COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Follow-up of recommendations to the Commission report on the protection of the EU’s financial interests – fight against fraud, 2014 Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Protection of the European Union's financial interests - Fight against Fraud 2015 Annual Report
Date: 2016-07-14
Institutions: European Anti-Fraud Office, European Commission
Subjects: EU Member State, EU expenditure, EU programme, common strategy, corruption, fight against crime, financial control, fraud, fraud against the EU, public contract

EN 

   EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 14.7.2016  SWD(2016) 236 final   COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Follow-up of recommendations to the Commission report on the protection of the  EU’s financial interests – fight against fraud, 2014 Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Protection of the European Union's financial interests - Fight against Fraud 2015 Annual Report {COM(2016) 472 final} {SWD(2016) 234 final} {SWD(2016) 235 final} {SWD(2016) 237 final} {SWD(2016) 238 final} {SWD(2016) 239 final}  
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

COMMISSION  STAFF  WORKING  DOCUMENT  FOLLOW-UP  OF 
RECOMMENDATIONS  TO  THE  COMMISSION  REPORT  ON  THE 
PROTECTION OF THE  EU’S FINANCIAL INTERESTS – FIGHT AGAINST 
2014  

SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................ 3 

1.

follow up by recommendation ...................................................................................... 6 

1.1.

Improved coordination and cooperation: a new impetus in the fight against fraud ..... 6 

1.1.1.

  Reinforced legal and administrative structures for enhanced cooperation ................... 6 

1.1.2.

  Measures to fight fraud and corruption in public procurement .................................. 11 

1.2.

Increasing detection: results and open issues ............................................................. 14 

1.2.1.

  Expenditure ................................................................................................................. 14 

1.2.2.

  Revenue: Updating control strategies ......................................................................... 16 

2.

Replies of member states ............................................................................................ 18 

2.1.

Improved coordination and cooperation: a new impetus in the fight against fraud ... 18 

2.1.1.

  Reinforced legal and administrative structures for enhanced cooperation ................. 18 

2.1.2.

  Measures to fight fraud and corruption in public procurement .................................. 50 

2.2.

Increasing detection: results and open issues ........................................................... 103 

2.2.1.

  Expenditure ............................................................................................................... 103 

2.2.2.

  Revenue: Updating control strategies ....................................................................... 117 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUMMARY 

In  the  2014  Report  on  the  protection  of  the  European  Union’s  financial  interests,  the 
Commission  made  a  number  of  recommendations  to  the  Member  States.  More  specifically, 
the recommendations included the following subjects: (1) encouraging them to use the Anti-
Fraud  Coordination  service  to  its  full  potential  whilst  developing  national  anti-fraud 
strategies;  (2)  transposition  of  Public  Procurement  directives  into  their  national  legislation 
with special emphasis placed on the definition of ‘conflict of interests’ and measures to tackle 
such conflicts; (3) improving low levels of reporting and; (4) strengthening customs controls 
with a focus on the decreasing number of customs controls at the time of clearance.  

As  stated  in  the  previous  report,  by  the  end  of  2014,  all  Member  States  had  an  AFCOS  in 
place.  There  are  some  variations  in  the  responsibilities  allocated  to  some  Member  States' 
AFCOS;  the  majority  of  Member  States1  empowered  their  AFCOS  with  coordination 
responsibilities,  four  Member  States2  accorded  it  with  administrative  investigative  powers 
and, UK has accorded it with criminal investigative powers. Four other Member States3 have 
organised an AFCOS network which entails cooperation between various parties. 

Poland reported that because of the composition and scope of its AFCOS, the body operates 
across  administrative  sectors,  and  therefore  ensures  proper  coordination  between  the 
government  administration  and  the  institutions  involved  in  implementing  EU  funds. 
Furthermore,  Dutch  Customs  decided  to  merge  its  AFCOS  with  two  other  fraud  teams  to 
make a single team for an optimum response to the Commission's requests and messages. The 
United  Kingdom  reported  that  there  are  arrangements  in  place  to  coordinate  the  different 
authorities engaged in anti-fraud measures.  

More  specifically,  the  four  Member  States  which  have  accorded  their  AFCOS  with 
administrative investigative powers reported the following:  

  Bulgaria’s  AFCOS  Council  provides  guidelines,  monitors  and  coordinates  the 
activities of state authorities responsible for preventing and combating infringements 
related to fraud, and cooperates with OLAF in carrying out investigations in Bulgaria. 
The  interaction  and  cooperation  between  the  AFCOS  Council  and  the  Prosecutor’s 
Office  of  the  Republic  of  Bulgaria  have  been  regulated  by  the  Agreement.  The 
Prosecutor’s  Office  cooperates  and  interacts  with  OLAF  with  regard  to  the 
administrative investigations concerning the Republic of Bulgaria. 

  Lithuania's  AFCOS,  FCIS,  is  entrusted  by  law  with  the  detection,  investigation  and 

prevention of criminal acts and other breaches of law connected with fraud. 

  Malta's AFCOs coordinates all legislative, administrative and operational obligations 
and  activities  related  to  the  protection  of  the  Community's  financial  interests, 

1  

2  
3  

Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Hungary, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Finland, Sweden  
Bulgaria, Lithuania, Malta, Romania 
Bulgaria, Denmark, Ireland, Slovakia 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
cooperate  with  OLAF  in  Financial  Investigations,  communicate  with  OLAF  on 
mandatory reporting and information exchange and conducts financial investigations. 
  Romania's  AFCOS  (the  Fight  against  Fraud  Department  -  DLAF)  carries  out  or 
coordinates control activities in  order to  detect irregularities, frauds and other illegal 
activities.  In  exercising  its  control  function,  the  Department  conducts  administrative 
investigations, on the spot checks, analysis and documentary checks. 

With regards to the first recommendation that AFCOS should be used to its full potential to 
ensure  cooperation  between  AFCOS  and  relevant  national  parties,  the  majority  of  Member 
States4 have taken such action, and have involved national entities relevant in the fight against 
fraud in their networks. An example of this would be the fact that five Member States5 have 
established  working  groups  and  trainings  to  improve  the  skills  of  the  members  of  national 
parties involved in combating fraud. Luxembourg has reported that this recommendation has 
been discussed with all the relevant stakeholders, and as such, a meeting was brought together 
including  all  the  relevant  authorities  involved  in  managing  EU  funds.  Furthermore,  Finland 
has  reported  that  it  will  examine  how  to  increase  the  efficiency  of  AFCOS  cooperation  in 
2016. Regarding the adoption of a National Anti-Fraud Strategy (NAFS), six Member States6 
have endorsed a National Anti-Fraud Strategy (NAFS), while five others7 are in the process of 
developing a NAFS. The Czech Republic has reported that it plans to adopt a revision of its 
NAFS and Italy reported that its AFCOS has drawn up and developed strategic orientations 
and actions which are updated annually and published since 2012 in their Annual Reports to 
the Italian Parliament.  

In  relation  to  recommendation  two,  the  majority  of  Member  States8  reported  that  they  have 
followed  the  Commissions’  recommendation  to  transpose  the  definition  of  ‘conflict  of 
interest’  contained  in  the  Public  Procurement  Directive  into  their  national  order  and  have 
drafted new national procurement laws. Two Member States9 have already adopted such a law 
and  new  law  will  come  into  effect  by  April  2016  for  a  further  seven  Member  States10. 
Furthermore,  Belgium,  France,  and  the  Netherlands  have  altered  already  existing  laws  to 
incorporate  the  EU  Directive.  The  United  Kingdom  has  implemented  the  'Public  Contracts 
Regulation 2015' as a response to the EU Directive, and similarly, Malta has introduced 'New 
National  Regulations'  transposing  the  Public  Procurement  Directive.  Furthermore,  Germany 
has made amendments to already existing national regulations. Two Member States11 have not 
taken  further  action  as  they  consider  that  their  national  law  already  coincides  with  the 

4  

5  
6  
7  
8  

9  
10  
11  

Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Germany,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Greece,  Spain,  Croatia,  Italy,  Cyprus, 
Latvia,  Lithuania,  Hungary,  Malta,  Netherlands,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania,  Slovenia,  Slovakia,  Sweden,  United 
Kingdom  
Latvia, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Romania 
Bulgaria, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Malta, Slovakia 
Spain, Latvia,  Luxembourg, Romania, Slovenia 
Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Greece,  Spain,  Croatia,  Italy,  Cyprus,  Latvia,  Lithuania, 
Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland 
Denmark, Slovenia 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Italy, Slovenia, Slovakia  
Poland, Sweden 

4 

 
 
 
                                                 
Directive.  Portugal  reported  that  its  national  legislation  requires  beneficiaries  to  conduct 
themselves  in  a  way  that  respects  the  principles  of  transparency  and  good  management  of 
public funding, but it has also drawn up Codes of Ethics and Conduct at internal level within 
each managing authority. Luxembourg reported that it is committed to protecting the financial 
interests of the EU effectively.  

With regards to the third recommendation and the low level of reporting of irregularities, the 
four  Member  States12  that  were  specifically  recommended  to  strengthen  their  systems  in 
relation to detecting and/or reporting fraud, responded on changes made for improving their 
national  system.  Three  Member  States13  specifically  referred  to  the  measures  undertaken  to 
improve the reporting of irregularities. In addition, four Member States14 stated that there was 
actually an increase in irregularities reported due to the efficiency of their detection system. 
The remaining Member States15 did not make any comment as they assumed that it was only 
applicable to the four named Member States. 

In relation to the fourth recommendation concerning the fight against customs fraud, Member 
States were invited to inform the Commission of the measures taken to strengthen cooperation 
in  order  to  ensure  that  all  transactions,  and  all  economic  operators,  are  included  in  the 
population for post-clearance controls, irrespective of whether or not the importer is located in 
the  Member  State  of  the  physical  importation.  While  the  majority  of  Member  States16 
reported  that  they  have  indulged  in  cooperation  with  other  Member  States  in  order  to  fight 
customs  fraud  and  detect  irregularities  more  successfully,  four  Member  States17  have 
specifically focused on improving internal cooperation within national bodies associated with 
post-clearance  controls.  Three  Member  States18  have  not  taken  any  further  measures 
concerning  recommendation  four  because  they  consider  that  their  system  is  efficient  and 
therefore it is not necessary to take further measures.  

Concerning the decreasing number of customs controls at the time of clearance, nine Member 
States19  have  specifically  explained  how  their  customs  administration  functions  and  five  of 
these20 gave specific examples of when their customs authorities were successful in detecting 
fraud or irregularities at the time of clearance. Furthermore, nine Member States21 have noted 
down examples in fighting customs fraud in the field of post-clearance controls. 

12  
13  
14  
15  

16  

17  
18  
19  
20  
21  

Denmark, Luxembourg, Slovakia, Finland 
Spain, France, Croatia 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Portugal 
Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Germany,  Ireland,  Italy,  Cyprus,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Hungary,  Malta,  Netherlands,  Poland, 
Romania, Slovenia, Sweden, United Kingdom 
Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Spain,  France,  Croatia,  Italy,  Cyprus,  Lithuania,  Hungary,  Malta,  Poland, 
Finland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Sweden, United Kingdom 
Greece, Italy, Latvia, United Kingdom 
Belgium, Estonia, France, Netherlands 
Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Romania, Slovenia 
Denmark, Greece, Cyprus, Romania, Slovenia 
Bulgaria, Greece, Croatia, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Finland, Sweden 

5 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1. 

FOLLOW UP BY RECOMMENDATION 

1.1. 

Improved  coordination  and  cooperation:  a  new  impetus  in  the  fight  against 
fraud 

1.1.1.  Reinforced legal and administrative structures for enhanced cooperation 

'Significant  steps  were  taken  in  2014  to  enhance  the  Commission’s  and  the Member  States’ 
protection of the EU’s financial interests. 

In 2014, the Commission successfully completed the priority actions of its multi-annual Anti-
Fraud  Strategy  (CAFS).  While  the  focus  of  CAFS  is  primarily  upon  developing  anti-fraud 
strategies  at  Commission  service  and  agency  level,  the  Commission  is  now  increasingly 
focusing on how to support Member States in developing their own anti-fraud strategies. 

Regulation  (EU)  No  883/2013  provides,  inter  alia,  for  enhanced  cooperation  with  Member 
States through the appointment of an AFCOS. 

At  the  end  of  2014,  all  Member  States  had  designated their  AFCOS.  The  responsibilities  of 
each  national  AFCOS vary, depending on the Member State. All Member States have given 
their  AFCOS  coordinative  responsibilities,  albeit  to  varying  extents.  Only  a  few  Member 
States empower their AFCOS to act in an investigative capacity. 

Structured coordination between anti-fraud bodies and other national authorities has proved 
to be a best practice and should be implemented in all Member States'. 

Recommendation 1: 

Member States are encouraged to use their AFCOS to its full potential. 

The  Commission  suggests  that  cooperation  between  relevant  national  parties  be 
developed in the framework of national anti-fraud strategies. 

Several Member States have responded in relation to measures taken to improve cooperation 
and to use their AFCOS to their full potential.  

To be more precise, twenty-one Member States have reported on the extensive involvement of 
various  national  parties  relevant  to  the  fight  against  fraud  and,  simultaneously,  on  the 
cooperation between such national parties with their AFCOS: 

  Belgium's  AFCOS  is  made  up  of  representatives  of  all  departments  involved  in  the 
fight against fraud including, inter alia, the customs administration, SPF Finances (the 
Federal  Public  Finance  Service),  regional  departments  managing  the  structural  and 
agricultural funds, the Economic Inspectorate and the Board of Prosecutors-General. 
  Bulgaria's  AFCOS  is  chaired  by  the  Minister  of  Interior  and  composed  of  ministers, 
deputy ministers and heads of administrations responsible for the management of the 
EU  funds  and  programmes,  directors  of  revenue  agencies,  and  heads  of  control, 

6 

 
 
 
certification,  audit  and  enforcement  bodies.  Bulgaria's  AFCOS  has  also  signed  a 
collaboration agreement with the Prosecutor's Office Bulgaria. It has also established 
an interdepartmental coordination centre on combating smuggling and controlling the 
movement  of  hazardous  goods  and  cargo,  aiming  to  ensure  the  interaction  and 
coordination between the bodies of the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Finance and 
the Ministry of Transport, Information Technology and Communications. 

  The Czech AFCOS has been cooperating with Customs Administration of the Czech 
Republic,  the  Supreme  Public  Prosecutor's  Office  and  the  Unit  for  Combating 
Corruption and Financial Crime. 

  The Danish AFCOS was placed in the Finance Ministry and, at the same time, an anti-
fraud  network  was  set  up  composed  of  the  Danish  AgriFish  Agency,  the  Danish 
Business  Authority,  the  Danish  Customs  and  Tax  Administration,  and  the  Public 
Prosecutor for Serious Economic and International Crime. 

  Germany reported that its AFCOS at the Ministry of Finance is in constant direct and 
indirect  contact  with  all  federal  and  regional  administrative  bodies  competent  for 
preventing, detecting and fighting fraud and irregularities in the country. 

  Estonian  AFCOS  has  involved  in  its  network  ministries,  managing/certifying  and 
auditing  authorities  and,  partners  from  investigative  institutions  such  as  different 
police forces, prosecutors, the Tax and Customs Board and the Competition Authority. 
Ireland reported that it established an AFCOS network which includes authorities like 
the  Department  of  Education,  Food  and  the  Marine,  Departments  of  Public 
Expenditure and Reform, Department of Education and Skills, Department of Justice, 
Revenue Commissioners and, the Irish police. 

 

  Greece's  AFCOS  cooperates  with  the  Fiscal  Audit  Committee  (EDEL)  and  the 
Ministry of Rural Development and Food. It also runs liaison offices for the following 
control  mechanisms:  the  Financial  and  Economic  Crime  Unit  (SDOE),  the  Financial 
Police  Directorate,  the  internal  audit  units  of  ministers,  and  the  Health  and  Welfare 
Services Inspectorate. 

  Spain's AFCOS is chaired by the Auditor General and comprises representatives of the 
ministries,  bodies  and  other  national 
institutions  responsible  for  managing, 
monitoring, preventing and combating fraud in relation to the financial interests of the 
EU. 

  The French Anti-Fraud Coordinating Service (SCAF) works closely with all national 
administrations and operators involved in the fight against fraud to protect the interests 
of  the  European  Union  under  the  Ministry  of  Finance  and  Public  Accounts  ,  the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Interior and Justice but also the regions which are 
managing  authorities.  Its  priorities  are:  (1)  to  facilitate  the  action  of  OLAF  in  the 
implementation of its investigations (exercise of the right of communication, referral 
to  relevant  institutional  interlocutors);  (2)  to  promote  administrations  and  national 
operators  in  the  fight  against  fraud  to  the  interests  of  the  European  Union  ( 
communication,  training)  including  the  fight  against  corruption;  (3)  to  participate  in 
committees and seminars organized by OLAF (COCOLAF , OAFCN); (4) to promote 
the sharing of best practices and risk analysis. The French AFCOS works closely with 
all  national  administrations  and  operators  involved  in  the  fight  against  fraud  to  the 

7 

 
interests of the European Union (Ministry of Finance and Public Accounts, Ministry of 
Agriculture,  Ministry  of  Interior  and  Justice)  but  also  with  the  regions  which  are 
managing authorities. 

 

  Croatia's  AFCOS  was  established  within  the  Ministry  of  Finance  and  has  been 
cooperating with  the  Croatian  State  Attorney's  Office.  In  order  for  Croatia to  ensure 
the efficient information flow and effective cooperation between national institutions 
and  AFCOS  it  has  set  up  an  AFCOS  system  that  establishes  cooperation  between 
institutions at different levels. 
Italy's AFCOS includes top level representatives from all administrations concerned in 
the management and/or control activities in the field of EU funding like, for example, 
the  Prime  Minister's  Office  Ministries  of  the  Interior,  Justice,  Economic  Affairs  and 
Finance, Economic Development, Agricultural Policies, Infrastructure and Transport, 
Employment  and  Education,  the  financial  police,  the  Carabinieri,  the  Customs 
Revenue Agencies, Agricultural  Payments Agency, Conference of the Regions, Union 
of Italian Provinces and Italian National Association of Municipalities. 

  Cyprus's AFCOS comprises of the following Services/Departments: the Legal Service 
and  specifically  the  responsible  Unit  combating  of  Money  Laundering  (MO.K.A.S), 
the Treasury of the Republic of Cyprus, Audit Service, Customs Department, Police, 
Internal  Audit  Service,  Cyprus  Agricultural  Payments  Organisation  and,  the 
Directorate General of European Programs coordination and Development. 

  Lithuania's AFCOS is the Financial Crime Investigation Service under the Ministry of 
Interior  and  it  cooperates  with  the Ministry  of Finance  and  the  Special  Investigation 
Service, which is responsible for the fight against corruption. They have drawn up a 
procedure  for  providing  the  Ministry  of  Finance  with  information  on  pre-trial 
investigations being carried out i.e. law enforcement agencies will inform the Ministry 
of  Finance  about  the  launch  of  pre-trial  investigations  (where  doing  so  will  not 
prejudice the course of the investigation).  

  Hungary  reported  that  cooperation  between  AFCOS  and  Hungary's  competent 
authorities  and  organisations  takes  place  at  various  levels.  As  such,  Hungary 
mentioned  the  Interdepartmental  Coordinating  Committee  on  European  Affairs'  Olaf 
expert  working  group  and the fact that eighteen Hungarian organisations (ministries, 
investigating  authorities,  control  bodies  and  EU  fund  managing  authorities)  delegate 
members to the group. 

  The  Dutch  AFCOS  cooperates  with  relevant  national  enforcement  partners  like  the 
Fiscal  Information  and  Investigation  Service  and,  the  Netherlands  Food  and  Product 
Safety Authority. 

  Poland's  AFCOS  is  headed  by  the  Government  Commissioner  for  Combating 
Financial Irregularities against Poland or the EU, and is assisted by an inter-ministerial 
Team  for  Combating  Financial  Irregularities  against  Poland  or  the  EU  (including 
specialised work groups established by the Team). 

  Romania reported that in order to improve inter-institutional cooperation, its AFCOS, 
the  Anti-Fraud  Department,  has  concluded  several  cooperation  protocols  with  the 
institutions involved in managing EU funds such as the Ministry of European Funds, 
or the National Anticorruption Directorate. 

8 

 
  Slovenia's AFCOS organises periodic meetings with other  Slovenian institutions that 
form  part  of  the  inter-departmental working  group  for  cooperation  with  OLAF.  This 
working  group  includes  members  like  the  Commission  for  the  Prevention  of 
Corruption, the Office of the State Prosecutor General of Slovenia, the Criminal Police 
Directorate, the Agency of Slovenia for Agricultural Markets and Rural Development, 
The  Government  Office  for  Development  and  European  Cohesion  Policy,  Office  for 
Money  Laundering  Prevention,  Ministry  of  Finance-Financial  Administration  of 
Slovenia, and the Ministry of Justice. 

  Slovakia's  AFCOS  is  assisted  by  an  AFCOS  network  which  includes  bodies  and 
institutions  who  provide  the  Union's  financial  resources  and  otherwise  handle  these 
funds, bodies who are authorised to check the use of these funds, and bodies who are 
entrusted with the exercise of powers in order to perform the tasks with regard to the 
protection of the EU's financial interest. 

  The  UK  has  reported  that  its  AFCOS,  the  City  of  London  Police  (CoLP),  and  the 
National  Police  Chiefs  Council  have  a  significant  number  of  memorandums  of 
understanding  in  place  with  various  national  bodies.  Several  of  these  bodies  include 
the  Association  of  British  Insurers,  the  Department  for  Business  Innovations  and 
Skills, the Department for Work and Pensions, the Medicines and Healthcare Products 
Regulatory  Agency,  the  Solicitors  Regulation  Authority,  the  Financial  Services 
Authority, the UK fraud prevention service called CIFAS, the National Crime Agency, 
the Crown Prosecution Service, and the Ministry of Defence Police. 

The rest of the Member States have given less detailed responses to this recommendation:  

  Latvia  referred  to  establishing  an  inter-institutional  working  group  to  draw  rules  for 
efficient  cooperation  and  exchange  of  information  in  order  to  strengthen  and  formalize 
cooperation between the Latvian competent authorities and OLAF and to improve mutual 
legal assistance.  

  Luxembourg has reported that a meeting was organised between all the relevant authorities 

involved in managing EU funds. 

  Malta reported excellent cooperation between bodies combating fraud.  

  Austria has not reported any information. 

  Portugal  has  reported  that  there  have  been  several  developments  with  regards  to  the 
cooperation between its AFCOS and various  national  bodies, whose  aim was to  improve 
on the sharing of knowledge and experience of running management and control systems 
in the anti-fraud area.  

  Finland has reported that in 2016 it will examine implementing measures that will render 

the AFCOS cooperation network more efficient.  

  Sweden reported that the Swedish Economic Crime Authority is the Swedish AFCOS and 
chairs the Swedish Council for the Protection of the European Union's Financial Interests 

9 

 
 
(the SEFI Council), and that all government authorities involved in the administration and 
protection of the EU's funds in Sweden are represented in the Council. 

Moreover,  a  number  of  Member  States  have  increasingly  focused  on  taking  measures  to 
protect EU funds: 

  The  main  purpose  of  Croatia’s  National  Strategy  adopted  for  the  period  2014-2016  is  to 
ensure effective and efficient protection of EU financial interests by further strengthening 
the AFCOS system. 

  Lithuania  adopted  Resolution  No  XII-1537  approving  a  National  anti-corruption 
programme for 2015-25 which will provide for the deployment of anti-corruption and anti-
fraud measures and activities relating to the use of EU fund resources. 

  Romania’s  Anti-fraud  Department  concluded  several  cooperation  protocols  with  the 

institutions involved in managing EU funds. 

  The  National  Strategy  adopted  by  Slovakia  is  focused  on  the  need  to  protect  EU  funds 
from fraud; measures contained in the Strategy relate both to the expenditure and revenue 
areas of the EU’s budget. 

  For the management of ESIF funds in the UK, AFCOS has a designated  regional contact 
point for each of the devolved nations and, in the case of England, for each of the major 
EU funds. 

Regarding  structured  coordination  and  the  development  of  national  anti-fraud  strategies,  six 
Member States22 have adopted a national anti-fraud strategy. In this regard: 

  In Belgium, the introduction of a national anti-fraud strategy will be examined in 2016. 

  Czech  Republic  has  reported  that  they  plan  to  revise  their  already  existing  national  anti-

fraud strategy and they are in the process to adopt it by government decree. 

  Estonia  reported  that  in  the  future  it  will  focus  more  on  composing  the  written  strategic 

action plan with every party's duties and goals. 

  Greece plans to update its National-anti fraud strategy. 

  Spain's AFCOS has prepared the draft which will govern the working and composition of 
the  Advisory  Council  for  Preventing  and  Combating  EU-related  fraud.  This  has  not  yet 
been approved by the Council of Ministers.  

  France  aims  to  construct  specific  measures  to  better  combat  fraud  against  the  Union’s 

financial interests as part of its national yearly plan for the fight against fraud. 

  Italy  supports  that  its  AFCOS  has  drawn  up  and  developed  the  national  strategy  for 
combating  irregularities/fraud  affecting  the  EU  budged  and  included  this  in  the  Annual 
Report to the Italian Parliament on 24th of December 2012. 

22  

Bulgaria, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Malta, Slovakia 

10 

 
                                                 
  Latvia has established an inter-institutional working group to elaborate anti-fraud strategy 
at  national  level  of  the  AFCOS  network  2017-2019  and  draw  up  rules  for  efficient 
cooperation and exchange of information. These are expected to be approved by the end of 
2016. As its first step towards adopting an NAFS, Latvia's AFCOS has updated the anti-
fraud strategy for the protection of the financial interests of the Union for 2014-2016. 

  In  2015,  Lithuania  has  approved  Lithuania's  National  Anti-corruption  Programme  for 
2015-25  providing  for  the  deployment  of  anti-corruption  and  anti-fraud  measures  and 
activities relating to the use of EU fund resources. 

  Luxembourg is currently devising a national anti-fraud strategy. 

  Portugal has adopted a Strategic Plan for 2015-2017 to combat tax and customs fraud and 
evasion. Also, an anti-fraud strategy is defined for each management and control system, 
with the aim of adopting effective and proportionate anti-fraud measures. 

  Romania  has  set  up  the  National  Public  Procurement  Agency  (ANAP)  and  in  2015 
developed  the  National  Public  Procurement  Strategy  which  has  been  approved  by  the 
Government. As such  it put  forward  measures  to  reform the national public procurement 
system between 2015 and 2020.  

  Slovenia has not yet drawn up a national strategy but plans to do so and plans to rely on the 
guidelines for drafting a national strategy which will be issued by a special working group 
within OLAF in 2016. 

1.1.2.  Measures to fight fraud and corruption in public procurement 

'In February 2014, the first EU anti-corruption report was adopted23 and the revised package 
of public procurement Directives and a new concessions Directive entered into force. 

The  transposition  of  these  Directives  gives  the  Member  States  an  opportunity  to  enhance 
transparency and strengthen their anti-fraud efforts, by defining conflict of interest, making e-
procurement  mandatory  and  introducing  monitoring  and  reporting  obligations  to  curb 
procurement fraud and other serious irregularities. 

In  addition,  Member  States  took  a  significant  number  of  legislative  and  administrative 
measures aimed at strengthening anti-fraud work in the area of public procurement.' 

Recommendation 2: 

During  the  public  procurement  process,  conflict  of  interest  can  cause  serious  harm  to 
the public budget and to the reputation of the EU and the Member States concerned. 

Member  States  are  invited  not  only  to  transpose  the  definition  of  ‘conflict  of  interest’ 
contained in the Public Procurement Directive, into national legislation, but also to put 
effective measures in place to tackle conflicts of interest. 

23 

See section 4.1.4. 

11 

 
 
                                                 
The  majority  of  Member  States24  have  taken  steps  to  endorse  the  Public  Procurement 
Directive  and  have  drafted  new  law which  has  not  yet  been  adopted.  Two  Member  States25 
have so far adopted a new law transposing the EU Public Procurement Directive into national 
legislation and three Member States26 have made amendments to provisions in their national 
law so that they can effectively incorporate the EU Directive.  

Germany has transposed the Public Procurement Directive in a two-stage procedure; the basic 
rules  have  been  transposed  in  Part  Four  of  the  'Restrain  Competition  Act',  and  the  more 
detailed  procedural  rules  were  implemented  by  amendments  to  the  'Public  Procurement 
Regulation'.  These  will  both  enter  into  force  on  18  April  2016.  Furthermore,  Malta  and  the 
United Kingdom have introduced new national Regulations in an effort to implement the EU 
Procurement Directive. Malta introduced  'national regulations' which are envisaged to  come 
into effect by April 2016 and the UK has introduced the 'Public Contracts Regulation 2015'.  

Two  Member  States27  have  not  taken  further  action  as  they  consider  that  their  national  law 
already  coincides  with  the  Directive.  In  particular,  Poland  has  mentioned  that  appropriate 
provisions for preventing and tackling conflicts of interest had been introduced into national 
public procurement law – Public Procurement Act (PZP) - even before the relevant provisions 
to  this  effect  were  introduced  into  the  EU  Directives  coordinating  the  award  of  public 
contracts.  Portugal  reported  that  its  national  legislation  requires  beneficiaries  to  conduct 
themselves  in  a  way  that  respects  the  principles  of  transparency  and  good  management  of 
public  funding,  and  as  such,  it  has  not  introduced  national  legislation,  but  Codes  of  Ethics 
have been drawn up at internal level and within each managing authority covering conflicts of 
interests.  Portugal  has  also  issued  guidelines  on  this  subject  recommending  the  adoption  of 
specific  procedures  by  the  managing  authorities,  which  set  out  the  approach  to  take  with 
regards to identifying  preferential relations, and how to  deal with  them. Similarly,  Romania 
has  not  introduced  any  new  national  legislation,  but  it  has  developed  a  'National  Public 
Procurement  Strategy'  in  2015  which  put  forward  measures  to  reform  the  national  public 
procurement system between 2015 and 2020.  

Three  Member  States28  have  laid  down  stricter  rules  on  conflict  of  interest  than  what  was 
intended by the EU Procurement Directive: 

In  Bulgaria  participation  in  a  public  procurement  by  any  person  for  whom  a  conflict  of 
interest has been established is prohibited and cannot be removed. 

In  Denmark,  the  voluntary  ground  for  exclusion  contained  in  Article  57(4)(e)  of  the 
Procurement Directive has been made mandatory. 

24  

25  
26  
27  
28  

Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Greece,  Spain,  Croatia,  Italy,  Cyprus,  Latvia,  Lithuania, 
Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland 
Denmark, Hungary 
Belgium, France, Netherlands 
Poland, Sweden 
Bulgaria, Denmark, Slovenia 

12 

 
 
                                                 
Slovenia requires any person responsible for a public procurement procedure to send ahead of 
the award of the public contract, a written notice informing all parties involved in drawing up 
the documentation. 

Furthermore, five Member States29 have adopted the procedure of 'declarations of conflict of 
interest': 

In Bulgaria, the guidelines on all managing authorities for operational programmes receiving 
European  funding  include  declarations  of  conflict  of  interest  in  order  to  participate  in  the 
procedure for the awarding of grants. Furthermore, all employees of the Managing Authority 
must sign declarations that they will refrain from a conflict of interest. 

In France, certain senior officials in management roles must declare their interests to the High 
Authority for Transparency in Public Life. 

In  Hungary  the  conflict  of  interest  declarations  are  one  of  the  documents  submitted  by  the 
contracting parties as part of public procurement checks conducted by the Public Procurement 
Supervisory Departments of the Prime Minister's Office. 

Portugal's Codes of Ethics and Conduct drawn up at internal level and within each managing 
authority include making a declaration of conflicts of interest. 

Slovakia endorses the idea of filing a form for the conflict of interest comprising information 
on the evaluation of the existence of a potential conflict of interests in the public procurement. 

Three Member States30 have allowed the possibility to appeal to a Court against a finding that 
there existed a conflict of interest in relation to a public procurement contract. Bulgaria has 
actually taken this even further by giving this appeal opportunity to participants who believe 
that a conflict of interest exists when the suspected participant has not been removed from the 
procedure.  

Three  Member  States31  focused  on  improving  transparency  in  the  field  of  public 
procurement. The Czech Republic obliges all its state-funded institutions to publish private-
law agreements exceeding the amount of €1850, and Slovenia makes it mandatory to annually 
publish statistical data of all public contracts exempted from a public procurement, but also 
the details of all entities awarded a public contract valued at more than €10 000 along with the 
subject  of  the  contract  and  the  exact  price  paid.  In  the  United  Kingdom,  information  on  all 
procurement spending over £25 000 and on all awarded contracts over £10 000 is published 
online. 

To this end, it is also important to mention the measures introduced by Romania and Spain: 

In Spain, all senior officials' assets will be inspected when their mandates come to the end by 
the Office of Conflicts of Interest. 

29  
30  
31  

Bulgaria France, Hungary, Portugal, Slovakia 
Bulgaria, Denmark, France 
Czech Republic, Slovenia, United Kingdom 

13 

 
                                                 
In Romania, the National Integrity Agency, an institution concerned with the administrative 
conflicts of interest, launched the PREVENT project which is an integrated information 
system used for preventing conflicts of interest in public procurement.  

1.2. 

Increasing detection: results and open issues 

1.2.1.  Expenditure 

'On  the expenditure  side,  the  fluctuation in  the number  of  fraudulent  irregularities  reported 
over the last five years is difficult to interpret. However, apart from the years 2011 and 2012, 
the amounts concerned have remained relatively stable. This might reflect the fact that most 
spending  programmes  are  multi-annual  and  the  level  of  detection  follows  their  cyclical 
nature. 

The role of Managing and Paying  Authorities in detecting fraud has grown since 2012 and 
should be further enhanced in the coming years, pursuant to the new regulatory framework 
for the period 2014-2020. 

Fraud  detection  practices  still  differ  between  Member  States  and  the  Commission  is 
concerned  about  the  low  number  of  potentially  fraudulent  irregularities  reported  by  some 
countries.  However,  the  number  of  Member  States  which  report  no,  or  very  few,  fraudulent 
cases  has  fallen  in  recent  years.  The  Commission  will  continue  to  provide  guidelines  to 
improve  the  convergence  of  national  systems  and  to  raise  awareness  of  fraud,  in  order  to 
protect the EU’s financial interests more efficiently. 

In 2014, Italy and Romania were the most effective countries in detecting potential fraud in 
the agriculture sector32. Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic were the most effective in 
the cohesion policy area. 

Overall, Germany was the most effective Member State regarding the detection of fraud'.  

Recommendation 3 

As  some  Member  States  continue  to  report  a  very  low  number  of  fraudulent 
irregularities,  the  Commission  recommends  strengthening  their  work  in  relation  to 
detecting and/or reporting fraud, in particular, as they have not reported any over the 
last five years: 

- 

- 

in the area of agriculture: Slovakia and Finland. 

in the area of cohesion policy: Denmark and Luxembourg.  

The  Commission  takes  note  of  progress  made  in  reporting  by  some  Member  States, 
such  as  France  and  Spain  in  the  cohesion  policy  area,  but  believes  that  there  is  still 
considerable room for improvement. 

32  

Hungary  reported  the  highest  number  of  fraudulent  irregularities  uncovered  during  the  course  of  an  OLAF 
investigation. 

14 

 
 
 
                                                 
Although satisfactory, the quality of the reported irregularities could be further improved, in 
particular  in  relation  to  the  classification  of  fraudulent  irregularities  and  the  timing  of 
reporting, as highlighted by the analysis of the Member States’ replies to the questionnaire. 

Given  the  new  rules  on  the  reporting  of  irregularities  currently  being  adopted,  and  the 
remaining  areas  for  improvement  identified  by  the  Commission  following  analysis  of  the 
information  provided  by  the  Member  States,  the  Commission  will  prepare  a  working 
document on the practicalities of the reporting of irregularities, in close cooperation with the 
Member States. 

The  two  Member  States33  explicitly  invited  to  strengthen  their  work  in  relation  to  detecting 
and/or reporting fraud in the area of agriculture, took significant steps in doing so. Finland has 
drawn  up  a  fraud  control  plan,  organised  training  on  fraud  control  and  reporting  within  the 
Paying  Agency  and  for  all  the  entities  handling  delegated  tasks.  Slovakia  has  changed  its 
methodology  both  in  deterring  the  IRQ2  and  IRQ3  qualification  and  in  relation  to  the 
methodology  used  by  the  Agricultural  Paying  Agency  to  report  irregularities  qualified  as 
IRQ3. As such, this has led to a higher number of identified fraudulent irregularities. 

