COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL Enhancing security in a world of mobility: improved information exchange in the fight against terrorism and stronger external borders
Date: 2016-09-14
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: EU visa policy, Europol, Frontex, Schengen Agreement, border control, exchange of information, external border of the EU, information system, passport, personal data

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   EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 14.9.2016  COM(2016) 602 final   COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL Enhancing security in a world of mobility: improved information exchange in the fight against terrorism and stronger external borders  
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION 

The  Schengen  area  is  one  of  the  EU's  most  cherished  achievements,  bringing  unique 
economic and societal gains as an area without controls at internal borders. But the challenge 
of  maintaining  security  in  an  open  Europe  has  been  put  to  a  huge  test  in  recent  years.  The 
pressures  of  the  migration  and  refugee  crisis,  alongside  a  wave  of  terrorist  attacks,  have 
demanded a new approach. The European Agenda on Migration and the European Agenda on 
Security1 have shown how deeper cooperation provides an answer not only in terms of crisis 
response, but also in terms of using shared pools of expertise and knowledge to build a more 
robust and lasting European system, one equal to the task of providing the strong borders and 
smart intelligence needed to ensure a secure Europe.  

This  Communication  takes  this  agenda  a  step  further,  setting  out  practical  measures  to 
accelerate and broaden this work. It builds on a powerful consensus – in the institutions2 and 
in public opinion3 – that the EU must do its utmost to help Member States to protect citizens, 
in  a  way  which  maximises  the  opportunities  for  cooperation  while  guaranteeing  the  full 
respect of the fundamental rights on which EU societies are based. 

The  background  to  this  work  must  be  a  determined  effort  to  maintain  progress  on  the  full 
range  of  measures  under  the  European  Agenda  on  Migration  and  the  European  Agenda  on 
Security.  

Strong  borders  also  means  reducing  the  risk  of  the  exceptional  pressures  seen  over  the  past 
year, by carrying forward the huge efforts undertaken to restore a stable situation in terms of 
humanitarian  standards  and  migration  management  in  the  wake  of  the  crisis.  It  means  a 
common approach on asylum and return while also enhancing pathways for legal migration. It 
means  working  through  the  Partnership  Framework  to  reduce  the  root  causes  of  irregular 
migration  and  consolidate  a  new  phase  in  migration  cooperation  with  key  partners.4  In  this 
way a strong external border will also provide the bedrock for Schengen as an area without 
controls at internal borders – as set out in the "Back to Schengen" roadmap5 – and enhance 
mobility. 

On the security side, an effective and genuine Security Union6 means Member States working 
closely  together  on  matters  of  security,  acknowledging  that  the  internal  security  of  one 
Member State is the internal security of all Member States and of the Union as a whole. Work 
in  areas  such  as  preventing  and  fighting  radicalisation,  improving  information  exchange, 
protecting citizens and critical infrastructures and cutting the access of terrorists and criminals 
to firearms or financing needs to be urgently carried through to use every opportunity at the 
EU's  disposal  to  tackle  security  threats.  Full  and  swift  implementation  in  all  these  areas 
provides the springboard to move still further. 

1   COM(2015) 185 final, 28 April 2015 and COM(2015) 240 final, 13 May 2015. 
2  

See for example the Joint Statement of EU Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs and representatives of 
EU institutions on the terrorist attacks in Brussels on 22 March 2016 (24 March 2016). 
In a recent Eurobarometer survey, 71% called for more EU action in relation to external borders and 82% in 
relation to counter-terrorism (Special Eurobarometer of the European Parliament, June 2016). 
"Communication  on  establishing  a  new  Partnership  Framework  with  third  countries  under  the  European 
Agenda on Migration", COM(2016)385 final, 7 June 2016. 
"Back to Schengen - A Roadmap", COM(2016) 120 final, 4 March 2016. 
"Delivering on the European Agenda on Security to fight against terrorism and pave the way towards and 
effective and genuine Security Union", COM(2016) 230 final, 20 April 2016. 

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4  

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6  

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This  Communication  sets  out  key workstreams  to  further  implement  the  European  Agendas 
on  Migration  and  Security  and  the  Security  Union.  Taken  together,  the  measures  are  key 
building  blocks  for  managing  migration,  facilitating  bona  fide  travel,  and  working  with 
Member  States  to  enhance  security.  The  faster  effective  and  interactive  systems  are  put  in 
place, the faster the benefits will be felt. This Communication therefore shows how this work 
must  be  accelerated,  as  well  as  highlighting  additional  developments  in  the  short  term  to 
further improve the management of external borders, to address security needs and ensure that 
border  guards,  customs  authorities,  asylum  services,  police  officers  and  judicial  authorities 
have the right information. This intensified use of data puts a particular onus on the need to 
respect  fundamental  rights  and  data  protection  rules  –  this  means  well-designed,  correctly-
used  and  properly-regulated  technology  and  information  systems,  and  full  safeguards  to 
ensure the protection of private life and personal data. 

2. 

MOBILITY  AND  SECURITY  THROUGH  STRONG  BORDERS  AND 
EFFECTIVE INFORMATION EXCHANGE 

Strong external borders play a key role in allowing internal mobility. This is all the more true 
for the European Union, where the strength of the external border  is a precondition for free 
movement within the Schengen area. Every year, there are some 400 million crossings of the 
Schengen  border  by  EU  citizens,  and  200  million  by  non-EU  citizens.  The  daily  reality  of 
border  control  is  of  central  importance  to  the  EU  economy,  to  EU  society,  and  to  relations 
with our neighbours.  

