Member State imposed its own 
conditions  on  road  undertakings  wishing  to  establish  themselves  on  its  territory.  The 
previous levels of variation created a risk that undertakings would choose to locate in 
Member  States  where  the  requirements  were  lower,  but  without  having  a  real 
operational base and office in the country of registration (establishment country). This 
previously resulted in competitive distortion, difficulties with checking compliance with 
road safety and social rules and evasion of taxes (European Commission, 2007a).   

indicated 

in  Section  6,  minimum  requirements 

for  stable  and  effective 
As 
establishment  have  now  been  introduced  under  the  Regulation.  It  can  therefore  be 
concluded that the Regulation has contributed to ensuring that minimum requirements 
for  stable  and  effective  establishment  exist  in  Member  States,  as  compared  to  the 
situation  prior  to  the  Regulations.    There  are  some  differences  in  the  requirements 
between countries (e.g. the above-mentioned requirements for a parking space).   

The functioning of the internal market may be undermined if letterbox companies (i.e. 
those  without  stable  and  effective  establishment)  are  used  to  either  avoid  paying 
taxes in the Member State where they are due, or if they are used to avoid legislation 
in  a  Member  State.  The  extent  to  which  the  Regulations  have  contributed  to  the 
reduction of letterbox companies in practice was also assessed in Evaluation Question 
1,  where  it  was  concluded  that  there  was  likely  to  have  been  some  positive  effects, 
but  at  the  same  time  there  are  some  letterbox  companies  that  remain  in  existence.  
The  problems  that  led  to  the  continued  existence  of  letterbox  companies  were 
identified as being linked to the different application of the rules in practice, with the 
consequence  that  letterbox  companies  are  more  difficult  to  detect  and  are 
inconsistently controlled (see Evaluation Questions 1 and 2). 

6.4.2.2. 

Financial standing 

Regulation 1071/2009 sets minimum requirements for operators to demonstrate that 
they  have  a  sufficient  level  of  capital  and  reserves  at  their  disposal  to  support  their 
enterprise (€9,000 for the first vehicle and €5,000 for each subsequent vehicle).  The 
main  changes  to  national  rules  that  resulted  from  the  Regulation  appear  to  have 
involved  relatively  small  adjustments  to  the  minimum  capital  and  reserve 

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requirements per vehicle (e.g. in Finland, prior to Regulation 1071/2009, requirement 
for  financial  standing  was  €10,000  for  every  truck  and  €4,000  for  every  additional 
vehicle; in Italy, €50,000 was previously required for the first vehicle and €5,000 for 
each  additional  vehicle.    Both  countries  now  have  requirements  in  line  with  the 
thresholds in the Regulation).  

The previous Directive set the same financial thresholds as the Regulation; however at 
the time there was a lack of clarity as to what these amounts were intended to cover 
(European  Commission,  2007a).    This  had  previously  led  to  disparities  where  an 
undertaking deemed to satisfy the minimum requirement of financial standing in one 
Member  State  would  not  satisfy  it  in  another,  even  though  they  were  authorised  to 
operate on the same market.   

The  introduction  of  the  possibility  to  prove  financial  standing  by  means  of  a  bank 
guarantee  was  intended  to  give  the  assurance  that  financial  standing  is  permanently 
met,  avoid  regular  reporting  and  give  greater  security  for  creditors  (European 
Commission,  2007a).    National  ministries  are  permitted  to  agree  or  require  that  an 
undertaking  demonstrate  its  financial  standing  by  means  of  a  certificate  such  as  a 
bank guarantee or an insurance, instead of certified accounts.  Certified accounts and 
bank  guarantees  are  accepted  in  most  Member  States  with  few  exceptions 
(respectively Luxembourg45 and Lithuania).  The use of insurance is permitted in fewer 
countries,  for  example  including  Austria,  Germany,  Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Sweden and Italy (see Annex A, Section 9.5.3, for further details). 

The effectiveness of the harmonisation of the requirement was assessed in the course 
of the stakeholders' consultations. The continuing lack of harmonisation was raised as 
a  concern  by  industry  associations  in  their  coordinated  response  to  the  high  level 
survey  although  the  specific  comments  received  related  mainly  to  issues  of 
enforcement. 

Despite the efforts to improve the interpretation, a number of issues still seem to be 
unclear according to national ministries. When asked about any provisions that could 
lead to difficulties or inconsistencies in interpretation, a range of issues were identified 
by ministry respondents as follows: 

  The following terms used in the Regulation were considered unclear: 

o  What exactly is meant by professional insurance (Austria); 

o  What should be understood by the notion capital and reserves (Belgium, 

Finland, Germany); 

o  Who could be the mentioned duly accredited person having a right to 

certify the annual accounts of transport undertaking (Estonia); 

o  With regard to the bank guarantee, it is not clear who is to be declared 

on the guarantee (Germany, Italy, Slovakia); 

o  What liability needs to be covered by insurance (Latvia, Slovakia). 

  Article 13.1(c)46 needs to be clarified, and the derogation in Article 7.2 (i.e. 
permitting the use of bank guarantees, liability insurance etc) is unclear. 
(Ireland). 

 

It is undefined how a newly established enterprise has to prove its financial 
standing (Lithuania, Germany). 

45 The possibility of using certified annual accounts is currently being evaluated in Luxembourg 

46  A  time  limit  not  exceeding  6  months  where  the  requirement  of  financial  standing  is  not 

satisfied 

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 

Italy also reports that some of the difficulty is due to the divergent legal 
concepts of a guarantee laid down in national law, and a lack of corporate 
insurance policies at early stages (European Commission, 2014a). 

interaction  with  national 

The  diverse  responses  above  suggest  that  many  terms  used  in  the  Regulation  cause 
problems in interpretation for at least a few Member States. Since most of the terms 
were  only  mentioned  by  one  or  two  respondents,  this  suggests  the  problems  may 
arise  specifically  with  regard  to  the 
laws/business 
practices/translation.    For  example,  the  Finnish  respondent  explained  that  the  term 
“capital  and  reserves"  and  its  true  meaning  is  not  translated  very  well  in  the  Finnish 
translation of Regulation 1071/2009. This ambiguity has led to many inquiries by the 
auditors  on  what  they  should  include  in  the  "capital"  of  an  undertaking.  Finland 
interprets  this  to  mean  company's  own  capital,  which  is  contributed  by  the  owner  or 
entrepreneur of a business rather than the borrowed capital, which must be paid back 
(usually  with  interest).    The  German  authorities  report  that  the  requirements  of  the 
Regulation  has  not been  defined any  more  explicitly  in  the  German  law  and  is  hence 
interpreted differently across the different enforcement authorities leading to different 
practices  across  the  control  authorities.    They  explained  that  the  previous  version  of 
the  German  law  explicitly  stated  which  types  of  assets  and  reserves  were  accepted, 
which made the assessment of financial standing easier.   

The consequence of these differing interpretations is that the requirement of financial 
standing is not strictly harmonised across the EU.  As discussed previously, the level of 
harmonisation  has  important  implications  for  the  smooth  functioning  of  the  internal 
market, as without common requirements there is a risk that firms located in Member 
States  with  lower  standards  will  gain  a  competitive  advantage.    Areas  that  are 
considered  to  be  highly  uncertain  may  also  lead  to  additional  enforcement  costs  for 
authorities.    When  asked  about  possible  actions  to  address  these  difficulties  or 
inconsistencies, ministries suggested the following: 

  Provide examples for insurances (Austria); 

  Clarify what is meant by capital and reserves (Belgium, Finland); 

  Explanation of liability risks which should be covered by insurance to comply 

with financial standing requirements (Latvia); 

  Amendments to the Regulation (Ireland); 

  Guidance notes (Ireland); 

  Amend Article 7 regarding starting statements for new enterprises or interim 

statements if financial standing was changed (i.e. increased amounts of capital 
and reserves) (Latvia). 

This  indicates  a  wide  support  among  ministries  for  more  guidance  and  clarifications, 
with  fewer  respondents  calling  for  amendments  to  the  Regulation.    Specific 
recommendations are outlined in the summary to this section. 

6.4.2.3. 

Good repute 

Most  Member  States  confirmed  that  there  were  no  additional  requirements  for  good 
repute above those in the Regulations.  Variations from the core requirements of the 
Regulation  (as  permitted)  were  around  the  inclusion  of  offenses  against  national 
legislation (Estonia, UK, Italy and Sweden).  Member State must implement their own 
system of penalties and also a system to determine whether loss of good repute would 
constitute  a  disproportionate  response  –  the  variation  across  Member  States  were 
already assessed in Evaluation Question 2 (see Section 6.2).   

Regulation  1071/2009  provides  that  Member  States  must  take  into  account  any 
convictions  or  penalties  for  a  serious  infringement  when  assessing  good  repute.    In 
practice, Member States vary in whether they treat administrative fines, arrangements 
out of court and on-the-spot payments as “penalties”.  For example, Bulgaria, Croatia, 

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Cyprus  and  Luxembourg  do  not  consider  any  of  these  as  penalties.  Administrative 
fines are considered in the assessment of good repute in Austria, Sweden, Lithuania, 
Belgium,  Estonia,  Germany,  Poland  and  Latvia;  Arrangements  out  of  court  are 
considered  in  Denmark,  Germany,  Poland  and  Estonia;  On-the-spot  payments  are 
considered in France, Belgium, Finland, Germany and Poland.  Full details are given in 
Annex A (see Section 9.5.5).   

The  Belgian  ministry  explained  that,  since  the  Regulation  mentions  both  convictions 
and  penalties,  they  interpret  it  such  as not  only  convictions,  but  also  every  payment 
that  drops  the  criminal  prosecution  (such  as  on  the  spot  fines  and  administrative 
fines) must be taken into account. However, they recognise that some Member States 
have chosen to include convictions only. The respondent  from Belgium is of the view 
that  this  important  part  of  the  condition  of  good  repute  should  be  the  same  in  all 
Member States.  One industry association commented that companies may try to shift 
to  Member  States  with  a  lenient  interpretation  of  penalties,  but  that  “so  far  this 
problem has not been very visible, as a lot of MS are not yet connected to ERRU”.  

Article  15  of  Regulation  1071/2009  calls  for  Member  States  to  take  steps  to  ensure 
that  undertakings  have  the  possibility  of  appealing  against  the  loss  of  good  repute. 
Indications  from  enforcement  authorities  are  that  appeals  may  take  place  in  court 
(e.g. Denmark, Netherlands) or with the enforcers (Poland, Romania).  Full details are 
given in Annex A (see Section 9.5.6).   

Procedures  for  rehabilitation  after  a  loss  of  good  repute  are  not  prescribed  in  the 
Regulation, but Member States are required to specify the measures applicable in the 
event of the suspension of an authorisation or a declaration of unfitness (Article 15).  
Some  Member  States  do  not  have  specific  procedures  (e.g.  Ireland,  Latvia,  and 
Bulgaria).    Several  Member  States  may  require  a  person  to  follow  specific  training, 
pass  an  examination,  or  otherwise  satisfy  the  competent  authorities  that  they  are 
rehabilitated  (UK,  Sweden,  Denmark).    The  period  of  time  that  must  elapse  before 
good repute is reinstated also varies greatly  between Member States – for example, 
from 6 months in Spain to 10 years in Luxembourg.  Full details are given in Annex A 
(see Section 9.5.6).   

The above findings show that the requirements of good repute vary between Member 
States,  with  the  consequence  of  distortions  of  competition  and  a  reduction  in  the 
smooth  functioning  of  the  internal  market.    Firstly,  there  are  differences  in 
interpretation  of  which  “penalties”  should  be  considered  in  the  assessment  of  good 
repute,  with  Member  States  taking  varying  approaches  in  terms  of  whether  or  not 
administrative  fines,  arrangements  out  of  court  and  on-the-spot  payments  are 
counted.  These differences have the consequence that the assessment of good repute 
is  not  harmonised  –  penalties  in  one  Member  State  may  lead  to  loss  of  good  repute 
but the same penalties would not lead to loss of good repute in another Member State.  
Secondly, procedures for rehabilitation vary, and in particular the period of time that 
must  elapse  before  good  repute  is  reinstated  varies  from  6  months  in  Spain  to  10 
years in Luxembourg.  This again means that there is not a level playing field. 

6.4.2.4. 

Professional competence 

Regulation  1071/2009  sets  out  the  minimum  areas  in  which  operators  must 
demonstrate  their  knowledge  via  a  written  examination,  including  those  with 
professional  experience  and  those  holding  a  diploma47.      The  minimum  standards 
ensure  that  certification  can  be  mutually  recognised  between  Member  States.  
Previous disparities had contributed to distortion of competition and potential damage 

47 These areas include: civil law; commercial law; social law; fiscal law; business and financial 
management;  access  to  the  market;  technical  standards;  and  road  safety,  where  road 
haulage is relevant to each area.   

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to  the  image  of  the  sector  in  the  case  of  low  quality  qualifications  (European 
Commission, 2007a).   

There is still some degree of variance observed in the requirements for an individual to 
gain  professional  competence,  including  minor  differences  in  the  length  and  type  of 
examination  required  of  candidates  wishing  to  qualify  as  transport  managers.   
Voluntary  conditions  that  are  listed  in  the  Regulation  (EC)  No  1071/2009  become 
mandatory if these are accepted by Member State: 

  Organisation of oral exam to supplement the written exam (Slovakia, Hungary, 

Austria, Belgium, Germany (optional48)); 

  Organisation  of  training  for  applicants  prior  to  the  exam  (Hungary,  Denmark, 

Ireland); 

  Promotion  of  periodic  training  at  10-year  intervals  (no  respondents  to  the 

survey indicated this option was taken up); 

  Retraining in order to update knowledge of persons who possess a certificate of 
professional  competence,  but  who  have  not  managed  road  undertaking  in  the 
last 5 years regarding the current developments of the legislation. 

Hence,  due  to  these  voluntary  requirements,  there  are  some  variations  between  the 
requirements  in  different  Member  States.    Some  examples  are  elaborated  in  more 
detail in Annex A (see Section 9.5.1).   

The main issue regarding these different practices is that it may lead to variations in 
the  difficulty  of  the  exam,  and  hence  could  lead  to  diverging  standards.    This  was 
raised  as  a  concern  by  the  ministries  from  Spain  and  France.    The  Swedish  ministry 
commented  that  the  possibilities  of  exemptions  that  could  be  granted  for  prior 
experience  or  qualifications  is  not  clear  and  might  lead  to  different  interpretations  in 
different countries. The French ministry expressed concerns over the comparability of 
the  level  of  professional  qualification  across  the  EU.    The  Belgian  ministry  noted  a 
limitation  in  that  the  passing  standards  in  the  regulation  are  related  to  all  subjects 
together  and  do  not  seem  to  allow  Member  States  to  take  into  account  serious 
deficiencies  on  individual  subjects.    Other  respondents  did  not  raise  any  specific 
issues.   

The pass rate can be used as a proxy for the difficulty of the exam, although it is not a 
perfect  indicator  due  to,  e.g.  differences  in  the  underlying  capabilities  of  the 
candidates.  The pass rate prior to the Regulation varied from 10% in France to 100% 
in  Cyprus  in  2005.    Compared  to  this,  it  appears  that  the  pass  rate  in  recent  years 
varies less widely between Member States, from 20-25% in some regions in Spain to 
96%  in  Estonia,  which  may  suggest  a  more  even  level  of  difficulty  compared  to  the 
previous situation but is not a conclusive indicator. There is no strong evidence of any 
systematic differences between EU-15 and EU-13 countries: the average pass rate for 
the  EU-15  countries  is  59%  (57%  weighted  average49)  and  for  EU-13  is  63%  (54% 
weighted average). Full details are given in Annex A (Section 9.5.1). 

Interviews  with  stakeholders  indicate  that  the  level  of  prior  training  undertakings  by 
candidates  is  an  important  factor  in  determining  the  overall  pass  rate:  For  example, 
national associations in Spain offer courses to prepare candidates for the exam which 
they  claim  increases  the  success  rate  from  20-25%  to  50%  (estimated  during  an 
interview  conducted  for  this  study).    The  variation  in  pass  rates  within  Span  was 

48  More  specifically,  there  are  two  two-hour  written  exams  (contributing  40%  and  35%  to  the 
total  grade),  and  one  oral  exam  of  30  minutes  (contributing  the  remaining  25%  to  the 
grade). A minimum of 60% over all examination parts has to be achieved, while each part 
has to be passed with at least 50%. In case the written examinations are passed with over 
60%, the oral examination is no longer necessary 

49 Excluding Spain and Finland, for which there was insufficient information  

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examined  in  more  detail  during  interviews.    The  ministry  replied  that  although  each 
region prepares its exam individually the basis and the structure is common for all of 
them  and  there  are  samples  that  are  to  be  followed  published  on  their  website.  
Estonia, Ireland and Denmark have preparatory courses and the pass rate is relatively 
high in these countries (respectively 96%, 85% and 87%), but Croatia does not have 
a  preparatory  course  and  also  has  a  high  pass  rates  (91%).  Without  access  to  any 
evidence on the underlying capabilities of the applicants, it is not possible to evaluate 
whether  the  differences  seen  between  the  countries  are  due  to  differences  in  the 
difficulty of the examinations.   

In  considering  whether  “diploma  tourism”  due  to  variations  in  the  difficulty  of  the 
exams  is  an  issue,  it  could  be  expected  that  if  such  practices  were  occurring 
systematically, a much larger number of applicants would be found in Member States 
that had a high pass rate (i.e. as a proxy for “easier” exams).  However, the data does 
not reveal any trends that suggest the number of applicants relative to the size of the 
transport market is disproportionately higher in countries with a higher pass rate (R2 = 
0.0235, see Annex A Section 9.5.4). 

A possible explanation is that even where differences in the difficulty of examinations 
prevail,  language  barriers  are  sufficient  to  prevent  applicants  from  transferring.    As 
such,  even  where  differences  may  exist,  the  impact  is  limited.  More  qualitative 
information  on  the  possible  effects  was  sought  during  interviews  with  national 
authorities,  German  authorities  report  that  despite  the  requirement  that  applicants 
shall  sit  the  examination  in  the  Member  State  in  which  they  have  their  normal 
residence or the Member State in which they work, it does occur that candidates travel 
to  another  Member  State  (i.e.  their  home  country)  to  sit  the  exam  in  order  to  avoid 
potential  German  language  difficulties.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Danish  authorities 
commented that there is not believed to be any diploma tourism since the training in 
Denmark  is  done  in  Danish  and  it  is  furthermore  obligatory  for  being  able  to  sit  the 
exam  afterwards.    The  Spanish  ministry  thought  that  some  individuals  could  go  to 
another  Member  State  in  order  to  obtain  the  qualification  since  exams  there  are 
easier,  and/or  they  may  qualify  for  exemptions  based  on  a  variety  of  qualifications.  
The  second  effect  mentioned  by  the  Spanish  ministry  (of  going  to  other  Member 
States based on exemptions) is examined in further detail below.   

Member  States  are  permitted  to  grant  certain  exemptions  if  they  so  choose,  as 
follows: 

  Exemption  from  exam  for  holders  of  certain  higher  education  qualifications  or 
technical  education  qualifications  issued  in  that  Member  State  (Austria, 
Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Estonia,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Luxembourg, 
Sweden and the UK). 

  Exemption from the examinations of persons who provide proof that they have 
continuously  managed  a  road  undertaking  in  one  or  more  Member  States  for 
the  period  of  10  years  before  4  December  2009  (Estonia,  France,  Germany, 
Luxembourg, Slovakia, Sweden and the UK). 

Several  Member  States  report  that  they  do  not  give  any  exemptions  from  the 
examination  for  any  reason  (Cyprus,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Ireland,  Latvia  and 
Lithuania).    Further  details  on  the  conditions  for  which  exemptions  are  granted  are 
provided  in  each  Member State  are  provided  in  Annex A  (see  Section  9.5.4).   Table 
6-7  shows  the  number  of  exemptions  granted  from  examinations  for  the  above 
reasons in selected Member States for which data could be obtained.   

Table 6-7: Number of exemptions granted in a selection of Member States 

Finland 

France 

Number of exemptions granted (year 2013) 

Approx. 800 in total (6% of total managers) 

7,166 (2012-2014) (78% of total managers) 

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Luxembourg 

Netherlands 

Sweden 

UK 

Poland  

Bulgaria 

Estonia 

Number of exemptions granted (year 2013) 

Less than 10 since 2010 

20 (0.8%)  

Very few 

13,000 exemptions in total (out of an unknown total number of 
transport managers) 

232 in total 

188 (0.01% of total managers) 

Approx. 30 in total 

Source:  Stakeholder  consultation  –  survey  of  national  transport  ministries  and  enforcement 
authorities  

Of the Member States that do grant exemptions, for the most part the total number of 
exemptions  granted  is  relatively  small  –  hence  granted  exemptions  cannot  be 
considered a significant cause of any market distortions and there do not appear to be 
significant  consequences  for  the  internal  market.    Only  in  the  UK  and  France  do  the 
number  of  exemptions  reach  the  thousands.    In  France,  the  requirements  have  not 
changed  compared  to  those  previously  in  place  before  Regulation  1071/2009  was 
introduced - the examinations are considered very difficult, and most operators opt to 
circumvent them by receiving derogations on the basis of prior qualifications  (NEA et 
al.,  2005).    The  French  enforcement  authority  commented  that  there  are  still  a 
significant number of persons possessing certificates that were gained on the basis of 
exemptions, but recognised that these exemptions have been phased out.  In the UK, 
the  reason  for  the  high  figure  is  not  explained  by  the  respondent.    However,  since 
2013  was  the  last  year  in  which  grandfather  rights  for  transport  manager  could  be 
sought this might explain the anomalously high figure.   

Moreover,  there  are  not  any  clear  relationships  between  the  examination  pass  rate 
and  the  number  of  exemptions  granted,  suggesting  that  applicants  in  countries  with 
difficult exams do not typically seek to gain competence using the exemptions instead 
(with the possible exception of France, discussed above).   

In  summary,  the  requirements  for  gaining  professional  competence  still  vary  across 
Member  States  as  permitted  by  the  Regulation  in  terms  of  the  type  of  examinations 
(e.g. oral examinations are used in Slovakia, Hungary, Austria, Belgium and optionally 
in  Germany).    This  has  the  consequence  that  the  smooth  functioning  of  the  internal 
market is reduced – as harmonisation is important to ensure that firms operate on a 
level playing field and to prevent firms located in Member States with lower standards 
gaining  a competitive  advantage over firms  in  Member States  with  higher  standards.   
Concerns raised relate to possible differences this may create in terms of the difficulty 
of  the  exams  and  the  degree  of  professional  competence  that  is  required  to  pass 
them.  The pass rate does indeed vary widely between Member States, from 20-25% 
in Spain to 96% in Estonia, although it is not clear to what extent this variation is due 
to other factors.  For example, information provided by stakeholders indicates that the 
level  of  prior  training  is  an  important  factor  in  determining  pass  rates.    Obtaining 
consistent data across Member States proved difficult, but on the basis of the available 
data  there  are  no  clear  indications  that  Member  States  with  higher  pass  marks  are 
attracting  disproportionately  high  number  of  applicants  (which  would  be  an  indicator 
of diploma tourism), nor that gaining qualifications through exemptions is being used 
on a wide scale in most Member States.   

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6.4.3.  Summary and conclusions for Evaluation Question 4 

6.4.3.1. 

Conclusions 

The  changes  enacted  by  Regulation  1072/2009  are  widely  considered  to  be  an 
improvement on the previous situation by national ministries in terms of clarifying the 
definition of the temporary nature of cabotage.  Previously, no formal definition of the 
temporary  nature  existed,  whereas  Regulation  1072/2009  clarified  the  temporary 
nature  of  cabotage  as  being  up  to  three  cabotage  operations  within  a  seven-day 
period  starting  the  day  after  the  unloading  of  the  international  transport.    In  this 
respect, the revisions can be considered to have led to clearer rules that ensure more 
harmonised conditions of access to the international road haulage market. 

At  the  same  time,  it  is  clear  that  there  is  still  more  work  needed  to  ensure  common 
rules  with  respect  to  cabotage.    Despite  the  changes  introduced  by  Regulation 
1072/2009  and  additional  guidance  released  by  the  Commission,  there  are  still 
different  interpretations  of  specific  issues,  which  impedes  the  smooth  functioning  of 
the internal market by creating fragmentation - such as how to count the number of 
operations  when  there  are  several  loading  and  unloading  points.    This  indicates  that 
there is a lack of clarity in the provisions of the Regulation, a view that is supported by 
responses  from  different  stakeholder  groups  (associations,  ministries  and  enforcers).  
The most problematic area appears to be how to count multi-drops, but several other 
areas  have  been  mentioned  including  the  calculation  of  the  seven  day  period,  what 
constitutes  a  cabotage  trip,  transport  of  empty  pallets,  interactions  with  other 
legislation and the need for improved documentation.   

Regarding  any  potential  market  disruption  due  to  imbalances  in  supply  and  demand 
created by the cabotage rules, in practice this does not appear to have been of great 
concern to Member States, although some specific cases have been reported that were 
not  escalated.    In  this  sense,  therefore,  the  Regulations  have  not  caused  disruptions 
to  the  internal  market  by  generating  imbalances.  Comments  received  indicated  that 
the  potential  for  safeguard  procedures  is  a  sensitive  matter,  with  concerns  over 
detrimental effects on the one hand, versus concerns over protectionist measures on 
the other.   

In  terms  of  whether  the  provisions  on  cabotage  have  contributed  to  reductions  in 
empty running, there is mixed evidence that points to both increases and decreases in 
fill  rates  (from  survey  responses  and  literature).    Overall  it  seems  unlikely  that  the 
provisions  have  had  any  significant  positive  or  negative  impacts,  but  the  effects  on 
individual carriers varies.   

Regulation  1071/2009  has  undoubtedly  improved  the  level  of  harmonisation  across 
the  Member  States  for  requirements  on  stable  and  effective  establishment  as 
compared to the situation prior to the Regulations.  Previously, some Member States 
had only basic registration criteria and whereas now the minimum requirements apply 
and  differences  in  national  legislation  are  relatively  small  (e.g.  variations  in 
requirements  or  not  for  a  parking  space).    Nevertheless,  there  are  variations  in 
enforcement  practices,  which  are  also  hampered  by  a perceived  lack  of  clarity  in  the 
provisions,  and  which  likely  lead  to  different  application  of  the  rules  in  practice  (see 
Evaluation Question 1 and 2).  This has the consequence that letterbox companies are 
more difficult to detect and are inconsistently controlled. 

With respect to other requirements, harmonisation contributes to the functioning 
of the internal market by ensuring common rules and mitigating competitive 
distortion.    On  the  requirements  of  financial  standing,  there  is  a  high  degree  of 
harmonisation  in  terms  of  the  minimum  thresholds  required  by  Member  States. 
However,  most  terms  used  in  the  Regulation  cause  (e.g.  capital  and  reserves, 
insurance,  accredited  persons  are  considered  unclear  by  at  least  one  ministry, 
suggesting  that  problems  may  arise  specifically  with  regard  to  the  interaction  with 
national  laws/business  practices/translation.    The  use  of  bank  guarantees  has  been 
widely introduced with few exceptions (e.g. Lithuania) and certified accounts are also 

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permitted  in  most  Member  States  (excluding  Luxembourg).  The  use  of  insurance  is 
permitted in fewer countries (8 out of 20 Member States participating in the survey of 
ministries).  

Concerning  the  requirement  for  good  repute,  the  minimum  requirements  have  been 
introduced  with  only  minor  variations  around  the  inclusion  of  additional  offenses 
against  national  legislation  in  the  assessment  of  good  repute  (Estonia,  UK,  Italy  and 
Sweden).      Member  States  vary  in  whether  they  treat  administrative  fines, 
arrangements  out  of  court  and  on-the-spot  payments  as  “penalties”.    For  example, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus and Luxembourg do not consider any of these as penalties. 
Administrative  fines  are  considered  in  Austria,  Sweden,  Lithuania,  Belgium,  Estonia, 
Germany,  Poland  and  Latvia;  Arrangements  out  of  court  are  considered  in  Denmark, 
Germany,  Poland  and  Estonia;  On-the-spot  payments  are  considered  in  France, 
Belgium,  Finland    Germany  and Poland.    These  differences  in  interpretation  have the 
consequence that the assessment of good repute is not harmonised – penalties in one 
Member State may lead to loss of good repute but the same penalties would not lead 
to loss of good repute in another Member State. In turn, this has implications for the 
smooth functioning of the internal market by creating competitive distortions.  

Although  no  Member  States  reported  that  they  did  not  have  an  appeals  procedure 
against loss of good repute, the process differs – for example, appeals may take place 
in  court  (e.g.  Denmark,  Netherlands)  or  be  lodged  with  the  enforcers  (Poland, 
Romania).    There  are  also  differences  reported  in  the  procedures  for  rehabilitation. 
Some  Member  States  do  not  have  specific  procedures  (e.g.  Ireland,  Latvia,  and 
Bulgaria).  The period of time that must elapse before reinstatement also varies widely 
from 6 months (Spain) to 10 years (Luxembourg).  

The requirements for gaining professional competence still vary across Member States 
as  permitted  by  the  Regulation  in  terms  of  the  type  of  examinations  (e.g.  oral 
examinations  are  used  in  Slovakia,  Hungary,  Austria,  Belgium  and  optionally  in 
Germany).    Objections  raised  in  this  respect  relate  to  possible  differences  this  may 
create  in  terms  of  the  difficulty  of  the  exams  and  the  degree  of  professional 
competence  that  is  required  to  pass  them.    Differences  in  the  standards  of 
professional  competence  create  competitive  distortions  and  consequently  impede  the 
smooth  functioning  of  the  internal  market.  The  pass  rate  does  indeed  vary  widely 
between Member States, from 20-25% in Spain to 96% in Estonia, although it is not 
clear  to  what  extent  this  variation  is  due  to  other  factors.    For  example,  information 
provided  by  stakeholders  indicates  that  the  level  of  prior  training  is  an  important 
factor in determining pass rates. 

A  related  concern  is  that  “diploma  tourism”  could  occur,  resulting  in  competitive 
distortion.      The  data  does  not  reveal  any  trends  that  suggest  that  countries  with 
higher  pass  rates  attract  a  higher  number  of  applicants  relative  to  their  transport 
market  size,  the  number  of  enterprises  or  vehicles.    A  possible  explanation  is  that 
language  barriers  prevent  applicants  from  transferring.    Finally,  the  total  number  of 
exemptions granted is usually relatively small in Member States where this is allowed 
–  hence  for  the  most  part,  this  does  not  appear  to  be  a  significant  cause  of  market 
distortions.   

6.4.3.2. 

Recommendations 

In  light  of  the  continuing  difficulties  in  achieving  harmonised  interpretations  of  the 
cabotage  rules  (despite  the  additional  guidance  released  by  the  Commission),  this 
suggests  that  a  clarification  of  the  provisions  in  the  Regulations  will  be  the  only 
effective  solution.    One  of  the  issues  with  the  use  of  guidelines  is  that  they  are  not 
legally binding, and hence cannot ensure a uniform interpretation – as demonstrated 
by  the  persistent  differences  despite  the  guidance  available.    A  clarification  of  the 
Regulation also appears to have broad support among stakeholders – for example, the 
French  respondent  to  the  enforcers  survey  notes  that  “Regulatory  clarification  or 

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interpretation  is  needed  at  EU  level”    to  solve  issues  of  heterogeneity  in 
interpretations.   

To  evaluate  whether  the  benefits  would  be  proportionate  for  this  measure,  the 
potential costs need to be assessed.  Changing the provisions in the Regulations may 
lead  to  some  one-off  implementation  and/or  ongoing  costs  for  authorities  due  to  the 
need  to  adapt  enforcement  practices  to  the  new  rules.    The  recommendation  of  the 
study team is to clarify existing provisions, rather than introducing large changes, and 
hence should not involve any substantial changes to activities.  We could not identify 
any specific cost information to assess the impact of clarifications, but parallels could 
be drawn from previous experience.  That is, the new rules introduced by Regulation 
1072/2009  as  compared  to  the  previous  rules  represented  changes  that  are  more 
major compared to the clarifications proposed in this recommendation. The responses 
to  the  survey  of  enforcement  authorities  indicate  that  the  costs  that  arose  from  the 
previous  changes  are  likely  to  have  been  small,  supporting  the  view  that  further 
clarifications will not incur significant additional costs.  To elaborate further:  

  Implementation (one-off) costs: Although all respondents to the enforcers’ 

survey were asked to estimate the implementation costs of Regulation 
1072/2009, Only Slovenia estimated a modest increase of €10,000. The 
respondent from Bulgaria noted “a slight increase in the administrative costs 
for our control authorities.”  The respondent from the UK thought there had 
been no implementation costs, and this is further supported by an assessment 
conducted by the DfT, which did not identify costs associated with the 
clarification of the rules in Regulation 1072/2009 (DfT, 2010).   

  Ongoing annual costs: All respondents to the enforcers’ survey except one 
reported that there had either been no material impact or they did not know.  
Only the respondent from the Netherlands felt that there had been a need for 
five additional staff (due to political and public pressure).   

Overall,  this  indicates  that  both  the  implementation  and  ongoing  costs  arising  from 
clarifying the provisions is likely to be small.   

By  contrast,  the  clarifications  could  lead  to  cost  reductions  for  authorities.  Looking 
back at what has already been achieved due to the clarification of the rules achieved 
so far compared to the previous regime, 21% of enforcement authorities consulted felt 
that  checks  were  more  efficient,  and  the  remainder  reported  that  there  had  either 
been  no  material  impact  or  they  did  not  know  –  whereas  no  authorities  reported 
increases in costs. 

Overall,  introducing  clarifications  to  the  cabotage  provisions  seems  to  entail  limited 
additional  costs  since  most  of  the  activities  should  already  be  carried  out,  and  this 
assumption seems to be supported by the assessment of marginal costs arising from 
the  previous  change  when  Regulation  1072/2009  was  first  introduced.    The  benefits 
on the other hand would accrue to enforcement authorities due to the ability to carry 
out  more  efficient  checks.    This  would  enable  the  achievement  of  the  operational 
objective to introduce clearer, more harmonised rules on cabotage. 

Although the provision on safeguard procedures has not been used to date, the study 
team  recommend  that  it  be  kept  in  place  in  case  of  truly  exceptional  circumstances.  
The lack of application by any Member State so far shows that it has not been used as 
a protectionist tool to restrict market access, which would be the major concern about 
retaining the measure. 

To ensure better harmonisation of the requirements of Regulation 1071/2009, greater 
clarity is needed around several terms used in the Regulations: 

  Financial standing: 

o  Capital  and  reserves  –  for  example,  what  specific  assets  should  be 

account when assessing the level of capital.   

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o  Professional  liability  insurance  –  there  is  no  clear  definition  of  the 

liability risks to be covered by insurance. 

o  Who  exactly  qualifies  as  the  “duly  accredited  person”  having  a  right  to 

certify the annual accounts of transport undertakings.   

  Good  repute:    whether  administrative  fines,  arrangements  out  of  court  and 

on-the-spot payments should be counted as “penalties”.    

  Professional  competence:  guidance  on  the  subject  areas  to  be  covered  is 
already  provided  in  the  Regulation,  but  comments  received  from  stakeholders 
indicate  some  concerns  over  diverging  levels  of  difficulty.    One  example  from 
Spain  could  be  used  as  a  possible  way  forwards  for  ensuring  greater 
harmonisation at EU level – the regions implement their own examinations, but 
guidance and a sample paper are provided on the ministry’s website.   

There  is  a  wide  support  among  ministries  for  more  guidance  and  clarifications,  and 
this is considered by the consultants to be the preferred first approach as opposed to 
amending the Regulation.  

The  study  team  recommend  that  the  precise  details  to  be  included  in  the  guidance 
should be a matter for a more focussed consultation with stakeholders, such that the 
final interpretations are in keeping with the spirit of the Regulation.  In the context of 
this  study,  the  consultants  can  point  to  different  examples  of  current  practice  and 
recommend that the experience of Member States is drawn on.  For example, in order 
to  determine  what  can  be  considered  as  capital  and  reserves,  there  are  several 
approaches  that  can  be  drawn  from  current  practice  in  Member  States.  Finland 
interprets  “capital”  to  mean  the  company's  own  capital,  which  is  contributed  by  the 
owner or entrepreneur of a business rather than the borrowed capital, which must be 
paid back (usually with interest) - in accordance with the first subparagraph in Fourth 
Council Directive 78/660 EEC of July 1978.  In the UK, when deciding whether or not it 
is  appropriate  to  take  a  particular  asset  into  account,  the  courts  consider  it  is 
important  to  bear  in  mind  that  the  assets  must  be  available,  or  can  be  made 
available50,  to  pay  bills  as  and  when  they  fall  due  (Traffic  Commissioner  for  Great 
Britain, 2015).   

50 The Guidance Notes issued by the Senior Traffic Commissioner indicate that one month, or 30 

days, is an appropriate cut-off point.   

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6.5.  Effectiveness:  To  what  extent  has  the  legislation  helped  to 
increase  the  level  of  compliance  with  EU  road  transport  social 
legislation?  

To what extent has the legislation helped to increase the level of compliance with EU 
road transport social legislation? How do the results compare to the state of play prior 
to the adoption of the Regulations? How do the results compare between different EU 
Member  States  and  regions  (i.e.  EU15  and  EU12)?  Have  the  Regulations  led  to  any 
unintended negative and/ or positive social effects? 

The  purpose  of  this  evaluation  question  is  to  gain  an  understanding  of  whether 
Regulations  1071/2009  and  1072/2009  have  contributed  to  increase  the  level  of 
compliance to the EU social legislation, namely with Regulation 561/2006 on driving 
times,  breaks  and  rest  periods  and  Directive  2002/15/EC  on  working  time  of 
“mobile” workers.  

Regulation  561/2006  lays  down  rules  on  driving  times,  breaks  and  rest  periods  for 
drivers.  Directive 2002/15/EC supplements the provisions of Regulation 561/2006 by 
setting a limit on mobile workers’ working time, i.e. time spent working whether or not 
this involves driving. The road social legislation aims to improve road safety levels by 
reducing  driver  fatigue,  and  to  ensure  that  road  transport  workers  are  afforded  an 
adequate level of social protection, including regard for their health and safety. 

As  a  general  point,  Table  6-8  shows  the  frequency  of  offences  against  Regulation 
561/2006  (driving  time  rules)  from  2007  to  2012.    It  demonstrates  a  general 
improvement  in  terms  of  the  infringement  rates  falling,  which  occurred  after  the 
introduction  of  Regulation  1071/2009  and  1072/2009.  However,  this  trend  was 
already occurring over previous years and there are no data to provide evidence of a 
direct  contribution  of  the  Regulations  to  this  reduction.    Further  analysis  of  the 
possible contribution of the Regulations is provided in this section.  

Table 6-8: Frequency of offences detected from 2007 to 2012 

Year 

2007-2008 

2009-2010 

2011-2012 

Number of offences 
detected 

Number of working days 
checked  

Detection rate 

3,244,997 

4,500,000 

3,861,964 

84,041,058 

145,858,300 

158,648,377 

3.9% 

3.1% 

2.4% 

Source:  Two-year  reports  concerning  the  implementation  of  Regulation  561/2006:  SEC(2011) 
52 final, SWD(2012) 270 final, SWD(2014) 342 final. 

6.5.1.  Requirements  of  Regulation  1071/2009  and  interactions  with  social 
legislation 

Regulation  1071/2009  may  have  improved  the  effectiveness  of  controls  at  the 
roadside and/or at the premises by ensuring that hauliers that are not complying with 
the social legislation can be detected.  Quantitative evidence of this would need to be 
in  the  form  of  identifying  the  additional  cases  of  non-compliance  with  the  social 
legislation  that were  found  thanks  to  the  requirements  of  Regulation  1071/2009.    All 
enforcement  authorities  were  asked  to  estimate  this  figure:  most  indicated  that  they 
had  no  data  and  could  not  make  an  estimate.    Three  responses  were  received  that 
indicated  a  positive  effect  (Poland,  Luxembourg  and  Romania):  in  Poland,  the 
authority  estimated  an  additional  5%  of  infringements  of  road  social  legislation  were 
detected.    The  Romanian  authorities  indicated  that  58  additional  infringements  were 
found (or 0.002% of the total).  The respondent from Luxembourg indicated a positive 
effect but could not provide quantitative data.  Conversely, the UK authorities reported 

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that  there  was  little  impact  on  detection  rates  because  the  vast  majority  of 
requirements were already in place.   

An alternative indicator is whether the levels of compliance with road social legislation 
are  considered  to  have  improved  due  to  the  Regulation  (that  is,  whether  there  are 
fewer infringements overall, as opposed to more infringements detected).  Since there 
are  no  empirical  data  suggesting  a  clear  connection  between  the  Regulation  and  the 
level  of  compliance  with  social  rules,  more  qualitative  responses  from  stakeholders 
were used as a proxy.   

Stakeholders  from  different  groups  were  asked  about  whether  they  felt  Regulation 
1071/2009  has  improved  compliance  with  the  social  legislation.    Respondents  to  the 
high level survey from the groups of trade unions and industry associations largely felt 
that  there  had  been  no  material  impact  of  Regulation  1071/2009  on  improving 
compliance with the road social legislation. Comments received to the survey indicate 
they  feel  the  problems  are  due  to  poor  enforcement  and  the  existence  of  letterbox 
companies.  

From  the  survey  of  ministries,  21%  indicated  a  significant  positive  effect,  and  38% 
indicated a slight positive effect compared to the situation prior to the Regulation.  The 
remaining respondents indicated no material impact or that they did not know, but no 
respondents felt that there had been any negative impacts.  As shown in Figure 6-16, 
respondents from the EU-13 indicate a stronger positive effect overall.  However, none 
of the respondents were able to provide quantitative data to support their views.   

Figure 6-16: Responses from ministries to the question: What has the impact 
of  Regulation  1071/2009  been  on  compliance  with  the  road  social 
legislation? 

Source: Survey of ministries (N=15; 9 respondents from EU-15 and five from EU-13) 

Enforcement  authorities  largely  view  the  impacts  of  the  Regulation  as  positive,  or  at 
worst  neutral,  and  there  were  no  respondents  reporting  that  there  were  negative 
impacts  (see  Figure  6-17).    The  requirements  of  stable  and  effective  establishment, 
professional  competence,  good  repute,  administrative  cooperation  and  transport 
managers all received positive indications from more than half of respondents.  

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Figure  6-17:  Responses  from  enforcement  authorities  to  the  question:  To 
what  extent  do  you  think  the  following  measures  had  a  positive/negative 
effect on compliance with road transport social legislation  

Source: enforcement authorities survey (N=15) 

Systematic differences between EU-15 and EU-13 countries are hard to identify, since 
the  number  of  respondents  from  EU-13  countries  was  only  five,  but  it  appears  that 
overall  the  EU-13 respondents  rated  all  requirements  more  positively  in  terms of  the 
impacts on social rules. 

Figure  6-18:  Responses  from  enforcement  authorities  to  the  question:  To 
what  extent  do  you  think  the  following  measures  had  a  positive/negative 
effect on compliance with road transport social legislation  

Source: enforcement authorities survey (10 respondents from EU-15 and 5 from EU-13) 

When  asked  to  substantiate  their  responses  further  only  a  few  qualitative  comments 
were  received.    The  French  enforcement  authorities  specifically  commented  that  the 
conditions  of  establishment,  good  repute  and  professional  (vocational)  capacity  have 
had a positive impact on compliance with the social legislation.  The respondent from 
the  Netherlands  remarked  that  the  effects  (if  existing)  were  either  not  known  or 
measurable.   

No  further  data  could  be  collected  via  interviews  either.    For  example,  the  Polish 
enforcers  remarked  that  they  felt  the  impacts  of  the  Regulation  on  compliance  with 
the social rules was positive, based on their personal experience, but had no data to 
support  this  position.  The  UK  enforcers  felt  there  was  no  impact,  but  this  was  a 
difficult question to answer and they similarly reported that there is no evidence.   

The  difficulty  of  obtaining  quantitative  estimates  was  also  reflected  in  the  Impact 
Assessment underlying the Regulations, where there was only a qualitative indication 

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of  “improvements”  to  social  conditions.  More  broadly,  there  are  still  problems  of 
uneven  monitoring  and  enforcement  across  the  EU  (see  Evaluation  Question  2),  and 
an  incomplete  implementation  of  requirements  on  administrative  cooperation  (see 
Evaluation Question 3), which may impede the effective enforcement of the rules and 
reduce  the  achieved  benefits  compared  to  the  expected  improvements  in  compliance 
with  the  social  legislation  (although  as  previously  mentioned,  the  magnitude  of  this 
impact was not quantified).    

In the absence of further quantitative evidence, a more specific qualitative assessment 
of  each  requirement  is  carried  out  below.  The  most  positive  effect  is  considered  to 
have come from the requirement of stable and effective establishment, with one-
third of enforcement authorities indicating a strong positive effect and a further 20% 
indicating a somewhat positive effect.  The reasons for this were explored further, and 
appear  to  relate  to  the  issue  of  letterbox  companies.  Such  companies  are  often 
(although not always) associated with criminal or dubious activities (Sørensen, 2015).  
Trade union respondents to the high level survey indicated that “in as far as the social 
and  labour  conditions  are  concerned,  illegal  practices  of  letterbox  companies  are  the 
biggest  problem  for  the  sector.  In  recent  years,  more  and  more  companies  have 
resorted to employing and ‘trafficking’ professional truck drivers through systems such 
as letter box companies… These practices have created considerable distortions on the 
EU  labour  market  and  on  domestic  labour  markets  of  a  number  of  Member  States.”.  
The  interaction  here  arises  because  undertakings  without  stable  and  effective 
establishment  (i.e.  letterbox  companies)  cannot  be  properly  checked  to  the  same 
extent as other undertakings – increasing the risk of businesses being able to infringe 
the road social legislation without detection and/or penalties.  

This  effect  is  also  reflected  in  the  monitoring  data  provided  under  Regulation 
561/2006, which shows that checks at the premises are more effective than roadside 
controls51.  Thus,  it  can  be  seen  that  the  requirement  for  stable  and  effective 
establishment  can  complement  the  enforcement  of  social  legislation,  as  well  as 
monitoring  of  the  other  provisions  in  Regulations  1071/2009.    Information  on  the 
number  of  simultaneous  infringements  (i.e.  whether  undertakings  without  stable  and 
effective  establishment  are  also  more  likely  to  commit  infringements  of  the  social 
rules) was not available.  

Professional  competence  also  received  strong  positive  responses  from  the 
enforcers.  In  this  respect,  Regulation  1071/2009  compels  transport  undertakings  to 
have  specific  knowledge  on  a  list  of  subjects  (as  laid  down  in  Annex  I  of  the 
Regulation) including, among others, EU road social and safety legislation.  Regulation 
1071/2009  aimed  to  achieve  a  higher  level  of  professional  qualification  of  road 
transport operators. Since knowing the rules is a first requirement to respecting them, 
the  increased  knowledge  of  transport  managers  was  expected  to  lead  to  increased 
compliance with social legislation (European Commission, 2007a). The direct impact is 
not  possible  to  quantify.  As  an  indicator  of  the  success  of  the  Regulations  in  this 
regard,  Figure  6-19  shows  that  ministries  consulted  for  this  study  generally  feel  that 
the  Regulation  has  had  a  positive  or  neutral  effect  in  this  regard,  with  EU-13 
respondents returning a more positive response overall.   

51 The detection rate of infringements at the premises is three times higher than at the roadside 

(COM(2014) 709 final ) 

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Figure 6-19: Responses from ministries to the question: What has the impact 
of  Regulation  1071/2009  been  on  standards  of  professional  qualification  in 
the industry? 

Source: Survey of ministries (N=15; 9 respondents from EU-15 and five from EU-13) 

The French ministry considered the impact of the rules on professional competence to 
be  negligible  in  France  because  similar  requirements  were  already  in  place,  but  they 
remarked  that  “the  beneficial  effects  of  this  Regulation  with  regard  to  the  level  of 
professional  qualification  of  managers  belonging  to  other  Member  States  is  surely 
indisputable.”   

Responses from undertakings also show an overall positive view, although a significant 
minority  (23%)  disagreed  that  standards had  been  raised.    When asked  to  elaborate 
on  this  view,  a  respondent  from  Romania  indicated  that  in  smaller  companies,  the 
business owner has more decision-making capability than the transport manager, and 
hence  the  professional  qualifications  do  not  change  how  the  company  is  managed, 
while  another  pointed  out  that  the  level  of  qualifications  are  not  the  same  across 
Europe. A German undertaking felt that there were still many in the industry who are 
unaware of their responsibilities. 

Figure 6-20: Responses to the undertakings survey to the question: To what 
extent do you agree or disagree that the measures have raised the standards 
of professional qualification in the industry? 

Source: Survey of undertakings (64 respondents from EU-15, 44 from EU-13) 

Overall,  both  ministries  and  undertakings  gave  overall  positive  responses  that  the 
requirement  of  professional  competence  had  raised  the  standards  of  professional 
competence  in  the  industry.    For  several  Member  States,  the  requirements  were 
already  in  place,  but  they  still  may  have  benefitted  from  higher  standards  of  foreign 
hauliers.  The  opinions  of  enforcement  authorities  also  support  the  view  that  the 
requirement has improved compliance with the road social legislation (Figure 6-17).   

A related provision is the requirement to designate a transport manager, which was 
expected  to  improve  compliance  with  the  road  social  rules  by  ensuring  that  all 
transport undertakings satisfy the minimum conditions regarding professional capacity 
(European Commission, 2007b).  In addition, ensuring that the transport manager be 
involved  in  the  daily  management  of  the  transport  undertaking  was  expected  to 

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improve  the  transparency  in  the  contractual  relationship  with  shippers,  and  hence 
contribute  to  better  compliance  with  road  safety  and  social  rules  (European 
Commission,  2007a).      In  this  specific  regard,  responses  from  ministries  indicate  an 
overall  view  that  the  Regulation  has  had  positive  or  neutral  effects  on  improving 
market transparency (Figure 6-21). 

Figure 6-21: Responses from ministries to the question: What has the impact 
of Regulation 1071/2009 been on market transparency? 

Source: Survey of ministries (N=15; 9 respondents from EU-15 and five from EU-13) 

Responses  from  undertakings  indicated  roughly  equal  shares  of  responses  indicating 
agreement  and  disagreement  that  there  had  been  improvements  in  market 
transparency  (39%  vs  35%  respectively).  When  asked  to  elaborate  on  their 
responses, an undertaking from Austria noted that checks were not harmonised, and 
two undertakings from Germany felt that nothing had changed.  

Figure 6-22: Responses to the undertakings survey to the question: To what 
extent  do  you  agree  or  disagree  that  the  measures  have  improved 
transparency in the logistics chain? 

Source: Survey of undertakings (64 respondents from EU-15, 44 from EU-13) 

Overall  it  is  harder  to  say  what  the  impact  on  market  transparency  has  been,  since 
different stakeholders report different levels of support.  Broadly, the ministries gave 
positive responses  and  the  opinions  of  enforcement  authorities  also support  the  view 
that the requirement has improved compliance with the road social legislation (Figure 
6-17).    Trade  unions  in  their joint  response  to  the  high  level  survey did  not  have an 
opinion  on  whether  an  unclear  link  between  the  transport  manager  and  the 
undertaking  was  still  a  problem  today  in  the  industry.    On  the  other  hand,  the 
undertakings  were  split  between  positive  and  negative  responses  (with  no  clear 
differences  between  EU-13  and  EU-15  respondents),  and  associations  in  their 
response to the high level survey were split between those that felt unclear links were 
still  a  significant  issue,  those  that  felt  it  was  a  slight  issue  and  those  who  felt  there 
was no issue.   

The good  repute of transport managers is conditional on not having been convicted 
of  a  serious  criminal  offence  or  not  having  incurred  a  penalty  for  a  serious 

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infringement.  The  link  with  the  social  legislation  is  made  explicit  in  Annex  IV  of  the 
Regulation,  which  lists  violation  of  social  rules  (i.e.  exceeding  driving  time  rules) 
among  the  most  serious  infringements.    However,  limited  quantitative  or  qualitative 
evidence  could  be  identified  that  would  shed  light  on  how  well  this  requirement  is 
supporting  the  compliance  with  social  legislation  in  practice.    For  example,  no  data 
could be found on what share of the withdrawals of good repute were specifically due 
to infringements of the social legislation.  The French ministry specifically commented 
that  it  is  difficult  to  measure  the  impact  that  may  have  arisen  due  to  including 
violations  of  the  social  rules  in  Annex  IV.    DfT  (2010)  reports  that  disqualification  of 
those managers judged to be of ill repute will lead to social benefits in the long term, 
since the threat of disqualification would also be expected to exert a wider disciplinary 
effect.    A  Swedish  association  interviewed  for  this  study  felt  that  companies  could 
sometimes  retain  their  good  repute  despite  breaking  the  social  rules,  and  called  for 
tougher rules.   

Since  limited  quantitative  or  qualitative  information  could  be  found  concerning  the 
impact  of  the  requirements  of  good  repute,  only  a  logical  argument  can  be  made  as 
follows:  As  discussed  in  Evaluation  Question  2,  the  enforcement  of  the  provisions  of 
good  repute  seems  to  be  applied  unevenly  in  Member  States,  with  some  countries 
taking  a  lenient  approach.  Since  the  effectiveness  of  the  requirement  (including  with 
regard  to  impacts  on  social  legislation)  depends  on  the  effective  enforcement,  the 
expected benefits probably have not been achieved.   

The  requirement  for  financial  standing  provides  a  level  of  security  to  creditors  and 
contributes  to  sure  that  the  operator  has  enough  financial  resources  to  comply  with 
standard  business  practices.    It  was  previously  identified  that  companies  with  low 
financial  standing  tend  to  be  more  negligent  and  to  infringe  the  rules  more  than  the 
others52  (European  Commission,  2007b).    A  literature  search  did  not  find  any  more 
recent studies to confirm whether this is still the case, and data on the infringements 
of financial standing does not indicate the extent to which these organisations had also 
infringed  the  social  legislation;  hence  no  conclusions  can  be  drawn  from  this 
information  as  to  whether  the  requirement  of  financial  standing  has  contributed  to 
improving social conditions.  

6.5.2.  Requirements  of  Regulation  1072/2009  and  interaction  with  social 
conditions 

The links between Regulation 1072/2009 and the social legislation are less direct, and 
the  Impact  Assessment  underlying  the  Regulations  did  not  anticipate  any  impact  on 
social  aspects  due  to  the  changes  to  cabotage  rules  or  control  documents  (European 
Commission,  2007b),  and  hence  no  impacts  were  quantified  or  expected.    This 
evaluation  question  aims  to  establish  whether  this  was  indeed  the  case,  or  if 
unexpected impacts occurred.   

Responses from trade unions to the high level survey show that this group think that 
Regulation  1072/2009  has  had  no  material  effect  in  terms  of  improving  compliance 
with the road social legislation.  Qualitative responses from the trade unions highlight 
their  concerns  that  the  poor  enforcement  of  cabotage  can  allow  the  non-respect  of 
Community rules overseeing labour and social law. Most industry associations also felt 
that there was no impact, although several indicated a highly detrimental effect due to 
unfair and low-price competition.   

52 A sample analysis of records of serious infringements against roadworthiness and driving time 
rules  made  in  France  has  found  that  18%  of  companies  which  do  not  meet  the  financial 
capacity condition do not comply with roadworthiness and driving time rules, which is 50% 
higher  than  the  population  of  transport  companies  which  meet  the  financial  capacity 
requirement (European Commission, 2007b) 

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Respondents  to  the  ministries  survey  largely  felt  that  there  had  been  no  material 
effect or that there had been positive effects (Figure 6-23).  Only the respondent from 
Germany indicated a slight negative effect but did not substantiate their reply further.  
Respondents from EU-13 countries appear to have a more positive view of the impacts 
compared to EU-15 countries.  

Figure 6-23: Responses from ministries to the question: What has the impact 
of  Regulation  1072/2009  been  on  compliance  with  the  road  social 
legislation? 

 Source: Survey of ministries (11 respondents from EU-15 and 8 from EU-13) 

The  French  ministry  further  commented  that  Regulation  1072/2009  has  not  had  a 
decisive  effect  of  the  proper  application  of  the  road  social  rules.  The  Bulgarian 
enforcers  commented  that  they  did  not  see  any  link  with  Regulation  1072/2009  and 
the social rules.   

The  same  absence  of  quantitative  data  to  support  such  views  as  already  discussed 
with regard to Regulation 1071/2009 was present and confirmed in the literature. For 
example,  Broughton  et  al  (2015)  note  that  evidence  on  unfair  competitive  practices 
and  illegal  activities  is  by  its  nature  difficult  to  obtain.    Hence,  a  more  qualitative 
assessment  must  be  carried  out  of  what  the  unexpected  impacts  could  have  been.  
The  main  potential  mechanism  by  which  Regulation  1072/2009  could  affect 
compliance with the social rules is through the impacts of cabotage.   

There are several recent studies on the impacts of cabotage in the EU.  According to 
Mundutéguy  (2014),  since  the  cabotage  regime  changed  in  2010,  many  national 
haulage companies fear that they will be outplayed by competitors who enjoy a more 
favourable  legislation  in  their  home  country.  As  a  result,  truck  drivers’  working 
conditions  may  worsen.    Tillman  (2012)  reports  that  cabotage  has  long  been  a 
sensitive  subject  and  many  hauliers  are  concerned  that  lower  salaries  and  lighter 
social  legislation  in  the  EU-13  Member  States  would  give  them  an  unmatched 
advantage in competition, as well  as lowering the quality and social  standards of the 
business.  The issue of driver wages in Europe is highly important for social impacts as 
it  can  be  a  major  source  of  competitive  advantage.    At  the  same  time,  even  though 
wages in new Member States have remained relatively stable, there is a large pool of 
non-EU  citizens  prepared  to  work  for  lower  wage  levels  (Sternberg  et  al,  2014).  
AECOM  (2014b)  report  general  concerns  over  enforcement  of  cabotage  and  social 
protection  rules.    UNECE  (2012)  recognises  that  deregulation  can  lead  to  cut-throat 
competition  and  declining  quality  in  the  sector,  and  market  opening  should  be 
accompanied  by  reinforcing  the  qualitative  framework  conditions,  e.g.  regarding 
safety, security, sustainability and social considerations.  

A dedicated study was commissioned in 2013 to assess the implementation and social 
impacts of cabotage, although the study recognised the difficulties in quantifying any 
impacts.  SDG  (2013a)  finds  that  the  market  entry  of  EU-13  hauliers  has  led  to 
increased  competitive  pressures  in  the  industry,  in  parallel  with  lobbying  efforts  to 
improve  the  effectiveness  of  controls  on  foreign  hauliers.    With  regard  to  the  price 
competition, SDG (2013a) states that  “this is after all what liberalisation is supposed 

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to  do  –  increasing  the  competitiveness  of  the  EU  economy  as  a  whole.”    The  study 
finds that the growth of cabotage operations has triggered specific legislation in some 
Member  States  such  as  Austria  and  France53,  and  hence  one  of  the  impacts  of 
cabotage  liberalisation  has  thus  been  more  stringent  application  of  social  legislation. 
Conversely,  the  study  recognised  that  illegality  is  a  problem,  and  that  the 
harmonisation  of  social  standards  and  enforcement  practices  across  the  European 
Union remains the challenge. 

ETF (2012a) warn that illegal cabotage and letterbox companies are expanding and its 
profitability is based on “social dumping”.  ETF (2012b) further claims that the manner 
in which the cabotage rules have been interpreted and delays in enforcement have led 
to  “massive  distortions  of  fair  competition  and  the  labour  market”.  The  report  claims 
that this is due to illegal cabotage activities and make a direct link with the problem of 
letterbox companies: Differences in tax and social/labour costs give hauliers from EU-
13  Member  States  a  cost  advantage,  which  hauliers  from  EU-15  Member  States  are 
offsetting  by  operating  via  letterbox  companies.    The  basis  of  the  claims  in  the  ETF 
reports are widespread surveys/interviews conducted with drivers – it was not possible 
for  the  study  team  to  obtain  the  raw  data  in  order  to  confirm  the  extent  to  which 
these problems are occurring.  

To  better  understand  how  developments  have  occurred  over  longer  time  periods 
(since  cabotage  restrictions  were  lifted  in  2010  for  most  countries  and  2012  for 
Romania  and  Bulgaria),  a  literature  search  on  the  impacts  of  past  liberalisation  was 
carried out.  There appears to be broad agreement that the differentials in wages and 
social  conditions  between  Member  States,  alongside  increased  competition,  lead  to 
strong  incentives  to  contravene  the  road  social  legislation.    For  example,  Hamelin 
(1999)  argues  the  deregulation  of  road  haulage  services  after  1993  significantly 
increased  the  competition  on  the  market,  which  forced  companies  to  reduce  their 
operational  costs  (especially  decreasing  labour  costs).    The  study  reports  that  fierce 
competition  is  instrumental  in  making  unsocial  working  hours  the  norm  for  drivers.  
Hermann  (2003)  focuses  on  Austria  as  a  case  study  and  finds  that  increased 
competition  after  Austria’s  accession  to  the  EU  had  forced  many  companies  to 
decrease  their  profit  margins  -  in  some  instances  companies  minimised  their  costs 
through unfair or illegal practices.  For example, some companies used performance-
based bonuses, which put pressure on their drivers to work long hours and were the 
most common reason for infringements of the driving and resting time rules.  Henstra 
et  al  (1999)  note  that  enforcement  of  social  rules  is  a  challenge  in  the  context  of 
deregulation and enlargement, especially since “as driver costs account for 50 per cent 
of total operating costs, there is a high incentive to violate the regulations of transport 
operations,  such  as  driving  bans  on  weekends,  permits  for  combined  transport 
activities, and the enforcement of the maximum driving times/minimum rest times.” 

Experience from overseas also indicates the same adjustment mechanisms - it is well-
established in literature that the deregulation in the USA made driving a less desirable 
occupation,  due  to  the  significant  drop  in  wages  and  the  demanding  working 
conditions  (Belman,  2005).    Boylaud  and  Nicoletti  (2001)  stated  that  “empirical 
evidence  suggests  that  liberalisation  in  road  freight  industry,  across  OECD  countries, 
has promoted efficiency and consumer welfare in the countries that have implemented 
reforms”.      The  ECMT  (2002)  state  that  the  economic  effect  in  terms  of  competition 
from  countries  with  lower  wages  in  the  sector  is  significant,  and  therefore  some 
transport  undertakings  deliberately  commit  infringements  of  the  social  legislation  in 
order to remain competitive.  

53 In Austria, cabotage operations are considered to be postings of workers and are subject  to 
the provisions of the Austrian Law Amending the Labour Contract Law (AVRAG).  Cabotage 
operators were required to ensure that they were compliant with all French laws relating to 
employment. 

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Hilal (2008) reports that EU economic deregulation has led to unintended social effects 
on  truck  drivers.    This  was  mainly  caused  by  the  fact  that  deregulation  was  not 
accompanied by an adequate degree of harmonisation of tax and labour legislation in 
some  Member  States.    Hilal  points  out  this  produced  several  negative  consequences 
for  fair  competition  on  the  market,  namely  social  dumping  and  fraudulent  practice.  
According  to  Hilal,  the  intensified  use  of  subcontracting  of  activities  to  self-employed 
drivers and illegal employment of third-country nationals leads to dodging of national 
tax laws and labour and welfare regulations, with worsens working conditions.   

The  studies  of  both  past  and  present  market  opening  point  to  the  issue  of  price 
competition (stemming from diverse wage levels and different tax/labour regimes) as 
a key driving force for deterioration of social conditions. The cabotage provisions were 
foreseen  as  a  transitional  cabotage  regime  as  long  as  harmonisation  of  the  road 
haulage  market  had  not  yet  been  completed,  aiming  to  strike  a  balance  between 
contending  positions  that  argued  for  complete  market  liberalisation  on  the  grounds 
that  this  would  increase  efficiency  versus  opposition  to  further  liberalisation  on  the 
basis that this could exacerbate social and fiscal competition between Member States.   

The  possibility  of  cabotage  leading  to  price  competition  is  now  examined  in  more 
detail.    The  issue  of  price  competition  arises  because  of  differences  in  social  models 
between  the  EU15  and  the  EU13,  mainly  due  to  driver  salaries  but  also  national  tax 
and social laws (TRT, 2013; Alonso & Ascociados, 2014; AECOM, 2014b; Broughton et 
al, 2015).  

Market  prices  for  long-distance  transport  (particularly  in  full-  and  part-load  services) 
did indeed come under considerable pressure in 2011. SDG (2013a) confirms that the 
effect of cabotage versus the general economic recession is difficult to determine, but 
posits  that  entry  of  EU-13  hauliers  exposed  pre-existing  inefficiencies  in  the  EU-15 
haulage  industry.    There  are  strong  suggestions  in  the  literature  that  the  added 
competitive pressure within the international road haulage market, combined with the 
differentials  in  labour  costs  and  employment  conditions  between  Member  States,  is 
creating  incentives  for  unfair  competitive  practices  (including  social  dumping) 
(Broughton, 2015; ETF, 2012a; SDG, 2013a; TRT, 2013; AECOM, 2014a).  

Some  stakeholders  (reportedly  Western  European  hauliers  in  particular,  according  to 
Kombiconsult,  2015)  attribute  the  recent  drop  in  freight  rates  to  the  liberalisation  of 
cabotage  -  arguing  that  road  hauliers  are  prepared  to  accept  nearly  any  price  to 
capture  inland  shipments  in  a  host  Member  State,  if  they  don’t  have  an  immediate 
backload  to  their  home  country,  or  stay  for  an  entire  week  before  returning  home 
(KombiConsult,  2015).    Claims  on  Swedish  national  television  are  that  carriers  and 
freight  forwarders  suppress  prices  to  a  level  that  makes  it  impossible  for  a  Swedish 
haulier  to  compete  if  it  has  drivers  that  are  paid  according  to  Swedish  terms  and 
conditions (Parliamentary questions, 2013b).  This situation is then blamed on the EU 
cabotage  rules,  which  allegedly  have  given  rise  to  market  distortion  and  risks  that 
foreign  drivers  are  forced  to  work  under  unacceptable  conditions  (Parliamentary 
questions, 2013b). 

A national study in Germany conducted in 2010 suggested that there had not been a 
significant  impact  between  2010  and  the  market  opening  in  2009,  but  this  could  be 
due to the crisis (BAG, 2010).  Another national study forecast the impact of opening 
to  Bulgaria  and  Romania,  and  concluded  that  there  would  not  be  significant  impacts 
because of language barriers,  lower quality of service and distance from the national 
transport market (BAG, 2012).  German stakeholders suggested during interviews that 
the studies were out of date.  Hence, more recent data on toll statistics was assessed.  
This  data  records  the  distance  travelled  by  vehicles  according  to  their  country  of 
registration,  and  it  shows  an  increase  in  activity  from  vehicles  registered  in  EU-13 
countries since 2012.  The biggest caboteurs in Germany were Polish undertakings in 
2013, who increased their cabotage activities by 32% compared to the year 2012 (to 
4.4  billion  t-km).  The  total  shares  of  performed  kilometres  on  German’s  toll  roads 
attributable  to  Romanian  and  Bulgarian  vehicles  in  2013  amount  to  2.4  and  1.1% 

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respectively  (BGL,  2014).  Figure  6-24  shows  the  shares  of  toll  kilometres  and  their 
development  in  the  period  from  2007  to  2013  by  the  country  of  registration  of  the 
vehicles.  

Figure  6-24:  Shares  of  German  toll  kilometres  and  their  developments  by 
country of registration of the vehicles in the period from 2007 to 2013 

Source: (BGL, 2014)  

Market research does indeed show that non-resident hauliers can undercut the market 
price  levels  for  national  transport  (KombiConsult,  2015).  A  number  of  reports  have 
also  highlighted  the  difficult  conditions  in  the  sector  in  light  of  decreasing  profit 
margins  and  growing  competition  from  EU-12  Member  States  (TRT,  2013);  (ITF, 
2009); (European Parliament, 2013a).   

This does not necessarily imply that the liberalisation of cabotage activities has caused 
the  collapse  in  freight  rates,  since  many  other  factors  were  at  work.    Following  the 
economic  crisis,  transport  volumes  decreased  or  stagnated.    However,  many  SMEs 
were  forced  to  keep  their  entire  fleets  in  service  due  to  the  need  to  pay  leasing  or 
rental  rates  for  the  trucks  and  to  earn  their  living,  as  other  job  opportunities  were 
scarce  in  the  hard  economic  circumstances.  This  led  to  overcapacity  in  the  freight 
market,  and  hauliers  were  prepared  to  cut  rates  to  obtain  a  shipment.    The 
KombiConsult  study  concludes  that  it  is  unlikely  that  cabotage  deregulation  has 
contributed to the ruinous price competition, but it is likely that it has contributed to 
the  intensified  struggle  for  cargo,  especially  in  specific  markets.    Even  if  cabotage  is 
growing,  its  volume  is  small  compared  to  the  total  EU  road  haulage  market  (even 
accounting for unreported cabotage).    

A related concern in the use of drivers from low-cost third countries to undercut wages 
and place further price pressure on transport markets. ETF (2012a) emphasises social 
problems linked to treatment of non-EU drivers, mentioning specifically an example of 
Turkish  drivers  brought  in  by  low-cost  flights  or  by  sea,  who  are  made  to  live  in  the 
port  area  of  Trieste  in  “appalling  conditions”  until  they  are  assigned  to  a  truck.  ETF 
claim  that  this  may  take  days,  and  urge  the  European  Commission  to  set  up  and 
coordinate  a  quota  system  for  the  distribution  of  operating  licences  to  third-country 
operators.    Quantifying  the  extent  of  any  issues  linked  directly  to  drivers  from  third 
countries  is  very  challenging  and  investigations  are  typically  based  on  local  case 
studies  and  ad  hoc  investigations.    The  reports  mentioned  above  about  the  poor 
conditions under which some of these drivers operate is closely linked to the question 
of  ensuring  effective  enforcement.  It  is  also  worth  noting  that  these  drivers  may 

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contribute  to  alleviate  the  shortage  of  drivers  in  Europe,  which  is  seen  as  a  major 
concern (Bayliss, 2012). Estimates of the expected shortage of drivers in 2018 range 
from  around  106,000  to  129,000,  depending  on  the  scenario  for  economic  growth 
(Bayliss, 2012).  Nationals of non-EU countries may be employed as drivers subject to 
the issuing of a driver attestation in line with Regulation 1072/2009. The drivers must 
then comply with all of the normal requirements of EU road haulage laws (e.g. driving 
time and rest periods, tachograph, or weights and dimensions of road vehicle etc).  

Respondents to the high level survey have reported concerns over the use of  Filipino 
drivers  in  Latvia.  The  issue  was  also  raised  in  a  Parliamentary  question,  where 
according to the Dutch magazine Truckstar, a German/Latvian road haulage business 
was using Filipino workers for international road haulage in Europe – it is claimed that 
this  is  an  attempt  to  cut  business  overheads  at  the  expense  of  employees 
(Parliamentary  questions,  2013c).  The  Commission  stated  in  its  response  to  this 
question that it was not aware of any other similar cases.  Looking at the monitoring 
reports  on  the  number  of  third-country  drivers  registered  in  Latvia,  it  has  remained 
relatively constant at around 5,000 between 2007 and 2011, and fell by 72% between 
2011  and  2014  (1,433  attestations  in  2014).    In  the  EU  as  a  whole,  the  number  of 
attestations  for drivers  from  third  countries  in  circulation  has  fallen  by  13%  between 
2011  and  2014,  and  they  represent  less  than  1%  of  all  drivers.    In  addition,  the 
number of new attestations issued for drivers from third countries in the EU has fallen 
by 18% between 2011 and 2014.  

Specific  problems  have  also  been  raised  with  regard  to  the  interaction  with  the 
Regulations  and  other  legislation  –  and  the  subsequent  deterioration  of  social 
conditions - by trade union respondents to the high level survey.  This concerns most 
importantly the Directive on Posted Workers (96/71/EC) and the Combined Transport 
Directive (92/106/EEC).  The potential issues are also reflected in the literature.  For 
example,  ETF  (2012b)  claim  that  combined  transport  is  a  contributing  factor  to  the 
expansion of illegal cabotage due to ineffective controls.  They further claim that the 
application  of  the  Posting  of  Workers  Directive  is  not  controlled  in  spite  of  clear 
provisions  stipulated  in  Regulation  1072/2009.    ETUI  (2014)  report  difficulties  in 
checking  the  actual  establishment  of  firms  in  foreign  Member  States  and  slow 
cooperation by corresponding authorities in the sending Member States. SDG (2013a) 
and  TRT  (2013)  find  inconsistent  application  of  the  Posting  of  Workers  Directive  in 
Member  States  and  difficulties  in  enforcement.  The  interactions  and  consequences 
between the Road Transport Package and the social legislation are examined further in 
Evaluation  Question  12  (see  Section  7.12).    In  summary,  there  are  complex 
interactions that may make enforcement of cabotage provisions more challenging with 
regard  to  combined  transport  and  posting  of  workers,  which  may  impede  the 
achievement of the intended levels of social protection.  

6.5.3.  Summary and conclusions 

The  provisions  laid  down  in  Regulation  1071/2009  aim  to  reinforce  the  level  of 
compliance  with  the  social  rules.    Survey  responses  from  the  groups  of  trade  unions 
and  industry  associations  show  that  these  groups  do  not  think  there  has  been  any 
impact  of  Regulation  1071/2009  on  improving  compliance  with  the  social  rules, 
whereas  responses  from  enforcement  authorities  and  ministries  show  that  these 
groups feel there have been positive impacts, with slightly higher support among EU-
13  respondents.    Quantitative  estimates  were  very  sparse,  but  suggest  increases  in 
detection  rates  of  non-compliance  with  the  social  legislation  due  to  the  provisions  of 
Regulation  1071/2009  in  Poland  (5%)  and  a  much  smaller  increase  in  Romania 
(0.002%).  

Indications  from  these  survey  responses  are  that  the  most  beneficial  provision  has 
been  the  requirement  of  stable  and  effective  establishment.    This  may  be  because  a 
key problem for social protection in the sector is the presence of letterbox companies, 
which  this  provision  directly  aims  to  target.    Having  a  stable  and  effective 

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establishment  also  allows  for  more  effective  checks  of  the  social  rules  compared  to 
roadside checks, as confirmed in the monitoring data from Regulation 561/2006.    

In assessing whether the expected benefits were achieved, it is worth noting that the 
magnitude of the expected impact was not quantified, and only a general mention of 
“improvements”  was  made  in  the  underlying  Impact  Assessment.    However,  various 
provisions of the Regulation have not been fully implemented or achieved as expected, 
including the uneven monitoring and enforcement (see Evaluation Question 2), and an 
incomplete  implementation  of  requirements  on  administrative  cooperation  (see 
Evaluation Question 3), which may impede the effective enforcement of the rules and 
reduce  the  achieved  benefits  compared  to  the  expected  improvements  in  compliance 
with the social legislation.    

In  summary  therefore,  Regulation  1071/2009  is  likely  to  have had neutral  or  slightly 
positive impacts with regard to ensuring compliance with social rules, but the extent of 
these impacts is impossible to quantify.   

The links between Regulation 1072/2009 and the social legislation are less direct and 
the  Impact  Assessment  underlying  the  Regulations  did  not  anticipate  any  impact  on 
social  aspects  due  to  the  changes  to  cabotage  rules  or  control  documents.  
Respondents to the surveys agreed that there had not been any material impact (i.e. 
respondents from trade unions, associations and ministries).   

In summary, Regulation 1072/2009 was not expected to have had any direct impacts 
on compliance with social legislation and no impacts were found.   

Concerning possible indirect impacts, a literature review was carried out of studies on 
the current cabotage rules, as well as previous liberalisation in the EU and overseas. 
There  was  consistent  agreement  between  the  studies  that  the  mechanisms  by  which 
cabotage  liberalisation  could  affect  social  conditions  was  via  increase  competition  in 
the sector, combined diverse wage levels and national labour/tax rules.  This leads to 
hauliers  trying  to  remain  competitive  by  lowering  salaries  for  drivers,  and  creates 
greater  incentives  to  circumvent  the  rules.    Nevertheless,  none  of  the  studies  found 
could quantify the extent to which the problems occur.  

While  cabotage  is  likely  to  have  contributed  to  greater  competition,  especially  in 
specific  freight  markets,  it  is  unlikely  to  be  the  sole  cause  of  the  intensified  price 
competition  seen  in  recent  years.    This  study  has  not  identified  any  comprehensive 
evidence  that  the  liberalisation  of  cabotage  has  created  significant  competitive 
distortions, but it is clear that widespread entry of hauliers with lower labour costs will 
cause price competition in the affected markets.  The problems of illegal cabotage and 
letterbox companies (see Evaluation Question 1), can undoubtedly contribute to non-
compliance  with  social  legislation,  since  these  firms  are  engaged  in  illegal  activities 
already.   

Specific  problems  were  also  identified  with  respect  to  the  interactions  with  the 
Directive  on  Posted  Workers  (96/71/EC)  and  the  Combined  Transport  Directive 
(92/106/EEC),  which  contribute  to  difficulties  in  enforcement  of  cabotage  and  hence 
potentially contribute to higher levels of illegal cabotage. 

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6.6.  Effectiveness:  To  what  extent  have  the  Regulations  had  an 
impact  on  road  safety,  particularly  in  terms  of  fatigue  of  drivers,  and 
helped  to  address  the  road  safety  concerns  identified  at  the  time  of 
adoption?  

To  what  extent  have  the  Regulations  had  an  impact  on  road  safety,  particularly  in 
terms  of  fatigue  of  drivers,  and  helped  to  address  the  road  safety  concerns 
identified at the time of adoption? How do the results compare between different EU 
Member States and regions (i.e. EU15 and EU12)? 

This  evaluation  question  focusses  on  whether  the  Regulation  have  had  an  impact  on 
road safety, with a particular focus on the fatigue of drivers.  The road safety concerns 
identified  at  the  time,  as  detailed  in  the  underlying  Impact  Assessment,  were  that 
pressure  to  save  costs  might  incite  some  operators to  poorly  comply  with  social  (i.e. 
driving time and rest periods) and safety rules (with regard to safety rules, the driving 
times  and  rest  periods  were  also  mentioned)  (European  Commission,  2007a).    The 
Impact Assessment and Proposal for the Regulations recognised that the influence on 
safety would be indirect. The magnitude of the impact was not quantified in any way – 
only “improvements” were identified at the time.   

It is worth clarifying the meaning of “fatigue” and its role in road safety.  According to 
Grandjean  (1979)  fatigue  can  be  defined  as  “gradual  and  cumulative  process 
associated with a loss of efficiency, and a disinclination for any kind of effort”. Fatigue 
impairs  the  driver’s  cognitive  and  motor  performance  by  slowing  reaction  times, 
reducing  attention  to  the  external  environment  and  disrupting  steering  skills  (TRL, 
2009).   

Driver  fatigue  therefore  represents  a  serious  problem  for  drivers  in  the  commercial 
transport  industry  and  is  a  risk  factor  for  accidents  involving  truck  drivers,  chiefly 
when it is caused by long working hours and sleep restriction (Smolarek and Jamroz, 
2013). Collisions that are caused by fatigue (often in association with sleepiness) – are 
usually  more  severe  than  other  types  of  accidents  and  a  greater  proportion  of  them 
are fatal (Åkerstedt and Haraldsson, 2001).   

The European Commission reports that non-compliance with obligations for minimum 
rest periods can result in driver fatigue, and they estimate that the cost of the fatigue 
of  professional  drivers  in  terms  of  accidents  is  €2.2  billion  per  year  in  the  EU-27 
(European  Commission,  2012b).    Although  in  general,  road  deaths  in  Europe  have 
been  decreasing  (ETSC,  2012),  accidents  result from  a spectrum of  causes  and  even 
the link with fatigue is often not clear (the available data is examined in more detail in 
Annex A). This makes it difficult to identify causal links with Regulation 1071/2009 and 
1072/2009.   

At a general level, there is a very close link between the impacts on compliance with 
the social rules (see Evaluation Question 6) and the impacts on driver fatigue.  This is 
shown  specifically  in  the  statistics  of  infringements  of  the  road  social  legislation 
(Figure 6-25), which consistently show that infringements of the driving times and rest 
periods  are  the  most  frequent,  despite  apparent  improvements  in  compliance  rates 
overall in recent years.   

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Figure  6-25:  Distribution  of  offences  by  type  of  infringements  of  Regulation 
561/2006 (2007-2012) 

Source: Bi-annual monitoring reports of Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 

6.6.1.  Regulation 1071/2009 and impacts on road safety 

The impacts of Regulations 1071/2009 on road safety and consequently on fatigue of 
drivers  are  closely  related  to  the  effects  on  social  rules  concerning  working/driving 
time  and  rest  periods.    That  is,  improved  compliance  with  the  social  rules  should 
ensure that drivers are afforded adequate rest in order to avoid fatigue (the main road 
safety issue identified at the time).   

Looking  in  more  detail  at  the  mechanisms  by  which  Regulation  1071/2009  was 
intended to  improve road  safety shows that  they  were  identical  to  those expected  to 
improve compliance with social legislation for each of the requirements (i.e. stable and 
effective establishment, financial standing, professional competence, good repute and 
designated  transport  managers)  (European  Commission,  2007a).  Hence,  the 
qualitative  assessment  of  safety  impacts  follows  from  the  previous  Evaluation 
Question,  where  it  was  found  that  the  impacts  were  likely  to  have  been  neutral  or 
slightly  positive  overall.  Responses  to  the  high  level  survey  from  trade  unions  and 
industry  associations  show  that  most  respondents  did  not  think  there  was  a material 
impact of Regulation 1071/2009 specifically on road safety as an issue separate from 
the  social  legislation.  No  specific  comments  were  received  from  stakeholders  on  this 
point.   

The requirement of financial standing and stable and effective establishment were also 
intended  to  have  an  impact  on  safety  by  ensuring  the  proper  maintenance  and 
roadworthiness  of  vehicles,  although  again  the  impact  is  not  possible  to  quantify.    A 
UK-based  association  pointed  out  that  the  minimum  levels  of  financial  standing  may 
no  longer  be  relevant,  since  many  vehicles  are  leased  or  hired  (and  therefore 
maintenance is included in the contract).  Guidance from the UK authorities addresses 
this issue and points out that they are still relevant for leased/hired vehicles because: 
“the financial requirement is not reduced in the case of contract or lease hire vehicles 
whose  maintenance  is  included  in  the  hire  charge,  since  there  are  often  substantial 
penalty  clauses  within  hire  agreements  which  would  have  to  be  met  if,  for  instance, 
the  operator  wanted  to  return  the  vehicles  early  upon  the  loss  of  a  contract.  The 
financial  requirement  is  primarily  for  the  purpose  of  working  capital.”  (Traffic 
Commissioner  for  Great  Britain,  2015).      The  only  other  evidence  of  a  possible  link 
could be found in older literature that predates the Regulation: Rodríguez et al. (2004) 
point  out  that  the  frequency  of  crashes  is  greater  in  freight  firms  with  low  liquidity, 
showing that the financial performance of the firm is related to safety.  Bruning (1989) 
finds  that  firms  on  the  edge  of  bankruptcy  decrease  their  investments  in  safety, 
maintenance,  and  equipment,  and  in  addition  they  use  owner-operators  more 
frequently, which can be regarded as detrimental from the safety perspective.   

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A review of the literature identified only a few other more recent references to safety 
in  particular  that  were  not  already  discussed  in  the  review  of  compliance  with  the 
social rules.  The UK’s DfT, specifically assessing the impacts of interconnecting their 
register  in  compliance  with  Regulation  1071/2009  concluded  that  that  “improved 
compliance/  safety  of  foreign  registered  commercial  vehicles  would  be  expected  to 
lead to a reduction in the number of fatal accidents that this type of vehicle is involved 
in  however,  it  has  not  been  possible  to  determine  what  proportion  of  the  overall 
benefits  of  the  package  can  be  attributed  to  the  interconnection  of  the  national 
registers” (DfT, 2014c).   

Overall,  and  as  expected  in  the  Impact  Assessment,  the  contribution  of  Regulation 
1071/2009  to  improving  road  safety  is  indirect  and  difficult  to  quantify.  There  is  no 
evidence  of  a  direct  impact  of  Regulation  1071/2009  on  road  safety  in  particular.  
Insofar  as  the  Regulations  support  compliance  with  the  social  legislation  (driving 
times, rest periods and working times), they will also contribute indirectly to safety by 
reducing  fatigue,  through  helping  to  ensure  drivers  get  adequate  rest.    However,  as 
previously discussed, the impacts in this regard are considered to be neutral or slightly 
positive  (see  Evaluation  Question  5).      Regulation  1072/2009  and  impacts  on  road 
safety  

The  impact  of  Regulation  1072/2009  on  fatigue  is  even  more  indirect  –  as  already 
discussed  in  the  previous  Evaluation  Question,  Regulation  1072/2009  was  not 
expected  to  have  any  effect  on  compliance  with  road  social  rules;  however,  market 
opening  may  have  increased  competition  in  the  haulage  sector.    The  increased 
pressure on profitability may have had knock-on effects on the compliance with road 
social  legislation.    Overall  therefore,  the  general  conclusions  follow  directly  from  the 
previous  Evaluation  Question.  This  section  therefore  focusses  on  any  other  possible 
unintended or unexpected impacts.   

Responses from trade unions to the high level survey show that this group think that 
Regulation  1072/2009  has  had  no  material  effect  in  terms  of  improving  compliance 
specifically  with  safety  rules.    Most  industry  associations  also  felt  that  there  was  no 
impact, whereas a few indicated a slightly detrimental effect. The comments received 
from  associations  mentioned  their  concerns  over  the  increasing  use  of  third  country 
drivers  obtaining  “quick  but  not  necessarily  adequate  and  sufficient  qualifications  to 
become a professional driver in the EU”.  In this respect, Directive 2003/59/EC on the 
initial  qualification  and  periodic  training  of  drivers  of  certain  road  vehicles  for  the 
carriage of goods or passengers is relevant.  This Directive aims to increase safety on 
European  roads  and  establishes  the  mandatory  initial  qualification  and  periodic 
training  requirements  for  drivers  who  are  nationals  of  Member  States  or  who  are 
working  for  an  undertaking  based  in  the  European  Union.    A  detailed  review  of  the 
effectiveness of the driver training Directive is outside the scope of the current study, 
but a recent ex-post evaluation concluded that it may have  had a positive impact on 
road  safety  by  reducing  human  error  (Panteia  et  al,  2014).    Vlakveld  et  al  (2012) 
reports that if there is any effect of the quality of driver training on crash involvement 
can have, it would only occur in the first one or two years after obtaining the license – 
after  which  point  the  experience  of  the  driver  outweighs  any  influence  of  the  driving 
training,  and  conclude  that  the  effect  in  the  Netherlands  is  probably  minimal.    Both 
studies  note  the  difficulty  of  obtaining  relevant  statistical  data  in  this  area.    As 
previously noted in Evaluation Question 5, drivers from third countries represent less 
than 1% of all drivers and their numbers have been decreasing in recent years.   

As  reported  in  SDG  (2013a),  the  opening  of  the  road  freight  transport  market  has 
resulted  in  an  increased  number  of  foreign  hauliers  and  drivers  circulating  across 
Member States, in particular across EU-15 countries. In some countries (UK, Germany 
and  the  Netherlands)  this  issue  has  raised  road  safety  concerns  (SDG,  2013a).  
However, the SDG study was not able to pull together any statistical evidence to back 
the  view  that  foreign  hauliers are  involved in  a greater number of  road crashes  than 
domestic hauliers.   

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In  a  meta-analysis  of  deregulation  and  transport  safety,  (Elivik,  2006)  sought  to 
quantify  the  safety  outcomes  of  deregulation  of  transport  in  the  road,  rail,  aviation 
and  sea  sector.  He  identified  41  studies  in  the  literature  search  and  concluded  that 
economic  deregulation  does  not  seem  to  hamper  safety.  The  meta-study’s  summary 
estimate of effect indicates that no statistical changes in road safety occurred because 
of deregulation.    

The  Impact  Assessment  underlying  the  Regulations  had  previously  identified  that  in 
the  UK,  HGVs  on  international  journeys  have  a  higher  rate  of  non-compliance  with 
roadworthiness rules than those engaged in purely domestic journeys (e.g. as regards 
roadworthiness, 31% of non-UK vehicles are non-compliant compared to 25% for UK 
vehicles).    An  interviewee  from  the  UK  commented  that  the  UK  has  historically  been 
concerned about non-domestic vehicles being more likely to commit offenses. Official 
statistics  now  show  similar  rates  of  infringement  for  UK  and  non-UK  vehicles.  
However,  the  respondent  pointed  out  that  UK  vehicles  are  subject  to  much  more 
targeted  checking  (using  the  national  risk  rating  system,  which  does  not  apply  to 
foreign vehicles) than non-UK vehicles and therefore the UK vehicles that are stopped 
ought  to  have  a  higher  rate  of  infringement  than  vehicles  stopped  at  random.  From 
this, it could be infer that non-UK vehicles are indeed more frequent offenders.   

