Special Report No 33 // 2016#Union Civil Protection Mechanism: the coordination of responses to disasters outside the EU has been broadly effective #(pursuant to Article 287(4), second subparagraph, TFEU)
Date: 2016-11-08
Institutions: European Court of Auditors
Subjects: EU aid, aid evaluation, civil defence, coordination of aid, emergency aid, humanitarian aid, infectious disease, man-made disaster, natural disaster

EN 

2016 

NO 33

Special Report  Union Civil Protection 

Mechanism: the 
coordination of responses 
to disasters outside the EU 
has been broadly effective

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EN 

2016 

NO 33

Special Report

Union Civil Protection 
Mechanism: the 
coordination of responses 
to disasters outside the EU 
has been broadly effective

(pursuant to Article 287(4), second subparagraph, TFEU)

Audit team

02

The ECA’s special reports set out the results of its performance and compliance audits of specific budgetary areas or 
management topics. The ECA selects and designs these audit tasks to be of maximum impact by considering the risks 
to performance or compliance, the level of income or spending involved, forthcoming developments and political 
and public interest.

This performance audit was produced by Chamber III – headed by ECA Member Karel Pinxten - which specialises in 
external action, security and justice spending areas. The audit was led by ECA Member Hans Gustaf Wessberg,  
supported by Peter Eklund, Head of private office, Emmanuel-Douglas Hellinakis, Attaché of private office;  
Sabine Hiernaux-Fritsch, Principal Manager; Michiel Sweerts, Head of Task; Mirko Iaconisi, Kristina Maksinen and  
Dirk Neumeister, Auditors.

From left to right: M. Iaconisi, D. Neumeister, E.-D. Hellinakis, H. G. Wessberg,  
K. Maksinen, M. Sweerts, P. Eklund.

Contents

03

Paragraph

Abbreviations and acronyms

Executive summary

Introduction

Background

Legal framework

Union Civil Protection Mechanism

I-VII 

1-11 

1-2 

3-4 

5-9 

10-11 

Financing the UCPM

12-16 

Audit scope and approach

17-71 

17-48 

17-19 

20-27 

28-33 

Observations

The Commission made use of the coordination structures in place but some tools could have been 
exploited further

The Commission activated the mechanism for responding to emergencies on a timely basis but could have 
gained additional time for mobilising resources through better use of the pre-alert phase

EU civil protection teams facilitated on-the-ground coordination but their selection process and reporting 
from the field had shortcomings

Although the voluntary pool was still of limited use at the time of the crises examined, the Commission 
played an active role in extending its scope

34-37 

EU civil protection teams benefited from substantial support from the EU delegations

38-40 

41-46 

The Commission made use of the existing ECHO Field Network, but greater civil protection synergies could 
be sought

The Commission respected UN OCHA’s leading role and adopted flexible coordination structures in 
coherence with the overall UN set-up

47-48 

The Commission took steps towards ensuring a smooth transition into the recovery phase

 
Contents 

04

49-69  While the Commission established a framework for collecting, disseminating and exchanging 

information, there is room for improvement on reporting

49-54 

The Commission’s CECIS communication platform is useful for information sharing, but further 
improvement is needed to enhance its impact

55-57 

Information products and maps were widely shared and there are indications that they were useful

58-60 

61-66 

67-69 

The Commission organised inclusive meetings which sought to promote information exchange with EU 
bodies and consistency in the delivery of assistance

By acting as a forum for information exchange, the Ebola Task Force added value to the response, but 
should have been established sooner

The Commission does not make full use of the information at its disposal to report on both its own and the 
UCPM’s overall performance

70-74 

Conclusions and recommendations

Annex I  —  Activation of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism for disasters outside the Union

Annex II  — 

 Union Civil Protection Mechanism — Relationship among the actors as of  
31 August 2016

Annex III  —  Overview of the three disasters examined

Annex IV  —  Deployment of EU epidemiologists to Guinea

Annex V  —  Timeline of events Ebola virus disease outbreak 2014-2015

Reply of the Commission

 
 
 
 
 
 
Abbreviations and 
acronyms

05

CECIS: Common Emergency Communication and Information System

DG DEVCO: Directorate General Development and Cooperation

DG NEAR: Directorate General Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations

DG SANTE: Directorate General Health and Food Safety

ECDC: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control

ECHO: Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations 

EEAS: European External Action Service

ERCC: Emergency Response Coordination Centre

EUCP: EU Civil Protection Coordination and Assessment (team)

EUD: European Union delegation

EUFOR: European Union Force

FPI: Service for Foreign Policy Instruments

GOARN: Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network

HSC: Health Security Committee

MSF: Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders)

OCHA: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OSOCC: On-site Operations Coordination Centre

UCPM: Union Civil Protection Mechanism

UNDAC: United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination

WFP: World Food Programme

WHO: World Health Organisation

Executive summary

06

I
Disasters can strike anywhere, anytime. The human, environmental and economic impact of disasters, whether 
natural or man made, can be considerable. When a disaster occurs, the reaction must be swift. Sound disaster man-
agement saves lives, and effective coordination among different responders is critical to the successful preparation 
for and response to disasters.

II
The European Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) was established to promote swift and effective operational 
cooperation between national civil protection services. It has two main objectives. Firstly, it aims to strengthen the 
cooperation between the Union and the UCPM’s Participating States (Member States plus six non-EU countries). 
Secondly, it aims to facilitate coordination in the field of civil protection in order to improve the effectiveness of 
systems for preventing, preparing for and responding to disasters.

III
The mechanism is managed by the European Commission. We examined whether the Commission had been effect-
ive in facilitating the coordination of the responses to disasters outside the Union through the UCPM. We did so by 
looking at the activations of the UCPM in response to three recent international disasters: the floods in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (2014); the Ebola virus outbreak in west Africa (2014–2016); and the Nepal earthquake (2015).

IV
We conclude that the Commission has been broadly effective in facilitating the coordination of the responses to 
disasters outside the Union since the beginning of 2014.

V
For each of the three disasters we examined, activation of the UCPM was timely, and the EU civil protection teams 
(EUCP teams) facilitated coordination on the ground with the Participating States’ teams. The Commission’s facilita-
tion of coordination is strengthened through the widespread dissemination of information products. The coordin-
ation among Commission departments, as well as with other EU and non-EU bodies, was inclusive. The Commission 
also respected the UN’s overall lead, and took steps to ensure a smooth transition into the recovery phase.

Executive summary 

07

VI
Notwithstanding our overall conclusion, we found a number of areas for further improvement, including: possible 
time savings during the early phases of disaster response, CECIS (the Commission’s communication and informa-
tion platform), on-the-ground coordination and synergies, the Commission’s and ECDC’s financial and administra-
tive arrangements for the large-scale deployment of epidemiologists through the UCPM, and UCPM performance 
reporting.

VII
We therefore recommend that the Commission:

(a)  identify ways to gain additional time during the pre-alert phase and during the selection and deployment of 

EUCP teams;

(b)  develop CECIS’s features to improve the overview of assistance provided and requested, to allow for a better 

follow-up of priorities and to enhance user-friendliness;

(c)  strengthen on-the-ground coordination through improving the EUCP teams’ reporting, exploiting the presence 

of ECHO Field Network experts and further involving EU delegations;

(d)  assess, together with the ECDC, potential changes needed to strengthen arrangements for the deployment of 

ECDC experts outside the Union through the UCPM;

(e)  improve reporting by automating the production of statistics and indicators, thereby strengthening 

accountability.

Introduction

08

Background

01 
Disasters can strike anywhere, anytime. The human, environmental and economic 
impact of disasters, whether natural or man made, can be considerable. Accord-
ing to one estimate, between 1994 and 2013 there were 6 873 natural disasters 
worldwide, which claimed 1.35 million lives — or about 68 000 on average annu-
ally1. A UN estimate puts the economic loss resulting from disasters in the period 
2005 to 2015 at 1.3 trillion US dollars2.

02 
When a disaster occurs, individuals, communities, governments and international 
organisations and donors must act very quickly. Sound disaster management3 
saves lives, and effective coordination among different responders is critical to 
the successful preparation for and response to crises and disasters.

Legal framework

03 
The EU’s powers in the area of civil protection are enshrined in Article 196 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which states that Union action 
should aim to promote swift, effective operational cooperation within the Union 
between national civil protection services, as well as consistency in international 
civil protection work.

04 
The Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) was first established in 2001. The 
current legal framework was laid down by Decision No 1313/2013, which applies 
since 1 January 2014 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Decision’)4. The mechanism 
has two main objectives. Firstly, it aims to strengthen the cooperation between 
the Union and the Participating States5. Secondly, it aims to facilitate coordi-
nation in the field of civil protection in order to improve the effectiveness of 
systems for preventing, preparing for and responding to natural and man-made 
disasters.

