JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Elements for an EU-wide strategic framework to support security sector reform
Date: 2016-07-05
Institutions: European Commission, European External Action Service
Subjects: European neighbourhood policy, common security and defence policy, conflict prevention, fundamental rights, governance, institutional reform, international cooperation, international security, public safety, threat to national security

EN 

   EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY Strasbourg, 5.7.2016  JOIN(2016) 31 final   JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Elements for an EU-wide strategic framework to support security sector reform {SWD(2016) 221 final}  
 
 
1.   RATIONALE AND SCOPE 

Security  sector  reform  (SSR)  is  the  process  of  transforming  a  country’s  security  system1  so 
that  it  gradually  provides  individuals  and  the  state  with  more  effective  and  accountable 
security in a manner consistent with respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and 
the principles of good governance. SSR is a long-term and political process, as it goes to the 
heart  of  power  relations  in  a  country.  It  needs  to  be  nationally  driven  and  requires  political 
commitment  and 
inter-institutional  cooperation  and  broad  stakeholder 
leadership, 
participation to achieve the widest possible consensus.  

insecurity,  and 

instability  are  widespread, 

Conflict, 
in  countries  directly 
neighbouring  the  EU.2  They  lead  to  human  suffering,  forced  displacement  and  dire 
development outcomes3, as recognised by EU development policy4, in work on security and 
development  in  general  and  in  the  United  Nations  Resolution  Transforming  our  world:  the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including Goal 165 and its security-related targets.  

including 

Insecurity  and  instability  are  frequently  generated  or  exacerbated  by  a  lack  of  effective  and 
accountable  security  systems.  Helping  partner  countries  to  reform  their  security  systems 
supports  the  EU’s  objectives  of  peace  and  stability,  inclusive  and  sustainable  development, 
state-building and democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international 
law.6 As recognised in the 2015 European Agenda on Security7, which emphasises the strong 
link  between  the  EU’s  internal  and  external  security,  conflict  and  insecurity  in  partner 
countries, sometimes associated with violent extremism, also affect the EU’s internal security, 
and that of EU citizens and EU trade and investment interests abroad.  

The  EU’s  engagement  on  SSR  to  date  is  assessed  in  the  Joint  Staff  Working  Document8 
accompanying  this  Joint  Communication,  which  summarises  the  findings  from  various 
evaluations, ‘lessons identified’ reports, studies and consultations with stakeholders over the 
past 15 years. The assessment concludes that there is room for improvement in the coherence, 
complementarity and coordination of the EU’s capacities and instruments. It also underlines 

1   In  line  with  the  OECD-DAC’s  SSR  guidelines,  a  national  security  sector  is  seen  as  including  the  law 
enforcement institutions (police, gendarmerie, customs, border guards, etc.), the criminal justice system (i.e. 
penal courts, prosecutor’s office, corrections), the armed forces, the intelligence services, the institutions that 
provide  political,  financial  and  judicial  oversight  (line  ministries,  parliamentary  committees,  court  of 
auditors, the judiciary, etc.) and non-state security actors, including customary authorities, traditional courts, 
guerrillas and liberation armies, private military and security companies. See The OECD DAC handbook on 
security system reform: supporting security and justice (OECD Publishing, Paris) 

2   JOIN(2015) 50, Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
3   43% of those living in absolute poverty reside in fragile and conflict-affected countries. 
4   COM(2011) 637 and Council conclusions Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for 

Change, 3166th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 14 May 2012 

5   Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Resolution adopted by the General 
Assembly on 25 September 2015; UNGA A/RES/70/1); Goal 16: ‘promote peaceful and inclusive societies 
for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive 
institutions at all levels’ 

6   In line with the provisions in the EU Treaties for the EU’s external action in general (Articles 21-22 TEU), 
CFSP/CSDP  (Articles 23-46  TEU),  development  cooperation  policy  (Articles 208-211  TFEU)  and  other 
cooperation policies (Articles 212-213 TFEU). 

7   European  Agenda  on  Security,  Commission  Communication  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the 

European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions (COM(2015) 185) 

8   SWD(2016) 221 

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that  in-depth  SSR  is  complex  and  requires  long-term  commitment,  without  prejudice  to  the 
shorter-term initiatives that might be needed to address immediate security threats. 

The  EU’s  diplomatic  and  financial,  military  and  civilian,  short-term  and  long-term 
interventions should be anchored more securely in a single EU-wide SSR support framework 
that  takes  account  of  the  interlinkages  between  politics,  security,  justice,  humanitarian 
response9,  development,  conflict  and  fragility.  Particularly  in  fragile,  developing  and 
transition countries, SSR requires political, financial and technical support from international 
partners.  With  its  global  reach,  wide-ranging  external  policies,  instruments,  tools  and  well-
established presence and experience, the EU is well placed to support partner countries in this 
respect, in coordination with other international actors, including the UN. 

This Joint Communication10 provides elements for such a framework, as set out in the May 
2015 Council conclusions11, including also for guiding the EU’s work on capacity building in 
support  of  security  and  development12  (CBSD).  It  reflects  the  ‘comprehensive  approach’  to 
external  conflict  and  crisis13  in  bringing  together  common  security  and  defence  policy 
(CSDP)  and  all  other  relevant  common  foreign  and  security  policy  (CFSP)  tools,  external 
action  instruments  and  freedom,  security  and  justice  actors,  thus  merging  and  updating  two 
previously  separate  EU  policy  concepts  for  SSR  support14.  It  will  contribute  to  the 
effectiveness  of  the  Global  Strategy  on  foreign  and  security  policy15  and  of  the  European 
Agenda  on  Security16.  It  also  takes  account  of  relevant  OECD-DAC  decisions17  and,  where 
applicable, OECD-DAC directives in the field of peace and security. 

