The Gulf monarchies beyond the Arab spring : changes and challenges.
Date: 2016-08-25
Institutions: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
Subjects: authoritarian regime, change of political system, democratisation, dictatorship, economic model, foreign policy, gulf, immigration, intervention policy, political crisis, political power, political system, political unrest, religious fundamentalism, terrorism

THE GULF

MONARCHIES

BEYOND THE ARAB

SPRING 

Edited by:

LUIGI NARBONE

MARTIN LESTRA

ANDGESCHANGESCHALLENThis work has been published by the European University Institute,
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies.
© European University Institute 2015
Editorial matter and selection © editors 2015
Chapters © authors individually 2015
This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes.  Any additional reproduction 
for other purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), 
editor(s). If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the 
title, the year and the publisher
Views  expressed  in  this  publication  reflect  the  opinion  of  individual  authors  and  not  those  of  the  
European University Institute.

THE GULF MONARCHIES BEYOND THE ARAB SPRING: 
CHANGES AND CHALLENGES

Foreword 

This  E-book  is  the  result  of  a  conference  on  “The  Gulf  Region,  Domestic 
Dynamics  and  Global-Regional  Perspectives.  Implications  for  the  European 
Union”, hosted by the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies in spring 
2015. The Scientific Director for the conference was Amb. Luigi Narbone, an EU 
Institutional Fellow at the EUI for the academic year 2014/15. As part of its global 
governance programme, the Schuman Centre was delighted to host a conference 
on this important region, the Gulf. Regionalism is a growing phenomenon in 
global politics and understanding the role and dynamics of different regions in 
necessary to understand the complexity and interdependence of our world. The 
Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) consisting of six monarchies is a regional and 
global actor. 
The  Gulf  has  come  to  assume  a  growing  significance  in  regional  politics  and 
the Gulf states have a major influence on events within and beyond the region. 
Although not large states, these countries have considerable financial clout arising 
from the role as major oil producers and have strong preferences about regional 
order. The objective of the conference was twofold, (a) to explore domestic and 
international  drivers  of  change  and  (b)  to  analyse  the  role  of  the  Gulf  in  the 
geopolitics of the Middle East in the context of the Arab Spring and its aftermath. 
The Gulf states are key actors in the MENA region and are competitors to Iran 
whom  they  regard  with  deep  mistrust.  The  conference  certainly  achieved  its 
objective; the chapters capture the range and diversity of the vibrant intellectual 
debate that took place during the course of the conference. For all Gulf states and 
the region, there are major challenges to be faced to do with the sustainability of 
their economic model and the security threats arising from failed states and the 
role of Iran in Yemen, Iraq and Syria. They must manage internal reform while 
at the same time addressing the exigencies of an unstable environment. 
The role of the Gulf and instability in the MENA region poses challenges too 
for the European Union. To date EU cooperation with the Gulf region has been 
minimalist.  Continuing  this  approach  is  unwise  given  the  importance  of  the 
Gulf  and  Europe’s  interest  in  restoring  a  degree  of  order  to  this  troubled  part 
of the world. Luigi Narbone is to be congratulated for organizing an excellent 
conference and ensuring that the conference contributions are captured in this 
E-book. The Schuman Centre is fully committed to research and policy dialogue 
on this part of Europe’s neighbourhood. 

Brigid Laffan
Director
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies

 
THE GULF 
MONARCHIES BEYOND 
THE ARAB SPRING. 
CHANGES AND 
CHALLENGES

Edited by 

LUIGI NARBONE

MARTIN LESTRA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION                   1
Luigi Narbone and Martin Lestra  

SECTION 1  
BEYOND THE ARAB SPRING.  
GULF COUNTRIES’ DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL  
DRIVERS OF CHANGE. 

THE GCC ECONOMIC MODEL IN AN AGE OF AUSTERITY   
Steffen Hertog,  
Associate Professor, 
London School of Economics 

IMMIGRATION VS. POPULATION IN THE GULF 
Philippe Fargues,  
Director, Migration Policy Centre,  
European University Institute

CHANGING GLOBAL DYNAMICS BETWEEN THE GULF,  
THE US, AND ASIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EU
Abdullah Baabood. Director,  
Gulf Studies Center,  
Qatar University

SECTION 2  
BEYOND THE ARAB SPRING.  
THE GULF COUNTRIES AND THE MIDDLE EASTERN GEOPOLITICS 

THE SHIA-SUNNI DIVIDE: WHEN RELIGION   
MASKS GEO-STRATEGY
Olivier Roy, 
Chair in Mediterranean Studies, 
European University Institute

5

11

18 

25 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TRANSNATIONAL IDENTITIES AFTER THE ARAB UPRISINGS    
Toby Matthiesen,  
Senior Research Fellow in the International Relations of the Middle East,  
St. Antony’s College, 
University of Oxford

THE GULF MONARCHIES AND IRAN:  
BETWEEN CONFRONTATION AND GEOSTRATEGIC REALITIES    
Marc Valeri, Director,  
Centre for Gulf Studies,  
University of Exeter

ARTICULATING THE NEW GULF COUNTRIES’ INTERVENTIONISM:    
WHAT LESSONS CAN BE DRAWN FROM THE CASE OF SAUDI  
ARABIA AND YEMEN?
Abubakr Al-Shamahi, 
Journalist,  
Al-Araby al-Jadeeda

JIHADIST DYNAMICS AFTER THE ARAB REVOLTS AND THEIR   
IMPACTS ON SAUDI ARABIA
Dominique Thomas, 
Associate Researcher,  
Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS)

CONCLUSION. THE GULF REGION BEYOND THE ARAB SPRING.  
WHAT IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EU?
Luigi Narbone.   
Director of the Mediterranean Programme,  
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute.

32

38

46 

53 

63  

 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION

Luigi Narbone and Martin Lestra

When  in  late  2014  the  Robert  Schuman  Centre 
for Advanced Studies of the European University 
Institute decided to organize a conference on ‘The 
Gulf  region:  domestic  dynamics  and  global-
regional perspectives. Implications  for the EU’ 
(Florence, Italy, 20-21 April 2015), the interest of 
researchers  and  policy-makers  in  the  Gulf  was 
already high. 

A  decade  of  positive  developments  had  changed 
the status of the region. The Gulf was now broadly 
recognized as one of the emerging regions of the 
world. In addition to their continuing prominence 
as  oil  and  gas  producers  and  exporters  –  made 
even  more  significant  by  a  long  cycle  of  high 
oil  prices  which  had  lasted  well  into  2014  –  the 
Gulf  countries  had  been  experiencing  important 
transformations brought about by years of booming 
economies,  huge 
investments, 
futuristic modernization of cities and attempts to 
move  away  from  over-reliance  on  hydrocarbon 
production by making the region a hub for global 
transportation  and  financial  services.  Sustained 
growth  had  translated  into  the  Gulf  countries 
playing  expanding  international  and  investor 
roles  worldwide;  this  had  been  accompanied  by 
a gradual shift towards Asia in international and 
trade relations. 

infrastructure 

Interest in the Gulf had further grown during the 
Arab  Spring,  when  many  questions  were  raised 
about  the  impact  on  the  political  sustainability 
of  the  authoritarian  Gulf  monarchies  of  the 
revolutionary  wave  that  swept  over  the  Arab 
world. Attention on the Gulf countries increased 
even more in the aftermath of the uprising, when 
it  became  apparent  that  they  had  emerged  as 
powerful regional players. In the face of regional 
challenges,  they  started  to  change  their  long-

standing foreign policy patterns and become more 
assertive  in  the  numerous  crises  of  the  MENA 
region  and  more  willing  to  shape  the  political 
transition in many countries.       

While  there  was  consensus  on  the  fact  that  the 
Gulf region had become an increasingly important 
actor,  many  questions  about  the  future  of  these 
monarchies and their role in the global and regional 
arenas were left unanswered. Is the Gulf economic 
model sustainable in times of low oil prices? And 
what would the impact be of diminishing growth 
on  political  stability?  How  do  structural  factors 
such as demography and continuing dependence 
on oil and  gas revenues limit the  Gulf countries’ 
capacity to maintain sustained economic growth? 
What  does  the  pivot  towards  Asia  entail  for 
the  security  of  Gulf  countries?  How  does  the 
geo-political  confrontation  with  Iran  shape  the 
deepening sectarianism? How successful can they 
be  at  insulating  themselves  from  instability  and 
projecting their interests in the Middle East? How 
united are the Gulf countries in their perceptions 
of  and  reactions  against  the  external  Iranian 
threat?  What  are  the  bases  and  consequences  of 
the Gulf countries’ new interventionism?

The  conference  was  conceived  as  an  attempt  to 
understand  the  different  dynamics  at  play  in 
the region. It had the ambition to try to connect 
different levels, from the local to the transnational 
to the global, and to look at the unexplored links 
between  domestic,  regional  and  external  factors. 
The  conference  speakers,  academics,  policy-
makers, 
journalists  and  financial  experts  all 
brought different perspectives to the discussion.

Three key issues were raised. First, the Arab Spring 
and its consequences in the broader MENA region 
have  put  the  changes  in  the  Gulf  polities  to  the 
test.  Exploration  of  structural  issues  such  as  the 
Gulf ’s fiscal, immigration and (non-) integration 
to  often 
policies  created 
overlooked domestic challenges that have regional 

the  background 

1

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challengesand  international  implications.  The  discussion 
went  beyond  assessment  of  the  stability  of  the 
GCC states during and after the Arab Spring. The 
structural  aspects  examined  helped  qualify  the 
paradigm  of  rentier  states,  which  does  not  fully 
capture the dynamics at work in this region.

In the second chapter, Philippe Fargues addresses 
demography and migration policies in the Gulf as 
key  determinants  of  its  economic  development. 
He  analyses  the  shortcomings  of  the  current 
migration  policies  and  the  factors  which  may  in 
the long term destabilize the ‘dual society’ model. 

Second,  the  conference  looked  at  the  various 
components of what is now commonly called the 
Gulf states’ ‘new interventionism’. With the cases of 
Yemen and Iran, it soon became clear that different 
national  interests  and  long-term  foreign  policy 
goals shape the way they act in the new context. 
But  it  was  also  clear  that  renewed  geo-political 
confrontations  have  triggered  new  mechanisms 
which  might  exacerbate  the  religious  dimension 
of the divide, thus making dialogue and the search 
for political solutions to the conflicts in the region 
more difficult.

Finally,  the  conference  enabled  academics  and 
policy-makers to outline the challenges facing EU-
GCC  relations  in  the  post-Arab  Spring  context. 
Within the framework of the Gulf ’s swing towards 
Asia  and  the  declining  influence  of  traditional 
powers in the region (the USA in particular), the 
Gulf and European perspectives explored during 
the  conference  cast  light  on  the  incentives  to 
deepen the relationship between the two regional 
blocks. 

These  common  threads  ran  throughout  the 
conference.  They  are  also  present  in  the  written 
contributions contained in this book. The various 
chapters  offer  substantive  and  concise  insights 
into what makes the Gulf countries and the GCC 
increasingly  pivotal  actors  in  international  and 
regional politics. 

In the first chapter, Steffen Hertog gives a detailed 
account of the fiscal pressure facing the Gulf states 
in the age of low oil prices. Drawing lessons from 
the 1990s, he looks at the way austerity will affect 
costly  state-driven  economic  growth  and  at  the 
possible consequences for both the Gulf countries’ 
domestic dynamics and foreign policy. 

In the third chapter, Abdullah Baabood points to 
the increasing economic and political ties between 
the  Gulf  and  Asian  countries  in  the  framework 
of a diminishing US presence, and questions the 
role  of  the  latter  as  guarantor  of  security  for  the 
Gulf countries. He examines the potential impact 
of  the  Gulf ’s  pivot  towards  Asia  on  EU-GCC 
relations and highlights how they have been to the 
detriment of the EU.

In  the  fourth  chapter,  Olivier  Roy  addresses 
the  ongoing  Sunni-Shia  confrontation,  now 
viewed  in  the  West  as  a  religious  clash,  through 
a genealogical approach. His geopolitical reading 
of this divide points to the role of Saudi Arabia as 
leader of the Sunni side and draws conclusions on 
how  the  growing  use  of  the  religious  dimension 
might  exacerbate  the  confrontation  between  the 
two camps. 

In  the  fifth  chapter,  Toby  Matthiesen  unfolds 
the  rise  of  transnational  sectarian  identities  as 
a  new  fundamental  factor  in  the  politics  of  the 
Middle  East  and  explains  how  regional  conflicts 
have  politicised  such  identities.  The  regional 
rivalry  between  Iran  and  Saudi  Arabia,  both  of 
which  use  sectarian  identities  to  further  their 
geopolitical  goals,  has  been  a  crucial  element  in 
this development.

In  a  complementary  perspective  on  the  external 
relations  of  the  Gulf  states,  in  the  sixth  chapter 
Marc  Valeri  makes  sense  of  the  diverging  views 
held by different Gulf countries on the relationship 
with  Iran.  He  looks  at  how  the  various  national 
interests shape different attitudes in dealing with 
the neighbour across the Gulf and at how they are 
reconciled in a difficult balance within the GCC.    

2

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and ChallengesIn  the  seventh  chapter,  while  recognizing  the 
in  Yemen, 
intervening  militarily 
novelty  of 
Abubakr Al-Shamahi traces the roots of the Saudi-
led operation back to a long-standing Saudi policy 
vis-à-vis the country. He challenges the idea that 
Saudi  Arabia’s  military  endeavour  represents  a 
major  shift  and  claims  that  controlled  instability 
in Yemen has been a Saudi foreign policy goal for 
several decades.

In chapter eight, Dominique Thomas unveils the 
internal  dynamics  of  jihadi  groups  in  the  Gulf 
region.  His  nuanced  account  of  jihadi  strategies 
–  notably  the  transnational  versus  the  territorial 
–  sheds  lights  on  the  divisions  existing  within 
the  jihadi  galaxy  and  the  ensuing  rivalries  and 
coalition  patterns,  notably  between  Al  Qaeda, 
Ansar al-Sharia and ISIS.

Finally,  Luigi  Narbone  draws  some  conclusions 
about recent domestic, regional and international 
developments  in  the  Gulf  countries  and  their 
implications  for  the  EU  and  the  EU-GCC 
relationship.

3

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and ChallengesSECTION 1  
BEYOND THE ARAB SPRING.  
GULF COUNTRIES' DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL  
DRIVERS OF CHANGE.

THE CURRENT FISCAL SITUATION

The  large  hydrocarbon  producers  of  the  GCC 
–  Kuwait,  Qatar,  Saudi  Arabia  and  the  UAE  –
recorded  substantial  fiscal  surpluses  for  2014, 
benefiting  from  high  oil  prices  earlier  in  the 
year. Bahrain alone incurred a substantial deficit. 
For  all  of  them,  however,  the  fiscal  outlook  has 
become cloudier, not only because of reduced oil 
prices  but  also  because  their  fiscal  needs  to  just 
operate their economies at the current level have 
drastically  increased  over  recent  years.  The  oil 
prices  at  which  GCC  government  budgets  break 
even  have  on  average  increased  more  than  three 
times  since  the  early  2000s.  According  to  IMF 
estimates, they now lie above current oil prices for 
Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia and (although only 
slightly) the UAE (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: 2014 and 2015 breakeven oil prices for 
the GCC

Source: IMF (January 2015), with adjustment for additional 
spending announcements by Saudi Arabia in late January

THE GCC ECONOMIC MODEL 
IN AN AGE OF AUSTERITY

Steffen Hertog,  
Associate Professor,  
London School of Economics

INTRODUCTION

As oil prices have more than halved since summer 
2014,  all  OPEC  countries  are  revising  their 
government  spending  policies.  While  countries 
like  Iran  and  Venezuela  face  an  imminent  fiscal 
crisis, the short-term ramifications for the Arabian 
Peninsula’s oil monarchies are less dramatic. In the 
long  run,  however,  their  very  high  dependence 
on  oil 
fundamental 
development challenge than for almost any other 
hydrocarbon  exporter.  It  is  likely  that  new  fiscal 
constraints  will  demonstrate  deep  limitations 
of  the  “Gulf  economic  model”,  revealing  the  fact 
that – all diversification attempts notwithstanding 
–  most  economic  activities  in  the  region  remain 
dependent on state spending.

income  poses  a  more 

In  trying  to  build  mid-  to  long-term  fiscal  and 
economic  scenarios  for  the  Gulf,  it  is  useful  to 
investigate the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
reactions to a previous period of low oil prices in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Drawing on this precedent, 
the present chapter will argue that henceforth GCC 
governments  are  likely  to  engage  in  less  costly 
policy experimentation through large investment 
projects  and  will  downsize  or  wind  down  some 
projects that are already in the pipeline. The focus 
of policy will gradually shift towards more painful 
but necessary reforms, such as subsidy reductions 
and,  potentially,  a  broadening  of  taxation  – 
although it is likely that such reforms will be too 
little too late to stave off a fiscal crisis in the long 
run. While capital spending will decline, current 
government  spending  on  salaries  and  transfers 
will  continue  to  rise  for  the  foreseeable  future, 
resulting  in  ongoing  if  more  modest  growth  of 
local consumer markets. 

5

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and ChallengesThis  means  that  for  all  the  countries  bar  Kuwait 
and  Qatar  deficits  are  expected  for  2015.  These 
will be substantial for the lower-income countries: 
Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia (see Figure 2). 

Figure 3: Size of Gulf SWFs

Figure  2:  Estimated  2014  and  2015  fiscal 
surpluses/deficits (% GDP)

Source: IMF (January 2015), with adjustment for additional 
spending  announcements  by  Saudi  Arabia  in  late  January 
(Jadwa April 2015)

The  fiscal  room  of  manoeuvre  for  Bahrain  and 
Oman,  both  of  which  have  only  small  overseas 
reserves,  is  particularly  restricted.  Bahrain  in 
particular already has a government debt of more 
than 40% of GDP. It has already engaged in some 
austerity  measures  and  is  the  only  country  in 
which estimated 2013 spending lay below that for 
2012.

The  other  four  GCC  countries  have  substantial 
overseas  reserves  that  are  equivalent  to  several 
annual budgets, giving them considerable leeway 
to run deficits without incurring net debt. Figure 
3  shows  the  absolute  estimated  size  of  Gulf 
sovereign  wealth  funds  (SWFs)  together  with 
their size relative to (expected) 2015 government 
expenditure.

Sources: SWF Institute, IMF

Policy-makers even in the high-reserve countries 
are  well  aware,  however,  that  the  rapid  spending 
growth of the last decade cannot continue. It could 
lead to a depletion of financial reserves within as 
little as half a decade in the case of Saudi Arabia 
and  between  one  and  two  decades  in  the  other 
cases. All the signals are that spending growth will 
strongly slow down in the coming years.

THE PRECEDENT OF THE AUSTERE 1990S

To  understand  what  the  shape  and  economic 
consequences  of  less  expansive  fiscal  policies 
will be, it is useful to study the experience of the 
last  period  of  low  oil  prices  and  fiscal  austerity, 
which  lasted  from  the  mid-1980s  to  the  late 
1990s. The general pattern across the region was 
that when governments had to make cuts, project 
and  infrastructure  spending  was  the  first  victim, 
while  current  spending  on  government  salaries 
and public services like education and health was 
protected as long as possible. Figure 4 shows that 
Saudi Arabia almost completely abandoned capital 
expenditure  in  the  1990s,  leading  to  a  decay  of 
public  infrastructure  that  was  only  ameliorated 
during the 2000s oil boom, when capital spending 
increased again.

6

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challenges 
The  austerity  of  the  1990s  showed  that  mass 
services  and 
to  employment, 
entitlements 
subsidies are more politically sensitive than other 
forms  of  spending,  reflecting  a  distributional 
commitment  among  GCC  rulers  that  is  stronger 
than  in  most  other  oil  states  –  but  which  also 
limits policy autonomy in hard times.

The basic parameters of the GCC political economy 
have  not  shifted  since  the  1990s.  If  anything, 
popular  entitlements  have  become  stronger  and 
citizens have become better organized at claiming 
them. Unlike political dissent, public and private 
protests  in  favour  of  salary  increases  and  state 
employment  or  against  subsidy  reforms  are 
generally tolerated and often effective. By contrast, 
private business has come under increasing public 
pressure  in  recent  years  for  failing  to  provide 
sufficient jobs for nationals, once again making it 
likely to be the first target of fiscal trimming. 

NEW FISCAL PATTERNS

Even  if  oil  prices  should  recover,  it  is  clear  that 
spending  growth  will  slow  down  in  the  coming 
years across the region and is likely to be followed 
by  spending  cuts  in  the  mid-term.  Even  just  a 
plateauing  of  spending  will  mean  falling  capital 
expenditure,  as  the  upward  trend  of  current 
spending is set to continue for the time being with 
national  working-age  populations  continuing  to 
grow  and  because  occasional  local  and  regional 
political  crises  could  lead  to  a  further  ratcheting 
up  of  patronage  spending.  Now,  already,  current 
spending  on  salaries  in  particular  is  quite  high 
in  the  GCC,  reaching  45%  of  total  government 
spending  in  the  Saudi  case,  compared  to  typical 
shares  in  OECD  countries  between  15  and  30% 
(Figure 5).

Figure  4:  Shares  of  current  and  capital 
expenditure in Saudi government spending

Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency

large  and 

GCC  government  subsidy  cuts  in  the  1990s 
predominantly  affected 
industrial 
consumers.  Budgets  for  industrial  loans  were 
squeezed  and  utility  tariffs  for  industrial  users 
increased,  while 
for  households 
subsidies 
remained  protected,  or  at  least  tariff  increases 
only  targeted  larger  (and  richer)  households 
with  higher  consumption  levels.  In  a  sign  of  the 
times,  the  Saudi  national  airline  increased  ticket 
prices  for  business  and  first  class  but  protected 
the  subsidized  prices  for  economy  travellers. 
Education and health services for nationals across 
the  region  remained  free  and  state  employment 
was not only protected but continued to grow.

Together with the reduced provision of industrial 
infrastructure,  reduced  state  support  made  life 
for  manufacturers  difficult.  However,  the  worst 
affected  sector  was  construction,  which  had 
previously  relied  on  state  projects  during  the 
1970s and early 1980s oil boom. Tens of thousands 
of  contractors  went  bankrupt  in  the  1980s  and 
1990s.  Reduced  capital  spending  meant  reduced 
investment in state-driven diversification policies 
in  infrastructure,  heavy  industry  and  logistics 
etc.  that  had  characterized  the  Gulf  economic 
model during the last decade or so. As benefits for 
households  were  protected  as  much  as  possible, 
firms  in  the  private  consumer  economy  suffered 
the least.

7

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challengesin 

less 

(somewhat 
less  developed  countries 
and  more  in  more  developed  ones).  As  Figure 
6  shows,  with  the  exception  of  Bahrain,  the 
share  of  government  spending  in  non-oil  GDP 
is  considerably  higher  in  the  GCC  region  and 
has  generally  increased  during  the  boom  of  the 
last  decade.  Closely  related  to  this,  the  ratio  of 
government  to  private  consumption  is  2-4  times 
higher in the GCC than in the rest of the world. 
In fact, even private consumer demand is mostly 
state-driven,  as  most  national  households  derive 
their  income  from  state  employment,  while 
foreigners  employed  in  the  private  sector  remit 
a  larger  share  of  their  (generally  lower)  incomes 
abroad.

Figure 6: Share of government spending in non-
oil GDP

Source: calculated from IMF and World Bank Development 
Indicators data

All  this  means  that  the  impact  of  slower  or 
local  economic 
declining  state  spending  on 
activity  will  be  particularly  pronounced.  In  the 
short run, this will mostly affect economic sectors 
depending  on  state  project  spending,  but  in  the 
mid-term even current spending will plateau and 
potentially  decline,  meaning  stagnation  in  the 
consumer economy too.

Figure 5: Saudi public salary spending

Source:  calculated  from  SAMA  annual  reports,  statistical 
yearbooks

As a result of this shift, some large-scale projects 
might be downsized or stopped, including some of 
the infrastructure planned for the 2022 World Cup 
in Qatar. In the long run, there is a danger of even 
essential infrastructure spending being squeezed, 
as was the case in the less wealthy GCC countries 
in  the  1990s,  which  in  turn  could  compromise 
industrial diversification.

SLOWING GROWTH

Economic  growth  in  the  GCC  remains  closely 
correlated with state spending. While this is also 
the  case  in  other  economies,  the  linkage  works 
differently  in  the  Gulf.  In  tax-based  economies, 
taxation  of  the  private  economy  finances  state 
expenditure, which in turn has an impact on the 
shape and level of private economic activity. In the 
GCC,  by  contrast,  business  is  only  taxed  lightly 
or  not  at  all.  While  state  spending  thus  affects 
growth in the private economy, it is hydrocarbon 
rents,  not 
local  business  activity,  which  set 
constraints  on  government  spending.  The  close 
correlation between state expenditure and private 
economic growth therefore reflects the one-sided 
dependence of private business.

As a global rule of thumb, government spending 
typically  constitutes  about  one  third  of  GDP 

8

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and ChallengesFISCAL CONSTRAINTS AS A POLICY 
OPPORTUNITY 

The looming shadow of a crisis can focus minds 
and lead to painful but necessary decisions – as it 
did in parts of the region in the 1990s. In fact, there 
are some signs of a renewed reform debate. Even 
in  Kuwait,  generally  the  region’s  reform  laggard, 
the government is now openly debating the need 
for fiscal and subsidy reforms in the face of lower 
oil prices. In practice, however, it is unlikely that 
the adjustment will be sufficient to tackle the long-
term fiscal challenge.

Subsidy reform

One necessary reform that is likely to happen in the 
coming years is an adjustment of domestic energy 
prices.  These  are  uniquely  low  in  comparison 
with  global  levels,  which  leads  to  large-scale 
over-consumption  and  imposes  increasing  fiscal 
costs  as  the  production  of  oil  and  particularly 
gas  is  becoming  more  expensive  in  the  region. 
Past  experience  and  the  current  policy  debate 
suggest that the first targets of price adjustments 
will  be  industrial  consumers,  followed  by  richer 
households. Electricity and fuel price reforms are 
actively  being  debated  in  Bahrain,  Kuwait  and 
Oman, while Abu Dhabi increased electricity and 
water tariffs in November 2014, although foreign 
residents bore the brunt of the increases.

Figure 7: Estimated energy subsidies in the GCC 
countries as share of GDP (2011)

GCC  governments  are  also  likely  to  consider 
sell-offs of non-essential public assets to alleviate 
deficits,  an  option  that  is  already  being  publicly 
discussed in Oman. There are limits to this strategy, 
however, as stock market valuations are likely to be 
depressed  at  exactly  the  time  of  fiscal  stagnation 
when revenue from privatization would be needed 
the most. Moreover, public companies in aviation, 
heavy industry,  telecoms  and banking have been 
core  tools  in  the  GCC’s  diversification  strategy 
and the rulers are unlikely to easily abandon the 
commanding heights of strategic sectors.

Finally, as GCC governments will be increasingly 
unable  to  accommodate  young  nationals  in  the 
public  sector,  they  will  increase  the  pressure  on 
the private sector to employ citizens. Such policies, 
however,  remain  difficult  to  implement  as  long 
as  the  local  labour  markets  remain  open  to  low-
cost immigrant labour – a core plank of the GCC 
economic model. 

Other painful reforms?

In  the  long  run,  it  is  obvious  that  the  GCC 
countries need to create a non-hydrocarbon fiscal 
base  –  an  issue  that  the  IMF  has  been  pressing 
for  more  than  three  decades.  Taxation  remains 
political  anathema,  however,  and  none  of  the 
GCC  governments  managed  to  introduce  any 
substantial  tax  reforms  during  the  last  phase  of 
austerity. A plan for a GCC-wide value added tax 
remains on ice.

A modern tax system takes a long time to build. 
Moreover,  as  the  state  dependence  of  the  GCC 
economies  remains  high,  it  is  not  clear  how 
large the private sector’s autonomous capacity to 
generate revenue really is. Equally important, the 
introduction of broad-based taxes is likely to give 
rise to political claims on the part of business and 
the  general  population  that  the  GCC  rulers  are 
likely to try to avoid until it is too late.

Source: IMF

9

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and ChallengesAt the same time, a period of prolonged austerity 
could  lead  to  a  survival  of  the  fittest  in  which 
diversification  is  limited  to  priority  sectors  that 
are  less  dependent  on  continuing  large-scale 
state support, including, potentially, international 
aviation, healthcare and local tourism.

For the time being, Dubai is the only GCC economy 
that  has  found  a  state-led  diversification  model 
that  is  not  dependent  on  continual  large  capital 
injections  from  the  government.  It  will  probably 
remain  the  only  place  with  this  distinction  for  a 
long time to come – although even Dubai is likely 
to indirectly suffer from austerity as demand from 
neighbouring markets slows down.

CONCLUSIONS: IMPACT ON THE “GCC 
ECONOMIC MODEL”

The  GCC  fiscal  situation  does  not  pose  an 
immediate  stability  threat.  The  richer  countries 
are  comfortable  for  at  least  another  decade  even 
with  lower  prices,  and  will  be  able  to  prevent 
a  politically  undesirable  economic  collapse  in 
Bahrain  and  Oman  through  grants  and  loans. 
Even when their overseas reserves are run down, 
the  governments  will  still  be  able  to  issue  debt, 
which they can strong-arm local banks to accept.

State spending and economic growth, however, are 
likely to slow down, reducing the policy flexibility 
of GCC regimes – including in the regional realm, 
where chequebook diplomacy will become harder 
to implement. Domestic popular entitlements will 
remain  ring-fenced,  so  unless  oil  prices  recover 
substantially there is a risk of economic and policy 
stagnation on the domestic front.

