COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing a mixed fishery multi-annual plan for demersal stocks and their fisheries in the North Sea
Date: 2016-08-03
Institutions: Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, European Commission
Subjects: North Sea, authorised catch, catch by species, catch quota, conservation of fish stocks, deep-sea fishing, fishing controls, fishing rights, sea fish, sustainable development

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   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 3.8.2016  SWD(2016) 272 final   COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  IMPACT ASSESSMENT  Accompanying the document PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing a mixed fishery multi-annual plan for demersal stocks and their fisheries in the North Sea {COM(2016) 493 final} {SWD(2016) 267 final}  
 
 
This report commits only the Commission's services involved in its preparation and does not 
prejudge the final form of any decision to be taken by the Commission 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

1.

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 7 

2.

  PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES .. 8 

2.1.  Organisation and timing .................................................................................... 8 

2.2.  Consultation of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board ................................................ 8 

2.3.  Consultation and expertise .............................................................................. 10 

2.3.1.  Consultation with Stakeholders ......................................................... 10 

2.3.2.  Expert advice ..................................................................................... 11 

2.3.3.  Other relevant studies ........................................................................ 12 

2.3.4. 

Internal consultation .......................................................................... 13 

3.

  PROBLEM DEFINITION ........................................................................................ 13 

3.1.  Existing legislation and political context ........................................................ 14 

3.1.1.  Annual fishing opportunities regulation ............................................ 15 

3.1.2.  The "old" CFP Regulation (EC)2371/2002 and management plans 

derived from it ................................................................................... 15 

3.1.3.  The new Basic Regulation ................................................................. 15 

3.1.4.  Lisbon Treaty, inter-institutional conflict and its resolution ............. 17 

3.1.5.  Technical measures regulations ......................................................... 18 

3.2.  "Traditional" management of North Sea demersal fisheries: The problem of 

discarding ........................................................................................................ 19 

3.3.  Solutions  and  problems  stemming  from  current  North  Sea  Management 

Plans ................................................................................................................ 20 

3.4.  CFP-reform: solving problems, creating new challenges ............................... 22 

3.4.1.  Ending discarding and overfishing .................................................... 22 

3.4.2.  New challenge: "Choke" species and underfishing ........................... 23 

3.4.3.  New challenge: the costs of landing all catches ................................ 25 

3.5.  Mismatch between the current management plans and the Basic Regulation  25 

3.6.  Solutions foreseen in the CFP Basic Regulation ............................................. 26 

3.7.  Who is affected? .............................................................................................. 26 

3.8.  Summary ......................................................................................................... 29 

3.9.  Legal basis for the EU to act ........................................................................... 29 

4.

  OBJECTIVES ........................................................................................................... 29 

4.1.  General objectives ........................................................................................... 29 

4.2.  Specific objectives ........................................................................................... 30 

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5.

  POLICY OPTIONS................................................................................................... 31 

5.1.  Discarded options ............................................................................................ 31 

5.1.1.  No policy change at EU level ............................................................ 31 

5.1.2.  Amendment of the existing management plans ................................ 32 

5.2.  Potential policy options ................................................................................... 33 

5.2.1.  Use solely the Basic Regulation (including the landing obligation) . 33 

5.2.2.  A single mixed-fisheries plan for North Sea demersal fisheries ....... 34 

6.

  ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS ....................................................................................... 40 

6.1.  Option 1- Use the Basic Regulation (including the landing obligation) ......... 41 

6.1.1.  Environmental effects........................................................................ 42 

6.1.2.  Economic effects ............................................................................... 42 

6.1.3.  Social effects ..................................................................................... 43 

6.1.4.  Administrative costs .......................................................................... 44 

6.2.  Option 2- A single mixed-fisheries plan for North Sea demersal fisheries..... 44 

6.2.1.  Sub-option 2.1 - FMSY is achieved by the start of 2016 ..................... 45 

6.2.2.  Sub-option 2.2 - FMSY is achieved by 2020 at the latest .................... 47 

6.2.3.  Sub-option 2.3 - short (5 year) recovery period ................................ 49 

6.2.4.  Sub-option 2.4 - long (10 year) recovery period ............................... 50 

6.3.  Summary ......................................................................................................... 50 

7.

  COMPARING THE OPTIONS ................................................................................ 53 

7.1.  Assessment against the environmental, economic and social impacts ............ 53 

7.2.  Qualitative assessment against the general and specific objectives ................ 54 

7.3.  Effectiveness, Efficiency, Coherence and Acceptability ................................ 55 

7.4.  The preferred option ........................................................................................ 57 

8.

  MONITORING AND EVALUATION .................................................................... 57 

8.1.  Monitoring ....................................................................................................... 57 

8.2.  Ex-ante evaluation of delegated acts (regionalised measures) ........................ 58 

8.3.  Ex-post evaluation of the plan ......................................................................... 59 

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Glossary 

Biomass 

Blim 

BMSY 

Days at sea 

Demersal 

Discard plan 

Biomass refers to the size of the stock in units of weight. Often, 
biomass  refers  to  only  one  part  of  the  stock  (e.g.  spawning 
biomass,  recruited  biomass  or  vulnerable  biomass,  the  latter  two 
of which are essentially equivalent). 

A biological reference point. The stock size below which there is 
a  risk  of  reduced  reproduction  leading  to  a  reduction  in 
recruitment. 

A  biological  reference  point.  BMSY  is  the  average  biomass 
expected  if  the  stock  is  exploited  at  FMSY.  It  is  a  notional  value 
around  which  stock  size  fluctuates  when  F=  FMSY.  It  strongly 
depends  on  the  interactions  between  the  fish  stock  and  the 
environment it lives in, including biological interactions between 
different species. 

Allowed maximum time for fishing trips allocated to vessels per 
year, depending on their type of fishing gear. For the purpose of 
this impact assessment it means the same as 'fishing effort' which 
is the product of the capacity and the activity of a fishing vessel. 

Descriptive  of  a  fish  which  lives  at  or  near  the  bottom  of  the 
water column, e.g. cod or haddock. 

A  plan  laying  down  specifications  for  implementation  of  the 
landing obligation in a given geographical area for given fisheries 
or species. The proposal for the plan is prepared by the Member 
States  concerned  and  after  scientific  assessment  adopted  as 
Commission  delegated  act.  Discard  plans  can  only  contain 
elements  listed  in  Article  15(5)  of  Regulation  (EU)  1380/2013 
(the "Basic Regulation"). 

Discards 

Unwanted catches returned to the sea during fishing operations.  

Fishing mortality (F) 

The rate at which fish are removed from the stock due to fishing 
operations. 

FMSY 

Harvest control rule 

A biological reference point. It is the fishing mortality rate that, if 
applied  constantly,  would 
in  an  average  catch 
corresponding to the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) and an 
average biomass corresponding to BMSY. 

result 

A  set  of  rules  which  specify  what  the  TAC  for  a  given  stock 
should be in a given year based on information about the state of 
that stock and its fisheries. 

Landing obligation 

Discarding  is  the  practice  of  returning  unwanted  catches  to  the 
sea, either dead or alive,  

Maximum Sustainable Yield 
(MSY) 

In population ecology and economics, MSY is the largest average 
yield (catch) that can theoretically be taken from a species’ stock 
indefinite  period  under  constant  environmental 
over  an 
conditions. 

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Mixed fisheries 

Overexploitation 

Pelagic 

Precautionary approach to 
fisheries management 

Recruitment 

Regionalisation 

Fisheries  in  which  several  species  are  likely  to  be  caught  in  the 
same fishing operation. 

A  situation  where  catches  of  fish  observed  fishing  mortality  (or 
exploitation) rates exceed targets. 

In relation to fish, the term 'pelagic' refers to fish which live in the 
upper  layers  of  the  water  column,  e.g.  herring,  sprat  and 
mackerel.  

An approach to managing fisheries to ensure a high probability of 
avoiding undesirable outcomes. Typically this involves specifying 
a limit value of spawning stock biomass, then managing fisheries 
to  make  sure  the  stock  stays  above  this  level.  A  limit  reference 
point  may  also  be  specified  for  fishing  mortality,  in  which  case 
management will aim to keep fishing mortality below this level.  

The  number  of  new  fish  added  to  the  exploitable  portion  of  the 
stock  resulting  from  growth  of  juvenile  fish  into  adults,  or 
migration of smaller fish. 

The process by which the Member States with direct interest for 
fisheries of a given geographical region organize themselves with 
the aim to agree on common management measures. The agreed 
measures  as  joined  recommendation  are  submitted  to  the 
Commission  and  after  scientific  assessment  adopted  as 
Commission delegated acts.    

Spawning Stock Biomass 

The  weight  (usually  in  tonnes)  of  the  total  number  of  individual 
fish that is old enough to reproduce. This generally corresponds to 
the minimum landing size and so defines the 'fishable' population.  

Stock 

TAC 

The population of a given species that forms a reproductive  unit 
and spawns little if at all with other units. The “total stock” refers 
to both juveniles and adults while “spawning stock” refers to the 
adult population (see above).  

Total allowable catch; the maximum biomass of fish  that can be 
caught from a given stock in a given year. 

Technical measures 

Measure  establishing  conditions  for  the  use  and  structure  of 
fishing gear and restrictions on access to fishing areas. 

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List of acronyms 

AC 

CFP  

EWG 

FTE 

GVA 

IA 

ICES 

MAP 

MRAG 

MSFD 

MSY 

NGO 

NSAC 

SME 

STECF 

TFEU 

Advisory Council 

Common Fisheries Policy 

Expert Working Group 

Full-Time Equivalent 

Gross Value Added 

Impact Assessment 

International Council for the Exploration of the Sea 

Multi-annual Plan 

Marine Resources Assessment Group 

Marine Strategy Framework Directive 

Maximum Sustainable Yield 

Nongovernmental Organization 

North Sea Advisory Council 

Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise  

Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries 

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 

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Lead DG: DG MARE 

Other  departments  involved:  DG  ENV,  DG  GROW,  Legal  Services  and  the  Secretariat-
General 

Agenda planning/WP reference: 2011/MARE/063 

1. 

INTRODUCTION 

This impact assessment (IA) concerns the future framework for managing the demersal stocks 
and their fisheries in the North Sea in the context of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) – the 
"Basic Regulation" - that entered into force in 2014. The new CFP introduced an obligation to 
manage fisheries sustainably based on the principle of maximum sustainable yield (MSY). At 
the same time it introduced an obligation to land all catches that, for the North Sea, will have 
to  be  implemented  incrementally  between  2016  and  2019.  The  new  CFP  gives  particular 
emphasis to multi-annual plans as one of the main conservation measure for fish stocks.  

The  current  rules  governing  the  demersal  fisheries  in  the  North  Sea  have  been  heavily 
criticised as overly prescriptive, ineffective and inapplicable. Additionally, they are not being 
applied coherently by the Council and the EU Member States. In particular, this is the case for 
the scheme that currently limits the number of days fishermen can spend at sea. It has created 
significant  administrative  burden  and  caused  problems  for  the  catching  sector  of  the  North 
Sea fishing industry by forcing them to apply unsustainable practices like discarding fish for 
which they do not have quota.  

The IA presents the problems and challenges produced by the different generations of policy 
in  detail.  It  defines  the  objectives  with  regard  to  the  Basic  Regulation,  outlines  the  main 
policy alternatives and examines the options available to introduce the improvements required 
for  an  effective  and  smooth  implementation  of  the  new  CFP.  The  consultation  with 
stakeholders  demonstrated  almost  unanimous  preference  for  a  new,  flexible  multi-annual 
management  plan  that  would  apply  to  fish  stocks  fished  in  mixed  demersal  fisheries  in  the 
North Sea.   

This plan should be adaptive to the changing realities and conservation needs by facilitating 
the development of regionalised measures that are consistent with the objectives contained in 
EU law. Finally, it will provide an opportunity to simplify the current rules that have become 
overly  complex  and  difficult  to  enforce.  Simplification  will  contribute  to  reductions  in 
administrative burden in terms of lessening the number of regulations fishermen will have to 
comply  with  and  Member  States  will  have  to  enforce.  This  stems  from  the  commitments 
detailed  in  the  Commission's  Regulatory  Fitness  and  Performance  Program  (REFIT)1  for 
"Better  Regulation".  It  also  addresses  the  simplification  needs  outlined  in  an  earlier 
Commission Communication on the implementation of the CFP2. 

1   COM(2013) 685 final Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European  Social  and  Economic  Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions.  Regulatory  Fitness  and 
Performance (REFIT): Results and Next Steps. 

2   COM(2009) 261 final Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on 

the implementation of the Action Plan for simplifying and improving the Common Fisheries Policy.  

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2. 

PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES 

2.1. 

Organisation and timing 

New conservation measures need to be considered for the demersal fisheries in the North Sea 
that would implement the new CFP and replace the existing management plans for cod3 and 
for plaice and sole4. The two existing plans have been evaluated by technical experts between 
2011  and  2014,  with  the  main  conclusions  that  both  plans  need  substantial  revision. 
Consultation on a new approach to fisheries management in the North Sea has been ongoing 
since then. 

This  impact  assessment  concerns  the  management  framework  for  the  demersal  stocks  and 
their  fisheries  in  the  North  Sea.  The  initiative  was  planned  in  2011  (Agenda  Planning 
2011/MARE/063)  and  enshrined  in  the  2013  Annual  Management  Plan  of  the  Directorate-
General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries. The long delay in implementing the initiative is 
due to the negotiations on the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) that lasted from 
2011  until  the  end  of  2013.  The  regulation  defining  the  new  CFP  entered  into  force  on 
January  1,  20145.  Additionally,  within  that  time  frame,  there  were  inter-institutional 
discussions on the respective competences of the Council and the Parliament; their agreement 
was published in January 20146.  

The impact assessment report (IAR) was submitted to the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB) 
on June 8, 2015. The RSB met to consider the IAR on July 1, 2015. The RSB produced a set 
of  comments7  prior  to  the  meeting,  on  June  26,  2015,  and  their  opinion8  was  published  on 
July 6, 2015. 

2.2. 

Consultation of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board 

The  impact  assessment  report  (IAR)  was  revised  considerably  following  the  extensive 
comments  received  from  the  RSB.  A  broad  description  of  the  changes,  requested  in  the 
opinion  from  the  RSB  (Ares(2015)2821066  -  06/07/2015)  is  given  below;  the  detailed 
changes  required  in  both  the  opinion  and  in  the  impact  assessment  quality  checklist  were 
provided to the RSB separately. 

The  opinion  listed  four  main  recommendations  for  improvement  in  the  following  areas:  the 
policy  context;  the  provisions  of  the  multi-annual  plan;  the analysis  of  impacts;  compliance 
and monitoring. 

The policy context: the revised report merged the previous sections entitled "Policy Context" 
and "Problem Definition" into a new section entitled "Problem Definition". This section now 

3   Council Regulation (EC) 1342/2008 of 18 December 2008 establishing a long-term plan for cod stocks and 
the fisheries exploiting those stocks and repealing Regulation (EC) No 423/2004. (OJ L 348, 24.12.2008). 
4   Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  676/2007  of  11  June  2007  establishing  a  multi-annual  plan  for  fisheries 

exploiting stocks of plaice and sole in the North Sea (OJ L 157, 19.6.2007). 

5   Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on the 

Common Fisheries Policy. (OJ L 354, 28.12.2013). 

6   http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/pech/dv/taskfor/taskforce.pdf  
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8   RSB opinion – Ref.Ares(2015)2821066 - 06/07/2015. 

Impact Assessment Quality Checklist for Regulatory Scrutiny Board Opinion. 

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explains in much clearer terms the evolution of fisheries management policy over the last 15 
years  including  the  introduction  of  the  existing  management  plans,  the  rationale  of  the  new 
Basic Regulation and the challenges that the various regulations have raised. It explains what 
instruments the Basic Regulation offers to solve the problems identified. It also explains how 
the results of an Inter-Institutional Task-Force that resolved inter-institutional stalemate on the 
new generation of management plans can be used to address the identified problems. 

Additionally, the objectives section has been redrafted. All objectives are now clearly linked 
to problems identified in the "Problem Definition" section, to the CFP Basic Regulation or to 
the multi-annual plan. 

Provisions of the multi-annual plan: the policy options section has been redrafted. Options 
that  were  discarded  early  in  the  process  are  presented  separately.  This  section  also explains 
why the status quo option has been discarded. 

Among  the  retained  options,  the  option  of  a  single  mixed-fisheries  multi-annual  plan  is 
presented  in  more  detail,  describing  in  more  clarity  the  relationship  with  other  regional 
management  plans  and  how  the  instrument  of  Regionalisation  will  be  used  within  the  plan. 
More sub-options are discussed. The report identifies one group of sub-options for which the 
best option has to be chosen based on qualitative arguments. These qualitative arguments are 
discussed  in  detail.  A  second  group  of  sub-options  is  identified  for  which  the  choice  of  the 
best option has to be based on a quantitative analysis. 

Analysis  of  impacts:  the  report  presents  the  analysis  of  the  quantitative  sub-options  of  the 
multi-annual plan in a more evidence-based format, as requested in the opinion. The results 
are presented based on the robust, though limited, quantitative support analysis carried out by 
STECF9.  

Compliance and monitoring: the monitoring and evaluation section now describes potential 
compliance issues, how the CFP Control Regulation monitors compliance in general and how 
the  Data  Collection  Framework  and  ICES  advice  based  on  these  data  provide  the  tools  for 
constant monitoring. It explains how the new mixed-fisheries plan incentivises compliance. It 
also depicts how the different components of the initiative will be monitored and evaluated. 

Further  clarification  was  requested  by  the  board  (Ares(2015)4245599  –  12/10/2015) 
following  its  scrutiny  of  the  revised  IAR.  The  revised  opinion  listed  four  main 
recommendations  for  clarification  in  the  following  areas:  coherence  with  other  initiatives; 
assessment of impacts; comparison of options; compliance issues. 

In this third version of the IAR a broad description of the changes is given below: 

Coherence with other initiatives: an explanatory footnote has been added in Section 5.2.2 to 
explain  the  coherence  between  the  new  regional  multi-annual  plans  and  the  new  technical 
measures  framework;  a  paragraph  has  been  added  in  Section  5.2.2.1  to  further  explain  the 
coherence between the new regional multi-annual plans themselves. 

Assessment  of  impacts:  a  more  quantitative  and  detailed  breakdown  of  possible  impacts 
from an economic and social perspective has been given in Section 6.2 for the sub-options of 

9   Report on Evaluation of management plans: Evaluation of the multi-annual plan for the North Sea demersal 

stocks (STECF-15-04). 

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Option 2 – a potential single mixed-fisheries plan for North Sea demersal fisheries using one 
economic indicator (profitability) and one social indicator (number of vessels) and comparing 
the  outcomes  to  the  baseline  option  (use  solely  the  Basic  Regulation  (including  the  landing 
obligation)). The data have  been taken from the robust, though limited, quantitative support 
analysis carried out by STECF9.  

Comparison  of  options:  an  extra  paragraph  has  been  inserted  into  Section  7.1  on  the 
assessment against the environmental, economic and social impacts. This better explains how 
the  sub-options  of  Option  2  compare  in  terms  of  effectiveness,  efficiency  and  coherence. 
Extra  text  has  been  inserted  into  Section  7.3  on  "Effectiveness,  Efficiency,  Coherence  and 
Acceptability" where the impacts of the sub-options of Option 2 can be distinguished. 

Compliance issues: the text in Section 8.2 has been revised to better explain how compliance 
will be ensured and why the risk to uneven implementation is believed to be. 

Additionally,  there  was  a  request  to  more  clearly  define  technical  terms.  Some  of  the 
definitions  in  the  glossary  have  been  revised.  A  figure  has  been  added  in  Section  3.1  to 
explain  better  the  MSY  concept  and  in  Section  5.2.2  to  explain  better  the  precautionary 
reference points Blim and Bpa. 

2.3. 

Consultation and expertise 

In  preparing  this  Impact  Assessment,  consultation  has  taken  place  at  different  levels, 
including stakeholders, scientists, public (including public administrations) and Commission 
services. It has followed a full evaluation process, set-up so that the initial tasks and questions 
to be addressed have been specified by DG MARE but the key inputs at all steps have come 
from  scientists  and  other  experts,  and  from  stakeholders  who  have  been  fully  involved 
throughout the process. 

2.3.1.  Consultation with Stakeholders 

Stakeholders  have  been  consulted  in  a  targeted  manner  during  the  scoping  exercise  and 
through consultation with the North  Sea Advisory Council10 (one of several  stakeholder-led 
organisations  established  in  order  to  encourage  participation  by  the  fisheries  sector  in  the 
formulation and management of the CFP – see Section 3.1.3). Two scoping workshops have 
been held.  

The first workshop was held in Brussels on 27 February 201411. Participants included invited 
scientific  experts  and  representatives  of  North  Sea  Member  States  and  the  North  Sea  and 
pelagic  ACs.  This  workshop  enabled  discussion  to  be  initiated  on  the  development  and 
implementation of a mixed-fisheries multi-annual plan for the North Sea. Mixed fisheries are 
fisheries in which several species are likely to be caught in the same fishing operation (i.e., 
using the same vessel and gear). 

10   http://www.nsrac.org 
11   Scoping  workshop  on  mixed  fisheries  management  for  the  North  Sea,  Brussels,  27.02.2014.  Overview. 

Ref.Ares (2015) 2301118-02/06/2015. 

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A  second  scoping  workshop  subsequently  took  place  in  Brussels  from  29  to  30  September 
201412. Participants included invited scientific experts, representatives of North Sea Member 
States  and  the  North  Sea  AC  (NSAC).  Its  main  objectives  were  to  reach  a  shared 
understanding  of  the  new  legal  and  political  framework  for  multi-annual  plans,  to  discuss  a 
draft  outline  of  how  the  future  MAP  for  the  North  Sea  could  look  and,  through  break-out 
groups,  to  take  forward  collective  thinking  on  the  possible  "building  blocks"  of  the  future 
plan.  

Additionally  there  were  discussions  with  the  NSAC,  through  its  Mixed  Fisheries  Focus 
Group, at meetings in October 2015 in Amsterdam and in March 2015 in Copenhagen10. 

A wide ranging, internet-based, public consultation was carried out from 9 February to 4 May 
201513. A total of 25 detailed contributions were received from Member States, the Advisory 
Councils (ACs), industry representative organisations, NGOs, and the general public13. Annex 
I  contains  a  summary  of  the  findings  from  the  public  consultation.  The  main  conclusions, 
which will also be reflected in the relevant parts of the report, were as follows: 

  current  management  plans  are  too  prescriptive  and  too  complex.  They  need  to  be 
replaced with legislation that is based on strategic objectives and general principles  

  any new management plans should take into account mixed-fisheries interactions 

 

the landing obligation presents a major challenge, not only to the fishing industry but 
also the Member States in the allocation of quotas to the fleets  

  detailed  rules  should  be  managed  at  a  regional  level,  but  there  has  to  be  coherence 

with management plans for neighbouring areas 

  many contributors agree on cod, haddock, saithe, whiting, sole, plaice and  Nephrops 
as  the  main  target  species.  There  are  varying  points  of  view  on  the  inclusion  of 
additional target species and on the level of protection of other species. In general, the 
Member  States  and  the  fishing  industry  favour  a  focus  on  the  main  target  species, 
whereas  the  NGOs  want  specific  objectives  for  each  of  the  harvested  species  in  the 
North Sea 

  Technical Measures introduced on the basis of the management plan should be agreed 

on at a regional level 

2.3.2.  Expert advice 

Most of the work and consultation necessary to cover all of these aspects of the work has been 
carried  out  by  scientists  working  through  the  auspices  of  the  Scientific,  Technical  and 
Economic  Committee  on  Fisheries  (STECF)14  and  The  International  Council  for  the 
Exploration  of  the  Sea  (ICES)15  as  well  as  by  the  Marine  Resources  Assessment  Group 
(MRAG) under a framework contract with the Commission. 

12   2nd  Scoping  workshop:  mixed  fisheries  management  for  North  Sea  demersal  stocks.  Overview  of  the 

discussions. Ref.Ares (2015) 2300556-02/06/2015. 

13   http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/maritimeaffairs_fisheries/consultations/north-sea-multiannual/index_en.htm 
14   Commission Decision of 26 August 2005 establishing a Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for 

Fisheries (2005/629/EC).  

15   http://www.ices.dk/explore-us/what-we-do/Pages/default.aspx 

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These bodies had conducted a number of evaluations of the current management plan for cod 
stocks3 (hereafter referred to as "the cod plan") and the management plan for North Sea sole 
and plaice4 (hereafter called "the flatfish plan") prior to the reform of the CFP. In the case of 
the flatfish plan, an impact assessment of options from the first "recovery stage" to the second 
"management stage" of the plan was carried out by the MRAG16 in 2009, as such a revision is 
foreseen in the plan itself once both stocks are observed to be within safe biological limits for 
two  consecutive  years.  An  STECF  expert  group  that  met  in  Vigo  in  October  201017  also  
evaluated the flatfish plan.  

