Norwegian residents of Indian origin : national and transnational integration.
Date: 2016-07-01
Institutions: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
Subjects: India, Norway, diaspora, economic development, immigration, integration of migrants, migrant, research report, social integration

Co-financed by the European Union

CARIM IndIA SeRIeSdevelopIng evIdenCe bASed MAnAgeMent And opeRAtIonS In IndIA-eU MIgRAtIon And pARtneRShIp (deMo: IndIA-eU MAp)   Norwegian residents of Indian origin National and transnational integration Helge Hiram Jensen Geir-Tore Brenne DEMO-India Research Report 2015/13EUI is Partner Institution of ICM  for the DEMO-India ProjectDEMO-India 
Developing Evidence based Management and Operations in 
India-EU Migration and Partnership 

Research Report 
Thematic Report 

DEMO-India RR 2015/13 

Norwegian residents of Indian origin 
National and transnational integration 

Helge Hiram Jensen * 

Geir-Tore Brenne ** 

* Associate professor at Kristiania University College, Dept. of Creativity and Innovation 
affiliated researcher at the European University Institute, Migration Policy Centre 
affiliated researcher at the University of Oslo, Dept. of Social Anthropology 
archivist at Alta Museum World Heritage Rock Art Centre 

** PhD candidate at the University of Oslo, Dept. of Sociology and Human Geography 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Any additional reproduction for 
other purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the Robert Schuman 
Centre for Advanced Studies. 
Requests should be addressed to mpc@eui.eu  

If cited or quoted, reference should be made as follows: 

Helge Hiram Jensen, Geir-Tore Brenne, Norwegian residents of Indian origin – National and 
transnational integration, DEMO-India RR 2015/13, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 
San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2015. 

The opinions expressed are those of the author(s) only and should not be considered as representative 
of the official position of the European Commission or of the European University Institute. 

© 2015, European University Institute 

ISBN: 978-92-9084-371-9 
doi:10.2870/83339 
Catalogue Number: QM-01-16-006-EN-N 

European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy 

http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
http://interact-project.eu/publications/ 
http://cadmus.eui.eu 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DEMO-India – Developing Evidence based Management and Operations in India-EU Migration 
and Partnership (DEMO: India-EU MaP) 

The Demo: India-EU MaP project, co-funded by the European Commission, is a continuation of the 
Carim India project (www.india-eu-migration.eu) and it examines the multiple facets of Indian 
migration to the EU. Its overall aim is to improve migration management between India and the EU, 
strengthen EU-India relations, and produce in-depth empirical knowledge about the different 
migration streams and pathways of Indian nationals in the EU. Its specific goals include providing: 

1. Evidence based research for more informed policy making and state intervention. 
2. Improved source country capacity in managing migration. 
3. Raising awareness among potential migrants of the risks of irregular migration.  
4. Collaboration with civil society groups.  
5. Empirical research and analysis of Indian communities across the EU, and their impact.  

The project is led by the Indian Centre for Migration in Delhi with the partnership of the Migration 
Policy Centre, RSCAS, EUI. 

For more information: 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (EUI) 
Villa Malafrasca 
Via Boccaccio 151 
50133 Florence 
Italy 
Tel: +39 055 46 85 817/892 
Fax: + 39 055 46 85 755 
Email: mpc@eui.eu 

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 

http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/ 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 

This report provides an overview of existing social science knowledge about Norwegian residents of 
Indian origin. This is relevant for policy makers in Europe and India, because the Norwegian case, in 
spite of its small size, is well documented. On this basis, the report theorizes how diasporas produce 
economic development. The report starts with a critical literature review, and proceeds with thematic 
chapters  on  history,  demography,  socio-economic  integration,  legal  framework,  and  socio-cultural 
integration.  For  each  topic,  the  report  summarizes  findings  from  all  existing  quantitative  and 
qualitative research, showing the Indian diaspora to be a particularly successful non-Western minority 
in  a  Western  host  country.  The  report,  therefore,  gives  some  sense  of  why  the  Indian  diaspora  in 
Norway  is  interpreted  as  successful  case  of  economic  and  cultural  integration.  But  the  report  also 
addresses the level of international integration, in economic and cultural terms, between the areas of 
arrival  and  the  areas  of  origin.  Pushing  beyond  the  limitations  of  methodological  nationalism,  the 
report conceptualizes diaspora communities as transnational social capital, which contribute to future 
economic  development,  within  the  historical  context  of  geographically  uneven  development.  The 
report  discusses  the  conceptual  implications  regarding  key  issues  like  internal  and  external 
colonialism, intersectional discrimination, national cultural plurality, and remittances as development 
strategy.  In  sum,  the  report  suggests  an  approach  for  future  diaspora  research.  The  phenomena  of 
socio-economic  and  socio-cultural  “integration”  should  be  discussed  not  only  within  a  national 
context,  as an issue  of  inclusion  within  a  host  nation,  but also  transnationally,  as  an issue  of ties  or 
even fellowship between different nations. 

Key  words:  Indian  diaspora,  international  integration,  socio-economic  integration,  socio-cultural 
integration 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table of contents 

1. Summary and introduction .................................................................................................................. 7 

2. Critical literature review ...................................................................................................................... 7 

2.1 Quantitative immigration research .......................................................................................... 8 

2.2 Qualitative immigration research ............................................................................................ 9 

2.3 “Giving voice” to subaltern subjects ..................................................................................... 10 

2.4 Common denominators across three strands of research ...................................................... 12 

2.5 Further directions? ................................................................................................................ 12 

3. History ............................................................................................................................................... 14 

3.1 Brief history: two waves of migration from India to Norway ............................................... 14 

3.2 Historical context: geographically uneven development ...................................................... 14 

3.2 Present historical situation for the Indian diaspora in Norway ............................................. 16 

4. Demography ...................................................................................................................................... 18 

4.1 The number of Norwegian residents with Indian origin ....................................................... 18 

4.2 Population increase over time ............................................................................................... 19 

4.3 Gender and age distribution .................................................................................................. 20 

4.4 Geographical settlement pattern ............................................................................................ 22 

4.5 Family structure .................................................................................................................... 26 

5. Socio-economic integration ............................................................................................................... 29 

5.1 Migration type ....................................................................................................................... 30 

5.2 Labor force participation ....................................................................................................... 31 

5.3 Occupation by economic sector ............................................................................................ 34 

5.4 Education among labor and family migrants and their offspring .......................................... 35 

5.5 Education among study migrants .......................................................................................... 38 

5.6 Marriage patterns: arranged marriage and family reunification ............................................ 41 

5.7 Gender and migration: intersectionality among Norwegian residents of Indian origin ........ 44 

5.8 Caste and migration: higher status in the community of origin ............................................ 45 

5.9 Remittances and social ties to India ...................................................................................... 46 

6. Legal framework ............................................................................................................................... 47 

6.1 Regulation of work migration ............................................................................................... 47 

6.2 Regulation of spouse and family migration .......................................................................... 49 

6.3 Regulations for international students ................................................................................... 51 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

 
 
 
7. Socio-cultural integration .................................................................................................................. 52 

7.1 Low prevalence of social problems – a function of integration ............................................ 53 

7.2 Cultural integration into the host nation: state, market and civil society .............................. 54 

7.3 Cultural integration in the diaspora: cultural and religious associations ............................... 56 

7.4 Norwegian mass media representations of the Indian community ........................................ 57 

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 58 

Sources and bibliography ...................................................................................................................... 60 

1. Literature on Norwegian residents of Indian origin ................................................................ 60 

2. Other sources used in this report ............................................................................................. 63 

Appendix 1. Education levels in the first wave of migration from India to Norway ............................ 67 

Appendix 2. Parental benefits, maternity leave and paternity leave ..................................................... 68 

Appendix 3. Brief review of how Indians in Norway are covered by the Norwegian media................... 69 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Summary and introduction 

The purpose of this report is to provide an overview of the existing social scientific knowledge about 
Norwegian  residents  of  Indian  origin.  With  increasing  economic  integration  between  India  and 
Europe, Norway accounts for only a fraction of the exchange of migration, capital and goods. But it is, 
nevertheless, relevant because it is a well-researched case. The Indian diaspora in Norway are often 
seen as a particularly successful example of diaspora from non-Western areas within Western Europe. 
In welfare policy terms, the group is seen as a particularly successful example of integration into the 
host  state,  and  as  such,  the  Indian  diaspora  has  received  special  attention  from  policy  makers. 
Immigrants from the “first wave”, which came to Norway from the 1960s up until the 1980s, are well 
established  with  employment,  small  business  entrepreneurship,  and  children  who  pursue  higher 
education, especially within the health professions. The “second wave” started at the very beginning of 
this century, and consists largely of highly-qualified technical and scientific personnel, many of whom 
work in the Norwegian petroleum industry. 

