Evaluation of the ECHO response to the Syrian crisis 2012-2014 : final report : June 2016.
Date: 2016-08-08
Institutions: Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO)
Subjects: Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Türkiye, aid evaluation, aid to refugees, data collection, development policy, emergency aid, financial aid, humanitarian aid

Evaluation of the ECHO 
response to the Syrian Crisis 
2012-2014 

Final Report 
June 2016 

This evaluation was commissioned by the Evaluation Sector of the 

Directorate General Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection – ECHO 

(European Commission) 

The opinions expressed in this document represent the authors’ point of view which are not 

necessarily shared by the European Commission or by the authorities of the concerned countries. 

This report has been prepared by ADE and URD. 

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Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2016 

ISBN: 978-92-79-53364-8 
DOI: 10.2795/59912 

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Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contract No ECHO/ADM/BUD/2014/01204 

This evaluation was commissioned by the Evaluation Sector of the 

Directorate General Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection – ECHO 

(European Commission) 

The opinions expressed in this document represent the authors’ point of view which are not 
necessarily shared by the European Commission or by the authorities of the concerned 
countries. 

Rue de Clairvaux 40, Bte 101 

B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium) 

Tel: +32 10 45 45 10 

Fax: +32 10 45 40 99 

E-mail: ade@ade.be 

Web: www.ade.be

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF ECHO’S RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
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Table of Contents 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

ACRONYM LIST 

ABSTRACT 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................ I 

RÉSUMÉ EXÉCUTIF ................................................................................................................. I 

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG .............................................................................................................. I 

1. 

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 1 

1.1  EVALUATION SUBJECT, PURPOSE AND SCOPE.......................................................................... 1 
1.2  THE FINAL REPORT ..................................................................................................................... 2 

2. 

EVALUATION CONTEXT ................................................................................................ 3 

2.1   REGIONAL CONTEXT: A WORSENING HUMANITARIAN CRISIS............................................... 3 
2.2   COUNTRY CONTEXTS .................................................................................................................. 5 
2.3   ECHO’S RESPONSE ................................................................................................................... 14 

3.  METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH ................................................................................... 21 

3.1  EVALUATION PHASES ................................................................................................................ 21 
3.2  EVALUATION QUESTIONS......................................................................................................... 22 
3.3   DATA COLLECTION ................................................................................................................... 23 
3.4   LIMITATION OF THE ANALYSIS ................................................................................................ 25 

4. 

ANSWERS TO EVALUATION QUESTIONS ...................................................................... 27 

EQ 1 – CONSISTENCY WITH THE 23 PRINCIPLES AND GHD ......................................................... 27 
EQS 2 TO 4 – ISSUES RELATED TO RELEVANCE AND TARGETING: CONSULTING LOCAL 
COMMUNITIES AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE NEEDS OF THE MOST VULNERABLE 
AND OF HOST POPULATIONS ............................................................................................................... 30 
EQS 5 – ADAPTING THE APPROACH TO SHIFTING NEEDS .............................................................. 39 
EQ 6 – EU ADDED VALUE .................................................................................................................. 44 
EQ 7 – URBAN SETTINGS .................................................................................................................... 47 
EQ 8 – PROTECTION ............................................................................................................................ 52 
EQ 9 – REMOTE MANAGEMENT ........................................................................................................ 59 
EQ 10 – USE OF CASH AND VOUCHERS ............................................................................................ 64 
EQ 11 – BUDGET ALLOCATION .......................................................................................................... 70 
EQ 12 – MONITORING SYSTEMS ........................................................................................................ 76 
EQ 13 – CONSORTIA AND MULTI-COUNTRY APPROACHES .......................................................... 80 
EQ 14 – COORDINATION .................................................................................................................... 84 
EQ 15 & 16 – LINKING RELIEF, REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT ................................... 87 
EQ 17 –SECURITY ................................................................................................................................. 92 
EQS 18 – ADVOCACY ........................................................................................................................... 95 

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5. 

CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................. 99 

6.   RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................. 111 

ANNEXES 

ANNEX I: TERMS OF REFERENCE ...................................................................................... 119 

ANNEX II:  EVALUATION INVENTORY ............................................................................. 139 

ANNEX III: 

COUNTRY REPORTS ................................................................................... 165 

ANNEX IV: 

BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................... 341 

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LIST OF TABLES 

Table 1 –   Country income levels and population data .............................................................5 
Table 2 –   Evaluation questions topics ..................................................................................... 22 
Table 3 –   Share of ECHO funded projects targeting vulnerable groups ........................... 32 
Table 4 –   Number of registered refugees per country as share of the total population ... 34 
Table 5 –   Estimate of the number of refugees compared to the local population in  

the Turkish border area ............................................................................................ 35 
Table 6 –   Share of ECHO-funded projects linked to host populations ............................. 38 
Table 7 –   Coverage of protection in ECHO Syria HIPs ...................................................... 54 
Table 8 –   Remote management risk mitigation measures ..................................................... 63 
Table 9 –   ECHO country allocations 2012-2014 per refugee/IDP received .................. 101 

LIST OF FIGURES 

Figure 1 –   Evaluation subject, purpose and scope: ....................................................................1 
Figure 2 –   Persons displaced by the Syrian conflict (millions) .................................................4 
Figure 3 –   Evolution of Syrian refugees in Iraq (Jan 2012 – 2015)..........................................7 
Figure 4 –   Evolution of Syrian refugees in Jordan (Jan 2012 – Jan 2015) ..............................9 
Figure 5 –   Evolution of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (Jan. 2012 - Jan. 2015) ..................... 12 
Figure 6 –   Registered Syrian refugees in Turkey (Dec. 2011- Dec. 2014)............................ 13 
Figure 7 –   Geographical distribution of ECHO funds 2012-2014 ....................................... 16 
Figure 8 –   Sector breakdown of ECHO-funded operations 2012-2014 .............................. 16 
Figure 9 –   Sector breakdown and partner distribution of ECHO-funded operations in 

Syria 2012-2014 .......................................................................................................... 17 

Figure 10 –  Sector breakdown and partner distribution of ECHO-funded operations in 

Lebanon 2012-2014 ................................................................................................... 17 

Figure 11 –  Sector breakdown and partner distribution of ECHO-funded operations in 

Jordan 2012-2014 ...................................................................................................... 18 

Figure 12 –  Sector breakdown and partner distribution of ECHO-funded operations in 

Turkey 2012-2014 ...................................................................................................... 18 

Figure 13 –  Sector breakdown and partner distribution of ECHO-funded operations in 

Iraq 2012-2014 ........................................................................................................... 19 
Figure 14 –  Evolution of ECHO-funded operations across the region 2012-2014 ............. 19 
Figure 15 –  Evaluation Phases ...................................................................................................... 21 
Figure 16 –  Data collection tools ................................................................................................. 23 
Figure 17 –  Evolution of refugees by country and of ECHO funding .................................. 41 
Figure 18 –  Sector breakdown of ECHO-funded operations 2012-2014 .............................. 57 
Figure 19 –  Global funding against people in need inside Syria .............................................. 71 

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Acronym list 

3RP 

Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 

ACAPS 

Assessment Capacities Project 

AFAD 

Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management Authority 

ALNAP 

Active Learning Network for Accountability and 
Performance 

AOG 

Armed Opposition Groups 

ATM 

Automated Teller Machine 

BPRM 

Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration 

COHAFA 

The Council working group on Humanitarian Aid and Food 
Aid 

DCI 

Development Cooperation Instrument 

DEVCO 

European Commission's Directorate-General for 
International Cooperation and Development  

DFID 

United Kingdom Department for International Development  

DG 

Directorate-General 

DGMM  Directorate General of Migration Management 

DRC 

The Danish Refugee Council 

EC 

European Commission 

ECHO 

The European Commission's Humanitarian aid and Civil 
Protection department 

EEAS 

European External Action Service 

ENI 

European Neighbourhood Instrument 

ENPI 

European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 

EQ 

Evaluation Question 

ETF 

European Training Foundation 

EU 

European Union  

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EUD 

European Union Delegation 

EUMS 

European Union Member State 

FAFA 

Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement 

FPA 

FTS 

Framework Partnership Agreement 

UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service 

GAM 

Global Acute Malnutrition  

GBV 

Gender-Based Violence 

GDP 

Gross Domestic Product 

GHD 

Good Humanitarian Donorship 

GNI 

Gross National Income 

HA 

Humanitarian Aid 

HCR 

High Commissioner for Refugees 

HCT 

Humanitarian Country Team 

HH 

HIP 

HouseHold 

Humanitarian Implementation Plan 

HOPE 

Humanitarian Office Programme Environment 

HQ 

IAF 

Headquarters 

Integrated Analysis Framework 

IASC 

Interagencies Standing Committee 

ICRC 

International Committee of the Red Cross 

IcSP 

Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace 

IDP 

IHL 

Internally Displaced Persons  

International Humanitarian Law 

INGO 

International Non-Governmental Organisation 

INSO 

International NGO Safety Organisation 

IPA 

Instrument of Pre-Accession 

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IRC 

International Rescue Committee 

JC 

Judgement Criteria 

JHDF 

Joint Humanitarian Development Framework 

KRG 

Kurdish Regional Government of Iraq 

KRI 

Kurdistan Region of Iraq 

LRRD 

Linking relief and Resilience and Development 

MIC 

Middle-Income Country 

MPCT 

Multi-Purpose Cash Transfer 

MTR 

Mid-Term Review 

NEAR 

Directorate-General of Neighbourhood and Enlargement 
Negotiations 

NFI 

Non-Food Items 

NGO 

Non-Governmental Organisation 

NRC 

Norwegian Refugee Council 

OCHA 

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid 

ODI 

Overseas Development Institute 

OECD 

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 

RCM 

Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement 

RM 

Remote Management 

SAM 

Severe Acute Malnutrition 

SGBV 

Sexual or Gender Based Violence 

SNAP 

Syria Needs Analysis Project 

SOP 

Standard Operating Procedure 

SSCL 

Safety Security Committee Lebanon 

TA 

Technical Assistance 

TOR 

Terms of Reference 

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TPID 

Temporary Protection Identification Document 

UN 

United Nations 

UNDP 

UN Development Programme 

UNHCR  UN High Committee for Refugees 

UNICEF  United Nations Children Fund 

US 

United States of America 

USAID 

United States Agency for International Development 

VASyR 

Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon 

WASH  Water Sanitation Health  

WFP 

UN World Food Programme 

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Abstract 

This report provides an overall independent evaluation of ECHO’s response to the Syrian 
crisis over the period of 2012-2014, covering Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey. The 
evaluation  draws  on  a  range  of  different  sources  of  evidence  including  project  data, 
interviews, field trips and a literature review. 

The evaluation concludes that ECHO was successful in translating a substantial allocation 
of funds into improved living conditions for refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
and other affected populations inside Syria through a rapid response across five countries, 
in both camp and non-camp settings. Detailed conclusions are made concerning the speed 
and coverage of ECHO’s funding; the adaptability of its response to the unique features of 
this  crisis;  the  contribution  that  ECHO  made  to  coordination,  advocacy  and  the  link 
between relief, rehabilitation and development; and on dealing with the protracted nature 
of the crisis. 

A set of five strategic recommendations are made for the future response of ECHO to the 
crisis  in  Syria,  concerning  the  provision  of  funding  allocations  in  the  medium-term;  the 
further  adaptation  of  the  response  to  the  specific  context;  the  conduct  of  coordination 
activities; dialogue with national authorities; and the building of greater synergies with EU 
instruments.   
Delegations 

funding 

and 

EC 

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Executive Summary 

The evaluation subject and objectives 

This evaluation provides an overall independent assessment of the ECHO response to the 
Syrian crisis in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey for the period 2012-2014. It covers 
ECHO-funded  operations  in  these  five  countries  and  answers  a  set  of  18  evaluation 
question defined by the European Commission, which serve as a basis to reaching useful 
conclusions  and  recommendations.  The  evaluation  is  geared  to  a  wide  range  of 
stakeholders,  including  ECHO  Headquarters  (HQ)  and  country  level  staff,  national  and 
regional  stakeholders,  participating  implementing  partners,  and  other  humanitarian  and 
development donors and agencies. It has both a retrospective and prospective dimension, 
aiming  at  assessing  past  support,  but  also  at  providing  recommendations  with  a  view  to 
improving the performance of ECHO operations in the future.  

Methodology 

The  evaluation  used  a  three-phase  approach  including  inception,  data  collection  and 
synthesis  phases.  The  analysis  was  structured  around  five  country  case  studies,  one  for 
Syria,  and  one  for  each  of  the  border  countries  covered.  At  the  end  of  each  phase,  the 
related deliverable was reviewed and approved by the evaluation steering group.  

The  data  collection  phase  included  both  desk  and  field  work  covering  the  18  evaluation 
questions defined in the evaluation terms of reference. The team conducted visits to each 
of  the  countries  covered,  except  in  Syria,  for  which  field  work  was  covered  through 
extensive  interviews  in  Amman  on  the  ECHO  support  provided  in  Syria  and  telephone 
interviews  with  ECHO  partners  operating  inside  Syria  both  in  Damascus  and  areas 
controlled  by  armed  opposition  groups.  Overall  the  team  interviewed  122  stakeholders 
(face-to-face  and  over 
including  representatives  from  European 
Commission  (EC)  headquarters,  ECHO  field  offices,  EU  Delegations,  Members  State 
representatives, UN Agencies, national and local authorities, international and local NGOs, 
and  beneficiaries.  This  included  also  on-site  visits.  The  team  reviewed  287  documents, 
including  policy  and  strategy  documents,  evaluations  and  or  studies,  and  a  more  general 
literature  review.    The  country  level  information  is  gathered  in  country  notes  that  are 
annexed to this report.  

telephone), 

the 

The  team  compiled  and  triangulated  data  during  the  synthesis  phase,  so  as  to  provide 
consolidated answers to the evaluations questions. Information gaps were completed using 
additional telephone interviews with ECHO partner offices in the region. The consolidated 
cross-checked 
the  conclusions  and 
recommendations, which are presented in this summary.  

findings  served  as  a  basis 

formulate 

to 

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Conclusions 

Overall statement on ECHO’s response 

ECHO  allocated  significant  funds  in  response  to  the  Syrian  crisis.  It  contributed  to  the 
improvement  of  living  conditions  for  refugees,  internally  displaced  persons  (IDPs)  and 
other  affected  populations  inside  Syria  through  a  rapid  response  across  five  countries,  in 
both  camp  and  non-camp  settings.  ECHO  also  made  important  contributions  to  the 
setting-up  of  the  infrastructure  required  for  a  large  scale  humanitarian  response  during 
2012  and  2013.  This  included  building  partner  capacity  and  presence  in  the  region, 
developing  needs  assessment  approaches  and  information  tools  and  systems,  and 
establishing coordination mechanisms at a regional level. 

Among the donors, ECHO was one with a very strong regional presence. This enabled it 
to  provide  its  partners  with  close  support  and  advice  on  the  basis  of  a  well-informed 
understanding  of  the  operational  context  in  which  they  worked.  ECHO  also  showed 
significant  adaptability  to  the  specific  and  evolving  context  inside  Syria  and  its 
neighbouring countries. 

Moving beyond the initial phases of the crisis will require significant attention in order to 
adapt to its protracted nature. Overlapping priorities emerge in this context, including the 
need  for  continued  emergency  response  for  those  directly  affected  by  the  conflict  and 
longer-term  needs  of  displaced  and  host  populations  alike.  ECHO  will  need  to  continue 
adapting its response to meet this evolving context, as well as ensuring good coordination 
with those actors best able to respond to longer-term needs. 

On speed and coverage of the funding 

In  the  first  phase  of  the  crisis  between  2012  and  end  of  2013,  ECHO  made  a 
considerable  and  important  investment  in  the  rapid  scale-up  of  humanitarian  aid 
operations in Syria and its neighbouring countries, which contributed to improved 
living conditions for affected populations.   

In 2012, in response to the outbreak of the crisis, ECHO immediately increased its funding 
to €156m. This was raised again to €357m in 2013; an increase of 129%. This rapid scale-
up of funding allowed ECHO to contribute to the crisis response on two fronts. Firstly, it 
provided a cross-sectoral and multi-country response both in camp and non-camp settings. 
This assistance was found to be well targeted to the right beneficiaries and in line with the 
priority needs in the region, taking into account the contributions of other actors. 

important  contributions  to  the  setting-up  of 

large-scale 
Secondly,  ECHO  made 
humanitarian aid operations in countries where humanitarian capacities and expertise were 
either not present or not adequate to address the rapidly growing crisis. This phase of the 
crisis involved the opening up of country offices for several ECHO partners, the expansion 
of UN and NGO teams, the setting up of needs assessment approaches and information 
tools  and  systems,  the  definition  of  programmes  and  strategies,  and  the  development  of 

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coordination  mechanisms.  These  processes  has  a  considerable  positive  influence  on  the 
early stages of the crisis. 

Over  the  full  evaluation  period  of  2012-2014,  ECHO  was  the  fourth  largest 
international donor to the Syrian crisis. But the scale and geographical scope of the 
crisis challenged ECHO’s ability to provide a transparently needs-based response. 

Over  2012-2014,  ECHO  was  the  fourth  largest  international  donor  to  the  Syrian  crisis, 
contributing  8%  of  the  total  humanitarian  contribution  over  this  period.  Its  funding 
allocations  per  country  varied  considerably  however,  from  €18  per  refugee  in  Turkey  to 
€237  in  Jordan,  without  clear  link  to  the  humanitarian  needs.  Country  allocations  per 
refugee  are  inevitably  impacted  by  many  factors,  including  the  cost  of  delivery  in  each 
country,  the  varying  degrees  of  engagement  of  host  countries  and  presence  of  other 
donors. This is of particular importance in the case of Turkey, where the government did 
not press international donors to intervene until 2015. Nevertheless, the link between these 
determining factors and the size of ECHO’s response was not always clear. 

The global response has not kept pace with the escalating humanitarian needs. UN appeals 
remained under-funded, forcing, inter alia, the World Food Programme (WFP) to suspend 
a  food  vouchers  programme  serving  1.7  million  Syrian  refugees  in  December  2014. 
Likewise, inside Syria, the number of people in need has grown at six times the rate of the 
global international humanitarian response from 2011 to January 2015. 

ECHO’s funding levels fluctuated significantly over the period 2012-2014 without a 
clear  link  to  changing  humanitarian  needs.  The  lack  of  predictability  hampered 
programming and implementation. 

ECHO’s funding allocations fluctuated over time, with the global amount (€163m) falling 
back in 2014 to a level similar to the one of 2012, representing a decrease of about 50%. 
This applied to all the countries individually (with decreases always above 50%), except for 
Turkey, where there was a slight increase.  

Although  in  some  cases  the  evaluation could  link  the  evolution  of  funding allocations  to 
the  evolution  of  needs,  globally  the  linkage  to  needs  were  not  clear.  ECHO  conducted 
annual analyses of needs using the Integrated Analysis Framework (IAF) but this did not 
include an estimate of the level of resources required and there was no clear methodology 
to link IAF findings to the final budget level. Nor is the budget directly linked to the UN 
appeals process and response plans. Accordingly, some evolutions are difficult to explain, 
such as the budget contraction in 2014, in a context of continuing rises in refugee numbers.  

ECHO did seek to mitigate the impact of these fluctuations on its programming partners. 
Firstly,  by  using  contributions  in  2013  to  cover  the  first  quarter  of  their  partners’ 
operations  in  2014  (and,  in  some  cases,  the  entire  first  semester).  And  secondly,  by 
privileging support to international NGOs (INGOs) in 2014 to ensure that, where possible, 
their assistance  was not disrupted  (as opposed  to  UN agencies which have stronger cash 
flows). 

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Whilst the overall perspective has been to increase ECHO funds to the region since 2012, 
the  fluctuations  between  annual  allocations  have  been  criticised  both  by  ECHO 
representatives  and  partners,  who  underlined  the  difficulty  of  dealing  with  the  lack  of 
predictability  of  the  funding.  In  neighbouring  countries  in  particular,  the  reductions 
between 2013 and 2014 forced ECHO to focus on only the most direct emergency needs, 
and to significantly cut the number of supported partners. This made it harder for partners 
to address the resilience of refugee households in the context of an increasingly protracted 
crisis. 

On adapting the response to unique features of the crisis  

The  Syrian  crisis  presents  the  international  humanitarian  community  with  a  unique 
combination of challenges and opportunities, stemming from a variety of factors: security 
risks; urban settings; an unprecedented scale; and the fact that the crisis concerns middle-
income  countries,  with  notably  a  different  type  of  host  government  interaction.  ECHO 
sought to tailor its response to these specificities.  

ECHO  was  innovative  in  supporting  the  large  scale  use  of  unconditional  cash 
transfers  to meet refugee  needs  in the largely  urbanised, middle-income countries 
bordering Syria. 

ECHO supported the provision of unconditional cash transfers to meet the basic needs of 
refugees  arriving  in  some  of  Syria’s  neighbouring  countries.  The  use  of  this  modality 
proved an efficient and effective way to deliver aid in the largely urbanised, middle-income 
countries bordering Syria, where the financial systems and electronic transfer mechanisms 
are  well  developed,  and  the  markets  can  supply  many  of  the  diverse  goods  and  services 
required. Despite strong ECHO attempts to unify the delivery of a single cash transfer to 
refugees,  parallel  systems  persisted  in  several  countries  –  with  UNHCR  providing 
unconditional cash transfers alongside WFP food vouchers. Nevertheless it was and is clear 
that  not  all  needs  could be  met  through  cash  transfers.  Consequently,  projects  to  deliver 
complementary goods and services, rightly remained in place.   

ECHO’s  support  for  remote  management  operations  inside  Syria  enabled  it  to 
reach  people  in  need  inside  areas  controlled  by  armed  opposition  groups  whilst 
mitigating the associated risks. 

ECHO helped to build the capacity of several partners to conduct operations through local 
partners  inside  areas  of  Syria  controlled  by  armed  opposition  groups  (AOGs).  By 
developing and sharing guidelines on remote  management, as well as conducting training 
workshops and amending monitoring requirements, ECHO was able to support operations 
inside  AOG-controlled  areas  whilst  mitigating  the  associated  risks.  This  in  turn  allowed 
ECHO  to  maintain  its  independence  by  ensuring  delivery  of  humanitarian  aid  in  both 
AOG- and government-held regions of Syria. 

The humanitarian community is still learning how to adapt to urban crises, and the 
degree of adaptation to urban contexts varied considerably between ECHO-funded 
operations. The absence of a visible urban strategy looks to have hampered efforts 

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to ensure common standards are met across the portfolio or to capitalise on lessons 
learned from previous programmes. 

In  2016,  the  humanitarian  community  as  a  whole  is  still  at  the  steep-end  of  the  learning 
curve regarding urban response. In this context, it is perhaps not surprising that ECHO did 
not have a clearly developed strategy or set of funding guidelines for urban response during 
the  evaluation  period.  Nevertheless,  the  absence  of  a  strategic  approach  looks  to  have 
hampered efforts to ensure common standards are met across the portfolio or to capitalise 
on lessons learned from previous programmes. 

Whilst some ECHO partners did provide examples of innovative responses to the specific 
challenges facing displaced populations and host communities in urban settings, the degree 
of adaptation to the urban nature of the crisis varied considerably between ECHO-funded 
projects.  Particular  problems  were  observed  regarding  the  engagement  of  municipal 
authorities  in  design  and  implementation  –  a  critical  area  of  best  practice  emerging  from 
the literature on urban response. 

ECHO’s use of multi-country contracts facilitated the rapid scale-up of contracts in 
the  early  phase  response,  but  hampered  timely  implementation  of  ECHO-funded 
operations from 2014 onwards. 

ECHO introduced multi-country contracts during the rapid  scale-up of contract volumes 
in 2013. This reduced the administrative burden on ECHO desk staff and arguably sped up 
the contracting at a time when significant effort was required to scale-up the capacity for 
humanitarian action in the region. But as time went on, the use of multi-country contracts 
hampered  timely  implementation  of  ECHO-funded  operations,  creating  unnecessary 
transaction  costs  and  unwieldy  administrative  procedures.  In  addition,  no  real  synergies 
were possible between country sub-components, which were by necessity implemented as 
separate  contracts  forced  into  one  administrative  dossier.  The  divergence  in  contexts 
between  countries  in  the  region  meant  that  it  was  impractical  for  partners  to  implement 
single  contracts  across  four  or  five  different  countries.  Moreover,  the  combination  of 
multi-country contracts and single-country desks within ECHO complicated the chains of 
command  and  increased  ECHO  response  times  for  contract  signature  and  modification 
requests.  It  further  created  a  problem  of  accountability,  with  the  signatory  being  held 
accountable  for  operations  across  the  whole  region  whilst  only  actually  following 
operations in one country. For these reasons, ECHO understandably reverted to country-
specific contracts for 2015-2016. 

ECHO engaged with authorities in host countries, but was in a difficult position to 
deal with these authorities, which hampered its capacity to build a partnership with 
them to enhance the response to the crisis.   

There  are  several  examples  of  ECHO  and  its  partners  engaging  (for  instance  through 
advocacy) with authorities of partner countries and local structures with a view to facilitate 
the provision and coordination of support; to provide support to host populations; and to 
help host countries to provide support to refugees.  

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In some cases this engagement led to the expected results; in others not. Overall, several 
difficulties  hampered  ECHO’s  capacity  to  build  a  partnership  with  the  authorities  of  the 
hosting countries:  
  The host countries are all middle income countries, some of which with a solid capacity 
to  deal  themselves  with  refugees,  and  with  sometimes  specific  policies  (like  the 
necessity  to  direct  a  share  of  the  support  to  vulnerable  host  populations,  even  when 
there was no evidence that they were the most in need) that were difficult to deal with; 
  The burden on the host countries was enormous, with very high levels of refugees to 
host, and with political repercussions on the willingness of host governments to host 
refugees. 

This led to missed  opportunities in terms of  synergies between ECHO and Government 
support,  and  in  terms  of  ECHO’s  capacity  to  influence  host  Governments  who  are  key 
providers of assistance. 

On coordination, advocacy and linking relief, rehabilitation and development 

ECHO  invested  significant  resources  in  high-level,  regional  coordination,  the 
success  of  which  was  hampered  by  external  factors.  The  decision  to  redirect 
resources towards more achievable targets was made too late. ECHO did however 
have  greater  success  in  supporting  technical  level  coordination,  through  working 
groups and project-level information sharing. 

  Strategy-level  coordination  was  hampered  by  the  ambiguity  between  UNHCR’s  and 
OCHA’s mandates in a Level 3 crisis that includes an intertwined set of refugee, IDP 
and  host  community  populations.  In  some  instances  this  led  to  complicated 
coordination structures and loss of potentially useful information-share. ECHO rightly 
identified this as a problem and sought to tackle it through advocacy towards the UN 
agencies  in  Amman  and  other  countries.  But  ultimately,  the  inter-agency  tensions 
remained, and UNHCR’s success in leading coordination efforts has remained uneven 
across the countries affected. 

  Moreover, ECHO’s efforts to encourage a coordinated regional response plan further 
complicated  the  task  of  improving  inter-agency  coordination.  The  time  and  resource 
investments in this endeavour were high, and the return limited.  

  Coordination between host governments and international humanitarian agencies was 
more  problematic. In Turkey, notably, coordination between  NGOs and the  national 
and local governments was weak. This hampered coordination of the response for non-
camp  refugees  and  limited  the  potential  for  developing  medium  and  long  term 
response  plans.  ECHO  had 
improving  NGO-government 
coordination, and appears to have had little traction in the coordination processes that 
exist between the government and UN agencies. 

impact  on 

limited 

  At  the  technical  level,  ECHO  contributed  to  coordination  platforms  and  working 
groups in the neighbouring countries and at the regional level, which helped partners to 
increase project-level coordination.  

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ECHO was recognized as a significant player in advocacy at a range of levels. But 
results  were  mixed,  with  notable  difficulties  regarding  advocacy  towards  host 
governments. 

ECHO  dedicated  substantial  efforts  to  advocacy  initiatives  at  different  levels  of  the 
organization  (including  the  Commissioner  level),  on  a  wide  variety  of  subjects  (access, 
support  to  under-served  areas,  etc.),  and  targeting  different  audiences  (UN,  host 
governments,  etc.).  Stakeholders  appreciated  this  role  and  ECHO  had  successes  in  this 
respect, but there were also examples of a less constructive dialogue between ECHO and 
host  country  governments,  for  instance  on  policy  stances  such  as  the  exclusion  of 
livelihood activities and inclusion of host community support in Jordan.  

ECHO, EEAS and NEAR sought to build a strategic burden-share to tackle a crisis 
that  simultaneously  presents  short-  and  long-term  needs.  But  results  at  the 
operational level remain uneven, and the higher level obstacles to tackling refugee 
livelihoods remain. 

The  Syrian  crisis  evolved  from  a  short-term  displacement  crisis  into  a  protracted  one.  It 
now  presents  humanitarian  donors  with  a  broad  spectrum  of  challenges,  including  both 
short-term and long-term needs simultaneously. 

ECHO and the other EU institutions sought to build the framework for a strategic burden-
share  in  the  response:  inter-service  meetings  aimed  to  establish  the  boundaries  and 
objectives of the  different EU  funding instruments at play  in  the region; ECHO and the 
Delegations  established  Joint  Humanitarian  and  Development  Frameworks  (JHDFs):  the 
MADAD  Trust  Fund  was  created  to  allow  European  Commission  and  Member  State 
contributions  to  be  channelled  together  to  tackle  the  intersection  between  humanitarian 
and development needs. 

But  the  fruits  of  these  strategic  efforts  have  not  had  sufficient  time  to  be  seen  at  the 
operational  level.  Whilst  some  instances  of  coordination  and  burden-sharing  between 
financing mechanisms were observed, notably in Turkey, in other cases they were lacking.  

On dealing with the protracted nature of the crisis 

ECHO  has  not  yet  adapted  a  strategy  level  focus  on  the  protracted  nature  of  the 
crisis, despite some progress in this respect. 
In 2016, the Syrian crisis entered its sixth year. The UN-backed political negotiations have 
yielded  a  cessation  of  violence,  but  the  future  of  the  conflict  remains  very  difficult  to 
predict.  The  response  should  therefore  be  equipped  to  handle  the  specific  needs  of  a 
protracted refugee crisis, as well as the challenge of providing assistance inside Syria as and 
when  possible.  This  situation  creates  needs  on  multiple  fronts:  i)  tackling  the  ongoing 
emergency needs of directly affected populations; ii) building their long-term resilience and 
self-help capacity; iii) ensuring that host communities receive enough support to handle the 
long-term  pressures  on  them.  As  a  result,  clarity  on  the  burden-share  between  ECHO, 
other EU institutions, Member States and other actors is vital. 

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ECHO  made  some  progress  towards  this  goal  over  the  period  2012-2014,  for  instance 
through the attention paid to the interplay between humanitarian funds and development 
resources.  The  Joint  Humanitarian  Development  Frameworks,  established  at  a  country-
level,  have  the  potential  to  help  clarify  the  burden-share  between  ECHO  and  other  EU 
institutions,  but  over  the  period  2012-2014,  this  process  remained  in  its  infancy.  ECHO 
worked also closely with other funding EU instruments to build a more integrated response 
to the crisis (for instance through the Instrument for Pre Accession in Turkey).   

But weaknesses remained in this area, notably regarding the engagement of local authorities 
and host governments to allow refugees the right to work (ECHO and the EU Delegations 
have  had  limited  impact  on  the  policies  of  host  governments  with  respect  to  refugee 
livelihoods); the predictability of ECHO funding levels for the Syrian crisis (cf. above); and 
the  ability  to  support  the  resilience  of  populations  inside  AOG-controlled  areas  of  Syria 
(the restriction of support to directly life-saving assistance for instance has been questioned 
by many partners).  

Recommendations 

The evaluation makes a total of 5 recommendations for the future response of ECHO to 
the Syrian crisis. Each of the recommendations are directed towards DG ECHO, although 
several  require  interaction  with  third  parties  to  work  together  in  order  to  improve  the 
overall response. 

DG  ECHO  should  provide,  and/or  advocate  for  the  provision  of,  adequate  and 
predictable resources to respond to the humanitarian needs of those affected by the 
Syrian crisis (R.1). 

The  contributions  of  ECHO  and  other  humanitarian  donors  have  decreased  sharply  in 
2014 and 2015, whilst at the same time the number of refugees has risen sharply. This has 
led  to  significant  underfunding  of  UN  appeals  and  cuts  in  assistance  to  affected 
populations.  There  have  been  calls  for  a  significant  revision  of  the  international  aid 
architecture  in  the  Syria  regional  response,  in  order  to  address  a  future  in  which  refugee 
populations  are  expected  to  stay  high  for  the  medium  term.  In  this  context,  it  is 
recommended  that  ECHO  considers  the  following  actions  to  facilitate  adequate 
humanitarian funding in the Syria crisis: 

a)  Allocate  humanitarian  funding  in  proportion  to  needs  that  have  been  visibly 
identified  by  ECHO  through  a  transparent  triangulation  of  available  needs 
assessments including, but not limited to, the UN-led Strategic Response Plan. 

b)  Actively seek additional voluntary contributions from EU member states to ensure 
that adequate  funding for Syria  does not adversely  affect ECHO’s ability to meet 
needs in other humanitarian crises.  

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c)  Make  the  best  use  of  limited  resources,  ECHO  should  explore  options  for 
achieving cost efficiency savings through the provision of more predictable funding 
to core response agencies.  

d)  Continue to work with other EC funding instruments to identify opportunities for 
complementary development financing of interventions to reduce the pressure on 
humanitarian resources – without compromising humanitarian principles.  

Further  adapt  the  ECHO  programme  to  respond  to  the  specific  context  of  the 
Syrian crisis (R.2). 

  Given  the  protracted  nature  of  the  conflict,  ECHO  should  consider  relaxing  the 
current  limitation  in  the  remote  management  guidelines  to  limit  interventions  to  life-
saving  activities.  ECHO  partners  have  now  established  close  connections  with  local 
partners who have demonstrated their capacity to provide principled humanitarian aid 
in  inside  Syria.  ECHO  should  consider  funding  livelihood  support  projects  through 
remote management protocols where suitably justified (R2.1). 

  Given the huge protection needs associate with the Syria crisis, and the importance of 
ECHO  in  supporting  this  sector,  it  is  recommended  that  ECHO  should  further 
prioritize the funding of protection related activities. This should include dialogue and 
capacity  building  with  implementing  partners  to  ensure  protection  support  can  be 
delivered in a timely fashion. (R2.2). 
In a context of continuing violence and instability inside Syria further refugee outflows 
may  be  anticipated.  ECHO  should  put  in  place  a  strong  and  flexible  capacity  to 
respond to the needs of new refugee caseloads (R2.3). 

 

  ECHO should further promote the use of coordinated unconditional cash transfers to 
meet basic needs at scale. ECHO supported unconditional cash transfers in Lebanon 
and  Jordan  that  covered  a  range  of  refugee  needs  in  neighboring  countries.  Multi-
purpose cash transfers proved both efficient and effective in meeting a basket of basic 
needs  in  the  context  of  highly  urbanized  host  countries  with  functional  markets  and 
banking systems. (R2.4) 

Focus on country level coordination and contracting arrangements, augmented by 
carefully prioritized elements of regional coordination (R.3). 

The value of the regional coordination structures has been limited and regional contracting 
inefficient.  It  is  therefore  recommended  that  ECHO  reduces  funding  of  regional 
coordination  activities  and  focuses  on  coordination  between  various  cross-border 
operation and operations inside Syria; considers investing in strengthening the capacity of 
UNHCR to discharge it responsibility for country level humanitarian coordination through 
an  Emergency  Response  Capacity  grant  at  the  central  level;  phases  out  multi-country 
contract and replaces them with single-country contracts.  
Increase  direct  dialogue  with  the  national  authorities  in  the  countries  hosting 
refugees (R.4). 

It  is  recommended  that  ECHO  systematically  seeks  to  strengthen  its  relationships  with 
host governments in the region through regular liaison meetings with national counterparts 

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during the missions of ECHO civil servants, supplemented by periodic meetings with Field 
Experts.  These  meetings  should  notably  be  used  to  discuss  related  to  advocacy  for 
humanitarian  space,  improved  coordination  between  ECHO  partners  and  Government, 
the needs based approach etc.  

Build  greater  synergies  with  EU  Delegations  and  other  EC  funding  instruments 
(R.5). 

ECHO  has  made  progress  in  building  links  to  other  funding  streams,  especially  at  the 
Brussels  level.  With  a  view  to  favour  a  closer  integration,  it  is  recommended  to:  i) 
strengthen  the  participation  of  ECHO  in  joint  planning  processes  with  the  EU 
Delegations; ii) Build on best practices of integrated programming; build towards potential 
exit strategies for ECHO.  

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Résumé exécutif 

Sujet et objectifs de l’évaluation 

Le présent document fournit une évaluation indépendante générale de la réponse d’ECHO 
à la crise syrienne en Syrie, au Liban, en Jordanie, en Irak et en Turquie durant la période 
2012-2014. Il couvre les opérations financées par ECHO dans ces cinq pays et répond à 18 
questions d’évaluation définies par la Commission européenne ; lesquelles servent de base 
pour  établir  des  conclusions  et  des  recommandations.  L’évaluation  repose  sur  un  large 
éventail de parties prenantes, comprenant le personnel d’ECHO au siège et au niveau des 
pays, les parties prenantes nationales et régionales, les partenaires opérationnels et d’autres 
bailleurs  de  fonds  et  organismes  humanitaires  et  de  coopération  au  développement.  Ce 
rapport  a  une  dimension  à  la  fois  rétrospective  et  prospective.  Il  vise  à  apprécier  l’appui 
apporté, mais aussi à faire des recommandations en vue d’améliorer les performances des 
opérations d’ECHO à l’avenir.  

Méthodologie 

L’évaluation a suivi une approche en trois phases : le lancement, la collecte de données et la 
synthèse.  L’analyse  est  structurée  autour  de  cinq  études  de  cas  pour  la  Syrie  et  une  pour 
chacun  des  pays  frontaliers  couverts.  À  la  fin  de  chaque  phase,  tous  les  livrables  ont  été 
examinés et approuvés par le comité de pilotage de l’évaluation.  

La  phase  de  collecte  de  données  comprend  le  travail  de  recherche  documentaire  et  de 
terrain  portant  sur  les  18  questions  d’évaluation  définies  dans  le  cahier  des  charges. 
L’équipe s’est rendue dans chacun des pays visés, sauf en Syrie, pays pour lequel la mission 
de  terrain  a  été  réalisée  au  travers  d’entretiens  approfondis  à  Amman  sur  l’appui  apporté 
par ECHO et d’entretiens téléphoniques avec les partenaires d’ECHO en Syrie, à Damas et 
dans les zones contrôlées par les groupes d’opposants armés. Au total, l’équipe a interrogé 
122  parties  prenantes  (en  face  à  face  et  par  téléphone) :  des  représentants  du  siège  de  la 
Commission européenne (CE), des bureaux de terrain d’ECHO et des délégations de l’UE, 
des  représentants  des  États  membres,  des  agences  de  l’ONU,  des  autorités  nationales  et 
locales,  des  ONG  locales  et  internationales  et  des  bénéficiaires.  Ce  chiffre  comprend 
également  des  visites  sur  place.  L’équipe  a  examiné  287  documents :  des  documents 
d’orientation et de stratégie, des évaluations et des études, ainsi qu’un examen général de la 
littérature.  Les  informations  au  niveau  des  pays  sont  rassemblées  dans  les  notes  de  pays 
figurant en annexe du présent rapport.  

L’équipe a compilé et triangulé les données pendant la phase de synthèse, afin d’apporter 
des  réponses  consolidées  aux  questions  d’évaluations.  Des  entretiens  téléphoniques 
supplémentaires avec les bureaux partenaires d’ECHO dans la région ont permis de pallier 
les informations manquantes. Les résultats consolidés et recoupés ont servi de base  pour 
formuler les conclusions et les recommandations présentées dans le présent résumé.  

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Conclusions 

Appréciation globale de la réponse d’ECHO 

ECHO a alloué des fonds importants en réponse à la crise syrienne. Son action a contribué 
à l’amélioration des conditions de vie des réfugiés, des personnes déplacées à l’intérieur de 
leur propre pays et d’autres populations à l’intérieur de la Syrie grâce à une réponse rapide 
dans cinq pays, dans et hors des camps de réfugiés. ECHO a également contribué de façon 
importante  à  la  mise  en  place  des  infrastructures  nécessaires  pour  une  intervention 
humanitaire à grande échelle en 2012 et 2013. Ceci englobe le renforcement des capacités et 
de la présence des partenaires dans la région ; le développement d’approches d’évaluation 
des  besoins  et  d’outils  et  systèmes  d’information ;  et  la  mise  en  place  de  mécanismes  de 
coordination au niveau régional. 

Parmi  les  bailleurs,  ECHO  avait  une  très  forte  présence  régionale.  Ceci  lui  a  permis  de 
fournir à ses partenaires un appui et des conseils fondés sur une bonne compréhension du 
contexte  opérationnel  dans  lequel  ils  ont  travaillé.  ECHO  a  également  montré  une 
importante capacité d’adaptation au contexte spécifique et en évolution en Syrie et dans les 
pays voisins. 

Au regard du caractère prolongé de la crise, beaucoup d’attention sera nécessaire pour en 
dépasser  les  premières  phases.  Dans  ce  contexte,  différentes  priorités  se  chevauchant 
émergent,  notamment  le  besoin  continu  d’intervention  d’urgence  pour  les  personnes 
directement touchées par le conflit et les besoins à plus long terme des personnes déplacées 
et  des  populations  qui  les  accueillent. ECHO  devra  continuer  à adapter  sa réponse    à  ce 
contexte changeant, en plus d’assurer une bonne coordination avec les acteurs les mieux à 
même de répondre aux besoins de long terme. 

Vitesse et couverture du financement 

Durant la  première  phase de la crise, entre 2012  et fin 2013,  ECHO a  consenti un 
investissement  considérable  et 
l’intensification  rapide  des 
opérations  d’aide  humanitaire  en  Syrie  et  dans  les  pays  voisins,  qui  a  contribué  à 
l’amélioration des conditions de vie des populations touchées.  

important  dans 

En  2012,  en  réponse  à  l’éclatement  de  la  crise,  ECHO  a  immédiatement  augmenté  son 
financement à hauteur de 156 millions d’euros. Celui-ci a ensuite été porté à 357 millions 
d’euros en  2013, soit une hausse  de 129 %. Cette intensification rapide du financement a 
permis à ECHO de contribuer à la réponse à la crise sur deux fronts. Tout d’abord, ECHO 
a  fourni  une  réponse  intersectorielle  et  multi-pays,  dans  et  hors  des  camps.  Cette  aide  a 
ciblé les bons bénéficiaires et a été conforme aux besoins prioritaires dans la région, tout en 
tenant compte de l’apport des autres acteurs. 

Deuxièmement, ECHO a contribué de manière significative à la mise en place d’opérations 
d’aide humanitaire à grande échelle dans les pays où les capacités humanitaires et l’expertise 
étaient absentes ou insuffisantes pour répondre au développement rapide de la crise. Cette 

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phase de la crise a vu l’ouverture de bureaux nationaux pour plusieurs partenaires d’ECHO, 
l’élargissement  des  équipes  de  l’ONU  et  des  ONG,  la  mise  en  place  d’approches 
d’évaluation  des  besoins  et  de  systèmes  et  outils  d’information,  la  définition  de 
programmes  et  de  stratégies  et  le  développement  de  mécanismes  de  coordination.  Ces 
processus ont eu une influence positive considérable lors des premiers stades de la crise. 

Durant  l’ensemble  de  la  période  d’évaluation,  de  2012  à  2014,  ECHO  a  été  le 
quatrième plus important bailleur international dans la crise syrienne. Mais à cause 
de  l’ampleur  et  de  la  portée  géographique  de  la  crise,  ECHO  a  éprouvé  des 
difficultés à fournir une réaction transparente fondée sur les besoins. 

Entre  2012  et  2014,  ECHO  a  été  le  quatrième  plus  grand  bailleur  dans  la  crise  syrienne, 
contribuant à 8 % de l’aide humanitaire totale au cours de cette période. Ses affectations de 
fonds par pays ont varié considérablement, de 18 € par réfugié en Turquie jusqu’à 237 € en 
Jordanie,  sans  lien  évident  avec  les  besoins  humanitaires.  Les  allocations  par  pays  et  par 
réfugié subissent inévitablement l’impact de nombreux facteurs : les frais de livraison dans 
chaque  pays,  les  divers  degrés  d’engagement  des  pays  d’accueil  et  la  présence  d’autres 
bailleurs  de  fonds.  Ceci  est  particulièrement  important  dans  le  cas  de  la  Turquie,  où  le 
gouvernement  n’a  pas  incité  les  bailleurs  internationaux  à  intervenir  jusqu’en  2015. 
Néanmoins, le lien entre ces facteurs déterminants et le volume de la contribution d’ECHO 
n’a pas toujours été clair. 

La réaction mondiale n'a pas suivi le rythme  de l’évolution des besoins humanitaires. Les 
appels  de  l’ONU  sont  restés  sous-financés,  ce  qui  a  forcé,  entre  autres,  le  Programme 
alimentaire  mondial  (PAM)  à  suspendre  un  programme  de  bons  alimentaires  desservant 
1,7 million  de  réfugiés  syriens  en  décembre  2014.  De  même,  à  l’intérieur  de  la  Syrie,  le 
nombre  de  personnes  dans  le  besoin  a  augmenté  six  fois  plus  vite  que  la  réaction 
humanitaire internationale entre 2011 et janvier 2015. 

Les  niveaux  de  financement  d’ECHO  ont  fluctué  considérablement  en  2012-2014 
sans lien clair avec l’évolution des besoins humanitaires. Le manque de prévisibilité 
a entravé la programmation et l’exécution de sa réponse à la crise. 

Les  affectations  de  fonds  d’ECHO  ont  fluctué  au  fil  du  temps,  le  montant  global  (163 
millions  d’euros)  retombant  en  2014  à  un  niveau  similaire  à  celui  de  2012,  soit  une 
diminution  d’environ  50 %.  Ceci  s’applique  à  tous  les  pays  individuellement  (avec  une 
diminution de plus de 50 % dans chaque cas), à l’exception de la Turquie, où il y a eu une 
légère augmentation.  

Même  si,  dans  certains  cas,  l’évaluation  a  pu  lier  l’évolution  des  dotations  à  celle  des 
besoins de financement, les liens avec les besoins à l’échelle mondiale n’étaient pas clairs. 
ECHO a analysé les besoins annuels en utilisant le cadre d’analyse intégré (CAI) mais cela 
ne  comportait  pas  d’estimation  du  niveau  des  ressources  requises  et  il  n’y  avait  aucune 
méthodologie claire pour lier les conclusions du CAI au niveau du budget final. Le budget 
n’est pas non plus directement lié aux processus d’appels des Nations Unies ni aux plans de 
réponse à la crise. En conséquence, certaines évolutions sont difficiles à expliquer, comme 
la contraction budgétaire de 2014, dans un contexte d’augmentation du nombre de réfugiés.  

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ECHO a effectivement cherché à atténuer les effets de ces fluctuations sur ses partenaires 
de programmation. Tout d’abord,  en utilisant des contributions en 2013 pour couvrir les 
opérations des partenaires au premier trimestre en 2014 (et, dans certains cas, l’ensemble 
du  premier  semestre).  Et  deuxièmement,  en  privilégiant  l’appui  aux  organisations  non 
gouvernementales internationales (ONGI) en 2014 pour faire en sorte que, dans la mesure 
du possible, leur appui ne soit pas interrompu (par opposition aux agences de l’ONU qui 
ont des flux de trésorerie plus importants). 

Tandis que la vision d’ensemble a été d’augmenter les fonds d’ECHO dans la région depuis 
2012,  les  fluctuations  des  affectations  annuelles  ont  été  critiquées  par  les  représentants 
d’ECHO  et  des  partenaires,  qui  ont  souligné  la  difficulté  de  traiter  le  manque  de 
prévisibilité du financement. Dans les pays voisins de la Syrie, en particulier, les réductions 
entre 2013 et 2014 ont forcé ECHO à se concentrer uniquement sur les besoins d’urgence 
plus directs et à  réduire  de manière  significative  le  nombre  de partenaires  pris en  charge. 
Pour les partenaires, cela rend plus difficile le renforcement de la résilience des familles de 
réfugiés, dans le contexte d’une crise de plus en plus longue. 

Adaptation de la réaction aux caractéristiques uniques de la crise  

La crise syrienne met la communauté humanitaire internationale devant une combinaison 
unique de défis et d’opportunités, en raison de plusieurs facteurs : risques pour la sécurité ; 
milieu urbain ; une échelle sans précédent ; le fait que la crise concerne des pays à revenu 
intermédiaire,  impliquant  des  interactions  d’un  type  différent  avec  le  gouvernement  des 
pays d’accueil. ECHO a cherché à adapter sa réponse à ces spécificités. 

ECHO a innové en soutenant l’utilisation à grande échelle des transferts de fonds 
inconditionnels  pour  répondre  aux  besoins  des  réfugiés  dans  des  pays  à  revenu 
intermédiaire en grande partie urbanisés, limitrophes de la Syrie. 

ÉCHO  a  favorisé  des  transferts  de  fonds  inconditionnels  pour  répondre  aux  besoins 
fondamentaux des réfugiés arrivés dans certains des pays voisins de la Syrie. L’utilisation de 
cette  modalité  s’est  avérée  un  moyen  efficace  d’acheminer  l’aide  dans  les  pays  à  revenu 
intermédiaire largement urbanisés limitrophes de la Syrie, où les systèmes financiers et les 
mécanismes  de  transfert  électronique  sont  bien  développés  et  où  les  marchés  peuvent 
fournir  une  grande  partie  des  divers  produits  et  services  requis.  Malgré  les  tentatives 
d’ECHO  visant  à  unifier  un  transfert  en  espèces  unique  aux  réfugiés,  des  systèmes 
parallèles  ont  persisté  dans  plusieurs  pays,  le  HCR  offrant  des  transferts  de  fonds 
inconditionnels en parallèle aux bons de nourriture du PAM. Néanmoins, il est clair que les 
transferts  en  espèces  n’ont  pas  permis  de  couvrir  tous  les  besoins.  Par  conséquent,  des 
projets  visant  à  offrir  des  produits  complémentaires  et  des  services  restent  en  vigueur,  à 
juste titre. 

L’appui  d’ECHO  aux  opérations  de  gestion  à  distance  à  l’intérieur  de  la  Syrie  a 
permis  d’atteindre  des  personnes  dans  le  besoin  à  l’intérieur  des  zones  contrôlées 
par les groupes d’opposants armés, tout en atténuant les risques connexes. 

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ECHO  a  contribué  à  renforcer  les  capacités  de  plusieurs  partenaires  pour  mener  des 
opérations  par  l’intermédiaire  de  partenaires  locaux  dans  les  zones  de  la  Syrie  contrôlées 
par  des  groupes  d’opposants  armés  (GOA).  En  développant  et  en  partageant  des  lignes 
directrices sur la gestion à distance, en organisant des ateliers de formation et en modifiant 
les  exigences  de  surveillance,  ECHO  a  pu  soutenir  des  opérations  à  l’intérieur  des  zones 
contrôlées par les GOA tout en atténuant les risques connexes. Cela a permis à ECHO de 
maintenir son indépendance, en assurant une prestation d’aide humanitaire dans les régions 
aux mains des GOA ou sous le contrôle du gouvernement syrien. 

La  communauté  humanitaire  est  toujours  en  train  d’apprendre  à  s’adapter  aux 
crises  en  milieu  urbain  et  le  degré  d’adaptation  aux  contextes  urbains  a 
considérablement varié parmi les opérations financées par ECHO. L’absence d’une 
stratégie urbaine visible semble avoir entravé les efforts pour respecter des normes 
communes  dans  l’ensemble  du  portefeuille  ou  pour  tirer  des  enseignements  des 
programmes antérieurs. 

En  2016,  la  communauté  humanitaire  dans  son  ensemble  en  est  toujours  au  stade  des 
dernières étapes, les plus difficiles sur la courbe d’apprentissage sur l’intervention en milieu 
urbain.  Dans  ce  contexte,  il  n’est  peut-être  pas  surprenant  qu’ECHO  n’ait  pas  eu  de 
stratégie claire ni un ensemble de lignes directrices pour  des interventions en milieu urbain  
pendant la période d’évaluation. Néanmoins, l’absence d’approche stratégique semble avoir 
entravé les efforts visant à respecter des normes communes dans l’ensemble du portefeuille 
ou à tirer des enseignements des programmes antérieurs. 

Alors  que  certains  partenaires  d’ECHO  ont  fourni  des  exemples  de  réponses  innovantes 
aux  défis  spécifiques  auxquels  sont  confrontés 
les 
communautés  d’accueil  en  milieu  urbain,  le  degré  d’adaptation  à  la  nature  urbaine  de  la 
crise  a  varié  considérablement  entre  les  projets  financés  par  ECHO.  Des  problèmes 
particuliers  ont  été  observés  concernant  l’engagement  des  autorités  municipales  dans  la 
conception  et  la  mise  en  œuvre  des  actions  –  un  secteur  crucial  des  bonnes  pratiques, 
émanant de la littérature sur l’intervention en milieu urbain. 

les  populations  déplacées  et 

L’utilisation par ECHO de contrats multi-pays a facilité l’intensification rapide des 
contrats  lors  de  la  phase  initiale  de  sa  réponse,  mais  a  entravé  la  mise  en  œuvre 
rapide des opérations financées par ECHO en 2014. 

ECHO a introduit des contrats multi-pays pendant l’intensification rapide des volumes des 
contrats en 2013. Cela a réduit le fardeau administratif du personnel des bureaux d’ECHO 
et a sans doute accéléré la passation de marchés à une époque où des efforts considérables 
étaient nécessaires pour intensifier la capacité d’action humanitaire dans la région. Mais au 
fil  du  temps,  l’utilisation  de  contrats  multi-pays  a  nui  à  la  mise  en  œuvre  rapide  des 
opérations  financées  par  ECHO,  en  créant  des  coûts  de  transaction  inutiles  et  des 
procédures administratives lourdes.  En outre, aucune synergie  réelle n’était possible entre 
les  sous-composantes  de  chaque  pays ;  lesquelles  ont  été  mises  en  œuvre  comme  des 
contrats  distincts,  rassemblés  dans  un  même  dossier  administratif.  La  divergence  des 
contextes  entre  les  pays  de  la  région  signifiait  qu’il  était  impossible  pour  les  partenaires 
d’établir des contrats uniques dans quatre ou cinq pays différents. En outre, la combinaison 

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de  contrats  multi-pays  et  des  offices  nationaux  d’ECHO  a  compliqué  les  chaînes  de 
commandement et a augmenté le temps de réponse d’ECHO aux demandes de passation et 
de modification de contrat. De plus, ceci a créé un problème de responsabilité, le signataire 
étant  tenu  responsable  des  opérations  dans  l’ensemble  de  la  région  tout  en  ne  suivant 
réellement  les  opérations  que  dans  un  seul  pays.  Pour  toutes  ces  raisons,  ECHO  est 
naturellement revenu à des contrats spécifiques par pays pour 2015-2016. 

ECHO  a  contacté  les  autorités  des  pays  d’accueil,  mais  était  dans  une  position 
difficile pour négocier  avec ces autorités, ce  qui a entravé sa capacité à établir un 
partenariat avec elles afin d’améliorer la réponse à la crise. 

Il existe plusieurs exemples où ECHO et ses partenaires ont contacté les autorités des pays 
partenaires  et  les  structures  locales  (par  exemple  à  travers  la  sensibilisation)  en  vue  de 
faciliter la fourniture et la coordination de l’aide, pour soutenir les populations d’accueil et 
pour aider les pays d’accueil à fournir un soutien aux réfugiés. 

Dans  certains  cas,  cet  engagement  a  produit  les  résultats  escomptés,  mais  pas  toujours. 
Globalement, plusieurs difficultés ont entravé la capacité d’ECHO à établir un partenariat 
avec les autorités des pays d’accueil : 
  Les pays d’accueil sont tous des pays à revenu intermédiaire, certains d'entre eux avec 
une solide capacité à s’occuper eux-mêmes des réfugiés et avec parfois des politiques 
spécifiques  difficiles  à  traiter   (comme  la  nécessité  d’orienter  une  part  de  l’appui  aux 
populations vulnérables, même lorsqu’il n’y avait aucune preuve qu’elles étaient le plus 
dans le besoin); 

  La  charge  pesant  sur  les  pays  d’accueil  était  énorme,  avec  des  niveaux  très  élevés  de 
réfugiés et  des répercussions politiques sur la volonté des gouvernements à accueillir 
les réfugiés. 

Ceci a conduit à des occasions manquées en termes de synergies entre le soutien d’ECHO 
et les gouvernements et en termes de capacité d’ECHO à influencer les gouvernements des 
pays d’accueil, qui sont les principaux fournisseurs d’aide. 

Coordination,  mobilisation  et 
développement 

lien  entre  aide  d’urgence,  redressement  et 

ECHO  a  investi  des  ressources  importantes  avec  une  coordination  régionale  de 
haut niveau, dont le succès a été entravé par des facteurs externes. La décision de 
réorienter  les  ressources  vers  des  objectifs  plus  réalisables  a  été  prise  trop  tard. 
ECHO  a  cependant  eu  plus  de  succès  en  soutenant  la  coordination  au  niveau 
technique,  par  le  biais  de  groupes  de  travail  et  le  partage  des  informations  au 
niveau du projet. 

  La coordination au niveau stratégique a été entravée par l’ambiguïté entre les mandats 
du  HCR  et  de  l’OCHA  en  cas  de  crise  de  niveau 3,  qui  comprend  un  entrelacs  de 
populations  de  réfugiés,  des  personnes  déplacées  et  de  populations  d’accueil.  Dans 
certains cas, cela a conduit à des structures de coordination complexes et à la perte du 
partage  des  informations  potentiellement  utiles.  ECHO  a  identifié  cela  comme  un 

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problème, à juste titre, et a cherché à y remédier par le biais d’une sensibilisation auprès 
des  agences  de  l’ONU  à  Amman  et  dans  d’autres  pays.  Mais  en  fin  de  compte,  les 
tensions entre les organismes ont subsistées, et le succès du HCR dans la gestion des 
efforts de coordination est resté inégal dans les pays concernés. 

  En  outre,  les  efforts  d’ECHO  pour  promouvoir  un  plan  d’intervention  régionale 
coordonnée  a  encore  compliqué  la  tâche  visant  à  améliorer  la  coordination  entre  les 
institutions.  Les  investissements  en  temps  et  en  ressources  dans  cet  effort  ont  été 
élevés et le rendement s’est avéré limité.  

  La  coordination  entre  les  gouvernements  des  pays  d’accueil  et  les  organismes 
humanitaires  internationaux  a  été  plus  problématique.  En  Turquie,  notamment,  la 
coordination entre les ONG et les gouvernements nationaux et locaux a été faible. Ceci 
a  entravé  la  coordination  de    la  réponse  hors  des  camps  de  réfugiés  et  a  limité  le 
potentiel de développement des plans d’intervention à moyen et à long terme. ECHO a 
eu  un  impact  limité  sur  l’amélioration  de  la  coordination  entre  les  ONG  et  le 
gouvernement  et  semble  avoir  eu  peu  de  poids  dans  les  processus  de  coordination 
existant entre le gouvernement et les agences de l’ONU. 

  Au  niveau  technique,  ECHO  a  contribué  à  des  plates-formes  de  coordination  et  de 
groupes  de  travail  dans  les  pays  voisins  et  au  niveau  régional,  ce  qui  a  aidé  les 
partenaires à renforcer la coordination au niveau du projet. 

ECHO a été reconnu comme un acteur important dans la mobilisation à différents 
niveaux. Mais les résultats ont été mitigés, avec des difficultés notables concernant 
les actions de plaidoyer auprès des gouvernements des pays d’accueil. 

ECHO  a  consacré  des  efforts  considérables  aux  initiatives  de  plaidoyer,  à  différents 
niveaux de l’organisation (y compris au niveau du commissaire), sur une grande variété de 
sujets (accès, appui aux zones mal desservies, etc.) et ciblant des publics différents (Nations 
Unies, gouvernements des pays d’accueil, etc.) Les parties prenantes ont apprécié ce rôle et 
ECHO a enregistré des succès à cet égard, mais il y a aussi des exemples de dialogue moins 
constructif  entre  les  gouvernements  des  pays  d’accueil  et  ECHO,  par  exemple  sur  des 
politiques  comme  l’exclusion  des  activités  de  subsistance  et  l’inclusion  d’un  soutien  aux 
communautés d’accueil en Jordanie. 

ECHO, le SEAE et NEAR ont cherché à répartir stratégiquement le fardeau pour 
faire  face  à  une  crise  qui  présente  simultanément  des  besoins  à  court  et  à  long 
terme. Mais les résultats sur le plan opérationnel restent inégaux et il subsiste des 
obstacles de niveau plus élevé concernant les moyens de subsistance des réfugiés. 

La  crise  syrienne  a  commencé  comme  une  crise  à  court  terme  de  déplacement  de 
personnes mais a fini par s’installer dans la durée. Elle pose maintenant un large éventail de 
défis aux bailleurs de fonds humanitaires, notamment la simultanéité des besoins à court et 
à long terme. 

ECHO et les autres institutions de l’UE ont cherché à créer un cadre pour une répartition 
stratégique  du  fardeau  de  la  réponse  à  la  crise :  des  réunions  interservices  qui  visaient  à 
établir les limites et les objectifs des différent instruments de l’UE à l’œuvre dans la région ; 
ECHO et les Délégations ont établi  des cadres de développement humanitaire communs 

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(CDHC) : le Fonds MADAD a été créé pour permettre la canalisation des contributions de 
la Commission européenne et des États membres pour traiter les besoins humanitaires et 
de développement. 

Mais ces efforts stratégiques n’ont pas eu assez de temps pour porter leurs fruits au niveau 
opérationnel.  Certains  exemples  de  coordination  et  de  répartition  des  tâches  entre  les 
mécanismes  de  financement  ont  été  observés,  notamment  en  Turquie,  mais  pas  dans 
d’autres cas.  

Faire face à la nature prolongée de la crise 

ECHO  n’a  pas  encore  développé  une  réponse  stratégique  au  prolongement  de  la 
crise, malgré certains progrès à cet égard. 

En  2016,  la  crise  syrienne  est  entrée  dans  sa  sixième  année.  Les  négociations  politiques 
soutenues par l’ONU ont donné lieu à un arrêt de la violence, mais l’avenir du conflit reste 
très  difficile  à  prédire.  La  réponse  doit  donc  être  adéquate  pour  les  besoins  spécifiques 
d’une  crise  de  réfugiés  prolongée,  et  pour  fournir  une  assistance  à  l’intérieur  de  la  Syrie 
quand  cela  s’avère  possible.  Cette  situation  crée  des  besoins  sur  de  multiples  fronts :  i) 
traiter  les  besoins  urgents  des  populations  directement  concernées ;  ii)  développer  leur 
résilience à long terme et la capacité d’entraide ; iii) s’assurer que les communautés d’accueil 
reçoivent suffisamment d’appui pour gérer les pressions à long terme. Dès lors, il faut une 
clarté quant à la répartition des tâches entre ECHO, les autres institutions de l’UE, les États 
membres et les autres acteurs. 

ECHO a accompli certains progrès en vue de cet objectif en 2012-2014, notamment par le 
biais de l’attention accordée à l’interaction entre les fonds humanitaires et les ressources de 
développement.  Les  cadres  de  développement  humanitaire  communs,  établis  au  niveau 
national,  sont  susceptibles  d’aider  à  clarifier  la  répartition  des  tâches  entre  ECHO  et  les 
autres  institutions  de  l’UE,  mais,  en  2012-2014,  ce  processus  est  resté  embryonnaire.  Par 
instruments  de  financement 
ailleurs,  ECHO  travaille  étroitement  avec 
communautaires pour développer une réponse plus intégrée à la crise (par exemple par le 
biais de l’instrument de pré-adhésion en Turquie). 

les  autres 

Mais  des  faiblesses  demeurent  dans  ce  domaine,  notamment  en  ce  qui  concerne 
l’engagement  des  autorités  locales  et  des  gouvernements  des  pays  d’accueil  pour  donner 
aux réfugiés le droit au travail (ECHO et les délégations de l’UE ont eu un impact limité 
sur les politiques des gouvernements des pays d’accueil en ce qui concerne les moyens de 
subsistance des réfugiés) ; la prévisibilité des niveaux de financement d’ECHO pour la crise 
syrienne (Cf.. plus haut) ; la capacité à soutenir la résilience des populations à l’intérieur des 
zones  contrôlées  par  les  GOA  en  Syrie  (par  exemple,  de  nombreux  partenaires 
s’interrogent sur le bien-fondé de la restriction de l’appui aux opérations d’aide immédiate 
et directe de survie).  

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Recommandations 

L’évaluation propose 5  recommandations pour la suite de la réponse d’ECHO à la crise 
syrienne.  Chacune  des  recommandations  s’adresse  à  la  DG  ECHO,  bien  que  plusieurs 
nécessitent une interaction avec des tierces parties pour travailler ensemble afin d’améliorer 
la réaction globale. 

La DG ECHO doit fournir et/ou soutenir la fourniture de ressources adéquates et 
prévisibles pour répondre aux besoins humanitaires des personnes touchées par la 
crise syrienne (R.1). 

Les  contributions  d’ECHO  et  d’autres  bailleurs  de  fonds  humanitaires  ont  diminué 
fortement  en  2014  et  2015,  alors  que,  dans  le  même  temps,  le  nombre  de  réfugiés  a 
considérablement  augmenté.  Ceci  a  conduit  à  un  sous-financement  important  des  appels 
des  Nations  Unies  et  à  des  réductions  de  l’aide  aux  populations  touchées.  Il  y  a  eu  des 
appels  pour  une  révision  importante  de  l’architecture  de  l’aide  internationale  dans  la 
réponse régionale à la crise, afin de traiter une situation où les populations réfugiées vont 
rester  nombreuses  à  moyen  terme.  Dans  ce  contexte,  il  est  recommandé  qu’ECHO 
considère  les actions suivantes pour faciliter un financement humanitaire adéquat pour la 
crise en Syrie : 

a)  Affecter  un  financement  humanitaire  proportionnel  aux  besoins  manifestement 
identifiés  par  ECHO  à  travers  un  recoupement  transparent  des  évaluations  des 
besoins,  y  compris,  entre  autres,  le  Plan  d’intervention  stratégique  sous  l’égide  de 
l’ONU. 

b)  Rechercher  activement  des  contributions  volontaires  supplémentaires  des  États 
membres  afin  de  garantir  que  les  fonds  pour  la  Syrie  ne  portent  pas  atteinte  à  la 
capacité d’ECHO à répondre à d’autres crises humanitaires. 

c)  Pour  faire  le  meilleur  usage  de  ressources  limitées,  ECHO  devrait  examiner  les 
possibilités  d’augmenter  son  efficience,  à  travers  un  financement  plus  prévisible 
pour les principaux organismes d’intervention. 

d)  Continuer  à  travailler avec  les  autres  instruments  de  financement  de  la CE  en  vue 
d’identifier  les  opportunités  de  financement  complémentaire  de  développement 
pour  réduire  la  pression  sur  les  ressources  humanitaires,  sans  compromettre  les 
principes humanitaires. 

Adapter  davantage  le  programme  d’ECHO  pour  répondre  au  contexte  spécifique 
de la crise syrienne (R.2). 

  Compte  tenu  du  caractère  prolongé  du  conflit,  ECHO  devrait  envisager  d’alléger  la 
limitation actuelle, dictée par les lignes directrices de la gestion à distance, qui limite les 
interventions  à  celles  destinées  à  sauver  des  vies.  Les  partenaires  d’ECHO  ont 
maintenant  établi  des  liens  étroits  avec  des  partenaires  locaux  qui  ont  démontré  leur 
capacité  à  fournir  une  aide  humanitaire  raisonnée  à  l’intérieur  de  la  Syrie.  ECHO 

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devrait envisager le financement de projets de soutien des moyens d’existence grâce à 
des protocoles de gestion à distance lorsque cela s’avère justifié (R2.1). 

  Compte tenu des énormes besoins de protection dans le cadre de la crise en Syrie, et de 
l’importance d’ECHO dans l’appui à ce secteur, il est recommandé qu’ECHO accorde 
une plus grande priorité au financement des activités liées à la protection. Ceci devrait 
inclure  le  dialogue  et  le  renforcement  des  capacités  avec  les  partenaires  afin  que  le 
soutien à la protection puisse être apporté dans les délais d’exécution (R2.2). 

  Dans un contexte de violence et d’instabilité en Syrie, on peut s’attendre à de nouveaux 
flux de réfugiés. ECHO devrait mettre en place une capacité à la fois souple et solide 
pour répondre aux besoins des nouveaux flux de réfugiés (R2.3). 

  ECHO  devrait  promouvoir  davantage 

l’utilisation  des 

transferts  en  espèces 
inconditionnels pour répondre aux besoins essentiels des réfugiés. ECHO a soutenu les 
transferts  en  espèces  inconditionnels  coordonnés  au  Liban  et  en  Jordanie,  et  ceux-ci 
couvrent  un  éventail  de  besoins  des  réfugiés  dans  les  pays  voisins.  L’usage  des 
transferts  multiples  s’est  avéré  efficient  et  efficace  pour  répondre  à  un  ensemble  de 
besoins fondamentaux dans le contexte d’un pays d’accueil fortement urbanisé avec des 
marchés et des systèmes bancaires fonctionnels (R2.4). 

Se  focaliser  sur  la  coordination  au  niveau  du  pays  et  sur  les  arrangements 
contractuels, complétée par des éléments de coordination régionale soigneusement 
priorisés (R.3). 

La valeur des structures régionales de coordination a été limitée et la passation de contrats 
régionaux  a  été  inefficace.  Par  conséquent,  il  est  recommandé  qu’ECHO  réduise  le 
financement  des  activités  de  coordination  régionale  et  mette  l’accent  sur  la  coordination 
entre les différentes opérations transfrontalières et les opérations à l’intérieur de la Syrie ; 
qu’ECHO  considère  investir  dans  le  renforcement  de  la  capacité  du  HCR  à  dégager  sa 
responsabilité  de  coordination  humanitaire  au  niveau  du  pays  à  travers  une  subvention 
les  contrat 
pour  une  réponse  d’urgence  au  niveau  central ;  qu’ECHO  élimine 
multinationaux et les remplace par des contrats nationaux. 

Renforcer le dialogue direct avec les autorités nationales dans les pays d’accueil des 
réfugiés (R.4). 

Il est recommandé qu’ECHO cherche systématiquement à renforcer ses relations avec les 
gouvernements  des  pays  d’accueil  dans  la  région,  par  le  biais  de  réunions  régulières  de 
liaison  avec  leurs  homologues  nationaux  au  cours  des  missions  des  fonctionnaires 
d’ECHO,  complétées  par  des  réunions  périodiques  avec  les  experts  sur  le  terrain.  Ces 
réunions devraient notamment servir à discuter de sujets relatifs au plaidoyer pour l’espace 
humanitaire,  l’amélioration  de  la  coordination  entre  le  gouvernement  et  les  partenaires 
d’ECHO, l’approche basée sur les besoins, etc. 

Établir  des  synergies  plus  importantes  avec  les  délégations  de  l’UE  et  les  autres 
instruments de financement (R.5). 

ECHO a réalisé des progrès dans la création de liens avec d’autres sources de financement, 
en  particulier  au  niveau  de  Bruxelles.  Pour  favoriser  une  intégration  plus  étroite,  il  est 
recommandé de : i) renforcer la participation d’ECHO dans les processus de planification 
conjointe  avec  les  délégations  de  l’UE ;  ii)  développer  les  meilleures  pratiques  de 

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programmation  intégrée ;  iii)  établir  progressivement  des  stratégies  de  sortie  potentielle 
pour ECHO. 

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Zusammenfassung 

Evaluierungsgegenstand und Ziele 

Diese Evaluierung bietet eine unabhängige Gesamtübersicht über die ECHO-Reaktion auf 
die  syrische  Krise  in  Syrien,  Libanon,  Jordanien,  Irak  und  in  der  Türkei  während  des 
Zeitraums  von  2012  bis  2014.  Sie  bezieht  sich  auf  mit  ECHO-Mitteln  finanzierte 
Operationen 
in  diesen  fünf  Ländern  und  beantwortet  18  von  der  europäischen 
Kommission  festgelegte  Prüfungsfragen,  die  als  Grundlage  dienen,  um  hilfreiche 
Folgerungen  und  Empfehlungen  zu  erstellen.  Die  Evaluierung  ist  auf  eine  Vielzahl  von 
Akteuren  ausgerichtet,  einschließlich  der  ECHO-Zentrale  und  des  Personals  auf 
Landesebene,  auf  nationale  und 
für  die 
für  humanitäre  und 
Implementierung 
rückblickende  wie  auch  eine 
Entwicklungsmaßnahmen.  Sie  bietet  sowohl  eine 
vorausblickende Dimension, die darauf abzielt, Unterstützungen aus der Vergangenheit zu 
bewerten, aber auch Empfehlungen anzubieten, wie die Leistung der ECHO-Operationen 
in Zukunft verbessert werden können.  

regionale  Akteure,  beteiligte  Partner 

andere  Geber  und  Behörden 

sowie 

Methodik 

Die  Evaluierung  verwendet  eine  Herangehensweise  in  drei  Phasen  mit  Einrichtung, 
Datensammlung und Synthese. Die Analyse umfasste Fallstudien zu fünf Ländern, eine zu 
Syrien und jeweils eine für die betreffenden angrenzenden Länder. Am Ende jeder Phase 
wurde das entsprechende Ergebnis überprüft und von der Lenkungsgruppe für Bewertung 
genehmigt.  

Die  Datensammlungsphase  umfasste  sowohl  Arbeiten  im  Innendienst  wie  auch  vor  Ort, 
um  die  18  Evaluierungsfragen  aus  der  Auftragsbeschreibung  abzudecken.  Das  Team 
besuchte die einzelnen betroffenen Länder außer Syrien; diesbezüglich bestand die Arbeit 
vor  Ort  aus  intensiven  Interviews  in  Amman  zu  der  in  Syrien  geleisteten  ECHO-
Unterstützung und aus telefonischen Interviews mit ECHO-Partnern, die innerhalb Syriens 
tätig sind, sowohl in Damaskus als auch in Gegenden, die von Gruppen der bewaffneten 
Opposition  kontrolliert  werden.  Insgesamt  hat  das  Team  Interviews  mit  122  Akteuren 
geführt (im direkten Gespräch und per Telefon). Hierzu zählten Vertreter der Zentrale der 
Europäischen  Kommission  (EK),  ECHO-Außenstellen,  EU-Delegationen,  Vertreter  der 
Mitgliedsstaaten,  UN-Büros,  nationale  und  internationale  Behörden,  internationale  und 
lokale  NGOs  und  Begünstigte.  Auch  Besuche  vor  Ort  gehörten  hierzu.  Das  Team 
untersuchte  287  Dokumente,  einschließlich  politischer  und  Strategiedokumente, 
Evaluierungen  und/oder  Studien  sowie  eine  allgemeinere  Literaturübersicht.  Die 
Informationen auf Landesebene werden in Länderberichten zusammengefasst, die sich im 
Anhang zu diesem Bericht befinden.  

Während  der  Synthese  hat  das  Team  Daten  zusammengestellt  und  trianguliert,  um 
konsolidierte Antworten auf die Evaluierungsfragen liefern zu können. Informationslücken 

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wurden mit Hilfe zusätzlicher Telefon-Interviews mit ECHO-Partner-Büros in der Region 
geschlossen. Die konsolidierten und mehrfach geprüften Ergebnisse dienten als Grundlage, 
um  die 
in  der  vorliegenden  Zusammenfassung  dargelegten  Folgerungen  und 
Empfehlungen zu formulieren.  

Folgerungen 

Gesamt-Statement zur Reaktion der ECHO 

In  Reaktion  auf  die  syrische  Krise  hat  die  ECHO  beträchtliche  Finanzierungen  geleistet. 
Durch eine rasche Reaktion in fünf Ländern hat dies – sowohl innerhalb als auch außerhalb 
von  Lagern  –  zu  einer  Verbesserung  der  Lebensbedingungen  von  Flüchtlingen, 
Binnenvertriebenen  (IDPs)  und  anderen  betroffenen  Bevölkerungsgruppen  innerhalb 
Syriens  geführt.  Die  ECHO  hat  außerdem  umfangreiche  Beiträge  zur  Einrichtung  der 
erforderlichen  Infrastruktur  für  eine  weit  reichende  humanitäre  Reaktion  während  der 
Jahre 2012 und 2013 geleistet. Dies umfasste den  Aufbau der  Kapazität und Präsenz der 
Partner  in  der  Region,  die  Entwicklung  der  Herangehensweisen  bei  der  Bewertung  der 
Bedürfnisse  und 
sowie  den  Aufbau  von 
Koordinationsmechanismen auf regionaler Ebene. 

Informationsmittel  und 

-systeme 

Die ECHO gehörte zu den Gebern mit sehr starker regionaler Präsenz. Damit konnte sie 
ihre Partner mit einer engen Unterstützung und Beratung auf Grundlage eines fundierten 
Verständnisses bezüglich des operativen  Kontextes, in dem sie arbeiteten, versorgen. Die 
ECHO  hat  auch  beträchtliche  Anpassungsfähigkeit  an  den  spezifischen  und  sich 
weiterentwickelnden  Kontext  innerhalb  Syriens  und  seiner  Nachbarstaaten  an  den  Tag 
gelegt. 

Über  die  Anfangsphasen  der  Krise  hinauszugehen,  erfordert  besondere  Aufmerksamkeit, 
um  sich  an  ihre  lang  anhaltende  Dauer  anzupassen.  In  diesem  Kontext  treten  einander 
überschneidende  Prioritäten  auf.  Hierzu  zählt  die  Notwendigkeit  einer  ständigen 
Notfallreaktion für die Bedürfnisse der direkt vom Konflikt betroffenen Vertriebenen und 
ebenso  für  die  längerfristigen  Bedürfnisse  der  Vertriebenen  wie  auch  für  die  Bedürfnisse 
der Aufnahmegemeinschaften. Die ECHO wird ihre Reaktion adaptieren müssen, um sich 
an  diesen 
in  Weiterentwicklung  befindlichen  Kontext  anzupassen  und  eine  gute 
Koordination mit denjenigen Akteuren zu gewährleisten, die bestmöglich in der Lage sind, 
längerfristige Bedürfnisse zu erfüllen. 

Über Geschwindigkeit und Deckung der Finanzmittel 

Während  der  ersten  Phase  der  Krise  zwischen  2012  und  2013  hat  die  ECHO  eine 
beträchtliche und umfangreiche Investition in den raschen Aufbau der humanitären 
Hilfsmaßnahmen  in  Syrien  und  seinen  Nachbarländern  getätigt,  was  zu  besseren 
Lebensbedingungen für die betroffenen Bevölkerungsgruppen führte.  

Im  Jahre  2012  erhöhte  die  ECHO  als  Reaktion  auf  die  Krise  unverzüglich  ihre 
Finanzmittel  auf  € 156  Mio.  Diese  wurden  2013  erneut  auf  € 357  Mio.  erhöht,  was  einer 

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Steigerung  von  129 %  entspricht.  Diese  rasche  Erhöhung  der  Finanzmittel  versetzte  die 
ECHO  in  die  Lage,  an  zwei  Fronten  zur  Krisenbewältigung  beizutragen.  Zum  Ersten 
stellte sie eine sektor- und länderübergreifende Hilfe sowohl innerhalb als auch außerhalb 
der Lager bereit. Es zeigte sich, dass diese Hilfe auf die richtigen Empfänger ausgerichtet 
war, den prioritären Bedürfnissen in der Region entsprach und dabei  die Beiträge anderer 
Akteure berücksichtigte. 

Zum  Zweiten  trug  die  ECHO  in  beträchtlichem  Maße  zur  Einrichtung  umfangreicher 
humanitärer  Hilfsmaßnahmen  in  Ländern  bei,  in  denen  humanitäre  Kapazitäten  und 
Erfahrungen  entweder  nicht  vorhanden  oder  nicht  angemessen  waren,  um  die  schnell 
wachsende Krise anzugehen. Diese Phase umfasste die / Eröffnung von Länderbüros für 
verschiedene  ECHO-Partner,  die  Vergrößerung  von  UN-  und  NGO-Teams,  die 
Einrichtung  von  Vorgehensweisen  zur  Bedarfsanalyse  und  von  Informationswerkzeugen 
und -systemen, zur Definition von Programmen und Strategien sowie zur Entwicklung von 
Koordinationsmechanismen. Diese Prozesse hatten einen beträchtlichen positiven Einfluss 
auf die frühen Stufen der Krise. 

Im  Laufe  des  gesamten  Evaluierungszeitraums  von  2012  bis  2014  war  die  ECHO 
der viertgrößte internationale Geber im Rahmen der Syrienkrise. Das Ausmaß und 
die  geografische  Reichweite  der  Krise  haben  jedoch  die  Fähigkeit  der  ECHO 
herausgefordert, eine transparente und bedürfnisorientierte Reaktion zu leisten. 

Von  2012  bis  2014  war  die  ECHO  der  viertgrößte  internationale  Geber  im  Rahmen  der 
Syrienkrise  und  trug  in  diesem  Zeitraum  8 %  der  gesamten  humanitären  Leistungen  bei. 
Ihre Mittelzuweisungen pro Land variierten allerdings stark von € 18 pro Flüchtling in der 
Türkei bis zu € 237 in Jordanien ohne klare Verbindung zu den humanitären Bedürfnissen. 
Die  Zuweisungen  für  die  Länder  pro  Flüchtling  unterliegen  unvermeidlich  zahlreichen 
Faktoren,  einschließlich  der  Kosten  für  die  Erbringung  in  den  einzelnen  Ländern,  der 
unterschiedlichen  Intensität  des  Engagements  in  den  Aufnahmeländern  und  der  Präsenz 
anderer Geber. Dies ist von besonderer Bedeutung im Falle der Türkei, wo die Regierung 
erst  2015  internationale  Geber  zur  Intervention  drängte.  Dennoch  war  die  Verbindung 
zwischen  diesen  bestimmenden  Faktoren  und  der  Größe  des  Einsatzes  der  ECHO  nicht 
immer deutlich. 

Die  globale  Reaktion  hat  mit  den  eskalierenden  humanitären  Bedürfnissen  nicht  Schritt 
gehalten. Die Appelle der UN blieben unterfinanziert, was unter anderem dazu führte, dass 
das  Welternährungsprogramm  (World  Food  Programme,  WFP)  ein  Programm  mit 
Essensmarken  aussetzte,  das  im  Dezember  2014  1,7  Millionen  syrische  Flüchtlinge 
versorgte.  Auch  ist  in  Syrien  die  Anzahl  der  bedürftigen  Menschen  von  2011  bis  Januar 
2015 sechs Μal schneller gewachsen als die weltweite humanitäre Hilfe. 

Im Zeitraum von 2012 bis 2014 hat das Finanzierungsniveau der ECHO ohne klare 
Verbindung  zu  wechselnden  humanitären  Bedürfnissen  in  beträchtlicher  Weise 
geschwankt.  Das  Fehlen  einer  Vorhersehbarkeit  beeinträchtigte  Programmierung 
und Umsetzung. 

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Die  finanziellen  Zuweisungen  der  ECHO  schwankten  im  Laufe  der  Zeit,  so  dass  der 
Gesamtbetrag (€ 163 Mio.) im Jahre 2014 auf einen Wert ähnlich dem von 2012 zurückfiel, 
was einer Verringerung um ca. 50 % entspricht. Dies gilt jeweils für alle Länder (immer mit 
Verringerungen um über 50 %), außer bei der Türkei, wo es eine leichte Steigerung gab.  

im  Allgemeinen  keine  Verbindung  zu  erkennen.  Die  ECHO  hat 

Auch wenn die Evaluierung in manchen Fällen eine Verbindung zwischen der Entwicklung 
der  Finanzierungszuwendungen  und  der  Entwicklung  der  Bedürfnisse  herstellen  konnte, 
war 
jährliche 
Bedarfsanalysen  unter  Verwendung  des  integrierten  Analyserahmens  (IAF)  durchgeführt, 
was  jedoch  keine  Einschätzung  des  Grades  der  erforderlichen  Ressourcen  umfasste; 
außerdem lag keine klare Methodik vor, um die IAF-Ergebnisse mit der endgültigen Höhe 
des  Budgets  zu  verbinden.  Hinzu  kommt,  dass  es  keine  klare  Verbindung  zwischen  dem 
Budget und den Hilfsplänen und den Aufrufen der UN gibt. Dementsprechend sind einige 
Entwicklungen schwer zu erklären, so beispielsweise der schrumpfende Etat im Jahre 2014 
vor dem Hintergrund der fortwährend steigenden Flüchtlingszahlen.  

Die  ECHO  versuchte,  die  Auswirkungen  dieser  Schwankungen  bei  ihren  Programm-
Partnern  abzumildern.  Zum  Einen  geschah  dies,  indem  man  Beiträge  aus dem  Jahr  2013 
verwendete,  um  im  Ersten  Quartal  (und  in  einigen  Fällen  während  des  gesamten  ersten 
Halbjahres) Operationen ihrer Partner im Jahr 2014 zu decken. Zum Zweiten, indem man 
der  Unterstützung  für  internationale  NGOs  (INGOs)  im  Jahre  2014  Vorrang  einräumte, 
um  zu  gewährleisten,  dass  deren  Unterstützung  nach  Möglichkeit  nicht  unterbrochen 
wurde (im Gegensatz zu UN-Agenturen, die über einen stärkeren Cash-Flow verfügen). 

Während die Gesamtperspektive darauf ausgerichtet war, ab 2012 die ECHO-Fonds für die 
Region  zu  erhöhen,  wurden  die  Schwankungen  zwischen  den  jährlichen  Zuwendungen 
sowohl von den ECHO-Vertretern als auch von den Partnern kritisiert: Sie betonten, wie 
schwierig  es  ist,  mit  der  Unvorhersehbarkeit  der  finanziellen  Unterstützung  umzugehen. 
Insbesondere in den Nachbarländern zwangen die Senkungen zwischen 2013 und 2014 die 
ECHO, sich nur auf die dringendsten Notfallbedürfnisse zu konzentrieren und die Anzahl 
unterstützter Partner beträchtlich zu verringern. Auf diese Weise wurde es für die Partner 
schwieriger,  die  Widerstandsfähigkeit  von  Flüchtlingshaushalten  im  Kontext  einer  immer 
länger anhaltenden Krise zu unterstützen. 

Zur Anpassung der Reaktion auf einzigartige Merkmale der Krise  

Die  Syrienkrise  stellt  die  internationale  humanitäre  Gemeinschaft  vor  eine  einzigartige 
Kombination  von  Herausforderungen  und  Gelegenheiten,  die  von  zahlreichen  Faktoren 
herrühren:  Sicherheitsrisiken,  urbane  Gegebenheiten,  ein  beispielloses  Ausmaß  und  die 
Tatsache, dass die Krise Länder mit mittlerem Einkommen betrifft, die auch noch eine sehr 
unterschiedliche  Interaktion  der  Regierungen  in  den  Aufnahmeländern  aufweisen.  Die 
ECHO hat versucht, ihre Reaktion an diese Besonderheiten anzupassen.  

Die  ECHO  war  innovativ  bei  der  Unterstützung  der  umfangreichen  Nutzung 
bedingungsloser Bargeldtransfers zur Erfüllung der Bedürfnisse der Flüchtlinge in 
den  weitgehend  urbanisierten  Ländern  mit  mittlerem  Einkommen,  die  an  Syrien 
angrenzen. 

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in  weitgehend  urbanisierten  Grenzländern  Syriens, 

Die  ECHO  hat  die  Bereitstellung  bedingungsloser  Bargeldtransfers  unterstützt,  um  die 
Grundbedürfnisse  der  in  einigen  der  Grenzländer  Syriens  eintreffenden  Flüchtlinge  zu 
erfüllen. Die Verwendung dieser Modalität erwies sich als wirksame und effiziente Art der 
Hilfeleistung 
in  denen  die 
Finanzsysteme und elektronischen Überweisungsmechanismen gut entwickelt sind und die 
Märkte  zahlreiche  der  erforderlichen  vielfältigen  Waren  und  Dienstleistungen  liefern 
können.  Trotz  der  Versuche  der  ECHO,  die  Durchführung  des  Bargeldtransfers  an 
Flüchtlinge zu vereinheitlichen, bestanden in mehreren Ländern parallele Systeme  – dabei 
bot  die  UNHCR  bedingungslose  Bargeldtransfers  neben  WFP-Lebensmittelgutscheinen. 
Dennoch  war  und  ist  es  klar,  dass  nicht  alle  Bedürfnisse  über  Bargeldtransfers  erfüllt 
werden  können.  Folglich  blieben  die  Projekte  zur  Lieferung  zusätzlicher  Waren  und 
Dienstleistungen zu Recht bestehen.  

Die  Unterstützung  der  ECHO  für  entfernte  Management-Maßnahmen  innerhalb 
Syriens versetzten sie in die Lage, bedürftige Menschen in Gebieten zu erreichen, 
die von bewaffneten Gruppen der Opposition kontrolliert wurden, während sie die 
damit verbundenen Risiken minderte. 

Die ECHO half, die Kapazitäten mehrerer Partner aufzubauen, um über lokale Partner in 
unter  der  Kontrolle  bewaffneter  Oppositionsgruppen  (AOGs)  stehenden  Gebieten  in 
Syrien Maßnahmen durchführen zu können. Durch die Entwicklung und Verbreitung von 
Richtlinien zum entfernten Management und die Durchführung von Schulungen sowie die 
Verbesserung der Überwachungsanforderungen war die ECHO in der Lage, Operationen 
innerhalb  von  AOG-kontrollierten  Bereichen  zu  unterstützen  und  gleichzeitig  die  damit 
verbundenen  Risiken  zu  lindern.  Dies  wiederum  versetzte  die  ECHO  in  die  Lage,  ihre 
Unabhängigkeit aufrecht zu erhalten, indem sie die Erbringung humanitärer Hilfe sowohl 
in von AOG als auch von der Regierung kontrollierten Regionen Syriens gewährleistet. 

Die  humanitäre  Gemeinschaft  lernt  gegenwärtig  immer  noch,  wie  man  sich  an 
urbane Krisen anpasst, und der Grad der Anpassung an urbane Kontexte schwankte 
beträchtlich  zwischen  den  von  der  ECHO  finanzierten  Operationen.  Das  Fehlen 
einer sichtbaren urbanen Strategie scheint die Anstrengungen behindert zu haben, 
gemeinsame  Standards  im  gesamten  Portfolio  zu  erfüllen  oder  aus  vorherigen 
Programmen Erlerntes umzusetzen. 

Im Jahre 2016 befindet sich die gesamte humanitäre Gemeinschaft hinsichtlich der urbanen 
Reaktionen  immer  noch  im  steil  ansteigenden  Bereich  der  Lernkurve.  In  diesem 
Zusammenhang  überrascht  es  vielleicht  nicht,  dass  die  ECHO  während  des 
Evaluierungszeitraums  nicht  über  eine  klar  entwickelte  Strategie  oder  eine  Reihe  von 
Finanzierungsrichtlinien  für  urbane  Hilfsmaßnahmen  verfügte.  Dennoch  scheint  das 
Fehlen einer strategischen Herangehensweise die Anstrengungen behindert zu haben, dass 
gemeinsame  Standards  im  gesamten  Portfolio  erfüllt  werden  oder  aus  vorherigen 
Programmen Erlerntes umgesetzt wird. 

Zwar haben einige ECHO-Partner Beispiele für innovative Reaktionen auf die besonderen 
Herausforderungen angesichts von Flüchtlings- und Aufnahmegemeinschaften in urbanen 
Umgebungen  geboten,  doch  schwankte  der  Grad  der  Anpassung  an  die  urbanen 

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Eigenschaften  der  Krise  bei  den  von  der  ECHO-finanzierten  Projekten.  Besondere 
Probleme zeigten sich hinsichtlich des Engagements kommunaler Behörden bei Gestaltung 
und Implementierung  – ein kritischer Bereich  für  die beste Vorgehensweise, der sich aus 
der Literatur über urbane Reaktionen ergibt. 

Die Verwendung von Mehrländerverträgen durch die ECHO erleichterte die rasche 
Steigerung  von  Verträgen  während  der  frühen  Reaktionsphase,  behinderte  jedoch 
ab 2014 die pünktliche Implementierung ECHO-finanzierter Maßnahmen. 

Während  der  raschen  Erhöhung  der  Vertragszahlen  im  Jahre  2013  führte  die  ECHO 
Mehrländerverträge  ein.  Damit  wurde  die  administrative  Belastung  der  Mitarbeiter  im 
Verwaltungsbereich  verringert  und  die  Vertragsabschlüsse  zu  einer  Zeit  beschleunigt,  als 
beträchtliche  Anstrengungen  erforderlich  waren,  um  die  Kapazitäten  für  humanitäre 
Maßnahmen  in  der  Region  zu  steigern.  Im  Laufe  der  Zeit  jedoch  behinderte  die 
Verwendung  von  Mehrländerverträgen  die  pünktliche  Umsetzung  ECHO-finanzierter 
Maßnahmen,  was  zu  unnötigen  Transaktionskosten  und  schwerfälligen  administrativen 
Prozeduren  führte.  Hinzu  kommt,  dass  keine  tatsächlichen  Synergien  zwischen  den 
Teilkomponenten  von  Ländern  möglich  waren,  die  notwendigerweise  als  getrennte 
Verträge  in  einer  Verwaltungsakte  zusammengeführt  wurden.  Der  unterschiedliche 
Kontext in den Ländern  in  der Region bedeuteten, dass es für die Partner  nicht möglich 
war,  einzelne  Verträge  in  vier  oder  fünf  unterschiedlichen  Ländern  umzusetzen.  Darüber 
hinaus  erschwerte  die  Kombination  von  Mehrländerverträgen  und  Ein-Land-
Niederlassungen 
innerhalb  der  ECHO  die  Weisungsketten  und  verzögerten  die 
Reaktionszeiten  für  Vertragsunterzeichnungen  und  Änderungswünsche.  Außerdem  führte 
dies zu einem Problem der Verantwortlichkeit, weil der Unterzeichner für Maßnahmen in 
der gesamten Region verantwortlich gemacht wurde, obwohl er nur Maßnahmen in einem 
einzigen Land überwachte. Aus diesen Gründen wechselte die ECHO verständlicherweise 
für 2015-2016 zu landesspezifischen Verträgen. 

Die  ECHO  hat  sich  bei  den  Behörden  in  den  Aufnahmeländern  engagiert,  war 
jedoch  bei  der  Verhandlung  mit  diesen  Behörden  in  einer  schwierigen  Position, 
was ihre Fähigkeit behinderte, eine Partnerschaft mit ihnen aufzubauen und so das 
Krisenmanagement zu verbessern.   

Es  gibt  zahlreiche  Beispiele,  dass  die  ECHO  und  ihre  Partner  sich  (beispielsweise  durch 
Anwaltschaft)  für  Behörden  von  Partnerländern  und  lokale  Strukturen  mit  dem  Ziel 
engagiert  haben,  die  Bereitstellung  und  Koordination  von  Unterstützung 
für 
Aufnahmegemeinschaften  zu  erleichtern  und  Aufnahmeländer  zu  unterstützen,  um 
Flüchtlingen Hilfe zu bieten.  

In manchen Fällen führte dieses Engagement zu den erwarteten Ergebnissen – in anderen 
nicht.  Insgesamt  haben  diverse  Schwierigkeiten  die  Fähigkeit  der  ECHO,  eine 
Partnerschaft mit den Behörden der Aufnahmeländer aufzubauen, behindert.  
  Bei allen Aufnahmeländern handelt es sich um Länder mit mittlerem Einkommen, von 
denen  einige  über  eine  stabile  Fähigkeit  verfügen,  den  Umgang  mit  den  Flüchtlingen 
(z. B.  der 
und  mit  einigen  besonderen  Herausforderungen  selbst  zu  regeln 
schutzbedürftige 
Notwendigkeit, 

der  Unterstützung 

einen 

Teil 

für 

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EVALUATION OF ECHO’S RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
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Aufnahmegemeinschaften  zu  verwenden,  auch  wenn  es  keine  Anzeichen  gab,  dass 
diese am bedürftigsten waren), mit denen schwer umzugehen war; 

  Die  Belastung  der  Aufnahmeländer  war  aufgrund  der  sehr  hohen  Zahl  der 
aufzunehmenden  Flüchtlinge  und  der  Auswirkungen  auf  die  Bereitschaft  der 
aufnehmenden Regierungen zur Aufnahme von Flüchtlingen enorm hoch. 

Dies führte  dazu, dass man Gelegenheiten  zu  Synergien  zwischen ECHO und staatlicher 
Unterstützung  verstreichen  ließ,  auch  hinsichtlich  der  Fähigkeit  der  ECHO,  Einfluss  auf 
die aufnehmenden Regierungen zu auszuüben, die schließlich die wesentlichen Bereitsteller 
von Unterstützung sind. 

Über  Koordination,  Anwaltschaft  und  die  Verbindung  von  Entlastung, 
Rehabilitation und Entwicklung 

Die  ECHO  hat  beträchtliche  Ressourcen  in  hochgradige  regionale  Koordination 
investiert,  deren  Erfolg  durch  externe  Faktoren  behindert  wurde.  Die 
Entscheidung,  Ressourcen  zu  besser  erreichbaren  Zielen  umzuleiten,  wurde  zu 
spät getroffen. Allerdings hatte die ECHO mehr Erfolg mit der Unterstützung der 
Koordination auf technischer Ebene mittels Arbeitsgruppen und Bereitstellung von 
Informationen auf Projektebene. 

und 

In  manchen 

Instanzen 
einem 

  Die  Koordination  auf  Strategieebene  wurde  durch  die  Unklarheit  zwischen  den 
Zuständigkeiten von UNHCR und OCHA bei einer Krise der Ebene 3 behindert, die 
sich  durch  die  Verflechtung  von  Flüchtlingen,  IDP  und  Aufnahmegemeinschaften 
komplizierten 
auszeichnet. 
Koordinationsstrukturen 
nützlicher 
Informationsweitergaben.  Die  ECHO  hat  dies  zu  Recht  als  Problem  erkannt  und 
versuchte, es über eine Anwaltschaft bei den Ämtern der UN in Amman und anderen 
Ländern  anzugehen.  Letztendlich  jedoch  blieben  die  Spannungen  zwischen  den 
Ämtern  bestehen  und  der  Erfolg  der  UNHCR  bei  der  Führung  der 
Koordinationsbemühungen blieb über die betroffenen Staaten hinweg ungleichmäßig. 
  Darüber hinaus haben die Anstrengungen der ECHO, einen koordinierten regionalen 
Reaktionsplan  zu  fördern,  die  Aufgabe,  die  Koordination  zwischen  den  Ämtern  zu 
verbessern, erschwert. Die Investitionen von Zeit und Ressourcen in dieses Bestreben 
waren hoch und der Erfolg nur begrenzt.  

zu 
potentiell 

führte 
Verlust 

dies 

  Die  Koordination  zwischen  den  aufnehmenden Regierungen  und  den  internationalen 
humanitären  Ämtern  war  noch  problematischer.  Besonders  in  der  Türkei  war  die 
Koordination zwischen NGOs und nationalen und lokalen Regierungen schwach. Dies 
behinderte die Koordination der Maßnahmen für nicht in Flüchtlingslagern befindliche 
Flüchtlinge und beschränkte das Potential für die Entwicklung mittel- und langfristiger 
Reaktionspläne. Die ECHO hatte nur beschränkten Einfluss auf die Verbesserung der 
Koordination zwischen NGOs und Regierung und scheint beim Koordinationsprozess 
zwischen Regierung und UN-Behörden nur geringe Wirkung gehabt zu haben. 

  Auf 

technischer  Ebene  hat  die  ECHO  zu  Koordinationsplattformen  und 
Arbeitsgruppen in den Nachbarländern und auf regionaler Ebene beigetragen, was den 
Partnern half, die Koordination auf Projektebene zu verbessern.  

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Die ECHO wurde als bedeutsamer Akteur in Sachen Anwaltschaft auf zahlreichen 
jedoch  waren  unterschiedlich  mit 
Ebenen  anerkannt.  Die  Ergebnisse 
beträchtlichen  Schwierigkeiten  hinsichtlich  der  Anwaltschaft  bei  aufnehmenden 
Regierungen. 

Die  ECHO 
setzte  auf  verschiedenen  Ebenen  der  Organisation  beträchtliche 
Anstrengungen  für  Anwaltschaftsinitiativen  ein  (einschließlich  der  Kommissionarsebene) 
und  das  bei  diversen  unterschiedlichen  Themen  (Zugang,  Unterstützung  unterversorgter 
Bereiche  usw.)  und  mit  der  Ausrichtung  auf  unterschiedliche  Zielgruppen  (UN, 
aufnehmende Regierungen usw.). Die  Akteure  begrüßten  diese  Rolle  und die  ECHO war 
diesbezüglich erfolgreich, allerdings gab es auch Beispiele für einen weniger konstruktiven 
Dialog  zwischen  ECHO  und  Regierungen  von  Aufnahmeländern,  beispielsweise  zu 
politischen  Positionierungen  wie  dem  Ausschluss  von  Aktivitäten  bezüglich 
Lebensgrundlagen  und  zur  Einbindung  der  Unterstützung  von  Aufnahmegemeinschaften 
in Jordanien.  

ECHO, EEAS und NEAR versuchten, eine strategische Lastenteilung aufzubauen, 
um  eine  Krise  anzugehen,  die  gleichzeitig  kurz-  und  langfristige  Bedürfnisse 
beinhaltet. Die Ergebnisse auf operativer Ebene bleiben jedoch ungleichmäßig und 
die  Hindernisse  auf  höherer  Ebene,  die  Lebensgrundlagen  für  Flüchtlinge 
anzugehen, bestehen fort. 

Die  Syrienkrise  hat  sich  von  einer  kurzfristigen  Vertreibungskrise  zu  einer  langwierigen 
Krise  entwickelt.  Sie  stellt  nun  humanitäre  Geber  vor  ein  breites  Spektrum  von 
Herausforderungen, die sowohl kurz- als auch langfristige Bedürfnisse umfassen. 

Als  Reaktion  darauf  waren  ECHO  und  die  übrigen  Institutionen  der  EU  bestrebt,  den 
Rahmen für eine strategische Lastenteilung aufzubauen: Meetings der Abteilungen sollten 
die  Grenzen  und  Ziele  der  verschiedenen 
eingebrachten 
Finanzierungsinstrumente  der  EU  feststellen;  die  ECHO  und  die  Delegationen  richteten 
gemeinsame humanitäre und Enwicklungsrahmen (JHDFs) ein: Der MADAD-Trust-Fond 
wurde  geschaffen,  damit  die  Beiträge  der  Europäischen  Kommission  und  der 
Mitgliedsstaaten  zusammengeführt  werden  konnten,  um  so  die  Schnittmenge  zwischen 
humanitären und Entwicklungsbedürfnissen anzugehen. 

in  der  Region 

Die  Zeit  reichte  jedoch  nicht,  damit  die  Früchte  dieser  strategischen  Anstrengungen  sich 
auf  operativer  Ebene  zeigen  konnten.  Während  man  einige  Fälle  von  Koordination  und 
Lastenteilung zwischen Finanzierungsmechanismen beobachten konnte – besonders in der 
Türkei – blieben sie jedoch in anderen Fällen aus.  

Zum Umgang mit der Langwierigkeit der Krise 

Die  ECHO  hat,  abgesehen  von  gewissen  diesbezüglichen  Fortschritten,  noch 
keinen  Fokus  auf  Strategieebene  bezüglich  der  Langwierigkeit  der  Krise 
beschlossen. 
Im  Jahre  2016  erreichte  die  Syrienkrise  ihr  sechstes  Jahr.  Die  von  den  UN  gestützten 
Verhandlungen  haben  zu  einer  Beendigung  der  Gewalt  geführt,  doch  die  Zukunft  des 

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Konfliktes  ist  weiterhin  nur  schwer  vorhersehbar.  Aus  diesem  Grunde  sollten  die 
Maßnahmen so gestaltet sein, dass die ECHO in der Lage ist, den besonderen Bedürfnissen 
einer  anhaltenden  Flüchtlingskrise  wie  auch  der  Herausforderung  innerhalb  Syriens  zu 
begegenen  und  Unterstützung  bieten  kann.  Diese  Situation  erzeugt  Bedürfnisse  an 
zahlreichen Fronten: i) Umgang  mit den fortbestehenden  dringenden Bedürfnissen  direkt 
betroffener Bevölkerungsgruppen; ii) Aufbau von deren langfristigem Durchhaltevermögen 
und  deren  Fähigkeit  zur  Selbsthilfe;  iii)  sicher  stellen,  dass  die  Aufnahmegemeinschaften 
genügend Unterstützung erhalten, um den langfristig auf sie wirkenden Druck aushalten zu 
können.  Dies  hat  zur  Folge,  dass  die  Klarheit  hinsichtlich  der  Lastenteilung  zwischen 
ECHO  und  anderen  EU-Institutionen,  Mitgliedsstaaten  und  anderen  Akteuren  von 
wesentlicher Bedeutung ist. 

Die ECHO hat während des Zeitraums von 2012 bis 2014 gewisse Fortschritte in Richtung 
dieses  Ziels  gemacht,  so  beispielsweise  über  die  Aufmerksamkeit,  die  man  dem 
Zusammenspiel  zwischen  humanitären  Fonds  und  Entwicklungsressourcen  zukommen 
lässt. Die auf Landesebene eingerichteten gemeinsamen humanitären Entwicklungsrahmen 
haben das Potential, bei der Klärung der Lastenteilung zwischen ECHO und anderen EU-
Institutionen zu helfen, jedoch blieb dieser Prozess während des Zeitraums von 2012 bis 
2014  in  seinen  Kinderschuhen  stecken.  Die  ECHO  hat  auch  eng  mit  anderen 
finanzierenden EU-Instrumenten zusammengearbeitet, um eine stärker integrierte Reaktion 
auf  die  Krise  einzurichten  (im  Falle  der  Türkei  beispielsweise  über  das  Instrument  der 
Beitrittsanwartschaft).   

In diesem Bereich jedoch blieben Schwachpunkte bestehen, insbesondere hinsichtlich des 
Engagements  lokaler  Behörden  und  Aufnahmeregierungen,  Flüchtlingen  das  Recht  auf 
Arbeit zu gewähren (ECHO und die EU-Delegationen hatten nur eingeschränkten Einfluss 
auf die Politik der Regierungen von Aufnahmeländern bezüglich der Lebensumstände der 
Flüchtlinge),  ebenso  hinsichtlich  der  Vorhersehbarkeit  der  ECHO-Finanzierungsebenen 
für  die  Syrienkrise  (s.  oben)  und  der  Fähigkeit,  die  Resilienz  von  Bevölkerungsgruppen 
innerhalb der AOG-kontrollierten Gebiete Syriens zu unterstützen (die Einschränkung der 
Unterstützung für direkt lebensrettende Hilfe wurde beispielsweise von vielen Partnern in 
Frage gestellt).  

Empfehlungen 

Die Evaluierung kommt insgesamt zu 5 Empfehlungen für die künftigen Reaktionen der 
ECHO  auf  die  Syrienkrise.  Sämtliche  Empfehlungen  werden  an  die  GD  ECHO  geleitet, 
wenngleich einige davon Interaktionen mit Dritten erfordern, um die Zusammenarbeit zu 
sichern und so die Gesamtreaktion zu verbessern. 

Die GD ECHO sollte adäquate und planbare Ressourcen für die Reaktion auf die 
humanitären  Bedürfnisse  der  von  der  Syrienkrise  betroffenen  Menschen 
bereitstellen und/oder für deren Bereitstellung eintreten (R.1). 