Two  meetings  took  place  in  2011  to  perform  a  retrospective  review  of  a  number  of 
management  plans,  including  the  cod  plan3:  these  were  a  combined  STECF/ICES  expert 
group in Copenhagen in February/March 201118 and a follow-up meeting in Hamburg in June 
201119.  Both  meetings  were  open  to  participants  from  NSAC  and  Member  State 
administrations.  Among  the  conclusions  of  these  analyses  were  that  the  cod  plan3  would 
benefit from linking to plans for Nephrops and haddock, whiting, saithe, sole and plaice in the 
North Sea and that the plan had not controlled fishing mortality as had been envisaged.   

The  Commission  Services  took  no  action  to  revise  either  plan  at  that  time  due  to  an  inter-
institutional  dispute  over  management  competencies.  Once  an  Inter-Institutional  Task  Force 
to resolve the dispute had presented its conclusions6, and following the adoption of the new 
CFP, work on the evaluations could take into account the new political context (see Sections 
3.1.3 and 3.1.4). 

In  2014,  an  STECF  expert  group  met  in  Varese,  Italy,  from  10  to  14  March,  to  prepare  a 
retrospective evaluation of the flatfish plan4. The evaluation was reviewed by STECF at their 
plenary meeting in Brussels later in March 201420. The first scoping meeting to discuss and 
hone the STECF EWG evaluation of the North Sea multi-annual plan options took place from 
6  to  8  December  2014  in  Varese,  Italy.  The  work  planned  by  that  group  was  subsequently 
carried out by a full panel of experts in the STECF EWG 15-02 in Varese, Italy from 16 to 20 
March 2015. The report9 was reviewed and presented to STECF at their plenary meeting from 
13-17 April 201521. 

2.3.3.  Other relevant studies 

This impact assessment for a North Sea multi-annual plan is taking place in the context of the 
new CFP and the redrafting of the technical measures regulations (see Section 3.1). The new 
CFP includes, inter alia, a new landing obligation, a timeline to reach maximum sustainable 

16   Economic and social impacts of multi-annual management plans for North Sea plaice and sole, Final Report 

Fish/2006/09. 

17   Report  of  the  Sub  Group  on  Management  Objectives  and  Strategies  (SGMOS  10-06).  Part  b)  Impact 

assessment of North Sea plaice and sole multi-annual plan. 

18   Report  on  Scoping  for  Impact  Assessments  for  Baltic  cod  and  Evaluation  of  Cod  in  Kattegat,  North  Sea, 

West of Scotland and Irish Sea (STECF-11-02). 

19   Evaluation of multi-annual plans for cod in Irish Sea, Kattegat, North Sea, and West of Scotland (STECF-

11-07). 

20   Report  on  Evaluation/scoping  of  management  plans:  Evaluation  of  the  multi-annual  management  plan  for 

the North Sea stocks of plaice and sole (STECF-14-03). 

21   Scientific,  Technical  And  Economic  Committee  For  Fisheries  –  48th  Plenary  Meeting  Report  (PLEN-15-

01). 

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yield (MSY) and Regionalisation. Against this background, a number of reports, studies and 
contracts have provided background on these issues. These include: 

 

the reform of the CFP22 
impacts of the introduction of the landing obligation23 24  

 
  socio-economic dimensions of the CFP25 26  

the development of a new technical measures regulation27 

 
  mixed-fisheries issues in the EU28, including dealing with choke effects29 
  considerations on management areas for the new multi-annual plans30 
  considerations of managing using MSY31 

2.3.4. 

Internal consultation 

An Impact Assessment Steering Group (IASG) was established in November 2014, which, in 
addition  to  DG  MARE,  comprised  representatives  from  four  other  Directorates-Generals 
(DG)  and  services  –  Secretariat  General  (SG);  Legal  Services  (SJ),  DG  Environment  (DG 
ENV)  and  DG  Internal  Market,  Industry,  Entrepreneurship  and  SMEs  (DG  GROW).  The 
IASG met on 3 occasions in 2015 – 23 January, 15 April, 8 May – and worked to finalise a 
draft of the IA by written consultation following its last meeting. 

3. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION 

The main objectives of the EU's Common Fisheries Policy are the sustainable management of 
fisheries  resources  by  maintaining  healthy  fish  stocks  and  providing  the  conditions  for  an 
economically  viable  and  competitive  fishing  industry.  Demersal  fisheries  in  the  North  Sea 
have  been  governed  by  common  rules  since  the  1970s  because  the  coastal  Member  States 

 http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/reform/impact_assessments_en.htm  

22  
23   45th Plenary Meeting Report of the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (PLEN-14-

01).  

24   http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/540360/IPOL_STU(2015)540360_EN.pdf 
25   http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/documentation/studies/socio_economic_dimension/index_en.htm 
26   http://www.socioec.eu/images/SOCIOEC/Media_Centre/Deliverables/SOCIOEC%20Deliverable%206%20 

8%20Management%20Measures%20North%20Sea%2026%2003%202012.pdf 

27   MRAG  et  al.  (2014).  A  study  in  support  of  the  development  of  a  new  Technical  conservation  measures 
framework within a reformed CFP. Lot 2: retrospective and prospective evaluation on the Common fisheries 
policy, excluding its international Dimension. Brussels. 265pp. 

28  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2014/529053/IPOL-

PECH_ET(2014)529053_EN.pdf 

29   http://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/documents/43805/830996/2014-11_STECF+14-19+-+Landing+Obligations+-

+part+4_JRC93045.pdf 

30   http://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/documents/43805/364146/2012-07_STECF+12-14+-+Management+plans+II+-

+area+definitions_JRC73150.pdf 

31   http://www.myfishproject.eu/project-myfish/deliverables  

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understood  the  need  for  a  common  regulatory  framework.  Prior  to  the  introduction  of  a 
common policy32, several demersal stocks were overfished33.  

Overfishing  occurs  in  an  unmanaged  fishery as  every  fisherman  tries  to  maximise  his  catch 
without  paying  attention  to  the  long-term  consequences  for  the  state  of  fish  stocks.  An 
individual fisherman simply does not have an incentive to catch less than he can. In the end, 
when  stocks  decline,  the  outcome  is  unsatisfactory  for  all  fishermen.  This  situation  is  often 
referred  to  as  "the  tragedy  of  the  commons".  Additionally,  without  regulation,  there  is  no 
incentive  for  fishermen  to  avoid  the  young  fish  which  have  not  yet  had  the  chance  to 
reproduce; this further deteriorates the state of the fish stock in question34.  

This section will show that, while regulation is needed to prevent overfishing and discarding, 
the current rules are outdated and too complex and, therefore, need to be updated. 

Figure 3.1.1. Driver and problems in an unregulated fishery. 

Section 3.1 briefly describes existing relevant legislation and the political context. Section 3.2 
describes  how traditional fisheries management in the North Sea tried to reduce overfishing 
and  how  this  approach  caused  new  problems  by  increasing  discarding.  Sections  3.3  to  3.6 
describe  how  additional  past  (management  plans)  and  recent  (CFP  reform)  regulation  has 
more or less successfully addressed problems identified in the preceding sections while at the 
same  time  creating  new  challenges.  Section  3.7  describes  who  is  affected  by  this  initiative. 
Section  3.8  summarises  why  this  initiative  is  needed  while  Section  3.9  discusses  the  legal 
basis for EU action. 

3.1. 

Existing legislation and political context 

The following section describes the most important EU legal frameworks regulating demersal 
fisheries of the North Sea in order to show the context for this initiative. 

32

   Regulation (EEC) No 2141/70 of the Council of 20 October 1970 laying down a common structural policy 

for the fishing industry (OJ L 236, 27.10.1970).  

33   See,  for  example,  Thurstan,  R.H.,  Brockington,  S.  &  C.M.  Roberts.  2010.  The  effects  of  118  years  of 
fisheries.  Nature  Communication,  1,  no.  15. 

fishing  on  UK  bottom 

trawl 

industrial 
doi:10.1038/ncomms1013  

34   See,  for  example,  Grafton,  R.Q.,  Kirkley,  J.,  Kompass,  T.  &  D.  Squires.  2006.  Economics  for  Fisheries 

Management. Ashgate Studies in Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, 176 pp. 

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3.1.1.  Annual fishing opportunities regulation 

Every  year,  in  its  annual  fishing  opportunities  regulation,  the  EU  establishes  the  amount  of 
fish  that  European  fishermen  are  allowed  to  exploit  from  each  fish  stock.  This  amount  is 
referred  to  as  the  total  allowable  catch  (TAC).  This  regulation  is  not  adopted  under  the 
ordinary legislative framework but solely by Council, upon proposal by the Commission. This 
deviation  from  the  ordinary  procedure  is  fixed  in  Article  43(3)  of  the  Treaty  on  the 
functioning  of  the  European  Union  (TFEU)35.  The  Commission  bases  its  proposals  for  the 
annual fishing opportunity regulations on annual scientific advice provided by ICES15. 

3.1.2.  The "old" CFP Regulation (EC)2371/2002 and management plans derived from it 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  2371/200236,  the  pre-reform  Basic  Regulation,  constituted  a 
horizontal regulation containing the most important rules on fisheries management in the EU.  

The Regulation foresaw the use of management plans of which the basic description of role 
and content could be found in its Articles 5 and 6. The ethos of these plans was to address the 
problem that, prior to 2002, there were no constraints to Council's decision to setting TACs. 
Hence, TACs were often set at too high levels and the size of many fish stocks subsequently 
declined.  These  plans  limited  the  freedom  of  Council  when  deciding  on  annual  fishing 
opportunities;  they  gave  binding  guidance  when  translating  scientific  advice  into  tangible 
annual TACs37. 

In  the  North  Sea  there  are  currently  two  management  plans,  introduced  in  2007  and  2008 
respectively: the flatfish plan4, for plaice and sole, and the cod plan3 were both adopted in the 
form of Council Regulations (Council Regulation (EC) No 676/2007 and Council Regulation 
(EC)  1342/2008  respectively).  It  is  important  to  note  that  although  Regulation  (EC) 
2371/200236 is no longer in force, the management plans derived from it still are. 

3.1.3.  The new Basic Regulation  

In  2013  a  new  Basic  Regulation  of  the  Common  Fisheries  Policy5  was  adopted  as  the 
cornerstone of a broad reform of the policy, replacing Regulation (EC) 2371/200236. Its main 
elements  are  listed  in  Annex  II.  The  new  Basic  Regulation  obliges  the  EU  to  manage  its 
fisheries  sustainably,  based  on  the  principle  of  Maximum  Sustainable  Yield  (MSY).  The 
MSY is the catch of a fish stock that optimises the yield from that stock in the long term.   

As another important measure, the Basic Regulation bans the discarding of fish (see Section 
3.4.1).  The  Basic  Regulation  also  foresees  the  use  of  management  plans,  now  called  multi-
annual plans. These multi-annual plans are supposed to implement the Basic Regulation and 
to  enable  its  objectives,  especially  with  regards  to  sustainable  MSY-based  fisheries 
management. In some narrowly defined cases, multi-annual plans are allowed to deviate from 
the provisions of the Basic Regulation (see Section 3.6). The current management plans like 
the cod3 and the flatfish4 plans do not fit into this structure as they were adopted prior to the 

35   Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 

Union.  

36   Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  2371/2002  of  20  December  2002  on  the  conservation  and  sustainable 

exploitation of fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries Policy (OJ L 358 , 31.12.2002). 

37   Green Paper on the future of the common fisheries policy (COM/2001/0135 final). 

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latest CFP reform. In  many aspects they are contradictory to the new Basic Regulation (see 
Section 3.5). 

Another  important  innovation  introduced  by  the  new  Basic  Regulation  is  the  so-called 
"Regionalisation".  Regionalisation  is  the  reform's  reply  to  the  common  and  long-lasting 
accusation of micro-management i.e. that in the CFP too many detailed decisions are taken in 
"Brussels", far away from the stakeholders concerned.  

The Basic Regulation lays down the concept of Regionalisation in Article 18 as a blueprint to 
be  used  in  future  CFP  legislation.  The  concept  is  supposed  to  be  used  for  detailed,  rather 
technical,  provisions  to  achieve  the  objectives  of  a  regulation.  It  foresees  that  fisheries 
regulations,  where  appropriate,  include  an  empowerment  to  the  Commission  to  adopt  these 
rather  technical  provisions  in  a  Delegated  Act.  The  difference  to  the  ordinary  case  of 
Delegated Acts is that the Commission invites the Member States that are affected by these 
provisions to collaborate to formulate Joint Recommendations on the measures to take. There 
is  a  strong  political  commitment  from  the  Commission  to  include  measures  into  these 
Delegated Acts that are only agreed unanimously by the concerned Member States38.  

The aim of Regionalisation is to increase the involvement of the Member States affected by 
regulation and thus to increase their identification with the measures. The Commission's role 
is  to  ensure  that  the  adopted  measures  are  suitable  to  fulfil  the  objectives  of  the  basic  act. 
Regionalisation  thus  constitutes  an  important  shift  from  instrument-based  to  results-based 
management. Regionalisation also gives a stronger voice to Advisory Councils (ACs) which 
have  to  be  consulted  when  formulating  Joint  Recommendations  (Art.  18(2)  of  the  Basic 
Regulation). ACs are stakeholder organisations39, established by the previous CFP reform in 
2002,  that  bring  together  the  industry  (fishing,  processing  and  marketing  sectors)  and  other 
interest  groups,  such  as  environmental  and  consumers'  organisations.  ACs  are  separated  by 
Sea Basins. Annex III  of the Basic Regulation  foresees an AC for the North  Sea area  – the 
North Sea Advisory Council (NSAC) - and delineates its exact area coverage to ICES Subarea 
IV and Division IIIa40.  

In  practice,  Regionalisation  in  the  North  Sea  area  will  be  delivered  by  the  Scheveningen 
group which is a group of Member States cooperating on fisheries policy, established in 2013. 
Members are Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, the UK and France. So 
far, the Commission has  received two Joint Recommendations  from the  group: one  in  2014 

38   If  Member  States  are  not  able  to  agree  on  measures  but  the  Commission  deems  certain  measures  as 
necessary, the Commission can obviously still propose regulation through the ordinary legislative procedure. 
Legally  speaking,  the  empowerment  to  adopt  Delegated  Acts  also  applies  when  there  is  no  regulation. 
However, there is strong political commitment from the Commission not to adopt a Delegated Act in such a 
situation, unless the basic act foresees otherwise. This is the case for the Basic Regulation (which not only 
describes regionalisation as a blueprint for future fisheries legislation but also applies it for the first time) 
with  regards  to  exemptions  from  the  landing  obligation  (see  Section  3.6).  Article  15(6)  contains  an 
empowerment to the Commission to adopt a Delegated Act based on a Joint Recommendation from Member 
States concerned while as a sort of fall back option, Article 15(7) contains a more limited empowerment to 
adopt a Delegated Act in the absence of a Joint Recommendation. 

39   http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/documentation/publications/cfp_factsheets/racs_en.pdf 

40   The  NE  Atlantic  (amongst  other  sea  areas)  is  divided  into  statistical  rectangles.  Various  combinations  of 
these  rectangles  are  combined  by  ICES  to  give  different  areas,  sub-areas,  divisions  and  sub-divisions. 
Various combinations of these ICES "zones" are used to define fish stocks in the ICES area. 

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for  the  pelagic  discard  plan  and  recently  another  one  for  the  demersal  discard  plan.  The 
Commission  has  submitted  the  recommendations  to  STECF  in  order  to  assess  their 
compatibility with the CFP. After a positive assessment is received, Commission proceeds to 
adoption of a delegated act that contains the elements proposed by the Joint Recommendation. 

The regionalisation procedure in the North Sea and the cooperation between members of the 
Scheveningen  group  and  the  Commission  has  already  proven  effective  when  adopting  the 
discard plan for small pelagic and industrial fisheries in the North Sea in 2014.   

3.1.4.  Lisbon Treaty, inter-institutional conflict and its resolution 

Prior to the changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon (the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European  Union  or  TFEU35),  fisheries  legislation  was  adopted  by  the  Council  based  on 
Commission  proposals.  Since  the  Lisbon  Treaty,  fisheries  legislation  is  now  subject  to  the 
ordinary  legislative  procedure  with  the  derogation  with  regards  to  "measures  on  […]  the 
allocation  of  fishing  opportunities"  (Article  43(3)  of  the  TFEU35),  i.e.  the  setting  of  annual 
TACs, remaining under control of the Council (see Section 3.1.1). The entry into force of the 
Lisbon  Treaty  led  to  a  dispute  between  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  on  the 
subject  of  multi-annual  plans,  as  on  the  one  hand  they  affect  the  setting  of  annual  TACs,  a 
Council competence, and on the other hand they go beyond the annual TAC setting exercise 
by taking a multi-annual policy perspective, suggesting that the Parliament should play a role.  

An  Inter-institutional  Task  Force  comprising  the  three  main  EU  Institutions  (Commission, 
Council  and  Parliament)  was  therefore  convened,  in  September  2013,  to  solve  the  delicate 
inter-institutional controversy that emerged on the sharing of competences. In its final report, 
issued in April 20146, the Task Force suggested, as a solution to the stalemate, a framework 
where multi-annual plans would be adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure while a 
certain margin for discretion would be kept for Council's annual TAC decisions. The solution 
would be to use  ranges, rather than point values, of FMSY  when defining the amount  of fish 
that is allowed to be caught through fishing every year in a multi-annual plan. Council would 
then, for the species covered by a plan, have to fix TACs within the ranges provided for in the 
plan.  ICES  provided  ranges  that  give  a  long-term  yield  from  the  stock  that  is  at  least  95 
percent of the yield if the FMSY point-value was being used (see 41 and Figure 3.1). 

Beyond the resolution of the inter-institutional conflict, the Task-Force also agreed to include 
biomass  safeguards  into  the  plans.  These  biomass  safeguards  are  thresholds  that  trigger 
remedial action if the biomass of a stock falls below a certain limit. The rationale for this is 
that exploiting a stock based on FMSY is the sustainable choice in most cases but it can put a 
stock at risk if the stock's biomass is very low. In such a situation it  is advisable to adopt a 
TAC  based  on  a  lower  exploitation  rate  or  to  take  other  measures  that  reduce  the  fishing 
mortality for this stock. Article 2(2) of the Basic Regulation requires fishing at FMSY or below 
and  adherence  to  the  precautionary  principle.  Biomass  safeguards  can  be  regarded  as  a 
concrete manifestation of the precautionary approach to fisheries. 

41   In fisheries science, the rate at which fish are removed from a stock due to fishing operations (including fish 
subsequently discarded) is denoted F. It is approximately the stock annual removal expressed as a proportion 
of  the  total  stock.  FMSY  is the  fishing  mortality  rate that,  if  applied constantly,  would result in  an  average 
catch  corresponding  to  the  Maximum  Sustainable  Yield  (MSY).  Upon  Commission's  request,  ICES  has 
calculated  ranges  for  important  North  Sea  stocks  that  maximise  long-term  average  yield  and  thus  comply 
with  the  CFP  objectives  (Version  4  of  Report  6.2.3.1  EU  request  to  ICES  to  provide  FMSY  ranges  for 
selected North Sea and Baltic Sea stocks).  

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Figure  3.1.  Example  of  yield  (production)  versus  fishing  mortality  (F)  for  a  hypothetical  fishery.  SSB: 
spawning stock biomass. The peak of the production function is MSY and the fishing mortality generating 
this peak is FMSY. 

The Task-Force results have already been followed in adopting a Commission proposal for a 
multi-annual  plan  for  the  stocks  of  cod,  herring  and  sprat  in  the  Baltic  Sea42.  Both  co-
legislators have received the proposal positively, adopted their respective positions and have 
been negotiating on the final text in trilogues since June 2015.  

3.1.5.  Technical measures regulations 

Another  important  tool  to  manage  fisheries  in  the  EU  has  been  to  prescribe  technical 
measures, i.e.  measures establishing conditions for the use and structure of fishing gear and 
restrictions on access to fishing areas. There are a large number of technical measures in place 
for fisheries exploiting stocks in the North Sea. At present, these are mainly contained in the 
main technical measures regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No. 850/1998)43. The measures 
include  gear  specifications,  minimum  percentages  of  target  species  and  by-catch  limitations 
by mesh  size  and area as  well as a variety of closed areas  and seasons. The reasons for the 
technical  measures vary but  very often they are in  place  to  increase avoidance  of unwanted 
catches and thus reduce discards. 

The Commission is working towards a new framework for technical measures to adapt it to 
the logic of the reformed CFP where discard avoidance is already strongly incentivised by the 
Basic  Regulation  (see  Section  3.4.1).  Preparation  and  consultations  on  this  issue  are  taking 
place in parallel with the North Sea multi-annual plan.  

42   Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a multiannual plan for 
the  stocks  of  cod,  herring  and  sprat  in  the  Baltic  Sea  and  the  fisheries  exploiting  those  stocks,  amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2187/2005 and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1098/2007.  

43   Council Regulation (EC) No 850/1998 of 30 March 1998 for the conservation of fishery resources through 

technical measures for the protection of juveniles of marine organisms. (OJ L 125, 27.4.1998). 

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3.2. 

"Traditional"  management  of  North  Sea  demersal  fisheries:  The  problem  of 
discarding  

In  the  North  Sea  and  adjacent  areas  a  wide  range  of  different  fish  and  shellfish  species  are 
exploited, among them many demersal species. Demersal fish are fish that live at or near the 
bottom of the water column, e.g. cod and haddock. The North Sea demersal fishery is a mixed 
fishery:  fishermen  unavoidably  catch  a  mixture  of  demersal  species  at  the  same  time.  They 
cannot control (or only to a limited extent) the composition of their catches44.  

Fisheries  in  the  EU  are  traditionally  managed  by  defining  and  prescribing  annually  the 
amount of fish that can be fished in the coming year for each stock. This amount is divided 
among  Member  States  following  a  fixed  allocation  key  and  then,  in  most  of  the  cases,  it  is 
shared out to fishing enterprises at the Member State level. If fishermen run out of quota for a 
particular stock ("stock A") and they still have quota available for another in the same mixed 
fishery ("stock B")  they are allowed to  keep  on fishing.  Fishermen simply  throw catches  of 
stock A back into the sea. They also discard catches of young fish because EU legislation45 
stipulates that they are not allowed to land catches below a certain size in order to avoid the 
emergence of a market for such young fish and thus further incentives for fishermen to catch 
young fish. Discarded fish does not survive in most cases29. The discarded part of the stocks is 
thus  wasted;  the  stocks  are  effectively  economically  underutilised.  While  TACs  reduce 
overfishing,  they  create  new  externalities  by  the  fact  that  over-quota  catches  are  being 
discarded and hence wasted.  

Another  problem  stems  from  the  fact  that  the  true  amount  of  discarding  is  unknown  and  is 
therefore only partially taken into account when setting the annual TAC. The TAC does then 
not  fully  reflect  the  amount  of  fish  that  is  really  killed  due  to  fishing.  This  is  one  among 
several reasons why TACs are often set too high and the stocks are overfished46. 

44   Depending  on  the  specific  circumstances,  catch  composition  can  sometimes  be  controlled  by  employing 
fishing  gear  that  allows  undesired  species  to  escape  ("selective"  gear)  or  by  avoiding  areas  with  an 
abundance of an unwanted species. 

45   Article 9 Council Regulation (EC) No. 850/1998, see footnote 43. 
46   Commission Staff Working Paper, Impact Assessment, accompanying the document Commission proposal 
for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  the  Common  Fisheries  Policy 
(SEC(2001)891). 

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Figure  3.2.1.  Traditional  management  and  the  new  problems  it  creates.  Rectangle:  policy  measure; 
diamond: problem; solid line: leads to unwanted result; dashed line: reduces / removes problem. 

3.3. 

Solutions and problems stemming from current North Sea Management Plans 

In the North Sea, the system described in the previous section has led to significant discarding 
and could not prevent overfishing37. The stock that has been most negatively affected by the 
right  to  discard  over-quota  fish  is  the  cod  stock.  Therefore,  when  introducing  the  cod 
management plan3 (see Section 3.1.2), the EU decided to protect the cod stock by introducing 
another  regulatory  system  in  addition  to  the  TAC  system.  The  cod  plan3  introduced 
limitations of  "days  at  sea",  i.e.  to the time  that  fishermen  are  allowed to  spend  at sea.  The 
system tried to protect the cod stock by generally limiting demersal fishing in the North Sea, 
including  fishing  for  other  stocks  where  cod  is  caught  as  an  unwanted  by-catch.  The  plan 
incentivised  fishing  methods  that  avoid  involuntary  catches  of  cod  by  allowing  Member 
States to increase the days at sea of their fishermen if they could prove that the cod by-catch 
of these fishermen is very low. A comparable system of days at sea has also been applied in 
the flatfish plan4.  

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Figure 3.3.1. The North Sea  management  plans  –  partial  solutions and  new  problems. Rectangle:  policy 
measure; diamond: problem; solid line: leads to unwanted result; dashed line: reduces / removes problem. 

These  current  management  regimes  are  considered  by  Member  States,  the  fishing  industry, 
scientists22-31,47  and  environmental  organisations  as 
ineffective,  overly  prescriptive, 
unnecessarily  burdensome  and  economically  damaging  for  the  EU  fishing  industry.  In 
particular, the “days at sea” regime has been at the centre of criticism. In its evaluation of the 
cod plan19, STECF concluded that the plan had not controlled fishing mortality as envisaged 
and  that  the  short-term  economic  impacts  of  the  management  plan  were  not  clear.  With 
regards to the flatfish plan, STECF concluded that the observed recovery of sole and plaice 
was unlikely to stem from limitations on days at sea20. The ability of the days at sea regime to 
address the problem of discarding has therefore been rather mediocre.  

