JOINT STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council A renewed partnership with the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific
Date: 2016-11-22
Institutions: Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development, European Commission
Subjects: ACP countries, climate change policy, cooperation agreement (EU), cooperation policy, employment policy, human rights, migration policy, negotiation of an agreement (EU), revision of an agreement, sustainable development

EN 

   EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY Strasbourg, 22.11.2016  SWD(2016) 380 final   JOINT STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  IMPACT ASSESSMENT  Accompanying the document Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council A renewed partnership with the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific {JOIN(2016) 52 final} {SWD(2016) 381 final}  
 
 
Contents 

Acronyms ............................................................................................................................................... 4 

Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 6 

1. Problem definition ........................................................................................................................... 10 

1.1 General problem .......................................................................................................................... 10 

1.2 Specific problems and related drivers ......................................................................................... 10 

1.2.1 Uneven patterns of development across Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific ................. 11 

1.2.2 Europe's growing security concerns and untapped economic potentials ........................... 13 

1.2.3 Insufficient recognition of deepened regional dynamics within and beyond ACP ............ 15 

1.2.4 Rising global challenges and challenged multilateralism .................................................. 15 

1.2.5 Insufficient inclusion for all stakeholders beyond national governments .......................... 16 

2. Why the EU should act ................................................................................................................... 18 

3. Objectives ......................................................................................................................................... 19 

3.1 General objective ......................................................................................................................... 19 

3.2 Specific objectives in response to the identified problems .......................................................... 19 

3.2.1 Foster sustainable development in ACP countries ............................................................. 19 

3.2.2 Enhance EU security and economic prosperity .................................................................. 19 

3.2.3 Encompass evolving regional dynamics within and beyond ACP ..................................... 19 

3.2.4 Ensure stronger alliances in addressing global challenges ................................................. 19 

3.2.5 Strengthen inclusive participation of stakeholders at various levels .................................. 20 

3.3 Overview of intervention logic .................................................................................................... 20 

3.4 Consistency of objectives with relevant EU policies .................................................................. 22 

3.5 Positions emerging from various stakeholders ............................................................................ 22 

3.6 ACP Group views ........................................................................................................................ 23 

4. Policy options ................................................................................................................................. 24 

4.1 Screening of all options ............................................................................................................... 24 

4.2 Description of the baseline scenario ..................................................................................... 25 

4.3 Description of the selected alternative options ..................................................................... 26 

Option 1. No partnership ............................................................................................................. 27 

Option 2. New partnership with ACP countries .......................................................................... 30 

Option 2.1: Revised common agreement (all ACP countries) .................................................... 31 

Option 2.2: Separate regional agreements (Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific) .......................... 32 

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Option 2.3: Three separate regional partnerships under a common umbrella. ............................ 32 

5. Analysis of impacts .......................................................................................................................... 34 

5.1 Identification of relevant impacts ................................................................................................ 34 

5.2 Social impacts.............................................................................................................................. 35 

Sustainable and inclusive development ...................................................................................... 35 

Migration-development nexus .................................................................................................... 37 

Enhanced participatory approach to cooperation ........................................................................ 40 

5.3 Political impacts .......................................................................................................................... 42 

Peace and security ....................................................................................................................... 42 

Democratic governance and human rights .................................................................................. 44 

Alliance building at the global level ........................................................................................... 46 

5.4 Economic impacts ....................................................................................................................... 48 

Trade cooperation ....................................................................................................................... 48 

Macroeconomic stability, private sector development and investment returns .......................... 51 

5.5 Environmental impacts ................................................................................................................ 54 

Environmental protection and climate change ............................................................................ 54 

5.6 Budgetary and administrative impacts ........................................................................................ 56 

6. Comparison of options .................................................................................................................... 60 

6.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 60 

6.2 Positive and negative effects of the policy options ..................................................................... 60 

6.3 Identification of the preferred option .......................................................................................... 65 

6.4 Specific feature of the preferred option – legal format ............................................................... 66 

6.5 Operational objectives ................................................................................................................. 68 

7. Monitoring and evaluation ............................................................................................................. 69 

List of annexes ..................................................................................................................................... 71 

3 

 
 
Acronyms 

ACP 

AOSIS 

APF 

BEST 

BRICS 

CELAC 

COP21 

CPA 

CSO 

DAC 

DCI 

EBA 

African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States 

Alliance of Small Island States 

African Peace Facility 

Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services in Territories of European Overseas  

Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 

Community of Latin American and Caribbean States 

Conference of the Parties – 21st Conference 

Cotonou Partnership Agreement 

Civil Society Organisation  

Development Assistance Committee 

Development Cooperation Instrument 

Everything But Arms 

ECOWAS 

Economic Community of West African States 

EDF 

EPA 

EPG 

EU 

FAO 

European Development Fund 

Economic Partnership Agreement 

Eminent Persons Group 

European Union 

Food and Agriculture Organization 

GPEDC 

Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation 

GSP 

HIC 

HR/VP 

IA 

ICT 

IMF 

IMO 

IPOA 

JAES 

JCES 

JMTC 

LA 

LDC 

LIC 

LMIC 

MDG 

General Scheme of Preferences 

High Income Country 

High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-
President of the European Commission 

Impact Assessment 

Information and Communication Technologies 

International Monetary Fund 

International Maritime Organisation 

Istanbul Programme of Action 

Joint Africa-EU Strategy 

Joint Caribbean-EU Partnership Strategy 

Joint Ministerial Trade Committee 

Local Authorities 

Least Developed Country 

Lower Income Country 

Lower Middle Income Country 

Millennium Development Goals 

4 

 
 
MEA 

MFF 

Multilateral Environmental Agreement 

Multiannual Financial Framework  

MSME 

Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises 

NSA 

OCTs 

ODA 

REC 

Non-State Actors 

Overseas Countries and Territories 

Official Development Assistance 

Regional Economic Community 

SAMOA 

SIDS Accelerated Modalities of Action 

SDG 

SIDS 

SME 

SSA 

TEU 

TFEU 

UMIC 

Sustainable Development Goals 

Small Island Developing States 

Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 

Sub-Saharan Africa 

Treaty on European Union 

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 

Upper Middle Income Country 

UNFCCC 

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 

WTO 

World Trade Organisation 

5 

 
Introduction 

The partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group 
of  States  of  the  one  part  and  the  European  Community  and  its  Member  States,  of  the  other 
part, signed in Cotonou on June 20001  is due to expire in February 2020. In light of existing 
provisions, negotiations between the parties must start by no later than August 2018, and the 
EU should reflect on how to best organise its relations with ACP countries. The partnership 
agreement is referred to as the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA).  

Signed in 2000 as an evolution of previous agreements since the 1975 Lomé convention, the 
CPA has set a comprehensive list of policy goals and political values to be jointly pursued by 
the  EU  and  partner  countries  across Africa,  the  Caribbean,  and  the  Pacific,  and  is  based  on 
three  complementary  pillars  (i.e.  political  dialogue,  economic  and  trade  cooperation  and 
development  finance  cooperation),  and  managed  through  joint  institutions.  As  such,  it  has 
provided  the  general  framework  for  all  joint  initiatives  promoted  by  the  EU  and  ACP 
countries  over  the  past  15  years,  including  regional  development  initiatives2  and  the 
Economic  Partnership  Agreements  (EPAs).  The  agreement  frames  the  cooperation  by 
defining the objectives, the principles on which the cooperation is based as well as the means 
and tools that will support the implementation. 

The CPA is mainly financed by the European Development Fund (EDF), an extra-budgetary 
fund  consistent  with  the  EU  Multiannual  Financial  Framework  composed  of  direct 
contributions  from  EU  Member  States,  set  up  specifically  to  support  the  achievement  of 
objectives  agreed  in  the  partnership3.  The  number  of  participating  countries  (over  100 
countries,  forming  a  majority  in  the  United  Nations  and  representing  around  1.5  billion 
people), its comprehensive scope, its joint management arrangements and its legally-binding 
nature give an idea of the magnitude and the relevance of the partnership.  

However,  since  2000  the  interests  and  ambitions  of  the  EU  and  the  ACP  countries  have 
evolved. The EU Global Strategy4 as well as the proposal for a new European Consensus on 
Development5,  as  well  as 
internationally  agreed  2030  Agenda  on  sustainable 
development6  and  the  Paris  Climate  Change  Agreement7,  provide  for  the  key  references 
against which future relations with ACP countries should be framed. Moreover, the changing 
global context, and notably the deepening of regionalisation across Africa, the Caribbean and 
the  Pacific,  point  to  the  need  to  review  the  scope  of  the  EU-ACP  partnership  as  well  as  its 

the 

1 20007/483/EC OJ L 317, 15.12.2000 
2 As the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, the Joint Caribbean-EU Partnership Strategy  
3 The EDF is then complemented by other existing external financial instruments sourced from the EU budget 
4 Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’'s Foreign and 
Security Policy, 28 June 2016 http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/shared-vision-common-action-stronger-europe 
5 Placeholder for Consensus Communication (C(2016) xxx final) 
6 Transforming our world: the 2030 agenda for sustainable development, United Nations A/RES/70/1 
7  Paris 
FCCC/cp/2015/L.9/Rev.1 

the  United  Nations  Framework  Convention  on  Climate  Change. 

agreement  under 

6 

 
                                                 
format. Furthermore, a number of lessons learned regarding the effectiveness and efficiency 
of the current partnership should be taken into account in the reflection on future relations. 

The  goal  is  that  of  forging  the  best  type  of  relationship  after  2020  that  allows  the  EU  to 
effectively pursue its interests in an ever-competitive global arena.  

The impact assessment will accompany the Communication on the future relations of the EU 
with  the  ACP  countries  after  2020,  and  will  serve  as  a  basis  for  the  subsequent 
recommendation and annexed negotiating directives.  

Changing context 

The global context in which the EU operates has undergone significant transformations since 
the  signature  of  the  Cotonou  Partnership Agreement  in  2000.  The  world  is  becoming  more 
interdependent  and  interconnected,  multi-polar,  complex  and  with  new  security  challenges. 
On  the  one  hand,  increased  interdependence,  technological  advances  and  intensified  trade 
have  opened  up  new  possibilities  to  accelerate  economic  growth  for  the  EU.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  persistence  of  situations  of  fragility  and  vulnerability,  the  uneven  progress  across 
the developing world and rising inequalities, the acceleration of terrorist and organised crime 
activities,  the  demographic  boom  (particularly  in  Africa),  and  continuing  environmental 
degradation and  climate  change,  pose  serious  challenges  to  social  and  economic  stability  in 
every part of the world, affecting the EU as well. Due to these increased interlinkages, there 
are stronger spill-over effects towards Europe (e.g. economic, irregular migration) than in the 
past.  

Furthermore, global challenges such as climate change have increased in importance, and the 
EU's  capacity  to  influence  the  course  of  international  affairs  is  affected  by  the  rise  of  new 
powers (e.g. China). In this changed context, it becomes important for the EU to build even 
stronger  and  political  relations  with  large  group  of  countries,  so  to  pursue  effectively  its 
interests.  

Another major trend over the last decades has been the intensification of regional dynamics. 
This  has  taken  place  as  well  within  the  ACP  group  of  countries.  These  diverse  regional 
dynamics  are  reflected  in  the  reinforcement  of  regional  and  continental  integration 
mechanisms,  coupled  with  a  strengthening  –  albeit  at  different  degrees  –  of  regional 
organisations.  Africa,  the  Caribbean,  and  the  Pacific  also  have  increasingly  been  facing 
specific  geopolitical,  economic  and  development  challenges.  For  instance,  migration  and 
security  are  central  to  the  EU's  relations  with  Africa,  whereas  climate  change  is  of  major 
importance in relations with the Caribbean and Pacific countries. A number of these relevant 
issues and opportunities for cooperation have been reflected in mutual partnerships between 
the  EU  and  main  existing  regional  fora,  such  as  the  Joint  Africa-EU  Strategy  and  the  Joint 
Caribbean EU Partnership Strategy8. Any future relationship must therefore take into account 

8 No such framework is in place for the Pacific countries 

7 

 
                                                 
increased regionalisation dynamics and existing regional strategies within the group of ACP 
countries. 

Evaluation of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA)  

As evidenced by the evaluation, as well as the consultation process, significant progress has 
been  made  under  each  of  the  three  pillars  of  the  CPA.  Firstly,  the  CPA  has  contributed  to 
poverty  eradication  and  to  human  development.  Secondly,  it  has  led  to  an  increase  in  trade 
flows to and from ACP countries and to their integration into the world economy. Thirdly, it 
has supported the promotion of peace and security and the reinforcement of democracy and 
human rights across various ACP countries.  

On  the  other  hand,  there  are  two  important  issues  where  the  record  of  the  EU-ACP 
partnership  has  been  mixed,  and  thus  require  further  attention  in  order  to  fully  address  the 
evolving context in which the CPA operates. Firstly, EU-ACP cooperation in the international 
arena is considered weak, as the CPA was not designed to address global challenges or to be 
an  effective  platform  to  promote  EU-ACP  common  interests  at  the  global  level. 
Notwithstanding  this,  EU-ACP  cooperation  has  played  a  decisive  role  towards  reaching  the 
Paris  Agreement  on  climate  change,  which  indeed  points  to  the  enormous  potential  of  an 
alliance of 100 countries in shaping international multilateral negotiations. 

Secondly, despite the  growing importance of  regional integration in the ACP world  and the 
strong support provided by the CPA to continental and sub-regional actors, the CPA has not 
fully acknowledge that the three ACP regions have been facing a different set of challenges, 
impacting the EU in different ways. Similarly, despite diversification featuring prominently in 
the partnership, the CPA has not fully taken into account the increased heterogeneity of ACP 
countries.  

The  evaluation  has  also  pointed  to  the  insufficient  implementation  of  some  provisions 
(particularly in the area of migration), to the fact that the joint institutions and specific ways 
of cooperation (e.g. co-management) have not worked as expected.  

Towards a new type of relations 

The  changing  global  context  calls  for  stronger  and  political  relations  that  encompass 
regionalization  and  strengthen  the  EU's  capacity  to  deliver  global  alliances.  The  purpose  of 
this  Impact  Assessment  is  to  determine  which  type  of  format  (if  any  at  all)  is  required  to 
organise and govern relations with partners in Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific, as to enable 
the EU to best pursue its interests.  

It  is  important  to  specify  that  the  financing  of  the  relations  is  not  dealt  with  within  the 
framework  of  this  impact  assessment.  Reasons  for  this  are  the  specific  focus  of  the  impact 
assessment on the way the relations should be best organised and the fact that the European 
Development Fund (EDF) is part of the discussion on the new set of financing instruments for 
external action due in 2020 under the new multiannual financial framework (MFF). No details 
on the amount and functioning of financing provisions are therefore discussed. However, in a 
few  cases  reference  is  made  to  specific  aspects  related  to  the  EDF  (e.g.  budgetisation  or 

8 

 
specific  procedures)  if  deemed  relevant  with  respect  to  the  potential  impact  of  the  different 
options. 

The  impact  assessment  accompanies  a  Communication  about  the  EU's  future  relations  with 
the  ACP  countries  to  be  adopted  in  November  2016.  The  Communication  presents  the 
preferred  way  forward,  based  on  the  outcome  of  this  impact  assessment,  and  includes  the 
main building blocks proposed for a negotiating mandate.  

9 

 
1. Problem definition 

1.1 General problem 

In an interdependent and multi-polar world, a range of challenges and opportunities related to 
countries  in  Africa,  the  Caribbean  and  the  Pacific  increasingly  affects  EU  security  and 
prosperity and should be adequately addressed.  

1.2 Specific problems and related drivers 

The current CPA has provided a comprehensive framework shaping the relations between the 
EU  and  ACP  countries,  and  has  been  instrumental  in  addressing  human  and  economic 
development  problems  and  promoting  EU  values.  Yet,  this  type  of  arrangement  may  no 
longer be effective and efficient in fully addressing a range of new specific problems. Some 
of  these  problems  originate  from  the  global  context  in  which  EU-ACP  relations  are 
embedded; others emanate directly from the application of the CPA to the more specific EU-
ACP context.  

Particularly, five specific problems have been identified.  

1.  The analysis of the global context shows that situations of fragility and inequality persist 
within the ACP countries. Although there has been clear progress in the area of human and 
economic development in ACP countries, achieved through a relevant contribution of the 
CPA, improvements have been insufficient and unevenly distributed.  

2.  Dynamics within ACP countries have a direct effect on the EU, posing serious challenges 
to  its  security  and  limiting  opportunities  for  further  prosperity  In  this  respect,  the  CPA 
provisions foreseen to ensure EU security and facilitate EU investment in ACP countries 
have not worked as expected, leaving the EU exposed to such enduring challenges. 

3.  Although trends of increasing regionalisation have emerged across Africa, the Caribbean 
and  the  Pacific,  the  CPA  has  not  been  able  to  fully  embrace  the  deepening  of  such 
regional  dynamics.  Therefore,  its  effectiveness  has  been  hindered  by  the  limited 
recognition of parallel partnerships existing with regions and sub-regions. 

4.  Increased global challenges call for more coordinated and ambitious collective action. So 
far, the EU and the ACP countries have not sufficiently exploited the potentials offered by 
stronger cooperation at the international level.  

5.  A  full  engagement  of  all  stakeholders,  beyond  national  governments,  is  required  to 
address  all  the  previously  identified  challenges.  Unfortunately,  the  CPA  contribution  in 
fostering more inclusive processes across ACP countries has been considered inadequate.  

Below follows a more detailed description of the specific problems that challenge the current 
focus of the relationship and the way it is organised and governed. Each section starts with the 
description of the global context in which EU-ACP relations have evolved and the challenges 
that  the  EU  has  to  face  in  order  to  effectively  pursue  its  interests. The  second  part  of  each 

10 

 
section  outlines  how  the  CPA  has  responded  to  the  problem,  and  to  do  so  it  draws  on  the 
evaluation and, wherever possible, the consultation process.  

1.2.1 Uneven patterns of development across Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific  

Notwithstanding  substantial  progress,  ACP  countries  remain  confronted  with  significant 
challenges  in  terms  of  conflicts  and  instability,  sustainable  development,  as  well  as  patchy 
integration  into  the  global  economy.  The  CPA  has  been  relatively  effective  in  providing 
support to ACP countries across those areas, but has not fully addressed the root causes. As a 
result, a range of challenges persist and are expected to grow in the future. 

Persisting conflicts and fragilities 

Conflicts and situations of fragility are more dominantly present in ACP countries than other 
parts of the world. Despite the gradual reduction of armed conflicts, as many as 15 African 
states  have  actually  witnessed  an  overall  increase  in  political  violence.  Importantly,  it  has 
been estimated that by 2030 62% of the world's extreme poor will live in fragile and conflict-
affected  countries,  20  of  which  are  in  Africa,  5  in  the  Pacific  and  1  in  the  Caribbean9. 
Similarly,  despite  significant  progress,  democratic  processes  are  still  weak  in  many  ACP 
states,  which  indeed  are  characterised  by  weak  institutions,  violations  of  human  rights, 
widespread corruption, and reduced or reducing space for civil society organisations. Another 
serious  source  of  instability  is  related  to  the  rise  of  population.  Between  2015  and  2050, 
Africa  is  projected  to  account  for  over  half  the  growth  in  world  population10.  This 
demographic  boom  calls  for,  on  the  one  hand,  substantial  investment  for  the  provision  of 
basic social services, and, on the other hand, poses a set of crucial challenges, such as rapid 
urbanisation, growing inequality, competition for resources (particularly land and water), and 
high levels of unemployment. 

Support to peace and security have been one of the main areas of achievement of the CPA. 
Yet,  such  support  has  largely  been  directed  at  responding  to  specific  crises,  rather  than 
addressing  root  causes  of  instability  and  fragility.  Moreover,  the  increased  prominence  of 
regional organisations and policy frameworks in this area has led many to question the long-
term relevance of the existing ACP-EU format.  

Similarly, the essential elements clause in the CPA – respect for human rights, democracy and 
the rule of law – combined with the appropriate measures mechanism in Article 96 CPA, is 
the  most  advanced  compared  to  other  EU  agreements  with  third  countries.  Undoubtedly, 
political  relations  between  the  EU  and  the  ACP  countries,  on  the  whole,  have  been 
strengthened.  However,  more  efforts  are  needed  to  overcome  the  perception  of  structured 
political dialogue as instrument for criticising the ACP governments or as an obligation to be 
fulfilled  in  order  to  have  continued  access  to  EU  funding,  particularly  for  those  highly 
dependent on EU aid and/or with closed political systems. 

9 OECD (2015), States of Fragility 2015: Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions; Sources: 2014 World Bank / AfDB, 
ADB Harmonised List, and 2014 Fragile States Index by the Fund for Peace 
10 UNDESA (2015), World Population Prospects – 2015 Revision 

11 

 
                                                 
Limited and unsustainable development 

Progress  on  sustainable  development  continues  to  be  patchy  across  ACP  countries.  Despite 
the good progress registered since the adoption of the MDGs, Sub-Saharan Africa remains the 
world's poorest region with more than 40% of the population still living in extreme poverty in 
2015.11 The situation is not likely to improve: in fact, it is projected that the world's extreme 
poor  will  be  increasingly  concentrated  in  Africa.12  Many  ACP  countries  still  lag  behind  on 
key  components  of  human  development,  yet  again  with  noticeable  inter-regional  and  intra-
regional differences.13 More specifically, women and girls face strong inequalities in terms of 
access to social services as well employment opportunities. Although ACP countries currently 
figure among the lowest greenhouse gas producers, a steep growth in energy demand in the 
next  decades14,  particularly  in  Africa,  is  expected  to  increase  dramatically  the  polluting 
potential of the region.15 Moreover, the ACP countries are also home to a large share of the 
world's  biodiversity  and  are  particularly  exposed  to  environmental  degradation.  In  many 
countries,  ecosystems  and  species  are  being  destroyed  or  degraded  under  the  pressures  of 
growing global demand for land and commodities, large-scale pollution driven by economic 
and  demographic  growth  and  unsustainable  consumption  and  production  patterns.  For 
instance,  population  growth  is  increasingly  straining  the  world's  limited  supply  of  fresh 
water.16  

The Cotonou Partnership Agreement has been essential in the promotion of human and social 
development across ACP countries, by supporting poverty reduction and addressing the needs 
of most vulnerable people. Nonetheless, much needs still to be done in a range of areas. For 
example, the CPA has hardly succeeded to put in place growth distribution policies, based on 
access  to  assets  and  not  only  to  services  by  the  poor17.  Also,  strong  commitments  towards 
women's  rights  were  not  always  matched  by  its  organisational  capacity  to  deliver,  which 
resulted  in  country  strategy  objectives,  programmes  and  dialogue  that  did  not  sufficiently 
consider a balanced gender approach. In terms climate change and environment sustainability, 
the CPA has contributed to raising awareness, yet the scale and duration of efforts has been 
largely  insufficient  to  reverse  environmental  degradation  and  counter  the  powerful  drivers 
underpinning it. The challenge is therefore to establish partnerships that address the needs of 
middle-income  countries,  including  rising  levels  of  inequalities,  and  fully  support  cross-
cutting issues of environmental sustainability and gender equality. 

11 United Nations (2015), The Millennium Development Goals report 2015 
12 Beegle, Kathleen, Luc Christiaensen, Andrew Dabalen, and Isis Gaddis. 2016. 'Poverty in a Rising Africa, 
Africa Poverty Report – Overview'. World Bank, Washington 
13  Almost  all  African  and  Pacific  countries  have  a  human  development  index  below  0.6,  while  almost  all 
Caribbean countries have a human development index above 0.6 
14 http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/Africa/Fact_sheet_outlook_to_2040.pdf 
15 coupled with supply largely based on wood, coal and other polluting practices, 
16 http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/scarcity.shtml 
17 Review of the strategic evaluations managed by DEVCO– February 2016 – Particip. 

12 

 
                                                 
Incomplete and patchy integration into the world economy 

Economic performance in the ACP region has been remarkable, yet results differ by country 
and  over  time.  In  particular,  most  countries  in  Africa  have  experienced  sustained  economic 
growth since 2000, with growth rates often exceeding 5% per year, making this region among 
the fastest growing ones in the world. By contrast, the Caribbean and the Pacific regions have 
grown  at  rates  below  the  world  average18.  Part  of  the  explanation  resides  in  the  increase  in 
trade  with  the  rest  of  the  world,  which  trebled  in  the  period  2000-2014.  Intra-ACP  trade 
flows, however, have remained relatively low, with an array of technical barriers and behind-
the-border obstacles weighing on regional integration efforts. Moreover, many economies are 
dependent  on  primary  commodities  and  are  vulnerable  to  shocks,  and  on  average  are 
significantly  less  diversified  than  other  developing  countries,  often  due  to  their  small  size, 
geographical remoteness or landlocked situation. As a result, the ACP group has become very 
diverse,  comprising  some  of  the  world's  most  resource-rich  countries,  some  of  the  fastest 
growing countries and some of the poorest countries in the world.  

The  Cotonou  Partnership  Agreement  has  supported  specific  actions  towards  a  greater 
integration of the ACP States into the world economy and, in fact, ACP-EU trade has steadily 
grown since 2000. The ACP as a group has maintained a trade surplus with the EU over these 
years; the EU remains by far the main investor in Africa, well ahead of China and the United 
States. The CPA, nevertheless, has not fully been able to increase diversification and reducing 
commodity-dependency  across  ACP  economies.  Further  efforts  are  therefore  required  to 
strengthen  long-term  sustainability  of  economic  performance  across  different  types  of  ACP 
countries. 

1.2.2 Europe's growing security concerns and untapped economic potentials 

The interdependence between the EU and ACP partner countries is resulting in a range of new 
challenges  and  opportunities  for  EU  citizens  and  businesses.  This  is  the  case  for  increased 
security issues and migration affecting EU societies. At the same time, more advanced ACP 
economies offer a range of new opportunities in terms of returns of investments. As further 
described  in  the  next  sections,  the  CPA  has  provided  certain  specific  provisions  to  address 
such challenges and potentials, but has not been sufficiently effective in fostering these direct 
EU interests in its relation with ACP countries. 

Security concerns expected to grow 

A growing number of concerns, most of which originate in partner countries, are potentially 
threatening EU security and stability. These threats certainly include conflicts beyond the EU 
borders and international terrorism, but also other forms of organised crime, such trafficking 
of human beings, weapons and drugs, as well as piracy and cybercrime. Deteriorating security 
in several regions of sub-Saharan Africa, such as the Sahel or the Horn, pose a direct threat to 
Europe  as  Africa's  immediate  neighbour  and  main  investor  and  trade  partner.  The  EU  also 

18 Intra-ACP Cooperation Strategy Paper and Indicative Programme 2014-2020 

13 

 
                                                 
shares  a  number  of  security  concerns  (e.g.  drug  trafficking,  organised  crime)  with  the 
Caribbean and the Pacific. All these threats are by their nature transnational and therefore call 
for  increased  cooperation  with  third  countries  in  order  to  improve  vigilance  and  cease  the 
activities of terrorist organisations.  

The  CPA  has  included  some  specific  provisions  related  to  international  terrorism, 
proliferation  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction  and  the  International  Criminal  Court.  Yet,  in 
light  of  recent  escalation  of  international  terrorism  and  various  forms  of  organised  crime, 
closer cooperation and more systematic and effective use of mechanisms established as well 
as use of more stringent mechanisms should be considered. 

Increasing migration flows 

Increasing  pressure  from  higher  levels  of  irregular  migration  to  the  EU  borders  is  likely  to 
stay with us over the coming decades, especially from Central Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa 
(West Africa and the Horn), in case of not adequate management of those growing flows. At 
the same time, migration represents an opportunity for countries in the EU, particularly those 
that  face  the  prospect  of  ageing  and  rapid  population  decline.  Current  trends  in  ageing  of 
European  population  are  expected  to  continue  in  the  future,  resulting  in  greater  decline  of 
available  active  labour  force  with  severe  challenge  for  the  EU  economic  performance  as  a 
whole.  

The Cotonou Agreement has provided a general framework for cooperation between EU and 
ACP  countries  in  the  area  of  migration,  supporting  dialogue,  addressing  human  right  issues 
including  fair treatment of legally residing  ACP nationals, and attempting to  tackle the root 
causes of migration. However, implementation of specific provisions of the CPA (Article 13) 
has been weak and concrete migration related initiatives are mostly dealt with in bilateral or 
specific regional cooperation formats. Expiration of the CPA in 2020, though, may leave an 
unwanted vacuum. 