1  Centre for Research on the 

Epidemiology of Disasters, The 
human cost of natural disasters 
2015: A global perspective, 2015.

2 

Sendai Framework for Disaster 
Risk Reduction 2015-2030 
estimates.

3  Defined by the International 
Federation of the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies as 
the organisation and 
management of resources and 
responsibilities for dealing 
with all humanitarian and civil 
protection aspects of 
emergencies, in particular 
resilience (mitigation, 
prevention and preparedness), 
response (relief and early 
recovery) and recovery 
(rehabilitation and 
reconstruction) in order to 
lessen the impact of disasters.

4  Decision No 1313/2013/EU of 
the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 17 December 
2013 on a Union Civil 
Protection Mechanism (OJ 
L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 924).

5  All EU Member States plus 

Norway, Iceland, Montenegro, 
Serbia, the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia and 
Turkey. These are referred to 
by the Commission as 
‘Participating States’, and this 
term shall be used throughout 
the rest of this report.

Introduction 

Union Civil Protection Mechanism

05 
The UCPM falls under the responsibility of the European Commission’s Director-
ate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations 
(ECHO). At its core is the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC). The 
ERCC is operational around the clock; it has a 24/7 situation room. The ERCC’s key 
operational roles include: acting as a Commission and EU crisis monitoring and 
coordination platform; operating as a communication hub between Participat-
ing States, the affected state and the deployed field experts; developing and 
disseminating information products; and facilitating cooperation between civil 
protection and humanitarian aid operations. These functions are supported by 
a web-based alert and notification application known as CECIS (Common Emer-
gency Communication and Information System)6.

The Emergency Response Coordination Centre

1
e
r
u
t
c
i
P

09

6 

7 

The Commission’s 
responsibility for the 
management of CECIS is set 
out in Article 8 of the Decision.

The impact assessment 
accompanying the legislative 
proposal for the Decision to 
establish the UCPM 
(Commission Staff Working 
Paper — Impact assessment— 
2011 review of the civil 
protection regulatory 
framework accompanying the 
document Decision of the 
European Parliament and the 
Council on a Union Civil 
Protection Mechanism and on 
establishing a Civil Protection 
Financial Instrument for the 
period 2014-2020, 
SEC(2011) 1632 final, 
20.12.2011) identified 
a number of shortcomings in 
EU disaster response capacity 
that the new legislation was 
designed to address.

© EU/ECHO/Ezequiel Scagnetti, 2015.

06 
The ERCC is supplemented by the European Emergency Response Capacity: 
a ‘voluntary pool’ of resources for a responding to disasters which have been pre-
committed by the Participating States and are on standby only to be used when 
called upon by the Commission. The voluntary pool is one of a number of in-
novations introduced in the new Decision to address weaknesses in the previous 
mechanism7. In particular, the pool aims to help achieve the following objectives: 
to shift from a reactive and an ad hoc coordination to a pre-planned, prearranged 
and predictable system; and to identify and fill critical gaps in disaster response 
capacity in a cost-effective way. The voluntary pool is explained in Box 1.

 
Introduction 

10

1 The voluntary pool explained
x
o
B

The European Emergency Response Capacity (or ‘voluntary pool’) brings together a range of relief teams, 
experts and equipment from a number of EU countries. These assets are kept on standby and made  available 
as soon as needed for EU civil protection missions all over the world.

Since its launch in October 2014, 10 countries have committed their response resources, or ‘capacities’, to the 
pool. Thirty-five response units (i.e. modules) have been registered; these include, for example, ‘urban search 
and rescue’ teams, specialised medical air evacuation resources, water purification equipment, high-capacity 
pumping units and forest fire-fighting teams. Further Member State resources are currently being registered.

The countries participating in the pool can benefit from EU financial support to upgrade the offered national 
response assets, to pay for certification and training costs and to cover up to 85 % of the costs related to the 
transport of teams and assets to disaster areas.

Evolution of the voluntary pool 
(Only registered modules — as at 20 June 2016)

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

s
e
l

u
d
o
m
d
e
r
e
t
s
i
g
e
r
f
o
r
e
b
m
u
N

3

4

34

35

32

29

27

Modules registered
and added to the pool

Modules in process of
being registered

Voluntary pool size

2014-Q4

2015-Q1

2015-Q2

2015-Q3

2015-Q4

2016-Q1

2016-Q2

Source: European Commission; ECA analysis.

 
 
 
 
Introduction 

11

07 
The UCPM can be activated through requests for assistance from affected 
countries or from the UN8. It can also be activated at the request of an EU Mem-
ber State for support in providing consular assistance to EU citizens affected by 
disasters outside the Union.

08 
Prevention, preparedness and response activities address (potential) disasters 
inside the EU, although the mechanism can also be activated to respond to dis-
asters outside the Union. In fact, of the 224 requests for assistance made in the 
2002-2015 period, 63 % related to disasters outside the EU, as illustrated in Figure 
1. The way the UPCM works is illustrated in Annex I.

8  UN organisations and certain 

other designated international 
organisations — the 
International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM), the 
International Federation of 
Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies (IFRC) and the 
Organisation for the 
Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons (OPCW) — have also 
been able to request 
assistance since 2014.

1 Requests for assistance through the UCPM (inside and outside the EU)
e
r
u
g
i
F

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

18

17

10

11

8

10

9

8

16

4

6

6

13

8

14

4

12

4

13

12

7

7

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2

5

3

2002

2003

4
1
2004

External

Internal

Source: European Commission.

09 
The Participating States retain primary responsibility for civil protection and 
determine the level of assistance to commit to any disaster response — and how 
much of that will be provided through the UCPM. The Commission does not 
command or have control over the Participating States’ teams, modules or other 
assets, which are deployed on a voluntary basis. Rather, the EU’s role is to sup-
port the Participating States in strengthening disaster prevention, preparedness 
and response through the facilitation of cooperation and coordination. For an 
overview of the relationships within the UCPM, see Annex II.

 
Introduction 

12

Financing the UCPM

10 
The annual budget appropriations for the 2014-2016 period for the UCPM are 
shown in Figure 2. Around 50 million euro per year is allocated to the operation 
of the mechanism, of which about one third is dedicated to response interven-
tions in third countries. This includes EU co-financing of operations to transport 
modules to affected countries. The costs of operating civil protection teams and 
assets are borne by the Participating States.

11 
The Commission will carry out an interim evaluation on the implementation of 
the Decision in 2017.

2 Implementation of UCPM budget 2014–2016
e
r
u
g
i
F

60

o
r
u
e
n
o

i
l
l
i

m

50

40

30

20

10

0

14.9

12.01

11.4

Response interventions in third
countries
Response interventions within
the Union
Disaster prevention and
preparedness in third countries
Disaster prevention and
preparedness within the Union

2014

2015

2016

1 2016: budgeted amounts.

Source: European Commission; ECA analysis.

 
 
Audit scope and approach

13

9 

In the 2014-2015 period there 
were 25 requests for 
assistance outside the Union. 
The three disasters selected 
were among the largest 
responses requiring 
substantial coordination.

10  Representatives came from 
the Directorates-General for 
European Civil Protection and 
Humanitarian Aid Operations 
(ECHO), Health and Food 
Safety (SANTE), International 
Cooperation and 
Development (DEVCO) and 
Neighbourhood and 
Enlargement Negotiations 
(NEAR).

12 
The audit aimed to assess whether the Commission had been effective in facili-
tating the coordination of the responses to disasters outside the Union since the 
establishment of the UCPM in 2014. In particular, this included the facilitation 
of coordination with Participating States, other EU institutions and agencies, 
the UN, the affected country and other relevant actors. We looked at how this 
coordin ation was implemented within existing structures and processes and ex-
amined the collection, dissemination and exchange of information with all of the 
aforementioned stakeholders.

13 
The audit criteria were established on the basis of the provisions of the Decision 
(see paragraph 4). The audit scope did not include prevention and preparedness 
activities, the effectiveness of the interventions themselves or the design of the 
mechanism.

14 
Three international disasters where the UCPM had been activated were selected 
for detailed examination9. These were selected on the basis of a range of criteria, 
including the type and scale of disaster, the role of the UCPM, the size of the EU 
response and the geographical spread. The disasters covered were the floods 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (May 2014), the Ebola virus disease outbreak in west 
Africa (March 2014-January 2016) and the Nepal earthquake (25 April 2015). For 
a detailed overview of the disasters examined, see Annex III.