Border  control  needs  to  offer  both  efficiency  and  security.  Straightforward  travel  for  the 
millions  of  Europeans  and  non-Europeans  crossing  the  border  must  offer  lighter  and 
streamlined procedures to benefit both EU citizens and 'bona fide' third country travellers. The 
result  is  major  economic  benefit  to  an  EU  economy  built  on  trade,  and  savings  for  hard-
pressed public authorities. But at the same time, it must enhance the other objectives of border 
management, such as tackling irregular migration, and identifying security risks. The answer 
lies  in  balancing  the  different  demands  of  border  management  through  efficient,  secure  and 
comprehensive  steps  tailor-made  to  different  kinds  of  arrivals,  reconciling  the  benefits  of 
increased mobility with the imperative of security. 

Many travellers are seeking a short-term stay in the EU for business, leisure or study, entering 
with a visa where required. In these cases, as in the case of all legal pathways to come to the 
EU,  the  border  represents  an  opportunity  to  check  that  all  entry  conditions  are  met  and  to 
welcome people to Europe.  

But the migration and refugee crisis has put the spotlight on the particular need to manage the 
irregular  arrivals.  The  EU  has  obligations  towards  those  in  need  of  international  protection, 
who need to be channelled towards the asylum system. On the other hand, those who have not 
used the legal pathways available and who have no right to stay need to return or be returned. 
It is therefore essential that everyone is registered as required on entry into the Schengen area, 
is subject to the appropriate identification and screening procedures, and is hosted in facilities 
which ensure that the necessary checks can be made. 

Shortcomings and gaps, including weaknesses at the EU's external borders, have been clearly 
demonstrated  in  the  response  to  the  migration  and  refugee  crisis.  Major  efforts  have  been 
needed  to  restore  effective  border  management.  These  include  the  unprecedented  work  to 
support Member States in the frontline through the "hotspot" approach; the step-by-step work 

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to return to the orderly application of the Schengen rules to protect the external border; and a 
deep level of cooperation and coordination to maintain a day-to-day scrutiny of the evolving 
situation.  These  efforts  must  continue,  most  obviously  in  Greece  and  Italy  where  there 
continue to be weaknesses in the structures put in place, the speed of implementation, and the 
supply of essential expertise from other Member States. This is why the early implementation 
of the European Border and Coast Guard is essential. 

Whilst borders are only part of the solution to security,  gaps in border control bring gaps in 
security.  The  emergence  of  foreign  terrorist  fighters  as  a  major  security  risk  has  underlined 
the cross-border  threat and the particular importance  of comprehensive and effective border 
checks,  including  on  EU  citizens.  This  adds  to  broader  concerns  that  counter-terrorism  has 
been hampered by the ability of terrorists  to operate across borders, putting the spotlight on 
gaps in the sharing of key intelligence. 

The  EU  can  use  the  opportunities  for  a  common  approach  to  build  a  powerful  system 
harnessing  its  scale  to  bring  citizens  more  security.  If  the  EU  uses  its  law  enforcement  and 
border control tools to the full, exploits the potential of inter-operability between information 
sources to  identify any security concerns from a common pool  of information,  and uses the 
stage  of  entry  into  the  EU  as  a  key  point  for  security  checks  to  take  place,  the  result  will 
negate  the  ability  of  terrorist  networks  to  exploit  gaps.  This  is  at  the  heart  of  the  Security 
Union. 

This puts the focus on entry procedures and external border management. It calls for checks 
which are thorough, but which avoid unnecessary delays, pointing to the benefits of screening 
before travel. It requires quality and certainty in identity documents, facilitated by comparable 
security features and common approaches to fighting document fraud. It underlines the need 
for border controls to be secure, swift and modern, with systems and procedures allowing for 
quick and reliable access to the information needed to check identity and status. 

Avoiding security gaps through a common approach 

In  April  2016,  the  Commission  launched  a  debate  on  how  to  develop  stronger  and  smarter 
information  systems7  to  address  shortcomings  and  gaps  in  the  architecture  and  in 
interoperability  of  current  data  systems  and  to  realise  the  full  potential  of  these  systems  to 
identify security threats, in full compliance with data protection rules. The performance of a 
system  is  of  course  also  conditioned  by  the  quality  of  data  it  contains,  hence  the  need  for 
Member States to fully implement and use existing rules and systems – such as the Schengen 
Information  System,  the  Visa  Information  System,  the  Interpol  Stolen  and  Lost  Travel 
Documents database, EURODAC and Europol databases.  

In  the  face  of  the  terrorist  threat  faced  today,  the  efficiency  of  security  checks  is  highly 
dependent on the exchange of information not only between law enforcement authorities, but 
also  intelligence  communities.  Effective  and  timely  information-sharing  among  relevant 
authorities  is  a  prerequisite  for  successful  counter-terrorism  action.  But  there  remains 
fragmentation at both  national  and EU levels which can lead to  dangerous security gaps.  In 
building bridges between the two communities, the EU level can help, both by upgrading EU 

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"Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security", COM(2016) 205 final, 6 April 2016. 
An  important  element  in  the  Communication  was  to  set  up  a  High  Level  Expert  Group  on  Information 
Systems and Interoperability. 

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mechanisms by making full use of the possibilities for cooperation under the EU Treaties, and 
by helping to instil a culture of common responsibility, and the will and capacity to turn that 
into operational action. 

3. 

3.1 

KEY OPERATIONAL STEPS 

Creating  European  integrated  border  management:  The  European  Border  and 
Coast Guard 

The European Parliament and the Council acted swiftly to reach agreement on the European 
Border  and  Coast  Guard  proposal:8  following  formal  adoption  of  the  Regulation  this  week, 
everything  is  now  ready  for  the  European  Border  and  Coast  Guard  to  roll  out  its  full 
operation.  