The UK Royal Society for the Prevention of Accident (ROSPA) (2012) noted a particular 
issue  in  the  UK  with  left-hand  vehicles.  In  2011  7%  of  total  road  deaths  in  HGV 
accidents  (N=257)  involved  foreign  registered  left-hand  HGVs,  and  left-hand  drive 
HGV drivers were more likely to be at least partially at fault for the accidents in which 
they  were  involved.    This  study  also  found  that  the  foreign  drivers  found  driving  in 
Britain more difficult due to the unfamiliar road layout and road user behaviour. 

Nævestad et al. (2014) found that the accident risk of foreign HGVs is approximately 
two times  higher  than  that  of  domestic  HGVs.    The  paper  concludes that  better data 
on accident risk and risk factors must be gathered in order to correctly analyse traffic 
safety  challenges.  The  SAFT  project  pages54  report  several  risk  factors  found  when 
investigating  Norwegian  accidents,  namely  that  foreign  lorry  drivers  often  lack 
sufficient competence on how to drive safely in the hilly Norwegian terrain, that their 
vehicles  are  typically  older  and  less  powerful,  that  they  are  influenced  by  the  safety 
cultures of their home countries and because foreign transport companies often violate 
rules on the technical state of trucks and lack of mandatory equipment.  The authors 
indicate  that  greater  cabotage  penetration,  especially  from  Easter  European  truck 
drivers, would have unfortunate consequences for road safety. Specifically, it is stated 
that  these hauliers are  more  likely  to  choose cheap  tyres,  and  it  is  also claimed  that 
foreign  lorry  drivers  choose  roads  with  as  few  ferries  and  toll  stops  as  possible,  in 
order  to  save  money.  As  a  consequence,  they  take  steep  and  narrow  roads  over 
mountains and around fjords.   

Considering also the broader implications of cabotage and price competition is also of 
relevance.    Since  price  is  considered  to  be  the  dominant  competitive  factor,  the 
possibility that this could have an impact on the operational quality of the companies 
could be a risk factor, as noted in the Norwegian case discussed above.  Conversely, 
Alvarez-Tikkakoski  et  al 
increased 
subcontracting  and  price  competition  may  lead  to  negligence  in  the  compliance  with 
traffic  safety  and  security,  and  in  practice  they  found  the  situation  is  quite  the 
opposite.    They  suggest  that  this  could  be  because  the  economic  and  financial 
difficulties have forced the poorly performing operators to completely exit the market, 
rather than just bend the safety rules and regulations of the industry.   

the  possibility 

investigate 

(2011) 

that 

54 Safe Foreign Transport (SAFT): https://www.toi.no/SAFT 

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Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

6.6.2.  Summary and conclusions 

The link between the Regulations and driver fatigue is rather indirect, and arises due 
to  the  effect  that  the  Regulations  have  on  compliance  with  social  rules.    The  social 
rules aim to ensuring drivers have adequate rest and are not fatigued, which was the 
main  aspect  of  road  safety  identified  at  the  time,  as  indicated  in  the  Impact 
Assessment.    Driver  fatigue  is  an  important  risk  factor  for  accidents  involving  truck 
drivers,  hence  improved  compliance  with  the  social  rules  should  ensure  that  fatigue-
related accidents are reduced.   

The  mechanisms  by which  the  Regulations  were  intended to  improve road safety  are 
therefore identical to those expected to improve compliance with social legislation, and 
the conclusions from the previous Evaluation Question apply here also with respect to 
impacts  on  safety  –  namely,  that  the  impacts  were  likely  to  have  been  neutral  or 
slightly  positive  overall,  but  their  indirect  nature  makes  it  difficult  to  attribute  any 
specific  improvements  to  the  Regulations.    Similarly,  the  positive  effects  appear  to 
have  been  slightly  greater  in  EU-13  countries  compared  to  EU-15  countries,  largely 
because  similar  requirements  were  already  in  place  in  EU-15  countries  prior  to 
Regulation  1071/2009  (see  Evaluation  Question  5).  Overall  there  is  no  evidence  to 
suggest  that  Regulation  1071/2009  has  had  any  effect  on  road  safety  aside  from 
indirectly via the social legislation. 

Regulation  1072/2009  was  not  expected  to  have  any  effect  on  compliance  with  road 
social rules, nor could any evidence of an effect be found, hence there is no evidence 
for an impact on road safety via this mechanism. 

The other main safety-related concern raised by respondents to the high level survey 
is  that  greater  penetration  of  foreign  drivers  (in  connection  with  increased  cabotage) 
without the requisite knowledge and skills can have harmful effects on safety.  Overall 
the  literature  shows  a  consensus  on  the  poor  quality  of  data  relating  to  safety  and 
accident risks, which prevents a statistical analysis of the safety impacts.  As such, the 
extent to which the accident rates of drivers has been affected is not clear.  However, 
research suggests that foreign-registered HGVs may be more at risk of accidents due 
to  factors  such  as  unfamiliar  road  layout  and  road  user  behaviour.    Concerning 
possible  differences  between  difference  EU  Member  States,  these  impacts  are  most 
likely  to  affect  EU-13  hauliers  (who  carry  out  a  large  share  of  cabotage),  whereas 
accident risks are more likely to affect Member States with particular characteristics – 
i.e. differences in left- and right-hand drive, and challenging terrain (e.g. mountainous 
regions) in some Member States.   

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6.7.  Effectiveness:  Have  the  Regulations  led  to  any  positive  and/or 
negative  unintended  effects  (both  in  terms  of  impacts  and  results) 
other than mentioned in previous questions?  

Have the  Regulations  led to  any  positive and/or  negative unintended  effects  (both  in 
terms of impacts and results) other than mentioned in previous questions? If so, what 
is the extent of these effects and which stakeholders groups are affected the most? 

This Evaluation Question aims to identify any positive or negative impacts of the 
Regulations that have not already been assessed in the previous sections.  Input from 
stakeholders, along with desk research, was used to identify the main areas for 
investigation, which are as follows: 

 

Impact of requirements for financial standing on firm exit; 

  Treatment of vehicles less than 3.5t; 

 

Interactions  with  the  increased  use  of  subcontracting  and  role  of  freight 
forwarders; 

  Systematic cabotage; and 

  Difficulties in proving legal cabotage. 

6.7.1.  Impact of financial standing requirements on firm exit 

Although the requirement of financial standing is considered to be straightforward for 
many  operators  to  comply  with,  specific  challenges  have  been  reported  in  particular 
Member States (e.g. Spain and the Czech Republic).  These problems do not appear to 
be widespread and are related to national administrative or legislative issues.  Further 
details are outlined in Annex A (see Section 9.7.1).  

One possible side effect of the requirement of financial standing is that it may have led 
to  greater  firm  exit.    Prior  to  the  introduction  of  the  Regulation,  under  Directive 
96/26/EC  (which  had  the  same  minimum  thresholds),  a  relatively  small  number  of 
operators failed to meet the requirement each year (NEA et al., 2005).  

Partial  data  are  available  on  the  extent  of  the  problem.  As  discussed  already  in 
Evaluation Question 2, most withdrawals were caused by not meeting the requirement 
on appropriate financial standing in France, Austria, the Netherlands and Finland.  This 
provides  an  indicator  that  the  requirements  could  be  difficult  to  meet.    French 
authority  elaborated  that  is  it  difficult  for  undertakings  to  obtain  certificates  of 
financial standing due to the low profitability of the sector.  

Trends over time would also indicate whether the requirement is becoming harder to 
meet  (i.e.  detected  infringements  are  increasing).  This  data  was  requested  from 
enforcement authorities, and the results are inconclusive for the patchy data received. 
The  number of  withdrawals  due to  not  meeting  the  requirement  of  financial  standing 
appears to have increased in some Member States and decreased in others as shown 
in Table 6-9. 

Table  6-9:  Number  of  withdrawals  due  to  not  meeting  the  requirement  of 
financial standing in selected Member States 

Member States 

Bulgaria 

France 

Denmark 

Luxembourg 

Finland 

2013 

964 

2,871 

50 

134 

450 

2009 

638 

2,361 

50 

154 

750 

134 

% change 

+51% 

+22% 

0% 

-13% 

-40% 

 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Source: Survey of enforcement authorities  

Qualitatively,  it  appears  that  difficulties  in  meeting  the  requirement  have  been 
exacerbated especially following the recession and for smaller operators – for example 
in  cases  where  payment  of  invoices  has  been  delayed,  leaving  them  with  insufficient 
reserves.  This is demonstrated by a number of examples.  Banque de France reports 
that many transport companies are now considered vulnerable from the point of view 
of  their  financial  standing  (European  Commission,  2014b).  In  the  UK,  the  Senior 
Traffic Commissioner noted that: “Another feature of the economic downturn has been 
an  increased  risk  of  insolvency  and  a  consequent  increase  in  public  inquiries  held 
featuring operators who seek to remain in business even though they no longer have 
the appropriate financial standing to hold an operator’s licence." (Culshaw, 2012).  

Where  an  operator  cannot  demonstrate  financial  standing,  Regulation  1071/2009 
allows  (but  does  not  require)  the  granting  of  a  period  of  time  (up  to  six  months)  to 
rectify  the  situation.    A  German  industry  association  felt  that  the  requirements  on 
financial  standing  are  the  most  problematic  out  of  all  the  requirements  of  Regulation 
1071/2009, but consider at the same time that “it is absolutely right that they exist”. 
The  German  ministry  suggested  that  six  months  may  not  be  sufficient  for  many 
operators, and that a period of up to 12 months would be more suitable.   

The  unintended  effects  may  also  be  mitigated  since  companies  that  exit  the  market 
may  also  re-enter  or  be  replaced  by  new  undertakings.    Several  sources  report  that 
the  barriers  to  entry  to  starting  a  transport  company  are  considered  to  be  relatively 
low (European Commission, 2014b); (WTO, 2010).   

Overall, examples from France and the UK suggest that the financial crisis may have 
made  it  more  difficult  for  firms  to  comply  with  the  requirement  of  financial  standing, 
leading  to  a  higher  number  of  firms  infringing  this  requirement.    This  led  to  the 
unintended effect  of  stimulating  greater firm  exit  during recessionary  periods. This  is 
supported  by  comments  from  the  German  ministry  and  data  to  the  effect  that  most 
withdrawals  were  caused  by  not  meeting  the  requirement  on  appropriate  financial 
standing in France, Austria, the Netherlands and Finland.   

6.7.2.  Treatment of vehicles less than 3.5t 

One possible impact of excluding vehicles less than 3.5t from the Regulations rules is 
that operators may switch to lighter vehicles in order to avoid them.  This would have 
the  consequence  of  reducing  the  effectiveness  of  the  rules  since  more  operators  are 
avoiding the scope. 

There is very little concrete data on the extent of any switching to lighter vehicles in 
practice, since it is not explicitly monitored in most countries and official statistics do 
not provide the necessary level of detail to determine the share of light goods vehicles 
in international transport.   

A large share of Member State ministries participating in the survey felt that there was 
no  or  very  little  impact  due  to  switching  so  far  or  potential  to  create  impacts  in  the 
future (47%).  A significant minority (12%) felt there was a significant impact due to 
switching  so  far  or  potential  to  create  impacts  in  the  future.    The  German  ministry 
remarked  during  an  interview  conducted  for  this  study  that  there  have  been 
observations  of  undertakings  (especially  Eastern  European)  investing  in  lighter 
vehicles  to  circumvent  the  cabotage  rules.    This  view  was  formed  based  on 
questionnaires  sent  to  regional  authorities.  However,  the  extent  of  these  practices  is 
unknown.  A German enforcement authority interviewed for this study confirmed that 
some regions are more concerned by such practices than others, and that it has been 
a  rather  new  phenomenon.  However,  they  explained  that  it  cannot  be  said  whether 
the  lighter  vehicles  have  replaced  heavier  vehicles,  or  whether  these  are  additional 
ones.    Finally,  a  German  industry  association  reported  that  there  are  an  increasing 
number of trucks at 11.9t in order to avoid the 12t limit for the toll roads.  Conversely, 

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Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

they  explained that  the  3.5t  limit  on  the  contrary  has  been  in  the  German  Transport 
Act for a long time, so there haven’t been any significant shifts. 

Separating  out  the  effect  of  the  Regulations  from  other  legislation  is  also  difficult, 
since  many  other  pieces  of  legislation  only  apply  to  vehicles  over  3.5t,  the  most 
significant  of  these  being  the  road  social  rules  (Regulation  561/2006),  road 
infrastructure charging (Directive 1999/62) and the tachograph Regulation (Regulation 
165/2014).    

Given  that  the  incentives  for  switching  behaviour  are  likely  to  be  economic,  the 
existence  of  cost  differentials  should  provide  an  indication  for  switching  potential.  
Comparing the cost differentials between different types of vehicles in Europe showed 
that HGVs have a considerable advantage over LGVs in all regions.  As shown in Table 
6-10, the cost of transport per ton by HGV (25 tonnes, 80m3) is only around 16% of 
the cost to transport a ton by LGV (1.65t, 20m3).  By volume, the cost of transport by 
HGV is around 60% of the cost of transport by LGV.  An increase of more than 25% in 
the freight transport cost price for HGVs (against a static LGV rate) would be needed 
for competition to occur (NEA, 2010).   

Table 6-10: Cost of transport by HGV relative to LGVs 

South West 
Europe 

Southeast 
Europe 

North West 
Europe 

North East 
Europe 

Per ton 

Per m3 

16% 

60% 

16% 

62% 

16% 

60% 

16% 

62% 

Source: (NEA, 2010) 

The  impact  may  also  be  limited  because  some  countries  have  extended  the 
Regulations to cover LGVs (and hence switching has lower benefits).  This is the case 
specifically  for  rules  on  cabotage  in  several  Member  States.    Around  half  of  the 
Member States consulted for this study apply the same cabotage rules to vehicles less 
than 3.5t (Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Latvia, Poland, Slovak 
Republic,  Sweden),  whereas  the  remainder  have  less  restrictive  rules.    A  Swedish 
trade  union  commented  that  phenomenon  of  shifting  to  lighted  vehicles  is  not  really 
observed  anymore,  since  the  rules  are  also  applied  to  vehicles  <3.5t.    A  Danish 
stakeholder  suggested  that  there  was  a  role  to  play  for  lighter  touch  regulation  of 
vehicles <3.5t, since Danish businesses in the <3.5t market are becoming concerned 
about  the  bad  reputation  these  businesses  have  –  for  business,  road  safety,  and 
behaviour. 

Several countries (Belgium and France) make reference to Article 8(5), in conjunction 
with Article 1(5), of Regulation 1072/2009, which is interpreted by them to mean that 
the  rules  governing  cabotage  apply  to  all  carriers,  including  those  who  use  light 
vehicles.  Italy and Latvia also extend requirements on authorisation to engage in road 
transport to undertakings below 3.5t (ICF, 2014).  Other HGV legislation has also been 
adapted  or  expanded  to  cover  LGVs,  such  as  rules  on  driving  times,  although  the 
situation is far from harmonised.   

In conclusion, there is no concrete evidence of an effect of switching to vehicles <3.5t 
in order to avoid the Road Transport Package in particular.  The likelihood of operators 
being  able  to  gain  a  substantial  advantage  by  doing  so  also  appears  limited  due  to 
economic  factors  and  the  fact  that  many  countries  have  extended  the  legislation  to 
cover lighter vehicles.  Hence it seems unlikely that there are systematic problems of 
switching to lighter vehicles due to Regulation 1071/2009 and 1072/2009 alone. 

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6.7.3.  Interaction  with  the  increased  use  of  subcontracting  and  the  role  of 
freight forwarders 

As  outlined  in  Section  5.2.2,  there  has  been  a  trend  toward  greater  use  of 
subcontracting,  as well  as the use  of  freight  forwarders55. This  may  allow  for greater 
efficiency  and  access  to  specialised  knowledge/services  in  the  market.    At  the  same 
time,  it  may  create  problems  because  responsibilities  become  harder  to  track,  and 
decision-makers  may  fall  outside  the  practical  scope  of  enforcement.    In  particular, 
subcontracting  chains  can  become  very  complex,  making  enforcement  of  the  rules 
harder.  

Although  the  requirements  of  the  Regulations  dictate  to  a  certain  extent  the 
operational conditions and details of the transport, freight forwarders and shippers are 
generally  not  liable  for  potential  infringements  to  the  transport  legislation  during  the 
transport.  Hauliers can therefore come under intense pressure to infringe regulations 
due  to,  for  example,  short  delivery  deadlines  set  by  forwarders  who  are  not  held 
responsible  (AECOM,  2014a;  Broughton  et  al,  2015).  As  described  in  Evaluation 
Question  2  (see  Section  6.2.2.3),  several  Member  States  have  introduced  co-liability 
that  includes  other  actors  in  the  transport  chain,  but  it  is  not  a  requirement  of  the 
Regulation. 

In  conclusion,  the  increased  use  of  subcontracting  and  the  role  of  freight  forwarders 
has  developed  externally  to  the  Regulations  –  this  development  has  been  ongoing 
since  before  the  Regulations  were  introduced  (see  Section  5.2.2  for  further  details) 
and  is  driven  by  market  forces  rather  than  the  legislation.      The  main  interaction  is 
that the scope of the Regulations may be relevant in terms of contributing to problems 
of  more  difficult  enforcement  (due  to  difficulty  in  tracking  responsibilities)  and  more 
pressure on hauliers (exerted by clients that are not held responsible for infringements 
of the rules). Systematic cabotage 

The  main  unexpected  and  unintended  impacts  of  Regulation  1072/2009  relate  to 
cabotage.    Notably,  the  Regulation’s  definition  of  temporary  cabotage  does  not 
exclude  “systematic”  cabotage.    This  means  that  in  practice  a  foreign  haulier  can 
spend the majority of its time in another EU country, as long as the haulier carries out 
an  international  trip  every  week.    This  is  despite  the  text  in  Recital  15,  which  states 
that  cabotage  should  not  be  a  permanent  or  continuous  activity,  and  hence  the 
appearance of systematic cabotage is considered to be an unintended consequence.   

Systematic  cabotage  may  affect  certain  Member  States  more  than  others,  partially 
due to their geography. For example, systematic cabotage appears to be carried out in 
Denmark,  but  does  not  appear  to  significantly  affect  Sweden,  and  has  only  been 
observed to a small extent in Norway56 (Sternberg et al, 2015).  The extent of possible 
systematic cabotage in other countries could not be determined, since the analysis of 
systematic cabotage in Denmark, Norway and Sweden needed to be carried out using 
specialised  data  collection  via  smartphone  applications  (as  explained  in  Evaluation 
Question 1, Section 6.1.2.1). 

One  Danish  undertaking  interviewed  for  this  study  admitted  they  are  carrying  out 
systematic  cabotage  themselves,  which  in  their  opinion  is  legal  based  on  the 
Regulations. 

Schramm  (2012)  suggests  that  large-scale  international  hauliers  with  enough  of  a 
demand for international trips can act as domestic hauliers and continually rotate their 

55  Freight  forwarders  organise  goods  movements  on  behalf  of  shippers,  with  one  or  more 
transport operators.  They provide services relating to the carriage, consolidation, storage, 
handling, packing or distribution of the goods, as well as ancillary or advisory services 

56  A  few  Lithuanian  trucks  seem  to  be  engaged  in  systematic  cabotage  between  southern  and 

western Norway, according to the study. 

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Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

trucks between two countries with three domestic trips in each of the countries.  The 
issue  of  systematic  cabotage  appears  to  arise  because  of  Denmark’s  specific 
geography  –  its  small  size  means  that  it  is  possible  for  a  truck  to  carry  out 
international  transport  on  a  daily  basis,  with  subsequent  cabotage.    Sternberg  et  al 
(2014)  showed  that  between  150  and  200  trucks  in  Denmark  operate  with  cabotage 
as  a  business  model  –  i.e.  they  are  stationed  in  Denmark,  leaving  the  country  for 
shorter  international  hauls  and  then  returning  to  run  cabotage  in  Denmark.      This  is 
expected to grow, given the major cost differences between Danish and new Member 
States’  hauliers.    According  to  the  study,  the  relatively  high  wages  of  drivers  in 
Denmark make cabotage as a business model a logical consequence.  

6.7.4.  Difficulties in proving legal cabotage 

The  lack  of  common  rules  and  requirements  across  Member  States  (as  discussed  in 
Evaluation  Question  4)  can  lead  to  difficulties  for  hauliers  in  providing  the  required 
documentation  to  prove  that  cabotage  is  lawful,  resulting  in  them  receiving  fines  for 
operations  that  were  otherwise  legal.      This  potential  issue  was  identified  in  the 
literature,  where  AECOM  (2014b)  reports  that  according  to  the  European  Transport 
Workers  Federation  has  found  during  the  field  visits  it  organises  to  interview  freight 
drivers in parking areas has revealed that ‘professional’ drivers are not always aware 
of the cabotage rules and as a result carry out illegal operations on a ‘large scale’. 

Information  on  the  extent  of  this  problem  is  difficult  to  locate  for  the  purposes  of 
cross-checking  the  evidence  from  stakeholders.    Enforcement  authorities  were  asked 
whether  they  could  provide  a  breakdown  of  the  reasons  for  cabotage  infringements 
but  were  not  able  to  identify  what  share  were  due  to  documentation  errors.  
Qualitatively,  the  enforcement  authorities  interviewed  in  Ireland  and  Bulgaria did  not 
think it was a big problem in their countries. The Dutch enforcer commented that they 
knew of some problems but could not estimate the extent.  

Since  access  to  the  cabotage  market  was  only  granted  in  2012  for  Bulgarian  and 
Romanian hauliers, it would be logical to consider that these hauliers would have the 
greatest  risk  of  unintentional  non-compliance  due  to  a  period  of  adjustment  to  the 
new provisions. It is difficult to verify whether this is the case using quantitative data 
due to a lack of availability.  To explore whether stakeholders in Romania and Bulgaria 
felt there were any adjustment problems, several interviews were carried out.   

Qualitatively, the Romanian enforcement authorities interviewed for this study observe 
that the behaviours of Romanian hauliers is improving year by year, i.e. compliance is 
improving. A Romanian undertaking explained that they consider the provisions in the 
Regulation to be fair, but this is undermined by the possibility for countries to impose 
diverse national rules. A Bulgarian association noted that: “lack of clarity in the rules 
creates  a  danger  of  penalising  hauliers  for  accidental  infringements”.    Both  the 
Bulgarian  association  and  a  Romanian  association  pointed  out  that  information  on 
national provisions is not available in a common language (such as English).  

On  the  other  hand,  even  stakeholders  in  Member  States  that  have  had  access  to 
cabotage for longer still report problems.  According to SDG (2013b), the UK enforcers 
have  found  that  the  main  cause  of  cabotage  infringements  is  an  inadequate 
understanding  of  the  cabotage  limitations.  During  interview,  a  Danish  undertaking 
commented “In general the regulations have improved the definition of cabotage and 
have made cabotage operations easier. However, there is still a need for clarification 
of the rules as the main problem is that they are interpreted differently across Member 
States.”.    He  further  explained  that  his  company  has  received  a  number  of  charges 
from  Danish  authorities,  but  they  have  won  every  case  in  front  of  the  court.    The 
possibility of difficulties in proving legal cabotage appears to be supported by a study 
in  Denmark.    The  authors  gained  access  to  complete  legal  documentation  for  one 
Bulgarian  haulier,  and  noted  the  haulier  had  received  several  fines  for  cabotage 
violations, all of them being due to documentation errors (e.g. the driver picked up the 
wrong consignments, failed to get a signature for consignment note etc) (Sternberg et 

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al,  2014).    This  information  from  a  single  haulier  does  not  provide  evidence  of  a 
widespread problem, but rather indicates that it is indeed possible for documentation 
errors to occur in practice.   

To  further  understand  the  potential  for  any  difficulties  in  demonstrating  compliance, 
undertakings  were  asked  about  the  main  difficulties  they  faced  in  proving  lawful 
cabotage, shown in Figure 6-26.  

Figure 6-26: Have you experienced problems with demonstrating compliance 
with cabotage rules to enforcement officers for the following reasons? 

Source: Undertakings survey (N=70) 

The issue of language barriers appears to be the most common, although the results 
also  verify  that  drivers  can  lose  the  required  documents  and  this  is  the  second-most 
common reason. The issue of language barriers was strongly identified by respondents 
from  both  EU-15  and  EU-13  Member  States  (i.e.  identified  as  occurring  most  of  the 
time  or  often  by  20-44%  of  respondents  in  Denmark,  Poland,  Romania  and  Austria).  
The  interaction  with  Combined  Transport  was  also  considered  a  difficulty  in  a  small 
share of cases and is further discussed in Evaluation Question 12. 

Overall,  the  possibility  that  hauliers  have  difficulty  in  proving  legal  cabotage  and 
unintentionally break the rules has been suggested in literature, but the extent of the 
problem  was  difficult  to  confirm.    Respondents  to  the  undertakings  survey  and 
Bulgarian  and  Romanian  interviewees  suggest  that  language  barriers  could  be  an 
important  factor,  including  the  lack  of  information  on  national  interpretations  in  a 
common language.   

6.7.5.  Summary and conclusions for Evaluation Question 7 

6.7.5.1. 

Conclusions 

An  unintended  consequence  of  the  requirement  of  financial  standing  is  that  it  may 
exclude firms that are otherwise considered reliable – due to for example, unforeseen 
market  changes  or  a  temporary  loss  of  a  major  client.    It  appears  that  difficulties  in 
meeting  the  requirement  have  been  exacerbated  especially  following  the  recession, 
and may particularly affect smaller operators.   

Several  stakeholders  voiced  concerns  over  the  potential  for  operators  to  switch  to 
vehicles  of  less  than  3.5t  in  order  to  avoid  the  Regulations  (as  well  as  many  other 
pieces of legislation).  There is very little concrete data to support claims of operators 
switching to lighter vehicles.  This in is part due to a lack of monitoring, as well as the 
difficulty in attributing switching behaviour to the Road Transport Package (as opposed 
to  other  legislation).    An  indication  of  the  potential  incentive  for  switching  can  be 

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obtained by analysing the cost differentials between transport with lighter and heavier 
vehicles.    This  shows  that  HGVs  have  a  substantial  cost  advantage  over  LGVs  (NEA, 
2010).      Even  with  the  combined  regulatory  burden  from  relevant  legislation,  it 
appears  unlikely  that  there  is  substantial  unfair  competition  between  light  goods 
vehicles and heavier freight vehicles in international commercial road freight transport 
(NEA, 2010).   

The increased use of subcontracting and the role of freight forwarders has developed 
externally to the Regulations, driven by market forces and continuing a trend that was 
in  evidence  prior  to  the  introduction  of  the  Regulations.    Possible  unintended  effects 
may  have  arisen  when  considering  this  market  development  alongside  the  scope  of 
the Regulations – i.e.  since freight forwarders and shippers are generally not liable for 
potential  infringements,  hauliers  can  come  under  more  intense  pressure  to  infringe 
regulations.  More specifically, the unintended effect of the rules is to place additional 
pressure  on  hauliers  when  seen  in  combination  with  market  developments  in 
subcontracting / use of freight forwarders. 

The problem of “systematic” cabotage, where hauliers spend the majority of their time 
in another EU country, appears to affect some Member States more than others – in 
particular,  this  activity  has  been  reported  in  Denmark,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  in 
Norway.    This  unintended  effect  occurs  because  systematic  cabotage  is  not  strictly 
forbidden by the Regulations, as long as the haulier is leaving the country every week.  
The relatively high wages of drivers in Denmark appears to be a key factor in making 
it more vulnerable to systematic cabotage as a business model, although the extent to 
which this occurs in other Member States is unknown.   

Overall,  the  possibility  that  hauliers  have  difficulty  in  proving  legal  cabotage  and 
unintentionally break the rules has been suggested in literature and in some individual 
cases, but the extent of the problem was difficult to confirm.   

6.7.5.2. 

Recommendations   

The  unintended  effects  of  the  requirements  of  financial  standing  leading  to  greater 
firm  exit  may  be  mitigated  by  extending  the  maximum  permissible  grace  period  to 
rectify the lack of financial standing to 12 months, instead of the current maximum of 
6  months.    The  additional  costs  of  this  measure  to  enforcement  authorities  are 
expected  to  be  minimal  on  the  basis  that  the existing  verifications  should  already be 
carried out (expect now at 12 months rather than 6).   

The potential for switching to lighter vehicles (<3.5t) is not clear and in the absence of 
concrete  data  on  such  problems,  no  legislative  measures  at  the  EU-level  are 
recommended by the study team.  Should concerns arise at the national level, there is 
demonstrated  experience  in  extending  the  rules  -  around  half  of  the  Member  States 
consulted  for  this  study  apply  the  same  cabotage  rules  to  vehicles  less  than  3.5t 
(Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Latvia, Poland, Slovak Republic, 
Sweden). 

Concerning  the  increased  use  of  subcontracting  and  the  role  of  freight  forwarders  – 
two possible solutions have been put forward: 

Firstly, introducing separate requirements for freight forwarders/shippers on access to 
the  profession  has  been  suggested:  In  a  presentation  at  the  Working  Party  on 
Intermodal  Transport  and  Logistics,  it  was  pointed  out  that  in  other professions  such 
as  lawyers,  doctors,  accountants,  practitioners  must  meet  certain  requirements  in 
order  to  gain  access  to  national  and  /  or  the  common  market  –  hence  it  was 
questioned why freight forwarders did not have similar requirements (UNECE, 2014).   
Possible  criteria could  include the requirement  of  good  repute,  financial  standing  and 
proven  market  knowledge  (UNECE,  2014).  This  would  have  benefits  in  terms  of 
increased  market  confidence,  reliability  and  quality  assurance,  but  could  also  restrict 
access  for  small  or  medium-sized  forwarders.  On  the  other  hand,  representatives  of 
freight forwarders interviewed for this study assert that the same conditions for access 

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to the profession could not apply since the responsibilities and required knowledge are 
quite different.   

The  second  possible  solution  would  be  introducing  joint  liability,  which  would  make 
freight  forwarders  responsible  for  infringements  that  they  contributed  to  –  this 
approach  is  already  used  in  the  Driving  Time  Regulation  (561/2006),  as  well  as  in 
certain  national  legislation  (e.g.  Germany).    However,  this  is  rarely  implemented  in 
practice due to the complex subcontracting arrangements in place that make it difficult 
to  determine  responsibility  and  meet  the  burden  of  proof  (Barbarino  et  al,  2014).  
Nevertheless,  a  greater  recourse  to  such  measures  has  been  identified  by  the  High 
Level  Group  as  a  positive  aspect  that  should  be  applied  to  other  areas  of  road 
transport  legislation  as  a  means  of  improving  the  effectiveness  of  the  rules  (Bayliss, 
2012).    In  the  view  of  the  study  team,  the  second  approach  of  introducing  joint 
liability  is  preferable  since  it  is  already  used  in  some  Member  States  and  therefore 
proven to be acceptable.  The possibility of introducing co-liability is considered further 
(along with recommendations) in Evaluation Question 12, in the context of ensuring a 
coherent legal framework. 

The practice of systematic cabotage is not strictly prohibited under the current form of 
the Regulations and it is clear that it is used in practice as a business model in some 
Member  States.    In  order  to  prevent  systematic  cabotage,  the  idea  of  a  “waiting 
period” has been discussed in Denmark, under which a certain amount of time would 
be  required  before  a  new  international  carriage  could  be  associated  with  cabotage 
(Trafikstyrelsen, 2013).  However, according to the Danish authorities the Commission 
has  stated  that  such  a  waiting  period  has  no  support  in  the  Regulation 
(Trafikstyrelsen,  2013).    Without  an  amendment  to  the  rules  to  allow  some  sort  of 
waiting period, it is therefore not clear how Member States can address this issue. 

Respondents  to  the  undertakings  survey  and  Bulgarian  and  Romanian  interviewees 
suggest that language barriers could be an important factor in the difficulties faced by 
hauliers  in  proving  legal  cabotage,  including  the  lack  of  information  on  national 
interpretations in a common language (e.g. English).  This issue is also related to the 
variation  in  national  rules  (discussed  in  Evaluation  Question  4,  along  with  specific 
recommendations),  since  the  differences  contribute  to  problems  of  proving  legal 
cabotage.    Some  authorities  have  produced  detailed  national  guidance  (e.g.  the 
French  guidelines  are  cited  as  an  example  of  best  practice  in  AECOM,  2014b  –  other 
countries  also  produce  guidance  including  Italy  and  Denmark).    However,  such 
information is still not available for all countries nor available in a common location.  A 
relatively low-cost solution would be to present the information already available in a 
central  area  (such  as  the  Commission  website),  which  can  be  used  by  hauliers  or 
associations.    

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6.8.  Efficiency: To what extent have the Regulations helped to reduce 
costs  (i.e.  compliance  and  administrative)  both  for  transport 
undertakings and national authorities?  

To  what  extent  have  the  Regulations  helped  to  reduce  costs  (i.e.  compliance  and 
administrative) both for transport undertakings and national authorities? In particular, 
were  the  expected  impacts  in  terms  of  administrative  simplification  (€190  million) 
achieved? Have the Regulations created any unintended additional costs? 

This evaluation question considers first the administrative cost savings and compliance 
costs that have occurred in practice, as compared to those expected at the time the 
Regulations were introduced.   

6.8.1.  Administrative cost savings 

The  ex-ante  savings  of  €190  million  were  expected  to  arise  from  administrative 
simplification  (European  Commission,  2007a).    This  figure  includes  impacts  on  the 
passenger  sector,  which  are  outside  of  the  scope  of  this  study.    The  relevant  total 
savings  within  the  scope  of  this  study  are  €182  million.    There  are  three  elements 
that  accounted  for  93%  (€175 million)  of  the  total  ex-ante  cost  savings,  which  are 
considered in the quantitative assessment below: improved monitoring, introduction of 
financial standing requirements and harmonisation of control documents.   

Table  6-11  shows  a  comparison  between  the  ex-ante  and  the  ex-post  cost  savings.  
Overall,  the  benefits  are  lower  than  originally  anticipated,  mainly  due  to  the  non-
achievement of the improved monitoring system under ERRU.  The full calculations of 
the ex-post costs are provided in Annex A (see Section 9.8.1).  The main points for 
each cost item are as follows: 

  Improved  monitoring:  Responses  from  stakeholders  suggest  the  benefits 
have been smaller than the ex-ante estimate. However, ministries consulted for 
this  study  are  optimistic  that  the  fully  interconnected  system  will  provide 
benefits.  The lower-bound ex-post benefits for public authorities are estimated 
on  the  basis  of  findings  in  ICF  (2014),  which  report  administrative  burden 
reductions of €1 million compared to the baseline for five countries, mainly due 
to  the  use  of  electronic  systems  (as  opposed  to  paper-based).  Due  to  the 
limited data available, the ICF report recommended that the data for countries 
should  not  be  extrapolated,  and  hence  no  upper-bound  estimate  was 
developed.  Time  savings  for  industry  are  estimated  to  be  negligible  in  the 
lower-bound case, as the expected benefits are mainly due to the avoidance of 
unnecessary checks under the interconnected system, which has not yet been 
achieved.    It  was  not  possible  to  define  upper-bound  estimates,  since  no 
further information could be found either in the literature or from stakeholders 
to form the basis of a more up-to-date estimation.   

  Financial standing: The main benefits were expected to arise due to the use 
of  bank  guarantees,  which  would  avoid  the  need  for  time-consuming  regular 
reporting  and  checks.  Since  most  countries  had  already  allowed  the  use  of 
bank  guarantees,  only  a  portion  of  undertakings  would  be  affected.  The  ex-
ante estimate assumed that 270,000 firms would opt to use bank guarantees, 
with a saving of €122 per annum per firm for industry and €100 per annum per 
firm  for public  authorities.    The  ex-post  estimation  is  based  on  the  number of 
community  licences  in  countries  that  changed  their  system  to  meet  the 
Regulations, which appears to be much lower than the ex-ante assumption, at 
107,525-156,051.  Responses to the undertakings survey indicate that in most 
cases  there  was  no  cost  or  saving,  but  a  small  portion  of  firms  experienced 
some impact.  The weighted average impact is a cost of  €53 per firm.  As for 
public authorities, no more up-to-date estimates were available of the costs or 
savings, so no ex-post estimate could be developed. 

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  Control  documents:  Feedback  from  stakeholders  indicates  that  harmonised 
control  documents  have  significantly  speeded  up  checks.    The  underlying 
assumptions  for  the  ex-ante  estimate  are  not  clear,  but  are  assumed  to  be 
mainly  due  to  time  savings.  Quantitative  estimates  obtained  in  interviews 
found  estimates  that  checks  had  speeded  up  by  15  minutes  on  the  road  for 
enforcement  officers  and  hauliers  (plus  45  minutes  of  back  office  time  for 
hauliers).  The  number  of  checks  EU-wide  is  estimated  at  1.2  million.  Cost 
savings  are  estimated  using  the  average  wage  rate  of  workers  in  public 
administration (€20.5/hr) for public authorities, and the average operating cost 
of a truck excluding fuel (€50/hr) for industry (for time saved during road-side 
checks.  Back-office time is estimated at a wage rate of €20.5/hr – the same as 
public  authorities).  Assuming  that  around  half  of  all  checks  are  now  quicker 
gives  the  upper-bound,  whereas  the  lower-bound  assumes  that  only  29%  of 
checks are now quicker – these shares are in line with survey responses from 
undertakings. 

Table 6-11: Comparison of administrative cost savings (€ millions) 

Industry 

Public authorities 

Total 

Ex-ante 

Ex-post 

Ex-
ante 

Ex-post 

Ex-ante 

Ex-post 

Difference 

33 

Negligible 

42 

1 

75 

1 

-74 

33 

-8 to -6 

27 

unknown 

60 

-8 to -6 

20 

11 to 18 

20 

2 to 3 

40 

13 to 21 

86 

5 to 10 

89 

3 to 4 

175 

8 to 14 

- 66 to  
- 68 

- 27 to  
- 19 

- 167 to 

- 161 

Improved 
monitoring 

Financial 
standing 

Control 
documents 

Total 
savings 

* Expected once ERRU system is fully functioning, assuming that ex-ante benefits are achieved 
Source:  Ex-ante  costs  from  (European  Commission,  2007a);  full  calculations  of  ex-post  costs 
provided in Annex A, Section 9.8.1 

The  ex-post  estimations  show  in  all  cases  that  the  savings  were  substantially  lower 
than  the  expected  benefits,  and  in  practice  there  is  very  little  evidence  of  any 
significant savings due.  The ex-post cost estimates are based on various assumptions 
and  approximations  due  to  the  overall  poor  availability  of  relevant  data,  and  are 
therefore subject to large uncertainties.  As such, they should be interpreted only as a 
guide  to  the  overall  level  of  savings  in  various  categories  for  the  purposes  of 
comparisons with the ex-ante costs. 

6.8.2.  Additional compliance costs 

The  main  additional  costs  in  the  ex-ante  assessment  were  due  to  increased 
compliance  costs  on  industry,  as  shown  in  Table  6-12.    These  were  thought  to  arise 
mainly  from  the  requirement  of  professional  competence  and  the  requirement  for  a 
designated transport manager   The ex-post costs have been calculated to be broadly 
in line with ex-ante cost (within the range of uncertainty).  The key assumptions are 
as follows: 

  Professional competence: This cost arises due to the need for training.  The 
actual  average  cost  of  training  was  slightly  lower  than  the  ex-ante  estimate 
(€1,030  compared  to  €1,200,  from  Machenil,  2014),  whereas  the  number  of 
applicants  was  slightly  higher  (around  14,500  compared  to  10,000),  leading 
overall  to  a  roughly  comparable  cost.    For  public  authorities,  the  cost  of 
accrediting a training centre was estimated to be substantially lower in practice 

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by  enforcement  authorities  compared  to  what  was  originally  assumed  (€200 
per centre ex-post, compared to €4,000 per centre ex-ante). 

  Transport  manager:  The  vast  majority  of  undertakings  consulted  indicated 
employing  a  transport  manager  did  not  imply  any  significant  change  in  costs, 
largely because they already fulfilled this requirement – hence overall costs to 
industry  are  assumed  to  be  negligible  in  the  lower  bound  case.    The  upper 
bound  case  assumes  that  around  1%  of  all  firms  incur  additional  costs.    The 
ex-ante  cost  estimate  only  considered  reimbursement  of  the  training  costs 
(€1,200).  The ex-post cost estimate instead reflects the need to increase pay 
in line with additional responsibilities (estimated at a €4,570 increase). 

Table 6-12: Comparison of additional compliance costs (€ millions) 

Industry 

Ex-ante 

Ex-post 

12 

15 - 21 

Professional 
competence 

Transport 
manager 

6 

Negligible to 
13 

Total costs 

18 

15 to 34 

Public authorities 
Ex-ante  Ex-post  Ex-ante 

Total 

Ex-post 

2 

0 

2 

0.1 

14 

15 to 21.1 

0 

6 

0 to 13 

0 to 0.1 

20 

15 to 34.1 

Difference 

+ 1 to 
+7.1 

- 6 to 
0 

- 5 to 
+ 7.1 

Source:  Ex-ante  costs  from  (European  Commission,  2007a);  full  calculations  of  ex-post  costs 
provided in Annex A, Section 9.8.2 

As  for  the  calculation  of  benefits,  the  availability  of  the  required  underlying  data  is 
extremely poor and hence the ex-post estimates should be interpreted as very rough 
approximations only, for the purposes of comparing the magnitude of impacts.    

6.8.3.  Other costs or benefits 

increase 

identified  a  “significant 

Concerning  the  requirement  of  stable  and  effective  establishment,  the  ex-ante 
estimates assumed that most businesses would already comply.  The results from the 
survey  of  undertakings  indicate  that  this  seems  to  have  been  the  case,  with  81% 
indicating  that  there  had  been  no  significant  cost  changes.    However,  8%  of 
in  costs”  associated  with  this 
respondents 
requirement.    However,  only  one  of  the  respondents  that  indicated  a  significant  cost 
increase  could  provide  a  numerical  estimate,  which  they  reported  as  €300  per  year.  
Although this seems inconsistent with the identification of the costs as significant, this 
respondent  was  a  self-employed  operator  and  such  costs  could  be  proportionately 
larger.  Estimates of the additional costs were obtained from 29 other undertakings of 
which 24 estimated the cost at zero, and the average of the five numerical responses 
received  was  €1,400.    Conversely,  5%  of  respondents  identified  some  reduction  in 
costs due to this requirement, although again numerical estimates were not provided.  
Overall  it  seems  that  the  requirement  of  stable  and  effective  establishment  could 
increase  costs  for  some  organisations  (although  the  magnitude  is  not  clear).    At  the 
same  time,  it  does  not  appear  to  have  systematically  impacted  the  industry  and  the 
majority of firms already met the requirements.   

There  were  no  other  additional  costs  or  benefits  identified  as  being  significant  in  the 
survey of undertakings.  A review of the literature also suggests that additional costs 
may  have  been  minimal.    For  example,  a  study  published  by  the  Polish  Ministry  of 
Transport  noted  that  the  authorisations  to  pursue  the  occupation  of  road  transport 
operator  in  Europe  replaced  the  previous  national  operating  licences  in  2007,  which 
would take place gradually and not entail any additional costs for business (Ministry of 
Transport,  2013).      The  Dutch  and  Slovakian  respondents  quoted  in  ICF  (2014)  felt 
that  the  business  impact  was  very  limited  in  their  countries.  The  UK  ex-ante 
assessment  found  that  the  requirement  of  stable  and  effective  establishment  would 
have  minimal  effect  because  operators  already  had  to  demonstrate  an  operating 

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centre (DfT, 2010). They also considered the impact of cabotage to be minimal due to 
the low penetration rates (DfT, 2010).  

Opportunity costs due to loss of good repute may affect individual transport managers 
(through  loss  of  income  for  an  average  of  two  years)  but  losses  of  income  will  be 
offset  by  income  gains  to  other  transport  managers  that  have  retained  their  good 
repute. In the long-run, the industry and society as a whole would also be expected to 
benefit  from  the  disqualification  of  those  managers  judged  to  be  of  ill  repute  (DfT, 
2010).  Unexpected  benefits  may  have  arisen  due  to  the  unanticipated  need  to 
temporarily  relax  the  cabotage  rules  in  order  to  meet  seasonal  peaks  in  the  motor 
vehicle trade in the UK.  The DfT estimates the additional benefits to businesses to be 
around  €1.8  million  per  year,  whereas  the  additional  cost  to  treasury  due  to  loss  of 
fuel  duty  and  VAT  would  be  €0.05  million  per  year  (DfT,  2012).    This  situation  is 
however rather unique to the UK and does not apply across Europe.   

Considering whether requirements might have disproportionate impacts on SMEs is an 
important part of evaluation. Around 45% of respondents to the high level survey felt 
that the Regulations had disproportionate impacts on SMEs.  The industry associations 
noted that in general, common administrative burdens automatically affect SMEs more 
and  also  felt  that  being  at  the  bottom  of  the  subcontracting  chain  made  them  less 
competitive. An industry association explained that negative impacts on SMEs may not 
necessarily  be  because  of  the  Regulation,  but  because  of  market  forces  and  the 
economic crisis. SMEs are disadvantaged because they cannot be as flexible as bigger 
companies  and  they  can't  outflag  or  subcontract.  Qualitatively,  in  ICF  (2014), 
Lithuania  and  Malta  underlined  that  it  might  be  more  difficult  for  SMEs  to  have  a 
transport manager in charge of haulage operations, as restrictions on the numbers of 
enterprises and vehicles were imposed.  In their responses to the survey of ministries, 
representatives from Lithuania also asserted that SMEs find it more difficult to have a 
transport manager in charge of haulage operations as restrictions on the numbers of 
enterprises and vehicles were imposed.   

The  view  that  cost  increases  naturally  affect  SMEs  more  negatively  makes  intuitive 
sense,  although  it  was  not  strongly  supported  by  the  responses  from  undertakings.  
The  survey  asked  about  whether  each  of  the  requirements  of  the  Regulations  had 
increased or reduced their costs.  Smaller companies employing fewer than 20 people 
(around one-third of respondents) actually had a lower share of respondents indicating 
a  cost  increase  compared  to  the  group  as  a  whole,  for  each  of  the  requirements 
relating  to  the  Regulations  (stable  and  effective  establishment,  financial  standing, 
transport  managers,  professional  competence,  cabotage  documentation  etc).    At  the 
same  time,  the  smaller  companies  indicated  a  higher  share  of  respondents  choosing 
the option of “don’t know”, which may explain this apparent discrepancy.   

6.8.4.  Summary and conclusions 

Overall, the benefits experienced to date due to reductions in administrative cost are 
much  lower  (92-95%  lower)  than  the  amount  originally  anticipated,  estimated  at  €8 
million to €14 million per annum to date, compared to the total savings expected for 
improved  monitoring,  financial  standing  and  harmonised  control  documents  of  €175 
million.  

The shortfall is mainly due to the fact that the ERRU system is not fully functional and 
negligible  benefits  could  be  calculated  to  date,  meaning  that  the  expected  benefits 
have  not  been  achieved.    Stakeholders  are  however  optimistic  that  the  system  will 
eventually  lead  to  cost  savings  once  the  interconnection  is  complete,  although  the 
possible  savings  once  this  is  achieved  could  not  be  estimated/quantified.    The  other 
main area of shortfall was the requirement of financial standing, which was expected 
to lead to savings for industry but is calculated to have resulted in net costs.  It may 
be  possible  that  the  benefits  due  to  these  requirements  could  not  be  noticed  or 
quantified  by  firms  since  they  were  expected  to  arise  from  less  frequent  verification 
(i.e. possibly time savings) – in any case, it seems they are unlikely to be significant 

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since  firms  could  not  identify  them.    In  the  view  of  the  consultants,  the  original 
estimates seem to have been over-optimistic.  

The additional compliance costs are estimated at €15 to €34 million per annum, which 
is broadly comparable to the ex-ante estimates of €20 million per annum.  The main 
uncertainty is the extent to which firms have been affected by the requirement for a 
designated  transport  manager  in  practice,  considering  the  possible  need  to  increase 
their salary commensurate with their increased responsibilities.  

In all cases, it should be noted that the availability of the underlying data required for 
the calculations is extremely poor, and hence the cost estimates should be interpreted 
as  a  very  rough  estimation  of  the  magnitude  of  impacts,  rather  than  an  exact 
calculation.   

Additional  costs  not  already  considered  may  include  costs  to  businesses  to  meet  the 
requirements of stable and effective establishment, but the impact does not appear to 
be  systematic  and  the  majority  of  firms  indicated  that  they  already  met  this 
requirement.    Other  costs  were  not  identified  as  being  significant.    The  possible 
negative  impact  of  cost  increases  on  SMEs  was  highlighted  by  industry  associations 
and  ministries  in  Lithuania  and  Malta,  but  the  extent  of  this  is  not  clear  and  SME 
respondents  to  the  undertakings  survey  did  not  provide  replies  that  suggested  a 
disproportionate impact.   

The  main  shortfall  in  the  achievement  of  the  expected  benefits  is  due  to  the 
incomplete functioning of ERRU, and hence it is recommended that interconnection is 
pursued as a priority.  The cost-effectiveness of such measures are calculated in more 
detail in Evaluation Question 9. 

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6.9.  Efficiency:  Are  there  costs  related  to  the  implementation  of  the 
new  provisions?  If  so,  are  they  proportionate  to  the  benefits 
achieved? 

Are  there  costs  related  to  the  implementation  of  the  new  provisions,  such  as  those 
related to stable and effective establishment, the European Register of Road Transport 
Undertakings and cabotage? If so, are they proportionate to the benefits achieved, in 
relation  to  the  measures  set  out  in  the  Regulations  (e.g.  setting  up  and 
interconnection  of  electronic  registers,  harmonisation  of  transport  documents  and 
checks of the establishment and cabotage provisions)? 

This  evaluation  question  is  concerned  with  the  implementation  costs  in  relation  to 
Regulations 1071/2009 and 1072/2009, that arose during the course of changing their 
national rules and introducing the new systems. 

6.9.1.  Qualitative analysis of implementation costs  

As  a  first  step,  the  relevant  one-off  costs  and  ongoing  costs  were  identified  (see 
Table  6-13)  and  a  qualitative  assessment  of  their  importance  was  made.    This 
screening is based on the responses from national enforcement authorities, who were 
asked to identify whether each item had a significant, small or negligible contribution 
to implementation costs.   

Table 6-13: Implementation costs for Regulations 1071/2009 and 1072/2009 

Cost item 

Regulation 1071/2009 

Contribution to overall 
implementation costs 

(% of stakeholder responses) 

Obligation to set up / maintain national electronic register 
and connect this with ERRU 

Significant contribution (82%) 

Establishing a risk rating system for targeting checks of 
good repute / financial standing / stable establishment 

Obligations for cooperation across borders 

Requirements for checks on stable and effective 
establishment 

Small contribution or no 
contribution (80%) 

Small contribution or no 
contribution (58%) 

No material impact (64%) 

Obligations to mutually recognise certificates issued in 
other Member States 

No material impact (70%) 

Regulation 1072/2009 

Obligation to ensure that serious infringements are 
recorded in the national electronic register (Article 14) 

Small contribution or no 
contribution (66%) 

Changes to the cabotage provisions 

No material impact (75%) 

Common format for community licences and drivers’ 
attestations 

No material impact (57%) 

Notes:  Respondents  identifying  that  costs  were  not  applicable  are  excluded  from  the 
calculations and percentages based on the remaining pool of respondents 
Source: Survey of enforcement authorities 

Specifically  concerning  the  cost  elements  identified  in  the  evaluation  question  itself, 
harmonisation  of  transport  documents  (common  format  for  community  licences 
and drivers’ attestations), checks on establishment and changes to the cabotage 
provisions  were  not  identified  as  having  had  any  significant  contribution  to  overall 
implementation costs.   

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6.9.2.  Quantitative analysis of identified implementation costs for public 
administrations 

As  shown  in  Table  6-13,  the  only  provision  that  made  a  significant  contribution  to 
implementation costs was the setting up of national electronic registers and their 
interconnection with ERRU.  

6.9.2.1. 

Setting up / upgrading of national registers 

Data  on  set-up  costs  for  national  registers  were  provided  by  a  number  of  Member 
States  (full  details  are  in  Annex  A,  see  Section  9.9.1).    Ministries  were  asked  to 
provide  estimates  of  the  setup  and  interconnection  costs,  disregarding  any  costs 
incurred  that  were  not  due  to  the  Regulation  (i.e.  ensuring  that  only  the  additional 
impact  of  the  Regulation  was  estimated).    In  absolute  terms,  there  was  a very  large 
variation  from  €14,755  in  Cyprus  up  to  €2.5  million  in  Poland.    In  some  cases,  the 
interconnection  cost  was  included  in  the  estimate  of  set-up  costs  (Germany,  UK, 
Ireland, Latvia, and Lithuania).   

To establish whether the expected level of costs were realised, the actual costs need 
to be compared to the ex-ante estimates.  Full details of the calculations are provided 
in Annex A.  Ex-ante cost estimates were taken from the TUNER study (Wilson et al, 
2009).   On the basis of the data provided by 11 Member States, the costs for set-up / 
upgrading of national registers were extrapolated to estimate the total investment for 
the EU-28.  The costs of implementation tend to scale with the size and complexity of 
the required system, hence Member States were classified according to whether they 
had small, medium or large registers (see Annex A for more details).   

As  shown  in  Table  6-14,  the  ex-post  cost  outcomes  appear  to  be  around  two-thirds 
lower  than  the  ex-ante  estimates.  The  total  cost  of  setting  up/upgrading  national 
registers for all 28 Member States was estimated at €18.2 million ex-post, compared 
to €52.75 million ex-ante.  However, it should be noted that, at the time the ex-ante 
estimates  provided  in  TUNER  were  considered  to  be  a  “worst  case”  (but  realistic) 
scenario,  and  were  calculated  in  recognition  of  the  fact  that  development  costs  for 
older systems could be significant. 

Table  6-14:  Comparison  between  ex-ante  and  ex-post  costs  for  set  up  / 
upgrading of national registers (disregarding any prior costs)  

Register size 

Number of 
Member 
States 

Member States 

Ex-ante set up cost  
(€ millions) 

Ex-post set up cost  
(€ millions) 

Small 

Medium 

Large 

Total 

9 

12 

7 

28 

HR, CY, DK, EE, FI, 
LT, LU, MT 

AT, BE, BG, CZ, EL, 
HU, IE, PT, RO, SE, 
SI, SK  

FR, DE, IT, NL, PL, 
ES, UK 

0.75 

1.5 

4.0 

52.75 

0.37 

0.51 

1.25 

18.20 

Notes: Cost  estimates of  set-up costs  provided by  Germany, Latvia,  Lithuania,  UK  and  Ireland 
were adjusted to take account of the fact that their cost estimates also included interconnection 
costs. 
Source:  Ex-ante  cost  estimates  and  MS  register  size  categories  from  Wilson  et  al  (2009), 
assuming  that  HR  has  a  small  register.    Ex-post  cost  estimates  from  survey  of  national 
ministries. 

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6.9.2.2. 

Interconnection to ERRU 

Not  all  Member  States  are  interconnected  to  the  ERRU  system  (see  Evaluation 
Question 3, Section 6.3), due to technical difficulties and delays. To date, 20 Member 
States57 are connected (plus Norway, which is not included in the calculations since it 
is not part of the EU-28).  Full details of the calculations are provided in Annex A. 

Separate  estimates  of  the  cost  of  interconnection  were  provided  by  eight  Member 
States  that  have  achieved  interconnection  indicate  that  on  average  the  costs  were 
around €300,000, but showing a very large range from €21,600 to €1.4 million.  There 
does not appear to be any relationships between the interconnection cost and the size 
of the national register, and no substantive comments were given by stakeholders as 
to why the costs may have varied.   

Nevertheless,  it  could  be  expected  that  the  costs  depend  more  on  the  ease  of  the 
implementation  process.    A  straightforward  interconnect  would  require  (Wilson  et  al, 
2009): 

  National registers are in place that have high degrees of automation; 

 

Information required by the Regulations to be already available; 

  Good ICT infrastructure already in place. 

Conversely,  if  these  conditions  are  not  met,  the  interconnection  process  would  be 
more  difficult.    The  number  of  Member  States  with  easy,  medium  and  difficult 
implementation  was  processes  taken  from  TUNER  project  (Wilson  et  al,  2009).    Only 
the  overall  numbers  were  identified  in  the  report  and  difficulty  levels  were  not 
assigned to individual countries.  In the absence of more up-to-date information, the 
same  number of  Member States  experiencing  easy,  medium  and  difficult connections 
was  assumed  in  order  to  extrapolate  the  partial  information  received  to  cover  all  20 
Member  States  that  have  interconnected  their  registers  so  far.  This  was  assumed  to 
be  a  reasonable  approximation  since  the  original  classification  in  the  TUNER  project 
was based on the infrastructure in place prior to the Regulations.  

Table 6-15 shows that the estimated ex-post interconnection costs for all 28 Member 
States  is  around  €3  million.    This  is  around  85%  lower  than  the  ex-ante  cost 
estimates.  Full details of the calculations are given in Annex A (see Section 9.9.3). 

Table  6-15:  Comparison  of  ex-ante  and  ex-post  cost  estimates  for 
interconnection 

Ease of 
implementation 

Number of 
Member States 
ex-ante (ex-
post) 

Ex-ante interconnection 
cost (€ millions) 

Ex-post interconnection 
cost (€ millions) 

Easy 

10 (7) 

0.58 (medium)  

(0.4 - 0.7) 

Medium 

11 (8) 

0.68 (medium)  

(0.5 - 0.8) 

Difficult 

7 (5) 

0.98 (medium)  

(0.8 - 1) 

Total 

28 (20) 

20.14 (medium)  

(15.1 - 22.8) 

0.05 

0.12 

0.31 

2.83 

57  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Cyprus,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Ireland, 
Latvia,  Lithuania,  Malta,  Netherlands,  Romania,  Slovak  Republic,  Slovenia,  Spain,  Sweden 
and the UK 

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* easy” interconnection taken as the lower quartile of the estimates provided; “medium” taken 
as the median of all estimates; “difficult” taken as the upper quartile of the estimates provided 
Notes:  Number  of  Member  States  with  easy,  medium  and  difficult  implementation  processes 
taken  from  TUNER  project  (Wilson  et  al,  2009).    Only  overall  numbers  were  identified,  and 
difficulty  levels  were  not  assigned  to  individual  countries.  Croatia  assumed  to  have  a  medium 
difficulty implementation.  Low, medium and high interconnection costs depend on whether low, 
medium  or  high  staff  costs  were  assumed.    Costs  include  staff  time,  maintenance,  hardware, 
software & interface connections 

6.9.3.  Cost-benefit analysis 

The primary benefits of setting up the ERRU were intended to be in terms of allowing 
more  efficient  and  effective  enforcement.    These  benefits  are  assessed  in  Evaluation 
Question 8, see Section 6.8), where it is found that there have been limited benefits to 
date  since  the  system  is  not  currently  fully  functioning.  The  ex-post  benefits  are 
estimated to be €1 million per year for public authorities and negligible for businesses.   

The  cost-benefit  analysis  must  take  one  further  cost  into  account  -  the  activities 
involved  in  maintenance,  management  and  operation  of  the  interconnected  registers 
represent  an  ongoing  cost  of  enforcement.    The  ex-ante  cost  estimate  for  ongoing 
maintenance at the EU level was €6 million per year (European Commission, 2007a), 
although this was not broken down at a Member State level.  To estimate the ex-post 
costs  it  is  assumed  that  the  maintenance  costs  scale  with  the  complexity  of  the 
national  registers.  As  shown  in  Table  6-16,  the  ex-post  cost  outcomes  appear  to  be 
around 73% lower than the ex-ante estimates, with the total for all 28 Member States 
estimated at €1.6 million (full details are given in Annex A).   

Table 6-16: Comparison between ex-ante and ex-post costs for maintenance 
of interconnected registers 

Register size 

Number of 
Member States 

Ex-ante maintenance cost of 
national registers (€) 

Ex-post maintenance 
cost (average €)* 

Large 

Medium 

Small 

Total 

7 

12 

9 

28 

Not given 

Not given 

Not given 

35,000 

59,000 

88,000 

6,000,000 

1,639,000 

*  unadjusted  average  of  responses  received  from  Member  States  in  the  surveys  in  each  size 
category 
Notes:  Number  of  Member  States  with  each  register  size  taken  from  TUNER  project.    Croatia 
assumed to have a small size 

The reason for this discrepancy is not explained by any comments from stakeholders, 
but  probably  reflects  the  lower  staffing  levels.    According  to  the  UK  Department  of 
Transport  (DfT,  2014c)  staff  costs  are  one  of  the  most  important  components  of  the 
overall  running  costs.    Hence  the  overall  low  costs  may  indicate  that  enforcement 
agencies  lack  appropriate levels  of  manpower  (as  suggested  by  stakeholders).    Once 
the  system  of  ERRU  is  fully  functioning  and  if  Member  States  are  making  and 
responding to requests, it could be expected that the maintenance costs will increase 
compared to the estimates provided for the current partially-functioning system.   

As shown in Table 6-17, the ex-post benefit-cost ratio is 0.2, based on the estimated 
current  maintenance  costs  and  lower-bound  estimated  benefits.    This  indicates  that 
the  system  has  not  been  cost-effective  to  date.    Full  calculations  are  provided  in 
Annex A (see Section 9.9).  

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Table 6-17: Net Present Value (NPV) of ERRU system (€ millions) 

NPV costs  
(one-off plus maintenance) 

NPV benefits 

Public 
authorities  

Industry 

Benefit-
Cost ratio 

34.9 

8.4 

negligible 

0.2 

NPV to-date (20 
Member States 
interconnected) 

Notes:  Using  a  discount  factor  of  4%,  and  estimating  the  costs  and  benefits  over  10  years.  
Benefits  are  assumed  to  start  accruing  annually  the  year  after  the  system  is  in  place.    Costs 
include the discounted costs of set-up, interconnection and maintenance.   

As discussed in Evaluation Question 3, the benefits in the cost-benefit calculations are 
substantially  lower  than  expected  due  to  the  partial  functioning  of  the  ERRU  system.  
Qualitatively,  the  benefits  are  widely  expected  to  increase  once  the  system  is  fully 
functioning  (see  Evaluation  Question  3).    Nevertheless,  the  extent  of  these  expected 
benefits  could  not  be  quantified  and  it  cannot  be  confirmed  whether or  not  the  cost-
benefit of the completed system will be positive or negative.  Taking into account that 
only 13 Member States were connected to ERRU in 2014 (rising to 20 in 2015 - plus 
Norway), it is considered too early to measure what the possible benefits  of the fully 
interconnected system will be.    

6.9.4.  Summary and conclusions for Evaluation Question 9 

This  Evaluation  Question  has  looked  at  the  implementation  costs  due  to  the  new 
requirements laid down in Regulations 1071/2009 and 1072/2009.   

The  only  provision  that  made  a  significant  contribution  to  implementation  costs  was 
the  setting  up  of  national  electronic  registers  and  their  interconnection  with  ERRU.  
Overall,  the  estimated  ex-post  cost  for  all  28  Member  States  is  €18.2  million  for  the 
setting up / upgrading of national registers (excluding any costs incurred prior to the 
adoption of the Regulation) and €2.83 million for their interconnection (a process that 
is still ongoing with only 20 Member States being interconnected to date).  This totals 
to  €22.1  million,  which  is  around  70%  lower  than  the  ex-ante  cost  estimates  of  €73 
million.    

Since  the  system  has  not  been  completed  to  date,  the  benefits  achieved  at  the 
moment  are  also  much  lower  than  the  ex-ante  estimates  (as  discussed  previously  in 
Evaluation  Question  8).    Current  estimates  of  the  benefit-cost  ratio  are  around  0.2 
(assuming  a  discount  rate  of  4%  and  a  time  period  of  10  years),  indicating  that  the 
system  has  not  been  cost-effective  so  far.    This  is  largely  because  the  benefits  are 
assumed to be rather small, due to the incomplete status of interconnection.  Although 
the  benefits  are  widely  expected  to  increase  once  interconnection  is  completed,  no 
quantitative estimates of the eventual benefits of the fully functioning system could be 
obtained.  

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6.10.  Efficiency: To what extent have the Regulations been efficient in 
their objective of enabling enforcement of the existing rules?  

To  what  extent  have  the  Regulations  been  efficient  in  their  objective  of  enabling 
enforcement  of  the  existing  rules?  Have  the  enforcement  practices  put  in  place  by 
Member  States  created  any  savings  or  costs  for  national  authorities  and  transport 
operators? 

This  Evaluation  Question  is  concerned  specifically  with  the  costs  arising  from 
enforcement measures in a “narrow” sense, e.g. the costs for individual checks.  The 
assessment  is  more  qualitative  than  for  the  previous  efficiency  questions.    This  is 
because  the  cost  for individual  elements  of enforcement  cannot  usually  be  separated 
out according to different activities, or even checks of requirements specifically related 
to the Road Transport Package, since enforcement authorities tend to conduct checks 
of several pieces of legislation in parallel.   

6.10.1. 

Regulation 1071/2009 

Enforcement  authorities  consulted  for  this  study  do  not  generally  appear  to  consider 
that  the  provisions  of  Regulation  1071/2009  had  any  significant  impacts  on  ongoing 
enforcement  costs  –  either  positive  or  negative.  Figure  6-27  shows  the  responses  of 
enforcement authorities when asked about the impact of Regulation 1071/2009 on the 
cost of their enforcement activities, with most indicating a neutral impact, and roughly 
equal proportions indicating an increase and a decrease.    

Figure  6-27:  Impact  on  annual  operational  costs  of  enforcement  authorities 
due to Regulation 1071/2009 

Source: Responses to the survey of enforcement authorities (N=14) 

When split by EU-15 and EU-13 respondents (Figure 6-28), the majority of responses 
for  each  group  was  still  that  there  was  no  material  impact.    All  of  the  answers 
indicating a cost reduction came from EU-15 respondents, whereas most of the “don’t 
know” responses came from EU-13 respondents.   

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Figure  6-28:  Impact  on  annual  operational  costs  of  enforcement  authorities 
due to Regulation 1071/2009 

 Source: Responses to the survey of enforcement authorities (9 respondents from EU-15 and 5 
from EU-13) 

The establishment of a risk rating system has elicited the most variation in responses.   
Those that identified significant increases in costs highlighted the additional staff time 
needed to operate the new systems and technical difficulties.  It should also be noted 
that  some  countries  still  have  not  set  up  a  risk  rating  system  as  required,  and  as 
discussed  in  Evaluation  Question  2,  the  functioning  of  these  systems  differs  between 
countries.   

In order to quantify whether the requirements of Regulation 1071/2009 have enabled 
more  targeted  checks,  enforcement  authorities  were  asked  to  estimate  the  extent  to 
which  they  could  now  achieve  this  due  to  the  requirements  of  the  Regulation.    The 
majority of respondents who replied to this question reported that they were not able 
to  reduce  the  number  of  checks  (Romania,  Latvia,  France,  Luxembourg,  Finland  and 
Germany), which appears in line with the qualitative responses received above.   The 
Danish  authority  stated  that  they  conduct  fewer checks  than  before,  but  the  number 
depends on the number of violations that feed into their risk-rating system.   

A  general  lack  of  quantitative  data  has  hindered  a  more  detailed  analysis,  despite 
requests made to ministries and enforcement authorities.  The difficulties in obtaining 
quantified  estimates  were  also  confirmed  in  a  previous  detailed  study  conducted  by 
ICF  (2014),  which  was  commissioned  to  focus  exclusively  on  the  cost  of  the 
Regulations.  In the ICF study, it was not possible to gather quantitative estimates of 
any  administrative  savings/costs  in  seven  Member  States  (the  Czech  Republic, 
Estonia,  Greece,  Spain,  Italy,  Cyprus  and  Slovenia).    In  addition,  the  savings  were 
explicitly  estimated  as  being  negligible  in  a  further  seven  Member  States  (including 

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Latvia,  Malta,  Netherlands,  Austria,  Slovakia,  Finland  and  Denmark).    The  Danish, 
Slovakian, Finnish and Austrian respondents commented that the lack of savings was 
due to similar requirements already being in place.  These findings are broadly in line 
with the responses for the surveys carried out in this study, which also indicate that in 
most  cases  there  was  no  material  impact,  and  that  any  impacts  are  difficult  to 
quantify.    

At  the  Member  State  level,  the  main  obstacles  or  difficulties  experienced  by  Member 
States  relate  to  the  financial  burdens  of  setting  up  and  interconnecting  national 
registers;  technical  difficulties  in  linking  national  registers  to  the  ERRU  and  delayed 
implementation  of  the  systems  slowing  down  the  monitoring  of  road  transport 
undertakings.    As  discussed  in  Evaluation  Question  9,  the  single  biggest  cost  of  the 
Regulation the set up and interconnection of national registers.   

The  differences  between  national  experiences  is  shown  below  through  examples  that 
have  been  developed  based  on  desk  research,  supplemented  with  findings  from  the 
interviews and surveys conducted for this study.   

As  examples  of  countries  that  have  reported  costly  experiences,  Germany  and  Italy 
are  reviewed.    The  German  authorities  reported  in  ICF  (2014)  that  a  new 
administrative  procedure  had  to  be  created  for  the  declaration  that  the  transport 
manager  is  unfit  to  manage  the  transport  activities  of  an  undertaking.  They  felt  that 
this  procedure  causes  further  administrative  burden,  as  does  the  evaluation  of  the 
requirements  of  the  transport  manager  and  the  risk  assessment  of  companies  (but 
these  costs  were  not  quantified).  They  recognise  that  the  extension  of  the  period  of 
validity of the licence from five to ten years might lighten the administrative burden, 
but again did not quantify the impact (ICF, 2014).   However, the response from the 
main enforcement authority in Germany to the survey for this study is not consistent 
with the findings in ICF, as the respondent indicated “some reduction” in ongoing costs 
for all of the requirements on common rules.  

The Italian ministry reported in their survey response that the major problems have 
been  encountered  in  the  test  phase  of  interconnection  since,  having  chosen  to  work 
with  the  platform  Eucaris,  it  was  necessary  to  carry  out  checks  -  first  in  one 
environment and then Eucaris environment configured to interact with the entire ERRU 
system  through  the  central  hub.  It  is  not  directly  clear  why  this  is  the  case  in  Italy, 
since  other  countries  also  used  Eucaris.    A  possible  explanation  as  remarked  by  the 
Italian  trade  associations  in  ICF  (2014)  is  that:  “Regulation  1071/2009  has  led  to 
duplication  between  the  old  Register  of  Road  Haulage  Companies  and  the  New 
National  Electronic  Register,  increasing  the  amount  and  type  of  information  to  be 
provided  and  the  number  of  authorities  the  undertakings  have  to  deal  with.”.    It 
appears that Italy have reported at various times the challenges faced due to the need 
to change from their previous paper-based system (ERRU working group, 2011).   

The representative from Malta reported in ICF (2014) that the main changes that had 
increased  administrative  burden  were  the  introduction  of  the  register  and  the 
limitations  in  the  operation  of  the  transport  manager  to  4  companies  and/or  50 
vehicles. 
from  greater 
harmonisation  and  a  more  level  playing  field  shall  balance  the  increase  in 
administrative burden caused by the same changes (ICF, 2014). 

  However,  they  consider  that  the  positive 

impacts 

The  Portuguese  respondent  in  ICF  (2014)  commented  that  “benefits  derived  from 
this Regulation – although unequivocal – are inherently difficult to account for in terms 
of administrative savings.”, but no further details of national best practice were found.  
The  response  from  Latvia  in  ICF  (2014)  pointed  out  that  the  access  of  enforcers  to 
data on infringements (national registers) and to information on the risk rating of the 
company  (risk  rating  systems) would contribute to  improving  enforcement;  however, 
the examination of all the information still requires administrative resources. 

The Irish respondents to the survey in ICF (2014) commented that potential savings 
of €1.3 million could be achieved due to the new computer systems, which enables the 

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exchange  of  enforcement  data  between  government  agencies,  provides  more  secure 
and  modern  documentation  systems  and  allows  operators  to  apply  for  and  manage 
their records online.  They felt that best practice would be for government bodies will 
continue to seek opportunities for greater electronic sharing of information in order to 
reduce the need for applicants to provide the same information repeatedly where they 
are applying for a range of services across different Government bodies. 

More  broadly,  the  UK  can  be  considered  an  example  of  best  practice.    ICF  (2014) 
reported that the UK authorities found the total direct costs over 10 years were €6.2 
million,  but  estimate  that  the  total  savings  were  €10.9  million  (net  saving  of  €4.7 
million over 10 years).  No further information on exactly what these costs or savings 
could be attributed to was reported.  Quoted in ICF (2014), the UK highlighted the key 
lesson  in  their  implementation  of  using  ‘independent  regulators’  (non-departmental 
public organisations that regulate an industry or sector), working with industry to find 
solutions  to  implementation  difficulties  and  to  find  ways  to  minimise  burdens  where 
possible  (ICF,  2014).    The  UK  respondent  to  the  enforcers’  survey  for  this  study 
remarked that they were able to conduct fewer checks compared to the situation prior 
to Regulation 1071/2009, but stressed that this was due to their national systems and 
not the Regulation.  In the UK, the Operator Compliance Risk Score (OCRS) system is 
used  to  decide  which  vehicles  should  be  inspected  at  the  roadside.  The  scoring 
includes  data  on  roadworthiness  test  history  information,  data  relating  to  when  the 
vehicle  fleet  was  checked  and  actual  checks  undertaken  at  the  roadside,  as  well  as 
traffic  enforcement  data  based  on  a  score  relating  to  the  number  of  infringements 
relating  to  driver  hours  and  the  number  of  infringements  relating  to  overloading  and 
other infringements. The effectiveness of the risk targeting has been demonstrated in 
the  enforcement  statistics  –  the  prohibition  rate  of  targeted  checks  was  26.6%  on 
average in 2013-2014, compared to a rate of 12.5% found for random checks (VOSA, 
2015).   

Quoted  in  ICF  (2014),  best  practice  highlighted  in  the  Netherlands  is  to  efficiently 
carry  out  company  inspections  on  the  basis  of  risk  factors,  and  also  stated  that 
implementation  of  the  Regulations  hade  negligible  impact  on  administrative  burdens 
for businesses and citizens. On the other hand, the Dutch respondents to the survey 
for  this  study  indicated  a  “significant  increase”  in  costs  in  connection  with  the  risk-
rating  system.    When  explored  in  more  detail,  this  cost  was  estimated  to  be  due  to 
having at least one extra full time employee that executes the system.  They were not 
able to estimate the extent of savings, but explained that their risk-rating system had 
been  developed  by  the  Dutch  Road  Haulage  Organisation  for  National  and 
International Transport, and it detects transport operators that are in risk of no longer 
fulfilling the requirement of financial standing. They further elaborated that the system 
also includes risk-targeted of professional competence.  

Enforcers were asked for their suggestions as to how enforcement could be made less 
costly  without  significantly  detracting  from  current  levels  of  compliance.    Several 
suggestions  were  received,  which  were  diverse  and  there  were  no  clear  themes 
emerging  across  groups  of  countries.    For  instance,  the  Romanian  respondent 
suggested  developing  automatic  control  systems  using  ICT  applications.    The  Dutch 
enforcers  considered  that  clear,  unambiguous  rules  were  still  needed.    They  also 
suggested  redesigning  ERRU  into  a  multipurpose  system  also  suitable  for  direct 
enforcement  and  risk  rating.    Finally,  they  called  for  more  international  cooperation 
through  ECR.    The  UK  authorities  suggested  desk-based  compliance  assessment  and 
earned recognition for compliant operators.   

In  conclusion,  this  lack  of  consistency  in  the  identified  means  to  improve  efficiency, 
along with the examples of enforcement practices from different countries, reflects the 
very  diverse  national  situations.  The  ability  to  achieve  costs  or  savings  at  the 
enforcement level seems to be largely dependent on the national implementation and 
the systems already in place prior to Regulation 1071/2009, especially concerning the 
pre-existing  ICT  infrastructure.    Best  practice  examples  from  the  UK  and  the 

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Netherlands indicate that a higher use of the risk rating system to target checks could 
result in greater cost-effectiveness.   

6.10.2. 

Regulation 1072/2009 

The  direct  cost  savings  at  the  enforcement  level  of  Regulation  1072/2009  that  were 
expected  in  the  ex-ante  assessment  to  be  much  smaller  compared  to  Regulation 
1071/2009.  Aside from the harmonisation of control documents (quantified previously 
in  Evaluation  Question  9),  the  main  expected  benefits  arose  from  the  simplification 
and  harmonisation  of  the  definition  of  cabotage  (estimated  to  save  €3  million  for 
public enforcement bodies and €4 million for hauliers each year).  

As  already  discussed  in  Evaluation  Question  2,  data  on  the  number  of  checks  of 
Community  Licences  and  Driver  Attestations  is  very  scarce.  The  general  lack  of 
information  is  also  confirmed  in  the  survey  responses  from  enforcement  authorities, 
with a high share of respondents indicating that they did not know what the impact on 
ongoing enforcement costs was.  As shown in Figure 6-29, almost half of respondents 
did not know, whereas most of the remaining respondents indicated that there was no 
material  impact.    The  significant  increase  in  costs  was  identified  by  the  Netherlands 
and refers to five additional full-time staff that were needed to implement controls of 
cabotage, but the respondent noted that this was due to national political pressure.   

Figure  6-29:  Response  to  the  question:  What  effect  on  ongoing  (annual) 
enforcement  costs  has  each  of  the  following  provisions  had  since  the 
adoption of the Regulation? 

Source: Enforcers’ survey (N=11) 

To  try  to  approach  the  issue  from  another  direction,  enforcers  were  asked  whether 
performing  checks  on  cabotage  was  more  efficient  now  due  to  the  new  rules, 
compared to the situation prior to Regulation 1072/2009.  However, again around half 
of  respondents  could  not  answer.    Three  enforcers  felt  that  the  efficiency  had 
improved, and four felt that there had been no material impact. No further comments 
were given to substantiate these answers in the surveys.   

Enforcement  authorities  in  interviews  were  expressly  asked  about  any  time  savings 
(as  distinct  from  cost  savings)  due  to  the  common  rules  for  cabotage  (NB,  time 
savings  due  to  the  common  formats  for  control  documents  were  already  assessed  in 
Evaluation  Question  8).  The  Romanian  authorities  interviewed  for  this  study  felt  that 
the  costs  were  the  same  as  compared  to  the  situation  prior  to  the  Regulation.    The 
Irish,  Latvian,  Polish  and  Slovenian  authorities  could  not  say.    Only  the  Bulgarian 
authorities were able to provide an indication that the common rules on cabotage had 
led to time savings of 10% (6 minutes).  The apparent diversity of experiences across 
Member States means that this data point cannot be extrapolated further.  According 
to  an  Austrian  industry  association,  cabotage  in  Austria  was  previously  checked 
through  the  "Kabotagekontrollblatt"  (cabotage  control  sheet).  With  the  new 
regulations  the  checks  are  done  based  on  the  CMR  and  waybills,  which  according  to 
the association makes it more difficult for enforcement authorities.   

Overall,  the  survey  results  and  interviews  strongly  suggest  that  there  have  not  been 
any  major  impacts  (increases  or  decreases)  on  enforcement  costs  due  to  Regulation 

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1072/2009.    Any  time  savings  due  to  the  common  rules  on  cabotage  appear  to  be 
harder  to  identify  and  quantify  compared  to  the  time  savings  due  to  harmonised 
control documents analysed previously in Evaluation Question 8. 

A review of the literature also did not return many specific results.  The UK authorities 
in their assessment of the rules did not indicate any significant costs associated with 
Regulation  1072/2009,  noting  expressly  that  it  was  not  possible  to  quantify  impacts 
associated with the improved definition of cabotage (DfT, 2010). SDG (2013a) reports 
that  enforcement  of  cabotage  rules  before  the  introduction  of  Regulation  1072/2009 
was difficult to implement both because of a lack of clarity of the legislative provisions 
ruling the cabotage market and because of the weakness of the instruments used and 
the  actions  put  in  place  to  monitor  them  –  the  report  considers  that  Regulation 
1072/2009  has  certainly  helped  to  define  the  scope  of  cabotage  operations  by 
providing  a  clearer  definition  based  on  specific  criteria  such  as  the  3  operations  in  7 
days  rule  and  the  link  to  international  carriage,  even  considering  the  different 
implementation across Member States (SDG, 2013a).   

One  potential  efficiency  issue  is  whether  or  not  hauliers  are  required  to  show 
documentation  (i.e.  CMR  consignment  note)  during  roadside  checks.    Regulation 
1072/2009 does not require that the documents must be on-board the vehicle when it 
is stopped for control purposes.  

The  French  ministry,  in  their  survey  response  for  this  study,  noted  that  Regulation 
1072/2009 does not require that these documents must be on-board the vehicle when 
it  is  stopped  for  control  purposes.    In  such  cases,  they  explained  that  getting  the 
document is time-consuming because the drivers have often to request it by email to 
his/her  company,  and  they  claim  that  a  lot  of  time  is  lost  with  an  associated 
administrative  cost  for  authorities  (controls  take  longer  than  needed)  and  economic 
costs for the company (i.e. if the vehicle is immobilised).   

In order to avoid this problem, Denmark requires that documentation is presented to 
enforcement officers on demand, and should be available when the vehicle is stopped.  
In  practice,  this  means  that  documentation  should  be  able  to  be  presented  within  a 
reasonable time after the stopping of the vehicle. Electronic forwarding within a quite 
short  time  is  accepted.  However,  providing  of  documentation  must  not  cause  a 
considerable delay of the inspection of the police (Trafikstyrelsen, 2014).   

In  Germany,  if  required  documentation  (including  the  driver  attestation)  cannot  be 
provided  upon  request,  entitled  authorities  may  impound  the  vehicle  until  these 
documents  can  be  submitted  (European  Parliament,  2013b).    Several  enforcement 
authorities  (Ireland,  Netherlands)  pointed  out  in  their  survey  responses  that  it  is  not 
clear whether an operator is permitted to produce documentation to show compliance 
with  cabotage  rules  after  a  roadside  check.    The  Dutch  enforcement  practice  is  that 
such  documentation  must  be  presented  to  the  inspecting  officer  at  the  time  of  the 
roadside check and not after the event.  

6.10.3. 

Summary and conclusions 

For  Regulation  1071/2009,  indications  from  both  the  survey  responses  and  literature 
are that there have not been any significant changes in enforcement costs, since most 
of the activities were already being carried  out.  A neutral cost impact was therefore 
indicated  for  the  requirements  of  stable  and  effective  establishment,  financial 
standing,  good  repute  and  professional  competence.    The  requirement  that  returned 
the most uncertain responses with regard to its impact was the establishment of a risk 
rating  system  for  targeting  checks,  possibly  due  to  the  different  functioning  of  these 
systems at the national level.    

Looking  at  specific  countries  in  more  detail  indicates  a  diverse  range  of  experiences. 
Italy  suffered  from  particular  difficulties  due  to  the  implementation  of  the  register, 
which  appear  to  be  due  to  duplication  with  the  previous  national  register.    The 
difficulty  and  time  required  to  implement  new  ICT  systems  should  not  be 

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underestimated, and many Member States have experienced technical difficulties and 
delays in the implementation of their systems (as identified in Evaluation Question 3).  
On  the  other  hand,  Ireland  felt  that  their  new  ICT  systems  had  decreased  the 
administrative  costs,  indicating  that  more  streamlined  implementation  should  be 
beneficial.   

Other  countries  felt  that  increases  in  costs  were  balanced  by  decreases  elsewhere 
(e.g. Latvia, Malta), whereas Portugal and the UK indicated net positive impacts.   

Best practice examples from the UK and the Netherlands indicate that a higher use of 
the risk rating system to target checks could result in greater cost-effectiveness – the 
risk  rating  systems  in  both  these  countries  go  beyond  the  minimum  requirements  of 
the  Regulation  by  including  factors  other  than  good  repute.    The  UK  highlighted  the 
benefits  of  using  independent  bodies  to  help  find  ways  of  minimising  burdens  in 
collaboration with industry.   

Ensuring  better  cooperation  has  been  suggested  as  a  way  to  improve  efficiency,  as 
already  discussed  in  Evaluation  Question  3.    No  other  consistent  suggestions  from 
enforcement bodies were received as to how enforcement could be made less costly, 
which possibly reflects the diverse national situations.  

For  Regulation  1072/2009,  again  there  do  not  appear  to  be  any  significant  changes 
(positive  or  negative)  in  the  enforcement  costs  indicated  via  surveys,  interviews  and 
literature review.  Therefore it can be concluded that although there are not likely to 
have  been  substantial  costs,  the  expected  savings  due  to  the  definition  of  cabotage 
operations  introduced  by  Regulation  1072/2009  have  not  been  achieved  (expected 
saving of €3 million for public enforcement bodies).   

A  possible  efficiency  issue  is  whether  or  not  hauliers  are  required  to  show 
documentation during roadside checks.  In cases where the driver does not have the 
documentation  in  the  vehicle,  it  was  pointed  out  that  this  increases  administrative 
burdens  and  impedes  the  work  of  control  officers.    To  combat  this,  some  Member 
States require that documentation is available in the vehicle or provided within a short 
time (e.g. Denmark, Netherlands).   

No  clear  examples  of  best  practices  that  resulted  in  cost  savings  were  evident.  
Suggestions  from  stakeholders  and  in  the  literature  largely  referred  to  the  possible 
extension of ERRU to ensure better cooperation and enable roadside officers to use the 
information  (see  Evaluation  Question  3  for  discussion  of  this),  and  the  use  of 
electronic  data/GNSS  (assessed  in  the  context  of  Evaluation  Question  2,  see  Section 
7.2).   

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6.11.  Relevance: To what extent are  the  operational  objectives  of the 
Regulations relevant and proportionate to address the problems of the 
sector? 

To  what  extent  are  the  operational  objectives  of  the  Regulations  (i.e.  to  lay  down 
sets of common rules on, inter alia, documentation, cabotage and requirements for 
access to the occupation, and the effective enforcement of these rules) relevant and 
proportionate to address the problems of: 

a)  Distorted competition between resident and non-resident hauliers; 

b)  Non-compliance with EU road transport social legislation and the road safety 

concerns identified at the time. 

c)  High levels of empty running 

The  assessment  of  “relevance”  analyses  whether  the  operational  objectives  of  the 
Regulations are still relevant and proportionate to the problems and needs of the road 
freight  transport  sector  today.    The  intervention  logic  diagram  (Figure  2-1)  shows  a 
mapping  of  the  needs  and  problems  of  the  sector  on  to  the  objectives  of  the 
Regulation.   

6.11.1. 
hauliers  

Distorted  competition  between  resident  and  non-resident 

There  are  two  elements  that  must  be  assessed  in  order  to  be  able  to  conclude  that 
distorted  competition  between  resident  and  non-resident  hauliers  is  still  a  relevant 
need today, i.e.: 

  To what extent are there still problems of competitive distortion between 

resident and non-resident hauliers; and 

 

If there are still problems of competitive distortion, whether the operational 
objectives of the Regulations are still adequate to address them. 

The  issue  of  competitive  distortion  relates  primarily  to  issues  of  letterbox  companies 
and  different  treatment  of  resident/non-resident  hauliers  through  inconsistent 
enforcement.   

The  general  form  of  the  problem  of  letterbox  companies  has  not  substantially 
changed  since  the  Regulation  was  introduced  –  letterbox  companies  can  enjoy 
significant  cost  savings  (e.g.  due  to  paying  lower  wages,  avoiding  taxes  and  social 
security  payments  etc),  leading  to  competitive  distortion  (as  discussed  in  Evaluation 
Question 1).   

Considering whether this is still a problem for the sector today, there is evidence that 
letterbox companies continue to exist.  The statistics on infringements show that there 
are  still  companies  without  stable  and  effective establishment, which  is  supported by 
reports  of  letterbox  companies  found  in  the  literature  and  views  from  the  different 
stakeholder  groups 
(trade  unions,  associations,  ministries  and 
undertakings).  However, the extent of this is not known (see Evaluation Question 1, 
Section 6.1). 

consulted 

Prior  to  the  Regulations,  the  lack  of  minimum  and  common  requirements  ensuring 
stable  and  effective  establishment  was  believed  to  be  contributing  to  the  increasing 
levels  of  companies  without  a  real  office  and  operational  base  (i.e.  “letter  box” 
companies)  (European  Commission,  2007a).  Due  to  the  difficulty  in  monitoring 
letterbox companies, no concrete causal relationships could be defined – nevertheless, 
letterbox  companies  are  by  definition  those  without  a  stable  and  effective 
establishment.  Hence, the operational objectives set up to address this issue were to 
lay  down  common  rules  on  admission  to  the  occupation  (namely  through  the 
requirement  of  stable  and  effective  establishment),  which  would  ensure  a  more  level 
playing field, and to enable the enforcement of these rules.  