The  cod  plan3  has  also been  heavily  criticised for  envisaging  further  restrictions even  when 
the cod stock in the North Sea started to recover in recent years. Its effect has been not only to 
limit  fishing  for  cod  in  the  North  Sea,  which  accounts  for  approximately  5%  of  the  fish 
landed, but also to prevent fishing vessels from leaving port even when they own legitimate 
fishing quota for the 95% of other fish. That consequence has been criticised as grossly unfair 
and disproportionate throughout the fishing sector.  

The  days  at  sea  regime  has  also  been  criticised  for  having  perverse  effects  that  damage  the 
environment  rather  than  preserving  fish  stocks,  for  instance  because  vessels  with  a  limited 
budget of fishing days have to fish close to shore where juvenile fish concentrates. Similarly, 
the  North  Sea  fishing  industry  has  argued  in  the  Public  Consultation  to  this  initiative  (see 
Annex I) that severe restrictions on the time they can spend at sea makes it more difficult for 
them  to  seek  fishing  areas  with  lower  cod  abundance,  so  the  restrictions  exacerbate  the 
problem  of  unwanted  cod  catches  in  the  mixed  fisheries.  Moreover,  the  days  at  sea 

47   Poseidon Aquatic  Resource Management  Lot  2 Study. Administrative  experience with  effort  management 

concerning the NE Atlantic (December 2010). 

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management  scheme  has  created  significant  administrative  burden  for  the  Commission  and 
Member State administrations. 

Since 2011, the Council has been calling on the Commission to submit a proposal to replace 
the cod plan, which it considers ineffective and discredited. 

In 2012, the Commission adopted two proposals48,  49 for amendments of the cod plan3. The 
first was to align it to the Lisbon Treaty; the second to amend it to provide interim solutions to 
its most pressing problems, pending the development and implementation of a mixed-fisheries 
plan for North Sea fisheries.  

In  December  2012,  Council  decided  to  split  the  COM  proposal  COM  (2012)049849  and 
unilaterally  adopted  a  Council  Regulation  (EU)  amending  the  cod  plan50.  That  amendment 
removed some of the most burdensome rigidities of the cod plan but without putting in place a 
scheme that would allow management of the cod stock effectively as part of a mixed fishery.   

The  European  Parliament  and  the  Commission  have  each  brought  an  action  against  the 
Council  to  the  European  Court  of  Justice  (ECJ)  for  the  annulment  of  that  regulation51.  It  is 
likely  that  the  judgement  of  the  ECJ  will  lead  to  its  repeal51.  This  would  re-establish  the 
previous version of the cod plan which is considered as unworkable and inapplicable. 

To sum up, the system of days at sea restrictions is ineffective, very bureaucratic and has not 
gained acceptance among fishermen. In the Public Consultation (Annex I) the fishing industry 
gave  a  clear  message  that  the  restrictions  on  days  at  sea  in  the  two  existing  plans  are  very 
unpopular  as  they  are  unworkable,  not  sufficiently  adaptive,  and/or  counterproductive. 
Additionally, the current plans have been criticised for not being flexible enough to address 
the issues that have evolved during their implementation. For these reasons, the plans can be 
regarded as regulatory failure which should be addressed by this initiative. More importantly, 
the plans can be regarded as pieces of outdated regulation because the problem of discarding 
in mixed fisheries is being addressed in a more thorough way by the new Basic Regulation of 
the CFP which will be described in the next section. 

3.4. 

CFP-reform: solving problems, creating new challenges 

3.4.1.  Ending discarding and overfishing 

The new Basic Regulation adopted in 2013 includes a new approach to solve the problems of 
overfishing  and  discarding.  The  new  Basic  Regulation  bans  discarding  by  introducing  an 

48   Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1342/2008 of 18 December 2008 establishing a long-term plan for cod stocks and the fisheries exploiting 
those stocks (COM(2012)0021). 

49   Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1342/2008 of 18 December 2008 establishing a long-term plan for cod stocks and the fisheries exploiting 
those stocks (COM(2012)0498 final). 

50   Council Regulation (EU) No 1243/2012 amending Regulation (EC) No 1342/2008 establishing a long-term 

plan for cod stocks and the fisheries exploiting those stocks. (OJ L 352, 21.12.2012). 

51   Joined  Cases  C‑124/13  and  C‑125/13.  (Common  fisheries  policy  —  Action  for  annulment  —  Council 
Regulation  (EU)  No  1243/2012  establishing  a  long-term  plan  for  cod  stocks  and  the  fisheries  exploiting 
those stocks — Legal basis — Scope of Article 43(2) and Article 43(3) TFEU — Technical implementing 
measures). 

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obligation to land all catches; this obligation is being introduced stepwise between 2015 and 
2019. The landing obligation implies that fishermen have to stop fishing when they run out of 
quota for one of the stocks that they catch – discarding will simply no longer be allowed. This 
provision is supposed to trigger behavioural change on many levels. The Commission expects 
Member  States  to  attribute  fishing  rights  to  their  fishermen  in  a  way  that  reflects,  as  far  as 
possible, the expected mixture of species caught. Fishermen are expected to change behaviour 
because they now have a much bigger incentive to avoid stocks that they do not want to catch 
because  they  would  have  to  "pay"  with  valuable  quota  for  these  catches.  Under  the  old 
management,  the  discarded  catch  was  not  counted  against  the  quota  for  that  species.  Under 
the  landing  obligation,  however,  not  only  do  all  fish  caught  have  to  be  landed  but  all  fish 
caught will now be counted against the quota for that stock.  The landing obligation should 
therefore trigger innovation in fishing gears, techniques and strategies. 

At the same time Article 2(2) of the new Basic Regulation makes the concept of Maximum 
Sustainable Yield (MSY) legally binding. Where possible by 2015, and at the latest by 2020, 
the  EU  cannot  set  total  allowable  catches  above  levels  that  comply  with  the  MSY  concept. 
Therefore,  once  FMSY  has  been  reached  for  any  particular  stock,  the  annual  fishing 
opportunities need to be set at the level necessary to ensure that exploitation does not exceed 
FMSY for that stock. 

These two central measures of the CFP are expected to solve the problem of overfishing and 
resource wastage caused by discarding. 

Figure 3.4.1. The CFP reform – a comprehensive solution. Rectangle: policy measure; diamond: problem; 
solid line: leads to unwanted result; dashed line: reduces / removes problem. 

3.4.2.  New challenge: "Choke" species and underfishing 

However, the rule that states that fishermen have to stop fishing when they run out of quota 
for just one of the stocks caught in the mixed fishery will create new problems. Some stocks 
will probably be underfished  in the future,  because the entire fishery will have to be closed 

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when another stock's quota has been used up. Such a stock which restricts fishing in a mixed 
fishery  is  often  referred  to  as  a  "choke  species".  The  problem  will  be  aggravated  by  the 
obligation  to  apply  the  MSY  concept  to  all  stocks  simultaneously  because  it  will  not  be 
possible  to  allow  (temporary)  overfishing  of  a  stock  that  "chokes"  the  fishery.  Due  to  the 
fluctuations  in  the  abundance  of  the  different  fish  stocks,  different  species  might  become 
choke  species  in  different  years.  The  resulting  underfishing  could  threaten  the  economic 
viability of the fishing industry.  

Figure 3.4.2. The CFP reform – creating new challenges. Rectangle: policy measure; diamond: problem; 
solid line: leads to unwanted result. 

Under  the  impact  of  the  landing  obligation,  where  no  discarding  is  allowed,  cod  has  the 
potential to be a choke species, given the significant degree of historical over-quota catches 
(currently discarded) of cod. These over-quota catches appear to be increasing in recent years, 
as shown in Table 3.4.2.1 giving the proportions of over-quota catches where 1.0 expresses an 
exact  match  of  catches  and  TAC  and  >1.0  expresses  catch  figures  that  are  higher  than  the 
TAC). 

Table 3.4.2.1. Over quota catches of cod in the North Sea 

Year 

Cod 

2010 

1.2 

2011 

1.4 

2012 

1.4 

2013 

1.4 

2014 

1.6 

Table  3.4.2.2  illustrates  the  hypothetical  effects  on  the  landed  value  for  seven  demersal 
species caught together in the North Sea if the landing obligation were already fully applied to 
cod  in  2015.  There  are  clearly  significant  reductions  in  the  quantities  of  other  demersal 
species that could be landed, with highly significant impacts on the reduction in value.  

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Table  3.4.2.2.  The  hypothetical  effects  on  landings,  in  tonnes,  and  value,  in  euros,  for  seven  North  Sea 
demersal fish  species  based  on the  cod  scenario  in the mixed-fisheries  advice for  201552  where, once  the 
North Sea cod quota is caught other fisheries catching cod would have to cease.  

Single  species  landing 
advice 2015 (t) 

Landings  (t)  if  landing 
obligation fully applied 

2012 value 
per ton (€) 

%  change  in  landed 
to 
value  compared 
single species advice 

26713 

48176 

128376 

72854 

10973 

2406 

17190 

26713 

16592 

60175 

45797 

6469 

1972 

9654 

2.72 

1.28 

1.41 

1.30 

9.36 

8.22 

1.27 

0 

-66 

-53 

-37 

-41 

-18 

-44 

Species 

Cod 

Haddock 

Plaice 

Saithe 

Sole 

Turbot 

Whiting 

The  problem  is  not  limited  to  the  cod  stock.  An  analysis  of  these  issues  for  the  North  Sea 
fisheries was undertaken by the STECF29, which showed that for all Member States and for a 
number  of  stocks,  catches  were  well  in  excess  of  the  available  quota  which  indicates  that 
these  stocks  would  become  choke  species  under  a  landing  obligation.  The  most  important 
findings of this STECF report are provided in Annex III.  

The  landing  obligation  will  be  introduced  in  the  North  Sea  demersal  fishery  stepwise  for 
catches  from  different  species  between  2016  and  201953.  Therefore,  the  problem  of 
underfishing is not imminent yet but will evolve from the legislation that is already in place. 

3.4.3.  New challenge: the costs of landing all catches 

Another  problem  created  by  the  Basic  Regulation  is  the  costs  of  the  landing  obligation  that 
fishermen  have  to  bear.  These  costs  notably  stem  from  having  to  sort  and  record  additional 
catches,  and  store  them  on  board  until  landed,  while  not  being  allowed  to  market  them  for 
human consumption54. In some cases, especially when the stock which is being discarded is in 
a good state, has low economic value or discarded amounts are relatively small, the obligation 
to land all catches might be a disproportionate measure. To sum up, the CFP reform solves the 
problem of overfishing and discarding but, when applied strictly, may lead to the problems of 
disproportionate costs and underfishing.  

3.5.  Mismatch between the current management plans and the Basic Regulation 

Some  provisions  of  the  cod  plan3  do  not  match  with  the  new  Basic  Regulation.  Most 
importantly, the current plans include rules on how to define the annual fishing opportunities 
that are not in line with the principle of MSY foreseen by the Basic Regulation. 

52   http://www.ices.dk/sites/pub/Publication%20Reports/Advice/2014/2014/mix-nsea.pdf 
53   Details will be included in a Delegated Act, adopted on the basis of Article 15(5)(a) of the Basic Regulation 

and developed according to the Regionalisation method. 

54   Article  15(11)  of  the  new  Basic  Regulation  bans  the  marketing  of  undersized  fish  for  direct  human 

consumption in order not to incentivise fishing activities that target young fish. 

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3.6. 

Solutions foreseen in the CFP Basic Regulation 

The Basic Regulation introduces a binding timetable for implementing the landing obligation, 
but  it  also  foresees  ways  to  address  the  challenges  described  above.  Before  the  entry  into 
force of the landing obligation in a specific fishery, Article 15(5) of this regulation allows for 
the adoption of exemptions from the landing obligation for species that have a high chance of 
survival  when  thrown  back  into  the  sea.  Exemptions  can  also  be  granted  "where  scientific 
evidence  indicates  that  increases  in  selectivity  are  very  difficult  to  achieve"  (Article 
15(5)(c)(i))  or  to  avoid  "disproportionate  costs  of  handling  unwanted  catches"  (Article 
15(5)(c)(ii)).  The  Basic  Regulation  contains  the  right  for  the  Commission  to  adopt  these 
exemptions in a Delegated Act for a transitional period of no more than three years. The Basic 
Regulation stipulates that these Delegated Acts, commonly referred to as "discard plans", are 
developed  following  the  Regionalisation  method  described  in  Section  3.1.3.  According  to 
Article  15(5)  of  the  Basic  Regulation,  any  exemptions  that  are  supposed  to  be  valid  for  a 
period longer than three years can only be adopted as part of a multi-annual plan.  

Another way towards a solution can be found in the Inter-Institutional Task Force's proposal 
to use fishing mortality ranges instead of the point estimate of FMSY (see Section 3.1.4). This 
would enable management of the mixed fishery by allowing some more room for manoeuvre 
to  set TACs in  a way that avoids underfishing  and thus  reduces economic and social losses 
caused by the "choke species" problem. 

An additional solution, not explicitly foreseen in the Basic Regulation but developed by the 
Inter-institutional  Task-Force  (see  Section  3.1.4)  is  the  "decoupling"  of  mixed  fisheries  by 
prescribing specific technical measures that increase selectivity. The Task-Force final report6 
foresees  room  for  such  measures  especially  for  by-catch  stocks  in  a  mixed  fishery  and 
foresees the use of the regionalisation procedure (see Section 3.1.3) to develop such measures. 

3.7.  Who is affected? 

The  fisheries  of  the  North  Sea  and  adjacent  areas  involve  vessels  from  Belgium,  Denmark, 
Germany,  France,  the  Netherlands,  Sweden  and  the  United  Kingdom,  as  well  as  Norway, 
using  a  wide  variety  of  different  fishing  gears  to  target  a  wide  range  of  different  fish  and 
shellfish  species.  According  to  the  2014  STECF  Annual  Economic  Report55,  in  2012,  the 
North Sea fleet comprised some 5800 vessels, varying in size from 6 m to greater than 40 m 
in  length.  Employment  within  the  North  Sea  fleet  (in  terms  of  full  time  equivalents)  was 
around 9300 people. The weight and value of landings generated by the EU North Sea fleet in 
2012 amounted to approximately 1.1 million tonnes and almost €1.5 billion respectively. The 
UK, French and Danish North Sea fleets together accounted for around 73% of the total days 
at sea in the region (See Annex IV for more detail on the North Sea demersal fisheries and 
stocks). 

In  the North Sea, demersal trawls and seines and beam trawls were the two most  important 
gears  with  respect  to  both  the  total  weight  of  species  landed  (64%)  and  the  total  value  of 
species landed (68%) by the EU North Sea fleet in 2012. The majority of demersal fish landed 
are  caught  in  these  gears.  The  numbers  of  vessels  and  employment  for  vessels  using  these 
gear categories (relative to all other gear types), for each Member State, for the top 35 fleet 

55   The 2014 Annual Economic Report on the EU Fishing fleet. STECF 14-16. 

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segments56,  are  given  in  Table  3.7.1.  Overall,  these  data  show  that,  in  2012,  these  two 
demersal  gear  categories  accounted  for  20%  of  the  vessels  and  more  than  55%  of  the 
employment of the entire North Sea fleet.  

Table 3.7.1. Numbers of vessels and employment in the EU North Sea fleet in 2012 by gear type and by 
Member State for the top 35 Member State fleet segments56 in terms of landed value. Employment is given 
as Full Time Equivalents (FTEs). 

EU Member State 

Fleet size 

FTEs 

Fleet size 

FTEs 

Fleet size 

FTEs 

Demersal trawls / seines 

Beam trawlers 

Other gears 

Belgium 

Denmark 

France 

Germany 

Netherlands 

Sweden 

UK 

Totals 

0 

218 

57 

15 

21 

66 

268 

645 

% of total NS fleet 

11 

0 

665 

297 

128 

84 

232 

2100 

3506 

38 

58 

0 

0 

181 

255 

0 

20 

514 

9 

157 

0 

0 

286 

906 

0 

118 

1467 

16 

0 

62 

186 

0 

13 

0 

1026 

1287 

22 

0 

234 

505 

0 

75 

0 

940 

1754 

19 

However, for individual Member States, the dependence on the demersal fleets can be much 
higher than the overall figures. For example, the demersal sector of the Belgian and German 
fleets  comprises  over  75%  of  their  North  Sea  fleet  in  each  country  (Table  3.7.1),  with  the 
Dutch fleet having around 50% of its vessels in the demersal sector. In terms of employment, 
only  France  has  significantly  less  than  50%  of  the  North  Sea  fleets'  employment  in  the 
demersal catching sector.  

The  catching  sector  for  North  Sea  demersal  fish  is,  demonstrably,  very  important  to  the 
Member  States  surrounding  the  North  Sea.  It  comprises  a  high  proportion  of  the  fleet  size, 
employment,  landed  value,  landed  weight,  fishing  time  (days  at  sea)  and  GVA  for  the 
majority of those Member States (Table 3.7.2). Clearly, any negative impacts on the demersal 
catching sector have the potential to impact those Member States. 

Within  the  top  35  North  Sea  fleet  segments56,  the  demersal  catching  sectors  in  Belgium, 
Germany and the Netherlands represent over 80% of the landed value of North Sea landings. 
Sweden's demersal sector provides over 93% of its landed weight; the figure is greater than 
80%  for  Belgium  and  Germany.  In  terms  of  gross  value  added  (GVA),  GVA  from  the 
demersal catching sectors in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden is in excess of 
70% for each of their North Sea fleets; it is around 50% for the UK. 

56   The STECF AER (see footnote 55) only provides detailed data for the 35 fleet segments with the highest 
value of landings. A fleet segment is a group of vessels from the same Member State using the same gear 
type. Although not exhaustive, the data available are still relevant, as in 2012 the top 35 Member State fleet 
segments in the catching sector represented 60% of the fishing effort, 84% of the landed weight and 83% of 
the landed value generated by the regional fleet. These top 35 fleet segments represented 42% of the fleet in 
terms of number of vessels and 72% of the employment. Note that these figures include landings generated 
from a variety of gear categories, not only demersal gears. All figures in this section refer to the top 35 fleet 
segments, not to the entire fishing fleet. 

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Table 3.7.2. Percentages of various categories, by Member State, represented by the demersal sector in 
2012 for the top 35 Member State fleet segments56 in terms of landed value. Employment is given as Full 
Time Equivalents (FTEs) 

EU 
State 

Member 

Fleet 
(%) 

size 

FTEs 
(%) 

Landed 
value (%)  

Landed 
weight (t) (%)  

Days 
sea (%) 

at 

GVA 
(%) 

Belgium 

Denmark 

France 

Germany 

Netherlands 

Sweden 

UK 

77 

21 

10 

79 

49 

13 

10 

73 

56 

23 

77 

78 

46 

52 

81 

45 

36 

84 

84 

70 

50 

81 

40 

39 

86 

53 

93 

37 

74 

43 

14 

82 

87 

22 

22 

84 

38 

21 

85 

84 

70 

48 

Additionally, there is a shore-based processing sector that deals with the North Sea fish catch. 
Figures for the numbers of enterprises and employment within the sector in each of the North 
Sea Member States are given in Table 3.7.3. Note that in most cases the enterprises will be 
processing catches from other areas as well as the North Sea. In terms of employment, 61% of 
these enterprises are micro-businesses and 37% are SMEs57. 

Table 3.7.3. Numbers of enterprises and employment in the processing sector of North Sea EU Member 
States in 2012. 

Number of enterprises by size (No. of employees) 

No. 
employees: 

of 

≤ 10 

11-49 

50-249 

≥250 

Total 

Belgium 

206 

Denmark 

57 

France 

Germany 

133 

171 

Netherlands  35 

Sweden 

UK 

Total 

190 

166 

958 

28 

30 

108 

56 

33 

25 

133 

413 

5 

19 

39 

15 

16 

8 

64 

166 

1 

0 

15 

8 

0 

0 

12 

36 

240 

106 

295 

250 

84 

223 

375 

1573 

Employment 
(FTEs) 

2492 

3409 

16184 

7010 

3567 

2135 

19070 

53867 

The  other  stakeholders  most  affected  by  this  proposal  would  be  the  sector  regulators  in  the 
Member  States.  Any  changes  to  the  regulatory  structure  will  require  a  re-adjustment  of  the 
management  regime.  Sectors'  research  agencies  will  also  be  affected  as  changes  in 
management measures will require experimentation and evaluation of these new measures. 

57   Report  of  the  STECF  Expert  Group  on:  Economic  Performance  of  the  EU  Fish  Processing  Industry 

(STECF-14-21). 

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3.8. 

Summary 

The EU has tried, for decades, to solve the main problems in the North Sea demersal fisheries: 
overfishing  and  discarding.  Currently,  old  instruments  (the  current  management  plans  and 
their days at sea schemes) and a new instrument (the new Basic Regulation) are in force at the 
same time, all aiming to solve these problems. The current management plans have failed to 
solve  these  problems  satisfactorily  while  creating  new  problems.  They  can  therefore  be 
regarded  as  regulatory  failure.  At  the  same  time  they  are  outdated  because  the  Basic 
Regulation addresses the same problems in a different way. 

The  Basic  Regulation  promises  to  solve  the  problems  of  overfishing  and  discarding  more 
effectively.  However,  this  regulation  is  too  strict  as  it  leads  to  underfishing  and  imposes  a 
landing obligation even in situations where such an obligation is disproportionate. Hence, if 
no alleviating measures (exemptions from the landing obligation beyond the 3 years discard 
plans,  flexibility  with  regards  to  MSY  in  a  mixed  fishery,  technical  measures  to  "decouple 
fisheries") are taken, the Basic Regulation will most likely have negative economic and social 
consequences for the fishing industry in the coming years.  

3.9. 

Legal basis for the EU to act  

According to Article 3(1)(d) of the TFEU35, the Union shall have exclusive competence in the 
conservation  of  marine  biological  resources  under  the  CFP.  Article  43(2)  of  the  TFEU35 
establishes  the  Union’s  power  to  adopt  the  provisions  necessary  for  the  pursuit  of  the 
objectives  of  the  CFP.  The  problems  identified  in  this  section  clearly  relate  to  the 
conservation  of  marine  biological  resources;  they  therefore  have  to  be  resolved  by  the  EU. 
Hence,  there  is  no  need  to  justify  measures  with  regards  to  the  principle  of  subsidiarity. 
Nevertheless, the reformed CFP gives the EU the possibility to move decision making closer 
to the affected stakeholder by making use of Regionalisation (see Section 3.1.3) thus living up 
to the spirit of subsidiarity.  

4. 

OBJECTIVES 

4.1. 

General objectives 

The current  initiative  complements  the CFP reform and helps to  implement it for the North 
Sea  demersal  fisheries.  It  therefore  has  to  be  in  line  with  objectives  of  the  CFP  Basic 
Regulation which are stated in its Article 2. Of particular importance for this initiative are the 
following objectives: 

 

 

 

to provide a transparent framework to achieve the maximum sustainable yield 
exploitation rate (FMSY) by 2015, where possible, and by 2020 at the latest  

to apply the precautionary approach 
the simplification of EU legislation and of the management of European fisheries58 

58   The  objective  of  simplification  is  not  stated  explicitly  in  the  Basic  Regulation  but  it  can  be  found  in 
Commission  Communications  COM(2011)417  (Communication  From  The  Commission  To  The  Council 
And  The  European  Parliament  on  the  Reform  of  the  Common  Fisheries  Policy)  and  COM(2009)261 
(Communication  From  The  Commission  To  The  Council  And  The  European  Parliament  on  the 
implementation of the Action Plan for simplifying and improving the Common Fisheries Policy).  

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4.2. 

Specific objectives 

Having  identified  the  main  problems  that  occur  in  the  North  Sea  demersal  fisheries,  or  that 
will occur once the landing obligation is introduced, the following objectives for this initiative 
can be derived: 

 

 

 

 

 

to reduce the extent of underfishing in a mixed fishery under a landing obligation (see 
Sections 3.4.2) by introducing FMSY ranges (see Sections 3.1.4 and 3.6), 
to  establish  biomass  safeguards  in  order  to  enable  the  precautionary  approach 
established in Article 2(2) of the Basic Regulation (see Section 3.1.4) 
to facilitate the application of the landing obligation introduced in the reformed CFP59 
(see Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 and 3.6) 

to establish the framework necessary for the implementation of Regionalisation within 
the North Sea area (see Sections 3.1.3 and 3.6) 

to remove the days at sea regime which has proven to be ineffective and which is no 
longer necessary given that the new Basic Regulation addresses the same underlying 
problems with different means 

It should be noted that the specific objectives are partly linked to each other. Facilitating the 
application of the landing obligation by granting exemptions from this obligation could help 
to  reduce  the  risk  of  underfishing  in  a  mixed  fishery.  Establishing  a  framework  for  the 
implementation of Regionalisation within the North Sea area makes it significantly easier to 
adopt technical measures that decouple mixed fisheries. Hence, Regionalisation equally has a 
potential to contribute to reducing the risk of underfishing (see Section 3.6).  