This framework: 

  applies  to  all  EU  actors  and  instruments:  political/diplomatic,  external  action 
instruments, crisis response18 and CSDP civilian and military actors at all levels. EU 
Member  States  are  encouraged  to  frame  their  bilateral  SSR  programmes  within  it, 
inter alia through joint programming exercises, in line with the Council conclusions 
on ‘stepping up joint programming’19; 

9   In line with JOIN(2013) 30 final, humanitarian aid is to be provided in accordance with its specific  modus 
operandi,  respectful  of  the  principles  of  humanity,  neutrality,  impartiality  and  independence,  solely  on  the 
basis of the needs of affected populations. 

10   Initiative No 21 in Annex I of the Commission’s 2016 Work Programme (COM(2015) 610 final) 
11   Council conclusions on CSDP, Council of the European Union (document 8971/15, May 2015) 
12   JOIN(2015)  17  final,  Capacity  building  in  support  of  security  and  development  –  Enabling  partners  to 

prevent and manage crises 

13   JOIN(2013) 30 final, The EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises 
14   A  concept  for  European  Community  support  for  security  sector  reform,  Communication  from  the 
Commission  to  the  Council  and  the  European  Parliament  (SEC(2006)  658);  and  EU  concept  for  ESDP 
support to SSR (Council 12566/4/05), which was produced on the basis of the European Security Strategy - A 
Secure Europe in a Better World, adopted by the European Council on December 2003 

15   Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign 
and Security Policy, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, June 2016 

16   COM(2015) 185 final, The European Agenda on Security  
17   For  example  the  agreement  to  ‘update  and  modernise  the  ODA  reporting  directives  on  peace  and  security 

expenditures’; see high-level meeting final communiqué (OECD DAC, 19 February 2016) 
18   For the purpose of this Communication, crisis response does not encompass humanitarian aid. 
19   See Council document 8831/16.  

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  will  guide  the  identification,  planning  and/or  implementation/execution  of  all 
EU  SSR-related  external  action  instruments/programmes/projects,  including 
CSDP  tools  with  specific  and/or  partial  mandates  involving  SSR-related  activities. 
While  the  focus  is  on  EU  support  to  security  sectors  in  other  countries,  this  Joint 
Communication  recognises  the  interdependence  of  security  and  justice.  The 
principles  it  sets  out  can  also  be  applied  to  justice  actors,  where  their  roles  and 
functions have clear implications for the security sector. 

  applies  in  all  contexts,  not  only  in  conflict  and  post-conflict  situations20,  and  is 

sufficiently broad to allow adaptation to the needs of each specific situation. 

2.   WHAT WE WANT TO ACHIEVE 

The  overarching  goal  of  this  EU-wide  strategic  framework  is  to  help  to  make  states  more 
stable and individuals more secure. To this end, it aims to enhance the EU’s effectiveness in 
promoting and supporting:  

A.  partner countries’ efforts to ensure security for individuals and the state; and 

B. 

the legitimacy, good governance, integrity and sustainability of the security sector of 
partner countries. 

A.  ENSURING SECURITY FOR INDIVIDUALS AND THE STATE 

To be effective, a national security sector must: 

  benefit from a clear and appropriate legal framework;  

  be guided by appropriate security and justice policies and strategies; and  

 

consist  of  well-coordinated  and  cooperative  institutions,  each  of  which  should  be 
properly  structured  and  organised,  with  a  clearly  defined  role,  appropriate 
procedures, skilled staff and resources.  

It  must  take  account  of  existing  informal  or  non-governmental  providers  of  security  and 
uphold the rule of law. 

Human security 

The first objective of a national security system must be to ensure the security of individuals, 
as perceived and experienced by them. This involves upholding their fundamental freedoms21 
and  properly  assessing,  in  a  participatory  way,  the  security  needs  of  different  groups, 
including  the  most  vulnerable.  The  system  should  address  the  specific  security  needs  of 
women, minors, the elderly and minorities.  

Reform efforts must be gender-sensitive22, to ensure that women and men have effective and 
equal  access  to  judicial  and  security  services.  To  this  end,  the  formulation  or  review  of 
national security policies should be informed by  gender-based analysis. In  addition, support 

20   While the principles outlined in this Joint Communication also apply to enlargement countries, the accession 
process involves different measures and procedures to ensure that the countries meet the accession criteria. 

21   Starting with freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to take action on one’s own behalf. 
22   See Council conclusions on the 2016-2020 Gender Action Plan (document 13201/15) 

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for  victims  of  violence  should  be  accompanied  by  preventive  measures  (e.g.  legislation, 
gender awareness-raising in police and military structures, tackling perpetrator impunity). 

Preventing and addressing transnational security threats 

National security systems must also be effective in countering transnational security threats, 
such  as  terrorism  and  organised  crime  in  all  its  forms.  Responses  must  include  the 
establishing or strengthening of international cooperation.  