15 
The audit work was carried out between December 2015 and May 2016. We met 
representatives of the European Commission10, the European External Action 
 Service (EEAS) — including the EU Delegation (EUD) to the UN in Geneva — and 
the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). In addition, we 
also met with representatives of the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humani-
tarian Affairs (OCHA), the World Health Organisation (WHO), the World Food Pro-
gramme (WFP) and Médecins sans Frontières (MSF). A field visit was carried out in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, where we met with the EUD/EU Special Representative’s 
office, the European Union Force (EUFOR), the UN Development Programme, 
representatives of the authorities at state, entity, cantonal and municipal level 
involved in the flood response and the Red Cross of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Audit scope and approach 

14

16 
Our work was primarily based on a review of the documents provided by the 
European Commission and EEAS. The auditors had access to CECIS. We col-
lected users’ perceptions of the mechanism and the responses to the three crises 
through a questionnaire sent to and answered by 11 Participating States. We 
also attended, in October 2015, the Commission’s conference in Luxembourg on 
lessons learned from the Ebola outbreak and an information session on medical 
evacuations (or ‘medevac’) preparation by the Luxembourg Air Rescue services in 
February 2016.

Observations

15

The Commission made use of the coordination 
structures in place but some tools could have been 
exploited further

11  Article 16(3)(a)(i) of the 

Decision.

The Commission activated the mechanism for responding 
to emergencies on a timely basis but could have gained 
additional time for mobilising resources through better use 
of the pre-alert phase

17 
When the Commission receives a request for assistance, it must notify the Partici-
pating States to that effect as soon as possible11. In all three disasters, the Com-
mission posted the request in a timely manner, thereby fulfilling its obligation to 
notify the Participating States without delay.

18 
The formal start of a coordinated EU disaster response begins with activation 
of the mechanism upon receipt of a request for assistance. However, there may 
be signs that a disaster is imminent before any such request is submitted. The 
Commission can, but is not obliged to, open an emergency in CECIS ahead of 
activation in a so-called ‘pre-alert mode’. This enables the Participating States 
to mobilise their assets ahead of a potential activation. The pre-alert mode was 
used in all three disasters. For the floods in Bosnia and Herzegovina (which can 
be considered a ‘slow-onset’ disaster), the magnitude of the threat was already 
clear when a state of natural disaster had been declared locally. However, the 
pre-alert mode was activated 1 day later, only 4 hours ahead of official activation. 
Prompter pre-alert activation could have bought additional time for mobilising 
resources.

19 
The Commission kept no written log of any informal contacts made with Partici-
pating States having close ties to and a good knowledge of the affected country. 
Such a log would allow for follow-up on previous activations, which could help 
build a systematic approach, saving valuable time at the activation stage as well 
as ensuring good coverage of Participating States that are in a good position to 
assist an affected country.

16

12  Article 16(3)(a)(ii) of the 

Decision.

13  COM(2010) 600 final of 

26 October 2010, ‘Towards 
a stronger European disaster 
response: the role of civil 
protection and humanitarian 
assistance’. Modules can 
consist of either civil 
protection assets or human 
resources, or a combination of 
both.

Observations 

EU civil protection teams facilitated on-the-ground 
coordination but their selection process and reporting from 
the field had shortcomings

20 
When there is a need for EU coordination on the ground after Participating 
States’ offers of assistance are accepted by the requesting party, the Commission 
should put together an EU civil protection coordination and assessment team 
(EUCP team) for immediate deployment to the affected country12. The aim of this 
team is to coordinate the work of the different Participating States teams and 
modules on the ground13, to provide technical advice and to facilitate coordin-
ation with the affected country. As illustrated in Annex I, the teams are selected 
by the Commission following nominations of experts by the Participating States, 
and each team is accompanied by a Liaison Officer deployed by the Commission.

21 
The deployment of EUCP teams is not dependent upon the approval of the 
requesting/affected country for disasters outside the Union. The ERCC is there-
fore not prohibited from sending Participating States requests for nominations 
as soon as a request for assistance has been received. In the cases of Nepal and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, there were early indications that the disasters were 
major and that, as a consequence, EU coordination would most likely be needed. 
Nevertheless, in both disasters, the time which elapsed from the receipt of the 
official request for assistance to the request in CECIS for nominations for the first 
team was 21.4 hours for Bosnia and Herzegovina and 22.8 hours for Nepal, as 
shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4.

3 Timeline for selection of EUCP experts — Bosnia and Herzegovina
e
r
u
g
i
F

1 day and 19 hours from the request for assistance 
to the appointment of the EUCP team

0

Floods

52.6

4.1

21.4

15.9

6.4

20

40

60

80

100

Hours

Pre-alert

Request
for
assistance

Acceptance

Request
for
experts

Deadline
for
oﬀers

Source: European Court of Auditors.

 
Observations 

17

4 Timeline for selection of EUCP experts — Nepal
e
r
u
g
i
F

2 days and 2 hours from the request for assistance to the appointment of the EUCP team

8.4

4.8

22.8

21.8

0

10

20

30

40

50

Earthquake

Pre-alert

Request
for
assistance

Source: European Court of Auditors.

Request
for
experts

5.0

60

70
Hours

Acceptance

Deadline
for
oﬀers

22 
Requests for nominations of experts are sent through CECIS with a deadline that 
is set on a case-by-case basis. The length of the deadline varied: in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina it was set at 15.9 hours (a slow-onset disaster) after the request for 
nominations, while the equivalent for Nepal was 21.8 hours (a sudden-onset dis-
aster). The auditors found no evidence of internal standards in this regard.

14 

ICF International, Ex-post 
evaluation of Civil Protection 
Financial Instrument and 
Community Civil Protection 
Mechanism (recast) 2007-
2013 — Final report, 16 
December 2014.

23 
After the deadline for nominations, the selection of experts and the staffing of 
the team took an additional 5-6 hours. While the legislation sets high-level cri-
teria for expert selection, the Court found that no predefined approach was used 
to determine which types of experts were needed and how many of each type. 
Moreover, we found no evidence of predefined criteria for selecting each type 
of expert in the form of checklists to be used during the selection process. The 
absence of clear selection criteria was acknowledged in an evaluation carried out 
in December 201414, which recommended the use of ‘expert profiles for CP team 
selection’.

24 
A predefined, standard composition of the team based on type of disaster and 
region could save the Commission valuable time before it sends out the initial 
request for nominations. For the subsequent selection from among the nominat-
ed candidates, a clear checklist could accelerate the process, even during times 
of low capacity at the ERCC (e.g. night shifts, weekends). Such a process could in 
addition allow for shortlists of potential team members to be drawn up ahead of 
the final deadline for nominations.

 
Observations 

18

25 
The performance of individual experts is not evaluated. While the evaluation 
of Participating States’ nominated experts can be a sensitive matter, adopting 
a structured approach to evaluating and documenting their performance could 
potentially save time during the selection procedure. An example of such a pro-
cess can be found in the EU-funded15 election observation missions (EOM), where 
peer-to-peer evaluations are routinely carried out for each observer sent by the 
Member States in order ‘to keep record of their professional performance and 
individual behaviour during any EU EOM in order to further facilitate and improve 
the selection process conducted by Member States and the EC’16.

15  European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human 
Rights.

16  Guidelines for EU election 

observer evaluation (FPI4), p. 1, 
first paragraph.

17  Article 16(3)(a)(ii) and (v) and 

Article 16(3)(b).

26 
The Commission should support common needs assessments through the pres-
ence of EUCP experts, and/or provide advice on the assistance required in view of 
the needs17. When needs are expressed by the requester for assistance (affected 
state or UN body), the ERCC ensures that these are shared with all Participating 
States via CECIS. There is also clear evidence to show that EUCP team members 
have participated in various assessment exercises on the ground. Where EUCP 
team members are integrated into UN OCHA’s UNDAC teams, as was the case in 
Nepal, common assessments are typically produced through the UN. An un-
intended consequence of this integration, however, is that it limits the possibil-
ity of identifying the EU’s individual contribution to these assessments (see also 
paragraphs 41 to 45).

EU experts visit Kathmandu and the hospital after the 
earthquake

2
e
r
u
t
c
i
P

© EU/ECHO/Pierre Prakash, 2015.

 
19

18  Article 16(3)(b) of the Decision.

Observations 

27 
Even where EU coordination was not fully integrated with UN coordination, as 
was the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we found only limited evidence of the 
causal link between needs assessments carried out on the ground by EUCP team 
members and the specific lists of needs being relayed to the Participating States. 
The quality of reporting varied between EUCP teams but generally focused on 
information sharing and planned and completed activities. Daily reports lacked 
dedicated sections for the identification and concrete follow-up of needs.

Although the voluntary pool was still of limited use at the 
time of the crises examined, the Commission played an active 
role in extending its scope

The voluntary pool was of limited use at the time of the crises 
examined

28 
The Commission’s duties towards the Participating States include making timely 
recommendations based on the needs on the ground and asking the Participat-
ing States to deploy specific resources18. If it is to make pertinent deployment 
recommendations, the Commission needs to be aware of the resources that are 
available for immediate deployment.