Die  Beiträge  der  ECHO  und  anderer  humanitärer  Geber  sind  2014  und  2015  stark 
gesunken, obwohl die Zahl der Flüchtlinge gleichzeitig stark gestiegen ist. Dies hat zu einer 

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beträchtlichen  Unterfinanzierung  der  UN-Appelle  und  zu  Kürzungen  bei  der 
Unterstützung  für  die  betroffenen  Bevölkerungen  geführt.  Es  gab  Aufrufe  zu  einer 
beträchtlichen  Überarbeitung  der  internationalen  Hilfsarchitektur  bei  der  regionalen 
Reaktion  in  Syrien,  um  sich  auf  eine  Zukunft  vorzubereiten,  in  der  die  Zahl  der 
Flüchtlingsgesellschaften  mittelfristig  hoch  bleiben  wird.  In  diesem  Zusammenhang  wird 
empfohlen, dass die ECHO die folgenden Maßnahmen in Betracht zieht, um eine adäquate 
humanitäre Finanzierung in der Syrienkrise zu erleichtern: 

a)  Gewährung einer humanitären Finanzierung proportional zu dem von der ECHO 
mittels  einer  transparenten  Triangulation  verfügbarer  Bedarfsanalysen  erkannten 
Bedarf 
strategischen 
Reaktionsplans. 

anderem,  des  UN-geführten 

einschließlich,  unter 

Die  ECHO  sollte  die  folgenden  Maßnahmen  in  Betracht  ziehen,  um  eine  adäquate 
humanitäre Finanzierung zu erleichtern: 

e)  Gewährung einer humanitären Finanzierung proportional zu dem von der ECHO 
mittels  einer  transparenten  Triangulation  verfügbarer  Bedarfsanalyse  erkannten 
Bedarf 
strategischen 
Reaktionsplans. 

anderem,  des  UN-geführten 

einschließlich,  unter 

f)  Aktive Suche nach zusätzlichen freiwilligen Beiträgen der EU-Mitgliedsstaaten, um 
zu gewährleisten, dass die angemessene Finanzierung für Syrien sich nicht negativ 
auf die Fähigkeit der ECHO auswirkt, in anderen humanitären Krisen Bedürfnisse 
erfüllen zu können.  

g)  Damit  die  begrenzten  Ressourcen  bestmöglich  genutzt  werden  können,  sollte  die 
ECHO  die  Möglichkeit  erforschen,  kostengünstige  Einsparungen  mittels  der 
Bereitstellung  einer  besser  vorhersehbaren  Finanzierung  für  Haupt-Agenturen  für 
Notfallmaßnahmen zu untersuchen.  

h)  Weiterhin  mit  anderen  EG-Finanzierungsinstrumenten  zusammenarbeiten,  um 
Möglichkeiten  für  ergänzende  Entwicklungsfinanzierungen  für  Interventionen 
aufzufinden, so dass der Druck auf humanitäre Ressourcen verringert wird – ohne 
bei den humanitären Grundsätzen Kompromisse einzugehen.  

ECHO-Programm  weiter  anpassen,  um  auf  den  besonderen  Kontext  der 
Syrienkrise zu reagieren (R.2). 

  Angesichts  der  Dauer  des  Konfliktes  sollte  die  ECHO  eine  Lockerung  der  aktuellen 
Beschränkungen bei den Richtlinien für entferntes Management in Betracht ziehen, um 
Interventionen  bei  lebensrettenden  Maßnahmen  nicht  zu  beschränken.  Die  ECHO-
Partner haben inzwischen enge Verbindungen zu lokalen Partnern aufgebaut, die ihre 
Fähigkeit unter Beweis gestellt haben, prinzipienfeste humanitäre Hilfe  innerhalb von 
Syrien  bereitzustellen.  Die  ECHO  sollte  die  Finanzierung  von  Projekten  zur 
Existenzsicherung über Protokolle für entferntes Management in Betracht ziehen, wo 
dies angemessen gerechtfertigt ist (R2.1). 

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EVALUATION OF ECHO’S RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
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  Angesichts  des  großen  Schutzbedarfs  in  Zusammenhang  mit  der  Syrienkrise  und  der 
Bedeutung der ECHO bei der Unterstützung dieses Sektors wird empfohlen, dass die 
ECHO  die  Finanzierung  von  Tätigkeiten  im  Zusammenhang  mit  Schutzmaßnahmen 
weiterhin  prioritär  behandelt.  Dies  sollte  den  Aufbau  von  Dialogen  und  Kapazitäten 
mit  der  Implementierung  von  Partnern  einschließen,  um  zu  gewährleisten,  dass  der 
Schutz zeitnah erbracht werden kann. (R2.2). 

  Angesichts der fortbestehenden Gewalt und Instabilität innerhalb Syriens kann davon 
ausgegangen  werden,  dass  es  weitere  Auswanderungen  von  Flüchtlingen  geben  wird. 
Die ECHO sollte eine starke und flexible Fähigkeit vorsehen, um auf die Bedürfnisse 
neuer Flüchtlingsfallzahlen zu reagieren (R2.3). 

  Die  ECHO sollte  weiterhin die Nutzung koordinierter bedingungsloser Geldtransfers 
fördern, um die Grundbedürfnisse erfüllen zu können. Die ECHO hat bedingungslose 
Geldtransfers  in  den  Libanon  und  nach  Jordanien  unterstützt,  mit  denen  zahlreiche 
Bedürfnisse  von  Flüchtlingen 
in  Nachbarländern  gedeckt  wurden.  Vielseitig 
verwendbare  Geldtransfers  haben  sich  bezüglich  der  Deckung  von  zahlreichen 
Basisbedürfnissen  in  stark  urbanisierten  Aufnahmeländern  mit  funktionierenden 
Märkten und Banksystemen sowohl als effizient wie auch als effektiv erwiesen. (R2.4) 

auf 
Konzentration 
Vergabevereinbarungen, ergänzt um sorgfältig priorisierte Elemente der regionalen 
Koordination (R.3). 

die  Koordination 

Landesebene 

und 

auf 

auf 

Der  Wert  der  regionalen  Koordinationsstrukturen  war  beschränkt  und  die  regionalen 
Vergaben  waren  ineffizient.  Aus  diesem  Grund  wird  empfohlen,  dass  die  ECHO  die 
Finanzierung 
sich  auf  die 
regionaler  Koordinationsaktivitäten  einschränkt  und 
Koordination  zwischen  verschiedenen  grenzüberschreitenden  Maßnahmen  und  auf 
Maßnahmen  innerhalb  Syriens  konzentriert,  die  Investition  in  die  Stärkung  der  Kapazität 
des UNHCR in Betracht  zieht,  um ihre Verantwortung  für humanitäre Koordination auf 
Landesebene über Zuschüsse für eine Soforthilfestruktur auf zentraler Ebene zu entlasten. 
Mehrländerverträge sollten abgebaut und diese durch Ein-Land-Verträge ersetzt werden.  

Verstärkung des direkten Dialogs mit den nationalen Behörden in den Ländern, die 
Flüchtlinge aufnehmen (R.4). 

Es  wird  empfohlen,  dass  die  ECHO  systematisch  versucht, 
ihr  Verhältnis  zu 
aufnehmenden  Regierungen  in  der  Region  zu  stärken,  indem  sie  während  der  Missionen 
der  ECHO-Beamten  regelmäßige  Verbindungstreffen  mit  nationalen  Amtskollegen 
einrichtet,  die  von  regelmäßigen  Meetings  mit  vor  Ort  befindlichen  Fachleuten  ergänzt 
werden. Diese Meetings sollten insbesondere dazu genutzt werden, Diskussionen zu führen 
im  Zusammenhang  mit  der  Förderung  humanitären  Raums,  der  besseren  Koordination 
zwischen  den  ECHO-Partnern  und  der  Regierung,  der  bedürfnisorientierten 
Vorgehensweise usw.  

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EVALUATION OF ECHO’S RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
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Aufbau 
Finanzierungsinstrumente der EG (R.5). 

Synergien  mit 

größerer 

EU-Delegationen 

und 

anderer 

Die  ECHO  hat  beim  Aufbau  von  Verbindungen  zu  anderen  Finanzierungsquellen 
Fortschritte  gemacht,  insbesondere  auf  Brüsseler  Ebene.  Im  Hinblick  auf  eine  stärkere 
Integration  wird  Folgendes  empfohlen:  i)  Stärkung  der  Beteiligung  der  ECHO  in 
gemeinsame  Planungsprozesse  mit  den  EU-Delegationen,  ii)  Einrichtung  der  besten 
Vorgehensweisen  für  die  integrierte  Programmierung;  Aufbau  in  Richtung  potentieller 
Ausstiegsstrategien für die ECHO. 

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EVALUATION OF ECHO’S RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
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1.  Introduction 

This  is  the  Final  Report  of  the  Evaluation  of  the  ECHO  Response  to  the  Syrian  Crisis, 
commissioned by the Evaluation Sector of the Directorate General Humanitarian Aid and 
Civil Protection (ECHO). 

This introduction is divided in two parts:  

  A brief introduction on the subject, scope, and purpose of the evaluation ; 
  A presentation of the report.  

1.1  Evaluation subject, purpose and scope  

As  shown  in  Figure  1,  the  evaluation  subject  is  the  relevance  (including  coherence, 
connectedness and EU added value), effectiveness (including impact), efficiency (including 
cost-effectiveness), and sustainability of ECHO’s response to the Syrian crisis from 2012-
2014.  

Figure 1 – Evaluation subject, purpose and scope: 

The evaluation purpose is threefold:  

  Retrospective: to  provide  accountability  for  the  large  portfolio  of  funds  channelled 

through ECHO in response to the Syrian crisis over the evaluation period; 

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Purpose•Provide comprehensive retrospective assessment•Include elements of a real-time evaluation •Provide a prospective assessment for future Syria strategySubjectEvaluation of ECHO’s response to the Syrian crisisrelevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainabilityScope•Geographic: Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq•Temporal: 2012-2014 •Thematic: all sectors covered by ECHO’s response to the crisis•Operational:only those operations targeting Syrian refugees and IDPs 
 
 
 
 
 
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  Real-time: to provide feedback to country desk officers for immediate use as the crisis 

continues to develop in 2015;  

  Forward-looking: 

the 
performance  of  ECHO-funded  operations  in  the  region,  in  light  of  the  emerging 
threats and challenges that donors will face in the coming years.  

to  provide  concrete  recommendations  for 

improving 

The evaluation is geared to a wide range of stakeholders, including ECHO HQ and country 
level  staff.  Its  forward-looking  recommendations  may  be  beneficial  to  other  evaluation 
stakeholders  (notably  national  and  regional  stakeholders,  and  other  humanitarian  donors 
and agencies). The evaluation’s overall recommendations may be of particular value in the 
light  of  ECHO’s  2015  Mid-Term  Review  (MTR)  and  the  design  of  ECHO’s  2016 
Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP). 

The scope of the evaluation covers ECHO-funded operations in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, 
Iraq and Turkey over the period 2012-2014. It should in this respect provide answers to the 
set  of  18  evaluations  questions  provided  in  the  TOR.  Where  useful,  it  should  also  draw 
lessons  on  the  different  sectors  in  which  support  was.  It  excludes  any  operations 
concerning other crises in those countries during the same period, e.g., Palestinian refugees 
in  Lebanon  or  Jordan,  or  Iraqi  IDPs  covered  by  DG  ECHO’s  Humanitarian 
Implementation Plan for Iraq 2012-2014. 

1.2  The final report 

The purpose of this report is to present a summary of the work carried out, the evaluation 
findings  per  evaluation  question,  the  conclusions  drawn  from  these  findings  and  the 
recommendations for the future. It is structured in 6 sections: 

  Section  1,  introduction: outlines the evaluation purpose,  scope  and  the  structure  of 

the final report. 

  Section  2,  evaluation  context:  presents  a  snapshot  of  the  Syrian  crisis  and  of  DG 

ECHO’s response. 

  Section  3,  methodological  approach:  presents  the  evaluation  phases,  evaluation 

questions, the challenges of the evaluation and the data collection tools used. 

  Section  4,  findings  per  evaluation  question:  provides  answers  to  the  different 

evaluation questions. 

  Section 5, conclusions: presents the conclusion drawn from the evaluation questions. 
  Section  6,  recommendations:  presents  the  recommendations  for  the  future  drawn 

from the conclusions. 

The final report also includes four annexes: 

  Annex 1 – Evaluation terms of reference 
  Annex 2 – Evaluation Inventory  
  Annex 3 – Country reports 
  Annex 4 – Bibliography  

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2.  Evaluation context 

2.1   Regional context: a worsening humanitarian crisis 

Over  the  evaluation  period  2012-2014,  the  humanitarian  crisis  worsened  for  the 
Syrian populations inside and outside the country. Inside Syria, as of 31 March 2015, 
over  200,000  people  had  been  killed  and  1  million  injured.  Human  rights  violations 
occurred  in  a  context  of  insecurity  and  disregard  of  international  law,  international 
humanitarian law and human rights law.1  

Humanitarian access was impeded by the use of siege tactics by multiple conflict actors, of 
indiscriminate  bombardment  and  refusal  of  humanitarian  access,  and  the  presence  of 
multiple extremist groups willing to target and kidnap humanitarian workers. The number 
of people living in areas that are difficult or impossible for aid agencies to reach rose to 2.5 
million in 2013  and then  doubled again  to 4.8  million at the  start of 2015.2 In 2014,  UN 
inter-agency  convoys  reached  only  1.1  million  beneficiaries  in  the  worst  affected  areas,  a 
drop  of  almost  1.8  million  from  2013.3 Likewise,  over  the  period  between  February  and 
June 2014, there was a 96% reduction in the amount of food and agriculture aid received 
by people in areas that are difficult or impossible to reach.4  

Against  this  backdrop,  displacement  continued  to  grow.  The  total  number  of 
displaced  persons,  including  both  internally  displaced  persons  and  refugees  in  other 
countries,  experienced  rapid  growth  over  the  evaluation  period  and  shows  no  signs  of 
reducing in the near future: 

1   UNHCR (2015) Updated Overview: 2015 Syria Response Plan and 2015-2016 Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan, 

p. 2. 

2   Oxfam et al. (2015) Failing Syria: Assessing the impact of UN Security Council resolutions in protecting and assisting 

civilians in Syria. 

3   OCHA (2015) Humanitarian Bulletin Syria, January 2015 (52): 3. 

4   OCHA (2014) “Humanitarian Needs Overview for the Whole of Syria”, at the Regional Whole of Syria Meeting in 

Beirut, 3 November 2014, slide 23. 

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Figure 2 – Persons displaced by the Syrian conflict (millions)5 

As  described  in  the  following  sections,  the  evolution  of  refugee  flows  into  each  of  the 
neighbouring countries has varied as a factor of shifting areas of fighting and changes in 
border policies. But in all countries, the largest growth took place in the end of 2012 and 
first half of 2013, during which period the international humanitarian response was scaled-
up significantly.  

The  prospects  for  safe  return  to  Syria  remain  limited  at  this  stage.  Consequently, 
Syrian  refugees continue to depend on the  assistance  provided by host countries and the 
international humanitarian community. As the following section outlines, the context and 
aid  delivery  parameters  vary  significantly  between  each  country  and  between  both  camp 
and non-camp settings. 

5   Figures unavailable for the number of IDPs prior to October 2012. 

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024681012Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)RefugeesSource:UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response, Inter-Agency Information Sharing Portal, accessed on 22ndSeptember 2015; and UN OCHA Syria Humanitarian Bulletins 2012-2015(Evaluation period: 2012-2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
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2.2   Country contexts 

The Syrian crisis is taking place in a region of middle-income countries with a high rate of 
urbanization and a long history of turbulence. 

Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey are all middle income countries with a GNI 
per capita of over US$1,045. Of the five countries, Syria has the lowest income levels and 
remains the only lower middle income country among them. 

Table 1 – Country income levels and population data6 

Country 

Income level  GNI per 

capita 
(current 
US$)* 

Population 
(millions) 

Urban 
population (%) 

Population 
under 15 (%) 

Upper Middle 
Iraq 
Upper Middle 
Jordan 
Lebanon  Upper Middle 
Lower Middle 
Syria 
Upper Middle 
Turkey 
* Atlas Method. All figures for 2014, except Syrian Arab Republic, for which GNI is only 
available for 2007 

6,320 
5,160 
9,800 
1,860 
10,840 

34.8 
6.6 
4.5 
22.2 
75.9 

69 
83 
88 
57 
73 

41 
36 
24 
37 
26 

All  five  countries  have  young,  relatively  urbanised  populations.  Each  of  the  four 
neighbouring countries have higher levels of urbanisation than  Syria itself, averaging 78% 
of the population in urban areas as defined by national statistical offices, compared to 57% 
inside Syria. The populations of all five countries are young, with an average of one third of 
the population under the age of 15 in 2014. 

Political  instability  and  insecurity  has  been  a  recurring  feature  of  the  region. Iraq, 
Syria and Lebanon have all undergone civil conflict or occupation by foreign forces in the 
recent past. Turkey  and Jordan are stable  in comparison, both falling  well outside the 50 
most  fragile  states  worldwide  in  2015. 7 Nevertheless,  Turkey  has  seen  internal  conflict 
related  to  the  rights  of  its  Kurdish  ethnic  minority,  whilst  Jordan  hosts  over  2  million 
registered Palestinian refugees – constituting just under a third of its total population8. 

Despite  these  common  factors,  the  country  contexts  faced  by  conflict-affected  Syrians 
differs  significantly  between  each  of  the  five  countries  under  the  evaluation  scope,  as 
detailed below. 

6   Source: World Bank Country Reports, accessed on 22nd September 2015 http://data.worldbank.org/country/syrian-

arab-republic  

7   US Fund for Peace (2015) Fragile States Index. 

8   UNRWA figure as of July 2014, accessed on 23rd September 2015 http://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/jordan  

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Syria 

People in need: 

As of the end of the evaluation period, in December 2014, a total of 12.2 million people 
were in need of humanitarian assistance inside Syria. This represents a twelvefold increase 
since  the  start  of  the  crisis  in  2011.  Of  the  12.2  million  in  need,  over  7.5  million  were 
internally displaced, and 4.8 million were in hard to reach areas. 

The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) grew throughout the evaluation period 
in response to the ongoing severity of the complex, multi-sided and fast-moving conflict. 
But  the  greatest  growth  in  IDP  numbers  were  seen  over  the  first  two  years  of  the 
evaluation period, 2012-2013, as illustrated in the following figure: 

Figure 2 – Evolution of Internally Displaced Persons inside Syria (Jan 2012-2015) 

Humanitarian needs and response parameters: 

Needs  assessments  inside  Syria  vary  considerably  between  organisations,  but  OCHA 
estimates for December 2014 suggest that: 

  9.8 million people were considered food insecure. 
  The  Global  Acute  Malnutrition  (GAM)  rate  was  7.2%  across  13  governorates 
covered  by  a  series  of  rapid  nutrition  assessments  in  July  2014;  whilst  the  Severe 
Acute Malnutrition (SAM) rate was registered at 2.3% in the same assessment. 

  11.6 million were in urgent need of access to clean water. 
  Only 43% of Syria’s hospitals remain fully functional. 
  25% of Syria’s schools have been damaged, destroyed or used as collective shelters 

or other non-educational purposes. 

  1.6  million  people  are  in  need  of  shelter,  with  1.2  million  houses  damaged  or 

destroyed. 

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Source: ADE0123456781/01/20121/01/20131/01/20141/01/2015InternallyDisplacedPersonsinsideSyria(Evaluation period: 2012-2014) 
 
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  Human  rights  violations  have  continued  to  occur  in  a  context  of  insecurity  and 
disregard  of  international  law,  international  humanitarian  law  and  human  rights 
law.9 

The ability of humanitarian actors to respond to these needs has been severely constrained 
by the crisis:  

  Humanitarian  access  has  been  impeded  by  the  use  siege  tactics,  indiscriminate 
bombardment and the presence of multiple extremist groups willing to target and 
kidnap humanitarian workers. 

  Staff of most major donor organisations and most expatriates have been impeded 

from entering Syria legally through the imposition of visa restrictions. 

  The conduct of cross-border humanitarian operations in areas not controlled by the 
government of Syria was initially hampered by the position of the Government of 
Syria. 

Kurdistan Region of Iraq  

Refugee population 

The  total  population  of  registered  Syrian  refugees  inside  Iraq  saw  rapid  growth  between 
August  2012  and  March  2013.  Thereafter,  numbers  continued  to  grow  with  varying 
rapidity,  decreasing slightly  from January 2014 to August 2014, and then increasing again 
with an influx from Kobane starting August through to January 2015.   

Figure 3 – Evolution of Syrian refugees in Iraq (Jan 2012 – 2015) 

Source: ADE on the basis of UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response, Inter-agency Information Sharing 
Portal, data extracted on 3 December 2015 

9   UNHCR (2015) Updated Overview: 2015 Syria Response Plan and 2015-2016 Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan, 

p. 2. 

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Figures taken at end of November 2014 show that, of the 230,000 refugees registered then, 
42% (88,286) were registered in camp, and 58% (144,201) were hosted in the community.10 
Those  in  camp  have  been  accommodated  across  camps  spread  across  Domiz,  Dohuk, 
Erbil,  Sulaymaniyah.  The  demographic  breakdown  varied  between  camp  and  non-camp 
settings,  with  women  making  up  the  largest  share  of  refugees  in  camp  settings,  and  men 
making up the largest share in non-camp settings. 

Security and access constraints 

The security and access context in Iraq was complicated following the fall of Mosul to the 
so-called  Islamic  State  in  June  2014  and  the  ongoing  conflict  in  Central  Iraq,  which  has 
displaced 2 million Iraqis. The influx of IDPs into the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) has 
increased  the  competition  for  resources  and  placed  increased  strain  on  the  host 
government when responding to the Syrian refugee’s needs.11 The so-called Islamic State’s 
takeover of the Al Obayidi camp in Anbar province has made  this camp inaccessible for 
UNHCR  and  international  humanitarian  agencies,  although  some  assistance  is  still 
provided to the 1,900 refugees accommodated there by national NGOs. 

Host government policy 

The  KRI  government  has  provided  significant  support  to  the  Syrian  refugees  since  the 
crises  began  in  2012.12 It  has,  for  instance,  paid  infrastructure  costs  for  camps  in  Erbil 
governorate  and  contributed  to  health  and  education  costs  for  Syrian  refugees.  The 
government has also granted residency permits that include the right to work and freedom 
of movement.  

Border  policy  has  impacted  refugee  access  to  KRI  over  the  evaluation  period.  The  year 
2014  saw  the  closure  of  the  Peshkharbour  border  crossing  and  irregular  admission  and 
entry  restrictions  have  been  observed.  But  likewise  the  opening  of  a  new  entry  point  at 
Ibrahim Khalid (Zakho district) during the period of the so-called Islamic State attacks on 
the Kobane district allows the entrance of 13,000 refugees into KRI over a period of two 
weeks in 2014. 

Arrests  and  detention  of  refugees  for  irregular  entry  or  illegal  movement  has  continued, 
and the Government of Iraq has increasingly linked their concern for border violations to 
their concern for terrorist activities inside of Iraq.13  

10   3RP (2015) Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2015-2016. Iraq Country Overview. 

11   Ibid. 

12   Ibid. 

13   Ibid. 

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Jordan 

Refugee population 

Over  600,000  Syrian  refugees  were  registered  by  UNHCR  in  Jordan  over  the  evaluation 
period. The flow of refugees increased dramatically in 2013 (see figure below), with more 
than 1,800 arriving each day in early 2013, and then began flattening out in 2014, with 33 or 
fewer arriving each day between October and December 2014. 

Figure 4 – Evolution of Syrian refugees in Jordan (Jan 2012 – Jan 2015)14 

Source: ADE on the basis of UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response, Inter-agency Information Sharing 
Portal, data extracted on 3 December 2015 

Of  the  total  646,700  refugees  registered  with  the  Jordanian  Ministry  of  Interior  as  of 
October  2014,  the  largest  group  are  women  (23.5%),  with  20.7%  adult  males.  85% 
(550,000)  are  living  in  non-camp  settings  in  urban  and  rural  areas. 15  The  highest 
concentrations  are  in  Northern  and  central  Jordan  (Amman,  Irbid,  Mafraq  and  Zarqa 
governorates). The largest camp population is in Za’atari, with more than 80,000 people in 
October 2014. Azraq is the second largest camp hosting 13,700 in October 2014. 

14   UNHCR (2015), ‘Syria Regional Refugee Response, Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal’, last updated 24 April 

2015 

15   Government of Jordan’s official figures as of 18 October, 2014. 

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Host government policy 

Over the evaluation period, Jordan has hosted 646,700 Syrian refugees, amounting to 10% 
of  its  pre-crisis  population.  This  has  impacted  Jordan’s  fiscal  position  and  driven  up 
demand for basic commodities while contributing to rising inflation.16  

Pre-crisis  unemployment  levels  in  Jordan,  was  already  persistently  above  12%. 17 Syrian 
refugees, like all non-Jordanians, require a work permit in order to gain employment. But 
the  process  for  Syrian  refugees  to  obtain  a  work  permit  has  been  criticised  as  slow  and 
opaque  by  international  organisations. 18 This  has  contributed  to  gradual  exhausting  of 
refugee assets and the increased use of negative coping mechanisms. 

The  Government  of  Jordan’s  border  policy  has  included  sporadic  closures  of  border 
crossing  points  with  Syria.  Until  mid-2013,  the  Jordanian  government  permitted  entry  to 
Syrians  across  its  informal  border  crossings  with  Syria.  Most  Syrians  crossed  through 
western entry points from Da’raa, near Tal Shihab, Hayat and Al Naseeb. But in mid-2013, 
the  Jordanian  government  closed  these  informal  western  crossing  points  to  all  Syrians 
except  the  war-wounded  and  exceptional  cases.  Since  then,  crossing  points  have  been 
closed between Ramtha and Da’raa (by the Jordanian and Syrian governments) and Jordan 
has  barred  entry  at  Amman’s  Queen  Alia  International  Airport  to  Syrians  without 
Jordanian residency permits or special exceptions.19 

The closure of these crossing and entry points has forced Syrians fleeing to Jordan to pass 
through dangerous areas of Syria in order to reach the remaining eastern border crossings. 
There have, moreover, been cases of refugees being brought into Jordanian territory from 
eastern  crossing  points  “screened  at  the  Government  of  Jordan  registration  center,  and 
then immediately deported to Syria without being registered”.20 

Lebanon 

Refugee population 

Over 1 million Syrian refugees have been registered by UNHCR inside Lebanon over the 
2012-2014 period. With a pre-crisis population of approximately 4 million, the end of the 
evaluation period (1 January 2012 – 31 December 2014) saw Lebanon hosting the largest 
per  capita  refugee  population  in  the  world,  at  more  than  one  quarter  of  the  country’s 
population.21 

The  following  figure  presents  the  evolution  of  registered  refugees  over  the  evaluation 
period. The registration rate increased significantly in the first quarter of January 2013 and 
maintained a near constant level until the end of 2014. Since then, registered numbers of 

16   Kingdom of Jordan (2015) Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis, p. 16. 

17   Kingdom of Jordan (2015) Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis, p. 18.  

18   ILO (2015) Access to work for Syrian refugees in Jordan, p.5. 

19   Human Rights Watch (2015) Jordan: Syrians Blocked, Stranded in Desert. 

20   SNAP (2015). 

21   ECHO (2015) ‘Syria Crisis ECHO Factsheet April 2015’ 

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refugees  have  flattened.  On  6  May  2015,  UNHCR  Lebanon  temporarily  suspended  new 
registrations in accordance with the instructions of the Government of Lebanon.22 

22   UNHCR 

(2015) 

Syria 

Portal, 

Lebanon 

profile. 

Accessed 

on 

3 

December 

2015 

(http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122). 

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Figure 5 – Evolution of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (Jan. 2012 - Jan. 2015) 

Source: ADE on the basis of UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response, Inter-agency Information Sharing 
Portal, data extracted on 3 December 2015 

Host government policy 

The Government of Lebanon is not a party to the 1951 Convention relating to the status 
of refugees, and has not signed the 1967 Convention. It does not apply term “refugee” to 
Syrians that have entered Lebanon after fleeing their country. Instead, the Government of 
Lebanon refers to such individuals as “displaced”. 

The Government of Lebanon has been reluctant to open formal refugee camps for Syrians 
inside Lebanon. As a consequence, refugees are dispersed throughout urban and peri-urban 
host communities across the country. The majority are located in the Syria-adjacent Beqaa 
Valley  (481,189)  and  in  Beirut  (346,125),  followed  by  the  north  (286,882)  and  south 
Lebanon (140,255) regions.23 

Until the final quarter of 2014, the Lebanese government operated an open border policy 
with Syria. In December 2014, the Government of Lebanon introduced entry requirements 
for those seeking entry from Syria. As a consequence, those seeking entry were required to 
provide  evidence  that  they  fall  into  one  of  nine  eligible  categories  or  that  they  are 
sponsored  by  a  Lebanese  citizen.  Furthermore,  the  policy  allowed  Lebanon  to  revoke 
refugee  status  from  those  who  violate  Lebanese  laws,  their  conditions  of  entry,  or  those 
who repeatedly travel between Lebanon and Syria. 24 

23   ECHO (2015) ‘Syria Crisis ECHO Factsheet April 2015’ 
24   ECHO (2014) ‘Briefing update on ECHO's operations in LEBANON’. 

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Turkey 

Refugee population 

Over 2 million Syrian refugees have been registered in Turkey since the start of the crisis in 
2011. The evolution of refugee numbers shows a different progression to that of Lebanon, 
Jordan or Iraq. Whilst number of refugees entering the latter countries increased sharply in 
early  2013,  in  Turkey,  the  number  grew  steadily  throughout  2013  and  2014,  and  then 
increasingly  sharply  at  the  end  of  the  evaluation  period  (December  2014  onwards).  This 
may  in  part  be  due  to  the  changing  conflict  dynamics  across  Northern  Syria  over  that 
period. 

As  of  end-2014,  the  largest  concentrations  of  refugees  have  been  reported  in  the  south 
(Adana,  Hatay,  Osmaniye,  and  Gaziantep)  and  south  east  (Adiyaman,  Kahramanmaras, 
Kilis,  Mardin,  Sanliurfa)  of  Turkey25.  However,  increasing  numbers  are  understood  to  be 
dispersing  to  the  large  urban  centres,  including  Istanbul,  Ankara  and  Izmir,  in  search  of 
employment opportunities. Approximately 265,000 refugees are housed in 25 government-
run refugee camps26, but the vast majority live outside camps in urban and peri-urban areas. 

Figure 6 – Registered Syrian refugees in Turkey (Dec. 2011- Dec. 2014) 

Source: ADE on the basis of UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response, Inter-agency Information 
Sharing Portal, data extracted on 3 December 2015 

25   3RP (2014) ‘Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2015-2016 - Turkey’, p7 

26   As of 20.July.2015 https://www.afad.gov.tr/TR/IcerikDetay1.aspx?IcerikID=848&ID=16   

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Host government policy 

Since the start of the Syrian crisis in 2011, Turkey has provided a high standard response 
for  refugees  and  declared  a  temporary  protection  regime.  As  of  end-2014,  Turkey  had 
constructed 22 camps (with three more completed in 2015) and ensured non-refoulement 
for  the  1.6  million  refugees  in  its  territory.  The  camps  have  been  set  up  and  run  by  the 
Turkish Government’s own Disaster and Emergency Management Agency.27  

In 2014, Turkey implemented a new policy framework governing its response to refugees 
in its territory. This new framework was bounded by two key legislative developments:  
  Firstly, the entry into force in April 2014 of the country’s first asylum legislation (the 
Law on foreigners and International Protection) which provided for the establishment 
of  a  specialized  institution  (the  General  Directorate  for  Migration  Management 
(DGMM) within the Ministry of Interior) to manage protection and migration-related 
matters; and 

  Secondly, the adoption of a Temporary Protection Regulation in October 2014, which 

foresaw the issuance of a TP Identification Document (TPID). 

Under  this  policy  framework,  each  newly  registered  refugee  in  Turkey  should  be  issued 
with a TPID, and the most vulnerable groups are expected to be identified by the DGMM 
and  then  prioritized  for  in-camp  accommodation.  The  TPID  should  then  provide  each 
refugee, in-camp or outside, with access to public services including health and education. 
This includes free access to primary and emergency healthcare and access to secondary and 
tertiary healthcare at the same fee-rate as Turkish citizens. The TPID should also provide 
access to certain sectors of the labour market and to social assistance.28  

As a result of this new policy  framework, registration is critical to ensuring full  access to 
services  for  refugees  in  Turkey.29 As  of  October  2014,  when  the  TPID  was  introduced, 
there  were  a  total  of  620,000  unregistered  Syrian  refugees  in  Turkey  (out  of  1.6  million 
total). 

2.3   ECHO’s response 

The following section presents the overview of ECHO funding in response to the Syrian 
crisis. It is based on the Evaluation Inventory presented in Annex II, which constitutes the 
full  inventory  of  ECHO-funded  contracts  within  the  evaluation  scope.  Annex  II  also 
provides details of the methods used to construct the Evaluation Inventory. 

This section covers 4 aspects of ECHO’s response: 

  Geographical distribution of ECHO funds 
  Sector breakdown of ECHO-funded operations across the region 
  Overview of funds per sector and partner for each country 

27 3RP (2014) ‘Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2015-2016 - Turkey’. 

28   3RP (2014) ‘Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2015-2016 - Turkey’, pp.5-6. 

29   3RP (2014) ‘Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2015-2016 - Turkey’, p6. 

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  Evolution of amounts contracted over the evaluation period 

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The geographical distribution of ECHO funds is presented in figure 7: 

Figure 7 – Geographical distribution of ECHO funds 2012-201430 

Source: ADE on the basis of ECHO HOPE database 

ECHO  contracted  €676  million  from  HIPs  in  response  to  the  Syrian  crisis  from  2012-
2014. The largest share of these funds has been allocated to Syria (45%), with Lebanon and 
Jordan together making up a further 46% of the total funds. 

The  total  €676  million  covered  a  wide  range  of  aid  sectors.  Figure  8  shows  the  sector 
breakdown of ECHO’s funding across the region: 

Figure 8 – Sector breakdown of ECHO-funded operations 2012-2014 

Source: ADE on the basis of ECHO HOPE database 

30   The figure shows the amount contracted in each country, including allocations under both single and multi-country 
projects. Thus, the total for Lebanon is equal to the sum of (the sum of the amounts contracted for all single-country 
projects in Lebanon) and (the sum of the amounts allocated to Lebanon under multi-country programmes). See the 
Evaluation Inventory in Annex II for the details of amounts given to each country under multi-country operations. 

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45%25%21%5%4%ECHO funding over the period, per country Lebanon(€169m)Turkey(€33m)Syria(€305m)Jordan(€142m)Total:€676mIraq(€27m)35%23%18%10%10%4%ECHO funding over the period, per sector Food(€159m)Healthand medical(€67m)Shelter(€235m)Multi-sector(€122m)Total:€676mProtection(€24m)Water/sanitation(€67m)Coordination(€2m) 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
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The  largest  share  of  ECHO’s  funds  were  channelled  towards  shelter  (35%).  Food  and 
multi-sector interventions together represented 41% of ECHO funding. 

The heterogeneity of the response across the region is visible when looking at the sectoral 
breakdown  per  country  (figures  9  to  13).  Whilst  shelter  and  food  are  in  the  top  three 
sectors funded for every country, as might be expected, the prevalence and relative priority 
of  protection,  multi-sector,  health  and  WASH  sectors  varies  significantly  between 
countries.  

On the other hand, the selection of implementing partners (figures 9 to 13) shows a degree 
of  similarity  across  countries,  with  the  largest  organisations  featuring  in  the  top  10 
implementing organisations in each country.  

Figure 9 – Sector breakdown and partner distribution of ECHO-funded 
operations in Syria 2012-2014 

Source: ADE on the basis of ECHO HOPE database & UN Financial Tracking Service extraction in May 2015 

Figure 10 – Sector breakdown and partner distribution of ECHO-funded 
operations in Lebanon 2012-2014 

Source: ADE on the basis of ECHO HOPE database & UN Financial Tracking Service extraction in May 2015 

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ECHO fundingper sector–Syria32%23%18%13%11%Food(€97.6m)Multi-sector(€56.2m)Healthand Medical(€39.1m)Water/sanitation(€34.6m)Coordination (€2m)Shelter(€69.6m)Protection,2%(€5.45m)Total:€304.7mTop 10 ECHO implementingpartners–Syria61.629.227.3181715.714.210.79.77010203040506070WFPICRCUNHCRWHOUNICEFDRCUNRWAIFRCIOMACTED(€m)€210.4m (69% of total commitmentin Syria)ECHO fundingper sector–Lebanon53%21%10%5%7%Shelter(€88.8m)Multi-sector(€35.9m)Food(€17.6m)Healthandmedical(€11.1m)Protection(€8.4m)Water/sanitation(€6.9m)4%Total:€169mTop 10 ECHO implementingpartners–Lebanon49.224.41710.69.17.15.85.44.64.30102030405060UNHCRDRCWFPHINRCSCSave TheChildrenMEDAIRPU-AMIDRC(REF.COUNCIL)(€m)€137.6m (81% of total commitmentin Lebanon) 
 
 
 
 
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Figure 11 – Sector breakdown and partner distribution of ECHO-funded 
operations in Jordan 2012-2014 

Source: ADE on the basis of ECHO HOPE database & UN Financial Tracking Service extraction in May 2015 

Figure 12 – Sector breakdown and partner distribution of ECHO-funded 
operations in Turkey 2012-2014 

Source: ADE on the basis of ECHO HOPE database & UN Financial Tracking Service extraction in May 2015 

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ECHO fundingper sector–Jordan38%16%15%14%11%Shelter(€54m)Water/sanitation(€20.9m)Multi-sector(€20m)Healthand medical(€15.1m)Food(€23.1m)Protection(€8.55m)6%Total:€141.8mTop 10 ECHO implementingpartners–Jordan 32.72215.512.676.956.75.64305101520253035UNHCRWFPUNICEFNRCIFRCTop upSCHIACTEDUNFPAMCS(€m)€116m (82% of total commitmentin Jordan)ECHO fundingper sector–Turkey39%33%20%5%Food(€13m)Shelter(€10.9m)Multi-sector(€6.55m)Healthand medical(€1.6m)Protection(€1.3m)4%Total:€33.4mTop 10 ECHO implementingpartners–Turkey135.2542.921.81.41.3510.502468101214WFPIOMIFRCDRCUNHCRDRC (REF.COUNCIL)MDMCAREPIN / GAAIMC(€m)€33.2m (99% of total commitmentin Turkey) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Figure 13 – Sector breakdown and partner distribution of ECHO-funded 
operations in Iraq 2012-2014 

Source: ADE on the basis of ECHO HOPE database & UN Financial Tracking Service extraction in May 2015 

Finally, the evolution of contracted funds over the evaluation period (based on the year of 
the  HIP  under  which  the  funding  was  contracted)  shows  a  significant  increase  in  2013. 
Country rankings remain the same over the period, except for Iraq and Turkey in 2014. 

Figure 14 – Evolution of ECHO-funded operations across the region 2012-2014 

Source: 

ADE 

on 

the 

basis 

of 

ECHO 

HOPE 

database

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ECHO fundingper sector-Iraq44%27%16%13%Shelter(€12m)Food(€7.3m)Water/Sanitation(€4.5m)Multi-sector(€3.5m)Protection(€0.1m)Total:€27.3mECHO implementingpartners-Iraq127.34.5210.50.102468101214UNHCRWFPUNICEFNRCMERCYCORPSIMCIRC-UK(€m)Total:€27.3m050100150200250300350400201220132014Evolution of ECHO funding over the period SyriaLebanonJordanTurkeyIraqTotal:€676m(€m)€156m€357m€163m 
 
 
 
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3.  Methodological approach 

This section presents the overall methodological approach for this evaluation, as well as a 
note  on  the  challenges  met.  This  includes  the  following  elements,  addressed  in  separate 
subsections below: 

  Evaluation phases;  
  Evaluation questions;  
  Data collection; 
  Limitations of the analysis.  

3.1  Evaluation phases 

As foreseen by the ToR, the evaluation was conducted in three main phases (desk, field 
and synthesis). Each phase had its own activities and deliverables.  

The following Figure summarizes the activities carried out in each phase, the deliverables 
produced and the interaction with the Steering Committee and Reference Group. 

Figure 15 – Evaluation Phases 

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Tasks•Kick-off meeting•Exploratory interviews•Funding mapping•EQ/JC/Indicators•Fine-tuned approach•Case study selection•Dissemination strategy•Interview guides& templates•Overall documentary analysis•Casestudy analysis•Preliminary responses to EQs•Approach for field phase•4 country missions•Field debriefings•Surveys (ECHO& partners)•Cross-checking and filling of information gaps•Responses to EQs•Conclusions •RecommendationsDeliverables•InceptionReport•Desk Report•Field Report•Draft Final Report•Final Report•SeminarSCSCSCSCSSCInceptionDesk studyFieldSynthesisSC: Steering Committee meeting; S: Dissemination Seminar 
 
 
 
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3.2  Evaluation questions 

The ToR defined a set of 18 questions to be answered by the evaluation. The main subjects 
of these questions are listed in table 3.1 below.  

Table 2 – Evaluation questions topics 

# 

Evaluation question topics 

EQ 1  On consistency with the 23 Principles and GHD 
EQ 2  On consulting local and regional communities 
EQ 3  On taking into account the needs of the most vulnerable 
EQ 4  On taking account the host populations 
EQ 5  On adapting the approach to shifting needs 
EQ 6  On the EU added value 
EQ 7  On taking into account the specific challenges of Urban settings 
EQ 8  On taking into account Protection 
EQ 9  On the success of Remote Management and on the use of guidance 
EQ 10  On the success of Cash and Vouchers and the use of context analysis 
EQ 11  On the appropriateness of the size of the budget 
EQ 12  On the appropriateness of monitoring systems 
EQ 13  On the experience with consortia and with a multi-country approach 
EQ 14  On the coordination of ECHO actions with other actors 
EQ 15  On the mainstreaming of LRRD 
EQ 16  On the successfulness of LRRD 
EQ 17  On taking into account the security situation 
EQ 18  On the effectiveness of Humanitarian Advocacy 

These questions can be grouped in seven themes:   
  Overarching question: EQ 1; 
  Design and answering needs: EQs 2 to 6 all can be grouped under issues that relate 
mainly to design and relevance (with some specificities for EQ 6 on value added); 
  Specific  thematics:  EQs  7  to  10  all  relate  to  effectiveness  with  respect  to  specific 
issues  or  themes,  even  if  they  also  examine  also  their  design  and  hence  relevance 
aspects; 

  Management and efficiency: EQs 11 to 13 can all be linked to efficiency issues, even 

if effectiveness is also at stake here; 

  Coordination: EQ 14 concerns very specifically coordination with different actors; 
  LRRD: EQs 15 and 16 concern LRRD and thus sustainability of support, but also the 

issue of coherence and complementarity; 

  Specific  items: EQs 17 and 18 concern two specific items: the security situation and 

humanitarian advocacy.  

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3.3   Data collection 

The evaluation has been structured  around five country  case  studies, one  for each of the 
neighbouring  countries.  These  case  studies  encompassed  both  desk  and  field  work.  The 
team visited each of the neighbouring countries. No field visit to Syria was organised, but 
the  team  conducted  extensive  interviews  in  Amman  on  the  ECHO  support  provided  in 
Syria  and  telephone  interviews  with  ECHO  partners  operating  inside  Syria  both  inside 
Damascus and through local partner organisations in areas controlled by armed opposition 
groups. 

The results are gathered in country notes that are annexed to this report. Each note has a 
similar structure, with six sections: i) introduction; ii) the specific context of the country; iii) 
an  overview  of  ECHO’s  support  in  the  country;  iv)  key  findings  with  respect  to  the 
evaluation questions; v) other relevant findings for the evaluation; vi) some lessons learned.  

The  information  collected  for  the  country  case  studies  was  furthermore  completed  by 
information collected at a more general level (i.e. not necessarily country specific), on the 
basis  of  both  documentary  sources  and  interviews  conducted.  Once  all  data  had  been 
collected  and  cross-checked  in  the  synthesis  phase,  information  gaps  were  identified  and 
filled using additional telephone interviews with ECHO partner offices in the region. 

Figure 16 below provides an overview of the data collection tools used for the evaluation, 
allowing  for  a  cross-checking  of  information  gathered  from  different  sources.  The 
evaluation team interviewed a total of 122 stakeholders and reviewed 287 documents.  

Figure 16 – Data collection tools 

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Cross-checking of multiple information sourcesData collection & cross-checkingFace-to-face interviews (Bxls)Follow-up telephone interviewsField visits (Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon & Turkey)Agency reports and evaluations reviewECHO aid inventoryLiterature reviewPolicy/Strategy document reviewFinal partner telephone interviews 
 
 
 
 
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Stakeholders  met  included  representatives  from  the  EC  headquarters,  the  ECHO  field 
offices, the EU Delegations, Member States, UN Agencies, Local Authorities, International 
NGOs, local NGOs, and beneficiaries. The documents reviewed are presented in Annex 4.  

3.4   Limitation of the analysis 

This  evaluation  has  been  confronted  by  a  number  of  challenges,  which  the  team  had 
identified  by  the  start  of  the  evaluation,  and  which  were,  together  with  the  means  to 
mitigate them, discussed with the Steering Committee. 

Despite mitigating measures, a number of limitations of the exercise remain, as is the case 
in each evaluation. The team deemed it important to highlight these:  

  A  first  challenge  is  that  this  evaluation  concerns  an  on-going  crisis  and  response, 
even if the temporal scope concerns the period 2012-2014. The team has tried to deal 
with this by constantly remaining abreast of the evolution of the crisis and the response 
of the international community. To the extent possible, it has also tried to take relevant 
elements occurring in 2015 into account in the proposed recommendations.  

  The scope for this evaluation was also particularly wide and ambitious. The ToR 
requested the evaluation to respond to a set of 18 evaluation questions. Not only is this 
a high number of questions, but some of these questions would call for a very wide and 
comprehensive analysis in their own right. In addition the evaluation needed to work 
on the five countries concerned, trying to take into account the specificities of each of 
them.  Furthermore  there was a request to combine a retrospective assessment with a 
real-time and forward looking dimension, and to pay attention to specific sector issues. 
The team has dealt with this complexity mainly in two ways:  
- 

First  by  structuring  the  evaluation  exercise  to  a  large  extent  around  five 
comprehensive country studies, so as to better understand the specificities of each 
context; 
Second by making sure it was possible to address usefully the evaluation questions 
with the means foreseen. This involved grouping the questions by themes where 
possible  (e.g.  bringing  together  questions  on  relevance,  or  the  two  questions  on 
LRRD). Furthermore, the team made sure it addressed the issues of the evaluation 
questions at strategy level.  

- 

  The security  situation  was also a specific challenge in this evaluation. The team has 
gone to each of the neighbouring countries, but for security reasons it did not conduct 
a visit to Syria. This was compensated to the extent possible by gathering information 
on  Syria  from  face-to-face  interviews  with  ECHO  headquarters,  ECHO’s  Amman 
office, and telephone interviews with ECHO partners operating inside Syria (including 
both those based inside Damascus and those operating through local partners in areas 
controlled by armed opposition groups). 

  Due to the limited time available in the field, the Turkey field mission was also unable 
to  cover  cross-border  operations  conducted  from  Gazientep.  The  team  therefore 
conducted 
interviews  of  ECHO  partners  responsible  for  remote 
management operations from Turkey (and Iraq) in order to investigate this issue. 

telephone 

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4.  Answers to Evaluation Questions 

This section presents the findings for each evaluation question.  

The  team  has  addressed  some  of  the  18  evaluations  questions  defined  in  the  Terms  of 
Reference jointly, where this was deemed useful given the close linkages between the issues 
raised by the questions. This concerns question 2 to 4, all related to relevance and targeting 
issues, and the questions 15 and 16, both on LRRD.  

The finding are made on the basis of the data collection outlined in section 3, and form the 
basis of the conclusions of section 5.  

EQ 1 – Consistency with the 23 Principles and GHD  

To what extent is the ECHO response to the Syrian crisis consistent with the 23 
Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship? 

This is an  overarching evaluation  question. It aims at verifying whether ECHO  has observed  the broad 
range  of  issues  represented  by  the  23  “Principles  and  Good  Practices  of  Humanitarian  Donorship”, 
endorsed  in  2003  by  the  European  Union  and  other  donors.  As  this  is  an  overarching  questions,  it 
regularly refers to the other evaluation questions.  

EQs 1 – Consistency with the 23 Principles and GHD – Answer Box 

Globally, ECHO has a robust system of procedures in place that ensure consistency with 
the broad spirit of the GHD initiative. This has resulted in need-based funding decisions 
at  project  level,  leading  to  the  widespread  appreciation  of  ECHO  as  a  principles 
humanitarian  donor. However, at strategic  level, ECHO Humanitarian  Implementation 
Plans  for  the  Syrian  crisis  over  the  period  2012-2014  do  not  explicitly  refer  to  the  23 
GHD  Principles.  Some  principles  are  covered,  with  specific  requirements  placed  on 
ECHO  partners  to  meet  the  principles  of  impartiality  (GHD  Principle  2)  and  to 
encourage  consistency  with  LRRD  norms  (GHD  Principle  9).  But  the  majority  of  the 
GHD Principles are not referred to in ECHO’s strategic papers guiding its response to 
the crisis.  

Moreover,  questions  have  been  raised  about  the  proportionality  of  the  global  funding 
allocations  made  by  ECHO  to  the  Syrian  crisis  over  the  evaluation  period.  A  rapid 
scaling-up of funds over 2012-2103 was followed by a 50% cut in allocations for 2014 
(and cuts continue into 2015). The link between these steep fluctuations in funding and 
the level of IDP and refugee needs remains unclear.  

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Did ECHO deploy specific decisions and actions to ensure consistency 
with the 23 principles in the Syrian crisis? 

ECHO strategy papers for the Syrian crisis response over 2012-2014 do not make an 
explicit attempt to ensure consistency with the 23 principles of good humanitarian 
practice (GHD).31 Reference to individual GHD principles in their own right, moreover, 
was patchy: 
  Requirements  were  included  to  ensure  partners  demonstrate  their  commitment  to 
impartiality  when  acting  inside  Syria  (GHD  Principle  2)  and  encourage  consistency 
with LRRD norms (GHD Principle 9). 

  Awareness of the IHL violations inside Syria was demonstrated in each of the ECHO 
HIPs for the Syrian crisis, but without explicitly including requirements from partners 
to respect and promote IHL (GHD Principle 4). 

Nevertheless,  ECHO  already  has  in  place  a  range  of  systems  and  procedures  to 
ensure consistency with the 23 principles, including : 
  Learning  and  accountability  mechanisms 

to  support  effective  and  efficient 

implementation of humanitarian aid (GHD Principles 21-23). 

  At  project-level,  a  funding  system  that  requires  partners  to  provide  thorough  needs 
assessments when making funding proposals, backed up by technically competent staff 
able to assess the validity of partner appraisals and make funding decisions accordingly 
(GHD Principle 6). 

  At strategy-level, global crisis funding allocations that linked to an Integrated Analysis 
Framework that, to a certain extent, is backed by needs assessment (although the clarity 
of the link from needs to global funding levels has also been questioned in this crisis. 
See EQ11 in this regard) (GHD Principle 12). 

Were there specific examples of where the Syrian response was (or was 
not) in line with the 23 Principles? 

The  evaluators  identified  several  examples  of  how  ECHO’s  support  has  been  in 
good alignment with the GHD principles: 
  Broadly  speaking,  ECHO  was  widely  perceived  as  a  principled  donor,  in  terms  of 
supporting  the  four  humanitarian  principles  of  humanity,  impartiality,  neutrality  and 
independence  (GHD  Principle  2).  NGO  stakeholders  cited  ECHO’s  willingness  to 
work  wherever  there  are  needs,  regardless  of  nationality,  ethnicity  or  territory.  This 
point is corroborated by the evaluation inventory, which shows that ECHO’s support 
concerned  the  protection  of  Syrian  civilians  in  all  areas  and  covered  a  wide  range  of 
sectors (provision of food, water and sanitation, shelter, etc.).  

  The strategic decision to support the delivery of humanitarian aid to AOG-controlled 
areas  of  Syria  from  2013  onwards  –  in  addition  to  continuing  operations  inside 
government-held zones – was widely seen as a critical element in implementing needs-
based, impartial aid (GHD Principle 2). The needs of Syrians in AOG-controlled areas 
are, in many cases, severe. The difficulty of reaching such populations created a gap in 
the  international  response  in  many  areas  of  North  West  Syria  in  particular.  ECHO’s 

31   ECHO Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIP) Syria (2012, 2013, 2014). 

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approach to working with its partners on remote management guidelines and standards 
helped to ensure that it could assist those in need even in some of the hardest-to-reach 
areas. Moreover, ECHO specifically sought to work with its partners to ensure that the 
use of local partners to deliver aid inside Syria did not impinge upon the provision of 
principled humanitarian aid. 

  ECHO has invested significant resources in supporting the role of the UN system in 
the  Syrian  crisis  response  (in  line  with  GHD  Principle  10).  Efforts  were  made  by 
ECHO’s regional office and headquarters to enhance the regional coordination of the 
response through the UN system. Whilst difficulties remain in this regard (outlined in 
more  detail  in  EQ  14),  ECHO’s  efforts  were  appreciated  by  UN  agencies.  At  single 
country  level,  ECHO  also  contributed  to  the  establishment  of  a  broad-based 
coordination  platform  in  Lebanon,  led  by  UNHCR,  which  included  non  UNHCR-
financing  partners  as  well  as  its  direct  partners.  Several  stakeholders  noted  that  this 
platform,  once  established,  helped  to  improve  coordination  of  the  response  in  the 
country. 

Questions can be asked about the proportionality of the global funding allocations 
made by ECHO to the Syrian crisis over the evaluation period: 

  ECHO  rapidly  scaling-up  funding  over  2012-2103.  Starting  from  limited  funding  for 
the crisis in 2011, ECHO quickly scaled up to €156m in 2012, and then increased again 
by 129% to €357m in 2013. This increase followed the significant increases in refugee 
caseloads in neighbouring countries and the increasing needs of IDPs inside Syria (see 
EQ 5 on this point). 

  But, as outlined in EQ5 and 11, in 2014 ECHO cut funding by over 50% to €163m, 
despite  continuing  growth  in  refugee  numbers  in  neighbouring  countries.  ECHO 
representatives highlighted that a significant part of the 2014 funds was front-loading 
for 2014 and that many 2013 contracts were extended until the end of June 2015. The 
2015  HIP  maintains  this  level  at  €164m  (but  again  here  also  ECHO  representatives 
explained that the final allocation at the end of 2015 was more than the double). 

  Many partners observed that these fluctuations were had to predict on the basis of the 
needs assessments in the field (see EQ11 for further details in this regard). This created 
difficulties  for  partners  in  terms  of  planning  and  implementation.  But  in  addition  it 
raised questions about the extent to which ECHO’s funding allocations were guided by 
needs assessment and insulated from political pressure. 

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EQs  2  to  4  –  Issues  related  to  relevance  and  targeting: 
consulting local communities and taking into account the needs 
of the most vulnerable and of host populations32  

To  what  extent  have  the  design  and  implementation  of  ECHO-funded 
interventions  taken into account the  needs  of the  most vulnerable people in the 
region, in particular women, children, the elderly and disabled people? (EQ 3) 

To  what  extent  have 
implementation and monitoring of ECHO-funded projects? (EQ2) 

local  communities  been  consulted  in  the  design, 

To  what  extent  has  the  ECHO  intervention  taken  account  of  the  host 
populations, and what concrete measures have been taken to address their needs 
and interests? (EQ 4) 

These Evaluation Questions are grouped as they all relate to relevance and targeting issues, addressing three 
dimensions:  
  The targeting of  groups with  particular vulnerabilities (cf. the first article of Commission Regulation 

1257/96); 

  The importance of consulting with local communities, to understand and better take into account their 

needs and concerns, and to foster project ownership by these communities;  
  Addressing the specific needs of host populations when receiving refugees.  

EQs 2 to 4 – On relevance and targeting – Answer Box 

Several elements indicate that ECHO’s overall commitment to addressing the needs of 
specific vulnerable groups was translated into action.  About 40% of ECHO-supported 
projects targeted specific groups. This concerned in particular women and children, and 
to a lesser extent elderly or disabled people. ECHO’s deployed efforts to reach the most 
vulnerable  in general  (beyond  specific  categories)  are  also  reflected  in  its  support,  with 
around  50%  of  projects  geared  to  that  objective.  ECHO  was  confronted  with  specific 
challenges in this respect, notably (i) the difficulty of identifying the most vulnerable and 
the costs related to them; and (ii) the fact that the specific requirements or dispositions 
of  the  authorities  of  host  countries  hampered  identification  of  or  access  to  the  most 
vulnerable. With the decrease in HA resources, the call for a stronger focus on the most 
vulnerable became stronger.  

In  terms  of  relations  with  the  hosting  countries,  ECHO  has  a  commitment  to  ensure 
that its partners consult local and regional communities. There are several examples of 
ECHO partners engaging with local structures, but there are also indications that such 
consultation was not successful in some cases or was even lacking, so that it is difficult to 
determine  to  what  extent  such  consultation  took  place  adequately  or  allowed  better 
addressing of needs and enhanced ownership of the support by local authorities.  

That  said,  ECHO  made  sure  that  a  substantial  part  of  its  support  was  geared  to  host 

32   We have grouped together questions 2-4 to better structure the findings.  

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communities.  This  concerned  both  projects  (about  30%  of  the  projects  (in  number  of 
projects  and  amounts  concerned)  it  supported  were  related  to  this  goal)  and  specific 
advocacy  initiatives.  This  took  place  in  a  context  in  which  the  pressure  on  host 
communities was very high, with local authorities differing strongly  in  their capacity to 
deal with refugees.  

On targeting groups with particular vulnerabilities (EQ 3)33 

As regards the issue of the needs of the most vulnerable, one should distinguish between:  
  people vulnerable to specific threats under specific conditions, who may for instance be 
refugees in in a “no-man’s land” in border areas, who have not yet been registered or 
who have lost their papers;  
specific  categories  of  vulnerable  people,  namely:  women,  children,  the  elderly  and 
disabled people.  

 

Several elements indicate that ECHO’s overall commitment to addressing the needs of 
specific vulnerable groups is reflected in its support:  

  ECHO has supported different partners specialized in working with specific vulnerable 
groups,  notably  children  (e.g.  UNICEF,  Save  the  Children),  disabled  people  (e.g. 
Handicap  International);  it  also  supported  projects  with  other  partners,  targeting 
specific vulnerable groups (e.g. on gender-based violence);  

  more  specifically,  as  shown  in  table  3  below  41%  of  the  projects  and  47%  of  the 
funding  related  to  projects  that  tackled  at  least  one  of  the  categories  mentioned 
above; 34 this  concerned  mostly  women/gender  and  children;  whereas  disabled  and 
elderly people were much less targeted; 
stakeholders  met  underlined  that  ECHO,  notably  vis-à-vis  its  partners,  is  one  of  the 
donors that press for support for these vulnerable groups;  

 

33   We  have  dropped  here  the  structuring  in  Judgment  Criteria,  and  have  structured  the  text  alongside  the  three 

Evaluation Questions to facilitate reading.  

34   To  determine  how  many  of  the  projects  targeted  specific  categories  of  vulnerable  people,  we  screened  the  single 
forms  of  all  projects  financed  by  ECHO  over  the  period  2012-2014.  When  the  specific  objectives  or  indicators 
defined  for  this  project  related  to  one  of  the  categories,  we  counted  the  project  among  those  targeting  such  a 
category.  Of the funds given by ECHO to projects with at least one objective concerning most vulnerable people, 
around 40% went to projects targeting - among others - children.  

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Table 3 – Share of ECHO funded projects targeting vulnerable groups 

Category 

# projects  Funding 

(€ M) 

Share of projects 
targeting at 
least: 

Share of funding 
of those projects 

Total inventory 
Specific categories 

105 

Women  26 
Children  35 
Disabled  5 
Elderly  3 
43 

Projects mentioning at 
least 1 of the 4 categories 
Most vulnerable people 
61 
Source: ADE based on ECHO 

679.2 

185.4 
273.8 
29.6 
5.1 
316.2 

365.4 

25% 
33% 
5% 
41% 

58% 

Similarly,  ECHO  aimed  more  generally  at  gearing  its  support  to  “the  most 
vulnerable people”. As shown in table 2.1 above, this concerns 58% of the projects and 
54%  of  funding.  It  is  also  illustrated  by  specific  initiatives  such  as  the  2013  Vulnerability 
Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (VASyR),  which  was  fully  funded  by ECHO35.  This 
comprehensive assessment was conducted by WFP, UNHCR and UNICEF, and aimed at 
enabling  “humanitarian stakeholders to improve their programming and to target assistance to the most 
vulnerable”. Widely  appreciated,  it  is  supposed  to  remain  a  reference  document  which  has 
been updated in 2014 and 2015.  In Jordan, ECHO supported  the Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework, as well as a related baseline survey in 2015.36  

There are however also examples  where  such  targeting  did  not  really  take  place. In 
Turkey, for instance, there was no formal comprehensive needs assessment of the urban-
based Syrian population (see below for more details of the reasons). The establishment of a 
Directorate-General  of  Migration  Management  (May  2015) 
is  expected  to  bring 
improvements in this respect. The lack of assessment prevented geographical targeting, but 
NGOs were still targeting at local level on the basis of need and vulnerability.  

However  such  targeting  of  the  most  vulnerable  among  those  in  need  was 
challenged or influenced by different factors, notably:  

 

the difficulty of identifying the most vulnerable and the costs related to them:  
- 

stakeholders stressed that specific circumstances make it hard to identify the most 
vulnerable,  for  example  in  Lebanon  where  refugees  are  not  in  camps  but 
dispersed; another factor is that some refugees do not wish to be identified; 
it was  also stated that such  identification  is a labour-intensive process  with high 
costs; for instance the above-mentioned VASyR, funded by ECHO, was criticized 
in this respect. Lack of coordination in targeting exercises was also highlighted.  

- 

35   WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR, Vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, 2013 Report.  

36   UNHCR,  Vulnerability  Assessment  Frameowrk  (VAF).  Baseline  survey,  2015.  The  VAF  team  has  worked  under  the 
of 
oversight 
ACTED, CARE, DRC, Handicap International, PU-AMI, UNICEF, UN Women, WFP, WHO, ECHO and BPRM. 

Committee, 

composed 

UNHCR 

Steering 

VAF 

and 

the 

led 

by 

of 

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  specific requirements or attitudes of the authorities of hosting countries made it 

difficult to focus on the most vulnerable, viz.:  
- 

the Jordan Government systematically required 30% of NGO resources dedicated 
to the plight of vulnerable Jordanians, whereas many stakeholders underlined that 
Syrian refugees are far more vulnerable;  
stakeholders  explained  that  the  Government  of  Turkey  was  reluctant  to  allow 
agencies to collect data on needs and vulnerabilities, and that initiatives were at a 
standstill;  

- 

 

the impact of the decrease in resources for HA to Syrian refugees: as shown in the 
inventory, funding decreased between 2013 and 2014, whereas the number of refugees 
increased;  some  stakeholders  explained  that  this  created  pressure  to  target  more,  but 
that such targeting was then  driven more  by resource availability than  by need, while 
others explained that there was no relation between both. 

On consulting local communities (EQ 2) 

There  is  a  certain  commitment  of  ECHO  to  ensure  that  its  partners  consult  local 
communities  when  providing  support.  But  it  is  not  clear  to  what  extent  such 
consultation  was  sufficient  or  how  far  it  allowed  better  tackling  of  the  needs  and 
enhancing  of  ownership  of  support  by  local  authorities;  indeed,  findings  suggest 
otherwise, viz.:  

  There are several examples of ECHO partners engaging with local structures, rooted in 
the communities; in Syria, for instance, needs assessments for cross-border operations 
were  based  on interviews with local councils and actors, and moreover local partners 
were using hotlines to help with the needs assessments. In Turkey FPA partners have 
offices  at  local  level  that  facilitate  interaction  with  communities,  and  partners  often 
reported consulting with local village heads (mukhtars) to help identify beneficiaries. 
  But there are also indications that consultation was not as successful in some cases, or 
even simply lacking; in Jordan, for instance, interviewees suggested that the question of 
the impact of the crisis on local municipalities and the issue of donor exit strategies had 
not  been  sufficiently  addressed  (see  EQs15-16  below).  To  some  extent  such  lack  of 
consultation  is  a  recurrent  finding  of  humanitarian  aid,  where  the  emergency  creates 
pressure for rapid response with little time for consultation.  

Stakeholders  explained  that  beyond  the  formal  requirements,  and  although  it  took 
place  on  some  occasions,  there  was  no  structured  and  systematic  approach  to 
consultation  with  local  authorities  in  host  countries.  Embedding  such  an  approach, 
whilst  theoretically  preferable,  would  nevertheless  have  been  difficult  in  the  context  of  a 
quickly evolving refugee emergency.37 

37   The challenges of local authority consultation in the Syria refugee response have been highlighted in, inter alia, Oxfam 
Italia (2014) The Partnership with Local Authorities in Responding to Humanitarian Crisis: The case of Lebanon. 

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On taking account of the needs of the host populations (EQ 4) 

As illustrated by box below, the pressure on Syria’s neighbouring countries from the 
arrival of refugees is extremely high in all countries, viz.: 

  As shown in Table 2.2 below, the total share of refugees in the total population is very 
high, especially in Jordan and Lebanon where it reached 8.5% and 20% respectively by 
the end of 2014. 

  But one should also look at the absolute figures, which are for instance the highest in 

Turkey, which hosted at the end of 2014 close to 1.6 million Syrian refugees. 

  Similarly  refugees are not equally  spread across the territory, especially in Turkey and 
Iraq. In Turkey refugees are all very close to the border area with Syria, which means 
that the pressure in this region is extremely high; table 2.3 provides an estimate of the 
population of some key cities and of refugees in that area, and on this basis the number 
of refugees would be closer to 10% of the local population (in some border towns it is 
even estimated at around 50%). A similar exercise in Iraq shows that refugees represent 
close to 4% of the people in the area. 

  Finally, the figures in table 4 concerns registered refugees, that is they do not take into 

account unregistered refugees.38  

Table 4 – Number of registered refugees per country as share of the total 
population39 

Country 
Iraq 
Jordan 
Lebanon 
Turkey 
Egypt 

# Refugees 

234,196 
623,112 
1,147,494 
1,557,899 
138,381 

2014 
Population  Refugees/population 
0.66% 
8.40% 
20.45% 
2.01% 
0.15% 

35,273,293 
7,416,083 
5,612,096 
77,523,788 
89,579,670 

Source: ADE, based on UNHCR, UN World population prospects 

38   Different instances have made estimates about the number of unregistered refugees. An UNHCR survey found for 
instance for Lebanon that by mid-2015 the proportion of unregistered individuals in households surveyed was around 
4%,  and  estimated  therefore  that  at  the  national  level  approximately  40,000  Syrian  individuals  were  not  registered 
(WFP,  UNHRCR,  UNICEF,  Vulnerability  assessment  of  Syrian  refugees  in  Lebanon,  2015).  For  Jordan,  a  Handicap 
International/Help  Age  survey  estimated  that  3.6%  of  refugees  in  the  countries  were  not  registered  (Handicap 
International, Help Age, Hidden victims of the Syrian crisis: disabled, injured and older refugees).  

39   The refugee/population figures given here do not take into account the distribution within countries. In the case of 
Iraq, where the Syrian refugees are concentrated in Iraqi Kurdistan, this changes the density significantly, with Syrian 
refugees making up approximately 4% of the population of KRI. Likewise in Turkey, where approximately 10% of 
the population in the region bordering Syria are Syrian refugees. 

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Table 5 – Estimate of the number of refugees compared to the local population in 
the Turkish border area 

Provinces 

Kilis 

Gazientep 

Sanliurfa 

Hatay 

Mardin 

Osmaniye 

Adiyaman 

Adana 

Total 

2014 

# in-
camp 
refugees 

# non-camp 
refugees  

Total 
refugees 

Population  In-camp 

refugees / 
population 

49,000 

86,578 

128,781 

29.18 

37,578 

33,070 

79,665 

14,735 

2,858 

7,597 

9,854 

11,124 

220,000 

253,070 

1,889,466 

170,000 

249,665 

1,845,667 

190,000 

204,735 

1,519,836 

70,000 

12,000 

44,000 

72,858 

19,597 

788,996 

506,807 

61,215 

1,089,038 

2,500 

12,354 

597,835 

50,000 

61,124 

2,165,595 

213,696 

807,500  1,021,196 

10,532,021 

Non-
camp 
refugees / 
population 
38.05 

11.64 

9.21 

12.50 

8.87 

2.37 

4.04 

0.42 

2.31 

7.67 

Total refugees / 
population 

67.23 

13.39 

13.53 

13.47 

9.23 

3.87 

5.62 

2.07 

2.82 

9.70 

1.75 

4.32 

0.97 

0.36 

1.50 

1.58 

1.65 

0.51 

2.03 

Kahramanmaras 

17,215 

Source: ADE based on Turkish Statistical Institute and ORSAM (Center for Middle 
Eastern Strategic Studies) 

Box 1 – Pressure on host communities 

The arrival of Syrian refugees has created a lot of pressure on the host populations of 
Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey; especially in the regions and governorates receiving the 
largest numbers of refugees per capita. This pressure impacted upon several sectors, as 
illustrated hereafter: 
 

In terms of housing, Jordan witnessed an increased demand that “has pushed up rents 
up to 300% in some areas”40. In Turkey, cities close to the border are also dealing with 
this issue. Kahramanmaraş, for instance, faced similar problems such as “a staggering 
150%  increase  in  rental  prices  […]  and  the  fact  that  landlords  attempt  to  get  rid  of  Turkish 
tenants to rent places to Syrians are common problems”41. Even though no quantification of 
this phenomenon was given, the KRG recognizes facing the same problem in cities 
with  major  refugee  influx.  In  the  Bekaa  Valley  in  Lebanon,  which  hosts  an 
important number of Syrian refugees, rents have risen by as much as 200% over a 
six  month  period  in  2012.  Similarly  in  one  district  of  Beirut,  which  hosts  many 
refugees, an increase of 400% was reported. In the latter case, one should be careful 
to  link  this  entirely  to  the  crisis.  Indeed,  as  noted  by  a  UN  report,  “the affordable 
housing crisis in Lebanon predates the arrival of Syrian refugees and some of the impediments for 
the  production  of  affordable  housing  […]  stem  from  an  already  prohibitively  expensive  housing 
market where property values are exorbitant due, in large part, to unfettered speculation and the 
absence of affordable housing policies”42; 

  With  regard  to  employment,  several  sources  indicate  that,  even  though  the 

40   UN, HCSP, National Resilience Plan 2014-2016, Draft, January 2014. 

41   ORSAM, TESEV, Effects of the Syrian refugees on Turkey, Orsam report n°195, January 2015. 

42   UNHCR, UN-Habitat, Housing, Land and Property issues in Lebanon. Implications of the Syrian refugee crisis, August 2014.  

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presence  of  international  agencies  creates  jobs,  the  availability  of  cheap  Syrian 
workers and the loss of trade with Syria make it harder for unskilled people of host 
communities to find work. This increases the vulnerability of the poorest members 
of  the  host  communities.  In  the  Turkish  province  of  Sanliurfa,  for  instance,  the 
unemployment  rate  rose  from  8.0%  in  2011  to  16.3%  in  2013,  while  the  national 
unemployment  rate  went  from  9.8%  in  2011  to  9.7%  in  2013.43 In  the  Kurdistan 
region of Iraq (KRI), the World Bank44 found that the poverty rate had more than 
doubled, going from 3.8% in 2012 to 8.1% in 2014. According to an UNDP/ODI 
report45, the economies of the neighbouring countries are also deteriorating due to 
increased  government  expenditures  and  increased  budget  deficit.  In  Jordan, 
agricultural  exports  to  Syria  decreased  by  25%  and  GDP  growth,  which  was  on 
average 6.6% in the 2000-2008 period, went down to 2.7% in 201246.  

  Furthermore, the refugee influx has led to a significant strain on health care clinics. 
Turkish  hospitals  in  border  provinces  are  stretched  to  capacity  as  Syrian  refugees 
receive  30%  to  40%  of  the  services  they  offer47.  In  Lebanon,  due  to  the  massive 
refugee influx, increased caseloads of at least 50% were reported in 2012, which are 
accompanied  by  deficiencies  in  the  supply  of  drugs  and  vaccines,  shortages  in 
doctors and specialists such as dentists, gynaecologists.  Furthermore, even though 
additional medical support  is usually provided, it is not the case for administrative 
and  operational  support,  “leading  to  significant  strain  on  the  ability  of  clinics  to  effectively 
manage the increased numbers of patients”48. Added to that, resources usually allocated to 
poor  Lebanese  have  been  diverted  towards  supporting  refugees,  creating  more 
tensions  between  the  refugees  and  the  local  communities.  Indeed,  according  to  a 
World  Bank  report,  as  Syrian  border  hospitals  are  overcrowded,  “Lebanese  have to 
travel  longer  distances  to  seek  care  in  alternative  facilities,  and  incur  higher costs  especially when 
they shift their care to the private sector.”49 

  The refugee influx is also at the origins of an increase in water and energy supply 
and  in  solid  waste,  burdening  even  more  municipal  budgets.  In  Lebanon,  the 
Ministry of Energy and water estimates than Syrian refugees have contributed to a 
28%  increase  in  water  demand  and  waste  water  generation,  Jordan  being  now  the 
second water-poorest country in the world. Consequently, due to overcrowding and 
the  lack  of  proper  sanitary  conditions  (limited  access  to  safe  water,  substandard 
housing), the prevalence and  risk  of  diseases has increased: the incidence rate of 
infectious  diseases  like,  among  others,  measles,  hepatitis  A,  diarrhoea  and  acute 
respiratory infections have risen in Jordan and Lebanon (9 measles cases reported in 
2011 in Lebanon against 1,456 cases in 201350), while Iraq had to deal with a cholera 

43   Some other evolutions have also been observed: Turkey has been delivering goods such as food, cement and first-aid 
products  to  NGOs  and  areas  under  Syrian  opposition  control.  For  instance,  the  province  of  Gaziantep’s  export 
revenue increased by more than 70% and Sanliurfa, whose exports had dipped from $148.3 million in 2011 to $110 
million in 2012, raised to $153.7 million in 2013. 

44   World Bank, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq : assessing the economic and social impact of the Syrian conflict and ISIS, April 2015. 

45   Bailey  S.,  Barbelet  V.,  Towards a resilience-based response to the Syrian refugee crisis, A critical review of vulnerability criteria and 

frameworks, UNDP, ODI, May 2014. 

46   UN, HCSP, National Resilience Plan 2014-2016, Draft, January 2014. 

47   ORSAM, TESEV, Effects of the Syrian refugees on Turkey, Orsam report n°195, January 2015. 

48   World  Vision  Lebanon,  WV  UK,  Under pressure: the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on host communities in Lebanon,  July 

2013. 

49   World Bank, Lebanon: Economic and Social Impact Assessment of the Syrian Conflict, September 2013.  

50   World Bank, Lebanon: Economic and Social Impact Assessment of the Syrian Conflict, September 2013. 

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outbreak  in  September  2015  and  polio,  which  had  disappeared  years  ago,  was 
detected anew in Turkey. 

  The  drastic  increase  in  number  of  students  enrolled  at  schools  is  affecting  the 
quality of education for all children with the return of double-shifts in schools. In 
2013,  41%  of  Jordan’s  schools  were  overcrowded,  against  36%  in  2011.  There  is 
also  a  widespread  perception  that  Syrian  children  are  receiving  more  support  for 
education,  accentuating  tensions  between  refugees  and  host  populations. 51  The 
poorest  members  of  host  communities  becoming  more  vulnerable,  the  drop-out 
rates of poor students  and the  risk  of  child  exploitation  and  child-trafficking  have 
increased, as noted by.  

As  explained  hereafter,  host  countries  and  regions  differed  in  their  capacity  to 
handle the refugees, viz.:  

 

 

 

 

in  Iraq  95%  of  Syrian  refugees  reside  in  the  Kurdish  Region,  with  consequently,  as 
stated above, much pressure on this region; 
in Jordan : the majority of refugees live outside the camps with the greatest share living 
in  Amman  and  the  Northern  governorates.  The  Jordanian  government  has  shown 
considerable  willingness  to  host  Syrian  refugees  and  remains  open  to  the  assistance 
provided  by  the  international  community,  although  access  to  healthcare  outside  of 
camps  is  dependent  upon  documentation  only  available  at  a  cost.52 The  government 
also requires all NGOs providing assistance to Syrian refugees to ensure that 30% of 
their assistance goes to the host communities. 
in Lebanon the pressure is very high, the Syrian refugees representing more than 20% 
of total residents in the country, not even counting the Palestinian refugees; this leads 
to  deterioration  in  services  to  the  Lebanese  population,  with  overcrowded  schools, 
over-exploited water resources, etc..  
in  Turkey,  despite  the  very  high  number  of  refugees,  there  was  originally  no  real 
demand  from  the  Government  for  support;  later  the  position  changed  and  the 
Government even complained about the lack of support for its response.  

In  this  context,  several  elements  indicate  that  the  EU  was  well  aware  of  the 
importance  of  supporting  the  host  populations  and  has  taken  initiatives  in  this 
respect, viz.:  

 

 

first, the  importance  of the issue  is clearly acknowledged in ECHO’s general strategy 
documents, and also in its Syria-specific documents, notably the HIPs of the different 
countries, and the Single Forms;  
second, ECHO has taken several initiatives to support host populations: as shown in 
Table  6  below,  58%  of  ECHO-funded  programmes  concerned  host  populations 
(representing 54% of funding).  

51   A  world  vision  report  quotes  a  Lebanese  national  in  this  respect :  “Syrian children gets everything for free, their bags, books 
transportation, registration is paid, but Lebanese have to pay for everything”.World Vision Lebanon, WV UK,  Under pressure: the 
impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on host communities in Lebanon, July 20113. 

52   UNHCR (2014) Syrian Refugee Health Access Survey in Jordan. 

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Table 6 – Share of ECHO-funded projects linked to host populations53 

Category 

# projects  Funding  

Total inventory 

Host population 
Source: ADE based on ECHO 

(€ M) 

37,578 

33,070 

49,000 

220,000 

Share of projects 
targeting at least: 

Share of funding 
of those projects 

86,578 

253,070 

128,781 

1,889,466 

  The approaches varied by country:  

- 

- 

- 

- 

in Iraq the choice was to ensure that these issues would be part of the engagement 
of DCI rather than under ECHO; 
in Jordan there was the need to gear 30% of donor support to host populations. 
Several  stakeholders  interviewed  (from  ECHO  but  also  from  NGO)  explained 
that this was something they were probably not able to change; 
in  Lebanon  there  was  a  combined  advocacy  role  with  both  the  Delegation  and 
other  donors,  to  ensure  that  the  concerns  identified  were  covered  by  other  EU 
instruments.  
in  Turkey  ECHO’s  strategy  consisted  mainly  of  advocating  to  the  Delegation 
provision of support to host populations in sectors impacted by a refugee influx, 
in combination with specific projects that targeted host populations.  

It  is  not  clear  to  what  extent  these  initiatives  can  be  considered  successful  and 
sufficient.  

53   Figures represent the number of projects with host populations referred to in target beneficiary groups as specified in 

project singleforms. 

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EQs 5 – Adapting the approach to shifting needs  

A) To what extent have ECHO and its partners been successful in adapting their 
approach and addressing gaps to the shifting needs of the region, as the crisis has 
evolved? B) Considering that project activities of partners in many cases have been 
carried over from one funding cycle to the next, to what extent have  the partners 
been revising their approach – being innovative – to better address the needs? C) 
What modifications to approaches are needed for the future? 

This Evaluation Question covers three dimensions:  
 

first it aims at understanding to what extent ECHO and its partners have been sufficiently flexible in 
their approach, so as to ensure they could react to the evolving crisis and related needs of the region; 
the second part is linked to the first and aims at understanding whether ECHO and partners have 
effectively revised their approaches; 
the third part concerns modifications needed for the future; as this necessitates more recommendations, it 
is tackled globally in the recommendations section.  

 

 

EQs 5 – Adapting the approach – Answer Box 

Partly  as  a  result  of  the  setting-up  work  conducted  in  the  initial  crisis  phase,  ECHO 
developed a  range  tools  to  ensure  that  its  approaches  could  be  adapted  to the  shifting 
needs of the regions where support was provided. To remain informed of the changes, 
ECHO could rely on its partners, its presence in coordination mechanisms, its links with 
the donor community, the assessments that it co-financed, and so forth. It also applied 
budgetary  mechanisms  that  favoured  flexibility  based  on  regular  and  frequent  dialogue 
with its partners 

Several  elements  indicate  that  ECHO  has  also  made  effective  efforts  to  adapt  its 
approach,  and  pressed  partners  to  do  so,  so  as  to  better  address  gaps.  For  instance 
ECHO  has  been  able  to  rapidly  mobilise  large  amounts  of  funds  in  response  to  the 
increases  in  the  influx  of  refugees  in  the  different  countries.  Moreover  a  closer 
examination of ECHO’s strategy in the different countries shows that it has been able to 
adapt  to  changing  situations  and  needs  (for  instance,  by  (i)  introducing  specific 
programmes such as the newcomers programme, (ii) by devising its strategy based on the 
(changing) approach of the host country, as was the case in Turkey, and (iii) by shifting 
towards  the  use  of  multi-purpose  cash  transfers  to  assist  refugees  in  meeting  the  full 
basket of their basic needs rather than focusing only on sector-specific support. 

To what extent did ECHO and its partners have a strategy to adapt to 
shifting needs of the region?  

ECHO invested  heavily during the 2012-2013 period  in  both setting  up and expanding a 
large-scale  humanitarian  response  to  the  Syria  crisis.  This  involved  only  in  scaling  up 
ECHO’s own resources but also in supporting the organization of large-scale operations in 
countries  where  humanitarian  capacities  and  expertise  were  either  not  present  or 
inadequate to address a rapidly growing humanitarian crisis.  

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As  a  result  of  the  work  conducted  in  this  initial  crisis  phase,  ECHO  developed  a 
range tools to ensure that its approaches could be adapted to the shifting needs of 
the regions where support was provided, viz.:  

 

the  permanent  offices  of  ECHO  and  of  some  of  its  partners  allowed  better 
understanding  of  field  realities  and  changes  in  them;  ECHO  was  also  involved  in 
coordination  mechanisms  with  other  donors,  which  was  also  a  valuable  source  of 
information;  

  needs  assessments  were  financed  by  ECHO  (see  for  instance  the  Vulnerability 

 

Assessments in Lebanon and Jordan); 
several  partners  mentioned  that  ECHO  applied  mechanisms  that  favoured  flexibility. 
For instance in each budget line there is flexibility in 10% of the budget which allows 
partners  to  adjust  their  programmes  without  going  through  burdensome  processes 
(normally an oral consultation followed by written confirmation is enough).  

While  numerous  instruments  scrutinize  the  situation  inside  Syria  and  monitor  situational 
changes,  the  process  of  ensuring  a  quality  flow  of  information  that  would  facilitate 
adaptability  of  projects  and  the  donor-partner  dialogue  that  could  sustain  it  remained  a 
permanent challenge. ECHO had to rely on its capacity to triangulate different sources.  

To what extent did ECHO and its partners effectively adapt their 
approaches to the shifting needs in the region, while being innovative?  

Several elements, developed below, indicate that  ECHO  has  made  efforts  to  adapt  its 
approach,  and  push  its  partners  to  do  so,  which  allowed  them  to  better  address 
gaps.  

A  first  element  is  that  ECHO  has  been  able  to  mobilise  funds  very  rapidly  in 
response to the crisis (i.e. between 2012 and 2013). This is illustrated in Figure 5.1 below. 
It shows that for the four neighbouring countries, ECHO has been able to rapidly increase 
funding in response to an increase of refugees, with a decrease in funding in 2014 except 
for Turkey. This issue is further discussed under EQ 11. 

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Figure 17 – Evolution of refugees by country and of ECHO funding 

In each of the countries concerned, there are clear examples of ECHO adapting its 
approach to shifting needs, viz.: 

 

 

 

In  Iraq,  ECHO  has  revised  its  approach  further  to  the  sudden  influx  of  56,000 
refugees, and the subsequent influx of 500 a day as of 15 August 2013. ECHO closely 
monitored  the  situation  and  engaged  in  intensive  dialogue  with  other  partners, 
including  UNHCR.  It  provided  a  key  role  in  addressing  the  concerns  of  WASH  and 
shelter among newly arrived refugees in 2013 and in pushing for a coordinated, multi-
actor, long-term approach to urban and non-camp refugees in KRI. 
In Jordan, ECHO funding has adapted to the rapid growth of refugee numbers in 2013 
(with  1,800 arriving  every  day  and  an  increase  of 100,000  to  550,000  refugees  during 
that year), followed by a flattening-out in 2014. Support targeted both camp and non-
camp  settings.  As  a  strong  increase  in  the  flow  of  refugees  entering  Jordan  was 
foreseen,  UNHCR  and  the  GoJ  decided  to  proactively  plan  for  a  second  large-scale 
camp  to  avoid  the  slow  camp  establishment  process  that  marked  the  creation  of 
Za’atari camp. ECHO supported the construction and maintenance of a field hospital 
in the Azraq camp, with a capacity to shelter more than 100,000 refugees. 
In Lebanon the Newcomers programme was specifically set up following the influx of 
new refugees. This programme,  which consisted in providing  basic support to all  the 

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new refugees - wherever they entered and with a similar package regardless of the aid 
delivered - is a good example of adapting to a continuously-evolving situation.  

  ECHO’s  strategy  in  response  to  the  humanitarian  needs  of  the  Syrian  people  has 
evolved  significantly  over  the  period  under  review,  in  response  both  to  changing 
situations  and  to  an  enhanced  understanding  of  the  situation  and  of  the  needs  and 
capacities  of  its  partners.  Globally  ECHO  aimed  to  provide  support  both  inside  and 
outside government-controlled areas, but it had to refine its approach in dialogue with 
its  partners,  in  view  of  the  difficulties  of  deploying  aid  agencies  and  delivering 
meaningful  humanitarian  aid.  Three  key  directions  were  identified:  (i)  more  focus  on 
pure humanitarian aid (health, life saving aid provision, protection); (ii) identification of 
how to improve access; and (iii) creation of conditions for better targeting. The answer 
to  EQ  9  also  shows  how  ECHO  has  responded  to  security  challenges  through  its 
remote management approach.  
In Turkey also, ECHO clearly adapted to a changing situation: 
-  provision of HA in Turkey was originally not high on the ECHO agenda:  

 

o  initially a larger number of refugees were concentrated in Jordan and Lebanon;  
o  the  GoT had considerable  ability to respond, and the  presence  of the refugees 

was not seen as such a threat to the stability of the State;  

o  AFAD controlled the response in conjunction with the Turkish Red Cross. They 
were  unwilling  to  accept  conditions  on  donations,  notably  with  respect  to 
monitoring and transparency;  

-  with  the  subsequent  large  growth  of  refugee  numbers  in  the  country  (see  also 
Figure  5.1),  it  became  apparent  that  there  was  no  quick  solution  and  the  GoT 
became more open to international assistance and even actively sought help; 
-  ECHO adapted to this evolving situation through two major strategic shifts: 

o  shifting  the  focus  of  support  from  the  GoT-run  camps  to  the  urban  refugee 
population; the proportion of camp-based support dropped by a third each year, 
to one-third of the total by 2014; 

o  identifying new geographic priorities, which led notably to an increase in support 

to the influx of refugees into the “far east”. 

Stakeholders in the different countries have confirmed this ability to adapt, and have 
not provided specific examples that point to a lack of flexibility. In Turkey, for instance, 
where the constant and unpredictable influx of refugees from Syria created a frequent need 
to  programme  adjustments,  stakeholders  noted  that  ECHO  was  an  extremely  flexible 
donor in supporting these requests. The TAs were regularly in touch with the programmes 
to  keep  abreast  of  changes  in  the  context.  Changes  were  often  agreed  verbally  and 
informally through a phone call – and confirmed later through formal amendments. NGO 
partners active in Syria, underlined that working in Syria was extremely difficult given the 
frequently  changing  context,  which often  meant that project  implementation was delayed 
by  external  factors  affecting  access.  These  same  partners  noted  that  ECHO  was  very 
flexible  in  accommodating  such  changes,  more  so  than  other  donors.  A  key  reason  for 
cited  for  this  flexibility  was  the  quality  and  presence  of  field  staff  in  the  region,  and  the 
depth of understanding that ECHO field TAs had of the changing context and key actors 
inside Syria.  

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To what extent did ECHO and its partners introduce specific innovations 
in adapting their approaches?  

There are some examples of innovations:  

 

 

In  Jordan,  for  instance,  for  UNHCR  and  WFP  food  programmes  supported  by 
ECHO,  the  targeted  provision  of  food  vouchers  to  camp-based  refugees,  through  a 
system  of supermarkets offering a wide range  of  food and non-food items  at a fixed 
price,  is  an  interesting  innovation.  But  the  absence  of  ATM  distribution  systems  in 
camps  does  not  yet  allow  real  unconditional  cash  transfers.  Cash  assistance  to  those 
outside  the  camps  and  host  communities  is  done  through  a  sophisticated  and 
innovative  system  involving  biometric  measures  (iris  scan  in  particular),  and  the 
distribution of ATM cards.  
In  Syria,  with  a  view  to  ensuring  that  ECHO-supported  cross-border  operations  are 
cost-effective,  respect  key  aspects  of  due  diligence,  and  limit  the  risks  of  negative 
effects,  ECHO  partners  developed  a  multitude  of  tools  and  made  innovative  use  of 
existing  technologies  (notably  Facebook,  WhatsApp,  and  also  geo-referenced  photos 
and videos (as proof of realization of activities).  

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EQ 6 – EU added value 

What  has  shown  to  be  the  EU  added  value  of  the  actions  examined  (i.e.  the 
added  value  of  EU  intervention,  compared  to  leaving  the  initiative  to  other 
actors)? 

This  Evaluation  Question  aims  at  examining  the  types  of  added  value  ECHO  has  provided  when 
intervening in the specific context of the Syrian crisis. More specifically it aims at assessing to what extent 
ECHO employed a specific approach and took specific initiatives to ensure it could provide added value. It 
also aims at assessing to what extent ECHO has been considered as providing specific types of added value 
in the context of the Syrian crisis.  

EQ 6 –EU added value – Answer Box 

Several elements suggest that ECHO has provided significant added value in the context 
of the Syrian  crisis. Over the period evaluated,  the  added  value recognised  by partners 
mostly concerned ECHO’s field presence and staff expertise, its flexibility and capacity 
to  adapt  its  approach  to  the  changing  context  (EQ  5),  and  its  proactiveness  in  the 
coordination of both donors and partners  (EQ 14). In terms of coordination ECHO’s 
set-up,  with  coordination  at  Brussels  level  and  whole-of-Syria  coordination,  allowed 
global  oversight  of  the  needs  arising  from  the  crisis,  which  is  unusual.  The  evaluation 
also found evidence of ECHO’s added value in advocacy towards other donors and UN 
agencies,  and  in  promoting  good  humanitarian  principles.  However  stakeholders  often 
considered that, despite significant efforts (in particular in contributing to the elaboration 
of  the  JHDF  and  being  involved  in  discussion  on  Syria  at  Brussels  and  field  levels, 
ECHO  did  not  fully  materialize  its  potential  added  value,  for  instance  in  terms  of 
capacity to connect with other funding streams in the Delegations. Nevertheless, ECHO 
has contributed to ensuring the EU delegations were as much as possible mobilized on 
supporting  the  absorption  capacity  of  host  countries  and  their  capacity  to  mitigate  the 
impact of the refugee crisis on their own citizens.  

Specific initiatives taken by ECHO to ensure it could provide added value 

  ECHO’s  strategic  decisions  have  provided  opportunities  for  added  value  as 
compared  to  other  donors.  In  Lebanon,  for  instance,  ECHO  was  the  first 
humanitarian donor to open a permanent office at the beginning of the Syrian crisis. Its 
field presence then contributed to increase its ability to adapt its approach to the needs 
and  their  dynamics.  Specifically  the  field  presence  allowed  ECHO  to  engage  early  in 
field assessments, and thus to understand realities and identify gaps. However there is 
no evidence, either from interviews or strategic documents, that the strategy of being 
present on the field at the very beginning of the crisis was driven by an opportunity to 
create added value in terms of flexibility and adaptability to the context, or in terms of 
gap-filling, for instance.  

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  ECHO  has  taken  the  opportunity  to  become  informed  of  interventions  by  key 
donors,  partners,  and  other  EU  services. During preparation of the HIPs, ECHO 
consulted the main actors (including those not financed by ECHO) in order to be able 
to  understand  their  approaches  and adjust  its  own  response  accordingly. ECHO  also 
conducted  close  dialogue  with  Delegations  (sometimes  at  the  very  beginning  of  the 
crisis such as in Lebanon), to work towards a coordinated strategy.  Similarly, partners 
interviewed  explained  that  ECHO  built  their  interventions  on  interaction  with  other 
stakeholders  in  the  field,  which  allowed  ECHO  to  gather  first-hand  information.    In 
this  sense  some  interviewees  explained  that  ECHO  was  “better  informed”  and  more 
“field led” than many other donors.  

  ECHO  has  been  proactive  in  donor  coordination,  with  a  view  to  avoiding  or 
mitigating duplication of effort. Over the evaluation period ECHO has taken action 
in  different  ways  in  this  regard.  ECHO  has  for  instance  managed  to  maintain  close 
relationships  with  Delegations  to  maximize  synergies  and  avoid  overlaps.  ECHO  has 
also  contributed  to  the  creation  of  coordination  mechanisms,  and  has  sought  to  stay 
aware of activities planned or implemented by different actors through participation in 
these mechanisms. Regarding its partners, ECHO has pushed for a better coordination 
through, for instance, requesting partners to outline their engagement in coordination. 
(See  the  response  to  EQ  14,  below,  for  further  details  of  ECHO’s  coordination 
activities.) 

Specific types of ECHO added value in the context of the Syrian crisis 

Stakeholders consider that ECHO has provided distinct added value as compared 
to other donors in terms of: 

  Field  presence  and  expertise:  owing  to  their  strong  in-house  capacity,  ECHO 
representatives have been able to conduct dialogue and provide useful and high-quality 
monitoring feedback to partner staff. The ability of ECHO’s TA to move more easily 
in  the  field  than  many  other  donor  representatives  has  also  been  highlighted,  for 
instance  in  Lebanon.  ECHO’s  extensive  coverage  and  feet-on-the-ground  approach 
has led to a great capacity to adapt to new emerging needs, for example the influx of 
approximatively  200,000  people  fleeing  to  Turkey  from  Kobane.  This  field  presence 
and  expertise  was  highlighted  by  many  interviewees  as  a  strong  VA.  They  also 
underlined  in  this  respect  the  regular  exchanges  and  good  communication  they  had 
with ECHO representatives.  

  A very operational donor with a good understanding of the realities in the field: 
linked  to  the  above,  there  was  a  broad  consensus  among  interviewees  that  ECHO 
proved itself as a partner that was very much operation oriented, not bureaucratic, with 
high  quality  TA,  who  provided  often  good  technical  advice.  In  the  same  line,  they 
explained that ECHO staff were very knowledgeable of the humanitarian world, with a 
good understanding of the constraints of implementing projects on the ground, open 
for discussion, and supportive to find solutions when problems arise.  

  Advocacy  (cf.  EQ  18): the strong involvement of ECHO in debates in which it can 
have a voice, for instance the coordination debate and, to some extent, the definition of 
host country government response, was perceived by partners as a key added value of 

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ECHO. This has been highlighted notably in Jordan. Furthermore ECHO’s reputation 
as  one  of  the  few  principled  donors  helped  ECHO  to  engage  host  country 
governments on issues such as protection. Further findings on advocacy are included 
under EQ18.  

  Coordination  (cf.  EQ  14):  the  capacity  of  ECHO  to  participate  in  different 
coordination mechanisms, at donor level as well as operational level, has been seen as 
an added value by its partners.  Feedback to EU Member States at the COHAFA has 
often  been  seen  as  useful.  ECHO’s  set  up,  with  coordination  at  Brussels  level  and 
whole-of-Syria coordination, has been a critical element in its added value, as it made 
possible  global  oversight  of  the  needs  arising  from  the  crisis.  Over  the  evaluation 
period  ECHO  has  also  had  the  capacity  to  play  an  instrumental  role  in  terms  of 
coordinating  and  liaising  with  other  donors  and  partners.  One  interviewee  explained 
that  “ECHO wishes to put everybody on the same line, making sure they work for the same cause”. 
EQ14  addresses  how  ECHO  has  been  successful  in  coordinating  its  operations  with 
the main actors in the context of the Syrian crisis.  

  Filling  the  gap:  the  role  of  ECHO  as  a  gap-filler  has  been  recognized  notably  in 
Jordan  and  in  Turkey,  where  ECHO  has  filled  gaps  by  providing  assistance  in  areas 
where no other actors have been present (e.g. Sirnak).  

  Flexibility  (cf.  EQ  5):  many  interlocutors  have  mentioned  that  ECHO  was  flexible 
and easier in terms of funding requests as compared to other donors. They underlined 
that ECHO was very responsive, rapidly adapted to changing needs, etc. The flexibility 
of ECHO in adapting to the changing context of the crisis is addressed in the above 
EQ5.  

  Promoting good humanitarian practice: over the evaluation period ECHO has been 
involved  in  various  debates  relating  to  humanitarian  practices.  In  Syria  for  instance, 
ECHO  has  significantly  contributed  to  make  aid  inside  Syria  more  transparent  and 
accountable, through significant efforts in improving remote-control mechanisms and 
related reporting. In Lebanon ECHO’s role in various debates, such as those on cash 
as  a  transfer  modality  and  on  the  one-card,  has  been  perceived  by  its  partners  as 
creative  and  fostering  innovation.  ECHO  has  also  engaged  with  UN  agencies  on 
driving the cost-efficiency agenda and other quality-related issues, including a focus on 
better targeting which is seen as critical in a context where funds have to be ‘rationed’. 
More  generally,  several  interviewees  described  ECHO  as  very  much  guided  by 
humanitarian principles and needs based approaches.  

  However  such  emphasis  on  better  targeting  was  not  always  perceived  as 
positive  or  fully  materialized  by  the  stakeholders. Indeed, ECHO has sometimes 
been  perceived  to  be  intrusive  when  trying  to  influence  agencies  during  topical 
discussion or geographical orientation. This was highlighted notably by interlocutors in 
Iraq  and  in  Jordan,  where  it  was  mentioned  that ECHO  sought  to  direct  partners  to 
some degree. In Lebanon, some partners perceived that ECHO had fuelled the debate 
on the coordination mandate between OCHA and UNHCR, which took the partners 
time and energy. In terms of materialization of value-added, the capacity of ECHO to 
connect  with  other  funding  streams  in  the  Delegations  is  regarded  as  not  fully 
explored. Yet both HQ and field interviews underlined the fact that the process is still 
in  its  infancy  and  that  much  remains  to  be  done  for  this  added  value  to  fully 
materialize.  

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EQ 7 – Urban Settings 

To  what  extent  have  the  specific  challenges  of  urban  settings  been  taken  into 
account  in  the  design  and  implementation  of  ECHO-funded  projects,  both  for 
refugees and host populations? To what extent have projects implemented in urban 
settings  been  successful?  What  particular  challenges  have  been  faced  and  what 
lessons have been learned? 

The  evaluation  question  seeks  to  understand  the  extent  to  which  ECHO-funded  projects  have  taken 
account  of  and  adapted  to  specific  challenges  related  to  the  fact  that  most  of  the  affected  areas  and 
populations  have  urban  or  peri-urban  characteristics.  Cities  in  Syria  have  been  the  primary  battlefields 
during the last few years. In neighbouring countries, the impact of the Syrian conflict has largely consisted in 
flow  of  refugees  in  or  around  cities.  In  Lebanon,  Jordan  and  Turkey  Syrian  refugees  have  significantly 
increased  the  urban  population  of  some  cities.  This  has  had  a  range  of  economic  and  social  impacts, 
including an increased demand for housing, jobs and health services.54 

EQ 7 – Urban Settings – Answer Box 

ECHO does not have clearly developed approaches for providing aid in urban contexts, 
and the humanitarian community as a whole is still developing good practice in this area. 
ECHO’s  strategic  response  to  the  Syria  crisis  did  not  provide  much  guidance  for 
partners seeking to adapt to urban challenges or seize the opportunities that they present. 
Many  ECHO-funded  proposals  made  brief  mention  of  challenges  to  their  projects 
resulting  from  delivery  in  an  urban  context,  but  in  most  cases  it  was  more  about 
learning-by-doing than conscious design.  

Despite  the  absence  of  an  overarching  strategic  approach  to  urban  response,  some 
ECHO partners developed specific approaches to tackle urban challenges on a case-by-
case  basis.  But  key  challenges  remain  regarding  engagement  with  municipal  authorities 
and  the  development  of  an  “urban  approach”  to  capitalise  on  the  growing  lessons 
learned on this issue rather than simply reacting to obstacles as they arise. 

Did ECHO and its partner agencies employ a specific approach to embed 
urban issues within ECHO-funded projects in response to the Syrian 
crisis? 

The humanitarian community as a whole is still in the early phases of developing 
guidelines and best practice for providing humanitarian aid in urban settings. 
Neither ECHO nor its partners have clearly developed approaches for providing aid 
in urban contexts. ECHO’s strategic response to the Syria crisis did not provide 
much guidance for partners seeking to adapt to urban challenges or seize the 
opportunities that they present.  

54   See, for example, UNHCR (2013) Countries Hosting Syrian Refugees: Solidarity and Burden-Sharing  – Background 

papers for the High Level Segment. UNHCR. 

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The evaluation period 2012-2014 saw a considerable growth in attention across the 
international humanitarian community towards the challenges that increased global 
urbanization presents for humanitarian aid response:  
  UNHCR’s  first  ‘Policy  on  Refugee  Protection  and  Solutions  in  Urban  Areas’  was 
published only 3 years prior to the evaluation period, in 2009. The IASC published its 
first action plan for meeting humanitarian challenges in urban areas as recently as 2011, 
whilst  the  ICRC  published  its  first  collection  of  lessons  learned  regarding  urban 
response to protracted conflict in 2015.  
In the run-up to the World Humanitarian Summit 2016, IRC and ALNAP (inter alia) 
have both published early attempts at lessons learned in this area. But importantly, as 
ALNAP  (2014)  notes,  “this  will  be  a  steep  learning  curve…currently,  urban 
humanitarian  response  appears  to  be  a  topic  with  many  unanswered  questions,  and 
where many lessons have not been tested in a wide variety of contexts.”55 

 

  Much of the learning in this area has been informed by the results of the Syria response 
itself. This is somewhat natural given the high urbanization of the region and the fact 
that a sizeable majority  of the refugee  population resides in non-camp settings, often 
(though not exclusively) dispersed across in urban and peri-urban areas. Nevertheless, 
assessment  of  ECHO’s  strategic  response  to  the  urban  challenge  in  the  Syria  crisis 
needs to be made against the background of this early-phase learning cycle. 

  Some key lessons have started to emerge on this issue over recent years, including:56  

- 
- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

the importance of local/municipal authority engagement in any response;  
the difficulty of profiling  needs in urban contexts and of distinguishing between 
displaced populations and the urban poor;  
the  difficulty  of  distinguishing  between  short-term  response  and  longer-term 
development and resilience-building activities; 
the potential for using “area-based” approaches that address cross-sectoral needs 
of a displaced population and host community in a distinct geographical zone;  
the potential for using cash-based programming in urban areas and working with 
local markets and private-sector initiatives;  
the importance of “urbanizing” sectoral interventions to meet the specific needs 
arising  from  urban  settings  re.  shelter,  WASH,  protection  and  health 
programming. 

ECHO’s  global  policy  guidelines  do  not  include  specific  consideration  of  the 
challenges of urban response: 
  Given the international policy context outlined above, it is perhaps not surprising that 
ECHO  does  not  currently  have  a  global  policy  approach  towards  the  provision  of 
humanitarian aid in urban contexts. This contrasts to the case of protection where, as 
explained under EQ8 of this report, clear guidelines exist governing ECHO’s funding 
approach to protection issues. 

55   ALNAP (2014) Responding to Urban Disasters: Learning from Previous Relief and Recovery Operations. 

56   ALNAP (2014) Responding to Urban Disasters: Learning from Previous Relief and Recovery Operations. IRC (2015) 
Humanitarian Action in a New Urban World. ICRC (2015) Urban Services During Protracted Armed Conflict. ICRC 
(2015) Brief: Urban Response Practitioner Workshop (Istanbul September 2015). JIPS (2014) Guidance for Profiling 
Urban  Displacement  Situations:  Challenges  and  Solutions.  Ferris  (2011)  Ten  Observations  on  the  Challenges  of 
Humanitarian Work in Urban Settings. 

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 

It is noteworthy, therefore, that ECHO staff interviewed by the evaluation team argued 
that there is a clear need for an urban policy within ECHO. Stakeholders cited the need 
for clear and coherent strategic response to the range of challenges presented by urban 
response. This view is also reflected by ECHO strategy papers for the Syria response, 
which pointed to the need for a long-term strategy – coordinated with other partners – 
to  tackle  the  challenge  posed  by  large  and  ongoing  urban  refugee  populations  (e.g. 
ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91000, p.21).  

Urban  challenges  were  not  systematically  integrated  in  the  ECHO  Humanitarian 
Implementation Plans (HIPs) for the Syria crisis: 
  ECHO’s  HIPs  over  the  period  2012-2014  demonstrate  awareness  of  the  scale  of  the 
urban  refugee  crisis  in  countries  neighbouring  Syria.  But  consideration  of  specific 
urban response challenges (or opportunities) is very limited. Key issues covered by the 
HIPs  include  the extent of  urban  violence inside Syria,  the  difficulty  of  profiling  and 
registering  urban  refugees,  and  the  increased  burden  placed  by  urban  refugee 
populations on host country public services. But the HIPs make no mention of many 
of  the  most  widely  recognised  challenges  to  providing  aid  in  urban  contexts  (see  list 
above)  nor  do  they  explicitly  encourage  partners  to  “urbanise”  sectoral  programming 
or to engage with local markets or municipal plans. 

  Finally,  despite  the  scale  and  extent  of  the  urban  challenge  in  this  crisis,  the  ECHO 
responses  and  expected  results  envisaged  in  the  HIPs  do  not  systematically  consider 
the  needs  of  the  displaced  in  urban  areas,  nor  provide  any  strategic  guidance  on 
approaches to tackle the challenges of providing aid in this context. 

ECHO  partners  were  not  aware  of  ECHO  taking  a  strategic  approach  towards 
urban response:  
  ECHO-funded  partners  operating  in  urban  contexts  in  countries  neighbouring  Syria 
were  not  aware  of  ECHO’s  strategic  approach  to  urban  policy.  This  contrasts  with 
other  issues  such  as  cash-based  programming  and,  latterly,  remote  management 
modalities, for which most partners were well aware of ECHO’s policy position. 

  Those partners that did actively adapt their programming to the urban context stated 
that  they  received  limited  guidance  or  consultation  on  this  point  from  ECHO.  The 
format  of  the  ECHO  funding  proposal  system  (based  on  the  single  form)  to  some 
extent  presented  an  obstacle  to  an  in-depth  discussion  of  how  a  partner  has  tailored 
their response to the urban context. But partners also cited a lack of discussion of this 
point with ECHO field staff and monitoring missions. 

  Review of partner single forms confirmed that only limited discussion of how projects 
would  be  tailored  to  the  urban  context  was  provided  by  partners  in  their  funding 
proposals. 

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Did the design of ECHO-funded projects identify the major challenges that 
exist in urban settings in order to design interventions appropriate to 
these specific situations? 

Many ECHO-funded proposals made brief mention of challenges to their projects 
resulting from delivery in an urban context, but in most cases it was more about 
learning-by-doing than conscious design: 
  Many  partners  made  reference  to  urban  challenges  in  project  designs,  although  the 
depth  of  analysis  varied  considerably  between  projects.  Of  the  40  project  proposals 
reviewed  by  the  evaluation  team  (which  covered  all  four  neighbouring  countries  and 
Syria), 28 included some consideration of urban challenges in the needs assessment. 
  Examples of urban challenges identified already at the design stage include: the scale of 
the  urban  refugee  population  and  the  difficulty  of  registering  and  profiling  refugees 
living in urban areas; shelter and winterisation challenges for refugees dispersed across 
urban  environments  and  using  substandard  housing  and  other  forms  of  informal 
shelter; gaps in protection referral mechanisms for refugees living in urban areas; lack 
of access to basic services for unregistered displaced persons. 

  But  only  rarely  did  ECHO  partners  operating  in  urban  settings  identify  engagement 
with municipal authorities and institutions as an area of priority. This runs contrary to 
lessons learned in the evolving literature on this subject (see above). Field interviews by 
the evaluation team suggested that this created a lack of understanding on the part of 
municipal actors regarding the activities of many of ECHO’s partners in the field. This 
has the  potential to create difficulties when partners  seek to move towards  transition 
away from provision of services in the future.  

  However,  regardless  of  whether  or  not  ECHO  partners  had  pre-identified  urban 
challenges  in  their  proposals,  most  partners  did  identify  such  challenges  iteratively 
throughout  implementation.  This  suggests  that,  in  line  with  the  absence  of  global 
strategies  on  this  issue  outlined  above,  partners  were  undergoing  a  learning  process 
during the evaluation period. 

Throughout implementation, were ECHO-funded projects able to tackle 
the specific challenges of urban response and coordinate properly with 
local authorities, urban services and institutions (municipalities), in line 
with the good practices elaborated by the sector? 