Much of the diversification in the GCC since the 
early 2000s has been state-driven, often by state-
owned enterprises reliant on sovereign guarantees 
and capital injections and supported by heavy state 
infrastructure  spending.  This  “diversification” 
strategy  has 
the  state 
dependence  of  local  economies  in  many  sectors. 
These capital-intensive diversification policies are 
likely to suffer first in an age of prolonged austerity.

ironically  deepened 

To  some  extent,  this  might  not  be  a  bad  thing, 
as  some  of  the  spending  on  prestige  projects  in 
places  like  Qatar  and  Abu  Dhabi  has  arguably 
been  frivolous.  There  will  be  less  large-scale 
like  renewable 
experimentation  with  sectors 
energy,  semiconductors  or  aircraft  technology. 
There  will  be 
less  investment  in  museums, 
world-scale tourism and  logistics  facilities, while 
investment in heavy industry will be more modest 
and  targeted.  Reduced  capital  spending  means  a 
more  modest  economic  agenda  and  a  stronger 
reliance on local consumer economies – although 
here  too  privately  derived  household  demand 
remains limited.

10

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and ChallengesIMMIGRATION VS. 
POPULATION IN THE GULF

Philippe Fargues,  
Director, Migration Policy Centre, European 
University Institute

INTRODUCTION

“Capital-rich  and 
labour-poor”.  This  is  how 
the  curse  of  the  Gulf  States  was  described  fifty 
years  ago.  The  world’s  largest  oil  stocks  had  just 
been  discovered  under  the  earth’s  most  arid  and 
internationally 
depopulated  region.  With  oil 
recognised as the property of the state and not of 
the  company  that  did  the  pumping,  the  scarcely 
populated  states  of  the  Gulf  acquired  enormous 
largest  and  oldest  (Saudi 
wealth.  From  the 
Arabia)  to  the  tiniest  and  youngest  (Qatar),  all 
six Gulf states soon faced income surpluses with 
population shortages, to which they all responded 
by  importing  labour.  In  just  five  decades,  the 
Gulf, which for centuries had received only small 
population flows, became the world’s third largest 
receiver of global migrants after the United States 
and  the  European  Union.  The  way  in  which 
these nascent nations would incorporate massive 
numbers of newcomers into the workplace but not 
into their societies is a unique feature of the Gulf. 

When strong oil economies emerged in the Gulf 
in the 1960s, Pan-Arabism was still at its height. 
Migration  from  South  Arabia,  the  Levant  and 
the  Nile  Valley  to  the  Gulf  was  seen  by  many  in 
the  region  as  a  strategic  move  towards  a  strong 
integrated  Arab  Nation.  Arab  labour  mobility 
would bring the human wealth of the Arab world 
together with its financial wealth, and a powerful 
nation would be born. This ideology was reinforced 
by  the  1973  Suez  Canal  War,  when  OAPEC  (the 
Organization  of  Arab  Petroleum  Exporting 
Countries) proclaimed an oil embargo on Israel’s 
allies and oil prices quadrupled. Oil income, and 

with  it  the  demand  for  migrant  labour,  soared 
in the Gulf. This is when the reality and rhetoric 
started to part company, as Asians gradually came 
to outnumber Arabs in the Gulf labour markets.1 

The 1990-91 Gulf war following the Iraqi invasion 
of  Kuwait  was  to  finish  off  the  pan-Arab  myth. 
Three million Arab migrants were deported from 
the Arab states where they were employed for the 
simple reason that they were born with the wrong 
citizenship: Egyptians from Iraq, as Egypt was part 
of  the  coalition  against  Iraq;  Palestinians  from 
Kuwait; and Yemenis from Saudi Arabia, because 
the  Palestine  Liberation  Organisation  and  the 
Yemeni  government  were  supporting  Iraq.  Since 
then,  Arab  migration,  which  was  the  preferred 
topic of Arab social scientists and conferences in 
the region in the 1980s, has disappeared from the 
academic  world.  Migrants  soon  returned  to  the 
Gulf, and because the vast majority were excluded 
from  host  citizenship  non-citizens  came  to  form 
most of the workforce (from 50 to 90% according 
to  the  state)  and  in  some  cases  most  of  the  total 
population (from 36 to 80%).

OPEN LABOUR MARKETS, CLOSED 
SOCIETIES 

The  Gulf  States  share  a  paradox:  non-nationals 
are key actors in their nation-building processes. 
Without  them,  the  Gulf  States  would  not  be 
what  they  are  today,  neither  economically  nor 
politically.  First,  migrants  have  always  been  and 
still  are  instrumental  in  building  these  states. 
Endowed with large surpluses of financial capital 
but  faced  with  acute  deficits  of  human  capital, 
the  Gulf  economies  resorted  to  massive  labour 
importation. As Figure 1 shows, the entire private 
sector – where most service and good production 

1  A.  Kapiszewski,  Arab  Versus  Asian  Migrant  Workers 
in  the  GCC  Countries,  United  Nations  Expert  Group 
Meeting on International Migration and Development 
in the Arab Region, Beirut (15-17 May 2006)

11

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challengeshappen  to  break  out  they  are  usually  solved  by 
returning the protesters to their country of origin; 
or the protestors are simply silenced. For example, 
in April 2015 a migrant construction worker fell to 
his death from a building in Ras-Al-Khaimah. His 
Asian fellow-workers protested and cars were set 
on fire. Social media outlets were urged not to give 
publicity to the incident as baseless claims could 
destabilise society. 

To  use  a  phrase  I  have  employed  elsewhere 
‘dual  societies’  have  emerged  in  the  Gulf,  with 
separate worlds for nationals and non-nationals.2 
Economically, as we have seen, the nationals have 
the world’s lowest rate of economic activity and are 
concentrated solely in the public sector, while non-
nationals have one of the world’s highest rates of 
activity and take on all the jobs in the private sector.  
Legally, the ‘kafâla’ (sponsorship) system creates a 
barrier as every foreign-national is obliged to have 
a national ‘kafeel’ (sponsor), who levies part of the 
migrant worker’s income. Moreover, jus sanguinis 
confines sons and daughters of migrants born in 
the Gulf to their parents’ non-national status with 
no  door  into  citizenship  through  naturalisation, 
which  is  restricted  to  exceptional  case.3  As  non-
citizens, migrants and their families are excluded 
from all the economic, social and political rights 
for  citizens.  Socially, 
and  benefits  reserved 
interaction is also extremely limited between the 
two.

Dual societies produce differentiated demographic 
patterns.  The  population  of  nationals/citizens 
grows solely through natural increase (determined 
by  birth  and  death  rates).  The  population  of 
non-nationals/non-citizens  grows  as  a  result 
of  two  additive  processes:  the  balance  between 
new  immigration  and  return  migration,  and 

2  P. Fargues, Réserves de main-d’oeuvre et rente pétro-
lière. Les migrations de travail vers les pays du Golfe 
(1980)

3  G. Parolin, Citizenship in the Arab World: Kin, Religion 

and the Nation State (2009)

is  concentrated  –  would  simply  collapse  without 
foreign workers. After all, they represent between 
80%  (Bahrain)  and  99%  (Qatar)  of  the  labour 
force.  Nationals  are  only  employed  in  the  public 
sector, mostly in administrative positions.

Fig.1 Percentage of Foreign-Nationals Employed 
by Sector (2013)

Source: Gulf Labour Markets and Migration, http://gulfmi-
gration.eu/ 

indispensable 

in 
In  brief,  migration  was 
transforming  financial  assets  into  infrastructure 
for  the  construction  of  sustainable  post-oil 
economies;  and  into  well-being  for  nationals. 
It  made  it  possible  to  provide  Gulf  nationals 
with  high  standards  of  living,  while  at  the  same 
time  allowing  them  the  world’s  lowest  level  of 
economic  participation.  By  turning  oil  income 
into no-taxation welfare states, migration brought 
legitimacy to Gulf rulers and political stability to 
their regimes.

Second,  migrants  are  not  offered  opportunities 
to  become  members  of  the  Gulf  host  societies. 
They are all guest workers, sometimes, in the case 
of high ranking workers, accompanied by family 
dependents.  Their  stay  can  only  be  temporary 
by  law  and  with  few  exceptions  they  cannot 
be  granted  citizenship  in  their  host  country. 
Moreover, all three-D jobs (dangerous, dirty, and 
demeaning)  are  carried  out  by  migrants.  This 
means that there is no national working class that 
might claim a right to protest. If labour conflicts 

12

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challengesnatural  increase.  Despite  migration  being  only 
temporary  according  to  the  law,  de  facto  many 
migrants  have  settled  in  the  Gulf,  resulting  in  a 
continuously  rising  proportion  of  non-national 
births. As a result, non-nationals have an overall 
rate of population growth consistently higher than 
nationals. 

ADDRESSING THE GCC DEMOGRAPHIC 
CHALLENGE

The governments of the Gulf States see demography 
as a challenge. With the exception of Saudi Arabia, 
the  Gulf  populations  are  small  in  both  absolute 
and relative terms (Table 1). Taking only nationals 
into account, Saudi Arabia’s population ranks 58th 
in  the  world  and  the  other  Gulf  States  between 
145th (Oman) and 187th (Qatar). With 25 million 
nationals in total (2010), the aggregate population 
of  the  Gulf  Cooperation  Council  (GCC)  would 
rank 45th. This is little compared with the GCC’s 
neighbours,  particularly  Iran,  and  the  source 
countries  of  the  migrants.  India’s  population  is 
fifty times that of the aggregate GCC states. GCC 
demography  is  also  unimpressive  in  terms  of  its 
economic potential, a fact which explains the high 
rates  of  international  migration  and  the  fear  of 
being overwhelmed by immigrants.

Designed  as  a  response  to  demographic  scarcity, 
international  migration  produces  ambivalent 
outcomes.  On  the  one  hand,  it  compensates  for 
local labour shortages, both in terms of quantity 
and quality: the workforce and skills that are not 
available  at  home  must  be  found  in  the  global 
labour  market.  On  the  other  hand,  international 
migration  affects  the  ratio  of  non-nationals  to 
nationals  in  the  resident  population.  This  ratio 
stands at between 32% in Saudi Arabia (SA) and 
89% in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In terms 
of the labour force, meanwhile, the proportion is 
between 51% (KSA) and 95% (UAE, Qatar). If the 
ratio  of  non-nationals  to  nationals  is  considered 
too high, then governments need to work at either 
increasing  the  denominator  or  decreasing  the 
numerator. 

13

Table 1: National populations of GCC States

Country

Bahrain 2010

Kuwait 2013

Oman 2013

Qatar 2010

Saudi Arabia 2013

UAE 2010

Total GCC

Millions

0.6

1.2

2.2

0.2

20.3

1.0

25.4

Source: GCC’s National statistical offices 

Table 2: Populations of selected GCC neighbours 
and partners (2013)

Country

Millions

Geographic neighbours
Iran 
Iraq
Yemen
Source countries of migrants
India
Pakistan
Bangladesh
Philippines
Egypt

75.1
31.5
24.3

1,251.7
182.1
156.7
98.5
82.1

Source: UN Population database http://esa.un.org/unpd/
wpp/

The first way (increasing the denominator) consists 
of stimulating the natural demographic growth of 
nationals.  This  is  the  objective  of  the  pro-birth-
rate policies adopted throughout the Gulf States, 
which are only attenuated in the case of Oman by 
a strong programme of family planning aimed at 
promoting women’s reproductive health.4 

4 

Jihan Safar, Mariage et procréation à Oman et au 
Koweït : étude des mutations générationnelles dans le 
contexte d’Etats rentiers (2015)

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challengesyears.  Two  complementary  policies  are  being 
pursued in all the GCC States. A first kind of policy 
aims at indigenising the workforce (‘Gulfization’) 
in the private sector by 1) creating incentives for 
the  employment  of  nationals;  and  2)  penalising 
the  employment  of  non-nationals.  Inaugurated 
25 years ago, these policies have failed – as can be 
seen  from  Figure  2.  There  are  many  reasons  for 
this,  including  the  fact  that  Gulfization  policies 
are not popular among employers (who will have 
to pay higher wages to nationals) and they do not 
meet  the  interests  of  all  citizens  (some  of  whom 
can  earn  an  income  from  sponsoring  numerous 
non-nationals). 

A  second  sort  of  policy  is  intended  to  limit  the 
stay  of  migrant  workers  and  not  permit  them 
to  establish  themselves  permanently.  Residence 
permits  are  only  temporary,  but  in  the  Gulf,  as 
elsewhere,  a  temporary  stay  may  be  repeated 
and  may  turn  into  a  long-term  one.  The  lasting 
settlement  of  many  migrants  is  demonstrated  by 
the  emergence  of  sizeable  numbers  of  ‘second-
generation’  migrants  who  were  born  and  have 
grown up in the Gulf.

Figure 2: Percentage of foreign nationals in GCC 
populations 1975-2015

Source: Gulf Labour Markets and Migration, http://gulfmi-
gration.eu/

The  pro-natalist  policies  adopted  in  the  Gulf  are 
unique  in  terms  of  the  public  money  spent  on 
subsidising marriage, procreation and the rearing 
of children. Moreover, the availability of (migrant) 
domestic workers – which in other contexts would 
free  women  for  economic  activity  outside  the 
household  –  in  the  Gulf  lightens  the  burden  of 
child rearing. 

The  family  policies  combined  with  open-door 
policies  regarding  the  immigration  of  domestic 
workers result in the cancellation of high fertility 
costs  at  the  household  level.    Indeed,  fertility 
among GCC nationals is still high in comparison 
with all the other  parts  of  the world at  the  same 
level  of  per  capita  income.  Nevertheless,  it  has 
declined in recent years as a result of other Gulf 
State  policies  designed  to  enhance  the  status 
of  women,  in  particular  in  terms  of  education.  
Female  enrolment  rates  at  secondary  school  and 
university are high today in all these states, with 
girls  typically  attending  school  for  more  years 
than boys. In the Gulf as elsewhere, the universal 
mechanism is triggered of more educated women 
leading to lower fertility rates.  

In  addition,  one  wonders  whether  pro-natalist 
policies can actually address the challenge of small 
national populations in the Gulf. Indeed, the high 
birth  rates  do  not  respond  to  the  needs  of  the 
labour markets as it takes 20 to 25 years to produce 
a worker from a new-born baby. Moreover, in the 
segmented  societies  of  the  Gulf  where  nationals 
often  stand  in  the  upper  ranks,  a  high  fertility 
rate of the nationals will reproduce the elite rather 
than  create  a  working  class  (which  is  what  these 
countries most need).  

The  second  way  to  reduce  the  non-nationals/
nationals  ratio  is  to  decrease  the  numerator  and 
set  the  objective  of  a  smaller  number  of  non-
nationals. For example, in March 2013 the Kuwaiti 
government proclaimed that its goal was to reduce 
its  population  of  migrants  by  one  million  in  ten 

14

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challengespolicies have resulted in a narrowing of the relative 
demographic base of their nationals. 

It  might  seem  only  common  sense  to  state  that 
the  GCC  countries  uniquely  combine  intense 
immigration  with  small  native  populations,  and 
that this means foreign majorities. However, this 
is  not  as  automatic  as  it  would  seem.  In  terms 
of  the  flows  of  migrants  they  have  received  with 
respect  to  their  native  populations,  Saudi  Arabia 
and  Oman  can  be  compared  with  Canada  or 
Australia in their period of highest immigration. 
In the case of the emirates (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar 
and each of the seven emirates of the UAE), which 
are often seen as city states, it is interesting to see 
how much they resemble other cities in the global 
south  in  terms  of  population  growth  (Figure  2). 
Given space restrictions, only two cities, Abidjan 
and  Abuja  (the  African  capitals  coming  first  in 
alphabetical  order),  are  shown  in  Figure  2,  but 
this  is  sufficient  to  affirm  that  far  from  being 
unique, Gulf cities are representative of a common 
process  of  urbanization  in  emerging  economies 
and  developing  countries.  It  is  also  typical  that 
urban  settings  are  built  by  migrant  workers. 
However, unlike the large cities of the south and 
immigration  states,  the  migrants  in  the  Gulf  are 
not part of the nations they have helped to build. 
Nation-building has been done by exclusion rather 
than by inclusion of the migrants.6

The  end  result  of  the  failure  of  both  types  of 
policy – replacing migrants with nationals at the 
workplace and only allowing temporary migration 
–  is  a  continuous  increase  in  the  proportion  of 
non-nationals in the (aggregate GCC) population 
from 36.6% in 1990 to 42.7% in 2010 and to 49.4% 
in 2015. 

An  alternative  way  to  reduce  the  non-nationals/
nationals  ratio  would  have  been  to  transfer 
people  from  the  numerator  to  the  denominator 
by  granting  citizenship  to  significant  numbers 
of  non-citizens.  Naturalising  foreign  nationals 
and  opening  channels  to  nationality  for  second-
generation migrants by introducing some jus soli 
into  the  nationality  law  would  both  reduce  the 
numerator  (fewer  foreigners)  and  increase  the  
denominator  (more  nationals).  The  demography 
of  the  GCC  States  would  start  to  resemble  that 
of  Canada,  Australia,  Singapore  and  other  large 
migrant-receiving  countries,  where  high  rates  of 
immigration  do  not  translate  into  high  growth 
rates of the foreign population. 

So  far,  naturalisation  has  not  been  implemented 
anywhere  in  the  GCC  on  a  significant  scale. 
The  only  exception  is  Bahrain,  where  a  grant 
of  nationality  to  many  migrants  in  the  early 
2010s  was  a  piece  of  demographic  engineering 
aimed  at  balancing  the  Shia  and  Sunni  Muslim 
communities.5 
Elsewhere,  major  migrant 
destination  countries  have  developed  policies 
of  migrant  inclusion  and  integration.  They  have 
opened  doors  to  the  acquisition  of  nationality, 
thereby  creating  new  citizens  out  of  former 
foreign nationals and enlarging the demographic 
base  of  their  national  populations.  However,  the 
GCC  countries  have  never  travelled  down  that 
road.  On  the  contrary,  they  have  kept  to  a  strict 
line  of  not  naturalising  migrants.  Having  failed 
to  replace  migrant  workers  with  nationals,  their 

5  F. De Bel-Air, Demography, Migration, and the Labour 
Market in Bahrain, Gulf Labour Markets and Migra-
tion (2015) 

6  P. Fargues, “Immigration Without Inclusion: Non-Na-
tionals in Nation-Building in the Gulf States,” Asian 
and Pacific Migration Journal 20 (2011): 281-282.

15

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and ChallengesFig.  2:  Demographic  Growth  of  Major  Gulf 
Cities and Selected Non-Gulf Cities 1950-2011

Source: United Nations, Population Division, World Urban-
ization  Prospects,  2014  Revision,  http://esa.un.org/unpd/
wup/FinalReport/

legitimising 

The  official  discourse 
the  no-
naturalisation line holds that integrating migrants 
and  granting  them  nationality  would  endanger 
the  culture  and  welfare  system  of  the  nation: 
the  culture  by  bringing  alien  values,  and  welfare 
by  increasing  the  number  of  those  entitled  to 
benefits. The common argument is that the policy 
of protecting citizens by closing off citizenship to 
foreign  nationals  is  dictated  by  the  demographic 
uniqueness of the GCC states, i.e. small national 
populations faced with large numbers of migrants. 
However,  as  suggested  above,  the  relationship 
between demography and policies has worked the 
other  way  around.  The  demographic  uniqueness 
of  the  Gulf  States  is  a  product  of  their  policies. 
The question is: to what extent are these policies 
sustainable?

CONCLUSION

Non-nationals or non-citizens form demographic 
majorities in the workforces of the Gulf States and 
in  the  total  populations  of  four  of  them.  Many 
come  alone  on  short-term  contracts,  after  which 
they  normally  return  home.  Others  have  their 

16

contracts renewed again and again and they settle. 
They do not cut their links with their homelands 
– where the governments are keen to engage with 
their  diaspora  in  several  ways,  from  attracting 
their savings to attracting their ballots – but most 
of their lives are spent in the Gulf. They are non-
citizens for a lifetime and their rights are severely 
limited  in  the  place  where  they  live.  Will  this 
situation change? 

Internal  moves  from  within  the  Gulf  States 
are  possible.  Debates  amongst  Gulf  citizens 
have  started  on  the  subject  of  amending  (if  not 
abolishing) the kafâla system.7 Nevertheless, there 
has  been  no  strong  voice  on  the  most  sensitive 
issue,  that  of  naturalising  migrants  (or  some  of 
them). In a context where the voices of migrants 
themselves are silenced, it seems unlikely that the 
duality of the Gulf societies will evolve as a result 
of internal forces. 

Can external forces cause a change? The migrant 
origin  states  increasingly  engage  in  supporting 
their  expatriate  nationals,  although  their  level 
of  engagement  greatly  varies  from  one  state  to 
another. They work to make migration financially 
profitable  for  the  migrant  and  for  his  or  her 
country  of  origin,  and  increasingly  also  protect 
their workers abroad from exploitation and abuse. 
However,  the  states  of  origin  would  not  support 
their citizens’ efforts to obtain full membership – 
and  eventually  citizenship  –  in  other  states  (the 
destination countries of their migrants). The game 
is  instead  being  played  outside  the  region.  With 
the rise of a global civil society, the international 
community is keeping a watchful eye on migrants 
in  terms  of  human  and  labour  rights.  Its  means 
of  efficiently  defending  the  people  involved  are 
still 
limited,  particularly  in  countries  where 
human  and  migrant  rights  organisations  are  not 
represented. But their loud voice in international 
fora and on the web must be heard everywhere. 

7  M. Dito, “Labor Migration in the GCC Countries: 

Some Reflections on a Chronic Dilemna,” Middle East 
Institute (2010) 

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and ChallengesREFERENCES

De Bel-Air, Françoise, Demography, Migration, and 
the Labour Market in Bahrain, GLMM-EN-
No.6/2015,  Migration  Policy  Centre,    Gulf 
Labour  Markets  and  Migration  (2015), 
http://gulfmigration.eu/publications/. 

Dito,  Mohammed,  “Labor  Migration 

in  the 
GCC  Countries:  Some  Reflections  on  a 
Chronic  Dilemna,”  Middle  East  Institute 
(2010), 
http://www.mei.edu/content/
labor-migration-gcc-countries-some-
reflections-chronic-dilemna.  

Fargues,  Philippe,  Réserves  de  main-d’oeuvre  et 
rente  pétrolière.  Les  migrations  de  travail 
vers les pays du Golfe, Editions du CERMOC 
/ Presses Universitaires de Lyon, Beyrouth 
/ Lyon (1980).

Fargues, 

Philippe, 

“Immigration  Without 
Inclusion:  Non-Nationals 
in  Nation-
Building  in  the  Gulf  States,”  Asian  and 
Pacific  Migration  Journal  20  (2011):  281-
282.

Kapiszewski 

,  Andrzej,  Arab  Versus  Asian 
Migrant  Workers  in  the  GCC  Countries, 
United Nations Expert Group Meeting on 
International Migration and Development 
in  the  Arab  Region,  Beirut  (15-17  May 
2006).

Parolin  ,  Gianluca  2009,  Citizenship  in  the  Arab 
World: Kin,  Religion  and the Nation State, 
Amsterdam,  Amsterdam  University  Press 
(2009).

Safar, Jihan, Mariage et procréation à Oman et au 
Koweït : étude des mutations générationnelles 
dans  le  contexte  d’Etats  rentiers,  Thèse  de 
Doctorat  en  Démographie  Economique, 
Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris (2015).

17

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and ChallengesCHANGING GLOBAL DYNAMICS 
BETWEEN THE GULF, THE US, 
AND ASIA: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR THE EU

Abdullah Baabood. Director,  
Gulf Studies Center,  
Qatar University

INTRODUCTION

Since  the  United  States  (US)  with  its  “Pax 
Americana”  replaced  the  British  with  their 
“Pax  Britannica”  as  the  new  hegemonic  power 
and  the  main  security  guarantor  of  the  Gulf  in 
the  1970s,  there  have  been  some  underlying 
shifts  in  the  regional  and  global  systems.  These 
include: the overthrow of the Shah of Iran by the 
Islamic  Revolution  in  the  late  1970s;  the  Soviet 
invasion  of  Afghanistan  in  1980;  the  Iran-Iraq 
War  (1980-1988),  culminating  in  the  creation  of 
the  Gulf  Cooperation  Council  (GCC)  in  1981; 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990) and Kuwait’s 
subsequent 
liberation  by  Operation  Desert 
Shield  and  Operation  Desert  Storm  (1991);  the 
formal  end  of  the  Cold  War  (1990);  the  fall  of 
the  Soviet  Union  (1991);  the  ratification  of  the 
European Union (1993); the invasion of Iraq and 
the downfall of Saddam Hussain’s regime (2003); 
the Arab Spring (2011); and a plethora of global 
energy and financial crises. During this period of 
turmoil, relations between the GCC and the West 
(the US and Europe) were challenged and tested 
but  remained  intact  due  to  interdependency 
and  mutual  interest  in  energy,  economic,  and 
security  cooperation.  However,  recent  shifts  in 
and changing dynamics of global geopolitics have 
shaken the enduring cooperative relations between 
the two sides, creating a new dimension of GCC 
relations with the US and Asia, with implications 
for the EU. 

THE SHIFT TO ASIA

The  global  demand  for  energy  is  increasingly 
coming from the East rather than the West, with 
China  already  becoming  the  world’s  largest  net 
importer of oil and India being the third largest. 
Two  thirds  of  Gulf  oil  went  to  Europe  and  the 
United  States  in  1980,  but  this  has  fallen  to  one 
third by 2004.1 The recent East-bound Gulf oil flow 
indicates that there will be noticeable changes in the 
geo-strategic considerations among the countries 
concerned. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia’s visits 
to India and China in 2006 were evidence of this 
pivotal  shift  in  the  global  energy  market.  China 
is actively working on securing access to Middle 
East  energy.  It  is  trying  to  build  a  Maritime  Silk 
Road  between  Asia  and  Europe  through  the 
development of Oman’s Sohar Port and Freezone, 
which  is  linked  to  the  Arabian  Peninsula  and 
the  Gulf  countries.2    Beijing  has  also  announced 
a  $46bn  investment  plan  that  will  be  heavily 
concentrated  in  the  China-Pakistan  Economic 
Corridor (CPEC) a combination of transport and 
energy projects, and the development of a major 
deep-sea port providing direct access to the Indian 
Ocean and beyond.3 For the Chinese, this region 
holds  geo-strategic  significance  as  the  corridor 
through Gwadar gives them their shortest access 
to the Middle East and Africa. In addition, China 
is investing in a number of ports in Asia, aiming to 
access sources of energy and increase its influence 
over maritime routes.

1  A. Echagüe, “Change or Continuity? US Policy Towards 
the  Middle  East  and  Its  Implications  For  EU  policy,” 
Documentos de Trabajo FRIDE 95 (2010). 

2  G.  Knowler,    “China  Focuses  Attention  on  Omani 
Port  of  Sohar,”  26  January  2015,  http://www.joc.com/
port-news/china-focuses-attention-omani-port-so-
har_20150126  

3  “Is  China-Pakistan  ‘Silk  Road’  a  Game-Changer?,” 
BBC, 22 April 2015,  http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
asia-32400091.

18

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challengespercent  of  the  world’s  total  crude  oil  production 
and 15 percent of global gas production), it will be 
no  surprise  if  the  GCC  States’  strategic  relations 
become  increasingly  aligned  with  the  emerging 
changes  in  the  energy  markets  and  the  global 
energy demand emanating from Asia. As a result of 
internal growth dynamics and global headwinds, 
the  GCC’s  external  relationships  are  inexorably 
shifting  from  the  historically  dominant  EU  and 
US  to  the  emerging  markets  of  Asia.  In  sum, 
substantial  changes  in  global  economic  weights 
over the past decades have increasingly shifted the 
Gulf countries’ economic focus towards the Asian 
continent. 

Moreover,  the  GCC-Asia  trade  relationship, 
which  was  initially  founded  on  the  energy 
requirements  of  established  and  emerging  Asian 
economies,  is  no  longer  limited  to  energy  and 
GCC  hydrocarbon  reserves.  The  change  in  the 
emphasis  of  GCC  trade  patterns  is  clear  and  the 
focus  of  Gulf  business  is  moving  eastwards.  A 
cursory glance at the region today would support 
this view. Asia is now the GCC’s most important 
trade  partner,  both  in  terms  of  its  hydrocarbon 
exports  and  also  of  its  imports  of  machinery, 
manufactured goods and food. Intensified bilateral 
investment relations have accompanied the GCC’s 
growing trade ties with developing Asia. Migrant 
workers  from  Asia,  especially  from  the  Indian 
subcontinent, now account for more than half of 
the GCC’s labour force, significantly contributing 
to  economic  prosperity  and  development  in  the 
Gulf monarchies.

This  shift  eastward  is  unsurprising  given  the 
travails of the developed Western economies. With 
the  sluggish  recovery  from  the  financial  crisis  in 
the EU and the US, Gulf economies have had to 
look elsewhere. For example, the UK, a traditional 
trading partner, has failed to hit growth of 2% in 
the  last  five  years,  while  the  US  has  fared  little 
better  with  annual  growth  rates  stuck  below  3%. 
On the other hand, in the same period China has 

India  has  become 

Similarly, 
increasingly 
dependent  on  Middle  East  oil  for  its  extensive 
appetite for energy, with the region becoming the 
largest supplier for India’s growing energy needs. 
To better access the energy in the region, India has 
discussed an Iran-Oman-India pipeline project for 
transportation of natural gas.4 Previously, projects 
such  as 
India-Pakistan-Iran 
pipeline were unsuccessful due to the difficulty of 
constructing and investing in such infrastructure 
in Pakistan with its many lawless tribal regions.

the  envisioned 

There  is  another  factor  contributing  to  the  shift, 
this  time  from  the  US  side.  The  so-called  shale 
revolution,  which  is  also  referred  to  as  a  game 
changer in the global energy market, has allowed 
the US to become less dependent on Gulf oil. This 
has diminished US interest in the region and will 
result  in  a  reduced  role  as  security  guarantor,  as 
the cost now outweighs the possible benefit. The 
fact  that  the  pivot  of  US  foreign  policy  is  also 
shifting  toward  the  East  explains  the  weakening 
motivation of the US to remain deeply involved in 
the Gulf region. 

Second, over the past few decades, the GCC states 
have witnessed rapid economic growth, with the 
value of their economies reaching $1.6 trillion in 
2013 and their financial surplus in sovereign wealth 
funds  touching  $2  trillion.  This  economic  boom 
has given the GCC much-needed confidence and 
the  GCC  members  have  increasingly  diversified 
their external market integration and investment 
friendliness.