29 
At the time of the examined disasters, only a very limited number of assets had 
been registered in the voluntary pool. As a result, the Commission was gener-
ally not in a position to make deployment recommendations or ask Participating 
States to deploy capacities from the voluntary pool.

30 
In October 2015, 1 year after the launch of the voluntary pool, still only a handful 
of modules had been registered in the pool. According to the Participating States 
questioned, the main reason for the slow development of the pool was the heavy 
administrative burden involved in registering and certifying response units/mod-
ules, which in some cases may also entail additional administrative arrangements 
at the national level.

20

19  Commission Implementing 
Decision 2014/762/EU of 
16 October 2014 laying down 
rules for the implementation 
of Decision No 1313/2013/EU 
of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on a Union 
Civil Protection Mechanism 
and repealing Commission 
Decisions 2004/277/EC, 
Euratom and 2007/606/EC, 
Euratom (OJ L 320, 6.11.2014, 
p. 1).

20  Annex II, point 10 of the 
Implementing Decision.

21  This component has been 
operational since the 
beginning of 2016, and in May 
2016 a team including ECDC 
epidemiologists was 
mobilised to respond to the 
yellow fever outbreak in Africa.

22  Regulation (EC) No 851/2004 
of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 
21 April 2004 establishing 
a European centre for disease 
prevention and control (OJ 
L 142, 30.4.2004, p. 1).

Observations 

The Commission played an active role in extending the capacities 
of the voluntary pool

31 
The need for a medical evacuation service for medical staff and humanitarian 
aid workers in the field was highlighted by several actors as the Ebola outbreak 
developed. The legal framework19 provided only for a more general service for 
‘medical aerial evacuation of disaster victims’20; it did not anticipate a service 
 specifically adapted to evacuate (potentially) infected medical staff or humanitar-
ian aid workers. The Commission nevertheless took an active role, pushing for 
a flexible approach and further capacities to be included in the voluntary pool. 
While the WHO was the only party authorised to request medical evacuations 
(or ‘medevac’), the ERCC played an important role, acting as a clearing house, 
answering any questions coming from the stakeholders at the various stages of 
the medevac process (WHO, Participating States, UN agencies, NGOs, etc.), and 
deploying the planes from the voluntary pool. The coordination and collabor-
ation needed to develop these capacities are described further in paragraph 66.

32 
As a direct response to the lack of medical staff during the Ebola outbreak, the 
Commission established the EU Medical Corps as a new component within the 
voluntary pool to mobilise medical and public health experts and teams for 
 preparedness or response operations inside or outside the EU21.

33 
The ECDC made an important contribution to the EU’s response to the Ebola 
outbreak through its ‘rapid risk assessments’ and coordinating the deployment 
of the ECDC’s and Member States’ epidemiological experts to the affected region 
(although these mostly happened after the peak of cases, as shown in Annex IV ). 
The ECDC is not prevented by its founding regulation22 from deploying epidemi-
ologists to countries outside the EU. The existing financial and administrative 
 arrangements within the ECDC as well as between the Commission and the 
ECDC, however, do not lend themselves well to large-scale deployments outside 
the EU, in particular for through the UCPM. The ECDC is not equipped in terms 
of core staff and processes to support sustainable deployments and, because its 
mandate is primarily focused on threats potentially affecting the EU, dedicated 
budgetary resources have not been made available to support such operations 
outside the Union. In the absence of a dedicated EU mechanism to deploy epi-
demiologists, experts were deployed through the WHO’s Global Outbreak Alert 
and Response Network. Under the terms of reference of these deployments, how-
ever, information restrictions applied and experts could not report directly to the 
ECDC and to the Commission.

21

23  Article 16(5) of the Decision.

24 

In Nepal, the head of the EU 
delegation signalled the 
inadequate level of 
preparedness of the EUD itself 
in the event of a worst-case 
scenario 2 months prior to the 
earthquake striking. While the 
scale of the disaster was very 
significant, it was less severe 
than foreseen in this 
worst-case scenario, and 
therefore the EUD was able to 
provide the necessary support 
to the EUCP team.

25  The Commission sent notes to 
the heads of EU delegations in 
2012 and at the end of 2014 
explaining the workings of the 
UCPM and how affected 
countries could request 
assistance.

Observations 

EU civil protection teams benefited from substantial support 
from the EU delegations

34 
The EUD in the affected country has an obligation to provide logistical support to 
the EUCP teams which, in turn, should liaise with the EUD23. In all the crises exam-
ined, the EUDs provided — within the capacities available — substantial support 
in terms of logistics, security briefings, facilitating meetings with local authori-
ties, advice and interpretation with local staff24.

35 
The auditors found evidence of effective collaboration between the EUCP ex-
perts and the EUDs. EUCP teams regularly shared information with the EUD staff. 
The EUCP teams used the EUDs’ premises as the base for their operations, where 
they held regular coordination meetings.

36 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the national authorities requested the common 
secur ity and defence policy mission ‘EUFOR Althea’ to provide first response sup-
port. The Commission involved EUFOR in the ERCC-organised coordination meet-
ings from the outset, enabling EUFOR to provide information on the action it had 
undertaken. Coordination on the ground between the EUCP team and  EUFOR 
was primarily facilitated by the EUD/EU Special Representative’s office, which 
also coordinated the activities of the various EU actors and the Member States’ 
missions. In this context, the EUCP team received direct assistance from EUFOR 
through the provision of a helicopter, which was then used to conduct an aerial 
assessment of the situation and a field visit.

37 
Levels of awareness of what capacities the UCPM could offer or how affected 
countries should request its assistance varied across the EUDs in the affected 
countries. There are no dedicated ‘civil protection focal points’ in the EUDs. While 
the EUD to Bosnia and Herzegovina had previous experience in triggering the 
mechanism, the EUDs in the countries affected by the Ebola outbreak had limited 
awareness of the possibilities offered by the UCPM at the outset of the crisis, 
despite the note sent by ECHO in 201225. At a Health Security Committee meeting 
in August 2014, ECHO informed Member States that it had taken the initiative of 
contacting the affected countries; nevertheless, we were unable to obtain direct 
evidence of proactive steps taken by the Commission, either directly or through 
the EEAS, to encourage the affected countries to request activation.

Observations 

22

The Commission made use of the existing ECHO Field 
Network, but greater civil protection synergies could be 
sought

38 
Following an activation, the Commission should seek synergies between the 
UCPM and other EU instruments, in particular with EU humanitarian aid26. The 
implementing rules of the Commission’s Decision do not explicitly address syner-
gies and the Commission has not identified the practical steps involved in achiev-
ing them. When analysing the three disasters, we identified efforts to coordinate 
and link with other instruments, especially with humanitarian and development 
aid, although this was mainly done on an ad hoc basis.

26  Article 16(11) of the Decision.

27  Article 16(2) of the Decision. 

The obligation with regard to 
integrating the coordination 
only applies to UN OCHA, not 
to other UN organisations.

28  Draft operational guidelines 

for field cooperation between 
EU civil protection and UNDAC 
teams: Civil Protection 
Committee, information 
exchange on ongoing 
activities, 21-22 October 2009.

39 
In all three cases examined, ECHO Field Network experts were deployed on the 
ground at the same time as the EUCP teams and modules, providing information 
to the ERCC and attending coordination meetings. In this way, the Commission 
made good use of the existing network in its overall response.

40 
Nevertheless, potential synergies have not been fully exploited between the civil 
protection and humanitarian assistance areas. The ECHO Field Network’s staff are 
experts in the UN humanitarian aid system but are typically not trained in mat-
ters of civil protection. In its lessons-learned report on Nepal, the Commission 
acknowledged that ‘Civil protection could make more/quicker use of the humani-
tarian aid partner network for assessments’.

The Commission respected UN OCHA’s leading role and 
adopted flexible coordination structures in coherence with 
the overall UN set-up

41 
According to the legal framework, the Commission’s coordination activities 
should be fully integrated into UN OCHA’s overall coordination efforts and re-
spect UN OCHA’s leading role27. Although ‘full integration’ is not further defined, 
the draft operational guidelines for field cooperation between EUCP and UNDAC 
teams cite three areas where ‘full integration is possible and desirable’: assess-
ment, coordination and information management28.

23

29  Clusters are groups of 

humanitarian organisations, 
both UN and non-UN, in each 
of the main sectors of 
humanitarian action, e.g. 
water or health. They are 
created when clear 
humanitarian needs exist 
within a sector, when there are 
numerous actors within 
sectors and when national 
authorities need coordination 
support.

30  ECHO, 2016, ‘A new role for 
regional coordination 
mechanisms in the framework 
of the OSOCC’, discussion 
paper for the Humanitarian 
Networks and Partnership 
Week, Geneva 2-5 February.

31 

Ibid.