Despite the absence of an overarching strategic approach to urban response, and 
the fact that the humanitarian sector as a whole was still at the early-phase of the 
learning process on this issue during the evaluation period, many ECHO partners 
developed specific approaches to tackle urban challenges on a case-by-case basis: 

  The use of unconditional cash transfers to meet the basic needs of refugees arriving in 
some of Syria’s neighbouring countries proved to be effective in the largely urbanised, 
middle-income  countries  bordering  Syria.  Banking  systems  and  electronic  transfer 
mechanisms are well established in Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and the Kurdish Region 
of Iraq,  and markets are able to supply a diversity  of goods and services to meet the 
most  basic  needs  of  refugees  at  efficient  prices.  Many  ECHO  partners  used  this 

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modality  to  provide  cash  amounts  indexed  against  a  minimum  expenditure  basket, 
thereby allowing refugees to purchase goods and services across a range of sectors. 
  Establishment  of  community  centres  for  outreach,  referral,  community  cohesion  and 
follow-up: some partners sought to establish community spaces for both refugees and 
host  community  members.  This  introduced  an  element  of  the  area-based  approach 
highlighted  in  the  urban  response  literature  cited  above.  Community  centres  allowed 
ECHO  partners  to  follow  up  casework  for  individual  refugees  and  family  units, 
establish  a  referral  mechanisms  for  protection  concerns,  assist  with  registration  and 
documentation issues, and improve social cohesion by bringing both refugee and host 
communities together. 

  Rehabilitation  of  urban  housing  units:  some  ECHO  partners  in  both  Jordan  and 
Lebanon conducted rehabilitation work on unfinished or substandard housing units in 
order to increase shelter supply. In some cases, this work was carried out to complete 
unfinished privately-owned properties, in exchange for a period of low or zero rent for 
refugee families. If carried out on a larger scale, this type of project has the potential to 
reduce  the  pressure  on  housing  demand  that  large  urban  refugee  populations  can 
create.  It  should  be  noted  that  these  projects  proved  difficult  to  implement  in  some 
cases,  particularly  regarding  negotiation  with  property  owners  regarding  rental  prices 
and tenancy periods. 

  One  persistent  weakness  in  the  urban  response  was  the  limited  engagement  with 
municipal  institutions  and  authorities.  Of  the  33  projects  in  neighbouring  countries 
reviewed  by  the  evaluation  team,  only  7  partnered  with  municipal  authorities.  Whilst 
some  partners actively  sought municipal engagement, including on issues of targeting 
and  profiling  in  some  instances,  many  had  only  very  limited  engagement.  One 
municipal authority in Jordan, visited by the evaluation team, argued that they had very 
limited  input  to  the  activities  of  ECHO  partners  in  their  district,  creating  a  sense  of 
disconnect  regarding  the  needs  of  host  communities  and  limited  scope  for  transition 
towards community ownership of projects in the future. 

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EQ 8 – Protection 

How and to what extent has protection been appropriately taken into account and 
implemented in ECHO-funded projects? 

Syria’s humanitarian crisis is often described as the largest protection-related crisis in the world57. Atrocities 
have been committed on a large scale, with more than 200,000 people killed between the start of the conflict 
in 2011 and August 2015.58 IHL violations are committed by all sides, including the use of sieges as a 
weapon  of  war,  indiscriminate  attacks  in  densely  populated  areas,  targeting  of  schools,  hospitals,  water 
networks  and  places  of  worship;  and  the  protection  needs  of  refugee  populations  have  been  large.  In  that 
context ECHO made significant  efforts to support financially and through  advocacy the mandated59 and 
non-mandated60 agencies in response to the numerous protection challenges. 

The  evaluation  question  seeks  to  understand  the  extent  to  which  ECHO-funded  projects  have  taken 
account  of  protection  needs  and  been  effective  in  meeting  them.  The  crisis  has  created  multiple  protection 
concerns. The most severe concerns were present inside Syria, where access restricts the provision of protection 
services to the most vulnerable, and in neighbouring countries, where specific concerns persist. 

EQ 8 – Protection – Answer Box 

ECHO  has  a  clearly  defined  approach  to  both  funding  protection  activities  and 
embedding protection as a cross-cutting issue, as outlined in its global policy framework 
and  strategy  papers  for  the  Syria  response  2012-2014.  ECHO  partners  consistently 
appreciate  the  degree  of  engagement  and  guidance  provided  by  ECHO  field  staff  on 
questions  of  protection  risks  both  inside  Syria  and  in  neighbouring  countries.  Many 
partners  rate  ECHO  as  having  been  one  of  the  most  engaged  donors  on  this  issue  – 
particularly towards the end of the evaluation period and beyond (2014-2016). 

Review  of  ECHO-funded  operations  over  the  period  demonstrates  that  ECHO’s  own 
protection  funding  guidelines  have  been  respected  by  the  funding  decisions  made. 
Moreover,  project  proposals  have,  on  the  whole,  provided  reasonably  detailed 
assessments  of  protection  risks  for  the  target  population,  although  disaggregation  by 
population sector remains limited. 

However,  only  limited  funding  amounts  have  been  channeled  towards  protection-
specific  activities  over  the  period.  This  must  be  understood  in  terms  of  the  limited 
capacity  of  ECHO  partners  to  provide  protection-specific  programmes,  most  notably 
during  the  first  phase  of  the  crisis  over  the  evaluation  period  2012-2014.  In  response, 
ECHO field staff have encouraged and supported partners to embed protection in their 
programmes, whilst supporting partners who integrate protection as a cross-cutting issue 
in  activities  targeting  other  areas  of  need.  Whilst  many  examples  exist  of  successful 
ECHO-funded projects that specifically targeted protection needs (including registration 
and  access  to  documentation  in  neighbouring  countries,  prevention  of  sexual  and 
gender-based violence), only limited examples of concrete protection activities have been 
found relating to activities that treated protection as a cross-cutting theme. 

57   OCHA (2015) Humanitarian Needs Overview, p.1 
58   UNHCHR (2014) Updated Statistical Analysis of Documentation of Killings in the Syrian Arab Republic, p.1 
59   ICRC, UNHCR, UNWRA, UNICEF. 
60   UNFPA, DRC, NRC, IRC; etc. 

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Did ECHO employ a specific approach to funding protection activities and 
embedding protection concerns within ECHO-funded projects in response 
to the Syrian crisis? 

ECHO has a clearly defined approach to both funding protection activities and 
embedding protection as a cross-cutting issue, as outlined in its global policy 
framework, Humanitarian Implementation Plans for the Syria response over the 
period 2012-2014, and guidance provided to partners from ECHO field staff. 

ECHO’s  global  policy  framework  outlines  a  specific  approach  to  funding 
protection  activities  and  embedding  protection  concerns  across  ECHO-funded 
operations: 
  ECHO (2009) Humanitarian Protection Funding Guidelines (hereafter, the “Protection 
Funding  Guidelines”)  outlines  ECHO’s  approach  to  funding  protection  activities 
worldwide. The following table outlines the what, who and how of ECHO’s approach  
to protection: 

Box 2 – ECHO Protection Funding Guidelines – What, Who and How61 

Types of activity funded: 

Non-structural  activities  (i.e.  excluding  long-term  capacity  building  of  institutions)  aimed  at 
reducing  the  risk  for  and  mitigating  the  impact  on  individuals  or  groups  of  human-generated 
violence, coercion, deprivation and abuse. In practice, this means that ECHO “may finance responsive 
as well as remedial actions, but will, in principle, exclude the environment-building actions.”  (ECHO  (2009),  p. 
6). 

Types of partner: 

Only those partners with added value and recognized experience in protection: 

  ICRC 
  UNHCR 
  UNICEF 
  Other specialized partners (UN agencies, RCM, NGOs) 

Basic conditions for effective protection programming: 

Only those activities that satisfy the following criteria should be funded: 

  Prior conduct of in-depth context analysis 
  Assurance of proper resourcing with experience staff 
  Involvement of the community’s own self-protection mechanisms 
  Adoption of clear and conscious protection strategy. 

  Review  of  ECHO-funded  project  proposals  demonstrates  that  these  conditions  were 

largely fulfilled by ECHO’s protection activities over the evaluation period: 
- 

Partners submitting proposals for protection-specific activities invariably included 
an  assessment  of  protection  needs  in  the  project  needs  assessment.  The  needs 

61   ECHO (2009) Humanitarian Protection: DG ECHO’s funding guidelines. ECHO. 

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assessments  were  moreover  largely  in  line  with  ECHO’s  own  assessment  of 
protection  needs  per  country  per  year  (see  HIP  analysis  below)  and  aligned  to 
needs outlined under UN response plans. 

-  ECHO  funded  protection-oriented  activities  primarily  through  UN  agencies, 
ICRC  and  INGOs  with  previous  experience  of  conducting  protection  activities, 
significant  staff  resources  and  either  their  own  protection  strategies/SOPs  (e.g. 
ICRC) or demonstrated alignment with strategies of key actors in-country, such as 
UNHCR. 

-  The  majority  of  ECHO  partners  that  conducted  protection  activities  took 
reasonable  account  of  community  self-protection  mechanisms  in  the  design  of 
their protection activities. Although this was not systematically the case in projects 
reviewed by the evaluation team. 

In addition  to outlining the conditions under which ECHO funds protection-specific 
activities,  and  in  accordance  with  commitments  of  EU  Consensus  on  Humanitarian 
Aid  to  the  “do  no  harm”  principle,  the  ECHO  Protection  Funding  Guidelines  also 
require that ECHO partners “do everything possible, within their capacities, to mitigate the effects 
of and prevent abuses and mainstream protection concerns in each of their actions”.62 

 

In the Syria response, ECHO’s HIPs provided partners with strategic direction and 
encouragement to embed protection concerns: 
  ECHO partners interviewed (remotely) inside Syria and also in neighbouring countries 
noted the clear and growing emphasis on protection needs in ECHO’s HIPs towards 
the end of the evaluation period and extending into 2015 and 2016. 

  Each of the HIPs for Syria over the period 2012-2014 (and moreover 2015) presented 
country-specific  protection  needs  and  proposed  appropriate  areas  of  intervention  for 
ECHO-funded operations in response. The following table synthesizes the coverage of 
protection  needs  and  responses  in  the  HIPs  over  the  evaluation  period  (2012-2014) 
and moreover in 2015: 

Table 7 – Coverage of protection in ECHO Syria HIPs63  

HIPs  Protection risks identified 

Proposed ECHO response 

Lebanon 

2012-
2014 

 Host community tensions 
 People with specific vulnerabilities64 
 GBV 
 Restrictive border controls 
201565   Restrictive border controls 

 Respect of Refugee Law, registration 

and legal status 

 ECHO monitoring tensions with host 

communities 

 Protection of most vulnerable groups 
 GBV activities 
 Support to registration capacity 
 Counseling and legal services 
 Protection of most vulnerable groups 

62   ECHO (2009) Humanitarian Protection: DG ECHO’s funding guidelines. ECHO, p. 5. Emphasis added. 

63   ECHO/SYR/BUD/2012/91000; ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91000; ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91000; 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91000. 

64   Namely the discharged wounded, women, elderly, people with disabilities and children. 

65   2015 lies outside the scope of the evaluation, but is included in this table to demonstrate the adaptation of ECHO to 

the evolving crisis. 

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HIPs  Protection risks identified 
 SGBV and child protection 

Proposed ECHO response 
 SGBV activities 

2012-
2014 

 Respect of Refugee Law for 

Palestinians from Syria 

 GBV, child labour and early marriage 

Jordan 

 Protection of people fleeing Syria, 

including Palestinians 

 Psychosocial support for children 
 Prevention and assistance to victims of 

GBV 

2015 

 Access to documentation and 

 Access to documentation and freedom 

freedom of movement 

 Early marriage and child labour 
 SGBV 

of movement 

 SGBV 

2012-
2014 

2012-
2014 

2015 

 Restrictive border controls 

Iraq 

Turkey 

 Restrictive border controls 
 Registration and legal status 
 GBV 
 Negative coping strategies 
 Safe access to Turkish territory 
 Psychological trauma 
 SGBV 
 Early marriage, child labour 
 Unaccompanied children 

Syria 

2012-
2014 

 IHL and human rights violations 
 Psychological trauma  
 Access to humanitarian assistance 
 SGBV 

2015 

 IHL and human rights violations 
 Access to humanitarian assistance 

 TA to support camp management, 
registration, returns and protection 

 TA to support camp management, 
registration, returns and protection 

 Documentation of urban refugee 

needs 

 ECHO advocacy for comprehensive 
registration and protection system 
 Support for out-of-camp community-

based protection systems 

 Protection of civilians affected by 
conflict, the sick and wounded 
 Protection of medical missions 
 IHL advocacy 
 Assistance to victims of GBV 
 Mental health and psychosocial 

services 

 Access to humanitarian assistance 

ECHO field staff encouraged and supported partners to embed protection in their 
programmes: 
 

Interviews  with  ECHO  partners  (both  mandated  organisations  such  as  UNHCR  and 
non-mandated  INGOs)  inside  Syria  and  in  neighbouring  countries  confirmed  a  high 
level  of  appreciation  for  the  strategic  guidance  that  ECHO  TAs  provided  regarding 
protection concerns for the refugee population. The continuing support for protection 
activities  in  2015  and  2016  funding  cycles  was  also  noted  as  a  strength  of  ECHO’s 
approach. 

  Partners  cited  the  strength  of  engagement  with  ECHO  TAs  and  the  ECHO  global 
protection advisor, who frequently  encouraged  them to integrate  protection concerns 

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as  a  cross-cutting  issue  in  their  interventions,  or  provided  guidance  and  support 
regarding protection-specific activities that fell under the scope of the areas of country-
specific protection concerns outlined in the HIPs (see table above).  

  ECHO  partners  based  inside  Syria  in  particular  highlighted  the  strength  of  ECHO’s 
engagement on protection. Examples of successful integration of protection concerns 
in line with ECHO encouragement included:  
-  The integration of protection when allocating families to shared-housing units: by 
insisting  that  ECHO  partners  ensure,  insofar  as  possible,  that  family  groups  are 
able  to  stay  together  in  temporary  housing,  ECHO  helped  to  reduce  the 
protection risks for internally displaced persons.  

-  Nuancing  the  targeting  approach  in  conflict  zones:  ECHO  worked  with  its 
partners  to  develop  context-sensitive  targeting  approaches.  This  encouraged 
partners to take account of local dynamics within conflict zones in order to avoid 
doing  harm,  and  helped  ensure  protection  of  vulnerable  groups  by  targeting 
distributions on the elderly or female-headed households. 
Improving  protection  referral  mechanisms  of  partners  that  conduct  non-
protection  oriented  activities,  including  local  partners  conducting  cross-border 
operations inside Syria. 

- 

Did the design of ECHO-funded projects identify and address the major 
protection risks present for people in need? 

The majority of ECHO-funded projects identified major protection risks in their 
needs analysis, but only very few sought to address these needs as a principle 
objective. A large number of ECHO-funded projects sought to tackle protection as 
a cross-cutting issue, but with only limited concrete action during implementation.  

Most ECHO-funded projects  identified the major protection risks present  in each 
country, with broad alignment to the priority protection needs identified by ECHO, 
UN and donor-funded analyses, but limited disaggregation by population segment: 
  Review of the SingleForms for ECHO-funded operations from 2012-2014 shows good 
coverage  of  protection  concerns  in  their  needs  assessments:  27  out  of  the 40  project 
needs assessments  reviewed  by the evaluation team included explicit consideration of 
protection needs. This included protection-oriented activities, those that mainstreamed 
protection in other areas, and those that did not conduct protection-related activities. 
  Partners  did  identify  a  range  of  different  protection  needs  (including,  e.g.  SGBV, 
protection  of  children,  application  of  refugee  law),  with  an  appropriate  degree  of 
variance in frequency between countries. Notably, the needs identified were broadly in 
line  with  those  noted  in  ECHO’s  HIPs  and  UN  response  plans  and  partner-funded 
studies.66  

  Protection needs were not systematically disambiguated between population segments 
(e.g. the elderly, disabled, children). Whilst the SingleForm now requires all partners to 
identify  target  groups  by  population  segment,  only  some  proposals  explicitly  broke 
down protection concerns on this basis. 

66   See, for example, NRC (2016) Drivers of Despair: refugee protection failures in Jordan and Lebanon. NRC. 

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  Most  of  the  ECHO-funded  programmes  implemented  inside  Syria  are  based  on  an 
assessment of the situation of the Syrian population at large and of the dangers that all 
Syrians face.  Most of these  programmes attempt to respond to the threats  faced, but 
the nature of the ongoing warfare inside Syria limits the amount that can be done in the 
area of security and safety of beneficiaries. 

  All  ECHO  SingleForms  include  a  specific  section  requiring  partners  to  explain  the 
extent to which protection (as well as other areas) will be mainstreamed in their project. 
Partners have on the whole completed this section with only brief remarks. 

Protection  needs  were  addressed  as  a  primary  objective  by  a  comparatively  small 
share of ECHO-funded operations: 
  As  a  primary  objective,  protection  was  the  second  smallest  area  of  intervention  for 

ECHO over 2012-2014, second only to coordination:67  

Figure 18 – Sector breakdown of ECHO-funded operations 2012-2014 

Source: ADE on the basis of ECHO HOPE database 

  Likewise,  at  project  level,  only  5%  (2  out  of  the  40)  project  designs  reviewed  by  the 

evaluation team sought to tackle protection needs as a principle objective.  

  Examples  of  activities  conducted  by  partners  specifically  targeting  protection  as  a 

principle objective included: 
- 

Providing sexual and gender-based violence support and prevention mechanisms 
through INGOs such as IRC in Jordan and other neighbouring countries. 

-  Helping  refugees  obtain  official  documentation  in  neighbouring  countries:  In 
Lebanon and Jordan, for instance, authorities increased restrictions on entry visas 
and  residency  permits  over  the  evaluation  period.  In  Jordan,  ECHO  funded 
UNHCR’s work to develop innovative approaches such as biometric registration, 
in  order  to  overcome  the  registration  backlog.  ECHO  also  funded  DRC  to 

67   See section 2.4 on ECHO’s response to the crisis. 

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35%23%18%10%10%4%ECHO funding over the period, per sector Food(€159m)Healthand medical(€67m)Shelter(€235m)Multi-sector(€122m)Total:€676mProtection(€24m)Water/sanitation(€67m)Coordination(€2m) 
 
                                                 
EVALUATION OF ECHO’S RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
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address barriers to documentation for refugees in the context of the Government 
of  Jordan’s  policy  shift  to  providing  healthcare  only  for  registered  refugees.  In 
Lebanon,  UNHCR  and  to  a  lesser  extend  ICRC  have,  with  ECHO  support, 
provided  undocumented  refugees  with  legal  assistance  and  contact  whilst  in 
custody.  

A significant number of ECHO-funded activities included protection activities as a 
cross-cutting theme, but with only limited concrete changes to programming being 
seen on the ground: 
  Approximately  half  (21)  of  the  40  ECHO-funded  SingleForms  reviewed  by  the 
evaluation  team  included  protection-related  activities  and/or  intended  results.  The 
majority  of these  were  included  primarily  as cross-cutting  issues,  with only 9 projects 
out  of  the  40  having  protection-related  objectives  as  such.  Examples  of  partners 
integrating protection concerns as a cross-cutting issue include WFP in Turkey seeking 
to avoid food distributions to large crowds and provided doorstep delivery for disabled 
persons. 

  However,  verified  instances  of  projects  integrating  protection  concerns  as  a  cross-
cutting  issue during implementation are limited. Notably, some ECHO field staff felt 
that  partners  often  identified  protection  risks  at  the  project  design  stage,  and  made 
commitments to address them as a cross-cutting issue, but made no concrete changes 
during  implementation  to  address  these  risks.  This  view  was  supported  by  the 
evaluation team’s findings from field visits to neighbouring countries. 

  ECHO’s own mission to Syria in November 2014 concluded that there was a need to 
increase  the  focus  on  protection  inside  Syria  including  by:  taking  a  more  proactive 
approach  to  protection  (both  on  the  ground  and  at  advocacy  level);  increasing  the 
focus  on  protection  and  safety  of  aid  workers;  addressing  issues  such  as  access  to 
neighbouring countries, restrictive internal policies and forced repatriation. 

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EQ 9 – Remote Management 

In cases when Remote  Management was being used, to what extent did it follow 
existing guidance documents and good practice, and how successful was it? 

Within  ECHO,  remote  management  is  defined  as  “an  operational  approach  used  to  provide  relief  in 
situations  where  humanitarian  access  to  disaster-affected  populations  is  limited”,  which  typically  involves 
transfer of operational responsibilities from international agencies to national or local partners. (European 
Commission,  Instruction  note  for  ECHO  staff  on  Remote  Management,  2013).  Remote  management 
carries several risks, and is treated by ECHO as a last resort. But ECHO’s own guidance documents and 
good practice are designed to help mitigate these risks. This Evaluation Question aims to assess the extent 
to  which  ECHO  has  followed  its  own  guidance  documents  when  funding  remotely  managed  operations 
inside Syria, and the extent to which it was successful in mitigating the key risks. 

EQ 9 – Remote Management – Answer Box 

ECHO’s  decision  to  support  remote  management  operations  inside  AOG-controlled 
areas of Syria, whilst simultaneously acting to mitigate the risks of doing so, enabled it to 
provide  effective  life-saving  assistance  to  some  of  the  most  vulnerable  populations  in 
hard-to-reach  areas.  Taken  in  tandem  with  ECHO’s  assistance  inside  government-held 
areas,  its  engagement  with  remote  management  operations  allowed  ECHO  to  provide 
impartial and needs-based assistance under difficult circumstances. 

The ECHO Note  on remote  management  is still seen by many partners as leading the 
policy agenda on this issue. A review of ECHO-funded operations inside Syria suggests 
that  the  Instruction  Note  has  been  widely  followed  by  all  partners.  Some  actors, 
however,  question  the  continuing  wisdom  of  the  Note’s  restriction  of  remote 
management  operations  to  direct  life-saving  aid,  particularly  in  the  context  of  a 
protracted  crisis  in  areas where  direct  management  remains  impossible.  Many  activities 
undertaken are often more of a “life protection” than a “direct life-saving” nature. 

As  regards  the  success  of  ECHO’s  approach  to  mitigating  the  risks  of  remote 
management,  the  indications  are  that a  combination  of  risk  mitigation  measures  put  in 
place  by  both  ECHO  and  its  partners  has  succeeded  in  minimising  the  potential  risks. 
This  includes  ensuring  security  for  local  partners, maintaining  quality,  relevant  aid,  and 
compliance with humanitarian principles. 

Did  ECHO  apply  it’s  own  Instruction  Note  on  Remote  Management  when 
funding remote management operations? 

The  Instruction  Note  for  ECHO  staff  on  Remote  Management  affirms  ECHO’s 
willingness  to  engage  in  Remote  Management  as  a  last  resort.  It  is  still  seen  by 
many partners as leading the policy agenda on this issue, viz.: 

  ECHO finalised its Instruction Note for ECHO staff on Remote Management in early 
2013,  prior  to  signature  of  the  majority  of  ECHO-funded  cross-border  operations 

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inside Syria. ECHO partners viewed the Note as being at the forefront of donor policy 
guidance on this issue. 

  The Instruction Note outlines ECHO’s policy on the use of remote management (RM) 
as a last resort and provided guidance on when and how to conduct RM operations and 
what  pitfalls  to  avoid.  In  particular  it  provides  seven  criteria  to  be  met  by  a  project 
proposal before ECHO staff can consider funding a remote management operation :  
1.  Access constraints must be such that they preclude direct management 
2.  Acceptance-building  measures  must  be  included  where  possible;  the  action 

must focus on life-saving action 

3.  Life-saving aid: the operation must focus on the delivery of life-saving aid 
4.  Security: it must be possible for the operation to be implemented without risking 

the lives of implementing staff 

5.  Needs assessment: the source must be credible  
6.  Staff capacity: local staff must be adequately qualified    and 
7.  Monitoring arrangements must be adapted to remote management. 

  ECHO  partners  highly  appreciated  the  Instruction  Note,  and  the  process  of  its 

development: 
-  Telephone  interviews  with  partners  conducting  remote  management  operations 
cited  the  collaborative  process  of  the  Instruction  Note’s  development  as 
particularly helpful in terms of understanding ECHO’s policy direction on remote 
management; 
Partners cited the Instruction Note itself as a useful addition to their own policy 
approaches on this issue, as well as highlighting broad-based agreement with the 
approach taken therein. 

- 

Review of ECHO-funded operations inside Syria suggests that the Instruction Note 
has been widely followed: 

  There  was  a  high  level  of  familiarity  with  the  Instruction  Note  amongst  ECHO 
partners. Telephone interviews indicate that ECHO partners operating inside Syria are 
very  familiar  with  the  Instruction  Note,  its  content  and  principles.  All  partners 
confirmed that ECHO’s dissemination of the Instruction Note in 2013 had been well-
received,  with  several  stating  that  this  was  the  first  clear  policy  guidance  they  had 
received from a major donor on this issue. 

  All those partners interviewed who conducted remote management operations saw the 
Note as a key reference point during the project design phase. Partners also reaffirmed 
that ECHO staff required each proposal to demonstrate alignment with the principles 
of the Note before agreeing funding.  

  ECHO-funded cross-border operations inside Syria showed strong alignment with the 

Instruction Note guidance, viz.: 
1.  Access constraints: all remote management operations reviewed were conducted 
in  areas  where  access  constraints  precluded  direct  management,  most 
prominently,  in  north-western  Syria.  In  some  cases  in  north-eastern  Syria,  for 
example, ECHO partners were able to demonstrate the safety of operating cross-
border  operations  from  Iraq  using  a  direct  management  modality  and  local 
presence in Kurdish-held zones. 

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2.  Acceptance-building  measures:  integration  of  acceptance-building  measures 
were seen in several instances. Most often this was based around the selection of 
local partners with legitimate authority within the community to deliver assistance. 
4.  Security: specific measures were taken by ECHO partners to ensure the security 
of  local  staff  delivering  aid  inside  Syria.  Such  measures  included  the  conduct  of 
security  briefings  and  training  of  local  staff,  an  emphasis  on  the  primacy  of 
security for aid workers, and the allocation of resources for emergency evacuation 
or medical assistance. 

5.  Needs  assessments:  efforts  to  increase  the  robustness  of  needs  assessments 
focused  on  triangulation  of  data  from  secondary  and  primary  sources,  including 
traders, refugees in neighbouring countries, and beneficiary feedback mechanisms.  
6.  Staff capacity: several ECHO partners conducted training sessions for new local 
partners, covering inter alia the conduct of principled humanitarian aid. While no 
examples of ECHO partners seconding staff to local partner organisations  were 
observed, one instance was seen of an ECHO partner housing the staff of a local 
organisation  in  their  own  offices  in  neighbouring  countries,  allowing  closer 
cooperation and capitalisation opportunities. 

7.  Monitoring:  monitoring  mechanisms  were  adapted  according  to  ECHO’s 
amendment  of  its  monitoring  requirements  for  remote  management  operations 
(see EQ 12, below). 

In the context of an ongoing protracted crisis inside Syria, the restriction of support 
to life-saving aid requires flexible application: 

  The  ECHO  Guidelines’  restriction  of  remote  management  operations  to  direct  life-
saving  aid  was  questioned  by  several  ECHO  partners  conducting  operations  inside 
Syria. In reality, ECHO partners provided a mixture of life-saving and “life-sustaining” 
activities, such as medium-term food storage and distribution services in areas such as 
Aleppo.  
In  addition  to  this,  many  ECHO  partners  noted  that,  in  addition  to  their  ECHO-
funded  operations,  they  are  simultaneously  providing  livelihoods  and  resilience 
programmes through remote management modalities with funding from other donors. 
The  need  for  such  operations  in  some  areas  of  Syria  is  clear,  given  the  protracted 
nature of the crisis.  

 

  As the crisis continues in 2016 and beyond, some partners encouraged flexibility in the 
future. Whilst the security  risks associated with remote  management are real,  and the 
mitigation measures outlined below continue to be necessary, the long-term effects of 
restricting aid to directly life-saving activities are not negligible. 

 

Were the potential risks of remote management successfully mitigated? 

ECHO’s support to remote management operations inside Syria proved an effective 
and much-needed response to the security risks present in AOG-controlled areas of 
Syria: 

  The  remote  management  operations  funded  by  ECHO  were  largely  successful  in 
providing life-saving assistance to those in need. The information from ECHO partner 

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beneficiary  feedback  mechanisms  suggest  that  the  delivery  of  assistance  and  the 
targeting of beneficiaries was both impartial and effective.  

  Both  ECHO  partners  and  other  donors  argued  that  ECHO’s  use  of  remote 
management allowed ECHO to provide impartial humanitarian assistance by operating 
inside AOG-controlled areas, whilst mitigating the risks  of doing so (see below). The 
decision to provide assistance in this way allowed ECHO to  operate in hard-to-reach 
areas  of  Syria,  thereby  providing  a  needs-based  humanitarian  response  in  difficult 
circumstances. 

ECHO  identified  the  key  potential  risks  of  conducting  remote  management 
operations, viz.: 

  Security risk transfers: the transfer of security risks from international to local staff in 

low security contexts. 

  Low quality/relevance of operations: the risk that remotely-managed operations do 
not  meet  the  same  quality  standards  as  directly-managed  operations,  owing  to  the 
inherent difficulty of managing operations from remote locations. 

  Non-compliance with humanitarian principles or impartial needs assessments: 
the risk that local partners, potentially new to humanitarian action, may not deliver aid 
in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  humanity,  impartiality,  independence  and 
neutrality. This is of particular importance in the conduct of needs assessments by local 
partners when ECHO’s direct contracting partner is unable to verify needs assessments 
through direct observation on location. 

  The “remote management trap”: the risk that, once remote management is adopted, 
it becomes difficult to reverse the process and revert to direct management when the 
circumstances allow it. 

Both ECHO and its partners undertook a range of measures to mitigate these risks. 
The following table outlines the principle measures undertaken: 

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Table 8 – Remote management risk mitigation measures 

Risk 
Security risk 
transfer 

ECHO mitigation measures 
 Inclusion of local staff risks in 

monitoring requirements 

Low quality/ 
relevance 

 Specific monitoring requirements 
for RM operations (see EQ12) 
 Partner selection, training, pools 

Partner mitigation measures 
 Close cooperation and training 
 Clarity on security protocol 
 Evaluation capacity 
 Local partner selection and 

training 

 Beneficiary feedback (hotlines, 

social media) 

Humanitarian 
principles / 
impartial needs 
assessments 
RM Trap 

 Inclusion of specific criteria on 

 Triangulation of partner needs 

impartiality of needs assessments 
in the Instruction Note on 
Remote Management. 

 Specific actions taken to ensure 
that ECHO and its partners 
retain the capacity to revert to 
direct management when context 
permits. 

assessments with primary 
sources (IDPs, traders, 
beneficiaries) 

 No action. Not viewed as 

relevant in Syria by ECHO 
partners. Syrian NGOs have a 
different view and regard this 
issue with greater concern 

Security  considerations  have  made  it  impossible  for  the  evaluators  to  directly  assess  the 
extent  to  which  these  risks  have  been  mitigated  on  the  ground  in  Syria.  As  a  proxy, 
telephone interviews with ECHO partners conducting operations inside Syria were carried 
out  during  the  data  collection  phase.  The  results  of  these  interviews  indicate  that  the 
combination of ECHO and ECHO partner measures has been broadly successful: 

  Security  risk  transfer:  no  significant  security  incidents  were  reported  affecting  local 

partner staff inside Syria over the period 2012-2014. 

  Low  quality/relevance:  the  primary  concerns  have  been  around  the  quality  of 
monitoring  reports  on  operations  conducted  using  remote  management,  although 
telephone  interviews  suggest  that  this  has  improved  over  the  evaluation  period.  But 
ECHO  partners  did  not  view  the  relevance  of  operations  or  overall  quality  of 
implementation  as  particularly  problematic  for  the  remote  management  operations 
conducted. 

  Humanitarian  principles  /  impartial  needs  assessments:  overall ECHO partners 
reported that their local implementing partners had respected humanitarian principles 
in the delivery of aid. One example was cited of a local partner travelling with military 
personnel  during  delivery,  but  the  feedback  mechanisms  were  such  that  the  ECHO 
partner was able to identify and tackle the problem immediately. 

  Remote  management  trap:  none  of  the  ECHO  partners  interviewed  in  this 
evaluation  saw  this  as  a  relevant  risk  in  the  Syrian  context.  The  ongoing  security 
concerns preclude expatriate presence in large parts of Northern Syria and are expected 
to  do  so  for  the  foreseeable  future.  It  is  therefore  not  a  situation  in which  switching 
back  to  direct  management  looks  possible.  Moreover,  for  some  Syrian  organisations 
operating as local  partners for international organisations, the fear is not that ECHO 
partners will become trapped in a remote management approach. But rather that they 
will  in  fact  downgrade  the  role  of  local  partners  as  soon  as  the  security  situation 
improves, thereby casting aside the bank of experience built up by these local partners 
from operating in very dangerous contexts. 

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EQ 10 – Use of Cash and Vouchers 

In  cases  of  use  of  Cash  and  Vouchers,  to  what  extent  has  this  been  based  on  a 
proper analysis of the context, and how successful has it been? 

This question seeks to understand the extent to which the choice of transfer modalities – at both strategic 
and operational levels – was grounded in a contextual analysis. Specific attention is placed on the use of 
vouchers and cash transfers. Second, the question calls for an evaluation of the effectiveness of cash transfers 
and vouchers in the context of the Syrian crisis. 

EQ 10 – Use of Cash and Vouchers – Answer Box 

The  ECHO  strategy  for  Syria  presented  in  the  HIPs  considers  the  use  of  a  range  of 
transfer modalities. A core element is the goal of establishing a coordinated approach to 
Multi-Purpose Cash Transfers. However the strategy is nuanced according to the context 
of  each  country.  This  transfer  modality  strategy  in  the  Syria  response  is  supported  by 
general evidence on the effectiveness of cash transfers and a local analysis of context.  

However, the ECHO strategy  for addressing system-level constraints on the use of cash 
transfers  is  poorly  developed;  in  particular  field-level  and  HQ-level  approaches  are 
insufficiently articulated. ECHO strategies in the region also fail to examine the potential 
synergies and linkages of humanitarian cash transfers to national social transfer systems.  

At  operational  level  most  partners  comply  with  the  over-arching  ECHO  policy  by 
supporting  funding  applications  with  a  context  analysis  justifying  the  proposed  transfer 
modality. However, there is a perception that ECHO is strongly ‘pro cash’  – rather than 
‘modality neutral’ – and may not be sufficiently open to arguments for alternative transfer 
modalities. 

The  evidence  suggest  that  –  where  feasible  and  appropriate  –  ECHO-funded  cash 
transfers are generally a more efficient and effective transfer mechanism than vouchers or 
in-kind.  Vouchers  are  generally  perceived  as  less  effective  than  cash  transfers,  but 
preferable to in-kind distributions. Based on collective experience there has been a gradual 
convergence  towards  the  use  of  cash  transfers  over  time  in  the  region.  But  ultimately 
effectiveness  depends  more  than  the  choice  of  modality,  and  critically  on  the  quality  of 
project design and implementation. 

Did the ECHO strategy for Syria consider the appropriate use of a range of 
transfer modalities? 

The ECHO HIPs make specific mention of the scope for using a range of transfer 
modalities nuanced according to the context. 

  The HIPs promote a trend in ECHO support from in-kind transfers to vouchers and 
then  cash  transfers,  nuanced  to  the  differing  contexts  and  needs.  The  2013  HIP 
recommends  ‘exploring  the  use  of  transfers’  in  Lebanon  and  ‘an  important  cash 

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component’  in  Jordan,  where  the environment  is most  conducive  to  the  use  of  cash. 
The 2014 HIP makes stronger references to the use of cash including ‘an evolution of this 
approach to include all commodities (food and non-food) in a system which could be articulated around 
cash’ in Lebanon. 
In Turkey and Iraq the HIP concentrates on use of vouchers. This is in line with the 
constraints  imposed  by  Government  policy  in  Turkey  (although  this  is  slowly  being 
relaxed and agencies are now  moving towards exploring the use  of cash transfers for 
urban refugees) and the limited financial infrastructure in Iraq.  

 

  For responses inside Syria the HIPs stress the need to manage risks ‘Partners that opt to 
implement  “cash  transfer”  modalities  should  present  a  detailed  description  of  market  capacities  and 
risk management/control approaches to be implemented in both government and non-government held 
areas’. 

The  transfer  modality  strategy  in  the  Syrian  response  is  supported  by  general 
evidence on the effectiveness of cash transfers and a local context analysis, viz.  

  The Syrian crisis is taking place in a middle-income region with relatively sophisticated 
economies and high levels of urbanization. Consumption patterns have been based on 
cash for decades. Subject to local market analysis (e.g. impact of cash aid on inflation, 
quantity and quality of commodities available, etc.), the provision of humanitarian aid 
through cash and vouchers is clearly one option available to donors in the region.  
  The goal of moving towards increased use of coordinated cash transfers is broadly in 
line  with  evidence  on  the  efficiency  and  effectiveness  gains  of  cash  transfers  vis-à-vis 
both vouchers and in-kind transfers (see following section), as well as the beneficiary 
preferences transmitted to the team during the course of the evaluation. 

  Cash  transfers  are  appropriately  referenced  in  the  HIPs  as  potentially  relevant  for 
meeting  needs  in  a  range  of  sectors  including  shelter,  NFIs,  winterization  kits,  food 
assistance and WASH.  

  The  use  of  cash  transfers  is  presented  in  the  HIPS  as  part  of  the  overall  response 
strategy  alongside  in-kind  transfers  and  vouchers.  All  stakeholders  agree  on  the  need 
for maintaining the capacity to deliver a variety of (complementary) transfer modalities 
according to the needs and local context. 

The  ECHO  strategy  for  addressing  system  level  constraints  on  the  use  of  cash 
transfers  is  poorly  developed,  with  weak  articulation  between  field  and  HQ  level 
advocacy efforts 

  A  range  of  significant  policy,  institutional,  infrastructural  and  technical  constraints 
inhibit  wider  uptake  of  cash  transfers.  This  includes  host  government  policy,  partner 
mandates,  limited  access  to  markets  and  financial  services,  and  greater  donor 
alignment. These constraints are particularly acute with regard to the introduction of a 
Multi-Purpose Cash Transfer (MPCT).  

  While the ECHO strategy focuses on encouraging partners to use cash transfers, there 
is limited strategic analysis and planning for directly  addressing the constraints which 
inhibit  greater  roll-out  of  cash  transfers.  For  example  most  UN  agencies  respond  to 
clearly-defined  sectoral  mandates  which  do  not  align  easily  with  the  use  of 
unconditional  cash grants. UN agencies noted that in the absence  of a parallel global 

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dialogue and coherent donor positioning, it was hard to capitalize on the opportunities 
offered by ECHO to expand cash programming. 

  ECHO  is  aligned  with  DFID  on  the  greater  use  of  cash  transfers,  but  other  donors 
maintain policy reservations on widespread use of cash transfers. Without broad donor 
agreement it will be hard to realize the use of MPCTs on a large scale. 

ECHO’s  has  made  some  movement  towards  linking  cash  transfers  with  national 
social  transfer  systems,  but  no  concrete  changes  in  ECHO’s  strategy  were  visible 
over the evaluation period  
  A number of development agencies (including the EU) are exploring the potential for 
responding to the protracted needs of refugees through national social transfer systems 
in  countries  such  as  Turkey  and  Jordan.  While  there  are  significant  challenges  to 
realizing this goal,  it also very attractive  as a potential ‘exit strategy’ for humanitarian 
aid in the region. 

  There  are  clear  opportunities  for  aligning  humanitarian  cash  transfers  (especially 
MPCTs)  with  national  systems  –  for  example  in  determining  eligibility  thresholds, 
transfer amounts and distribution mechanisms.  

  ECHO has sought to engage on this issue with EU Delegations, implementing partners 
and  government  agencies  in  Turkey,  Jordan  and  Iraq.  But  interviews  with  ECHO 
partners suggest that they have not been actively encouraged to pursue this option by 
ECHO,  and  ECHO’s  HIPs  over  2012-2014  provide  no  guidance  to  partners  on  this 
point. 

Does  the  appraisal  of  ECHO  actions  take  account  of  an  appropriate 
analysis of the context? 

Most  partners  comply  with  the  overarching  ECHO  policy  by  supporting  funding 
applications with a context analysis justifying the proposed transfer modality 

  ECHO’s  approach  to  using  cash  and  voucher  transfer  modalities  is  presented  in  its 
‘Thematic  Policy  Document  No.  3’.  The  requirement  is  that  “all  modalities  of 
humanitarian  assistance  be  systematically  analysed  and  compared  so  that  ECHO  can 
support  partners  in  responding  to  identified  needs  in  the  most  appropriate  way 
according to the context”. In operational terms this entails a needs analysis, a market 
analysis and a response analysis for selecting a transfer modality. 

  Partners  at  field  level  were  generally  aware  of  this  requirement,  usually  through 
dialogue  with  the  ECHO  TA  rather  than  directly  from  the  policy  document.  Most 
Single Form applications reviewed included some form of context or response analysis 
in their proposals, including an analysis of needs and markets.  

Partners in several countries perceived that ECHO was strongly ‘pro cash’ – rather 
than ‘modality neutral’ 

 

In  some  countries  including  Lebanon  and  Jordan  there  was  a  strong  perception  that 
ECHO strongly favoured funding key sectoral responses through cash transfers. This 
was judged to override arguments presented in the partners’ applications, with ECHO 
in effect pre-determining what they are open to funding.  

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  There is an apparent tension as to whether the choice of transfer modality should occur 
at the strategic (national) level or within individual funding applications. In the Syrian 
context  greater  emphasis  is  being  placed  on  the  strategic  analysis,  as  compared  to 
normal ECHO practice. 

  Partner opinion on this stance was divided. Many agencies, especially ‘pro-cash’ larger 
NGOs saw this as a welcome stand countering the inertia of key agencies and forcing a 
change  in  programming  models.  Some  agencies  felt  that  such  a  technical  decision 
should  fall  within  their  remit,  not  ECHO’s.  Other  agencies  appreciated  the  technical 
justification  for  the  ECHO  position  but  in  the  absence  of  adapted  mandates  feared 
they would be effectively excluded from funding opportunities in the medium term.  

Have  ECHO-funded  cash  and  voucher  operations  been  effective  in  the 
Syria context? 

Where  feasible  and  appropriate  cash  transfers  are  generally  a  more  efficient  and 
effective transfer mechanism than vouchers or in-kind, and there has been a general 
convergence towards the use of cash transfers over time.  

  Cash  transfers  have  capitalized  on  the  use  of  electronic  distribution  platforms  in  the 
region.  They  have  very low  administrative  costs  –  for  example  in  Jordan  90%  of  the 
ECHO  funds  to  UNHCR  directly  reach  beneficiaries  in  the  form  of  cash.  Biometric 
distribution  platforms  –  while  not  exclusively  associated  with  cash  transfers  –  have 
dramatically reduced fraud.  

  Where ‘choice’ and ‘dignity’ are seen as objectives in their own right then cash transfers 
are  automatically  seen  as  more  effective  than  alternative  transfer  mechanisms.  For 
urban  refugees  in  a  middle-income  context  with  diverse  needs,  cash  transfers  were 
widely viewed as the most efficient and effective option as they allow beneficiaries to 
exercise control over what they use the money for. 

  Cash transfers are also recognized to have multiplier effects on local economies. These 
are hard to quantify but good evidence has been gathered, e.g. on the impact on local 
markets and job creation in Lebanon and Turkey.68 

  Potential  cost savings have been  suggested  from the consolidation of several sectoral 
responses  into  a  single  MPCT  with  economies  of  scale  including  consolidated 
assessments (instead of duplication of one assessment for food, one for education, one 
for shelter, etc.) and delivery costs. However, genuine MPCTs have yet to be rolled out 
in any of the affected countries69 and these savings remain largely hypothetical. 
In  some  situations  there  is  no  feasible  alternative  to  the  use  of  cash  transfers,  e.g. 
meeting  the  shelter  needs  of  urban  refugees  in  Jordan  and  Lebanon;  although  other 
complementary  initiatives  can  increase  supply  –  and  dampen  inflationary  impacts  – 
cash transfers are the primary means of meeting the key shelter needs of out-of-camp 
refugees.  

 

68   See,  among  others,  Bailey  &  Pongracz  (2015)  Humanitarian  cash  transfers  -  cost  value  for  money  and  economic 
impact;  Lehmann  &  Masterson  (2016)  Impact  evaluation  of  a  cash-transfer  programme  for  Syrian  refugees  in 
Lebanon; IRC (2014) Emergency Economies - The Impact of Cash Assistance in Lebanon. 

69   E.g.  in  Jordan  and  Lebanon  UNHCR  led  cash  transfers  principally  designed  to  address  shelter  needs  are  delivered 

alongside WFP food vouchers 

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Vouchers are generally perceived as less effective than cash transfers, but preferable 
to in-kind distributions 

  Cash and vouchers are different modalities with different characteristics and levels of 
effectiveness.  Many  partners  erroneously  view  cash-denominated  vouchers  as 
equivalent to cash transfers.  

  Vouchers can share many of the advantages of cash transfers with the high efficiency 
associated with electronic vouchers and secondary multiplier effects on local markets. 
However, evidence from the field suggests that the limited choice afforded by vouchers 
results  in  less  competitive  prices  in  the  contracted  shops,  and  significant  resale  at 
discounted values by beneficiaries needing income to meet other needs. 

  The  costs  associated  with  the  transport,  storage  and  leakage  of  in-kind  commodities 
(e.g. food) generally make this the least effective option. The cost savings of using WFP 
vouchers as compared to providing  hot meals in Turkish camps is estimated  at 30%. 
Several  NGOs  indicated  that  the  management  costs  associated  with  in-kind  transfers 
made them a clearly less-favoured option. 

  However  some  stakeholder  argued  that  vouchers  and  in-kind  transfers  were  more 
effective when judged against a narrow sectoral objective. The limited nature of these 
transfers made it easier to target specific outcomes and control the quality of goods and 
services provided.    

Ultimately effectiveness depends on more than the choice of modality, critically the 
quality of project design and implementation 

  Several  stakeholders  pointed  out  that  effectiveness  depends  on  far  more  than  the 
choice of modality and much depends on the quality of management. Firstly, there is 
the  requirement  to  target  accurately;  effectiveness  depends  on  getting  resources  to 
those in need. Second, effectiveness depends heavily on the amount of the transfer, not 
just the form in which it  comes. This is particularly  pertinent as the strategic  shift to 
using  MPCTs  has  occurred  in  conjunction  with  falling  aid  budgets,  meaning  that  a 
lower proportion of needs can be met.  

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EQ 11 – Budget allocation 

Is  the  size  of  the  budget  allocated  by  ECHO  to  the  region  appropriate  and 
proportionate to what the actions set out to achieve? Could the same results have 
been achieved with less funding? 

This question focuses on the efficiency and effectiveness of ECHO’s response to the Syrian crisis. It seeks to 
measure the extent to which: 

 
 

funding was appropriate to ECHO’s target objectives; 
implementation measures were optimally efficient to achieving those objectives. 

EQ 11 – Budget allocation – Answer Box 

The  appropriateness  and  proportionality  of  the  ECHO  budget  was  questioned  by  the 
evaluation  findings.  The  link  between  the  ECHO  funding  decisions  and  beneficiary 
needs  in  Syria  is  opaque  and  appears  to  have  been  sensitive  to  political  influence. 
ECHO’s budget contributions are not linked to UN appeals process and response plans, 
whilst global funding of UN appeals has not kept pace with the growth in the number of 
people  in  need.  The  Syria  context  also  highlights  challenges  in  determining  an 
appropriate  budget  share  for  ECHO,  given  the  large,  but  weakly  coordinated, 
contributions  from  non-traditional  humanitarian  donors  and  Governments  of  middle-
income host countries. 

ECHO has generally  provided a logical rationale for the sub-allocation of funds to the 
countries within the  region  –  with the possible exception of Turkey’s low share  of the 
burden,  the  ECHO  Syria  team  has  used  a  relatively  small  budget  to  promote  an 
ambitious  set  of  strategic  objectives  and  exert  larger-than-expected  influence  on  the 
overall response. In part this has been achieved through good collaboration with other 
EU funding instruments to allow more targeted use of the humanitarian budget. 

ECHO  has  limited  ability  to  appraise,  monitor  or  evaluate  the  efficiency  and 
effectiveness of the funded  measures,  making it hard to draw conclusions on the cost-
effective of ECHO-funded activities. There is some qualitative evidence that ECHO has 
improved the  cost-efficiency  of its operations at project level  – principally through  the 
increased  use  of  cash  transfers  –  but  further  cost  savings  could  potentially  be  made, 
especially with more attention to system-level innovations. 

Was the ECHO budget allocation process in response to the  Syrian crisis 
appropriate and proportionate? 

The link between the ECHO funding decisions and beneficiary needs is opaque 

  As  a  humanitarian  donor  ECHO  is  committed  to  funding  on  the  basis  of  need.  As 
stated in the EU humanitarian consensus ‘The objective of EU humanitarian aid is to provide 
a needs-based emergency response aimed at preserving life, preventing and alleviating human suffering 

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 

and  maintaining  human  dignity  wherever  the  need  arises  if  governments  and  local  actors  are 
overwhelmed, unable or unwilling to act’. 
Inside  Syria,  global  funding  of  the  international  humanitarian  response  has  not  kept 
pace  with  the  growth  in  needs.  Indeed,  OCHA  estimates  that  humanitarian  needs 
inside Syria have grown at six times the pace of funding since the crisis began: 

Figure 19 – Global funding against people in need inside Syria 

Source: UN OCHA (2015) Bulletin on Syria, Jan 2015 

  Likewise, ECHO funding allocations per country varied considerably, without clear link 

to the humanitarian needs: 

Table 8 – ECHO country allocations 2012-2014 per refugee/IDP received70 

Country 
Jordan 
Iraq 
Lebanon 
Syria(IDPs) 
Turkey 

Allocations (€m)  # Refugees (m)  Allocations / Refugee (€) 
237 
135 
141 
40 
18 

142 
27 
169 
305 
33 

0.6 
0.2 
1.2 
7.6  
1.8 

70   To allow comparison to ECHO funding over 2012-2014, refugee numbers are here taken from UNHCR statistics as 
of  December  2014.  These  figures  have  changed  over  the  course  of  2015.  Source:  Evaluation  Inventory  based  on 
ECHO HOPE database; UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response, Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal, data 
extracted on 5 May 2015; UN OCHA Syria Humanitarian Bulletin January 2015. 

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0246810121402468101214People in NeedTotal Humanitarian Funding2012201320142015People in need (millions)Funding (US$ billions)US$639mUS$1.4bnUS$1.8bn12.2m10.8m9.3m6.8m4m2.5m1m 
 
 
 
                                                 
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  Country allocations per refugee can be impacted by many factors, including the cost of 
delivery  in  each  country,  the  varying  degrees  of  engagement  of  host  countries  and 
presence of other donors. Nevertheless, the link between these determining factors and 
the  size  of  ECHO’s  response  was  not  always  clear,  with  notably  shortfalls  cited  in 
Turkey. 

  ECHO  budget  allocations  are  not  directly  linked  to  the  UN  appeals  process  and 
response plans. As an input to setting the annual budget ECHO gathers data on needs 
at  crisis  level  through  the  Integrated  Analysis  Framework  (IAF).  This  document  also 
includes  additional  information  on  other  relevant  factors  affecting  the  capacity  to 
respond,  including  contributions  from  other  donors,  access  constraints  and  the 
absorptive  capacity  of  ECHO  partners.  This  process  does  not  ask  for  a  field-level 
estimate (from either the desk or TA) of the level of resources required. 

  However, there is no clear methodology for linking the IAF findings to the final budget 
level.  The  impression  of  ECHO  staff  consulted  is  that  the  IAF  helps  to  determine 
whether the budget allocation should go up or down, but not to set the actual budget 
figure.  

The  Syrian  crisis  has  highlighted  new  challenges  in  determining  an  appropriate 
budget share for ECHO 

  ECHO  has  maintained  a  fairly  consistent  burden  share  compared  to  other  official 
humanitarian  donors in  response  to the Syrian crisis.  The OCHA FTS data (which is 
not  always  easily  reconcilable with  ECHO’s  own  internal  reporting)  suggests  that  the 
ECHO contribution71 to the Syrian crisis constitutes around 11% of total humanitarian 
contributions.  This  is  broadly  in  line  with  ECHO’s  estimated  burden  share  which 
typically falls in the 10-15% range in other humanitarian crises.  

  The  Syrian  crisis  has  been  characterized  by  large  –  and  according  to  OCHA  poorly 
reported - contributions from ‘non-traditional’ donors, especially the Gulf States. The 
lack of coordination channels with these new donors presents ECHO with a challenge 
in calibrating its own contributions appropriately.  

  A separate feature of the Syrian crisis has been the very large contributions made by the 
countries hosting the Syrian refugees. Turkey estimates its own contribution since 2012 
to  exceed  US$5  billion  (although  no  breakdown  is  given  to  substantiate  this  figure). 
ECHO  –  along  with  other  international  donors  –  has  struggled  to  determine  how  to 
assess  the  appropriate  role  of  an  international  humanitarian  donor  in  a  context  of 
capacitated  MICs,  and  consequently  much  of  the  financial  burden  has  been  left  on 
Governments in the region. 

The  ECHO  budget  allocation  process  lacks  predictability  and  appears  subject  to 
political influence 

  Overall, the budget allocation has fluctuated considerably over the years and is poorly 
correlated  with  refugee  numbers  or  needs.  There  was  a  rapid  increase  in  funding  in 
2013  which  ECHO  staff  reported  as  challenging  to  programme.  This  pattern  is 
understood to reflect the early significant political interest of the EC in the Syrian crisis 
response. There followed a rapid contraction of the ECHO budget in 2014, despite a 

71   The contribution from other EU instruments to the Syria response is additional to this. 

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continuing  rise  in  refugee  numbers,  which  was  seen  as  insufficient  by  ECHO  field 
staff.  

  The  fluctuations  in  annual  budget  allocations  were  also  criticized  as  inappropriate  by 
partners.  The  Syrian  crisis  has  become  a  protracted  crisis  implying  the  need  for 
predictable funding. Partners are constrained in their ability to plan for a longer-term 
response  –  and  ultimately  beneficiaries  are  subject  to  inconsistent  and  unpredictable 
oscillations in the level of support they receive. 

Did ECHO calibrate its objectives to the available funding? 

ECHO  has  generally  provided  a  logical  rationale  in  how  it  has  allocated  funds  to 
the countries within the region 

  For  the  ECHO  Syria  team  the  budgeting  decisions  have  been  around  the  most 
appropriate  use  of  the  available  resources  allocated  by  senior  management  for  the 
response.  With  the  HIP process  largely  based  on analysis  of  all  available  information 
and a dialogue with partners and other donors, it is the evaluation’s view that most key 
decisions have been based on appropriate criteria (seriousness of need, including their 
life-saving  nature  or  dignity  securing/protection  ensuring  effects,  presence  of 
experienced  partners  knowing  the  field)  and  consideration  of  the  best  available 
information at the time of the decision. The fact that there is a “reserve” with the “top 
up system” allows to respond to situations that could not be foreseen earlier. 

  A  fair  rationale  was  used  to  explain  the  allocation  of  HIP  resources  between  the 
different  countries.  This  is  understood  to  include  consideration  of  the  numbers  of 
people  in  need,  the  depth  of  their  needs  and  the  funding  gaps,  given  other  potential 
sources of financing. The largest share of the funding is devoted to the Syria response 
which  is  almost  entirely  reliant  on  humanitarian  financing,  as  compared  with 
neighbouring  countries  in  which  host  Government  financing  and  complementary 
streams of donor development financing can be drawn on.  

  One  possible  anomaly  appears  to  be  the  relatively  low  level  of  funding  allocated  to 
Turkey – despite its hosting the largest number of refugees. This is largely based on a 
presumption regarding the capacity of the Turkish State to manage the crisis. However, 
the evidence is that the needs of the out-of-camp refugees – the great majority of the 
caseload  –  remain  largely  unmet.  ECHO’s  burden  share  in  Turkey  of  4%  of 
international aid72 falls far below the share in other countries in the region. 

ECHO has used a relatively small budget to promote an ambitious set of strategic 
objectives  

  ECHO  has  sought  to  use  its  limited  resources  to  focus  on  areas  of  comparative 
advantage. For example, in general the ECHO resources have been used to focus on 
the needs of out-of-camp refugees. ECHO’s in-country presence and partnerships with 
NGOs have given it an advantage in this area as compared to other donors. ECHO has 
played  an  important  role  in  ensuring  that  the  overall  response  did  not  remain  overly 
focused on the camps. 

72   OCHA  FTS  data  for  2012-14  -  other  donors  report  providing  approx.  USD  570m.  Separately  the  Turkish  state 

estimates it has provided USD 5 billion. 

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  ECHO has been at the forefront of pressing for introduction  of Multi-Purpose  Cash 
Transfers  (MPCT).  These  objectives  have  pushed  the  debate  forward  both  in  the 
region  and  at  international  level.  However  it  is  also  apparent  that  ECHO  alone  was 
unable  to  sufficiently  influence  the  decision-making  of  large  UN  agencies  –  for 
example through financing MPCTs on a substantial scale. This highlights the need for 
stronger donor coordination and joint strategies on key issues.  

ECHO  has  effectively  collaborated  with  other  EU  instruments  in  the  region  to 
complement the limited humanitarian budget  

  Close  collaboration  was  made  with  the  EU  Delegations  in  Jordan  and  Turkey  to 
synergize the use of humanitarian and development resources. This allowed the limited 
humanitarian resources to be directed to meeting the most pressing needs, where there 
were no alternative funding sources. 

  Development resources were used in areas such as support for national social services 
that could benefit both refugees and host communities, such as education and health. 
Examples were found of good integrated planning, for example ECHO used Children 
of  Peace  funding  to  kick  start  education  initiatives  which  were  then  taken  on  in  the 
medium term by other less agile EU instruments. 

  However,  the  integration  of  humanitarian  and  development  instruments  in  the  Syria 
response  did  highlight  several  potential  concerns,  including  the  extent  to  which 
development resources may  be used  in cases where  humanitarian resources would be 
more appropriate. For example, the EU Syria Trust Fund is being used to finance WFP 
operations and the IcSP to fund protection activities in Turkey. It could be argued that 
it would have been more appropriate to explore voluntary humanitarian contributions 
by EUMS to ECHO as a way of meeting these core humanitarian needs. 

Were ECHO-funded activities cost-effective? 

ECHO  has  a  limited  quantitative  ability  to  appraise,  monitor  or  evaluate  the 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the funded actions 

  ECHO does not have a standard approach to cost-efficiency analysis and partners are 
not  required  to  calculate  efficiency  ratios  as  part  of  the  Single  Form  applications  or 
monitoring  reports.  At  the  end  of  the  evaluation  period  the  ECHO  Syria  team  did 
develop their own ‘dashboard’ that includes comparative cost-efficiency analysis of the 
different projects being appraised for funding under the HIP. However this has not yet 
been institutionalized at either field or corporate level. 

  Cost-effectiveness analysis depends on a robust measurement of results or outcomes. 
Implementing  partners  are  held  accountable  for  reporting  on  outcome-level  results 
using  standardized  Key  Results  Indicators  (KRIs)  across  the  different  sectors.  There 
are  question  as  to  the  robustness  and  comparability  of  these  indicators;  the 
accountability  of  partners  in  using  these  KRIs  was  weak  but  has  improved  with  the 
introduction of the new 2014 Single Form.  

  Overall  there  is  little  evidence  that  monitoring  and  financial  reports  were  used  to 

analyses cost-effectiveness and inform future strategy.  

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There  is  some  evidence  that  ECHO  has  improved  the  cost-efficiency  of  its 
operations but further gains could still be made 

  Findings  on  the  cost-effectiveness  of  ECHO  operations  drew  primarily  rely  on 
subjective opinions. There is a degree of consensus that the shift from in-kind transfers 
to  vouchers  and  cash  transfers  offers  significant  efficiency  gains.  However  WFP  still 
argues that in-kind transfers are the most cost-efficient given waivers on import tax on 
food items. As noted earlier these gains are largely being realized at project level – there 
is  as  yet  little  evidence  of  MPCTs  leading  to  system-level  savings  through  greater 
coordination of assessments and delivery costs.  

  There  are  suggestions  that  cost-efficiency  could  be  improved  through  ECHO 

reconsidering its approach to:  
- 

longer-term,  predictable  funding  in  a  protracted  crisis  (DFID  studies  point  to 
significant  savings  through  using  longer-term  contracts  of  up  to  three  years  for 
emergency response); 
reconsideration of targeting procedures (ECHO is encouraging strict targeting of 
beneficiaries  to  ‘ration’  the  use  of  limited  funds  –  but  these  targeting  exercises 
incur considerable costs);   and  
consideration of direct funding of national NGOs (current all funds pass through 
FPA  or  FAFA  partners  who  require  a  7%  overhead  charge,  although  several 
NGOs based in these MICs have an evident capacity for direct implementation). 

- 

- 

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EQ 12 – Monitoring Systems 

Were appropriate monitoring systems in place to support sound management of 
ECHO operations? 

Monitoring of operations conducted in emergency settings throws up particular challenges not present in other 
contexts,  including  for  example  increased  insecurity  and  uncertainty  for  the  key  stakeholders  (including 
donor,  partner  and  beneficiary  sides),  restricted  access,  absence  of  baseline  data,  and  rapid  changes  in 
personnel.73 Donor and partner monitoring systems are therefore required  to meet each of these challenges 
whilst ensuring robust and reliable data is observed in line with monitoring objectives. 

This  question  seeks  to  understand  the  extent  to  which  ECHO  simultaneously  established  its  own 
monitoring  system  and  supported  its  partners  in  setting  up  its  own  by  making  available the  appropriate 
resources to meet the challenges highlighted above, and thus to underpin the sound management of ECHO-
supported operations. This is of particular importance in the Syrian context, where remote management of 
operations  inside  Syria  places  additional  restrictions  on  access  to  key  stakeholders,  while  simultaneously 
emphasising an increased need for monitoring data to ensure accountability. 

EQ 12 – Monitoring Systems – Answer Box 

Outside Syria coverage of project monitoring by  ECHO field staff has been  reasonable 
given the rapid and significant upscaling of the contract volume in 2013, with two-thirds 
of all completed projects covered by at least one monitoring mission by ECHO field or 
headquarters staff. Direct monitoring by partners followed in most instances the general 
rules  applied  to  ECHO-supported  operations.  It  is  worth  noting  that  partner-led 
innovations  on  post-distribution  monitoring,  such  as  the  use  of  eVouchers  to  monitor 
potential  cases  of  fraud,  have  also  been  observed.  Within  Syria  the  picture  is  rather 
different.  No  direct  monitoring  by  ECHO  staff  was  possible  until  recently  when  a  few 
exceptional  visits  could  take  place.  As  project  monitoring  inside  Syria  has  faced 
understandable  obstacles, ECHO facilitated adaptation of the monitoring framework to 
fit the specific context of remote management, including a greater focus on aid diversion.  

But concerns have nevertheless been raised about the quality of monitoring missions and 
the availability of data  from ECHO partners. In  particular data  on results  achieved  was 
less  systematically  collected,  with  weaknesses  observed  in  the  monitoring  of  project 
results.  Broader  learning  mechanisms,  including  evaluation,  have  been  weaker;  and 
opportunities remain for greater lesson-learning from ECHO’s experience in this crisis. 

73   IFRC (2011), ‘Project/programme monitoring and evaluation (M&E) guide’, p.27. 

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Did ECHO undertake specific actions to ensure the quality and coverage 
of its monitoring mechanisms? 

  ECHO-funded  projects  are  subject  to  a  range  of  different  monitoring 
mechanisms tracking performance and results. Mechanisms range from partner-led 
project  monitoring  during 
intermittent  monitoring  missions 
conducted by ECHO Technical Assistants and national field officers in-country, post-
distribution monitoring, visits from ECHO regional office staff, headquarters missions 
to the field, and strategic evaluations and oversight from other EU institutions such as 
the European Parliament. 

implementation, 

  Outside  Syria,  coverage  of  project  monitoring  by  ECHO  field  staff  has  been 
reasonable, in the context of rapid and significant increases in contract volume. 
64%  of  the  83  projects  in  the  evaluation  inventory  which  have  reached  final  report 
stage  were  covered  by  at  least  one  monitoring  mission  from  ECHO  field  or 
headquarters staff. 

  Some  concern  have  been  raised  about  the  quality  of  monitoring  missions  and 
availability of data from ECHO partners. Concerns were raised within ECHO and 
among partner organisations in this regard. Contributory factors cited include: 
- 
- 

security restrictions for monitoring operations inside Syria; 
the difficulty of conducting monitoring operations across multi-country projects, 
which  were  often  operating  on  different  timescales  between  countries,,  or 
reporting to multiple country desk and field officers within ECHO; 
the limited availability of ECHO staff to analyse data provided by partners during 
the rapid scaling-up of contract volumes in the 2012-2013 period. 

- 

  Review  of  the  monitoring  reports  for  ECHO-funded  projects  in  the  evaluation 
inventory  revealed  variance 
in  their  quality.  Some  projects  were  subject  to 
comprehensive  monitoring  assessments  while  others  were  either  completed  without 
any monitoring reports being filed, or else were visited by monitoring teams with only 
partial coverage of the project’s components and countries of operation. In particular 
availability  of  data  on  achievement  of  results  was  cited  as  a  concern  in  many 
monitoring reports. 

  ECHO  partners  viewed  monitoring  visits  from  ECHO  TAs  as  useful  tools  for 
performance  management,  while  ECHO’s  broader  monitoring  mechanisms 
were less well-received:  
- 

Partner feedback suggests that monitoring missions conducted by ECHO’s field 
technical advisors were generally quite highly appreciated by project staff. ECHO 
staff  feedback  to  project  teams  was  perceived  as  timely  and  operational,  and  as 
one  important  part  of  the  ongoing  close  relationship  that  many  partners  value 
with ECHO field teams. 

-  On  the  other  hand,  most  partners  argued  that  ECHO’s  broader  monitoring 

mechanisms were over-burdensome, viz.:  
o  UN  agencies  working  through  multi-donor  arrangements  reported  that 
ECHO’s  monitoring  and  reporting  requirements  were  a  poor  fit  for  their 
programming structures;  

o  NGO  partners  argued  that  they  received  too  many  visits  from  ECHO 
headquarters,  the  staff  of  which  were  less  able  to  provide  operational 
feedback of use to partners during the implementation phase; 

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o 

all partners concurred that ECHO’s reporting structure was rather heavy and 
labour-intensive,  contrary  to  the  push  for  simplicity  embodied  by,  among 
others, the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative. 

  Broader  learning  mechanisms,  including  evaluation,  have  been  weaker.  Few 
projects  have  conducted  external  evaluations,  and  data  on  project  results  and  impact 
remain  very  weak  –  especially  within  Syria.  Some  partners,  funded  with  ECHO 
resources, have conducted studies on key thematic issues in the context of the Syrian 
crisis (e.g. NRC (2014) A Precarious Existence: the Shelter situation of Refugees from 
Syria in Neighbouring Countries). But this remains the exception rather than the rule, 
and  opportunities  for  learning  from  ECHO’s  experience  in  this  crisis  could  be  more 
systematically  pursued,  whilst  taking  account  of  the  need  to  avoid  duplicating 
assessments and evaluations already available in the public domain. 

Did ECHO tailor monitoring mechanisms to the specific needs of remote 
management? 

  ECHO  specifically  amended  its  project  monitoring  mechanisms  to  meet  the 
context  of  operations  conducted 
through  remote  management.  ECHO 
introduced a specific  amendment to all contracts with a component inside Syria. The 
amendment introduced monthly (later adapted to quarterly) reporting requirements and 
an  additional  focus  on  aid  diversion,  security  risks  to  local  staff,  and  other  factors. 
Several partners observed that the initial monthly reporting was too heavy – and were 
concerned  that  ECHO  staff  did  not  have  the  resources  to  absorb  this  quantity  of 
information.  

  ECHO  partners  operating  inside  Syria  were  asked  to  provide  comprehensive 
data  on  the  number  of  monitoring  missions  conducted  and  the  monitoring 
capacity of their organisations. While appreciated by some ECHO partners, notably 
NGOs  working  with  new  local  partners,  these  requirements  were  regarded  as  too 
bureaucratic by several larger partner organisations. 

  Telephone  interviews  with  ECHO  partners  and  a  review  in  2014  of  project 
documentation  from  cross-border  operations  show  broad  adaptation  of  partner 
monitoring systems in line with the requirements of Article 8 of the contract 

Did ECHO partners monitor their operations and ensure data and findings 
were available for ECHO’s use in a timely manner? 

  As described under JC 12.1 above,  global  monitoring  coverage  of  ECHO-funded 
projects  in  response  in  the  countries  affected  by  the  Syrian  crisis  and 
surrounding Syria was relatively good. This is less the case within Syria. 

  Some  concerns  were  raised  within  monitoring  reports  regarding  timely 
availability  of  data  from  partners,  particularly  regarding  achievement  of  results  by 
project sub-component. 

  Several  examples  were  seen  of  innovative  post-distribution  monitoring  tools 
being used by ECHO partners. Electronic vouchers used in camp settings in Jordan 
and  non-camp  settings  in  Turkey  allowed  ECHO  partners  to  conduct  real  time 
monitoring of expenditure patterns and, in some cases, to guard against potential fraud 

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(e.g.  by  tracking  large  numbers  of  vouchers  being  redeemed  within  a  short  space  of 
time).

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EQ 13 – Consortia and Multi-Country Approaches 

What has  been  the  partners’  experience  of working in consortia as well as with a 
multi-country approach? 

This  question  seeks  to  understand  the  extent  to  which  ECHO’s  use  of  consortia  and  multi-country 
approaches was efficient. This is of particular importance in the context of a regional crisis such as Syria, 
with significant numbers of people in need across multiple countries. The definitions of consortia and multi-
country approaches are given below: 

Consortia approaches: ECHO-funded grant agreements allow for consortia of several FPA partners 
to  work  together  under  one  consortium  agreement  for  a  given  programme  of  action.  Under  such  an 
arrangement one  FPA partner signs the Specific Grant  Agreement and acts as consortium leader, while 
others take part in implementation.  

Multi-country approaches:  ECHO  HIPs  over  the  period  2013-2014  covered  humanitarian 
response to the Syrian crisis across multiple countries (Syria, Iraq, Turkey, Lebanon  and Jordan). This 
allowed  partners  to  target  beneficiaries  in  a  range  of  beneficiary  countries  in  a  single  operation.  Such 
arrangements  have  specific  implications  for  the  evaluation  of  an  operation’s  effectiveness  and  efficiency, 
including  a  greater  number  of  implementation  organisations  and  a  further  intended  benefit  as  regards 
efficiency gains. 

EQ 13 – Consortia and Multi-Country Approaches – Answer Box 

Only  a  limited  number  of  consortia  were  formed  by  ECHO  partners  during  the 
evaluation  period.  Partners  typically  viewed  consortia  arrangements  as  lacking  added-
value  in  the  context  of  the  Syrian  response,  with  the  potential  coordination  benefits 
outweighed  by  the  administrative  costs  for  the  partners.  In  contrast,  multi-country 
contracts with single agencies became the default contracting modality for ECHO during 
the  evaluation  period.  This  was  in  part  motivated  by  the  need  to  reduce  the 
administrative burden on ECHO desk officers at a time of limited staff resources and a 
rapid scaling-up of contract volumes. However, the evidence suggests that the expected 
donor-side  efficiency  gains  did  not  materialise,  in  part  due  to  a  mismatch  between  the 
multi-country contract structure and the single-country staffing structure within ECHO 
at headquarters (desk officers) and field level (TA). Moreover the evidence suggests that 
multi-country  contracts  created  obstacles  to  timely  implementation,  and  the  potential 
efficiency  gains  of  multi-country  contracts  through  cross-country  capitalisation  and 
budget reallocations did not materialise.  

To what extent did ECHO partners work in consortia and through a multi-
country approach? 

  Only  very  few  partners  took  the  opportunity  to  form  consortia  for  ECHO 
contracts  over  the  evaluation  period.  Interviews  with  partners  over  the  period 
suggest that the principle reasons for this included: 

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-  Contract  size:  the  fit  between  ECHO  contract  size  and  principle  funding 
partners  was  considered  good,  such  that  ECHO  contracts  did  not  present  their 
partners with a challenge in terms of absorption capacity. Some ECHO partners 
formed consortia for other donors over the same period, but mainly where those 
donors (e.g. DFID) provided larger grants than the partners in question were used 
to handling alone. 

-  Limited  perceived  added-value:  partners  cited  increased  agency  coordination 
and  intra-agency  capacity  building  as  the  major  point  of  potential  added-value 
from consortia formations. But intra-agency capacity building was not felt to be a 
useful  added-value  for  the  INGOs  operating  in  neighbouring  countries,  all  of 
whom  have  significant  capacity  and  years  of  experience  with  ECHO  and  other 
major  donors.  Likewise  partners  argued  that  coordination  could  be  sufficiently 
managed without forming consortia – despite some of the coordination challenges 
witnessed  by  the  evaluation  team  in  e.g.  the  Lebanon  cash  response  (see  EQ14 
below). 

-  Administrative  burden:  partners  cited  the  added  administrative  burden  of 
forming and managing a formal consortium as a deterring factor, particularly for 
the lead agencies. This was to some extent vindicated by the difficulties observed 
in the case of the Red Cross consortium that managed the field hospital in Azraq 
camp in Jordan. Led by the Finnish Red Cross, the consortium initially included 
10 partners, most of which had left the consortium by June 2014. 

  Multi-country  contracts  constituted  the  majority  of  ECHO’s  funding  portfolio 
over  the  period  2012-2014. But the majority of partners spoken to by the evaluation 
team  reported  that  their  operations,  whilst  multi-country  at  contract  level,  were 
managed as several individual country-level operations, with only very limited examples 
of  inter-country  lessons  learning  and  budget  transfers  on  the  part  of  partners 
themselves (see below). 

Did ECHO undertake specific actions to ensure multi-country operations 
made efficient use of available resources? 

  The use of multi-country contracts was in part motivated by the need to reduce 
the  administrative  burden  on  ECHO  desk  officers  at  a  time  of  limited  staff 
resources and a rapid scaling-up of contract volumes, viz.: 
-  The  2013  and  2014  Humanitarian  Implementation  Plans  covered  humanitarian 
response to the Syrian crisis across Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Iraq;  
-  This  coincided  with  the  rapid  scaling-up  of  funding  allocations  for  the  Syrian 
crisis throughout the 2012-2013 period (see EQs 5 and 11 on this point), which 
increased pressure on the contracting team inside ECHO headquarters; 

-  Using  multi-country  contracts  allowed  ECHO  to  allocate  substantial  resources 
across  multiple  countries  of  operation,  thereby  reducing  the  total  number  of 
contracts  required  to  cover  the  crisis  across  the  region.  In  this  sense  there  was 
reasonable expectation of greater contracting efficiency at donor level. 

  However,  the  evidence  suggests  that  the  expected  donor-side  efficiency  gains 

did not materialise, viz. : 
-  Both  ECHO  staff  and  partners  cited  a  mismatch  between  the  multi-country 
contract  structure  and  the  single-country  staffing  structure  within  ECHO 

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headquarters,  which  led  to  the  perception  among  partners  of  long  or  confused 
chains of command on the donor side;  

-  ECHO  staff,  at  both  headquarters  and  field  levels,  observed  an  increased 
administrative burden on the donor side. The need for each country desk officer 
to sign off on each multi-country contract, and on each subsequent modification 
request, placed an additional coordination burden on ECHO staff.  

  Moreover, the evidence suggests that multi-country contracts created obstacles 

to timely implementation.  
-  ECHO partners observed delays in contract signature and amendment due to the 
complexity  of  the  signature  process.  All  ECHO  partners  spoken  to  in  the  field 
mentioned the increased lag-time between field office agreement and finalisation 
of the decision at headquarters level, due to the need for all country desk officers 
to sign off on each contract and modification request. 

-  The  significant  variance  in  country  contexts  across  the  five  implementing 
countries meant that individual country subcomponents were often implemented 
at  different  paces.  This  made  it  harder  to  fulfil  single,  one-size-fits-all  reporting 
requirements (e.g. by requiring one interim report to be delivered at the same time 
across  all  countries)  and  hampered  timely  renewal  of  individual  country 
subprojects on completion. 

Did ECHO partners provide evidence that consortium and multi-country 
arrangements reduced coverage gaps and duplications between countries 
and partner organisations? 

  The potential efficiency gains of multi-country contracts through cross-country 
capitalisation and budget reallocations did not materialise: 

-  Only  a  few  cases  of  budget  reallocations  between  country  subcomponents  of 
multi-country  contracts  exist.  Partners  and  ECHO  staff  argued  that  such 
reallocations are difficult to implement, given the short implementation timescale 
for  most  ECHO-funded  projects  in  combination  with  the  lengthy  procedures 
required to sign off modifications for multi-country projects (see above). 

-  Capitalisation  between  country  subcomponents  occurred  in  a  handful  of  cases 
observed  by  the  evaluation  team.  NRC,  for  example,  clearly  applied  lessons 
learned in the shelter work conducted in Lebanon to their operations in Jordanian 
non-camp settings. But such examples are not directly attributable to the nature of 
the  multi-country  contract.  Rather,  the  internal  learning  structures  of  ECHO’s 
larger  INGO  partners  were  more  normally  cited  as  the  key  driving  factor.  This 
interpretation  is  supported  by  observation  of  similar  learning  activities  taking 
place within partner organisations where the two projects in question did not fall 
under  the  same  contract,  e.g.  between  projects  funded  by  ECHO  and  those 
funded by other donors. 

  Only limited numbers of consortia were formed, and partner experience of them 

was negative, viz.: 
- 

in some cases consortia groups broke up during implementation, due to differing 
levels of engagement and ownership between the individual partners; 
in other cases partners questioned whether ECHO’s procedures were well aligned 
with  the  development  of  consortia,  a  potential  increase  in  overhead  costs  being 

- 

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required  to  manage  coordination  between  partners  and  meet  ECHO’s  reporting 
requirements.  

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EQ 14 – Coordination 

How  successful  has  ECHO  been  in  coordinating  its  operations  with  other  main 
actors, notably in promoting synergies avoiding duplication, and addressing gaps 
and  resource  conflicts  at  the  situational,  regional,  country  and  sector-specific 
levels? 

This question seeks to determine the extent to which ECHO has succeeded in coordinating operations with 
other key actors in the Syria response across regional, country and sector-specific levels. This includes - but is 
by no means limited to  -  European donors, as section 1 above makes clear. ECHO coordination with the 
UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, OCHA, the UN Country Team in Damascus, regional 
level  UN  bodies,  and  neighbouring  country  offices  will  need  to  be  assessed.  Furthermore,  coordination 
challenges for ECHO and other donors vary between Syria and neighbouring countries, each neighbouring 
country  providing  different  levels  of  local  coordination,  as  noted  in  ECHO  (2014)  Humanitarian 
Implementation Plan for Syria. 

EQ 14 – Coordination – Answer Box 
The  nature  of  the  Syrian  crisis,  as  a  Level  3  emergency  with  a  significant  refugee 
component,  makes  strategic-level  coordination  both  important  and  difficult  to  achieve. 
In  this  context  ECHO  made  significant  efforts  to  improve  strategic  coordination 
between traditional OECD donors and technical coordination at the sector level. Both of 
these aspects were reasonably successful (although coordination of cross-line and cross-
border  operations  could  have  been  improved),  and  ECHO’s  contributions  to  this 
success were widely appreciated.  

On the other hand, coordination between humanitarian agencies (including donors) and 
host governments was generally weak, as was coordination with non-OECD donors. But 
in  these  cases  coordination  success  was  impeded  by  factors  outside  ECHO’s  direct 
control,  primarily  concerning  the  willingness  of  other  actors  to  engage  in  effective 
coordination  activities.  Most  of  all,  the  ambiguity  of  UNHCR’s  and  OCHA’s 
coordination mandates in the Syrian crisis hampered overall coordination at the macro-
level. 

At strategy level, did ECHO take specific action to enhance coordination 
with other main actors? 

  The nature  of the Syrian crisis makes strategic-level coordination both important and 

difficult to achieve, viz.: 
-  As  Syrian  populations  move  around  within  Syria  (IDP)  and  between  Syria  and 
neighbouring  countries  (where  they  become  refugees),  coordination  between 
donors,  partners  and  UN  agencies  with  different  mandates  and  focusing  on 
different  types  of  population  (IDP,  refugees  or  host  populations)  becomes 
increasingly important.  

-  But  the  question  of  which  body,  OCHA  or  UNHCR,  takes  the  strategic 
coordination role is inherently more difficult in an L3 emergency that includes a 

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 

substantial  refugee  crisis  component.  Confusion  and  weak  articulation  between 
HCR-led sectoral groups and OCHA-led cluster systems created tension. 

In  this  context,  ECHO,  which  often  attended  HCT  “+”  meetings  (humanitarian 
agencies + key donors) made significant efforts to improve strategic coordination, viz.: 
-  ECHO  supported  the  coordination  role  of  OCHA  both  inside  Syria  and  in 
neighbouring countries, including supporting the development of OCHA’s Whole 
of Syria approach;  

-  ECHO  invested  in  a  regionally-coordinated  approach,  by  having  a  Syria 
coordinator at HQ and Amman, seeking to improve coordination of efforts both 
inside Syria and across neighbouring countries; 

-  ECHO  also  encouraged  UNHCR  to  broaden  its  coordination  activities  in 
Lebanon in order to include non-HCR partner organisations. Stakeholders suggest 
that this improved strategic coordination between the key actors in this country. 

  But the end-results of these efforts remain limited: 

-  A difficult relationship between key personnel in UNHCR and OCHA continued 
to  hamper  coordination  efforts  for  many  actors,  ECHO  included.  Some 
stakeholders argued that ECHO could have made better use of resources if it had 
not invested so heavily in promoting the OCHA coordination role. Moreover the 
perception  that  ECHO’s  advocacy  for  the  role  of  OCHA  in  having  the  upper 
hand  in  coordination  in  the  refugee  crisis  actually  fuelled  greater  inter-agency 
conflict. 
In Turkey stakeholders cited unaddressed weaknesses in the coordination capacity 
of  UNHCR  as  compared  to  the  cluster  system,  for  which  tools  were  developed 
such as coordination guidelines and training rosters. 

- 

-  Questions  were  raised  about  the  payback  on  investing  in  Amman  as  a  hub  for 
coordination of ECHO’s response across the region. While it was accepted by all 
stakeholders  that  coordination  of  the  response  inside  Syria  was  a  vital  activity 
requiring  significant  resources,  the  task  of  coordination  between  countries  had 
less obvious relevance. 

Did ECHO needs analyses and funding decisions identify and take 
account of the activities of other main actors? 

  ECHO  supported  the  strategic  coordination  process,  including  efforts  to  improve 
needs  assessments  and  data-sharing,  such  as  ACAPS  (the  Assessment  Capacities 
Project), SNAP (the Syria Needs Analysis Project) and REACH. However the presence 
of  so  many  different  needs  assessments  was  itself  cited  by  many  ECHO  partners  as 
problematic. While these reports have reportedly been seen as useful by donors at HQ 
level,  the  lack  of  compatibility  and  comparability  between  the  different  data  sets  and 
assessments  and  question-marks  about  the  quality  of  the  data  collection  makes  them 
difficult  to  use  as  an  operation  tool.  Triangulation  with  other  sources  therefore 
remained imperative.  

  The majority of ECHO-funded operations in neighbouring countries did take account 
of the activities of the other main actors. Assessing the presence of other actors inside 
Syria  was  more  challenging  due  to  the  security  risks  involved.  Nevertheless  partner 
proposals for ECHO-funded activities inside Syria also provided an assessment, insofar 

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as possible, of the presence of other actors in their areas of operation prior to project 
launch. 

  ECHO’s  funding  decisions  in  Turkey  notably  addressed  gaps  in  donor  response  in 
2015, when it moved towards a “far-east” strategy of supporting non-camp refugees at 
the  eastern  end  of  the  border  region  with  Syria,  an  area  not  significantly  covered  by 
other donors. 

  Finally,  ECHO  supported  NGO  coordination  mechanisms  in  both  Turkey  and 
Lebanon, as well as supporting security coordination through the INSO platform (the 
International NGO Safety Organisation). 

Did ECHO-funded actions target, and achieve, enhanced synergies and 
reduced duplications? 

 

Inside  Syria  the  security  context  presented,  and  continues  to  present,  an  obstacle  to 
effective  information-sharing  and  thus  to  identification  of  possible  duplications  or 
gaps. In that regard:  
-  ECHO partners have little or no access and struggle to gather information from 
local  partners;  the  lack  of  international  presence  on  the  ground  continues  to 
present a problem in this regard, as highlighted in recent literature;74  

-  OCHA has struggled to obtain information on NGO presence inside Syria due to 
data  security  concerns.  The  lack  of a  secure  data-handling  service  between  even 
large INGOs and OCHA remains problematic in a context where information on 
the  whereabouts  of  humanitarian  actors  can  be  highly  sensitive  for  all  those 
concerned. 

 

  But ECHO did fund cross-border operations inside Syria prior to the engagement of 
UN agencies in this area, thereby helping address one of the largest coverage gaps in 
the crisis. 
In Jordan and Lebanon ECHO was vocal in working to increase coordination between 
a  crowded  market-place  of  donors.  Duplication  was  observed  between  cash 
programmes  in  Lebanon,  including  the  use  of  different  banking  card  systems  by 
different  donors.  In  response,  ECHO  sought  to  develop  a  one-card  solution  to 
increase efficiency and coherence.  
In Turkey, in contrast, donor involvement has been lower, leading to gaps in assistance 
rather than  duplication risks. ECHO has actively sought to ensure  that such gaps are 
filled,  for  example  through  the  “far-east”  strategy  developed  for  2015  (see  JC14.2 
above). 

 

74   See,  for  example,  Healy  and  Tiller  (2014)  “Where  is  Everyone?  Responding  to  Emergencies  in  the  Most  Difficult 

Places.” MSF. 

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EQ 15 & 16 – Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development 

To what extent are ECHO actions coherent with and complementary to the actions 
of other EC services? To what extent has LRRD  been mainstreamed into ECHO-
funded projects in the region? To what extent have medium-to-long-term objectives 
been taken into account in the programming of ECHO interventions? 

To what extent have the ECHO-funded actions been successful in terms of LRRD? 
How has the handover to development actors been prepared and carried out? What 
further could be done (enabling factors, tools, mechanism, change in strategy, etc.) 
to  increase  the  uptake  of  results  and  lessons  learned  from  relief  projects  in 
development planning and programming? 

As explained in the Commissions’ 2001 communication, the concept of LRRD originates from a “concern 
about the so-called “grey zone” between humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development. This grey 
zone arises because humanitarian assistance differs from development co-operation programmes. The former 
addresses  the  immediate  needs  of  individuals  affected  by  crises  and  is  provided  mainly  through  non-
governmental and international organisations. The latter aims to support autonomous development policies 
and strategies and is provided  mainly under co-operation  programmes agreed  with the partner country.”75 
These questions aim at verifying the extent to which ECHO funded operations were conceived with a view 
to link relief, rehabilitation and development. More specifically, in the context of an evaluation of ECHO’s 
support, they aim at verifying to what extent ECHO, when providing emergency aid, has taken longer term 
objectives  into  account  in  its  programming  and  has  also  endeavoured  to  ensure  complementarity  with  the 
longer term support provided, notably by DEVCO. It also aims at examining the successes achieved in this 
respect.  

The answer to the question is constructed around four key issues:  
  The meaning of LRRD in the specific context of the Syrian crisis ; 
  The extent  to which  ECHO has worked  on  mainstreaming LRRD in this context and its specific 

interaction with DEVCO for this purpose; 
  Specific initiatives taken with respect to LRRD; 
  The extent to which the approach to LRRD was part of a comprehensive and strategic approach.  

EQs 15 & 16 – LRRD – Answer Box 
The  issue  of  LRRD  has  a  specific  relevance  in  the  context  of  the  Syrian  crisis.  Indeed, 
although the emergency needs continue to be extremely high, and even if at the beginning 
of  2016  there  are  no  clear  prospects  on  when  refugees  will  be  able  to  return  home,  the 
protracted  nature  of  the  crisis  poses  specific  challenges  that  go  beyond  immediate  relief. 
These concern both the refugees and the host communities. The refugees are confronted 
with specific needs linked to the long term nature of their stay outside of their country, for 
instance  in  terms  of  employment,  livelihoods,  education,  or  even  longer  term  health 
support. The host communities of the neighbouring countries are under huge pressure to 

75 European Commission, COM (2001) 153 final, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. 

Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development – An assessment, 2001.  

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deal with the important flow of refugees, which implies longer term development needs (in 
terms  of  infrastructure,  livelihoods,  etc.).  Inside  Syria,  with  a  continuously  evolving  and 
uncertain  situation,  and  little  prospect  of  reconstruction  in  the  short  run,  the  core  needs 
remain heavily on the side of emergency support. 

In  this  context,  ECHO  has  taken  several  initiatives  to  mainstream  LRRD  and  to 
collaborate  with  DEVCO  in  this  respect  over  the  period  considered.  The  HIPs,  for 
instance,  always  contain  a  specific  section  on  LRRD  and  on  the  use  of  complementary 
instruments.  ECHO  and  DEVCO  have  also  collaborated  to  develop  Joint  Humanitarian 
Development  Frameworks  in  Jordan,  Lebanon,  and  Turkey.  In  terms  of  collaboration 
between  ECHO  and  DEVCO  on  the  ground,  there  are  different  perceptions:  some 
stakeholders  underlined  a  close  collaboration;  others  considered  that  the  worlds  of 
development and humanitarian aid were still very much separate, as they are more globally 
in the donor community.  

ECHO  has  made  this  mainstreaming  concrete  through  staging  different  interventions 
jointly  with  DEVCO  between  2012  and  2014,  but  it  is  difficult  to  state  that  the  LRRD 
approach  adopted  at  strategy  level  completely  trickled  down  to  the  project  level.  Indeed, 
the announced complementarity with,  for instance, the ENI instrument and the IfS were 
concretised in a number of cases and there were also several examples of ECHO funded 
projects that took a longer term perspective while intervening in emergency situations. But 
the latter approach was not systematic.  

Towards the end of the 2014, ECHO, but also the wider donor community, took specific 
initiatives  that  contributed  to  redesigning  the  aid  architecture  in  the  sense  of  a  more 
comprehensive  and  strategic  approach  towards  LRRD.  Indeed,  both  the  3RP  initiative 
developed by the UN and countries of the region, and especially the EU the MADAD fund 
put LRRD at the heart of their approach.  

The  issue  of  LRRD  has  a  specific  relevance  in  the  context  of  the  Syrian  crisis:  it 
should  be  understood  against  the  backdrop  of  a  protracted  crisis;  it  needs  to  be 
posed differently inside and outside Syria; and it concerns different groups of target 
beneficiaries (refugees and host communities).   
  Many stakeholders interviewed underlined that the first challenge remains to deal with 
the enormous amount of emergency needs. This is not to say that LRRD was not 
important, but the priority was often on relief.  

  At the start of 2016, it is clear that this is a protracted crisis, without clear prospects as 
to  its  ending.  Recent  reports  have  cited  the  need  for  a  significant  revision  to  the  aid 
architecture  in  order  to  address  the  protracted  crisis  with  coordinated  and  multi-year 
mechanisms.76 This  makes  the  relevance  of  going  beyond  relief  even  clearer:  specific 
needs arise (see below) to make sure refugees can be supported in and for the longer 
run.  This  said,  stakeholders  interviewed  underlined  that  with  the  protraction  of  the 
crisis,  the  emergency  needs  keep  increasing,  given  the  continuous  flow  of  IDPs  and 
refugees  entering  neighbouring  countries.  In  this  context,  a  number  of  interviewees 
underlined that their first concern remained dealing with emergency. 

76   See,  inter  alia,  the  DSRA  (2015)  Dead  Sea  Resilience  Agenda;  and  ODI  (2016)  Enhancing  Aid  Architecture  in  the 

Regional Response to the Syria Crisis. 

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  The emphasis on emergency is even stronger inside Syria. At the beginning of 2016, 
military operations and destruction are still occurring on a large scale and the scenario 
of  an  end  to  the  conflict  is  still  very  uncertain.  In  such  a  context  of  a  continuously 
uncertain and evolving situation, there are very little possibilities to start thinking about 
the  longer  run.  Moreover,  donor  support  is  made  more  challenging  as  it  takes  place 
through  remote  management.  Hence,  interviewees  underline  that  their  main  focus 
remains clearly on dealing with emergency needs.    

  Needs in terms of rehabilitation and development concern two types of beneficiaries:  

-  First there are the refugees themselves. Confronted with the duration of the crisis, 
and with little prospect of a return to Syria in the short run, they face needs that 
are  linked  to  their  prolonged  stay  outside  of  their  country,  notably  in  terms  of 
employment,  livelihoods,  education  for  their  children,  etc.  As  underlined  by  an 
interviewee,  the  lack  of  capacity  of  hosting  countries  and  aid  providers  to  deal 
with these needs most probably plays a role in the refugees’ decisions to leave the 
host country and continue their search for another location to stay in the longer 
run. This same interviewee explained that numerous refugees on a daily basis gave 
their reasons for leaving the host countries and moving to Greece as: 1) The lack 
of employment or the fact that they felt exploited in the job they had; 2) The lack 
of possibilities to offer education to their children; 3) A lack of health treatment 
(many of them had war related injuries or were suffering from severe diseases). In 
other words, this highlights the importance of going beyond immediate relief and 
suggests that difficulties were met during the period covered in doing so.  

-  As  mentioned  under  the  response  to  EQs  2-4  above,  the  pressure  on  the host 
countries  is  very  high.  Many  refugees  are  there  to  stay  in  the  longer  run.  This 
poses challenges to the host countries in their capacities to deal with this situation, 
in  terms  of  the  livelihoods  they  can  provide,  sufficient  water  and  sanitation, 
employment,  etc.  This  is  even  more  stringent  for  countries  that  already  had 
difficulties in dealing with some of these aspects before the Syrian crisis.   

Over the period covered, ECHO has taken initiatives to mainstream LRRD, and to 
collaborate  with  DEVCO  with  a  view  to  link  relief  to  rehabilitation  and 
development.  
  The  HIPs  have  always  contained  a  section  on  LRRD,  which  notably  describes  the 
complementarity  of  the  ECHO  support  with  other  (EU)  support  such  as  the 
Instrument  for  Stability  (IfS)  or  the  ENPI  funding.  As  an  example,  the  2012  HIP 
planned  (among  other  things)  to  support  emergency  education  for  displaced  Syrian 
children  and  for  host  communities  in  Jordan  through  UNICEF  with  ENPI  funding. 
Similarly,  the  2013  HIP  announced  the  use  of  IfS  funding  to  support  the  capacity 
development of local administrative structures in Syria and to support the stabilization 
of living conditions of Syrians through a community-based approach.  

  ECHO and the EUDs have developed Joint Humanitarian Development Frameworks 

in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey.  

  Stakeholders  provided  mixed  messages  on  the  overall  collaboration  between  ECHO 
and the EUDs in terms of LRRD. In Turkey for instance, some interviewees reported a 
close collaboration between ECHO and the EU Delegation to maximize synergies and 
overlaps  and  to  present  an  integrated  “one  EU”  response.  Likewise,  in  Lebanon, 
interviewees  reported  that  the  links  between  ECHO  and  other  EC  Services  were 
activated rapidly at both HQ and country level.  But other interviewees considered (in 

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several  countries)  that  ECHO  and  the  EUD  remain  quite  separate  and  operate  from 
“two  different  worlds”,  underlining  that  more  generally  throughout  the  donor 
community  there  is  still  a  too  big  divide  between  the  development  and  the 
humanitarian worlds.  

A number of initiatives made the mainstreaming of LRRD concrete over the period 
2012-2014,  although  it  is  difficult  to  state  that  the  LRRD  approach  aimed  for  at 
strategy level completely trickled down to the project level.  
  As announced in the HIPs, ECHO has worked with other EU instruments to build a 
more integrated response to the crisis. In Turkey, for instance, the Instrument for Pre-
Accession  (IPA)  is  a  huge  source  of  support,  with  around  €600m  per  year,  and 
contributed  for  instance  with  €3M  to  providing  capacity-building  for  AFAD. 77 
Interviewees also explain that ECHO has played a specific role in supporting the EU 
Delegation  in  developing  the  IPA  strategy  for  Turkey,  notably  by  helping  to  identify 
priority  sectors  of  support,  geographical  areas  of  need,  and  implementation  partners. 
Jordan and Lebanon also worked through the ENI, with examples of good synergies, 
for instance through a focus on education for refugees (not a direct priority of ECHO) 
or on primary health care (with ECHO working on secondary health care), or WASH 
support,  where  DEVCO  handles  large  infrastructure,  whereas  ECHO  works  at  HH 
level.   
It  cannot,  however,  be  stated  that  the  projects  financed  by  DG  ECHO  were 
systematically  aimed  at  ensuring  the  continuum  between  a  shorter  and  longer  term 
perspective. Nevertheless, several projects clearly pursued objectives that went beyond 
responding to the most acute and urgent needs. In Turkey, ECHO has supported the 
immediate  education  needs  of  refugees  through  the  “Children  of  Peace”  initiative. 
While  not  a  traditional  humanitarian  responsibility,  interviewees  underlined  that  this 
has worked well. The flexible ECHO funding allowed the rapid start-up of educational 
programmes, and has been followed up through longer-term funding by development 
instruments that take time to mobilize.  

 

Towards  the  end  of  the  2012-2014  period,  and  in  the  subsequent  years,  specific 
initiatives  were  taken,  both  within  the  overall  and  the  EU  specific  donor 
architecture,  to  favour  a  more  comprehensive  and  strategic  approach  towards 
LRRD.  
  At the end of 2014, a “Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 20015-2016” (3RP) was drafted 
as  “a nationally-led, regionally coherent strategy which is built on the national response plans of the 
countries  in  the  region.”  This  plan  “brings  together  almost  200  humanitarian  and  development 
partners,  including  governments,  United  Nations  agencies,  and  national  international  NGOs”.  It 
aims  at  “bringing  about  a  scaling-up  of  resilience  and  stabilization-based  development  and 
humanitarian assistance with the crisis”.  The  3RP,  of  which  an  updated  version  for  2016-
2017 was published in February 2016, explicitly  endeavours to inscribe support in an 
LRRD  perspective,  considering  that  “traditional humanitarian assistance is no longer enough, 
especially given that an end to the crisis is not imminent”.  It  calls  for  a  “new aid architecture”,  as 
“the task ahead goes well beyond the resources,  expertise, capacities, and mandates of humanitarian 

77   The  Disaster  and  Emergency  Management  authority  from  the  Republic  of  Turkey.  Although  this  concerns 
emergency,  we  would  say  that  the  focus  on  capacity-building  inscribes  this  support  with  a  will  to  deal  with  longer 
term aspects of a protracted crisis.  

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organisations”, and because it is necessary to bring in “longer-term – and scaled up – assistance 
by  development  actors,  bilateral  partners,  international  financial  institutions  and  the  private  sectors 
(…) to address the massive structural impact of the crisis.” The plan puts LRRD at the core of 
the  aid  architecture,  adopting  an  approach  “that combines protection and humanitarian relief 
efforts with more focus on supporting national plans and development interventions to build resilience 
among individuals, communities and institutions across sectors”.78 

  The  MADAD  Trust  Fund  was  established  under  the  ENI  in  December  2014.  Its 
overall  objective  is  “to  provide  a  coherent  and  reinforced  aid  response  to  the  Syrian  crisis  on  a 
regional  scale,  responding  primarily  in  the  first  instance  to  the  needs  of  refugees  from  Syria  in 
neighbouring countries, as well as of the communities hosting the refugees and their administrations, in 
particular as regards resilience and early recovery”. The idea is for EU and international donor 
assistance  to  provide,  through  the  Trust  Fund,  “a  comprehensive  response  package 
commensurate  to  the  challenges”.  It  shall  also  “recognize  the  complementary  roles  of  development 
cooperation,  humanitarian  action  and  political  dialogue  and  engagement  as  essential  components  of 
building resilience and ensure that effort to link relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) remain 
integrated  to  such  activities.” 79 In  this  context,  the  focus  of  the  Trust  Fund  operations 
should be, among other things, on aspects that are key in an LRRD perspective, such 
as: supporting the long term capacity of host states to address refugee flows, education 
(for  children,  vocational  training  for  adults,  higher  education  to  Syrian  students, 
providing  (in  Iraq)  seed  money  in  the  effort  to  link  development  with  humanitarian 
assistance,  support  to  governments  of  the  region  to  pursue  policies  conductive  to 
enhanced economic resilience among refugee and host communities, etc.80  

78   Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2015-2016. In response to the Syria Crisis. Regional Strategic Overview, pp. 5-8.  

79   Agreement  establishing  The  European  Union  Regional  Trust  Fund  in  Response  to  the  Syrian  Crisis,  « the  Madad 

Fund ».  

80   Strategic orientation document for the European Union Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, « the 

Madad Fund ».  

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EQ 17 –Security 

To  what  extent  have  the  ECHO-funded  projects  taken  into  account  the  security 
situation  in  the  field  for  the  partners'  organisations?  What  is  the  scope  for 
improvement? 

This question aims to assess the extent to which the design and implementation of ECHO-funded actions 
took into account the security situation, both within Syria and in neighbouring countries. In particular, the 
Evaluation Question aims to assess the quality of the operations design regarding the security situation. It 
also examines the role of ECHO in terms of promoting safe humanitarian access for partner organisations 
in low-security contexts.  

EQ 17–Security – Answer Box 

international  staff  changed 

Evidence  shows that ECHO-funded actions were  based  on in-depth knowledge  of the 
security context, and that ECHO and its partners were able to adapt programmes to the 
fast-changing security situation in the field. Review of ECHO projects inside Syria show 
that  97%  of  funded  projects  included  a  suitably  robust  assessment  of  the  security 
situation, despite the difficulty of gathering data in the country. As the security situation 
for 
its  approach  to 
programming,  most  notably  inside  AOG-controlled  areas.  The  introduction  of  remote 
management  guidelines  helped  ECHO  partners  minimise  transfer  of  security  risks  to 
local  partners  and  provide  risk  mitigation  and  training  wherever  possible.  ECHO’s 
support  to  the  NGO  security  platform  INSO  also  helped  promote  safe  delivery  of 
humanitarian aid by NGO partners and non-partners alike. Through both these efforts 
and  its  early  and  continued  support  for  remotely-managed  operations  in  hard-to-reach 
areas inside Syria, ECHO can be judged to have eased safe humanitarian access in areas 
of high risk. 

inside  Syria,  ECHO  adapted 

To what extent did ECHO-funded operations take account of the security 
context?  

ECHO-funded  actions  were  based  on  an  in-depth  knowledge  of  the  security 
context:  

  Security  assessments  are  conducted  by  the  partners  when  designing  the  projects,  and 
the analyses are reported to ECHO through the dedicated sections in the Single Form. 
The review of the “assumptions and risks” and “contingency measures” sections in the 
Single  Forms  of  ECHO  projects  inside  Syria  indeed  showed  that  97%  of  funded 
projects  included  a  suitably  robust  assessment  of  the  security  situation,  despite  the 
difficulty of gathering data in the country. This means that only 3% (two out of 68) of 
the projects inside Syria included no (or limited) assessment of the risks in their Single 
Forms.  And  in  the  two  exceptional  cases  the  low  level  of  security  assessment  was 
highlighted by ECHO in the related FichOp.  

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  ECHO  is also  equipped  to  evaluate  the  situation  on  the  ground  on  a  real-time  basis, 
notably thanks to its extended field presence and expertise. As highlighted in EQ6 on 
added  value,  ECHO  has  an  extensive  field  presence,  strong  in-house  capacity,  and  a 
feet-on-the-ground capability that has led to a strong capacity to analyse and adapt to 
the  context.  In  addition,  ECHO’s  regular  contacts  with  the  UN,  ICRC  and  Member 
States offer important windows of discussion on the security situation. 

There is evidence of ECHO’s capacity to adapt to the changing security context:  

  Partners have highlighted that they have a good working relationship and dialogue with 
ECHO TA in the field. This dialogue is permanent, as changing security patterns in a 
given  operational  environment  would  imply  the  need  to  reassess  the  situation  and  to 
reallocate activities if required. Any change is then discussed and agreed with ECHO. 

 

In  Lebanon  for  instance,  it  has  been  reported  that  whenever  necessary  ECHO 
demonstrated  high  readiness  to  discuss  the  implications  for  programming  of  a 
degraded  security  situation  which  limits  access  and  necessitates  adaptation.  Similarly, 
sensitive areas of Lebanon (Beqaa plain, Tripoli area) are under permanent scrutiny by 
ECHO TA with a view to possible adaptation of programmes as required by the level 
of  threats.  In  Syria,  as  an  immediate  response  to  changing  frontlines,  projects  that 
targeted the new accessible areas of the Idlib governorate have been implemented.  

To what extent did ECHO promote safe humanitarian access in situations 
of low security?  

With  the  exception  of  cross-border  operations  from  Iraq,  ECHO  has  not  been 
directly  involved  in  either  facilitation  of  humanitarian  access  inside  Syria  or  the 
negotiations with armed groups on behalf of its partners. Nevertheless, ECHO has 
adapted its approach somewhat to ensure safe access in low security situations: 

  First, by applying remote management inside Syria once the risk to international staff 
became apparent. Following attacks on international staff, ECHO’s partners decided to 
withdraw  its  international  staff  from  inside  Syria  and  to  change  its  approach.  ECHO 
was fully supportive both in accepting that its partners pull out their international staff, 
and  in  supporting  their  continued  operations  inside  AOG-controlled  areas  with 
remotely-managed operations.  

  Second,  by  developing  guidelines  on  remote  management  that  addressed  security 
concerns, among other issues (see EQ9). These guidelines were a policy-level attempt 
to avoid transfer of security risks to local partners. Indeed, through the related training 
provided  to  its  partners,  and  for  instance  through  inclusion  of  local  staff  risks  in 
monitoring requirements, ECHO sought to mitigate the risks conducting humanitarian 
aid  operations  in  this  manner.  In  addition,  ECHO  partners  have  also  implemented 
their own measures to ensure the security of local staff delivering aid inside Syria. Such 
measures included for instance training of local staff. 

ECHO  has  been  involved  in  the  promotion  of  the  security  and  safety  of 
humanitarian personnel:  

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 

In  fact  ECHO  has  been  financing  security-focused  platforms  at  both  regional  and 
country  levels.  At  regional  level  ECHO  has  funded  the  International  NGO  Safety 
Organization  (INSO)  that  supports  the  safety  of  aid  workers  by  establishing  safety 
coordination platforms in insecure contexts.  

  At country level, ECHO has financed the Safety Security Committee Lebanon (SSCL), 
which includes collection and dissemination of safety and security information. In Iraq 
ECHO  has  supported  NGOs  and  their  own  social  worker  networks,  through  which 
risks and danger are identified and appropriate measures taken.  

  ECHO has also provided financial support for their partners, to facilitate the putting in 
place  of  adapted  security  measures,  including  security  training  events.  The  SSCL,  for 
instance,  was  one  of  the  outcomes  of  an  ECHO  project  with  DRC.  Other  projects, 
such  as  the  Emergency  Assistance  and  Enhanced  Protection  to  Conflict-Affected 
Palestine Refugees project, had a share of their budget dedicated to security training.  

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EQs 18 – Advocacy  

How effective and active has ECHO been in terms of humanitarian advocacy (on 
issues  like  coordination,  access,  open  borders,  cross-line  interventions,  INGO 
registration, work permits, etc.)? How could ECHO improve in this respect?  

This Evaluation Question aims at understanding to what extent ECHO has conducted activities in terms 
of  advocacy  and  to  what  extent  such  activities  have  contributed  to  change,  for  instance  policy  changes  in 
neighbouring countries policies or in donor approaches.  

EQs 18– Advocacy– Answer Box 

Advocacy has been a priority of ECHO in the context of the Syrian crisis. Stakeholders 
(including  representatives  from  ECHO)  explained  that  ECHO  devoted  important 
resources to this area.  

Such efforts were conducted at different levels within ECHO, from the more political to 
the  more  operational  level.  They  targeted  various  audiences  (national  bodies,  the  UN, 
other  donors,  etc.),  and  concerned  different  subjects  (access,  the  importance  of 
providing  a  response  to  underserved  areas  like  in  the  far  East  region  in  Turkey,  visa 
granting, technical issues, etc.).  

But  the  field,  regional  and  global  advocacy  strategies  were  not  fully  linked  up.  This 
limited  the  overall  effectiveness  of  ECHO’s  advocacy  work.  If  core  messages  were 
centrally  agreed  and  prioritized  it  would  have  been  far  more  effective.  Nevertheless, 
context specific advocacy messages also had their specific comparative advantages. The 
difficulty can be summarized as the challenge of “how to be global enough and specific 
enough” to ensure that there is a global coherence in a diversified approach. 

