JOINT STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Capacity Building in support of Security and Development Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation from the European Parliament and the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 230/2014 of 11 March 2014 establishing an instrument contributing to stability and peace
Date: 2016-07-05
Institutions: European Commission, Service for Foreign Policy Instruments
Subjects: EU financing, common security and defence policy, conflict prevention, development aid, foreign policy, international cooperation, international security, military cooperation, peacekeeping

EN 

   EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY Strasbourg, 5.7.2016  SWD(2016) 222 final   JOINT STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  IMPACT ASSESSMENT  Capacity Building in support of Security and Development  Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation from the European Parliament and the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 230/2014 of 11 March 2014 establishing an instrument contributing to stability and peace {COM(2016) 447 final} {SWD(2016) 225 final}  
 
 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT 

CAPACITY BUILDING IN SUPPORT OF SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT  

1. 

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 4 

1.1.  POLICY CONTEXT ......................................................................................................... 5 

1.2.  GAP IN CURRENT EU EXTERNAL ACTIONS INSTRUMENTS: THE MISSING LINK .............. 8 

1.3.  PROBLEM DEFINITION: WHO IS AFFECTED BY THE PROBLEM AND HOW? ..................... 10 

1.4.  PILOT PROJECTS: ILLUSTRATION OF LIMITATIONS ...................................................... 12 

1.5.  CSDP: ILLUSTRATION OF LIMITATIONS ...................................................................... 12 

1.6.  CONTEXT PROVIDED BY EU PRIMARY LAW ................................................................ 13 

1.7.  THE EU’S NEED TO ACT AND JUSTIFICATION (SUBSIDIARITY) ..................................... 14 

1.8.  BASELINE SCENARIO .................................................................................................. 15 

2.  OBJECTIVES: WHAT SHOULD BE ACHIEVED? ..................................................................... 16 

2.1.  GENERAL OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................ 16 

2.2.  SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................. 16 

2.3.  RISKS AND MITIGATING MEASURES ............................................................................ 18 

2.4.  CONSISTENCY WITH EU POLICIES ............................................................................... 19 

3.  POLICY OPTIONS TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES ................................................................. 20 

3.1. 

IDENTIFYING THE POLICY OPTIONS ............................................................................. 20 

3.2.  OPTIONS OUTSIDE THE GENERAL BUDGET OF THE UNION ........................................... 21 

3.3.  OPTIONS WITHIN THE GENERAL BUDGET OF THE UNION ............................................. 21 

3.4.  DESCRIPTION OF THE POLICY OPTIONS ....................................................................... 21 

Option 1 – Adapting the African Peace Facility .............................................................. 21 

Option 2 – New dedicated instrument outside the general budget of the Union 
comparable to the European Development Fund (EDF) .................................................. 23 

Option 3 – Revision of the Athena mechanism ............................................................... 23 

Option 4 – Adapting the Instrument contributing to stability and peace ......................... 24 

Option 5 – ‘Facility’ with existing EU instruments ......................................................... 25 

Option 6 – New dedicated instrument based on Articles 209 and 212 ............................ 26 

Option 7 – New instrument based on Article 28 TEU under CFSP ................................ 26 

4.  COMPARISON OF THE POLICY OPTIONS AND ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACTS ....................... 27 

4.1.  COMPARING THE OPTIONS .......................................................................................... 27 

4.2.  PREFERRED OPTION .................................................................................................... 31 

5.  MONITORING AND EVALUATION ....................................................................................... 31 

3.  ANNEXES .......................................................................................................................... 33 

ANNEX 1: INCEPTION IMPACT ASSESSMENT ......................................................................... 33 

ANNEX 2: PUBLIC CONSULTATION: OVERVIEW ..................................................................... 33 

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ANNEX 3: TARGETED CONSULTATION OF STAKEHOLDERS .................................................... 40 

ANNEX 4: ADDITIONAL VIEWS BY EU MEMBER STATES ....................................................... 41 

ANNEX 5: LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................ 42 

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1.  INTRODUCTION 

Sustainable  development  and  poverty  eradication  require  peace  and  security;  at  the  same 
time,  without  development  and  poverty  reduction  there  will  be  no  sustainable  peace.  The 
initiative  ‘Capacity  building  in  support  of  security  and  development’  (CBSD)  seeks  to 
address  this  link,  as  part  of  the  Commission  Work  Programme  2016.1  The  importance  of 
appropriate capacity building of all security actors in EU partner countries was identified in a 
Joint Communication from the Commission and the High Representative of 28 April 20152 
and the subsequent conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council of 18 May 20153.  

The May 2015 Council conclusions called for an EU-wide strategic framework for security 
sector  reform  in  partner  countries,  which  should  also  outline  how  coordination  between 
different  types  of  capacity  building  could  be  reinforced.  This  is  done  in  the  Joint 
Communication  Elements  for  an  EU-wide  strategic  framework  to  support  Security  Sector 
Reform4,  which  recognises  that  “conflict,  insecurity  and  instability  […]  lead  to  human 
suffering,  forced  displacement  and  dire  development  outcomes5,  as  recognised  by  EU 
development policy6, in work on security and development in general and in the United 
Nations  Resolution  Transforming  our  world: 
the  2030  Agenda  for  Sustainable 
Development, including Goal 16”7 on peace and stability. The Joint Communication further 
recognises that “insecurity and instability are frequently generated or aggravated by a lack of 
effective and accountable security systems”. The Joint Communication seeks to enhance the 
EU’s effectiveness in supporting: (a) partner countries - to ensure security for individuals and 
the  State,  including  preventing  and  addressing  transnational  security  threats,  and  (b)  the 
legitimacy,  good  governance,  integrity  and  sustainability  of  the  security  sectors  of  partner 
countries. 

In  2015,  EU  Member  States  requested  proposals  on  how  best  to  address  an  identified 
problem, namely the lack of comprehensive and flexible EU support to capacity building 
(especially  training  and  equipment)  of  security  actors,  including  the  military,  in  third 
countries  in  the  pursuit  of  development  policy  goals.  The  Council  hence  invited  the 
European  External  Action  Service  (EEAS)  and  Commission  services  to  explore  “the  full 
potential of all relevant Union instruments taking into account their legal bases, and to assess 
the  feasibility”  of  different  options.8  The  European  Council  of  June  2015  recalled  the  need 
for  “empowering  and  enabling  partners  to  prevent  and  manage  crises,  including  through 
concrete projects of capacity building with a flexible geographic scope”.9  

1 COM (2015) 610 final of 28 October 2015. The work programme package includes a Communication on 
security sector reform and a possible new dedicated instrument for capacity building in support of security and 
development in partner countries. 
2 JOIN(2015) 17 final of 28 April 2015 
3 Foreign Affairs Council (Defence formation) conclusions on CSDP, document 8971/15 of 18 May 2015 
4 JOIN(2016) 31 
5 Approximately 43% of those living in absolute poverty reside in fragile and conflict-affected countries. 
6 COM(2011) 637 and Council conclusions ‘Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for 
Change’, 3166th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 14 May 2012 
7 Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Resolution adopted by the General 
Assembly on 25 September 2015; UNGA A/RES/70/1); Goal 16: ‘promote peaceful and inclusive societies for 
sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive 
institutions at all levels’ 
8 Foreign Affairs Council (Defence formation) conclusions on CSDP, document 8971/15 of 18 May 2015 
9 Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 25 and 26 June 2015, EUCO 22/15 

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Following  intensive  discussions  with  different  Council  formations  throughout  2015  and 
exchanges  at  the  European  Parliament  on  the  topic,  an  online  public  consultation  was 
launched  on  1 April  2016;  whilst  acknowledging  the  non-representativeness  of  responses 
provided,  94%  of  the  respondents  to  the  public  consultation  agreed  that  an  effective, 
legitimate  and  accountable  security  sector  in  partner  countries  could  contribute  to  peace, 
human security and sustainable development. 

1.1. POLICY CONTEXT 

Union  policy  in  the  field  of  development  cooperation  is  to  be  conducted  within  the 
framework  of  the  principles  and  objectives  of  the  Union’s  external  action,  which  include, 
inter alia, the preservation of peace, prevention of conflicts and strengthening of international 
security  as  well  as  the  fostering  of  sustainable  economic,  social  and  environmental 
development of developing countries (Article 21 TEU). With regard to development policy, 
the EU and its Member States act in line with development objectives (Article 208 TFEU) as 
described  by,  inter  alia,  the  European  Consensus  on  Development10  and  the  Agenda  for 
Change11  as  well  as  the  guidelines  of  the  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and 
Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee12 (DAC), as appropriate. 

The link between security and development has been recognised both at European and at 
international level.13 The 2005 European Consensus on Development already recognised this 
link, which is central to maximising the effectiveness of the EU’s external and development 
action. Supporting partner countries’ security systems, as part of a broader reform process to 
provide effective and accountable security to the State and to individuals, contributes to the 
EU’s objectives of inclusive and sustainable development, state-building and the rule of law.  

Drawing  on  the  work  on  security  systems  pioneered  by  the  OECD  in  200814,  four  broad 
categories composing the security sector in a State can be identified: 

i. 

State  institutions  with  a  formal  mandate  to  ensure  the  safety  of  the  State  and  its 
citizens  against  violence  and  coercion.  This  includes  armed  forces,  police, 
paramilitary forces, intelligence services, border guards, customs authorities, etc.; 
ii.  Civil  authorities  appointed  for  the  control  and  oversight  of  these  institutions.  This 
includes  the  parliament,  ministries  of  defence,  interior  and  foreign  affairs,  national 
security agencies, and certain non-state actors;  

iii.  Criminal  justice  agencies.  This  includes  ministries  of  justice,  prosecutorial  and 
investigation  services,  the  judiciary  and  courts,  human  rights  institutions,  and 
traditional and customary justice authorities; 

10 Joint declaration by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting 
within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on the development policy of the European 
Union entitled “The European Consensus”, Official Journal C 46 of 24.2.2006 
11 COM(2011) 637 and Council conclusions Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for 
Change, 3166th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 14 May 2012 
12 http://www.oecd.org/dac/dacguidelinesandreferenceseries.htm 
13 The EU Council conclusions of 19 November 2007 stated that the nexus between development and security 
should inform Union strategies and policies in order to contribute to policy coherence for development and to 
the coherence of the EU external action in general. See also the World Bank’s World Development Report 
(Conflict, Security, and Development), 2011 
14 The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform, OECD: Paris, 25 February 2008. See also 
DG DEVCO 2012 “Inspiring change; EU support to rule of law, justice and security sector reform”.  

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iv.  Non-State security actors including customary authorities, traditional courts, non-state 

bodies, private military and security companies, etc. 

Different  instruments  and  approaches  are  needed  to  ensure  an  appropriate  approach  to 
security  sector  reform,  which  is  “a  core  element  of  multidimensional  peacekeeping  and 
peacebuilding, essential for addressing the roots of conflict  and building the foundations  of 
long-term  peace  and  development  [whose  aim]  is  to  help  ensure  people  are  safer  through 
effective  and  accountable  security  institutions,  that  operate  under  civilian  control  within  a 
framework of the rule of law and human rights.”15 

A  working  security  sector,  which  comprises  the  different  categories  mentioned  above,  is 
essential  for  “the  consolidation  of  peace  and  stability,  promoting  poverty  reduction,  rule  of 
law and good governance, extending legitimate state authority, and preventing countries from 
relapsing  into  conflict.”16  Indeed,  human  security  includes  people-centred,  multi-sectoral, 
comprehensive,  context-specific  and  prevention-oriented  approaches.  This  is  especially  the 
case  when  it  is  clear  that  without  security,  access  to  the  people  most  at  risk  of  being  left 
behind  in  conflict  settings  is  limited,  and  effective  outcomes  of  either  humanitarian  or 
development  work  are  less  likely.17  The  European  Council  conclusions  of  19/20  December 
2013 emphasised “the importance of supporting partner countries and regional organisations, 
through providing training, advice, equipment and resources where appropriate, so that they 
can increasingly prevent or manage crises by themselves”.18 

The  adoption  of  the  United  Nations’  (UN)  2030  Agenda  for  Sustainable  Development19 
and  its  Sustainable  Development  Goal20  (SDG)  16  on  ‘peace  and  justice’  underlines  the 
importance of promoting peaceful and inclusive societies, the provision of access to justice 
for all, and building effective, accountable institutions at all levels. SDG 16 emphasises the 
need to strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation 
for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to, inter alia, prevent 
violence and combat terrorism and crime. In particular in fragile and conflict-affected States, 
channelling  investments  in  line  with  development  effectiveness  principles  would  help  to 
address the root causes of conflict and fragility. 

