After the EUGS : mainstreaming a new CSDP.
Date: 2016-09-02
Institutions: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Subjects: common foreign and security policy, common security and defence policy, defence policy, international security

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After the EUGS: mainstreaming a new CSDP
by Margriet Drent and Dick Zandee

At  the  beginning  of  July,  the  Dutch  Prime 
Minister,  Mark  Rutte,  was  interviewed  on  na-
tional television to discuss the achievements of 
the Netherlands EU Presidency in the first half 
of 2016. Rutte probably wanted to highlight the 
success stories: first and foremost, stopping the 
migration flows across the Aegean Sea. Yet he 
almost lost the opportunity as the interviewer 
confronted him with the outcome of the UK EU 
referendum. Apart from everything else, Brexit 
spoiled Mark Rutte’s party on Dutch TV.  

The  same  happened  to  High  Representative 
Federica  Mogherini  when  she  presented  the 
new EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security 
Policy (EUGS) to the European Council of 28-
29 June. It is generally considered an excellent 
strategy  that  steers  the  EU  in  its  responses  to 
the challenges of a more connected, contested 
and  complex  world.  Yet  the  new  strategy  re-
ceived  almost  no  media  attention.  Brexit  also 
spoiled Federica Mogherini’s party. 

Now,  in  order  to  implement  the  EUGS,  more 
work  needs  to  be  done.  One  of  the  areas  for 
follow-up is security and defence. The conse-
quences  for  the  EU’s  Common  Security  and 
Defence Policy (CSDP) need to be defined, in 
particular for the armed forces of the member 
states. To this end, a CSDP ‘White Book’ or a 
Security and Defence Strategy (SDS) will have 
to be developed. But what should an SDS en-
tail?

Elements of an SDS 

Luckily, work on the SDS will not have to start 
from  scratch.  The  EU  institutions  and  mem-
ber  state  capitals  have  already  been  preparing 
themselves during the last few months. And the 
Dutch EU Presidency has stimulated the debate 
about the consequences of the EUGS for CSDP 
and  for  deepening  European  defence  coopera-
tion.  Together  with  the  Clingendael  Institute, 
several  seminars  were  organised  to  discuss  the 
defence  implications  of  the  EUGS  and,  more 
specifically, the ‘how, what and when’ of a CSDP 
‘White Book’, as it was called at the time. The re-
sult of these informal discussions can be broken 
down into four areas: ambition level and tasks; 
capabilities;  tools  and  instruments;  and,  lastly, 
the way forward.

The  existing  level  of  ambition  stems,  just  like 
the  CSDP  ‘Petersberg  tasks’,  from  a  different 
era.  The  changed  security  environment  means 
that  it  is  time  for  review  and  adjustment,  tak-
ing  into  account  both  the  changing  nature  of 
crisis  management  operations,  as  well  as  the 
impact  of  the  external-internal  security  nexus. 
Preferably,  a  new  level  of  ambition  should  not 
be  defined  by  the  number  of  military  person-
nel to be deployed, but rather in the sorts and 
types  of  operations  the  EU  is  able  to  conduct. 
The ‘Petersberg tasks’ will have to be redefined 
as they no longer reflect all the different types of 
operations which the EU is already conducting 

European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)

July 2016

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today  and  may  carry  out  in  the  future.  Clearly, 
in addition to external crisis management, CSDP 
has to play a role ‘in the defence of Europe’, both 
in response to hybrid threats from the east as well 
as  to  the  spillover  effects  of  the  conflicts  to  the 
south. In particular, a structural CSDP contribu-
tion to border security will be required. 

The  mutual  assistance  clause  (Article  42.7),  al-
ready  activated  by  France,  could  also  imply  a 
role for CSDP inside EU territory (although this 
would  imply  a  treaty  change).  Once  tasks  have 
been  defined,  ambition  levels  can  be  identified, 
including  for  the  full  spectrum  of  operations. 
Ambition levels should be realistic for near-term 
implementation, yet could be more ambitious in 
terms of long-term goals.