The report  has  seven  chapters:  (1)  this  introductory  summary;  (2)  a  critical  literature  review;  (3) 
then a historical overview; (4) a demographical overview: (5) a chapter on socio-economic integration; 
(6)  one  on  the  legal  framework  which  regulates  the  migration;  and  (7)  a  chapter  on  socio-cultural 
integration. The critical literature review suggests some new perspectives, which we have attempted to 
develop  in  the  report.  Thus,  the  historical  chapter  includes  a  transnational  history  of  geographically 
uneven  development.  The  chapters  on  socio-economic  integration  and  socio-cultural  integration 
include, meanwhile, debates about increasing transnational integration between nations, as well as the 
more traditional debate about the integration of diaspora groups into host nations. Our hope is that this 
new perspective will be found fruitful by researchers working on the Indian diaspora in various host 
countries,  or  alternatively  workers  on  other  diaspora  groups  in  Norway.  Most  of  the  data  behind 
employed here are registry data from Statistics Norway, and most of the findings are from secondary 
sources. In addition, we have carried out a pilot study on how the Norwegian mass media portrays the 
Indian diaspora, which is found in Appendix 3. One paragraph in the chapter on legal regulations is an 
extract from an earlier Carim-India report, written by ourselves. In the present report, the two authors 
have developed most of the thinking presented here together, though Jensen has written chapters 1, 2, 
3, 4, 5 and 7, and Appendix 2 and 3, while Brenne has written chapter 6 and Appendix 3.  

We  thank  Kathryn  Lum  for  useful  advice.  For  valuable  conversations  we  thank  Øyvind  Wiborg, 
Jana Sverdljuk, Abderrahim Mokhtarri, Sharam Alghasi, Wei Jiang and the journal Kontur. We also 
thank the past research project Cultural Complexity in the New Norway, at the University of Oslo, as 
well  as  the  discontinued  Gender,  Race  and  Sexuality  Working  Group,  at  the  European  University 
Institute.  For  office  facilities,  we  thank  Alta  Museum  World  Heritage  Rock  Art  Centre,  the 
Department of Social Anthropology at the University of Oslo, and the Oslo House of Literature.  

2. Critical literature review 

For  the  social  sciences,  Norwegian  residents  of  Indian  origin  constitute  a  small  matter  within  any 
research on living conditions among non-Western origin diaspora communities. Most existing writing 
is  to  be  found  within  Norwegian  “immigration  research”.  For  the  sake  of  convenience,  I  will  give 
separate  presentations  for  quantitative  and  qualitative  forms  of  immigration  research  regarding 
Indian-Norwegians.  However,  not  only  immigration research,  but  also some  other  research,  which  I 
will  characterize  as  attempts  at  “giving  voice”  to  subaltern  subjects  has  focused  on  Norwegian 
Indians. This literature review includes all the contributions that I have been able to find by searching 
through Bibsys and Oria, the national university library databases, as well as the database at Statistics 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

 
Helge Hiram Jensen, Geir-Tore Brenne  

Norway.1 In the following, I will first present all the contributions within each of the three fields of 
research mentioned above. I will, after, sum up some main findings from the research. In the end, a 
critical discussion will lead to suggestions for further research.  

2.1 Quantitative immigration research 

In quantitative “immigration research” in Norway, the Norwegian residents of Indian origin have been 
the  subject  of  special  interest  because  they  are  seen  as  a  successful  “immigrant  community”; 
successful  that  is  with  regard  to  the  main  concern  for  this  strand  of  research,  namely  social 
marginalization from or integration into the middle class majority in Norway. 

First, Statistics Norway has published a number of reports with descriptive statistics. These show 
some trends in the register data regarding the living conditions among immigrants, with comparisons 
across  selected  countries  of  origin,  including  India.  The  reports  focus  on  selected  topics,  such  as: 
demographic structure (Henriksen 2007; Pettersen 2009); economic conditions (Hirsch 2010; Epland 
and  Kirkeberg  2014;  Omholt  and  Strøm  2014);  marriage  patterns  (Wiik  2014;  Sandnes  and  Østby 
2015); crime rates (Skarðhamar, Thorsen and Henriksen 2011); and participation in electoral politics 
(Wiggen  and  Aalandslid  2014).  None  of  these  reports  takes  any  particular  interest  in  Norwegian 
residents  of  Indian  origin.  They  tend,  rather,  to  compare  living  conditions  across  ten  to  twenty 
different countries of origin. In this context, the Norwegian residents of Indian origin are largely seen 
as an example of a relatively successful immigrant group, with relatively good education, more high-
status  employment,  lower  levels  of  crime,  and  a  higher  level  of  political  participation.  The  reports 
from Statistics Norway tend to be rather descriptive, and they seldom address theoretical issues. There 
are,  for  example,  no  explanatory  analyses;  explanatory  models;  or  issues  of  conceptual  validity. 
Nevertheless,  Statistics  Norway  makes  its  register  data  available  for  social  researchers  who  inquire 
about such issues. 

Second,  some  university-based  quantitative  sociologists  are  building  upon  the  register  data  from 
Statistics Norway, in order to inquire into issues of causality or conceptual validity. They belong to an 
environment  of  researchers  who  take  a  special  interest  in  education  levels  as  an  indicator  of  social 
stratification  and  marginalization  (e.g.  Schou  2006,  2013;  Fekjær  2006;  Lervik  2010,  2012,  2014; 
Birkeland et al. 2014). In this context, researchers often discuss the reasons for marginalization versus 
integration,  when  comparing  various  ethnic  origins  or  various  class  positions  among  citizens.  To 
explain  such  differences,  the  researchers  debate  the  relative  weight  of  individual  choice  versus 
structural strains. One might see an implicit reference to the policy debate between Neoclassical and 
Marxian political economy, where the researchers serve social liberal or liberal socialist policies. They 
also  discuss  the  relative  weight  of  economic  determinants  versus  cultural  determinants,  where  one 
might see an implicit reference to other policy debates. Researchers refrain from “vulgar culturalism”, 
or  what  Edward  Said  (1978)  called  “orientalism”,  which  would assume  that  liberty  and equality  are 
specifically Western values, and that non-Western culture is against such values. However, they have 
also moved away from the one-sided application of economic models (be they Neoclassical or Marxist 
ones).  Thus,  more  recent  contributors  to  this  literature  emphasize  the  relevance  of  diaspora 
communities  and transnational  networks in  explaining  the  successful  integration  into the  Norwegian 
middle class of Norwegian residents of Indian or Pakistani origin (Lervik 2014a). 

Finally, it should be noted that all this research based on official register data is an ongoing fifteen-
year  long  process.  Until  the  turn  of  the  millennium,  sociologists  in  Norway  gave  relatively  little 
attention to  “ethnicity”, though  “class” and “gender” had been much studied in the post-war period. 
This  might  be  because  the  registration  of  ethnicity  had  historically  been  a  tool  for  the  racist 

1 This sampling technique is not infallible. Aarset (2015) had not yet been included in the search database at the 
moment of searching. Ananthakrishnan (1987) was registered, but hard to access. The examples indicate that 
errors might occur when library searching systems are used to indicate the extension of a discourse.  

8 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

                                                      
Norwegian residents of Indian origin – National and transnational integration 

administration of national minorities and indigenous peoples (Søby 2014). However, this data has also 
been used by the ethnically marginalized as a tool for emancipation (ibidem). In the late 1960s, when 
Norway began to receive labor migrants from India and other non-western countries, the official state 
registers  had  no  procedures  to  observe  the  living  conditions  of  these  new  residents.  Thus,  it  was  a 
religious  association  for  Lutheran  diakonia  (Diakonhjemmet  University  High  School)  which  carried 
out  the  pioneering  socio-economic  studies  of  living  conditions  among  the  first  labor  migrants  from 
non-western countries, such as India (Bø 1979a, 1979b, 1980). Some social historians have tried to fill 
in the missing pieces regarding the 1980s and 1990s, by combining an eclectic mix of various register 
data from Statistics Norway (Wist 2000). When we observe the social conditions of scientific practice, 
the quantitative immigration research in Norway can be identified (to use Foucault’s expression) as a 
“discursive  formation”  and  a  particular  institutional  practice.  The  reports  from  Statistics  Norway 
constitute  its  core,  and  as  they  avoid  addressing  contested  theories,  they  may  implicitly  apply 
hegemonic  theories.  The  early  attempts  by  non-state  actors  to  gather  socio-economic  data  on 
immigrants, as well as the historian’s attempt to gather historical statistics from various sources, may 
be seen as entrepreneurial attempts to empower the emancipatory potential of quantitative immigration 
research. 

2.2 Qualitative immigration research 

Within qualitative “immigration research” in Norway, the Norwegian residents of Indian origin have 
received  less  attention  than  the  overlapping  categories  of  the  Punjabi  and  Sikh  diaspora.  These 
researchers  inquire  into  specificity  rather  than  regularity,  and,  thus,  they  are  less  interested  in 
comparisons  across  various  countries  of  origin,  and  more  interested  in  particular  diaspora 
communities.  Such  diaspora  communities  may  be  organized  according  to  country  of  origin (such  as 
India)., They may, though, equally be organized by region of origin (such as Punjab) or by confession 
(e.g. Sikh, Hindu or Christian). 