However, the GCC’s economic structure is largely 
driven  by  oil  and  gas  exports.  The  oil  and  gas 
sector amounts to 63 percent of the public revenue 
of  these  countries,  or  41  percent  of  their  GDP 
and over 70 percent of their total export revenue. 
Given the GCC’s levels of oil and gas reserves (40 

4  K. Taneja, “India’s Importance in the Middle East,” 22 
April 2014,  http://warontherocks.com/2014/04/indias-
growing-strategic-importance-to-the-middle-east-and-
persian-gulf/ 

19

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challengesrecorded  average  straight-line  annual  growth  of 
8.9% and India has achieved a rate of 7%.

service  stops  in  Djibouti,  Oman,  Saudi  Arabia, 
and Sudan.7

China-GCC  trade  ties  are  strengthening  at  a 
faster  rate  than  investment.  By  2020,  China 
will  be  the  biggest  export  market  for  the  GCC, 
and  Chinese  investment  in  the  GCC  is  on  the 
rise,  mostly  in  wholesale  and  retail  trade,  with  a 
significant  increase  in  Saudi  Arabia.  In  contrast, 
Gulf  companies  have  secured  comparatively 
few  refinery  projects  in  China,  and  portfolio 
investments have been limited.

Third,  the  established  strength  of  Chinese  and 
Indian  military  power  marks  these  countries  as 
influential  players  in  the  global  security  order, 
which  may  provide  the  Gulf  countries  with  a 
potential future option for their security insurance, 
helping  to  fill  the  power  vacuum  which  the  US, 
much as the British did in the past, looks likely to 
leave. According to the Global Firepower Military 
Rankings 2015, China and India rank respectively 
as the third and the fourth largest world military 
powers after the US and Russia.

In fact, China has been visibly engaging in military 
missions  overseas  with  its  increasing  military 
strength.  The  Chinese  navy  was  dispatched  to 
Somali  waters  in  2008.  In  2010,  Chinese  navy 
vessels  docked  in  Iran  and  at  Port  Zayed  in  the 
United  Arab  Emirates  in  order  to  participate  in 
counter-piracy operation5 and China commenced 
a bilateral counter-piracy exercise with the US in 
the  Gulf  of  Aden  and  the  Horn  of  Africa  on  11 
December  2014.6  China  has  initiated  joint  anti-
piracy exercises and naval visits to neighbouring 
countries  and  the  Middle  East  region  for  the 
purpose of military diplomacy as well as to protect 
strategic  trade  routes,  building  interim  technical 

2014, 

September 

5  M.  Singh,  “China’s  Military  Presence  in  the  Gulf,” 
26 
http://blogs.wsj.com/wash-
wire/2014/09/26/chinas-military-presence-in-the-gulf/. 
6  US  Navy,    “China  Conduct  Anti-Piracy  Exercise”,  12 
December  2014,  http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.
asp?story_id=84858 

Likewise,  India  has  also  been  militarily  active 
in  the  Gulf.8  In  2008  India  and  Qatar  signed  a 
defence  agreement  establishing  the  foundations 
for  a  deeper  Indian  involvement  in  the  region. 
Under  the  agreement,  New  Delhi  committed  to 
protect Qatar from external threats. The deal with 
Qatar  leads  to  the  possibility  of  India  providing 
military  support  in  an  event  in  which  shipping 
lines  become  blocked  and  hamper  the  free  flow 
of oil and gas to the sub-continental shores. India 
signed  a  similar  defence  pact  with  Saudi  Arabia 
in 2014. This implies that China and India, while 
currently far from being global powers, are already 
playing  a  strategic  role  as  reliable  and  capable 
international  military  powers.  The  GCC  states’ 
strengthening ties with these countries signal that 
they may prove to be appropriate potential future 
alternatives  to  the  dwindling  influence  in  the 
region of the US. 

THE GCC, THE US AND THE EU

The opposing views held by the US and the Gulf 
countries  in  addressing  critical  regional  issues 
further complicate matters between the two sides. 
Indeed, the US and the Gulf states have begun to 
diverge  on  many  issues,  such  as  the  US  nuclear 
deal with Iran and crises in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. 
The  US-Iran  nuclear  deal  is  perhaps  the  main 
issue  that  is  threatening  to  compromise  the  long 
history of relations between the US and the Gulf 
states.  Given  the  fundamental  sectarian  tension 
between the Arab Gulf states and Iran with respect 
to the balance of power in the region, the decades-
old  efforts  by  the  US  in  reaching  a  framework 
agreement on the nuclear issue with Iran – from 

7  D.  Sun,  “China’s  Soft  Military  Presence  in  the  Middle 
East,”  11  March  2015,  http://www.mei.edu/content/
map/china%E2%80%99s-soft-military-presence-mid-
dle-east 

8  Taneja, “India’s Importance”, op. cit.

20

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challengeswhich the GCC states have been excluded – pose 
a significant threat for the GCC, as Iran has been 
able to gradually step closer to its goal of becoming 
a  nuclear  power.  The  sense  of  urgency  has  not 
been shared by the US, which has persisted with 
diplomatic measures without a willingness to take 
more decisive actions.

The  Syrian  crisis  is  another  major  issue  that  has 
weakened the bond between the US and the GCC 
states.  From  the  Gulf  States’  perspectives,  the 
continuing survival of the Assad regime remains a 
source of instability that may result in a dangerous 
spillover effect in neighbouring countries such as 
Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq. Accordingly, the Arab 
Gulf countries have thrown their support behind 
the opposition movement and called for a lifting of 
the arms embargo, which has prevented necessary 
outside arms support from being delivered to the 
people  on  the  ground.  Meanwhile,  the  US  has 
resisted  calls  for  the  lifting  of  the  arms  embargo 
and  even  vetoed  the  possibility  of  supplying 
adequate weaponry to the rebel forces.9 

With  such  momentous  shifts  in  the  strategic 
relations  between  the  GCC  and  the  US  and  the 
GCC  and  the  two  major  Asian  powers  of  China 
and  India,  one  might  legitimately  wonder  what 
implications  these  changes  will  have  for  Europe, 
given the historical relations between the Gulf and 
Europe  and  the  existing  economic  and  political 
interests shared by the two regions. 

Essentially, EU-GCC relations commenced in the 
late  1980s  with  the  two  regional  organizations 
signing  a  Cooperation  Agreement  in  1989  that 
provided  for  intra-regional  cooperation  in  many 
fields, including economic, energy, environmental, 
education  and  research,  customs,  and  other 
technical  fields.  The  agreement  also  initiated 

9  A. Sager, “Whither GCC-US Relations?,” Gulf Research 
Center,  29  March  2013,  http://www.grc.net/?frm_
action=view_newsletter_web&sec_code=grcanalysis&-
frm_module=contents&show_web_list_link=1&int_
content_id=80613 

a  political  dialogue  that  was  accompanied  by 
negotiations  on  free  trade.  This  relationship  was 
based  on  historic  engagement  and  reciprocal 
interests in trade, energy investment and security, 
in  which  the  two  regions  enjoy  a  high  degree  of 
complementarity.

However, the meagre outcome of this relationship 
shows that it has been difficult for the EU and the 
GCC to move from their rather simple cooperation 
to  a  more  strategic  partnership.  This  is  due  to 
conditions  set  by  both  parties:  the  EU  has  failed 
to recognize the full value of the GCC countries’ 
economic  and  geopolitical  potential  beyond  the 
Middle East context. Furthermore, the absence of 
a  unified  EU  policy  towards  the  Gulf  region  has 
produced contradictions between the bilateral and 
multilateral  tracks  of  EU-GCC  diplomacy.  There 
is  no  consensus  within  the  GCC  side  regarding 
a  strategic  partnership  with  the  EU.  This  could 
be attributable to the fact that “both parties have 
given  priority  to  their  partnership  with  the  US, 
which  is  more  able  than  the  EU  to  provide  the 
security  guarantees  that  the  Gulf  needs  and  on 
which it bases its foreign policy.10

However,  the  EU’s  position  on  the  critical  issues 
in  the  region  has  not  always  been  in  accordance 
with US policy, despite managing to fit itself in the 
direction  of  the  US  perspective  in  most  regards. 
In  particular,  the  EU  and  the  US  demonstrated 
differing stances on addressing the crisis in Syria 
after the Arab uprising swept the region in 2011.

Given  the  sensitive  context  of  the  Gulf,  where 
the  EU,  the  US,  and  the  GCC  countries  do  not 
always  see  eye  to  eye,  the  recent  dynamic  shifts 
in  GCC-US  and  GCC-Asia  relations  should 
be  clearly  understood  by  the  EU  vis-à-vis  its 
policy  towards  the  region.  In  fact,  there  are  a 
number of reasons why the EU needs to consider 

10  C.  Bianco,  “EU-GCC  Cooperation  in  an  Era  of 
Socio-Economic  Challenges,”  Istituto  Affari  Inter-
nazionali  (2014),  http://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/
eu-gcc-cooperation-era-socio-economic-challenges

21

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challengesnegotiations  that  have  not  lead  to  anything 
substantial  and  have  hampered  the  healthy 
development  of  close  intra-regional  relations. 
Moreover,  further  efforts  to  revive  EU-GCC 
relations through the Joint Action Program (JAP) 
have not yielded any useful results, and neither has 
the political dialogue, which continued to reiterate 
previously held positions and failed to unfreeze the 
deadlock in the free trade negotiations. This is an 
opportune moment to reconsider this relationship 
in the light of the changing global dynamics.

CONCLUSIONS

The implications of changing global, Gulf-US and 
Gulf-Asia dynamics for the EU represent a positive 
signal  of  a  valuable  opportunity  for  Europe 
to  become  more  engaged  in  this  strategically 
important  region.  Due  to  the  Asian  powers’ 
rapidly  growing  energy  needs  and  their  need  to 
secure stable access to Gulf oil, the economic and 
strategic  ties  of  the  GCC  with  China  and  India 
have  grown  significantly.  Alongside  this,  the 
decreasing  US  energy  dependence  on  the  region 
as a result of domestic shale energy production has 
shaken the historic partnership between the Gulf 
and the US. Furthermore, the established military 
strength  of  China  and  India  has  allowed  them  a 
deeper engagement in the Gulf, which is also made 
possible by the pivotal change in US foreign policy 
towards  the  East.  The  differing  stance  between 
the  GCC  countries  and  the  US  on  critical  issues 
in  the  region,  including  the  Iranian  nuclear  deal 
and crises in Syria and Yemen, has prompted the 
Gulf states to diversify their security partnerships. 
However, all of these changes in fact offer the EU 
more  space  to  project  its  own  policy  toward  the 
region,  as  the  possibility  of  less  US  presence  is 
becoming  more  apparent  and  the  Asian  powers 
still enjoy only limited influence there. Given the 
economic and strategic potential of the Gulf region, 
the European powers should strive to direct these 
shifting dynamics in favour of their own interests. 

reserves,  compounded  with 

developing its current relations with the Gulf into 
a  more  strategic  partnership,  and  the  changes  in 
GCC relations with the US and Asia allow more 
space  for  such  developments.  First  of  all,  better 
partnership between the EU and the Gulf can be 
helpful  in  resolving  the  financial  and  economic 
crisis in Europe. With the Gulf countries’ sizeable 
financial 
their 
inflated  economies,  the  EU  could  greatly  benefit 
from  foreign  direct  investment  from  the  GCC. 
In  addition,  there  are  many  areas  where  the  EU 
and the GCC states share similar interests, such as 
countering terrorism and maintaining stability in 
the region, especially in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region with a particular focus on 
containing Iran’s nuclear ambitions and securing a 
stable energy flow. The facts that the volume of EU-
GCC trade is twice the size of that between the US 
and that the GCC and the EU economies have a 
greater reliance on Gulf energy than the US should 
encourage the EU to take a more solid approach 
towards  the  region.  Although  the  US  presence 
and its influence in the region still remains strong 
compared to any other international actor, mutual 
interests in many issues and mutual economic and 
strategic significance mean that it is time for the 
EU to play a more active role in the region than it 
did before.

The  EU  should  note  that  the  combination  of 
the  decreased  US  interest  in  the  region  and  the 
GCC states’ mistrust of US policy creates a more 
favourable  environment  for  the  EU.  In  addition, 
the role China and India can play in the region’s 
security is still limited compared to the traditional 
Western powers. Indeed, some EU member states 
such  as  the  UK  and  France  have  made  large 
contributions to GCC security and continue to do 
so  via  bilateral  security  arrangements  and  arms 
sales. These bilateral arrangements could be useful 
in augmenting collective EU-GCC relations.

The  EU  and  the  GCC  need  to  reconsider  their 
relations  and  learn  from  previous  pitfalls.  It  is 
fair to say that there has been a period of missed 
opportunities  because  of  the  stagnant  free  trade 

22

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and ChallengesEast,” 22 April 2014,  http://warontherocks.
com/2014/04/indias-growing-strategic-
importance-to-the-middle-east-and-per-
sian-gulf/.

US Navy, “China Conduct Anti-Piracy Exercise,” 
Mass  Communication  Specialist  1st  Class 
Travis  Alston  and  Mass  Communication 
Specialist 3rd Class Eric Coffer, 12 Decem-
ber 2014, http://www.navy.mil/submit/dis-
play.asp?story_id=84858

REFERENCES

Bianco, Cinzia, “EU-GCC Cooperation in an Era 
of  Socio-Economic  Challenges,”  Istituto 
degli  Affari  Internazionali  (2014),    http://
www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/eu-gcc-coop-
eration-era-socio-economic-challenges. 

Echagüe, Ana, “Change or Continuity? US Policy 
Towards the Middle East and Its Implica-
tions  For  EU  policy,”  Documentos  de  Tra-
bajo FRIDE 95 (2010). 

“Is China-Pakistan ‘Silk Road’ a Game-Changer?,” 
BBC, 22 April 2015,  http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-asia-32400091.Knowler, Greg,  
“China  Focuses  Attention  on  Omani  Port 
of  Sohar,”  26  January  2015,  http://www.
joc.com/port-news/china-focuses-atten-
tion-omani-port-sohar_20150126. 

Oxford  Business  Group,  “GCC  Trade  With  Asia 
Is Growing and Diversifying,  http://www.
oxfordbusinessgroup.com/analysis/ori-
ent-express-trade-asia-growing-and-di-
versifying

Sager, Abdulaziz, “Whither GCC-US Relations?,” 
Gulf  Research  Center,  29  March  2013, 
http://www.grc.net/?frm_action=view_
newsletter_web&sec_code=grcanalysis&-
frm_module=contents&show_web_list_
link=1&int_content_id=80613.

Singh, Michael, “China’s Military Presence in the 
Gulf,”26  September  2014,  http://blogs.wsj.
com/washwire/2014/09/26/chinas-mili-
tary-presence-in-the-gulf/. 

Sun,  Degang,  “China’s  Soft  Military  Presence 
in  the  Middle  East,”  11  March  2015, 
http://www.mei.edu/content/map/chi-
na%E2%80%99s-soft-militar y-pres-
ence-middle-east.

Taneja,  Kabir,  “India’s  Importance  in  the  Middle 

23

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and ChallengesSECTION 2  
BEYOND THE ARAB SPRING.  
THE GULF COUNTRIES AND  
THE MIDDLE EASTERN  
GEOPOLITICS

24

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and ChallengesTHE SHIA-SUNNI DIVIDE: 
WHEN RELIGION MASKS GEO-
STRATEGY

Olivier Roy, 
Chair in Mediterranean Studies, 
European University Institute

INTRODUCTION

Iraq  after 

the  US  military 
Starting  with 
intervention  in  2003,  and  culminating  with  the 
Arab spring in 2011, the quest for democracy in 
Iraq, Bahrain and Syria has rapidly turned into a 
sectarian conflict between Shias and Sunnis. With 
the  open  military  intervention  of  the  Lebanese 
Hezbollah  in  Syria,  and  the  growing  presence  of 
the  Iranian  Guardians  of  the  Revolution  on  the 
side of the Bashar regime in Syria, and of the Shia 
government  in  Iraq,  local  civil  wars  have  turned 
into a regional confrontation between a Shia axis 
supported by Iran and a Sunni axis supported by 
Saudi Arabia. This polarization extends to Yemen, 
where  the  Zaidites,  a  dissident  Shia  community 
dominant  in  the  North  with  no  affinity  with  the 
mainstream  “Twelver”  Shiism,  have  received  the 
support  of  Iran,  while  the  Saudis  have  launched 
a  military  campaign  in  support  of  the  Sunni 
opponents. Here, we can see a change of alliances: 
in the sixties the Zaidites were supported by Saudi 
Arabia  because  they  were  defending  the  Yemeni 
monarchy against an alliance of Arab nationalists 
and  socialists  which  mainly  recruited  among 
Sunnis.

How should this sudden religious polarization be 
interpreted? Is it the expression of a centuries-old 
religious divide or the result of a new geo-strategic 
alignment  in  the  Middle  East,  where  conflict 
between  Iran  and  Saudi  Arabia  through  proxies 
has replaced the Israel-Palestine conflict?

SHIISM: FROM POLITICS TO THEOLOGY

The historical divide between Shias and Sunnis had 
nothing to do with theology: it was the result of a 
feud  for  the  Prophet’s  succession.  Ali,  the  fourth 
Caliph, cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet, and 
his son Hussein lost the battle. Subsequently, their 
followers (the Shias) withdrew from politics. In the 
course of history they developed a specific theology 
centred  on  the  imamat:  the  spiritual  leadership 
of a certain number of direct descendants of Ali, 
who  became  the  leading  religious  model  for  the 
Shias. The main concept of the dominant school, 
the  Twelvers,  is  that  the  twelfth  imam  has  been 
“occulted” and will come back at the end of time.

The mainstream Shias, the Twelvers, consider the 
twelfth Imam to be the last, while other groups, far 
less  numerous,  chose  to  stop  or  diverge  at  some 
point (the fifth Imam for the Zaydis, the seventh 
for the Ismailis, etc.). Other groups reserve special 
worship  for  Ali  without  referring  to  the  line  of 
imamat, and thus are often described by the Sunnis 
as  extreme  Shias  (but  most  of  the  Shias  do  not 
recognize them as part of the family), the Alawis 
of Syria and the Alevis of Turkey for instance. The 
early  Shias  used  to  be  concentrated  around  the 
north of the Persian Gulf and in the south of what 
is now Lebanon.

The religious divide turned into politics when the 
Safavi dynasty took over Iran (1501) and decided 
to  adopt  Twelver  Shiism  as  the  state  religion. 
At  that  time,  the  four  large  empires  (Ottoman, 
Safavis,  Uzbeks  and  Moghols)  that  fought  for 
supremacy from Istanbul to Delhi and Samarkand 
were headed by Turkic dynasties so the opposition 
between  Iran  and  the  others  was  rapidly  framed 
in  terms  of  a  religious  divide.  In  1517,  Selim  II, 
the Ottoman Sultan, reclaimed the title of Caliph, 
which  had  become  obsolete  since  the  fall  of  the 
Abbasid  lineage  in  1257,  to  claim  a  religious 
Sunni  legitimacy.  During  the  same  century,  the 
Safavis  brought  religious  Arab  Shia  families  into 

25

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and ChallengesIran  to  create  a  Shia  state  clergy  which  could  be 
anchored into an Arab genealogy, setting the basis 
for  the  emergence  of  great  transnational  clerical 
families  (Arabo-persian)  that  are  still  prominent 
in  the  Shia  clergy  (the  Musavi,  Sadr,  Shirazi  and 
Tabataba’I, etc).

a political dimension when the Iranian revolution 
put  an  end  to  the  collegiality  of  the  Ayatollas  by 
making  the  supposedly  “greater”  of  them  both 
a  spiritual  and  political  leader,  a  function  called 
“velayat-e faqih”, or “regency of the doctor of the 
law”.

Another  reason  for  turning  to  orthodox  Arab 
Shia  clerics  was  to  establish  some  distance  from 
the  popular  “Alevism”  of  the  Turkmen  troops, 
which was too “heterodox” and “shamanic” for it 
to be made the official religion of a former Sunni 
society.  Two  events  contributed  to  shaping  the 
contemporary  form  of  this  new  Shia  clergy:  the 
Afghan  invasion  of  Iran  in  1727  led  to  the  exile 
of the leading Shia clergy to Najaf and Kerbala in 
the  Ottoman  territory,  where  they  were  granted 
extra-territoriality  (it  was  only  to  be  abolished 
in 1979 by Saddam Hussein); and the theological 
quarrel over ijtihad1 versus taqlid,2 which was won 
by  the  reformists,  led  to  the  progressive  fixation 
of  the  “marjayya”,  i.e.  the  institutionalization  of  
the  figure  of  the  “Mojtahed”  as  being  entitled  to 
provide  religious  guidance  to  believers  and  to 
train  mollahs  who  would  teach  in  his  name  and 
convey  the  religious  tax  or  khums  to  their  “great 
ayatollah”  or  Mojtahed.  A  college  of  a  dozen  co-
opted  Mojtahed  has  ruled  over  the  Shia  clergy 
since that time. The concept of marjayyat took on 

1  “Islamic legal term meaning “independent reasoning,” 
as  opposed  to  taqlid  (imitation).  One  of  four  sources 
of  Sunni  law.  Utilized  where  the  Quran  and  Sunnah 
(the first two sources) are silent. It requires a thorough 
knowledge of theology, revealed texts and legal theory 
(usul al-fiqh), a sophisticated capacity for legal reason-
ing,  and  a  thorough  knowledge  of  Arabic”  (Esposito 
2013).

2  “Conformity  to  legal  precedent,  traditional  behaviour, 
and doctrines. Often juxtaposed by reformers with ijti-
had, independent reasoning based on revelation. Tradi-
tionally, legal precedent is considered binding in Islamic 
law,  but  taqlid  has  acquired  a  negative  connotation 
among modern reformers, who use the term to refer to 
cultural and intellectual stagnation and unwillingness 
to experiment with new ideas. Reformist criticism has 
taken  both  fundamentalist  and  modernist  directions” 
(Esposito 2013).

Since  the  18th  century  the  Shia  clergy  has 
become  politically  autonomous,  economically 
independent, 
transnational  and  hierarchized, 
although Iran has been the only country to claim 
Shiism as its “national” religion. Iran thus became 
closely associated with Shiism, although after the 
fall of the Safavis, no monarch used it as the main 
tool  of  foreign  influence  until  the  victory  of  the 
Islamic  revolution  of  1979.  In  parallel,  tensions 
between  Sunnis  and  Shias  seemed  to  decrease 
everywhere in the wake of the Nahda movement, 
which  started  at  the  end  of  the  19th  century 
precisely  because  of  a  debate  over  re-opening 
“ijtihad”,  to  the  point  that  in  1958  the  university 
of  Al  Azhar  declared  that  it  is  permissible  for  a 
Muslim to follow the jaffari legal school of thought 
(mazhab3). Jaffari (after the 6th Imam, Jaffar, who 
endeavoured to outline what a Shia fiqh could be) 
become  the  conventional  neutral  denomination 
for Shiism. In the present litigious context, to refer 
to  the  Jaffari  legal  system  connotes  an  inclusive 
attitude towards the Shias. There have been many 
intermarriages  between  Shias  and  Sunnis  in 
Pakistan since its independence and also in some 
Arab countries, and sectarian identity was not an 
issue until 1977.

However, the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979 
changed  everything.  For  a  second  time  Shiism 
became associated with a state strategy of regional 
expansionism  coupled  with  a  revolutionary  call 
to  topple  the  existing  Arab  regimes.  In  parallel, 
in its opposition both to Israel and to Iran, Arab 

3  A  legal  school  of  thought  is  called  a  mazhab,  which 
means that it is not a different religious interpretation 
but just a variation in legal interpretations. To call Shi-
ism  a  mazhab  is  to  re-introduce  it  into  mainstream 
Islamic orthodoxy.

26

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challengesnationalism  took  on  an  increasingly  religious 
Sunni  dimension  under  the  growing  leadership 
of  Saudi  Arabia:  the  Wahhabis  and  the  Salafis 
used theological arguments to condemn Shias as 
renegades  (rafidhin).  The  Sunnitisation  of  Arab 
militancy also had a side effect: the marginalisation 
of the Arab Christians.

Neither the Iranian revolution nor the salafisation 
of  Sunnism  came  out  of  the  blue,  even  though 
the  religious  radicalization  that  was  at  work 
before  1979  went  mainly  unnoticed  by  Western 
observers.  While  the  role  played  by  Wahhabism 
and  Saudi  Arabia  has  been  acknowledged,  little 
research  has  been  conducted  on  the  Shia  revival 
that  preceded  the  Iranian  revolution  because 
the  revolution  put  the  focus  on  Iran,  while  the 
movement  of  radicalization  had  been  happening 
widely outside Iran.

THE SHIA REVIVAL BEFORE THE IRANIAN 
ISLAMIC REVIVAL

Many local rural Shia communities in Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, southern Iraq and southern Lebanon in 
the mid-20th century were not under the control of 
the clergy of Najaf and Qom. They were under the 
leadership  of  big  landowners  (zaim  in  Lebanon, 
arbab  in  central  Afghanistan)  and  they  were 
usually called by specific ethnic names (metwalis 
in  Lebanon,  hazara  in  Afghanistan).  However, 
from the 1950s a dual movement of clericalisation 
and social mobilization took place. Young clerics 
trained  in  the  howze  (Shia  religious  schools)  of 
Najaf and Qom came back to their places of origin, 
or were even sent by leading ayatollahs, to launch a 
sort of “awakening” religious movement that went 
in  parallel  with  contestation  of  the  leadership  of 
the landowners and a call for education and social 
reforms. The movement was also associated with 
rural  migration,  with  local  young  Shias  going  to 
the capital (Beyrouth) or abroad (Iran and Iraq for 
the  Afghan  Shias).  While  working  as  “migrants”, 

many  youths  also  went  to  religious  schools,  the 
level  of  which  was  far  higher  than  in  the  Sunni 
madrasa, which played the same role in Pakistan, 
Afghanistan and the Gulf for the Sunnis.

The great names of the new religious militants are, 
among others, Musa Sadr for South Lebanon, who 
set up the “amal” movement, and Sayyed Balkhi in 
Afghanistan. Both of these “clericalized” the local 
Shia communities by appointing modern clerics, 
and disenclaved them by connecting them to the 
religious centres of Shiism, jumping from the local 
to the global, and often bypassing the national state 
where  Shias  were  underrepresented  (Lebanon, 
Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Gulf states). They also 
contributed  to  homogenizing  Shia  communities 
by encouraging them to adopt Iranian-style rites, 
practices and dress (for the celebration of Ashura,4 
for  instance)  and  discarding  local  folklore  and 
popular religion. A common clerical Shia culture, 
which  later  would  turn  into  a  political  and 
ideological one, took shape from Beirut to Karachi.

This movement of religious revival was not directed 
by Iran, although there is evidence that the Shah 
of Iran provided help to Musa Sadr. It was mainly 
managed by the various great ayatollahs of Najaf 
and Kerbala. In fact, although the ayatollahs usually 
shared the same religious views, there were many 
reasons  for  them  to  compete  among  themselves: 
their  networks  of  followers  were  not  bound  by 
ethnic,  national  or  linguistic  borders,  and  more 
followers  meant  more  financial  resources,  which 
allowed  them  to  open  madrasas  and  charities 
and  thus  enhance  their  religious  and  ipso  facto 
political  influence.  The  main  difference  among 
them  concerned  their  attitudes  to  politics:  the 

4  “Commemoration of the martyrdom in 680 of Husayn, 
Muhammad’s  grandson  and  the  third  imam  of  Shii 
Islam.  Shii  communities  annually  reenact  the  tragedy 
in a passion play, including self-mortification and dis-
plays  of  sorrow  and  remorse  intended  to  unite  them 
in  Husayn’s  suffering  and  death  as  an  aid  to  salvation 
on  the  Day  of  Judgment.”  In  Esposito,  John  (ed.),  The 
Oxford Dictionary of Islam (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013).

27

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challengesmost influential ayatollah of Najaf, Khu’y, rejected 
the concept of Islamic revolution, and was quietist 
and somewhat conservative, while ayatollah Baqer 
al  Sadr  was  far  more  involved  in  politics  (and 
would be executed by Saddam Hussein in 1980). 
However, both schools of thought contributed to 
the mobilisation and homogenisation of the local 
Shia communities by connecting them to a clerical 
and international centre. It  is also worthwhile to 
note  that  the  Iranian  clergy  was  not  the  most 
active nor the most radical. Until 1963, ayatollah 
Khomeyni  was  quite  conservative;  it  was  only 
when  the  Shah  launched  his  “white  revolution” 
that he became a vocal opponent of the regime and 
shifted to a revolutionary Islam, attracting younger 
radical clerics (hodjat ol-islam, like Mottahari).

This  religious  revival  touched  only  the  Twelver 
Shias. During the sixties the Yemeni Zaydis were 
split  between  royalists  and  republicans,  but  were 
massively  opposed  to  the  socialists  of  South 
Yemen, and thus closer to Saudi Arabia, while both 
the  Turkish  Alevis  and  the  Syrian  Alawis  joined 
nationalist and secular political parties (CHP and 
Baas).

THE WATERSHED OF THE IRANIAN 
REVOLUTION: FROM RELIGION TO 
POLITICS. 