The EU is a major supporter of the ‘New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States’21 adopted 
in  Busan  in  2011;  this  commitment  was  reiterated  in  the  context  of  Agenda  2030  in  the 
Stockholm Declaration of 4 April 2016.22 Strengthening the security-development nexus is an 
essential element of the New Deal, as is the commitment to country ownership. The European 
Parliament’s  resolution  on  the  global  development  framework  after  2015  highlights  the 
importance  of  the  ‘New  Deal’  and  insists  on  a  long-term  commitment  that  prioritises 

15 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/security.shtml See also Securing States and societies: 
strengthening the United Nations comprehensive support to security sector reform, Report of the Secretary-
General, A/67/970–S/2013/480 of 13 August 2013 
16 Ibid. 
17 Public consultation: contribution by VOICE 
18 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140245.pdf 
19 http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/  
20 Sustainable Development Goal 16: promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, 
provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels 
21 The EU endorsed the New Deal for engagement in fragile states, one of the main Building Blocks of the 4th 
High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in November 2011 (see http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/en/) 
22 Stockholm Declaration: Addressing Fragility and Building Peace in a Changing World 

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“security  sector  reform  and  the  establishment  of  the  rule  of  law  and  democratic 
institutions”.23 

There  is  a  need  for  mutually  reinforcing  interventions  in  the  areas  of  security  and 
development.24  Today’s  challenges  show  that  additional  efforts  are  needed  to  link 
development  cooperation  with  peace  and  security  support.  The  narrative  of  both  the  EU’s 
security and development cooperation is changing. 

The  Commission  has  taken  initiatives  pertaining  to  the  security-development  nexus  for 
several years.25  The Union already finances a multitude of actions in  peace-building and in 
the field of capacity building in support of security and development. Over the period 2001-
2009, the Commission contracted over EUR 1 billion in interventions related to support for 
security  and  justice  sector  reform  in  partner  countries,  with  six  main  core  areas:  law 
enforcement;  border  management; 
reform;  Disarmament,  Demobilisation, 
Reintegration  (DDR);  civilian  management;  and  civilian  oversight.  Over  105  countries 
benefitted  from  security-related  interventions,  with  85%  of  the  funding  concentrated  in  23 
countries.  

justice 

The  EU’s  external  financing  instruments  –  comprising  both  geographic  cooperation  with 
developing  countries  and  horizontal  crisis  response  –  have  focused  on  supporting  security 
sector reform with a civilian objective primarily. In the framework of the public consultation, 
88%  of  the  respondents  agreed  that  the  security-development  nexus  should  be  better 
integrated in EU support strategies in order to better contribute to sustainable development in 
partner countries. Some contributions26 expressed that within the process of policy coherence 
and integration, there should be a clear division of labour and mandates between civilian and 
military actors, while the integrity of each policy and its respective objectives and budget are 
safeguarded.  

The  EU  has  already  financed,  through  the  Instrument  contributing  to  Stability  and  Peace27 
(IcSP) and other external action instruments28, the provision of equipment for the benefit of 
civilian security forces. Examples include the provision of Communication and Information 
System  (CIS)  equipment,  vehicles,  or  infrastructures  for  the  Cameroon  Border  Guards  and 
Gendarmerie. Through the European Neighbourhood Instrument29 (ENI), the Union has also 
supported security actors in neighbourhood countries in the context of security sector reform 
(SSR)  such  as  the  technical  assistance  to  the  Lebanese  security  sector.  Links  to  Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions/operations exist, since it is through them that 
the EU advises, mentors and trains security actors of partner countries and organisations, be 
they civilian or military.  

23 2014/2143 (INI) 
24 See Joint Communication of 28 April 2015 from the European Commission and the High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on ‘Capacity building in support of security and 
development’, JOIN(2015) 17 final 
25 See, for example, the 2011 Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention (COM(2011) 211) 
26 Public consultation: contribution by ACT Alliance Advocacy to the European Union.  
27 Regulation (EU) No 230/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing 
an instrument contributing to stability and peace 
28 For example: IPA II, ENI 
29 Regulation (EU) No 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 

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Today’s  challenges  show  that  additional  efforts  are  needed  improve  the  functioning  of 
security forces in a manner consistent with the respect for human rights, democracy, the rule 
of  law  and  good  governance  principles.  These  can  contribute  to  the  objective  of  fostering 
sustainable development, provided appropriate trainings are imparted.  

Current  challenges  at  the  borders  of  the  European  Union  but  also  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa 
expose three realities: 1) Today’s security challenges need a comprehensive approach where 
security and development are closely linked; 2) No single country can protect itself against 
these challenges on its own: the EU as such has to display an even greater effort in enhancing 
and  developing  its  cooperation  with  partners;  3)  Challenges  are  acute  and  the  EU  favours 
supporting partners’ ability to prevent or manage conflicts by themselves. 

1.2. GAP IN CURRENT EU EXTERNAL ACTIONS INSTRUMENTS: THE MISSING LINK 

At  present,  none  of  the  existing  financing  instruments  within  the  field  of  external  action 
explicitly  allows  for  building  the  capacity  of  the  military  in  partner  countries  in  order  to 
contribute to sustainable development, despite urgency on the ground. This hampers the EU’s 
ability  to  achieve  external  action  objectives,  including  fostering  conditions  for  peace, 
human security and sustainable development. The inability to finance capacity building in 
the  security  sector  (both  equipment  and  training)  impinges  on  partners’  security  and 
wellbeing, on the humanitarian and development situation of partner countries. 

This  shortfall  affects  the  efficiency  and  sustainability  of  the  Union’s  external  action. 
Capacity  building  in  support  of  security  and  development  (CBSD)  aims  to  tackle  this 
shortfall  and  enable  the  Union  to  enhance  the  capacity  of  the  military  actors  in  partner 
countries to ensure human security in their countries.  

In a globally deteriorating security environment, the limitations of the current EU toolbox of 
external action instruments hamper its ability to comprehensively address the issue, improve 
cooperation, in particular with partner countries’ armed forces, and thus effectively contribute 
to development efforts. This constitutes a missed opportunity to ensure a maximum impact of 
EU development cooperation policy. In order to address this gap, the possibilities within the 
Union’s  primary  law  need  to  be  clarified  and  additional  funds  should  be  endowed  to  this 
initiative. This would allow to contribute to the sustainable development of partner countries 
in fragile or crisis situations.  

The  Joint  Communication  on  CBSD  illustrated  that  a  significant  part  of  external  assistance 
programmes funded by the EU’s development and technical cooperation instruments already 
tackles  security  and  development  challenges.  In  the  current  Multiannual  Financial 
Framework (MFF) 2014-2020, the EU has programmed actions in the governance sector in at 
least  69  countries  around  the  world  whilst  there  are  rule  of  law  programmes  foreseen  or 
ongoing in 38 countries and programmes with a clear security component in 16 countries.  

The EU engages in security, peace-building and conflict prevention through a multiplicity of 
channels  and  different  instruments.  The  Union  has  several  instruments  at  its  disposal  to 
support its external action including30: the Development Cooperation Instrument31 (DCI), the 

30 Heading IV of the general budget of the Union includes other instruments (e.g. Macro-Financial Assistance, 
the Instrument for Nuclear Safety and Cooperation or humanitarian aid), which are however not relevant in this 
context. 
31 Regulation (EU) No 233/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 

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European  Instrument  for  Democracy  and  Human  Rights  Worldwide32  (EIDHR),  the 
European  Neighbourhood  Instrument33  (ENI),  the  Instrument  contributing  to  Stability  and 
Peace34  (IcSP),  the  Instrument  for  Pre-accession  Assistance35  (IPA  II),  or  the  Partnership 
Instrument  for  cooperation  with  third  countries36  (PI),  in  addition  to  the  extra-budgetary 
European Development Fund37 (EDF). 

These  basic  acts  lay  down  the  criteria  and  circumstances  under  which  funding  can  be 
provided  and  thus  programmed.  Programming  of  the  two  main  development  instruments 
under the current MFF, i.e. the 11th EDF and the DCI, for the period 2014-2020 is based on 
the  key  policy  principles  of  the  ‘Agenda  for  Change’:  ownership  and  inclusiveness, 
comprehensiveness and coherence, flexibility to adapt to different contexts, coordination with 
Member  States  and  other  donors  as  well  as  consultation  with  humanitarian  actors. 
Programming starts with an assessment of the overall situation of the partner country with a 
view  to  defining  a  vision  regarding  the  EU’s  relationship  with  that  country.  In  the  case  of 
fragile and conflict affected States it is particularly important for the EU to deliver as one, in 
order  to  ensure  complementarity  between  instruments  and  consistency  with  overall  EU 
external action.  

The DCI includes specific provisions restricting the financing of military-related equipment 
activities. It stipulates, “Union assistance under this Regulation shall not be used to finance 
the procurement of arms or ammunition, or operations having military or defence purposes”. 
It  moreover  states  that  “Actions  under  geographic  programmes  shall  be  designed  so  as  to 
fulfil the criteria for ODA [official development assistance] established by the OECD/DAC”; 
it  also  establishes  that  “at  least  95%  of  the  expenditure  foreseen  under  the  thematic 
programmes and at least 90% of the expenditure foreseen under the Pan-African programme 
shall fulfil the criteria for ODA established by the OECD/DAC”.  

The recently revised ODA Reporting Directives in the field of peace and security38 provide 
greater clarity and further develop the scope of ODA rules for the security sector (e.g. support 
to the police, security sector reform, countering violent extremism, control of small arms and 
light  weapons).  They  maintain  several  safeguards,  notably  the  principally  civilian nature  of 
ODA, although support to the military can be recognised as ODA in exceptional and clearly 
delimitated  circumstances.  By  contrast,  the  direct  participation  in  military  expenditures 
remains not eligible. The formulation of CBSD actions should explicitly build on how they 
can contribute to the EU’s development objectives. Taking into account the objectives of the 
Union’s  development  cooperation,  i.e.  to  contribute  to  the  pursuit  of  the  sustainable 
development of developing countries, financing of the military, beyond ODA, would only be 
possible where State institutions have become dysfunctional for the achievement of peaceful 
and  inclusive  societies,  and  where  a  rule  of  law  objective  is  pursued  with  the  aim  of  re-
establishing a functioning civilian rule. 

32 Regulation (EU) No 235/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 
33 Regulation (EU) No 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 
34 Regulation (EU) No 230/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 
35 Regulation (EU) No 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 
36 Regulation (EU) No 234/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 
37 For the 11th EDF Internal Agreement, see OJ L 210, 6.8.2013, p. 1.  
38 http://www.oecd.org/dac/DAC-HLM-Communique-2016.pdf  

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1.3. PROBLEM DEFINITION: WHO IS AFFECTED BY THE PROBLEM AND HOW?  

The Joint Communication on CBSD analysed how EU support to help build the capacities of 
partners, and thus contribute to stability, security and development, could be improved. The 
Communication  identified  gaps  in  the  EU’s  ability  to  support  building  the  capacities  of 
partners  in  the  security  sector.  The  Union’s  external  financing  instruments  support  a 
multitude of actions in the field of capacity building in support of security and development, 
including  effective  civilian  administration  and  civilian  oversight  over  the  security  system. 
However,  the  Communication  concluded,  “there  is  currently  no  EU  budget  instrument 
designed to provide a comprehensive financing to security capacity building in partner 
countries,  in  particular  its  military  component”.39  The  Communication  thus  highlighted 
the Union’s apparent inability to provide funding to military actors from the general budget 
of the Union. 

The  Joint  Communication  on  CBSD  of  April  2015  and  the  ensuing  Council  conclusions 
confirmed that enabling partner countries and regional organisations to prevent and manage 
crises by themselves through support to their security capacity building was an important tool 
for  delivering  on  the  EU’s  global  ambitions,  including  promoting  sustainable  development 
and poverty reduction. Taking into account that by 2030, 62% of the global poor are expected 
to  live in  fragile states40, poverty  reduction  will  greatly depend on the ability  to  effectively 
address  the  root  causes  of  fragility  and  notably  the  lack  of  security,  including  by  working 
directly with military actors. 

In  the  context  of  fragile  states,  development  depends  as  much  on  stronger  economic 
foundations  and  improvement  of  social  sectors  as  on  security,  justice  and  governance.  The 
Advisory  Group  of  Experts  on  UN  peacebuilding41  pointed  out  that  there  is  a  need  for 
greater  coherence  across  development,  political  and  security  actors  in  order  to  sustain 
peace, one of the key objective and challenge for development in  fragile states in line with 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The Advisory Group of Experts also states that 
more  development  investment  and  focus  is  needed  in  the  political,  security  and  justice 
dimensions  of  the  Peacebuilding  and  Statebuilding  Goals,  as  part  of  the  New  Deal  of 
Engagement in Fragile States, adopted by the G7+ group of 20 fragile and conflict-affected 
countries, development partners and international organisations, including the EU. The 2011 
World  Bank’s  ‘World  Development  Report  on  Conflict,  Security  and  Development’42 
explains how violence and conflict are a development problem. Authors of the report, which 
is  based  on  country-level  surveys,  underline  that  linking  military  and  policing  assistance 
with justice assistance is crucial because their lack of connection have been the source of 
problems in many fragile countries. 