First, some social anthropologists took interest in the first wave of labor migration to Norway from 
India,  Pakistan  and  other  non-Western  countries.  The  newly  arrived  migrants  received  visits  from 
Norwegians who had carried out participant observation in the relevant countries of origin. The first 
Norwegian  residents  of  Indian  origin  were  few  in  number,  mostly  settled  in  one  particular  town  in 
Norway,  Drammen,  and  all  originated  from  one  particular  region  in  India,  Punjab.  Thus,  it  was 
possible  to  employ  participant  observation  as  a  method  to  study  the  life  of  this  diaspora  within  the 
local environments at both ends of their migration route (Kramer 1979a, 1979b, 1979c, 1980a, 1980b, 
1980c,  1980d;  Tambs-Lyche  1979a,  1979b).  Since  Punjab  had  been  divided  between  India  and 
Pakistan  in  1949,  research  on  labor  migration  from  Indian  Punjab  was  compared  with  similar 
migration  from  Pakistani’s  Punjab  (Aase  1979a,  1979b,  1991).  Among  the  interesting  observations 
one  can  mention  that  Drammen  1979  found  that  the  memories  of  sectarian  conflict  in  Punjab  1949 
were recent and painful. They prevented much social integration between immigrants from Pakistani 
Punjab, who were mostly Moslem, and the Indian Punjab, who were mostly Hindus or Sikhs (Kramer 
1979a: 147-148). It might also be mentioned that among the first Norwegian residents of Indian origin, 
the ethnographer met many individuals who had found occupations in Norway below what, in class 
and education terms, they might have expected in India (see e.g. Kramer 1979a: 150). For more about 
the latter issue, see Appendix 1. 

Secondly, there has been one pilot study carried out about the second wave of labor migration from 
India to Norway, in the last fifteen years, many migrants from which settled in Stavanger, a town with 
a  large  oil  industry  (Staurland  2012).  The  interview  data  in  the  thesis  may  be  used  to  suggest 
hypotheses  for  further  research:  though  the  concluding  chapter  seems  rather  “national  romantic”  by 
assuming the existence of coherent national cultures in Norway and India. 

Thirdly,  some  religious  studies  researchers  have  inquired  into  diaspora  communities  that  are 
maintained  through  religious  associations.  For  the  present  report,  I  have  done  an  unsystematic 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

9 

Helge Hiram Jensen, Geir-Tore Brenne  

literature  search  for  published  research  regarding  the  relevant  religious  diaspora  communities  in 
Norway. This literature search does not indicate much about the extension of this field of research, but 
it shows that it contains substantial contributions. Most of the Hindu and Sikh Norwegian residents do 
have  Indian  origins,  but  some  are  from  other  countries.  In  addition,  there  are  some  Norwegian 
residents of Indian origin belong to other religions, including Christianity (e.g. Bettum 2007; Jacobsen 
2008, 2011). 

Fourth,  some  research  within  media  studies  deals  with  the  symbolic  representation  of  “India” 
within  the  Norwegian  mass  media:  though  this  is  not  the  same  as  symbolic  representation  of 
Norwegian residents of Indian origin (Eide 2002, 2005). 

Fifth, some historians and sociologists have combined quantitative and qualitative data in order to 
reconstruct a particular historical process or a regular causal mechanism. In my review of quantitative 
studies above, I  mentioned one historian and one sociologist who have compared the life courses of 
Norwegian  residents  of  Indian  and  Pakistani  origin.  Both  used  quantitative  register  data  in  order  to 
“zoom out” on some general patterns, and both employed qualitative life story interviews in order to 
“zoom in” on some particular causal links or mechanisms (Wist 2000, Lervik 2014). The Norwegian 
residents of Indian origin are also covered in the last volume of a three-volume work on the history of 
immigration to Norway with less attention to particular causal mechanisms, but more attention to the 
wider historical process (Tjelmeland 2003, and Brochman 2003 in Kjeldstadli 2003c: 130, 215, 370, 
and also: 42, 68, 105, 151, 245). The authors build on secondary sources regarding the first wave of 
migration  from  India  to  Norway,  both  the  pioneering  socio-economic  surveys  (Bø  1979a,  1979b, 
1980),  and  the  early  transnational  social  anthropology  (Kramer  1979a,  1979b,  1980).  Modern 
immigration from India and other non-Western countries is seen, in these three volumes in the context 
of all immigration to Norway throughout the entire history of the Norwegian state (Kjeldstadli 2003a, 
2003b). 

Finally, qualitative immigration research seems to be a rather coherent “discoursive formation” or 
institutional  arrangement,  which  has  emerged  out  of  social  anthropological  research  on  the  first 
modern  diasporas  to  Norway  in  the  1970s.  The  advances  within  this  strand  of  research  challenges 
“methodological  nationalism”  as  a  premise  in  social  science  research.  With  the  exception  of  one 
singular  study,  with  a  “national  romantic”  concept  of  culture,  the  main  thrust  has  been  towards  the 
rediscovery of pluralism within national communities (of origin as well as settlement), combined with 
the discovery of the actual pluralism of transnational diaspora communities 

2.3 “Giving voice” to subaltern subjects 

At the fringes of institutionalized social science are subjectivist gender studies and similar attempts at 
giving  voice  to  subaltern  persons  themselves.  As  observed  by  quantitative  immigration  researchers, 
Norwegian  residents  of  Indian  origin  include  many  middle  class  persons  who  are  emphatically  not 
subaltern.  Nevertheless,  even  the  Indian  diaspora  in  Norway  includes  persons  who  have  been 
mobilized by attempts to give voices to persons who find themselves in a marginalized social position 
because of gender, class, or simply because their skin color is associated with the old colonies.  

First, some gender studies researchers has inquired into the life histories of young adults of South 
Asian origin, in order to understand arranged marriages (Bredal 2006). This study includes six persons 
of  Indian  origin  (ibidem:  139).  Theoretically,  the  author  is  sympathetic  to  a  form  of  “third  world” 
feminism that sees “cultures” as internally contested (ibidem: 299), and she certainly aims at giving a 
voice to her subjects. However, one might wonder if there might be some implicit cultural essentialism 
in  her  research  design,  which  is  to  observe  individual  experiences  about  marriage  practices  that  are 
assumed to be generally South Asian. 

Second, some research within nursing and the health science has gathered a number of personal life 
histories about aging, social wellbeing and health among women who migrated from India to Norway 

10 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

Norwegian residents of Indian origin – National and transnational integration 

in the 1970s (Sharma 2009). The interviews are put into context by the researcher’s own experience as 
a highly-educated Indian woman who has migrated to Norway, within the framework of an explorative 
or  hypothesis-generative  research  design.  This  study  is  framed  as  health  research,  but  it  might  also 
stand  as  gender  research,  because  Madhu  Sharma  utilizes  her  particular  standpoint  as  an 
epistemological resource, enabling her as a non-white woman to give voice to other non-white women 
with similar experiences.2 

Third, some journalistic contributions, as academic works on gender or health, also aim at  giving 
voice to human beings. One collection of edited life histories, including the stories of three Indians, 
was published after the first wave of labor immigration from the “third world” (Ytre-Arne 1986). One 
of the Indian youngsters who contributed to that book (Brenna 1986), would grow up to become an 
author  of  several  books  with  a  public  voice.  She  also  wrote  about  her  personal  experiences  as  an 
“immigrant  woman”  of  Indian  origin  in  Norway  (Brenna  2012).  These  life  histories  revolve  around 
issues of freedom and cultural conventions, similar to the aforementioned example of gender studies. 
Notably, Brenna (2012) is a Norwegian woman of Indian origin who grew up to speak for herself in 
public.  Another  autobiography  of  a  younger  woman  of  Indian  origin  was  published  the  same  year 
(Kaur 2012). Prableen Kaur is active in the Oslo Labor Party and local Sikh associations. She became 
famous in 2011, when she blogged about her experience as a survivor after the 22 July massacre, a 
right-wing  extremist  attack  on  children  and  youngsters  in  the  Norwegian  Labor  Party  (Kaur  2011). 
Both Kaur and Brenna are vocal and empowered women of color. It should also be noted that from 
1994  until  2000  there  was  also  a  newspaper  for  and  about  Norwegian  residents  of  Indian  origin 
(Immigrant  times  –  Voice  of  Indian  Immigrants).  This  has  been  archived  by  the  library  of  the 
University of Oslo, but it is written in a language that I cannot read. 

Fourth, one may or may not consider it relevant to include personal experiences narrated in a more 
or  less  “fictional”  format,  which  also,  as  with  gender  studies,  health  studies  and  journalistic 
contributions, can give voice to subjects. The “immigrant literature” in Western Europe includes a few 
books  about  what  it  means  to  be  a  Norwegian  resident  of  Indian  origin  (Gill  2008,  2011;  Naveen 
2010). Judged as literature, such books may be rather didactic: though judged as science, their method 
might  be  hard  to  replicate.  At  least  some  of  these  novels  (Gill 2008,  2011) can  be  defined  within a 
specific tradition, namely social socialist realism, which is a method of artistic inquiry with defined 
esthetic and didactic criteria. 