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The  targeting  of  the  provisions  themselves  therefore  directly  focus  on  the  issue  of 
letterbox  companies  and  can  thus  be  considered  appropriate  in  this  sense.    The 
content  of  the  provisions,  especially  concerning  a  more  precise  definition  of  an 
operating centre, may need to be made more precise in order to ensure they are fully 
appropriate to address the issue (as discussed in Evaluation Question 1).   

In  terms  of  ensuring  the  adequate  enforcement  of  the  rules  and  control  of  letterbox 
companies, the objective was to achieve this through the measures on administrative 
simplification and cooperation between Member States. Experience from other areas of 
legislation indicates that these are considered to be important tools in the fight against 
letterbox  companies,  for  example  in  the  Posting  of  Workers  Directive,  Money 
Laundering Directive and Parent-Subsidiary Directive (Sørensen, 2015).  Although it is 
clear that the full implementation of these provisions has not yet been achieved (see 
Evaluation Question 3), the targeting of the objectives is appropriate.   

Competitive  distortions  are  also  created  by  the  unequal  treatment  of  road  transport 
undertakings  in  different  Member  States,  owing  to  divergences  in  control  and 
penalty  systems  relevant  for  access  to  the  market  and  profession  (European 
Commission, 2011b).   It is clear from the analysis in Evaluation Question 2 that this 
is still a problem for the sector today and there is not a level playing field in terms of 
the  enforcement  practices  and/or  penalty  systems  in  place.    This  can  introduce 
competitive distortion by providing inconsistent disincentives for non-compliance.   

Ensuring  fair  competition  has  been  an  important  part  of  the  EU’s  work  ever  since  it 
was  set  out  in  the  Treaty  of  Rome  in  1957.    Therefore,  the  identified  problem  of 
competitive  distortion  that  the  Regulations  seek  to  address  through  its  objectives  is 
still  pertinent  today  and  remains  relevant  to  achieving  future  EU  transport  policy 
goals.   

More specifically, although the operational objectives of the Regulations were sets out 
a  framework  for  access  to  and  operations  in  the  road  transport  market  at  the 
European  level,  enforcement  remains  the  responsibility  of  individual  Member  States 
(Bayliss, 2012), as well as the laying down of penalty systems. Hence, the operational 
objectives  do  not  directly  target  the  problem  of  divergences  in  control  and  penalty 
systems.    If  harmonisation  of  control  and  penalty  systems  were  to  be  pursued  more 
explicitly  (see  recommendations  in  Evaluation  Question  2),  it  would  therefore  be 
relevant to add this as an operational objective.   

6.11.2. 
road safety rules 

Non-compliance  with  EU  road  transport  social  legislation  and 

The issue of non-compliance with EU road transport social legislation and road safety 
rules  is  very  closely  linked  to  the  issue  of  competitive  distortion  –  as  shown  in  the 
intervention  logic  diagram.    It  appears  that  the  issue  of  non-compliance  with  social 
legislation (such as non-respect of driving times) is still a problem in the EU, despite 
improvements  in  recent  years  (TRT,  2012  –  see  also  Table  10-9).    These  unfair 
practices contribute toward a general decline in standards, as well as having impacts 
on  social  and  working  conditions.    Non-compliance  with  road  transport  social 
legislation also has knock-on effects for road safety.   

The EU renewed its commitment to improving road safety in 2010 by setting a target 
of reducing road deaths by 50% by 2020, compared to 2010 levels.  Progress against 
this goal is shown in Figure 6-30. Despite recent progress, a year-to-year reduction of 
at  least  6.7%  is  needed  over  the  2010-2020  period  to  reach  the  target  through 
constant progress in annual percentage terms (ETSC, 2015). 

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Figure 6-30: Reduction in road deaths since 1990 in Europe (log scale) 

Source: (ETSC, 2015) 

Regarding whether the operational objectives of the Regulations are still adequate to 
ensure  compliance  with  road  social  and  safety  rules,  it  is  worth  considering  the 
possible incentives for operators to commit infringements.  When the Regulations were 
devised,  it  was  identified  that  the  pressure  to  save  costs  in  the  industry  could  incite 
some road operators to poorly comply with rules on road safety and social standards 
(European  Commission,  2007a).  The  industry  has  since  suffered  considerably  during 
the  recession,  which  led  to  further  reductions  in  profit  margins  and  pressure  to  cut 
costs  (discussed  extensively  in  Evaluation  Question  5).  This  suggests  that  the  main 
identified  drivers  for  breaking  road  social  and  safety  rules  may  have  increased 
compared  to  the  situation  before  the  Regulations,  given  the  economic  circumstances 
of the sector today.  With this in mind, it is even more important to have mechanisms 
in place that ensure compliance with the social rules  – meaning that the objective to 
improve compliance with the social and safety rules is still relevant today.   

In terms of the targeting of the objectives, it is worth noting that the Regulations and 
intended  to  play  a  supporting  role  in  enhancing  compliance  with  the  separate 
legislation on social and safety issues.  Insofar as this supporting role can be defined, 
the  targeting  of  the  objectives  is  therefore  appropriate,  since  they  ensure  the 
alignment of the objectives with achieving wider EU transport goals.   

More  specifically,  as  discussed  in  Evaluation  Question  5,  one  of  the  major  concerns 
over  social  and  safety  issues  relates  to  the  unscrupulous  practices  of  letterbox 
companies, as well as the ineffectiveness of controls to detect illegal cabotage.  Hence, 
the  general  conclusions  from  the  previous  section  also  apply  here,  i.e.  that  the 
targeting of the objectives could be made more precise in this area.  

6.11.3. 

High levels of empty running 

The objective to reduce empty running is primarily addressed at the operational level 
through  the  provisions  on  cabotage.    This  objective  is  still  relevant  considering  that 
the  EU  has  committed  itself  to  substantial,  long-term  CO2  reductions  in  order  to 
address climate change.  The Commission’s most recent Transport White Paper sets a 
target  reduction  for  transport  of  60%  in  2050  compared  to  1990  levels  (European 
Commission, 2011a).   

As shown in Annex A (see Section 9.10), almost a quarter of all goods vehicle-km in 
the  EU-28  are  empty  runs,  meaning  that  it  is  still  a  prevalent  issue  in  Europe.    A 
separate analysis of empty running by type of operation carried out by the European 
Commission  (2014b)  finds  that  the  share  of  empty  vehicle  km  during  trips  within 

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Member  State  by  foreign  operators  (cabotage  if  loaded)  has  significantly  dropped  in 
recent  years  but  in  2012  still  remained  at  around  47%  -  significantly  higher  than  in 
other types of operations.    

The relevance of the Regulations to target the problem of high levels of empty running 
and  increase  efficiency  depends  on  whether  or  not  the  provisions  on  cabotage  can 
enable  operators  to  combine  loads  and  use  more  efficient  routing.  As  discussed 
already  in  Evaluation  Question  4  (see  Section  6.4.1.3)  any  contribution  towards 
reducing  empty  running  and  reduction  of  GHG  emissions  is  difficult  to  establish,  but 
overall impacts are probably minor.   

Hence, the targeting of this objective to reduce empty running does not appear to be 
relevant. A more precise and relevant targeting of the cabotage rules would instead be 
to  improve  the  economic  efficiency  of  transport  (rather  than  environmental 
efficiency).    Here,  there  is  stronger  evidence  that  cabotage  is  effective  at  supporting 
these  goals  (as  discussed  in  Evaluation  Question  5,  Section  6.5.2).    Overall,  there  is 
consensus in the literature that greater liberalisation of cabotage has been successful 
in allowing for lower transport  prices and diversification of supply – primarily through 
shifting to lower wage drivers (e.g. WTO, 2010; Sternberg et al, 2014). 

6.11.4. 

Summary and conclusions  

The  problem  of  competitive  distortion  between  resident  and  non-resident  haulers 
relates  primarily  to  issues  of  i)  letterbox  companies  and  ii)  different  treatment  of 
resident/non-resident hauliers through inconsistent enforcement.   

Firstly,  letterbox  companies  can  enjoy  significant  cost  savings  (e.g.  due  to  paying 
lower wages, avoiding taxes and social security payments etc), leading to competitive 
distortion.    In  this  case,  there  was  a  lack  of  minimum  and  common  requirements 
ensuring stable and effective establishment prior to the introduction of the Regulation.  
Since  letterbox  companies  are  by  definition  those  without  a  stable  and  effective 
establishment,  the    targeting  of  the  objectives  is  relevant  to  the  problem  (i.e.  the 
objective  to  lay  down  common  rules).    Further  specific  actions  should  enhance  the 
measures  and  ensure  that  they  are  fully  adequate  to  address  the  needs  (i.e.  more 
precise  definition  of  an  operating  centre  and  greater  cooperation  between  Member 
States).   

Secondly, concerning divergent control and enforcement systems, although this is still 
an  area  of  development  (e.g.  work  is  ongoing  to  harmonise  the  categorisation  of 
infringements),  the  objectives  do  not  explicitly  aim  at  the  harmonisation  of  controls, 
and hence this issue is not adequately targeted by the operational objectives.  In this 
sense,  the  objectives  are  not  relevant/proportionate  to  address  the  problem  of 
divergent controls.  As noted by the High Level Group, the main progress in terms of 
harmonisation  of  enforcement  has  been  concentrated  in  the  areas  of  driving  and 
working times (since the impact on competitiveness is considered to be highest in this 
area),  but  it  is  recommended  that  the  Commission  extends  this  work  to  other  areas 
(Bayliss, 2012).    

In light of the continuing issues around ensuring a high level of social protection and 
of road safety, it can be concluded that the operational objectives of the Regulation to 
improve compliance in this area remain important and relevant to target the needs of 
the sector.   Increased  cost pressure  in the industry following the economic recession 
may  also  have  increased  the  incentives  for  non-compliance  with  social  and  safety 
rules,  making  the  risk  factors  higher  today  compared  to  when  the  Regulations  was 
introduced.  The proportionality of the objectives is also justified by the fact that the 
Regulations  work  alongside  other  legislation  as  part  of  an  integrated  approach  to 
ensure  compliance  with  road  social  and  safety  rules.    The  means  by  which  the 
Regulations aim to target the problems of competitive distortion are also closely linked 
with  the  non-compliance  with  road  social  and  safety  legislation,  and  hence  the  same 
conclusions apply.  

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The problem of high levels of empty running is still relevant in the context of the need 
to  reduce  fuel  consumption  and  GHG  emissions  from  transport.    However,  there  is 
little  evidence  that  increased  cabotage  can  improve  the  environmental  efficiency  of 
transport in practice.  Hence, the operational objectives of the Regulations in this area 
do not appear to be relevant. A more relevant objective that should replace the goal to 
reduce  empty  running  would  be  to  complete  the  single  market  for  transport  and 
improve economic efficiency (rather than environmental efficiency) of transport.   

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6.12.  Coherence: How do the Regulations interact with and if relevant, 
have an impact on the objectives of other related legislation? 

How do the Regulations interact with and if relevant, have an impact on the objectives 
of the following acts: 

  Directive 96/71/EC on posting of workers;  
  Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 on contractual obligations ('Rome I Regulation');  

  Directive 92/106/EC on combined transport;  
  Social  provisions  in  road  transport  (Directive  2002/15/EC  on  working  time  of 
mobile workers, Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 on driving time and rest periods, 
Directive  2006/22/EC  on  enforcement  of  social  provisions  in  road  transport, 
Regulation (EC) No 165/2014 on the digital tachograph)?  

Can  inconsistencies  of  references  and  definitions,  and  overlaps  of  provisions  be 
identified?  Is  there  scope  to  streamline  the  regulatory  framework  in  the  transport 
sector?   

Regulations  1071/2009  and  1072/2009  interact  with  several  and  different  legal 
instruments  at  EU  level.  The  analysis  for  this  question  considers  (i)  the  coherence 
between  the  objectives  and  specific  provisions  of  Regulation  1071/2009,  Regulation 
1072/2009  and  the  EU  legal  instruments  listed  above,  as  well  as  (ii)  any  possible 
impact on the coherence between these provisions.   

6.12.1. 

Regulation 561/2006 and Directive 2002/15/EC 

Regulation  561/2006  lays  down  rules  on  driving  times,  breaks  and  rest  periods  for 
drivers  engaged  in  the  carriage  of  goods  and  passengers  by  road  in  order  to 
harmonise  the  conditions  of  competition  between  modes  of  inland  transport.  In  this 
sense,  the  Regulation  applies  to  the  carriage  by  road  of  goods  where  the  maximum 
permissible mass exceeds 3.5 tonnes, or passengers by vehicles that may carry more 
than 9 persons.  

Directive 2002/15/EC applies to mobile workers employed by undertakings covered by 
the  abovementioned  Regulation  or  by  the  AETR  Agreement  (European  Agreement  on 
the Work of Crews of Vehicles Engaged in International Road Transport). The purpose 
of this Directive is to set minimum requirements for the organisation of working time 
in order to improve the health and safety of persons performing mobile road transport 
and to improve road safety and competition. 

6.12.1.1. 

Interactions  

The  main  interactions  between  Regulation  561/2006  (driving  time  and  rest  periods), 
Directive  2002/15/EC  (working  time)  and  Regulation  1071/2009  relate  to  certain 
obligations  imposed  on  road  transport  operators  as  regards  the  requirement  of  good 
repute and the consequences of the infringements of such obligations.   

Pursuant to Article 6.1 b) of Regulation 1071/2009, in order to satisfy the requirement 
of  good  repute  laid  down  in  Article  3.1  b)  of  this  Regulation,  undertakings  and 
transport  managers  shall  meet,  among  other  conditions,  the  driving  time  and  rest 
periods of drivers as well as the working time.  

In addition, Annex IV point 1 a) and b) of Regulation 1071/2009 establishes as “most 
serious  infringements”  (that  may  lead  to  loss of  good  repute)  the  non-respect  of  the 
following social rules:  

  Exceeding the maximum 6-day or fortnightly driving time limits by margins of 

25 % or more; and  

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  Exceeding, during a daily working period, the maximum daily driving time limit 

by a margin of 50 % or more without taking a break or without an 
uninterrupted rest period of at least 4.5 hours. 

A serious infringement of Regulation 561/2006 and/or Directive 2002/15/EC may lead 
(through  the  application  of  Article  22  and  Annex  IV  of  Regulation  1071/2009)  to  the 
declaration  of  unfitness  of  the  transport  manager,  the  suspension  or  even  the 
withdrawal of the authorisation.  

These time limits can be appraised in Table 6-18.   

Table 6-18: Overview of driving and working time provisions 

Driving  time  and  rest  periods 
Regulation 

Working time Directive 

9h/10h driving time 

/ 

56h driving time 

Average  48  hour  week  working 
time 

90h driving time 

/ 

Maximum 
working/driving time 

daily 

Weekly 
working/driving time 

Fortnightly 
working/driving time  

Maximum  work/drive 
at night 

/ 

Breaks 

45  min;  may  be  divided  into  two, 
one  at  least  30min;  and  shall  be 
taken  after  no  more  than  4.5h 
drive. 

10h  max  for  every  24h  period 
working time 

Total  working  hours:  6h-9h, 
then break(s) at least 30 min in 
total. 

Daily rest periods 

11h;  may  be  reduced  to  9h  three 
times a week 

11h;  may  be  reduced  to  9h 
three times a week 

Weekly rest periods 

45  continuous  hours,  even  though 
it  can  be  reduced  every  second 
week to 24h. 

45  continuous  hours,  even 
though it can be reduced every 
second week to 24h. 

6.12.1.2. 

Impacts on the objectives 

The  objectives  pursued  by  Regulation  561/2006  and  Directive  2002/15/EC  (i.e. 
improvement of working conditions for road transport operators and road safety) are 
coherent  with  the  objectives  of  the  Road  Transport  Package,  as  they  all  aim  to 
improve social and working conditions for transport workers in Europe.  In particular, 
Regulation  561/2006  and  Directive  2002/15/EC  define  specific  rights  and  obligations 
for  road  transport  operators  that  implement  and  develop  (in  a  detailed  manner)  the 
general requirements provided for in Regulation 1071/2009.  

6.12.1.3. 
provisions  

Consistency  of  references  and  definitions,  and  overlaps  in 

The references to and definitions of the infringements contained in the Road Transport 
Package  and  in  the  driving  and  working  time  rules  as  described  above  appear  to  be  
consistent.  No  contradiction  has  been  identified  between  these  legal  instruments  as 
regards the definitions of infringements.  

However,  it  should  be  noted  that  Regulation  1071/2009  does  not  contain  a  specific 
reference  to  Regulation  561/2006  or  to  Directive  2002/15/EC  when  establishing  the 
requirements  of  driving  time,  rest  periods  and  working  time  (Article  6)  or  when 
defining  in  Annex  IV  the  most  serious  infringements  related  to  driving  and  working 
time limits. The only reference to Regulation 561/2006 and to Directive 2002/15/EC is 
made in Annex I of Regulation 1071/2009 (subjects to be known by operators for the 
purposes of the requirement of professional competence).  

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An  additional  aspect  of  consistency  pertains  to  the  issue  of  who  is  liable  for  these 
infringements.    Regulation  561/2006  contains  provisions  on  liability  of  transport 
undertakings  (including  consignors,  freight  forwarders,  tour  operators,  principal 
contractors,  subcontractors  and  driver  employment  agencies)  for  infringements 
committed  by  drivers  of  such  undertakings  (the  so-called  co-liability).  However, 
neither  Regulation  1071/2009  nor  Regulation  1072/2009  contains  such  co-liability 
provisions. In this respect:  

  Regulation 1071/2009 establishes the requirements for an 

undertaking/individual to enter the profession of road transport operator. 
Accordingly, any possible sanction for an infringement of Regulation 1071/2009 
would only be imposed to these operators. As regards this particular point, the 
co-liability principle established in Regulation 561/2006 does not raise 
coherence concerns. For example, a consignor or a freight forwarder that hires 
a road transport operator for a limited time or for a particular service may 
logically not be sanctioned because such road transport operator does not 
comply with the four requirements to access the occupation.  

  Regulation 1072/2009 contains provisions for the regulation of the operation of 

the road transport (e.g. rules on cabotage). This is, Regulation 1072/2009, as 
well as Regulation 561/2006, contain provisions applicable to the carrying out 
of the activity. However, only Regulation 561/20069 provides for the principle 
of co-liability. As a result, a freight forwarder having hired a road transport 
undertaking may be held liable for an infringement of driving time limits 
committed by a driver, but it may not be held liable for an illegal cabotage 
operation. A coherence concern arises in this regard.  

At least two stakeholders interviewed for the purposes of this study among the group 
of  transport  undertakings’  associations  have  indicated  that  although  logistics 
companies  develop  a  wider  range  of  tasks  within  the  road  transport  sector,  they  are 
submitted  to  a  degree  of  liability  lower  than  the  liability  imposed  on  transport 
undertakings when it comes to cabotage.  

6.12.1.4. 

Scope to streamline the regulatory framework 

Considering  the  above,  the  following  actions  may  be  undertaken  in  order  to  address 
the coherence concerns identified:  

  To include in Regulation 1071/2009 specific reference to Regulation 561/2006 
and to Directive 2002/15/EC when establishing the requirements of driving 
time, rest periods and working time (Article 6) and when defining in Annex IV 
the most serious infringements related to driving and working time limits.  

  To analyse the possibility of amending Regulation 1072/2009 in order to 

establish a co-liability regime as regards the infringement of cabotage rules 
and, therefore, to achieve a more harmonised treatment of infringements in 
the road transport sector.    

6.12.2. 

Directive 2006/22/EC 

The  objective  of  this  Directive  is  to  lay  down  clear,  common  rules  on  minimum 
conditions  for  checking  the  correct  and  uniform  implementation  of  social  legislation 
applicable to road transport. 

6.12.2.1. 

Interactions  

Enforcement of Regulation 561/2006 is regulated by Directive 2006/22/EC, which has 
been  amended  by  Directive  2009/4/EC  on  counter  measures  to  prevent  and  detect 
manipulation  of  records  of  tachographs.  Directive  2006/22/EC  established  that,  as 
from 1 January 2012, a minimum of 4% of days worked by drivers of vehicles falling 
within  the  scope  of  Regulation  561/2006  should  be  checked.    The  Directive  also 
established  that  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  checks  (random  rotation  roadside 

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checks;  roadside  concerted  checks  at  least  six  times  per  year;  and/or  checks  at  the 
premises of the undertakings) are executed efficiently and quickly.  

Interactions with the Road Transport Package occur via several main areas: 

  Ensuring compliance with Regulation 561/2006: Regulation 1071/2009 

and Directive 2006/22/EC provide for an obligation for Member States to check 
the compliance with driving time and rest periods as well as working time. 

  Use of a risk-rating system to target checks: pursuant to Article 12 of 
Regulation 1071/2009, Member States shall apply the risk rating system 
established in Article 9 of Directive 2006/22/EC to all possible infringements of 
the requirements of good repute as defined in Regulation 1071/2009.  

6.12.2.2. 

Impacts on the objectives  

The  objectives  pursued  by  Directive  2006/22/EC  are  complementary  to  the 
implementation  of  Regulation  1071/2009,  of  Regulation  561/2006  and  of  Directive 
2002/15/EC.  In  particular,  as  stated  in  Recital  3  of  Directive  2006/22/EC,  “[i]t  is 
therefore necessary to ensure proper application and harmonised interpretation of the 
social rules on road transport through the establishment of minimum requirements for 
the  uniform  and  effective  checking  by  the  Member  States  of  compliance  with  the 
relevant provisions. Those checks should serve to reduce and prevent infringements”.  

Therefore, the objectives of Directive 2006/22/EC are coherent with those pursued by 
the  Road  Transport  Package  and  by  the  social  rules  applicable  to  road  transport 
operations.  However,  as  explained  below,  a  closer  look  at  the  specific  provisions  of 
these legal instruments reveals some inconsistencies.  

6.12.2.3. 
provisions 

Consistency  of  references  and  definitions,  and  overlaps  of 

These lists are not concomitant and differ. Annex III of Directive 2006/22/EC contains 
a shorter list of infringements that diverge from those listed in Annex IV of Regulation 
1071/2009,  which  in  its  turn  contains  a  much  more  detailed  list  of  infringements 
related  not  only  to  driving  periods  and  rest  time  but  also  to  installation  and  use  of 
recording equipment, producing information and fraud. 

Table  6-19:  List  of  inconsistencies  between  infringements  identified  in 
Regulation 1071/2009 and Directive 2006/22 

serious 
Most 
(Regulation 1071/2009) 

infringement 

Infringement 
2006/22) 

(Directive 

Exceeding 
maximum driving 
time 

Exceeding the maximum 6-day or 
fortnightly driving time limits by 
margins of 25 % or more. 

Exceeding the maximum daily, 
weekly or fortnightly driving times; 

Not respecting 
breaks 

Exceeding, during a daily working 
period, the maximum daily driving 
time limit by a margin of 50 % or 
more without taking a break or 
without an uninterrupted rest 
period of at least 4.5 hours. 

Lack of 
tachograph 

Not having a tachograph or using 
a fraudulent device able to modify 
the records of the recording 
equipment or falsifying record 
sheets or data downloaded from 
the tachograph. 

-  disregarding the 

minimum daily or weekly 
rest period; 

-  disregarding the 
minimum break; 

Failure to fit a tachograph in 
accordance with Regulation (EEC) 
No 3821/85. 

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As  the  table  above shows,  infringements  listed  in  Annex  III of  Directive 2006/22 are 
very  general  whereas  Annex  IV  1071/2009  indicates  most  serious  infringements  and 
therefore  the  level  of  detail  is  higher.  However,  this  does  not  mean  that  lists  are 
inconsistent. Annex IV includes the following infringements as most serious which are 
not  included  in  Directive  2006/22:  (i)  driving  without  a  valid  roadworthiness,  (ii) 
inappropriate transportation of dangerous, (iii) driving with a driver card that has been 
falsified,  (iv)  driving  with  a  considerable  excess  in  the  maximum  permissible  laden 
mass.  These  infringements  are  not  included  in  Directive  2006/22  since  they  are  not 
directly related to social aspects of the road transport. 

There  are  overlaps  /  inconsistencies  between  Regulation  1071/2009  and  Directive 
2006/22/EC  as  regards  the  requirements  for  monitoring  in  terms  of  frequency  of 
checks,  types  of  checks  and  the  possible  (minimum)  number  of  operators  under 
control.  For  instance,  Regulation  1071/2009  requires  Member  States  to  carry  out 
checks  at  least  every  5  years  to  verify  that  undertakings  fulfil  the  requirements 
established by the regulation, whereas the criterion followed by Directive  2006/22 to 
require  checks  on  the  social  aspects  of  road  transport  is  based  on  a  minimum 
percentage  of  days  worked  by  drivers.  In  addition,  the  Directive  establishes  the 
proportion  of  checks  that  shall  be  carried  out  at  the  roadside  and  at  the  premises, 
which is not included the Regulation. 

In  addition,  Regulation  1071/2009  and  Directive  2006/22/EC  provide  for  different 
types of cooperation between national authorities as regards the relevant information 
gathered.  Thus,  whereas  Article  24  of  Regulation  1071/2009  establishes  a  mutual 
assistance system by way of which Member States shall exchange relevant information 
for  the  pursuit  of  the  occupation  of  road  transport  operator,  Directive  2006/22/EC 
promotes  cooperation  between  Member  States  by  way  of:  (i)  not  only  exchanging 
information, but also (ii) through an intracommunity liaison to ensure coordination for, 
inter  alia,  respect  the  principle  of  ne  bis  in  idem.    This  is,  unlike  Regulation 
1071/2009,  Directive  2006/22/EC  provides  not  only  for  an  exchange  of  information 
but also for more developed levels of cooperation between authorities.  

6.12.2.4. 

 Scope to streamline the regulatory framework 

Several  stakeholders  among  the  group  of  transport  ministries  and  enforcers  have 
indicated  that  the  adoption  of  a  harmonised  list  of  categories,  types  and  degrees  of 
seriousness  of  infringements  leading  to  the  loss  of  good  repute  would  help  achieve 
uniformity  in  the  implementation  of  the  abovementioned  provisions.  Some  of  the 
stakeholders  among  the  group  of  transport  ministries  and  enforcers  have  also 
indicated  that  an  approximation  of  legislation  as  regards  sanctions  could  be  positive. 
However,  they  acknowledge  that  the  latter  could  be  a  difficult  process  taking  into 
account  that  the  application  of  sanctions  falls  under  the  competence  of  Member 
States.    

It should be noted that the European Commission has already adopted and published 
a proposal for a Commission Regulation that would supplement Regulation 1071/2009 
and amend Annex III of Directive 2006/22/EC. The proposal contains detailed lists of 
harmonised serious infringements that may lead to the loss of good repute of a road 
transport operator, including a new Annex III of Directive 2006/22/EC to ensure legal 
consistency between Regulation 1071/2009 and Directive 2006/22/EC.  However, the 
European Parliament did not adopt the proposal58, pointing out that the list contained 
in the proposal “failed to include a complete list of serious infringements of Regulation 
(EC)  No  1072/2009,  since  point  10  of  Annex  1  to  the  draft  Commission  regulation 
does not include illegal cabotage, which, given its negative impact on drivers, should 

58http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+MOTION+B8-2014-

0325+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN 

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clearly  be  regarded  as  a  serious  infringement”.  In  its  follow-up  to  the  Parliament’s 
resolution  (document  of  31  March  2005)59,  the  Commission  indicated  its  intention  to 
examine possibilities of submitting an amended draft measure to address the concerns 
of  the  European  Parliament,  but  also  pointed  out  that  some  demands  cannot  be 
accommodated.  One  such  point  is  the  demand  to  address  infringements  of  the 
national  laws  applicable  to  cabotage  operations,  since  the  classification  operated  by 
the proposed Regulation deals only with the relevant EU acquis60. 

Finally, it would also be advisable to harmonise the rules on monitoring of compliance 
of  social  rules  and  cooperation  between  the  national  enforcers,  considering  that  the 
rules contained in Directive 2006/22/EC are more complete. In this sense, the existing 
extension  of  the  Directive  2006/22/EC  risk  rating  system  to  Regulation  1071/2009 
could serve as a model for further synergies.  

6.12.3. 
165/2014) 

Tachograph 

rules 

(Regulation  3812/85  and  Regulation 

Recording equipment must be installed in vehicles registered in a Member State which 
are used for the carriage of passengers (more than 9 persons) or goods by road (more 
than  3.5  t).  The  tachograph  is  a  device  that  records  the  driving  time,  breaks,  rest 
periods as well as periods of other work undertaken by a driver. 

6.12.3.1. 

Interactions  

Compliance of road social provisions (i.e. limits of mandatory rest and driving hours) 
is  monitored  via  the  tachograph  installed  in  the  vehicles.  Tachographs  were  mainly 
regulated  by  Regulation  3821/85  -the  Tachograph  Regulation-  amended  ten  times  to 
take  into  account  the  relevant  technical  developments.  Tachographs  are  mandatory 
for all vehicles exceeding 3.5 tones; for vehicles registered after 1 May 2006 a digital 
tachograph is mandatory.  

In January 2014, the Commission adopted Regulation No 165/2014 on tachographs in 
road transport. The new Regulation is intended to regulate the introduction of “smart 
tachographs”  and  the  establishment  of  new  and  easier  control  measures  to  improve 
compliance.  It  is  expected  that  smart  tachographs  will  allow  better  enforcement  of 
rules  on  driving  and  resting  times.  While  currently  tachographs  only  record  the 
country in which the driver is travelling, these devices will integrate a GPS to capture 
data for at least the start and the end of the working periods and after three hours of 
accumulated  time.   Smart  tachographs  will  have  to  be  installed  into  new  vehicles 
within  three  years  after  the  Commission  has  set  out  the  technical  specifications  for 
such devices. 

The main interactions between the tachograph rules and the Road Transport Package 
are: 

  The non-compliance with tachograph rules can lead to loss of good repute as 

established in Regulation 1071/2009.  

  The possible use of tachographs for the enforcement of cabotage rules 

contained in Regulation 1072/2009.  

59 

60 

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2014/2

859(RPS)#tab-0 

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2014/2

859(RPS)#tab-0 

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6.12.3.2. 

Impacts on the objectives 

The  objectives  pursued  by  Regulation  165/2014  are  complementary  to  the 
implementation of the Road Transport Package and the social rules applicable to road 
transport and, therefore, coherent in that they aim to ensure the compliance with the 
requirements  and  an  effective  checking  of  such  compliance.  However,  some 
inconsistencies as regards the specific provisions of these legal instruments have been 
identified as explained below.  

6.12.3.3. 
provisions 

Consistency  of  references  and  definition,  and  overlaps  of 

New exemptions are also introduced by the 2014 tachograph Regulation, i.e. vehicles 
with  a  maximum  permissible  mass  not  below  7.5  tonnes,  which  carry  materials, 
equipment or machinery for the driver’s use in the course of his work, and which are 
only  used  within  a  100  km  radius  from  the  base  of  the  company,  are  not  subject  to 
this instrument.   

In  relation  to  the  above,  Regulation  1071/2009  is  applicable  to  vehicles  with  a  laden 
mass of more than 3.5 tonnes. This means that it is not consistent with the exemption 
established  in  Regulation  165/2014  and  applicable  to  vehicles  with  a  laden  mass  not 
exceeding 7.5 tonnes. Especially considering that, in accordance with point 2 of Annex 
IV  of  Regulation  1071/2009;  not  having  a  tachograph  constitutes  a  most  serious 
infringement of this provision. 

6.12.3.4. 

Scope to streamline the regulatory framework 

Several  stakeholders  among  the  groups  of  freight  forwarders  and  trade  unions  have 
called  for  the  use  of  tachograph  data  when  enforcing  rules  related  to  cabotage. 
However, although in Recital 18 of Regulation 1072/2009 it is stated that “in order to 
perform  efficient  controls  of  cabotage  operations,  the  enforcement  authorities  of  the 
host Member State should, at least, have access to data from consignment notes and 
from  recording  equipment”.  It  may  be  advisable  to  analyse  whether  Regulation 
1072/2009  may  be  amended  and  include  a  specific  provision  providing  for  the 
compulsory use of tachographs when performing cabotage.    

It  appears  that  the  use  of  tachographs  can  help  enforcement.  However,  digital 
tachographs are only mandatory for new vehicles registered after 1 May 2006. Thus, 
there  is  no  obligation  for  older  vehicles  to  install  digital  tachographs.  These  older 
vehicles are allowed to use the analogical tachograph sine die, even if the tachograph 
gets  broken  or  needs  repair  or  replacement.  In  this  scenario  it  is  likely  that  digital 
tachographs will coexist with analogical ones for decades. 

Finally,  it  would  be  advisable  to  address  the  inconsistency  identified  above  between 
the  exemptions  contained  in  the  2014  tachograph  Regulation  and  Regulation 
1071/2009.      

6.12.4. 

Combined transport Directive 92/106/EEC 

Directive  92/106/EEC  on  combined  transport  was  adopted  in  order  to  promote 
combined 
transport  operations  by  way  of  reducing  restrictions,  eliminating 
authorisation  procedures  and  granting  financial  support  through  fiscal  incentives. 
Pursuant  to  Article  1  of  this  directive,  “combined  transport’  means  the  transport  of 
goods  between  Member  States  where  the  lorry,  trailer,  semi-trailer,  with  or  without 
tractor unit, swap body or container of 20 feet or more uses the road on the initial or 
final  leg  of  the  journey  and,  on  the  other  leg,  rail  or  inland  waterway  or  maritime 
services  where  this section  exceeds  100  km  as  the crow flies  and  make the  initial  or 
final road transport leg of the journey;  

—  between  the  point  where  the  goods  are  loaded  and  the  nearest  suitable  rail 
loading  station  for  the  initial  leg,  and  between  the  nearest  suitable  rail 

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unloading station and the point where the goods are unloaded for the final leg, 
or  

—  within  a  radius  not  exceeding  150  km  as  the  crow  flies  from  the  inland 

waterway port or seaport of loading or unloading”. 

6.12.4.1. 

Interactions  

In accordance with recital 16 of Regulation 1072/2009, this legal instrument is without 
prejudice to the provisions concerning the incoming or outgoing carriage of goods by 
road as one leg of a combined transport journey as laid down in Directive 92/106/EEC. 
This  is,  the  road  legs  of  combined  transport  operations  are  exempted  from  the 
limitations  on  cabotage  contained  in  Regulation  1072/2009  as  long  as  the  conditions 
established in Article 1 of Directive 92/106/EEC are fulfilled. 

6.12.4.2. 

Impacts on the objectives 

The  Combined  Transport  Directive  seeks  to  boost  operations  through  liberalisation  of 
road  cabotage,  the  elimination  authorisation  procedures  for  Combined  Transport 
operations and to grant financial support through fiscal incentives for certain of these 
operations.  In  this  sense,  the  objectives  of  this  Directive  are  to  promote  the  modal 
shift  of  long  distance  freight  transport  away  from  road,  which  will  help  to  reduce 
congestion  and  emissions  and  is  consistent  with  the  overarching  goals  of  the  EU 
enshrined in the Transport White Paper (2011).   

Recital  15  of  Regulation  1072/2009  states  that  cabotage  operations  should  not  be 
prohibited  as  long  as  they  are  not  carried  out  in  a  way  that  creates  a  permanent  or 
continuous  activity  within  that  Member  State.  In  this  sense,  it  is  the  exemptions  for 
cabotage  transport  with  regard  to  combined  transport  were  therefore  intended  to 
support this objective. 

6.12.4.3. 
provisions 

Consistency  of  references  and  definition,  and  overlaps  of 

As  indicated  in  a  recent  study  elaborated  by  KombiConsult  et  al  (2015),  combined 
transport  was  a  precursor  of  the  liberalisation  of  cabotage.  Pursuant  to  Article  4  of 
Directive 92/106/EEC, Member States are allowed to fully exempt combined transport 
operations  from  the  cabotage  ban.  However,  later  on,  Regulation  1072/2009  limited 
the number of cabotage operations.  

The  exemptions  for  combined  transport  apply  the  same  way  to  all  combinations  of 
combined  transport  operations,  whether  accompanied  or  unaccompanied,  and  does 
not depend on whether the road leg crosses a border or not. However, the above does 
not  necessarily  equal  the  absence  of  tensions  between  Regulation  1072/2009  and 
Directive 92/106/EEC, as explained below.  

In  summer  2014,  the  Commission  launched  a  public  consultation  in  order  to  analyse 
the implementation of Directive 92/106/EEC and whether an update is now necessary. 
The  results  of  this  consultation61  suggest  that  two-thirds  of  the  (industry) 
stakeholders62 gave overall positive feedback in the sense that the Directive had been 

61http://ec.europa.eu/transport/media/consultations/doc/2014-combined-

transport/summary.pdf  

62  The  Commission  received  93  full  questionnaires,  6  position  papers  (from  which  5  were  in 

addition  to  a  questionnaire)  and  10  respondents  had  chosen  not  to  provide  full 

questionnaires  and  their  input  was  hence  limited  to  general  comments.  The  respondents 

came  from  18  Member  States  and  from  2  non-EU  countries.  The  majority  of  respondents 

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helpful  for  the  operation  of  their  business.  In  general,  they  indicated  that  the 
exemption from cabotage rules was particularly helpful and welcomed. It is indicated 
in  the  KombiConsult  study  abovementioned  that  “according  to  the  findings  of  this 
study  and  the  stakeholders  of  the  CT  industry,  the  provisions  under  Article  4  have 
been  very  effective  in  promoting  CT  operations.  They  have  stimulated  the  cost  and 
quality competition for pre- and on-carriage road legs. Furthermore, they enable road 
hauliers to deploy their own lorries in initial and final road legs in other MS than where 
they  are  established  and  this  facilitate  the  control  of  these  operations.  This  has  also 
contributed to enhance the economics of CT operations”.  

However, a few stakeholders participating in the public consultation indicated that this 
exemption  leads  to  social  dumping  where  operators  employ  drivers  from  central  and 
east  European  countries  to  perform  the  road  legs  of  combined  transport  in  western 
European  countries,  which  leads  to  unfair  competition  against  local  SMEs  that  pay 
higher  salaries.  As  regards  this  possible  failure,  the  KombiConsult  study  argues  that 
“the  study  has  not  identified  any  comprehensive  evidence  that  would  confirm  this 
argument. In contrast, national authorities in MS such as Germany could not identify a 
significant negative impact of cabotage on inland road transport markets”.  

With regard to the main concern identified by stakeholders in relation with EU rules on 
combined  transport  (i.e.  lack  of  clarity  when  it  comes  to  make  a  differentiation 
between  the  road  legs  of  combined  transport  and  cabotage),  it  is  worth  noting  that 
38%  of  the  stakeholders  in  the  Commission’s  public  consultation  considered  that 
combined  transport  was  not  completely  free  from  cabotage  restrictions.  This  is,  a 
significant  percentage  of  operators  submitted  to  the  combined  transport  provisions 
and  to  Regulation  1072/2009  may  be  unaware  of  their  correct  implementation. 
Indeed, most of the concerns flagged by stakeholders in this consultation were related 
to differences in the national implementation of Directive 92/106/EEC among Member 
States.   

In  line  with  the  above,  one  stakeholder  from  Sweden  interviewed  for  the  purpose  of 
the present study has pointed out that the difference between cabotage and combined 
transport  is  not  crystal  clear  in  practice  and  that  possible  abuses  could  occur  on  the 
basis  of  a  large  (mis)interpretation  of  what  is  cabotage.  This  has  been  confirmed  by 
other  stakeholders  who  agreed  in  that  in  some  circumstances  it  is  not  easy  to  prove 
that the driver has  been performing the road haulage leg(s) of a combined transport 
and not cabotage.  

In addition, A stakeholder from an association active in logistics has pointed out that 
in  countries  such  a  Denmark,  where  distances  are  not  far  and  the  carrier  is  always 
within 150km far from the port it is fairly easily to make an operation to be combined 
transport.  In  this  sense,  enforcers  often  find  that  what  initially  looks  as  illegal 
cabotage turns out to be combined transport and therefore are somehow discouraged 
to control this type of transport. 

In  this  respect,  several  stakeholders  raised  the  issue  of  disparities  between  the 
documentation  requirements  for  cabotage  and  combined  transport.  In  this  sense, 
stakeholders in the 2014 Commission consultation suggested that the establishment of 
a single document for combined transport operations, similar to the CMR, could solve 
the current issues related to documentation. 

were  business  representatives  (73%),  with  some  NGO's  and  individuals  also  contributing. 

The  participation  of  public  authorities  from  Member  States  was  unfortunately  not 

comprehensive,  with  replies  from  only  6  Member  States  relevant  Ministries  and  6  replies 

from regional or sector-specific authorities.  

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As  regards  the  enforcement  of  Directive  92/106/EEC,  the  majority  of  the  Member 
States exempt the road leg of combined transport operations from any cabotage ban 
for companies established in EU (only Belgium, Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia 
do  not  provide  for  exemptions).  Only  three  Member  States  place  restrictions  on 
combined  transport  operations  as  regards  cabotage  journeys  by  road,  allowing 
cabotage only in accordance with Regulation 1072/2009: Czech Republic, Netherlands, 
and Slovakia (KombiConsult, 2015). 

A  proposal  suggested  by  the  results  of    the  Commission’s  consultation  on  the 
Combined  Transport  Directive  was  to  review  the  definition  of  combined  transport, 
considered  outdated  by  60%  of  respondents  who  would  prefer  an  absolute  distance 
driven  by  road  using  appropriate  motorways  or  a  percentage  of  the  total  combined 
transport trip rather than the current “as the crow flies” definition. Some stakeholders 
consulted  for  the  purposes  of  the  present  study  indicated  the  need  for  updating  the 
provisions  on  combined transport  or  even  (according  to  few  stakeholders)  to  remove 
the provisions altogether.  

6.12.4.4. 

Scope to streamline the regulatory framework 

In  certain  Member  States  the  first  and  final  leg  of  a  combined  transport  journey  are 
considered  as  a  cabotage  operation  and  not  as  a  combined  transport  operation. 
Several  stakeholders  called  the  need  for  a  common  definition  as  to  how  cabotage 
relates  to  combined  transport.  They  consider  that  the  provisions  of  the  Combined 
Transport  Directive  currently  in  force  do  not  provide  an  appropriate  and  binding 
guidance  to  address  this  particular  issue.  In  addition,  the  majority  of  stakeholders 
asked  for  better  enforcement  of  the  existing  rules,  especially  as  far  as  cabotage  and 
cross-border road legs are concerned.  

A clearer definition of combined transport that preferably avoids the term “as the crow 
flies”  is  needed.  This  should  be  accompanied  with  a  more  efficient  system  (for 
instance,  a  specific  combined  transport  document)  to  prove  that  the  road  leg  of  this 
transport is indeed a part of a whole journey carried by road in combination with other 
means  of  transport  and  not  cabotage.  Notwithstanding  this,  the  appropriate 
instrument  to  be  amended  as  far  as  this  is  concerned  is  the  Combined  Transport 
Directive. 

6.12.5. 

Posting of Workers (Directives 96/71/EC and 2014/67/EU) 

Directive 96/71 (the Posting of Workers Directive) applies to undertakings established 
in a Member State which, in the framework of the transnational provision of services, 
post workers to the territory of another Member State.  

Directive 2014/67/EU on the Posting of Workers Enforcement was adopted on 15 May 
2014  and  shall  be  implemented  by  Member States  within  2016.  This new  instrument 
aims  at  improving  enforceability  of  the  Posting  of  Workers  Directive  by,  inter  alia, 
clarifying the concept of posting, improving cooperation between national authorities, 
increasing monitoring over companies and ensuring that  effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive. 

6.12.5.1. 

Interactions  

Directive 96/71/EC regulates the posting of workers, i.e. the situation where workers 
employed in one EU Member State are sent by their employer on a temporary basis to 
carry  out  their  work  in  another  EU  Member  State.  This  is  obviously  relevant  in  this 
field because of the nature of the tasks entrusted to haulage drivers.  

Directive 2014/67/EC aims at a better and more uniform implementation, application 
and  enforcement  of  the  Posting  of  Workers  Directive  by,  inter  alia,  (i)  improving 
cooperation between national authorities, (ii) clarifying the definition of posting so as 
to increase legal certainty and to tackle the problem of 'letter-box' companies; and (ii) 

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reinforcing  the  handling  of  complaints  and  the  penalties.  Members  States  need  to 
implement the provisions of this Direction within the early summer of 2016.  

6.12.5.2. 

Impacts on the objectives 

This Directive aims at avoiding "social dumping" where foreign service providers may 
undercut  local  providers  because  their  labour  standards  are  lower.  It  establishes 
mandatory  rules  regarding  the  terms  and  conditions  of  employment  to  be  applied  to 
an  employee  posted  in  another  EU  Member  State.  These  rules  will  reflect  the 
standards of local workers in the host EU Member State (that is, where the employee 
is sent to work).  

The core idea of this instrument is that if an EU Member State has provided for certain 
minimum  terms  and  conditions  of  employment,  these  shall  also  apply  to  workers 
posted  to  that  State.  These  minimum  terms  may  be  established  by  national  laws, 
administrative provisions, collective agreements or arbitration awards. 

The  impact  on  the  objectives  of  the  Road  Transport  Package,  this  Directive  seem  
coherent,  as  they  all  intend  to  improve  social  and  working  conditions  and  to  ensure 
common rules for transport workers in Europe. 

6.12.5.3. 
provisions 

Consistency  of  references  and  definition,  and  overlaps  of 

Recital 17 of Regulation 1072/2009 refers to Directive 96/71 in order to indicate that 
the latter applies to transport undertakings performing a cabotage operation. As some 
authors pointed out63, this raises several questions. Since cabotage for road transport 
purposes  necessarily  takes  place  after  an  international  transport,  it  is  not  clear  what 
are  the  rules  that  apply  to  international  drivers  if  they  do  not  carry  out  cabotage 
operations.  Furthermore,  it  is  not  clear  if  an  international  transport,  especially  if 
regularly repeated, falls within the scope of Directive 96/71. 

The European Commission reaffirmed that the Posting of Workers Directive applies to 
cabotage  operations  and  that  point-to-point  international  road  transport  falls  outside 
the scope of this Directive64. This seems a logical interpretation since it would become 
extremely burdensome to apply the labour legislation of each country to each segment 
of an international transport. 

However,  it  has  been  indicated  in  a  subsequent  study  prepared  for  the  European 
Commission (van Hoek & Houwerzijl, 2011b) the need to formulate a sub-rule for the 
application  of  Directive  96/71/EC  to  transport  workers.  The  study  specifically 
emphasizes  that  “[t]hough  the  Directive  does  apply  to  transport  workers  (…),  the 
system of the Directive is ill fitted to deal with workers who do not work in a specific 
country but rather from a specific country. The PWD is most often deemed to apply to 
cabotage,  but  the  effectuation  of  the  monitoring  of  the  protection  is  highly 
problematic. Furthermore, certain requirements in the PWD (notably the presence of a 
service  contract  between  the  employer  and  a  recipient  in  the  host  state)  may  block 
application  of  the  protection  to  transport  workers,  even  in  the  case  of  cabotage.  It 
seems advisable to formulate a sub-rule for applying the PWD to transport workers. In 

63  See  “The  inspection  activity  within  posting  of  workers  in  the  road  transport:  a  guide  for 

control authorities”  http://www.tagliacarne.it/files/141031/guida_transpo_inglese.pdf    page 

14 

64 COM (2006) 439 Commission Staff Working Document: Commission's services report on the 

implementation of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of 

the provision of services. 

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its  absence,  and  awaiting  a  European  solution,  Member  States  may  involve  the 
national  social  partners  in  the  sector  to  determine  the  proper  application  and 
enforcement of the PWD to this sector”. 

With regard to the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC, and leaving purely international 
transport  aside,  it  is  still  unclear  if  the  application  to  cabotage  operations  is  smooth, 
both for operators and enforcers. For example, it does not seem an easy task for an 
undertaking  to  calculate  and  assure  that  all  drivers  performing  cabotage  pursuant  to 
Regulation  1072/2009  in  each  country  are  remunerated  accordingly.  The  same 
difficulty  may  arise  for  authorities  in  charge  of  monitoring  compliance  with  social 
provisions. 

More  particularly,  there  is  indication  that  not  all  Members  States  expressly  recognise 
the application of the Posting of Workers Directive to cabotage. For instance, in Italy, 
the  Netherlands  and  Estonia  the  application  of  the  Posting  of  Workers  Directive  is 
unclear (SDG, 2013a). As pointed out in a 2011 complementary study elaborated for 
the  European  Commission  (van  Hoek  &  Houwerzijl,  2011a)  “The  current  study  also 
confirms  the  special  status  of  transport  workers,  both  as  regards  the  exact  criterion 
for  application  of  the  protection  offered  by  the  PWD  and  as  regards  the  practical 
application  and  enforcement  thereof.  HU,  SK,  CZ  have  or  until  recently  had  specific 
conflict of laws rules for transport workers. Cross-border mobility of transport workers 
may not qualify as posting under domestic law and/or the implementation measure in 
AT,  HU,  SI  and  PT.  These  findings  underscore  the  relevance  of  a  separate 
implementation  of  the  PWD  for  transport  workers,  as  was  recommended  in  the  first 
study.  In  absence  of  and  awaiting  a  European  solution,  Member  States  may  involve 
the  national  social  partners  in  the  sector  to  determine  the  proper  application  and 
enforcement of the PWD to this sector.” 

Moreover,  Directive  96/71  requires  an  “employment  relationship”  between  the 
undertaking making the posting and the worker during the period of posting65. This is 
a  current  source  of  problems  since,  for  instance,  stakeholders  in  Sweden  have 
indicated that such requirement would mean that there has to be a contract between 
the  transport  company  and  a  service  recipient  operating  in  the  state  where  the 
cabotage  takes  place.  In  Sweden,  such  a  contract  is  deemed  to  be  absent  when  the 
contract  with  the  transport  company  was  entered  into  by  a  forwarding  or  freighting 
agency established outside the country of cabotage.  In the transport sector, workers 
are often posted by an agency or within a group (not on the basis of a contract) and 
most  of  the  other  relationships  with  foreign  undertakings  are  based  on  transport 
contracts  to  which  rules  on  protection  of  workers’  rights  in  subcontracting  chains  do 
not apply (Ghent University, 2012). 

6.12.5.4. 

Scope to streamline the regulatory framework 

A  proposal  made  by  the  High  Level  Group  is  to  divide  cabotage  into  linked  (to 
international movements) and non-linked cabotage (Bayliss, 2012).  

  The  first  one  would  be  regarded  as  an  international  operation  and  be  focused 
on  the  reduction  of  empty  running.  Therefore,  it  would  neither  be  subject  to 
pre-registration  nor  to  Directive  96/71.  This  possibility  would  imply  reviewing 
the Directive to amend its scope. The High Level Group also proposes to reduce 
the 7-day rule established in Regulation 1072/2009 to a 4-day rule but without 
limitations  on  the  number  of  cabotage  operations.  The  latter  has  been 
seconded  by  certain  stakeholders  in  the  groups  of  medium  sized  undertaking 
associations and freight forwarders interviewed for the purposes of this Study. 
This issue is not influenced by the 2014 enforcement Directive. 

65 See Article 1 of the Regulation. 

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  By  contrast,  non-linked  cabotage  could  take  place:  (i)  after  an  international 
movement per se; (ii) after an international movement plus linked cabotage; or 
(iii)  entirely  independent  of  these  two  types  of  operations.  Therefore,  a  road 
transport  operator  should  be  free  to  enter  another  EU  Member  State  with  an 
empty vehicle and participate in the domestic market. For such operations, and 
in  line  with  Directive  96/71  which  covers  road  transport  cabotage,  the  core 
conditions  of  this  directive  should  effectively  apply  to  all  cabotage  operations, 
and  without  regard  to  the  current  requirement  under  the  directive  for  a 
contractual  relationship  between  the  operator  and  the  final  recipient  of  the 
goods.  

The  High  Level  Group  on  the  Development  of  the  EU  Road  Haulage  Market  also 
proposed a further restriction of days per year depending on the type of vehicle.  

The High Level Group’s proposal, although pragmatic, could be difficult to implement. 
On the one hand, assessing the type of cabotage at a check may not be an easy task. 
On the other hand, the proposal to limit the time but not the operations may not suit 
all countries due to their geographical characteristics. A Swedish stakeholder (a freight 
forwarder  association)  consulted  for  the  purposes  of  this  Study  indicated  that  for 
countries with a considerable geographical extension where the main cities are distant 
from one each other, reducing the time-limit from 7 days to 4 days may not be useful 
since  no  more  than  two  or  three  cabotage  operations  may  be  carried  out  in  such 
period of time.  

It  is  safe  to  affirm  that  an  appropriate  enforceability  of  the  Directive  to  cabotage 
operations  is  highly  questionable  due  to  the  inherent  difficulty  to  check  whether 
drivers performing cabotage are granted the minimum conditions of the workers in the 
country  where  they  perform  cabotage  and  for  the  part  of  their  trip  where  they  are 
performing  such  cabotage.  Furthermore,  certain  requirements  of  the  Posting  of 
Workers Directive,  such  as the  existence  of  a service  contract  between  the  employer 
and a recipient in the host state may impede the protection granted by the Directive 
to transport workers.  

In the line with what has been previously suggested, a recent study has indicated that 
the  present  system  of  cabotage  is  not  working  correctly,  as  there  is  no  way  of 
controlling  the  number  of  days  of  cabotage  (Broughton  et  al.,  2015).  In  this  sense, 
stakeholders  seem  to  indicate  that  it  is  very  difficult  to  control,  including  via  the 
Posting of Workers Directive, since there are too many intermediary bodies involved, 
meaning that contractual issues are tough to be checked. 

It  appears  obvious  that  certain  legal  loopholes  exist  in  this  respect  and  that  the 
current obligation to apply the provisions of the Posting of Workers Directive to drivers 
performing  cabotage  under  the  rules  established  by  Regulation  1072/2009  are  too 
burdensome to be implemented and almost impossible to be controlled and enforced. 
This  means  that  the  coherence  between  Regulation  1072/2009  and  the  Posting  of 
Workers Directive in not evident, at least from the practical perspective.   

There  is  room  for  an  amendment  to  the  Posting  of  Workers  Directive  in  order  to 
reinforce  the  obligation  of  applying  its  provisions  to  cabotage.  In  addition,  operators 
should  be  allowed  to  calculate  the  salaries  and  conditions  applicable  to  their  workers 
performing  cabotage  in  an  easier manner  (i.e.  by  establishing  percentages  or  quotas 
depending  on  the  amount  of  cabotage  performed  in  a  concrete  country).  This  could 
also help labour authorities to verify the correct application of this Directive, which in 
view  of  the  imminent  national  implementation  of  Directive  2014/67/UE    (in  2016  as 
required by the Directive) could contribute to improve the enforcement. 

6.12.6. 

Rome I Regulation 

Regulation  (EC)  No  593/2008  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  17 
June  2008  on  the  law  applicable  to  contractual  obligations  (Rome  I  Regulation)  is 
designed to establish which law governs the interpretation of contracts. 

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6.12.6.1. 

Interactions  

Even though Rome I Regulation has not been specifically designed for the road sector, 
its  application  and  enforcement  has  a  significant  impact  on  the  overall  working  and 
social conditions of workers in this sector given the mobile and international character 
of road transport operations (TRT, 2013).   

6.12.6.2. 

Impacts on the objectives 

The interaction of Regulations 1071/2009 and 1072/2009 with the Rome I Regulation 
is  not  direct,  and  therefore  they  pursue  different  objectives.  While  Regulations 
1071/2009  and  1072/2009  pursue  the  objectives  of  modernising  the  rules  governing 
admission  to  the  occupation  of  road  transport  operator  and  ensuring  a  coherent 
framework  for  international  road  haulage,  respectively,  the  Rome  I  Regulation  is 
focused on guaranteeing legal certainty in the EU judicial area. 

However, this does not mean that the objectives are contradictory or incoherent. The 
Rome  I  Regulation  regulates  the  law  governing  contracts  in  the  sector,  from 
employment contracts between drivers and operators to service contracts between the 
later and freight-forwarders.  In this sense helps to ensure common rules to boost the 
correct functioning of the transport activities at EU level. 

6.12.6.3. 
provisions 

Consistency  of  references  and  definition,  and  overlaps  of 

For  all  the  cases  in  which  a  driver  carries  out  his/her  activity  either  in  or  from  the 
country of his habitual workplace, or abroad without fulfilling the conditions of posting 
covered  by  Directive  96/71/EC  (i.e.  for  all  international  transport  which  does  not 
qualify as cabotage), the worker is covered by the provisions of Rome I Regulation.  

The  provisions  on  the  law  applicable  to  employment  contracts  contained  in  Rome  I 
Regulation have the same objective as in Directive 96/71/EC, that is, avoiding "social 
dumping" where foreign service providers may undercut local providers because their 
labour  standards  are  lower.  Some  take  the  view  that  in  order  to  eradicate  social 
dumping  in  road  transport  it  is  necessary  to:  (i)  ensure  an  effective  enforcement  of 
Rome  I  Regulation,  (ii)  eradicate  the  letter  box  company  practice  by  correctly 
enforcing  the  requirement  of  an  effective  and  stable  establishment  of  Regulation 
1071/2009 and (iii) ensure the enforcement of the current cabotage rules as laid down 
in Regulation 1072/2009 (ETF, 2012a).  

Article 8 of Rome I Regulation which provides that:  

“1.  An  individual  employment  contract  shall  be  governed  by  the  law  chosen  by  the 
parties in accordance with [principle of freedom of choice as stated in] Article 3. Such 
a  choice  of  law  may  not,  however,  have  the  result  of  depriving  the  employee  of  the 
protection afforded to him by provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement 
under the law that, in the absence of choice, would have been applicable pursuant to 
paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this Article. 

2. To the extent that the law applicable to the individual employment contract has not 
been chosen by the parties, the contract shall be governed by the law of the country 
in  which  or,  failing  that,  from  which  the  employee  habitually  carries  out  his  work  in 
performance of the contract. The country where the work is habitually carried out shall 
not be deemed to have changed if he is temporarily employed in another country. 

3.  Where  the  law  applicable  cannot  be  determined  pursuant  to  paragraph  2,  the 
contract  shall  be  governed  by  the  law  of  the  country  where  the  place  of  business 
through which the employee was engaged is situated. 

4.  Where  it  appears  from  the  circumstances  as  a  whole  that  the  contract  is  more 
closely  connected  with  a  country  other  than  that  indicated  in  paragraphs  2  or  3,  the 
law of that other country shall apply”. 

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Therefore, to ensure a correct enforcement of Rome I Regulation and to fight against 
social dumping in the road transport sector, some stakeholders have recommended to 
include  the  non-compliance  with  Rome  I  Regulation  within  the  list  of  most  serious 
infringements that, under Regulation 1071/2009, lead to the loss of good repute and 
withdrawal  of  authorisation  to  perform  road  transport  activities  (ETF,  2012a),  as 
provided for in Article 22 of Regulation 1071/2009.  

In  this  sense,  concerning  the  application  of  Article  8  of  Rome  I  Regulation,  Belgian 
trade  unions  recently  raised  their  concerns  with  regard  to  the  current  incoherence 
between  the  case-law  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  EU  when  applied  to  road 
transport:. . 

In  the 2011  Koelzsch  judgment66,  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  EU  established that  the 
law  of  the  Member  State  in  which  the  worker  conducts  the  ‘major  part’  of  his  or  her 
role (i.e. loading/unloading of goods, reception of instructions etc.) shall apply. 

It  stated  that  “in  a  situation  in  which  an  employee  carries  out  his  activities  in  more 
than one [Member State], the country in which the employee habitually carries out his 
work in performance of the contract (…) is that in which or from which, in the light of 
all the factors which characterise that activity, the employee performs the greater part 
of his obligations towards his employer” (paragraph 50 of the judgment). 

Subsequently, the judgment delivered in 2013 in the case Schlecker67 established that 
even  where  an  employee  carries  out  the  work  in  performance  of  the  contract 
habitually,  for  a  lengthy  period  and  without  interruption  in  the  same  country,  the 
national  court  may,  under  the  concluding  part  of  that  provision,  disregard  the  law  of 
the  country  where  the  work  is  habitually  carried  out,  if  it  appears  from  the 
circumstances  as  a  whole  that  the  contract  is  more  closely  connected  with  another 
country (paragraph 45 of the judgment).  

For  the  Belgian  trade  unions  there  is  an  evident  lack  of  coherence  between  the  two 
judgments:  

 

 

In  the  Koelzsch  judgment,  the  Court  states  that  the  employment  contract 
should be governed by the law of the country in which the employee performs 
the greater part of his obligations towards his employer (i.e. A Polish driver is 
employed  by  a  Polish  company  but  he  performs  the  greater  part  of  his  job  in 
Germany. The employment agreement should governed by German law); while  

In  the  Schlecker  judgment,  the  Court  states  that  the  national  court  may 
disregard the law applicable in the country where the work is habitually carried 
out, if it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is more 
closely connected with another country (i.e. The Polish driver is employed by a 
Polish  company  and  he  performs  the  greater  part  of  his  job  in  Germany.  The 
employment  agreement  could  be  governed  by  Polish  law,  as  there  are  more 
connections  between  him  and  this  country  –i.e.  nationality,  residence  of  the 
driver,  place  of  registry  of  the  company,  plate  of  the  vehicles,  etc.-  than  with 
Germany). 

66 Judgment of the CJEU of 15 March 2011, case C-29/10, Heiko Koelzsch v Luxembourg 

67 Judgment of the CJEU of 12 September 2013, case C-64/12, Anton Schlecker v Melitta Josefa 

Boedeker. 

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6.12.6.4. 

Scope to streamline the regulatory framework 

Further  clarification  on  the  above-mentioned  issues  by  Court  of  Justice  of  the  EU 
seems  necessary.  Alternatively,  as  claimed  by  the  Belgian  trade  unions,  an 
amendment of Article 8 of Rome I Regulation could be envisaged as follows:  

These trade unions suggest that, in case of a dispute, the applicable law should not be 
determined  by  the  place  where  the  employee  performs  the  greater  part  of  his/her 
obligations  or  by  the  closest  connection,  but  be  established  taking  into  account  the 
strongest  social  protection  for  workers.  In  the  example  above,  the  law  that  applies 
would not be established by either the criterion on the place where the greater part of 
the worker’s obligations is performed (Germany) or the place with greater connections 
to  the  contractual  relationship  (Poland)  but  by  the  country  that  offers  better  labour 
conditions. However, this would necessarily require a legislative amendment of Rome I 
Regulation and to open a legislative procedure as provided by the TFEU. 

In sum, there is not a lack of coherence per se between the analysed regulations and 
Rome  I Regulation.  However,  the  correct  enforcement  of Regulations  1071/2009  and 
1072/2009 has an impact on the correct implementation and enforcement of Rome  I 
Regulation. Vice versa, it has been suggested that a breach of Rome I Regulation (i.e. 
depriving  the  driver  from  the  law  that  better  protects  his/her  interests)  should  be 
included  as  one  of  the  infringements  that  may  lead  to  loss  of  good  repute  and 
withdrawal of the community licence, pursuant to Regulation 1071/2009. 

6.12.7. 
Transport) multilateral permit system and possible bilateral agreements  

Interaction with the ECMT (European Conference of Ministers of 

The European Conference of Ministers of Transport (“ECMT”) is an international forum 
for  policy  issues  of  relevance  to  the  different  transport  modes,  among  which,  road 
transport  and  intermodal  transport.  It  has  43  full  members;  therefore  its  scope  is 
larger than the EU.  

6.12.7.1. 

Interactions  

This section addressed the coherence and possible overlaps of third country aspects of 
the  Road  Transport  package  (particularly  Regulation  1072/2009)  with  existing 
agreements and structures governing the international carriage of goods including EU 
and non EU members. These include the ECMT and any multilateral permit system and 
any bilateral agreements of EU Member States with non-EU countries. 

6.12.7.2. 

Impacts on the objectives 

One of the objectives of the ECMT is to ensure a gradual liberalisation of road freight 
transport  which  a  priori,  is  consistent  with  the  objectives  pursued  by  Regulation 
1072/2009. 

6.12.7.3. 
provisions 

Consistency  of  references  and  definition,  and  overlaps  of 

The  ECMT  is  an  intergovernmental  organisation  established  by  a  Protocol  signed  in 
Brussels  on  17  October  1953  (“the  1953  Protocol”).  By  a  decision  of  the  ECMT’s 
Council of Ministers at their meeting in Dublin in May 2006, the ECMT was transformed 
into the International Transport Forum (“ITF”) and integrated as an intergovernmental 
organisation  within  the  OECD.  In  the  vein  of  the  former  ECMT,  the  ITF  operates  a 
system  of  multilateral  road  transport  permits  between  its  members68.  The  ECMT 

68 Countries participating in the ECMT quota system are Albania, Armenia,  Austria, Azerbaijan, 

Belarus,  Belgium,  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  Bulgaria,  Croatia,  the  Czech  Republic,  Denmark, 

Estonia,  Finland,  France,  FYR  Macedonia,  Georgia,  Germany,  Greece,  Hungary,  Ireland, 

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multilateral  quota  of  transport  licences  was  seen  as  a  practical  step  towards  the 
gradual  liberalisation  of  road  freight  transport69.  ECMT  licences  are  multilateral 
licences, delivered by the ITF/ECMT, for the international carriage of goods by road for 
hire  or  reward  by  transport  undertakings  established  in  an  ECMT  Member  country. 
They cover, on the basis of a quota system, the transport operations being performed: 

a)  between ECMT Member countries; and  

b)  in transit through the territory of one or several ECMT Member country(ies) by 

vehicles registered in an ECMT Member country70. 

For instance, ECMT licence delivered will apply on (i) the transport operations between 
the  Russian  Federation  and  Latvia,  and  (ii)  on  the  transport  operations  between  the 
Belarus and Italy as well as the ECMT countries crossed in transit (Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Austria). 

EU  Member  States  also  have  bilateral  agreements  with  several  non-EU  countries, 
which  allow  hauliers  to  travel  to  or  through  those  countries  as  long  as  the  hauliers 
hold a permit for the country with which the bilateral agreement has been made.  

Pursuant  to  Article  3  of  Regulation  1072/2009,  international  carriage  shall  be  carried 
out  subject  to  possession  of  a Community  licence,  which  is  issued by  an  EU  Member 
State,  in  accordance  with  this  regulation,  to  any  haulier  carrying  goods  by  road  for 
hire or reward who (i) is established in that EU Member State and (ii) is entitled in the 
Member  State  of  establishment  to  carry  out  the  international  carriage  of  goods  by 
road,  in  accordance  with  legislation  concerning  admission  to  the  occupation  of  road 
haulage operator (Article 4 of Regulation 1072/2009).  

At the same time though, based on Article 1.2 of Regulation 1072/2009, in the event 
of carriage from an EU Member State to a third country and vice versa, the Regulation 
shall apply to the part of the journey on the territory of any Member State crossed in 
transit. It shall not apply to that part of the journey on the territory of the EU Member 
State  of  loading  or  unloading,  as  long  as  the  necessary  agreement  between  the  EU 
and the third country concerned has not been concluded. 

As  an  example,  Regulation  1072/2009  shall  apply  to  the  transport  company  for  a 
journey between Italy and Belarus. This Regulation will be applicable in the EU transit 
countries (Austria, the Czech Republic and Poland), but will not be applicable in Italy 
neither  to  the  part  of  the  journey  on  the  territory  of  Belarus,  as  long  as  there  is  no 
agreement between the EU and Belarus. 

There  are  possible  overlaps  between  Regulation  1072/2009  and  the  ECMT 
mechanisms.  

EU  hauliers  who  are  holders  of  Community  licences  should  be  permitted  to  carry  out 
national transport services within a Member State on a temporary basis in conformity 
with Regulation 1072/2009, without having a registered office or other establishment 
therein  (recital  13).  This  Regulation  should  apply  (i)  to  the  international  carriage  of 
goods  by  road  for  hire  or  reward  for  journeys  carried  out  within  the  territory  of  the 

Italy,  Latvia,  Liechtenstein,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Malta,  Moldova,  Montenegro, 

Netherlands,  Norway,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania,  Russian  Federation,  Serbia,  Slovakia, 

Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom. 

69 

ECMT 

Multilateral 

Quota: 

User 

Guide, 

www.internationaltransportforum.org/Pub/pdf/13MQguide.pdf, January 2014, p. 5. 

70 Idem, p. 15, nº 3.1. 

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Community  and  (ii)  as  provided  in  Article  1.2,  in  the  event  of  carriage  from  an  EU 
Member  State  to  a  third  country  and  vice  versa,  to  the  part  of  the  journey  on  the 
territory of any Member State crossed in transit.  

However,  some  stakeholders  have  claimed  that  the  “third  country”  aspect  of 
Regulation 1072/2009 could overlap with the ECMT multilateral road haulage permits 
and possible bilateral agreements.  

First  of  all,  in  accordance  with  recital  3,  Regulation  1072/2009  should  apply  to  all 
international carriage on the EU territory in order to ensure a coherent framework for 
international road haulage throughout the EU. In 2009, carriage from Member States 
to  third  countries  was  still  largely  covered  by  bilateral  agreements  between  the 
Member States and those third countries. Therefore, Regulation 1072/2009 should not 
apply to that part of the journey within the territory of the Member State of loading or 
unloading,  as  long  as  the  necessary  agreements  between  the  EU  and  the  third 
countries concerned have not been concluded.  

This  means  that,  as  long  as  the  necessary  agreement  between  the  EU  and  a  third 
country has not been concluded, a same journey might have to be covered by permit 
issued under a bilateral agreement and a Community license. Nevertheless, Regulation 
1072/2009 should apply to the territory of the Member State(s) crossed in transit. 

It  also  appears  that  when  EU  hauliers  coming  back  from  or  going  to  a  third  country 
are subject to a check in the territory of an EU Member State different from the place 
of loading or unloading, the Community license may not be enough and these hauliers 
would  also  be  required  to  have  an  additional  permit,  such  as  an  ECMT  permit  or  a 
permit issued under a bilateral agreement. 

This  would  explain  why  ECMT  licences  are  still  delivered  between  EU  Member  States 
and why EU Member States continue to exchange between them third country permits 
within the framework of their bilateral agreements. 

Taking  into  account  that  based  on  Regulation  1072/2009,  (i)  EU  hauliers  holders  of 
Community  licences  should  be  permitted  to  carry  out  transport  services  within  a 
Member State on a temporary basis, (ii) including in the event of carriage from an EU 
Member State to a third country and vice versa, but excluding the part of the journey 
on  the  territory  of  any  Member  State  crossed  in  transit  (as  long  as  the  EU  has  not 
concluded an agreement with the third country concerned): 

  The  authorities  of  the  Member  State  of  loading  or  unloading  may  require  the 
hauliers  to  hold  an  additional  permit  (such  as  an  ECMT  permit  or  a  permit 
issued under a bilateral agreement) than the Community license, as long as the 
EU has not concluded an agreement with the third country concerned; 

  The  authorities  of  the  Member  States  crossed  in  transit  should  not  be 
authorized  to  require  the  hauliers  to  hold  an  additional  permit  than  the 
Community license which should be enough. 

6.12.7.4. 

Scope to streamline the regulatory framework 

Based  on  the  above,  it  is  questionable  whether  the  authorities  of  the  Member States 
crossed in transit should be authorised to require the hauliers going to or coming back 
from a third country to hold an additional permit than the Community license, which in 
principle could be enough. Any check of a EU haulier going to or coming back from a 
third country in the territory of an EU Member State crossed in transit where he/she is 
required  to  hold  an  ECMT  permit  or  a  permit  issued  under  a  bilateral  agreement 
besides his/her Community license could constitute a breach of Regulation 1072/2009. 

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6.12.8. 

Summary and conclusions 

6.12.8.1. 

Conclusions 

Overall, the legal framework is not fully coherent. There are  certain difficulties in the 
the 
correct 
satisfactorily  achievement  of  the  objectives  of  these  EU  instruments,  considering  the 
relation with the other EU legislation interacting with the Road Transport Package.  

implementation  of  Regulations  1071/2009  and  1072/2009  and 

The  objectives  pursued  by  Regulation  561/2006  and  Directive  2002/15/EC  on 
driving,  rest  and  working  time  for  road  transport  operators  are  coherent  with  the 
objectives  of  the  Road  Transport  Package,  as  they  all  aim  to  improve  social  and 
working conditions for transport workers in Europe. However, it should be highlighted 
that:  

  Article  6  of  Regulation  1071/2009  (requirements  of  driving  time,  rest  periods 
and working time) does not contain specific references to Regulation 561/2006 
or to Directive 2002/15/EC.  

  Annex  IV  of  Regulation  1071/2009  (containing  the  list  of  most  serious 
infringements  related  among  others  to  driving  and  working  time  limits)  does 
not  make  either  a  specific  reference  to  Regulation  561/2006  or  to  Directive 
2002/15/EC.  

  The  co-liability  principle  established  by  Regulation  561/2006  (i.e.  liability  of 
transport  undertakings  such  as  consignors,  freight  forwarders,  tour  operators, 
principal  contractors,  subcontractors  and  driver  employment  agencies;  for 
infringements committed by drivers working for such operators) is not provided 
for  by  Regulations  1071/2009  and  1072/2009.  In  this  sense,  at  least  two 
Spanish  stakeholders 
transport  undertakings  association  and  an 
undertaking)  have  highlighted  that  when  it  comes  to  cabotage  services, 
although logistics companies provide a wider range of road transport services, 
they  are  submitted  to  a  degree  of  liability  lower  than  the  liability  thresholds 
applicable to transport undertakings.  

(a 

As regards Directive 2006/22/EC, which contains provisions for the enforcement of 
Regulation  561/2006,  we  have  identified  the  following  inconsistencies  between  the 
Directive and Regulation 1071/2009: 

  Differences  on  the  lists  of  infringements  contained  in  Annex  IV  of  Regulation 
1071/2009  and  Annex  III  of  Directive  2006/22/EC  and  referring  to  the 
requirements on (i) good repute and (ii) driving time and rest periods.  

  There  are  also  certain  inconsistencies  between  Regulation  1071/2009  and 
Directive  2006/22/EC  concerning  the  requirements 
for  monitoring  the 
compliance  with  both  provisions,  as  well  as  the  types  of  cooperation  between 
national authorities. It should be noted that Regulation 1071/2009 extends the 
application of the risk rating system established in Directive 2006/22/EC to all 
possible  infringements  of  the  requirements  of  good  repute  as  defined  in 
Regulation  1071/2009.  Therefore,  the  mentioned  inconsistencies  could  make 
the  common  use  of  the  risk  rating  system  more  complicated,  should 
contradictory  or  non-coherent  data  be  included  in  the  system  for  the  same 
operators. 

Compliance  of  road  social  provisions  is  monitored  in  practice  via  the  tachograph 
installed  in  the  vehicles.  New  exemptions  are  also  introduced  by  the  2014 
tachograph Regulation 165/2014.  Regulation 1071/2009 is applicable to vehicles 
with a laden mass of more than 3.5 tonnes. This means that it is not consistent with 
the  exemption  established  in  Regulation  165/2014  and  applicable  to  vehicles  with  a 
laden mass not exceeding 7.5 tonnes. Especially considering that, in accordance with 
point  2  of  Annex  IV  of  Regulation  1071/2009;  not  having  a tachograph  constitutes  a 
most  serious  infringement  of  this  provision.    The  Swedish  and  Spanish  stakeholders 
interviewed for the purposes of this Study (i.e. freight forwarders, drivers’ associations 

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and  transport  undertaking  association  groups)  have  also  called  for  the  use  of 
tachograph  data  when  enforcing  rules  related  to  cabotage.  In  the  view  of  the 
consultants, this proposal may reinforce the monitoring and enforcement of cabotage 
rules. 

The Combined Transport Directive 92/106/EEC seeks to boost operations through 
liberalisation of road cabotage, the elimination authorisation procedures for Combined 
Transport operations and to grant financial support through fiscal incentives for certain 
of these operations. A European Commission consultation carried out in 2014 indicated 
that a great number of stakeholders agree in that the exemption from cabotage rules 
under  the  Combined  Transport  Directive  was  particularly  helpful  and  welcomed.  
However, this consultation has also shown that some provisions may be outdated and 
its application gives rise to certain inconsistencies among Member States (for instance, 
38%  of  the  stakeholders  consulted  by  the  Commission  indicated  that  combined 
transport  was  not  completely  free  from  cabotage  restrictions).  In  the  opinion  of  the 
consultants,  an  amendment  of  this  instrument  that  allowed  a  clarification  of  the 
concept  of  Combined  Transport  and  the  introduction  of  specific  documentation  would 
be positive; without the need of an amendment in Regulation 1072/2009. 

The  enforceability  of  the  Posting  of  Workers  Directive  with  regard  to  cabotage 
operations  is  highly  questionable.  There  is  an  inherent  difficulty  in  checking  whether 
drivers performing cabotage are granted the minimum conditions of the workers in the 
country  where  they  perform  cabotage  and  for  the  part  of  their  trip  where  they  are 
performing  such  cabotage.  Furthermore,  certain  requirements  of  the  Posting  of 
Workers Directive,  such  as the  existence  of  a service  contract  between  the  employer 
and a recipient in the host state, may impede the protection granted by the Directive 
to transport workers. It is expected that Directive 2014/67/UE will improve the means 
of  controlling  that  the  provisions  of  the  Posting  of  Workers  Directive  are  being 
correctly implemented, especially to avoid the use of letter-box companies in order to 
circumvent  the  application  of  the  Posting  of  Workers  Directive  and  Regulation 
1071/2009. 

There is not a lack of coherence between Regulations 1071/2009 and 1072/2009 and 
Rome I Regulation. However, certain stakeholders, such as the European Transport 
Workers Federation in 201271  have suggested that a breach of Rome I Regulation (i.e. 
depriving  the  driver  from  the  law  that  better  protects  his/her  interests)  should  be 
included  as  one  of  the  infringements  that  may  lead  to  loss  of  good  repute  and 
withdrawal of the community licence, pursuant to Regulation 1071/2009. Although this 
suggestion is positive, its implementation and enforcement would be, in the opinion of 
the  consultants,  difficult  at  this  stage.  It  would  be  disproportionate  to  withdraw  the 
licence  on  the  basis  of  an  infringement  of  Rome  I  Regulation  at  the  stage  when 
Directive  2014/67/UE  (regulating  specific  requirements  for  undertakings  posting 
workers) is not fully implemented yet. 

Possible  overlaps  with  the  European  Conference  of  Ministers  of  Transport 
(“ECMT”)  and  any  multilateral  permit  system  and  any  bilateral  agreements  of  EU 
Member  States  with  non-EU  countries  have  been  analysed.    In  this  regard,  it  is 
questionable  whether  the  authorities  of  the  Member  States  crossed  in  transit  should 
be authorised to require the hauliers going to or coming back from a third country to 
hold  an  additional  permit  than  the  Community  license,  which  in  principle  could  be 
enough. Any check of a EU haulier going to or coming back from a third country in the 
territory of an EU Member State crossed in transit where he/she is required to hold an 
ECMT  permit  or  a  permit  issued  under  a  bilateral  agreement  besides  his/her 
Community license could constitute a breach of Regulation 1072/2009. 

71 

http://www.etf-europe.org/files/extranet/-

75/37898/ETF%20MANIFESTO%20on%20working%20conditions%20of%20professional%2
0drivers%20EN.pdf 

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6.12.8.2. 

Recommendations 

Certain actions could be taken to enhance the consistency of references  between the 
Road  Transport  Package  and  the  road  social  legislation  (Regulation  561/2006, 
Directive 2002/15/EC and Directive 2006/22/EC), in particular regarding the definition 
of infringements.  In this respect, it could be recommended to: 

 

Include in Regulation 1071/2009 specific reference to Regulation 561/2006 and 
to Directive 2002/15/EC when establishing the requirements of driving time, 
rest periods and working time (Article 6) and when defining in Annex IV the 
most serious infringements related to driving and working time limits.  

  Ensure a harmonised list of categories, types and degrees of seriousness of 

infringements across all instruments. 

  Harmonise the rules on monitoring of compliance of social rules and 

cooperation between the national enforcers, considering that the rules 
contained in the enforcement Directive 2006/22/EC are more complete. In this 
sense, the existing extension of the Directive 2006/22/EC risk rating system to 
Regulation 1071/2009 could serve as a model for further synergies.  

 

It could also be advisable to analyse the possibility of amending Regulation 
1072/2009 in order to establish a co-liability regime as regards the 
infringement of cabotage rules and, therefore, to achieve a more harmonised 
treatment of infringements in the road transport sector.    

Regarding combined transport, there are several issues: 

  There is a need for a common definition as to how cabotage relates to 
combined transport: In certain Member States the first and final leg of a 
combined transport journey are considered as a cabotage operation and not as 
a combined transport operation.  A clearer definition of combined transport is 
needed that preferably avoids the term “as the crow flies”.  

  Improved  documentation:  Improved  documentation:  In  this  respect,  more 
than  70%  of  stakeholders  raised  the  issue  of  disparities  between  the 
documentation  requirements  for  cabotage  and  combined  transport.    The 
establishment of a single document for combined transport operations, similar 
to the CMR, could solve the current issues related to documentation.   

The  enforceability  of  the  Posting  of  Workers  Directive  with  regard  to  cabotage 
operations is still questionable. There is room for an amendment to the legislation, in 
line  with  the  proposals  made  by  the  High  Level  Group.  In  this  sense,  as  part  of  its 
work programme for 2015, the Commission has set as one of its priorities to carry out 
a review of the Posting of Workers Directive 

To ensure a correct enforcement of the Rome I Regulation and to fight against social 
dumping  in  the  road  transport  sector,  some  stakeholders,  such  as  the  European 
Transport Workers’ Federation, have recommended that non-compliance with Rome I 
Regulation  (i.e.  depriving  the  driver  from  the  law  that  better  protects  his/her 
interests) should be included as one of the infringements that may lead to loss of good 
repute  and  withdrawal  of  the  community  licence,  pursuant  to  Regulation  1071/2009 
(ETF, 2012a).  It has also been suggested that in case of disputes the applicable law 
should not be determined by the place where the employee performs the greater part 
of  his/her  obligations  or  by  the  closest  connection,  but  be  established  taking  into 
account  the  strongest  social  protection  for  workers.  In  the  example  above,  the  law 
that  applies  would  not  be  established  by  either  the  criterion  on  the  place  where  the 
greater  part  of  the  worker’s  obligations  is  performed  (Germany)  or  the  place  with 
greater  connections  to  the  contractual  relationship  (Poland)  but  by  the  country  that 
offers  better  labour  conditions.  However,  this  would  necessarily  require  a  legislative 
amendment of Rome I Regulation and to open a legislative procedure as provided by 
the TFEU. 

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In  terms  of  the  interaction  with  structures  regulating  trade  with  third  countries,  the 
authorities of some Member States crossed in transit require the hauliers going to or 
coming  back  from  a  third  country  to  hold  a  permit  additional  to  the  Community 
license. In this situation, it is questionable whether this requirement for an additional 
permit is in line with Regulation 1072/2009. 

Overall,  there  appear  to  be  certain  difficulties  in  the  correct  implementation  of 
Regulations  1071/2009  and  1072/2009  and  the  satisfactorily  achievement  of  the 
objectives  of  these  EU  instruments,  considering  the  relation  with  the  other  EU 
legislation  interacting  with  the  Road  Transport  Package.  This  situation  may  be 
improved by updating obsolete legislation and enhancing harmonisation at the level of 
national transposition and enforcement.   

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6.13.  Coherence:  How  do  the  effects  of  the  two  Regulations  relate  to 
the  goals  of  EU  transport  policy  and  the  wider  economic,  social  or 
environmental challenges of EU policies?  

In  terms  of  their  effects,  how  do  the  two  Regulations  relate  to  the  goals  of  EU 
transport policy (as set out in the 2011 White Paper) and the wider economic, social or 
environmental  challenges  of  EU  policies?  Have  they  contributed  to  these  policy 
objectives?  In  particular,  do  Regulations  contribute  towards  the  2020  Road  Safety 
aims and to the general objective to reduce the GHG emissions (if so, to what extent)? 

This  question  examines  how  the  two  Regulations  relate,  in  terms  of  objectives  and 
actual  effects,  to  a  number  of  key  EU  transport  and  broader  EU  policy  goals 
concerning  social  conditions,  road  safety,  development  of  the  internal  market  and 
reduction of GHGs. 

6.13.1. 

Contribution to EU goals on social conditions and road safety 

Considering the social context of the Regulations, there are notable challenges around 
the harmonisation of social conditions in the sector.  The Transport White Paper calls 
for: 

  A higher degree of convergence and enforcement of social and safety rules, 

while recognising that pursuing market opening and competitiveness needs to 
be balanced with the social agenda in order to ensure quality jobs and working 
conditions.   

  A goal to achieve close to zero fatalities in road transport by 2050 and to halve 

road casualties by 2020 (European Commission, 2011a).    

At the level of policy objectives and the respective provisions, the two Regulations are 
clearly  coherent  with  the  goals  of  EU  transport  policy,  as  their  objectives  are  to 
contribute to increased compliance with EU road transport social and safety legislation.  
However, as discussed in detail in Evaluation Questions 5 and 6 (see Section 6.5 and 
6.6), the actual impact of the Regulations on social conditions and road safety remains 
largely indirect and difficult to quantify.   

Nonetheless, it is also clear that the Regulations can play a supporting role in creating 
the  right  framework  conditions  to  ensure  compliance  with  the  social  and  safety 
legislation, and hence can be considered coherent in this respect.  

6.13.2. 

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 

Particularly  relevant  is  the  role  of  Road  Transport  Package  in  establishing  minimum 
requirements  to  avoid  the  establishment  of  letterbox  companies  and  abuse  of  the 
principle of freedoms derived from the Treaty. In terms of actual impacts, as already 
presented  in  Evaluation  Question  1,  it  appears  that  the  problem  of  letterbox  has  not 
been entirely solved by the introduction of the Regulation.   

One  of  the  issues  that  has  been  raised  is  the  question  of  whether  the  freedom  of 
establishment  under  Article  49  TFEU72  could  actually  (perversely)  support  the 
establishment  of  letterbox  companies.  The ultimate objective of  Article  49 TFEU  is  to 
ensure  a  common  market  for  goods  and  services  within  the  EU  which  is  consistent 
with the objectives of Regulations 1071/2009 and 1072/2009. 

In  principle,  the  freedom  of  establishment  applies  if  a  company  qualifies  as  an 
establishment. If the company is formed without any activities or without the intention 

72 Under which establishing a subsidiary is covered by the freedom of establishment  

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of having any activities (i.e. it is a letterbox company), then there is no establishment 
and consequently it would fall outside the protection of Article 49 (Sørensen, 2015).   

On  the  other  hand,  Article  54  TFEU  concerning  the  rights  of  free  movement  and  the 
freedom to provide services provides a very broad definition of the companies that are 
covered,  which  identified  that  companies  must  have  “their  registered  office,  central 
administration or principal place of business within the Union”.  Companies with their 
registered office within the EU can exercise the right of establishment and the freedom 
to  provide  services  if  “…  their  activity  shows  a  real  and  continuous  link  with  the 
economy  of  a  Member  State”.    The  implication  is  that  letterbox  companies  formed 
without  any  activities  in  the  Union  cannot  rely  on  the  right  of  establishment  or  the 
freedom to provide services (Sørensen, 2015).  However, even though there should be 
some  activities  within  the  EU,  this  does  not  mean  that  the  activity  should  be  in  the 
Member  State  of  incorporation.    That  is,  if  a  company  manages  to  establish  in  a 
Member  State  with  laxer  rules,  a  letterbox  company  may  then  exercise  the  free 
movement rights.   

The  EU  has  therefore  tried  to  introduce  legislation  that  aims  to  make  it  easier  for 
Member States to prevent letterbox companies from undermining the internal market.  
The  Road  Transport  Package  through  Article  5  of  Regulation  1071/2009,  which  sets 
out  the  conditions  for  genuine  and  effective  establishment  in  a  Member  State,  is 
therefore  contributing  to  strengthening  the  legal  framework  concerning  the  need  for 
stable and effective establishment.  

6.13.3. 

Reducing empty running (reducing GHGs) 

In  relation  to  empty  running,  the  Transport  White  Paper  (2011)  anticipates  that  the 
removal  of  the  restrictions  to  cabotage  would  allow  hauliers  to  take  up  contracts  as 
these  become  available,  hence  also  reducing  fuel  consumption  and  GHGs.    The 
European  Parliament  has  called  for  the  gradual  opening  up  of  the  road  haulage 
transport  markets 
including  greater 
in  numerous  resolutions  and  reports  – 
liberalisation  of  cabotage  to  cut  the  level  of  empty  running  (European  Parliament, 
2015). However, as established earlier in Evaluation Question 4 (see Section 7.4), the 
ability  of  cabotage  to  increase  fill  rates  is  not  clear  and  it  is  difficult  to  establish  any 
contribution to these objectives.  