The European Border and Coast Guard is a major advance in the EU's border management. It 
specifically  targets  the  weaknesses  so  obvious  in  the  migration  and  refugee  crisis:  the 
fragmentation  of  effort,  the  lack  of  consistency  in  border  control,  and  the  shortfalls  in  the 
provision  of  national  expertise.  It  will  enable  integrated  border  management  by  bringing 
together a powerful new European Border and Coast Guard Agency with the national services 
responsible  for  border  management,  including  coastguards  to  the  extent  that  they  carry  out 
border control tasks.9 The Agency will build on the work of Frontex with new tasks in areas 
like  return,  organising  a  systematic  EU  approach.  It  will  formalise  the  "hotspot"  approach 
being  used  today  to  help  Member  States  under  the  most  intense  pressure.  Crucially,  it  will 
ensure  high  and  uniform  standards,  with  mandatory  vulnerability  assessments  to  assess  the 
capacity  and  readiness  of  Member  States,  and  ultimately,  the  Agency  can  be  tasked  to 
intervene directly on the territory of a Member State.10  

The result marks a radical upgrade of the EU's ability to react to the fluctuating challenge of 
migrants  arriving  at  the  EU  external  border.  Response  capacity  will  be  on  a  permanent 
footing, with standing pools of national border guards – at least 1,500-strong – and technical 
equipment,  rather  than  relying  on  stop-start,  voluntary  contributions.  As  well  as  ensuring 
orderly  management  at  the  external  border,  it  would  mean  that  proper  identity  and  security 
checks are carried out. This is also linked to the need to modify the Schengen Borders Code to 
require systematic checks.11  

The European Border and Coast Guard will also be key to security. It will work with other EU 
agencies  such  as  Europol  and  Eurojust  to  prevent  and  detect  cross-border  crime  such  as 
migrant smuggling, trafficking in human beings and terrorism.12 It will also support Member 
States with expertise at the external borders, for example as part of operations against migrant 
smugglers. Members of the teams carrying out a border management operation will also now 

8   COM(2015) 671 final, 15 December 2015. 
9  

It will also have a stronger governance structure, including a complaint mechanism for fundamental rights 
and more accountability of the Agency to the European Parliament. 
If  shortcomings  in  the  control  of  the  external  borders  risk  jeopardising  the  functioning  of  the  Schengen 
area, and on the basis of an agreed operational plan. 

10  

11   COM(2015)  670  final,  15  December  2015.  Checks  would  be  made  against  relevant  law  enforcement 
databases  at  the  external  borders  on  all  persons,  including  EU  citizens  and  their  families,  to  screen  for 
threats to public order and internal security. 

12   The  Agency  should  also  take  into  account  the  Union  Customs  Risk  Management  and  Supply  Chain 
Security  Strategy,  providing  inter-agency  cooperation  and  information  sharing  among  customs,  law 
enforcement and security agencies. 

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be  able  to  consult  relevant  European  databases,  including  law  enforcement  databases.  This 
will ensure that the teams on the ground have access to the information they need – and this 
can  be  extended  to  national  databases  at  the  discretion  of  the  host  Member  State.13  The 
deepened  cooperation  with  Europol  and  Eurojust  will  require  a  particular  attention  to  data 
protection.  Personal  data  will  be  collected  during  the  Agency's  operational  activities, 
regarding persons who are suspected, on reasonable grounds, by the competent authorities of 
the  Member  States  of  involvement  in  cross-border  criminal  activities,  such  as  migrant 
smuggling, trafficking in human beings or terrorism. This will be transmitted to Europol and 
to  the  competent  authorities  of  the  Member  States  systematically  and  without  delay,  in 
accordance with national legislation and national and Union data protection rules. 

It is imperative for the European Border and Coast Guard to be up and running. The fact that 
the new Agency will work on the basis of today's Frontex means it can start implementing its 
core  tasks  from  the  first  day  of  work.  The  Commission,  Frontex  and  Member  States  have 
advanced  work  to  prepare  the  ground  for  the  rollout  of  its  full  operations.  Five  operational 
priorities  have  been  identified  for  action  even  before  the  entry  into  force  of  the  new 
Regulation.  These  involve  putting  in  place  the  mandatory  pooling  of  resources,  paving  the 
way  for  the  vulnerability  assessments  by  determining  a  common  methodology  and 
undertaking a pilot assessment, taking the first steps on the new tasks for return, and preparing 
standard models for recurrent tasks like the complaint mechanism and status agreements with 
third countries. As a result, the key functions of the Agency will be operational. 

These accelerated preparations must be pursued in parallel with intensified efforts to keep up 
the  pressure  to  ensure  strong  borders  under  the  current  regime.  The  ongoing  Frontex 
operations in Greece and Italy are still indispensable to restoring normal border management 
in  those  Member  States.  Other  operations  in  the  Balkans,  for  example  in  Bulgaria,  are  also 
key to preventing the emergence of new smuggling routes. Intensifying these operations and 
carrying them over smoothly under the European Border and Coast Guard framework is also 
critical to restoring the conditions for a return to a normally functioning Schengen by the end 
of 2016. This means being ready to deploy the first European Border Guards in October 2016. 
It  is  therefore  an  urgent  necessity  for  Member  States  to  address  the  current  shortfalls  in 
provision of experts in response to Frontex calls for Greece, Italy and Bulgaria.14  

Also important is the increase in the budget and staff of the Agency, as a consequence of the 
extension of the current  Frontex mandate  and new tasks.  This  will mean  the budget  will be 
more than trebled – by the end of 2017, staffing for the Agency will have more than doubled 
what was originally envisaged for Frontex. To support accelerating the implementation of the 
Regulation, there needs to be partial frontloading of the additional human resources foreseen 
for 2017. The Commission will make a proposal to the budget authority to allow the Agency 
to recruit staff members before the end of this year. The result should be that the Agency is 
immediately  able  to  take  over  Frontex's  existing  operations  and  respond  in  full  to  any 
emerging needs. 