There  are cases  in  which  ECHO  attains  its  goal  in  terms  of  advocacy,  as well as  cases 
where it did not (or not yet). There are also examples of missed opportunities. This does 
not allow a general statement of ECHO’s effectiveness in this respect, but it is clear that 
stakeholders underlined the importance of ECHO in this respect and were in favour of 
continued emphasis on advocacy by ECHO.  

To what  extent was  advocacy  a  priority  of  ECHO  response  strategies  for 
Syria and its neigbouring countries? 

Several elements indicate that advocacy has been a priority of ECHO in the context 
of the Syrian crisis:  
  ECHO representatives underlined that they spent a substantial part of their time on 

advocacy  -  one person even estimating this at one-third of their time;  

  other stakeholders stated  that ECHO devoted  substantial resources to advocacy, also 
highlighting that they appreciated this and that it was an important role for ECHO; 

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Such  advocacy  activities  were  conducted  at  different  levels  within  ECHO,  targeting 
various audiences and covering a broad range of subjects: 

  Advocacy also took place on a day-to-day basis in the countries, but several missions at 
the highest level took also place (Commissioner, Director General, Head of Operations 
of the B unit). This was especially important when it came to difficult negotiations with 
Damascus Authorities (on issues such as visas, presence of NGO, etc.)  

  Such  advocacy targeted different audiences:  national  and  regional  authorities,  UN 

 

bodies, partners and donors, but it also took place within ECHO itself.  
It concerned different types of subject:  
- 

regarding authorities in the different neighboring countries, ECHO advocated:  
o  on facilitating access, registration, visa granting, protection; 
o 

to obtain authorization for activities for non-camp refugees (Iraq, Erbil, joint 
advocacy  by  NRC,  and  ECHO);  and  to  ensure  that  basic  protection  and 
security provisions are taken care of when supporting camps; 

o  on  the  necessity  of  the  aid  system  being  able  to  monitor  support  from 

Damascus for cross-border operations;  

o  on  the  importance  of  providing  a  response  to  under-served  areas  (as  in 

Turkey for the far East region); 

- 

- 

- 
- 

o  on humanitarian principles.  
regarding  partners:  promotion  of  unconditional  cash,  pressing  for  improved 
quality in specific technical areas in market analysis, in WASH (case in Lebanon), 
etc.; 
regarding  the  UN:  advocacy  for  better  coordination,  for  more  engagement  on 
access and protection, for better information management; 
regarding other donors: for more engagement on political issues; 
regarding  several  other  stakeholders:  support  for  the  UN  Security  Council 
Resolution 2139 (February 2014) on ceasing attacks against civilians, etc.  

To  what  extent  did  ECHO  advocacy  contribute  to  concrete  changes  in 
approach  or  policy  neigbouring  countries  and  among  other  donors, 
including  in  terms  of  coordination  with  Governments  and  better  access 
inside Syria? 

There are examples of successes and failures in terms of advocacy, as well as some 
missed opportunities:  

 

In  some  cases  there  are  indications  that  the  advocacy  reached  its  goals  (or  part  of 
them):  
- 

in Turkey, for instance, ECHO contributed to opening up the policy space for the 
GoT to respond to the needs of urban refugees, especially in the far east ;  
In Jordan, stakeholders explained that ECHO managed, together with DFID and 
BPRM, to gather wide support for the Jordan health system; 

- 

-  ECHO’s advocacy, together with DFID and USAID, on cross-border operations 
which, according to stakeholders, largely contributed to the joint decision of these 
donors  to  engage  on  a  substantial  scale  with  cross-border  operations,  even  at  a 
time  where  the  UN  Resolution  was  not  yet  available  to  give  the  required  legal 

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framework  to  these  operations;  this  also  included  examples  where  ECHO 
contributed to increased coordination. 

  But  the  team  came  also  came  across  several  cases  where  advocacy  had  (not  yet) 

succeeded, viz.:  
- 

as an example, ECHO did not succeed in pressing WFP to move more quickly on 
the cash system (see EQ 10 on cash for more details); 
similarly ECHO did not manage to enhance coordination between UNHCR and 
OCHA (see EQ 14 on coordination); 

- 

-  ECHO’s  advocacy  with  respect  to  the  opening  of  the  border  in  Lebanon  for 
Syrian  refugees  in  difficult  situations  (wounded  people,  escaping  military 
operations, etc.)  also did not generate the expected result, this also being the case 
in Jordan; in both cases the authorities questioned Europe’s willingness to “open 
the borders”.  

  Some cases were  also identified where  ECHO could have  usefully advocated but did 
not really seize the opportunity. This concerns for instance the “30% rule” in Jordan 
(namely  that  30%  of  NGO  support  should  go  to  Jordanians),  in  which  according  to 
some  stakeholders  ECHO  could  have  played  a  major  role  but  was  in  fact  only 
marginally involved.  

A point raised by several stakeholders is that field, regional and global advocacy strategies 
were not linked. This undermined the overall effectiveness of ECHO’s advocacy work. If 
core  messages  had  been  centrally  agreed  and  prioritized  it  would  have  been  far  more 
effective. 

Although the advocacy has not always (or has not yet) reached its objectives, stakeholders 
underlined  the  importance  of  ECHO’s  role  in  this  respect  and  were  in  favour  of 
continued emphasis on advocacy by ECHO.  

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5.  Conclusions 

This chapter presents the Conclusions emerging from the evaluation findings and analysis. 
They are structured in the following groups so as to facilitate an overall synthesis: 

  The overall statement on ECHO’s response; 
  Conclusions 1 to 3 on the speed and coverage of ECHO’s funding in response to the 

immediate crisis; 

  Conclusions 4 to 8 all concern the way in which ECHO adapted its response modalities 

to the specific features of the Syrian crisis;  

  Conclusions  9  to  11  concern  the  extent  to  which  ECHO  supported  coordination, 

advocacy and linking relief, rehabilitation and development; 

  Conclusion 12 examines how ECHO dealt with the protracted nature of the crisis.  
Each conclusion refers where relevant to the evaluation question(s) and other sources on 
which it is based.  

Overall statement on ECHO’s response 

ECHO  allocated  significant  funds  in  response  to  the  Syrian  crisis.  It  contributed  to  the 
improvement  of  living  conditions  for  refugees,  internally  displaced  persons  (IDPs)  and 
other  affected  populations  inside  Syria  through  a  rapid  response  across  five  countries,  in 
both  camp  and  non-camp  settings.  ECHO  also  made  important  contributions  to  the 
setting-up  of  the  infrastructure  required  for  a  large  scale  humanitarian  response  during 
2012  and  2013.  This  included  building  partner  capacity  and  presence  in  the  region, 
developing  needs  assessment  approaches  and  information  tools  and  systems,  and 
establishing coordination mechanisms at a regional level. 

ECHO’s regional presence was stronger than other donors in the response. This enabled it 
to  provide  its  partners  with  close  support  and  advice  on  the  basis  of  a  well-informed 
understanding  of  the  operational  context  in  which  they  worked.  ECHO  also  showed 
significant  adaptability  to  the  specific  and  evolving  context  inside  Syria  and  its 
neighbouring countries. 

Moving beyond the initial phases of the crisis will require significant attention in order to 
adapt to its protracted nature. Overlapping priorities emerge in this context, including the 
need  for  continued  emergency  response  for  those  directly  affected  by  the  conflict  and 
longer-term  needs  of  displaced  and  host  populations  alike.  ECHO  will  need  to  continue 
adapting its response to meet this evolving context, as well as ensuring good coordination 
with those actors best able to respond to longer-term needs. 

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Conclusion C1 to C3: On speed and coverage of the of funding 

C1 – In the first phase of the crisis between 2012 and end of 2013, ECHO 
made  a  considerable  and  important  investment  in  the  rapid  scale-up  of 
humanitarian  aid  operations  in  Syria  and  its  neighbouring  countries, 
which contributed to improved living conditions for affected populations. 

Based on the inventory, EQ 5, and EQ 11 

In 2012, in response to the outbreak of the crisis, ECHO immediately increased its funding 
to €156m. This was raised again to €357m in 2013; an increase of 129%. This rapid scale-
up of funding allowed ECHO to contribute to the crisis response on two fronts. Firstly, it 
provided a cross-sectoral and multi-country response both in camp and non-camp settings. 
In  terms  of  effectiveness,  ECHO’s  assistance  was  found  to  be  well  targeted  to  the  right 
beneficiaries  and  in  line  with  the  priority  needs  in  the  region,  taking  into  account  the 
contributions  of  other  actors.  In  this  way,  ECHO  contributed  to  improved  living 
conditions  for  IDPs  and  other  affected  populations  inside  Syria  and  refugees  in 
neighbouring countries. 

important  contributions  to  the  setting-up  of 

Secondly,  ECHO  made 
large-scale 
humanitarian aid operations in countries where humanitarian capacities and expertise were 
either not present or not adequate to address the rapidly growing crisis. This phase of the 
crisis involved the opening up of country offices for several ECHO partners, the expansion 
of UN and NGO teams, the setting up of needs assessment approaches and information 
tools  and  systems,  the  definition  of  programmes  and  strategies,  and  the  development  of 
coordination  mechanisms.  These  processes  has  a  considerable  positive  influence  on  the 
early stages of the crisis. 

C2 – ECHO was the  fourth largest  international donor  to the Syrian crisis 
over  2012-2014.  But  the  scale  and  geographical  scope  of  the  crisis 
challenged  ECHO’s  ability  to  provide  a  transparently  needs-based 
response. 

Based on the inventory and EQ 11 

The massive scale and complexity of the Syria crisis has proved extremely challenging for 
all  donors.  The  response  has  involved  financing  from  diverse  sources  including  host 
governments, international humanitarian aid, development finance, and from both OECD 
and non-OECD donors alike. 

But  the  global  response  has  not  kept  pace  with  the  escalating  humanitarian  needs.  UN 
appeals  remain  under-funded,  forcing,  inter  alia,  WFP  to  suspend  a  food  vouchers 
programme  serving  1.7  million  Syrian  refugees  in  December  2014.  Likewise,  inside  Syria, 
the number of people in  need  has  grown  at  six  times  the  rate  of  the global  international 
humanitarian response from 2011 to January 2015 (see Figure 18 above). 

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Over  2012-2014,  ECHO  was  the  fourth  largest  international  donor  to  the  Syrian  crisis, 
contributing 8% of the total humanitarian contribution over this period. Nevertheless, the 
scale and geographical scope of needs has been particularly difficult for ECHO to respond 
to  within  fixed  budget  ceilings.  At  times,  notably  in  2013,  large  allocations  to  Syria  may 
have  prejudiced  ECHOs  ability  to  respond  outside  the  region.  Conversely,  other  major 
crises (e.g. Ebola in 2014) may have compromised the Syria response.  

Likewise, ECHO funding allocations per country varied considerably, without clear link to 
the humanitarian needs: 

Table 9 – ECHO country allocations 2012-2014 per refugee/IDP received81 

Country 
Jordan 
Iraq 
Lebanon 
Syria(IDPs) 
Turkey 

Allocations (€m)  # Refugees (m)  Allocations / Refugee (€) 
237 
135 
141 
40 
18 

142 
27 
169 
305 
33 

0.6 
0.2 
1.2 
7.6  
1.8 

Country allocations per refugee will inevitably be impacted by many factors, including the 
cost of delivery in each country, the varying degrees of engagement of host countries and 
presence of other donors. Nevertheless, the link between these determining factors and the 
size of ECHO’s response was not always clear, with notably shortfalls cited in Turkey. 

C3  –  ECHO’s  funding  levels  fluctuated  significantly  over  the  period  2012-
2014  without  a  clear  link  to  changing  humanitarian  needs.  The  lack  of 
predictability hampered programming and implementation. 

ECHO’s funding allocations fluctuated over time, with the global amount (€163m) falling 
back in 2014 to a level similar to the one of 2012, representing a decrease of about 50%. 
This applied to all the countries individually (with decreases always above 50%), except for 
Turkey, where there was a slight increase.  

Based on the inventory and EQ 11 

Although  in  some  cases  the  evaluation 
could 
link  the  evolution  of  funding 
allocations to the evolution of needs (for 
instance the global increase in response to 
the  massive  influx  of  refugees  in  2013), 
globally  the  linkage  to  needs  were  not 
clear.  ECHO  conducted  annual  analyses 
of  needs  using  the  Integrated  Analysis 

81   To allow comparison to ECHO funding over 2012-2014, refugee numbers are here taken from UNHCR statistics as 
of  December  2014.  These  figures  have  changed  over  the  course  of  2015.  Source:  Evaluation  Inventory  based  on 
ECHO HOPE database; UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response, Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal, data 
extracted on 5 May 2015; UN OCHA Syria Humanitarian Bulletin January 2015. 

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Source: ADE Evaluation Inventory, 2015050100150200250300350400201220132014Evolution of ECHO funding over the period SyriaLebanonJordanTurkeyIraqTotal:€676m(€m)€156m€357m€163m 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
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Framework (IAF) but this does not include an estimate of the level of resources required 
and there was no clear methodology to link IAF findings to the final budget level. Nor is 
the  budget  directly  linked  to  the  UN  appeals  process  and  response  plans.  Accordingly, 
some  evolutions  are  difficult  to  explain,  such  as  the  budget  contraction  in  2014,  in  a 
context of continuing rise in refugee numbers.  

ECHO did seek to mitigate the impact of these fluctuations on its programming partners. 
Firstly,  by  using  contributions  in  2013  to  cover  the  first  quarter  of  their  partners’ 
operations  in  2014  (and,  in  some  cases,  the  entire  first  semester).  And  secondly,  by 
privileging support to international NGOs (INGOs) in 2014 to ensure that, where possible, 
their assistance  was  not disrupted  (as opposed  to  UN agencies which have stronger cash 
flows). 

Whilst the overall perspective has been to increase ECHO funds to the region since 2012, 
the  fluctuations  between  annual  allocations  have  been  criticised  both  by  ECHO 
representatives  and  partners,  who  underlined  the  difficulty  of  dealing  with  the  lack  of 
predictability  of  the  funding.  In  neighbouring  countries  in  particular,  the  reductions 
between 2013 and 2014 forced ECHO to focus on only the most direct emergency needs, 
and to significantly cut the number of supported partners. This made it harder for partners 
to address the resilience of refugee households in the context of an increasingly protracted 
crisis. 

Conclusions C4-C8: On adapting the response to unique features of the 
crisis 

  The nature of the Syrian crisis presents the international humanitarian community with 
a  unique  combination  of  challenges  and  opportunities,  stemming  from  a  number  of 
factors including:  
-  Security  risks:  delivering  aid  where  safe  access  for  aid  workers  is  extremely 

limited. 

-  Urban  settings:  responding  to  a  large-scale  refugee  crisis  in  a  largely  urbanised 

setting. 

 

-  Large-scale: responding to a rapid refugee influx of unprecedented scale. 
-  Middle-income countries: a different type of host government interaction. 
In this context, ECHO sought to tailor its response to the specificities of the crisis, and 
its  ability  to  do  so  was  cited  as  one  of  ECHO’s  added-values  compared  to  other 
donors. Conclusions C4-C8 outline the specific adjustments that ECHO made in this 
case.  But  it  should  also  be  noted  that  ECHO  was  aided  by  two  aspects  of  ECHO’s 
global modus operandi: i) its strong field presence and technical capacity in the region, 
which  helped  ensure  that  response  options  were  adapted  to  the  specificities  of  the 
crisis; and ii) its use of partner context and response analyses to justify the operational 
decisions  taken  at  project  level,  rather  than  enforcing  a  top-down  model  on  partner 
organizations as a condition of funding.  

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C4  –  ECHO  was  innovative  in  supporting  the  large  scale  use  of 
unconditional cash transfers to meet refugee needs in the largely urbanised, 
middle-income countries bordering Syria. 

Based on EQ 10 

ECHO supported the provision of unconditional cash transfers to meet the basic needs of 
refugees  arriving  in  some  of  Syria’s  neighbouring  countries.  The  use  of  this  modality 
proved an efficient and effective way to deliver aid in the largely urbanised, middle-income 
countries bordering Syria, where the financial systems and electronic transfer mechanisms 
are  well  developed,  and  the  markets  can  supply  many  of  the  diverse  goods  and  services 
required. Despite strong ECHO attempts to unify the delivery of a single cash transfer to 
refugees,  parallel  systems  persisted  in  several  countries  –  with  UNHCR  providing 
unconditional cash transfers alongside WFP food vouchers. Nevertheless it was and is clear 
that  not  all  needs  could be  met  through  cash  transfers.  Consequently,  projects  to  deliver 
complementary  goods  and  services,  including  case  management  approaches,  rightly 
remained in place.   

C5  –  ECHO’s  support  for  remote  management  operations  inside  Syria 
enabled  it  to  reach  people  in  need  inside  areas  controlled  by  armed 
opposition groups whilst mitigating the associated risks. 

ECHO helped to build the capacity of several partners to conduct operations inside AOG-
controlled  areas of Syria  through  local partners.  By  developing and sharing guidelines on 
remote management, as well as conducting training workshops and amending monitoring 
requirements, ECHO was able to support operations inside AOG-controlled  areas whilst 
mitigating the associated risks. This in turn allowed ECHO to maintain its independence by 
ensuring delivery of humanitarian aid in both AOG- and government-held regions of Syria. 

Based on EQ 9 

C6  –  The  humanitarian  community  is  still  learning  how  to  adapt  to  urban 
crises,  and  the  degree  of  adaptation  to  urban  contexts  varied  considerably 
between ECHO-funded operations. The absence of a visible urban strategy 
looks to have hampered efforts to ensure common standards are met across 
the portfolio or to capitalise on lessons learned from previous programmes. 

In  2016,  the  humanitarian  community  as  a  whole  is  still  at  the  steep-end  of  the  learning 
curve regarding urban response. In this context, it is perhaps not surprising that ECHO did 
not have a clearly developed strategy or set of funding guidelines for urban response during 
the  evaluation  period.  Nevertheless,  the  absence  of  a  strategic  approach  looks  to  have 
hampered efforts to ensure common standards are met across the portfolio or to capitalise 
on lessons learned from previous programmes. 

Based on EQ 7 

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Whilst some ECHO partners did provide examples of innovative responses to the specific 
challenges facing displaced populations and host communities in urban settings, the degree 
of adaptation to the urban nature of the crisis varied considerably between ECHO-funded 
projects.  Particular  problems  were  observed  regarding  the  engagement  of  municipal 
authorities  in  design  and  implementation  –  a  critical  area  of  best  practice  emerging  from 
the literature on urban response. 

C7– ECHO’s use of multi-country contracts facilitated the rapid scale-up of 
contracts in the early phase response, but hampered timely implementation 
of ECHO-funded operations from 2014 onwards. 

Based on EQ 13 

ECHO introduced multi-country contracts during the rapid  scale-up of contract volumes 
in 2013. This reduced the administrative burden on ECHO desk staff and arguably sped up 
the contracting at a time when significant effort was required to scale-up the capacity for 
humanitarian action in the region. But as time went on, the use of multi-country contracts 
hampered  timely  implementation  of  ECHO-funded  operations,  creating  unnecessary 
transaction  costs  and  unwieldy  administrative  procedures.  In  addition,  no  real  synergies 
were possible between country sub-components, which were by necessity implemented as 
separate  contracts  forced  into  one  administrative  dossier.  The  divergence  in  contexts 
between  countries  in  the  region  meant  that  it  was  impractical  for  partners  to  implement 
single  contracts  across  four  or  five  different  countries.  Moreover,  the  combination  of 
multi-country contracts and single-country desks within ECHO complicated the chains of 
command  and  increased  ECHO  response  times  for  contract  signature  and  modification 
requests.  It  further  created  a  problem  of  accountability,  with  the  signatory  being  held 
accountable  for  operations  across  the  whole  region  whilst  only  actually  following 
operations in one country. For these reasons, ECHO understandably reverted to country-
specific contracts for 2015-2016. 

C8  –  ECHO  engaged  with  authorities  in  host  countries,  but  was  in  a 
difficult position to deal with these authorities, which hampered its capacity 
to build a partnership with them to enhance the response to the crisis.   

Based on EQ 2 & EQ4, EQ 18 

Engaging with authorities in host countries, is important for different purposes:  

- 
- 
- 
- 

to facilitate the provision of support provided by ECHO and its partners; 
to coordinate better with these authorities that provide support themselves; 
to provide support to host populations where this has been decided;  
to help host countries to provide support to refugees.  

There are several examples of ECHO and its partners engaging with authorities of partner 
countries  and  local  structures  with  these  purposes.  This  concerned,  among  other  things, 
advocacy on specific matters (e.g. for access to specific zones), coordination activities, but 
also  support  that  was  geared  to  host  communities  (about  30%  of  the  projects  supported 
can be related to host community support).  

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In some cases this engagement led to the expected results; in others not (see for instance 
the  next  conclusion  on  the  coordination  with  host  governments).  In  some  cases,  local 
authorities  (such  as  municipalities)  considered  there  was  not  sufficient  consultation  for 
instance.  

Overall, it seems that several difficulties hampered ECHO’s capacity to build a partnership 
with the authorities of the hosting countries:  

  The host countries are all middle income countries, some of which with a solid capacity 
to  deal  themselves  with  refugees,  and  with  sometimes  specific  policies  (like  the 
necessity to direct a share of the support to host populations, even when there was no 
evidence that they were the most in need) that were difficult to deal with; 

  The burden on the host countries was enormous, with very high levels  of refugees to 
host, and with political repercussions on the willingness of host governments to host 
refugees;  

This led to missed  opportunities in terms of  synergies between ECHO and Government 
support, and in terms of ECHO’s capacity to influence the host Governments who are key 
providers of assistance.   

Conclusion C9-C11: On coordination, advocacy and LRRD 

invested  significant  resources 

in  high-level,  regional 
C9  -  ECHO 
coordination, the success of  which was hampered by external factors. The 
decision  to  redirect  resources  towards  more  achievable  targets  was  made 
too  late.  ECHO  did  however  have  greater success in  supporting  technical 
level  coordination,  through  working  groups  and  project-level  information 
sharing. 

Based on EQ 14 

  Strategy-level coordination efforts were hampered by the ambiguity between UNHCR’s 
and OCHA’s mandates in an L3 crisis that includes an intertwined set of refugee, IDP 
and host community populations. In some instances this ambiguity led to complicated 
coordination  structures  and  loss  of  potentially  useful  information-share. 82  ECHO 
rightly  identified  this  as  a  problem  and  sought  to  tackle it  through  advocacy  towards 
the  UN  agencies  in  Amman  and  other  countries.  But  ultimately,  the  inter-agency 
tensions remained, and UNHCR’s success in leading coordination efforts has remained 
uneven across the countries affected.83  

82   Anticipation  of  refugee  flows,  for  example,  might  have  been  improved  by  increased  information-sharing  between 
cross-border  activities  (coordinated  by  OCHA)  and  neighbouring  country  coordination  activities  in  Turkey 
(coordinated by UNHCR). 

83   In  Turkey  and  Jordan,  for  example,  the  capacity  of  UNHCR  to  coordinate  the  refugee  response  was  criticised.  In 
Lebanon the situation improved when UNHCR, with ECHO’s support, took the lead and established a broad-based 
coordination programme that included NGOs it was not financing. 

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  Moreover, ECHO’s efforts to encourage a coordinated regional response plan further 
complicated  the  task  of  improving  inter-agency  coordination.  The  time  and  resource 
investments in this endeavour were high, and the return limited. With the exception of 
regional coordination of cross-border activities, many stakeholders argued that it would 
be more efficient to strip away the regional coordination efforts and allow autonomous 
operations in each country. The priority at regional level was identified as coordination 
between the various cross border and cross line operations. 

  Coordination between host governments and international humanitarian agencies was 
also  problematic.  In  Turkey,  notably,  coordination  between  NGOs  and  the  national 
and local governments was weak. This hampered coordination of the response for non-
camp  refugees  and  limited  the  potential  for  developing  medium  and  long  term 
response  plans.  ECHO  had 
improving  NGO-government 
coordination, and appears to have had little traction in the coordination processes that 
exist between the government and UN agencies. 

impact  on 

limited 

  At  the  technical  level,  ECHO  contributed  to  coordination  platforms  and  working 
groups  in  the  neighbouring  countries  and  at  the  regional  level.  This  action  helped 
partners to increase project-level coordination. Examples include ECHO’s support for 
cash  working  groups  across  the  region,  its  encouragement  of  regular  partner 
coordination  exercises  in  UNHCR  camps  in  Iraq,  and  its  support  to  cross-border 
cooperation platforms in Turkey.  

C10 - ECHO was recognized as a significant player in advocacy at a range 
of  levels.  But  results  were  mixed,  with  notable  difficulties  regarding 
advocacy towards host governments. 

Based on EQ 18 

ECHO  dedicated  substantial  efforts  to  advocacy  initiatives  at  different  levels  of  the 
organization (including the Commissioner level), on a wide variety of subjects (access, on 
support  to  under-served  areas,  etc.),  and  targeting  different  audiences  (UN,  host 
governments,  etc.).  Stakeholders  appreciated  and  underlined  the  importance  of  this  role 
played by ECHO. ECHO reached successes in this respect, for instance by contributing to 
the Government of Turkey allowing NGOs to respond to the needs of urban refugees in 
the  far-east.  But,  as  mentioned  above,  there  were  also  examples  of  a  less  constructive 
dialogue  between  ECHO  and  host  country  governments,  notably  on  issues  such  as 
coordination between the host government and NGOs in Turkey or policy stances such as 
the exclusion of livelihood activities and inclusion of host community support in Jordan.  

C11 – ECHO, EEAS and NEAR sought to build a strategic burden-share 
to  tackle  a  crisis  that  simultaneously  presents  short-  and  long-term 
needs. But results at the operational level remain uneven, and the higher 
level obstacles to tackling refugee livelihoods remain. 

Over  the  course  of  the  evaluation  period,  the  Syrian  crisis  evolved  from  a  short-term 
displacement  crisis  into  a  protracted  one.  It  now  presents  humanitarian  donors  with  a 

Based on EQ 15 and EQ 16 

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broad  spectrum  of  challenges, 
long-term  needs 
simultaneously  (e.g.  the  emergency  needs  for  the  displaced,  capacity  to  respond  to 
additional refugee outflows in the near future, the long-term livelihood needs of refugees, 
and  the  pressures  on  host  communities  to  adapt  to  large  refugee  populations  for  the 
foreseeable future). 

including  both  short-term  and 

In this context, ECHO and the other EU institutions sought to build the framework for a 
strategic burden-share in the response. Inter-service meetings at headquarter level aimed to 
establish the boundaries and objectives of the different EU funding instruments at play in 
the  region.  At  country  level  ECHO  and  the  Delegations  established  Joint  Humanitarian 
and  Development  Frameworks  (JHDFs)  to  structure  to  the  interactions  between 
humanitarian  and  development  programming.  And  the  creation  of  the  MADAD  Trust 
Fund  should  allow  European  Commission  and  Member  State  contributions  to  be 
channelled  together  to  tackle  the  intersection  between  humanitarian  and  development 
needs. 

But  the  fruits  of  these  strategic  efforts  have  not  had  sufficient  time  to  be  seen  at  the 
operational  level.  Whilst  some  instances  of  coordination  and  burden-sharing  between 
financing mechanisms were observed, notably in Turkey, in other cases they were lacking. 
Involvement  of  ECHO  partners  with  national  and  local  authorities  has  been  weak,  even 
though coordination with them is a key element for future ECHO exit strategies.  

Ultimately  the  socio-economic  conditions  of  Syrian  refugees  will  not  improve  until  a 
combination of higher-level factors change, including: host governments granting access to 
their labour markets, investments being made in job facilitation, refugees who are unable to 
work  being  included  in  social  safety  nets,  and  third  countries  accepting  responsibility  for 
resettling a larger share of refugees. These factors present a range of strategic obstacles to 
the improvement of refugee livelihoods that call for renewed coordination on the part of 
EU institutions and Member States alike. 

Conclusion C12: On dealing with the protracted nature of the crisis 

C12  –  ECHO  has  not  yet  adapted  a  strategy  level  focus  on  the  protracted 
nature of the crisis, despite some progress in this respect. 

Based on EQ 1, EQ9, EQ 15, EQ 16 and EQ 18 

In  2016,  the  Syrian  crisis  will  enter  its  sixth  year.  The  UN-backed  political  negotiations 
have yielded a cessation of violence, but the future of the conflict remains very difficult to 
predict.  The  response  should  therefore  be  equipped  to  handle  the  specific  needs  of  a 
protracted refugee crisis, as well as the challenge of providing assistance inside Syria as and 
when  possible.  This  situation  creates  needs  on  multiple  fronts:  i)  tackling  the  ongoing 
emergency needs of directly affected populations; ii) building their long-term resilience and 
self-help capacity; iii) ensuring that host communities receive enough support to handle the 
long-term  pressures  on  them.  As  a  result,  clarity  on  the  burden-share  between  ECHO, 
other EU institutions, Member States and other actors is vital. 

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ECHO made some progress towards this goal over the period 2012-2014: 

  ECHO  paid  attention  to  the  interplay  between  humanitarian  funds  and  development 
resources,  and  maintained  a  close  relationship  with  EU  Delegations.  The  Joint 
Humanitarian  Development  Frameworks,  established  at  a  country-level,  have  the 
potential  to  help  clarify  the  burden-share  between  ECHO and  other  EU  institutions. 
Over the period 2012-2014, this process remained in its infancy, with little evidence of 
its added value being fully materialized. 

  ECHO worked closely with other funding EU instruments to build a more integrated 
investments  from  other 

response  to  the  crisis.  Examples  of  complementary 
instruments include: 
-  The  Instrument  for  Pre  Accession  (IPA)  in  Turkey.  Implementation  of  IPA 
projects  to  support  the  refugee  crisis  has  proved  complicated  and  slow  to 
establish. But the contribution of approximately €600m per year from the IPA has 
helped tackle the scale of needs in the country whilst allowing ECHO to focus its 
own resources on a narrower set of sectors and beneficiaries. 

-  A  European  Trust  Fund  (ETF)  for  the  Syria  crisis  response  is  starting  up  under 
DG  NEAR.  This  is  primarily  related  to  long-term  development  funding  on 
resilience but can be used as humanitarian aid instrument. In Turkey, the ETF will 
reallocate  $18m  from  IPA  funds  and  has  earmarked  $5m  to  WFP  and  $11m  to 
UNICEF.  
In  Jordan  and  Lebanon,  synergies  were  seen  between  ECHO’s  work  and  the 
European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI). The ENI has provided support for 
education of refugees – an area not prioritized by ECHO. 

- 

But weaknesses remain in this area, notably regarding: 

  Engagement  of  local  authorities  and  host  governments  to  allow  refugees  the 
right  to  work.  Fostering  the  resilience  of  Syrian  refugees  in  neighbouring  countries 
requires  continued  engagement  with  host  governments  on  the  issues  of  refugee 
livelihoods,  the  right  to  work  and  access  to  education.  Likewise,  supporting  host 
communities  as  they  adapt  to  resource  pressures  extending  beyond  the  short-term, 
requires engagement with municipal authorities. ECHO and the EU Delegations have 
had  limited  impact  on  the  policies  of  host  governments  with  respect  to  refugee 
livelihoods. Likewise, strategic engagement of municipal authorities by ECHO and its 
partners was limited, even in urbanized areas bordering Syria where the refugee burden 
has been particularly high. 

  The predictability of ECHO funding levels for the Syrian crisis. Predictability of 
funding  allocations  can  facilitate  strategic  planning  and  linkages  with  long-term 
development  financing.  But  as  outlined  in  Conclusion  2,  above,  ECHO  funding 
allocations for the crisis varied significantly year-on-year, with a 50% decrease between 
2013  and  2014.  Moreover,  the  link  between  the  evolution  of  allocations  and  the 
evolution of needs was not always clear, making it harder for ECHO to build synergies 
with other EU institutions working on the longer-term perspective.  

  Ability to support  the  resilience  of populations inside AOG-controlled areas of 
Syria.  ECHO’s  policy  on  supporting  remote  management  operations  has  helped 
ECHO  partners  to  provide  essential  emergency  assistance  to  populations  in  hard-to-
reach areas of Syria. But the restriction of support to directly life-saving assistance has 

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been questioned by many partners. As the crisis inside Syria continues with no obvious 
end  in  sight,  the  need  for  resilience  activities  in  these  areas  increases.  Many  ECHO 
partners are already conducting such activities with funds from other donors, but the 
scale  of  need  presents  a  case  for  ECHO  to  consider  ways  for  it  to  support  similar 
projects. 

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6.   Recommendations 

The evaluation makes a total of 5 recommendations for the future response of ECHO to 
the Syrian crisis. Each of the recommendations are directed towards DG ECHO, although 
several  require  interaction  with  third  parties  to  work  together  in  order  to  improve  the 
overall response.  

The  recommendations  are  intended  to  point  the  way  towards  further  improvements  in 
ECHO’s  response  based  on  previous  successes  and  lessons  learned  from  the  early-phase 
response  (2012-2014),  as  outlined  in  the  conclusions  presented  above.  But  the  evolving 
status  of  UN-supported  political  negotiations  –  including  a  cessation  of  hostilities 
announced in February 2016 – make it difficult to predict the context in which ECHO will 
be  operating  in  the  future.  The  recommendations  made  in  this  evaluation  are  therefore 
based  on  a  working  hypothesis  that  large-scale  returns  to  Syria  are  unlikely  in  the  near 
future,  and  therefore  that  the  protracted  refugee  crisis  will  continue  over  the  next  3-5 
years.84 

R1  –  DG  ECHO  should  provide,  and/or  advocate  for  the  provision  of, 
adequate  and  predictable  resources  to  respond  to  the  humanitarian  needs 
of those affected by the Syrian crisis. 

Based on Conclusions 1-3  

As  outlined  in  Conclusions  1-3,  the  allocations  made  by  ECHO  are  not  transparently 
aligned with assessed needs. The contributions of ECHO and other humanitarian donors 
have decreased sharply in 2014 and 2015, whilst at the same time the number of refugees 
has  risen  sharply.  This  has  led  to  significant  underfunding  of  UN  appeals  and  cuts  in 
assistance to affected populations.  

Some actors have called for radical revision of the aid architecture for the regional crisis in 
Syria, 85  and  commitments  have  been  made  to  build  predictable,  multi-year  funding 
mechanisms  that  strengthen  coherence  and  effectiveness  in  responding  to  a  complex, 
protracted  crisis. 86  Given  that  ECHO  itself  cannot  provide  multi-year  funding,  it  is 
recommended  that  ECHO  instead  considers  the  following  actions  to  facilitate  adequate 
humanitarian funding in the Syria crisis: 

b)  Allocate  humanitarian  funding  in  proportion  to  needs  that  have  been  visibly 
identified  by  ECHO  through  a  transparent  triangulation  of  available  needs 
assessments including, but not limited to, the UN-led Strategic Response Plan. 

84   As per, for example, ODI (2016) Enhancing aid architecture in the regional response to the Syria crisis. 

85   Idem. 

86   Dead Sea Resilience Agenda (2015), p.3. 

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c)  Actively seek additional voluntary contributions from EU member states to ensure 
that  adequate  funding  for Syria does not adversely  affect  ECHO’s ability  to  meet 
needs in other humanitarian crises.  

d)  To  make  the  best  use  of  limited  resources,  ECHO  should  explore  options  for 
achieving cost efficiency savings through the provision of more predictable funding 
to core response agencies.  

e)  Continue to work with other EC funding instruments to identify opportunities for 
complementary development financing of interventions to reduce the pressure on 
humanitarian resources – without compromising humanitarian principles.  

R2  –  Further  adapt  the  ECHO  programme  to  respond  to  the  specific 
context of the Syrian crisis.  

Based on Conclusions 4-8  

The Syrian crisis presents an atypical humanitarian context. The crisis includes a large-scale, 
regional  displacement  of  unprecedented  scale;  across  a  collection  of  largely  urbanized, 
middle-income countries; with significant security risks to humanitarian actors inside Syria. 
Over  the  first  three  years  of  the  crisis,  ECHO  sought  to  tailor  its  support  to  these 
specificities.  Many  aspects  of  its  response  proved  appropriate  and  effective  -  such  as  the 
use of cash and vouchers to meet basic needs. However, areas of support to adapt  future 
programming include:  

R2.1. Given the protracted nature of the conflict, ECHO should consider relaxing the 
current limitation in the remote management guidelines to limit interventions 
to  life-saving  activities.  ECHO  partners  have  now  established  close  connections 
with  local  partners  who  have  demonstrated  their  capacity  to  provide  principled 
humanitarian  aid  in  inside  Syria.  ECHO  should  consider  funding  livelihood 
support  projects  through  remote  management  protocols  where  suitably 
justified. 

R2.2. Given the huge protection needs associate with the Syria crisis, and the importance 
of ECHO in supporting this sector, it is recommended that ECHO should further 
prioritize  the  funding  of  protection-related  activities.  This  should  include 
dialogue and capacity building with implementing partners ensure protection support 
can be delivered in a timely fashion. 

R2.3.  In  a  context  of  continuing  violence  and  instability  inside  Syria  further  refugee 
outflows may be anticipated.  ECHO  should  put  in  place  a  strong  and  flexible 
capacity to respond to the needs of new refugee caseloads. 

R2.4. ECHO  should  further  promote  the  use  of  coordinated  unconditional  cash 
transfers  to  meet  basic  needs  at  scale.  ECHO  supported  unconditional  cash 
transfers  in  Lebanon  and  Jordan  that  covered  a  range  of  refugee  needs  in 
neighboring  countries.  Multi-purpose  cash  transfers  proved  both  efficient  and 

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effective in meeting a basket of basic needs in the context of highly urbanized host 
countries  with  functional  markets  and  banking  systems.  It  is  recommended  that 
ECHO should further develop this approach through: 
a)  Building  the  pre-requisites  for  coordinated  delivery  programmes  focusing 
support  away  from  agency  level  initiatives  to  coordinated  needs  assessments, 
common  beneficiary  registration  systems,  unified 
targeting  criteria  and 
establishing a shared infrastructure for cash distributions. 

b)  Engage in a high level strategic dialogue within the UN to clarify the mandates 
of sectoral agencies for the use of unconditional cash transfers – as opposed to 
vouchers. 

c)  In concert with likeminded donors, develop advocacy strategies to address host 

Government concerns on the use of cash transfers for refugees. 

R3  –  Focus  on  country  level  coordination  and  contracting  arrangements, 
augmented by carefully prioritized elements of regional coordination.  

The  Syria  crisis  has  been  framed  as  a  regional  crisis  since  the  outset.  There  has  been  a 
substantial 
investment  by  ECHO  in  establishing  regional  coordination  structures. 
Contracting  was  initially  done  through  large  regional  contracts  with  ECHO  partners. 
However, the  value of the  regional  coordination structures has been  limited and regional 
contracting inefficient. It is therefore recommended that:  

Based on Conclusions 7 & 9 

a)  ECHO  should  reduce  funding  of  regional  coordination  activities.  Continuing 
support  to  regional  efforts  should  focus  on  coordination  between  the  various 
cross-border operations and operations inside Syria. 

b)  ECHO  should  consider  investing  in  strengthening  the  capacity  of  UNHCR  to 
discharge  it responsibility for country  level humanitarian  coordination through  an 
Emergency Response Capacity grant at the central level.  

c)  Phase  out  any  remaining  multi-country  contracts  and  replace  with  single-country 

contracts.  

R4 – Increase direct dialogue with the national authorities in the countries 
hosting refugees. 

The vast majority of the response to the needs of refugees are being met by the authorities 
and communities in neighboring countries. ECHO has established weak links to national 
and local government structures. To some extent it has been able to utilize the established 
communication channels of the EU Delegations to communicate with Governments. The 
limited interaction also reflects a desire to remain ‘independent’.  

Based on Conclusion 10 

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The  limited  direct  interaction  carries  costs.  Strategic  programmatic  synergies  may  be  lost 
through exclusion from key coordination forums. Critical opportunities for advocacy may 
be curtailed – including maintaining or increasing humanitarian and policy ‘space’ for the 
operations of ECHO partners. Enhancing coordination with host governments at national 
and  local  level  could  therefore  improve  the  effectiveness  of  ECHO’s  response  whilst 
helping to prepare for ECHO’s exit. 

It  is  therefore  recommended  that  ECHO  should  systematically  seek  to  strengthen  its 
relationships  with  host  governments  in  the  region  through  regular  liaison  meetings  with 
national  counterparts  during  the  missions  of  ECHO  functionnaires,  supplemented  by 
periodic  meetings  with  Field  Experts.  These  meetings  should  be  used  to  discuss  issues 
including: 

  Advocacy  for  humanitarian  space  and  programmes  and  improved  coordination 
between  ECHO  partners  and  Government.  An  additional  issue  for  discussion  is  the 
inclusion of host communities as beneficiaries of humanitarian programming. 

  ECHO should promote the principle that any assistance to host populations should be 
needs based, not policy driven. The level of need of host beneficiaries would need to 
be  equivalent  to  the  targeting  criteria  used  for  refugees.  ECHO  needs  to  better 
communicate  why  it  cannot  use  humanitarian  funds  to  support  domestic  political 
objectives. 

R5  –  Build  greater  synergies  with  EU  Delegations  and  other  EC  funding 
instruments.  

Based on Conclusions 11 & 12 

In  the  context  of  the  Syria  crisis  it  is  understood  that  there  is  not  a  linear  progression 
between  different  EC  funding  instruments.  Instead  they  need  to  be  used  simultaneously 
and  there  is  no  uniform  pattern  of  chronological  transition  between  them.  ECHO  has 
made  progress  in  building  links  to  other  funding streams,  especially  at  the Brussels  level. 
More  could  be  done  in  a  closer  integration  of  ECHO  and  other  instruments  at  country 
level. Specific steps in this process are: 

  Strengthen the participation of ECHO in joint planning processes with the EU 
Delegations. The Joint Humanitarian Development Frameworks developed at country 
level  provide  a  framework  for  strategic  cooperation  between  ECHO  and  the 
Delegations at the field level. The level of cooperation between ECHO and the EUDs 
in the region in developing, and implementing, JHDFs remains mixed, but with several 
very  positive  experiences.  It  is  recommended  that  ECHO  should  prioritize  its 
engagement in these planning processes at national level. 

  Build  on  best  practices  of  integrated  programming.  ECHO  already  had  several 
examples of good practice which can be developed. In particular the use of the ECHO 
Children of Peace fund has been used to rapidly start educational support to refugees, 

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which were then followed by the larger, more predictable, but slower to mobilize EC 
development funds.  

Build  towards  potential  exit  strategies  for  ECHO.  The  main  strategy  for  an  exit  in 
neighbouring countries appears to be a combination of  establishing the right to work 
for refugees with the ability to do so, and inclusion in a safety net for those who are 
chronically  poor  and  unable  to  work.  ECHO  strategy  does  not  yet  specifically 
contribute  to  achieving  this  transition.  ECHO  could  seek  to  explore  this  option  in 
greater  detail  with  the  EU  Delegations,  to  ensure  that  refugees  can  be  covered  by 
support to safety nets in neighbouring countries over the next two to three years.  

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Annexes 

 
 
 
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Table of Contents 

TERMS OF REFERENCE 

ANNEX I:  
ANNEX II:     EVALUATION INVENTORY 
ANNEX III:    COUNTRY REPORTS 
ANNEX IV:    BIBLIOGRAPHY 

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Annex I: Terms of Reference 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex I 

 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL HUMANITARIAN AID AND CIVIL PROTECTION - ECHO 

ECHO  A - Strategy, Policy and International Co-operation 
A/3 - Policy and Implementation Frameworks 

ANNEX I 

Terms of Reference 

For the evaluation of the ECHO response to 

The Syrian Crisis 

2012 - 2014 

 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Table of Contents 

1.  General context .............................................................................................................. 121 

2.  Specific Context ............................................................................................................. 124 

3.  Purpose and scope of the evaluation .............................................................................. 126 

4.  Specific scope of the evaluation ..................................................................................... 126 

5.  Methodology, outputs and schedule ............................................................................... 129 

6.  Management and supervision of the evaluation ............................................................. 133 

7.  Evaluation team .............................................................................................................. 133 

8.  Amount of the Contract .................................................................................................. 133 

9.  Timetable ........................................................................................................................ 133 

10. 

Content of the Offer ................................................................................................... 134 

11. 

Award ......................................................................................................................... 135 

12. 

The final report ........................................................................................................... 135 

GENERAL CONTEXT  

1.  The legal base for Humanitarian Aid is provided by Article 21487 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, and the Humanitarian Aid Regulation (HAR; No. 

87  http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-the-functioning-of-the-european-union-and-comments/part-5-
external-action-by-the-union/title-3-cooperation-with-third-countries-and-humantarian-aid/chapter-3-humanitarian-aid/502-
article-214.html  

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1257/96)88. The objectives of EU humanitarian assistance are outlined in these 
documents, and could – for evaluation purposes – be summarised as follows: From a 
donor perspective and in coordination with other main humanitarian actors, to 
provide the right amount and type of aid, at the right time, and in an appropriate way, 
to the populations most affected by natural and/or manmade disasters, in order to 
save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity. 

2.  The humanitarian aid budget is mainly implemented through annual funding 

decisions89 adopted by the Commission, which are directly based on the HAR. A 
funding decision is taken for humanitarian operations in each country/region at the 
time of establishing the budget, or for each unforeseen intervention as needed. The 
funding decision specifies the amount, the objectives, maximum amounts to be 
financed by objective, potential partners, and possible areas of intervention. Since 
2011 the funding decisions are referred to as ‘Humanitarian Implementation Plans’ 
(HIP).  

3.  The Communication on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development90 (LRRD) 

stresses that better relief can contribute to development; better development can 
reduce the need for emergency relief; and better rehabilitation can facilitate the 
transition between two. The EU’s contribution to international efforts in protracted 
crises and post-crisis situations could be improved by better integrating the long-term 
perspective into relief operations, adaptation of development programmes and 
instruments to allow for quicker and more effective take-over from relief interventions 
and improved donor coordination. Furthermore, LRRD is central to the overall 
purpose of conflict prevention91. The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid92 
highlights the link between humanitarian early recovery operations and long-term 
development objectives as well as coherence and complementarity in EU responses to 
crises.  

4.  Protection is embedded in the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil 

Protection department ECHO's mandate as defined by the HAR and confirmed by the 
European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. Its objective is to reduce physical and 
psychological insecurity for persons and groups under threat. When providing general 
assistance, humanitarian actors must ensure that their actions do not undermine 
protection, nor exacerbate existing inequalities (do-no-harm principle). The 2009 
funding guidelines for humanitarian protection activities93 define the framework in 
which ECHO may support protection activities, including the type of partners and the 

88 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1996:163:0001:0006:EN:PDF  

89 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/en/funding-evaluations/funding-decisions-hips   

90 Communication COM(96) 156 ; Communication COM (2001) 153 - An assessment 

91 Communication of the Commission on Conflict Prevention COM (2001)211 final 

92 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/media/publications/consensus_en.pdf  

93 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/sectoral/humanitarian_protection_funding_guidelines_en.pdf  

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kind of activities it may finance. ECHO supports non-structural activities aimed at 
reducing the risk, and mitigating the impact of human-generated violence, coercion, 
deprivation and abuse of vulnerable individuals or groups in the context of 
humanitarian crises. 

5.  In situations of limited access to crisis areas, remote management may be the only 

way to deliver assistance to affected populations. DG ECHO defines remote 
management as an operational approach used to provide relief in situations where 
humanitarian access to disaster-affected populations is limited. Typically, this 
involves humanitarian agencies transferring operational responsibilities, usually 
carried out by expatriate staff, to national and local employees or implementing 
partners. The aim is to enable relief projects to be implemented in places where 
expatriates cannot go. The Instruction note94 for ECHO staff on Remote Management 
provides guidance for DG ECHO staff on remote management, explaining what 
considerations must be made before accepting an action including a remote 
management component. The note can be used by Partners as a reference. When the 
Partner puts in place a remote management mechanism, it is necessary to explain, in 
section 6.1 of the Single Form, the organizational and management structure in place 
and, in section 8.1 of the Single Form, how the monitoring arrangements have been 
adapted to this specific working environment. 

6.  Urban areas are complex settings to implement humanitarian assistance and are 

different from rural areas in terms of needs and vulnerabilities of the affected people. 
Furthermore, capacities, methods, and preparedness of local actors, institutions, and 
partners vary considerably between cities and regions. Humanitarian actors, including 
DG ECHO, have developed and extensive range of policies, practices, standards and 
tools for humanitarian work that are often more adapted to rural areas, but far less to 
urban areas. In the past few years a number of studies have been conducted to explore 
the drivers of urbanization and its consequences and implications to humanitarian aid. 
Some of these studies have formulated suggestions on how international humanitarian 
aid can best engage with the changing settlement patterns. 

7.  Strengthening the gender approach within the European Union's (EU) humanitarian 
aid is a commitment made in the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, which 
highlights the need to integrate gender considerations, to promote the active 
participation of women in humanitarian aid and to incorporate protection strategies 
against sexual and gender-based violence. A Commission Staff Working document95 
has been established to address this issue. 

94 http://dgecho-partners-

helpdesk.eu/_media/actions_implementation/remote_management/remote_management_instructions.pdf  

95 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/sites/echo-site/files/Gender_SWD_2013.pdf  

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96

8.  In certain humanitarian disasters, the supply of food to markets and shops is sustained, 
yet, the affected population loses the means to buy it. In such cases, the cash and 
voucher aid approach (See DG ECHO Thematic Policy document no 3
humanitarian aid reaches directly those with the greatest need in a timely manner. The 
European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department (ECHO) 
uses cash and vouchers and other alternative forms of humanitarian assistance only 
after thoroughly evaluating all options. It recognises that cash and voucher 
programmes have to be cautiously planned in order to prevent unintended inflation, 
depression or social imbalances in local markets while reaching the most vulnerable 
groups (women, children and the elderly). The use of cash and voucher has been 
increasing in recent years. The fastest increase of use of this system has been reached 
in providing food assistance – up 47% in 2013. Yet, all humanitarian sectors are open 
to cash and voucher programmes. 

) ensures 

SPECIFIC CONTEXT 

The Syrian Crisis 

Since March 2011, the violent crackdown of the protests in Syria and the ensuing protection 
crisis  has  progressively  developed  into  a  widespread  non-international  armed  conflict,  with 
severe humanitarian consequences in Syria and its neighbouring countries. From a widespread 
guerrilla fare, the conflict has evolved towards a full-fledged civil war. Large portions of the 
territory  have  fallen  under  the  temporary  or  permanent  control  of  numerous  Armed 
Opposition Groups, particularly in the North and the East of the country.  

With the conflict entering its fourth year, the needs of the affected populations, including 10,8 
million  people  inside  the  country  (UNOCHA,  June  2014)  and  over  3  million  refugees 
(UNHCR,  August  2014),  as  well  as  overstretched  host  communities  in  neighbouring 
countries, are of an unprecedented scale. The number of conflict-related deaths has surpassed 
191,000 individuals and an estimated one million have been war-wounded. 
The Syrian crisis morphed from a humanitarian emergency to  a multidimensional acute and 
protracted crisis directly affecting several countries in the region – in particular Lebanon and 
Jordan whose social, economic and structural capacity to deal with the ever growing influx of 
refugees has been stretched to the limits. 

Current situation 

Inside Syria 

During  the  last  year  fighting  has  escalated  along  and  across  shifting  frontlines  between 
opposition  and  governmental  forces.  In  one  year,  the  number  of  people  displaced  has 
increased  6-fold  (6.5  million  people),  the  number  of  people  in  need  of  humanitarian  aid  by 
more than two and the number of refugees in neighbourhood countries by three. 

96 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/sectoral/them_policy_doc_cashandvouchers_en.pdf  

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The situation in  Syria is  expected to  deteriorate  further as there are no immediate prospects 
for a military or political solution to the conflict, and all sides still have significant capacity to 
resist and inflict damage. The international community has yet to find a way forward after the 
breakdown  of  the  Geneva  II  process.    The  assumption  is  that  violence  and  instability  will 
continue to prevail. The growing involvement of extremist and foreign non-state actors in the 
fighting  in  Syria  poses  a  threat  to  stability  in  the  region  and  beyond.  The  prospect  of  an 
international  military  coalition  against  the  specific  threat  of  the  so-called  Islamic  State  in 
Syria  in  Iraq  also  risks  worsening  the  plight  of  civilian  populations  caught  in  the  crossfire. 
The  rapidly  changing  dynamics  of  the  conflict  within  a  frame  of  substantial  international 
military operation will render access of humanitarian aid more complex and challenging.   

The  response  to  population’s  needs  has  been  hindered  by  the  sharp  deterioration  of  the 
security  environment,  the  systematic  obstruction  of  the  Syrian  authorities,  and  the  growing 
number of armed opposition groups which impose serious difficulties to aid agencies and at 
times  prevent  aid  from  reaching  civilian  populations.  More  than  ever,  all  available  options 
must be explored to support principled humanitarian operations everywhere inside Syria. 

Access  to  people  in  need  has  not  significantly  improved  in  spite  of  United  Nations  (UN) 
Security Council Resolution (SCR) 2139 (2014). The sixth report of the Secretary General of 
21 August 2014 on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014) and 2165 
(2014) relates some improvements in access across borders and across lines. While there have 
undoubtedly been new openings to increase aid delivery across borders, the scale, scope and 
outreach of this modality of aid delivery by the United Nations is still quite limited. 

Neighbouring Countries 

The  neighbouring  countries  cannot  cope  with  the  refugee  crisis  in  the  long  term  without 
significant  support  from  the  international  community.  This  is  especially  true  for  Lebanon 
which  hosts  over  1  million  Syrian  refugees  representing  25%  of  its  population,  and  Jordan 
where  Syrian  refugees  account  for  10%  of  its  population  on  top  of  an  already  important 
presence of Iraqi and other refugees. Such a demographic burden is posing a growing threat to   
the  economic,  social  and  political  stability  of  these  states.  Turkey  is  hosting  more  than  one 
million  refugees,  with  an  increasingly  strong  impact  on  public  services  and  infrastructure. 
Iraq, in the throngs of its own crisis, is hosting over 215,000 Syrian refugees while trying to 
cope  with  1.8  million  new  IDPs  in  the  first  eight  months  of  the  year;  different  waves  of 
conflict-affected populations are now in direct competition for meagre resources.  

An  independent  evaluation97 of  the  UNHCR  response  to  the  refugee  influx  in  Jordan  and 
Lebanon is currently ongoing and in its final stage. 

ECHO funding 

So far, DG ECHO has invested €665,75 million in the response to the Syria crisis through the 
Syria HIPs (including also the neighbouring countries), but as well from part of the Lebanon 
and Iraq HIPs: 

 

Financial decision: ECHO/ME/BUD/2012/01000,  

10 M EUR 

97Terms of Reference:  http://www.unhcr.org/52f8fcf89.pdf  

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 

 

 

 

 

Financial decision ECHO/SYR/BUD/2012/91000,  

146 M EUR 

Financial decision ECHO/LBN/BUD/2012/91000, 

7 M EUR 

Financial decision ECHO/ME/BUD/2012/91000  

10 MEUR 

Financial decision: ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91000,  

350 M EUR 

Financial decision: ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91000,  

150 M EUR 

PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION 

Based  on  Regulation  (EC)  1257/96  and  the  EU  Financial  Regulation,  the  purpose  of  this 
Request for Services is to have an independent overall evaluation of the ECHO response to 
the Syrian crisis in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Turkey for the period of 2012 – 2014.  

The  evaluation  should  cover  relevance  (including  coherence,  connectedness  and  EU  Added 
Value),  effectiveness  (including  impacts),  efficiency  (including  cost-effectiveness)  and 
sustainability. 

It should: 

  provide a structured and comprehensive retrospective assessment of DG ECHO's 

funded operations from an accountability perspective supporting the victims of the 
Syrian crisis from 2012 to 2014 in line with its mandate;; 
include elements of a real-time evaluation defined as an evaluation that almost 
simultaneously provides feed-back for immediate use; 

 

  and, it should provide a prospective strategic assessment with a view to identifying 
practical options and recommendations in the context of the future Syrian crisis 
strategy, with the view of improving performance of ECHO operations in the region. 

The  key  users  of  the  evaluation  report  include  inter  alia  ECHO  staff  at  HQ,  regional  and 
country level, national and regional stakeholders, the participating implementing partners, and 
other humanitarian and development donors and agencies. 

The information requested in the evaluation questions listed in section 4 is the main subject of 
this evaluation. The findings of the evaluation must be presented in the report in the form of 
evidence-based,  reasoned  answers  to  each  of  the  evaluation  questions.  Conclusions  will  be 
directly linked to recommendations, if applicable. 

SPECIFIC SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION 

Evaluation questions – applying to all five countries examined 

These  questions  reflect  the  Commission's  needs  in  terms  of  information  with  a  view  to 
accountability  and  improved  performance  of  humanitarian  actions,  and  they  will  be  further 
discussed and validated at the Desk Phase. 

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1.  To what extent is the ECHO response to the Syrian crisis consistent with the 23 

Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship98? 

2.  To what extent have local and regional communities been consulted in the design 

and implementation of ECHO-funded projects? 

3.  To what extent have the design and implementation of ECHO-funded interventions 

taken into account the needs of the most vulnerable people in the region, in 
particular women, children, elderly and disabled people? 

4.  To what extent has the ECHO intervention taken account of the host populations, and 

what concrete measures have been taken to address their needs and interests? 

5.  To what extent has ECHO and its partners been successful in adapting their 

approach and addressing gaps to the shifting needs of the region, as the crisis has 
evolved? Considering that project activities of partners in many cases have been 
carried over from one funding cycle to the next, to what extent have the partners been 
revising their approach – being innovative – to better address the needs? What 
modifications to approaches are needed for the future? 

6.  What has shown to be the EU added value of the actions examined (i.e. the added 
value of EU intervention, compared to leaving the initiative to other actors)? 

7.  To what extent have the specific challenges of Urban settings been taken into account 
in the design and implementation of ECHO-funded projects, both for refugees and 
host populations? To what extent have projects implemented in Urban settings been 
successful? What particular challenges have been faced and what lessons have been 
learned? 

8.  How and to what extent has Protection been appropriately taken into account and 

implemented in ECHO-funded projects? 

9.  In cases when Remote Management is being used, to what extent does this follow 

existing guidance documents and good practice, and how successful is it? 

10. In cases of use of Cash and Vouchers, to what extent has this been based on a proper 

analysis of the context, and how successful has it been? 

11. Is the size of the budget allocated by ECHO to the region appropriate and 

proportionate to what the actions are set out to achieve? Could the same results have 
been achieved with less funding? 

12. Are appropriate monitoring systems in place to support a sound management of the 

ECHO operations? 

13. What has been the partners’ experience of working in consortia as well as with a 

multi-country approach? 

98 http://www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/gns/principles-good-practice-ghd/overview.aspx  
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14. How successful has ECHO been in coordinating its operations with other main 

actors, e.g. promoting synergies and avoiding duplications, gaps and resource conflicts 
at the situational/regional, country and sector-specific levels? 

15. To what extent is the ECHO actions coherent and complementary to the actions of 
other EC services? To what extent has LRRD been mainstreamed into ECHO-
funded projects in the region? To what extent have medium to long-term objectives 
been taken into account in the programming of ECHO interventions? 

16. To what extent have the ECHO-funded actions been successful in terms of LRRD? 
How has the hand-over been prepared and carried out to development actors? What 
could be further done (enabling factors, tools, mechanism, change in strategy, etc.) to 
increase the uptake of results and lessons learned from relief projects into 
development planning/programming? 

17. To what extent have the ECHO-funded projects taken into account the security 
situation in the field for the partners' organisations? What is the scope for 
improvement? 

18. How effective and active has ECHO been in terms of Humanitarian Advocacy (on 
issues like coordination, access, open borders, etc.)? How could ECHO improve in 
this respect?  

Other tasks under the assignment 

The Contractor should:  

  identify the main lessons learnt in the different sectors covered by the ECHO intervention 
(Protection, Shelter/NFIs, Water and Sanitation, Health, Food Assistance, Multi-sectoral 
assistance and coordination). What has worked or not and what were the major critical 
success factors? How can the identification and documentation of good practices be further 
improved? 

  at a general level, identify the main factors limiting the success of the projects funded in 
the region over the period covered by the evaluation. COMMENT: This relates to an audit 
recommendation; Success-limiting factors should be identified in order to develop 
indicators for focused monitoring, with the overall purpose of strengthening the 
monitoring system. 

  reconstruct the intervention logic for the ECHO-funded actions in the Syrian crisis; 

  provide a statement about the validity of the evaluation results, i.e. to what extent it has 
been possible to provide reliable statements on all essential aspects of the intervention 
examined. Issues to be referred to may include scoping of the evaluation exercise, 
availability of data, unexpected problems encountered in the evaluation process, 
proportionality between budget and objectives of the assignment, etc.; 

  make a proposal for the dissemination of the evaluation results; 

  provide an abstract of the evaluation of no more than 200 words. 

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METHODOLOGY, OUTPUTS AND SCHEDULE 

In their offer, the bidders will describe in detail the methodological approach they propose in 
order to tackle the evaluation questions listed above, as well as the tasks requested. 

This  will include a proposal  for indicative judgment  criteria99 that they may consider useful 
for  addressing  each  evaluation  question.  The  judgement  criteria,  as  well  as  the  information 
sources  to  be  used  in  addressing  these  criteria,  will  be  discussed  and  validated  by  the 
Commission during the desk phase 

To  the  extent  possible  the  methodology  should  promote  the  participation  in  the  evaluation 
exercise of all actors concerned, including beneficiaries and local communities when relevant 
and  feasible.  The  methodological  approach  will  be  refined  with,  and  validated  by,  the 
Commission during the desk phase. 

Deliverables 

Within  the  framework  of  the  present  evaluation,  the  contractors  will  produce  the  following 
deliverables, in accordance with the schedule defined in this chapter: 

1.  Inception Report 
2.  Desk Report 
3.  Field Reports (per each country visited) 
4.  Final Report + one annexe per country (Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan and Turkey). 

Meetings 

It is expected that the contractor participate in four meetings in Brussels with the evaluation 
Steering  Group, as specified below.  For these meetings  minutes  should  be  drafted  by  the 
contractor, to be agreed among the participants. 

Desk phase 

The Desk Phase will deal with: 

  an analysis of existing Commission documents as well as other donors' and partners 

information; 

  meetings with Commission staff, other donors, organisations and partners, as appropriate; 

 

the final approach and schedule for the field missions. 

The Desk phase starts when the contract is signed, and it will be based both on documents 
provided by the Commission and retrieved by the contractors from the start of their work. The 
documents  may  be  produced  by  the  Commission  or  any  other  relevant  actor  (other 

99   A judgement criterion specifies an aspect of the evaluated intervention that will allow its merits or success to be assessed. E.g., 
if  the  question  is  "To  what  extent  has  DG  ECHO  assistance,  both  overall  and  by  sector  been  appropriate  and  impacted 
positively the targeted population?", a general judgement criterion might be "Assistance goes to the people most in need of 
assistance".  In  developing  judgment  criteria,  the  tenderers  may  make  use  of  existing  methodological,  technical  or  political 
guidance provided by actors in the field of Humanitarian Assistance such as HAP, the Sphere Project, GHD, etc. 

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Commission  services,  international  agencies,  other  donors,  partners,  communities  of 
practice…).  The  contractor  will  ensure  that  an  appropriate  literature  review  is  carried  out 
throughout the contract. 

The  Inception  Meeting  will  take  place  in  Brussels  at  DG  ECHO  headquarters  with  the 
Steering Committee, on the basis of an Inception Report and a PowerPoint presentation that 
will be sent to the ECHO Evaluation Sector prior to the meeting.  

A phone conference may be organized before the meeting to sort out any open issues that the 
evaluation team might perceive regarding the evaluation. 

The Inception Report will contain the following elements: 

 

finalized evaluation questions; each evaluation question will be accompanied by 
judgement criteria and indicators; 

 

the rationale for each evaluation question; 

  a description of the methodology for data collection and analysis, including the chain of 

reasoning for responding to the evaluation questions, and indicating limitations; 

  a detailed work plan; 

The report should demonstrate the consultants’ clear understanding of the Terms of Reference 
and of the deliverables required as well as the final  timing for the evaluation,  including the 
schedule for the field work and case studies. 

The  Inception  Report  will  be  commented  on  and,  if  satisfactory,  approved  by  the 
Commission. 

At the latest ten days before the start of the Field Phase, the contractors will produce a Desk 
Report that will include: 

  A short description of the data collection work implemented, including the meetings, 

reviews and interviews conducted; 

  The first elements of answers to the evaluation questions when available; 

  The initial assumptions concerning the evaluation questions, to be tested during the Field 

Phase, on the basis of the preliminary analysis carried out during the desk phase; 

  Progress of data gathering; a conclusion on the quality of data collected so far, and 

whether remedial actions will be required in the next phase to close information gaps; 
identification of data to be collected in the field; an outline for the field visit including a 
preliminary schedule and list of partners, stakeholders and projects to be visited, 
explaining criteria used for choosing the sample of projects;  

  Methodological tools to be used in the field phase, describing how data should be cross-

checked, including any possible limitations; 

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  A discussion of possible issues identified during the Desk Phase that had not been 

previously discussed with the Commission. The Commission will consider these issues 
and decide on whether they merit further consideration in the light of the evaluation. 

A  meeting  will  be  organized  in  Brussels  to  present  the  desk  report  and  discuss  it  with  the 
Steering  Committee.  A  video  conference  with  the  field  office  could  be  envisaged.  The 
evaluator  will  duly  consider  all  comments  from  the  Steering  Committee,  as  a  condition  for 
approval. In case of disagreement, the evaluator will provide an argumented reply explaining 
why a certain comment cannot be accepted. In case of substantial disagreements, the evaluator 
may be called for another meeting in Brussels to further discuss the subject of disagreement. 
The  expenses  for  such  a  meeting  will  be  covered  by  the  existing  budget  of  the  Specific 
Contract. 

Field Phase 

Following  the  formal  approval  of  the  Desk  Report,  the  evaluation  team  shall  undertake  the 
field visits to all the countries except Syria,  security situation permitting. The details of 
the  field  missions  will  be  discussed  and  agreed  with  the  Commission  during  the  inception 
meeting, and will be refined in the inception and desk reports. 

The travel and accommodation arrangements, the organisation of meetings, and the securing 
of visas will remain the sole responsibility of the contractor. 

If, during the Field Phase, any significant change from the agreed methodology or scheduled 
work  plan  is  considered  necessary,  this  will  be  explained  to  and  agreed  with  DG  ECHO 
Evaluation Sector, in consultation with the steering group. 

At  the  end  of  the  mission  the  consultants  should  meet  with  the  Delegation,  DG  ECHO’s 
experts and DG ECHO’s partners for discussion of observations arising from the evaluation. 
The evaluation team is required to share their findings with the NGOs/IOs concerned to allow 
them to comment upon. The purpose is to promote dialogue, mutual learning and ownership 
and to build capacity of the Commission’s partners. 

At the end of each field trip the team leader should ensure that a  Field  Report  is drawn up 
and  transmitted  to  DG  ECHO  Evaluation  Sector.  The  Field  Report  will  describe  briefly  the 
data  collection  activities  implemented,  with  special  mentioning  of  those  of  a  participatory 
nature (including in annex the list of sites and persons visited, minutes from the focus groups 
if organized, the minutes of the workshop and any other relevant technical documents); a brief 
description  of  the  situation  found;  as  well  as  any  relevant  items  identified  during  the  field 
visit, which could have an influence in the methodology or the conclusions of the evaluation. 
N.B.:  the  Field  Report  is  not  an  evaluation  as  such,  and  should  not  include  overall 
conclusions and recommendations, neither a collection of project evaluations. It is a working 
document  to report on the fieldwork and identify any particular issues to be tackled during 
the synthesis phase (e.g. remedial actions related to the methodological approach, etc.).  

A  meeting  will  be  organized  in  Brussels  to  present  the  Field  Report  and discuss  it  with  the 
Steering  Committee.  A  video  conference  with  the  field  office  may  be  organised.  The 
evaluator  will  duly  consider  all  comments  from  the  Steering  Committee,  as  a  condition  for 
approval. In case of disagreement, the evaluator will provide an argumented reply explaining 
why a certain comment cannot be accepted. In case of substantial disagreements, the evaluator 

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may be called for another meeting in Brussels to further discuss the subject of disagreement. 
The  expenses  for  such  a  meeting  will  be  covered  by  the  existing  budget  of  the  Specific 
Contract. 

As a reminder, conclusions and recommendations must be drafted with a view to the overall 
evaluation of the Commission's intervention in the area concerned, and will be based on the 
overall information collected during the evaluation process. 

Synthesis phase 

A first Draft Final Report (maximum 60 pages excluding the annexes) in accordance with 
the  format  given  in  point  5  of  the  annex  of  the  Terms  of  Reference  shall  be  submitted 
electronically to the DG ECHO Evaluation Sector. It should be submitted after the evaluators’ 
return from the field according to the agreed timetable. 

A  meeting  will  be  organised  in  Brussels  after  the  submission  of  the  first  draft  final  report. 
The evaluator will make a PowerPoint presentation to DG ECHO and key staff on the main 
findings,  conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation. The date for the meeting will 
be agreed between the Steering Committee and the evaluator. 

Prior to the meeting, DG ECHO may provide written comments on the first draft report to the 
evaluation team.  

On the basis of the results of the meeting on the Draft Report, and duly taking into account 
the comments received before and during the meeting, a Draft Final Report (maximum 60 
pages  excluding  the  annexes)  will  be  submitted  to  DG  ECHO  Evaluation  Sector  not  later 
than 10 calendar days after the meeting. The Steering Committee should mark its agreement, 
make comments or request further amendments within 10 calendar days. 

Final report 

On  the  basis  of  the  comments  made  by  DG  ECHO,  the  evaluation  team  shall  make 
appropriate  amendments  and  submit  the  Final  Report  (maximum  60  pages  excluding  the 
annexes),  accompanied  by  an  Executive  Summary  (maximum  8  pages),  within  10 
calendar  days.  If  the  evaluator  reject  any  of  the  comments  this  must  be  explained  and 
substantiated in writing. 

The report shall follow the structure outlined in section 12. 

The  Executive  Summary  should  be  translated  into  French  and  German  by  a  professional 
translation agency, once it has been approved by the responsible body. 

The  evaluator  will  provide  a  Power  Point  presentation  in  electronic  form  together  with  the 
final  report,  covering  the  main  conclusions  and  recommendations  of  the  evaluation.  The 
evaluator  may  be  requested  to  present  the  evaluation  results  to  DG  ECHO's  staff  and/or 
stakeholders. 

For a detailed layout of the final report, please see section 11 below. 

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Dissemination and follow-up 

The evaluation report is an important working tool for DG ECHO, and once finalised it will 
be  published  in  the  public  domain  on  the  Internet.  Its  use  is  intended  for  DG  ECHO's 
operational  and  policy  staff,  other  EU  services,  humanitarian  beneficiaries,  EU  Member 
States and citizens, other donors and humanitarian actors. 

Following the approval of the final report, DG ECHO will proceed with the dissemination and 
follow-up of the results of the evaluation. 

MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF THE EVALUATION 

The Evaluation Sector of DG ECHO is responsible for the management and the monitoring of 
the evaluation, in consultation with the Unit(s) responsible for the evaluation subject. The DG 
ECHO  Evaluation  Sector,  and  in  particular  the  internal  manager  assigned  to  the  evaluation, 
should  therefore  always  be  kept  informed  and  consulted  by  the  evaluator  and  copied  on  all 
correspondence with other DG ECHO staff. 

The DG ECHO Evaluation manager is the contact person for the evaluator and shall assist the 
team during their mission in tasks such as providing documents and facilitating contacts.  

A Steering Committee, made up of Commission staff involved in the activity evaluated, will 
provide  general  assistance  to  and  feedback  on  the  evaluation  exercise,  and  discuss  the 
conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation.  

EVALUATION TEAM 

This evaluation will be carried out by a team  with experience both in the humanitarian field 
and  in  the  evaluation  of  humanitarian  aid.  If  necessary,  the  experts  must  agree  to  work  in 
high-risk areas. It is therefore recommended that the team include national experts whenever 
possible. 

AMOUNT OF THE CONTRACT 

The maximum budget allocated to this study is 350 000 €. 

TIMETABLE 

The duration of the assignment is 7 months.  

The evaluation starts after the contract has been signed by both parties, and no expenses may 
be  incurred  before  that.  The  main  part  of  the  existing  relevant  documents  will  be  provided 
after the signature of the contract. 

The indicative starting date of the evaluation is XXX. 

In their offer, the bidders shall provide an indicative schedule based on the following table: 

Indicative 
timing 

Report 

Meeting 

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T+2 weeks 

Draft Inception Report 

T+3 weeks 

Inception meeting 

T+6 weeks 

Draft Desk Report 

T+7 weeks 

T+13 weeks 

T+14 weeks 

Draft Field Report 

Desk Report meeting 

Field Report meeting 

T+20 weeks 

Draft Final Report 

T+21 weeks 

Draft Final Report meeting 

T+25 

Final Report 

CONTENT OF THE OFFER 

The administrative part of the bidder's offer must include: 

1.  The tender submission form (annex D to the model specific contract); 

2.  A signed Experts' declaration of availability, absence of conflict of interest and not 

being in a situation of exclusion (annex F to the model specific contract) 

The technical part of the bidder's offer must include: 

1.  A description of the understanding of the Terms of Reference, their scope and the 
tasks covered by the contract. This will include a graphic reconstruction of the 
intervention logic of the Commission's humanitarian activities concerned. It will also 
explain the bidder's understanding of the evaluation questions, including a first 
proposal of judgment criteria to be used for answering the evaluation questions and the 
information sources to be used for answering the questions. The final definition of 
judgment criteria and information sources will be validated by the Commission during 
the desk phase;  

2.  The methodology the bidder intends to apply for this evaluation for each of the phases 
involved, including a draft proposal for the number of case studies to be carried out 
during the field visit, the regions to be visited, and the reasons for such a choice. The 
methodology will be refined and validated by the Commission during the desk phase; 

3.  A description of the distribution of tasks in the team, including an indicative 

quantification of the work for each expert in terms of person/days; 

4.  A detailed proposed timetable for its implementation with the total number of days 

needed for each of the phases (Desk, Field and Synthesis). 

5.  The CVs of each of the experts proposed. 

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The  financial  part  of  the  offer  must  include  the  proposed  total  budget  in  Euros,  taking  due 
account of the maximum amount for this evaluation as defined in chapter 7 of this Terms of 
Reference. The price must be expressed as a lump sum for the whole of the services provided. 

AWARD 

The contract will be awarded to the tender offering the best value for money on the basis of 
the following criteria: 

Quality criteria 

N° 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

Qualitative Award criteria 

Understanding of the terms of reference and the 
aim of the services to be provided  
Methodology for structuring, data collection and 
analysis 
Organization of tasks and team, timetable  

Appropriateness of the team on the basis of the 
expertise proposed 

Total 

Weighting 
(max. 
points) 
10 

40 

10 

40 

100 

Only those tenders with a mark higher than 50% of the maximum number of points for each 
quality  criteria,  and  higher  than  70%  for  the  overall  maximum  number  of  points,  will  be 
considered for the award of the contract. 

Price 

For the purpose of the financial evaluation  of the offers, the Commission will use the lump 
sum price as submitted in the financial offer of the tenderer. 

Award of the contract 

The contract will be awarded to the tender achieving the highest score obtained by applying 
the following formula: 

Score for tender X  = 

Cheapest price 
Price of tender X 

* 

total quality score (out of 100) for all 
criteria of tender X 

THE FINAL REPORT 

By commissioning an independent evaluation and/or review DG ECHO expects to obtain an 
objective,  critical,  easy  to  read  and  transparent  analysis  of  its  interventions.  This  analysis 
should  contain  the  information  needed  by  the  Commission  for  management,  policy-making 
and  accountability.  It  should  also  include  operational,  realistic  recommendations  at 
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operational  and/or  strategic  level.  Above  all,  the  report  should  be  a  document  that  can 
function as a learning tool. Therefore, while writing it, the evaluators should always bear in 
mind why the report is done, for whom, and how the results will be used.  

To each evaluation question quoted in the report the consultant will provide an evidence-base, 
reasoned  answer.  Conclusions100 will  be  provided  pointing  out  strengths  and  weaknesses  of 
the evaluated intervention, with special attention paid to the intended and unintended results. 
Furthermore, the report is a working tool of value to DG ECHO only as long as it is feasible 
and  pragmatic,  keeping  in  mind  DG  ECHO's  mandate  constraints  and  it  clearly  reflects  the 
evaluator's independent view. DG ECHO's concern is to respect this independence. 

The evaluation methods should be clearly outlined in the report and their appropriateness, focus 
and users should be explained pointing out strengths and weaknesses of the methods. The report 
should  briefly  outline  the  nature  (e.g.  external  or  mixed)  and  composition  of  the  team  (e.g. 
sector expertise, local knowledge, gender balance) and its appropriateness for the evaluation. It 
should also briefly outline the evaluators’ biases and/or constraints that might have affected the 
evaluation and how these have been counteracted (past experiences, background, etc.). 

The  report  shall  be  written  in  a  straightforward  manner  in  English  with  an  Executive 
Summary at the beginning of the document. Final editing shall be provided by the contractor. 
The  report  should  be  in  the  font  Times  Roman  12,  have  single  line  spacing  and  be  fully 
justified. 

The final report should contain: 

 
 
 
 

An Executive Summary of maximum 8 pages. 
A list of Abbreviations and Acronyms 
Technical annexes. 
Other annexes as necessary. 

This format should be strictly adhered to: 

 

 

 

 

Cover page (a template is provided at the end of this annex) 

title of the evaluation report; 
date of the evaluation; 
name of the company; 
disclaimer  in  the  sense  that  "The  opinions  expressed  in  this  document  represent 
the  views  of  the  authors,  which  are  not  necessarily  shared  by  the  European 
Commission." 

Table of contents 

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms 

Executive Summary 
A  clearly  drafted,  to-the-point  and  free-standing  Executive  Summary  is  an 
essential element. It should be short, no more than 8 pages. It should focus on 

100   A conclusion draws on data collection and analyses undertaken, through a transparent chain of arguments. (OECD Glossary 

of Key terms in Evaluation and results based management) 

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the key purpose or issues of the evaluation, outline the main points of the analysis, 
and  contain  a  matrix  made  of  two  columns  clearly  indicating  the  main 
conclusions and specific recommendations. Cross-references should be made to 
the corresponding page or paragraph numbers in the main text. EU Member States 
receive each Executive Summary, which is also published on DG ECHO website. 
The evaluation team  should  take this into account  when drafting this part of the 
report. 

  Main body of the report 

The report should include at least a description of 

 
 
 

 
 
 
 

 

the purpose of the evaluation 
the scope of the evaluation 
the design and conduct of the evaluation, including a description of the 
methodology used 
limitations and challenges 
the evidence found 
the analysis carried out 
the conclusions drawn in the form of reasoned answers to each of the 
evaluation questions provided in the Specifications. The questions must be 
quoted fully in the report, followed by an evidence-based answer. 
Conclusions should be fully substantiated, and derive in a logical manner 
from the data collection and analysis carried out during the evaluation 
process 
recommendations for the future. Recommendations should be clearly linked 
to the findings and based on conclusions. They should be as realistic, 
operational and pragmatic as possible; they should take careful account of 
the circumstances currently prevailing in the context of the implementation 
of the humanitarian activities, DG ECHO's mandate and of the resources 
available to implement it both locally and at the Commission level. 
Recommendations should be prioritised, directed at specific users and 
where appropriate include an indicative timeframe. 

All possible confidential information shall be presented in a separate annex. 

While  finalising  the  report  and  its  annexes,  the  evaluators  will  always  highlight  changes 
(using  track  changes)  and  modifications  introduced  as  resulting  from  the  meeting  and  the 
comments received from DG ECHO Evaluation Sector. 

Each report and all its annexes shall be transmitted in electronic form to DG ECHO – To the 
attention of DG ECHO A3/Evaluation sector, AN88 04/05, B-1049 Brussels, Belgium. 

The  final  report  should  be  sent  by  email  to  DG  ECHO  Evaluation  Sector  (ECHO-
EVAL@ec.europa.eu)  in  three  separate  documents  in  PDF  format  each  containing:  the 
executive summary, the report without its annexes (also removed from the table of contents) 
and the report with its annexes. 

TEMPLATE FOR COVER PAGE 

Terms of Reference – The Syrian Crisis - 2011 / 2014 

 - Page 137 

 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
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NAME AND LOGO OF THE CONSULTING COMPANY 

(OPTIONAL INSERTION OF PICTURE/DRAWING/MAP) 

TITLE OF THE EVALUATION REPORT; 
DATE OF THE EVALUATION; 

The opinions expressed in this document represent 
the views of the authors, which are not necessarily 
shared by the European Commission. 

Terms of Reference – The Syrian Crisis - 2011 / 2014 

 - Page 138 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
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Annex II:  Evaluation Inventory 

This  annex  presents  the  Evaluation  Inventory  used  as  the  basis  for  the  evaluation’s 
overview of the magnitude of the ECHO funding in relation to the Syrian crisis. It presents 
the list of contracts for ECHO-funded operations that fall under the evaluation scope. For 
each contract, the following data-points are provided: 

  HOPE Contract number 
  ECHO Signed Date 
  Partner Name 
  HOPE Contract Title 
  ECHO Activity Description 
  Sector 
  Funding in € M 

The annex includes two sections: 

  Methods used to construct the Evaluation Inventory 
  The Evaluation Inventory. 

AII.I  Methods used to construct the Evaluation Inventory 

The inventory was constructed from two sources: 

  The Syria Crisis Team Dataset: the evaluators used the dataset provided to them 
by the DG ECHO Syria Crisis Team in Unit B4. This dataset provides the total EU 
funds contracted in response to the Syria crisis as of 09/01/2015.101 

  The  DG  ECHO  HOPE  database:102 the  evaluators  further  took  an  extraction 

from the DG ECHO HOPE dataset on 29th January 2015. 

The inventory was constructed from the cross-referencing of contracts between these two 
sources, staying in line with the scope defined in the evaluation Terms of Reference. This 
cross-referencing process contained five discrete steps, each of which are outlined below. 

Step 1: isolating eligible contracts from the Syria Crisis Team Dataset. 

The  team  isolated  all  and  only  those  contracts  in  the  Syria  Crisis  Team  Dataset  that  are 
eligible for consideration in this evaluation. In line with the evaluation Terms of Reference 
(see  Annex  I),  this  includes  all  and  only  contracts  falling  under  the  Humanitarian 
Implementation Plans (HIPs) for Syria 2012-2014 and part of the Lebanon and Iraq HIPs:

101   DG ECHO (2015) EU Funds contracted in response to the Syria crisis (as of 09/01/2015). 

102   The Humanitarian Office Programming Environment (HOPE) database is DG ECHO’s internal database covering 

all funding decisions, project documents and contracts for ECHO-funded operations worldwide. 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex II / Page 139 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
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  Financial decision: ECHO/ME/BUD/2012/01000,  10 M EUR 
  Financial decision ECHO/SYR/BUD/2012/91000,  146 M EUR 
  Financial decision ECHO/LBN/BUD/2012/91000, 7 M EUR 
  Financial decision ECHO/ME/BUD/2012/91000,  10 MEUR 
  Financial decision: ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91000,  
  Financial decision: ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91000,  

350 M EUR 
150 M EUR 

It should be noted that only two of the contracts  in the Syria  Crisis Team  Dataset came 
from HIPs in Lebanon and Iraq, namely: 

  ECHO/LBN/BUD/2012/91002:  Shelter  and  Water  and  Sanitation  networks 

rehabilitation for vulnerable Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (€0.5 million). 

  ECHO/-ME/BUD/2013/91001: ICRC Water/Sanitation and Protection activities 

in Iraq (€6.7 million).103 

Funds allocated to Syria and neighbouring countries over the evaluation period from other 
sources have not been included in the Evaluation Inventory.104 

Step 2: cross-checking each eligible contract with DG ECHO’s HOPE database 

Each eligible contract in the Syria Crisis Team Dataset was then cross-checked against the 
HOPE  database  using  the  contract  number  and  date.  All  eligible  contracts  were  then 
assigned the full contract number given in the HOPE database. 

The HOPE database extraction was conducted on the 29th January 2015 from the contracts 
module using external online access. The following search criteria were applied: 

  Contracts signed by ECHO between 1st January 2012 and 31st December 2014. 
  Contracts  in  the  following  beneficiary  countries:  Syria,  Lebanon,  Jordan,  Iraq, 

Turkey. 

  All data fields were selected for the extraction. 

Contracts  extracted  using  this  method  that  did  not  fall  under  the  eligible  HIPs  outlined 
above in Step 1 were then removed from the extraction. 

103   ECHO/-ME/BUD/2013 is not included in the list of HIPs provided in the Terms of Reference, but this contract 

was nevertheless included after consultation with DG ECHO Iraq Desk Officer. 

104   Thus,  all  funds  channelled  from  the  following  sources  have  been  excluded  in  order  to  maintain  focus  on  the 
evaluation  scope  defined  in  the  Terms  of  Reference:  the  European  Neighbourhood  Policy  Instrument,  funds  re-
oriented from the Lebanon Annual Action Programme, Budget Support operations in Jordan, the Instrument for Pre-
Accession, the Development Cooperation Instrument, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, 
Foreign Policy Instruments and the Instrument for Stability.  

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex II / Page 140 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
ADE 

Step 3: construction of a consolidated Evaluation Inventory. 

The information provided for each eligible contract in the Syria Crisis Team Dataset was 
then  augmented  with  the  further  information  provided  by  the  full  set  of  data  fields 
available in the HOPE extraction. This allowed the team to determine, among other things, 
the sectors of intervention addressed by each operation. 

The  following  data-points  were  collected  for  each  contract  and  are  presented  in  The 
Evaluation Inventory: 

Data-point 
HOPE Contract number 
ECHO Signed Date 
Partner Name 
HOPE Contract Title 
ECHO Activity Description 
Sector 
Funding in € M 

Source 
HOPE extraction 
Syria Crisis Team Dataset 
Syria Crisis Team Dataset 
HOPE extraction 
Syria Crisis Team Dataset 
HOPE extraction and Syria Crisis Team Dataset105 
Syria Crisis Team Dataset 

The contracts for which Step 3 was conducted constitute the Evaluation Inventory.  

Step  3  was  not  possible  for  some  contracts,  on  the  basis  that  they  did  not  appear 
simultaneously in both the Syria Crisis Team Dataset and the HOPE extraction. 

Step 4: Compiling the list of contracts not present in the HOPE database. 

Some  contracts  present  in  the  Syria  Crisis  Team  Dataset  were  not  present  in  the  HOPE 
extraction.  Further  manual  searches  failed  to  retrieve  the  contract  information  from  the 
database. These contracts have been presented in a separate table in the following section. 
The  amounts  funded  for  these  contracts  were  not  included  in  the  inventory  analysis 
presented below. 

Step 5: Compiling the list of theoretically eligible contracts not present in the Syria 
Crisis Team Dataset. 

Some contracts were present in the HOPE extraction but appear eligible for the evaluation 
due the datapoints extracted above. These contracts have been presented in a separate table 
in the following section. The amounts funded for these contracts were not included in the 
inventory analysis presented below. 

105   Where  available,  this  information  was  taken  from  the  primary  aid  type  defined  in  the  HOPE  database.  In  those 
instances here the HOPE extraction did not define a primary aid type, the evaluators assigned a sector on the basis of 
the Activity Description and/or HOPE Contract Title. 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex II / Page 141 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
ADE 

AII.II The Evaluation Inventory 

The result of this five step process was the construction of: 

  The Evaluation Inventory 
  The list of contracts not included in the Syria Crisis Team Dataset 
  The list of contracts not included in the HOPE extraction. 

The inventory presented in the final report is based upon the Evaluation Inventory alone. 

This  section  presents  the  Evaluation  Inventory  in  three  tables  (one  for  each  contracting 
year  in  the  evaluation  period)  and  subsequently  the  two  additional  contract  lists.

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex II / Page 142 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation Inventory: 2012 

HOPE Contract Number 

ECHO 
Signed 
Date 

Partner 
Name 

HOPE Contract Title 

ECHO Activity 
Description 

Sector 

Funding in € M 

SY 

JO 

LB 

TR 

IQ  Total 

EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 
ADE 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2012/91001  

27/03/2013  WFP 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2012/91002  

15/02/2013  DRC 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2012/91003  

04/04/2013  ACTED 

Emergency Food Assistance to 
People Affected by Unrest in 
Syria and Logistics & 
Telecommunications 
Augmentation and Coordination 
to Support Humanitarian 
Operations 
Emergency assistance to conflict 
and displacement affected 
population in Syria and 
neighbouring countries 
Providing life-saving support to 
most vulnerable displaced 
Syrians and host communities 

Food assistance, SSO 

Food   

26.1 

7.5 

6.04 

2.3 

41.94 

Shelter winterization 
and NFIs 

Shelter   

4.7 

1.1 

4.2 

WASH, shelter 
winterization and NFIs 

Water / 
Sanitation   

2.65 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2012/91004  

17/09/2012  ICRC 

ICRC economic security 
activities in Syria 

Food assistance, NFIs, 
Cash for work 

Food   

5 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2012/91005  

13/12/2012  UNRWA 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2012/91006  

21/08/2013  IFRC 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2012/91007  

03/05/2013  IRC-UK 

Emergency Assistance to 
Palestine Refugees impacted by 
Conflict in Syria 

Shelter winterization 
and NFIs, food 
assistance 

Emergency support to 
populations affected by the crisis 
in Syria 
Supporting Syrian Refugee 
Women?s and Girls? Protection 
and Mental Health 

Health, DRR, SSO, 
shelter winterization 
and NFIs 

Psychosocial  gender-
based violence, WASH 

Food   

3.5 

Health and 
Medical   

10.7 

Protection   

1.5 

1.6 

0.8 

0.1 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2012/91008  

18/07/2013  UNICEF 

Emergency response for 
vulnerable Syrian children, their 
families and host communities 

Wash in refugee camps, 
coordination of wash 
activities 

Water / 
Sanitation  

2 

6 

1 

10 

2.65 

5 

3.5 

10.7 

4 

9 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex II / Page 143 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 
ADE 

HOPE Contract Number 

ECHO 
Signed 
Date 

Partner 
Name 

HOPE Contract Title 

ECHO Activity 
Description 

Sector 

Funding in € M 

SY 

JO 

LB 

TR 

IQ  Total 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2012/91009  

16/01/2013  SC 

Support to Children and families 
affected by by violence in Syria 

Shelter winterization 
and NFIs 

Protection 

1.25 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2012/91010  

04/02/2013  PU 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2012/91011  

26/04/2013  ACF-SP 

Emergency support to unrest-
affected population in Syria and 
neighbouring countries 

Shelter winterization 
and NFIs 

Shelter   

2.45 

1.85 

Humanitarian WASH response 
in support to the population 
affected by the unrest in Syria 

WASH 

Water / 
Sanitation   

0.66 

1.31 

1.25 

4.3 

1.97 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2012/91012  

28/02/2013  UNHCR 

Support to displaced Syrians in 
neighbouring countries, and to 
affected population in Syria 

Winterization shelter 
and NFIs, registration, 
health, coordination 

Shelter   

9.3 

10.2 

12.1 

2  3.947  37.547 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2012/91013  

25/10/2013  HELP 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2012/91014  

05/02/2013  ICMC 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2012/91015  

31/07/2013  GVC 

Emergency response to the 
conflict in Syria 
Winterisation Assistance to 
Vulnerable Syrians in Jordan 
Winterization package for under-
served Syrian families in the 
Bekaa Valley 

WASH 

Shelter winterization 
and NFIs 

Water / 
Sanitation   

Shelter   

1.05 

0.48 

WASH, shelter 
winterization and NFIs 

Water / 
Sanitation   

1 

1.05 

0.48 

1 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2012/91016  

16/04/2013  HI 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2012/91017  

23/08/2013  AVSI 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2012/91018  

27/03/2013  WHO 

Emergency intervention for the 
most vulnerable people affected 
by the Syrian crisis - phase 2 

Emergency health care 
for people with injuries, 
protection 

Health and 
Medical   

1.2  2.175 

3.375 

Emergency intervention in 
support of syrian conflict 
affected population during 
winter in jordan and lebanon 
Response to health needs in 
Syrian Arab Republic 

Shelter winterization 
and NFIs 

Shelter   

0.35 

0.82 

Health 

Health and 
Medical   

4 

1.17 

4 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex II / Page 144 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 
ADE 

HOPE Contract Number 

ECHO 
Signed 
Date 

Partner 
Name 

HOPE Contract Title 

ECHO Activity 
Description 

Sector 

Funding in € M 

SY 

JO 

LB 

TR 

IQ  Total 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2012/91019  

05/02/2013  TDH 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2012/91020  

19/07/2013  UNFPA 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2012/91021  

17/05/2013  NRC 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2012/91022  

31/05/2013  MC 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2012/91023  

27/03/2013  IFRC 

Emergency support to people 
affected by the Syrian crisis 

Humanitarian Interventions to 
address Reproductive Health 
rights and prevent and respond 
to Gender-Based Violence, 
among Syrian refugees in Jordan 
Continued support to people 
escaping the armed conflict in 
Syrian and seeking refuge in 
Neighboring countries. 
Increased Winter Preparedness 
and Improved Hygiene for 
Syrian Rrefugees in Northern 
Jordan 

Turkey: Population Movement - 
Winterization programme 

Protection 

Protection   

0.5 

Protection and health in 
Jordan 

Health and 
Medical   

1 

Coordination, shelter 
winterization and NFIs, 
SSO, protection 

Shelter rehabilitation, 
shelter winterization 
and NFIs 

Shelter   

3.4 

4.2 

Shelter   

1.7 

Shelter   

2 

0.5 

1 

7.6 

1.7 

2 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex II / Page 145 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation Inventory: 2013 

HOPE Contract Number 

ECHO 
Signed 
Date 

Partner 
Name 

HOPE Contract Title 

ECHO Activity 
Description 

Sector 

Funding in € M 

SY 

JO 

LB 

TR 

IQ  Total 

EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 
ADE 

Emergency operation in 
Syria 

Shelter   

1.3 

Food   

5 

1.3 

5 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91001   30/04/2013   ACTED 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91002   17/04/2013   ICRC 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91003   01/12/2014   IOM 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91004   17/12/2013   CARE 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91005   02/07/2014   DRC 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91006   12/12/2013   UNRWA 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91007   29/11/2013   ICMC 

Emergency Assistance to Syrian 
conflict-affected and displaced 
populations and Support to 
Humanitarian Coordination 
ICRC Economic Security, 
Health and Detention activities 
in Syria 

Emegency Relief Assistance to 
Vulnerable Populations Affected 
by the Crisis in Syria 

Providing life-saving support to 
most vulnerable displaced 
Syrians and host communities 

Emergency assistance to conflict 
and displacement affected 
population in Syria and 
neighbouring countries 
Emergency Assistance and 
Enhanced Protection to 
Conflict-Affected Palestine 
Refugees 

Providing Humanitarian 
Assistance to Vulnerable Syrians 
and Host-Communities 

Economic Security, 
Health and Detention 
activities in Syria 
Relief assistance to 
vulnerable populatiuons 
affected by the crisis 
(emergency 
rehabilitation of 
collective shelters and 
NFIs distributions) 
Cash assistance, food 
vouchers and NFIs 
distribution to urban 
refugees 

Shelter winterization, 
NFIs, protection & 
coordination 

Shelter winterization 
and NFIs, food 
assistance 

Shelter winterization 
and NFIs 

Shelter   

6.2 

2 

8.2 

Shelter   

1.9 

2.2 

4.1 

Shelter   

11 

1 

20.2 

2.9 

35.1 

Food   

8.856  0.169 

Shelter   

0.8 

9.025 

0.8 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex II / Page 146 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOPE Contract Number 

ECHO 
Signed 
Date 

Partner 
Name 

HOPE Contract Title 

ECHO Activity 
Description 

Sector 

Funding in € M 

SY 

JO 

LB 

TR 

IQ  Total 

EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 
ADE 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91008   20/11/2014   NRC 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91009   06/08/2014   SC 

Continued support to people 
affected by the Syria armed 
conflict 

Providing immediate relief and 
protection to children and their 
families affected by the conflict, 
both within Syria and border 
countries 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91010   09/07/2014   CARITAS 

Aide humanitaire de base aux 
réfugiés syriens au Liban 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91011   11/12/2013  

SOLIDAR
ITES 
Internatio
nal 

Emergency assistance to 
vulnerable populations affected 
by the Syria crisis 

Continued support to 
people affected by the 
Syrian armed conflict: 
WASH, Shelter and 
NFIs, Protection 
Provision of immediate 
relief and protection to 
children affected by the 
conflict (cash transfer 
and therapeutic psycho-
social activities in 
Jordand and shleter and 
support to new arrivals 
ilnLebanon) + NFIs  
winter in Syria 
Support to new arrivals 
in the Beeka valley 
(Food and NFI 
vouchers + rental 
assistance + SGBV) - 
Lebanon 
Emergency assistance 
to vulnerable 
population affected by 
the crisis in Lebanon 
(Shelter/WASH/NFIs 
distribution)  

Shelter   

7 

8.2 

2.9 

1 

19.1 

Protection   

3.5 

5.7 

7.1 

16.3 

Shelter   

1.1 

1.1 

Shelter   

3 

3 

3 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91012   03/09/2014   UNFPA 

Providing life saving Sexual and 
Reproductive Health for 
populations affected by the 
Syrian crisis 

Protection and health in 
Syria 

Health and 
Medical   

1 

2 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex II / Page 147 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 
ADE 

HOPE Contract Number 

ECHO 
Signed 
Date 

Partner 
Name 

HOPE Contract Title 

ECHO Activity 
Description 

Sector 

Funding in € M 

SY 

JO 

LB 

TR 

IQ  Total 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91013   22/05/2014   MEDAIR 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91014   25/08/2014   MC 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91015   31/05/2013   OCHA 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91016   26/09/2014   PU-AMI 

Humanitarian assistance to the 
populations affected by the 
Syrian crisis 

WASH and NFI assistance to 
Syrian IDPs and refugees in 
Lebanon 

Enabling timely, principled and 
coordinated response to the 
humanitarian crisis triggered by 
the unrest in the Syrian Arab 
Republic. 

Life saving assistance to conflict-
affected population in Syria and 
neighbouring countries 

Humanitarian 
assistance to the 
populations affected by 
the Syrian crisis: Shelter 
and NFIs 
NFIs distribution to Ne 
comers in Lebanon and 
WASH assistance to 
IDPs in Syria 

Shelter   

1 

3.5 

4.5 

Water / 
Sanitation   

2.915 

0.43 

3.345 

Coordination of 
humanitarian assistance 
inside Syria 

Coordinatio
n   

1 

1 

Life saving assistance to 
conflict-affected 
population in Syria and 
neighbouring countries: 
Food assistance, short 
term food security and 
livelihood support, 
WASH, Health, Shelter 
and NFIs 

Shelter   

3.2 

1.25 

2.25 

6.7 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91017   27/08/2014   UNICEF 

Emergency Assistance to the 
people affected by the Syrian 
crisis with particular focus on 
children. 

Wash in refugee camps, 
coordination of wash 
activities 

Water / 
Sanitation   

13 

7.5 

3.5 

24 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex II / Page 148 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 
ADE 

HOPE Contract Number 

ECHO 
Signed 
Date 

Partner 
Name 

HOPE Contract Title 

ECHO Activity 
Description 

Sector 

Funding in € M 

SY 

JO 

LB 

TR 

IQ  Total 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91018   03/12/2013   UNHCR 

Support to affected population 
in Syria and to displaced Syrians 
and hosting communities in 
neighbouring countries 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91019   19/08/2014   HI 

Emergency intervention for the 
most vulnerable people affected 
by the Syrian crisis? Phase 3 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91020   08/05/2014  

World 
Vision 

Integrated Emergency Support 
to Populations Affected by the 
Syria Crisis 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91021   15/10/2014   OGB 

Humanitarian Response and 
Assistance for People Affected 
by the Syrian Crisis 

Support to affected 
population in Syria and 
to displaced Syrians and 
hosting communities in 
neighbouring countries: 
registration, 
shelter/NFIshealth, 
coordination 
Emergency 
intervention for the 
most vulnerable people 
affected by the Syrian 
crisis Phase 3: Food 
assistance, Health, 
Shelter and NFIs, 
Protection, 
Coordiantion 
Integrated Emergency 
Support to Refugees 
and Host Communities 
in Countries Affected 
by the Syria Crisis: 
WASH, Shelter and 
NFIs, Child Protection 
Integrated EFSL, 
WASH and Protection 
Response for Syrian 
Refugees living in Host 
Communities in Jordan 
and Lebanon and Syria 

Shelter   

17 

17 

23 

6 

63 

Health and 
Medical   

1.7 

4 

6.5 

12.2 

Water / 
Sanitation   

Water / 
Sanitation   

1 

0.5 

1.5 

2 

1.82 

1.7 

5.52 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex II / Page 149 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 
ADE 

HOPE Contract Number 

ECHO 
Signed 
Date 

Partner 
Name 

HOPE Contract Title 

ECHO Activity 
Description 

Sector 

Funding in € M 

SY 

JO 

LB 

TR 

IQ  Total 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91022   14/11/2014   ACTED 

Emergency Assistance to Syrian 
displaced populations and their 
host communities and Support 
to Humanitarian Coordination 

Emergency Assistance 
to vulnerable people 
affected by the crisis: 
NFI distribution, 
WASH, Winterization 
and Support to 
Humanitarian 
Coordination 

Water / 
Sanitation   

3.6 

2 

1 

6.6 

Food assistance 

Food   

1 

3 

Shelter   

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91023   27/02/2014  

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91024   07/03/2014  

CARITAS 
Lux 

Humanitarian assistance to 
Syrian IDPs and refugees 
affected by the Syria regional 
crisis 

Red Cross 
DK 

Emergency support to 
populations affected by the Syria 
crisis 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91025   08/05/2014   WHO 

Strengthening the health 
humanitarian response in the 
Syria crisis 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91026   27/03/2014  

INTERSO
S 

Emergency relief assistance for 
Syrian crisis affected vulnerable 
population 

Emergency support to 
populations affected by 
the crisis in Syria: 
WASH, Health, Shelter 
and NFIs 
Strengthening the 
health humanitarian 
response in Syria with 
focus on the provision 
of urgently needed 
essential medicines 
Emergency relief 
assistance for Syrian 
crisis affected 
vulnerable population: 
Shelter and NFIs 

Health and 
Medical   

9.5 

Shelter   

0.5 

1 

3 

9.5 

0.5 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex II / Page 150 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 
ADE 

HOPE Contract Number 

ECHO 
Signed 
Date 

Partner 
Name 

HOPE Contract Title 

ECHO Activity 
Description 

Sector 

Funding in € M 

SY 

JO 

LB 

TR 

IQ  Total 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91027   11/04/2014   WA UK 

Emergency Assistance & 
Winterisation Preparation for 
Affected Population by the Syria 
Conflict in Lebanon 

Emergency Assistance 
& Winterisation 
Preparation for 
Newcomer (Palestine) 
Refugees from Syria to 
Beirut 

Shelter   

0.3 

0.3 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91028   02/12/2014  

IFRC Top 
up 

Provision of secondary level 
hospital and surgical care for the 
refugee population in Azraq, 
Jordan. 

HOSPITALITALY 

Health and 
Medical   

0 

6.99 

6.99 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91029   13/06/2014   MERLIN 

Essential Emergency Health 
Assistance to Conflict Affected 
and Displaced Populations 
affected by the Syria Crisis 

Surgical Health 
Assistance 

Health and 
Medical   

1 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91030   22/08/2014   MCS 

Support to people affected by 
the Syrian crisis 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91031   31/03/2014   PIN 

Emergency Life-Saving Relief 
for War-Affected Syrian 
population 

Increased Winter 
Preparedness and 
Improved Hygiene for 
Syrian Rrefugees in 
Northern Jordan and 
Syria: WASH, Shelter 
rehabilitation and NFIs 
Emergency assistance 
in the field of food 
assistance, NFIs 
distribution and waste 
management 

Shelter   

1.5 

3 

Food   

2.1 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91032   20/03/2014  

SOLIDAR
ITES 

Provision of emergency 
assistance for populations 
affected by the Syrian conflict 

CFW, Water vouchers 
and Winterization 

Food   

2 

1 

4.5 

2.1 

2 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex II / Page 151 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 
ADE 

HOPE Contract Number 

ECHO 
Signed 
Date 

Partner 
Name 

HOPE Contract Title 

ECHO Activity 
Description 

Sector 

Funding in € M 

SY 

JO 

LB 

TR 

IQ  Total 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91033   22/12/2014  

CONCER
N 

Humanitarian Emergency 
Response to Syria Crisis 

Syria Crisis Emergency 
Response: WASH and 
Emergency 
preparedness 

Water / 
Sanitation   

2.2 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91034   20/09/2013   ICRC 

ICRC assistance for victims of 
the Syrian crisis. 

ICRC Health activities 
in Lebanon 

Health and 
Medical   

2.5 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91035   04/03/2014   MDM 

Provision of emergency relief to 
conflict affected and displaced 
population affected by the Syria 
crisis 

Health assistance 

Health and 
Medical   

1.885 

2.2 

2.5 

1.885 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91036   13/12/2013   IFRC 

Turkey: Population Movement 

Health, SSO, shelter  
and NFIs 

Shelter   

2 

2 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91037   14/07/2014   TDH-IT 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91038   03/12/2013   AVSI  

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91039   08/08/2014   ACF-SP 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91040   05/12/2013   WFP 

Response to primary and 
vulnerability - based needs of 
PRS and Syrian Refugees in the 
Palestinian Camps and 
surrounding areas in Lebanon 

Emergency intervention in 
support of vulnerable syrian 
conflict affected population 

Humanitarian assistance to the 
populations affected by the 
Syrian conflict in Syria and the 
neighboring countries 

Emergency Food Assistance to 
Displaced Syrians in Syria and 
the Neighbouring Countries 

Cash assistance and 
NFIs distribution to 
PRS and Syrian 
refugees in Lebanon 

Winterization (Shelter 
and NFIs) 

Shelter   

0 

1.23 

Shelter   

0 

0.35 

0.6 

Wash + food + 
shelter/NFIs  

Shelter   

3 

0.75 

1.9 

1.23 

0.95 

5.65 

Food assistance 

Food   

30 

10 

11 

7 

3 

61 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex II / Page 152 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 
ADE 

HOPE Contract Number 

ECHO 
Signed 
Date 

Partner 
Name 

HOPE Contract Title 

ECHO Activity 
Description 

Sector 

Funding in € M 

SY 

JO 

LB 

TR 

IQ  Total 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91041   11/06/2014   GVC-IT 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91042   16/10/2014   IRC 

ECHO/LBN/BUD/2012/91002   11/12/2014   PU-AMI 

ECHO/-ME/BUD/2013/91001   18/10/2013   Iraq HIP 

Emergency Response for Syrian 
and Lebanese families affected 
by the Syrian conflict 

Syrian Crisis Response - A 
Regional Approach 

WASH, shelter and 
NFIs 

Psychosocial  gender-
based violence + 
WASH + Food 

Shelter and Water and Sanitation 
networks rehabilitation for 
vulnerable Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon 

Shelter 

Shelter   

0 

1.5 

Food   

4.2 

1 

0.6 

Water / 
Sanitation   

0.5 

ICRC Water/Sanitation and 
Protection activities in Iraq 

Support to Iraqi 
refugees affected by the 
Syria crisis 

Water / 
Sanitation   

6.705 

1.5 

5.8 

0.5 

6.705 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex II / Page 153 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation Inventory: 2014 

HOPE Contract Number 

ECHO 
Signed 
Date 

Partner 
Name 

HOPE Contract Title 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91001 

24/12/2014  HELP 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91002 

15/05/2014  OCHA 

Emergency response and 
humanitarian assistance to the 
victims of the armed conflict in 
Syria. 