Untapped potentials for economic cooperation 

It has been estimated that in the next 10-15 years, 90% of the world's growth will come from 
outside  Europe,19  so  the  EU  has  every  interest  in  making  sure  that  its  companies  remain 
competitive and are able to access new markets and benefit from these sources of growth. For 
instance, statistics on internationalisation show that only 13% of Europe's small and medium-
sized enterprises  (SMEs)  are exporting beyond  EU borders20. The EU's strategy for its own 
development – the Europe 2020 strategy – is based on close relationship with the business and 
relies on private sector investments in many areas.21 Advanced ACP economies have a role to 

19 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/november/tradoc_146955.pdf, p 4. 
20 http://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/international-aspects/index_en.htm  
21 Examples linked to Europe 2020 include sustainable supply and fair access to raw materials, agriculture and 
rural  development,  health,  disaster  management,  mobility  and  migration,  transport,  labour  standards,  social 
dialogue,  improving  the  scope  and  coverage  of  social  protection  and  youth  employment  policies.  An  open 
Europe,  operating  within  a  rules-based  international  framework,  is  the  best  route  to  exploiting  the  benefits  of 
globalisation. 

14 

 
                                                 
play as EU strategic partners to achieve with greater success the EU's own growth, jobs and 
investment agenda through trade and investment or through sector cooperation22. 

The  Cotonou  Partnership  Agreement  has  been  instrumental  in  fostering  trade  cooperation 
between  the  EU  and  the  ACP.  ACP-EU  trade  has  steadily  grown  since  the  signature  of  the 
CPA in 2000, regardless of the global financial and economic crisis, and trade flows with the 
ACP  more  than  doubled  in  the  period  2000-2014.  The  CPA,  by  contrast,  has  been  less 
successful in generating investment opportunities in sectors that are vital for growth and job 
creation.  ACP  countries  remain  in  need  of  a  transparent,  stable  and  rules-based  business 
climate. The Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) contribute to respond to such needs 
by creating a stable and predictable framework for trade relations. 

1.2.3  Insufficient  recognition  of  deepened  regional  dynamics  within  and  beyond 
ACP 

Within  the  ACP  Group  there  has  been  a  growing  differentiation  of  economic,  political  and 
social  development  patterns,  in  particular  between  "booming"  middle-income  countries  and 
least developed countries and fragile states. Importantly Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific 
have  increasingly  been  facing  specific  geopolitical,  economic  and  development  challenges. 
For  instance,  migration  and  security  are  central  to  the  EU's  relations  with  Africa,  whereas 
climate change is crucial for Caribbean and Pacific countries. 

Some of the issues of pivotal relevance for the EU require stronger involvement of a range of 
actors placed outside the ACP region. This is the case when addressing relevant migration and 
security  issues,  which  in  Africa  requires  the  involvement  of  Northern  African  partners,  not 
part of the ACP group.  

The  Cotonou  Partnership  Agreement  has  recognised  and  supported  the  increased  role  of 
regional formats. Importantly, the EU and ACP countries have developed a number of policy 
frameworks  and  agreements  based  on  regional  dynamics  (notably  the  Joint  Africa-EU 
Strategy23,  the  Joint  Caribbean-EU  Partnership24).  These  regional  dynamics,  including 
countries beyond ACP, are not fully reflected into the current CPA approach, thus limiting its 
effectiveness in a range of crucial policy areas (e.g. migration, poverty eradication, and fight 
against terrorism). 

1.2.4 Rising global challenges and challenged multilateralism 

Globalisation  increases  interdependence  amongst  all  actors,  often  pursuing  different  values 
and  agendas.  Effective  global  governance  requires  the  ability  of  all  parties  to  foster  policy 
dialogue  and  reach  consensus  around  key  common  interests.  Increasing  pressure  of  global 
challenges, therefore, calls for strong international cooperation (e.g. action on climate change, 
conflict  resolution  or  free  world  trade).  The  mounting  political  and  diplomatic  influence  of 

22 See also http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf 
23 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/97496.pdf  
24 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/133566.pdf  

15 

 
                                                 
emerging powers such as China, Brazil or India, notably in developing countries, affects the 
EU's  capacity  to  promote  and  diffuse  its  political  values.  Mobilisation  of  multi-lateral 
alliances is therefore an essential tool to foster EU values and goals at the global level. 

The EU is committed to rules-based effective multilateralism, with the United Nations at its 
core. Regional groupings and structural alliances within the UN context are becoming more 
important  in  a  multi-polar  world,  but  have  sometimes  competing  agendas  affecting  the  EU. 
Outcomes  of  international  negotiations  are  not  always  fully  in  line  with  EU  interests  or 
ambitions.  Against  this  background,  as  shown  by  the  negotiations  at  the  COP21  on  climate 
change,  focus  should  be  on  building  strategic  alliances  with  partner  countries  on  topics  of 
common  concern  (e.g.  climate  change,  blue  economy,  fight  against  illicit  financial  flows) 
where the ACP might have potentially more common interests with the EU than with the G77.  

Recently,  ambitious  global  action  has  been  undertaken  to  address  global  challenges.  In  this 
respect, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development has  set the framework for collective 
action for the next 15 years, and the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework 
Convention  on  Climate  Change  agreed  in  December  2015  has  solidified  international 
cooperation  for  climate  change  and  provided  a  way  forward  towards  a  more  sustainable 
future. Nonetheless, a major and recurring limitation in today's global governance architecture 
is the gap between ambitious commitments taken in various international fora on a series of 
global  issues  and  their  implementation,  including  accountability  mechanisms.  Again,  strong 
alliances with partner countries are required to avoid the lack of implementation. 

The  Cotonou  Partnership  Agreement  was  not  initially  designed  to  tackle  global  challenges. 
Successive revisions,  however,  have  introduced  provisions  on  issues  that  transcend  national 
borders  (e.g.  peace  and  security,  migration,  terrorism,  climate  change).  Moreover,  the  EU-
ACP interactions on global issues have materialised in the adoption of many joint resolutions, 
declarations  or  statements  on  issues  such  as  food  prices,  global  financial  crisis,  aid 
effectiveness,  climate  change,  post-2015  global  development  framework.  However,  often 
these joint positions have not translated into concrete actions. On some global challenges of 
interest  to  the  EU  the  ACP  contains  the  large  majority  of,  but  not  all,  members  of  other 
international alliances (e.g. LDCs, SIDS). Crucially, the negotiations at the COP21 on climate 
change have shown that building strategic alliances on topics of common concern positively 
affect outcomes in international negotiations.  

1.2.5 Insufficient inclusion for all stakeholders beyond national governments 

Civil  society  organisations  and  local  authorities,  along  with  parliaments,  are  essential  in 
building  and  consolidating  the  foundations  for  broad-based  democratic  ownership  of 
cooperation  policies  and  processes  that  are  at  the  basis  of  inclusive  and  sustainable 
development. However, their effective contribution is hindered by the lack of organisational 
and human capacities and resources. Moreover, limited possibilities for dialogue still prevail 
in  many  countries  where  space  for  civil  society  organisations  is  reduced  or  reducing  as  a 
result of an increasing number of restrictions.  

16 

 
The  Cotonou  Partnership  Agreement  has  provided  a  framework  for  a  broad  and  inclusive 
relationship  that  goes  beyond  national  governments,  by  recognising  the  role  of  parliaments, 
local  authorities  and  non-state  actors  (civil  society,  private  sector,  trade  unions)  in 
development. It has formalised their role both in the conduct of political dialogue and in the 
programming  and  implementation  of  cooperation  programmes.  However,  the  level  of 
participation  of  several  of  these  actors  has  been  too  limited  and  varies  largely  from  one 
country to another.  

In  a  number  of  countries,  EU  support  has  been  particularly  successful  in  contributing  to 
strengthening  NSAs  and  in  developing  their  capacity  to  participate  in  policy  dialogue  with 
government. The lack of common understanding of the role of NSAs and agreed rules for a 
regular  dialogue  are  often  pointed  out  as  the  main  shortcomings  of  the  CPA.  The  CPA's 
effectiveness for promoting participatory action has been criticised, mainly because of the gap 
between principles and practises and the fact that mechanisms for ensuring full participation 
in the partnership have essentially been established on an ad hoc basis.  

Insufficient  efforts  have  been  put  to  ensure  more  transparent  and  inclusive  governance 
systems, including greater and real involvement of democratic institutions (i.e. local, national 
and regional), CSOs and the private sector. As a result, the role of non-state actors and local 
authorities  as  political  interest  groups,  and  not  only  implementing  partners,  has  not  been 
sufficiently acknowledged.  

17 

 
2. Why the EU should act  

The legal basis for an international agreement is provided in Articles 209(2), 212(3) and 217 
of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union.  They  specify  that  the  Union  may 
conclude  with  (developing)  third  countries  and  competent  international  organisations  any 
agreement  helping  to  achieve  the  objectives  referred  to  in  Article  21  of  the  Treaty  on  the 
European  Union  (TEU),  which  is  part  of  the  common  provisions  on  the  Union's  external 
action,  and  in  Article  208  of  the  Treaty.  On  that  basis,  the  EU  may  conclude  agreements 
establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, as well as cooperation 
agreements  with  third  countries  other  than  developing  countries  (as  the  case  might  be  for 
some ACP countries). 

The  challenges  and  opportunities  faced  by  Europe,  as  described  in  Chapter  1,  demand  a 
comprehensive  and  joined-up  approach.  Thanks  to  its  broad  set  of  instruments  and  critical 
mass,  the  EU  is  well  placed  to  confront  the  challenges  and  seize  the  opportunities  ahead. 
Coordinated  action  by  the  EU  as  a  whole  has  an  added  value  that,  in  terms  of  policy  and 
financial leverage, is bigger than the sum of individual EU Member States (MS) actions. EU 
added value in this respect has been demonstrated in the CPA evaluation. 

Given the broad policy scope and the number of partners involved, a similar comprehensive 
approach is unlikely to be achieved by EU MS alone. Furthermore, the global network of EU 
delegations  ensures  a  political  presence  in  countries  where  some  Member  States  are  not 
present.  In  addition,  some  policy  areas  are  of  exclusive  EU  competence,  notably  trade.  EU 
action  will  thus  achieve  better  results  than  if  Member  States  were  to  act  individually.  In 
addition, a number of mechanisms are in place (e.g. joint-programming), allowing for EU MS 
to take direct action on specific areas in specific countries or regions if better placed than the 
EU.  

This initiative pursues directly the Union's objective in external action as in Article 21 of the 
Treaty on European Union and contributes to the political priority of 'EU as a stronger global 
actor'.  The  specific  external  action  political  priorities  are  further  defined  by  the  EU  Global 
Strategy and the EU Consensus for Development which is currently being reviewed, as well 
as  relevant  sector  EU  policies.  The  main  objectives  are  to  guarantee  security  and  to  build 
resilient societies beyond the EU through the implementation of the Sustainable Development 
Goals, as well as to provide for more effective global governance. These strategies take into 
account  the  international  commitments  made  through  the  2030  Agenda  and  the  Paris 
Agreement on Climate Change. 

As stated by the EU Global  Strategy, to  attain these priorities  the EU needs to engage  with 
others  and  revamp  its  external  partnerships,  in  a  responsible  way.  In  the  pursuit  of  the  EU 
goals,  it  has  to  reach  out  to  states,  regional  bodies  and  international  organisations.  It  has  to 
work  with  core  partners,  like-minded  countries  and  regional  groupings.  It  has  to  deepen  its 
partnerships with civil society and the private sector as key players in a networked world. 

18 

 
3. Objectives 

3.1 General objective  

The general objective is that of shaping relations with partners in Africa, the Caribbean and 
the Pacific as to best achieve the EU's strategic interests. 

3.2 Specific objectives in response to the identified problems 

The specific objectives define how the EU should best organise and govern its relations with 
ACP  countries  with  the  view  to  promoting  EU  security  and  prosperity,  and  providing  more 
effective global governance, taking into account  the changed global context and the lessons 
learned from the CPA evaluation.  

3.2.1 Foster sustainable development in ACP countries 

A  strong  European  Union  requires  action  towards  the  achievement  of  the  sustainable 
development goals across ACP countries (and beyond). Major efforts are needed to tackle the 
intertwined  challenges  of  eliminating  poverty,  improving  well-being  and  ensuring  that  such 
progress  is  sustainable.  The  EU  has  committed  to  implementing  the  2030  Agenda,  both 
internally and in its external policies: all its policies and instruments should therefore be fully 
in line with this new framework.  

3.2.2 Enhance EU security and economic prosperity 

A  strong  European  Union  requires  resilient  states  beyond  its  borders.  Many  threats  and 
challenges to which the EU and its Member States are directly confronted find their origin in 
other  parts  of  the  world.  At  the  same  time,  growing  markets  in  ACP  countries  provide 
economic  opportunities  for  EU  businesses.  The  EU  should  therefore  ensure  that  future 
relations  with  ACP  countries  support  addressing  growing  security  concerns  and  seizing 
untapped economic opportunities. 

3.2.3 Encompass evolving regional dynamics within and beyond ACP 

A strong European Union calls for more tailored actions in support of regional dynamics, with 
the view to better targeting regional specificities. In this regard, cooperation with formal and 
ad-hoc  regional  formats  must  be  pursued  in  order  to  serve  interests  more  effectively  on 
economic matters and in the areas of peace and security and migration.  

3.2.4 Ensure stronger alliances in addressing global challenges  

A strong European Union requires the ability of building strategic alliances with the view to 
tackling the rise of global challenges and strengthening the role of the EU in the international 
arena.  More  specifically,  the  EU  must  be  able  to  better  draw  on  the  diplomatic  capital  that 
reinforced cooperation with  ACP countries could  offer in  various international contexts and 
ensure that ambitious commitments at the global level do not fall short at the implementation 
stage.  

19 

 
3.2.5 Strengthen inclusive participation of stakeholders at various levels 

A strong European Union implies an enhanced ability to build multi-stakeholder partnerships. 
More  specifically,  the  EU  must  ensure  more  inclusive  involvement  of  a  range  of  different 
actors,  including  civil  society  organisations,  parliaments,  local  authorities,  as  well  as  the 
private  sector.  In  doing  so,  the  EU  will  support  the  achievement  of  the  Sustainable 
Development  Goals,  and  at  the  same  time  provide  for  more  transparent  and  inclusive 
governance systems. 

3.3 Overview of intervention logic 

The table below provides an overview of the main elements of the intervention logic. Through 
an analysis of the evolving context and the evaluation of the current EU-ACP partnership, the 
general  and  specific  problems  (Chapter  1)  are  identified.  These  problems,  together  with  the 
EU interests, form the basis for setting the general and specific objectives (Chapter 3). As to 
best  reach  these  objectives,  different  possible  options  in  organising  and  governing  the 
relations with the ACP countries (Chapter 4) are explored.  

20 

 
 
Table 3.1 Overview intervention logic 

21 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4 Consistency of objectives with relevant EU policies 

The specific objectives listed above are all consistent with the objectives and principles of the 
Union's  external  action  as  set  out  in  the  EU  Treaty  on  European  Union  and  President 
Juncker's  priority  of  the  EU  as  a  stronger  global  actor.  They  are  aligned  with  the  political 
priorities defined by the EU Global Strategy and EU development cooperation policy, as set 
by the proposal for a new European Consensus on Development and the Agenda for Change, 
as  well  as  in  sector  policy  areas  (e.g.  human  development,  private  sector  development, 
climate  change).  Moreover,  the  objectives  are  in  line  with  the  EU  commitment  to  Policy 
Coherence for Development (PCD), as they take into full consideration the interests and needs 
of developing countries, including the group of LDCs. 

3.5 Positions emerging from various stakeholders  

Problems and objectives identified in this Impact Assessment have been largely discussed by 
stakeholders  through  a  range  of  formal  and  informal  exchanges  promoted  through  time, 
including  a  public  consultation25.  A  general  consensus  has  emerged  on  the  fact  that  some 
changes  must  be  made  to  the  existing  Cotonou  Partnership  Agreement.  Many  stakeholders 
have put forward the need to support ACP partners in the implementation of the Sustainable 
Development  Goals  and  jointly  act  to  address  global  challenges  including  climate  change. 
The importance to strengthen EU interests, specifically in the areas of security and migration, 
has  been  mentioned  by  several  EU  Member  States.  A  shared  request  also  emerges  for  a 
greater  inclusion  of  non-state  actors,  as  well  as  local  authorities  and  parliaments,  in  the 
implementation of the partnership.  

Looking at key aspects on how a future relationship should be organised, some stakeholders 
call for a renewed and improved partnership, other suggest that ACP-wide agreements are no 
longer reflecting regional dynamics, and many are in between these two opposite viewpoints. 
Still, a general consensus emerges on the need to take into account regional dynamics and the 
evolving regional partnerships at regional and sub-regional levels.  

A  less  homogeneous  position  emerged  on  the  inclusion  of  new  non-ACP  possible  partners, 
with some suggesting the need to fully include non-ACP LDCs and Small Islands Developing 
States (SIDS), and other (often the case for Member States) mostly keen on focussing on the 
sole ACP countries in case of a renewed agreement. Importantly, many stakeholders in favour 
of a renewal of the EU-ACP partnership underline the fact that the legally-binding nature of 
the  agreement  has  been  instrumental  to  its  implementation  and  as  such  should  be  still 
considered in the future.  

25 Summary report of the public consultation 'Towards a new partnership between the European Union and the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific countries after 2020' European Union, Ref. Ares(2016)1372862 

22 

 
                                                 
3.6 ACP Group views  

Over the past few years, the ACP Group has launched a series of initiatives with regard to its 
own future and that of the ACP-EU partnership. At the ACP Summit in 2012, the ACP Heads 
of State and Government have affirmed that they are determined to 'stay united as a group'26, 
while  at  the  same  time  acknowledging  the  need  to  reposition  and  transform  itself  into  'a 
dynamic  and  effective  inter-governmental  organisation  fully  responsive  to  the  global 
challenges of an unsettled and multi-polar 21st century'27.  

The  most  recent ACP summit held on May  2016 in  Port Moresby,  Papua New  Guinea,  has 
reiterated the added  value of the ACP as  Group to  address internal  challenges  as well as  in 
playing an increased role in the international arena. The summit outcome document states that 
the strength, unity and solidarity among their States is an essential element in sustaining the 
future  of  the  countries  in  a  changing  world  of  challenges  and  opportunities,  by  becoming 
influential  players  in  shaping  more  sustainable  global  governance28.  It  also  specifies  the 
objectives  of  'improving  the  living  standards  of  its  people  through  good  governance, 
preservation of peace and security, social justice, entrepreneurship, building capacities in the 
private sector, […] sustainable development as well as through South-South, North-South and 
Triangular Cooperation'29.  

The view of the ACP countries on the future relation with the EU after 2020 is particularly 
addressed  in  the  PNG  Summit  Waigani  communiqué,  with  three  key  messages.  The 
communiqué  states  that  the  ACP-EU  partnership  provides  a  good  basis  that  should  be 
consolidated  through  an  established,  comprehensive,  and  legally-binding  framework30.  It 
further expresses specific commitment to the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and 
proportionality  in  order  to  more  effectively  complement  the  efforts  of  the  international 
community as well regional economic communities and regional integration organisations in 
the pursuit of sustainable development. It seeks as well to leverage the ACP Group's strength 
in  numbers  and  outreach  to  participate  in,  and  contribute  more  effectively  to,  global 
governance institutions and fora. 

26 Sipopo Declaration of the 7th Summit of the ACP Heads of State and Government, December 2012 
27 Final Report of the Ambassadorial Working Group on the Future Perspectives of the African Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) Group of States Transforming the ACP Group into an Effective Global Player, December 2014 
28 Waigani Communiqué of the 8th Summit of the ACP Heads of States and Government, May 2016 
29 Port Moresby Declaration of the 8th Summit of the ACP Heads of States and Government, May 2016 
30 http://www.acp.int/content/viewpoint-eu-acp-force-south-south-triangular-cooperation  

23 

 
 
                                                 
4. Policy options 

4.1 Screening of all options 

The  evolving  global  context,  the  shortcomings  identified  in  the  CPA  evaluation  and  the 
updated EU interests, have casted doubts upon whether the current EU-ACP partnership could 
be the best format to meet the new objectives. Starting from the current CPA as the baseline 
scenario, several alternative options have been considered taking into account the consultation 
process  and  a  mapping  of  stakeholder  positions  (see  section  3.5  and  3.6).  Each  of  these 
options  has  been  preliminary  matched  against  the  five  specific  objectives.  As  explained 
further,  it  immediately  emerged  that  some  fell  short  in  allowing  meeting  one  or  more 
objectives and therefore they could not be selected for further assessment. Other proposals, by 
contrast, have been deemed more likely to meet, to different degrees, the five objectives and 
therefore have been subject to full assessment.  

Alternative options considered  

A first alternative to the baseline scenario implies no EU action at all. The assumption is that 
the absence of a single formalised agreement between the EU and the 79 ACP countries when 
the  existing  partnership  expires  in  2020  represents  the  best  way  to  reach  the  envisaged 
objectives.  In  support  of  this,  some  stakeholders  have  claimed  that  the  three  ACP  regions 
have not enough in common that holds them together as they have increasingly been facing 
different  sets  of  problems.  Moreover,  the  argument  runs,  the  EU-ACP  framework  has 
gradually lost relevance, in that substantive decisions that pertain to ACP countries are taken 
in other contexts. Importantly, continental/regional organisations with allegedly more political 
authority  and  legitimacy  have  been playing  a  more  prominent  role  in  the  three  continents  – 
and this trend will be likely reinforced in the future. Therefore, adopting a specific partnership 
with such a diverse group of countries may not be an efficient policy choice. 

A second alternative takes into account the fact that a number of features have made the EU-
ACP partnership a successful model for a contractual relationship. This approach, therefore, 
supports  the  idea  of  preserving  a  comprehensive  partnership  comprising  a  number  of  inter-
linked areas of cooperation, but at the same time proposes to significantly adapt it to the new 
reality  and  align  it  to  the  new  objectives.  The  goal  is  to  move  EU-ACP  relations  beyond  a 
mainly  development  perspective  towards  a  stronger  political  partnership,  based  on  shared 
values and mutual interest, which could ensure more security and prosperity for the EU. This 
scenario  of  new  partnership,  building  on  the  evaluation  outcomes  and  the  consultation 
process, includes three sub-options, which differ in terms of the extent to which they take into 
account  the  intensification  of  regionalisation  dynamics  and  enable  the  association  of  new 
partners to best meet the envisaged objectives.  

Alternative options discarded 

A  number  of  additional  options  have  emerged  across  the  consultation  process  and/or  have 
been  advanced  by  relevant  stakeholders  in  various  contexts.  Each  of  these  proposals  has 

24 

 
undoubtedly some  merits but, due to evident limitations in the achievement of all identified 
objectives, has not been further considered for assessment.  

  Ad hoc agreement with thematic approaches  

This  option  implies  that  the  EU  would  take  a  thematic  approach,  targeting  specific 
challenges (e.g. peace and security, migration, climate change, food security) in specific 
groups  of  concerned  countries,  thus  abandoning  the  existing  EU-ACP  framework.  In 
doing so, this option could help promote various EU interests on ad-hoc basis, but would 
prevent  the  adoption  of  comprehensive  approaches  towards  a  broader  range  of  partner 
countries. It would result in a loss of the positive aspects of the CPA highlighted by the 
CPA  evaluation  (e.g.  commitment  to  agreed  principles  and  values,  coherent  approach, 
structured political dialogue). It would also weaken the role of the EU at the global level 
in that it assumes that partner countries would positively respond to the invitation of the 
EU  to  work  together  on  specific  areas  of  interest  to  the  EU.  Finally,  it  would  meet  the 
opposition of the ACP countries. 

  Partnership with Least Developed Countries only 

This option proposes to bring together the LDCs that belong to the ACP group and those 
that  do  not  (situated  in  Asia).  In  doing  so,  it  would  facilitate  targeted  actions  (most 
notably  on  aid  and  trade)  for  this  poorest  group  of  countries  in  the  world.  However,  it 
would fail to support the EU in the achievement of a broader range of EU interests (i.e. 
security, migration) in a larger group of countries (e.g. middle-income countries). It would 
also  weaken  the  role  of  the  EU  at  the  global  level  by  reducing  the  scope  for  strategic 
alliances  with  a  larger  group  of  countries.  Similar  arguments  can  be  made  for  specific 
policies towards SIDS or MICs. 

  Partnership with African countries only 

This option proposes to bring together all countries in Africa, which are currently covered 
under  different  instruments  and  policies.  In  doing  so,  it  would  enable  a  more  coherent, 
continental,  approach  towards  both  sub-Saharan  and  North  Africa  countries  as  well  as 
South Africa and would help achieve some goals in certain policy areas (particularly on 
peace  and  security  and  on  migration).  These  benefits,  however,  are  also  present  in 
alternative options considered. This option would result in no agreement with countries in 
the Caribbean and Pacific and would lead to the loss of the positive aspects of the CPA 
highlighted  by  the  CPA  evaluation  (e.g.  commitment  to  agreed  principles  and  values; 
coherent approach; structured political dialogue). More importantly, by reducing the scope 
for strategic alliances with a larger group of countries, it would weaken the role of the EU 
at the global level. This option would encounter opposition of the Caribbean and Pacific 
regions. 

4.2 Description of the baseline scenario 

The  baseline  scenario  assumes  the  continuation  of  the  status  quo  (that  is,  the  CPA  as  it 
currently stands) after 2020. In fact, the preparatory process and the evaluation have revealed 

25 

 
that  the  CPA  has  obtained  significant  results  as  compared  to  its  objectives.  However,  the 
uneven  development  of  countries,  the  increased  prominence  of  regional  actors  and  policy 
frameworks,  the  rise  of  a  number  of  global  challenges,  the  threats  to  inclusive  governance 
processes suggest not only that the current CPA would no longer be fit for purpose when it 
expires in 2020, but also that without significant changes the problems identified in Section 1 
would  worsen.  Furthermore,  the  evaluation  has  pointed  to  a  number  of  weaknesses  with 
regards to principles and values, some implementation mechanisms to promote EU interests, 
and the system of co-management that require attention.  

The current CPA settings, based on a single agreement without regional diversification, would 
also  ingenerate  further  inconsistencies  with  respect  to  the  different  regional  priorities  and 
objectives as defined in Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific. On the one hand, in fact, the 2007 
Joint  Africa-EU  Strategy  (JAES)  has  given  significant  prominence  to  political  aspects 
(notably  peace  and  security,  migration)  and  sustainable  development.  On  the  other  hand,  in 
the  2012  Joint  Caribbean  EU  Partnership  Strategy  (JCES)  and  the  2006  Strategy  for  a 
Strengthened Partnership with the Pacific Islands (SfPI), emphasis has been placed on issues 
such as climate change, environment, disaster management and sustainable energy, reflecting 
the specificity and needs of these regions and their environment-related vulnerabilities. 

When  projected  into  the  future,  the  baseline  would  largely  fail  to  address  a  range  of 
challenges  across  the  identified  specific  objectives.  It  would  fail  to  fully  incorporate  the 
changing development paradigm built around the Sustainable Development Goals (Objective 
1). Moreover, it would be insufficient to deal with increased migration pressures and would 
not  be  able  to  promote  strongly  enough  private  sector  development  and  EU  investments 
abroad,  thus  failing  to  answer  to  the  growing  EU  concerns  for  enhanced  security  and 
prosperity  (Objective  2).  It  would  also  be  inadequate  to  deal  with  the  increased  regional 
dynamics  and  heterogeneity  between  ACP  countries  (Objective  3).  Importantly,  the 
evaluation  has  pointed  to  the  fact  that  the  CPA  was  not  designed  to  deal  with  global 
challenges. Despite its potential to engage with ACP countries on a range of areas of mutual 
interest,  an  update  of  the  existing  provisions  and  ways  of  working  would  be  necessary  to 
effectively  tackle  global  challenges  and  build  alliances  in  international  fora  (Objective  4). 
Finally,  the  CPA  evaluation  has  shown  that  EU-ACP  relations  have  suffered  from  the 
existence of overlapping policy frameworks, at time ineffective political dialogue, and limited 
involvement of non-state actors (Objective 5). Should the existing CPA be extended when it 
expires in 2020, some problems of a more operational nature (e.g. funding mechanisms, joint 
institutions,  NAO  system)  outlined  in  the  CPA  evaluation  would  make  the  EU-ACP 
partnership more ineffective.  