B.   LEGITIMACY

23, GOOD GOVERNANCE, INTEGRITY AND SUSTAINABILITY 

Human rights, the rule of law and democratic principles24 

Security actors must respect and uphold human rights, without discrimination, for the general 
population  and  their  own  members.  The  security  sector  must  be  subject  to  effective 
democratic control and oversight25. It should operate within a clear and unambiguous legal 
framework approved by the national legislator, including effective civilian control. Its budget 
should  be  an  integral  part  of  the  national  budget  and  be  discussed  and  approved  by  the 
legislature, which must be able to exercise effective oversight. Consulting and involving civil 
society should be standard practice in the development and monitoring of security and justice 
policy and activities. 

Good governance principles26 

Transparency  and  openness  should  apply  and  legal  guarantees  be  put  in  place  to  prevent 
arbitrary decision-making. Recruitment and promotion procedures and appointments to senior 
positions  in  the  security  structure  should  be  based  on  clearly  defined,  publicly  available 
criteria. Official chains of command must be respected. The classification and dissemination 
of,  and  access  to,  security  sector  documents  (including  procurement  processes)  should  be 
subject to officially agreed and predictable procedures. Information should be public, so as to 
enhance  transparency  and  understanding.  Limitations  to  openness  and  transparency  may  be 
justified on grounds of clearly defined public policy (e.g. data protection), but should always 
be kept to a minimum. 

The  participation  of  all  stakeholders  in  the  reform  process  implies  that  national  security 
policies and  strategies  are  developed  through  inclusive  consultation  processes.  In  particular, 
women’s  participation  should  be  ensured  in  line  with  relevant  UN  Security  Council 
Resolutions27.  

23   For the purposes of this document, a security sector is deemed legitimate when: i. it respects internationally 
accepted human rights, the rule of law and democratic principles; ii. it applies the good governance principles 
of transparency and openness, participation and inclusivity, and accountability; and iii. it fights corruption. 
24   This is in line with Articles 3 and 21c TEU, which require the Union, in its relations with the wider world, to 
uphold  and  promote  its  values  and  interests,  including  democracy,  the  rule  of  law,  the  universality  and 
indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Lisbon Treaty requires that the EU’s policies, 
including those on external relations, are in accordance with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 

25   In the specific case of the judiciary, the separation of powers should be ensured so that judicial independence 
is guaranteed and the courts are not subject to improper influence from the other branches of government or 
from private or partisan interests.  

26   See  European  Governance:  A  White  Paper  (COM(2001)  428);  two  other  good  governance  principles 

(effectiveness and coherence) are outlined under objective A and in chapter 3 respectively. 
27   UNSC S/RES/1325 (2000); UNSC S/RES/2242 (2015) on women and peace and security 

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The  security  sector  itself  should  be  inclusive.  Security  forces  should  not  exclude  or 
discriminate  against  any  particular  group.  To  avoid  generating  tension,  resource  allocation 
should be public, justified and reflect legally defined roles/tasks. Women should have equal 
opportunities and be empowered within the security forces.  

Effective  internal  accountability  systems,  such  as  internal  inspection  services  and  audits, 
should  be  in  place  within  individual  security  institutions,  which  should  also  be  subject  to 
external financial and operational conduct control by the national court of auditors and other 
oversight  or  equivalent  bodies.  Mechanisms  such  as  vetting,  codes  of  conduct,  independent 
complaints  bodies  and  scrutiny  by  civil  society  also  contribute  to  accountability.  To  avoid 
impunity,  it  is  important  to  uphold  the  principle  of  equality  before  the  law,  avoidance  of 
arbitrariness,  and  procedural  and  legal  transparency  when  a  security  actor  is  brought  to 
justice. The remit of any separate military justice system should be clear and circumscribed; 
in all cases, civilians should be tried by civilian courts. 

Integrity and the fight against corruption 

Trust between the population and security actors is crucial for the effectiveness of the security 
sector.  It  is  undermined  by  any  instance  of  bribery,  extortion,  embezzlement  of  funds, 
cronyism  and  nepotism.  The  financial  resources  allocated  to  the  security  sector  should  be 
managed  on  the  basis  of  the  same  good  governance  principles  that  apply  to  other  public 
sectors.  Like  other  public  procurement  processes,  the  procurement  of  military  and  police 
equipment and services should be subject to appropriate procedures, constraints and scrutiny. 
Nationwide anti-corruption strategies should equally apply to security actors.  

Sustainability 

To  be  applicable  and  effective,  security  legislation,  institutions  and  procedures  should  be 
developed  on  the  basis  of  nationally  owned  processes,  in  line  with  the  ‘whole  of  society’ 
approach28.  The  commitment  of  key  political,  security  and  justice  stakeholders,  and  the 
support of civil society are essential.  

In principle, levels of staffing, investment and financial resources should be based on proper 
planning and be fiscally sustainable, so as not to jeopardise the provision of other essential 
public services. 

3.   HOW WE WANT TO ACHIEVE IT  

EU  engagement  in  the  security  sector  is  based  on  a  set  of  key  elements  and  principles, 
including the aid effectiveness principles29, which apply to security as much as to other areas 
of cooperation. 

Understand the security sector in its wider context 

EU  engagement  in  the  security  sector  of  a  partner  country  or  region  will  involve 
understanding  and  factoring  in  the  formal  and  informal  rules  that  govern  how  security  and 

28   As outlined in the HORIZON 2020 - Work Programme 2016–2017, Societal Challenge 7: Secure societies – 
Protecting freedom and security of Europe and its citizens and Societal Challenge 6: Europe in a changing 
world - inclusive, innovative and reflective societies.  

29   See  OECD-DAC  Paris  Declaration  on  Aid  Effectiveness  (2005)  and  the  Accra  Agenda  for  Action  (2008); 
Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation; Fourth High-Level Forum On Aid Effectiveness 
(Busan, Republic of Korea, 29 November-1 December 2011). 