Enabling more effective and 
principled humanitarian action 
that meets the need of affected 
people. 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91003 

13/08/2014 

DANISH 
RED 
CROSS 

Emergency Support to 
Populations Affected by the 
Syria Crisis 

ECHO Activity 
Description 

Emergency response 
and humanitarian 
assistance to the 
victims of the armed 
conflict in Syria: 
Wash and NFIs 
project 

Coordination inside 
Syria 

Emergency Support 
to Populations 
Affected by the Syria 
Crisis:  Multi-sectorial 
operation with Health 
/ SARC Capacity 
building on logistic / 
NFIs /Wash with 
Hygiene Kits 
distribution 

EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 
ADE 

Sector 

Funding in € M 

SY 

JO 

LB 

TR 

IQ  Total 

Multisector 

0.7 

Coordination 

1 

Multisector 

7 

0.7 

1 

7 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex II / Page 154 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 
ADE 

HOPE Contract Number 

ECHO 
Signed 
Date 

Partner 
Name 

HOPE Contract Title 

ECHO Activity 
Description 

Sector 

Funding in € M 

SY 

JO 

LB 

TR 

IQ  Total 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91004 

19/01/2015 

MERCY 
CORPS 

Initial request: Multi-sectoral 
assistance to Syrian IDPs 
refugees and their host 
communities MR Iraq: 
Winterisation assistance to 
vulnerable Syrian refugees and 
host communities in 
Iraq(1/11/14-31/03/15) MR II-
Syria Al Hassakeh: Support to 
people affected by the Syrian 
crisis(15/12/14-15/03/15) 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91005 

23/10/2014 

PIN / 
GAA 

Humanitarian assistance to war 
affected population within Syria 
and urban refugees in Turkey 

WASH and shelter in 
Syria + cash 
assistance to urban 
refugees in Iraq 

Food and NFIs in 
Syria +  food 
assistance, short-term 
food security and 
livelihood support 
with cash-based 
interventions in 
Turkey 

Multisector 

2 

1 

3 

Multisector 

4 

1 

5 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex II / Page 155 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOPE Contract Number 

ECHO 
Signed 
Date 

Partner 
Name 

HOPE Contract Title 

ECHO Activity 
Description 

Sector 

Funding in € M 

SY 

JO 

LB 

TR 

IQ  Total 

EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 
ADE 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91006 

29/12/2014 

SOLIDAR
ITES INT 

Emergency assistance to 
vulnerable populations affected 
by the Syria crisis 

1) Multi-sector 
project (food 
assistance, short-term 
food security and 
livelihood support) 
through cash-based 
intervention + 
WASH/Hygiene/NF
I + Shelter/NFI in 
Syria.  
2) Wash and Shelter 
and cash to only 
unregestered in 
Lebanon 

Multisector 

1 

2.4 

3.4 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91007 

21/01/2015  RI 

Providing emergency assistance 
to the population affected by the 
Syria crisis 

Reproductive and 
Primary Health 
Assistance in Syria 

Health and 
Medical 

3.5 

0.25 

3.75 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91008 

28/05/2014 

CARITAS 
LUX 

Humanitarian assistance to 
Syrian IDPs and refugees 
affected by the Syria regional 
crisis 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91009 

16/10/2014  GOAL 

Emergency assistance to the 
population affected by the 
conflict in Syria. 

Humanitarian 
assistance to Syrian 
IDPs and refugees 
affected by the Syria 
regional crisis: food 
assistance through 
hot meals and dry 
rations 
Emergency assistance 
and relief to conflict 
affected population in 
Syria: 
Food/Livelihood 
Support through 
C&V schemes 

Food 

1.4 

Food 

3 

1.4 

3 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex II / Page 156 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 
ADE 

HOPE Contract Number 

ECHO 
Signed 
Date 

Partner 
Name 

HOPE Contract Title 

ECHO Activity 
Description 

Sector 

Funding in € M 

SY 

JO 

LB 

TR 

IQ  Total 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91010 

19/01/2015  ADRA 

Humanitarian assistance to the 
Syrian population affected by the 
conflict in Syria 

WASH assistance in 
Rural Damascus 

Water / 
Sanitation 

0.5 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91011 

13/06/2014  OXFAM 

Reducing suffering and 
vulnerability of those affected by 
Syrian Crisis in Jordan and Syria 

WASH, cash 
assistance, 
medical/protection 
support to women in 
non-camp setting in 
Jordan + Wash, 
EFSL, NFIs, Shelter 
and capacity building 
in Syria 

Multisector 

0.8 

0.5 

0.5 

1.3 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91012 

24/11/2014  NRC 

Continued support to 
displacement affected 
populations of the Syrian crisis 

Shelter/NFIs in 
Lebanon 

Shelter 

1 

2 

1 

4 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91013 

28/11/2014 

CROIX-
ROUGE 
FR 

Program of assistance for the 
people affected by the Syria crisis 

Syrian refugees and 
vulnerable hosting 
populations 
emergency assistance 
program in Lebanon 
and Jordan: Health 
support through 
Lebanese RC in 
Lebanon and WASH 
and cash assistance in 
Jordan 

Multisector 

0.5 

0.5 

1 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex II / Page 157 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 
ADE 

HOPE Contract Number 

ECHO 
Signed 
Date 

Partner 
Name 

HOPE Contract Title 

ECHO Activity 
Description 

Sector 

Funding in € M 

SY 

JO 

LB 

TR 

IQ  Total 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91014 

02/12/2014  CARE 

Assistance to populations 
affected by the Syria crisis 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91015 

14/11/2014  ACTED 

Providing emergency assistance 
to Syrians and vulnerable host 
populations in Syria and its 
neighbouring countries 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91016 

04/12/2014 

Save The 
Children 

Providing immediate relief and 
protection to children and their 
families affected by the Syrian 
crisis 

Multisector 

1 

1.96 

2.96 

Multisector 

2.1 

1 

3.1 

Multisector 

2.48 

2.5 

5.8 

10.78 

Assistance to 
populations affected 
by the Syria crisis: 
Emergency cash 
assistance 
Providing emergency 
assistance to Syrians 
and vulnerable host 
populations in Syria 
and its neighbouring 
countries: 
shelter/NFIs, WASH, 
CASH assistance 
1) Shelter, NFIs for 
winterization, 
unconditional cash 
assistance and child 
protection in non-
camp setting in 
Jordan 
2) Food 
security/NFIs/Shlete
r in Syria 
3)Shelter/NFIs in 
Lebanon 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91017 

22/05/2014  WV 

Integrated Emergency Support 
to Populations Affected by the 
Syria Crisis 

Wash and hyigiene 
kits in Lebanon 

Water / 
Sanitation 

0.5 

0.5 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex II / Page 158 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 
ADE 

HOPE Contract Number 

ECHO 
Signed 
Date 

Partner 
Name 

HOPE Contract Title 

ECHO Activity 
Description 

Sector 

Funding in € M 

SY 

JO 

LB 

TR 

IQ  Total 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91018 

19/12/2014 

DRC 
(REF. 
COUNCI
L) 

Coordinated Assistance to 
Conflict and Displacement 
Affected Population in Syria and 
Neighboring Countries 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91019 

03/12/2014  MEDAIR 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91020 

24/09/2014  HI 

Life-saving humanitarian 
assistance to the most vulnerable 
populations affected by the 
Syrian Crisis 

Emergency intervention for the 
most vulnerable people affected 
by the Syrian crisis? Phase 4 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91021 

19/12/2014 

IOM 

Regional and multi-sector 
assistance to populations 
affected by the Syria crisis 

Coordinated 
Assistance to Conflict 
and Displacement 
Affected Population 
in Syria and 
Neighbouring 
Countries: 
shelter/NFIs, WASH, 
cash assistance 
Shelter/NFIs for ITS 
in Lebanon + 
Nutrition assessment 
in Southern Syria 
Emergency 
intervention for the 
most vulnerable 
people affected by the 
Syrian crisis– Phase 4: 
health specific 
services to people 
with disabilities + 
shelter/NFIs 

NFI/shelter activities 
in Turkey (urban 
refugees) & in Syria 

Multisector 

5 

0.9 

4.3 

1.8 

12.00 

Multisector 

0.2 

1.9 

2.1 

Multisector 

2 

1.5 

2 

5.5 

Multisector 

3.5 

3.25 

6.75 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex II / Page 159 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 
ADE 

HOPE Contract Number 

ECHO 
Signed 
Date 

Partner 
Name 

HOPE Contract Title 

ECHO Activity 
Description 

Sector 

Funding in € M 

SY 

JO 

LB 

TR 

IQ  Total 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91022 

18/06/2014  AVSI 

Emergency intervention in 
support of vulnerable Syrian 
conflict affected population in 
Lebanon and Jordan 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91023 

19/06/2014 

ICMC 

Providing Humanitarian 
Assistance in response to the 
Syrian Crisis 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91024 

02/12/2014 

IRC 

Responding to the Syrian Crisis 

Emergency 
intervention in 
support of vulnerable 
Syrian conflict 
affected population in 
Lebanon and Jordan: 
WASH, CASH 
assistance, 
Winterization 
Providing 
Humanitarian 
Assistance to 
Vulnerable Syrian 
Refugees and Host-
Communities in 
Jordan: Unconditional 
cash and NFIs in 
non-camp settings in 
Northern Jordan. 
WASH in Syria + 
SGBV & PSS in 
Lebanon 

Multisector 

0.3 

0.2 

0.5 

Multisector 

0.5 

0.5 

Multisector 

1.32 

0.75 

0.4 

2.47 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex II / Page 160 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOPE Contract Number 

ECHO 
Signed 
Date 

Partner 
Name 

HOPE Contract Title 

ECHO Activity 
Description 

Sector 

Funding in € M 

SY 

JO 

LB 

TR 

IQ  Total 

EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 
ADE 

Multisector 

4.7 

1 

0.1 

0.5 

0.51 

6.81 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91025 

19/12/2014 

IMC 

Provision of health, mental 
health and WASH support to 
conflict affected communities in 
Syria and Syrian refugees in 
Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon and 
Turkey. 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91026 

24/11/2014  PU-AMI 

Life saving assistance to conflict-
affected population in Syria and 
neighbouring countries. 

Primary health care 
(including RH, 
MHPSS, 
SGBVChronic 
diseases) in non- 
camp setting in 
Jordan and Iraq.  
WASH for supported 
health facilities and 
WASH in high risk of 
polio areas in Syria + 
specific Leishmania 
project in Syria 
Shleter/NFIs & 
Health & WASH in 
Syria + Shleter & 
Health in Lebanon 

Multisector 

2 

0.5 

1.9 

4.4 

12.5 

1.95 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91027 

17/12/2014 

ICRC 

ICRC Economic Security, 
WASH, Health and Protection 
activities in Syria. 

Health and Wash 
assistance 

Multisector 

12.5 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91028 

21/08/2014  UNRWA 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91029 

19/12/2014  MDM 

Multi-sectoral humanitarian 
assistance to conflict affected 
Palestine refugees from Syria 

Improve access to health 
services for conflict affected and 
displaced population affected by 
the Syrian and Iraqi crisis. 

Multisector 

1.9 

0.05 

Health and 
Medical 

1.4 

1.4 

2.8 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91030 

19/12/2014  CARE 

INSO Syria 

Protection 

0.45 

1.35 

1.8 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex II / Page 161 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 
ADE 

HOPE Contract Number 

ECHO 
Signed 
Date 

Partner 
Name 

HOPE Contract Title 

ECHO Activity 
Description 

Sector 

Funding in € M 

SY 

JO 

LB 

TR 

IQ  Total 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91031 

16/10/2014  WHO 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91032 

24/10/2014  UNICEF 

Health response to humanitarian 
needs in the Syrian Arab 
Republic 
Emergency Assistance to the 
people affected by the Syrian 
crisis with particular focus on 
children 

Health (emergency 
health, SHC, 
vaccination) 

Wash in camps in 
Jordan + Wash & 
Health in Syria 

Health and 
Medical 

4.5 

Multisector 

2 

2 

4.5 

4 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91033 

22/12/2014  WFP 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91034 

23/01/2015  UNFPA 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91035 

10/11/2014  ACF 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91036 

01/12/2014  GVC 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91037 

23/12/2014  UNHCR 

Emergency Food Assistance to 
Displaced Syrians in Syria, 
Jordan, Iraq and Turkey 

Comprehensive Reproductive 
health and Sexual and Gender 
Based Violence Interventions for 
Syrian Refugees 

Integrated Emergency assistance 
to the Syrian crisis-affected 
populations living in Host 
Communities in the Districts of 
Ramtha and Bani Obaid, Irbid 
Governorate - Jordan 

Emergency support to Syrian 
and Lebanese population 
affected by the Syrian crisis 

Support to affected population 
in Syria and to displaced Syrians 
and hosting communities in 
neighbouring countries 

Food 

5.5 

4.5 

6 

2 

18 

Multisector 

1 

Multisector 

0.5 

Multisector 

0.4 

1 

0.5 

0.4 

Multisector 

1 

5.5 

14.1 

2 

22.6 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex II / Page 162 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 
ADE 

List of contracts not included in the Syria Crisis Team Dataset 

HOPE Contract Number 

ECHO 
Signed 
Date 

Partner Name 

HOPE Contract Title 

Primary Aid 
Type 

Secondary Aid 
Type 

Funding in € 
M 

ECHO/LBN/BUD/2012/91001   19/12/2012  UNRWA-PS  

2012 Emergency Food Assistance for Displaced 
Families from Nahr el-Bared Camp (NBC) 

Food   

    2.0 

ECHO/LBN/BUD/2012/91002   27/03/2013  PU-AMI-FR  

ECHO/LBN/BUD/2012/91003   04/07/2012  CARITAS-AT  

ECHO/LBN/BUD/2012/91004   02/08/2012  UNRWA-PS  

ECHO/LBN/BUD/2012/91005   29/08/2012  CROIX-ROUGE-NL  

ECHO/LBN/BUD/2012/91006   15/04/2013  TDH-IT  

Shelter and Water and Sanitation networks 
rehabilitation for vulnerable Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon 

Critical Health Services to Vulnerable Elderly 
Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon 
Protection of Palestine refugees in Lebanon- Phase 
III 
Improved health of the most vulnerable Palestinian 
Refugees 
Provision of Food and Non food Items needed to 
face primary needs and the upcoming winter to 
Palestinian refugees from Syria in Lebanon 

Water / 
Sanitation   

Health and 
Medical   

Protection   

Health and 
Medical   

Shelter   

    1.191  

        0.25  

        0.215  

       0.525 

Food   

Protection   

    1.319  

ECHO/LBN/BUD/2012/91007   03/05/2013  UNRWA-PS  

Emergency Assistance to displaced Palestine refugees 
from Syria in Lebanon 

Health and 
Medical   

Protection   

    1.5  

ECHO/CHD/BUD/2014/91011  30/10/2014 

CONCERN 
WORLDWIDE-IR  

EU Children of Peace Initiative - Enhancing access 
to quality primary education and psycho social 
support for conflict-affected children in Turkey. 

ECHO/CHD/BUD/2012/01002  05/04/2013  ACTED-FR  

ECHO/CHD/BUD/2013/01006  26/11/2013  TRIANGLE-FR  

Improving Child and Youth Protection among 
conflict-affected Syrian refugees 

Emergency education towards Syrian refugee 
children in KR-I 

Protection   

Protection   

       0. 4 

       0. 4 

       0. 3 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex II / Page 163 

 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 
ADE 

List of contracts not included in the HOPE extraction 

HOPE Contract 
Number 

ECHO 
Reference 
Number 

91007 (Leb 
HIP) 

91007 (Leb 
HIP) 

Partner 
Name 

TdH Italy 

UNRWA 

HOPE Contract Title 

ECHO Activity 
Description 

Sector 

Funding in € M 

SY 

JO 

LB 

TR 

IQ  Total 

Winterization  andNFI 

Protection, Coordination, 
Health 

1.319 

1.5 

1.319 

1.5 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex II / Page 164 

 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
ADE 

Annex III: Country reports  

This Annex presents the evaluation country reports. Five country reports were completed 
in total, covering each of the countries under the evaluation scope: Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Syria and Turkey. 

The country reports are stand-alone documents providing: 
  Background context on the humanitarian situation in each country  
  ECHO’s response  
  Findings per evaluation question  
  Other relevant findings for the evaluation and  
  Lessons learned. 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex III / Page 165 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
ADE 

Iraq Country Report  

IRAQ COUNTRY REPORT .................................................................................................... 167 

1. 

2. 

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 169 
1.1.Methodology ............................................................................................................................ 169 
1.2.Structure of the Iraq Country Report .................................................................................. 169 
CONTEXT .................................................................................................................................. 170 
2.1.Iraq, KRI and the Syrian crisis .............................................................................................. 170 
2.2.Outline of the humanitarian context .................................................................................... 171 
Key humanitarian issues....................................................................................................... 173 
Response from the national and international communities .................................................... 173 
OVERVIEW OF THE ECHO APPROACH IN THE COUNTRY ................................................. 177 
KEY FINDINGS WITH RESPECT TO THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS (EQS) ...................... 178 
TENTATIVE CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 191 

2.2.1. 
2.2.2. 

3. 
4. 
5. 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex III / Page 167 

 
 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
ADE 

1.  Introduction 

This  Country  Report  on  the  Kurdistan  Region  of  Iraq  is  part  of  the  broader  external 
evaluation process carried out on the ECHO response to the Syria crisis.  

1.1.  Methodology 

The methodology applied in this case study is based on four pillars: 
  Documents  reviewed:  in  addition  to  the  work  undertaken  during  the  desk  study, 
additional documents on the context, projects, needs and impact have been gathered in 
the field and analysed 
Interviews with key stakeholders  
-  ECHO (other services of the European Commission are not represented in KRI) 

 

and Member States (French Embassy); 

-  UN Agencies (UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, OCHA, UNDP) 
-  NGOs (DRC, NRC, MC, ACTED) 
-  National actors (Camp Director in Gestapa, ERC, MODM) 

  Three field visits (Gestapa camp, Syrian refugees in Erbid city, Syrian refugees in peri-
urban  areas)  which  allowed  direct  observation  of  programmes  and  interviews  with 
Syrian refugees (in camp and non-camp situations) 
Initial  briefing  and  final  debriefing  with  ECHO  staff  to  validate  the  findings  and  go 
through the initial and tentative recommendations. 

 

1.2.  Structure of the Iraq Country Report 

The structure of the Iraq country report is as follows: 
Section 1: Introduction 
  Description  of  the  methodology  (description  of  places  visited,  types  of  interlocutor 

met, etc.) 

  Description of the structure of the Country Report 

Section 2: The context in Iraq 
  Brief overview of the socio-economic  context of Iraq  
  Brief description of the specific constraints on the refugees’ and IDPs’ situation in the 

country 

  Brief description of the national and international response 

Section 3: Overview of the ECHO approach in the country: 
  Overview of ECHO’s overall approach and main priorities in KRI 
  Overview of funding and activities undertaken in KRI 

Section 4: Key findings with respect to the Evaluation Questions  

Section 5: Other relevant findings of the evaluation 
  Specific findings on the case study subjects 
  Specific lessons with respect to the sectors concerned (water, health, etc.)  
  Other relevant findings  

Section 6: Tentative conclusion 

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2.  Context 

2.1. 

Iraq context106 

Iraq  is  an  upper-middle  income  country  with  a  population  of  37  million.  The  GDP  per 
capita  had  declined  by  a  third  between  1980  and  2006,  from  about  US$3,000  to  about 
US$2,000 as a result of conflict and war. It has since grown steadily throughout 2006 and 
2014, to reach US$6,147 in 2014. 

Iraq's largely state-run economy is dominated by the oil sector, which provides more than 
90%  of  government  revenue.  The  oil  price  crisis  and  the  crisis  related  to  the  so-called 
Islamic  State,  combined  with  political  instability  in  2014,  impacted  private  sector 
consumption and investment, and limited government spending, particularly on investment 
projects. The oil sector has, however, continued to expand mostly thanks to the southern 
oil fields.  

Iraq also faces severe security challenges. As a result of the ongoing conflict with  the so-
called Islamic State, more than 17,000 civilians were killed in Iraq during 2014. The number 
of civilian casualties continues to climb in reaching almost 8000 civilians through the end 
of  June  2015.  It  is  estimated  that  about  134,300  civilians  were  killed  due  to  violence 
between 2003- 2014.  

The  population  remains  extremely  vulnerable  to  the  ongoing  security  problems  and 
reduction in oil prices. Poverty levels have increased and now stand at 22.5% in 2014. The 
number  of  people  living  below  the  poverty  line  increased  by  an  estimated 2.8  million  by 
end-2014.  The  displacement  of  Iraqis  and  Syrian  refugees  have  further  disrupted  local 
economic conditions.  

According  to  the  estimates  from  the  United  Nations  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees 
(UNHCR),  as  of  26  August  2014,  over  90%  of  the  215,000  Syrian  refugees  in  Iraq  were 
located  in  the  Kurdistan  Region  of  Iraq  (KRI).  The  Kurdistan  Regional  Government 
(KRG) is facing an economic and humanitarian crisis as a result of both the influx of Syrian 
refugees and the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) in 2014. According to a KRG – World 
Bank report, economic growth contracted 5 percentage points in the KRI, and poverty rate 
more than double increasing from 3.5 percent to 8.1 percent. 

106 http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/iraq/overview#2 ; 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html; 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/iraq; UNHCR, Comparative Analysis of Syrian Refugees Staying 
In and Outside Camps, KRI - September 2014; http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-
east-28147263; World Bank, COUNTRY PARTNERSHIP STRATEGY FOR THE REPUBLIC OF 
IRAQ FOR THE PERIOD FY13-FY16 (November 2012); 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/02/12/kurdistan-region-iraq-
stabilize-economy  

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2.2.  Outline of the humanitarian context 

2.2.1 Refugee population 

The  total  population  of  registered  Syrian  refugees  inside  Iraq  saw  rapid  growth  between 
August  2012  and  March  2013.  Thereafter,  numbers  continued  to  grow  with  varying 
rapidity,  decreasing slightly  from January 2014 to August 2014, and then  increasing again 
with an influx from Kobane starting August through to January 2015. 

Figure 1 – Evolution of Syrian refugees in Iraq (Jan. 2012 – Jan. 2015) 

Source: ADE on the basis of UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response, Inter-agency Information 
Sharing Portal, data extracted on 3 December 2015 

The dynamics of arrival resulted in a phased settlement process, with the creation first of 
the  Domuz  camp,  then  several  additional  smaller  camps  in  the  Erbil  and  Sulemanya 
governorates.  Figures  taken  at  the  end  of  November  2014  show  that,  of  the  230,000 
refugees  registered  at  the  time,  42%  (88,286)  were  registered  in  9  camps,  and  58% 
(144,201) were hosted in the community.107 The camps accommodating the refugees were 
spread  across  Domiz,  Dohuk,  Erbil  and  Sulaymaniyah.  The  demographic  breakdown 
varied  between  camp  and  non-camp  settings,  with  men  making  up  the  largest  share  of 
refugees  hosted  in  the  community,  and  women  making  up  the  largest  share  in  camp 
settings. 

107  3RP  (2015)  Regional  Refugee  and  Resilience  Plan  2015-2016.  Iraq  Country  Overview.  The  9  camps  are:  Domiz, 
Gawilan  and  Akre  in  Dohuk  Governorate,  Kawergosk,  Darashakran,  Basima  and  Qustapa  in  Erbil  Governorate, 
Arbat in Sulaymaniyah Governorate, and Al Obayidi in Anbar. 

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00,050,10,150,20,250,331/01/201231/01/201331/01/201431/01/2015MillionsRegisteredSyrianrefugeesin Iraq(Evaluation period: 2012-2014) 
 
 
 
                                                 
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The security and access context in Iraq was complicated following the fall of Mosul to the 
so-called  Islamic  State  in  June  2014  and  the  ongoing  conflict  in  Central  Iraq,  which  has 
displaced 2 million Iraqis. The influx of IDPs into the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) has 
increased  the  competition  for  resources  and  placed  increased  strain  on  the  host 
government when responding to the Syrian refugees’ needs.108 The so-called Islamic State’s 
takeover  of  the  Al  Obayidi  camp  in  Anbar  province  has  made  this  camp  inaccessible  to 
UNHCR  and  international  humanitarian  agencies,  although  some  assistance  is  still 
provided to the 1,900 refugees accommodated there by national NGOs. 

108   Ibid 

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2.2.2 Key Humanitarian issues 

The humanitarian and security situation in Iraq became more complicated over the course 
of  2014,  with  the  effects  of  the  conflict  with  the  so-called  Islamic  State  in  Central  Iraq 
resulting in the displacement of two million Iraqis. The large IDP population has impacted 
on the Syrian refugees’ ability to cope with their own displacement in several ways, as the 
struggle for resources such as accommodation and employment has intensified and severely 
stressed the capacity of the KRI Government and the international community. 109   

While  some  better-off  refugees,  especially  those  who  were  among  the  first  waves,  have 
managed  to  rent  houses  or  flats  of  acceptable  quality,  many  others  live  in  sub-standard 
housing.  Regarding  employment,  interviews  with  Syrian  refugees  in  Erbil  city  reveal  that 
they  are  for  the  most  part  unskilled  and  semi-skilled  workers.  The  reasons  for  this  vary 
from  a  lack  of  acknowledgment  of  Syrian  certificates  in  KRI  to  strategic  exploitation  by 
KRI entrepreneurs to keep the refugees in low-paid jobs and maintain job precariousness 
by enhancing competition with other job searchers (from the Philippines, Bangladesh and 
now the IDPs). The relative proportion of Syrian refugees in the construction labour force 
was approximately 25% in December 2013.110  

Whereas  the  level  of  vulnerability  of  the  refugee  population  has  not  increased  too 
dramatically,  as  indicated  by  the  recent  food  security  survey  (the  food  security  score 
remains high111), the needs assessments for camp and non-camp refuges, conducted in 2014, 
revealed that in  the future  stronger emphasis  needs to  be placed on self-reliance, income 
generation and institutional capacity. Major gaps were identified in several sectors including 
education, particularly for refugees living outside camps, where some 40% of children are 
out of school.112 Furthermore, the fact that many of the camps are overcrowded is also a 
concern  and  efforts  are  being  made  to  increase  their  size  in  order  to  reduce  population 
density and improve the living conditions of the refugees.  

Pressure on basic services due to the influx of IDPs is expected to  place further pressure 
on  living  conditions  in  already  saturated  communities  and  camps.  To  prevent  the  social 
conflict that may arise  from competition for jobs  and resources, an inclusive programme 
taking  a  holistic  community  approach,  including  both  the  impacted  communities  and 
refugees, needs to be implemented.113   

2.2.3. Response from the KRI Government  

The  KRI  government  has  provided  significant  support  to  the  Syrian  refugees  since  the 
crisis  began  in  2012.114 It  has,  for  instance,  paid  infrastructure  costs  for  camps  in  Erbil 
Governorate  (about US$ 750,000  annually for electricity  in all camps) and contributed  to 

109   3RP (2014) ‘Regional Refugee and Resilience plan 2015-2016 – Iraq’, pp 3 and 9 
110

  DRC, –Construction and Service--‐sector Labour Market Systems Mapping and Analysis, KRI, December 2014 

111   Interview with WFP 
112   3RP (2014) ‘Regional Refugee and Resilience plan 2015-2016 – Iraq’, pp 6 and 9 
113   3RP (2014) ‘Regional Refugee and Resilience plan 2015-2016 – Iraq’, pp 3 and 9 
114   3RP (2015) Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2015-2016. Iraq Country Overview 

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health and education costs for Syrian refugees. The government has also granted residency 
permits that include the right to work and freedom of movement.  

Border policy has impacted on refugee access to KRI over the evaluation period. As part of 
its initial very welcoming response, the Kurdish Regional Government facilitated residency 
permits granting the right to work and freedom of movement throughout the region. This 
was done in line with the progressive registration of all Syrian refugees by UNHCR.  The 
response was coordinated with relevant ministries (Ministry of Migration and Displacement, 
Ministry of Interior of the KRG, Ministry of Planning) and other governmental structures 
in Central Iraq and in the KRI, UN agencies, and international and national NGOs.115 In 
each  governorate  there  was  a  unit  handling  refugees,  for  instance  the  Erbil  Refugee 
Committee (ERC), attached to the Ministry of Interior.  

The year 2014 saw the closure of the Peshkharbour border crossing and irregular admission 
and entry restrictions have been observed. But likewise the opening of a new entry point at 
Ibrahim Khalid (Zakho district) during the period of the so-called Islamic State attacks on 
the Kobane district allowed the entrance of 13,000 refugees into KRI over a period of two 
weeks in 2014. 

The arrest and detention of refugees for irregular entry or illegal movement has continued, 
and the Government of Iraq has increasingly linked their concern for border violations to 
their concern for terrorist activities inside of Iraq.116 

2.2.4 Response from the international community 

The  contribution  of  donors  over  2012-2014  amounted  to  US$482  million,  with  a 
significant increase between 2012 and 2013 following the refugee influx increase. The USA 
has been the main donor, providing almost one-third of contributions, followed by ECHO 
(12%) and two EU Member States, namely Germany (9%) and the UK (8%). The USA is 
also the largest humanitarian donor, followed by Europe (ECHO), Germany, the UK and 
Kuwait. A few other EU Member States have also contributed to the response (Denmark, 
France). 

115   Ibid, p9 
116   3RP (2015) Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2015-2016. Iraq Country Overview 

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Figure 2 – Donor contribution in Iraq  per year 2012-2014 (US$ million) 

. 
Source: Evaluation Inventory (based on FTS extraction) 

Almost  90%  of  donor  contributions  in  Iraq  were  dedicated  to  multi-sector  support. 
Coordination, shelter and NFI items and food together accounted for 5% of the support. 
Finally, support for water and sanitation, protection, education and health represented 3% 
of donor support, the remaining being support in unspecified sectors. 

Figure 3 –  Contribution by donors in Iraq (US$ million) 

Source: Evaluation Inventory (based on FTS extraction) 

Until the end of 2014, assistance to Syrian refugees was guided by the Refugee Response 
Plan  (RRP6),  which  prioritized  life-saving  or  prevention  of  immediate  risk  of  harm  and 
prevention  of  conditions  leading  to  increased  vulnerability.  There  is  now  a  trend  in  the 
international  community’s  understanding  of  the  crisis  away  from  a  classic  humanitarian 
crisis  towards  a  protracted  crisis  requiring  long-term  involvement  in  the  care  and 
maintenance of the refugee camps, enhanced support for the livelihoods of refugees, and 
strong and consistent support for existing development structures that will strengthen the 
absorption  capacity  of  the  KRI  society  and  economy.  Therefore,  the  new  Refugee 

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Source: ADE050100150200250300Iraq: contributions by yearTotal committed: US$ 482m2223%20122013201414245(US$ millions)Source: ADE020406080100120140160Iraq: contributions by donor15031%12%3%3%3%3%5%6%8%9%5844382m2416141313USAECHOGermanyUKKuwaitWFPCanadaJapanDenmarkCERFTotal committed: US$ 482m(US$ millions) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Response and Resilience Plan (3RP) for 2015-16 also incorporates a resilience component. 
The objective of this component is to reduce the dependence on aid by planning long-term 
responses,  including  increased  attention  on  host  communities  impacted  by  the  refugees’ 
presence. 117  Of  the  US$426  million  requested  in  the  3RP,  US$108  million  is  for  the 
resilience component.118 

Figure 4 – Donors’ contribution in Iraq by sector 2012-2014 (US$ million) 

Source: Evaluation Inventory (based on FTS extraction) 

117   3RP (2015) ‘Information Kit Syrian Refugees No 11 - Iraq: Humanitarian Inter-Agency Interventions’, p2 
118   UNHCR and UNDP (2015) ‘3RP Update – Issue 4, p2   

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Source: ADEShelter& NFIs2% (US$ 7.3m) Unspecified6% (US$ 28.0m) Coordination 2% (US$ 10.4m) Food 1% (US$ 5.3m) Multi-sector(US$ 418.0m) Water/Sanitation1% (US$ 5.2m) Protection 1% (US$ 4.7m) Education 1% (US$ 2.6m) Health0% (US$ 0.4m) Iraq: contributions by sector87%Total committed: US$ 482m 
 
                                                 
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3.  Overview of the ECHO approach in the country  

3.1.  Support to refugee camps 

ECHO’s  camp-based  operations  are  implemented  through  international  agencies  such  as 
UNHCR  (multi-sector,  protection,  coordination),  WFP  (food  assistance),  UNICEF 
(WASH interventions), NRC (shelter), and Medical Corp (health).  

Food assistance, through the support of the WFP emergency food assistance scheme, was 
launched  in  response  to  an  official  request  from  the  Kurdish  authorities  in  Iraq  and  the 
Ministry  of  Displacement  and  Migration.  Assistance  was  provided  through  vouchers 
(US$31 per person per month) and in-kind food baskets as well as emergency school meals. 
Food assistance is provided in the camps until incomes or addition to the PDS safety-net 
are assured.119  

ECHO has been active in WASH interventions and support to coordination in the sector. 
The provision of water and sanitation services to refugee camps in Iraq is  essential, given 
the  dry  environment.  All  camps,  regardless  of  size,  have  remained  critically  overcrowded 
(Dormiz  hosting  over  45  000  persons  whereas  it  was  originally  built  for  20 000).  The 
congestion  in  the  camps  has  resulted  in  ad  hoc  shelter  with  no  connection  to  the  water 
network.120 Improvements  in  water  and  sanitation  were  being  implemented  in  Queshtapa 
camp at the time of the mission, in agreement with the municipal council as part of their 
“urban master plan”.  However, a clear strategy from the authorities as to the future of the 
new  camps  and  the  meeting  of  the  refugees’  most  basic  needs  has  yet  to  be  elaborated 
upon.121 

3.2.  Support for non-camp urban refugees122  

ECHO has supported key actors such as DRC or NRC in reaching non–camp refugees and 
ensuring  adequate  support  to  the  most  vulnerable.  ECHO’s  approach  to  non-camp 
refugees has consisted, through support to implementing partners, of:  

  assistance to the most vulnerable households with shelter upgrades through vouchers ; 
 
  winterization assistance to vulnerable Syrian refugees and host communities.  

information outreach ; 

Shelter is a primary concern for out-of-camp refugees, both in terms of high rental costs 
relative  to  available  income  streams  and  of  the  suitability  of  housing  options.  Needs 
assessments  among  refugees  also  revealed  problems  with  access  to  employment  and 
livelihood.  The  government  has  been  hesitant  to  facilitate  assistance,  particularly  to 
refugees in Erbil city (as compared to Dohuk or Sulaimaniyah).  

There  is  also  an  information  gap  among  urban  refugees  regarding  existing  and  available 
services and service providers. Many of them are spread through peri-urban areas around 
the main cities with limited access to aid agencies as they are less visible and more difficult 

119   ECHO (2013) ‘Project 2013/00805 eSingle form’ 
120   ECHO (2014) ‘Humanitarian Implementation Plan ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/9100’, p10 
121   ECHO (2014) ‘Humanitarian Implementation Plan ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/9100’, p20 
122   ECHO (2015) ‘Project 2014/00314 Fichop’: ECHO (2015) ‘Project 2014/00293 Fichop’ 

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to  reach.  UNHCR  is  also  involved  in  improving  outreach  to  non-camp  refugees  and 
ensuring adequate support to the most vulnerable.  

3.3. 

 Overview of funding and activities undertaken in the country 

ECHO has provided €27.3 million to the response inside KRI over the evaluation period. 
This represent approximately 4% of the overall Syrian response. 

Around 70% of ECHO’s support to Syrian refugees in Iraq over 2012-2014 covered shelter 
(44%) and food assistance (27%). Water and sanitation (16%), multi-sector support (13%), 
and protection (1%) together represented the remaining 30% of ECHO’s funding over the 
evaluation period. 

ECHO funds were channelled through a limited range of implementing partners, the main 
ones being UN agencies and the WFP. 

Figure 5  – Snapshot of ECHO’s response in Iraq 2012-2014 

Source: Evaluation Inventory (based on FTS extraction)

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June 2016 

Annex III / Page 178 

ECHO fundingper sector-Iraq44%27%16%13%Shelter(€12m)Food(€7.3m)Water/Sanitation(€4.5m)Multi-sector(€3.5m)Protection(€0.1m)Total:€27.3mECHO implementingpartners-Iraq127.34.5210.50.102468101214UNHCRWFPUNICEFNRCMERCYCORPSIMCIRC-UK(€m)Total:€27.3mSource: ADE Evaluation Inventory, 2015 
 
 
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4.  Key findings with respect to the Evaluation Questions 

(EQs)  

EQ 1 – Good Humanitarian Donorship 

JC 1.1 ECHO deployed specific decisions and actions to ensure consistency with 
the 23 principles in the Syrian crisis response 

  Knowledge of the GHDI principles among the ECHO TA and ECHO partners in 
the  field  is  in  most  cases  relatively  limited  and  restricted  to  the  first  principles 
(humanitarian principles).  

  No specific mechanisms are in place to ensure consistency with the 23 principles. 
However, ECHO’s own procedures facilitate the consistency with certain principles 
(humanitarian principles based on assessed needs, engagement and participation of 
affected populations.)  

JC 1.2 There are specific examples of where the Syrian response was (or was not) in 
line with the 23 principles 

  ECHO  tries  to  promote  appropriate  needs  assessments  to  facilitate  resource 
allocation according to need (as per principle 5): two important Multi-Sector Needs 
Assessments  were  completed  during  April  and  May  2014,  one  covering  the  KRI 
camp  resident  population  and  the  other  the  non-camp  refugees. 123  These 
assessments  provided  concrete  evidence  of  the  areas  of  assistance  in  need  of 
further  attention  and  were  to  be  complemented  by  a  second  round  of  similar 
assessments in the latter part of the year. An inter-sector workshop was planned for 
August 2014, when the results of these assessments were due to be considered with 
a view to redesigning programmatic activities to address needs as shown. Together, 
these assessments formed the foundation for 2015 planning. 

  ECHO paid attention to the precision of the description of activities and indicators 
as well  as to  the  still  very short timeframe  of funding from a few months to one 
year,  partly  contradicting  the  engagement  of  Principle  13  “the  possibility  of 
reducing,  or  enhancing  the  flexibility  of,  earmarking,  and  of  introducing  longer-
term funding arrangements”. 

  The  fact  that  ECHO  does  not  contribute  directly  to  UN,  Red  Cross  or  National 
Appeals  is  not  in  line  with  Principle  14  but  is  compatible  with  Principle  6 
(allocation based on needs assessed). Yet ECHO supports projects which are in line 
with  these  appeals  but  not  necessary  through  the  appealing  agency  (UNHCR, 
OCHA). 

  ECHO  is  perceived  not  to  be  in  line  with  the  principle  aimed  at  limiting 
earmarking, which is supposed to facilitate flexibility; partners such as UN agencies 
complained about this. 

  Most  agencies  complain  about  ECHO’s  lack  of  adhesion  to  Principle  23  on 
standardized  reporting.  ECHO’s  single  form  is  seen  by  other  donors  as  too 
complicated and not user-friendly. 

123   Project 2014/00793 eSingle Form: 

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EQ 2 – Consultation of local and regional communities 

JC 2.1. ECHO or its partners deployed specific measures for involving local and 
regional communities  

As a donor, ECHO does not itself deploy specific measures for involving local or regional 
communities.  However  ECHO  expects  its  partners  to  be  able  to  demonstrate  how  they 
engage  with  local  communities  in  their  operations.  While  most  single  forms  make  clear 
reference  to  this  exigency,  the  reality  in  the  field  can  be  less  evident.  In  many  instances, 
however, decisions on site locations and site planning have been made by local authorities. 

JC 2.2. ECHO and/or partner monitoring mechanisms took account of beneficiary 
views and provided appropriate feedback loops to funding officers 
Consultations  on  project  planning  are  supposed  to  be  conducted  with  refugee  leaders.124 
Regular feedback is due to be sought from the camp management on services provided to 
ensure  that  all  needs  are  tackled  and  that  services  are  adjusted  as  needed.  During  the 
mission, complaint mechanisms were observed during NFI distributions by DRC and seem 
to function  correctly.  However, the real involvement of refugees in  the operations is less 
obvious. Many are trying to cope with the aid they have received and needs that have not 
been  covered  despite  affirmations  that  beneficiaries  will  be  involved  in  all  stages  of  the 
action, from design to implementation.125 As part of the assessments conducted to prepare 
proposals, all NGO and ECHO partners are supposed to seek information from refugees 
on the  nature  of their  needs, as well as feedback on  initial implementation through  post-
distribution  monitoring.  This  happens  unevenly  despite  commendable  efforts  by  ECHO 
partners.  Most  NGOs  use  the  information  gathered  to  tailor  future  phases  of  the 
programme,  to  ensure  that  the  main  needs  of  the  refugees  continue  to  be  met.  Yet,  this 
also  means  that  readjustments  of  the  programme  might  be  needed,  requiring  (time-
consuming) amendments with ECHO, which may reduce the incentive to regularly adapt 
programmes in light of feedback received. 

EQ3  –  To  what  extent  have  the  design  and  implementation  of  ECHO-funded 
interventions  taken  into  account  the  needs  of  the  most  vulnerable  people  in  the 
region, in particular women, children, elderly and disabled people? 

JC 3.1 ECHO deployed specific measures/a specific approach/strategy to make 
sure ECHO-funded interventions  took into account the needs  of the most 
vulnerable people in the region both at design and implementation stages 

The preparation of the HIP comprised a thorough review of the humanitarian situation in 
the  affected  area.  After  a  year,  during  which  the  needs  of  Syrian  refugees  in  Iraq  were 
covered under the Syria Regional HIP, they finally ended up in the framework of the Iraq 
HIP, which was justified by the overwhelming weight of the IDP crisis. 

JC 3.2 The design of ECHO-funded interventions reflects the needs of the most 
vulnerable people well 

Most projects seen or discussed in the field have been based on a certain prioritization of 
the needs of the most vulnerable. For instance, at the project outset a partner had to refine 

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the vulnerability criteria to ensure alignment with the relevant UNHCR sector guidelines.126 
The core criterion is economic vulnerability, including larger families, families with limited 
income  generation  opportunities,  vulnerable  women-headed  households,  and  families 
supporting a disabled or ill person. ECHO’s emphasis on the importance of targeting the 
most vulnerable as part of the proposed action encouraged its partners to focus on needs 
and  not  on  status-related  or  protection-related vulnerability  as  laid  down in  the  UNHCR 
sector guidelines.   

JC 3.3 ECHO took specific measures to ensure that during implementation the 
needs of the most vulnerable people were taken into account 

ECHO’s insistence on targeting is permanent, especially at a time of resource constraints. 

EQ  4  –  To  what  extent  has  the  ECHO  intervention  taken  account  of  the  host 
populations,  and  what  concrete  measures  have  been  taken  to  address  their  needs 
and interests? 

JC 4.1. : ECHO applied a specific approach/strategy to make sure that the needs 
and interests of host populations were taken into account 

KRI is not a poor area and the regional institutions have both the means and the will to 
cater for their population. However, with the end of the “real estate bubble” and the fall in 
oil prices, there may be a need for alternative funding to revitalize the local economy and 
make life easier for host populations and refugees alike. 

JC 4.2. : ECHO took specific measures to address the needs and interests of host 
populations 

At  this  stage,  ECHO  believes  that  given  the  economic  situation  of  KRI  and  despite  the 
consumer price increases that affect the host population, nothing meaningful can be done 
using already scarce humanitarian funding. The main priorities are to attract development 
funds and boost the private sector. 

JC 4.3. : The measures achieved their objectives 

The strategy in the current context is still in its infancy. The lessons from the past underline 
the importance of EU-Iraq bilateral cooperation agreements. The direction taken in the EU 
2011-2013 Country Strategy Paper for Iraq indicated that the priorities for the EU in Iraq 
are  basic  services  and  good  governance  and  it  remains  to  be  seen  how  this  could  be 
articulated with ECHO humanitarian objectives in KRI. 

EQ  5  –  To  what  extent  have  ECHO  and  its  partners  been  successful  in  adapting 
their approach and addressing gaps to the shifting needs of the region, as the crisis 
has  evolved?  B)  Considering that project activities of partners  in many cases  have 
been  carried  over  from  one  funding  cycle  to  the  next,  to  what  extent  have  the 
partners  been  revising  their  approach  –  being  innovative  –  to  better  address  the 
needs? C) What modifications to approaches are needed for the future? 

JC 5.1 ECHO and its partners had a strategy to adapt their approach to the shifting 
needs of the region 

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Needs  assessments  have  been  widely  used  by  ECHO  and  its  partners  to  adapt  their 
programmes to shifting contexts (cf. JC 1.2). 
Actors  met  during  the  mission  systematically  referred  to  the  following  elements  as  being 
the strategy to adapt approaches to shifting needs: 
  Permanent dialogue with ECHO’s team in the field 
  Rapidity in the exchange of letters; 
  Capacity to invest HR in the cumbersome revision of the e-single-form; 
  Capacity to advance money; 
  Exploration of other donors in case it takes too long for DG ECHO internal process 
(from the field TA to Syrian coordination based in Amman and then to Brussels). 

JC 5.2 ECHO and its partners have revised their approaches/interventions so as to 
better address the shifting needs of the region 

The box below describes how humanitarian stakeholders adapted to the sudden increase of 
Syrian refugees in KRI from August 2013.  

Influx of refugees in KRI  

On the 5th September 2013 an estimated 56,000 Syrians arrived in the  region through the border 
crossing of Peshkabur and Sahela. The new arrivals added to the already existing 149,258 (UNHCR, 
13th  Aug)  refugees  settled  in  the  Kurdistan Region’s  Domiz  camp  and  among host  communities. 
The  number  of  Syrian  refugees  seeking  refuge  in  KRG  continued  to  grow  on  a  daily  basis,  with 
more  than  500  crossing  the  border  every  day.    The  sudden  influx  of  Syrians  was  stretching  the 
response capacity of the government, local communities and other humanitarian stakeholders.  

Being already overcrowded, the only existing and operational refugee camp in the Kurdistan Region 
of Iraq, Domiz camp, could not host any further refugees. The ongoing camp development in Dara 
Shakran, Erbil Governorate (planned capacity: 10,000 with discussion of an extension to 20,000), 
was  not  due  to  be  completed  until  September  and  was  initially  set  up  as  a  settlement  option  for 
vulnerable  refugees  currently  residing  in  host  communities.  Additional  camps,  designed  to  host 
large  refugee  populations,  were  developed  (Barika  in  Sulemanya  and  Gawilan  in  Ninewa)  and 
opened in the last quarter of 2013.  

Prior to the ongoing influx, local communities already hosted over 105,000 refugees, which placed a 
significant burden on their resources. On arrival in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, refugees had to 
settle in a transitional area adjacent to the border, where they were granted access to basic facilities 
set up by the authorities and humanitarian stakeholders.  

On a daily basis, new arrivals were then quickly relocated to temporary settlement sites (initially to 
communal buildings such as schools and mosques; then, when they were ready, to camps) in Erbil, 
Sulemanya, and Ninewa governorates through a shuttle system operated by KRG authorities with 
support from IOM. Given its already high refugee concentration, no new arrivals could be settled 
in  Dohuk  Governorate.  In total,  four sites  in  Erbil,  two  in  Ninewa,  and  four  in  Sulimanya,  were 
established. 
REACH Situational Report, September 5th 2013 

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JC 5.3 In the case of project activities that have been carried over from one funding 
cycle to the next, ECHO partners adapted their approaches/interventions to the 
changed needs. 

JC 5.4 When adapting their approaches to changing needs, ECHO’s partners 
introduced specific innovations 

As  the  crisis  entered  a  protracted  cycle,  there  were  ongoing  adaptations  in  the  shelter 
sector, where NGOs such as NRC were moving from a “cash for limited improvement of 
living  conditions”  approach  to  a  more  sophisticated  support  for  the  improvement  of 
shelter  and  securing  land  tenure.  This  new  approach  (tested  in  Jordan),  consisted  in  the 
establishment of a contract between refugees, landlords, municipalities and NGOs for the 
rehabilitation  of  flats  or  houses,  with  ECHO-supported  partners  providing  the  landlords 
with financial support (on the basis of a Bill of Quantity) in exchange for a rent freeze or 
free rent for a given period of time. Municipalities were not too keen to see cheap lodging 
capacity being developed for Syrian refugees. 

JC 5.5 Implications for ECHO (and partner) approaches relative to expected shifts 
in beneficiary needs 

For  the  ECHO  partner  system,  the  implication  of  trying  to  adjust  to  shifting  needs  is 
additional  work  and  exchanges  between  the  field  (KRI),  Amman  (regional  coordination 
and  RSO),  Brussels  and  the  partners’  HQs.  While  the  obligation  to  justify  changes  with 
evidence  is  seen  by  all  as  an  essential  prerequisite,  updating  the  e-single-form  is  seen  as 
time-consuming,  especially  when  fast-changing  circumstances  call  for  several,  sometimes 
overlapping  e-single-form  modifications.  If  the  timelines  for  exchange  of  information  at 
field  level  are  often  straightforward  (partners  can  easily  call  or  come  to  the  ECHO  TA 
office  in  Erbil,  the  subsequent  steps  of  consultation  and  validation  with  upper  levels 
(regional, HQ) are often seen as relatively slow and sometimes frustrating, as the position 
of the TA and HQ can differ. 

EQ 6 – EU added value 

JC 6.1 ECHO’s approach to ensure added value 

ECHO’s added  value  is seen as embedded  in its TAs in the field and their  dedication to 
field monitoring and dialogue with their partners. 

JC 6.2 ECHO was recognized as providing specific types of added value 

The  advisory  role  of  ECHO’s  TAs  is  widely  acknowledged.  However,  people  sometimes 
complain  of the “intrusiveness”  it can cause  when they  try to influence agencies in some 
topical discussion or in terms of geographical orientation. 

EQ 7 – Urban settings 

JC 7.1 ECHO’s approach to embed urban issues 

ECHO does not have a special policy on urban issues. It is, however, sensitive to the fact 
that urban contexts are full of threats and opportunities and that vulnerabilities have to be 
analysed in a specific manner. 

JC 7.2 ECHO identified and took account of the major challenges that exist in 
urban settings 

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Assessments conducted indicate that shelter is a primary concern for out-of-camp refugees, 
both in terms of high rental costs relative to available income streams and of the suitability 
of  housing  options.  ECHO’s  partners  have  proposed  shelter  NFI  assistance  (through 
vouchers)  to  help  refugees  improve  their  shelter  condition  as  the  most  appropriate 
response. 127  They  have  developed  a  fully-fledged  programme  to  promote  the  urban 
integration  of  refugees  by  helping  them,  through  a  cash  system,  to  undertake  a  basic 
rehabilitation of equipment and facilities where they have settled. 
The  July  2013  assessment 128 clearly  identified  that  the  need  both  for  shelter  and  for  a 
reliable  source  of  income  are  priorities  for  households.  An  ECHO  partner’s  initial  plans 
focused  on  physically  upgrading  refugees'  current  shelters.  However,  more  in-depth 
investigation  during  the  January  assessment  showed  that  this  was  not  feasible,  primarily 
because  many  houses  were  illegally  built  or  rented,  or  in  the  worst  cases  only  partially 
constructed. Many refugees mentioned cash flow problems due to their irregular work or 
unemployment and the stress this places on households. Based on this information, shelter 
NFI  assistance  (through  vouchers)  to  help  refugees  improve  their  shelter  condition  was 
identified as the most appropriate response. 

JC 7.3 ECHO tackled urban challenges and coordinated with local authorities, 
urban services and institutions in line with good practice  

Special  institutions  have  been  set  up  by  the  KRI  Authorities  to  address  refugee-related 

issues: 

  Erbil Refugee Council (ERC) for the Erbil area,  
  Dohuk Refugee Support Association (DRSA) for the Dohuk area, 
  Suleymania Refugee Association (SRA) for the Sulemaniya area. 

Agencies  consult  these  institutions.  However,  there  is  less  consultation  with  municipal 
institutions. ECHO itself has limited contact with authorities at governorate level and even 
less  at  municipal  levels.  Its  partners  often  cite  corruption  and  inefficiency  as  reasons  for 
this limited engagement. 

EQ8  –  (Protection):  How  and  to  what  extent  has  Protection  been  appropriately 
taken into account and implemented in ECHO-funded projects? 

JC 8.1. ECHO and its partner agencies employed a specific approach to embedding 
protection within ECHO-funded projects in response to the Syrian crisis 

Although  many  e-single-forms  mentioned  that  efforts  will  be  made  to  embed  and 
mainstream protection in project implementation, evidence of this is infrequent and often 
related to issues such as lighting streets in camps and around latrines, or ensuring that there 
will be “women houses and child-friendly spaces in the camps”.  

JC 8.2. The design of ECHO-funded projects identified the major threats that exist 
to the physical and psychological security of humanitarian aid beneficiaries 

The main issues of protection in the area are linked to the application of refugee law and 
are  implemented  by  UNHCR  and  some  of  its  closest  partners  (for  instance  the  NGO 
COPIL).  Child  protection  and  to  a  lesser  degree  SGBV  are  also  seen  as  key  issues.  It 
seems,  however,  very  difficult  to  differentiate  issues  specifically  linked  to  the  refugee 

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situation  from  those  more  embedded  in  the  local  culture  (addressing  child  and  women 
protection in local cultures requires the presence of anthropologists and social scientists to 
identify  the  key  issues  and  cannot  be  easily  addressed  under  short-term  humanitarian 
funding). 

JC  8.3.  ECHO-funded  project  designs  disambiguated  protection  needs  per 
population  segment  and  location,  including  identifying  specific  threats  to 
vulnerable groups. 

Many  e-single-forms  prepared  at  proposal  level  and  revised  at  the  interim  and  final 
reporting  stages  attempt  to  present  data  disaggregation.  This  remains  uneven  between 
project documents. The initial assessments on which proposals are made do not necessary 
fully present the specific threats to vulnerable people, especially when the NGO was not 
present in the areas before the crisis and has little knowledge and few networks in the area 
for proper identification of these issues. 

EQ 9 – In cases when Remote Management was being used, to what extent did it 
follow  existing  guidance  documents  and  good  practice,  and  how  successful  was 
it?129 

Assistance to camp and non-camp refugees in Erbil Governorate does not require remote 
management. Most people working in Dormiz or Sulemanya Governorates also have direct 
access to the populations they assist. Remote management takes place only for the Allobay 
refugee camp for Syrian refugees, which is managed by UNHCR.  

EQ10 – Cash and vouchers 

JC 10.1 The ECHO strategy for Syria considered the appropriate use of a range of 
transfer modalities 

There is a perception among many actors that there is a systematic and relatively dogmatic 
push by ECHO for “cash only” solutions. 

JC 10.2 The appraisal of ECHO actions took account of an appropriate analysis of 
the context 

ECHO  partners  perceive  ECHO  as  strongly  pushing  for  unconditional  cash  from  an 
ideological  standpoint  not  fully  backed  up  by  micro-economic  and  sociological  analysis. 
Some  have  already  mentioned  that  if  ECHO  makes  funding  conditional  on  a  "UCT 
only” strategy, they might decide not to request money from ECHO.  

JC 10.3 ECHO-funded cash and voucher operations have been effective in the 
Syrian context 

Experience is, however, being acquired through pilot projects and through growing use of 
iris scan and card systems. 

EQ 11 – Is the size of the budget allocated by ECHO to the region appropriate and 
proportionate  to what  the actions set out  to achieve? Could the same  results  have 
been achieved with less funding? 

JC 11.1. / JC 11.2. The ECHO budget allocation to respond to the Syrian crisis was 
appropriate and proportionate 

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The  decreasing  level  of  humanitarian  resources  affecting  the  overall  Syrian  response  has 
had  a  significant  impact  in  KRI,  taking  into  account  the  eruption  of  the  internal 
displacement crisis from the start of 2014, coupled with the influx of Syrian arrivals from 
Kobane  in  the  last  quarter  of  2014.  Subsequently,  overcrowding  and  competition  for 
humanitarian resources, service provision and jobs have risen sharply for refugees living in 
camps, while ECHO has had to press further for tight targeting.  

JC 11.3. ECHO calibrated its objectives to the available funding 

Calibrating  the  response  objectives  to  the  available  resources  is  done  through  several 
mechanisms including: 
 
  allocating resources through two windows: HIP funding early in the year and a “top-
up” by mid year; this system does not facilitate proactive planning by the partners. 

imposing further targeting of NGOs; 

JC 11.4. ECHO-funded activities were cost-effective 

EQ  12  –  Were  appropriate  monitoring  systems  in  place  to  support  sound 
management of ECHO operations? 

JC 12.1. ECHO undertook specific actions/commitments to ensure that the quality 
and coverage of its monitoring mechanisms were conducive to support sound 
management of ECHO-funded operations 

ECHO supports the Cash Working Group to improve the quality of cash transfer through 
more dynamic exchanges between actors. 

JC 12.2. ECHO adopted a specific approach to ensure that monitoring mechanisms 
were tailored to the specific needs of remote management 

This is not an issue in KRI. 

JC.12.3. ECHO partners implemented operations monitoring and ensured data and 
findings were available for ECHO’s use in a timely manner 

There  are  three  main  contractual  stages  when  partners  have  to  ensure  that  data  and 
findings are made available to ECHO: 
  at the proposal stage, as part of the annex to the e-single-form; 
  at the interim report stage; 
  at the final report stage (especially when an external evaluation has been provided for 

and included in the budget). 

Information  also  has  to  be  made  available  when  ECHO  TAs  carry  out  monitoring 
missions. 

The e-single-form requires that a monitoring system is put in place and activated.  Given 
the  importance  of  such  data  for  reporting,  ECHO  partners  ensure  that  monitoring 
provides the required information related to activities.  

EQ 13 – What has been the partners’ experience of working in consortia as well as 
with a multi-country approach? 

JC 13.1. ECHO undertook specific actions/commitments to ensure consortium and 
multi-country operations made efficient use of available resources 

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Only  one  new  consortium  is  currently  being  supported.  Its  objective  is  to  channel  more 
resources through  the  partners involved in a coordinated manner by Unconditional Cash 
Transfer. It is the result of a discussion between ECHO and its possible partners, including 
Mercy Corps which is a key actor in the area. 

JC 13.2.  ECHO partners provided evidence that consortium and multi-country 
arrangements reduced coverage gaps and duplication between countries and 
partner organisations 

At  this  stage,  the  objective  of  the  Cash  consortium  is  more  about  the  coherence  of  the 
approach (indicators, targeting, etc.) than about coverage or gap avoidance. 

EQ 14 –  ECHO successfulness to coordinate operations with other main actors 

JC 14.1 Actions undertaken to enhance coordination 

The participation of all ECHO partners in coordination mechanisms is seen as compulsory 
and  ECHO  has  invested  significant  amounts  of  money  to  make  coordination  work.  In 
UNHCR camps, bi-weekly technical or sectoral meetings take place at camp level. ECHO 
TAs  keep  overall  coordination  under  scrutiny  as  it  supports  UNHCR’s  coordination 
activities130 for both camp and out-of-camp refugees. 

The  involvement  of  technical  staff  from  UNHCR  partners  is  required  in  coordination  at 
camp  level.  NGO  coordination  bodies  takes  care  of  coordination  for  the  “non-camp 
refugees”.  Reporting  on  coordination  is  uneven  between  ECHO  partners.  One  of  them, 
for  instance,  was  not  in  a  position  to  answer  the  question  regarding  the  role  of  the 
Coordinator  and  Information  Manager  that  ECHO  has  been  paying  for  during  the 
implementation of this action. 

JC 14.2 ECHO identified and took account of main actors’ activities 

With  the  UNHCR  databases,  the  work  done  with  OCHA,  and  its  own  participation  in 
various  coordination  mechanisms,  the  ECHO  team  in  Erbil  is  aware  of  the  various 
activities planned or implemented by different actors. However, the ECHO team does not 
have enough resources to be as involved as they would like to be. 

JC 14.3 ECHO actions sought to enhance synergies and reduce the duplication of 
effort, gaps or resource conflicts 

  ECHO  supports  a  cash  working  group  to  facilitate  coordination  and  the  search  for 

synergy in exchanges between agencies involved in cash transfer activities. 

  ECHO contributed to the establishment of a regular coordination mechanism with its 
Implementing  Partners  (IPs)  and  UNHCR 131  as  part  of  the  Domiz  humanitarian 
response. All WASH partners joined the Domiz WASH Coordination Meetings, as well 
as  ad hoc  working  groups  to  tackle  specific  issues  based  on  need.  The  coordination 
mechanisms  in  place  have  led  to  a  clearer  definition  of  responsibilities  and  lines  of 
funding for the Implementing Partners.  

JC 14.4 ECHO’s actions demonstrated synergies and no duplication of effort, gaps 
or resource conflicts are apparent 

Few  donors  are  present.  Donor  coordination  to  avoid  gaps  and  duplication  takes  place 
either in Erbil, among the small group of donors with permanent presence in KRI, or in 

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Baghdad.  For  donors  with  no  presence  in  Iraq,  coordination  takes  place  when  donors’ 
delegations come to KGI. 

EQ15 – Mainstreaming of LRRD 

JC 15.1 ECHO coordinated with EC development actors (DG DEVCO, EEAS, and 
EU MS) from the earliest phases of the crisis response 

Coordination within the EU Delegation is seen from Kurdistan as relatively theoretical, as 
the  Delegation  is  in  Baghdad  while  the  DCI  team  in  charge  of  the  Iraq  programmes  is 
located in Amman, and thus far from the field.  

JC 15.2 ECHO deployed the various instruments available to implement stability 
measures in a coherent and complementary fashion with the EU toolbox 

Most partners and interviewees stressed their difficulty understanding the EU set-up, with 
ECHO  in  Erbil,  the  Delegation  in  Baghdad  and  DCI  in  Amman.  Unclear  messages 
regarding the MADAD trust fund add further confusion. 

JC 15.3 ECHO-funded actions have been based on a strong context analysis 

ECHO  TAs  in  Erbil  use  all  available  sources  of  information  to  develop  and  strengthen 
their  own  analysis  and  be  better  equipped  to  base  their  decisions  on  a  strong  context 
analysis. The complexity of the situation in Kurdistan has resulted in a situation in which 
the area covered by HIPs has varied, from one HIP only for Syrian refugees (coordinated 
at the Syria coordination unit) and one for Iraq (mainly for IDP), to one HIP for Iraq with 
two chapters, one for Syrian refugees and one for the Iraq IDP crisis.  

JC 15.4 ECHO-funded projects have been framed in the context of longer-term 
requirements of reconstruction and development 

In  the  context  of  the  current  protracted  crisis  and  taking  in  account  current  budgetary 
restriction, ECHO is trying to refocus its project portfolio on life-saving activities. At the 
same  time,  it  recognizes  that  building  up  the  resilience  of  refugees  and  their  host 
communities is essential for reducing dependency. In the EU Delegation in Baghdad and in 
Brussels, ECHO is leading discussions on how stronger emphasis on job opportunities and 
livelihoods  will  be  essential  for  providing  a  longer-term  basis  for  downscaling  external 
support.   

EQ16 – Success in terms of LRRD 

JC 16.1 ECHO-funded operations have been implemented through rapid decision-
making processes and flexible instruments 

ECHO’s  agility  results  from  its  definition  of  different  types  of  funding  window,  ranging 
from advanced planning with the HIP to emergency decisions on rapid response to specific 
emergencies (here more linked to events in Iraq.) For more on rapid decision-making and 
adaptability, see EQ5 on flexibility 

JC 16.2 ECHO provided a coordinated response strategy through its actions 

During a large part of the period under review, the presence of ECHO in KRI was largely 
insufficient,  which  means  that  coordination  capacity  was  extremely  limited.  This  has 
improved  significantly  over  the  last  18  months  with  the  opening  of  the  ECHO  office  in 
Erbil, which has allowed ECHO not only to monitor funded projects much better, but also 
to be present on all coordination fronts.  

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JC 16.3 ECHO engaged with a range of locally important actors through its actions 

In KRI, the number of actors involved with humanitarian aid is limited. UN agencies (such 
as UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, UNDP, UNFPA, etc.) are all in the UN compound as part of 
the  UN  Integrated  Mission  in  Iraq  (UNAMI)  and  were  coordinated  by  its  humanitarian 
branch,  the  Integrated  Coordination  Office  for  Humanitarian  and  Development  Affairs 
(ICODHA),  recently  replaced  by  an  OCHA  office.  INGOs  are  present  in  KRI,  with  a 
surge following the  2014 Syrian  influx,  but their capacity is extremely stretched owing  to 
the  Iraq  IDP  crisis.  National  authorities  see  ECHO  as  a  key  partner,  although  not  all  of 
them understand how it functions or the difference between the EU Delegation’s role and 
that of ECHO. 

JC 16.4 ECHO-funded interventions experienced a smooth and timely phase-out, 
thereby avoiding “grey zones” in international assistance 
DRC, 132  supported  by  UNHCR  and  UNDP,  is  currently  implementing  a  livelihood 
programme with two components: 
 
 

support to business development in camps (through business grants and training); 
job placement within host communities. 

The agencies are examining perspectives on how to support the sustainability of livelihoods 
for the target population, especially Syrian refugees. 

JC16.5 ECHO-funded actions encouraged “cross-learning” of humanitarian and 
development experiences 

At this stage, there are extremely limited results as the office managing the DCI for Iraq are 
in Amman and come only occasionally to Erbil.  

EQ17–  (Security)  To  what  extent  have  the  ECHO-funded  projects  taken  into 
account  the  security  situation  in  the  field  for  the  partners'  organizations?  What  is 
the scope for improvement? 

JC 17.1. The design of ECHO-funded actions has been based on an in-depth 
knowledge of the security situation, both in Syria and in neighbouring countries 

There  is  contradictory  evidence  on  how  much  people  base  their  actions  on  in-depth 
knowledge of the security situation both in Syria and in KRI. Most use the same sources 
(for  instance  the  REACH  reports)  and  access  the  same  documents  (International  Crisis 
Group reports). 

JC 17.2. The design and implementation of ECHO-funded actions facilitated 
humanitarian access for partner organizations 

ECHO is not involved in facilitating access and security. ECHO partners and UN agencies 
function  under  the  Baghdad  Security  Rules  imposed  by  the  Head  of  UNAMI,  which  are 
relatively extreme owing to the context in many parts of Iraq. The UN camp on the road to 
the  airport  can  be  as  much  a  protection  as  it  could  become  a  trap.  NGOs  work  under 
different rules and are extremely aware of the risk but also of the importance of balancing 
risk  and  humanitarian  necessity.  The  camp  environments  in  which  many  of  them  work 
under UNHCR are relatively secure and those working in non-camp environments are fully 
connected with networks of social workers who can inform them in the event of danger. 

132   EMMA: https://mega.co.nz/#F!Wx52iDLI!YuMk6eJVqXt4vrfi2fsUQg 

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JC 17.3. ECHO-funded actions promoted the security and safety of humanitarian 
personnel delivering humanitarian aid 

ECHO gives significant support to NGOs and their own social worker networks, which is 
a means of identifying risks and danger and for taking appropriate measures (in particular 
no-go areas). 

EQ18  –  (Humanitarian  advocacy)  How  effective  and  active  has  ECHO  been  in 
terms  of  Humanitarian  Advocacy  (on  issues  like  coordination,  access,  open 
borders, cross-line intervention, INGO registration, work permits, etc.)?  

JC 18.1. Advocacy has been a priority of ECHO response strategies for Syria and its 
neighbouring countries 

Advocacy  on  access,  registration  and  protection  has  been  a  key  component  of  ECHO’s 
presence. This, as well as the need to better monitor the supported projects, has been very 
instrumental in triggering the decision to open the ECHO office in Erbil (other factors in 
the choice were the better security and easier mobility as compared with Baghdad). 

JC 18.2. ECHO advocacy contributed to concrete policy changes in neighbouring 
countries  

Following  the  Erbil  authorities'  reluctance  to  allow  humanitarian  assistance  to  refugees 
outside  camp  settings,  NRC133 has  engaged  in  strong  advocacy,  with  ECHO  support,  for 
authorization to implement activities for non-camp refugees. A mechanism has been put in 
place  to  facilitate  the  flow  of  information  between  the  partners  and  ECHO  in  order  to 
promptly  inform  ECHO  of  any  substantial  limitation  imposed  on  their  activities  and,  if 
necessary, shift the focus of non-camp assistance to other governorates. 

ECHO  regularly  reiterated  its position of not supporting camps without basic protection 
and security provision in place.134 The location of Gawilan camp (and Aqra) in the DIB has 
been  and  continues  to  be  of  particular  concern.  ECHO  continues  to  advocate  for 
Centrality of Protection in Humanitarian Action (as per the IASC Principals' statement of 
17th  December  2013)  and  is  hoping  for  a  similar  stand  from  UNHCR.  In  the  meantime, 
ECHO does not wish for any of its resources to be expended on camps in these areas. 

JC 18.3. ECHO advocacy contributed to changes in approach by other donors in 
Syria and neighbouring countries 

ECHO is seen by many visiting donor representatives, and by the few donors established 
in KRI (France, UK, USA, Germany, etc.), as the most engaged in the field and the most 
relevant  in  addressing  questions  as  to  how  to  improve  humanitarian  aid  in  that  context. 
This means that when ECHO TAs raise an issue, for instance mainstreaming protection (as 
in  the  case  of  SGBV),  other  donors  follow.  One  donor  representative  indicated  that  all 
advocacy messages from ECHO are immediately transmitted to HQ for information and 
with a request for direction. 

JC 18.4. ECHO advocacy contributed to increased coordination between donors 
and governments in Syria and neighbouring countries 

ECHO  is  regularly  in  touch  with  the  different  Refugee  Committees  established  in  the 
different governorates. This means that the TAs are regularly made aware of the concerns 
of the KRI Authorities and are able to forward this information either to donors which are 
based  in  KRI  but  are  less  mobile  (embassy  staff  have  much  more  restrictive  movement 
delegations.
procedures), 

visiting 

or 

to 

133   Project 2013/00467 Fichop: 
134   Project 2014/00793 Fichop: 

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5.  Tentative conclusion 

ECHO is often seen as much as a partner as a donor: this situation is largely correlated 
with the intensive presence of ECHO TAs, who are often seen as key actors in ensuring 
that  proposals  are  submitted,  that  implementation  is  correct,  whether  modification  is 
possible  or  whether  coordination  is  effective.  The  quality  and  dedication  of  the  TAs  has 
been  systematically  mentioned,  even  by  agencies  which  have  received  no  funding  from 
ECHO or else have had difficulties with their projects. 

The  right  staffing  at  the  right  time:  given  the  widely-recognized  importance  of  a 
permanent ECHO presence in this type of situation, both strategically and operationally, it 
is  “mission  critical”  to  ensure  that  administrative  “red  tape”  does  not  undermine  rapid 
manning of ECHO offices with experienced TAs or recruitment of competent local field 
officers. 

Camp  management  is  well  under  control;  the  main  difficulties  are  for  non-camp 
refugees:  ECHO’s  early  support  for  partners  involved  in  setting  up  camps  was  highly 
appreciated;  despite  some  need  for  improvement  (WASH  in  particular)  and  for  care  and 
maintenance, the camps are well-established and able to cater for the refugees for the time 
being.  The  main  area  of  difficulty  is  for  the  more  vulnerable  non-camp  refugees,  who 
might find themselves outside any form of social security net, and addressing the needs of 
these vulnerable refugees requires time-consuming and labour-intensive “house-to-house” 
surveys. This implies a regular presence in the different urban and peri-urban environments 
to  facilitate  the  identification  of  cases  and  play  an  “honest  broker”  role  with  service 
delivery institutions. 

The mission in KRI helped to identify a series of key issues: 

-  A  need  for  ECHO  to  develop  a  capacity  to  better  respond  to  crises  in  countries 
which  have  reached  a  certain  level  of  economic  development.  The  differential 
between what people used to have and what they now have is for them what defines 
“dignity”.  This  means  that  some  “non-life-saving”  needs  (television,  hot  water, 
electricity,  washing  machines,  etc.)  are  seen  as  equally  important  for  them  as  “life-
saving” ones. This is where the use of unconditional cash is of such value, but also 
carries its own risks and limits.  

-  A need for ECHO to further explore the requirements, constraints and opportunities 

associated with work in urban contexts. 

Cash  transfer  is  a  useful  aid  delivery  mechanism,  but  the  context  in  KRI  is  not 
always very favourable to rapid deployment of unconditional cash: the lack of a well-
functioning bank system (in many areas there is no ATM and bank-based transactions are 
not  fully  rooted  in  local  culture)  and  some  institutional  barriers  within  agencies,  for 
instance, have yet to be fully analysed and properly managed. Much experience is, however, 
being gathered from some pilot projects and through the growing use of iris scan and card 
systems. 

The influx of Iraqi IDPs  is  significantly modifying the humanitarian landscape in 
KRI, and Syrian refugees might be relegated to a lower priority. The capacity of the 
humanitarian aid system to simultaneously address two crises of differing magnitudes and 

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political importance is at stake here. Allocation of scarce resources may entail even stricter 
targeting and stringent prioritization, with all the humanitarian costs associated with them. 

High  levels  of  uncertainty  and  the  need  to  remain  extremely  alert  and  agile:  the 
complexity  of the  situation and its possible development comprises several factors which 
could all have significant impact on the humanitarian situation in KRI and will continue to 
require a high level of attention at both field and HQ levels, namely: 

- 

- 

- 

- 

the  evolution  of  the  crisis  in  Syria  and  of  the  flow  of  refugees  and  its  possible 
stabilization  or  acceleration,  including  the  risk  of  an  influx  of  Aran  Syrian  refugees, 
who will not be as welcome as their Kurdish fellow-countrymen; 

the  evolution  of  the  war  in  Iraq  and  of  the  subsequent  IDP  crisis  which  is 
overwhelming all humanitarian efforts in KRI; 

the evolution of the impact of the economic crisis in KRI (decline in oil revenues, total 
cessation of all construction activities, etc.) on the employment market; 

the  way  in  which  neighbouring  countries  (especially  Turkey  and  Iran)  adjust  their 
strategy to the situation.  

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Jordan Country Report  

ANNEX III: 

COUNTRY REPORTS ................................................................................... 165 

JORDAN COUNTRY REPORT ............................................................................................... 193 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 195 
1.1.Methodology ............................................................................................................................ 195 
1.2 Structure of the Jordan Country Report .............................................................................. 195 
THE CONTEXT .......................................................................................................................... 196 
2.1 Refugee population ................................................................................................................. 196 
2.2 Host government policy ........................................................................................................ 199 
2.2.1 Key humanitarian issues ..................................................................................................... 200 
2.2.2 Response from the international community ................................................................... 201 
2.3 Overview of funding and activities undertaken in the country ........................................ 204 
2.4 ECHO’s strategic sectoral choices ....................................................................................... 205 
KEY FINDINGS WITH RESPECT TO THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS (EQS) ...................... 208 
3.1 Overview of ECHO’s overall strategy and main priorities in Syria ................................ 272 
3.2 ECHO’s approach to humanitarian access in hard-to-reach areas .................................. 273 
KEY FINDINGS WITH RESPECT TO THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS .................................. 277 

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1.  Introduction 

This Jordan Country  report is part of the broader external evaluation process carried out 
on the ECHO response to the Syrian crisis.  

1.1.  Methodology 

The methodology applied for this case study is based on four pillars: 

-  documents  reviewed:  in  addition  to  the  work  undertaken  during  the  desk  study, 
documentation  on  the  context,  projects,  needs  analyses  and  impact  studies  have 
been gathered in the field and analyzed (see Annex 1) 
interviews with key stakeholders  

- 

o 

 From  the  European  Commission  (ECHO,  EEAS)  and  Member  States 
(DFID); 

o  UN Agencies (RHC, OCHA, UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, UNFPA) 
o  NGOs (DRC, NRC, ACF, Save, HI, PU-AMI,IRC, ICMC) 
o  Red Cross (IFRC, Finnish RC, French RC) 
o  National actors (Camp Director in Za’atari, Deputy Mayor in Irbid) 

- 

- 

three  field  visits  (Za’atari  camp,  Azraq  camp,  Irbid  town)  which  allowed  for  the 
direct observation of programmes and interviews with Syrian refugees (in Za’atari 
and in Irbid) 
a  final  debriefing  with  ECHO  staff  to  validate  the  findings  and  go  through  the 
initial and tentative recommendations. 

1.2.  Structure of the Jordan Country Report 

The structure of the Jordan country report is as follows: 

Section 1: Introduction 
  Description of the methodology  
  Description of the structure of the country report 

Section 2: The context in Jordan 
  Refugee population 
  Host government policy 

Section 3: Overview of the ECHO approach in the country: 
  Overview of ECHO’s overall approach and main priorities in the country 
  Overview of funding and activities undertaken in the country 

Section 4: Key findings with respect to the evaluation questions  

Section 5: Other relevant findings for the evaluation 
  Specific findings on the case study subjects 
  Specific lessons with respect to the sectors (water, health, etc.) concerned 
  Other relevant findings  

Section 6: Country-specific conclusions 

Annexes 
  List of documents consulted and of persons met 
  Other 

annexes 

deemed 

useful, 

including 

specific 

lessons 

learned 

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2.  The context  

2.1 Refugee population 

Over  600,000  Syrian  refugees  were  registered  by  UNHCR  in  Jordan  over  the  evaluation 
period. The flow of refugees increased dramatically in 2013 (see figure below), with more 
than 1,800 arriving each day in early 2013, and then began flattening out in 2014, with 33 or 
fewer arriving each day between October and December 2014. 

Figure 1 – Evolution of Syrian refugees in Jordan (Jan. 2012 – Jan. 2015)135 

Source: ADE on the basis of UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response, Inter-agency 
Information Sharing Portal, data extracted on 3 December 2015 

Of  the  total  646,700  refugees  registered  with  the  Jordanian  Ministry  of  Interior  as  of 
October  2014,  the  largest  group  are  women  (23.5%),  with  20.7%  adult  males.  85% 
(550,000)  are  living  in  non-camp  settings  in  urban  and  rural  areas. 136  The  highest 
concentrations  are  in  Northern  and  central  Jordan  (Amman,  Irbid,  Mafraq  and  Zarqa 
governorates). The largest camp population is in Za’atari, with more than 80,000 people in 
October 2014. Azraq is the second largest camp hosting 13,700 in October 2014. 

During the first few months of 2012, refugees were hosted in a small camp (Bachab Cheh) 
close  to  at  the  border,  and  then,  with  the  increased  number,  in  two  other  settlements  in 
Ramtha, Irbid Governorate (Cyber City and King Abdalah Park or KAP). Simultaneously, 

135   UNHCR (2015), ‘Syria Regional Refugee Response, Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal’, last updated 24 April 

2015 

136   Government of Jordan’s official figures as of 18 October, 2014. 

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00,10,20,30,40,50,60,719/01/201219/01/201319/01/201419/01/2015MillionsRegisteredSyrianrefugeesin Jordan(Evaluation period: 2012-2014) 
 
 
                                                 
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many  refugees  were  hosted  by  families,  as  similar  populations  live  on  both  sides  of  the 
border,  especially  in  the  case  of  Dara  Governorate.  Another  camp  was  also  created  with 
Emirati  support  (called  “Emirati  Jordanian  Camps”-EJC-  often  referred  as  “five-stars 
camp”). 

With the  rapid  growth of the refugee  population,  more  and more  entered into cities, the 
situation  became  a  source  of  growing  concern  for  the  Government  of  Jordan.  Za’atari 
camp  was  built  and  opened  in  July  2012.  This  camp  has  grown  progressively  and  has 
evolved organically, with little  overall planning. By the end  of 2013, Za’atari’s population 
had  reached  120,000.  The  camp  evolved,  with  the  tents  being  replaced  by  so  called 
“caravans” (prefabricated houses), and saw its population diminish to 80,000 refugees.  By 
mid-2015, approximately 430,000 refugees had passed through the camp. 120,000 residents 
had returned to Syria, 60,000  had been  sponsored  by Jordanian nationals to enable them 
formally to leave the camp, and 120,000 more had left the camp informally. 

As the population continued to cross the border from Syria, the Government of Jordan has 
decided that another camp should be opened and all new refugees should be brought into 
it. The Azraq camp was then created in the desert of Zarqa Governorate in Central Eastern 
Jordan. The camp was designed to host a maximum of 130,000 refugees and was intended 
to  take  into  account  the  lessons  learnt  from  Za’atari,  including  the  use  of  advanced 
planning  and  the  early  creation  of  infrastructures.  Expensive  infrastructural  work  was 
undertaken with UNHCR (ECHO-funded) for the road network, for the water (borehole 
and  trucking  systems)  and  sanitation  systems  (septic  tanks  and  gully  trucks),  for  NFI 
distribution and voucher or cash utilization (supermarket), and for the health infrastructure, 
with a first level of care taking with International Medical Corp,  a well-equipped hospital 
under the Finnish Red Cross and a referral system with Amman hospitals for serious cases. 
At  the  time  of  the  evaluation  visit  (mid-2015),  there  were  only  18,000  refugees  and  the 
number was growing slowly, but steadily. The camp had been held in a state of readiness in 
the event of an unexpected increase.137 

84%  of  refugees  are  concentrated  around  major  urban  areas  in  the  northwest  as  against 
16%  in  camps  (Za’atari,  Azraq,  ERC),  whilst  the  remainder  are  living  in  rented  and 
informal shelters in Amman and in southern governorates.  

137   UNCHR (2015) RRP6 Jordan Response Plan. UNHCR. 

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Table 1 – UNHCR registered Syrians by location138 

Location 
Registered 
Syrians 

Amman  Mafraq 

Irbid 

Zarqa  Balqa  Madaba 

Jarash  Karak  Ajloun  Maan  Aqaba  Tafilah  Dispersed  TOTAL 

174,972  158,651  143,031  74,994  20,702  11,172 

10,738  9,398  9,387 

7,278  3,121 

2,047 

1,796 

627,29 

Source: Evaluation Inventory (based on FTS extraction) 

Figure 2 – Geographical spread of refugees in Jordan 2012-2014139 

Source: UNHCR Syria Portal 

138   Ibid. 
139   ACAPS (2015) Syria Four Years On: No End in Sight. ACAPS. 

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2.2 Host government policy 

Over the evaluation period, Jordan has hosted 646,700 Syrian refugees, amounting to 10% 
of  its  pre-crisis  population.  This  has  impacted  Jordan’s  fiscal  position  and  driven  up 
demand for basic commodities while contributing to rising inflation.140  

Pre-crisis  unemployment  levels  in  Jordan  were  already  persistently  above  12%. 141 Syrian 
refugees, like all non-Jordanians, require a work permit in order to gain employment. But 
the  process  for  Syrian  refugees  to  obtain  a  work  permit  has  been  criticised  as  slow  and 
opaque by international organisations.142 This has contributed to the gradual exhausting of 
refugee assets and the increased use of negative coping mechanisms. 

The  Government  of  Jordan’s  border  policy  has  included  sporadic  closures  of  border 
crossing  points  with  Syria.  Until  mid-2013,  the  Jordanian  government  permitted  entry  to 
Syrians  across  its  informal  border  crossings  with  Syria.  Most  Syrians  crossed  through 
western entry points from Da’raa, near Tal Shihab, Hayat and Al Naseeb. But in mid-2013, 
the  Jordanian  government  closed  these  informal  western  crossing  points  to  all  Syrians 
except  the  war-wounded  and  exceptional  cases.  Since  then,  crossing  points  have  been 
closed between Ramtha and Da’raa (by the Jordanian and Syrian governments) and Jordan 
has  barred  entry  at  Amman’s  Queen  Alia  International  Airport  to  Syrians  without 
Jordanian residency permits or special exceptions.143 

The closure of these crossing and entry points has forced Syrians fleeing to Jordan to pass 
through dangerous areas of Syria in order to reach the remaining eastern border crossings. 
There have, moreover, been cases of refugees being brought into Jordanian territory from 
eastern  crossing  points  “screened  at  the  Government  of  Jordan  registration  center,  and 
then immediately deported to Syria without being registered”.144 

Refugees out of camps : 
The  majority  of  refugees  are  out-of-camp:  by  2015,  83%  of  Syrian  refugees  in  Jordan  (520,700)  live 
outside the camps145 with the largest concentrations living in urban areas in Amman, Mafraq and Irbid 
governorates.146 

Increasing  vulnerability: UNHCR reports in 2015 acute needs inside Mafraq governorate, the third most 
densely populated refugee governorate outside the camp settings (behind Amman and Irbid). Two-thirds 
of refugees in Mafraq are now living below the national poverty line and one in six refugee households is 

140   Kingdom of Jordan (2015) Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis, p. 16. 

141   Kingdom of Jordan (2015) Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis, p. 18.  

142   ILO (2015) Access to work for Syrian refugees in Jordan, p.5. 

143   Human Rights Watch (2015) Jordan: Syrians Blocked, Stranded in Desert. 

144   SNAP (2015). 

145   Ibid. 
146   UNHCR (2015), ‘Syria Regional Refugee Response, Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal’, last updated 24 April 

2015 

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in abject poverty. Almost 50% of refugees have no heating, 25% have unreliable electricity and 20% have 
no functioning toilet. 

Rising social tensions: in 2015 one in 11 people in Jordan are now Syrian refugees, and the increased strain 
on  Jordanian  infrastructure  and  competition  for  housing,  jobs  and  to  some  extent  international 
assistance is creating social tensions between refugees and host communities.147 

Informal shelter: in April 2015 one in ten refugees was living in an informal shelter such as a tent or caravan. 

Living conditions in informal shelters are often worse than in formal shelters.148 

Inflation-effects: rental costs have increased between 100% and 200% in some urban areas since the crisis, 
threatening  many  Syrian  families  with  eviction.  Half  of  those  living  in  rented  accommodation  are  in 
inappropriate conditions, 20% being without functioning latrines.149  

This  situation  has  had  significant  repercussions  on  the  economic  and  social  features  of 
Jordan. Rental prices have increased between 100% and 200% in some urban areas since 
the  crisis.  Half  of  the  refugees  living  in  rented  accommodation  are  in  inappropriate 
conditions, with 20% not having functioning latrines. Community resources, infrastructure 
and  social  services  are  overstretched.  Rent  rises  and  job  competition  have  led  to  rising 
tensions with the host population. 

2.2.1  Key humanitarian issues 

Several  key  changes  in  the  Government  of  Jordan’s 
policies have contributed to an increasingly precarious 
humanitarian situation in the country: 

Key national policies have evolved toward a more 
restricted and less refugee-friendly humanitarian 
space, especially: 
-  On asylum 
-  On access to camps 
-  On access to services (including health) through 

the Urban Verification process 

Access  to  Jordanian  Territory:  the  number  of  entry 
points  has  decreased  since  2013,  leaving  only  those 
that are hard to reach. There were multiple reports in 
2014  of  large  numbers  of  refugees  trapped  between 
Syria and Jordan, and forced returns from registration 
centres  in  Jordan  have  been  reported.  The  asylum 
policy  began  to  change  with  the  policy  on  entrance 
into Jordan becoming more and more strict. The only entry point left by mid 2015 was on 
the northeastern frontier. It is a military zone where ICRC is one of the very rare agencies 
to have access, thanks to its old contacts with the Jordanian Army. It is the area where the 
only  border  crossing  of  the  East  is  established.  ICRC  supported  the  creation  of  a  small 
transit camp and a hosting capacity with water and relief supplies in the “no man’s land” on 
the Syrian side. A system of precooked meals is now in place for the “no man’s land” and 
for  the  transit  camp  prior  to  people  being  screened  by  the  Jordanian  Border  Police  and 
transferred  to  the  UNHCR  camps.  This  was  the  result  of  a  lengthy  negotiation  process, 
with the security of Jordan very much uppermost in the debate. 

-  On labour and livelihood 
-  On the share of assistance (compulsory 30 % to 
be allocated to Jordanian vulnerable groups) 

147   Ibid. 
148   Ibid. 
149   ACAPS (2015) Syria Four Years On: No End in Sight. ACAPS. 

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their economic weight on the family. 

-  Young girls who can be married early in order to lessen 

Different  forms  of  vulnerability:  Among  the  different 
groups  which  took  refuge  in  Jordan,  several  groups  are 
particularly vulnerable: 
-  Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS) who were under 
the  responsibility  of  UNRWA.  PRS  struggle  with 
limited incomes and livelihood opportunities and are at 
risk of forced return.  

Access  to  aid:  Concerns  have  grown  about 
access  to  humanitarian  aid  in  2014.  Camp 
residents  are  finding  it  increasingly  difficult 
to  complete  registration  requirements  for 
relocation  to  urban  areas.  Forced  returns  to 
camps are increasingly reported, contributing 
to  reticence  in  approaching  authorities  and 
the  subsequent  impact  on  access  to  aid  and 
public  services  within  host  communities. 
Free  access  to  health  services 
in  State 
hospitals  for  Syrian  refugees,  which  was 
in 
granted  since  2012,  was 
November  2014,  adding  to  the  financial 
burden  of  the  refugees.  WFP  cut  food 
assistance 
in 
October  2014  owing  to  a  funding  shortfall, 
although  some  have  had  their  assistance 
restored after appeal. The value of WFP food 
vouchers was also reduced in 2015, with 85% 
of refugees reporting they would be unable to meet the cost of basic needs without food 
aid. Negative coping strategies such as early marriage have grown in 2014 among the Syrian 
refugee community, with 30% of all registered Syrian marriages in Jordan involving women 
under  17  and  a  worrying  increase  in  deliveries  below  age  16.  Children  dropping  out  of 
school  to  engage  in  different  types  of  jobs  in  the  informal  sector  became  a  significant 
source of income for Syrian refugee families. 

-  Young children in general who can be taken away from 
school and put to work to participate in the household. 
-  Gender-based violence (GBV) is a growing protection 
concern in both Za’atari and Azraq camps. Women in 
general can be targeted by SGBV in a situation where 
men are increasingly distressed by the situation and can 
become even more violent.  

-  Negative  coping  strategies  among  poor  families  are 
also  a  concern,  including  early  marriage  and  child 
labour.1 

to  37,000  urban  refugees 

terminated 

2.2.2  Response from the international community 

The UN system established that funding requirements for 2015 would amount to US$ 1.2 
billion150. By April, only US$ 195 million (16% coverage)151 had been received.  

Figure 3 – Donors’ contribution in Jordan 2012-2014 (US$ million) 

150   UNHCR (2015), ‘Syria Regional Refugee Response, Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal’, last updated  24 April 

2015 
151   Ibid. 

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Source: ADE01002003004005006007008009001000Jordan: contributions by yearTotal committed: US$ 2.0bn9283%201220132014235847(US$ millions) 
 
 
 
                                                 
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Source: Evaluation Inventory (based on FTS extraction) 

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Jordan was the third biggest recipient in terms of total contributions during 2012-2014 
(behind Syria and Lebanon), receiving US$2 billion from the international community. This 
represents 18% of all contributions to respond to the Syrian crisis (US$11 billion). 
The increase of registered refugees from 100,000 to 550,000 in 2013 triggered a four-fold 
increase  in  total  contributions,  with  subsequent  2014  contributions  remaining  above 
90% of that peak. The USA contributed almost one quarter of all funds, with ECHO 
and the UK making up a further 22%. Other major donors include a mix of OECD and 
Middle Eastern countries and UN agencies. One particular feature of this crisis is that Gulf 
Donors are in 4th, 6th and 7th positions in terms of recorded financial contributions. 

Figure 4 – Contribution by donors in Jordan (US$ million) 

Source: Evaluation Inventory (based on FTS extraction) 

Figure 5 – Donors’ contribution in Jordan, by sector 2012-2014 (US$ million)

Source: Evaluation Inventory (based on FTS extraction) 

Multi-sector  support  made  up  almost  80%  of  international  contributions,  perhaps 
reflecting  the  use  of  cash  and  voucher-based  assistance  for  the  84%  of  refugees  living 
outside the camps. Other major sectors supported by the international community include 
shelter and NFIs, food and health. 

Coordination  of  international  efforts  in  Jordan  has  been  very  complicated  and  a 
subject of much tension between UNHCR, which sees the crisis in Jordan as “a refugee 

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Source: ADE050100150200250300350400450500Jordan: contributions by donor45923%11%3%3%4%4%4%6%7%11%2192151311278376756968USAECHOUKKuwaitGermanyUAESaudiArabiaWFPCanadaJapanTotal committed: US$ 2.0bn(US$ millions)Source: ADEFood 3% (US$ 65m) Unspecified7% (US$ 132m) Shelter& NFIs4% (US$ 87m) Health2% (US$ 47m) Multi-sector(US$ 1.59bn) Education 2% (US$ 31m) Water/Sanitation1% (US$ 24m) Protection 1% (US$ 18m) Coordination 1% (US$ 15m) Jordan: contributions by sector79%Other10% (US$ 4m) 1 Other: Economicrecovery, mine action and safety/securityof staff and operationsTotal committed: US$ 2.0bn 
 
 
 
 
 
               
 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
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crisis”, and OCHA, which has tried to establish itself to coordinate the response at a higher 
level  of  crisis  management  (including  promotion  of  a  “Whole  of  Syria”  (WoS)  approach 
coordinated by a Regional Humanitarian Coordinator based in Amman, but supervising the 
efforts of the Jordan-based HC who was in effect the UNHCR Representative). Overview 
of the ECHO approach in the country  

2.3 Overview of funding and activities undertaken in the country 

Figure 6 – Donors’ contribution in Jordan, by year 2012-2015 

Amounts 

100000000

80000000

60000000

40000000

20000000

0

2012

2013

2014

2015

Source: Evaluation Inventory (based on FTS extraction) 

Funding from ECHO increased in 2013 (a year which saw important investment in Azraq 
camp) and diminished in 2014.  

In  recognition  of  the  significant  level  of  humanitarian  needs  in  Jordan,  ECHO  has 
supported a range of partners over the evaluation period. This support has included shelter, 
food,  WASH  and  multi-sector  cash-based  assistance,  alongside  health  and  protection 
services. Support has targeted both camp and non-camp settings, including urban refugees 
in Amman and rural-based non-camp refugees in Irbid Governorate.  

  Over one third of ECHO’s support covered shelter, totalling US$54 million during 

the period 2012-2014. 

  Food (16%), water and sanitation (15%) and multi-sector support (14%) were the 

next largest sectors by contribution size. 

  ECHO  worked  through  a  range  of  implementing  partners,  with  a  large  share  of 

funds (82%) channelled through the top ten partners. 

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Figure 7 – Snapshot of ECHO’s response in Jordan 2012-2014 

Source: Evaluation Inventory (based on FTS extraction) 

2.4  ECHO’s strategic sectoral choices 

The interviews in Amman and the field visits confirmed that ECHO-supported operations,  
in  line  with  Humanitarian  Intervention  Plans  (HIP)152,  cover  the  following  priorities  by 
sector in Jordan: 

  Camp  settings: ECHO supported in-camp infrastructure establishment (road, camp 
planning, water and sanitation, energy) and improvements though UNHCR and NRC. 
ECHO  also  sought  to  encourage  improved  site  planning  in  Azraq  on  the  basis  of 
lessons learned in the Za’atari camp. In-camp spare capacity is now significant. Both 
Za’atari and Azraq have a maximum potential capacity of 130,000. By current figures 
this leaves an extra capacity of 50,000 in Za’atari and 112,000 in Azraq.153 

  Shelter:  in  camps,  ECHO  supported  the  process  of  improving  shelters  to  meet  the 
needs  of  prolonged  occupation  of  shelter  units  through  a  transition  from  tents  to 
“prefabricated housing”. Cash assistance was prioritised for non-camp shelter support, 
to help pay rent and share  the economic burden with host families. In  addition, and 
taking  into  account  the  low  social  housing  stock  available,  ECHO  also  targeted  the 
provision  of  additional  housing  by  specific  support  for  landlords  to  facilitate 
apartment rehabilitation to counterbalance increased housing demand and rent rises in 
response to the refugee influx.  

  Non Food Items: as far as possible, ECHO supported the use of unconditional cash 
as  a  means  of  facilitating  refugees’  choice  in  NFI.  This  seems  to  have  been  most 
appropriate  for  hygiene  kits  and  winterization  items  (blankets,  clothes).  One  caveat 
reported is that in this case, refugees tend to opt for the lowest price, often the lowest 

152   ECHO (2012; 2013; 2014) Humanitarian Implementation Plans: Syria Crisis. 
153   Derived  from  maximum  capacity  figures  given  in  ECHO  (2014)  Humanitarian  Implementation  Plan  Syria  Crisis: 

ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91000. ECHO. 

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ECHO fundingper sector–Jordan38%16%15%14%11%Shelter(€54m)Water/sanitation(€20.9m)Multi-sector(€20m)Healthand medical(€15.1m)Food(€23.1m)Protection(€8.55m)6%Total:€141.8mTop 10 ECHO implementingpartners–Jordan 32.72215.512.676.956.75.64305101520253035UNHCRWFPUNICEFNRCIFRCTop upSCHIACTEDUNFPAMCS(€m)€116m (82% of total commitmentin Jordan)Source: ADE Evaluation Inventory, 2015 
 
                                                 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
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quality. This reportedly results in a certain level of risk (e.g. gas explosions) and rapid 
deterioration  of  the  items.  Winterization  programmes  are  reportedly  frequently 
implemented late owing to the late arrival of an ECHO top-up budget. 

  Food:  ECHO  works  though  UNHCR and  WFP  for  its  food  programmes.  Targeted 
provision of food vouchers to camp-based refugees through a system of supermarkets 
offering  a  wide  range  of  food  and  non-food  items  under  a  fixed  price  is  a  very 
interesting  innovation,  although  the  absence  of  ATM  distribution  systems  in  camps 
does not yet allow real unconditional cash transfers. Cash assistance to those outside 
the  camps  and  host  communities  is  done  through  a  sophisticated  and  innovative 
system involving biometric measures (iris scans in particular) and distribution of ATM 
cards.  

  WASH:  in-camp,  ECHO  supported  the  establishment  of  a  water  supply  (boreholes, 
trucking system, distribution of tanks) through UNHCR, which sub-contracted first to 
ACTED  and  then  to  additional  agencies  to  reduce  possible  risks  (OXFAM,  JAN). 
Sanitation remains a significant problem as septic tanks and gully trucks still represent 
the main, albeit costly, option. The WASH conditions of in-camp residents have been 
challenged  by  the  rapid  influx  of  new  refugees.  Misuse  and  vandalism  of  WASH 
facilities  and  water  wastage  is  an  important  problem  in  Za’atari.  Costs  of  delivering 
effective WASH services in Azraq are estimated to be double that in Za’atari owing to 
the  long  distance  for  truck  replenishment  and  difficulties  in  reaching  underground 
water. 154  Hygiene  promotion  and  community  mobilisation  was  also  targeted  to 
minimise transmission of WASH-related communicable diseases. Access to water and 
sanitation  outside  the  refugee  camps  is  limited.  The  proportion  of  households  in 
refugee-hosting areas with access to municipal water networks can be as low as 55%. 
Access  is  still  more  problematic  for  those  living  in  informal  shelters.  For  non-camp 
residents, ECHO targeted a mixed modality approach through in-kind, cash transfers 
and  vouchers.  ECHO  has  sought  to  provide  a  flexible,  integrated  and  adaptable 
WASH  approach  outside  camp  settings.  This  approach  was  justified  by  the  rapid 
evolution  of  refugee  numbers,  dispersion  and  seasonal  needs.  ECHO  prioritised  a 
flexible  and  adaptive  approach  taking  account  of  the  refugee  trends  and  necessary 
adjustments to seasonal needs. 

  Health:  Healthcare  in  Za’atari  was  by  mid  2015  well  covered,  whilst  in  Azraq  the 
priority has been on increasing healthcare outreach and reducing the burden on local 
health facilities.155 Within camps, health services function at three levels: 

o Public  health  managed  in  Za’atari  by  different  NGOs  with  nine  primary 
healthcare centres and 120 community health volunteers. Primary health concerns 
include  communicable  and  non-communicable  diseases,  as  well  as  treating  the 
war-wounded and providing immunization for children156 (Handicap International 
funded by ECHO in Za’atari and in Azraq by IMC). 

o First-line  hospitals  (two  field  hospitals  in  Za’atari  managed  by  different  NGOs 
including an MSF hospital not funded by ECHO, and in Azraq the Finnish Red 
Cross Hospital only).  

154   ECHO (2014) Humanitarian Implementation Plan Syria Crisis: ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91000. ECHO. 
155   ECHO (2014) Humanitarian Implementation Plan Syria Crisis: ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91000. ECHO. 
156   UNHCR (2015) Factsheet Za’atari Refugee Camp, April 2015. UNHCR. 

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o Third-line care through referral to better equipped Jordanian hospitals in Amman.  

Health  priority  targets  included  reproductive  health  (with  antenatal  care,  obstetric 
work and post-natal follow up), management of GBV cases and treatment of chronic 
diseases.  Outside  the  camps,  emphasis  has  been  given  to  cash  support  in  order  to 
expand  access  for  those  not  receiving  healthcare,  whether  due  to  non-registration, 
expired  certification,  residence  in  remote  areas  or,  in  many  cases,  lack  of  financial 
means.  ECHO  has  also  targeted  advocacy  towards  other  donors  and  financial 
instruments for much greater support to the health system. 

  Protection: ECHO supported different types of protection programmes in favour of 
refugees in Jordan. Support for UNHCR as the main responsible agency for refugee 
rights  represents  a  key  stumbling  block.  In  addition,  different  programmes  of 
agencies have been supported, in particular: 

o 
o 

o 

those involved in children’s rights (UNICEF);  
those 
in  targeted  protection  against  SGBV  (UNFPA,  IRC)  with 
preventative  measures,  as  well  as  individual  medical  and  legal  support  to 
SGBV victims; 
those  in  protection  against  deprivation  of  socio-economic  rights  for  all 
those 
in 
administrative processes linked to registration, etc. (NRC, HI) in order to 
prevent forced repatriation or forced relocation to camps;   and 

legal  counselling,  support 

from  Syria, 

through 

fleeing 

o  psychosocial  support  for  people  affected  by  conflict-related  trauma  and 
family  separation,  as  well  as  prevention  of  and  assistance  to  victims  of 
GBV.  

Special  attention  was  paid  to  the  fate  of  Palestinians  refugees  from  Syria,  initially 
under the mandate of UNWRA. 

  Integrated approach and multi sector programmes: conditional cash supported 
by  hard  and  soft  measures  and  unconditional  cash  modalities  were  considered 
under the HIP 2014 as a strategic tool for humanitarian programming.  

  Coordination: ECHO has been involved in different levels of coordination (with 
donors,  within  the  HCT  and  IATF)  and  has  encouraged  harmonised  needs 
assessment methodologies, targeting criteria and modality selection.  

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3.  Key  findings  with  respect  to  the  Evaluation  Questions 

(EQs)  

EQ 1 – Good Humanitarian Donorship 

JC 1.1 ECHO deployed specific decisions and actions to ensure consistency with 
the 23 principles in the Syrian crisis response 

  From  interviews,  it  appears  that  several  ECHO  TAs’  and  ECHO  partners’ 
knowledge  of  the  GHD  principles  mostly  concerned  the  first  principles 
(humanitarian principles).  

JC 1.2 There are specific examples of where the Syrian response was (or was not) in 
line with the 23 Principles 

  The  fact  that  ECHO  did  not  contribute  directly  to  UN,  Red  Cross  or  National 
Appeals  is  not  in  line  with  Principle  14  but  is  compatible  with  Principle  6 
(allocation  based  on  assessed  need).  This  means  that  ECHO  supports  projects 
which  are  in  line  with  these  appeals  but  not  necessarily  through  the  appealing 
agency (UNHCR, OCHA or Jordan Refugee Plan). 

  Several interviewees considered that the reporting on the basis of the ECHO single 
form was rather complicated and not so user-friendly, and hence not really in line 
with principle 23 on standardized reporting.  

EQ 2-Consultation of local and regional communities 

JC  2.1.  ECHO  or  its  partners  deployed  specific  measures  for  involving  local  and 
regional communities  

  ECHO  TAs  in  the  field  devoted  due  care  that  its  partners  involved  local 
communities  (local  groupings  rather  than  institutional  mechanisms  such  as 
municipalities; see comments on EQ7) in their operations, according to interviewed 
NGOs  in  Amman  and  Irbid.  This  is  confirmed  by  the  analysis  of  several  single 
forms. 

  But  there  is  less  evidence  of  the  engagement  of  local  municipal  authorities.  Field 
interviews  suggest  that  some  municipal  authorities  feel  that  the  impact  on 
municipal  services  and  the  question  of  donor  exit  strategies  have  not  been 
sufficiently addressed. 

JC 2.2. ECHO and/or partner monitoring mechanisms took account of beneficiary 
views and provided appropriate feedback loops to funding officers 

  Through  their  national  staff,  NGOs  have  mechanisms  to  collect  feedback  from 
their  beneficiaries.  NGOs  such  as  HI  and  NRC  have  established  call-centres  to 
facilitate  interaction  with  the  populations.  For  UNFPA,  special  care  is  paid  to 
interaction  with  SGBV  cases  to  ensure  that  they  are  well-treated  when  sent  to 
referral mechanisms. 

  Where  ECHO  partners  work  with  and  through  local  organizations,  particular 
attention  is  paid  to  ensuring  that  monitoring  mechanisms  allow  for  a  proper 
feedback loop and retroaction. For instance, JHAS (Jordan Health Aid Society), the 
main partner of HI in Jordan, implements some of the HI activities in JHAS PHC 

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clinics.  Specific  reporting  systems  enable  HI  to  follow  the  work  of  JHAS  and 
correctly report on it.157   

EQ3  –  To  what  extent  have  the  design  and  implementation  of  ECHO-funded 
interventions  taken  into  account  the  needs  of  the  most  vulnerable  people  in  the 
region, in particular women, children, elderly and disabled people? 
JC 3.1 ECHO deployed specific measures/a specific approach/strategy to make 
sure ECHO-funded interventions  took into account the needs  of the most 
vulnerable people in the region both at design and implementation stages 

  The preparation of the HIP comprised a thorough review of vulnerabilities in the 
affected  area.  Projects  not  fitting  into  that  analysis  have  mostly  not  been 
considered. In the case of Jordan, this issue has been made more complicated by a 
request  by  the  Jordan  Government  for  30%  of  resources  to  be  systematically 
channelled  through  NGOs  allocated  to  the  plight  of  vulnerable  Jordanians.  As 
explained by several interviewees, this has put ECHO and its NGO partners in a 
difficult  situation  as  most  vulnerable  Jordanians  are  far  less  vulnerable  than  the 
Syrian  refugees,  who  have  seen  their  resource  base  eroded  by  years  of 
displacements following often serious losses in the area of origin.   

JC 3.2 The design of ECHO-funded interventions reflects the needs of the most 
vulnerable people well 

  Projects  seen  in  the  field  have  generally  been  based  on  the  needs  of  the  most 

vulnerable people, viz. 
o  ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91012  (UNFPA):  this  project  specifically  targeted 
victims  of  gender-based  violence  (GBV)  in  ten  governorates  of  Jordan  and  in 
Za’atari camp. The project provided sexual and reproductive health care for the 
most vulnerable populations. 

o  ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91019 (HI): this project specifically targeted disabled 
and  injured  refugees  in  Jordan,  providing  support  for  basic  needs,  physical 
rehabilitation, support and mobility devices, and psychosocial support. (Source: 
single-form, p.10) 

ECHO and a certain number of its partners (UNHCR, Finish Red Cross, ACTED, NRC) 
had  to  anticipate  the  evolution  of  camp  populations  following  a  significant  additional 
inflow  of  refugees  in  2013,  meaning  that  the  design  of  Azraq  camp  is  based  on  the 
assumption of 130,000 refugees. Funding was allocated not on the basis of assessed needs 
but on the basis of the expected needs of Azraq camp; and its facilities, including the Finish 
underused.  The  Finnish  Red  Cross 
Red  Cross  Hospital, 
ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91028  continues  to  provide  healthcare  to  all  sick  people  in 
Azraq camp as they are deprived of access to any hospital structure, although emphasis was 
placed  in  the  single-form  for  expected  vulnerable  groups  with  special  health  needs, 
including women, children and the elderly (p.7). In refugee camps, health structures have to 
be accessible to all sick people. 

largely 

are 

157   Fichop 2013/00645 

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JC 3.3 ECHO took specific measures to ensure that during implementation, the 
needs of the most vulnerable people were taken into account 
During the field visits, ECHO TAs normally verify that the needs of vulnerable groups are 
properly  catered  for  by  the  partners.  For  instance,  in  Jordan  the  situation  is  especially 
difficult  for  persons  with  injuries  (PwI)  or  disabilities  (PwD),  older  persons,  and  persons 
with  chronic  diseases.  PwI,  in  particular,  are  in  urgent  need  of  follow-up  care  for  their 
injuries to prevent or tackle the development of permanent disabilities. In Jordan, HI teams 
report an increasing numbers of persons arriving with injuries, often complex, war-related 
injuries.  Of  the  persons  with  injuries  supported  by  HI  in  Jordan,  90%  have  war-related 
injuries. ECHO staff are in regular contact with their partners to verify that persons with 
existing  disabilities,  older  persons,  and  persons  with  chronic  diseases,  who  often  face 
additional barriers in accessing support and relief efforts, are properly supported. Lack of 
physical accessibility, existing attitudes within the community, and the breakdown of social 
networks have to be particularly kept in view by ECHO-funded support systems. One of 
the key issues identified is that classical response activities do not identify these vulnerable 
populations, which often become "virtually invisible" to relief stakeholders. 

EQ  4: To  what  extent  has  the  ECHO  intervention  taken  account  of  the  host 
populations,  and  what  concrete  measures  have  been  taken  to  address  their  needs 
and interests? 

JC 4.1. : ECHO applied a specific approach/strategy to make sure that the needs 
and interests of host populations were taken into account 
ECHO and its partners devoted due attention to the plight of host populations, which are 
also  affected  by  the  economic  impact  of  the  presence  of  high  numbers  of  refugees  in 
Jordan’s cities. This is rendered essential by Jordanian policies which direct that 30 % of all 
aid to refugees through NGOs must be allocated to vulnerable Jordanian groups. 