4.3 Description of the selected alternative options  

The description of the proposed alternative options is structured as follows:  

 

'What' section – which looks at the scope and goals being pursued; 

26 

 
 

 

'Who' section – which looks at the involvement of existing partners (i.e. ACP countries) 
and  key  stakeholders  (i.e.  continental  and  regional  organisations,  non-state  actors,  local 
authorities, parliaments); 
'How'  section  –  which  looks  at  the  set-up  of  the  relations,  potential  extension  to  new 
partners,  reform  of  institutions  and  procedures,  and  legally-binding  nature  in  case  of 
partnership. 

Option 1. No partnership 

This  option  assumes  that  no  specific  partnership  is  required  after  2020,  as  the  existing  EU 
policy and strategies are well suited to fully achieve the five objectives. Future relations with 
the ACP countries after 2020 will be based on existing EU thematic and regional initiatives 
and the application/implementation of international agreements subscribed by the EU and its 
partner countries.  

What 

The  policy  of  EU  relations  with  the  ACP  countries  is  based  on  the  combination  of  existing 
documents/strategies, some taking a thematic, others a geographic approach.  

Amongst those:  

  The new EU Global Strategy adopted in June 2016, providing a clear political framework, 
with  guidelines  for  action,  while  remaining  sufficiently  flexible  to  respond  to  changing 
realities. 

  The  envisaged  revision  of  the  European  Consensus  on  Development  providing  the  EU's 
vision  on  international  development,  the  alignment  with  the  Sustainable  Development 
Goals and the evolving global agenda on development effectiveness. 

  Existing  trade  policies  will  be  applied  to  the  ACP  countries  as  well  as  the  external 
dimensions of existing EU policies on many areas such as agriculture, research, education, 
etc. 

  The three regional strategies for Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, proposing specific 

actions tailored to the different geographical contexts, as discussed in the baseline.  

Who 

EU relations with the 79 countries that currently form the ACP group will break up into the 
groups covered by the different strategies that the EU has adopted for the three regions: 

  48 African countries will fall under the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy;  
  16 Caribbean countries under the 2012 Joint Caribbean EU Partnership Strategy;  
  15  Pacific  countries  under  the  2006  EU  Strategy  for  a  Strengthened  Partnership  with 

Pacific Islands.  

Some  ACP  countries  would  cluster  around  existing  means  of  implementation.  In  particular, 
the  39  states  that  belong  to  the  LDCs  group  would  continue  to  benefit  from  the  special 

27 

 
provisions  on  trade  (Everything  But  Arms  initiative)  and  aid  (i.e.  on  the  basis  of  the 
differentiation principle) dedicated to this specific group of countries31.  

National  governments  will  remain  the  primary  interlocutors  of  the  EU,  but  regional 
organisations  of  the  Caribbean,  Pacific  and  within  Africa  may  keep  gaining  prominence. 
Relations  with  key  stakeholders  will  fall  under  the  general  approach  that  the  EU  has  taken 
towards civil society organisations and local authorities32.  

How 

In the area of development cooperation, three possibilities can be envisaged, although there is 
currently no legal or political basis for these and much will depend on the discussions for the 
next Multi-annual Financial Framework: 

1.   The  existing  European  Development  Fund  could  possibly  be  continued  as  an 
intergovernmental  agreement  among  Member  States 
the  geographic 
cooperation with ACP countries (in which case the current system would continue to exist 
outside the EU Budget); 

to  finance 

2.   The ACP countries would be covered by the successor of the Development Cooperation 
Instrument  (DCI)33  –  if  co-legislators  so  decide  on  the  basis  of  a  proposal  from  the 
Commission – in which case the relevant budget would need to be substantially increased 
(the  total  resources  of  the  current  EDF  amount  to  EUR  30.5  billion  for  the  years  2014-
2020); 

3.   A  new  instrument  under  the  EU  budget  for  cooperation  with  ACP  countries  could  be 

created.  

As  is  already  the  case  today,  ACP  countries  would  be  eligible  for  cooperation  under  other 
external  financing  instruments  under  the  Union's  general  budget  (e.g.  thematic  programmes 
under  the  DCI,  Instrument  contributing  to  Stability  and  Peace34,  Human  Rights  and 
Democracy Instrument35), supposing they continue after 2020. 

As  for  trade,  ACP-EU  trade  relations  have  been  gradually  moving  from  a  specific  non-
reciprocal trade regime to WTO-compatible Economic Partnership Agreements36. Apart from 
EPAs and the related Market Access Regulation37, there is no specific trade policy instrument 
for the ACP, but they are treated on par with other countries at the same level of development 
through  the  EU's  Generalised  Scheme  of  Preferences  (GSP)  which  includes  the  Everything 
But Arms (EBA) for the LDCs.  

31 See Regulation 978/2012 which contains the European Union's Generalised System of Preferences. 
32 COM (2013) 280, 15 May 2013. 
33 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014R0233  
34 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2014:077:0001:0010:EN:PDF  
35 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014R0235  
36 The state of play of the negotiations of the EPAs can be found here: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/september/tradoc_144912.pdf  
37 Council Regulation (EC) No 1528/2007 of 20 December 2007 amended by Council Regulation No 527/2013 

28 

 
                                                 
As for political affairs, relations with the ACP countries from Africa and Caribbean will be 
based on existing political declarations: the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and the Joint Caribbean 
EU  Partnership  Strategy.  An  important  limitation  to  address  is  the  fact  that  no  such 
framework is currently in place for the Pacific countries38. Further developments would also 
be  required,  with  respect  to  the  capacity  of  existing  regional  fora,  to  ensure  the  stronger 
decision-making mechanisms needed to effectively replace the current CPA structures.  

Political  dialogue  with  countries  will  therefore  be  based  on  ad-hoc  arrangements,  with  no 
legally-binding  commitment  available  in  the  absence  of  the  overall  CPA  framework.  The 
current provisions of Article 8 and Article 96 CPA (essential elements clause and appropriate 
measures) would cease to exist. In the area of peace and security, the African Peace Facility 
(APF) is the most important instrument for the promotion of peace and security in Africa. It 
was created on the basis of Article 11 of the CPA, since it allowed dedicating EDF money to 
cover  military  or  defence-related  expenditure,  while  this  was  considered  not  possible  under 
the EU budget (Article 41.2 TEU). Without its legal (CPA) and financial (EDF) framework 
the APF would cease to exist.  

With  regard  to  the  institutional  and  procedural  shortcomings  highlighted  in  the  CPA 
evaluation, no particular change would be considered under this option as the whole EU-ACP 
framework would disappear altogether (including joint institutions, joint management, etc.).  

Table 4.1 Overview of Option 1 

Option 1 

What 

General principles derived from: 

 EU Global Strategy  
 European Consensus on Development/Agenda for Change 
 External dimension of EU existing policies 
 Geographic strategies  

Partners 

ACP countries but not as a group 

Who 

Stakeholders 

General principles for relations with:  

 NSAs, LAs, and parliaments from ACP countries 
 Continental/regional organisations  

Procedures 

 Existing procedures 

How 

Architecture 

 No agreement with ACP group 
 Existing strategies for Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific regions  

38 Apart from the 2006 Strategy for a Strengthened Partnership with the Pacific Islands (SfPI). 

29 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Option 2. New partnership with ACP countries 

This option assumes that a new partnership agreement between the EU and the countries of 
Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific would be adopted. The framework of general principles 
of EU external action and specific EU policies discussed above in the case of 'no partnership' 
are fully applicable to this scenario as well. But a partnership agreement goes further in the 
sense  that  the  partner  countries  agree  and  commit  to  working  together  towards  certain 
objectives.  

Looking at the 'new partnership' option, there are three sub-options identified with the view to 
best  meet  the  five  specific  objectives.  All  sub-options  differ  in  the  same  way  from  the 
baseline  scenario  with  respect  to  new  content  ('what')  and  actors  ('who')  considered. 
Nonetheless,  in  order  to  achieve  the  objectives  the  three  sub-options  differ  in  their 
organisational design ('how'). Descriptions of 'what' and 'who' hereby are therefore applicable 
to all sub-options, while the 'how' is detailed for each sub-option. 

What 

The  new  partnership  departs  from  the  scope  of  the  CPA,  focused  primarily  on  poverty 
eradication  and  integration  of  ACP  countries  into  the  world  economy,  to  promote  a 
partnership with more encompassing objectives, based on shared values and mutual interests. 
Importantly, the EU would be expected to better promote its economic and political interests 
more clearly than the current CPA. 

In line with Objective 1, this option is aligned to the goals internationally agreed as part of the 
2030  Agenda,  and  proposes  a  more  targeted  yet  diversified  approach  to  sustainable  and 
inclusive  development  in  ACP  countries.  The  promotion  of  human  and  social  development 
will continue to feature prominently, but the new partnership will differentiate actions across 
different types of countries.  

In  line  with  Objective  2,  this  option  includes  a  number  of  more  stringent  provisions  to 
promote  EU  security  and  prosperity  (while  preserving  the  key  values  and  principles  of  the 
CPA).  These  provisions  are  expected  to  tackle  rising  security  challenges  for  the  EU, 
particularly in the area of international terrorism and organised crime and to tackle migration 
challenges through return and readmission and provision of possibilities for legal migration. 
Moreover,  they  will  set  the  right  conditions  for  increased  EU  investment,  particularly  by 
small and medium-sized enterprises, to address the fact that various stakeholders want to see 
more economic opportunities from the EU's new relations with ACP countries.  

Who 

The  new  partnership  will  include  the  current  79  ACP  countries  but,  as  explained  further,  it 
allows for reaching out to new members, notably to the nine non-ACP member of the group 
of LDCs (total LDCs is 48); the six non-ACP members of the group of SIDS (total SIDS is 
37),  and  the  5  countries  in  Northern  Africa  (total  Africa  is  53).  As  regards  the  latter,  this 
should not impact on their neighbourhood status and association agreements with the EU. The 

30 

 
purpose of such geographical extension is to create the most appropriate geographical scope 
for engagement with a group of countries to reach the five objectives. 

Governments in partner countries will continue to be the main interlocutors for the EU at the 
national  level.  However,  in  line  with  Objective  5,  the  new  partnership  will  take  a  more 
comprehensive  approach  and  advance  the  principle  of  democratic  ownership  by  effectively 
involving other actors besides central governments (and in doing so, it will respond to one of 
the main criticisms emerging from the consultations and the evaluation, that these actors have 
been inadequately involved). The new partnership will thus improve mechanisms to allow for 
greater participation of different types of non-state actors, such as civil society and economic 
and social partners, including the private sector and trade union organisations, in development 
planning  as  well  as  political  dialogue.  It  will  also  include  new  provisions  to  facilitate  the 
further  involvement  of  other  state-linked  actors,  notably  regional  organisations,  national 
parliaments, and local authorities.  

How 

Three alternative variations to the new partnership option are considered to see the extent to 
which the objectives are more likely to be met either with all ACP countries, or rather through 
more regionalised approaches  (Objective 3). At one side (Option 2.1) some  stakeholders, as 
well  as  the  evaluation,  have  pointed  to  the  fact  that  the  current  format  rather  than  being 
dismantled should instead be improved. In their view, this option offers a familiar framework, 
which  has  been  able  to  deliver  significant  results  and,  once  scope  and  procedures  are 
upgraded,  it  would  be  capable  of  reaching  all  five  objectives.  At  the  other  side,  a  large 
number  of  stakeholders  claim  that  the  heterogeneity  of  ACP  countries,  the  increased 
prominence  of  continental  and  regional  organisations,  and  the  fact  that  important  decisions 
have been taken in (competing) frameworks beyond the current EU-ACP partnership call for 
a radical change. In their views, the new partnership should embrace deepened regionalisation 
dynamics to address problems at the most appropriate level.  

The IA looks into the extent to which EU-ACP relations would have to be fully regionalised 
(Option  2.2)  or  whether  some  objectives  –  expectedly  Objective  1,  2,  and  5  –  are  better 
pursued  at  regional  level  and  other  objectives  –  expectedly  Objective  4  –  at  all-ACP  level 
(Option 2.3).  

More specifically:  

Option 2.1: Revised common agreement (all ACP countries) 

This option preserves the current institutional design, as a means to address a broader range of 
objectives  (WHAT)  and  stakeholders  (WHO)  with  respect  to  the  current  baseline,  with  one 
agreement  to  be  signed  only  at  all  ACP  countries'  level.  However,  it  will  no  longer  be 
structured  along  the  three  pillars  that  have  characterised  the  CPA.  Instead,  it  will  include  a 
first  section  identifying  common  values,  principles  and  actors,  and  a  second  section 
specifying a wide range of cooperation areas applicable to all ACP countries and some new 
provisions for collaboration in the international arena (Objective 4). 

31 

 
Option 2.2: Separate regional agreements (Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific)  

This  option  entails  three  separate  agreements  with  three  regions  (Africa,  Caribbean,  and 
Pacific). Also in this case, each new regional partnership will go beyond the three pillars  of 
the CPA. Moreover, it will include a first section identifying common values, principles and 
actors, and a second section specifying a targeted number of areas of cooperation tailored to 
regional  specificities,  as  well  as  some  provisions  for  a  potential  collaboration  in  the 
international arena (Objective 4).  

Option 2.3: Three separate regional partnerships under a common umbrella.  

This  option  foresees  one  agreement  with  ACP  countries,  but  has  two  components:  i)  an 
overarching umbrella listing common values, principles and interests, and identifying avenues 
for  cooperation  in  the  international  arena  (Objective  4);  ii)  three  separate  regionalised 
partnerships  with  countries  in  the  three  regions  (Africa,  the  Caribbean  and  the  Pacific), 
detailing  specific  priorities  for  the  three  regions,  with  the  view  to  better  tailoring  actions  to 
specific contexts. 

The three options vary in terms of how they facilitate  reaching out to new partner countries 
and the extent to which such outreach help address one or more aspects of the five objectives. 
More specifically, countries in North-Africa have increasingly become crucial to addressing 
migration issues as well as other challenges to stability that have spill-over effects on the EU 
(Objective 2). Opening up to the non-ACP members of the groups of LDCs and SIDS could 
help promote a more targeted and coherent development approach based on different types of 
country  vulnerabilities  (Objective  1).  Importantly,  reaching  out  to  the  three  groups  (i.e. 
countries in North Africa, LDCs and SIDS) could provide the EU with additional diplomatic 
capital to tackle global challenges and promote its interests and values in various international 
fora (Objective 4). 

The three options share a number of features as well, specifically the fact that they are legally-
binding  and  that  they  will  be  subject  to  significant  operational  and  administrative 
improvements. The evaluation and the consultation process have highlighted the fact that the 
legally-binding nature of the CPA has been instrumental to achieving a number of goals. In 
particular, it has ensured stability and predictability, has facilitated the respect of the essential 
elements  of  the  partnership  through  enhanced  political  dialogue,  and  has  guaranteed  a 
platform  for  the  enforceability  of  international  trade  agreements,  which  is  crucial  for 
generating confidence in investors.  

Moreover,  the  new  partnership  sets  to  make  adjustments  to  some  of  the  current  tools  and 
instruments.  This  responds  to  various  contributions  to  the  consultations  and  to  the 
recommendations  of  the  CPA  evaluation,  which  have  pointed  to  the  complexity  of 
management rules and procedures as obstacles to effectiveness and efficiency. For instance, 
the  general  principles  of  co-management  –  which  has  proven  important  for  planning  and 
implementation of development assistance – will be preserved, but the National Authorising 
Office  (NAO)  system  will  be  reviewed  to  streamline  procedures  and  enhance  partner 
ownership. In the same vein, changes will be made in the existing joint institutions, with the 

32 

 
view  to  facilitating  closer  collaboration  in  areas  that  cut  across  countries  and  better 
engagement between the EU and the ACP countries in international contexts.  

Table 4.2 Overview of Option 2 and its sub-options 

Option 2.1 

Option 2.2 

Option 2.3 

What 

 Promoting sustainable and inclusive development 

 Enhancing EU interests of security and prosperity  

 Encompassing regional dynamics 

 Tackling global challenges 

  ACP countries  

Partners 

  LDCs, SIDS, North Africa countries 

Who 

How 

  Empowered NSAs, LAs, and parliaments from ACP countries 

Stakeholders 

  Stronger engagement with continental and regional organisations, 

and possibly third countries, and private development actors 

Procedures 

New  procedures  (i.e.  improved  co-management,  stronger  political 
dialogue) 

Architecture 

1 agreement  

for all ACP countries 

3 agreements  

with the three regions 
(A, C, P) 

3 regional 
partnerships (A, C, 
P) under a common 
umbrella 

33 

 
 
 
 
5. Analysis of impacts 

5.1 Identification of relevant impacts 

The general and specific objectives led to the identification of a number of options to organise 
and govern the relations with ACP countries. These options have political, social, economic, 
environmental and administrative impacts in many domains, which are described below. The 
different domains looked into for each type of impact are those deemed as critical under the 
specific problems section.  

Table 5.1 Relation between objectives, policy options, and areas of impacts 

Objectives 

General 

Specific 

Shape relations with 
partners in Africa, 
the Caribbean and the 
Pacific as to best 
achieve the EU's 
strategic interests  

Foster sustainable 
development in 
ACP countries 

Enhance EU 
security and 
economic prosperity  

Encompass 
evolving regional 
dynamics within 
and beyond ACP 
borders 

Ensure stronger 
alliances to address 
global challenges 

Strengthen inclusive 
participation of 
stakeholders at 
various levels 

Policy Options 

Areas of Impacts 

Social 
  Sustainable  and  inclusive 

Baseline: CPA 

development  

Option 1. No 
partnership with ACP 
countries  

Option 2. New 
partnership with ACP 
countries 

  Migration-development 

nexus 
  Enhanced 

participatory 

approach to cooperation 

Political  
  Peace and security  
  Democratic  governance 

and human rights 

  Alliance  building  at  the 

global level 

Option 2.1. Revised 
common agreement  
(all ACP) 

Economic 
  Trade cooperation  
  Macro-economic 

Option 2.2. Separate 
regional agreements 
(Africa, Caribbean and 
Pacific) 

Option 2.3 Three regional 
partnerships under a 
common umbrella 

stability, 
investment 
returns and private sector 
development 

Environmental 
  Environmental  protection 
and climate change 

Budgetary and 
administrative 

The  assessment  is  conducted  only  on  those  domains  that  are  expected  to  show  variation  in 
terms  of  change  across  the  various  options.  In  a  number  of  other  important  domains  the 
choice  of  the  option  is  not  expected  to  produce  significant  change  vis-à-vis  the  baseline 
scenario and therefore no assessment is carried out. 

34 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The analysis of the various types of impact will then be used in Section 6, to ascertain which 
of the options best meets the objectives according to the criteria of effectiveness, efficiency 
and coherence. Specificities amongst Options 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 are provided only when (and to 
the extent which) they are relevant for the analysis of the specific impacts to be assessed. 

5.2 Social impacts 

Sustainable and inclusive development  

The  adoption  of  2030  Agenda,  and  the  related  17  Sustainable  Development  Goals,  has 
marked a substantial change in development thinking and practices. By integrating the three 
dimensions  of  sustainable  development  (social,  economic,  and  environmental)  and  by 
advancing  a  universal  approach,  it  has  crystallised  the  idea  that  current  challenges  are 
affecting  all  countries  and  all  should  contribute  to  its  implementation  through  collective 
action.  To  support  the  implementation  of  2030  Agenda,  the  Addis  Ababa  Action  Agenda 
(AAAA)  has  called  on  the  international  community  to  put  in  place  a  diversified  set  of 
measures – certainly official development assistance but also other private sources, including 
domestic resource mobilisation in developing countries.  

The implementation of 2030 Agenda is expected to generate substantial direct social impacts, 
with respect to eradication of poverty, access to health, sanitation and education services, as 
well  as  fighting  of  inequalities  and  gender  discrimination39.  Indirectly  though,  due  to  its 
multi-dimensional approach, it is also expected to have a significant environmental impact, by 
urging  parties  to  take  concrete  actions  fighting  climate  change  and  environmental 
degradation,  as  well  as  economic  impact,  by  setting  the  conditions  in  place  for  sustainable 
economic growth.  

The CPA has contributed to making substantial progress on human and social development, 
but has been less successful in tackling the root causes of poverty and inequality. Moreover, it 
has not been able to ensure a diversification of approaches, nor has it acted as a catalyst for 
mobilising  a  wide  range  of  development  funding  resources.  To  be  consistent  with  2030 
Agenda,  the  CPA  should  cater  for  more  flexible  and  differentiated  –  but  also  tailored  – 
partnerships  for  countries  and  regions,  allowing  for  a  wide  spectrum  of  cooperation 
possibilities. 

Option 1 

The absence of a partnership does not mean that the EU will no longer engage on sustainable 
development  with  its  ACP  partners.  The  EU  has  committed  to  implement  2030  Agenda 
(SDGs)  through  its  internal  and  external  policies,  ensuring  Europe's  economic  growth  and 
social  and  environmental  sustainability,  taking  into  account  the  Europe  2020  review.  This 
strategy is to be presented in 2016. 

39  For  analyses  of  the  issues  of  poverty  and  human  development,  including  future  scenarios,  see  the  Nopoor 
project at http://www.nopoor.eu/ 

35 

 
                                                 
Nevertheless,  this  option  presents  some  significant  weaknesses,  which  may  slow-down  the 
achievement  of  the  17  SDGs.  First  and  foremost,  it  will  discontinue  and  likely  damage  an 
established relationship with a large number of countries that are crucial for a more effective 
implementation of the 2030 Agenda. Second, the abandonment of an established partnership 
with a diverse group of developing countries such as the ACP group – which cuts across key 
groups  such  as  LDCs,  SIDS,  MICs  –  will  significantly  reduce  opportunities  of  coalition-
building  to  tackle  global  challenges  in  multilateral  fora.  Third,  the  lack  of  comprehensive 
approach  cutting  across  different  policy  areas  will  increase  the  risk  that  the  social  pillar  is 
treated separately from other sectors rather than integrated within all interventions in order to 
maximise the contribution of these interventions to people's lives: indeed human development 
contributes as well to growth and to peaceful societies.  

Finally, since challenges cannot be solved by individual states alone, mobilising and engaging 
all stakeholders (civil society and private sector) in collective action is needed: the lack of a 
formalised  partnership  which  includes  the  most  comprehensive  framework  for  non-state 
actors  does  not  give  the  possibility  of  creating  these  much  needed  multi-stakeholder 
partnerships. In sum, the EU's attempt to implement the 2030 Agenda could be significantly 
undermined if activities were to fall under different partnerships and instruments. 

Option 2 

A new partnership will build on the significant achievements of the CPA on human and social 
development and on shared international commitment of EU and ACP countries to achieving 
sustainable,  resilient  and  inclusive  development.  The  new  ACP-EU  partnership  is  therefore 
meant as an strong framework to implement the general EU vision in an integrated manner by 
bringing  together,  in  one  single  comprehensive  agreement,  (i)  the  economic,  social  and 
environmental  aspects  of  the  2030  Agenda,  as  well  as  the  additional  political  dimension 
characterising  the  long-standing  ACP-EU  relations;  and  (ii)  the  necessary  means  of 
implementation to effectively achieve each of the 17 SDGs.  

More specifically, the significant update of new content and scope of the new partnership vis-
à-vis  the  baseline  scenario  will  allow  it  to  be  more  responsive  to  different  ACP  countries' 
needs through enhanced differentiation; ensure the involvement of all stakeholders, which are 
crucial  to  create  multi-stakeholder  partnerships;  and  serve  EU  interests,  e.g.  in  international 
fora  and  by creating  more  opportunities  for  European  firms  in  the  delivery  of  global  public 
goods.  

Furthermore,  a  more  diversified  range  of  means  of  implementation  in  line  with  the  Addis 
Ababa Action Agenda will be expected to turn the future ACP-EU Partnership into a strong 
vehicle  to  deliver  on  the  2030  Agenda.  The  new  partnership,  by  embracing  the  concept  of 
differentiated  partnership,  is  expected  to  be  a  significantly  positive  force  in  supporting  the 
implementation  of  the  2030  Agenda  through  concrete  actions,  demonstration  effects  and 
mutual lesson learning.  

This option enables flexible and tailored partnerships for/with countries and regions, allowing 
for a spectrum of cooperation possibilities across the various sub-options:  

36 

 
  Options 2.1 and Option 2.3 would offer the possibility to implement thematic action (e.g. 

human development, food security);  

  Options  2.1  and  Option  2.3  would  offer  the  possibility  to  act  on  the  basis  of  levels  of 

development and vulnerability (e.g. LDCs, SIDS, fragile states, MICs);  

  Options  2.2  and  Option  2.3  would  offer  the  possibility  to  take  the  aspects  of 
regionalisation into account, with or without an overarching chapter: the establishment of 
three  regionalised  partnerships  would  allow  EU  cooperation  to  be  tailored  to  the  needs 
and  specificities  of  each  region,  taking  into  account  the  specific  vulnerabilities  and 
capacities of the respective countries and regions.  

In sum, the existence of a new partnership would represent a strong political commitment by 
all  stakeholders  (governmental  and  non-governmental),  necessary  to  translate  global  vision 
into  concrete  and  action-oriented  cooperation.  By  further  reinforcing  existing  cooperation 
efforts  and  strategically  targeting  global  challenges,  new  opportunities  will  be  created  to 
define and promote common interests for the EU and ACP partners in areas of high political 
relevance. 

Migration-development nexus 

By  investing  in  the  development-migration  nexus  and  legal  migration  opportunities  for 
potential  workforces,  migration  can  have  a  positive  impact  on  the  social  and  economic 
development  in  the  EU  and  the  ACP  countries.40  Both  South-North  and  South-South  legal 
migration  open  up  opportunities  for  migrants  in  terms  of  better  employment  and  higher 
incomes. This can enhance development in the host countries and countries of origin, and can 
in turn reduce irregular migration pressure on other ACP countries and the EU.41 The greatest 
impact will be attained if migration provisions also take into account the contextual factors in 
both  the  country  of  origin  and  the  host  country,  such  as  effects  of  remittances,  integration 
policies for immigrants and risks and consequences of brain-drain dynamics 

Facilitating  legal  migration  can  help  addressing  demographic  challenges  in  Africa  and  the 
EU.  While  the  EU  might  experience  scarcity  in  labour  forces  in  the  future,  high  population 
growth  in  several  African  ACP  countries  is  expected  to  generate  surpluses  in  workforces. 
Better  prevention,  better  migration  management  and  fight  against  irregular  migration  will 
lessen security risks and human suffering related to irregular migration, and reduce migration-
related  crimes  such  as  human  trafficking  and  migrant  smuggling.  Acknowledging  and 
addressing  climate  change  related  migration  will  be  important  to  mitigate  and  pre-empt 

40 Keijzer M., Heraud J., and Frankenhaeuser M., (2015), 'Theory and practice? A Comparative Analysis of 
Migration and Development Policies in Eleven European Countries and the European Commission', 
International Migration, p. 3. 
41 Crush, J, (2015), 'The EU-ACP migration and Development relationship', Migration and Development, Vol. 4 
(1), p. 49; Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, ECDPM, SALO, (2015), 'Making migration beneficial to Europe and Africa', 
Joint Policy brief/Seminar Report, p 6. 

37 

 
                                                 
negative effects on development in affected counties and counter possible increased migration 
pressures on the EU and ACP countries.  

Migration  dynamics,  opportunities  and  challenges  differ  substantially  in  and  between  the 
three regions, and differences are equally substantial between regions within Africa. Several 
migration-related issues, for example, are severely affecting some African countries such as 
massive  forced  displacement  due  to  conflict;  violence  and  human  rights  abuses;  and  the 
problem  of  human  trafficking  and  migrant  smuggling.42  The  latter  is  also  problem  in  the 
Caribbean and Pacific.43  

The  African  region  is  particularly  relevant  for  the  EU  since  the  large  majority  of  ACP 
migrants  coming  to  the  EU  are  African.44  The  United  Nations  High  Commissioner  for 
Refugees global trends report states that migration pressure on EU Member States is likely to 
rise  over  the  coming  years,  especially  from  Sub  Saharan  Africa.  Demographic  trends  in 
Africa  are  also  increasing  migration  pressure  in  African  ACP  countries  and  EU  member 
states.  