Moreover, Denmark has made changes to the area of cohesion policy; drawn up an anti-fraud 
policy,  and  organised  both  preventive  administrative  checks  and  on-the-spot  checks  by  the 
management authority. It also noted that the low level of fraudulent activities reflects the low 
level of fraud that actually takes place. Luxembourg has responded by stating that it plans to 
hold  meetings  between  all  authorities  involved  in  managing  EU  funds  on  a  regular  basis  in 
order to achieve a structured coordination.  

While the Commission praised some progress by France and Spain in reporting on cohesion 
policy  irregularities,  it  noted  considerable  room  for  improvement.  Both  countries  tool 
concrete  steps  to  improve  this.  Spain  set  up  the  Advisory  Council  for  Preventing  and 
Combating  EU-related  Fraud  which  sets  out  general  criteria  and  establishes  procedures  for 
handling specific cases of suspected fraud. France, through the Inter-ministerial Commission 
for  the  Coordination  of  Inspections  continued  the  efforts  it  had  already  begun  in  2014  in 
fighting fraud. The ARACHNE tool is widely used by the French authorities who also arrange 
training sessions for their officials. Furthermore, since May 2015, France has adopted a stance 
whereby  administrative  actions  are  simplified,  and  as  such,  it  has  adjusted  professional 
secrecy  in  information  exchange  between  administrative  authorities.  This  has  led  to  halting 
the  production  of  supporting  documents  and  has  made  the  process  by  which  information  is 
shared among authorities much quicker. 

Estonia, Czech Republic, Greece, Portugal and Croatia have highlighted their efforts to report 
fraudulent  irregularities.  Such  efforts  entailed  updating  and  improving  guidelines  for 
managing  irregularities  in  the  case  of  Croatia,  organising  training  courses  on  fraud-related 
issues  in  the  case  of  Greece,  and  collaborating  with  all  involved  offices  in  the  case  of  the 

33  

Slovakia, Finland 

15 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Czech  Republic.  Furthermore,  Portugal  explicitly  stated  that  there  was  an  increase  in  the 
reporting of irregularities and Estonia characterised its reporting on fraudulent irregularities as 
‘average’.  

The  remaining  Member  States  which  did  not  reply  to  this  recommendation  assumed  that  it 
was only applicable to four named Member States.  

1.2.2.  Revenue: Updating control strategies 

'In  2014,  on  the  revenue  side,  the  number  of  detected  irregularities,  and  in  particular,  the 
level  of  the  established  amounts  increased  significantly  in  comparison  with  previous  years. 
Considering the risks of cross-border fraud, the Commission believes that close cooperation 
between the Member States and exchange of information beyond the borders for purposes of 
customs  controls  is  to  be  welcomed.  Exchange  of  information  on  customs  transactions, 
economic  operators  or  debts  should  ensure  that  all  customs  transactions  and  economic 
operators are included in the populations for post-clearance controls, regardless of the place 
of  physical  importation  of  goods,  or  the  place  where  the  economic  operator  is  located. 
Information  received  from  other  Member  States  should  be integral  to  risk  management  and 
supplement  the  national  populations  used  for  risk  management  purposes.  Absence  of  such 
cooperation might result in financial liability in the area of TOR. 

Based on the figures for 2014, it can be concluded that cases of fraud and irregularities are 
detected  much  more  often  after  the  clearance  of  goods.  It  should  be  kept  in  mind  that  a 
combination of different control strategies is required. However, post-clearance controls are 
the most effective method of detection, both in terms of the number of cases detected and in 
terms  of  established  amounts.  Controls  at  the  time  of  clearance  of  goods  and  inspections 
carried out by anti-fraud services are crucial to the detection of certain types of existing fraud 
and new types of fraud. 

Furthermore,  mutual  assistance  notices  issued  following  JCOs  conducted  by  OLAF  are  an 
important source of information for detecting irregularities in transactions involving certain 
types of goods'. 

Recommendation 4 

To  fight  customs  fraud,  Member  States  are  invited  to  inform  the  Commission  of  the 
measures taken to strengthen cooperation in order to ensure that all transactions, and 
all  economic  operators,  are  included  in  the  population  for  post-clearance  controls, 
irrespective  of  whether  or  not  the  importer  is  located  in  the  Member  State  of  the 
physical importation.  

Considering  the  decreasing  number  of  customs  controls  at  the  time  of  clearance, 
Member  States  are  invited  to  exchange  experiences  when  customs  authorities  were 
particularly successful in detecting fraud or irregularities at the time of clearance.  

16 

 
 
 
 
Regarding  this  recommendation,  the  Member  States’  replies  mainly  focused  upon  the 
measures  taken  to  strengthen  cooperation  and  fight  customs  fraud.  A  significant  number  of 
Member States34 commented on the importance of cooperating with other Member States and 
the measures they have taken to accomplish that e.g. by signing bilateral agreements.  

To this end, in 2014 the customs authority in Lithuania launched a Data Mining project so that 
Member States can share their experiences in identifying fraud during post-clearance checks. 
The  project  was  launched  with  a  view  to  setting  up  similar  joint  models  in  other  member 
States. 

Six Member States35  reported that they do not exlude economic operators registered in other 
Member States in their investigations to identify customs fraud. This further emphasises the 
adoption  of  the  Commission’s  recommendation  when  it  comes  to  cooperating  with  other 
Member States to identify irregularities. 

Belgium mentions its dissatisfaction with Commission's recommendation four. According to 
the  Belgian  customs,  financial  responsibility  is  increasingly  being  shifted  on  the  Member 
States  in  the  area  of  post-clearance  controls.  However,  Member  States  are  only  financially 
responsible  for  losses  of  traditional  own  resources  when  the  losses  occur  for  reasons 
imputable to them. This has been confirmed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In such 
cases liability starts typically from the point in time when the own resources would have been 
made available in the absence of the Memebr State's error, which has also been confirmed by 
the ECJ. On the other hand the own resources legislation has recently been changed, after a 
proposal by the Commission to that effect, reducing the interest rate applicable to delays in 
making available own resources and allowing for possible derogations from Member States' 
financial responsibility for cases involving criminal investigations. 

34  
35  

Czech Republic, France, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden  
Bulgaria, Germany, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Romania 

17 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2. 

REPLIES OF MEMBER STATES 

2.1. 

Improved coordination and cooperation: a new impetus in the fight against fraud 

2.1.1.  Reinforced legal and administrative structures for enhanced cooperation 

Significant steps were taken in 2014 to enhance the Commission’s and the Member States’ protection of the EU’s financial interests. 

In  2014,  the  Commission  successfully  completed  the  priority  actions  of  its  multi-annual  Anti-Fraud  Strategy  (CAFS).  While  the  focus  of  CAFS  is 
primarily upon developing anti-fraud strategies at Commission service and agency level, the Commission is now increasingly focusing on how to support 
Member States in developing their own anti-fraud strategies. 

Regulation (EU) No 883/2013 provides, inter alia, for enhanced cooperation with Member States through the appointment of an AFCOS. 

At the end of 2014, all Member States had designated their AFCOS. The responsibilities of each national AFCOS vary, depending on the Member State. 
All Member States have given their AFCOS coordinative responsibilities, albeit to varying extents. Only a few Member States empower their AFCOS to 
act in an investigative capacity. 

Structured  coordination  between  anti-fraud  bodies  and  other  national  authorities  have  proved  to  be  a  best  practice  and  should  be  implemented  in  all 
Member States. 

Recommendation 1: 

Member States are encouraged to use their AFCOS to its full potential. 

The Commission suggests that cooperation between relevant national parties be developed in the framework of national anti-fraud strategies. 

18 

 
 
BE  Belgium decided to allocate the AFCOS responsibilities to the interdepartmental committee for coordinating the fight against economic  fraud 

(CICF). 
The committee is made up of representatives of all departments involved in the fight against economic fraud, and therefore in the fight against 
fraud affecting the financial interests of the EU. The members of the committee include, inter alia: the customs administration, SPF Finances (the 
Federal Public Finance Service), regional departments managing the structural and agricultural funds, the Economic Inspectorate and the Board 
of Prosecutors-General. 
The  committee  meets  four  times  per  year in  order  to  coordinate  action, prepare  COCOLAF  meetings,  coordinate  the  reply  to  the  Article  325 
questionnaire, etc.  
A secretariat is responsible for following up specific requests from OLAF, e.g. relating to on-the-spot controls. 
The  introduction  of  a  national  anti-fraud  strategy  will  be  examined  in  2016.  There  is  currently  no  national  coordination  of  the  anti-fraud 
strategies applied by the different departments concerned. 
A legal framework to regulate the operation of the AFCOS and cooperation with all the departments concerned is currently being drafted.  

BG 

In  fulfilment  of  the  European  Commission’s  recommendations,  by  Council  of  Ministers  Decree  (PMS)  No 18  of  4 February 2003, 
Bulgaria established  a  Council  for  Coordination  in  the  Fight  Against  Infringements  Affecting  the  European  Union’s  Financial  Interests 
(AFCOS).  At  the  higher  political  level,  the  AFCOS  Council  provides  guidelines,  monitors  and  coordinates  the  activities  of  State  authorities 
responsible for preventing and combating infringements affecting the revenue and expenditure of the EU budget and the national budget. The 
Council is chaired by the Minister for the Interior, who implements the State policy on the protection of the EU’s financial interests. The Council 
is composed of ministers, deputy-ministers and heads of administrations responsible for the management of EU funds and programmes, directors 
of  revenue  agencies,  and  heads  of  control,  certification,  audit  and  enforcement  bodies.  The  operation  of  the  Council  is  supported  by  the 
Protection of the European Union’s Financial Interests Directorate (AFCOS), a specialised unit within the Ministry of the Interior (MVR) which 
carries out control, information and coordination activities relating to the protection of the European Union’s financial interests. 

In  accordance  with  Article 3(4)  of  Regulation  (EU,  EURATOM)  No 883/2013  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council,  the 
AFCOS Directorate is the designated national coordinating anti-fraud service, which assists the effective cooperation and information exchange 
with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). The AFCOS Directorate coordinates the operational cooperation between OLAF and the members 
of the AFCOS Council in carrying out investigations in Bulgaria, and ensures and coordinates, at the national level, the reporting of irregularities 

19 

 
 
between the national institutions and the European Commission. 

With the adoption, in December 2014, of the National Strategy for Preventing and Combating Irregularities and Fraud Affecting the Financial 
Interests  of  the  EU  for  the  period  2014–2020  and  of  the  Action  Plan  implementing  the  National  Strategy  for  the  period  2015–2016,  the 
cooperation between the responsible national institutions, whose heads are AFCOS Council members, is implemented in a structured manner on 
the basis of the strategic goals and functions envisaged in the two programming documents. 

The  National  Strategy  for  Preventing  and  Combating  Irregularities  and  Fraud  Affecting  the  Financial  Interests  of  the  EU  identifies 
4 strategic goals, providing the framework for cooperation between the responsible national institutions: 

Improving prevention by strengthening the regulatory framework, increasing the administrative capacity and enhancing transparency and access 
to information; 

Improving efficiency in detecting and combating irregularities and fraud by strengthening cooperation among revenue authorities and enhancing 
internal control and interaction between State authorities, the private sector, non-governmental organisations and civil society; 

Strengthening the cooperation with OLAF and the competent EU institutions, the Member States and third countries; 

Improving the efficiency of investigation, refunding and sanctions activities. 

All  institutions  administering  European  programmes  cooperate  closely  with  the  AFCOS  Directorate,  which  is  reflected  in  the  submission  of 
information to the Directorate in all cases when indications of fraud are established in the course of checks and when suspected irregularities are 
classified as ‘suspected fraud’. Upon completion of the alerts the responsible institutions notify the AFCOS Directorate of the final position and 
the  measures  adopted  in  response  to  the  alert.  In  addition,  the  relevant  national  institutions  report  to  the  AFCOS  every  three  months  on  the 
registered irregularities and the measures taken in response to them. 

Furthermore,  all  institutions  administering  European  programmes  actively  implement  the  AFCOS  Directorate’s  Methodological  Guidelines 

20 

 
 
relating to the administration of irregularities. The Permanent Working Group on Irregularities, headed by the AFCOS Directorate, discusses, on 
an  ongoing  basis,  all  complex  issues  arising  in  relation  to  the  administration  of  irregularities.  The  training  sessions  organised  by  the  AFCOS 
Directorate further enhance the administrative capacity of experts responsible for the prevention, detection, reporting and subsequent handling of 
cases of irregularities and fraud relating to the spending of funds from the common budget of the EU. 

The following agreements were signed in fulfilment of the tasks defined in the Action Plan implementing the National Strategy for Preventing 
and Combating Irregularities and Fraud Affecting the Financial Interests of the EU for the period 2014–2020: 

Agreement  of 23 March 2015 between the Bulgarian Prosecutor’s Office, the Ministry  of the Interior, the State Agency for National  Security 
(DANS),  the  National  Revenue  Agency  (NAP)  and  the  Customs  Agency  (AM)  on  establishing  an  interdepartmental  unit  to  support  the 
investigation of organised crime related to financial offences. The main priorities in the unit’s operations are the specialisation and teamwork of 
prosecutors, investigative police officers, officials from the DANS, the NAP and the AM; information exchange and confidentiality, efficiency 
and speed of preliminary checks and pre-trial proceedings. The overall management and control over the unit and the joint investigation teams 
established within it are exercised by the Supreme Court of Cassation deputy responsible for this area, designated by the Prosecutor General. 

In early November of 2015 a Cooperation and Collaboration Agreement was signed between the Council for Coordination in the Fight Against 
Infringements  Affecting  the  European  Union’s  Financial  Interests  (AFCOS)  and  the  Prosecutor’s  Office  of  Bulgaria  (PRB).  The  agreement 
establishes the conditions, procedures and formats for the interaction and cooperation between the Council and the Prosecutor’s Office. 

The PRB has set up an electronic register for the exchange of information between the Prosecutor’s Office of Bulgaria and the European Anti-
Fraud Office in accordance with the agreement signed between the PRB and the AFCOS Council. 

PMS  No 89/16 April 2015  established  an  interdepartmental  coordination  centre  on  combating  smuggling  and  controlling  the  movement  of 
hazardous goods and cargo, aiming to ensure the interaction and coordination between the bodies of the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of 
Finance and the Ministry of Transport, Information Technology and Communications (MTITS). The effective interaction at the inter-institutional 
level and the coordination of the operational activities on identified cases of smuggling and tax misuse from a single coordination centre enables 

21 

 
 
immediate action on risk analysis, identification of countermeasures and undertaking of joint control activities by the law enforcement bodies, 
the Executive Agency for Automobile Administration and the two revenue agencies: the National Revenue Agency and the Customs Agency. 

CZ  The  Czech  AFCOS  team  intensively  cooperated  with  the  other  relevant  Czech  parties  such  as  the  Customs  Administration  of  the  Czech 
Republic, the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Unit for Combating Corruption and Financial Crime as to improve the fight against 
fraud and irregularities. Firstly, the Czech AFCOS team organized a conference for the members of local contact points of AFCOS in September 
2015, in which representatives of the aforementioned offices were trained in the field of the protection of the EU’s financial interests, specifically 
in  analysing  collected  evidence  or  gathered  facts  which  are  reported  to  the  administrative  authority,  inter  alia,  when  there  is  suspicion  of  a 
violation of administrative law, or it regards the case of suspicion of a breach of criminal law. We focused on the efficiency of the detection and 
legal classification of behaviour  of the accused party  by inspectors during the conduction  of checks, inspections, and prompt reporting  to  the 
police. A representative of the Unit for Combating Corruption and Financial Crime presented a few case studies to show practical examples 
of breaching the Czech Penal Code, specifically of criminal cases where suspects caused financial damage to the EU budget. 

Secondly, the revision of the Czech national anti-fraud strategy is still in the process of being adopted. As far as the internal comments procedure 
is concerned, it has been completed. In regards to the external comments procedure, it has not been adopted yet. The revised  strategy shall be 
adopted by government decree. 

In addition to that, based on the Agreement on the Mutual Cooperation, the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office in cooperation with the Supreme 
Audit Office organized a workshop.  The workshop attended by representatives of those bodies held on 13th September 2015 was organized to 
exchange practical information, describing new types of criminal activities, and different possibilities for common cooperation in procedures for 
the awarding of public contracts co-financed by ESIF. 

DK  The Danish Anti-Fraud Coordination Service was placed in the Finance Ministry by a Government decision in May 2014. In order to support the 
Finance  Ministry  in  this  task,  an  anti-fraud  network  was  set  up  at  the  same  time,  composed  of  the  relevant  authorities  (the  Danish  AgriFish 
Agency,  the  Danish  Business  Authority,  the  Danish  Customs  and  Tax  Administration,  and  the  Public  Prosecutor  for  Serious  Economic  and 

22 

 
 
International Crime (SØIK)). The network was set up in this way so as to cover both the revenue side and the expenditure side, along with the 
prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of fraud against the EU’s financial interests and recovery of the unduly paid funds.  

The Finance Ministry thus carries out the obligations laid down in Article 3(4) of the OLAF Regulation and can act as a contact point for OLAF. 
However, the Danish AFCOS is merely a coordinating unit, and specific inquiries from OLAF are therefore passed on to the relevant authority. 
Cooperation in the network helps to ease this communication.  

The AFCOS network meets regularly, both before relevant meetings in Brussels, and also in connection with thematic meetings on subjects of 
cross-cutting relevance for the authorities. Cooperation in the network allows for a helpful and regular exchange of ideas and experiences, and 
easier coordination of cross-cutting issues. It also allows for discussions of a more strategic nature.  

Cooperation in the network has been reinforced through regular meetings, exchanges of experience, and continuous information exchange. It is 
our view that cooperation in the network has been - and continues to be - useful for the authorities involved in fighting fraud against the EU’s 
financial  interests.  A  manual  is  being  drawn  up  in  order  to  completely  clarify  the  respective  authorities’  powers,  anti-fraud  action  plans, 
interfaces and cooperation within the AFCOS network, and their cooperation with OLAF. The aim is to strengthen cooperation by giving a more 
cross-cutting overview of the authorities’ work in fighting fraud against EU funds. This can be helpful to authorities both within and outside of 
the network. It is not considered necessary at the present time to have a formal national anti-fraud strategy. 

DE  Germany's  AFCOS  at  the  Ministry  of  Finance  is  in  constant  direct  and  indirect  contact  with  all  federal  and  regional  administrative  bodies 
competent for preventing, detecting and fighting fraud and irregularities in the country. The issue of preventing and fighting fraud now routinely 
features  on  the  agenda  for  coordination  meetings  and  other  discussions  with  these  authorities.  OLAF's  coordination  assistance  is  consistently 
provided but depends to a great degree on mutual recognition and reporting. 

EE 

The Estonian AFCOS exists since 2003. It includes:  

institutions granting different aid, such as 1st Level Implementing Bodies, 2nd Level Implementing Bodies = Ministries, Managing / Certifying 

23 

 
 
and Auditing Authorities   

partners from investigative institutions, such as different police forces, prosecutors, the Tax and Customs Board, Competition Authority 

It organises joint training courses at least twice a year, where common cases and area-specific challenges and achievements are discussed. Due to 
regular and close cooperation we all are aware of our and the others’ duties and the importance of cooperation for the protection of the EU and 
Estonian financial interests. 

In the future we will focus more on composing the written strategic action plan with every party’s duties and goals. We will assess this plan in 
our annual meeting with the partners’ 

IE 

Regarding cooperation between AFCOS and the relevant national authorities, Ireland established an AFCOS network, the inaugural meeting of 
which took place in May 2015. The relevant authorities represented at the inaugural meeting included the Department of Education, Food and the 
Marine, Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, Department of Education and Skills, Department of Justice, Revenue Commissioners 
and the Irish police.  The AFCOS network will meet periodically to inter alia share information and best practice. 

EL 

ENTITY 

Secretariat-
General for the 
Fight Against 
Corruption 

Law 4320/2015 established the Secretariat-General for the Fight Against Corruption with the task of 
drawing up a draft national strategy for preventing and combating corruption and fraud, specifying the strategy 
in terms of measures and actions to be taken by each ministry and entity, and coordinating all services and 
entities involved in the implementation of the strategy, with a view to ensuring its implementation, coherence 
and effectiveness by giving instructions and recommendations.  

To this end, it has been designated as the anti-fraud coordination service (AFCOS), pursuant to Article 3(4) of 

24 

 
 
 
 
Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
11 September 2013. As an AFCOS, it acts as a national contact point with OLAF, i.e. the EU agency that 
investigates fraud against the EU budget. 

The Secretariat-General for the Fight Against Corruption, in its capacity as an AFCOS, cooperates closely with 
the Special Service for Institutional Support of the Secretariat-General for Public Investments and NSRF with a 
view to updating the national strategy for combating fraud in structural actions and implementing the 
provisions of the new management and control system for the new programming period 2014-2020 on 
combating fraud in structural actions. 

In addition, it cooperates with the Fiscal Audit Committee (EDEL) to ensure the effective functioning of the 
management and control system, with a view to preventing and identifying cases of fraud. It also cooperates 
with the Ministry of Rural Development and Food, with a view to detecting and preventing irregularities in aid 
payment. 

The Secretariat-General for the Fight Against Corruption removes conflicts and resolves matters of overlapping 
responsibilities between departments or agencies involved in the fight against corruption, by proposing 
appropriate solutions for the effective resolution of those matters and by bringing forward the necessary 
legislative or regulatory interventions. 

It issues general instructions and recommendations and intervenes, where required, to facilitate the exchange of 
information between agencies and entities fighting against corruption and fraud.  

Within its remit, the Secretariat-General draws up coordinated action programmes to combat corruption and 
fraud, thus implementing the national strategic planning. These programmes are addressed to the administrative 
bodies concerned, which have an obligation to coordinate their actions to achieve the above strategy. To ensure 

25 

 
 
this coordination, the Secretariat-General runs liaison offices for the following control mechanisms: (a) the 
Financial and Economic Crime Unit (SDOE), (b) the Financial Police Directorate, (c) the internal audit units of 
ministries and (d) the Health and Welfare Services Inspectorate.  

Moreover, joint teams were formed and operated in 2015, consisting of one delegate from each body, so as to 
achieve better cooperation and control, even within those control mechanisms. 

In this context, joint control teams coordinated by the Secretariat-General for the Fight Against Corruption 
have been created to combat smuggling, with the involvement of the Financial Police, the SDOE, the Coast 
Guard, the customs authorities and the Internal Affairs Directorate of the Secretariat-General for Public 
Revenue. 

An illustration of this is the outcome of the cooperation with law enforcement authorities from October 2015 to 
8 February 2016, following information given by the Secretariat-General for the Fight Against Corruption in its 
capacity as AFCOS: 

- seizure by the customs authorities of nine containers with a total of 102 190 000 smuggled cigarettes, 
corresponding to a total of € 18 773 129.69 in duties and taxes; 

- on-site inspections by OLAF in December 2015 in Athens, supported by SDOE and coordinated by the 
Secretariat-General for the Fight Against Corruption; 

- in a number of cases the Coast Guard carried out checks on ships following information given by the 
Secretariat-General for the Fight Against Corruption in its capacity as AFCOS. 

ES  A  new  twenty-fifth  additional  provision,  which  entered  into  force  on  2  October  2015,  was  added  to  the  General  Subsidies  Law  (GSL) 

26 

 
 
 
No 38/2003 of 17 November 2003. This granted legal status to the establishment of the National Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS) and 
to  the  regulation  of  its  core  tasks.  These  aspects  were  previously  covered  by  a  regulatory  instrument  (Royal  Decree  No  802/2014  of  19 
September 2014, which set up the AFCOS). 

The 25th additional provision of the GSL added to the rules governing the Anti-Fraud Coordination Service by including certain elements that 
are  needed  for  it  to  be  able  to  carry  out  its  tasks  successfully.  In  particular,  the  following  should  be  noted  concerning  the  content  of 
Recommendation 1:  

1) Firstly, point four of the fourth paragraph of the 25th additional provision of the GSL provides that 'The National Anti-Fraud Coordination 
Service shall be assisted by an Advisory Council chaired by the Auditor General and comprising representatives of the ministries, bodies and 
other  national  institutions  responsible  for  managing,  monitoring,  preventing  and  combating  fraud  in  relation  to  the  financial  interests  of  the 
European Union. Its composition and workings shall be established by Royal Decree.' 

The  National  Anti-Fraud  Coordination  Service  has  prepared  the  draft  of  the  Royal  Decree  governing  the  composition  and  workings  of  the 
Advisory  Council  for Preventing and  Combating  EU-related  Fraud.  The  process  of  approving  the  Royal  Decree  is  ongoing.  AFCOS  has 
prepared the text of the Royal Decree as well as the accompanying documentation required for the approval process. However, the text has not 
yet been approved by the Council of Ministers because the general election was held and it cannot be approved until a new Government has been 
formed. 

When designing the Advisory Council for Preventing and Combating EU-related Fraud the recommendations made by OLAF itself were used as 
a reference point, particularly those made in the 'Guidance note on the main tasks and responsibilities of an Anti-Fraud Coordination Service 
(AFCOS)' (prepared by OLAF in October 2013) and especially those in Part IV 'Institutional framework of the AFCOS in the Member State'. 

In  light  of  the  above,  a  broad-based  composition  was  chosen  so  as  to  represent  all  the  national  bodies,  entities  and  institutions  that  are 
responsible  for  managing,  monitoring,  preventing  and  combating  fraud  in  this  field.  As  such,  the  Advisory  Council  is  designed  to  be  the 
principal tool for ensuring cooperation between the various bodies and entities concerned. 

27 

 
 
Thus,  in  accordance  with  Article 3  of  the  draft  Royal  Decree,  the  Advisory  Council  for  Preventing  and  Combating  EU-related  Fraud  will 
comprise the following members: 

a) A Chairperson, who will represent the Auditor General. 

b) A Deputy Chairperson, who will represent the National Anti-Fraud Coordination Service. 

c) One member to represent each Managing and Certifying Authority for each European Fund. 

d) Two members representing the National Audit Office, in its capacity as the auditing authority. 

e) Two members representing the National Agency for Tax Administration, at least one of whom will represent the Department of Customs and 
Excise as regards customs duties and other traditional own resources in the EU budget. 

f) One member representing the State Secretariat for Security of the Ministry of the Interior. 

g) One member representing the Directorate-General for Police, as a body with the power to investigate fraud. 

h) One member representing the Directorate-General for the Civil Guard, as a body with the power to investigate fraud. 

i) One member representing the State Prosecutor's Office. 

j) One member representing the State Secretariat for the European Union. 

k) One member or several members representing the bodies or institutions of the Autonomous Communities responsible for managing European 
Union funds if they choose to accept the invitation from the Chairperson of the Advisory Council. 

l) One member representing local administration, on a proposal from the largest association of local authorities in the country, if it chooses to 

28 

 
 
accept the invitation from the Chairperson of the Advisory Council. 

 In  addition,  the  draft  Royal  Decree  provides  that,  alongside  the  voting  members  of  the  Advisory  Council,  experts  -  where  appropriate  -  and 
especially OLAF representatives may attend its meetings in an advisory capacity without the right to vote. 

As  regards  the  tasks  conferred  upon  the  Advisory  Council,  the  purpose  of  the  Royal  Decree  is  to  make  the  Council  the  principal  tool  for 
guaranteeing effective cooperation between all those involved in the various stages of the anti-fraud cycle (prevention, detection, investigation, 
recovery/sanctions) and for ensuring that the National Anti-Fraud Coordination Service can successfully perform its coordination role in terms of 
preventing and combating fraud. To this end, Article 2 of the draft Royal Decree confers the following tasks upon the Advisory Council: 

'a)  Consider,  and  if  necessary,  comment  on  draft  laws  and  proposals  of  any  kind  that  are  submitted  to  it  by  the  National  Anti-Fraud 

Coordination Service. 

b)  Study,  consider  and  propose  to  the  National  Anti-Fraud  Coordination  Service  any  measures  considered  necessary  regarding  the 

prevention of and fight against fraud vis-à-vis the financial interests of the European Union. 

c)  Work  together  with the  National  Anti-Fraud  Coordination  Service to  establish systems that  allow  a  smooth  exchange  of  information 
between the national institutions that are responsible for managing, monitoring, preventing and combating fraud vis-à-vis the financial interests 
of the European Union, and between these bodies and the European Anti-Fraud Office, in full compliance with the existing rules on information 
confidentiality.  

d) Work together with the National Anti-Fraud Coordination Service when coordinating anti-fraud measures to be taken by the relevant 

national authorities. 

e)  Help  the  National  Anti-Fraud  Coordination  Service  set  out  general  criteria  and  establish  procedures  for  handling  specific  cases  of 

suspected fraud, as well as the procedures to be followed in each case depending on the specific circumstances in each individual case. 

29 

 
 
f) Inform and advise the National Anti-Fraud Coordination Service in relation to any issues that it may raise regarding the prevention of 

and fight against fraud vis-à-vis the financial interests of the European Union. 

g) Communicate information concerning the proposals, decisions and recommendations made by the European Union in the field of the 

prevention of and fight against fraud. 

h) Help draw up and promote the national strategy to prevent and combat fraud vis-à-vis the financial interests of the European Union. 

i) Any other task that is assigned to it by law or regulation, within the scope of its powers'. 

2)  Secondly,  the  25th  additional  provision  of  the  GSL  confers  new  powers  on  the  National  Anti-Fraud  Coordination  Service  to  ensure  the 
statutory involvement of the entities that might be affected by the actions of AFCOS, thereby ensuring that AFCOS can carry out its duties fully. 

In  particular,  paragraph  5  of  the  25th  additional  provision  lays  down  that  ‘The  authorities,  representatives  of  the  State,  Autonomous 
Communities and Local Authorities, as well as the heads and directors of public offices, public bodies and other public organisations and, in 
general, those who exercise public duties or work in these institutions shall cooperate with and support the Service' and that 'The Service shall 
have the same powers as OLAF to access information relevant to the matter under investigation'. 

3) The National Anti-Fraud Coordination Service is holding meetings with various national bodies and institutions with a view to establishing 
channels  for  cooperation  with  any  other  bodies  that  may  have  an  interest  in  combating  fraud  vis-à-vis  the  financial  interests  of  the  European 
Union. In this respect, a convention, protocol or similar instrument is due to be drawn up to formalise relations between AFCOS and relevant 
departments in the Prosecutor's Office for the Fight against Corruption and Organised Crime regarding channels for exchanging information on 
cases of fraud vis-à-vis the EU's financial interests, among other issues. 

FR 

Since its creation in 2008, the National Anti-Fraud Unit (Délégation nationale de lutte contre la fraude - DNLF) has drawn up a national plan for 
the fight against fraud in national public finances.  This plan is approved every year  by the Prime Minister or,  by delegation, the Minister for 

30 

 
 
Finance,  during  the  meeting  of  the  National  Anti-Fraud  Committee.  For  2016,  it is  planned to  include  in  the  plan specific  measures  to  better 
combat fraud against the Union’s financial interests.  

HR 

1.  Introduction 

The Republic of Croatia has  fulfilled its obligation under Article 3, paragraph 4 of the Regulation (EU EURATOM) No. 883/2013, since the 
Service for Combating Irregularities and Fraud (SCIF) was established within the Ministry of Finance. SCIF performs a coordinating role within 
the AFCOS system and acts as the main contact point to the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF) and therefore ensures protection of financial 
interests of the EU in the Republic of Croatia. 

Tasks  and  responsibilities  of  SCIF  are  set  in  the  Government  Decree  on  internal  organization  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance  (OG  32/12,  67/12, 
124/12,  78/13,  102/13,  24/14,  134/14,  154/14)  and  in  the  Government  Regulation  on  the  institutional  framework  of  the  system  of  combating 
irregularities and fraud (OG 144/13). 

2.  Strategic documents 

National Anti-fraud Strategy for the Protection of the EU Financial Interest for the period 2010-2012 

On 14 January 2010, the Government of the Republic of Croatia adopted the National Anti-fraud Strategy for the Protection of the EU Financial 
Interest for the period 2010-2012 as the main strategic document stressing the priorities in the protection of EU financial interests and measures 
for their attainment. The Strategy defined the scope of work and responsibilities of bodies in the AFCOS system, as well as the measures and 
activities  for  strengthening  the  protection  of  EU  financial  interests  in  the  Republic  of  Croatia.  Most  of  those  measures  and  activities  were 
fulfilled  during  the  course  of  implementation  of  IPA  2007  Twinning  light  project  “Strengthening  Croatian  AFCOS  System  with  the  aim  of 
protecting the EU's financial interests”. 

National Anti-Fraud Strategy in the Field of Protection of EU Financial Interests for the period 2014-2016 

Following  the  National strategy  2010  –  2012,  on  23  January  2014,  the  Government  adopted  the  National  Anti-Fraud  Strategy in  the  Field  of 

31 

 
 
 
Protection  of  EU  Financial  Interests  for  the  period  2014-2016  and  its  accompanying  Action  Plan.  The  purpose  of  this  Strategy  is  to  ensure 
effective and efficient protection of EU financial interests by further strengthening the AFCOS system in the Republic of Croatia, by carrying out 
predefined measures and achievement of the set objectives. 

Moreover, when drafting the Strategy 2014- 2016, all the aspects that require improvement on the basis of the weaknesses detected in the system 
for combating irregularities and fraud were taken into account. 

3.  Cooperation between SCIF and relevant national parties 

Efficient  information  flow  and  effective  cooperation  between  institutions  within  the  AFCOS  system  in  the  Republic  of  Croatia  (cooperation 
between institutions at different levels i.e. SCIF – AFCOS Network- Irregularity Reporting System) are set and in use. 

Cooperation  between  SCIF  and  relevant  national  parties  is  a  product  of  good  practices  and  has  also  its  basis  in  national  legislation  (e.g. 
Regulation on the institutional framework of the system for combating irregularities and fraud (OG 144/13), Decision on the establishment of the 
AFCOS network (NN 151/13)).  

In order to further enhance cooperation with certain national bodies, measures set in the National Anti-Fraud Strategy in the Field of Protection 
of EU Financial Interests for the period 2014-2016 and Action Plan, inter alia, include signing Protocols on: 

• 

• 

• 

cooperation and exchange of information between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Interior (MOI),  

cooperation and exchange of information between the Ministry of Finance and the Croatian State Attorney's Office (SAO), 

cooperation and exchange of information between the Ministry of Finance and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). 

The aim of these Protocols is to help to define cooperation and exchange of information in detail. 

Protocol  on  cooperation  with  the  Ministry  of  Interior  was  signed  on  24.3.2015  and  with  the  Croatian  State  Attorney's  Office  (SAO)  on 
16.6.2016. On 14 April 2015, the Ministry of Finance sent to OLAF the initiative for concluding Administrative Cooperation Arrangement with 

32 

 
 
OLAF (ACA). By defining fields of mutual cooperation, ways of communication and information exchange, ACA ought to improve the already 
effective  cooperation  between  the Ministry  of Finance  and  OLAF  and  to  contribute  to  the  enhancement  of  the  protection  of  the  EU  financial 
interests in general. 

Additionally, SCIF also drafted Guidelines for managing irregularities and fraud which are integrated within Manuals of procedure of 
Irregularity Reporting System bodies in the context of EU Structural Instruments environment (programming period 2007 – 2013) and 
for  ESI  Funds  (programming  period  2014  –  2020)  (Guidelines).  Guidelines  were  adopted  by  Minister  of  Finance  on  13  August  2015. 
Correspondingly, reinforced cooperation and exchange of information is achieved through the Guidelines, since the document is, inter 
alia, consisted of provisions on way how to and in which form bodies should cooperate with each other. 

IT 

The  Italian  COLAF  (Comitato  per  la  lotta  contro  le  frodi  nei  confronti  dell’Unione  europea  [Committee  for  combating  fraud  against  the 
European Union]) was established by Article 76 of Law No 142 of 19 February 1992, and subsequently confirmed by Article 54 of Law No 234 
of 24 December 2012.  

Furthermore, on the basis of Article 3(4) of the recently adopted Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by OLAF, the  Committee has been designated as the central Anti Fraud 
Coordination service (AFCOS). 

The  Committee  is  the  government  body  responsible  for  drawing  up  and  developing  the  national  strategy  for  combating  irregularities/fraud 
affecting the EU budget, included in the annual report to the Italian Parliament provided for by Article 54 of Law No 234 of 24 December 2012. 

It has advisory and guidance functions for the coordination of all actions to combat fraud/irregularities in the fields of taxation, the common 
agricultural policy and the Structural Funds.  