6.13.4. 

Development of a single European transport area 

The continuing importance of pursuing a single European transport area and removing 
competitive distortions is reiterated in the Commission’s 2011 Transport White Paper.  
The  White  Paper  calls  for  a  review  of  the  market  situation  of  road  freight  and  of  the 
degree of convergence in enforcement and implementation of legislation – noting that 
“a  further  integration  of  the  road  freight  market  will  render  road  transport  more 
efficient  and  competitive”  (European  Commission,  2011a).    As  such,  removing 
competitive  distortions  will  allow  for  the  provision  of  more  efficient  and  better 
transport services.  Given the dominant role of road transport in industry's production 
and distribution systems, it will contribute to the EU's competitiveness and efficiency, 
supporting the EU 2020 goals for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth.  

In  this  respect,  by  aiming  to  ensure  a  level-playing  field  between  resident  and  non-
resident  hauliers,  improving  clarity  in  relation  to  existing  provisions  and  laying  down 
clear common rules, the Regulations are clearly coherent with the development of the 
single European transport area.    

With regard to Regulation 1072/2009 and cabotage, completion of the single market is 
a highly relevant goal.  Further integration of the internal market is identified as one 
of the key drivers for growth and jobs, and the Report of the Commission on the State 
of  the  Single  Market  Integration  2013  pointed  to  opening  cabotage  as  a  key  priority 
for improving market performance. The remaining cabotage restrictions may limit the 
possibilities  to  optimise  fleet  management  and  match  supply  and  demand,  thereby 
reducing  transport  efficiency,  creating  an  impediment  to  competitiveness  and  growth 

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and  reducing  the  attractiveness  of  the  EU  as  a  base  for  manufacturing  and  trading 
(European Commission, 2013a). 

At  the  same  time,  the  European  Parliament  has  repeatedly  emphasised  that 
liberalisation  must  go  hand  in  hand  with  harmonisation,  and  that  social  aspects  and 
safety must be guaranteed.  Evaluation Question 5 (see Section 7.5) also points to the 
continuing  social  and  economic  differences  between  Member  States,  which  suggests 
that further liberalisation of cabotage is  premature. If further harmonisation of social 
conditions is not first achieved, there is a serious risk that the success of road hauliers 
would  be  due  to  their  ability  to  get  access  to  the  most  favourable  labour  provisions 
(legally or illegally), rather than their competitiveness and economic efficiency (EPRS, 
2014). 

6.13.5. 

Summary and conclusions 

In  terms  of  improving  social  conditions  and  road  safety,  the  Regulations  help  to 
incentivise  high  compliance  with  the  social  and  safety  legislation.  In  this  respect  the 
Regulations can be considered coherent with overarching EU transport policy goals to 
improve  social  conditions  and  road  safety,  although  it  is  not  possible  to  quantify  the 
exact impact and the effects are indirect.  

In relation to the TFEU, there have been some questions raised on whether interaction 
with  the  Treaty  on  the  right  of  establishment  actually  encourages  the  formation  of 
letterbox  companies.    In  this  area  there  is  no  contradiction  with  the  Regulations  in 
theory.  If an existing company that is doing business in one Member State wants to 
re-incorporate  in  a  different  Member  State,  but  without  the  intention  of  having  any 
establishment in the new Member State, this transaction will not be protected by the 
freedom of establishment.   

Overall, there is little evidence to suggest that the cabotage rules have contributed to 
reducing empty running and GHGs from transport.  Rather, the issue of cabotage has 
a  stronger  link  the  EU  level  goals  on  completion  of  the  Single  Market  and  ensuring 
European  competitiveness.    Further  liberalisation  of  cabotage  in  line  with  long-term 
policy  goals  is  foreseen  in  order  to  complete  the  Single  Market.    However,  a  fully 
integrated EU road freight market would first need a greater degree of harmonisation 
of socio-economic-legal conditions.  

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6.14.  EU  added  value:    To  what  extent  could  a  different  level  of 
regulation  (e.g.  at  national  level)  be  more  relevant  and/or  effective 
and/or efficient than the applicable one to ensure common rules? 

To  what  extent  could  a  different  level  of  regulation  (e.g.  at  national  level)  be  more 
relevant  and/or  effective  and/or  efficient  than  the  applicable  one  to  ensure  common 
rules for:  

a)  Admission to the occupation of road haulage operator,  

b)  Access to the international road haulage market,  

c)  The conditions under which non-resident hauliers may operate within a Member 

State other than the one of registration?  

To what extent could a different level of regulation (e.g. national regulation) improve 
the enforcement of these rules?  

This question considers the added value of an action at the EU level compared to other 
actions that could be taken by Members States, or even by the industry itself and (ii) 
should an action at the EU level be the most suitable one, whether an action by way of 
Regulation has been the most effective, efficient and relevant. 

6.14.1. 

EU actions vs. multilateral agreements 

By  definition, national  legislation  cannot  ensure  common rules  at  EU  level,  due to  its 
limited  geographical  scope  and  therefore  some  level  of  international  legislation  is 
needed  –  either  at  the  EU  level  or  else  in  the  form  of  bilateral  or  multilateral 
agreements.  

The  Impact  Assessment  that  preceded  the  adoption  of  Regulation  1071/2009  and 
1072/2009  showed  that  there  were  considerable  disparities  across  Member  States  in 
terms  of  the  definitions  of  legal  terms  contained  or  relevant  for  the  purposes  of 
applying  the  rules,  application  and  control/enforcement  of  rules  on  access  to  the 
profession  and  to  the  international  transport  market.    This  resulted  in  low 
effectiveness and efficiency of the rules. The impact assessment also concluded that in 
the  case  of  the  "no  change"  option  such  problems  would  remain  and  would  even 
increase given the strong growth of international transport. 

It would have been illogical to solve such issues by means of bilateral or multilateral 
agreements,  which  are  less  efficient  than  EU  rules  both  in  terms  of  procedure  and 
substance  where  a  large  number  of  Member  States  are  involved.  The  adoption  of  a 
“classic”  international  agreement  is  subject  in  each  Member  State  to  different  timing 
and  rules,  needs  to  be  ratified  or  even  incorporated  in  national  law  and  it  is  not 
subject  to  unique  interpretation  by  a  common  judicial  body  such  as  the  European 
Court  of  Justice.  On  the  contrary,  EU  Law  is  “monist”  as  compared  with  public 
international  law  and  subject  to  a  common  timeline  and  judicial  interpretation  body. 
The  choice  for  classic  “international  public  law”  rules  would  then  lead  to  different 
rhythms and disparities between member states.  

As  for  today,  a  vast  majority  of  stakeholders  among  all  groups  interviewed  for  the 
purpose  of  this  study  (i.e.  transport  ministries,  enforcers,  transport  undertakings 
associations, 
further 
harmonisation  in  this  field  in  the  sense  that  the  rules  established  by  Regulations 
1071/2009  and  1072/2009  should  be  more  homogenously  interpreted  in  all  Member 
States. Based on this and considering the above, it is self-evident that a high degree 
of efficiency could not be achieved only with international public law instruments. 

trade  unions)  have  called 

forwarders  and 

freight 

for 

Thus,  from  a  relevance,  efficiency  and  effectiveness  perspective,  EU  law  instruments 
appear to have been a much more suitable than classic international law instruments. 
Indeed,  previous  experience  of  multilateral  and  bilateral  systems  in  place  prior  to 
Regulation  1072/2009  governing  cabotage  agreements  have  shown  that  this  cannot 

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ensure an appropriate degree of homogeneity across the EU, and could even have the 
perverse effect of increasing the disparities between Member States.    

6.14.2. 

EU actions vs. self-regulation 

The aim of the European Union’s land transport policy is to promote a mobility that is 
efficient,  safe,  secure  and  environmentally  friendly.  Compliance  with  social  and  road 
safety rules are therefore important in order to ensure a level playing field all across 
the EU. Those are by definition matters of public policy that (i) could risk not being the 
first  priority  of  the  industry  in  every  circumstance,  especially  at  times  of  economic 
crisis and (ii) transcend national boundaries. Self-regulation schemes may not achieve 
sufficient  business  coverage,  and  thus  be  ineffective  (OECD,  2015).  To  achieve 
efficient  results  at  a  pan-European  level  merely  through  industry  self-regulatory 
schemes  seems  impractical  and  it  would  be  unrealistic  to  embrace  all  of  those  goals 
and policies by using only self-regulatory schemes. 

Different levels of compliance with existing regulations across Member States confirm 
that business practices vary across Member States and that, therefore, self-regulation 
would  not  be  sufficient  to  overcome  the  problems  still  encountered.    Moreover, 
effective compliance regimes are an integral part of this process, which is precisely the 
underlying issue that needs to be addressed. 

The  majority  of  stakeholders  from  all  groups  interviewed  (i.e.  transport  ministries, 
enforcers,  transport  undertakings  associations,  freight  forwarders  and  trade  unions) 
expressed a strong preference for legislation by means of a regulation over a directive 
in  this  field.  In  their  view,  a  regulation  would  reduce  the  margin  of  discretion  of 
Member States which would mean a lower risk of different application of the EU rules. 

6.14.3. 

EU Regulation vs. EU Directive 

Before  the  adoption  of  the  Road  Transport  Package  access  to  the  occupation  of  road 
transport operator and to the international transport market were regulated by means 
of Directives and Regulations (see Section 2.1). Practical experience and the relevant 
impact  assessment  showed  severe  inconsistencies  in  the  application  of  the  previous 
Directive  96/26/EC  and  related  instruments  by  Member  States.  These  problems 
created distortion of competition between operators and resulted in poor effectiveness 
and efficiency of the rules.  As such, the Impact Assessment clearly indicated the need 
for  a  Regulation  as  the  most  appropriate  instrument  in  order  to  achieve  a  more 
uniform situation (European Commission, 2007c).   

Based on the above, it is safe to conclude that a different type of instrument under EU 
law, such as a Directive, could not be more effective and/or efficient than the current 
Regulations.  

6.14.4. 

Summary and conclusions 

In general, Regulations 1071/2009 and 1072/2009 are broadly considered to have led 
to  positive  effects  compared  to  the  situation  prior  to  when  they  entered  into  force, 
those  positive  effects  show  that  there  is  a  clear  added  value  of  regulating  the  road 
transport and cabotage through EU legal instruments. 

Nevertheless,  some  failures  remain  in  the  current  system,  so  more  still  needs  to  be 
done  to  support  further  harmonisation.  This  provides  support  to  the  conclusions  that 
an EU approach in the form of a Regulation is the most suitable way to ensure a level 
playing field in the road transport and cabotage. 

6.14.5. 

Recommendations 

This section considers the most appropriate level of intervention that could be used to 
solve  the  identified  issues  with  enforcement.  Regulations  1071/2009  and  1072/2009 

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came  from  a  set  of  pre-existing  EU  instruments,  so  from  a  pure  procedural  and 
technical  point  of  view  it  would not  seem logical  to  set  up  at  this stage  new  rules  or 
implementing rules on the basis of different legislative proceedings and switch back to 
a  “non  EU”  system.  Besides,  the  majority  of  respondents  to  the  high  level  survey 
consulted  felt  that  it  was  somewhat  or  highly  unlikely  that  Member  States  would 
attempt to implement common rules in the absence of EU-level rules.    

Since the most suitable instruments to improve the current system should be adopted 
at a the EU level, question is how to ensure the most appropriate interaction between 
different types of instruments.   

An amendment of the Regulation containing sufficiently precise rules could then seem 
more  suitable,  in  the  sense  that  it  would  remain  in  line  with  the  existing  legal 
architecture.  There  are  also  possible  arguments  for  a  Directive-based  approach  for 
enforcement.   

A  parallel  can  be  drawn  with  the  control  of  compliance  with  the  social  legislation  by 
Member  States’  competent  authorities,  which  is  governed  by  Directive  2006/22/EC. 
This  does  not  give  the  Member  States  great  leeway  in  control  measures  of  working 
conditions rules (such as roadside or premises checks) and imposes quite burdensome 
obligations. The choice to use a separate enforcement Directive for Posting of Workers 
over a revision to the existing Directive was mainly due to a desire to clearly express 
the Commission’s view that they key problems lie with the enforcement of the existing 
rules  and  not  with  the  rules  themselves  (European  Commission,  2012b).    A  similar 
situation  exists  concerning  the  Road  Transport  Package,  and  hence  the  use  of  an 
enforcement Directive could be beneficial.   

One  could  argue  that  the  new  rules  to  be  adopted  at  the  EU  level  to  improve  the 
current  system  should  focus  (for  example)  on  the  level  or  range  of  penalties  for 
infringements  of  the  provisions  of  Regulation  1071/2009  or  on  the  level  and/or 
intensity  of  monitoring.  Meanwhile,  focusing  on  those  aspects  does  not  necessarily 
imply that the most suitable instrument to do so is a Directive (as with the regime laid 
down by Directive 2006/22/EC). The level of monitoring could indeed be addressed by 
means  of  a  Directive,  in  order  to  leave  the  Member  States  enough  margin  of 
manoeuvre  to  adapt  monitoring  rules  to  their  own  internal  structure  and  policy. 
Nevertheless, other enforcement gaps could need a new Regulation or an amendment 
of  the  existing  ones,  as  differences  in  implementation  would  be  leading  to  the 
application of double standards. This would be the case for the notion of “good repute” 
and  the  different  approach  of  Member  States  on  liability  (as  shown  in  Evaluation 
Question 2, in some Member States the employer would be held fully responsible for 
mistakes or infringements of his drivers, while in others this would not be the case).    

The  question  also  arises  as  to  whether  the  outstanding  issues  identified  could  have 
been dealt only by means of hard law instruments (i.e. the amendment of the existing 
Regulations)  or  also  through  the  adoption  of  soft  law  instruments,  such  as  guidance 
notes or  new  guidelines  by  the  European  Commission.  The  common  issue  with  these 
processes  is  that  while  all  have  normative  content  (as  they  interpret  or  complete 
Regulations,  Decisions  or  Directives),  they  are  not  formally  binding.  Furthermore, 
experience  shows  that  the  elaboration  on  guidance  notes  is  difficult  and  takes  time 
and, as they remain non-binding documents, the Commission cannot sanction Member 
States  that  do  not  follow  them.  Therefore,  from  both  an  effectiveness  and  efficiency 
aspect,  for  legal  concepts  which,  according  to  the  practice  of  Member  States,  entail 
the  greatest  level  of  discrepancy  or  difficulties,  the  clarification  needed  should  be 
included in the Regulations themselves. 

The  mere  clarification  of  existing  legal  concepts  (such  as,  for  instance,  how  to  apply 
the  European  classification  of  infringements,  i.e.  annex  IV  of  Regulation  1071/2009) 
could be left to new Guidelines to be issued by the Commission, provided that there is 
not a great discrepancy between Member States in terms of the relevant definition of 
those concepts. 

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If,  on  the  contrary,  important  discrepancies  exist  or  certain  aspects  remain  an 
important  source  of  difficulty  for  enforcement  agencies,  clarification  should  most 
probably be included in the text of the Regulation itself. This would be the case for the 
provisions  on  what  should  be  considered  a  stable  and  effective  establishment  under 
Regulation  1071/2009,  or  whether  multi-drop  operations  are  to  be  considered  as  a 
single operation or several transport operations. 

Thus, the conclusion is that a combination of (i) a new Regulation (or an amendment 
of the existing ones) when it leads to the imposition of new obligations to the industry 
and  the  Member  States,  (ii)  an  enforcement  Directive  for  pure  enforcement  issues 
that, for practical reasons, may not be addressed with a Regulation together with (iii) 
new  guidelines  to  clarify  unclear  legal  concepts  where  there  is  not  great  discrepancy 
on their meaning may be the most suitable way to tackle the issues identified above 

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6.15.  EU  added  value:  Is  there  any  evidence  that  in  certain  cases  a 
different  level  of  regulation  could  have  been  more  relevant  and/or 
effective and/or efficient to achieve the objectives? 

Is  there  any  evidence  that  in  certain  cases  a  different  level  of  regulation  (e.g.  at 
national  level)  could  have  been  more  relevant  and/or  effective  and/or  efficient  than 
the applicable one to achieve the objectives of:  

a)  Reducing  distortions  of  competition  between  resident  and  non-resident 

hauliers;  

b)  Increasing compliance with EU road transport social legislation;  

c)  Improving road safety levels? 

The  problems  of  competitive  distortion,  compliance  with  road  transport  social 
legislation  and  road  safety  are  all  closely  interlinked,  as  shown  in  the  intervention 
logic.  Therefore,  this  question  assesses  them  together  as  a  whole.      This  section 
assesses  the  available  evidence  on  what  legislative  approaches  have  been  used,  and 
whether  there  is  any  evidence  pointing  to  a  higher  level  of  success  compared  to  the 
current Regulations.    

Drawing on the analysis of effectiveness, it can be seen that the Regulations have not 
been  entirely  successful  in  achieving  the  related  objectives.    The  main  issues  with 
respect to the non-achievement of the overarching objectives arise from: 

1.  The existence of letterbox companies, and 

2.  Different interpretations of the cabotage rules.  

The  issue  of  letterbox  companies  has  been  a  recurring  problem  in  many  areas  of 
European  law  and  has  resulted  in  sector-specific  legislation.    Relevant  areas  include 
the enforcement Directive to improve the enforcement of the Posted Workers Directive 
(2014/67/EC),  the  revised  proposals  for  Money  Laundering  Directive and  revisions  to 
the Parent-Subsidiary Directive in November 2013, which intend to make it easier for 
the Member States to combat certain types of tax fraud and tax evasion.   

One of the most closely related areas is in the Posting of Workers, where there have 
been  increasing  problems  with  companies  that  claim  to  be  established  in  other 
Member  States  and  are  thus  apparently  complying  with  the  legislation  there. 
Consequently,  they  claim  that  they  cannot  be  fully  subject  to  the  legislation  in  the 
Member States where they post workers in order to supply services.   

The problems have recently been targeted by the enforcement Directive of the Posting 
of Workers (2014/67/EC).  This Directive does not change the fundamental rules, but 
rather  seeks  to  introduce  procedures  that  will  better  control  letterbox  companies.  
Although the expected impacts of the enforcement Directive of the Posting of Workers 
proved  difficult  to  quantify  during  the  underlying  Impact  Assessment,  the  main 
argument  of  the  revisions  is  that  increased  regulatory  certainty  and  cooperation 
between  Member  States  will  create  positive  effects  on  the  development  of  the  single 
market.    The  costs  were  also  considered  to  be  “relatively  small  and  well-contained 
while  the  benefits  are  significant.”  (European  Commission,  2012b).    Since  the 
problems  it  aimed  to  address  are  largely  similar  to  those  pertaining  to  letterbox 
companies in the context of Regulation 1071/2009,  this provides some evidence that 
legislation via an enforcement Directive could be relevant, effective and efficient. 

The different interpretations of the cabotage rules are another main issue contributing 
to  competitive  distortion.  Although  a  non-binding  approach  could  help  to  explain  the 
intended  interpretation  of  the  cabotage  rules,  drawing  for  example  on  the  existing 
case law, these criteria would not be legally binding. Guidelines, Recommendations or 
interpretative  Communication  may  not  tackle  the  issues  an  entirely  satisfactory  way, 
and could become a source of criticism in cases where stakeholders feel the case law 
has not been reflected correctly.  

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A case in point are the previous attempts to clarify cabotage rules through guidelines 
and FAQs, which have not been incorporated by Member States.  Following the entry 
into  force  of  the  cabotage  provisions  on  14  May  2010,  several  Member  States  and 
stakeholders  raised  questions  regarding  its  correct  application.  To  clarify  the 
interpretation, the Commission organised in 2011 a committee meeting to go through 
the main critical points on the cabotage provisions, as well as publishing a list of FAQs 
clarifying aspects such as the starting date of the cabotage period, the possibility of a 
cabotage operation to allow for several loading and/or unloading points (multi-drops) 
and  the  calculation  of  the  7-day  period.    Despite  these  FAQs,  differences  in 
interpretation  remain.    Prior  to  this  and  before  the  introduction  of  Regulation 
1072/2009,  the  Commission  had  adopted  an  interpretive  communication73  to  help 
clarify  matters.    Despite  this,  several  Member  States  still  saw  a  need  to  adopt  their 
own  guidelines  or  national  rules  on  road  cabotage  and  this  framework  left  hauliers 
without  legal  certainty  that  their  cabotage  operations  were  lawful  (European 
Commission,  2007a).    These  experiences  strongly  indicate  that  a  different  level  of 
regulation would be less relevant, effective and efficient.   

6.15.1. 

Summary and conclusions 

Experience  from  other  legislative  areas  that  aim  to  tackle  the  problem  of  letterbox 
companies  points  to  procedures  that  may  enable  better  control  and  hence  reduce 
competitive distortion.  The enforcement Directive of the Posting of Workers provides 
a  good  example,  since  the  problems  it  aimed  to  address  are  largely  similar  to  those 
pertaining to letterbox companies in the context of Regulation 1071/2009.  This some 
evidence that legislation via an enforcement Directive could be relevant, effective and 
efficient (as assessed in Evaluation Question 1). 

Concerning  the  lack  of  harmonisation  in  the  interpretation  of  the  cabotage  rules, 
previous  efforts  using  Directives  as  well  as  non-binding  measures  have  not  been 
sufficient to ensure harmonisation.  This suggests that the objectives of more uniform 
interpretation rules could not have been achieved at any level of legislation other than 
through Regulations.   

More generally, the possible approaches to improve EU added value in the context of 
this  Evaluation  Question  are  identical  to  the  conclusions  of  Evaluation  Question  14 
(see Section 6.14).   

73  Commission Interpretative Communication on  the temporary nature of  road cabotage in  the 

movement of freight (2005/C 21/02), 26 January 2005. 

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7.  CONCLUSIONS 

On the basis of the analysis presented in Section 7, we present the main conclusions 
arising in relation to each of the overall evaluation questions. 

7.1.  Effectiveness 

The questions on effectiveness aim to assess the extent to which the Regulations have 
achieved their objectives.  Overall, there is strong support for the Regulations in terms 
of  the  provisions  and  consider  them  an  appropriate  framework  through  which  to 
achieve the objectives of more harmonised conditions for access to the profession and 
to  the  international  road  transport  market.    The  problems  that  currently  prevent  the 
full  achievement  of  these  objectives  mainly  relate  to  the  existence  of  letterbox 
companies, interpretation of cabotage rules and a lack of effective enforcement.   

7.1.1.  General objectives 

General  objective  1:  Improve  social  conditions  in  the  transport  profession 
and the level of road safety 

The Regulations had general objectives to improve the level of road safety and to 
improve  social  conditions  by  improving  compliance  with  EU  road  transport  social 
legislation.   

In this sense, the provisions laid down in Regulation 1071/2009 aimed to reinforce the 
level  of  compliance  with  the  social  and  safety  rules.  However,  since  the  expected 
magnitude  of  these  impacts  were  not  quantified  due  to  the  indirect  nature  of  these 
impacts,  there  was  no  indicator  against  which  the  extent  to  which  the  objective  has 
been achieved could be assessed.  In terms of ex-post outcomes, it appears that any 
impacts have been minimal and are likely to have been neutral or slightly positive.    

Conversely,  Regulation  1072/2009  was  not  expected  to  have  direct  impacts  on 
compliance with the social and safety rules, and in practice there do not appear to 
have been any discernible direct effects.  Indirect impacts may have occurred due to 
increased price competition following cabotage market opening.   There was consistent 
agreement  in  the  literature  that  the  mechanisms  by  which  cabotage  liberalisation 
could  affect  social/safety  conditions  was  via  increase  competition  in  the  sector, 
combined  diverse  wage  levels  and  national  labour/tax  rules.    This  leads  to  hauliers 
trying  to  remain  competitive  by  lowering  salaries  for  drivers,  and  creates  greater 
incentives  to  circumvent  the  rules.    Nevertheless,  none  of  the  studies  found  could 
quantify the extent to which the problems occur.  

In conclusion, the achievement of Regulation 1071/2009 against this general objective 
has been positive (although impossible to quantify).  The direct impacts of Regulation 
1072/2009 have been negligible, whereas the indirect impacts caused by increases in 
competition  are  likely  to  have  been  negative  in  terms  of  social  and  safety  impacts.  
Overall,  the  Regulations  have  been  ineffective  in  significantly  promoting  social  and 
safety improvements.   

General  objective  2:  To  ensure  a  level  playing  field  between  resident  and 
non-resident hauliers 

As  general  objectives,  the  Regulations  aimed  to  support  the  completion  of  the 
internal  market  in  road  transport  by  ensuring  a  level-playing  field  between 
resident and non-resident hauliers.   

Several  issues  that  prevented  the  achievement  of  the  objective  to  ensure  a  level 
playing field were discovered, relating mainly to: 

  The  continuing  existence  of  letterbox  companies,  which  distort  the  market  by 

undercutting legitimate operators; 

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  Differences  in  interpretation  of  the  provisions  in  the  Regulations,  leading  to 
fragmentary  national  rules.    For  example,  differences  in  which  penalties  are 
considered in assessment of good repute (see below for further details) 

  Uneven  approaches  to  monitoring  and  enforcement,  in  terms  of  penalties  and 
organisation of checks for both Regulations (see below for further details). 

Firstly,  an  important  market  distortion  is  the  presence  of  letterbox  companies. 
Although there are no comprehensive statistics on the number of letterbox companies, 
available  evidence  does  strongly  suggest  that  the  problem  has  not  been  solved,  and 
that  the  practices  of  letterbox  companies  are  highly  detrimental  to  the  industry  as 
they  can  undercut  legitimate  businesses  that  fully  comply  with  the  rules.    Significant 
cost  differentials  between  Member  States  remains  the  key  underlying  driver  of  this 
problem  while,  at  the  same  time,  enforcement  of  the  provisions  on  stable  and 
effective establishment were considered to be more difficult due to: 

  The lack of a clear definition of an operating centre; and 

  The frequent need for cross-border investigations and related difficulties in 

gaining support from authorities from other Member States.  

  A lack of resources and administrative capacity, combined with the more 

demanding nature of the checks of stable and effective establishment, makes 
the enforcement of the requirement for all undertakings a challenge  

Differences  in  the  interpretation  and  implementation  of  the  provisions  of  the 
Regulations  also  impede  the  achievement  of  a  level  playing  field.    A  key  example  is 
that  the  official  monitoring  data  strongly  suggests  that  there  is  variation  in  terms  of 
the stringency with which good repute is checked (i.e. in many Member States there 
were  no  reported  withdrawals  on  the  basis  of  loss  of  good  repute).    There  are  two 
main issues linked to this uneven application, namely: 

  A perceived lack of clarity in definitions of precisely which infringements should 

lead to the loss of good repute.    

 

Inconsistent approaches and incomplete implementation concerning 
administrative procedures to determine whether loss of good repute would be 
disproportionate.  

Overall, the other requirements of the Regulation are generally considered possible to 
enforce  to  effective  enforcement  and  ensuring  a  level  playing  field.    Still,  variations 
were uncovered concerning other provisions that may jeopardise the achievement of a 
level playing field: 

On the requirements of  financial standing, there is a high degree of harmonisation 
in terms of the minimum thresholds required by Member States. However, most terms 
used in the Regulation cause (e.g. capital and reserves, insurance, accredited persons 
are  considered  unclear  by  at  least  one  ministry,  suggesting  that  problems  may  arise 
specifically  with 
laws/business 
practices/translation.   

interaction  with  national 

regard 

the 

to 

The  revisions  to  the  cabotage  rules  in  Regulation  1072/2009  can  be  considered  to 
have  led  to  clearer  rules  that  ensure  more  harmonised  conditions  of  access  to  the 
international road haulage market.  At the same time, it is clear that there is still more 
work needed to ensure common rules with respect to cabotage.  Despite the changes 
introduced  by  Regulation  1072/2009  and  additional  guidance  released  by  the 
Commission,  there  are  still  different  interpretations  of  specific  issues,  which  impedes 
the smooth functioning of the internal market by creating fragmentation 

Evidence  collected  for  this  study  showed  an  uneven  approach  to  monitoring  and 
enforcement. There was a distinct lack of quantitative data on the number of checks 
and infringements of the various provisions of Regulation 1071/2009.  Qualitatively, it 
appears that the requirements are verified for all new applicants in the Member States 

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that  reported  information,  whereas  additional  checks  may  be  conducted  on  the  basis 
of a risk rating system (e.g. in Denmark).  Reviewing enforcement practices related 
to cabotage across different Member States showed a range of approaches to control 
and  demonstrated  that  there  is  no  consistent  recipe  to  determine  the  most  effective 
enforcement  techniques;  however,  it  appears  that  for  most  countries,  both  a  high 
frequency of controls and dissuasive level of penalties are needed.  In countries where 
the  enforcement  of  cabotage  is  a  political  priority  (e.g.  France  and  Denmark), 
penalties are relatively high, budgets for control have been increased in recent years 
and  issues  of  a  lack  of  manpower  do  not  appear  to  be  a  current  concern  in  these 
countries.  

In  terms  of  the  penalties  in  place  for  infringements  of  Regulation  1071/2009,  the 
variation of financial penalties between Member States is often to a level that cannot 
be  justified  on  grounds  solely  of  socio-economic  differences,  and  there  is  also  wide 
variation  in  the  typology  of  infringements  (criminal  or  administrative).  The  variation 
between  countries  may  be  because  the  current  categorisation  of  infringements  in 
Annex  IV  is  not  considered  clear/appropriate  by  some  Member  State  ministries,  and 
the need for further guidance was highlighted, especially by EU-13 respondents.  The 
level  of  fines  applicable  to  cabotage  infringements  varies  greatly  across  Member 
States,  as  well  as  the  possibility  of  other  penalties  (such  as  immobilisation  of  the 
vehicle) and liability of other actors in the transport chain.  The variation means that 
there is not a level playing field in Europe. 

Partial  progress  has  been  made  in  terms  of  ensuring  a  more  level  playing  field 
regarding  the  establishment  of  common  minimum  requirements  for  access  to  the 
profession and to the international haulage market.  This has been achieved especially 
in  terms  of  improving  the  harmonisation  of  definitions.    However,  the  general 
objective of achieving a level playing field for hauliers has not been fully achieved due 
to the continuing presence of letterbox companies, differing national interpretations of 
the rules and uneven monitoring/enforcement.   

General objective 3: To improve transport market efficiency 

The  mechanism  through  which  the  Regulations  aimed  to  improve  transport  market 
efficiency  was  by  reducing  empty  running  due  to  clarifications  in  the  cabotage  rules.  
In  terms  of  whether  the  provisions  on  cabotage  have  contributed  to  reductions  in 
empty running, there is mixed evidence that points to both increases and decreases in 
fill rates.   

Overall therefore, it seems unlikely that the provisions of Regulation 1072/2009 have 
had  any  significant  positive  or  negative  impacts  in  terms  of  improving  transport 
market efficiency (reducing empty running), but the effects on individual carriers vary.   

7.1.2.  Specific objectives 

Specific objective 1: Reductions in administrative burdens 

As specific objectives, both Regulations aimed to reduce the administrative burden 
for  national  authorities  and  transport  undertakings  through  allowing  for  improved 
monitoring and administrative simplification via the introduction and interconnection of 
national registers, harmonisation of control documents and new provisions on financial 
standing.  As  discussed  in  the  next  section  of  efficiency,  the  expected  reductions  in 
administrative  burden  have  not  been  achieved  in  practice.    This  is  largely  due  to 
delays in the establishment of ERRU and a lack of administrative cooperation.   

Concerning the establishment of ERRU, only 13 Member States were interconnected in 
2014, rising to 20 Member States in 2015, despite the deadline of 31 December 2012.  
Many of the difficulties that have been reported are technical.  Nevertheless, there is a 
high level of support among ministries and industry stakeholders for the completion of 
the interconnection.    

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Good  practices  in  terms  of  administrative  cooperation  appear  to  be  carried  out  in 
Bulgaria,  the  Netherlands  and  Luxembourg,  where  information  exchanges  took  place 
and  additional  infringements  were  detected  as  a  result.  This  shows  that  in  some 
Member  States,  the  effectiveness  of  enforcement  has  been  improved  due  to 
cooperation,  and  there  has  been  some  progress  towards  achieving  the  objectives  of 
the Regulations in this respect.  At the same time, the evidence strongly suggests that 
implementation and progress is unequal across the Member States.   

In  conclusion,  the  measures  on  administrative  simplification  and  cooperation  are  still 
very much a work in progress, and as a result the objectives have still not been met.     

Specific objective 2: Ensure a higher level of professional qualification of road 
transport operators 

Through  setting  higher  standards  for  the  examination  granting  access  to  the 
occupation and conditions for good repute, Regulation 1071/2009 aimed to achieve a 
higher level of professional qualification of road transport operators.   

In this respect, Regulation 1071/2009 compels transport undertakings to have specific 
knowledge on a list of subjects (as laid down in Annex I of the Regulation).  The direct 
impact is not possible to quantify. Qualitatively, both ministries and undertakings gave 
overall  positive  views  in  their  survey  responses  that  the  requirement  of  professional 
competence had raised the standards of professional competence in the industry.  For 
several  Member  States,  the  requirements  were  already  in  place,  but  they  still  may 
have benefitted from higher standards of foreign hauliers.     

The requirements for gaining professional competence still vary across Member States 
as  permitted  by  the  Regulation  in  terms  of  the  type  of  examinations  (e.g.  oral 
examinations  are  used  in  Slovakia,  Hungary,  Austria,  Belgium  and  optionally  in 
Germany).    Objections  raised  in  this  respect  relate  to  possible  differences  this  may 
create  in  terms  of  the  difficulty  of  the  exams  and  the  degree  of  professional 
competence  that  is  required  to  pass  them.    Differences  in  the  standards  of 
professional  competence  create  competitive  distortions  and  consequently  impede  the 
smooth  functioning  of  the  internal  market.  The  pass  rate  does  indeed  vary  widely 
between Member States, from 20-25% in Spain to 96% in Estonia, although it is not 
clear  to  what  extent  this  variation  is  due  to  other  factors.    For  example,  information 
provided  by  stakeholders  indicates  that  the  level  of  prior  training  is  an  important 
factor in determining pass rates. 

A  related  concern  is  that  “diploma  tourism”  could  occur,  resulting  in  competitive 
distortion.      The  data  does  not  reveal  any  trends  that  suggest  that  countries  with 
higher  pass  rates  attract  a  higher  number  of  applicants  relative  to  their  transport 
market  size,  the  number  of  enterprises  or  vehicles.    A  possible  explanation  is  that 
language  barriers  prevent  applicants  from  transferring.    Finally,  the  total  number  of 
exemptions granted is usually relatively small in Member States where this is allowed 
–  hence  for  the  most  part,  this  does  not  appear  to  be  a  significant  cause  of  market 
distortions.   

In  conclusion,  the  requirements  of  Regulation  1071/2009  concerning  professional 
qualification  may  have  contributed  to  an  improvement  in  the  standards  for  Member 
States  where  previous  similar  requirements  were  not  already  in  place  (more  usually 
the EU-13 countries).  Potential weaknesses that may undermine the achievement of 
this objective are concerns over varying standards across the EU and related issues of 
diploma tourism, although no conclusive evidence of these effects could be found. 

Specific  objective  3:  Enhance  compliance  with  EU  road  transport  social  and 
safety legislation  

As  previously  discussed  under  General  Objective  1,  the  Regulations  have  been 
ineffective in significantly promoting social and safety improvements.   

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Specific objective 4: Enhance compliance with requirement of the temporary 
nature of cabotage 

Regulation 1072/2009 aimed to better define the temporary nature of cabotage 
operations,  in  order  to  improve  the  clarity  and  eliminate  legal  uncertainty  for 
Community  hauliers.    The  changes  enacted  by  Regulation  1072/2009  are  widely 
considered  to  be  an  improvement  on  the  previous  situation  by  national  ministries  in 
terms of clarifying the definition of the temporary nature of cabotage, enabling greater 
harmonisation.  Nevertheless,  there  are  still  different  interpretations  of  the  cabotage 
rules. The most problematic area appears to be how to count multi-drops, but several 
other  areas  have  been  mentioned  including  the  calculation  of  the  seven  day  period, 
what  constitutes  a  cabotage  trip,  transport  of  empty  pallets,  interactions  with  other 
legislation and the need for improved documentation.   

The  clearer  definition  introduced  by  the  Regulation  was  also  meant  to  improve 
compliance  with  requirements  on  the  temporary  nature  of  cabotage 
operations.  Compliance with the cabotage provisions is shown in official statistics 
to  be  high  in  most  countries.    It  is  not  clear  how  well  the  official  infringement 
detection  rates  reflect  the  true  situation,  since  examples  were  found  of  the  official 
statistics  being  relatively  accurate,  as  well  as  both  over-  and  under-estimating  the 
true infringement rate. The problems are likely concentrated in the heavily cabotaged 
EU-15  Member  States,  potentially  to  a  greater  extent  than  is  reflected  in  official 
statistics – a view that is supported by analysis of statistics and bottom-up modelling 
estimates.  

Attempts  to  establish  trends  over  time  (and  to  conclude  on  the  contribution  of  the 
Regulation  to  reducing  illegal  cabotage)  encounter  great  difficulties  due  to  a  lack  of 
data.  There was little evidence in the literature or provided by stakeholders that could 
be  used  to  develop  robust  conclusions.  Indications  from  a  small  sample  of  countries 
(Denmark, Germany, Poland) show that the compliance rate has slightly improved or 
remained consistently low in recent years, but  it is difficult to extrapolate from these 
cases to the rest of Europe.   

The most important contributing factor to difficulties in enforcement was identified 
as  a  lack  of  manpower.    However,  responses  to  the  enforcers’  survey  indicated  that 
many  other  factors  also  contributed  to  difficulties  in  enforcement,  including  a  lack  of 
clarity  in  provisions,  differing  interpretations  across  Member  States,  as  well  as 
difficulties in cross-border cooperation.  This indicates that enforcement is considered 
challenging in many different circumstances and across diverse national situations.   

Confirming the legality of cabotage on the basis of only the CMR consignment note 
was highlighted as an issue due to two main factors: Firstly, the CMR document does 
not  necessarily  contain  all  of  the  information  needed  to  verify  whether  a  cabotage 
operation is in compliance with the rules. Particular difficulties were mentioned around 
verifying  the  start  of  cabotage  operations,  its  link  to  international  carriage,  the 
calculation of the 7-day period and the identification of the number of journeys carried 
out within the period.   Secondly, there is a possibility that documents are falsified or 
hidden, although the extent of such practices is unknown.  

In conclusion, the first part of the specific objective concerning the establishment of a 
better definition of the temporary nature of cabotage has been partially achieved and 
progress  can  be  considered  positive.    Nevertheless,  clarifications  of  specific  aspects 
may still be needed to ensure the full achievement of this part of the objective.  There 
was  insufficient  data  to  assess  the  achievement  of  the  second  part  of  the  objective 
concerning  improvements  in  compliance  with  the  cabotage  provisions.    Qualitatively, 
indications  of  difficulties  around  enforcement  suggest  that  there  is  a  risk  of  illegal 
cabotage activities, especially in heavily cabotaged Member States.  

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Specific objective 5: Reduce the level of empty running  

As  previously  discussed  under  General  Objective  3,  it  seems  unlikely  that  the 
provisions  have  had  any  significant  positive  or  negative  impacts,  but  the  effects  on 
individual carriers varies.   

7.1.3.  Unintended consequences 

Possible unintended consequences of Regulation 1071/2009 were identified in that 
the requirement of financial standing may exclude firms that are otherwise considered 
reliable  –  due  to  for  example,  unforeseen  market  changes  or  a  temporary  loss  of  a 
major  client.    It  appears  that  difficulties  in  meeting  the  requirement  have  been 
exacerbated  following  the  recession,  and  may  particularly  affect  smaller  operators, 
leading to greater firm exit than intended. 

Possible  unintended  consequences  of  Regulation  1072/2009  (sometimes  in 
combination with 1071/2009) were identified as follows: 

  The potential for operators to switch to vehicles of less than 3.5t in order to 
avoid the rules of cabotage (and to a lesser extent, Regulation 1071/2009): 
There is very little concrete data to support claims of operators switching to 
lighter vehicles.  This in is part due to a lack of monitoring, as well as the 
difficulty in attributing switching behaviour to the Road Transport Package (as 
opposed to other legislation).  Overall, it appears unlikely that the Road 
Transport Package has made a significant contribution to switching due to 
economic factors and the fact that many Member States have extended the 
provisions to cover lighter vehicles. 

  Freight forwarders and shippers are not subject to the rules of the Road 

Transport Package. Although the requirements of the Regulations dictate to a 
certain extent the operational conditions and details of the transport, they are 
generally not liable for potential infringements to the transport legislation 
during the transport.  As a consequence, hauliers can come under intense 
pressure to infringe regulations due to, for example, short delivery deadlines 
set by forwarders who are not held responsible. 

  The problem of “systematic” cabotage, where hauliers spend the majority of its 

time in another EU country, appears to affect some Member States in 
particular, e.g. this activity has been reported in Denmark, and to a lesser 
extent in Norway. 

  Overall, the possibility that hauliers have difficulty in proving legal cabotage 

and unintentionally break the rules has been suggested in literature and in 
some individual cases, but the extent of the problem was difficult to confirm. 

7.2.  Efficiency 

Overall, the benefits experienced to date due to reductions in administrative cost are 
much  lower  (92-95%  lower)  than  the  amount  originally  anticipated.    Total  savings 
from improved monitoring, requirements of financial standing and harmonised control 
documents are estimated at €8 million to €14 million per annum to date, compared to 
the expected savings of €175 million. The shortfall  is mainly due to  the fact that the 
ERRU system is not fully functional and negligible benefits could be calculated to date, 
meaning  that  the  expected  benefits  have  not  been  achieved.    Stakeholders  are 
however  optimistic  that  the  system  will  eventually  lead  to  cost  savings  once  the 
interconnection is complete, although the savings that could be expected once this is 
achieved  could  not  be  quantified.    The  additional  compliance  costs  are  estimated  at 

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€15 to €34 million per annum, which is broadly comparable to the ex-ante estimates 
of  €20  million  per  annum.    The  main  uncertainty  is  the  extent  to  which  firms  have 
been  affected  by  the  requirement  for  a  designated  transport  manager  in  practice, 
considering  the  possible  need  to  increase  their  salary  commensurate  with  their 
increased responsibilities.  

The  only  provision  that  made  a  significant  contribution  to  implementation  costs  was 
the  setting  up  of  national  electronic  registers  and  their  interconnection  with  ERRU.  
Overall,  the  estimated  ex-post  cost  for  all  28  Member  States  is  €18.2  million  for  the 
setting up / upgrading of national registers (excluding any costs incurred prior to the 
adoption of the Regulation) and €2.83 million for their interconnection (a process that 
is still ongoing with only 20 Member States being interconnected to date).  This totals 
to  €22.1  million,  which  is  around  70%  lower  than  the  ex-ante  cost  estimates  of  €73 
million.    

Since  the  system  has  not  been  completed  to  date,  the  benefits  achieved  at  the 
moment  are  also  much  lower  than  the  ex-ante  estimates  (as  discussed  previously  in 
Evaluation  Question  8).    Current  estimates  of  the  benefit-cost  ratio  are  around  0.2 
(assuming  a  discount  rate  of  4%  and  a  time  period  of  10  years),  indicating  that  the 
system  has  not  been  cost-effective  so  far.    This  is  largely  because  the  benefits  are 
assumed  to  be  rather  small,  due  to  the  incomplete  status  of  interconnection  – 
however,  it  was  not  possible  to  develop  quantitative  estimates  of  the  expected 
benefits of the fully functioning system. As for ongoing enforcement costs, indications 
from  both  the  survey  responses  and  literature  are  that  there  have  not  been  any 
significant  changes  in  enforcement  costs,  since  most  of  the  activities  were  already 
being carried out. 

Best practice examples from the UK and the Netherlands indicate that a higher use of 
the risk rating system to target checks could result in greater cost-effectiveness – the 
risk  rating  systems  in  both  these  countries  go  beyond  the  minimum  requirements  of 
the Regulation by including factors other than good repute.   

7.3.  Relevance 

Overall  the  Regulations  are  still  considered  relevant  tools  in  order  to  meet  the 
objectives  of  reducing  competitive  distortion,  improving  compliance  with  road  social 
legislation and improving road safety.  They work alongside other legislation as part of 
an integrated approach and their objectives support the EU goals.   

The  remaining  problems  mainly  arise  due  to  issues  of  interpretation  and/or 
enforcement  of  the  provisions  in  the  Regulations,  rather  than  from  the  objectives  or 
targeting of the rules themselves.  For example, concerning letterbox companies, the 
targeting of the objectives is appropriate/relevant to the problem, but further specific 
actions  should  enhance  the  measures  and  ensure  that  they  are  fully  adequate  to 
address  the  needs  (i.e.  more  precise  definition  of  an  operating  centre  and  greater 
cooperation between Member States).  The issue of divergent control and enforcement 
systems  is  still  an  area  of  development  (e.g.  work  is  ongoing  to  harmonise  the 
categorisation of infringements).  However, the objectives do not explicitly aim at the 
harmonisation  of  controls,  and  hence  this  issue  is  not  adequately  targeted  by  the 
operational objectives.   

The objective to address high levels of empty running is still relevant in the context of 
the  need  to  reduce  fuel  consumption  and  GHG  emissions  from  transport.    However, 
evidence is mixed as to the extent to which cabotage has been an adequate means to 
improve fill rates. 

7.4.  Coherence 

Overall,  the  legal  framework  is  not  fully  coherent-  i.e.  there  are  certain  difficulties  in 
the  correct  implementation  of  Regulations  1071/2009  and  1072/2009  and  the 

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satisfactorily achievement of their objectives of these EU instruments, considering the 
relation with the other EU legislation.  The main interactions are described below. 

The  objectives  pursued  by  Regulation  561/2006  and  Directive  2002/15/EC  on 
driving,  rest  and  working  time  for  road  transport  operators  are  coherent  with  the 
objectives  of  the  Road  Transport  Package,  as  they  all  aim  to  improve  social  and 
working conditions for transport workers in Europe.  There are possible inconsistencies 
where  Regulation  1071/2009  does  not  contain  a  specific  reference  to  Regulation 
561/2006  or  to  Directive  2002/15/EC  –  e.g.  when  defining  in  Annex  IV  the  most 
serious infringements related to driving and working time limits.  Furthermore, the co-
liability  principle  established  by  Regulation  561/2006  is  not  provided  for  by 
Regulations 1071/2009 and 1072/2009. 

As regards Directive 2006/22/EC which contains provisions for the enforcement of 
Regulation  561/2006,  there  are  differences  in  the  lists  of  infringements  contained  in 
Annex  IV  of  Regulation  1071/2009  and  Annex  III  of  Directive  2006/22/EC  and 
referring to the requirements on (i) good repute and (ii) driving time and rest periods.  
There  are  also  certain  inconsistencies  between  Regulation  1071/2009  and  Directive 
2006/22/EC  concerning  the  requirements  for  monitoring  the  compliance  with  both 
provisions, as well as the types of cooperation between national authorities. 

Regulation  1071/2009  is  applicable  to  vehicles  with  a  laden  mass  of  more  than  3.5 
tonnes.  This  means  that  it  is  not  consistent  with  the  exemption  established  in 
tachograph  Regulation  165/2014,  which  is  applicable  to  vehicles  with  a  laden 
mass not exceeding 7.5 tonnes. 

This  is,  the  road  legs  of  combined  transport  operations  are  exempted  from  the 
limitations  on  cabotage  contained  in  Regulation  1072/2009  as  long  as  the  conditions 
established  in  Article  1  of  the  Combined  Transport  Directive  92/106/EEC  are 
fulfilled.  However, some provisions may be outdated and its application gives rise to 
certain  inconsistencies  among  Member  States.    There  are  also  possible  disparities 
between the documentation requirements for cabotage and combined transport.   

The  enforceability  of  the  Posting  of  Workers  Directive  with  regard  to  cabotage 
operations  is  highly  questionable.  There  is  an  inherent  difficulty  in  checking  whether 
drivers performing cabotage are granted the minimum conditions of the workers in the 
country  where  they  perform  cabotage  and  for  the  part  of  their  trip  where  they  are 
performing  such  cabotage.  Furthermore,  certain  requirements  of  the  Posting  of 
Workers Directive,  such  as the  existence  of  a service  contract  between  the  employer 
and a recipient in the host state may impede the protection granted by the Directive 
to transport workers.   

A  lack  of  coherence  between  Regulations  1071/2009  and  1072/2009  and  Rome  I 
Regulation has not been identified.  

In relation to the TFEU, there have been some questions raised on whether interaction 
with  the  Treaty  on  the  right  of  establishment  actually  encourages  the  formation  of 
letterbox  companies.    In  this  area  there  is  no  contradiction  with  the  Regulations  in 
theory.  If an existing company that is doing business in one Member State wants to 
re-incorporate  in  a  different  Member  State,  but  without  the  intention  of  having  any 
establishment in the new Member State, this transaction will not be protected by the 
freedom of establishment.   

7.5.  EU added value 

In general, Regulations 1071/2009 and 1072/2009 are broadly considered to have led 
to positive effects compared to the situation prior to when they entered into force, and 
those  positive  effects  show  that  there  is  a  clear  added  value  of  regulating  the  road 
transport and cabotage through EU legal instruments.  The analysis also suggests that 
the  adoption  of  an  EU  Regulation  has  had  certain  advantages  in  comparison  to 
alternatives.    In  particular,  previous  efforts  using  Directives  as  well  as  non-binding 
measures (e.g. guidance notes) have not been sufficient to ensure common rules and 

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harmonisation.  Therefore the use of a Regulation appears to be the most appropriate, 
effective and relevant instrument to achieve the objectives.   

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8.  RECOMMENDATIONS 

The practical recommendations from this evaluation fall mainly into three categories: 

1.  Measures to combat letterbox companies; 

2.  Clarification of the cabotage rules; 

3.  Guidance and sharing of best practice; and 

4.  Longer-term considerations.   

8.1.  Measures to combat letterbox companies 

The  recommendations  to  combat letterbox  companies  more  effectively  and  efficiently 
aim to directly target the problem areas identified, namely: a lack of clarity over how 
to  define  an  operating  centre  and  a  lack  of  effective  cooperation  between  Member 
States.   

In  the  view  of  the  study  team,  a  more  precise  definition  as  to  what  constitutes  an 
operating  centre  should  be  introduced  at  the  European  level,  in  keeping  with  the 
objectives  to  ensure  common  rules  on  access  to  the  profession.  Cooperation  is  also 
particularly  important  in  the  control  of  letterbox  companies,  since  it  frequently 
requires cross-border investigations.   

In  our  judgement,  the  Enforcement  Directive  of  the  Posting  of  Workers  Directive 
(2014/67/EU) provides a good blueprint of more detailed criteria that could be used to 
define  an  operating  centre,  and  also  provides  a  good  and  transferable  example  of 
provisions on better cooperation.   

It  is  therefore  recommended  that  a  similar  approach  be  considered  to  amend 
Regulation  1071/2009  directly,  or  to  introduce  a  supporting  enforcement  Directive.  
This  recommendation  should  not  entail  substantial  additional  costs  to  enforcement 
authorities, since there are not any substantial changes to the actions that should be 
taken already.  The Impact Assessment for the Enforcement Directive of the Posting of 
Workers  Directive  assesses  precisely  the  administrative  burdens  of  introducing  a 
clearer definition of an operating centre and greater cooperation and did not find any 
significant  additional  costs.  Since  the  recommendations  of  this  study  are  to  follow 
closely  the  revisions  to  the  Directive,  it  is  logical  that  the  cost  assessment  will  be 
similar and that there will not be substantial additional costs.   

Concerning the infrastructure needed to ensure  cooperation, the current priority with 
regards  to  ensuring  the  effectiveness  and  efficiency  of  the  rules  should  be  to  ensure 
that full implementation of the existing provisions (such as the full setting up of ERRU) 
is  achieved,  rather  than  attempting  to  introduce  additional  measures.    As  such,  the 
completion  of  the  interconnection  of  national  registers  via  ERRU  is  vital  for  the 
achievement of the regulatory objectives and to ensure the efficiency of enforcement.   

The  benefits  of  such  a  measure  would  be  in  the  form  of  avoided  losses  for 
stakeholders  –  specifically,  the  fiscal  and  labour  losses  per  truck  to  Member  States 
have been estimated at around €40,875 per year.  The benefits to legitimate firms will 
be in the form of income gains that were previously lost to letterbox companies, which 
were  estimated  command  a  cost  advantage  of  around  10-30%.      Considering  the 
limited costs, alongside the significant benefits to Member States and companies, the 
benefits  associated  with  this  recommendation  appears  to  be  proportionate  to  the 
costs.   

8.2.  Clarification of cabotage rules 

In  light  of  the  continuing  difficulties  in  achieving  harmonised  interpretations  of  the 
cabotage  rules  (despite  the  additional  guidance  released  by  the  Commission),  this 
suggests  that  a  clarification  of  the  provisions  in  the  Regulations  will  be  the  only 
effective solution.   

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More specifically, the intended interpretations of the rules have already been clarified 
by the Commission in the FAQ document on cabotage.  However, since these are not 
legally binding the interpretations have not been taken up.  

The practice of systematic cabotage is not strictly prohibited under the current form of 
the  Regulations.  If  this  is  to  be  addressed,  there  additionally  needs  to  be  an 
amendment to the rules to allow some sort of waiting period. 

Overall,  introducing  clarifications  to  the  cabotage  provisions  seems  to  entail  limited 
additional  costs  since  most  of  the  activities  should  already  be  carried  out,  and  this 
assumption seems to be supported by the assessment of marginal costs arising from 
the  previous  change  when  Regulation  1072/2009  was  first  introduced.    The  benefits 
on the other hand would accrue to enforcement authorities due to the ability to carry 
out  more  efficient  checks.    This  would  enable  the  achievement  of  the  operational 
objective to introduce clearer, more harmonised rules on cabotage. 

8.3.  Guidance and sharing of best practice 

Additional guidance and sharing of best practices is recommended by the study team 
in several areas (outlined below).  These areas are where the main problems identified 
related to a lack of clarity in the provisions, and where guidance has not already been 
tried as a measure to improve the consistency of application.   

For  Regulation  1071/2009,  areas  that  could  be  targeted  by  guidance  and  sharing  of 
best practice are recommended as follows: 

  Stable and effective establishment: Provide guidance on the development 

of risk-rating indices, such as those used in France, in order to identify 
organisations at higher risk of infringing the requirements.  This would help to 
prioritise the scarce enforcement capability by targeting higher risk 
undertakings for more detailed checks.  

  Financial standing:    

o  Guidance on procedures for verifying the financial standing of newly 

established enterprises.  Examples of the approaches used were given 
for the UK, where bank statement evidence will be accepted, so long as 
the requisite amount is available, and a finance condition will be put in 
place requiring a further set of bank statements (Traffic Commissioner 
for Great Britain, 2015).  The Irish authorities accept a current state of 
affairs for a new business. 

o  Guidance on how to monitor if the financial standing requirement is met 
continuously. This could be based on the risk rating system developed in 
the Netherlands. 

o  Clarification of terms used in the Regulation, including:  

  What can be considered as  “capital and reserves”;  

  What exactly is meant by “professional insurance” and what 

liability should be covered;  

  What exactly is meant by “bank guarantee” and who is to be 

declared on it; 

  Who could be the mentioned duly accredited person having a 
right to certify the annual accounts of transport undertaking. 

  Good repute:  

o  Provide clearer definitions of precisely which infringements should lead 

to the loss of good repute, and clarification of whether administrative 
fines, arrangements out of court and on-the-spot payments should be 
counted as “penalties”.    

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o  Provide examples of best practices for procedures to determine whether 
the loss of good repute would be disproportionate, to encourage a more 
consistent approach and help to avoid over-use of this provision.   

o  Clearer definitions of who should be included in the list of relevant 
persons to be checked for good repute in addition to the transport 
manager.  Examples from individual Member States suggests that the 
list of other relevant persons to be checked could include: CEOs and 
general partners in partnerships (Finland) or legal representatives of the 
undertakings (Latvia).   

  Professional competence: guidance on the subject areas to be covered is 

already provided in the Regulation, but comments received from stakeholders 
indicate some concerns over diverging levels of difficulty.  One example from 
Spain could be used as a possible way forwards for ensuring greater 
harmonisation at EU level – the regions implement their own examinations, but 
guidance and a sample paper are provided on the ministry’s website 

  Transport manager:  

o  A more detailed list of the responsibilities/activities of the transport 

manager, to ensure that a “genuine link” is demonstrated.   

o  Guidance on methods to clarify the link between the transport manager 
and the undertaking.  One option to improve this link would be wider 
take-up of the approach used in the UK, where transport managers are 
“added” to an operating licence, making the link very robust. 

  Administrative cooperation: In order to further improve the level of 

cooperation, agreement on acceptable response times may also be helpful so 
that the expectations of national authorities are clear, along with a procedure 
for escalation if these timescales are not met.   

For  Regulation  1072/2009,  aside  from  clarifications  to  the  cabotage  rules  as 
mentioned above, additional guidance could be provided in the following areas: 

  Best practice  on specifically how to conduct cabotage checks effectively and 

efficiently, in particular how to use supplementary evidence from sources other 
than the CMR consignment note (such as tachograph data). 

  Encouraging Member States to provide information on their national cabotage 

rules, so that this can be provided on the Commission website.   

  More guidance on the harmonised categorisation of infringements, 

supplemented by explanations and participation in working group discussions.    

Guidance, rather than strict rules, would allow Member States adjust the conditions to 
suit  the  national  context  and  take  best  advantage  of  existing  monitoring  systems  in 
order  to  keep  the  costs  minimal.    In  other  areas  where  guidance  has  already  been 
tried and has not worked, or as a longer term consideration, legislative measures may 
be considered.  

8.4.  Longer-term considerations 

In  the  longer  term,  switching  to  electronic  documents  and  making  use  of  digital 
tachograph  data  appears  to  be  an  attractive  solution  to  improve  the  effectiveness  of 
cabotage  enforcement,  but  currently  there  are  legal  and  technological  barriers  to 
implementation that mean this would not be effective in the short- and medium-run.  

In  the  future,  additional  measures  such  as  requiring  ERRU  to  be  made  accessible  to 
roadside officers (as suggested by some stakeholders) could be considered.  The study 
team  consider  that  attempting  to  introduce  additional  measures  such  as  this  on  a 
mandatory basis while Member States are still experiencing technical difficulties would 
only exacerbate such problems, and hence recommend the priority should be to focus 

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on  implementation  of  the  existing  provisions  instead.    Nevertheless,  making  ERRU 
accessible  to  roadside  officers  could  be  considered  at  a  national  level  by  interested 
authorities for implementation on a voluntary basis. 

The  unintended  effects  of  the  requirements  of  financial  standing  leading  to  greater 
firm  exit  may  be  mitigated  by  extending  the  maximum  permissible  grace  period  to 
rectify the lack of financial standing to 12 months, instead of the current maximum of 
6  months.    The  additional  costs  of  this  measure  to  enforcement  authorities  are 
expected  to  be  minimal  on  the  basis  that  the existing  verifications  should  already be 
carried out (expect now at 12 months rather than 6).   

The  problem  of  letterbox  companies  occurs  in  many  industries  and  there  have  been 
several  recent  actions  taken  in  other  areas  in  order  to  reduce  the  problem.    For 
example, steps have been taken to try to extend liability to those who are responsible 
for using letterbox companies in an abusive way– including extending liability to those 
who are responsible for setting up and managing the letterbox company.  This may be 
a  possible  approach  to  consider  to  address  letterbox  companies  in  the  transport 
sector, and the success of these initiatives in other areas should be closely monitored 
to see if similar approaches would be appropriate.   

Another area of work is the harmonisation of sanctions.  Should problems persist and 
additional guidance prove insufficient, a stronger approach could be via harmonisation 
in  criminal  law,  where  EU  competence  is  established  in  the  TFEU,  Article  83.    This 
could  be  justified  on  the  grounds  that  the  most  serious  infringements  are  already 
sanctioned  in  many  Member  States  with  criminal  sanctions  and  all  criminal  systems 
foresee  financial  penalties  as  criminal  sanctions.    Appropriate  levels  of  proportionate 
and  dissuasive  minimum  levels  of  pecuniary  fines  have  been  suggested  by  Grimaldi 
(2013a):    

  Most serious infringement: €2,000 for employees, €20,000 for employers; 

  Very serious infringement: €1,000 for employees, €10,000 for employers. 

The study team consider the recommendations from Grimaldi to be a starting point for 
negotiations, which would be needed to secure any progress in this area. However, it 
unlikely to be practical to fix maximum levels of fines, as some Member States apply 
sanctions  proportionate  to  the  wage  and  the  turnovers  of  transport  operators 
(Grimaldi,  2013a).    These  penalties  could  be  accompanied  by  sanctions  such  as 
confiscation  or  immobilisation  of  the  vehicle,  and  of  the  withdrawal  of  the  driving 
licenses  and  of  the  Community  licenses,  which  are  seen  as  effective  complementary 
measures,  because  they  do  not  allow  the  operators  to  gain  the  advantage  from 
infringements of the relevant rules.   

Certain actions could be taken to enhance the consistency of references between the 
Road  Transport  Package  and  the  road  social  legislation  (Regulation  561/2006, 
Directive 2002/15/EC and Directive 2006/22/EC), in particular regarding the definition 
of infringements.  In this respect, it could be recommended to: 

 

Include in Regulation 1071/2009 specific reference to Regulation 561/2006 and 
to Directive 2002/15/EC when establishing the requirements of driving time, 
rest periods and working time (Article 6) and when defining in Annex IV the 
most serious infringements related to driving and working time limits.  

  Ensure a harmonised list of categories, types and degrees of seriousness of 

infringements across all instruments. 

  Harmonise the rules on monitoring of compliance of social rules and 
cooperation between the national enforcers, considering that the rules 
contained in the enforcement Directive 2006/22/EC are more complete. In this 
sense, the existing extension of the Directive 2006/22/EC risk rating system to 
Regulation 1071/2009 could serve as a model for further synergies.  

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 

It could also be advisable to analyse the possibility of amending Regulation 
1072/2009 in order to establish a co-liability regime as regards the 
infringement of cabotage rules and, therefore, to achieve a more harmonised 
treatment of infringements in the road transport sector.    

Finally,  several  recommendations  were  made  to  improve  the  coherence  of  the 
legislation.  Regarding combined transport, there are several issues: 

  There is a need for a common definition as to how cabotage relates to 
combined transport: In certain Member States the first and final leg of a 
combined transport journey are considered as a cabotage operation and not as 
a combined transport operation.  A clearer definition of combined transport is 
needed that preferably avoids the term “as the crow flies”.  

  Improved documentation: In this respect, several stakeholders raised the 

issue of disparities between the documentation requirements for cabotage and 
combined transport.  The establishment of a single document for combined 
transport operations, similar to the CMR, could solve the current issues related 
to documentation.   

The  enforceability  of  the  Posting  of  Workers  Directive  with  regard  to  cabotage 
operations is highly questionable. There is room for an amendment to the legislation, 
in line with the proposals made by the High Level Group to divide cabotage into linked 
(to international movements) and non-linked cabotage (Bayliss, 2012).  

To ensure a correct enforcement of the Rome I Regulation and to fight against social 
dumping  in  the  road  transport  sector,  non-compliance  with  Rome  I  Regulation  (i.e. 
depriving  the  driver  from  the  law  that  better  protects  his/her  interests)  should  be 
included  as  one  of  the  infringements  that  may  lead  to  loss  of  good  repute  and 
withdrawal of the community licence, pursuant to Regulation 1071/2009.   

There are possible arguments for a supplementary enforcement Directive on the basis 
that  enforcement  is  a  sensitive  issue  for  Member  States  and  national  authorities  are 
organised  differently.  Greater  cooperation  between  Member  States  could  also  be 
mandated if guidance and voluntary cooperation proves insufficient.   A parallel can be 
drawn  with  the  control  of  compliance  with  the  driving  time  rules  (Regulation 
561/2006), which is governed by Directive 2006/22/EC.  

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9.  ANNEX A: SUPPLEMENTARY TECHNICAL ANALYSIS 

This  annex  contains  additional  supporting  evidence  and  analysis  for  each  of  the 
evaluation questions, that is referred to in the main report. 

9.1.  Monitoring data 

9.1.1.  Monitoring  information  submitted  under  Article  26  of  Regulation 
1071/2009 

Article 26 requires that Member States must draw up a report every two years, which 
shall include: 

a)  An  overview  of  the  sector  with  regard  to  good  repute,  financial  standing  and 

professional competence; 

b)  the  number  of  authorisations  granted  by  year  and  by  type,  those  suspended, 
those  withdrawn,  the  number  of  declarations  of  unfitness  and  the  reasons  on 
which those decisions were based; 

c)  The number of certificates of professional competence issued each year; 

d)  Core statistics relating to the national electronic registers and their use by the 

competent authorities; and 

e)  An overview of exchanges of information with other Member States pursuant to 
Article 18(2),  including  in  particular  the  annual  number  of  established 
infringements notified to other Member States and the replies received, as well 
as  the  annual  number  of  requests  and  replies  received  pursuant  to 
Article 18(3). 

The first report under Regulation 1071/2009 covers the period from 4 December 2011 
until  31  December  2012.  The  next  reporting  period  will  cover  the  full  two-year 
timeframe from 1 January 2013 till 31 December 2014.   

Despite  the  obligation  under  the  Regulations,  six  Member  States,  namely  Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg and Portugal, did not submit their national 
reports in time for the first report  (European Commission, 2014a).   Several Member 
States experienced severe delays and data was missing in several cases.   

As  noted  by  the  Commission  in  its  2014  report,  the  quality  and  timeliness  of 
submissions will likely have been affected by the fact that this was the first reporting 
period;  however,  the  lack  of  data  makes  it  difficult  to  assess  the  implementation  on 
the basis of information provided (European Commission, 2014a).   

9.1.1.1. 

Authorisations granted 

Table  9-1  shows  the  reported  data  from  Member  States  regarding  the  authorisations 
granted in the first reporting period.  On the basis of the Member States that reported 
authorisations, around 171,000 were granted in the reporting period.  However due to 
a lack of information about national systems74, this does not provide a clear picture on 
numbers of undertakings pursuing the occupation of road transport operator. Member 
States  have  therefore  been  encouraged  by  the  Commission  to  prepare  an  outline  of 
their  national  arrangements  for  authorisations  in  order  to  allow  for  a  collection  of 
consistent data in the next reporting period (European Commission, 2014a).   

74 Depending on the national schemes, there is a range of scenarios; an authorisation might be 
a prerequisite to obtain a licence for national transportation and/or a Community licence in 
order to carry out international carriage, it might be an equivalent of a licence for national 
transportation or it might mean a licence for national and international transport granted by 
means of the single authorisation (European Commission, 2014a).   

209 

 
 
                                          
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Table 9-1: Authorisations granted (Over the period 4.12.2011 – 31.12.2012) 

Member 
States 

Authorisations granted 

Community licences 

Licenses for national 
transportation 

Road 
haulage 

Passenger 
transport 

Road 
haulage 

Passenger 
transport 

Road 
haulage 

Passenger 
transport 

166 

0 

No report provided 

4301 

381 

4667 

1607 

170 

8 

34 

8 

4484 

5412 

22682 

27174 

616 

75072 

4402 

295 

5985 

809 

7182 

644 

1067 

106 

30534 

1149 

444 

56 

No report provided 

1026 

120 

No report provided 

No report provided 

808 

940 

70 

60 

No report provided 

8 

0 

92 

No report provided 

8699 

785 

13135 

1962 

No information provided** 

1248 

45 

166 

8 

3 

26 

16 

AT 

BE 

BG 

CY 

CZ* 

DK 

EE* 

FI 

FR1 

DE 

EL 

HU 

IE 

IT 

LV* 

LT* 

LU 

MT* 

NL* 

PL* 

PT 

RO 

SK* 

SL 

ES* 

SE 

UK 

Source: (European Commission, 2014a), Annex I 
Notes: * Numbers cover only the year 2012.   
**  No  official  monitoring  report  provided  –  estimates  from  DfT  indicate  that  4,996 
authorisations were granted in the reporting period 
1: Number of undertakings engaged in road transportation fulfilling requirements to access the 
profession, extended to vehicles below 3.5 tonnes of permissible laden mass and carrying below 
9 people, including a driver. 
2: The  number includes authorisations to pursue the occupation  of  national transport operator 
as  well  as  international  or  national-international  transport  operator.  It  also  includes  the 
renewals. 

210 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

9.1.1.2. 
unfitness of transport managers 

Withdrawals  and  suspended  authorisations  and  declarations  of 

Table  9-2  summarises  the  number  of  penalties  imposed  per  type  by  each  Member 
State  in  the  first  reporting  period  4.12.2011-  31.12.2012.    Only  a  small  number  of 
Member  States  provided  breakdowns  of  the  reasons  for  these  penalties.  The  official 
monitoring  data  suggests  that  total  withdrawals  are  less  than  100  in  most  Member 
States  (Austria,  10  –  of  which  nine  were  due  to  infringements  of  the  requirement  of 
financial  standing);  Estonia  (2);  Ireland  (2);  Hungary  (31);  Italy  (31);  Latvia  (58); 
Lithuania (4); Poland (62).  Member States where withdrawals were particularly high 
included  CZ  (956);  FR  (3344);  EL  (222);  NL  (2038);  SK  (1219);  ES  (27595);  SE 
(892).  Data on declarations of unfitness were not provided by many  Member States 
or  not  split  between  road  haulage  and  passenger  transport.    Nevertheless,  total 
declarations were relatively high in IT (348) and HU (123) compared to less than 20 
reported for all  other  Member States  that  provided  data.  The  number of  suspensions 
was less than 50 in all Member States that provided data apart from CZ (373) and ES 
(12493).  

Table  9-2:  Withdrawals  and  Suspended  Authorisations,  and  Declarations  of 
Unfitness of Transport Managers (Over the period 4.12.2011 – 31.12.2012) 

Member 
States 

Authorisations 
withdrawn 

Authorisations 
suspended 

Number of  
declarations of 
unfitness 

Road 
haulage 

Passenger 
transport 

Road 
haulage 

Passenger 
transport 

Road 
haulage 

Passenger 
transport 

AT 

BE 

BG 

CY 

CZ* 

DK 

EE* 

FI 

FR 

DE 

EL 

HU 

IE 

IT 

LV* 

LT* 

LU 

MT* 

NL* 

PL* 

PT 

RO 

SK* 

10 

956 

2 

No report provided 

No data 

No information provided 

373 

No report provided 

0 

No report provided 

3344 

1424 

No information provided 

No report provided 

222 

48 

0 

0 

14 

3 

0 

58 

4 

0 

31 

2 

31 

2 

0 

0 

3 

0 

0 

123 

6 

No information provided 

0 

348 

No information provided 

13 

No information provided 

No report provided 

0 

1038 

No data 

No data 

0 

0 

62 

6 

No information provided 

0 

0 

No data 

0 

1219 

No report provided 

1 

0 

211 

No information provided 

0 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Member 
States 

Authorisations 
withdrawn 

Authorisations 
suspended 

Number of  
declarations of 
unfitness 

SL 

ES* 

SE 

UK 

592 

37595 

892 

20 

19 

73 

No information provided 

12493 

1 

No information provided 

No information provided 

No information provided 

Source: (European Commission, 2014a), Annex II 
Note: *Numbers covering the year 2012 
For EE: the number of Authorisations Withdrawn refers to the Community license 
For FR:  Numbers cover only  the year  2012.  Number of  authorisations withdrawn  in relation to 
undertakings  engaged  in  road  transportation  fulfilling  requirements  to  access  the  profession, 
extended to vehicles below 3.5 tonnes of permissible laden mass and carrying below 9 people, 
including a driver. 

9.1.1.3. 

Certificates of professional competence issued 

Table 9-3 shows data on the certificates of professional competence issued.  Between 
December  2011  and  December  2012,  more  than  52,000  certificates  of  professional 
competence  were  awarded  in  EU  Member  States.  This  number  includes  certificates 
granted on the basis of an examination as provided by Article 8 of Regulation EC (No) 
1071/2009 and through recognition of experience, following an exemption specified in 
Article  9  of  this  Regulation.    This  figure  also  includes  certifications  for  passenger 
transport  operators, since  most  Member States  do not  report  any  split  between  road 
haulage  and  passenger  transport;  however in  general  it  appears  that  the  majority  of 
certificates  were  be  for  road  haulage  operators.    Among  the  Member  States  that 
reported  data,  only  Malta  reported  that  there  were  no  certificates  of  professional 
competence issued in the reference period (European Commission, 2014a). 

Table  9-3:  Certificates  of  Professional  Competence  Issued  (Over  the  period 
4.12.2011 – 31.12.2012) 

Member 
States 

Certificates of 
professional 
competence 

Road 
haulage 

Passenger 
transport 

AT 

BE 

BG 

CY 

71 

No report provided 

1547 

171 

21 

CZ* 

4295 

DK 

EE* 

FI 

No report provided 

303 

109 

No report provided 

FR 

3375 

1794 

Comments 

802 certificates issued on the basis of an examination 
which had been successfully passed. In 3493 cases, 
certificates of professional competence issued under 
Directive 96/26/EC were replaced at the request of 
holders 

For  road  haulage:  559  –  examination,  674  - 
equivalency  of  diplomas  and  2542  -  recognition  of 
experience 

For  passenger  transport:  108  –  examination,  133  - 
equivalency  of  diplomas  and  1553  -  recognition  of 

212 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Member 
States 

Certificates of 
professional 
competence 

DE 

EL 

No report provided 

2294 

experience 

Comments 

For road haulage: 1183 of certificates of professional 
competence and 1507 certificates after 10-year 
periodic training  

For passenger transport: 153 of certificates of 
professional competence and 510 certificates after 
10-year periodic training 

A road transport manager needs to successfully pass 
an examination based on attendance of a specific 
vocational training course, which is mandatory for 
candidates not having an upper secondary school 
diploma. 

HU 

1183 

153 

IE 

273 

150 

IT 

3977 

242 

LV* 

LT* 

LU 

MT* 

NL* 

PL* 

PT 

RO 

SK* 

SL 

ES* 

SE 

UK 

516 

1028 

No report provided 

0 

566 

2469 

0 

38 

345 

No report provided 

12488 

3977 

1294 

231 

4904 

957 

3051 

No information provided 

Source: (European Commission, 2014a), Annex III 
Note: *Numbers covering the year 2012 

9.1.2.  Monitoring  information  submitted  under  Article  17  of  Regulation 
1072/2009 

Article 17 lays  down  requirements  for  reporting.    Every  two years,  Member States 
must  inform  the  Commission  of  the  number  of  hauliers  possessing  Community 
licences,  the  number  of  certified  true  copies  corresponding  to  the  vehicles  in 
circulation and the number of driver attestations issued and in circulation.  Table 9-4 
shows  data  reported  for  2014.      The  total  number  of  Community  Licences  in  the  EU 
has been slightly fluctuating around 270,000 over the past few years (figures available 
between  2007  and  2013)  without  a  clear  negative  or  positive  trend  (unpublished  DG 
MOVE  dataset).  However,  some  Member  States  are  replacing  their  national  licences 
with Community Licences, so the figures are potentially upward biased. 

213 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Table 9-4: Member State reporting under Article 17 of Regulation 1072/2009 
(2014 data) 

Member 
State 

Hauliers 
possessing 
community 
licences at the 
end of 2014 

Certified true 
copies in 
circulation at 
the end of 2014 

Driver 
attestations 
issued in 2014 

Driver 
attestations in 
circulation at 
the end of 2014 

BE 

BG 

CZ 

DK 

DE* 

EE 

IE 

EL 

ES 

FR 

HR 

IT 

CY 

LV 

LT 

LU 

HU 

MT 

NL 

AT 

PL 

PT 

RO 

SI 

SK 

FI 

SE 

UK 

8,351 

10,378 

11,552 

5,016 

40,440 

2,458 

2,346 

1,965 

27,724 

23,439 

2,762 

14,638 

146 

3,294 

3,641 

365 

6,426 

49 

11,668 

3,596 

29,488 

5,726 

36,162 

5,279 

6,563 

10,526 

3,469 

9,416 

54,354 

69,655 

79,459 

34,941 

340,510 

13,202 

11,298 

3,344 

104,633 

319,012 

13,121 

58,552 

358 

13,213 

28,486 

4,925 

41,423 

348 

98,330 

32,060 

168,645 

58,829 

129,665 

21,508 

41,070 

45,892 

13,399 

39,479 

120 

8 

455 

0 

953 

166 

0 

5 

4,994 

132 

10 

1,275 

0 

2,144 

6,715 

32 

194 

22 

37 

374 

9,255 

610 

3 

5,461 

347 

302 

4 

0 

114 

89 

727 

3 

2,883 

357 

0 

14 

8,321 

287 

10 

4,098 

12 

1,433 

3,895 

33 

251 

22 

145 

1,590 

6,809 

3,148 

31 

6,056 

474 

761 

39 

0 

There  are  considerable  disparities  among  Member  States  in  the  charges  applied  to 
obtain the Community licenses and their certified true copies.  

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Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

9.2.  Effectiveness:  To  what  extent  are  compliance  levels  with  the 
new provisions satisfactory?  

9.2.1.  Evidence of the extent of letterbox companies in Europe 

The  Commission  has  reported  that  letterbox  companies  still  exist  in  certain  Member 
States  (European  Commission,  2014b).  There  are  no  comprehensive  EU  statistics  or 
studies of the extent to which letterbox companies are still a problem in Europe.  The 
examples  below  have  been  collated  from  the  literature  in  order  to  help  inform  the 
assessment of the problem.   

Even within a single country, stakeholder views on the situation differ.  For example, 
one Spanish association of road transport operators interviewed for this study felt that 
letterbox  companies  have  never  been  a  problem  in  Spain,  whereas  a  Spanish  trade 
union responded that there is  a problem that  is not being properly detected, citing a 
recent  example  of  fake  subsidiaries in  the  area  of  Murcia  and  Alicante.   The  Spanish 
enforcement  authority  instead  reported  that  letterbox  companies  were  seen  as  a 
problem all over Europe. None of the stakeholders in question could provide concrete 
evidence  on  the  extent  (or  not)  of  the  problem  and  hence  the  situation  remains 
unclear.  

ETF  (2012a)  claims  that  letterbox  employment  schemes  “proliferate”.    They  demand 
that  Regulation  1071/2009  be  amended  to  combat  this  practice  by  ensuring  that 
undertakings  have  parking  spaces  for  all  registered  vehicles  as  a  condition  of  stable 
and effective establishment, that Member States are required to conduct checks every 
2  years  (as  opposed  to  every  five  years),  that  the  transport  manager  may  only 
manage one undertaking and that the authorisation of undertaking found in breach of 
Regulation 1071/2009 to be immediately withdrawn.  

In a question to the Commission dated 11 September 2013 (Parliamentary questions, 
2013a), attention was drawn to a possible breach of the provisions of Regulation (EC) 
No 1071/2009 in the transport sector. In its answer, the Commission stated that the 
information on which the question was based did not allow it to establish whether the 
companies referred to in the question were infringing the provisions of Regulation (EC) 
No  1071/2009.    In  its  response,  the  Commission  requested  that  the  German 
authorities  carry  out  an  individual  check  to  verify  whether  the  undertaking  met  the 
conditions  governing  admission  to  the  occupation  of  transport  operator,  under  the 
procedure laid out in Article 12(3). The Commission also noted that it is ultimately the 
duty  of the  Member States  concerned  to  ensure  that  the  provisions  of  the  regulation 
are  enforced.    Exploring  the  validity  of  these  reports  in  more  detail  via  interviews 
demonstrates  how  difficult  it  is  to  investigate  and  verify  the  existence  of  letterbox 
companies.    During  interviews  conducted  for  this  study,  German  stakeholders  were 
asked  to  comment  on  this  specific  issue  and  in  general  appeared  to  recognise  there 
were  some  problems:  a  German  trade  union  reported  that  the  problem  of  letterbox 
companies  in  the  Flensburg/Luebeck  area  is  well  known  (although  there  are  also 
legitimate companies operating from these regions), and also highlighted a problem at 
the border to the Netherlands. They consider the incentives for this behaviour are that 
Germany provides cheaper drivers and has less restrictive laws concerning wages and 
social  security  payments  compared  to  Denmark  and  the  Netherlands.    The  German 
ministry also supported the view that letterbox companies are a problem in Northern 
Germany. When asked about incentives driving this, they note that Eastern European 
letterbox  companies  are  frequently  established  in  Germany  to  get  access  to  permits 
that allow them to operate in non-EU countries in the East, such as Russia.  A German 
industry association further recognised the issue of letterbox companies but suggested 
that it is a very local problem. In their view, the main reason for these companies are 
(in addition to fiscal reasons), the fact that companies that are registered in Germany 
can ask for exemption of the driving ban of trucks on Sundays. In Schleswig Holstein 
there are many applications for these exemptions. Outside of Schleswig Holstein, they 
feel that there are not any noteworthy letterbox companies in Germany.  Finally, five 

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Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

German  undertakings  interviewed  for  this  study  believed  that  letterbox  companies 
cannot  exist  long  term  in  Germany  as  the  controls  by  the  BAG  (Federal  Office  for 
Freight Transport) and the tax office are too frequent and thorough.  

Danish stakeholders were similarly asked during interviews conducted for this study to 
expand  on  the  media  coverage  of  certain  Danish  firms  with  subsidiaries  in  Germany 
that are not meeting the “stable and effective establishment”. The Danish Ministry and 
Danish enforcement authorities emphasised that these were only claims and that there 
is not established proof of such illegal practices taking place.  The Ministry explained 
that it is difficult to say what the effect of letterbox companies has been and no effect 
has  been  measured.    The  enforcement  authority  commented  that  they  must  rely  on 
the  German  authorities  for  further  information  in  this  case,  but  typically  they  do  not 
receive  any  responses,  although  the  further  emphasised  that  they  certainly  did  not 
blame  their  German  counterparts.    A  Danish  trade  union  elaborated  that  there  were 
journalists  trying  to  go  investigate  the  issue  in  Flensburg,  who  sent  pictures  of  the 
letterbox  companies’  sites  to  the  Danish  administration:  they  claim  that  the 
photographs showed the establishment was a residential site, and that the information 
was  sent  to  the  Commission.  Their  understanding  of  the  most  recent  developments 
were  that  the  Commission  sent  a  letter  to  the  German  authorities,  who  in  turn 
confirmed that in their opinion they were legitimate hauliers where there were actual 
activities.  

The  European  Trade  Union  Institute  (ETUI)  has  collated  several  reports  from  court 
cases against alleged letterbox companies (ETUI, 2014), which reports on the case of 
a  Dutch  company  setting  up  a  Hungarian  subsidiary  in  Budapest.  The  drivers 
employed by this company were directly engaged by the Dutch parent company, while 
the  Hungarian  company  employed  only  one  half-time  administrative  employee  and 
stationed  none  of  its  trucks  in  Hungary.  The  drivers  were  reportedly  “subjected  to 
constant pressure because the ‘Hungarian way’ was cheaper”.  

The Belgian trade journal Truck & Business (2012) published an article alleging similar 
practices  involving  Slovakian  letterbox  companies  being  set  up  by  businesses  that 
really operate from Belgium. These companies are thought to have a much lower cost 
base than their Belgian competitors as a result of several factors, such as wages and 
social  insurance  payments,  which  are  typically  much  lower  for  transport  workers  in 
Slovakia than in Belgium75. The secretary general of ČESMAD Slovakia stated a belief 
that these companies were in fact paying the Slovakian minimum wage, i.e. even less 
than  the  typical  Slovakian  transport  worker’s  wage.  In  addition,  the  standard 
corporate tax rate in Slovakia is roughly 10 percentage points lower than in Belgium, 
and  according  to  the  Truck  &  Business  article,  at  the  time  of  printing,  transport 
businesses relocating to Slovakia were even eligible for complete relief from road tax 
on vehicles not used for transport activities in that country. 

The Belgian transport workers’ union, FGTB (2012), conducted its own investigation of 
alleged  letterbox companies  in  Slovakia and  even  went  as  far as assembling  a list  of 
names of alleged letterbox companies, which it shared with Slovakian authorities and 
published  online.  The  union  visited  the  premises  of  some  of  these  businesses  in 
Slovakia  18  months  after  it  had  named  them,  and  found  that  only  one  of  the  12 
premises it visited appeared to have any trucks at their registered offices. 

In  the  Netherlands,  irregularities  with  respect  to  the  transport  of  dangerous  goods 
have  occurred,  concerning  companies  employed  by  Dutch  hauliers,  but  recruited 
through their foreign branches in Poland and Hungary.  These subsidiaries have been 
reported as “fictitious”, and the companies involved are associated with allegations of 

75 The article claims that Slovak drivers receive salaries that are between one-fifth to one-third 

that of a Belgian driver. 

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paying low wages, providing poor working conditions and encouraging drivers to work 
long hours (TRT, 2013).   

The  Italian  trade  union  FILT-CGIL  reports  cases  of  illegal  cabotage  operations  in  the 
Marche  region,  where  international  companies  employ  drivers  under  letterbox 
companies.  Eastern European drivers (mainly from Bulgaria, but also from Poland and 
Ukraine) are employed, (but never return to their countries of origin) and drive trucks 
that are registered in Bulgaria or Poland.  According to the trade union, through such 
unfair practices, companies can offer transport prices that are between 20% and 25% 
lower  than  the  minimum  tariff  set  by  the  national  legislation,  with  subsequent 
disruptive effects on the market (TRT, 2013).   

In  France,  several  cases  have  been  reported  of  the  establishment  of  ‘fake’  foreign 
subsidiaries or transnational contractual relationships with the sole aim to provide ‘low 
cost’ labour. Such practices recently featured in media reports on the activities of the 
Norbert  Dentressangle  group.    In  one  case  a  French  transport  operator  set  up  a 
subsidiary  in  Poland  which  recruited  one  hundred  drivers  to  perform  road  haulage  in 
France  (European  Commission,  2012b). The usual  schedule  of  Polish  drivers  included 
six  weeks  of  work  in  France  and  one  week  of  rest  in  Poland.  The  Polish  drivers  were 
working  six  days  per  week  and,  during  their  stay  in  France,  they  stayed  in  flats 
provided  by  the  French  company.  The  vehicles  were  owned  by  the  French  mother 
company; the Polish subsidiary rented the trucks from the mother company and then 
it rented them back while providing the posted drivers. The French courts established 
that  a  proper  but  disguised  employment  relationship  existed  between  the  French 
company  and  the  Polish  drivers,  as  the  former  organised  and  directed  in  detail  the 
work of the latter. A similar case involved another French company which established 
a  subsidiary  in  Slovakia.  Slovak  drivers  were  actually  working  for  up  to  15  weeks  in 
France  and  were  part  of  the  mother  company  workforce.  In  particular,  the  French 
company  entrusted  the  Slovak  subsidiary  to  carry  out  its  own  transport  contracts, 
while the foreign firm did not have any independent activity in Slovakia and all of its 
trailers  were  provided  by  the  mother  company.  Again  the  foreign  subsidiary  did  not 
show  any  independent  entrepreneurial  activity  and  was  established  with  the  only 
purpose  to  provide  drivers  at  a  lower  cost  to  the  French  mother  company.  In  other 
cases, the provision of drivers for on-going operations in France is organised through 
agencies (European Commission, 2012b). 

Another  question  submitted  to  the  European  Parliament  concerns  possible  Greek 
transport operators transferring to neighbouring countries in order to take advantage 
of  lower  taxes76.    Allegedly,  these  are  “bogus”  transfers,  since  the  undertakings  in 
question  are  not  fulfilling  the  terms  of  Article  5(a),  (b)  and  (c)  regarding  the  core 
premises  and  transport  activities  of  an  undertaking.    In  its  reply,  the  Commission 
noted that Article 12 of the Regulation requires Member States to verify regularly by 
means  of  targeted  checks  that  transport  undertakings  established  on  their  territory 
fully  comply  with  the  criteria  defined  in  the  Regulation.    They  further  note  that  the 
Regulation  does  not  set  rules  on  the  corporate  taxation  levels  applied  to  road 
transport operators.  