The  CPA,  in  its  Article  13,  provided  a  basis  for  political  dialogue  between  the  EU  and  the 
ACP in the area of migration. It also deals with issues such as human rights, fair treatment of 
legally residing ACP nationals, tackling root causes of migration, irregular migration as well 
as  return  and  readmission.  It  contains  the  obligation  –  on  both  sides  –  to  readmit  their 
nationals  who  are  illegally  present  on  the  territory  of  the  other  party,  without  further 
formalities, and provide them with appropriate identity documents for that purpose.  

The  implementation  of  Article  13  was  uneven  and  led  to  uneven  results,  whilst  bearing  in 
mind  differences  in  contexts  between  the  Caribbean  and  Pacific  regions  and  Africa.  In 
particular, the legal obligation to readmit its own nationals has in practice seen unsatisfactory 
implementation  and  uneven  cooperation  from  African  countries.  Recent  developments 
highlight  the  importance  to  review  the  agreement  in  the  area  of  return  and  readmission  in 
order to strengthen the relevant provisions and make them more operational.  

Article  13  does  not  reflect  the  EU's  comprehensive  approach  to  migration  enshrined  in  key 
EU policy documents on migration, such as the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility 
and  the  European  Agenda  on  Migration45,  including  as  well  the  EU  Communication  on 
Enhancing Legal Avenues to Europe and the EU Action Plan on Integration46.  

42 http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a02d7fd6.html/ 
43 https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/global_phenomenon_en.pdf 
44 Crush, J, (2015), 'The EU-ACP migration and Development relationship', Migration and Development, Vol. 4 
(1), p. 44. 
45 SEC (2011) 1353 FINAL 
46 COM(2016) 197 FINAL 

38 

 
                                                 
Option 1 

In the absence of a partnership, several available mechanisms remain to organise dialogue and 
cooperation in the area of migration between the EU and the African ACP countries. These 
alternative agreements are tailored to local realities and allow for differentiation in partners.  

Such  alternative  mechanisms  include  other  key  partners  such  as  North  African  countries, 
ECOWAS and the African Union Commission. In 2006 for example, the Rabat process was 
established  to  address  irregular  migration  from  Sub-Saharan  Africa  to  Europe  through  the 
West-African  migration  road.  A  year  later,  the  Africa-EU  Migration,  Mobility  and 
Employment  partnership  was  launched,  focussing  on  areas  such  as  fighting  trafficking  in 
human beings, remittances, diaspora, mobility and labour migration, international protection 
and  irregular  migration.  The  Khartoum  process,  launched  in  2014,  established  a  dialogue 
between  the  EU,  nine  African  countries  in  the  Horn  of  Africa  and  the  African  Union 
Commission.  In  2015,  a  political  declaration  and  action  plan  was  adopted  at  the  Valletta 
Summit on Migration by several African countries and the EU on all the key migration areas. 

There are no alternatives available for cooperation between the EU and the Pacific region. For 
the  Caribbean,  the  EU-CELAC  structured  dialogue  on  migration  provides  a  framework  to 
exchange best practices and build capacities, but does not cover comprehensive cooperation 
mechanisms.47 

While  the  implementation  of  Article  13  of  the  CPA,  in  which  the  migration  principles  are 
captured,  has  been  uneven,  discontinuing  the  agreement  would  mean  abolishing  key 
principles  and  legal  obligation  agreed  upon  between  the  EU  and  79  countries,  without  any 
immediate  alternative  approach  to  agree  on  these  commitments  with  direct  partners.  These 
principles cover fair treatment of third country nationals, non-discrimination, addressing root 
causes  of  illegal  migration  and  readmission  of  nationals  who  are  illegally  present  on  the 
territory of the other party. Even though the scope of the article does not cover all dimensions 
of  the  migration  issue,  it  provides  a  solid  ground  for  cooperation  and  dialogue,  even  for 
alternative formats of dialogue within ACP-EU relations.  

Option 2 

This  option,  entailing  a  widening  of  scope  in  terms  of  content,  uses  as  a  starting  point  the 
agreed Article 13 of the current CPA, but develops it to make it both more comprehensive and 
more stringent. In doing so, it allows for a more holistic approach towards migration, better 
addressing objectives put forward in the relevant EU policy documents48. The new approach 

47 http://www.eeas.europa.eu/la/migration/index_en.htm 
48 Brussels, 18.11.2011, COM(2011) 743 final, Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The 
Global Approach to Migration and Mobility. European Commission, 13.5.2015, COM (2015) 240 final, 
'Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions a European Agenda on Migration'. 

39 

 
                                                 
can  also  incorporate  relevant  parts  of  the  2030  Agenda  for  sustainable  and  inclusive 
development.  

The EU and ACP countries were unable to include this holistic approach on migration in the 
2010 revision of the CPA, but several actions afterwards indicate that the parties are willing to 
strengthen cooperation. For instance, a joint declaration was adopted and several sessions on 
migration-related issues were held in Brussels, resulting in recommendations endorsed by the 
ACP-EU Council of Ministers. In addition, it was explicitly stated that results of the dialogue 
should  feed  into  the  revision  of  the  Cotonou  agreement.49  The  outcome  of  the  public 
consultation  also  indicated  that  a  more  holistic  approach  should  be  applied.50  Furthermore, 
since migration issues go beyond ACP borders, with a key role for Northern Africa countries 
which  often  serves  as  a  transit  for  migrants  from  Sub-Saharan  Africa,  the  involvement  of 
Northern Africa in the new partnership would be particularly relevant. 

  Option  2.1  would  allow  preserving  the  commitment  of  all  EU  and  ACP  countries  on 
adopting a holistic approach to migration. However, it would be more difficult to take the 
strong regional specificities into account under this option. 

  Options  2.2  and  Option  2.3,  by  contrast,  would  allow  moulding  the  agreement  to  the 
region-specific  migration  opportunities  and  challenges  in  Africa,  the  Caribbean  and  the 
Pacific,  which  might  in  turn  enhance  the  positive  economic  and  social  impact.  Security 
issues  related  to  irregular  migration  and  migration-related  crime  will  also  be  better 
addressed. The public consultation also indicated that migration issues are better solved at 
the regional level.51  

Enhanced participatory approach to cooperation  

Greater  and  better  inclusion  of  a  wide  range  of  stakeholders  is  essential  for  achieving 
sustainable and inclusive development, as they allow identifying the specific needs of people 
affected by various policy interventions. Stakeholder participation is also crucial in achieving 
significant  political  impacts  (by  promoting  human  rights  and  supporting  democratic 
governance),  economic  impacts  (for  example  by  encouraging  and  monitoring  public-private 
partnerships), and environmental impacts (as they ensure greater commitments by all relevant 
stakeholders in developing and implementing sustainable environmental practices). Through 
time,  however,  the  space  for  democratic  engagement  for  non-state  actors  across  ACP 
countries  has  shrunk.  The  role  of  civil  society  has  been  increasingly  challenged  by  new 
restrictive  legal  frameworks,  whilst  the  role  of  parliaments  and  local  authorities  has  been 
threatened by an increasing trend of centralisation of power and even authoritarianism across 
various ACP countries.  

49 http://www.acp.int/content/joint-acp-eu-council-backs-experts-recommendations-migration; 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/05/29-acp-dialogue-migration-development/ 
50 European Commission, (2016), 'Towards a new partnership between the European Union and the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific Countries after 2020', Summary report of the public consultation'.  
51 European Commission, (2016), 'Towards a new partnership between the European Union and the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific Countries after 2020', Summary report of the public consultation'. 

40 

 
                                                 
The CPA has provided a framework for a broad and inclusive relationship that goes beyond 
national governments, by recognising the role of parliaments, local authorities and non-state 
actors (civil society, private sector, trade unions) in development. It has formalised their role 
both  in  the  conduct  of  political  dialogue  and  in  the  programming  and  implementation  of 
cooperation programmes. 

The consultation process has confirmed that the provisions for stakeholder engagement have 
made the CPA a unique framework in the field of international cooperation. These actors have 
indeed  been  supported  in  complementing  the  state  in  partner  countries  in  the  delivery  of 
goods  and  services  for  better  human  and  social  development.  At  the  same  time,  their 
advocacy role has remained limited and there is a growing request for further involvement in 
political  dialogue  through  the  adoption  of  specific  mechanisms.  Similarly,  local  authorities 
have  been  mostly  designated  as  partners  for  service  delivery,  rather  than  as  relevant 
stakeholders  to  be  fully  involved  in  CPA  decision-making  processes.  Based  on  the 
consultation of stakeholders, an urgent need to further involve the private sector has become 
manifest. 

Option 1  

Under this option, the lack of a formalised partnership with the ACP countries means that the 
role  of  these  actors  would  be  significantly  reduced,  since  the  mutual  rights  and  obligations 
would  no  longer  be  defined  in  any  legally-binding  agreement.  The  impact  will  therefore  be 
lower  than  the  baseline.  Doing  away  with  multi-decade  efforts  to  ensure  a  systematic 
inclusion of key stakeholders in ACP-EU relations would send a wrong political message to 
ACP governments, as well as NSAs/LAs/parliaments' organisations.  

Although it could be improved, in its current shape and in some countries, the CPA appears as 
a political  incentive at country  level  to  involve these  actors in  the development process. As 
mentioned earlier, the CPA, for the first time, provided a framework where key actors were 
recognised  as  partners.  Removing  this  framework  could  possibly  imply  serious  drawbacks 
and further marginalise them. Multi-stakeholder partnerships are also at the heart of the new 
universal 2030 Agenda and are seen as a way to achieve results,  and therefore could appear 
counter-productive  to  put  an  end  to  a  political  agreement  capacitated  to  strengthen  this 
dialogue.  

Option 2 

The new partnership would build on the provisions of the existing CPA, taking into account 
several  recommendations  made  during  the  stakeholder  consultation,  particularly  by  civil 
society  organisations.  The  inclusion  of  more  stringent  mechanisms  for  a  more  active 
involvement  throughout  the  development  process  will  have  a  direct  positive  effect  on 
sustainable and inclusive development, across a number of different policy areas.  

It would allow involving stakeholders in a comprehensive way in the different policy areas. 
Positive  political  impacts  are  expected  through  their  involvement  in  peace  building  and 
tackling  the  root  causes  of  state  fragility.  The  further  involvement  of  local  authorities  and 

41 

 
NGOs  within  and  beyond  the  urban  areas,  which  has  been  a  major  critique,  will  have  a 
significant  impact  in  the  local implementation  of  the  2030 Agenda.  The  involvement  of  the 
private sector is also expected to contribute to filling funding gaps, improving on delivery of 
goods  and  services,  encouraging  innovation  and  promoting  business  partnership  between 
ACP and European actors.  

Besides service delivery, the new provisions would allow NSAs to act as a catalyst for change 
and  foster  an  enabling  environment  for  better  interactions  between  citizens  and  state, 
ultimately  enhancing  democratic  accountability,  especially  in  those  countries  which  are 
restricting policy space for non-state actors. This option is expected to achieve greater impacts 
if compared to the baseline scenario.  

5.3 Political impacts 

Peace and security 

Peace and security have become areas of strategic importance  in  ACP-EU relations. On the 
one hand, it is widely accepted that development and security policies are closely interrelated: 
countries  involved  in  conflicts  or  facing  threats  to  political  stability  suffer  from  reduced 
progress  towards  human  development  and  experience  significant  economic  slow-downs  (or 
collapse),  which  has  obvious  social  consequences.  On  the  other  hand,  instability  in  ACP 
countries has major negative implications for Europe in terms of increased threats to security 
related to migration flows, organised crime, trafficking of people, drugs, and weapons, as well 
as in terms of missed economic opportunities for European firms, thus significantly reducing 
the prospects for foreign direct investment in ACP countries. 

The CPA has been instrumental in the areas of conflict prevention, peace-keeping and peace- 
building  at  country,  regional  and  continental  levels.  Indeed,  the  African  Peace  Facility  has 
provided  a  strong  direct  support  for  the  resolution  of  a  number  of  crises  in  Africa  and  has 
significantly  contributed  to  the  enhancement  of  the  AU  and  some  RECs  capacities  in 
preventing  and  reacting  to  threats  to  stability.  At  the  same  time,  as  highlighted  by  several 
contributors to the public consultation and to the expert round tables, the CPA has been less 
effective in tackling the root causes of state fragility, for example by strengthening and better 
enacting  the  security-development  nexus,  and  to  ensure  coherence  between  the  various 
security-related instruments, institutions and policies.  

Importantly,  the  three  regions  face  substantial  different  peace  and  security  challenges,  and 
these  differences  appear  as  well  within  Africa  itself.  Furthermore,  the  challenges  in  Africa, 
affecting  directly  the  EU,  are  going  beyond  the  borders  of  the  ACP,  most  notably  North 
Africa.  In  this  regard,  the  existing  format  does  not  allow  to  significantly  take  this 
diversification  into  account  and  provide  for  more  tailored  approaches  and  platforms  of 
dialogue to the specific region. It does not profit from the increased role that continental (i.e. 
AU) and regional (e.g. ECOWAS) organisations have in addressing peace and security in the 
three regions.  

42 

 
Option 1 

Under  this  option,  provisions  on  peace  and  security  for  ACP  countries  will  fall  under  the 
Joint-Africa  EU  Strategy  and  the  Joint  Caribbean  EU  Partnership  Strategy,  which  provide 
general political frameworks for EU engagement in these areas, whereas the Strategy for the 
Pacific does not. The lack of a formalised partnership for ACP-EU relations implies that the 
EU would have to rely on ad-hoc strategies with the aim of implementing its comprehensive 
approach  to  security.  Moreover,  crucial  existing  commitments  to  fighting  international 
terrorism  and  preventing  the  proliferation  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction  (as  well  as  the 
reference  to  the  International  Criminal  Court  and  the  Statute  of  Rome),  would  be  lost.  An 
important problem to solve concerns the APF: should the EDF cease to exist, some potentially 
difficult change is required as the Treaty of Lisbon (Article 41.2 TEU) excludes expenditures 
arising from operations having military, or defence implications from being financed by the 
EU  budget.  The  ongoing  consideration  of  a  potential  future  EU  instrument  for  capacity 
building in security and development (CBSD) is particularly looking into this issue52. 

Option 2.1 

This option has some strengths and weaknesses in relation to the baseline. On the one hand, 
the adoption of a new and more comprehensive partnership is expected to facilitate targeted 
actions  to  better  address  the  root  causes  of  instability  and  state  fragility  (for  instance, 
increased  inequalities,  population  displacement,  hunger  and  food  insecurity)  as  well  as 
resilience  building  to  help  prevent  recurrent  humanitarian  crises.  Moreover,  it  will  preserve 
the commitment made by both parties to fight international terrorism and the proliferation of 
weapons  of  mass  destructions.  On  the  other  hand,  it  would  still  not  allow  tailoring  actions 
towards the three regions in line with the deepening of regionalisation dynamics, would not 
fully  benefit  from  the  increased  role  of  continental  (i.e.  AU)  and  regional  (e.g.  ECOWAS) 
organisations,  and  would  not  fully  resolve  the  potential  overlap  of  competences  between 
different institutions and frameworks (ACP-EU and EU-AU).  

Option 2.2  

This  option  has  the  merit  that  it  would  fully  take  into  account  that  different  regions  face 
different sets of security challenges and therefore more tailored actions are required to address 
their needs. In particular, in Africa (thanks also to the extension of countries in North Africa), 
this  would  allow  strengthening  the  African  Peace  and  Security  Architecture  (APSA), 
including contributing to the solution of conflicts and enhancing the capacity of the AU and 
the various RECs, and addressing other sources of fragility. In the Caribbean, attention would 
likely be placed on drug trafficking and organised crime, and in the Pacific on ethnic tensions. 
This  option  would  also  avoid  the  current  overlap  between  continental/regional  and  ACP 
institutions. Nonetheless, the potential lack (or the difficult re-negotiation) of an overarching 

52  Commission  proposal  amending  Regulation  (EU)  230/2014  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council 
establishing an instrument contributing to stability and peace (COM(2016)447 final) 

43 

 
                                                 
chapter,  in  which  all  parties  commit  to  fight  against  terrorism  and  the  proliferation  of 
weapons of mass destruction, would significantly reduce the positive impact of this option. 

Option 2.3  

This option offers a good framework to implement the comprehensive approach to peace and 
security.  It  combines  the  advantages  of  both  thematic  and  geographic  approaches.  In 
particular, a new, more comprehensive, ACP-EU partnership is expected to better promote the 
security-development nexus, with a view to effectively addressing the root causes of fragility 
and facilitating resilience building. It will put in place the right conditions for more tailored 
actions  in  line  with  the  specific  security  needs  of  the  three  regions,  and  create  new 
opportunities  for  increased  cooperation  between  EU  and  ACP  countries  on  issues  of  global 
relevance, including the fight against international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. 
These  positive  effects  would  be  further  enhanced  by  the  association  of  countries  in  North 
Africa into the new EU-ACP partnership. 

Democratic governance and human rights 

The promotion of human rights and democratic governance is at the heart of the EU's external 
action.  The  European  Union  sees  human  rights  as  universal  and  indivisible,  and  actively 
promotes and defends them both within its borders and when engaging in relations with non-
EU  countries.  Essential  elements  clauses  are  a  core  component  of  all  EU  legally-binding 
agreements with third countries; they have become even more important in a multipolar world 
with emerging players which do not, or to a lesser extent, respect such values and principles. 
Besides an obvious political impact, the effective promotion of human rights and democratic 
governance  has  major  social  and  economic  impacts:  on  the  one  hand,  it  supports  the 
achievement  of  sustainable  and  inclusive  development  in  partner  countries  by  increasing 
democratic  accountability;  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  expected  to  positively  affect  economic 
prosperity, both in partner countries and in Europe, by creating the conditions for increased 
activities related to sustainable growth.  

The  CPA  formula  is  the  most  substantive  and  prescriptive  one  compared  to  all  other  EU 
agreements  with  third  countries,  with  Articles  8  and  9  specifying  the  essential  and 
fundamental  elements  of  the  partnership,  and  Articles  96  and  97  defining  the  procedures  in 
case of breach of one of those elements. Thanks to these provisions, the CPA has been useful 
in promoting the linkage between these values and principles not only in the political pillar, 
but  also  in  the  development  cooperation  and  trade  pillars  –  for  instance,  the  non-execution 
clauses of the EPAs refer to the appropriate measures under the CPA. Nevertheless, the CPA 
would  have  to  be  amended  with  the view  to  correcting  existing  problems  linked  to  existing 
implementation  mechanisms  and  to  address  emerging  trends  of  weakened  democratic 
practises and human rights violations in several ACP countries. In particular, some criticisms, 
made  by  some  ACP  states  and  several  civil  society  organisations,  relate  to  the  perceived 
inconsistency, since its procedures have not been applied consistently across ACP countries. 
Furthermore, political dialogue has often fallen short of addressing the underlying causes of 
weak governance and hence has failed to be a real game-changer in the EU's democratisation 
efforts.  

44 

 
Option 1  

The  absence  of  a  partnership,  particularly  with  a  number  of  countries  where  violations  of 
human rights and cases of democracy decay are increasing, would be perceived as loss of the 
EU's  long-standing  commitment  to  promote  the  'essential  elements'  of  the  CPA  and  would 
seriously damage its reputation of normative actor, especially in a context in which emerging 
powers show less interest in universal norms and values.  

In the case of no partnership, the EU will continue to promote and defend the universality and 
indivisibility  of  all  human  rights  in  cooperation  with  national  governments  from  the  three 
regions  (as  well  as  in  collaboration  with  international  and  regional  organisations  and  civil 
society),  but  the  lack  of  comprehensive  provisions  would  significantly  weaken  its  efforts. 
Political  dialogue  with  individual  countries  would  be  largely  promoted  on  an  ad-hoc  and 
informal basis and no coherent institutional interactions at the ACP level would be envisaged. 
As a result, a reduced impact of this option vis-à-vis the baseline scenario is expected, when it 
comes  to  ensuring  more  ambitious  rules  and  standards  across  countries,  as  well  as  the 
formation of ACP-EU alliances at the international level for the promotion of specific norms.  

Option 2.1  

This option assumes the preservation of all the overall provisions of the CPA, specifically the 
general  commitment  to  values  and  principles  and  the  accompanying  implementation 
measures, but foresees the strengthening of mechanisms for political dialogue at both national 
and  global  levels.  At  the  national  level,  in  line  with  the  suggestions  made  by  several 
contributors to the public consultations, the implementation of more flexible approaches for 
associating  governments  in  political  dialogue  together  with  a  closer  involvement  of  non-
governmental  actors  (e.g.  civil  society,  local  authorities,  parliaments)  are  expected  to 
significantly  enhance  democratic  accountability  and  the  overall  promotion  of  human  rights. 
At the global level, this option would allow to better engage ACP countries in the promotion 
of  issues  of  common  interest  (for  example  in  the  case  of  UN  resolutions)  –  and  this  effect 
would  be  further  strengthened  by  the  association  into  the  EU-ACP  new  partnership  of  the 
non-ACP members of the LDCs and SIDS groups.  

Option 2.2  

This  option  implies  the  full  re-negotiations  of  all  the  provisions  on  human  rights  and 
democratic governance at regional level, which could in  fact prove very challenging. In  the 
case of Africa, African-AU human rights systems and governance agendas might potentially 
offer building blocks for an agreement on similar type of provisions as the ones embedded in 
Article  9  of  the  CPA.  The  re-negotiation  of  the  provisions  on  human  rights  and  democratic 
governance  is  likely  to  be  more  challenging  in  the  case  of  the  Caribbean  and  the  Pacific, 
because neither of the relevant joint partnership/strategy includes similar provisions to those 
for Africa.  It would be at least equally  difficult to  renegotiate legally-binding procedures in 
case  of  non-respect  of  the  fundamental  and  essential  elements  as  established  by  Articles  96 

45 

 
 
and 97 of the CPA. The absence of provisions on political dialogue would imply the loss of an 
important forum where to discuss cases of decay in human rights and democratic governance 
– and therefore a significant reduced impact of this option vis-à-vis the baseline scenario.  

Option 2.3  

This  option  has  the  merit  of  integrating  the  main  advantages  of  option  2.1,  notably  the 
possibility  to  have  focused  discussions  at  ACP-EU  level  on  key  global  issues  and  more 
flexible and participatory approaches to the promotion and protection of human rights at the 
national  level.  It  would  also  give  the  possibility  to  better  anchor  political  dialogue  in  the 
regional frameworks and systems (for example in the African Governance Architecture), so as 
to increase the legitimacy and role of key regional actors in this area, like AU and RECs, and 
foster the support to greater democratic practices. At the same time, it should be noted that, 
irrespective of the option retained, the challenge of re-negotiating new provisions on human 
rights  and  democratic  governance with  ACP  countries  in  a  future  partnership  should  not  be 
underestimated.  For  many,  the  inclusion  of  clear  and  legally-binding  provisions  on 
fundamental and essential elements in 2000 was possible due to a certain leverage of the EU 
with respect to ACP countries. Twenty years later, agreeing to the same level of obligations 
on  issues  that  have  proven  contentious  (good  governance) and  on  issues  where  EU  policies 
are strong (LGBTI rights) may prove to be challenging.  

Alliance building at the global level 

A central goal for the EU is the promotion of its values and interests at the international level, 
which in a growing multipolar world, with actors projecting diverging priorities, requires the 
set-up of reliable alliances. If such alliances are effective they reinforce the EU's position in 
the global arena, and therefore ensure strong political impacts. Effective alliances would also 
result in other impacts (i.e. social, environmental and economic), depending on the types of 
policy areas targeted and ambitions in the common goals identified. More specifically, they 
would  allow  the  EU  and  the  ACP  better  addressing  a  range  of  global  challenges,  notably 
international terrorism, financial stability, climate change, communicable diseases, and so on. 

The CPA provided a (insufficiently developed) platform for EU and ACP countries to discuss 
relevant policy matters and identify common interests and joint positions aimed at influencing 
global decision-making processes and international fora. Yet, the parties have not been able to 
reach  the  full  potential  that  such  a  close  relationship  could  offer.53  Importantly,  the  joint 
position adopted on climate change in the framework of COP21 in Paris has shown the major 
potential that an alliance between more than 100 countries has in successfully shaping global 
negotiations  and  provides  a  crucial  reference  for  the  future.  There  is  therefore  need  for 
improvements  in  the  range  of  policy  areas  to  be  addressed,  the  concrete  processes  and 
procedures agreed  to  allow  such  alliances in  an  effective  and  timely  manner,  as  well  as  the 
involvement of additional key partners beyond ACP and EU countries in specific policy areas 
and international fora.  

53 CPA evaluation (DEVCO, 2016). 

46 

 
                                                 
Option 1  

This  option will limit possibilities of alliance building to countries already  belonging  to  the 
existing  regional  partnerships,  in  a  limited  range  of  policy  areas,  or  to  ad-hoc  coalitions 
provided  that  (a  substantial  number  of)  ACP  countries  are  interested  in  joining  the  EU  in 
pursuing issues of global relevance. In the absence of an ACP-EU partnership, the EU would 
not  be  able  to  build  on  the  success  of  the  COP21  experience  and  would  not  be  able  to 
effectively  compete  with  existing  fora  to  which  ACP  countries  belong,  such  as  the  G-77. 
Importantly,  this  option  would  run  counter  the  preferences  of  the  ACP  Group,  which  has 
manifested  its  intention  to  form  strategic  alliances  with  the  EU  at  the  global  level  to  tackle 
global challenges and underlined that joint positions result in outcomes closer to the interest 
of  the  two  parties  when  done  through  an  established,  comprehensive,  and  legally-binding 
framework.  

Option 2.1  

This  option  will  build  upon  the  potential  provided  by  the  CPA.  Reformed  EU-ACP  joint 
institutions and the redefinition of new objectives will increase the likelihood of the ACP-EU 
partnership to effectively tackle a range of global challenges. In so doing, the expectation is 
that  of  a  higher  impact  vis-à-vis  the  baseline  scenario.  An  additional  important  element  to 
take  into  account  is  that  the  extension  of  the  partnership  to  the  non-ACP  members  of  the 
LDCs SIDS groups and to countries in North Africa would allow the EU to rely on additional 
diplomatic  clout  on  crucial  issues,  notably  global  trade  negotiations,  climate  change  and 
migration.  

Option 2.2 

This option, at best, would promote alliances only with countries that belong to the three ACP 
regions, and on a restricted number of region-specific challenges. Even such scenario may be 
too  optimistic,  as  suggested  by  difficulties  in  building  such  alliances  so  far,  under  existing 
regional settings. Moreover, it is unlikely that this option would allow building alliances with 
cross-cutting group of countries, such as LDCs or SIDS, in future crucial global negotiations 
on trade and climate change. Overall, the reduced critical mass generated by distinct regional 
alliances undermines the potential impact of this option and therefore represents a step back 
from the baseline scenario.  

Option 2.3  

This option will encompass the advantages of a strengthened framework to more effectively 
addressing global challenges, as evidenced under option 2.1, together with an opportunity for 
more  focused  alliances  on  region-specific  challenges,  as  highlighted  under  option  2.2.  The 
considerations  on  the  benefits  accrued  by  the  extension  of  the  ACP-EU  partnership  to  the 
non-ACP members of the LDCs and SIDS groups (as well as countries in North Africa) made 
for option 2.1 apply also to this scenario. 

47 

 
5.4 Economic impacts 

Trade cooperation 

The main objectives of EU-ACP trade cooperation have, traditionally, been that of integrating 
the  ACP  in  the  world  economy,  promoting  sustainable  development  and  contributing  to 
poverty eradication. For this reason, it is expected to generate different types of impacts. The 
primary  impact  is  economic:  EU-ACP  trade  cooperation  is  expected  to  bring  substantial 
benefits  to  European  firms,  including  small  and  medium  enterprises  (SMEs),  based  on 
implementation  of  EPAs  and  increased  access  to  growing  ACP  markets.  Trade  cooperation 
has also significant social and political impacts. As highlighted in 2030 Agenda, it can be a 
crucial vehicle for achieving sustainable development. Economic growth and job creation are 
also expected to contribute to reduced migration flows. Importantly, the ACP as a group has 
played an active role in the Doha Development Agenda negotiations and therefore can be a 
strategic  partner  in  building  global  alliances.  Finally,  trade  cooperation  has  been  linked  to 
values  through  the  provisions  on  essential  elements,  good  governance  and  sustainable 
development. 