Another important objective of the CFP is to minimise negative impacts of fishing activities 
on  the  marine  ecosystem  (Basic  Regulation,  Article  2(3)  and  to  be  coherent  with  the  EU 
environmental legislation (Basic Regulation, Article 2(5)(j)). Any initiative taken within the 
Common  Fisheries  Policy  shall  therefore  avoid  being  detrimental  to  these  objectives  and 
where possible should help to achieve them.  

An additional important objective of the CFP is to achieve "economic, social and employment 
benefits"  (Article  2(1))  and  to  "provide  conditions  for  economically  viable  and  competitive 
fishing  capture  and  processing  industry"  (Article  2(5)(c)).  This  initiative  will  contribute  to 
achieving this objective by preventing underfishing and by simplifying legislation. 

59   The issue of Regionalisation is closely linked to the new technical measures framework which is currently 
under  development  (see  Section  3.1.5).  The  new 
technical  measures  framework  might  enable 
Regionalisation  for  all  EU  waters.  However,  as  a  new  technical  measures  framework  would  constitute  a 
major reform  of the way the EU manages its fisheries, substantial delays in the adoption of that initiative 
cannot be excluded. For the reasons described in Section 3.6, after the introduction of the landing obligation 
regionalised technical  measures  will  become  essential  in  the North Sea  to  "decouple"  mixed  fisheries  and 
thus increase the yield from the fishery. Therefore, one cannot rely on the technical measures framework to 
bring  about  the  possibility  of  regionalised  technical  measures  but  the  initiative  developed  in  this  impact 
assessment also has to enable Regionalisation. The Commission will have to ensure coherence between the 
different instruments. 

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5. 

POLICY OPTIONS  

A screening of different policy options has led to the identification of those policy options that 
are most likely to meet the objectives and address the problems identified in Section 3. The 
four options considered are the existing management approach, amending the existing plans, 
managing solely according to the new CFP (the Basic Regulation), and establishing a single 
mixed-fisheries  multi-annual  plan.  The  first  two  options  (existing  management  approach, 
amending  the  existing  plans)  have  been  discarded  early  on.  The  reasons  for  this  will  be 
explained  in  the  following  sub-sections.  Subsequently,  the  remaining  two  options  will  be 
discussed  in  more  detail,  including  sub-options  for  a  potential  mixed-fisheries  multi-annual 
plan. 

5.1. 

Discarded options 

5.1.1.  No policy change at EU level 

The first option is the status quo option or no policy change at EU level, i.e. to continue to 
apply  the  existing  management  (i.e.  cod3  and  flatfish4)  plans,  in  combination  with  all  other 
existing rules of the new CFP. 

Under  this  option  none  of  the  objectives  of  this  initiative  would  be  reached.  It  would  not 
provide a transparent framework on how and when to achieve the maximum sustainable yield 
exploitation  rate  (FMSY).  Instead  it  would  provide  for  contradictory  management  objectives, 
i.e. the fishing mortality rates stated in the existing plans and the MSY objective stated in the 
Basic Regulation60. The unilateral amendment by Council to the cod plan (Council Regulation 
1243/2012) see Section 3.3), deemed illegal by Commission and Parliament, does not change 
the  fishing  mortality  rate  stated  in  the  plan  and  therefore  does  not  solve  the  problem.  This 
option would also not introduce ranges for FMSY. 

The current plans only include biomass safeguards for the cod stocks, therefore, the objectives 
of  applying  the  precautionary  approach  and  establishing  biomass  safeguards  cannot  be 
reached for all other stocks in the North Sea.  

Under this option, it would not be possible to replace the discard plans after they have lapsed. 
The landing obligation would thus also be applied in cases where this is disproportionate (see 
Section  3.4.3).  Moreover,  this  option  does  not  enable  Regionalisation  in  the  North  Sea  and 
would not do away with days at sea management61, a policy that has been strongly criticised 
at many levels (see Section 3.3).  

Due to the contradictory provisions that would be in force, this option clearly does not reach 
the objective to simplify legislation.  

60   The target fishing mortality provided for in the cod plan is no longer appropriate because it is much higher 
than FMSY for the North Sea stock. The same applies for both the sole and plaice stocks, for which the plan 
has achieved the first-stage objectives and has not been amended to introduce new objectives. It is therefore 
outdated vis-à-vis the new CFP. 

61   The unilateral amendment Council made to the cod plan (see Section 3.3) does not abolish the days at sea 
scheme, it merely eases its application by limiting the automatic days at sea reductions foreseen in the plan 
(Council Regulation 1243/2012, Article 1(2)). 

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Additionally, stakeholders clearly reject this option13. In the public consultations for both the 
North Sea multi-annual plan and for the new framework for technical measures the catching 
sector gave a clear message that the restrictions on days at sea in the two existing plans are 
very  unpopular  as  they  are  unworkable,  not  sufficiently  adaptive,  and/or  counterproductive. 
Both  the  catching  sector  and  the  Member  States  consider  that  these  restrictions  would  be 
unnecessary or even counterproductive when the landing obligation enters into force and the 
administrative  burden  of  implementing  them  would  therefore  no  longer  be  justified. 
Additionally, the current plans have been criticised for not being flexible enough to address 
the  issues  that  have  evolved  during  their  implementation.  The  Member  States  directly 
concerned  have  requested  to  replace  these  plans  as  soon  as  possible.  There  are  high 
expectations  by  all  stakeholders  that  these  plans  will  be  replaced.  In  addition,  there  are 
expectations, e.g. from the European Parliament, to bring more fisheries under multi-annual 
plans in the future. In 2012 the European Parliament adopted a resolution which "calls on the 
Commission  to  provide  for  the  establishment  of  long-term  management  plans  for  all  EU 
fisheries"62. 

This "no-change"-option has been discarded very early in the process, not only because none 
of  the  problems  identified  above  would  be  resolved  but  also  because  under  this  option 
contradictory, competing legislation would be in force; it would, therefore, be unclear which 
of the legislations would be enforced. The "no-change"-option is therefore not an appropriate 
baseline against which the other options can be assessed63.  

5.1.2.  Amendment of the existing management plans 

This  option  would  enable  an  update  and  review  of  the  existing  management  plans,  and 
subsequently consider the introduction of a series of new single-species plans. Existing (cod 
and flatfish) plans  would be updated to  meet the challenges of the new CFP reform, and in 
light  of  their  evaluations  –  adjusting  to  FMSY,  reviewing  elements  such  as  days  at  sea 
restrictions, etc. Over time new, additional, plans could be introduced for stocks not currently 
under a management plan. This would entail the development of between 7 and 9 plans for the 
demersal  fish  stocks  for  which  ICES  currently  provides  scientific  advice  on  maximum 
sustainable yield41, and potentially a further 23 plans for other commercially important stocks. 

Some  of  the  objectives  of  this  initiative  can  be  achieved  by  this  option  in  exactly  the  same 
way as under a single mixed-fisheries multi-annual plan: a transparent framework for FMSY as 
well  as  FMSY  ranges  and  biomass  safeguards  could  be  established;  days  at  sea  management 
could  be  abolished.  These  elements  will  be  discussed  in  more  depth  in  the  section  dealing 
with the option of a single mixed-fisheries multi-annual plan (see Section 5.2.2). 

However,  keeping  and  amending  the  existing  plans  would  make  it  difficult  to  achieve  the 
objectives  of  implementing  regionalisation  and  facilitating  the  introduction  of  the  landing 
obligation.  This  is  because  integrated  approaches  to  the  implementation  of  the  landing 
obligation  (introduced  per  fishery)  or  of  technical  measures  to  be  introduced  at  a  regional 
level would be virtually impossible because the same technical measures applying to fishing 

62   European  Parliament  resolution  of  12  September  2012  on  the  reform  of  the  Common  Fisheries  Policy  – 

Overarching Communication (2011/2290(INI)). 

63   We recognise that it is unorthodox to discard the "no-change" option. However, we have demonstrated that 
the  current  management  plans  constitute  regulatory  failure.  To  discard  this  option  is,  therefore,  the 
pragmatic and honest approach. 

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different  stocks  would  have  to  be  introduced  in  separate  delegated  acts  based  on  different 
(multiple)  single-stock  plans  –  and  would  therefore  create  a  proliferation  of  delegated  acts. 
This would also be the case for the implementing rules governing the landing obligation and 
possible  exemptions  from  this  obligation  (see  Section  3.6).  In  a  mixed  fishery  it  would  be 
unclear which of the species/stock-based plans would have to include details on the fisheries-
based phasing in of the landing obligation. Additionally, future exemptions from the landing 
obligation for the North Sea would need to be distributed over many different plans instead of 
being contained within one document as is the case for the current discard plans.  

The  foreseen  outcome  would  create  a  very  complex  legal  framework,  with  complicated 
management challenges and most  likely increased administrative burden in  developing each 
plan  and  implementing  and  updating  them  to  ensure  coherence  between  them.  The  risk  of 
unforeseen  loopholes  would  also  need  to  be  considered.  The  objective  of  simplifying 
legislation would clearly not be met. 

The Public Consultation showed that, among stakeholders, there has been strong criticism of 
the  complexity  of  the  existing  legislation,  so  any  further  complications  arising  from  a 
multiplicity of plans are unlikely to be welcomed. Additionally, Member States consider that 
no time should be spent on amendment of the plans in force and focus instead should be on 
development of a new multi-annual plan for the North Sea mixed fisheries. There is general 
support by stakeholders that the existing plans should be replaced by a new holistic plan (see 
Annex I). 

This option would address some of the objectives in the same way that a mixed-fisheries plan 
can (i.e. provision of a transparent framework; introduction of FMSY ranges; application of the 
precautionary approach; removal of the days at sea regime). However, there are difficulties to 
solve  the  remaining  problems  that  a  single-species  plan  can  address  more  easily  (i.e. 
facilitation  of  the  landing  obligation;  Regionalisation;  simplification;  see  Section  5.2.2); 
therefore this option has also been discarded. 

5.2. 

Potential policy options 

5.2.1.  Use solely the Basic Regulation (including the landing obligation) 
This option would aim at repealing the two existing multi-annual plans (the cod plan3 and the 
flatfish  plan4)  and  apply  only  the  Basic  Regulation,  including  the  landing  obligation.  This 
option would mean that for every (of the around 40 – see Annex IV) stock in the North Sea 
the management obligation is to achieve MSY by 2020 at the latest. This means that the TACs 
that  are  set  annually  for  all  stocks  must  respect  MSY  objectives,  using  the  point  estimate 
value  of  FMSY  as  a  target.  TACs  are  set  on  a  single-stock  basis,  where  there  may  be  no 
consideration  of  mixed-fisheries  interactions.  This  has  proven  in  the  past  to  lead  to 
mismatches in the quota basket for fishermen and Member States, normally having discarding 
as a potential consequence. With the landing obligation, a large number of stocks would turn 
into choke species under this option (see Section 3.4.2). As a consequence, either the fishery 
would  need  to  be  stopped  completely  before  the  end  of  the  season  –  to  ensure  that  the 
conservation objectives are met and the TAC is respected – or, alternatively, fishermen would 
continue  to  fish  for  species  for  which  they  still  have  quota,  in  combination  with  illegal 
discarding. The latter, though hard to estimate quantitatively, would lead to a deterioration of 
catch  data,  distortion  of  stock  assessments  and  the  risk  of  structural  (not  identified) 
overfishing of the choke-species' stock. 

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A quick remedy would need to be found whereby cod could be isolated (decoupled) from the 
other  demersal  species,  in  particular  from  haddock,  by  means  of  technical  measures  (see 
Section  3.6).  Such  short-term  remedies  are  not  foreseeable  under  the  Basic  Regulation, 
especially in the absence of adaptable technical measures or alternative conservation measures 
–  which  would  have  to  be  adopted  through  co-decision:  the  inflexible  governance  structure 
(no  regionalisation)  would  hinder  stock  conservation.  This  option  would  operate  within  the 
existing  framework  of  technical  measures  under  co-decision,  implying  very  limited 
adaptability of the technical rules to new situations or requirements.  

In  addition,  the  lack  of  flexibility  and  adaptability  in,  notably,  the  technical  measures 
legislation,  rules  out  the  possibility  to  introduce  more  selective  and  avoidance  fishing 
strategies  and  techniques  to  a  significant  degree.  Individual  fishermen  will  see  no  driver  to 
change the behaviour when others don't participate – which is typically the argument for the 
tragedy of the commons. In the absence of these adaptations of fishing gears and of fishing 
strategies, the choke species phenomenon will continue to hamper the fishing industries. 

This option would also imply that the implementation of the landing obligation in North Sea 
demersal  fisheries  would  have  to  proceed  without  any  facilitating  practical  measures  after 
2018. Once the discard plan expires, the landing obligation would have to be applied without 
any  exemptions  which  could  have  severe  negative  economic  effects  in  some  fisheries  (see 
Table 3.4.2). 

Additionally,  under  this  option,  when  stocks  fall  below  a  stock  size  consistent  with  full 
reproductive capacity, there would be no immediate safeguards written into the regulation. In 
the absence of such semi-automatic initiatives to recover the stocks to safe biological levels, 
stock recovery is normally slow as decision makers avoid drastic measures that lead to large 
reductions in fishing mortality.  

5.2.2.  A single mixed-fisheries plan for North Sea demersal fisheries 

This  option  would  provide  one  plan,  containing  one  single  management  framework  for  the 
management of stocks caught together in demersal fisheries in the North Sea. It would aim to 
account  for  mixed-fisheries  interactions  through  the  introduction  of  FMSY  ranges,  allowing 
more flexibility in the setting of fishing opportunities. This would enable more coherence in 
the definition of fishing opportunities for the different stocks it would cover because different 
stock's  TACs  would  be  able  to  be  based  on  values  of  fishing  mortality  within  their  FMSY 
ranges,  rather  than  the  point  estimate  value  of  FMSY  (see  Section  3.4.2).  A  mixed-fisheries 
plan,  using  ranges  of  fishing  mortality,  instead  of  point  estimates,  as  MSY  targets  would 
maximise  the  contribution  that  a  mixed-fisheries  approach  to  setting  TACs  could  make  to 
reducing the choke species problem. 

Figure 5.2.2.1 illustrates for five of the six main North Sea demersal stocks how FMSY ranges 
help to resolve the choke species problem described in Section 3.4.2. Each of the symbols in 
the figure shows where the fishing mortality in 2013 is, in relation to FMSY. If the value is less 
than 1, then the fishing mortality in 2013 (F2013) is higher than the FMSY values. If the value is 
greater  than  1  then  the  F2013  is  lower  than  the  FMSY  values.  The  three  different  symbols 
represent F2013 relative to: the point estimate of FMSY (blue diamonds); the upper bound of the 
FMSY range (red triangles); the lower bound of the FMSY range (green squares). It can be seen 
that saithe, plaice and sole, for example, have F2013 values that are around FMSY (they all have 
values of around 1) and similar relative ranges of FMSY for the three species. Conversely, cod 
and haddock are very different to the other three species. Cod in 2013 is well above its FMSY 
values,  whereas  haddock  is  well  below  its  FMSY  values.  It  would,  therefore,  be  easy  to  set 

EN  

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coherent  TACs  for  saithe,  plaice  and  sole  to  ensure  exploitation  consistent  with  FMSY. 
However, because the relative FMSY ranges for cod and haddock have minimal overlap with 
each  other  and  with  the  ranges  for  the  other  species  it  would  be  difficult  to  set  TACs  that 
would exploit all five species at levels consistent with FMSY. This is where regionally defined 
technical measures that would be possible under the framework of a multi-annual plan could 
be  useful  to  complement  the  FMSY  range  approach,  for  example,  by  reducing  the  F  for  cod 
through  technical  measures  and  thereby  minimising  choke  effects,  rather  than  setting 
incompatible TACs. 

An  added  important  dimension,  agreed  by  the  Inter-Institutional  Task  Force6,  would  be  the 
identification of the species that determine the fishery as opposed to the by-catch species, with 
distinct management targets for the two categories of stocks – all befitting the MSY objective. 
For  the  target  species  (driving  the  fishery)  the  plan  would  introduce  ranges  of  fishing 
mortality,  while  for  by-catch  species  in  the  fishery  it  would  include  specific  or  alternative 
conservation measures to ensure that the conservation objectives are respected. 

FMSY range / F2013 

FmsyUp/F2013

Fmsy/F2013

FmsyLow/F2013

3,00

2,50

2,00

1,50

1,00

0,50

0,00

Cod

Had

Whg

Saithe

Ple

Sole

Figure 5.2.2.1. FMSY ranges in 2013 relative to the fishing mortality in 2013 (F2013), for five of the six main 
North  Sea  stocks.  "FmsyUp"  and  "FmsyLow"  are  the  upper  and  lower  bounds  of  the  FMSY  ranges 
respectively for each species that were provided to STECF by ICES in March 2015 (N.B. Some of these 
values have since been updated). 

The  regionalised  governance  possibilities  under  the  new  CFP  (see  Section  3.1.3)  mean  that 
the plan would not only allow for adaptation mechanisms in specified technical measures to 
allow for the introduction of measures to decouple fisheries (see above) but also to use such 
measures  to  minimise  impacts  of  fishing  on  the  wider  marine  environment,  e.g.  on  marine 
mammals,  sea  birds  and  the  sea  bed.  Specific  technical  measures  to  protect  the  marine 
environment might be needed for one fleet, but not necessarily for another. Under this option, 
it will be possible to adopt such measures rapidly, without having to make use of the lengthy 
Ordinary Legislative Procedure64.  

64   The new technical measures framework which is currently under development will also enable the adoption 
of  regionalised  technical  measures.  The  exact  legal  setup  for  the  interplay  between  the  new  technical 
measures regulation and the multi-annual plans is still under development. 

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By the same token, the plan would allow for the introduction of implementation elements for 
the landing obligation in light of the limited lifespan of discard plans.  

Creating  a  single  management  framework,  with  in-built  options  for  Regionalisation  and 
adaptation  would  allow  the  plan  to  be  responsive  to  changes  in  the  fisheries,  in  the 
management advice and in the status of the stocks while keeping consistency between all of 
the elements relevant for the management, and making it easier to ensure coherence across the 
stocks caught together in the mixed fisheries. 

Within this option there are a number of choices to be made: 

 
 

 
 

 
 

the delineation of areas and the consequent fisheries and stocks to be covered 
the choice of how to introduce measures that facilitate the introduction of the landing 
obligation 
the choice of the ranges for FMSY 
the choice of species for which precise MSY-related target ranges would be set. The 
Task Force agreement foresees focus on the species that drive the fishery  – the main 
target species – and by managing those sustainably, the plan is expected to deliver on 
the conservation objectives for the by-catch species as well  
the latest dates for achieving FMSY (between now and 2020 at the latest)  
the time period for rebuilding stocks to precautionary levels (whenever they are below 
such levels) 

The first four choices can be taken based on a qualitative analysis conducted in the following 
sub-section. The last two sub-options will be analysed quantitatively. 

5.2.2.1.  Sub-options for qualitative analysis 

Delineation of areas 

When deciding on the area scope of the plan, several criteria have to be taken into account: 

  different  multi-annual  plans  have  to  be  coherent,  situations  where  areas  remain 

 

 

uncovered by a plan in the long term should be avoided 
the  area  coverage  should  be  as  coherent  as  possible  with  the  areas  covered  by 
established Member States' regional cooperation fora (here: the Scheveningen group, 
see Section 3.1.3) and Advisory Council areas (here : the NSAC, see Section 3.1.3). In 
case of a mismatch between  the area covered by the plan and these bodies,  Member 
States  would  have  to  cooperate  outside  the  established  regional  fora  when  drafting 
Joint  Recommendations  and  two  or  more  Advisory  Councils  would  have  to  be 
consulted on these measures. 
fish  stocks  do  not  respect  the  borders  drawn  by  humans;  additionally  the  borders 
between  fish  stocks  are  different.  However,  as  much  as  coherence  as  possible  in 
biological and fisheries terms should be achieved.  

It  is  obvious  that  ICES  Subarea  IV,  which  is  the  main  part  of  the  North  Sea,  should  be 
covered  by  the  plan.  The  question  is  whether  adjacent  waters  like  Skagerrak  and  Kattegat 
(Division  IIIa)  and  the  Eastern  Channel  (Division  VIId)  should  be  covered  by  the  plan  as 
well. 

Skagerrak and Kattegat have to be covered by the plan as they are not covered by the Baltic 
Sea  plan  which  has  been  proposed  by  the  Commission42.  Not  including  this  area  into  the 

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North Sea plan would lead to a situation where this area would likely remain uncovered in the 
long-run as it is too small to justify a plan on its own. 

STECF30 was requested to comment on the areas to include in the new generation of regional 
management  plans.  STECF  recommended  inclusion  of  the  Eastern  Channel  within  a  North 
Sea  plan,  as  the  fish  in  the  Eastern  Channel  (VIId)  appear  to  have  greater  affinity  with  the 
North Sea than areas to the west. At the same time, however, this area is not covered by the 
Scheveningen group and the NSAC but by the regional management body called the North-
Western High-Level Group and by the North-Western Waters AC (NWWAC). Therefore, it 
has  to  be  decided  whether  to  follow  the  criteria  of  coherence  with  the  area  coverage  of 
established management bodies and Advisory Councils or the criteria of biological coherence. 
It seems appropriate to opt for coherence with the management areas. The reason is that it is 
not so important where to establish management objectives for fish stocks, e.g. FMSY ranges. 
What is important is that there are no contradictory objectives for the same stock in different 
plans. Management objectives should be included in the plan which covers the area of main 
abundance of a stock. In order to ensure coherence between different plans, all plans would 
have  to  ensure  that  management  objectives  established  in  other  plans  remain  valid  when  a 
stock straddles the areas of those plans.  The Commission can  ensure this  when establishing 
and amending plans. Hence, a lack of biological coherence can be remedied.  

Deviating from the area covered by the Scheveningen group and the NSAC would be more 
problematic, notably when adopting measures under Regionalisation. As explained, additional 
Member  States  and  the  NWWAC  would  have  to  be  consulted  when  formulating  Joint 
Recommendations. This would be detrimental to a smooth implementation of Regionalisation 
which  actually  builds  on  improving  cooperation  among  Member  States  as  well  as  among 
stakeholders,  so  changing  the  current  configuration  should  be  avoided.  The  sub-option  of 
including the Eastern Channel into the plan is therefore discarded. This area will have to be 
covered by the North-Western Waters plan which is being developed in parallel. 

To  ensure  coherence  with  the  other  plans,  the  Commission  has  to  ensure  that  if  a  range  of 
FMSY is to be set for any straddling stock then this range is included in the plan that covers the 
area  of  main  abundance  of  the  stock  in  question;  all  other  plans  containing  that  straddling 
stock will contain a provision that makes the application of the FMSY range also binding in the 
areas that they cover. 

In  the  Public  Consultation  (Annex  I),  some  stakeholders  supported  the  inclusion  of  the 
Eastern Channel into the plan, while some contributions from the fishing industry objected to 
the inclusion of Skagerrak and Kattegat and the Eastern Channel if this leads to the inclusion 
of additional stocks other than straddling stocks that are also present in the main basin of the 
North  Sea  (Subarea  IV).  The  NSAC  in  its  contribution  only  highlighted  the  need  of 
consistency with adjacent areas. 

Choice of method for facilitating the introduction of the landing obligation  

As  described  in  Section  3.6,  the  Basic  Regulation  allows  the  adoption  of  so-called  "discard 
plans" through Regionalisation to adopt exemptions from the landing obligation for not more 
than three years. After the expiry of these discard  plans, exemptions will still be needed,  in 
order  to  allow  for  the  discarding  of  species  that  survive  discarding  and  to  allow  for 
exemptions  in  situations  where  the  landing  obligation  is  a  disproportionate  measure.  The 
Basic  Regulation  itself  foresees  in  Article  15(5)  that  such  exemptions  should  be  adopted  as 
parts of a multi-annual plan and "where relevant, further specified in accordance with Article 

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18", i.e. through Regionalisation. The latter would mean that the multi-annual plan includes 
an empowerment to adopt delegated acts for this purpose. 

When drafting a multi-annual plan, the Commission will have to decide which elements of the 
future exemptions from the Basic Regulation will be included in the multi-annual plan itself 
and which elements will be adopted as a part of a delegated act / Joint Recommendation.  

However, the option of including exemptions in the plan itself can be discarded, for several 
reasons.  Firstly,  the  discard  plans  that  are  adopted  on  the  Basic  Regulation  are  constantly 
evolving.  The  Scheveningen  group  has  brought  forward  a  first  Joint  Recommendation 
concerning  demersal  North  Sea  fisheries  that  only  covers  the  first  stage  of  the  landing 
obligation, i.e. exemptions from the landing obligation for the stocks for which this obligation 
applies already in 2016. Further Joint Recommendations will follow for the following steps. 
The multi-annual plan will be adopted before the landing obligation will be fully implemented 
in the North Sea, thus an empowerment for delegated acts to adopt exemptions for the later 
steps of the phasing-in of the landing obligation would be needed in order to avoid a situation 
where the plan has to be amended several times through the Ordinary Legislative Procedure. 
One  could  imagine  consolidation  of  all  the  exemptions  already  adopted  in  the  plan  itself; 
however,  some  these  exemptions  might  still  evolve  as  some  of  them,  following  STECF 
evaluation65,  will  probably  only  be  granted  under  the  condition  that  the  Member  States 
conduct  further  scientific  studies  that  justify  these  exemptions.  The  adaptive,  flexible 
approach  of  Regionalisation  is  therefore  clearly  the  preferred  option  for  this  element  of  the 
plan. 