It  includes  top-level  representatives  from  all  the  administrations  concerned  in  the  management  and/or  control  activities  in  the  field  of  EU 
funding,  namely:  Prime  Minister's  Office,  Ministries  of  the  Interior,  Justice,  Economic  Affairs  and  Finance,  Economic  Development, 
Agricultural Policies, Infrastructure and Transport, Employment and Education; the Guardia di Finanza (financial police), the Carabinieri; the 

33 

 
 
Customs and Revenue Agencies; Agricultural Payments Agency; Conference of the Regions, Union of Italian Provinces and Italian National 
Association of Municipalities.  

The  Committee  is  therefore  the  ideal  tool  for  enhancing  knowledge  of  and  analysing  illegal  activities,  as  well  as  identifying  the  most 
appropriate action to prevent, combat and punish irregularities and fraud. 

The  strategic  action  carried  out  by  AFCOS  has  tackled  several  significant  areas  of  activity,  at  all  levels,  in  order  to  improve  further  the 
coordination  of  all  the  national  institutions  concerned,  and  consequently,  the  national  anti-fraud  structure,  mainly  from  the  point  of  view  of 
preventing illegal activities. 

Thanks to the significant efforts made, good results have been achieved and further strategic areas of activity identified for the future, both at 
national and European levels. These are set out in the aforementioned annual report to Parliament.  

CY 

In Cyprus, with Minister’s Decision No. 56.370 dated 12/09/2002 AFCOS was established and as a contact point with the Anti-Fraud Office in 
the European Union (OLAF), was set the Legal Service and specifically the responsible Unit combating of Money Laundering (MO.K.A.S). 

Later, with Minister’s Decision No. 61.895, dated 21/04/2005, Contact Point was set the Treasury of the Republic of Cyprus, since at that time 
was responsible for the notification to the Commission of all irregularities were identified by all services of AFCOS members. Now the AFCOS 
members shall communicate on their own cases. 

Cyprus identified the competent authorities which are able to provide OLAF’s Office with the assistance needed in the performance of its duties. 

AFCOS in Cyprus is composed of the following Services/Departments: 

  MOKAS 
  Treasury of the Republic Of Cyprus 
  Audit Service  

34 

 
 
  Customs Department 
  Police 
 
  Cyprus Agricultural Payments Organisation 
  Directorate General of European Programs coordination and Development 

Internal Audit Service 

No  antifraud  Strategy  was  developed,  but  a  structured  coordination  between  anti-fraud  bodies  (members  of  AFCOS)  and  other  national 
authorities exist.   

When a  case opened  by OLAF or  a request for provision  of information/documents  all  members of AFCOS  work towards the satisfaction of 
OLAF’s request in line with local and European Law. If the information relates to other areas such as Tax, social insurance, existing shareholders 
a writing request is made to the competent departments for provision of such information. Such exchange of information respects the principles 
of confidentiality and the rules on data protection. 

Note that for customs matters the Customs Department is the only the competent Authority .  

In Cyprus, the AFCOS is not empowered to act in an investigative capacity. 

LV 

On  16  July  2015  the  Cabinet  of  Ministers  approved  a  new  mid-term  policy  planning  document  “The  Corruption  Prevention  and  Combating 
Guidelines  for  2015-2020”  describing  the  current  situation  of  Latvia’s  anticorruption  policy,  defining  problems  and  stipulating  tasks  to  be 
executed by various state institutions, implementation time frame for individual assignments, justification of the assignment and overall policy 
results to be expected within a certain period of time. 

To enforce the rules for the new programming period 2014-2020 in the Guidelines, particular tasks are assigned to all public institutions i.e. 
State  institutions  and  municipalities  shall  adopt  and/or  update  their  Anti-Corruption  Action  Plans,  including  risk  based  anti-fraud  and  anti-
corruption measures to prevent and detect fraud in the EU funds and other foreign financial assistance instruments, if applicable.  

35 

 
 
To improve cooperation and to use the AFCOS to its full potential an Inter-institutional working group has been established to: 

1)  elaborate an Anti-Fraud Strategy at the national level of the AFCOS network 2017 – 2019 and 
2)  draw up rules for efficient cooperation and exchange of information in order to strengthen and formalize cooperation between the Latvian 

competent authorities and  OLAF and to improve mutual legal assistance. 

They are expected to be approved by the end of 2016. 

Furthermore AFCOS has updated the Anti-fraud strategy of the Ministry of Finance for the protection of the financial interests of the Union for 
2014 – 2016. The strategy covers State Administrative Institutions that are Subordinate to the Ministry of Finance, as AFCOS Latvia is located 
at the Ministry of Finance, and was meant to be the first step towards National Anti-Fraud strategy. Continued implementation of the measures 
set out in the action plan: 

-  updated information on the website of the Ministry of Finance and other institutions involved in the EU management about the AFCOS and 

other institutions involved in protection of EU's financial interests and published information leaflet on whistle-blowing; 

-  distributed information to AFCOS network on the AFCOS and OLAF and possible trainings, seminars, exchange of best practice on fraud 

and corruption-related topics; 

-  working groups organized in between the meetings of the AFCOS Council with investigators to examine specific cases of suspected fraud; 
-  AFCOS  and  representatives  from  relevant  national  parties  participated  in  OLAF  meetings  and  training  sessions  as  well  as  exchange  of 
experience  and  best  practice  with  the  Member  States  in  this  area  (seminar  organized  by  the  AFCOS  with  the  participation  of  OLAF,  to 
improve cooperation for on-the-spot checks; exchange of best practice in IT tools with IT, DK, BG and EL representatives). 

LT 

In the Republic of Lithuania, the Financial Crime Investigation Service under the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania 

(hereinafter "FCIS") is responsible for the coordination of cooperation between State and other institutions and OLAF. 

The FCIS participates in the drafting of legal acts regulating the administration of EU structural funds and documents detailing these, and 

submits proposals to the competent authorities about how to amend and improve them. 

36 

 
 
The FICS is also entrusted by law with the detection, investigation and prevention of criminal acts and other breaches of law connected 
with the receipt and use of financial support funds from EU and foreign states. Where a case of fraud is suspected, the FCIS must be informed of 
this in writing without delay. The FCIS informs the body that submitted the information on a suspected case of fraud about the decision to launch 
or not to launch an investigation into an alleged offence. This cooperation with the FCIS works on a case-by-case basis. 

Each year the FCIS organizes anti-fraud training courses for employees involved in the administration and control of EU structural funds 
which present examples of the most common types of fraud encountered, discuss issues of concern regarding cooperation between the FCIS and 
institutions  administering  EU  structural  fund  resources  in  the  investigation,  prevention  and  detection  of  suspected  cases  of  fraud,  and  look  at 
what lies ahead. 

FCIS representatives likewise participate in the work of the EU fund infringement inspectors' working group, which examines questions 
relating  to  the  investigation,  identification,  elimination  and  prevention  of  infringements  relating  to  projects  jointly  financed  under  the  EU 
structural funds. 

It  should  be  noted  that  cooperation is  being  stepped  up  between  law  enforcement  agencies  and  the  Ministry  of  Finance  to  ensure  that 
information  is  collected on  pre-trial  investigations  relating  to  projects and  their  progress,  that  the  measures  provided  for  under legislation  are 
executed  as  expeditiously  as  possible  and  that  only  eligible  project  expenditure  is  declared  to  the  Commission,  and  to  ensure  that  prevention 
measures are effective. Accordingly, the Ministry of Finance, together with the FCIS and the Special Investigation Service (hereinafter "SIS"), 
which is responsible for the fight against corruption, has drawn up a procedure for providing the Ministry of Finance with information on pre-
trial  investigations  being  carried  out,  i.e.  law  enforcement  agencies  will  inform  the  Ministry  of  Finance  about  the  launch  of  pre-trial 
investigations  (where  doing  so  does  not  prejudice  the  course  of  the  investigation)  and  of  procedural  decisions  relating  to  their  progress  (e.g. 
referral for judicial proceedings) or termination. 

Furthermore, Resolution No XII-1537 of 10 March 2015 of the Seimas [Parliament] of the Republic of Lithuania approving the 2015-25 
Lithuanian  National  Anti-Corruption  Programme  approved  Lithuania's  National  anti-corruption  programme  for  2015-25  (hereinafter 
"programme"), providing for the deployment of anti-corruption and anti-fraud measures and activities relating to the use of EU fund resources 

37 

 
 
(subparagraph 29.2.3. of the programme). 

The  2015-2019  inter-institutional  action  plan  to  implement  the  programme  approved  by  the  Lithuanian  Government  on  17  June  2015 
provides  for  the  deployment  of  anti-corruption  and  anti-fraud  measures  and  activities  relating  to  the  use  of  EU  fund  resources  (measure  No 
2.2.4.), by carrying out an analysis of the reasons for corruption and fraud, risk factors and problems in the field of the use of EU fund resources, 
the  identification  of  anti-corruption  and  anti-fraud  measures  and  activities  and  the  coordination  and  control  of  their  implementation  until  31 
December 2019. 

Responsibility for implementing this measure lies with the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of the Interior, 
the Ministry of Social Security and Labour, the Prosecutor General's Office, the SIS and the FCIS, i.e. the authorities that are responsible within 
their respective areas of competence for the implementation of the relevant EU funds and programmes in Lithuania, and the authorities with the 
power and experience to prevent, investigate and detect fraud and corruption. 

LU  Luxembourg is committed to effective protection of the EU's financial interests. The recommendations to the Commission’s report on the 

protection of the EU’s financial interests have therefore been discussed with all the relevant stakeholders and are going to be taken into account 
in the national anti-fraud strategy that Luxembourg is currently devising. A first meeting that brought together all the relevant authorities 
involved in managing EU funds had taken place. It is Luxembourg’s intention to have such meetings on a regular basis in order to have a 
structured coordination.  

HU  The Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS) was created in Hungary in 2001 within the existing Central Management of the National Tax 
and Customs Administration. The Service operates under the name ‘OLAF Coordination Bureau’ (‘the Bureau’) and carries out certain defined 
tasks relating to the protection of the financial interests of the European Union in Hungary on an on-going basis. The following were among the 
most important of these tasks in 2015: 

 handling enquiries on EU funding; 

facilitating the work of OLAF investigators; 

38 

 
 
coordinating on-the-spot checks carried out by OLAF; 

providing assistance to individual whistle-blowers or other organisations. 

reporting irregularities involving EU funding: 

managing the IMS system in Hungary; 

forwarding irregularity reports to OLAF; 

participating in the development of the system for dealing with irregularities. 

Performing horizontal activities related to the above key tasks: 

formulating and representing Hungary’s position at meetings of EU-level (Council and Commission) sectoral working groups; 

chairing  the  OLAF  experts  working  group  (working  group  No  43)  of  the  Interdepartmental  Coordinating  Committee  on  European  Affairs 
(ICCEA); 

conducting training, educational and expert consultation activities. 

Contacts and cooperation between AFCOS and Hungary’s competent authorities and organisations take place at various levels. 

The most wide-ranging cooperation can be seen in the work of the ICCEA’s OLAF expert working group (working group No 43). For the 
purposes of EU anti-fraud activities the working group was set up to make preparations for tasks stemming from Hungary’s EU membership, 
formulate negotiating positions to be advocated in EU decision-making procedures, monitor the development of EU policies and coordinate the 
requisite government measures. Eighteen Hungarian organisations (ministries, investigating authorities, control bodies and EU fund managing 
authorities) delegate members to the group. This working group met once in 2015 and carried out twenty written procedures, with its members 

39 

 
 
being regularly notified of incidents, new information and documents associated with protection of the EU’s financial interests. 

Extensive cooperation is also being undertaken to raise awareness of anti-fraud measures to protect public funds and on education and training 
to develop the system for dealing with irregularities involving EU funds in Hungary. In 2015 AFCOS made several presentations, including at 
the International Taxation Conference organised by the Hungarian Association of Qualified Tax Experts and the 2015 ‘Anti-Corruption Festival’ 
organised  by  the  European  Commission  and  Transparency  International.  Competent  Bureau  staff  also  made  presentations  on  the  topic  of 
protecting  the  EU’s  financial  interests  as  part  of  in-house  training  at  various  organisations  (for  example,  Magyar  Fejlesztési  Bank  Zrt. 
(Hungarian Development Bank), Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem (Corvinus University of Budapest) and the Hungarian State Treasury). Hundreds 
of participants attended.  

The Bureau also held three events of its own, which contributed to the exchange of professional opinions with staff of institutions involved in 
EU-funded projects or in dealing with irregularities or investigating the misuse of aid. At these events, experts involved in dealing with the issue 
could hear presentations and receive updates  not  only  from competent AFCOS staff, but  also from experts  from the Prime Minister’s Office, 
Ministry  of  National  Development,  Hungarian  Competition  Authority,  Directorate-General  for  Audit  of  EU  Funds,  and  the  Supreme  Public 
Prosecutor’s Office. 

To make this a regular event, the Bureau is planning to conclude a cooperation agreement on training with the Prime Minister’s Office, which 
coordinates the management of EU funds and also runs training courses in this area. 

When  it comes  to  OLAF  investigations  and the  system for  dealing with  and  reporting  on irregularities,  contacts and  cooperation  have  a 
narrower and more specialised focus. Activities in these areas typically involve targeted one-off enquiries. 

In its advisory capacity, AFCOS is regularly involved in commenting and giving opinions on draft sectoral strategies, rules and guidelines for 
handling irregularities and fraud prevention. 

Given  the  above,  it  can  be  said  that  Hungary  is  concentrating  on  utilising  the  full  potential  of  the  Anti-Fraud  Coordination  Service,  and  in 
accordance  with  Regulation  (EU,  Euratom)  No  883/2013,  AFCOS  is  playing  a  major  role  in  fulfilling  Hungary’s  legal,  administrative  and 

40 

 
 
operational obligations to protect the EU’s financial interests, ensuring cooperation between OLAF, Hungarian institutions and authorities, and 
promoting the dissemination of information among specialist organisations operating in the field in Hungary.  

MT  Malta’s National Anti-Fraud and Corruption Strategy was tabled in Parliament in November 2008 together with two other documents during 

the Budget debate.  

The other documents were:  

(1) Corporate Governance Framework for Public Sector Entities; and  

(2) Code of Ethics for Board Directors in Public Sector Entities.  

The Anti-Fraud Co-ordination Service (AFCOS) Malta was established at IAID during the EU membership negotiations and an Administrative 
Cooperation Arrangement (ACA) was signed by IAID and OLAF in June 2003. 

The basic functions of AFCOS Malta are to: 

1.  co-ordinate within Malta all legislative, administrative and operational obligations and activities related to the protection of the 

Community’s financial interests;  

2.  co-operate with OLAF in Financial Investigations (assistance in both directions); and  
3.  communicate with OLAF regarding mandatory reporting and information exchange.  
Amongst other functions which include the conduct of financial investigations in terms of Articles 3 and 5 of the Internal Audit and Financial 
Investigations Act (cap. 461 of the Laws of Malta), AFCOS Malta co-ordinates strategy dissemination and implementation, develops vision, 
standards and agreements on ensuring co-operation in investigations and prosecution of cases of fraud and corruption.  

As stated in the Executive Summary of Malta’s National Anti-Fraud and Corruption Strategy: “the main aim of the anti-fraud and corruption 
strategy is to set up a normative, institutional and operational framework for the effective and efficient fight against irregularities, fraud and 

41 

 
 
corruption  in  Malta,  reflecting  both  the  local  requirements  and  its  international  obligations.  The  main  thrusts  of  the  strategy  are  prevention, 
deterrence,  detection,  investigation  and  prosecution  of  fraud  and  corruption,  whilst  encouraging  and  facilitating  transparency  and 
accountability”. 

Article  23  of  cap.  461  makes  reference  to  the  setting  up  of  a  Co-ordinating  Committee  “to  facilitate  the  exchange  of  information  between 
different entities charged with the protection and safeguarding of public funds”. Nonetheless, this Committee has, to date, never been set up in a 
formal way albeit IAID, the Attorney General Office and the Economic Crimes Unit within the Malta Police are in close contact especially in 
relation to ongoing financial investigations.  

The aim of Malta’s National Anti-Fraud and Corruption Strategy is to have a Co-ordinating Committee whose remit is to “devise an initiative 
through which public financial control is analysed and seen that it is being addressed adequately. The Co-ordinating Committee will then be in 
a position to make the necessary recommendations to the appropriate authorities for the improvement of public financial control”.  

As a sideline,  one  should note that  though the formal Co-ordinating Committee  has not  been  set  up, cooperation between  bodies combating 
fraud in Malta is well pronounced.  

Nonetheless, IAID has set an objective to set up the Co-ordinating Committee in terms of Article 23 of cap. 461 and hold the first meeting with 
the relevant stakeholders charged with combating fraud and irregularities in Malta by the first half of the current year. Moreover, IAID is in the 
process  of  finalizing  an  Operational  Base  for  further  cooperation  between  the  Department  and  the  Economic  Crimes  Unit  within  the  Malta 
Police.  These  two  objectives  are  considered  to  be  of  utmost  importance  and  as  such,  have  been  included  in  the  operational  plan  of  AFCOS 
Malta for Year 2016. 

NL 

Dutch Customs decided last year (2015) to position the AFCOS differently (combine it with two other fraud teams to make a single team) for 
an optimum response to the Commission's requests and messages. The revamped AFCOS will start operations on 1 April and will be positioned 
independently from other teams within Customs. The new AFCOS has the required areas of expertise to comply with the broad AFCOS remit.  

42 

 
 
Dutch Customs recognises and makes extensive use of cooperation with the relevant enforcement partners (e.g. FIOD - Fiscal Information and 
Investigation  Service,  NVWA  -  Netherlands  Food  and  Product  Safety  Authority,  foreign  customs  authorities);  nationally  and  internationally 
determined priorities are aligned annually and examined for cooperation opportunities. Progress has thus been made towards the one-stop shop 
approach.  

AT  No information provided. 

PL 

PT 

The tasks of the AFCOS, as defined in Article 3(4) of Regulation 883/2013, which consist in facilitating effective cooperation and exchange of 
information  with  OLAF  in  connection  with  investigations  conducted  by  OLAF,  are  carried  out  by  the  Department  for  the  Protection  of  the 
EU’s Financial Interests in the Ministry of Finance. In addition,  Poland also has an  AFCOS structure, which offers a platform for cooperation 
between the actors involved, one of the most important functions of which is the exchange between institutions which implement EU funds and 
law  enforcement  authorities  of  information  of  key  importance  for  preventing  fraud  against  the  financial  interests  of  the  EU.  The  body  is 
headed  by  the  Government  Commissioner  for  Combating  Financial  Irregularities  against  Poland  or  the  EU,  assisted  by  an  Inter-ministerial 
Team for Combating Financial Irregularities against Poland or the EU (including specialised work groups established by the Team). Because of 
its composition and the scope of its tasks, the body operates across administrative sectors. With this set-up, proper coordination between the 
government administration and the institutions  involved  in  implementing  EU  funds  in  Poland  can  be ensured insofar as  it is  relevant  to  the 
overarching objective of protection of Poland's and the EU's financial interests. Work groups have been established by the Team as part of the 
process  of  establishing  and  implementing  effective  and  proportionate  measures  for  combating  fraud  (which  are  required  under  the 
2014-2020 financial framework). 
The 2015-2017 Strategic Plan to combat tax and customs fraud and evasion was approved. The aim of its strategic areas of action is: to step 
up the fight against tax and customs fraud and evasion and the black economy, increase the effectiveness and efficiency of tax and customs 
inspection,  promote  voluntary  compliance  with  tax  and  customs  obligations  and  also  improve  the  effectiveness  of  tax  and  customs 
management and collection. 
With  specific  regard  to  the  AFCOS,  a  role  which  in  Portugal  is  performed  by  the  Inspectorate-General  of  Finance  (IGF),  it  is  worth 
highlighting  developments  in  cooperation  with  various  national  bodies.  The  aim  is  to  share  knowledge  and  experiences  of  running 

43 

 
 
management and control systems in the anti-fraud area. 

An anti-fraud strategy is defined for each management and control system, with the aim of adopting effective and proportionate anti-fraud 
measures,  taking  into  account  the  risks  identified  in  the  area  of  activity  and  establishing  the  procedures  to  be  followed  as  regards  fraud 
prevention, detection and correction and the reporting of findings to the appropriate bodies. 

A good example of cooperation and pooling of experience and good practice was the visit by an AFCOS delegation from Bulgaria, which 
took  place  from  16  to  19  March  2015  in  Lisbon.  The  visit  included  workshops,  held  either  at  the  IGF  (AFCOS  unit)  or  at  other  bodies 
involved in managing and monitoring Community funds (ADC, IFAP and managing authority of POPH), or at the Lisbon District  Public 
Prosecutor’s Office. 

RO  The Anti-Fraud Department (DLAF) has been established as an AFCOS since as early as 2002. The institution's capacity was strengthened 
over the years, and since 2011, under the legislation governing its organisation and functioning (Law No 61/2011 and Government Decision 
No 738/2011), the  Department has been performing all the tasks set out in the Guidance  Note  on Main Tasks and Responsibilities of  an 
Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS).  

To  improve  inter-institutional  cooperation,  in  addition  to  the  existing  bilateral  cooperation  agreements,  DLAF  has  concluded  several 
cooperation  protocols  with  the  institutions  involved  in  managing  EU  funds  (such  as  the  Ministry  of  European  Funds  or  the  National 
Anticorruption Directorate). 

In  the  context  of  the  new  2014-2020  Multiannual  Financial  Framework  Regulations  and  the  negotiations  between  the  Romanian 
Government  (through  its  Ministry  of  European  Funds)  and  the  European  Commission  on  the  2014-2020  Partnership  Agreement  for  the 
European  Structural  and  Investment  Funds  and  the  resulting  design  of  the  new  national  infrastructure  for  the  management  of  EU  funds, 
DLAF has started developing the ESIF National Anti-Fraud Strategy, by coordinating diagnostic analyses to assess the current state of play, 

44 

 
 
as well as anti-fraud risk analyses to serve as a basis for the general and specific objectives of the strategy and help design its action plan.  

DLAF has reviewed the implementation of the DG REGIO Guidance Note on Fraud Risk Assessment and Effective and Proportionate Anti-
Fraud  Measures  for  the  2014-2020  Programming  Period,  and  has  provided  guidance  on  the  subject  to  the  authorities  responsible  for 
managing European funds . 

In terms of national cooperation, DLAF organises training programmes on subjects relating to the protection of the financial interests of the 
EU  in  Romania,  in  cooperation  with  the  National  Institute  of  the  Magistracy,  the  Ministry  of  European  Funds,  the  Audit  Authority, 
Managing Authorities, etc. 

Since 2014, it has shared responsibility for implementing the national project providing further training to magistrates on topics relating to 
the protection of the financial interests of the EU (PIF) with the National Institute of the Magistracy.  

In addition, at the invitation of partner institutions, DLAF representatives attended national events relevant to the protection of the financial 
interests of the EU in Romania and to the fight against fraud involving EU funds. 

Sl 

Slovenia's reply to recommendation No 1 

AFCOS was designated in 2002 and has since played a very active role in protecting the EU's financial interests. In addition to its usual 
work,  which  involves  cooperating  with  OLAF  and  the  Commission,  AFCOS  also  organises  periodic  meetings  with  other  Slovenian 
institutions  that  form  part  of  the  Inter-departmental  working  group  for  cooperating  with  OLAF.  The  working  group  meets  at  least  twice 
every  year  and  provides  a  platform  for  the  exchange  of  information  and  experience  between  its  members  with  a  view  to  improving  and 
promoting active cooperation and coordination in fighting fraud against the EU. 

45 

 
 
The group's members come from the following institutions: Commission for the Prevention of Corruption, Office of the State Prosecutor 
General of Slovenia, Criminal Police Directorate, Agency of Slovenia for Agricultural Markets and Rural Development, Government Office 
for Development and European Cohesion Policy, Office for Money Laundering Prevention , Ministry of Finance – Financial Administration 
of Slovenia, and the Ministry of Justice. 

AFCOS  also  organises  conferences  (one  every  two  years)  on  safeguarding  the  EU's  financial  interests  targeting  those  responsible  for 
administering and supervising the use of money from EU funds, those responsible for reporting irregularities, all heads of internal auditing 
services at ministries, and representatives of the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption, the Office of the State Prosecutor General of 
Slovenia,  the  Criminal  Police  Directorate,  the  National  Review  Commission  for  Reviewing  Public  Procurement  Award  Procedures,  and 
Transparency Slovenia. 

Slovenia  has  yet  to  draw  up  its  national  strategy  for  protecting  the  EU's  financial  interests,  which  will  entail  good  inter-institutional 
cooperation. Slovenia plans to use the guidelines for drafting a national strategy, as they will facilitate better coordination and organisation 
of tasks needed for producing the national strategy in the coming year. The Government Office for Development and European Cohesion 
Policy has already begun work on the cohesion policy part of the strategy. 

SK 

In the Slovak Republic, the function of an anti-fraud co-ordination service is performed by organisational units of the Office of the Slovak 
Government, namely the Central Contact Point for OLAF that is part of the Control and Anti-Corruption Section.  

To perform its tasks, the anti-fraud co-ordination service in the Slovak Republic is assisted by an AFCOS Network. The AFCOS Network is 
a  structure  of  co-operating  authorities  and  bodies  (i.e.  AFCOS  Network  partners),  whose  main  objective  is  to  mutually  co-operate  in 
performing the tasks focused on the protection of the EU´s financial interests as well as to efficiently communicate with OLAF and other 
Member  States.  That  Network  is  an  anti-fraud  structure  that  comprises  contact  points  from  the  relevant  sectors.  The  AFCOS  Network 
includes the following entities: a) the bodies and institutions who provide the Union’s financial resources and otherwise handle with these 

46 

 
 
funds; 

b) the bodies who are authorized to check the use of these funds, and the bodies who are entrusted with the exercise of powers in order to 
perform the tasks with regard to the protection of the EU’s financial interests;  

On 7 January 2015, the Government of the Slovak Republic approved an updated version of the National Strategy for the Protection of the 
European Union´s Financial Interests in the Slovak Republic with regard to the programming period of 2014-2020.  

 The National Strategy was drawn up in recognition of the need to improve the protection of funds provided from the EU budget for the 
period of 2014-2020. This document replaced the previous National Strategy for the Protection of the Financial Interests of the EC in the 
SR, including its subsequent updates, that was approved by the Government Resolution No 547 of 27 June 2007. 

The  content  of  the  National  Strategy  reflects  a  detailed  description  of  individual  parts  of  the  anti-fraud  cycle:  prevention  of  fraud  and 
irregularities;  detection;  investigation  and  prosecution;  recovery  of  unduly  paid  funds;  and  sanctions.  The  measures  contained  in  the 
National Strategy relate to both the expenditure and revenue parts of the EU’s budget. 

FI  Ways of rendering the AFCOS cooperation network more efficient will be examined and promoted in 2016; this objective is also one of the 
performance targets of the Government Financial Controller Function, which acts as the Finnish AFCOS. Appropriate ways of improving 
efficiency could include regular meetings of the service as well as the promotion and dissemination of good practices (an example of a good 
practice is the fraud control plan drawn up by the Finnish Agency for Rural Affairs).  

If necessary, wider strategic issues related to fraud control can be included on the agenda of the advisory board for internal control and risk 
management, which is a statutory advisory board appointed by the government and laid down in the State Budget Decree. The tasks of the 
advisory  board are to assess the  organisation and status  of internal  control and the  related risk  management and to  propose development 

47 

 
 
initiatives.  Other  tasks  include  monitoring  and  evaluating  the  situation  concerning  misuse  or  violations  committed  in  the  operations  of 
government  agencies  and  public  bodies  or  aimed  at  state  funds  or  assets,  or  funds  or  assets  for  which  the  state  is  responsible,  and 
coordinating and developing the  operations and procedures of  various authorities and  government  agencies and  public  bodies, as well as 
reporting on misuse and errors.  

SE 

In  March  2015,  the  Swedish  Ministry  of  Finance  initiated  an  inquiry  tasked  to  review  the  legal  situation  regarding  OLAF’s  on-the-spot 
checks in Sweden, inter alia in order to bring it up-to-date with the present Multiannual Financial Perspective 2014-2020.   

The inquiry proposes some legal changes, covering on-the-spot checks, the role of competent authorities and AFCOS, that will enter into 
force in 2017. These proposals are currently subject to referral to authorities and other actors concerned in Sweden until mid April 2016. 

The Swedish Economic Crime Authority is the Swedish AFCOS and chairs the Swedish Council for the Protection of the European Union’s 
Financial  Interests  (the  SEFI  Council).    All  government  authorities  involved  in  the  administration  and  protection  of  the  EU’s  funds  in 
Sweden  are  represented  in  the  Council  and  its  mission  is  to  promote  an  efficient  and  correct  use  of  EU-related  funds  in  Sweden.  The 
Council has met at several occasions during the year and continue to facilitate cooperation between AFCOS and relevant national parties. 

UK  The City of London Police (CoLP), where the UK AFCOS is domiciled, has a national police strategy with respect to fraud.  

In  the  UK,  the  AFCOS  remit  is  to  act  as  the  designated  contact  point  for  incoming  OLAF  referrals  for  police  investigation.  Cases  of 
suspected fraud identified by managing authorities on the other hand are examined by the authority’s fraud investigation unit, and followed 
up if necessary by local police forces therefore not requiring liaison through AFCOS. However, managing authorities report irregularities to 
OLAF, managed centrally by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) for England, and by the devolved administrations in 
other  parts  of  the  UK.  Because  of  these  unique  governance  arrangements  in  the  UK,  which  are  spread  across  four  constituent  nations, 

48 

 
 
managing authorities develop their own anti-fraud strategies.  

Nonetheless there are arrangements in place to coordinate the different authorities engaged in anti-fraud measures. CoLP manages the UK’s 
national  fraud  reporting  centre  which  is  the  single  point  of  contact  for  all  reported  fraud.  CoLP  has  MOUs  with  all  UK  police  forces  in 
relation  to  the  tasking  of  fraud  cases  for  investigation.  CoLP  and  OLAF  are  in  the  process  of  signing  a  cooperation  and  exchange  of 
information  agreement.  For  the  management  of  ESIF  funds  in  the  UK,  AFCOS  has  a  designated  regional  contact  point  for  each  of  the 
devolved  nations,  and,  in  the  case  of  England,  for  each  of  the  major  EU  funds  (ERDF  and  ESF).  Relevant  communications  regarding 
AFCOS are regularly circulated to managing authorities and paying agencies. 

CoLP and the National Police Chiefs Council have a significant number of MoUs in place with the following national bodies. AFCOS, as a 
part of CoLP, benefits from these links: 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Association of British Insurers 

Department for Business Innovation and Skills 

Charity Commission 

Department for Work and Pensions 

Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency 

Solicitors Regulation Authority 

Financial Services Authority  

CIFAS, the UK fraud prevention service 

Overseas Corruption and Bribery Unit 

National Crime Agency 

49 

 
 
 

 

 

 

Serious Fraud Office 

Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service 

Financial Conduct Authority 

Crown Prosecution Service 

Ministry of Defence Police 

 
AFCOS  also  benefits  from  CoLP’s  agreements  with  overseas  law  enforcement.  Using  the  structures  provided  by  Europol,  Interpol,  the 
Home Office, and OLAF, UK AFCOS willingly shares information with international bodies to support prosecutions both within the UK 
and overseas. A significant number of MoUs are in place to facilitate such international cooperation.  

2.1.2.  Measures to fight fraud and corruption in public procurement 

In  February 2014, the first  EU anti-corruption report was adopted36 and  the revised package  of public procurement Directives  and a new concessions 
Directive entered into force. 

The transposition of these Directives gives the Member States an opportunity to enhance transparency and strengthen their anti-fraud efforts, by defining 
conflict of interest, making e-procurement mandatory and introducing monitoring and reporting obligations to curb procurement fraud and other serious 
irregularities. 

In addition, Member States took a significant number of legislative and administrative measures aimed at strengthening anti-fraud work in the area of 
public procurement. 

36 

See section 4.1.4. 

50 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
Recommendation 2: 

During the public procurement process, conflict of interest can cause serious harm to the public budget and to the reputation of both the EU 
and the Member States concerned. 

Member  States  are  invited  not  only  to  transpose  the  definition  of  ‘conflict  of  interest’  contained  in  the  Public  Procurement  Directive,  into 
national legislation but also to put effective measures in place to tackle conflicts of interest. 

BE  As part of the transposition process, Belgium has worked mainly, as regards conflicts of interest, on extending the existing  measures in 
that area. There was already a whole raft of specific measures in Belgian law on the prevention of conflicts  of this type. Those measures 
have been slightly adapted to bring them into line with Directives 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU. 

More specifically, the existence of a conflict of interest under Belgian law will be presumed, for example (as is already the case): 

1. where there is a relationship by blood or by marriage to the third degree in direct line, or to the fourth degree in collateral line, or in the 
event of legal cohabitation, between the civil servant or public official and one of the candidates or tenderers or any other natural person 
who holds powers of representation, decision-making or control on behalf of one of the above;  

2. where the civil servant or public official is himself or herself, or through an intermediary, the owner, joint owner or an active partner of 
one of the candidate or tendering companies or holds, de jure or de facto, himself or herself, or, where applicable, through an intermediary, 
powers of representation, decision-making or control. 

The  Act  will  clarify  that  a  civil  servant  or  public  official  in  a  conflict-of-interest  situation  must  recuse  himself/herself  and  immediately 
notify the contracting authority thereof in writing. This provision is currently included in the implementing decree. 

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Where the civil servant or public official holds himself or herself, or through an intermediary, one or more shares or stock representing at 
least  five  per  cent  of  the  share  capital  of  one  of  the  candidate  or  tendering  companies,  he  or  she  will  likewise  be  obliged  to  notify  the 
contracting authority (as is already the case). 

The government also intends to take action against the ‘revolving door’ phenomenon. This is a situation where a person who has worked 
in-house  at  a  contracting  authority,  in  a  hierarchical  relationship  or  otherwise,  subsequently  plays  a  part  in  the  award  of  a  public 
procurement contract by the contracting authority, where a direct link exists between the activities previously performed by that person for 
the contracting authority and their activities under the contract. The application of this measure would be limited to a period of two years 
following the person's resignation or any other type of departure from his/her employment. Such a situation would be considered a conflict 
of interest.  

There  will,  of course, also be  measures  designed  to  exclude candidates  or tenderers  from  participating  in  a contract because  of specific 
conduct or acts at any stage of the procedure.  Exclusion will be mandatory in the case of candidates or tenderers convicted of corruption 
or  fraud  by  a  judicial  decision  having  final  and  binding  effect.  Exclusion  will,  however,  be  optional  and  left  to  the  discretion  of  the 
contracting authority: 

- where they have committed acts, entered into agreements or implemented restrictive practices with the aim of distorting competition; 

- where a conflict of interest cannot be effectively remedied by other less intrusive measures; 

- where a distortion of competition resulting from the prior involvement of the economic operators in the preparation of the procurement 
procedure cannot be remedied by other, less intrusive measures; 

-  where  they  have  attempted  to  unduly  influence  the  decision-making  process  of  the  contracting  authority,  to  obtain  confidential 

52 

 
 
information that may confer upon them undue advantages in the procurement procedure or to negligently provide misleading information 
that may have a material influence on decisions concerning exclusion, selection or award. 

Measures are also envisaged in the areas of governance and monitoring, in particular an obligation for Belgium to submit an audit report 
every three years to the European Commission, focusing on the prevention, detection and reporting of cases of fraud, corruption, conflicts 
of interest and other serious irregularities in the field of public procurement. 

BG  Pursuant to Article 19(2)(5) of the Public Procurement Act (ZOP), the Public Procurement Agency, as a specialised body, is empowered to 
draw up draft legislation in the field of public procurement, including drafts relating to the implementation of EU legislation in this field. 
In accordance with the aforesaid powers and in the light of the new Public Procurement Directives, 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU, a draft 
of  a  new  ZOP  was  prepared  and  submitted  for  discussion  to  the  National  Assembly  (the  new  ZOP  was  adopted  at  second  reading  on 
2 February 2016).  The  measures  envisaged  in  the  draft,  specifically  targeting  the  prevention  of  conflicts  of  interest,  pertain  to  the 
following: 

Article 54(1)(7) of the draft ZOP prohibits participation in a public procurement procedure by any person for whom a conflict of interest 
has  been established and cannot  be  removed. In this regard, any interested  party is obliged, when participating in a public  procurement 
procedure,  to  declare  the  absence  of  the  aforesaid  circumstance  in  the  European  Single  Procurement  Document  (ESPD).  Unlike  the 
applicable European Directives, under which the application of the grounds is left to the discretion of contracting authorities, the draft act 
adopts a more restrictive approach, whereby the contracting authority is obliged always to include this requirement in public procurement 
procedures. 