Finally,  I  will  observe  that  these  attempts  to  give  voice  to  neglected  subjects  do  not  constitute  a 
unified “discursive formation” or institutional arrangement. Rather, they are dispersed  across various 
discursive  practices.  An  explicit  epistemological  foundation  for  the  usage  of  personal  experience  is 
found  within  academic  gender  studies,  e.g.  by  the  feminist  epistemologist  Karin  Widerberg  (1995). 
However, with regard to Norwegian residents of Indian origin, it is through health science that a non-
white woman (Sharma 2009) speaks for non-white women like herself. In gender studies, meanwhile, 
a  white  woman  (Bredal  2006)  attempts  to  speak  on  behalf  of  non-white  women.  Outside  academic 
discourse,  some  Indian-Norwegian  woman  also  speak  for  themselves  in  journalistic  pieces  (Kaur 
2011,  2012;  Brenna  2012)  and  social  realist  literature  (Naveen  2010).  The  point  with  feminist 
epistemology,  however,  is  a  combined  attention  to  both  subjective  experience  and  objective 
environment. I certainly wonder whether Madhu Sharma’s applied health science does not indicate a 
path for intersectional emancipatory efforts among Norwegian residents of Indian origin.  

2 With what words can we refer to persons who are targeted by racial discrimination – without using the terms of 
racial discrimination? Racial discrimination can be real, even though “races” are not real. This report uses the 
terms “non-white people” and “people of color”. These terms are awkward, but the alternatives may be even 
worse. (See also Chapters 5.2, footnote 4, and 5.7, footnote 5.) 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

11 

                                                      
Helge Hiram Jensen, Geir-Tore Brenne  

2.4 Common denominators across three strands of research 

For  all  three  strands  of  social  research  that  have  been  reviewed  here, a  common  denominator is the 
attempt to serve emancipation, either via state policies, or via civil activism. I started by reviewing the 
research  that  is  at  the  core  of  institutionalized  policy,  namely  descriptive  reports  from  Statistics 
Norway.  These  are  based  on  official  state  registries,  which  are  the  product  of  state  policies.  I  have 
concluded by reviewing the research at the fringe of institutionalized policy: the attempts to give voice 
to  neglected  subjects,  not  only  through  the  social  sciences,  but  also  journalism  and  fiction,  helps 
convey  experiences  that  are  autonomous  of  institutionalized  science  or  politics.  Between  those  two 
extremes, I have reviewed a wide range of studies of Norwegian residents of Indian origin.  

For quantitative immigration research, the Norwegian residents of Indian origin are interesting as 
an  example  of  particularly  successful  integration  into  the  Norwegian  middle  class  majority.  The 
conditions are described by Statistics Norway, and explanations sought by academic research. Within 
qualitative immigration  research,  there has been  a focus  on transnational life  histories  which  reveal 
complex social mobility within the Indian and Norwegian middle classes: in both countries research 
has brought to the surface a history of cultural pluralism and migration.  

For attempts at “giving voice” to subaltern subjects, the Norwegian residents of Indian origin have 
received attention because women of South-Asian origin – women of color – seldom have a voice in 
the Norwegian public debate, and it is often assumed that they need help – or even patronage.  

All three strands of research share a commitment to social welfare issues, rather than, for example, 
asking how labor migration may be beneficial for economic growth. Researchers are mainly interested 
in  social  marginalization  versus  social  integration,  in  three  categories  class/caste,  gender/sex  and 
ethnicity/race.  Some  seek  explanations  in  Marxist  economism  (e.g.  Schou  2006)  and  some  in 
“national-romantic”  culturalism  (e.g.  Staurland  2012).  However,  most  have  moved  towards  a 
combination  of  neoliberal  “choice”  models  with  Marxist  “structural”  models.  They,  then,  combine 
these economic models with refined cultural theories, reading family ties and religious associations as 
“social capital” (e.g. Sharma 2009; Wist 2000; Lervik 2014). There has been a significant progress in 
knowledge about Norwegian residents of Indian origin. 

2.5 Further directions?  

One  possible  further  direction  could  be  for  social  scientists  to  combine  their  commitment  to  social 
welfare with an interest in economic growth. That would not only be beneficial for the host country 
and  for  the  country  of  origin.  It  might  also  potentially  have  an  emancipatory  effect  on  subaltern 
subjects. In particular, I would suggest more attention to geographically uneven development, within 
states as well as between them. In international law, development is a collective human right, which is 
relevant  for  emerging  economies,  and  also,  for  marginalized  groups  within  industrialized  or 
developing countries.  

In “giving voice” to subaltern subjects, it would be useful for the scholarship to pay more attention 
to how non-white women may experience racial and sexual discrimination. This discrimination may 
come in an open “hostile” form, but also in a well-intended “benevolent” form (Crenshaw 1999). Such 
intersectional  sensitivity  to  the  racism/sexism  nexus  is  hardly  visible  in  the  research  on  Norwegian 
residents of Indian origin, with one exception: Madhu Sharma (2009), the only Indian women among 
the  authors,  is  also  the  only  author  to  seriously  address  personal  experiences  of  racism.  Her  health 
research might be seen as a materially oriented version of the intersectionality approach, which some 
cultural  researchers  have  applied  in  the  study  of  other  diaspora  communities  in  Norway  (e.g.  Berg, 
Flemmen and Gullikstad 2010; Sverdljuk 2013, 2014). 

It  may  be  relevant  for  immigration  research  (both  quantitative  and  qualitative)  to  interpret 
contemporary labor immigration to Europe in the context of its past labor emigration; and similarly, to 
imposed 
see 

the  emerging  economies  of 

the  context  of  colonially 

the  present 

time 

in 

12 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

Norwegian residents of Indian origin – National and transnational integration 

underdevelopment in the past. Norway not only has a long history of immigration (Kjeldstadli 2003a, 
2003b,  2013c),  but  also  a  history  of  mass  emigration  (Østrem  2006).  While  some  emigrated  to 
America, others migrated internally, to indigenous Sámi areas under Norwegian control, which were 
re-defined as “Colonie” (Pedersen 1999). Colonial history helps us explain contemporary migration in 
several ways. In the context of comparative history, it is relevant that India, after its liberation from 
Britain,  must  overcome  its  own  legacy  of  internal  colonization  (Routledge  1993).  In  the  context  of 
transnational  history,  it  is  relevant  that  some  members  of  the  Norwegian  elite  in  fact  emigrated  to 
India, in order to serve the administration of Denmark-Norway’s colony Trankebar in south-east India 
(Feldbæk 1990). Researching migration within a context of uneven development helps emphasize the 
socio-economic  aspect  of  a  problematic  where  other  critiques  of  immigration  research  have 
emphasized  the  socio-cultural  side.  The  latter  group  consists  of  experts  on  “nation  building”,  as  an 
open-ended  process  of  making  and  maintaining  communities.  These  researchers  wonder  why 
immigration  researchers  define  minorities  as  the  problem  in  isolation  from  the  majority,  though  all 
minorities  are  defined  as  such  in  contrast  to  some  majority.  Thus,  immigration  research  implicitly 
defines  the  host  community  in  terms  of  popular  political  myths,  rather  than  empirical  knowledge 
(Bauböck 2008; Eriksen and Hoëm 1999). In the historical nation building process, the socio-cultural 
aspect  was  the  making  and  maintenance  of  community  –  but  the  socio-economic  aspect  was 
geographically uneven development. 

My suggestions build, in fact, on one specific school of Indian social science, which has produced 
fresh  insights  on:  decolonization  (Chakrabarty  2000);  national  disunity  (Chatterjee  1996);  and  the 
voice  of  subaltern  subjects  (Spivak  1988).  The  main  point  is  to  widen  the  thematic  scope  of  social 
sciences with Norwegian residents of Indian origin: the existing commitment to social welfare could 
be complimented with an interest in economic growth, with a background of geographically uneven 
economic  development.  Existing  research  has  shown  that  Norwegian  residents  of  Indian  origin  are 
relatively  successful  and  consequently,  that  they  tend  to  be  resources  rather  than  clients.  Still, 
according  to  others,  some  members  of  this  group  may  consider  themselves  to  be  marginalized.  The 
distinction between success and subaltern position is not straightforward. An example. A woman from 
an upper caste with a university degree may find herself an immigrant, with a job she is overqualified 
for, experiencing discrimination, and fearing future widowhood, not knowing what to expect from the 
welfare  state.  Her  situation  would  be  relative  deprivation,  not  poverty.  There  are  several  issues  that 
remain under-documented regarding Norwegian residents of Indian origin, and consequently, there are 
segments within this group who lack a voice and attention within research and policy. 