Choice of the FMSY ranges 

In  terms  of  the  ranges  of  FMSY  to  be  used  in  the  plan,  in  September  2014  Commission 
Services  requested  ICES  to  provide  plausible  values  around  FMSY  (ranges  for  FMSY)  for 
various  stocks  of  fish  and  shellfish  in  the  North  Sea41,  to  be  based  on  the  stock  biology, 
fishery characteristics and environmental conditions (see also Section 3.1.4). ICES provided 
FMSY ranges41 (Flower, Fupper) that are derived to deliver no more than a 5% difference in long-
term  yield  compared  with  FMSY.  Additionally,  in  order  to  be  consistent  with  the  ICES 
precautionary approach, the value for Fupper is capped, so that the probability of the spawning 
stock biomass (SSB) being below the limit biomass reference point (Blim) is no more than 5% 
(66 and Figure 5.2.2.2 below). 

Theoretically, wider (or narrower) ranges could be envisaged. However, for consistency and 
coherence with the Baltic plan, which has used the ICES definitions for the FMSY ranges, the 
North Sea plan will also use ICES' definitions.  

65   STECF report -Landing Obligation - Part 5 (demersal species for NWW, SWW and North Sea). 

66   SSB is the spawning stock biomass – the size of the adult part of a stock (in tonnes) that is able to contribute 
to reproduction in any given year; Blim and Bpa are conservation (or precautionary) reference points for any 
stock. The smaller the stock size, the greater the likelihood that reproduction will be impaired and the stock 
will fall below safe biological limits. If the stock size is below Blim there is a risk that the stock will suffer 
from severely reduced productivity. Bpa is the biomass reference point designed to have a low probability of 
being below Blim. When the spawning stock size is estimated to be above Bpa, the probability of impaired 
recruitment is expected to be low. 

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Bpa 

Figure  5.2.2.2.  Illustration  of  biomass-based  reference  points.  Blim  and  Bpa  are  precautionary  reference 
points related to the risk of impaired reproductive capacity. Diamonds show the variable recruitment for 
different spawning stock sizes (SSB) that has been observed over the years. Recruitment can be seen to be 
generally lower when the SSB is below Blim. 

In the Public Consultation (Annex I), the NGOs replied that they would like to set the upper 
bound of the range at the point estimate of FMSY. However, this would effectively set FMSY as 
a limit not as a target. The current practice is to consider FMSY as a target, which means that 
the actual fishing mortality would fluctuate around FMSY, sometimes above, sometimes below. 
Setting  FMSY  as  a  limit  would  mean  that  we  should  never  fish  above  that  level.  The  target 
fishing mortality would, therefore, need to be substantially lower than FMSY. This would lead 
to underfishing of virtually all stocks in the mixed fishery. 

Choice of species 

All  harvested  species  in  the  North  Sea  are  covered  by  the  obligations  and  objectives  of  the 
Basic Regulation and these same harvested species will be covered by this plan. Where FMSY 
ranges are available then those species will be listed accordingly. Currently these are the main 
target species. However, the plan is expected to deliver on the conservation objectives for the 
by-catch species as well and to evaluate the question of whether management of the species 
that  drive  the  fisheries  adequately  allows  for  the  management  of  the  by-catch  species, 
STECF29  carried  out  an  analysis  of  correlations  between  the  catches  of  driver  species 
identified in the plan and a variety of by-catch species. The analysis overall suggested limited 
correlation meaning that, at the gross level, management of the species that drive the fisheries 
would  not  be  adequate  for  the  management  of  the  by-catch  species.  However,  when  the 
analysis  was  performed  at  the  fleet  segment  level,  there  were  some  obvious  strong 
correlations between some driver and by-catch species in specific segments but not in others. 
This  suggests  the  scope  to  use  fleet  segment-related  management  measures  for  the  driver 
species  as a way of  managing  some of the by-catch species  through, for example, technical 
measures.  Under  the  framework  of  the  multi-annual  plan,  the  regionalised  governance  will 

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enable these kinds of measures to be introduced at the appropriate regional level to enable the 
appropriate management of the by-catch species. 

5.2.2.2.  Sub-options for quantitative analysis 

Achievement of FMSY 

Article  2(2)  of  the  Basic  Regulation  provides  for  a  binding  obligation  to  reach  FMSY  (see 
Section 3.4.1) but leaves some flexibility regarding the timeframe for reaching this target (by 
2015  where  possible  and  […]  at  the  latest  by  2020).  In  order  to  achieve  the  objective  of 
providing a transparent framework regarding FMSY, the plan should specify this timetable for 
the North Sea demersal stocks. The environmental, economic and social impacts of different 
timeframes should therefore be assessed.  

The time period for rebuilding stocks to precautionary levels 

Annex 2 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement67 contains guidelines for applying a precautionary 
approach  within  an  MSY  framework.  In  accordance  with  a  precautionary  approach, 
populations  need  to  be  maintained  within  safe  biological  limits  to  make  MSY  possible. 
However,  within  safe  biological  limits,  an  MSY  approach  is  necessary  to  achieve  MSY.  A 
precautionary approach is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for MSY. 

When a stock's biomass falls below safe biological limits then it needs to be rebuilt because 
when the spawning stock size is estimated to be below safe biological limits, the probability 
of  impaired  recruitment  is  expected  to  be  high66.  The  time  taken  to  rebuild  any  stock  is 
associated with the level of risk that managers are prepared to take in attempting to achieve 
management  objectives.  It  is  anticipated  that  catch  opportunities  would  be  set  at  a  fishing 
mortality rate that is lower than the lower bound of the FMSY range; this is coherent with the 
Baltic plan proposal. 

A biomass objective in a plan should be linked to a binding timetable; otherwise rebuilding 
the stock can be delayed and will not have any binding effect. Theoretically, many different 
timeframes can be imagined. However, it seems reasonable not to go beyond a recovery time 
of  10  years,  firstly  because  longer  timelines  would  make  the  objective  irrelevant  for  the 
current  generation  of  fishermen  and  would  thus  put  at  risk  the  support  for  this  policy 
objective. Secondly, if a stock is below a biomass safeguard threshold, there is a constant risk 
that  the  stock  might  collapse  and  the  stock  size  shrink  to  even  lower  levels.  Therefore,  the 
time at which the stock is left in such a risky state has to be limited.  

Recovery within 5 years seems to be a reasonable choice as an alternative sub-option. As the 
most important stock that is below Bpa at the moment is cod and as the TAC for this stock has 
a  limiting  effect  on  fishing  for  other  stocks,  a  faster  recovery  time  would  imply  a  stronger 
reduction of the TAC and thus have more negative economic and social consequences. 

6. 

ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS  

The main areas of uncertainty in the short-term are around the introduction of both the landing 
obligation and Regionalisation, introducing the new concept of results-based management, as 

67   UN. 1995. United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. 

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noted in Sections 3.1.3 and 3.4.2. This uncertainty has a knock-on effect for the evaluation of 
the  impacts  of  the  candidate  options,  as  by  nature  these  impacts  will  be  very  difficult  to 
quantify.  It  is  impossible  at  this  stage  to  know  what  Joint  Recommendations  the  Member 
States  may  put  forward  for  technical  and  other  conservation  measures  etc.  and  their 
subsequent  impacts,  and  the  landing  obligation  will  be  introduce  on  a  stepwise  basis, 
introducing more stringent, but currently unknown, exemptions each year. 

As  a  result,  the  approach  used  here  has  been  to  give  the  best  evaluation  of  the  possible 
impacts of each option, taking into account the introduction of the landing obligation in the 
new CFP. 

The impacts are considered in the light of various indicators which are:  

ENVIRONMENT: abundance of the main stocks (SSB; risk to Blim; risk to Bpa

66) 

ECONOMIC: landed value; profitability and revenue  

SOCIAL: employment; number of vessels.  

6.1. 

Option 1- Use the Basic Regulation (including the landing obligation) 

This option can be considered as a realistic baseline scenario in the sense that existing plans 
have lost most of their value in light of the MSY objective under the new CFP (see Section 
5.1.1). 

Description of the option and stakeholder support 

Under this option the current management plans are repealed and the new Basic Regulation 
(including  the  landing  obligation)  is  applied (see  Sections 3.4  and  5.2.1).  This  option  is  the 
baseline  against  which  any  added  value  of  the  mixed-fisheries  multi-annual  plan  can  be 
ascertained.  

The  large  majority  of  stakeholders  call  for  repealing  the  current  cod  plan,  which  is  seen  as 
rigid and overly restrictive. Generally, however, stakeholders are expecting a strategic multi-
annual framework that is provided by a new generation of plans, containing ranges of FMSY, 
rather  than  a  reversion  to  the  unpopular  situation  (before  the  plans)  whereby  TACs  are  set 
purely on an annual basis, without guidance and only steering on MSY. The high expectations 
from  EU  Institutions,  Member  States'  authorities  and  stakeholders  for  a  multi-annual  plan 
imply  that  this  option  would  only  be  acceptable  when  a  multi-annual  plan  would  have  no 
clear,  demonstrable  added  value.  Additionally,  repealing  a  plan  without  replacing  it  is 
considered not  to  be in  line  with  the  objectives  of  the  CFP  (i.e.  to  bring  more  stocks  under 
multi-annual management plans). Additionally, this approach would mean that the European 
Parliament would not be involved in the decision making. 

The  majority  of  the  important  fish  species  in  the  North  Sea  demersal  fishery  have  already 
achieved, or are close to achieving FMSY. Cod, however, is still being exploited above FMSY. 
The information available at the time of the consultation and scientific analysis68 was that cod 
was  fished  in  2014  at  a  fishing  mortality  of  F=0.4.  The  impact  of  achieving  FMSY  will, 

68   ICES  Advice  2014.  Cod  in  Subarea  IV  (North  Sea)  and  Divisions  VIId  (Eastern  Channel)  and  IIIa  West 

(Skagerrak). 

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therefore, mostly be driven by the rate at which the fishing mortality for cod is reduced from 
0.4 to FMSY. 

The following impacts will be described with the assumption that fishing mortality on cod is 
reduced from F=0.4 in 2014 to the point estimate of FMSY for cod, where F=0.22, at the start 
of 2016. 

Table  3.4.2  in  Section  3.4.2  above,  describing  the  evolution  of  the  problem  with  full 
implementation of the landing obligation, illustrates the effects that cod can have on the under 
exploitation of other species in the North Sea demersal fisheries. The single species scientific 
advice for cod in 2015 given in Table 3.4.2, and also in Table 6.1 below, shows the landings 
that  would  be  obtained  if  the  North  Sea  cod  stock  was  fished  at  FMSY  in  2015.  Table  3.4.2 
illustrates the impact of the choke effect that cod would exert on the landings of other stocks 
in  the  North  Sea  mixed-fisheries  assemblage;  it  also  shows  the  subsequent  impact  on  the 
value of those landings. Table 6.1 illustrates the impact of the reduction in catch on the size of 
the stock (SSB) the following year. The tables are highly illustrative of the scale of the impact 
of an immediate change to FMSY for cod. 

Table 6.1. The effects on landings and SSB, in tonnes, for six North Sea demersal fish species based on the 
mixed-fisheries advice for 201553 where, once the North Sea cod quota is caught, other fisheries catching 
cod would have to cease fishing.  

Single species 
landings advice 
2015 (t) 

Landings (t) if 
landing obligation 
fully applied  

SSB (t) 2016 
following single 
species advice 

SSB (t) 2016 
following full LO 
on cod 

% difference 
in SSB 

26713 

48176 

128376 

72854 

10973 

17190 

26713 

16592 

60175 

45797 

6469 

9654 

109100 

117426 

735259 

178867 

53783 

266012 

104855 

146776 

803339 

210160 

58524 

270986 

-4 

25 

9 

17 

9 

2 

Species 

Cod 

Haddock 

Plaice 

Saithe 

Sole 

Whiting 

6.1.1.  Environmental effects 

The landings of cod would be significantly reduced if  FMSY is achieved at the start of 2016, 
from around 40 000 t to 26 713 t. The choke effect that this would exert on the other stocks in 
the North Sea mixed-fisheries assemblage would result in significantly reduced catches of the 
other fish species. The knock-on effect of this would be positive for the stock size of all of the 
species because less fish would be removed in the fisheries, leaving larger stocks in the sea. 
However, the short term impact on SSB is small compared to larger long-term effects where 
leaving higher biomasses reduces the risks to any of the stocks falling below Bpa and Blim. The 
MSY  approach  is  intended  to  make  the  best  use  of  the  ecosystem  productivity  in  the  long 
term. Therefore, in the long term, once  MSY is achieved, the SSB for each stock would be 
expected to fluctuate around its maximum. All of the stocks have some way to go to achieve 
their maxima.  

6.1.2.  Economic effects  

The  converse  effect  is  true  for  the  economic  effects  on  the  North  Sea  industry.  Table  3.4.2 
shows  that  the  large  reduction  in  catch  opportunities  resulting  from  an  immediate  move  to 

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FMSY would have catastrophic effects on the industry. In 2016 alone, the value (based on 2012 
values) of the haddock landings could be reduced by more than 60%; plaice by 53%, saithe, 
sole and whiting by about 40%; turbot by around 20%. This equates to a loss of landed value 
(based on 2012 values) of around €200 million in one single year, a loss of 55% overall. 

Section 3.7 shows that the catching sector for North Sea demersal fish is very important to the 
Member  States  surrounding  the  North  Sea.  It  comprises  a  high  proportion  of  the  fleet  size, 
employment,  landed  value,  landed  weight,  fishing  time  (days  at  sea)  and  GVA  for  the 
majority of those Member States. Fleets carrying both major gear types (demersal trawls and 
seines and beam trawls) would be negatively impacted significantly as all of the species above 
are caught in those gears. These gear types catch around 90% by value (see Annex IV) of the 
top ten demersal species (which include all of those listed above). 

Cod  is  among  the  most  valuable  and  the  most  vulnerable  stocks in  the  mixture  of  demersal 
species  in  the  North  Sea.  Without  the  mixed-fisheries  considerations  and  the  flexibility  to 
match  TACs  between  stocks  within  the  boundaries  of  the  CFP  (as  indicated  above),  the 
introduction  of  the  landing  obligation  will  have  additional  negative  economic  and  social 
impacts, until a solution can be found and applied that isolates (decouples) cod from the other 
demersal  species.  Additionally,  the  economic  impact  of  the  effect  of  other  choke  species 
would also be negative for many of the North Sea fleets, with significant under-quota catches 
being landed with the corresponding negative economic effects (Table 3.4.2).  

While the discard plan to implement the landing obligation in the North Sea may give some 
temporary relief to these problems, in the longer term, the discard plan would be phased out 
(after 3 years) – leaving the industry with a stringent set of rules, with no room for flexibility 
or  exemptions.  This  will  aggravate  the  phenomenon  of  choke  species  into  almost  every 
fishery and even for virtually every fisherman individually; fisheries will have to be stopped 
before  the  whole  quota  basket  is  used  up,  with  the  corresponding  economic  losses  for 
fishermen and the industry as a whole. In addition, handling costs may increase. 

6.1.3. 

Social effects 

Fishermen  normally  work  under  the  concept  of  share  fishermen69,  therefore  negative 
economic  impacts  (in  terms  of  returns  and  revenues  of  vessels)  are  directly  translated  into 
either reduced income for the crew members, or, where possible in reduction of crew and job 
losses.   

The  social  effects  of  an  immediate  move  to  FMSY  would  therefore  also  have  catastrophic 
effects.  A  55%  reduction  in  landings  of  the  named  species  would  be  a  highly  significant 
reduction for the processing sector to absorb in a single year. 

Given  the  large  number  of  SMEs  and  micro-businesses  in  the  North  Sea  catching  and 
processing  sectors,  significant  direct  negative  impacts  on  both  sectors  would  occur.  In  the 
demersal catching sector, the top 35 fleet segments with the highest landed value (see Section 
3.7),  some  1100  vessels,  consist  exclusively  of  vessels  with  an  average  of  10  (FTE) 
employees or less, averaging 4 (FTE) employees (Table 3.7.1). The processing sector has 958 
companies  with  10  employees  or  less,  61%  of  the  processing  enterprises.  98%  of  these 
enterprises employ less than 250 people (Table 3.7.3). 

69   A  ‘share  fisherman’  is  someone  who  works  in  the  fishing  industry  that  is  paid  a  share  of  the  earnings  or 

profit of the boat and is not employed under a contract. 

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6.1.4.  Administrative costs 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  repeal  of  the  existing  management  plans  would  reduce 
administrative costs, particularly because the management of days at sea would no longer be 
required. However under this option, TACs would be set annually for each stock on the basis 
of single species MSY advice, with no account taken of mixed-fisheries interactions (Section 
5.2.1). Moreover, there would be no facility to rapidly adjust technical measures at regional 
level  to  reduce  the  impact  of  mixed  fisheries.  There  are  likely  to  be  indirect  administrative 
costs  arising  from  this.  One  example  is  that  choke  effects  caused  by  the  lack  of  coherence 
between  TACs  would  create  an  incentive  for  illegal  discarding,  which  would  need  to  be 
controlled through enhanced enforcement. 

6.2. 

Option 2- A single mixed-fisheries plan for North Sea demersal fisheries  

Description of the option, stakeholder support and consideration of the sub-options  

Under Option 2, there would be one plan, containing one single management framework for 
management of stocks caught together in demersal fisheries in the North Sea. It would aim to 
account  for  mixed-fisheries  interactions  (links  between  stocks  and  species)  and  enable 
coherence  in  the  definition  of  fishing  opportunities  for  the  stocks  it  would  cover.  It  would 
include any specific  or  alternative  conservation measures  for  by-catch  species  caught  in  the 
fisheries for which TACs are established. This corresponds to what the European Parliament 
and Member States expect and is the same approach as taken for the Baltic plan. 

The  large  majority  of  stakeholders  agree  that  multi-annual  plans  are  preferable  to  setting 
TACs  purely  on  an  annual  basis,  and  that  it  would  make  sense  to  develop  a  single  mixed-
fisheries  plan  covering  the  main  demersal  species  in  the  North  Sea.  Additionally,  the  new 
multi-annual  plan  will  provide  the  framework  for  more  a  flexible  regional,  results-based 
management approach that has strong stakeholder support. 

The sub-options relating to the latest date for achievement of FMSY in European fisheries (sub-
options 2.1. and 2.2) and stock rebuilding timetables, to be implemented when the spawning 
stock biomass is outside safe biological limits, (sub-options 2.3 and 2.4) were assessed by the 
STECF9. They  examined the impacts of achieving FMSY both immediately  and by 2020 and 
the impacts of achieving rebuilding within 5 or 10 years. These are compared to Option 1  – 
the Basic Regulation under the new CFP. The STECF analyis was performed using a variety 
of  models to give the best results possible, whilst recognising that the scope of the analysis 
was somewhat limited due to the lack of a holistic model that could adequately capture all of 
the  dynamics.  In  the  Public  Consultation,  several  stakeholders  seemed  to  prefer  an 
incremental reduction to FMSY by 2020. 

Under  each  sub-option  it  is  possible  to  set  fishing  opportunities  using  a  range  of  fishing 
mortalities, between a lower and an upper bound of FMSY as defined by ICES41 for each stock. 
STECF9  used  this  approach  -  an  envelope,  or  bracketing,  approach  -  where  the  scenarios 
tested  considered  the  likely  consequences  of  moving  to  the  target  (i.e.  the  lower  or  upper 
bound of FMSY) in the first or last year of the intended timescale (2016 or 2020) and keeping 
fishing mortality constant during the rest of the period. The levels of fishing mortality were 
set at both extremes of the FMSY range, to give a “best / worst case” scenario evaluation. This 
approach  informs  on  the  range  of  potential  outcomes  of  alternative  tactical  management 
decisions  and  is  the  most  pragmatic  approach  given  that  Council  decisions  on  the  annual 
fishing opportunites cannot be anticipated. Additionally, the variables of F and time to reach 

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FMSY, and of SSB and time to rebuild, give myriad possible sub-options that are not realistic 
to  model  (Figure  6.2.1).  Ultimately,  the  impacts  of  any  of  the  sub-options  are  highly 
dependent on the choices of fishing mortality that would be made each year by the Council 
under a single mixed-fisheries plan for North Sea demersal fisheries.  

Figure 6.2.1. Illustration to show, simplistically, how fishing could be reduced from the situation in 2015 to 
immediate achievement of the FMSY ranges in 2016 or a more prolonged achievement by 2020. Note that 
the trajectory could be smooth, as is illustrated, or stepwise and that there are, therefore, many ways to 
achieve the same result which are too numerous to model. 

6.2.1. 

Sub-option 2.1 - FMSY is achieved by the start of 2016 

6.2.1.1.  Environmental effects 

The  STECF  analysis9  shows  that  where  FMSY  is  achieved  by  the  start  of  2016,  in  the  short 
term, fishing at the upper bound of the FMSY range will generate larger catches for all stocks 
with the trade-offs of higher inter-annual variability and larger fishing mortalities - which can 
be  50%  above  those  in  Option  1.  The  consequence  of  this  is  lower  biomasses  than  under 
Option 1. This results in increased risks to the SSB falling below Blim for cod and below Bpa 
for haddock and sole.  

In  contrast,  however,  where  fishing  is  at  the  lower  bound  of  the  FMSY  range,  compared  to 
Option 1, the catches are lower and show lower inter-annual variability. The consequence of 
this is higher biomasses with subsequent reduction to the risks of SSB falling below both Bpa 
and Blim.  

The largest trade-off to fishing at the upper bound of the FMSY is keeping biomasses at lower 
levels.  

In the long term, fishing at the upper bound of the FMSY range generates larger catches than 
Option  1,  while  fishing  at  the  lower  bound  produces  smaller  catches.  The  trade-offs  are 
between biomass levels and the fishing mortality required to get those catches, which can be 
seen  as  a  proxy  for  variable  costs.  Fishing  at  the  upper  bound  of  the  FMSY  range  generates 
more catches but keeps biomass at lower levels, which implies an increase in biological risk 
and an increase in effort. 
Additionally, STECF9 concluded that to maximise the likelihood of achieving the objectives 
of  the  CFP,  setting  fishing  opportunities  at  the  upper  bound  of  the  FMSY  range  should  be 

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applied only in exceptional circumstances, such as in the case of cod where, in the short term, 
fishing opportunities need to be reconciled with the other species in the mixed fishery. Under 
the multi-annual plan this flexibility is inherent and gives considerable added value over and 
above Option 1. 

6.2.1.2.  Economic effects 

Two models were available to predict socio-economic effects. The first, SIMFISH, is limited 
to  2  flatfish  and  1  shrimp  species,  predominantly in  the southern  North  Sea,  and to  6  beam 
trawl  fleet  segments.  The  second,  FISHRENT,  contains  4  demersal  fish  species  and  10 
demersal trawl fleet segments. Neither model deals with mixed-fisheries considerations. The 
results are, therefore, limited. 

The economic effects vary depending on the level of F.  

If F is  set at  the upper bound of the  FMSY range more fishing  effort is required to catch the 
higher short-term catches; the large increase required in fishing mortality, when compared to 
Option 1, may not be balanced out by the effort required to catch the higher quantities of fish, 
leading to a less profitable fishery.  

However, setting F at the lower bound of the FMSY range results in reduced costs across most 
of the fleet segments with other indicators showing a variable result but generally better than 
under Option 1.  

For the mixed fishery as a whole, therefore, utilising the upper bound of the FMSY range for a 
substantial proportion of the stocks may impair the economic performance of the fleet in the 
long term whereas fishing at the lower bound of the FMSY range will give improved economic 
performance. 

Profitability is one of the economic indicators that can be predicted in both economic models. 
In SIMFISH, where FMSY is achieved by the start of 2016, only 2 of the 6 fleet segments show 
any likely impact on profitability compared to Option  1. The extent  of the impact will very 
much depend on choices of fishing mortality that would be made each year by the Council. 
The  2  fleet  segments  are  Dutch  beam  trawlers  between  24  and  40  m  vessel  length  and, 
secondly, those with a vessel length greater than 40 m. In FISHRENT, the profitability for all 
bar 3 of the the 10 fleet segments is likely to be affected, to a greater or lesser extent, by the 
attainment of FMSY by the start of 2016. Four fleet segments are most likely to be impacted. 
These are German demersal trawlers between 24 and 40 m vessel length; German and French 
demersal trawlers with vessel lengths greater than 40 m and UK demersal trawlers with vessel 
lengths between 12 and 18 m. 

6.2.1.3.  Social effects  

Two models were available to predict socio-economic effects. The first, SIMFISH, is limited 
to  2  flatfish  and  1  shrimp  species,  predominantly in  the  southern  North  Sea,  and to  6  beam 
trawl  fleet  segments.  The  second,  FISHRENT,  contains  4  demersal  fish  species  and  10 
demersal trawl fleet segments. Neither model deals with mixed-fisheries considerations. The 
results are, therefore, limited. 