According to the definition in subparagraph 21 of § 1 of the Supplementary Provisions of the ZOP, a ‘conflict of interest’ is present when 

53 

 
 
 
the  contracting authority, its employees  or  persons  hired  by it  (beyond its structure),  participating in the  preparation or  awarding  of the 
public procurement contract or in a position to influence its outcome, have an interest which may result in benefits under Article 2(3) of 
the  Conflict  of  Interest  Prevention  and  Ascertainment  Act  (ZPUKI),  and  which  could  be  assumed  to  affect  their  impartiality  and 
independence with regard to the award. It should be noted that persons for whom the presence of a ‘conflict of interest’ is examined, as 
well as the connection between them, are identical to those under the new Directives. 

The draft also envisages an opportunity for the contracting authority to reject any proof of technical and professional skills presented by a 
person who has an interest which may result in a benefit under Article 2(3) of the ZPUKI. The draft is in compliance with Article 58(4)(2) 
of Directive 2014/24/EU. 

In addition to introducing the aforesaid provisions of the European directives, the draft act proposes national measures aimed at ensuring 
the  principle  of  free  and  fair  competition,  ensuring  equal  treatment  of  all  participants  and  avoiding  agreements  or  concerted  practices 
between participants in public procurement procedures. 

The  draft  act  examines  the  presence  of  a  conflict  of  interest  between  committee  members  and  procedure  participants.  To  this  end,  the 
committee members will be required to submit to the contracting authority a declaration of absence of conflicts of interest after receiving 
the list of participants/applicants. In the event that such a conflict is established with regard to a committee member, they will be removed 
from the procedure, and their actions will not be taken into account by the committee. 

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When  during  a  public  procurement  procedure  the  contracting authority  establishes a  conflict  of interest  with  regard  to the  applicants  or 
participants, depending on the type of the procedure, it is obliged to point out this circumstance in the respective decision, as well as the 
measures undertaken to rectify it. The decisions of the contracting authority are subject to appeal before the Commission for Protection of 
Competition or the Supreme Administrative Court as the second instance, as appropriate, ensuring that each participant  can defend their 
interests if they disagree with the decision of the contracting authority. Such an opportunity is also given to participants who believe that a 
conflict of interest exists but the participant concerned has not been removed from the procedure. 

Article 44(3)  and  (4)  of  the  draft  Act  provide  for  specific  measures  by  the  contracting  authorities  when  they  have  conducted  market 
consultations  before  announcing  the  awards.  In  this  case,  the  contracting  authority  is  obliged  to  publish  in  the  buyer  profile  all  the 
information exchanged in connection with the preparation of the public procurement procedure, as well as to set an appropriate term for 
the receipt of bids. Furthermore, the contracting authority is obliged to extend the term for the receipt of applications for participation or 
bids when they have made use of the opportunity to shorten the terms and within the deadline set by them only one bid or participation 
application  has  been  received,  submitted  by  a  person  who  has  consulted  them.  When,  regardless  of  the  measures  taken,  the  contracting 
authority cannot ensure compliance with the principle of equal treatment, it must remove the candidate/participant who consulted it from 
the  procedure.  The  envisaged  measures  aim  to  eliminate  any  opportunity  for  persons  who  have  consulted  the  contracting  authority  to 
receive any undue advantage over other participants in the procedures. 

The draft Act also provides for the mandatory removal from the procedures of participants or applicants who represent related parties. The 
grounds for removal were introduced in order to prevent concerted practices in the procedures and fictitious offering of the  same bid by 
them. The definition of ‘related parties’ contained in the Act refers to relationships regulated under § 1(13) and (14) of the Supplementary 
Provisions to the Public Offering of Securities Act. Under the aforesaid provisions, these are the persons whose activity is controlled by a 

55 

 
 
 
third party, persons where one controls the other or its subsidiary, etc. 

On 20 March 2015, the Commission for Prevention and Ascertainment of Conflict of Interest (KPUKI) signed a Framework Agreement 
for cooperation with the Commission for Protection of Competition (KZK). The Agreement is aimed at further strengthening cooperation 
on and effective action against conflict of interest and actions that could lead to the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition. The 
agreement states that when, in connection with the operation of the KZK, it is established that a person holding public office has violated 
the provisions of the ZPUKI, the KZK will send an alert to the KPUKI. Likewise, when, in connection with the operation of the KPUKI, 
there is information giving rise to reasonable suspicion of violations of competition rules, the KPUKI will send an alert to the KZK. 

In fulfilment of the signed Framework Agreement, in 2015 the KPUKI and the KZK conducted reciprocal training for their staff, thereby 
increasing  the  administrative  capacity  of  their  experts  to  take  effective  action  against  any  manifestation  of  conflict  of  interest  and  anti-
monopoly behaviour. 

In addition to the measures already adopted in 2014, specifically the controls introduced against fraud, ‘red flags’ and the  declaration on 
the absence of conflicts of interest under Article 57(2) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012, in 2015 the ‘National Fund’ Directorate 
— a Certifying Authority under all operational programmes  — detailed its control procedures on establishing indicators  on conflicts of 
interest  at  the  Managing  Authorities  and  Beneficiaries  level,  and  on  formulating  a  conclusion  based  on  them.  As  a  result,  a  number  of 
additional  checks  have  been  and  will  be  performed  in  order  to  establish  the  presence  of  conflicts  of  interest,  which  contributes  to  the 
effective implementation of the adopted measures. 

An  analysis  was  conducted  on  the  irregularities  in  the  absorption  of  EU  funds,  which  established  that  only  1 %  of  the  reported 
1190 irregularities  during  the  period  2007–2013  under  the  SKF  are  related  to  conflicts  of  interest.  The  main  irregularities  concern 
violations of procedures conducted under the ZOP and inadmissible, unlawful or unjustified costs. 

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The European Commission regards ‘Arachne’ as a useful tool to combat fraud, and its use will be taken into consideration when assessing 
the compliance of the implemented control systems. The Managing Authorities under operational programmes co-funded by the ERDF, 
the ESF, the CF and the YEI during the programming period 2014–2020 are planning to use ‘Arachne’ as a system for assessing the risk of 
fraud and irregularities. 

The system enables the continuous and systematic monitoring and review of internal and external data relating to projects, beneficiaries, 
contracts and contractors. The information is analysed and enables the efficiency of the management and control systems of operational 
programmes  to  be  increased,  especially  reducing  the  error  rate  by  focusing  the  controls  on  projects  with  the  greatest  risk  and 
simultaneously strengthening the measures to identify and prevent fraud against the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund. 

By  Order  No R-249  of  2 December 2015,  the  Deputy  Prime  Minister  for  EU  Funds  and  Economic  Policy,  Mr  Tomislav  Donchev, 
established  the  procedure  for  managing  access  to  ARACHNE,  the  European  Commission’s  fraud  and  irregularity  risk  assessment  tool. 
Under the procedure, the EU Funds Management Systems Directorate (SUSES), which is the Central Coordination Unit Directorate under 
the Rules of Procedure of the Council of Ministers and its administration (promulgated in SG No 2 of 8 January 2016), was designated as 
the central coordinator of the system at national level. 

For the performance of inspections on public procurement procedures by the Audit Authority (the IAOSES), the absence of circumstances 
under Article 35(1) and (2)  of the  ZOP with regard to  the  members  of the  committee  conducting  the  procedure and  the  consultants  has 
been established as a separate item for verification. It examines the number of committee members and consultants, the date that submitted 
bids were received, the number of submitted declarations, the date of their submission and their contents. In 2015, the checklist for public 
procurement  procedures  was  supplemented  and  expanded  so  as  to  include  dedicated  questions  aimed  at  establishing  indicators  of 
irregularities  and  fraud.  Checklists  contain  detailed  guidelines  and  instructions  to  auditors  regarding  the  manner  in  which  they  should 
analyse  the  established  irregularities  in  order  to  assess  the  presence  of  any  fraud  indicators.  In  order  to  assist  auditors,  the  working 

57 

 
 
document identifies specific hypotheses as examples of ‘red flags’ for irregularities. This part of the checklist was developed on the basis 
of  OLAF’s  Practical  Guidelines  on  establishing  conflicts  of  interest  in  public  procurement  procedures.  The  checklists  of  the  Audit 
Authority were provided to the Court of Auditors, the Public Financial Inspection Agency (ADFI), the Minister of Finance and the Deputy 
Prime Minister for European funds and economic policy. In order to unify the methodology for examining public procurement procedures 
and to improve the fraud indicator identification skills, in a letter No 5.15.207 of 8 April 2015, the Deputy Prime Minister for European 
funds and economic policy requested that all Managing Authorities under the operational programmes should implement the checklists of 
the Audit Authority. 

In addition, every year after the completion of the audits of operations, the Audit Authority prepares an analysis of established violations 
under the public procurement legislation. The purpose of this analysis is to acquaint stakeholders with the main types of violations with a 
financial impact conceded by beneficiaries in the selection of contractors for supplies, services or construction in order to avoid them in 
the future. The final analysis is published on IAOSES’s website and is presented to the bodies exercising control functions in the field of 
public procurement (including the Managing Authorities on operational programmes) and to the AFCOS Directorate. 

All  Managing  Authorities  for  operational  programmes  receiving  European  funding  undertake  active  measures  to  prevent  conflicts  of 
interest. The guidelines on the management and implementation of operational programmes include declarations of conflict of interest for 
participation in the procedure for the awarding of grants, as well as a declaration on the absence of conflicts of interest under Article 57(2) 
of  Regulation (EU, Euratom)  No 966/2012  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  25 October 2012  on  the  financial  rules 
applicable  to  the  general  budget  of  the  Union  and  repealing  Council  Regulation  (EC,  Euratom)  No 1605/2002,  which  is  completed  by 
officers  from  the  directorates  participating  in  programme  preparation,  implementation  and  management,  members  of  the  units/teams 
managing EU-funded projects. 

The  general  terms  and  conditions  of  grant  contracts  include  clauses  for  the  beneficiaries  and  their  employees,  obliging  them  to  take 

58 

 
 
appropriate  steps  to  prevent  or  terminate  conflicts  of  interest.  Under  Article 47  of  the  Public  Procurement  Act,  participants  in 
public procurement procedures must declare the absence of a conflict of interest, as a condition for their participation in the procedure. The 
beneficiaries in territorial cooperation programmes co-funded under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) are obliged, under 
the  signed  grant  contracts,  to  observe,  for  the  purposes  of  public  procurement,  the  rules  set  forth  in  the  Practical  Guide  to  contract 
procedures for EU external actions, including the provisions on conflicts of interest. If there is any suspicion of a conflict of interest, the 
competent  national  authority,  i.e.  the  Commission  for  Prevention  and  Ascertainment  of  Conflict  of  Interest,  must  be  notified  and  its 
decision must be complied with. In cases where a conflict of interest is established by a competent national authority, financial corrections 
are  imposed,  amounting  to  100 %,  pursuant  to  the  provisions  on  irregularity  21  of  Appendix 1  to  Article 6(1)  of  the  Methodology  on 
Determining Financial Corrections (MOFK), adopted by Council of Ministers Decree No 134 of 5 July 2010. 

In addition to the Bulgarian regulations on the prevention of conflicts of interest, the project implementation guidelines  for beneficiaries, 
which  are  mandatory  for  all  beneficiaries  under  the  Operational  Programmes  with  failure  to  implement  them  resulting  in  the  non-
verification of the costs under the respective programme, expressly state that in order to establish effective and proportional measures for 
combating  fraud  in  the  reporting  of  identified  risks  (Article 125(4)(c)  of  Regulation  (EU) No 1303/2013),  all  members  of  the  project 
management  team  must  complete  a  declaration  on  the  absence  of  conflicts  of  interest  under  Article 57(2)  of  Regulation  (EU, 
Euratom) No 966/2012. It is also completed by the project manager when the contract is signed. The declaration must also be completed 
by  the  contracting  authority  or  the  persons  empowered  by  it  under  Article 8(2)  of  the  ZOP.  Copies  of  the  completed  and  signed 
declarations are to be presented by the beneficiary to the Managing Authority once the project management team has been determined (via 
a contract/order), or, as appropriate, to the authorised person/s who will be organising and conducting the public procurement procedures 
on  the  project  and  signing  the  contracts  for  them.  When  personnel  changes  are  made,  the  new  team  members/authorised  persons  also 
present  a  declaration.  When  a  technical  report  is  filed,  if  the  declarations  on  the  absence  of  conflicts  of  interest  under  Article 57(2)  of 
Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 have not been submitted, the report is not processed. In addition to the above, each person signing 

59 

 
 
such a declaration is liable under criminal law if they provide false information. 

The Managing Authority’s procedural guidelines on the implementation of the operational programmes Development of Competitiveness 
(OPRK),  Innovations  and  Competitiveness  (OPIK),  and  Initiatives  for  Small  and  Medium  Enterprises  (IMSP),  contain  a  chapter  on 
‘Conflict of Interest,’  which  outlines  in  detail  the  procedures  on  preventing  and  avoiding  conflicts  of  interest  in  fulfilment  of  the 
official obligations on administering the grant contracts. 

In  accordance  with  the  guidelines,  all  employees  of  the  Managing  Authority  sign  a  declaration  stating  that  they  are  familiar  with  the 
provisions of Article 57 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financial rules 
applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 (the ‘Financial Regulation’) 
and are not in a situation of conflict of interest under Article 57(2) of the Regulation. 

Employees declare their obligation to report immediately any conflict of interest arising in the performance of their duties, and in the event 
of a conflict of interest they must withdraw from the task. 

In fulfilling their commitments, the members of evaluation committees sign a declaration on the absence of conflicts of interest with the 
evaluated applicants. The declarations signed during the period are duly verified; the verification is undertaken using a checklist. 

All external experts hired to assess the implementation of grant contracts must sign a declaration on the absence  of conflicts of interest 
with the assessed beneficiary and its suppliers, which is subject to verification. The verification is reflected in a checklist. 

The general terms and conditions of grant contracts include clauses obliging the beneficiaries to avoid conflicts of interest. 

The Contracting Authority is entitled to terminate the contract unilaterally, without compensation, in the event that a conflict of interest 

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has been established. 

The  Managing  Authority  under  the  Operational  Programme  for  the  development  of  the  Fisheries  Sector  (OPRSR)  has  adopted  a 
‘Procedure  for  subsequent  control  on  public  procurement  procedures  pursuant  to  the  Rules  of  Procedure  of  the  Structural  Funds  for 
Fisheries  Directorate  (SFR),  conducted  by  applicants/beneficiaries  under  the  OPRSR,  which  constitute  contracting  authorities  under 
Article 7 and Article 14a(3) and (4) of the ZOP for costs fully or partially financed by the European Fisheries Fund (EFF)’. This Procedure 
has  been  amended  in  the  interests  of  more  effective  verification  of  the  legality  of  public  procurements  conducted  by  beneficiaries  in 
accordance with the principles of publicity and transparency pursuant to in the ZOP, and in order to achieve the objectives of the ZOP, 
namely to ensure economy, effectiveness and efficiency in expending: 1. public finances; 2. resources provided from European funds and 
programmes. The Procedure introduced amendments in the form of checklists and relevant indicators. One of the changes pertains to the 
introduction of indicators for conflict of interest, as follows: 

‘1. Indicators of fraud in a conflict of interest: 

A  conflict  of  interest  can  arise  when  an  employee  of  the  contracting  authority  (a  manager,  a  member  of  a  committee  conducting  the 
procedure,  an  employee  participating  in  the  preparation  and/or  conduct  of  the  specific  public  procurement  procedure)  has  undeclared 
interests in connection with a particular contract or contractor/economic operator. 

A conflict of interest may be suspected if one or more of the following circumstances is established: 

- Unexplained or unusual favouritism of a specific participant (for instance, only one bid was submitted; only one participant was admitted 
and the others were rejected; there are restrictive requirements and/or conditions favouring specific economic operators; some participants 
are  rejected  in  contravention  of  the  rules;  the  participant  selected  as  a  contractor  does  not  meet  the  requirements  of  the  contracting 
authority;  unequal  treatment  of  the  participants  in  the  procedure;  not  all  irregular  or  invalid  documents  from  envelope  No 1  of  the 

61 

 
 
eliminated participants could be identified within the procedure under Article 68(7)–(9) of the ZOP). 

- There are signs that a member of the committee holding the procedure, or any other employee who is directly involved in its conduct, 
carries out  economic  activities (e.g. in the  committee conducting the  procedure, persons external  to the  contracting authority  have been 
assigned as members, or the preparation of the documentation for participation was done by persons external to the contracting authority). 

- There are close contacts (including contacts known to the public) between a member of the committee conducting the procedure  or any 
other employee directly involved in the procedure, and the appointed contractor. 

-  A  person  participating  in  a  grouping  or  consenting  to  be  listed  as  a  subcontractor  in  the  bid  of  another  participant  has  submitted  a 
separate bid; 

- There is a change in the bid after its submission and after the deadline for the submission of bids; 

- There are objections/complaints/alerts from other participants claiming some of the indicators of fraud; 

- There is information that some of the bids were opened before the deadline for the submission of bids and before the public sessions for 
the opening of the bids/price proposals; 

-  The  participant  appointed  as  contractor  has  supplemented/amended  their  bid  after  the  deadline  for  the  submission  of  bids,  beyond  the 
procedure under Article 68(7)–(9) of the ZOP.’ 

These  amendments  ensure  that  the  Managing  Authority  has  met  the  requirements  for  strengthening  the  prevention  of  violations  and 
irregularities in  the  conduct  of  public  procurement  procedures  and  for  standardisation  of  the  verification  indicators  and  the 

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performance assessment criteria between the audited person and the audit authority. 

CZ 

In compliance with Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement  and 
repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on 26 February 2014 on the award 
of concession contracts, and Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on 26 February 2014 on procurement by 
entities  operating  in  the  water,  energy,  transport  and  postal  services  sectors  and  repealing  Directive  2004/17/EC,  the  new  rules  were 
incorporated into the new proposal entitled Act On Public Procurement. The legislation has not been finished yet. The proposal has been 
discussed in the Chamber of Deputies and has been addressed to the Senate for discussion. The new legislation scheduled to come into 
effect on 17 April 2016 (as was required by the aforementioned Directives) will not be adhered to. According to the latest information, the 
new act will come into effect on 1 August 2016.   

Act No. 340/2015 Coll., on Special Conditions for the Efficacy of Some Agreements, Publication of These Agreements (and an Agreement 
Register that came into effect in 2015), will come into effect starting 1st July 2016. From the date the Act comes into effect, entities such 
as  state-funded  institutions,  local  government  authority-funded  institutions,  health  insurance  companies  and  legal  entities  (in  which  the 
state or any local government authority has the majority ownership or ownership through another legal entity) will be obliged to publish 
private-law  agreements,  agreements  on  the  provision  of  grants  or  repayable  financial  assistance  via  the  Agreement  Register  in  written 
form,  provided  that  the  limit  concerning  the  amount  of  the  lower  agreements  exceeds  a  value  of  50 000,-CZK  without  VAT 
(approximately 1850 EUR).  

DK 

In Denmark, the Procurement Directive (Directive 2014/24/EU) has been implemented by Law No 1564 of 15 December 2015.  

Article 57(4)(e) of the Procurement Directive contains a voluntary ground for exclusion, whereby a bidder can be excluded if there is a 
conflict of interests that cannot be remedied with less radical measures. In Denmark’s implementation, this voluntary ground for exclusion 

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has been made mandatory. This is a more effective safeguard against conflicts of interest than that envisaged in the Procurement Directive. 
Moreover,  this  mandatory  exclusion  in  the  case  of  conflict  of  interests  is  also  stipulated  in  Denmark’s  implementation  of  the  Utilities 
Directive (Directive 2014/25/EU) and the Concessions Directive (2014/23/EU).  

In addition, Denmark has an Appeals Board for Public Procurement [Klagenævnet for Udbud], which ensures easy and cheap access for 
bidders to appeal against – among other things – conflicts of interest in tender procedures. This creates effective monitoring and also has a 
preventive effect with respect to conflicts of interests. 

DE  General 

In Germany the new EU public procurement directives are being transposed into German law in a two-stage procedure. The basic rules 
have been transposed in Part Four of the Restraint of Competition Act [Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen], which was adopted 
on  18 December 2015  and  will  enter  into  force  on  18 April 2016  (the  time-limit  for  transposition).  The  new  Act  also  contains  the  rules 
excluding  companies  from  procurement  procedures  in  the  event  of  corruption,  fraud  or  other  serious  misconduct.  The  more  detailed 
procedural rules of Directive 2014/24/EU, including the definition of the term ‘conflict of interest’, are being implemented by amendments 
to  the  Public  Procurement  Regulation.  On  20 January  2016  Germany's  Federal  Cabinet  adopted  a  Government  draft  of  the 
Public Procurement Regulation, which now has to be approved by the German Bundestag and the Bundesrat. The new Public Procurement 
Regulation will also enter into force on 18 April 2016. 

The  Government  draft  of  the  Public  Procurement  Regulation  contains  the  broad  definition  of  ‘conflict  of  interest’  in  the  second 
subparagraph  of  Article  24(2)  of  Directive  2014/24/EU.  In  order  to  ensure  that  contracting  authorities  take  appropriate  measures  to 
manage  conflicts  of  interest,  the  Regulation  stipulates  that  employees  of  the  contracting  authority  (or  a  procurement  service  provider 
acting  on  behalf  of  the  contracting  authority)  with  a  conflict  of  interest  are  not  to  be  allowed  to  take  part  in  a  public  procurement 

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procedure. It also contains a detailed list of the persons who may be presumed to have a conflict of interest. The draft Public Procurement 
Regulation  also  includes  a  mechanism  aimed  at  ensuring  that  competition  is  not  distorted  by  the  involvement  of  enterprises  that  were 
previously involved in preparing the procurement procedure. 

Overall, Germany's new public procurement law contains effective mechanisms for countering conflicts of interest. 

ESF Structural Fund 

As regards  the  European  Social Fund  (ESF),  Germany  attaches  great importance at federal level  to  preventing and tackling  conflicts  of 
interest and their potential threat to public finances both in general and in public procurement procedures.  

In  the  2014-2020  funding  period  Article 125(4)(c)  of  Regulation  (EU)  No 1303/2013  of  17 December 2013  requires  the  federal  ESF 
managing authority and the administrative services of the federal ministries involved in the ESF to put in place effective and proportionate 
anti-fraud measures, taking into account the risks identified. This includes managing conflicts of interest. 

To  identify  the  relevant  risk  areas,  the  federal  ESF  managing  authority,  in  cooperation  with  a  self-evaluation  team,  conducted  a  risk 
characterisation/risk assessment at the level of the ESF federal programmes of the 'Operational Programme ESF Federal Germany 2014-
2020'  and  described  and  assessed  the  measures  taken  to  combat  fraud/corruption  and  to  reduce  risks  -  including  managing  conflicts  of 
interests.  

The evaluation team is composed of representatives of the ESF managing authority, the administrations of the federal ministries involved 
(Employment and Social Affairs; Education and Research; Family, Elderly People, Women and Youth; Environment; Economic Affairs 
and Technology) and the implementing/intermediate bodies. In addition to the managing authority and the administrative departments, the 
line units of the federal ministries involved in the ESF were included. The ESF audit authority and the ESF certifying authority play an 

65 

 
 
advisory role vis-à-vis the ESF self-evaluation team. 

The measures in the management and control systems (MCS) for preventing and fighting fraud and corruption are guided by a number of 
principles, such as separation of functions, and involve in-depth checks at application and implementation level. Further MCS measures 
consist in maximising transparency, training and providing materials to raise awareness of fraud and corruption risks. The description of 
management  and  control  systems  as  a  whole,  also  includes  a  wide  range  of  other  measures,  obligations  and  approaches,  such  as  risk 
management, aimed at supporting, flanking and complementing action to prevent and fight fraud and corruption and to manage conflicts of 
interest. These activities are also part of the strategy to prevent and fight fraud and corruption, which encompasses managing conflicts of 
interest. 

Preventing and fighting fraud and corruption and managing conflicts of interest is seen as an on-going process, encompassing planning, 
implementation, monitoring and improvement. This optimisation process covers the entire programming period and is applied at  all ESF 
levels.  

Separation of functions is one of the most effective measures in fighting fraud and corruption and managing conflicts of interest. For this 
reason, almost all the programmes of the 'ESF Federal Operational Programme 2014-2020' apply the principle of separation of functions 
to, on the one hand, authorisation (checking applications and drawing up grant decisions) and, on the other, checking requests for payment 
and proof of expenditure. Consistently applying the dual-control principle with checks on factual and accounting accuracy and a separate 
payment function ensures a high degree of supervision and control over the implementation of support (authorisation, clearing, reporting 
and record-keeping, audits). 

The operations co-financed by the ESF are subject to a wide range of controls carried out by the managing authority and its intermediate 
bodies. These controls are supplemented by those carried out by the certifying authority and audit authority, the Federal Court of Auditors 

66 

 
 
and, at European level, by the European Commission, the European Court of Auditors and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF).  

The  high  number  and  density  of  audits  and  controls  serves  both  repressive  and  preventive  purposes  by,  respectively,  increasing  the 
detection of conflicts of interest and by deterring others from engaging in fraud/corruption in respect of ESF support. 

Audits  at  implementation  level  cover,  in  particular,  calls  for  funds,  public  procurement  documentation,  intermediate  and  final  payment 
requests  and  on-the-spot  checks.  These  audits  may,  as  a  further  measure  to  combat  fraud  and  corruption,  result  in  withdrawal  of  the 
funding granted, recovery and irregularity proceedings, thereby reducing the risk of conflicts of interest. 

Audits on calls for funds are carried out at the same time as public procurement audits. The comprehensive and exhaustive requirements 
and  provisions  of  public  procurement  law  represented  by  the  Restraint  of  Competition  Act  (GWB),  the  Public  Procurement  Regulation 
(VgV), the Public Procurement Regulation for Construction Works (VOB/A), the Public Procurement Regulation for Services (VOL/A), 
the Public Procurement Regulation for Freelance Services (VOF) and the various sector-specific procurement manuals mean that Germany 
has  a  regulatory  framework  which,  by  imposing  strict  procedural  rules  and  rules  of  conduct  for  the  award  of  public  contracts,  counters 
fraud and corruption.  

Since these provisions have been widely incorporated into national funding legislation (No 3 ANBest-P or No 3 ANBest-Gk), they also 
serve to counter fraud and corruption and conflicts of interest in the award of contracts under projects co-financed by the ESF. 

The  principle  of  transparency,  as  a  measure  for  fighting  fraud  and  corruption  and  conflicts  of  interest,  is  reflected  in  the  'Federal  ESF 
Operational Programme 2014-2020' by the requirement to document the administrative procedure and the right of access to the files. Free 
access  to  the  funding  guidelines,  the  websites  of  the  ESF  authorities  at  federal  and  Land  level  and  the  regularly  updated  lists  of 
beneficiaries also contribute to transparency. 

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The principle of transparency is also served by the fact that suspicions of fraud or corruption can be reported via the functional mailbox of 
the  federal  ministry  (e.g.  the  anti-corruption  officer  of  the  federal  ministries  involved  in  the  ESF)  or  by  telephone/mail  both  to  the 
managing authority and all intermediate bodies involved in implementing aid. All reports of possible fraud and corruption connected with 
projects co-financed by the EU are immediately and thoroughly investigated - if necessary, with the help of the national law enforcement 
authorities - and followed up by appropriate action.  

Agriculture and fisheries 

The eligibility criteria for the accreditation of agricultural paying agencies and the designation audit of the managing/certifying authorities 
for the structural funds include appropriate measures to detect and remedy or prevent conflicts of interest. 

In  addition  to  the  existing  measures  (e.g.  rotation  of  staff/personnel  training),  the  non-binding Commission  (OLAF)  guides  ‘Identifying 
conflicts  of  interest  in  public  procurement  procedures  for  structural  actions’  and  ‘Identifying  conflicts  of  interests  in  the  agricultural 
sector’  are,  wherever  possible,  complied  with  by  paying  agencies  and  managing/certifying  authorities  in  the  agriculture  and  fisheries 
sector. 

Given Germany's federal system, individual measures can vary from one Land to another. 

In principle, however, most of the recommendations proposed in the two guidance documents are complied with. The relevant audit bodies 
ensure an on-going review of these measures. 

EE 

 In 2015 Estonia commenced the official inter-ministerial consultation on the draft of the new public procurement act transposing the EU 
public procurement Directives in which the definition of “conflict of interest” is defined as stated in the Directive.  Also, in their internal 
procurement rules there is an obligation for contracting authorities to define the best suitable  measures  for them to tackle  the situations 

68 

 
 
where the conflict of interest occurs. It is expected that the law will be adopted during 2016. 

Estonia has a  public e-Procurement Register and is now exploring the possibiliy of making the Register obligatory for all non-contracting 
beneficiaries (starting from a stipulated amount). 

IE 

Ireland expects to have transposed the public procurement Directive into national legislation by the deadline in mid-April 2016. Following 
this, it can be expected that general guidance (administrative measures) will be prepared on the new Directive and it may contain measures 
that contracting authorities/entities may take to avoid conflicts of interest. 

EL 

ENTITY 

Single Independent 
Public 
Procurement 
Authority 

2 

Greece  had  taken  the  following  steps  with  regard  to  the  issue  of  conflict  of  interest  mentioned  in 
Questionnaire: 
of 
Recommendation 
Article 45  of  Law 4281/2014  contains  a  provision  dealing  with  the  issue  of  conflict  of  interest  in  public 
procurement. 
However, the application of this provision has been suspended until 29 February 2016 by means of Article 5 of 
Law 4354/2015 
No 176). 
Gazette, 
Moreover,  the  conflict  of interest  provisions set out in the  European  Directives  on public  procurement will be 
transposed into national legislation by 18 April 2016. 

(Government 

Series 

the 

I, 

ES 

1) In 2015, the process of preparing a new preliminary draft Law on  Public Sector Contracts (LCSP) was completed, one of the aims of 
which is to transpose Directive 2014/24/EU of 26 February 2014 on public procurement. 

The  draft  has  been  finalised  and  is  available  on  the  website  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance  and  Public  Administration.  Almost  all  of  the 

69 

 
 
 
 
 
required reports have been published as part of the approval process, and the draft is now ready for the new government that  takes office 
(following the recent Spanish general election); it can then be sent to the Spanish Parliament for processing and approval, after which it 
can enter into force.  

The  definition  of  conflict  of  interest  contained  in  the  Directive  is  transposed  in  Article  64  of  the  aforementioned  preliminary  draft  law, 
entitled 'Fight against corruption and prevention of conflicts of interest' and which lays down the following in paragraph 2: 'the concept of 
conflict  of  interest  shall  cover,  at  least,  any  situation  in  which  a  member  of  staff  of  the  contracting  body,  who  is  also  involved  in  the 
tendering procedure or who could influence the outcome of the procedure, has a direct or indirect financial, economic or personal interest 
that could appear to compromise his or her impartiality and independence in the tendering procedure.' 

In addition to transposing the definition of conflict of interest, the draft LCSP includes a provision expressly requiring contracting bodies 
to implement appropriate measures to combat fraud, nepotism and corruption. They are also specifically required to prevent, detect and 
effectively resolve any conflicts of interest that may arise during tendering procedures so as to avoid any adverse effects on competition 
and guarantee the transparency of the procedure and the equal treatment of all candidates and bidders (Article 64(1)). 

Also,  the  principle  of  integrity  is  expressly  referred  to  in  the  Law  for  the  first  time  (Article  1)  as  a  principle  that  must  inform  the 
interpretation and application of the provisions of the Law on Public Sector Contracts. 

2) Furthermore, an amendment was made to Article 60(1) of the current Law on Public Sector Contracts (Royal Legislative Decree 3/2011 
of  14  November  2011).  The  aim  of this amendment,  which entered into  force  on  2  October 2015, is to  strengthen  the  rules concerning 
conflicts of interest in public service contracts. The amendment was approved through paragraph one of the Ninth Final Provision of the 
new Law 40/2015 of 1 October 2015 laying down the legal arrangements applicable to the public sector (LRJSP). 

Specifically, the ban on tendering in the event of a conflict of interest - currently contained in Article 60(1)(g) of the revised text of the 

70 

 
 
LCSP - is extended to cover 1) relatives in the ascending line, 2) relatives in the descending line and 3) other relatives up to the second 
degree of consanguinity or affinity of those persons directly affected by the ban. Until now, the ban only covered (a) spouse or equivalent 
relationship and (b) descendants for whom one is the legal representative (minors, essentially). This amendment applies not only at state 
level, but also applies to the Autonomous Communities and Local Authorities. 

3)  Lastly,  in  Chapter  II  of  Law  3/2015  of  30  March  2015  governing  the  duties  of  senior  officials  in  the  General  State  Administration, 
which  was  approved  on  30  March  2015,  rules  are  laid  down  concerning  conflicts  of  interest  and  incompatibility  of  the  duties  of  senior 
officials. 

Below are some of the new aspects brought in by this new law: 

a)  The  definition  of  conflict  of  interest  is  more  precise.  A  senior  official  is  understood  to  be  involved  in  a  conflict  of  interest  when  a 
decision  they  are  going  to  make  could  affect  their  personal  interests,  be  they  financial  or  professional,  as  the  decision  could  benefit  or 
harm these interests. The following are considered to be personal interests: 

- Personal interests. 

- Family interests, including the interests of the spouse or co-habiting partner and of relatives within four degrees of consanguinity or two 
degrees of affinity. 

- The interests of persons with whom one is involved in a legal dispute. 

- The interests of persons with whom one has a close friendship or manifest enmity. 

- The interests of legal persons or private entities with which the senior official has had ties through a working or professional relationship 

71 

 
 
of any kind in the two years prior to their appointment. 

- The interests of legal persons or private entities with which the family members listed in the second point have ties through a working or 
professional relationship of any kind if they are working in a management, advisory or administrative role. 

b) An early-warning system to detect possible conflicts of interest is introduced. The system functions as follows: based on the information 
provided by the senior official in their declaration of activities, or using information they may be asked to provide, the Office for Conflicts 
of Interest will inform the senior official in advance about any issues or subjects that  - as a general rule - they must refrain from dealing 
with in the course of their duties. The senior official may consult the Office for Conflicts of Interest as often as they feel is necessary and 
at any time regarding the appropriateness of avoiding certain issues. 

c)  The  restrictions  on senior  officials  holding  shares in companies  are extended  to include shares held  by the  senior  official  through  an 
intermediary; an intermediary is understood to be the natural or legal person acting on the senior official's behalf. 

d) The role of the Office for Conflicts of Interest is strengthened.  

A  key  point  in  this  regard  is  the  new  rule  on  the  duty  to  collaborate  with  the  Office  for  Conflicts  of  Interest;  essentially  this  involves 
providing the Office with information so that it can check whether the details given by senior officials are correct. 

As  such,  all  public  institutions,  bodies  and  organisations,  as  well  as  private  entities,  will  be  obliged  to  collaborate  with  the  Office  for 
Conflicts of Interest, with a view to detecting any instances of non-compliance with the incompatibility rules laid down in this law.  

Furthermore, the Office for Conflicts of Interest may request public information, files, archives or registers - particularly those from the tax 
or social security authorities - that it needs to carry out its duties. For example, the law lays down that the Office for Conflicts of Interest 
may regularly request information from the social security authorities to check the employment situation of senior officials who have been 

72 

 
 
suspended.    

Furthermore, the Office for Conflicts of Interest has been upgraded to the level of Directorate-General and the procedure for appointing its 
Director  has  been  tightened  up.  Candidates  must  appear  before  the  relevant  Committee  in  the  Congress  of  Deputies  before  they  are 
appointed so that the Committee can examine whether their experience, training and skills are suited to the job. 

e) All senior officials' assets will be inspected when their mandates come to an end. The inspection will be carried out by the Office for 
Conflicts of Interest to make sure that the obligations laid  down in Law 3/2015 have been properly complied with and to check for any 
indications of unexplained wealth, bearing in mind the official's income during their mandate and any changes to their assets. The Office 
for Conflicts of Interest must record the findings of the inspection in the relevant report. 

f) The statutes of limitations for offences and sanctions in this area are extended (from three years for very serious offences, two years for 
serious offences, and six months for minor offences to five years, three years and one year respectively). 