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justice actors operate. Similar appreciation is needed for the interactions and power relations 
between  security,  justice  and  non-security  actors,  and  for  existing  conflict  dynamics.30 
Political, socio-economic, cultural and historical awareness is key.  

The EU should base its political dialogue and action on prior analysis of a country’s security 
sector and how it is situated within this wider context. EU Delegations have been instructed to 
analyse and report on the security sector using existing reporting mechanisms. When a CSDP 
mission is present, such analysis and reporting will be joint, in line with the ‘comprehensive 
approach’. Member State embassies, in particular those with security and/or defence attachés, 
will be invited to contribute information and expertise. 

Where  large-scale  SSR  support  is  envisaged,  the  EU  will  carry  out  a  structured  context 
assessment  (e.g. a  political  economy  analysis)  covering  all  stakeholders  (e.g. security  and 
justice  actors,  including  expected  sources  of  resistance,  drivers  for  change  and  groups 
traditionally excluded from the security and justice institutions, such as women, young people 
and minorities). This assessment should focus on security needs as perceived and experienced 
by key demographic groups and how the security sector is addressing them.   

The  assessment  should  include  analysis  of  existing  national  policies/strategies  and  budget, 
local  security  and  judicial  practices,  sources  of  insecurity  and  instability,  potential  risk 
factors, observance of democratic governance and human security principles, how effectively 
individuals’  security  is  protected,  existing  international  cooperation  and  coordination,  and 
opportunities  for  support.  It  should  identify  specific  security  problems  that  EU  assistance 
could  prioritise  and  the  process  of  change  to  which  the  assistance  can  contribute.  The  EU 
should  promote  shared  analysis  by  involving  relevant  local  and  international  actors  and 
sources of expertise. Wherever possible, national authorities will be involved in and, ideally, 
lead such assessments. Peer review expertise may be mobilised.  

In addition to informing the design of SSR support, such assessments will serve to establish 
baselines  against  which  to  monitor  the  impact  of  EU  engagement.  They  will  be  updated 
regularly  to  keep  track  of  changes  and  retain  their  usefulness  for  the  implementation  of 
support.  

Action box  

As  instructed,  EU  Delegations  will  include  analysis  of  the  security  sector  in  their  regular 
reporting  (together  with  CSDP  missions  where  present).  The  EU  should  launch  deeper 
security sector assessments where significant engagement is envisaged. 

Building  on  existing  methodological  documents,  EEAS/Commission  services  will  provide 
guidance on how to carry out security sector analyses. 

Enable broad national ownership  

‘National  ownership’  goes  beyond  a  government’s  acceptance  of  international  actors’ 
interventions.  Reform  efforts  will  be  effective  and  sustainable  only  if  they  are  rooted  in  a 
country’s institutions (including through budgetary commitment), owned by national security 
and justice actors, and considered legitimate by society as a whole. This means that national 
actors should steer the process and take overall responsibility for the results of interventions, 
with  external  partners  providing  advice  and  support.  It  also  means  that  all  (state  and  non-

30   See  the  joint  EEAS-Commission  services  Guidance  note  on  the  use  of  Conflict  Analysis  in  support  of  EU 

external action. 

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state) stakeholders, including marginalised groups, should be involved in efforts gradually to 
build  consensus  around  intervention  in  the  security  sector  on  the  basis  of  nationally  owned 
and  accepted  strategies,  where  applicable.  This  is  a  challenge,  as  actors  will  have divergent 
interests and some will resist reform.   

In a crisis situation or in the immediate aftermath of conflict, when state institutions may be 
weak or absent, the early stages of EU support should pave the way for national ownership on 
the basis of a participatory process which includes civil society. 

Action box  

When engaging in SSR support activities, the EU should:  

-  assess political commitment to reform, likely sources of resistance and ways in which its 

support can build constituencies that may come to support the change process; 

-  base  its  support  on  national  policies,  plans  and  strategies,  and  priority  issues,  where 

relevant building on national processes or ongoing action; and 

- 

involve  all  stakeholders,  including  non-state  and  civil  society  actors,  from  the 
identification stage, to build the greatest possible consensus around interventions. 

See the bigger picture  

Security sector governance reflects the general governance situation of the country in question 
and  should  be  developed  in  the  context  of  wider  governance  initiatives.  The  EU  should 
encourage partner governments and civil society to embed security sector issues in nationwide 
multiannual development strategies and to link them as far as possible to ongoing or planned 
governance efforts in other sectors. Equally, policy dialogues on public finance management 
and transparency/budget oversight have to include the security sector.  

SSR support should anticipate the impact it will have across the security sector and beyond. 
The  criminal  justice  chain  and  border  management  are  clear  examples  of  a  strong 
interconnection between various security and justice actors that calls for a holistic approach. 
This does not mean that EU support must encompass the entire security sector of the partner 
country;  it  may  be  most  effective  when  it  targets  selected  entry  points  that  are  more 
accessible, susceptible to positive development and/or that maximise leverage.   

To  tackle  identified  security  challenges,  the  EU  may  consider  adopting  a  problem-solving 
approach  by  developing  programmes  composed  of  different  sets  of  interventions.  It  may  be 
that not all of them involve security and justice actors directly, but seek to engage a range of 
stakeholders  from  different  sectors.  For  instance,  urban  security  programmes  may  include 
support for local security services, urban planning and vocational training for young people. 