9.2.2.  Review of empirical evidence on labour cost convergence in Europe 

Ismeri  Europa  (2012)  examine  average  hourly  labour  cost  data  and  compute  a 
measure of dispersion (coefficient of variation). Hourly labour costs dispersion shows a 
decreasing  trend  in  EU27,  EA17  and  EU12,  more  pronounced  in  EU12  and  stable  in 
EU15.  Therefore  it  seems  to  be  evidence  of  very  slow  “labour  costs  converging 
process”  between  the  EU12  and  EU15  countries.    They  complete  a  literature  review 

76http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2012-

002553&language=PL 

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and  conclude  that  there  seems  to  be  evidence  of  very  slow  “labour  costs  converging 
process” between the EU12 and EU15 countries. 

Analysis of datasets for the manufacturing sector from the OECD covering 1974-1998 
in  Abraham  (2001)  shows  overall  convergence  between  countries  with  higher  and 
lower labour costs, although progress is slow and patchy.  Convergence is found to be 
more  pronounced  when  the  gap  in  labour  costs  between  countries  is  larger.  
Productivity differentials explain a large part of the differences.  

Data  from  Dullien  and  Fritsche  (2007)  do  not  support  the  hypothesis  of  unit  labour 
cost  (ULC)  growth  in  the  European  Monetary  Union  (EMU),  although  for  some 
countries there is evidence of relative rather than absolute convergence.  Lebrun and 
Perez  (2011)  show  that  nominal  and  real  unit  labour  costs  growth  differentials 
between  euro  area  members  have  continued  and  even  widened  in  the  EMU  due  to 
divergent  evolutions  in  capital-output  ratios,  nominal  effective  exchange  rates  and 
country-specific institutional features, coupled with an increased sensitivity of real unit 
labour costs to fundamentals following the shift in the monetary regime.  Arpaia and 
Pichelmann (2007) find persistent cross-country differences in wages and labour cost 
development in the Euro area, which are indicative of an insufficient degree of nominal 
and real wage flexibility. Šlander and Ogorevc (2010) confirm absolute convergence of 
wages  within  the  EU,  and  reveal  narrowing  in  the  wage  gap  between  high-  and  low- 
wage regions even after controlling for their different productivity growth rates. 

9.2.3.  Analysis of modelled versus reported cabotage 

Figure 9-1 shows the total volume of activity that is reported as cabotage within each 
member state, alongside the estimated total activity, from AECOM (2014c).  Estimated 
total  activity  is  based  on  bottom-up  estimates  of  the  total  contestable  markets  (i.e. 
hat market within National Haulage that is most relevant for cabotage activity, which 
tends to exclude highly specialised trade) and the level of cost differential: 

  Where  the  Cost  Differential  between  Country  Pairs  is  greater  than  0.83,  the 
cabotage rate is equal to the reported cabotage rate in Eurostat, or is equal to 
53 (average cabotage rate) where no rate is reported by Eurostat; or 

  Where  the  Cost  Differential  between  Country  Pairs  is  less  than  0.83,  the 
cabotage  rate  is  estimated  using  a  trendline  in  which  cabotage  rates  start  at 
130  tonne-km/tonne  and  rise  to  maximum  values  in  excess  of  500  tonne-
km/tonne. 

Figure  9-1  shows  potentially  large  discrepancies  (more  than  2,000  million  t-km) 
between cabotage levels reporting in Eurostat and the expected activity for Germany, 
Austria  and  Italy.    Discrepancies  of  between  500  and  2,000  million  t-km  were  also 
found for France, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Belgium. In aggregate, unreported 
activity  is  estimated  at  1.94  times  the  reported  level  of  cabotage  across  the  EU27. 
Unreported  activity  includes  flagging  out  (the  dominant  cause)  as  well  as  illegal 
activity (that may be viewed as legitimate flagging out by some companies). 

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Figure 9-1: Analysis of modelled versus reported cabotage (million t-km) 

Source: AECOM (2014c) 

The  analysis  shows  that  the  actual  level  of  haulage  activity  undertaken  by  non-
domiciled  hauliers  is  considerably  higher  than  that  suggested  by  cabotage  statistics.  
It  is  considered  that  the  unreported  activity  comprises  flagging  out  activity  (which 
remains a grey area) and other illegal activities.  

9.3.  Effectiveness:  To  what  extent  are  the  new  enforcement 
measures effective?  

9.3.1.  Implementation  of  requirements  in  Regulation  1071/2009  concerning 
checks 

Some information on the enforcement procedures in place in different Member States 
was  provided  in  the  official  monitoring  reports  (European  Commission,  2014a):  
Estonia  reported  that  checks  are  carried  out  according  to  a  risk-based  system  and 
mainly  undertakings  which  have  an  increased  risk  of  committing  serious  or  frequent 
infringements to road transport rules are targeted.  In Ireland checks of good repute, 
financial standing and professional competence are performed at least every five years 
in  the  framework  of  an  authorisation  renewal  process  for  each  undertaking.  In 
addition,  these  checks might  take place  more  frequently for  some  operators who  are 
deemed  high  risk  or  come  to  the  attention  of  the  competent  authority.  In  Latvia, 
checks  of  compliance  with  financial  standing  are  performed  by  means  of  information 
from the annual reports provided by the Register of Enterprises. Hungary indicated the 
numbers  of  checks  on  conditions  of  good  repute  (11062),  financial  standing  (7197) 
and  professional  competence  (5329)  during  this  reporting  period  (4/12/2011  – 
31/12/2012). 

In  order  to  better  understand  how  the  enforcement  systems  were  developed  and 
applied  in  different  Member  States,  additional  details  were  sought  via  surveys  and 
interviews carried out for this study.  Only a small number of respondents were able to 
give  further  information  on  how  checks  were  conducted,  but  these  case  studies 
present  a  more  detailed  picture  of  how  enforcement  functions  in  certain  Member 
States.      The  examples  below  are  sourced  from  interviews  carried  out  for this study, 
unless otherwise indicated.   

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The  Polish  authority  commented  that  their risk  rating  system  is  used  in  the  manner 
as  prescribed  by  Directive  2006/22/EC.  In  Poland  there  are  400  inspectors  are 
responsible for checks at the roadside and at the premises. The information collected 
by the inspectors are then forwarded to the International Transport Office and to local 
authorities  issuing  the  community  licenses  and  checking  for  the  4  requirements  of 
Regulation  1071/2009  (stable  and  effective  establishment,  good  repute,  financial 
standing and professional competence).   

Estonia’s risk-based system mainly targets undertakings that have an increased risk 
of  committing  serious  or  frequent  infringements  to  road  transport  rules  (European 
Commission, 2014a).  

The  German  ministry  reports  that  previously  there  was  only  a  risk  rating  system  at 
the  regional  level,  whereas  now  it  operates  country-wide  thanks  to  Regulation 
1071/2009.  As  of  July  2014  the  infringements  are  rated  with  either  5  points  (most 
serious infringements), 3 points (more serious/serious infringements) or 1 point (other 
infringements).  An  undertaking  is  then  rated  as  having  an  increased  risk  if  it  has 
accumulated either 5 points (for undertakings with to 10 vehicles), 8 points (up to 50 
vehicles),  or  11  points  (more  than  50  vehicles)  (BAG,  2014).    The  enforcement 
authority reports that the mandatory checks take place and penalties are imposed, but 
they  would  always  prefer  to  carry  out  even  more  checks.  The  ministry  reports  that 
previously  there  was  only  a  risk  rating  system  at  the  regional  level,  whereas  now  it 
operates country-wide thanks to Regulation 1071/2009. 

The  UK’s  Driver  and  Vehicle  Standards  Agency  has  had  a  system  known  as  OCRS 
(Operator Compliance Risk Score) since 2006 which was refined in 2012 to improve its 
predictive ability. The OCRS goes beyond the minimum requirements of the legislation 
by integrating information on roadworthiness infringements, which are correlated with 
other infringements (SDG, 2013a). 

The  respondent  from  Denmark  indicated  that  all  new  applicants  for  a  licence  to 
operate were checked for financial standing, professional competence, debt and stable 
establishment.  Checks of good repute are only conducted if the police have reported a 
problem or there is any other indication that there might be a problem.  Infringements 
in  the  system  are  registered  for  5  years  and  comprise  the  infringements  that  are 
detected by the police during roadside checks.  The Danish authority typically checks 
all  new  applicants  as  well  as  around  250  additional  ones.  These  additional  firms  are 
selected on the basis of the risk rating system. The Danish authority considered that 
the risk-rating system works well - it has been in place for around 20 years but it has 
constantly been updated and improved.   

The Romanian authority reported that they have a risk rating system to target checks 
of infringements reflecting all offences in road transport for each transport company.  
They  reported  that  if  a  company  opens  a  branch,  checks  are  done  on  its  stable  and 
effective establishment, and they considered this to be an effective system. 

In  the  Netherlands,  the  Dutch  Road  Haulage  Organisation  for  National  and 
International Transport has developed a method to detect transport operators that are 
in risk of no longer fulfilling the requirement of financial standing. Transport operators 
that  are  at  risk  will  be  closely  monitored.  In  the  event  a  that  a  high  risk  transport 
operator  is  not  able  to  satisfy  the  requirement  of  financial  standing  within  the  given 
timeframe as laid down in Article 13 of Regulation 1071/2009, the Community license 
will  be  withdrawn.  With  this  method,  transport  operators  are  obliged  to  satisfy  the 
requirement of financial standing during the whole period of validity of the Community 
license and not only during the application period. According to the Dutch enforcement 
authority  questioned  for  this  study,  the  result  of  this  method  is  that  only  financially 
stable  transport  operators  will  keep  their  Community  license.    The  Dutch  enforcers 
also report that risk rating applies to professional competence. 

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The Finnish enforcement authority explained that the risk rating system in Finland is 
linked to checks of good repute. Systematic checking of good repute concerning all the 
relevant  persons  is  considered  to  be  a  demanding  task,  which  is  precisely  why  risk 
rating is needed.   

The Irish system targets undertakings that are deemed high risk or have come to the 
attention of the competent authority  (European Commission, 2014a). The monitoring 
report indicated that good repute is checked by vetting the transport manager and any 
other relevant person with the National Vetting Service provided by the National Police 
Force. This vetting service provides the competent authority with a list of convictions 
that  can  be  used  to  determine  good  repute  (European  Commission,  2014a).    During 
the 5-year period of validity of an operator’s licence, there will  ordinarily be no  need 
for an operator to furnish additional information to the licensing authority. This would 
only  happen  when  the  authority  has detected  a risk  in  respect  of  that  operator (ICF, 
2014). 

Specifically  concerning  checks  of  stable  and  effective  establishment,  several 
enforcement authorities (as described below), commented on the demanding nature of 
the checks: 

  A Bulgarian enforcement authority interviewed for this study commented that 

“there is a problem of administrative capacity, and thus it is difficult to perform 
checks of stable and effective establishment”.   

  The German authorities reported that current enforcement capacities are often 
insufficient to thoroughly verify whether an establishment is really stable.     

  The Finnish ministry commented that “It is nearly impossible to monitor 

effectively all the establishments of approx. 15,000 road transport 
undertakings in Finland. This is largely due to lack of resources.”   

  The respondent from the Netherlands pointed out that checks of establishment 

take more effort compared to regular checks. 

9.3.2.  Implementation  of  administrative  procedures  to  determine  whether 
the loss of good repute would be disproportionate 

Table  9-5  provides  an  overview  of  the  administrative  procedures  in  place  in  selected 
Member  States,  for  the  purposes  of  determining  whether  the  loss  of  good  repute 
would be disproportionate.   

Table  9-5:  Overview  of  procedures  in  place  for  determining  whether  loss  of 
good repute would be disproportionate 

Member State 

Details of procedure 

Austria 

Belgium 

Denmark 

Finland 

France 

Germany 

No data 

No data 

Assessment on a case-by case basis according to section 12 of “lov om 
godskørsel” or section 14 of “lov om buskørsel”. 
Written warnings, loss of good repute (declarations of unfitness of 
transport managers) and other sanctions such as information on those 
undertakings, which are classed as posing an increased risk, are 
registered in Vallu, which is the Finnish national register of road transport 
undertakings.  
Detailed procedures in place – see below 

The question of the assessment of disproportionality is carried out by 
means of an individual examination.  In Annex IV to Regulation 
1071/2009, a means of interpretation is given to the most serious 
violations 

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Member State 

Details of procedure 

Ireland 

No data 

Luxembourg 

No data 

Sweden 

UK 

Italy 

Estonia 

Poland  

Assessments are made primarily on the basis of internal policies and 
existing practices, in accordance with the EU-regulations. 
The Senior Traffic Commissioner Statutory Document provides guidance.   

No data 

Detailed procedures in place – see below 

No data 

Slovak Republic 

the information could be found on the Electronic register of Undertakings  

Bulgaria 

Croatia 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

We do not have specific rules of procedure in such cases. 

No data 

 Cabinet Regulation of 21 February 2012 No121 The Procedures for the 
Issue, Withdrawn and Temporary Suspension of Special Authorisations 
(Licences) and Licence Cards in Relation to Road Transport Vehicles for 
Commercial Carriage and the Issue of Professional Competence 
Certificates for Road Transport Operations Managers" " 
No additional requirements. 

Cyprus 

Chief of Cyprus Police  

Czech republic 

§ 35a of the road transport act 

Source: Survey of ministries 

Estonia has set out detailed procedures based on concrete indicators to determine the 
most  proportionate  response.    The  competent  authority  (MKM)  notifies  the 
undertaking  that  an  administrative  procedure  has  been  initiated  for  determining 
whether  a  loss  of  good  repute  of  that  transport  undertaking  would  constitute  a 
disproportionate  response.    The  transport  undertaking  has  a  right  to  present 
explanations concerning the infringement and to submit an overview of the measures 
taken by the undertaking itself to avoid infringements in future. The explanations will 
be examined by the Road Transport Commission (consisting of nine members from the 
MKM,  Police  Board,  Labour  Inspectorate,  Road  Administration  as  well  as  from 
organisations  of  transport  undertakings).    The  appropriate  proposals  available  to  the 
Road Transport Commission are defined according to the number of penalties for most 
serious infringements that the undertaking has received in the last 12 months and the 
total  number  of  certified  true  copies  of  the  Community  licence  (i.e.,  the  number  of 
vehicles)  that  the  transport  undertaking  holds,  which  are  multiplied  together  to  form 
an index.  

In  France,  the  procedure  applied  by  the  competent  authority  is  that  the  regional 
prefect  convenes  a  regional  commission  for  administrative  sanctions  consisting  of 
representatives of trucking companies (employers' organisations) and truck drivers of 
representatives (unions). The person concerned may orally present his defence and to 
be assisted by a lawyer. After the hearings a decision is made, and this decision may 
be  further  appealed  to  the  administrative  court.  It  can  also  be  the  subject  of  a 
disciplinary complaint to the Minister of Transport who will decide the meeting of the 
National  Commission  for  administrative  penalties,  consultative  body,  which  was  also 
attended by representatives of trucking companies and truck drivers and during which 
the person involved can again  

In  addition,  Italy  reported  in  2014  that  it  is  in  the  process  of  drawing  up  procedural 
measures to decide whether the loss of good repute would be disproportionate to the 
infringement committed (European Commission, 2014a). 

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9.3.3.  Typology  and  level  of  sanctions  applied  in  Member  States  for 
infringements of the Road Transport Package 

Table  9-6  shows  the  type  of  sanctions  (administrative  and/or  criminal)  applied  by 
Member States for infringements of the Road Transport Package.   

Table  9-6:  Member  State  sanctions  of  infringements  of  the  Road  Transport 
Package 

Member 
State 

Austria 

Administrative 
sanctions 

Criminal sanctions 

   

Mainly 

 

In case of recidivism. In some cases such as transport of 
dangerous goods the penalty reaches €50,000  and 
therefore should be qualified as criminal in nature 

Belgium 

  

 

The sanctions for infringements of EU rules are all 
possibly criminal in nature 

Bulgaria 

Cyprus 

Czech 
Republic 

 

 

  

Mainly 

 

 

  

Some - administrative sanctions could be qualified as 
criminal ones for most of the very serious and most 
serious infringements of EU law. 

Denmark 

Estonia 

 

 

 

 

Very serious and most serious infringements are 
sanctioned with criminal sanctions 

Finland 

France 

Germany 

Greece 

Hungary 

Ireland 

Italy 

  

Some 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Latvia 

  

Mainly 

Luxembourg    

Poland 

Some 

  

Mainly 

  

Mainly  

 

  

 

For very serious infringements, only tachograph frauds 
are sanctioned with criminal sanction 

 

 

Administrative sanctions that could be classified as 
substantially criminal are only applicable to some of the 
most serious infringements such as driving without a 
community licence and transport of dangerous goods 

  

Only two infringements 

 

  

Some most serious infringements are not sanctioned with 
criminal sanctions but with administrative ones. 

Portugal 

 

 

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Member 
State 

Romania 

Slovakia 

Slovenia 

Spain 

Administrative 
sanctions 

Criminal sanctions 

  

  

Mainly 

 

 

  

Only two infringements 

  

Some 

  

Only one infringement 

 

Administrative sanctions which should qualify as criminal 
are applicable in case of recurrence of the most serious 
and very serious infringements 

Sweden 

 

  

Only two infringements 

Netherlands   

UK 

  

Some 

 

  

Mainly 

Notes:  Administrative  infringements  are  those  that  are  defined  as  such  in  administrative 
regulations. Criminal are those that are defined as such in the special part of the criminal code 
and/or in special statutes/acts 
Source: (Grimaldi, 2013a). 

The dissuasive effect of sanctions differs enormously across those Member States that 
have  qualified  infringements  of  commercial  road  transport  as  criminal  offence.    For 
example,  the  sanctions  of  the  most  serious  infringement  “exceeding,  during  a  daily 
working  period,  the  maximum  daily  driving  time  limit  by  a  margin  of  50%  or  more 
without taking a break or without an uninterrupted rest period of at least 4,5 hours” is 
punished as follows (Grimaldi, 2013a).: 

  Luxembourg  -  imprisonment  from  8  days  to  5  years  and  or  a  fine  of  €251  to 

€25,000.  

  Malta - the criminal sanction would amount to a fine of €58. 

Turning  now  to  the  level  of  the  penalties  in  place,  infringements  categorised  at  the 
same level may attract vastly different fines with ten-fold differences reported in some 
areas.    For  instance,  the  first  infringement  qualified  as  most  serious  in  Annex  IV  of 
Regulation  1071/2009  is  “exceeding  the  maximum  6-day  or  fortnightly  driving  time 
limits  by  margins  of  25%  or  more”.    This  is  sanctioned  differently  across  the  EU,  for 
example (Grimaldi, 2013a):  

  Germany - a fine of up to €15,000;  

 

Italy - a fine from €400 to €1,600;  

  Latvia - a fine of up to €300. 

As another example, again referring to most serious infringements listed in Annex IV 
of  Regulation  “transporting  dangerous  goods  that  are  prohibited  for  transport  (A)  or 
transporting  such  goods  in  a  prohibited  or  non-approved  means  of  containment  or 
without identifying them on the vehicle as dangerous goods, thus endangering lives or 
the environment to such extent that it leads to a decision to immobilise the vehicle” is 
sanctioned variously as follows (Grimaldi, 2013a).:  

  Austria – a monetary penalty of up to €50,000;  

  Greece with a monetary penalty of approximately €150. 

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The Grimaldi (2013a) study was very extensive and it would not have been possible to 
repeat the study and verify that all the findings are still up-to-date currently.  To see if 
anything substantial had changed from the above, legal experts from the study team 
analysed the situation in the case study countries (see Annex C, case studies for more 
details).  Fines  were  confirmed  to  be  tailored  to  the  seriousness  of  the  offences  in 
Spain, Romania and Germany, although the levels of fines imposed are different.  The 
most serious infringements are fined €1,001-6,000 in Spain, €2,040-2,720 in Romania 
and  up  to  €200,000  in  Germany.    Serious  infringements  are  fined  at  €401-1,000  in 
Spain,  €910-1,360  in  Romania  and  up  to  €100,000  in  Germany77.  The  German 
authorities commented in interviews conducted for this study that the fines indicated 
were the absolute maximum,  and are in practice only charged in court rulings in case 
of repetitive infringements.  Both the Spanish and Romanian ministries commented in 
their  survey  responses  that  they  felt  the  categorisation  of  infringements  in  Article  IV 
was  both  clear  and  appropriate.    The  Romanian  enforcement  authorities  commented 
during  interview  that  they  felt  the  penalty  system  should  be  improved.  In  Romania 
one  a  check  is  carried  out,  fines  cannot  be  more  than  double  of  the  most  serious 
infringement detected. If three fines are applied, they are summed up but their total 
cannot  be  more  than  the  double  of  the  fine  for  the  most  serious  infringement 
detected. 

Concerning the other case study countries, in Denmark, the Road Traffic Act No. 1386 
(Bekendtgørelse af færdselsloven) as reviewed by the legal experts, does not seem to 
provide for differentiated fines in line with Annex IV.  According to Grimaldi (2013a), 
the specific level of fines imposed for infringements of Regulation 1071/2009 are not 
regulated  by  law  or  administrative  regulations  in  Denmark,  but  based  on  case  law, 
with  recommended  levels  of  DKK  400-4,000  (€53-530)  depending  of  the  offence, 
rising to DKK 10,000-25,000 (€1,340-3,350) under aggravating circumstances (i.e. if 
the violation occurs over a longer period such as 3-6 months).  

Regulation 1071/2009 was implemented into Polish law through the Road Haulage Act, 
where according to Grimaldi (2013a), the Act does not contain any provisions referring 
to loss of good repute in case of committing the most serious infringements, described 
in  Annex  IV  to  Regulation  No  1071/2009.    The  review  for  this  study  showered  that 
penalties  are  defined  in  the  Act  and  range  from  500PLN  (€118)  for  failing  to  meet 
administrative  demands  (e.g.  to  show  certificates  of  professional  competence  within 
14 days) up to 8,000PLN (€1,888) for carrying out road transport operations without 
the  required  authorisations  to  pursue the  occupation,  although  it  was  not  possible  to 
verify  this  information  with  Polish  stakeholders.  The  Polish  enforcers  interviewed  for 
this  study  considered  the  level  of  sanctions  to  be  a  political  issue  and  could  not 
comment on their effectiveness or whether they were proportionate. 

The  Dutch ministry  commented  that  “Discretionary flexibility  given to  Member States 
(based  on  the  principle  of  subsidiarity)  contributes  to  inequality  and  has  negative 
impact  on  harmonisation”.  The  Irish  enforcers  replied  that  there  are  different 
enforcement  approaches  between  countries  and  different  interpretation  of  breaches.  
The French authorities felt that the problem is the fact that each Member State has its 
own system and information is not shared. The respondent to the survey of ministries 
from  Bulgaria  urged  the  completion  and  adoption  of  the  list  of  categories,  types  and 
degrees  of  seriousness  of  offences 
in  the 
implementation.    The  Finnish  authority  also  called  for  EU  action  to  ensure 
harmonisation of seriousness of infringements and sanctions, and the respondent from 
Slovakia felt the current list in Annex IV is not sufficient.  The German ministry noted 
that the levels of infringements are confusing and lead to inconsistent application.  

in  order  to  achieve  uniformity 

77 On a PPP basis: for most serious infringements approx. €1,650-9,850 in Spain, €5,700-7,600 
in Romania and up to €282,400 in Germany. For serious infringements approx. €650-1,650 
in Spain, €2,550-3,800 in Romania and up to €141,200 in Germany 

225 

 
 
                                          
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

9.3.4.  Staff involved in checks of cabotage 

Concerning  the  lack  of  manpower,  details  were  gathered  through  stakeholder 
interviews carried out for this study, indicating a range of staffing levels and degrees 
of satisfaction 

  According to the Bulgarian authority, there are 480 staff responsible for 

carrying out checks concerning Regulation 1072/2009.  In their view, this is not 
enough but it is not possible to increase this number due to a lack of financial 
resources.  

  The Latvian enforcement authority reported that they need more staff but don't 
have the budget, which was cut following the economic crises. They report that 
this year the number of inspectors have been increased (10 more inspectors, 
up to 28) but it is still not enough. 

  A Swedish trade union interviewed for this study reported a lack of police 

resources and claimed that the police stick to easy checks to meet the legal 
target.  According to a recent study, there are 450 officers in Sweden of which 
only 160 have specialist knowledge (Sternberg et al, 2015).   

  The Irish authority reports that they are under resourced, with only 11 staff, 

and this contributes to the poor effectiveness of checks.  The 11 staff are also 
responsible for checks of drivers hours & tachograph regulations; mobile 
workers working time directive; drivers CPC.  The Garda Síochána share 
responsibility for checks. 

  The Dutch authority commented that it would be better to have more staff.  

They reported that 5 full-time equivalent staff were added (total is unknown) 
as additional staff dedicated to the enforcement of the cabotage rules. Next to 
that, police officers from the National Police contribute to enforcement. The 
National Police is going through a reorganisation and is reorienting on tasks, 
therefore the exact number is not yet known. 

  The Spanish ministry estimated in their survey response that Spain employs 
400 traffic agents and 150 employees of the administrative organs of the 
regions that carry out checks on cabotage and reports that the number of staff 
makes some contribution to enforcement difficulties. The Traffic Civil Guard 
have reported a significant increase in vehicle being detected with irregularities 
concerning cabotage, which has motivated plans for increased controls in 2015 
(Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport, 2015c).   

  The Romanian enforcers estimate that there are around 317 enforcers and that 

staffing levels are a significant concern. 

Table  9-7  shows  the  information  on  the  level  of  staffing  that  could  be  collected  from 
enforcers  in  the  survey,  alongside  their  judgement  on  whether  staffing  levels  are 
adequate and the size of the cabotage market.  It shows that there is no clear trend 
concerning any optimum size of staff, either in absolute terms or relative to the size of 
the  cabotage  market.    For  example,  the  UK  has  a  similar  ratio  of  staff  to  cabotage 
market  size  as  Sweden  and  Spain,  whereas  Bulgaria  has  the  highest  ratio  of  staff  to 
cabotage market size. 

Table  9-7:  Level  of  staffing  in  selected  Member  States  and  ratio  of  staff  to 
size of cabotage market 

Member 
State 

Cabotage  t-km 
in 2013 

SE 

1,240,880  

Number 
Time 
(FTE) staff 

of 

Full 
Equivalent 

Approx  ratio  of  staff 
per  100,000 
t-km 
cabotage 

Are  staffing  levels 
considered 
adequate? 

450 
in 
officers 
Sweden  of  which  only 

226 

36 

No 

 
 
 
                          
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Member 
State 

Cabotage  t-km 
in 2013 

Number 
Time 
(FTE) staff 

of 

Full 
Equivalent 

Approx  ratio  of  staff 
per  100,000 
t-km 
cabotage 

Are  staffing  levels 
considered 
adequate? 

160  have  specialist 
knowledge 

400 traffic agents and 
150  employees  of  the 
administrative  organs 
of the regions  

962,136  

18,766  

480 

4,743  

3,251  

28 

11 

500  dedicated  control 
officers  in  France,  are 
supported 
their 
activities  by  other 
forces  totalling  more 
than 7,000 people  

in 

7,360,496  

68,024  

400 

ES 

BG 

LV 

IE 

FR 

PL 

UK  

1,056,109  

300 

Source: Survey of enforcement authorities 

42 

2,558 

590 

338 

7  (95) 

588 

28 

No 

No 

No 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

227 

 
 
                              
                                
                                   
                                   
                          
                                
                          
 
 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

9.4.  Effectiveness:  To  what  extent  are 
administrative cooperation effective?  

the  measures  on 

This  section  provides  additional  details  on  the  content  and  development  of  national 
electronic registers and their interconnection.   

The  introduction  of  electronic  registers  was  intended  to  modernise  the  rules,  in  line 
with  the  Action  Programme  for  Reducing  Administrative  Burdens  in  the  European 
Union  (EESC,  2008).  The  European  TUNER  (Transport  UNdertakings  Electronic 
Register) project identified that each Member State had some kind of existing register 
of  road  Transport  Undertakings,  although  they  varied  greatly  in  terms  of  their 
technical  architecture,  the  data  they  held  and  the  users  and  processes  they  support 
(Wilson et al, 2009).   Article 16(2) of the Regulation therefore defined the elements 
that  should  be  included  in  national  electronic  registers.      Regulation  1072/2009  also 
requires  certain  information  to  be  entered  into  the  databases.    As  well  as  basic 
information  such  as  the  name  and  address  of  the  operator,  data  should  be  held  on 
serious infringements and penalties that have resulted in a conviction in the last two 
years.  The  types  of  convictions  and  penalties  that  must  be  held  in  the  register  are 
listed in the Regulation.   

The national registers were intended to be interconnected from 31 December 2012, as 
laid down in Article 16(5) of Regulation 1071/2009.  The linked-up database is known 
as the European Register of Road transport Undertakings (ERRU).  ERRU is intended to 
allow for better information exchange between Member States, so that the competent 
authorities can better monitor the compliance of road transport undertakings with the 
rules  in  force.    The  ERRU  system  provides  a  means  to  interconnect  the  national 
registries  through  the  exchange  of  structured  (XML)  messages  to  a  central  hub. 
Member  states  can  chose  to  exchange  XML  messages  via  a  central  hub  or  peer-to-
peer.   

A first decision on the format of the national electronic registers was adopted in 2009 
on minimum requirements for the data to be entered in the national electronic register 
of  road  transport  undertakings  (2009/992/EU).    Regulation  1213/2010  establishes 
common  rules  concerning  the  interconnection  of  national  electronic  registers  on  road 
transport  undertakings.    The  Regulation  defines  the  format  of  the  national  electronic 
registers in terms of minimum requirements for the data to be entered.   

To  understand 
in  more  detail  what  the  difficulties  involved  in  establishing 
interconnection were, national ministries in all Member States were invited to describe 
any issues they faced. The reasons for delays in interconnection given mainly related 
to technical issues as follows: 

  The performance of the system is still is not sufficient yet (response times are 

too long) (Austria); 

  Due to delays in terms of the conception of the system and functioning of the 

ERRU on the national level (Poland); 

  Delays from the Commission on the classification of offences provided for in 

Article 6, as well as the extensive preparatory work was needed.  This included 
the need to create the national electronic register, to create records for 
managers who previously did not exist in the ministry’s system; initial 
problems regarding the definition of process management services relating to 
offenses (Italy); 

  The German authorities noted that there were some problems with ERRU in the 

beginning, but these have now been resolved. 

228 

 
 
 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

9.5.  Effectiveness:  To  what  extent  have  the  Regulations  contributed 
to the smooth functioning of the internal market for road transport?  

9.5.1.  Interpretation of specific cabotage provisions 

Table  9-8  shows  the  interpretations  of  key  cabotage  provisions  in  selected  Member 
States,  based  on  the  responses  of  ministries  to  the  survey  and  during  interviews. 

229 

 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Table 9-8: Interpretation of specific cabotage provisions in selected Member States 

Germany 

Denmark 

Romania 

Netherlands 

Belgium 

Poland  

Ireland 

Bulgaria 

Latvia 

Multi-drops: how to 
count the number of 
operations when 
there are several 
loading and 
unloading points 

EC guidelines are: A 
cabotage operation 
can involve several 
loading points, 
several delivery 
points or even 
several loading and 
delivery points, as 
the case may be 

load, 

To  what 
degree 
does  a  vehicle  have 
to  be  loaded  when 
entering  a  country 
full 
(partial 
pallets 
load, 
enough) 
to  carry 
out  cabotage?  To 
what  degree  does  a 
vehicle  have  to  be 
unloaded? 

EC  guidelines  are: 
All  goods  carried  in 
the  course  of  the 
transport 
incoming 
must  have  been 
delivered 

the 

Is 
CMR 
obligatory  or  are 
documents 
other 
valid as well? 

EC  guidelines  are: 

One cabotage 
operation can 
have more 
loading and/or 
unloading 
points, as long 
as everything 
is one single 
freight 
contract  

Otherwise 
each loading 
point or each 
client counts 
as one 
operation 

Cabotage 
starts 
in 
Germany  only 
after 
the 
complete 
unloading 
the vehicle 

of 

No information  Follows EC 
guidelines: 

One cabotage 
operation can 
have multiple 
drop-off OR 
multiple 
loading points 
(but not both) 

1 cabotage 
operation can 
include several 
loadings and 
unloadings but 
these must be 
for the same 
sender and 
receiver. 

If part loads 
are for the 
same 
customer – 
than it is one 
operation, if 
they are for 
certain 
number of 
customers, 
than it should 
be counted as 
separate 
cabotage 
operations. 

This 
interpretation 
is  a  problem, 
the  Regulation 
is not clear 

Partial 
loading/ 
unloading 
is 
not counted as  

No information 

level  of 

No 
load defined 

There  are  no 
specifications 
accordingly 

Any  loading  is 
a cabotage 

level  of 

No 
loads are set 

There  are  no 
criteria 
concerning  the 
level of load 

specific 
No 
criteria: 
the 
vehicle  should 
be 
loaded 
before 
entering 
in 
Latvia  but  the 
level  of 
load 
has  not  been 
discussed 

International 
transport  that 
enters 
a 
country can be 
empty,  partial 
or full loads 

a 

Only 
considered 
when 
transport 
is 
operation 
out 
carried 
from 
its 
beginning  until 
its 
in 
end 
Romania. 
Operation  has 
to  be  unique,- 
partial 
operations  are 
not counted as 
cabotage 

The 
documents 
that  can  be 
used 
for 
proving 

An  according 
consignment 
note  (or  any 
other 
documents 

CMR document 
is  compulsory 
and  it  is  on 
this  basis  that 
cabotage 

CMR  is  legally 
required 

is 

CMR 
obligatory. 
There  are  no 
other 
documents. 

is  valid 

CMR 
for 
international 
transport only 

CMR 
obligatory 

is 

The  CMR 
is 
obligatory.  No 
other 
documents  are 
valid 

230 

is  not 
for 

CMR 
obligatory 
transport 
companies, 
but 

they 

 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Germany 

Denmark 

Romania 

Netherlands 

Belgium 

Poland  

Ireland 

Bulgaria 

Latvia 

additional 
No 
document 
[other 
than  the  CMR]  is 
required  in  order  to 
prove 
the 
cabotage  rules  have 
been respected78. 

that 

cabotage  are 
line  with 
in 
what 
is 
allowed  in  Reg 
1072  -  there 
are 
no 
additional 
requirements 

that 
prove 
cabotage  -  as 
set  out  in  the 
- 
Regulation 
there 
is  not 
any  additional 
requirement 

operations  are 
checked. 

No information 

it  suffices  to 
leave Romania 

it  is  sufficient 
they  have 
if 
the 
left 
country 
for 
any 
other 
territory 

it  is  sufficient 
they  have 
if 
left 
the 
country 

It  is  sufficient, 
if  they  left  the 
country 

It  is  sufficient 
they  have 
if 
left 
the 
country  to  any 
other country 

They  have  to 
return  to  their 
own country 

Is  it  necessary  for 
vehicles to return to 
their 
‘home’ 
territory  first  before 
re-entering  with  a 
new  load  or  is  it 
they 
if 
sufficient 
have 
the 
left 
country to any other 
territory? 

the 

do 
to 
home 
can 

Vehicles 
not  need 
return 
and 
immediately 
re-enter 
German 
territory  with 
an 
international 
load  in  order 
to  be  allowed 
to  carry  out 
new  cabotage 
operations 
- 
they only need 
to  cross 
the 
border. 

usually  use  it. 
They  may  use 
other 
documents 
proving 
same 
information 

the 

No information 

How  is  transport  of 
empty 
pallets/containers 
counted? 

The  operation 
must  be  an 
"economic 
activity" 
international 
shipping 
documents 
provide a good 

- 

of 

Transport 
empty 
containers  and 
empty  returns 
does  not  give 
access 
to 
legally perform 
cabotage 

If  pallets  are 
in 
described 
the 
CMR 
document they 
count 
a 
transport 
operation, 
otherwise  the 

as 

no 
special 
rules,  it  is  a 
transport 
operation 
well 

as 

Is  considered 
as 
also 
cabotage 

As  any  other 
commodity 

Transport 
of 
empty  pallets 
is  a  transport 
operation 

of 

Transport 
empty 
containers  are 
not cabotage 

No information 

78 This provision, however, does not mean that control authorities cannot use other evidence required by road transport legislation e.g. the tachograph data, to 

establish whether a cabotage operation is carried out according to the rules. 

231 

 
 
 
                                          
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Germany 

Denmark 

Romania 

Netherlands 

Belgium 

Poland  

Ireland 

Bulgaria 

Latvia 

is 

vehicle 
considered 
empty. 

indication 
for 
that;  there  is 
however 
no 
threshold/guid
elines  on  how 
full  the  truck 
has 
be 
to 
loaded. 

operations, 
if 
the  carriage  of 
the 
empty 
containers  and 
return 
packaging 
is 
not  considered 
an 
actual 
carriage 

Source: Stakeholder interviews with national transport ministries and/or enforcers 

232 

 
 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

9.5.2.  Requirements for stable and effective establishment  

Table  9-9  shows  the  requirements  for  stable  and  effective  establishment  in  selected 
Member States, as reported in survey responses for this study. 

Table  9-9:  Requirements  for  stable  and  effective  establishment  in  selected 
Member States 

Other 

Details 

Member 
States 

Implemented as 
per Regulation 

Requirement 
for a parking 
space 

Austria 

Belgium 

Yes 

Other 
requirements 

Bulgaria 

Croatia 

Cyprus 

Czech 
Republic 

Denmark 

Estonia 

Finland 

France 

Germany 

Ireland 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

Luxembou
rg 

Other 
requirements 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Other 
requirements 

Yes 

Yes 

Other 
requirements 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Poland 

Slovakia 

Other 
requirements 

Other 
requirements 

Sweden 

Yes 

UK 

Other 
requirements 

No 

No 

Yes 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

Yes 

No 

No 

No 

No 

Yes 

No 

Yes 

Requirement 
to own 
certain 
property 
No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

Yes 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

Yes 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

Yes 

No 

No 

Yes 

No 

No 

Yes 

Italy 

Yes 

No 

No 

No 

233 

The Belgian legislation 
also stipulates that the 
CMR Consignment notes 
must be available  
Requirement for parking 
space 

Undertaking must be 
registered in Finnish 
Trade Register and its 
municipality of residence 
must be in Finland.  

Requirement for parking 
space 

The establishment has to 
be appropriate to the size 
of the company; the 
manager has to be 
present on a regular 
basis;  the existence of a 
parking space is checked; 
however it is not a legal 
requirement 
Additional definition of 
what constitutes an 
operating centre 
Requirement for parking 
space 

Licence holders 
(undertakings) must 
provide a self declaration 
that either they 
themselves own the 
premises they intend to 
use as an operating 
centre or have permission 
from the site owner.   

 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Member 
States 

Implemented as 
per Regulation 

Requirement 
for a parking 
space 

Romania 

Spain 

Other 
requirements 

Other 
requirements 

No 

No 

Requirement 
to own 
certain 
property 
No 

No 

Other 

Details 

No 

No 

Spanish legislation 
requires undertakings to 
have any type of 
premises (a private 
domicile may suffice) as 
long as they keep all 
relevant documentation 
there and have the 
appropriate technical 
equipment (e.g. a 
computer).   

Source: survey of national transport ministries  

9.5.3.  Options  permitted  to  demonstrate  financial  standing  in  selected 
Member States 

The  minimum  requirements  for  financial  standing  are  that  an  undertaking  must 
demonstrate  every  year,  that  it  has  at  its  disposal  capital  and  reserves  totalling  at 
least  EUR  9 000  when  only  one  vehicle  is  used  and  EUR 5 000  for  each  additional 
vehicle  used.    This  may  be  demonstrated  on  the  basis  of  certified  annual  accounts.  
Member  States  may  also  permit  undertakings  to  demonstrate  this  level  of  financial 
standing by way of a bank guarantee (allowed in 18 Member States) or an insurance 
(8 Member States).  

Table  9-10:  Options  that  operators  are  allowed  to  use  to  demonstrate 
financial standing 

Certified 
annual 
accounts 

Bank 
guarantee 

Professional 
insurance 

Other details 

Austria 

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Croatia 

Allowed 

Allowed 

Allowed 

Allowed 

Allowed 

Not allowed 

Allowed 

Allowed 

Allowed 

Allowed 

Allowed 

Allowed 

Czech republic 

Allowed 

Allowed 

Allowed 

Denmark 

Allowed 

Allowed 

Allowed 

Estonia 

Finland 

Allowed 

Allowed 

Allowed 

Allowed 

Allowed 

Not allowed 

France 

Allowed 

Allowed 

Not allowed 

Germany 

Ireland 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

Allowed 

Allowed 

Allowed 

Allowed 

Allowed 

Not allowed 

Allowed 

Allowed 

Allowed 

Allowed 

Not allowed 

Not allowed 

Luxembourg 

Not allowed 

Allowed 

Not allowed 

234 

Bank deposit as a security, closed 
account 

The  financial  guarantee  is  capped 
in  French  regulations,  half  of  the 
required financial capacity.  

We accept a certified statement of 
affairs for a new business 

Currently LU is evaluating whether 
the  financial  standing  could  also 
be  demonstrated  by  certified 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Certified 
annual 
accounts 

Bank 
guarantee 

Professional 
insurance 

Other details 

Poland  

Allowed 

Allowed 

Allowed 

Slovak Republic 

Allowed 

Allowed 

Not allowed 

Sweden 

Allowed 

Allowed 

Allowed 

UK 

Italy 

Allowed 

Allowed 

Not allowed 

Allowed 

Allowed 

Allowed 

annual  accounts.  No  decision  has 
been taken yet. 

Establishment 
foundation  carter;  record 
business register 

contract, 
from 

Surety by insurance companies or 
other  financial  companies,  duly 
authorised by the Bank of Italy. 

Source: Survey of ministries 

9.5.4.  Professional examinations in selected Member States 

An overview of requirements in some Member States for professional examinations is 
shown in Table 9-11, highlighting the differences.   

Table  9-11:  Overview  of  requirements  for  professional  examinations  in 
selected Member States 

Slovakia  Hungary  Sweden 

Ireland 

Czech 
Republic 

  
< 1 hour 

> 2 
hours 

- 

> 2 
hours 

 

 

 

 

- 

- 

 

 

b 

 

 

 

2.5 hours 

2.25 
hours 

- 

2 hours 

2.5 hours 

- 

 

- 

 

a 

 

> 2 
hours 

- 

> 2 
hours 

 

 

 

Mandatory oral exam 

Length 
of 
written 
exam 

Multiple choice 

Open ended 

Exercises or case 
studies 

Training prior to the exam 

Exemption granted – education 
qualifications 

Exemption granted – continuously 
managing a road undertaking for a 
period of 10 years prior to 4 Dec 
2009 

Source:  (Hvizdáková,  2012)  and  updated  with  stakeholder  responses  for  the  study  (the  Irish 
respondent indicated that preparatory training was required prior to the exam) 

Notes: a) only for persons to passed the exam in Institute of Road Transport Engineers 

b)  Only  for  persons  who  provide  proof  that  they  have  continuously  managed  a  road 
undertaking, but only in Hungary 

Preparatory training in  mandatory only in some Member States, and furthermore the 
duration  varies.    For  example,  the  duration  of  preparatory  training  is  108  hours  in 
Denmark,  76  hours  in  Estonia  and  110  hours  in  Ireland.    In  Belgium,  it  is  only 
obligatory to attend the course (duration 115 hours) if the applicant fails the exam.   

Table 9-12 shows that the pass rate varies widely between Member States.   

Table 9-12: Total applicants and pass rates in selected Member States 

Total applicants (2013) 

Pass rate in 2013 (%) 

235 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Total applicants (2013) 

Pass rate in 2013 (%) 

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Croatia 

Cyprus 

692 

2,518 

1,045 

121 

44% 

35% 

91% 

54% 

Denmark 

183 in 2013; 202 in 2014 

80% in 2013; 87% in 2014 

Estonia 

Finland 

France 

Germany 

Ireland 

Lithuania 

Poland  

Sweden 

UK 

420 

No data 

1,846 

3,063 (road transport) 

461 

3,038 

5,971 

1,218 

9,600 

96% 

Goods transport: 83%, (year 2014) 

39% 

51% 

85% 

46% 

56% 

61% 

60% 

Source:  Stakeholder  consultation  –  survey  of  national  transport  ministries  and  enforcement 
authorities 

Figure  9-2  shows  that  there  are  no  clear  relationships  between  the  number  of 
applicants relative to the national transport market (million t-km) and the pass rate in 
that country.   

Figure 9-2: Applicants per million t-km versus the pass rate 

Table  9-13  shows  the  conditions  under  which  exemptions  are  granted  in  selected 
Member States.   

Table  9-13:  Summary  of  exemptions  permitted  in  a  selection  of  Member 
States 

Previous qualifications 

Persons who have 
continuously managed a 
road haulage undertaking 
for a certain period of 
time 

Number of 
exemptions 
granted 

236 

 
 
 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Previous qualifications 

Persons who have 
continuously managed a 
road haulage undertaking 
for a certain period of 
time 

Number of 
exemptions 
granted 

Austria 

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Croatia 

Cyprus 

Czech 
republic 

Denmark 

Estonia 

Finland 

Several  qualifications  are  granted 
by law. 

is  exempted 

Several  awarded.  For  example  a 
person  holding  the  Master  of  Laws 
the 
degree 
following  subjects  in  annex  I  of 
Regulation 
civil, 
commercial,  social  and  fiscal  law 
(A, B, C and D). 

1071/2009: 

from 

for 

Persons who have an IRU Academy 
professional 
diploma 
issued 
competence  which  were 
between 
and 
29.07.2010 

19.11.2002 

Pursuant  to  Article  21  (2)  of  the 
Regulation  (A  certificate 
issued 
before 4  December 2011) 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The transport manager is 
exempted from the training course 
and examinations in case the 
person holds a university diploma 
or a diploma of an institution of 
professional higher education in a 
specialisation in a relevant area 

The transport manager is 
exempted in case the person 
certifies that they have 
continuously managed a 
transport undertaking over a 
term of ten year preceding 4 
December 2009. 

Finnish Transport Safety Agency can grant an exemption (straight to 
written examination without the four weeks study program), to a 
person, who holds higher education qualification in e.g. business, 
administration, technical education or logistics and has worked in 
these tasks for at least one year. 

France 

Applicants can be exempted from 
the written examination if they 
hold certain diplomas 

Recognition of professional 
experience is still in place but 
expected to be repealed 
eventually. 

Provided they have managed a 
company continuously for 10 
years 

Provided they have commenced 
training before 4 November 2011.  
Some qualifications are also 
recognised as sole proof of 
competence 

- 

- 

188 (0.01% 
of total 
managers) 

- 

- 

- 

- 

Approx. 30 in 
total 

Approx. 800 
in total (6% 
of total 
managers) 

7,166 (2012-
2014) (78% 
of total 
managers) 

No data 

 

 

 

 

 

 

- 

- 

- 

Natural or legal persons who 
provide evidence that they have 
been authorised in a Member State 
to exercise the profession 
concerned, are exempted in 
Luxembourg. 

There is no exemption from the 
examination. With 5 years of 
managing experience in a road 
haulage company, an 
exemption from the preparatory 
training may be granted. 

Less than 10 
since 2010 

Germany 

Ireland 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

Luxembourg 

Netherlands 

In case the transport manager 
passes away or is unable to 

20 (0.8%)  

237 

 
 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Previous qualifications 

Persons who have 
continuously managed a 
road haulage undertaking 
for a certain period of 
time 

Number of 
exemptions 
granted 

fulfil his job because of  a 
physical or legal disability the 
Dutch Road Haulage 
Organisation for National and 
International Transport can 
decide to exempt an employee 
from the examinations.  The 
person that replaces the 
transport manager must have 
continuously managed  the 
relevant transport operator for 
a period of 10 years before  4 
December 2009 

Poland  

Slovak 
Republic 

Sweden 

UK 

 

Yes 

 

Yes 

Exemptions may be granted 
according to Article 8(7) 

Exemptions may be granted  
according to Article 9 

Previous holders of equivalent 
qualifications have been allowed to 
maintain their exemptions. 

Previous holders of an 
exemption for 'grandfather' 
rights from the 1970s have 
been allowed to keep their 
exemptions if they have 
managed an undertaking during 
the 10 year qualifying period. 

232 in total 

No data 

Very few 

13,000 in 
total 

Source:  Stakeholder  consultation  –  survey  of  national  transport  ministries  and  enforcement 
authorities 

Table 9-14 shows the total applicants and pass rates in selected Member States. 

Table 9-14: Total applicants and pass rates in selected Member States 

Pass 
in 
(%) 

rate 
2005 

Preparatory courses? 

Belgium 

35-42% 

Yes  –  only  obligatory  if  the 
exam 
before 
another attempt.  115 hours 

failed 

is 

Total 
applicants 
(2013) 

Pass rate in 2013 
(%) 

692 

44% 

Denmark  90% 

Yes – 108 hours 

183 in 2013; 
202 in 2014 

80% in 2013; 87% 
in 2014 

Finland 

Unknown 

Unknown 

No data 

Goods transport: 
83%, (year 2014). 

France 

10% 

Germany  53% 

No 

No 

Ireland 

75% 

Yes – 110 hours 

Sweden 

Unknown 

Unknown 

UK 

“high” 

No 

1,846 

3,063 (road 
transport) 

461 

1,218 

9,600 

39% 

51% 

85% 

61% 

60% 

Spain 

Unknown 

Unknown 

Unknown 

Varies per region.  
As low as 20-25% in 
some regions 

238 

 
 
 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Pass 
in 
(%) 

rate 
2005 

Preparatory courses? 

Total 
applicants 
(2013) 

Pass rate in 2013 
(%) 

Lithuania  50% 

No 

Poland  

75% 

Unknown 

Croatia 

N/A 

Cyprus 

100% 

No 

No 

Estonia 

Unknown 

Yes (76 hours) 

Bulgaria  Unknown 

No 

3,038 

5,971 

1,045 

121 

420 

2,518 

46% 

56% 

91% 

54% 

96% 

35% 

*Have preparatory courses 
Source:  Stakeholder  consultation  –  survey  of  national  transport  ministries  and  enforcement 
authorities and NEA (2005) for pass rates in 2005 

9.5.5. What is considered in the assessment of good repute 

Regulation  1071/2009  provides  that  Member  States  must  take  into  account  any 
convictions  or  penalties  for  a  serious  infringement  when  assessing  good  repute.  
Member  States  take  a  range  of  approaches  in  terms  whether  administrative  fines, 
arrangements  out  of  court  and  on-the-spot  payments  count  as  penalties,  as  shown 
below. 

Table  9-15:  Overview  of  whether  administrative  fines,  arrangements  out  of 
court,  and  on-the-spot  payments  count  as  “penalties”  in  selected  Member 
States 

Member State 

Do administrative 
fines, arrangements 
out of court, and on-
the-spot payments 
count as “penalties”? 

Details  

Austria 

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Croatia 

Cyprus 

Czech 
Republic 

Denmark 

Estonia 

Yes 

Yes 

No 

No 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Finland 

Yes 

Administrative fines 

Every payment that drops the criminal prosecution, 
for  example  on-the-spot-fines  and  administrative 
fines. 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Final decision on guilt and punishment 

Arrangements out of court. 

Administrative  fines  and  arrangements  out  of 
court. 
On-the-spot  fines  and  driving  bans  are  taken  into 
account.  
Another  example  is  the  check  of  driving  time 
limits,  which  are  often  checked  by  the  Finnish 
Occupational  Safety  and  Health  Administration. 
This  authority  reports  infringements  to  ELY,  which 
takes  them  into  account  when  assessing  good 
these 
repute.  Police  also 

regularly 

reports 

239 

 
 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Member State 

Do administrative 
fines, arrangements 
out of court, and on-
the-spot payments 
count as “penalties”? 

Details  

to 

payments 

immediate 

the  driver,  not 

infringements,  though  the  on-the-spot  payments 
are  often  directed 
the 
undertaking  in  question.      Finnish  Occupational 
Safety  and  Health  Administration  checks  also  that 
the  undertakings  operate 
in  accordance  with 
Employment  Contracts  Act,  Collective  Agreements 
Act,  Working  Hours  Act,  Annual  Holidays  Act  and 
Employment  Accidents  Act.  If  gross  negligence  is 
detected, this must be taken into account.  
Only 
-spot 
(on-the 
payments)  are  concerned  in  this  case.  These 
payments  roadside  for  3rd  or  4th  class  offenses 
are  minor  offenses.  In  isolation,  these  violations 
are  not 
into  question  the 
reputation  of  the  manager  of  the  company's 
transport  activities.  However,  the  reputation  may 
be  withdrawn  if  the  review  of  the  offender's 
situation  highlights  a  significant  recurrence  in  the 
commission of such offenses. 
Fines  and  judgments  are  considered  as  sanctions. 
Extrajudicial  settlements  and  instant  payments 
may also be taken into account. 
On the spot fines Prohibition notices Penalty points 
Fixed penalties 
Assessing  good  repute  the  imposed  administrative 
fines in the sphere of road transport are taken into 
account. 

intended  to  call 

Administrative 

N/A 

In  2015  we  have  adopted  internal  regulation  in 
which  whole  procedure  is  described  in  details. 
Aforementioned  document  defines  what  kind  of 
penalties  are  taken  into  account  when  assessing 
good  repute.  We  take  into  account  penalties  such 
as: administrative fines, arrangements out of court 
as well as on-the-spot payments as “penalties” for 
the purposes of establishing good repute 

France 

Yes 

Germany 

Ireland 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

Luxembourg 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

No 

Poland 

Yes 

Slovakia 

Yes 

No details given 

Sweden 

UK 

Italy 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Administrative  fines  count  as  penalties.  On-the-
spot  payments  are  applied  but  that 
is  not 
considered as a sanction in itself, but merely a way 
to ensure that penalties are being paid 

See STC Statutory document No. 1 

No details given 

240 

 
 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

9.5.6.  Procedures  in  place  for  appeals  and  rehabilitation  after  loss  of  good 
repute 

Enforcement  authorities  were  asked  whether  there  was  a  procedure  for  appeals 
against loss of good repute in their Member State.   

Table 9-16: Procedures for appeals against loss of good repute  

Member 
State 
Poland 

Is there a 
procedure? 
Yes 

Romania 

Yes 

Latvia 
France 
Netherlands 

Yes 
Yes 
Yes 

Denmark 
United 
Kingdom 
Luxembourg 
Finland 

Yes 
Yes 

Yes 
Yes 

Please explain the procedure and any conditions that 
must be met 
In accordance with Polish provisions haulier is entitled to pledge 
an appeal to General Inspector of Road Transport (14 days from 
the date of delivery of administrative decision) and then 
possibly refer the case to the court. 
Yes. For challenging administrative action regarding the 
withdrawal of good repute, the carrier may file a complaint prior 
to the institution which decided to withdraw good repute within 
30 days and if the answer is negative it may submit a complaint 
to the court within 30 days. 
No information 
No information 
According to national law, article 8.1 of the Wet wegvervoer 
goederen to be more precise (Dutch law), any transport 
operator or transport manager is able to appeal against every 
decision made by The Dutch Road Haulage Organisation for 
National and International Transport concerning an application, 
a withdrawal, a suspension of the Community license or a 
declaration of unfitness of the transport manager. An appeal 
process will be examined by a national court of law that has 
jurisdiction.    
The appeal takes place in court 
No information 

No information 
No information 

Source: survey of enforcement authorities and of ministries 

Enforcement  authorities  were  asked  whether  there was a procedure  for rehabilitation 
after loss of good repute in their Member State.  The procedures vary, as outlined in 
Table 9-17 

Table 9-17: Procedures for rehabilitation after loss of good repute 

Member State 

Romania 

Is there a 
procedure? 
Yes 

Latvia 
Bulgaria 
France 

No 
No 
Yes 

Netherlands 

Yes 

Denmark 

Yes 

Please explain the procedure and any conditions that 
must be met 
According to our national legislation Order 980/2011, the 
transport operator is rehabilitated after one year from the 
date of the loss of good repute respecting the conditions 
relating to the requirement of good repute.  
No information 
No information 
Any loss of good repute is accompanied by a deadline set by 
the regional prefect (authority which pronounced the loss of 
good repute) in compliance with the provisions of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure. 
The Dutch national legislation gives the additional possibility 
to impose a cease and desist charge for violations of the rules 
of the Regulation 1071/2009.  
When a transport manager has lost his good repute, he gets a 
quarantine period up to 3 years. Before a person can be 
reinstated as a transport manager, he must follow a course 
and pass an examination. 

241 

 
 
 
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Member State 

Is there a 
procedure? 

United Kingdom  Yes 

Luxembourg 

Yes 

Finland 

No 

Austria 
Belgium 

Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Germany 
Ireland 

Lithuania 

Sweden 

Italy 

No 
Yes 

No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Please explain the procedure and any conditions that 
must be met 
An undertaking must satisfy the Traffic Commissioner that 
they are 'rehabilitated' before their good repute is regained, 
at the discretion of the Traffic Commissioner. 
Legislation does not provide for a specific rehabilitation 
procedure, however: 10 years after the facts that led to the 
loss of good repute have arisen, they cannot be taken in to 
account anymore. It is considered as a second chance.  
There are no specific rehabilitation procedures after loss of 
good repute, time limits are in place: fines and other 
sanctions (as stated above) are taken into account for the 
past two year period. Corporate fines and prison sentences 
are taken into account for the past five year period 
No information 
One who has been convicted of a serious criminal offence or 
incurred a penalty for one of the most serious infringements 
as set out in Annex IV shall be rehabilitated after 2 years (or 
4 in case of repetition) regarding the requirement of good 
repute 
No information 
No information 
No information 
No information 
The legislation is currently being drafted to provide for 
rehabilitation measures. 
Validity of conviction or administrative penalty shall expire in 
itself or shall be recalled. 
Good repute is rehabilitated through elapse of time or through 
a written exam in accordance to article 8.1 (in part or fully)  
(2 kap. 5 § , 4 kap. 2 § and 3 § SFS 2012:210) 
Rehabilitation after 6 months  

Source: survey of enforcement authorities and of ministries 

9.6.  Effectiveness:  To  what  extent  have  the  Regulations  had  an 
impact  on  road  safety,  particularly  in  terms  of  fatigue  of  drivers,  and 
helped  to  address  the  road  safety  concerns  identified  at  the  time  of 
adoption?  

9.6.1.  Driver fatigue and road safety 

It  often  difficult  to  confirm  whether  an  accident  was  caused  by  fatigue  or  not,  since 
the  degree  of  fatigue  is  difficult  to  measure  -  any  measurement  is  dependent  on 
interviews  with  the  driver  and  interpreting  his  statements.  Understandably  drivers 
rarely admit to being fatigued as this would be considered reckless driving and could 
have legal consequences (Amundsen and Sagberg, 2003). 

Alternatively,  data  on  the  extent  of  fatigue  is  estimated  from  other  variables  (for 
example, characteristics of accidents), or from specially constructed studies collecting 
new  material  on  the  incidence  of  tiredness  in  relation  to  accidents.  Therefore,  while 
the typical representation of fatigue in official  road accident statistics may be around 
3% or less, the actual contribution of fatigue is hidden by systematic under-reporting 
(Aworemi et al., 2010). 

In the UK, where more recent figures from UK regarding the year 2013 indicate that 
fatigue  related  fatal  crashes  involving  goods  vehicles  accounts  for  2%  of  all  fatigue-
related  accidents,  an  analysis  (TRL,  2009)  of  the  data  with  which  the  Heavy  Vehicle 
Crash  Injury  Study  (HCVCIS)  database  has  been  populated  over  the  years  1195  to 
2007 inclusive, shows that out of a total of 3,069 accidents where commercial vehicles 

242 

 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

were involved (e.g. HGVs, LGVs and passenger service vehicles), 1,217 crashes were 
due to behavioural factors. To these accidents fatigue, excess hours and the combine 
defect  of  fatigue  and  excess  hours  contributed  in  a  proportion  of  respectively  10%, 
3% and 1.6%. 

Narrowing the focus to HGVs, fatigue was the most important contributory effects with 
a  proportion  of  4.1%  of  all  accidents  were  this  group  of  vehicles  was  involved 
(N=691),  while  excess  hours  were  the  main  cause  of  accidents  in  only  1.9%  of 
circumstances.  In  this  respect,  it  is  worth  noting  that,  compared  to  HGVs,  LGVs 
reported  a  greater  proportion  of  accidents  where  fatigue  was  the  main  cause  (5.5%, 
N=41 accidents).  

Finally,  in  terms  of  accident  severity,  Accidents  involving  HGVs  show  an  increased 
level  of  severity  when  the  driver  is  fatigued  (1.26  fatalities  per  accident  involving  a 
fatigued  driver)  in  comparison  with  all  HGV  accidents  (1.11  fatalities  per  accident 
involving a fatigued driver) (TRL, 2009). For LGVs there appears to be no difference in 
severity. 

In  the  Netherlands,  in  a  survey  undertaken  by  SWOV,  truck  drivers  reported  falling 
asleep  while  driving  more  frequently  than  car  drivers  (23%  to  10%).  They  also  said 
that  in  the  past  year  they  had  continued  or  started  to  drive  although  they  felt  they 
were too tired to do so (37% HGV drivers vs. 20% of car drivers)  (Goldenbled et al, 
2011). 

In Poland, a study conducted between 2005 and 2007 found that truck drivers caused 
26.5%  of  total  fatigue-related  accidents  involving  25.3%  of  injuries  and  34%  of 
fatalities (Smolarek and Jamroz, 2013). 

External  studies  in  Sweden  indicate  that  10%  to  20%  of  all  single  accidents  are 
caused by fatigue (Anlund et al., 2004) while Swedish accident statistics from 1994 to 
2001 indicate a proportion of fatigue related accidents involving lorries of 3% (Volvo, 
2013). 

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9.7.  Effectiveness:  Have  the  Regulations  led  to  any  positive  and/or 
negative  unintended  effects  (both  in  terms  of  impacts  and  results) 
other than mentioned in previous questions?  

9.7.1.  Impacts of the financial standing requirements on firms 

Under  Regulation  1071/2009,  operators  must  demonstrate  that  they  have  enough 
finance  to  support  their  vehicle  (with  the  minimum  levels  set  at  €9,000  for  the  first 
vehicle and €5,000 for subsequent vehicles).   

The  requirement  of  financial  standing  was  also  implemented  in  order  to  prevent 
companies  with  relatively  limited  financial  backup  from  entering  the  market  and  to 
avoid  some  of  the  negative  impacts  (damage  to  creditors,  etc.)  associated  with 
bankruptcies (European Commission, 2007a).  Some stakeholders have made remarks 
regarding  the  issue  of  insolvency  proceedings  in  Spain  (“Concurso  de  acreedores”). 
This system is designed to find an arrangement with creditors and to allow the viability 
of the company in order to avoid winding up. As soon as the company is declared to 
be  in  insolvency  or  bankruptcy  by  a  judge  and  the  parties  start  to  try  to  reach  an 
agreement, the road transport company is deemed to have lost financial capability and 
may lose authorisation to operate.  

Therefore,  this  requirement  has  a  perverse  effect  in  Spain  with  regard  to  companies 
that  apply  for  bankruptcy  proceedings.    Firstly,  if  declared  insolvent,  the  company 
cannot operate and cannot have any income that allows viability or a settlement with 
creditors.    Secondly,  some  creditors  use  this  situation  in  bad  faith  to  threaten  the 
company,  as  they  know  the  request  for  insolvency  proceedings  may  force  the 
company  to  irreversible  bankruptcy.    The  Spanish  authorities  have  indicated  that 
Article 46 a) LOTT has been drafted as an exemption and that the judge that hears the 
case in an insolvency proceeding may allow the company to continue operating if the 
competent authority that issues the authorisation considers that it is realistic to expect 
a financial rehabilitation of the company within a reasonable time. 

According  to  the  Czech  enforcement  authorities,  they  perceive  a  problem  with 
financial  standing  requirements  to  be  in  their  domestic  legislation,  because  natural 
persons are allowed to use a simplified version of tax evidence, rather than the more 
formal “book-keeping” required of larger firms.  Since Regulation 1071/2009 uses the 
term “book-keeping”, the ministry been demanding the more comprehensive evidence 
of natural persons.  Despite discussions on the matter, it is not clear that both options 
should  be  acceptable.      The  result  of  this  national  situation  is  that  smaller  firms  are 
disproportionately affected.   

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9.8.  Efficiency: To what extent have the Regulations helped to reduce 
costs  (i.e.  compliance  and  administrative)  both  for  transport 
undertakings and national authorities?  

9.8.1.  Detailed benefit (cost saving) calculations 

9.8.1.1. Improved monitoring 

The  main  savings  from  improved  monitoring  were  assumed  to  arise  from  more 
targeted  and  effective  checks  (largely  due  to  implementation  of  ERRU).    In  the  ex-
ante  assessment,  it  was  calculated  that  improved  monitoring  would  reduce 
administrative  costs  to  industry  by  €33  million  and  for  national  authorities  by  €42 
million per year (European Commission, 2007a) – this was largely due to time savings 
from avoided checks and greater automation. 

Since  ERRU  is  not  fully  functioning,  the  actual  impacts  in  practice  have  been  very 
limited so far.  Most respondents to the survey of ministries could not report any been 
any  impacts  on  efficiency  to  date  (most  indicated  they  did  not  know  or  had  not 
connected yet,  i.e.  55%).   Four respondents  felt  that  efficiency  had  improved  due  to 
ERRU  (Bulgaria,  Estonia,  Sweden,  Ireland)  and  four  felt  there  had  been  no  material 
impact  (Denmark,  France,  Germany,  UK).    However,  as  reported  in  Evaluation 
Question  3,  stakeholders (including  ministries,  enforcement  bodies  and  trade unions) 
were generally optimistic as to the future efficiency savings and urged the completion 
of the ERRU.    

For  industry,  the  ex-post  benefits  in  the  lower-bound  are  estimated  to  be  negligible.  
This  is  because  the  main  benefits  of  the  ERRU  that  affect  industry  are  due  to  the 
avoided checks, which can only occur in practice one the interconnection takes place.  
Since  there  were  no  estimates  of  possible  benefits  to  industry  that  could  be  found 
either  in  the  literature  or  from  stakeholder  inputs,  the  upper-bound  estimate  is  also 
assumed  to  be  negligible.    Once  the  system  of  ERRU  is  fully  functioning,  it  may  be 
possible  that  there  are  benefits  to  industry,  but  these  could  not  be  estimated  or 
quantified in the current study. 

As  a  conservative  ex-post  estimate  of  the  lower-bound  possible  benefits  to  public 
authorities  due  to  avoided  checks,  it  is  considered  that  the  impacts  so  far  are  also 
negligible.    This  is  because  the  Member  States  that  reported  no  material  impact  or 
could  not  report  an  effect  constitute  the  major  share  of  road  haulage  activity  in 
Europe.   

The second part of the benefits that accrue to public authorities are the savings from 
greater  automation.    That  is,  it  will  reduce  the  time  taken  because  the  process  of 
completing and submitting information for road haulage will be faster if an electronic, 
rather  than  a  paper-based,  system  is  used.    Since  limited  data  could  be  obtained 
directly from stakeholders in this respect, we use literature estimates.   

To inform the lower bound ex-post figure, an estimate of savings to date is needed.  A 
recent  study  carried  out  in  2014  by  ICF  also  highlighted  problems  of  obtaining  data. 
They  estimated  administrative  burden  reductions  of  €1  million  in  a  sample  of  five 
Member  States  (UK,  Hungary,  Latvia,  Ireland,  Slovenia).    The  total  savings  were 
estimated to be around 21% compared to the baseline administrative burden in each 
country. These savings arise mainly because  submitting information for road haulage 
transport will be faster if an electronic, rather than a paper-based, system is used.   

In  fact,  the  ICF  study  estimate  was  extrapolated  to  the  five  Member  States  on  the 
basis of information obtained for only three (UK, HU, LV), making extrapolation to the 
whole  EU  rather  uncertain.    Responses  from  Denmark,  Italy,  Malta,  the  Netherlands, 
Austria,  Slovakia,  Lithuania  and  Germany  reported  in  ICF  (2014)  indicate  that  the 
administrations  think  the  savings  have  been  negligible,  and  show  that  the  savings 
have not been uniform across all countries.  Because of this, only the data for the five 

245 

 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Member States included in the ICF study are counted in the ex-post estimate, making 
the lower-bound ex-post estimate for public authorities a total of €1 million.   

There  were  no  other  sources  of  information  on  possible  benefits  to  public  authorities 
other than the ICF (2014) study, hence there is no upper-bound estimate.  Once the 
system  of  ERRU  is  fully  functioning,  it  may  be  possible  that  the  benefits  are  higher 
(especially due to the network effects), but these could not be estimated or quantified 
in the current study. 

9.8.1.2. Financial standing requirements 

It  was  estimated  ex-ante  that  the  use  of  bank  guarantees  would  avoid  the  need  for 
time-consuming  regular  reporting  and  checks,  which  would  save  €33  million  for 
industry and €27 million for national administrations  (European Commission, 2007a), 
assuming  that  270,000  firms  opted  to  use  them.    This  equates  to  a  cost  saving  per 
firm of €100 for administrations and €122 for firms.  

These  ex-ante  estimates  may  have  been  optimistic  given  that  many  countries  had 
previously allowed the use of bank guarantees (NEA et al, 2005). This is backed up by 
stakeholder  views  -  enforcement  authorities  largely  felt  that  the  requirement  of 
financial standing had no material impact on their costs (either positive or negative).   

Table  9-18  shows  the  previous  provisions  in  place  in  the  Member  States  and  the 
number of Community Licences in each at the end of 2013.  

Table 9-18: Overview of previous provisions in Member States and number of 
Community Licences 

Member 
State 

Hauliers 
possessing 
Community  Licences 
at the end of 2014 

Previously allowed the 
use of bank 
guarantees? 

Number of firms 
benefitting 

AT 

BE 

BG 

CY 

CZ 

DE 

DK 

EE 

EL 

ES 

FI 

FR 

HU 

IE 

IT 

LT 

LU 

LV 

MT 

3,596 

8,351 

10,378 

146 

11,552 

40,440 

5,016 

2,458 

1,965 

27,724 

10,526 

23,439 

6,426 

2,346 

14,638 

3,641 

365 

3,294 

49 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes, but only for firms 
starting transport 
activities 
Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Unknown 

Yes 

Required only in special 
cases 
Yes 

Up to 50% of the required 
capacity 
Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

No 

Unknown 

Unknown 

246 

0 

0 

0 

146 

0 

0 

0 

0 - 2,458 

0 

27,724 

0 

23,439 

0 

0 

0 

0 

365 

0-3,294 

0-49 

 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Member 
State 

possessing 
Hauliers 
Community  Licences 
at the end of 2014 

Previously allowed the 
use of bank 
guarantees? 

Number of firms 
benefitting 

NL 

PL 

PT 

RO 

SE 

SI 

SK 

UK  

Total 

11,668 

29,488 

5,726 

36,162 

3,469 

5,279 

6,563 

9,416 

284,121 

No 

No 

Yes 

Unknown 

Yes 

No 

Unknown 

No 

11,668 

29,488 

0 

0-36,162 

0 

5,279 

0-6,563 

9,416 

107,525 – 156,051 
(average 131,788) 

Notes: Number of firms benefitting in each country due to the introduction of bank guarantees 
is assumed to be zero in  countries that  already  permitted the use of  bank  guarantees,  and all 
firms  in  the  case  where  this  was  not  previously  allowed.    Where  the  previous  situation  was 
unknown, the lower bound assumes that no firms benefit and the upper bound assumes that all 
firms benefit. 
Source:  Previous  rules  from  NEA  et  al  (2005);  Number  of  Community  Licences  from  national 
reporting 

The  total  number  of  Community  Licence  holders  that  are  in  countries  that  did  not 
previously  allow  this  option  was  around  107,525  to  156,021  in  2014  (the  average 
value  of  131,788  was  used  in  calculations).    For  the  purposes  of  estimating  ex-post 
impacts,  it  is  assumed  that  all  of  these  firms  opted  to  use  bank  guarantees79.    This 
may  represent  an  upper  bound  estimate,  as  not  all  of  the  firms  may  opt  for  bank 
guarantees if there is a cheaper option available.   

No  conclusive  data  on  the  cost  or  saving  per  firm  was  found,  but  the  ex-ante 
estimates  may  have  been  optimistic.    Around  half  of  undertakings  responding  to  the 
survey  reported  no  material  impact  on  their  businesses.    A  significant  minority  (7%) 
reported  negative  impacts,  although  these  respondents  were  mainly  from  Germany 
(where  there  is  an  additional  national  requirement  for  an  insurance,  see  Annex  C).  
When  asked  specifically  to  estimate  the  costs  and  savings  of  obtaining  bank 
guarantees,  almost  all  respondents  did  not  answer.    27  responses  were  received 
giving quantitative estimates – the average of these was a net cost of €450, and the 
median  was  €100.  Overall,  it  is  difficult  to  say  what  could  be  used  as  an  updated 
figure, so an approach to develop a weighted estimate was used.  The additional costs 
were taken from the 27 estimates received.  The estimated savings that applied to 7% 
of firms were assumed to be equal in magnitude (but opposite in sign, i.e. a saving of 
€100) to the estimate of “some increase in costs”, since no quantitative estimates of 
the savings were received. 

Table  9-19:  Development  of  a  weighted  estimate  of  the  impact  of  bank 
guarantees 

Response  from  undertakings 
survey 

Share of responses 
(weighting) 

Assumed impact per firm (EUR) 

Significant increase in costs 

Some increase in costs 

7% 

29% 

450 (average of 27 estimates) 

100 (median of 27 estimates) 

79  Noting  that  the  requirement  of  financial  standing  is  an  ongoing  requirement  that  must  be 

demonstrated continuously, i.e. not just for new applicants 

247 

 
 
 
                                          
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Response  from  undertakings 
survey 

Share of responses 
(weighting) 

Assumed impact per firm (EUR) 

Neutral 

Some reduction in costs 

Significant reduction in costs 

Don’t know / no opinion 

Weighted average impact per firm 

48% 

7% 

0% 

9% 

0 (no impact) 
100 (equal in magnitude to “some 
increase in costs”) 

N/A 

0 (no impact) 

EUR 53 

Source:  survey  of  undertakings  (N=75).    Assumed  impact  per  firm  based  on  27  numerical 
estimates of costs. 

The weighted average cost per firm is therefore €53. Only one specific estimate of the 
possible  impacts  of  the  financial  standing  requirement  was  found  in  the  literature  to 
cross-check  this  figure  –  in  the  UK,  it  was  assumed  by  the  DfT  that  the  majority  of 
businesses  produced  accounts  already  but  an  estimated  additional  cost  of  £500  was 
expected to affect 5% of firms (DfT, 2010).  This equates to an average cost per firm 
of £25 (approx. €35), which corresponds well to the estimated figure above.  

No  estimates  of  the  administrative  costs  or  savings  for  public  authorities  were 
obtained from any stakeholders, nor found in the literature – in the absence of more 
up-to-date information, it was not possible to develop ex-post estimates.  The ex-post 
estimates are therefore an increased cost of €4-6 million for industry, whereas savings 
for public authorities could not be estimated. 

9.8.1.3. Harmonised control documents 

The use of harmonised control documents was predicted to speed up roadside controls 
considerably,  leading  to  administrative  cost  savings  of  €20  million  per  year  each  for 
industry  and  public  authorities.  The  underlying  assumptions  are  not  clear  in  the 
Impact  Assessment,  but  it  could  be  assumed  that  the  major  cost  savings  are  due  to 
reductions in time taken for checks.   

Undertakings showed a high level of support when asked whether enforcers were able 
to check their licences more quickly, although there was less support on the matter of 
whether the requirements had led to a cost saving (see Figure 9-3). 

Figure  9-3:  Undertakings  responses  to  questions  on  the  impact  of  common 
control documents 

Source: Undertakings survey 

Qualitatively, responses from the interviews also support the conclusion that there has 
been  a  reduction  in  time  taken  during  checks  due  to  harmonised  control  documents.  
A Bulgarian association remarked that “harmonisation of forms used in checks always 

248 

 
 
 
  
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

facilitates  better  control.  However  we  have  no  quantitative  information  on  the 
benefits.” An Italian undertaking commented that “the standardisation of document is 
a positive step forwards to accelerate the control actions and to save time during this 
process.”    A  Romanian  undertaking  commented  that  checks  were  faster  now, 
confirmed  that  documentation  was  more  standardised  and  felt  that  the  time  their 
business  had  to  spend  on  compliance  had  reduced.    However,  they  were  not  able  to 
quantify the extent of these impacts.   

Half of the  enforcement authorities that responded to the survey also confirmed that 
checks  were  significantly  or  somewhat  faster  due  to  the  introduction  of  harmonised 
control  documents.    Those  that  were  able  to  quantify  the  time  savings  indicated  a 
reduction  of  around  15  minutes.    An  average  labour  cost  of  €20.5/hr80  for  public 
authorities was assumed. 

Only  three  undertakings  were  able  to  quantify  the  reduction  in  time  taken  due  to 
faster checks – with estimates of 1-2 hours saved per vehicle.  This seems rather high 
compared  to  the  estimate  from  enforcement  authorities,  but  also  includes  time  for 
preparation.  In  any  case,  the  lower  estimate  of  1  hour  saved  was  used  as  the  total 
amount of time saved per check. For industry, the operating cost of a vehicle per hour 
provides  a  more  representative  estimate  of  the  costs.    Bayliss  (2012)  shows  the 
operating costs of a truck are €45/hr to €80/hr depending on the country.  Adjusting 
this to exclude the cost of fuel (which will not be relevant if a truck is stationary during 
a  check)  gives  an  average  operating  cost  of  €50/hr,  which  is  taken  as  the  indicative 
cost  saving  for  industry  for  time  saved  for  roadside  checks.    For  back-office  time 
savings, the same wage rate of  €20.5/hr as used for public authorities was assumed 
(i.e. 15 minutes at €50/hr and 45 minutes at €20.5/hr). 

Assuming  a  vehicle  is  only  checked  once  per  year,  and  noting  that  the  cost  savings 
only  become  relevant  /  accessible  once  a  vehicle  is  checked,  it  can  be  very  roughly 
assumed that the total number of roadside cabotage checks can be used as a proxy to 
estimate the total time savings.  

The total number of checks is only known for certain countries as follows.   

Table  9-20:  Number  of  cabotage  controls  in  selected  countries  and  cost 
savings 

Country 

Italy 

Poland 

UK 

Germany 

France 

Denmark 

Slovenia 

Ireland 

Period 

Inspections 

January 2012 – October 2012 

2013 

March 2012 – March 2013 

2014 

2013 

2014 

2013 

2013 

220,965 

233,118 

114,500* 

183,200 

50,928 

4,794 

300 

185 

* based on a reported 229 infringements and a detection rate of 0.2% 
Source: survey responses and European Parliament (2013a); (Sternberg et al, 2014). 

Since there is no further data on the number of checks carried out in other countries, 
we  can  only  very  roughly  approximate  the  total  number  of  checks  in  the  EU.  
Countries appear to fall into two groups: 

80 Total hourly labour costs in public administration, Eurostat, 2014 – Labour cost survey 

249 

 
 
                                          
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

  Those that carry out a high number of checks: With the total number of checks 
in numbering hundreds of thousands (Italy, Poland, UK, Germany, France);  

  Those that carry out a lower number of checks: Denmark, Slovenia, Ireland. 
To  scale  up  to  the  EU  level,  countries  were  divided  into  whether  they  were  likely  to 
carry out a relatively high or low number of checks based on the amount of cabotage 
carried out in the country and the size of the transport market.  A high category was 
assigned if the national transport market was greater than 100 billion t-km in 2013 OR 
if  the  amount  of  cabotage  performed  in  the  country  was  more  than  1  million  t-km.  
These  thresholds  were  chosen  on  the  basis  that  they  captured  the  known  countries 
that carry out a high number of checks, and that the level of activity tended to drop of 
very  quickly  after  these  points.    The  number  of  annual  checks  for  the  high  category 
was  estimated  as  the  average  of  the  number  of  checks  in  Italy,  Poland,  UK  and 
Germany.    The  number  of  annual  checks  in  the  low  category  was  estimated  as  the 
average of Denmark, Slovenia and Ireland. 

Table 9-21: Estimation of total number of relevant checks in the EU-28 

Category 

Number of annual 
checks 

Number of Member 
States 

Total number of 
checks 

High 

Low 

Total 

160,500 

2,000 

N/A 

8 

20 

28 

1,284,000 

40,000 

1.3 million 

Notes: High category assigned if: national transport market was greater than 100 billion t-km in 
2013 OR if the amount of cabotage performed in the country was more than 1 million t-km (DE, 
PL, ES, FR, UK, IT, SE, BE) 

Using  this  scaling  approach,  a  total  of  1.3  million  checks  in  the  EU  per  year  was 
estimated.  This may seem high, although as a benchmark almost 9.7 million vehicles 
were controlled in the EU in 2009-2010 under the social legislation (SWD(2012) 270).  
It  does  not  seem  reasonable  to  assume  that  every  one  of  these  checks  would  be 
quicker. Rather, for the upper bound, 48% of checks are assumed to be quicker – this 
is  in  line  with  the  percentage  of  undertakings  that  slightly  OR  strongly  agreed  that 
enforcers  check  their  documents  more  quickly  now  (see  Figure  9-3).    For  the  lower 
bound,  29%  of  checks  are  assumed  to  be  quicker,  in  line  with  the  proportion  of 
undertakings that strongly agreed that checks are quicker now. 

Accordingly, the total annual savings for public authorities are around €2 million in the 
lower  bound  case  and  €3  million  in  the  upper  bound  case.  For  industry,  the  annual 
savings are around €11 million in the lower bound case and €18 million in the upper 
bound case.  

9.8.2.  Detailed compliance cost calculations 

9.8.2.1. Professional competence 

The requirement of professional competence was expected to result in an increase in 
compliance  costs  of  €16  million  per  year  for  industry  and  of  €2  million  per  year  for 
public authorities.  The industry costs in the ex-ante estimates were mainly due to the 
training fees for undertakings, using an assumption that a training course costing 
€1,200 would be needed and 50% of applicants would need a course.    

The average cost of training used in the ex-post calculations, as estimated by IRU in 
(Machenil,  2014), was  slightly  lower  compared  to  the  ex-ante assumption,  at €1,030 
(summing  an  average  cost  of  €881  for  the  training  classes  plus  an  average  cost  of 
€149 for the exam), with only 33% of applicants taking a course (Machenil, 2014), but 
the  overall  number  of  applicants  has  been  higher  than  anticipated  in  the  Impact 

250 

 
 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Assessment.  A  rough  estimation  of  the  number  of  certificates  of  professional 
competence  issued  in  2012-2013  is  44,000  according  to  the  official  monitoring  data 
submitted, which gives the lower bound estimate of the number of certificates issued.   

However,  seven  Member  States  did  not  provide  data.    Gap-filling  was  based  on 
assuming  an  average  turnover  rate  of  22%  in  the  industry  (calculated  from  the 
Member  States  that  did  provide  data  as  the  ratio  of  hauliers  possessing  community 
licences  at  the  end  of  2014  to  the  number  of  new  certificates  of  professional 
competence  issued).    This  leads  to  an  upper-bound  estimate  of  61,000  certificates 
issued (see Table 9-22). 

Table  9-22:  Gap-filling  calculations  to  estimate  the  number  of  certificates  of 
professional competence issued for countries that did not provide monitoring 
reports 

Assuming  that  33%  of  those  applicants  took  a  course  (in  line  with  Machenil,  2014),  
leads to an overall cost of training of €15 million in the lower bound, which is broadly 
in  line  with  the  ex-ante  costs  (i.e.  33%  of  44,000  applicants  paying  €1,030  each).  
The upper-bound estimate is €21 million (based on 61,000 applicants). 

The  additional  costs  for  public  authorities  were  from  the  authorisation  of  training 
centres.  The estimated compliance cost of €2 million per year was calculated on the 
basis  that  500  centres  would  be  needed  for  the  whole  EU,  given  that  seven  Member 
States  already  accredited  centres.    Most  Member  States  consulted  for  this  study 
reported  that  they  did  not  authorise  centres  since  there  was  no  demand  for  this 
service  –  of  those  that  did  authorise  centres,  a  total  of  300  additional  accreditations 
(excluding  countries  that  already  accredited  centres)  were  reported.    As  such,  the 
original  estimate  of  500  centres  appears  appropriate.  Two  Member  States  provided 

251 

 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

estimates  of  the  cost  of  accreditation  (averaging  €200  per  centre),  and  on  this basis 
the total cost of accreditation is €0.1 million, only a fraction of the initial estimate.  

9.8.2.2. Transport manager 

According  to  the  responses  received  to  the  undertakings  survey  carried  out  for  this 
study, the vast majority (91%) of responding operators reported that the requirement 
for  a  designated  transport  manager  did  not  imply  any  significant  change  in  costs, 
largely  because  they  already  fulfilled  this  requirement,  whereas  8%  did  not  know  – 
hence overall costs to industry are assumed to be negligible (i.e. significant increases 
in costs were identified by only 1% of respondents).  Normally, the Transport Manager 
is employed by within the company and holds already all the competences necessary 
to be able to carry out this role.  As such, the lower-bound estimate is assumed to be 
negligible. 

Only a few undertakings were able to provide estimates of the additional costs, which 
were  mainly  gathered  through  interviews.    Overall,  30  respondents  provided 
quantified  costs  of  which  half  indicated  that  this  cost  was  zero  or  negligible.    Of  the 
remaining answers that estimated some level of additional costs, there was a range of 
between  €1,000  and  €60,000  but  this  largely  depends  on  whether  a  new  transport 
manager  was  recruited  or  whether  the  salary  of  an  existing  employee  had  to  be 
increased due to increased responsibilities.  On average, small undertakings with up to 
50 people returned a, average cost of €7,000, whereas the overall median was €4,750 
(excluding respondents who identified zero costs), suggesting a slightly greater impact 
on SMEs. 

In any case, the ex-ante costs only accounted for the additional cost of training more 
transport  managers,  and  did  not  consider  the  need  for  greater  salaries  due  to 
increased  responsibilities  (or  bidding  up  costs  of  existing  managers).    Consequently, 
the  original  ex-ante  estimate  of  €6  million  per  year  could  be  an  underestimate.    To 
find an upper-bound estimate for the ex-post costs to industry, it is assumed that 1% 
of all firms experienced a cost in connection with the requirement, which corresponds 
to the proportion of undertakings that reported significant cost increase in the survey.  
Assuming  that  2,900  firms  are  affected  and  they  each  incur  costs  of  €4,750  (the 
median  estimate  provided,  as  explained  above),  the  total  costs  to  industry  would  be 
€13  million  per  year  (Table  9-23).    This  indicates  that  the  calculation  is  highly 
sensitive to the underlying assumptions. 

Table 9-23: Calculation of upper-bound cost to industry of transport manager 
requirements 

9.8.2.3. 

Other costs 

To explore any possible impacts in more detail and to support the responses from the 
undertakings survey, interviews with hauliers were carried out.  A Polish undertaking 
reported  no  costs  associated  with  the  Regulation.    A  Romanian  undertaking  replied 
that  the  only  cost  was  linked  to  the  requirement  in  Romania  to  renew  the  licence 
documents  every  year,  at  a  cost  of  €60  per  truck  (for  300  trucks,  i.e.  €18,000  per 
year).    One  German  undertaking  felt  that  ensuring  the  correct  documentation  for 
cabotage could account for 25% of a dispatcher’s role (i.e. €10,000 per year). On the 
other hand, three other German undertakings explained that there had not been any 
changes  in  costs  due  to  documentation.  One  Danish  undertaking  estimated  a  10% 
increase  in  administrative  effort,  but  considered  this  was  balanced  by  the  positive 
effects of the Regulations.  Another Danish undertaking reported that there had been 
no costs.  Two Italian undertakings confirmed that there had been no costs.  

252 

 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Overall, the interviews confirm that in many cases the cost impacts of the Regulations 
have been negligible.  In cases where costs have been incurred, the increase in costs 
does not appear to have been systematic across the industry.    

9.9.  Efficiency:  Are  there  costs  related  to  the  implementation  of  the 
new  provisions?  If  so,  are  they  proportionate  to  the  benefits 
achieved? 

9.9.1.  Data provided by stakeholders 

Table  9-24  provides  an  overview  of  cost  estimates  provided  by  national  transport 
ministries via the stakeholder surveys.  

Table  9-24:  Overview  of  costs  associated  with  setting  up  and  maintaining 
national  registers  and  their  connection  to  the  ERRU  (disregarding  any  costs 
incurred prior to the adoption of the Regulations) 

 = Yes;  = No; n/a = not applicable (indicated by respondent) 

t
n
e
m
t
s
e
v
n

i

s
u
o

i
v
e
r
P

s
n
o
i
t
a
l
u
g
e
R

Member 
State 

Austria 

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Croatia 

Cyprus 

Denmark 

Estonia 

y
d
a
e
r
l
a

r
e
t
s
i
g
e
R

-
e
r
p
d
e
t
s
i
x
e

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Finland  

n/a 

France 

Germany 

 

 

?
t
e
n
O
H
C
A
T
n

i

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Set-up of national 
register 
(one-off cost 
in €) 

Connection to 
ERRU 
(one-off cost 
in €) 

Running costs 
(€/year) 

550,000 

561,000 

Unknown 

200,000 

14,755 

140,000 

116,000 

80,000 

40,500 

103,000 

8,100 

Not applicable 

Not applicable 

Included in set up 
costs 

Unknown 

N/A 

120,600 

26,800 

126,000 

21,600 

7,500 

Not applicable 

Not applicable 

1,000 

400,000 (upgrading 
pre-existing register) 

540,000 

120,000 

* 

2.1 mio. 