The  Commission  is  committed  to  provide  financial  assistance  for  urgent  needs  to  Member 
States facing extreme pressure at the external borders of the Union. The Commission will also 
use the full range of EU funding possibilities, most obviously the support to borders through 

13   The High level Interoperability Group is also looking at the possibility of giving the agency direct access to 

the European databases, taking into account data protection considerations. 

14   As of 12 September 2016, the shortfalls in Member States' support stands at 253 for Joint Operation 

Poseidon, 129 for Joint Operation Triton, and 172 for the Joint Operations in Bulgaria.  

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the Internal Security Fund, to support the medium and long-term work of Member States to 
ensure their responsibilities to provide a strong external border. Full use of these opportunities 
can be a major support to the development of high-quality and consistent border measures. 

Next steps: 

Member States should: 
-  Fill the current shortfalls in response to calls for experts for Frontex operations in Greece, 

Italy and Bulgaria. 

-  Through  participation  in  the  Management  Board,  support  the  acceleration  of  the  new 

Agency's work. 

-  Ensure that the national contributions to the rapid reaction and technical equipment pools 
are ready for full use from "day one" – including starting the annual bilateral talks now so 
that the contributions for 2017 are clear well before the end of this year. 

Frontex should: 
-  Ensure that the methodology for the vulnerability assessment is agreed in October  2016 
and  the  pilot  completed  in  November  2016,  so  that  the  full  set  of  first  vulnerability 
assessments are concluded in the first three months of 2017. 

-  Ensure that the expert and equipment pools can be fully operational from the first day of 

operations. 

-  Speed up the recruitment of additional staff in order to carry out the enhanced mandate of 

the Agency. 

-  Ensure that the first European Border Guards are ready to be deployed in October 2016. 

The Commission will: 
-  Adopt the model status agreement with third countries by the end of October. 
-  Adopt  in  September  2016  the  budgetary  proposals  required  to  allow  the  Agency  to 
swiftly recruit additional staff, in particular a proposal for amending the 2016 budget. 
-  Continue  providing  timely  emergency  financial  assistance  to  Member  States  facing 

extreme pressure at the external borders. 

-  Provide administrative assistance to the Agency to facilitate the recruitment of necessary 

additional staff. 

-  Exploit the medium and long term possibilities offered by EU funds to support Member 

States' capacities at external borders. 

The European Parliament and the Council should: 
-  By the end of October, agree on the proposed amendment to the Schengen Borders Code. 
-  Fast-track the budget amendment to bring forward recruitments for the new Agency. 

3.2 

Stronger controls through the Entry-Exit System (EES) 

The Commission proposed a new Entry-Exit System in April 2016.15 The System will collect 
data (identity, travel document and biometrics) and register entry and exit records (date and 

15   COM(2016) 194 final, 6 April 2016. 

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place of entry and exit) at the point of crossing. This more modern system of external border 
management,  which  replaces  the  stamping  of  passports,  will  improve  the  effectiveness  of 
border  controls  and  help  ease  the  border  crossing  of  bona  fide  travellers  facing  the  risk  of 
extra delays with the ever-increasing number of travellers.  

It will have a particularly important role in ensuring the rules are applied to visa-free, as well 
as  visa-authorised,  access  to  the  EU.  It  will  also  help  to  identify  overstayers  (individuals 
remaining in the Schengen Area after the end of their authorised stay). The rules on short stay 
entry  (maximum  90  days  in  any  180  day  period)  in  the  Schengen  area  apply  to  all  third 
country nationals. So it will be a crucial tool in identifying all third country nationals staying 
in the Schengen area beyond this period. 

The  System  will  also  bring  a  contribution  to  security  more  broadly,  as  it  will  detect  and 
combat identity fraud as well as the misuse of travel documents and possible repeat attempts 
to  evade  controls,  since  it  would  also  record  refusals  of  entry.  The  possibility  for  law 
enforcement  authorities  to  access  the  system  will  support  the  fight  against  terrorism  and 
organised  crime.  As  such  it  will  contribute  to  the  prevention,  detection  and  investigation  of 
terrorism  and  other  serious  crime.  The  legislative  proposal  is  part  of  the  broader  'Smart 
Borders  Package',  addressing  the  role  of  information  systems  in  enhancing  external  border 
management, internal security and the fight against terrorism and organised crime. This also 
includes the Communication on 'Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and 
Security'  and  a  further  proposed  amendment  to  the  Schengen  Borders  Code  to  integrate  the 
technical changes needed for the Entry-Exit System.  

There  has  been  significant  and  speedy  progress  on  the  legal  proposals  in  Council,  both  at 
technical  and  political  level.  The  target  date  for  adoption  by  the  European  Parliament  and 
Council of the end of 2016 should be met. This will allow eu-LISA to start the development 
of the system in 2017, in view of having the system fully operational at the start of 2020. 

Next steps: 

The European Parliament and the Council should: 
-  By end 2016, agree on the Regulation for establishing an EU Entry-Exit System. 

3.3  Checking  visa-free  travellers  in  advance:  a  European  Travel  Information  and 

Authorisation System (ETIAS) 

An area of growing importance in finding the balance between mobility and security concerns 
legal entry into the Schengen area without the need for a visa. Visa liberalisation has proved 
an  important  tool  in  building  partnerships  with  third  countries,  including  as  a  means  of 
ensuring effective systems of return and readmission, and to increase the attractiveness of the 
EU  for  business  and  tourism.16  There  is  also  an  important  element  of  reciprocity,  with  visa 
liberalisation generally working both ways, also enabling EU citizens to travel easily abroad. 
This  points  to  a  steady  increase  in  the  rise  in  the  number  of  visa-exempt  travellers  to  the 

16   Almost  60  countries  worldwide  benefit  from  visa  free  travel  to  the  European  Union.  The  full  list  is 

contained in Annex II of the Visa Regulation 539/2001 of 15 March 2001, OJ L 81, 21.3.2001.  