JC 4.2 : ECHO took specific measures to address the needs and interests of host 
populations 
As ECHO allocates resources on “assessed needs”, it requests its partners to appraise the 
needs  of  these  Jordanian  vulnerable  groups.  While  there  is  no  doubt  that  there  are  high 
levels of unemployment and poverty in Jordan, the situation of these groups is better than 
that  of  many  refugees,  particularly  owing  to  the  existence  of  a  national  programme  for 
social  protection  which  is  not  accessible  to  Syrian  refugees.  Interviewees  highlighted  a 
feeling  of  unease  about  the  implementation  of  this  compulsory  earmarking  of  resources 
regardless  of  the  real  levels  of  need.  Specific  concerns  have  been  raised  about  the 
appropriateness,  implementation  and  impact  of  complying  with  the  30%  rule.  Concerns 
included: 
  whether  responsibility  for  providing  the  30%  for  host  populations  should  fall  on 
ECHO’s shoulders rather than the Joint Humanitarian Development Framework; the 
latter  option  would  allow  ECHO  to  continue  targeting  according  to  need  and 
regardless of origin, in line with its mandate; 
implementation difficulties, which have been noted by ECHO partners, some of whom 
have  struggled  to  receive  sufficiently  consolidated  data  on  the  host  population  for 
targeting the beneficiaries in greatest need; 

 

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 

the  fact  that  the  impact on  ECHO  partners’  ability  to  successfully  target  the  greatest 
needs  has  been  negative.  Whilst  host  population  needs  are  clear,  the  imposition  of  a 
fixed funding ratio on the basis of origin rather than need has forced NGO partners to 
reduce their coverage of the most needy in their response to the refugee crisis. 

It is largely through dialogue with EEAS and NEAR at the Delegation and Brussels levels 
that options for enhanced support for host populations are identified and funded. This is 
particularly the case in contexts such as Irbid, where funding for alternative energy projects 
is made available to host populations through the NEAR budget. 

JC 4.3: The measures reached their objectives 
It is difficult to know if these measures are achieving their objectives as they are relatively 
new.  Field  interviews  suggest  that  municipal  authorities  are  facing  growing  resource 
constraints  (including  water,  waste  management,  housing,  education  and  law  and  order) 
directly  linked  to  the  out-of-camp  refugee  populations.  It  is  not  evident  that  donor 
investment  sufficiently  targeted  these  concerns  during  the  period  2012-2014.  But  the 
measures  already  taken  do  represent  an  important  entry  point  in  the  dialogue  with  the 
Jordanian authorities on the support for vulnerable Jordanian populations. 

EQ 5 - A) To what extent have ECHO and its partners been successful in adapting 
their approach and addressing gaps to the shifting needs of the region, as the crisis 
has  evolved? B) Considering that project activities of partners  in many cases  have 
been  carried  over  from  one  funding  cycle  to  the  next,  to  what  extent  have  the 
partners  been  revising  their  approach  –  being  innovative  –  to  better  address  the 
needs? C) What modifications to approaches are needed for the future? 

The  ECHO  team  has  been  very  attentive  in  ensuring  that  variations  in  the  context  are 
backed  up by proper  development  of  the  project and  that all  partners  pay due  tribute  to 
this attentive and supportive attitude.  

JC 5.1 ECHO and its partners had a strategy to adapt their approach to the shifting 
needs of the region 

  There  is  a  primary  source  of  flexibility  within  each  budget  item  (with  strict  limits) 
which  allows  for  a  first  level  of  flexibility,  not  requesting  interaction  with  ECHO. 
Most ECHO partners use this facility without difficulty. 

  Through dialogue and rapid mechanisms (exchange of letters after oral consultation), 
ECHO  partners  can  easily  adjust  their  programmes  beyond  the  in-built  level  of 
flexibility if so required. It has to be duly backed up by argument and explanation, but 
most  partners  acknowledge  that  it  functions  quite  well.  Handicap  International 
requested a modification to project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2013/91019 in order to scale 
up the response to the crisis as the number of IDPs and refugees increased in 2013. 
(Source: Single form, p.6.) 

JC 5.2 ECHO and its partners have revised their approaches/interventions so as to 
better address the shifting needs of the region 

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  As outlined in Section 2.2.1 above, refugee numbers in Jordan grew rapidly over the 
evaluation period.  In July  2012, the number stood at 25,000,  mostly  based in small 
camps in the north, but within a year it had grown to over 500,000, spread across the 
northern  governorates  in  primarily  non-camp  settings.  ECHO  responded  to  the 
rapid  growth  of  WASH  and  shelter  needs  in  the  Za’atari  camp  through  its 
partnership  with  UNICEF,  as  well  as  supporting  ACTED  and  the  NGOs  that 
followed them in the out-of-camp response across Jordan.  

  Regarding  the  initial  support  to  out-of-camp  refugees,  field  interviews  suggest  that 
there was a high degree of lesson-learning as they progressed, particularly in the early 
responses during 2012.  Enhanced  feedback mechanisms were  in place that enabled 
partners to provide new assessments on every  site  visit, rather than  restricting it to 
periodic  monitoring  mechanisms.  This  was  cited  as  an  enabling  factor  in  ECHO’s 
responsiveness to the rapidly changing situation. 

  The funding for the hospital in Azraq camp was allocated at a time when UNHCR 
expected the camp to receive 130,000 refugees. In the light of the significantly lower 
number of refugees that have registered there, the EU’s financing of €3.5m for the 
hospital has raised some  concerns. Adaptation has taken  place  to some  extent (e.g. 
reducing  ECHO  funding  from  an  initial  €5.2m,  focusing  on  cost  containment 
measures  and  reduction  of  human  resource  costs).  Finally,  ECHO  informed  the 
implementing partner that it would not continue to support the hospital costs at the 
present level. Discussions with the partner explored the different options, taking into 
account the different scenarios (especially in relation to the 24/7 presence of certain 
services  in  the  hospital  (especially  in  surgery)  or  the  higher  reliance  on  referral  to 
Amman  hospitals). An in-depth analysis is ongoing  to identify  where savings could 
be made in the cost structure, without degrading the quality of the services. Finnish 
Red Cross is preparing a revised proposal taking into account the budget reductions 
to  be  gained  from  increased  synergies  and  scale-downs.  ECHO  has  also  raised  the 
possibility of hospital closure in the event that refugee numbers do not significantly 
increase.  

JC 5.3 In the case of project activities that have been carried over from one funding 
cycle to the next, ECHO partners adapted their approaches/interventions to the 
changed needs. 
 

In the case of Jordan, moving from one funding cycle to another basically means being 
confronted  with the  impact of the duration of the  crisis on  the  affected populations 
(accentuated  deprivation  and  increased  reliance  on  negative  coping  strategies)  and 
stronger  confrontation  with  the  more  and  more  constraining  policies  of  the 
Government of Jordan. It also means being confronted with changing donor policies 
and  resource  availability.  ECHO  partners  had  to  adapt  to  these  trends.  Funding 
reductions  have  been  particularly  felt  as  they  obliged  some  partners  to  stop,  scale 
down, or significantly  modify their programmes. Others explored  alternative funding 
streams (e.g. NRC actively explored NEAR, and others turned to DFID and BPRM).  

JC 5.4 When adapting their approaches to changing needs, ECHO’s partners 
introduced specific innovations 

JC 5.5 Implications for ECHO (and partner) approaches relative to expected shifts 
in beneficiary needs 

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  Shifts of beneficiary needs will be the result of: 

o  dramatic changes in Syria 
o  evolving policies in Jordan 

  Anticipating  these  possible  changes  or  just  responding  to  them  will  lead  to  very 
different  courses  of  action  for  ECHO  and  by  extension  for  its  partners.  Political 
analysis  and  full  use  of  the  toolbox  of  political  economy  are  the  prerequisites  for 
identification of changes and exploration of adaptive options. 

EQ 6 – EU Added-Value 
JC 6.1 ECHO employed a specific approach and took specific initiatives to ensure it 
could provide added value 
  The main element of ECHO’s added value, as recognized by all partners in Jordan, is 
not linked to the Jordan programme but to the overall set-up of ECHO with its TAs 
in strong interaction with the partners. 

  The specific set-up put in place for the Syrian crisis, linked to ECHO’s global capacity 
to  coordinate  operations  beyond  the  strict  boundaries  (with  HQ  and  field 
coordinators)  is  recognized  as  interesting,  but  opaque.  Many  stakeholders  do  not 
understand  or  visualize  the  difference  between  the  RSO  and  the  Regional  Syria 
Coordination. 

  Many  actors  recognize  ECHO’s  role  as  a  gap-filler  through  the  provision  of  multi-

sectoral multi-partner assistance.158  

  The capacity of ECHO to connect with other funding streams in the EU Delegation is 
seen as a “not fully explored added value”. Indeed, this capacity to connect can offer 
interesting  avenues  for  covering  the  specific  needs  that  are  emerging  as  the  crisis 
becomes  more  and  more  protracted  in  nature.  Yet  both  HQ  and  field  interviews 
underlined the fact that the process is still in its infancy and that much remains to be 
done for this added value to fully materialize.  

  The capacity of ECHO to enter into the different coordination mechanisms (between 

donors, at the HCT/IATF) is seen as an added value.  

JC 6.2 ECHO was recognised as providing specific types of added value in the 
context of the Syrian crisis 
  The main element of ECHO’s added value, as recognized by all partners in Jordan, is 
largely linked to its strong engagement in advocacy where it can have a strong voice: 
this  is  particularly  true  in  the  coordination  debate  as  well  as  in  the  definition  of  the 
response to the GoJ requests. 

  Partners also cited the strength of ECHO’s field presence and expertise. Compared to 
other donors, ECHO was viewed as having a strong in-house capacity to identify gaps 
and  respond,  and  the  quality  of  the  monitoring  feedback  from  ECHO  officers  to 
partner staff has been highlighted as useful added value during implementation. Some 
partners argued that this expertise, whilst strong, is still very much person-led; changes 
in  ECHO  field  personnel  can  therefore  lead  to  a  shift  in  focus  or  understanding  of 
priorities or gaps in coverage.  

158   ECHO (2015) Mission to Syria (Damascus) 17-21 November 2014. Internal Document. 

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EQ 7 – Urban Settings 

JC 7.1 ECHO and its partner agencies employed a specific approach to embed 
urban issues within ECHO-funded projects in response to the Syrian crisis 
With more than 80% of Syrian refugees living in Jordanian cities outside camps, it was of 
utmost importance  that the urban nature  of part  of the refugee  crisis be understood and 
addressed through “urban lenses”. This was done through several entry points: 
  Cash:  cities  indeed  function  through  a  cash  economy,  and  ECHO  and  its  partners 
have  engaged  strongly  in  unconditional  cash  transfers;  DRC  implemented  cash 
transfers  in  Jordan  in  urban  contexts  in  Amman  Karak  and  Ma’an  governorates, 
through  a  partner  (JHCO)  with  a  particular  mandate  to  provide  assistance  in  urban 
settings (source: single form, p.65) ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91012 (DRC); 

  Shelter: ECHO supports a new approach to shelter in Jordanian cities, with cash-for-
rent components as well as dedicated cash programmes helping landlords to improve, 
refurbish and release new flats to be made available to refugee families. 

  WASH:  ECHO  supports  operations  dealing  with  urban  WASH  through  support  in 
negotiation with Water Authorities and landlords for installation of water meters and 
improvements in sanitation programmes. 

JC 7.2 The design of ECHO-funded projects identified the major challenges that 
exist in urban settings in order to design interventions appropriate to these specific 
types of situation 
 

Identification  of  the  administrative  system  regulating  life  in  cities  has  contributed  to 
ECHO’s support for interesting mechanisms to help refugees manage their paperwork 
properly. Support for NRC counsellors and Hotline systems, for instance, represents 
an important contribution to helping refugees survive in Jordanian cities. 

  The fact  that urban economies are, in Jordan as in almost all  urban contexts, largely 
monetized implies that many ECHO programmes in cities in Jordan are cash-based. 
  A few missing issues are linked to the limited strategic engagement of ECHO and its 

partners with municipal institutions and authorities. 

JC 7.3 Throughout implementation, ECHO-funded projects were able to tackle the 
specific urban challenges (for displaced persons and refugees as well as for the host 
urban populations) and to coordinate properly with the local authorities, urban 
services and institutions (municipalities), in line with the good practices elaborated 
by the sector 
  Coordination  mechanisms  for  the  urban  response  have  taken  time  to  become 
established in Jordan. Field interviews suggest that coordination of the urban response 
in  2012  was  particularly  poor,  whilst  all  donors,  not  just  ECHO,  focused  on  the 
significant need to invest in scaling up the in-camp response in the Za’atari and, later, 
Azraq camps.  

  By  2014,  urban coordination mechanisms had been set up, but they remain primarily 
focused on the north of the country, with limited coverage of activities in the south. 
  Coordination with local authorities is also complicated by the fact that most donors are 
operating in the same areas as projects financed through development funding streams. 
Some relationships have been hampered by the practice of all donors, not just ECHO, 

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of soliciting the same local authority staff separately for humanitarian and development 
programmes that operate in the same urban zones. 

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EQ8, (Protection): How and to what extent has Protection been appropriately taken 
into account and implemented in ECHO-funded projects? 

JC 8.1. ECHO and its partner agencies employed a specific approach to embed 
protection within ECHO-funded projects in response to the Syrian crisis 

The approach to embedding protection in programming is very different where the partner 
is  a  mandated  agency  as  compared  to  a  non-mandated  agency  which  has  to  mainstream 
protection in its normal programming. 

Protection by mandated agencies: 

ICRC:  ICRC  is  involved  in  Jordan  largely  for  its  system  of   tracing  and  re-establishing 
family  links  through  the  Jordanian  Red  Crescent  Society.  It  is  also  developing  a  specific 
programme  to  combine  assistance  and  protection  in  the  “no-man’s  land”  at  the 
Jordan/Syria  border.  ICRC  is  slowly  coming  to  grips  with  the  extremely  complex  and 
problematic issue of  “missing persons”. ECHO will be funding ICRC in 2015 to address 
the repression and deportation concerns that have arisen as the crisis has evolved. 

UNHCR: for UNHCR, the protection challenges are multiform: preventing repression in 
the  “no-man’s  land”,  ensuring  protection  while  in  first  asylum  countries,  prevention  of  
forced repatriation and facilitating asylum in a third country. The first step of  protection in 
Jordan is the registration of  refugees with a sophisticated system based on biometrics and 
iris  scanning  to  avoid  fraud,  enhancing  protection  but,  even  more  importantly,  ensuring 
access  to  certain  services.  Growing  concerns  are  emerging  over  reinforced  entry  right 
limitation  and  increased  deportation,  reflecting  the  country’s  own  security  concerns. 
UNHCR is making a lot of  effort to promote refugee protection through enhanced efforts 
to  facilitate  refugee  registration  and  regulation,  in  particular  in  out-of-camp  situations. 
Enhanced  attention  is  needed  as  negative  coping  strategies  triggered  by  deteriorating 
economic  conditions  have  an  impact  on  protection  for  refugee  children  (forced  labour), 
girls (early marriage) and women (SGBV). The RTE of  the UNHCR response to the Syrian 
refugee crisis159 concluded that UNHCR managed to substantially scale-up its operations in 
the regions and helped prevent the refugee crisis from spiralling out of  control.  

UNICEF: by supporting child protection directly and through its partners and developing 
advocacy, UNICEF tries to implement the Child Convention. In Jordan, the direct number 
of  boys and girls benefiting  from protection interventions is estimated at  4,200 in Azraq 
camp, based on an expected influx of  70,000 refugees in Azraq. 

UNWRA:  UNWRA supports, and is making all efforts to protect, Palestinian refugees in 
Syria and those that flee from Syria to neighbouring countries. 

Protection by non-mandated agencies: 

As  a  cross-cutting  theme,  it  has  been  difficult  to  mainstream  protection  in  partner 
programmes. But ECHO has sought to work with specific partners on protection concerns 
throughout the evaluation period. In particular: 

IRC:  IRC  has  deployed  significant  efforts  in  both  protection  of   women  and  child 
protection, in coordination with, and with the support of, UNICEF.  

159   From slow boil to breaking point; a RTE of UNHCR response to the Syrian refugee crisis, July 2013 

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DRC:  DRC  has  been  conducting  protection  projects  with  ECHO  funding  that  focus  on 
addressing barriers to registration for refugees. New requirements placed on refugees mean 
that  the  cost  of   registration  (30  Jordanian  Dinars)  needs  to  be  met  upfront  by  refugees 
before they can access services. DRC has been providing support to tackle this barrier to 
registration, and ECHO is seen as a key donor in this area. 

UNFPA:  UNFPA  endeavours  to  prevent  SGBV  and  to  alleviate  the  suffering  of   SGBV 
victims through various programmes ranging from advocacy and prevention to support for 
victims. 

JC 8.2. The design of ECHO-funded projects identified the major threats that exist 
to the physical and psychological security of humanitarian aid beneficiaries 

This  is  done  in  a  relatively  systematic  manner  by  ECHO  partners  when  they  write  their 
proposals and have to justify a protection agenda in their proposal. The mandated agencies 
refer  more  to  their  mandate  than  to  a  precise  description  of   threats.  Non-mandated 
agencies  tend  to  be  less  specific  in  terms  of   description  of   threats  and  use  very  generic 
terms  (SGBV,  child  protection).  Yet  security  and  protection  require  a  sensitive  approach 
which partly explains this cautious attitude.  

JC  8.3.  ECHO-funded  project  designs  disambiguated  protection  needs  per 
population  segment  and  location,  including  identifying  specific  threats  to 
vulnerable groups 

Many  threats,  such  as  being  victim  of  indiscriminate  bombing  or  prevention  of  entire 
groups from entering a country to find a safe haven, do not target specific segments of a 
population (e.g. as stated in the single forms of ICRC and UNHCR) while others (SGBV, 
forced recruitment of child soldiers) do specifically target discrete groups (women, young 
girls and boys, etc.). Most partners try to disaggregate the population accordingly (see the 
single forms of UNICEF, IRC, UNFPA). 

EQ  9:  In  cases  when  Remote  Management  was  being  used,  to  what  extent  did  it 
follow  existing  guidance  documents  and  good  practice,  and  how  successful  was 
it?160 

This is not applicable in Jordan. 

EQ10 – Cash and vouchers 

JC 10.1 The ECHO strategy for Syria considered the appropriate use of a range of 
transfer modalities 

  For cash programmes in Jordan, ECHO has prioritised implementing partners that 
have no obligation to provide assistance to host communities (primarily IFRC and 
UN agencies) as well as partners that provide other forms of community support to 
complement cash transfers (e.g. psychosocial support, reproductive health, gender-
based violence and other risks).161  

160   With a view to avoiding ambiguity on the period covered, we suggest phrasing the question in the past tense.  
161   ECHO (2015) Mission to Syria (Damascus) 17-21 November 2014. Internal Document. 

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  But ECHO has also provided cash grants through a large number of NGOs inside 
Jordan,  including  IRC,  ACF,  DRC,  and  Save  the  Children.  Support  has  included 
unconditional  cash  transfers  to  tackle  multi-sectoral  needs,  indexed  against  basic 
needs defined through Minimum Expenditure Baskets. 

  Field interviews suggest that ECHO has invested time in the question of modality 
selection  in  Jordan,  and  partner  single  forms  on  the  whole  link  the  modality 
selection to the response analysis.  

  Some  partner  projects  have  sought  to  use  a  range  of  modalities  to  tailor  their 
response  to  need  e.g.  ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91024  (IRC),  which  deployed  a 
range of transfer modalities in their response to the needs of GBV victims in non-
camp  settings  in  Jordan.  Support  included  SGBV  case  management,  provision  of 
psychosocial  and  healthcare  and  provision  of  cash  transfers.  IRC  specifically 
targeted vulnerable groups which had been subject to GBV and which had limited 
access to financial services through other means (source: single form, p.7). 

JC 10.2 The appraisal of ECHO actions took account of an appropriate analysis of 
the context 

  Food: cash has been prioritised for food assistance outside camp settings, for both 
Syrian  refugees  and  host  communities.  Conditional  cash  transfers  (e.g.  cash  for 
work)  have  been  considered,  and  ECHO  has  sought  to  encourage  harmonised 
needs assessment methods, targeting criteria and transfer mechanisms. 

  Shelter: ECHO has targeted cash assistance for shelter outside camp settings, with 
the  primary  focus  being  on  helping  vulnerable  Syrian  families  pay  rent  and  share 
the  economic  burden  with  host  families.  In  the  light  of  the  increased  housing 
demand and rising rent  charges, ECHO has also sought to promote  provision of 
additional housing units. 

  The 2015 ECHO mission to Jordan cites concerns about the sustainability of cash 
transfers in Jordan. In particular, the mission report cites usage of cash for rent and 
debt without tackling the rising GBV and child education challenges. The ECHO 
mission  also  reports  negative  coping  strategies  in  response  to  debt  and  aid 
dependency – and links them to the use of cash transfers  – such as limiting food 
consumption and child access to education, marrying children off or sending them 
to work.162 

  ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91012  (DRC):  this  ECHO-funded  DRC  programme 
used  unconditional  cash  transfers  in  Jordan  and  other  neighbouring  countries.  In 
the  Jordanian  context,  needs  assessments  do  not  appear  to  have  included  market 
assessments,  instead  relying  on  lessons  learned  and  monitoring  reports  from 
previous  programmes,  which  pointed  to  continuing  inaccessibility  of  livelihood 
options for Syrians in Jordan (source: single form). 

JC 10.3 ECHO-funded cash and voucher operations have been effective in the 
Syrian context 

162   ECHO (2015) Mission to Syria (Damascus) 17-21 November 2014. Internal Document. 

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  The 2015 ECHO mission to Jordan showed that over 57% of ECHO funding goes 
towards  cash-based  programmes  (or  40%  if  WFP  in-camp  vouchers  are  not 
counted).163 

  Unconditional cash has been the most widely adopted approach by ECHO partners 
(13  out  of  18  partners  under  HIP  2014),  and  was  recognised  as  the  most  cost-
efficient and dignified modality for urban refugees.164 

EQ 11. Is the size of the budget allocated by ECHO to the region appropriate and 
proportionate  to  what  the  actions  are  set  out  to  achieve?  Could  the  same  results 
have been achieved with less funding? 

JC 11.1. The ECHO budget allocation to respond to the Syrian crisis was 
appropriate 
Field  visits  highlighted  the  fact  that  the  humanitarian  assistance  in  Jordan  has  not  been 
large enough to keep the refugees afloat. Regardless of modality or donor, the response has 
failed to break the vicious cycle of refugees needing to deplete their reserve assets to meet 
their  basic  needs,  then  depleting  the  negative  coping  strategies  open  to  them,  and  then 
finally having no option for remaining afloat other than returning to the camps or to Syria. 
Diaspora support has not sustained refugee living standards in the same way as it has done 
for Palestinian or Somali refugees. 

JC 11.2. The ECHO budget allocation to respond to the Syrian crisis was 
proportionate 
  Despite  the  overall  inadequacy  of  the  donor  response,  the  sudden  peak  in  funding 
allocations in 2013 was viewed as politically driven, rather than calibrated to the growth 
of humanitarian need in that year as compared to 2012 or 2014. 

  Needs  assessments  in  the  region  are  gradually  improving.  But  competition  between 
tools (e.g. the difference between the mapping tools used by SNAP and REACH) and 
a degree of information overload has hampered the comparability of assessment data. 
In this context, ECHO has rightly continued to cross-check partner needs assessments 
against ACAPS or similar benchmarks. 

JC 11.3. ECHO calibrated its objectives to the available funding 
  The  drop  in  available  funds  between  2014  and  2015  forced  ECHO  to  calibrate  its 
objectives  over  this  period.  It  has  reduced  the  number  of  partners  funded  by 
approximately one-third and has sought to focus support on emergency needs.  

JC 11.4. ECHO-funded activities were cost-effective 

EQ  12:  Were  appropriate  monitoring  systems  in  place  to  support  sound 
management of ECHO operations? 
JC 12.1. ECHO undertook specific actions/commitments to ensure that the quality 
and coverage of its monitoring mechanisms were conducive to support sound 
management of ECHO-funded operations 

163   ECHO (2015) Mission to Syria (Damascus) 17-21 November 2014. Internal Document. 
164   ECHO (2015) Mission to Syria (Damascus) 17-21 November 2014. Internal Document. 

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  NGO  partners  have  on  the  whole  been  happy  with  ECHO’s  approach  to  project 
monitoring.  Partners themselves have, where appropriate, been able  to continue  their 
own monitoring approaches and ECHO has been open to the information fed back to 
them from partner-led monitoring mechanisms. 

  ECHO’s  feedback  to  partners  from  their  own  monitoring  visits  has  also  been  well 
received by most NGO partners, notably due to the quality of the operational feedback 
and information sharing. A limited number of complaints were received from NGOs 
regarding ECHO monitoring missions, focusing primarily on the lack of a collaborative 
framework  for  improving  project  implementation  and  the  absence  of  independently-
contracted monitoring staff. 

JC 12.2. ECHO adopted a specific approach to ensure that monitoring mechanisms 
were tailored to the specific needs of remote management 

JC.12.3. ECHO partners implemented operations monitoring and ensured data and 
findings were available for ECHO’s use in a timely manner 

EQ 13: What has  been  the partners’  experience of working in consortia as well as 
with a multi-country approach? 

JC 13.1. ECHO undertook specific actions/commitments to ensure consortium and 
multi-country operations made efficient use of available resources 
  Consortium  and  multi-country  programmes  are  largely  seen  as  tools  for  decreasing 
transaction costs at donor level by transferring this burden to leaders of consortia or 
of multi-country programmes. Interviews in Brussels and in the field indicated that this 
was seen as a very good solution by ECHO field and HQ staff at a time when human 
resources  were  extremely  stretched  and  the  portfolio  size  was  large.  By  all  accounts, 
this seems to have been a false lead, as consortia and multi-country programmes are in 
fact extremely complex and their management very resource-intensive. 

  Specific problems created by multi-country programmes included:  

- 

- 

- 

timely 

lack  of  clear  focal  points  and  long  chains  of  command  increasing  contracting 
delays  and  hampering 
responses  when  problems  arose  during 
implementation;  
the  feasibility  of  switching  funds  between  country  sub-programmes  being 
hampered  by  slow  reaction  times  and  disagreements  between  the  multiple 
programme stakeholders and ECHO TAs involved, and by the short liquidation 
periods for ECHO projects; 
the  potential  added  value  of  multi-country  projects  in  terms  of  lesson-learning 
between  countries  being  limited  by  the  fundamentally  different  refugee  contexts 
in different neighbouring countries. 

JC 13.2.  ECHO partners provided evidence that consortium and multi-country 
arrangements reduced coverage gaps and duplications between countries and 
partner organisations 

  Several partners rightly emphasized the impossibility of predicting the evolution of 
crises,  the  security  environment  or  the  impacts  of  these  evolutions  on  protection 

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issues.  They  base  their  propositions  on  their  current  appreciation  of  the  context 
and on possible likely scenarios.  

  JC  13.1.  ECHO  undertook  specific  actions/commitments  to  ensure 
consortium and multi-country operations made efficient use of available 
resources 

  Protection is too sensitive a subject to be appropriately tackled per se by consortia as 
the  sensitivity  and  the  confidentiality  of  information  is  often  high.  Consortia 
between  ECHO  partners  have  been  more  frequent  for  classical  assistance 
interventions,  but  tried  to  mainstream  protection  under  the  “do  no  harm” 
principle.  The  multi-country  approach  allows  better  understanding  of  the  various 
dynamics of the Syrian conflict and its spill-overs into neighbouring countries and 
significantly strengthens analytical and anticipation capacities as regards population 
protection and staff security. 

  JC 13.2. ECHO partners provided evidence that consortium and multi-
country arrangements reduced coverage gaps and duplications between 
countries and partner organisations 

  Being  multi-country  also  allows  diversification  of  operational  options  and 
adaptation of programmes to a possible deterioration of the situation (shifting part 
of  the  aid  planned  for  one  area  to  another,  in  particular  in  areas  where  internal 
displacements  and  cross-border  movements  expose  people  to  more  aggression, 
violence  and  breaches  of  IHL  and  IRL,  thus  increasing  protection  needs).  If  the 
situation  allows,  the  regional  geographical  set-up 
is  seen  as  significantly 
strengthening the position of any serious partner involved in protection in a range 
of difficult areas (ICRC, UNHCR and DRC, for instance). 

EQ 14  -  ECHO successfulness to coordinate operations with other main actors 

JC 14.1 Actions undertaken to enhance coordination 
  ECHO is involved in humanitarian donor coordination and this is one of its strongest 
pillars.  ECHO  is  also  a  member  of  the  Interagency  Task  Force  and  of  the 
Humanitarian Country Team, as an active observer.  

  ECHO supports OCHA in its coordination role. 

JC 14.2 ECHO identified and took account of main actors’ activities 
  ECHO analyses the activities and how they are coordinated at different stages in the 

programming process through:  
o  HIP discussions 
o  Single form preparation and reporting 
o  ECHO field reviews 
o  Coordination processes 

JC 14.3 ECHO’s actions sought to enhance synergies and reduce duplications of 
effort, gaps or resource conflicts 
  The  single  form  makes  compulsory  the  mention  of  how  partners  are  involved  in 
coordination to avoid duplication and gaps. This is regularly reviewed by ECHO TAs 

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as they are involved in many coordination efforts, including with other humanitarian 
donors. 

JC 14.4 ECHO actions demonstrated synergies and no duplications of effort, gaps 
or resource conflicts 

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EQ15 – Mainstreaming of LRRD 

In  the  context  of  Jordan,  it  is  important  to  state  that  we  are  not  in  a  classical  LRRD 
situation  but  more  in  a  state  of  transition  from  acute  emergency  to  protracted  crisis, 
articulating short and long terms, specifically involving: 

 

initial  investment  in  camp  infrastructure covering priority humanitarian needs 
of  camp  residents,  ECHO’s  per capita  funding  of  the  camps  has  fallen  since  mid-
2014 as the initial infrastructure investments have mostly been completed and the 
marginal cost has decreased. For this reason, ECHO will cease to support partners 
in in-camp WASH and shelter activities in 2015;  but 

  continuing ECHO support  for  refugees in camps  to support the most vulnerable 
who  have  no  other  option  but  to  stay  in  the  camps.  Priority  will  be  given  to  the 
most vulnerable, including women and children. 

JC 15.1 ECHO coordinated with EC development actors (DG DEVCO, EEAS, and 
EU MS) from the earliest phases of the crisis response 

It is important to note that ECHO has been concerned by a set of specific issues, viz.: 

- 

- 

the duration of the crisis and the limited adaptation of emergency response 
to  protracted  needs:  when  a  displacement  lasts  more  than  a  few  months,  the 
needs evolve and the means of responding to them has to adjust and adapt to these 
new challenges;   
the plight of the host populations: the demand by the Jordanian authorities that 
30%  of  the  funds  should  be  systematically  allocated  to  vulnerable  Jordanians  has 
created  a  feeling  of  unease,  as  their  difficulties  are  not  solely  the  result  of  the 
refugee  influx,  but also the impact of reduced  resilience  due  to unsustainable and 
unfair development. ECHO has underlined several times their efforts to bring on 
board development donors to respond strategically to this issue.   

JC 15.2 ECHO deployed the various instruments available to implement stability 
measures in a coherent and complementary fashion with the EU toolbox 
In  2014,  ECHO’s  Amman  office  began  working  with  the  EU  Delegation  on  the 
development of a Joint  Humanitarian  and Development Framework (JHDF). The  JHDF 
negotiations  seek  to  ensure  that  ECHO  operations  go  beyond  coherence  with  other 
policies in the country and towards complementarity. One example would be the potential 
use  of  IfS  and  other  tools  to  address  host  community  tensions  in  the  perspective  of  a 
protracted  crisis,  or  the  inclusion  of  Syrian  refugees  in  NEAR-funded  livelihood 
programmes.  This  drive  corresponds  to  the  broad-based  movement  towards  resilience  in 
the 3RP response plan.  

JC 15.3 ECHO-funded actions have been based on a strong context analysis 

JC 15.4 ECHO-funded projects have been framed in the context of longer-term 
requirements of reconstruction and development 
ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91018  (DRC):  this  ECHO-funded  DRC  project  specifically 
seeks  durable  solutions  for  the  long-term  displaced  Syrian  population.  In  Jordan,  DRC 

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used  recurrent  monthly  cash  transfers  to  increase  livelihood  options  and  support  the 
monthly costs for refugees living out-of-camp. 
EQ16 – Success in terms of LRRD 

JC 16.1 ECHO-funded operations have been implemented through rapid decision-
making processes and flexible instruments 

JC 16.2 ECHO provided a coordinated response strategy through its actions 
ECHO  has  noted  significant  LRRD  concerns  regarding  Syrian  refugees  inside  Jordan, 
including the depletion of refugees’ own resources and the use of negative coping strategies 
to enhance livelihoods.  

JC 16.3 ECHO engaged with a range of locally important actors through its actions 
Education  services in Za’atari are provided through three schools operating on double-
shifts.  55%  of  the  28,000  school-age  children  in  Za’atari  are  enrolled,  whilst  13%  are 
engaged in child labour. UNICEF partners also provide child protection case management, 
psychosocial  support  and  recreational  activities  for  children.  The  desire  to  continue 
education has also been cited as a reason for returning to Syria.165 

JC 16.4 ECHO-funded interventions experienced a smooth and timely phase-out, 
thereby avoiding “grey zones” in international assistance 
 

Food  rations  for  refugees  in-camp  continue  to  need  full  support  from  donor 
funding.  The  shift  from  in-kind  to  voucher  systems  in  Za’atari  was  viewed  as  a 
success, Azraq having introduced a similar system from the outset. 
In  contrast  with  phasing-out  operations,  several  projects  in  non-camp  settings  in 
Jordan are being continued and rolled over in the context of a potentially protracted 
and 
ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91018 
crisis, 
ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91024  (IRC).  Nevertheless,  development  of  the  Joint 
Development and Humanitarian Framework (see EQ 15 above) may address future 
phase-out challenges in the years to come. 

(DRC) 

e.g. 

 

 

JC16.5 ECHO-funded actions encouraged “cross-learning” of humanitarian and 
development experiences 
 

ECHO  supports  the  production  of  several  studies  and  advocacy  documents, 
including  lessons  learned,  which  all  represent  interesting  opportunities  for  cross-
learning, first of all among humanitarian actors; 
The  only  areas  for  cross-learning  between  humanitarian  and  development  actors  at 
this stage are: 
o 
o 

the discussions around the JHDF at Delegation level; 
the discussions with certain partners which also have “development resources” 
(for  instance  the  French  Red  Cross,  which  is  an  ECHO  partner  with  large 
programmes under a Red Cross Consortium, financed by the Agence Française 
de Développement for a programme in Amman. 

165   UNHCR (2015) Factsheet Za’atari Refugee Camp, April 2015. UNHCR. 

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EQ17,  (Security)  To  what  extent  have  the  ECHO-funded  projects  taken  into 
account  the  security  situation  in  the  field  for  the  partners'  organisations?  What  is 
the scope for improvement? 

JC 17.1. The design of ECHO-funded actions has been based on an in-depth 
knowledge of the security situation, both in Syria and in neighbouring countries 

Security  in  Jordan  is  not  a  strong  concern  for  the  aid  agencies  as  the  Jordanian  security 
apparatus  seems  to  be  extremely  effective.  However,  there  exists  a  security  reference 
person in every ECHO partner. 

JC 17.2. The design and implementation of ECHO-funded actions facilitated 
humanitarian access for partner organizations 

ECHO  engagement  in  supporting  access  to  affected  populations  by  its  partners  takes 
several forms: 
 

engagement  on  specific  issues  (for  instance  with  UNHCR  on  police  round-up  of 
refugees in Jordanian cities); 
engagement  with  ICRC  on  improving  access  to  and  delivery  of  assistance  and 
protection in  the  “no-man’s land” at the Jordan-Syria  border. This  has involved  inter 
alia joint visits to the border area. 

 

The fact that this engagement is also accompanied by funding greatly facilitates the impact 
of ECHO advocacy towards its partners. 

JC 17.3. ECHO-funded actions promoted the security and safety of humanitarian 
personnel delivering humanitarian aid 

See 17.1 

EQ18 (Humanitarian advocacy) How effective and active has ECHO been in terms 
of  Humanitarian  Advocacy  (on  issues  like  coordination,  access,  open  borders, 
cross-line intervention, INGO registration, work permits, etc.)?  

JC 18.1. Advocacy has been a priority of ECHO response strategies for Syria and its 
neighbouring countries 

ECHO has repeatedly made presentations to COHAFA and to other fora in the EU about 
the need  to protect and assist the Syrian  population and the affected inhabitants of   host 
countries.  

JC 18.2. ECHO advocacy contributed to concrete policy changes in neighbouring 
countries  

ECHO is marginally involved with the EU Delegation in Amman and much more involved 
with  other  humanitarian  donors 
in  discussions  with  the  national  authorities  on 
humanitarian access (opening or closing borders), camps and non-camp management. 

ECHO undertakes considerable advocacy with UN agencies:  

  With some success: ECHO made much effort to persuade UNHCR to design timely 
winterization  programmes  for  2013.  It  came  too  late  and  was  of  poor  quality,  so 
ECHO decided not to finance it. The following year the same situation occurred but 

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finally,  under  much  pressure  from  ECHO,  UNHCR  managed  to  present  a  better 
action plan for winterization. 

  With total lack of success: 

o  advocacy in pressing WFP to move more quickly to a cash system; 
o  advocacy for improving coordination between HCR-OCHA. 

JC 18.3. ECHO advocacy contributed to changes in approach by other donors in 
Syria and neighbouring countries 
ECHO’s  efforts  in  advocacy,  together  with  DFID  and  BPRM,  probably  influence  other 
donors, for instance in garnering wider support for the Jordanian health system in response 
to  the  strain  placed  on  Jordanian  infrastructure  by  the  long-term  presence  of  such  large 
numbers of refugees. 

JC 18.4. ECHO advocacy contributed to increased coordination between donors 
and governments in Syria and neighbouring countries 

ECHO is always very engaged in coordination efforts between donors, the aid community 
and, when required, governments, although coordination with the latter, while encouraged 
by ECHO, is often left to the operational partners.  

4.  Country-specific conclusions 

4.1.  Addressing complexity and adjusting to a protracted crisis 

The complexity of the context in Jordan presents several critical challenges, viz.: 

-  managing and funding humanitarian contexts in which crises are linked to a range 
of  factors  and  earlier  events,  especially  the  Palestinian  and  Iraq  crises  and  their 
different  phases.  These  different  layers  all  have  their  impact  on  Jordanian  society 
and its perception of refugees, exile and asylum. ECHO’s role in navigating these 
different priorities is relatively complex 
the  complexity  of  moving  from  emergency  response  to  a  situation  of 
protractedness; 

- 

-  decreasing coping capacities of all stakeholders; 
- 
the total absence of a political perspective; 
-  decreasing donor funding capacity; 
- 

a context in which stability and regional security is at stake. 

In that type of context flexible funding, with a capacity to programme over a period longer 
than one year, and readiness to explore operational options beyond classical humanitarian 
aid, is essential.  
Responding  to  the  protection  and  assistance  needs  of  Syrian  refugees  will  require  much 
stronger  engagement  with  municipal  authorities  and  clearer  signals  from  development 
agencies that they are also ready to engage more forcefully in helping Jordan’s population. 
Otherwise  the  more  vulnerable  non-camp  refugees  will  either  move  to  camps  or  try  to 
return to Syria, with all the associated risks.  

4.2.  Addressing unpredictability and uncertainty: the “no regret” 

approach.  

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The difficulties in planning the sizes of the camps and in calibrating the level of services in 
a time of high uncertainty highlights the need for a degree of courage and a capacity to take 
some  proactive  decisions  in  the  full  knowledge  that  there  remains  a  risk  of  making 
mistakes.  Risk-taking  is  an  attitude  less  and  less  frequent  in  the  humanitarian  sector  and 
ECHO TAs should be enabled to support such an approach, provided that it is done in a 
transparent  manner  with  the  relevant  hypotheses  clearly  laid  down  on  the  table  for 
discussion. 

4.3.  Camp and non-camp refugees  

Owing  to  its  presence  in  Jordan  prior  to  the  crisis,  ECHO  was  able  to  provide  early 
support to its partners, mainly UNHCR, involved in camp settings. In Za’atari camp care 
and  maintenance  are  needed  as  the  camp  is  densely  populated.  The  need  to  design 
additional camps to ensure that there exists capacity to cope with any potential additional 
influx  of  Syrian  refugees  led  to  creation  of  the  Azraq  camp,  which  is  still  largely 
underutilized. The situation of these camps is relatively stable, with the possibility that the 
robust policy of the GoJ will trigger further movements to camps. The situation is far more 
precarious  for  non-camp  refugees  who  are  less  and  less  welcomed  by  the  Jordanian 
Authorities. Protection of and assistance for them is more complex, labour intensive and 
far  less  visible.  While  some  manage  to  find  different  kinds  of  livelihood  in  the  informal 
sector  (construction,  agriculture,  etc.),  many  others  are  struggling  against  many  odds  to 
survive and their situation will become even harder if GoJ’s tightened policy is confirmed.  

4.4.  Appropriate human resources 

While  ECHO  has  been  present  in  Amman  for  a  long  period  with  the  RSO,  the  slow 
adaptation  of  its  capacity  to  cope  with  the  rapid  increase  of  work  has  been  a  source  of 
much hardship, burnout and disarray at all levels in ECHO. While the setup is now seen as 
optimal,  new  rumours  of  reorganization  are  creating  another  phase  of  destabilization, 
which is not conducive to effective and efficient delivery. The appropriateness of staffing is 
made even more important as many actors see in ECHO an extremely valuable donor, as 
the TAs often play as much a role of strategic partner as of donor.  

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Lebanon Country Report 

LEBANON COUNTRY REPORT ............................................................................................ 229 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 
5. 

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 231 
1.1.Methodology ............................................................................................................................ 231 
1.2.Structure of the Lebanon Country Report .......................................................................... 231 
CONTEXT .................................................................................................................................. 232 
2.1.Lebanon context ..................................................................................................................... 232 
2.2.The humanitarian context in Lebanon ................................................................................ 232 
OVERVIEW OF THE ECHO APPROACH IN THE COUNTRY ................................................. 239 
3.1.Newcomers programme......................................................................................................... 239 
3.2.Overview of funding and activities undertaken in the country ........................................ 240 
KEY FINDINGS WITH RESPECT TO EVALUATION QUESTIONS .......................................... 242 
TENTATIVE CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 258 

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1.  Introduction 

This Lebanon Country report is part of the broader external evaluation process carried out 
on the ECHO response to the Syria crisis.  

1.1.  Methodology 

The methodology applied for this case study is based on four pillars: 

-  Documents  reviewed:  in  addition  to  the  desk  study,  additional  documents  on  the 

context, projects, needs and impact have been gathered in the field and analyzed  
Interviews with key stakeholders  

- 

o  ECHO and other services of the EC’s Delegation in Beirut 
o  DFID,  French Embassy, Swiss SDC, Spanish Embassy; 
o  UN Agencies (HC, UNHCR, OCHA, UNDP, WFP) 
o  I NGOs (DRC, NRC, WA, PU-AMI, OXFAM; TDH-I) 
o  L-NGOs (Amel, Naba’a) 
o  National actors (in Tripoli and in the Bekaa Valley) 

-  Three field visits in the North (Tripoli) and in the Bekaa Valley (Zahle and Baalbeck) 
- 

Initial briefing and final debriefing with ECHO staff to validate the findings and review 
the initial and tentative conclusions. 

1.2.  Structure of the Lebanon Country Report 

The structure of the Lebanon country report is as follows: 

 Section 1: Introduction 

  Description of the methodology  
  Description of the structure of the country report 

 Section 2: The context in Lebanon 

  Brief overview of the socio-economic context  
  Brief description of the constraints faced by the Syrian refugees 
  Brief description of the national and international response in Lebanon 

 Section 3: Overview of the ECHO approach in the country 

  Overview of ECHO’s overall approach and main priorities in Lebanon 
  Overview of funding and activities undertaken in Lebanon 

 Section 4: Key findings with respect to the Evaluation Questions  

 Section 5: Tentative conclusion  

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2.  Context 

2.1.  Lebanon context  

Lebanon  is  a  small,  high-middle  income  country  of  4.5  million  people  (plus  a  large 
diaspora of several million), with an area of 10,452 km2, and an average GDP per capita of 
around US$18,100 in 2014. It is one of the few countries in the region with ample water 
resources and plentiful  rainfall. Its  service-based  economy  is driven by a dynamic  private 
sector and is highly dependent on the Arab Gulf economies. Lebanon is a sectarian-based 
consensual  democracy  in  which  political  authority  is  shared  among  confessional  groups 
(largely between representatives of the Christian and Muslim communities). The President, 
the Prime Minister, and the Speaker of Parliament share power. The consensual nature of 
the  country’s  governance  system  renders  policy  decision-making  lengthy  and  can  create 
deadlocks that have, in the past, derailed government’s drive for reform. 166 

One of the key issues facing Lebanon is the economic and social impact of the Syrian crisis, 
now  entering  its  fifth  year.  Over  one  million  Syrians,  about  a  quarter  of  the  Lebanese 
population,  have  taken  refuge  in  Lebanon  since  the  conflict  started  in  March  2011  (see 
section 2.2), straining public finances, service delivery and the environment. It is estimated 
that as a result of the Syrian crisis, some 170,000 additional Lebanese had been pushed into 
poverty (above the current 1 million) by the end of 2014; an additional 220,000 to 320,000 
Lebanese  citizens  are  estimated  to  have  become  unemployed,  most  of  them  unskilled 
youth.167 

The  international  community  realised  very  rapidly  that  the  existing  high  level  of 
governmental instability was at stake if the GoL was left to handle the Syrian refugee crisis 
alone.  This  lead  to  early  mobilization  not  only  of  humanitarian  aid,  but  also  of 
development funds to support the capacity of decaying Lebanese infrastructures (notably in 
water and education) to cope with the influx of new users.  

2.2.  The humanitarian context in Lebanon 

2.2.1.  Refugees in Lebanon  

Over 1 million Syrian refugees have been registered by UNHCR inside Lebanon over the 
2012-2014 period. With a pre-crisis population of approximately 4 million, the end of the 
evaluation period (1 January 2012 – 31 December 2014) saw Lebanon hosting the largest 
per  capita  refugee  population  in  the  world,  at  more  than  one  quarter  of  the  country’s 
population.168 

The  following  figure  presents  the  evolution  of  registered  refugees  over  the  evaluation 
period. The registration rate increased significantly in the first quarter of January 2013 and 
maintained a near constant level until the end of 2014. Since then, registered numbers of 

166     http://www-

wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2010/08/04/000112742_20100804174523/Re
ndered/PDF/546900LB0R201010198.pdf and https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/le.html  

167     http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/lebanon/overview  

168    ECHO (2015) ‘Syria Crisis ECHO Factsheet April 2015’ 

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refugees  have  flattened.  On  6  May  2015,  UNHCR  Lebanon  temporarily  suspended  new 
registrations in accordance with the instructions of the Government of Lebanon.169 

Figure 1 – Evolution of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (Jan. 2012 - Jan. 2015) 

Source: ADE analysis, based on UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response, Inter-agency 
Information Sharing Portal, data extracted on 3 December 2015 

The  refugees  have  progressively  increased  their  presence  in  many  parts  of  the  country: 
Bekaa Valley, adjacent to Syria (418,189), Beirut (346,125), North Lebanon (286,882), and 
South Lebanon (140,255).170 Given the non-camp policy of the GoL (mainly due to its past 
experience with Palestinian refugees), Syrian refugees are dispersed throughout urban and 
peri-urban  host  communities,  in  family  flats,  small  informal  tented  settlements,  or  in 
collective centres.  

169

 UNHCR 

(2015) 

Syria 

Portal, 

Lebanon 

profile. 

Accessed 

on 

3  December 

2015 

(http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122). 

170     ECHO (2015) ‘Syria Crisis ECHO Factsheet April 2015’ 

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00,20,40,60,811,21,427/01/201227/01/201327/01/201427/01/2015MillionsRegisteredSyrianrefugeesin Lebanon(Evaluation period: 2012-2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
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Figure 2 – Evolution of Registered Refugees in Lebanon 

Source: UNHCR Syria Portal 

Until October 2014, the Lebanese government operated an open-border policy with Syria. 
Lebanon is not a state party to the 1951 convention relating to the status of refugees, and 
has  not  signed  the  1967  convention.  Indeed  Lebanon  refers  to  the  Syrian  refugees  as 
‘displaced’.171 The GoL’s new border policy, issued in December 2014, seeks to reduce the 
numbers of Syrian refuges in its territory and ease the burden on host communities. Syrians 
(and Palestinians from Syria) seeking entry from Syria are required to provide evidence that 
they  fall  into  one  of  nine  eligible  categories  or  that  they  are  sponsored  by  a  Lebanese 
citizen.  The  new  policy  also  allows  Lebanon  to  revoke  refugee  status  from  those  who 
violate Lebanese laws, their conditions of entry, or who repeatedly travel between Lebanon 
and Syria.172  

The lack of official status for many of the refugees, and the subsequent risk of harassment 
by the Lebanese security forces, has resulted in restrictions on their movements and in their 
not seeking health care even when sick. This is particularly the case for men.  

2.2.2 Key issues 

  Shelter remains a serious concern for the vast majority of refugee families. Almost all 
refugees pay rent, even if many live in very poor shelters such as garages and tents. The 
number  of  house  evictions  and  dismantling  of  informal  refugee  settlements  is 
increasing,  and  forced  repatriations  to  Syria,  regular  deportations  and  backflows  of 
vulnerable persons have been reported.173  

171   3RP (2014) ‘Regional Refugee and Resilience plan 2015-2016 – Lebanon’, p.3 
172   ECHO (2014) ‘Briefing update on ECHO's operations in LEBANON’. 
173   ECHO (2015) ‘Syria Crisis ECHO Factsheet April 2015’ 

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Figure 3 – Syrian refugees by type of settlement in Lebanon 

Source: VaSyR, 2014 

  The majority of Syrian refugees in Lebanon are poor. After four years in Lebanon, the 
refugees  are  experiencing  a  deterioration  of  their  economic  situation  (VaSyr  2015 
preliminary results). This is partly due to a reduction in humanitarian assistance, lack of 
access to employment opportunities, diminution of the legal status of refugees in the 
country,  and  depletion  of  their  financial  and  asset  reserves.  At  the  same  time,  the 
economic conditions of the poorest Lebanese have also followed the same pattern of 
degradation,  albeit  for  different  reasons,  such  as  reductions  in  daily  employment 
opportunities,  and  competition  for  jobs  with  the  cheaper  and  more  easily  exploitable 
Syrian work force. 

  Tensions  with  local  communities  have  increased,  notably  due  to  the  economic 
concerns mentioned above, and also due to security concerns. A few thousand Syrian 
refugees  have,  for  instance,  experienced  disputes  over  land  and  rent-related  housing 
tenure. In 2014, extremist armed groups crossed into Lebanon from Syria and clashed 
with  the  Lebanese  Armed  Forces,  resulting  in  the  displacement  of  communities. 
Lebanese leaders have been increasingly active in easing tensions.174 

174   3RP (2014) ‘Regional Refugee and Resilience plan 2015-2016 – Lebanon’, p.4 

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  Over  the  evaluation  period,  access  to  basic  services,  particularly  health  services,  has 
become  more  expensive  and  more  difficult,  especially  following  the  reduction  of 
services at subsidized prices. This reduction of access is compounded by the healthcare 
system in Lebanon, consisting essentially of private and for-profit health centres, clinics 
and hospitals charging very high prices, and with a secondary level barely accessible to 
Syrian refugees (UNHCR 2014 secondary health care results). Certain services, such as 
immunizations, pre- and post-natal care, and chronic diseases, have very low coverage 
in the “supported” health services for both Syrian refugees and the poorer sections of 

The situation faced by refugees can be summarised as follows1: 
  Food: 74% of displaced Syrians are considered food-insecure. 
 

Shelter: 55% of persons displaced from Syria live in sub-standard shelters, including 16 per cent 
in informal settlements. 

  Education: 280,000 school-aged Syrian children were out of school during the 2013-2014 school 

year. 

  Health: The displaced from Syria increasingly need subsidization and assistance in accessing basic 
healthcare. The risk of infectious disease is also rising for children in the context of lower average 
immunization rates. 

  WASH: A third of displaced Syrians lack safe water access. 12% of displaced Syrian households 

have no access to bathrooms. 

  Many children displaced from Syria reportedly need psychosocial care to recover from traumatic 

events and address behavioral issues. 

the  Lebanese  population.  In  the  case  of  chronic  diseases,  which  have  a  very  high 
prevalence in both the Syrian and Lebanese populations, this not only represents a very 
high cost for the patient, but also increased risk and additional cost when secondary or 
tertiary care is needed.  

2.2.3 International response 

  With US$2.2 billion received during the period 2012-2014, Lebanon has accounted for 
the largest share of humanitarian donors’ support to the Syrian crisis in the region.  

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Figure 4 – Humanitarian donor contributions in Lebanon 2012-2014 (US$ million) 

Source: Evaluation Inventory (based on FTS extraction) 

  There  was  a  significant  increase  in  humanitarian  donor  contributions  from  2012  to 
2013, and an average  contribution of US$1  billion in 2013 and 2014. The increase  in 
contributions  followed  the  rise  in  the  refugee  influx.  The  USA  has  been  the  main 
donor,  providing  27%  of  the  contributions,  followed  by  ECHO  (10%)  and  two  EU 
Member States,  namely  the UK  (9%) and  Germany (6%). As the GoL indicated that 
the handling of that crisis should largely be undertaken by the international community, 
a  combination  of  UN  agencies  and  national  and  international  NGOs  have  mobilized 
themselves  in  response  to  the  situation.  UNHCR  was  mandated  to  take  on  the 
international  coordination  role,  while  on  the  side  of  the  GoL,  the  High  Relief 
Committee,  attached  to  the  Prime  Minister’s  Office,  was  designated  as  the  key  focal 
point.  

Figure 5 – Contributions by Donors in Lebanon (US$ million) 

Source: Evaluation Inventory (based on FTS extraction) 

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Source: ADE020040060080010001200Lebanon: contributions by year1.01bn3%201220132014130m1.04bnTotal committed: US$ 2.2bn(US$ millions)Source: ADE0100200300400500600700Lebanon: contributions by donor59827%10%2%4%4%5%5%6%6%9%228205126124103102887753USAECHOUKGermanyKuwaitWFPEC(nonECHO)CanadaVarious(unspecified)JapanTotal committed: US$ 2.2bn(US$ millions) 
 
 
 
 
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  Over 80% of donor contributions were dedicated to multi-sector support. Support for 
the  provision  of  food  (3%),  shelter  and  NFIs  (2%),  and  health  (2%)  together 
represented  7%  of  contributions.  The  remaining  9%  consisted  of  support  to  non-
specified and other sectors (including water and sanitation, education, and protection).  

Figure 6 – Donor contributions in Lebanon by sector 2012-2014 (US$ million) 

Source: Evaluation Inventory (based on FTS extraction) 

  There has been an evolution among the international community in its understanding 
of the Syrian crisis, from its being a humanitarian crisis to its being both a humanitarian 
and development crisis. In consequence, the 3RP plan 2015-2016 includes a resilience 
dimension which aims at supporting investments in long-term development solutions 
and resilience-building in addition to humanitarian assistance. From the US$1.97 billion 
foreseen  in  the  3RP,  a  budget  of  US$724  million  was  dedicated  to  the  resilience 
component.175 

175   UNHCR and UNDP (2015) ‘3RP Update – Issue 4, p.2 

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Source: ADEShelter& NFIs2% (US$ 51.8m) Unspecified8% (US$ 167m) Food 3% (US$ 61.4m) Health2% (US$ 43.7m) Multi-sector(US$ 1.8bn) Lebanon: contributions by sector84%Other11% (US$ 31.1m) 1 Other: Water/sanitation, educationand protectionTotal committed: US$ 2.2bn 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
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3.  Overview of the ECHO approach in the country  

3.1.  Newcomers programme  

During  the  period  under  review,  ECHO  supported  a  “flagship  programme”,  the 
Newcomers programme, which started in August 2012 and was scaled up in January 2013. 
This programme aimed at providing a fast response to the needs of newly-arriving Syrian 
refugees until they could be taken care of by normal UNHCR activities; more specifically: 

  newcomers  were  assisted  with  non-food  items  (blankets,  mattresses,  kitchen  kit, 
hygiene kit and baby kit, if applicable, worth on average $300 for a standard family of 
five  people)  and  food  assistance  (provided  by  WFP,  worth  $105  for  the  same  sized 
family); 

 

the programme relied on a well-connected network of local focal points (municipalities, 
community  focal  points,  mayors,  NGOs  and  in  some  cases  other  newcomers 
themselves) to identify beneficiaries.  

The programme was implemented to cover the needs of new arrivals up until registration 
with UNHCR when the waiting period exceeded three months. By end of February 2014, 
the  registration  waiting  period  had  decreased  significantly  to  an  average  of  22  days 
countrywide,  and  refugees  had  access  to  assistance  one  or  two  weeks  later.  However, 
assistance for registration did not include the package provided to newcomers, for instance 
blankets, mattresses, and kitchen kits. With the likely permanent closure of the borders, the 
newcomers’ operations have been redirected, using the available stocks of non-food items 
or  NFIs  (blankets,  stoves,  fuel,  etc.)  for  winterization  activities  and  for  provision  of 
assistance, notably to victims of secondary displacement and evictees.  

ECHO’s  contribution  to  the  Newcomers  programme  in  Lebanon  is  shown  in  the  table 
below. DRC has been the leading agency, targeting around 25,000 newcomers per month 
in the North, South and Bekaa governorates. UNHCR has assumed the role of ‘provider of 
last  resort’  or  ‘gap  filler’  to  the  newcomer  programmes  implemented  through  ECHO 
partners. 

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Table 1 – ECHO funded newcomers projects 

ECHO Partner 

Newcomers 

HH 

Budget NC  (€) 

 DRC  

305,000 

70,930 

 SOLIDARITES  

 STC  

 CARITAS-FR  

 MEDAIR  

 MERCY CORPS  

 WA-UK  

 HI  

 ICRC  

 OXFAM  

 TDH-IT  

 AVSI  

 GVC  

Total 

15,000 

29,250 

17,650 

6,170 

10,290 

4,800 

33,000 

25,000 

5,000 

2,100 

1,750 

3,488 

5,850 

5,230 

1,435 

730 

1,116 

7,674 

5,814 

1,163 

488 

407 

17,400 

4,047 

472,410 

108,373 

8,084,037 

810,000 

2,350,000 

734,000 

250,000 

300,000 

300,000 

1,000,000 

815,000 

200,000 

220,000 

302,000 

1,500,000 

16,865,037 

Source: ECHO (2014) ‘Newcomers Paper’ 

ECHO  has  also  been  very  involved  in  the  discussions  on  transfer  modalities.  Indeed, 
different  transfer modalities co-exist in Lebanon, with the need  to find optimal synergies 
and  enhanced  effectiveness  while  still  being  able  to  ensure  that  “niches”  can  be  reached 
and that emerging constraints are not jeopardizing access to transfer modality mechanisms.  

3.2.  Overview of funding and activities undertaken in the country 

After Syria, Lebanon is the second beneficiary of ECHO support for the Syrian crisis, with 
25% of the funding over the period. ECHO’s HIPs over the period 2012-2014 focused on 
the following areas for support of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, viz.: 

  Half of ECHO’s support for Syrian refugees in Lebanon during the period 2012-
2014 was for shelter (53%). This took several forms, from unconditional cash that 
could be used for the renting of houses or flats, to more sophisticated programmes 
involving basic repair or quadripartite contracting (between house-owner, refugee, 
NGO and municipality) in order to improve tenancy security for the refugee. 

  Multi-sector support (21%), and food support (10%) together represented 31% of 

ECHO’s funding over the evaluation period. 

  Health and medical support (7%), protection (5%), and water and sanitation (4%) 

represented the remaining 16%.  

  Specific  support  for  winterization  has  been  a  key  component  of  the  ECHO-
supported response as the weather in the Bekaa Valley has been extremely severe 
over recent winters, with several snowstorms. 

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ECHO funds were channelled through a range of implementing partners, UNHCR being 
the  main  one.  The  ten  largest  implementing  partners  represented  81%  of  total 
commitments in Lebanon.  

  Figure 7 – Snapshot of ECHO’s response in Lebanon 2012-2014

Source: Evaluation Inventory (based on FTS extraction) 

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ECHO fundingper sector–Lebanon53%21%10%5%7%Shelter(€88.8m)Multi-sector(€35.9m)Food(€17.6m)Healthandmedical(€11.1m)Protection(€8.4m)Water/sanitation(€6.9m)4%Total:€169mTop 10 ECHO implementingpartners–Lebanon49.224.41710.69.17.15.85.44.64.30102030405060UNHCRDRCWFPHINRCSCSave TheChildrenMEDAIRPU-AMIDRC(€m)€137.6m (81% of total commitmentin Lebanon)Source: ADE Evaluation Inventory, 2015 
 
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4.  Key findings with respect to Evaluation Questions 

EQ 1 – Good Humanitarian Donorship 

JC 1.1 ECHO deployed specific decisions and actions to ensure consistency with 
the 23 principles in the Syria crisis response 

ECHO TAs acknowledged a certain level of understanding of what the GHDI stands for, 
especially regarding the engagement of donors on humanitarian principles. The GHDI is to 
some  extent  perceived  as  relating  to  HQ  policies  rather  than  to  the  field,  for  instance  as 
regards to harmonization and simplification of reporting.   

 JC 1.2 There are specific examples of where the Syria response was (or was not) in 
line with the 23 Principles 

Even  if  the  HIP  ensured  a  certain  level  of  advanced  understanding  of  the  amounts  of 
resources available and of ECHO’s strategy, it remained difficult to ensure predictability in 
the  funding  of  partners.  This  was  further  accentuated  by  the  relative  unpredictability  of 
funds (cf. for instance  the system  of top-up) and  the  fact that the  strategy could only be 
revised  when  new  resources  were  allocated.  In  that  context,  the  implementing  partners 
would  have  welcomed  a  clear  strategy  from  ECHO.  However,  they  all  recognized  that 
ECHO had made efforts to adapt its resources to the needs faced by the partners as regard 
to the crisis. 

EQ 2-Consultation of local and regional communities 

JC 2.1. ECHO or its partners deployed specific measures for involving local and 
regional communities  

ECHO  partners  regularly  managed  to  engage  with  local  structures  deeply  rooted  in  the 
communities (Naddah for the Palestinian Syrian  refugees, for instance).  Other structures, 
such  as  the  Welfare  Association  (WA)  or  Amel,  are  Lebanese  NGOs  that  have  been 
involved for years with communities and are now opening international offices in Europe. 
This  should  increase  their  visibility  and  contribute  to  their  involvement  as  partners  of 
ECHO and international NGOs.  

JC 2.2. ECHO and/or partner monitoring mechanisms took account of beneficiary 
views and provided appropriate feedback loops to funding officers 

Consultations  and  focus  groups  with  refugees  are  organised  by  partners  in  Lebanon. 
However, they provide a feed-back loop to project managers and technical staff rather than 
to funding officers. 

EQ3  –  To  what  extent  have  the  design  and  implementation  of  ECHO-funded 
interventions  taken  into  account  the  needs  of  the  most  vulnerable  people  in  the 
region, in particular women, children, elderly and disabled people? 

JC 3.1 ECHO deployed specific measures/a specific approach/strategy to make 
sure ECHO-funded interventions  took into account the needs  of the most 
vulnerable people in the region both at design and implementation stages 

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Systematic needs assessments are reported by implementing partners and are a prerequisite 
for preparing an e-single-form. Implementing partners have also reported that they have to 
be  more  restrictive  in  how  they  select  the  beneficiaries  as  resources  become  more 
stretched.  However,  the  fact  that  the  population  is  not  in  camps  but  rather  dispersed  in 
family flats, small, informal tented settlements or collective centres makes it a challenge to 
identify  the  most  vulnerable  and  where  they  are.  Partners  also  report  challenges  in 
collecting  information  on  refugees,  especially  given  the  highly  labour-intensive  process 
required  for  this  type  of  situation  with  a  high  level  of  dispersion,  but  also  because  some 
refugees do not wish to be identified as they do not always have all the papers needed.  

The  Vulnerability  Assessment  of  Syrian  Refugees  in  Lebanon  (VASyR)  represents  a 
significant inter-agency initiative and a useful source of information on vulnerability, yet it 
cannot explore all the key issues in detail. Some studies have been launched at project level 
to provide a more fine-tuned overview of the vulnerability of the population. 

JC 3.2 The design of ECHO-funded interventions reflects the needs of the most 
vulnerable people well 

The  Newcomers  programme  was  more  of  a  “blanket  programme”  than  a  programme 
designed  to  discriminate  between  different  groups  of  people  according  to  degree  of 
vulnerability. In almost all other supported programmes, partners have been requested to 
undertake significant efforts to improve targeting and to strengthen the focus on the most 
vulnerable groups. 

JC 3.3 ECHO took specific measures to ensure that during implementation, the 
needs of the most vulnerable people were taken into account 

ECHO  has  been  recognized  as  a  flexible  donor,  allowing  adaptation  to  changes 
encountered  during  the  implementation  of  its  support.  The  Newcomers  programme  is 
itself an innovation that was supported as deemed necessary during the  first  years of the 
Syrian  refugee  influx  into Lebanon. The dialogue between ECHO and its partners, along 
with  frequent  field  visits,  have  contributed  to  the  development  of  the  programme  over 
time,  taking  into  account  the  variations  in  the  needs  and  numbers  of  refugees  crossing 
borders.   

 EQ  4: To  what  extent  has  the  ECHO  intervention  taken  account  of  the  host 
populations,  and  what  concrete  measures  have  been  taken  to  address  their  needs 
and interests? 

JC 4.1. : ECHO applied a specific approach/strategy to make sure that the needs 
and interests of host populations were taken into account 

The interests of the host communities have been taken very seriously into account by the 
development  donors,  in  particular  the  development  institutions  of  the  EC,  to  ensure  the 
political stability of the country. ECHO did not develop a specific approach in this regard.  

JC 4.2 : ECHO took specific measures to address the needs and interests of host 
populations 

ECHO’s role was more of an “advocacy nature” within the EU Delegation and with other 
donors.  In  particular,  ECHO  has  tried  to  ensure  that  the  concerns  identified  by  their 

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partners  in  the  field  were  covered  by  the  other  instruments  of  the  EC  when  they  were 
mobilized.  

The  fact  that  the  GoL  does  not  provide  services  at  municipality  level  represents  a 
significant challenge. The lack of involvement of the GoL also inhibits resolution of some 
issues,  particularly  in  the  fields  of  infrastructure  (WASH)  and  social  housing  (shelter). 
When compatible with the response to the Syrian refugees’ needs and when resources were 
available, ECHO partners tried to fill some gaps in sectors not covered by the government, 
for instance in WASH. 

JC 4.3: The measures reached their objectives 

In  situations  of  permanent  political  instability,  when  there  is  often  nobody  to  sign 
documents  relating  to  the  disbursement  of  the  resources  of  bilateral  and  multilateral 
agreements, ECHO’s room is limited.  

In  that  context,  there  is  a  perception  in  some  circles  of  a  5-star  response  provided  to 
Syrians.  There  is  also  a  perception  that  Syrians  have  money,  and  that  the  international 
community has forgotten the Lebanese, especially the poor. 

EQ 5: A) To what extent have ECHO and its partners been successful in adapting 
their approach and addressing gaps to the shifting needs of the region, as the crisis 
has  evolved? B) Considering that project activities of partners  in many cases  have 
been  carried  over  from  one  funding  cycle  to  the  next,  to  what  extent  have  the 
partners  been  revising  their  approach  –  being  innovative  –  to  better  address  the 
needs? C) What modifications to approaches are needed for the future? 

JC 5.1 ECHO and its partners had a strategy to adapt their approach to the shifting 
needs of the region 

ECHO was the first humanitarian donor to open a permanent office in Lebanon. ECHO 
was  also  engaged  from  early  on  in  field  assessments  so  as  to  better  understand  the  local 
realities  and  to  decide  where  and  through  whom  to  allocate  resources.  ECHO  has  also 
rapidly engaged in consultation with the main actors (even those that were not its partners) 
in the different sectors so as to be able to adapt its approach and to better understand the 
needs of the population, their nature and their dynamics. The Newcomers programme, for 
instance, arose from the delays observed in registration (it requiring up to three months to 
become registered). 

 The  regular  engagement  of  ECHO  in  coordination  mechanisms  also  helped  identify 
emerging needs resulting from changing situations. Partners also reported strategic bilateral 
discussions  with  ECHO  on  changing  contexts  and  gaps  in  the  field,  and  the  possible 
repercussions on their ongoing programmes. 

 JC 5.2 ECHO and its partners have revised their approaches/interventions so as to 
better address the shifting needs of the region 

ECHO  and  its  partners  rapidly  initiated  the  Newcomers  programme.  Given  the  border 
restrictions that led to a reduction in newcomers, partners discussed with ECHO how to 
continue such projects. In one case the focus was shifted to the renovation of shelters.   

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 JC 5.3 In the case of project activities that have been carried over from one funding 
cycle to the next, ECHO partners adapted their approaches/interventions to the 
changed needs. 

Partners  have  reported  flexibility  from  ECHO  in  accepting  changes  in  response  to 
changing situations or when real problems (for instance, security) hinder implementation. 
Interactions  with  the  TAs  most  of  the  time  led  to  rapid  decisions  with  the  ECHO  field 
office.  Validation  at  other  levels,  especially  Brussels  desks,  often  took  more  time,  but  in 
most  instances  modifications  were  accepted  and  the  partner  had  either  to  undertake  a 
modification  of  the  e-single-form,  or  to  ensure  that  any  change  in  implementation  was 
reported in the interim report.   For instance, a partner has reported that it had a project 
for PRS that was banned by the government. A needs assessment was carried out, and it 
appeared that shelter was a real need. ECHO funds were then reallocated to shelter, which 
was new for the partner.  

Given the drastic change in the GoL’s policy towards refugees and, more specifically, the 
closure of borders from 24th October 2014, another partner had to modify its activities in 
2014. This was considered relevant and justified given the steep decrease in the number of 
refugees entering the country. Intensive communication and discussions have taken place 
in  the  field  in  order  to  channel  resources  to  some  of  the  pressing  needs  of  the  most 
vulnerable refugees. 

 JC 5.4 When adapting their approaches to changing needs, ECHO’s partners 
introduced specific innovations 

The main innovation is the emergence of the “basic needs” concept which brings together 
food,  NFI,  shelter,  and  so  forth.  It  can  be  implemented  through  a  single  card,  with  or 
without  unconditional  cash  transfer  (CT),  or  with  a  combination  of  unconditional  and 
targeted  CT.  The  other  interesting  evolution  is  the  fact  that,  following  ECHO’s 
recommendation, UNHCR has created a “coordination mechanism” dedicated to working 
with and for non-UNHCR partners. 

JC 5.5 Implications for ECHO (and partner) approaches relative to expected shifts 
in beneficiary needs 

When  the  HIP  was  regional,  modification  requests  in  response  to  changing  situations 
affecting  different  contexts  in  a  non-synchronous  manner  resulted  in  complex  processes 
requiring  several  exchanges.  The  related  workload  for  both  ECHO  and  its  partners  was 
high.  With  national  HIPs,  which  is  now  the  usual  response  model,  the  process  is  less 
complicated and less time-consuming.  

 EQ 6 – EU Added-Value 

JC 6.1 ECHO employed a specific approach and took specific initiatives to ensure it 
could provide added value 

ECHO’s  approach  to  ensuring  provision  of  value  added  to  both  its  partners  and  other 
donors  remains  anchored  in  the  presence  of  its  TAs,  who  are  able  to  move  much  more 
easily  in  the  field  than  many  other  donor  representatives.  The  rapid  reopening  of  the 
ECHO  office  in  the  EU  Delegation  in  Beirut  and  the  reinforced  manning  of  this  office 
with a second TA specialized in cash and food security gave ECHO an enhanced capacity 

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to follow developments (examples include the Bekaa situation during the incidents in the 
North), and to intervene in key humanitarian debates (on protection, cash, health, etc.). 

 JC 6.2 ECHO was recognised as providing specific types of added value in the 
context of the Syrian crisis 

ECHO is perceived as flexible in terms of funding requests as compared to other donors. 
Its  involvement  at  both  operational  and  strategic  levels  with  its  partners  is  well  received, 
even if disagreements have occurred (over cash, for instance). Its role in the debates is seen 
by its partners as creative and fostering innovation.  

ECHO  is  also  perceived  to  have  a  political  role  in  influencing  the  aid  agenda  and  the 
shaping of the  aid architecture (which is perceived as sometimes going  beyond a donor’s 
role). 

EQ 7 – Urban Settings 

JC 7.1 ECHO and its partner agencies employed a specific approach to embed 
urban issues within ECHO-funded projects in response to the Syrian crisis 

As  the  GoL  agreed  to  receive  Syrian  refugees  on  the  basis  of  a  “no  camp  policy”,  the 
refugees had to find other solutions to their shelter needs. Several options were identified: 
flats in unfinished houses for rent, unused parts of existing buildings in urban, peri-urban 
and  rural  areas,  collective  centres,  or  small  settlements  known  as  “informal  tented 
settlements”(a  group  of  tents  to  which  aid  agencies  deliver  basic  services,  e.g.  WASH, 
counselling, informal adult and child education).    

There  was  no  specific  approach  to  the  embedding  of  urban  issues,  but  there  was  an 
understanding that some of the key modalities used in camps (such as pit latrines) are not 
appropriate in urban (non-camp) environments. 

 JC 7.2 The design of ECHO-funded projects identified the major challenges that 
exist in urban settings in order to design interventions appropriate to these specific 
types of situation 

WASH: Most equipment is provided under a “life-saving” argument and is supposed to be 
temporary basic equipment. But in high-density urban conditions, if the structures are not 
permanent,  there  is  risk  of  contamination  with  water-borne  diseases.  It  is  important  to 
recall that many of the WASH urban infrastructures in Lebanon are old and have not been 
properly maintained for years. But rehabilitating the urban WASH networks is far beyond 
ECHO’s mandate and capacities. ECHO partners, however, work at the lower level and at 
the  final  end  of  the  network,  at  “distribution  level”,  with  an  entity  (water  establishment) 
which  has  capacity  problems.  There  is  a  need  for  coordination  between  stakeholders, 
including the government and the water establishment.  

Settlements  and  Shelter:  Many  refugees  (30%  of  refugees  in  Akka,  for  instance)  are  in 
informal settlements while some others have managed to find more  formal arrangements 
and are renting flats. Limited support for the improvement of unfinished flats and unused 
parts  of  buildings  has  been  provided  in  individual  houses,  collective  centres  (settlements 
managed  by  refugees  with  organised  structures  –  which  are  more  urban),  and  collective 
shelters  (refugees  managing  their  own  settlement,  but  without  a  management  structure). 
According to a partner, 50% of refugees are still in need of shelter support.  

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Cash  for  rent:  Cash  for  rent  programmes  have  been  established.  This  is  more  an 
adaptation to a situation in which refugees are on their own (no camps) in middle-income 
countries than in urban contexts, as it can be applied in both urban and rural areas. There 
are different options, ranging from dedicated cash for rent programmes (refuges received a 
grant  of  $150/month  for  rent)  to  unconditional  cash  operations  in  which  refugees  can 
decide  how  they  want  to  use  their  money,  rent  often  being  one  of  the  chosen  priorities.  
Two problems have been mentioned: 

-  The  risk  of  destabilizing  the  rent  market  and  triggering  rent  increases  that  would  also 

affect the Lebanese population and cause tensions.  

-  The limited negotiation power refugees have  vis-à-vis landlords (who can increase  rent, 
evict  people,  etc.).  This  is  where  the  mechanism  of  quadripartite  agreements  for  flat 
improvement  intervenes.  In  the  quadripartite  agreement,  signed  by  the  landlord,  the 
beneficiary, the municipal authority and the NGO, the landlord directly receives funds 
to  improve  the  flat  according  to  an  agreed  upon  Bill  of  Quantity,  and  accepts  a  rent 
freeze or even a free-rent period during which the refugee family will be hosted in the 
renovated flat. 

 JC 7.3 Throughout implementation, ECHO-funded projects were able to tackle the 
specific urban challenges (for the displaced and for refugees as well as for the host 
urban populations) and to coordinate properly with the local authorities, urban 
services and institutions (municipalities), in line with the good practices elaborated 
by the sector 

It  appears  that  many  partners  have  had  limited  coordination  with  municipalities.  NGOs 
have  contacted  municipalities  only  when  problems  have  arisen,  and  not  during  project 
design,  which  has  sometimes  led  to  incoherent  planning  with  negative  effects  on  local 
communities  (e.g.  in  the  case  of  a  water  evacuation  project  between  two  municipalities). 
Municipalities  have  also  reported  that  they  were  not  always  informed  when  EU  projects 
were implemented. 

 EQ8:  How  and  to  what  extent  has  Protection  been  appropriately  taken  into 
account and implemented in ECHO-funded projects? 

JC 8.1. ECHO and its partner agencies employed a specific approach to embed 
protection within ECHO-funded projects in response to the Syrian crisis 

Apart  from  UNHCR,  which  is  mandated  by  the  international  community  for  refugee 
protection,  and  apart  from  agencies  addressing  the  need  to  secure  access  of  refugees  to 
shelters  through  rental  agreements  and  counselling  (ICLA  with  DRC  for  instance),  there 
has been limited real protection programming among ECHO partners, although many refer 
to protection in their project proposals.176  

Initial  registration  has  been  incorporated  into  a  more  comprehensive  data  base,  the 
Refugee  Analysis  Information  System  (RAIS),  which  combines  different  types  of  socio-
economic information with the official data set. Many Syrians do not wish to be registered 
in the “RAIS”  (involving  profiling  of refugees  as  used  by UNHCR) because  they do not 
wish to be associated with a camp. The position of one of ECHO’s partners is not to use 
this database, as the privacy of the people they seek to protect is not guaranteed. However, 

176   As per many single forms consulted 

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ECHO  wishes  this  database  to  be  associated  with  the  cash  programme,  although  this 
means that the government might be able to gain access to the information.  

JC 8.2. The design of ECHO-funded projects identified the major threats that exist 
to the physical and psychological security of humanitarian aid beneficiaries 

One  of  ECHO’s  partners  assists  refugees  in  obtaining  official  documents.  The  Lebanese 
authorities  established  a  series  of  visas  for  entering  Lebanon.  Refugees  are  no  longer 
allowed  to  enter,  but  they  can  still  come  if  they  have  reasons  other  than  seeking  refuge 
(health,  job,  transit  to  another  country,  etc.).  The  type  of  visa  and  the  validity  of  the 
residency  permit  have  strong  impacts  on  livelihood  and  movements,  as  some  refugees 
prefer to restrict their movements so as not to encounter checkpoints as they are illegals. 
Indeed, the fact that refugees have to renew their registration every six months at a cost of 
US$200 has created a growing body of unregistered refugees with access neither to health 
services  nor  to  protection.  When  refugees  are  arrested  at  the  checkpoint  they  may  be 
detained for weeks or months (depending on their capacity to pay fines, support from an 
employer,  etc.).  UNHCR  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  ICRC  are  the  main  ECHO  partners 
keeping in contact with these people while in custody, in order to provide legal assistance, 
for example.  

 JC  8.3.  ECHO-funded  project  designs  disambiguated  protection  needs  per 
population  segment  and  location,  including  identifying  specific  threats  to 
vulnerable groups 

The  level  of  disaggregation  of  protection  needs  is  not  optimal.  In  fact,  it  varies  more  by 
area in relation to existing security measures locally in place than by type of population. In 
addition,  it  fluctuates  considerably  as  it  depends  significantly  on  national  policies  on 
asylum. The main element that is kept under scrutiny by most ECHO partners is currently 
the impact of changes in asylum policy and residency permit renewals, and this applies to 
all Syrian refugees. 

EQ  9:  In  cases  when  Remote  Management  was  being  used,  to  what  extent  did  it 
follow  existing  guidance  documents  and  good  practice,  and  how  successful  was 
it?177 

Most  areas  are  normally  accessible  in  Lebanon,  although  the  region  of  Tripoli  and  the 
Northern part of the Bekaa Valley have been subject to regular tension, making them from 
time to time difficult to access by international staff. In Tripoli, only national staff would 
visit  the  areas  during  difficult  periods  and  programmes  would  be  put  temporarily  on 
standby.  In  the  sealed  area  of  Asal  in  the  Northern  Bekaa  Valley,  where  heavy 
confrontations  between  Syrian  movements  and  the  Lebanese  army  took  place,  ACF 
managed  to  retain  its  national  staff  and  maintain  its  activities  in  the  enclave.  Remote 
management is not used per se, the agency involved being relatively experienced in this type 
of sensitive operation and managing the situation well with its own methods. 

EQ10 – Cash and vouchers 

Rationale for cash transfers in the context of Lebanon178:  as a middle-income country 
with a free market economy and a functioning banking system, Lebanon offers possibilities 

177   With a view to avoiding ambiguity on the period covered, we suggest phrasing the question in the past tense.  

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for  testing  and  implementing  a  different  type  of  humanitarian  aid  operation  (no  logistics 
difficulties,  functioning  markets,  etc.).  Cash  transfers  are  expected  to  be  a  cost-effective 
modality,  with  economies  of  scale  and  mainstreamed  assessment  (instead  of  duplication 
involving  one  assessment  for  food,  one  for  education,  one  for  shelter,  etc.).  Given  the 
massive need and limited funding, effective use of the funding is crucial. The development 
of  telecommunication  and  cash  transfer  technologies  has  greatly  improved  the  efficiency 
and security of cash delivery over time. Cash transfer is unavoidable, as the main need of 
the refugee population is rent subsidies.  
Challenges  to  cash  assistance 179 :    cash  assistance  requires  a  strong  coordination 
mechanism and true cooperation between partners on the ground in order to have: 

 

joint and multisector assessments of needs and vulnerability;  

  a common assistance package in line with identified needs;   and 

  agreement on the delivery modality (i.e. on the agency with the formal card, the bank 
list  of 

  monitoring  responsibilities,  responsibility  for  updating  the 

contract, 
beneficiaries, etc.) 

ECHO’s  approach180:  ECHO’s  assistance  is  provided  through  both  unconditional  cash 
transfers (mainly for the winterization programme) and restricted cash assistance (through 
vouchers) for food and rent. Regarding the winter response, ECHO contributes notably to 
the provision of unconditional cash to cover the most vulnerable HHs’ basic needs while 
prioritizing those living at high altitudes (through UNHCR and NGOs).  ECHO so far is 
channelling such funds through UNHCR, for a total of €10m. UNHCR and NGOs have 
agreed  on  an  amount  of  money  to  be  given  to  the  most  vulnerable  to  meet  their  basic 
needs. Cash assistance is provided to only 10% of Syrian refugees living in Lebanon. Those 
assisted represent the most vulnerable, who struggle to meet basic needs (women-headed 
families, etc.). The assistance provided covers the minimum survival expenditure and is far 
below Lebanon’s minimum wage. 

Extensive  work  has  been  done  to  develop  a  multipurpose  unconditional  cash  transfer 
programme  at  inter-agency  level.  A  combined  transfer  of  around  $300  (probably  to  be 
funded by WFP and UNHCR), hopefully through one electronic card, is under discussion 
– with $150  in  the  form of electronic food vouchers and $150 as cash. ECHO has been 
extensively  involved  through  its  country  office  and  through  the  support  of  a  cash  expert 
seconded to the cash working group. 

As resources have been shrinking over the last two years, there is a need to “do more with 
less”,  a  point  that  highlights  the  importance  of  an  efficient,  prioritized  and  coordinated 
response.  ECHO  has  been  advocating  greater  use  of  cash  as  a  cost-efficient  modality, 
targeting the most vulnerable and improving coordination. Concerted efforts to design an 
inter-agency cash operation are finally bearing fruit.  

178   ECHO  (2014)  ‘Single  cash  transfer  in  Lebanon  –  One-pager  or  CoHAFA’;  ECHO  (2014)  ‘Briefing  update  on 
ECHO's operations in LEBANON’; ‘Draft Concept Note - Multipurpose cash assistance to respond to humanitarian 
needs’; ECHO ‘Jean-Louis De Brouwer letter to UNHCR and WFP’ 
179   ECHO (2014) ‘Single cash transfer in Lebanon – One-pager or CoHAFA  
180   ‘Draft Concept Note - Multipurpose cash assistance to respond to humanitarian needs’; ECHO(2015) ‘Commissioner 
Stylianides  Mission  to  Lebanon  -    28-31  January  2015’;  ECHO  (2014)  ‘Briefing  update  on  ECHO's  operations  in 
LEBANON’ 

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JC 10.1 The ECHO strategy for Syria considered the appropriate use of a range of 
transfer modalities 

ECHO in Lebanon works through partners using different modalities for resource transfer: 
food vouchers through WFP, cash through UNHCR, in-kind or a combination of in-kind 
and  cash  though  several  NGOs  (DRC  for  Newcomers,  WA  for  winterization,  etc.).  Yet 
ECHO has been extremely vocal in promoting unconditional cash transfers (UCT) as the 
best  option  in  the  context  of  Lebanon.  At  first,  ECHO  supported  WFP  in  the 
implementation  of  food  vouchers  but  subsequently,  when  WFP  demonstrated  some 
resistance  to  cash,  ECHO  discontinued  its  support.  Partners  have  suggested  that  ECHO 
should allow space for different approaches instead of pushing exclusively for UCT. 

JC 10.2 The appraisal of ECHO actions took account of an appropriate analysis of 
the context 

Partners  call  for  better  understanding  of  how  refugees  use  their  money,  given  the 
restrictions on their mobility and the number of cards they have to manage (as the one-card 
approach may not materialise). The unconditional cash approach has generated reluctance 
from ECHO partners for various reasons:  

-  mandate issues (for WFP for instance); 

- 

limited  quality  control  of  the  products  bought  by  the  beneficiaries  (for  instance 
medicines); 

-  depending on the geographical areas, cash is not always the solution (e.g. when there 

is no ATM cash transfer cannot be used); 

-  some  partners  consider  that  cash  cannot  be  used  for  WASH,  especially  for  large, 

community infrastructures; 

-  many  studies  are  reported  to  have  shown  that  the  buying  power  of  refugees  is 
lowered  through  use  of  unconditional  cash  as  they  depend  on  local  market  prices 
with limited negotiating power with traders; 

-  partners  have  also  highlighted  their  incomprehension  of  ECHO’s  willingness  to 
move  all  its  money  into  multipurpose  cash  (WASH,  shelter,  etc.  while  people  use 
money  for  education,  health,  etc.);  they  consider  that,  in  the  case  of  shelter  for 
instance,  cash  is  not  a  good  option  (people  will  rent  substandard  shelter  at  higher 
prices), and moreover they have stressed that the amount will never cover minimum 
basic needs, as ECHO is aware; 

-  some partners consider that cash for protection is not possible in this country.  

ECHO considered that the context of Lebanon was such as to allow testing and learning 
from the unconditional cash modality. 

JC 10.3 ECHO-funded cash and voucher operations have been effective in the 
Syrian context 

With  cash  used  to  pay  for  rent  and  health  expenditure,  and  food  vouchers  facilitating 
access  to  food  for  those  who  benefited  from  them,  resource  transfers  have  indeed  been 
useful.  Yet  the  significant  reduction  of  funds,  leading  to  stronger  targeting  and  limited 

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coverage,  together  with  the  growing  difficulty  Syrian  refugees  have  had  in  accessing  an 
ATM, have limited overall effectiveness. 

EQ 11. Is the size of the budget allocated by ECHO to the region appropriate and 
proportionate  to  what  the  actions  are  set  out  to  achieve?  Could  the  same  results 
have been achieved with less funding? 

JC 11.1. The ECHO budget allocation in response to the Syrian crisis was 
appropriate 

The  aid  allocation  by  ECHO  to  Lebanon  was  sufficient  to  cover  the  special  needs  of 
newcomers  and  to  cover  winterization  programming.  The  declining  donor  support  for 
WFP culminated in a reduction of the monthly food allowance for refugees from US$37 to 
US$19 and then to US$13. This is likely to have significantly affected the capacity of many 
Syrians to cope. If that trend, which has been clearly identified in VASyR 2014 and 2015, 
continues,  ECHO  resources  may  not  be  sufficient  to  address  the  degradation  of  the 
humanitarian situation. 

JC 11.2. The ECHO budget allocation to respond to the Syrian crisis was 
proportionate 

Most ECHO TAs and HQ staff underlined the fact that HIPs should be national in order 
to secure the funds allocated to each country on the basis of the situation in the field.  At 
the  same  time,  it  makes  sense  to  have  a  global  vision  to  ensure  that,  in  times  of  scarce 
resources, appropriate reallocations are possible. The current mechanism, with oversight of 
the whole response, a fine-tuned assessment of specific needs permitted by the presence of 
TAs in the field, and permanent dialogue between partners, TAs and ECHO HQ, offers a 
good set-up to ensure resource allocation is in line with needs. 

JC 11.3. ECHO calibrated its objectives to the available funding 

As a needs-based donor, ECHO’s funding envelopes should be determined by the scale of 
need.  The  Syrian  crisis  and  its  high  political  visibility  inverted  the  process  and  linked 
objectives to funding availability. According to a partner, competition for funding between 
the different agencies drives response design to a greater extent than it should. 

JC 11.4. ECHO-funded activities were cost-effective 

EQ  12:  Were  appropriate  monitoring  systems  in  place  to  support  sound 
management of ECHO operations? 

JC 12.1. ECHO undertook specific actions/commitments to ensure that the quality 
and coverage of its monitoring mechanisms were conducive to support sound 
management of ECHO-funded operations 

ECHO  presence  in  the  field,  with  a  full-fledged  office  manned  by  two  TAs  and  their 
national  assistants,  contributes  to  its  capacity  to  monitor  programmes,  identify  risks  and 
difficulties, and engage in discussions with partners to find solutions. 

JC 12.2. ECHO adopted a specific approach to ensure that monitoring mechanisms 
were tailored to the specific needs of remote management 

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Apart  from  the  very  special  situation  in  the  Northern  Bekaa,  where  only  one  I-NGO  is 
working (ACF), there is no need for remote management in Lebanon.   

 JC.12.3. ECHO partners implemented operations monitoring and ensured data and 
findings were available for ECHO’s use in a timely manner 

The  number  and  size  of  reports  to  prepare  for  ECHO  is  seen  as  substantial  and  time-
consuming  by  some  partners.  Some  of  them  also  see  monitoring  more  as  a  tool  for 
reporting  to  donors  than  as  support  for  project  steering.  Yet  the  field-level  monitoring 
missions carried out by ECHO staff are regarded differently. A partner even reported that 
ECHO’s regular field monitoring visits were very helpful in analysing project difficulties (in 
that  particular  case  in  WASH  and  shelter),  and  in  facilitating  reallocation  of  funds  when 
deemed necessary (e.g. to adjust to significant situational changes). 

EQ 13: What has  been  the partners’  experience of working in consortia as well as 
with a multi-country approach? 

JC 13.1. ECHO undertook specific actions/commitments to ensure consortium and 
multi-country operations made efficient use of available resources 

The multi-country approach was used at the outset, as it was perceived by ECHO to be the 
most appropriate given the resources available for the Syrian crisis at the time (at both HQ 
and  field  levels).  This  approach  was  also  expected  to  increase  coordination  between 
partners’ offices in the different countries. From the partners’ point of view, however, the 
consortium  approach  was  perceived  to  be  time-consuming,  and  to  involve  additional 
bureaucracy.  Multi-country  programmes  can  be  envisaged  when  the  same  programme 
applies  in  the  various  countries.  It  becomes  more  complicated  when  there  are  different 
programmes in different countries, all falling within a regional programme. 

Once  human  resources  were  increased  and  disparities  between  countries  (leading  to 
significant differences in the modalities of project implementation) were better understood, 
the  national  contracts  were  prioritized.  The  fact  that  the  reinforced  structure  in  the  field 
mirrored  a similarly  strengthened capacity  at HQ level was highly appreciated  by all.  The 
possible  exception  could  be  cross-border  issues,  for  which  it  might  make  sense  to  have 
regional (multi-country) programmes. 

JC 13.2. ECHO partners provided evidence that consortium and multi-country 
arrangements reduced coverage gaps and duplications between countries and 
partner organisations 

 EQ 14  -  ECHO’s success in coordinating operations with other main actors 

 JC 14.1 Actions undertaken to enhance coordination 

ECHO has been proactive in enhancing coordination, viz.: 

-  ECHO has funded coordination from the outset; 

-  ECHO has contributed, with HCR Lebanon, to facilitating the creation of a dedicated 
coordination  mechanism  outside  pure  UNHCR  programming,  in  order  to  clearly 
dissociate HCR coordination activities and the HCR programme; 

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-  ECHO  is  pressing  for  better  geographical  coordination,  and  a  limited  number  of 

actors in the Bekaa valley for instance (through the HIP 2015); 

-  ECHO  is  perceived  by  some  implementing  partners  to  have  played  a  key  role  in 
coordination (ECHO suggested, for instance, covering both WASH and shelter, which 
used to be separate), as compared to other donors (DFID for instance); 

-  ECHO staff consider that a common vision should be defined with active donors, in 
order to have joint programming of funds (which would be new); this should be a top-
down  approach  with  the  support  of  HQ,  as  the  influence  of  ECHO  in  the  field  on 
some operating donors such as UNICEF is limited.  

There are some key limits to what ECHO can do in coordination, as many donors chose 
their  own  programmes  in  the  context  of  political  vacuum  in  the  GoL.  ECHO’s  role  in 
pressing  for  better  donor  coordination  is,  however,  well  recognized.  ECHO  has  also 
invested much time and energy in establishing how the international coordination and aid 
architecture in Lebanon could be improved. In that respect, ECHO has also been accused 
of having fuelled the debate on the coordination mandate between OCHA and UNHCR, 
which took much time and energy from the partners.  

JC 14.2 ECHO identified and took account of main actors’ activities 

ECHO’s  engagement  at  all  levels  with  the  UN  system  has  been  essential,  but  time-
consuming.  At  field  level  there  is  an  uneven  level  of  coordination  with  municipalities, 
which  are  more  involved  than  the  higher  levels  of  government.  The  fact  that  the 
implementing  actors  have  to  negotiate  with  different  levels  of  government  increases  the 
complexity.  ECHO  has  kept  some  distance  from  these  national-level  actors  and  in  most 
instances  presses  for  the  EU  Delegation  to  be  the  front-runner  in  negotiations  with  the 
GoL. 

JC 14.3 ECHO actions sought to enhance synergies and reduce duplications of 
effort, gaps or resource conflicts 

The risk of duplication (in terms of structures or operations) arising from the high number 
of actors in Lebanon has been indicated, and is perceived not to be cost-effective. It has 
been  reported  that,  in  terms  of  assistance,  duplication  is  avoided  thanks  to  inter-agency 
tools  (there  is  a  questionnaire  on  who  does  what).  However,  in  WASH  for  instance,  the 
map  of  who  does  what  and  where  indicates  that  some  regions  have  many implementers, 
while others are significantly less well covered. It is expected that donors could improve the 
situation, for instance by having discussions on gaps with sector coordinators rather than at 
the partner level. It is also currently perceived that intervention choices are highly political 
and not evidence-based. 

 JC 14.4 ECHO actions demonstrated synergies and no duplication of effort, gaps or 
resource conflicts 

With its TAs in the field frequently visiting the operations, the clear request in the e-single-
form for presentation of the coordination mechanisms in which the partners are involved 
at different times in the life of the project, and the regular participation of ECHO staff in 
coordination meetings with other donors and the humanitarian community, much effort is 
being  made  in  Beirut  and  at  field  level  to  limit  gaps  and  duplication.  The  support  by 

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ECHO  of  consortia  (for  instance  for  the  Newcomers  programme)  or  to  stimulate 
collective  debate  on  cash  transfer  also  contributed  to  the  identification  of  possible 
synergies. 

EQ15 – Mainstreaming of LRRD 

 JC 15.1 ECHO coordinated with EC development actors (DG DEVCO, EEAS, and 
EU MS) from the earliest phases of the crisis response 

The links between ECHO and other EC Services were activated rapidly at the Brussels and 
Beirut  levels.  From  2012,  a  document  defining  the  respective  roles  of  ECHO,  DEVCO 
and IfS (prior to the JHDF format) was available. The collaboration between ECHO and 
DEVCO is perceived as good in Lebanon (common position papers, joint programming, 
etc.). Problems have, however, occurred owing to mandate-related issues: child protection 
is  partly  covered  by  ECHO’s  mandate  but  can  be  linked  to  the  education  activities  of 
DEVCO.  EU  staff  in  Lebanon  consider  that  most  of  the  problems  have  arisen  from 
difficulties  at  HQ  level  rather  than  in  the  field.  Coordination  with  Member  States  varies 
widely, with very strong links with some and limited links with others. There is, however, a 
demand  for  a  closer  collaboration  with  ECHO,  and  recognition  of  the  essential  role  the 
TAs play in keeping MS aware of the situation in the field. 

 JC 15.2 ECHO deployed the various instruments available to implement stability 
measures in a coherent and complementary fashion with the EU toolbox 

 JC 15.3 ECHO-funded actions have been based on a strong context analysis 

ECHO’s  presence  and  mobility  in  the  field  and  its  close  linkages  with  its  operational 
partners are essential components of a strong capacity to access information and analyses 
on  contexts,  needs,  and  risks.  Through  its  national  staff  and  participation  in  many 
meetings, ECHO monitors not only humanitarian issues but also context evolution.  

 JC 15.4 ECHO-funded projects have been framed in the context of longer-term 
requirements of reconstruction and development 

Long-term vision requires notably strong  upfront engagement with municipal institutions 
by ECHO and its partners, which was limited. Municipalities indeed reported that they are 
not always informed about EU projects. 

EQ16 – Success in terms of LRRD 

 JC 16.1 ECHO-funded operations have been implemented through rapid decision-
making processes and flexible instruments 

The  fact  that  ECHO  had  a  presence  in  Lebanon  facilitated  rapid  understanding  of  the 
issues  at  stake  (refugees  flooding  urban  settings,  tensions  over  the  creation  of  refugee 
camps, etc.) and facilitated decision-making at an early phase, even before the reopening of 
the ECHO office in Beirut. The permanent exchange of information between ECHO staff, 
their  partners  and  other  donors  also  greatly  facilitated  swift  accumulation  of  data  on  the 
situation and enabled ECHO to take rapid decisions (for instance when flows of refugees 
where on the rise at the Syrian-Lebanese border) 

JC 16.2 ECHO provided a coordinated response strategy through its actions 

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The  position  of  ECHO  in  almost  all  key  coordination  fora  was  key  to  ensuring  that  the 
provision  of  ECHO-supported  aid  took  place  in  a  coordinated  manner.  This  was 
particularly important when strategic decisions had to be made, for instance to continue or 
discontinue the “Newcomers programmes” or to limit operations when security became an 
issue in the Tripoli area. 

JC 16.3 ECHO engaged with a range of locally important actors through its actions 

In  Lebanon,  ECHO  has  been  in  regular  contact  with  the  top  levels  of  the  humanitarian 
community,  ranging  from  the  RC/HC  to  all  heads  of  agencies.  ECHO  TAs  were  also 
invited to hold discussions with high-level delegations visiting the humanitarian operations 
in Lebanon. The contacts with the Lebanese authorities were given much lower priority, as 
political dialogue was much more in the hands of the EU Delegation. 

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 JC 16.4 ECHO-funded interventions experienced a smooth and timely phase-out, 
thereby avoiding “grey zones” in international assistance 

There  is  a  willingness  to  transfer  the  know-how  to  the  Lebanese,  in  order  to  leave  the 
humanitarian sphere for the development sphere (“Lebanisation” of the aid).   

 JC16.5 ECHO-funded actions encouraged “cross-learning” of humanitarian and 
development experiences 

 EQ17 -  To what extent have the ECHO-funded projects taken into account the 
security situation in the field for the partners' organisations? What is the scope for 
improvement? 

JC 17.1. The design of ECHO-funded actions has been based on an in-depth 
knowledge of the security situation, both in Syria and in neighbouring countries 

The  network  of  ECHO  TAs  throughout  the  whole  Syrian  crisis  and  the  existence  of  a 
coordination  mechanism  in  the  field,  based  in  Amman  and  mirrored  by  a  similar 
coordination system in Brussels, are strong assets in ensuring proper monitoring of the way 
in which the crisis evolves and in anticipating possible repercussions on the humanitarian 
situation  in  Lebanon.  The  fact  that  ECHO  TAs  in  Beirut  are  highly  respected,  are  in 
permanent contact with their partners but are also part of the ECHO network across the 
whole region also makes them sources of key information on the evolution of the situation 
and risks in the whole region. 

JC 17.2. The design and implementation of ECHO-funded actions facilitated 
humanitarian access for partner organisations 

ECHO accepts financial provision for security and safety in the e-single-form. In addition, 
when  deemed  necessary,  ECHO  has  demonstrated  high  readiness  to  discuss  the 
repercussions  of  a  deteriorating  security  situation  limiting  access  and  requiring  the 
adaptation of programmes. 

JC 17.3. ECHO-funded actions promoted the security and safety of humanitarian 
personnel delivering humanitarian aid 

One  of the  projects supported by ECHO is the  Safety Security  System  (SCCL program), 
which includes collection and dissemination of safety and security information (when there 
is an alert, a message is sent via SMS and WhatsApp) and training events.  

 EQ 18   -   (Humanitarian advocacy) How effective and active has ECHO been in 
terms  of  Humanitarian  Advocacy  (on  issues  like  coordination,  access,  open 
borders, cross-line intervention, INGO registration, work permits, etc.)?  

 JC 18.1 Advocacy has been a priority of ECHO response strategies for Syria and its 
neighbouring countries  

ECHO’s Syria network included a number of favoured topics (unconditional cash transfer, 
OCHA/UNHCR  coordination  divide,  etc.)  for  advocacy.  These  subjects,  together  with 
protection and access, formed the basis of an informal advocacy strategy. 

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 JC 18.2 ECHO advocacy contributed to concrete policy changes in neighbouring 
countries  

According  to  its  partners,  ECHO  is  in  favour  of  advocacy  on  NGOs  working  with 
unregistered, deregistered or illegal refugees. But ECHO’s influence on the government is 
unclear to the partners, especially as the Delegation and the Ambassador may not convey 
the  same  message.  In  terms  of  border  restrictions,  ECHO  advocated  for  the  right  of 
refugees to mobility. However, its argument was questioned by the government, given the 
EU’s own current policy on migration, and the EU’s support for Lebanon in response to 
the crisis.     

 JC 18.3 ECHO advocacy contributed to changes in approach by other donors in 
Syria and neighbouring countries 

 JC 18.4 ECHO advocacy contributed to increased coordination between donors 
and governments in Syria and neighbouring countries 

ECHO staff have reported that they have succeeded in obtaining approval for the revision 
of ECHO’s policy on cash and vouchers, as cash is now considered to be the appropriate 
approach in Lebanon.  

 JC 18.5 ECHO and EEAS advocacy contributed to increased humanitarian access 
inside Syria 

This 

is 

not 

a 

real 

issue 

in 

Lebanon.

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5.  Tentative Conclusion 

The Lebanon mission identified a series of key issues for ECHO. 

-  Working in a protracted crisis requires sophisticated coordination mechanisms 
both within the EU system (ECHO, EEAS, DEVCO, IsF) and in the international aid 
architecture.  The  situation  in  Lebanon  shows  how  complex  it  is  to achieve the  right 
balance and structure and how time-consuming it can easily become. 

-  Highly politicized contexts attract resources and political commitments. There 
is  a  always  a  danger  of  ECHO  being  either  flooded  by  “political  money”  or 
instrumentalized under a stabilization agenda. 

-  Middle-income countries and highly-urbanized contexts constitute a challenge 
to  many  aid  practices.  Micro-economists,  social scientists and urban specialists are 
essential assets not frequently present on the rosters of aid agencies.  

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EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
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Syria Country Report 

SYRIA COUNTRY REPORT ................................................................................................... 259 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 261 
1.1.Methodology ............................................................................................................................ 261 
1.2.Structure of the Syria Country Report ................................................................................. 261 
CONTEXT .................................................................................................................................. 263 
2.1.The crisis in Syria .................................................................................................................... 263 
2.2.The humanitarian crisis in Syria ............................................................................................ 266 
Outline of the humanitarian context ..................................................................................... 266 
The international response .................................................................................................... 268 
ECHO’S RESPONSE ................................................................................................................. 272 
3.1.Overview of ECHO’s overall strategy and main priorities in Syria ................................. 272 
3.2.ECHO’s approach to humanitarian access in hard-to-reach areas .................................. 273 
KEY FINDINGS WITH RESPECT TO THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS .................................. 277 

2.2.1. 
2.2.2. 

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1.  Introduction 

This Syria Country Report is part of the broader external evaluation process carried out on 
the ECHO response to the Syrian crisis.  

1.1.  Methodology 

The methodology applied for this case study is based on four pillars: 

-  Documents  reviewed:  in  addition  to  the  work  undertaken  during  the  desk  study, 
documentation  on  the  context,  projects,  needs  analyses  and  impact  analyses  has 
been gathered in the field and analysed (see annex N°1) 

- 

Interviews with key stakeholders  

o  ECHO and other services of the European Commission 
o  UN Agencies (regional HC, UNHCR, OCHA, UNDP, WFP), including the 
team leader of the OCHA Operational Peer Review of the Syrian response 
and ICRC 

o  I  NGOs  (DRC,  NRC,  PU-AMI,  ACTED,  GOAL,  CARITAS,  Save  the 

Children) and other experts 

Owing to the ongoing security risks inside Syria, no field visit could be carried out, either 
from  Damascus  or  from  neighbouring  countries.  It  is  important  to  recall  that  in  view  of 
this  restriction,  which  affects  both  the  evaluation  team  and  ECHO  staff,  the  evaluation 
findings could only be gathered via discussion with stakeholders in neighbouring countries 
and  the  HQ.  The  team  visited  Gazientep  and  the Turkish  border  region  to  assess  cross-
border operations, and interviewed a range of ECHO’s INGO partners operating remote 
management  operations  from  Turkey  and  Iraq.  Triangulation  between  sources  was 
prioritised where feasible in order to increase the level of confidence in the data collected. 

1.2.  Structure of the Syria Country Report 

The structure of the Syria country report is as follows: 

Section 1: Introduction 
  Description of the methodology 
  Description of the structure of the country report 
Section 2: The context inside Syria 
  Brief overview of the socio-economic context in Syria 
  Brief  description  of  the  specific  constraints  of  the  IDPs  and  conflict-affected 

population in the country 

  Brief description of the national and international response in Syria 
Section 3: Overview of the ECHO approach in the country: 
  Overview of ECHO’s overall approach and main priorities in Syria 
  Overview of funding and activities undertaken in Syria 
Section 4: Key findings with respect to the Evaluation Questions  
Section 5: Other relevant findings for the evaluation 
  Specific findings on the case study subjects 
  Specific lessons with respect to the sectors (water, health, etc.) concerned 
  Other relevant findings  

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Section 6: Country-specific conclusions 
Annexes 
  List of persons met  
  List 

of 

documents 

consulted 

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2.  Context 

2.1.  The crisis in Syria 

People in need: 

As of the end of the evaluation period, in December 2014, a total of 12.2 million people 
were in need of humanitarian assistance inside Syria. This represents a twelvefold increase 
since  the  start  of  the  crisis  in  2011.  Of  the  12.2  million  in  need,  over  7.5  million  were 
internally displaced, and 4.8 million were in hard to reach areas. 

The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) grew throughout the evaluation period 
in response to the ongoing severity of the complex, multi-sided and fast-moving conflict. 
But  the  greatest  growth  in  IDP  numbers  were  seen  over  the  first  two  years  of  the 
evaluation period, 2012-2013, as illustrated in the following figure: 

Figure 2 – Evolution of Internally Displaced Persons inside Syria (Jan 2012-2015) 

Humanitarian needs and response parameters: 

Needs  assessments  inside  Syria  vary  considerably  between  organisations,  but  OCHA 
estimates for December 2014 suggest that: 

  9.8 million people were considered food insecure. 
  The  Global  Acute  Malnutrition  (GAM)  rate  was  7.2%  across  13  governorates 
covered  by  a  series  of  rapid  nutrition  assessments  in  July  2014;  whilst  the  Severe 
Acute Malnutrition (SAM) rate was registered at 2.3% in the same assessment. 

  11.6 million were in urgent need of access to clean water. 
  Only 43% of Syria’s hospitals remain fully functional. 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex III / Page 263 

Source: ADE0123456781/01/20121/01/20131/01/20141/01/2015InternallyDisplacedPersonsinsideSyria(Evaluation period: 2012-2014) 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
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  25% of Syria’s schools have been damaged, destroyed or used as collective shelters 

or other non-educational purposes. 