Addressing existing shortfalls – in areas such as 
intelligence and reconnaissance, enablers for ex-
peditionary operations, precision munitions, and 
securing  sea  lines  of  communication  –  remains 
high on the agenda. However, a ‘new’ CSDP re-
quires additional efforts and a shift in priorities. 
First,  hybrid  threats  also  demand  military  re-
sponses.  CSDP  could  contribute,  for  example, 
by  deploying  EU  Battlegroups  to  non-NATO 
members Sweden and Finland or by assisting the 
Baltic states in reinforcing their internal security, 
in particular through paramilitary units (gendar-
merie) – upon request. 

Second, for (external) crisis management, the EU 
should be able to cover the whole spectrum from 
stabilisation, training and assistance to interven-
tion  operations.  For  autonomous  full  spectrum 
operations in the near term, the EU should aim 
for a brigade-sized force, with adequate sea and 
air elements as required. Border security-related 
tasks  will  increase  the  need  for  smaller  vessels, 
surveillance  assets  (space  and  air-based)  and 
border guard personnel. But a fresh look at na-
val  (and  air)  capabilities  at  the  high  end  of  the 
spectrum is also required in view of the increas-
ing anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) threats. 
Clearly, such autonomous European capabilities 
will not materialise overnight, but related capa-
bility goals should be defined as early as possible 
in view of long-term planning cycles. 

Political  will  remains  the  key  factor  to  deepen 
European  defence  cooperation.  However,  new 
tools  and  instruments  are  also  needed  to  trans-
late political will – as expressed in Declarations 
and  Council  Conclusions  –  into  real  capability 
improvement.  So  far,  the  principle  of  voluntar-
ism has provided an excuse for doing too little. 
A step-change is needed in order to move in the 

direction  of  greater  accountability  and  commit-
ment.  And  transparency  on  long-term  defence 
and procurement plans will be the first require-
ment.

But sharing plans is not enough. The SDS should 
define  a  new  system,  based  on  monitoring,  as-
sessment and accountability of the member states’ 
efforts to solve capability shortfalls and to deepen 
European  defence  cooperation.  Such  a  system 
could  be  developed  over  time  with  data  collec-
tion and assessment authority gradually shifting 
to  the  European  Defence  Agency.  It  could  start 
with  defence  ministers  collectively  reviewing 
their  plans  annually  (ministerial  peer  pressure) 
via a more structured and obligatory assessment 
based  on  EDA  documentation  per  country  (po-
litical assessment), and shift to a more ‘European 
Semester’-like  accountability  regime  in  the  long 
term.  Benchmarks  for  collaborative  investment 
should  receive  more  political  attention.  Other 
ways  of  financing  defence  expenditure  through 
the Union budget should also be fully explored. 
In  particular,  a  sizeable  defence  research  pro-
gramme  within  the  post-Horizon  2020  frame-
work programme for research and innovation is 
needed.

the way ahead

Time is a critical factor. It took a year to formulate 
the EUGS, and taking one more year for devel-
oping the SDS will be very risky as the political 
agendas in 2017 will likely be dominated by the 
Brexit negotiations, as well as national elections 
in  several  EU  countries,  including  France  and 
Germany. 

EU  foreign  ministers  have  already  had  a  first 
exchange  of  ideas  on  18  July,  while  the  High 
Representative will present a plan with a timeta-
ble and proposals, most probably soon after the 
summer break. Defence ministers will also get in-
volved during their informal meeting, set to take 
place in late September in Slovakia. By then, three 
months  will  have  already  passed  since  the  June 
European Council. Also taking into account that 
the European Commission intends to publish its 
Defence Action Plan in the second half of 2016, 
there will be little time left for developing the SDS 
– and separating the two documents would send 
the wrong signal as the Commission’s defence ac-
tivities will have to be capability-driven.

Margriet Drent and Dick Zandee are  Senior 
 Research Fellows at the Netherlands 
 Institute of Foreign Relations ‘Clingendael’ 
in The Hague. 

European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)

July 2016

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© EU Institute for Security Studies, 2016. | Qn-al-16-034-2a-n | ISBn 978-92-9198-408-4 | ISSn 2315-1129 | doi:10.2815/312822