The  CPA  has  facilitated  increased  trade  flows  between  the  parties  as  well  as  the  ACP 
countries' increasing WTO membership and the group's increasing role in international trade 
negotiations.  After  the  expiry  of  the  non-reciprocal  preference  regime  in  2007,  EPAs  have 
been  concluded  in  all  the  three  regions  to  serve  as  the  main  platform  for  EU-ACP  trade 
cooperation  with  those  ACP  countries  that  have  opted  for  this  instrument.  At  this  stage, 
though, evidence on the actual impact of EPAs remains limited, as their implementation is too 
recent to have relevant data and their effects will be felt gradually in the long term.  

The  current  organisation  of  the  dialogue  is  however  not  optimal.  The  ACP-EU  dialogue  on 
trade may be seen as too much focussed on ACP interest, and not enough on EU interests, and 
some  provisions  can  be considered  to  reflect  an obsolete  model  of  trade  policy.  In  fact,  the 
dialogue  has  mostly  focussed  on  trade  in  goods  and  on  tariffs,  as  well  as  certain  non-tariff 
measures,  whereas  modern  trade  is  organised  around  value  chains,  the  digital  economy, 
services,  trade-related  issues  and  investment.  There  is  thus  scope  for  improvement,  and  the 
current framework offers the necessary space for an update without calling into question the 
core principles and the institutional architecture of the ACP-EU partnership. For example, the 
links  with  core  EU  values  and  sustainable  development  (including 
labour  rights, 
environmental standards, and anti-corruption measures) should be strengthened. 

Option 1 

This  option  would  have  major  shortcomings,  linked  respectively  to  loss  of  a  framework 
agreement within which the EPAs  are implemented, the loss of the holistic approach of the 
CPA and the reduced scope for trade cooperation with ACP countries at the global level.  

Firstly,  EPAs  are  fully-fledged  international  agreements  and  the  disappearance  of  the  CPA 
would not, as such, affect their validity. However, the absence of a framework agreement at 
all-ACP level would involve a number of considerable drawbacks, including risks related to 

48 

 
interpretation and possible renegotiation of EPAs. EPAs are based on the objectives and the 
essential  and  fundamental  elements  of  the  CPA  laid  down  in  Articles  1,  2  and  9.  The  CPA 
also  contains  tools  and  mechanisms  to  address  and  implement  such  elements,  including 
political dialogue (Article 8), as well as the appropriate measures that can be adopted in cases 
of  breaches  of  the  essential  elements  (Article  96)  or  in  serious  cases  of  corruption  (Article 
97). The reference to these elements in the various EPAs implies that they can be part of the 
implementation and dialogue between the parties, and, as the last resort, an EPA could even 
be suspended in case of non-respect. Nevertheless, to ensure legal certainty and maintain the 
provisions on political dialogue and enforcement measures, the EPA texts would have to be 
revised,  and  this  could  involve  potentially  cumbersome  renegotiation  and  a  risk  of 
inconsistencies  between  regions.  An  alternative  possibility  would  be  that  of  negotiating 
separate framework agreements with all EPA partners, which would imply excessive political, 
institutional and administrative burdens and complications.  

Secondly,  ACP-EU  trade  relations  under  the  CPA  have  been  based  on  a  holistic  approach 
including the political, economic and development dimensions and their inter-linkages. This 
has notably allowed addressing trade (e.g. market access, trade in services) and trade-related 
areas (e.g. sustainable development) within political dialogues with ACP countries, including 
with  those  that  have  not  (yet)  concluded  an  EPA.  Should  the  existing  CPA  framework  be 
abandoned,  many  ACP  countries  would  fall  under  the  EU's  Generalised  Scheme  of 
Preferences,  where  applicable  (i.e.  below  Upper  Middle  Income  countries),  which  does  not 
have  similar  provisions  to  the  CPA  in  terms  of  dialogue  and  appropriate  measures.  The 
inclusion  of  these  mechanisms  in  various  unilateral  and  bilateral  trade  cooperation 
instruments  would  involve  the  risk  of  in  silo  approaches,  which  would  be  a  drawback  as 
compared  to  the  unique  multi-dimensional  nature  of  the  CPA.  Moreover,  EPAs  have  a 
significant  development  dimension,  requiring  mobilisation  of  substantial  Aid-for-Trade 
resources.  While  development  cooperation  could  in  principle  be  provided  under  any 
instrument outside a framework agreement comparable to the CPA, the existence of an ACP-
EU  partnership  has  so  far  facilitated  the  channelling  of  funding  for  the  preparation  and 
implementation  of  EPAs.  Dismantlement  of  this  partnership  could  involve  a  risk  of 
uncertainty concerning the magnitude of such funding. 

Thirdly, in the absence of a formalised partnership, there would no longer be any institutional 
vehicle to address trade issues at all-ACP level, as the joint ACP-EU institutions including the 
Joint Ministerial Trade Committee (JMTC) would be dismantled. Trade dialogue with  ACP 
partners  would  be  conducted  at  best  in  the  context  of  each  EPA  and  possibly  other 
frameworks  such  as  the  JAES  with  Africa,  without  any  all-ACP  institutional  channel  to 
exchange  views,  consult  on  horizontal  issues  and  cross-fertilise  between  different  EPAs. 
Moreover, the parties would be deprived of access to an inclusive dialogue that allows them 
to  address trade  issues,  such  as  WTO issues,  non-tariff barriers and trade capacity building, 
simultaneously with all ACP countries.  

49 

 
Option 2.1  

This  option  would  have  the  considerable  advantage  of  preserving  a  number  of  important 
elements of the CPA. First of all, it would keep the link between the trade provisions of the 
partnership  and  its  essential  elements  (i.e.  human  rights,  democracy,  and  rule  of  law), 
fundamental element (i.e. good governance) and principles regarding trade-related areas (e.g. 
labour  rights  and  environment).  All  these  issues  could  be  continued  to  be  discussed  in  the 
ACP-EU  political  dialogue  and  appropriate  measures  (including  suspension  of  trade 
preferences) could be taken in case of breaches of the essential elements (Article 96 CPA) or 
in  serious  cases  of  corruption  (Article  97  CPA).  Furthermore,  the  institutions  for  trade 
dialogue would be maintained. All these provisions are the only means for a comprehensive 
dialogue on trade issues simultaneously with all ACP countries in one go, not only on EPAs 
and trade  capacity  building  but  also on non-tariff  barriers and  WTO issues.  They also offer 
the possibility of fostering mutual understanding and common interests between the ACP and 
the  EU  in  multilateral  fora,  including  at  the  WTO  where  ACP-EU  cooperation  has  recently 
been useful for instance in the context of the negotiation of the Trade Facilitation Agreement. 

Option 2.2  

This option entails the substitution of the legally-binding relationship between the EU and the 
ACP  Group  of  States  either  by  a  non-legally-binding  relationship,  or  no  interaction  at  all 
under  the  post-Cotonou  arrangement.  In  parallel,  the  interaction  between  the  EU  and  the 
regional level would be strengthened and become legally-binding – in addition to the legally-
binding  EPA  arrangements  which  are  already  in  place  with  some  RECs  or  EPA  regional 
configurations. In particular: (a) dialogue on trade would take place between the EU and the 
political regional entities, such as the African Union, Cariforum or Caricom, Pacific  Forum; 
(b)  dialogue  on  trade  would  take  place  with  the  Regional  Economic  Communities  or  EPA 
regional configurations. This option has some major shortcomings.  

First,  the  disappearance  of  a  legally  binding  framework  agreement  for  EPAs  would  involve 
the same issues as under option 1.   

Second,  breaking  down  the  current  all-ACP  level  would  deprive  the  parties  of  access  to  an 
inclusive dialogue that allows addressing trade issues simultaneously with all ACP countries. 
This  would  lead  to  fragmenting  this  dialogue  into  several  fora,  which  would  involve  the 
disadvantage of multiplying the political, institutional and administrative burden of managing 
such  a  dialogue.  In  the  current  framework,  EPA  institutions  already  deal,  or  will  deal,  with 
trade  issues  specifically  attached  to  each  EPA  regional  configuration  or  REC  anyway, 
according to the provisions of the EPAs. The relevant degree of regionalisation is thus already 
introduced  in  the  current  framework.  The  agendas  of  the  EPA  institutions  include  a  broad 
scope of issues, reflective of the various priorities of the EPAs. Moreover, trade cooperation 
issues  are  already  part  and  parcel  of  the  agendas  of  the  political  dialogues  with  RECs  or 
national  governments  even  where  no  EPA  is  applied.  The  added  value  of  strengthening  the 
dialogue on trade between the EU and RECs is therefore not obvious.  

50 

 
It is true, to an extent, that trade issues in Africa, which includes a high number of LDCs and 
land-locked countries, are different from those of the (mostly middle-income) islands of the 
Caribbean  and  the  Pacific  and  there  is  very  limited  intra-ACP  trade  between  Africa, 
Caribbean  and  Pacific. However,  current  agendas  at  ACP  level  do include  issues  which  are 
region-specific. The degree of coherence and specificity of the agendas in each region should 
also  not  be  overestimated  at  least  as  far  as  trade  is  concerned.  If  one  takes  Africa  as  an 
example,  there  is  limited  convergence  of  interests  between  North  Africa  and  Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Legally, North Africa is linked to the EU through specific trade arrangements, distinct 
from and potentially in contradiction with any legally-binding frame which would possibly be 
established  with  Africa/AU.  The  different  degrees  of  development  between  middle-income 
countries,  such  as  Nigeria  and  South  Africa,  and  LDCs  potentially  affect  negatively 
coherence. Finally, structural disagreements within Africa regarding trade policy and the links 
between  trade  and  industrialisation  are  also  a  strong  limitation  to  the  coherence  and 
consequently the relevance of Africa as a block in this policy area.  

Option 2.3  

This  option  has  the  double  advantage  of  preserving  the  positive  elements  of  the  CPA 
regarding the all-ACP level (as highlighted in Option 2.1), while introducing an interaction at 
regional level which would be better tuned to the specific interests of the various regions (as 
highlighted in Option 2.2).  

Regarding  the  all-ACP  level,  a  slimmed  down  legally-binding  cover  arrangement  would 
include the essential and fundamental elements, with the appropriate measures to implement 
and enforce them, as well as the related political and policy dialogue mechanisms, the main 
principles and objectives of the partnership, and certain elements on trade cooperation such as 
trade and sustainable development and development cooperation. Space will be also preserved 
for  policy  dialogue  with  the  ACP  Group  on  trade,  in  order  to  discuss  overall  WTO  matters 
and  possible  joint  approaches  in  other  international  governance  forums  on  trade  and 
development (e.g. G20, 2030 Agenda).  

Regarding a strengthened interaction at regional level, the option would allow to engage with 
a range of relevant regional and sub-regional cooperation formats beyond ACP countries, by 
building on existing dialogue at the different regional levels (e.g. AU and CELAC on relevant 
continental  issues,  REC/EPA  sub-regional  configurations  with  respect  to  trade,  etc.).  Such 
approach  will  therefore  support  a  greater  alignment  between  the  ACP-wide  agreement  and 
specific regional joint initiatives pursued by the EU in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific.  

Macroeconomic stability, private sector development and investment returns  

There  is  strong  consensus  on  the  strategic  role  that  the  private  sector  plays  in  generating 
sustainable  economic  growth  in  developing  countries  and  at  the  same  time  enhancing 
investment  returns  for  European  firms  and  citizens.  The  expansion  of  the  private  sector  in 
ACP  countries  is  widely  recognised  as  a  powerful  tool  not  only  for  job  creation  –  which  is 
vital  in  light  of  the  population  growth  –  but  also  because  it  plays  a crucial role in  the  fight 
against  poverty  and  for  progress  on  human  and  social  development,  particularly  for  the 

51 

 
economic  and  social  empowerment  of  the  poorest  and  most  vulnerable,  including  women, 
girls and youth. And through innovation and investment in low-carbon and resource-efficient 
solutions,  it  has  a  major  role  to  play  in  the  transformation  towards  an  inclusive  green 
economy  –  thus  generating  significant  environmental  impact.  Indirect  positive  impacts  on 
other areas such as migration, by creating new jobs in ACP countries, and peace and security, 
by potential reducing sources of inequality, could also be expected. 

The  EU  has  every  interest  in  making  sure  that  its  companies  benefit  from  growth  in  ACP 
countries and are able to access new markets. In this respect, some of the most advanced ACP 
economies  do  have  a  role  to  play  in  the  EU's  own  growth,  jobs  and  investment  agenda 
through  trade  and  investment  or  through  sector  cooperation.  The  holistic  approach  to  the 
private sector underpins the EU's strategy for its own development – the Europe 2020 strategy 
–  where  SMEs  and  investments  have  been  given  a  central  place  for  achieving  sustainable 
growth.  Similarly,  the  new  EU  trade  and  investment  strategy  ('Trade  for  All')  foresees  that 
investment and investment protection provisions will have to be integrated into broader trade 
agreements  (including  with  ACP  countries),  whereas  investment  agreements  have  so  far 
tended to be negotiated separately.  

The CPA has significantly contributed to macro-economic stability in ACP countries, being a 
precondition to sustainable growth, particularly through the budget support aid modality. By 
contrast,  the  benefits  of  mainstreaming  and  engaging  the  private  sector  as  a  strategic 
development  actor  in  all  the  sectors  (i.e.  sustainable  energy,  sustainable  agriculture  and 
agribusiness,  infrastructure,  green  sectors)  have  largely  been  overlooked.  While  the  CPA 
recognises  the  special  need  for  investment  and  private  sector  development  and  outlines 
concrete measures to achieve this (e.g. capacity building, partnerships, financing, information 
sharing),  the  implementation  of  this  part  of  the  agreement  has  been  mainly  government 
driven,  and  in  fact  constrained.  Importantly,  the  various  initiatives  and  mechanisms  agreed 
upon  over  the  years  had  little  effect  on  creating  a  favourable  environment  for  greater 
attraction  of  and  return  on  foreign  investments,  promoting  access  to  innovation  (i.e. 
knowledge and technologies) and supporting economic diversification across ACP countries. 
In addition, support to the group of ACP LDCs has been too often limited to aid mechanisms, 
with  very  low  opportunities  for  the  private  sector  to  contribute  to  development  strategies. 
Clearly, against the increased global competitiveness, the CPA needs a substantial update as 
to  capture  the  whole  potential  of  the  private  sector  for  both  ACP  countries  and  European 
firms and citizens.  

Option 1 

This  option  entails  that  the  EU  would  have  to  rely  solely  on  the  external  dimension  of  the 
Europe  2020  and  the  Trade  for  All  strategies,  which  however  do  not  contain  specific 
implementation  mechanisms.  Importantly,  should  the  partnership  with  ACP  countries  be 
discontinued, the EU would lose an important tool to engage with 79 states in the economic 
sphere. This would not only limit the promotion of EU existing economic interests, but would 
result  in  curbed  future  market  opportunities.  In  particular,  abolishing  the  partnership  would 
entail  losing  the  commitment  from  ACP  countries  on  a  number  of  general  principles  on 

52 

 
macro-economic stability and investment protection. In fact, these provisions would have to 
be renegotiated with individual countries, with a positive outcome not necessarily guaranteed 
for all cases. Ultimately, it would no longer be possible to organise ACP-EU policy dialogues 
on issues related to private sector development and macroeconomic stability and to implement 
commitments  taken  at  the  international  level  that  are  important  to  fostering  an  enabling 
environment for sustainable economic growth.  

This  option  would  also  go  against  the  preferences  of  ACP  countries,  which  have  indicated 
that  private  sector  development  and  macroeconomic  stability  are  key  issues  on  which  they 
want to work closely in cooperation with the EU. The absence of a partnership would lead to 
the loss of a number of mechanisms and instruments that were established to promote private 
sector development in ACP countries, which have worked as well as anticipated, but that still 
provide a solid base for future development54. In addition, the EU would no longer dispose of 
a framework to apply an integrated approach to sustainable economic growth, and would have 
to  rely  on  thematic  instruments  to  foster  economic  macro-stability  and  private  sector 
development. 

Option 2  

This  option  builds  on  the  positive  aspects  of  the  CPA,  most  notably  on  macro-economic 
stability and investment protection, but at the same recognises that the new partnership has to 
be  adapted  to  the  new  political  and  economic  reality  and  to  shift  accordingly  from  an  aid-
based approach to multi-stakeholder and multi-level relationship where the private sector has 
an  important  role  to  play  in  the  economic  sphere.  More  and  more  ACP  countries,  in  fact, 
perceive themselves as economic players on a global stage and seek economic partnerships, 
rather than aid-driven partnerships. Importantly, the presence of a partnership is expected to 
enhance  the  confidence  of  international  (and  of  course  European)  investors,  allow  for  a 
greater  focus  on  effective  means  to  attract  international  investments,  and  enable  greater 
returns,  

The  impact  of  this  option,  in  all  its  three  variations,  is  expected  to  be  stronger  than  the 
baseline, though some variations can still be noted. Specifically, Option 2.1 and Option 2.3 
are  expected  to  provide  better  ways  for  responding  to  global  challenges  (e.g.  financial 
stability,  taxation,  commodities).  Moreover,  they  would  enable  to  better  tackle  challenges 
faced by groups of countries cutting across the three regions, for example LDCs. Option 2.2 
and Option 2.3 would allow adopting approaches tailored to the specific needs and challenges 
of  different  regions,  engaging  more  closely  with  regional  economic  communities,  and 
potentially  fostering  regional  integration.  In  the  case  of  Option  2.2,  however,  the  re-
negotiation of general principles in this area could pose serious problems in that some of the 
existing regional frameworks and regional organisations would not necessarily be prepared to 
confirm existing commitments.  

54  At  the  intra-ACP  level,  various  support  instruments  have  been  put  in  place,  including  the  Global  Energy 
Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund (GEEREF), the ACP/EU Microfinance Programme, the Private Sector 
Enabling  Environment  Facility  (BizClim),  ACP  Investment  Facility  (IF)  and  PROINVEST,  an  EU-ACP 
partnership programme for the promotion of investment and technology) 

53 

 
                                                 
5.5 Environmental impacts 

Environmental protection and climate change 

Fostering  environmental  protection  and  addressing  challenges  related  to  climate  change  are 
strategic EU policy goals, with commitments agreed in several international fora including the 
relevant SDGs in the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement. These SDGs refer specifically to 
agriculture  and  fisheries,  land  degradation  and  desertification,  protection  of  terrestrial  and 
marine  ecosystems  and  the  services  they  provide,  sound  management  of  chemical  waste, 
resource  efficiency  and sustainable use  of  natural  resources.  SDG  objective  13  calls  to  take 
urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts. 

ACP  countries  are  home  to  a  large  share  of  the  world's  biodiversity,  which  is  severely 
affected  by  the  persistence  of  unsustainable  industrial  practices  and  illegal  activities. 
Although ACP countries are currently amongst the lowest greenhouse gas producers, trends 
for Sub Saharan Africa in the next 15 years are predicting a steep increase in energy demand. 
Many of the ACP countries are very vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. To address 
these challenges and vulnerabilities, the implementation of the Paris Agreement is essential. 

Addressing environmental challenges in ACP countries will have high returns for the EU and 
globally.  Large-scale  destruction  of  wildlife  and  ecosystems  is  primarily  an  irreversible 
environmental loss, which indirectly exposes ACP societies to  indirect economic and social 
threats. Ecosystems provide goods, and regulatory and support services which are crucial for 
human wellbeing and  economic development of ACP countries as  well as  indirectly for the 
entire planet. Importantly, a shift towards sustainable practices in local production will allow 
a range of indirect gains for the EU.  

Climate  change  is  an  area  where  mutual  interests  can  be  identified  amongst  EU,  African, 
Caribbean  and  Pacific  countries.  Direct  environmental  and  indirect  socio-economic  impacts 
of climate change policies are therefore relevant for both ACP and EU countries, although to 
different extents. Mitigation policies will also provide positive environmental, economic and 
social impacts for the EU and globally.  

The CPA has been instrumental in promoting adaptation measures based on joint agreements 
for  environmental  cross-cutting  issues  (Art.  32),  supported  through  EDF  operations  (e.g. 
Global  Climate  Change  Alliance).  Strategic  Environmental  Assessments  have  been 
increasingly  adopted  to  assess  the  environmental  impact  of  sectorial  policies  across  ACP 
countries, with interventions being judged significantly better than other EU actions in non-
ACP global regions.  

The CPA has also set the scene for a range of political and policy joint actions in supporting 
climate  change  adaptation  and  mitigation across  ACP  countries  and  globally.  Notably,  joint 
ACP-EU  actions  under  the  current  CPA  have  been  decisive  towards  the  conclusion  of  the 
Paris Agreement on climate change at the COP21 bridging the divide between developing and 
developed  countries  (195  countries  adopted  the  first-ever  universal,  legally-binding  global 
climate deal). The agreement has been considered as a major win for Europe, as well as for 

54 

 
the global community. The environmental, social and economic impact of this legally-binding 
agreement is potentially massive, but will depend on the degree of its implementation.  

This said, scale and duration of efforts under current CPA have been judged insufficient, as it 
could  so  far  not  reverse  persisting  environmental  degradation,  nor  address  root  causes  of 
negative environmental impacts on lands and oceans in the region.  

Option 1 

The option will build on programmes and mechanisms available at regional or thematic level, 
aimed at fostering environmental protection and fighting climate change (e.g. Climate Change 
Alliance or Biodiversity and Protected Area Management).  

A  first  limitation  of  this  option  emerges  with  respect  to  the  implementation  of  environment 
related  parts  of  2030  Agenda,  Paris Agreement  under  the  UNFCCC  and  external  aspects  of 
environmental EU policies. These in fact require coordinated actions with many interrelated 
policy areas, which will be more difficult to organise in the absence of an overall partnership. 
international 
Compared 
commitments will be respected and related activities implemented. 

therefore  fewer  guarantees 

the  baseline, 

there  are 

that 

to 

Importantly,  the  lack  of  a  common  platform  at  the  ACP  level  will  limit  the  potentials  for 
setting-up  formal  alliances  and  joint  ACP-EU  positions  at  the  global  level.  As  a  result, 
potentials of alliances for stronger commitments at the global level, in line with EU ambitions 
on these policy areas, will be certainly reduced. Ad-hoc mobilisation will still be possible, so 
to  build  on  existing  dialogues  at  the  regional  levels,  but  impacts  are  expected  to  be  limited 
when  compared  to  the  current  CPA  potentials  in  mobilising  a  stronger  critical  mass  in 
relevant international processes and at the UN level. 

Option 2.1 

The option will strengthen the efforts and ambitions of the current partnership. It will build on 
current  global  agreements  such  as  the  SDGs  and  Paris  Agreement,  by  providing  for  greater 
guarantee  of  respect  of  commitments  and  implementation  of  activities  towards  the  agreed 
international  goals,  while  seeking  to  go  beyond  them  in  some  areas.  Also,  dedicated 
procedures  to  allow  alliances  in  relevant  global  fora  (e.g.  UN,  FAO,  and  IMO)  will  be 
introduced,  building  on  the  results  obtained  under  the  current  CPA.  This  could  lead  to 
stronger  agreements  related  to  environmental  protection  or  climate  change  mitigation. 
Potential  further  engagement  with  all  LDCs  and  SIDSs,  including  non-ACP  countries,  will 
also  allow  supporting  climate  change  adaptation  across  most  vulnerable  countries  and 
forming  stronger  alliances  at  global levels.  Impacts  are therefore  expected  to  be  stronger  as 
compared to the baseline.  

Option 2.2  

The  option  will  promote  more  tailored  and  focussed  set  of  agreements  for  Africa,  the 
Caribbean and the Pacific. With respect to the current CPA single framework, it will allow to 
further  diversify  the  EU  intervention  across  the  three  regions,  and  strengthen  existing  sub-

55 

 
regional  operations  and  policy  dialogue  on  region-specific  needs,  challenges  and  potentials. 
More  tailored  mechanisms  for  Sub-Saharan  Africa  (SSA)  countries  are  expected  to  achieve 
greater  impacts.  This  option  would  allow  as  well  for  increased  cooperation  with  other  key 
actors,  but  this  would  have  to  be  organised  for  the  three  regions  separately.  In  this  regard, 
cooperation with  LDCs  and SIDs would be difficult in  light of the geographic spread of its 
members over the different regions. Furthermore, although  individual  regional alliances can 
be pursued, the critical mass mobilised could be in fact limited, if compared with joint ACP-
EU  statements.  There  is  very  limited  precedent  experience  of  joint  cooperation  in 
international fora with respective regions. 

Option 2.3  

The  option  will  strengthen  the  efforts  and  ambitions  of  the  current  partnership,  as  under 
option  2.1.  A  partnership  provides  for  greater  guarantee  of  respect  of  commitments  and 
implementation  of  activities  towards  the  agreed  international  goals.  Also,  dedicated 
procedures  to  allow  alliances  in  relevant  global  fora  (e.g.  UN,  FAO,  and  IMO)  will  be 
introduced,  building  on  the  results  obtained  under  the  current  CPA.  The  option  will  allow 
focusing  and  eventually  going  beyond  the  commitments  made  at  international  level.  It  will 
build on successful practices and processes in the creation of climate change alliances at the 
ACP-level (as in Option 2.1). At the same time, through regional partnerships, it will allow to 
increase impacts through more tailored support activities (similarly to Option 2.2), based on 
regional needs, priorities and political/societal willingness. The overall impact of this option 
is therefore expected to be stronger than the baseline, both at the global and regional levels. 

5.6 Budgetary and administrative impacts 

The decisions made on the future framework to organise the relationship between the EU and 
ACP countries will also have budgetary, administrative and institutional implications.  

As regards the budgetary aspects, the main financial instrument underpinning the CPA is the 
European  Development  Fund55,  which  is  an  extra-budgetary  fund  financed  by  direct 
contributions from EU Member States according to a contribution key and is covered by its 
own  financial  rules.  Appraising  the  EDF  is  not  within  the  scope  of  this  impact  assessment. 
The  future  of  the  EDF  will  be  tackled  in  the  context  of  the  next  multiannual  financial 
framework.  If  the  EDF  were  to  be  incorporated  into  the  EU  budget,  this  might  have 
consequences  for  the  ACP  EU  relations,  particularly  regarding  the  implementation  and 
financing of peace and security activities (as operators having military or defence implications 
cannot be financed by the EU budget56), and the principles of co-management.  

55 Created in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome and launched in 1959, the European Development Fund is the EU's 
main  instrument  for  providing  development  aid  to  ACP  countries  and  to  OCTs.  The  EDF  funds  cooperation 
activities in the fields of economic development, social and human development as well as regional cooperation 
and integration. 
56 Art 41 TEU. 

56 

 
                                                 
As regards administrative implications, the EDF is implemented jointly with the beneficiary 
countries  via  specific  co-management  mechanisms,  such  as 
the  National/Regional 
Authorising  Officer.  Financial  co-management  aims  at  promoting  the  principles  of  aid 
predictability,  ownership,  alignment,  transparency,  in  line  with  the  global  agenda  on  aid 
effectiveness. By moving beyond the donor-beneficiary relation, co-management of the EDF 
has  also  proven  important  for  the  planning  and programming,  monitoring  and  evaluation  of 
EU  cooperation  with  the  ACP  countries.  However,  its  effectiveness  has  been  hampered  in 
practice  by  a  number  of  shortcomings,  such  as  the  lack  of  capacity  of  NAO  systems, 
centralised  and  bureaucratic  procedures,  which  have 
flexibility  and 
responsiveness of aid. 

reduced 

the 

The  different  options  will  have  an  obvious  impact  on  the  joint  institutions  and  the  ACP 
secretariat.  This  is  not  cost-neutral,  and  the  various  options  bring  about  different  impact  on 
the  cost  of  institutional  functioning.  However,  the  main  financial  costs  of  a  partnership  are 
linked  to  the  implementation  of  activities  set  up  within  the  cooperation  framework(s),  and 
these will not be significantly impacted by the form of the future relations.  

The  CPA  joint  institutions57  are  currently  set-up  for  managing  the  partnership.  Under  the 
current  CPA,  EDF  allocations  earmarked  to  support  the  joint  institutions  accounted  for,  on 
average, EUR 1.5 million per year. The budget earmarked to support the ACP  secretariat is 
about EUR 8 million per year. The EP also has a small budget to finance participation in the 
Joint  Parliamentary  Assembly.  However,  the  effectiveness  and  efficiency  of  the  CPA 
institutions  in  practice  have  been  seriously  hampered  by  administrative  burdens,  formalism 
and slow decision-making mechanisms. 