The  Iranian  Islamist  regime  immediately  took  a 
radical  pan-Islamist  approach  and  emphasized  a 
strong anti-imperialist anti-Zionist revolutionary 
stand against the existing Arab regimes. However, 
it  failed  to  attract  the  Sunni  masses.  The  Iraqi 
attack  on  Iran  in  September  1980,  followed  by 
a  bloody  8-year  war,  undermined  the  Iranian 
appeal  to  the  Sunnis.  Most  Arab  countries  (with 
the  exception  of  Syria)  backed  Iraq,  and  they 
were  followed,  with  more  or  less  enthusiasm, 
by  the  Islamist  movements  (Muslim  Brothers). 
Sunni  solidarity  worked.  Iran  never  succeeded 
in  attracting  militant  Sunni  groups,  but  only 

splinter  groups  (like  Sheykh  Cha’aban  in  Tripoli, 
Lebanon). The  picture  was  more  mixed  with  the 
Shia Arabs because the Iranian regime requested 
not  only  their  strategic  support  against  Saddam 
Hussein  but  also  an  ideological  commitment 
to  the  revolution  and  its  leading  principle  of 
velayat-e  faqih.  Many  traditional  Shia  clerics 
(Shamseddin  in  Lebanon,  Khuy  in  Iraq)  refused 
to accept velayat-e faqih and kept a neutral stand 
on  the  war.  Others,  like  Fadlallah  in  Lebanon, 
politically  endorsed  the  cause  of  Iran  but  still 
rejected  velayat-e  faqih  for  religious  reasons.  By 
contrast, many mid-level clerics who were part of 
the Shia “awakening” enthusiastically backed both 
revolutionary Iran and the concept of velayat. To 
ensure  its  control  of  Shiism,  the  Iranian  regime 
launched  a  campaign  of  “revolutionization” 
inside  foreign  Shia  communities  and  backed 
new  revolutionary  organisations  either  against 
traditional  political  parties  (Amal  in  Lebanon) 
or in parallel with them (Da’wat in Iraq). In some 
cases this resulted in a Shia civil war: in the Shia 
region of Hazarajat in Afghanistan the pro-Iranian 
Nasr movement fought and won a tough civil war 
against the moderate “shura” from 1982 to 1984; 
in  Lebanon  the  Hezbollah  won  hegemony  over 
the Shias; and in Iraq the Supreme Council for the 
Islamic  Revolution  in  Iraq  (SCIRI)  was  founded 
in  Iran  in  1982  and  received  the  bulk  of  Iranian 
support.

THE SUNNI BACKLASH

Even  though  many  Shia  leaders  (Khu’y  in  Iraq, 
Shirazi  for  the  Gulf  states)  did  not  endorse  the 
Iranian  revolution,  the  Arab  regimes  tended  to 
perceive Shias in general as an Iranian fifth column. 
Restrictions were put on public religious practices 
(Ashura) and many were expelled from Iraq and 
Kuwait,  dubbed  Iranians.  Only  in  Lebanon  did 
the war enable Hezbollah to become a prominent 
political party and the leading military force in the 
country.

28

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and ChallengesHowever,  another  kind  of  Sunni  reaction  rose 
from  below,  even  though  it  was  encouraged  by 
the  growing  policy  of  re-Islamization  initiated 
by  many  Sunni  states.  In  Pakistan,  for  instance, 
the  Islamization  policy  decided  by  General  Zia 
ul  Haqq  after  the  coup  of  1977  resulted  in  the 
imposition of zakat (tax on wealth) on individual 
bank  accounts.  The  Shias  protested,  saying  that 
they  paid  the  khums  directly  to  their  religious 
authorities  and  thus  should  be  exempted  from 
zakat. They won their case but the consequence was 
that people had to register as either Shia or Sunni, 
which  thus  led  to  an  “obligation  to  choose”  and 
transformed what was a “grey area” about religious 
affiliations  into  an  increasing  sectarianisation  of 
public space. A radical Sunni group created in the 
Punjab in 1985, Sipah-e Saheban, waged a terrorist 
war against the Shias. Many members of the Shia 
elite  were  killed  just  because  they  were  Shias. 
In  south  Punjab,  the  Shias  began  to  regroup  in 
distinctive neighbourhoods that were more easily 
defensible  and  many  mosques  were  transformed 
into  militarized  strongholds.  This  phenomenon, 
despite having been triggered by a small group of 
militants, generated forms of ethnic cleansing and 
regrouping  by  sectarian  affiliation  everywhere. 
The  civil  war  in  Lebanon  resulted  in  the  same 
polarisation,  as  did  the  civil  war  that  de  facto 
broke out in Iraq after the US invasion of 2003. In 
parallel,  the  Wahhabi  authorities  launched  fatwa 
upon fatwa to qualify the Shias as “renegades”. The 
spirit of the Al Azhar fatwa of 1958 was dead.

Once again, the growing antagonism between Shias 
and Sunnis had nothing to do with a “millenial” 
hatred,  but  with  a  strategic  realignment  that 
resulted from both a backlash against the Iranian 
revolution and from a religious revival turned into 
an  ideological  radicalisation  that  touched  both 
Shias  and  Sunnis.  The  geostrategic  struggle  for 
hegemony in the Middle East enlarged and even 
re-created the religious divide between Shias and 
Sunnis, as did the wave of re-Islamization, because 
the latter focussed precisely on “who owns Islam?” 

This  paradox  of  the  Islamist  revival  was  not 
understood  at  the  time  by  the  West,  which  saw 
the Iranian revolution as the vanguard of a global 
Islamic  radicalization,  without  seeing  that,  by 
definition,  this  re-Islamization  would  exacerbate 
the sectarian religious divides within the Muslim 
world.

IRAN: FROM PAN-ISLAMISM TO A 
COALITION OF MINORITIES IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST

In  1989  with  the  death  of  Khomeini,  it  seemed 
that  the  Islamic  revolution  had  failed  to  make  a 
breakthrough  among  the  Sunnis  and  was  stuck 
everywhere  in  a  “Shia  ghetto”.  Nevertheless,  Iran 
did not renounce its strategy of becoming the leader 
of the Middle East: it downplayed its revolutionary 
dimension,  tried  to  mend  fences  with  Arab 
regimes and recast its appeal through support for 
the great cause that nobody could ignore: the fight 
against Israel. Hezbollah and Hamas were the two 
show-case players in this strategy. In a word, Iran 
paradoxically played more on “Arab nationalism” 
than  on  “Islamic  revolution”.  Arming  Hezbollah 
and  Hamas,  adopting  an  intransigent  attitude 
towards Israel, and building a nuclear programme 
to  achieve  its  sanctuarisation  were  the  main 
pillars  of  the  Iranian  strategy.  The  conservative 
Arab  regimes  saw  Iran  more  as  a  threat  than  as 
an  ally  against  Israel,  but  were  restrained  by  the 
popularity  of  the  Palestinian  cause  among  their 
populations.

Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia waged a “clandestine” 
campaign  against  Iran  by  supporting  radical 
Sunni  movements  that  would  fight  Iran  and 
the  Shias  everywhere  in  close  cooperation  with 
Pakistan,  which  wanted  to  thwart  Iranian  (and 
Indian)  influence  in  Afghanistan.  Radical  Sunni 
movements were supported more or less openly: 
the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Lashkar-i Jhangvi 
in  Pakistan,  and  other  radical  groups  in  Iranian 

29

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challengesto 

penetrated  the  non-Twelver  religious  minorities. 
identify  with  secular  Arab 
These  used 
nationalism,  but  when  this  pan-Arabism  came 
into crisis they were confronted with the hostility 
of  Sunni  radicals  who  considered  them  heretics. 
At the end of the 1970s, when Hafez el Asad was 
looking  for  some  “Muslim”  credentials  on  the 
eve  of  his  fight  against  the  Muslim  Brothers,  no 
Sunni religious institutions would agree to deliver 
a certificate of “membership” in the ummah to the 
Alawis.  Only  Musa  Sadr  in  Lebanon  recognized 
the  Alawis  as  Shia  Muslims.  In  the  wake  of  the 
alliance  forged  between  Iran  and  Syria,  certain 
Shia clerics endeavoured to “shiitize” the Alawis. 
The neighbourhood around the grave of Sidnayya 
Zeynab in Damascus became a “Twelver” enclave, 
the  place  where  the  Lebanese  sheikh  Fadlallah 
opened his howza.

Simultaneously,  Iran  launched  a  campaign  in 
the  direction  of  the  Turkish  Alevis,  who  had 
already been the target of terrorist activities (the 
massacres of Sivas and Marash in the 1980s). Later, 
the Houthist movement in Yemen allied with Iran 
after 2011 and started to show more willingness to 
identify not so much with Zaïdism as with Shiism 
in general. In a word, the presumption that Shias 
could  be  an  Iranian  fifth  column  became  a  self-
fulfilling  prophecy,  despite  the  fact  that  most  of 
the Arab Shias, with the exception of Hezbollah, 
do not really identify with Iran but are constrained 
to  do  so  by  both  internal  factors  (the  religious 
awakening)  and  geostrategic  pressure  (they  have 
no other real ally than Iran).

Baluchistan. However, this policy backfired on 11 
September 2001 when it became obvious that some 
of  the  radical  Sunni  movements,  even  strongly 
anti-Shia ones, saw the West as their main target. 
Saudi Arabia and the Salafi radicals would never 
be able to disentangle the “good” anti-Shia Sunni 
radicals from the “bad” terrorist movements.

The  apex  of  the  Iranian  strategy  was  the  Israeli 
attack  in  South  Lebanon  and  its  relative  defeat 
in  the  face  of  Hezbollah  (summer  2006).  For  a 
short  period,  Nasrallah  became  the  hero  of  the 
Arab street, and Hezbollah the champion of Arab 
nationalism.  Its  support  for  Hamas  allowed  Iran 
to  appear  to  bypass  the  Shia-Sunni  divide  in  the 
name of the common fight against Zionism.

Curiously, this strategy crumbled six months later 
with  the  execution  of  Saddam  Hussein,  which 
was the indicator that a new civil war had started 
in Iraq, opposing the new Shia rulers against the 
Sunni  minority  after  the  US  invasion.  Falluja 
replaced South Lebanon in radical Sunni imagery. 
A second event was the Arab spring: this refocused 
Arab politics on national and domestic issues, to 
the  detriment  of  pan-Arab  solidarity.  Moreover, 
it undermined the Syrian regime, something that 
was not acceptable for Iran. In a very short span 
of time, Iran decided to support the Assad regime 
in Syria at all costs. With its military intervention 
in Syria, Hezbollah turned from pan-Arab heroes 
into a factional sectarian movement fighting as a 
proxy for Iran. 2012 was the year when the deep 
changes in the geostrategic relations of the Middle 
East, at work since 1979, accelerated and became 
irreversible. A broad Shia coalition led by Iran was 
fighting  a  profoundly  divided  Sunni  Arab  array 
of  opposed  elements,  including  radical  jihadists 
and  terrorists  (Daesh),  already  defeated  Muslim 
Brothers, conservative Salafis and Wahhabis, and 
authoritarian states (Saudi Arabia, Egypt).

A final element of importance was the broadening 
of the concept of “Shia”. Iranian influence slowly 

30

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and ChallengesCONCLUSIONS

This  polarization  between  Shias  and  Sunnis  has 
brought  the  Gulf  emirates  and  monarchies  back 
into the fold of Saudi Arabia. The problem is that 
the  Saudi  leadership  of  the  anti-Iran  coalition 
might  exacerbate  the  religious  dimension  of  the 
divide,  because  the  Wahhabi  clergy  qualify  the 
Shias  as  heretics,  thus  giving  a  purely  religious 
dimension to the new geo-strategic alignment. The 
few endeavours to shape a Sunni coalition under a 
less religious and more political mobilization have 
failed; for instance, during the Arab spring Qatar 
tried to play a specific Sunni  card by  supporting 
the Muslim Brothers, who never accused the Shias 
of  being  heretics,  but  their  crushing  defeat  in 
Egypt put all the Muslim Brothers of the Middle 
East on the defensive. The increased tensions with 
Iran put the Gulf States, which are geographically 
closer to Iran than Saudi Arabia, on the front line.

They  may  fear  being  drawn  into  too  direct  a 
confrontation  with  Iran,  a  confrontation  which 
may  have  already  started  in  Yemen,  as  it  is  the 
first  time  that  a  Saudi-led  coalition  has  directly 
intervened in a regional conflict by sending troops 
on the ground. This is a big shift from war by proxy, 
which was the favourite tool of Saudi policy until 
the coming into power of the new King Salman.

The  first  states  to  be  fragilized  by  the  religious 
interpretation  of  the  conflict  between  Iran  and 
Saudi  Arabia  are  of  course  Kuwait  and  Bahrain, 
because of the presence of huge Shia populations. 
Oman cannot buy the “excommunication” of the 
Shias  in  the  name  of  defence  of  Sunnism.  But 
Saudi  Arabia  itself  is  not  immune:  the  discrete 
endeavours of the monarchy to mend fences with 
the  Saudi  Shia  community  during  the  1990s  are 
in jeopardy. The religious divide is not the cause 
of  the  conflict  between  a  coalition  led  by  Saudi 
Arabia  and  the  pro-Iran  axis;  nevertheless,  the 
exacerbation  of  religious  mobilization  makes 
it  harder  to  find  domestic  political  settlements 
(in Yemen for instance) and to find a diplomatic 
solution to the crisis.

31

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and ChallengesTRANSNATIONAL IDENTITIES 
AFTER THE ARAB UPRISINGS

Toby Matthiesen,  
Senior Research Fellow in the International 
Relations of the Middle East,  
St. Antony’s College, 
University of Oxford

INTRODUCTION

transnational 

The  prominence  of 
identities 
has  been  one  of  the  main  features  of  the  Arab 
uprisings  that  started  in  late  2010.  While  all  the 
uprisings were driven by local grievances and the 
protesters  were  careful  to  initially  use  local  and 
national  slogans,  in  most  cases  the  transnational 
dimension  became  central,  particularly  after  the 
harsh  security  responses  and  the  failure  of  some 
of the democratic experiments (such as in Egypt). 
But has this transnational dimension undermined 
the  importance  of  the  state  as  a  key  actor  and 
as  the  form  of  government  these  transnational 
movements aspire to? Or are movements such as 
Islamic State merely replicating many of the forms 
of  governance  that  have  characterised  Middle 
Eastern states for decades? 

PAN-ARAB OR PAN-ISLAMIC? 

Transnational identities during the Arab uprisings 
took  many  different  forms;  they  were  first  of 
all  pan-Arab,  ensuring  that  the  protests  spread 
from  one  Arab  country  to  another,  driven  by  a 
pan-Arab  public  sphere  of  largely  Gulf-funded 
satellite  channels  and  social  media.1  Most  Arabs 

1  This  does  not  mean  that  this  pan-Arab  public  sphere 
has  the  same  goals  as  earlier  pan-Arabist  movements, 
i.e.  the  unification  of  the  Arab  countries.  But  some  of 
the legacies of pan-Arabism, such as a common public 
sphere in the form of mass media, a sense of together-
ness and the idea that events in one Arab country impact 
on another, were key to explaining the rapid spread of 
the Arab uprisings. 

felt intricately connected to the events and started 
to  hold  strong  opinions  about  them.  The  Arab 
uprisings were also of great interest to the global 
Left, which hoped that the revolutions in the Arab 
world  were  genuine  social  revolutions  against 
right-wing  dictatorships  that  could  usher  in  a 
better era for the peoples of the Middle East and 
inspire transformations in other parts of the world. 
Leftist groups were key in the protest movements 
in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen and beyond. It 
was  also  no  coincidence  that  Tahrir  (Liberation) 
became a key term used at the Occupy protests in 
America and Europe. 

But  the  appeal  of  the  uprisings  was  in  part  also 
pan-Islamic,  in  the  sense  that  Muslims  around 
the  world  started  to  pay  even  closer  attention  to 
developments  in  the  Middle  East  and  become 
emotionally  involved,  particularly  after  the  start 
of the Syrian revolution. The Muslim Brotherhood 
seemed  best  positioned  to  profit  from  this  pan-
Islamic sentiment. It has branches in most Arab and 
Islamic countries, and won elections in Egypt and 
Tunisia, and thus became empowered throughout 
the  region.  After  the  Gulf-backed  coup  in  the 
summer of 2013 against former Egyptian president 
Morsi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, the 
future  of  the  most  popular  transnational  Sunni 
Islamist  movement  which  embraced  elections  as 
a means to attain power is uncertain. As a result, 
more  violent  Sunni  Islamist  movements,  which 
equally  play  on  transnational  Islamic  identities, 
have gained traction.

SECTARIAN TRANSNATIONAL IDENTITIES

level,  the  most 

At  the  regional 
important 
transnational  identities  that  became  key  were 
tribal  and  sectarian.  Transnational  religious 
identities largely followed the schism between the 
various  forms  of  Sunni  Islam  and  the  different 
branches  of  Shiism.  For  example,  the  doctrinal 
differences between the different forms of Shiism, 
such as the Alawites, Zaidis and Twelver Shia, are 

32

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challengessubstantial. Nevertheless, in today’s great game for 
regional hegemony these doctrinal and historical 
differences  seem  to  have  become  less  important, 
and  various  non-Sunni  groups  are  cooperating 
more  closely  than  before.  This  is  happening 
partly  under  pressure  from  Iran,  which  is  trying 
to  homogenise  Shiism  and  extend  its  influence 
amongst Shia communities around the world. The 
alliance of the Assad regime in Syria, and to a lesser 
extent the Houthi movement in Yemen, with Iran 
is  firstly  tactical  and  political  and  only  secondly 
religious.  However,  in  the  wake  of  war  and  with 
the  empowerment  of  extreme  anti-Shia  forces 
such  as  Islamic  State,  a  religious  consolidation 
within  Shiism  seems  to  be  slowly  taking  place. 
Hizbullah’s intervention on the side of the regime 
in the Syrian conflict was a symbolic reminder of 
this, and it has contributed to the sectarianisation 
of both Syria and Lebanon.

Sunni Muslims, too, were initially divided across 
ideological  (and  doctrinal)  lines  and  disagreed 
over  whether  the  Arab  uprisings  were  to  be 
embraced  or  staved  off.  However,  increasingly, 
and particularly since King Salman came to power 
in Saudi Arabia in January 2015, an effort has been 
made to unite different Sunni political movements, 
including  the  Muslim  Brotherhood,  in  order  to 
confront  Iran  and  what  the  Gulf  Arabs  perceive 
as Iranian proxies.2 As such, the regional civil war 
based on transnational sectarian identities is not 
set  to  stop  any  time  soon.  Instead,  transnational 
sectarian identities are becoming more polarised 
and more rigid across the region. 

The  tribal  connections  between  Syria,  Jordan, 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and between Saudi 
Arabia  and  Yemen,  have  also  become  politicised 

2  See, for example, T. Matthiesen, The domestic sources 
of  Saudi  foreign  policy:  Islamists  and  the  state  in 
the  wake  of  the  Arab  Uprisings  (Washington,  D.C.: 
Brookings  Institution,  2015),  https://www.academia.
edu/15259726/The_domestic_sources_of_Saudi_for-
eign_policy_Islamists_and_the_state_in_the_wake_
of_the_Arab_Uprisings.

and can explain some of the support that Kuwaitis 
and Saudis (and other Gulf nationals) have given 
to militant groups in Syria and Iraq, and why these 
groups are now a real threat to Gulf security. Often, 
tribal  ties  overlap  with  the  networks  of  (mainly 
Sunni) Islamist political movements. 

THE FAILURE OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN 
STATE PROJECT

The breakdown of states in the region and the rise 
of trans- and subnational loyalties has sometimes 
been explained with  reference to the notion that 
these states were invented after World War 1 and 
were  not  built  on  a  “genuine”  feeling  of  national 
destiny or belonging. There is some truth in this. 
Nevertheless, all nations are invented and imagined, 
and most Middle Eastern states have used all the 
means at their disposal to create national identities 
for the best part of a century, and have taught their 
version  of  national  history  in  schools,  created 
national myths, and often fought wars to honour 
these  myths.3  Therefore,  the  notion  that  Middle 
Eastern  states  are  “artificial”  is  over-simplistic. 
Instead,  trans-  and  subnational  identities,  which 
for a long time were not necessarily at odds with 
each other or with the nationalist narratives, have 
now become salient for a number of reasons. 

First  of  all,  states  have  in  many  ways  failed  to 
live  up  to  the  expectations  of  their  citizens  and 
to  deliver  on  promises  of  development  and 
progress.  The  Middle  Eastern  state  is  a  classic 
centralist  state,  imposing  its  preferred  version  of 
language,  culture,  religion  and  national  identity 
on peripheral regions, which often received little 
in  return  and  remained  marginalised.  Take  the 
case  of  Aleppo,  for  example,  which  was  one  of 
the most important trading centres of the Middle 
East  until  its  integration  into  the  Syrian  nation 
state. The  new  borders  cut  it  off  from  its  natural 
3  B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the 
Origin  and  Spread  of  Nationalism,  2nd  ed.  (London: 
Verso, 1991). 

33

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challengeshinterland and the Damascene elite ensured that 
Damascus  became  the  unrivalled  capital  of  the 
country.  These  unequal  and  exploitative  centre-
periphery  relations  inflamed  subnational  and 
transnational identities across the region. It is no 
coincidence that many of the uprisings started at 
the marginalised periphery: in Sidi Bouzid, Deraa, 
Awamiya  and  hundreds  of  other  small  towns 
and  villages.  In  the  eyes  of  many  people  outside 
the  patronage  networks  of  the  state,  the  state 
institutions  were  so  corrupt  and  transgressive 
that  the  state  itself  lost  much  of  its  legitimacy. 
For others who depended on state patronage, the 
battle became all about saving the institutions that 
fed  them  and  their  families,  and  about  crushing 
the protest movements that wanted to reform or 
dismantle these same institutions. Thus, it is to a 
large  extent  the  failure  of  governance  in  Middle 
Eastern states that led to the rise of identity politics 
after the Arab uprisings. 

In  addition,  regional  conflicts  have  politicised 
transnational  identities  that  previously  were  not 
primarily political, but social, cultural or spiritual 
(such  as  religious  identities  in  the  age  of  Arab 
nationalism). Authoritarian rulers had for decades 
manipulated  and  inflamed  sectarian,  tribal  and 
regional differences in order to stay in power, and 
delegitimised  potential  opponents  by  accusing 
them of maintaining transnational ties “to outside 
powers”.  This  stigmatisation  of  movements  that 
sought to highlight legitimate grievances and the 
crushing  of  all  dissent  in  the  name  of  national 
security  has  turned  the  “threat”  of  transnational 
ties into a self-fulfilling prophecy. 

The  regional  rivalry  between  Iran  and  Saudi 
Arabia,  both  of  which  use  sectarian  identities  to 
further  their  geopolitical  goals,  has  been  crucial 
in  this  regard.  Certainly,  the  sectarianisation  of 
the  Bahrain  uprising  and  the  bloody  trajectory 
of  the  Syrian  revolution  from  national  uprising 
to  a  situation  where  extreme  sectarian  groups 
like Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamic State are leading 

the  fight  against  the  regime,  and  are  threatening 
the survival of a whole range of religious groups, 
have  inflamed  sectarian  tensions  all  across  the 
Middle East, and indeed beyond. This is becoming 
particularly  evident  on  social  media,  where 
initially  activists  broadly  supported  all  the  Arab 
uprisings.  After  a  while,  however,  sectarianism 
and  ideology  started  to  divide  the  Arab  publics. 
By  and  large,  Shia  Muslims  came  to  not  support 
the  Syrian  revolutionaries,  but  to  cheer  for  their 
co-religionists  in  Bahrain  and  the  Saudi  Eastern 
Province. Sunni Muslims, on the other hand, were 
suspicious  of  the  latter  two  protest  movements, 
but were very vocal in their support for the Syrian 
cause.4 

ISLAMIC STATE AND THE CALIPHATE 

Transnational Islamic identities therefore became 
as much a source of unity as of division. A whole 
range of transnational Islamic movements claimed 
to  be  the  legitimate  heirs  of  the  Arab  uprisings. 
Islamic  State  has  emerged  as  one  of  the  most 
forceful of these groups, not least because its aim 
to  establish  a  caliphate  has  activated  yet  another 
powerful  transnational  narrative  that  appeals  to 
Muslims around the world. There have long been 
Islamic  movements  seeking  to  preserve  or  re-
establish the caliphate abolished in 1924, from the 
Khilafat movement in India to Hizb ut-Tahrir, the 
global Islamist movement with a strong presence in 
Asia. However, most Islamist movements deemed 
the  caliphate  a  distant  goal  that  could  only  re-
emerge under certain ideal conditions, and instead 
wanted to focus on building an Islamic state (al-
dawla  al-islamiyya).  Before  renaming  itself  just 
“Islamic State”, the group was known as The Islamic 
State in Iraq and al-Sham. The intellectual leap of 
the group has then been to merge the discourses of 
the utopian Islamic state and the caliphate which 
4  M.  Lynch,  “Rethinking  nations  in  the  Middle  East”, 
Washington Post, 2 June 2015, http://www.washington-
post.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/06/02/rethink-
ing-nations-in-the-middle-east. 

34

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challengeshave  been  prevalent  in  a  whole  range  of  Islamic 
contexts for decades and to try to implement them 
in a specific territory, Iraq and al-Sham. They have 
even  managed  to  incorporate  the  discourse  of 
Greater Syrian nationalism, of bilad al-Sham. The 
notion of unifying bilad al-Sham, a geographical 
designation  that  broadly  corresponds  to  the 
“Levant”,  i.e.  Syria,  Lebanon,  Palestine,  Jordan 
and  parts  of  Iraq,  has  been  the  aim  of  Syrian 
nationalists.  Its  name  therefore  symbolises  the 
territorial  aspirations  of  Islamic  State.  It  is  this 
combination  of  a  ruthless  state-building  project 
with a revolutionary transnational identity, indeed 
a new internationalism, that has so far ensured its 
success. 

Islamic  State  has  answered  the  question  whether 
the Sykes-Picot agreement, the line drawn up by 
French  and  British  diplomats  during  the  First 
World  War  to  divide  the  Middle  East,  which 
defined  the  boundaries  of  the  post-Ottoman 
Arab  states,  is  still  relevant.  De  facto  it  is  not, 
even  though  it  still  dominates  official  maps  and 
minds,  but  the  new  polities  that  are  emerging 
resemble the old ones in many ways, and many of 
the sub- and transnational movements that want 
to establish a state mainly seek to redraw the map 
of the Middle East, not fundamentally change the 
laws of politics. 

THE KURDS AND THE ARAB SHIA 

Kurdish nationalism is a case in point. It seeks to 
unite all Kurds (mainly from Iraq, Syria, Turkey and 
Iran) in a Greater Kurdistan. In many ways, it will 
be the success or, more likely, eventual failure of the 
policies of the states that now contain significant 
Kurdish  populations  that  will  determine  the  fate 
of  the  Kurdish  nationalist  project.  The  fallout 
from  the  Arab  uprisings  has  certainly  given  this 
project  new  momentum.  However,  the  Kurdish 
state envisioned by Kurdish nationalists is a classic 
Middle Eastern state, based on ethnic nationalism, 
with  hostile  neighbours,  worries  about  regime 

security, an economy based on natural resources 
and an elite that came of age in times of war and 
has been accused of corruption. 

The situation of the Arab Shia is also related to the 
developments  above.  The  Shia-led  government 
of  Iraq  has  been  unable  to  reach  a  mutually 
beneficial agreement with the Kurds, and is facing 
difficulties in convincing Iraq’s Sunnis in the areas 
under  Islamic  State  control  that  the  Iraqi  nation 
state is a better alternative for them than Islamic 
State.  However,  the  rise  of  the  Iraqi  Shia  since 
2003  together  with  the  Arab  uprisings  have  had 
profound impacts on another group of Arab Shia: 
those that live in the Gulf (mainly in Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait). Bahraini and Saudi Shia have 
taken to the streets to demand more rights since 
2011, while Kuwaiti Shia have by and large backed 
the ruling family and even supported a crackdown 
on the largely Sunni tribal and Islamist opposition 
there. 

The diverging trajectories of the Shia in the Gulf 
show that it is still the national context that shapes 
the  local  strategic  decisions  of  transnational 
political actors. There have been attempts by Gulf 
Shia to write the Shia into national historiographies 
and  into  the  national  consciousness.  Because 
Arab  Shia  are  a  majority  in  Bahrain  and  they 
see  themselves  as  the  original  inhabitants  of  the 
island, it was fairly straightforward for Shia actors 
there  to  embrace  a  language  of  nationalism  and 
inclusiveness, because these actors can reasonably 
hope  to  play  a  key  role  in  the  country  one  day. 
In  Saudi  Arabia,  where  Shia  make  up  about  10-
15%  of  the  citizen  population,  after  a  period  of 
confrontation  in  the  1970s  and  1980s  the  main 
Shia  actors  have  tried  to  engage  with  the  ruling 
family  and  with  wider  Saudi  society.  They  have 
thus raised the visibility of the Shia in the kingdom, 
even 
institutionalised  discrimination 
remains an issue.5 

though 

5  For more see T. Matthiesen, The Other Saudis: Shiism, 
Dissent and Sectarianism (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2015).

35

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and ChallengesCONCLUSION

While  the  transnationalism  that  has  emerged 
so  strongly  in  the  Middle  East  is  in  many  ways 
an  attempt  to  create  new  nation  states  based  on 
ethnicity  and/or  religion,  this  does  not  make  it 
less threatening to existing Middle Eastern states. 
It is beyond doubt that these movements seek to 
profoundly redraw the map of the Middle East, and 
they may well succeed. However, what may look 
new is not necessarily original. The new political 
entities such as Islamic State are replicating many 
of  the  practices  that  the  corrupt,  brutal  and 
authoritarian  rentier  states  of  the  Middle  East 
have  used  for  decades.  Therefore,  their  eventual 
success in “governing” the populations under their 
control may be limited, as they will face many of 
the  same  problems  that  have  bedevilled  Middle 
Eastern  states  for  a  century,  and  that  eventually 
led  to  the  Arab  uprisings.6  While  transnational 
identities have certainly become more important 
in the Middle East, nationalism, and particularly 
the notion of the nation state, have not yet become 
obsolete. 

6  Tripp,  “IS:  the  rentier  caliphate  with  no  new  ideas”, 
Al-Araby,  8  February,  2015,  http://www.alaraby.co.uk/
english/politics/2015/2/8/is-the-rentier-caliphate-with-
no-new-ideas.