The number of vessels is one of the social indicators can be modelled in both SIMFISH and 
FISHRENT. In SIMFISH, where FMSY is achieved by the start of 2016, only 2 of the 6 fleet 
segments  show  any  likely  impact  on  the  number  of  vessels  compared  to  Option  1,  and  to  a 
more limited extent than the possible change in profitability. Again, the extent of the impact 
will very much depend on choices of fishing mortality that would be made each year by the 

EN  

47 

EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Council.  The  2  fleet  segments  are  the  same  as  those  mentioned  above  for  the  economic 
indicator of profitability. In FISHRENT, the pattern is similar to that for profitability. All bar 
2  of  the  the  10  fleet  segments  are  likely  to  be  affected,  to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent,  by  the 
attainment of FMSY by the start of 2016, compared to Option 1. The vessel numbers of 2 other 
fleet segments are considerably more likely to be impacted than the others. These are German 
demersal trawlers between 24 and 40 m vessel length and UK demersal trawlers with vessel 
lengths between 12 and 18 m. 

Given  the  large  number  of  SMEs  and  micro-businesses  in  the  North  Sea  catching  and 
processing  sectors,  direct  negative  impacts  on  both  sectors  are  possible  with  fishing  at  the 
upper  bound  of  the  FMSY  range.  Conversely,  fishing  at  the  lower  bound  of  the  FMSY  range 
gives an improved outcome in comparison to Option 1. 

The socio-economic effects mentioned above will mostly affect SMEs and micro-businesses. 
Although  the  fleet  segments  themselves  may  each  employ  a  large  number  of  people,  each 
individual enterprise (in many cases these are skipper owned enterprises) itself will have only 
a small crew. For example, in the demersal catching sector, the top 35 fleet segments with the 
highest landed value (see Section 3.7), some 1100 vessels, consist exclusively of vessels with 
an average of 10 (FTE) employees or less, averaging 4 (FTE) employees (Table 3.7.1). The 
processing  sector  has  958  companies  with  10  employees  or  less,  61%  of  the  processing 
enterprises. 98% of these enterprises employ less than 250 people (Table 3.7.3). 

6.2.1.4.  Administrative costs 

One plan, containing one single management framework for the management of stocks caught 
together  in  demersal  fisheries  in  the  North  Sea  will  represent  considerable  simplification  in 
comparison to Option 1. Creating a single management framework, with in-built options for 
Regionalisation and adaptation will allow the plan to be responsive to changes in the fisheries, 
in the management advice and in the status of the stocks while keeping consistency between 
all  of  the  elements  relevant  for  the  management,  and  making  it  easier  to  ensure  coherence 
across the stocks caught together in the mixed fisheries. The administrative burden under this 
option will be considerably lower than under Option 1. 

6.2.2. 

Sub-option 2.2 - FMSY is achieved by 2020 at the latest 

6.2.2.1.  Environmental effects 

The  STECF  analysis  shows  that  if  the  achievement  of  FMSY  is  delayed  to  2020,  catches  are 
lower than, but not very different from, the average catches under sub-option 2.1. SSB is, on 
average, generally higher than the average SSB under sub-option 2.1. Overall this represents 
an  improvement  on  Option  1,  which  is  reflected  in  lower  risks  to  Bpa  and  Blim,  with  the 
exception of cod and sole’s risk to Blim.  

When  fishing  at  the  upper  bound  of  the  FMSY  range,  the  stocks  of  cod  and  sole  show  an 
increased risk to Blim and a significantly increased risk to Bpa for cod in 2020 when compared 
with  sub-option  2.1,  which  is,  in  turn,  an  increased  risk  on Option  1.  Overall,  in  the  longer 
term,  fishing  at  the  upper  bound  of  the  FMSY  range  generates  higher  catches  but  keeps 
biomasses lower and increases risks to the stocks of falling below both Blim and Bpa.  

Similarly to sub-option 2.1, if exploitation is at the lower bound of the FMSY range, compared 
to  Option  1  the  catches  are  lower  and  show  lower  inter-annual  variability,  leaving  higher 
biomasses  and  reducing  the  risks  to  Blim  and  Bpa.  Moreover,  biomasses  are  even  higher  and 
risks to Blim and Bpa are further reduced compared to sub-option 2.1. 

EN  

48 

EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Again, for the mixed fishery as a whole, the best approach to maximise long-term yield would 
be to attempt to reconcile F on mixed fisheries using Fs between the lower bound of the FMSY 
range and FMSY. This will lead to larger and healthier stocks. 

6.2.2.2.  Economic effects 

Under this sub-option, where achievement of FMSY is delayed to 2020, compared to Option 1, 
there  are  larger landings  for  the  fleets  but  these may  be  associated  with higher  costs  due to 
higher effort needed to make these  catches. Overall, fishing at the upper bound of the  FMSY 
range  leads  to  a  negative  impact  on  profitability  and  net  profit  because  effort  has  to  be 
sustained at a higher level.  

As  with  sub-option  2.1,  fishing  at  the  lower  bound  of  the  FMSY  range,  in  contrast,  leads  to 
higher profitability across many of the fleet segments because less effort is required to catch 
the fish, and will, therefore, give improved economic performance compared with Option 1. 

For the mixed fishery as a whole, therefore, utilising the upper bound of the FMSY range for a 
substantial proportion of the stocks may impair the economic performance of the fleet in the 
long term.  

Profitability can be predicted in both economic models. In SIMFISH, where FMSY is achieved 
by 2020, the effects on the fleet segments are more limited than with immediate attainment of 
FMSY  and  with  less  variable  effects.  Again,  only  2  of  the  6  fleet  segments  show  any  likely 
impact on profitability compared to Option 1. The extent of the impact will very much depend 
on  choices  of  fishing  mortality  that  would  be  made  each  year  by  the  Council.  The  2  fleet 
segments are different to those under immediate attainment of  FMSY; they are German beam 
trawlers  between  18  and  24  m  vessel  length  and  Dutch  beam  trawlers  with  vessel  lengths 
between  12  and  24  m.  In  FISHRENT,  the  same  fleet  segments  are  affected  as  for  the 
attainment  of  FMSY  by  the  start  of  2016  but  the  potential  effects  on  profitability  could  be 
larger, depending on the choice of fishing mortality, for the most affected segments. 

6.2.2.3.  Social effects 

The  number  of  vessels  can  be  modelled  in  both  SIMFISH  and  FISHRENT.  In  SIMFISH, 
where FMSY is achieved by 2020, the same 2 of the 6 fleet segments show any likely impact on 
the  number  of  vessels  compared  to  Option  1,  but  to  a  greater  extent  than  those  seen  with 
immediate  attainment  of  FMSY.  Again,  the  extent  of  the  impact  will  very  much  depend  on 
choices of fishing mortality that would be made each year by the Council. In FISHRENT, the 
pattern is similar to  that for the  immediate attainment  of FMSY. All  bar 2 of the the 10 fleet 
segments are likely to be affected, to a greater or lesser extent, by the attainment of FMSY by 
the start of 2016. The vessel numbers of 3 other fleet segments are considerably more likely to 
be impacted than the others. Two are the same as for the results  where FMSY is achieved by 
2016:    German  demersal  trawlers  between  24  and  40  m  vessel  length  and  UK  demersal 
trawlers  with  vessel  lengths  between  12  and  18  m;  the  third  fleet  segment  affected  is  the 
German demersal trawlers with a vessel length greater than 40 m.  

6.2.2.4.  Administrative costs 

The administrative costs, effects on simplification and the reduction of administrative burden 
under this sub-option are the same as those related to sub-option 2.1. 

EN  

49 

EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stock rebuilding timetables 

The  multi-annual  plan  introduces  biomass  safeguards  that  are  not  contained  in  the  Basic 
Regulation.  These  will  enable  stocks  to  be  rebuilt  above  precautionary  levels  (above  which 
there is a low probability that the recruitment will be impaired) whenever the SSB falls below 
the  levels  stipulated.  It  is  anticipated  that  catch  opportunities  would  be  set  at  a  fishing 
mortality  rate  that  is  lower  than  the  lower  bound  of  the  FMSY  range.  The  time  period  for 
recovery could be long or short. It will be discussed below in the short and medium term (5 
versus 10 years) – see Section 5.2.2.  

Currently,  the  majority  of  the  important  fish  species  in  the  North  Sea  demersal  fishery  are 
already within  safe biological limits.  The impact  on most  stocks of a short  term (5  year)  or 
medium term (10 year) recovery period when a stock falls below its precautionary biomass is 
not very pronounced except for cod where the risks to SSB, to Blim and to Bpa are very much 
higher  if  recovery  is  protracted.  This  is  because  cod  is  still  below  safe  biological  limits 
although  its  biomass  has  been  showing  a  steady  recovery  in  recent  years.  Nevertheless, 
because it is still below the biomass safeguard and fishing mortality is still above FMSY, the 
management of this stock will continue to drive the impacts on the mixed fisheries.  

The  significant  added  value  of  this  multi-annual  plan,  over  and  above  Option  1,  is  the 
inclusion of conservation measures that can be adopted to enable the rebuilding of stocks that 
fall below precautionary levels. 

6.2.3. 

Sub-option 2.3 - short (5 year) recovery period 

6.2.3.1.  Environmental effects 

A short recovery time will mean that F has to be reduced considerably to enable the stock to 
rebuild quickly. The knock-on effect of this would be positive for the stock size of all of the 
species because less fish would be removed in the fisheries, leaving larger stocks in the sea. 
The  STECF  analysis  shows  that  the  risk  for  cod  of  being  below  Bpa  by  2020  is  reduced 
significantly  in  comparison  to  the  Basic  Regulation  and  is  lower  than  in  the  slow  recovery 
scheme. 

From  a  stock  perspective,  fast  recovery  for  cod  seems  preferable  because  it  bears  a  smaller 
risk  with  lower  uncertainty  for  future  biomass  levels,  not  least  for  cod,  and  it  confers 
improved environmental sustainability. 

6.2.3.2.  Economic effects 

Similarly to sub-option 2.2, a short recovery time and fishing below the lower bound of the 
FMSY range leads to higher profitability across many of the fleet segments because less effort 
is  required  to  catch  the  fish,  and  will,  therefore,  give  improved  economic  performance 
compared with Option 1. 

6.2.3.3.  Social effects 

Fishing below the lower bound of the FMSY range gives an improved outcome in comparison 
to Option 1. It is, therefore, likely that the impacts on factors like job losses, reduction in crew 
numbers  etc.,  would  be  lower  than  under  Option  1.  This  would  be  more  beneficial  for  the 
large  number  of  SMEs  and  micro-businesses  in  the  North  Sea  catching  and  processing 
sectors. 

EN  

50 

EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2.3.4.  Administrative costs 

The administrative costs, effects on simplification and the reduction of administrative burden 
under this sub-option are the same as those related to the other sub-options. 

6.2.4. 

Sub-option 2.4 - long (10 year) recovery period 

6.2.4.1.  Environmental effects 

Compared to sub-option 2.3, the risk to Bpa for cod is higher if recovery is protracted, but still 
significantly lower than the risk under Option 1. 

6.2.4.2.  Economic effects 

The  economic  effects  on  the  fleet  are  improved  with  a  slower  recovery  time  compared  to 
Option 1 but more negative than with a fast recovery time. 

6.2.4.3.  Social effects 

Any  negative  economic  effects  will  mostly  affect  SMEs  and  micro-businesses.  In  the 
demersal catching sector, the top 35 fleet segments with the highest landed value (see Section 
3.7),  some  1100  vessels,  consist  exclusively  of  vessels  with  an  average  of  10  (FTE) 
employees or less, averaging 4 (FTE) employees (Table 3.7.1). The processing sector has 958 
companies  with  10  employees  or  less,  61%  of  the  processing  enterprises.  98%  of  these 
enterprises employ less than 250 people (Table 3.7.3). 

6.2.4.4.  Administrative costs 

The administrative costs, effects on simplification and the reduction of administrative burden 
under this sub-option are the same as those related to the other sub-options. 

Overall,  STECF  considered  that  a  fast  recovery  scenario  (5  years)  is  better  than  a  slow 
recovery, because it bears a smaller risk and smaller uncertainty to the future biomass levels, 
not least for cod, without making much difference to the fleets in the short term. 

6.3. 

Summary 

The  following  text  table  summarises  the  results  of  the  analysis  comparing  the  two  feasible 
options and sub-options. 

EN  

51 

EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Option 2- A single mixed-fisheries plan for North Sea demersal fisheries 

Option 1-Use the CFP 
Basic Regulation 
(including the landing 
obligation) 

Sub-option 2.1. 
FMSY achieved by the start of 2016 

Sub-option 2.2. 
FMSY achieved by 2020 at the latest 

Lower bound of 
FMSY 

Upper bound of 
FMSY 

Lower bound of 
FMSY 

Upper bound of 
FMSY 

Sub-option 2.3.      
5 year rebuilding 
period 

Sub-option 2.4.      

10 year rebuilding 
period 

Acceptability 

Low. The majority of 
stakeholders want the 
current plans to be 
repealed.  

High. There is high expectation from stakeholders for a strategic multi-annual framework enabling a flexible, regional results-based 
management. It will aim to account for mixed-fisheries interactions and enable coherence in the definition of fishing opportunities and 
include any specific or alternative conservation measures for by-catch species caught in the fisheries for which TACs are established  

Environmental 
effects 

Economic 
effects 

Single species TACs with 
no consideration of the 
mixed-fisheries 
interactions leading to 
discarding and /or choke 
effects. No biomass 
safeguards to recover 
stocks  

Severe negative economic 
effects with choke effects 
driving down profits. Short 
term negative effects with 
a 55% loss of landed value 
of major fish species in 
North Sea mixed fisheries 

Higher biomasses 
c.f. Option 1. 
Reduced risk of 
falling below safe 
biological limits 
(Bpa and Blim) 

Lower effort and 
reduced costs. 
Outcome better 
than Option 1 

Lower biomasses c.f. 
Option 1. Increased 
risk of falling below 
Bpa and Blim 

Higher biomasses 
and reduced risk of 
falling below Bpa 
and Blim c.f. sub-
option 2.1 

Increased risk c.f. 
sub-option 2.1. 
Significantly 
increased risk for 
cod and sole falling 
below Blim and for 
cod below Bpa 

Low risk of cod 
being below Bpa 
and Blim by 2020. 
Higher biomass for 
all stocks 

Low risk of cod 
being below Bpa 
and Blim by 2025 
but higher than in 
sub-option 2.3 

Higher effort 
required for short 
term increase in 
catch gives less 
profitable fishery 
than Option 1 

Higher profitability 
across many fleet  
segments to give 
improved 
economic 
performance c.f. 
Option 1 

Higher landings but 
higher costs 
leading to negative 
impact on 
profitability and net 
profit c.f. sub- 
Option 1 

Higher profitability 
across many fleet  
segments to give 
improved 
economic 
performance c.f. 
Option 1 

Improved c.f. 
Option 1 but lower 
than sub-option 2.3 

Social effects 

Reduced income for crew 
members. Likely reduction 
of crew numbers and job 
losses – mostly affecting 
SMEs. 

Improved outcome 
for SMEs and 
micro-businesses 
in comparison to 
Option 1 

Direct negative 
effects on SMEs and 
microbusinesses 
likely worse than 
Option 1 

Improved outcome 
in comparison with 
Option 1 

More negative 
effects for SMEs 
and micro-
businesses than in 
Option 1 

Improved outcome 
in comparison with 
Option 1 

Improved c.f. 
Option 1 but lower 
than sub-option 2.3 

Administrative 
burden 

Mixed. Some reduction 
and some increase. 

One  plan,  containing  one  single  management  framework  for  the  management  of  stocks  caught  together  in  demersal  fisheries  in  the 
North Sea will represent considerable simplification. The administrative burden under Option 2 will be considerably lower than under 
Option 1 

EN  

52 

EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For  the  management  plan  sub-options  it  is  very  important  to  remember  that,  in  reality, 
Council will set fishing opportunities between the lower and upper bounds of FMSY as defined 
by ICES41; this means that the outcome within each sub-option will be different than fishing 
at  either  the  higher  or  lower  bound  of  the  range.  However,  the  outcome  would  not  be  that 
different when compared for the same rate of F for the different sub-options.  

Additionally,  it  should  be  noted  that  fishing  at  FMSY  does  not  guarantee  that  a  stock  will 
remain above its safeguard biomass. In the case of cod, the current fishing mortality is above 
FMSY,  and  the  biomass  is  below  the  safeguard  biomass.  Although  these  are  two  different 
issues  to  be  addressed  they  both  require  the  same  solution,  which  is  a  reduction  in  fishing 
mortality.  The  impacts  of  a  rapid  reduction  in  fishing  mortality  to  FMSY  and  of  a  rapid 
recovery of the biomass levels are therefore essentially the same. 

Compared to the Basic Regulation, a  single management framework for the management of 
stocks  caught  together  in  demersal  fisheries  in  the  North  Sea  will  confer  a  number  of 
advantages: 

  simplification: 

the  single  management  framework,  with 

in-built  options  for 
Regionalisation  and  adaptation  will  allow  the  plan  to  be  flexible  to  deal  with 
conservation measures and issues such as using fleet-related management measures for 
the driver species as a way of managing some of the by-catch species 

 

 

the  FMSY  range  approach  appears  to  confer  flexibility  that  could  help  reconcile 
difficulties arising in the mixed-fisheries context 

the use of FMSY ranges gives scope to reconcile TACs for different species so that they 
become closer to being consistent with FMSY 

  however, the use of the FMSY range approach should only be employed when informed 

by objective mixed-fisheries advice  

 

the biomass safeguards provide an important level of protection against over-fishing 

The Basic Regulation stipulates that "the maximum yield sustainable exploitation rate shall be 
achieved by 2015 where possible and on a progressive incremental basis at the latest by 2020 
for all stocks." The sub-options 2.1 and 2.2 are illustrative of the effects of earlier versus later 
attainment of FMSY. 

Whether fishing mortalities are chosen at the lower or upper bounds of the FMSY ranges does 
make a difference, with negative effects on risk and profitability at the upper bounds. Fishing 
at  the  upper  bounds  of  the  ranges  will  maintain  smaller  stock  biomasses,  require  greater 
fishing effort (and therefore have negative consequences in terms of carbon dioxide emissions 
and  profitability)  and,  as  a  consequence  of  higher  fishing  mortalities,  tend  to  reduce  the 
average ages in the populations which is not indicative of a healthy stock70. Additionally, the 
impact of the FMSY range approach is highly dependent on the choices of fishing mortality that 
would be  made each year by the Council  under  a single mixed-fisheries plan for North  Sea 
demersal  fisheries.  ICES  has  specified  the  ranges  of  FMSY  that  should  be  followed41  for  a 
number  of  North  Sea  demersal  stocks.  For  precautionary  management,  and  to  provide 
maximum long term benefits for the stocks,  it has stipulated that the F targets set should be 

70   Descriptor 3 of Directive 2008/56/EC Of The European Parliament And Of The Council of 17 June 2008 
establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy (Marine Strategy 
Framework Directive). 

EN  

53 

EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
between  the  lower  bound  of  FMSY  and  the  point  estimate  of  FMSY.  STECF  similarly 
demonstrated9 that there is an increased risk of over-exploitation if fishing opportunities are 
set in line with the upper bounds of the FMSY ranges, particularly if several stocks in a mixed 
fishery are involved. Similarly there are increased economic and social risks to fishing at the 
upper  bounds  of  the  FMSY  ranges.  However,  setting  fishing  opportunities  at  the  level  of  the 
upper  bound  of  the  FMSY  range  could  be  applied  but  only  in  exceptional  circumstances  and 
only  in  the  short  term,  such  as  in  the  case  of  cod  where  fishing  opportunities  need  to  be 
reconciled with the other species in the mixed fishery. These findings are in accordance with 
Recital  7  of  the  Basic  Regulation  that  states  "The  exploitation  rates  should  be  achieved  by 
2015. Achieving those exploitation rates by a later date should be allowed only if achieving 
them by 2015 would seriously jeopardise the social and economic sustainability of the fishing 
fleets  involved.  After  2015,  those  rates  should  be  achieved  as  soon  as  possible  and  in  any 
event no later than 2020". 

7. 

COMPARING THE OPTIONS 

The  new  CFP  introduces  a  number  of  changes  to  the  way  fisheries  are  managed  in  the 
European Union. The most important of these are the landing obligation and Regionalisation. 
These represent a fundamental shift in fisheries management and will change the behaviour of 
the  fleets  in  ways  that  are  difficult  to  predict.  This  means  that  any  proposals  for  new 
management measures must be evaluated against a baseline that will in any case change.  

Any new management measures must be coherent with the requirements of the new CFP. This 
means that they must facilitate the landing obligation, establish the framework necessary for 
the implementation of Regionalisation and take into account mixed-fisheries interactions.  

7.1. 

Assessment against the environmental, economic and social impacts 

Table 7.1 provides a comparison of the options and sub-options in terms of the environmental, 
economic  and  social  impacts  of  a  new  mixed-fisheries  multi-annual  plan  compared  to 
managing according to the Basic Regulation.  

Table 7.1 shows that management under sub option 2.2, where FMSY is achieved by 2020 at 
the latest, is more advantageous than under either sub-option 2.1 (where FMSY is achieved by 
the start of 2016) or Option 1 – use the CFP Basic Regulation. The suite of measures under 
sub-option  2.2  has  the  most  advantageous  outcome  when  analysing  the  trade-offs  between 
environmental,  economic  and  social  impacts,  especially  when  fishing  between  the  lower 
bound  of  FMSY  and  the  point  estimate  of  FMSY;  this  ensures  precautionary  management  and 
provides  the  maximum  long  term  benefits  for  the  stocks'  status,  economic  returns  and 
environmental impact. 

EN  

54 

EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table  7.1.  Comparison  of  options  and  sub-options  in  terms  of  achieving  the  objectives  of  revising  the 
management of demersal fisheries in the North Sea. 

Option 1- Use the 
CFP Basic 
Regulation 
(including the 
landing 
obligation) 

Option 2- A single mixed-fisheries plan for North Sea demersal 
fisheries 

Sub-option 
2.1. FMSY 
achieved by 
the start of 
2016 

Sub-option 2.2.   
FMSY achieved 
by 2020 at the 
latest 

Sub-option 2.3.      

Sub-option 2.4.      

5 year 
rebuilding 
period 

10 year 
rebuilding 
period 

Environmental 
effects 

Economic 
effects 

0 

0 

+ 

++ 

++/-* 

++/-* 

Social effects 

0 

++/-* 

++/-* 

++ 

+ 

+ 

+ 

+ 

+ 

Key: 0 = neutral impact, + = positive impact, ++ = very positive impact (relative to other options), - = negative 
impact, +/- = both positive and negative impacts 

*  N.B.  Fishing  between  FMSY  and  Flower  gives  much  more  positive  results  than  the  Basic  Regulation. 
However, fishing above FMSY for more than very short time periods gives more negative results than the 
Basic Regulation. 

7.2. 

Qualitative assessment against the general and specific objectives 

A comparison of the Basic Regulation and a new mixed-fisheries multi-annual plan relative to 
the objectives of revising the management of demersal fisheries in the North Sea is provided 
in Table 7.2. 

Table 7.2 shows Option 2 as the plan in its entirety, rather than divided into the sub-options 
that have been analysed for their respective impacts. Each sub-option scores the same against 
each objective. It is  only when they are compared against the environmental, economic and 
social  indicators  (Table  7.1  above),  that  the  true  differences  between  the  sub-options  are 
apparent.  The two tables together enhance the ability to  choose  the preferred option (taking 
into account the sub-options within Option 2). 

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Table  7.2.  Comparison  of  options  in  terms  of  achieving  the  objectives  of  revising  the  management  of 
demersal fisheries in the North Sea. 

Options 

Option 1 – Basic 
Regulation 

Option 2 – mixed-
fisheries multi-
annual plan 

s
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v
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O

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p
S

Provide a transparent framework to achieve 
Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) by 
2020 at the latest 

Apply the precautionary approach 

Simplification of EU legislation and of the 
management of European fisheries 

Reduce the extent of underfishing in a 
mixed fishery under a landing obligation by 
introducing FMSY ranges 

Establish biomass safeguards in order to 
enable the precautionary approach 
established in Article 2(2) of the Basic 
Regulation 

Facilitate the application of the landing 
obligation introduced in the reformed CFP 

Establish the framework necessary for the 
implementation of regionalisation within 
the North Sea area 

Remove the days at sea regime which 
proved ineffective and which is no longer 
necessary given that the new Basic 
Regulation addresses the same underlying 
problems with different means 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

++ 

++ 

++ 

++ 

++ 

++ 

++ 

++ 

Key: 0 = neutral impact, + = positive impact, ++ = very positive impact (relative to other options), - = negative 
impact, +/- = both positive and negative impacts 

7.3. 