Option 1 

Ending  the  partnership  would  imply  abolishing  the  joint  institutions,  and  thus  the  financial 
burden that these institutions entail. Without dedicated EU funding, the ACP secretariat will 
have to be fully self-financed by ACP countries, also resulting in a reduction of costs for the 
EU.  However,  in  order  to  achieve  the  objectives  put  forward  in  this  document,  alternative 
actions and frameworks will have to be set up which will induce costs which are difficult to 
predict. 

In  addition,  the  principle  of  financial  co-management  which  lies  at  the  heart  of  the  CPA 
would no longer apply to ACP countries. This would constitute the loss of an important tool 
for  mutual  engagement  in  the  field  of  development  cooperation.  Aid  provided  to  ACP 
countries  would  nonetheless  still  be  guided  by  the  principles  of  ownership  and  mutual 
accountability that currently apply to non-ACP developing countries under other EU external 
action instruments such as the DCI. 

Option 2.1  

57  ACP-EU  Council  of  Ministers,  ACP-EU  Joint  Parliamentary  Assembly,  ACP-EU  Committee  of 
Ambassadors 

57 

 
                                                 
The option foresees a single partnership agreement to be concluded between the EU and the 
ACP.  The  costs  related  to  the  joint  institutions  and  the  ACP  Secretariat  are  comparable  to 
those in the baseline scenario. The focus will be on improving the efficiency and effectiveness 
of  the  functioning  of  the  Joint  institutions.  Capacity  building  projects  set  up  to  enhance  the 
ACP Secretariat's role as well as that of NAOs/RAOs might induce supplementary costs, but 
would also  enhance  the effectiveness and efficiency of co-management  mechanisms. At the 
same  time,  co-management  is  expected  to  be  improved  through  simplified  administrative 
procedures and increased transparency. 

Option 2.2  

The option assumes  a  regionalised partnership, dissolving  the framework  at ACP level, and 
therefore eliminating the costs related to maintaining both the joint institutions and the ACP 
secretariat.  Existing  regional  institutional  frameworks  and  policies  will  be  used  to  organise 
the relation with the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries respectively. Given the lack of 
resources and capacities that several of these regional organisations suffer from, making these 
institutions  fit  for  purpose  will  induce  additional  costs.  Regional  strategies  are  not  as 
comprehensive as the CPA and related regional structures are characterised by an important 
'implementation'  gap,  following  lack  of  capacity  and  lack  of  inclusiveness  towards  the  civil 
society and the private sector, hampering the operationalisation and implementation of these 
strategies. Furthermore, regional structures largely depend on donor funding and there is no 
joint strategy with the Pacific. Transaction costs might increase as the EU will engage with a 
higher  number  of  organisations.  As  regards  co-management  mechanisms,  similar  types  of 
improvements  in  terms  of  capacity-development  and  administrative  simplification  could  be 
considered as in Option 2.1. 

Option 2.3  

The option entails a regionalisation of the EU-ACP relationship whereby the decision-making 
process will be strongly regionalised. As described for Option 2.2, working with and through 
existing regional structures will induce additional costs in order to make these institutions fit 
for purpose. While an institutional setting will remain necessary to manage the partnership at 
ACP  level,  it  will  have  to  reflect  the  limited  scope  of  the  overarching  framework.  It  has  to 
avoid duplication of management and implementation tasks carried out at regional level, and 
will  substantially  reduce  costs  at  ACP  level.  A  streamlining  exercise  on  the  basis  of  the 
subsidiarity principle should enable less or leaner structures and reduced number of meetings 
at ACP and regional level, avoiding duplication or overlap of different existing frameworks 
and  structures.  Costs  will  be  further  reduced  with  self-financing  of  the  ACP  secretariat  by 
ACP countries. The evaluation points to a number of deficiencies in the functioning due to the 
absence of clarity of processes, procedures and monitoring, which have to be addressed. As 
regards  co-management  mechanisms,  the  same  type  of  improvements  as  those  envisaged 
under Options 2.1 and 2.2 would apply.  

While no substantial difference can be made between the sub-options at this stage in terms of 
the management cost of the relations with the ACP countries, it will be important to identify 
the  most  appropriate  level  of  competences  (between  national,  regional,  continental  and  all-

58 

 
ACP),  that  will  allow  the  EU  to  reach  its  objectives.  On  this  basis,  the  institutional 
engagement and related financial cost should be decided. 

59 

 
 
6. Comparison of options  

6.1 Introduction 

This section seeks to link the specific objectives listed in Section 3 to the various impacts for 
each  domain  identified  in  Section  5.  In  doing  so,  the  merits  of  the  various  options  will  be 
established. Clearly, each of the five objectives is linked to more than one domain.  

The  comparison  is  conducted  following  the  criteria  of  effectiveness,  efficiency,  and 
coherence, by taking into account the various impacts discussed in Section 5:  

  Effectiveness  looks  at  the  extent  to  which  each  option  meets  the  five  objectives  that  the 

EU has set for its relations with ACP countries;  

  Efficiency gauges the extent to which each option is cost-effective;  

  Coherence  helps  ascertain  the  extent  to  which  each  option  is  consistent  with  the  EU's 
external action, whilst contributing to the promotion of policy coherence for development.  

In  the  following  section  an  assessment  of  all  identified  options  is  provided.  The  baseline  is 
firstly  described,  providing  a  reference  for  assessing  the  main  strengths  and  weaknesses  of 
each other option in achieving the identified objectives for the EU (Section 3). On the basis of 
such assessment, the options are then compared to identify the preferred one. 

6.2 Positive and negative effects of the policy options 

Baseline  

The  baseline  scenario  (representing  the  status  quo)  assumes  the  extension  of  the  Cotonou 
Partnership Agreement after its expiration in February 2020. The consultation process and the 
evaluation have shown that good progress has been made towards the main objectives of the 
CPA  but  have  also  pointed  to  a  number  of  weaknesses  with  regard  to  the  respect  of  the 
efficiency and effectiveness of some provisions and mechanisms and the  coherence between 
various  overlapping  policy  frameworks,  problems  which  would  worsen  if  not  properly 
addressed.  Furthermore,  major  changes  have  occurred  over  the  past  15  years  in  the  overall 
global  context  and  the  interests  and  ambitions  of  both  the  EU  and  ACP  countries  have 
evolved.  

It is therefore become evident that, when projected into the future after its expiration in 2020, 
the  existing  CPA  would  not  be  effective  in  integrating  the  new  development  agenda  built 
around the new Sustainable Development Goals, responding to the EU growing concerns over 
stability  and  prosperity,  dealing  with  deepened  regional  dynamics  and  the  increased 
heterogeneity  of  ACP  countries,  enhancing  the  EU's  ability  to  tackle  global  challenges  and 
forging  strategic  alliances  in  the  international  arena,  and  facilitating  a  more  inclusive 
involvement of all stakeholders in policy and political processes. In sum, an extension of the 
status quo would result in limited effectiveness, efficiency, and coherence. 

60 

 
Option 1 

The option relies on existing policies, and by doing so strengthens the recognition of regional 
needs and the established regional frameworks. Under this option, the EU will have to adopt 
specific actions to promote sustainable and inclusive development and enhance its prospects 
for  increased  security,  stability  and  prosperity.  Moreover,  without  a  partnership  the  EU's 
ability to promote democracy and human rights in such a large number of third countries will 
be negatively affected, not least because of the lost commitment to the principles and essential 
elements  agreed  upon  under  the  CPA  and  the  lack  of  structured  and  effective  political 
dialogue. In the absence of the CPA ambitious framework with respect to the involvement of 
key stakeholders, the effectiveness of this option in fostering participatory collective actions 
will  also  be  negatively  affected.  Through  this  option,  the  EU  would  send  a  strong  negative 
political signal which would be particularly detrimental in the context of an increasing multi-
polar  world  and  emerging  powers  with  different  sets  of  priorities  and  reduced  interest  in 
norms and values. 

There  may  be  some  opportunities  to  create  ad-hoc  alliances  to  address  specific  global 
challenges, but the EU would have to rely on the willingness of its counterparts to join forces 
in  international  contexts.  This  would  happen  in  a  framework  of  competing  existing 
international alliances and against the likely prospects of ACP countries seeking to enter into 
new  partnerships  with  emerging  powers.  In  this  broader  context  the  EU  would  have 
difficulties to form effective strategic alliances that could include a group of 79 countries at 
once.  

Another  important  drawback  is  that,  from  a  trade  perspective,  the  absence  of  a  framework 
agreement  at  all-ACP  level  might  entail  a  substantive  revision  of  the  EPAs,  which  would 
result in  new cumbersome and difficult renegotiation  processes, bearing significant political 
risks for the EU. The fact that the EU will have to rely on a diverse set of thematic approaches 
and  less  comprehensive  regional  partnerships  will  negatively  affect  the  degree  of  efficiency 
(turning  strategies  into  concrete  activities)  as  well  as  coherence  of  its  action  (both  EU 
coherence and policy coherence for development).  

Although  the  absence  of  a  formalised  partnership  would  remove  current  procedures  and 
institutions,  including  their  inefficiencies  as  highlighted  in  the  CPA  evaluation,  it  will 
represent a serious impediment to the generation of comprehensive and coherent approaches 
towards ACP countries, thus limiting the scope for the actual implementation of the security-
development  nexus  and  migration-development  nexus.  The  option  would  also  increase  the 
risks  of  relying  on  unstructured  procedures  and  process  for  policy  dialogue,  therefore 
hindering the potentials for promoting effective and reliable policy relations amongst the EU 
and  ACP  countries.  Importantly,  the  perspective  of  not  having  a  partnership  will  meet  the 
opposition  of  the  ACP  countries,  which  on  various  occasions  have  reaffirmed  their 
determination to stay united as a group and to deepen and enhance their relationship with the 
EU.  

61 

 
This  option therefore  offers  limited improvements  in  terms  of  effectiveness,  with  respect  to 
the baseline, as it allows meeting only some of the objectives identified in Section 3 and has a 
mixed performance in terms of efficiency and coherence.  

Option 2.1 

In terms of effectiveness, the EU will be able to promote its economic and political interests 
by  introducing  a  set  of  specific  measures  and  mechanisms  in  the  areas  of  democratic 
governance,  security,  migration,  private  sector  development  and investment,  climate  change 
and, more generally, sustainable and inclusive development with the view to contributing to 
the successful implementation of 2030 Agenda.  

In  doing  so,  this  option  promotes  a  holistic  approach  to  the  EU's  relations  with  the  ACP 
countries  (i.e.  better  policy  coherence  for  development)  and  creates  the  conditions  to  forge 
strategic  alliances  in  various  international  contexts  (i.e.  greater  global  impact),  which 
ultimately  contribute  to  enhanced  EU  coherence.  Importantly,  the  outreach  of  the  EU-ACP 
partnership to the group of LDCs and SIDS that does not already belong to the ACP would 
add diplomatic capital to the EU in international contexts. 

This  option  preserves  the  positive  legacy  of  the  CPA  (i.e.  commitment  to  agreed  principles 
and values; comprehensive approach; structured political dialogue; inclusion of stakeholders), 
but  at  the  same  time  addresses  the  weaknesses  highlighted  by  the  evaluation  and  the 
consultation  process.  More  specifically,  it  strengthens  political  dialogue,  makes  significant 
adjustments  to  the  system  of  co-management  and  the  joint  institutions,  thus  enhancing 
efficiency.  One  of  the  main  characterising  features  of  the  CPA,  that  is  ensuring  the  full 
participation of key stakeholders in the development process, is not only maintained but also 
reinforced. 

Importantly, this option preserves the overall elements which are needed to conduct the EU's 
trade  policy  vis-à-vis  the  ACP  countries  as  well  as  a  component  of  cooperation  with 
continental and  regional  organisations,  and  also  offers  the  flexibility  to  improve  and  update 
existing instruments, for example in relation to trade-related norms. 

As  regards  efficiency  and  coherence,  some  crucial  concerns  remain  unresolved,  specifically 
with  regard  to  the  overall  suitability  of  the  institutional  design  when  compared  with 
competing policy frameworks, which over the years have become significantly prominent in 
the relations between EU and ACP countries/regions. In fact, the increased heterogeneity in 
interests  and  needs  of  the  three  ACP  regions  is  not  adequately  taken  into  account  by  this 
option. 

With respect to the baseline, this option assures the achievement of most of the objectives set 
in Section 3, but with a mixed performance in terms of efficiency and coherence. 

Option 2.2 

This option has the merit of customising EU external relations according to the specific needs 
and priorities of the different regions – thus enhanced effectiveness. 

62 

 
By  facilitating  engagement  with  homogenous  geographical  continental  and  regional 
groupings,  it  contributes  to  enhancing  coherence  in  the  EU's  external  action.  More 
specifically,  it  is  likely  to  reinforce  relations  with  Africa  and  the  Caribbean  –  assuming 
however  that the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and the Joint Caribbean-EU Partnership  Strategy 
are strengthened – but will not have the same effects for the Pacific, for which no such joint 
comprehensive partnership exists.  Moreover, the stronger involvement of countries in North 
Africa  enables  the  EU  and  the  ACP  to  maximise  results  in  several  areas,  particularly  in 
strengthening  links  between  peace  and  security  and  sustainable  development,  fighting 
terrorism and promoting better managed migration flows. Nevertheless, some problems may 
likely  remain  at  the  implementation  level,  owing  to  the  limited  capacity  of  the  existing 
continental  and  regional  organisations  in  the  three  regions  –  hence  the  risk  of  reduced 
efficiency.  

A major challenge for this option would be that of dismantling the EU's relationship with the 
ACP  group  as  a  whole  (and  making  it  more  difficult  to  reach  out  to  the  group  of  non-ACP 
LDCs and SIDS), which is expected to substantially hamper the pursuit of common EU and 
ACP interests at the global level – thus reduced effectiveness. 

Furthermore, an agreement confirming the current strong commitment of both parties to the 
principles  and  the  essential  elements  contained  in  the  CPA  would  be  more  difficult  to 
conclude.  Even  more  uncertain  is  the  prospect  of  achieving  legally-binding  agreements, 
considering that negotiations would have to start from scratch, unlike in option 2.1 and option 
2.3.  

Finally, this option could entail a revision of the EPA texts – owing the absence of a chapeau 
as  foreseen  by  the  current  CPA  in  which  some  general  provisions  for  trade  cooperation  are 
outlined – bearing economic and political risks for the EU. 

With  respect  to  the  baseline,  this  option  enables  the  overall  achievement  of  most  of  the 
objectives set in Section 3 and assures a great coherence, but with mixed results in terms of 
efficiency. 

Option 2.3 

The  option  has  the  merits  of  acting  at  two  levels.  By  fostering  the  regional  components,  it 
facilitates  the  promotion  of  EU  tailored  actions  in  the  three  ACP  regions  with  a  view  to 
effectively  meeting  all  the  new  economic  and  political  objectives.  By  strengthening  the 
common framework, it creates the ideal condition for building strategic alliances with a group 
of 79 ACP countries (and potentially more with the strategic outreach to countries in North 
Africa  and  the  non-ACP  members  of  the  group  of  LDCs  and  SIDS),  hence  maximising  the 
impact of the EU in the international arena. The option therefore brings together the potentials 
of previous options 2.1 and 2.2, while addressing their drawbacks 

Like option 2.1, it preserves the positive aspects of the CPA as highlighted by the evaluation, 
most notably the commitment to the promotion of human rights and democratic governance 
(through  a  strengthened  political  dialogue)  and  the  inclusion  of  key  stakeholders  in  the 

63 

 
development process; maintains the general provisions that underpin trade cooperation (thus 
avoiding  lengthy  and  potentially  risky  re-negotiations  of  EPA  texts);  makes  significant 
adjustments to the system of co-management and the joint institutions. All these measure will 
enhance efficiency.  

Like option 2.1, it provides the EU with added diplomatic capital for a more strategic pursuit 
of its interest (and those of the ACP group) in the international arena, as well as for the actual 
promotion of a number of values and norms. Moreover, it makes it easier to implicate other 
countries (i.e. LDCs, SIDS) in addressing global challenges, particularly climate change and 
other aspects of the 2030 Agenda.  

Like  option  2.2,  it  allows  for  constructively  building  on  existing  policy  frameworks  for  the 
relations  between  the  EU  and  the  various  ACP  regions  which  over  the  years  have  become 
gradually more prominent, most notably the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and to enable tailored 
actions  to  the  specific  needs  and  priorities  of  different  regions  –  thus  contributing  to 
enhancing  efficiency  and  coherence.  Moreover,  the  strategic  outreach  to  countries  in  North 
Africa  enables  the  EU  (and  the  ACP)  to  maximise  results  in  several  areas,  particularly  in 
strengthening  links  between  peace  and  security  and  sustainable  development,  fighting 
terrorism and promoting better managed migration flows. 

The option, with respect to the baseline, simultaneously contributes to enhanced effectiveness, 
coherence, and efficiency.  

Overall comparison of the assessed options  

Based on the assessment described so far, the various options are compared so to identify the 
extent to  which each of those are more or  less effective, efficient  and coherent  to reach the 
objectives, when compared to the baseline.  

A  scoring  system  (+  –)  is  used  to  determine  the  preferred  option  vis-à-vis  the  baseline 
scenario  (see  Table  6.5).  Scores  are  derived  from  a  thorough  reflection  on  the  analysis 
conducted in Section 5, whereby each option has been assessed in detail across the different 
types  of  impacts  that  it  has  in  meeting  the  five  objectives.  Each  option  can  present  both  an 
advantage and disadvantage vis-à-vis the baseline scenario, hence the possible presence of + 
and – for certain criteria. Details for this assessment are provided in Annex 4. 

On  the  basis  of  this  comparison,  the  preferred  option  is  identified  and  further  discussed  in 
Section 6.3.  

64 

 
Table 6.1: Comparison of options with respect to the criteria of effectiveness, efficiency and 
coherence  

Option 
1 

Option 
2.1 

Option 
2.2 

Option 
2.3 

Effectiveness 

Fostered sustainable development 

Enhanced EU security and economic prosperity 
Encompassed regional dynamics within and beyond 
ACP borders 

Increased action on global challenges (International 
alliances) 

Strengthened inclusive participation of stakeholders 
at various levels 

Efficiency 

Enhanced institutional fitness  
Achieved optimisation of procedures and processes 

Coherence 

Increased coherence with overarching EU priorities 
Improved policy coherence for development 

+ – 

+ – 
++ 

– 

– 

+ – 

+ – 

+ 
+ – 

6.3 Identification of the preferred option 

+ 

+ 
= 

+ 

+ 

+ – 

+ 

+ – 
+ 

++ 

++ – 
++ 

– 

+ 

+ – 

+ 

+ 
+ 

++ 

++ 
++ 

+ 

+ 

++ – 

+ 

++ 
+ 

From  the  above  comparative  table, it  emerges  that  the  preferred  option  for  the  EU  is  that  a 
new  partnership  between  the  EU  and  the  ACP  countries,  in  the  form  of  an  overarching 
agreement  including  a  'roof'  listing  common  values,  principles  and  interests  and  identifying 
general  principles  and  avenues  for  cooperation  in  the  international  arena,  and  three 
partnerships setting region-specific priorities and actions to implement respectively in Africa, 
the Caribbean and the Pacific.  

This  new  format  facilitates,  on  the  one  hand,  the  promotion  of  series  of  norms  and  values 
across all ACP countries and EU-ACP cooperation in the international arena (also thanks to 
the reach out to countries in North Africa and to non-ACP countries belonging to the groups 
of  LDCs  and  SIDS);  on  the  other  hand,  by  taking  into  account  deepened  regionalisation 
dynamics  and  the  increased  heterogeneity  of  ACP  countries,  it  allows  taking  actions  at  the 
most  appropriate  level,  within  Africa,  the  Caribbean  and  the  Pacific.  The  regional 
partnerships  will  set  priorities  and  actions  for  the  respective  regions  and  integrate  existing 
regional strategies. 

This option enables the preservation of all the valuable elements of the current CPA but most 
importantly put the right conditions in place for the EU to meet its new objectives, including 
that of more effectively pursing its political and economic interests, increasing its impact in 

65 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the global arena, and enhancing the prospects of implementing 2030 Agenda (thus enhanced 
effectiveness).  Moreover,  it  significantly  enhances  efficiency  and  coherence  by  making 
substantial adjustments to the system of co-management and joint institutions, strengthening 
political dialogue, and facilitating synergetic interactions between different EU policies.  

6.4 Specific feature of the preferred option – legal format 

As  part  of  the  preferred  option  selected,  one  important issue  that  will have  to  be dealt  with 
concerns the legal form of the agreement, and as such its main advantages and disadvantages 
are further discussed. 

The current Cotonou Partnership Agreement is legally-binding. Some stakeholders argue that 
this  does  not  bring  much  advantage  and  should  be  avoided  in  the  future  as  it  comes  with 
lengthy  procedures  to  change,  reducing  flexibility  and  efficiency.  It  is  stated  that  legally-
binding measures are not strictly necessary when defining basic principles as well as political 
dialogues, as positive experiences with non-ACP countries have proven. Also, legally-binding 
agreements do not necessarily guarantee that all signatories will adhere to the obligations. As 
emerging  from  the  CPA  evaluation,  some  provisions  have  not  been  fully  implemented  in 
partner  countries,  notwithstanding  their  legally-binding  nature  often  due  to  lack  of  political 
will  (e.g.  Article  13  on  migration).  Governments  which  had  no  interest  in  pursuing  formal 
Article 8 political dialogues, for example, have not been persuaded by the existence of a legal 
provision  in  this  sense.  Finally,  with  respect  to  more  stringent  binding  commitments  to  be 
agreed  in  the  future,  difficult  discussions  are  also  anticipated  around  a  number  of  specific 
issues (e.g. ICC, CPA Article 96 procedure). 

Legally-binding  agreements,  nonetheless,  have  also  a  number  of  features  which  enable 
effective cooperation and lead to results. The evaluation of the Cotonou agreement, the public 
consultation and the consultation of EU delegations, for example, highlight the fact that the 
legally-binding nature of the CPA has been instrumental to its implementation in a number of 
countries.  They  have  amongst  others  provided  for  an  advanced,  long-term,  stable  and 
comprehensive  reference  for  political  dialogue,  cooperation  and  trade.  It  has  given  the 
essential  space  to  dialogue  on  human  rights  or  migration.  Additionally,  they  allow  for 
consultations on 'essential elements' such as human rights, democracy and rule of law, also in 
case  of  violations  against  these  essential  elements.  Moreover,  a  legally-binding  framework 
enables  financing  projects  in  these  essential  elements  areas,  where  they  would  fail  to  be 
accepted by some authorities. 

The legal basis is particularly important in relation to commitments made by the parties in the 
area  of  human  rights,  democracy,  good  governance  and  the  rule  of  law.  These  solid 
commitments,  captured in  the legally-binding  nature  of  the agreement, would  be  lost,  if the 
legal  nature  of  the  partnership  would  be  abandoned.  This  would  give  the  impression  that 
pursuing these principles is no longer a priority for the EU in its relation with ACP countries, 
and in EU external policies in general. It would damage the EU's reputation as a normative 
actor,  especially  when  taking  into  account  the  many  challenges  the  ACP  countries  face  in 
these areas, and the deteriorating situation in terms  of political space for non-state actors in 

66 

 
some countries.  Also in light of the changing international scene with emerging  powers  not 
sharing  these  principles  on  human  rights,  democracy,  good governance and  the  rule  of  law, 
abolishing the legally-binding nature would give the wrong political message.  

A  legally-binding  agreement  would  be  in  line  with  the  EU's  ambition  to  help  advancing  a 
rules based world,  built on democracy,  the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality 
and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international 
law. Taking these ambitions into account, a legally-binding agreement presents a number of 
advantages  vis-à-vis  political  declarations.  The  EU  has  signed  many  legally-binding 
agreements with other countries, for example, in the area of trade (open-ended) and climate 
change  (Paris  Agreement).  However,  broader  legally-binding  political  agreements  are  less 
common.  

For  the  trade  related  aspects  of  the  ACP-EU  relation,  the  absence  of  a  legally-binding 
framework  agreement  at  ACP  level  would  generate  substantial  drawbacks.  To  ensure  legal 
certainty, to maintain the political dialogue mechanisms and, moreover, the possibility to use 
appropriate enforcement measures under the Economic Partnership Agreements, the texts of 
the agreements might need to be revised, since they contain references to the CPA. This might 
entail  renegotiating  the  EPAs,  which  would  not  only  be  a  cumbersome  process,  but  also 
generate political and reputational risks for the EU.  

A  legally-binding  agreement  also  clearly  indicates  in  which  areas  and  to  what  extent 
signatories are willing to work together, enhancing predictability and clarity. While ratifying a 
legally-binding agreement can be more cumbersome than agreeing on a political declaration, 
the ratification process is more democratic, increases involvement from national stakeholders 
and  improves  accountability.  Also,  legally-binding  agreements  can  include  a  range  of 
provisions that enable parties to make adjustments in a timely manner when desirable.  

While  it  is  not  guaranteed  that  all  parties  will  deliver  on  all  commitments  made,  signing  a 
legally-binding  agreement  is  foreseen  as  a  firm  expression  of  political  will  to  carry  out  the 
agreement  and  invest  in  ACP-EU  relations.  Abolishing  the  legally-binding  nature,  instead, 
would be an indication that parties are less committed.  

Regardless  the  range  of  possible  challenges,  therefore,  it  is  believed  that  a  legally-binding 
framework  is  instrumental  to  the  achievement  of  all  EU  specific  objectives.  The 
implementation of joint commitments is more likely to be achieved when the political will is 
reinforced with legal commitments.  

Obtaining such an agreement is considered realistic, when negotiating a new framework with 
the  group  of  ACP  countries,  due  to  the  longstanding  relation  through  which  trust  and 
consensus around a number of essential elements and values has been built. A legally-binding 
agreement is therefore the preferred specific feature for the policy option to be negotiated by 
the  EU  with  ACP  countries,  while  foreseeing  mechanisms  that  allow  the  agreement  to  be 
adapted timely to changing times, particularly for the regional partnerships.  

67 

 
6.5 Operational objectives 

In  order  to  effectively  support  the  achievement  of  the  specific  objectives  envisaged  for  the 
new ACP-EU partnership, a range of operational objectives are reported here in respect to the 
specific objective, to be pursued through the policy option identified in this report.  

Table 6.2: Relation between specific and operational objectives 

Transversal to 
all objectives 
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Specific objectives 

I. Foster sustainable 
development in ACP 
countries 

II. Enhance EU security 
and economic 
prosperity 

Operational objectives 

With reference to the specific objectives 

-  Reinforce  trade  cooperation,  private  investment 
and  technological  cooperation  as  vehicles  of 
development 

-  Reinforce and broaden political dialogue 
-  Strengthen links between peace and security and 

- 

sustainable and inclusive development 
Improve  tools  and  dialogue  for  environmental 
protection  and  sustainability  and  for  climate 
change mitigation and adaptation policies 

-  Strengthen  cooperation  to  respond  to  security 

threats in the European Union 

-  Promote better managed migration flows 
-  Promote  EU  commercial  interests  and  market 

opportunities, increase investment 

III. Encompass regional 
dynamics 

- 

Identify  and 
strategies 

implement 

specific 

regional 

-  Promote  effective  and  efficient  rules  based 

multilateralism 

IV. Ensure stronger 
alliances to address 
global challenges  

-  Promote  and  establish  strategic  and  effective 
alliances with third/ACP countries on key global 
issues 
-  Reduce 

on 
commitments taken in various international fora 
-  Engage with emerging donors on new areas for 
existing 

implementation 

strengthen 

and 

gap 

the 

cooperation 
commitments 

V. Strengthen inclusive 
participation of 
stakeholders at various 
levels 

-  Promote  an  enabling  environment 

for  a 
strengthened  role  of  non-state  actors  (including 
civil society and private sector), local authorities 
and parliaments 

-  Establish  stronger  mechanisms  for  engagement 

with regional organisations 

68 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Monitoring and evaluation 

A  well  performing  monitoring  and  evaluation  system  will  increase  accountability  and 
transparency  and  demonstrate  the  extent  to  which  the  EU  is  effectively  and  efficiently 
achieving  the  expected  objectives  and  goals  of  the  partnership  with  ACP  countries.  In 
addition to providing an updated scoreboard of the realisation of the EU external action, these 
measurements will help establishing benchmarks and designing future priorities to consider. 
Monitoring and evaluation of the specific objectives will have to take various forms since the 
objectives  belong  to  various  policy  areas  and  they  are  not  all  equally  quantifiable. 
Nonetheless,  by  allowing  regular  joint  reviews  they  will  provide  a  system  for  identifying 
areas  of  the  partnership  that  need  to  be  adapted  or  strengthened.  Furthermore,  they  will 
provide  relevant 
thereby 
into 
strengthening the framework for ensuring effectiveness of EU funding for external action. 

internal  management  decisions, 

information 

to  feed 

Importantly, the framework for cooperation should avoid the creation of additional technical 
burdens for partners involved in its implementation. The proposed monitoring and evaluation 
system  will  therefore  build  on  the  relevant  existing  EU  monitoring  and  evaluation  systems 
that cover the respective policy areas under consideration (e.g. trade and investment, climate 
action, migration, etc.).  