However, since the start of the Arab uprisings the 
notion of a transnational connection between these 
Gulf Shia has again become more important. This 
has been spurred by increased sectarian tensions 
at  the  regional  level  and  the  discrimination  and 
repression that the Bahraini and Saudi Shia face in 
particular. There is a sense that these transnational 
connections  amongst  Gulf  Shia  relate  to  the 
notion of the imagined community that was once 
“Ancient  Bahrain”,  when  the  Gulf  coast  from 
Basra  down  to  Qatar  was  united  in  one  single 
polity. In the Bahraini and Eastern Province case, 
there is a sense that this is also associated with a 
shared  descent  and  a  shared  religious  affiliation, 
which makes it similar to ethnic nationalism. The 
project  that  a  number  of  opposition  groups  seek 
to implement is that of “Greater Bahrain”, unifying 
Bahrain with Qatif and al-Ahsa in the Saudi Eastern 
Province  and  perhaps  areas  beyond.  Needless  to 
say, this is anathema to the Gulf governments and 
Sunnis in the Gulf, many of whom instead favour 
supporting Arab separatists in Iran’s Gulf province 
of al-Ahwaz.

ETHNIC CLEANSING

In several multi-religious societies, and particularly 
where the Sunni-Shia split is of relevance, there is 
a  real  threat  of  mass  displacements  and  killings 
based on sectarian or ethnic lines. In some places, 
such  ethnic  cleansing  has  already  occurred  (for 
example in the case of the Yezidi Kurds in Iraq). 
The longer the wars in Syria and Iraq go on, the 
more  areas  will  be  split  into  “Sunni”  and  “Shia” 
territories.  Minorities  will  probably  mainly  seek 
refuge  in  “Shia”  and  Kurdish  areas.  Recently, 
Islamic  State  has  vowed  to  expand  its  strategy 
of  ethnic  cleansing  outside  Iraq  and  Syria.  The 
Saudi (Najd) branch of Islamic State has started a 
deadly bombing campaign against Shia in the Gulf 
with  the  declared  aim  of  purifying  the  Arabian 
Peninsula  of  the  “rejectionists”  (a  pejorative  way 
of referring to Shia).  

36

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and ChallengesREFERENCES

Anderson,  Benedict,  Imagined  Communities: 
Reflections  on  the  Origin  and  Spread  of 
Nationalism,  2nd  ed.  (London:  Verso, 
1991). 

Lynch, Marc, “Rethinking nations in the Middle 
East,” Washington Post, 2 June 2015, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/mon-
key-cage/wp/2015/06/02/rethinking-na-
tions-in-the-middle-east. 

Matthiesen,  Toby, The  Other  Saudis:  Shiism,  Dis-
sent  and  Sectarianism  (Cambridge:  Cam-
bridge University Press, 2015).

The domestic sources of Saudi foreign poli-
cy: Islamists and the state in the wake of the 
Arab Uprisings (Washington, D.C.: Brook-
ings Institution, 2015).

Tripp,  Charles,  “IS:  the  rentier  caliphate  with  no 
new  ideas,”  Al-Araby,  8  February  2015, 
http://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/poli-
tics/2015/2/8/is-the-rentier-caliphate-
with-no-new-ideas.

37

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challenges 
this  context, 

this  chapter  analyses 

In 
the 
relationship between the Gulf monarchies and Iran 
after 2011, which has been marked by a regional 
struggle  for  influence  between  Saudi  Arabia  and 
Iran.  This  confrontation  has  plunged  West  Asia 
(and in particular, Yemen, Iraq and Syria) into the 
situation  it  is  in  today,  and  is  also  characterised 
by notable divergences of views and (political and 
economic) interests among the GCC states when 
dealing with Iran and the latter’s future role in the 
region.

The  GCC  was  created  in  1981  with  the  aim  of 
formulating  common 
“achieving  unity”  and 
regulations 
including  economics, 
in  fields 
customs,  commerce,  education  and  culture.  The 
fact that the six monarchies share similar political 
systems and international allies and have survived 
similar challenges to their rule (Arab nationalism, 
socialism and revolutionary Islamism, to mention 
only  a  few)  has  been  the  most  solid  cement 
keeping  the  GCC  alive.  However,  deep-founded 
divisions and power imbalances within the council 
led to it being largely unproductive over the first 
three  decades  of  its  existence.  One  of  the  best 
illustrations of this has been the single currency. 
The  Gulf  Monetary  Council  was  established  on 
27  March  2010,  but  progress  towards  monetary 
integration has been negligible: Oman left in 2007 
and the UAE stormed out of the project in 2009. 
Even on security issues, structural divergences of 
views have impeded the emergence of a common 
line. While Saudi Arabia (and more recently Qatar) 
has  been  funding  Islamist  groups  and  militants 
abroad since the 1980s, this has been a cause for 
concern in other GCC capitals, which are worried 
about a long-term boomerang effect on their own 
internal stability. More recently, Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates and Bahrain have accused 
Qatar of interfering in their domestic affairs and 
supporting local Muslim Brotherhood cells.

At  the  beginning  of  2011,  when  it  became  clear 
that  protests  would  not  only  take  place  in  Egypt 

THE GULF MONARCHIES 
AND IRAN: BETWEEN 
CONFRONTATION AND 
GEOSTRATEGIC REALITIES

Marc Valeri, Director,  
Centre for Gulf Studies,  
University of Exeter

INTRODUCTION

The  international  agreement  on  Iran’s  nuclear 
programme  between  the  P5+1  (Britain,  China, 
France,  Russia  and  the  United  States,  plus 
Germany) and Iran on 14 July 2015 was reached 
while Saudi Arabia, Egypt and four of their other 
Gulf  Cooperation  Council  (GCC)  allies  were 
engaged in a large-scale air campaign codenamed 
Operation  Decisive  Storm  against  the  Houthis  in 
Yemen  –  a  conflict  which  resulted  in  more  than 
5,200  deaths  as  of  29  September,  and  more  than 
21 million people (80 percent of the population) 
in  need  of  humanitarian  assistance  and  with  no 
access to safe water.1 This sequence of events has 
taken  place  while  manipulation  of  the  sectarian 
card  has  underpinned  policy  responses  to  the 
Arab  Spring  in  the  region  and  only  heightened 
tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, 
conflicting  dynamics  have  been  at  play  within 
the  GCC  since  2011.  Fundamental  divergences 
over  the  Muslim  Brotherhood  issue,  and  the 
post-Arab  Spring  Middle  East  in  general,  led  to 
increasing  tensions  between  Qatar  and  Saudi 
Arabia,  the  UAE  and  Bahrain.  However,  all  the 
GCC monarchies have shown strong cohesion in 
dealing with internal peaceful protests, including 
on  the  occasion  of  the  military  intervention  in 
Bahrain in 2011. 

1  United  Nations  Office 

the  Coordination  of 
for 
Humanitarian Affairs, “Yemen Humanitarian Bulletin 
No.  3,”  29  September  2015  (available  at:  http://bit.
ly/1LDxJnl, checked on 12 October 2015).

38

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challengesand Tunisia but in the Gulf too, all the GCC ruling 
families  agreed  that  they  did  not  intend  to  go 
beyond  what  they  fundamentally  considered  a 
red line, i.e. keeping the centre of political power 
(encompassing  the  executive  and  the  legislative 
power)  as  their  personal  prerogative  closed  off 
from  contestation.  The  potential  scenario  of  a 
regional  unbalancing  of  power  driven  by  a  lack 
of  support  from  external  allies  (the  overthrow 
of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt was often used as an 
example)  led  the  GCC  countries  to  temporarily 
set  aside  their  differences  and  to  find  solutions 
together. All the GCC countries (even those which 
did  not  send  troops)  supported  the  Peninsula 
Shield  intervention  in  Bahrain  in  2011.  The 
Bahraini authorities worked desperately to depict 
the  uprising  as  a  sectarian  movement.2  This  was 
done  by  not  only  blaming  Iran  for  its  supposed 
interference in the island’s internal affairs, but also 
by targeting activists on a sectarian basis. All the 
GCC  rulers  signed  up,  explicitly  or  implicitly,  to 
the  narrative  that  Iran  was  behind  the  protests. 
Obviously,  this  blame  game  served  the  purposes 
of  the  GCC’s  ruling  families,  which  by  branding 
the  protests  as  an  exogenous  product  sought  to 
avoid  having  to  face  indigenous  grievances.  In 
addition, the GCC countries coordinated financial 
aid to help Oman and Bahrain cope with the Arab 
Spring (an aid package worth US$ 20bn) in March 
2011.

However, this support for its weakest links (Oman 
and  Bahrain)  was  not  the  first  step  towards 
a  strengthening  of  the  ties  between  the  GCC 
countries  that  Saudi  Arabia  may  have  hoped.  In 
late  2011,  King  ‘Abd  Allah  of  Saudi  Arabia  put 
forward a plan to create a Gulf Union which would 
co-operate on foreign policy and defence, as well 
as on trade and currency. The idea was supported 
by Bahrain – but only Bahrain. The other states all 

2  For a study of the manipulation of sectarian identities by 
the Bahraini and Saudi regimes during the Arab Spring, 
see  T.  Matthiesen,  Sectarian  Gulf:  Bahrain,  Saudi 
Arabia,  and  the  Arab  Spring  That  Wasn’t  (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2013).

have had objections, due not only to their fear that 
such  a  structure  could  increase  Saudi  ambitions 
to  dominate  the  smaller  GCC  states  but  also  to 
their divergent priorities in foreign policy. While 
Qatar  gave  support  to  the  Muslim  Brotherhood, 
infuriating  Saudi  Arabia,  strong  reservations 
about the union were voiced in Kuwait in the name 
of  preservation  of  the  country’s  parliamentary 
system, and in the UAE. Oman went even further 
and in November 2013 declared that it would not 
prevent the upgrading of the GCC into a union of 
six countries but would “not be part of it” if it were 
to happen.3

DIVERGENCES OF VIEWS TOWARD IRAN

While  the  creation  of  the  GCC  had  its  raison 
d’être  as  a  reaction  to  the  Islamic  revolution  in 
Iran and the Iran-Iraq war, overall a heterogenic 
combination  of  shared 
interests  and  shared 
concerns,  suspicion  and  familiarity,  ideological 
and geopolitical contrasts and pragmatism leaves 
the GCC with a confused attitude vis-à-vis Tehran. 
The approach of a number of GCC rulers remains 
marked  by  Iran’s  foreign  policy  of  exporting  the 
Islamic  revolution  in  the  1980s  and  suspicion 
(varying over time) of Tehran’s interference in the 
Gulf monarchies’ domestic politics in support of 
local Shi‘i minorities. While this perceived threat 
posed  by  Iran  to  the  GCC  countries’  internal 
stability does not impede some common narrative 
about Iran, it is not shared to the same extent and 
in the same way by the monarchies, which explains 
their  different  attitudes  toward  Tehran.  While 
Saudi  Arabia  and  Bahrain  have  been  the  states 
in  the  GCC  least  open  to  Iran’s  recent  tentative 

3  This was the second such statement by Oman, following 
the Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusuf bin 
‘Alawi’s clarification in June 2012 that “the GCC union 
does  not  exist”  and  “subsists  only  among  journalists” 
(H.  al-Hina’i  and  E.  al-Shidi,  “Yusuf  bin  ‘Alawi:  “La 
yujad ittihad”… wa-l-lajna “intahat” [Yusuf bin ‘Alawi: 
“The  Union  Does  Not  Exist”…  and  the  Committee 
“Ended”], ‘Uman, 3 June 2012: 13).

39

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challengesinternational rehabilitation – viewing the United 
States’  rapprochement  with  Iran  as  a  zero-sum 
game which could impact their own partnership 
with Washington – Oman has been the most open. 
The multidimensionality in the relations between 
the GCC monarchies and Iran is best exemplified 
by the UAE’s relationship with Iran.

itself,  by 

Because  of  Dubai’s  regional  role  as  a  re-export 
hub and its massive Iranian business community,4 
the  UAE  was  the  second  most  affected  country, 
after  Iran 
international  sanctions 
against Tehran. Between 2009 and 2014, business 
between  the  countries  plunged  by  83%  5  On  the 
other  hand,  Abu  Dhabi,  which  has  branded  Iran 
a  threat  to  stability  and  national  security  since 
Tehran’s  seizure  in  1971  of  the  three  islands  of 
Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunbs,6 has for 
long  been  one  of  the  most  intransigent  vis-à-vis 
the concessions made in the nuclear negotiations. 
In  2010,  the  UAE  ambassador  to  Washington, 
Yusef al-‘Otaiba, publicly endorsed the possibility 
of  military  action  against  Iran.7  Following  the 
2009  financial  crisis  and  the  rescue  of  Dubai  by 
a $20 billion bailout from Abu Dhabi, Dubai had 
no  other  choice  than  to  rigorously  comply  with 
sanction  measures  on  commercial  transactions 
and smuggling with Iran.

Of all the GCC members, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain 
demonstrate  the  most  wariness  and  distrust 
toward Iran and the possibility of ending Tehran’s 
isolation.  To  this  is  added  the  rivalry  since  1979 

4  More  than  10,000  firms  in  the  emirate  have  Iranian 
ownership,  according  to  Dubai’s  Iranian  Business 
Council.  Ethnic  Iranians  account  for  15  percent  of  its 
population  (L.  al-Nahhas,  “Iran  Merchants  in  Dubai 
Eagerly  Await  Sanctions  Relief,”  Agence  France-Presse, 
14 July 2015).
J. Tirone, I. Lakshmanan and K. Foroohar, “Iran Nuclear 
Deal  Leaves  Obama,  Rouhani  Seeking  Support,” 
Bloomberg Business, 25 November 2013.

5 

6  All the GCC countries support the UAE’s claim on the 

islands.

7  E. Lake, “U.A.E. Diplomat Mulls Hit on Iran’s Nukes,” 

Washington Times, 6 July 2010.

between monarchic Saudi Arabia and republican 
Iran  for  the  political-religious  leadership  in  the 
Muslim  world  and  for  regional  hegemony  in 
the  post-Arab  Spring  Middle  East.  Saudi  and 
Bahraini  leaders  frequently  refer  to  the  crucial 
role played by Iran in the early 1980s in organising 
the political arm of the Shirazi movement in the 
Gulf  monarchies,  and  in  particular  to  the  plot 
against  Bahrain’s  ruling  dynasty  in  December 
1981  by  the  Islamic  Front  for  the  Liberation  of 
Bahrain. In 2008, according to State Department 
cables  released  by  WikiLeaks,  King  ‘Abd  Allah 
urged the United States to strike in Iran and spoke 
of  the  need  to  “cut  off  the  head  of  the  [Iranian] 
snake.”8 During the 2011 popular peaceful protests 
in  Bahrain,  the  Iranian  card,  and  Iran’s  alleged 
local supporters like the al-Wifaq political society, 
were  used  as  a  foil  to  convince  both  the  Sunnis 
and secular Shi‘a in Bahrain and the international 
community that the current regime, despite being 
authoritarian, was the lesser of two evils. This went 
with  the  development  of  a  very  anti-Iranian  and 
(anti-Shi‘i) rhetoric in many Saudi and Bahraini, 
but also Kuwaiti and Emirati, media.

The Shi‘a in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have long 
been  perceived  as  having  a  historical  experience 
of  discrimination  and  deprivation  of  social 
opportunities,  while  the  situation  of  their  co-
religionists  in  the  other  Gulf  monarchies  offers 
a  very  different  picture.  In  Kuwait,  the  United 
Arab  Emirates  and  Oman,  wealthy  Shi‘i  families 
play  a  prominent  role  in  the  economic  and 
financial systems of the state and even enjoy top 
political  positions.  These  three  regimes  have 
been  less  inclined  than  their  Bahraini  and  Saudi 
counterparts  to  see  Iranian  Trojan  horses  in 
their  domestic  Shi‘i  minority.  Shi‘i  groups  in 
Kuwait, Oman and the UAE have been invaluable 
allies  of  the  rulers  throughout  the  twentieth  and 

8  “Saudi  King  Abdullah  and  Senior  Princes  on 
Saudi  Policy  Towards  Iraq,”  US  Diplomatic  Cable 
08RIYADH649_a  (available  at:  https://wikileaks.org/
plusd/cables/08RIYADH649_a.html).

40

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challengestwenty-first centuries, and have vested interests in 
maintaining the existing political order.

At the other end of the spectrum, Sultan Qaboos 
of  Oman  has  always  considered  that  there  is  no 
long-term  alternative  to  peaceful  coexistence 
between the two shores of the Gulf. Oman did not 
cease  diplomatic  relations  with  Tehran  after  the 
Islamic Revolution in 1979 and from the creation 
of  the  GCC  was  hostile  to  any  transformation 
of  the  organisation  into  an  anti-Iran  coalition.9 
Not  only  has  Muscat  contended  that  the  Iranian 
government  in  its  current  form  is  here  to  stay 
but it has also rejected the idea that Iran poses a 
fundamental  threat  to  the  region.  The  sultanate 
considers that it has no reason not to believe Iran’s 
assurances that its nuclear programme has purely 
civilian  purposes.10  As  a  consequence,  according 
to  Omani  officials,  political  and  military  threats 
posed  by  Iran  to  the  GCC  states  can  only  be 
deterred by cooperation and de-escalation. Oman 
also  played  an  important  role  in  facilitating  the 
conclusion  of  the  Iran-P5+1  nuclear  deal  in 
November  2013.  When  this  was  signed,  the  US 
media  revealed  that  secret  meetings  between  US 
and  Iranian  officials  had  taken  place  in  Muscat 
since March 2013.

The Omani attitude towards Iran is compounded 
by their sharing of the sovereignty of the Strait of 
Hormuz, through which approximately one-third 
of the world’s sea-borne trade in crude petroleum 
passed in 2014. In August 2010 the two countries 
signed  a  defence  co-operation  agreement  in 
which  in  particular  they  agreed  to  hold  joint 
military exercises and to increase their exchange 
of  border  intelligence  and  information.  Under 
this security pact, the Iranian and Omani navies 
held  joint  military  exercises  in  the  Sea  of  Oman 

9 

J.  Townsend,  “Le  sultanat  d’Oman;  vers  la  fin  d’un 
particularisme  séculaire  ?”Maghreb-Machrek,  n.94 
(1981).

10  Oman’s  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  “The  Positions  of 
the Sultanate,” 22 September 2013 (Available at: http://
www.mofa.gov.om/?cat=124&lang=en).

in  April  2014  for  the  fourth  consecutive  year.  In 
Tehran  in  October  2014,  the  defence  ministers 
of the two countries signed a new memorandum 
of  understanding  intended  to  tackle  drug  and 
human  trafficking  and  to  serve  as  a  framework 
for  closer  military  cooperation  in  the  future. 
In  May  2015,  Oman’s  Minister  Responsible  for 
Foreign  Affairs  Yusuf  bin  ‘Alawi  and  his  Iranian 
counterpart  Muhammad  Javad  Zarif  announced 
the  countries  had  demarcated  a  450-km  section 
of their maritime border that had not previously 
been defined.

Sultan  Qaboos’s  eternal  gratitude  for  the  Shah’s 
decisive military effort during the Dhofar war has 
also  clearly  been  a  crucial  factor  here.  No  other 
state  in  the  region  (apart  from  Jordan)  played 
a  comparable  role  in  helping  Sultan  Qaboos  at 
that  time.  Last  but  not  least,  Oman’s  increasing 
dependence on Iran for gas has given it a particular 
interest in maintaining good relations. A 25-year 
gas deal valued at around USD60 billion has been 
signed,  according  to  which  Iran  will  supply  ten 
billion cubic meters of gas annually to Oman via a 
350km pipeline linking southern Iran to the port 
of Sohar.

Like Oman, Qatar’s policy towards Iran has been 
determined  by  the  consideration  that  it  has  no 
interest  in  presenting  Iran  as  the  sole  source  of 
regional tensions and that “maintaining a healthy 
relationship  with  Iran  […]  is  of  paramount 
strategic  importance.”11  This  is  explained  by  the 
sharing of the North Dome/South Pars field, the 
world’s largest gas field, the exploitation of which 
has been crucial to Qatar’s prosperity for the last 
twenty  years.  Qatar’s  public  welcoming  of  the 
Iran-P5+1 nuclear deal in July 2015 has its roots 
in its long-term vital strategic interests in keeping 
a friendly relationship with Tehran, even though 

11  F.  Ayub,  “Introduction,”  in  “Post-Nuclear:  The  Future 
for  Iran  in  its  Neighbourhood,”  European  Council  on 
Foreign Relations, December 2014: 4 (Available at:
http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR120_GULF_ANALYSIS.

pdf)

41

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challengesuntil  recently  it  has  been  devoid  of  substantial 
cooperation.  Another  factor  explaining  Qatar’s 
desire  to  maintain  a  cordial  relationship  has  to 
do  with  the  fear  that  tensions  with  Iran  may 
induce  Sunni-Shi‘i  frictions  inside  the  country, 
although  the  Shi‘a,  which  represent  10  percent 
of  Qatari  nationals,  have  no  past  record  of 
participation in opposition movements and enjoy 
religious  freedom.  The  creation  of  a  Joint  Free 
Economic Area in the Iranian region of Bushehr 
was  announced  in  July  2014  and  the  two  parties 
insisted on their readiness to invest in linking the 
ports of Bushehr in Iran and al-Ruwais in Qatar.

With  a  large  Shi‘i  minority  (estimated  at  20-25 
percent of its population) historically composed of 
merchant classes close to the ruling family, but also 
a significant presence of Sunni political groups and 
individuals suspected of funding jihadism in Syria 
and Iraq, Kuwait sees no point in making an enemy 
of Iran either. While  Kuwait  has had to be more 
receptive to Saudi fears regarding Iran than Oman 
and  Qatar  have  been,  the  Kuwaiti  Emir’s  visit  to 
Iran in May 2014, the first such by a Kuwaiti ruler 
since 1979, was interpreted as an effort to mediate 
between  Tehran  and  Riyadh.  On  this  occasion, 
Kuwaiti  officials  suggested  that  “Gulf  countries’ 
links with Iran should be on a bilateral level, not 
as  a  bloc,”12  which  is  something  welcomed  by 
Iran but that Saudi Arabia wants to avoid like the 
plague. President Rouhani and Emir Sabah issued 
a  joint  statement  in  which  they  “expressed  their 
satisfaction over the march of bilateral relations” 
and described the visit as a “turning point in the 
relations between the two nations,”13 following the 
signing  of  several  trade  and  security  agreements 
and memoranda of understanding.

12  A.  Hammond,  “The  United  Arab  Emirates,  Qatar, 
Oman, and Kuwait: The Gulf Front Weakens,” in ibid.: 
15. 

13  “Kuwait, Iran Vow Joint Work to Develop Ties,” Kuwait 

News Agency (KUNA), 2 June 2014.

THE SAUDI CLAIM FOR REGIONAL 
HEGEMONY

On the occasion of the Camp David summit with 
the  GCC  countries  in  May  2015,  US  President 
Barack Obama worked hard to reassure his allies 
over the Iranian nuclear deal, since the possibility 
of  a  grand  bargain  at  the  expense  of  the  Arab 
monarchies  was  a  cause  of  concern  in  various 
GCC capitals. The conclusion of an agreement on 
the Iranian nuclear issue indeed conceals a great 
deal of anxiety, in Riyadh in particular. Together 
with Israel, Saudi Arabia is the country that most 
actively tried to delay the talks and lobbied against 
the agreement. The Saudi leadership, together with 
the  Bahraini  one,  fears  that  loosening  sanctions 
will enable Tehran to become more confident in the 
regional arena and push its influence – in a word, 
to challenge Saudi Arabia’s sphere of influence in 
the  Gulf  and  wider  West  Asia.  However  Iranian 
foreign policy has no longer anything to do with 
its foreign policy of the 1980s which concentrated 
on exportation of the Islamic Revolution.

A key determinant of Iranian foreign policy after 
the Islamic Revolution – and to a large extent, until 
now – has been its resistance to the United States 
and  to  its  allies  in  the  Middle  East.  In  order  to 
achieve these goals, Iran has been providing direct 
military and financial support to allied groups or 
parties, either because they have been sympathetic 
to Iran’s geopolitical goals (e.g. Bashar al-Assad’s 
regime  in  Syria,  Hezbollah  in  Lebanon  and  Shi‘i 
militias  in  Iraq)  or  because  they  have  opposed 
Iran’s enemies (e.g. Hamas). However, the regime 
of international sanctions imposed on Iran has had 
a significant impact on its foreign policy. Despite 
its revolutionary rhetoric, it has been governed by 
pragmatic  more  than  ideological  considerations. 
Mirroring the feeling experienced in various GCC 
capitals toward Iran, a key driver of Iranian foreign 
policy has been the perception of a threat to the 
regime posed by the United States and its allies in 
the name of the country’s national interest but also 

42

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challengesout of diplomatic isolation. As Mehran Kamrava 
explains, “Iranian foreign policy has been reactive 
at  best  and  filled  with  empty  but  unwelcomed 
rhetoric  at  worst.”14  In  particular, 
frequent 
provocative  and  absurd  statements  emerging 
from  Tehran15  only  fuel  regional  tensions  by 
feeding  into  the  narrative  of  Iran’s  imperialistic 
ambitions,  and  are  in  return  used  to  stoke  more 
poisonous rhetoric. More generally, Tehran takes 
great delight in relaying information related to the 
harsh repression that has been taking place against 
the Bahraini opposition and Saudi activists from 
the Eastern Province, and in vocally condemning 
the Bahraini and Saudi governments’ handling of 
protests. However, in a context where the velayat-e 
faqih doctrine16 has long ceased to be a guiding 
star, this strategy of adding fuel to the fire has the 
advantage of maintaining much ambiguity about 
its  actual  capacity  for  influence.  Bahrain  and 
Yemen  are  certainly  not  Syria  and  Lebanon;  the 
al-Wifaq society, and even the al-Wafa’ movement 
in  Bahrain,  are  certainly  not  Hezbollah.  Despite 
its desperate efforts to portray itself as a regional 
mastermind,  because  of  its  diplomatic  isolation 
Iran’s political appeal is out of proportion to what 
it  may  have  been  in  the  1980s,  and  its  nuisance 
capacity is probably more imagined than real.

and  find  a  flattering  explanation  for  their  more 
than  embarrassing  incapacity  to  overcome  what 
was  not  considered  more  than  a  tribal  militia, 
the  Saudi  and  Yemeni  governments  repeatedly 
accused Tehran of supporting the Houthis, despite 
the United States’ unambiguous scepticism about 
these allegations.17 While Iranian officials denied 
interference in the war, the Iranian media were not 
shy at celebrating the Houthis’ “heroic resistance” 
–  thereby  implicitly  confirming  the  accusation 
of  Tehran’s  support  but,  more 
importantly, 
presenting  Iran  as  a  key  player  at  little  expense. 
Even  in  2015,  as  Gabriele  vom  Bruck  explains, 
the  Iranian  influence  in  Yemen  is  “trivial.  The 
Houthis want Yemen to be independent, […] they 
don’t want to be controlled by Saudi Arabia or the 
Americans, and they certainly don’t want to replace 
the  Saudis  with  the  Iranians.  I  don’t  think  the 
Iranians have influence in their decision-making. 
It’s  not  a  relationship  like  that  between  Iran  and 
Hezbollah.”18 The last International Crisis Group 
report on Yemen also points out that the Houthis 
“are less dependent on Tehran than Hadi and his 
allies are on Riyadh, but on today’s trajectory, their 
relative self-sufficiency will not last long. They are 
already  soliciting  Iranian  financial  and  political 
support.”19

Yemen, where Iran’s actual role has been anything 
but  obvious,  has  been  the  perfect  example  of 
this.  Claims  that  the  Houthis  were  linked  to 
Iran can be traced back to 2009, when the Saudi 
forces  suffered  humiliating  setbacks  during  their 
military  incursion  into  Yemeni  territory  to  fight 
the  Houthis.  As  a  convenient  way  to  save  face 

In order to legitimise the 2015 military intervention, 
Saudi  Arabia  has  tried  to  frame  it  as  an  Arab 
defence  front  against  Persian  expansionism,20 
and  also  as  a  Sunni-Shi‘i  confrontation  (even 
though  Pakistan  –  despite  being  a  strong  Saudi 
ally – and Turkey refused any involvement in the 
war, while Egypt was not eager, to say the least, to 

14  M.  Kamrava,  “What  Iran  Needs  to  Do  Now,”  CIRS 

Analysis, 14 April 2015 (available at:

 http://cirs.georgetown.edu/news-cirs/what-iran-needs-do-

now).

15  As  exemplified  by  regular  claims  from  more  or  less 
senior  Iranian  officials  that  Bahrain  should  be  the 
fourteenth province of Iran.

17  B. Whitaker, “Yemen, the US and the Houthis. What the 

Wikileaks Cables Reveal,” al-Bab, 6 April 2015.

18  Quoted in G. Viscusi, P. Donahue and J. Walcott, “Saudi 
Claims  on  Iran’s  Role  in  Yemen  Face  Skepticism  in 
West,” Bloomberg, 14 April 2015.

19  International  Crisis  Group,  “Yemen  at  War,”  Middle 

East Briefing no.45, 27 March 2015.

16  Literally “the guardianship of the jurists,” this doctrine 
in Shi‘i Islam is the current political system in Iran and 
gives political leadership to the jurist in Islamic law.

20  Despite  the  fact  that  Algeria,  Tunisia,  Lebanon,  Syria, 
Iraq and Oman, among others, refused to participate in 
the coalition.

43

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challengesenter the conflict). However, beyond Iran’s actual 
or  imagined  involvement,  the  goal  of  the  Saudi-
led  military  intervention  is  instead  to  maintain 
the  continuity  of  authoritarian  governance  in 
the  region  by  actively  repressing  the  forces  that 
threaten to undo the status quo in a weak Yemen. 
By emphasising the security issues, most of those 
present at the Arab League Summit in March 2015 
were  mostly  eager  to  turn  the  page  on  the  Arab 
Spring and its calls for structural political changes. 