There  are  a  number  of  concrete  examples  to  illustrate  the  relationship  between  military 
capacity  and  sustainable  development.  The  World  Bank’s  2011  World  Development  Report 
provides  examples  such  as  the  success  of  joint  teams  drawn  from  both  the  police  and  the 
military  in  Colombia  to  prevent  violence  or  the  cooperation  of  the  military  with  Non-
Governmental  Organisations  (NGOs),  in  Haiti  to  repair  water  management  networks. 
Another  example  is  the  Security  Sector  Development  Programme  (SSDP)  between  the 

39 JOIN(2015) 17, p. 8  
40 See OECD’s States of Fragility report (Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions), 2015 
41 See Advisory Group of Experts on UN peacebuilding, The Challenge of Sustaining the Peace, 2015 
42 See World Bank, World Development Report: Conflict, Security and Development, 2011 

10 

 
 
                                                 
Netherlands  and  Burundi,  which  focused  on  the  armed  force  and  the  police  to  improve  the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of the Burundi security sector.  

In  some  fragile  countries,  armed  forces  under  civilian  oversight  are  instrumental  to  protect 
the  population  and  ensure  the  integrity  of  the  territory  against  threats  such  as  incursions  of 
armed or terrorist groups. Countries such as Niger and Chad are regularly attacked on their 
territory by Boko Haram, which undermines humanitarian and development efforts in these 
areas. This also leads to an increasing number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the 
region  and  a  corresponding  mobilisation  of  humanitarian  funds,  including  from  the  EU,  to 
address  the  needs  of  these  IDPs  and  refugees.  This  finally  undermines  trade  activities 
between the countries in the same region (Nigeria and Chad for instance). In countries where 
armed forces are not properly established as part of the State, they do not exercise full control 
over  the  country  territory;  armed  groups  often  substitute  the  military  until  appropriate 
disarmament, remobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) processes are carried out in the context 
of  security  sector  reform.  Until  this  process  has  started,  disorder  is  often  at  its  utmost: 
Somalia, Central African Republic, Mali, and Libya are some well-known examples.  

The problem consequently affects partner countries directly, whose security sector may be in 
need of training or equipment (i.e. capacity building) in the context of security sector reform. 
Not  addressing  critical  operational  needs  of  partners  hampers  the  achievement  of  essential 
objectives for development, i.e. to foster conditions for sustainable peace and human security. 
The  improvement  of  the  functioning  of  military  actors  and  the  strengthening  of  their 
governance, particularly in fragile contexts and countries emerging from conflict, contributes 
to  peace,  human  security  and  stability,  and  thereby  to  the  achievement  of  the  Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs).  

Needs  identified  by  CSDP  missions  that  could  not  be  covered  by  partner  countries  have 
included  communication  or  protective  equipment  against  mines  and  explosive  devices,  as 
well as ambulances, water tanks and fuel trucks, accommodation, food and medical support. 
The EU Training Mission (EUTM) in Somalia43 identified gaps including: inadequate living 
conditions and teaching facilities, lack of basic support (e.g. water, food, beds, mattresses and 
blankets). In some cases, ad hoc solutions can be found, such as the provision of vehicles by 
other donors in Mali, but this is not consistent, nor is it a sustainable solution. Where ad hoc 
funding  is  not  possible,  alternative  funding  sources  cannot  always  be  identified  to  fill  the 
gaps.  

In the public consultation, 85% of the respondents agreed that strengthening the governance 
of military actors, particularly in fragile countries and countries emerging from conflict could 
lead to stability and the achievement of sustainable development goals.  

The  CBSD  initiative  aims  to  enhance  the  effectiveness  and  efficiency  of  development 
policy in view of ensuring sustainable development. The initiative is framed by the elements 
contributing  to  an  EU-wide  strategic  framework  for  supporting  Security  Sector  Reform 
(SSR), which provides the larger governance system of the security actors. 

In view of ongoing and developing conflicts, threats and instabilities in the EU’s immediate 
and wider neighbourhood, it is necessary to address the CBSD issue urgently. This sense 

43 JOIN (2015) 17, p. 6  

11 

 
 
                                                 
of urgency has been repeatedly underlined by several Member States over the past two years. 
Enabling a quick operationalisation is a major criterion when comparing the options.  

Therefore, a short-term option should be privileged over any mid- to long-term option.  

1.4. PILOT PROJECTS: ILLUSTRATION OF LIMITATIONS 

Further to the Joint Communication on CBSD and in order to understand the situation better, 
the  Council  invited  Commission  services  and  the  EEAS  to  present  by  summer  2015  an 
implementation plan with concrete measures and actors involved.44  

Mali and Somalia were identified as ‘pilot cases’ in order to better define capacity building in 
support  of  security  and  development  (CBSD)  as  well  as  to  clearly  identify  what  can  and 
cannot be done under the current instruments. The list of projects included activities, which 
the  EU  can,  and  was  already  doing  (e.g.  support  to  internal  security  forces  and  rule  of 
law/justice, reconciliation and peace resolution).  

Those activities for which it was not possible to  find financing under the general budget of 
the Union and the EDF during the timeframe of the exercise were those linked to support to 
the military with the military as the main beneficiary, such as a medical facility for militaries 
(albeit opened also to civilians) to be administered by a Ministry of Defence or information 
technology (IT) systems (logistic information, human resources) for a Ministry of Defence. 

More  specifically,  out  of  13  ‘pilot  projects’,  eight  found  financing  by  EU  instruments,  i.e. 
projects for which EU instruments had already previously been used for financing, mainly in 
support  of  good  governance.  Two  projects  have  been  funded  by  EU  Member  States 
bilaterally,  and  one  has  been  considered  no  longer  relevant  due  to  the  delay  in  finding  a 
financing solution.  

Projects,  which  could  not  be  funded  by  the  external  financing  instruments  under  the 
Union’s budget, were related to military capacity building as such.  

1.5. CSDP: ILLUSTRATION OF LIMITATIONS 

Both  civilian  and  military  CSDP  missions  and  operations  (and  in  particular  EU  training 
missions)  are  an  essential  component  within  the  EU’s  comprehensive  approach  to  crisis 
management  in  third  countries45  and  partly  fulfil  the  training  pillar  of  capacity  building  in 
support of security and development for both defence and civilian security personnel. CSDP 
missions can train, recruit and provide bespoke training to higher management and executive 
levels including advice and mentoring at ministerial level. 

Resources  for  EU  CSDP  military  operations  are  financed  by  the  participating  EU  Member 
States, and through the Athena mechanism46, which was designed to manage the financing of 
common costs relating to EU military operations under the CSDP. These costs concern, inter 

44 See Council conclusions of May 2015 
45 JOIN(2013) 30 final of 11 December 2013 
46 Article 41 TEU sets the principles for the financing of EU civilian and military crisis management operations. 
The common costs of such operations are currently covered by Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/528 of 27 March 
2015 establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations 
having military or defence implications (Athena) and repealing Decision 2011/871/CFSP, OJ L 84, 28.03.2015 

12 

 
 
                                                 
alia,  headquarters’  implementation  and  running  costs,  infrastructure,  logistics  and  mission 
support. Currently, Athena does not cover the costs incurred by a partner country supported 
through a mission or operation. 

Some CSDP missions have reported that the personnel they have trained cannot manoeuvre 
and operate in the field because of a lack of essential equipment. In particular, the transport, 
medical, command and control (communications and the operationalisation of command and 
leadership) and logistic functions remain areas where equipment is deficient or non-existent 
in many countries where CSDP training missions are active. 

CSDP  missions  and  their  budgets  are  not  designed  to  provide  equipment  to  security 
sector  actors  of  partner  countries;  the  expenditure  for  military  operations  to  be  financed 
pursuant to Article 41(2) TEU by the Athena mechanism, concerns expenditure arising out of 
the  functioning  and  the  equipment  of  the  EU  CSDP  missions/operations.  CSDP  missions 
provide  training  to  military  and  civilian  security  forces  of  third  countries.  However,  due  to 
how the Athena mechanism is designed today, they cannot provide the equipment and help 
ensure its sustainability for training purposes or to follow up on the operationalisation of the 
defence units they have trained.  

The effectiveness of the CSDP missions/operations may also be compromised by difficulties 
arising  from  lack  of  coordination  and  joint  planning  amongst  the  different  EU  actors  and 
insufficient articulation between short- and long-term actions. 

1.6. CONTEXT PROVIDED BY EU PRIMARY LAW 

The Union can only act in areas in which the Member States have transferred powers to the 
Union (Articles 5(2) TEU, 2(1) TFEU). A measure therefore always has to be based on the 
correct  legal  basis,  which  is  to  be  chosen  on  the  basis  of  the  aim  and  the  content  of  the 
measure. It follows that it is necessary to determine the main or the predominant purpose or 
component of the measure.47  

Considering  the  scope  of  development  cooperation,  the  financing  of  capacity  building 
(training and equipment support) in  the security sector on the basis of Article 209 TFEU is 
not per se excluded only because of the military nature of the beneficiary.48 Being based on 
Article  209  TFEU,  the  intended  measure  has  to  come  within  the  scope  of  the  Union’s 
development  cooperation  policy,  which  is  interpreted  broadly  in  line  with  the  Treaties  and 
settled  case  law.49  By  contrast,  a  measure  does  not  fall  within  the  Union’s  development 
cooperation policy if it has as its main purpose the implementation of another policy.50 

In practice, the ‘centre of gravity approach’ applies, i.e. a measure will have as a legal basis 
either  the  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  (CFSP)  or  Articles  209/212  TFEU, 
depending  on  the  most  important  component  within  it.  Building  military/defence  capacities 
for other purposes would encroach on CFSP in breach of Article 40 TEU. A measure which 
has  a  strong  component  in  relation  to  the  financing  of  the  military  of  third  countries  for 
defence-related purposes, would thus come under the Union’s CFSP and cannot be based at 

47 C-377/12, Commission v Council (Philippines), paragraph 34 
48 See also JOIN (2015) 17 of 28 April 2015, p. 7; see also below on the OECD/DAC Reporting Directives in 
the field of peace and security  
49 C-377/12, European Commission v Council (PCA Philippines), paragraph 37 
50 See ECJ, C-377/12, Commission v Council (Philippines), paragraph 44 

13 

 
 
                                                 
the  same  time  on  another  non-CFSP  legal  basis.51  A  CFSP  or  CSDP  measure  would  be 
subject  to  Article  41(2)  TEU,  which  reads:  “Operating  expenditure  to  which  the 
implementation of this Chapter gives rise shall […] be charged to the Union’s budget, except 
for such expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications […].” 

CBSD measures under this initiative would be carried out in the context of a wider security 
sector reform, in line with the overarching objective of achieving sustainable development. 

1.7. THE EU’S NEED TO ACT AND JUSTIFICATION (SUBSIDIARITY)  

As  challenges  rise,  the  need  for  the  Union  to  act  in  a  coherent  manner  increases.  Member 
States have called on the Commission and the High Representative to present proposals that 
would allow the Union to engage comprehensively in capacity building in support of security 
and  development.  Member  States  understand  this  to  be  an  essential  part  of  EU  support  to 
security sector reform.  

The  2007  Council  conclusions  on  an  EU  response  to  situations  of  fragility  called  “on  the 
Commission, in close cooperation with the Member States, to map Community and bilateral 
financial  instrument,  as  well  as  Member  States’  intervention  possibilities”.52  In  December 
2013,  the  European  Council  further  emphasised  “the  importance  of  supporting  partner 
countries  and  regional  organisations,  through  providing  training,  advice,  equipment  and 
resources  where  appropriate,  so  that  they  can  increasingly  prevent  or  manage  crises  by 
themselves”.53  

In 2014 and in line with the European Council conclusions of December 2013 on security and 
defence,  the  Council  reiterated  “the  need  to  enhance  the  effectiveness  of  CSDP  [...]  This 
requires  systematic  cooperation  and  coordination  within  the  EU  and  among  its  Member 
States,  underlining  the  importance  of  addressing  the  need  to  sustain  sufficient  expenditures 
related  to  security  and  defence,  and  coherent  and  effective  use  of  EU  instruments  and 
polices”54; furthermore, the Council invited the High Representative and the Commission “to 
present  a  joint  proposal  for  a  policy  approach  for  concrete  implementation”55  which  was 
followed  up  by  the  Joint  Communication  on  capacity  building  in  support  of  security  and 
development in 2015. 

Development  cooperation  policy  is  a  parallel  competence  (Article  4(4)  TFEU),  i.e.  the 
exercise of the Union’s competence does not result in Member States being prevented from 
exercising theirs. Furthermore, the Union’s operations and those of the Member States shall 
complement and reinforce each other (Article 208(1) TFEU). The EU and its Member States 
have a role to play through the comprehensive approach to preventing and managing conflicts 
and their causes.56 

51 C-91/05, Commission v Council (ECOWAS), in relation to ex-Article 47 TEU; Judgment of the Court of 
11 June 1991 - Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Communities – Case 
C-300/89 
52 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/97177.pdf 
53 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140245.pdf 
54 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/145824.pdf 
55 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/145816.pdf 
56 JOIN(2013) 30 final of 11 December 2013 

14 

 
 
                                                 
EU action is necessary and justified both on the grounds of the objectives laid down in the 
Treaties  and  on  the  subsidiarity  principle.  Comprehensive  and  flexible  EU  support  to  the 
security sector would have the benefit of allowing short and longer-term actions to bring on 
board  all  security  actors  in  a  country,  and  would  allow  for  better  coordination  of  such 
support. Interventions at EU level can better achieve security and stability and act as a driver 
for  more  effective  international  efforts  around  security  and  development.  The  political 
objective of delivering security for the EU cannot be achieved without effective engagement 
with partners in non-EU countries and international organisations.  