  The  2030  Agenda  follow-up  and  review  mechanisms,  and  resulting  global  indicators58, 
will  provide  the  foundation  for  monitoring  the  implementation  of  the  future  ACP-EU 
partnership. It will present a coherent framework and a baseline through which to assess 
results and  impacts  of a range of objectives set-up for the partnership across  Africa, the 
Caribbean and the Pacific. This is expected to be particularly relevant for Objective 1 of 
the  new  partnership.  This  will  be  further  supported  by  other  mechanisms,  such  as  the 
monitoring  frameworks59  under  the  Global  Partnership  for  Effective  Development 
Cooperation60  and 
the  EU  International  Cooperation  and  Development  Results 
Framework61.  External  expertise  to  evaluate  and  review  EU  projects  could  be  used  for 
specific initiatives requiring additional monitoring and evaluation62.  

  Advancements  towards  Specific  Objective  2  will  be  largely  based  on  EU  systems.  For 
example, indicators set-up to assess advancements in the area of migration reflected in the 
biennial report on the implementation of the GAMM will be used. 

58  The  Inter-Agency  and  Expert  Group  on  SDG  indicators  (IAEG-SDGs)  has  put  forward  a  proposal  of  229 
indicators,  to  be  reviewed  by  the  UN  Statistical  Commission  and  submitted  to  ECOSOC  and  the  General 
Assembly for adoption.  
59 Eurostat underlines its willingness to support statistical capacity building in partner countries to strengthen 
national governance. Stronger national statistical systems will also be needed to monitor and report against 2030 
Agenda. 
60 http://effectivecooperation.org/about/global-monitoring-framework/ 
61 https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/devcos-results-framework_en 
62 In addition to these, the TWI2050 global initiative is also considered as a possible source of data on progress 
across regions that can be provided for each SDG. 

69 

 
                                                 
  Ad-hoc  indicators  and  a  dedicated  monitoring  system  will  have  to  be  developed, 
particularly  when  it  comes  to  advancement  in  process  (for  operational  objectives)  and 
outcomes/impacts for Objectives 3 and 4. 

  Advancements towards Specific Objective 5 will be largely based on the EU International 
Cooperation  and  Development  Results  Framework  as  well  as  the  monitoring  of  the  EU 
Country  Roadmaps  for  Engagement  with  Civil  Society,  complemented  by  global  and 
regional indicators to assess progress on the enabling environment for participatory action, 
such as the worldwide governance indicators (WGI). 

A preliminary overview of possible indicators to be considered in the implementation of the 
new partnership is provided in Annex 5. The table gives an indication of available sources of 
data,  as  well  as  types  of  measures  to  be  developed  for  monitoring  and  evaluating  the 
advancements and consequent results of the partnership through time, including the relation 
between  Specific  Objectives  and  related  Areas  of  Impacts  to  which  the  new  partnership  is 
expected  to  contribute.  Monitoring  and  Evaluation  Reports  will  have  to  further  assess  the 
extent to which a new partnership has actually contributed to such impacts.  

The  analysis  at  this  stage  provides  an  overview  of  how  such  operations  would  have  to  be 
implemented,  as  required  by  the  EU  Better  Regulation  Guidelines.  This  will  have  to  be 
streamlined, after the negotiations, to the exact features and timelines of a future partnership. 

70 

 
List of annexes 

1.  Procedural information 
2.  Stakeholder consultation 
3.  Report on public consultation 
4.  Comparison of options  
5.  Monitoring and evaluation table of intervention 

71 

 
 
 
Annex 1 - Procedural information  

1. Identification 

Lead Services: DG DEVCO and EEAS 
Agenda planning/WP reference: 2015/DEVCO+/003. 

2. Organisation and timing  

The process that led to drafting this Impact Assessment has followed a number of steps.  

In October 2013, under the co-lead of DG DEVCO and the EEAS, an Inter-service steering 
group on ACP-EU relations post 2020 was established in order to involve all relevant services 
in  the  preparatory  process  for  a  Commission  proposal  with  draft  Council  negotiating 
directives. 

This  Inter-service  steering  group  was  composed  of  representatives  of  the  following 
Directorate  Generals:  AGRI,  BUDG,  CLIMA,  CNECT,  COMM,  COMP,  EAC,  ECFIN, 
ECHO, EMPL, ENER, ENV, EPSC, ESTAT, FISMA, FPI, GROW, HOME, HR, JRC, JUST, 
MOVE,  MARE,  NEAR,  OLAF,  REGIO,  RTD,  SANTE,  SG,  SJ,  TAXUD  and  TRADE,  as 
well as to EPSC and FPI.  

The Inter-service steering group met to discuss the Joint Consultation Paper, the Evaluation, 
as well as the Impact Assessment.  

the  RSB 

The  Impact  assessment  was  submitted  to  the  Regulatory  Scrutiny  Board  (RSB)  on  11  May 
2016.  The  Meeting  of 
the  received 
recommendations from the RSB the draft impact assessment was revised. This revised impact 
assessment was submitted again to the board which provided a positive opinion on the 4th of 
August  2016,  including  some  further  recommendations  which  have  been  addressed  in  the 
document.  

took  place  on  8  June.  Following 

Main changes included a clearer spelling out of the objective of the impact assessment itself 
and the introduction of the 'intervention logic' framework. The latter has been introduced as to 
clarify better the link between problems, objectives and options.  

The  characteristics  of  the  Cotonou  Partnership  Agreement  have  been  explained  in  the 
introduction. Furthermore, to strengthen the description of the problem section, the link with 
the major context changes and outcome of the CPA evaluation was strengthened. 

The  chapter  on  'why  the  EU  should  act'  has  been  further  developed  and  the  EU  Global 
Strategy  priorities  have  been  integrated.  Views  of  different  stakeholders  have  been  more 
clearly  spelled  out  throughout  the  text  as  well,  using  to  a  large  extent  the  outcome  of  the 

72 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
public consultation. The view of the ACP countries has been described better, with particular 
reference to the outcome of the recent ACP summit end of May 2016 in Papua New Guinea.    

As regards the options, both the baseline and the different options have been better described 
in the context after 2020 and the analysis of priority domains has been revised. These changes 
have  then  been  reflected  in  the  conclusions  (comparison  chapter  6),  which  have  been  fine-
tuned.    The  comparative  table  in  chapter  6  is  explained  more  in  detail  through  a 
supplementary annex. A number of  modalities to the preferred option have  been  introduced 
and their pros as well as cons are discussed. 

As regards the EDF, It is important to specify that the financing of the relations is not dealt 
with within the framework of this impact assessment. Reasons for this are the specific focus 
of the impact assessment on the way the relations should be best organised and the fact that 
the European Development Fund (EDF) instrument is part of the discussion on the new set of 
financial  instruments  for  external  action  due  in  2020  under  the  new  multiannual  financial 
framework  (MFF).  No  details  on  the  amount  and  functioning  of  financing  provisions  are 
therefore discussed. However, in a few cases reference is made to specific aspects related to 
the  EDF  (e.g.  its  role  in  relation  to  the  African  Peace  Facility,  or  costs  related  to  joint 
institutions) if deemed relevant with respect to the potential impact of the different options. 

3. Consultation and expertise 

An  important  aspect  of  the  Impact  Assessment  builds  upon  the  stocktaking  of  the  current 
partnership  agreement,  and  the  extent  to  which  it  remains  valid  for  the  future  and  offers  a 
platform to advance common interests. A thorough review of the assumptions on which the 
partnership is based, of its scope, instruments and ways of working was thus carried with the 
objective  of  providing  relevant  and  evidence-based  information  for  decision  making.  The 
evaluation Staff Working Document63 assessed the effectiveness of the current agreement.  
Analysis on specific topics was provided by external consultants, who also helped to analyse 
the outcome of the broad public consultation and the consultation of the Delegations. Further 
input  was  provided  by  EU  Member  States  and  some  major  non-governmental  organisations 
undertaking  similar  analyses.  Information  was  also  gathered  through  ongoing  discussions 
with  EU  Member  States  and  the  European  Parliament.  Stakeholders  were  also  consulted 
through a public consultation and a number of more targeted consultations (see Annex 2). 

63  SWD(2016)  260  http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/joint-staff-working-document-evaluation-cotonou-partnership-
agreement_en 

73 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Annex 2 – Stakeholder consultation 

The  stakeholder  consultation  has  been  a  major  undertaking  in  the  policy  preparation  for  a 
future  relationship  with  the  ACP  countries.  The  EU  has  elaborated  early  on  a  consultation 
strategy in order to collect input and views from a wide range of stakeholders, from EU and 
third  countries,  on  the  key  questions  pertaining  to  the  partnership  and  relations  after  2020. 
The  Commission’s  minimum  standards  for  public  consultation  have  been  met,  and  all 
interested parties have had the opportunity to contribute to this inclusive consultation process.  

The following targeted and open public consultation activities were carried out:  
  a targeted series of round tables64 in spring 2015 with a variety of stakeholders in different 
EU Member States to analyse and evaluate various aspects of the CPA and identify key 
issues and questions for the public consultation; 

  a  broad  public  consultation65,  on  the  basis  of  the  Joint  Consultation  Paper  entitled 
"Towards a new partnership between the European Union and the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific countries after 2020" (see Annex 3); 

  an  internal  survey  in  October  2015  in  order  to  capture  the  experience  and  views  of  the 
Commission's  staff  in  the  field  –  EU  Delegations  were  requested  to  consult  Member 
States'  embassies  and  capture  the  assessment  from  the  respective  national  authorities  on 
specific topics; 

  Dialogue with civil society representatives: Policy Forum on Development (14-16 March 

2016) and DEVCO Civil Society Event (16-17 March 2016); 

  High-level event back to back to the ACP-EU Joint Ministerial Committee in April 2016. 

Looking  at key  aspects  on  a  future  relationship,  the  main  findings  and key  messages  of  the 
public consultation are summarised below: 
  A  consensus  appears  on  the  need  to  adapt  the  content  of  the  new  partnership  to  global 
trends  and  tendencies,  including  climate  change,  migration  pressures,  economic 
development; 

  Respondents  largely  agree  that  the  2030  Agenda  for  Sustainable  Development  and  the 
SDGs should be a priority, particularly the focus on poverty eradication, inequalities, the 
universality principle, as well as democracy, human rights, and good governance; 

  Most respondents underline the need to pursue EU interests in the future relationship with 

ACP countries; 

  There is  a  large  majority in  favour of a stronger role of civil society  actors  and private 

sector, 

  The potential role of public-private partnerships using multi-stakeholder approaches has 

been emphasised as a useful instrument to encompass different objectives; 

64 European Commission (2015),  ACP - EU relations after 2020: Issues for the EU in consultation phase 1 Final 
Report, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/eprd-acp-eu-post-cotonou-final-report_en.pdf  
65 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/public-consultation-eu-acp-new-partnership_en  

74 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
  Participants  are  largely  in  favour  of  strengthening  the  partnership  with  other  actors, 

including emerging powers, philanthropy and regional organisations; 

  Stakeholders stressed the need to take into account the evolved regional partnerships that 
the  EU  is  forging  at  continental  (African  Union)  and  regional  (Regional  Economic 
Communities)  level.  However,  there  are  diverging  views  about  their  respective  roles, 
about  how  to  ensure  synergies  and  proper  coordination,  and  how  to  organise  the 
relationship with the ACP Group; 

  There is consensus that the geographical scope of a new partnership should remain very 
broad  as  to  allow  critical  mass  to  have  an  impact  on  global  issues,  and  build  alliances 
around coherent thematic groupings; 

  The majority of replies underline the fact that the legally binding nature of the agreement 

has been instrumental to its implementation; 

  Many  respondents  consider  that  the  framework  for  engagement  with  the  ACP  Group 

should be more focused and lighter. 

75 

 
 
 
Annex 3 - Report on public consultation 

EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
Directorate General for  
International Cooperation and Development 

EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE 

‘TOWARDS A NEW PARTNERSHIP  
BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE AFRICAN, 
CARIBBEAN AND PACIFIC COUNTRIES AFTER 2020’ 

– Summary report of the public consultation  

March 2016 

76 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table of contents 

Table of contents .................................................................................................................................. 77 

Acronyms ............................................................................................................................................. 79 

Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 80 

Main outcomes on key questions ........................................................................................................ 81 

Summary of contributions following the thematic structure of the JCP ....................................... 82 

I. 

Shared principles and common interests (the 'what') ................................................................ 82 

i)  Common global interests in a multipolar world (Q1-2) ........................................................ 82 

ii)  Human rights, democracy and rule of law, as well as good governance (Q3-4) ................... 82 

iii) Peace and security, fight against terrorism and organised crime (Q5-6) ............................... 83 

iv) Sustainable and inclusive economic growth (Q7-16) ............................................................ 83 

v)  Human and social development (Q17-18) ............................................................................. 85 

vi) Migration and mobility (Q19-20) .......................................................................................... 85 

II.  Towards a more effective partnership (the 'how') ..................................................................... 87 

i)  A stronger political relationship (Q21-23) ............................................................................ 87 

ii)  Coherence of geographical scope (Q24-26) .......................................................................... 87 

iii) Cooperation tailored more towards groups of countries with a similar development level 
(Q27-28) ...................................................................................................................................... 88 

iv) Strengthen the relationship with key actors (Q29-33) ........................................................... 88 

v)  Streamline the institutional set-up and functioning of the partnership (Q34-37) .................. 89 

vi) Better adapted and more flexible development cooperation tools and methods (Q38-43) ... 89 

Overview of received contributions by country and category ......................................................... 91 

77 

 
 
 
 
Disclaimer 

This report summarises the main views and suggestions expressed by the respondents to the 
various  questions  contained  in  the  joint  consultation  paper  'Towards  a  new  partnership 
between the European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries after 2020’ of 
6 October 2015 (JOIN(2015) 33 final). They can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the 
European Commission or the European External Action Service. 

78 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acronyms 

ACP 

CPA 

African, Caribbean and Pacific States 

Cotonou Partnership Agreement 

CDE 
Centre for the Development of Enterprise  
COP21  Conference of the Parties – 21st Conference 

CSO 

DCI 

Civil Society Organisation 

Development Cooperation Instrument 

DRM 

Domestic Resource Mobilisation  

EDF 

European Development Fund 

EEAS 

European External Action Service 

EIB 

EIF 

EPA 

EU 

European Investment Bank 

Enhanced Integrated Framework  

Economic Partnership Agreement 

European Union 

EUD 

EU Delegation 

FDI 

ICT 

IF 

JCP 

LDC 

Foreign Direct Investment 

Information and Communication Technologies 

Investment Facility OR Integrated Framework  

Joint Consultation Paper 

Least Developed Country 

MDG 

Millennium Development Goal 

NAO 

NSA 

ODA 

PCD 

PFM 

SDG 

SIDS 

National Authorising Officer 

Non-State Actor 

Official Development Assistance 

Policy Coherence for Development 

Public Financial Management 

Sustainable Development Goal 

Small Island Developing States 

SYSMIN  Instrument for cooperation in the Mining Sector 

TAIEX  Technical Assistance and Information Exchange 

79 

 
 
 
Introduction 

In  October  2015,  the  European  Commission  and  the  High  Representative  of  the  Union  for 
Foreign  Affairs  and  Security  Policy  launched  a  public  consultation  on  the  basis  of  a  Joint 
Consultation Paper (JCP) entitled "Towards a new partnership between the European Union 
and the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries after 2020"66.  

The purpose was to initiate the discussion on the key questions pertaining to the partnership 
and  relations  with  the  group  of  African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific  (ACP)  countries  after  2020. 
The outcomes of the public consultation are reviewed in this report and will contribute to the 
evaluation  of  the  current  Cotonou  Partnership  Agreement  (CPA)  and  to  the  setting  out  of 
policy proposals for a future relationship. 

The  consultation  ran  for  twelve  weeks  from  6  October  to  31  December  2015.  The 
questionnaire  was  composed  of  43  questions  dealing  with  both  backward-looking  and 
forward-looking aspects, and covering multiple issues regarding the content, scope and tools 
of the EU-ACP partnership.  

Respondents  were  invited  to  answer  the  questions  using  an  online  form.  Not  all  questions 
were answered by all respondents and the provided replies generally offered opinions rather 
than evidence-based analysis.  

A total of 103 contributions  were received from a wide range of stakeholders from  EU and 
ACP  countries.  Most  submissions  were  received  from  public  authorities,  followed  by  civil 
society  organisations,  associations  and  think  tanks  and  a  limited  number  from  the  private 
sector. 

Although a wide range of stakeholders have contributed to the consultation, no robust trend 
could  be  drawn  from  the  analysis  regarding  commonalities  and/or  divergences  based  on 
categories of stakeholder. Identified key messages are generally wide-ranging and common to 
several  groups  of  stakeholders,  regardless  of  their  category  or  geographical  origin.  A  major 
problem  highlighted  is  the  difficulty  to  attribute  progress  or  lack  thereof  specifically  to  the 
CPA framework or to EU policy as a whole. 

Main findings and key messages are summarised below.  

66 JOIN(2015) 33 final. 

80 

 
 
                                                 
Main outcomes on key questions 

On  the  past  performance  of  the  CPA,  respondents  see  generally  a  positive  contribution  to 
human and social development, including poverty reduction, but opinions seem divided on the 
contribution  towards  sustainable  and  inclusive  economic  development.  Work  on  peace  and 
security as well as trade was positively evaluated, although the latter to a lesser extent than 
expected. In some other areas, respondents have mostly a critical opinion of the effectiveness 
of  the  CPA,  especially  with  regard  to  private  sector  development  and  Foreign  Direct 
Investment  (FDI),  migration,  the  democratic  governance  related  mechanisms  and  the 
generation of EU-ACP alliances on global challenges.  

Looking forward, respondents largely agree on EU interests to be pursued in the future in our 
relations  with  ACP  countries.  The  main  priority  put  forward  is  the  implementation  of  the 
Sustainable  Development  Goals  (SDGs).  A  number  of  key  concerns  are  identified  under 
global  challenges,  notably  climate  change,  poverty  reduction,  inequalities,  migration  and 
peace and security. Private sector development, improved business environment and business 
promotion  are  seen  as  priorities  in  the  framework  of  sustainable  and  inclusive  economic 
growth. 

Looking at key aspects on how a future relationship should be organized, the main trends are 
as follows: 

-  The  majority  of  replies  underline  the  fact  that  the  legally  binding  nature  of  the 
agreement has been instrumental to its implementation. 
-  A  consensus  appears  about  the  need  to  take  into  account  the  evolved  regional 
partnerships  at  continental  (African  Union)  and  regional  (Regional  Economic 
Communities)  level.  However,  there  are  diverging  views  about  their  respective  roles, 
about  how  to  ensure  synergies  and  proper  coordination,  and  how  to  organise  the 
relationship with the ACP Group. Nevertheless, on the latter, many respondents consider 
that the framework for engagement with the Group should be more focused and lighter. 
- 
e.g. COP21. 
-  There is a very large majority in favour of a stronger role of civil society actors and 
private sector.  

 The  general  view  is  that  the  CPA  can  be  adapted  to  deliver  on  global  public  goods 

81 

 
 
 
 
Summary of contributions following the thematic structure of 
the JCP 

I. 

Shared principles and common interests (the 'what') 

i) 

Common global interests in a multipolar world (Q1-2) 

According  to  a  majority  of  respondents,  the  CPA  has  been  less  effective  in  tackling  global 
challenges  than  expected.  There  are  two  main  reasons  cited:  first,  the  Partnership  was  not 
designed to deal with  global challenges  as such, limiting its capacity to  deal with  collective 
problems  that  interest  all  ACP  countries  (e.g.  climate  change,  migration);  second,  ACP 
countries,  at  times,  have  chosen  to  cooperate  with  other  groupings,  for  instance  the  G77, 
which may have been perceived as better articulating their interests. 
Nevertheless,  it is the general  view that  the CPA could be effectively  adapted to  deliver  on 
key  global  public  goods,  as  it  has  already  proven  useful  to  place  key  issues  on  the  global 
development agenda. For instance, the coalition of ‘High Ambition’ at COP21 in Paris, which 
was  built  as  a  result  of  the  EU's  special  partnership  with  the  ACP  Group  of  States,  is  an 
example that could be replicated in the future. 
Respondents have identified a number of global challenges where the future partnership could 
add  value.  More  specifically,  emphasis  was  put  on  the  ‘SDG  package’,  but  also  on  climate 
change,  poverty  reduction,  peace  and  security,  fight  against  international  terrorism,  private 
sector development, energy security, natural disasters, equitable trade practices, urbanisation 
(though some of these issues are not necessarily global challenges). 
Greater  coordination  between  the  EU  and  the  ACP  at  the  international  level,  as  well  as  the 
need to promote Policy Coherence for (Sustainable) Development were largely emphasised as 
needed in order to achieve better results when addressing global challenges.  

ii) 

Human  rights,  democracy  and  rule  of  law,  as  well  as  good  governance 
(Q3-4) 

Respondents  have  been  generally  critical  on  the  extent  to  which  the  CPA  mechanisms  (i.e. 
political  dialogue,  financial  support,  appropriate  measures,  suspension  of  development 
cooperation) have contributed to  improving human rights, democracy,  rule of law and good 
governance, including the fight against corruption. Political dialogue as foreseen in Article 8 
of the CPA is seen as too EU-driven, technical and formalistic.  

Nevertheless,  the  need  to  preserve  and  strengthen  political  dialogue  in  the  future  was 
underlined  by  many  respondents  who  acknowledged  that  political  dialogue  has  allowed 
raising the profile of certain human rights and controversial issues in the development agenda.  

A majority of respondents consider that the involvement of key stakeholders has been useful 
but not sufficient to promote human rights and democratic governance, and that more should 
be  done  to  further  encourage  their  participation.  Many  respondents  point  to  the  shrinking 
space  for  Non  State  Actors  (NSAs)  in  several  ACP  States  because  of  restrictive  legislation 

82 

 
 
 
adopted during the past decade reducing their degree of autonomy and freedom. In particular, 
the EU should continue to support Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and local authorities 
with additional capacity-building and financial resources and actively seek their participation 
in political and economic processes, especially at the local level.  

iii) 

Peace and security, fight against terrorism and organised crime (Q5-6) 

The  provisions  on  peace  and  security  are  considered  in  general  as  appropriate  and  useful, 
most notably in relation to Africa, with the recommendation to improve and strengthen them 
further.  It  is  also  underlined  that  regional  organisations  have  gradually  become  more 
prominent in this domain, with the result that the added value of the ACP Group is somewhat 
limited  in  this  regard.  Therefore,  in  order  to  ensure  an  effective  approach  to  peace  and 
security  issues,  the  emerging  consensus  is  that  greater  integration  of  national,  regional  or 
continental level approaches should be sought.  

The  majority  of  respondents  indicate  that  the  future  partnership  should  provide  for  more 
effective  joint  action  on  conflict  prevention,  peace-building  and  state-building  activities,  as 
well as on tackling transnational security challenges. The future partnership framework could 
allow for a comprehensive approach to peace and security, provided there is sufficient joint 
planning  and  coordination  so  that  the  existing  duplications  and  gaps  between  transnational, 
regional, national and thematic support by the EU and its Member States are avoided.  