CONCLUSION

Beyond this common understanding among GCC 
rulers  that  cohesion  must  prevail  in  a  time  of 
internal  peaceful  protests,  as  exemplified  by  the 
signature  in  November  2012  of  a  GCC  security 
pact  strengthening  cooperation  and  mutual 
assistance in security matters,21 structural political 
divergences  on  strategic  interests  remain.  While 
Riyadh  writers  and  leaders  continue  to  promote 
an  image  of  Saudi  Arabia  as  the  Big  Sister  of 
the  other  monarchies,  this  unwelcome  Saudi 
tutelage has been something that the smaller GCC 
monarchies (except Bahrain, to some extent) have 
been  resisting.  This  contributes  to  explaining 
why  –  even  though  most  Gulf  regimes  remain 
wary  of  Iran  –  Kuwait,  Oman,  Qatar  and  even 
the  UAE  all  want  an  improvement  in  relations, 
and are aware that they have much to gain from 
a nuclear agreement. Not only would any chance 
of  an  Iranian  nuclear  weapon  be  put  off,  but  so 
would Iran’s temptation to exploit and exacerbate 
regional  tensions.  Iran’s  reintegration  into  the 
international community would hopefully prepare 
the ground for long-term resolutions of crises like 
those in Iraq and Syria which need a combination 
of  all  regional  and  international  parties,  and  the 
collateral  impacts  (like  ISIS)  of  which  are  vital 
threats for all the GCC monarchies. Last but not 
least,  a  nuclear  deal  would  make  new  human, 
security and business exchanges and cooperation 
between the two shores of the Gulf possible again.

21  The  pact,  which  has  been  ratified  by  all  the  regimes 
except Kuwait so far, allows the hunting down of those 
who  are  outside  the  law  or  the  system,  or  who  are 
wanted by party states, regardless of their nationalities, 
and the taking of necessary measures against them. It 
also  allows  the  integration  of  the  signatories’  security 
apparatuses to provide support during times of security 
disturbances  and  unrest  in  a  signatory  state.  Since 
January 2015, at least three Kuwaiti opposition figures, 
social media activists and heads of political movements 
have been detained at the request of the Saudi authorities 
(cf.  M.  al-Rasheed,  “Kuwaiti  Activists  Targeted  under 
GCC Security Pact,” al-Monitor, 20 March 2015).

44

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challenges“Kuwait,  Iran  Vow  Joint  Work  to  Develop  Ties,” 
Kuwait News Agency (KUNA), 2 June 2014.

Lake, Eli, “U.A.E. Diplomat Mulls Hit on Iran’s Nukes,” 

Washington Times, 6 July 2010.

Tirone, 

Jonathan,  Lakshmanan, 

Indira  and 
Foroohar,  Kambiz,  “Iran  Nuclear  Deal 
Leaves Obama, Rouhani Seeking Support,” 
Bloomberg Business, 25 November 2013.

Whitaker, Brian, “Yemen, the US and the Houthis. 
What the Wikileaks Cables Reveal,” al-Bab, 
6 April 2015.

Official sources

Oman’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Positions 
of the Sultanate,” 22 September 2013, http://
www.mofa.gov.om/?cat=124&lang=en.

“Saudi King Abdullah and Senior Princes on Saudi 
Policy Towards Iraq,” US Diplomatic Cable 
08RIYADH649. 
https://wikileaks.org/
plusd/cables/08RIYADH649_a.html.  

United  Nations  Office  for  the  Coordination 
“Yemen: 
of  Humanitarian  Affairs, 
Humanitarian  Catastrophe, 
Situation 
Report  No.  13,”  United  Nations,  30  June 
2015. http://bit.ly/1dKefUn. 

REFERENCES

Books and academic articles

Matthiesen,  Toby,  Sectarian  Gulf:  Bahrain,  Saudi 
Arabia,  and  the  Arab  Spring  That  Wasn’t 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013).

Townsend, John, “Le sultanat d’Oman; vers la fin d’un 
particularisme  séculaire  ?”  Maghreb-Machrek  
94 (1981).

Reports and newspapers and news agencies 
articles

Al-Hina’i,  H.  Al-Shidi,  E.,  “Yusuf  bin  ‘Alawi:  “La 
yujad ittihad”… wa-l-lajna “intahat” [Yusuf 
bin ‘Alawi: “The Union Does Not Exist”… 
and  the  Committee  “Ended”],  ‘Uman,  3 
June 2012.

Al-Nahhas,  Lynne,  “Iran  Merchants  in  Dubai  Eagerly 
Await Sanctions Relief,” Agence France-Presse, 14 
July 2015.

Al-Rasheed, Madawi, “Kuwaiti Activists Targeted 
under GCC Security Pact,” Al-Monitor, 20 
March 2015.

Ayub,  Fatima,  “Introduction,”  in  “Post-Nuclear: 
The Future for Iran in its Neighbourhood,” 
European  Council  on  Foreign  Relations 
http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/
(2014), 
ECFR120_GULF_ANALYSIS.pdf.

Hammond, Andrew, “The United Arab Emirates, 
Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait: The Gulf Front 
Weakens,” in European Council on Foreign 
Relations 
http://www.ecfr.eu/
page/-/ECFR120_GULF_ANALYSIS.pdf.

(2014), 

International  Crisis  Group,  “Yemen  at  War,” 
Middle East Briefing no.45, 27 March 2015.

Kamrava, Mehran, “What Iran Needs to Do Now,” 
CIRS  Analysis,  14  April  2015,  http://cirs.
georgetown.edu/news-cirs/what-iran-
needs-do-now.

45

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and ChallengesARTICULATING THE 
NEW GULF COUNTRIES’ 
INTERVENTIONISM: WHAT 
LESSONS CAN BE DRAWN 
FROM THE CASE OF SAUDI 
ARABIA AND YEMEN?

Abubakr Al-Shamahi, 
Journalist,  
Al-Araby al-Jadeeda

INTRODUCTION

On  3  June  2011,  President  Ali  Abdullah  Saleh 
of  Yemen,  struggling  to  contain  a  mass  uprising 
tentatively referred to as a ‘revolution’, was severely 
injured  after  an  assassination  attempt  at  the 
Presidential Palace in Sana’a. The next day, Saleh 
flew out to the capital of Saudi Arabia, Riyadh, in 
what appeared to many to be the start of an exile 
in Yemen’s oil-rich neighbour.

Even if Saleh wanted to return, it was felt that the 
Saudis would not allow it, especially as several of 
the  leading  figures  opposing  Saleh  were  friendly 
with Saudi Arabia and on the Saudi payroll.1 Saleh 
had  not  been  particularly  liked  by  Saudi  Arabia 
over  the  years.2  Allowing  Saleh  to  return  would 
paint  Saudi  Arabia  in  a  negative  light  on  the 
world stage as an opponent of Yemen’s democratic 
uprising. Moreover, his return would threaten to 
throw Yemen perilously closer to civil war, and an 
unstable Yemen with al-Qaeda militants roaming 
its  lawless  provinces  would  not  be  an  attractive 
prospect  for  the  Kingdom.  Nevertheless,  on  23 
September  2011  after  three  months  in  Riyadh, 
Saleh  defiantly  returned  to  Sana’a.  Saudi  Arabia 

1  E. Knickermeyer, “Trouble Down South”, Foreign Pol-
icy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/07/05/
trouble_down_south.

had  defied  the  analysts  and  did  not  stand  in  his 
way.

Moving forward to 2015, Saleh still plays a pivotal 
role in Yemen. He is still defiant. However, instead 
of  being  a  friend  to  Saudi  Arabia  he  stands  in 
front  of  his  bombed  residence  vowing  never  to 
surrender  and  berating  those  who  attacked  him 
–  the  Saudis.  He  has  become  an  enemy  of  Saudi 
Arabia and an ally of the pro-Iranian Houthi rebel 
group, who the Saudis have vowed not to allow to 
rule  Yemen.  He  still  controls  several  of  the  most 
powerful Yemeni army units and his forces, along 
with the Houthis, have been pounded by a Saudi-
led coalition since 26 March.

How did the 2011 and 2015 scenarios happen? Why 
did Saudi Arabia allow Saleh to return to Yemen in 
2011,  and  why  are  they  so  virulently  opposed  to 
him now, turning their military and media arsenal 
against him? Why has Saudi Arabia’s relationship 
with  Yemen  throughout  the  20th  century  and 
into the 21st century been littered with seemingly 
contradictory  and  puzzling  policies  and  actions? 
How did Saudi Arabia manage to lose control of 
Saleh and potentially allow the Iranians to gain a 
foothold on their southern border?

All these questions go to the root of Saudi Arabia’s 
relationship with Yemen, one  that stretches back 
to  the  very  founding  of  the  modern  Saudi  state 
in  its  modern  form  in  1934.  Saudi  Arabia  is  by 
far  the  most  influential  external  actor  in  Yemen3 
and  its  policies  there,  especially  after  the  end  of 
the North Yemeni Civil War in 1970, have largely 
involved  balancing  different  sides  against  each 
other, attempting to ‘dance on the heads of snakes’, 
as  Saleh  refers  to  his  own  method  of  controlling 
Yemen.

Saudi  Arabia’s  role  in  the  2015  conflict,  and  to  a 
lesser  extent  in  the  2011  uprising,  reflects  the 
intertwined modern histories of the two countries. 

2  P. Dresch, “The Tribal Factor in the Yemeni Crisis,” in 
The Yemeni Crisis of 1994: Causes and Consequences, 
edited by Jamal S. Al-Suwaidi, Saqi Books, 1995, p. 39

3  S. Phillips, Sarah, Yemen and the Politics of Permanent 
Crisis, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
2011, p. 75

46

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and ChallengesOnce again, Saudi Arabia seeks to directly counter 
any  influence  a  rival  power  may  have  in  Yemen, 
with  Iran  being  the  case  in  point  today  while  it 
was  Nasser’s  Egypt  and  the  Soviet  Union  in  the 
past,  and  ensure  that  whoever  takes  the  reins  of 
power  in  Yemen  will  keep  Riyadh’s  interests  in 
mind.  The  historical  border  dispute  between  the 
two  countries,  one  that  goes  back  to  the  very 
formation  of  the  modern  Saudi  state,  is  also 
reflected  in  the  cross-border  raids  conducted  by 
the Houthis and the propaganda disseminated by 
pro-Houthi groups focusing on the idea that the 
south of Saudi Arabia is part of ‘Greater Yemen’. 

The  real  difference  in  the  Saudi  role  today, 
in  comparison  with  the  country’s  historical 
interventions  in  Yemen,  is  its  directness  and  the 
sheer number of air raids conducted, as well as the 
active participation of Saudi ground troops in the 
conflict. This military operation marks something 
new, and could potentially indicate a lack of faith 
in  the  United  States’  preparedness  to  defend 
Saudi Arabia against Iran, as well as increasingly 
aggressive  interventions  that  perhaps  reflect  the 
emergence  of  the  younger  generation  of  Saudi 
princes into positions of power. 

AN INTERTWINED HISTORY

The modern histories of Saudi Arabia and Yemen 
are intertwined. The founder of the modern Saudi 
state,  King  Abdulaziz  Ibn  Saud,  expanded  his 
borders  at  the  expense  of  North  Yemen’s  Imam 
Yahya by taking the provinces of Asir, Jizan, and 
Najran in the Saudi-Yemeni War of 1934. However, 
by 1948 he was refusing to aid the Imam’s enemies 
as they plotted to overthrow him. The ‘Wahhabi’ 
Sunni Ibn Saud’s sons, King Saud and King Faisal, 
then militarily backed the Zaydi Shia Imamate in 
the  Yemeni  Civil  War  of  1962-1970  against  the 
predominantly  Sunni  Republicans  –  although 
within Yemen the sectarian aspect of this change 
in  power  was  minimal,  many  of  the  leading 
revolutionaries being Zaydi.

The  Saudi  Arabians  spent  the  1970s  and  1980s 
fearing  a  united  Yemen,  which  they  were  afraid 
would  be  dominated  by  South  Yemen’s  ruling 
Marxists  and  Socialists.  However,  when  North 
and South Yemen came together as the Republic 
of  Yemen  in  1990  under  the  leadership  of  the 
North’s Ali Abdullah Saleh, Saudi Arabia worked 
to  undermine  it,  to  the  extent  that  it  backed  the 
same figures in the 1994 Civil War it once feared: 
the former Marxist-Leninists of South Yemen.4

The  post-Arab  Spring  phase  saw  the  Saudi-led 
Gulf  Cooperation  Council  persuade  the  Yemeni 
elite to implement an initiative that saw Saleh step 
down and be replaced by his deputy, Abd-Rabbo 
Mansour  Hadi.  Saleh  was  given  immunity  from 
prosecution, as well as being allowed to continue 
in politics, in return for his resignation. However, 
the  emergence  of  Qatar,  and  Saudi  reticence  to 
support Muslim Brotherhood movements, meant 
the  sidelining  of  one  of  Saudi  Arabia’s  most 
powerful allies in Yemen, the Islah Party.

The  al-Ahmar  family,  the  leaders  of  Hashid, 
Yemen’s  most  powerful  tribal  confederation, 
featured  prominently  amongst  the  upper  tier  of 
Islah’s leadership, and were also very close to Saudi 
Arabia.  In  the  years  after  Yemen’s  unification  in 
1990, Islah played very much the role of the ‘loyal 
opposition’  in  an  alliance  with  Saleh  against  a 
common  enemy,  the  Socialist  Party.  Islah’s  role, 
and  especially  that  of  its  tribal  wing,  as  a  useful 
ally  to  Saudi  Arabia  was  at  odds  with  Riyadh’s 
post-2011  regional  crackdown  on  the  Muslim 
Brotherhood,  which  it  saw  as  a  regional  threat 
in  the  light  of  their  gains  in  post-revolutionary 
Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen. 

The failure of the GCC initiative to steer Yemen’s 
democratic transition, and the weakening of Islah, 
eventually  led  to  the  Houthi-Saleh  overthrow 
of  the  government  in  Sanaa,  the  final  touches  to 
which were made in February 2015, and the launch 
of  what  was  initially  called  ‘Operation  Decisive 

4 

Ibid., p. 77

47

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and ChallengesStorm’,  a  military  coalition  dominated  by  Saudi 
Arabia  carrying  out  an  unprecedented  airstrike 
campaign in an attempt to eliminate the Houthis.

Saudi  Arabia’s  on-off  relationship  with  Islah  is 
now especially evident as the war carries on. The 
party  is  the  most  popular  anti-Houthi  force  on 
the  ground  in  Yemen  and  therefore  particularly 
useful  in  the  campaign.  However,  the  Kingdom, 
and its ally the United Arab Emirates, is also wary 
of  allowing  Islah,  and  by  extension  the  Muslim 
Brotherhood, to strengthen its position in the event 
of the Houthis and Saleh falling. This is something 
that could possibly explain the complaints of anti-
Houthi  fighters  in  Yemen’s  central  city  of  Taiz, 
many of whom are associated with Islah, that they 
have been receiving  relatively  little support from 
the  Saudi-led  coalition  in  comparison  with  the 
southern  city  of  Aden,  where  most  local  fighters 
are southern separatists. 

FEAR OF EGYPT

Dominance  in  Yemen  by  a  non-friendly  state 
would pose a severe security threat to Saudi Arabia. 
The best historical example of this comes from the 
1960s. At that time Saudi Arabia felt particularly 
vulnerable  and  so  the  threat  that  came  from  a 
large Egyptian presence in North Yemen was felt 
particularly. During the North Yemeni Civil War, 
the primary goal of the Saudis was not actually the 
return of the Imamate monarchy but the removal 
of  the  Egyptians  from  North  Yemen.  This  was 
demonstrated  by  Saudi  Arabia’s  agreement  to  a 
UN plan that would have seen it stop supporting 
the  royalists  in  return  for  Egyptian  withdrawal 
from North Yemen.5

For  Nasser,  a  foothold  in  the  Arabian  Peninsula 
on the doorstep of his greatest foe, Saudi Arabia, 
was too tempting to pass up. King Saud and (then) 
Crown Prince Faisal were more than aware of this 
5  G. Gause, Saudi-Yemeni Relations, New York: Colum-

bia University Press, 2010, p. 63.

and saw Nasser’s dispatch of troops to North Yemen 
as  a  move  to  “overthrow  the  Saudi  monarchy 
and  gain  control  of  the  vast  oil  resources  which 
it  possessed”.6  The  Egyptian  presence  in  North 
Yemen  meant  that  Nasser  now  had  a  base  from 
which he could conduct operations against Saudi 
Arabia.  Saboteurs  started  to  infiltrate  the  Saudi 
territory  from  “revolutionary  Yemen”.7  In  1967, 
for  example,  seventeen  Yemenis  were  publicly 
beheaded  in  Riyadh  after  being  found  guilty  of 
planning bomb explosions.8

The  Saudi  Arabians  aimed  to  make  the  situation 
for  the  Egyptians  in  North  Yemen  untenable. 
At  the  same  time,  and  especially  during  the 
later  years  of  the  civil  war,  the  Saudis  began 
more  covert  moves  to  back  a  ‘third  party’  in  the 
conflict. Omar Saqqaf, the Saudi Vice-Minister for 
Foreign  Affairs,  explained  to  the  British  in  1964 
that  the  “Saudis  hoped  that  as  matters  dragged 
on,  Yemenis  on  both  sides  would  eventually  get 
together;  there  were  moderate  republicans  who 
disliked the republic and there were royalists who 
disliked  the  Imam”.9  The  Saudis,  therefore,  were 
trying  to  find  suitably  friendly  forces  in  North 
Yemen  who  would  not  threaten  Saudi  security 
should they take over. In fact, the Saudi attempts 
to woo republicans away from Nasser’s Egypt were 
relatively  successful.  As  early  as  1965,  leading 
figures in the revolution against the Imam, such as 
Ahmed  Nu’man,  future  President  Abdulrahman 
al-Iryani,  and  Muhammed  al-Zubayri, 
took 
part  in  the  Khamir  Conference,  where  Nu’man 
announced  that  he  was  prepared  to  extend  “the 

6  G. A Fawaz, “The Kennedy Administration and the 
Egyptian-Saudi Conflict in Yemen: Co-opting Arab 
Nationalism,” Middle East Journal, 49 no. 2 (1995), p. 
299

7  M. S. Badeeb, The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict Over North 
Yemen, 1962-1970, The George Washington University 
[PhD Dissertation], 1985, p. 112

8  E. O’Ballance, The War in Yemen, Faber & Faber, p. 172
Jones, Clive, Britain and the Yemen Civil War 1962-
9 
1965, Sussex Academic Press, 2004, p. 103

48

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challengeshand of friendship” to Saudi Arabia.10 By 1969, the 
republicans  had  split  along  ideological  lines  and 
the conservatives, who had defeated the leftists in 
a power struggle, began to court the Saudis.

FEAR OF A STRONG YEMEN

One  of  Saudi  Arabia’s  many  balancing  acts  in 
Yemen has been to ensure that it does not get too 
strong  but  at  the  same  time  does  not  collapse. 
The  idea  is  that  Yemen’s  problems  should  stay 
contained  within  Yemen  and  not  trouble  Saudi 
Arabia.  To  this  end,  Saudi  Arabia  has  worked 
to  prop  up  the  Yemeni  government,  most  often 
with financial aid, especially after 2011. With the 
government facing bankruptcy numerous times in 
these  past  few  years,  the  Saudis  have  stepped  in, 
often quietly, to ensure that government employees 
were paid and fuel flowed into the country. This, 
however,  stopped  when  the  Houthis  took  over 
Sanaa.  Nevertheless,  it  can  be  argued  that  even 
its military intervention in Yemen is designed to 
aid the legitimate Yemeni government, even if the 
actual  results  of  the  intervention  seem  to  have 
made things worse.

The intervention can also be looked at in another 
light:  as  an  attempt  by  Saudi  Arabia  to  crush 
any  possibility  that  Yemen  could  becoming 
independent of its sphere of influence, and, even 
worse,  join  the  Iranian  orbit.  This  fear  of  being 
unable to control Yemen has driven Saudi Arabia 
into action in the past. In November 1990, a mere 
few months after North and South Yemen united 
to form the Republic of Yemen, a state that could 
potentially  threaten  Saudi  Arabia’s  dominant 
position in the region in the future, the Yemenis 
found themselves on the United Nations Security 
Council voting on  whether to condemn  Saddam 
Hussein’s invasion of Iraq and request his troops to 
withdraw, thereby setting in motion the First Gulf 
War. For various reasons, including Saleh’s affinity 

10  O’Ballance, op. cit., p. 167

to  Saddam,  Yemen  abstained  and  called  for  an 
Arab solution to the crisis, attempting to maintain 
an official policy of neutrality. The Gulf states, led 
by Saudi Arabia, responded with fury. Yemenis in 
Saudi  Arabia,  who  had  previously  been  exempt 
from  being  treated  as  foreign  nationals  when  it 
came  to  employment  there,  were  given  thirty 
days to find a Saudi sponsor. This was effectively 
impossible, and in just over a month one million 
Yemeni foreign workers in Saudi Arabia returned 
destitute to Yemen.11 The results were devastating 
for the Yemeni economy: the inflation rate reached 
100 percent and GDP dropped 4.8 percent by 1991, 
and  unemployment  went  to  35  percent  in  1992. 
This  was  coupled  with  aid  from  the  Gulf  states 
decreasing from $20.5 million to $2.9 million.12

The  Saudi  Arabians  have  also  worked  to  weaken 
the  Yemeni  state  in  a  different  way  –  by  keeping 
non-state  actors,  mostly  Yemen’s  famous  tribes, 
well paid. It is often argued that the tribal system 
is  an  inherent  part  of  Yemen,  with  the  most 
important,  the  Hashid  and  Bakil,  believed  to 
date  back  to  the  pre-Islamic  period.  There  is  an 
old Yemeni tribal saying that Yemen is the tribes 
and  the  tribes  are  Yemen.13  Nevertheless,  some 
Yemeni leaders have been able to move against the 
tribes. In South Yemen, the Marxists were able to 
effectively eradicate their power, and even in North 
Yemen  President  Ibrahim  al-Hamdi  successfully 
weakened  them  in  the  1970s,14although  he  was 
eventually killed for his troubles.15

11  P. Conge and G. Okruhlik, “National Autonomy, Labor 
Migration and Political Crisis: Yemen and Saudi Ara-
bia,” Middle East Journal, 51 no. 4, 1995, p. 560

12  Ibid.
13  P. Dresch,op. cit., p. 47 
14  A. A. Al-Ahsab, “What Makes Yemen’s Spring Differ-
ent?” in The Arab Spring and Arab Thaw: Unfinished 
Revolutions and the Quest for Democracy, edited by 
John Davis, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd, 2013.

15  E. M. Manea, “La tribu et l’Etat au Yemen” in Islam et 
changement social, edited by Mondher Kilani, Laus-
anne: Editions Payot, 1998, pp. 205-218

49

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and ChallengesHAS SAUDI ARABIA BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN 
ITS INTERVENTIONS?

We can now come to look at whether Saudi Arabia 
has been successful in its interventions in Yemen, 
and I shall start with Saudi Arabia’s dealings with 
its allies within Yemen.

In  his  book  The  Tragedy  of  Great  Power  Politics, 
the  political  scientist  John  Mearsheimer  states 
that  “alliances  are  only  temporary  marriages  of 
convenience:  today’s  alliance  partner  might  be 
tomorrow’s  enemy,  and  today’s  enemy  might  be 
tomorrow’s alliance partner”.16 This is indeed true 
when  it  comes  to  Saudi  Arabia’s  allies  in  Yemen, 
be they Ali Abdullah Saleh or Yemen’s numerous 
tribes. 

The  problem  that  has  come  with  Saudi  Arabian 
largesse  in  Yemen  is  that  its  allies  have  not  been 
particularly reliable. Especially by the tribes, Saudi 
Arabia has been seen as a bank. The tribes would 
always  agree  to  take  the  money,  but  that  was  no 
guarantee that they would fight on behalf of Saudi 
Arabia.17 Currently, despite years of lavishing funds 
on  influential  tribal  sheikhs,  Saudi  Arabia  finds 
itself  in  a  position  where  most  of  the  important 
northern  sheikhs  have  thrown  in  their  lot  with 
Saleh and the Houthis, and where those who have 
not have proven themselves to be ineffective and 
weak.

Part  of  this  was  out  of  Saudi  Arabia’s  hands. 
Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar, the paramount leader 
of  Hashid,  was  Saudi  Arabia’s  man  in  Yemen. 
It  was  he  who  brought  Saleh  into  the  Saudi  fold 
at  the  start  of  his  presidency18  and  ensured  that 
Yemen’s  ‘multi-party  democracy’  did  not  get  too 

16  J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W. 

W. Norton & Company, 2001, p.33 

17  M.Kamrava, The Modern Middle East: A Political His-

tory Since the First World War,  University of California 
Press, 2011, p. 115

18  B. Al-Baker, “Power and War in Saudi Arabia’s Back-
yard,” Al-Araby Al-Jadeed English, 10 February 2015, 
http://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2015/2/11/
power-and-war-in-saudi-arabias-backyard 

lively, with the Islah Party that he led serving, in 
effect, as a loyal opposition party to Saleh until the 
early 2000s. He was able to keep things relatively 
calm in Yemen, but his death in 2007 marked the 
beginning  of  the  end  of  the  great  balancing  act 
within  Yemen,  the  loss  of  an  extremely  valuable 
ally for Saudi Arabia, and left shoes that his many 
sons simply could not fill. 

Instead,  slowly  but  surely,  Yemen  has  descended 
into anarchy. The Houthis, from their heartland of 
Sa’dah right up on the Saudi Arabian border, fought 
six wars against the Yemeni state from 2004 to 2010, 
none of which ended decisively and one of which 
involved  a  poor  performance  by  Saudi  Arabia 
and a brief foray by the Houthis over the border.19 
2011 brought revolution, and the unknown. In the 
short  term,  Saudi  Arabia  managed  to  influence 
a political transition whereby its allies could still 
hold sway south of the border, but the problematic 
nature of the ‘democratic transition’ and its failure 
to  address  the  root  causes  of  the  2011  protest 
movement were there for all to see. 

A  free-falling  Yemeni  economy,  the  inability  of 
Hadi to enforce his will, the lawless nature of many 
parts  of  the  country,  a  burgeoning  but  disunited 
southern  secessionist  movement,  and  al-Qaeda 
roaming  areas  of  the  country  freely  all  gave  the 
impression of a failing state. These problems have 
largely stayed within Yemen’s borders for now, but 
the  potential  for  them  to  spill  over  the  border  is 
great.

Saudi Arabia’s military intervention has so far not 
achieved its stated goal of removing the Houthis. 
The Houthis and Saleh have been pushed back in 
the south of the country, but still do not appear to 
be on the verge of defeat. Local ‘resistance’ forces 
on  the  ground  –  who  often  represent  no  one 
but  themselves  despite  the  international  media 
seemingly insisting that they are fighting for Hadi 
– are spirited but lack coordination, training and 

19  T. Y Ismael and J. Ismael, Government and Politics of 

the Contemporary Middle East: Continuity and Change, 
Routledge, 2012, p. 410

50

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challengestactics,  and  are  finding  the  going  difficult.  More 
importantly,  and  highlighting  Yemen’s  lack  of 
national unity, they are not willing to fight in areas 
of the country away from their own. This was seen 
in the outright refusal of southern fighters to fight 
in the north of Yemen. 

opposed  or  that  seem  ideologically  opposed  to 
them.  The  Saudi  Arabian  aim  has  not  been  to 
completely  dominate  Yemen  and  annex  it,  but 
merely to ensure that it does not pose a threat to 
Saudi  Arabia.  Saudi  Arabia’s  focus  is  on  just  one 
thing when handling its neighbour: security.

Worse  still,  the  Houthi-Saleh  forces  have  begun 
to fire missiles across the border and also even to 
make brief forays attacking Saudi Arabian border 
posts  –  an  embarrassment  for  Saudi  Arabia.20 
Saudi  Arabia  has  now  bogged  itself  down  in  a 
ground invasion, and along with its Gulf allies has 
taken losses. The advance towards Sana’a is slow, 
has cost billions of dollars in a period of tightened 
Saudi purse strings, and may face more criticism at 
home should the numbers of Saudi dead continue 
to rise. 

CONCLUSION: LESSONS TO BE LEARNED

First  and  foremost,  it  is  important  to  remember 
that  Yemen  is  a  unique  country  in  the  region, 
enjoying  its  own  history,  culture  and  political 
landscape. Therefore, any attempts to extrapolate 
from  the  Saudi  Arabian  experience  in  Yemen 
and  project  it  onto  other  countries  in  the  region 
will  be  fruitless.  However,  many  lessons  can  still 
be  learned  from  Saudi  Arabia’s  interventions  in 
Yemen. 

in 
Despite  often  being  perceived,  especially 
journalistic circles, as a state driven by a religious 
ideology and one that can perhaps act irrationally 
in  the  political  sense,  it  is  quite  clear  that  in 
actuality  Saudi  Arabia’s  foreign  policy  is  by  and 
large motivated by security concerns, specifically 
the  security  of  the  ruling  al-Saud  family.  In  this 
regard, Saudi Arabia is much like most other states 
in the world.

As  explained  above,  the  Saudi  Arabians  have 
often allied with forces that they either previously 

20  BBC News, “Yemen Crisis: Saudi Arabia ‘repels Houthi 
border attack’,” 1 May 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-middle-east-32537543

A  question  that  is  glaringly  obvious  in  the  light 
of  the  current  conflict  in  Yemen  is  how  reliable 
local  proxies  can  be.  These  proxies  have  failed 
Saudi  Arabia,  and  some,  such  as  Saleh,  are 
actively attacking it. Billions of dollars have been 
channelled  to  actors  across  the  border  and  yet 
Saudi  Arabia  still  finds  itself  with  a  pro-Iranian 
group on the verge of taking over Yemen and al-
Qaeda growing in strength. What level of influence 
can  a  country  project  through  unreliable  local 
allies? Local proxies allow a state like Saudi Arabia 
to avoid getting its hands dirty, but when they fail 
what comes next?

Can a military intervention by a Gulf state succeed? 
Despite  much  talk  of  a  new  age  of  Gulf  military 
unilateralism,  the  fighting  performance  of  Saudi 
Arabia and its allies has been poor. Saudi Arabia 
and  its  fellow  Gulf  states  certainly  have  modern 
air  forces,  but  clearly  air  power  is  not  sufficient. 
Will  Saudi  Arabia,  and  by  extension  other  Gulf 
states,  continue  to  risk  their  own  troops  in  the 
regions’ conflict zones, as they have in Yemen? Or 
will they continue to risk dealing with unreliable 
and potentially unsavoury characters to do the job 
for them? 