All options identified in this document comply with the principle of proportionality in so far 
as they are limited to what is necessary in order to attain the general and specific objectives 
described below. 

1.8. BASELINE SCENARIO 

The  baseline  scenario  equals  the  current  status  quo,  i.e.  doing  nothing  to  address  the 
identified  problem.  Not  addressing  the  problem  would  leave  the  current  legal  and  financial 
framework unchanged, perpetuating the lack of clarity and ensuing gap in the current set of 
EU external action instruments. This option would not address the current limitations of the 
EU to engage comprehensively in capacity building in support of security and development, 
which is an essential part of EU support to security sector reform and an important dimension 
for the effectiveness and sustainability of CSDP missions. 

If  the  problem  is  not  tackled,  the  effectiveness  of  the  Union’s  actions  and  its  ability  to 
contribute to stability and the  achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals would 
be compromised, especially in fragile countries.  

Events in Europe’s neighbourhood and in Africa point to a dramatic and deteriorating global 
security  situation,  with  more  than  1.5  billion  people  living  in  fragile  and  conflict  affected 
regions  worldwide.  The  World  Bank  estimates  that  half  of  the  world’s  poor  will  live  in 
countries  affected  by  fragility,  conflict  and  violence  by  2030.  The  particular  challenges  in 
fragile  states  require  rapid,  continuous  and  integrated  efforts,  aiming  at  sustainable 
development. 

In some countries, especially fragile ones, security needs to be provided and guaranteed by 
military  actors.  Support  to  military  actors  would  thus  contribute  to  stabilisation  and 
development efforts. CBSD interventions would need to be underpinned by human security 
principles and be based on a thorough contextual analysis and risk management frameworks.  

Long-term  engagement  in  governance,  peace  and  capacity  building,  is  instrumental  to 
ensuring  long-term  sustainable  development,  peaceful  and  resilient  societies.  Failure  to 
address  the  capacity  building  of  armed  forces  will  reduce  their  ability  to  contribute  to 
preventing and managing crises. Lack of EU support in CBSD would also lead to limited 
capacity, lack of accountability and lack of professional skills of military actors. 

In  addition,  in  fragile  contexts,  weak  military  actors  are  often  partly  responsible  for  the 
inability of a state to prevent and manage crises or, worse still, may contribute to instability 
and  insecurity.  In  several  areas  in  the  Sahel,  in  the  Horn  of  Africa  and  in  the  Middle  East, 
years of efforts and investments to alleviate poverty have been undermined and reversed by 
crises and have had important and negative humanitarian and developmental costs.  

15 

 
 
In  post-conflict  situations,  military  actors  can  also  help  guarantee  a  secure  environment  for 
the  reconstruction  of  basic  infrastructures  and  the  longer-term  recovery  by  facilitating  the 
delivery  of  services  by  the  state  and  humanitarian  actors.  In  fragile  contexts  therefore, 
capacity building in support of security and development can contribute to minimise the 
risks  posed  by  crises  and  insecurity  on  years  of  development  efforts.  Provided  the 
objective is clear and the actions clearly delimitated, CBSD can contribute to maximising the 
positive  impacts  of  development  interventions  in  a  recovery  context,  to  address  factors  of 
fragility, and to help build resilience. In short, CBSD measures can have a catalytic effect.  

Perpetuating the baseline scenario should be discarded; failure to act would imply loss 
of  EU  credibility  as  well  as  missed  opportunity  to  create  the  conditions  for  enhancing 
the effectiveness and improving the delivery of long-term external assistance. 

2.  OBJECTIVES: WHAT SHOULD BE ACHIEVED?  

2.1. GENERAL OBJECTIVES 

The general objectives of this initiative are those set out in Articles 21 TEU and 208 TFEU, 
and in particular: 

- 

- 

to  ensure  that  the  EU’s  development  assistance  to  fragile  developing  countries  is  not 
undermined  by  situations  of  instability  and  conflict,  by  enabling  all  security  actors, 
including the military, to ensure stability, peace and law and order;  

to foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing 
countries,  with  the  primary  aim  of  eradicating  poverty,  whilst  complying  with  the 
commitments  and  taking  into  account  the  objectives  approved  in  the  context  of  the 
United Nations and other relevant international organisations. 

2.2. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES 

The specific objectives are: 

- 

- 

- 

to  contribute  to  improving  the  capacity  of  partners  to  prevent  and  manage  crises  by 
themselves; 

to contribute to improving the effectiveness of security actors, including the military, 
within  partner  countries  through  the  delivery  of  capacity  building  in  support  of 
security and development; and  

to contribute to ensuring the respect of the rule of law, good governance, as well as 
enhanced civilian control and oversight over the military in third countries.  

In concrete terms, EU financial and technical assistance for security actors, including the 
military, would cover:  

-  capacity  building  programmes  in  support  of  security  and  development  through 
training,  mentoring  and advice,  aimed  at  building  and  strengthening  military  actors’ 
capacity in order to contribute to the achievement of peaceful and inclusive societies, 

16 

 
 
 
including  through  creating  more  effective,  accountable  and  transparent  military 
institutions; 

- 

the  provision  of  non-lethal  equipment  (i.e.  equipment  excluding  arms  and 
ammunition); and  

- 

infrastructure improvements.  

In  order  to  contribute  to  sustainable  development  and  in  particular  to  the  achievement  of 
stable,  peaceful  and  inclusive  societies,  it  is  essential  to  promote  good  governance  in  the 
public administration, including the ministries of defence and the armed forces, which 
are an integral part of the executive branch of Government. Typical good governance support 
activities  are  those  aimed  at  enhancing  efficiency,  transparency,  accountability,  civilian 
oversight and democratic control of the armed forces, in particular with regard to the legal 
framework; organisation and administration, including standards and ethics; human resources 
management  (e.g.  recruitment,  training,  remuneration,  career  development,  disciplinary 
measures,  retirement);  asset  management;  financial  management,  including  budget  and 
procurement; 
judicial  oversight, 
inspection, 
Parliamentary  control;  public  communication,  media  relations  and  interaction  with  civil 
society. 

internal  control  and 

reporting,  audit, 

EU financial support may cover the performance by the military of development and human 
security tasks, notably reconstruction/rehabilitation of civil infrastructure (e.g. roads, bridges, 
schools, hospitals), mine clearance, removal and disposal of explosive remnants of war and 
unexploded  ordinance,  disarmament  and  demobilisation  of  ex-combatants,  collection  and 
destruction of small arms and light weapons, civil protection tasks in emergencies, as well as 
border and migration management activities when the responsible national body is of military 
nature or is unable to ensure these functions. 

With regard to specific pieces of equipment and infrastructure upgrade interventions for the 
military, it may cover IT systems (including software), transport vehicles (troops, cargo…), 
communication  means,  uniforms  and  protective  gear,  surveillance  and  mine  clearance 
equipment,  training-related  equipment  and  facilities,  functional  infrastructure  (buildings, 
barracks…),  medical  and  sport  facilities,  water  and  sanitation  infrastructure,  power  supply, 
logistic and storage facilities, furniture, stationery. 

CBSD assistance measures should be underpinned by the following principles: (a) ownership 
by  the  partner  country,  alignment  to  the  partner’s  long-term  development  strategies, 
harmonisation  of  support  and  coordination  of  interventions  among  actors  to  avoid 
duplication,  focus  on  results  and  mutual  accountability  (development  effectiveness 
principles); (b) respect for human rights and adherence to international humanitarian law; and 
(c) coherence  with  other  EU  actions  as  part  of  a  broader  EU  comprehensive  approach  to 
external conflict and crises.57 

The financing of actions should be feasible as soon as possible with a worldwide application 
and respecting existing budgetary possibilities. 

57 JOIN(2013) 30 final of 11 December 2013 

17 

 
 
                                                 
2.3. RISKS AND MITIGATING MEASURES 

Support  to  military  actors  entails  a  wide  range  of  risks  (contextual,  programmatic, 
reputational and institutional) that may hamper the effectiveness and sustainability of CBSD 
support.  Some  contributions  to  the  public  consultation58  have  underlined  specific  risks 
attached to CBSD and corresponding need to manage them.  

To ensure the efficiency of the Union’s development interventions: CBSD measures should 
enhance  the  effectiveness  and  efficiency  of  development  policy.  Capacity  building  in 
support  of  security  and  development  should  exclude  any  activities,  which  result  in 
recurrent military expenditure, the procurement of arms and ammunition, and training 
solely  designed  to  enhance  the  fighting  capacity  of  the  armed  forces  would  not  be 
eligible for EU financial support. 

Whilst  in  worst-case  scenarios,  equipment  provided  could  be  misused  and/or  transferred  to 
unfriendly actors (e.g. non-state armed groups that seize the equipment), the exclusion of the 
procurement  of  arms  and  ammunition,  recurrent  military  expenditures,  and  training 
solely designed to contribute to the fighting capacity of the armed forces, would de facto 
limit  these  risks.  Moreover,  capacity  support  programmes  in  countries  where  there  are 
serious threats against State institutions, would contribute to strengthen the effectiveness and 
efficiency of development policy. 

Additional  mitigation  measures  may  include  assurances  and  compliance  criteria  from  the 
government concerned, training on human rights and humanitarian law in line with  the UN 
Charter and principles of international law, complementary interventions (on oversight for 
example),  or  communication  strategies  to  deal  with  reputational  risks.  Maintaining  a  sector 
and political dialogue with the ministries of defence and the government, during and after the 
lifespan  of  CBSD  projects,  should  also  be  key  to  managing  risks.  Possible  risks  and  the 
effectiveness  of  the  mitigation  measures  would  be  continuously  monitored  during  the 
implementation of the projects.  

In addition, in accordance with the Joint Communication on capacity building in support of 
security and development that called for the development of risk management methodology 
on  EU  support  to  the  security  sector  of  partner  countries  or  organisations,  a  specific  risk 
assessment will be conducted in the context of the SSR policy framework. This will include 
assessing  risks  on  human  rights  and  conflict  sensitivity  analysis.  Specific  risk  assessment 
modalities  applicable  to  CBSD  may  include  assessments  based  on  the  EU  early  warning 
system,  and  conflict  risk  and  conflict  analysis  frameworks  to  develop  a  shared 
understanding and regular monitoring of the situation. Finally, the commitment to ensure the 
transparency  and  impact  of  peace  and  security  spending  and  tracking  its  contribution  to 
achieve  SDG  16  targets  can  address  what  some  stakeholders  could  perceive  as  the  risk  of 
‘securitisation of development’.  

Lessons  learned  from  experiences  with  regard  to  budget  support  risk  management 
frameworks as well as emerging practice of CSDP mission performance benchmarks will be 
valuable contributions to this exercise. 

As  part  of  those  modalities,  EU  support  to  CBSD  should  be  grounded  in  context 
analysis/conflict  and  be  conflict  sensitive  (context-specific  analysis).  The  ‘do-no-harm’ 

58 Public consultation: contribution by European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) 

18 

 
 
                                                 
principle will be a key underlying principle for CBSD. An in depth analysis of the political 
and security situation of the country concerned and potential associated risks would have to 
take  place  in  a  timely  manner  with  a  view  to  determine  the  Union’s  ability  to  assist.  EU 
Delegations, especially in countries where the EU does not have a CSDP presence, should be 
closely involved. That assessment would cover, inter alia, resource implications, stock-taking 
of  other  actors’  efforts,  planned  assistance  to  engage  in  a  capacity  building  effort,  an 
assessment  of  the  specific  needs  of  the  country,  as  well  as  objectives  and  benchmarks  to 
monitor  progress.  Other  important  aspects  such  as  local  ownership  by  the  partner  country, 
absorption  capacity,  and  sustainability  in  the  medium  and  long  term  as  well  as  articulation 
with  longer-term  broader  SSR  programmes  in  the  governance  sector  would  be  part  of  that 
context specific analysis. 

2.4. CONSISTENCY WITH EU POLICIES 

The ‘security-development nexus’ is a key underlying principle in the application of the EU’s 
comprehensive  approach to  external conflicts  and crises. The present  initiative fits with  the 
ambition  to  bring  together  EU  tools  on  major  challenges,  as  outlined  in  the  Joint 
Communication on ‘The EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crisis’59 and 
the subsequent Council conclusions60. The comprehensive approach applies to all phases of 
the conflict cycle, including prevention, early warning, crisis management, stabilisation and 
longer-term peace-building leading to development. 

Coordination is a key factor for successful delivery of capacity building in support of security 
and development in partner countries. The initiative would ensure: (a) coherence with other 
EU actions as part of a broader EU comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises; 
(b) consistency, coordination and complementarity of the different short-term and long-term 
capabilities and instruments, based on a common strategic vision. 