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Schengen  area.  An  additional17  layer  of  systematic  control  for  visa-free  country  nationals 
would be a valuable complement to existing measures to maintain and strengthen the security 
of the Schengen area.  

The  idea  of  establishing  an  EU  Travel  Information  and  Authorisation  System  (ETIAS)  was 
launched in the Communication on Stronger and Smarter Information Systems in April 2016. 
The  Commission  has  now  decided  to  make  a  proposal  for  such  a  system.  It  would  be  an 
automated system used to determine the eligibility of visa exempt third country nationals to 
travel  to  the  Schengen  Area.  Countries  like  the  USA,  Canada  and  Australia  already  use 
similar systems and consider these as an important part of their essential security protections – 
as  a  result,  these  systems  are  now  familiar  to  many  Europeans.18  As  a  minimum,  it  would 
cover  all  visa  exempted  third  country  nationals  travelling  to  the  Schengen  Area  for  a  short 
stay  (maximum  90  days  over  any  period  of  180  days).  It  will  gather  information  on  these 
travellers prior to the start of their travel, to allow for advance processing. For the travellers, 
this will give them confidence that they would be able to pass the borders smoothly. For the 
EU authorities, this will allow to check for any potential security risk. It would therefore fulfil 
a dual function of border management and law enforcement.  

Such  a  system  would  allow  for  checks  against  other  databases  and  verify  the  application 
against set criteria and conditions. The objectives would be to ensure that: 

 

 

 
 
 
 

 

the  applicant  had  no  visa  application  refused  in  Visa  Information  System  (valid  for 
nationals of countries only recently granted visa waiver status); 
the  applicant  and  his/her  travel  document  is  not  subject  to  an  alert  in  the  Schengen 
Information System; 
the applicant is not subject to an alert in the Europol Information System; 
the travel document is not reported stolen or lost in the Interpol database; 
the applicant has no overstay or refusal of entry reported in the future Entry-Exit System; 
the intended travel complies with the short stay rules (intended duration combined with 
existing travel history is compatible with the 90-day over any period of 180-day rule); 
the applicant fulfils the entry conditions as defined in the Schengen Border Code. 

It would also be possible to make a link with Advance Passenger Information and Passenger 
Name  Record  databases.19  Applications  rejected  from  the  automatic  processing  would  be 
transferred to a central team, for example in an existing EU Agency – which could handle the 
straightforward issues like the non-respect of the short stay rules. Applications subject to an 
alert  in  a  database  could  be  forwarded  to  the  Member  State(s)  responsible  for  the  alert  for 
further verifications, for example through an interview of the applicant in a consular post. 

The Commission's proposal will address issues including the costs of developing and running 
the  system,  the  type  of  data  to  be  collected  and  assessed,  the  interoperability  with  other 
existing  and  future  systems,  operational  aspects  at  borders,  the  processing  of  data,  legal 

17   The  Commission  proposed  in  May  2016  a  revision  of  the  suspension  mechanism  in  Article  1a  of 
Regulation (EC) No 539/2001, allowing the temporary suspension of the visa exemption for nationals of a 
third country when certain conditions are met (COM(2016) 290 final). 

18   For example, the United States Electronic System for Travel Authorisation system was set up in 2007. This 
determines  the  eligibility  of  visitors  to  travel  to  the  US  under  its  Visa  Waiver  Program  by  requiring  an 
approved travel authorisation prior to travel. 

19   The Passenger Name Record Directive (PNR), though not as such a border control instrument, will bring 
critical new data on-stream for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences 
and serious crime. 

9 

 
 
 
                                                 
aspects  (including  data  protection  considerations),  human  resources  implications,  and  the 
impact on tourism and business.  

Next steps: 

The Commission will: 

-  Engage in further consultations and present a legislative proposal for the establishment 

of an EU Travel Information and Authorisation System by November 2016.  

3.4 Enhancing  identity  management  and  strengthening  the  fight  against  document 

fraud: Document Security 

Secure travel and identity documents are crucial whenever it is necessary to establish without 
doubt the identity of a person. Better management of free movement, migration and mobility 
relies on robust systems to prevent abuses and threats to internal security through failings in 
document security. 

The  EU  has  developed  a  coherent  approach  on  securing  travel  documents,  for  example  by 
moving towards the use of biometric data. This has resulted in harmonised solutions for EU 
citizens' passports,20 documents for third country nationals,21 and information systems.22 High 
standards relating to the protection of personal data have been ensured.  

However, there is evidence of increased document fraud in high-risk areas.23 In addition, the 
nature of document fraud is rapidly evolving. Criminal networks involved in false identity and 
travel  documents  are  becoming  more  specialised  and  are  constantly  developing  new 
techniques, including manipulating anti-forgery devices and circumventing biometric checks. 
Even  if  the  introduction  of  more  sophisticated  security  features,  production  methods  and 
document  inspection  systems  is  making  forging  or  counterfeiting  of  identity  and  travel 
documents  more  difficult,  fraudsters  will  look  for  other  ways  to  evade  detection.  They  also 
target  other  types  of  documents  such  as  national  ID  cards  and  "breeder"  documents  (birth, 
marriage  and  death  certificates)  which  are  used  as  supporting  documents  to  obtain  genuine 
identity, residence and travel documents. 