Ireland 

 

500,000 

Included in set up 
costs 

80,000 

Included in set up 
costs 

50,000 

Italy 

* 

593,425 

49,650 

110,000 

Latvia 

 

 

95,000 

Included in set up 

7,000 

253 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Member 
State 

Lithuania 

Poland 

y
d
a
e
r
l
a

r
e
t
s
i
g
e
R

s
n
o
i
t
a
l
u
g
e
R

-
e
r
p
d
e
t
s
i
x
e

 

 

Slovakia 

n/a 

Sweden 

United 
Kingdom 

 

 

t
n
e
m
t
s
e
v
n

i

s
u
o

i
v
e
r
P

?
t
e
n
O
H
C
A
T
n

i

 

 

 

 

 

Set-up of national 
register 
(one-off cost 
in €) 

Connection to 
ERRU 
(one-off cost 
in €) 

Running costs 
(€/year) 

1.5 mio. 

Included in set up 
cost 

133,000 

2.5 mio. 

Not applicable 

Not applicable 

Not applicable 

Not applicable 

30,000 

Unknown 

1.2 mio. 

1.5 mio. 

Included in set up 
costs 

48,700 

41,400 

*Note: Connected with ERRU through EUCARIS.    
Source: Stakeholder responses to survey of national transport ministries  

9.9.2.  Costs of setting up national registers 

Ex-ante estimates 

Firstly, we analyse the ex-ante estimates of the cost to set up national registers. The 
Impact  Assessment  underlying  the  Regulations  does  not  appear  to  make  any  explicit 
reference  to  set-up  costs  in  its  ex-ante  estimates,  noting  only  that  Member  States 
typically  had  existing  registers  that  would  limit  the  investment  needed.  As  such,  the 
estimated  cost  referred  to  in  the  Impact  Assessment  for  establishing  the  system  of 
registers  appears  to  refer  exclusively  to  the  interconnection  to  ERRU  (where  it 
matches the lower cost estimates of €15 million in Wilson et al, 2009).   

In order to find appropriate ex-ante costs for comparison, the TUNER project was used 
as the main source, and this was one of the studies that informed the original Impact 
Assessment  (Wilson  et  al,  2009).    The  TUNER  noted  that  national  registers  were  of 
varying  quality  and  sophistication,  and  in  any  case  would  require  some  upgrades  to 
ensure they met the new requirements set out in the Regulations.  Hence it  was not 
realistic  to  expect  there  to  be  zero  cost.    This  is  confirmed  by  the  feedback  from 
stakeholders,  where  incremental  investment  costs  were  identified  in  most  countries 
despite having pre-existing registers. 

The  ex-ante  estimates  were  therefore  assumed  to  be  in  line  with  the  estimates  from 
the  TUNER  project.    The  only  additional  assumption  is  that  Croatia  has  a  small 
register,  due  to  the  relatively  small  number  of  undertakings  in  the  country.    This 
allowed the extrapolation of the calculations to cover 28 Member States and allow for 
a like-for-like comparison with the ex-post estimates.  The total cost for setting up and 
upgrading the national registers in the ex-ante case is therefore €52.75 million.   

Table  9-25:  Comparison  between  ex-ante  and  ex-post  costs  for  set  up  / 
upgrading of national registers (disregarding any prior costs) 

Register size 

Number of Member States 

Ex-ante set up cost  
(“worst case” € millions) 

Small 

Medium 

9 

12 

254 

0.75 

1.5 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Register size 

Number of Member States 

Ex-ante set up cost  
(“worst case” € millions) 

Large 

Total 

7 

28 

4.0 

52.75 

Ex-post estimates 

Since  only  11  countries  provided  ex-post  cost  estimates,  these  needed  to  be 
extrapolated  to  estimate  the  total  investment  for  setting  up  national  registers  in  all 
EU-28 countries.  The data provided by 11 Member States (shown in Table 9-24), was 
assessed visually in order to ascertain the most appropriate basis for extrapolation.   

As can be seen in Figure 9-4, it can be seen that the costs are broadly proportionate 
to the “size” of the national register.  The categorisation of small, medium and large 
registers  as  shown  in  Figure  9-4  is  consistent  with  the  TUNER  project  (Wilson  et  al, 
2009),  because  the  characteristics  on  which  the  categorisation  was  made  are  still 
relevant  and  will  not  have  changed.    On  this  basis  it  can  be  seen  that  the  costs  of 
implementation  tend  to  scale  with  the  size  and  complexity  of  the  required  system.  
Hence, the size categories of each Member State were retained for the calculations of 
the ex-post impacts.  

Figure 9-4: Overview of set-up costs by size of national register (disregarding 
any costs incurred prior to the adoption of the Regulations)  

* Cost estimate provided also includes interconnection 
Notes:  Categorisation  of  small,  medium  and  large  registers  is  taken  from  the  TUNER  project 
(Wilson  et  al,  2009).    Large  registers  comprise  a  large  number  of  transport  undertakings, 
manage a large part of the process and are highly automated. Small registers manage a small 
number of undertakings, manage only some of the process and have some automation. “lower 
cost efficiency” region indicates a higher cost to community licence ratio. 
Source: Responses to the survey of Member State transport ministries 

Looking  at  the  ratio  of  costs  compared  to  the  number  of  Community  licences  as  a 
rough  measure  of  cost-efficiency,  the  regions  of  higher  and  lower  cost-efficiency  are 
indicated  on  the  diagram.    The  inclusion  of  interconnection  costs  in  the  overall 
estimate  does  not  appear  to  systematically  affect  the  overall  cost-efficiency  of  the 
systems,  with  some  showing  above-average  cost-efficiency  (Latvia,  Germany  –  as 
identified  from  Figure  9-4)  and  others  showing  below-average  cost-efficiency 
(Lithuania,  Ireland).    The  most  cost-efficient  system  is  found  in  France  due  to  the 

255 

 
 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

relatively  low  investment  cost.    The  survey  respondents  indicated  that  this  was 
because  the  register  was  implemented  as  an  upgrade  of  the  previous  system.    The 
least  cost-effective  systems  (with  the  highest  cost  to  community  licence  ratio)  are 
found  in  Poland  and  Lithuania.    According  to  the  Polish  authorities,  the  large  size  in 
terms  of  national  vehicle  fleets  and  the  significant  number  of  companies  has  made 
setting up the register  and its interconnection particularly complicated.  In Lithuania, 
the set-up cost also included the cost for interconnection, which may contribute to the 
apparently low cost-efficiency.   

There  was  an  issue  with  the  data  provided  by  some  Member  States  because  the 
estimate included both set-up and interconnection costs.  In order to correct for this, 
the  data  needed  to  be  adjusted  –  the  calculations  are  shown  in  Table  9-26.    Five 
countries  provided  separate  estimates  of  the  set-up  and  interconnection  costs      For 
four  out  of the  five,  the  interconnection  cost was  8-25%  of the  set-up  cost,  whereas 
only  in  France  was  the  interconnection  cost  higher  than  the  set-up  cost.    Due  to  the 
high level of skew, the median connection cost as a percentage of the set-up cost (i.e. 
17%)  was  used  to  adjust  the  cost  estimates  from  countries  that  did  not  provide 
separate costs (i.e. Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, UK).  

Table  9-26:  Adjustment  calculations  made  to  estimate  set-up  costs  without 
interconnection based on data provided by ministries 

Source:  MS  register  size  categories  from  Wilson  et  al  (2009).    Ex-post  cost  estimates  from 
survey of national ministries 

The  average  set-up  costs  for  registers  in  each  size  category  (small/medium/large) 
were  then  calculated  as  the  average  of  the  estimated  provided  by  countries  in  each 
category.    For  example,  the  set-up  costs  for  a  small  register  were  estimated  as  the 
average  of  the  estimates  provided  by  Estonia,  Cyprus,  Latvia  and  Lithuania.    Similar 
calculations were carried out for the medium and large size categories.   

The  total  ex-post  set-up  costs  were  then  calculated  by  extrapolating  these  estimates 
to cover all 28 Member States, as shown in Table 9-27. 

Table  9-27:  Ex-post  costs  for  set  up  /  upgrading  of  national  registers 
(disregarding any prior costs) 

Register size 

Number of 
Member States 

Member States 

Ex-post set up cost  
(€ millions)* 

Small 

Medium 

9 

12 

HR, CY, DK, EE, FI, LT, LU, 
MT 

AT, BE, BG, CZ, EL, HU, IE, 
PT, RO, SE, SI, SK  

0.37 

0.51 

256 

 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Register size 

Number of 
Member States 

Member States 

Ex-post set up cost  
(€ millions)* 

Large 

Total 

7 

28 

FR, DE, IT, NL, PL, ES, UK 

1.25 

18.20 

* Cost estimates of set-up costs provided by Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, UK and Ireland were 
adjusted  to  take  account  of  the  fact  that  their  cost  estimates  also  included  interconnection 
costs. 
Source: MS register size categories from Wilson et al (2009), plus assuming that HR has a small 
register.  Ex-post cost estimates from survey of national ministries 

9.9.3.  Costs of interconnecting national registers 

Ex-ante 

The ex-ante estimates of interconnection costs were calculated depending on the ease 
of  the  implementation  process.  According  to  the  ex-ante  study,  a  straightforward 
interconnection would require (Wilson et al, 2009): 

  National registers are in place that have high degrees of automation; 

 

Information required by the Regulations to be already available; 

  Good ICT infrastructure already in place. 

Conversely,  if  these  conditions  are  not  met,  the  interconnection  process  would  be 
more difficult.   

Table  9-28  shows  that  the  estimated  ex-ante  cost  estimates.    The  interconnection 
costs  and  the  number  of  Member  States  experiencing  easy,  medium  and  difficult 
implementation  are  taken  from  the  TUNER  project.  The  total  ex-ante  costs  were 
estimated to be around €20 million. 

Table 9-28: Ex-ante cost estimates for interconnection 

Ease of implementation 

Number of Member 
States 

Ex-ante interconnection cost (€ 
millions) 

Easy 

Medium 

Difficult 

Total 

10 

11 

7 

28 

0.58 (medium)  

(0.4 - 0.7) 

0.68 (medium)  

(0.5 - 0.8) 

0.98 (medium)  

(0.8 - 1) 

20.14 (medium)  

(15.1 - 22.8) 

Notes:  Number  of  Member  States  with  easy,  medium  and  difficult  implementation  processes 
taken  from  TUNER  project  (Wilson  et  al,  2009).    Only  overall  numbers  were  identified,  and 
difficulty  levels  were  not  assigned  to  individual  countries.  Croatia  assumed  to  have  a  medium 
difficulty implementation.  Low, medium and high interconnection costs depend on whether low, 
medium  or  high  staff  costs  were  assumed.    Costs  include  staff  time,  maintenance,  hardware, 
software & interface connections 

257 

 
 
 
 
 
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Ex-post 

To  date,  20  Member  States81  are  connected  to  the  ERRU  (plus  Norway,  which  is  not 
included  in  the  calculations  since  it  is  not  part  of  the  EU-28).    Hence,  the  ex-post 
calculations only cover these 20 Member States.    

Ex-post  interconnection  cost  estimates  were  received  from  eight  Member  States.    A 
further  five  Member  States  provided  estimates  of  the  total  costs  for  set-up  and 
interconnection,  from  which  the  share  related  to  interconnection  could  be  estimated 
(using the median share of 17%, see previous section).   

Table 9-29: Ex-post interconnection costs, derived from survey respones 

Source: Survey of ministries 
Notes:  For  Member  States  that  only  provided  a  single  cost  estimate  covering  interconnection 
and set-up costs, the share of interconnection costs was assumed to be 17% 

The  average  ex-post  cost  of  easy,  medium  and  difficult  interconnections  were 
estimated  from  the  available  data  by  assuming  that  “easy”  implementation 
corresponded to the lower quartile of the data, “medium” corresponded to the median 
and “difficult” corresponded to the upper quartile.   

In order to extrapolate these costs from 13 Member States to 20 Member States, the 
level of difficulty of interconnection needed to be estimated.  However, only the overall 
numbers  of  Member  States  experiencing  easy,  medium  or  difficult  interconnection 
processes  were  identified  in  the  ex-ante  study,  and  the  difficulty  levels  were  not 
assigned to individual countries.  In the absence of  more up-to-date information, the 
same  proportion  of  Member  States  experiencing  easy,  medium  and  difficult 
connections  was  assumed  in  order  to  extrapolate  the  partial  information  received.  
This was assumed to be a reasonable approximation since the original classification in 
the  TUNER  project  was  based  on  the  infrastructure  in  place  prior  to  the  Regulations, 
and the basis of the categorisation should not have changed.  

Table 9-30  shows the ex-post cost estimates for interconnection, which reach a total 
of nearly €3 million for the 20 Member States that have connected to ERRU so far. 

81  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Cyprus,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Ireland, 
Latvia,  Lithuania,  Malta,  Netherlands,  Romania,  Slovak  Republic,  Slovenia,  Spain,  Sweden 
and the UK 

258 

 
 
 
                                          
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Table 9-30: Ex-post cost estimates for interconnection 

To-date 

Full interconnection 

Ease of 
implementation 

Number of 
Member 
States 

Ex-post 
interconnection 
cost € millions) 

Number of Member 
States 

Ex-post 
interconnection 
cost € millions) 

Easy 

Medium 

Difficult 

Total 

7 

8 

5 

20 

0.05 

0.12 

0.31 

2.83 

10 

11 

7 

28 

0.05 

0.12 

0.31 

3.94 

Source:  Number  of  Member  States  with  easy,  medium  and  difficult  implementation  processes 
assumed  to  have  the  same  proportion  as  the  estimates  from  TUNER  project  (Wilson  et  al, 
2009), scaled to cover the 20 MS that have connected so far 

9.9.4.  Running costs 

Ex-ante 

The  activities  involved  in  maintenance,  management  and  operation  of  the  registers 
represent  an  ongoing  cost  of  enforcement.    The  ex-ante  cost  estimate  for  ongoing 
maintenance at the EU level was €6 million per year (European Commission, 2007a), 
although this was not broken down at a Member State level.   

Ex-post 

To  estimate  the  ex-post  costs  it  was  assumed  that  the  maintenance  costs  scale  with 
the  complexity  of  the  national  registers.  The  ex-post  annual  maintenance  costs  were 
provided  by  15  Member  States,  shown  in  Table  9-31,  and  scaled  up  to  cover  all  28 
Member States.   

Table 9-31: Ex-post maintenance costs, provided by Member States 

The average cost of maintenance of a small register was assumed to be equal to the 
average  of  all  cost  estimates  provided  by  countries  with  small  registers  (i.e.  the 
average  of  estimates  from  Estonia,  Finland,  Latvia  and  Lithuania,  as  shown  above).  
Similarly, the cost of maintenance of medium and large registers was estimated as the 
average of the costs provided by Member States in those categories. 

259 

 
 
 
 
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As  shown  in  Table  9-32  the  ex-post  cost  outcomes  appear  to  be  around  73%  lower 
than the ex-ante estimates, with the total for all 28 Member States estimated at €1.6 
million.   

Table 9-32: Ex-post costs for maintenance of registers 

Register size 

Number of Member States 

Ex-post maintenance cost (average 
€)* 

Large 

Medium 

Small 

Total 

7 

12 

9 

28 

35,000 

59,000 

88,000 

1,639,000 

9.9.5.  Cost-benefit analysis 

Net  present  value  calculations  were  carried  out  using  a  timescale  of  10  years  and  a 
discount  factor  of  4%.    Table  9-33  shows  the  cost  amounts  and  net  present  value 
(NPV) for each cost and benefit category.  The total NPV of the costs is €34.9 million. 
The  net  present  value  of  benefits  to  public  authorities  is  €8.4  million,  which  gives  a 
benefit-to-cost ratio of 0.2.   

Table 9-33: Net Present Value calculations for ERRU (€ millions) 

Cost 

Cost amount 

NPV  

One-off (implementation) costs – occur in year 1 

Set up 

Interconnection 

Annual costs 

Running costs  

Annual benefits 

Firms  

Public authorities  

18.20 

2.83 

1.64 

- 

1.0 

18.20 

2.86 

13.83 

- 

8.44 

Notes: Assuming a discount factor of 4%.  Costs in the first year are not discounted, following 
standard NPV conventions and consistent with guidance in the Better Regulations Guidelines 

9.10.  Relevance:  To what extent are  the  operational  objectives  of the 
Regulations relevant and proportionate to address the problems of the 
sector? 

9.10.1. 

Levels of empty running 

Almost  a  quarter  of  all  goods  vehicle  km  in  the  EU28  are  empty  runs.  The  share  of 
empty runs in national transport is higher than in international transport (Figure 9-5). 
This  is  likely  because  empty  running  being  more  common  on  shorter  distance 
operations.  There  is  generally  an  inverse  relationship  between  journey  length  and 
share of empty running (Huber, 2013).  

260 

 
 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Figure 9-5: Share of empty vehicle km across different operations 

Source: Eurostat dataset “road_go_ta_tott” 
Notes: excludes Italy, Belgium and Romania as no data on empty runs was provided for these 
countries. 

In terms of regional variation, the share of national empty vehicle km in the EU13 is 
significantly higher than in the EU15 (Figure 9-6). There is some negative correlation 
between the share of domestic empty running and personnel costs, labour productivity 
or GDP per capita. It is not clear from the available data whether the seemingly more 
efficient  freight  transport  practices  in  higher  income  countries  are  attributable  to  the 
more  developed  logistics  infrastructure associated  with  the  higher  demand,  to  higher 
labour  costs,  to  higher  competitive  pressure  or  to  a  combination  of  these  and  other 
factors.  

Figure  9-6:  Share  of  empty  vehicle  km:  EU15  vs.  EU13,  national  vs. 
international  

Source: Eurostat dataset road_go_ta_tott 
Notes: excludes Italy, Belgium and Romania as no data on empty runs was provided for these 
countries. 

The share of empty runs in international operations is slightly lower in the EU13. This 
gap is mainly attributable to the Netherlands reporting a significantly higher share  of 
empty running (26%) than all other EU15 Member States. It is not clear whether the 
share  of  international  empty  vehicle  km  have  been  over-estimated,  or  whether  the 
Netherland’s  geographical  and  economic  situation  leads  to  significantly  higher  empty 
vehicle km in international haulage. 

261 

 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

10.  ANNEX B: SUMMARY OF STAKEHOLDER CONTRIBUTIONS 

10.1.  Organisation of the consultation 

The  consultation  consisted  of  targeted  surveys  distributed  to  different  stakeholder 
groups,  supported  by  telephone  or  face-to-face  interviews.    Questionnaires  were 
drafted  by  the  study  team  on  the  basis  of  desk  research  and  exploratory  interviews.  
Each survey was then pilot-tested with one or two relevant organisations and revised 
based  on  the  feedback  received.    After  the  European  Commission  approved  the 
surveys, they were distributed among the target groups and open for responses for at 
least 8 weeks, and up 3 months in some cases.   

Follow-up interviews were scheduled on the basis of responses to the final question in 
each survey, where participants could indicate whether or not they were willing to be 
contacted for further input to the study.   

The stakeholder engagement activities are summarised in Table 10-1 

Table 10-1: Summary of stakeholder engagement 

Type of stakeholder 

Approached 

Responded 

Interviews 

National transport ministries 

Enforcement authorities 

Industry associations 

Trade unions 

Undertakings 

TOTAL (interviews) 

Surveys 

National transport ministries 

Enforcement authorities 

Undertakings survey 

High level (general) survey 

TOTAL (surveys) 

6 

18 

20 

12 

72 

128 

47 

78 
N/AA 
154 

4 

13 

14 

6 

16 

54 

20 

20 

122 
37B 
199 

% response 
rate 

67% 

72% 

70% 

50% 

22% 

42% 

43% 

26% 

- 

24% 

- 

Notes:  Stakeholder  engagement  activities  were  conducted  from  October  2014  until  July  2015.  
Response rates are approximate, as some organisations forwarded the request to participate to 
other organisations on our behalf. 
A)  Undertakings  surveys  were  distributed  via  national  associations,  hence  it  is  not  known  how 
many organisations were contacted.  B) A number of coordinated responses were received from 
trade unions and transport operator associations.  Due to the breadth and depth of issues that 
needed  to  be  covered  in  the  evaluation,  the  questionnaires  were  necessarily  rather  long  and 
complex,  and  may  have  been  difficult  for  some  stakeholders  to  find  the  time  to  answer.    The 
inputs  received  from  those  stakeholders  that  responded  are  highly  appreciated.    Overall,  the 
stakeholder  response  rate  can  be  considered  to  be  very  good  in  light  of  this,  and  also 
considering the highly technical and specific nature of the Regulations.   

Due to the breadth and depth of issues that needed to be covered in the evaluation, 
the questionnaires were necessarily rather long and complex.  This may have made it 
more difficult for some stakeholders to find the time to answer, and it is likely that this 
impacted  on  the  response  rate.    Nevertheless,  many  stakeholders  took  the  time  to 
participate  in  the  surveys  and  the  interviews,  and  their  inputs  have  been  highly 
appreciated.    Overall,  the  stakeholder  response  rate  can  be  considered  to  be  very 
good  in  light  of  this,  and  also  considering  the  highly  technical  and  specific  nature  of 
the Regulations.   

10.2.  National transport ministries 

The consultation of national transport ministries focussed on national implementation 
of  the  Regulations,  especially  on  national  derogations,  flexibilities  and  additional 

262 

 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

provisions.    It  also  requested  information  about  the  situation  in  place  prior  to  the 
Regulations and how this had changed, as well as national level impacts.   

Responses were received from the national transport ministries of 20 Member States 
as  follows:  Austria;  Belgium;  Bulgaria;  Croatia;  Cyprus;  Czech  Republic;  Denmark; 
Estonia;  Finland;  France;  Germany;  Ireland;  Italy;  Latvia;  Lithuania;  Luxembourg; 
Poland;  Slovak  Republic;  Sweden;  UK.    There  was  one  response  per  Member  State, 
often submitted as a combination of inputs from different departments. These survey 
results contained a mixture of qualitative and quantitative information.  

10.2.1. 

Regulation 1071/2009 

10.2.1.1. 

Stable and effective establishment 

Regulation  1071/2009  introduced  a  requirement  for  transport  undertakings  to 
demonstrate  their  “effective  and  stable  establishment”.    Around  half  of  the  Member 
States  responded  that  there  were  no  specific  problems  with  the  interpretation  of 
provisions82.  The remaining Member States identified difficulties around the following 
areas: 

  The Belgian respondent noted that it was not clear how to interpret the notion 
of “appropriate technical equipment and facilities”, which leads to problems of 
letterbox companies.  

  The Bulgarian respondent noted that it is difficult to define when a transport 

undertaking does not satisfy the requirement on stable and effective 
establishment since the Regulation does not include specific criteria with which 
the operating centre needs to comply.   

  The respondent from Germany suggested that the requirements should be 

more stringent than previously stipulated – i.e. that an establishment must be 
an economically independent unit, in order to avoid problems of the same 
company owning licences in several countries.   

  The respondent from Finland suggested that the Regulation could be improved 
by making the requirements less vague.  They also note that there have been 
few occasions where a company from another Member State or outside the 
European Union has applied a Community license from Finland. They have not 
agreed to register in Finland appropriately, so the applications have been 
denied.  

  The respondent from France is of the view that the wording of Article 5 of the 

Regulation does not raise any difficulty. The issue is rather the lack of control in 
Member States on whose territory letterbox companies are established.  They 
suggest that the European Commission should be systematically informed of 
these practices. 

  The respondent from Lithuania noted that they are unable to check the 

requirements of Article 5(b) prior the granting of the authorisation (i.e. the 
requirement for an undertakings to have at its disposal at least one vehicle).   

Five  Member  States  reported  that  they  suspected  letterbox  companies  were  being 
established  on  their  territory  (Germany,  Luxembourg,  Estonia,  Slovakia,  Bulgaria).  
Another  five  Member  States  identified  the  reverse  problem  -  that  they  suspected 
companies  from  their  own  countries  were  setting  up  letterbox  companies  in  other 
Member  States  (Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Sweden,  Slovakia).    The  impacts  of 
letterbox companies were similarly reported as: 

82  Austria,  Denmark,  Ireland,  Luxembourg,  Sweden,  UK,  Italy,  Poland,  Latvia,  Cyprus,  Czech 

Republic  

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  Movement of jobs to other countries due to the use of low cost labour 

(Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany); 

  Unfair competition in the road haulage sector (Belgium, Bulgaria, France);  

  A decrease of tax revenues (Belgium, Bulgaria, France); 

  Loss of earnings for drivers (France); 

  Negative impacts on safety (Bulgaria) 

  Undermining of the financing of social security systems (Belgium, France);  

  A higher risk of letter box companies performing illegal cabotage operations 

(Belgium). 

In terms of identifying letterbox companies, the French Ministry has identified multiple 
indices  to  indicate  a  higher  risk  of  non-respect  for  Article  5  of  the  Regulation 
1071/2009:  

  The place of establishment of these subsidiaries is generally a building located 
in an urban residential area, and obviously does not include the local operating 
and facilities appropriate technology;  

  Transport operations from or to the establishment of the said Member State 

seem marginal in terms of all transactions. In reality, the transport operations 
are carried out from or to the Member State headquarters of the parent 
company to which the subsidiary;  

  The drivers rarely have the same nationality as the establishment said Member 
State: they are usually effectively employed in the Member State headquarters 
of the parent company.   

The Swedish respondent has also observed the drivers often not come from the same 
country as where the agency is located. 

Most  respondents  did  not  feel  there  were  any  loopholes  (11  out  of  2083)  or  gave  no 
answer  to  this question  (4  out  of  2084).    Specific  loopholes  were  mentioned  by  other 
respondents as follows: The Bulgarian respondent felt there were loopholes related to 
the condition of conducting operations effectively and continuously with the necessary 
administrative  equipment  and  with  the  appropriate  technical  equipment  and  facilities 
at  an  operating  centre.  The  respondents  from  France  and  Denmark  felt  that 
enforcement of the provisions needed more attention.   

10.2.1.2. 

Good repute 

The  good  repute  of  transport  managers  (or  undertakings)  is  conditional  on  their  not 
having  been  convicted  of  a  serious  criminal  offence  or  having  incurred  a  penalty  for 
one  of  the  most  serious  infringements  of  road  transport  rules.  Member  States  are 
responsible  for  determining  good  repute  according  to  these  conditions,  which  are 
described in detail in Article 6 of Regulation 1071/2009.   

In  over  half  of  the  Member  States  (13)85,  there  are  no  differences  between  current 
rules under Regulation 1071/2009 and the previous systems they had in place.  Where 
differences were reported, they concern: 

83 Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Sweden, UK, Italy, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Czech 

Republic 

84 Austria, Poland, Slovakia, Cyprus 

85  Austria,  Denmark,  Ireland,  Luxembourg,  Sweden,  UK,  Poland,  Slovakia,  Bulgaria,  Croatia, 

Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus 

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  Differences in the categorisation of the seriousness of offences (Belgium, 

Estonia, Finland,  

  Differences in the list of relevant persons to be checked (Finland) 

  The conduct of the transport undertaking was not previously taken into account 

in determining the requirement of good repute (Belgium, Finland) 

  Time period of convictions taken into account (Belgium) 

  Other types of infringements led to loss of good repute (Belgium, Czech 

Republic) 

Most (14)86  Member States  confirmed  that  there  were  no  additional  requirements  for 
good repute above those in the Regulations.  Variations from the core requirements of 
the  Regulation  were  around  the  type  of  offenses  taken  into  consideration  and  the 
relevant persons to be checked.   

Article  6(1)  states  that  Member  States  shall  consider  “convictions,  penalties  or 
infringements”.      However,  Member  States  vary  in  terms  of  whether  they  consider 
aspects  such  as  administrative  fines,  arrangements  out  of  court,  and/or  on-the-spot 
payments for the purposes of assessing good repute.  Some respondents were of the 
view  that  this  was  an  important  part  of  the  condition  of  good  repute  and  should 
therefore be harmonised between Member States.  Currently there is a high degree of 
variation  between  Member  States.  Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Cyprus  and  Luxembourg  do  not 
consider  any  of  administrative  fines,  arrangements  out  of  court  and  on-the-spot 
payments  as  penalties.  Administrative  fines  are  considered  in  Austria,  Sweden, 
Lithuania,  Belgium,  Estonia,  Germany,  Poland  and  Latvia;  Arrangements  out  of  court 
are considered in Denmark, Germany, Poland and Estonia; On-the-spot payments are 
considered in France, Belgium, Finland, Germany and Poland. 

Procedures  for  rehabilitation  after  a  loss  of  good  repute  are  not  prescribed  in  the 
Regulation,  and  as  a  result  there  some  Member  States  do  not  have  any  defined 
procedure  at  all  (e.g.  Ireland,  Latvia,  and  Bulgaria).    Several  Member  States  may 
require a person to follow specific training, pass an examination, or otherwise satisfy 
the  competent  authorities  that  they  are  rehabilitated  (UK,  Sweden,  Denmark).    In 
many  cases,  good  repute  is  reinstatement  after  a  certain  period  of  time  -  as 
examples: 

  Belgium: rehabilitation occurs after two years (or four in the case of repeated 

infringements).   

  Denmark: rehabilitation occurs after three years, provided the person passes a 

test.   

  Estonia: rehabilitation occurs after two years 
  France: any loss of good repute is accompanied by a deadline set in compliance 

 

with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
Italy: six months after the penalty imposed for illegal practice or breach of the 
obligations of nature and social security imposed on the employer. 

The aspect that varies most between Member States appears to be the way in which 
the  seriousness  of  the  offenses  are  defined  (see  Figure  10-1).    The  majority  of 
Member States strongly or slightly agree that the types of offenses considered “most 
serious”  are  appropriate  (70%)  and  clear  (64%).    At  the  same  time,  most  Member 
States  also  strongly  or  slightly  agree  that  further  guidance  is  required  to  ensure 
consistency between Member States in terms of the categorisation of offences by level 
of seriousness (65%), as well as the way in which their sanctions are aligned (52%).   

86  Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark,  France,  Germany,  Ireland,  Poland,  Slovakia,  Bulgaria,  Croatia, 

Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus, Czech Republic  

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Figure  10-1:  Member  State  responses  to  the  question:  Is  the  way  most 
serious offenses are defined in Annex IV of Regulation 1071/2009 both clear 
and appropriate? 

In  terms  of  improving  implementation,  the  Lithuanian  respondent  suggested  that 
procedures for exchanging information on good repute between Member States should 
be  established,  so  that  persons  who  had  lived  in  another  Member  State  would  not 
need to submit documents proving the good repute.  At present, even determining the 
appropriate body to issue such documents is challenging.   

10.2.1.3. 

Requirements for financial standing 

The  minimum  requirements  for  financial  standing  are  that  an  undertaking  must 
demonstrate  every  year,  that  it  has  at  its  disposal  capital  and  reserves  totalling  at 
least  EUR  9 000  when  only  one  vehicle  is  used  and  EUR 5 000  for  each  additional 
vehicle used 

Most  Member  States  (17)87  indicated  that  there  were  no  additional  requirements  for 
financial  standing  beyond  the  minimum  level  set  out  in  the  Regulation,  and 
furthermore  in  the  majority  of  cases  the  current  rules  had  not  changed  compared  to 
the  previous  situation  before  Regulation  1071/2009.    The  main  changes  appear  to 
have  involved  relatively  small  adjustments  to  the  minimum  capital  and  reserve 
requirements per vehicle (e.g. in Finland, prior to Regulation 1071/2009, requirement 
for  financial  standing  was  €10,000  for  every  truck  and  €4,000  for  every  additional 
vehicle), as well as the means by  which an  undertaking could demonstrate this (e.g. 
there was no requirement for presenting certified accounts).  

It is relatively rare for Member States to require a higher level of capital and reserves 
per  vehicle  than  the  minimum  levels  set  out  in  the  Regulations,  although  some 
countries  have  imposed  higher  thresholds  (e.g.  €50,000  for  the  first  vehicle  and 
€5,000  for  each  additional  vehicle  in  Italy).    A  few  Member  States  require  that 
applicants must not have substantial arrears (such as in Austria and Denmark).   

When  asked  about  any  provisions  that  could  lead  to  difficulties  or  inconsistencies  in 
interpretation, a range of issues were identified: 

 
 

It is not clear what exactly is meant by professional insurance (Austria) 
It's unclear what should be understood by the notion capital and reserves 
(Belgium, Finland) 

87  Belgium,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Luxembourg,  Sweden,  UK,  Italy,  Estonia,  Poland, 

Slovakia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus, Czech Republic  

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  The mechanism of checking if transport undertakings are capable of meeting 

 

their financial obligations throughout the business year is problematic (Croatia) 
It is not clear enough who could be the mentioned duly accredited person 
having a right to certify the annual accounts of transport undertaking (Estonia) 
  With regard to the bank guarantee, it is not clear who is to be declared on the 

guarantee (Germany, Italy, Slovakia) 

  No clear explanation of liability covered by insurance (Latvia, Slovakia) 
 

It is undefined how a newly established enterprise has to prove its financial 
standing if it was established in the course of current year and has not drawn 
up its financial statement (annual account) as yet (Lithuania) 

  The wording of Article 7.1 suggests that an undertaking must demonstrate 

yearly, that it has adequate resources at its disposal. Community licenses are 
issued for five year period, so there is no need to demonstrate financial 
standing every year (Finland). 

  Article 13.1(c)88 needs to be clarified (Ireland)  

10.2.1.4. 

Professional competence 

Professional  knowledge  shall  be  demonstrated  by  means  of  a  compulsory  written 
examination  which,  if  a  Member  State  so  decides,  may  be  supplemented  by  an  oral 
examination.    Most  Member  States  (13)89  report  that  there  are  no  additional 
requirements  for  professional  competence  above  those  set  out  in  the  Regulation.  
Other Member States report that they require: 

  Supplementary oral exams (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Slovak Republic); 
  Preparatory training (Denmark, Estonia, Ireland).  The duration of preparatory 

training is 108 hours in Denmark, 76 hours in Estonia and 110 hours in Ireland.  
In Belgium, it is only obligatory to attend the course (duration 115 hours) if the 
applicant fails the exam.   

The  French  ministry  mentioned  their  concern  that  the  examinations  are  not  of 
comparable levels of difficulty in all Member States, and hence could lead to diverging 
standards.   

Most  Member  States  have  not  exercised  their  rights  under  Article  8(4)  to  accredit 
centres for examination and training90, with the most common explanation being that 
there is no demand for accreditation and the current system is functioning well (e.g. in 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Sweden).   

The provision of national grants to cover the cost of training does not appear to be a 
widespread practice, and we did not find any evidence to suggest that it is a source of 
market  distortion.    Only  Ireland  reported  that  grants  were  provided  for  long-term 
unemployed, who constitute around 5% of total applicants – no other Member States 
identified that grants were available.   

When  asked  if  any  of  the  provisions  were  unclear,  the  following  responses  were 
received: 

 

It is not clear, why the exemption for persons who provide proof that they have 
continuously managed a road haulage undertaking or a road passenger 

88  a  time  limit  not  exceeding  6  months  where  the  requirement  of  financial  standing  is  not 

satisfied 

89  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Luxembourg,  Sweden,  UK,  Poland,  Slovakia,  Bulgaria,  Croatia, 

Lithuania, Cyprus, Czech Republic  

90  Austria,  France,  Luxembourg,  Sweden,  UK,  Poland,  Slovakia,  Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Latvia, 

Cyprus, Czech Republic  

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transport undertaking in one or more Member States for the period of 10 
years" must have occurred before 4 December 2009 although the Regulation 
applies with effect from 4 December 2011 (Austria) 

  The passing standards in the regulation are related to all subjects together and 
do not seem to allow Member States to take into account serious deficiencies 
on individual subjects (Belgium) 

  The comparability of the level of professional qualification across the EU should 

 

be studied, particularly regarding the level of difficulty of the written 
examinations (France) 
 Article 21 paragraph 1 of Regulation 1071/2009: It lacks a list of all authorities 
and bodies in the EU Member States, which are empowered to issue certificates 
as well as pictures of patterns of issued thence audit certificates with the 
relevant safety features (Germany) 

  We have some problems with documents approvals, per Article 21, para 2 

(Slovakia) 

  The meaning of “...have continuously managed a road haulage undertaking or 

a road passenger transport undertaking" is not clear (Sweden) 

  According to the Swedish Transport Agency there is no consolidated list of 

authorities according to article 27 (Sweden) 

  Possibilities of exemption in Article 8.7 are difficult to interpret and lead 
reasonably to different interpretations in different countries (Sweden) 

The  only  possible  loophole  was  identified  by  the  German  respondent,  who  reported 
that although Art. 8 No. 2 of Regulation 1071/2009 stipulates that the examination is 
taken  in  the  Member  State  where  the  person  has  their  personal  residence  or  where 
they want to work, the wording of Article 8 appears to allow a loophole.   

10.2.1.5. 

Designation of a transport manager 

Regulation 1071/2009 sets out that the transport manager may manage the transport 
activities of up to four different undertakings with a combined maximum total fleet of 
50 vehicles.  Member States may decide to lower the number of undertakings and/or 
the size of the total fleet of vehicles which that person may manage.  This option has 
been  exercised  in  some  Member  States,  for  example:  Finland  allows  the  transport 
manager to manage only one undertaking with a maximum of 50 vehicles; in France, 
an external manager is limited to two companies with a total maximum of 20 vehicles. 

The  concept  of  a  transport  manager  was  only  introduced  into  law  due  to  the 
Regulation  in  Austria,  Finland.    France  and  Germany  did  not  previously  have  the 
concept of an external transport manager.  

The  limits  of  a  maximum  of  four  companies  and  50  vehicles  were  not  applied  in 
several Member States:  

  Previously the condition of a maximum total fleet of 50 vehicles was not 

 

applied in Czech Republic  
In Lithuania, the transport manager could previously manage the transport 
activities of up to two different undertakings carried out with a combined 
maximum total fleet of 30 vehicles. 

  Belgium did not apply either limits of 50 vehicles or four companies 
  Cyprus (previously only one company was allowed).  

The  respondent  from  France  considered  that  the  actual  degree  of  involvement  that 
external  managers  can  have  in  the  management  of  a  company  could  be  called  into 
question  (considering  they  can  handle  up  to  four).  However,  they  note  that  it  is  too 
early to form a definite opinion since the Regulation has only been in force for a few 
years.    Nevertheless,  France  has  imposed  a  stricter  limit  for  external  managers  of 

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handling two companies for a total twenty vehicles. However,  they consider that this 
problem can lead some persons holding the certificate of professional competence for 
rent  it,  so  as  to  allow  some  trucking  companies  to  comply  with  the  rule,  without 
having to invest sufficiently in the current management of these companies. 

Issues highlighted by respondents are as follows: 

  The notions owner" and "shareholder" in article 4, 1, b are not clear. First of 
all, these aren't professional positions within an undertaking (Belgium) 
It is possible to become transport manager without being employed by the 
undertaking. It increases the risk of the undertakings uses a stooge (Denmark) 

 

  Transport Manager should always manage effectively and continuously the 
activities of the undertaking. In case of designated Transport Manager, 
controlling this may be quite difficult. The Finnish licencing authority requires a 
written contract in which the designated managers’ responsibilities are clearly 
defined. These contracts come in all shapes and forms and it is not fully 
understood by the undertakings, what the minimum responsibilities of a 
Transport Manager should be (Finland) 

  Role of transport manager is not defined accurately and particular 

 

discrepancies arise in practice (Slovakia) 
It could be argued that there is a gap between authority and responsibility in 
cases when the transport manager is an employee or a designated person 
outside the undertaking. (Sweden) 

Several  ministries  suggest  including  in  the  Regulation  a  more  detailed  list  of  the 
responsibilities/activities  of  the transport  manager in  order to  avoid  the  use  of “front 
men” (Germany, Finland, Slovakia, Sweden). 

A  possible  loophole  identified  by  Finland  is  the  possibility  to  use  fake  transport 
managers  who  do  not  actually  manage  an  undertaking,  but  merely  lend  their  good 
repute.   

10.2.1.6. 

Administrative simplification and cooperation 

Member  States  were  asked  whether  they  felt  that  setting  up  a  national  register  had 
improved the effectiveness of their enforcement activities.  Around 40%91 of Member 
States reported that setting up the register had no material impact on effectiveness – 
these  typically  included  larger  Member  States  with  significant  transport  volumes.   
Those  that  reported  improvements  in  effectiveness  (25%)92  were  generally  smaller 
Member States (in terms of transport volumes), who did not have a system already in 
place.    No  substantial  comments  were  offered  to  shed  further  light  on  these  trends, 
but  it  can  be  expected  that  the  major  effectiveness  gains  would  stem  from  the 
international cooperation via ERRU once interconnection is completed.     

91 Austria, France, Germany, Ireland, UK, Italy, Slovakia, Bulgaria 

92 Finland, Estonia, Croatia, Lithuania, Cyprus 

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Figure  10-2:  Member  State  responses  to  survey  question:  Have  you  found 
that  setting  up  a  national  electronic  register  of  road  transport  undertakings 
has  changed  the  effectiveness  of  enforcement  by  facilitating  better 
coordination of different administrative bodies within your Member State? 

Source: Ministry survey (N=15) 

Member  States  were  asked  about  the  impact  of  participating  in  ERRU  on  the 
effectiveness  of  their  cooperation.    Encouragingly,  many  Member  States  that  are 
participating  have  reported  that  they  feel  the  effectiveness  has  improved93,  whereas 
others report that they have not noticed any effect94.  

Figure 10-3: Member State responses to the question: How has participation 
in ERRU affected the cooperation between you and other Member States? 

The reasons for not having connected to ERRU were given as: 

  The performance is not sufficient yet (response times are too long) (Austria); 
  Croatia as a new Member State is currently at the testing stage 
  Cyprus reports that it is at the testing stage 
  Poland do not participate in the ERRU due to delays in terms of the conception 

of the system and functioning of the ERRU on the national level. 

  Extensive preparatory work was needed (Italy) 

Since a number of Member States are not yet connected to ERRU, stakeholders were 
also asked whether they expected any significant impacts.   Most ministries consulted 
were  hopeful  that  improvements  in  control  should  be  achieved  (Bulgaria,  Denmark, 
Estonia,  Finland,  France  and  Sweden),  indicating  a  high  level  of  support  for  the 
measures.  The respondents from Belgium and Germany noted that it was too early to 
tell.  Conversely, only the Austrian ministry reported that they still did not expect any 
substantial  impacts.    They  explained  that  language  barriers  impede  information 
sharing  between  Member  States,  since  Member  States  must  report  infringements  in 
the language of the host Member State.  They consider that translation would be “far 

93 Belgium, Ireland, Sweden, Estonia, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus 

94 Denmark, France, Germany, UK 

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too much administrative burden” and considered that it does not add anything to road 
traffic  safety.    Responses  from  the  high  level  survey  from  both  trade  unions  and 
industry associations called for the completion of ERRU as a matter of urgency. 

10.2.1.7. 

Additional requirements 

Article 3(2) of the Regulation allows Member States to impose additional requirements 
next  to  the  four  requirements  given  in  Article  3(1)  of  the  Regulation  (i.e.  next  to 
having  an  effective  and  stable  establishment;  being  of  good  repute;  having  an 
appropriate financial standing and having the requisite professional competence). 

Few Member States have reported any additional requirements under Article 3(2).   

  Estonia: A licence applicant and a licence holder must be registered in the 

commercial register or in the register of non-profit associations and 
foundations; The licence issuer may refuse to issue a licence if the applicant 
has non-staggered tax arrears or the court has declared the applicant 
bankrupt; The licence issuer may refuse to issue a licence if the applicant’s 
previous licence was revoked on the basis of clauses 191 2) to 6) of this Act 
less than two years ago; The licence issuer may refuse to issue a licence if the 
applicant is subject to an occupational ban in the field of road transport 
imposed by a final judgment in a business-related criminal offence or a 
prohibition on enterprise or a prohibition on business arising from law or a 
judicial decision.   

  Sweden: The competent authority may prescribe conditions under which a 
transport undertaking is authorised to engage in the occupation of road 
transport operator, when authorisation is given or later. (2 kap. 7 § SFS 
2012:210). Specific reasons are required for the authority to announce such 
conditions. Conditions shall be in accordance with Art 3.2. For example, 
licensees could be required to report their financial situation at certain 
intervals. 

10.2.1.8. 

Penalties 

As  shown  in  Figure  10-1,  the  majority  of  Member  States  consulted  for  this  study 
strongly  or  slightly  agree  that  the  types  of  offenses  considered  “most  serious”  are 
appropriate (70%) and clear (64%).   

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Figure  10-4:  Member  State  responses  to  the  question:  Is  the  way  most 
serious offenses are defined in Annex IV of Regulation 1071/2009 both clear 
and appropriate? 

Strongly agree 

Slightly agree 

Neutral 

Slightly disagree 

Strongly disagree 

Don't know 

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

The types of offenses considered “most 
serious” are clear 

The types of offenses considered “most 
serious” are appropriate 

Further guidance is required to ensure
consistency between Member States in the
categorisation of offenses by level of…

At  the  same  time,  most  Member  States  also  strongly  or  slightly  agree  that  further 
guidance  is  required  to  ensure  consistency  between  Member  States  in  terms  of  the 
categorisation of offences by level of seriousness (65%), as well as the way in which 
their sanctions are aligned (52%).   

10.2.2. 

Regulation 1072/2009 

10.2.2.1. 

Cabotage provisions 

None  of  the  Member  States  that  responded  to  the  survey  identified  any  additional 
provisions  in  their  country  relating  to  requirements  on  fees,  providing  advance 
warning or requirements  for specific additional documentation.  In Belgium the client 
can be held co-responsible for having given instructions to the carrier which have led 
to the non-compliance of the cabotage rule.  

The documentation needed to prove lawful cabotage was raised as a potential issue in 
interviews  and  in  the  survey.    Regulation  1072/2009  does  not  require  that  these 
documents  must  be  on-board  the  vehicle  when  it  is  stopped  for  control  purposes. 
According  to  the  French  ministry,  obtaining  the  documents  is  therefore  time-
consuming because the drivers have often to request it from his/her company. A lot of 
time  is  then  lost  to the  associated  administrative cost  for  authorities  and  companies.  
Denmark  requires  on-the-spot  provision  of  the  required  documentation  in  order  to 
avoid  this  problem,  or  alternatively  electronic  forwarding  within  a  quite  short  time  is 
accepted (see Annex C, case study on Denmark – Section 11).   

Member  States  reported  generally  positive  impacts  in  terms  of  achieving  the 
objectives,  with  89%  of  respondents  saying  that  the  Regulations  had  a  significant  or 
slight  positive  effect  in  terms  of  clarifying  definitions  of  the  temporary  nature  of 
cabotage.  95% of respondents felt that there had been a significant or slight positive 
effect in terms of ensuring common rules, and 79% felt there were significant or slight 
positive  effect  in  terms  of  enabling  enforcement.    Importantly,  no  Member  States 
identified any slight or significant negative impacts in any of these areas.   

The  majority  of  respondents  felt  that  EU  rules  and  guidelines  were  clear  for  certain 
provisions, including: 

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  When a haulier is permitted to start cabotage operations (i.e. requirements on 
what the preceding transport operation must have been) (63% of respondents 
feel that rules and guidelines are clear); 

  When the 7-day period starts and how it is calculated (73%); 
 

Interaction with the ECMT (European Conference of Ministers of Transport) 
multilateral permit system (63%) 

Member State ministries participating in the survey identified “significant ambiguities” 
regarding, in particular: 

  How to count the number of operations when there are several loading and 

 

unloading points (44% of respondents);  
Interaction with rules regarding combined transport (as per the Combined 
Transport Directive, 92/106/EEC) (33% of respondents);  

  Concerning the three day limit and performing cabotage operations in several 

Member States (32% of respondents); and 

  Provisions regarding what documentary proof is required of the caboteur and 

what use enforcers are permitted to make of other evidence (22%). 

The majority of Member States consulted for this study (13) 95 felt that there were no 
imbalances  of  supply  and  demand  created  by  the  cabotage  provisions.    Most  others 
provided no opinion (Cyprus, Finland, Luxembourg, and Sweden). Ireland and the UK 
mention  specific  problems  with  movement  of  new  cars  and  vans  during  the  peak 
registration  periods.    The  respondent  from  Belgium  felt  that  small  countries  were 
disadvantaged  because  a  haulier  can  easily  bypass  these  limitations  by  performing  a 
new international transport after the three cabotage operations.   

In  the  event  of  “serious  disturbance(s)  of  the  national  transport  market”  that  occur 
due to (or are aggravated by) cabotage, Regulation 1072/2009 permits governments 
to refer to the Commission with a view to adopting safeguard measures, as per Article 
10(1).    When  asked  whether  these  provisions  were  still  required,  Member  State 
responses  were  split  –with  nine  Member  States  in  favour  of  keeping  them  (Belgium, 
Croatia,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Sweden,  Italy)  and  five  in 
favour  of  dropping  them  (Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Ireland  [in  view  of  further 
liberalisation], Lithuania, Poland). 

Around  half  of  the  Member  States  consulted  for  this  study  apply  the  same  cabotage 
rules  to  vehicles  <3.5t  (Belgium,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Latvia, 
Poland, Slovak Republic, Sweden), whereas the remainder have less restrictive rules.   

One possible impact of excluding vehicles <3.5t from cabotage rules is that operators 
may switch to lighter vehicles.   There is very little hard data on the extent of this in 
practice, since it not explicitly monitored in most countries.   The majority of Member 
States  participating  in  the  survey  felt  that  there  was  no  or  very  little  impact,  but 
respondents from Germany and France both felt that there was a significant impact on 
switching  to  lighter  vehicles,  whereas  an  authority  from  Belgium  suggested  that  this 
practice  was  being  used  especially  by  Polish  hauliers  (although  no  quantitative  data 
was  available).      A  Danish  stakeholder  suggested  that  there  was  a  role  to  play  for 
lighter touch regulation of vehicles <3.5t, since Danish businesses in the <3.5 market 
are  becoming  concerned  about  the  bad  reputation  these  businesses  have  –  for 
business, road safety, and behaviour. 

95   Austria,  Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Estonia,  France,  Germany,  Latvia, 

Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Italy. 

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10.2.2.2. 

Control documents 

Around  half  of  the  Member  States  consulted  for  this  study  report  that  they  made 
changes  to  the  format  of  certified  true  copies  of  Community  Licences  in  order  to 
comply  with  Regulation  1072/2009  (Austria,  Denmark,  Finland,  Germany,  Ireland, 
Sweden,  Italy,  Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Czech  Republic).    The  changes  mainly  related  to 
adding  security  features  and  updating  the  formatting  to  be  consistent  with  the 
requirements in Annex I and II. 

According to Article 4(2), the Community licence shall be issued for renewable periods 
of  up  to 10  years.    Member  States  typically  issue  licences  for  periods  of  5  years 
(Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, UK) or 10 years (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Germany,  Slovak  Republic,  Sweden).  
One  stakeholder  remarks  that  having  renewal  periods  as  long  as  10  years  can 
complicate the monitoring of companies.   

Finally,  the  German  respondent  noted  a  particular  issue  with  the  translation  of  the 
legal text: the English term "certified true copy" is reproduced in the German text as 
only  “certified  copies”.  In  practice,  this  has  already  led  to  a  photocopies  of  a  license 
issued  by  the  licensing  authority  to  be  created  authenticated  by  a  non-competent 
authority.    

10.3.  Enforcement authorities  

The consultation of enforcement authorities aimed to gather much of the quantitative 
information needed to answer the evaluation questions on efficiency and effectiveness.   

A total of 20 different enforcement authorities responded to the survey.  The questions 
were split into separate parts covering the two Regulations, since (multiple) different 
authorities  may  have  responsibility  for  one  or  both  Regulations.    15  responses  were 
received  to  the  first  part  on  Regulation  1071/2009,  including  authorities  from  14 
different  Member  States,  of  which  nine  were  EU15  (France;  Netherlands;  Denmark; 
Austria; Ireland; UK; Luxembourg; Spain; Finland) and five were EU13 (Poland; Czech 
Republic; Bulgaria; Romania; Latvia).  15 responses to the second part on Regulation 
1072/2009, including authorities from 11 different Member States, of which five were 
EU15  (France;  Netherlands;  Denmark;  Austria;  Germany)  and  six  were  EU13  (Czech 
Republic; Poland; Romania; Slovenia; Latvia; Bulgaria). 

10.3.1. 

Regulation 1071/2009 

The majority (as shown in Figure 10-5) of enforcement authorities reported that most 
provisions  of  Regulation  1071/2009  did  not  cause  difficulties  with  enforcement.    The 
main area of contention appears to be the obligations for cooperation across borders.    

274 

 
 
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Figure  10-5:  Responses  from  enforcement  authorities  to  the  question:  Are 
there  any  parts  of  the  provisions  in  Regulation  1071/2009  that  may  lead  to 
difficulties in monitoring and enforcement? 

Source: survey of enforcement authorities (N=15) 

It is difficult to assess any systematic differences between responses from EU-13 and 
EU-15  Member  States  since  there  was  a  relatively  low  number  of  overall  responses 
(five  concerning  EU-13  Member  States).  Overall,  a  higher  share  of  EU-15  Member 
States  reported  no  or  few  difficulties  with  enforcement  of  specific  requirements.  
Cooperation  across  borders  stood  out  as  the  requirement  that  attracted  the  highest 
number of “significant difficulties” (Denmark, Luxembourg and Germany).  

Table 10-2: Responses split by EU-13 versus EU-15 Member States 

or 

No 
difficulties 
enforce 

few 
to 

Some 
difficulties 

Significant 
difficulties 

Not  applicable 
or don’t know 

Requirements for checks on 
stable and effective 
establishment 

Move to use of a risk rating 
system for targeting checks 

Common rules on 
requirements for financial 
standing 

Common rules on 
requirements for good 
repute 

Common rules on 
requirements for 
professional competence 

Requirement for a 
designated transport 
manager 

Obligation to maintain 
national electronic register 
and connect this with ERRU 

Obligations for cooperation 
across borders 

EU-15 

90% 

EU-13 

40% 

EU-15 

60% 

EU-13 

20% 

EU-15 

90% 

EU-13 

80% 

EU-15 

100% 

EU-13 

20% 

EU-15 

80% 

EU-13 

100% 

EU-15 

78% 

EU-13 

80% 

EU-15 

70% 

EU-13 

0% 

EU-15 

40% 

EU-13 

20% 

10% 

40% 

20% 

60% 

0% 

20% 

0% 

80% 

10% 

0% 

11% 

20% 

20% 

75% 

20% 

80% 

0% 

20% 

0% 

0% 

0% 

0% 

0% 

0% 

0% 

0% 

0% 

0% 

10% 

0% 

30% 

0% 

0% 

0% 

20% 

20% 

10% 

0% 

0% 

0% 

10% 

0% 

11% 

0% 

0% 

25% 

10% 

0% 

Source: survey of enforcement authorities (5 respondents from EU-13 and 10 from EU-15) 

275 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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The main contributing factor to the difficulties was reported to be a lack of manpower 
to  carry  out  enforcement  (Figure  10-6).    Specifically,  the  respondent  from  France 
noted  that  in-depth  examination  of  the  files  requires  significant  resources  in  human 
resources.  This is also likely to be related to the second-most important contributing 
factor identified by the respondents: lack of staff with appropriate knowledge.  That is, 
it  is  important  to  have  staff  with  a  high  level  of  skill  due  to  the  complexity  of  the 
legislation.   

Figure 10-6:  Responses from enforcement authorities to the question: What 
are  the  main  reasons  that  contribute  to  difficulties  in  enforcement  of 
Regulation 1071/2009? 

Source: survey of enforcement authorities (N=15) 

Other potential areas contributing to enforcement problems received a broadly similar 
ranking  overall,  with  around  40-50%  of  respondents  identifying  them  as  having  at 
least some contribution, which indicates that there are many different issues at work, 
and it was similarly identified as the factor making the most significant contribution by 
EU-15  and  EU-13  respondents.    There  were  small  differences  in  the  identification  of 
contributing  factors  between  the  EU-15  and  EU13.    A  higher  share  of  EU-13 
respondents  felt  that  lack  of  clarity,  differences  in  interpretations,  lack  of  staff  with 
appropriate knowledge and poor information on appeals procedures made a significant 
contribution  to  difficulties  in  enforcement,  but  this  was  mainly  due  to  the  responses 
from  the  Polish  authority.    Minor  differences  in  the  distribution  of  response  were 
received  for  the  contribution  of  other  factors,  but  due  to  the  low  number  of 
respondents  these  shares  are  strongly  affected  by  the  choices  of  each  individual  and 
do not provide a very robust insight into overall conditions.    

Table 10-3: Responses split by EU-13 versus EU-15 Member States 

Significant 
contribution 

Some 
contribution 

or 

No 
minor 
contribution 

Not  applicable 
or don’t know 

Lack of clarity in provision 

EU-13 

25% 

EU-15 

0% 

EU-15 

0% 

Differences across Member 
States in interpretation 
and/or implementation of the 
provisions of Regulation 
1071/2009 

40% 

50% 

30% 

40% 

25% 

30% 

20% 

0% 

40% 

EU-13 

25% 

50% 

25% 

0% 

276 

 
 
 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Significant 
contribution 

Some 
contribution 

or 

No 
minor 
contribution 

Not  applicable 
or don’t know 

Lack of staff with appropriate 
knowledge 

Lack of manpower to carry 
out enforcement 

EU-15 

EU-13 

EU-15 

EU-13 

EU-15 

10% 

25% 

30% 

25% 

20% 

Language barriers 

EU-13 

0% 

EU-15 

EU-13 

20% 

25% 

EU-15 

11% 

EU-13 

EU-15 

EU-13 

0% 

0% 

0% 

EU-15 

22% 

EU-13 

0% 

EU-15 

10% 

Enforcement is costly 

The means of evading the 
rules are becoming more 
sophisticated 

Difficulties in cooperation 
with other national bodies 

Difficulties 
in  cooperation 
with competent authorities in 
other Member States 

Lack  of,  or  poor  information 
appeals 
available 
on, 
against 
procedures 
across 
infringements 
Member States 

30% 

0% 

30% 

25% 

10% 

50% 

20% 

25% 

33% 

50% 

40% 

25% 

33% 

50% 

20% 

50% 

75% 

30% 

50% 

50% 

50% 

30% 

50% 

22% 

50% 

30% 

75% 

22% 

50% 

30% 

10% 

0% 

10% 

0% 

20% 

0% 

30% 

0% 

33% 

0% 

30% 

0% 

22% 

0% 

40% 

EU-13 

25% 

50% 

25% 

0% 

Source: survey of enforcement authorities (5 respondents from EU-13 and 10 from EU-15) 

The  respondent  from  France  felt  that  the  requirement  of  establishment  and  the 
designated  transport  manager  help  to  make  circumvention  of  the  Regulation  more 
difficult.  The respondent from the Netherlands felt that the main problem was the lack 
of an European Road Transport Agency and the lack of commitment in some Member 
States  to  invest  in  cooperation  within  Euro  Contrôle  Route.    Concerning  difficulties  in 
cooperation  between  Member  States,  the  respondent  from  Denmark  reported  that 
they  do  not  receive  any  data  from  other  countries,  whereas  the  French  respondent 
claimed  that  there  is  not  always  feedback  from  the  liaison  offices  of  the  various 
member countries. 

When  asked  about  potential  loopholes  in  the  Regulation,  respondents  were  split: 
seven felt there were loopholes (Poland, Romania, France, Netherlands, UK, Finland)) 
and five felt there were not (Denmark, Austria, Luxembourg, Spain, Germany).  When 
asked to comment on their answers, the potential loopholes were explained as: 

  Discretionary  flexibility  given  to  Member  States  (based  on  the  principle  of 
impact  on 

inequality  and  has  negative 

to 

subsidiarity)  contributes 
harmonisation (Netherlands) 

  Member  States  could  be  more  vigilant  in  the  operators  they  are  prepared  to 

authorise (UK) 

  Exchanging information on infringements between Member States is not at the 

level it was supposed to be (Finland)  

  One of the most significant issues that have recently arisen is the phenomenon 

of so called letter box companies (Poland) 

  More details are needed on how one can determine whether the withdrawal of 

good repute is disproportionate (Romania) 

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Authorities  were  asked  to  qualitatively  rank  the  most  important  factors  that  could 
contribute  to  investment  costs  (Figure  10-7).    The  responses  indicated  that  the 
national register and ERRU were by far the most important.  

Figure 10-7: Responses to the question: What factors contributed to the one-
off investment costs? 

Source: survey of enforcement authorities (N=15) 

The  relative  importance  of  the  obligations  to  maintain  a  national  electronic  register 
and connect this with ERRU are also clear when examining the responses split by EU-
13  and  EU-15  Member  States,  where  it  remained  by  far  the  most  important 
contributor  to  investment  costs  identified  by  both  groups  (Figure  10-8).    EU-13 
respondents  identified  the  establishment  of  a  risk  rating  system  as  a  slightly  higher 
cost.  Responses across other categories of costs were broadly similar.   

278 

 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Figure  10-8:  Responses  split  by  EU-15  and  EU-13  respondents  to  the 
question: What factors contributed to the one-off investment costs? 

Source: survey of enforcement authorities (5 respondents from EU-13 and 10 from EU-15) 

Respondents  were  also  asked  about  the  effect  of  the  Regulation  on  ongoing  (annual 
costs).    The  results  show  slight  mix  of  reactions  (Figure  10-9),  with  roughly  equal 
numbers  reporting  increases  and  decreases  in  costs,  whereas  the  majority  reported 
that there was no material impact.  This seems to indicate that on balance there have 
not  been  increases  or  decreases  due  to  most  of  the  provisions  –  the  provision  that 
causes the most uncertainty among the respondents is the risk rating system, where 
36% of respondents could not provide a qualitative estimate.  

Figure 10-9: What effect on ongoing (annual) costs has each of the following 
provisions had since the adoption of the Regulation? 

279 

 
 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Source: survey of enforcement authorities (N=15) 

When  split  by  EU-15  and  EU-13  Member  States  (Figure  10-10),  the  responses  still 
indicate  that  both  groups  largely  experienced  no  material  impact.    However,  the 
reductions in costs appear to have benefitted EU-15 respondents, whereas most of the 
significant  increases  were  reported  by  EU-13  respondents  (Poland,  who  commented 
that this was due to the  cost  of  creation  of  a national  register  and Bulgaria,  who did 
not substantiate their reply).  

Figure  10-10:  Responses  split  by  EU-15  and  EU-13  Member  States:  What 
effect  on  ongoing  (annual)  costs  has  each  of  the  following  provisions  had 
since the adoption of the Regulation? 

Source: survey of enforcement authorities (5 respondents from EU-13 and 10 from EU-15) 

One  comment  from Latvia suggested  that  there  were  some  increases  in  costs due to 
additional  maintenance  of  the  national  register.    The  respondent  from  Romania 
highlights that for checking the stable and effective establishment of the undertaking, 
the  enforcer  checks  the  specific  documents  at  the  address  of  the  premises.  For 
checking  the  good  repute,  the  officer  checks  the  criminal  records  of  the  transport 
manager and of the transport undertaking and in data base the infringements that led 
to the loss of good repute.  The respondent from Finland commented that as resources 
have  become  scarcer  there  has  been  urgent  need  to  build  electronic  interfaces 
between different national authorities. Building and maintaining these connections has 
led to some costs. 

When asked for suggestions as to how the cost of the Regulations could be improved, 
respondents provided the following suggestions: 

  Clear unambiguous, easy to apply and enforceable rules (Netherlands); 

  Redesign  ERRU  into  a  simple  multipurpose  system  also  suitable  for  direct 

enforcement and risk rating (Netherlands);  

  Motivate and stimulate international cooperation of the ECR (Netherlands); 

280 

 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

  Desk based compliance assessments (UK); 

  Earned recognition for compliant operators (UK); 

  Develop and implement automatic control system by using IT applications that 
contribute  to  information  flow  and  improve  the  efficiency  of  enforcement 
(Romania). 

The other respondents did not provide any suggestions.  

Regarding  the  need  for  further  guidance  on  the  categorisation  of  infringements  and 
associated penalties, enforcement authorities appeared to be broadly supportive of the 
current form of Annex IV of Regulation 1071/2009, but still showing some uncertainty 
of the clarity and appropriateness of the categories (Figure 10-11).   

Figure  10-11:    Responses  from  enforcement  authorities  to  the  question:  Is 
the way  the Commission  has described serious  offenses and categorised  the 
most  serious  offenses  in  Annex  IV  of  the  Regulation  both  clear  and 
appropriate? 

Source: survey of enforcement authorities (N=15) 

When  split  by  EU-15  versus  EU-13  responses  (Figure  10-12),  there  appears  to  be 
more agreement that current categories and descriptions are clear/appropriate among 
the  EU-15  respondents.  Respondents  calling  for  additional  guidance  included  the 
authorities  from  Poland,  Romania,  Latvia,  Bulgaria,  Netherlands,  Denmark  and 
Finland.  

281 

 
 
 
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Figure 10-12: Responses from enforcement authorities to the question: Is the 
way the Commission has described serious offenses and categorised the most 
serious offenses in Annex IV of the Regulation both clear and appropriate? 

Source: survey of enforcement authorities (5 respondents from EU-13 and 10 from EU-15) 

Respondents  were  asked  to  specific  which  provisions  in  particular  are  considered 
unclear or inappropriate.  Replies received included: 

  Point  1,  letter  b  of  the  Annex  IV  of  Regulation  1071/2009  –  the  respondent 

called for more guidance (Romania); 

  A  practical  approximation  of  sanctions  between  Member  States  could  be 
explored.  However,  this  is  an  area  that  touches  the  penal  systems  of  the 
Member  States,  introducing  a  serious  element  of  complexity  to  advance  the 
process (France); 

  The  drivers  hours  offences  are  ambiguous.  An  expired  driving  licence  by  e.g. 
one  day  is  seen  as  a  serious  offence,  although  in  national  legislation  this  is  a 
minor offence (Netherlands);  

  There are major differences within Member States related to who in case of an 
offence is addressed; the driver, the transport manager, the transport company 
as legal entity or a combination of these actors. When the driver is addressed 
as  defendant,  ERRU  is  left  out  totally  by  not  leaving  traces  in  the  system 
(Netherlands); 

  The  Serious  Infringements  of  Annex  4  also  must  include  infringement  of  the 

cabotage rules (Denmark) 

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When asked whether they felt the current penalty systems in their respective Member 
States  were  proportionate  and  dissuasive,  none  of  the  respondents  responded 
negatively.    The  replies  were  approximately  evenly  split  between  strong  agreement, 
slight  agreement  and  neutral.    One  Irish  enforcement  authority  interviewed  for  this 
study  commented  that  the  time  delay  between  the  detection  and  the  subsequent 
appearance in court reduces the effectiveness of the penalty.   

Enforcement  authorities  were  asked  whether  setting  up  a  national  electronic  register 
of road transport undertakings led to changes in the effectiveness of enforcement by 
facilitating  better  coordination  of  different  administrative  bodies  within  their  Member 
State.    In  several  countries,  the  register  already  existed  and  as  such  there  was  no 
change (France, Latvia, Denmark).  Three respondents felt that the risk rating system 
had  improved  the  effectiveness  of  checks  (Luxembourg,  Spain,  Finland),  while  three 
felt it had improved the efficiency of checks (UK, Spain, Finland). The UK respondent 
noted that “Although there has been an improvement, there is still room for significant 
further improvement.”  The Spanish authority commented that the risk rating system 
is not mandatory in their view according to the Regulations.  

When  asked  specifically  about  whether  they  could  now  conduct  fewer  checks  in  total 
due  to  Regulation  1071/2009  than  they  otherwise  would  have,  most  enforcement 
authorities  were  unable  to  give  an  answer.    Several  felt  that  they  did  not  conduct 
fewer  checks  (Latvia,  Romania,  France,  Finland,  and  Germany).    Denmark  felt  that 
they did conduct fewer checks although were not able to quantify the number. The UK 
felt  they  conducted fewer checks as a result  of  their national  targeting  methodology, 
rather than the implementation of Regulation 1071/2009. 

Respondents  were  asked  how  the  requirements  for  administrative  cooperation  might 
be  made  more  effective.    The  respondent  from  Poland  reported  that  “In  our  opinion 
current  legislation  in  field  of  minimum  requirements  for  administrative  cooperation 
across borders is sufficient. It enables Member States to enhance cooperation and on 
the other hand ensures leeway.” Suggestions included: 

  Administrative cooperation across borders  will be more effective once ERRU is 

set up (Romania); 

  By providing an unified forms for information requests (Latvia); 

  The implementation term of a European control agency for road transport could 
be  the  right  framework  of  coordinated  initiatives  and  sharing  best  practices 
(France); 

  Lack  of  an  European  Road  Transport  Agency  and  the  lack  of  commitment  in 
some  member  states  to  invest  in  European  cooperation  within,  e.g.  Euro 
Contrôle Route (Netherlands); 

 

It  should  be  a  requirement  that  Member  States  should  answer  the  inquiries 
they  receive  from  other  member  States.  Today  critical  questions  are  not 
answered (Denmark); 

  Through ERRU, but ERRU has informational purposes only (Spain); 

  For  German  operating  inspectors  it  must  be  allowed  to  perform  inspections  in 
the foreign companies with their foreign supervisory authorities (Germany). 

Enforcement authorities were asked about the extent to which they felt the Regulation 
had  achieved  a  positive/negative  effect  on  compliance  with  road  transport  social 
legislation  (i.e.  the  EU  driving/rest/break  time  Regulation  and  the  EU  road  transport 
working  time  Directive).    Responses  showed  broad  support  for  the  Regulation,  with 
around  50-60%  reporting  positive  effects  for  each  provision,  and  no  authorities  felt 
there were negative impacts (Figure 10-13).  

283 

 
 
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Figure  10-13:  Responses  to  the  question  -  To  what  extent  do  you  think  the 
following  measures  had  a  positive/negative  effect  on  compliance  with  road 
transport social legislation? 

Source: survey of enforcement authorities (N=15) 

Respondents were not able to quantify the effect.  The enforcement authority from the 
Netherlands  specifically  commented  that  “These  effects,  if  existing,  are  either  not 
known  or  measurable.”    When  asked  to  quantify  the  additional  number  of 
infringements  of  social  legislation  that  had  been  detected  as  a  result  of  Regulation 
1071/2009,  most  respondents  were  unable  to  provide  information.    The  respondent 
from  Romania  estimated  that  58  infringements  had  been  found,  or  0.002%  of  the 
total.  The respondent from Poland estimated  that an additional  5% of infringements 
of road transport social legislation were detected.  

When asked about any other positive effects of the legislation.  The French respondent 
noted  that  the  French  legislation  was  inspired  by  the  1071/2009  Regulation  to 
strengthen  and  improve  the  conditions  of  access  to  carriers  occupation  resorting  to 
light vehicles.  The respondent from the Netherlands emphasised the improvements in 
international  contacts,  cooperation,  improved  information  and  harmonisation.    The 
respondent  from  Luxembourg  noted  that  now  a  minimum  standard  for  professional 
qualification has been achieved.   

Similarly,  respondents  were  asked  about  any  other  negative  impacts.    The  French 
respondent  warned  about  the  risks  of  excluding  vehicles  under  3.5  tonnes  from  the 
scope and felt that consequently, they are increasingly used for the same purposes as 
heavy vehicles to enter the same market.  The respondent from Latvia noted that the 
additional information processing required extra staff.  

10.3.2. 

Regulation 1072/2009 

Enforcement  authorities  were  asked  whether  there  were  any  specific  difficulties  with 
enforcement  of  Regulation  1072/2009  (Figure  10-14).    They  identified  the  most 
significant  difficulties  around  how  to  count  the  number  of  operations  when  there  are 
several loading and unloading points, similarly to the responses received from national 
ministries.    The  majority  of  respondents  (between  50-60%)  identified  at  least  some 
difficulties  with  the  other  provisions,  suggesting  that  overall  the  enforcement  of 
Regulation  1072/2009  is  more  challenging  than  for  1071/2009.    Despite  this,  some 
enforcer  claimed  that  they  faced  no  difficulties  regarding  the  enforcement  –  the 
difficulties therefore appear to be highly influenced by the national situation.   

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Figure  10-14:  Responses  from  enforcement  authorities  to  the  question:  Are 
there  any  parts  of  the  provisions  in  Regulation  1072/2009  that  may  lead  to 
difficulties in monitoring and enforcement? 

Source: survey of enforcement authorities (N=14) 

Respondents  from  EU-13  countries  reported  overall  fewer  difficulties  in  enforcement 
across all of the categories, with the largest discrepancy relating to the interpretation 
of multi-drop transit (Figure 10-15).  

Figure  10-15:  Responses  split  by  EU-15  and  EU-13  respondents  from 
enforcement authorities to the question: Are there any parts of the provisions 
in  Regulation  1072/2009  that  may  lead  to  difficulties  in  monitoring  and 
enforcement? 

Source: survey of enforcement authorities (7 respondents from EU-13 and 7 from EU-15) 

Specific  comments  were  sought  in  order  to  substantiate  these  responses.    The 
respondent  from  Latvia  noted  that  there  were  no  problems  with  cabotage  in  their 
country.  The French authority identified ambiguities with respect to certain provisions, 

285 

 
 
 
 
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the  differences  in  interpretation  and  the  heterogeneity  of  controls  in  other  Member 
States.  They also reported that “monitoring compliance of the period of three days is 
impossible  to  perform”  and  suggested  that  “the  obligation  to  mention  the  time  and 
date of loading and unloading, should be added to the evidence referred to in art. 8.3 
of  Regulation  1072/2009,  since  data  are  lacking  for  the  controllers”.    They  also  note 
that  “There  was  conflict  between  standards  Directive  92/106  and  Regulation 
1072/2009  in  the  beginning,  but  since  then  the  interpretative  notes  of  the  French 
authorities  as  the  Commission  has  resolved  the  situation  and  it  is  clear  that  a 
transaction coming within the scope of Directive 92/106 is not considered a cabotage 
operation. That  said,  other  multimodal  transport  situations  arise:  it  is  the  case  of 
multimodal  dimension  to  operations  that  do  not  fall  within  the  scope  of  the  Directive 
because,  for  example,  the  leg  of  the  route  taken  by  sea  is  below  the  threshold 
prescribed  by  the  directive  (Channel  crossing). A  need  for  regulatory  clarification  or 
interpretation  is  needed  at  EU  level  for  these  situations. The  ECMT  system  prohibits 
cabotage: so there is no interaction between the two legal regimes.” 

The  respondent  from  the  Netherlands  highlighted  that  the  provisions  in  article  8  are 
not clear on whether or not the driver has to produce the required documents at the 
roadside  during  a  roadside  check.      The  determination  of  the  date  and  the  place  of 
entry in NL is also considered a problem, as well as the number of journeys in relation 
to  loading  and  unloading  in  the  Member  State.  Finally,  the  respondent  noted  issues 
with the CMR transport documents and the other required administration, in order to 
determine the number of cabotage trips in the member state.     

The respondent from Ireland also pointed out ambiguity as to whether an operator is 
permitted  to  produce  documentation  to  show  compliance  with  cabotage  rules  after  a 
roadside  check.    The  national  enforcement  practice  is  that  such  documentation  must 
be presented to the inspecting officer at the time of the roadside check and not after 
the  event.  Non-standard  forms  and  documentation  leave  the  regime  open  to 
fraudulent activity by unscrupulous operators. 

The contributing factors to any difficulties in enforcement were similar to those listed 
for  Regulation  1071/2009,  with  lack  of  manpower  and  staff  with  appropriate 
knowledge identified as leading factors.  This similarity in contributing factors is to be 
expected since checks of both Regulations are often carried out at the same time.   

The  lack  of  clarity  in  provisions,  differing  interpretations  across  Member  States  and 
increasingly  sophisticated  means  of  evading  detection  were  identified  as  more 
important  factors  for  Regulation  1072/2009,  as  well  as  difficulties  in  cross-border 
cooperation (Figure 10-16).   

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Figure 10-16: Responses from enforcement authorities to the question: What 
are  the  main  reasons  that  contribute  to  difficulties  in  enforcement  of 
Regulation 1072/2009? 

Source: survey of enforcement authorities (N=13) 

Overall,  EU-15  respondents  highlighted  several  categories  as  making  a  more 
significant  contribution  to  difficulties  in  enforcement,  including:  lack  of  clarity  in  the 
provisions,  differences  in  interpretation  of  the  provisions,  cost  of  enforcement, 
increasingly sophisticated means of evading the rules.  Conversely, EU-13 respondents 
reported a lack of staff with adequate knowledge and lack of manpower as being more 
significant  factors  compared  to  EU-15  respondents.    Overall,  the  profile  of  responses 
was not widely differentiated – lack of manpower, differing interpretations and a lack 
of clarity in the provisions were highlighted as the most major issues in both groups, 
with EU-13 respondents reporting additional major issues (more than half reporting at 
least some contribution to problems) concerning language barriers.  

Table 10-4: Responses split by EU-13 versus EU-15 Member States 

Significant 
contribution 

Some 
contribution 

No  or  minor 
contribution 

Not 
applicable  or 
don’t know 

Lack of clarity in provisions 

EU-13 

17% 

EU-15 

33% 

Differences across Member 
States in interpretation and/or 
implementation of the 
provisions of Regulation 
1072/2009 

Lack of staff with appropriate 
knowledge 

Lack of manpower to carry 
out enforcement 

EU-15 

14% 

EU-13 

EU-15 

0% 

0% 

EU-13 

33% 

EU-15 

29% 

EU-13 

50% 

EU-15 

17% 

Language barriers 

EU-13 

17% 

Enforcement is costly 

EU-15 

29% 

50% 

33% 

57% 

50% 

43% 

17% 

43% 

17% 

33% 

50% 

14% 

287 

17% 

33% 

14% 

0% 

57% 

50% 

29% 

33% 

50% 

33% 

29% 

0% 

17% 

14% 

50% 

0% 

0% 

0% 

0% 

0% 

0% 

29% 

 
 
 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Significant 
contribution 

Some 
contribution 

No  or  minor 
contribution 

Not 
applicable  or 
don’t know 

EU-13 

0% 

EU-15 

43% 

EU-13 

17% 

EU-15 

EU-13 

0% 

0% 

EU-15 

14% 

EU-13 

EU-15 

0% 

0% 

33% 

14% 

33% 

17% 

0% 

14% 

33% 

43% 

50% 

14% 

50% 

33% 

83% 

57% 

17% 

29% 

17% 

29% 

0% 

50% 

17% 

14% 

50% 

29% 

EU-13 

0% 

33% 

33% 

33% 

The means of evading the 
rules are becoming more 
sophisticated 

Difficulties in cooperation 
with other national bodies 

Difficulties 
in  cooperation 
with  competent  authorities  in 
other Member States 

Lack  of,  or  poor  information 
appeals 
available 
on, 
against 
procedures 
infringements 
across 
Member States 

Source: survey of enforcement authorities (6 respondents from EU-13 and 7 from EU-15) 

With the limited resources available, the Irish enforcement authorities report that their 
priorities have to remain with driving time rules and tachograph regulations, from the 
perspective of road safety.   

Concerning  a  move  to  electronic  consignment  notes  and  tracking  of  vehicle 
movements using GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System), enforcement authorities 
were  split  over  whether  this  would  improve  the  effectiveness  of  enforcement.    Two 
strongly  agreed  that  this  would  be  an  effective  solution  (Slovenia,  Germany),  on  the 
basis  that  it  would  help  to  avoid  manipulation  of  records.    Three  respondents  were 
neutral  (Czech  Republic,  Ireland,  UK),  noting  that  greater  harmonisation  through 
shared  training/exchanges  would  provide  enforcers  with  real  life  experience  of  best 
practice  and  is  probably  more  likely  to  improve  enforcement  rather  than  using 
technology such as GNSS.  Several authorities (France, Netherlands, and Austria) also 
pointed to difficulties related to data protection and the fact that extensive tracking of 
vehicles should not be an objective of the Regulation.   

Around  half  of  respondents  strongly  agreed  that  guidance  on  the  interpretation  of 
Regulation  1072/2009  provided  by  their  national  government  was  sufficient  (Figure 
10-17),  whereas  only  29%  strongly  agreed  that  EC  guidance  was  sufficient.  
Furthermore,  while  only  7%  slightly  disagreed  that  national  guidance  was  sufficient, 
this  increased  to  21%  when  considering  EC  guidance.    When  asked  to  specify  the 
areas  that  needed  further  guidance,  respondents  identified:  multi-drops  (Poland, 
Ireland),  documentation  issues  (Poland,  France,  and  Ireland),  the  7-day  period 
(Poland); combined transport (Netherlands, Ireland) 

Figure 10-17: Responses to the question: Do you feel the guidance you have 
received on the interpretation of Regulation 1072/2009 is sufficient? 

288 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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Source: Survey of enforcement authorities (N=14) 

A  breakdown  of  responses  by  EU-15  versus  EU-13  (Figure  10-18)  reveals  that  there 
are higher levels of agreement that current guidance issued by national governments 
and  the  EC  among  the  EU-13  Member  States  is  sufficient,  whereas  more  EU-15 
Member States disagree that the guidance is sufficient.  

Figure  10-18  Responses  to  the  question:  Do  you  feel  the  guidance  you  have 
received on the interpretation of Regulation 1072/2009 is sufficient? 

The 

Source: survey of enforcement authorities (7 respondents from EU-13 and 7 from EU-15) 

The  French  authority  elaborated  Regulation  1072/2009  provides  for  mandatory 
documentation  for  verification  of  prior  international  transport  cabotage,  but  says 
nothing  about  the  cabotage  operations  themselves.    Authorities  should  be  able  to 
request  additional  information,  including  on  the  date  and  precise  time  management 
and  delivery  of  goods  in  order  to  ensure  effective  controls,  and  to  the  count  of  the 
number of cabotage operations.  

Concerning the adequacy of the consignment note as a means of enforcement in more 
detail, most respondents slightly agreed that a consignment note is sufficient, and at 
the  same  time  agreed  that  additional  documents  are  required  (Figure  10-19).    This 
apparent  inconsistency  is  resolved  when  looking  at  the  responses  split  by  EU-13 and 
EU-15 (see below).   

Figure 10-19: Responses to the question: Is a consignment note sufficient for 
proving lawful cabotage, or are additional cabotage documents required? 

Source: Survey of enforcement authorities (N=14) 

EU-13  respondents  show  greater  agreement  that  the  consignment  note  is  sufficient, 
whereas  the  respondents  that  disagreed  were  from  EU-15  Member  States  (Figure 
10-20).   

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Figure 10-20: Responses to the question: Is a consignment note sufficient for 
proving lawful cabotage, or are additional cabotage documents required? 

Source: survey of enforcement authorities (7 respondents from EU-13 and 7 from EU-15) 

Suggestions  for  additional  documentation  included:  Tachograph  records  (Romania, 
Ireland, Czech Republic); Records of time and date of loading and unloading (France); 
ferry tickets/fuel receipts/accommodation/drivers diary (Ireland). 

Enforcement authorities were asked to estimate the implementation costs incurred as 
a  result  of  Regulation  1072/2009.    The  majority  were  unable  to  provide  data.    Only 
Slovenia estimated a modest increase of €10,000. The respondent from Bulgaria noted 
“a  slight  increase  in  the  administrative  costs  for  our  control  authorities.”    The 
respondent  from  the  UK  thought  there  had  been  no  implementation  costs,  whereas 
the  respondent  from  the  Netherlands  felt  that  there  had  been  a  need  for  five 
additional staff.  

When asked to qualitatively rate the factors that contributed to implementation costs, 
a high number of respondents reported that they did not know or the costs were not 
applicable  (Figure  10-21).    Overall,  the  implementation  costs  appear  to  have  been 
modest.   

Figure 10-21: Responses to  the  question: Which  provisions were the one-off 
(implementation) costs attributable to? 

Source: survey of enforcement authorities (N=12) 

Overall,  both  EU-13  and  EU-15  groups  reported  relatively  modest  /  no  material 
impacts  for  the  changes  to  cabotage  provisions  and  common  formats  for  licence 
documents and driver attestations, with only Poland and the Netherlands reported any 
contribution and the remaining respondents identifying no material impact or that they 

290 

 
 
 
  
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

did  not  know  (Figure  10-22).    Concerning  the  obligation  to  ensure  that  serious 
infringements are recorded in the national register, the respondents from Poland and 
the  Netherlands  reported  significant  contributions  (these  show  as  different 
percentages because of the different number of respondents in each group), whereas 
Slovenia and Bulgaria also identified some contribution in the EU-13 group.  

Figure 10-22: Responses to  the  question: Which  provisions were the one-off 
(implementation) costs attributable to? 

 Source: survey of enforcement authorities (7 respondents from EU-13 and 5 from EU-15) 

Authorities  were  asked  to  estimate  the  amount  of  time  needed  to  conduct  checks  of 
the  provisions.    The  responses  received  are  shown  below.    21%  of  respondents 
reported  that  checks  were  significantly  faster  now,  29%  felt  they  were  somewhat 
faster, and the remaining 50% felt that there had been no material change.  All of the 
respondents from EU-15 countries reported no material change, whereas of the EU-13 
Member  States,  38%  reported  that  checks  were  “significantly  faster”  and  50% 
responded that checks were “somewhat faster”.  

Table 10-5: Time taken to conduct checks 

Member State 

Czech Republic 
Poland 

Romania 
Slovenia 
Latvia 
Bulgaria 
France 

Netherlands 

Changes to the cabotage 
provisions 

20 min. max. 
Average timespan of roadside 
check with infringements found 
out is around 45 minutes. As 
for roadside check without 
infringements detected this 
period is reduced to around 30 
minutes.    
1/2 hours 
25 minutes 
30 min - 1h 
Don't know 
Between 30 minutes and 2 
hours depending on whether 
the documents are in rules or 
not 
1 hr / inspection 

291 

Common format for 
community licences and 
drivers’ attestations 
5 min. max. 
No data 

10 minutes 
15 minutes 
30 min - 1h 
10 minutes 
Between 30 minutes and 2 hours 
depending on whether the 
documents are in rules or not 

N/A 

 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Member State 

Changes to the cabotage 
provisions 

Austria 
Ireland 

30 minutes 
30 minutes 

Common format for 
community licences and 
drivers’ attestations 
30 minutes 
Don't know 

When  asked  about  the  effect  of  Regulation  1072/2009  on  ongoing  annual  costs,  all 
respondents  except  the  Netherlands  reported  that  there  had  either  been  no  material 
impact or they did not know. The respondent from the Netherlands indicated that five 
additional  full-time  staff  had  been  required  due  to  political  and  public  pressure, 
resulting from public order and safety issues.   

Finally,  respondents  were  asked  whether  performing  checks  on  cabotage  more 
efficient/effective  now,  with  the  implementation  of  Regulation  1072/2009,  compared 
to  the  situation  before  the  legislation.    Around  half  of  respondents  felt  that  the 
effectiveness  had  improved  (Czech  Republic,  Poland,  Slovenia,  France,  UK,  Spain), 
whereas  the  remainder  reported  that  there  had  either  been  no  material  impact 
(Germany,  Romania,  Austria)  or  they  did  not  know  (Latvia,  Bulgaria,  Netherlands, 
Ireland).    Three  respondents  felt  that  checks  were  more  efficient  (Slovenia,  France, 
Spain),  and  the  remainder  reported  that  there  had  either  been  no  material  impact 
(Romania,  Austria,  UK,  Germany)  or  they  did  not  know  (Czech  Republic,  Latvia, 
Bulgaria, Netherlands, Ireland). No respondents felt that checks were less effective or 
efficient.   

When  asked  how  the  costs  of  the  Regulation  could  be  reduced,  suggestions  were 
received  concerning:  clarification  of  the  provisions  (Romania);  a  move  to  electronic 
forms  (Romania,  France,  Netherlands);  a  common  database  of  issued  licenses  of  all 
countries (Slovenia); Uniform system for risk assessment (Slovenia). 

10.4.  Undertakings consultation 

Undertakings  were  invited  to  respond  to  a  confidential  survey  via  national 
associations.  This survey aimed to evaluate how well the Regulations are working and 
the  impacts  on  transport  undertakings.    Table  10-6  provides  an  overview  of  the 
number of associations contacted in order to request their participation in the study.   