Observations 

42 
In practice, the degree of integration in the UN system falls across a broad spec-
trum. There might be joint EU/UNDAC assessment missions, EUCP teams integrat-
ed into the UNDAC-established On-site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC), 
parallel EU and UNDAC teams or no UNDAC team at all. There is no ‘one size fits 
all’ approach. How well EUCP teams will fit into the overall coordination structure 
is very context specific: the greater the EU contribution to rescue operations, the 
greater the need for a strong EU coordination role.

43 
This is illustrated by the very different coordination structures with the UN in 
place for the three examined disasters. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, due to the 
absence of a UNDAC team, the UN resident coordinator and the EU head of 
delegation/EUSR agreed informally to assign to the EUCP team the responsibility 
for coordinating incoming civil protection assistance. At the same time, the EU 
respected the UN’s lead on humanitarian aid coordination through the ‘cluster 
system’29 established by the UN Development Programme in Bosnia and Herze-
govina. In Nepal, the EUCP teams were integrated into the UN OSOCC structure 
and the cluster system. During the Ebola outbreak, EU experts were deployed to 
the UNDAC teams as associated members. While these cases differed, the Court 
found that, in all three cases, the Commission respected the UN’s lead.

44 
The integration of EUCP experts into the UN OSOCC structure in Nepal made it 
difficult for us to clearly and separately identify the EU contribution to the overall 
coordination efforts and its added value. Although the EUCP team’s activity re-
ports highlighted regular contact with the modules deployed via the UCPM and 
provided first-hand information for the ERCC and the Participating States, the 
modules were mainly coordinated through the UN system (e.g. the allocation of 
areas of operation or concrete tasks).

45 
While liaison officers and EUCP experts from regional mechanisms like the UCPM 
can be deployed to UN OSOCCs, their integration ‘does not provide a sufficient 
basis for regional organisations to facilitate operational coordination for their 
members’30. Therefore, the Commission has been tasked by the UN in 2016 with 
defining more precisely a specific role for regional coordination mechanisms 
within the OSOCCs’ operations. This is intended to improve operational coordin-
ation among their own members, allowing for more common situational analyses 
and needs assessments31.

Observations 

24

46 
Cooperation is largely based on a high level of trust, and so personal relation-
ships play an important role. The Commission has acknowledged, however, 
the need to formalise its relationships with UN OCHA and other UN agencies to 
strengthen cooperation and coordination in disaster preparedness and response. 
Since 2015 it has signed formal cooperation agreements with UN OCHA and the 
WFP, and further agreements with the WHO and the IOM are planned.

32  Article 16(3)(e) of the Decision.

The Commission took steps towards ensuring a smooth 
transition into the recovery phase

47 
Towards the end of a disaster, in the closing phase of the civil protection re-
sponse, the Commission has an obligation to facilitate a smooth handover among 
all relevant actors32. To this end, handover meetings took place for all three dis-
asters, aimed at ensuring a smooth transition to humanitarian aid/further invest-
ment (see Box 2).

48 
For all three disasters, post-disaster needs assessments were carried out jointly 
by the UN, the World Bank and the European Commission. Following the floods 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ERCC actively participated in the selection of 
experts for the recovery needs assessment and carried out a related preparatory 
mission. ECHO also collaborated closely with DG NEAR ahead of the July 2014 
international donor conference of the country’.

2 Coordinating the transition into the recovery phase in Bosnia and Herzegovina
x
o
B

The case of the Austrian water purification module in the Posavina canton in Bosnia and Herzegovina can 
serve as an illustration of a thorough handover. As assistance was being phased out, the EUCP team collabor-
ated with the local working group — in which local governments, water suppliers, international teams and 
several NGOs were represented — to agree on a strategy to provide drinking water until enough wells had 
been tested and, if necessary, cleaned. This resulted in the need for the Austrian team to stay for 2 months. 
Their large capacity made a phased withdrawal of the other teams possible and also ensured that the working 
group was connected to the national Unicef-led WASH33 cluster.

33  Water, sanitation and hygiene.

 
25

34  European Emergency Disaster 
Response Information System. 
EDRIS is a web-based 
information system used to 
identify EU humanitarian aid 
contributions. EDRIS is not 
part of the UCPM.

Observations 

While the Commission established a framework for 
collecting, disseminating and exchanging information, 
there is room for improvement on reporting

The Commission’s CECIS communication platform is useful 
for information sharing, but further improvement is needed 
to enhance its impact

49 
Information sharing lies at the heart of the UCPM and is instrumental in effective 
coordination. It is facilitated by the ERCC’s key communication tool, CECIS. This 
provides a central platform for issuing updates on emergencies as they develop, 
distributing information products and keeping an overview of the assistance 
requested, offered, and accepted or rejected.

50 
The assistance overview is a key feature of CECIS in responding to a disaster. 
Participating States have specifically expressed their appreciation of this feature. 
However, we found that there is room for improvement in both the presentation 
of the overviews and the efficiency of compiling them. For example, although 
the application offers a summary of requests and offers, it does not show the 
total accepted offers and outstanding needs per request, nor does it show a re-
quest’s status. Requests that have already been met can be distinguished from 
those which are still waiting for offers, but this information can only be retrieved 
manually. This proves challenging where there is a high volume of requests. Such 
limitations make the summary complex to read and impair the ERCC’s ability 
to provide Participating States with a central, real-time overview. Participating 
States have confirmed that this is a significant limitation.

51 
Keeping track of all in-kind and financial contributions in a multifaceted crisis 
(like the Ebola outbreak), where civil protection assistance and humanitarian aid 
often overlap, is another challenge. The Commission has highlighted weaknesses 
in EDRIS34, and outlined the immediate actions taken to mitigate these, in its 
Ebola lessons-learned report. In April 2016 the Commission enabled a real-time 
link between EDRIS and CECIS with the aim of providing a consolidated overview 
of both civil protection assistance and humanitarian aid. This feature was not 
available at the time of the audit, and so we were unable to assess its usefulness.

26

35  For example, several types of 
communications coexist: 
important operational 
messages (such as requests for 
assistance or relevant logistical 
details), administrative 
communications (such as 
transport co-financing 
requests and grants), reports 
and meeting minutes.

36  Article 16(3)(a)(iii) of the 

Decision.

Observations 

52 
The lack of mobile access to CECIS constitutes an important limitation for de-
ployed EUCP teams in the field. Having simplified, read-only access to the 
summary of requests and offers (see paragraph 50) could allow for a complete 
overview of the EU’s accepted and pending offers, enabling the team to further 
facilitate coordination on the ground.

53 
Messages exchanged between the ERCC and the Participating States — of which 
there may be hundreds during any given disaster — in the CECIS logbook can 
only be filtered with difficulty. Our analysis of the logbook highlighted that no 
distinction is made between operational messages and administrative com-
munications35, which may hinder the quick follow-up of important operational 
matters. A Commission internal audit on CECIS in 2012 underlined the underuse 
of the filtering system, especially by the Participating States, and recommended 
an awareness campaign targeting the ERCC duty officers and the Participating 
States. Despite such a campaign being undertaken, the situation remains largely 
unchanged.

54 
The current procedure for introducing transport support requests is heavily 
manual and therefore time consuming for both the ERCC and the Participating 
States. This represents an unnecessary administrative burden, particularly in the 
context of crisis onset. Useful information concerning the shipment of the as-
sistance (departure time, arrival time, etc.) remains locked in paper forms instead 
of being recorded in the CECIS database, making it unusable by the system in the 
production of reports and transport overviews.

Information products and maps were widely shared and 
there are indications that they were useful

55 
The Commission should share assessments and analyses with all relevant part-
ners36. For all three disasters examined, we found sufficient evidence that the 
Commission had shared assessments and analyses with the Participating States 
by regularly publishing civil protection messages, situation reports and crisis 
flashes in CECIS.

Observations 

27

56 
The Commission’s Copernicus Emergency Management Service, which provides 
geospatial information derived from satellite remote sensing, was activated for 
all three disasters. The production of maps was coordinated with the UN’s map-
ping service, Unosat37, and the auditors found no evidence of duplicated efforts. 
The maps produced by Copernicus were available on the publicly accessible 
Copernicus website38.

57 
While plenty of maps were produced for each disaster examined, finding docu-
mented evidence of their relevance mid-response is by nature challenging. 
Never theless, the auditors found one instance where a Copernicus map contrib-
uted directly to the decision-making process during the floods in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (see Box 3).

37  We have evidence of 

a dialogue between Unosat 
and the ERCC, and they have 
access to each other’s tools.

38  http://emergency.copernicus.

eu/mapping/

39  Article 16(3)(a)(iii) and 16(4) of 

the Decision.

40  Article 16(8) of the Decision.

41  Bosnia and Herzegovina: DG 
NEAR and EUFOR; Ebola: DG 
DEVCO, FPI, DG SANTE, DG 
MOVE, DG RTD, ECDC, 
Eurocontrol; Nepal: DG DEVCO 
and FPI.