EU  agencies  are  already  heavily  involved  in  efforts  to  combat  document  fraud.  Frontex 
provides Member States with document expert teams and tools for inspection for first arrivals 
of  migrants  in  the  hotspots,  as  well  as  training  and  risk  analysis.  The  European  Counter 
Terrorism  Centre  in  Europol  is  working  on  the  link  between  fraudulent  documents  and 
terrorism,  while  document  security  is  a  key  issue  in  the  work  of  the  Europol  European 
Migrant Smuggling Centre.  

20   Regulation  (EC)  2252/2004  on  standards  for  security  features  and  biometrics  in  passports  and  travel 

documents issued by Member States. 

21   Such  as  visa  (Regulation  (EC)  1683/95),  residence  permits  for  third  country  nationals  (Regulation  (EC) 

1030/2002) and facilitated (rail) travel documents (Regulation 693/2003). 

22     Visa Information System and Schengen Information System. 
23   Europol has pointed to concerns that in the last two years, criminal gangs have been increasingly investing 
more in the production of fake documents to support a growing criminal market associated with the migrant 
crisis. Document fraud is now a highly important enabler of organised crime operated by groups involved 
in stealing or producing counterfeit passports and other travel documents (statement of 31 May 2016). 
10 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
The  Commission  constantly  monitors  technical  developments  and  upgrades  the  security 
features of the visa format, residence permits for third country nationals and passports issued 
by  Member  States,  paying  particular  attention  to  fundamental  rights  and  personal  data 
protection. Two recent proposals to upgrade and re-design the visa and residence permit have 
been made.24 The urgent adoption of these proposals will be an important step forward.  

In addition, in its Communication on ‘Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders 
and  Security’  the  Commission  looked  ahead  to  new  ways  to  enhance  electronic  document 
security  and  identity  document  management.  It  will  propose  an  Action  Plan  targeting 
weaknesses in the process and proposing corrective action. This will distinguish actions to be 
taken at EU level from areas of national competence. 

According to recent reports from Frontex, national ID cards with a lower security level were 
the  most  frequently  detected  false  documents.  As  a  follow-up  to  the  2013  EU  Citizenship 
Report, the Commission launched a study at the end of 2015 to further assess how to address 
security  concerns  and  the  difficulties  encountered  by  EU  citizens  regarding  residence  cards 
and identity  documents.  Following a  public consultation, an impact assessment will explore 
options in the perspective of a possible legislative initiative. The Commission is also working 
on making Emergency Travel Documents more secure. 

Next steps: 

The European Parliament and the Council should: 
-  Adopt  the  proposals  on  a  new  design  and  enhanced  security  features  for  the  uniform 

formats for visas and residence permits by the end of 2016. 

The Commission will: 
-  By  December  2016,  adopt  an  Action  Plan  on  document  security,  as  well  as  exploring 

enhanced security features for Emergency Travel Documents. 

3.5 

Developing the Security Union: Reinforcing Europol  

Successive terrorist attacks have highlighted the complex and dynamic terrorism threat faced 
by  Europe  today.  It  seems  clear  that  shortcomings  in  the  exchange  and  use  of  information 
have contributed to the failure to prevent attacks and apprehend suspected terrorists. Effective 
and  timely  information-sharing  among  relevant  authorities  (security  and  law  enforcement 
authorities,  including  customs  and  border  guards  where  relevant)  is  a  vital  prerequisite  for 
successful  action  against  terrorism  and  serious  crime.  But  progress  in  this  area  has  proved 
difficult,  and  there  is  still  fragmentation  at  both  national  and  EU  levels  that  risks  to  leave 
dangerous security gaps. Similarly, the migrant crisis has shown how organised crime groups 
are quick to exploit new opportunities, even at the risk of human tragedy. As the EU's core 
tool to harness cooperation to operational effect, Europol has taken some major steps forward, 
with the recent setting up of the European Counter Terrorism Centre,25 the European Migrant 

24   Amendments to Regulation (EC) 1683/95, COM(2015) 303 final of 24 June 2015 and Regulation (EC) 

1030/2002, COM(2016) 434 final of 30 June 2016. 

25   The  Centre  has  been  operational  since  1  January  2016  and  is  composed  of  different  entities  such  as  the 
Internet  Referral  Unit,  the  EU-US  Terrorist  Financing  Tracking  Programme  (TFTP),  Europol's  Analysis 
Work Files and Focal Points (such as TRAVELLERS on foreign terrorist fighters) and the European Bomb 

11 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Smuggling Centre26 and the European Cybercrime Centre.27 Additional resources have been 
made available to take account of the new tasks.28 But the scale of the new security challenges 
requires  a  further  step  forward  and  as  foreseen  in  the  Security  Union  Communication,  this 
Communication  sets  out  concrete  steps  to  upgrade  the  European  Counter  Terrorism  Centre 
and to strengthen the work of Europol.  

While  some  progress  has  been  observed  recently,  and  law  enforcement  counter-terrorism 
units increasingly cooperate with Europol's European Counter-Terrorism Centre, cooperation 
between  law  enforcement  and  security  services  is  still  uneven.29  Security  services  exchange 
more  regularly  through  the  Counter  Terrorism  Group  (CTG),30  outside  the  EU  framework, 
and the two communities remain operationally disconnected.  

The key challenge remains how to harness the potential benefits of sharing  information and 
intelligence  to  make  a  real  operational  difference.  This  does  not  need  institutional 
innovations.  But  making  full  use  of  the  possibilities  for  cooperation  under  the  EU  Treaties 
could  deliver  a  change  in  sharing  and  connecting  information  through  multidisciplinary 
cooperation.  The  range  of  options  available  to  achieve  this  objective  are  framed  by  the 
competences  confered  in  the  Treaties,  the  responsibility  for  national  security  belonging  to 
Member States. In this context, the Commission will look for practical solutions to improve 
information exchange.  