The different actions under the proposed initiative should be designed in line with the new 
EU-wide security sector reform framework, including monitoring and evaluation principles 
and a dedicated risk management framework. Programmes would have to set out how they fit 
with relevant EU country or regional strategies, and be programmed in a manner that ensures 
involvement of all relevant EU actors.  

Besides  applying  the  framework  on  Security  Sector  Reform  and  regardless  of  the  option 
retained, the following practical measures in particular could improve coordination:  

a)  consultation  and  information  sharing  in  relation  to  ongoing  and  planned  capacity 
building  support  activities  conducted  through  the  bilateral  development  cooperation 
of Member States and the Union’s assistance programmes (Article 210 TFEU);  

b)  information sharing with the EU’s multilateral partners (including the UN, NATO and 
Organisation  for  Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe  (OSCE)  and  other  third 
countries and strategic partners; 

59 JOIN(2013) 30 final of 11 December 2013 
60 Council conclusions 9644/14 of 12 May 2014 

19 

 
 
                                                 
c)  better  use  of  the  Political  Framework  for  Crisis  Approach  process,  developed  to 
support  decision-making  by  the  Council  on  CSDP  operations,  to  intensify  the  ties 
between services in charge of development cooperation and security policy matters;  

d)  better  use  by  CSDP  actions  of  development  cooperation  expertise  (equally, 

development programmes can benefit from CSDP and Member State expertise); 

e)  more  regular  and  systematic  interaction  between  EU  Delegations  and  the  CSDP 

missions and/or operations at partner country level. 

The  selected  option  should  allow  for  improved  interaction  between  EU  Delegations  and 
CSDP missions/operations at partner country level enhancing the effectiveness of the various 
EU  activities  for  capacity  building  in  support  of  security  and  development  and  fostering 
synergies between them. 

3.  POLICY OPTIONS TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES 

3.1. IDENTIFYING THE POLICY OPTIONS  

This  section  examines  different  policy  options  to  meet  the  specific  objectives  of  this 
initiative.  Some  of  these  options  had  already  been  identified  in  the  Joint  Communication, 
while  others  have  been  added  subsequently  as  part  of  the  reflection  process,  including  the 
public consultation. 

The  options  considered  range  from  the  current  status  quo  (baseline),  i.e.  doing  nothing  to 
address identified needs, which is however discarded upfront, to adjusting existing financing 
mechanisms  within  or  outside the  general  budget  of  the  Union,  to  developing  an  EU  fully-
fledged  comprehensive  dedicated  financing  instrument.  The  options  consequently  imply 
different degrees of change to existing secondary legislation.  

Options  entail  different  timeframes:  short-,  mid-  and  long-term.  Favouring  a  short-term 
option  is  crucial  in  order  to  address  the  immediate  challenges.  A  short-term  option  would 
consist of an adoption by the Commission of a proposal in 2016. Mid- to long-term options 
would imply adoption of a proposal by the Commission at the earliest in 2018.61  

The  analysis  of  the  options  is  divided  into  two  broad  categories  according  to  the  source  of 
financing:  outside  the  general  budget  of  the  Union  and  within  the  general  budget  of  the 
Union.  

Options 4, 5 and 6 described below within the general budget of the Union would require the 
submission  of  a  legislative  proposal  by  the  Commission  to  the  co-legislators  and  would  be 
adopted through an ordinary legislative procedure. Option 7 would  require either individual 
and/or framework Council decisions. 

Options  outside  of  the  general  budget  of  the  Union  would  be  subject  to  different  adoption 
procedures. For example, changes to the African Peace Facility (option 1) would have to be 

61 This could take place as a possible follow up to the Mid-Term Review (MTR) of external action financing 
instruments, based on the recommendations of the MTR report due by the end of 2017. 

20 

 
 
 
                                                 
formalised through an amendment to Council Regulation 2015/322 involving a Commission 
proposal to be adopted by the Council.  

3.2. OPTIONS OUTSIDE THE GENERAL BUDGET OF THE UNION 

  Option  1:  Adapting  the  African  Peace  Facility  (APF):  This  option  would  seek  to 
address  limitations  linked  to  the  scope,  the  geographical  focus  and  the  APF’s  regional 
approach. 

  Option 2: A new dedicated instrument outside the general budget of the Union, could 
be comparable to the European Development Fund (EDF), but with a worldwide scope, 
so as to avoid the geographic limitations imposed by the EDF.  

  Option 3: Revision of the Athena mechanism:  A revision could seek to include costs 

incurred by partner countries in the costs covered by the Athena mechanism. 

3.3. OPTIONS WITHIN THE GENERAL BUDGET OF THE UNION 

  Option  4:  Adapting  an  existing  EU  instrument:  This  option  looks  into  the  possible 
adaptation  of  the  Instrument  contributing  to  Stability  and  Peace  (IcSP)  by  introducing 
new type of assistance measures within the scope of the IcSP Regulation. The adaptation 
of  other  external  actions  instruments  such  as  the  European  Neighbourhood  Instrument 
(ENI)  or  the  Development  Cooperation  Instrument  (DCI)  can  be  discarded  as  the  two 
latter  instruments  cannot  provide  the  requested  worldwide  scope  (DCI  covers  non-ACP 
developing countries and ENI is geared to EU neighbourhood countries).  

  Option 5: Facility based on existing EU instruments (e.g. DCI, ENI, IcSP): This option 
would  imply  drawing  on  existing  instruments  from  a  policy-perspective  and  financially 
and can be discarded up-front, since the instruments would need to be amended in order 
to allow for the use of the military as partners.  

  Option  6:  New  dedicated  instrument  based  on  Articles  209  and  212  TFEU:  This 
option would consist of developing a new EU external financing instrument designed to 
address the security development nexus including the military dimension of CBSD.  

  Option 7: New instrument based on Article 28 TEU under CFSP 

3.4. DESCRIPTION OF THE POLICY OPTIONS  

-  Options outside the general budget of the Union are: 

Option 1 – Adapting the African Peace Facility  

Outside  the  general  budget  of  the  Union,  the  European  Development  Fund  (EDF)  provides 
financial resources to implement the EU’s development cooperation policy with the African, 
Caribbean  and  Pacific  (ACP)  group  of  states  under  the  Cotonou  Partnership  Agreement.62 

62 Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the 
one part and the European Community and its Member States of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 
23.06.2000, revised in Luxembourg on 25 June 2005, revised in Ouagadougou on 22 June 2010 

21 

 
 
                                                 
The  African  Peace  Facility63  (APF)  was  set  up  in  2003  under  the  EDF;  it  is  to  date  the 
Union’s  most  far-reaching  instrument  to  address  the  security-development  nexus  in  Africa, 
also  providing  support  to  military  activities.  Nonetheless,  the  APF  remains  an  exceptional 
and  temporary  instrument  and  is  subject  to  a  number  of  limitations,  notably  in  its 
geographical and exclusively regional coverage. 

The  primary  purposes  of  the  APF  are  to  finance  African-led  military  peace  and  security 
operations and to provide support to the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and 
related initiatives under the Early Response Mechanism. The APF has a distinct continental 
and regional focus; its geographical scope is restricted to African countries that are members 
of the Cotonou Agreement, i.e. Sub-Saharan Africa, and its support is solely provided to or 
through  the  African  Union  and  African  regional  organisations,  not  bilaterally  to  individual 
States. Assistance to the military, including equipment, can be provided under the APF, only 
in  support  of  regional  operations:  multinational,  African-led  Peace  Support  Operations 
(PSOs). Furthermore, it is demand-driven, since EU financial support can only be considered 
at the request of the African Union. The procedure to provide funding under the APF is set 
out in Article 15 of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/322 for the current financial framework 
(2014-2020).64  The  list  of  non-eligible  APF  expenditure  includes  ammunition,  arms  and 
specific military equipment, spare parts for arms and military equipment, salaries and military 
training for soldiers.  

Making use of the African Peace Facility to finance training and equipment would require a 
redesign of the APF, which would have to be negotiated within the ACP-EU framework and 
with the African Union and its Commission, which manages the Facility. Modifications to the 
current  APF  would  have  to  be  formalised  through  an  amendment  to  Council  Regulation 
2015/322, following discussions with the African Union and its Commission, which manages 
the Facility. This latter process could be expected to take considerable time. 

In  addition,  considering  the  current  and  expected  budgetary  pressure  on  the  APF,  which 
seriously  challenges  its  financial  sustainability,  any  extension  of  its  scope  to  address 
additional  needs  would  likely  need  to  be  accompanied  by  an  increase  of  its  financial 
allocation under the EDF. 

Even if an adaptation of the APF in order to change its scope would be conceivable, funds 
could only be made available to countries, which are members of the ACP group. This means 
that the worldwide application, requested by EU Member States would not be possible.65  

Therefore,  although  amending  the  APF  to  make  it  more  operational  and  geared  to 
address possible needs in Africa could be envisaged, the inability to use it globally, leads 
this option to be discarded. 

63 Article 11 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement on “Peace building policies, conflict prevention and 
resolution” and the relevant Council conclusions provide the legal basis for the APF; Decision No 3/2003 of the 
ACP-EC Council of Ministers of 11 December 2003 on the use of resources from the long-term development 
envelope of the 9th EDF for the creation of a Peace Facility for Africa, OJ L 345, 31.12.2003 
64 See Article 15 of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/322, OJ L 58, 3.3.2015, p. 1.  
65 The APF is funded by the EDF, an instrument which is exclusively for countries who are party to the Cotonou 
Agreement. 

22 

 
 
                                                 
Option 2 – New dedicated instrument outside the general budget of the Union 
comparable to the European Development Fund (EDF) 

An ad hoc CBSD instrument outside the general budget of the Union could be designed with 
a  worldwide  geographical  scope  and  with  no  ex  ante  obligation  to  fulfil  OECD/DAC 
requirements  on  ODA.  It  could  support  CBSD  activities  of  civilian  and  military  actors.  It 
would be for the EU Member States to define possible limits on expenditure eligibility. These 
features,  combined,  would  give  the  new  instrument  the  flexibility  to  address  existing  needs 
anywhere. 

Such an extra-budgetary option could be operationalised in two different ways, either within 
the CFSP framework or within a separate ad hoc legal intergovernmental framework (i.e. an 
agreement  between  EU  Member  States  similar  to  that  establishing  the  EDF66).  Either  way, 
the operationalisation of this option would require a commitment from EU Member States to 
provide additional financial contributions. This would prove difficult to secure since in the 
current economic context, Member States have repeatedly expressed a preference for a 
solution that stays within the limits of the current budgetary allocations.  

Moreover, this option would require a unanimous agreement of the EU Member States (in the 
form of an international agreement between EU Member States and, consequently, be subject 
to  the  respective  lengthy  national  procedures  required  (e.g.  ratification),  unless  provisional 
application has been agreed. In view of the timing and the additional financial resources 
required, this option should be discarded.  

Option 3 – Revision of the Athena mechanism 

Operating expenditure (functioning and equipment) to which Common Security and Defence 
Policy  (CSDP)  military  operations  give  rise  cannot  be  financed  from  the  general  budget  of 
the  Union.  Costs  are  charged,  by  virtue  of  Article  41(2)  TEU,  to  the  Member  States,  in 
accordance with the Gross National Product Scale, unless the Council, acting unanimously, 
decides otherwise. 

By its Decision 2015/528 of 27 March 2015 establishing the Athena mechanism, the Council 
decided  that  the  Member  States  would  finance  the  sole  operating  expenditure  linked  to  the 
common costs of military operations.67 This means that, regardless of their participation in a 
given  CSDP  military  operation,  27  EU  Member  States  contribute  to  the  financing  of  the 
common costs of EU military operations through Athena on a GNP basis.  

The  remaining  expenditure  to  which  CSDP  military  operations  (non-common  costs)  are 
charged to the contributing Member States follows, in principle, according to the rule “costs 
lie  where  they  fall”.  These  common  costs  are  in  particular:  (a) headquarters  (HQ) 
implementation  and  running  costs,  including  travel,  IT  systems,  administration,  public 
information,  locally hired staff, Force Headquarters (FHQ)  deployment and lodging; (b) for 
forces  as  a  whole,  infrastructure,  medical  services  (in  theatre),  medical  evacuation, 

66 For the 11th EDF Internal Agreement, see OJ L 210, 6.8.2013, p. 1.  
67 All Member States contribute to the financing of the Athena mechanism with the exception of Denmark. 

23 

 
 
                                                 
identification,  acquisition  of  information  (satellite  images);  (c) reimbursements  to/from 
NATO or other organisations (e.g. the UN).68 

Although  the  possibility  of  amending  the  Athena  mechanism  to  cater  for  CBSD  needs  is 
implicitly  mentioned  in  the  Joint  Communication  on  CBSD,  extending  the  scope  of  the 
Athena mechanism to expenditure which is not linked to the functioning and the equipment 
of  military  CSDP  missions  would  completely  modify  the  nature  of  the  mechanism.  The 
Athena  mechanism  is  set  up,  by  virtue  of  Article  41(2)  TEU  for  the  benefit  of  EU  CSDP 
military  operations.  Athena  as  it  stands  now  is  not  an  instrument  for  the  benefit  of  third 
parties,  including  developing  countries.  Moreover,  Member  States  are  not  in  agreement 
with a possible review.69 This option should be consequently discarded. 