Where  feasible,  effective  and  cost-efficient,  budget  support  operations  based  on  national 
policy or strategy and clear and achievable security-related indicators should be encouraged 
so as to strengthen national ownership and governance, in full compliance with the relevant 
budget support guidelines.31 

31   Budget  Support  Guidelines.  Programming,  Design  and  Management  –  A  modern  approach  to  Budget 
Support, Working document, Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid, European 
Commission, September 2012 

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Systematic political and policy dialogue 

SSR-related  intervention  should  be  systematically  accompanied  by  broad  sectoral  dialogue 
and supported by high-level political engagement. There must be read-across to political and 
policy dialogue(s) on human rights, rule of law, democracy and good governance issues, and 
compliance with international obligations, inter alia in the field of international humanitarian 
law.  Progress  in  this  respect  will  be  monitored  and  evaluated  throughout  the  intervention. 
Political and policy dialogue can also serve to promote national ownership. 

Action box 

Where  there  is  significant  engagement,  the  EU  and  the  partner  country  may  discuss  and 
agree benchmarks and relevant mechanisms for regular review in order to measure progress 
in  security  sector  governance  and  effectiveness.  These  may  take  the  form  of  a  non-binding 
instrument  entailing  political  commitments32;  specific  arrangements  will  be  made  case  by 
case.  

Coordinate EU support 

In line with the ‘comprehensive approach’ to external conflict and crisis, all EU diplomatic, 
development  and  CSDP  support  action  should  be  coherent,  coordinated,  complementary, 
properly sequenced and in line with legal, policy and institutional frameworks. The aim is to 
promote  the  effectiveness  of  EU  SSR  support.  Where  significant  EU  intervention  in  the 
security  sector  is  planned,  the  EU  and  the  Member  States  should  map  SSR  activities, 
preferably  with  other  international  actors.  This  will  enable  information-sharing  so  as  to 
develop  a  common  understanding  of  context  and  gather 
identified  and 
recommendations  to  be  fed  into  political  and  policy  dialogue,  adjustments  to  ongoing 
programmes, the formulation of planned intervention, and programming processes.  

lessons 

This mapping could also form a basis on which EU actors jointly define common objectives 
and develop a ‘coordination matrix’ (coordinated in the field by the EU Delegation), which 
would  enable  them  to  identify  appropriate  links  and  sequencing  between  political  dialogue, 
cooperation activities/instruments  and  possible CSDP  missions/operations.  The  coordination 
matrix would be a living document, building, where relevant, on existing political frameworks 
for  crisis  approach  (PFCAs)  and/or  country  programming  frameworks  and  strategies, 
including in the context of joint programming. 

EU  instruments  are  subject  to  different  programming  and  decision-making  procedures  and 
regulatory constraints, which stem from their respective legal bases. EU coordination matrices 
at country level will not amend these rules but rather reflect a common understanding among 
all EU actors as to priorities, objectives and their possible roles. 

Such  “coordination  matrices”  will  identify  risks,  mitigating  measures  and,  to  the  extent 
possible, an exit strategy that is coherent with the partner country’s longer-term national plan 
and  financial  capacity.  They  will  form  the  basis  for  a  monitoring  and  evaluation  system 
allowing  measurement  of  progress  and  the  impact  of  EU  support.  Where  a  single  support 
strategy is developed, such elements will be discussed directly and agreed at that level.  

32 For example memoranda of understanding, joint statements, arrangements, etc. 

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Action box 

A comprehensive EU ‘coordination matrix’ will be developed in at least two countries in the 
two  years  following  adoption  of  this  Joint  Communication,  in  coherence  with  any  existing 
joint programming donor matrices. 

Coordinate with other international actors 

The  EU  in  coordination  with  the  Member  States  should  seek  synergies  with  other 
international actors and seek to build consensus with them in line with Article 210 TFEU. To 
this  end,  close  cooperation  will  be  sought  with  the  UN,  regional  and  other  international 
organisations  (in  particular  those  with  a  security  mandate),  bilateral  partners  active  on 
security-related  issues  and,  where  appropriate,  specialised  international  NGOs.  The  security 
international 
sector  should  be  an 
actors/donors.  Where  possible  and  applicable,  international  actors  should  consider  framing 
their  actions  around  a  nationally  owned,  single  support  strategy  for  security  sector 
development. 

in-country  coordination  among 

inherent  part  of 

Action box 

Building  on  the  ‘coordination  matrix’,  the  EU  in  coordination  with  the  Member  States  and 
other international partners will promote a comprehensive international engagement around 
a single security sector support strategy to be developed together with the partner country.  

Be flexible and balance long-term systemic change and immediate security needs 

Transforming any security sector involves a lengthy process that must take account of specific 
institutional cultures and sensitivity to change. It requires long-term vision and engagement. 
In each specific context, the EU needs to find the proper balance and coherence between such 
long-term efforts and the need to meet individuals’ more pressing, often immediate, security 
needs.  

As  the  operational  environment  may  change  rapidly,  especially  in  fragile  states  or 
post-conflict, some actions may come to a standstill, or human rights or governance principles 
may be violated. SSR support programmes will need to be adaptable.   

Action box 

When engaging in SSR-related activities, the EU should: 

- 

- 

set incremental and achievable targets; 

engage in short-term activities to build the confidence of security and justice actors, open 
doors for future cooperation and sustain political and policy dialogue;  

-  adapt  to  rapidly  changing  operational  conditions,  especially  in  fragile  or  post-conflict 
states. Where appropriate the intervention will be implemented using the flexibility under 
the Union’s financial rules and procedures; and 

-  plan CSDP missions in support of SSR to reflect the need for long-term and sustainable 
involvement in the security sector and entail close cooperation with the EU Delegations. 