Effectiveness, Efficiency, Coherence and Acceptability 

Effectiveness 

Table 7.2 shows that  Option  2 is  considerably  more effective than Option  1 with  respect  to 
meeting  the  objectives.  The  plan  would  ensure  that  the  main  stocks  covered  by  the  plan 
achieve their MSY targets by specified deadlines whilst minimising any conflicts between the 
management requirements for each of the stocks. The plan also introduces biomass safeguards 
that require action to recover stocks that fall outside safe biological limits. It is apparent from 
Table  7.1  that  a  faster  recovery  period  (sub-option  2.3)  is  preferable  to  a  slower  one  (sub-
option  2.4)  because  it  confers  greater  environmental  benefits  to  the  fish  stocks  than  slower 
recovery with minimal differences in the economic and social impacts. The plan would allow 
for  adaptation  mechanisms  in  specified  technical  measures  to  take  measures  aiming  at 
decoupling fisheries and helping to achieve the conservation objectives of the plan, as well as 
to minimise impacts of fishing on the marine environment. This would be done through the 
regionalised  governance  possibilities  under  the new  CFP.  At  the same  time,  the  plan  would 

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allow to introduce implementation elements for the landing obligation in light of the limited 
lifespan  of  discard  plans.  One  plan,  containing  one  single  management  framework  for  the 
management  of  stocks  caught  together  in  demersal  fisheries  in  the  North  Sea  will  represent 
considerable simplification compared to Option 1. 

These actions represent additional added value of Option 2 over and above Option 1. 

The stocks of plaice, saithe and sole are already fished within their MSY ranges, so it will be 
relatively  simple  for  the  Council  to  fix  TACs  for  these  species  that  minimise  any  choke 
effects  in  the  mixed  fisheries.  More  problematic  are  cod  and  haddock.  It  can  be  seen  from 
Figure  5.1.4.1  that  it  is  impossible  to  find  levels  of  fishing  mortality  on  these  stocks  that 
would  be  coherent  with  one  another,  or  indeed  with  the  fishing  mortalities  of  plaice,  saithe 
and sole. This does not mean that the TACs are necessarily incompatible; that would depend 
on the degree of interaction in the mixed fisheries. It is probable that, for example, the TAC 
for sole could be fixed independently to that of haddock with few, if any, problems. The same 
is  not  true  for  cod  and  haddock,  which  are  highly  associated  in  the  mixed  fisheries.  The 
degree to which the TACs on these species could be made compatible would depend not only 
on the relative sizes of the TAC, but also on the degree to which the fisheries on cod and the 
fisheries  on  haddock  could  be  decoupled,  perhaps  through  technical  measures  or  through 
changes  in  the  spatial  or  seasonal  behaviour  of  the  fleets.  This  illustrates  further  the 
effectiveness and added value of Option 2, where both TAC levels and appropriate regional 
technical measures can be considered together in the same legal framework. 

Efficiency 

Option 2 creates more efficient management than Option 1 because it provides a framework 
within  which  flexibility  and  rapid  decision  making,  tailored  to  the  characteristics  of  the 
specific  sea  basin,  will  be  possible  through  a  regional  decision  making  process.  This  is  the 
case regardless of the sub-options chosen within Option 2. The administrative burden under 
Option 2 would be expected to be considerably lower than under Option 1. Under Option 2, 
more coherent TACs and regional technical measures will reduce unwanted catches and hence 
reduce  the  burden  on  control  and  enforcement.  Overall,  the  single  mixed-fisheries  multi-
annual  plan  represents  consolidation  of  the  management  of  the  North  Sea  demersal  fish 
stocks.  

Coherence 

Option  1 is  coherent  with  the  overarching  objectives  of the CFP  but  it  is  not  fully  coherent 
with  regionalised  decision-making  as  envisaged  in  the  CFP.  Nor  is  it  coherent  with  the 
objectives of the CFP to take into account mixed-fisheries interactions. This option provides 
only limited scope for simplification. 

Option 2 is coherent with the objectives of the CFP and provides a governance structure that 
is fully in line with Regionalisation.   

Acceptability 

The  majority  of  stakeholders  agree  that  multi-annual  plans  are  preferable  to  setting  TACs 
purely on an annual basis, and that it would make sense to develop a single mixed-fisheries 
plan  covering  the  main  demersal  species  in  the  North  Sea13.  This  shows  that  Option  2  is 
preferable  to  Option  1.  The  majority  of  contributors  think  that  the  current  North  Sea 
management plans need to be replaced and that a mixed-fisheries multi-annual approach is the 

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right way forward. Contributors from Member States' administrations and the fishing industry 
would  like to  see  simple,  non-prescriptive  regulation  –an  EU  framework  including  strategic 
objectives and general principles with detailed rules drawn up through the regionalised model. 
A  new  mixed-fisheries  multi-annual  plan  is  seen  as  an  opportunity  to  improve  the 
management of North Sea fisheries. 

Table 7.3. Comparison of the options in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and acceptability in 
achieving the objectives. 

Effectiveness 

Efficiency 

Coherence 

Acceptability 

Option 1 

Option 2 

0 

++ 

0 

++ 

0 

++ 

0 

++ 

Key: 0 = neutral impact, + = positive impact, ++ = very positive impact (relative to other options), - = negative 
impact, +/- = both positive and negative impacts 

7.4. 

The preferred option 

The  preferred  option  is  a  mixed-fisheries  multi-annual  plan  with  the  sub-options  of  the 
achievement of FMSY by 2020 at the latest, in line with the objectives of the Basic Regulation, 
with faster recovery of a stock when it falls below safe biological limits. Once FMSY has been 
reached for any particular stock, exploitation should not exceed FMSY for that stock. 

This  suite  of  measures  has  the  most  advantageous  outcome  when  analysing  the  trade-offs 
between  environmental,  economic  and  social  impacts  (Table  7.1),  especially  when  fishing 
between the lower bound of FMSY and the point estimate of FMSY; this ensures precautionary 
management  and  provides  the  maximum  long  term  benefits  for  the  stocks'  status,  economic 
returns  and  environmental  impact.  Additionally,  ICES41  and  STECF9  have  both  stipulated, 
through  considerable  analysis,  that  there  is  an  increased  risk  of  over-exploitation  if  fishing 
opportunities  are  set  in  line  with  the  upper  bounds  of  the  FMSY  ranges,  particularly  where 
several stocks in a mixed fishery are involved.  

The operational objectives that would enable this suite of measures are: 

  keep fishing mortality within the target fishing mortality ranges defined by ICES for 

the main target species 

  maintain spawning stock biomass above the biomass safeguards (MSY Btrigger and the 

limit biomass Blim) defined by ICES for the main target species 

  ensure that fishing practices are adopted, through Regionalisation, to take into account 

the specific characteristics of the fisheries in the North Sea 

8. 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

Any  multi-annual  plan  must  have  the  means  to  ensure  its  correct  implementation  and 
application.  As  the  preferred  option  is  a  regulation  that  is  directly  applicable,  there  are  no 
problems  with  implementation.  Correct  application,  however,  has  to  be  monitored  and 
evaluated.  

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8.1.  Monitoring 

The Commission has to monitor whether the MSY related fishing mortality targets prescribed 
by  the  plan  are  being  met.  This  is  relatively  easy  as  these  targets  have  to  be  translated  into 
total  allowable  catches  (TACs)  to  be  adopted  by  Council  in  its  annual  fishing  opportunies 
regulation. Adopting TACs that do not correspond to the provisions of the plan would simply 
be illegal.  

The same goes for the achievement of the precautionary approach. The Commission proposal 
for the annual fishing opportunities regulation is based on annual ICES advice which again is 
based  on  catch  data  and  scientific  sampling  data  provided  by  Member  States  fulfilling  the 
obligations  they  have  under  the  EU  data  collection  regulation71.  If  a  stock  is  below  the 
precautionary targets established by the plan, ICES would advise what fishing mortality has to 
be adopted to move biomass above the theshold and within the timeframe provided for in the 
plan. Council would be legally bound to adopt TACs based on these fishing mortality rates. 

It  also  has  to  be  ensured  that  the  TACs  adopted  by  Council  are  being  respected.  The  EU 
fisheries  control  regulation  (Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1224/2009)72  contains  provisions 
that oblige Member States to control whether fishermen respect the CFP rules. Among other 
rules,  Member  States  are  obliged  to  carry  out  landing  inspections  and  cross  check  whether 
fishermen correctly record their catches to make sure that fishermen do not land more catches 
than their quota allows and to ensure that no fish caught illegally enters markets. The Control 
Regulation also contains provisions on the deduction of quota applied to Member States in the 
form of reduced fishing opportunities if a quota from the previous year had been overfished. 

The application of the ranges for FMSY and their effects will have to be monitored throughout 
the application of the plan. It has to be ensured that Council does not set TACs that are based 
in the upper part of the F ranges without having a justification stemming from mixed-fisheries 
/  choke  species  problems.  DG  MARE  deals  annually  with  the  preparation  of  Council 
decisions  and  with  ICES  stock  advice,  so  no  special  monitoring  arrangements  have  to  be 
taken. If TACs are set too often in the upper part of the range, the Commission can react by 
proposing an amendment to the plan. 

Additionally,  to  ensure  that  Regionalisation  works  effectively,  the  Commission  will  ensure 
that the Joint Recommendations submitted by Member States are scientifically sound and will 
meet  their  objectives.  This  will  be  ensured  through  the  evaluation  of  each  Joint 
Recommendation by the STECF. 

8.2. 

Ex-ante evaluation of delegated acts (regionalised measures) 

All Joint Recommendations proposed by Member States will have to be evaluated by STECF 
before being adopted as a Delegated Act. A similar evaluation has been made for the discard 
plans that are being adopted based on the delegation in the Basic Regulation. Commission has 

71   Council Regulation (EC) No 199/2008 of 25 February 2008 concerning the establishment of a Community 
framework for the collection, management and use of data in the fisheries sector and support for scientific 
advice regarding the Common Fisheries Policy. (OJ L 060, 5.3.2008). 

72   Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009 of 20 November 2009 establishing a Community control system for 
ensuring compliance with the rules of the common fisheries policy, amending Regulations (EC) No 847/96, 
(EC) No 2371/2002, (EC) No 811/2004, (EC) No 768/2005, (EC) No 2115/2005, (EC) No 2166/2005, (EC) 
No  388/2006,  (EC)  No  509/2007,  (EC)  No  676/2007,  (EC)  No  1098/2007,  (EC)  No  1300/2008,  (EC)  No 
1342/2008 and repealing Regulations (EEC) No 2847/93, (EC) No 1627/94 and (EC) No 1966/2006. (OJ L 
343, 22.12.2009). 

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already  successfully  asked  Member  States  to  modify  their  Joint  Recommendations  in  cases 
where STECF concluded that provisions foreseen in a Joint Recommendations were not based 
on correct scientific advice. 

When  it  comes  to  technical  measures  that  serve  to  decouple  the  mixed  fishery  in  order  to 
increase its economic profitability, there is a strong incentive for Member States to propose 
Joint  Recommendations  that  include  effective  measures.  If  Member  States  do  not  suggest 
such technical measures, one potential instrument to solve the choke species problem remains 
unused, thus the productivity of the fishery decreases.  

There is a similar incentive for Member States to suggest effective technical measures aiming 
at achieving the conservation targets of the plan. If Member States do not suggest appropriate 
technical  measures,  the  TAC  of  the  species  concerned  will  have  to  be  reduced  to  be  in 
compliance  with  the  plan.  That  again  constitutes  a  strong  incentive  for  Member  States  to 
suggest appropriate technical measures. 

Member States will also have a strong incentive to control compliance with these measures, as 
these measures only successfully decouple the mixed fisheries or achieve conservation targets 
if they are really enforced. In addition, it can be expected that the Regionalisation procedure 
increases Member States' support for the agreed measures as Member States will play a much 
more  active  role  in  developing  these  measures.  This  should  also  increase  compliance  by 
Member States. 

The  Control  Regulation  also  obliges  Member  States  to  verify  within  their  Exclusive 
Economic  Zones  whether  CFP  provisions  are  complied  with.  Previous  EU-level  technical 
measures contain provisions to make control easier (e.g. provisions to have only one gear type 
on  board  at  a  time,  so  that  fisheries  inspectors  easily  determine  which  gear  has  been  used 
during the fishing trip). Joint Recommendations could include similar provisions, if deemed 
sensible by Member States. 

Measures  adopted  through  Regionalisation  are  Union  Measures,  even  though  they  are 
developed  by  regional  groups  of  Member  States.  The  Control  Regulation  then  obliges 
Member States to control the application of these rules. The Commission will be obliged to 
monitor  the  correct  implementation  of  the  rules  (and  of  the  control  systems)  by  Member 
States. In suspected cases of non-compliance by Member States the Commission will follow 
the standard procedures, i.e. EU pilots and infringement procedures. 

8.3. 

Ex-post evaluation of the plan 

The plan, and its environmental, economic and social effects, should be evaluated by STECF 
5 years after its entry into force. An earlier evaluation is not sensible, due to fact that there is 
an  important  time  gap  between  implementation  of  the  plan  and  when  the  data  required  for 
evaluation are available. STECF notes that a period of 48 months after implementation would 
be required in order to have 3 years of biological data at its disposal and 60 months for 3 years 
of economic data to be available73. It also has to be noted that the regulatory environment in 
the  North  Sea  demersal  fisheries  will  be  under  constant  change  due  to  the  stepwise 
introduction  of  the  landing  obligation  between  2016  and  2019.  The  use  of  the  FMSY  ranges 
will  likely  change  over  time  because  with  every  additional  stock  which  comes  under  the 

73 Report of the STECF Study Group on the Evaluation of Fishery Multi-Annual Plans (SGMOS 09-02). 

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landing  obligation  other  choke  species  challenges  might  arise.  This  is  another  reason  to 
evaluate the plan only after the landing obligation has been fully in force for some years. 

Indicators to be used for the evaluation should be environmental (fishing mortality and SSB 
for all relevant stocks), economic (net profit margin, return on fixed capital assets (ROFTA) 
and gross value added by full-time equivalent (GVA/FTE) as well as social (total employed, 
total  FTE,  average  wage).  It  would  be  advisable  to  analyse  economic  and  social  indicators 
both  on  an  aggregated  as  well  as  on  a  fleet-segment  level,  to  see  whether  the  management 
options taken had specific effects in specific segments. 

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ANNEX I 

SUMMARY OF PUBLIC CONSULTATION 

Introduction 

Council  Regulation  (EU)  No  1380/2013  on  the  new  Common  Fisheries  Policy  (CFP), 
establishes  new  objectives  and  means  for  sustainable  fisheries,  including  the  objective  of 
maintaining  populations  of  harvested  species  above  levels  that  can  produce  the  maximum 
sustainable yield and achieving an exploitation rate consistent with this objective as soon as 
possible and at the latest by 2020 for all stocks.  

The  new  CFP  also  introduces  a  landing  obligation,  which  means  that  unwanted  catches  of 
species that are subject to quotas can no longer be discarded, and objectives that contribute to 
achieving  "good  environmental  status"  (GES)  as  required  by  Directive  2008/56/EC  (the 
Marine Strategy Framework Directive, or MSFD). 

The introduction of the landing obligation represents a fundamental shift in the way in which 
fisheries are managed. In the North Sea demersal fisheries, several species are usually caught 
together in the same net. The management plans currently in place were conceived when there 
was  no  landing  obligation.  This  limits  their  effectiveness,  because  under  the  previous  CFP, 
fishing could continue in these mixed fisheries even if the quota for one or more of the species 
concerned  was  exhausted.  The  unwanted  catches  would  simply  be  discarded.  Indeed,  there 
was a legal obligation to discard catches in excess of quota, and also to discard any fish that 
were  below  the  minimum  landing  size.  This  will  no  longer  be  the  case.  Under  the  landing 
obligation, the fishery should be stopped whenever the quota for any one of the species in the 
mixture is exhausted. Moreover, all under-sized fish must be landed and counted against the 
quota.  

In line with the principles and objectives set out in Articles 9 and 10 of the Basic Regulation 
(Council  Regulation  (EU)  No  1380/2013),  and  to  the  extent  possible,  multi-annual  plans 
should become the main repository for all of the elements and instruments necessary for the 
management of the fisheries and stocks that a plan encompasses. This ambition would need to 
take  into  account  the  developments  regarding  the  landing  obligation  and  technical 
conservation  measures  which  are  underway  in  a  parallel  process  to  development  of  this 
proposal.  It  could  be  envisaged  that  recommended  measures  or  approaches  resulting  from 
those developments be incorporated into any multi-annual plan, through regionalisation. 

A new multi-annual plan for the North Sea would aim to fulfil the objectives of the new CFP 
i.e.  to  achieve  an  exploitation  rate  consistent  with  maximum  sustainable  yield  (MSY),  to 
ensure  high  and  stable  yields  for  the  industry,  while  taking  into  account  mixed-fisheries 
interactions. It would respond to the challenges under the landing obligation, and would seek 
a  results-based  approach  by  enabling  tailor  made  management  measures  to  be  produced  in 
close consultation with fishers and Member States. It would also contribute to the objectives 
of  the  Marine  Strategy  Framework  Directive,  achieving  high  long-term  yields  while 
maintaining productive and healthy fish stocks within functioning marine ecosystems. 

The views of stakeholders and the public in general were sought through a public consultation 
on the best way forward to modernise and rationalise multi-annual plans in the context of the 
new CFP. This document reports on the outcome of this consultation. 

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The overview of the contributions presented is based on the written contributions received. It 
is neither intended to draw conclusions regarding the options proposed nor does it represent 
the  position  of  the  Commission.  It  will  support  the  preparation  of  the  Impact  Assessment 
report,  which  in  turn  will  be  the  basis  for  developing  the  Commission's  proposal  for  a  new 
multi-annual plan for North Sea fisheries.  

Contributions received 

The  public  consultation  took  place between  9  February and  4  May  2015,  with  a  total  of  25 
written contributions received. Individual contributions are available on the dedicated website 
to this consultation74. 

Table AI.1 provides a summary of the submissions by stakeholder grouping. 

Table AI.1. Breakdown of contributions to the Public Consultation on North Sea multi-annual plans 

Stakeholder Group 

Number of contributions  Examples 

Advisory Councils 

1 (4%) 

MED AC, SWW AC, NS AC, NWW AC, BS AC 

Member States 
administrations 

Civil society 
organisations 

4 (16%) 

Ministries, Local government 

9 (36%) 

Environmental NGOs 

Industry/interest  groups 
stakeholder organisations 

9 (36%) 

Fishermen's  representative  organisations,  ,  consumer 
groups, European transport workers federation, anglers  
organisations, fisheries consultants 

General Public 

2 (8%) 

Citizens  with  differing  backgrounds  (e.g.  retired 
fisherman, anglers, member of NGO)  

General comments 

The  majority  of  contributors  think  that  the  current  North  Sea  long  term  management  plans 
need  to  be  replaced  as  they  have  become  outdated  due  to  the  introduction  of  the  landing 
obligation.  Member  States'  and  industry's  contributions  strongly  criticise  the  current  effort-
based  regime  that  does  not  incentivise  fishermen  to  fish  more  selectively.  The  majority  of 
stakeholders  state  that  a  mixed-fisheries  multi-annual  approach  is  the  right  way  forward. 
Contributors from Member States' administrations and the fishing industry would like to see 
simple,  non-prescriptive  regulation  –an  EU  framework  including  strategic  objectives  and 
general principles with detailed rules drawn up through the regionalised model. A new mixed-
fisheries multi-annual plan is seen as an opportunity to improve the management of North Sea 
fisheries. 

Almost  all  NGO  contributors  highlight  that  the  precautionary  approach  and  the  ecosystem-
based approach should be respected in all new MAPs. With respect to the way that TACs will 
be set in the future, almost all NGOs state that FMSY must be an upper limit and not a target 
value. NGOs strongly argue against FMSY ranges where the upper bound of the range is above 
FMSY. NGOs also want biomass reference points which trigger previously agreed reductions in 
F to be included into the plan. 

74  http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/maritimeaffairs_fisheries/consultations/north-sea-multiannual/index_en.htm 

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Implementation of the landing obligation 

There  is  general  agreement  from  all  contributors  that  the  implementation  of  the  landing 
obligation will present a major challenge for the fishing industry. Some industry contributors 
challenge  the  usefulness  of  the  landing  obligation.  While  sharing  the  point  of  view  that  the 
landing obligation will present an important challenge for fishermen, NGO contributors also 
emphasise the environmental and economic opportunities that a successful implementation of 
the  landing  obligation  might  present.  One  NGO  points  out  that  the  implementation  of  the 
landing obligation not only poses a challenge to the fishing industry but also to MS as a new 
approach to quota allocation within MS is needed.  

Area coverage 

There  is  general  agreement  that  the  plan  must  make  suitable  provision  for  consistency  with 
other area plans to ensure consistency of objectives. There are divergent views whether stocks 
that are not predominantly fished in the North Sea should be covered by the proposed North 
Sea plan or not. All Member States that participated in the consultation recommend that the 
plan  covers  ICES  areas  IIIa,  IV  and  VIId.  However,  some  contributions  from  the  fishing 
industry  object  to  the  inclusion  of  IIIa  and  VIId  if  this  leads  to  the  inclusion  of  additional 
stocks  other  than  straddling  stocks  that  are  also  present  in  the  main  basin  of  the  North  Sea 
(area IV).   

Major stocks to be included in the plan 

The  most  frequently  mentioned  additional  major  stock  to  be  included  in  the  plan  was 
monkfish. Clarity over approaches for co-management with Norway was also mentioned (by 
NSAC and Member States). Many industry contributors agree with the list of stocks presented 
in  the  consultation  document.  In  addition  to  monkfish,  a  stock  that  is  mentioned  in  several 
industry contributions is megrim. A couple of other fishing industry contributors individually 
suggest adding other stocks, e.g. sea bass or brown shrimp. NGO contributors emphasise that 
the  MSY  objective  should  be  applied  to  all  harvested  species.  One  NGO  contribution 
mentions  lemon  sole,  brill  and  turbot  as  drivers  of  fishermen's  behaviour  which  therefore 
might be considered as major stocks. 

By-catch species to be covered by the plan 

With  respect  to  by-catch  species,  where  by-catches  are  significant  or  where  interactions  are 
important,  technical  measures  through  regionalisation  are  considered  appropriate  by  the 
majority  of  industry  contributors,  the  NSAC  and  Member  States,  using  an  adaptive  and 
incremental  approach  and  monitoring  the  situation  to  determine  the  most  at-risk  species. 
Many  NGOs  again  emphasise  that  the  CFP's  MSY  objectives  should  apply  to  all  species. 
Some NGOs give special mention to the protected zero-TAC species porbeagle and spurdog, 
which need special protection as they still can be discarded in the future. 

Ecosystem considerations 

For ecosystem considerations, many industry and Member State contributors feel that existing 
legislation already takes the ecosystem into account. There was recognition that some stocks 
may need to be exploited more lightly than FMSY to achieve MSFD Descriptor 3.   

However,  NGO  contributors  agree  on  the  need  to  include  ecosystem  considerations  when 
drafting  the  multi-annual  plan.  They  see  a  need  in  respecting  the  MFSD  objectives  when 

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adopting fisheries legislation and also refer to article 2(3) of the Basic Regulation of the CFP 
which foresees an ecosystem-based approach. Some NGOs want very concrete objectives to 
be achieved like the improvement of the state of specific Natura 2000 sites.  

One  Member  State  and  one  NGO  state  that  the  multi-annual  plan  should  be  developed 
incrementally and that ecosystem considerations might be added after evaluation of the new 
plan or when scientific advice evolves. 

Regionalised technical measures 

For  technical  measures,  Member  States  and  fishing  industry  ask  the  Commission  to 
coordinate  the  elaboration  of  the  multi-annual  plan  and  future  framework  for  technical 
measures  to  avoid  duplication.  One  Member  State  highlighted  that  they  should  be  broadly 
formulated  to  avoid  excluding  possible  instruments  for  future  management.  All  technical 
measures should be dealt with through regionalisation alone. 

The  AC,  Member  States  and  industry  highlighted  a  wide  range  of  technical  measures 
including selectivity improvements, spatial / temporal closures, limitations or prohibitions on 
the  use  of  certain  fishing  gears  and  activities,  MCRS  and  combinations  of  measures  where 
necessary.  

One industry interest group suggested new technologies like sorting fish in the water prior to 
bringing them on board and leaving behind the unwanted catch. 

Additionally,  many  NGOs  underline  the  need  for  broad  consultation  and  effective 
regionalisation  when  developing  new  technical  measures.  Several  NGOs  propose  temporal, 
real-time and permanent closures in order to protect juveniles and/or vulnerable species. Some 
NGOs refer to the possibility of creating fish stock recovery areas as defined in Article 8 of 
the  Basic  Regulation.  Many  NGOs  suggest  introducing  measures  for  higher  selectivity  of 
fishing  gear.  Some  NGOs  want  best  practices  on  handling  unwanted  catches  (e.g.  of 
vulnerable species like sharks and rays) to  be promoted, in order  to achieve higher survival 
rates. 

Two  NGOs  suggest  other  concrete  measures  like  obligatory  by-catch  reduction  devices, 
move-on  rules,  obligatory  CCTV  in  cod  ends,  improved  monitoring  and  reporting 
requirements and the limitation of fishing licences to certain areas. 