-  Options within the general budget of the Union are: 

Option 4 – Adapting the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace 

This option looks into the possible adaptation of the Instrument contributing to Stability and 
Peace (IcSP).  This  option would consist  of amending the IcSP Regulation by introducing a 
new type of assistance measures.  

The  review  of  other  external  actions  instruments  can  be  discarded:  the  review  of  the 
European  Neighbourhood  Instrument  (ENI)  and  the  Development  Cooperation  Instrument 
(DCI) would not address the requests by the Council for a flexible geographical scope, since 
both have a limited geographical scope. They are moreover subject to ODA directives.  

On  the  other  hand,  the  main  objectives  of  the  Instrument  contributing  to  Stability  and 
Peace  (IcSP,  2014-2020)  are:  i)  to  contribute  to  stability  (at  least  70%  of  funding),  ii)  to 
contribute to the prevention of conflicts and to ensure capacity and preparedness to address 
pre- and post-crisis situations and build peace (9% of funding), and iii) to address global and 
trans-regional threats to peace, international security and stability. 

The  scope  of  the  instrument  is  worldwide  and  its  interventions  are  not  bound  by  OECD 
ODA  criteria.  The  IcSP  is  based  on  Articles  209  and  212  TFEU.  While  Article  212  TFEU 
concerns  technical  cooperation  with  third  countries,  cooperation  with  developing  countries 
comes under the scope of Article 209 TFEU.  

The  IcSP  instrument  addresses  needs  that  cannot  otherwise  be  tackled  under  any  other 
instrument either because of (a) the urgency of the response, (b) the global or trans-regional 
nature of the problem, exceeding the scope of a geographic instrument; (c) the exclusion of 
the  supported  area  from  funding  under  ODA-bound  instruments  (e.g.  counter-terrorism),  or 
(d)  the  non-country  specific  nature  of  the  assistance  (e.g.  projects  to  develop  international 
standards or policies in the field of conflict prevention and peace-building). 

In order to respond to crisis and/or to rapidly intervene to preserve peace and prevent conflict, 
the IcSP instrument allows, inter alia, support for international state and non-state actors in 

68 When requested by the Operation Commander and approved by the Special Committee, Athena may also 
finance the following: (a) barracks and lodging/infrastructure, essential additional equipment, medical services, 
acquisition of information; (b) other critical theatre-level capabilities (demining, chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) protection, storage and destruction of weapons). 
69 Foreign Affairs Council (Defence formation) conclusions on CSDP, document 8971/15 of 18 May 2015 

24 

 
 
                                                 
promoting confidence-building, mediation, dialogue and reconciliation; the establishment and 
the functioning of interim administrations mandated in accordance with international law; the 
development  of  democratic,  pluralistic  state  institutions,  including  measures  to  enhance 
civilian  administrations  and  the  role  of  women;  international  criminal  tribunals  and  ad  hoc 
national  tribunals,  truth  and  reconciliation  commissions;  civilian  measures  related  to  the 
demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants into civil society as well as measures 
to  reintegrate  victims  of  armed  conflict  including  gender-based  violence  and  the  specific 
needs of women and children and measures in response to natural or man-made disasters in 
the absence of or as a complement to humanitarian assistance.  

the  security-development  nexus  within  a  civilian  context,  often 

Within  this  framework,  the  IcSP  has  funded  a  number  of  crisis-related  CBSD  actions 
in  a 
addressing 
complementary  way  to  civilian  CSDP  missions.  However,  its  current  provisions  do  not 
explicitly  allow  for  assistance  measures  that  involve  building  the  capacity  of  security 
actors, including the military. 

Therefore, bearing in  mind the nature of the IcSP, its objectives, the flexibility in its scope 
(thematic and geographic) and in its implementation/delivery mechanism (programmable, but 
also  non-programmable),  a  targeted  revision  of  the  IcSP  appears  as  the  most  appropriate 
short-term option to support CBSD actions today. 

An amendment to the IcSP Regulation would be limited to adding a new type of assistance 
measure allowing the instrument to address the current gap by enabling support to enhance 
the partners’ capacity to prevent, to prepare for and to respond to crises. This would be done 
in  particular  through  the  provision  of  training  and  equipment  to  military  forces  to  address 
urgent  short-term  as  well  as  medium-term  needs  in  the  context  of  the  achievement  of 
sustainable development, i.e. stable, inclusive and peaceful societies. The amendment of the 
IcSP  Regulation  would  be  a  transition  option  valid  up  to  the  end  of  the  current  Multi-
annual  Financial  Framework  (2020);  it  would  not  preclude  a  more  comprehensive 
approach to security sector reform. The mid-term review of external action instruments will 
offer  an  opportunity  to  look  critically  at  Union  instruments  and,  if  needed,  to  propose 
amendments to the corresponding regulations looking at value-added, relevance, coherence, 
complementarity  across  instruments  as  well  as  the  adequacy  to  the  evolving  context  and 
priorities. 

Option 5 – ‘Facility’ with existing EU instruments  

This option, which was mentioned in the Joint Communication of April 2015, would consist 
of  setting  up  a  dedicated  ‘facility’  linking  various  instruments  by  regrouping  and  bringing 
security elements to the forefront. The main feature of such an option is that it would draw on 
different resources from existing external financing instruments, notably: ENI, DCI and IcSP. 
Such a facility could take the form of a thematic trust fund.70  

A  dedicated  thematic  trust  fund  would  have  the  merit  of  allowing  Member  States  and 
potentially  other  donors  to  contribute  funds.  However,  this  assumes  a  wish  of  EU  Member 
States  to  contribute  additional  funding,  which  is  not  the  case.  Moreover,  since  an  EU  trust 

70 The provisions of the Financial Regulation (Article 187) allow for the creation of trust funds for emergency, 
post-emergency situations or for addressing a specific thematic issue, provided there is true value added to the 
Union intervention, and provided the trust fund brings clear visibility, managerial advantages and additionality. 

25 

 
 
                                                 
fund would not be a new instrument, but an implementing tool, it would still be bound by the 
requirements  of  the  basic  legal  acts  from  which  it  drew  the  funds,  although  the  bilateral 
contributions  from  other  donors/  EU  Member  States  would  not  be  bound  to  these 
requirements.  Establishing  a  thematic  trust  fund  to  support  CBSD  measures  would  require 
amending  several  existing  instruments,  since  instruments  do  not  explicitly  allow  for  the 
financing  of  all  security  actors.  The  complexity  of  this  option  would  therefore  not  be 
proportionate to address the identified gap and should be discarded. 

Option 6 – New dedicated instrument based on Articles 209 and 212  

A  dedicated  instrument  to  support  sustainable  development  by  means  of  support  to  the 
security sectors of third countries would serve, without any geographic limitation, the broader 
objective of supporting security and development flexibly and comprehensively, covering as 
many  interrelated  aspects  of  the  security  system  as  possible.  It  could  promote,  inter  alia, 
cooperation  to  support  capacity  building  of  the  security  sector,  including  military  actors  in 
order to foster stabilisation and development efforts.71  

A  dedicated  instrument  could  provide  a  more  comprehensive  and  holistic  approach  to 
security  and  development  within  the  security  sector  reform  policy  framework  than  the 
revision of the IcSP described above. Such a broader instrument could be, inter alia, a vehicle 
to  operationalise  the  Global  Strategy72  for  the  EU’s  foreign  and  security  policy  and  would 
also be linked more comprehensively to the European Agenda on Security.73 

This  option  would  require  proposing  a  new  Regulation  establishing  a  new  financing 
instrument.  However,  this  option  would  also  require  the  revision  of  a  number  of  existing 
instruments  which  include  programmes  dedicated  to  security  sector  reform  (e.g.  ENI,  DCI, 
IcSP)  in  different  fields  (e.g.  police  or  border  patrol  reform).  Bearing  in  mind  that  a 
proposal  for  a  new  instrument  larger  in  scope  should  only  be  explored  within  the 
context  of  the  MTR  of  the  external  financing  instruments  (i.e.  a  proposal  by  the 
Commission could be tabled at the earliest by 2018), this option should be discarded.  

Option 7 – New instrument based on Article 28 TEU under CFSP 

In case of need, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) chapter in the Treaty on 
European Union (Article 28 TEU), allows the Council to adopt decisions to preserve peace, 
prevent conflicts and strengthen international security in line with Article 21(2)(c) TEU. On 
this basis, the Council could adopt (on a proposal from the High Representative): 

-  a general instrument financed under the CFSP budget, setting out general rules on the 
eligibility  of  ‘capacity  building  in  support  of  security  and  development’  (CBSD) 
expenditure and related procedures. Such an instrument would be implemented on a 
case  by  case  basis  through  specific  Council  implementing  decisions  relating  to 
specific actions to be carried out in the concerned third States; or 

71 This could include adequate training facilities for third country security sector personnel and better structures 
of governance and civilian oversight in the defence sector which is essential for an effective EU intervention in 
terms of security sector reform. 
72 Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign 
and Security Policy, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, June 2016 
73 COM(2015) 185 final of 28 April 2015 

26 

 
 
                                                 
-  Decisions  setting  up  a  specific  instrument  tailored  to  a  specific  action  and  financed 

under the CFSP budget.  

This  option would require a general CFSP instrument (established by a Council framework 
Decision) and/or a specific Council decision adopted by unanimity. It would also require that 
the  necessary  funding  be  made  available  in  a  corresponding  budget  line  within  the  CFSP 
under  Heading  IV.  Nevertheless,  a  new  instrument  based  on  Article  28  TEU  would  be 
subject  to  the  limitations  under  Article  41(2)  TEU  and  should  consequently  be 
discarded.  

4.  COMPARISON OF THE POLICY OPTIONS AND ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACTS 

4.1. COMPARING THE OPTIONS 

The purpose of capacity building in support of security and development measures should be 
to allow the Union’s development efforts to be more effective by contributing to provide the 
necessary enabling environment, i.e. stable and secure societies, where all partners, including 
the military, play their role in supporting the respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of 
law and good governance principles.  

The  focus  of  CBSD  funding  should  be  restricted  to  those  elements  that  cannot  be  funded 
otherwise  under  the  currently  existing  instruments.  The  way  forward  should  not  be  used  to 
replace  what  is  currently  already  done  and  realised  under  the  CSDP  framework.  Rather,  it 
should  be  used  to  ensure  complementarity  between  CSDP  missions  and  operations  and 
Security  Sector  Reform  (SSR)  efforts  funded  under  other  instruments  (e.g.  the  EDF  or  the 
DCI),  thus  promoting  comprehensiveness  and  complementarity  between  ongoing  efforts  in 
the domain of security and development. 

It is important that the creation of a new instrument, or the adjustment of existing ones, do 
not  divert  funding  away  from  existing  measures  aimed  at  building  peace  and  preventing 
violent conflict in partner countries, including activities which are led by civil society actors. 

The main differences between the options relate to: 

  possibility  under  the  proposed  measure  to  react  flexibly  (i.e.  quickly)  and 

comprehensively (i.a. worldwide application); 

 

feasibility within budgetary constraints faced by Member States; and  

  ability  of  the  Commission  to  table  a  proposal  rapidly  and  prospects  for  entry  into 

force within a reasonable timeframe. 

In  light  of  the  analysis  above,  certain  conclusions  can  be  drawn  as  regards  the  main 
advantages and disadvantages of the various options presented: 

As  regards  the  options  outside  the  general  budget  of  the  Union,  they  all  have  several 
disadvantages,  also  in  light  of  the  expectations  expressed  by  Member  States.  These 
disadvantages  concern  the  scope  (ability  to  work  with  military  actors  and  geographic 
coverage) and also financial considerations. 

27 

 
 
 
The  APF  (option  1)  is  already  financially  stretched  and  its  use  for  CBSD  would  require 
additional  financing.  In  addition,  the  APF  is  only  applicable  to  ACP  Africa,  its  non-
worldwide  application  excludes  this  option  a  priori,  since  an  amendment  to  change  its 
geographical coverage would require prior discussions with the ACP side and its link with the 
Cotonou Agreement would only allow its use in ACP countries.  

Options  2  and  3  (new  dedicated  instrument  and  revision  of  the  Athena  mechanism)  would 
require additional financing to be provided by Member States. This would prove difficult to 
secure  since  in  the  current  economic  context,  Member  States  have  repeatedly  expressed  a 
preference for a solution that stays within the limits of existing budgetary allocations. These 
options can consequently not be considered at this stage. 

As regards the options within the general budget of the Union: 

Options  4  and  6  –  amending  an  existing  instrument(s)  or  designing  a  new  one/within  the 
general  budget  of  the  Union  –  compared  to  the  options  outside  the  Union  budget,  have  the 
advantage of: 

  evidencing a policy shift that would need to be endorsed by the co-legislators in the 

context of an ordinary legislative procedure;  

  staying within the current budget of the Union, albeit within the limits of the current 
MFF  under  Heading  IV,  making  them  much  more  likely  to  be  acceptable  to  the 
Council, since they would not require additional financial efforts by Member States;  

  being able to enter into force more quickly than the options outside the general budget 

of the Union. 