Measure progress: monitor and evaluate 

The  general  monitoring  and  evaluation  principles  for  projects  and  programmes  apply  to  all 
security sector interventions; in particular, it is important to: 

10 

 
- 

- 

- 

define baselines from the outset; 

establish  clearly  defined,  feasible  and  time-bound  targets  and  impact  indicators 
linked to clear criteria to measure the achievement of results and objectives; and 

allocate sufficient human and financial resources for internal monitoring.  

Monitoring  and  evaluation  activities  should  include  qualitative  and  quantitative  data-
gathering  and  analysis  to  integrate  community  and  individual  perceptions  of  change  in  line 
with people-centred human security approaches. 

Robust  monitoring  and regular  evaluations  of  ongoing  interventions  will  allow  the EU  (and 
non-EU active partners) to take stock of progress, draw lessons and review activity. 

Action box 

The  EEAS/Commission  services  will  prepare  joint  monitoring  and  evaluation  guidelines, 
including indicators for security capacity-building and SSR-related activities applicable to all 
external action instruments and missions.  

Manage risk 

SSR support entails risks which must be anticipated and for which mitigation measures must 
be drawn up; these include: 

i.  

insufficient national political commitment to change 

Political commitment to reform may be insufficient or superficial; it may fade over 
time. The EU must be equipped to gauge the real level of commitment on the side of 
the partner country and plan its engagement accordingly. In some contexts, it could 
start  with  small  interventions  that  aim  to  foster  confidence  and  national  political 
commitment and scale up at a later stage. Engagement with civil society may be an 
entry point. 

ii.   negative unintended consequences 

No intervention is neutral and support to the security sector demands a ‘do no harm’ 
approach33 that factors in underlying sources of conflict. Context analysis will help 
EU  actors  to  avoid  unintended  negative  impacts  on  conflict  dynamics,  for  example 
by: 

 

 

inadvertently  replicating  or  amplifying  existing  tensions,  e.g. by  reinforcing 
patterns of domination and exclusion;  

introducing  reforms  and  resources  that  favour  vested  interests  or  become 
entangled  in  corruption  and  patronage  systems  and  in  turn  generate  new 
grievances/instability. 

iii.   reputational risk 

Security actors supported by the EU may act in a biased, discriminatory or abusive 
way  towards  the  population;  this  will  have  an  indirect  negative  effect  on  the  EU’s 
reputation.  Also,  assets  may  fall  into  the  wrong  hands.  Working  with  other 
international  actors  to  assess  reputational  risk  and  draw  up  realistic  mitigating 

33   COM(2010) 126, Humanitarian Food Assistance 

11 

 
                                                            
measures will be part and parcel of designing SSR support. Where applicable and on 
the basis of careful case-by-case analysis, derogations can be applied to the visibility 
rules for EU external action programmes/tools. 

iv.   risk of non-intervention  

It is the duty of any state to protect its civilians. In some cases, its failure to do so 
may  lead  to  serious  violations  of  human  rights  or  democratic  principles,  human 
suffering or loss of life, including atrocity crimes. When considered useful to prevent 
such  extreme  occurrences  and  help  deal  with  them  where  they  could  arise,  on  the 
basis  of  a  UNSC  resolution  or  a  bilateral  agreement  with  the  partner  state,  the  EU 
may  decide  to  engage  in  SSR  support  activities  even  in  the  absence  of  important 
conditions, such as real commitment to change.  

Action box 

The EEAS/Commission  services will prepare a dedicated risk management methodology for 
EU support. This will include mitigating measures drawing inter alia on the ‘risk management 
framework mechanism for budget support operations’.34  
As provided for in its 2015-2019 Action plan for human rights and democracy35, the EU has 
to  develop  a ‘human rights due diligence policy’ outlining measures to ensure that EU and 
Member  States’  support  to  the  security  sector  is  in  compliance  with/contributes  to  the 
promotion,  protection  and  enforcement  of  international  human  rights  and  international 
humanitarian law, and is consistent with the EU’s human rights policies.  

Make best use of EU SSR expertise  

The EU should mobilise staff with the appropriate expertise and experience and with a strong 
understanding of technical and political issues relating to SSR. It must draw on the expertise 
of the Member States and, in specific areas where they bring clear added value, relevant EU 
agencies  (e.g. Europol,  CEPOL,  FRONTEX)  subject  to  their  respective  mandates,  priorities 
and resources. 

This EU-wide SSR policy framework envisages strong coordination and cooperation between 
EU actors and Member States to foster synergies and complementarities between instruments 
and missions in a ‘whole EU’ approach. It also provides for coordination with the activities of 
international and regional organisations and relevant NGOs.   