One  issue  that  remains  badly  documented  is  the  composition  and  origin  of  the  second  peak  of 
migration  from  India  to  Norway,  which  took  place  just  after  2000.  We  have  much  more  detailed 
knowledge about the first wave of migration from India to Norway during the 1970s. One reason for this 
bias  is  simply  that  the  first  wave  was  smaller  in  number  and  more  geographically  concentrated. 
Consequently,  it  was  possible  to  describe  the  diaspora  as  a  whole  by  applying  fieldwork  methods  of 
social  anthropology.  The  latter  wave  is  larger  in  number,  and  is  more  scattered  in  terms  of  region  of 
settlement, and perhaps also region of origin. Since much of the second wave consists of highly-qualified 
workers in the petroleum industry, better knowledge about this diaspora matters. It would be of relevance 
for  the  affected  individuals  and  families,  but  also  for  policy  makers  who  are  committed  to  capitalist 
growth and mutual “comparative advantages” between India and the European Economic Area. 

Another  issue  that  is  poorly  documented  are  the  remittances  sent  from  the  Indian  diaspora  in 
Norway  back  to  their  community  of  origin  in  India.  Statistics  Norway  gathers  economic  data  about 
trade  and  business  ownership  that  integrate  Norway  and  India,  and  also  various  socio-economic 
integration indicators for the Indian diaspora as it joins the middle class majority in Norway. It gives, 
though, less attention to the transnational household of transnational family businesses. This may be 
seen  as  a  state-and-market-bias,  which  overlooks  the  actual  economic  practices  that  are  non-market 
and non-state. It may be significant, however, for economic development in regions like Punjab and 
minorities like the Indian diaspora. Better measurement of remittances sent from the Indian diaspora 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

13 

Helge Hiram Jensen, Geir-Tore Brenne  

back to India would be relevant not only for small business owners and for the transnational families 
themselves.  It  might  also  prove  useful  for  policy  makers  who  are  committed  to  social  liberal 
inclusiveness, regionally balanced development within and between nations, and the maintenance of 
social legitimacy for the Indian state and the European Economic Area. 

3. History 

This chapter presents a brief history of immigration from India to Norway (3.1), but also its context 
within long-term transnational history (3.2). This will allow for a discussion of the present historical 
situation  of  Norwegian  residents  of  Indian  origin  (3.3).  History  is  not  merely  a  collection  of  facts, 
because  the  facts  are  presented  in  an  order  according  to  assumptions  about  how  one  thing  leads  to 
another.  The  present  chapters  contextualize  the  facts  in  order  to  provide  understanding  of  causal 
interaction  between  transnational  migrations,  on  the  one  hand,  and  geographically  uneven 
development on the other. Such a perspective was suggested at the end of the literature review in the 
previous chapter.  

3.1 Brief history: two waves of migration from India to Norway 

There have been two significant waves of migration from India to Norway. The first wave was in the 
1970s, and consisted mainly of labor migrants who found employment in the industrial or agricultural 
sectors.  This  started  when  Britain  began  to  restrict  immigration  from  India  (a  former  colony),  and 
some emigrants from India happened to end up in Norway (Wist 2000). Many of them came from the 
Indian  Punjab,  and  settled  in  the  Drammen  urban  region  (Kramer  1979a;  Wist  2000;  Kjeldstadli 
2003c; Tjelmeland 2003: 129). Chain migration included further arrivals through family reunification. 
The  second  wave  began  after  2000,  and  it  consists  mainly  of  labor  migrants,  who  find  work  in  the 
computing  or  engineering  sector.  Many  of  them  have  settled  in  Stavanger,  the  main  hub  for  the 
Norwegian oil and gas industry (Pettersen 2009). Data are scarce about their area of origin in India. 
The  first  wave  of  migrants  settled  down  with  families,  often  using  the  opportunity  for  family 
migration. The second wave of migrants from India to Norway are often unmarried men, but they may 
not  have  had  the  time  yet  to  settle  down  with  families  (ibidem).  Immigration  researchers  frame  the 
Norwegian residents of Indian origin as exceptionally successful, comparing them to other diasporas 
of non-Western origin (see e.g. Wist 2000; Lervik 2014a). The employment rate is high (see 5.2) and 
social  problems  barely  feature  (see  7.1).  The  children  of  immigrants  from  India  are  very  likely  to 
pursuer  higher  education  (see  5.4).  Norwegian  residents  of  Indian  origin  seem  to  have  adapted  a 
family pattern from the host nation (see 4.5); while at the same time maintaining ties to the extended 
family in their area of origin (see 5.6).  

3.2 Historical context: geographically uneven development 

Within  what  historical  context  is  it  more  fruitful  to  understand  the  brief  history  of  migration  from 
India  to  Norway?  The  critical  literature  review  concluded  with  a  suggestion  that  contemporary 
migration should be understood in the context of the long-term fluctuations of transnational economic 
history:  in  particular  the  historical  causes  of  geographically  uneven  development  (2.5).  Labor 
migration  can  potentially  contribute  to  economic  development,  and  takes  place  within  a  global 
situation of geographically uneven development. The fact that some regions are more prosperous than 
others may facilitate labor migration. Some might argue that labor migration should be seen as “brain 
drain”, which amplifies uneven development (Castles, Haas  and Miller 2014: 32). Others may claim 
that  labor  migration  facilitates  “comparative  advantages”  of  mutual  benefit  for  the  sending  and  the 
receiving  country  (ibidem:  30).  Beyond  these  two  ideological  positions,  a  more  empirical  approach 
might  find  various  points  whereby  transnational  social  capital  in  diaspora  communities  facilitate 
various  forms  of  economic  development  (ibidem:  39-45,  53).  For  some  similar  positions  in  the 

14 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

Norwegian residents of Indian origin – National and transnational integration 

Norwegian  policy  debate,  see  Kjeldstadli  (2003a:  123,  370-371).  Some  policy  makers  prefer  the 
theory of “brain drain” while other choose that of “comparative advantages”. In any case, it is useful 
with  empirical  data  about  the  long-term  historical  causes  of  geographically  uneven  development 
(external as well as internal colonialism). 

External colonialism 

In  a  long-term  historical  perspective,  it  may  be  relevant  that  there  was  once  a  flow  of  elite  labor 
migration from Norway to Trankebar (probably better known as Chennai or Madras). This is because 
Trankebar was a colony of the Danish kingdom from 1620 until 1845, while Norway was a province 
of  Denmark  until  1814.  Danish  and  Norwegian  ships  were  an  integrated  part  of  global  colonialism, 
transporting  various  goods,  including  slaves  (Feldbæk  1990).  Throughout  the  1800s,  Norway 
experienced  a period  of  industrialization,  urbanization  and  emigration,  where  the  population surplus 
from  the  old  agricultural  economy  either  found  new  work  in  the  towns,  or  sought  new  agricultural 
lands on the colonial frontiers. Thus, a considerable portion of the Norwegian population became labor 
immigrants in North America (Østrem 2006). This historical emigration is part of a larger pattern. In a 
long-term perspective, there have been two phases of global mass migration, both related to the long 
history of economic globalization: first the emigration from colonial Europe, later the immigration to 
post-colonial Europe (Hatton and Williamson 2005).  

In  Western  Europe,  including  its  Norwegian  “semi-periphery”,  the  process  of  industrialization 
coincided  with  that  of  colonization.  For  a  period,  the  Indian  Subcontinent  became  a  colony  under 
Western European powers, mainly Britain. Sketching a rough panorama over global economic history, 
Wallerstein  (1979:  26-27)  claimed  that  during  the  colonial  area,  a  previously  established  “Indian 
Ocean  Proto-World  Economy”  became  assimilated  as  a  periphery  within  the  emerging  “West-
European World Economy”. This view has found some confirmation in later research, when the details 
of  the  picture  were  filled  in  with  a  more  empirical  study  of  the  historical  documents  (see  e.g. 
Lieberman  2003).  After  independence  from  Britain  in  1947,  it  took  some  decades  before  India 
returned to the global scene as a re-emerging economy. In global political economy, it now is one of 
the BRICS-countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South-Africa). These large national economies 
are now intensively industrializing. They are also re-emerging as global geopolitical players. One of 
the striking differences between the early industrialized and the late industrialized countries is that the 
West-European  pioneers  were industrializing  during  the  era  of West-European  colonialism,  whereas 
the BRICS-countries are now industrializing within a multi-centered geopolitical order. There is now a 
more  developed  framework  of  international  law,  and  thus,  the  late  industrializers  may  be  choosing 
more civilized approaches than the colonialist savagery of the early industrializers. At the same time, 
underdevelopment in some regions is the historical outcome of a transnational history, which led to the 
present overdevelopment of other regions. 