These considerations also apply to option 5 (‘Facility’ with existing instruments). However, 
option  5  would  require  not  only  tabling  a  new  proposal,  but  also  amending  not  one  but 
several  financing  instruments.  Finally  yet  importantly,  by  proposing  a  new  legal  act,  this 
option would not be in line with the principle of ‘simplification’. Option 5 should therefore 
be discarded. Creating a new instrument (option 6) is a longer-term option and it would also 
be contrary to the principle of simplification, by creating an additional legal act. Therefore, 
this option should also be discarded. 

Option 4, i.e. amendment of the IcSP would appear as the best option, because:  

 

 

 

threat: 

its  programming  and 

it  is  specifically  geared  to  flexibly  address  situations  where  peace  and  security  are 
under 
implementation  framework  provides  for 
exceptional  assistance  measures  and  interim  response  programmes  with  a  limited 
duration,  with  a  view  to  establishing  or  re-establishing  the  essential  conditions 
necessary for the effective implementation of the EU’s external cooperation policies. 

it allows to quickly and flexibly addressing crisis situation, i.e. to provide assistance 
in situations of crisis, or emerging crises to prevent conflicts, as well as assistance for 
conflict prevention, peace building and crisis preparedness; 

it has a worldwide geographic scope; it can address global and trans-regional threats 
to peace, international security and stability; 

28 

 
 
 

it is not bound by ODA requirements. 

Option 7, a new instrument based on Article 28 TEU should be discarded as it would not be 
able to pursue all of the objectives.  

29 

 
 
Analysis of the different options with regard to effectiveness, efficiency and coherence  

Outside the budget of the Union 

Within the budget of the Union 

Option 1: 
Review 
African 
Peace 
Facility 

Option 2: 
Instrument 
outside the 
general budget 
of the Union  

Option 3: 
Review of the 
Athena 
mechanism 

Option 4: 
Adaptation of the 
Instrument 
contributing to 
Stability and 
Peace 

Option 5: 
‘Facility’ 
within existing 
TFEU 
instruments  

Option 6: 
New TFEU 
based 
dedicated 
instrument 

Option 7: New 
TEU based 
instrument 
under CFSP 
budget 

+ 

- 

0 

Effectiveness (how effective 
an intervention is in terms of 
achieving its objectives) 

Efficiency/cost-effectiveness 
(measures what was / will be 
achieved and compares it to 
inputs/resources: financial, 
human, organisational) 
Coherence (how well the 
proposed intervention work 
both internally and externally 
with other EU policy 
objectives and with other 
initiatives and instruments) 

++ 

0 

- 

Total 

0 

+ 

+ 

0 

0 

+ 

+ 

+ 

+ 

+ 

0 

+ 

+++ 

++ 

+ 

0 

0 

+ 

0 

+ 

0 

+ 

30 

 
 
 
 
4.2. PREFERRED OPTION  

Following the comparative analysis above, the need to provide financing to all security actors in 
partner countries, including the military, would allow to complement the EU toolbox of external 
action instruments. This  is an urgent developmental and political priority. Therefore, a limited 
revision  of  the  IcSP  would  appear  the  most  effective  short-term  solution,  addressing  the 
issue  at  stake,  in  view  of  (i) timing,  (ii)  objectives,  (iii) geographical  coverage,  and 
(iv) flexibility in its implementation as a crisis instrument.  

A  revised  IcSP  Regulation  would  indicate  that  assistance  should  cover  support  for  measures 
aimed  at  building  and  strengthening  the  capacity  of  military  actors  of  partner  countries  to 
contribute  to  sustainable  development  and  in  particular  the  achievement  of  peaceful  and 
inclusive societies. The technical and financial assistance may cover in particular, the provision 
of  capacity  building  programmes  as  well  as  the  provision  of  non-lethal  equipment  and 
infrastructure  improvements.  For  example,  supporting  the  establishment  and  operation  of  a 
medical  facility  including  civilian  and  military  personnel  in  Somalia  would  be  possible  under 
this option, while this was not possible as shown during the pilot-project phase. Measures funded 
should  promote  that  military  actors  operate  in  accordance  with  international  law  and  promote 
and enforce human rights and the rule of law. 

Support to the military of third countries with EU instruments using Article 209 TFEU as a legal 
basis would remain exceptional. It would only be applicable in specific partner countries under 
clearly  defined  situations  where  building  the  capacity  of  the  military  serves  a  developmental 
goal.  

In terms of cost, a budget of EUR 100 million over the period 2017-2020 would be required. 
The initiative could be financed through redeployment within Heading IV of the general budget 
of the Union. No additional resources would be mobilised. Implementation will be governed by 
Regulation No 236/2014  laying  down common rules  and procedures for the implementation  of 
the  Union’s  instruments  for  financing  external  actions.74  The  amount  of  EUR  100  million  is 
based  on  a  projection  over  a  four-year  period  taking  into  account  the  size  of  projects  already 
identified.  This  amount  represents  a  marginal  percentage  within  Heading  IV.  The 
implementation of CBSD measures will hence not divert funding away from existing measures 
aimed at development that is more “traditional”.  

A comprehensive and long-term implementation of the CBSD initiative (i.e. including support to 
the  military  for  defence-related  purposes)  would  consequently  require  combining  a  budget 
instrument (for development tasks) with another, possibly extra-budgetary, mechanism. 

5.  MONITORING AND EVALUATION  

Monitoring  and  evaluation  modalities  are  laid  down  in  Regulation  No 236/2014  laying  down 
common rules  and  procedures for the  implementation of the Union’s instruments for financing 

74 OJ EU, L77, 15 March 2014, p. 95. 

31 

 
 
 
                                                 
external action75 that applies to all EU external financing instruments, including the Instrument 
contributing to Stability and Peace, which is the preferred option. Reporting modalities are also 
foreseen in this Regulation. 

Under all options, monitoring and evaluation modalities play an important role. EU Delegations, 
EEAS and Commission services will continuously monitor the implementation of CBSD projects 
with military actors including through field visits, providing managers valuable information on 
progress  or  lack  thereof  against  set  objectives  while  helping  to  identify/anticipate  potential 
difficulties  to  take  corrective  action.  External,  independent  experts  may  also  be  contracted  to 
assess and evaluate the performance of CBSD programmes. These assessments and evaluations, 
whether  internal  or  external,  will  contribute  to  accountability,  and  to  the  improvement  of 
ongoing  interventions;  they  will  also  draw  lessons  from  past  experiences  to  inform  future 
policies  and  actions  using  the  internationally-recognised  OECD-DAC  evaluation  criteria 
including (potential) impact. The results shall feedback into the programme design and resource 
allocation. 

75 Article 12 and Article 13, OJ EU, L77, 15 March 2014, p. 95. 

32 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
3.  ANNEXES 

These  sections  provide  an  overview  of  the  consultation  tools  that  have  been  used  for  this 
initiative. The tools include an Inception Impact Assessment, a public consultation and targeted 
consultations with relevant stakeholders, including EU Member States. It covers in particular the 
main trends emerging from the internet based public consultation as well as the views of several 
EU Member States as expressed in a non-paper. 

ANNEX 1: INCEPTION IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

The  Inception  Impact  Assessment  was  published  on  the  Commission’s  website  to  give 
stakeholders the opportunity to provide feedback.76 No feedback was received. 

ANNEX 2: PUBLIC CONSULTATION: OVERVIEW 

An online public consultation was launched on 1 April 2016 and closed on 27 May 2016. The 
aim  was  to  gather  views  from  the  public.  Seventy-eight  contributions  were  received. 
Respondents  were  to  a  large  extent  citizens/private  individuals  as  well  as  non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). 

Within  the  framework  of  this  public  consultation,  94%  of  the  respondents  agreed  that  an 
effective,  legitimate  and  accountable  security  sector  in  partner  countries  could  contribute  to 
peace,  human  security  and  sustainable  development;  88%  of  the  respondents  agreed  that  the 
security development nexus should be better integrated in EU support strategies in order to better 
contribute to sustainable  development  in partner countries; 85%  of the respondents agreed that 
strengthening  the  governance  of  military  actors,  particularly  in  fragile  countries  and  countries 
emerging  from conflict could lead to stability and the achievement of sustainable development 
goals. 

Regarding  other  aspects  (CBSD  purpose,  context  in  which  CBSD  support  could  be  deployed, 
geographical scope and possible type of CBSD activities), the majority of respondents expressed 
‘no  opinion’;  69%  favoured  the  sub-option  ‘nowhere’  when  it  comes  to  regions/partners 
countries of deployment and 59% favoured the sub-option ‘nothing’ when it comes to possible 
type of activities. 

A number of respondents questioned the format of the survey,  inter alia, stating that it did not 
allow for appropriate consideration of the breadth of factors that needed to be addressed. 

Specific contributions included the following points:  

-  The focus of CBSD funding should be restricted to those elements that cannot be funded 
otherwise  under  the  currently  existing  instruments.  A  possible  initiative  should  not  be 
used to replace what is already done and realised under the CSDP framework. Rather, it 
should be used to build effective linkages between CSDP missions and operations on the 
one  hand,  and  Security  Sector  Reform  (SSR)  efforts  funded  under  other  instruments  or 
thus  promoting 
the  DCI)  on 
mechanisms  (e.g. 

the  other  hand, 

the  EDF  or 

76 http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/roadmaps/docs/2016_fpi_002_capacity_building_security_development.pdf  

33 

 
 
 
                                                 
comprehensiveness  and  complementarity  between  ongoing  efforts  in  the  domain  of 
security and development77; 

-  Within the process of policy coherence and integration, there should be a clear division of 
labour  and  mandates  between  civilian  and  military  actors,  while  the  integrity  of  each 
policy area and their respective objectives and budget are safeguarded78; 

-  The  definition  of  security  is  wider  than  State  security  and  should  focus  primarily  on 
human security. Human security includes people-centred, multi-sectoral, comprehensive, 
context-specific and prevention-oriented approaches. This is especially the case when it is 
clear  that  without  security,  access  to  the  people  most  at  risk  of  being  left  behind  in 
conflict  settings  is  limited,  and  effective  outcomes  of  either  humanitarian  and 
development work are less likely79;  

-  The creation of a new funding instrument, or the adjustment of existing ones, should not 
divert  funding  away  from  existing  measures  aimed  at  building  peace  and  preventing 
violent  conflict  in  partner  countries,  including  those  activities  which  are  led  by  civil 
society actors80; 

-  CBSD funding should not be bound by ODA-eligibility criteria, as its rationale would be 
to  cover activities that cannot be funded under the development instruments because  of 
the restrictions posed by the DAC criteria.81 A focus on complementarity would also limit 
the  risk  of  a  ‘securitisation’  of  development  fund.  However,  it  is  important  that  the 
contribution that financing of military  actors can make  to  development processes  is not 
simply taken for granted. Instead, efforts should be made to ensure that the formulation of 
CBSD  actions  explicitly  builds  on  a  theory  of  change  on  how  it  can  contribute  to  the 
EU’s development objectives; 

-  Under the current EU external instruments framework, it is possible to work effectively 
towards  sustainable  peace  and  security  by  making  use  of  the  political  and  civilian 
potential  for  conflict  prevention  and  transformation  or  security  sector  reform;  civilian 
action and civil society efforts in the area of human rights and human security, rather than 
military capacities, should be strengthened82; 

-  A  number  of  contributions  highlighted  that  the  EU  should  support  civilian-led  peace-
building  efforts,  since  stabilisation  and  conflict  prevention  is  best  carried  by  civilian 
peace keepers83; EU financing for security should concentrate on diplomacy, mediation, 
enhancing  the  rule  of  law,  human  rights  and  peace-building,  and  other  non-military 
means to build sustainable security84;  

77 Public consultation: contribution by European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM)  
78 Public consultation: contribution by ACT Alliance Advocacy to the European Union  
79 Public consultation: contribution by VOICE 
80 Public consultation: contribution by European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) and by 
European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) 
81 Public consultation: contribution by European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) 
82 Public consultation: contribution by ACT Alliance Advocacy to the European Union 
83 Private citizen 
84 Ibid 

34 

 
 
                                                 
-  There are UN rules on whether and how to use military support to deliver humanitarian 
aid (Oslo guidelines for natural disasters and MCDA (Military and Civil Defence Assets) 
guidelines for conflict); if these rules are not followed, it risks to negatively impact the 
entire humanitarian endeavour85; blurring the lines between humanitarian aid and military 
action might not only put humanitarian staff at risk, by jeopardising their neutrality and 
independence, but also the humanitarian space as a whole86; 

-  The EU should focus on peacebuilding techniques to integrate young people into society. 
Education will help reduce the number of people whose only option seems to come with 
being  recruited  to  armed  forces.  Peace  education  would  be  particularly  useful87; 
peacebuilding activities that focus on young people offer the opportunity to address the 
needs of a group whose interests are often marginalised during conflict88;  

-  CBSD constitutes a high priority. It is important for the credibility of the EU to deliver on 
this issue. CBSD must tackle different kinds of security challenges and therefore has to 
encompass both military and civilian components. In the short term, the IcSP constitutes 
the  most  appropriate  tool  to  achieve  this  objective;  In  the  medium-term,  a  dedicated 
instrument89; 

-  The  link  between  security  and  development  and  the  support  to  partner  countries  and 
regional  organisations  (through  the  provision  of  training,  advice  and  non-lethal 
equipment) is important90. In order for partners to be able to prevent or manage crises by 
themselves,  necessary  support  can  include:  infrastructure  support,  CIS  (communication 
and  information  systems)  equipment,  logistics  support,  personal  equipment  and  non-
lethal  personal  protective  equipment  and  administrative  support  and  systems.  It  is 
important  to  maintain  a  clear  separation  of  military  and  humanitarian  actors  (the 
humanitarian space concept) for the purposes of supporting EU humanitarian action91. 