At headquarters 

The  Commission  and  the  HR  will  establish  a  permanent  informal  inter-service  SSR  task 
force,  with  representatives  from  relevant  thematic  EEAS  and  Commission  services,  which 
will  advise  and  support  EU  Delegations,  EEAS  and  Commission  services  and  CSDP 
missions.  It  will  contribute  to  ensuring  coherence  and  complementarity  of  EU  SSR  activity 
and  support  the  planning  and  design  of  SSR  development  cooperation  projects  and  CSDP 
planning  documents.  Its  role  should  also  be  reflected  in  the  next  edition  of  the  crisis 
management  procedures.  It  will  develop  methodological  tools,  standards,  procedures  and 
practices  for  EU  SSR  activities  and  provide  training,  inter  alia  by  supporting  the  European 

34   Budget  Support  Guidelines:  Programming,  Design  and  Management  –  A  modern  approach  to  Budget 
Support, Working document, Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid, European 
Commission, September 2012 

35   JOIN(2015) 16 

12 

 
                                                            
Security  and  Defence  College  (ESDC).  The  task  force  will  oversee  the  monitoring, 
evaluation, learning framework and risk management mechanisms. 

In the field 

Responsibility  for  the  coordination  of  security  sector  support  on  the  ground  rests  with  the 
Head  of  the  EU  Delegation  in  the  partner  country  or  region  in  question.  Where  a  CSDP 
mission is present in the country, the Council is invited to ensure that its mandate allows it to 
assist the EU Delegation on SSR-related issues. In this respect, the head of the mission will be 
available to advise the Head of Delegation.  

EU  Delegations  and  Member  State  diplomatic  missions  should  share  information  and 
analysis,  participate  in  joint  analysis  and  contribute  to  the  formulation  of  SSR  coordination 
matrices.   

Where  the  EU  has  a  particularly  significant  and  diversified  security  sector  engagement  and 
relevant  coordination  structures  are not  in  place,  it  will  seek  to  establish  coordination  task 
forces for security sector support at country level (with the political and operational sections 
of  EU  Delegations,  CSDP  missions,  Member  States  and,  where  possible,  relevant  partners 
such as the UN, the World Bank and non-EU countries involved in the security sector). 

Action box 

A  permanent  informal  inter-service  SSR  task  force  will  be  established  to  oversee  EU  SSR 
activities.  

The  ESDC’s  SSR  training  curricula  should  be  updated  to  take  account  of  this  EU-wide 
strategic framework. Also, cooperation between the ESDC and relevant Commission training 
services should be strengthened to reflect the EU-wide approach. 

Instructions to Heads of Delegation will include the task to ensure the local coordination of 
all  EU  stakeholders  in  security  sector  dialogue  and  support.  This  will  not  impact  on  the 
CSDP missions’ line of command. 

The  mandate  of  CSDP  missions  should  include  the  provision  of  technical  advice  to  EU 
Delegations.  

In  countries where  the EU has a significant SSR commitment,  it should be ensured that the 
Delegation has appropriate security sector expertise. 

4.   AREAS OF ENGAGEMENT 

The EU may support all components of the security sector, including the military, within the 
limits of EU legislation through the following activities (non-exhaustive list): 

 

Institutional support 

Support for security and justice institutions includes assistance in developing partner 
countries  national  defence,  security  and  justice  policies  and  strategies,  national 
and  operational 
coordination  mechanisms, 
procedures,  internal  accountability  mechanisms,  human  resources  planning  and 
management,  information  and  data,  and  budgeting  and  financial  management 
systems,  in  full  compliance  with  human  rights  principles  and  compliance  with 
international humanitarian law.  

communication 

administrative, 

13 

 
Institutional support may include assistance in the planning of reforms which should 
be  tailored  and  context-sensitive  and  aim  to  help  partner  states  assess  their  own 
needs, and express and achieve their vision by setting realistic short-, medium- and 
long-term  outcomes.  It  should  help  them  allocate  human,  technical  and  financial 
resources as appropriate. In so doing the EU will also engage with non-state and civil 
society actors. 

The  EU  should  ensure  that  its  efforts  to  strengthen  institutions  generate  direct 
short-term  benefits  for  the  population  in  terms  of  improved  security  service 
provision.  

  Training 

EU  support  includes  building  the  capacity  of  national  or  regional  training 
institutions. This may include technical assistance and mentoring, assessing training 
needs,  developing  new  curricula  and  ‘training  the  trainers’.  EU  training  assistance 
will specify the knowledge, skills and/or attitudes it is intended to pass on, so as to 
promote  behavioural  change  in  security  sector  personnel,  units  and  institutions.  It 
will also seek to ensure that training is valued in terms of career perspectives and that 
staff perform the duties for which they have been trained. 

Support  may  be  linked  to  dialogue  on  and  support  for  national  human  resource 
management systems involving the identification of profiles needed by security and 
justice institutions, fair and transparent recruitment and promotion, etc.  

Where  there  is  a  need  to  restore  basic justice and  security services rapidly, the  EU 
may  provide  training  directly,  in  particular  through  CSDP  missions.  As  far  as 
possible, it will do this in cooperation with national training institutions, with a view 
to strengthening them and eventually handing over responsibility for the training.  

  Equipment 

The  EU  can  provide  non-lethal  equipment36  to  security  sector  actors.  This  will  be 
done within a broader security support framework for the country. The EU will need 
to  seek  appropriate  guarantees  that  equipment  will  not  be  used  to  violate  human 
rights,  fundamental  freedoms  or  the  rule  of  law.  To  avoid  the  risk  of  equipment 
becoming unserviceable, abandoned, unaccounted for or misused, the existence and 
functioning  of  logistical  support  and  registry/tracing  chains  will  be  assessed  and, 
where  required,  support  will  be  provided  to  improve  their  effectiveness.  The 
development of basic good practice in the area of equipment management will be an 
integral  part  of  any  equipment  package  to  ensure  its  maintenance,  re-supply  and 
disposal.  