Internal colonialism 

In explaining geographically uneven development, however, the external colonization of one area by 
another  country  may  not  be  of  more  significance  than  the internal  colonization of  particular regions 
within a country. Internally in Western Europe, as well as internally in the Indian Subcontinent, there 
are ongoing efforts to overcome the internal colonial heritage. On the Indian side, one much debated 
case is the conflict over hydropower development in Narmada River (Routledge 1993). In Europe, the 
most  central  case  may  be  the  Sámi  struggle  for  indigenous  human  rights,  which  was  triggered  by  a 
conflict  over  hydropower development  on  the  Alta River,  Norway  (Jensen  2013).  In  the  Norwegian 
case,  some  of  the  labor  force  surplus  during  industrialization  went  to  the  colonial  frontier  in  North 
America,  while  others  settled  in  a  similar  frontier  within  Sámi  areas,  re-defined  as  “Colonie” 
(Pedersen  1999).  This  is  a  complex  colonial  history,  including  the  emigration  of  Indigenous  Sámi, 
some of whom engaged in reindeer husbandry with Native Americans (Jensen 2012). As a result, the 
history  of  internal  and  external  colonialism  has  produced  complex  fragmentary  nations  in  Europe, 
much  as  what  Chatterjee  (1996)  observed  in  India.  The  ongoing  efforts  to  overcome  the  colonial 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

15 

Helge Hiram Jensen, Geir-Tore Brenne  

heritage  includes regional efforts  towards  more  geographically  inclusive  development.  According  to 
international  human  rights  law,  the  national  minorities,  indigenous  peoples  and  tribal  peoples  enjoy 
the right to freedom from systematic discrimination or resource grabbing.  

Contemporary outcome 

As  noted  above,  the  early  industrializers  operated  within  a  global  context  which  was  less  regulated 
than  that  experienced  by  the  late  industrializers.  The  UN  has  imperfections  but  it  does,  at  least, 
provide some international norms, as do other macro-regional cooperation efforts. Within international 
human rights law, what is of particular relevance for re-emerging economies as well as for developing 
internal  regions,  is  the  second  half  of  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights,  which  has  been 
specified in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Jensen 2015: 45-46). 
The individual right to development includes a collective right to freedom from collectively imposed 
underdevelopment.  Among  macro-regional  institutional  arrangements,  the  European  Union  and  the 
Indian federal state can both be seen as large-scale efforts to find shared solutions to shared problems. 
There are also some economic and political ties between these two large federations. The EU is India’s 
largest  trading  partner,  accounting  for  20%  of  its  trade,  whereas  India  is  the  EU’s  eighth  largest 
trading partner (Wikipedia 2015b). Consequently, transnational investments are also increasing. Since 
2007, there have been efforts at establishing an India-EU free trade agreement, but these efforts have 
not yet been fruitful. India is not part of any military alliance, but its top strategic partners are Russia 
and  the  USA,  before  its  three  main  EU  trading  partners:  France,  Britain  and  Germany  (ibidem). 
Norway is a fully integrated partner of the inner EU market, the European Economic Area (EEA), but 
as a small country, Norway does not count among India’s main trading partners in the EU/EEA.  

3.2 Present historical situation for the Indian diaspora in Norway 

Within this large theatre of economic and strategic geography, the relations between Norway and India 
account for a small fraction of transnational flows. 

The  Norwegian  government  has  an  official  policy  for  multilateral  cooperation  with  the  Indian 
government, within the areas of energy/climate, economy, science/education and culture (Norwegian 
Ministries  2009).  Consequently,  the  Norwegian  government  has  funded  research  and  education 
cooperation  programs  (SIU  2013;  Norwegian  Research  Council  2015).  Transnational  commercial 
actors had long been dissatisfied with an old tax cooperation agreement between Norway and India, 
dating back to 1987, and in 2011, this was replaced by a new tax cooperation agreement (Norwegian 
Ministry of Finance 1987, 2011; Larsen 2011). Nevertheless, the economic ties between Norway and 
India remain comparatively small in volume. The two tables (1-2) below give some sense of Norway’s 
economic  integration  with selected  number  of  countries.  Table 1  shows  trade  of  goods,  both  import 
and  export  measured  in  Norwegian  currency.  Table  2  shows  transnational  business  ownership 
structures,  both  Norwegian-controlled  businesses  abroad  and  foreign-owned  businesses  in  Norway, 
measured by number of employees. Within both tables, the left side in both tables show economic ties 
between Norway and the various BRICS-countries. By contrast, in both tables, the right side of both 
tables show economic ties between Norway and some selected other counties: one neighboring Nordic 
country,  three  EU/EEA  countries  and  one  North-American  country.  As  the  tables  show,  the 
Norwegian  economy  has  some  degree  of  integration  with  the  Indian  economy,  as  also  with  other 
BRICS-countries,  though  it  is  clearly  less  integrated with  South  Africa,  and  clearly  more  integrated 
with  China.  Nevertheless,  the  selected  countries  on  the  right-hand  side  of  the  table  illustrate  that 
Norway  still  tends  to  be  more  integrated  with  other  Nordic  countries,  with  other  West-European 
countries, and with North-American countries. 

16 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

 
 
Norwegian residents of Indian origin – National and transnational integration 

Table 1. Norwegian foreign trade, with selected countries.  
Approximate monthly import/export, 2011-2012, in millions of Norwegian Kroner (NOK) 

Country 
China 

Russia 

Brazil 

India 

South-Africa 

Import 

Export 

3,000 

950 

500 

250 

150 

Country 
1,500  Sweden 

500   Poland 

200  France 

150  Britain 

50  USA 

Import 

Export 

5,200 

1,000 

1,200 

2,300 

1,600 

5,000 

1,000 

4,500 

21,000 

3,000 

Source: Statistics Norway 2014 (table 08803). 

Table 2. Norway in transnational business ownership, ties with selected countries.  
Norwegian-controlled businesses abroad or foreign-controlled businesses in Norway  
(number of employees) 

Country 
China 
Russia 
Brazil 
India 
South-Africa 

Norway 

Foreign 

10,684 
4,873 
11,609 
11,227 
1,259 

Country 
3,244  Sweden 
25  Poland 
25  France 
112  Britain 
7  USA 

Norway 

Foreign  

45,551 
11,075 
6,865 
16,320 
22,428 

83,352 
927 
15,788 
30,285 
49,153 

Source: Statistics Norway 2014 (tables 09827 and 08086). 

The  description  above  shows  the  transnational  economic  context  of  Norwegian  residents  of  Indian 
origin.  There  is  a  striking  gap  between,  on  the  one  hand,  the  comparatively  small  volume  of  the 
economic ties between India and Norway, and on the other, the fact that the Indian community in the 
country stands high among the various diaspora communities in Norway. 

The second wave of migrants tend to find work as highly-qualified technical personnel within the 
geographical  hub  of  the  Norwegian  oil  industry  (Pettersen  2009).  Such  labor  migration  may  have  a 
positive potential for policy  makers whose primary concern is high tech industries that can generate 
large  profits.  It  may  not  be  unrealistic  when  some  analysts  hope  for  a  “Silicon  Valley”  effect  (see 
UKIERI 2012, cited in SIU 2012: 30-31). Such potentials fit with the above-mentioned policies from 
the Norwegian government, whose priority is to foster bilateral co-operation with India in technology 
and science with economic relevance. 

The  first  wave  of  migrants,  however,  mostly  found  labor  class  jobs  within  industry  and 
agriculture (Tjelmeland 2003: 129, cited by Pettersen 2009: 110). The early anthropological studies 
indicate that many of the first wave immigrants from India were over-qualified for these jobs. For 
further details, see Appendix 1. Most of the first wave immigrants from India established families, 
and  became  well  integrated  in  the  host  nation,  while  remaining  integrated  with  their  local 
community  of  origin.  Quite  a few  would  pursue  small  business  entrepreneurship  (Wist 2000), and 
many of their children would pursue higher education within the health professions (Schou 2013). 
Such  labor  migration  may  be  interesting  for  policy  makers  whose  primary  interest  is  to  make 
economic globalization more socially inclusive: this includes the development of small transnational 
businesses and a high degree of participation in host country life.  It would have been interesting to 
carry  out  a  survey  among  small  business  entrepreneurs  of  Indian  background  regarding  the 
perceived relevance of the Norwegian-Indian tax cooperation agreement. It might be that small and 
medium  transnational  businesses  will  experience  the  regulation  as  being  helpful,  but  the  opposite 
might  also  be  possible.  These  small-scale  entrepreneurs  go  largely  unnoticed  by  social  scientists, 
and they do not leave their mark in the official statistics (Wist 2000: 53), probably because they are 
hardly taken into account by the policy makers. 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

17 

Helge Hiram Jensen, Geir-Tore Brenne  

The present Norwegian coalition government might be relevant for the above-mentioned segments 
of  the  Indian  diaspora  in  Norway,  and  vice  versa.  The  political  basis  for  this  government  is  a 
Consortium  of  Cooperation  between  four  parties  in  the  Norwegian  parliament  (Brenne  and  Jensen 
2013).  They  have  a  consensus  on  liberal  norms,  but  interpret  them  differently.  On  one  side,  the 
Progress Party has promised further restriction on immigration from non-Western countries. This party 
is arguably happy that immigrants from India integrate well, but the party does not seem very relevant 
for  any  diaspora  from  a  non-Western  country.  Then  there  is  the  Liberal  Party  and  the  Christian 
People’s  Party  which  emphasize  social  inclusiveness  and  small  business  entrepreneurship.  The 
policies  of  these  two  parties  would  perhaps  be  beneficial  for  most  of  the  “first  wavers”  and  their 
offspring  among  Norwegian  residents  of  Indian  origin.  In-between  the  two  opposing  blocks,  the 
dominant Conservative Party is in favor of market liberalism and the import of highly qualified labor. 
This  party  may  have  policies  that  are  more  beneficial  for  the  “second  wavers”  among  Norwegian 
residents of Indian origin. 