The Commission organised inclusive meetings which sought 
to promote information exchange with EU bodies and 
consistency in the delivery of assistance

58 
The Commission is supposed to share its assessments and analyses not only with 
its civil protection partners but also with the EEAS, thus ensuring coherence 
between the civil protection operations and the Union’s overall relations with the 
affected country39. The Commission may also take any additional supporting or 
complementary action to ensure consistency in the delivery of assistance40. For 
all three crises examined, ECHO organised interservice coordination meetings 
for all relevant DGs and EU agencies, and the EEAS41, making use of the ERCC as 
a central convening platform. We obtained evidence to suggest that these meet-
ings proved to be inclusive and sought to mitigate the risk of overlap/duplication 
in the EU response.

3 Copernicus map contributed to improved decision-making in Bosnia and 
x
o
B

Herzegovina

In May 2014 the municipality of Odžak, a town located in the Posavina Canton in northern Bosnia and Herze-
govina, was severely affected by the flooding of the river Sava. On 26 May 2014 the Danish team, based in 
Modriča, was ready to pump water in a particularly flooded part of Odžak. At a later stage, when the local 
pump station was re-established with the support of local engineers and Danish technical experts, the Danish 
and German teams jointly assessed the area, using maps provided by the EU’s mapping service, Copernicus. 
The maps were provided by the EU OSOCC, based at Orašje Football Stadium. The maps were used to deter-
mine the depth of the mud and the status of the ground beneath. It was concluded that it was safe to simply 
dig deeper, letting the water sink into the ground, rather than selecting the more time-consuming option of 
pumping. The digging option also eliminated the need to relocate the water after pumping. Without such 
a map, the team would not have been able to assess the situation correctly and would most likely not have 
taken the risk of digging rather than pumping.

 
Observations 

28

59 
The Commission involved the EEAS (both the headquarters and the EUDs) from 
the outset of the analysed crises by including them in the coordination meet-
ings and in a regular exchange of information. In fact, the ERCC was in contact 
with the EEAS even before each official UCPM activation. Member States did not 
request activation of the UCPM in order to obtain civil protection support for 
consular assistance in any of the disasters examined. In the case of Nepal, how-
ever, the EEAS did activate its Consular Online tool (CoOL) to share information 
with Member States and the ERCC; ECHO mainly provided the EEAS with flight 
information based on the overviews it had in CECIS42.

42 

In 2013, a joint ECHO–EEAS 
exploratory mission to Nepal 
recommended a joint EU 
preparedness plan for 
strengthening coordination 
on consular issues (and this 
recommendation was 
reiterated in a follow-up 
mission in 2014). While such 
a proactive, specific mission is 
an example of good practice, 
the preparedness plan was 
never devised.

60 
Coordination and collaboration among Commission departments generally 
worked well. DG DEVCO demonstrated  flexibility in providing early additional 
humanitarian assistance to ECHO during the Ebola outbreak through the realloca-
tion of funding from the EDF’s B-Reserve,  as well as the rapid deployment of its 
mobile CBRN laboratories. Moreover, ECHO coordinated closely with DG DEVCO 
for the High-Level Conference in March 2015, during the Ebola outbreak.

By acting as a forum for information exchange, the Ebola 
Task Force added value to the response, but should have 
been established sooner

61 
The Ebola outbreak in west Africa was an atypical disaster from the point of view 
of the UCPM. The Commission and EU agencies reacted quickly to the initial 
reports of the outbreak: the ECDC circulated its first rapid risk assessment on 
the subject in March 2014; the European Mobile Laboratory was deployed to 
the  region in April; the outbreak was discussed several times by the Health and 
Secur ity Committees (HSCs) between April and August 2014; and funding was 
quickly mobilised for some key ECHO partners. The initial response, however, 
lacked a strategic approach and it was not decided who would be in charge. 
After the escalation of the crisis and the declaration of a Public Health Emergency 
of International Concern (PHEIC) by the WHO on 8 August 2014, coordination 
meetings were organised, although these were often not results oriented and so 
lacked clear action and follow-up points.

Observations 

29

62 
An Ebola Task Force (ETF) was established in October, about 6 weeks after the 
European Council called on 30 August 2014 for increased coordination and the 
adoption of a comprehensive response framework (CRF). The CRF was developed 
throughout September and underwent numerous revisions over the following 
weeks. All of this occurred several months after the initial outbreak. At the end 
of October, the Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management was 
appointed the EU Ebola Coordinator by the European Council to provide political 
coordination.

43  The International 

Humanitarian Partnership 
(IHP) is a network between 
seven European emergency 
management agencies. The 
member countries of the IHP 
are also UCPM Participating 
States, but they nevertheless 
gave a presentation to the ETF 
on their activities as IHP 
members.

63 
The Coordinator played an important role in drawing Member States’ attention 
to critical actions and the support needed to scale up the response (for example, 
organising a joint visit to west Africa in October 2014, as well as high-level meet-
ings and the March 2015 Brussels Donor Conference). As can be seen in Annex V, 
these developments — while necessary — came after the number of cases had 
already peaked.

64 
The establishment of the ETF — which was hosted by the ERCC — was welcomed 
by all stakeholders as an important step in strengthening the coordination and 
development of the EU’s response. Its terms of reference were operational in 
nature, and included ensuring complementarity and identifying synergies. Its 
approach was inclusive: in addition to other Commission services, the EEAS, EU 
agencies, the Council Secretariat and Member States (including some national 
Ebola coordinators), and representatives of the WHO, OCHA, WFP, Unicef, IHP43 
and several NGOs acting on the front line of the response, attended the ETF 
meetings. According to numerous stakeholders, the real-time situation updates 
communicated by the EUDs and the ECHO Field Network representatives was 
of particular value. We found that the ETF served primarily as an information 
exchange platform to promote coordination, rather than as a decision-making 
body.

65 
Despite some weaknesses in information management (information overload; 
distribution lists not always being up to date), the ETF was able to contribute to 
ensuring greater coordination and a more consistent delivery of response. Three 
examples illustrate this:

(a)  It emerged during discussions in the ETF that two separate EEAS and Com-

mission (ECHO, DG DEVCO, DG SANCO and FPI) field missions were being 
organised for the end of October 2014. Steps were taken to mitigate the risk 
of overlap and duplication by producing a joint mission report.

Observations 

30

(b)  DG SANTE was able to channel the information shared in the Task Force 

towards the HSC, and to help plan and develop the DG SANTE and ECHO-
organised workshops (on, for example, safety and control issues and the 
European Medical Corps).

(c)  ECDC staff and epidemiologists from ECDC fellowship programmes were 

deployed through the WHO’s Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network 
(GOARN) to support epidemiological investigations at the district level, 
including case finding and contact tracing. While the cooperation between 
the epidemiologists and the WHO was considered to have worked well on 
the whole, the ECDC reported to the ETF that the deployed experts had faced 
considerable logistical problems. ECHO subsequently launched a mission to 
identify ways of improving the support for the teams.

66 
During the Ebola outbreak, the fact that there was no guarantee of a medevac 
for (potentially) infected international healthcare and humanitarian aid workers 
deterred some such individuals from accepting deployment to the region. The 
collaboration both within and without the ETF between ECHO, DG SANTE and 
the WHO to establish an EU medevac system represents an example of effective 
coordination, although this took a long time to develop considering the urgency 
and central importance of the need (see Box 4).

4 The development of the EU medevac system was a complex and lengthy operation
x
o
B

The acute need for medical evacuations of humanitarian aid workers and healthcare workers was expressed 
by MSF and the United Nations in August and September 2014 respectively44. ECHO worked closely with DG 
SANTE and the WHO to develop standard operating procedures for an EU medevac system, which were ap-
proved by the HSC on 14 October. In parallel, the Commission looked for means of transport (planes) in both 
the civil/commercial45 and military domain46. After the Commission was unable to get the Participating States 
to commit to making civil assets available for medical evacuation efforts, on 5 September 2014 ECHO formally 
asked the EEAS to activate its EU Movement and Planning Cell (EUMPC), with the aim of finding a solution 
involving use of military assets. Despite the close collaboration between ECHO and the EUMPC, Member 
States’ willingness to commit military assets was very limited. The lack of previous experience in this area, the 
absence of ready-made technical solutions and the time required to adapt the assets and register them posed 
further considerable obstacles to timely delivery. Eventually the EU medevac system was completed when 
Luxembourg pledged two planes to the voluntary pool, and it became available from mid February 2015.

44  The acute need for medical evacuation was expressed explicitly by MSF on 11 August 2014; the UN OCHA sent a request for medical evacuation 

capacities to the ERCC and NATO on 1 September 2014.

45  Although Member States were able to carry out medical evacuations on a bilateral basis, and the Commission had a commercial option available, 

this was not considered sufficient.