Citizen's contributions 

Two responses were received from members of the general public. One respondent is a retired 
fisheries  scientist.  His  contribution  emphasizes  the  need  to  set  F  below  FMSY  and  suggests 
working on defining a general rule for defining such an F value like 75 or 80 percent of FMSY 
instead  of  setting  F  arbitrarily  below  FMSY.  He  also  points  out  the  need  to  reduce  fishing 
below the F value foreseen in the plan if scientific data indicate that the size of the spawning 
stock has fallen below some threshold value. 

The  other  respondent  is  the  Chief  Executive  of  a  regional  processors'  association  who 
contributed  on  his  own  behalf.  He  strongly  criticises  the  landing  obligation  and  emphasises 
the need to leave more decisions to the individual fishermen. He also asks to add crab, squid 
and lobster to the list of main target and bycatch species. 

A  word  cloud  indicating  the  100  most  frequently  used  words  and  phrases  in  the  combined 
responses to the public consultation from all contributors is illustrated in Figure AI.1. 
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Figure AI.1. Word cloud to show the 100 most frequently used words and phrases in the combined responses to the public consultation from all contributors 

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ANNEX II 

MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE COMMON FISHERIES POLICY 

The  new  CFP,  Regulation  (EU)  138/2013  entered  into  force  on  1  January  2014.  The  main 
elements of the new CFP are:  

(1) Maximum  Sustainable  Yield  is  the  best  possible  objective  for  renewable  and 
profitable fisheries, harvesting the maximum amount of fish on a long term basis. 
The  objective  of  the  CFP  is  to  ensure  that  MSY  is  achieved  by  2015  where 
possible,  and  by  2020  at  the  latest.  Not  all  stocks  in  the  north-east  Atlantic  are 
MSY-assessed  yet.  Of  the  assessed  stocks  60%  of  them  are  fished  at  MSY  (up 
from 6 % only in 2005). In the Mediterranean only around 11% of assessed stocks 
are  within  MSY  and  there  is  little  sign  of  improvement.  For  many  stocks, 
particularly in the Mediterranean, we have no assessment of MSY. 

(2) Annual legislation on fixing fishing opportunities (TACs and quotas, some are 
set on a two-yearly basis): to fix, based on scientific advice that is consistent with 
MSY and in accordance with multi-annual plans (where they exist), the amount of 
fishing  for  the  stocks  concerned,  and  to  allocate  quotas  to  the  Member  States 
following  the  so-called  relative  stability  key.  In  turn,  Member  States  deal  with 
how  to  distribute  their  national  quotas  to  their  fishermen.  Annually  fishing 
opportunities  are  set  for  the  Baltic,  North  Sea,  Atlantic  and  deep-sea  stock,  by 
Council  only,  to  determine  the  level  of  catches  (before  the  landing  obligation: 
landings), for each stock. The COM outlines its approach for the TAC each spring 
in a Policy Statement. 

The  COM  proposals  are  based  on  existing  multi-annual  plans  (with  certain 
provisions on TAC setting), or on annual biological advice. TACs are shared out 
to  Member  States  following  fixed  allocation  keys  (so-called  relative  stability, 
which  differs  among  stocks).  TACs  (in  tonnes)  are  a  translation  of  fishing 
mortality (F, mortality caused by fishing as a ratio of the stock). In the context of 
multi-annual plans the COM will be seeking advice on MSY expressed in ranges 
of fishing mortality that correspond to sustainable fishing and MSY, for the target 
species. 

Under  certain  multi-annual  plans  TACs  are  accompanied  by  effort  reduction 
schemes  for  certain  fleets.  These  effort  regimes  are  currently  considered 
ineffective,  causing  red  tape,  and  sometimes  creating  conflicts  with  the  TACs. 
They are likely to disappear from future multi-annual plans, but are currently still 
part of the TAC proposals. 

(3) The  landing  obligation:  The  new  CFP  includes  a  landing  obligation  for  all 
catches of species subject to catch limits (TACs) and, in the Mediterranean, also 
catches of species which are subject to minimum sizes (only blue-fin tuna is under 
TAC in this sea basin).  

It applies to all Union vessels fishing in Union and non-Union waters. The landing 
obligation  is  applied  in  a  gradual  way  and  is  fishery  based.  On  1  January  2015 

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pelagic fisheries and industrial fisheries everywhere in Union waters will be under 
the landing obligation, as will be all other fisheries (salmon and cod) in the Baltic.  

The  landing  obligation  comes  with  a  set  of  potential  measures  and  flexibility 
instruments  to  make  the  transition  and  timely  implementation  possible.  These 
include  quota  flexibilities,  exemptions  for  species  that  have  a  high  survival  rate 
and  a  de  minimis  exemption  to  cater  for  unwanted  catches  that  are  unavoidable. 
The  plans  may  also  fix  conservation  reference  sizes  for  fish.  These  measures 
should be developed through multi-annual plans, but in the absence of such plans, 
discard plans can be adopted.  

The new CFP encourages regionalisation, which basically allows Member States, 
in consultation with the relevant stakeholder Advisory Councils, to come forward 
with  a  proposal  for  a  discard  plan  (joint  recommendation)  that  the  COM,  after 
review, turns into Union legislation (through a Commission Regulation).  

(4) EU  multi-annual  plans;  national  plans  in  the  Mediterranean:  they  contain  the 
framework  for  management  of  a  stock  or  a  combination  of  stocks  (by  fishery). 
Multi-annual  plans  are  designed  to  ensure  effective  management  of  the  fisheries 
and to bring conservation and management provisions for groups of stocks under 
plans.  Plans contribute to stability and a long-term security for the industry. The 
main elements of plans are: 

 

 

 

MSY-related targets (per target stock), deadlines for achieving MSY, and 
fishing mortality/exploitation ranges that are consistent with MSY (FMSY as 
a range of values) 

safeguard provisions if science indicates that stocks are in trouble; specific 
conservation  measures  for  non-target  species,  so  as  to  keep  them  within 
sustainable boundaries 

mechanisms to  allow for regionalisation of implementing  measures under 
the plan 

(5) Fleet  capacity  rules:  these  are  provisions  to  support  that  the  fleet  capacity  of  a 
Member State matches with the fishing opportunities that are allocated to it; fleet 
overcapacity  potentially  leads  to  overfishing.  Member  States  cannot  increase  the 
engine power or storage capacity of their fleets. Each Member State is subject to a 
maximum  capacity  threshold  (in  engine  power  (kW)  and  in  vessel  volume  (gt)). 
Nominally,  all  Member  States  fleets  are  under  these  ceilings;  however,  in  many 
Member States the effective engine capacity may well outscore the numbers in the 
CFP. Despite intensified enforcement, this is a persistent and hard-to-tackle issue. 

Annually Member States must report on the balance between capacity and fishing 
opportunities. Historically this has not been linked to targeted actions. For the first 
time,  under  the  new  CFP  Member  States  have  to  give  follow-up  to  the 
identification of overcapacity with an action plan to eliminate it, in order to have 
access to funding for decommissioning of excess vessels. The assessment exercise 
by  Member  States  on  the  balance  between  capacity  and  fishing  opportunities  is 
facilitated  by  common  guidelines  developed  by  the  Commission.  It  includes 
technical  and  economic  parameters.  Member  States  will  have  to  include  in  their 

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reports  an  action  plan  for  the  fleet  segments  with  identified  imbalance.  In  the 
action  plan,  Member  States  have  to  set  out  the  adjustment  targets  and  tools  to 
achieve  the  balance.  The  plan  has  to  include  a  clear  time  frame  for  the 
implementation of the action plan as well. 

(6) The  External  Dimension:  The  CFP  reform  enshrines  for  the  first  time  the 
external dimension of the CFP (Part VI of the Basic Regulation: Articles 28-31). It 
calls  for  strong  external  action  that  follows  externally  the  same  principles  and 
standards  as  internally  while  promoting  a  level-playing  field  for  EU  operators. 
Under the CFP new international agreements should  

 

 

 

contribute  to  long  term  sustainability  worldwide  via  stronger  bilateral 
relations  and  tackling  global  issues  such  as  IUU  fishing  and  fishing 
overcapacity 

uphold  and  strengthen  the  global  architecture  for  fisheries  governance 
(UN, FAO, OECD, etc.) 

contribute  towards  a  more  effective  functioning  of  RFMOs,  more 
sustainable  Fisheries  Agreements  and  better  coherence  with  other  EU 
policies 

(7) Data  Collection  Framework:  a  set  of  requirements  on  collection  by  fishermen 
and  Member  States  and  management  of  biological  and  other  data  as  input  for 
biological, economic and other knowledge and advice in support of the policy. To 
align  to  the  new  CFP  a  Commission  proposal  for  a  revised  Data  Collection 
Framework  Regulation is under preparation. It will introduce  simplifications  and 
more  flexibility  and  adaptability,  based  on  an  evaluation  of  the  previous 
framework.  

(8) Advisory Councils: The Advisory Councils (ACs) were established since 2004 to 
advise  the  Commission  on  matters  related  to  fisheries  management  in  their 
the 
respective  areas  of  competence.  Seven  ACs  were  established 
Mediterranean  Sea,  the  South  Western  Waters,  the  North  Western  Waters,  the 
North Sea, the Baltic Sea, small pelagic species, and the Long Distance Fleet. 

for 

ACs  are  stakeholders'  organisations  that  bring  together  the  industry  (fishing, 
processing  and  marketing  sectors)  and  other 
interest  groups,  such  as 
environmental and consumers' organisations. They receive an annual grant of up to 
250.000 euros from the Commission to cover part of  their operational costs. The 
new  CFP  foresees  the  creation  of  four  new  ACs  for  Aquaculture,  Markets,  the 
Black Sea and Outermost Regions. 

ACs  are  expected  to  expand  their  play  in  the  regionalised  CFP  and  are  to  be 
consulted  by  Member  States  when  preparing 
joint  recommendations  on 
conservation measures.  

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ANALYSIS ON CHOKE SPECIES EXTRACTED FROM STECF 14-19 

ANNEX III 

The findings of the STECF for selected Member States are summarised in the figures below75. Given the uncertainties on how the landing obligation will 
be implemented, the information presented can only be used to flag potential choke species issues. All information is presented in relative terms (ratio of 
realized catches to quota), regardless of the actual size of the quota and/or of the value of the fishery. 

  The blue bars - indicate the ratio of actual landings to actual quota (final quota in 2012 after swaps). Where this is close to 1, it indicates a high 

uptake of the quota and a good balance between landings and final fishing opportunities at the country level. 

  The red bars -  show the same thing for the initial quotas (before swaps). A comparison between the red and the blue bars therefore indicates the 

extent to which the Member State is dependent on receiving quota from other Member States to cover its landings. 

  The green bars - illustrate the mismatch between catches (landings + estimated discards) and the initial quota allocation in 2012. Any green bar 
above  1 indicates that  the 2012 initial  quota  would not  have  been  sufficient  to  account for the realised catches  if they had  been  subject to  the 
landing obligation, and is therefore the primary indicator for potential choke effects.  

The main conclusions concerning North Sea stocks are summarised after the figures for each of the Member States. 

75   Report on Landing Obligations in EU Fisheries -part 4(STECF-14-19).  

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For Germany: 

  Cod catches in IIIa are well in excess of initial and final quota 
  Nephrops catches in IV are well in excess of initial quota although the final quota was able to cover all catches although quota/catches are small 
  Hake catches in IV are well in excess of initial and final quota 

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For Denmark: 

  Cod catches in IV and IIIa are in excess of initial quota and final quota 
  Megrim catches in IV are above the initial and final quota although catches are low 
  Hake catches in IV are in excess of initial and final quota and the initial quota is higher than the final quota 
  Haddock catches in IIIa are in excess of the initial and final quota 
  Saithe catches in IV are in excess of initial and final quota 

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For the United Kingdom: 

  Catches of cod in IV are in excess of initial and final quota 
  Catches of haddock in IV are in excess of initial quota but aligned with final quota 
  Catches of hake in IV are well in excess of initial and final quota 
  Catches of saithe in IV are in excess of initial and final quota 

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For the Netherlands: 

  Catches of haddock in IV are in excess of initial quota and broadly in line with final quota 
  Catches of hake in IV are in excess of initial quota 
  Catches of Nephrops in IV are well in excess of initial quota and in excess of final quota 
  Catches of plaice in in IV are well in excess of initial and final quota 
  Catches of whiting in IV are well in excess of initial and final quota 

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ANNEX IV 

NORTH SEA DEMERSAL STOCKS AND FISHERIES 

ICES  divides  the  area  under  consideration  into  the  following  sub-areas,:  the  North  Sea 
(ICES Sub-area IV, sub-divided into ICES Divisions IVa, IVb and IVc); the Skagerrak & 
Kattegat  (ICES  Division  IIIa);  the  Eastern  Channel  (ICES  Division  VIId).  These  areas 
are shown on the map in the figure below (Figure A.IV.1.) 

Figure A.IV.1. The North Sea area showing ICES reporting areas. 

DEMERSAL STOCKS  IN THE NORTH SEA AREA 

The fish populations within this broad area form a number of stocks, some of which are 
distributed across several ICES reporting areas. Some of these stocks are already subject 
to  management  plans  (see  Table  A.IV.1).  In  addition  to  these  fish  stocks,  there  are 
important fisheries for Norway Lobster (Nephrops norvegicus). This crustacean occurs in 
number  of  separate  populations  in  different  parts  of  the  North  Sea.  These  are  called 
Functional Units (FU). The Functional Units in the North Sea area are further described 
in Table A.IV.2 and Figure A.IV.2. No management plans are currently in place for the 
Norway Lobster fisheries although a plan has been proposed by the North Sea Advisory 
Council (NSAC)76. This was recently reviewed by the STECF77. STECF concluded that 
the measures and instruments described in the LTMP for North Sea  Nephrops fisheries 
proposed by the NSAC are worded such that the intention is to deliver the objectives of 

76   http://www.nsrac.org/category/reports/meetings-c/nfg/ 
77   http://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/documents/43805/991908/2015-04_STECF+PLEN+15-01_JRC95802.pdf 

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the  CFP  (Council  Regulation  (EU)  No  1380/2013).  However,  there  is  an  absence  of 
specific detail on how any of the measures listed will be implemented in practice. Hence, 
STECF  concludes  it  is  not  possible  to  assess  whether  the  plan  is  likely  to  deliver  the 
objectives of the CFP. 

Table A.IV.1. Management and advice status in 2014 for North Sea demersal stocks. 

Species 

Area 

EU mgt 
plan 

EU / NO 
strategy 

Advice 
basis1 

FMSY 
ranges2 

Biomass 
safeguards2 

Anglerfish, Lophius 
piscatorius & L. budegassa 

IIIa, IV & VI 

Blonde ray, Raja brachyura 

IVc & VIId 

Blue ling, Molva dypterygia 

I, II, VIII, IX, XII, IIIa & 
IVa 

Brill, Scopthalmus rhombus 

IV, IIIa & VIId,e 

Cod, Gadus morhua 

IIIa East 

DLS 

DLS 

DLS 

DLS 

PA 

Cod, Gadus morhua 

IV, IIIa West & VIId 

Reg. 
1342/2008 

MP 

Y 

Y 

Cuckoo ray, Leucoraja naevus 

IV & IIIa 

Dab, Limanda limanda 

IV & IIIa 

Flounder, Platichthys flesus 

IV & IIIa 

Grey gurnard, Eutrigla 
gurnardus4 

IV, IIIa & VIId 

Haddock, Melanogrammus 
aeglefinus 

IIIaN, IV & VI 

Hake, Merluccius merluccius 

IIIa, IV, VI, & VII, & 
VIIIa,b,d 

Lemon sole, Microstomus kitt 

IV & IIIa 

Lesser spotted dogfish, 
Scyliorhinus canicula4 

Ling, Molva molva 

IV, IIIa & VIId 

IIIa, IVa, VI, VII, VIII, 
IX, XII, & XIV 

Megrim, Lepidorhombus 
whiffiagonis 

IVa & VIa 

Northern shrimp, Pandalus 
borealis 

Northern shrimp, Pandalus 
borealis 

Fladen ground IVa 

IVa East & IIIa West 

Norway lobster, Nephrops 
norvegicus 

IIIa 

DLS 

DLS 

DLS 

DLS 

Y3 

MS 

Y 

Y 

MSY 

DLS 

DLS 

DLS 

MSY 

Y 

Y 

DLS 

MSY and 
PA 

MSY 

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Norway lobster, Nephrops 
norvegicus 

IV 

Norway pout, Trisopterus 
esmarki 

IV & IIIa 

Plaice, Pleuronectes platessa 

IV 

mixed 

PC 

Y for 
some 
FU 

Y for some 
FU 

Reg. 
676/2007 

MP 

Y 

Y 

Plaice, Pleuronectes platessa 

IIIa 

DLS 

Plaice, Pleuronectes platessa 

VIId 

Y 

Y 

Y 

Pollack, Pollachius pollachius 

IV & IIIa 

Saithe, Pollachius virens 

IIIa, IV & VI 

Y 

Reg. 
676/2007 

Sole, Solea solea 

Sole, Solea solea 

Sole, Solea solea 

IV 

IIIa 

VIId 

Spotted ray, Raja montagui 

IV, IIIa & VIId 

Striped red mullet, Mullus 
surmuletus4 

IV, IIIa & VIId 

Thornback ray, Raja clavata 

IV, IIIa & VIId 

Turbot, Scophthalmus 
maximus 

Turbot, Scophthalmus 
maximus 

Tusk, Brosme brosme 

Whiting, Merlangius 
merlangus 

Whiting, Merlangius 
merlangus 

IV 

IIIa 

IIIa, Vb, VIa, & XIIb, & 
IV, VII, VIII, & IX 

IV & VIId 

IIIa 

Witch 

IV, IIIa & VIId 

Y 

Y 

Y 

Y 

Y 

Y 

Y 

Y 

DLS 

MS 

MP 

MSY 

MSY 

DLS 

DLS 

DLS 

DLS 

DLS 

DLS 

Y 

DLS 

DLS 

DLS 

1 advice basis: MP: EU management plan; MS: EU/Norway management strategy; DLS: data limited approach; FU: 
functional unit; MSY: FMSY;PA: precautionary approach; PC: precautionary considerations. 
2http://www.ices.dk/sites/pub/Publication%20Reports/Advice/2015/Special_Requests/EU_FMSY_ranges_for_selected
_NS_and_BS_stocks.pdf; 3 under review; 4 
ICES advice given but no TAC. 

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Amongst  the  main  North  Sea  demersal  stocks,  cod  is  currently  the  one  of  greatest 
concern.  The  stock biomass has  been  below its limit reference  point (Blim)  for over ten 
years, and it was forecast to reach that biomass at the start of 201478. Fishing mortality 
has  also  been  high,  and  while  it  has  shown  some  recent  reduction  to  below  the 
precautionary level, the stock is still over-exploited with respect to MSY. In contrast, the 
spawning  biomass  of  the  haddock  stock  is  above  the  relevant  reference  points  and  the 
stock is being harvested below the target level associated with MSY. The main stocks of 
sole and plaice in the North Sea are subject to a combined management plan, reflecting 
the close link between the fisheries for the two species. This has contributed to a plaice 
stock which is  currently at a historic high level and which is  being fished at below the 
MSY  target  level.  The  spawning  biomass  of  the  North  Sea  sole  stock  is  above  the 
relevant reference points but the stock is being harvested above the target level associated 
with MSY. 

NORWAY LOBSTER FUNCTIONAL UNITS IN THE NORTH SEA AREA 

Norway lobster (Nephrops) stocks have been identified by ICES experts on the basis of 
their  population  distribution  and  characteristics,  and  established  as  separate  Functional 
Units. The Functional Units (FU) are defined by groupings of ICES statistical rectangles; 
they  are  illustrated  in  Figure  A.IV.2  and  detailed  in  Table  A.IV.2.  The  statistical 
rectangles  making  up  each  FU  encompass  the  distribution  of  mud  sediment  on  which 
Nephrops  live.  There  are  two  FUs  in  Division  IIIa  and  nine  FUs  in  Subarea  IV. 
Management of Nephrops currently operates at the ICES Subarea/Division level.  

Figure A.IV.2. Name of each Norway Lobster Functional Unit in the North Sea area. 

78   ICES Advice 2014. Cod in Subarea IV (North Sea) and Divisions VIId (Eastern Channel) and IIIa 

West (Skagerrak). 

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Table A.IV.2. Name and number of Norway Lobster Functional Units in the North Sea area. 

FU No.  FU name 

ICES Division 

Scientific advice 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

32 

33 

34 

Skagerrak 

Kattegat 

Botney Gut – Silver Pit 

Farn Deeps 

Fladen Ground 

Firth of Forth 

Moray Firth 

Noup 

Norwegian Deep 

Off Horn Reef 

Devil's Hole 

IIIa 

IIIa 

IVb,c 

IVb 

IVa 

IVb 

IVa 

IVa 

IVa 

IVb 

IVb 

Y 

Y 

N 

Y 

Y 

Y 

Y 

N 

N 

N 

N 

DEMERSAL FLEETS IN THE NORTH SEA AREA 

Data  from  the  STECF  Annual  Economic  Report  (AER)  on  the  EU  fishing  fleet79  80 
suggest that the EU North Sea fleet spent a total of around 471 thousand days at sea in 
2012,  in  line  with  2011.  Vessels  predominantly  using  demersal  trawls  and  seines  and 
beam trawls accounted for 36% of the total number of days at sea in the North Sea. 

Demersal  trawls  and  seines  and  beam  trawls  were  the  two  most  important  gears  with 
respect  to  both  the  total  weight  of  species  landed  (64%)  and  the  total  value  of  species 
landed (68%) by the EU North Sea fleet in 2012 (Table A.IV.3). 

Table A.IV.3. Percentages of total landed weight and of landed value by the EU North Sea fleet by 
gear type, across all fleet segments, in 2012.  

Demersal  trawls  and  seines  and  beam 
trawls 

Pelagic trawls and purse seines 

Other gears 

% of total landed weight 
(t)  
64 

% of total landed value 
(€)  
68 

25 

11 

13 

19 

Although  around  30  species  of  fish  and  shellfish  are  caught  in  the  mixed  demersal 
fishery, around 23% of the total landed value and 44% of the total landed weight in 2012 
was accounted for by the top ten demersal species alone. In terms of value landed these 

79   The 2014 Annual Economic Report on the EU Fishing fleet. STECF 14-16. 
80   The  STECF  Annual  Economic  Report  (AER)  on  the  EU  fishing  fleet  gives  summaries  by  both 
individual Member State and by sea basin area. In the latter category, the North Sea is combined with 
the  Eastern  Arctic  area,  hence  some  of  the  figures  summarised  here  may  also  include  some  catches 
from the latter area. However, these are likely to be relatively small, and should not change the overall 
picture. The data summarised in the 2014 AER report cover the years up to 2013. However, the data 
for 2013 are incomplete, so only data up to 2012 are used here. 

EN  

79 

EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
were,  in  order  of  importance:  sole,  plaice,  Nephrops,  cod,  saithe,  haddock,  turbot, 
anglerfish,  whiting  and  lemon  sole.  In  terms  of  weight  landed,  the  order  was  slightly 
different  and  dab  replaced  turbot  in  the  species  list:  plaice,  saithe,  haddock,  cod, 
Nephrops, whiting, sole, dab, anglerfish and lemon sole. 

Capture in demersal trawls and seines and beam trawls accounted for around 90% of the 
top ten demersal species caught across all North Sea fleet segments, both by weight and 
by value landed, in 2012 (Table A.IV.4).  

Table A.IV.4. Percentages of total weight and of value landed by the EU North Sea fleet by gear type, 
across all fleet segments, for the top ten demersal species, in 2012.  

Demersal  trawls  and  seines  and  beam 
trawls 

Pelagic trawls and purse seines 

Other gears 

% of total landed weight 
(t)  
92 

% of total landed value 
(€)  
87 

0 

8 

0 

13 

The STECF 2014 AER79 provides detailed fleet and segment information for the top 35 
Member State  fleet segments  with  the highest landed values81. Table A.IV.5 shows the 
vessel size categories  as percentages of both  the total weight  and total  value landed by 
the  different  fleet  segments  in  2012.  These  data  show  that  around  70%  of  the  landed 
weight  and  40%  of  the  landed  value  came  from  the  two  important  demersal  gear 
categories. The vessels using these gears tended to be the larger vessels in the fleet, with 
the majority greater than 18 m length.  

Table  A.IV.5.  Percentage  of  the  total  landed  weight  and  total  landed  value  by  the  different  fleet 
segments, for the different vessel size categories, in 2012, for the top 35 Member State fleet segments 
by landed value.  

% of total landed weight (t)  

% of total landed value (€)  

Vessel 
length 
category 
(m) 

Demersal 
trawls  and 
seines  and 
beam trawls 

Pelagic 
trawls and 
purse seines 

Other gears  Demersal 

trawls  and 
seines  and 
beam trawls 

Other gears 

Pelagic 
trawls and 
purse seines 

< 10 

10 - 12 

12 - 18 

18 - 24 

24 - 40 

> 40 

Total 

0 

0 

6 

20 

25 

18 

69 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

20 

20 

3 

3 

3 

1 

1 

0 

11 

0 

0 

2 

9 

15 

14 

41 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

32 

32 

1 

1 

1 

0 

1 

0 

4 

81 A fleet segment is a group of vessels from the same Member State using the same gear type. 

EN  

80 

EN