Whilst Europol has proven its added value and has gained credibility with national services, 
its  counter-terrorism  capabilities  need  to  be  enhanced  if  it  is  to  play  its  full  role.  Europol's 
European  Counter-Terrorism  Centre  is  the  backbone  of  the  EU's  action  against  terrorism, 
acting  as  an  information  and  cooperation  hub  in  support  to  Member  States,  also  analysing 
terrorism, assessing threats, and supporting the development of counter-terrorism operational 
plans.  It  has  already  helped  to  increase  the  flow  of  information  shared  among  the  law 
enforcement authorities working on counter-terrorism, adapting infrastructures to the needs of 
the  counter-terrorism  community.  An  increase  in  data  supplied  to  Europol's  databases  has 
been seen.31 But as a focal point for marshalling and analysing information, its effectiveness 

Data System. It has access to EU information systems and the network of Financial Intelligence Units. It 
has  been  reinforced  by  the  Joint  Liaison  Team  of  seconded  counter  terrorism  experts.  EU  CTC's  current 
workforce is composed of 64 persons. 

26   The  European  Migrant  Smuggling  Centre  (EMSC)  was  launched  on  22  February  2016.  The  goal  of  the 
Centre is to proactively support EU Member States in dismantling criminal networks involved in organised 
migrant  smuggling.  The  Centre  focuses  on  geographical  criminal  hotspots,  and  is  building  a  better 
capability  across  the  European  Union  to  fight  people  smuggling  networks.  EMSC's  current  workforce  is 
composed of 39 persons. 

27   The European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) has been operational since January 2013. Its goal is to strengthen 
the  law  enforcement  response  to  cybercrime  in  the  EU  and  to  help  protect  European  citizens,  businesses 
and governments.  

28   Reinforcements  accompanying  the  new  Europol  Regulation  and  foreseen  in  the  2017  budget  add  up  to 

around 90 extra posts. 

29   This fragmentation is a well-known deficiency, as already underlined by the European Council in its March 
2004 Declaration on combating terrorism. There has so far been a lack of action to overcome this issue. 
30   The CTG is an informal group outside the EU framework that gathers the security services of EU Member 
States,  Norway  and  Switzerland  to  support  cooperation  and  operational  exchange  of  intelligence.  It  also 
produces  joint  terrorism  threat  assessments  based  on  intelligence  provided  by  national  services  and 
cooperates with the Intelligence and Situational Centre (EU INTCEN). 

31   Such  as  Focal  Point  TRAVELLERS  or  the  Europol  Information  System.  To  give  a  practical  example, 
Taskforce  Fraternité,  the  dedicated  team  created  to  support  the  investigations  into  the  Paris  and  Brussels 
attacks, and which pools together Europol analysts and counter-terrorism experts seconded by the Member 
States, has processed an unprecedented volume of data to investigate further international connections of 

12 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
depends  on  its  capacity  to  quickly  process  what  could  be  very  large  surges  in  information 
shared at key moments. 

Reinforcing the European Counter-Terrorism Centre would allow it to take a more pro-active 
role  in  helping  to  prevent  and  disrupt  terrorist  activities.  This  would  target  the  timely 
detection  of  suspects  and  networks,  the  identification  of  new  lines  of  investigations,  the 
detection  of  international  flows  of  terrorist  financing  and  illegal  firearms,  and  enhanced 
internet  referrals  and  investigation  support  through  the  EU  Internet  Referral  Unit  – 
maximising  the  opportunities  for  the  cross-fertilisation  of  information  to  lead  to  better 
identification  of  risk  and  prosecution  of  wrongdoing.  For  example,  Europol  has  pointed  to 
how  some  of  the  suspects  involved  in  migrant  smuggling  are  also  involved  in  other  crime 
such as drug trafficking, document forgery, property crime and trafficking in human beings.32 
There  are  also  concerns  that  migrant  smuggling  routes  and  networks  are  used  to  infiltrate 
potential  terrorists  (notably  foreign  terrorist  fighters)  into  the  EU  and  that  terrorist 
organisations rely on migrant smuggling as a source of funding. 

The  current  capabilities  of  the  European  Counter  Terrorism  Centre  will  be  upgraded  in  the 
following areas:  

includes 

  Upgrading Europol's access to EU databases   This 

the  Visa 

Information 
System and Eurodac,33 future systems such as the Entry-Exit System or ETIAS, as well as 
the  full  exploitation  of  Europol's  access  to  the  Schengen  Information  System  under  its 
existing mandate. The Commission will use the revision of the legal basis of the Schengen 
Information  System  to  propose  to  expand  Europol's  access  to  all  alert  categories  stored 
there  and  to  related  functionalities.  Europol  should  also  exploit  the  possibility  it  has  to 
request Passenger Name Record data from Passenger Information Units in Member States. 
As  part  of  the  process  initiated  by  the  Commission  towards  the  interoperability  of 
information  systems,  the  High  Level  Expert  Group  on  Information  Systems  and 
Interoperability should explore  options  to  optimise  simultaneous  searches  by  Europol  of 
relevant EU databases when it is necessary for its tasks. 

  Strengthening  the  internal  governance  of  the  European  Counter  Terrorism  Centre 
Building  on  the  positive  experience  of  the  European  Cybercrime  Centre  at  Europol,  the 
Commission proposes to establish a Programme Board as an extra governance tool for the 
internal work of the European Counter Terrorism Centre. This would provide an internal 
steering  mechanism  for  its  work,  addressing  aspects  such  as  its  work  programme,  its 
working  methods  and  best  practices.  It  would  bring  together  Member  States'  law 
enforcement  counter-terrorism  authorities,  the  Commission  and,  where  appropriate  and 
necessary,  other  relevant  partners,  including  EU  agencies  and  bodies  such  as  Eurojust, 
Frontex  and  the  EEAS/EU  INTCEN.  It  will  be  made  clear  that  this  would  in  no  way 
impinge on the mandate of Europol's Management Board.   

the terrorists involved in those attacks by analysing communication, financial, internet and forensic records. 
The ex post support provided by Europol via its Task Force Fraternité has proved to be effective and was 
widely acknowledged. However, the ECTC needs to be fully equipped to take a more pro-active role also in 
anticipating threats. 