85 Public consultation: contribution by CARE France 
86 Public consultation: contribution by VOICE 
87 Private citizen 
88 Private citizen 
89 Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation of Belgium 
90 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade/Department of Defence, Ireland 
91 Ibid  

35 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
Capacity Building in Support of Security and Development 
(CBSD) - Online public consultation  

Questions Set 1 
No 1: Do you agree that an effective, legitimate and 
accountable security sector in partner countries could 
contribute to peace, human security and sustainable 
development? 
Agree 

Disagree 

Completely disagree  

No opinion  

Answer
s 

Rati
o 

73 

94% 

2 

1 

2 

3% 

1% 

3% 

No 2: Do you agree that the security-development nexus 
should be better integrated in EU support strategies in order 
to better contribute to sustainable development in partner 
countries? 

Answer
s  

Rati
o 

Agree 

Disagree 

Completely disagree  

No opinion  

69 

88% 

3 

4 

2 

4% 

5% 

3% 

No 4: Do you agree that there are gaps in addressing 
military capacity building in partner countries within the 
current EU financial framework, notably in the provision of 
non-lethal equipment and infrastructure, and that these 
gaps could undermine the effectiveness of the EU’s response 
to conflicts, crises and fragility? 

Agree 

Disagree 

Completely disagree  

No opinion  

No 5: Do you agree that Security Sector Reform (SSR) 
should cover both civilian (e.g. justice, police) and military 
aspects?  
Agree 

Disagree 

Completely disagree  

No opinion  

Questions Set II: In your opinion, on a scale from 1 (highest 
priority) to 5 (lowest priority) 

No 3: Do you agree that strengthening the governance of 
military actors, particularly in fragile countries and 
countries emerging from conflict could lead to stability and 
the achievement of sustainable development goals 

Answer
s 

Rati
o 

No 6: EU financial support to military actors in partner 
countries, should be used in: 

Crisis situations (including emerging crises) 

Agree 

Disagree 

Completely disagree  

No opinion  

66 

85% 

6 

4 

2 

8% 

5% 

3% 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

Answer
s  

Rati
o 

22 

7 

6 

37 

31% 

10% 

8% 

51% 

Answer
s 

Rati
o 

30 

3 

4 

41 

38% 

4% 

5% 

53% 

Answer
s  

Rati
o 

13 

17% 

2 

2 

7 

3% 

3% 

9% 

12 

15% 

36 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
No opinion  

Post crises situations 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

No opinion  

Stables contexts 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

No opinion  

42 

54% 

5 

11 

14% 

4 

2 

8 

8 

45 

7 

5 

4 

5 

12 

45 

5% 

3% 

10% 

10% 

58% 

9% 

6% 

5% 

6% 

15% 

58% 

No opinion  
Usefully complement EU efforts to support civilian security 
actors 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

No opinion  

Help in achieving more successful Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) processes 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

No 7: EU financial support to military actors in partner 
countries could:  

Answer
s  

Rati
o 

No opinion  

Enhance more effective coordination on the ground 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

No opinion  

Bring added value to EU CSDP training missions 

1 

2 

3 

4 

10 

13% 

5 

7 

3 

8 

45 

12 

2 

8 

3 

6% 

9% 

4% 

10% 

58% 

15% 

3% 

10% 

4% 

No 8: EU financial support to military actors in partner 
countries, in a situation of crisis, post crisis or in a 
stabilisation context, should aim to:  

Provide stability and security for sustainable development 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

No opinion  
Promote more accountable, legitimate and effective military 
actors 

8 

45 

11 

11 

4 

2 

6 

10% 

58% 

14% 

14% 

5% 

3% 

8% 

44 

56% 

12 

12 

2 

5 

5 

15% 

15% 

3% 

6% 

6% 

42 

54% 

Answer
s  

Rati
o 

20 

26% 

1 

4 

1 

10 

42 

1% 

5% 

1% 

13% 

54% 

37 

 
 
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
  
  
  
  
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

No opinion  
Support the EU’s humanitarian efforts 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

No opinion  

No 9: EU financial support to military actors in partner 
countries, in a situation of crisis, post crisis or in a 
stabilisation context, could be used in:  
Sub-Saharan Africa 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

No opinion  
EU neighbourhood countries 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

44 

56% 

13 

17% 

4 

4 

2 

14 

41 

6 

1 

9 

2 

17 

43 

5% 

5% 

3% 

18% 

53% 

8% 

1% 

12% 

3% 

22% 

55% 

49 

63% 

1 

1 

1 

16 

10 

1% 

1% 

1% 

21% 

13% 

13 

9 

6 

10 

40 

17% 

12% 

8% 

0% 

13% 

51% 

No opinion  
Sub-Saharan Africa and EU neighbourhood countries 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

13 

17% 

No opinion  

7 

5 

2 

11 

40 

9% 

6% 

3% 

14% 

51% 

All partner countries 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

Answer
s  

Rati
o 

No opinion  
Nowhere 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

No opinion  

8 

4 

5 

3 

14 

44 

9 

5 

4 

2 

10% 

5% 

6% 

4% 

18% 

56% 

12% 

6% 

5% 

3% 

14 

18% 

No 10: EU financial support to military actors in partner 
countries, in a situation of crisis, post crisis or in a 
stabilisation context, should consist of:  

Answer
s  

Rati
o 

Capacity building programmes (including training, 
mentoring and advice) 

1 

2 

15 

3 

19% 

4% 

38 

 
 
  
  
  
  
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
  
  
3 

4 

5 

No opinion  

Equipment (strictly non-lethal) 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

No opinion  
Infrastructure improvements (hospitals, training rooms, 
roads) 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

No opinion  

Allowances of actors involved in security 
policy/implementation (including salaries) 

5 

1 

11 

43 

6% 

1% 

14% 

55% 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

12 

15% 

No opinion  

2 

5 

2 

15 

42 

12 

8 

7 

1 

10 

40 

3% 

6% 

3% 

19% 

54% 

15% 

10% 

9% 

1% 

13% 

51% 

Improving communication between all actors involved in 
security policy/implementation 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

No opinion  

Nothing 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

No opinion  

3 

6 

7 

5 

17 

40 

4% 

8% 

9% 

6% 

22% 

51% 

13 

17% 

7 

6 

4 

11 

37 

46 

1 

1 

17 

13 

9% 

8% 

5% 

14% 

47% 

59% 

1% 

1% 

0% 

22% 

17% 

39 

 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
ANNEX 3: TARGETED CONSULTATION OF STAKEHOLDERS  

In  addition  to  the  Inception  Impact  Assessment  and  the  public  consultation  described  above, 
several meetings, workshops and seminars with relevant stakeholders to consider and exchange 
views  on  the  different  issues  concerned  by  this  initiative  took  place  over  2015.  This  section 
illustrates the main conclusions that can be drawn from those consultations: 

Civil  Society  Dialogue  Network  Policy  Meeting.  Capacity  building  in  support  of  security  and 
development: Gathering civil society input, Brussels, 12 March 2015 

This  workshop  brought  together  19  representatives  of  European  peacebuilding  civil  society 
organisations  (CSOs)  and  officials  from  both  the  European  Commission  and  the  European 
External  Action  Service  (EEAS)  to  gather  analysis  and  recommendations  on  the  issues  and 
approaches  involved  in  building  the  capacity  of  the  EU’s  partners  in  support  of  security  and 
development. The report of this workshop pointed to the following:  

  Capacity building in support of security and development in the EU’s partner countries is 

in the European interest;  

  There  are  expectations  that  the  debates  and  sensitivities  surrounding  security  and 
development  will  lead  to  an  implementation  which  has  real  impact  in  the  EU’s  partner 
countries; 

  The EU’s increased focus on conflict prevention is welcome; 
 

Investment in civil society’s ability to interact with institutions alongside support for the 
institutions themselves is important;  

  Capacity building has been focused on the ability of states to provide security and justice. 
One  way  of  implementing  the  EU’s  Comprehensive  Approach  and  increasing  the 
complementarity  of  CSDP  missions  and  other  EU  tools  could  be  by  increasing  both 
capacities  to  deliver  security  and  justice  whilst  also  increasing  the  demand  for  more 
effective delivery; 

  Capacity  building  is  about  building  relations  between  different  actors  and,  therefore,  it 
requires  trust  building,  which  cannot  happen  overnight.  Designing  support  for  capacity 
building must take this into account and allow for long-term, flexible approaches. 

European Parliament. Meeting of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence, Brussels, 28 May 
2015 

During this meeting, representatives of the European Commission and the EEAS presented the 
main  features  of  the  Joint  Communication  on  CBSD  recalling  that  from  a  development 
perspective the main underlying assumption is that poverty and lack of governance have direct 
consequences on partners’ security. Members who intervened supported the option of creating a 
specifically  dedicated  instrument  as  the  most  efficient  way  to  ensure  consistency  among  the 
scattered EU and Member States’ initiatives already addressing the development/security nexus 
while also underlining the need to strike a balance between development and security objectives.  

The  Commission  and  the  EEAS  concurred  that  there  is  no  intention  to  militarise  development 
aid,  and  that  the  assessment  of  risks  (notably  reputational)  is  crucial.  Beyond  the  CBSD 
initiative, it is important to continue working on good governance and building the capacity of 

40 

 
 
partner  countries,  which  goes  in  tandem  with  the  development  of  a  new  strategic  policy 
framework on security sector reform. 

European  Parliament.  Meeting  of  the  Committee  on  Development,  hearing  on  Security  and 
Development, Brussels, 30 November – 1 December 2015 

At the Committee meeting, the European Parliament Members drew attention, among others, to 
the  implementation  of  SDG  16  on  peace,  security  and  justice,  and  to  the  importance  of  the 
human  rights  approach  to  development  and  the  need  to  address  the  development-security  link. 
The  hearing  addressed  specifically  the  combined  challenges  of  security  and  development; 
Members  who  intervened  considered  that  funding  should  be  used  to  provide  not  only  training, 
but also equipment. 

ANNEX 4: ADDITIONAL VIEWS BY EU MEMBER STATES 

In a non-paper, dated 15 April 2016, ten EU Member States underlined the high priority attached 
by Member States to the implementation of the CBSD as well as the need for action to develop 
the EU’s ability to work with partners to strengthen their civilian and military security sector.92  

The ten Member States also emphasised that: 

 

In the short term, the IcSP, as a key external assistance instrument, constitutes the most 
appropriate tool to achieve the objective; 

  An instrument has a double leverage: first for short-term actions in response to situations 
of  crisis  and  second  for  long-term  capacity-building  of  organisations  engaged  in  crisis 
response and peace-building; 

  The IcSP has to be used to implement the CBSD pilot projects, including for the funding 

of equipment. 

92 See “Implementation of the CBSD initiative “, Food For Thought Paper by Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain (Brussels, 15 April 2016). 

41 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
ANNEX 5: LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 

ACP 

APF 

APSA   

CBSD   

CFSP   

CIS 

CPA 

Africa, Caribbean and Pacific 

African Peace Facility 

African Peace and Security Architecture 

Capacity building in support of security and development 

Common Foreign and Security Policy 

Communication and Information System 

Cotonou Partnership Agreement 

CSDP   

Common Security and Defence Policy  

CSO 

DAC 

DCI 

DDR 

Civil Society Organisation 

Development Assistance Committee 

Development Cooperation Instrument 

Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration 

EEAS   

European External Action Service 

EDF 

European Development Fund 

EIDHR 

European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 

ENI 

EU 

EUTM  

HRVP 

IcSP 

IPA 

IT 

JRC 

European Neighbourhood Instrument 

European Union 

European Union Training Mission 

High  Representative  of  the  Union  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  Security  Policy  / 
Vice-President of the Commission 

Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace 

Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance 

Information Technology 

European Commission’s Joint Research Centre 

MCDA 

Military and Civil Defence Assets 

MFF 

MTR 

Multiannual Financial Framework 

Mid-Term Review 

NATO  

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 

NGO 

ODA 

OECD  

OSCE   

Non-governmental Organisation 

Official Development Assistance 

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 

42 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PI 

PSO 

SDG 

SSR 

TEU 

Partnership Instrument 

Peace Support Operation 

Sustainable Development Goal 

Security Sector Reform 

Treaty on European Union 

TFEU   

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 

UN 

United Nations 

43