For Saudi Arabia, a clear lesson is that the policy 
of  attempting  to  prevent  the  Yemeni  state  from 
growing  stronger  and  its  irrational  fear  that  a 
Yemen  with  a  more  independent  domestic  and 
foreign  policy  could  be  dangerous  have  led  to 
disaster. The Saudi Arabians should help build the 
Yemeni  state  and  its  institutions  and  allow  this 
rapidly-growing  country  to  achieve  its  potential. 
Yemen’s  young  and  hard-working  population 
would  be  a  boon  to  the  Gulf  economies  should 
restrictions on work visas be relaxed. Yemen and 
Saudi Arabia can exist as peaceful neighbours, and 
must, if the two countries are to prosper.

51

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and ChallengesJones,  Clive.,  Britain  and  the  Yemen  Civil  War 
1962-1965, (Sussex Academic Press, 2004).

Kamrava,  Mehra,  The  Modern  Middle  East:  A 
Political History Since the First World War, 
(University of California Press, 2011). 

Knickermeyer, Ellen, “Trouble Down South,” For-
eign  Policy.  5  July  2011,  http://www.for-
eignpolicy.com/articles/2011/07/05/trou-
ble_down_south .

Manea,  Elham  M,  “La  tribu  et  l’Etat  au  Yemen” 
in Islam et changement social, ed. Mondher 
Kilani (Lausanne: Editions Payot, 1998).

Mearsheimer,  John,  The  Tragedy  of  Great  Power 
Politics (W. W. Norton & Company, 2001). 

O’Ballance,  Edgar,  The  War  in  Yemen  (Faber  & 

Faber, 1971).

Phillips, Sarah, “Yemen and the Politics of Perma-
nent Crisis,” The International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (2011). 

REFERENCES

“Yemen  Crisis:  Saudi  Arabia  ‘repels  Houthi  bor-
der attack’, BBC News, 1 May 2015, http://
w w w.bbc.co.u k /news/world-midd le-
east-32537543.

Al-Ahsab,  Ahmed  Ali.,  “What  Makes  Yemen’s 
Spring Different?,” in The Arab Spring and 
Arab Thaw: Unfinished Revolutions and the 
Quest for Democracy, ed. John Davis (Ash-
gate Publishing, Ltd, 2013).

Al-Baker, Basheer. “Power and War in Saudi Ara-
bia’s  Backyard,”  in  Al-Araby  Al-Jadeed 
English,  10  February  2015,  http://www.
alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2015/2/11/
power-and-war-in-saudi-arabias-back-
yard. 

Badeeb, Saeed Mohammed. 1985. The Saudi-Egyp-
tian Conflict Over North Yemen, 1962-1970, 
PhD  Dissertation,  The  George  Washing-
ton University (1985).

Conge, Patrick and& Okruhlik, Gwenn., “National 
Autonomy, Labor Migration and Political 
Crisis:  Yemen  and  Saudi  Arabia,”  Middle 
East Journal 51 (2004).

Dresch,  Paul  K.  1995,  “The  Tribal  Factor  in  the 
Yemeni  Crisis,”  in  The  Yemeni  Crisis  of 
1994: Causes and Consequences, ed. Jamal 
S. Al-Suwaidi (Saqi Books, 1995).

Gause,  Gregory.,  Saudi-Yemeni  Relations  (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1990).10

Gerges, Fawaz A., “The Kennedy Administration 
and the Egyptian-Saudi Conflict in Yemen: 
Co-opting Arab Nationalism,” Middle East 
Journal 49 (1995).

Ismael, Tareq Y., Ismael, Jacqueline S. 2012. Gov-
ernment and Politics of the Contemporary 
Middle East: Continuity and Change (Lon-
don: Routledge, 2012). 

52

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and ChallengesJIHADIST DYNAMICS AFTER 
THE ARAB REVOLTS AND 
THEIR IMPACTS ON SAUDI 
ARABIA

Dominique Thomas, 
Associate Researcher, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en 
Sciences Sociales (EHESS)

INTRODUCTION

Al Qaeda (AQ) remains an organization with an 
Arab-Islamic  identity,  built  around  a  political 
core to which are attached official wings bound by 
varying  degrees  of  proximity.  AQ  has  also  taken 
the form of an ideological movement, which is the 
origin  of  the  geographical  extension  of  its  ideas. 
This expansion has evolved in the wake of the Arab 
revolts, which, by opening political fields and ideas 
have offered opportunities for many jihadists from 
AQ  movements  to  present  themselves  as  social 
forces (in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt under the name 
of Ansar al-Sharia).  However,  in  2013 the policy 
changes of authorities in transition (Tunisia, Libya) 
and  the  return  of  authoritarian  regimes  (Egypt) 
limited  the  scope  of  action  of  these  movements. 

The most influential AQ supporters are currently 
mainly  located  in  Yemen  –  the  hub  of  the 
organization  Al-Qaeda  in  the  Arabic  Peninsula 
(AQAP),  and  in  Syria  –  with  the  strategic 
bridgehead  for  the  jihadist  agenda  in  the  Levant 
under  the  umbrella  of  many  groups  like  Jabhat 
al-Nusra  (JaN).  In  spring  2013,  this  region  saw 
the  dissent  of  Islamic  State  in  Iraq  and  Syria 
(ISIS), leading to further competition among the 
jihadist  organizations  of  the  two  camps.  Since 
the beginning of 2014, ISIS, renamed on 29 June 
Islamic  State  (IS),  proclaimed  a  Caliphate  and 
carried out a major territorial conquest in Iraq (its 
original  birthplace)  and  Syria.  Its  local  alliances 

have enabled it to make substantial military gains, 
particularly with the takeover of major Sunni cities 
in  Iraq,  such  as  Mossoul,  Falouja  and  Ramadi. 
ISIS  then  became  a  form  of  disparate  coalition 
(formed  of  Iraqi  jihadists  and  insurgents:  ISIS 
Iraqi militants, tribal leaders opposed to the Shia 
regime  in  Baghdad,  some  local  jihadist  factions, 
foreign fighters and former military Baathists). In 
search of new alliances with other jihadist groups, 
the main ambition of ISIS and its leader, Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi,  is  to  become  the  new  icon  for  the 
defence  of  Sunni  Arabs  through  an  expansionist 
strategy with an operative communication plan.

The  rise  of  radical  jihadist  organizations  such  as 
ISIS  and  AQAP  has  largely  forced  the  Kingdom 
of  Saudi  Arabia  (KSA)  to  implement  a  policy 
against these armed jihadist groups. Aware of the 
new  threat  represented  by  ISIS,  KSA  decided  to 
participate in the international coalition led by the 
United States in September 2014 with Jordan and 
three other countries from the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (Qatar, UAE and Bahrain). In Yemen, the 
political crisis after Houthi rebels took Sanaa led 
to the establishment of a Sunni military coalition 
against the Houthi militias. As with the Peninsula 
Shield  operation  in  Bahrain  in  March  2011,  the 
Decisive  Storm  operation  should  be  interpreted 
as demonstration of the willingness of the Saudis 
to stop any Iranian proxy threat in its immediate 
regional  framework.  Since  their  involvement  in 
the coalition against ISIS, the Saudis now consider 
the  fight  against  jihadism  a  second  priority.  The 
recent  Decisive  Storm  intervention  also  has  the 
further  objective  of  regaining  the  support  of  the 
tribes and preventing them from shifting toward 
radical  Sunni  groups  like  AQAP  or  ISIS.  These 
commitments  also  have  important  consequences 
for  KSA  domestic  stability  because  the  kingdom 
fears  the  potential  effects  of  ISIS  since  attacks 
targeted several Shia mosques on its own territory.

53

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challenges 
1 - AL-QAEDA: A WEAKENED CENTRAL 
CORE WITH MORE INDEPENDENT 
WINGS    

Since 2011, besides the death of its historic leader, 
Osama  bin  Laden,  the  core  of  AQ  has  lost  most 
of  its  influential  lieutenants.  Most  were  killed  by 
US  drone  strikes  in  Pakistan’s  tribal  areas.1  This 
had significant consequences and weakened AQ’s 
central  command,  which  is  currently  unable 
to  set  up  a  high-level  operational  strategy.  This 
situation  has  forced  AQ  to  review  its  strategy 
and to adopt new approaches on the ground. The 
several partnerships observed among the jihadists 
in  Pakistan,  Iraq,  Yemen  and  in  the  Sahel  area 
are  perfect  illustrations  of  this  reawakening.  The 
strategy shows an adaptation to local specificities 
by  making  alliances  with  local  armed  militias 
organized through tribal, regional and also ethnic 
and religious ties.

1.1 How AQ became a network of proxies

AQAP has been working in Yemen to establish a 
more  solid  haven  since  2009.  After  initiating  an 
expensive  regionalization  phase  in  the  southern 
governorates  of  Abyan  and  Shabwa  in  2011, 
resulting  from  the  fall  of  President  Saleh,  AQAP 
changed  its  strategy.  After  2013,  its  members 
strengthened  their  efforts  and  carried  out  major 
actions against the Yemeni Armed Forces (attacks 
against  official  military  buildings,  security  force 
officers  and  Western  expatriates).  AQ  faced  an 
absence of leadership succession in its central core 
based  in  the  Afghanistan  and  Pakistan  regions 
and  so  Yemen,  with  the  increased  presence  of 
AQAP,  has  become  the  new  ideological  and 
operational  centre  of  gravity  for  the  AQ  central 
command.  Following  the  Huthi  rebels  taking 

1  The main lieutenants of Osama bin Laden killed by US 
drones are the Egyptian Mustafa Abu al-Yazid in March 
2010, the Libyans Jamal Ibrahim al-Misrati (aka Atiyah 
Allah al-Libi) in August 2011 and Hassan Muhammad 
Qaed (aka Abu Yahya al-Libi) in June 2012. 

Sanaa  in  September  2014,  the  country  slipped 
into a civil war in March 2015 involving a Sunni 
Arab  military  intervention  under  Saudi  Arabian 
leadership.  AQAP  has  fully  benefited  from  this 
instability to strengthen its presence, particularly 
in  the  southern  governorates  of  Hadramawt  and 
Shabwa  because  the  Arab  coalition  does  not 
consider the war against AQAP a current priority, 
but only secondary. However, Riyadh indeed fears 
a  shift  in  the  Yemeni  Sunni  tribes  in  favour  of 
jihadist  groups  (AQAP  and  ISIS,  which  has  also 
claimed  wilayas  in  Yemen  since  January  2015). 
In  this  contradiction,  the  Kingdom  needs  the 
indirect  support  of  AQAP,  which  represents  the 
best bulwark in South Yemen to contain the Huthi 
progression.  KSA  also  supports  the  legitimate 
government of President Hadi, who sees the AQAP 
threat as important as the Huthi rebels. Defining 
who is the most dangerous enemy in Yemen could 
thus be the next policy priority for KSA.   

In  North  Africa,  Al  Qaeda  in  the  Islamic 
Maghreb  (AQIM)  has  gained  prominence  since 
its  creation  in  2007.  The  organization  achieved 
this  development  on  several  fronts:  first,  it  took 
advantage  of  the  context  of  Arab  revolts  in  the 
region  to  extend  its  influence;  and  second,  it 
continued  the  expansion  of  its  activities  in  the 
Sahel  area.  AQIM  transferred  its  main  forces  to 
the south, which changed its centre of gravity from 
the  North  Algerian  Mountains  to  the  Sahelian 
zone,  while  preserving  its  Algerian  leadership. 
The  movement  wanted  to  become  the  African 
jihadist  showcase.  However,  the  French  military 
operation in early 2013 (aka Serval) led to a new 
period  of  dispersion  and  local  reconfigurations. 
AQIM  has  been  weakened  in  Sahel  and  lost  its 
main operative Katiba leaders, but the group has 
continued to search for new alliances in order to 
preserve its activities in this region. It is trying to 
reposition its activities in North Africa, mostly in 
Tunisia and Libya. In the Sahel, the strengthening 
of links with Tuareg radicals allows it to maintain 

54

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challengesa disseminated presence in northern Mali. AQIM 
has also suffered several internal difficulties, which 
weakened its leadership in 2011 with the creation 
of  the  Unicity  Movement  in  West  Africa  (also 
known under the French acronym MUJAO) and 
in  September  2012  with  a  rupture  with  Mokhtar 
Bel-Mokhtar, who led one of AQIM’s Katiba in the 
Sahel.2  

In  Syria,  the  strong  militarization  of  protest 
against Assad’s regime and the lack of a political 
solution has greatly promoted the emancipation of 
jihadist  groups,  which  have  become  increasingly 
active  and  effective.  A  continual  flow  of  foreign 
fighters,  currently  estimated  at  around  25,000 
activists,  has  reinforced  this  phenomenon.  For 
AQ,  Syria  has  become  the  stepping  stone  for  an 
offensive  strategy  in  the  Levant.  Since  the  JaN 
pledged allegiance to AQ in April 2013, this group 
has  emerged  as  the  front  for  AQ  in  Syria.  Other 
jihadist structures, such as Jund al-Aqsa Junud al-
Sham, a coalition of the Ansareddin Front and the 
Ahrar  al-Sham  movement,  have  gained  support 
from  AQ  militants  who  joined  in  Syria.  The 
current situation in Syria features jihadist rivalries 
between  AQ’s  supporters.  On  the  one  side  are 
those  who  do  not  reject  alliances  and  coalitions 
with  other  Syrian  Islamist  factions;  on  the  other 
are those who exclusively follow the line endorsed 
by  ISIS,  which  controls  an  unbroken  swathe  of 
territory from eastern Syria to western Iraq. This 
has led to deep divisions within the Syrian jihadist 
groups.

in  Syria 

The  conflict  publicly  observed 
is 
characteristic  of  recurrent  divisions  seen  within 
the Global jihadist movement in the last decade. 
In fact, there are many historical precedents, from 
Afghanistan  to  North  Africa  and  in  the  Arabian 
Peninsula  and  Iraq.  These  regions  have  all  been 
exposed  to  ideological  fractures,  which  have 

2 

In August 2013, the main faction of the MUJAO merged 
with the Belmokhtar group to become the al-Mourabi-
toun organization, which has so far maintained its alle-
giance with AQ. 

sometimes  strengthened  power  struggles  within 
the  movement.  After  the  split  between  JaN  and 
ISIS, the role and authority of Ayman Al-Zhawahiri 
at  the  top  of  AQ  were  clearly  challenged.  Every 
jihadist body is now forced to align itself with or 
against one camp, i.e. JaN, the AQ proxy in Syria, 
or ISIS.

1.2 Syria also became a new Jihadist haven for 
Saudis fighters

From  the  beginning  of  the  militarization  of  the 
Syrian  opposition  phase  during  the  summer  of 
2011, probably galvanized by the many calls from 
Saudi  territory  to  overthrow  the  Syrian  regime 
observed  since  the  beginning  of  2012,  Saudis 
jihadists  have  played  an  influential  role  in  the 
Levant  within  some  radical  groups  like  ISIS  and 
JaN.  The  proportion  of  Saudi  fighters  in  Syria 
appears  to  have  considerably  risen  since  the 
summer  of  2012.  Currently  estimated  between 
2500  and  3000  combatants,  they  are,  with  the 
Tunisians  and  Jordanians,  the  largest  group  of 
foreign fighters. As noticed in previous experiences 
during  the  Jihad  campaigns  in  Afghanistan, 
Chechnya,  Iraq  and  Yemen,  their  motives  are 
mainly based on a political-religious commitment: 
to fight the tyranny of the Syrian regime, to defend 
Sunni populations, to fight the Alawi sect, which is 
considered heretical, and to fight against Iranian, 
Iraqi and Lebanese Shia militias. In Syria, the Saudi 
jihadists  have  formed  small,  often  independent, 
groups  (such  as  the  al-Khadra  and  al-’Izz  Suqur 
Brigades), and then gradually rallied to dominant 
movements like JaN and ISIS (almost 60% of them 
are currently estimated to be fighting in the ranks 
of  ISIS  in  Syria  and  Iraq).  This  influence  of  ISIS 
inside  the  Saudi  jihadist  framework  should  also 
been  understood  as  resulting  from  the  influence 
of  many  Saudi  jihadist  networks  formed  for  the 
recruitment  of  more  than  3,000  fighters  in  Iraq 
between 2003 and 2008.

55

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challenges1.3 Ansar al-Sharia: the origin and structure of a 
new jihadist movement

In  the  Arab  countries  that  experienced  regime 
change  after  the  wave  of  popular  protest  (Egypt, 
jihadist  militant 
Tunisia  and  Libya),  some 
groups  released  from  prison  or  returning  after 
years  of  exile  have  turned  into  social  preaching 
movements.  Unlike  other  Islamist  forces  which 
have  entered  a  phase  of  institutionalization,  like 
the Muslim Brotherhood and some Salafist parties 
in Egypt and Yemen, they prefer to remain outside 
of politics. While the narratives of these jihadists 
are  global,  displaying  solidarity  with  oppressed 
Muslims  around  the  world,  their  strategy  is, 
however,  based  on  local  actions  that  take  into 
consideration the immediate needs of the poorest 
part  of  the  population.  These  movements  have 
become  extremely  popular,  even  among  pious 
educated  youths  who  sometimes  have  a  higher 
level  of  education  but  are  still  economically 
marginalized.  Furthermore,  failures  of  states  – 
and  the  subsequent  frustration  that  emerges  – 
strengthen  the  popularity  of  these  movements. 
They define themselves with a dual identity (both 
Salafist  and  jihadist)  and  most  of  them  have 
adopted the name Ansar al-Sharia (AS, supporters 
of Sharia).

In  the  context  of  popular  protest  against  the 
Yemeni  regime  in  May  2011,  the  tribal  jihadist 
insurgency  in  Yemen,  which  initiated  in  the 
southern  provinces  of  Abyan  and  Shabwa,  was 
based on an organization named AS in Yemen. The 
composition of this structure, which had a highly 
leadership,  remained  extremely 
decentralized 
heterogeneous.  Islamists  from  the  former  Aden 
Abyan Army (an armed jihadist movement based 
in  Southern  Yemen  and  active  between  1998 
and  2002)  recommitted  themselves  around  an 
irredentist core. Other activists from the southern 
secessionist movement passed into a new Islamist 
resistance  and  local  tribesmen  were  radicalized 

after  US  drone  attacks  in  December  2009.3  The 
activists of the AQAP cells also decided to merge 
into  an  insurgent  group  with  a  significant  tribal 
identity.

The establishment of AS in Yemen not only marks 
a will to give an Islamic colour to political demands 
based  on  a  rejection  of  the  patrimonial  state 
implemented by President Ali Saleh; it also allows 
for  the  foundation  of  an  opposition  to  a  central 
authority  perceived  as  authoritarian  and  devoid 
of social justice. However, in these provinces, the 
distinction between AS and AQAP remains only 
symbolic  and  is  confined  to  the  communication 
level.  The  two  groups  communicate  differently, 
using different networks on the Web, but they are 
coordinated at the command level. The leaders of 
AS have local power but do not speak for AQAP, 
which is more active in global Jihad issues. AS in 
Yemen  is  primarily  a  shop  window  that  allows 
AQAP  to  benefit  from  a  popular  and  necessary 
base for its organization, which has adapted to its 
tribal, social and political milieu.4

In  Tunisia,  the  AS  group  was  formed  in  May 
2011 and became the main jihadist representative 
movement in the country. It opened talks with the 
Ennahda Islamist movement and took advantage 
of  the  space  for  expression  offered  to  propagate 
its  discourse  by  controlling  local  prayer  rooms 
and  mosques.  Efficient  dissemination  of  this 
preaching  and  a  strong  presence  in  social  media 
networks  like  Facebook  and  Twitter  help  AS  to 
control  several  social  networks  in  the  country. 
Charity  associations  accompanied  this  policy  on 
the ground and there were violent demonstrations 

4 

3  The cases of the Awaliq tribe in Abyan and the Shabwa 
and  Al  Dhahab  family  clans  in  al-Baydha  province 
are  representative  of  the  patterns  of  radicalization  in 
Yemeni tribes. 
In  April  2015,  after  the  fall  of  the  city  of  Mukalla  in 
Hadramawt  following  the  collapse  of  the  Yemeni 
government,  AQAP  and  Ansar  al-Sharia  supporters 
appeared under a new alias called “the Sons of Hadra-
mawt”.  The  aim  is  to  give  local  colour  to  the  jihadist 
movement and to obtain more people support. 

56

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challengesto defend their conception   of Islam. AS in Tunisia 
was then dismantled after the group was banned 
by the authorities in the summer of 2013. This was 
due  to  murders  of  political  figures  in  2013  and 
violent confrontations in the Shaambi Mountains 
between security forces and armed activists. Many 
AS  militants  were  arrested  and  the  movement 
became  totally  illegal  and  lost  its  principal  bases 
in  the  country.  Its  ability  to  communicate  was 
drastically reduced and it was confronted with the 
exile of its main leaders, such as its founder Ben 
Hassine  Sayfallah  (aka  Abu  Ayyadh  al-Tunisi). 
Tunisian  fighters  from  Syria  (estimated  at  more 
than  3000)  and  Libya,  mostly  affiliated  to  ISIS, 
gradually  became  the  principal  nodes  of  the 
main Tunisian jihadist communication networks 
by  relaying  information  from  the  key  figures  in 
AS.  After  this  period,  the  option  of  violence  has 
therefore seemed on the rise within the AS ranks. 
The  presence  of  training  facilities  in  Libya  could 
lead some Tunisian jihadist networks to carry out 
attacks from there against the Tunisian authorities 
(targeting  security  forces,  prisons,  politicians, 
tourism facilities and ex-patriots).

Starting  from  June  2012,  the  same  AS  group 
appeared  in  northwest  Libya  (mainly  in  Derna 
and Benghazi). Similar methods to those seen in 
Tunisia were applied, but AS in Libya is also linked 
with  armed  militias  whose  existence  remains  a 
structural  element  of  the  Libyan  landscape  after 
the  fall  of  Muammar  Gaddafi.  After  this  event, 
the  weakness  of  the  new  transitional  political 
institutions, a lack of a united security apparatus 
and  the  militarization  of  political  competition 
with the offensive by General Haftar, launched in 
2014 and supported by several authoritarian Arab 
regimes, strengthened and expanded the presence 
of  jihadist  groups  in  Libya.  This  context  caused 
further 
radicalization  and  anti-government 
rhetoric  within  the  Libyan  jihadist  structures. 
AS  also  received  verbal  support  from  some 
representatives  of  AQ.  The  group  in  Libya  has 
confirmed its participation in the various clashes 

which took place against the Haftar coalition. The 
phase  of  being  a  simple  preaching  association 
seems to have ended because of the confrontation 
imposed by the Haftar camp. AS in Libya has also 
rejected  the  positions  of  the  Fajr  Libya  militias, 
another  coalition  based  in  Tripoli  and  Misrata. 
Since  the  summer  of  2014  it  has  joined  other 
Islamist  coalitions  based  in  Benghazi  and  Derna 
against the Tobruk authorities.

In  Egypt,  the  release  of  many  figures  who  were 
arrested during the Afghan jihad period resulted 
in  the  creation  of  a  militant  group.  Its  action  is 
focused outside the political framework and it also 
took the name of AS. This group soon expressed its 
opposition to the political programme presented 
by  the  Salafist  parties  (such  as  Al-Nour),  which 
it  considered  too  modernist  because  of  their 
recognition  of  the  democratic  political  system. 
The  Egyptian  jihadists  have  also  tried  to  extend 
their  influence  by  organizing  several  media 
actions  in  solidarity  with  their  “AS  brothers” 
in  Tunisia  and  Libya,  and  by  carrying  out  joint 
projects with some Salafist centres based in Gaza. 
They  have  taken  advantage  of  their  charismatic 
leaders, such as Ahmad Ashwash and Muhamad 
al-Zhawahiri,  the  brother  of  the  current  AQ 
Emir.  However,  the  repression  that  followed  the 
removal  of  President  Muhamad  Morsi  in  3  July 
2013 changed the Islamist balance in the Egyptian 
scene.  The  jihadists,  who  refused  en  masse  to 
show  up  alongside  the  pro-Morsi  demonstrators 
to defend the democratic legitimacy of the former 
president, have not been spared from repression. 
Many  of  their  influential  figures,  including  Al-
Zhawahiri,  have  been  arrested.  Many  activists 
from  the  period  between  2011  and  2013  who 
escaped  repression  have  joined  armed  jihadist 
groups mainly active in the north and in the Sinai 
Peninsula, such as Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, formed 
in 2011 by militants from Sinai.

57

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challenges2 - THE RISE OF ISIS

2.2 The positive momentum of the Arab revolts

However,  with  a  rise  of  deep  Sunni  frustration 
resulting  in  protests  increasingly  turned  against 
the central Iraqi government ruled by PM Nuri al-
Maliki, the domestic Iraqi context gradually became 
favourable  to  ISI.  The  Sunni  Arabs  perceived 
the authorities to be discriminating  against their 
community. In spring 2013, ISI changed its name 
again  and  became  the  “Islamic  State  in  Iraq  and 
the Levant” (ISIS), due to its presence in the Syrian 
conflict.  The  movement  was  also  strengthened 
with  a  new  leadership  and  by  the  hegemonic 
ambitions of its new emir, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. 
A  rise  in  Sunni-Shia  rivalries  in  Iraq,  combined 
with the development of the Syrian conflict with 
a  massive  influx  of  foreign  fighters,  considerably 
strengthened  the  movement.  Moreover,  taking 
advantage  of  the  exasperation  of  some  Sunni 
tribal  leaders  with  the  Maliki  government,  ISIS 
was able to amplify its recruitment base. Former 
minor Iraqi jihadist groups such as Ansar al-Islam 
(composed of Islamist Kurds), Ansar al-Sunna and 
Jaysh al-Islami also joined the ISIS cause to carry 
out  anti-government  attacks,  without  claiming 
allegiance to al-Baghdadi.

After the beginning of 2014, ISIS launched a major 
offensive for territorial conquest. Its local alliances 
have  enabled  it  to  obtain  substantial  military 
gains by taking control of major Sunni cities, like 
Mosul. The ISIS strategy in Syria is influenced by 
the Iraq war, in which Sunni antagonism against 
the  Alawi-Shia  alliance  was  greatly  exploited. 
While some clans have rallied to ISIS as an anti-
Maliki  option,  without  sharing  the  ideals  of  this 
ultra-radical jihadist organization, ISIS continues 
to maintain a strong territorial base the size of the 
UK between Syria and Iraq.

2.1 A movement deeply rooted in Iraq

The  history  of  ISIS  is  characterized  by  attempts 
at  unification  of  the  many  armed  Sunni  Islamist 
brigades  which  gradually  emerged  after  the  US 
military  intervention  in  2003.  This  process  went 
through many phases. From AQ in Mesopotamia 
under the leadership of Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi, 
the  group  changed  its  name  three  times  to 
become  “Islamic  state  in  Iraq”  (ISI)  in  January 
2007.  This  transformation  was  the  result  of  the 
ISI  leadership,  which  had  been  dominated  by 
Iraqis  since  the  death  of  Zarqawi,  preferring  to 
emancipate  themselves  from  the  tutelage  of  AQ 
and  to  promote  a  programme  of  establishing  an 
Islamic state in Iraq.

The organization was weakened by a multi-faceted 
security  policy  and  pushed  from  the  heart  of 
Baghdad in 2009, and it seemed to have difficulty 
finding  a  second  breath.  In  fact,  after  2010  ISI 
only  made  its  presence  felt  on  Iraqi  territory  by 
means  of  specific  localized  spectacular  actions 
(explosions,  mainly 
targeting  security  sites, 
conscription  centres,  members  of  resilient  Sunni 
militias  and  Shia  religious  places). The  deaths  of 
the  two  main  figures  in  the  movement  in  April 
20105 and multiple arrests of its members by the 
Iraqi security forces had substantial consequences 
for the efficiency of the group, which in 2011was 
considered to be very weak.

5 

Its emir, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, a former officer in the 
Baathist  army,  and  the  Egyptian  Abu  Ayyub,  the  true 
religious eminence of the movement, were killed in a US 
air strike, as Al-Zarqawi had been in June 2006. 

58

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challenges2.4 The Saudi Arabian territory and the new ISIS 
threat

The  military  successes  of  ISIS  in  Syria  and  Iraq 
and the proclamation of the caliphate confirmed 
the  attractiveness  of  this  organization  in  radical 
circles  inside  the  Kingdom,  especially  among 
young  people  but  less  among  historical  Jihadist 
preachers, who still support AQ affiliates. Former 
Saudi  fighters  in  Iraq  of  the  2003  generation  are 
now  the  current  charismatic  figures  supporting 
networks and cells formed inside KSA.

The domestic Saudi security apparatus (Mabahith) 
announces it has dismantled dozens of operational 
networks  linked  to  ISIS  in  KSA  since  May  2014. 
These  operations  have  also  included  numerous 
arrests  in  radical  spheres.  The  November  2014 
attack  against  a  hussayniyya  (Shia  place  of 
socialization) in the Eastern Province of Al-Ahsa 
also revealed the presence of pro-ISIS operational 
networks determined to carry out suicide bombing 
attacks on Saudi territory. KSA became a priority 
target  for  ISIS  because  of  the  presence  of  a  Shia 
minority  installed  in  the  west  of  the  Kingdom. 
This first attack was a turning point in the modus 
operandi  of  pro-ISIS  jihadists  in  KSA,  whereas 
AQAP  never  targeted  Shia  civilians  during  the 
campaign  launched  between  2003  and  2006. 
(Three  more  mosques  have  been  targeted  since 
November 2014). The Saudi authorities have also 
decided to reinforce border controls and increase 
surveillance of places of worship to stop any call 
to  join  Iraq  and  Syria.  The  Kingdom  fears  the 
takeover of border crossings by jihadist fighters in 
the southern Iraqi province of al-Anbar. The reality 
of this threat took a new turn with an incident on 
5  January 2015,  when  four Jihadists  attacked the 
position of Suwayf on the northern border.