Table  10-6:  Overview  of  organisations  contacted  in  order  to  distribute 
undertakings survey 

Distribution  of  undertakings 
survey 

Contacted 

Confirmed 

Case study countries 

All other Member States 

DE 

DK 

ES 

PL 

RO 

4 

4 

7 

4 

4 

75 

2  

2 

3 

3 

2 

11 

10.4.1. 

Regulation 1071/2009 

10.4.1.1. 

Stable and effective establishment 

Respondents were asked about the impacts of the requirement of stable and effective 
establishment  (Figure  10-23).    Most  respondents  (56%)  strongly  or  slightly  agreed 
that  there  had  not  been  any  significant  adverse  effects  on  them.    Respondents  from 
Germany and Denmark were more likely to strongly disagree that the requirement had 
led to fair competition and/or a reduction in letterbox companies.    

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Figure  10-23:  To  what  extent  do  you  agree  that  the  introduction  of  the 
requirement  for  “effective  and  stable”  establishment  has  had  the  following 
effects? 

Comments offered on the types of negative impacts that had resulted mainly referred 
to  the  adverse  effects  of  letterbox  companies  on  legitimate  businesses  arising  from 
increased  pressure  on  prices  and  loss  of  business.    It  was  further  posited  that  the 
additional  administrative  costs  of  the  legislation  would  be  justified  if  the  intended 
market  impacts  had  been  achieved,  but  letterbox  companies  still  exist.    Some 
stakeholders  indicated  that  their  labour  costs  had  been  affected  by  the  requirement, 
with estimated increases ranging from 5% to 30%, whereas others reported that there 
had been no impact on labour costs.  

Respondents  were  asked  to  estimate  the  cost  advantage  of  letterbox  companies 
compare  to  a  company  that  fully  complies  with  the  transport  rules.    The  highest 
estimates  were  from  Austrian  respondents,  who  predicted  an  advantage  of  40%, 
whereas  respondents  from  Poland  only  estimated  a  9%  advantage.  The  median 
estimate  was  17.5%,  which  indicates  a  positive  skew  in  the  results  (i.e.    a  relatively 
smaller  number  of  estimates  of  very  large  cost  advantages  are  pulling  the  mean 
upward). 

Figure 10-24: Estimated cost advantage of letterbox companies compared to 
a company that fully complies with road transport rules (weighted average) 

Wages  of  drivers,  taxes  and  social  contributions  were  all  identified  as  significant 
factors  contributing  to  this  overall  cost  advantage.    Wages  were  particularly  strongly 
identified  by  respondents  from  Denmark  and  Germany,  where  wages  are  among  the 
highest in Europe.   

Around half of the respondents reported that they had never been checked for stable 
and  effective  establishment.    Of  the  84  respondents  who  had  been  checked,  48% 

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strongly  or  slightly  agreed  that  the  checks  would  be  sufficient  to  detect  letterbox 
companies  (the  weakest  support  was  in  Poland,  where  none  of  the  respondents  felt 
that checks were sufficient).  This suggests that in most countries the existing checks 
are considered thorough enough by many undertakings, but the level of enforcement 
is  inconsistent.      Several  respondents  called  for  more  thorough  checks,  and  claimed 
that  current  controls  were  too  cursory.    Furthermore,  the  level  of  undertakings  that 
have not been checked suggests that Member States are not meeting the requirement 
to  check  stable  and  effective  establishment  before  granting  access  to  the  profession, 
although these physical checks may be conducted on a risk-based prioritisation.  

Overall, 78% of respondents felt that there was still a need for requirements on stable 
and  effective  establishment.    The  main  reasons  given  for  this  continuing  need  were 
due to the need to ensure a level playing field. 

10.4.1.2. 

Good repute 

Out of all the core requirements of Regulation 1071/2009, good repute was viewed by 
undertakings as having the strongest positive effect in terms of reducing the potential 
for  operators  who  break  the  law  to  undercut  legitimate  businesses  (59%  strongly  or 
slightly agree).   

Figure  10-25:  To  what  extent  do  you  agree  that  the  requirement  for  good 
repute has had the following effects? 

The main issues with this part of the legislation were highlighted as being the different 
treatment  across  Member  States  –  several  undertakings  felt  that  the  legislation  was 
not equally controlled and sanctioned in all Member States.   

10.4.1.3. 

Financial standing 

The  responses  on  the  issue  of  financial  standing  indicated  that  around  half  (48%) 
undertakings slightly or strongly agree that there were no significant adverse impacts 
on  them.    Views  on  whether  the  requirement  of  financial  standing  had  helped  to 
achieve  its  market  objectives  were  mixed,  with  much  weaker  support  for  positive 
impacts  (around  one-third  slightly  or  strongly  agreeing)  than  for  the  requirement  of 
good  repute  and  stable  and  effective  establishment  (around  40-60%  of  respondents 
slightly or strongly agreeing).   

294 

 
 
 
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Figure  10-26:  To  what  extent  do  you  agree  that  the  requirement  for 
appropriate financial standing has had the following effects? 

10.4.1.4. 

Professional competence 

The  majority  of  undertakings  felt  that  the  requirement  for  professional  competence 
had  not  impacted  them  adversely  (51%  of  respondents  slightly  or  strongly  agree), 
although  it  was  also  not  viewed  as  being  completely  effective  in  achieving  its 
objectives.  Overall, the views were broadly positive (Figure 10-27).   

Figure  10-27:    To  what  extent  do  you  agree  that  standards  for  professional 
qualification of transport managers have had the following effects? 

Many  of  the  respondents  who  voiced  strongly  negative  answers  were  from  Austria 
(40%).  In  the  view  of  these  respondents,  the  approach  across  countries  is  not 
harmonised.  Two Austrian respondents felt that the procedures in their country were 
overly bureaucratic, which penalises undertakings in Austria.  

10.4.1.5. 

Transport manager 

The  requirement  for  a  designated  transport  manager  received  broadly  neutral 
responses  overall  (Figure  10-28),  with  a  relatively  higher  share  of  strongly  negative 
views  compared  to  any  of  the  other  requirements.    The  responses  indicate  a  more 
negative response from self-employed respondents, as well as companies with 50-100 
employees  (possibly  due  to  the  cut-off  point  in  the  Regulation  that  refers  to  an 
external manager being permitted to handle only up to 50 vehicles).   

Figure  10-28:  To  what  extent  do  you  agree  that  the  introduction  of 
requirements  surrounding  the  good  repute  of  transport  managers,  and  the 

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requirement  for  operators  to  have  a  designated  ‘transport  manager’,  have 
had the following effects? 

Respondents  from  Romania  were  overall  more  positive  about  the  impacts  of  this 
provision, which may also need to be considered in light of the additional provisions in 
national law that restricts a transport manager to a single company (as opposed to a 
maximum  of  four).  Nevertheless,  one  Romanian  respondent  pointed  out  that  a 
transport  manager  may  still  not  have  a  decision-making  role  –  for  example  a  small 
company may still be led by the business owner. 

The main issue reported was the potential to install false transport managers or front 
men, which reduces the effectiveness of this requirement.  

10.4.2. 

Regulation 1072/2009 

10.4.2.1. 

Rules on cabotage 

The majority of undertakings participating in the survey (65%) reported that cabotage 
activates  accounted  for  less  than  1%  of  their  deliveries.    Most  of  the  remaining 
respondents reported that cabotage accounted from less than 20% of their deliveries.  
Only  two  companies  reported  that  cabotage  accounted  for  80%  of  more  of  their 
deliveries, but both indicated that it accounted for less than 1% of their revenue – it is 
not  clear  what  the  underlying  reason  for  this  is,  but  the  discrepancy  suggests  there 
was  a  response  error  since  the  share  of  cabotage  operations  and  revenue  showed  a 
very close correspondence in all other responses.   

Almost half of respondents felt that the cabotage rules had resulted in reduced empty 
running  to  at  least  some  extent.    The  effects  on  other  aspects  were  on  balance 
considered  slightly  positive,  which  indicates  the  overall  impacts  are  probably  positive 
overall, but rather diffuse and with some stakeholders negatively impacted.   

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Figure  10-29:  What  impacts  do  the  current  requirements  on  cabotage  have 
on road haulage in the European market? 

There  was  no  clear-cut  split  between  Eastern  and  Western  European  respondents  on 
these issues, as might be expected.  Representatives from both Eastern and Western 
European  countries,  and  respondents  from  within  the  same  country,  gave  both 
positive  and  negative  answers  on  all  aspects.    Since  the  sample  of  undertakings  did 
not  include  many  companies  with  a  high  reliance  on  cabotage,  this  may  have 
influenced the answers.   

Comments  received  on  the  effectiveness  of  the  cabotage  rules  identified  the  lack  of 
effective controls as the major issue.  Based on their own experience, around 65% of 
undertakings  consider  that  checks  of  cabotage  (when  they  do  take  place)  are 
adequate to detect companies that break the rules. The main problems contributing to 
difficulties  in  demonstrating  compliance  with  the  rules  were  identified  as  being 
language barriers – i.e. enforcement officers being unable to interpret the requirement 
documents.  In second place, problems of drivers losing or misplacing the documents 
were cited.  

10.4.2.2. 

Control documents 

Undertakings were asked about whether the introduction of more harmonised control 
documents had resulted in any specific efficiencies.  The most positive responses were 
related to the time taken for enforcers to check licences (48% of respondents strongly 
or slightly agreed that time taken had reduced), whereas more mixed responses were 
received  on  other  elements  (Figure  10-30).    Most  of  the  strong  disagreement  was 
from German respondents (50%). 

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Figure  10-30:  Based  on  your  experience  of  having  Community  Licences  or 
driver  attestations  checked  while  in  another  country,  to  what  extent  do  you 
agree with the following statements? 

10.5.  High level consultation 

The high level survey and interviews aimed to capture responses from stakeholders for 
which there is not a targeted survey.  It was mainly targeted at associations and trade 
unions (national and European) who have a high-level overview of the impacts of the 
Regulations. 

The high level survey was answered by a total of 37 organisations, mainly associations 
of transport operators (14) and trade unions (12), with a small number of NGOs and 
other types of association.  There were nine responses from stakeholders based in the 
EU-12,  eight  responses  from  EU-level  organisations,  and  the  remaining  respondents 
were from the EU-15 (20).   

The following sections provide a summary of the responses.  A number of trade unions 
and  associations  of  transport  operators  submitted  coordinated  responses  between 
themselves.  Since it is not possible to correct for the effect of respondents submitting 
joint  responses  or  not,  a  numerical  analysis  of  the  results  is  not  appropriate  and  is 
therefore not included.   

While  the  high  level  survey  was  not  intended  to  be  a  representative  sample,  it  does 
provide a collation of relevant views on the functioning of the Regulations. Rather, the 
objective  of  this  survey  and  the  supporting  interviews  was  to  gain  high  level 
indications of the main problems and positive impacts, in order to guide and feed into 
further research.   

10.5.1. 

Relevance 

Stakeholders  responding  to  the  high  level  survey  were  asked  about  the  extent  to 
which certain problems still affected the road haulage sector today, which is an aspect 
that is important to assess the relevance of the Regulations.   

Responses to the high level survey cannot be directly interpreted numerically 
(due  to  the  submission  of  coordinated  responses,  not  all  of  which  were 
clearly  identified  as  such).    However,  strong  agreement  in  the  results  is  still 
indicative  of  areas  that  are  likely  to  be  agreed  upon  more  generally  among  the 
stakeholders  groups.    The  main  issued  identified  by  100%  of  respondents  as  a 
significant issue for the road haulage sector were: 

 

Illegal practices of letterbox companies; 

  Lack of enforcement capabilities to enforce the provisions of the Regulations. 

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Other  issues  identified  as  significant  problems  by  a  majority  (more  than  half)  of 
respondents were: 

  Unclear definition and control of temporary cabotage (identified by around half 

of industry associations); 

  Uneven approaches to monitoring of compliance between different Member 
States (identified by trade unions in their joint response and around half of 
industry associations); 

  Lack of provisions on administrative cooperation between Member States 
identified by trade unions in their joint response and around one-third of 
industry associations); 

 

Illegal practices of letterbox companies (companies without stable and effective 
establishment) (identified by trade unions); 

  Lack of enforcement capacities to enforce the provisions of the two Regulations 

(identified by trade unions). 

Relating to the core requirements of the Regulations, fewer respondents felt that these 
were  still  an  issue  (i.e.  the  requirement  to  demonstrate  stable  and  effective 
establishment,  non-comparability  of  certificates  of  professional  competence,  non-
comparability  of  certificates  of  financial  capability  between  Member  States,  lack  of  a 
clear  link  between  the  transport  manager  and  the  undertaking,  common  formats  for 
control documents).  Nevertheless, at least some respondents  (industry associations) 
still  felt  that  these  requirements  were  still  not  being  met,  indicating  that  the 
Regulations  have  not  been  entirely  effective  and  these  areas  are  still  relevant 
problems for the sector today.   

Comments received from participants were typically as part of a coordinated response.  
Trade  unions  felt  that  the  definition  of  cabotage  is  clear,  but  rather  it  is  control  of 
cabotage that is an issue due to lack of enforcement capacities and lack of political will 
from the legislators.  They suggest: 

  Mandatory regular automatic recording of vehicle location (geo-positioning). 
The access and the safe storage of this data will be possible with the new 
‘smart’ tachograph, but only new vehicles will be equipped.  Hence, they 
recommend retrofitting of all vehicle fleets;  

  Pre-notification of each cabotage operation should be introduced, by which 
hauliers would inform a designated Member State service of each cabotage 
operation prior to carrying it out;  

 

Illegal cabotage must be part of the list of categorisation of infringements 
leading to the loss of good repute.   

The  trade  unions  report  an  increase  in  letter  box  companies  in  recent  years,  noting 
that the host Member States are less inclined to control compliance with the provisions 
of  Regulation  1071/2009.      They  feel  that  the  lack  of  administrative  cooperation  is 
rather  a  matter  of  will  of  the  Member  States  than  a  matter  of  legal  ‘provisions’.    
Concerning  social  and  labour  conditions,  they  consider  the  “illegal  practices  of  letter 
box  companies”  as  the  biggest  problem  for  the  sector.  These  practices  have  created 
considerable distortions in the EU labour market and on domestic labour markets of a 
number  of  Member  States.  They  also  mention  that  professional  drivers  subject  to 
these  schemes  are  mostly  employed  on  individual  labour  contracts  written  in  a 
language  other  than  their  own.  Community  rules  such  as  the  Posting  of  workers 
directives  (Directive  96/71/EC,  Directive  2014/67/EU)  and  the  Rome  I  regulation 
(Regulation  EC  No  593/2008)  have  never  been  enforced  in  road  transport  although 
they  do  cover  the  sector.  An  effective  enforcement  of  the  three  EU  legal  acts  would 
address to a fair extent the above described situation.    

The trade unions consider that the lack of enforcement capacities is the second most 
critical problem of the sector. This has be regarded in conjunction with: Lack of clear, 

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by 
EU-wide, uniformly introduced enforcement measures;  Lack 
enforcement and control authorities - to data that enables thorough enforcement and 
controls:  plenty  of  data  is  in  possession  of  hauliers  (i.e.  exact  location  of  vehicles 
during the entire journey) or Member States (i.e. minimum requirements for the data 
to be entered in the national electronic registers) but is not available to enforcement 
authorities;  and finally, delays in the full implementation and functioning of the ERRU 
system (due by December 2011, thus delayed by 4 years).  

access 

of 

- 

Some industry associations also submitted a coordinated response.  They felt that the 
legislation  leaves  a  lot  of  uncertainty  and  lack  of  clarity:  “lack  of  certainty  that 
cabotage is a temporary activity; no clear rule on when provision of a service need to 
lead to establishment; no clear rules on applicable labour market rules; no clarity on 
link  between  this  Regulation  and  the  Directive  on  combined  transport.    Also  serious 
delays  in  the  implementation  of  the  ERRU  and  the  categorisation  of  infringements 
causes  concerns.  As  regards  the  categorisation  of  infringements  it  will  have  to  be 
considered  to  cover  all  relevant  infringements,  including  -  as  requested  by  European 
Parliament - the infringements linked to cabotage issues” 

Another  industry  association  highlighted  concerns  over  insufficient  enforcement  on 
stable  and  effective  establishment  in  the  Member  States  where  letterbox  companies 
are  set  up.  They  reports  that  differences  in  interpretation  and  implementation  of 
provisions are leading to the application of double standards (i.e. interpretation by MS 
of the word "penalty" in art 6 of 1071/09 leading to different application of provision 
by MS and consequent impact on the good repute of companies). They also point out 
that many MS are not yet connected to ERRU and until the end of 2015 only the most 
serious infringements from annex IV have to be taken into account. Another problem 
dealing  with  good  repute:  the  different  approach  in  the  MS  on  liability.  They  recount 
that  in  some  MS  the  employer  is  held  responsible  for  mistakes/infringements  of  his 
drivers  while  in  other  MS  this  is  not  the  case  with  the  consequent  difference  in  the 
convictions,  penalties  and  fines  imposed  on  the  employer  or  company  and  the 
application of double standards within the EU.  

Finally,  an  industry  association  pointed  out  specific  areas  of  the  legislation  that  lack 
clarity, namely:   

  Articles 8 and 9 Regulation 1072/2009:  

o  When the 7 day period starts 

o  How to count several loading points possible   

o  Which documents on board should be treated as a proof of cabotage?   

  Recital 17 Reg. 1072/2009 – whether posting of workers applies to cabotage 

  Whether road transport in Combined Transport a cabotage or not. The initial 

and/or final leg of the transport is not to be considered as cabotage but as part 
of combined transport. Are these transports part of Combined Transport or are 
to be considered as cabotage?  Member States also differ in their opinion on 
whether combined transport is a 1 leg or a 2 leg operation. 

Factors  that  have  affected  the  road  haulage  market  other  than  the  Regulations  were 
given by industry associations as follows: 

  The impact of the economic crisis. Pre-existing differences in competition were 

exacerbated since the crisis that started in 2008-2009. 

 

Increased competition from operators registered in third countries, which are 
not sufficiently  controlled for compliance with the provisions of the bilateral 
agreements; 

  The issue of shared liability of the shippers and forwarders and the increase in 

subcontracting.  The result of this development is that the real responsibility for 
a road transport operation can be far removed from the haulier/driver actually 

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doing the transport.  The different approaches across Member States on 
liability was also highlighted. In some Member States the employer is held 
responsible for infringements committed by his drivers while in other Member 
States this is not the case; 

  Shortage of qualified professional drivers; 

  The lack of alignment in interpretation, implementation, application and 

enforcement of other road transport legislation, such as those relating to 
driving and rest times rules, use of tachographs, posting of workers, weights 
and dimensions of vehicles 

Trade unions commented on delays in implementation of ERRU and a lack of controls 
leading to an increase in letterbox companies. The current needs of the haulage sector 
were identified by trade unions as:  

  To start operating on the basis of the fair price of a transport operation. This 
would be a price which reflects the full compliance with the social, economic 
and environmental Community rules applicable to road transport; 

  To cease practicing social fraud and dumping;   

  To solve the unfair competition between hauliers on basis of social and labour 

costs, that deeply affects the sector;  

  Significantly better enforcement capacities and resources. 

Industry associations identified the critical needs as: 

  Unfair competition; 

  The challenge of insufficient priority for fair and efficient enforcement in the 

different Member States;     

  The increased competition of operators registered in third countries, which are 
not sufficiently  controlled for compliance with the provisions of the bilateral 
agreements 

  The lack of alignment in interpretation, implementation, application and 

enforcement of the rules as those relating to driving and rest times rules, use 
of tachographs, posting of workers, weights and dimensions of vehicles which 
leads individual Member States to take unilateral actions with a negative 
impact on the functioning of the Single Market;     

  The lack of a centralised, single information source about the specific national 

requirements in a working language (preferably English)  

  The issue of shared liability of the shippers and forwarders;     

  Qualified professional drivers shortage and difficulties of recruiting a new 

generation of drivers. 

  Hauliers are not free to carry out transport operations freely, which can force 

them to travel with empty vehicles, or stop them from loading their vehicles in 
an optimal way, which creates efficiency losses. This is a constraint to the 
overall efficiency of the road haulage and logistics sector in the EU. 

  There is a need to look into possible regulation of vehicles less than 3.5 t as 
there seems to be growing circumvention of existing EU legal framework by 
using vehicles below 3.5 t outside scope. 

Concerning the scope of the rules, respondents were asked whether they felt that any 
changes to the scope or measures of the Regulations were needed in order to ensure 
that  they  still  target  the  needs  of  the  sector.    Trade  unions  responded  that  “The 
Regulations  provide  a  fair  set  of  rules.  What  the  sector  needs  is  better  enforcement 
and  clear  enforcement  measures  of  these  rules.”    Industry  associations  identified  a 

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need  for  more  cooperation  between  Member  States.    Responses  among  the 
associations were split between those that called for cabotage as a temporary activity 
to  be  clarified  and  limited,  especially  until  social  and  working  conditions  are 
harmonised  (largely  respondents  from  Western  Europe  and  transport  operators’ 
associations), versus those that supported the completion of the internal market and 
lifting  of  cabotage  restrictions  (largely  respondents  from  Eastern  Europe  and 
logistics/freight forwarder associations).  

10.5.2. 

Regulation 1071/2009 

Trade  unions  reported  that  expanding  letterbox  companies  enabling  companies  to 
circumvent  their  labour  and  social  obligations,  while  making  it  difficult  to  track  down 
and hold responsible the real employer in cases such as unpaid wages, unemployment 
benefit  or  healthcare  benefits.    Although  non-compliance  is  not  solely  restricted  to 
letterbox  companies,  they  are  in  a  better  position  to  breach  the  law  since  their 
complex  structure  makes  it  more  difficult  to  detect  –  for  example,  the  companies  in 
question may falsely declare social security contributions being paid in any EU Member 
State  without  being  subject  to  checks.  They  further  posit  that  “As  long  as  letter  box 
companies continue to exist, Regulation EC No 1071/2009 will have no material effect 
on a level playing field between resident and non-resident hauliers”, and also that “the 
existence  of  letter  box companies have a negative  impact  on  the  level  of  compliance 
with road social legislation” 

They  also  highlighted  that  most  of  the  letter  box  companies  see  a  business 
opportunity  in  practising  illegal  cabotage.  They  emphasise  that  cross-border 
enforcement practice and cooperation is needed to control letterbox companies, which 
is  almost  unattainable  as  long  as  the  host  Member  States  have  little  interest  to 
cooperate  and  as  long  as  Member  States  across  the  EU  experience  shortages  in 
enforcement capacity.  

It was suggested by trade unions that letterbox companies have increased in number 
due  to  the  delays  in  setting  up  ERRU.    Furthermore,  they  highlight  that  the  data 
registered  in  the  ERRU  is  not  accessible  to  enforcement  authorities.    This  would 
facilitate  enforcement  of  Regulation  1071/2009,  as  well  as  controls  of  labour  and 
social legislation.  Several stakeholders mentioned that certain Member States do not 
have  a  risk  rating  system.    This  was  confirmed  in  interviews  with  representatives  of 
several Member States – for example, Bulgaria has yet to adopt such a system.   

Responses  received  from  transport  operators’  industry  associations  were  generally 
dismissive  of  the  possibility  that  the  Regulation  had  achieved  any  positive  impacts, 
with  responses  indicating  this  group  felt  there  had  not  been  any  material  effect  on 
compliance  levels,  partly  due  to  tachograph  manipulation  and  poor  enforcement.  
Several  also  mentioned  the  issue  of  subcontracting  in  the  sector,  which  makes 
enforcement more challenging. 

One industry association interviewed for this study highlighted that the application of 
the  stable  and  effective  establishment  is  "gold  plated"  in  the  UK.  The  standards  for 
establishing a transport undertaking go over and above what is set out in Regulation 
1071/2009,  and  include,  for  example,  requirements  to  publish  a  notice  in  the  press 
when intending to set up a new operating centre. These additional requirements were 
seen  positively  by  the  industry  association  as  they  help  to  maintain  a  more  positive 
image for the industry. 

Trade unions called for a better definition of stable and effective establishment, which 
might improve control.  For example, the original proposal from the Commission made 
explicit mention of a number of parking spaces having to be available.  

Concerning  the  provisions  that  require  a  designated  transport  manager,  some 
stakeholder  report  developments  in  the  use  of  “front  men”,  where  the  real  transport 
manager  is  different  from  the  registered  transport  manager.    Other  stakeholders 
pointed out the practice of switching transport manager, for example when companies 

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with  owners  who  get  barred  from  the  industry  may  return  with  a  new  transport 
manager the next day.  One industry association interviewed for this study highlighted 
the UK as potential best practice in this area, since transport managers are “added” to 
an operating licence, making the link very robust.   

A  number  of  stakeholders  also  called  for  the  establishment  of  the  same  exams  and 
certification  for  professional  competence,  as  well  as  updates  to  the  professional 
training  processes.    It  was  noted  that  the  EU  system  requires  harmonised  rules  on 
access  to  the  profession  but  there’s  not  an  EU  system  for  ensuring  the  quality  of 
training given. 

A  general  comment  made  by  both  associations  and  trade  unions  was  the  lack  of 
effective enforcement of the requirement of good repute.   

In terms of whether there have been any disproportionate impacts for SMEs, the main 
factor identified was an increase in administrative burdens.  Potentially there may also 
have been a deterioration of conditions due to the position of SMEs at the end of the 
subcontracting  chain,  leading  to  greater  price  pressure.    The  SMEs  cannot  be  as 
flexible  as  larger  companies  and  they  cannot  outflag  or  subcontract,  which  places 
them at a disadvantage.   

10.5.3. 

Regulation 1072/2009 

In  their  joint  response,  trade  unions  reported  that  “In  the  absence  of  controls,  non-
compliance  of  cabotage  rules  leaves  an  open  door  to  hauliers  who  want  to  operate 
low-cost  on  a  high-cost  domestic  transport  market  of  a  Member  State.  Uncontrolled 
and unsanctioned illegal cabotage proved to have negative effects on fair competition 
between hauliers and created distortions on the labour markets of the Member States 
which  are  subject  to  cabotage”.    They  recommended  that  enforcement  of  cabotage 
provisions could be made easier through mandatory recording of vehicle location (geo-
positioning),  electronic  documents  (e-waybills),  adding  illegal  cabotage  to  the  list  of 
infringements leading to the loss of good repute and retrofitting of vehicles with smart 
tachographs.  Their coordinated response also called for mandatory pre-notification of 
cabotage  activities,  although  they  noted  that  the  European  Commission  treats  these 
measures as free movement barriers.    

Trade  unions  considered  that  Regulation  1072/2009  was  indeed  effective  in  ensuring 
common  rules  for  cabotage,  but  the  problem  is  that  the  rules  are  not  enforced  and 
respected.      So  as  long  as  cabotage  rules  fail  to  be  effectively  enforced,  performing 
illegal  cabotage  without  being  controlled  and  sanctioned  will  always  represent  an 
incentive for the setting-up of new and more letter box companies.  They reports that 
there  has  been  no  material  evidence  (statistics)  that  cabotage  has  a  positive  impact 
on reducing the amount of empty runs.            

The  problems  of  inconsistencies  in  cabotage  rules  are  compounded  by  a  lack  of 
information  on  national  implementation.    Some  stakeholders  indicated  that  providing 
the  information  in  English  would  be  an  improvement  that  could  help  hauliers  avoid 
accidental infringements.   

Several  associations  submitted  a  response  that  points  out  that  “individual  Member 
States  are continuously  trying  to impose their own interpretation  of  the  provisions  in 
absence of clear guidance from the European Commission”.   

Transport  operators’  associations  point  out  the  cabotage  provisions  need  clarification 
and  need  to  be  complemented  with  rules  on  labour  market  and  social  legislation 
applicable  for  cabotage,  combined  transport  and  international  operations.    They  feel 
that there is still no clear definition of: 

  What constitutes a cabotage trip 

  Whether freight with different destinations can be counted as one trip 

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  What  constitutes  a  vehicle  –  i.e.  whether  it  needs  to  be  the  exact  same 

combination or if there can be changes 

  How to calculate 7 days 

  A  need  for  improvements  of  documentation,  including  documentation  of  the 

trailer   

  Clarification of which rules have been infringed   

  How to apply posting of workers directive to cabotage. 

Effective  controls  and  sanctioning  require  well-functioning  cross-border  enforcement 
practices,  which  is  difficult  under  the  current  conditions  due  to  a  lack  of  necessary 
data, lack of data exchange, and lack of cooperation between Member States.   

During  interviews,  industry  associations  were  sceptical  as  to  whether  cabotage  has 
decreased  empty  running.   In  the  highly  competitive  road  haulage  market,  any 
operator  with  significant  empty  runs  will  go  out  of  business.   Conversely,  a  Spanish 
trade  union  felt  that  cabotage  has  indeed  helped  to  reduce  empty  runs.   One 
stakeholder suggested that further liberalisation of cabotage could lead to more empty 
runs, since it could become more attractive to pick up loads that are more remote.  

10.5.4. 

Harmonisation (EU added value) 

Respondents to the high level survey were asked about the extent to which they felt it 
was likely that Member States  would have attempted to ensure common rules in the 
absence  of  EU  Regulations.    Trade  unions  in  their  coordinated  response  did  not 
express  a  view.    Industry  associations  in  general  returned  a  majority  in  favour  of 
viewing  it  as  unlikely  (around  50-60%  responding  that  it  was  highly  or  somewhat 
unlikely,  compared  to  around  30-40%  responding  that  it  was  highly  or  somewhat 
likely).   

10.6.  Summary of stakeholder consultation 

There  was  generally  a  high  level  of  support  among  all  stakeholder  groups  for  the 
Regulations as a fair set of rules for the sector, but lack of enforcement has hampered 
the effectiveness of the Regulations in achieving their objectives in practice. 

It is very clear from the responses received that effective enforcement is regarded as 
a significant issue across the board, which in turn leads to illegal practices and unfair 
competition  affecting  conditions  in  the  sector.    The  major  areas  of  concern  were 
highlighted as being the rules on cabotage and the existence of letterbox companies.  
Potential reasons underlying the current situation were suggested variously as a lack 
of  political  will,  a  lack  of  enforcement  capability,  differing  interpretations  of  the  rules 
due  to  a  lack  of  clarity,  delays  in  setting  up  ERRU  and  lack  of  cross-border 
cooperation.   

All of these factors appear to contribute to difficulties in enforcement to at least some 
extent – overall it appears that there is no single issue that could resolve the problems 
with enforcement.  However, stakeholders generally express support for a combination 
of  more  guidelines/clarifications  to  enable  a  uniform  interpretation  of  the  rule  and, 
further cooperation between different authorities and Member States.   

Undertakings  in  particular  felt  that  the  requirements  of  stable  and  effective 
establishment  and  good  repute  had  positive  effects  in  terms  of  achieving  their 
objectives.    These  specifically  referred  to  creating  a  more  level  playing  field  and  to 
reducing  the  possibility  that  businesses  who  break  the  rules  will  undercut  legitimate 
businesses.    The  majority  of  undertakings  did  not  identify  any  significant  adverse 
impacts  on  their  businesses;  however,  those  that  felt  impacted  were  mainly  SMEs, 
indicating that these firms may be experiencing disproportionate impacts.   

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11.  ANNEX C: CASE STUDIES 

The  case  study  investigations  were  carried  out  in  order  to  conduct  more  in-depth 
analysis of specific situations, which would not be possible for all Member States.   The 
analysis was conducted for five Member States, as follows: 

1  Denmark; 

2  Spain; 

3  Germany; 

4 

Poland; and 

5  Romania. 

11.1.  Denmark  

11.1.1. 

Market situation and developments  

11.1.1.1. 

Market overview 

The  road  transport  industry  in  Denmark  is  characterised  by  many  small  businesses, 
although there has recently been a structural adjustment in the sector, as the average 
company size (measured in number of permits) was 15% larger in 2012 compared to 
2002 (ITD, 2014a).     

The sector suffered considerably in the years following the economic crisis.  Between 
2007 and 2012, the number of trucking companies in Denmark declined from just over 
6,300 to just under 5,400, with the majority of firms leaving due to bankruptcy (ITD, 
2014a).   

While international comparisons are difficult due to the lack of detailed European data 
on  individual  industries,  it  appears  that  the  decline  in  Denmark  has  been  far  more 
significant compared to other Member States (including UK, France, Germany, Sweden 
and the Netherlands).   At least part of this is likely due to a loss of competitiveness 
due to a decline in road transport productivity96 of around 30% in 2010 compared to 
2000,  which  has  been  accompanied  by  an  increase  in  driver  wages  (Jespersen  et  al, 
2012).    At  the  same  time,  there  is  growing  competition  from  German  and  Polish 
truckers, or from foreign subsidiaries of Danish hauliers (Jespersen et al, 2012).   

The  issue  of  wages  is  highly  relevant,  since  they  typically  constitute  a  major 
proportion of total haulage costs. It is nevertheless difficult to identify concrete data - 
while  some  information  is  available  on  driver  pay,  this  does  not  include  information 
about  working  hours  and  components  of  remuneration,  which  vary  widely.  
Nevertheless,  it  is  generally  believed  that  the  level  of  driver  wages  in  Denmark  is 
among the highest in Europe (Jespersen et al, 2012); (Transportministeriet, 2008).  It 
is  estimated  that  driver  costs  account  for  around  56%  of  total  haulier  costs  in 
Denmark, compared to 48% in Germany and only 20% in Poland (AECOM, 2013a).  

The  contraction  of  the  trucking  sector  was  accompanied  by  considerable  job  losses.  
During  the  period  from  2008  to  2010  there  was  a  sharp  decline  in  employment  with 
around 8,000 job losses (a 22% decline) (Jespersen et al, 2012).  Of these 8,000 job 
losses, an estimated 1,800 job losses were as a result of relocation97.  To put this in 
context  with  the  overall  market  size,  this  would  equate  to  every  Danish  freight 

96 Calculated as gross value added in constant prices with 2005 as the base year, divided by the 

total number of hours worked. 

97 “Flagging” activities refers to work that is moved to subsidiaries abroad, whereas “relocation” 
includes both flagging and activities that have been subcontracted to firms abroad that are 
outside of their group. 

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haulage firm with more than 20 employees having relocated 5.5 jobs over the three-
year  period.    The  impact  of  these  job  losses  on  the  national  economy  depends  on 
whether  displaced  workers  can  find  employment  elsewhere,  and  if  so,  whether  they 
displace other workers in turn.  Assuming in the worst case that these relocated jobs 
led  directly  to  an  increase  in  unemployment,  the  impact  of  relocation  between  2008 
and 2010 would bring about 117 to 485 million DKK98 in the form of costs to the state 
and unemployment benefits (€15 to 63 million).    

The  growing  trend  toward  establishment  abroad  is  also  accompanied  by  a  declining 
share  of  Danish  trucks.    Since  2005,  the  ITD  has  published  counts  of  the  number  of 
trucks owned by the Danish foreign affiliates. In 2005 1,150 trucks that were flagged 
out from Denmark were counted (i.e. owned by subsidiaries of Danish companies set 
up  abroad).  By  2011,  this  number  had  almost  doubled  to  3,257  (Jespersen  et  al, 
2012).  Around half of the flagged trucks were owned by German subsidiaries, a sixth 
were  re-flagged  to  Poland  and  the  remainder  divided  between  a  number  of 
Scandinavian,  Baltic  and  other  European  countries.    Responses  from  interviews 
conducted  for  this  study  with  Danish  stakeholders  indicate  that  the  main  reasons  for 
relocation  are  to  take  advantage of  lower costs  abroad  (especially  due to  high  driver 
wages in Denmark)  

Figure  11-1:  Share  of  trucks  with  non-Danish  licence  plates  that  are  owned 
by Danish subsidiaries  

Source: (ITD, 2014a).   

The  future  developments  of  these  trends  are  highly  uncertain,  but  it  is  likely  that 
additional competitive pressure (such as further liberalisation of cabotage) would lead 
to  more  relocation.  Despite  this,  there  have  not  been  further  job  losses  in  the  road 
transport sector since 2010, when the new cabotage rules entered into force – while in 
the same period Denmark lost 175,000 jobs in the private sector due to the economic 
crisis (Trafikstyrelsen, 2013).   

1.1.1.1 Community licenses, certified copies and driver attestations 

After  a  period  of  stagnation  or  decline,  demand  for  community  licenses  and  certified 
copies in Denmark increased in 2013 (see Figure 11-2). The increase in 2013 despite 

98  According  to  the  Ministry  of  Employment,  the  annual  cost  of  an  unemployed  worker  is 

65,000kr and the maximum benefit rate is 204,880kr.   

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the  reduction  in  tonne  kilometres  of  international  transport  at  the  same  time  is 
because Denmark replaced the national licence with the Community licence in 2012. 

Figure 11-2: Haulier community licences and certified copies in Denmark 
(thousands) 

Source:  Ricardo-AEA  analysis  of  Member  State  reportage  to  the  Commission  pursuant  to 
Regulations 684/92, 881/92, 1072/2009 

Driver  attestation  data  indicate  that  very  few  attestations  exist  in  Denmark;  only  3 
were in circulation in 2012 and 2013. 

11.1.1.2. 

Cabotage 

Danish hauliers have a very dominant position on the national transport market, while 
the  reverse  is  true  for  international  transport  (Statistics  Denmark,  2014).  This  is  in 
part because a large share of domestic freight transports carried out in Denmark (and 
neighbouring countries) have specific vehicle combinations that are not useful for the 
international  transport  of  goods  (e.g.  forest  products,  agriculture)  (Sternberg  et  al, 
2015).   

In Denmark 

The  overall  volume  of  cabotage  performed  on  Danish  territory  has  been  roughly 
stable,  and  there  has  not  been  any  significant  change  in  the  share  of  Danish  trucks 
since the new cabotage rules entered into force.  According to Eurostat data there has 
been  a  sizeable  shift  in  the  control  of  this  market:  German  hauliers,  previously 
accounting  for  78%  of  all  cabotage  t  km  in  2008,  have  seen  their  market  share 
dwindle while Poland’s expands (see Figure 11-3).  

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Figure 11-3: Tonne-km of cabotage in Denmark by Member State of 
registration of haulier 

Source: Ricardo-AEA analysis of Eurostat 

Cabotage  transport  has  been  investigated  by  the  Danish  Transport  Authority,  who 
note that the available statistics on cabotage are not necessarily representative of the 
true situation (Trafikstyrelsen, 2013).  The accuracy of the Eurostat cabotage statistics 
for Denmark has been called  into question on the basis of several  studies. According 
to border censuses, Danish trucks accounted for 22% of trucks passing Danish borders 
in 2008 and also 20% in 2013.  The share of German trucks has declined (from 44% 
in  2008  to  34%  in  2013)  while  the  share  of  trucks  from  Eastern  Europe  has  steadily 
increased  (from  18%  in  2008  to  27%  in  2013  –  mainly  from  Poland)  (ITD,  2014a).  
The figures for the carriage of goods by Danish trucks are nonetheless subject to large 
uncertainty.   

Figure 11-4: Market share of registered vehicles going into Denmark 

Source: (ITD, 2014a) 

A  comparison  with  Eurostat  and  observational  data  collected  under 
the 
Cabotagestudien  shows  obvious  differences,  where  several  of  the  most  observed 
countries have confidential statistics (Sternberg et al, 2015). 

Table 11-1: Comparison with Eurostat and observational data (counts) 

Country 

% 

sights 

Eurostat t-km 

Eurostat %c 

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Country 

PL 

RO 

BG 

LT 

DE 

LV 

EE 

SK 

% 

22% 

20% 

17% 

12% 

10% 

3% 

2% 

2% 

sights 

Eurostat t-km 

Eurostat %c 

4,739 

4,204 

3,663 

2,554 

2,139 

611 

462 

432 

106,314 

10,060 

Confidential 

6,095 

30% 

5% 

?% 

2% 

169,353 

48% 

Confidential 

4,632 

Confidential 

?% 

1% 

?% 

By Danish companies 

Danish  companies  perform  cabotage  in  Norway,  Sweden,  France  and  Germany,  and 
the overall volume of cabotage performed has grown modestly since 2008, largely as 
a consequence of growing volumes in France and Germany. 

Figure 11-5: Tonne-km of cabotage performed by Danish hauliers in other 
Member States 

Source: Ricardo-AEA analysis of Eurostat. 

Note:  In  instances  where  data  is  flagged  as  confidential,  it  is  necessarily  omitted  from  this 
graph 

11.1.2. 

Regulation 1071/2009 

11.1.2.1. 

Implementation and status 

Regulation 1071/2009 has been implemented into Danish legislation by (i) the Act No. 
1051  of  12  November  2012  on  road  haulage  (Lov  om  godskørsel),  and  (ii)  the  Road 
Traffic Act No. 1386 of 11 December 2013  (Bekendtgørelse af færdselsloven). 

The  provisions  in  Regulation  1071/2009  were  similar  to  the  existing  Danish  entry 
requirements  –  as  a  result,  few  changes  were  needed  and  the  additional  impact  of 
Regulation 1071/2009 specifically is limited. The points of departure from the standard 
requirements of the Regulations are outlined below. 

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The Regulation made it possible for Member States to impose requirements in addition 
to  those in  Article  3  of  Regulation  1071/2009,  hence Denmark  retained its  additional 
conditions that an applicant: 

1)  Is not undergoing restructuring proceedings or bankruptcy, 

2)  Has no significant debts due to the public for an amount in the range of 50,000 

DKK or more, and 

3)  Assures  that  it  will  lead  business  in  a  responsible  manner  and  in  accordance 

with good practice within the industry. 

In  order  to  check  whether  a  road  haulage  operator  has  a  debt  of  more  than  50,000 
DKK, the Danish Transport Authority makes an enquiry to the Danish Tax Authorities. 

Concerning the requirement of good repute, arrangements out of court also count as 
penalties for the purpose of this requirement in Denmark. 

In  addition  to  the  requirements  laid  down  in  Article  4  of  Regulation  1071/2009,  the 
company must have an approved transport manager that: 

1)  Is  of  legal  age  and  not  under  guardianship  or  under  curatorship  by  the 

Guardianship Act  

2)  Is not under restructuring proceedings or bankruptcy, 

3)  Has no significant debts due to the public for an amount in the range of 50,000 

DKK or more 

4)  Has  not  have  been  convicted  of  a  criminal  offense  that  constitutes  an 

immediate danger of abuse of the right to perform haulage, and 

5)  Assures  that  he  will  be  able  to  business  in  a  responsible  manner  and  in 

accordance with good practice within the industry. 

A specific requirement in Denmark for access to the occupation is that applicants for a 
Community  Licence  (valid  for  10  years)  must  take  preparatory  training  is  required; 
representing a total of 144 lessons of 45 minutes each, that is, around 3 weeks.  The 
cost  of  this  is  around  20,000  DKK  (€2,700),  and  it  takes  around  three  weeks 
(Confederation  of  Danish  Industry,  2013).  The  pass  rate  of  the  exam  was  80%  in 
2013 (183 applicants) and 87% in 2014 (202 applicants); all examination and training 
centres in Denmark (12) are accredited by the Danish Transport Authority. To obtain 
such  an  accreditation,  Danish  authorities  report  that  the  applicant  must  submit  an 
application outlining aspects such as the proposed curriculum. 

Operators  must  meet  an  initial  financial  capability  requirement  of  150,000  DKK 
(around  €20,100)  to  obtain  the  first  two  licences  whereas  the  EU  rules  only  require 
reserves  of  €9,000  for  the  first  vehicle.  For  each  additional  vehicle  DKK  40,000  are 
required  (around  €5,300)99.  Further,  the  company  must  not  have  arrears  to  the 
government exceeding 50,000 DKK (around €6,700). The Danish Transport Authority 
makes  an  enquiry  to  the  Danish  Tax  Authorities  on  this  matter  when  verifying  the 
financial  capability  of  the  undertaking.  The  higher  requirements  place  an  additional 
cost on businesses compared to neighbouring countries.   

Danish  authorities  report  that  a  risk  rating  system  has  been  in  place  for  over  20 
years that has since been under continuous development. The system is considered to 
work  well.  Typically,  the  Danish  Transport  Authority  checks  each  year  all  new 
applicants as well as around 250 additional undertakings that are mainly selected on 
the basis of the risk rating system. Checks are hence very targeted.  

In order to consider how serious the infringements are weighed and when good repute 
is  affected,  Denmark  uses  a  system  where  numbers  of  violations  are  related  to  the 
number  of  licenses  through  a  five-year  system,  as  long  as  this  categorization 

99 http://prague.aija.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/WsB-National-Report-Denmark.pdf 

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processes  is  over.  In  practical  terms,  when  the  Danish  Transport  Authority  has 
received  five  reports  of  violations  concerning  a  determined  undertaking  from  the 
Danish  Police  or  from  EU  Member  States’  authorities,  the  Danish  Transport  Authority 
gets  a  full  transcript  of  violations  concerning  this  undertaking  from  the  criminal 
register. If the number of violations within the last five years compared to the number 
of  vehicles  exceeds  a  ratio  of  0.15,  the  Danish  Transport  Authority  will  make  an 
evaluation of whether there is basis for a reaction. The ultimate consequence could be 
that  the  undertaking  loses  its  right  to  operate.  New  applicants  are  typically  checked 
for  financial  standing,  professional  competence,  the  undertaking’s  debt  and  stable 
establishment.  Checks  on  stable  establishment  are  typically  omitted  from  then 
onwards,  since  letterbox  companies  on  Danish  territory  are  not  usually  a  problem; 
requirements  for  good  repute  are  only  checked  in  case  the  police  has  reported  a 
problem or there is any other indication that there might be a problem. 

Denmark  is  connected  to  the  ERRU  and  reports  that  the  connection  has  resulted  in 
one-off costs of 900,000 DKK (around €120,000) and ongoing annual costs of 200,000 
DKK  (around  €27,000).  Authorities  hope  that  this  connection  will  result  in  an 
increasing number of notifications on infringements from other Member States in the 
future,  although  until  now  no  material  impact  on  the  effectiveness  and  efficiency  of 
enforcement  activities  could  be  observed  thanks  to  the  connection  to  ERRU.  The 
Danish Transport Authority reports that critical questions addressed to other Member 
States’ authorities frequently remain unanswered. 

With regards to the Transport Manager, the Danish Transport Authority reports that 
external  transport  managers  are  required  to  have  a  “clear  link”  to  the  company. 
However, the meaning of this “clear link” is defined on a case-by-case basis: Typically 
the  transport  manager  has  to  be  the  owner  or  an  employee  of  the  company;  an 
external  transport  manager  that  only  owns  a  negligible  share  of  the  company  will 
typically not be considered as being a lawful external transport manager. In practice it 
is  the  enforcement  officer’s  responsibility  to  judge  whether  the  link  of  the  transport 
manager to the company is sufficient. 

11.1.2.2. 

 Enforcement and compliance 

Denmark did not provide a country report on the implementation in the period from 4 
December  2011  until  31  December  2012  of  certain  provisions  of  Regulation  (EC)  No 
1071/2009,  hence  there  are  no  statistics  on  authorisations  or  certificates  of 
professional competence granted/withdrawn over that period available (EC, 2014a). 

The  strict  enforcement  of  the  rules  on  stable  and  effective  establishment  would 
also give Danish carriers with foreign-registered trucks a significant incentive to move 
their  entire  business  abroad  (Jespersen  et  al,  2012).    The  issue  of  “letterbox” 
companies  set  up  by  Danish  companies  has  frequently  featured  in  the  media,  with  a 
particularly  high-profile  debate  concerning  companies  that  allegedly  set  up  letterbox 
companies  in  Flensburg,  Germany  (Parliamentary  questions,  2013a).  The  debate 
culminating  in  the  European  Commission  requesting  that  a  specific  carrier  based  in 
Germany  be  investigated.    However,  it  has  been  reported  that  after  contact  with 
German  and  Romanian  authorities,  no  concrete  evidence  of  illegal  Danish-owned 
letterbox  companies  could  be  detected  (IDAG,  2014).  Hence,  the  extent  to  which 
Danish-owned letterbox companies are a problem is not clear.   

To  ensure  better  enforcement  and  for  the  avoidance  of  potential  loopholes,  the 
Ministry of Transport and the Danish Transport Authority take the view that it should 
be compulsory that the nationality of the Community license is consistent with the one 
of the vehicles, and that the registered user of the vehicle is also consistent with the 
name  on  the  Community  license.  According  to  the  Danish  Transport  Authority,  this 
would  already  be  compulsory  and,  as  a  consequence,  this  would  be  an  additional 
requirement.  However,  this  would  only  apply  to  Danish  undertakings  and  this  would 
not be enforced for undertakings/vehicles of other EU Member States. 

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According  to  the  Transport  Authority,  the  good  repute  can  be  re-established  after  a 
'waiting  period'  of  3  years,  after  retaking  the  obligatory  preparatory  courses  and 
passing the exam.  

In Denmark, the Road Traffic Act No. 1386 (Bekendtgørelse af færdselsloven) does not 
seem to provide for differentiated fines, as reviewed by the study team.  According to 
Grimaldi  (2013a),  the  specific  level  of  fines  imposed  for  infringements  of  Regulation 
1071/2009  are  not  regulated  by  law  or  administrative  regulations  in  Denmark,  but 
based on case law, with recommended levels of DKK 400-4,000 (€53-530) depending 
of  the  offence,  rising  to  DKK  10,000-25,000  (€1,340-3,350)  under  aggravating 
circumstances (i.e. if the violation occurs over a longer period such as 3-6 months). 

11.1.3. 

Regulation 1072/2009 

11.1.3.1. 

 Implementation and status 

Regulation  1072/2009  has  been  implemented  into  Danish  legislation  by  the  Act  No. 
1051 of 12 November 2012 on road haulage (Lov om godskørsel).   

There has been extensive debate in Denmark over the issue of cabotage, with no clear 
conclusions.    Participating  stakeholders  formed  two  main  groups  that  were  generally 
(as  a  simplification)  in  direct  opposition  on  most  of  the  discussed  issues.    Although 
positions showed some variation, it was generally that case that the first group, which 
included Danish Transport and Logistics (DTL), Free Danish Truck Drivers (FDL) and 3F 
(trade  union),  tended  to  advocate  measures  that  would  better  control  (illegal) 
cabotage.    In  the  second  group,  the  Danish  freight  forwarders,  DI  Transport, 
Employers'  Association  for  Transport  and  Logistics  (ATL)  and  International  Transport 
Denmark (ITD), were more in favour of maintaining the current rules. 

The  major  source  of  debate  in  Denmark  regarding  cabotage  is  whether  cabotage 
services should be permitted on a “systematic” basis, i.e. on a very frequent and year-
round  basis.  This is  linked to  the  national  debate over the  legitimacy  of  seeking  cost 
advantages  by  performing  national  transport  in  Denmark  as  cabotage  rather  than 
normal national transport.  DTL, FDL and 3F claim that legal cabotage can be carried 
out  systematically  in  Denmark,  leading  to  competitive  distortion  (Trafikstyrelsen, 
2013). On the other side of the debate, Danish freight forwarders, DI Transport, ATL 
and ITD,  believe that the cabotage is legal based on the common EU rules and that 
special  national  rules  to  curtail  systematic  cabotage  would  limit  the  internal  market 
and lead to retaliatory protectionist measures abroad (Trafikstyrelsen, 2013).   

A recent study (Sternberg et al, 2014) gives the following figures with regards to the 
nationality of vehicles in Denmark:  

Country 

Poland 

Bulgaria 

Lithuania 

Germany 

Romania 

Estonia 

Latvia 

Slovakia 

% 

19% 

18% 

15% 

12% 

9% 

4% 

4% 

3% 

Number of trucks 

744 

718 

601 

467 

362 

165 

156 

125 

Most  of  the  vehicles  accounted  for  in  the  abovementioned  table  have  only  been 
sighted  once  or  twice,  which  means  that  they  have  most  likely  been  carrying  out  an 
international  transport.  In  terms  of  frequency  of  observation  figures  are  slightly 
different: 

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Country 

Poland 

Romania  

Bulgaria  

Lithuania   

Germany 

Latvia  

Estonia 

Slovakia 

% 

22% 

20% 

17% 

12% 

10% 

3% 

2% 

2% 

Number of trucks 

4739 

4204 

3663 

2554 

2139 

611 

462 

432 

The  issue  of  systematic  cabotage  appears  to  arise  because  of  Denmark’s  specific 
geography  –  its  small  size  means  that  it  is  possible  for  a  truck  to  carry  out 
international  transport  on  a  daily  basis,  with  subsequent  cabotage.    A  study  of 
cabotage in Denmark suggests that 150-200 foreign trucks are engaged in systematic 
cabotage  (Sternberg  et  al,  2014).    This  is  expected  to  grow,  given  the  major  cost 
differences between Danish and new Member States’ hauliers.  The issue of systematic 
cabotage  seems  to  mainly  be  an  issue  for  Denmark  –  it  does  not  appear  to 
significantly  affect Sweden,  and  has only  been  observed  to  a small  extent  in  Norway 
(Sternberg et al, 2015).  

In  order  to  prevent  systematic  cabotage,  the  idea  of  a  “waiting  period”  has  been 
discussed,  under  which  a  certain  amount  of  time  would  be  required  before  a  new 
international  carriage  could  be  associated  with  cabotage.    However,  the  Commission 
has stated in a letter of 4 July 2012 that such a waiting period has no support in the 
Regulation (Trafikstyrelsen, 2013).   

The  Danish  Ministry  of  Transport  considers  that  the  2011  European  Commission’s 
guidelines  raise  a  large  number  of  problems  with  the  definitions.    In  particular, 
concerning  the  definition  of  “cabotage  operation”,  these  guidelines  provide  that 
cabotage operation can involve several loading points, several delivery points or even 
several  loading  and  delivery  points,  as  the  case  may  be.  The  Danish  Ministry  of 
Transport seems to consider that it would be better to specify a determined number of 
loading/unloading  points.  The  Ministry  of  Transport  also  recognises  that  its 
interpretation  on  how  to  count  the  number  of  operations  when  there  are  several 
loading and uploading points is different from the European Commission’s guidelines. 

A  further  issue  of  contention  is  the  transport  of  empty  containers  and  empty  returns 
(pallets,  flower  transport  stands  or  the  like).    Currently  this  does  not  give  access  to 
legally perform cabotage operations, if the carriage of the empty containers and return 
packaging is not considered an actual carriage, cf. § 16 b, subsection 1 in ministerial 
order  on  haulage.    These  are  not  considered  to  be  goods  for  consumption,  sale,  or 
manufacture,  so  their  international  carriage  into  Denmark  does  not  give  foreign 
hauliers the right to perform cabotage operations in Denmark.   

Concerning  the  7  day  period,  the  Danish  Ministry  of  Transport  wonders  whether  it 
should  be  allowed  to  be  systematic  or  a  minimum  period  should  be  required  before 
entering the Member State again in order to be allowed to carry out cabotage. 

11.1.3.2. 

Enforcement and compliance 

In  Denmark,  roadside  checks  are  carried  out  by  the  police.  The  Danish  Transport 
Authority  assists  in  case  of  interpretation  problems  and  carries  out  itself  checks  at 
premises. 

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Danish authorities report that significant ambiguities remain regarding the definition of 
cabotage  operations.  In  order  to  comply  with  Regulation  1072/2009,  cabotage  rules 
are (as reported by the Danish Transport Authority) enforced in the following way:  

-  A cabotage operation can have multiple drop-off or multiple loading points (but 
not both) – this is irrespective of the number of different receivers  or senders 
of  the  transport  (it  is  not  possible  to  have  multiple  receivers  and  multiple 
senders); 

-  There  is  no  requirement  concerning  the  return  of  the  vehicle  to  the  home 
country,  before  the  vehicle  is  allowed  to  re-enter  Danish  territory  for  carrying 
out an international transport operation; 

-  There  is  not  requirement  concerning  the  period  the  vehicle  has  to  spend 
outside of Danish territory before it can re-enter the country for carrying out an 
international transport operation; 

-  There  is  no  specific  requirement  on  the  type  of  the  international  transport 
operation  that  allows  an  undertakings  to  carry  out  a  subsequent  cabotage 
operation  on  Danish  territory  (i.e.  the  transport  of  empty  pallets  or  partial 
loads is sufficient). 

These  rules  are  not  considered  stringent  enough  by  the  Danish  Transport  Authority. 
The authority further reports severe difficulties in proving illegal cabotage operations, 
one  reason  being  the  difficulty  of  proving  the  number  of  cabotage  operations  that 
have  already  been  carried  out.  Consignment  notes  can  be  discarded  or  sent  back  to 
the  undertaking  to  avoid  any  evidence  of  such  operations  in  the  vehicle.  To  improve 
the enforcement system, tests are currently being carried out on a system that takes 
pictures of trucks entering and leaving the territory: with such a system the duration 
of  the  periods  that  trucks  spend  in  Denmark  can  potentially  be  retraced,  which  can 
help pointing to potential illegal cabotage activities. 

In  Denmark,  the  cabotage  rules  are  also  enforced  for  vehicles  with  a  total  mass  of 
below  3.5  tonnes.  Shifts  to  lighter  vehicles  in  transport  operations  were  hence  not 
observed. 

There  are  no  costs  for  undertakings  to  obtain  a  community  licence,  a  certified  true 
copy or a driver attestation. The renewal period for the community licence is 10 years. 
In  order  to  improve  and  facilitate  enforcement  practices,  the  Danish  transport 
authority suggests among other measures EU-wide requirements that ensure that 

-  The  nationality  of  the  community  licence  is  the  same  as  the  Member  State 

where the vehicles are registered; 

-  The registered user of the vehicle  is the same person for who the Community 

licence was issued; 

-  The community licence is always also issued in Roman characters. 

Concerning  compliance,  DTL,  FDL  and  3F  have  raised  significant  concerns  over  the 
extent  of  illegal  cabotage,  claiming  that  it  has  been  increasing  in  recent  years 
(Trafikstyrelsen, 2013). As discussed elsewhere in this report, there is scant evidence 
of  widespread  illegal  cabotage  –  however,  systematic  cabotage  (legal  under  the 
Regulation)  appears  to  be  in  practice  in  Denmark.    The  latest  statistics  from  the 
Danish police indicate illegal cabotage at 0.5% (Bröndum, 2014). 

According  to  the  Danish  Transport  Authority,  additional  10  million  DKK  in  2013  and 
17.5 million DKK in 2014 were allocated to increase policing on cabotage. In order to 
improve control of cabotage, the following measures have been implemented: 

  Additional staff and equipment; 
  Use  of  cameras  at  border  crossings,  including  existing  cameras  for  the 
enforcement  of  the  road  tax  (Eurovignette)  that  are  based  on  licence  plate 
recognition. 

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  Restated  waybills.    Discussions  have  been  held  regarding  a  voluntary 
document that gives an overview of cabotage.  Although this must be voluntary 
(since  the  Regulation  does  not  allow  for  demands  on  documentation  design), 
this  should  allow  police  the  option  of  faster  and  more  effective  verification  of 
compliance with the cabotage rules. 

  Hotline  for  the  police.    The  National  Police  state  that  there  is  a  training 
programme  for  relevant  employees.    Furthermore,  they  state  that  there  is  a 
hotline to provide advice to police districts. 

  Increasing the level of fines for very serious offenses, with a differentiation 

of fines for minor offenses. 

  Increased efforts to improve information and reporting.  Comprehensive 
reporting of cabotage statistics may be challenging due to local monitoring and 
reporting  structures.    For  example,  in  Denmark  the  IT  system  used  by  the 
national  police  does  not  allow  for  easy  reporting  of  enforcement  efforts,  and 
extraction of the relevant data requires a comprehensive manual review of the 
individual cases (Trafikstyrelsen, 2013).   

  Increased  use  of  tachograph  data.  The  increased  use  of  tachographs  as  a 
means of control were discussed, although the Ministry of Justice notes that the 
amended tachograph  legislation  was  only  designed to  facilitate the  monitoring 
of  driving  times  and  rest  periods,  and  not  for  cabotage.    Nevertheless, 
experience  with  the  new  recording  equipment  could  help  to  reinforce  the 
controls  on  cabotage  (Trafikstyrelsen,  2013).    The  police  already  have  the 
possibility  to  use  the  tachograph  for  control  of  cabotage.  However,  it  has  the 
limitation that only the start and end point must be specified  (Trafikstyrelsen, 
2013).   

Statistics  have  indicated  that,  at  least  based  on  initial  data,  the  increased  controls 
have  been  effective.    The  National  Police  believe  that  the  enhanced  controls  (higher 
fines  and  increased  resources)  have  contributed  to  positive  developments,  which 
reveal fewer violations of the rules, with a decrease in the number of cases 83 percent 
from 2012 to 2013 (Report to the Transport Committee, 2014): 

 

 
 

In 2012: 350 cases of illegal cabotage on the basis of 1500 controls of trucks; 

In 2013: 180 cases on the basis of 4,500 controls of trucks; 

Initial data for the first months of 2014 show similar trends to 2013 

They further report specific challenges with enforcement of cabotage: 

  Missing receipts on freight documents; 
  Performing cabotage operations before international transport is completed; 

  Difficulties with controlling vehicles after three cabotage movements, where the 
drivers announced they were leaving the country but actually drove the goods 
to  Padborg  and  continued  driving  in  Denmark  interpretations  (Trafikstyrelsen, 
2013) 

Depending  on  the  circumstances,  a  freight  forwarder  will  be  able  to  be  penalised  for 
complicity  in  a  foreign  haulier’s  illegal  cabotage  operation,  cf.  the  general  rules  on 
complicity  in  the  Code  of  Penal  Law,  paragraph  23.    Experience  shows  that  the 
prosecution  is  often  difficult  to  implement  in  practice  since  there  are  considerable 
challenges in proving they have knowledge of illegal practices (Trafikstyrelsen, 2013).   

A  representative  of  Danish  Operators  interviewed  for  this  study  suggested  that  the 
need  to  provide  proof  of  lawful  cabotage  often  entails  significant  costs  for 
operators: there is a high fine for failing to provide even one element of the necessary 
evidence. According to the 2014 Danish guidelines on cabotage, “Documentation is to 
be  available  at  the  time  the  vehicle  is  stopped  and  is  to  be  presented  to  the 
enforcement  authorities  on  demand,  cf.  §  16  a  in  the  ministerial  order  on  haulage. 
This  means  that  documentation  should  be  able  to  be  presented  within  a  reasonable 
time after the stopping of the vehicle. Electronic forwarding within a quite short time is 

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accepted.  However,  providing  of  documentation  must  not  cause  a  considerable  delay 
of the inspection of the police”. (Trafikstyrelsen, 2014).   

The  fine  structure  was  revised  in  2013.  The  offenses  are  divided  into  less  serious 
offenses,  serious  infringements  and  very  serious  infringements,  with  corresponding 
levels  of  fines  at  5,000  DKK,  15,000  DKK  and  35,000  DKK  respectively100.  The  fine 
may be doubled or tripled if aggravating circumstances are present. This will be based 
on  a  specific  assessment  of  each  individual  case.  According  to  the  Ministry  of 
Transport,  the  Commission  has  questioned  Denmark  on  a  total  of  four  matters 
regarding  provisions  in  freight  transport,  one  of  which  was  the  level  of  fines.  At  the 
time of writing this report, the case is still open and, in the meantime, fines remain in 
place. 

Breach of the cabotage rules is an offence established by § 17, subsection 1, n. 3 of 
the  Law  on  Road  Haulage.  In  line  with  the  abovementioned,  fines  for  breach  of 
cabotage rules start at DKK 5,000 (EUR 670 approx.) for minor infringements (ex. lack 
of information about specifications of goods), at DKK 15,000 (EUR 2,010 approx.) for 
serious infringements (ex. lack of documentation for the international carriage) and at 
DKK 35,000 (EUR 4,680 approx.) for very serious infringements (ex. illegal cabotage 
operations).  

The  police  may  impound  the  vehicle  (but  not  the  semi-trailers  /  trailers)  if  deemed 
necessary  to  ensure  the  payment  of  the  fine  and  costs,  or  in  case  of  serious  and 
repeating  offences.  Impoundment  shall  be  lifted  once  the  amounts  are  paid  or 
secured101. .  Conversely, the issue of holding the entire vehicle (including trailers) has 
raised the issue of legal security and proportionality (Trafikstyrelsen, 2013).   

Depending  on  the  circumstances,  a  freight  forwarder  will  be  able  to  be  penalized  for 
complicity  in  a  foreign  haulier’s  illegal  cabotage  operation,  cf.  the  general  rules  on 
complicity in the Code of Penal Law, paragraph 23102. 

Some stakeholders (DI Transport, ATL, ITD and Danish freight forwarders) believe the 
fines,  especially  for  minor  offenses,  are  not  proportional  (Trafikstyrelsen,  2013).   
Others  (3F,  DTL,  FDL)  believe  that  the  fines  act  as  an  important  deterrent  for  illegal 
cabotage,  especially  given  the  differences  in  pay  and  working  conditions  in  Denmark 
compared to Baltic and Eastern European countries.    

The police also have the option to hold the motor vehicle (but not the semi-trailers / 
trailers)  until  the  fines  are  paid.    Conversely,  the  issue  of  holding  the  entire  vehicle 
(including  trailers)  has  raised  the  issue  of  legal  security  and  proportionality 
(Trafikstyrelsen, 2013).   

11.2.  Spain 

11.2.1. 

Market situation and developments  

11.2.1.1. 

Market overview 

In  Spain,  The  economic  crisis  led  to  a  sharp  reduction  in  the  number  of  companies 
authorised to use HDVs from 75,965 firms in 2008 to 60,918 firms in 2015 (Ministry of 
Infrastructure  and  Transport,  2015b).    In  2015  there  were  304,648  HGVs  (vehicles 
above 3.5t) registered in Spain (Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport, 2015b).  The 
market  is  fragmented,  with  many  small  businesses.    Most  of  the  firms  (52%)  have 

100 Cabotage Guidelines published by the Danish Transport Authority in September 2014. 

101 Ibidem 

102 Ibidem. 

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only  one  vehicle;  however  these  companies  together  account  for  only  15%  of  total 
HDVs (Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport, 2015b).   

Table  11-2  shows  that  the  total  operating  costs  of  HGVs  in  Spain  are  relatively  low 
compared  to  other  EU-15  countries,  although  they  still  exceed  those  of  new  Member 
States.    In  part,  this  is  because  driver  wages  in  Spain  are  on  a  par  with  those  in 
Eastern  Europe,  averaging  at  €1,000  to  €2,000  per  month  –  similar  to  a  driver  in 
Poland  or  Bulgaria  (€1,000  to  €1,200  per  month)  and  lower  than  other  Western 
European  countries  (AECOM,  2014a).    Fuel  is  also  relatively  cheap  compared  to 
neighbouring  countries,  with  a  typical  pump  price  of  €1.374/litre  compared  to 
€1.411/litre in Portugal and €1.387/litre in France (AECOM, 2014a).  

Table 11-2: Hourly cost of operating an HGV 

Country 

Spain 

France 

Germany 

Italy 

Austria 

Slovenia 

Poland 

Hungary 

Romania 

Total operating costs ( per 
hour) 

Driver costs (as a percentage of 
total operating costs) 

58.87 

80.10 

79.06 

76.94 

74.38 

60.14 

52.05 

51.44 

44.6 

34.7% 

38.9% 

33.3% 

33.5% 

34.3% 

30.5% 

23.0% 

27.5% 

24.9% 

Source: AECOM (2014a) 

11.2.1.2. 

Community licenses, certified copies and driver attestations 

Although the number of transport companies in Spain fell between 2009 and 2013, the 
number of  Community  licences  increased  slightly  during  the  same  period (see  Figure 
11-6).  The  number  of  certified  true  copies  has  remained  roughly  flat  over  the  same 
period,  which  may  suggest  a  reduction  in  average  fleet  size  of  international  hauliers 
based  in  Spain.  Although  the  average  size  of  road  haulage  companies  had  gradually 
increased  from  1.93  vehicles  in  1999  to  3.14  vehicles  in  2008  (Ministry  of 
Infrastructure  and  Transport,  2015b),  this  trend  levelled  off  between  2008  and  2015 
in  part  due  to  the  economic  crisis,  and  also  partly  due  to  changes  in  national 
regulations (Order FOM/734/2007). 

Figure 11-6: Haulier community licenses and certified copies in Spain 
(thousands) 

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Source:  Ricardo-AEA  analysis  of  Member  State  reportage  to  the  Commission  pursuant  to 
Regulations 684/92, 881/92, 1072/2009 

As  of  31  December  2014,  the  number  of  Community  Licenses  was  27,724  and  the 
number  of  Certified  Copies  was  104,633  (Ministry  of  Infrastructure  and  Transport, 
2015b).  The majority of licences were issued to individuals, whereas the majority of 
certified copies were issued to corporations.   

Driver attestation data from Spain suggest that the use of drivers from third countries 
may  have  recently  decreased,  but  Spain  makes  relatively  frequent  use  of  foreign 
drivers  (at  least  compared  to  other  Member  States)  with  as  many  as  seven  or  eight 
drivers from third countries for every 100 Community licenses or certified copies. 

11.2.1.3. 

Cabotage 

In Spain 

After  falling  steadily  since  2007,  the  total  amount  of  cabotage  activity  in  Spain 
partially  rebounded  in  2013,  although  it  remains  much  lower  than  it  was  before  the 
financial  crisis.  The  cabotage  penetration  rate  in  Spain  is  low  (0.8%  in  2013)  and  it 
mainly hosts caboteurs from Portugal (see Figure 11-7).  

Figure 11-7: T-km of cabotage in Spain by Member State of registration of 
haulier 

Source: Ricardo-AEA analysis of Eurostat 
Note:  In  instances  where  data  is  flagged  as  confidential,  it  is  necessarily  omitted  from  this 
graph 

By Spanish Companies 

Cabotage carried out by Spanish companies is focussed almost entirely on France (see 
Figure  11-8),  where  Spanish  hauliers  have  exploited  their  competitive  advantages 
(mainly due to lower wages) (European Parliament, 2013a).  

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Figure 11-8: Tonne-km of cabotage performed by Spanish hauliers in other 
Member States 

Source: Ricardo-AEA analysis of Eurostat 
Note:  In  instances  where  data  is  flagged  as  confidential,  it  is  necessarily  omitted  from  this 
graph 

Overall,  these  figures  reveal  that  Spanish  operators  have  a  significantly  favourable 
competitive  position  when  compared  to  France  but  a  less  favourable  position  when 
compared  to  Portugal.  This  balance  is  partly  the  result  of  the  average  cost  base, 
including 
the 
internationalisation of the national fleet plays a role (75% of vehicles in Portugal carry 
out  both  national  and  international  transport,  while  only  4%  of  vehicles  in  Spain  do) 
(European Parliament, 2013a). 

these  markets.  Also 

labour  costs  and 

flows  between 

trade 

11.2.2. 

Regulation 1071/2009 

11.2.2.1. 

Implementation and status 

Access  to  the  profession  is  regulated  under  the  national  Law  on  Land  Transport 
(LOTT)103  and  its  implementing  legislation  the  Royal  Decree  1211/1990  (ROTT)104.    
Both the LOTT and the ROTT were amended in 2013 in order to adapt the legislation 
to  Regulations  1071/2009  and  1072/2009.    The  2013  amendment  included  a 
disposition  indicating  that  a  further  amendment  of  the  ROTT  would  occur  within  two 
years  of  the  entry  into  force  of  this  new  regime.  However,  the  deadline  has  already 
elapsed and the new amended ROTT has not been adopted. 

The  previous  national  system  concerning  access  to  the  profession  met  the  minimum 
requirements  of  the  Regulations,  and  hence  did  not  need  substantial  modification 
(Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport, 2011).   

introduced 

to  ensure  effective  and  stable 
Additional  provisions  were 
establishment.    The  Spanish  legislation  requires  undertakings  to  have  any  type  of 
premises  (a  private  domicile  may  suffice)  as  long  as  they  keep  all  relevant 
documentation there and have the appropriate technical equipment (e.g. a computer).  
Some stakeholders have raised concerns that physical persons who act as independent 
operators  may  access  the  occupation  by  registering  their  own  domicile  as 
establishment  in  the  sense  of  Regulation  1071/2009.    In  their  view,  inspection 
activities could be hindered since accessing a domicile would require to obtain a prior 
legal warrant.  By contrast, at least one stakeholder has indicated that there would be 
no  such  obstacle  since  these  operators  are  obliged  to  sign  a  declaration  to  allow  the 
authorities to access their domicile for the purpose of inspection activities. 

103 Ley de Ordenación de los Transportes Terrestres 

104 Reglamento de Ordenación de los Transportes Terrestre 

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There  is  an  additional  requirement  that  applicants  must  have  three  vehicles 
representing at least one payload of 60 tonnes. Such vehicles may not exceed a 
maximum  age  of  five  months  from  its  first  registration  in  the  time  of  application  the 
application. (Art 19 ORDER FOM / 734/2007, of March 20).  Recently, there have been 
debates  over  whether  to  remove  the  additional  requirement  for  three  trucks  (TLT, 
2015).    Accordingly,  one  of  the  main  obstacles  is  to  acquire  sufficient  capital  to 
purchase  three  nearly  new  trucks  (estimated  at  €330,000).    This  can  be  avoided  by 
either  joining  a  cooperative105  (estimated  at  €14,000  total106)  or  transferring  the 
authorisation from another firm (€27,000 per transfer) (Domenech, 2014).  Recently, 
there have been debates over whether to remove the additional requirement for three 
trucks  (TLT,  2015).  Several  stakeholders have  expressed  their confidence  in  that  the 
law will be amended soon, although this was not confirmed by the Spanish Authorities. 
However,  both  the  European  Commission  and  the  Spanish  competition  authority  will 
be analysing whether this requirement creates a barrier to enter the market. 

The  conditions  of  financial  capability  (Article  46 LOTT)  match  the thresholds  set  in 
Regulation 1071/2009.   Certified annual accounts, bank guarantees and professional 
insurance are allowed to prove financial standing. All Spanish stakeholders interviewed 
have confirmed that this is proportionate and necessary. 

Article  45  LOTT  covers  provisions  related  to  good  repute:  neither  the  company  nor 
the  transport  manager  may  have  been  condemned  for  serious  criminal  offences  or 
misdemeanours. 

The test of professional competence includes two stages: the first stage consists of 
100 multiple choice questions with four alternative answers. The second stage consists 
of  six  practical  case  studies  (Ministry  of  Infrastructure  and  Transport,  2015a).    The 
tests can only be carried out by the administration of each region (19 centres in total).  

Pass  rates  for  the  examinations  are  reported  to  vary  from  region  to  region  but  were 
estimated by an interviewee to be on average 20-25%. Navarre is allegedly one of the 
most difficult regions to pass the exam with a success rate of only 12% while regions 
such as Andalusia or Catalonia are thought to be considerably easier. Stakeholders are 
divided with regard to the degree of difficulty of the exam. Some have indicated that it 
is  suitable  in  its  current  form  and  it  is  feasible  to  obtain  the  title  subject  with 
appropriate  prior  study.  Others  have  indicated  that  the  syllabus  and  the  degree  of 
difficulty exceed what it is needed for operating in the market and therefore the exam 
is unnecessarily difficult for persons without a university background. 

Before  the  implementation  of  Regulation  1071/2009  freight  forwarders  and  hauliers 
were  required  to  pass  different  exams,  whereas  now  they  the  same  despite  the 
different requirements for these two professions.  

The only exemption from the exams for professional competence applies to applicants 
who  have  obtained  the  title  of  superior  technician  in  transport  and  logistics.  This 
degree  requires  around  2,000  hours  of  vocational  training  and  is  regulated  by  the 
Royal-Decree 1572/2011. It contains all subjects specified by the Regulation as well as 
additional content. 

Regarding the role of transport manager, there is a possibility of managing different 
companies as long as these companies are linked, for instance a parent company and 
its subsidiary. This provision requires that at least 50% of all companies must belong 
to the same owner to be allowed to be managed by the same person holding the title 
of  transport  manager.  Most  stakeholders  have  indicated  that  the  fact  that  linked 
companies share their transport manager is rather exceptional. Normally there is one 

105 A group of transport professionals who organise joint production of goods/services 

106  Including  €2,000  social  contributions,  €5,000  security  deposit  and  €7,000  for  a  truck  (not 

necessarily new). 

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transport  manager  per  company.    If  a  company  loses  its  transport  manager  (for 
instance  if  the  employee  who  holds  the  title  leaves  the  company)  it  is  mandatory  to 
notify the authority. The company may operate ad interim for three months without a 
transport manager.  

The Ministry of Development mentioned that the development of further regulation is 
in  progress  in  order  to:  (i)  concretise  the  functions  of  the  manager  within  the 
company; (ii) require clear legal links between the manager and the company. 

Spain  already  had  a  national  registry  prior  to  the  implementation  of  Regulation 
1071/2009 and fully participates in ERRU. The Ministry of Development emphasised in 
the  interview  for  this  study  that  the  national  registry  facilitates  management  and 
inspection.  The  cooperation  on  the  international  level  is  still  scarce  since  many 
Member  States  are  still  not  fully  participating.  So  far  Spain  only  exchanged 
information  on  operators  infringing  the  regulations  with  Denmark,  the  UK  and 
Slovenia.   

Article  35.3 of  Law  9/2013  states  that  the  Inspectorate will  focus  on  companies  with 
greater  risks  (in  compliance  with  Article  12  of  Regulation  1071/2009).    To  that  end, 
the inspection authorities shall draw up an inspection plan in close collaboration with 
other transport authorities that should be guided by the principles of transport safety 
and free competition. 

11.2.2.2. 

 Enforcement and compliance 

According to European Commission (2014a), in 2012, Spain issued one of the highest 
quantities of authorisations (almost 31,000 for both passenger and goods transport). 
The  withdrawals  were  either  (i)  due  to  failure  to  provide  proof  of  meeting  the 
conditions  needed  for  an  authorisation  to  be  granted,  (ii)  on  the  request  of  an 
applicant  or  (iii)  the  cease  of  operations.  (European  Commission,  2014a).    The 
breakdown of the share of withdrawals due to each of these different reasons was not 
indicated.   

Planning  of  controls  is  carried  out  jointly  through  collaboration  in  the  National 
Committee on Road Transport, in order to achieve proper coordination in carrying out 
the  different  levels  of  inspection  (Ministry  of  Infrastructure  and  Transport,  2015c).  
The  bodies  involved  include  national  (Guardia  Civil)  and  by  regional  (Policías  de  las 
comunidades autónomas) and local administrations. The Ministry specifically mentions 
the need to control behaviours that distort the market in order to improve confidence 
in the transport industry and to ensure fair competition.   

The national enforcement authorities therefore consider that it is even more important 
to  strengthen  control  measures  against  unfair  competition  in  the  sector,  since  the 
current  conditions  following  the  economic  crisis  could  lead  to  an  increased  risk  of 
infringements  of  the  rules,  particularly  with  a  view  to  reducing  costs  (Ministry  of 
Infrastructure  and  Transport,  2015c).    The  Ministry  recognises  that  the  reduction  of 
unlawful conduct can only bring benefits for the sector, since its reduction will improve 
competition between companies (Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport, 2015c).   

Authorisations  are  granted  without  a  specific  duration.  However,  their  validity  is 
subject to a periodic “visa” (visado) carried out every two years (Article 45 ROTT).  At 
this  point,  they  again  need  to  show  compliance  with  the  requirements  for  access  to 
the  occupation.    Therefore,  there  are  no  “ad  hoc”  or  random  inspections  to  check 
compliance  with  stable  and  effective  establishment,  but  rather  these  checks  are 
conducted  only  when  applying  for  an  authorisation  and  obtaining  a  renewal.    The 
extent of any problems with letterbox companies in Spain is not clear from publically 
available  data.    Although  overall  no  specific  incidents  in  recent  years  could  be 
identified  by  the  study  team,  problems  in  identifying  “ghost  companies”  have  been 
reported (European Parliament, 2013a).   

The  vast  majority  of  stakeholders  interviewed  for  the  purposes  of  this  study  have 
raised  concerns  about  the  current  situation  regarding  letterbox  companies.  While 

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some stakeholders have indicated that there is no such problem in Spain and that the 
only  issue  would  be  that  some  companies  are  being  relocated  or  have  opened  law-
abiding  subsidiaries  abroad,  the  majority  of  stakeholders  have  indicated  that  some 
Spanish  companies  would  be  illegally  out-flagged  in  countries  such  as  Poland  and 
Romania,  without  an  effective  and  stable  establishment.  When  asked  about  whether 
the  Road  Transport  Package  rules  have  effectively  reduced  the  number  of  letterbox 
companies in Spain, stakeholders were divided. The vast majority indicated that it had 
indeed reduced the number and that the tendency is to continue to decrease, although 
there  are  still  a  number  of  deficiencies  in  enforcement  that  should  be  corrected.  By 
contrast,  there  are  at  least  two  stakeholders  that  consider  that  the  number  of 
letterbox companies is  currently increasing.  One of these stakeholders has indicated 
as  one  of  the  reasons  behind  this  situation  could  be  the  less  strict  enforcement 
measures in the countries that attract more letterbox companies (i.e. Poland, Romania 
and  Bulgaria)  together  with  the  unsatisfactory  implementation  of  the  European 
Register of Road Transport Undertakings (ERRU). 

Regarding  the  requirement  of  financial  standing,  an  undertaking  association 
interviewed  for  this  study  claimed  that  the  limits  are  proportional  and  do  not  create 
barriers  to  entry.    Nevertheless,  it  raised  a  specific  concern  due  to  insolvency 
procedures in Spain.  Insolvency procedures aim to allow a company to come to an 
arrangement  with  its  creditors;  however,  once  a  company  enters  into  the  insolvency 
proceedings, the company loses its financial standing and hence also its authorisation 
to  operate.  As  a  consequence,  the  company  cannot  have  any  income  that  allows 
viability  or  a  settlement  with  creditors.  Therefore,  this  requirement  has  a  perverse 
effect with regard to companies that apply for bankruptcy proceedings.  Firstly, in that 
insolvency proceedings are empty of content since the loss of financial capability does 
not  allow  the  company  to  operate,  and  therefore  no  transport  company  can  really 
benefit from the chance to negotiate with creditors.  Secondly, some creditors use this 
situation  in  bad  faith  to  threaten  the  company,  as  they  know  the  request  for 
insolvency proceedings may force the company to irreversible bankruptcy and winding 
up.  The Spanish authorities have indicated that Article 46 a) LOTT has been drafted 
as an  exemption  and  that  the  judge  that  hears the  case  in  an  insolvency  proceeding 
may  allow  the  company  to  continue  operating  if  the  competent  authority  that  issues 
the authorisation considers that it is realistic to expect a financial rehabilitation of the 
company within a reasonable time. 

In  this  sense,  the  judgment  delivered  by  the  Audiencia  Provincial  of  Almeria  on  8th 
March 2013 indicates that the court that deals with the insolvency proceedings cannot 
order the competent authority to issue a new visa for the transport undertaking as this 
exceeds  its  competence.  By  contrast,  it  may  declare  that  the  undertaking  complies 
with the requirements to obtain the visa so that the authority may take the decision as 
a basis to renew the visa. 

The  withdrawal  of  good  repute  has  never  been  used  in  Spain,  which  stakeholders 
view  as  undermining  the  effectiveness  of  this  sanction.    In  order  to  improve  the 
effectiveness  of  this  sanction,  amendments  to  the  LOTT/ROTT  were  made  in  2013. 
With this amendment, operators and transport managers may lose  their good repute 
after incurring in very serious infringements (Article 143 (5) LOTT).  Nevertheless, the 
legal  provision  requires  a  firm  decision  on  the  infringement,  i.e.  against  which  no 
further appeal is possible. Therefore, it is still too soon to see companies or transport 
managers losing their good repute. 

There is no formal procedure to re-establish good repute: After the  first loss of good 
repute, good repute is automatically re-established after 6 months. This period might 
be extended to 12 months in case of recidivism.  

Concerning transport managers, at least one stakeholder was concerned that some 
operators  could  still  be  hiring  the  title.  However,  the  overwhelming  majority  of 
stakeholders has denied this situation and by contrast have stressed that controls over 
this condition are very strict. 

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In Spain, fines appear to be tailored to the seriousness of the offences: 

  Very serious infringements €1,001-6,000 (up to €18,000 in case of recidivism) 
e.g. performing public transport without holding professional capacity, good 
repute and financial capability 

  Serious infringements €401-1,000 e.g. not providing the authority with the 
licence or authorisation (or certified copies) once they have been revoked; 

  Minor infringements €100-400 e.g. not carrying documentation in certain 

specific cases 

11.2.3. 

Regulation 1072/2009 

11.2.3.1. 

 Implementation and status 

Spain introduced its national regulation of cabotage activities ahead of the approval of 
Regulation  1072/2009:  The  provisions  for  cabotage  in  Spain  were  enacted  by 
Ministerial  Order  FOM/2181/2008,  approved  in  July  2008.    This  Order  limits  the 
possibility of performing cabotage in Spain to three cabotage operations in seven days 
after  an  international  transport  (in  accordance  to  the  rule  established  by  Regulation 
1072/2009). 

It is also possible to enter the Spanish territory with an empty vehicle and perform a 
single cabotage operation provided that: (i) this is carried out no later than three days 
from  the  entry  and  until  the  seventh  day  from  the  entry;  and  (ii)  the  vehicle  has 
performed  a  prior  international  transport  which  concluded  in  another  Member  State. 
An example of this situation would be the following: 

-  a Portuguese vehicle leaves Porto fully loaded on the 1st June. 

- 

it  unloads  50%  of  its  load  in  Marseille  (France)  on  4th  June  and  50%  in 
Perpignan (France) on the 5th June 

-  On  6th  June  it  enters  the  Spanish  territory  running  empty  and  stops  in 

Zaragoza where it loads 50% of its capacity. 

-  On 7th June it unloads the goods picked up in Zaragoza in León (Spain) 

-  On 8th June it arrives back to Porto. 

This  interpretation  is  not  followed  by  all  other  Member  States.    For  instance,  some 
Member States consider that if the vehicle unloads in three different points that belong 
to  the  same  client,  this  would  only  count  as  one  cabotage  operation.    On  the 
contrary, in Spain it is considered irrelevant if the client is the same.  

Spanish  operators  have  increasingly  reported  concerns  about  the  entry  into  the 
market of Romanian and Bulgarian hauliers. The Ministry is hence seen to be likely to 
intensify  controls  over  trucks  from  these  Member  States  (European  Parliament, 
2013a).   

Vehicles under 3.5t do not need a Community licence and are not subject to cabotage 
rules.    As  a  result,  concerns  have  grown  over  the  possible  use  of  vans  (<3.5t)  and 
agricultural  tractors  in  order  to  avoid  using  vehicles  falling  under  the  cabotage 
provisions (European Parliament, 2013a).  

Recently,  the  association  FENADISMER  has  filed  a  complaint  before  the  Spanish 
authorities indicating that some foreign operators could be performing illegal cabotage 
in relation with some infrastructure projects for the high speed railway and highways 
in  Spain  (FENADISMER,  2015).  Following  this  complaint  the  Spanish  enforcement 
authorities carried out some checks in which some CMR documents were found to be 
counterfeited. 

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For  Community  Licences,  the  amount  payable  is  €  119.59  for  the  issuance  of  the 
original  Community  certificate  plus  €  5.99  per  copy  (Ministry  of  Infrastructure  and 
Transport,  2015a).    An  issue  that  has  been  reported  by  several  stakeholders 
interviewed  for  this  study  is  that,  in  order  to  renew  the  licence  it  is  necessary  to 
provide the authority with the old one, leaving the operators without a proper licence 
for a short period of time. The authority delivers a provisional one until the definitive 
one is ready but the former only allows the operator to travel in Spain and not abroad. 

The Ministry of Development reported that they were currently working on a solution 
to  allow  the  renewal  of  the  licence  online,  which  would  improve  the  administrative 
process. The plan is to implement this system as mandatory in 2017.  

11.2.3.2. 

Enforcement and compliance 

The  enforcement  of  cabotage  rules  in  Spain  is  overseen  by  the  Ministry  of 
Infrastructure  and  Transport  (Ministerio  de  Fomento),  and  the  Subdirección  de 
Inspección  del  Transporte  in  particular.  However,  as  a  result  of  recent  devolution 
reforms,  roadside  checks  are  carried  out  both  by  national  (Guardia  Civil)  and  by 
regional (Policía de las Comunidades Autónomas).  The interface between local bodies 
and  national  authorities  has  been  reported  in  the  literature  as  problematic,  for 
example  in  the  communication  of  data  (SDG,  2013a).    The  Ministry  of  Development 
estimates  that  Spain  employs  400  traffic  agents  and  150  employees  of  the 
administrative organs of the regions that carry out checks on cabotage. 

Given  the  trends  towards  increasing  relocation  of  businesses,  the  National  Transport 
Committee  has  called  for  greater  controls  on  cabotage  to  prevent  unfair  competition 
and  social  dumping  (Ministry  of  Infrastructure  and  Transport,  2015c).    Furthermore, 
the Traffic Civil  Guard have reported a significant increase in vehicles being detected 
with  irregularities  concerning  cabotage,  which  has  motivated  plans  for  increased 
controls in 2015 (Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport, 2015c).   