32   Europol report on Migrant Smuggling in the EU – February 2016. 
33   Europol  has  access  to  the  VIS  and  EURODAC  but  should  accelerate  the  ongoing  work  to  establish  the 

connection to these databases. 

13 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
  Maximising the benefits of cooperation  Europol has developed a network of operational 
cooperation  partners  within  the  EU  (Eurojust  and  Frontex)  and  beyond  (several  key 
partners  such  as  the  United  States,  Australia,  Norway  and  Switzerland,  as  well  as 
Interpol). The Commission and Europol, in close consultation with the European External 
Action  Service  (EEAS),  will  explore  avenues  for  enhanced  cooperation  with  other  third 
countries, including as part of efforts to develop anti-terrorism partnerships with countries 
in  the  Middle  East  and  North  Africa.  This  should  include  exploring  avenues  for  an 
involvement  of  security  experts  deployed  in  EU  Delegations  and  for  the  improved 
transmission  of  information  by  third  countries  (including  through  the  intermediary  of 
Interpol).  

  Additional  financial  and  human  resources  Recent  experience  following  the  Paris  and 
Brussels  attacks  suggest  that  the  European  Counter  Terrorism  Centre  needs  additional 
financial, technological and human  resources to be able to handle and process increased 
volumes  of  information  and  criminal  intelligence.  These  needs  will  further  increase  as 
Europol's access to information and databases expands. Already  today, the Centre is not 
sufficiently equipped to deliver 24/7 support to Member States, a major gap in the face of 
events  such  as  a  major  terrorist  attack.  The  Commission  will  conduct  a  thorough  needs 
assessment  and  take  the  necessary  steps  towards  a  significant  reinforcement,  including 
resources  with  specialised  linguistic  and  IT  skills,  and  long-term  secondments  from 
Member States' authorities. 

These  upgrades  do  not  require  any  change  to  Europol's  legal  framework  –  adopted  only  in 
2016  –  but  could  take  the  opportunity  of  the  full  implementation  of  the  new  Europol 
Regulation as from May 2017 to be put in place at the same time. 

It is also urgent to find a practical solution to the gap between the parallel tracks of the law 
enforcement community and the intelligence community, and between the European Counter-
Terrorism Centre and the Counter Terrorism Group, to allow for a more systematic interaction 
between  both  communities  and  therefore  an  enhanced  operational  cooperation.  Reinforcing 
the two tracks of the European Counter-Terrorism Centre and the Counter Terrorism Group, 
keeping them separate but linking the two communities, would add up to an effective counter-
terrorism cooperation framework in Europe, without the need for new structures. 

In  parallel  to the evolution of the Europol European Counter-Terrorism Centre, the Counter 
Terrorism  Group  has  recently  been  strengthened  by  introducing  a  common  platform  for  the 
exchange  of  information  between  Member  States'  security  services,  accompanied  by  secure 
infrastructure for timely and secure communication. This presents a new opportunity to define 
a level of interaction between this platform and the law enforcement community cooperating 
within the European Counter-Terrorism Centre at Europol. 

The  Commission  therefore  encourages  Member  States  to  consider  opening  the  Counter 
Terrorism  Group,  an  intergovernmental  intelligence  forum,  to  interaction  with  law 
enforcement authorities cooperating within the framework of Europol (the European Counter-
Terrorism Centre). With the objective of linking the dots, some form of information exchange 
hub  could  offer  a  platform  where  authorities  obtaining  information  related  to  terrorism  or 
other serious cross border crimes would share it with such law enforcement authorities.  

Such an information exchange hub would not be a new feature across the European security 
landscape.  A  number  of  Member  States  have  counter-terrorism  coordination  processes  or 

14 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"fusion centres" in place at national level for national security services and law enforcement 
authorities to come together. Such mechanisms vary however greatly in terms of institutional 
structure (specific entity or dedicated body) and mandate (from strategic threat assessment to 
operational coordination). Member States will be invited to share the successful experiences 
and lessons learnt at national level in establishing information exchange structures. 

Next steps: 

Member States should: 
-  Facilitate  an  information  exchange  hub  based  on  the  interaction  between  the  law 
enforcement  community  and  the  intelligence  community,  within  the  framework  of  the 
Counter  Terrorism  Group  and  the  European  Counter-Terrorism  Centre,  in  accordance 
with relevant EU and national rules and arrangements. 

The Commission will: 
-  Work with Europol, the Council and the European Parliament to take all necessary steps 
to  upgrade Europol's  capabilities by the entry into  application of the new Regulation in 
May 2017. 

4. 

CONCLUSION 

Delivering on better border management, better use of the tools and databases available, and 
developing  new  tools  and  cooperation  mechanisms  for  the  future  are  the  keys  to  providing 
strong  borders  and  effective  security  for  citizens  in  a  world  of  mobility.  This  can  make  a 
crucial difference to the security of the EU, its Member States and its citizens.  

This Communication sets out the actions that need to be taken in the immediate future, both at 
the  European  and  the  national  level,  to  help  deliver  stronger  external  borders  and  a  greater 
degree of security for citizens.  

The  EU  institutions  and  Member  States  must  now  show  the  same  urgency  and  focus  they 
deployed to ensure the quick adoption of the European Border and Coast Guard to issues of 
implementation and operational delivery, as well as taking forward proposals on the table, and 
to concretise the future steps towards an effective and genuine Security Union.  

15