2.3 The Caliphate as an expansionist agenda

On 29 June 2014, ISIS announced the restoration 
of  the  Islamic  Caliphate  in  Syria  and  Iraq,  ruled 
by  Abu  Bakr  al-Baghdadi.  As  well  as  being  part 
of a well-organized communication strategy, this 
announcement marked the determination of ISIS 
to  set  itself  up  as  a  regional  jihadist  movement. 
It  also  underlined  the  importance  of  Iraq  in  the 
history of the Caliphate to gain Islamic support for 
its  legitimacy.  Since  this  announcement,  despite 
many groups and activists claiming allegiance to its 
command, ISIS has remained extremely localized.6 
Its  expansion  is  geographically  extensive  but  it 
includes a limited number of militants. However, 
it  has  gained  from  a  leadership  crisis  in  the  AQ 
ranks  as  a  consequence  of  several  leaders  being 
killed in drone strikes (in Yemen7 and Waziristan). 
Divisions between rival AQIM and AS factions in 
North  Africa  have  contributed  to  strengthening 
its  position.  More  specifically,  allegiances  with 
Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis in Sinai (November 2014), 
small armed groups in Libya (October 2014) and 
Boko Haram in Nigeria (March 2015) remain the 
most  significant  successes  of  the  organization. 
Furthermore,  its  networks  in  Saudi  Arabia  have 
also been growing since attacks were carried out 
against  Shia  religious  sites  in  November  2014 
and May 2015. In Yemen, the failure of the state 
promoted chaos and saw the emergence of small 
ISIS  cells  in  March  2014.  However,  even  though 
these  factions  have  targeted  Hawthi  rebels  and 
Shia Zaydi centres in Sanaa, they are not able to 
contest  AQAP  hegemony.  The  organization  also 
tries  to  claim  responsibility  for  all  individual 
jihadist operations in the world thanks to a very 
effective  propaganda  apparatus  involving  several 
communication networks on the web.

6  Splits with a region of AQIM, with some Pakistani Tal-
iban  leaders,  some  figures  in  AS  in  Tunisia,  and  mili-
tants  in  the  Sahel,  Jordan,  Indonesia,  Philippines  and 
the Caucasus can be mentioned. 

7  Since 2015, AQAP has lost most of its leaders in Yemen: 
Hareth  al-Nazhari,  Ibrahim  al-Rubaysh,  Ali  al-Ansi 
and its Emir Nasser al-Wahishi were all killed by drone 
strikes in the region of Hadramawt.

59

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challenges2.5    AQ  versus  ISIS:  Islamic  State  against  the 
State of networks, or the struggle for Jihad

In addition to the military gains achieved in Iraq 
and eastern Syria, which strengthened the influence 
of al-Baghdadi in the conflict for authority against 
AQ,8  the  historic  global 
jihadist  movement 
continues  to  benefit  from  strong  support  from 
its  “local  wings”  (AQIM  and  AQAP),  and  from 
many  global  jihadist  figures.  However,  the  main 
ideologues of these organizations have expressed 
their  disagreement  with  ISIS  methods  on  the 
issues  of  shedding  the  blood  of  Sunni  Muslims 
and  the  need  for  prior  consultation  concerning 
the  implementation  of  an  Islamic  Caliphate  and 
the  programme  for  its  application.9  Indeed,  ISIS 
has  been  reluctant  to  share  power  within  the 
jihadist  community.  Furthermore,  its  hegemonic 
aspirations  related  to  the  Caliphate  are  regularly 
denounced by AQ. ISIS cannot replace AQ because 
the two groups’ identities are different. ISIS has a 
regional and territorial agenda: the Caliphate; AQ 
is a transnational movement and wants to be the 
inspirational driver of global jihad, turned against 
both  Arab  regimes  and  the  Western  alliance  led 
by the United States. As a result, the pro-jihadist 
preachers who speak for AQ from Yemen, Jordan 
and  Saudi  Arabia  continue  to  maintain  the 
estrangement.

These  publicly-revealed  differences  remind  us 
of  previous  recurring  divisions  within  the  global 
jihadist  movement.  The  historical  conflicts  from 
Afghanistan  to  North  Africa  –  via  the  Arab 
Peninsula  and  Iraq  –  were  all  characterized  by 
ideological  fractures,  sometimes  emphasized  by 
power  struggles  within  the  movement.  The  role 

8  After the Syrian discord in spring 2013, AQ announced 
that it would exclusively sponsor JaN, the main jihadist 
rival group of ISIS in Syria. 

9  Since  February  2014,  the  most  virulent  criticisms 
against  ISIS  have  come  from  prominent  AQ  figures, 
such as the Jordanians Abu Qatada and Abu Muham-
mad al-Maqdisi.

and authority of Al-Zhawahiri at the top of AQ has 
clearly been challenged, and every jihadist entity is 
now forced to declare itself for or against one of the 
two camps. Even within jihadist communication, 
the social network groups and forums follow the 
same  line.  Sometimes  these  rivalries  go  beyond 
the ideological framework and escalate into armed 
conflict between pro-AQ and pro-ISIS groups, as 
has happened recently in Syria (since 2014) and in 
Libya in the city of Derna (since June 2015), where 
ISIS supporters have been expelled from the city 
by the local Islamist coalition of which AS in Libya 
is a part.

CONCLUSION

The  global 
jihadist  movement  has  grown 
significantly  since  the  beginning  of  the  Arab 
revolts  in  2011.  Its  expansion  has  been  boosted 
by failed states (Libya, Syria, Yemen), by crises of 
governance  and  legitimacy  (Tunisia,  Egypt,  Iraq, 
Mali) and by the inability of corrupt authoritarian 
regimes to open their political spheres. The release 
of hundreds of jihadists detained for years in Arab 
prisons has also had an effect in this dynamic.

The jihadist movement is now more regionalized 
and has succeeded in ruling territories and cities 
in the Sahel, Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Libya, places 
where  many  tribes  and  people  were  generally 
opposed  to  centralizing  states.  The  resources, 
funding  and  recruitment  for  these  organizations 
have  become  particularly  important.  The  two 
major  labels  that  have  successfully  expanded  in 
this region are AS and ISIS. The evolution of the 
Syrian conflict and the rise of ISIS in Iraq have led 
to  a  polarization  within  the  global  jihadist  field, 
which has become divided between supporters of 
AQ and ISIS. This division is becoming the norm 
and  means  competition  between  two  jihadist 
poles  that  are  in  confrontation  for  supremacy  in 
the global jihad.

60

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and ChallengesFor  KSA,  the  contradictory  directions  of  its 
regional  policy  constitute  a  dilemma  (whether 
to  prioritise  fighting  Iranian  proxies  or  targeting 
the  Jihadist  threats).  The  threat  from  jihadist 
groups like AQAP, JaN and ISIS forces the Saudi 
authorities  to  tighten  controls  on  its  territory 
with  regard  to  the  number  of  Saudis  involved 
in  these  organizations.  However,  the  Kingdom 
is  committed  to  a  policy  of  participation  in  two 
main military operations to contain the influence 
of Iran and its proxies in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. 
Nevertheless,  the  effectiveness  of  this  axis  of 
policy  will  not  produce  significant  results  if 
jihadist armed groups are weakened. Ideologically, 
they are the most opposed to the Shia and more 
determined  to  fight  them.  These  contradictions 
may  lead  Riyadh  to  make  more  difficult  choices 
than  have  been  experienced  in  the  Kingdom  for 
over a century.

61

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and ChallengesREFERENCES

“A  False  Foundation?  AQAP,  Tribes  and  Ungov-
erned Spaces in Yemen,” CTC West Point 
(2011). 

“The  Al  Qaeda  Networks:  a  New  Framework 
for  Defining  the  Enemy,”  Critical  Threat 
(2013). 

Barrett,  Richard.  The  Islamic  State,  The  Soufan 

Group, November 2014.

Caillet, Romain. “From the Baath to the Caliph-
ate,  the  Former  Officers  of  Saddam  and 
the Islamic State”, NOREF (2015). 

Dazi Heni, Fatiha. “Saudi Arabia: the political im-
plications of a new regional policy and the 
jihadist challenge”, Arab Reform Initiative, 
September 2015. 

Joscelyn, Thomas. “Global al Qaeda: Affiliates, ob-
jectives,  and  future  challenges,”  LWJ,  18 
July 18 2013.

Lister, Charles. Profiling the Islamic State, Brook-
ings Doha center, November 2014. 

Zelin, Aaron. “The War between AQ and ISIS for 
Supremacy  of  the  Global  Jihadist  Move-
ment,” The Washington Institute (2014). 

Zelin,  Aron.  “The  State  of  al-Qaeda”,  The  Wash-
ington Institute, 13 April 2015. 

62

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and ChallengesCONCLUSION. THE GULF 
REGION BEYOND THE ARAB 
SPRING. WHAT IMPLICATIONS 
FOR THE EU?

Luigi Narbone.   
Director of the Mediterranean Programme,  
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 
European University Institute.

The 20th century has witnessed profound chang-
es in the international system and the rise of 
several new countries to the rank of global ac-
tors. The six monarchies of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) are among them. The new status 
of the Gulf has important consequences, particu-
larly for the MENA region, and calls for renewed 
attention from the part of the EU.  

I. THE GULF REGION AND THE WORLD

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, 
Qatar  and  to  a 
lesser  extent  Bahrain  and 
Oman  have  long  enjoyed  world  prominence  in 
hydrocarbon production and exporting. The GCC 
countries make up around 24 percent of world oil 
production, with over 40 percent and 24 percent 
of world oil and gas reserves respectively. The ten-
year  high  oil  price  cycle,  which  ended  in  2014, 
enabled them to enter a period of sustained growth 
and ascend to the status of emerging powers. From 
2009 to 2014, the Gulf countries’ combined GDP 
almost  doubled,  making  them  one  of  the  largest 
world  economies,  while  high  consumption  and 
investment  rates  increased  the  integration  of  the 
region  with  the  rest  of  the  world.    Development 
strategies  aimed  at  reducing  dependence  on 
oil  and  gas  and  at  providing  employment  for 
their  growing  young  populations  created  major 
infrastructure, 
investment  opportunities 
services and mega-projects. In a few years, these 
countries transformed their outlook, modernizing 

in 

cities,  attracting  immigrants  from  Asia  and  the 
Middle East, establishing new economic poles and 
turning the Arabian Peninsula into an important 
financial and East-West transport hub. 

At  the  same  time,  oil  wealth  allowed  the  GCC 
members  to  intensify  their  projection  onto  the 
global stage and to start multiplying international 
links. Diversification strategies put in place by their 
Sovereign  Wealth  Funds  increasingly  favoured 
investments  in  emerging  markets.  For  example, 
Gulf  investments  in  Africa  grew  considerably, 
particularly  in  agrobusiness  in  a  quest  for  food 
security  for  the  region,  while  energy-hungry 
Asian countries became key trade and investment 
partners. GCC strategic ties with China and India 
deepened  substantially,  opening  the  way  to  co-
operation in numerous areas, including security. 

partner.  While 

The  EU  remained  the  GCC’s  most  important 
trading 
region-to-region 
ties  stagnated  because  of  the  stalling  of  FTA 
negotiations, bilateral economic relations between 
members  of  the  two  regional  blocks  flourished. 
In  2014,  the  Gulf  was  the  fifth  major  trading 
partner  of  the  EU,  accounting  for  4.2  percent  of 
total  EU  trade.  Spurred  by  the  need  to  find  new 
markets during the prolonged recession triggered 
by  the  financial  crisis,  EU  countries  invested 
heavily  in  fostering  economic  relations  with  the 
Gulf. European businesses and investors enjoyed 
a  dominant  role  in  many  sectors,  while  some 
European countries continued to play a major role 
in  GCC  security,  through  security  and  defence 
cooperation and as arms suppliers. However, the 
deepening of GCC-Asia relations started to pose a 
challenge to the European position.  

The  Gulf  countries’  pivot  to  Asia  went  hand  in 
hand  with  a  gradual  reduction  of  the  presence 
and  influence  of  the  US,  the  traditional  GCC 
partner and security guarantor. The shale energy 
revolution  reduced  US  energy  dependency  on 
the Middle East and made it possible for the US 

63

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challengesto  start  reconsidering  its  long-standing  strategic 
commitment to the region. The US shift to Asia, 
the  implementation  of  the  Obama  doctrine 
based  on  reduced  engagement  and  leading  from 
behind,  and  differences  over  critical  issues  like 
the  Iran  nuclear  dossier  and  the  Syrian  conflict 
accentuated the distance between the Gulf and the 
US.  This  increased  the  Gulf ’s  sense  of  unease  in 
the face of multiple Middle Eastern challenges and 
contributed to strengthening the idea that security 
and  the  defence  of  vital  interests  now  had  to  be 
taken in their own hands.    

II. THE GULF AND THE MENA REGION.

Against this backdrop, the MENA region became 
one  of  the  main  focuses  of  the  Gulf  countries’ 
international  relations.  Growing  economic  and 
investment  interests  and  the  intensification  of 
financial flows, including aid and charity transfers, 
to  Middle  Eastern  and  North  African  countries, 
went  together  with  an  unprecedented  effort  to 
increase political and cultural influence there.

As  this  ebook  has  shown,  the  Arab  Spring,  with 
the  ensuing  changes  and  chaos,  did  nothing  but 
accelerate Gulf penetration into the MENA region. 
Protecting  the  stability  of  the  Gulf  countries, 
which  in  the  view  of  the  ruling  monarchies  also 
meant shielding their regimes from the winds of 
political change sweeping the region, became the 
underlying objective of their regional policies, the 
one common goal on which all the GCC countries 
agreed and converged. 

Action  by  the  GCC  countries  articulated  into 
several  areas  of  intervention.  In  the  wake  of  the 
uprising  in  2011-12,  all  the  Gulf  monarchies 
swiftly  moved  to  guarantee  domestic  consensus 
and  reduce  grievances  among  their  populations. 
They curbed nascent political opposition through 
economic handouts and co-optation of new social 
groups.  At  the  same  time,  they  began  to  play  a 

more  proactive  role  in  the  region.  For  instance, 
they  provided  economic  support  to  Oman, 
Bahrain  and  other  Arab  monarchies  (Morocco 
and  Jordan)  and  to  friendly  regimes  that  had 
emerged  from  the  post-Arab-Spring  transition, 
such  as  the  military  government  in  Egypt;  but 
they also became players in the post-Arab-Spring 
politics of many Arab countries, through funding 
or backing political and social forces amenable to 
Gulf interests and by sponsoring factionalism. 

At  times,  the  GCC  countries  acted  together  as  a 
regional  grouping.  There  were  attempts  under 
Saudi  leadership  to  strengthen  GCC  foreign 
and  security  policy  co-ordination.  Nevertheless, 
more  often  they  moved  as  individual  nations 
with  different  economic  interests  and  divergent 
foreign  policy  agendas  and  objectives.  The  issue 
of the 2013-14 row between Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE on one side and Qatar on the other over the 
Muslim Brotherhood is a good case in point. This 
dispute pushed GCC solidarity to the limits and it 
took  much  pressure  and  many  mediation  efforts 
by  the  Saudis  to  convince  Qatar  to  abandon  its 
region-wide support of the Muslim Brothers.

Several of our ebook chapters have shown that, in a 
variety of cases, the new regional course undertaken 
by  the  Gulf  countries  is  a  combination  of  old 
and  new  concerns  and  policies.  A  fundamental 
concern  about  security  and  territorial  integrity 
has always been a driving force behind the foreign 
policy  of  the  oil-rich  and  scarcely-populated 
emirates and monarchies, which have had to face 
numerous regional threats since their foundation. 
Similarly,  certain  foreign  policy  objectives  are 
long-standing.  For  example,  contrasting  Iran’s 
activism in the region and the use of proxies and 
clients  to  counter  what  are  perceived  as  Iran’s 
attempts  to  establish  its  influence  in  the  Gulf ’s 
immediate  neighbourhood,  supporting  tribes  in 
Yemen and elsewhere, salafi islamists throughout 
the region and sunni jihadist fighters in regional 
conflicts,  and  finally  providing  large  financial 

64

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challengespackages to support friendly countries are all good 
illustrations of tools that the Gulf countries have 
used  in  the  past  and  that  continue  to  be  part  of 
their policies in the MENA region.

The novelty is that both the real and the perceived 
threats have greatly multiplied in the post-Arab-
Spring  era  and  now  stem  from  the  growing 
instability,  power  vacuums  or  state  failure  in 
neighbouring countries. 

As  stressed  in  this  ebook,  the  Gulf  countries 
have  felt  increasingly  encircled  by  what  they  see 
as  proxy  conflicts  sponsored  by  Iran  in  Yemen, 
Iraq  and  Syria.  They  see  Iran’s  activities  as  the 
prism through which to read regional instability. 
Consequently, in the various crises in the region 
they  have  actively  supported  factions  that  could 
act  as  proxies  in  the  geo-political  confrontation 
with Iran. 

Because  of  its  regional  weight,  history  and 
political-religious  role,  the  reaction  to  the  threat 
from Iran has been different in Saudi Arabia and 
in  the  smaller  GCC  countries.  Saudi  Arabia  has 
proposed  itself  as  the  leader  of  the  Sunni  camp 
in  a  context  characterized  by  intensification  of 
the sectarian confrontation opposing Sunnis and 
Shias.  The  origin  of  the  cleavage  is  geo-political, 
not religious, but the exacerbation of the religious 
dimension can further deepen the divide, making 
it  harder  to  find  domestic  political  settlements 
or diplomatic solutions to the many crises in the 
region. 

The Iranian nuclear deal plays on the fundamental 
fears  of  Saudi  Arabia  and,  as  a  consequence,  of 
the other Gulf countries. It will allow the re-entry 
of Iran as a fully legitimate actor on the regional 
scene, while the end of sanctions will boost Iran’s 
economy  and  increase  its  military  capabilities. 
These developments, if not managed carefully, risk 
further hardening Saudi responses.

The smaller Gulf emirates have higher economic 
and  security  stakes  in  their  relations  with  Iran 
and  have  traditionally  been  more  cautious  in 
dealing with their neighbour across the water. The 
geopolitical  confrontation  with  Iran,  which  the 
Saudis accuse of meddling in Arab affairs, and the 
ensuing  polarization  between  Shias  and  Sunnis 
have  brought  about  a  re-alignment  under  Saudi 
Arabia leadership within the GCC, increasing the 
concern of the smaller GCC emirates that tensions 
might eventually lead to direct confrontation. 

The chaos that has followed the Arab uprising has 
also  created  a  fertile  ground  for  the  expansion 
of  transnational  jihadist  movements  that  put 
into  question  the  very  existence  of  post-colonial 
borders.  In  the  case  of  the  territories  controlled 
by ISIS in Syria and Iraq, they have even started 
to  dismantle  them,  at  least  rhetorically  replacing 
nation  states  with  the  caliphate.  After  the  Arab 
Spring, global jihadism has been on the rise in the 
region. Jihadist movements have taken advantage 
of  the  crisis  of  legitimacy  and  poor  governance 
in  a  number  of  countries  and  have  succeeded 
in  establishing  themselves  as  a  ruling  force  in 
territories  and  cities  in  Sahel,  Yemen,  Iraq,  Syria 
and  Libya,  creating  links  with  tribes  and  groups 
opposed  to  the  central  states.  This  development 
is  particularly  dangerous  for  the  Gulf  countries. 
The  intensification  of  the  jihadist  threat  and 
the  rise  of  ISIS  increase  the  risk  of  a  complete 
collapse  of  the  region’s  security  order.  Moreover, 
jihadism represents a domestic security threat as 
its  political  message  resonates  among  sectors  of 
the population, as is shown by the large number of 
Saudi fighters who have joined ISIS.

An  additional  element  of  novelty  in  the  post-
Arab-Spring  setting  is  the  much-discussed  new 
Gulf  assertiveness  on  regional  issues.  The  Gulf 
countries  seem  to  have  abandoned  their  long-
standing behind-the-scenes approach and appear 
willing  to  intervene  directly  in  many  situations. 
In Syria, Iraq and Libya, new and more proactive 

65

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challengessustainability of the Gulf model, the new economic 
situation might increase the risk of instability and 
make  interventionist  policies  more  difficult  to 
implement.  It  remains  to  be  seen,  for  instance, 
what kind of impact the cost of the war in Yemen 
will  have  on  the  Saudi  and  Gulf  economies  and, 
consequently, on the domestic political dynamics. 
In  sum,  the  Gulf  countries  might  have  to  face  a 
scenario  characterized  by  domestic  stagnation, 
uncertainties  and  difficult  dilemmas  in  foreign 
policy,  while  the  situation  in  the  MENA  region 
does not show any sign of improvements.

IV. WHAT IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EU?

The changes in Gulf status and policies highlighted 
in this ebook have important implications for the 
Middle  East  and  beyond.  How  should  the  EU 
react?  What  should  the  EU  response  to  the  new 
role of the Gulf in the international and regional 
arenas be? 

The  1988  EU-GCC  Co-operation  Agreement  – 
which is the basis of the relationship between the 
two  blocks  –  gives  emphasis  to  region-to-region 
ties  and  focuses  mainly  on  economic  issues  and 
co-operation  in  areas  such  as  energy,  industry, 
trade  and  services,  science  and  technology, 
and  the  environment.  Over  the  years,  the  EU-
GCC  relationship  has  borne  limited  fruits.  The 
prolonged  focus  on  the  now-deadlocked  FTA 
negotiations  produced  frustration  on  both  sides 
and  has  been  detrimental  to  the  development 
of  a  more  multifaceted  relationship.  Currently, 
bilateral ties between EU and GCC member states 
are much stronger than the region-to-region ones. 

EU  co-operation  has  made  only 
limited 
achievements.  The  Gulf  model  and  economic 
diversification efforts aim at building a knowledge-
based economy, with heavy investment in research 
and development, higher education and centres of 
excellence. Moreover, structural and public sector 

Gulf  strategies  have  gone  hand  in  hand  with  a 
more  audacious  use  of  traditional  foreign  policy 
tools and with a higher profile in multilateral fora. 

The  Saudi-led  operation  in  Yemen  epitomizes 
the  great  shift  from  the  traditional  war  by  proxy 
to a new interventionist stance. For the first time, 
a  coalition  led  by  Saudi  Arabia  has  militarily 
intervened  in  a  regional  conflict,  used  airpower, 
and  sent  troops  on  the  ground.  As  shown  in 
the  ebook,  the  intervention  in  Yemen  aims  to 
achieve  long-term  objectives  in  the  country 
and  to  counter  the  alleged  Iranian  meddling. 
However, the intervention is not devoid of risks, 
and  demonstrates  the  Saudi  determination  to  be 
an  active  participant  in  the  shaping  of  the  new 
regional order. 

III. CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE 

As  the  ebook  shows,  these  changes  in  the 
approach  of  Gulf  foreign  policies  in  the  MENA 
region occur while new structural challenges cast 
some  shadows  over  the  future.  The  drop  in  oil 
prices, resulting from a global supply glut, is likely 
to  be  a  lasting  phenomenon  and  to  reduce  Gulf 
country revenues for some time to come. Painful 
economic  reforms  and  important  adaptations  in 
their  development  and  diversification  strategies 
cannot  be  put  off  any  longer. The  Gulf  countries 
will  be  forced  to  eliminate  waste  and  subsidies, 
reduce infrastructural investments and introduce 
important  structural  reforms,  while  maintaining 
redistributive 
are 
essential  to  keep  their  peoples’  allegiance  to  the 
regimes.  Similarly,  the  demographic  structure 
of  GCC  countries  and  the  shortcomings  of  their 
immigration  policies  might  negatively  affect 
growth prospects in the long run. 

economic  policies 

that 

While  the  presence  of  large  financial  reserves 
landing  for  the  GCC 
should  avoid  a  hard 
economies and dispel any immediate threat to the 

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The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challengesreforms are made even more urgent by the current 
negative  economic  cycle.  In  this  framework, 
deepening 
the  exchanges  and  cooperation 
between the GCC and the EU would be extremely 
valuable, and there are several areas – from higher 
education  to  research,  from  environment  to 
clean energy – where the two sides could benefit 
from joint initiatives, partnerships and synergies. 
People-to-people initiatives could increase mutual 
knowledge and create better understanding, thus 
benefiting EU-GCC business and political ties. 

The  political  aspects  of  the  relationship  are  still 
under-developed.  Calls  to  intensify  the  political 
dialogue,  for 
instance  to  co-ordinate  policy 
responses  to  regional  crises,  have  resulted  in 
limited  increases  in  contacts,  with  the  exception 
of  the  case  of  Yemen  in  2011-12,  where  the  EU 
supported the GCC peace initiative and its (now-
suspended)  implementation.  Human  rights  have 
been a divisive issue and attempts to start an EU-
GCC dialogue in this area have brought no results.   

Given  the  changes  and  challenges  affecting  the 
Gulf  and  the  surrounding  MENA  region,  it 
would  be  short-sighted  for  the  EU  to  keep  the 
relationship at the current minimalist levels. As we 
have seen in this ebook, the GCC is now a global 
player which is re-orientating its international and 
economic relations towards Asia and is adopting 
a new proactive and at times controversial stance 
in the crisis-ridden MENA region. The EU has a 
strategic interest in revisiting its relationship with 
the GCC and its members. Engaging with the Gulf 
countries should serve the purpose of increasing 
convergence  on  regional  issues.  The  EU  and  the 
Gulf  countries  should  find  common  ground  on 
how  to  deal  with  regional  threats,  to  dispel  the 
fears – like, for instance, on the issue of the Iran 
nuclear agreement – which impede the reduction 
of tension and the stabilisation of the region. They 
should look for synergies and a positive division of 
labour in handling the regional crises, to increase 
the  chance  of  success  of  mediation  and  conflict-
resolution efforts.

67

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and ChallengesCONTRIBUTORS

Abubakr Al-Shamahi is a graduate of the School of Oriental and African Studies 
(SOAS), University of London. He is a British-Yemeni freelance journalist, the 
Media  Researcher  at  the  MBI  Al  Jaber  Media  Institute,  Sana’a,  and  the  editor 
of CommentMidEast.com. As a freelance journalist he has covered events such 
as the 2011 revolution in Yemen and the conditions facing Syrian refugees in 
Turkey. 

Abdullah Baabood is the Director of the Gulf Studies Program at Qatar University. 
He has a general interest in international relations and the international political 
economy, particularly in the subject area of regionalism and globalization. His 
specific academic interest focuses on the Gulf States’ economic, political, security 
and social development and their external relations. 

Philippe  Fargues  is  the  founding  Director  of  the  Migration  Policy  Centre. 
He  is  a  sociologist  and  demographer.  He  has  been  Director  of  the  Center  for 
Migration  and  Refugee  Studies  at  the  American  University  in  Cairo,  a  senior 
researcher at the French National Institute for Demographic Studies in Paris, a 
visiting professor at Harvard, and the Director of the Centre for Economic Legal 
and Social Studies (CEDEJ) in Cairo.

Steffen Hertog is Associate Professor in Comparative Politics in the Department 
of  Government  at  the  London  School  of  Economics  and  Political  Science. 
He joined the Government Department in 2010 as a lecturer. He was previously 
Kuwait  Professor  at  Sciences  Po  Paris,  a  lecturer  in  political  economy  at 
the  University  of  Durham,  and  a  post-doctoral  research  fellow  at  Princeton 
University. 

Martin  Lestra  is  a  PhD  candidate  at  the  Department  of  Social  and  Political 
Sciences,  European  University  Institute.  He  is  a  graduate  of  the  Grenoble 
Institute of Political Studies, the University of Kent, and the College of Europe, 
where  he  was  awarded  the  Lavoisier  Scholarship  (French  Ministry  of  Foreign 
and European Affairs).

68

The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and ChallengesToby Matthiesen is currently a Senior Research Fellow in International Relations 
of the Middle East at St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford. He was previously 
a research fellow at Pembroke College, Cambridge, and at the London School of 
Economics  and  Political  Science.  He  gained  his  doctorate  from  the  School  of 
Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in 2011. 

Luigi  Narbone  is  an  official  of  the  EEAS*  and  Director  of  the  Mediterranean 
Programme  at  the  Robert  Schuman  Centre  for  Advanced  Studies  of  the 
European  University  Institute.  He  has  almost  three  decades  of  experience 
in  international  affairs  at  the  UN  and  EC/EEAS.  He  has  been  posted  in 
various  capacities  to  New  York,  Brussels,  Sudan,  the  Russian  Federation, 
Chile,  Turkey  and  lately  as  Ambassador,  Head  of  the  EU  Delegation, 
to  Saudi  Arabia,  Kuwait,  Qatar,  Bahrain,  UAE  and  Oman  (2008-12). 
* The views express in this ebook a reflect the opinions of the author and not those 
of the EEAS

Olivier  Roy  is  a  Joint  Chair  at  the  RSCAS  and  the  Chair  in  Mediterranean 
Studies. He leads the ReligioWest programme at the EUI.  He is the author of 
“Globalized Islam” (Chicago University Press), 2004, and more recently of “The 
Holy Ignorance” (Seuil, 2008). He is presently working on “Islamic norms in the 
public sphere”, conversions, apostasy and comparative religion.

Dominique  Thomas  holds  a  degree  from  Sciences  Po  Paris  and  the  National 
Institute for Oriental Languages and Civilizations (INALCO). He is an Associate 
Researcher at the Institute for the Study of Islam and of Societies of the Muslim 
World, and at AKI Crisis Today for the Italian agency ADN Kronos International. 
He  specializes  in  issues  relating  to  radical  political  Islamism  in  the  United 
Kingdom and political opposition groups in the Middle East. 

Marc  Valeri  was  a  ‘Jean  Monnet’  Fellow  at  the  European  University  Institute 
of  Florence  in  2005-2006  and  then  ‘Marie  Curie’  Research  Fellow  at  the  IAIS 
between 2007 and 2009. In 2009-10, he held a position as Teaching Fellow in 
politics and constitutional law at the University of La Rochelle (France) and was 
concomitantly  Honorary  Research  Fellow  at  the  IAIS.  In  September  2010,  he 
took up his current position at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies at the 
University of Exeter.

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The Gulf Monarchies Beyond the Arab Spring. Changes and Challenges