46 

It can be activated through a formal request from ECHO when no civil alternatives can fulfil the needs in a given crisis (in principle, military 
solutions should always be the last resort).

 
Observations 

31

The Commission does not make full use of the information at 
its disposal to report on both its own and the UCPM’s overall 
performance

67 
In ECHO’s annual management plans and activity reports, the Commission has 
defined one indicator relating to the response phase of a disaster47, more specifi-
cally to the timeliness of the response. However, the indicator covers elements 
outside the Commission’s control48. This makes accounting for its own perform-
ance difficult.

47  Result indicator 1: Average 

speed of interventions under 
the UCPM (from offer 
acceptance to deployment).

48  For example, resources made 
available by Participating 
States, or nominations of 
Participating States’ experts.

68 
The UCPM’s main communication tool, CECIS, does not capture performance data 
in an automated, structured way, making identifying performance data a manual, 
time-consuming exercise. Since the dataset that can be automatically exploited 
by the system is limited, CECIS cannot produce detailed reports or management 
information on the operational efficiency of the different steps of an emergency 
response — whether or not those steps are under the Commission’s direct con-
trol. A number of Participating States said that they would like CECIS to generate 
more aggregated performance information.

69 
The absence of quantitative performance statistics on, for example, time liness or 
outstanding requests awaiting offers deprives the Commission and the Par-
ticipating States of essential information to measure UCPM performance and 
its added value, which could help strengthen its continued acceptance by its 
stakeholders.

Conclusions and 
recommendations

32

70 
We conclude that the Commission has been broadly effective in facilitating the 
coordination of responses to disasters outside the Union since the beginning of 
2014. Our overall assessment has been confirmed by all the Participating States 
that responded to our questionnaire. They expressed satisfaction with the role 
played by the Commission in facilitating coordination.

71 
For each of the three disasters we examined, activation of the Union Civil Pro-
tection Mechanism (UCPM) was timely (see paragraphs 17 to 19), and the EU 
civil protection teams (EUCP teams) facilitated coordination on the ground with 
Participating States’ teams (see paragraphs 26 to 27). The Commission’s facilita-
tion of coordination is strengthened through the widespread dissemination of 
information products, which were considered useful (see paragraphs 55 to 57).

72 
The Commission adopted an inclusive approach towards coordination amongst 
its own services, as well as with other EU and non-EU bodies (see paragraphs 
34 to 37; and paragraphs 58 to 66). Although the degree to which EU coordin-
ation activities were integrated into the UN system varied between disasters, we 
conclude that the Commission respected the UN’s overall lead (see paragraphs 
41 to 46). The Commission’s coordination role extended to the end phase of the 
responses, taking steps to ensure a smooth transition into the recovery phase 
(see paragraphs 47 to 48).

73 
An important innovation of the legislation establishing the UCPM has been the 
development of the European Emergency Response Capacity (or ‘voluntary 
pool’), which establishes pre-committed resources for response. The develop-
ment of the voluntary pool has been slow, meaning that the Commission was not 
in a position to recommend the deployment of specific assets in its response to 
the disasters we examined. Nevertheless, the Commission played an important 
role in extending the scope of the pool when needed (see paragraphs 28 to 32).

Conclusions and recommendations 

33

74 
Notwithstanding our overall conclusion, we found a number of areas for further 
improvement. The Commission could gain time during the pre-alert phase and 
during the selection and deployment of the EUCP teams (see paragraphs 20 to 
25). A number of features in CECIS, the Commission’s communication and infor-
mation platform, could be further improved (see paragraphs 49 to 54). There is 
room for further enhancement of on-the-ground coordination, and more syner-
gies could be sought between civil protection and humanitarian aid operations 
(see paragraphs 38 to 40). The Commission’s and ECDC’s financial and administra-
tive arrangements did not lend themselves well to the large-scale deployment 
of epidemiologists through the UCPM during the Ebola crisis (see paragraph 33). 
Finally, the Commission could improve UCPM performance reporting (see para-
graphs 67 to 69). We make five recommendations below to address these points.

Recommendation 1 — Gaining time in the critical early stages 
of a response

The Commission should:

(a)  make earlier use of the pre-alert phase in CECIS for slow-onset disasters– as 

soon as first indicators of impact and/or needs arise — to allow Participating 
States to mobilise resources ahead of UCPM activation;

(b)  following requests for assistance, send out requests for nominations of 

experts immediately if a substantial response from Participating States to 
a major disaster can be reasonably expected;

(c) 

identify ways to speed up the selection and deployment of EUCP teams, and 
invite Participating States to develop, together with the Commission, peer-
based expert performance evaluations as well as post-mission feedback ses-
sions between the team and Commission headquarters;

(d)  develop a written log of any contact made with Participating States having 

close ties to the affected country, which may therefore be in a good position 
to assist.

Target implementation date: end of first half of 2017

Conclusions and recommendations 

34

Recommendation 2 — Improving CECIS’ features

In order to improve the overview of assistance provided and requested, to allow 
for a better follow-up of priorities and to enhance user-friendliness, the Commis-
sion should redesign a number of key features in CECIS, including:

(a)  automating the gap analyses of requests made versus requests fulfilled and 

introducing a sorting option;

(b)  providing EUCP teams in the field with a simplified, real-time version of the 

summary of requests and offers;

(c)  automating the workflow for transport support requests to enable a faster 

end-to-end process and the production of statistics and real-time overviews;

(d)  taking further steps to filter operational and administrative messages effect-

ively and identifying measures to strengthen the usage of this feature.

Target implementation date:
Agreement of requirements and action plan with stakeholders:  
end of first half of 2017 
Tendering, implementation and testing: end of 2018

Recommendation 3 — Strengthening coordination and 
potential synergies on the ground

The Commission should:

(a)  enhance the EUCP teams’ reporting from the field by requiring clearer de-
scriptions of the needs assessments carried out and concrete follow-up of 
identified needs;

(b)  identify how the ECHO Field Network might be further exploited to support 
the work of the EUCP teams in general, and situation and needs assessments 
specifically;

(c)  identify more opportunities for strengthening reciprocal knowledge be-

tween civil protection and humanitarian assistance providers, including those 
in the UN cluster system;

(d)  designate ‘civil protection focal points’ within the ECHO Field Network 

national and regional offices; it should also — together with the EEAS — des-
ignate ‘civil protection focal points’ among staff in EUDs in at-risk countries. 
These focal points, would be provided with regular training on developments 
in the UCPM and procedures for its activation.

Target implementation date: end of 2017

Conclusions and recommendations 

35

Recommendation 4 — Exploring potential changes to 
arrangements for deploying epidemiologists

In the event that the EU decides to deploy epidemiologists through the UCPM in 
response to future large-scale emergencies with health consequences outside 
the Union — and taking full account of WHO’s lead in this regard — the Com-
mission and the ECDC should jointly explore possible changes to the existing 
administrative and financial arrangements that might facilitate rapid and flexible 
deployments.

Target implementation date: beginning of 2018

Recommendation 5 — Strengthening accountability through 
improved reporting

To provide itself and the Participating State with information that could further 
enhance the performance, added value and acceptance of the UCPM, the Com-
mission should:

(a)  set key performance indicators in respect of those parts of the response that 

fall within its control and for which it can be held accountable;

(b)  develop automatically generated statistics and reports based on CECIS data 
to compare the responses to different activations and identify areas for im-
provement of the UCPM;

Target implementation date:
Definition of key performance indicators: end of first half 2017
Generation of statistics and reports: end of 2018 (see Recommendation 2)

This Special Report was adopted by Chamber III, headed by Mr Karel PINXTEN, 
Member of the Court of Auditors, in Luxembourg at its meeting of 8 November 
2016.

For the Court of Auditors

Klaus-Heiner LEHNE
President

 
 
 
Annexes

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Annexes 

37

Union Civil Protection Mechanism — Relationship among the actors as of 
31 August 2016

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Annexes 

38

I Overview of the three disasters examined
I
I
x
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n
n
A

Ebola in west Africa

Earthquake in Nepal

Floods in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Type of crisis

Start

Duration of on-site 
support

Affected population

Epidemic

March 2014

22 months

> 28 000 infection cases
> 11 200 deaths

Impact of the crisis

Devastating effects on security, health 
and economy of the whole region.