FR  The  transposition  of  the  ‘public  procurement’  Directives  (Directive  2014/24/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  26 
February 2014 and Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014) provided an opportunity to 
build on the procedures currently in place, in particular: 

  by specifying that the final conviction on corruption charges of a member of an administrative, management or supervisory body of 
a  legal  person,  or  of  a  natural  person  who  has  powers  of  representation,  decision-making  or  control  therein,  shall  lead  to  the 
exclusion from public procurement procedures of that legal person, as long as the natural person is performing these functions; 

  by enhancing transparency through the obligation to disclose any amendments that are made. 
 

in  reproducing  the  definition  of  conflict  of  interests  as  set  out  in  the  European  ‘public  procurement’  Directives  2014/24/EU  and 
2014/25/EU, as well as all the measures provided for by these directives to restore normality (in particular, exclusions of people who 

73 

 
 
are subject to a conflict of interests when the situation cannot be effectively remedied by less intrusive measures). 

Order No 2015-899 of 23 July 2015 on public procurement was therefore published in the Official Journal of the French Republic (internet 
link: Ordonnance n°2015-899). It must be supplemented by implementing decrees, the publication of which is scheduled for February 2016. 

Anti-corruption measures were already part of public procurement procedures, in accordance with Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC 
of 31 March 2004.  

The issue of corruption and of the fight against it is essentially tackled through tendering bans, namely by excluding from the procedure 
those persons: 

  who have been convicted by final judgement on corruption charges; 
  who have attempted to influence the decision of a public purchaser; 
  or who have caused distortion of competition. 

Not only in cases where the law so provides and which relate to convictions for involvement in a criminal organisation, corruption, fraud or 
money laundering, but also in cases of professional misconduct or false declarations, the judge may impose a ban on taking part in public 
tenders.  

Persons who may be subject to a ban are those ‘who have, in the last five years, received a final conviction for one of the offences provided 
for (...) in Article 433-1 [active corruption practices and trading in influence], (...) in Article 435-2 [active corruption of EU officials and 
officials of Member States], (...) of the Criminal Code’. This rule stems from the public procurement Directives themselves, which require a 
‘final judgement’. This replicates the requirement contained in the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) concluded within the 
framework of the WTO. 

The exclusion rules laid down in the European Directives were reproduced (Articles 45(1) and 48 of Order No 2015-899 of 23 July 2015 on 
public  procurement).  These  measures  apply  to  public  procurement  contracts  concluded  by  the  contracting  authorities  and  to  public 

74 

 
 
procurement  contracts  concluded  by  contracting  entities.  The  essential  details  of  concluded  public  procurement  contracts  will  be  made 
available  to  the  public  free  of  charge  (open-data).  Implementation  guides  will  include  recommendations  on  the  fight  against  corruption. 
Public procurement procedures will be conducted electronically for all purchasers, within the deadlines laid down by the directives. 

The fight against corruption and fraud in public procurement is also underpinned by factors that are not specific to rules governing public 
procurement, such as:  

 

fast  and  effective  redress  mechanisms  before  the  administrative  court  (pre-contractual  interim  relief  in  particular),  with  stronger 
powers for the judge, open to any person who may wish to contest a public-contract award decision (see the case-law of the Council 
of State, in particular the ‘Department of Tarn and Garonne’ judgement, sitting of 21 March 2014, reading of 4 April 2014, Case 
No 358994); 

  services focused on the detection of corruption cases (the TRACFIN Financial Intelligence Unit and, to a lesser extent, the Regional 
courts of accounts) and the prosecution thereof (in particular the National Financial Prosecutor, established by organic law No 1115-
2013 of 6 December 2013); 

  protection  procedures  for  people  reporting  corruption,  under  Law  No 2007-1598  of  13 November  2007  on  the  fight  against 
corruption  and  Article 35  of  Law  No 1117-2013  of  6 December  2013  on  the  fight  against  tax  fraud  and  serious  economic  and 
financial crime; 
the fact that a conviction for violation of probity (and in particular for corruption) may, as an additional penalty, lead to a prohibition 
on  holding  elected  office,  and  thus  the  inability  to  participate  in  public  procurement  procedures,  the  exclusion  of  convicted 
businesses from public procurement, etc. 

 

It is for this reason that, ever since the circular dated 29 December 2009, versions of the ‘public procurement good practice guide’, drawn 
up by the Legal Affairs Department of the Economic and Finance Ministries, has contained specific recommendations on the fight against 
corruption.  

The guide reminds readers that a corruption conviction will result in a ban on taking part in tendering procedures, and also recommends that 

75 

 
 
public purchasers adopt a Code of Practice governing the conduct both of their purchasing  departments and of final decision-makers. For 
example, it contains rules relating to bans on accepting gifts or invitations, to the need to disclose connections of any kind between a public 
servant and a given supplier and to the requirement for purchasing managers to take sufficient leave, as well as rules relating to accessing, 
securing and storing all documents that record communications with suppliers. (Good practice guide)  

This information is repeated in the ‘Handbook on Public Procurement’; put online on 7 July 2015 by the Legal Affairs Department, which 
brings together the  following: the  September  2014  version  of the  public  procurement  good  practice  guide;  datasheets for the  contracting 
authorities;  tables  of  advertising,  procedures  and  deadlines;  and  flowcharts  of  procedures  (diagrams  of  the  steps  in  the  different  public 
procurement procedures).  

In particular with regard to the measures taken in order to fight against conflicts of interest, the following elements should be highlighted:  

1/ On 31 July 2015, the government introduced a fast-track procedure in order to allow early adoption of the draft law on ethics and the 
rights  and  obligations  of  officials,  which  was  since  adopted  at  first  reading  by  the  National  Assembly  and  the  Senate.  This  draft  law 
provides for an amendment to chapter IV of Law No 83-634 of 13 July 1983 on the rights and obligations of officials, by inserting into this 
law an Article 25a, worded as follows: ‘ I. – Officials shall immediately put a stop to - or prevent - situations of conflict of interest in which 
they  find  themselves  or  in  which  they  could  find  themselves.  For  the  purposes  of  this  Law,  a  conflict  of  interests  is  any  situation  of 
interaction  between  a  public  interest  and  public  or  private  interests,  which  is  likely  to  influence  or  appear  to  influence  the  independent, 
impartial and objective exercise of their duties. II. - To this end, officials who consider themselves to be in a conflict of interest situation: 
‘1°If they are in hierarchical positions, inform their manager; the manager, after being informed, or on his or her own initiative, entrusts 
(where necessary) the handling of the file or the preparation of the decision to another person;   2 If they have been given a delegation of 
signature, they refrain from using it; 3  If they are a member of a collegiate body, they refrain from sitting on it, or, where necessary, from 
deliberating in it. 4  If they perform judicial functions, they shall be deputised for, in accordance with the rules of their jurisdiction; 5° If 
they  exercise  powers  delegated  to  them,  they  shall  be  deputised  for  by  any  delegate,  to  whom  they  shall  refrain  from  giving 
instructions.’   Once  the  law  has been  definitively adopted,  a decree  of  the  Council of  State will set  out the  rules  for implementing these 

76 

 
 
provisions.  

Furthermore,  the  same  draft  law  provides  that  certain  senior  officials  in  management  roles  must,  following  the  example  of  top  national 
figures  (who  have  been  obliged  since  2011  to  submit  a  declaration  of  interests)  also  declare  their  interests  to  the  High  Authority  for 
Transparency  in  Public  Life  [Haute  Autorité  pour  la  Transparence  de  la  Vie  Publique],  created  by  Laws  No 2013-96  and  2013-907  of 
11 October 2013. 

2/ With regard to public procurement by regional authorities and the public bodies established by them, the phrase ‘conflict  of interests’ 
does not feature explicitly in the General Code of Local Authorities [code général des collectivités territoriales], but it is indirectly referred 
to in Article L 2131-11 of the Code, which stipulates that it is illegal for one or several members of the Council to deliberate on a matter in 
which they have an interest (whether the interest is in a personal capacity, or in their capacity as an agent). Similarly, if someone subject to 
this provision and who has an interest in the matter participates in the preparatory work and in the discussions  preceding the adoption of 
such  a  deliberation,  they  could  vitiate  the  legality  of  that  deliberation.  This  is  the  case  even  if  such  participation  is  not  followed  by  the 
person voting in the decision at issue, if the interested person was in a position to exercise effective influence on the decision at issue.’ 

The decision through which a contracting authority has awarded a public contract can therefore be subject to an application for annulment 
before the administrative court.  

However, the administrative court has a fairly strict interpretation of the term ‘interested adviser’. Thus, in its ‘Commune de Saint-Maur-
des-Fossés’(case No 355756) judgement of 9 May 2012, the Council of State, the highest French administrative court, ruled that ‘the mere 
fact that a member of a municipal council is a shareholder in one of the companies competing for a municipal contract, and has a family tie 
with its manager, does not justify rejecting that company’s bid on principle, if it is an ordinary works contract the usefulness of which is not 
in  dispute,  and  there  are  no  claims  that  the  municipal  councillor  who  took  part  only  in  the  deliberation  that  authorised  the  procurement 
procedure exercised special influence on the vote’. 

However,  in  a  judgement  of  21 November  2012,  ‘M  Chartier’,  (case  No 334726),  the  Council  of  State  ruled  that  a  municipal  councillor 

77 

 
 
with an interest in a matter that was the subject of a deliberation must refrain from taking part in the vote on it (and in taking part in the 
preparatory  work,  if  they  are  likely  to  have  an  effective  influence  on  the  decision  from  that  stage).  In  that  judgement,  the  Upper  House 
brought its case-law closer to that of the Court of Cassation, which considers that elected local officials must take part neither in any sitting 
of the municipal council, nor in any meeting in which urban development documents (or any decision in which they might have an interest, 
directly or indirectly) are being prepared (see Cass. Crim., 23 February 2011, No 10-82.988). 

It should be noted that the court seised in this way may rule only on the validity of the disputed act. 

3/  Independently  of  the  action  before  the  administrative  court  that  is  challenging  the  act  -  or  at  the  same  time  as  it  -  an  action  may  be 
brought  on  criminal  grounds  where  participation  by  an  elected  official  in  the  disputed  decision  may  constitute  a  violation  of  probity,  as 
referred to in Article 432-12 of the Penal Code, or an ‘illegal conflict of interest’. The purpose of this provision is to prevent any collusion, 
whether actual or presumed, between the public interest that the elected official must serve and his or her private interest. Decisions taken 
on behalf of the community must not be the subject of suspected conflict with the private interests - direct or indirect, financial, material or 
simply moral - of those who took part in the decision. It follows from Article 432-12 of the Penal Code, and from case-law laid down by 
the ordinary courts, that elected officials are guilty of an illegal conflict of interests if they take decisions on behalf of the community in a 
matter concerning them. This also holds true if the officials were merely present at the deliberations (without taking part in the vote) after 
which the decision was taken. It is also an illegal conflict of interests to take part in the preparatory works for a case, even if the elected 
officials do not subsequently deliberate on it. Consequently, officials may be  held liable if they award a contract, are part of a decision-
making  body  during  the  preparatory  procedure  or  take  part  in  the  preparatory  work,  if  they  have  an  interest  in  the  process  within  the 
meaning of Article 432-12 of the Penal Code. The same applies if the elected official holds a financial stake in the company to which the 
contract  has  been  awarded  if  he  or  she  has  family  ties  with  one  of  the  managers.  There  is  criminal  liability  on  that  basis,  even  if  the 
procurement procedure governing the contract was strictly adhered to. Moreover, in order for there to be a violation, there is no requirement 
for proof to be provided that the person in question benefited from the process or that the community suffered any harm.  

Therefore, anyone likely to be interested within the meaning of Article 432-12 of the Penal Code must systematically stand aside from the 

78 

 
 
beginning of the procedure. 

Illegal conflict of interests is punishable by five years’ imprisonment and by a fine of € 500 000. The amount can be raised to twice the 
proceeds gained from the infringement.  

However, the criminal court may not annul the decision at issue, as this is the exclusive competence of the administrative courts. 

In communes with 3 500 inhabitants or fewer, mayors, deputies or municipal councillors who have been delegated as – or are acting in the 
place  of  –  the  mayor  may  each  deal  with  the  commune  for  which  they  are  an  elected  official  for  the  transfer  of  movable  or  immovable 
property  or  for  the  provision  of  services  up  to  an  annual  limit  of  EUR 16 000.  In  addition,  in  these  communes,  mayors,  deputies,  or 
municipal councillors who have been delegated as - or are acting in the place of - the mayor may acquire a plot of a communal subdivision 
in  order  to  build  their  personal  dwelling  or  conclude  residential  leases  with  the  commune  for  their  own  residence.  These  acts  must  be 
authorised,  after  valuation  of  the  assets  in  question  by  the  State  Property  Department,  by  a  reasoned  decision  of  the  municipal  council. 
Elected  officials  may  acquire  property  belonging  to  the  commune  for  which  they  were  elected  for  the  creation  or  development  of  their 
professional activity. The price may not be less than the assessment made by the State Property Department. Regardless of the value of the 
assets in question, the act must be authorised by a reasoned decision of the municipal council.  

HR 

1.  Public Procurement 

The Ministry of Economy is in the process of drafting the new Public Procurement Act. The new Public Procurement Act will transpose 
into Croatian legislation provisions set in the Public Procurement Directives (2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU), therefore provisions in Article 
24 of the 2014/24/EU Directive and Article 42 of the 2014/25/EU Directive on conflict of interest will be transposed. 

Moreover,  it  should  be  stressed  that  the  current  Public  Procurement  Act  (OJ  90/11,  83/13,  143/1,  13/14)  contains  measures  with  the 
objective of preventing conflict of interest. Measures are set in Article 13 and Article 176 of current Public Procurement Act: 

Preventing conflicts of interests 

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(1)  The  following  relationships  of  contracting  authorities/entities  and  economic  operators  shall  be  regarded  as  conflict  of  interest  in  the 
award of public procurement contracts: 

Article 13 

1. if the representative of the contracting authority/entity at the same time performs 

management-related activities in the economic operator, or 

2.  if  the  representative  of  the  contracting  authority/entity  holds  a  business  share,  stock  or  other  rights  entitling  it  to  participate  in 
management, that is, capital of the economic operator by more than 0.5%. 

(2) Representative of the contracting authority/entity within the meaning of this Article means: 

1. the head of a body of the contracting authority/entity, member of the management or supervisory body of the contracting authority/entity, 

2. the authorised representatives of the contracting authority/entity in the particular public procurement procedure referred to in Article 24 
of this Act, and 

3.  other  persons  referred  to  in  Article  24  paragraph  5  of  this  Act  which  have  impact  on  decision  making,  and  in  particular  the  public 
procurement procedure. 

(3)  Contracting  authorities/entities  may  not  award  public  procurement  contracts  to  economic  operators  referred  to  in  paragraph  1  of  this 
Article  as  tenderers  and  members  of  a  group  of  tenderers.  Economic  operators  referred  to  in  paragraph  1  of  this  Article  may  not  act  as 
subcontractors of the selected tenderer. 

(4) Paragraph 3 of this Article shall also apply where an economic operator referred to in the paragraph 1 of this Article is a person related 
to the representative of the contracting authority/entity referred to in point 1 paragraph 2 of this Article. Related persons are the spouse or 

80 

 
 
life partner, a blood relative in the direct line, siblings, an adopted parent or child of the representative of the contracting authority/entity 
referred to in point 1 paragraph 2 of this Article. 

(5) Paragraph 4 of this Article shall not apply where a person related to the representative of the contracting authority/entity referred to in 
point 1 paragraph 2 of this Article acquired business share, stock or other rights entitling it to participate in management, that is, capital of 
the economic operator by more than 0.5% in the period of more than two years before the representative of the contracting authority/entity 
that is related to was appointed or took over its duties. Application of this provision does not prejudice other obligations that in such cases 
refer to persons obliged by the special regulation on suppression of conflict of interest. 

(6)  Paragraph  3  of  this  Article  shall  also  apply  when  a  representative  of  the  contracting  authority/entity  or  person  related  to  the 
representative  of  the  contracting  authority/entity  referred  to  in  point  1  paragraph  2  of  this  Article  has  transferred  its  ownership  share  to 
another person or specific body (trustee) pursuant special regulation on suppression of conflict of interest. 

(7)  A  situation  where  the  representative  of  the  contracting  authority/entity  or  the  person  related  to  the  representative  of  the  contracting 
authority/entity  referred  to  in  point  1  paragraph  2  of  this  Article  performs  management-related  activities  in  the  economic  operator  as  an 
official representative of the contracting authority, and not as a private individual shall not be regarded as a conflict of interest referred to in 
point 1 paragraph 1 of this Article. 

(8)  Representatives  of  the  contracting  authority/entity  shall  sign  a  statement  concerning  the  existence  or  non-existence  of  a  conflict  of 
interest within the meaning of their relationship or the relationship of person related to the representative of the contracting authority/entity 
referred to in point 1 paragraph 2 of this Article with the economic operators referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article. 

(9) On the basis of the statements referred to in paragraph 8 of this Article, the contracting authority/entity shall: 

1 Publish on its website the list of economic operators with whom the representative of the contracting authority/entity referred to in point 
1, paragraph 2 of this Article or persons related to it are in a relationship referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article or notification that there 
are no such operators. If the contracting authority does not own a website, the said list shall be published in its official bulletin or bulletin 

81 

 
 
board or made permanently available to the interested public in some other way, 

2. in the tender documents for the particular public procurement procedure, specify the list of economic operators with whom it is in the 
conflict of interest within the meaning of this Article or specify that there are no such operators, 

3. the list referred to in point 1 of this paragraph must be continuously updated in line with any changes thereto.  

Nullity of a contract 

Article 176 

A public contract shall be null and void if awarded contrary to the provision of Article 13 of this Act. 

2.  Concessions 

As  regards  the  Directive  2014/23/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  of  26  February  2014  on  the  award  of  concession 
contracts  (the  Directive),  specifically  Article  35  on  combating  corruption  and  preventing  conflicts  of  interest,  it  should  be  noted  that 
Directive’s provisions are implemented in the Draft Proposal on Concessions Act. It is expected the public discussion on the Draft Proposal 
to be finished till 18.2.2016. Furthermore, it is expected to submit the Draft Proposal for adoption to the Government and Parliament by 
7.3.2016, in order to be adopted on 16.4.2016, when the Republic of Croatia is obliged to implement the Directive. 

IT 

Italy  will  transpose  the  public  procurement  directives  into  national  law  by  18  April  2016.  In  the  national  implementing  legislation  (the 
new  Public  Procurement  Code),  a  specific  provision  will  transpose  the  provision  on  ‘conflict  of  interest’  in  the  Public  Procurement 
Directive. 

Moreover  the  Italian  national  anti-corruption  authority  has  specific  expertise  in  preventing  and  combating  corruption  in  public 
administrations and in monitoring public procurement. 

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CY  The definition of conflict of interest as provided for in the new Procurement Directives is purely adopted in the harmonizing draft Laws. 
The Cyprus Public Procurement Directorate has prepared for the transposition of each Directive. Currently, the Draft Laws are under legal-
linguistic  process,  provided  by  the  Law  Office  of  the  Republic  of  Cyprus,  in  accordance  the  national  law-making  practice.  After  this 
completion, they will be laid before the Council of Ministers for approval and then before the House of Representatives for voting and entry 
into force. 

No further measures  are taken in 2015, however the  national provisions on General Principles of Administrative Law, do not permit the 
participation in or production of any administrative act, of a person having singular relationship or family relationship by blood or marriage 
up  to  the  fourth  degree  or  is  acute  hatred  to  the  person  concerned  as  the  case  might  be,  having  an  interest  in  the  outcome  (including 
procurement procedures).In this respect, we consider that the new Directives provisions are largely covered already.   

LV 

On  19  November  2015,  the  meeting  of  State  secretaries  announced  the  draft  of  the  new  Public  Procurement  Law,  where  the  Public 
Procurement Directive is transposed. The draft introduces regulation on conflict of interest and condition that contracting authority shall 
exclude economic operator from procurement procedure if: 

-  contracting authority official, 
-  employee, 
-  member of the board or council or 
-  proctor, or  
-  person which constitutes a procurement commission or sign a procurement contract, or which elaborate procurement documentation, 
-  member of procurement commission or expert 

has a connection with the tenderers and a conflict of interest cannot be effectively remedied by other less intrusive measures.  

The  Public  Procurement  Law  already  provides  regulation  on  administrative  liability  in  case  of  breach  of  rules  of  conflicts  of  interest 

83 

 
 
elimination. Since 2014 administrative sanctions are imposed by Procurement Monitoring Bureau. 

LT 

Measures have already been taken in Lithuania to implement the second recommendation in the OLAF document about combating 
fraud and corruption in public procurement. These measures are set out in the draft laws drawn up by the Ministry of the Economy which 
transpose  the  provisions  of  Directives  2014/24/EU  and  2014/25/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  and  which  were 
approved by the Government at the meeting of 4 November 2015. The draft laws in question, i.e. draft law No XIIP-3750 amending the 
Law  on  public  procurement  No  I-1491  (hereinafter  "the  draft  law")  and  draft  law  No  XIIP-3751  on  procurements  made  by  procuring 
entities in the water management, energy, transport and postal services sector, are currently being discussed by the relevant parliamentary 
committees. 

In a bid to combat conflicts of interest in public procurement, the first of these draft laws transposes not just the provisions of the 
relevant  Directives,  but also  proposes  laying  down  additional  national requirements to take  account  of, inter  alia,  the  European  Court  of 
Justice judgment in Case C-538 eVigilo. A detailed description of the provisions in question follows. 

Article 21(1) of the draft law (which transposes Article 24 of Directive 2014/24/EU) defines a conflict of interest: "In procurement, 
situations shall be classified as conflicts of interest where staff members of the contracting authority or of a provider of an ancillary service, 
Commission members or experts, or observers involved in the procurement procedure who may have an influence on the outcome of that 
procedure  have,  directly  or  indirectly,  a  financial,  economic  or  other  personal  interest  which  might  be  perceived  to  compromise  their 
impartiality and independence in the context of the procurement procedure." In a bid to prevent such conflicts of interest, Article 21(2) of 
the draft law proposes imposing a national obligation on contracting authorities to require that each person referred to in Article 21(1) of 
the draft law take part in procurement proceedings or take decisions relating to a procurement only after signing a confidentiality statement 
and  an  impartiality  declaration  in  the  form  decided  on  by  the  Public  Procurement  Commission  and  the  Supreme  Official  Ethics 
Commission. 

Paragraphs 37 and 39 of ECJ Case, C–538, eVigilo, state that the finding of bias on the part of an expert requires in particular the 

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assessment of facts and evidence that comes within the competence of the contracting authorities and the administrative or judicial control 
authorities. The ECJ has consistently held that, in the absence of EU rules governing the matter, it is for every Member State to lay down 
the detailed rules of administrative and judicial procedures for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from EU law. In view of such 
clarifications  by  the  ECJ,  Article  21(3)  of  the  draft  law  proposes  stipulating  what  protocol  the  contracting  authority  must  observe  if  it 
suspects a conflict of interest. If substantiated information suggests that an individual referred to in Article 21(1) of the draft law may be 
subject to a conflict of interest and has not distanced himself from the taking of decisions relating to the procurement in question, the head 
of the contracting authority or his authorised representative shall bar the person from participating in the decision-making process and carry 
out a check on this person's activities relating to the procurement. A contracting authority that has established that an individual is subject to 
a  conflict  of  interest  shall  exclude  him  from  taking  decisions  regarding  the  procurements  in  question  and  assess  whether  the  conflict  of 
interest constitutes grounds for excluding a supplier. 

Article 45(4)(2) of the draft law (which transposes Article 57(4)(e) of Directive 2014/24/EU) proposes stipulating that a contracting 
authority  shall  exclude  a  supplier  from  a  procurement  procedure  if  during  the  procurement  procedure  he  has  found  himself  subject  to  a 
conflict  of  interest  and  the  situation  cannot  be  remedied.  The  Lithuanian  government  takes  public  procurement  infringements  very 
seriously, which is why it opted for the stricter option provided for in Directive 2014/24/EU. The draft law proposes requiring contracting 
authorities  to  apply  grounds  for  excluding  a  supplier  in  the  event  of  a  conflict  of  interest  that  cannot  be  remedied,  or  ban  them  from 
selectively including grounds for excluding suppliers in the procurement documentation. 

Conflict of interest is a new concept in public procurement regulations, which is why it is important to provide contracting authorities with 
methodological  assistance  with  clarifying  this  concept  and  identifying  conflicts  of  interest  in  practice.  To  this  end,  the  Lithuanian 
government  has  suggested  requiring  the  Supreme  Official  Ethics  Commission,  pursuant  to  Article  90(5)  of  the  draft  law,  to  draw  up 
guidelines on issues relating to the identification of conflicts of interest in public procurement. 

LU  Luxembourg is committed to effective protection of the EU's financial interests. The recommendations to the Commission’s report on the 
protection of the EU’s financial interests have therefore been discussed with all the relevant stakeholders and will be taken into account in 

85 

 
 
the  national  anti-fraud  strategy  that  Luxembourg  is  currently  devising.  A  first  meeting  that  brought  together  all  the  relevant  authorities 
involved  in  managing  EU  funds  had  taken  place.  Luxembourg  intends  to  have  such  meetings  on  a  regular  basis  to  ensure  structured 
coordination. 

HU  To make the new Public Procurement Act CXLIII of 2015 as consistent as possible with the new EU Directives, Hungary has incorporated 
the EU requirements of openness, transparency, and the proper management of public funds, and guarantee the widest possible competition. 
Incorporating these objectives into the Public Procurement Act contributes towards reducing corruption in the public procurement process 
and increasing the openness and transparency of public procurement procedures.  

In  addition  to  transposing  the  Directive,  the  new  Public  Procurement  Act  contains  several  measures  which  facilitate  fair  public 
procurements,  competition  and  the  fight  against  corruption.  Indeed,  the  Public  Procurement  Act  lays  down  stricter  rules  on  conflict  of 
interest than the Directive. . By providing for conflict-of-interest rules going beyond those needing to be transposed from the Directive, the 
Public Procurement Act promotes the implementation of the measures set out in proposal No 2 of the 2014 PIF report.  

The  conflict-of-interest  rules  have  been  supplemented  to  cover  a  few  typical  instances  where  the  likelihood  of  a  conflict  of  interest  is 
greatest,  and  where  the  contracting  authority  must  check  for  the  existence  of  a  conflict  of  interest  particularly  carefully.  One  instance 
covered  is  where  an  executive  officer  or  supervisory  committee  member  of  an  organisation  is  drawn  by  the  contracting  party  into  an 
activity connected with the procurement procedure or its preparation. 

Dignitaries  and  the  heads  of  some  competent  national  bodies  have  also  been  excluded  from  public  procurement  procedures,  as  have 
organisations under the ownership of relatives living in the same household as them. The 1 December 2015 amendment to the conflict-of-
interest rule has made it one of the most stringent in Europe, and even stricter than the relevant EU Directives. 

The  practical  effectiveness  of  the  conflict-of-interest  rules  is  further  facilitated  by  ex-ante  checks  on  EU-funded  public  procurement 
procedures  for  contracts  over  the  EU  threshold  value  for  supplies  and  services  and  contracts  for  over  HUF  300  million  for  works.  The 
public procurement checks under these procedures are conducted by the Public Procurement Supervisory Department (PPS) of the  Prime 

86 

 
 
Minister’s  Office.  Pursuant  to  point  384  of  Annex  I  to  Government  Decree  No  272/2014  of  5  November  2014,  the  relevant  conflict-of-
interest  declarations  are  one  of  the  documents  submitted  by  the  contracting  parties  as  part  of  these  checks.  The  declarations  are  also 
inspected  during  ex ante  checks.  In  other  cases,  follow-up  checks  of  EU-financed  public  procurement  procedures  not  falling  within  the 
scope  of  PPS  checks  (procedures  under  the  threshold  values  mentioned  above)  are  conducted  by  managing  authorities.  The  conflict-of-
interest declarations that the contracting parties are required to submit are also re-inspected during the checks by the managing authorities. 

If the checks reveal infringements, infringement proceedings may be initiated against the contracting parties or, in the case of infringements 
which cannot be rectified, judicial review proceedings may be brought before the Public Procurement Arbitration Board.  

Similarly,  the  Public  Procurement  Auditing  Department  (which  audits  the  public  procurements  of  budgetary  institutions  and  institutions 
managed or overseen by the government, economic organisations in which the state has a majority ownership and public foundations of the 
government  and  public  foundations  managed  or  established  by  them)  also  checks  the  conflict-of-interest  declarations  submitted  by  the 
contracting  parties  as  part  of  the  audit.  Prior  to  1  November  2015,  the  contracting  parties  were  obliged,  under  Annex  1  to  Government 
Decree  No  46/2011  of  25  March  2011  on  the  centralised  control  and  authorisation  of  public  procurements,  to  submit  declarations  for 
control and authorisation if they involved contracting for supplies or services with an estimated net value of at least HUF 25 million, or for 
works with an estimated net value of at least HUF 150 million. In the case of controls beneath this threshold value, the audit authority made 
a  request  pursuant  to  Section  4/A(1)  of  the  above  Government  Decree  for  the  further  disclosure  of  information,  demanding  that  the 
tenderers submit conflict-of-interest declarations. For checks initiated since 1 November 2015, tenderers are obliged, under Annexes 2-4 to 
Government  Decree  No  320/2015  of  30  October  2015  on  the  centralised  control  and  authorisation  of  public  procurements,  to  submit  a 
conflict-of-interest declaration to the Public Procurement Supervisory Department at the time the check is initiated. 

Hungary notes that it has taken measures in conformity with the above provisions and practical solutions to implement proposal 2 as set out 
in the 2014 PIF report, to make the conflict-of-interest rules effective. 

MT 

The following terms will be included as part of the new Regulations transposing the Public Procurement Directives which come into effect 

87 

 
 
in April 2016. 

In Regulation 2, the term is defined as follows: 

‘conflicts  of  interest’  shall  at  least  mean  any  situation  where  any  person,  including  staff  members  of  the  contracting  authority  or  of  a 
procurement service provider acting on behalf of the contracting authority, who are involved in the conduct of the procurement procedure 
or may influence the outcome of that procedure have, directly or indirectly, a financial, economic or other personal interest which might 
be perceived to compromise their impartiality and independence in the context of the procurement procedure; 

Regulation 16(g): It shall be the duty of all contracting authorities: 

“to  take  appropriate  measures  to  effectively  prevent,  identify  and  remedy  conflicts  of  interest  arising  in  the  conduct  of  procurement 
procedures so as to avoid any distortion of competition and to ensure equal treatment of all economic operators;” 

As part of the Exclusion Criteria where in Regulation 194, it is stated that: 

A contract shall also not be awarded to an economic operator who, during the procurement procedure for that contract:  

(b)  is subject to a conflict of interest as referred to under the definition in regulation 2 which cannot be effectively remedied by other less 
intrusive measures; 

Furthermore,  Contracting  Authorities  are  obliged  to  report  in  the  individual  reports  on  procedures  for  the  award  of  contracts,  as  per 
Regulation 241 (2)(i), where conflicts of interests were detected (if any) and subsequent measures taken. 

Additionally  in  the  Tender  Documents,  specifically  in  the  General  Rules  Governing  Tenders  and  also  in  the  General  Conditions,  the 
following clauses to mitigate Conflict of Interest are included: 

3.4          A  company  may  act  as  a  subcontractor  for  any  number  of  tenderers,  and  joint  ventures/consortia,  provided  that  it  does  not 

88 

 
 
participate individually or as part of a joint venture/consortium, and that the nominations do not lead to a conflict of interest, collusion, or 
improper practice. 

21. Ethics Clauses 

21.1      Any  attempt  by  a  candidate  or  tenderer  to  obtain  confidential  information,  enter  into  unlawful  agreements  with  competitors  or 
influence  the  committee  or  the  Central  Government  Authority  during  the  process  of  examining,  clarifying,  evaluating  and  comparing 
tenders will lead to the rejection of his candidacy or tender and may result in administrative penalties. 

21.2     Without the Central Government Authority's prior written authorisation, the Contractor and his staff or any other company with 
which the Contractor is associated or linked may not, even on an ancillary or subcontracting basis, supply other services, carry out works 
or supply equipment for the project. This prohibition also applies to any other programmes or projects that could, owing to the nature of 
the contract, give rise to a conflict of interest on the part of the Contractor. 

21.3     When putting forward a candidacy or tender, the candidate or tenderer must declare that he is not affected by any potential conflict 
of interest, and that he has no particular link with other tenderers or parties involved in the project. 

21.4     The Contractor must at all times act impartially and as a faithful adviser in accordance with the code of conduct of his profession. 
He must refrain from making public statements about the project or services without the Contracting Authority's prior approval. He may 
not commit the Contracting Authority in any way without its prior written consent. 

21.5     For the duration of the contract, the Contractor and his staff must respect human rights and undertake not to offend the political, 
cultural and religious morals of Malta. 

21.6     The Contractor may not accept any payment connected with the contract other than that provided for therein. The Contractor and 
his staff must not exercise any activity or receive any advantage inconsistent with their obligations to the Contracting Authority. 

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21.7      The  Contractor  and  his  staff  are  obliged  to  maintain  professional  secrecy  for  the  entire  duration  of  the  contract  and  after  its 
completion. All reports and documents drawn up or received by the Contractor are confidential. 

21.8     The contract governs the Parties' use of all reports and documents drawn up, received or presented by them during the execution of 
the contract. 

21.9      The  Contractor  shall  refrain  from  any  relationship  likely  to  compromise  his  independence  or  that  of  his  staff.  If  the  Contractor 
ceases to be independent, the Central Government Authority may, regardless of injury, terminate the contract without further  notice and 
without the Contractor having any claim to compensation. 

21.10   The tender(s) concerned will be rejected or the contract terminated if it emerges that the award or execution of a contract has given 
rise  to  unusual  commercial  expenses.  Such  unusual  commercial  expenses  are  commissions  not  mentioned  in  the  main  contract  or  not 
stemming from a properly concluded contract referring to the main contract, commissions not paid in return for any actual and legitimate 
service,  commissions  remitted  to  a  tax  haven,  commissions  paid  to  a  recipient  who  is  not  clearly  identified  or  commissions  paid  to  a 
company which has every appearance of being a front company. 

NL 

The Public Procurement Directives will be transposed into national law in 2016 through the introduction of amendments to the 
Aanbestedingswet 2012 (2012 Public Procurement Act) as from 18 April 2016, including the definition of ‘conflict of interest’.  

In addition, once the Aanbestedingsreglement Werken (ARW, the Public Works Procurement Regulation) comes into effect, a ‘Model K 
Declaration’ can be required. By means of the Model K Declaration tenderers declare that their tender has not been influenced by an 
unlawful agreement with competitors (September 2015). Even if the ARW is not in effect, a contracting authority can ask for a (self-) 
declaration of ‘no conflict of interest’, ‘no insider dealing’ or ‘no agreement between competitors’.  
Furthermore, the Netherlands has great expectations of the ARACHNE programme introduced by the EC, which can offer an insight into 
the mutual relations between companies and their managers, shareholders or owners. 

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AT  No information provided 

PL 

Appropriate provisions for preventing and tackling conflicts of interest were introduced into national public procurement law before the 
relevant provisions were introduced into the EU Directives coordinating the award of public contracts. These provisions have been part of 
the Public Procurement Act (PZP) since its adoption, i.e. since 29 January 2004. 

The current PZP provides for solutions to prevent conflicts of interest, including for example the obligation to exclude employees of the 
contracting  authority  from  a  public  procurement  procedure  if  necessary,  i.e.  when  impartiality  is  doubted.  Appropriate  provisions  to 
prevent and tackle conflicts of interest have also been put into place with respect to employees of the Public Procurement Office (UZP) 
who supervise public procurement procedures. They provide for the possibility of excluding UZP employees from supervision tasks, and 
require such employees to inform the UZP President of the reasons for their exclusion. The grounds laid down in the PZA for excluding 
employees  of  a  contracting  authority  from  a  public  procurement  procedure  and  UZP  employees  from  supervision  tasks  cover  all  the 
situations identified in the  definition of conflict of interest laid  down  in the  new  EU  public  procurement Directives and do  not require 
further adaptation. 

Meanwhile, when transposing the above-mentioned Directives into Polish law, consideration is being given to providing for exclusion of 
contractors from the public procurement procedure when other measures (such as excluding employees of the contracting authority from 
the procedure) prove insufficient to eliminate a conflict of interest. 

In addition, managing authorities of operational programmes under cohesion policy are required, under the guidelines of the minister for 
regional development on the arrangements for monitoring implementation of operational programmes in 2014–20, to draw up documents 
outlining ways to prevent and tackle corruption and fraud. The procedures in question also include mechanisms to prevent conflicts  of 
interest. In view the Commission's Recommendation, managing authorities will include in those documents the definition of conflict of 
interest as provided for in the Public Procurement Directive of the EP and the Council. 