4. Demography 

Detailed  demographic  figures  for  Norwegian  residents  of  Indian  origin  are  available  from  Statistics 
Norway, as are figures regarding all ethnic minorities in the country. This chapter starts by reviewing 
the number of Norwegian residents of Indian origin (4.1), then describes: changes in those numbers 
(4.2); the gender and age distribution (4.3); the geographical settlement pattern (4.4); and the typical 
family structures (4.5). The data in this chapter were all found in one report from Statistics Norway, 
which  describes  the  settlement  pattern  of  immigrants  (and  their  offspring)  from  seventeen  different 
countries of origin (Pettersen 2009). The geographical data, however, have been remixed by applying 
official categorization to regional urban clusters (Ministry of Municipalities 2002). 

4.1 The number of Norwegian residents with Indian origin 

In 2008, there were 8,500 persons in Norway who were either migrants from India, or born to parents 
from  India.  About  one  third  of  these  were  born  in  Norway  by  parents  from  India  (Pettersen  2009: 
109). The population of “Indian Norwegians” was formed by two waves of immigration from India to 
Norway, as described in the previous chapter. The first wave took place in the 1970s, and consisted 
mainly of young men from agrarian middle class in Indian Punjab, who found labor class jobs within 
agriculture or industry in the Drammen region (see e.g. Wist 2000; Kramer 1979). The second wave 
took off around 2005 and mainly consists of persons with high education, finding highly specialized 
occupations (Pettersen 2009: 109). 

The migration flow from India to Norway is quantitatively small for the country of origin, which is 
a large federation. It is though quite considerable for the receiving country, which is a small nation-
state. Statistics Norway counts the 8,500 residents of Indian origin as the eighteenth largest “group of 
immigrants” in Norway. Among the various “groups of immigrants”, those with India as a country of 
origin have an unusually large proportion of members born in Norway to immigrant parents. Among 
residents born in Norway to immigrant parents, Indian immigrants constitute the eighth largest group 
(Pettersen 2009: 109). It must, however, be noted that Statistics Norway here defines “immigrant” as 
residents whose country of origin is in Asia, Africa, Latin-America, Oceania except for Australia and 
New Zealand, and finally, Europe  except the Nordic countries (Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Iceland) 
and  the  EU-15  (the  first  fifteen  states  of  EU).  Thus,  for  all  practical  matters,  this  definition  of 
“immigrant”  in  fact  excludes  all  immigrants  from  the  European  Economic  Area,  the  USA,  Canada, 
Australia and New Zeeland, while including all migrants from post-colonial and post-socialist states 
(see also Pettersen 2009: 12, 109). Since much of the migration to Norway comes from those countries 
of origin that are excluded from the statistics, a figure that includes all immigration from all countries, 
would certainly show residents of Indian origin as ranking lower than the eighteenth largest group of 
immigrants.  

18 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

Norwegian residents of Indian origin – National and transnational integration 

4.2 Population increase over time 

The population of Norwegian residents with Indian origin has increased over time. Statistics Norway 
has rather good figures regarding immigration to and emigration from India.  

Figure 1. Volume of immigration India-Norway, and emigration Norway-India 
(absolute numbers) 

Source: Statistics Norway, in Pettersen 2009: 111 (Figure 7.1). 

The  figure  give  information  about  immigration  to  Norway  from  India,  as  well  as  emigration  from 
Norway to India. How much of this constitutes circular migration remains unknown. 

Immigration 

Compared to other countries of origin, a rather large portion of the immigrants from India arrived to 
Norway  before  the  Norwegian  state  introduced  a  general  “immigration  stop”  in  1975.3  Among  the 
earliest Indian immigrants, most came from the Indian Punjab, while Pakistani Punjab was the main 
area of origin for the Pakistani immigrants. Many of the immigrants from Punjab to Norway settled in 
Drammen,  a  small  town  outside  Oslo,  and  were  hired  as  untrained  workers  within  industry  and 
agriculture  (Kjeldstadli  2003:  129,  cited  in  Petersen  2009:  110).  The  first  wave  of  labor  migration 
implied a beginning to family migration as well, and the first wave peaked in 1987, a year when a total 
of  389  persons  migrated  from  India  to  Norway.  After  that  year,  there  was  a  steady  decrease  in 
emigration from  India, which continued until 1996, when only 134 persons from  India emigrated to 
Norway. After that year, there was a small increase. In 2005, there were 356 immigrants from India. 
Then  the  number  nearly  doubled  the  following  year,  with  564  persons  in  2006,  and  then  nearly 
doubled again, with 998 persons in 2007. Indeed, India was the fourth non-European country of origin 
for immigration to Norway in 2007 (Petersen 2009: 111).  

Emigration 

The  registered  figure  of  emigration  from  Norway  to  India  is  less  reliable  than  the  figure  for 
immigration.  This  is  because  an  émigré  is  not  registered  until  he  or  she  has  changed  officially 
registered address in Norway. In 1993, the figure shows a sudden jump in emigration, and this is not 
due to any substantial change, but only to an effort to tidy up the address registry (Henriksen 2008, 
cited in Pettersen 2009: 111). Additionally, there is a lack of data regarding how many of the émigrés 
from Norway to India, who were not of Indian origin, and how many were returnees. One may assume 

3 The so-called “immigration stop” was, in fact, no full stop. See Chapter 6.2.1 in the present report. 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

19 

 
 
                                                      
Helge Hiram Jensen, Geir-Tore Brenne  

that a considerable portion of the emigrants to India consists of earlier immigrants from India (or the 
children of immigrants). But we have not data for making estimates here.  

4.3 Gender and age distribution 

There is good data showing the age and gender distribution of Norwegian residents of Indian origin 
(immigrants as well as children of immigrants).  

Figure 2. Norwegian residents of Indian origin, by gender and age, absolute numbers,  
by 1 January 2008 

Note. Yellow: immigrants. White: born in Norway by immigrant parents. 
Source: Statistics Norway, in Pettersen 2009: 112 (Figure 7.2). 

Figure 3. Norwegian residents of Indian origin, by gender and age, percentages,  
by January 2008 

Note. Yellow: immigrants. White: born in Norway by immigrant parents.  
Source: Statistics Norway, in Pettersen 2009: 112 (Figure 7.3). 

20 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

 
 
Norwegian residents of Indian origin – National and transnational integration 

There  might  be  slightly  more  men  than  women  among  Norwegian  residents  of  Indian  origin.  The 
relative predominance of men over women is clear among the elder age groups (55-69 years of age), 
but not so much among the younger cohorts. The gender distribution among Norwegian residents of 
Indian origin is also clear among those who live in municipalities where most of the Indian immigrants 
arrived  during  the  second  wave  (Stavanger,  Sandefjord,  Sandnes).  There  is,  meanwhile,  no  such 
tendency in the municipalities that received the first wave of Indian immigrants (Oslo, Drammen, Lier, 
Nedre Eiker) (Pettersen 2009: 111). 

It  may seem contradictory that the gender difference is pronounced among the oldest age groups 
and in the municipalities that received the second wave of migration. I would suggest that this is due 
to a mechanism whereby much labor migration starts with a man, who is followed by a wife, who later 
has children (Kramer 1979a). There is an even number of men and women among the younger cohorts 
of residents of Indian origin: and also among those who are settled in municipalities where most of the 
immigration  from  India  arrived  early.  According  to  Statistics  Norway,  this  even  gender  distribution 
among the residents of Indian origin differs from the male preponderance, which is the general pattern 
among “immigrants”, and also within each country of origin other than India (Pettersen 2009: 111). 

Similar seemingly contradictory patterns are found in the age distribution independently of gender. 
On the one hand, residents with Indian origin include c many persons above 50 years of age, on the 
other, the same group also includes comparatively many persons below the age of twenty. As many as 
one  out  of  four  in  this  group  are  above  50  years  of  age  (ibidem),  a  number  that  stands  in  striking 
contrast to the median age of 35 among all residents who are classified as “immigrants” by Statistics 
Norway. At the same time, three out of four are below 20  years of age in the same group. This is a 
rather  large  proportion,  compared  to  other  categories  of  immigrants  (including  offspring).  The 
relatively large ratio of persons above 50 and below twenty may be explained in various ways. It has 
been suggested that this reflects the two waves of migration (Pettersen 2009: 113). The first wave of 
migration would explain much of the ratio for the group below twenty, as well as for the one above 50. 
As  mentioned  above,  among  the  various  “immigrants  groups”  in  Norway,  those  with  India  as  a 
country of origin have an unusually large proportion of  members born within Norway to immigrant 
parents (see also Pettersen 2009: 109).  