UCPM activation 
requestor

World Health Organisation (WHO) 
through UN OCHA

UCPM activation date

14 August 2014

UCPM Participating 
States taking part in the 
response

14

Earthquake

25 April 2015

~ 3 weeks

800 000 affected 
8 700 deaths
2 200 injured

Several villages destroyed.
> 510 000 houses destroyed
> 286 767 houses damaged

Nepali authorities

26 April 2015

17

Floods / Landslides

13-15 May 2014

~ 2.5 weeks

3 000 000 affected
76 deaths

Hundreds of thousands of people lost 
their livelihoods and key infrastructure 
was damaged

Ministry of Security of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina

17 May 2014 

19

UN role

Main international 
actors

Deployed EUCP team

Assistance offered 
through the UCPM

WHO was leading the response, 
supported by Unmeer, EU, US, UK, FR 
UNDAC team present

WHO, UNMEER, EU Ebola Task force 
(core: ECHO, DG DEVCO, DG SANCO, DG 
MOVE, ECDC, EEAS), US, UK, FR, MSF, 
other NGOs and bilateral donors

4 EU CP experts (as UNDAC team 
members)
1 ECHO Regional Logistic Coordinator

Food aid, medical kits, etc.
Blankets and chlorine

 •
 •
 • Mobile laboratories, treatment 

centres

 • Ambulances and field hospitals
 •

Logistical support, airlifting, navy 
ships
 • Medevac

UNDAC team present and UN cluster 
system activated

No UNDAC team and cluster system 
officially not activated although similar 
structures were effectively in place

United Nations (OCHA, UNDAC, Unicef, 
WFP), Relief International, bilateral 
donors, NGOs

UN, World Bank, bilateral donors, Red 
Cross, EUFOR, NGOs

3 ERCC liaison officers
10 EU CP experts

2 ERCC liaison officers
10 EU CP experts
1 ECHO technical assistant

 •

Search and rescue teams; base 
camps

 • Water purification modules
 • Medical teams
 •

Tents, blankets, sleeping bags, 
shelters

 • Water pumps,
 • Water purification units
 •
 •
 • Helicopters, rescue boats
 •

Sandbags
Food aid

Tents, blankets, heaters, towels

 
Annexes 

39

V Deployment of EU epidemiologists to Guinea
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Annexes 

40

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Reply of the  
Commission

Executive summary

41

VI
The Commission welcomes the constructive approach taken by the Court, which identifies room for improvement. 
This report contains pragmatic recommendations, which, once implemented, will improve the contribution of the 
UCPM to the capacity of the Participating States as well as to the provision of rescue and relief to the people in 
need.

VII
The Commission accepts all the recommendations.

Introduction

Box 1 — The voluntary pool explained
As of 1 October 2016, 16 Member States have registered or are in the process of registering a total of 78 response 
capacities to the voluntary pool.

Capacities have been committed from Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Finland, Denmark, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. Capacities from the 
voluntary pool were deployed on eight occasions so far, involving the response to Ebola and to the 2016 yellow 
fever outbreak, to forest fires inside EU Member States, to Ecuador following the 2016 earthquake and to Haiti fol-
lowing Hurricane Matthew (2016).

These operations involved water purification units, forest fire-fighting planes, public health and mobile labora-
tories, and technical assistance and support teams. These operations show the added value of the pool, and also 
indicate that assets from the pool will be used more and more frequently.

Observations

18
The Commission has begun in 2016 to use the ‘pre-alert’ mode whenever such signs are detected/forecast, in par-
ticular considering opening a pre-alert when a red alert in GDACS appears (also corroborating the potential human-
itarian impact). Since then the ‘pre-alert’ mode was used more than 12 times. For instance, for the earthquake in 
Ecuador (April 2016, a sudden-onset calamity), the pre-alert was opened almost 2 hours before the request from UN 
for expertise and 16 hours before the request from the affected country. Equally, during Hurricane Matthew in Haiti 
(October 2016, a slow onset), the pre-alert was opened 1.5 days before the request from the affected country.

21
This approach was used in the Ecuador earthquake (April 2016) when Participating States were informed about the 
EUCPT deployment 2 hours before offer and acceptance of a search and rescue team.

Reply of the Commission 

42

Common reply to paragraphs 23 and 24
The Civil Protection Committee established a specific Training Policy Group in order to discuss the EUCPT expert 
profiles and their functions within teams. However, it was agreed with the CPC that the Commission will bring 
another proposal about possible registration in the voluntary pool of categories of experts instead of individually 
named experts in the first half of 2017.

25
The Commission, in the new training cycle which started in May 2016, has started to implement in the training 
courses the principle that EUCPT candidates are being evaluated by the trainers and receive individual feedback at 
the end of the training. In addition, the national training coordinator may request to receive the evaluation forms 
for a specific expert of the same nationality.

29
After the significant increase of the pre-planned assets in 2016, it is expected that the use of the voluntary pool will 
significantly increase in the future. However, there are also disproportions and the Commission will adopt in the 
coming months a report on capacity gaps in the voluntary pool. 

38
The Commission, as a result of the recent ERCC lessons learnt, promoted progressive levels of close coordination 
and cooperation EUCP and the humanitarian aid instruments. Among other, various formal mechanisms have been 
discussed by the Commission's actors involved in both civil protection and humanitarian aid, including those in the 
field, through regional and HQ seminars.

40
The improved cooperation and coordination between EUCPT and the Humanitarian Aid field network made pos-
sible, for instance, that during the recent UCPM activation for Hurricane Matthew in Haiti (October 2016) most of 
the gaps in terms of needs have been identified via the Commission's own humanitarian aid network. However, the 
Commission agrees that outreach to colleagues in ECHO field offices and EU delegations needs to become more 
systematic.

50
As the Commission has already indicated that the ‘assistance overview’ functionality should  be redesigned in close 
collaboration with the users, the 12th Civil Protection Committee (June 2016) decided to call for a CECIS steering 
group meeting in order to address and regulate this kind of request.

51
The real-time link between EDRIS and CECIS is now implemented in CECIS. All actions taken in the context of a crisis, 
based on a common identifier, can now be displayed together on the same screen for civil protection and humani-
tarian aid. This functionality of EDRIS has been released in production still in 2016.

Reply of the Commission 

43

52
While security in CECIS is a real and permanent concern for the Participating States, it was stated in the draft civil 
protection work programme 2017 that the option to develop interface web services or webpages in order to export 
CECIS information to other ERCC information tools, such as the ERCC portal for the field, will be explored. 

53
As the Commission has already indicated that the CECIS logbook should be redesigned in close collaboration with 
the users, the 12th Civil Protection Committee (June 2016) decided to call for a CECIS steering group meeting in 
order to address and regulate this kind of request.

54
The draft civil protection work programme 2017 forsees to enable in CECIS a faster process for transport, and reduce 
the administrative workflow of support requests. 

66
Significant efforts were needed to establish a functional and safe evacuation process, combining the medical and 
logistical needs of the patient, the safety of the aircraft and pilots and the capacity of the receiving medical entity.

Common reply to paragraphs 67-69
The Commission acknowledges the findings and will make full use of the recommendations for addressing the 
issue, in addition to the already planned developments for the next years for improving CECIS’s usability and 
performance.

Conclusions and recommendations

73
The registration of assets for the voluntary pool has significantly increased in the last half of 2016. As of 1 October 
2016 there are 78 capacities registered or in process of being registered.

74
The Commission welcomes the constructive approach taken by the Court, which identified room for improve-
ment. This report contains pragmatic recommendations, which, once implemented, will improve the contribution 
of the UCPM to the capacity of the Participating States as well as to the provision of rescue and relief to the people 
in need. In addition the Commission will make use of the innovations of the legislation establishing the UCPM for 
extending resources use when needed. 

Recommendation 1
The Commission accepts the recommendation.

Reply of the Commission 

44

Recommendation 2
The Commission accepts the recommendation. Significant developments are planned in the coming years to 
improve CECIS’s usability in different domains. These points will be addressed with a steering/users group to define 
their priorities.

Recommendation 3
The Commission accepts the recommendation.

Recommendation 4
The Commission accepts the recommendation.

Recommendation 5
The Commission accepts the recommendation.

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Event

Adoption of the Audit Planning Memorandum/Start of audit

Official sending of draft report to Commission (or other auditee)

Adoption of the final report after the adversarial procedure

Commission’s (or other auditee’s) official replies received in all languages

Date

24.11.2015

28.9.2016

8.11.2016

7.12.2016

 
Disasters can strike anywhere, anytime. When a disaster 
occurs — whether natural or man made — the reaction 
must be swift. Sound disaster management saves lives, and 
effective coordination among different responders is critical 
to a successful response. The European Union Civil 
Protection Mechanism (UCPM) was established to promote 
swift and effective operational cooperation between 
national civil protection services, with an important role for 
the European Commission to facilitate coordination. We 
examined whether the Commission effectively facilitated 
such coordination through the UCPM during three recent 
international disasters: the floods in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (2014); the Ebola virus outbreak in west Africa 
(2014-2016); and the Nepal earthquake (2015). We conclude 
that, since the beginning of 2014, the Commission has been 
broadly effective in its coordinating role. We make 
a number of recommendations to help further improve the 
functioning of the UCPM during the response phase.

EUROPEAN
COURT
OF AUDITORS