PT  Codes of Ethics and Conduct were drawn up at internal level and within each managing authority. These cover the question of conflicts of 
interest, in the form of a declaration of conflicts of interest and an internal organisational structure ensuring the segregation of duties. 

The  national  legislation,  which  defines  the  general  rules  for  implementing  operational  programmes  funded  by  the  ESIF,  requires 

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beneficiaries to respect the  principles of transparency, competition and good management of public  funding in order  to avoid situations 
involving potential conflicts of interests, notably in relations between beneficiaries and their suppliers or service providers (Article 24(k) 
of Decree-Law No 159/2014 of 27 October 2014). 

During 2015 the ADC issued guidelines on this subject, suggesting the adoption of specific procedures by the managing authorities, which 
set out the approach to take as regards identifying preferential relations and how to deal with them in the context of their  monitoring and 
internal control functions. 

Mechanisms have also been set up for the receipt, circulation and sharing of information concerning notification of a specific situation of 
non-compliance or potential fraud, such as complaint information. 

Still on this recommendation, it should be noted that IFAP has developed and implemented an information system requiring beneficiaries to 
declare  any  special  relations  when  submitting  payment  claims  under  EAFRD  Investment.  If  this  is  the  case,  the  claims  are  examined  in 
order to assess the reasonableness of any costs related to such situations. 

RO 

1.  In  the  light  of  the  Romanian  Government's  obligation  to  fulfil  the  horizontal  ex-ante  conditionality  relating  to  the  reform  of  public 
procurement set out in Romania's Partnership Agreement for the 2014-2020 financial programming period, approved by Commission 
Decision  C(2014)5515  of  6 August 2014, the  National Public Procurement Agency (ANAP)  has  been set up as the  main institution 
responsible  for  managing  public  investment  and  assuring  the  quality  of  public  expenditure.  One  of  the  Agency's  main  tasks  is  to 
supervise the public procurement system, based on its monitoring function and ex-ante and ex-post activities, and to highlight system 
irregularities or problems in real time. When alerted to systemic shortcomings, ANAP will define the problems and refer them to the 
competent authorities to take corrective action. 

In  2015, ANAP developed the  National  Public Procurement Strategy, approved  by Government  Decision No  901/2015, in  which it  put 
forward measures to reform the national public procurement system between 2015 and 2020. The development of the strategy is a crucial 

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step in the reform of the Romanian public procurement system, as it sets out a common vision at a key moment when the new Directives 
in  the  field  proposes  a  paradigm  shift  for  Member  States,  as  public  procurement  is  becoming  the  main  tool  for  unlocking  growth  at 
European level.  

To transpose the new EU Directives, a legislative package on public procurement, containing provisions to fight favouritism, conflicts of 
interest  and  corruption,  was  launched  on  27  October  2015:  (i)  Draft  Law  on  public  procurement  (L628/23.11.2015);  (ii)  Draft  Law  on 
sector-specific procurement (L627/23.11.2015); (iii) Draft Law on concession contracts for public works or services (L630/23.11.2015); 
(iv)  Draft  Law  laying  down  remedies  and  means  of  redress  in  relation  to  the  award  of  public  procurement  contracts,  sector-specific 
procurement contracts and concession contracts, and on the organisation and functioning of the National Complaint Resolution Council 
(L629/23.11.2015). The legislative package is currently under debate by the competent committees of the Romanian Senate. 

2.  In  2015,  the  National  Integrity  Agency  (ANI),  an  institution  with  exclusive  powers  in  the  field  of  detecting  incompatibilities, 
administrative conflicts of interest and unjustified wealth, continued its activities under PREVENT, the integrated information system 
used for preventing conflicts of interest in public procurement. The project was launched in 2014. The draft law has been approved by 
the  Chamber  of  Deputies  and  is  currently  under  debate  by  the  relevant  committees  of  the  Romanian  Senate.  Technically,  the 
PREVENT program has been finalised and tested successfully. 

3.  DLAF  was  also  a  member  of  the  working  group  created  by  ANI  to  prepare  the  draft  (PREVENT)  law  setting  up  a  mechanism  to 
prevent  conflicts  of  interest  in  all  public  procurement  procedures  by  putting  an  information  system  (interconnecting  databases)  in 
place. 

SI 

The Ministry of Public Administration took into account the need to increase transparency and reduce corruption risks when drafting the 
new Public Procurement Act (ZJN-3) was being drafted. The act was passed in the National Assembly on 18 November 2015,  published in 
the Official Gazette of Slovenia (No 91/15). ZJN-3 will apply as of 1 April 2016 and thus ensure the timely transposition of the most recent 
directives into national law. 

In  order  to  reduce  the  possible  risk  of  corruption,  ZJN-3  introduces  stricter  provisions  regarding  the  prevention  of  conflicts  of  interest. 

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Specifically,  the  Act  requires  any  person  responsible  for  a  public  procurement  procedure  to  send  —  ahead  of  the  award  of  the  public 
contract — a written notice informing all parties involved in drawing up the documentation or parts thereof or in decision-making at any 
level of the selected contractor. Moreover, where the person responsible for the public procurement procedure has any direct or indirect ties 
with the selected contractor or any private, financial or economic interest that could affect its objectivity and impartiality in administering 
the  procurement  procedure  or  raise  doubts  as  to  its  objectivity  and  impartiality,  such  a  person  must  immediately  notify  the  contracting 
authority of the conflict in writing and proceed as instructed. The head of the contracting authority must ensure in this context that any tasks 
are carried out in keeping with the law and impartially. ZJN-3 therefore provides that a direct or indirect link exists between a tenderer and 
the person responsible for the public procurement procedure if the latter is married to the tenderer or his/her registered partner or same-sex 
partner, or a member of the same household, or direct blood relative or collateral blood relative to the third degree inclusive, or relative by 
affinity to the second degree inclusive, or adoptive parent, adopted child, foster parent, foster child, or has business or labour relations with 
the tenderer or the tenderer's partner whose shareholding exceeds 5 % or the tenderer's legal representative or authorised signatory. In the 
previous version of the Act, the 5 % share was set at 25 %. ZJN-3 also provides that the contracting authority may disqualify any tenderer 
attempting to unduly influence its decision, without the need to specify this caveat beforehand. ZJN-3 further provides for the possibility of 
prior cooperation of candidates and tenderers, stipulating that where a candidate, tenderer or an enterprise related to the candidate or the 
tenderer has conducted preliminary market research for the contracting authority or has been in any way been involved in organising the 
public  procurement  procedure,  the  contracting  authority  must  take  all  action  necessary  to  ensure  that  the  presence  of  that  candidate  or 
tenderer  does  not  distort  competition.  These  measures  include  the  communication  to  the  other  candidates  and  tenderers  of  relevant 
information  exchanged  in  the  context  of  or  resulting  from  the  involvement  of  the  candidate  or  tenderer  in  the  preparation  of  the 
procurement procedure and the fixing of suitable time limits for the receipt of tenders. 

The Slovenian authorities are convinced that greater transparency significantly contributes to reducing corruption risks. In this respect ZJN-
3 lays down a new obligation for public contracts that are exempt from public procurement procedures, making it mandatory to annually 
publish not only statistical data but also the details of all entities awarded a public contract valued at more than EUR 10 000, along with the 
subject of the contract and the exact price paid. From now on, all decisions to award a public contract and any notices of changes  to the 
contract after signing will be published on the portal [sic]. The Ministry has also developed a major project on increasing  transparency in 

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public  procurement.  It  is  an  IT  solution  called  STATIST  and  available  to  the  general  public  as  of  January  2016.  STATIST  is  the  first 
integrated,  first-hand  and  updatable  database  of  public  contracts  awarded  in  Slovenia.  It  contains  details  of  every  public  procurement 
procedure  since  1 January  2013,  which  can  be  searched  according  to  a  variety  of  criteria.  The  application  displays,  in  terms  of  contract 
value,  a  list  of  the  ten  largest  contracting  entities,  a  list  of  the  ten  largest  tenderers,  a  list  of  the  ten  areas  in  which  most  contracts  were 
awarded,  and  the  legal  basis  for  awarding  the  contracts.  Data  can  be  exported  in  cvs  format,  which  supports  multiple  uses.  All  the  data 
displayed on the screen can be saved in pdf document. 

Transparency  in  public  procurement  has  also  increased  by  an  upgrade  of  the  Public  Procurement  Portal  allowing  users  to  access,  as  of 
25 May 2015, information about public contracts, concessions and public-private partnerships (the legal basis for this is Article 10a(5) of 
the  Access  to  Public  Information  Act  –  ZDIJZ).  Since  25 May 2015  public  contracts  can  be  accessed  through  the  Public  procurement 
Portal: http://www.enarocanje.si/objavapogodb/iskalnik.aspx 

The  amended  version  of  the  Access  to  Public  Information  Act  (ZDIJZ-C)  provides  for  greater  transparency  on  the  part  of  contracting 
entities  engaging  in  public  procurement.  ZDIJZ-C  requires  all  public  entities  bound  by  this  act  and  appearing  as  contract  authorities, 
concession grantors or public partners to publish, within 48 days of awarding a public contract or a concession, or selecting a partner in a 
PPP, any public information contained in the contract that they have concluded. These legal provisions are aimed at improving transparency 
in the use of public funds for public contracts, and follow the principles already established within the OECD and the Open Government 
Partnership.  Indeed,  one  of  the  main  recommendations  from  these  organisations  concerns  a  proactive  approach  to  publishing  the  key 
documents and data on public contracts online. 

SK  The transposition of the Directives on public procurement has provided each Member State with the possibility to enhance transparency in 
public procurement, inter alia, by the definition of conflict of interest in public procurement. On 28 May 2015, a new draft of the proposal 
for the bill on public procurement was submitted by the Government of the Slovak Republic to the National Council of the Slovak Republic 
(i.e. Slovakian Parliament) for adoption. The latest EU Directives on public procurement have been transposed into the wording of the bill. 
On 18 November 2015, the Slovakian Parliament approved the Government's proposal for a new bill on public procurement that entered 

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into force on 18 April 2016. The latest Public Procurement Act contains a definition of conflict of interest, sets out appropriate ways for its 
elimination  from  the  procurement  process  and  also  includes  other  steps  that  shall  be  applied  by  the  contracting  authority  should  the 
authority  fail  to  eliminate  conflicts  of  interest  from  the  public  procurement  procedure.  At  the  same  time,  on  6  May  2015,  the  Public 
Procurement Office issued an Interpretative Notice No 3/2015 of 6 May 2015 to the assessment of potential conflicts of interests between 
the contracting authority, contracting entity, the person specified in § 7 of the Public Procurement Act and the tenderer. The Interpretative 
Notice is published on the Public Procurement Office’s website. The idea of this Interpretative Notice is that the Public Procurement Office 
recommends  the  contracting  authorities,  contracting  entities  and  the  persons  specified  in  § 7  of  the  Public  Procurement  Act  to  always 
address, in the public procurement notice, the existence of a potential conflict of interest that could distort or restrict fair competition. It also 
recommends  them  to  take  appropriate  measures  to  ensure  that  potential  conflicts  of  interest  are  avoided.  At  the  same  time,  the  Office 
suggests  that,  as  a  further  action  taken  for  the  purpose  of  proper  assessment  of  the  existence  of  a  conflict  of  interests  in  the  public 
procurement that is under inspection, each file shall also include a "conflict of interest form" comprising information on the evaluation of 
the existence of a potential conflict of interests in the public procurement that was subject to checks carried out by the Office. 

The  Slovak  Procurement  Office’s  Interpretative  Notice  No  3/2015  of  5  June  2015  is  available  to  both  the  general  public  and  the 
professional public on http://www.uvo.gov.sk/app/Lists/file/row/132/col/col_1. 

The need to specify the conflict of interest in public procurement more precisely was implied by the Decision (EC) No C (2013) 9527 of 19 
December 2013 on the setting out and approval of the guidelines for determining financial corrections to be made by the Commission to 
expenditure financed by the Union under shared management, for non-compliance with the rules on public procurement. That Commission 
Decision  and  individual  types  of  non-compliance  with  the  rules  and  principles  of  public  procurement  were  transposed  into  the  Central 
Coordination Authority’s Methodological Guidance No 5 for determining financial corrections to be made by the managing authority in the 
case of non-compliance with the rules and procedures of public procurement. This Methodological Guidance defines conflicts of interest in 
a similar vein: “A conflict of interests between the contracting authority/beneficiary and the tenderer or the candidate has been established 
by the competent judicial or official body”. Since in the context of the Slovak Republic, however, after the adoption of the  Commission 
Decision No C (2013) 9527, there was neither definition of conflict of interests in public procurement nor a designated competent official 

96 

 
 
body  authorised  to  confirm  the  existence  of  a  conflict  of  interests,  the  Central  Coordination  Authority  (hereafter  “CCA”)  issued  the 
Methodological Guidance No 13 of 18 March 2015 for the assessment of conflict of interests in the process of public procurement for the 
PP 2014-2020. The aim of that Methodological Guidance was to define the concept of “conflict of interests”, and to determine basic rules 
binding for  the  managing authorities responsible  for the  implementation  of the  operational  programmes  within the  PP  2014-2020.  These 
authorities  are  obliged  to  follow  these  rules  when  identifying  and  assessing  conflicts  of  interest  in  public  procurement.  The  concept  of 
conflict  of interests  shall at least  cover any situation  where the  persons  on  the  part  of the  contracting authority, who  are  involved  in the 
conduct of the procurement procedure, could influence the outcome of that procedure (regardless those persons are involved) have, directly 
or indirectly, a financial, economic or other personal interest which might be perceived to compromise their impartiality and independence 
in the context of the procurement procedure. The Methodological Guidance applies solely to situations of conflict of interests at the level of 
the  contracting  authority  and  the  tenderer/candidate.  At  the  same  time,  the  Methodological  Guidance  specifies  the  official  body  that  is 
authorised to assess the area defined by a conflict of interests in public procurement. The designated bodies include the Public Procurement 
Office  and,  in  certain  cases,  a managing  authority.  The  Methodological  Guidance  also  sets  out  an  administrative  procedure  for  the 
identification of potential conflicts of interests. It includes the specification of the most frequent forms of linkages and their traces in the 
procurement documentation. That Methodological Guidance contributes to prevention through the identification of the findings  relating to 
conflicts  of  interest  and  provides  managing  authorities  with  guidance  on  how  to  effectively  tackle  a  potential  conflict  of  interests.  An 
Annex  to  the  CCA’s  Methodological  Guidance  contains  a  practical  guide  for  managers  issued  by  OLAF,  which  includes  additional 
information on various forms of linkages and prevention thereto. In order to avoid a conflict of interests, the managing authorities, with a 
view  to  their  previous  practice,  experience  and  the  specificities  of  an  operational  programme,  shall  be  obliged  to  implement  the  rules, 
procedures and recommendations in relation to the recipients/applicants. At the same time, it is necessary to specify requirements and the 
scope  of verification of the conflict of interests. It is also recommended that all staff carrying out checks of the procurement procedures 
have a sufficient knowledge of a list of “red flags” that can be used to identify situations where a conflict of interests occurs. The CAA’s 
Methodological  Guidance  recommends  that  the  managing  authority  should  require  the  beneficiary  to  submit,  within  the  public 
procurement,  the  documentation  that  shall  include  a  solemn  declaration  on  the  exclusion  of  a  conflict  of  interests,  with  the  caveat  that 
should a conflict of interests be established in the future (ex post), the financial correction of up to 100 % shall be determined for the public 

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procurement concerned. 

FI   Ministry of Employment and the Economy: under the new procurement legislation, Finland will bring into force the obligations pursuant to the 
new Procurement Directive relating to the conflicts of interest referred to above as well as any other obligations under the Directive. No further 
regulation is envisaged in this respect.  

In Finland, disqualification is governed by a number of special laws. As regards administration, provisions on disqualification are contained in 
Sections 27-30 of the Administrative Procedure Act. The Act also concerns decision-making related to procurement, and it is already applied to 
procurement  by  authorities.  Effective  means  of  legal  protection  and  redress  are  already  in  place  under  the  Procurement  Act  and  the 
Administrative  Procedure  Act.  Once  the  Procurement  Act  has  been  adopted,  its  implementation  will  be  notified  to  the  Commission  in  the 
normal manner as required by the Directive. Since a comparative table, among other things, is required under the Directive, such a table will be 
included in the notification to the Commission. 

Finnish Agency for Rural Affairs (MAVI): a number of measures related to aid administered by MAVI are subject to Finnish legislation on the 
disqualification  of  an  official,  which  lays  down  provisions  on  conflicts  of  interest  involving  contracting  authorities.  In  connection  with  the 
national implementation of the procurement directives, the national legislator will consider how conflict of interests will be taken into account 
in  the  procurement  procedure.  MAVI  will  continue  to  issue  instructions  and  regulations  and  carry  out  monitoring  to  ensure  that  the 
administration of aid complies with the requirements of existing legislation. 

SE 

In the legislative proposal implementing the new Directive on Public Procurement (201/24/EU), the Swedish government has made the 
assessment that Sweden fulfills the requirements of rules on conflict of interest in Article 24 of the Directive. According to its assessment 
it is neither necessary nor appropriate to include the special regulations on disqualification due to conflicts of interest. 

The  Directive  requires  Member  States  to  ensure  that  contracting  authorities  prevent,  identify  and  remedy  conflicts  of  interest  that  arise 
during  the  contract.  There  is  no  requirement  for  this  to  be  done  in  the  provisions  of  the  procurement  legislation.  The  situations  of 

98 

 
 
prohibited conflicts of interest that are identified in the Directive must be cared for in national law.  

Quite irrespective of the regulation on conflicts of interest of the Directive, it should be pointed out, that each contracting authority shall 
observe the basic principles of public procurement, i.a. the principle of equality, which includes a ban on taking irrelevant considerations. 
It  follows  from  this  principle  that  the  authority  is  obliged  to  control  whether  there  are  any  conflicts  of  interest  and  to  take  appropriate 
measures to prevent and detect such conflicts and to resolve them (cf C-538/123, eViglio, p. 42 and 47).  

The Administrative Procedure Act (1986:223), section 11, regulates the different legal bases for disqualification. Section 12 regulates the 
legal consequences of  such disqualification. 

The  Administrative  rules  of  disqualification  mentioned  above  are  applicable  to  a  large  extent  in  public  procurement  and  are  more 
comprehensive than the provisions on conflicts of interest in the Directives.  

The Swedish government has decided that conflict of interest issues should not be regulated differently in procurement legislation than in 
other  respects  governed  by  the  Administrative  Procedure  Act.  Such  legislation  could  cause  uncertainty  to  the  contracting  authorities 
applying the provisions, since the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act are subsidiary to the inconsistent provisions of any other 
law or regulation (section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act). It would, inter alia, seem unclear if the rules only supplement or if they 
completely replace the Administrative rules of disqualification. 

Municipal authorities are not obliged to apply the Administrative Procedure Act, but they should apply the rules on conflicts of interest set 
out  in  the  Local  Government  Act  (1991:900).  The  provisions  are  adapted  to  local  conditions  and  do  not  completely  correspond  to  the 
Administrative  regulations,  but  when  it  comes  to  procurement  it  meets  the  requirements  of  the  Directives  on  the  provisions  that  are 
focused  on  the  'financial,  economic  or  other  personal  interest  which  might  be  perceived  to  compromise  their  impartiality  and 
independence in the context of the procurement procedure'. 

Accordingly,  the  Swedish  government  has  concluded  that  no  additional  provisions  on  conflicts  of  interest  in  the  public  procurement 

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legislation are necessary to fulfil the purpose of the corresponding provisions of the Directive. 

UK  On conflicts of interest 

The  UK  government  has  implemented  The  Public  Contracts  Regulations  2015,  which  provides  for  'appropriate  measures  to  effectively 
prevent, identify and remedy conflicts of interest'. 

The UK Government implemented the new procurement Directive in February 2015, 14 months earlier than the transposition deadline of 
April 2016, in order to realise as early as possible the economic benefits of the new improved rules regime. 

Part  24  of  the  Public  Contracts  Regulations  2015  imposes  a  legally  binding  duty  on  UK  contracting  authorities  to  take  appropriate 
measures to effectively prevent, identify and remedy conflicts of interest. It also includes the definition of conflicts of interest, please see:  

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2015/102/contents/made 

The Regulation was subject to public consultation. 

The UK government also supported the implementation  of the new rules with the roll-out of a blended learning package, including free 
face-to-face training for 4000 procurement staff, an e-learning package, and various on-line guidance resources, see: 

https://www.gov.uk/guidance/transposing-eu-procurement-directives    

To  tackle  conflicts  of  interest,  the  Government  has  placed  a  general  obligation  on  all  Government  officials  to  use  public  money 
responsibly. All Government departments must ensure that funds raised using powers agreed by Parliament are well managed and spent 
wisely.  In  HMRC  for  example,  the  Commercial  Directorate’s  guidelines  set  out  procurement  activities,  checks  and  procedures,  and 
relevant  financial  delegated  authorisation  limits.  Specifically,  guidance  was  provided  with  examples  of  good  practice,  such  as  where 
declarations are signed by procurement staff to confirm they have no outside interests with bidders. The regulations were not gold-plated 

100 

 
 
with prescriptive rules on how contracting authorities should prevent conflicts of interest in order to avoid ‘box-ticking’ and encourage an 
outcomes-based approach. 

The UK also submitted a paper on managing conflicts of interest to COCOLAF which gives further detail on measures undertaken. 

General information on UK public procurement policy 

In  terms  of  sourcing  public  sector  goods  and  services,  the  Crown  Commercial  Service  (CCS)  is  a  Cabinet  Office  government  agency 
which  provides  a central procurement service. It brings  together policy, advice and  direct  buying, providing commercial services to the 
public sector and saving money for the taxpayer. 

In addition to expertise of CCS within individual Government departments, there are specialised procurement personnel or units to help 
identify and remedy conflicts of interest. In some departments, for example, HMRC (Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, which deals 
with VAT and customs), there is an internal Commercial Directorate which provides comprehensive procurement, contract  management 
and commercial risk management services. In other departments, CCS provides a fully managed commercial service and therefore do not 
require an internal commercial function. 

Information  on  all  procurement  spending  over  £25,000  is  published  on  www.data.gov.uk.  Information  on  all  awarded  contracts  over 
£10,000 is published on the Contracts Finder website, a government portal which allows applicants to search for tenders for government 
contracts worth between £10,000 - £100,000. Awarded contracts of any value may also be published here. 

All  commercial  opportunities  worth  more  than  £10,000  are  advertised  on  TED/Contract  Finder/OJEU  and  all  appropriate  commercial 
publications (e.g. trade journals).  

More information on the UK Government’s procurement process is available via GOV.UK website: 

https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/cabinet-office/about/procurement 

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https://www.gov.uk/guidance/public-sector-procurement-policy   

102 

 
 
 
 
2.2. 

Increasing detection: results and open issues 

2.2.1.  Expenditure 

On the expenditure side, the fluctuation in the number of fraudulent irregularities reported over the last five years is difficult to interpret. However, apart 
from the years 2011 and 2012, the amounts concerned have remained relatively stable. This might reflect the fact that most spending programmes are 
multi-annual and the level of detection follows their cyclical nature. 

The role of Managing and Paying Authorities in detecting fraud has grown since 2012 and should be further enhanced in the coming years, pursuant to 
the new regulatory framework for the period 2014-2020. 

Fraud  detection  practices  still  differ  between  Member  States  and  the  Commission  is  concerned  about  the  low  number  of  potentially  fraudulent 
irregularities  reported  by  some  countries.  However,  the  number  of  Member  States  which  report  no,  or  very  few,  fraudulent  cases  has  fallen  in  recent 
years. The Commission will continue to provide guidelines to improve the convergence of national systems and to raise awareness of fraud, in order to 
protect the EU’s financial interests more efficiently. 

In  2014,  Italy  and  Romania  were  the  most  effective  countries  in  detecting  potential  fraud  in  the  agriculture  sector37.  Germany,  Poland  and  the Czech 
Republic were the most effective in the cohesion policy area. 

Overall, Germany was the most effective Member State regarding the detection of fraud.  

Recommendation 3 

As some Member States continue to report a very low number of fraudulent irregularities, the Commission recommends strengthening their 
work in relation to detecting and/or reporting fraud, in particular, as they have not reported any over the last five years: 

- 

in the area of agriculture: Slovakia and Finland. 

37  

Hungary reported the highest number of fraudulent irregularities uncovered during the course of an OLAF investigation. 

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- 

in the area of cohesion policy: Denmark and Luxembourg.  

The Commission takes note of progress made in reporting by some Member States, such as France and Spain in the cohesion policy area, but 
believes that there is still considerable room for improvement. 

Although  satisfactory,  the  quality  of  the  reported  irregularities  could  be  further  improved,  in  particular  in  relation  to  the  classification  of  fraudulent 
irregularities and the timing of reporting, as highlighted by the analysis of the Member States’ replies to the questionnaire. 

Given the new rules on the reporting of irregularities currently being adopted, and the remaining areas for  improvement identified by the Commission 
following  analysis  of  the  information  provided  by  the  Member  States,  the  Commission  will  prepare  a  working  document  on  the  practicalities  of  the 
reporting of irregularities, in close cooperation with the Member States. 

BE  No information provided. 

BG  No information provided. 

CZ  Regarding  the  number  of  reported  fraudulent  irregularities  in  expenditures,  the  Czech  Republic  reported  3  established  fraud  cases  and  43 
suspected fraud cases in 2015. The Czech AFCOS team  collaborated with all involved offices so as to improve the auditors’ and inspectors’ 
knowledge  of  frauds  and  suspected  activities  in  order  to  develop  efficient  detection  of  suspicious  activities  and  legal  classification  of  these 
activities (conference of the Czech AFCOS department in September 2015). 

The Customs Administration of the Czech Republic actively uses the RIF system, which is also used by the other EU members. In 2015, the 
Customs  Administration of the Czech Republic processed 5 records into the RIF system. This  means that  the Customs Administration made 
2000 records of documents in total. These records included our own cases which had been detected in the Czech Republic, as well as a response 

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to external records that had been inserted into the RIF system (evaluation and feedback). The external records inserted into the RIF system are 
subsequently used for assessment and creation of risk profiles. These risk profiles are regularly internally evaluated, and the risk assessment is 
inserted back into the RIF system.  

DK  All irregularities are reported to OLAF in accordance with the applicable rules. The management authority has an internal procedure for the use 

of reports to ensure uniform access for treatment of Regional-Fund and Social-Fund cases. 

On  the  basis  of  the  anti-fraud  action  plan  drawn  up  by  the  management  authority  in  accordance  with  Article 125(4)(c)  of  Regulation  (EU) 
No 1303/2013, a large number of preventive measures were launched to fight fraud. An anti-fraud policy was drawn up. Among other things, it 
contains contact details for the management authority that can be used when fraud is suspected. The policy is distributed to all beneficiaries in 
connection with EU co-financing contracts and can also be found on the Danish Business Authority’s website  www.regionalt.dk. In order to 
strengthen  the  measures  for  the  detection  of  fraud,  a  presentation  was  held  for  all  the  case  handlers  at  the  management  authority  and  the 
certifying authority, to raise awareness about signs of fraud. In addition, an organisation was established within the management authority that 
will ensure an enhanced and consistent evaluation of cases of suspected fraud. 

Preventive administrative checks relating to fraud have been organised. Among other things, a chief auditor has been appointed responsible for 
monitoring the administrative capacities and the inspection environment in the projects. Furthermore, all applications for payment are signed 
and in that way approved by the auditor before evaluation of the case can proceed and payment can be made by the management authority.  

In addition, the management authority’s on-the-spot checks are organised by random project selection combined with risk-based selection on the 
basis of identified irregularities. 

In 2015, a case of suspected fraud was reported that was handed over to SØIK (the Public Prosecutor for Serious Economic and International 
Crime). 

The Danish Business Authority continues to be of the view that Regional-Fund projects and Social-Fund projects in Denmark have a very low 

105 

 
 
rate of fraudulent irregularity. 

DE  Not applicable to Germany. 

EE 

IE 

EL 

Estonia’s statistics on fraudulent irregularities are average. There were new cases of suspected fraud and the cases were finalised with a court 
decision  in  2015.  Estonia  detects,  investigates  and  solves  cases  because  they  have  close  and  effective  cooperation  with  the  investigative 
institutions. 

No information provided. 

ENTITY 

The EDEL, through system checks carried out on managing authorities and intermediate management bodies, gives 
recommendations/instructions for the effective operation of the management and control system, which, inter alia, are 
aimed at the timely prevention and/or the effective detection of cases of fraud. In addition, if checks on transactions 
identify a similar suspicion, the EDEL communicates the results of the audit report to the Public Administration 
Inspectorate and, where appropriate, to the public prosecution authorities. 

As regards the communication of cases of fraud or suspected fraud, 40 cases of suspected fraud have been communicated 
to OLAF since 2012. In addition, training courses on fraud-related issues are being offered to the managing authorities. 

Ministry of 
Finance / State 
General 
Accounts Office / 
Fiscal Audit 
Committee 
(EDEL) / 
Directorate for 
Planning and 
Assessment of 

106 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Audits  

Ministry of 
Rural 
Development 
and Food / 
Directorate for 
Legislative 
Initiative and 
Management of 
Infringements  

In seeking to safeguard the Community’s financial interests and ensure the verification of compliance with the conditions 
for granting aid, the departments of the Ministry of Rural Development and Food and the Paying Agency have adopted a 
series of measures and control procedures (e.g. administrative, on-site and central administrative computerised checks, 
including cross-checks) which contribute positively to the detection and prevention of irregularities and also the timely 
detection of cases of fraud before payment of the aid. 

Those checks have identified a number of irregularities and cases of suspected fraud. 

In particular, as regards agricultural funds: 

 

 

 

 

in 2011, nine cases of suspected fraud were communicated to OLAF  
in 2012, four cases of suspected fraud were communicated to OLAF  
in 2013, 21 cases of suspected fraud and one case of fraud were communicated to OLAF  
in 2014, 13 cases of suspected fraud were communicated to OLAF 

ES  One of the possible areas that could be improved in terms of detecting and reporting suspected instances of fraud stems from  the fact that the 
national  authorities  responsible  for  reporting  irregularities  do  not  always  have  clear  criteria  that  they  can  use  to  determine  whether  an 
irregularity actually constitutes fraud or what the impact will be if the irregularity is classified as fraud. Nor is a system available for them to 
consult in order to resolve any queries they may have.  

In this regard, and as a specific measure that builds on the efforts already made by Spain in this area in relation to cohesion policy, we would 
highlight  the  creation  of  the  Advisory  Council  for  Preventing  and  Combating  EU-related  Fraud.  One  of  the  specific  tasks  entrusted  to  the 

107 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Council is to 'Help the National Anti-Fraud Coordination Service set out general criteria and establish procedures for handling specific cases 
of suspected fraud, as well as the procedures to be followed in each case depending on the particular circumstances in each individual case'. As 
a result, this should provide a framework for drawing up recommendations or circulars - based on the OLAF guidelines - to send to managing, 
certifying  and  audit  authorities  so  as  to  clearly  define  when  an  irregularity  constitutes  fraud,  what  the  impact  will  be  if  the  irregularity  is 
classified as fraud and what procedure to follow in these cases. Furthermore, a system is due to be set up so that the authorities mentioned above 
can ask questions and receive answers regarding specific cases where they are unsure if the case in question constitutes fraud. 

At the time of writing, the National Anti-Fraud Coordination Service is drafting a briefing note regarding the reporting of suspected fraud in 
cases where legal proceedings are on-going.  

FR 

In response to recommendation No 3 on the notification of fraudulent irregularity and proposing further efforts in the detection and/or reporting 
of fraud, the French authorities have carried out the following measures: 

The  Inter-ministerial Commission  for  the  Coordination  of  Inspections  [Commission interministérielle  de  coordination  des contrôles  - 
CICC], France’s audit authority for European structural funds, continued in 2015 the efforts already begun in 2014: 

Thus, the CICC drew attention to the requirements related to the reporting of irregularities and allegations of fraud to OLAF in the handbook 
that  it  draws  up  every  year  for  its  operations  controllers  and  that  acts  as  their  instructions  for  the  smooth  progress  of  their  operational 
inspections.  

In  addition,  as  part  of  the  training  seminar  for  operations  controllers,  CICC  invited  an  OLAF  representative  to  come  and  present  the 
Commission’s  expectations  with  respect  to  the  fight  against  fraud  under  the  Structural  Funds.  There  was  also  a  presentation  on  the  tools 
developed by OLAF for the detection of fraud during an audit mission. The supporting materials were widely distributed. 

-  Moreover,  the  Inter-ministerial  Commission  for  the  Coordination  of  Inspections  of  the  operations  of  the  European  Agricultural 
Guarantee  Funds  (EAGF)  and  of  their  beneficiaries  and  those  liable  to  make  payment  into  them  [Commission  interministérielle  de 

108 

 
 
coordination des contrôles sur les opérations et les bénéficiaires et redevables relevant des fonds communautaires agricoles de garantie 
(CICC- FEAGA)] is engaged in an on-going process to improve the detection and prevention of fraud. In particular, it does this by means of a 
risk  assessment  that  it  conducts  every  year  and  submits  to  the  European  Commission  and  that  influences  the  EAGF  ex-post  inspection 
programme  that  is  set  up  each  year.  This  risk  assessment  takes  into  account  several  parameters,  including  the  agricultural  aid  measures 
themselves, the amount of aid paid, and the outcome of previous checks. It helps to better predict and target cases where irregularities are most 
likely, thereby improving fraud prevention and detection. In addition, as part of their training, newcomers to the ‘Mission COSA’ inspection 
body (COSA - contrôle des opérations dans le secteur agricole - ‘operations in the agricultural sector’), to which CICC-FEAGA entrusts most of 
the ex-post inspections, are made aware of the prevention and detection of ‘suspected fraud’. The suspected fraud is then reported to the Public 
Prosecutor  under  Article 40  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  who  alone  in  France  is  authorised  to  describe  something  as  a  fraudulent 
irregularity. 

Acting as a cross-fund coordination authority, the Office of the Commissioner General for Territorial Equality [Commissariat Général à 
l’Egalité des Territoires - CGET] and the European Commission set up training sessions on the ARACHNE tool for the French authorities. 
During these sessions, the different features of the tool were presented to the authorities that would decide to make use of it. The sessions also 
provided the chance to discuss and raise awareness about the procedures to be set up in order to detect and prevent fraud. In this context, there 
were  regular  exchanges  with  the  European  Commission.  Finally,  they  were  sent  working  documents  and  a  list  of  questions,  covering  in 
particular subjects such as the content of ARACHNE, but also fraud detection. The CICC (CICC-Structural Fund and CICC-FEAGA) also 
took part in training courses organised by the Commission in order to master the tools that it had developed and that it proposes Member States 
should  use,  in  particular  for  the  ARACHNE  system  and  the  IMS  (Irregularity  Management  System)  registration  mechanism.  In  both  cases, 
members of the CICC administrative team with responsibility for these issues took part in the training.  

Since  2013,  the  CGET  has  set  up  an  inter-fund  working  group  on  the  regulation,  management  and  monitoring  of  European  Structural  and 
Investment Funds, with a view to securing the management of European funds in France. In this context, several working documents have been 
produced  that  provide  tools  to  assist  the  implementation  and  securing  of  the  funds  in  France.  The  CGET  is  also  leading  a  ‘Preventing  and 
fighting  fraud’  working  group  in  connection  with  the  management  of  European  programmes.  This  group  makes  it  possible to  reconsider  the 

109 

 
 
regulatory requirements to which the management authorities must adhere. But the group also helps to circulate exchanges and best practices on 
the measures to be implemented regarding the detection and reporting of fraud. Where needed, the CGET takes part in network meetings on the 
subject of fighting and preventing fraud. This largely helps to raise the awareness of the management authorities about related issues. 

The CGET also supports the management authorities by responding directly to their requests (internal inspection, conflict of interest, whistle-
blowers...) but also by drawing up documents to which they can refer, such as: the note recommending use of the ARACHNE tool.  
Finally, the national technical assistance programme 2014-2020 plans to fund training courses for programme management authorities, 
certification authorities and audit authorities on different areas, including public procurement. In this context, a national-level working group 
was set up in order to organise the implementation of these training courses, in particular in the following areas: 

 

 

the applicable rules on public procurement; 

the main irregularities detected and the financial corrections to be applied; 

  practical inspection exercises on public procurement. 