Stakeholders  in  Spain  have  called  for  sufficient  resources  to  be  granted  to  control 
bodies,  in  order  to  improve  their  ability  to  perform  wide-ranging  controls  (European 
Parliament, 2013a).    

The fines for non-compliance with the cabotage rules range from €201 to €4001. Fines 
increase if the person liable had been fined for a very serious infringement within the 
previous 12 months.  In addition to these fines, vehicle immobilisation and the loss of 
good repute can be applied as penalties for cabotage rules violations.  

In  2013,  there  were  two  important  amendments  in  Spain  with  regard  to  sanctions. 
First,  Spain  reduced  the  quantity  of  fines  by  50%.  Second,  as  for  tachograph 
infringements,  the  operators  may  avoid  the  fine  if  they  prove  that  a  compliance 
programme  has  been  implemented  within  the  company  and  that  the  driver  that  did 
not  follow  the  rules  has  been  penalised  internally.  The  Spanish  competent  authority 
has issued a document called “Baremo sancionador” with guidelines on the application 
of these fines within the assigned ranges. The “Baremo” is regularly updated and has 
no legal binding character, although it is frequently used by the enforcing authorities. 

11.3.  Germany 

11.3.1. 

Market situation and developments  

11.3.1.1. 

Market Overview 

Figure 11-9 shows that the transport performance over the period from 2008 to 2013 
fell  from  276.2  to  261.8  billion  tkm (5.2%), mainly due to  decreases  in  cross-border 
long-distance  transport.  Short-distance  transport  has  continuously  increased  during 
the same period. 

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Figure 11-9: Road freight transport by German HGVs from 2008 to 2013  

Source: (BAG, 2014) 

In  the  first  half  of  2014,  road  freight  transport  activities  increased  compared  to  the 
first half of 2013 (by 9% in terms of tonnage, and by 4% in t-km) (BAG, 2014). This 
upswing  in  2014  is  also  reflected  by  the  significant  decrease  in  the  number  of 
registered  insolvencies  during  the  first  half  of  the  year  in  the  road  freight  transport 
sector, as shown in Figure 11-10. 

Figure  11-10: Number of registered  insolvencies  in the first 6 months of the 
years 2008-2014  

Source: (BAG, 2014) 

West  German  transport  operators  frequently  focus  on  ‘high  quality’  transport  and 
increasingly  outsource  transport  operations  to  their  Eastern  European  or  Eastern 
German subsidiaries (Guihery, 2008). East German drivers can be paid 30% less than 
Western German drivers, given that Eastern German undertakings are more exposed 
to  competition  from  lower-wage  countries.  Downward  pressure  on  prices  also  comes 
from the use of cabotage operations, as well as excess capacity in the relatively small 
domestic markets in the new Member States (European Parliament, 2013a). According 
to  the  BAG,  the  German  federal  office  for  goods  transport,  labour  cost  differences 
between Germany and other Member States have been gradually decreasing since the 
cabotage  rules  were  introduced  in  2009  and  part  of  the  remaining  differences  are 
outweighed by a higher efficiency of German hauliers (European Parliament, 2013a).     

11.3.1.2. 

Community licenses, certified copies and driver attestations 

The  number  of  Community  licences  in  circulation  is  an  indicator  of  the  number  of 
undertakings  performing  international  transport,  while  the  number  of  certified  copies 
provides  further  information  on  international  transport  activity  as  it  is  related  to  the 

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total  fleet  engaged  in  international  transport.  These  indicators  suggest  that  the  total 
number of operators performing international transport was stagnant in Germany from 
2007 onwards, until a sharp drop between 2010 and 2011 (see Figure 11-11) can be 
observed, which is in line with the observed insolvencies in the sector over the same 
period (as shown in Figure 11-10 above).  

Figure 11-11: Haulier community licences and certified copies in Germany 
(thousands)  

Source:  Ricardo-AEA  analysis  of  Member  State  reportage  to  the  Commission  pursuant  to 
Regulations 684/92, 881/92, 1072/2009 

Driver attestation data provided by Germany to the Commission indicate that the use 
of drivers from third countries is very infrequent in Germany: in 2013, for every 100 
community  licenses  and  certified  copies  there  were  just  0.6  driver  attestations  in 
circulation.  This  suggests  that  less  than  1%  of  vehicles  owned  by  German 
undertakings were being driven by individuals from third countries. Driver attestation 
data for other years has not been made available.  

11.3.1.3. 

Cabotage 

In Germany 

In 2010, the BAG, the German federal office for goods transport, published a report on 
the  effects  of  the  opening  of  the  cabotage  market  to  the  ‘new’  EU  Member  States  in 
May 2009 (BAG, 2010). The report (published in April 2010) concludes that there had 
not  yet  been  any  significant  impact  other  than  in  (i)  the  auto-transport  market  - 
possibly  because  the  automotive  industry  was  increasingly  tendering  their  transport 
operations on an EU-wide level -, and (ii) the container transport market in Northern 
Germany – where the number of Czech and Polish trucks appeared to have increased. 
A  possible  reason  for  the  limited  impact  was  due  to  the  slow  growth  in  the  sector 
following the economic crisis. However, the report did suggest that an impact could be 
expected  in  the  future,  mainly  due  to  German  undertakings  that  might  increasingly 
operate via their subsidiaries in Eastern Europe.  

The  Germany  market  has  shown  greater  resilience  to  foreign  cabotage  operations 
since the opening of the market in 2009 when compared to that of many other EU15 
Member  States  (European  Parliament,  2013a).  Germany’s  requirement  regarding 
liability insurance107 is thought to be the main factor.  For instance, following market 

107  (§  7  of  the  German  Road  Haulage  Act,  the  GüKG,  requires  liability  insurance  against  the 
damage of goods amounting to no less than €600,000 for each claim, and no less than €1.2 
million for a year 

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opening  in  2012  Romanian  and  Bulgarian  hauliers  were  expected  to  need  a 
supplemental insurance of around €500 per year per vehicle (BAG, 2012).  In addition, 
the German market is protected by several factors (BAG, 2012): 

  The  geographic  distance  of  the  transport  markets  with  partly  non-matching 

freight flows;  

  Language barriers and differences in mentality; 

  Quality differences. Domestic companies were expected to be able to charge a 
premium  due  to  their  higher  quality  of  service,  reliability  and  punctuality 
(European Parliament, 2013a). 

  Competitive  pressures  from  road  transport  undertakings  from  Poland,  the 
Czech Republic; and the Baltic States that had already operated in the German 
market.  

  High efficiency of German hauliers, which negates the labour cost advantage of 
other hauliers.  For example, Romania’s labour cost advantage is estimated fall 
from 50% to a total operating cost advantage of only 30%. 

Stakeholders  interviewed  for  this  study  further  state  that  favourable  conditions  in 
Germany  concerning  vehicle  leasing  and  maintenance  contracts  allows  German 
undertakings  to  maintain  some  competitive  advantage  over  Eastern  European 
companies/drivers. Also, maintenance costs are typically lower, since German drivers, 
working  under  better  working  conditions  and  frequently  operating  the  same  vehicle, 
take better care of their vehicles.  

However,  not  all  stakeholders  consulted  for  this  study  agreed  that  the  quality  of 
service could be a significant selling point in today’s transport market, except in niche 
markets  (e.g.  transport  of  dangerous  goods,  food  products,  animal  transport  etc).  A 
stakeholder  states  that  a  strategy  of  German  transport  operators  has  therefore  been 
to either specialise on a specific type of transport operations, or to diversify away from 
classic  transport  operations  to  the  provision  of  services  such  as  the  assembly  of  the 
product or other services adding value to the product being transported. 

Figure 11-12 shows that cabotage activities in Germany have more than doubled. The 
biggest caboteurs in Germany were Polish undertakings in 2013, who increased their 
cabotage  activities  by  32%  compared  to  the  year  2012  (to  4.4  billion  tkm).  Despite 
these  increases,  the  cabotage  penetration  rate  in  Germany  is  still  lower  than  in 
countries such as Belgium (6.5%), Austria (5.2%), France (4.5%) and Sweden (3.9%) 
(BAG, 2014).  

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Figure 11-12: Tonne-km of cabotage in Germany by Member State of 
registration of haulier 

Source: Ricardo-AEA analysis of Eurostat 
Note:  In  instances  where  data  is  flagged  as  confidential,  it  is  necessarily  omitted  from  this 
graph 

The  analysis  provided  in  European  Parliament  (2013a)  suggests  that  the  2012 
cabotage  market  opening  had  a  more  significant  impact  than  expected:  journeys 
realised by Bulgarian hauliers on German roads increased significantly more than the 
trade flows between these two countries in the period from 2011 to 2012. Part of this 
is  seen  to  be  due  to  cabotage  activities  that  are  carried  out  in  the  continuation  of 
international transports to Germany.  

The  BAG  has  analysed  cabotage  activities  through  surveys/interviews  that  were 
carried out during roadside checks in 2014 (BAG, 2014). During a three-month period 
in  2014,  801  drivers  that  were  carrying  out  cabotage  activities  were  surveyed.  The 
vehicles  of  the  interviewees  were  registered  in  Poland  (with  a  share  of  55%),  the 
Czech Republic (9%), the Netherlands (7%) and Rumania (6%). In 87% of the cases 
the  nationality  was  the  driver  was  identical  to  the  country  of  registration  of  the 
vehicle. In 19 cases German drivers were found in non-German vehicles, mainly from 
the  Netherlands  and  Luxembourg.  The  survey  showed  that  the  increase  of  cabotage 
activities  in  Germany  has  been  largely  promoted  by  the  commissioning  of  such 
activities  by  German  companies  (customers  of  cabotage  activities  in  Germany  are 
mainly  German 
and 
manufacturing/trading businesses.  Cabotage activities are carried out fairly regularly 
–  typically  five  or  more  times  per  month  and  a  significant  share  of  cabotage  can  be 
attributed to “regularly recurrent” transport services108.  

companies), 

forwarders 

including 

freight 

both 

By German companies 

The cabotage activity of Germany hauliers reduced markedly after the financial crisis, 
and has not yet recovered to 2008 levels. German cabotage activity is spread across 

108    The  meaning  of  ‘regularly  recurrent’  is  not  defined,  but  might  refer  to  same  transport 
services  that  are  carried  out  for  the  same  client  more  frequently,  having  the  same  origin 
and  destination;  it  is  also  possible  that  respondents  had  a  different  understanding  of  the 
meaning of ‘regularly recurrent’ 

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many  neighbouring  or  nearby  countries,  especially  Italy  and  France  (see  Figure 
11-13). 

Figure 11-13: Tonne-km of cabotage performed by German hauliers in other 
Member States 

Source: Ricardo-AEA analysis of Eurostat 
Note:  In  instances  where  data  is  flagged  as  confidential,  it  is  necessarily  omitted  from  this 
graph 

11.3.2. 

Regulation 1071/2009 

11.3.2.1. 

Implementation and status 

the  goods 

Regulation 1071/2009 (and 1072/2009) was adopted into German national law by the 
revision of the German Road Haulage Act (the “Güterkraftverkehrsgesetz”, GüKG) on 
the 23rd of September 2011. The German Regulation on the access to the profession 
of 
für  den 
(the 
Güterkraftverkehr”, GBZugV), which is based on the GüKG, was accordingly amended 
on  21st  December  2011.  The  implementation  of  the  national  register  of  transport 
undertakings  was 
"Verkehrsunternehmens-
Durchführungsverordnung”  (VUDat-DV),  which  was  also  adopted  on  the  21st  of 
December 2011 .  

furthermore  passed  with 

“Berufszugangsverordnung 

transport  market 

the 

Regulation  1071/2009  (as  well  as  1072/2009)  resulted  in  changes  to  the  General 
“Allgemeine 
Administrative  Regulation 
Verwaltungsvorschrift  zum  Güterkraftverkehrsrecht”,  GüKVwV),  which  were  released 
on the 10th of August 2012. The regulation on fees in the context of road haulage (the 
“Güterkraftverkehrskostenverordnung”,  GüKKostV)  did  not  need  any  revisions  due  to 
Regulation  1071/20009  (it  was  last  amended  in  2004);  it  sets  out  the  fees  to  be 
charged for official acts in relation to the provisions of the German Road Haulage Act.   

road  haulage 

(the 

law 

the 

to 

The  requirements  regarding  establishment,  good  repute, 
financial  standing, 
professional competence and designation of a transport manager, are largely the same 
as set out in 1071/2009 (see § 3 Erlaubnispflicht of the GüKG and the GBZugV, which 
both refer to 1071/2009).   

With  the  introduction  of  1071/2009  there  is  no  requirement  anymore  that  such  a 
qualified  person  is  directly  employed  by  the  undertaking.  Stakeholders  consulted  for 
this  study  took  different  views  on  whether  external  transport  managers  should  be 
permitted at all, on whether the limit of managing up to 50 vehicles for four different 
undertakings  is  too  stringent  or  too  loose,  and  on  whether  such  (or  a  similar)  limit 

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should  be  introduced  for  internal  transport  managers.  Enforcement  authorities  state 
that it is very difficult to verify whether an external transport manager effectively and 
continuously  manages  the  transport  activities  of  the  undertaking,  given  that  there  is 
no definition of the required degree of availability or their adequate remuneration are 
defined.  As such, “sham” labour contracts are difficult to uncover.  

Regarding  the  requirement  of  professional  competence,  Germany  requires  a 
supplementary  oral  examination  that  contributes  to  the  total  mark  of  the 
examination for transport managers. More specifically, there are two two-hour written 
exams  (contributing  40%  and  35%  to  the  total  grade)  that  combine  multi-choice 
questions,  with  questions  with  a  direct  response  and  case  study  questions,  and  one 
oral exam of 30 minutes (contributing the remaining 25% to the grade). A minimum 
of  60%  over  all  examination  parts  has  to  be  achieved,  while  each  part  has  to  be 
passed with at least 50%. In case the written examinations are passed with over 60%, 
the  oral  examination  is  no  longer  necessary  (it  is  also  omitted  in  case  the  results  of 
the  written  examination  do  not  allow  a  positive  mark  to  the  overall  examination 
anymore).  

The costs for the examination amount to €195 (IHK Köln, 2012). Where a person had 
commenced  training  or  passed  the  final  examination  before  the  4th  of  December 
2011,  no  further  examination  is  required.  Furthermore,  professional  competence  can 
be established if a person has managed a transport undertaking for at least ten years 
prior the 4th of December 2009 in one or more EU Member States. Further, certificates 
of professional competence that were restricted to the performance of short-distance 
goods  transport  operations,  transport  operations  for  the  purpose  of  relocations,  or 
inner-city transport are valid. Job trainings or degree programmes that had previously 
been  accredited  to  provide  for  proof  of  professional  competence  are  no  longer  valid 
since  the  inception  of  the  new  GBZugV  (IHK,  2015).  According  to  questionnaire 
responses  received  for  this  study,  the  pass  rate  of  the  exams  was  51%  for  goods 
transport and 77% for passenger transport in 2013.  

Referring to Article 8 (2), German authorities report that despite the requirement that 
applicants  shall  sit  the  examination  in  the  Member  State  in  which  they  have  their 
normal  residence  or  the  Member  State  in  which  they  work,  it  does  occur  that 
candidates travel to another Member State (i.e. their home country) to sit the exam in 
order to avoid potential German language difficulties.  

Regarding the requirement of good repute, the German Transport Act (GüKG) states 
that  in  case  a  designated  transport  manager  or  a  licence  holder  has  lost  their  good 
repute, this good repute is to be re-established upon request ‘in case facts justify the 
assumption’  that  this  reestablishment  is  legitimate  (see  §3(5b)).  A  more  explicit 
description of these facts and/or how the procedure works in practice is not defined in 
national legislation. 

Regarding  the  requirement  of  financial  standing,  the  minimum  level  of  financial 
standing  is  possible  by  the  means  of  certified  annual  accounts,  a  bank  guarantee, 
professional insurances and ‘other’ (as stated in Regulation 1071/2009) – a term that 
has not been defined any more explicitly in the German law and is hence interpreted 
differently  across  the  different  enforcement  authorities  leading  to  different  practices 
across the control authorities.  Questionnaire responses highlight the following issues 
in Germany: 

  The previous version of the German law explicitly stated which types of assets 
and reserves were accepted, which made the assessment of financial standing 
easier  –  especially  in  the  case  of  undertakings  that  are  exempt  from 
bookkeeping  and  accounting  requirements  (e.g.  because  of  their  size  and/or 
legal status).  

  Regarding  the  bank  guarantee,  it  is  questioned  who  the  addressee  of  such  a 
guarantee is supposed to be. Enforcement authorities also question how such a 

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guarantee  can  possibly  ensure  that  an  undertaking  can  meet  its  liabilities  at 
any point in time in practice.  

 

It  is  not  clearly  defined  what  type  of  proof  is  needed  when  an  undertaking 
applies for a licence for the first time and thus has less documentary evidence 
of its financial standing.  

  A  stable  financial  standing  over  longer  time  periods  is  reported  to  be  very 

difficult to verify. 

In  general,  German  enforcement  authorities  call  for  clearer  and  unambiguous 
definitions  of  which  documentation  and/or  assets  or  reserves  are  necessary  for 
proving financial standing.  

While  most  German  stakeholders  interviewed  for  this  study  state  that  the  financial 
standing requirement is definitely necessary, it is also thought to be the most difficult 
requirement  for  undertakings  to  comply  with.    By  contrast,  one  German  undertaking 
emphasised  that  the  capital  requirements  are  too  low:  they  allow  an  increasing 
number of small businesses who can undercut average prices by up to 10% to enter 
the market. Such companies frequently have a high turnover of drivers.   

Regarding  the  requirements  on  stable  and  effective  establishment,    German 
authorities  highlight  the  difficulty  in  verification,  mainly  due  to  the  different  terms.  
Article 5 of the Regulation refers to both an establishment (“Niederlassung”) in Article 
5  (a)  and  an  operating  centre  (“Betriebsstätte“)  in  Article  5  (c).  It  has  also  been 
highlighted  that  current  enforcement  capacities  are  often  insufficient  to  thoroughly 
verify whether an establishment is really stable.  

According  to  German  legislation,  a  company  which  has  its  seat  in  Germany  may  be 
granted a license for up to ten years provided that it complies with the requirements 
established in Article 3 of Regulation 1071/2009. A company that holds a Community 
license  does  not  need  a  separate  (German)  license  unless  the  carriage  is  between 
Germany and a state which is neither an EU Member State nor contracting party to the 
Agreement on the European Economic Area nor Switzerland. 

Stakeholders  interviewed  for  this  study  expressed  that  there  is  ambiguity  concerning 
whether  a  community  licence  can  only  be  granted  in  the  Member  State  where  the 
undertaking has its main establishment, or whether the licence can also be granted in 
the  Member  State  where  the  undertaking  has  a  registered  subsidiary.  As  Member 
States  appear  to  have  different  approaches  in  this  respect,  German  authorities  have 
been in contact with the Commission in order to address the problem. At the time of 
writing this report, the issue has not further advanced. 

However,  all  German  road  transport  undertakings  that  operate  HGVs  also  require  an 
additional  insurance  against  the  damage  of  transported  goods.  The  minimum  sum 
insured must not be lower than €600,000 per event of damage. The annual maximum 
limit of indemnity must not be lower than twice the insured minimum sum.  

With  regards  to  liability,  the  German  Road  Transport  Act  (GüKG)  defines  that  a 
contracting party is required to request information from the haulier on the availability 
of the required documentation needed for carrying out road transport operations. More 
explicitly,  Article  7c  of  the  GüKG  states  that  any  organisation  contracting  transport 
services to another enterprise on a commercial basis, must not allow these services to 
be  carried  out  in  the  event  he  has  the  knowledge,  or  negligently  has  no  knowledge, 
that the contracted enterprise:  

  does  not  hold  an  allowance,  does  not  hold  an  entitlement,  or  alternatively  a 
community  licence  that  allows  to  carry  out  the  transport  operation  (or 
illegitimately uses the allowance, entitlement or licence);  

  deploys  drivers  in  a  manner  not  compliant  with  the  provisions  of  the  German 
Road  Transport  Act,  or  for  who  he  does  not  hold  a  driver  attestation  in 
accordance with Articles 3 and 5 of Regulation (EC) No 1072/2009;  

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 

subcontracts services to another freight forwarder or haulier which carries out 
the services under the conditions listed above.  

According to a stakeholder interviewed for this study, contracting parties deal with this 
liability  in  practice  by  letting  the  contractor  sign  a  form  that  states  that  all 
documentation and employment practices are in order. This signed form is enough for 
the  contracting  party  to  be  immune  against  any  potential  charges.  Interviewed 
authorities  however say  that  such forms  would not  be  sufficient  to  claim non-liability 
for potential infringements.  

The national electronic register of transport undertakings (called “einzelstaatliches 
elektronisches Register” (EER)) is under the responsibility of the BAG. The public part 
of this register can be accessed since the 1st of October 2013. The parts of the register 
that are not publically available but accessible to all according responsible authorities 
in the Member States on request (and that provide information on infringements and 
related  administrative  decisions,  as  according  to  Regulation  1071/2009)  are  held 
separately.    However,  according  to  §  16 of  the  German  Transport  Act  (GüKG),  the 
BAG  does  maintain  a  file  on  completed  sanctioning  proceedings  related  to 
infringements  of  the  GüKG  (BAG,  2015)  (BAG,  2014).  The  German  Ministry  of 
Transport  reported  for  this  study  that  the  costs  for  setting  up  the  EER  and  its 
connection  to  the  ERRU  to  have  been  €2.1m.  The  annual  running  costs  amount  to 
€80,000. In general, the efforts are currently seen to greatly outweigh the benefits of 
the  national  register.  However,  it  is  acknowledged  that  this  imbalance  might  change 
for the better thanks to the connection of the register to the ERRU via EUCARIS (which 
has  taken  effect  on  the  13  January  2015).  EUCARIS  is  as  a  generic  data  exchange 
network  used  for  vehicle  and  driver  data  (including  driving  licences,  insurance 
information and personal data for collecting traffic fines from foreigners). 

Previously,  there  was  a  risk  rating  system  at  regional  level.  However,  with  the  entry 
into force of Regulations 1071/2009 and 1072/2009, a country-wide risk rating system 
was  implemented.  The  German  risk  rating  system  is  based  on  the  classification  of 
infringements into the four categories of most serious infringements (as according to 
Annex IV of Regulation 1071/2009). As of July 2014 the infringements are rated with 
either  5  points  (most  serious  infringements),  3  points  (more  serious/serious 
infringements)  or  1  point  (other  infringements).  An  undertaking  is  then  rated  as 
having an increased risk if it has accumulated either 5 points (for undertakings with to 
10  vehicles),  8  points  (up  to  50  vehicles),  or  11  points  (more  than  50  vehicles). 
Undertaking with ‘increased risk’ are checked  to confirm whether the conditions to the 
access to the professions are still met. If this is the case, but the increased risk of the 
undertaking persists, another check of the undertaking is carried out within two years. 
In order to account for the frequency of serious and very serious infringements, three 
serious infringements per driver per year is counted as one very serious infringement, 
and  three  very  serious  infringements  per  driver  per  year  are  counted  as  one  most 
serious infringement (BAG, 2014).  

The  German  authorities  have  indicated  that  in  practice,  the  categorisation  of 
infringements  poses  difficulties  though,  especially  with  regards  to  the  infringements 
that  are  defined  in  Annex  IV.  In  their  opinion,  the  infringements  should  be  better 
defined.  The  most  serious  infringements  appear  to  be  clear,  but  everything  below 
poses difficulties. An 'infringement regulation' would be convenient in this context, as 
it was rejected by the European Parliament. 

The  German  Transport  Act  (GüKG)  currently  applies  to  all  vehicles  with  a  mass  of 
more than 3.5t (see § 1 (1) of the GüKG). It has been discussed whether professional 
licences should be a requirement for undertakings that only operate with vehicles with 
a  maximum  speed  limit  of  40km/h  –  undertakings  that  are  clearly  out  of  scope  of 
Regulation  1071/2009  according  to  Article  1  (4c)  (unless  defined  differently  by  a 
Member  State).  The  industry  association  BGL  (Bundesverband  Güterkraftverkehr 
Logistik  und  Entsorgung)  opposes  the  exemption,  since  this  would  put  additional 
competitive pressure onto this market segment, typically operating in the agricultural 

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sector. The BGL generally opposes any extension of the list of exemptions provided in 
§ 2 of the GüKG). (BGL, 2014) 

11.3.2.2. 

Enforcement and compliance 

The  German  Road  Transport  Act  (the  GüKG)  defines  in  detail  the  duties  and 
competence  of  the  BAG,  an  independent  higher  federal  authority.  The  BAG  is 
responsible  for  checks  at  the  road  side  and  at  premises,  establishing  statistics,  the 
Road  Transport  Act’s  legal  development  as  well  as  for  market  monitoring.  The  office 
maintains  the  national  register  of  transport  undertakings  as  well  as  the  register  of 
committed  offences.  It  furthermore  acts  as  the  national  contact  point,  as  defined  in 
article 18 of Regulation 1071/2009.  

The  German  undertakings  association  BGL  highlighted  that  Danish  companies  have 
been  outflagging  vehicle  fleets  to  Germany  for  many  years  (BGL,  2014).  Recent 
reports  had  appeared  that  claimed  that  these  companies  were  letterbox  companies 
that  only  register  vehicles  in  Germany  while  organising  the  vehicles’  schedules  from 
Denmark. This practice allowed them to benefit from lower labour costs, tax rates and 
social  security  payments  and  exemptions  of  the  German  driving  ban  for  trucks  on 
Sundays.  German  authorities  interviewed  for  this  study  further  report  on  letterbox 
companies  that  are  established  as  a  means  to  get  access  to  transport  permits 
established under bi- or multilateral agreements with non-EU countries.   

Drivers  protested  against  (at  least  20)  Danish  undertakings  that  outflag  their 
operations  to  Flensburg  and  Handewitt,  without  fulfilling  the  requirements  of 
Regulation  1071/2009  on  the  conditions  for  establishment,  which  saves  them  up  to 
EUR  1,000  of  base  salary  per  driver.  Authorities  however  note  that  these  companies 
create jobs in the area. 

Several  stakeholders  believe  that  German  authorities  do  not  check/prosecute  these 
companies  properly;  however,  the  authorities  claim  that  it  is  not  straight-forward  to 
prove  any  illegal  practices  of  these  ‘outflagged’  companies  (see  for  example  (SHZ, 
2013)).   

With regards to checks and compliance statistics, Germany did not provide a country 
report on the implementation in the period from 4 December 2011 until 31 December 
2012,  hence  there  are  no  statistics  on  authorisations  or  certificates  of  professional 
competence  granted/withdrawn  over  that  period  available  (European  Commission, 
2014a).The BAG provides data as shown in  Table 11-3. More detailed information on 
the explicit type or seriousness of infringements for 2013 or any previous years could 
not be identified.  

Table  11-3:  Overview  of  roadside  checks  carried  out  by  BAG  in  2013  and 
identified infringements 

Controlled vehicles 
Total number of 
infringements 
Of which in the field of... 

The German Road 
Transport Act 
(GüKG) 
Illegal Employment 
Driver regulations* 
Hazardous goods law 
Road traffic law 
Waste law 
Other (e.g. food 

Total 

German vehicles 

Non-resident 
vehicles 

505,829 
217,267 

100% 
100% 

201,031 
114,545 

40% 
53% 

304,798 
102,722 

60% 
47% 

9,087 

4.2% 

4,558 

4.0% 

4,529 

4.4% 

378 
158,819 
5,651 
38,743 
4,483 
106 

0.2% 
73.1% 
2.6% 
17.8% 
2.1% 
0.0% 

137 
95,324 
1,937 
10,648 
1,880 
61 

0.1% 
83.2% 
1.7% 
9.3% 
1.6% 
0.1% 

241 
63,495 
3,714 
28,095 
2,603 
45 

0.2% 
61.8% 
3.6% 
27.4% 
2.5% 
0.0% 

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Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

Total 

German vehicles 

Non-resident 
vehicles 

legislation) 

*  Values  refer  to  the  total  number  of  detected  infringements,  accounting  for  possible  multiple 
infringements detected Source: Provided by the BAG for this study 

Article  19  of  the  German  Road  Transport  Act  defines  maximum  fines  for  non-
compliance  with  the  rules.  Three  types  of  infringements  are  identified  that  can  be 
penalised by fines of up to €200,000, €100,000 and €20,000 respectively. The highest 
fine can be charged in cases of unlawful employment of driving personnel, or in case 
of  cabotage  activities  that  are  carried  out  by  non-EU  drivers  that  do  not  possess  or 
carry a driver attestation. The fine of up to €100,000 can be charged when deploying 
security  personnel  or  vehicles  that  are  not  in  accordance  with  Regulation  (EU) 
1214/2011.  The  fine  of  up  to  €20,000  can,  among  others,  be  charged  in  case  the 
undertaking is found not to fulfil the requirements for engaging in the occupation of a 
road  transport  operator  (i.e.  does  not  possess  the  necessary  licence,  hence  the 
specific  requirements  of  Regulation  1071/2009), 
in  case  customers  (parties 
commissioning  the  transport)  neglect  their  customer-specific  obligations  (see  Article 
7c of the GüKG), or in case international or cabotage activities are carried out without 
the  undertaking  holding  a  community  licence.  All  these  fines  represent  the  absolute 
maximum fines and are in practice only charged in court  rulings in case of repetitive 
infringements.  In addition, Article 18 of the German Road Transport Act allows border 
authorities  to  send  vehicles  back  if  the  necessary  and  mandatory  documentation  are 
not shown. 

The  “Buß-  und  Verwarnungsgeldkatalog  GüKG”  is  of  more  importance  in  ‘everyday’ 
enforcement  practice  –  it  defines  the  fines  for  single  infringements.  This  “catalogue” 
distinguishes  between  penalties  for  intentional  and  negligent  infringements  and 
furthermore  separates  between  penalties  for  undertakings,  drivers  and  parties 
commissioning  transport  operations  (customers).  The  highest  €5,000  penalty  for  the 
most  serious  infringements  is  charged  to  undertakings  and  customers  only.  The 
highest  fee  drivers  can  be  charged  amounts  to  €250.  National  guidance  is  also 
provided  by  the  “Katalog  der  nationalen  Straf-  und  Bußgeldtatbestände,  die 
„Schwerste Verstöße“ i. S. d. Anhangs IV der Verordnung (EG) 1071/2009 darstellen” 
– a catalogue that provides a list of infringements that are to be classified as serious 
infringements according to annex IV or Regulation 1071/2009. 

In  case  an  undertaking  has  lost  its  good  repute,  rehabilitation  of  the  undertaking  is 
possible:  a  new  application  has  to  be  made  and  the  exam  has  to  be  passed  again, 
after the deletion of the records of the undertaking in the national register.   

Enforcement  authorities  consulted  for  this  study  call  for  a  clearer  definition  of  when 
the  loss  of  good  repute  and  the  resulting  withdrawal  of  the  licence  can  be  seen  as  a 
disproportionate measure.  Currently  it  is  seen  that  the  term  ‘disproportionate’  leaves 
too  much  room  for  interpretation.  Furthermore,  enforcement  authorities  ask  for 
clearer  definitions  of  the  categorisation  of  infringements  according  to  their  severity. 
The current use of terms causes confusion in practice.  Some specific issues that were 
mentioned by authorities during interviews conducted for this study were further that: 

- 

- 

- 

If  falsifying  record  sheets  is  classified  as  most  serious  infringement,  also  the 
failure  to  keep  them  (for  long  enough)  should  be  classified  as  most  serious 
infringement;  

If the absence of a tachograph is classified as most serious infringement, also 
the  non-functioning  or  an  unused  tachograph  should  be  classified  as  most 
serious infringement; 

Long-established typically compliant undertakings should be treated differently 
than  new  applicants,  especially  since  the  loss  of  good  repute  of  established 
undertakings  is  very  difficult  in  practice  anyway:  enforcers  typically  avoid 
withdrawing  a licence  in  case  of  a single  most  serious  infringement  of  a long-

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Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

stablished  company,  as  this  is  seen  as  a  disproportionate  measure.  However, 
this is  a  judgement  to  be  made  by  the  enforcement  officer on  a case-by-case 
basis as there is no official guidance in this respect.  

11.3.3. 

Regulation 1072/2009 

11.3.3.1. 

Implementation and status 

National legislation was not significantly affected by the entry into force of Regulation 
1072/2009 as since 2008, provisions established in European law had already been in 
force to a large extent.  In 2008 (prior to the introduction of Regulation 1072/2009), 
Germany introduced a rule allowing hauliers from other Member States to undertake 3 
cabotage operations within 7 days, following the transportation of a cross-border load 
to  Germany  which  involved  the  full  or  partial  unloading  of  the  vehicle.  In  addition, 
Article 7a of the Road Haulage Act established the requirement for hauliers conducting 
domestic  transport  operations  in  Germany  to  hold  liability  insurance  against  the 
damage  of  goods  carried  (European  Parliament,  2013b).    Following  adoption  of 
Regulation 1072/2009, an amendment of the German Road Haulage Act was issued on 
31  July  2010,  which    and  introduced  a  more  detailed  description  of  a  number  of 
infringements was added (European Parliament, 2013b).   

Regulation  1072/2009  was  adopted  into  German  national  law  by  the  revision  of  the 
German Road Haulage Act (GüKG) on the 23rd of September 2011 to ensure that the 
national  legislation  referred  to  Regulation  1072/2009.  Article  17a  (2)  of  the 
GüKGrKabotageV  states  that  cabotage  in  Germany  is  allowed  after  a  full  or  partial 
unloading of the vehicle following a cross-border transport.  This is a more explicit 
definition  of  when  a  cabotage  operation  starts  than  provided  in  Article  8(2)  of 
Regulation  1071/2009,  which  states  that  cabotage  operations  may  be  carried  out 
“once  the  goods  […]  have  been  delivered”  (Regulation  1071/2009  hence  does  not 
make it this explicit whether a delivery must be a fully or partially unloaded before a 
cabotage operation starts)     .  

Concerning  multi-drops,  the  BAG  takes  the  following  stance:  a  cabotage  service 
containing more than one loading or unloading point is seen as a single service in case 
there is only one single sender of the cargo or, respectively, only one single receiver 
of the cargo, irrespective of the number of loading or unloading points. In case there 
are  multiple  senders  and/or  receivers  of  the  transported  cargo,  the  operation  cannot 
be counted as single a cabotage operation (HK Hamburg, 2015). According to German 
authorities, an international transport operation into Germany (after which a cabotage 
operation can start) is counted as such if it can be seen as an ‘economic activity’ – in 
practice,  international  shipping  documents  provide  the  necessary  evidence,  however, 
no official threshold values/guidelines have been established here that make it evident 
which  transport  can  or  cannot  be  seen  as  a  true  ‘economic  activity’.  There  are  no 
requirements for vehicles to return to their home country or to spend a certain period 
out  of  Germany  before  re-entering  the  German  territory  in  order  to  carry  out  new 
cabotage  activities.  There  are  no  additional  requirements  in  Germany  to  the  ones  as 
set out in Regulation 1071/2009 as to how a cabotage operation can be proven.  

German  industry  strongly  opposes  any  further  opening  of  the  cabotage  market.  The 
industry association BGL highlights that empty runs cannot be reduced with increasing 
liberalisation  of  the  market:  empty  runs  are  either  due  to  specificities  of  certain 
transport  operations  (e.g.  operations  carried  out  by  waste  disposal  vehicles,  lumber 
trucks etc.) or due to unmatched operations (e.g. there is three times as much cargo 
that  gets  delivered  into  Berlin  than  out  of  Berlin).  Furthermore,  also  the  trip  to/from 
the  first/last  loading/unloading  points  will  necessarily  always  be  empty.  The  share  of 
empty runs of 20% (or 10% in long-distance transport) is expected to remain stable, 
as they have from 2005 onwards. Since then neither the introduction of toll roads in 
2005,  nor  the  increase  of  tolls  in  2009  led  to  a  reduction  of  empty  runs  (SVG 
Hamburg, 2014).  

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Stakeholders  surveyed/interviewed  for  this  study  within  the  group  of  transport 
undertakings state that an increased use of vehicles below 3.5t (partly equipped with 
bunk  beds)  among  foreign  operators  has  been  observed  -  possibly  this  is  a  result  of 
the applicability of the German Transport Act (GüKG) only to vehicles above 3.5t and 
hence  of  attempts  to  circumvent  the  cabotage  rules.  Concrete  data  on  this 
phenomenon  could  not  be  gathered,  hence  the  extent  of  it  remains  unknown.  Given 
this lack of data, it is also impossible to say whether these vehicles replace the heavier 
vehicle types or whether these lighter vehicles represent new, additional vehicles that 
have  come  into  operation.  However,  German  stakeholders  interviewed  for  this  study 
among  the  groups  of  trade  unions  and  enforcers  have  the  impression  that  this 
phenomenon has especially increased since 2014.   

11.3.3.2. 

Enforcement and compliance 

According  to  questionnaire  responses  for  this  study,  cabotage  rules  are  enforced  by 
the (federal and local) police, the licence authorities as well as the BAG.  

According to the numbers received from the BAG for this study (see Table 11-4), the 
number  of  cabotage  checks  has  somewhat  decreased  over  the  past  three  years. 
Despite  the  decreasing  number  of  checks,  the  number  of  detected  infringements  has 
however  risen,  resulting  in  an  increase  of  the  detection  rate  from  2.6%  in  2012  to 
8.3%  in  2014.  Even  so,  the  overall  detection  rates  are  relatively  low  for  Germany 
vehicles, but relatively higher for other EU vehicles.  

Table 11-4: Cabotage control statistics for Germany 2012 - 2014 

Number of vehicles 
controlled  

DE 

EU 

Total 

Number of detected 
infringements 
EU 

DE 

Total  DE 

Detection rate         

(in %)  
EU 

Total 

2012 

2013 

2014 

98,283 

108,837 

207,120 

86,234 

99,980 

186,214 

76,608 

106,592 

183,200 

52 

29 

87 

484 

698 

536 

727 

1,433 

1,520 

0.5 

0.3 

1.1 

4.4 

7.0 

13.4 

2.6 

3.9 

8.3 

Source: Provided by the BAG for this study 

German stakeholders mention that monitoring compliance with the current law is not 
straightforward and control of certain requirements (e.g. the empty entry of vehicles) 
are  almost  impossible  to  monitor  (European  Parliament,  2013a).  Some  German 
authorities  appreciated  the  fact  that  the  legislation  allows  license  documents  to  be 
issued  ‘up  to  10  years’,  which  allows  them  to  differentiate  between  more  or  less 
reliable undertakings, with more or less proven financial standing, in case the need be. 
In  practice,  the  issuance  of  a  licence  valid  for  less  than  10  years  requires  additional 
justification  from  the  side  of  the  enforcement  authorities  though.  So  only  few 
enforcement  authorities  (or  officers)  make  use  of  such  shortened  validity  periods  of 
licence documents.  Also, given that many undertakings are hence only checked every 
10 years, while infringements are only registered for a period of around two years, the 
likelihood of detecting unlawful practices of undertakings has decreased. Enforcement 
authorities have hence proposed to reduce the issuance period of licence documents to 
five years. 

The  respondent  to  the  enforcers  survey  for  this  study  indicated  a  minimum  fine  of 
€1,000  and  a  maximum  fine  of  €20,000,  for  example,  cabotage  activities  that  are 
carried out by non-EU drivers that do not possess or carry a driver attestation.  In the 
event  that  the  required  documentation  (including  the  driver  attestation)  cannot  be 
provided  upon  request,  the  BAG  and  other  entitled  authorities  may  impound  the 
vehicle until these documents can be submitted (European Parliament, 2013b).   

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11.4.  Poland 

11.4.1. 

Market situation and developments  

11.4.1.1. 

Market overview 

In  2013  Poland  had  a  total  of  28,227  businesses  with  a  valid  license  for  carriage  of 
goods  in  the  EU  (GITD,  2015).    In  contrast  to  much  of  Europe,  the  number  of 
enterprises has increased over recent years, rising from 26,418 in 2011.   

Table 11-5: Number and size of enterprises with a valid licence for carriage of 
goods in the EU (2013) 

Employees 

Number of businesses 

Number of vehicles 

None 

1 

2-4 

5-10 

11-20 

21-50 

51-100 

Over 100 

Total 

1,652 (6%) 

6,750 (23%) 

11,818 (40%) 

6,015 (20%) 

1,988 (7%) 

948 (3%) 

223 (1%) 

94 (0%) 

29,488 

0 (0%) 

6,749 (4%) 

32,652 (19%) 

40,554 (24%) 

28,206 (17%) 

28,609 (17%) 

15,215 (9%) 

16,660 (10%) 

168,645 

Source: (GITD, 2015).   

Poland enjoys competitive advantages over many countries due to its relatively lower 
driver  wages,  fuel  costs,  maintenance  and  repair  services  (CNR,  2012).      In  recent 
years, foreign companies operating in Poland (notably from Germany) have given rise 
to additional competition in the sector.  This has led to an observable increase in the 
quality  of service  that  is  provided,  which  is  moving  markedly  towards  the  levels  of 
Western competitors ( (CNR, 2012).   The continued economic growth might point to 
gradual  increases  in  the  Polish  salary  levels,  however,  increased  competition  from 
Romanian  and  Bulgarian  drivers  may  still  keep  them  in  check  (European  Parliament, 
2013a). 

Besides  increased  market  and  cabotage  activity,  low  wages  in  Poland  have  however 
also caused a driver migration from Eastern to Western European countries, resulting 
in observable driver shortages within Poland. In Poland this shortfall was estimated 
to  amount  to  30,000  drivers  already  in  2007  and  is  up  until  today  seen  to  be 
particularly high in Poland (AECOM, 2014a). As a result several operators have started 
employing  drivers  from  other  countries,  “turning  a  blind  eye  to  employment 
documentation and thus saving money”, such as from Romania and Bulgaria (AECOM, 
2014a).  The  Polish  enforcer  (GITD  –  General  Inspectorate  of  Road  Transport)  stated 
during the interview for this study that it was not aware of such practices. 

11.4.1.2. 

Community licences, certified copies and driver attestations 

Community  licence  data  suggest  that  there  has  been  very  significant  growth  in  the 
international  activity  of  Polish  road  hauliers:  the  number  of  community  licences  has 
grown  by  roughly  40%  from  2007  to  2013  (see  Figure  11-14  for  total  numbers  of 
these licences).  

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Figure 11-14: Haulier community licenses and certified copies in Poland 
(thousands) 

Source:  Ricardo-AEA  analysis  of  Member  State  reportage  to  the  Commission  pursuant  to 
Regulations 684/92, 881/92, 1072/2009 

In  2013,  there  were  5,641  driver  attestations  issued  in  Poland  and  4,771  in 
circulation. The majority of these belonged to drivers from Ukraine (58%) and Belarus 
(35%) (GITD, 2015).  

11.4.1.3. 

Cabotage 

Cabotage activities in Poland 

Between May 2009 and the entry into force of Regulation (EC) No 1072/2009 in May 
2010,  the  Road  Transport  Act  specified  that  in  order  to  perform  cabotage  operations 
on  Polish  roads,  transport  undertakings  had  to  obtain  a  permit  from  the  Ministry  of 
Infrastructure.  Cabotage  activity  carried  out  in  Poland  appears  to  be  dominated  by 
hauliers  from  just  two  Member  States:  Germany  and  Estonia.  For  all  other  Member 
States, Eurostat either indicates that no cabotage was performed or that the numbers 
are to be kept confidential. Eurostat applies confidentiality when there are less than 10 
vehicle  records  in  the  surveys  of  any  type  of  operation,  so  in  practice  confidentiality 
probably  indicates  that  a  negligible  amount  of  activity  has  taken  place  (European 
Commission, 2003). 

The  total  amount  of  cabotage  activity  in  Poland  –  less  than  50M  tonne-kilometres  in 
2013 – is tiny in comparison to its neighbour Germany and has shown little growth.   

By Polish Companies 

Poland was excluded from the EU cabotage market due to interim restrictions for new 
Member States between 2004 and 2009 (1st May). Poland is by far the largest provider 
of cabotage services across the EU (by comparison, the second largest provider is the 
Netherlands,  where  the  cabotage  activity  is  around  one  third  of  that  in  Poland 
(measured  in  t  km).  Polish  hauliers  are  responsible  of  around  28%  of  all  reported 
cabotage activities across the EU in 2013 (Eurostat). Poland’s strong cabotage position 
is certainly due to several reasons, such as having a large fleet of vehicles, its location 
in  relation  to  large  markets  such  as  Germany  and  its  comparatively  low  rates 
compared  to  many  EU15  countries.  In  certain  circumstances  Polish  drivers  however 
also  operate  at  similar  wages  as  local  competitors  under  the  directive  on  Posting  of 
Workers (AECOM, 2014a).  

The  activity  of  Polish  caboteurs  is  mainly  concentrated  on  Germany  –  62%  of  all 
tonne-kilometres  by  Polish  caboteurs  in  2013  were  performed  there.  This  reflects 
Germany’s geographic proximity, its large market for national transport, and the cost 
differential  between  companies  based  in  the  two  Member  States.  Aside  from  market 
liberalisation,  an  important  factor  in  the  success  of  the  Polish  goods  road  transport 
sector has also been the opening of new sections of motorways, which further reduced 

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journey  times  for  trips  to/from  Germany  and  Western  Europe  (European  Parliament, 
2013a).    The  remainder  of  the  cabotage  activity  by  Polish  hauliers  is  spread  over 
France (15%), Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK, Norway, and to a lesser extent 
other Member States (see Figure 11-15).  

In  all  of  these  Member  States,  Polish  hauliers  in  2008  (before  lifting  of  restrictions) 
performed  a  small  fraction  of  the  amount  of  cabotage  they  performed  in  2013.  With 
the  lifting  of  the  restrictions  in  2009,  the  cabotage  market  has  more  than  doubled 
between  2008  and  2009.  Between  2009  and  2013,  the  number  of  tonne  km  of 
cabotage  has  almost  tripled  (Figure  11-15).  In  tonne-kilometre  terms,  the  total 
amount of cabotage performed by Polish hauliers (over 7,000Mio t km) is now roughly 
the same as the size of the entire market for national transport in Ireland or Bulgaria. 

Figure 11-15: Tonne-km of cabotage performed by Polish hauliers in other 
Member States 

Source: Ricardo-AEA analysis of Eurostat 
Note:  In  instances  where  data  is  flagged  as  confidential,  it  is  necessarily  omitted  from  this 
graph 

11.4.2. 

Regulation 1071/2009 

11.4.2.1. 

Implementation and status 

The  national  legislation  that  covers  Regulation  1071/2009  in  Poland  is  the  Road 
Transport  Act  (Ustawa  z  dnia  5  kwietnia  2013  r.  o  zmianie  ustawy  o  transporcie 
drogowym  oraz  ustawy  o  czasie  pracy  kierowców  (Kancelaria  Sejmu,  2013).  The 
changes  to  national  law  to  reflect  the  requirements  of  European  legislation  are 
summarised  in  Table  11-6.    The  authorisations  to  pursue  the  occupation  of  road 
transport operator in Europe replaced the previous national operating licences in 2007, 
which according to the Regulatory Impact Assessment would take place gradually and 
not entail any additional costs for business (Ministry of Transport, 2013).  The fee for 
an  authorisation  to  pursue  the  occupation  of  road  transport  operator  is  1000  PLN 
(€236 approximately) and it is granted for an indefinite period.  

Table 11-6: Summary of amendments to national law 

Before 3 December 2011  After 3 December 2011 

Transport 

The person managing the  The person managing the transport operations, 

who is an employee, shareholder, owner, 

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Before 3 December 2011  After 3 December 2011 

manager 

enterprise 

Proof of 
professional 
competence 

Separate certificates for 
national and international 
transport 

entrepreneur or member of the management of 
a company. 

National and international transport requires the 
same certificate. The exam consists of a 
compulsory multiple choice questions (64 
questions) and a mandatory case study. Fees 
are 800 PLN (500 PLN for exam fee and 300 
PLN for certificate).  Subjects are specified in 
Reg 1071/2009 

Good repute 

Required for operator 
only 

Required 

Stable and 
effective 
establishment 

Not required 

Required 

Financial 
standing 

Required, based on 
available funds or assets 

Required, based on capital and reserves 

Source: (OZPTD, 2011) 

Requirements for stable and effective establishment were introduced that require 
operators  to  have  an  operational  base  in  which  they  conduct  their  activities  with  the 
necessary administrative and technical equipment.  Reportedly, there was a lack of a 
clear  interpretation  of  the  concept  of  an  operational  base  in  practice,  since  the 
Regulation is the only instance of such a requirement in state law. As such, no other 
legislation  has  a  specific  legal  definition  of  what  standards  should  be  met  (e.g.  for 
mandatory  equipment)  (ARENA561,  2012).  Subsequently,  the  legal  text  was  clarified 
in  the  2013  amendment  to  the  Road  Transport  Act  (RCL,  2013).  The  amendment 
defined  a  stable  and  effective  establishment  as  a  place  equipped  with  technical 
equipment  and  technical  devices  appropriate  to  carry  out  transport  activities  in  a 
structured  and  continuous  manner,  which  includes  at  least  one  of  the  following 
elements:  

  A parking place; 
  An unloading area; 

  Equipment for maintenance of vehicles. 

The Polish enforcer (GITD – General Inspectorate of Road Transport) reported that the 
definitions  for  stable  an  effective  establishment  improved  the  situation  in  Poland  and 
had a positive effect.  

The requirements for financial standing are in line with the minimum limits set out in 
the Regulation and had been in place prior to the amendment (RCL, 2013). According 
to  the  Ministry  of  Infrastructure  and  Development  in  Poland,  all  options  regarding 
proving  financial  standing  requirements  are  possible  (e.g.  certified  annual  accounts, 
bank  guarantee,  and  a  professional  insurance).  None  of  this  study’s  respondents  to 
the  ministry,  enforcement  and  high  level  questionnaires  and  interviews  mentioned  a 
specific problem with the financial standing values. 

However, one issue reported in the media appears to have been that, under national 
accounting law, firms with income of less than €1,200,000 were not required to have 
audited accounts, leaving them with difficulties to demonstrate their financial standing 
(Etransport  blog,  2013).    The  regulation  provided  carriers  with  the  opportunity  to 
demonstrate  their  financial  capability  with  "...  security,  such  as  a  bank  guarantee  or 
insurance,  including  professional  liability  insurance  from  one  or  more  banks  or  other 
financial institutions, including insurance companies, ...".  According to media reports, 
such insurance products are being offered on the market, and although they represent 
an  additional  cost  for  operators  it  makes  the  process  of  obtaining  a  licence  easier 
(LOG24, 2012). 

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The  only  exemption  from  the  examinations  to  demonstrate  professional  competence 
that is foreseen by Polish law is having a diploma of higher education or postgraduate 
diploma  in  field  of  road  transport.  According  to  the  questionnaire  responses  received 
by  the  Inspectorate  of  Road  Transport  (the  Główny  Inspektorat  Transportu 
Drogowego, GITD) the pass rates for these exams was 60% in 2013 (or a typical year 
after the introduction of the new standards). 

The  Ministry  of  Infrastructure  and  Development  has  stated  in  their  answers  to  the 
questionnaire that so far, Poland has not set up a national electronic register, however 
is  in  the  process  of  its  development.  The  delay  is  stated  to  be  related  to  the 
complexity and size of the register given that Poland has one of the biggest fleets of 
trucks for international operations as well as a large number of transport companies. 

11.4.2.2. 

Enforcement and compliance 

The  GITD  is  responsible  for  enforcing  Regulation  1071/2009.  Further  organisations 
that are enforcing the rules are the District Authority Offices that issue authorisations 
to  pursue  the  occupation  of  road  transport  operator  in  national  transport  and  the 
Motor  Transport  Institute  under  the  Ministry  of  Infrastructure  and  Development  that 
carries out examinations and the issuing of certificates. 

Based  on  the  questionnaires  received  from  Polish  enforcement  authorities,  the 
obligation  for  cooperation  across  borders  led  to  some  difficulties  in  enforcement  and 
monitoring in practice, although the minimum requirements are seen to be sufficient.  
Furthermore,  some  difficulties  were  experienced  with  requirements  for  checks  on 
stable  and  effective  establishments,  common  rules  on  requirements  for  good  repute, 
requirements  for  a  designated  transport  manager,  obligation  to  maintain  national 
electronic register and connect this with ERRU.  

The main reasons named for these difficulties of enforcement are reported as the lack 
of clarity in provisions, the differences across Member States in interpretation and/or 
implementation  of  the  provisions  of  Regulation  1071/2009  and  the  lack  of,  or  poor 
information  available  on,  appeal  procedures  against  infringements  across  Member 
States. 

Poland  reported  that  7,182  authorisations  for  road  haulage  operations  were  granted 
over  the  period  from  4th  December  2011  until  31st  December  2012,  and  62  were 
withdrawn  in  the  same  period  (whereas  there  were  no  declarations  of  unfitness) 
(European  Commission,  2014a).    There  were  2,469  certificates  of  professional 
competence granted in 2012 (European Commission, 2014a). 

The  GITD  provided  statistics  on  the  enforcement  of certain  aspects of  the Regulation 
1071/2009 before and after it was implemented.  .Between the years 2008 and 2013 
the number of checks for stable and effective establishment has almost doubled from 
1386  to  2351.  These  checks  have  led  to  30  licence  withdrawals  in  2013.  In  only  9 
cases  overall  the  International  Transport  Office  refused  to  issue  a  licence.  The 
Inspectorate of Road Transport estimated that the number of additional infringements 
of  road  transport  social  legislation  detected  as  a  result  of  the  introduction  of 
Regulation 1071/2009 are estimated to be around 5% of total annual infringements of 
road transport social legislation. 

Penalties  are  outlined  in  the  Road  Haulage  Act  and  range  from  500PLN  for  failing  to 
meet  administrative  demands  (e.g.  to  show  certificates  of  professional  competence 
within  14  days)  up  to  8,000PLN  (€1,888  approximately)  for  carrying  out  road 
transport operations without the required authorisations to pursue the occupation.  

Written  responses  received  for  this  study  from  Polish  stakeholders  regarding  the 
existence  of  a  rehabilitation  procedure  are  contradictory  which  suggests  that  the 
provisions are unclear in this respect. 

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11.4.3. 

Regulation 1072/2009 

11.4.3.1. 

 Implementation and status 

The  Road  Transport  Act  specifies  the  competencies  of  national  institutions  with 
regard  to  the  provisions  of  Regulation  1072/2009  (Kancelaria  Sejmu,  2013).  The  Act 
was first passed in 2001 and has been further amended numerous times since to take 
account  of  new  Polish  and  EU  legislation.    Article  29a  of  the  Act  specifies  that  the 
driver  of  the  vehicle  performing  cabotage  operations  in  Poland  is  required  to  show 
upon request all relevant documents (including waybills and invoices) for the cabotage 
operations carried out on Polish territory (European Parliament, 2013a). 

The  Posted  Workers  Directive  does  not  seem  to  apply  to  the  transport  and  road 
haulage industry in Poland (European Parliament, 2013a).   

The costs of obtaining a road transport licence in Poland (a 10 year licence costs 
close  to  €2,000;  a  certified  copy  costs  around  €211)  are  significantly  higher  than  in 
Germany, the Czech Republic or, Slovakia, where the costs of obtaining a licence are 
€700,  €40,    and  €7  respectively  (European  Parliament,  2013a).  The  costs  of  a  true 
certified  copy  is  11%  of  the  fee  for  issuing  the  community  licence  and  a  driver 
attestation is around € 10 for 5 years. 

11.4.3.2. 

Enforcement and compliance 

The  Polish  road  haulage  market  is  policed  by  its  own  enforcement  agency,  the 
Inspectorate  of  Road  Transport.  Other  forces  are  allowed  to  conduct  roadside 
checks of vehicles in Poland, including the road police, the border guard, the military 
police,  and  the  customs  service.  However,  the  Road  Transport  Act  requires  these 
forces to create a co-ordinated plan of enforcement of road transport rules (European 
Parliament,  2013a).    The  General  Inspectorate  of  Road  Transport  states  that  around 
400  road  transport  inspectors  are  responsible  for  performing  roadside  checks  in  full 
scope as well as company checks. 

Infringements  with  regards  to  cabotage  regulations  are  a  very  small  issue  in 
Poland:  The  GITD  conducted  157,000  roadside  checks  of  vehicles  between  January 
and October 2012. Infringements with regard to cabotage regulations were identified 
in only three cases (European Parliament, 2013a). In the interview conducted with the 
GITD  it  was  suggested  that  this  low  infringement  rate  is  due  to  the  Polish  transport 
market not being appealing for undertakings from other countries. 

The GITD estimates that the average time needed for carrying out a roadside check is 
around  45  minutes  if  infringements  are  detected  and  30  min  if  no  infringements  are 
detected.  These  checks  are  reported  to  have  become  more  efficient/effective  as  a 
result  of  the  introduction  of  one  common  format  of  community  licence  and  drivers' 
attestations and the harmonisation of the rules.  

However, according to the Ministry of Transport and the GITD, significant ambiguities 
remain  regarding  the  cabotage  provisions.  The  following  items  have  been  specifically 
mentioned: 

-  The  possibility  of  partial  loading  or  unloading  during  the  trip  appears  to  be 

interpreted differently across Member States. 

-  While it appears clear that a limit of only one cabotage operation exists in case 
of  unladen  entry  to  a  given  Member  State,  it  appears  unclear  whether  this 
cabotage  operation  needs  to  be  proceeded  by  an  international  carriage  to  a 
Member State other than the one in which the haulier is established. 

-  The  counting  of  the  first  and  last  leg  of  combined  transport  operations  as 

cabotage operations appears to be different across Member States. 

-  The  required  documentation  for  proving  cabotage  activities  varies  across 
Member  States  leading  to  ambiguities  among  undertakings  as  to  what 
documentation should be carried by the driver.  

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The fines or sanctions for infringements regarding Community licences are as follows 
(European Parliament, 2013a): 

  Company does not hold Community licence or one or more of its vehicles is not 

registered on the licence: 8,000 PLN (ca. €1,914) - penalty for haulage 
company; 

  Absence of certified copy on-board the vehicle: 500 PLN (ca. €119) penalty for 

driver; 2,000 PLN (ca. €478) penalty for company;  
  Fraudulent/false licence: regulated by criminal law;  
  Performing cabotage operations by a foreign transport operator in violation of 
the rules set down by Regulation (EC) No 1072/2009 and the Road Transport 
Act is set to 10,000 PLN (ca. €2,392). 

As  stated  by  the  GITD  in  an  interview  conducted  for  this  study,  enforcement 
authorities have the option to immobilise a vehicle until the undertaking pays the fine 
imposed.  

11.5.  Romania 

11.5.1. 

Market situation and developments  

11.5.1.1. 

Market overview 

The  Romanian  road  transport  market  experienced  a  big  drop  in  activity  during  the 
financial and economic crises in the first decade of this millennium. Between 2008 and 
2010, the market decreased by more than 50%, which is the sharpest fall in transport 
activity  across  the  Member  States.  In  2010,  the  Romanian  transport  industry 
association  UNTRR  reported  on  the  difficulties  that  the  Romanian  transport  market 
was  experiencing  (UNTRR,  2010).  According  to  UNTRR,  Romanian  hauliers  first  had 
difficulties  in  complying  with  legislative  requirements  from  the  EU  in  2007,  when 
international  competition  started  to  increase,  and  when  distortions  of  competition 
came  to  light  due  to  an  inadequate  enforcement  of  Romanian  and  EU  legislation.  In 
2008,  this  led  to  national  haulier  protests:  hauliers  also  protested  due  to  the 
disastrous state of Romanian roads, the lack of parking facilities that made compliance 
with  EU  requirements  concerning  resting  times  difficult,  abusive  traffic  controls,  high 
fuel prices and the high fiscal burden prevalent in the sector. In the period from 2008 
to  2009  -  the  most  difficult  year  in  that  decade  for  the  Romanian  freight  transport 
market - the overall number of goods transport vehicles (>3.5t) decreased by 20,000 
vehicles (or by 15%).  

In  2010,  Romanian  transport  companies  came  under  additional  pressure  due  to  cost 
increases in the range of estimated 10-15%. These stemmed from increases in taxes 
on  vehicles,  insurance  premiums,  diesel  excise  and  administrative  burdens  (UNTRR, 
2010).  

In  recent  years,  transport  across  the  EU  seems  to  have  become  the  main  driver  of 
development for Romanian hauliers (Transporter, 2014).   

The  UNTRR  reports  to  have  observed  an  increase  in  competition  from  carriers  of  the 
new EU countries (Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Bulgaria), some of them having bigger 
fleets  than  Romanian  carriers.  A  great  disadvantage  of  the  Romanian  carrier  is 
reported  to  be  the  lack  of  trust  from  the  direct  customers  and  the  lack  of  know-how 
concerning complex transport services (logistics of goods throughout the entire value 
chain)  (UNTRR,  2013).  The  UNTRR  identifies  this  imbalance  between  imports  and 
exports as one of the biggest problems in the Romanian road haulage sector, leading 
to a high number of empty loads for trucks leaving the country. 

The majority of Romanian transport companies are classified as small companies with 
either  0-10  employees  (44%)  or  11  –  50  employees  (28%).  Only  4  %  of  the 

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companies have more than 500 employees. The turnover of the companies is  largely 
proportional to their size (UNTRR, 2013).  

1.1.1.2  Community licenses, certified copies and driver attestations 

The  data  on  Community  licences  do  not  provide  any  evidence  of  an  increase  in  the 
number  of  Romanian  haulage  businesses  with  access  to  the  international  market 
between  2009  and  2013  (see  Figure  11-16).  The  data  are  indicative  of  significant 
volatility  in  the  market,  with  a  fluctuation  in  certified  copies  of  almost  10%  in  an 
individual year and a fluctuation in community licenses of almost 25% in a single year. 

Figure 11-16: Haulier community licences and certified copies in Romania 
(thousands) 

Source:  Ricardo-AEA  analysis  of  Member  State  reportage  to  the  Commission  pursuant  to 
Regulations 684/92, 881/92, 1072/2009 

According to the data provided by Romania to the European Commission, fewer than 
100 driver attestations have ever been in circulation since 2011, suggesting the use of 
drivers from third countries by Romanian transport operators is negligible.  

11.5.1.2. 

Cabotage 

Cabotage in Romania 

Romania’s cabotage penetration rate (0.4% in 2013) is among the lowest in the EU. 

Cabotage by Romanian companies 

The  share  of  cabotage  as  a  percentage  of  all  t-km  that  Romania  hauliers  perform  is 
fairly typical, at 2.8%. As with other EU12 Member States, there has been a dramatic 
growth in the cabotage activity of Romania hauliers, given that Romania was subject 
to a transitional period preventing hauliers from performing cabotage in certain other 
Member  States  until  the  end  of  2011.  Cabotage  activity  in  tonne-kilometres  almost 
doubled  in  2012  and  then  more  than  doubled  again  in  2013.  The  Eurostat  data  also 
show  that  Romanian  hauliers  perform  a  significant  amount  of  cabotage  in  France, 
despite the distance from Romania (Figure 11-17). 

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Figure 11-17: Tonne-km of cabotage performed by Romanian hauliers in 
other Member States 

Source: Ricardo-AEA analysis of Eurostat 
Note:  In  instances  where  data  is  flagged  as  confidential,  it  is  necessarily  omitted  from  this 
graph 

Both  Romania  and  Bulgaria  were  subject  to  transitional  periods  preventing  hauliers 
from  these  countries  from  performing  cabotage  in  certain  other  EU  Member  States 
until the end of 2011. Since then, as shown in Figure 11-17, the cabotage market has 
almost doubled in the period from 2012 to 2013 only.  

Regarding  driver  wages,  reports  are  varied.    Considering  all  remuneration  elements, 
the wages of Romanian drivers in international transport appear to be reaching similar 
levels  to  those  of  Spanish  hauliers  (4-5  €/hour)  (European  Commission,  2014b).  
When  compared  to  Poland,  driver  costs  for  Romanian  haulers  are  92.5%  of  those 
incurred  by  Polish  undertakings  (European  Parliament,  2013b).  Anecdotal  evidence 
further  suggests  that  Polish  operators  employ  drivers  from  Romania  at  rates  of  pay 
that  are  up  to  50%  less  than  what  is  paid  to  Polish  drivers  –  rates  that  are  only 
possible  when  ignoring  requirements  regarding  employment  documentation  (AECOM, 
2014a). It has also been reported that Spain reverts to drivers from mainly Romania 
(or  Latin  America),  that  accept  net  salaries  in  the  range  of  EUR  1,000  per  month 
(CNR,  2013).    In  conclusion,  it  is  likely  that  the  wage  differential  between  Romania 
and other countries is falling, but the precise figures are difficult to determine. 

11.5.2. 

Regulation 1071/2009 

11.5.2.1. 

Implementation and status 

The  relevant  legislation  is  Order  No.  27/2011,  approved  by  Order No MTI.  980  of  30 
November  2011  creates  the  general  legal  framework  for  the  application  of  the 
provisions  of  Regulation  1071/2009  and  1072/2009.    The  requirements  for  access  to 
the  occupation  of  road  transport  operator  directly  reference  the  requirements  of 
Regulation  1071/2009  concerning  the  conditions  of  establishment,  good  repute, 
financial standing etc.   

Undertakings  can  demonstrate  financial  standing  by  means  of  audited accounts,  or  if 
the  undertaking  does  not  prove  ownership  of  capital  and  financial  reserves  in  para. 
(1),  it  may  demonstrate  compliance  by  a  certificate  of  financial  capacity,  such  as  a 
bank  guarantee  or  insurance  provided  for  in  Article  7  paragraph  (2)  of  Regulation 
1071/2009  issued  by  one  or  more  banks  or  other  financial  institutions  including 
insurance companies (Romanian Government, 2011).   

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Once  authorisation  has  been  obtained,  the  company  must  have  at  least  one  vehicle 
registered  and  in  circulation,  whether  owned,  leased  or  rented.  Previously,  it  was 
reported that companies operated without any registered vehicles (Blerot, 2010).  

The  certificate  of  competence  of  the  transport  manager  is  obtained  on  the  basis  of 
initial  training  followed  by  a  two-hour  examination.    Holders  of  certificates  of 
competence  are  required  to  attend  regular  professional  training  in  the  areas listed in 
Annex I to Regulation 1071/2009, at intervals not exceeding 10 years, and finally an 
assessment on updating knowledge on the conditions set by the competent authority.  
In  order  to  update  the  knowledge  they  possess,  transport  managers  are  required  to 
attend courses for continuing training (Romanian Government, 2011).  

According  to  UNTRR,  the  market  is  very  sensitive  to  training  prices  and  companies 
frequently  prefer  to  conduct  their  training  for  drivers  and  transport  managers  in-
house.  There  are  200  training  centres  that  are  authorised  to  deliver  these  trainings. 
On  average  the  costs  for  a  1-week  training  is  €70.  However,  UNTRR  criticises  the 
quality  of  these  training  courses  and  highlights  that  the  training  centres  that  offer 
good  quality  training  apply  much  higher  prices  which  most  Romanian  companies 
cannot afford. 

In  Romania,  an  individual  may  act  as  transport  manager  for  only  one  company  (as 
opposed  to  a  maximum  of  four)  (Romanian  Government,  2011).    According  to  the 
questionnaire  response  from  the  State  Inspectorate  for  Road  Transport  Control 
(ISCTR) for this study, this is in line with the provisions before the introduction of the 
Regulation  1071/2009,  which  have  proven  to  be  efficient.  One  transport  manager 
being  able  to  cover  only  one  company  is  seen  to  prevent  “false”  managers  and 
furthermore facilitates checks at the premises for control officers. 

11.5.2.2. 

 Enforcement and compliance 

In  Romania,  the  State  Inspectorate  for  Road  Transport  Control  (ISCTR)  is  the  main 
responsible  for  enforcing  road  transport  legislation.  This  body  was  created  under 
Ordinance  no.  26/2011  as  a  permanent  specialised  technical  body  of  the  Ministry  of 
Transport  and  Infrastructure,  and  it  was  designed  to  ensure  efficient  inspection  and 
enforcement. According to questionnaire responses received, the ISCTR employed 317 
full-time road transport enforcers in 2015.  

Furthermore,  also  the  state  police  (covering  6  items)  and  the  road  administration  (4 
items)  take  on  significant  responsibility.  Also the  customs  authority and  other  bodies 
are involved with very limited responsibility. The Romanian Road Authority – ARR – is 
the national contact point for the ERRU, is responsible for reporting to the Commission 
under  the  Regulation  and  shares  responsibility  with  the  ISCTR  for  maintaining  the 
national electronic register. The ARR is furthermore responsible for issuing operators’ 
licences  and  certificates,  and  administers  examinations  and  trainings  for  various 
qualifications  in  the  road  transport  sector  (ARR,  2015).  According  to  UNTRR 
questionnaire  response,  there  have  been  serious  delays in  the  implementation  of  the 
European  electronic  register,  which  hampers  the  cross-border  cooperation  between 
Member States. 

The ISCTR reports that its controls were improved in 2014 compared to the previous 
year by better targeting of controls, but also by increasing the level of training of its 
inspectors,  and  as  a  result  they  feel  that  compliance  has  improved  (Traffic  media, 
2015).    According  to  activity  reports  of  the  ISCTR,  the  more  rigorous  controls  are 
reflected  in  the  higher  number  of  offenses  detected  (30,070  in  2014  compared  to 
26,075 in 2013).   

In  the  first  reporting  period  under  Regulation  1071/2009,  only  one  suspension  was 
reported  in  Romania,  and  there  were  no  withdrawals  of  authorisations  for  transport 
managers (European Commission, 2014a).  The largest number of new certificates of 
professional competence of any Member State were awarded in Romania, with 12,488 
in road haulage (European Commission, 2014a).   

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According  to  the  national  association,  interviewed  as  part  of  this  study,  there  is  not 
thought  to  be  a  significant  existence  of  letter-box  companies  in  Romania.  Foreign 
companies  that  enter  the  Romanian  market  are  typically  big  international  freight 
transport companies that enter via the purchase of national companies (which comply 
with all requirements).  

When  establishing  a  transport  undertaking  in  Romania,  around  60%  of  transport 
companies  use  insurance  as  a  fall-back  option  to  demonstrate  financial  standing 
(Bleort, 2011). A transport association interviewed for this study reported that one of 
the  main  enforcement  problems  with  Regulation  1071/2009  is  the  proof  of  financial 
capability. 

According to the respondent to the enforcement authority survey, Romania has a risk 
rating system that targets checks of infringements of Regulation 1071/2009. In 2014, 
23  sanctions  were  applied  for  not  holding  all  the  documents  that  maintain  the 
conditions  for  access  to  the  occupation  of  road  haulage  operator  and  road  transport 
market. 

The  enforcement  authority  states  in  their  questionnaire  response  that  58  additional 
cases of infringements of road transport social legislation have been detected in 2013 
(or  0.002%  of  the  total).  In  2013,  7110  of  the  checks  were  conducted  on  own 
initiative, 511 checks were conducted due to tip-offs from other Member States. 

infringements 

Government Decision no. 76 of February 5 2014, amending Government Decision no. 
69/2012  that  classifies 
into  minor,  serious  and  very  serious 
infringements  of  Regulations  1071/2009,  1072/2009  and  1073/2009,  revised  the 
penalties for infringements of the Regulations. The main changes  were to reduce the 
number  of  infringements  categorised  and  very  serious  and  serious,  as  well  as  to 
reduce the applicable fines. The main changes are summarised in Table 11-7.  Further 
administrative  sanctions  are  the  suspension  and  withdrawal  of  the  certified  copy  and 
of the transport license as well as the suspension of the right of use of the vehicle. 

Table 11-7: Categorisation of infringements and applicable fines 

Infringeme
nt type 

Number of infringements 
in each category 

Fines 

2012  

2014  

2012  

2014  

Very serious 

41 

24 

14,000-18,000 RON 

9,000-12,000 RON 

(€3,160-4,060) 

(€2,040-2,720) 

Serious 

Minor 

83 

32 

62 

8,000-12,000 RON 

4,000-6,000 RON 

(€1,810-2,720) 

(€910-1,360) 

31 

3,000-6,000 RON 

500-2,000 RON 

(€680-1,360) 

(€110-450) 

Source:  Government  Decision  no.  76  of  February  5  2014  and  Government  Decision  no.  69  of 
February 1, 2012  

These  changes  were  due  to  concerns  that  the  previous  high  level  of  fines  and  their 
wide  application  could  drive  transport  operators  out  of  business  in  the  current 
economic  climate  –  particularly  in  combination  with  the  high  number  of  very  serious 
infringements  (Ministry  of  Transport  Romania,  2012).    It  was  further  noted  that  the 
previous  rules  could  create  difficulties  for  competent  authorities  regarding  the 
enforcement  of  fine  decisions  and  the  collection  of  fines  due  to  the  risks  of 
infringement  being  classified  different  by  inspection  staff  (also  leading  to  a  lack  of 
uniformity of controls). According to a national association (interviewed for this study), 
this situation might lead to different fines being applied to the same infringement and 
can, as a consequence, increase the risk of bribery. 

The undertaking and/or its transport manager can lose their good repute if they have 
been  convicted  according  to  Art.  6  para.  (1)  of  Regulation  1071/2009;  or  committed 

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serious  infringements  listed  in  Annex.  IV  to  Regulation  1071/2009,  or  have  been 
declared unfit according to Article 14 of Regulation 1071/2009.  In the case of being 
declared unit, the operator / transport manager is deemed rehabilitated after a period 
of  one  year  from  the  date  of  the  loss  of  good  repute.  A  carrier  can  file  a 
complaint/appeal  within  30  days  and  if  the  answer  is  negative  he  may  submit  a 
complaint to the court within 30 days. 

11.5.3. 

Regulation 1072/2009 

11.5.3.1. 

 Implementation and status 

The  relevant  national  legislation  for  Regulation  1072/2009  is  the  same  as  for 
Regulation 1071/2009 – i.e. Order No. 27/2011.  Romanian hauliers were not allowed 
to perform cabotage in most countries until 1 January 2012.  

Cabotage  is  only  considered  when  a  transport  operation  is  carried  out  from  its 
beginning  until  its  end  in  Romania.  The  transport  operation  has  to  be  unique,  Partial 
operations are not considered as cabotage. CMR document is compulsory and it is on 
this basis that cabotage operations are checked. As regards the origin and destination 
of  vehicles,  it  suffices  to  leave  Romania.  Empty  pallets  will  count  as  a  transport 
operation  if  they  are  described  in  the  CMR  document,  otherwise  the  vehicle  will  be 
considered empty. 

11.5.3.2. 

Enforcement and compliance 

The  State  Inspectorate  for  Road  Transport  Control  is  responsible  for  enforcing 
Regulation  1072/2009.  To  check  if  a  cabotage  operation  is  lawful,  the  Romanian 
authorities  check  the  consignment  note  (CMR).  As  some  drivers  might  not  show  all 
CMR applicable the inspectors often check tachographs as well. To ensure a complete 
control  of  cabotage  the  State  Inspectorate  for  Road  Transport  Control  states  that  an 
online database of CMRs would be necessary. 

A national association suggests that many Romanian operators may still be ‘afraid’ of 
cabotage  operations  due  to  the  lack  of  available  information  in  Romanian  on  the 
provisions in place in the different Member States, since they do not want to risk to be 
subject of fines due to possible unwanted negligence of national rules.  

The  ISTCR  indicated  that  only  a  single  fine  imposed  for  illegal  cabotage  was 
communicated to the Romanian authorities in 2013. They observe that compliance by 
Romanian hauliers is improving year by year. This subsequently improves the quality 
of the service provided as well as the enforcement controls. 

It is the view of a national association that Regulation 1072/2009 has not imposed any 
significant  additional  administrative  costs  on  operators,  since  similar  requirements 
were  in  place  before.    The  main  cost  impact  that  was  mentioned  relates  to  the 
issuance of transport licences and the certified copies to be held for each truck. 
While  the  licence  is  delivered  for  a  period  of  10  years,  the  certified  copies  are  only 
valid for 1  year. As a result, even in case the registration number of a vehicle is not 
changed over the year, a new certified copy has to be issued. The cost of the certified 
true copy is 260 RON (about 58 Euro) per year, so for 10 years its cost is of 2600 RON 
(580  Euro).  The  certified  true  copies  are  personalised  by  issuer  with  the  registration 
numbers  of  the  vehicles  for  whom  they  have  been  issued.  According  to  UNTRR, 
authorities  take  over  15  days  to  issue  this  certified  copy,  or,  alternatively,  charge 
around EUR60 for an accelerated issuing. In case a certified copy is to be issued for a 
longer time frame (> 1 year), authorities charge a multiple (i.e. EUR60 for each year 
of ‘extension’). This additional charge for the issuance of certified copies is seen to be 
an illegal procedure.   

A  further  issue  raised  by  a  national  association  is  the  observation  that  an  increasing 
number of third country drivers (e.g. from the Philippines) are obtaining qualifications 
to  become  a  professional  driver  in  the  EU.  In  the  view  of  this  stakeholder,  these 

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qualifications are not necessarily adequate and sufficient and that this increase in third 
country drivers might lead to an increased problem of social dumping across the EU. 
As  it  is  the  case  for  Regulation  1072/2009,  the  infringements  of  1071/2009  are 
classified into very serious, serious and minor infringements as set out in Government 
Decision no. 69 of February 1, 2012 and amended by Government Decision no. 76 of 
February 5 2014. See the section on Regulation 1071/2009 above for the penalties for 
each  type  of  infringement.    The  ISCTR  confirmed  that  enforcement  of  Regulation 
1072/2009  proves  to  be  difficult.  There  is  a  debate  as  to  which  would  be  the  best 
practices to apply this Regulation. 

The  State  Inspectorate  for Road  Transport  Control  suggests  in  the  interview  that  the 
penalty  system  should  be  improved.  In  Romania,  when  a  check  is  carried  out,  fines 
cannot  be  more  than  double  of  the  fines  related  to  the  most  serious  infringement 
detected,  meaning  that  if  three  infringements  are  detected,  the  total  fine  being 
sanctioned  is  two  times  the  maximum  fine  for  a  most  serious  infringement.  This 
mechanism is reported to be perceived as disproportionate as it does not differentiate 
between companies according to their size (vehicle fleet).   

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12.  ANNEX D: INFRINGEMENT CASES 

Several  infringement  cases  relating  to  Regulations  1071/2009  and  1072/2009  have 
been initiated and handled both by the European Commission against Member States, 
mainly related to as to the lack of connection of national registers with the European 
Register  of  Road  Transport  Undertakings  (“ERRU”),  and  by  the  authorities  of  the  EU 
Member States. 

12.1.  Infringements at EU level 

Enquiries  -either  at  the  very  first  stages  of  investigation,  without  opening  formal 
infringement  procedures,  or  even  following  the  opening  of  such  procedures  pursuant 
to Article 258 TFEU- are currently being carried out by the European Commission with 
regard to the application by Member States of the obligations contained in Regulations 
(EU) No 1071/2009 and (EU) No 1072/2009.  

Below  are  described  the  (possible)  infringements  identified  and  investigated  by  the 
European  Commission.  This  description  has  been  elaborated  on  the  basis  of  (i)  the 
information made public by the European Commission and (ii) of the data provided by 
two  officials  of  Directorate  General  for  Mobility  and  Transport  (“DG  MOVE”) 
interviewed  for  the  purposes  of  this  Study.  It  should  be  noted  that  part  of  the 
information gathered to complete this point was treated as confidential and could not 
be published.  

12.1.1. 
Infringements  related  to  the  non  interconnection  of  national 
registers  with  the  European  Register  of  Road  Transport  Undertakings 
(“ERRU”).  

Pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1071/2009, each EU Member State shall 
keep  a  national  electronic  register  of  authorized  road  transport  undertakings.  Article 
16.2  of  this  Regulation  also  requires  the  interconnection  of  national  registers  at  EU 
level.  For  such  purposes,  and  following  the  mandate  contained  in  Article  16.2,  the 
European  Commission  adopted  the  Regulation  (EU)  No  1213/2010  of  16  December 
2010 establishing common rules concerning the interconnection of national electronic 
registers  on  road  transport  undertakings109  and  created  the  ERRU.  As  established  in 
Article 16.5 of Regulation (EU) No 1071/2009, accessibility through national registers 
and  interconnection  should  be  implemented  by  31  December  2012.  This  is  not  the 
case for all the Member States.  

The ERRU central hub is an electronic tool developed at EU level which allows national 
registers  of  transport  undertakings  to  be  interconnected.  Both  the  European 
Commission and the EU Member States are responsible for the operation of ERRU. On 
the  one  hand,  the  Commission  receives  messages  and  consultations  from  Members 
States  and  forwards  them  to  the  relevant  other  Member  States.  On  the  other  hand, 
each Member State shall connect its national registry to the ERRU central hub. 

The European Commission has made public that infringement proceedings have been 
initiated against Czech Republic, Cyprus, Greece, Luxembourg, Poland and Portugal110. 
In  particular,  the  Commission  has  addressed  reasoned  opinions  requesting  these  six 
Member States to fully implement the EU rules concerning the interconnection of their 
national registers of road transport operators. Should the Member States not take the 

109 OJ L 335 of 18.12.2010, p. 21/29.  

110See 

Commission’s 

press 

releases 

available 

at: 

http://ec.europa.eu/transport/newsletters/2014/11-28/articles/infringements_en.htm, 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/newsletters/2015/06-08/articles/infringement-
germany_en.htm, and http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-4871_en.htm 

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necessary measures to comply with this request, the Commission may decide to refer 
the matters to the European Court of Justice.  

12.1.2. 
1071/2009 

Infringements  of  other  provisions  of  Regulation  (EU)  No 

Enquiries  (prior  to  the  opening  of  possible  formal  proceedings)  and  infringement 
procedures  have  also  been  initiated  by  the  European  Commission  against  several 
Member States concerning:  

-  Alleged  infringement  of  the  provisions  contained  in  Regulation  (EU)  No 

1071/2009  that  require  undertakings  engaged  in  the  occupation  of  road 

transport  operator to  have an  effective and  stable  establishment  in  a Member 

State.  Based  on  the  information  available,  several  Member  States  would  be 

allowing  the  so-called  letterbox  companies,  i.e.  undertakings  operating  in  a 

Member  State  without  having  an  effective  and  stable  establishment  in  such 

country, or not carrying out enough compliance controls against them. 

- 

 Possible restrictions to the right of establishment in one Member State where 

establishment would be limited to road operators operating at least more than 

three vehicles.  

12.1.3. 

Infringement of Regulation (EU) No 1072/2009 

On  April  2015,  the  European  Commission  requested  Finland  –through  a  reasoned 
opinion-  to  fully  implement  the  provisions  of  Regulation  (EU)  No  1072/2009  and,  in 
particular, the provisions on cabotage. More precisely:  

(i) 

Based  on  Regulation  (EU)  No  1072/2009,  road  operators  holding  a 

Community  licence  should  be  allowed  to  carry  out  up  to  three  national 

carriage  operations  (cabotage)  in  another  Member  State  following  an 

international  carriage  from  another  Member  State  or  from  a  third  country. 

Cabotage  is  not  submitted  to  further  limitations  under  Regulation  (EU)  No 

1072/2009.  Some legal provisions enacted in Finland subject the possibility 

of  operating  cabotage  in  this  country  to  an  additional  condition,  i.e.  to 

operate up to ten operations in a three-month period.  

(ii) 

In  addition,  in  accordance  with  Regulation  (EU)  No  1072/2009,  each 

cabotage  operation  may  involve  several  loading  and  unloading  points. 

However,  under  Finish  law,  one  single  loading  corresponds  to  one  single 

cabotage operation.  

Finland had two months to reply the reasoned opinion. Should Finland do not adapt its 
national  rules  to  the  requirements  of  the  Commission,  the  latter  may  refer  the 
infringement to the European Court of Justice.   

12.2.  INFRINGEMENTS AT NATIONAL LEVEL 

12.2.1. 

Case DOCTRANS-PRIMAFRÍO (Portugal) - France 

On  19  January  2015 
the  Portuguese  company  DOCTRANS  TRANSPORTES 
RODOVIARIOS  DE  MERCADORIAS  Lda,  a  subsidiary  of  the  Spanish  undertaking 

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PRIMAFRÍO  S.A.  was  sanctioned  by  the  French  authorities  with  a  ban  to  perform 
cabotage in France for a period of 12 months111. 

It is estimated that DOCTRANS has approximately 1,000 vehicles circulating in France 
where it has been accused of 32 infringements between 2012 and 2014, out of which 
16 correspond to irregular cabotage operations and the remaining ones to the misuse 
of the tachograph. 

12.2.2. 

Case Shanks Logistics (Belgium) - France 

France also sanctioned the Belgian road transport company Shanks on 15 July 2014 to 
a  12  month  prohibition  from  carrying  out  cabotage  operations.  7  out  of  the  9 
infringements were related to illegal cabotage. 

12.2.3. 
by one trade union in Spain 

Alleged lack of compliance with Regulation 1071/2009 indicated 

The  Spanish  trade  union  CC.OO.112  –interviewed  for  the  purposes  of  this  Study-  has 
reported  what  in  their  view  constitute  a  clear  case  of  letterbox  companies  related  to 
Coca-Cola  transporters  in  Begano  (Galicia)  and  transporters  of  milk  from  the  brand 
CELTA. 

The  bottler  manufacturer  of  Coca-Cola 
its  24 
transportation  companies  that  it  would  no  longer  work  with  them  since  it  will  work 
with the Group Sesé from 2015 onwards. Sesé is a road transport company located in 
Aragón.  However,  the  trade  union  and  associations  of  hauliers  such  as  FENADISMER 
have suggested that Sesé is being illegally out-flagged to Romania for tax purposes. 

in  Galicia  communicated  to 

The  same  situation  would  be  applicable  to  transporters  of  CELTA  milk,  subsidiary  of 
the  Portuguese  group  Lactogal.  The  company  announced  the  termination  of  its 
contracts with 7 transporters in favour of the group Carreras. Due to social pressure, 
CELTA rectified its position113. 

12.2.4. 

Illegal cabotage and forgery of documentation in Spain 

The Spanish association FENADISMER has recently published in its website114 that the 
Spanish  enforcement  authorities  (Guardia  Civil)  have  detected  falsified  documents  in 
cabotage  operations  carried  out  in  Spain.  The  foreign  vehicles  in  question  carried 
falsified CMRs in order to prove the international transport. 

The association complains that this situation is taking place regularly in connection to 
great infrastructure projects such as the high speed train works or certain highways in 
Spain. 

111 Decision number 20150119 – 0003 signed by the Prefect of the Region Center – Val de Loire 

in France. 

112 Confederación Sindical de Comisiones Obreras. www.ccoo.com   

113 A summary of these two situations has been published in this transport and logistic website: 

http://www.logisticaytransporte.es/noticias.php/Leche-Celta-y-Coca-Cola--Galicia--
prescinden-de-sus-transportistas-repartidores./50321  

114 The press release published by FENADISMER is accessible from the following link: 

http://www.fenadismer.es/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1140&Itemid=28 

353 

 
 
 
 
 
                                          
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

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Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

14.  ANNEX F: GLOSSARY 

BAG 

BGL 

Bundesamt  für  Güterverkehr  (German  Federal  Office  of  Goods 
Transport) 

German Haulage Association 

Cabotage 

National carriage for hire or reward carried out on a temporary basis 
in a host Member State 

CMR 

DV 

EC 

Convention des Marchandises par Route, or consignment letter 

Danish Road Haulage Association 

European Commission 

ERRU 

European Register of Road Transport Undertakings 

Flagging out  The relocation of a road haulage business from one Member State to 
another,  or  the  establishment  of  a  subsidiary  in  another  member 
state to take advantage of perceived lower operating costs there 

Freight 
forwarder 

A freight forwarder is a person or company that organises shipments 
for  individuals  or  firms.  A  forwarder  is  not  typically  a  carrier,  but  is 
an expert in supply chain management. 

GHG 

HLG 

HGV 

IRU 

LCV 

Greenhouse  gases.  Pollutant  emissions  from  transport  and  other 
sources,  which  contribute  to  the  greenhouse  gas  effect  and  climate 
change. 

High Level Group on Road Freight Transport 

Heavy Goods Vehicle 

International Road Transport Union 

Light Commercial Vehicle 

Letterbox 
companies 

Companies "established" in a Member State where they do not carry 
out  their  administrative  functions  or  commercial  activities,  in 
violation of Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 1071/2009 

REFIT 

Regulatory Fitness and Performance programme 

N category 

Goods vehicles, including categories N1, N2 and N3 

ZMPD 

Polish Haulage Association 

361 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Ex-post evaluation of Regulation 1071/2009 and Regulation 1072/2009 

362 

 
 
[
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