A smaller number of respondents believe that the future EU ACP partnership should not be 
(further)  involved  in  the  above-mentioned  areas.  In  their  view,  continental,  regional  and 
national levels are more relevant to deal with these specific issues. Moreover, the EU should 
try  to  engage  with  other  partners  at  the  global  level  –  in  particular  the  UN  –  and  seek  to 
cooperate  with  international  powers  like  the  USA,  Russia,  China  and  India,  wherever 
possible. 

iv) 

Sustainable and inclusive economic growth (Q7-16) 

The  opinions  on  the  overall  record  of  the  CPA  in  promoting  sustainable  and  inclusive 
economic  development  are  divided,  not  least  because  of  the  problems  related  to  attributing 
results. Some have argued that the CPA has significantly contributed to poverty reduction and 
economic growth, ensuring country ownership and achieving inclusiveness by addressing the 
needs of the most vulnerable people. Others have taken a more critical stance, arguing that the 
EU has pursued an economic development model based on international trade and extractive 
industries, which has largely failed to reach all segments of the population in ACP countries. 
It is further argued by some that similar successes/failures could have been achieved through 
other agreements, rather than necessarily though the CPA. 
Looking forward, there is general consensus that the adoption of the SDGs has provided an 
important framework for international cooperation and that any future partnership should be 
adapted  to  ensure  the  effective  implementation  of  the  2030  agenda  in  the  various  ACP 
countries.  In  line  with  this,  it  would  be  necessary  to  tackle  inequality,  support  greater trade 
and  investment  opportunities,  focus  more  on  private  sector  development,  provide  better 

83 

 
 
 
evidence-based PCD analyses, pay additional attention to cross-cutting issues, ensure greater 
collaboration  and  inter-institutional  dialogue  between  the  EU  and  ACP,  and  increase 
ownership  of  local/regional  governments  and  CSOs  and  grass-roots  organisations  with  the 
aim of ‘localising’ the SDGs.  
The contribution of the partnership's trade preferences to the integration of ACP countries in 
the world economy and to its development goals is generally considered positive, albeit less 
than expected. Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), the Everything But Arms initiative 
and the trade related assistance to Least Developed Countries (LDCs) have been instrumental 
for  improving  ACP  countries'  position  in  world  trade  (notably  EU-ACP).  However, 
integration  into  the  world  economy  is  uneven  and  the  impact  on  poverty  reduction  is 
questioned.  
EPAs  are  a  subject  where  no  general  consensus  seems  to  emerge.  They  have  undoubtedly 
contributed  to  investors  and  traders’  confidence  in  ACP  economies  and  the  EU  should 
increase  its  ambitions  during  trade  negotiations  with  ACP  States  to  achieve  the  maximum 
reciprocal  liberalisation.  However,  it  is  questioned  if  the  trade  preferences  have  been  in  the 
ACP’s  interest  in  the  longer  run.  Moreover,  some  respondents  go  on  to  say  that  EPAs  and 
most  importantly  the  EU’s  policy  in  the  World  Trade  Organisation  (WTO)  have  gravely 
damaged agricultural production and food security in the ACP countries. 
Most  contributors  see  the  need  for  further  specific  provisions  on  trade  cooperation  in  the 
future. There is a need for some substantial additions and revisions. A number of suggestions 
are made, such as: the enhancement of infrastructure, trade facilitation issues, mechanisms for 
industrial  development  and  capacity  building  of  ACP  countries,  increased  opportunities  for 
liberalisation of services and investment as well as trade-related areas such as regulations and 
competition, especially for countries that have not signed EPAs yet. 
Looking at more sector-focussed elements, there are mixed views on the record of the CPA in 
supporting macroeconomic and financial stability. The starting point is that the effectiveness 
depends to a large extent on specific contexts and therefore it is difficult to establish a clear 
link between the CPA measures and the improvements observed in the country.  
Most  contributions  consider  that  the  mobilisation  of  the  private  sector  and  the  attraction  of 
FDI are areas where the Partnership has not been effective. Their view is that economic trends 
in the world economy and other economic and political factors such as the improved business 
enabling environment, better trading environment and more effective economic infrastructure 
in the ACP countries are behind any improvement. A small group of respondents offer a more 
positive  assessment.  The  perception  is  that,  overall,  the  CPA  has  positively  contributed  to 
improving the investment climate. 
Respondents  also  consider  that  the  potential  of  the  EU  and  ACP  private  sectors  could  be 
better  harnessed  by  further  improving  the  business  enabling  environment  (particularly  for 
micro-,  small-  and  medium-sized  enterprises),  the  trading  and  investment  climate  through 
effective investment promotion and protection agreements and legal frameworks that respect 
basic  environmental  and  social  rights.  Official  Development  Assistance  (ODA)  is  seen  as  a 
catalyst for mobilising a wide range of resources. However, Domestic Resource Mobilisation 
(DRM) is still considered as the main resource for development. 
The  general  view  is  that  advantages  of  the  digital  economy  have  not  yet  been  fully  reaped. 
The  digital  economy  can  potentially  contribute  significantly  to  the  expansion  of  the  private 

84 

 
sector and the economic development of ACP countries, notably through enabling access to 
international  markets,  the  transfer  of  technology  and  business  networking.  One  should  not 
only focus on the economic benefits of Information and Communication technologies (ICT), 
but also seek to capitalise on their social and political impacts. 
For  some,  the  CPA  has  been  effective  in  contributing  towards  an  increase  in  agricultural 
development and trade, particularly through the European Development Fund (EDF). This has 
led  to  increased  crop  productivity  and  access  to  water  for  low-income  rural  populations, 
agricultural  research  and  extension  services,  and  engagement  with  low-income  rural 
populations.  In  contrast,  a  smaller  group  believes  that  the  CPA  has  not  contributed,  stating 
that  it  has  not  encouraged  effective  diversification  nor  has  it  resulted  in  increased  levels  of 
exports.  

v) 

Human and social development (Q17-18) 

A  large  majority  of  respondents  state  that  the  CPA  has  contributed  to  making  substantial 
progress  on  human  development,  including  poverty  reduction,  gender  equality  and 
empowerment  of  women,  yet  some  important  challenges  remain.  Many  underline  that  the 
strong  poverty  focus  of  the  CPA,  through  the  EDF,  has  been  well  targeted  to  achieving 
MDGs,  particularly  poverty  eradication  and  gender  equality.  An  important  consideration  is 
that impacts are not easily attributable to the CPA due to lack of aggregated evidence. 
The starting point is that of harmonising the future agreement with the 2030 Agenda as much 
as  possible  to  be  able  to  deliver  on  these  top  priority  objectives  in  the  most  efficient  and 
effective way possible. In terms of specific goals, the top five priorities raised by respondents 
include: education (SDG 4) and health (SDG 3); decent employment, especially for the youth 
(SDG  8);  poverty  reduction-inequality  nexus  (SDG  10);  environmental  sustainability  and 
climate change (SDG 13); gender equality and the empowerment of women, girls and youth 
(SDG 5). 

vi)  Migration and mobility (Q19-20) 

There is a general negative assessment of the effectiveness of the CPA’s contribution to the 
area of migration. The lack of consistency between the EU and ACP agendas is cited as one 
of  the  main  obstacles  in  this  regard.  Africa  is  often  quoted  as  a  showcase  where  countries 
focus  on  development  aspects  (e.g.  remittances,  brain-gain),  while  the  EU  is  much  more 
interested in readmission, control measures and the security aspects of migration. The narrow 
focus  of  Article  13  CPA  on  legal  residents,  migrants  legally  employed  in  EU  and  ACP 
countries, returns and readmission of nationals illegally present on the territories of EU and 
ACP  countries,  is  considered  one  of  the  main  causes  of  its  limited  contribution  to  the 
discussion on migration issues. 
The  majority  of  responses  suggest  that  the  main  objectives  with  regard  to  migration  in  a 
future partnership framework should focus on the respect of migrants' human rights and the 
promotion of fair, safe and responsible migration, the fight against human trafficking, abuse 
and  discrimination  as  well  as  tackling  the  root  causes  (notably  armed  conflict  and  climate 
change) of forced migration, circular and South-South migration. In this regard, the inclusion 
of  La  Valletta  Summit’s  political  agreement  and  the  associated  Action  Plan  of  November 

85 

 
2015  is  considered  fundamental.  Some  question  whether  the  ACP-level  is  actually the  right 
one to address migration issues. For them, in fact, regions are better suited, particularly since 
some countries of origin and transit are not included in the ACP Group. 

86 

 
 
 
II. 

Towards a more effective partnership (the 'how') 

i) 

A stronger political relationship (Q21-23) 

Political  dialogue  is  widely  recognised  as  one  of  the  main  elements  of  the  CPA,  and  is 
generally perceived as a useful tool as it allows a regular exchange with partner countries on 
topics  of  common  interest.  However,  there  is  no  consensus  on  its  effectiveness.  It  is 
considered  most  effective  at  national  level,  although  its  quality  varies  from  one  country  to 
another. Political dialogue at regional level is seen as complementary and necessary, but has 
been  limited  due  to  resource  constraints  and  lack  of  institutional  capacities  of  regional 
organisations.  At  the  ACP  level,  existing  structures  could  be  better  used  to  forge  common 
positions in international organisations and negotiations – as was the case at COP21. 

Many respondents point out that political dialogue remains underused, limited notably by its 
often  rigid  and  formalised  nature,  as  well  as  the  lack  of  transparency  and  insufficient 
involvement  of  other  key  stakeholders  such  as  civil  society  and  local  authorities.  Most 
respondents  agree  that  the  scope  of  political  dialogue  should  be  broadened  to  be  as 
comprehensive as possible. A greater involvement of key stakeholders is deemed necessary, 
as  well  as  a  stronger  involvement  of  EU  Member  States  (MS)  in  view  of  strengthening 
synergies to provide for more leverage. However, it is underlined as well that EU MS are not 
a homogeneous group and some want to keep their own engagement with partner countries.  

A majority of respondents consider that the legally binding nature of the agreement has been 
instrumental  to  its  implementation  (e.g.  political  dialogue),  and  some  call  for  strengthening 
this dimension. This being said, others point to the fact that certain legal provisions have not 
been fully implemented and argue that reciprocity and a consensus on basic principles as well 
as  political  dialogues,  do  not  necessarily  have  to  be  conducted  within  the  framework  of  a 
legally binding agreement. 

ii) 

Coherence of geographical scope (Q24-26) 

A  number  of  respondents  stress  that  certain  key  values  and  principles  should  always  be 
central to any future partnership and that it should be integrated within the broader external 
objectives of the EU. While there are some in favour of one agreement for all ACP countries, 
many state that the future partnership should adapt to the increasingly sub-regional approach 
that  the  EU  has  been  following  to  address  foreign  policy,  security,  trade  and  development 
concerns in the ACP regions. Nevertheless, it should be noted that regional frameworks may 
still be fragile and criticised for lacking means of implementation. One option could be that of 
maintaining  a  revised  and  slimmed-down  EU-ACP  agreement  as  an  umbrella  agreement, 
complemented  with  individual  and  more  substantial  agreements  at  the  regional  level.  Some 
propose to  split  the  current  partnership  into  three  more  specific  geographical  groupings  and 
no longer consider the ACP Group as one. 
As regards opening the EU-ACP partnership to other countries, many share the view that this 
could be useful, particularly towards developing and neighbouring countries that face similar 
challenges (e.g. LDCs, Small Islands and Development States (SIDS)). On the other hand, a 

87 

 
 
different  view  is  that  opening  to  other  countries  would  further  dilute  the  importance  of  the 
EU-ACP  partnership,  potentially  making  common  ground  harder  to  find  and  reducing  the 
capacity  for  effective  collective  action.  Overall,  a  consensus  seems  to  emerge  that  the 
geographical  scope should remain  very broad to allow a critical mass to  have  an  impact  on 
global issues, and build alliances around coherent thematic groupings. 
Looking at building more structured relationships with other regions beyond the ACP Group, 
a  large  majority  of  respondents  agree  that  there  is  scope  and  opportunity  for  including 
emerging  partners  in  Asia  and  Latin  America.  Many  respondents  underline  that  such  a 
structured  relationship  would  be  particularly  necessary  with  Africa  (treated  “as  one”  and 
therefore integrating North Africa), and that deepening the political partnership with Africa is 
a key priority. 

iii) 

Cooperation  tailored  more  towards  groups  of  countries  with  a  similar 
development level (Q27-28) 

The  current  system  of  aid  allocation  is  mostly  considered  to  strike  a  good  balance  between 
prioritisation  of  needs  and  greater  aid  effectiveness.  Still,  for  some  it  is  not  adequate  for 
targeting  countries  most  in  need,  it  is  too  technocratic  and  can  even  be  counterproductive. 
Those with this view consider that need, capacity and performance are rarely aligned and the 
neediest countries tend also to have the least capacity and the poorest performance. 

As  for  the  future  partnership,  the  general  view  is  that  the  allocation  of  resources  should 
continue to prioritise countries most in need, notably LDCs and fragile states, in line with the 
2030  Agenda.  At  the  same  time,  some  respondents  suggest  that  resource  allocation  should 
take  into  consideration  in-country  inequalities  and  various  types  of  vulnerability.  In  fact, 
differentiation does not necessarily mean graduation.  

Many state that partnerships should go beyond only aid, traditional donor-recipient dynamics, 
and beyond one-size-fits-all approaches. It is suggested to explore tools, including innovative 
forms  of  assistance  such  as:  blending;  knowledge  and  experience  sharing;  twinning  and 
initiatives.  Several 
Technical  Assistance  and 
respondents  underline  that  ODA  should  mainly  act,  if  not  exclusively,  as  a  catalyst  for 
domestic resources and FDI mobilisation. 

Information  Exchange 

(TAIEX)-like 

iv) 

Strengthen the relationship with key actors (Q29-33) 

The CPA is acknowledged as quite unique in its recognition of the role of NSAs. However, 
most respondents have mixed views on the effectiveness of the current model of stakeholder 
engagement and note a strong discrepancy between the principles enshrined in the agreement 
and how the partnership is implemented in practice. CSOs mainly underline that mechanisms 
for  ensuring  full  participation  of  civil  society  in  the  partnership  have  been  developed,  but 
have  to  date  functioned  on  an  ad  hoc  basis.  Various  respondents  also  point  to  a  low 
involvement of the private sector. 
A large consensus emerges on the need for stronger and broader engagement from all types of 
stakeholders. The need for an enabling environment was largely cited as essential to promote 
efficient  and  effective  stakeholder  engagement.  Many  responses  underline  the  need  to 

88 

 
establish legal frameworks and specific and sustainable consultative mechanisms at national 
and  regional  levels,  to  ensure  increased  participation.  Access  to  information  and  more 
transparency were stressed as well. 
A  number  of  respondents  suggest  that  the  promotion  of  triangular  and  South-South 
cooperation  should  be  done  in  the  framework  of  support  to  regional  organisations  and 
regional economic integration. For example, the EU could support ACP partner countries that 
have more potential or experience to support other countries in their region. Many agree that 
the  preferred  modalities  for  this  type  of  cooperation  are:  technical  assistance,  capacity 
building,  technology  transfer,  peer  learning,  sharing  of  experiences,  and  exchange  of  best 
practices. 

v) 

Streamline  the  institutional  set-up  and  functioning  of  the  partnership 
(Q34-37) 

A  large  majority  of  respondents  believes  that  the  joint  institutions  have  not  been  effective. 
They have functioned in a rather bureaucratic way, focusing mainly on financial and technical 
cooperation and side-lining the political substance of the partnership. The track record of the 
existing ACP-EU framework in dealing with common challenges is sobering and therefore the 
institutions should be substantially revised. A small group of responses take a more positive 
view  on  the  effectiveness  of  the  joint  institutions,  arguing  that  they  have  played  not  only  a 
symbolic role, but they have fostered constructive dialogue between partners. 
However, opinions are clearly divided when considering the added value of the joint ACP-EU 
institutions  as  compared  to  more  recent  regional  and  regional  economic  community 
frameworks  for  dialogue  and  cooperation.  One  group  considers  the  joint  institutions  of  key 
relevance  as  they  provide  for  genuine  dialogue,  strengthen  the  ACP-EU  positions  in  the 
global  arena  and  make  ACP  countries’  political  voice  stronger.  For  the  other  group,  the 
regional cooperation between the EU and ACP has largely been taken over by new regional 
and sub-regional organisations. In both cases, respondents show preference for changes in the 
current institutional arrangements to address common challenges and promote joint interests.  
Finally,  a  large  majority  of  respondents  is  in  favour  of  requesting  a  higher  degree  of  self-
financing by the ACP States, which would be in line as well with the ACP ambitions to be an 
autonomous player. However, contributions should be dependent on financial capacity. Few 
argue  that  this  is  not  relevant.  While  self-financing  is  important,  several  ACP  countries  are 
among the poorest in the world and face considerable resources challenges. 

vi) 

Better  adapted  and  more  flexible  development  cooperation  tools  and 
methods (Q38-43) 

Respondents are divided over the added value of having a dedicated financing instrument in 
support of the ACP-EU partnership. A slight majority considers there is added value, not only 
because it ensures predictable and reliable funding but mostly because the EDF is perhaps one 
of  the  most  tangible  and  significant  aspects  of  the  ACP-EU  relationship.  This  notion  is 
challenged  by  those  who  see  the  EDF  as  a  duplicate  of  the  Development  Cooperation 
Instrument  (DCI)  but  with  different  arrangements.  Many  responses  show  that  the  EDF 
‘budgetisation’ is highly desirable.  

89 

 
The  assessment  of  the  current  system  of  co-management  generates  another  divide  among 
respondents.  Some  consider  it  promotes  the  principles  of  ownership  and  partnership,  the 
alignment to government policies and the achievement of results. Others do not believe there 
is any added value, as the National Authorising Officer (NAO) system has developed into an 
obstacle  because  it  is  isolated  from  decision-making  centres  and  adds  more  layers  of 
bureaucracy, which can reduce the flexibility and responsiveness of aid. 
There is a general agreement about the contribution of the current programming process to the 
ownership of development processes by the ACP countries. It is essential that this principle be 
reinforced. In parallel, respondents underline that the ACP Group must take full ownership of 
its institutions, including their finances. Respondents also recognise the potential of EU joint 
programming  to  improve  the  quality  of  EU  development  cooperation  by  enhancing 
transparency,  accountability  and  coordination  within  EU  Member  States,  although  more 
progress  should  be  made  in  joint  modalities  for  delivering  aid,  delegated  cooperation,  or 
monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.  
The variety of existing tools to support the EU and ACP common principles and interests is 
considered broad although gaps still remain (e.g. twinning and TAIEX could be added). The 
effectiveness of budget support generates agreement among respondents. It should remain the 
key implementation modality of any future financing instrument but with a higher degree of 
flexibility  during  implementation.  Most  respondents  agree  with  the  need  to  request  co-
financing  from  countries  that  have  reached  a  certain  level  of  development.  Sustaining  the 
ACP structure with only EU resources is incompatible with the ambitions of the ACP to be an 
autonomous player and it greatly reduces the legitimacy, credibility and effectiveness of the 
ACP Group.  
Finally, respondents identify areas where the expertise of the EU and its Member States can 
be  better  mobilised,  particularly  in  the  middle-income  countries:  exchange  of  experiences 
(e.g.  through  twinning  and  peer-to-peer  partnerships);  technical  assistance  and  transfer  of 
knowledge (e.g. for sustainable agriculture or the preservation and sustainable management of 
natural resources); non-ODA cooperation and private sector development (e.g. increased role 
of  diasporas  or  triangular  cooperation  actions  with  other  ACP  countries);  and  institutional 
dialogue (e.g. network of information-sharing and strengthening of institutional dialogue).  

90 

 
 
 
Overview of received contributions by country and category  

Table 1. Geographic distribution of contributions 
Country of origin 
EU 

Number of responses 

Austria 
Belgium 
Czech Republic 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Hungary 
Italy 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
The Netherlands 
Poland 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 

Non EU 
Benin 
Cabo Verde 
Cameroun 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
Ethiopia 
The Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea-Bissau 
Jamaica 
Mauritania 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Samoa 
Swaziland 
Togo 
Uganda 
USA 

Total 

2 
25 
2 
7 
8 
3 
1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
1 
3 
2 
3 
12 

2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
3 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
4 
1 
103 

91 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Stakeholder categories 

Category of stakeholder 
Associations 
Civil society organisations 
Citizens 
Companies 
Public authorities / International organisations 
Think tanks 
Total 

Number of responses 
16 
23 
13 
4 
41 
6 
103 

92 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 4 – Table 6.1 Comparison of options with respect to the criteria of effectiveness, efficiency and coherence 

The table hereby provides an overall assessment of each option, as identified and discussed throughout the Impact Assessment report, which is 
summarised  in  Chapter  6.2.  The  criteria  identified  are  based  on  the  objectives  (Chapter  3)  to  be  achieved.  For  each  of  the  different  options 
(chapter  4.1),  the  most  relevant  pros  (+)  and  con’s  (-)  are  identified  with  respect  to  their  respective  effectiveness  efficiency  and  coherence  in 
achieving the specific objectives.  The impact assessment methodology requires that the assessment of each criterion for each option happens 
against the baseline. The latter assessment is based on the various potential impacts they are expected to achieve (Chapter 5). 

Option 1 

Option 2.1 

Effectiveness 
Fostered 
development 

sustainable 

(+ –) 

(+) New Integrated Strategy in line with SDGs 
(–) Loss of comprehensive implementation partnership 

Enhance  EU    security  and 
prosperity 

(+ –) 
(+)  Enhanced  focus  on  EU  interests  in  areas  of 
security, migration and investment 
(–)  Loss  of  strong  commitment  to  norms  and  values 
and need for substantive revision of certain agreements 
(e.g. EPAs) 

(+) 
in 

(+)  New  objectives 
perseveration  of  comprehensive 
partnership) 

line  with  SDGs  (and 
implementation 

(+) 
(+)  New  mechanisms  to  better  promote  EU  interests 
in areas of security, migration, investment 

 Increased  action  on  global 
challenges 
(International 
alliances) 
 Strengthened 
inclusive 
participation  of  stakeholders 
at various levels 

(–) 
(–)  Possibility  to  only  create  ad-hoc  alliances  on 
specific global challenges  

(+) 
(+)  Strengthened  institutions  for  effective  alliance 
building at global level  

(–) 
(–)  Loss  of  ambitious  in  the  framework  for  involving 
key stakeholders (currently in place due to the CPA) 

(+) 
(+) Enhanced role of NSAs (e.g. civil society, private 
sector), local authorities, parliaments, and RECs 

93 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Efficiency 
Enhanced institutional fitness  

optimization 
Achieved 
procedures and processes 

of 

Coherence 
Increased 
overarching EU priorities 

coherence  with 

Improved  policy  coherence 
for development 

(+ –) 
(+) Increased flexibility from loss of unfit institutional 
design  
(–)  Need  for  adaptation  of  existing  structures  and 
instruments in the absence of overall framework  

(+ –) 
(+)  Gain  from  loss  of  inefficient  procedures  and 
processes 
(–) Risks from reliance on unstructured procedures and 
processes (including principles of co-management and 
dialogue)  

(+ –) 

Increased  opportunities 

(+) 
approaches to countries 
(–) Risks from reliance on unfit institutional design 

for  comprehensive 

 (+) 
(+) 
co-management 
strengthened dialogue mechanisms 

Improved 

system 

and 

(+) 

(+ –) 

(+) Alignment to new EU Global Strategy  

(+ –) 
(+)  New  general  strategy  aimed  at  sustainable  and 
inclusive development 
(–)Reduced 
approaches  

comprehensive 

opportunities 

for 

(+)  New 
objectives 
comprehensive approach 
(–) Overlap with other policy frameworks 

aimed 

at 

integrated 

(+) 
(+) New objectives promoting needs and priorities of 
developing countries in integrated fashion 

94 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effectiveness 
Fostered 
development 

sustainable 

Enhance  EU  security  and 
prosperity 

Option 2.2 

Option 2.3 

(+ +) 
in 

line  with  SDGs 

(+)  New  objectives 
perseveration  of 
partnership) 
(+) Tailored actions according to regional needs 

comprehensive 

(and 
implementation 

 (+ +) 
in 

line  with  SDGs 

(+)  New  objectives 
perseveration  of 
partnership) 
(+) Tailored actions according to regional needs 

comprehensive 

(and 
implementation 

 (+ + –) 
(+) New mechanisms to better promote EU interests in 
areas of security, migration, investment 
(+) Tailored actions according to regional needs 
(–)  Increased  risk  of  loss  of  commitment  to  values 
through 
revision  of 
agreements (e.g. EPAs).  

regional  negotiations  and 

(+ +) 
(+) New mechanisms to better promote EU interests in 
areas of security, migration, investment 
(+) Tailored actions according to regional needs 

Increased  action  on  global 
challenges 
(International 
alliances) 

 (–) 
(–) Reduced influence of regional alliances on specific 
global challenges  

(+) 
(+)  Strengthened  institutions  for  effective  alliance 
building  at  global  level,  as  well  as  on  regional  public 
goods  

Strengthened 
inclusive 
participation  of  stakeholders 
at various levels  
Efficiency 
Enhanced institutional fitness  

 (+)  
(+) Enhanced role of NSAs (e.g. civil society, private 
sector), local authorities and parliaments, and RECs 

(+)  
(+) Enhanced role of NSAs (e.g. civil society, private 
sector), local authorities, parliaments, and RECs 

(+ –) 
(+)  Improved  institutional  design  to  fit  regional 
priorities 

(+ + –) 
(+)  Improved  institutional  design  to  fit  regional 
priorities 

95 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(–) Limited capacity of existing frameworks 

(+)  Improved  institutional  design  to  foster  common 
interests at global level 
(–)  Adjustment  of  institutional  structures  to  fit  the 
regional priorities (building on existing frameworks) 

Achieved 
optimization 
procedures and processes 

of 

(+) 
(+) Improved co-management system and strengthened 
dialogue mechanisms 

(+) 
(+) Improved co-management system and strengthened 
dialogue mechanisms 

Coherence 
Increased EU coherence 

(+) 

(+ +) 

(+)  New  general  strategy  aimed  at 
comprehensive  approach 
priorities 

line  with 

in 

integrated 
regional 

at 

aimed 

strategy 

integrated 
(+)New  general 
comprehensive  approach  at  the  global  level  (e.g. 
towards LDCs) 
(+)  New  general  strategy  aimed  at 
comprehensive  approach 
priorities 

integrated 
regional 

line  with 

in 

Improved  policy  coherence 
for development 

(+) 
(+)  Promoting  needs  and  priorities  of  developing 
countries in integrated fashion 

(+) 
(+)  New  objectives  promoting  needs  and  priorities  of 
developing countries in integrated fashion 

96 

 
 
 
 
Annex 5: monitoring and evaluation table of intervention 

EU Intervention 

Specific Objectives 

Related actions 

I.  Foster  sustainable  
development in ACP 
countries 

o  Supporting partner countries in the 

attainment of the SDGs; 

o  Tailored action for eradication of poverty, 

increased human development and 
reduced  inequalities within and across 
countries; 

o  Improving environmental protection and 
sustainability and supporting climate 
change mitigation and adaptation policies; 

o  Reinforcing economic, trade and 

technological cooperation putting more 
emphasis on trade, private investment and 
technological progress as vehicles of 
development; 

o  Promoting regional cooperation and 

integration; 

o  Strengthening the links between peace and 
security and sustainable and inclusive 
development; 

o  Promoting human rights, gender equality, 

Monitoring and Evaluation 
Indicators 

Systems for 
Data Collection 

Advancement  of  ACP  countries  on 
relevant  SDGs 
(e.g. 
human  and  social  development, 
environmental protection) 

indicators 

Global  follow-up  and  review  of 
the  2030  Agenda  for  Sustainable 
Development 
Monitoring  framework  of 
the 
Global  Partnership  for  Effective 
Development Cooperation  

integration 

of  ACP 
Greater 
countries  in  the  world  economy 
(e.g.  trade  activities,  FDI  flows, 
technology transfer) 

WTO 
UNCTAD  
EUROSTAT 

regional 

Increased  activities  of 
organisations  
Enhanced  conflict  prevention  and 
peace-building actions 

Enhanced  respect  of  human  rights 
governance 
and 

democratic 

RECs reports 

UN  
EEAS  reports  on  peace  and 
security  
UNDP 
EEAS  monitoring  of  human 

97 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the rule of law, good governance, and 
peaceful and inclusive societies; 

principles in ACP countries 

rights and democracy promotion 

Increased  share  of  ODA  to  LDCs 
and  fragile  states  and  increased 
levels  of  innovative  financing  for 
trade-related 
and 
development 
assistance 

DEVCO 

EU 
Results Framework  
OECD-DAC 

Development 

and 
ACP  national 
country level monitoring systems  

statistics 

Increased trade and FDI flows from 
EU  to  ACP  countries  (including 
beyond-the-border issues)  

WTO 
UNCTAD 
EUROSTAT 

Increased stability in ACP countries 

UN  
WB  

II.  Enhance  EU 
security 
and 
prosperity  

o  Tailoring EU international cooperation to 
the needs, resources and capacities of 
partner countries and regions, including 
with regard to allocation of 
aid/differentiation, as well as stronger 
focus on regional specificities. 

o  Promoting a mutually beneficial growth 
agenda with ACP economies, especially 
with some of the more advanced, 
benefitting EU's commercial interests 
through increased trade and investment and 
sector cooperation; 

o  Responding to peace and security 

challenges that the EU faces as spill-over 
effects of political instability elsewhere, 
including by dealing with root causes, 
preventing, managing and resolving 
conflict, contributing to peace building, 
tackling terrorism and preventing 
radicalisation, disrupting organised crime, 
and fighting cybercrime; 

Reduced  number  of 
irregular 
migrants  (cf.  Valletta  Action  Plan 
on migration) 

o  Tackling root causes to migration and 

promoting better managed migration flows 
that are beneficial to countries of origin, 

Increased 
migration   

benefits 

of 

legal 

report 

on 
the  Global 
and 

Biennial 
implementation  of 
Approach 
Mobility (GAMM) 
Mechanisms  under  the  ACP-EU 
Dialogue on Migration 

to  Migration 

98 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
transit and destination; 

o  Engaging in a reinforced political dialogue, 
beyond the exchange of views, towards a 
focus on concrete results. 

Deepened 
political 
dialogue activities at country level  

EU-ACP 

EU Delegations 
EEAS reports 

o  Identify and implement specific regional 

See regional strategies 

See regional strategies 

strategies 

o  Creating a stronger alliance between ACP 
and EU countries on key global issues 
with shared common concerns, interests 
and ambitions; 

Number  of  EU-ACP  common 
/  voting 
positions 
joint 
declarations 
international 
in 
settings  

and 

UN 
Outcomes 
summits 

of 

international 

Encompass 

III 
regional dynamics 
Ensure 
IV. 
ambitious  alliances 
in  addressing  global 
challenges 

o  Undertaking targeted action to reduce the 
gap between commitments taken in 
various international fora on a series of 
global issues and their actual 
implementation; 

Accountability  mechanisms  put  in 
place  for monitoring commitments 
at international level 

o  Jointly engaging with emerging donors on 

Joint actions with emerging donors 

cooperation. 

role  of 

the  EU 

Increased 
in 
international  affairs  and  better 
external  perception  of  the  EU  as  a 
global actor 

DEVCO 

EU 
Results 
Delegations 
EU external perceptions surveys 

Development 
EU 
/ 

Framework 

o  Strengthening the role of non-state actors 

(including civil society and private 
sector), local authorities and parliaments. 
This entails moving from service delivery 
to advocacy based on improved 
engagement with national authorities; 

environment 

for 
Enabling 
democratic  accountability  in  ACP 
countries 

Increased  participation  of  NSAs, 
LAs  and  Parliaments  in  policy-

Regional  governance  indicators 
(e.g.  African  Peer  Review 
Mechanism) 
EU 
Results  
Framework  

Development 

DEVCO 

99 

Strengthen 

V. 
inclusive 
participation 
stakeholders 

of 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
o  Improving cooperation and coordination 

with continental and regional 
organisations. 

making processes in ACP countries 
Established 
consultation 
mechanisms and increased dialogue 
regional 
with 
organisations  

continental 

and 

Bank 

governance 

World 
indicators 
ACP  national 
and 
country level monitoring systems 
NGO reports 
EU Delegations / EU evaluations 

statistics 

100