  Support for oversight mechanisms 

The  EU  should  support  the  establishment  or  strengthening  of  effective  civilian 
control and oversight, inter alia by: 

  promoting  and  supporting  the  formulation  and  enforcement  of  relevant 

legislation and procedures; and  

 

increasing  the  capacity  of  independent  complaints  and  civilian  oversight 
institutions and mechanisms. 

36   JOIN(2015) 17 final 

14 

 
                                                            
Beneficiaries  may  be  national  legislative  bodies  and  independent  or  quasi-
independent  bodies  such  as  ombudsmen,  human  rights  institutions  or  commissions, 
anti-corruption  commissions,  independent  police  complaints  commissions,  and 
judicial authorities in their role of overseeing law enforcement agencies, etc. 

The  EU  should  promote  the  active  participation  of  civil  society  in  these  oversight 
mechanisms  and,  where  relevant,  support  civil  society  initiatives  to  monitor  the 
conduct  of  the  security  forces.  It  will  also  promote  the  freedom  of  the  media  and 
strengthen its capacity to report responsibly on the security sector. 

  Community security  

Where violence and conflicts are linked to political, social and economic issues that 
are  strictly  local  or  national  security  forces  are  unable  to  provide  vital  security 
services, the EU can finance support initiatives whereby the population is provided 
with security and justice benefits through a community security approach, involving 
(official  and/or  traditional)  local  authorities,  where  possible,  the  residents  of  the 
communities and neighbourhoods in question and local security forces. The aim will 
be  to  improve  the  security  of  local  communities,  resolve  conflict  and  address  local 
root causes of violence, and ultimately to ensure that national authorities are able to 
address security and conflict problems at local level.  

  Links between SSR and other areas of engagement 

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants 

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) refers to a set of interventions 
in a process of demilitarising official and unofficial armed groups by disarming and 
disbanding non-state groups or downsizing armed forces and reintegrating them into 
civilian life37. DDR processes should respond to immediate security needs and help 
lay  the  foundations  for  longer-term  stability  in  a  country  or  region.  They  should 
therefore link in with an overall peace process and preferably with a broader SSR. In 
conflict and post-conflict contexts, EU SSR and DDR support will balance the need 
to restore basic security services as an urgent stabilisation measure with the need to 
avoid  hindering  longer-term  stability  by,  for  instance,  legitimising  non-inclusive 
security forces. 

Transitional justice  

Transitional  justice  encompasses  “the  full  range  of  processes  and  mechanisms 
associated  with  a  society’s  attempts  to  come  to  terms  with  a  legacy  of  large-scale 
past  abuses, 
justice  and  achieve 
to  ensure  accountability,  serve 
reconciliation”.38 Transitional justice measures should ultimately help to re-establish 
and strengthen the rule of law. 

in  order 

In post-conflict and transition countries, SSR as a component of institutional reform 
can  contribute  to  prevent  conflict  from  flaring  up  again;  it  thus  helps  to  ensure 
accountability  and  respect  for  human  rights  and  prevent  future  violations.  The 

37   EU  concept  for  support  to  disarmament,  demobilisation  and  reintegration  (DDR),  approved  by  the 

Commission on 14 December 2006 and by the Council of the European Union on 11 December 2006 

38   UN Security Council, document S/2004/616 

15 

 
                                                            
Council conclusions on support to transitional justice39 underline the importance of 
SSR. 

Small arms and light weapons (SALWs) 

The  availability  of  SALWs  is  often  a  key  factor  in  triggering  and  spreading 
insecurity.  ‘Residual  conflicts’  sustained  by  the  illicit  spread  of  SALWs  often  blur 
the  dividing  line  between  armed  conflict  and  criminality40.  SALW  control  is 
intrinsically linked to SSR efforts, not least in limiting the perceived or actual need 
or propensity of individuals or communities to provide for their own defence. 

5.   MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 

The implementation of this policy framework will be regularly monitored and evaluated. Each 
year  an  inter-service  team  composed  of  EEAS  and  Commission  representatives,  with  the 
support of external consultants where needed, will review the EU’s overall engagement in the 
security sector in at least one priority country. 

The  evaluation  criteria  will  be  based  on  the  objectives  and  principles  outlined  in  this  Joint 
Communication,  on  the  shared  monitoring  and  evaluation  guidelines  and  on  the  actual 
implementation of the relevant risk management framework. 

The relevance of the EU’s engagement will also be evaluated, on the basis of criteria such as: 

- 

- 

- 

the quality and comprehensiveness of its analysis of the security sector; 

its responsiveness to urgent crises and emerging opportunities; and 

consistency  between  EU  support,  broader  EU  security  and  development  goals  and 
the security goals of partner countries. 

Evaluations will be made publicly available. Recommendations will be drafted and follow-up 
action  will  be  monitored.  The  evaluations  will  also  be  used  to  gather  best  practices  and 
lessons identified, to be fed into EU staff training and reflections on EU financial instruments. 
This will help to improve internal procedures and the efficiency of the support. 

The overall performance of this strategic framework will be evaluated within five years’ time.  

The European Commission and the High Representative invite the European Parliament and 
the Council to endorse and support the approach set out in this Joint Communication and to 
engage  fully  in  the  move  towards  more  coherent  and  effective  EU  engagement  in  assisting 
SSR in its partner countries. 

39   Council conclusions on the EU’s support to transitional justice, 16 November 2015 (13576/15) 
40   EU  strategy  to  combat  illicit  accumulation  and  trafficking  of  SALW  and  their  ammunition,  Council 

conclusions (5319/06) 

16