  1.6  million  people  are  in  need  of  shelter,  with  1.2  million  houses  damaged  or 

destroyed. 

  Human  rights  violations  have  continued  to  occur  in  a  context  of  insecurity  and 
disregard  of  international  law,  international  humanitarian  law  and  human  rights 
law.181 

The ability of humanitarian actors to respond to these needs has been severely constrained 
by the crisis:  

  Humanitarian  access  has  been  impeded  by  the  use  siege  tactics,  indiscriminate 
bombardment and the presence of multiple extremist groups willing to target and 
kidnap humanitarian workers. 

  Staff of most major donor organisations and most expatriates have been impeded 

from entering Syria legally through the imposition of visa restrictions. 

  The conduct of cross-border humanitarian operations in areas not controlled by the 
government of Syria was initially hampered by the position of the Government of 
Syria. 

181   UNHCR (2015) Updated Overview: 2015 Syria Response Plan and 2015-2016 Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan, 

p. 2. 

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During the period covered by the evaluation, the conflict evolved from a situation where 
only a limited number of areas were affected, to a whole-of-Syria multi-group war, leaving 
no area untouched. The trend over the years was the emergence of three different areas of 
conflict: 

-  The North with the Kurds; 

-  The South with the Free Syrian Army; 

-  The centre with the so-called Islamic State (IS), Jabhat Al Nusra and other alliances.  

The white part of the map is mainly uninhabited desert. 

Syria  is  a  highly  urbanized  country  with  at  least  half  of  its  22.2  million  people  living  in 
urban  and  peri-urban  areas.  Its  cities  are  modern  and  thus  very  dependent  on  electricity, 
telecommunication  networks  and  sewage  systems,  all  of  which  have  been  severely 
disrupted during the conflict. With a population of over 1.8 million, Damascus is the centre 
of  power  in  modern  Syria.   The  capital  was  defended  by  the  Syrian  military,  making  it 
difficult for insurgents to infiltrate the suburbs.  Once they did, the government responded 

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with intensive aerial bombardment, regular mortar fire and heavy shelling. The insurgents 
reacted by penetrating deeper into the city, even carrying out hit and run operations against 
government targets.   

In other cities such as Aleppo (which had a pre-war population of almost 3 million people) 
or Homs, the impact of the war has been huge. Carpet bombing and use of barrel bombs 
have  taken  a  high  toll  on  the  civilian  population  while  making  external  humanitarian 
intervention extremely difficult.  

2.2.  The humanitarian crisis in Syria 

2.2.1.  Outline of the humanitarian context  

The humanitarian situation can be characterized by several indicators: 

-  High  level  of  casualties  directly  linked  to  military  confrontations.  The  death  toll  has 
been constantly on the rise. Estimates of deaths in the Syrian Civil War vary depending 
on  the  source,  but  on  15th  January  2015  the  United  Nations  put  out  an  estimate  of 
220,000 deaths including a large proportions of civilians caught or targeted by military 
operations. 

 

Important 
population 
displacements  both  within  the 
country  and  into  neighbouring 
countries:  

o  3.9  million  people  fled  the 

country  

The humanitarian situation in Syria in brief:  
(Source: UNOCHA 2015 SRP Syrian Arab Republic) 
  Food  insecurity:  9.8  million  (69%  of  the  population  in 

Syria) are food insecure 

  Malnutrition:  GAM  rate  of  7.2%  in  13  governorates, 

and SAM rate of 2.3%. 

  Water  and  sanitation:  11.6  million  (81%)  are  in  urgent 

inside 

safe-haven 

o  7.6  million  IDPs  tried  to  seek 
a 
the 
country, moving from rural to 
urban  areas,  from  urban  to 
rural  zones,  from  one  city  to 
one 
another 
another 
neighbourhood 
within 
city 
boundaries. (UNOCHA March 2015) 

from 
to 
same 

the 

or 

need of access to clean water and sanitation. 

  Healthcare:  only  43%  of  hospitals  are  fully  functional 
and 
(including  vaccine-
preventable  diseases  such  as  polio  and  measles)  are  on 
the rise. 

communicable  diseases 

  Shelter: 1.6 million people (11%) are in need of shelter. 
  Palestinian refugees inside Syria are particularly affected, 
with  64%  of  the  registered  refugees  displaced  and 
almost  all  dependent  on  UNRWA  to  meet  their  basic 
needs. 

  Populations in need and unable or unwilling to move from their current settlements: 

o  An unknown number of people in besieged areas (cities under blockade)  

o  A significant number of people in areas controlled by AOG.  

Over  the  years,  the  war  has  by  and  large  paralyzed  the  whole  economy  of  the  country. 
Energy distribution, trade, local production (industry and agriculture) and service delivery 
are between slow motion and total standstill. This has increased  the  challenge to survive. 
The number of people (PIN) in need inside the country is estimated by OCHA at around 
12.2  million  (Source: UNOCHA as of March 2015),  with  one-third  (4.8  million)  trapped  in 
“hard  to  reach  areas”,  a  term  describing  besieged  areas  and  areas  under  the  control  of 
opposition groups. (Source: UNOCHA 2015 Strategic Response Plan). 

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Protection is the most important need, as none of the parties  in the conflict seem to pay 
any  respect  to  International  Humanitarian  Law  (IHL).  ICRC  is  making  every  effort  in  a 
very difficult context to disseminate IHL, to call on all armed groups to respect it and to 
abide by certain rules of  combat, and is collecting allegations of  all manner of  breaches of  
IHL in  the  neighbouring countries. ICRC is progressively  but still unsatisfactorily gaining 
access to jails inside Syria. It is developing its system for tracing and re-establishing family 
links through the network of  National Societies. ICRC is slowly coming to grips with the 
extremely  complex  and  problematic  issue  of   “missing  persons”,  which  will  be  a  highly 
problematic issue in the future.  

Relatively sophisticated water and sanitation systems existed in the cities as well as in the 
countryside, although a downward trend in the water table “recharge” was seen as a serious 
likely problem, especially for the growing urban centres. This system was based on sizeable 
power stations, large-scale electricity and more importantly a comprehensive system of high 
tension power lines for electricity distribution across the country. Many of these networks 
have  been  partially  or  totally  destroyed  as  a  result  of  military  operations,  which  means 
falling  back  on  large  generators.    The  changing  pattern  of  the  demography  linked  to 
population  displacements  is  modifying  the  geographic  repartition  of  the  demand  and 
putting heavy demand on old water networks. 

There  was  a  relatively  good  and  modern  health  care  system  prior  to  the  conflict.  In 
particular, many medicines and items of medical equipment were produced in-country. The 
health system was progressively building its capacity to tackle modern health problems and 
chronic diseases such as diabetes, high blood pressure, and others. The system has by and 
large collapsed in many areas. The targeting of the health system by conflict actors has had 
dramatic  repercussions.  Medical  equipment  and  products  for  surgery  are  prohibited  or 
tightly  controlled  whilst  health  structures  are  targeted  by  military  means  and  first  aid 
activities  have  been  deliberately  targeted  by  snipers.    Surgery  is  being  conducted  in 
appalling  conditions  by  very  courageous  Syrian  practitioners,  ill  equipped,  with  limited 
supplies.  The  brain  drain  in  the  health  system  has  been  particularly  hard-hitting  for  the 
population. Physical rehabilitation will be one of the most challenging sectors in the post-
war  era.  In  Aleppo  alone  there  are  around  650  to  750  forced  amputations  per  month. 
Handicapped  persons  and  amputees  now  number  between  70,000  and  100,000  in  the 
Aleppo region. This will present a daunting prospect for the post-war era. 

Public  health  is  also  suffering  dramatically  from  the  destruction  of  the  health  system. 
Leishmaniosis  re-explodes  everywhere,  as  do  measles,  tuberculosis  and  possibly  polio. 
UNICEF and WHO are doing their best to vaccinate children on all sides, but this is very 
difficult. Developed-country  and urban diseases are extremely  difficult to treat, and there 
are not many experienced health aid actors in the country. Psychosocial care is also an area 
where the impact of the war is most dramatic.  

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Figure 1 – Humanitarian donor contributions in Syria 2012-2014 (US$ billion) 

Source: Evaluation Inventory (based on FTS extraction) 

A dominant feature of humanitarian aid delivery in Syria relates to the lack of humanitarian 
space and the attempts of some armed groups to take over humanitarian aid as a potential 
winning hand in gaining the support of local communities. Humanitarian access182 has been 
hindered  by  the  deterioration  in  the  security  environment,  obstruction  by  the  Syrian 
authorities  and  the  growing  number  of  AOGs  which  have  at  times  prevented  aid  from 
reaching civilian populations. 

One might note that no credible, large scale nutritional survey has been carried out since 
the beginning of the conflict, despite the growing concerns after four years of war. Despite 
the  impressive  resilience  demonstrated  so  far  by  the  Syrian  population,  there  is  a  high 
likelihood  that  survival  mechanisms  will  soon  be  exhausted.  Until  recently  there  was  no 
“GAM  alert”,  but  there  are  now  a  few  reports  from  Aleppo  hospitals  indicating  that  the 
trend might be changing and that malnutrition might become a serious issue.   

2.2.2.  The international response  

The first humanitarian interventions inside the country were the result of a limited presence 
of NGOs (between 13 and 15) and UN Agencies, many of which were involved in either 
“development programming” or in the response to the Palestinian and Iraqi refugee 
presence in Syria.   

The global humanitarian response in figures: 

Humanitarian agencies in Syria immediately faced four challenges:  

182

  (Source: ECHO 2014 Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Syria Crisis, pp.2-3) 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex III / Page 268 

Source: ADE00.511.522.5Syria: contributions by yearTotal committed: US$ 4.3bn1.453%2012201320140.62.20(US$ billions) 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
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-  how to develop humanitarian interventions in Government-controlled areas; 

-  how to develop acceptable humanitarian interventions in areas controlled by armed 

oppositions groups from Damascus (cross-line operations); 

-  how to develop acceptable humanitarian interventions in besieged areas or in areas 

closed by active war operations; 

-  how  to  develop  operations  outside  government-controlled  areas  when  crossing 
lines  is  not  possible:  the  concept  of  cross-border  operations  from  countries 
bordering Syria arose as the only alternative. 

Inside Syria, the UN System, through its RC/HC and the UN agencies, took the lead in the 
negotiations with the Syrian Government and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) on the 
issue of working in or from Government-controlled areas. The negotiations finally took a 
positive turn in early summer 2012 and a new MOU was ready by July 2012 for signature 
by humanitarian agencies and the Government. This MOU underlines, inter alia, that by 
signing the text the NGOs remain within the framework of Syrian law and will not attempt 
to become involved in cross-border operations. For agencies present in Damascus, the 
terms of the alternatives in summer 2012 were simple: stay in Damascus or develop cross-
border operations. Several NGOs made the choice to stay in Syria, to try to develop 
operations in Government-controlled zones and in hard-to-reach areas through cross-lines.  

The cornerstone in all these discussions and operational engagements is the SARC. It is 
through SARC that visas are transmitted to the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Is 
through the SARC that field visit permits can be obtained and it is the SARC that facilitates 
the possibility of having international staff posted in the different governorates outside 
Damascus. SARC has been mandated by the Syrian Government for the coordination and 
implementation of humanitarian aid.  

Several actors who work constantly with it even underline the fact that, at branch levels in 
the governorates, there is much commitment to humanitarian aid. In practical terms, SARC 
receives aid items in Damascus and distributes them to the expected beneficiaries.. 

The situation mostly did not evolve positively. Access remains the most important 
problem. NGOs have been expelled from Syria because of their involvement in Cross-
Border Operations.  

ICRC, NGO and UN agencies finally managed to open some doors in 2013 by including 
activities of reconstruction of and support for health and education structures, in relation 
to the respective line ministries. Yet the tendency of the Syrian Government to change 
administrative procedures and rules regularly helps maintain a high level of uncertainty on 
the capacity to operate inside the country from Damascus. 

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Figure 2 – Contributions by Donors in Syria (US$ billion) 

Source: Evaluation Inventory (based on FTS extraction) 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex III / Page 270 

Source: ADE00.20.40.60.811.21.41.6Syria: contributions by donor1.535%9%2%3%3%4%6%6%6%8%0.40.30.20.20.20.20.10.10.1USAUKECHOSaudiArabiaUAEGermanyNGO ConsortiumKuwaitCanadaNorwayTotal committed: US$ 4.3bn(US$ billions) 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
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The appeals from the UN system represent an interesting indicator of the overall level of 
resources  mobilized  in  Syria  between  2011  and  2015.  Assistance  for  populations  inside 
Syria  (in  government-controlled  areas  and  in  areas  controlled  by  the  opposition  groups) 
amounts  to  US$2,802bn.  This  can  be  compared  with  the  amounts  of  money  injected  by 
non-conventional  donors  in  all  sectors,  including  military  assistance.  According  to  the 
European Council on Foreign Affairs and Survival, assistance from Saudi Arabia and Qatar 
was estimated at US$6-7bn between 2011 and 2013. Iranian aid to Syria was reportedly in 
the  range  US$15-19bn  over  a  similar  period.  The  combination  of  all  available  data  from 
these  countries  totals  US$21-26bn,  probably  an  underestimate.  This  does  not  take  into 
account  other  financial  means  injected  into  Syria  by  the  Russian  Federation,  the  USA  or 
even  Europe  and  its  Member  States.  Some  think-tanks  estimated  that  humanitarian  aid 
represents no more than 10% of overall resources injected into the country. Data is lacking 
on  the  overall  level  of  resources  that  the  so-called  Islamic  State  is  allocating  to  social 
services, health, and food assistance in favour of the population under its control.  

Figure 3 – Donor contributions in Syria by sector 2012-2014 (US$ million) 

Source: Evaluation Inventory (based on FTS extraction) 

One key parameter is information on needs, situations, and presence of aid actors. A series 
of loosely coordinated initiatives emerged, with the Syrian Need Assessment Project 
(SNAP) from ACAP, REACH from ACTED, SIMAP from OCHA, and others. These 
different tools frequently presented similar issues, albeit packaged differently, and produced 
a high quantity of information which was not easily absorbable and has effectively been 
more often a black box than a clearly understood body of data on develop-ments in Syria.  

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex III / Page 271 

Source: ADEShelter& NFIs(US$ 249m) Food (US$ 1.4bn) Health(US$ 354m) Coordination (US$ 160m) Unspecified(US$ 1.7bn) Water/Sanitation3% (US$ 129m) Multi-sector2% (US$ 107m) Education 2% (US$ 82m) Other13% (US$ 114m) Syria: contributions by sector40%1 Other: Economicrecovery, protection, agriculture, safetyand securityof staff and operations, mine action32%8%6%4%Total committed: US$ 4.3bn 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
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3.  ECHO’s response 

3.1.  Overview  of  ECHO’s  overall  strategy  and  main  priorities  in 

Syria 

In recognition of the fact that the scale of the most urgent needs inside Syria outstrips its 
response, ECHO’s strategic approach has been to prioritise life-saving activities and require 
partners to ensure that the most vulnerable are assisted first.183 In line with this approach, 
of ECHO’s Humanitarian Implementation Plans for Syria during 2012-2014, almost three-
quarters covered food assistance and livelihoods (32%), shelter and non-food items (23%), 
and  multi-sector  support  through  UN  agencies  (18%);  health,  water  and  sanitation, 
protection  and  coordination  together  made  up  the  remaining  one-quarter  of  the  total. 
ECHO  worked  through  a  range  of  implementing  partners,  with  a  large  share  of  funds 
(69%) channelled through the top ten partners. 

Figure 4 – Snapshot of ECHO’s response in Syria 2012-2014 

Source: Evaluation Inventory (based on FTS extraction) 

ECHO’s  strategy  for  responding  to  the  humanitarian  needs  of  the  Syrian  people  has 
evolved  significantly  over  the  period  under  review,  both  as  a  response  to  changing 
situations or as a result of enhanced understanding of the situations, needs and capacities 
of  its  partners.  ECHO  globally  aimed  to  provide  support  both  inside  and  beyond 
government-controlled areas, and refined its approach, in dialogue with its partners, in view 
of  the  difficulties  of  deploying  aid  agencies  and  delivering  meaningful  humanitarian  aid. 
Three key directions where identified: 

-  more focus on pure humanitarian aid (health, life saving aid provision, protection); 

183   ECHO 2014 Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Syria Crisis; ECHO 2013 Humanitarian Implementation Plan 

(HIP) Syria Crisis; ECHO 2012 Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Syria Crisis. 

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Annex III / Page 272 

ECHO fundingper sector–Syria32%23%18%13%11%Food(€97.6m)Multi-sector(€56.2m)Healthand Medical(€39.1m)Water/sanitation(€34.6m)Coordination (€2m)Shelter(€69.6m)Protection,2%(€5.45m)Total:€304.7mTop 10 ECHO implementingpartners–Syria61.629.227.3181715.714.210.79.77010203040506070WFPICRCUNHCRWHOUNICEFDRCUNRWAIFRCIOMACTED(€m)€210.4m (69% of total commitmentin Syria)Source: ADE Evaluation Inventory, 2015 
 
 
 
                                                 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
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- 

- 

identification of how to improve access;  

creation of conditions for better targeting. 

3.2.  ECHO’s  approach  to  humanitarian  access  in  hard-to-reach 

areas 

The  majority  of  hard-to-reach  people  in  need  inside  Syria  are  in  AOG184-controlled  or 
contested territories. Accessing them represents a significant challenge185. 

From  Damascus:  ECHO kept pushing to be able  to carry  out  field  monitoring and  in 
2015 managed to obtain some  opportunities to do so (in rural  Damascus with WFP and 
IFRC). But with the increased difficulties of obtaining visas, signed MOUs and field visit 
permits,  the  number  of  Damascus-based  partners  has  decreased.  From  2012  to  2013  the 
main priority was to refine the strategy with ICRC, WFP and UNICEF. With the increased 
demand  for  better  reporting  on  operations  inside  Syria,  especially  on  access  to  hard-to-
reach areas, ECHO and its partners had to modify their strategy by: 

-  first, shifting from a “multi-sectoral approach” to a strategy more focused on priority 
areas (protection, health and WASH) with shelter, NFI and food assistance as part of a 
“second line” of intervention; 

-  second and in parallel, streamlining the geographical focus on areas most in need; this 
amounted  to  a  stronger  focus  on  “rapid  response  capacity”  to  intervene  rapidly  in 
areas where event-related emerging needs can be detected (for instance after a military 
confrontation,  with  an  increased  number  of  IDPs  in  a  given  area  requiring  urgent 
assistance); 

-  the third element of the evolution of the strategy consists of much greater integration 
and  collaboration  between  ECHO  and  the  other  EU  instruments,  especially  NEAR 
and Instrument for Stability. 

Cross-Border operations:  as provision of aid inside AOG-controlled territory is impeded 
by  the  difficulty  of  achieving  agreement  on  cross-line  operations  with  Damascus  (aid 
provided  to  AOG-controlled  areas  from  government-controlled  areas),  cross-border 
operations  were  discussed  between  ECHO  and  its  partners  long  before  the  UN  Security 
Council  passed  Resolution  2139  (2014),  authorising  UN  agencies  and  implementing 
partners to bring life-saving assistance through border crossings. When the ECHO office 
in  Damascus  was  closed  for  security  reasons,  cross-border  operations  with  varying 
monitoring  systems,  largely  based  on  remote  management,  again  became  an  option.  The 
process had already started from Turkey in 2012, with Food for Peace resources (part of 
the  US  Aid  system).  The  three  main  donors  involved  (ECHO,  DFID,  USAID)  decided 
together that cross-border operations should go ahead and be scaled up. Very soon, 45% 
of  the  assistance  outside  of  government-controlled  areas  was  being  delivered  through 
cross-line operations, with 55% through cross-border operations. Cross-border operations 

184   AOGs  are  all  Non-State  Armed  Groups,  following  the  OCHA  definition  which  covers  FSLA,  secular  groups  and 

185

Islamist groups such as the so-called Islamic State and Al Nusra. 
  ECHO (2014) Syria crisis: State of play of cross-border humanitarian operations, March 2014, 6 p. 
ECHO (2014) Mission to Syria (Damascus) 17 -21 November 2014, 4 p. 
ECHO AMMAN (2014) Report on remote management note held with partners – Beirut (week of 22-26 September), 10 p.  
ECHO AMMAN (2014) Preliminary analysis on the monthly reports from ECHO partners received during the year 2014, 4 p. 
ECHO (2014) Remote management and the Syria crisis, 6 p. 

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were  carried  out  from  Southern  Turkey  (the  highest  volume),  Jordan  (mostly  through 
Government of Jordan structures), from the Kurdish Region of Iraq (KIR), and to a lesser 
extent  from  Lebanon.  Indeed,  not  considering  this  option  was  seen  as  a  breach  of 
humanitarian principles (impartiality and independence) and would have left large parts of 
Syria only to donors not following GHD principles. The legality of cross-border operations 
raised much discussion within ECHO and among its partners given the different positions 
taken  by  governments  of  neighbouring  countries  and  the  lack  of  consent  from  the 
Government  of  Syria.  At  the  beginning,  ECHO  was  extremely  reluctant,  but  finally 
accepted  some  operations.  Large-scale  operations  were  launched  from  Turkey,  with  a 
certain level of international field monitoring. Working modalities had to be explored, for 
instance  the  use  of  the  Hawala  system  to  pay  staff  inside  the  country,  and  the  types  of 
partnership  that  were  possible  and  effective  (with  local  society  organizations,  municipal 
councils,  etc.).  Cross-border  operations  rapidly  became  synonymous  with  remote 
management,  especially  after  the  kidnapping  of  two  ACTED  staff  and  subsequent 
degradation of the security environment (with additional aid worker kidnappings). ECHO’s 
position on remote management has been very  prudent, as this was seen as a “last resort 
option” (no real needs assessment and targeting, very limited capacity for real monitoring), 
but also very pragmatic (what would be the humanitarian cost of not doing it?). A series of 
key  parameters  have  been  put  in  place  to  ensure  that  ECHO-supported  cross-border 
operations  are  cost-effective,  respect  key  aspects  of  due  diligence  and  limit  the  risk  of 
negative effects. This has led to the development of a multitude of tools and innovative use 
of existing technologies. If communication by telephone and internet is not necessarily easy 
(bad  connections,  many  gaps  in  the  network,  security  and  confidentiality  issues),  the 
different options (Facebook, WhatsApp, etc.) are used widely. Geo-referenced photos and 
videos  (proof  of  realization  of  activities),  third-party  monitoring  and  other  triangulation 
means are tested, explored and developed. In addition, ECHO is still internally negotiating 
its own capacity to carry out direct monitoring by its TAs or national staff. This took place 
successfully in  the Hassakeh area from KIR;  and the challenge now  is to identify  further 
areas where it might be feasible, particularly from Turkey.  
The seven questions on remote management186 are shown below: 

Number  Question 

Specific assessment criteria 

1 

Is there an access problem? 

2 

Does the proposed action include 
acceptance-building measures? 

1. It is clear that access problems exist that cannot be resolved by the 
partner, and that these are sufficiently serious to  prevent humanitarian 
delivery unless a remote management approach is adopted.  

2. No  other  humanitarian  organization  eligible  for  ECHO  funding, 
with  the  required capacity  and  experience,  is  willing  and  able  to  meet 
the humanitarian needs identified in the proposed action through direct 
implementation.  

1. The proposed action identifies actors at local, provincial, national or 
international levels who have or could have an impact on humanitarian 
access in the proposed geographical area(s) of intervention.  

2. Where possible, the action includes concrete steps to gain, regain or 
maintain acceptance of neutral and independent humanitarian action.  

186

  Instruction note for ECHO staff on Remote Management, Brussels;  Ref. Ares(2013)168580 - 08/02/2013 

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Is it a direct life-saving action? 

The action is designed to implement direct, life-saving operations.  

3 

4 

5 

Can the action be implemented 
without risking the lives of those 
undertaking the work on the 
ground?  

What is the source of the needs 
assessment in a remotely-managed 
action? 

6 

Are the staff adequately qualified? 

There  is  clear  evidence  that  the  security  risks  linked  to  project 
monitoring  undertaken  by  local  staff/partners  are  substantially  lower 
than  the  risks  identified  as  the  reason  for  withdrawing,  or  limiting 
access by, expatriate staff.  

1.  The  proposed  action  specifies  which  sources  of  information  have 
been used to estimate needs.  

2.  In  conflict-affected  environments,  data  collected  remotely  (e.g. 
through  local  staff,  external  partners  or  aerial  surveillance)  have  been 
confirmed  through  cross-verification  with  direct  sources  (e.g.  IDPs 
who have fled affected areas, traders or community representatives).  

1. Steps have been taken to ensure that suitably senior and competent 
national  staff,  with  experience  inside  and  outside  the  country,  are 
placed in key managerial positions as close as possible to the area(s) of 
intervention.  

2.  The  action  identifies  potential  qualification  gaps  and  explains 
whether the necessary technical, analytical and managerial skills can be 
found in the national labour market. If skill gaps have been identified, 
the proposal includes relevant training measures to address them.  

7 

Are monitoring arrangements 
adapted for remote management? 

1.  The  proposed  action  includes  arrangements  to  facilitate  direct 
contact between senior staff in charge of remotely-managed operations 
and beneficiaries or other local stakeholders.  

2.  The  action  does  not  rely  on  third  party  monitoring  provided  by 
private firms  or individual consultants that offer or have offered their 
services to military organizations or any other party in the conflict.  

Challenges to cross-border operations are, however, numerous: 

  while  UN  Security  Council  Resolution  2139  was  passed  in  2014  (requesting  consent 
from the Government of Syria and providing a mandate for ECHO and its partners to 
develop  cross-border  operations),  it  represents  a  significant  politicization  of  the 
humanitarian scene which is not without its dangers; 

 

 

the  same  applies  to  UNSCR  2165  approved  in  July  2014,  making  cross-border 
operations official, thereby overcoming the legality challenge187;  

the legal framework for INGO operations inside Turkey is not clear and major donors, 
including ECHO, have decided to abide by Turkish regulations; this has held back the 
ability of ECHO to scale up support for cross-border operations (CBOs) from Turkey 
and  has  therefore  limited  the  INGO  capacity  to  implement  CBOs  on  an  expanded 
scale. 

ECHO  drew  up  a  framework  for  cross-border  operations 188  in  order  to  support  the 
capacity  of  aid  actors  to  implement  CBOs  on  an  expanded  scale.  While  there  is  no  real 
network  of  NGOs  for  remote  management,  ECHO  facilitated  information  exchange  on 

187   ECHO (2014) Draft Note on State of Play of Cross-Border Humanitarian Operations. Internal Document. 
188

  (Source: ECHO (2014) Framework for Cross Border Initiatives in Northern Syria.) 

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good  practice.  ECHO  supported  32  CBOs  during  the  2012-2014  period  (all  during  2013 
and  2014),  totalling  €6  billion.  The  breakdown  by  contract  is  presented  in  the  following 
table: 

Table 1 –  ECHO-funded cross-border operations 2012-2014 

Partner 

ECHO-funded amount (€ m) 

Contract # 

From Turkey 

From Iraq 

From Jordan 

From Lebanon 

2014 

MERCY CORPS 

        1.50  

0.5 

0.07 

0.5 

0.5 

PIN / WHH 

SOLIDARITES 

RI 

CARITAS LUX 

GOAL 

ADRA 

OXFAM 

ACTED 

STC / RB 

IOM 

IRC 

IMC 

MDM France 

CARE / INSO 

WFP 

2013 

ACTED 

IOM 

DRC 

NRC-NO 

STC-Red Barnet 

4 

1 

3.5 

1.65 

3.25 

0 

2.1 

1.98 

1.5 

0.82 

4.7 

1.4 

0.45 

3 

1,133 

1 

0.8 

7 

3.5 

MERCY CORPS 

2,915 

FEDERATION HANDICAP 

ACTED 

CARITAS LUX 

MERLIN >> STC 

PEOPLE IN NEED 

SOLIDARITES INT 

CONCERN 

MDM FRANCE 

IRC 

WFP 

TOTAL: 

0.7 

3.6 

1 

1 

2.1 

2 

2.2 

2,057 

4.2 

1.4 

6,166.35  

1.50  

-    

0.07  

Source: ADE analysis from ECHO HOPE database extraction. 

91004 

91005 

91006 

91007 

91008 

91009 

91010 

91011 

91015 

91016 

91021 

91024 

91025 

91029 

91030 

91033 

91001 

91003 

91005 

91008 

91009 

91014 

91019 

91022 

91023 

91029 

91031 

91032 

91033 

91035 

91042 

91043 

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EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
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4.  Key findings with respect to the Evaluation Questions  

EQ 1 – Good Humanitarian Principles 

JC1.1 ECHO deployed specific decisions and actions to ensure consistency with the 
23 principles in the Syrian crisis response 

GHD principles have been taken into account in ECHO’s framework for implementation 
of cross-border operations, e.g. on: 

  not  working  through  local  power-holders  in  conflict  areas  (in  line  with  GHD 

principle 2);  

  proper targeting of beneficiaries (in line with GHD principle 6); 

 

specific measures on monitoring approaches (GHD principles 21-23). 

ECHO’s  decision  to  conduct  cross-border  operations  was  motivated  by  the  four 
humanitarian  principles  (GHD  principle  2)  and  –  given  the  concentration  of  IDPs  in 
AOG-controlled areas (Aleppo  and Idlib) – provision of aid in proportion to need (GHD 
principle 6) 

JC1.2 There are specific examples of where the Syria response was (or was not) in 
line with the 23 Principles 

Cross-border operations aimed at providing food and NFIs to some of the most vulnerable 
IDP groups in hard-to-reach areas in Northern Syria (GHD principles 2 and 3), was based 
on needs assessments (GHD principle 6) which were conducted in consultation with local 
authorities  (GHD  principle  7) 189 .  The  politicization  of  the  debate  on  cross-border 
operations, with the involvement of the Security Council though SC resolutions, is seen as 
a  risky  trend  not  fully  in  line  with  GHD  principles.  But  it  could  also  be  seen  as 
implementation by States of their obligations deriving from Article 1 common to the Four 
Geneva Conventions, in line with the strategy of the GHDI. 

EQ 2-Consultation of local and regional communities 

JC  2.1.  ECHO  or  its  partners  deployed  specific  measures  for  involving  local  and 
regional communities  

Needs assessments for cross-border operations are based on interviews with local councils 
and  local  actors190 which  often  have  a  certain  social  representativeness.  Questionnaires191 
were  used  to  assess  needs,  the  assistance  provided  and  gaps  in  food  security  and 
livelihoods,  WASH  and  education.  But  Syrian  Civil  Society  organisations  were  not  well 
known to the majority of the current aid stakeholders. Very few Civil Society organisations 
were  present  in  Syria  before  the  conflict  and,  owing  to  the  characteristics  of  previous 
regimes, the NGO network was not very well developed.192 One particular element derives 
from  the  level  of  development  of  Syria  prior  to  the  crisis,  with  a  fast-developing  urban 

CHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91005 (PIN) 

189   E 
190   ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91009 (GOAL 
191   ibid 
192   Khalaf,  Ramadan,  Stolleis  (2014)  “Activism  in  Difficult  Times:  Civil  Society  Groups  in  Syria  2011-2014”.  Badael 

Project, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. 

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middle  class.  Several  stakeholders  mentioned  that  their  tools,  developed  mostly  for  rural 
African contexts, do not necessary fit well in this modern Middle Eastern, often urbanized 
situation. In these situations, to quote an inhabitant from Aleppo “there is no such thing as 
‘a community’; there are ‘inhabitants of a same street, people going to the same bakery, but 
not real community’”. In addition, one stakeholder mentioned that when trying to identify 
the most vulnerable people in IDP settlements, they encountered much difficulty as these 
IDP gatherings are often made up of people from different areas with no real “community 
cohesion”.  Discussing  with  communities  was  thus  described  as  “discussing  with 
gatekeepers”.  

JC 2.2. ECHO and/or partner monitoring mechanisms took account of beneficiary 
views and provided appropriate feedback loops to funding officers 

Needs  assessments  and  monitoring  for  cross-border  operations  inside  Syria  are  by  and 
large based on a multi-sector assessment. For instance, Handicap International’s survey193 
covered 476 Syrian households. The needs assessment was conducted by HI in partnership 
with its local partner organisations, which selected and contracted Syrian social workers on 
the basis of their region of origin. Monitoring of this remote management project involved 
feedback from local leaders and population groups. 

EQ3  –  To  what  extent  have  the  design  and  implementation  of  ECHO-funded 
interventions  taken  into  account  the  needs  of  the  most  vulnerable  people  in  the 
region, in particular women, children, elderly and disabled people? 

JC 3.1 ECHO deployed specific measures/a specific approach/strategy to make 
sure ECHO-funded interventions  took into account the needs  of the most 
vulnerable people in the region both at design and implementation stages 

ECHO  strongly  supported  among  its  partners  the principles  of  better  targeting  by  zones 
and of better disaggregation of populations by specific categories linked to needs, rather by 
very rough grouping (IDP, host). In some areas, especially in hard-to-reach areas or areas 
controlled  by  difficult  AOG  (DAESH  in  particular),  specific  efforts  had  to  be  made  to 
ensure that essential services, such as water networks or major hospitals, could continue to 
function  and  offer  services  for  vulnerable  people.  ECHO  supported  actors  already  well-
rooted  in  the  area  prior  to  the  current  situation,  and  negotiated  with  partners  able  to 
negotiate some margin of manoeuvre with the rulers of a given area.  

JC 3.2 The design of ECHO-funded interventions reflects well the needs of the 
most vulnerable people 

Many  cross-border  or  cross-line  operations  specifically  targeted  IDPs  in  hard-to-reach 
areas.  Fine-tuned  targeting  is  not  always  easy  in  these  areas  and  interventions  do  not 
necessarily target women, children or the elderly. Targeting and reporting is more linked to 
the level of impact of the military confrontations. WFP reporting is now much more fine-
tuned  in  terms  of  geographical  data  (down  to  sub-districts),  facilitating  prioritization  and 
better targeting.  Several projects inside Syria encounter difficulties  in  fully adjusting to all 
requirements  in  terms  of  gender  and  age  disaggregation,  as  they  work  through  local 
partners which do not necessarily  have the capacity  or understanding  required to do that 

193   ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91020 

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according to ECHO standards (especially the Gender and Age marker). ECHO’s internal 
analysis of project proposals or project monitoring reports could lead to additional requests 
in terms of better clarification and disaggregation.194 From Damascus,  both the work and 
the capacity to target properly are undermined by the fact that everything has to go through 
the  SARC  and  that  cross-line  operations  to  the  most  affected  hard-to-reach  areas  are 
becoming more and more difficult. ICRC, for instance, with around 40 delegates, applies a 
lot of pressure to obtain permits to visit operations and to verify that those most in need 
are well targeted. Yet globally, whereas since January 2015 55 requests have been filed for 
cross-line visits, only 9 have been successful.  

JC3.3 ECHO took specific measures to ensure that during implementation, the 
needs of the most vulnerable people were taken into account 

For instance, a project by Handicap International, designed on the basis of an assessment 
among  war-wounded,  disabled,  elderly  and  persons  under  psychological  stress  to 
investigate the needs for rehabilitation services, was seen by ECHO staff as insufficiently 
targeting women or the elderly195, and HI was asked to come back with more information. 
Yet, given the difficult operational conditions prevailing inside Syria, ECHO did fund the 
project. 

EQ  4: To  what  extent  has  the  ECHO  intervention  taken  account  of  the  host 
populations,  and  what  concrete  measures  have  been  taken  to  address  their  needs 
and interests? 

JC 4.1. : ECHO applied a specific approach/strategy to make sure that needs and 
interest of host populations were taken into account 

This EQ is not applicable inside Syria, where the needs of IDPs are in most cases mixed 
with the non-displaced war-affected populations.  

JC 4.2 : ECHO took specific measures to address the needs and interest of host 
populations 

JC 4.3: The measures reached their objectives 

EQ  5:  To  what  extent  have  ECHO  and  its  partners  been  successful  in  adapting 
their approach and addressing gaps to the shifting needs of the region, as the crisis 
has  evolved? B) Considering that project activities of partners  in many cases  have 
been  carried  over  from  one  funding  cycle  to  the  next,  to  what  extent  have  the 
partners  been  revising  their  approach  –  being  innovative  –  to  better  address  the 
needs? C) What modifications to approaches are needed for the future? 

JC 5.1 ECHO and its partners had a strategy to adapt their approach to the shifting 
needs of the region 

ECHO and its partners are supporting or participating in a series of data collection and 
analysis processes in order to increase the evidence base on with to design, allocate, modify 
and implement programmes in an ever-changing environment. ACAPS reports (SNAP), 

194   Handicap International ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91020 
195   ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91020 Fichop 

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REACH and global sources of information are widely used to monitor the evolution of 
needs (in terms of location, magnitude, etc.). There is a certain suspicion of how far all 
these initiatives (with their associated collaboration, competition and so forth) originate 
from similar sources, only packaged rather differently.  

JC 5.2 ECHO and its partners have revised their approaches/interventions so as to 
better address the shifting needs of the region 

In many instances, ECHO and its partners have  been  able to respond rapidly  to shifting 
needs.  For  example,  GOAL  (ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91009  GOAL)  was  able  to 
intervene rapidly, after a quick exchange of views with ECHO TA in the newly accessible 
areas of the Idlib governorate after frontlines shifted (following the so-called Islamic State 
withdrawal from that zone). 

JC 5.3 In the case of project activities that have been carried over from one funding 
cycle to the next, ECHO partners adapted their approaches/interventions to the 
changed needs. 

JC 5.4 When adapting their approaches to changing needs, ECHO’s partners 
introduced specific innovations 

It is not so much an adaptation to changing needs, but rather to changing and more drastic 
constraints, within which ECHO partners had to demonstrate a capacity to innovate. The 
deteriorated security situation in large parts of Syria thus implied that they had to find new 
ways  of  doing  things.  Agencies  which  were  present  in  DAESH-controlled  zones,  for 
instance,  had  to  find  less  visible  ways  of  operating  in  order  to  be  able  to  continue  their 
work without exposing their partners too much.  When DAESH came  under much  more 
stringent  attacks  by  the  Coalition  or  by  another  rebel  movement,  these  attempts  to 
innovate ran up against limits and agencies had to discontinue their programmes. 

JC 5.5 Implications for ECHO (and partner) approaches relative to expected shifts 
in beneficiary needs 

ECHO TAs have in all instances been in close dialogue with their partners, but with other 
sources  of  information  (including  other  donors)?  This  permanent  contact  with  different 
sources  facilitated  triangulation  of  information  and  regular  discussion  with  partners  in 
order  to  ensure  that  some  agencies  would  be  ready  to  respond  to  particular  emerging 
needs. 

EQ 6 – EU Added-Value 

JC 6.1 ECHO employed a specific approach and took specific initiatives to ensure it 
could provide added value 

The  distribution  reports  prepared  by  SARC  seem  to  concern  some  of  the  most-affected 
areas.  NGOs  involved  in  ECHO-supported  cross-border  operations  try  to  produce  the 
best available data on their operations. While there can be no possible final reliance on any 
of  these  data,  they  seem  to  indicate  some  positive  impacts  on  the  affected  populations.  
Partnership  with SARC,  along with multiplication of triangulation mechanisms for cross-
border  operations,  are  the  best  systems  to  hand  and  ECHO  has  been  both  relatively 
conservative  in  keeping  monitoring  and  targeting  at  the  core  of  its  operations,  and  also 

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extremely  creative  in  providing  added  value  on  new  field-based  monitoring  systems,  in 
organizing  training  sessions  in  the  region  and  in  supporting  NGO-based  coordination 
systems on cross-border operations. 

JC 6.2 ECHO was recognised as providing specific types of added value in the 
context of the Syrian crisis 

ECHO  has  been  seen  as  significantly  contributing  added  value  is  its  effort  to  make  aid 
inside  Syria  more  transparent  and  accountable,  through  significant  efforts  in  improving 
remote  management  mechanisms  and  related  reporting.    This  also  means  promoting  the 
idea  that  what  it  needed  is  not  “systematic  positive  reporting”  which  is  often  used  and 
affects  the  credibility  of  the  aid  system,  but  also  recognition  of  the  difficulties  and 
demonstration of efforts to overcome them. 

One very critical added value of ECHO is its capacity to keep track of when humanitarian 
actions  are  affected  by  spoilers  and  raise  awareness  of  this  danger.  The  frequently 
politicization  of  humanitarian  aid  (role  of  the  UN Security  Council),  the  frequent  mix  of 
humanitarian  aid  and  anti-terrorist  campaigns  (or  the  more  and  more  frequent  linkages 
established between humanitarian aid to be provided inside Syria and the emerging new EU 
migration policies, are examples. 

It  is  in  the  areas  of  remote  management  that  ECHO  has  provided  some  of  the  most 
creative  added  value.  Indeed  in  2011  ECHO  finalized  an  Instruction  Note  on  remote 
management  in  order  to  offer  a  framework  and  definition  for  this  specific  operational 
modality for use by partners and ECHO staff (with a focus on Somalia and Afghanistan). 
With the intensity of the confrontation inside Syria leading to massive access issues in 2012, 
derogation was agreed for ECHO-supported projects inside Syria as regards application of 
the remote management instruction note. With additional tools created to better assess aid 
diversion and report on field monitoring, ECHO significantly contributed to increasing the 
accountability  of  its  partners  on  ongoing  operations  inside  Syria  and  to  improving  the 
impression given to external stakeholders, including taxpayers and politicians, of operations 
inside Syria 

EQ 7 – Urban Settings 

The UN Secretary General recently announced that more than 180,000 people have been 
killed  during  the  last  four  years  of  the  Syrian  war.  The  majority  of  these  deaths  have 
occurred  in  urban  areas.  The  evolution  of  the  warfare  and  the  conduct  of  hostilities 
resulted  into more  and more  “war in city syndrome”  with “besieged cities”, “fragmented 
cities”  and “abandoned  cities (or parts of cities)”. ICRC and other actors had to develop 
strategies  for  each  of  these  situations  in  order  to  obtain  access  to  the  populations  and 
cross-lines, as well as negotiating local ceasefires to allow safe passage for convoys. While 
this was achieved with some success, it was very limited (see regular SG situation reports to 
the UNSC). 

JC 7.1 ECHO and its partner agencies employed a specific approach to embed 
urban issues within ECHO-funded projects in response to the Syrian crisis 

As  a  result  of  the  conflict,  humanitarian  needs  in  urban  areas  are  enormous  but  so  far 
access  and  logistical  constraints  have  made  it  difficult  for  aid  agencies  to  respond  on  an 
appropriate  scale.  For   relocated  families  in  in  schools,  classrooms  and  other  public 

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buildings,  and  for  the  new  coming  families  who  have  to  stay  outside  in  the  playground, 
with a temperature reaching above 40°C in summer, water is the top priority. In Damascus, 
where  temperatures can also reach  more  than  40°C in summer, NGOs  such as Première 
Urgence –Aide Médicale Internationale and agencies like UNICEF  have organized water 
trucking;  PU-AMI  is  distributing  55,000  litres  of  water  every  day  to  5,000  people  in  ten 
schools while SIF is trucking water in other parts of Damascus, while rehabilitation small-
scale  sanitation  schemes.  These  types  of  projects,  however  useful  though  they  are,  are 
expensive drops in the ocean and cannot be sustained over a long period of time. In winter, 
winterization  programmes,  including  distribution  of  winter  clothes  and  blankets,  are 
essential as life in destroyed houses and in the precarious IDP settlements becomes largely 
unbearable during the cold Syrian winters. Yet bringing such goods in an impartial way (ie 
to  both  sides)  into  the  urban  war  zones  proved  very  difficult  in  view  of  the  constraints 
imposed  by  the  Syrian  Government  and  the  still  ongoing  military  operations.  ICRC  has 
tried  to  negotiate  with  the  Syrian  government  and  insurgent  groups  permission  for  the 
Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) to evacuate civilians  – especially the wounded, women 
and children – from combat zones in Homs and Aleppo, but with limited success as many 
groups  among  the  insurgents  consider  the  SARC  to  be  a  tool  of  the  Government.. 
Ultimately,  the  government  and  most  of  the  opposition  groups  rejected  this  move  as  it 
would have meant ceding control over territory and people. 

JC 7.2 The design of ECHO-funded projects identified the major challenges that 
exist in urban settings in order to design interventions appropriate to these specific 
situations 

The  urban  challenges  were  further  identified  during  the  course  of  the  operation  and  the 
increased  level  of  understanding  of  the  “urban  challenges”  was  based  on  permanent 
iteration  in  project  design  and  lesson-learning  processes.  Only  ICRC  was  able  from  the 
beginning  to  deploy  a  proper  urban  approach.  The  advantage  of  ICRC,  given  its  long 
presence in the country, is a good network of contacts in the Water Boards196 at central and 
regional  levels.  ICRC  developed  a  very  new  operational  relation  with  the  Water  Boards 
which  identify  urban  projects  and  have  them  validated  by  ICRC  engineers.  ICRC  then 
supports  procurement  of  the  material  (often  generators  and  valves),  and  consumables 
(chlorine, spare parts). 

JC 7.3 Throughout implementation, ECHO-funded projects were able to tackle the 
specific urban challenges (for displaced and refugees as well as for the host urban 
populations) and to coordinate properly with the local authorities, urban services 
and institutions (municipalities), in line with the good practices elaborated by the 
sector 

The main ECHO funded interventions in Syrian cities were based on  the following three 
assumptions which were key to the design and implementation of the response. 

-  Conflict  in  urban  settings  in  Syria  has  had  several  health  consequences.  Significant 
numbers of civilians are wounded at any given time and it is very difficult  to evacuate 
them  to  acceptably  equipped  health  centres.  Treating  the  high  number  of  wounded 
brought  to  the  health  institutions  after  each  of  the  military  operations  requires  skills, 

196   The  Ministry  of  Water  resources,  (known  as  national  Water  Board)  used  to  work  either  with  public  or  private 

stakeholders. It continues to pay staff even on the opposition side. 

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equipment,  hygienic  conditions,  and  blood.  Surgical  teams  with  specialized  skills  are 
required  as  well  as  sufficient  supplies  of  blood,  anaesthetics,  drugs  and 
disinfectant.   Electricity  and  water  must  also  be  available  to  maintain  cold  chains  and 
minimum hygiene standards.  Capacity to stabilise a wounded patient’s condition, as well 
as means of evacuation, are crucially missing when cities become active battlefields. The 
key element of the strategy here was to ensure that any single opportunity to replenish 
stocks  was  used  to  ensure  that  minimal  capacity  remains  in  place  to  cope  with 
difficulties.  In addition to poor sanitary and aseptic  facilities, the limited  availability of 
blood  is regularly  mentioned by surgeons  returning  from the field.  ICRC, through  the 
SARC, and a few NGOs capable of working in urban areas (MSF, MDM) have tried to 
ensure  that  whatever  is  needed  to  allow  basic  health  and  surgical  care  to  continue  to 
function is provided (equipment, medicine, generators, etc.).  

-  Conflict in urban contexts creates many difficulties for accessing basic services: ICRC, 
UNICEF  and  NGO  have  been  trying  to  address  the  needs  in  WASH  and  shelters. 
There  was  a  relatively  sophisticated  system  in  the  cities  as  well  as  in  the  countryside, 
although  a  downward  trend  of  the  water  table  “recharge”  was  seen  as  a  likely  serious 
problem,  especially  for  the  growing  urban  centres.  This  system  was  based  on  sizeable 
stations, large-scale electricity and, more importantly, a rather comprehensive system of 
electricity distribution in the country with high tension lines. Of course these networks 
are  often  partly  or  totally  destroyed  during  military  operations,  which  means  that  the 
fall-back solution is based on large generators.  The changing patterns of demography 
linked  to  population  displacements  are  modifying  the  geographical  distribution  of 
demand and  impose heavy  demands  on sometime old  networks. The war itself  causes 
much damage  to the  networks,  meaning that a permanent repair capacity has to be in 
place.  ICRC  supports  it  by  providing  spare  parts  and  other  necessities,  which  is 
relatively expensive.  

-  Conflict in urban setting often triggers various stages of displacements of 
different magnitude. Assisting  these  IDP  is  a  real  challenge,  as  their  locations,  the 
rapidity  and  scale  of  their  movement,  and  even  sometimes  the  unpredictability  of  the 
patterns  of  displacements,  make  fast  reaction  difficult.  Agencies  have  been  more 
involved  in  the  longer-term  response  to  them,  especially  with  food  (WFP),  NFI  and 
shelter  (NGO,  UNICEF,  ICRC)  as  well  as  specific  WASH  interventions  (ICRC, 
UNICEF,  NGOs).  SARC  is  also  involved  when  IDP  sites  are  to  be  targeted.  Several 
hundred  collective  centres  are  currently  supported  and  the  SARC  developed  an 
innovative  system  of  supporting  new  centres,  with  pre-made  shower  systems  just 
needing to be installed.  

EQ8, (Protection): How and to what extent has Protection been appropriately taken 
into account and implemented in ECHO-funded projects? 

JC 8.1. ECHO and its partner agencies employed a specific approach to embed 
protection within ECHO-funded projects in response to the Syrian crisis 
Syria’s humanitarian crisis is by and large the largest protection crisis in the world, viz.:197 
o  more  than  200,000  people  were  killed  between  the  start  of  the  conflict  in  2011  and 

August 2015;198 

197   OCHA (2015) Humanitarian Needs Overview, p.1 

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o  IHL and HRL violations have been committed by all sides, including use of sieges as a 
weapon  of  war,  indiscriminate  attacks  in  densely  populated  areas,  and  targeting  of 
civilian infrastructure (schools, hospitals, water networks, places of worship); 

o  medical personnel working in non-government controlled areas are particularly targeted: 

560 personnel have been killed since 2011, and 200 health facilities attacked 

Protection  institutions  and  family  protection  network  structures  have  been  negatively 
impacted  by  the  conflict,  increasing  the  vulnerability  of  displaced  and  communities  at 
large.199 Moreover, fluctuating frontlines, increased use of force, and regionalisation of the 
conflict have further complicated delivery and monitoring of protection services.200 

ECHO-supported  protection  activities  inside  Syria  over  the  evaluation  period  have  been 
conducted  by  various  INGOs  and  international  organisations,  in  particular  ICRC,  with  a 
specific focus on protection of civilians, humanitarian staff and medical missions in Syria. 
Mainstreaming  protection in ECHO-funded projects is more  complex, as there  are many 
different views of what protection means. In November 2014 ECHO undertook a mission 
to Syria, which concluded that there was a need to increase ECHO’s focus on protection 
inside Syria including:201 
o  taking a more pro-active approach to protection on the ground and at advocacy level; 

o  increasing the focus on protection and safety of aid workers; 

o  addressing  issues  such  as  access  to  neighbouring  countries,  restrictive  internal  policies 

and forced repatriations for security reasons. 

JC 8.2. The design of ECHO-funded projects identified the major threats that exist 
to the physical and psychological security of humanitarian aid beneficiaries 

Most  of  the  ECHO  funded  programmes  implemented  inside  Syria  are  well  aware  of  the 
situation of the Syrian population at large and the dangers affecting it, and not only the aid 
beneficiaries.  Most  of  these  programmes  try  to  respond  to  some  needs,  but  given  the 
situation, they can only do very little in the area of security and safety of beneficiaries. 

JC  8.3.  ECHO-funded  project  designs  disambiguated  protection  needs  per 
population  segment  and  location,  including  identifying  specific  threats  to 
vulnerable groups 

EQ  9:  In  cases  when  Remote  Management  was  being  used,  to  what  extent  did  it 
follow existing guidance documents and good practice, and how successful was it? 

During the few first months of the conflict a handful of NGO managed to work in active 
front-line areas inside Syria with a certain international presence. The few aid actors able to 
do that, such as MSF and MDM, were working through small-scale health structures which 
were either very mobile or very discrete, and with networks of Syrian practitioners. These 
small-scale  medical  operations,  largely  of  a  surgical  nature,  were  frequently  assaulted  by 
Government security forces (MDM, 2012). These NGOs had to negotiate on movement of 
medical teams and supplies from neighbouring countries through cross-border operations 

198   UNHCHR (2014) Updated Statistical Analysis of Documentation of Killings in the Syrian Arab Republic, p.1 
199   OCHA (2015) Humanitarian Needs Overview, p.1. 
200   Idem., p.5 
201   ECHO (2014) Mission to Syria (Damascus) 17-21 November 2014. 

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and  across  many  checkpoints  controlled  by  different  groups,  making  these  movements 
highly hazardous. This became more and more difficult and agencies started to rely more 
and  more  on  local  networks.  What  was  possible  in  health,  especially  with  largely  self-
financed  agencies,  is  much  more  difficult  for  large-scale  relief  operations  funded  by 
international donors. These donors have much more constraining requirements in terms of 
accountability, fraud and aid diversion control, and thus have to put more importance on 
monitoring.  But  monitoring  requires  access  and  the  capacity  to  move  to  the  field  and  to 
observe and interview people. Where this is not possible directly, there comes into play the 
full set of options under the concept of “remote management”. 

-  From Damascus, field visits are a difficult issue. All field visits involving the presence 
of expatriate staff or NGO personnel have to be authorized by SARC. There are very 
few  administrative  obstacles  in  the  Damascus  and  Rural  Damascus  Governorates  and 
only security conditions linked to the level of military activities in the area could hamper 
field  visits.  Access  to  other  governorates  is  far  less  easy  and  travel  permits  are  rarely 
delivered.  This  means  that  vulnerability  analysis,  beneficiary  targeting  and  post-
distribution monitoring by NGO staff is very difficult.    

-  From  neighbouring  countries:  remote  management  is  currently  the  only  modality, 
especially since the killing of some aid workers by IS. Aid agencies work either through 
national  Syrian  staff  travelling  in  and  out  of  the  country,  or  through  Syrian  staff 
established inside Syria but maintaining a capacity to communicate with the head office 
in  the  neighbouring  country,  or  through  national  partners,  which  can  be  local  NGO, 
local  councils,  or  others.  There  are  many  differences,  however,  between  the  level  of 
engagement  in  cross-border  operations  and  related  remote  management  between 
Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and KIR, viz.: 

o  From Turkey cross-border work has now become a strategic feature of aid to Syrian 
people,  and  several  donors  are  engaged  in  it,  with  millions  of  dollars  of  aid  being 
transported across the border by NGOs. Coordination mechanisms are now in place, 
and NGOs have developed sophisticated data collection and communication systems 
using geo-referenced photos and videos, third party monitoring (etc.) for monitoring 
and reporting; 

o  From  Jordan:  cross-border  operations  are  under  the  strict  control  of  the  Border 
Security  apparatus  which  checks  every  single  truck.  It  is  mostly  carried  out  by  UN 
agencies. 

o  From Lebanon: cross-border operations are kept very much under the radar in order 
to  avoid  political  difficulties  with  the  Lebanese  Authorities.  The  easy  contacts  with 
Syrian  NGOs has  facilitated  the emergence  of a very creative  operations base, well 
advanced in terms of monitoring and of its ability to go quite far inside Syria (Rural 
Damascus, Hassakeh, Aleppo). 

o  From KIR: this is still at an early stage. It has become particularly important as needs 
for  assistance  in  Hassakeh  governorate,  including  for  230,000  IDPs,  have  become 
more  and  more  problematic  as  XL  assistance  became  impossible  and  Turkish 
authorities closed the crossing points mid-2013.   

JC9.1 When the instructions (notably the 7 questions with assessment criteria) were 
available, ECHO applied them before using remote management 

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ECHO made significant efforts to help agencies to develop remote management 
mechanisms which would offer sufficient guarantees on an acceptable level of aid 
effectiveness and accountability. This entailed: 

Main  findings  from  the  ERCHO  organized  workshops  in  Beirut  and  Gaziantep  on 
remote management: 

1.  Partner  awareness,  knowledge,  understanding  of  and  compliance  with  exiting  DG 

ECHO guidance on remote management is, at best, mixed.  

2.  Despite an excessively difficult context, it is incorrect to qualify all operations under 
any  single  management  arrangement.  Partners  often  employ  a  variety  of 
implementation modalities across sectors with varying degrees of direct and remote 
management, depending on the context and available partnerships. 

3.  Remote management operations are prone to a certain amount of institutional and 

operational inertia. 

4.  Available information (especially for needs assessments and beneficiary selection) is 
incomplete  and  highly  subjective  owing  to  a  heavy  reliance  on  local  networks,  key 
informants, etc.  

5.  There  exists  strong  dependence  on  local  staff  and  partners  where  their  capacity, 
affiliation, and acceptance are simultaneously a key advantage and a key constraint. 
6.  The  absence  of  reliable  population  data,  baselines,  movement  tracking  and  timely 
information is a major limiting factor, both in terms of planning and response, but 
also  in  determining  the  relevance  and  impact  of  humanitarian  operations.  This  is 
compounded  by  weak  or  absent  coordination  structures  and  the  absence  of 
comprehensive needs, response and gaps analysis. 

7.  Within  cash  based  programming,  the  key  concern  is  the  safety  and  security  of  the 
transfers  and  related  accountability  concerns.  This,  in  turn,  limits  the  potential  for 
substantial scale-up of this modality.  

8.  Remotely  managed  voucher  systems  are  relevant  where  needs  are  predictable  and 
time  bound,  but  are  not  practical  for  emergency  response  and  populations 
movements. 

9.  Opportunities to avail of third party monitoring mechanisms are limited and need to 

be built. 

10. Until  recently,  aid  diversion  reports  expected  from  partners  have  not  been  fully 
-  The wide and regular dissemination of a Remote management Guidance Note; 

exploited. 

-  Organization  of  several  workshops  (Gaziantep,  Beirut)  on  remote  management,  in  order  to 

facilitate exchange of experience and good practice between the aid agencies; 

-  Support to coordination mechanisms on remote management,  

-  The inclusion of a revised version of Article 8 of the contracts, requesting additional information 

on the operations (how many field monitoring visits, analysis of aid diversion, etc.) 

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New article 8.1. to be included in all the 2014 contracts with a Syria component:  
 "Considering current operational conditions in Syria, XXX is requested to submit to DG ECHO a quarterly report 
summarizing findings and observations of its monitoring / assessment missions; including instances of misuse of 
humanitarian aid. Whenever possible and as applicable, the report will provide quantitative information resulting 
from monitoring activities. The elements of reporting shall include the dates and locations where project activities 
were  monitored,  the  participation  (or  not)  of  expatriates  personnel  during  project  monitoring  visits, and  the 
modality  for  the  aid delivery  (direct,  through  SARC,  other  NGO,  CBO),  the  number  of  expatriate  staff  present 
inside  Syria,  number  of  national  personnel  under  contract,  and  difficulties  encountered  to  conduct  adequate 
monitoring  during  the  reporting  period.  DG  ECHO  will  provide  a  standard  format  to  fill  for  this  report  that 
should  be  sent  ten  days  maximum  after  each  quarter.  With  due  consideration  to  the  confidentiality  of  the 
information and data provided in the quarterly monitoring reports, DH ECHO will only use the information or 
data in an aggregate and non-attributable manner." 

JC9.2  Before  the  availability  of  the  instructions  ECHO  followed  other 
guidance/good practice before using remote management 

JC9.3 When remote management was used, potential risks and pitfalls of remote 
management were mitigated or did not adversely impact the concerned projects 

As all cross-border operations used remote management, and partners were selected largely 
on their capacities to manage possible risks. Partners with previous positive experience and 
demonstrated  capacities  based  on  previous  successful  delivery  (2013)  and  with  clearly 
stipulated risk mitigation measures (such as staff training), were given priority, for instance 
People  In  Need  (ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91005  (PIN).  Another  interesting  example  is 
Handicap  International  (HI)  which  deployed  programmes  (post-operative  rehabilitation 
care,  food  and  essential  household  items  and  [mine]  risk  education)  in  Aleppo,  Homs, 
Damascus  and  Dara’a  areas  via  five  Syrian  Civil  Society  Organisations  a  using  a  remote 
management  model.  Mitigation  measures  included  use  of  adjusted  evaluation  and 
monitoring approaches to overcome the security challenges presented by work inside Syria, 
establishment of partner networks including both local and international partners to ensure 
project  continuity,  and  maintenance  of  regular  contact  with  local  authorities.  One 
problematic  aspect  of  remote  management  was  noted  during  the  previous  round  of 
funding  of  the  project  prior  to  2014,  namely  that  non-standardisation  of  the  food  and 
hygiene kits meant that local partners sourced items locally and were therefore dependent 
on  local  availability.  ECHO  encouraged  HI  to  work  towards  standardisation  of  kits 
provided  and  development  of  guidelines  for  local  partners  to  follow  in  this  regard. 
(ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91020 Single Form). 

EQ10 – Cash and vouchers 

JC 10.1 The ECHO strategy for Syria considered the appropriate use of a range of 
transfer modalities 

ECHO, along with its partners inside Syria, explored the series of options and the obstacles 
they  could  encounter.  For  instance,  inside  Syria  most  aid  is  in-kind  and  the  Damascus 
government  is  seen  as  totally  against  cash  transfer,  yet  several  local  charities  and  NGOs 
have been continuously using cash transfer through all kinds of mechanism, ranging from 
direct cash hand-outs to cash transfers through the Hawala system. The critical element in 
the  discussion  is  how  far  the  different  qualifiers  are  able  to  meet  basic  requirements  in 
terms of the existing capacities of the markets and traders, the level of inflation, security, 

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capacity  to  carry  out  market  surveys,  and  so  forth.  Owing  to  the  highly  varied  and  fluid 
situations  inside  Syria,  resource  transfer  mechanism  require  an  in-depth  level  of  situation 
analysis. 

JC 10.2 The appraisal of ECHO actions took account of an appropriate analysis of 
the context 

The key qualifiers for cash programming (functioning markets, level of inflation relatively 
well controlled, security of the cash providers) have been always at the forefront of ECHO 
reflections on the possibility of supporting cash programming by its partners. In Syria, the 
high  rate  of  inflation  and  the  control  of  some  areas  by  groups  included  in  the  EU/U 
terrorist  list  represent  two  significant  hindrances  to  large-scale  cash  transfer  operations. 
Some ECHO partners are however involved in localized small-scale pilot operations to test 
several hypotheses, including the current capacity of the Hawala system to distribute large-
scale cash to targeted beneficiaries and to be able to deliver this on an appropriate scale. 

JC 10.3 ECHO-funded cash and voucher operations have been effective in the Syria 
context 

There is so far very little evidence that the context of Syria, although it differs significantly 
in  terms  of  the  usual  cash  programming  qualifiers,  is  incompatible  with  hosting  of 
substantial cash operations beyond the ongoing pilot projects. 

EQ 11. Is the size of the budget allocated by ECHO to the region appropriate and 
proportionate  to  what  the  actions  are  set  out  to  achieve?  Could  the  same  results 
have been achieved with less funding? 

JC 11.1. The ECHO budget allocation to respond to the Syrian crisis was 
appropriate 

JC 11.2. The ECHO budget allocation to respond to the Syrian crisis was 
proportionate 

JC 11.3. ECHO calibrated its objectives to the available funding 

JC 11.4. ECHO-funded activities were cost-effective 

EQ 12: Judgement criteria and indicators 

JC 12.1. ECHO undertook specific actions/commitments to ensure that the quality 
and coverage of its monitoring mechanisms were conducive to support sound 
management of ECHO-funded operations 

The  best  ECHO  could  do  is  to  support  both  remote  management  and  multiplication  of 
tools  for  triangulation  by  its  partners.  ECHO  invested  resources  in  initiatives  to  provide 
information on the context, programme performance and impact as part of its support for 
global strategic and operational information  management on the situation  inside Syria.  In 
the  end  the  result  produced  by  these  mechanisms  did  not  satisfy  ECHO  which 
discontinued its funding. 

JC12.2 ECHO adopted a specific approach to ensure that monitoring mechanisms 
were tailored to the specific needs of remote management 

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ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91005  (PIN)  &  ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91005  (GOAL):  & 
ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91020 (Handicap International): the monitoring mechanism was 
adapted for remote management as used in the CBO component. Additional reporting was 
required from the implementing partner, including instances of misuse of aid and security 
considerations for expatriate and national staff. 

JC.12.3. ECHO partners implemented operations monitoring and ensured data and 
findings were available for ECHO’s use in a timely manner 

From a contractual point of view, ECHO partners are due to provide information on the 
basis of regular reporting based on the single form. In the case of cross-border operations, 
and  in  view  of  the  lower  level  of  control  in  a  context  of  remote  management,  new 
parameters have been put in place in the reporting system, through modification of Article 
8 of the contractual arrangements, stipulating the need to: 

- 

- 

report on aid diversion;  

give  comprehensive  data  on  monitoring  capacity  (staff  number  and  level  of 
seniority, number of field visits and of interviews carried out, etc.) 

EQ 13: What has  been  the partners’  experience of working in consortia as well as 
with a multi-country approach? 

JC 13.1. ECHO undertook specific actions/commitments to ensure consortium and 
multi-country operations made efficient use of available resources 

At  the  outset  ECHO was  confronted  with  a  certain  scarcity  of  partners:  few  NGOs  and 
UN  agencies  had  difficulty  in  moving  from  their  pre-war  development  mode  to  a  more 
emergency response mode. One of the key elements of the ECHO strategy was to increase 
the  number  of  partners  and  improve  geographical coverage.  Confronted  with  an  internal 
scarcity of manpower during 2012 and at the beginning of 2013, ECHO had to resort to 
large scale contracts, but this did not turn out to be very successful.  

Several partners rightly emphasized the impossibility of predicting the evolution of crises, 
the  security  environment  and  the  impact  of  such  evolution  on  protection  issues.  They 
based  their  propositions  on  their  current  appreciation  of  the  context  and  on  possible 
scenarios. The multi-country approach allows better understanding of the various dynamics 
of  the  Syrian  conflict  and  its  spill-over  to  neighbouring  countries  and  significantly 
strengthens  analytical  and  anticipation  capacities  on  protection  of  the  population  and 
security of staff. Being multi-country also allows diversification of operational options and 
adaptation of programmes to a possible deterioration of the situation (shifting part of the 
aid planned from one area to the other, in particular in areas where internal displacements 
and  cross-border  movements  expose  people  more  to  aggression,  violence  and  breach  of 
IHL  and  IRL,  thus  increasing  protection  needs.  If  a  situation  allows,  the  regional 
geographical set-up is seen as significantly strengthening the position of any serious partner 
involved in protection in a range of difficult areas (e.g. ICRC, UNHCR and DRC). 

JC 13.2.  ECHO partners provided evidence that consortium and multi-country 
arrangements reduced coverage gaps and duplications between countries and 
partner organisations 

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The return to specific country contracts was made possible by an increase in staffing and a 
better sharing of roles between two TA, one in charge of a Damascus-based operation as 
well as cross-border operation with Lebanon and Jordan, and another in charge of whole-
of-Syria coordination and cross-border work with Turkey and Iraq. 

EQ 14  -  ECHO successfulness to coordinate operations with other main actors 

JC 14.1 Actions undertaken to enhance coordination 

ECHO has been fully engaged in all discussions on coordination since the beginning of the 
crisis and even more strongly in the context of the whole-of-Syria initiative. 

Yet ECHO realized that its NGO partners have not been very much supported by the UN 
system in Syria, in particular by the RC/HC. This situation, largely  the wish of the Syrian 
Government, leaves a large operational space for the UN agencies and puts the NGOs in a 
very  weak  position  in  their  negotiations  with  the  Government.  ECHO  made  systematic 
requests to both the UN and the Government for more positive engagement with NGOs, 
so far with only limited success.  

Even if different initiatives (ACAP’s SNAP, ACTED’s REACH, US-funded IMMAP, etc.) 
are making available substantial documentation on the situation, most of this information 
has been used more in donor capitals by high-level decision-makers than by field operators 
for better local coordination. The number of fund-raising documents produced during the 
Syrian crisis and describing the humanitarian situation and related needs is also large. The 
area  of  information  production  and  dissemination,  which  should  have  been  the  central 
pillar around which to build operational coordination, itself became an area for competition 
and lack of coordination. This in the end triggered the decision of ECHO to stop financing 
some of these initiatives. 

JC 14.2 ECHO identified and took account of main actors’ activities 

ECHO followed very carefully the Syrian Response Plans (SRP) developed for Syria by the 
UN  system  and  the  Damascus-based  RC/HC.  Key  concerns  relate  to  the  fact  that  the 
amount  of  resources  requested  by  the  SRP  are  always  on  the  rise,  while  access  and  the 
capacity to deliver remains limited, if not decreasing, owing to problems linked to security 
and access rather than merely to financial limitations. This implies better tuning of financial 
requests, with more use of reality checks on what can realistically be done. ECHO is trying 
to  engage  in  a  dialogue,  for  instance,  with  Iran  on  coordination.  Discussions  with  Qatar 
MFA indicated a willingness to engage with ECHO in coordination matters. 

JC 14.3 ECHO actions sought to enhance synergies and reduce duplications of 
effort, gaps or resource conflicts 

ECHO  has  been  very  actively  engaged  in  multi-donor  coordination.  In  the  Syrian  crisis 
there  is  a  tendency  to  forget  and  not  to  engage  with  certain  non-traditional  donors  who 
play a significant role in the aid sector, the SRP for instance not paying much attention to 
their contribution. 

The ECHO Syria  team was also very active  in trying  to help  the  UN system  improve its 
coordination.  It  has  been  playing  a  dynamic  role  in  the  promotion  of  the  whole-of-Syria 
approach,  trying  to  bring  the  different  “hubs”  together  in  a  constructive  dialogue  with 
Damascus. These efforts to streamline the international coordination mechanisms have had 

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some success, for instance the transition from CRSP to 3RP, but also ended up supporting 
creation of a significant new bureaucracy (114 regional coordinators at a cost of more than 
US$22m.  The  key  elements  expected  from  the  revised  architecture  (better  mapping  of 
needs  and  responses,  more  fluid  circulation  of  information,  facilitation  of  collective 
responses)  became  lost  in  inter-agency  conflicts,  an  internal  OCHA  struggle,  and  sundry 
confrontations. As one ECHO staff said “one year has been lost”  in which much energy 
has been diverted from important field support to time-consuming efforts to improve the 
aid  architecture;  another  however  mentioned  that  if  the  process  had  been  successful,  a 
significantly better response could have been achieved and the sense of “lost time” would 
have evaporated. 

JC 14.4 ECHO actions demonstrated synergies and no duplications of effort, gaps 
or resource conflicts 

By  keeping  in  touch  with  all  its  partners  in  all  hubs  as  well  as  Damascus  (although  the 
mission  there  are  relatively  rare),  by  actively  contributing  to  the  existing  coordination 
mechanisms (or supporting their creation if not in place), and by engaging in a systematic 
manner in donor coordination, ECHO significantly contributed to reduction of duplication 
and of possible gaps in the response. 

When  required,  ECHO  jointly  funded  projects  with  other  donors  in  order  to  place 
coordination upstream in the process. For instance ECHO decided to support HI’s mine 
action  work  already  co-funded  by  SDC,  MOFA  Luxembourg  and  the  Dutch  MOFA. 
Given  the  Dutch  MOFA’s  contributions  to  HI,  ECHO  contributed  to  the  mine  action 
component of this programme in order to increase donor diversification in this area for HI. 
Moreover ECHO support for HI inside Syria filled a potential gap created by HI’s decision 
not  to  seek  bilateral  aid  from  French  or  American  donors  for  operations  inside  Syria  (as 
these donors are also parties to the conflict)202. This cross-border project was implemented 
by  Handicap  International  (HI)  via  five  different  Syrian  NGO  partners.  Synergies  were 
built within the programme to allow access to rehabilitation care among the separate NGO 
partner organisations. 

EQ15 – Mainstreaming of LRRD 

JC 15.1 ECHO coordinated with EC development actors (DG DEVCO, EEAS, and 
EU MS) from the earliest phases of a crisis response 

is  how  to  use  simultaneously,  and 

The  coordination  between  ECHO  and  other  EU  instruments  (NEAR  and  IfS)  has  been 
key to coping with immense needs in different areas. In Syria the war is slowly destroying 
all the results of previous decades of development efforts and, as the war is far from over, 
in  well  thought-through 
the  key  question 
complementarity, the different tools available at EC and Member State level. For instance, 
ECHO  supports  food  aid  programmes  through  WFP  while  NEAR  supports  livelihood 
interventions  through  FAO.  There  are  nevertheless  some  difficulties,  if  not  divergent 
views, as regards the EU tools, as they do not have the same mandate. EEAS for instance 
is  not  fully  involved  in  the  humanitarian  debates  which  take  place  in  New  York  and 
Geneva, but fully supports the role of Staffan de Mistura, the UN special envoy especially, 
on  freeze  zones,  cross-border  issues,  cross-line  issues  and  the  international  presence  in 

202   Handicap International ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91020  

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Syria.  While  there  are  many  discussions  on  what  is  a  freeze  zone  and  on  local  ceasefire 
agreements, ECHO is very concerned about the possible interactions of political agendas (a 
ceasefire and the establishment of a freeze zone is seen as a political act) and humanitarian 
issues, and the possible instrumentalization of humanitarian issues for a political rationale.  

JC 15.2 ECHO deployed the various instruments available to implement stability 
measures in a coherent and complementary fashion with the EU toolbox 

Some interviewees considered that, for a long time ECHO’s team to handle support inside 
Syria was insufficiently staffed to cope with the complexity and magnitude of the needs and 
allocated resources. Priority was given to ECHO’s own work over coordination with other 
EU  Services  and  with  Member  States.  Matters  improved  significantly  when  more  human 
resources were allocated at both field and Brussels levels. There was further improvement 
with the progressive relocation of  ECHO Syria  Coordination from the Amman  office  to 
the Beirut office, as Beirut is only a two-hour drive from Damascus. 

JC 15.3 ECHO-funded actions have been based on a strong context analysis 

ECHO  is  now  deployed  with  a  significant  set-up  of  TAs,  many  highly  experienced  and 
connected to almost all relevant information providers (despite not financing them, at least 
until  recently  –  e.g.  ACAP’s  SNAP).  The  fact  that  there  is  a  dedicated  team  to  maintain 
oversight of the whole context and of the internal response is a unique asset in undertaking 
permanent context analysis and facilitating decision-making, if not subject to overwhelming 
political pressures. 

JC 15.4 ECHO-funded projects have been framed in the context of longer-term 
requirements of reconstruction and development 

At this stage it is far too early to start addressing the long term in a detailed manner or to 
foresee what reconstruction and development will mean in the future, as new needs arise 
every day owing to the very active and highly volatile conflict still taking place inside Syria. 
Most operations are short-term interventions aimed at immediate alleviation of suffering. If 
post-conflict proactive planning takes place (as it should), it is not within ECHO’s remit.  

EQ16 – Successfulness in terms of LRRD 

JC 16.1 ECHO-funded operations have been implemented through rapid decision-
making processes and flexible instruments 

The capacity of ECHO network of donors and partners allows rapid spread of information 
about  events  unfolding  inside  Syria.  Fluid  and  rapid  discussions  between  donors,  and 
consultation with institutions  that are  best-placed, experienced  and ready to engage, have 
been key to emergency management when military confrontation erupts and people are on 
the move. 

JC 16.2 ECHO provided a coordinated response strategy through its actions 

The  capacity  of  ECHO  to  provide  a  coordinated  response  strategy  largely  relies  on  the 
evolution of the overall staffing of the ECHO field operations. From one person in charge 
of  the  whole  “inside  Syria  response”  to  the  current  set-up  with  one  person  covering 
Damascus  and  cross-border  operations  from  Jordan  and  Lebanon  and  another 
coordinating  the  whole-of-Syria  approach  and  covering  cross-border  operations  from 

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Turkey, there is  significant gain  in capacity for understanding  the  ever-changing situation 
and keeping the right oversight on an extremely complex humanitarian response.  

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JC 16.3 ECHO engaged with a range of locally important actors through its actions 

ECHO not only coordinates with other EC Services, but also as an engaged donor present 
in  almost  all  key  strategic  dialogue  between  donors  on  aid  in  Syria  (with  a  key  role  for 
instance  at  donor  pledging  conferences),  in  the  UN  system  at  the  highest  level  in  New 
York,  Geneva,  and    also  in  the  MENA  region,  including  of  course  in  Damascus  and 
surrounding  countries  in  which  the  ECHO  Syria  team  has  direct  relations  with  HC  and 
RC/HC as well as with the UNCT. In Damascus the situation is less easy, but regular visits 
from ECHO management in Brussels facilitate access to several key levels in the Damascus 
administration. 

JC 16.4 ECHO-funded interventions experienced a smooth and timely phase-out, 
thereby avoiding “grey zones” in international assistance 

JC16.5 ECHO-funded actions encouraged “cross-learning” of humanitarian and 
development experiences 

In Damascus many of the UN agencies were very much in slow development mode when 
the  crisis  developed  and  it  took  them  some  time  to  speed  up  their  responses.  “Cross-
learning” has been more from development to emergency rather than the reverse. 

EQ17,  (Security)  To  what  extent  have  the  ECHO-funded  projects  taken  into 
account  the  security  situation  in  the  field  for  the  partners'  organisations?  What  is 
the scope for improvement? 

JC 17.1. The design of ECHO-funded actions has been based on an in-depth 
knowledge of the security situation, both in Syria and in neighbouring countries 

Syria  is  one  of  the  most  violent  environments  in  which  humanitarian  aid  has  been 
deployed. Security patterns related to assistance and protection in Syria are to a large extent 
dominated by several main threats:  

- 

- 

- 

risk of humanitarian actors being caught in an active conflict zone;  

armed extremist groups who use capture (and killing) of humanitarian actors as part 
of their warfare strategy; 

armed  criminal  groups  who  mainly  take  people  either  for  ransom  or  for  sale  to 
extremist groups.  

Each of these security threats carries different implications. Most ECHO partners now use 
staff who have been trained in safety and security issues. Several partners mentioned that 
their dialogue on potential deterioration of the security  situation  with ECHO TAs in the 
field  is  ongoing,  as  changing  security  patterns  in  a  given  operational  environment  would 
imply a need to reassess the situation and reallocate activities if required. Any change to the 
action would then be discussed and agreed with ECHO.  

ECHO supports security measures including recruitment of personnel who can constantly 
monitor  the  situation  on  the  ground  as  regards  military  activities  through  an  extensive 
network  of  relevant  contacts  across  the  area,  and  is  therefore  well-equipped  to  evaluate 
situations on a real-time basis in each particular locality covered by the various projects. In 
order to increase protection of staff in Syria, all agencies have standard security measures in 
place.  They  can  become  members  of  NGO  Security  Working  Groups  and  participate  in 

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meetings  at  country  or  regional  levels  (for  instance  sub-groups  for  Halab  and  Idlib 
Governorates).  They  also  establish  specific  security  protocols  for  activities,  including 
profile management strategy and establishment of evacuation plans for their staff. 

JC 17.2. The design and implementation of ECHO-funded actions facilitated 
humanitarian access for partner’s organizations 

When cross-border operations are discussed between ECHO and its partners, all elements 
of  the  remote  management  approach,  of  security  management  and  of  the  necessary 
precautions are raised. While there is no evidence in one or other direction, it is likely that 
this has given partners better cards to work with to negotiate access inside Syria, including 
areas with the highest IDP concentrations (Aleppo and Idlib) despite security constraints203.  

JC 17.3. ECHO-funded actions promoted the security and safety of humanitarian 
personnel delivering humanitarian aid 

ECHO supports all required measures in the programmes to ensure the safety and security 
of the aid actors. It has for instance financially supported a security assessment conducted 
for cross-border operations through the Turkish border which included a risk assessment 
and mitigation plan for staff operating in eastern provinces close to the Syrian border.204 

ECHO pays specific attention to the capacity and knowledge of its partners to operate in 
dangerous areas. For instance, working in DAESH and Al Nusra zones is very complicated 
as  the  dangers  are  considerable.  Only  partners  which  had  networks  prior  to  the  war  and 
have managed to keep contact with these networks are able to operate in these areas. Some 
local NGOs are still present and active in Raka and Deir El Zor areas, as well as in Aleppo 
and Edlib, and are able to negotiate with the local powers in place. 

EQ18  (Humanitarian  advocacy)  How  effective  and  active  has  ECHO  been  in  terms  of 
Humanitarian  Advocacy  (on  issues  like  coordination,  access,  open  borders,  cross-line 
intervention, INGO registration, work permits, etc.)?  

JC 18.1. Advocacy has been a priority of ECHO response strategies for Syria and its 
neighbouring countries 

As a permanent feature, ECHO systematically advocated for the capacity for the aid system 
to be able to undertake monitoring, both from Damascus and for cross-border operations. 
But  in  its  understanding  that  on  this  subject  advocacy  is  not  enough,  it  demonstrated  its 
appreciation  of   the  subject  by  engaging  more  in  support  of   training  local  capacities  to 
better monitor aid in the  complex and sensitive environment inside Syria. Supporting the 
establishment of  partnerships with local Syrian NGOs205 was seen as essential.  

In addition to the ECHO-supported efforts on protection, the EU and Member States all 
supported UN Security Council Resolution 2139 in February 2014 demanding all parties to 
immediately cease attacks on civilians; end arbitrary detention, kidnapping and torture; and 
lift sieges of  populated areas. During the months following the passing of  this Resolution, 
civilians in Syria have witnessed ever-increasing suffering and death, while more and more 
restrictions  have  been  imposed  in  refugees.    The  regular  efforts  by  ICRC,  UN  special 

203   ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91005 (PIN 
204   ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91005 (PIN): 
205   http://refugeesinternational.org/sites/default/files/150511_syria_local_aid.pdf 

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envoys,  and  EU  Delegations,  including  ECHO,  to  advocate  for  respect  for  IHL,  human 
rights laws and other instruments have so far by and large been in vain.  

ECHO, together with other authorities of the European Commission, has been involved in 
several key negotiations to facilitate the humanitarian operations of its partners, including 
visa  granting,  registrations,  and  deployments  to  the  field  for  monitoring.  The  success  of 
these  efforts  has  been  uneven  and  ECHO  delegations  were  systematically  subjected  to  a 
highly political discourse from the Syrian MOFA. 

Several missions from the highest levels of ECHO (General director, Head of Operations) 
as well as by the Commissioner, have taken place in Damascus to negotiate on the presence 
of  ECHO  staff  and  of  its  partners  (visas,  agreement  on  opening  of  offices,  field  visits). 
This has not always been successful, but efforts are constantly  being pursued.  

JC 18.2. ECHO advocacy contributed to concrete policy changes in neighbouring 
countries  

The  fact  that  ECHO  organized  regular  exchanges  between  the  different  hubs  and  with 
Damascus  helped  the  institution  gain  much  improved  oversight  and  much  more  easily 
identify  areas  of  convergence  and  areas  of  divergence  between  the  different  zones  of 
operation. This contributed  to elaboration of much more  refined advocacy messaging  on 
access, on cross-border mechanisms, and on remote management across the whole region 
affected by the Syrian crisis. 

JC 18.3. ECHO advocacy contributed to changes in approach by other donors in 
Syria and neighbouring countries 

A critical role has been the debate between ECHO and other donors, especially DFID and 
USAID, on cross-border operations. This advocacy largely contributed to the joint decision 
of  these  donors  to  engage  on  a  substantial  scale  with  cross-border  operations,  even  at  a 
time when the UN Resolution was not yet in place to give the required legality framework 
to these operations. 

JC 18.4. ECHO advocacy contributed to increased coordination between donors 
and governments in Syria and neighbouring countries 

Evidence  suggests  that,  on  the  contrary,  better  coordination  between  donors  facilitated 
advocacy with local governments, NGOs and UN agencies. 

1.  Country-specific conclusions  

With the end of the Syrian crisis not easy to forecast, and probably not happening in the 
near  future,  fighting  is  likely  to  continue  on  a  large  scale  in  the  country,  with  all  the 
associated suffering leading  to population displacements, degradation of living  conditions 
and increased population fatigue.  Coping mechanisms will continue to be eroded and are 
probably relatively close to breaking point for many families. 

Access  and  protection  remain  the  most  challenging  issues,  and  with  the  evolution  of  the 
conflict  and  the  growing  difficulties  and  constraints  imposed  by  Damascus,  cross-border 
activities are more and more seen as a key lifeline for many Syrians. ECHO demonstrated a 
remarkable  capacity  to  stay  involved  in  these  subjects,  and  to  be  permanently  seeking 

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innovative approaches and new ways of working, even if that implies paradigm shifts both 
internally and within the aid system.  

Above all, through the engagement of its staff ECHO has continued to prove its capacity 
to not only engage operationally with its network of partners, but also to regularly raise the 
flag of humanitarian principles when politics or “over-pragmatism” encroached on them.  

In  addition,  the  current  ECHO  set-up  in  the  field  and  at  Brussels  level    -    probably  too 
slowly established but now firmly in place  -  offers an exceptional oversight of the crisis 
and  of the  international response  which on the one  hand allows a rapid  and coordinated 
response  and  on  the  other  facilitates  significant  influence  on  aid  practices  and  aid 
mechanisms.  

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Turkey Country Report 

Turkey Country Report ........................................................................................................................... 259 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 
5. 

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 301 
1.1.Methodology ............................................................................................................................ 301 
1.2.Structure of the Turkey Country Report ............................................................................. 301 
THE CONTEXT .......................................................................................................................... 302 
2.1.Turkey Context ........................................................................................................................ 302 
2.2.Outline of the humanitarian context .................................................................................... 302 
2.2.1.Dynamics of displacement ................................................................................................. 303 
2.2.2.Key humanitarian issues ..................................................................................................... 304 
2.2.3.Response from the Turkish Government ........................................................................ 305 
2.2.4.Response from the international community .................................................................. 308 
OVERVIEW OF THE ECHO APPROACH IN THE COUNTRY ................................................. 312 
3.1.ECHO overall strategy ........................................................................................................... 312 
3.2.Application of the basic assistance package in border areas............................................. 312 
3.3.Expanding coverage in the “far east” .................................................................................. 313 
3.4.Overview of funding and activities undertaken in the country ........................................ 313 
KEY FINDINGS WITH RESPECT TO THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS (EQS) ...................... 315 
OTHER RELEVANT FINDINGS FOR THE EVALUATION ........................................................ 338 
5.1.Allocation of resources to Refugees in the Far East ......................................................... 338 
5.2.Basic Needs Approach ........................................................................................................... 339 
5.3.Other issues ............................................................................................................................. 339 

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1.  Introduction 

This Turkey Country report is part of the broader external evaluation process carried out 
on the DG ECHO response to the Syria crisis.  

The  major  focus  of  the  Turkey  case  study  is  related  to  ECHO-funded  actions  inside 
Turkey. In addition the mission discussed remote management issues with NGOs based in 
Turkey supporting operations in the country.  

1.1. Methodology 

The methodology applied for this case study is based on three pillars: 

-  Documents  reviewed:  In  addition  to  the  work  undertaken  during  the  desk  study, 
additional  documents  covering  context,  projects,  needs  and  impact  have  been 
gathered in the field and analyzed  
Interviews with key stakeholders  

- 

o  ECHO Field Assistants (Brussels and Turkey) and EU Delegation 
o  UN Agencies (Deputy RHC, OCHA, UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, IOM) 
o  INGOs (DRC, IRC, IMC, MDM, CONCERN, WWH, People in Need) 
o  CSOs (Support to Life, Doctors Worldwide, Turkish Doctors Association, 

Turkish Pharmacist Association) 

o  National authorities (Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management 
Authority – AFAD Urfa, Diyarbakir Governors office & Camp Managers) 
o  Refugee  interviews  through  focus  group  and  household  visits  (Diyabakir 
camp,  Batman,  Mardin,  Kiziltepe,  Kilis,  Hatay)  which  allowed  direct 
observation of programmes and interviews with Syrian refugees 
-  Final debriefing with DG ECHO staff to validate the findings and go through the 

initial and tentative conclusions. 

1.2. Structure of the Turkey Country Report 

The structure of the Turkey country report is as follows: 

Section 2: The context in Turkey 
  Brief overview of the socio-economic  context of Turkey 
  Brief  description  of  the  specific  constraints  on  the  refugees’  situation  in  the  country 

and the impact on host communities 

Section 3: Overview of the ECHO approach in the country: 
  Overview of ECHO’s overall approach and main priorities in the country 
  Overview of funding and activities undertaken in the country 

Section 4: Key findings with respect to the Evaluation Questions 

Section 5: Other relevant findings of the evaluation 
  Specific findings on the case study subjects 
  Specific lessons with respect to the sectors concerned (water, health, etc.)  
  Other relevant findings  
Section 6: Issues arising 

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2.  The context  

2.1. Turkey Context206 

Turkey  is  a  large  middle-income  country  with  a  population  of  77  million207.  The  Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of $799 billion208 makes Turkey the 18th largest economy in the 
world209. In less than a decade, per capita income in the country has nearly tripled and now 
exceeds $10,000, although the GINI coefficient has remained relatively unchanged (41.4 in 
2004  and  40.0  in  2011 210 ).  According  to  the 
World  Bank,  Turkey’s  economic 
situation 
remains  favorable  compared  to  the  rest  of 
Europe  and  the  rest  of  the  MENA  region. 
Turkey is a member of the OECD and the G20, 
and  an  increasingly  important  donor  to  bilateral 
Official Development Assistance (ODA). 

The  Justice  and  Development  Party  (AKP)  won 
the  general  election  on  June  7th  but  lost  its 
majority  as  the  pro-Kurdish  party  reached  the 
10%  vote  threshold  for  entering  parliament.  An 
unstable  minority  government  or  coalition  is 
likely to follow. 

Turkey  has  a  complex  relationship  with  the  European  Union  (EU).  The  EU  remains 
Turkey’s  largest  economic  partner,  accounting  for  46%  of  Turkish  trade  in  2011.  Turkey 
became  a  candidate  for  full  membership  in  the  EU  at  the  Helsinki  summit  in  1999. 
Accession  negotiations  began  in  October  2005  and  continue  to  make  progress,  despite  a 
number of political obstacles (including relations with Cyprus).  However, with the rise of 
the AKP, Turkey has styrengthened its relationship with the Middle East and North Africa. 

Decades  of  social  and  economic  repression  of  Kurdish  and  Alevi  minorities  has  fuelled 
grievances  and  deepened  the  divide  between  the  Kurds  and  the  rest  of  Turkey.  Despite 
improvements  to  the  Kurds’  civil  rights,  a  permanent  solution  is  yet  to  come  about  and 
violence continues to flare up. Further deterioration of the conflict may be due to the war 
in Syria, given the power vacuum created by the withdrawal of the Syrian army from the 
Kurdish areas in Syria (near Turkey’s south-east border).  

2.2. Outline of the humanitarian context  

206   Information 

in 

this  section 

is  drawn 

from  http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/turkey/overview  and 

https://economics.rabobank.com/publications/2013/september/country-report-turkey/ 

207   End-2014 estimate, Turkstat (http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/UstMenu.do?metod=temelist)  

208   http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf 

  /  http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/GDP-

ranking-table 

209   http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/turkey/overview 

210   http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?page=2 

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2.2.1. Dynamics of displacement 

Over 2 million Syrian refugees have been registered in Turkey since the start of the crisis in 
2011. The evolution of refugee numbers shows a different progression to that of Lebanon, 
Jordan or Iraq. Whilst number of refugees entering the latter countries increased sharply in 
early  2013,  in  Turkey,  the  number  grew  steadily  throughout  2013  and  2014,  and  then 
increasingly  sharply  at  the  end  of  the  evaluation  period  (December  2014  onwards).  This 
may  in  part  be  due  to  the  changing  conflict  dynamics  across  Northern  Syria  over  that 
period. 

Figure 1 – Registered Syrian refugees in Turkey (Dec. 2011- Dec. 2014) 

Source: ADE analysis, based on UNHCR (Syria Regional Refugee Response, Inter-agency 
Information Sharing Portal), data extracted on 3 December 2015 

As  of  end-2014,  the  largest  concentrations  of  refugees  have  been  reported  in  the  south 
(Adana,  Hatay,  Osmaniye,  and  Gaziantep)  and  south  east  (Adiyaman,  Kahramanmaras, 
Kilis, Mardin, Sanliurfa) of Turkey211. However, increasing numbers are understood to be 
dispersing  to  the  large  urban  centres,  including  Istanbul,  Ankara  and  Izmir,  in  search  of 
employment opportunities. Approximately 265,000 refugees are housed in 25 government-
run  refugee  camps  (of  which  3  were  completed  in  2015) 212,  but  the  vast  majority  live 
outside camps in urban and peri-urban areas.  

211   3RP (2014) ‘Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2015-2016 - Turkey’, p7 

212   As of 20.July.2015 https://www.afad.gov.tr/TR/IcerikDetay1.aspx?IcerikID=848&ID=16   

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00,511,522,516/12/201116/12/201216/12/201316/12/2014MillionsRegisteredSyrianrefugeesin Turkey(Evaluation period: 2012-2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
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Figure 2 – Number of Registered Refugees in Turkey per province (2012-2014) 

Source: UNHCR Syria Portal 

2.2.2. Key humanitarian issues 

Camp  conditions  are  described  as  exceptionally  good  when  judged  against  international 
standards.  Refugees  residing  in  camps  are  widely  provided  with  food,  shelter,  education, 
basic services and medical assistance. No major gaps in the provision of goods and services 
are reported within the camps. However the vast majority are sheltered outside the camps 
in  towns  and  cities  (often  described  as  ‘urban  refugees’).  There  is  a  stark  divergence 
between  the  condition  of  refugees  within  and  outside  the  camps.  Although  recent, 
comprehensive  needs  assessments  of  the  out-of-camp  population  are  lacking,  many  of 
these refugees are reported to be facing difficult conditions. The out-of-camp refugees are 
often left to fend for themselves with limited access to basic assistance and it is reported 
that  their  needs  are  to  some  degree  similar  to  off-camp  Syrian  refugees  in  Lebanon  or 
Jordan. 

Current  initiatives  aimed  at  profiling  their  needs,  a  prerequisite  for  the  organisation  of 
assistance, are at a standstill213. There is an overall lack of coordinated needs assessments by 
humanitarian organisations. For refugees in urban areas, an AFAD assessment from 2013 
provides  the  latest  consolidated  source  of  information  –  although  localized  agency  level 
assessments  have  been  conducted  more  recently.  A  range  of  basic  needs  have  been 
identified amongst this group of refugees214: 

  Food:  77.5%  of  Syrian  women  in  Turkey  found  access  to  food  insufficient, 

according to an assessment by the Turkish government. 

  Shelter:  one  in  four  non-camp  refugees  are  assessed  to  be  living  in  inadequate 
conditions or in an open area, while about 62 per cent of them live together with at 
least seven people.  

  Health:  Syrians,  whether  registered  as  refugees  or  not,  are  entitled  to  the  same 
health  services  as  Turkish  citizens.  However,  some  unregistered  non-camp  Syrian 
refugees report difficulties accessing full services, especially hospital referrals. Some 
NGOs  are  beginning  to  provide  health  services  to  non-registered,  non-camp 
refugees, but are unable to meet all their needs.  

  Education: registered Syrian refugees are offered access to Turkish schools.  There 
are 576,000 school-aged Syrian  refugee children  in Turkey. In camps, 73% attend 

213   HIP ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/9100 

214   ACAPS, 2015 

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school, whereas only 27% of refugee children in host communities have access to 
education.  

  Water: 25% of the women living outside camps said access to drinking water was 

difficult (based on the AFAD study). 

  Protection: half of the refugee population are children, with specific needs in terms 
of  protection  issues.  1  in  10  Syrian  refugee  children  is  working  –  in  agriculture, 
restaurants and shops, as mobile vendors or begging215.  

  There is growing attention in the media to the manner in which the dire situation of 
the refugees is making women and girls vulnerable to sexual exploitation.216 There 
are  media  reports  of  commercialization  of  extra-legal  marriages.217 While  Turkey 
maintains  an  open-border  policy  for  Syrian  refugees  at  official  crossing  points, 
there are only two fully open points along a 900km stretch of the border; and even 
there,  those  without  passports  are  routinely  turned  away  unless  they  have  urgent 
medical or humanitarian needs.218 

The majority of arrivals have found refuge in and around the border cities. This has created 
a degree of tension with the host communities, especially in the border provinces where the 
refugees remain concentrated (up to 50% in some areas of Kilis and Hatay). Public services 
such  as  schools  and  hospitals  have  been  stretched.  Refugees  have  also  had  economic 
effects – including competition for jobs driving down wage rates and inflating the cost of 
rented accomodation219. It is estimated that 8.2 million people in refugee hosting areas are 
impacted by the presence of Syrian refugees220. 

Increasing tensions with local communities have contributed to the shift in public opinion 
regarding Syrian refugees. Public opinion in Turkey has become unwelcoming, even hostile 
to  Syrian  refugees  as  their  length  of  stay  in  the  country  increases 221.  In  cities  such  as 
Gaziantep, Sanliurfa, Hatay, Killis, and Kahramanmaras, thousands of people have joined 
protests demanding that Syrians be sent back. 

2.2.3.  Response from the Turkish Government 

The initial response of the Turkish government was very welcoming, with an “open-door 
policy” applied to Syrian refugees222. This approach was accompanied by three other policy 

215   ACAPS (2015) Syria Four Years On: No End in Sight. ACAPS 

216   Brenda Stoter, “Syrian women refugees humiliated, exploited in Turkey” Al-Monitor, March 12, 2014, 

http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/03/syria-refugees-women-exploitation-harassment.html. 

217   Mehves Evin, “Suriyelilerle evlilik ticarete dönüştü [Marriages with Syrians  have  become  a trade]” Milliyet, January 

27, 2014, http://www.milliyet.com.tr/suriyelilerle-evlilik-ticarete/gundem/detay/1827612/default.htm. 

218   https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/11/turkey-border-abuses-and-destitution-aggravating-plight-syria-

refugees/ 

219   ORSAM (2015) ‘Effects of the Syrian refugees on Turkey’, p7 & pp12-13 

220   3RP (2014) ‘Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2015-2016 - Turkey’, p3 

221   Ahmed Içduygu (Migration Policy Institute), 2015 ‘Syrian refugees in Turkey – The long road ahead’, p11 

222

Because  Turkey  accepted  the  1951  Geneva  Convection  on  the  legal  status  of  refugees  with  geographical 
limitations, it cannot    accept Syrians as legal refugees (only people coming from Europe can get refugee status in 

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elements,  namely 223  ensuring  temporary  protection,  upholding  the  principle  of  non-
refoulement,  and  providing  optimal  humanitarian  assistance. 224
 Syrians  were  originally 
considered guests and not granted legal asylum, though many have been able to obtain legal 
residence.  

In 2014, Turkey implemented a new policy framework governing its response to refugees 
in its territory. This new framework was bounded by two key legislative developments:  
  Firstly, the entry into force in April 2014 of the country’s first asylum legislation (the 
Law on foreigners and International Protection) which provided for the establishment 
of  a  specialized  institution  (the  General  Directorate  for  Migration  Management 
(DGMM) within the Ministry of Interior) to manage protection and migration-related 
matters; and 

  Secondly, the adoption by the Turkish Council of Ministers of a Temporary Protection 
Regulation  in  October  2014,  which  foresaw  the  issuance  of  a  TP  Identification 
Document (TPID). 

Under  this  policy  framework,  each  newly  registered  refugee  in  Turkey  should  be  issued 
with a TPID, and the most vulnerable groups are expected to be identified by the DGMM 
and  then  prioritized  for  in-camp  accommodation.  The  TPID  should  then  provide  each 
refugee, in-camp or outside, with access to public services including health and education. 
This includes free access to primary and emergency healthcare and access to secondary and 
tertiary healthcare at the same fee-rate as Turkish citizens. The TPID should also provide 
access to certain sectors of the labour market and to social assistance.225  

The  main  response  to  the  needs  of  the  Syrian  refugees  has  come  from  the  Turkish 
Government.  For  political  and  security  reasons  Turkey  has  chosen  to  take  full 
responsibility for funding and managing the camps rather than delegating to international 
actors.  Given  the  length  of  the  crisis  and  the  increased  number  of  refugees,  it  is  a 
significant  financial  burden.  By  early  2015  the  financial  cost  of  the  support  for  Syrian 
refugees reached US$ 5 billion226, with only 3% covered by the international community227.  

Turkey).  Therefore,  Syrian  in  Turkey  are  considered  and  “guests”  in  the  formal  terminology  (ORSAM,  2015 
‘Effects of the Syrian refugees on Turkey’, p12; Ahmed Içduygu (Migration Policy Institute), 2015 ‘Syrian refugees 
in Turkey – The long road ahead’, p7) 

223   ORSAM, 2015 ‘Effects of the Syrian refugees on Turkey’, pp12-13; Ahmed Içduygu (Migration Policy Institute), 2015 

‘Syrian refugees in Turkey – The long road ahead’, p8 

224   The  legal  framework  allowing  to  apply  these  policies  has  been  implemented  in  2014  (the  new  Law of Foreigners and 
International Protection  has  been  in    force  since  2014,  and  the  new  Temporary Protection Regulation  came  into  effect  on 
October 2014), Ahmed Içduygu (Migration Policy Institute), 2015 ‘Syrian refugees in Turkey – The long road ahead’, 
pp8-9 

225   3RP (2014) ‘Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2015-2016 - Turkey’, pp.5-6. 

226   Ahmed Içduygu (Migration Policy Institute), 2015 ‘Syrian refugees in Turkey  – The long road ahead’, p11. It is not 
clear  how  this  figure  has  been  calculated  and  whether  this  refers  only  to  camp  costs  or  also  the  cost  of  providing 
access to health and education services. 

227   Ahmed Içduygu (Migration Policy Institute), 2015 ‘Syrian refugees in Turkey – The long road ahead’, p11 

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Authorities assumed that the crisis would be resolved quickly and focused on providing aid 
and  assistance  to  refugees  in  camps.  Turkey  established  an  efficient  emergency  response, 
ensuring  protection  and  assistance  in  25  camps  set  up  by  the  Disaster  and  Emergency 
Management Agency (AFAD).228  

Figure 3 –  Location of Government Refugee Camps in Turkey 

Source: UNHCR Syria Portal 

However, the capacity of the camps has been overwhelmed by the subsequent scale of the 
refugee  influx229.  With  the  increase  in  the  number  of  refugees,  Turkish  authorities  have 
developed informal approaches to limiting new arrivals, for political and practical reasons230.  

Turkey is concerned about the impact of the Syrian conflict on its security. Its government 
openly  opposes  the  Assad  regime  and  has  provided  assistance  to  Syrians  fleeing  into 
Turkey since 2011. It has given refuge to the commander of the Free Syrian Army. In late 
2012, at the request of the Turkish government, in response to attacks on Turkish civilians 
and a Turkish jet by Syrian forces, NATO began providing air defence capabilities in major 
southern  cities  in  order  to  boost  defences  against  a  potential  Syrian  missile  attack 231 . 
Fighting in the north Syrian region intensified in September 2014, causing 200,000 Syrians 

228   3RP (2014) ‘Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2015-2016’, pp3-4 

229   It is also true to say that the majority of refugees prefer life outside of the camps. There are currently approximately 

55,000 empty spaces in AFAD run camps. 

230

Border authorities used for instance a policy of “passage with careful control” intended notably to restrict the 
number of entries and prevent dangerous entries (Ahmed Içduygu (Migration Policy Institute), 2015 ‘Syrian refugees 
in Turkey – The long road ahead’, p7). According to Amnesty International, many individuals are being denied access 
to the safety of Turkish territory, and those who must cross irregularly are at risk of abuses such as push-backs, being 
fired on with live ammunition, or torture and other ill-treatment (Amnesty International, 2014 ‘Struggling to Survive, 
Refugees from Syria in Turkey, p7) 

231   NB  this  rreport  was  written  in  mid  July  and  does  not  take  account  of  subsequent  developments  in  the  security 

situation. 

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to  flee  to  Turkey.  As  a  result,  the  Turkish  government  has  tightened  border  security  in 
order to prevent local citizens from joining the battle232. 

Access to Turkey is growing more difficult. Only two official crossing-points are open to 
Syrian  refugees  along  900  km  of  border,  down  from  the  previous  19  points.  Refugees 
without travel documents have been turned away, and since 2015 those moving back and 
forth between the two countries face restrictions, and fines if they exceed their authorised 
stay.  

The Temporary Protection Directive has not yet been fully implemented. It is foreseen that 
registered  and  documented  Syrian  refugees  have  the  possibility  of  applying  for  work 
permits in proscribed sectors, professions and geographical areas.  

2.2.4.  Response from the international community 

UN agencies have been active in supporting Government of Turkey (GoT) efforts in the 
camps,  including  shelter,  WASH,  health,  food/livelihoods,  protection,  education  and 
logistics/transportation services.  

INGOs must undergo Turkey’s opaque and complex registration process, which  can take 
months  or  even  years  to  complete 233 .  The  situation  has  improved;  as  of  mid-2014 
approximately 20 humanitarian INGOs were registered in Turkey, compared to only three 
a year earlier. 

UN  agencies  and  IOM  are  also  incrementally  engaging  with  the  response  to  off-camp 
refugees.  INGOs  have  been  the  forerunners  in  the  international  off-camp  humanitarian 
response covering a wide geographical area in partnership with local NGOs in the south-
east of the country, but also Istanbul and other big cities. However, NGOs are reportedly 
discouraged by AFAD from working with Syrian refugees who have not registered. 

As regards the context for humanitarian response,  the ability to respond differs markedly 
by province, with western proviences, which received refugees in the initial phases of the 
crisis, being an easier environment than provinces further east. This is further complicated 
by  tensions  between  central  and  provincial  governments.  Kurdish  political  actors  are 
reported to engage in campaigning against access of what perhaps they see as “constituents” 
to GoT State services – i.e AFAD camps.  

Coordination between the Government and international humanitarian agencies appears to 
be  problematic.  Provincial  Governorates  are  reported  to  have  establish  monthly 
coordination meetings for the response and have drawn up provincial plans to address the 
needs  of  refugees  at  provincial  level.  These  plans  have  not  yet  been  circulated.  NGO 
involvement  and  participation  in  the  national  consultation  process  is  reportedly  minimal 
and  not  encouraged  by  the  GoT.  Parallel  sectoral  coordination  mechanisms  have  been 

232   ACAPS (2015) Syria Four Years On: No End in Sight. ACAPS 

233   Amnesty International 

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established  by  the  UN  and  NGOs  in  Ankara  –  although  these  remain  informal  and 
informants suggest participation is patchy. 
As illustrated in the figures below234:  

- 

- 

  The contribution of donors over 2012-2014 amounted to US$ 562 million, with a 
significant increase over the years. The USA has been the main donor, providing 
37% of contributions, followed by Qatar (7%) and Saudi Arabia (7%). The most 
active EU MS have been the UK and Germany, with respectively 6% and 3% of 
donors’ contributions over the period.  

  Almost  70%  of  donors’  contributions  were  dedicated  to  multi-sector  support. 
Shelter  and  NFIs  support  has  represented  respectively  7%  and  4%  of  the 
contributions. Support in the health sector has represented 3% of contributions, 
the remaining being non-specified sectors (16%) and others (2%).  

Figure 4 – Donor contributions in Turkey 2012-2014 (US$ million) 

Source: Evaluation Inventory (based on FTS extraction) 

234   FTS Extractions 

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Source: ADE050100150200250300350Turkey: contributions by year195m3%20122013201477m290mTotal committed: US$ 562m(US$ millions) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
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Figure 5 – Contributions by Donors in Turkey (US$ million) 

Source: Evaluation Inventory (based on FTS extraction) 

Figure 6 – Donors’ contributions in Turkey, by sector 2012-2014 (US$ million) 

Source: Evaluation Inventory (based on FTS extraction) 

There  is  an  evolution  in  the  international  community  of  perceptions  of  the  Syrian  crisis, 
from it being a humanitarian crisis to being both a humanitarian and a development crisis. 
This shift has implications for the definition of adequate response both inside and outside 
Syria,  including  calls  for  investments  in  long-term  development  solutions  and  resilience-
building in addition to humanitarian assistance. From the US$ 624 million planned in the 
3RP for 2015, a budget of US$164 million is dedicated to the resilience component.235 

Pledges for resettlement, whereby a country offers residency and assistance to refugees, as 
well  as  humanitarian  admission  places  which  involve  temporary  residency  and  family 

235   UNHCR and UNDP (2015) ‘3RP Update – Issue 4, pp1-2. 

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Source: ADE050100150200250Turkey: contributions by donor209m37%7%3%3%4%4%5%5%6%7%42m40m36m31m27m24m21m19m18mUSAQatarSaudiArabiaUKKuwaitWFPEC(nonECHO)JapanGermanyECHOTotal committed: US$ 562m(US$ millions)Source: ADEFood 2% (US$ 25m) Sectornot specified(US$ 89m) Shelter& NFIs2% (US$ 38m) Health3% (US$ 16m) Multi-sector(US$ 38.4m) Other2% (US$ 11m) Turkey: contributions by sector68%16%7%4%Total committed: US$ 562m 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
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reunification, remain very scarce. In three days in September 2014 Turkey  received  some 
130,000  refugees  from  Syria,  more  than  the  entire  European  Union  had  taken  for 
resettlement in the previous three years. 