Finally, and more generally, in 2015 the agricultural aid-paying agencies (FranceAgriMer - FAM, Services and Payment Agency [Agence de 
services  et  de  paiement  -  ASP])  bolstered  their  internal  inspection  action  plan  with  anti-fraud  actions  (awareness-raising  actions  for  agents, 
educational activities: analysis of fraud cases encountered and exchanges on these cases...).  

More  specifically  for  FAM,  a  memorandum  stressing  the  sensitive  nature  of  the  subject  of  ‘fraud’,  and  describing  the  action  plan  to  be 
deployed, was circulated to all staff on 16 June 2015. It was accompanied by a memorandum on the establishment’s internal inspection policy 
and by an introduction to the elements of the plan.  

Between now and the end of the first quarter of 2016, the specific actions thus identified will all have been taken. 

In  addition,  the  administrative  simplification  actions  taken  in  France  led  to  the  adoption  of  Order  No 2015-507  of  7 May  2015 
adjusting  professional  secrecy  in  information  exchange  between  administrative  authorities  and  ending  the  production  of  supporting 

110 

 
 
documents38:  From  now  on,  the  authorities  will  share  with  each  other  the  information  that  they  used  to  request  repeatedly  from 
companies/applicants/beneficiaries for every procedure. 

A decree  will lay down the list  of documents that  the companies/applicants/beneficiaries  will thus no longer have  to  produce.  Thanks to  the 
order, data exchange between authorities will make it possible, for example, to simplify the formalities for public procurement, aid files, grant 
applications, authorisations and declarations of various activities, agricultural procedures, environmental procedures, customs procedures, and 
procedures related to employment and vocational training.  

As  a  result,  the  work  undertaken  by  the  Secretariat-General  for  the  Modernisation of  Public  Action  makes  it  possible  to  progress quickly  in 
making available information that is held by the administration and that was hitherto provided by the applicant/beneficiary.  

This opening up of data between authorities significantly reduces the risks of fraud where the situation of the applicant and compliance 
with  eligibility  criteria  are  concerned:  The  information,  data,  or  document  directly  exchanged  between  the  authorities  in  a  secure  system 
cannot be altered or modified to obtain a special advantage. 

A decree laying down the list of supporting documents concerned should be published by the end of 2015. 

FranceAgriMer (with SG-MAP) has experimented with the system since the first workshops, and is including the data or documents necessary 

38 Order No 2015-507 of 7 May 2015 thus amends Article 16a of the law of 12 April 2000. 

1°  A  sentence  that  reads  as  follows  has  been  added  to  the  first  paragraph  of  section  I:  ‘The  administrative  authorities  that  receive  this  information  or  data  may  not,  as  regards  companies,  invoke 
professional secrecy once they are conducting duties that have been entrusted to them by legal or regulatory provisions and are authorised to have access to information or data exchanged in this way.’ 

2  After section II, there follows a section III, worded as follows: ‘III - When the information or data necessary to deal with a request made by a company, or the declaration made by a company, can be 
obtained directly from another administrative authority under the conditions laid down in I, a declaration on the honour of the company representative concerning the accuracy of the declared information 
replaces the production of supporting documents. A decree lays down the list of documents that the companies no longer have to produce.’ 

111 

 
 
                                                 
 
to support the aid files as they become available. 

HR  As regards reporting on fraudulent irregularities, the Republic of Croatia fulfills its obligation by having all necessary tools and mechanisms in 
place (legal basis /institutional set up, guidelines, procedures, regular meetings /round tables of the AFCOS Network, continuous maintaining of 
the AFIS-IMS). 

In order to update and improve the Guidelines for managing irregularities and fraud in the context of EU Structural Instruments environment 
(programming period 2007  – 2013) from 17 April 2014, SCIF drafted Guidelines for managing irregularities and fraud in the context of EU 
Structural  Instruments  environment  (programming  period  2007  –  2013)  and  for  ESI  Funds  (programming  period  2014  –  2020)  (Guidelines). 
Guidelines were adopted by Minister of Finance on 13 August 2015 and are integrated within Manuals of procedure of Irregularity Reporting 
System bodies. 

Guidelines describe the methodology for comprehensive process of irregularity management, particularly for prevention, detection, treatment 
and reporting of irregularities and provide with the more detailed instructions for activities of irregularity management process and examples of 
the cases thereof. The Guidelines are targeted at development of coherent practice in application of legal framework and further clarifications 
for handling fraud cases within projects financed from EU Structural Instruments environment (programming period 2007 – 2013) and for ESI 
Funds (programming period 2014 – 2020). 

IT 

No information provided. 

CY  No information provided. 

LV   No information provided. 

LT  No information provided. 

LU  Luxembourg is committed to the effective protection of the EU's financial interests. The recommendations to the Commission’s  report on the 
protection of the EU’s financial interests have therefore been discussed with all the relevant stakeholders and are going to be taken into account 

112 

 
 
in  the  national  anti-fraud  strategy  that  Luxembourg  is  currently  devising.  A  first  meeting  that  brought  together  all  the  relevant  authorities 
involved in managing EU funds had taken place. Luxembourg intends to have such meetings on a regular basis in order to have a structured 
coordination. 

HU  No information provided. 

MT  No information provided. 

NL  Not applicable in Netherlands. 

AT  No information provided 

PL  No information provided. 

PT  Although this recommendation is not addressed to Portugal, the national authorities wish to highlight the efforts made to step up efforts to detect 

and report cases of irregularities with indications of fraud.  

Last year there was an increase in the reporting of irregularities with indications of fraud by Portugal in the area of cohesion policy (including 
the EFF). Between the first and third quarters of 2015, 19 cases out of a total of 233 were reported, which is far higher than in previous years. 

PP 2007 - 2014 Indications of Fraud 

Figures  from 
Public 
Prosecutor's 

CF 

ERDF 

EFF 

IF 

ESF 

GRAND 

113 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Office 

2010 

2011 

2012 

2013 

2014 

2015 

1 

1 

1 

1 

7 

9 

1 

6 

8 

Grand Total 

1 

TOTAL 

2 

4 

4 

2 

7 

4 

2 

6 

19 

* 

16 

34 

*includes  3 
investigation) 

cases 

involving  81  projects 

(OLAF 

The ESF continues to play a bigger role - it was the main source of detection at management level. Besides stepping up administrative and on-
the-spot checks, cross-checks of suppliers also made a major contribution.  

114 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In  this  connection,  it  is  worth  stressing  the  importance  of  closer  cooperation  between  the  authorities  where  beneficiaries  and  suppliers  are 
located in several Member States. The legal and institutional structures have been set up to that end by designating the respective AFCOS.  

RO  No information provided. 

SI 

Slovenia routinely reports irregularities, some of which are also labelled as cases of suspected fraud. Slovenia as a country is not exposed in this 
respect.  We  therefore take  the  view  that  a reply  is  not  needed,  since  we  comply  with  the  recommendation  on  reporting  and  classification  of 
reports. 

SK  As  of  1  January  2015,  the  Slovak  Republic  has  changed  the  methodology  for  the  moment  of  determining  the  IRQ2  and  IRQ3  qualification, 
which was done through a more detailed definition of the first administrative and judicial finding (PACA) in the context of the Slovak Republic, 
which  was  reflected  in  the  higher  number  of  identified  fraudulent  irregularities  and,  proportionally,  the  increased  number  of  fraudulent 
irregularities reported to the Commission, both in the agricultural and structural measures. 

The Agricultural Paying Agency also changed the methodology for reporting irregularities qualified as being IRQ3. Therefore, it has amended 
its internal methodological procedures, i.e. it updated the provisions on the identification, processing and reporting of irregularities qualified as 
being IRQ3, within the paying agency, in its Directive No 5/2015 of 13 August 2015 on addressing the irregularities and the recovery of funds. 
This Directive provides the basic framework for addressing the problem. The procedures for addressing the issues of detection and subsequent 
treatment  of  irregularities  qualified  as  being  IRQ3  have  also  been  updated  in  the  Manual  of  15  September  2015  of  the  Payments  Section’s 
Division of Irregularities and Debts Administration of the Agricultural Paying Agency. 

In 2015, according to the latest data, the competent departments registered in the AGIS/MFR 44 cases of irregularities qualified as being IRQ3, 
in the total granted amount of  EUR 2 998 396.74. 

The  methodology  developed  by  the  Deloitte  Audit  s. r. o.  company  to  address  the  issue  of  fraud  and  fraudulent  conduct  has  the  following 

115 

 
 
breakdown: 

01 The methodology for the detection and prevention of fraud 2015 PPA 

02 Guides for the fraud risk self-assessment, including a matrix of fraud risks 2015 PPA 

03 The fraud risks matrix – Instructions for the completion of the form 

04 Matrix of fraud risks 

05 The list of recommendations for the prevention of fraud 

The  methodology  has  been  drawn  up  following  the  implementation  contract  No  OVO1-2015-000121-063  “Provision  of  professional 
consultancy services for the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development of the Slovak Republic in its capacity as managing authority for the 
Programme of Rural Development of the Slovak Republic 2014-2020, and the services related to the accreditation of the Agricultural Paying 
Agency  for  new  funding  and  procedures  within  the  framework  of  the  European  Agricultural  Fund  for  Rural  Development  and  the European 
Agricultural  Guarantee  Fund”,  in  particular,  point  6  of  Annex  1  to  the  Contract    –  “The  risk  analysis  with  a  focus  on  the  prevention  of 
fraudulent conduct in project and non-project funding and proposal for the methodology for fraud prevention and detection”. 

By 23 November 2015, the competent PPA service, i.e. Internal Control Department, reported 9 cases of suspected fraud to the law-enforcement 
authorities of the Slovak Republic. 

FI 

In 2015, MAVI took a number of measures to prevent and fight more efficiently against fraud. It has drawn up a fraud control plan, organised 
training on fraud control and reporting within the Paying Agency and for all the entities handling delegated tasks, identified fraud risks related 
to the different aid schemes managed by it, and actively distributed anti-fraud information to all the entities carrying out Paying Agency tasks. 
MAVI/Finland  considers  that  effective  national  legislation  and  effective  management  and  control  systems  in  combination  with  the  local 
knowledge of regional authorities have produced and will continue to produce results specifically in the field of fraud control. 

116 

 
 
SE  No information provided. 

UK  No information provided. 

2.2.2.  Revenue: Updating control strategies 

In  2014,  on  the  revenue  side,  the  number  of  detected  irregularities  and,  in  particular,  the  level  of  the  established  amounts  increased  significantly  in 
comparison with previous years. Considering the risks of cross-border fraud, the Commission believes that close cooperation between the Member States 
and exchange of information beyond the borders for purposes of customs controls is to be welcomed. Exchange of information on customs transactions, 
economic  operators  or  debts  should  ensure  that  all  customs  transactions  and  economic  operators  are  included  in  the  populations  for  post-clearance 
controls, regardless of the place of physical importation of goods, or the place where the economic operator is located. Information received from other 
Member  States  should  be  integral  to  risk  management  and  supplement  the  national  populations  used  for  risk  management  purposes.  Absence  of  such 
cooperation might result in financial liability in the area of Traditional Own Resources. 

Based on the figures for 2014, it can be concluded that cases of fraud and irregularities are detected much more often after the clearance of goods. It 
should be kept in mind that a combination of different control strategies is required. However, post-clearance controls are the most effective method of 
detection, both in terms of the number of cases detected and in terms of established amounts. Controls at the time of clearance of goods and inspections 
carried out by anti-fraud services are crucial to the detection of certain types of existing fraud and new types of fraud. 

Furthermore,  mutual  assistance  notices  issued  following  Joint  Customs  Operations  conducted  by  OLAF  are  an  important  source  of  information  for 
detection of irregularities in transactions involving certain types of goods. 

Recommendation 4 

To  fight  customs  fraud,  Member  States  are  invited  to  inform  the  Commission  of  the  measures  taken  to  strengthen  cooperation  in  order  to 
ensure that all transactions, and all economic operators, are included in the population for post-clearance controls, irrespective of whether or 

117 

 
 
not the importer is located in the Member State of the physical importation.  

Considering the decreasing number of customs controls at the time of clearance, Member States are invited to exchange experiences where 
customs authorities were particularly successful in detecting fraud or irregularities at the time of clearance.  

BE 

The Belgian customs authorities are not taking any specific additional measures based on Commission Recommendation 4. Belgian customs 
already complies with the recommendation and is the number one in Europe in terms of the GDP to duties collected ratio. 

 Moreover, Belgian customs regrets the fact that financial responsibility is being increasingly shifted onto the Member States, especially in the 
area  of  post-clearance  controls.    In  the  case  of  post-clearance  controls  in  particular,  it  is  difficult  to  recover  the  duties  at  issue,  often  after 
lengthy fraud investigations.  Yet the Commission invariably takes the date when the fraud is discovered as the date when the duties fall due 
and  calculates  the  late-payment  interest  from  that  date.    In  so  doing,  the  Commission  bases  itself  on  the  ‘own  resources’  regulation.    That 
regulation is unfair to Member States in several respects and very counter-productive as regards fraud investigations.  The Commission has 
been repeatedly reminded of this by various Member States, but the initiatives it takes with a view to amending the ‘own resources’ regulation 
fail to address this problem.    

BG 

In  order  to  strengthen  the  cooperation  in  the  fight  against  fraud,  customs  officers  are  using  ‘MAB  mail’  more  frequently  to  exchange 
information on specific cases and investigations, as well as when subsequent inspections are required. 

Analysis  is  conducted  and  risk  areas  and  economic  operators  are  defined  for  the  purposes  of  carrying  out  subsequent  control  on 
economic operators  conducting  customs  activities  within  the  country.  Subsequent  inspections  are  done  for  economic  operators  that  are  not 
established within the territory of the country but are registered for VAT purposes and conduct customs activities in the country. If necessary, 
additional information is requested, under international cooperation, from the country where the company is established. 

Economic  operators  were  selected  for  inspection  after  the  participation  of  experts  from  the  Bulgarian  customs  administration  in  a 
joint EU/Turkey  mission  on  administrative  cooperation,  as  well  as  in  response  to  alerts  received  via  the  Anti-Fraud  Information  System 

118 

 
 
(AFIS) from the European Anti-Fraud Office. 

In  most  cases,  identified  risks  are  confirmed  by  subsequent  control.  The  selection  of  economic  operators  for  subsequent  control  is  made 
entirely within the productive environment of the integrated module ‘Subsequent Control’. The module analyses and assesses vast amounts of 
data, improves the analysis and risk assessment process for the selection of the economic operators to be subjected to control, and automates 
and supports the activities of the specialised subsequent control units in compliance with customs legislation. 

CZ 

In  2015  the  Customs  Administration  of  the  Czech  Republic  was  very  active  in  sharing  information  between  EU  Member  States  regarding 
conducted  inspections  following  the  release  of  goods.  In  terms  of  the  Customs  2000  Programme,  the  members  of  the  Czech  Customs 
Administration  visited  a  few  countries  (Finland,  Lithuania  and  Germany)  in  order  to  develop  cooperation  between  these  offices  and  share 
information concerning the latest trends in frauds. Bilateral meetings with representatives from Slovakia take place every year. Since 2014, the 
new  expert  group  for  exchanging  information  in  the  field  of  inspections  following  the  release  of  goods  has  been  established  amongst  the 
Visegrad  Group  (Czech  Republic,  Slovakia,  Poland  and  Hungary).  The  main  topic  of  the  meetings  is  the  mutual  presentation  of  the  most 
interesting fraud cases that are detected during the inspections following the release of goods. The aforementioned sharing of information is 
used for establishing whether similar fraud cases were committed in other countries. In many cases in which inspections were conducted on a 
suspected party, customs debt was assessed, fined, and as a result the suspected party relocated its business activities into other EU member 
states. 

Regarding the identification of significant risk during inspections following the release of goods (provided that there is a possibility to create 
negative fiscal impact on other EU member states) the risk is reported to other EU members by issuing either a RIF or via an AM report to the 
OLAF office. 

DK 

 As regards the first part of Recommendation 4 on ‘measures taken to strengthen cooperation in order to ensure that all transactions, and all 
economic operators, are included in the populations for post-clearance controls, irrespective of whether or not the importer is located in the 
Member  State  of  the  physical  importation.  The  authorities  are  invited  to  exchange  experiences  from  cases  where  they  were  particularly 

119 

 
 
successful in detecting fraud or irregularities,’ Denmark has the following comment: 

In  the  Danish  Customs  and  Tax  Administration’s  overall  risk  assessment  of  businesses,  one  of  the  risk  parameters  must  be  designed 
specifically to  ensure  that the control  also includes  all  transactions and economic operators. For businesses that  have  a single authorisation 
relating to the local clearance procedure, a control plan is prepared between the Member States concerned.  

As regards the second part of Recommendation 4, which refers to examples concerning physical checks, the following should be noted:  

In  relation  to  physical  checks  (at  the  border),  the  Danish  Customs  and  Tax  Administration  has  encountered  a  variety  of  cases  of  under-
invoicing, where the import was stopped at the border after the Customs and Tax Administration imposed safety conditions before releasing 
the goods. In two cases, the businesses’ first attempts at importing were stopped as a result of risk profiles established in the national risk-
analysis system, whereby considerable losses were prevented (the received contract revealed plans for up to 700-1 500 imported containers per 
year). In the course of January 2016, risk-profiles will be established re: Chapters 61, 62 and 64 in relation to under-invoicing. 

DE 

The customs administration currently uses the IT tool ATLAS (Automated  Tariff and Local Customs Clearance System)  for the automated 
clearance and recording of trade with third countries. This IT tool is used to handle all customs clearance operations required by customs law 
(both standard and simplified procedures). All the particulars required for the relevant customs procedures are entered in ATLAS and available 
for  the  purposes  of  computerised  clearance.  This  means  that  the  IT  application  contains  complete  data  on  all  transactions  and  economic 
operators, irrespective of whether or not the importer is located in the Member State of importation. 

The  customs  administration  uses  the  clearance  data  stored  in  ATLAS  for  the  computerised,  risk-oriented  selection  of  operations  for  post-
clearance controls. 

It  should  also  be  noted  that  both  Regulation  (EC)  No 515/97  and  the  various  EU  regulations  in  the  milk  and  sugar  market  organisations 
provide for requests for information and spontaneous reports, enhancing the exchange of information between Member States.  

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EE 

Estonia did not add any functionality to the SELECT system neither changed our working order or legislation in 2015. 

IE 

In  Ireland,  electronic  systems  are  used  to  target  risk  at  pre-clearance,  clearance  and  post  clearance.   All  consignments  are  subjected  to 
electronic  risk  analysis  which  targets  all  forms  of  risk  including  safety  and  security,  financial,  prohibitions  and  restrictions,  IPR,  fraud 
etc.  Where a consignment is selected for intervention, it will be controlled either on arrival, at clearance or in a post clearance setting. We 
review our procedures on an on-going basis 

Counterfeit goods can pose risks to consumers’ health and safety and undermine legitimate businesses. In 2015, Revenue interventions under 
the EU Regulation 608/2013 resulted in 2713 detentions involving 138,182 items. The estimated market value of the genuine equivalents of 
the detained items was €2.25 million. In addition in 9 joint enforcement operations with the Garda NBCI targeting criminal gangs, importing 
commercial  volumes  of  counterfeit  goods  resulted  in  high  volume  seizures  with  an  estimated  genuine  equivalent  value  of  €3.2m. 
Investigations are on-going in each of the cases.  The main categories of goods seized for intellectual property rights infringements included 
consumer products such as handbags, sports shoes, watches, mobile phones and phone accessories. Furthermore, 2 significant consignments of 
mis-declared  perfumes  destined  for  the  Christmas  markets  were  seized  to  the  value  of  €10m.  Cigarettes  would  also  be  major  value  items 
seized by Customs each year. For 2015 we seized 68M cigarettes at €36M in street price. 

EL 

ENTITY 

of 
/ 

Ministry 
Finance 
Secretariat-
for 
General 
Public Revenue / 
Directorate-

The relevant customs administration directorate has noted the following: 

With regard to post-clearance controls, all transactions and economic operators have been included and the relevant 
profiles imported in the national risk analysis system. In addition, information obtained from different sources and also 
from the authorities of other Member States is being processed and sufficient checks are being carried out by customs 

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General 
Customs 
Excise  

for 
and 

officials. 

Another circular and a manual concerning the performance of post-clearance controls have been issued and distributed 
to all customs officials, in order to enhance their efficiency and effectiveness in the performance of their duties. 

Since October 2015, three additional mobile teams have been activated, dealing inter alia with post-clearance controls 
throughout Greece. 

Despite their short operational period, they have achieved truly remarkable results.  

For example, following a coordinated operation between two mobile groups acting in Northern Greece and Athens, a 
criminal network of illegal bottling and marketing of alcoholic beverages was dismantled. 

Last year, the Greek customs authorities discovered and seized the following goods at the time of customs clearance: 

cigarettes declared as wooden furniture, shoes, ornaments, plastic items, sheets, towels, clothes, etc.; 

counterfeit goods in containers, mixed with other goods or sent by post; 

CITES products (clothes made of North American lynx/bobcat/Lynx rufus fur/skin) hidden in containers between other 
goods; 

More  CITES  products  (handbags  made  of  python  leather  and  garments  made  of  North  American  lynx/bobcat/Lynx 
rufus fur/skin) were also found in the boot of a car traveller. They were also found to be transported as goods in the 
luggage of airline passengers.  

ES 

The  system  of  post-clearance  checks  in  Spain  does  not  include  any  restrictions  as  regards  the  operators  on  which  checks  can  be  made. 
Specifically,  there  are  no  legal  or  administrative  rules  excluding  operators  established  in  other  Member  States,  nor  are  there  any  special 

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programmes of checks on operators that are not established in Spain. As such, the same risk factors apply to all operators, although the level of 
activity  of  operators  not  established  in  Spain  is  obviously  lower,  meaning  that  the  likelihood  of  them  being  subject  to  checks  is  also 
significantly lower. 

Furthermore,  Regulation  No  515/97  on  mutual  assistance  in  customs  matters  is  applied.  In  particular,  regular  contact  is  made  with  our 
neighbouring countries (France and Portugal), which account for the vast majority of activity carried out in Spain by operators established in 
other Member States.  

Regarding  the  decreasing  number  of  checks  made  at  the  time  of  clearance,  Spain  is  developing  IT  systems  to  automatically  approve  the 
certificates required for the import of goods. This does not mean that fewer checks will be made, but rather that checks on documents will be 
replaced by prior approval using the IT system. 

The Spanish government uses the RIF application to report any detected incidents when these are considered significant. 

Regarding the recommendation to provide examples of successful operations at the time of clearance, the Commission is aware of the fraud 
and irregularity cases sent through the OWNRES system, and there is nothing particular to highlight in this regard. 

FR 

In response to recommendation 7, put forward by the European Commission in its 2012 Annual Report, the French authorities explained in 
great  detail  the  inspections  policy  of  the  General  Directorate  of  Customs  and  Indirect  Taxes  (Direction  générale  des  douanes  et  des  droits 
indirects- DGDDI) and the system that had been put in place as a result. The structure of the organisation that was presented, and which is 
based on a targeted approach to inspections and preliminary risk assessment, did not undergo any major changes in 2015. The ex ante controls 
are indeed very targeted, but  they are supplemented by an  ex  post  control  system on two levels:  Level 1  ex post within 4  months after  the 
release warrant of the goods, and ex post 2 focused on the fight against fraud over the whole non-time-barred period.  

The French customs authorities are involved in informing the other Member States following the detection of fraud and irregularities. 

Thus, as regards revenues, the DGDDI reports a growing number of cases of fraud compared to cases of irregularity. This shows - on the one 

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hand  -  the  dynamism  of  the  customs  authorities  in  terms  of  controls  and  observation.  On  the  other  hand,  the  trend  reversal  is  the  result  of 
improved classification of reported cases after the distribution of new instructions and the reorganisation of the case-reporting system. Wilful 
intent  has  not  always  been  determined  when  the  initial  notification  document  is  drawn  up,  and  it  is  this  document  that  is  used  to  decide 
whether a case should be reported via OWNRES and the information updated. The services in charge of entering fraud and irregularity reports 
in OWNRES-Web pay particular attention to this issue.  

The appearance of new instructions on RIF (Risk Information Form) messages and on mutual assistance cases in 2015 made it possible to raise 
awareness among the departments once again about this issue of information transmission between Member States. Several examples of files 
can be brought up to show the involvement of the French customs authorities: 

as part of the SNAKE joint customs operation (JCO), the transmission of RIF messages during investigations made it possible to inform the 
other Member States of the risk of fraud shifting to other entry points to the EU and to observe operations designed to reduce the customs 
value;  

as part of an investigation into under-valuing, the department observed that part of the consignment cleared customs in Belgium under customs 
procedure 42  and  was  then  brought  into  France.  The  department  then  communicated  its  findings  to  the  Belgian  services  so  that  they  could 
correct the differential in customs duties for procedure 42 declarations submitted in Belgium. 

More  generally,  it  has  been  specified  that  risks  associated  with  the  protection  of  financial  interests  (PFI)  are  part  of  the  targeting 
criteria and inspection criteria for customs clearance operations by the DGDDI. 

The table below presents an evaluation of it for the past four years: 

Years 

2012 

2013 

2014 

2015 

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Declarations  made  by  foreign  importers  targeted  for  PFI  risks 
(Criteria used 1+2+3) 

106061 

97582 

99539 

112524 

Numbers  of  foreign  importers  placed  under  control  ex  ante  out  of 
the PFI-risk SADs (criteria used 1+2+3+4) 

1569 

2081 

630 

627 

Rate of foreign importers submitting in France placed under control 
ex ante out of the PFI-risk SADs (criteria used 1+2+3+4) 

1.47 % 

2.13 % 

0.63 % 

0.56 % 

The decrease in the rate of those placed under control can be explained by the reform and streamlining of the policy on placing declarations 
under control. 

The study of the targeting of these declarations shows that a very large proportion were selected according to criteria related to procedure 42 
and also to RIFs. 

This shows that Community cooperation has been taken into account in the control of these operators. 

Consultation of the control dossiers concerning these selected declarations shows that they led to documentary and physical checks. 

With regard to prospects for improvement, two factors must be taken into account: 

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in the future, and in particular with a view to the establishment of the Union Customs Code (UCC), it would appear necessary to have access 
to the declarations of economic operators clearing customs in another Member State. At the same time, it seems feasible to make available to 
other EU customs authorities the data on declarations made in France by the operators of other Member States; 

The DGDDI is currently experimenting with a new national framework for analysing operator risk, an ex-ante - but also an ex-post - control-
guidance  tool.  Unlike  the  previous  framework,  this  new  framework  takes  into  account  foreign  operators  clearing  customs  in  France.  It  is 
therefore  a  significant  focus  for  improving  control  guidance,  in  particular  for  high-risk  foreign  operators.  The  possibility  of  exchanging 
information with other customs authorities based on the results of the risk analysis using this framework could be considered, provided that it 
was legally possible. 

HR 

The Republic of Croatia is actively involved in specific working groups of the European Commission through its representatives. Experience 
gained  from  participation  is  taken  into  account  in  order  to  review  the  control  strategies  to  ensure  that  well-targeted,  risk-based  customs 
controls  are  in  place  which  make  possible  efficient  detection  of  fraudulent  import  operations. In  that  sense, Customs  Administration  of  the 
Republic of Croatia (CA) applies EU and national risk indicators. 

In relation to post-clearance controls, CA follows the Annual plan for controls that includes the list of companies that are at risk. Additionally, 
everyday customs work in the field brings a great number of new risk information. 

It  is  noticeable  that  information  and  data  gained  through  mutual  assistance  are  of  help  and  that  mutual  assistance  makes  it  possible  to 
effectively detect fraudulent import operations. For example, such operations are often conducted during the Joint Customs Operations. 

Furthermore,  CA  participated  in  the  project  with  the  Republic  of  Austria  under  the  title  Harmonization  of  the  Croatian  Customs 
Administration with the standards, organization and operational methodology of EU post-clearance control and audit. The results of the 
project (a number of documents were drafted such as regulations and guidelines in order to help and improve everyday work of customs 
officers) are taken into account when planning and executing operations. 

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IT 

Contribution of the Customs and Monopolies Agency 

In recommendation No 4 OLAF asks the Member States to adopt cooperation instruments in order to ensure that all transactions and economic 
operators  are  included  in  post-clearance  checks,  irrespective  of  whether  or  not  the  importer  is  located  in  the  Member  State  of  'physical' 
importation of the goods. Furthermore, in view of the decreasing number of checks on clearance, the Member States are also encouraged to 
exchange  experiences  about  discovering  fraud  at  the  time  of  customs  clearance.  In  general,  the  Customs  and  Monopolies  Agency  has  a 
computer system that processes all customs declarations, which, in turn, are transmitted electronically. This also allows the extensive mapping 
of the operators involved in the exchanges. 

The  computerised  management  of  customs  declarations  has  been  implemented  for  several  years  as  part  of  the  ‘Customs  One-Stop  Shop’ 
adopted  under  national  laws,  with  checks  of  documents,  certificates  etc.  coming  from  other  administrations  and  annexed  to  the  customs 
declarations  as  required  for  customs  clearance.  The  on-line  dialogue  between  the  national  administrations  involved  in  customs  clearance 
makes it possible to verify ex ante the authenticity and the existence of the documents annexed to the customs declarations,  download them 
and,  in  cases  of  selection  for  checks  also  involving  other  authorities  (e.g.  health,  veterinary,  CITES,  etc.),  to  coordinate  the  checks  on  the 
different actors by concentrating them at the time of customs clearance. 

Other  instruments  of  cooperation  between  bodies  of  the  financial  administration  (Customs  and  Monopolies  Agency,  the  Revenue  Agency, 
Guardia  di  Finanza)  have  been  in  place  for  some  time  in  the  context  of  a  ‘control  booth’  to  coordinate  their  actions,  mainly  through  post-
clearance checks on samples of taxpayers analysed with respect to their tax fraud/customs risk.  

A further specific anti-fraud cooperation instrument for assessing and addressing the risks of money laundering and financing of international 
terrorism and any other related risks has been implemented through a specific Memorandum of Understanding with the Financial Intelligence 
Unit (FIU). This also allows activities aimed at sharing methodological and analytical tools for the identification of schemes and indicators of 
anomalies in cash movements, for the control of which the Agency is responsible. 

Most of the other cooperation activities with the police and the judiciary form part of the activities carried out by the customs offices with 

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powers of criminal investigation, in order to reinforce anti-fraud protection both in analyses aimed at planning and carrying out on-line checks 
and in post-clearance checks. The customs control system is based on risk analysis: every customs declaration presented is processed by the 
system and examined by the Customs Control Circuit, which allocates it to one of the five control channels on the basis of thousands of risk 
profiles associated with one or more aspects of the declaration (e.g. origin, provenance, goods, packaging, etc.):  

RED CHANNEL – physical check on goods providing also for documentary checks (VM);  

ORANGE CHANNEL - scanner check (X-ray) on vehicles and containers providing also for documentary checks and the possibility, in the 
event of anomalies, of a physical check on the goods (CS); 

YELLOW CHANNEL - documentary check providing also for the possibility of further checks in the event of anomalies (CD); 

GREEN CHANNEL - automated check allowing for immediate release of the goods once the system checks have been passed (CA); 

BLUE  CHANNEL  -  post-clearance  check  with  review  of  one  or  more  transactions  carried  out  by  one  or  more  higher-risk  operators.  The 
BLUE CHANNEL is selected as a centralised post-clearance tool based on the risk analyses. The risk analyses therefore include both objective 
profiles  (e.g.  anti-dumping  duties,  preferences,  postal  and  courier  consignments,  etc.)  and  subjective  profiles  (operators  active  in  these  risk 
areas, operators indicated on the basis of the local, national and Community risk analyses). 

This selection system has been equipped with a sophisticated system of monitoring and an e-mail alert system that sends a message directly to 
the office where the declaration is registered. The Blue Channel monitoring system gives, virtually in real time (timing deferred by one day) an 
overview of the review activities, indicating the execution time (in days) from the beginning to the conclusion of the individual review activity 
as well as the result of the check and the increase in duties established. 

The  definition  of  the  risk  profiles  for  the  selection  of  checks  both  on  clearance  and  post-clearance  is  also  based  on  constant  intelligence 
activities to gather, link and assess information obtained from the analysis of transaction flows and from numerous national  and Community 
databases. A cyclical process of assessment/updating of risk profiles based on the results of checks, all of which are recorded in the system, 

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allows the system to 'learn' from the results obtained in order to enhance the effectiveness and selection criteria for the checks and gradually 
reduce the number of checks carried out. The subjective profiles (white/blacklist of operators engaging in transactions) reduce or increase the 
risk, depending also on the status of the economic operator (e.g. authorised economic operator, approved exporter, etc.). Management of the 
profiles  is  also  based  on  information  received  from  EC  services  (e.g.  RIF,  INF-AM,  EUROFISC  reports)  and  that  obtained  under  mutual 
assistance between customs administrations (e.g. Reg. No 515/97, Naples II Convention) and, more generally, from other qualified sources, 
including those abroad, on the basis of a relevant legal framework. 

This brief description of the customs control system highlights the double approach - operation/operator — on the basis of which the actions 
are decided. These actions cover the whole range available, taking into account the numerous objective and subjective profiles entered in the 
system and the numerous arrangements for the exchange of data, documents and information between national and foreign administrations and 
bodies. 

Based on the brief and general description of the customs control system, below is a summary of certain information relating to the specific 
instruments being used to implement the recommendations: 

adopt cooperation instruments to ensure that all transactions and economic operators are included in post-clearance checks, irrespective of 
whether or not the importer is located in the Member State of 'physical' importation of the goods 

The Agency ensures this protection through cooperation with other institutions and bodies. See answers on: 

Cooperation with other national bodies 

Control booth with Revenue Agency and Guardia di Finanza 

Cooperation with monetary authority and FIUs 

Cooperation with police and judiciary 

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Cooperation with other national administrations in the framework of the Customs One-Stop Shop 

Cooperation with foreign bodies  

European Commission (RIF, INF-AM, EUROFISC) 

Other European customs administrations or third countries with which there are agreements on mutual administrative assistance 

Results: 

In particular, the positive results obtained following implementation of the instruments mentioned above include the results in the following 
sectors at high risk of customs/tax fraud: 

Undue use of Reg. 42 (release of goods for free circulation without payment of VAT on imports of goods stated as being destined for another 
Member State). 

Undue use of Reg. 45 (release of goods for free circulation without payment of VAT on import of goods stated as being destined for the tax 
warehouse procedure) 

Undue use of the VAT ceiling (carousel fraud and missing traders) 

exchange experience on the discovery of fraud at the time of clearance 

The activities to combat fraud detrimental to the EU budget include the results obtained through the massive efforts to counter under-invoicing 
by false indication of customs value. This under-invoicing is often combined with the production of false documentation when presenting the 
customs declaration, with evident effects in terms of evasion, duties and VAT on imports. It also affects national VAT and income tax on the 

130 

 
 
 
subsequent 'internal' movements of the goods, often instrumented through movements not declared for tax purposes. Significant results have 
been obtained from the activities to combat under-invoicing carried out by the Agency, in particular since 2005 (raising of the average values 
declared for imports per kg of goods, especially in the sectors and countries at most risk of fraud (clothing, footwear, bags, etc. imported from 
China), which, between 2003 and 2013, rose from around EUR 5.3 to around EUR 21.52 without there being any particular inflationary factor 
in China-Italy trade in the period in question. The following are the direct results of this increase: 

an increase of around EUR 5.3 billion in revenue from customs duty and VAT between 2005 and Jan/June 2013, in the clothing, footwear and 
bag sectors alone, and only concerning goods from China; 

release for consumption of goods on which a triple amount of duties and VAT have been paid on importation. 

In addition to the above results, the following data should also be considered: 

1 - seizure of around 53.6 million items (clothing, pairs of shoes, bags, etc.) in the period 2005-2013; 

2 - in 2009-2013, 632 cases of reported smuggling submitted to the judicial authorities; 

3 - additional duties established in reports on smuggling by under-invoicing from 2005 to 2013, of around EUR 412 million including penalty 
payments. 

The Italian customs’ experiences in combating under-invoicing were brought to the attention of the EU bodies and other Member States in all 
relevant forums in order to promote cooperation and exchange of information so as to prevent, or at least limit, a shift to other Community 
customs offices of under-invoiced import flows which, as far as could be ascertained, are often managed by the same organisations working 
with bases in several Member States 

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Contribution by the Guardia di Finanza 

Recommendation  No  4  refers  to  post-clearance  controls,  i.e.  to  inspection  activities  designed  to  verify  the  overall  legality  of  customs 
transactions, implemented not only at the stage of entry or exit of the goods into/from the national territory but also subsequently at economic 
operators engaged in foreign trade. 