Overall the international contribution to humanitarian needs in Turkey remains very low. 
International funding requirements for 2015 are estimated at US$ 624 million236. However 
by April  2015 only US$  100  million had been  received (16% of the request)237. To  many 
donors Turkey is not seen as priority given its relatively strong national capacity to respond 
to the crisis. 

236   UNHCR, Syria Regional Refugee Response, Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal, last updated 24 April 2015 

237   Ibid 

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3.  Overview of the ECHO approach in the country  

3.1. ECHO overall strategy 

ECHO’s initial support in 2012 was focused on the camps established by AFAD. ECHO 
implemented  a  few  projects  through  IFRC,  providing  tents  and  NFIs.  Post-distribution 
monitoring  proved  problematic,  however,  given  that  camps  were  well  resourced  by  the 
GoT and therefore not seen as an ECHO priority for continued funding.  

The strategy subsequently shifted to accessing refugees living outside the camps and focusing on providing 
support to the most vulnerable refugees, namely out-of-camp refugees and newcomers. ECHO 
piloted  support  through  UNHCR  and  NGOs,  in  particular  using  established  INGO 
partners already delivering cross-border aid to Syria. ECHO supported operations,  in line 
with  the  respective  Humanitarian  Intervention  Plans  (HIP),  giving  priority  to  in-kind 
provision of food, NFIs and health services, with a primary focus on: 

  Protection: ECHO’s  advocacy  for  a  comprehensive  protection  and  assistance 
strategy  for  the  Syrian  refugee  caseload  in  Turkey,  and  a  uniform  and  systematic 
registration system for Syrian refugees;  

  Food Security and Livelihoods: in-kind,  cash  and  voucher  assistance  for  the 

most vulnerable families and individuals potential modalities for assistance; 

  Health: essential  health  care  including  patient  referrals,  transportation  services, 

translation and legal services; 

  NFIs: NFI support to newcomers in terms of basic needs and support for winter.  

3.2. Application of the basic assistance package in border areas 

ECHO  has  adopted  a  strategic  goal  of  attempting  to  meet  a  range  of  needs  through  the 
provision of a single cash grant to refugees. A multi-purpose cash grant is a revolutionary 
approach  for  ECHO  which  has  traditionally  responded  through  sectoral  programmes.  In 
order to achieve this goal ECHO is building the potential use of unconditional cash transfers. 

A number of reasons are advanced to justify this approach, in part cost-efficiency and cost-
effectiveness. Cash-based support is regarded as enabling ECHO to respond more flexibly 
to the different needs of the (urban) refugee population238 and guarantee the credibility and 
transparency  of  EU  humanitarian  aid 239 .  This  approach  builds  on  the  experience  of 
introducing basic needs grants elsewhere in the region – eg. Lebanon and Jordan.  

Currently ECHO still works with a range of different NGOs to provide a range of services. 
However there has been a progressive shift in approach. An intermediate step has been a 

238   3RP (2014) ‘Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2015-2016 - Turkey’, p8 

239   http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/needs-assessments_en 

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shift from in-kind transfers to the use of (electronic) vouchers. For example, with ECHO 
support, IOM240 provides cash denominated electronic vouchers for 45TL (approximately 
€15)  per  person  and  40  TL  (€13)  per  family  per  month.  This  amount  is  based  on  the 
meeting of food needs. The Turkish Government still prohibits the use of unrestricted cash 
to refugees.  

3.3. Expanding coverage in the “far east”241 

No  (precise)  definition  of  the  “far  east”  is  provided  in  the  documentation.  Available 
information  provides  indications  that  the  “Far  East”  refers  to  the  area  of  the  Turkish-
Syrian border close to Iraq, including the provinces of Mardin, Diyarbakir, and Batman242.  
But in principle this area has received the bulk of the more recent refugee influx originating 
from the IS-controlled areas of Syria and Iraq from late 2014 onwards.  

ECHO  has  prioritized  the  expansion  of  coverage  into  this  zone  based  on  unmet  needs. 
Prior  to  ECHO’s  intervention  Batman  and  Diyarbakir  have  not  been  covered  by 
humanitarian  responses243 and  no  additional  INGOs  are  currently  operating  in  the  area 
except ECHO partners.   

3.4. Overview of funding and activities undertaken in the country 

ECHO  has  provided  €33.4  million  to  the  response  inside  Turkey  over  the  evaluation 
reference period. This represents approximately 5% of the overall Syria response. 

Around 70% of ECHO’s support to Syrian refugees in Turkey during 2012-2014 covered 
food  assistance  (39%)  and  NFIs  (33%).  Multi-sector  support  (20%),  health  and  medical 
support  (5%),  and  protection  (4%)  together  represent  the  remaining  30%  of  ECHO’s 
funding over the evaluation period. 

ECHO funds were channelled through a range of implementing partners, the WFP being 
the  main  one.  The  ten  biggest  implementing  partners  represented  99%  of  total 
commitment in Turkey.  

240   Project 2014-91021 

241   The term “Far East” was introduced in the ToR.  

242 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/11398325/The-British-soldier-fighting-IS-with-the-
Kurds.html ; Syria Regional Refugee Response – Inter agency Information Sharing Portal (Map showing the refugee 
camps  hosting  Syrian  refugees  in  southeast  Turkey  and  their  population  as  at  31  July  2014,  and  Registered  Syrian 
refugees in urban locations in southeast Turkey as of 31 July 2014); ECHO (2015) Project 2015/00582 Fichop  

243   Ibid, p21 

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  Figure 7 – Snapshot of ECHO’s response in Turkey 2012-2014244 

Source: Evaluation Inventory (based on FTS extraction)

244   NB sector labelled “shelter” is predominantly NFIs.  

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ECHO fundingper sector–Turkey39%33%20%5%Food(€13m)Shelter(€10.9m)Multi-sector(€6.55m)Healthand medical(€1.6m)Protection(€1.3m)4%Total:€33.4mTop 10 ECHO implementingpartners–Turkey135.2542.921.81.41.3510.502468101214WFPIOMIFRCDRCUNHCRDRCMDMCAREPIN /GAAIMC(€m)€33.2m (99% of total commitmentin Turkey)Source: ADE Evaluation Inventory, 2015 
 
 
                                                 
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4.  Key findings with respect to the Evaluation Questions (EQs)  

EQ 1 – Good Humanitarian Donorship 

JC 1.1 ECHO deployed specific decisions and actions to ensure consistency with 
the 23 principles in the Syria crisis response 

  NB This is an overarching question and comments relevant to performance on the 23 principles – 
especially positive comments - are contained within the remaining 17 EQs. This section highlights 
issues that are not explicitly addressed elsewhere in the report. 

  ECHO has continued to support INGOs delivering aid to populations living in IS-
controlled areas in accordance with the principles of neutrality and independence. 
Many other donors have terminated aid to IS-controlled areas. 

JC 1.2 There are specific examples of where the Syria response was (or was not) in 
line with the 23 Principles 

  ECHO has struggled to “Allocate humanitarian funding in proportion to needs and 
on  the  basis  of  needs  assessments”.  While  allocations  have  taken  account  of  the 
available needs assessment information, the information is inadequate.  

  The  large  allocations  to  the  Syria  response  in  2013  were  reported  to  have  had  a 
significant  impact  on  the  budget  allocations  of  other  global  ECHO  programmes. 
This  runs  counter  to  the  principle  of  “Striving  to  ensure  that  funding  of 
humanitarian action in new crises does not adversely affect the meeting of needs in 
ongoing crises”. 

  Despite the increasingly protracted nature of the crisis ECHO has not been able to 
“…  ensure  predictability  and  flexibility  in  funding  to  United  Nations  agencies, 
funds  and  programmes  and  to  other  key  humanitarian  organisations”.  There  is 
currently  significant under-funding of the operations of UN agencies leading  to a 
lack of predictability of their response.  This is exemplified by the recent large cuts 
in WFP operations across the region announced at short notice.  

EQ 2-Consultation of local and regional communities 

JC  2.1.  ECHO  or  its  partners  deployed  specific  measures  for  involving  local  and 
regional communities  

  FPA  partners  have  offices  at  local  level  which  facilitates  interaction  with  the 

communities.  

  NGO FPA partners consult closely with communities at the local level in terms of 
identifying  needs.  They  implement  for  instance  components  in  close  and  direct 
coordination with partners and local authorities. They also participate in group and 
bilateral  meetings  regularly  held  with 
leaders 
(mukhtars), key community-based entities and key community members within the 
refugee population.  

local  authorities,  community 

JC 2.2. ECHO and/or partner monitoring mechanisms took account of beneficiary 
views and provided appropriate feedback loops to funding officers 

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  ECHO partners have consulted  the beneficiaries of  actions provided  up until  the 
current date, and have rolled out a specific hotline for issues and challenges, as well 
as complaints mechanism.  In the framework of the  same  project,  relevant gender 
and age  groups  have  participated in the design, implementation and evaluation of 
the action.  

  ECHO partners have also conducted  direct interviews with beneficiaries or focus 
group  with  key  stakeholders  to  ensure  that  beneficiary  demands and  feedback  on 
past  assistance  are  taken  into  account  in  the  design  of  the  action.  In  Syria  and 
Turkey this is done through regular post-distribution monitoring surveys and focus 
group discussions. 

EQ3  –  To  what  extent  have  the  design  and  implementation  of  ECHO-funded 
interventions  taken  into  account  the  needs  of  the  most  vulnerable  people  in  the 
region, in particular women, children, elderly and disabled people? 

JC 3.1 ECHO deployed specific measures/a specific approach/strategy to ensure 
that  ECHO-funded  interventions  took  into  account  the  needs  of  the most 
vulnerable people in the region both at design and implementation stages 

 

In accordance with humanitarian principles established by the European Consensus 
on  Humanitarian  Aid,  the  EU  seeks to  address  the  needs  of  the  most  vulnerable 
people facing a crisis. A needs-based approach is therefore necessary to ensure that 
aid  is  provided  in  different  countries  according  to  their  respective  needs, 
independent of any pressure245.  

  However,  no  formal  comprehensive  needs  assessment  of  the  urban-based  Syrian 
population  exists 246 .  It  is  therefore  difficult  to  quantify  and  identify  the  most 
vulnerable  populations  or  determine  the  most  appropriate  larger-scale  assistance 
programmes for implementation in cooperation with the Government247.  

  The  establishment  of  the  new  DGMM  is  seen  to  offer  some  opportunities  for 
improved needs assessment but so far this has not yet been realised. Data available 
from Government consists essentially only of numbers of refugees. Accompanying 
data  on  vulnerability  that  would  normally  be  collected  and  made  available  is  not 
collected or shared.  

  GoT appears resistant to allowing any agency – or even academic institutions – to 
collect  data  on  needs  and  vulnerabilities.  Each  individual  question  needs  to  be 
approved by the authorities and are often rather arbitrarily deleted.  

  Current  initiatives  aimed  at  profiling  their  needs  or  registering  urban  refugees,  a 
prerequisite for organization of assistance, are at a standstill248. UNHCR initiated a 
(ECHO-funded) profiling exercise which provides critical information on the non-
camp  refugee  population  –  but  GoT  withheld  the  study  and  instead  AFAD 
undertook an assessment exercise.  

245   http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/needs-assessments_en 

246   The GoT does participate in the 3RP document which includes an appeal for funding. However, this is not viewed as 

a comprehensive or credible assessment of needs.  

247   3RP (2014) ‘Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2015-2016 - Turkey’, p30 

248   HIP ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/9100 

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JC 3.2 The design of ECHO-funded interventions reflects the needs of the most 
vulnerable people 

  All  partner  agreements  specify  targeting  criteria,  including  inclusion  of  specific 

vulnerable groups. Gender and age breakdowns are given in each SF.  

JC 3.3 ECHO took specific measures to ensure that during implementation the 
needs of the most vulnerable people were taken into account 
NGO  FPA  partners  consult  closely  with  communities  at  local  level  to  target  the  most 
vulnerable. Based on project documents, it appeared for instance that:  

  Based  on  ECHO  partner  assessments  conducted  in  Kilis  and  Hatay,  the  focus 
would  be  placed  on  identification  of:  female  heads  of  households  (FHH),  elderly 
persons  with  no  caregivers,  female  survivors  of  torture  and  SGBV  survivors, 
women  with  serious  medical  conditions,  people  with  disabilities  or  coming  from 
large families without a coping mechanism or community support; 

  Beneficiaries’  identification  would  be  through  community-based  focal  points 
conducting  outreach,  and  community  leaders  and  other  local  or  international 
NGOs working in the area;  

  Families would be identified through focal persons from local communities (Syrian 

or Turkish) and AFAD;  

  Relevant  gender  and  age  groups  participated  in  the  design,  implementation  and 

evaluation of the action; 

  ECHO  partner  used  volunteers  to  assess  families  in  order  to  identify  the  most 
vulnerable  for  assistance.  In  recognition  of  the  importance  of  this  process, 
volunteers received a thorough three-day assessment and protection training so as 
to ensure that high quality assessments were completed; 

  Beneficiaries  would  be  selected  following  field  assessment  conducted  by  ECHO 
partners, local NGOs or authorities, or UN sector leads. When vulnerability criteria 
are  not  commonly  agreed  between  sector  partners,  the  following  criteria,  in  line 
with  humanitarian  operations  standards,  are  followed  by  the  partner:  1)  social 
vulnerability:  extended  family  size,  numbers  of  infants  and  children,  numbers  of 
pregnant or lactating women, disabled and elderly members; 2) financial loss: loss 
of  property  and  belongings,  current  source  of  income  and  savings;  3)  lack  of 
external support: aid received from host family, local population, local authorities, 
aid agencies, relatives back home; 4) psychological distress: dead or injured family 
members, mental health. 

EQ 4: To  what  extent  has  the  ECHO  intervention  taken  account  of  the  host 
populations,  and  what  concrete  measures  have  been  taken  to  address  their  needs 
and interests? 

JC 4.1. : ECHO applied a specific approach/strategy to ensure that the needs and 
interest of host populations were taken into account 

  The strategy was set by recognition of a) minimal resources for response in Turkey, 
and b) no explicit demand from authorities for a proportion of the assistance to be 

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directed  to  the  host  population  (as  in  Jordan);  hence  an  explicit  decision  not  to 
target host population through ECHO projects. 

 

  However,  ECHO  does  advocate  with  the  EU  Delegation  to  provide  support  to 
host populations in sectors impacted by the refugee influx, including education and 
health (see EQ 15).  
In  strategic  terms  a  clear  distinction  is  made  between  advocating  for  support  to 
host populations specifically affected by the arrival of the refugees and the needs of 
poor Turkish citizens who may be  in a position of need equivalent to that of the 
refugees.  EU  support  in  relation  to  the  refugee  response  does  not  extend  to  this 
second category. 

JC 4.2 : ECHO took specific measures to address the needs and interest of host 
populations 
ECHO partners seek opportunities to support host populations where possible: 

o  Several activities were open to Syrian refugees in Turkey, including interested host 
community members. As at the end of October 2013 for instance, approximately 
15% of the beneficiaries of an ECHO funded project were Turkish citizens from 
the host communities. 

o  Partners  recognized  in  their  activities  the  need  to  further  strengthen  mid-term 
programming  for  refugee  and  host  communities  in  addition  to  continuing 
lifesaving  assistance.  Food  security  support  angle  (in  line  with Regional  Refugee 
and Resilience Plan 2015-2016 (3RP)) was emphasized “in order to protect local 
communities as well as Syrian refugees in the long-term”. 

JC 4.3: The measures reached their objectives 

EQ 5  - A) To what extent have ECHO and its partners been successful in adapting 
their approach and addressing gaps to the shifting needs of the region, as the crisis 
has  evolved?  B)  Considering that project activities of partners  have  in many cases 
been  carried  over  from  one  funding  cycle  to  the  next,  to  what  extent  have  the 
partners  been  revising  their  approach  –  being  innovative  –  to  better  address  the 
needs? C) What modifications to approaches are needed for the future? 

JC 5.1 ECHO and its partners had a strategy to adapt their approach to the shifting 
needs of the region 

  The provision of humanitarian assistance in Turkey was originally not high on the 

ECHO agenda:  

o  Initially  larger  number  of  refugees  were  concentrated  in  Jordan  and 

Lebanon.  

o  The Turkish Government had greater ability to respond – and the presence 
of the refugees was not seen as such a threat to the stability of the State.  
o  AFAD controlled the response in conjunction with the Turkish Red Cross.  
It  was  unwilling  to  accept  conditions  on  donations,  eg.  monitoring  and 
transparency. In essence it is not familiar with humanitarian principles. 

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  However, there was a subsequent large growth of refugee numbers in the country. 
It became apparent that there was no quick solution and GoT became more open 
to international assistance and actively sought help. ECHO adapted to this evolving 
situation through two major strategic shifts: 

o  Shifting  the  focus  of  support  from  the  GoT-run  camps  to  the  urban 
refugee  population.  The  proportion  of  camp-based  support  dropped  by  a 
third each year, to one-third of the total by 2014.  

o  Identifying new geographical priorities. Increasing support for the influx of 

refugees into the “far east”. 

  More  recently  there  has  been  recognition  that  the  response  is  shifting  from 
addressing  the  immediate  needs  of  a  refugee  influx  –  with  the  hope  that  the 
population would return to Syria within a few months – to a recognition that this 
appears  to  be  a  protracted  crisis  with  little  immediate  prospect  of  a  resolution  of 
the conflict in Syria.  

  Finally  the  response  has  had  to  adapt  to  falling  humanitarian  resources,  despite  a 

continued rise in refugee numbers. 

JC 5.2 ECHO and its partners have revised their approaches/interventions so as to 
better address the shifting needs of the region 

  ECHO  was  the  first  donor  to  earmark  resources  to  off-camp  refugees  (WFP, 

UNICEF). 

  ECHO has funded projects that were of high importance, as they would give both 
Syrian and Iraqi refugees’ access to assistance in areas where ECHO previously has 
not had presence and where further influx of populations could take place.  

  An  ECHO  partner  has  commissioned  several  assessments  targeting  non-camp 
refugees,  namely  to  evaluate  needs and  gaps  of  new  arrivals  and  other  vulnerable 
Syrian  families,  with  consideration  given  to  protection  and  shelter  needs.  In 
addition,  the  partner  field  teams  conducted  a  qualitative  assessment,  including  a 
house-to-house  survey  and  focus  group  exercises.  This  exercise  was  followed  by 
continuous  monitoring  of  refugee  communities  by  ECHO  partner  and  its  local 
partners' staff and volunteers. 

  Continuing  support in  camps focuses on key  areas of health and PSS  where gaps 

are recognized by the local authorities. 

JC 5.3 In the case of project activities that have been carried over from one funding 
cycle to the next, ECHO partners adapted their approaches/interventions to the 
changed needs. 
See evolution of modalities - EQ 10 

JC 5.4 When adapting their approaches to changing needs, ECHO’s partners 
introduced specific innovations 
See also 5.2 

  ECHO partners noted that the constant and unpredictable influx of refugees from 
Syria created a need for frequent programme adjustments. They noted that ECHO 
was  an  extremely  flexible  donor  in  supporting  these  requests.  The  TAs  were 
regularly in touch with the programmes to keep abreast of changes in the context. 

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Changes  were  often  agreed  verbally  and  informally  through  a  phone  call  –  and 
confirmed later through formal amendments. 

JC 5.5 Implications for ECHO (and partner) approaches relative to expected shifts 
in beneficiary needs 

  The  refugee  caseload  is  forecast  to  increase  substantially  in  the  next  year,  placing 

further stress on limited resources.  

EQ 6 – EU Added-Value 

JC 6.1 ECHO employed a specific approach and took specific initiatives to ensure it 
could provide added value 

  ECHO  is  holding  close  dialogue  with  the  EU  Delegation  and  DG  ENLARG  to 
work  towards  a  coordinated  strategy.  This  maximizes  the  overall  flow  of  EU 
resources  in  response  to  needs  and  maintains  the  comparative  advantages  of 
humanitarian and developmental resource flows. See 15 more more detail.  

  The  resources  available  to  ECHO  in  Turkey  were  very  minor  compared  to  other 
donors.  For  example  it  provided  $120m  per  year,  with  $70m  to  UNHCR  alone. 
Therefore ECHO had to seek specific added value for its operations.  Much of this 
is driven by a strong field presence. 

JC 6.2 ECHO was recognised as providing specific types of added value in the 
context of the Syria crisis 

  Funding was strategic with relatively few international donors. Turkey suffers from 
being  seen  as  a  ‘capacitated’  Government  and  therefore  received  little  outside 
support.  ECHO  has  filled  gaps  by  providing  assistance  in  areas  where  no  other 
actors have been present (e.g. Sirnak). 

  ECHO has shown great reactivity by quickly responding to new urgent needs (e.g. 
influx  of  approx.  200.000  people  fleeing  to  Turkey  from  Kobane);  due  to  the 
extensive geographical coverage and the number of feet on the ground.  

  ECHO has also managed to play an instrumental role in terms of coordinating and 

 

 

liaising with other donors and partners (e.g. IcSP €12 million package).  
In  terms  of  steering  coordination  and  harmonization  of  the  approaches,  the 
capacity of many donors is limited to ‘writing cheques’. In contrast ECHO is able 
to engage at several levels (local, national, international) in coordination efforts. It 
provides support for the cluster system in cross-border operations. 
In terms of driving the cost-efficiency agenda, ECHO is also able to engage with 
UN agencies and other quality issues, including a focus on better targeting which is 
seen as critical in a context where funds have to be ‘rationed’.    

  ECHO  can  be  considered  as  one  of  the  few  principled  donors  in  the  advocacy 
field, which allows them to engage with issues such as protection offered by host 
countries. However, the ability of ECHO to advocate for an open border policy in 
Turkey is compromised by Europe’s own stance on this issue.  

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EQ 7 – Urban Settings 

JC 7.1 ECHO and its partner agencies employed a specific approach to embed 
urban issues within ECHO-funded projects in response to the Syrian crisis 

  OCHA  argue  that  urban  crises  require  a  new  conceptualization  of  need,  and  of 
what is life-saving in such contexts. Potentially this should expand to include issues 
such  as  garbage  collection,  sewage  systems  and  power  supplies.  Currently  this 
remains largely off the radar for most humanitarian agencies.  

JC 7.2 The design of ECHO-funded projects identified the major challenges that 
exist in urban settings in order to design interventions appropriate to these specific 
type of situation 

 

  ECHO to continue to focus on unconditional cash or voucher programmes with a 
multi-sector  approach  as  a  primary  urban  response,  with  supplementary  health 
projects (especially provision of rehabilitation).  
It is estimated that around 70% of all Syrian refugees live along border areas (the 
highest  numbers  are  in  Hatay,  Gaziantep  and  Sanilurfa).  However,  increasingly 
Syrian  refugee  populations  have  dispersed  throughout  the  country  and  are  in  no 
less  than  79  of  the  81  Turkish  provinces.  Up  to  500,000  reside  in  Istanbul 
(330,000), Izmir and Ankara. ECHO is currently investigating whether support to 
refugees in the large cities is warranted.  

JC 7.3 Throughout implementation, ECHO-funded projects were able to tackle the 
specific urban challenges (for displaced and refugees as well as for the host urban 
populations) and to coordinate properly with the local authorities, urban services 
and institutions (municipalities), in line with the good practices elaborated by the 
sector 

  Last  December  ECHO  chaired  the  first  coordination  meeting  on  urban  refugees. 
This meeting was followed with one chair from UNHCR and recently the 3W table 
has been produced. 

EQ8 (Protection): How and to what extent has protection been appropriately taken 
into account and implemented in ECHO-funded projects? 

JC 8.1. ECHO and its partner agencies employed a specific approach to embedding 
protection within ECHO-funded projects in response to the Syrian crisis 

  ECHO  has  to  some  extent  sought  to  use  other  EU  instruments  to  support 
protection activities through referral to GoT services (see EQ 15). However, several 
agencies  note  that  this  remains  a  volatile  period  and  argue  for  a  need  to  support 
NGOs in this area. It is “not a development moment yet”.  

  Significant gaps in protection are identified by partners in Turkey:  

o  Turkish medical services appear under-equipped to handle the demands of 
the large number of traumatised refugees, including victims of sexual abuse.  
o  Issue  of  child  protection  is  a  large  gap  where  few  agencies  are  working  – 

including issues of child labour and unaccompanied minors.  
o  Mobile latrines are needed for women at border crossing points. 
o  Support  is  needed  for  legal  issues  such  as  official  contracts  for  refugees 

renting houses in Turkey.   

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  Huge rise in bombing of civilians after fall of Idlib. A need has been identified to 
balance delivery of relief items with advocacy efforts to reduce bombings. There is 
a danger of “becoming obsessed with delivery”. 

  There is some evidence of mainstreaming of protection issues, for example in WFP 
contract avoidance of distributions to big crowds, assessments of specific needs of 
women and children, deliveries to the doors of the disabled, only anonymized data 
sent  into  Syria,  and  so  on.  Other  partners  (eg.  DRC)  take  protection  issues  into 
account when selecting beneficiaries for their voucher programmes. 

JC  8.3.  ECHO-funded  project  designs  disambiguated  protection  needs  per 
population  segment  and  location,  including  identifying  specific  threats  to 
vulnerable groups 

  ECHO/  EU  Delegation  supported  the  registration  process.  There  are  obvious 
logistical difficulties associated with registering the hundreds of thousands of Syrian 
refugees who have arrived in the past 3½ years – many of them irregularly. Another 
significant challenge is that Syrian refugees sometimes choose not to register. Some 
people avoid registration because AFAD registration requires individuals to reside 
in  the  province  in  which  they  are  registered,  preventing  them  moving  if  work  or 
accommodation opportunities arise elsewhere249.  

  Project  2013-91005  A  protection  consultant  conducted  an  assessment  in  south-
eastern  and  southern  Turkey.  The  report  detailed  recommended  vulnerability 
criteria, and guidelines and forms to be used have been finalized. Implementation is 
planned to start by November-December 2013 benefiting 180 cases. 

EQ  9:  In  cases  when  Remote  Management  was  being  used,  to  what  extent  did  it 
follow  existing  guidance  documents  and  good  practice,  and  how  successful  was 
it?250 

JC 9.1 When the instructions (notably the seven questions with assessment criteria) 
were available, ECHO applied them before using remote management 

  Partner agencies widely reported participating in an ECHO-sponsored workshop in 
2014 to present the remote management guidelines. However, since then there has 
not been much follow-up. 

 

  Partner  interviewed  uniformly  reported  that  their  proposals  were  developed  in 
adherence with the ECHO guidelines. However, they were not usually able to recall 
the specific provisions of the guidelines.  
INGO  partners  referred  to  “double  standards”  in  the  application  of  remote 
management issues. ECHO is seen to be more rigorous in the standards applied to 
NGOs than those applied to UN agencies. The example given is that, while NGOs 
are accountable for the delivery of goods to household level, UN agencies are only 
accountable up to delivery to warehouses in Syria. 

249   Amnesty, 2014 

250   With a view to avoiding ambiguity on the period covered, we suggest to phrase the question in the past tense.  

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  There is current interest in using “Third  Party” monitoring arrangements in Syria 
where  an  independent  body  is  contracted  to  provide  independent  monitoring 
services. The issue of the cost implications is coming to the fore.  

  After  four  years  beneficiary  communities  are  increasingly  looking  for  livelihood 
interventions  rather  than  continued  distributions  of  NFIs  etc.  However,  the  RM 
guidelines are not compatible with this shift. There is a preference for CFW over 
NFIs except in the case of sudden displacements. 

JC 9.2 Before  the  availability  of  the  instructions  ECHO  followed  other 
guidance/good practice before using remote management 
  Partners have implemented a range of RM measures: 

o  GPS-referenced photos of CFW outputs  
o  Video of distributions 
o  Beneficiary lists 
o  Use of female monitors 
o  Monitoring of non-beneficiaries to capture exclusion errors 
o  Complaint mechanisms (eg. Telephone-based systems) 
o  Third party monitoring 
o  Regular assessment in operational areas 
o  Constant contact and information-sharing with rebel groups 
o  Quarterly reporting to ECHO 

  OCHA monitors due diligence of partners and have a centralized list of approved 

partners. 

 

 

  However there is a sense that not enough is known about the effectiveness of these 
measures. There is only limited lesson-learning among agencies. Some are seen as 
costly  and  ineffective,  some  the  opposite.  Several  partners  aare  interested  in  an 
ECHO sponsored consultancy to examine RM protocols and strengthen capacity-
building amongst partners.  
Inside Syria some partners (eg. PIN) report hesitancy to use cash transfers due to 
risk of fraud. There is a preference for using vouchers or CFW.  
INGOs  have  stopped  sending  international  staff  into  Syria  since  2013  owing  to 
perceptions  of  an  increased  risk  of  kidnapping.  It  can  be  said  that  the  RM 
arrangements  are  acknowledged  to  result  in  the  transfer  of  risks  from  INGOs  to 
Syrian NGOs. This is an inherently risky environment in which to operate. There is 
a need to be overt regarding risks and have adequate insurance cover in place.    
INGOs are careful to minimize risks in the selection of partner agencies in Syria, 
e.g. PIN is working with their own  ex-staff in Aleppo who have established their 
own NGO, familiar with procedures and standards. 
In  terms  of  problems  of  access  to  besieged  areas  and  less  stable  settings,  all 
operations become complicated. RM protocols are more relevant where there is a 
degree of stability.   

 

 

JC 9.3  When remote management was used, potential risks and pitfalls of remote 
management were mitigated or did not adversely impact on the concerned projects 
  ECHO were reported to be flexible in adapting the RM guidance according to the 
context.  For  example,  in  IS-controlled  areas  the  partners  were  not  required  to 

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conduct a household level PDM exercise. This would have created issues – the so-
called Islamic State want to be seen in the role of the provider as the State does not 
want visibility for the NGO. Enforcing a PDM exercise would have  created risks 
for implementing staff in these areas. 

  Not  all  the  aid  going  into  Syria  is  limited  to  emergency  supplies  (eg.  food,  NFIs, 
shelter,  health,  water,  etc.)  that  the  RM  guidelines  were  designed  to  support.  For 
example,  aid  is  also  provided  to  the  education  sector  including  rebuilding  of 
schools. This raises new challenges for RM. 

  Partners reported losses of goods promptly to ECHO and found them sympathetic 
to the losses. It is expected that a certain amount of diversion will occur in a war 
situation.  If  promptly  reported  and  explained  and  mitigation  measures  are  put  in 
place, then it is accepted.  

EQ10 – Cash and vouchers 

JC 10.1 The ECHO strategy for Syria considered the appropriate use of a range of 
transfer modalities 

  So  far  there  has  been  a  process  of  transition  in  Turkey  from  in-kind  to  paper 
vouchers to electronic vouchers. Vouchers are seen as preferable in terms of ease 
and  efficiency  of  implementation  and  in  providing  a  degree  of  choice  to 
beneficiaries. It is notable that the WFP response started with vouchers – there was 
no initial in-kind response. 

  The strategic goal of ECHO is to provide a single cash-based grant to refugees to 
meet a range of needs (MPCT) flexibly. This is driven by the (positive) experience 
of  using  basic  needs  grants  in  Lebanon  and  Jordan.  It  has  been  proved  in  other 
contexts  that  cash  is  the  most  appropriate  form  of  relief.  Vouchers  have  some 
disadvantages in terms of fraud.  

  Partners appeared to strongly endorse the goal; physical distribution is seen as very 
expensive and difficult to manage. But they have as yet been unable to commence 
cash distributions. The main constraint is Government policy at two levels: frst, the 
GoT is unwilling to endorse cash grants to urban refugees for fear of creating a pull 
factor;  second,  Turkish  banks  are  unwilling  or  unable  to  open  accounts  for 
refugees. 

  Currently ECHO still works with a range of different NGOs to provide a range of 
services. It is clear that even if a basic needs grant approach was realized, ECHO 
would  still  need  to  complement  this  with  additional  transfers  using  a  range  of 
modalities for complementary goals. 

  So far a (partial) trend has been established away from in-kind provision of goods 
(eg.  food  and  NFIs);  for  example  under  project  2014-91018,  the  remaining 
beneficiaries receiving one-off support will be provided with a one-off e-card with a 
preloaded  budget  to  facilitate  access  to  food  and  non-food  items.  This  change  in 
methodology is a result of the identification and piloting of a suitable e-card system 
and provider.  

  DRC are about to embark on a pilot cash transfer for refugees dispersed through 
the PTT (Turkish Post Office). This is funded by DFID. If successful it is expected 
that other agencies will rapidly replicate this approach.  

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  So  far  within  ECHO  there  has  been  little  consideration  of  whether  humanitarian 
cash  transfers  could  provide  a  tactic  for  transitioning  refugees  from  humanitarian 
assistance  to  the  national  social  transfer  system.  Ultimately  this  could  provide  an 
exit strategy for ECHO.    

  The need for a mix of transfer modalities  – not just a voucher or cash approach, 
even in the food sector - is recognized. For example, in-kind stocks are maintained 
by NGOs to provide a first response to newly-arrived refugees. 

  A problem is that the ECHO SF does  not accommodate  basic needs grants  – all 

results are classified within a single sector.  

JC 10.2 The appraisal of DG ECHO actions took account of an appropriate analysis 
of the context 

 

 

 

In  the  Turkey  context  it  is  clear  that  markets  are  able  to  supply  the  basic  goods 
(food and NFIs) required by refugees.  
In  2015  ECHO  conducted  a  feasibility  study  of  cash  transfers  through  DKH. 
ECHO  partners  conducted  a  relevant  analysis  of  suppliers  to  ensure  price 
competitiveness  in  the  choice  of  goods  that  could  be  purchased  with  the  e-
vouchers.  
It  is  surprising  that  there  was  less  evidence  of  a  rigorous  comparison  of  the 
companies  used  to  manage  the  e-voucher  system.  Consequently  partners  were 
paying  these  companies  between  2%  and  8%  for  providing  the  same  service  of 
issuing the cards and managing the payment system.  

JC 10.3 ECHO-funded cash and voucher operations have been effective in the Syria 
context 

  Many  actors  in  Turkey  are  engaged  in voucher  transfers  -  7-8  agencies  located  in 
different  areas,  working  with  local  partners.  The  size  of  transfer  is  more  or  less 
standardized.  

  Having introduced cash-based responses through NGOs the next step is up-scaling 
these responses. The mechanism for this is seen to be through WFP. As an entry 
point,  ECHO  is  working  with  WFP  on  a  pilot  out-of-camp  cash  and  voucher 
response. 

  The value of vouchers is typically set in relation to either food needs or food-plus-
basic hygiene items. These are not designed to meet a range of basic needs. In any 
case the nature of vouchers – as opposed to cash – effectively limits the potential 
objectives of the transfer. 

  The value of transfers falls far short of meeting basic needs. In all families visited 
this provided a complement to other income sources such as employment and gifts 
from neighbours,  family or friends. 

  Vouchers  have  significant  constraints  on  effectiveness.  They  cannot  be  used  to 
meet beneficiaries’ needs (eg. shelter, electrical goods).  There is also the problem 
of  potential  resale  of  vouchers  reducing  efficiency  and  effectiveness.  The  GoT 
mentioned the risk that refugees may move around and make multiple registrations 
for (cash) cards – fraud is seen as a bigger issue than with in-kind distributions. 

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  Many programmes are short-term (eg. six-month) pilot projects. However, there is 
no  apparent  strategy  for  what  these  pilot  programmes  will  transition  to.  Usually 
pilot projects come with an expectation that they will be scaled-up if successful.  
  WFP are leading efforts to upscale responses to urban refugees, subject to aiming 
for  a  50:50  split  of  resources  for  300,000  camp  and  off-camp  beneficiaries. 
Working with NGOs and GoT to harmonize registration platforms, targeting and 
distribution platform. A single eCard can be used potentially by a range of agencies 
for voucher transfers, cash transfers and in-kind transfers.  

  Underlying  a  basic  needs  grant  several  partners  operated  a  case  management 
approach to identifying and responding to urgent needs. Depending on needs, the 
possible  response  options  includes  referral  to  government  services  or  access  to 
additional cash transfers.  

  ECHO  struggles  to  deliver  vouchers  or  cash  in  large  cities  (eg.  Gaziantep).  It  is 
beyond the capacity of the traditional NGO partners as the scale is overwhelming 
and  caseloads  are  huge.  Consequently  the  NGOs  tend  to  stay  operational  in  the 
smaller  centres.  To  start  operations  in  this  context  need  a  large  partner  such  as 
WFP. 

EQ 11. Is the size of the budget allocated by ECHO to the region appropriate and 
proportionate  to  what  the  actions  are  set  out  to  achieve?  Could  the  same  results 
have been achieved with less funding? 

 

JC 11.1. The ECHO budget allocation to respond to the Syria crisis was appropriate 
In  crude  terms  the  budget  allocation  for  the  response  in  Turkey  is  many  times 
lower  than  in  other  neighbouring  countries.    Evidence  that  funds  are  insufficient 
include the large cuts being made in WFP distributions to camp and urban refugees 
(although this applies across  the region), in  both the number of beneficiaries and 
the amount distributed.   

  The  budget  allocation  for  Turkey  has  been  influenced  by  a  number  of 
considerations a) the number of refugees, b) the needs of the refugees and c) the 
capacity  of  the  host  government  to  respond  to  their  needs  and  requests  for 
international assistance.   

 

  However comparable, country-wide needs assessments are missing, making needs-
based  allocations  problematic.  In  particular  a  systematic  needs  assessment  of  the 
needs  of  urban  refugees  is  lacking.  This  ultimately  makes  it  hard  to  judge  the 
appropriateness of the budget allocation.  
It is argued in several ECHO reports that the condition of the non-camp refugees 
in  Turkey  differs  little  from  those  in  Jordan  and  Lebanon.  In  the  absence  of  a 
comprehensive  and  updated  assessment  it  is  hard  to  support  or  refute  this  claim. 
However, it is noted that there is a substantial difference in that the strength of the 
Turkish economy offers significant (albeit informal) work opportunities.   
It  is  observed  that  annual  funding  levels  have  fluctuated  considerably.  Limited 
funding in 2012 was followed by an “over-generous” allocation in 2013 when funds 
were “hard to sink”. This “almost blew the bank” for ECHO and led to significant 
cuts  in  other  global  crisis  responses.  Funding  processes  are  understood  to  be 
heavily influenced by politics.   

 

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 

It is also noted that there are several important political drivers behind the overall 
EU envelope of assistance to Turkey: 

o  One  of  the  drivers  of  expanding  coverage  inside  Turkey  is  strategic. 
INGOs were  facing  difficulties in  registering in Turkey  to work on cross-
border  operations  into  Syria.  Funding  INGOs  to  respond  inside  Turkey 
was seen as a way of strengthening the case for local registration. 

o  Critically,  further  assistance  in  Turkey  is  perceived  as  keeping  refugees 

closer to home, avoiding pressure on European borders. 

  There is no ‘bottom-up’ calculation of the budget requirement in Turkey is. Instead 
it becomes a top-down cake-sharing exercise. Staff are left to argue for a share of 
the available resources.  

JC  11.2.  The  ECHO  budget  allocation  to  respond  to  the  Syria  crisis  was 
proportionate 

  The  proportionality  of  ECHO’s  response  is  influenced  by  decision-making  at 

different levels:  
o  Burden  share  between  the  response  of  the  Host  Government  and  the 

International Community 

o  Burden share of ECHO compared to other donors 
o  Allocation of ECHO resources to Syria compared to other crises 
o  Allocation  of  ECHO  resources  to  Turkey  compared  to  other  elements  of  the 

Syria crisis response   

  The  data  already  reviewed  and  further  interviews  suggest  that  the  Turkish 
Government  is  bearing  a  disproportionate  responsibility  for  the  response. At  end 
of 2014 it was estimated that the Government had covered at least 95% of the total 
cost. 

  ECHO’s  share  of  the  burden  during  2012-14,  compared  to  other  donors,  is 
estimated  at  14%251.  This  would  appear  to  be  roughly  in  line  with  overall  norms 
(+/- 10% of global humanitarian response from Government sources). 

  The  allocation  of  resources  by  ECHO  between  humanitarian  crises  is  supported 
through the completion of an Integrated Analysis Framework (IAF) on an annual 
basis.  This  is  done  for  each  country  or  crisis  (in  this  case  for  Syria  as  a  whole). 
However, interviews indicate that the capacity for cross-crisis comparison is weak. 
Technically this is difficult and is also seen to rely on information that is not well 
represented  in  the  IAF,  such  as  that  on  access,  response  capacity  and  on-going 
response. 
In  practice  allocations  were  found  to  be  made  mostly  through  a  process  of 
inheritance  –  that  is,.  looking  at  last  years’  allocation  and  adjusting  up  or  down 
rather than really comparing between crises.  
In  practice  the  Syria  team  felt  that  the  response  was  underfunded  but  felt 
constrained to temper their requests in line with the overall envelope of resources 
available  to  ECHO.  An  ‘upper  limit’  was  self-imposed  in  formulating  the  budget 
request, rather than its being strictly needs-based. 

 

 

251   FTS data 

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  Within  the  HIP  operational  recommendations  were  drawn  up  to  justify  the 
allocation  of  funds  between  countries.  This  addresses  criteria  such  as  number  of 
IDPs  or  refugees,  responses  of  international  organizations,  the  humanitarian 
agenda,  new  opportunities,  and  so  forth.  The  perception  is  that  the  allocation 
procedure was fair and reasonable. Syria is seen as a pure humanitarian crisis with 
no development funding opportunities. Development actors are contributing to the 
response  in  other  countries  –  lower  potential  support  in  Lebanon  (no  US 
development funding) has led to this being a secondary priority. Jordan prioritized 
according to relative numbers of refugees, and Iraq to limited response capacity.  
  Turkey receives lowest priority within the team for funding allocation. However, if 
the  border  stays  open  and  numbers  continue  to  increase  then  this  allocation 
deserves to be revisited. 

  ECHO is potentially looking for an exit strategy over the next 5-10 years. Driven in 
part by a expectation  of waning political  interest over time,  the  strategy is one of 
increasingly focusing resources on meeting needs within Syria itself and away from 
neighbouring countries, including Turkey. 

JC 11.3. ECHO calibrated its objectives to the available funding 

  Given  the  limited  funding,  beneficiary  selection  is  seen  as  key  to  responding 
effectively  to  the  most  pressing  needs.  Partners  are  pressed  for  stricter  targeting 
criteria balancing the limited resources against the increased number of refugees. 
  ECHO has been  pressing for targeting of available resources closely  on the most 
‘vulnerable groups’  (eg.  Single-women-headed  households)  in  prioritization  of  the 
use of limited funds. ‘Partners to review their targeting criteria, inclusion rates and 
refrain  from  providing  blanket  assistance  in  order  to  ensure  that  the  most 
vulnerable are being reached’252. 

  ECHO  partners  have  written  well-defined  and  clear  proposals  and  have  proved 
responsive  in  communications  with  ECHO,  by  for  example  showing  a  high 
accountability  commitment  by  applying  continuous  verification  and  reassessment 
of planned households in order to confirm or change the caseload  in every three-
month assistance cycle. 

  However this approach is raising questions. Currently many partners target 30-40% 
of  the  population,  potentially  to  target  as  low  as  the  bottom  10%.  This  raises 
challenges  of  a)  feasibility  of  identifying  this  group,  b)  appropriateness  –  if  needs 
are present in a larger segment of the population, and c) the cost of targeting -  a 
disproportionate amount of the budget may be used on targeting processes.  

JC 11.4. ECHO-funded activities were cost-effective 

 

In the initial phase of response the priority for ECHO was meeting urgent needs. 
This ‘emergency phase’ persisted for a longer period than ‘normal’ and dominated 
decision-making  over  the  first  two  years.  Cost-efficiency  considerations  only 
emerged as a priority once the acute phase started to abate. 

  The  heart  of  the  ECHO  cost-efficiency  strategy  is  to  introduce  cash-based 
solutions  –  drawing  on  the  experience  of  multi-purpose  cash  grants  in  Lebanon. 

252   ECHO Desk Officer Mission Report, February 2015. 

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The entry  point for this was supporting the use  of eVouchers by WFP in camps. 
One  major  contribution  to  efficiency  was  funding  WFP  to  manage  food 
distribution in camps through the provision of eVouchers in camps in 2013.  

  “WFP support in the camps has brought down costs of the food assistance by 70% 
in  some  cases,  resulting  in  US$13.7  million  savings  per  month  compared  to  the 
provision  of  daily  hot  meals  by  AFAD,  while  also  delivering  food  assistance 
through  a  means  that  is  preferred  by  Syrians  living  in  the  camps 253”.  This  was 
reported to be recognized as an effective innovation with considerable cost savings 
by AFAD.  

  This  then  set  the  stage  for  out-of-camp  cash  based  distributions  -  and  ultimately 
use of cash rather than vouchers. Cash is seen as more efficient as voucher shops 
have  higher  prices  and  resale  of  vouchers  at  discounted  prices  by  beneficiaries  is 
significant.  These  are  seen  as  progressive  steps  in  greater  cost  efficiency.  The 
current issues of focus are: 
o  standardizing on a common platform: one major lesson from Lebanon was the 
inefficiency of running two parallel systems – the  WFP eVoucher and UNHCR 
multi-purpose  wallet.  Trying  to  avoid  the  problem  of  multiple  bank  fees  in 
Turkey. 

o  delivering cash at scale: this battle is still being fought. 

  Most  recently  the  Syria  team  has  introduced  the  use  of  a  ‘dashboard’  to  directly 
compare  the  cost-efficiency  of  different  projects  proposed  for  funding  under  the 
HIP.  This  makes  explicit  the  administration  costs  and  value  of  transfer  per 
beneficiary.   

  The proposal submitted by partners were in line with ECHO’s strategy in Turkey, 
especially in terms of geographic areas, focus on marginalised and most vulnerable 
off-camp refugees, quality programming with cost-efficiency, especially in terms of 
cash/e-voucher programming”. 

EQ  12:  Were  appropriate  monitoring  systems  in  place  to  support  sound 
management of ECHO operations? 

JC 12.1. ECHO undertook specific actions/commitments to ensure that the quality 
and coverage of its monitoring mechanisms were conducive to support sound 
management of ECHO-funded operations 

  ECHO  conducted  regular  and  routine  project  visits  to  partners  in  Turkey.  Most 
partners welcomed the level of engagement by ECHO, but some indicated that the 
monitoring  could  be  intrusive  and  demanding  of  staff  time.  ECHO-related  visits 
come  not  just  from  ECHO  country  TAs  but  also  from  regional  staff,  Brussels 
desks and consultants (such as the evaluators). 

JC 12.2. ECHO adopted a specific approach to ensure that monitoring mechanisms 
were tailored to the specific needs of remote management 

253   ECHO Trip Report, 2014 

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JC.12.3. ECHO partners implemented operations monitoring and ensured data and 
findings were available for ECHO’s use in a timely manner 

  Strong PDM monitoring arrangements witnessed in all ECHO projects visited by 

the evaluators. 

  Use of electronic distribution technology by a majority of partners allows real time 

monitoring of expenditure patterns of eVouchers.  

EQ 13: What has  been  the partners’  experience of working in consortia as well as 
with a multi-country approach? 

JC 13.1. ECHO undertook specific actions/commitments to ensure consortium and 
multi-country operations made efficient use of available resources 

  ECHO has not promoted consortia  in the Syria context.  Instead it has promoted 
multi-country  contracts  for  individual  agencies,  and  partnership  between  INGOs 
and national NGOs in implementing actions. 

JC 13.2. ECHO partners provided evidence that consortium and multi-country 
arrangements reduced coverage gaps and duplication between countries and 
partner organisations 

  The  main  benefit  of  multi-country  contracts  was  in  enabling  ECHO  to  disperse 
funds in larger volumes when staffing levels were low at the start of the crisis. This 
arguably  allowed  some  efficiencies  in  cross-border  operations  –  that  is,  allowing 
flexibility  in  delivering  within  Syria  according  to  changing  needs  and  access 
opportunities.   

  Monitors observed widespread negative reaction to multi-country contracts. ECHO 
desks  had  problems  in  following  contracts  that  didn’t  match  their  country-based 
responsibilities. It also raised the questions of legal accountability.  

  The  size  and  complexity  of  the  contracts  made  quality  control  challenging. 
Contracts were in “a constant state of reworking” as one or more country element 
would be under review. It was judged better to follow contracts at country level.  
  Relationships  between  INGOs  and  national  NGOs  –  where  they  worked  well  – 
were  seen  to  be  mutually  beneficial.  Local  partners  bring  understanding  of  local 
contexts while INGOs bring technical skills and standards, and financial resources.  
  Partners view consortia as having potential advantages and disadvantages. The main 
advantages  were  seen  as  relating  to  lesson-learning  and  a  clear  division  of 
geographical  responsibilities.  The  main  disadvantage  was  seen  to  be  the  loss  of 
flexibility to adapt rapidly to evolving circumstances. 

EQ 14 - ECHO success to coordinate operations with other main actors 

JC 14.1 Actions undertaken to enhance coordination 

  Coordination  has  been  a  major  problem  at  both  national  and  regional  levels.  All 

aspects were affected  -  3Ws, learning and advocacy. 

  Coordination between the Government and international humanitarian agencies in 
general  appears  to  be  weak  and  problematic.  UN  coordination  mechanisms  have 

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not filled this gap at national level254. UNHCR is mandated to lead the coordination 
of a response to refugees, but is reported to have had problems in ‘stepping out of 
the  shadow  of  the  Government’ 255  and  is  careful  not  to  undermine  the 
Government.  

  UNHCR  has  a  problem  in  separating  coordination  from  its  operational  role.  Its 
role  in  relation  to  other  UN  agencies  and  NGOs  was  characterised  as  one  of 
“control not coordination”. 

  ECHO did successfully challenge UNHCR to fulfil its responsibilities to establish 
in  concert  with  the  national  authorities.  It  was 
sectoral  working  groups 
acknowledged  by  partners  to  have  triggered  the  formation  of  working  groups. 
However ECHO influence on UNHCR is very limited and UNHCR performance 
in the region is very uneven.  
It  was  felt  that  ECHO  could  have  done  more  at  the  very  highest  levels  to  push 
UNHCR to take on greater responsibility for coordination in Turkey – and where 
necessary challenging the Government. Opportunities at DG level to liaise with the 
Head of UNHCR were apparently not taken.  

 

  ECHO  also  contributed  to  establishment  of  an  NGO  coordination  forum  under 

DRC that primarily addressed coordination of cross-border relief. 

  While the Government, in conjunction with the Turkish Red Crescent, effectively 
organizes the camp-based response, there is a gap in coordinating the response to 
out-of-camp  refugees.  There  is  still  no  clear  government  policy  towards  working 
with  the  non-camp  refugees  and  coordination  is  weak  and  rudimentary.  AFAD 
rarely requests assistance from NGO agencies. 

  No mechanism has been  created at strategic  level for non-camp refugees and the 
in  nature  and  has 
international  actors  has  been  reactive 

response  from 
systematically coordination. 

  Coordination  between  the  UN  and  NGOs  primarily  takes  place  in  Gaziantep. 
Coordination between the national government and UN takes place in Ankara. The 
links between these  levels of coordination are weak and NGOs feel disconnected 
from  the  national  authorities.  The  GoT  regards  the  UN  as  the  sole  humanitarian 
provider.  The  Deputy  Regional  HC,  based  in  Gaziantep,  has  no  link  to 
Government.  

  The Provincial Governorates have established monthly coordination meetings and 
are  responsible  for  provincial  plans  to  address  the  needs  of  refugee  presence  at 
provincial  level.  Such  plans,  even  if  they  are  ready,  have  not  yet  been  circulated. 
NGO  involvement  and  participation  in  the  consultation  process  is  reportedly 
minimal. 

  A Cash Working Group has been established in Turkey (and supported by ECHO) 
to coordinate the programming of cash transfers by the UN and NGOs agencies. 
This  appears  to  have  become  more  active  with  the  transfer  of  leadership  from 
UNHCR to WFP. Overall it appears to have been slow to address basic functions 
such  as  the  harmonization  of  transfer  amounts  or  sharing  information  and 
experiences on the alternative electronic distribution platforms available.  

254   ECHO Monthly Report for Turkey, April 2015 

255   ECHO Mission Report, 2014.  

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  A large gap in institutional mandates remains in the UN system. No one agency is 
in the lead on multi-purpose cash. There is a vision of a revolutionary change with 
one agency responsible for targeting and distributions. This would greatly simplify 
–  and  improve  the  efficiency  of  –  the  response.  Coordination  has  remained  at 
technical, rather than strategic, level.  

  ECHO played an important role in encouraging regional coordination, for example 
asking  the  UN  to  provide  an  overview  of  needs.  However,  it  is  now  widely 
questioned if regional  coordination has been  effective. There is little  added value; 
UN  appeals  failed  to  prioritize  allocations  across  the  region.  It  is  argued  that 
regional  coordination  activities  should  be  stripped  away  –  with  the  exception  of 
coordination of cross-border activities. The plan is to allow the response in other countries 
to  operate  autonomously.  There  has  been  little  value  or  return  on  large  regional 
coordination efforts. 

  A coordination gap was also identified between the Turkey operations (coordinated 
by UNHCR) and the XB operations (coordinated by OCHA). There is a need for 
much  better  information-sharing  to  anticipate  refugees  flows  –  from  Turkey  into 
Syria  and also as regards  returning refugees in the  other direction. XB operations 
are  in  general  also  weakly  coordinated.  There  are  different  levels  of  coordination 
which  remain  intertwined.  CCCM,  who  works  with  UNHCR,  is  currently 
coordinating  activities  in  Syria  including  XB  activities.  Just  starting  is  a  regular 
exchange of information between Damascus and XB operations from the various 
neighbouring countries to develop a “whole of Syria approach”.  

JC 14.2 ECHO identified and took account of main actors’ activities 

  The focus on both urban refugees and the far east demonstrated ECHO’s focus on 
a gap. However this gap was not identified through coordination mechanisms, but 
rather  in  spite  of  the  lack  of  coordination.  It  was  evident  that  there  was  ‘no 
masterplan’ in the programming of aid. INGO concentration was in the central and 
western areas of Kilis and Hatay. 

  Recently  a  3W  table  has  been  produced  on  urban  activities  by  the  informal 

coordination group256. 

  Within Syria there is a problem that INGOs are unwilling to share information on 
who  is  doing  what  and  where  for  security  concerns.  A  further  issue  is  that  one 
agency may be taking both humanitarian and stabilization funds to co-finance one 
project and does not wish to be transparent over the overlap.  

  This  lack  of  transparency  makes  coordination  very  problematic  and  creates  an 

inability to see gaps in coverage.  

  Nor  do  all  donors  share  information  through  the  OCHA  FTS.  OCHA  estimate 
that a maximum of 50% of the aid flows are captured through the system. Much of 
the aid comes from non-traditional donors such as the Gulf States, and many lack a 
international 
the 
tradition  of  sharing 
community. Large stabilization funds are not captured in the system. 

information  on  contributions  with 

256   ECHO Mission Report, February 2015. 

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JC 14.3 ECHO actions sought to enhance synergies and reduce duplications of 
effort, gaps or resource conflicts 

  The issue is not really one of duplication. In many areas there is either an absence 
of NGOs or only one that is operational. ‘Emptiness of assistance’ is a problem.  
  ECHO  is  trying  to  further  improve  the  harmonization  of  cash  and  voucher 
responses. An evaluation is included in the coming Daikonie-led project which it is 
hoped will contribute to the overall harmonization effort. 

JC 14.4 ECHO actions demonstrated synergies and no duplications of effort, gaps 
or resource conflicts 

  Project 2015/00582 So far, despite overwhelming and growing needs in the country, 
donor  engagement  has  been  limited,  with  the  consequence  that  ECHO  in  some 
areas  has  been  the  only  international  donor  present.  In  relation  to  this,  Diakonie 
covers an essential gap in terms of providing multi-purpose cash assistance as the 
main partner in locations – fpr example Batman and Diyarbakir - where access to 
aid is otherwise scarce. 

EQ15 – Mainstreaming of LRRD 

JC 15.1 ECHO coordinated with EC development actors (DG DEVCO, EEAS, and 
EU MS) from the earliest phases of a crisis response 

  ECHO  played  close  attention  to  how  the  use  of  humanitarian  funds  interplayed 
with  other  development  sources.  This  was  critical  given  the  scale  of  needs.  This 
allowed them to focus on a narrower set of sectors and beneficiaries.  

  ECHO maintains a close relationship with EU Delegations to maximize synergies 
and  avoid  overlaps.  This  is  a  question  of  making  the  best  possible  use  of  the 
available instruments. 

  ECHO has worked closely with other EU instruments to build a more integrated 
response to the crisis. Complementary investments from other instruments include:  
o  The Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) which is a huge source of support 
for  Turkey  at  around  €600m  per  year,  delivered  through  national 
institutions.  

o  IPA  contribution  to  the  Syria  crisis  in  Turkey  through  two  main  projects: 
€10M with UNHCR for registration and profiling of out-of-camp refugees, 
implementation  of  12  mobile  clinics,  mapping  of  INGOs  at  municipality 
level for better coordination and €3M with AFAD for capacity-building. 
o  It has proved very complicated and slow, and is relatively inflexible – it has 
only  been  able  to  use  unspent  funds  from  previous  decisions  on  the 
emergency. It took a long time to negotiate.  

o  A  European  Trust  Fund  (ETF)  for  the  Syria  crisis  response  is  starting  up 
under  DG  NEAR.  This  is  primarily  related  to  long-term  development 
funding  on  resilience  but  can  be  used  as  a  humanitarian  aid  instrument. 
$18m will be reallocated from IPA to ETF, while $5m has been earmarked 
to WFP and $11m to UNICEF.  

o  Jordan  and  Lebanon  work  through  the  European  Neighbourhood 
Instrument (ENI). Examples of synergies are evident. A focus on education 

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for  refugees  has  good  synergies  as  ECHO  does  not  prioritize  education. 
DEVCO  focus  on  primary  health  care  and  ECHO  focus  on  secondary 
health  care.  As  regards  WASH  support,  DEVCO  handles 
large 
infrastructure, and ECHO works at HH level. 

  There  is  potential  for  ECHO  to  advocate  for  other  EUMS  to  contribute 
humanitarian  funds  under  ECHO  management  in  Turkey  (external  accrued 
revenues).  However,  this  has  not  yet  been  pursued.  It  could  be  an  alternative  to 
contributing  to  the  EUTF  which  has  a  more  ambiguous  responsibility  for 
humanitarian response.  

  EUTF  has  been  useful  in  allowing  EUMS  which  would  not  otherwise  contribute 
development funds to Turkey, for example the UK, Italy and Germany, to do so.. 
  The main possibility for an exit strategy in Turkey appears to be a combination of i) 
the right to work for those with the ability to work, complemented by ii) inclusion 
in  a  safety  net  of  those  who  are  chronically  poor  and  unable  to  work.  ECHO 
strategy  does  not  yet  specifically  contribute  to  achieving  this  transition.  Other 
agencies are exploring this option (WFP, UNICEF). The EU Delegation is open to 
further  exploring  support  to  the  national  safety  net  over  the  next  2-3  years, 
including support to refugees. 

  An alternative is resettlement in Europe – especially for certain groups such as the 
Yazidi  whose  return  is  particularly  risky  and  problematic.  However,  there  is  little 
progress in that regard at European level.  

JC 15.2 ECHO deployed the various instruments available to implement stability 
measures in a coherent and complementary fashion with the EU toolbox 

  The  IcSP257 supported  two  projects  in  Turkey:  UNHCR  training  AFAD  on camp 
to  mitigate  child  recruitment  and 

management  and  UNICEF  education 
radicalisation. 

  The  IcSP  is  also  being  looked  to  as  source  of  funds  for  refugee  “community 

centres” that will address a range of protection issues.  

  Questions  were  raised  on  the  appropriateness  of  using  IcSP  funds  to  support 
protection  and  it  was  argued  that  protection  should  remain  a  core  humanitarian 
responsibility.  

JC 15.3 ECHO-funded actions have been based on a strong context analysis 

  A  Joint  Humanitarian  Development  Framework  has  been  developed  for  Turkey. 
ECHO also invested heavily in supporting the EU Delegation to develop the IPA 
strategy  for  Turkey.  The  specific  role  of  ECHO  has  been  in  helping  to  identify 
priority  sectors  of  support,  geographical  areas  of  need  and  implementation 
partners.  

  This  collaboration  in  Turkey  is  viewed  by  the  EU  Delegation  as  a  model  of 
collaboration  –  collaboration  of  ECHO  and  EU  Delegation  is  traditionally  weak. 
ECHO has helped the EU to present an integrated “one EU” response.    

257   From March 2014, the Instrument for Stability (IfS) was succeeded by the Instrument contributing to Stability and 

Peace (IcSP) 

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JC 15.4 ECHO-funded projects have been framed in the context of longer-term 
requirements of reconstruction and development 

  ECHO  has  supported  the  immediate  education  needs  of  refugees  through  the 
‘Children  of  Peace’  initiative.    While  not  a  traditional  humanitarian  responsibility 
this  is  seen  to  have  worked  well.  The  flexible  ECHO  funding  has  allowed  rapid 
start-up  of  educational  programmes.  This  has  been  followed  up  through  longer-
term funding by development instruments which take time to mobilize. 
In facilitating the return of refugees to Kobane the ECHO contribution has been 
limited  to  supporting  de-mining  operations.  Further  rehabilitation  actions  are 
expected to be funded through other EU instruments. 

 

  Through establishment of community centres in Hatay and Sanliurfa, DRC Turkey 
has  supported  the  development  of  the  following  two  core  areas  for  beneficiaries: 
resilience capacities that strengthen individual, family and community psychosocial 
coping  mechanisms,  and  capacities  to  enhance  useful  skills  such  as  problem-
solving, communication, computer skills, and languages. Obtaining new knowledge 
and  skills  has  helped  refugees  develop  themselves  in  their  places  of  displacement 
and prepare themselves to become productive in their country of origin when the 
time is appropriate. 

EQ16 – Successfulness in terms of LRRD 

JC 16.1 ECHO-funded operations have been implemented through rapid decision-
making processes and flexible instruments 

JC 16.2 ECHO provided a coordinated response strategy through its actions 

JC 16.3 ECHO engaged with a range of locally important actors through its actions 

JC 16.4 ECHO-funded interventions experienced a smooth and timely phase-out, 
thereby avoiding “grey zones” in international assistance 

  ECHO partners recognize  the need  to further  strengthen mid-term programming 
for  refugee  and  host  communities  in  addition  to  continuing  lifesaving  assistance. 
The protracted crisis in  Syria and its increasing impact on neighbouring  countries 
urgently requires assistance for strengthening the resilience and self-help ability of 
the affected population. 

  Education  initiatives  started  by  ECHO  have  been  smoothly  transitioned  to  GoT 
authority. Initially GoT was reluctant to invest in education for fear of sending the 
wrong message to refugees – that they were staying in Turkey. It has now accepted 
responsibility and is rapidly bringing this up to an adequate level. 

JC16.5 ECHO-funded actions encouraged “cross-learning” of humanitarian and 
development experiences 

EQ17, (Security) To what extent have the ECHO-funded projects taken into 
account the security situation in the field for the partners' organisations? What is 
the scope for improvement? 

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JC 17.1. The design of ECHO-funded actions has been based on an in-depth 
knowledge of the security situation, both in Syria and in neighboring countries 

JC 17.2. The design and implementation of ECHO-funded actions facilitated 
humanitarian access for partner’s organizations 

JC 17.3. ECHO-funded actions promoted the security and safety of humanitarian 
personnel delivering humanitarian aid 

  ECHO are reportedly supportive when agencies have had to slow down operations 

owing to security concerns (eg. WFP in Syria) 

EQ18  (Humanitarian  advocacy)  How  effective  and  active  has  ECHO  been  in  terms  of 
Humanitarian  Advocacy  (on  issues  like  coordination,  access,  open  borders,  cross-line 
intervention, INGO registration, work permits, etc.)?  

JC 18.1. Advocacy has been a priority of ECHO response strategies for Syria and its 
neighbouring countries 

  ECHO advocated heavily for a response to under-served areas (far east), based on 
a  field  presence  capable  of  identifying  evolving  needs.  Other  donors  depend  on 
partner  proposals  –  but  in  this  case  partners  were  not  present  in  these  areas. 
ECHO identified the need and encouraged partners to establish a presence in these 
areas.  

JC 18.2. ECHO advocacy contributed to concrete policy changes in neighbouring 
countries  
 

In  general  ECHO  advocacy  to  the  GoT  has  been  delivered  through  the  EU 
Ambassador. This has greater traction with the Turkish authorities. However it has 
been  harder  to  advocate  on  some  core  humanitarian  issues,  for  example  open 
border policies, given the EU’s own policies.  

  ECHO has contributed to opening up the policy space from the GoT to respond 
to the needs of urban refugees, especially in the far east. Prior to this NGOs had 
been  reluctant  to  work  in  this  area.  Effective  use  of  small  funding  grants 
demonstrated that concerns over operating in this area were overstated.  

  ECHO  advocated  for  respect  for  humanitarian  principles  within  Turkey.  For 
example  it  reported  advocating  with  the  GoT  for  the  registration  of  INGOs. 
However,  details  of  the  form  that  this  advocacy  took  are  not  clear.  It  was  also 
reinforced  by  advocacy  by  the  EUMS  embassies,  which  was  reported  to  be  very 
effective.  

  ECHO intervened with the local Kurdish authorities when partners had problems 
with local authorities which wanted to take control of humanitarian resources and 
credit  for  the  response.  Active  intervention  provided  partners  with  important 
support for continuing operations.  

  ECHO advocated to GoT in specific cases in support of work permits for NGOs. 
The recent rule limiting NGOs to issuing a maximum of five Syrian employee with 

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authorization  to  travel  back  and  forward  across  the  Syrian  border  has  proved  a 
particular constraint.  

JC 18.3. ECHO advocacy contributed to changes in approach by other donors in 
Syria and neighbouring countries 

  DG ECHO has advocated with EUMS for increased assistance to the response in 
Turkey.  However  some  EUMS  are  withdrawing  assistance  (eg.  DFID)  as  they 
reprioritize  towards  a  response  inside  Syria.  Turkey  seen  as  a  middle-income 
country that is ‘able to cope’.  

JC 18.4. ECHO advocacy contributed to increased coordination between donors 
and governments in Syria and neighbouring countries 

  There  are  limited  opportunities  for  donor  coordination  at  field  level  as  so  few 
donors are present. Essentially ECHO, USG (BPM and FFP) and Germans. DFID 
is concentrating on cross-border operations.  

  ECHO  sits  as  one  of  three  donors  on  the  HLG  which  sets  coordinated  donor 

policy. It is seen as an effective member of this group. 

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5.  Other relevant findings for the evaluation  

5.1. Allocation of resources to Refugees in the Far East 

The evaluation ToR highlight questions relating to the allocation of resources by ECHO to 
the influx of refugees in the far east of the country. A number of observations can be made 
in  relation  to  this  issue,  although  it  is  hard  to  disentangle  this  specific  question  from  the 
overall question of how ECHO allocated resources to the Turkey response. In terms of the 
general challenges of resource allocation for ECHO: 
 

the  expectation  is  that  as  a  humanitarian  organization  that  ECHO  should  provide 
assistance  according  to  need;  the  absence  of  a  current,  comprehensive  and  credible 
needs assessment (in the far east or nationally) undermines the ability of ECHO  -  and 
the evaluators  -  to conclusively assess the appropriate level of resources required; 
even  if  better  information  on  needs  were  available  there  is  an  apparent  corporate 
constraint to appropriate resource allocation. Budget allocation processes are a process 
of  “cake  splitting”  in  which  arguments  are  advanced  for  a  share  of  the  available 
resources.  At  no  point  is  the  field  level  requested  to  define  an  appropriate  resource 
request in response to needs. 

 

Related  to  this  point  is  the  relative  inflexibility  of  total  EU  humanitarian  resources. 
Increased  allocations to the  Syria  crisis  are  understood  in  terms  of  the  implications  for  a 
diminished  capacity  to  respond  to  other  global  crises.  Consequently,  decisions  tend  to 
factor this in rather than allocating purely on the basis of need.  

There is an added complication in the Turkey context as a middle-income country (MIC). 
The  appropriate  response  to  needs  has  to  take  into  account  the  ability  of  the  State  to 
respond. This has proved contentious, with the State first declining outside assistance and 
then  requesting  it,  but  then  donors  being  unwilling  to  respond.    The  role  of  ECHO  in 
meeting  these  needs  also  should  be  contextualized  by  an  appreciation  of  the  evolving 
capacity of the government to meet these needs (both directly and indirectly, eg. through 
opening up the labour market). 

In the far east it is evident that the ECHO country team took a strategic decision to expand 
humanitarian  aid,  where  a  Kurdish  majority  area  is  also  underserved  for  several  reasons, 
including the highly politicized environment and challenging dynamics between local actors 
(municipalities)  and  local  government.  In  addition  the  situation  in  Syria  remains  unstable 
and major refugee flows may be anticipated in future, for example from Raqqa City should 
access improve. 

It  was  apparent  during  the  field  mission  that  many  out-of-camp  refugees  remain 
underserved and the most vulnerable have high levels of need. In many locations ECHO 
remains the only active donor in this region. Consequently, attempts to “fill the gap” may 
need to be complemented by further advocacy for other donors to carry a larger share of 
the burden. 

The  appropriate  division  of  responsibility  between  ECHO  and  other  EU  Instruments 
needs to be factored in to determination of the appropriate budget. Much of the argument 

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for  supporting  refugees  in  Turkey  is  essentially  political  rather  than  humanitarian  –  for 
example  stemming  the  flow  of  refugees  to  Europe,  countering  terrorism  objectives,  and 
others.  In this case  it is appropriate  that political objectives should be responded to with 
the use of development funds.  

5.2. Basic Needs Approach 

This  country  study  examined  the  appropriateness  and  proportionality  of  the  basic 
assistance  package  provided  by  ECHO-funded  operations  to  out-of-camp  refugees, 
including  obstacles  to  success  and  lessons  learned  from  implementation.  Specific  related 
issues were identified as follows: 

  ECHO-funded  operations  in  Turkey  have  converted  a  large  proportion  of 
operations from delivery of  in-kind transfers to electronic vouchers. This move has 
been  accepted  as  an  efficient  and  effective  response  by  all  actors:  UN,  NGOs, 
Government and beneficiaries. 

  However, these transfers do not yet represent a ‘basic needs grant’ as they are still 
designed  to  meet  sectoral  food  needs  –  in  some  cases  supplemented  by  NFIs.  
Nearly  all  actors  agree  that  a  further  transition  to  cash  transfers  is  desirable.  The 
main dissenting voice is from the GoT although some space for experimentation is 
emerging.  

  The arguments advanced for the use of cash include :   

o 

the ability to meet a wider range of needs (eg. rent, schooling costs, health, 
consumer durables, etc.) 
o  beneficiary choice and dignity 
o  efficiency – it allows beneficairies to shop at cheaper outlets 
o 

the ability to save (vouchers expire at the end of each month). 
  There is a struggle to deliver vouchers or cash in big cities (eg. Gaziantep) Beyond 
the capacity of NGO partners as needs overwhelming – stay in smaller centres. To 
start operations in this context a new strategy is needed, such as working through a 
big UN agency.  

  A cash-based basic needs grant presents opportunities for medium-term linkages to 
national social transfer systems. In order to exploit these linkages it is logical that 
various elements of the cash grants should be standardized – and as far as posible 
in  line  with  the  standards  of  the  national  system.  This  includes  a  standardized 
registration  list  and    targeting  criteria,  and  agreement  on  a  common  Minimum 
Expenditure Basket (MEB) and transfer amounts.  

5.3. Other issues 

Sectoral Focus: 

  Shelter is consistently and repeatedly reported by beneficiaries to be the top priority 
need. DRC assessments revealed that the priority needs are cash for food and rent. 
258  Households  reported  that  they  would  go  without  food  to  ensure  that  rent 
payments  are  made.  Also  inconsistent  with  ECHO  responses  elsewhere  in  the 
region where shelter is a priority.  

258   ECHO (2013) Project 2013-91005 eSingle Form 

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  However  ECHO  does  not  support  the  shelter  sector  in  Turkey,  partly  on  the 
grounds  that  ‘no  proposals  were  forthcoming’.  NRC  –  a  shelter  specialist  –  is 
establishing itself in Turkey and the situation may well change in future.  However, 
in contrast to this position, the lack of an established shelter programme in the far 
east was not used as a reason by ECHO not to engage in this area,  

  Education  is  a  clear  refugees’  priority  that  does  not  fall  within  the  normal 
humanitarian mandate. ECHO is  providing intital  support to schools through the 
Children  of  Peace  Initiative 259 .  Four  different  projects  (UNICEF,  CONCERN 
(two),  People  in  Need)  are  investing  in  developing  school  infrastructure  and 
services. This  supports the  two-shift  system, with  Turks educated in the morning 
and Syrians in the afternoon. This experiment is being viewed positively, aided by a 
rapid transition to support throuigh development instruments. 

Partnership issues:  

 

In  the  case  of  Turkey  few  of  ECHO’s  FPA  NGO  partners  had  an  established 
presence  and  very  few  had  established  relationships  with  local  NGOs.  However 
such relationships are critical to effective delivery.  There is no clear strategy as to 
how  these  relationships  could  be  quickly  established  to  facilitate  implementation. 
There  were  a  number  of  “arranged  marriages”  –  several  suggested  by  ECHO  – 
which proved to have mixed success.  

  There is potential for learning from this issue and for having a preparedness plan 
for similar situations in which ECHO commences operations in new contexts. This 
might  involve  preparedness  measures,  support  for  capacity-building  of  CSOs  and 
consideration  of  whether  under  exceptional  circumstances  ECHO  might  directly 
fund high-quality local NGOs260. 

Visibility:  

  There  is  very  little  visibility  of  ECHO  operations  in  Turkey.  Derogations  for 
operations  inside  Syria  have  been  widely  used  in  Turkey.  Consquently  at  the 
beneficairy level there is little understanding of where these resources come from – 
beneficiaries  often  stated  that  the  aid  came  from  the  local  Mukhtars.  The  issue 
needs to be followed up closely.  

Rapid response:  

  Preparedness  for  rapid  influxes  of  refugees  and  a  rapid  response  to  new  access 
opportunities inside Syria is central to the humanitarian response. While ECHO is a 
flexible donor there is no stand-by arrangement for preparedness measures. 

  ECHO  is  not  supportive  of  the  OCHA-managed  Pooled  Fund  which  does  offer 

rapid access to funds for pre-approved Syrian NGOs.  

259   This was established with the proceeds of the Nobel Prize awarded to the EU. 

260   This may require changes to the requirement to fund only European registered NGOs. 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex III / Page 340 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
ADE 

Annex IV: Bibliography  

The following bibliography presents the list of documents consulted during the evaluation. 
It is presented by order of author (alphabetical) and then year (ascending). 

Author 
 3RP  
 3RP  
 3RP  
 3RP  
3RP 

3RP  

3RP  

ACAPS 

ACAPS  

ACAPS  

1 ACF 
ADE, GROUPE 
URD, IECAH 
2 ADRA 
Agulhas Applied 
Knowledge 
Ahmed Içduygu 
(Migration Policy 
Institute) 
Allex-Billaud L.  

Year 
2014 
2014 
2014 
2014 
2014 

2015 

2015 

2012 

2014 

2015 

2014 
2015 

2014 
2015 

2015 

2014 

ALNAP 

2014 

Title 
Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2015-2016 
Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2015-2016 - Iraq 
Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2015-2016 - Lebanon 
Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2015-2016 - Turkey 
Overview: 2015 Syria Response Plan and 2015-2016 Regional Refugee 
and Resilience Plan  

Information Kit Syrian Refugees No 10 - Iraq: Humanitarian Inter-
Agency Interventions 
Information Kit Syrian Refugees No 11 - Iraq: Humanitarian Inter-
Agency Interventions 
Emergency capacity building project: Secondary Data Review: Syrian Arab 
Republic 14.12.11 – 20.02.12 
Regional analysis Syria, Strategic Needs Analysis Project, 1er October – 31 
December 2014 
Syria four years on: No end in sight, Mapping the situation for internally 
displaced Syrians and refugees after four years of civil war. 
ECHO Workshop in Beirut -Workshop on remote management in Syria 
Evaluation of the ECHO response to the Syrian crisis, Revised inception 
report 
ECHO Workshop in Beirut -Partner presentation - model 
DFID Syria Crisis Unit, 
Humanitarian Programme Process Evaluation 
Syrian refugees in Turkey – The long road ahead 

Quel rôle pour les gouvernements locaux dans les Etats fragiles et en 
crise ? Le cas de la crise syrienne, Séminaire pour le Dialogue et le 
développement des capacités des autorités locales et régionales en Afrique 
dans les domaines du développement et de la gouvernance locale. 
Responding to urban disasters: Learning from previous relief and 
recovery operations  

AMEL 

Amnesty 
International 
Australian 
Government – 
Department of 

2015 

2014 

Four years into the Turmoil of the Syrian Crisis, Activity Report 2014-
2015 
Struggling to Survive, Refugees from Syria in Turkey 

2014 

Australia’s Humanitarian Response to the Syria Crisis - Evaluation report 

# 
1 
2 
3 
4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex IV / Page 341 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
ADE 

Year 

Title 

# 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

29 

30 
31 
32 
33 

34 

35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 

43 

44 

45 

46 
47 

Author 
Foreign Affairs and 
Trade 
Bailey S., Barbelet 
V. 
Bonino F.  

2014 

2014 

2015 

2014 

British Embassy 
Amman 
British Embassy 
Amman, REACH 
Christian 
Lehmann, Daniel 
T. R. Masterson 
Cities Unies France  2014 

2016 

Creac’h Y.-K., 
Lassen L. B. 
Crisp J. and al.  

DFID 

 DFID 
4 DG ECHO 
3 DG ECHO 
 DG ECHO 
DG ECHO 

 DG ECHO 
6 DG ECHO 
9 DG ECHO 
5 DG ECHO 
 DG ECHO 
 DG ECHO 
 DG ECHO 
DG ECHO 
1
3 
DG ECHO 
1
4 
DG ECHO 
8 

DG ECHO 
1
0 
 DG ECHO 
 DG ECHO 

2012 

2013 

2013 

2014 
2012 
2012 
2012 
2012 

2012 
2013 
2013 
2013 
2013 
2013 
2013 
2013 

2013 

2013 

2013 

2013 
2013 

Towards a resilience-based response to the Syrian refugee crisis, A critical 
review of vulnerability criteria and frameworks, UNDP, ODI, May 2014. 
Evaluating protection in humanitarian action: issues and challenges, 
ALNAP Working Paper 
Social Cohesion in Host Communities in Nother Jordan 

Understanding Social Cohesion & Resilience in Jordanian Host 
Communities 
Impact evaluation of a cash-transfer programme for Syrian refugees in 
Lebanon 

Le fonds de solidarité pour les réfugiés syriens au Liban: le projet de la 
municipalité de Kab Elias 
DRC Middle East & North Africa: Turkey Mission 

From slow boil to breaking point: A real-time evaluation of UNHCR’s 
response to the Syrian refugee emergency 
Written evidence submitted by the Department for International 
Development 
Operational Plan 2011-2016 Syria, Updated December 2014 
ECHO Lebanon monthly report, July 2012 
HIP 2012 - ECHO/LBN/BUD/2012/91000 (Mid – term review 2012) 
Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Iraq crisis 
Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Palestinian Refugees in 
Lebanon 
Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Syria crisis 
Dashboard CBOs 
DG ECHO: Syria Crisis - Total divided by Sector 
ECHO memo on commission financed humanitarian operations in Syria 
Future use of IFS, Meeting with P. Vimont and F. Fotiadis 
Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Syria crisis 
Instruction note for DG ECHO staff on Remote management, Brussels 
Instruction note for ECHO staff on Remote Management Ref. 
Ares(2013)168580 - 08/02/2013 
Note to Jean-Louis De Brouwer on the Monitoring of aid delivery in Syria 

Note to Jean-Louis De Brouwer on the State of Play on monitoring of 
Cross Border Operations inside Syria - Note ARES (2013) 3047112 of 
13/09/2013 
Presentation on the EU funding 2012-2013 

Project 2013/00624 Fichop 
Project 2013/00624 Single Form 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex IV / Page 342 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
ADE 

Year 
2013 
2013 
2013 
2013 

Title 
Project 2013/00805 eSingle form 
Project 2013/91005 eSingle Form 
Summary of the CBOs 
Syria crisis – Inter-service coordination meeting,  11 January 2013  

2013 

Syria crisis – Inter-service coordination meeting, 18 January 2013 

2014 

2014 Voter Registration in Lebanon 

2014 

2014 

2014 

2014 

2014 
2014 
2014 

2014 

2014 
2014 

2014 

2014 

2014 

2014 
2014 

2014 

2014 

2014 

A 21st century response model: Donors’ approach to multi-purpose cash 
transfer – from operation to policy, 24th June 2014 (agenda) 
Agreement for technical support to an organization between DG ECHO 
and ACU 
Background briefing – (Re)Thinking the direct assistance in Lebanon in 
2014 
Background Document on Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS) 

Background Note Support to CBOs – The Case of Turkey 
Briefing update on DG ECHO's operations in LEBANON’ 
Challenges and opportunities – The food part in multi-purpose cash 
transfers 
Changes in article 8.1. to be included in all the 2014 contracts with a Syria 
component 
DG ECHO Factsheet – Turkey – December 2014 
Distinction between ECHO funding based on Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1257/96 and other instruments for external assistance 
Donors’ approach to multi-purpose cash transfer – from operations to 
policy 
Brussels, 24th June 2014 (outcomes of the discussions) 
Draft Concept Note: Multipurpose cash assistance to respond to 
humanitarian needs 
Draft Concept Paper - 10 Common Principles for Multi-Purpose 
Assistance to Respond to Humanitarian Needs 
Draft Note on State of Play of Cross-Border Humanitarian Operations 
Draft Note: Syria crisis – state of play of cross-border humanitarian 
operations,  March 2014 
ECHO  Funds contracted in response to the Syria crisis (as of 
05/09/2014) 
ECHO  Funds contracted in response to the Syria crisis (as of 
16/10/2014) 
ECHO Lebanon monthly report, April 2014 

2014 

ECHO Lebanon monthly report, December 2014 

2014 

ECHO Lebanon monthly report, February 2014 

2014 

ECHO Lebanon monthly report, July/August 2014 

# 
48 
49 
50 
51 

52 

53 

54 

55 

56 

57 

58 
59 
60 

61 

62 
63 

64 

65 

66 

67 
68 

69 

70 

71 

72 

73 

74 

Author 
 DG ECHO 
 DG ECHO 
7 DG ECHO 
DG ECHO 
1
2 
DG ECHO 
1
1 
DG ECHO 
3
4 
DG ECHO 
2
3 
DG ECHO 
5
6 
DG ECHO 
3
3 
DG ECHO 
4
5 
 DG ECHO 
 DG ECHO 
DG ECHO 
2
7 
DG ECHO 
4
7 
 DG ECHO 
DG ECHO 
6
1 
DG ECHO 
3
0 

DG ECHO 
6
7 
DG ECHO 
4
2 
 DG ECHO 
DG ECHO 
1
6 
DG ECHO 
1
7 
DG ECHO 
2
0 
DG ECHO 
3
6 
DG ECHO 
3
7 
DG ECHO 
3
5 
3DG ECHO 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex IV / Page 343 

 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
ADE 

Year 

Title 

2014 

ECHO Lebanon monthly report, June 2014 

2014 

ECHO Lebanon monthly report, March 2014 

2014 

ECHO Lebanon monthly report, November2014 

2014 

ECHO memo on aid diversion 

2014 

ECHO quarterly reporting table - Ref. Ares(2014)2863343 - 02/09/2014 

2014 

2014 

2014 

2014 

ECHO Workshop in Beirut - Aid Diversion monitoring report: A first 
overview 
ECHO Workshop in Beirut - Instruction note on Remote management 

ECHO Workshop in Beirut - Remote management:  Facts, challenges and 
perspectives of humanitarian Aid in Syria 
ECHO Workshop in Beirut - Report on Aid Diversion: Syria operation 

2014 

Framework for cross border initiatives in Northern Syria 

2014 
2014 
2014 

2014 
2014 
2014 

2014 

2014 
2014 

2014 

2014 

2014 

2014 

2014 
2014 

Health Paper 
Humanitarian Implementation Plan DG ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/9100 
HIP 2015 -ECHO/WWD/BUD/2015/01000 (technical annex) 

Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Syria crisis 
Humanitarian Implementation Plan DG ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/9100 
INGO Visa and Work Permit Difficulties 

Inter-agency multi-purpose cash transfer to most destitute refugees in 
Lebanon - State of play (annex to the Lebanon monthly report, April 
2014) 
Jean-Louis De Brouwer letter to UNHCR and WFP 
Joint donor mission - Food/Cash assistance, 21-22 October 2014 
(agenda) 
Joint donor mission - Food/Cash assistance, 21-22 October 2014 
(participants) 
Letter from Claus Sorensen to Partners,  Reporting requirements of 
ECHO for operations inside Syria 
Letter from Jean Louis de Brouwer to WFP - UNHCR  

Letter from Jean Louis de Brouwer to WFP-UNHCR - Cost effectiveness 
in humanitarian aid 
Mission to Syria (Damascus) 17 -21 November 2014 
Monitoring Report of missions inside Syria (dashboard) 

2014 

Monthly report Lebanon 

# 

75 

76 

77 

78 

79 

80 

81 

82 

83 

84 

85 
86 
87 

88 
89 
90 

91 

92 
93 

94 

95 

96 

97 

98 
99 

100 

Author 
8 
DG ECHO 
3
9 
DG ECHO 
4
0 
DG ECHO 
4
1 
DG ECHO 
4
8 
DG ECHO 
4
9 
DG ECHO 
5
2 
DG ECHO 
5
1 
DG ECHO 
5
0 
DG ECHO 
5
4 
DG ECHO 
5
8 
 DG ECHO 
 DG ECHO 
DG ECHO 
1
9 
 DG ECHO 
 DG ECHO 
DG ECHO 
6
5 
DG ECHO 
3
2 

 DG ECHO 
DG ECHO 
2
8 
DG ECHO 
2
9 
DG ECHO 
6
6 
DG ECHO 
6
3 
DG ECHO 
6
4 
 DG ECHO 
DG ECHO 
5
5 
 DG ECHO 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex IV / Page 344 

 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
ADE 

Year 
2014 
2014 

2014 
2014 
2014 
2014 
2014 
2014 
2014 
2014 

2014 

2014 

2014 

2014 
2014 

2014 

2014 
2014 

2014 

2014 

2014 

2015 

2015 
2015 
2015 
2015 
2015 
2015 
2015 

Title 
Newcomers Paper 
Note to  Jean-Louis De Brouwer  on the Rejection of Registration of 4 
NGOs by the Turkish Authorities 
Project 2014/00314 Fichop 
Project 2014/00314 Single Form 
Project 2014/00793 eSingle Form 
Project 2014/00793 Fichop 
Project 2014/91018 eSingle Form  
Project 2014/91021 eSingle Form 
Remote management and the Syria crisis 
Report on Remote Management note held with Partners -Beirut  

Roundtable in Brussels, 29th January 2014 - The Increased Use of Cash in 
the Humanitarian Response in Lebanon (conclusions) 
Roundtable in Brussels, 29th January 2014 - The Increased Use of Cash in 
the Humanitarian Response in Lebanon (agenda) 
Roundtable in Brussels, 29th January 2014 - The Increased Use of Cash in 
the Humanitarian Response in Lebanon (participants) 
Single cash transfer in Lebanon – One-pager or CoHAFA 
Synthesis of EU 2014 Humanitarian Strategies in response to the Syria 
Crisis 
Syria – Humanitarian Financing Strategy  

Syria crisis: State of play of cross-border humanitarian operations 
Syria Integrated Analysis Framework for 2014 

Terms of reference - Donors mission - Food/cash assistance in the 
response to the Syrian refugees crisis in Lebanon and Jordan, 19-23 
October 2014  
Terms of Reference for the evaluation of the ECHO response to the 
Syrian Crisis 2012 - 2014 - Annex I 
Third-Party Monitoring - Summary of discussions, ECHO Gaziantep 
Remote-Management Workshop, 25 September 2014 
Background Paper on Protection – Syrian Refugees in Lebanon 

Commissioner Stylianides Mission to Lebanon -  28-31 January 2015 
Country report: Iraq 
Country report: Jordan 
Country report: Lebanon 
Country report: Turkey 
DG ECHO funding Syria crisis: € 681 million 
EU Funds contracted in response to the Syria crisis (as of 09/01/2015) 

2015 

HIP 2015 - ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91000 (publication note) 

# 
101 
102 

103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 

111 

112 

113 

114 
115 

116 

117 
118 

119 

120 

121 

122 

123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 

130 

Author 
 DG ECHO 
DG ECHO 
5
9 
 DG ECHO 
 DG ECHO 
 DG ECHO 
 DG ECHO 
 DG ECHO 
 DG ECHO 
 DG ECHO 
DG ECHO 
5
3 
DG ECHO 
2
5 
DG ECHO 
2
6 
DG ECHO 
6
2 
 DG ECHO 
DG ECHO 
2
1 
DG ECHO 
6
0 
 DG ECHO 
DG ECHO 
1
8 
DG ECHO 
3
1 

DG ECHO 
1
5 
DG ECHO 
4
6 
DG ECHO 
7
4 
 DG ECHO 
 DG ECHO 
 DG ECHO 
 DG ECHO 
 DG ECHO 
 DG ECHO 
DG ECHO 
6
8 
DG ECHO 
6
9 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex IV / Page 345 

 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
ADE 

Title 
Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Syria Crisis 
Joint Humanitarian Development Framework (JHDF) in Jordan in 
response to the Syrian crisis for 2015-2016 
Joint Humanitarian Development Framework (JHDF) in response to the 
Syrian crisis for 2015-2016 
Lebanon Response model – ECHO positioning in 2015 

 Mission Report (Mission to Turkey, 17 – 28 January 2015) 
Mission report: mission to Jordan 7-14 February 2015 
Monitoring, remote management and aid diversion - Syria Crisis 

Project 2014/00314 Fichop 
Project 2014-00308 eSINGLE FORM  
Project 2015/00582 Fichop 
Shelter for Syrian Refugees in Lebanon – Briefing Note Updates (as of 22 
January 2015) 
Summary of Commissioner Stylianides Field visit to Bekaa, 31 January 
2015   
Summary of Commissioner Stylianides Mission to Lebanon, 28-31 
January 2015 
Syria country report 
Syria crisis, DG ECHO factsheet 
Terms of Reference for the evaluation of the DG ECHO response to the 
Syrian crisis 2012-2014, Annex 1 
Turkey Monthly Report April 
Draft Concept Note - Multipurpose cash assistance to respond to 
humanitarian needs 
Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Syrian Crisis 
Preliminary analysis on the monthly reports from DG ECHO partners 
received during the year 2014 
Report on remote management note held with partners – Beirut (week of 
22-26 September) 
DRC Jordan Needs Assessment 
ECHO Workshop in Beirut -Partner presentation - model 

A study of the opportunities in labour markets for IDPs and Refugees in 
KRI  Construction Labour and Service‐sector Labour Market Systems  

Construction and Service‐sector Labour Market Systems: 
A study of the opportunities in employment for Iraqi IDPs and Syrian Ref
ugees 
The Dead Sea Resilience Agenda 
Ten Observations on the Challenges of Humanitarian Work in Urban 
Settings 
Note to the attention of Jean-louis de Brouwer 

# 
131 

132 

133 

134 

135 
136 
137 

138 
139 
140 
141 

142 

143 

144 
145 

146 

147 

148 

149 

150 

151 

152 
153 

154 

155 

156 

157 

158 

Year 
2015 
2015 

2015 

2015 

2015 
2015 
2015 

2015 
2015 
2015 
2015 

2015 

2015 

2015 
2015 
2015 

2015 
2015 

2015 
2014 

2014 

2013 
2014 

2014 

2014 

2015 
2011 

Author 
 DG ECHO 
DG ECHO 

DG ECHO 

DG ECHO 
7
2 
 DG ECHO  
 DG ECHO 
DG ECHO 
7
5 
 DG ECHO 
 DG ECHO  
 DG ECHO 
DG ECHO 
7
3 
DG ECHO 
7
0 
DG ECHO 
7
1 
 DG ECHO 
 DG ECHO 
DG ECHO 

 DG ECHO 
DG ECHO 

 DG ECHO 
DG ECHO 
Amman 
DG ECHO 
Amman 
 DRC 
DRC 
7
6 
DRC, UNDP, 
UNHCR, From the 
People of Japan 
DRC, UNDP, 
UNHCR, From the 
People of Japan 
 DSRA 
Elizabeth Ferris 

European 
Commission  

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex IV / Page 346 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
ADE 

Title 
Commission Implementing Decision of 30.3.2012 amending Commission 
implementing decision C(2012)740 of 3 February 2012 on the financing 
of emergency humanitarian actions in the Middle East from the General 
Budget of the EU 
Joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council, 
Elements for an EU regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the 
Da’esh threat 
Council conclusions on the EU Regional Strategy for Syria and Iraq as 
well as the ISIL/Da’esh threat 
Outline of the counter-terrorism strategy for Syria and Iraq, with 
particular focus on foreign fighters 
Breaking the hourglass: Partnerships in remote management settings, the 
cases of Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan, Briefing Paper n°1 

Issue 48 
Inter‐agency real‐time evaluation in Haiti: 3 months after the earthquake 

A review of evidence of humanitarian cash transfer programming in 
urban areas 
Evaluation of the Norwegian Refugee Council’s Lebanon Host 
Community Shelter Programmes: “Increasing the availability of host 
community housing stock and improving living conditions for the 
provision of refugee shelter” 
UDOC Urban Displacement 
& Outside of Camp Desk Review 
Rapport sur les droits des femmes au Kurdistan (Irak –Rojava Syrie) 

2015 

Aid inside Syria: A step in the right direction? Field Report 

2013 
2015 
1993 

2013 

Working in Syrian cities at war: humanitarian aid under constraints 
Issue Paper on Migration and Refugees in Urban Areas 
De la géopolitique à l'humanitaire : le cas du Kurdistan d'Irak, Cultures et 
conflits N°11 
Letter from ECHO partners to DG ECHO 

2014 

ECHO Workshop in Beirut - HELP – Help for SelfHelp e.V. Syria 

2015 

Breaking the hourglass: Partnerships in remote management settings, the 
cases of Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan 

# 

159 

160 

161 

162 

163 

164 

165 

166 

167 

168 

169 

170 

171 
172 

173 

174 

175 

176 

Author 
European 
Commission 

European 
Commission 

Year 
2012 

2015 

European Union 

2015 

European Union 

2015 

2015 

2015 
2010 

2015 

2015 

2014 

2015 

Feinstein 
International 
Center  
 Field Exchange 
François 
Grünewald 
(Groupe URD), 
Andrea Binder 
(GPPi) 
Gabrielle Smith, 
Lili Mohiddin - iied 
Garcia O. 

7
Global CCCM 
Cluster 
7 
Global network for 
rights and 
development 
Grisgraber D. , 
Reynolds S. 
 Grünewald F. 
 HABITAT III 
Hamit Bozarslan 

Handicap 
International, 
Médecins du 
7
Monde, Merlin, 
8 
People in Need, 
Solidarités 
International 
HELP 
7
9 
Howe, K., Stites, 
E., Chudacoff, D. 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex IV / Page 347 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
ADE 

# 

177 

178 

179 

180 

181 

182 

183 

184 

185 

186 

187 

188 

189 

190 

191 

192 

193 

194 

195 

196 

197 

Author 
Hugo Slim, 
Lorenzo 
Trombetta 
Human Rights 
Watch - HRW 
Humanitarian 
Country Team 
Humanitarian 
Country Team 
ICRC 

ICRC  
7 

Inter-Agency 
Coordination 
Inter-Agency 
8
Coordination 
0 
Lebanon 
Inter-agency 
Standing 
Committee  
Internal 
Displacement 
Monitoring Centre, 
NRC 
International Crisis 
Group 
International Crisis 
Group 
International Crisis 
Group 
International Crisis 
Group 
International 
Labour 
Organization - ILO 
IRC 

IRC 

IRC 

J. Lamb 

John Cosgrave, 
8
Ben Ramalingam, 
1 
Tony Beck 
 Karen Jacobsen, 

Year 
2014 

Title 
Syria Crisis Common Context Analysis 

2015 

Jordan: Syrians Blocked, Stranded in Desert 

2014 

2015 Strategic Response Plan – Syrian Arab Republic 

2015 

The Humanitarian Country Team Strategy for Protection Syria 

2013 

2015 

2014 

Professional standard for Protection Work carried out by humanitarian 
and human rights actors in armed conflict and other situations of violence 
Urban Services during proacted armed conflict; A call for a better 
approach to assisting affected people.  
Lebanon: Inter-Agency support plan 

2014 

Lebanon: Inter-Agency Winter Support Plan 

2015 

IASC Second Action Plan for Meeting Humanitarian Challenges in Urban 
Areas 2015-2017 

2014 

Syria: No safe haven – a country on the move, a nation on the brink 

2012 

Syria’s Mutating Conflict 

2013 

Syria’s metastasizing conflicts, Middle East Report n°143 

2014 

2015 

2015 

2014 

2015 

2015 

2015 

2009 

Rigged cars and barrel bombs: Aleppo and the State of the Syrian war, 
Middle East Report n°155 
Syria calling: Radicalization in Central Asia, Policy Brief Europe and 
Central Asia briefing n°72 
Access to work for Syrian refugees in Jordan: 
A discussion paper on labour and refugee laws and policies 

An Impact Evaluation of the 2013-2014 Winter Cash Assistance 
Program for Syrian Refugees in Lebanon 
Humanitarian Action in a New Urban World - World Humanitarian 
Summit: Regional Consultation, Europe and Others 
Brief: Urban Response Practitioner Workshop Meeting Needs in a 
Context of Protracted Urban Displacement in the Middle East and North 
Africa 
Working with markets and the local Government whilst responding to the 
WaSH needs of the Syrian Crisis 
Real-time evaluations of humanitarian action 
An ALNAP Guide - Pilot Version 

2014 

Guidance for Profiling urban displacement situations challenges and 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex IV / Page 348 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
ADE 

Year 

2013 
2014 

2013 
2014 

Title 
solutions. Joint IDP profiling service. 

Syrian Humanitarian Crisis: The Fundamental Difficulties Facing Turkey 
Development of a framework for multipurpose cash assistance to 
improve aid effectiveness in Lebanon: Support to the market assessment 
and monitoring component 
Syrian humanitarian crisis: The fundamental difficulties facing Turkey 
Interview to Rachid Derbas, 11 July 2014 

2014 

ALNAP Urban Webinar on Mapping 

Soigner en Syrie et aux frontières : témoigner des souffrances 
Pathways To Resilience: Transforming Syrian Refugee Camps Into Self-
Sustaining Settlements 

Powerpoint presentation on Feasibility study for Resilience in Syrian 
Refugee Camps and their Neighbouring Host Community 

Urgence Syrie: 2 ans de conflit. L’aide humanitaire dans l’impasse 
A precarious existence: the shelter situation of refugees from Syria in 
neighboring countries 
Drivers of despair, refugee protection failures in Jordan and Lebanon 
Comprehensive regional strategic framework for the Syria crisis 
Two-month Joint Operational Plans for the Whole of Syria, Mid-
September 2014/Mid-November 2014 
2015 Syria Response Plan Summary December 2014 

Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) 
Turkey-Syria: Border Crossing Status, 24 April 2015 
MSNA-Syria Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment 

Effects of the Syrian refugees on Turkey, Orsam report n°195, January 
2015 
Failing Syria: Assessing the impact of UN Security Council resolutions in 
protecting and assisting civilians in Syria 
The Partnership with Local Authorities in Responding to Humanitarian 
Crisis: The case of Lebanon Lessons learned and recommendations. 
The Welfare of Syrian refuges. Evidence from Jordan and Lebanon.  

Addressing Vulnerability? Cash Transfer Programming and 
Protection Outcomes for Out-of-Camp Syrian Refugees 
An analysis of the Danish Refugee Council’s e-card programming 
in southern Turkey 

# 

Author 
Ivan Cardona 

198 

199 

200 
201 

202 

203 

204 

205 

206 

207 

208 
209 

210 

211 

212 
213 

214 

215 

216 

217 

218 

219 

 Kemal Kirisci 
Key Development 
Services 

 Kirisci K. 
L'Hebdo Magazine 
8
2 
Matthew Wencel -
REACH  
 MDM 
Middle-East 
Research Institute 
(MERI) 
Middle-East 
Research Institute 
(MERI) 
 MSF 
NRC 

 NRC 
 OCHA 
OCHA 

OCHA 

 OCHA 
 OCHA 
OCHA, REACH, 
SNAP 
ORSAM, TESEV 

2012 
2015 

2015 

2013 
2014 

2016 
2014 
2014 

2014 

2015 
2015 
2014 

2015 

OXFAM et al. 

2015 

OXFAM Italia 

2014 

Paolo Verme, 
Chiara Gigliarano, 
Christina Wieser, 
Kerren Hedlund, 
Marc Petzoldt, 
Marco Santacroce 
Paula Armstrong, 
Karen Jacobsen 

2016 

2015 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex IV / Page 349 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
ADE 

Title 
Evaluation of the DG DG ECHO’s Action in Response to the IRAQI 
Crisis (2007 – 2009) 
Evaluation and Review of the Use of Cash and Vouchers in Humanitarian 
Crises - Evaluation Report 
ECHO Workshop in Beirut -Partner presentation 

Powerpoint on Multi-Sector Needs Assessment of Syrian Refugees 
Residing in Camps and Host Communities: Final Review 
Multi-Sector Needs Assessment Of Syrian Refugees Residing In Camps, 
Kurdistan region of Iraq, Assessment Report 
Multi-Sector Needs Assessment Of Syrian Refugees Residing In Host 
Communities, Iraq Assessment Report  
Aid Inside Syria: A step in the right direction ? 

Emergency Market Mapping & Analysis: Rice, lentils and yeast market 
systems 
Humanitarian cash transfers: cost, value for money and economic impact 

Survivre au-delà de la Syrie: Quelles réalités pour les réfugiés de Syrie et 
les communautés hôtes au Liban ?, 
International and local/diaspora actors in the Syria response: a diverging 
set of systems? 
Jordan Response Plan for the Syrian Crisis 

UKAID in Jordan 
A resilience-based development response to the Syria crisis 
Stabilization & resilience in protracted, politically-induced emergencies: a 
case study exploration of Lebanon 
Surviving in the city 
Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, Egypt:  Countries hosting Syrian refugees 
- Solidarity and burden-sharing, Background papers for the High Level 
Segment 
Management response to the recommendations of “From slow boil to 
boiling point” – A real-time evaluation of UNHCR’s response to the 
Syrian refugee crisis 
The future of Syria: Refugee children in crisis 
Vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, 2013 Report 
2014 Syria Regional Response Plan - Mid-year update 
Syrian Refugee Health Access Survey in Jordan 
UN-Habitat, Housing, Land and Property issues in Lebanon. Implications 
of the Syrian refugee crisis, August 2014 
UNHCR Policy on Alternatives to camps 

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232 
233 

234 

235 

236 

237 

238 
239 
240 
241 

242 

243 

Author 
PROLOG 

PROLOG Consult 
8
3 
PU-AMI 
8
4 
REACH 

Year 
2009 

2008 

2014 

2015 

REACH, UNHCR 

2015 

REACH, UNHCR 

2015 

Refugee 
International  
Saint E. 

Sarah Bailey, 
Sophie Pongracz - 
odi 
Secours Islamique 
France 
Svoboda E., 
Pantuliano S. 
The Haschemite 
Kingdom of 
Jordan – Ministry 
of Planning and 
International 
Cooperation 
 UKAID 
 UNDP 
UNDP, MERCY 
CORPS 
 UNHCR 
UNHCR 

2015 

2014 

2015 

2014 

2015 

2015 

2015 
2014 
2014 

2009 
2013 

UNHCR 

2013 

 UNHCR 
 UNHCR 
 UNHCR 
 UNHCR 
UNHCR 

 UNHCR 

2013 
2013 
2014 
2014 
2014 

2014 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex IV / Page 350 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
ADE 

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253 

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256 

257 
258 

259 

260 

261 

262 
263 

264 

265 

266 

267 

268 

269 

270 
271 

272 

Author 
 UNHCR 
 UNHCR 
 UNHCR 
 UNHCR 
UNHCR 

UNHCR 

UNHCR 

 UNHCR 
UNHCR 

 UNHCR 
UNHCR 

Year 
2015 
2015 
2015 
2015 
2015 

2015 

2015 

2015 
2015 

2015 
2015 

 UNHCR 
UNHCR, REACH 

2015 
2013 

 UNHCR, UNDP  
 UNHCR, WHO 
UNICEF 

2015 
2014 
2014 

 UNICEF, UNHCR  2015 
2012 
United Nations 

 United Nations 
 United Nations 
United Nations 

2012 
2013 
2013 

United Nations 

2013 

 United Nations 
United Nations 

2014 
2014 

United Nations 

2014 

United Nations 

2014 

 United Nations 
 United Nations 
United Nations 

2014 
2014 
2014 

Title 
Iraq: Inter-agency operational update – Syrian refugees in Iraq 
Jordan: UNHCR operational update 
Jordan Vulnerability Assessment Frameowrk (VAF). Baseline survey 
Qab Elias snapshot 
Refugee response: UNHCR achievements at a glance January- March 
2015 
Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2015-2016 in response to the Syria 
crisis – Turkey 
Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2015-2016 in response to the Syria 
crisis – Iraq 
Registered Syrians in Jordan, 2 May 2015 
Syria Regional Refugee Response, Inter-agency Information Sharing 
Portal, last updated 10 April 2015 
Syrian refugees –Iraq: Towards stabilization, 2014 end-year report N° 10 
Syrian refugees-Iraq: Humanitarian Inter-Agency Interventions, First 
quarterly report 2015 N°11, Regional Refugee Resilience Plan 2015-2016 
in response to the Syria crisis 
Zaatari Refugee camp, UNHCR factsheet 
Refugee influx into the Kurdistan region of Iraq, REACH situational 
report, 5 September 2013 
3RP Update – Issue 4 
Syrian Refugee Health Access Survey in Jordan 
Syria crisis: Monthly humanitarian situation report, 20 May – 12 June 
2014, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey and Egypt 
Child Protection. Syria Crisis Regional interagency workshop report. 
Syria IATF post-conflict pre-assessment paper, Foundations for Socio-
Economic Recovery 
Thematic paper on human rights 
2014 Syria Response Plan 6: Turkey 
2014 Syrian Arab Republic Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan 
(SHARP) 
2014 Syrian Arab Republic Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan 
(SHARP) 
2014 Syria Regional Response Plan 
Application des résolutions 2139 (2014) et 2165 (2014) du Conseil de 
Sécurité 
Nous acquitter de notre responsabilité  collective : assistance 
internationale et responsabilité de protéger – Rapport du Secrétaire 
général 
Rapport du Secrétaire général sur l’application des résolutions 2139 (2014) 
et 2165 (2014) du Conseil de Sécurité 
Resolution 2165, Security Council 
Resolution 2191, Security Council 
Host Community Support Platform, National Resilience Plan 2014-2016, 
Draft, January 2014 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex IV / Page 351 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE ECHO RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2012-2014 
ADE 

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276 
277 

278 

279 

280 

281 

282 
283 

284 

285 

286 

287 

Author 
 United Nations 
 United Nations 
 United Nations 
 United Nations 
 USAID 
Van Bruaene M., 
Deboutte D. 
Victoria  Metcalfe-
Hough, Marcus 
Manuel, Alastair 
McKechnie  
Waheed Lor-
Mehdiabadi, Lesley 
Adams 
WFP 

 WFP 
WFP-UNHCR 
8
6 
World Bank 

World Bank, 
Lebanon 
 World Vision 
World Vision 
Lebanon, WV 
UK 

Year 
2015 
2015 
2015 
2015 
2014 
2010 

2016 

2014 

2015 

2015 
2014 

2015 

2013 

2012 
2013 

Title 
UNCT-HQ meeting « Protection in Syria’s armed conflict » 
Humanitarian Coordination Architecture 
Political strategy on protection in Syria 
UN system-wide approach to protection in Syria & action points 
Syria – Complex Emergency, Fact sheet # 3 
Evaluation of the DG DG ECHO’s action in response to the Iraqi crisis 
(2007 – 2009) 
Enhancing aid architecture in the regional response to the Syria crisis 

Evaluation and review of the use of cash and vouchers in humanitarian 
crises: Part 1 – Evaluation report 

Impact of WFP reduced assistance to Syria refugees in Jordanian 
communities 
Syrian refugees in communities in Jordan: Impact of reduced assistance 
WFP-UNHCR Road Map 

The Kurdistan region of Iraq: assessing the economic and social impact of 
the Syrian conflict and ISIS 
Economic and Social Impact Assessment of the Syrian Conflict, 
September 2013 
Minimum Inter-Agency Standards for Protection Mainstreaming 
Under pressure: the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on host 
communities in Lebanon, July 2013 

Final Report  

June 2016 

Annex IV / Page 352 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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DOI:10.2795/59912