In  this  respect,  in  accordance  with  Article  2  of  Legislative  Decree  No  68  of  19  March  2001,  the  Guardia  di  Finanza  are  also  required  to 
prevent, investigate and prosecute infringements of 'customs duty, border duty and other own resources and expenditure from the EU budget'. 
To  this  end,  without  prejudice  to  the  provisions  of  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code  and  other  applicable  laws,  the  Guardia  di  Finanza  avail 
themselves  of  the  rights  and  powers  provided  for  by  Articles  32  and  33  of  Presidential  Decree  No  600/1973  and  Articles  51  and  52  of 
Presidential Decree No 633/1972. 

In addition, specific responsibilities in the area of customs are assigned to the Guardia di Finanza under Article 64(3) of Decree Law No 331 
of 30 August 1993, enacted by Law No 427 of 29 October 1993. This provision, in line with the equivalent provisions on value added tax and 
the  assessment  of  income  tax,  states  that  'the  Guardia  di  Finanza  cooperates  with  the  customs  offices  in  identifying  and  acquiring  useful 
elements  for  the  checks  carried  out  by  the  offices,  in  accordance  with  the  legislation  and  with  the  powers  provided  for  in  Article11(9)  of 
Legislative Decree No 374 of 8 November 1990’. 

Under the latter provision, the Guardia di Finanza cooperates by carrying out 'full or partial checks for reviews of several customs operations'. 

In 2014-2015, 99 'customs checks' and 286 'customs controls' were carried out. 

These activities are additional to the set of measures put in place by the Guardia di Finanza in the customs sector: by way of an example, in 
2015 the Guardia carried out 8 411 measures. 5 885 persons were reported to the judicial authorities and 8 455 infringements were found. 

In  the  same  section,  470  investigations  delegated  by  the  public  prosecutors  were  carried  out,  including  international  investigations,  378  of 

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which have already been concluded. 

CY 

The Department of Customs and Excise of the Republic of Cyprus has an effective system of risk assessment in place which allows carrying 
out checks targeted at high – risk imports at the time of clearance. 

More specifically computerized Risk Analysis on imported goods at the time of clearance is performed in three ways: 

Weight based. 

Specific profiles. 

Random selection. 

Additionally,  there  are  five  (5)  standard  criteria  used,  namely,  importer,  clearing  agent,  country  of  origin,  commodity  code,  and  procedure 
code. Moreover local criteria are used as well, established and fed into the system by the Intelligence Unit Based at Customs Headquarters. 

Also all incoming intelligence is evaluated and utilized: 

For the mapping out of the Departments policy and priorities 

To modulate the active risk profiles or to create new risk profiles in the electronic risk analysis system 

To disseminate alert messages to the customs officers and other competent authorities local and foreign. 

There is a process in which information is continuously updated, analyzed, acted upon and reviewed according to the feedback. 

Moreover, and based on the powers vested by the Customs Code Law, 94(I) of 2004, the officers of Department of Customs and Excise of the 
Republic of Cyprus, can perform at any time, checks on any goods imported, exported and or transited to, from or through the Republic of 

133 

 
 
Cyprus, irrespective of whether or not the importer is located in the Republic of Cyprus. 

Also  the  Department  of  Customs  and  Excise  of  the  Republic  of  Cyprus,  upon  written  requests  from  any  Member  State,  based  on  Mutual 
Assistance  Request,  the  Naples  II  Convention,  and  the  Regulation  515/97,  can  perform  on  the  spot  checks  and  post  clearance  checks  on 
entities located in the Republic of Cyprus.   

Below please find the relevant articles of the Customs Code Law 94 (I) of 2004: 

Article 4 (1) - Under the exclusive competence of the Department of Customs and Excise are the following: 

(i)  the  implementation  of  the  provisions  of  this  Law,  of  the  Customs  Community  Code  and  its  Implementing  Provisions,  the  Cyprus  and 
corresponding  relevant  Community  Legislation  which  relates  to  taxes,  the  assessment  and  collection  of  duties,  taxes  and  other  charges 
imposed  according  to  the  above  legislation,  the  administration  of  the  intelligence  system  as  well  as  the  exchange  and  processing  of 
intelligence, retrieved from an electronic system or any other means, which refer to matters of its competence; 

(ii) The implementation of any legislation that has been vested in it. 

(2) The Department of Customs and Excise is also competent, through its Director, at the points of entry and exit, at the customs yards and in 
all customs territory, to protect public health and society, examine people, baggage, goods and means of transport. This includes the tracking 
down  of  illegal  movement  of  narcotics,  psychotropic  or  toxic  substances,  weapons,  explosives,  nuclear  material,  funds  from  economic 
criminal activities, cultural goods, pirated and counterfeit goods, obscene goods. It is also competent for customs and other contraventions and 
criminal offences which refer to transportation, fishing, protection of the environment, movement of goods of intellectual property, wild fauna 
and flora, chemical precursors, as well as any other customs  or other contraventions and criminal offences which are not mentioned in this 
subsection  and  are  verified  during  the  checks  which  have  been  assigned  to  it  by  the  specific  provisions  of  the  Community  and  the  Cyprus 
Legislation, International Treaties and Agreements for the protection of the interests of the Republic and of the European Union. 

(3)  Under  the  exclusive  competence  of  the  Department  of  Customs  and  Excise  is  the  supervision  and  the  control  of  the  places  which  are 

134 

 
 
recognized as customs yards and temporary storage facilities or have been approved as free zones or free warehouses. 

(4) The Department of Customs and Excise is cooperating with  other authorities of the Republic and outside the Republic in  matters of its 
competence and offers its assistance to them. Police officers have the duty to provide any assistance for the implementation of the customs and 
the other legislation. 

(5) The Director and  or the authorized officers shall  not  be liable to any control by a private security or guarding  firm of a place  which is 
subject to customs control, provided their capacity is declared and their identification card is shown. 

Article 75 – Power of entry, visit, inspection and control. 

At any time authorized officers may enter and visit any place subject to customs supervision, such as customs warehouses, temporary storage 
facilities, free zones, free warehouses and any other facilities for inspection and control of the goods placed therein, and for exercising controls 
of the records, books, documents or particulars, even in electronic form, of any natural or legal person. 

Article 76 – Power of exercising controls. 

Authorized  officers,  in  order  to  verify  or  secure  compliance  with  the  customs  or  the  other  legislation,  may  exercise  controls  on  all  goods 
related  to  the  entry  or  importation,  exit  or  exportation,  or  movement  or  deposit  thereof  in  places  of  business  activities,  as  well  as  on  any 
records, books, documents or particulars, even in electronic form, of any natural or legal person: 

Provided that the authorized officers have the power to demand any information related to the above  

Article 77 – Power to use appropriate scientific means for control purposes.  

Authorized  officers,  on  carrying  out  control  to  verify  or  secure  compliance  with  the  customs  or  the  other  legislation,  may  use  any  proper 
scientific or other mechanical means or other apparatus.  

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Article 79 - Power to enter and search premises. 

(1) In order to exercise any of the powers vested in him under the customs legislation or the other legislation, any authorized officer may, at 
any reasonable time, enter any premises, other than a dwelling house or place, and inspect and search these premises as well  as any goods, 
records, books, documents or particulars, even in electronic form, therein. 

 (2) Notwithstanding any other power vested by the customs legislation or the other legislation, where there are reasonable grounds to suspect 
that in any premises, other than a dwelling house or place, an offence is being committed or has been committed or is about to be committed 
which is provided for by the customs or the other legislation or that evidence of commission or probable commission of such offence will be 
found, any authorized officer may enter these premises, other than a dwelling house or place, and search it. 

 (3) Without prejudice to the foregoing subsection or to any other power vested under the customs and the other legislation, when a judge of a 
District  Court is satisfied by an oath statement in  writing of any authorized officer that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that in  any 
premises, including a dwelling house or place, an offence is being committed or has been committed or is about to be committed which is 
provided for by the customs or the other legislation or that evidence of commission or probable commission of such offence will be found, the 
judge may by warrant under his hand authorize that officer or any other person named in the warrant to enter and search any premises or place, 
as well as a dwelling house or place, so named.  

(4) Every search warrant must bear the signature of the judge who issues it, the date and time issued, as well as the judge’s assurance that he 
has been reasonably satisfied for the need to issue the warrant . 

(5) The authorized officer who has the power to search under the provisions of subsections (1) and (2) or has been authorized by a warrant 
under subsection (3) to carry out the search may - 

(a) detain, seize as liable to forfeiture, or remove any goods or detain or seize any records, books, documents or particulars, even in electronic 
form, which were found in the premises and for which he has reasonable grounds to believe that they can be used as evidence for the purpose 

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of any court proceedings; and or  

(b) Search or have of any person searched who is in the premises for which he reasonably believes that he possesses such goods or records, 
books, documents or particulars  

       Provided that a person shall be searched by an authorized officer of the same gender  

(6) The authorized officer or any other person having the power under this section to enter any premises may use such force as may be deemed 
reasonably necessary for exercising this power  

Article 80 - Power to search premises where anything liable to forfeiture is lying therein.  

(1)  Without  prejudice  to  any  other  power  conferred  by  this  Law,  where  there  are  reasonable  grounds  to  suspect  that  any  goods  liable  to 
forfeiture under the customs or the other legislation or any records, book, document or particular, even in electronic form, which is related to 
the commission of an offence under the customs and the other legislation are kept or concealed in any premises, other than a dwelling house or 
place, any authorized officer may enter these premises, at any time, whether by day or night, and examine, search for, detain, seize as liable to 
forfeiture  or  remove  any  such  goods  and  or  detain  or  seize  any  records,  books,  documents  or  particulars,  even  in  electronic  form,  and  in 
addition, so far as is reasonably necessary for the purpose of such entry, to break open any door, window or container and force and remove 
any other impediment or obstruction  

(2) The provisions of section 79(3) to (6) shall apply mutatis mutandis for the purposes of this section  

Considering the decreasing number of customs controls at the time of clearance, Member States are invited to exchange experiences 
where customs authorities were particularly successful in detecting fraud or irregularities at the time of clearance. 

On  7th  of  April  2015,  a  container  arrived  at  Limassol  Port,  from  Singapore,  declared  to  contain  artificial  grass.  Based  on  risk  analysis  and 
information  received,  it  was  decided  that  the  container  should  be  physically  examined.  From  the  physical  examination  conducted  it  was 

137 

 
 
established that the container was full of cigarettes (6.162.000 of Richman and 3.440.000 of Rocco) which were seized as liable to forfeiture.   

The case is a classic example where OLAF (the administration that gave the information) and the Customs Administration of the Republic of 
Cyprus, cooperated closely and had a successful result.       

LV  

National  Customs  Board  of  the  State  Revenue  Service  (hereafter-  National  Customs  Board)  ensures  post-clearance  control  based  on  the 
received  risk  information  and  also  performing  random  controls.  In  cases  when  risk  information  has  been  received  or  identified  during  risk 
analysis of the transactions, National Customs Board informs Tax Control Board about identified risk and asks to evaluate identified risk and 
perform risk reducing measures (e.g. customs audit or thematically controls for selected transactions). This ensures more closely cooperation 
and  risk  information  exchange  at  the  moment  of  clearance  and  post-clearance  time  and  helps  to  ensure  that  all  transactions  and  economic 
operators are included in post-clearance control framework. 

At the time  of clearance customs control is  performed based on centralised automatic risk profiles and identified  risks from  local (manual) 
analysis (customs officer at the customs control point). In cases when at the moment of clearance revenue risk has been identified, the National 
Customs Board informs the Tax Control Board.  

Although in cases when the Tax Control Board identifies risks that can be reduced or identified only at the clearance moment, the Tax Control 
Board  sends  this  risk  information  to  the  National  Customs  Board  and  the  National  Customs  Board  ensures  risk  necessary  actions  for 
identification  and  reducing  of  the  risk.  E.g.  the  Tax  Control  Board  has  sent  the  risk  information  about  possible  fraud  with  revenue  when 
fictitious export has been done for high valuable goods, e.g. jewelleries. National Customs Board based on received information about goods 
and  companies  created  automated  risk  profile.  During  the  action  of  profile  customs  officers  ensured  that  the  goods  declared  in  the  export 
declaration really has left the territory of European Union. In close cooperation between customs and tax authorities risk of tax evasion has 
been reduced. Also on the bases of the received risk information risk reducing measures can be performed for import procedures, e.g. if the 
Tax Control Department sent the information that the economic operator has been included in the list of fraudulent companies, the National 
Customs  Board  performs  all  necessary  action  to  ensure  that  during  the  clearance  moment  a  centralised  automated  risk  profile  hit`s  the 

138 

 
 
company and additional control measures has been ensured. 

LT  We  would  point  out  that  Lithuanian  Customs  (hereinafter  "Customs"),  in  the  course  of  its  duties,  makes  use  of  the  RIKS3.AUDIT  risk 
assessment and control system, which covers all persons who have filed at least one customs declaration with Customs, regardless of in which 
EU  Member  State  they  are  established.  The  system  evaluates  individuals  according  to  a  number  of  risk  areas  and  characteristics  (e.g.  risk 
analysis based on individuals or the goods they are transporting) and, taking into account risk rating and likelihood, ranks  them on a list of 
individuals  subject  to  post-clearance  control.  Individuals  are  selected  for  checks  even  where  the  requisite  additional  information  has  been 
received  from  other  information  sources  –  Lithuanian  control  bodies,  the  Commission  services  and  the  competent  authorities  of  other  EU 
Member States, account also being taken of the information provided by RIKS3.AUDIT (albeit with low risk ratings). 

If post-clearance identity checks call for an assessment of risk areas relating to the customs declarations filed by the persons in question with 
the customs authorities of other Member States, the customs administrations of those other EU Member States are contacted where necessary 
and a request made for the necessary additional information, or they are informed about the irregularities (infringements) identified, which the 
customs authorities of the other EU Member States may be unaware of (as the records on the person being checked are kept in Lithuania). 

Furthermore, in 2014 the project "Use of data mining to identify customs risks and detect possible violations within the competence of customs 
authorities" got under way, having been launched by Customs. The aim of this project is to share experience between Member State customs 
authorities using "data mining" methods to identify possible infringements (including those relating to taxes). 

Data mining methods are successfully applied to anything arousing suspicion (declarations, goods, people) during post-clearance checks, e.g. 
historical  information  that  has  been  collected  on  identified  tax  infringements  is  used  to  identify  possible  infringements  of  a  similar  nature. 
Customs  also  use  data  mining  methods  to  plan  post-clearance  checks  on  the  codes,  origin  or  value  of  goods  that  may  have  been  declared 
incorrectly. 

This  project  was  launched  with  a  view  to  setting  up  similar  joint  models  in  other Member  States,  and  brings  together  representatives  from 
Austria, Belgium the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, France, Finland, Hungary and Germany, as 

139 

 
 
LU 

HU 

well as representatives from the European Commission's Directorate-General for Taxation and Tax Union (DG TAXUD), the Commission's 
Joint Research Centre (Ispra), the University of Vilnius and OLAF. 

A start is now being made on creating experimental international data mining models designed to identify cases where the origin of goods may 
have  been  wrongly  declared  during  execution  of  the  procedure  for  the  free  circulation  of  goods.  A  related  set  of  import  data  from  four 
countries (Lithuania, Belgium, the Netherlands and Poland) is used for the experimental model, with plans to develop this to include data from 
other countries. 

Luxembourg is committed to the effective protection of the EU's financial interests. The recommendations to the Commission’s report on the 
protection of the EU’s financial interests have therefore been discussed with all the relevant stakeholders and will be taken into account in the 
national anti-fraud strategy that Luxembourg is currently devising. A first meeting that brought together all the relevant authorities involved in 
managing EU funds had taken place. Luxembourg intends to have such meetings on a regular basis in order to have a structured coordination. 

In  terms  of  strengthening  cooperation  among  Member  States,  the  Hungarian  Customs  Authority  has  concluded  bilateral  agreements  with 
several EU Member States on the mutual exchange of data on customs procedures for the purpose of customs checks. Bilateral agreements are 
currently in force between the Hungarian Customs Authority and the customs authorities of Slovakia, Romania, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, 
Poland and Croatia.  

Pursuant to these agreements, the customs authority of the other Member State provides data on customs procedures initiated in that Member 
State by traders established in Hungary, and the Hungarian customs authority regularly provides data on customs procedures in Hungary by 
traders established in the other Member State, by way of spontaneous assistance.  

The data files are subjected to a comprehensive analysis by the central risk analysis body every year, and if a risk is identified, it is flagged up 
for customs administration and auditing purposes. Relevant information on the risk is also provided to the customs authority  of the foreign 
country within the context of spontaneous assistance. 

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The Hungarian customs authority is also pursuing cooperation within the EU and national legislative frameworks and, with their authorisation, 
with its partners in Hungary, in order to support customs audit activities. 

As  regards  pooling  experience  among  Member  States,  the  Visegrád  (V4)  countries  (the  Czech  Republic,  Poland,  Hungary  and  Slovakia) 
exchange experience through regional cooperation in customs matters at annual meetings of the heads of their respective customs authorities 
or through discussions or data exchanges within expert groups. At meetings of customs chiefs, the experience gained in the previous year is 
evaluated and decisions taken on tasks for the following year.  

Questions related to the under-invoicing of textile products and footwear from the Far East and the mitigation of fraud committed with excise 
goods are permanent topics of discussion. This type of fraud accounts for a very significant shortfall in those countries’ budget revenue. The 
results of working group on the customs value of goods imported from Asia can be considered a success.  

In  line  with  the  Visegrád  Four’s  Trenčín  Declaration,  concluded  as  a  collective  step  against  under-invoicing,  the  V4  undertook  to  apply  a 
threshold price (established on the basis of reliable prices at EU28 level determined by the AREP Automated Monitoring Tool (AMT)) to a 
certain number of products by 1 January 2016. The efficiency and effectiveness of cooperation will then be assessed in  discussions among 
experts. 

The first meeting of the V4 working group dealing with follow-up customs checks was organised in Prague in December 2014 at the initiative 
of  the  Czech  Customs  Authority.  The  working  group  recommended  that  V4  customs  authorities  strengthen  follow-up  customs  checks  by 
sharing risk information, best practices and legal interpretations. In December 2015 the Slovak customs authority organised a meeting on items 
on the agenda of the previous meeting of the working group. The sub-working group worked efficiently and productively. The next meeting 
will take place at the end of 2016 according to schedule. 

In  addition,  it  should  be  pointed  out  that  in  previous  years,  OLAF  held  meetings  of  a  working  group  on  judicial  review  (customs  law)  – 
Judicial Appeals in Connection with OLAF Customs Investigations), which also considered issues of customs law falling within the scope of 
follow-up  checks  and  cases  and  judicial  review  proceedings  relating  to  investigations  conducted  or  coordinated  by  OLAF.  The  Hungarian 

141 

 
 
customs authority supports OLAF’s initiative and urges that similar meetings also be organised in future. 

MT 

The strengthening of cooperation in customs matters is not a unilateral action of any member state.  It takes place within mutually established 
legal  parameters  that  are  equally  applicable  to  all  Member  States,  such  as  the  Authorised  Economic  Operator  concept,  where  the  status  of 
authorised economic operator granted by one Member State is recognised by the other Member States for the purposes of risk profiling and 
liability for controls. 

Post-clearance controls take place on the basis of declarations submitted via an Economic Operators Identification and Registration System 
(EORI),  wherein  access  is  currently  limited  to  locally  VAT-registered  operators.   However,  where  investigations  are  required  that  involve 
operators  who  are  not  located  in  Malta,  effective  use  is  made  of  legal  tools  for  mutual  assistance  between  different  MS  customs 
administrations, such as Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 and Naples II Convention. 

NL 

The Netherlands has been applying the possibility of post-import checks for many years. These are based on the presumed risk, i.e. checks are 
carried out after import on the basis of risk analysis and risk detection. Post-import checks are already carried out on importers which are not 
established in the Netherlands; in such cases the use of mutual assistance channels (within the meaning of Regulation 515/97) is one factor that 
comes immediately into play and is actually implemented.  

As far as the Netherlands is concerned, we can mention the customs authorities' success in tackling the import fraud involving solar panels in 
which  large  amounts  of  anti-dumping  duty  were  evaded.  The  operation  was  put  into  effect  by  a  dedicated  team  monitoring  and  directly 
flagging all relevant developments allowing new fraud methods to be quickly identified and tackled. A number of MA reports were produced 
on this based on the results of the investigation by Dutch customs. This case involved very close cooperation with OLAF. 

AT 

142 

 
 
 
PL 

In order to strengthen cooperation as recommended, the Polish Customs Service has taken the following action: 

• 
Within the Eurofisc network for the exchange of VAT information between Member States, particulars of customs declarations subject 
to procedures designated by codes 42 and 63 are exchanged and the threshold value of goods covered by a single customs declaration39 is not 
applied. 

• 
Under bilateral agreements with the Czech Republic and Slovakia (since October 2014) and with the Hungarian administration (since 
January 2015), data entered in selected boxes of the SAD, concerning every import and export clearance relating to entrepreneurs located in a 
country that is a party to the agreement, are exchanged via AFIS on a monthly basis. 

Moreover, the Customs Service is particularly interested in strengthening cooperation on the exchange of data, and in particular: 

• 
as far as the recommended cooperation within the Eurofisc information exchange network is concerned, it would like the Commission 
to take further steps to ensure that all EU Member States join the system. It is also important that information relating to containerised cargo is 
exchanged without the application of the threshold value of goods covered by a single customs declaration, 

it would like the Commission to consider the possibility of extending the system of data exchange between the Polish Customs Service 

• 
and the Visegrad countries via AFIS to include other EU Member States. 

39 Council Regulation (EU) No 904/20 I 0 of 7 October 201 0 on administrative cooperation and combating fraud in the field of value added tax (OJ L 2010, No 268, p. 1) regulates the exchange of information through Eurofisc. 
The customs procedure designated by code 42 concerns simultaneous release for consumption and for home use of goods which are the subject of VAT-exempt supply to another Member State and, where applicable, 
suspension of excise duty. The customs procedure designated by code 63  concerns reimportation with simultaneous release for free circulation and for home use of goods which are the subject of VAT-exempt supply to 
another Member State and, where applicable, suspension of excise duty 

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In view of the need to protect the financial interests of the EU, it is particularly important that the Member States in which major European 
freight-handling  ports  are  located  participate  in  the  exchange  of  information.  The  Polish  Customs  Service  is  ready  to  cooperate  on  the 
exchange of data on an equal footing with all EU Member States,  as is the case with the Visegrad countries. The Customs Service will step up 
its  efforts  to  date  to  provide  other  Member  States  with  information  on  cases  of  significant  fraud  or  irregularities  detected  at  the  time  of 
clearance.  For actions in this area, the Common Customs Risk Management System is used. 

PT 

In  2015,  with  computerised  import  declarations,  the  Tax  and  Customs  Authority  decided  to  increase  the  number  of  customs  declarations 
subject  to  automatic  analysis  and  risk  assessment  in  order  to  step  up  controls.  This  was  possible  because  from  11  July  2015  the  electronic 
import system included customs procedures 7100 and 4071 and from 30 August 2015 it included procedures 51, 53 and 91. Consequently, in 
terms of risk, these procedures are now assessed by the automatic selection system. 

As regards fraud prevention and the fight against organised crime, the Tax and Customs Authority also pointed out the following: 

In  criminal  law,  under  the  2015  Budget  Act,  legislative  changes  were  made  to  the  General  Law  on  Tax  Offences  with  the  objective  of 
punishing offences as customs crimes, regardless of the value of the tax due or the value of the goods involved in the offence, where there are 
indications of organised crime or with an international dimension, or where there are qualifying circumstances in which the legal right to be 
protected has nothing to do with asset values (for example, the CITES Convention — Protection of species). 

In addition, the special crime of smuggling of rough diamonds, punishable by three to eight years' imprisonment, was included in the measures 
to implement Council Regulation (EC) No 2368/2002 of 20 December 2002 implementing the Kimberley Process certification scheme for the 
international trade in rough diamonds, designating the Tax and Customs Authority as the EU authority for certification purposes; 

As regards money laundering (in accordance with the position of the IMF and FATF, for the purposes of stepping up the fight against money 
laundering) the proposal to  increase the minimum sentences for customs crimes  to one year and the maximum sentences to four years was 

144 

 
 
 
formalised in order to include customs crimes as crimes preceding money laundering and also for other reasons, including systematisation. 

A proposal to provide in law for a new form of customs crime, connected with the non-declaration of cash, was also formalised. 

Lastly, the proposal to establish a specific criminal category applicable to export or import goods subject to international restrictive measures 
was formalised.  

RO 

 Time of clearance: 

The Directorate-General for Customs (DGV) implements risk management with the aim of ensuring that all customs transactions are subject to 
an equivalent level of control and, at the same time, that customs fraud is prevented and combated. 

 Electronic risk analysis is one stage in processing a customs declaration, irrespective of whether the economic operator's registered office is in 
Romania or another Member State. In conducting a national risk analysis, available information and data provided by OLAF, DG TAXUD and 
other Member States are used to create national risk profiles and enter them in the electronic risk management application.  

The electronic risk analysis selects customs declarations submitted by any economic agent based on the national risk criteria entered into the 
national  risk  management  application,  called  Risk  Management  Framework  (RMF),  which  is  permanently  interconnected  with  the 
systems/applications used for processing customs declarations. 

In 2015, the electronic risk analysis implemented at the time of customs clearance selected 40 852 import customs transactions (at item level) 
carried  out  by  economic  operators  with  a  registered  office  in  a  Member  State  other  than  Romania  (e.g.  the  Netherlands,  Italy,  the  Czech 
Republic  and  the  United  Kingdom).  Of  those  import  customs  transactions,  2 566  (at  item  level)  were  selected  based  on  the  national  risk 
profiles for physical checks of the goods while on the means of transport, and 412 (at item level) were assigned, based on the 'first customs 
clearance' criterion, to the red customs clearance channel, involving a physical check of the goods. 

145 

 
 
Post-clearance control: 

Under  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  515/97  [tr.  note:  cited  as  515/1999  in  the  original]  on  mutual  assistance  between  the  administrative 
authorities  of  the  Member  States  and  cooperation  between  the  latter  and  the  Commission  to  ensure  the  correct  application  of  the  law  on 
customs and agricultural matters, requests for data and information on customs transactions in a Member State must be based on suspected 
infringements of customs law. Romania makes frequent use of this mechanism to obtain data and information that it needs in order to manage 
cases that are subject to the post-clearance verification procedure. 

A significant proportion of all post-clearance verification activities relate to the selection for post-clearance verification of transactions carried 
out in Romania following alerts received from OLAF.  

We would mention, for example, two risk profiles created based on information received from OLAF: No 115617_SIVCU_14, set up based on 
a  suspected  misdeclaration  of  the  tariff  classification  of  goods  to  avoid  customs  duties,  and  No  16954_1_SIVCU_15,  set  up  following  a 
suspected undervaluation of the goods in customs. Underlying the measure was a risk analysis carried out by OLAF based on the SURV II 
program and the ISPRA-OLAF database. 

In  2015,  DLAF  processed  a  total  of  108  AM  alert  messages  relating  to  various  OLAF  investigation  cases,  of  which  14  were  new,  and  for 
which post-release verification was performed after the Directorate-General for Customs examined the information available in the national 
database. 

In 2015, as a result of post-release checks triggered by AM messages from OLAF, 41 cases of fraud/irregularities involving amounts greater 
than  EUR 10 000  were  entered  into  the  OWNRES  online  system.  The  total  amount  in  customs,  anti-dumping  and  countervailing  duties, 
representing traditional own resources (TOR), was established at EUR 6 852 511. 

As, apart from Regulation (EC) No 515/97, there is no uniform European methodology regulating notifications of data and information from 
customs databases among Member States for preliminary risk analysis purposes, no operation carried out in another Member State has been 

146 

 
 
included in our control plans so far. The only exception is Hungary, with which Romania has concluded an information sharing protocol.  

When carrying out checks at registered offices of economic agents within their jurisdiction, verification teams check all the transactions in the 
financial and accounting records of the operator concerned that fall within the risk profile identified. 

To ensure that the financial interests of the European Union in the field of traditional own resources are protected efficiently, and taking into 
account the human, material and logistical resources available, the customs authority gives priority to the post-release verification of customs 
declarations which have been evaluated on the basis of risk analyses and which have the highest financial impact. 

SI 

Given  that  Slovenia  mostly  uses  the  simplified  declaration  procedure,  which  means  fewer  checks  during  the  clearance  stage,  there  is  more 
emphasis on post-clearance checks, specifically customs audits and post-clearance controls. 

At the beginning of every year, the Financial Administration of Slovenia, which is also the national customs authority, draws up an annual 
plan  of  inspections  and  post-clearance  controls  and  sends  it  to  financial  inspectors  to  be  implemented.  The  annual  plan  is  based  on  risk 
indicators, which in turn draw on the results of clearance checks, inspections and post-clearance controls in the previous year. A list of entities 
where risk is the highest is obtained by analysing the risk indicators. The annual plan also takes account of the risk of customs debt, which 
means  that  it  also  comprises  certain  entities  that  have  not  been  inspected  for  the  last  two  years  and  dispose  of  a  large  number  of  import 
declarations  or  were  found  to  have  committed  irregularities  in  the  past.  The  annual  plan  includes  customs  authorisations  (AEO, 
simplifications, customs warehouses, etc.). 

It includes entities established in Slovenia, but also those based in other Member States, which appear as importers in the customs clearance 
procedure  in  Slovenia.  Documentation  and  the  requisite  information  are  obtained  from  foreign  customs  declarants  during  a  post-clearance 
check,  while  administrative  documents  (e.g.  customs  record  and  decisions)  are  sent  to  their  address  abroad.  When  necessary,  data  may  be 
requested from another Member State as part of administrative assistance under Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97. 

In addition to regular inspections, there are also non-routine inspections and post-clearance controls following reports or requests from other 

147 

 
 
organisational  units  within  the  Financial  Administration;  in  fact,  these  are  post-clearance  check  requests  under  Council  Regulation  (EC) 
No 515/97  (AM-messages,  inspection  requests  from  other  Member  States)  and  inspection  requests  from  third  countries  (under  other 
international agreements). A certain number of post-clearance checks (for the customs procedure 42) is carried out on the basis of feedback 
from Eurofisc WF3 and also WF1 and WF2 as part of the information exchange programme under Council Regulation (EU) No 904/2010 on 
administrative cooperation in the field of VAT. 

We have detected irregularities in the following areas during customs clearance checks: 

– 
incorrect  tariff  code  assigned  to  goods  (e.g.  sanded  wood  of  a  thickness  exceeding  6 mm  assigned  code  4421909790  and  zero  duty 
instead of the correct code 4407994000 and a duty rate of 2.5 %; colour printing ink in plastic containers assigned code 8443999000 and zero 
duty instead of the correct code 3215900010 and a duty rate of 6.5 %; stamping foils assigned code 9612101010 with zero duty instead of the 
correct code 3212100000 and a duty rate of 6.5 %); 

– 

– 

– 

undue application of a reduced preferential duty rate (e.g. fruit from Israel); 

incorrectly declared quantity, and consequently value, of goods; 

value of goods declared too low (e.g. second-hand machinery and tools, chewing tobacco, etc.). 

SK 

In order to facilitate legitimate trade, the competent authorities across the European Union endeavour to reduce barriers in  the international 
trade  through  introducing  the  use  of  information  and  communication  technologies,  while  these  technologies  should  enable  all  customs  and 
trade transactions to be carried out in the environment of paper-free documents. The objective of introducing the modernised approach by the 
customs authorities is not only to introduce the full computerization but also to reduce the number of physical customs checks and carrying out 
them  on  the  basis  of  risk  management.  Protection  of  the  financial  interests  of  the  Union,  which  are  closely  linked  to  the  interests  of  the 
Member States, is provided in the form of checks and audits carried out after the release of the goods. Carrying out the ex-post checks shall be 
based on risk analysis, which in practice means that the entities where the check is being carried out after the release of the goods shall be 

148 

 
 
selected on the basis of a certain risk. Determining the risk areas shall be based on analytical documents that respond to trends in the area of 
frauds  and  circumvention  of  customs  and  tax  legislation.  Each  risk  area  is  further  elaborated  in  the  context  regarding  the  area  of  risk, 
description  of  frauds,  and  the  legislation  concerned.  From  the  perspective  of  efficient  conduct  of  audits  after  the  release  of  goods,  it  is 
therefore necessary to focus the attention already on the selection of subjects on the basis of determined risks, while using the databases and 
new information systems that would be able to very precisely identify risk behaviour of an entity, undervalued goods or any other risks. 

International  co-operation  between  the  V4  Countries,  which  started  in  Prague  last  December,  is  one  of  the  key  areas  for  constant 
improvements  of  control  mechanisms.  The  objective  of  the  V4  expert  group  is:  to  present  the  most  interesting  cases  of  commercial  fraud 
identified within the audits and checks already carried out after the release of the goods, as well as to exchange information about risk entities 
releasing  the  goods  in  one  Member  State  while  being  established  in  another  Member  State;  to  exchange  information  about  practical 
experiences  in  carrying  out  the  audits;  to  present  the  national  case  law  and  the  EU  case  law  related  to  the  area  concerned;  to  exchange 
experience in the so-called non-fiscal checks (e.g. dual-use goods, military material); and other related activities in other fields, such as the 
education system. The presentation is carried out, for example, by means of comparing the output performance and effectiveness of controls. 
In  this  context,  it  is  necessary  to  mention  regular  meetings  of  representatives  of  the  Financial  Directorate  of  the  Slovak  Republic  with  the 
representatives of the Customs Administration of the Czech Republic. The recent meeting took place in October 2015 and it followed long-
term  cooperation  in  the  area  of  conducting  audits  after  the  release  of  goods.  The  purpose  of  those  meetings  is  to  streamline  inspection 
activities, which results in a fiscal benefit for both the national budgets of the participating Member States and the EU budget.  In 2015, the 
last event in the calendar of the international meetings was the meeting at the level of experts of the V4 Countries. The meeting took place on 
8 and 9 December 2015 at the premises of the Financial Directorate of the Slovak Republic. 

FI 

In order to protect the EU's Traditional Own Resources (TOR), efforts are made to perform post-clearance controls on high-risk products and 
operators where the tax interest is significant. Finnish Customs performs regular risk analyses on its own resources, while the Corporate Audit 
carries out post-clearance controls.  

The risks detected by other Member States are used in risk analyses as well as checks. As regards anti-dumping duties, Finnish Customs works 

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regularly in cooperation with the Swedish and the Danish customs authorities, for example by exchanging information and experiences on risk 
analysis and post-clearance controls. 

In addition, Finland uses the RIFs, i.e. the risk information forms and findings of other countries, in risk analysis and post-clearance controls. 
National working methods have been developed for processing this RIF information. 

SE 

A vital part of Swedish Customs control strategy is the relation between risk based customs controls and various communication measures. 
Controls shall focus on errors that are intentional and serious, well targeted analysis are therefore significant.   

A decision to perform a post-clearance control is based on a risk analysis. During 2015 a new framework of intelligence has been implemented 
in  Swedish  Customs.  The  framework  describes  how  intelligence  on  an  overall  basis  will  be  conducted.  In  addition  to  the  new 
framework,  officers are receiving training to strengthen their analytical ability. 

Swedish  Customs  is  currently  developing  a  new  risk  management  system.  The  new  system  will  enable  selecting  and  analysis  of  the 
information  that is  submitted to  Customs in  every different stage of the goods flow. The system is  expected to  be implemented in  October 
2016. Integration with the present system and future systems will be made as soon as possible after October 2016.  

In addition, Swedish Customs participate actively in different project groups, e.g. CRMS/RIF, to develop information exchange between MS 
and COM, as well as within ConTraffic  (Contraffic/SAD).  Furthermore, Sweden emphasises handling MA (Mutual Assistance, in accordance 
with RF 515/97) and RIF (Risk Information Form). 

UK 

 As part of the 2016 Budget, the Chancellor announced a range of measures to help tackle customs and VAT abuse and fraud including: 

introducing legislation to make Non Established Taxable Persons have a fiscal agent, with joint and several liability, as their representative in 
the UK 

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making e-commerce platforms share tax liability with the on-line retailers using their services 

carrying out a public consultation exercise on a registration scheme for Fulfilment Houses to ensure that they meet certain standards and carry 
out due diligence checks on the importers using their facilities 

consulting internationally about what additional steps can be taken to prevent fraud in the e-commerce of goods. 

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