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

21 

 
 
Helge Hiram Jensen, Geir-Tore Brenne  

4.4 Geographical settlement pattern 

There  is  good  data  regarding  the  geographical  settlement  pattern  for  residents  in  Norway  of  Indian 
origin (immigrants and children of immigrants). This population group is clustered in relatively few 
municipalities. Norway has 430 municipalities, but only 187 have residents of Indian origin (either as 
immigrants or children of immigrants). Of these, only ten municipalities have more than one hundred 
residents of Indian origin (Pettersen 2009: 109). 

Table 3 shows the top twenty municipalities for residents of Indian origin. This has been taken from 
my main source, a report from Statistics Norway (Pettersen 2009). 

Table 4 shows the same municipalities sorted according to clusters of urban settlements, which include 
several  municipalities.  This  table  I  have  compiled  by  taking  data  from  the  above-mentioned  table. 
However,  I  have  sorted  them  according  to  another  statistical  categorization,  the  so-called 
“metropolitan regions” of Norway (Ministry of Municipalities 2002; see also Wikipedia 2015a; 2015c 
for information in English). 

Table 3. Norwegian residents of Indian origin, by municipality, by 1 January 2008  
(number and percent) 

Source: Statistics Norway, in Pettersen 2009: 109 (Table7.1). 

22 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

 
 
Norwegian residents of Indian origin – National and transnational integration 

Table 4. Norwegian residents of Indian origin, percentage per urban regions 

6% 
2% 
2% 
1% 
1% 
2% 
1% 
1% 
6%  
3% 
3% 

7% 
2% 
3% 

Oslo Region 

Oslo proper 
Greater Oslo 

66% 
40% 
14% 

Northern sector 

Lørenskog 
Skedsmo   
Nittedal   
Ullensaker 

Southern sector 

Oppegård 
Frogn 
Western sector 
Bærum 
Asker 
Drammen Region 12% 

Drammen  
Nedre Eiker 
Lier 

Bergen   

Stavanger Region 
Stavanger  
Sandnes  

6% 

5% 
4% 
1% 

Sattelites to Oslo Region 4% 
1% 
Fredrikstad 
1% 
Tønsberg 
1% 
Kristiansand 
1% 
Sandefjord 

Trondheim 

3% 

Source: Statistics Norway, in Pettersen 2009: 110. 

Note: definitions of urban regions from: Ministry of Municipalities (2002). 

The  largest proportion  of residents  of  Indian  origin  (immigrants  and  their  children) is  settled  within 
several  clusters  in  the  Oslo  Region  (66%).  An  independent  cluster  is  found  in  Bergen,  the  second 
largest  city  of  Norway  (6%).  Then,  there  are  clusters  of  residents  of  Indian  origin  settled  in  the 
Stavanger Region, an area that has grown much because of offshore petroleum industry (5%). Apart 
from that, there are some smaller clusters settled in towns within the regional network of roads and 
rails  leading  from  the  Oslo  Region  (4%),  and  one  rather  large  cluster  in  the  university  town  of 
Trondheim  (3%).  None  of  the  municipalities  in  Northern  Norway  has  any  significant  number  of 
residents with Indian origin.  

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

23 

 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Helge Hiram Jensen, Geir-Tore Brenne  

Figure 4. Immigrants from India, by gender and municipality, by 1 January 2008 (%) 

Source: Statistics Norway, in Pettersen 2009: 113 (Figure 7.4). 

Figure 5. Immigrants from India, by age and municipality, by 1 January 2008 (%) 

Source: Statistics Norway, in Pettersen 2009: 113 (Figure 7.5) 

24 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

 
 
 
Norwegian residents of Indian origin – National and transnational integration 

Figure 6. Immigrants from India, by duration of residence and municipality, by 1 January 2008 (%) 

Source: Statistics Norway, in Pettersen 2009: 114 (Figure 7.6). 

Municipal-specific figures regarding the age and gender of residents of Indian origin (immigrants and 
their  children)  reveal  much  information  about  how  the  geographical  settlement  pattern  has  been 
shaped by historical waves of migration.  

First,  the  three  municipalities  Drammen,  Lier  and  Nedre  Eiker  –  all  situated  in  the  Drammen 
Region, within the larger Oslo Region – have the largest proportions of inhabitants of Indian origin. 
(This means, the percentage of the total number of inhabitants in the municipality of Indian origins, 
either as immigrants or children of immigrants). Furthermore, these three municipalities are the ones 
with  the  largest  concentration  of  children  born  of  immigrants  from  India  (Pettersen  2009:  109).  In 
these municipalities there are hardly any children or youngsters who have themselves migrated from 
India to Norway (ibidem: 113). These observations indicate that Drammen, Lier and Nedre Eiker are 
the municipalities with the largest proportion of Indians who are the longest established in the country. 
The first wave of industrial and agricultural labor migrants from India tended to settle in the Drammen 
Region, so this squares with the history of Indian migration to Norway.  

Second,  the  municipality  of  Stavanger  has  very  few  inhabitants  who  are  children  of  immigrants 
from  India (ibidem: 110). On the other hand, Stavanger, with Sandnes and Sandefjord, are the three 
municipalities with the largest concentration of children who have themselves migrated together with 
their  parents  (ibidem:  113).  In  Stavanger  and  Sandnes,  hardly  any  children  or  youngsters  are 
Norwegian-born  children  of  Indian  immigrants.  As  previously  mentioned,  there  are  also  more  men 
than  women  among  residents  of  Indian  origin  within  these  three  municipalities.  These  numbers 
indicate  that  Stavanger,  Sandnes  and  Sandefjord  are  the  municipalities  that  have  received  the  most 
Indian immigrants from the second wave of migration (ibidem: 110). I cannot explain why this is the 
case  for  Sandefjord,  which  is  a  town  on  the  Southern  Coast.  However,  it  makes  lots  of  sense  for 
Stavanger  and  Sandnes,  which  both  belong  to  the  innovative  Stavanger  Region,  where  much  of  the 
Norwegian oil industry is based.  

Additionally, it may be noted that among residents of Indian origin in Trondheim (about 3% of the 
total  number  of  residents  of  Indian  origin  in  Norway)  there  is  a  rather  high  proportion  who  have 
arrived in the recent wave, and for the sake of education (Pettersen 2009: 115). This town is known for 
its advanced education in engineering.  

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

25 

Helge Hiram Jensen, Geir-Tore Brenne  

Finally, Statistics Norway comments that all registered “immigrant groups” typically tend to settle 
in and around the capital city in the Oslo Region. What is unusual for Norwegian residents of Indian 
origin  (when  compared  to  immigrant  families  from  other  countries)  is  that  there  are  very  few  who 
have settled in Østfold County to the southeast of Oslo, and in Tromsø, the largest town of Northern 
Norway (Pettersen 2009: 110).  

Overall,  we  have  rather  good  information  about  the  waves  of  migration  that  has  produced  the 
geographical settlement pattern, and I have suggested some plausible explanations above. The clustering 
in  the  Oslo  Region  is  a  general  pattern  for  most  immigrants  to  Norway  (from  post-colonial  or  post-
socialist countries). Within this, the clustering around the Drammen Region is a result of the specificities 
of the first wave of migration from India to Norway: workers, mainly from Punjab, found opportunities, 
in and around Drammen. For the cluster in Bergen, I have not found any explanations; however, this is 
the  second  largest  town  in  the  country.  Regarding  the  cluster  in  the  Stavanger  Region  and  the  small 
cluster  in  Trondheim,  both  are  results  of  the  second  wave  of  migration,  with  highly-qualified  labor 
migrants settling within the main technical innovation belt in Norway, and education migrants going to 
the main technical university in the country. Finally, the tiny Indian communities found in Sandefjord 
and  other  small  towns  along  the  roads  from  the  Oslo  Region  may  have  ended  up  there  as  a  spillover 
effect, from the settlement in the Oslo Region. This could be tested with further study. 

4.5 Family structure 

Family patterns among Norwegian residents of Indian origin (immigrants and their children) are rather 
similar to the family patterns among Norwegian residents in general. Additionally, the family patterns 
among residents of Indian origin tend to vary between different municipalities, according to the above-
mentioned geographical settlement distribution and historical waves of migration. 

Figure 7. Norwegian residents of Indian origin, by number of persons in the household, and 
municipality, by 1 January 2008 (%) 

Source: Statistics Norway, in Pettersen 2009: 116 (Figure 7.8). 

26 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

 
 
 
Norwegian residents of Indian origin – National and transnational integration 

Figure 8. Norwegian residents of Indian origin, by household type and municipality,  
by 1 January 2008 (%) 

Source: Statistics Norway, in Pettersen 2009: 117 (Figure 7.9). 

Figure 9. Norwegian residents of Indian origin, by civil status and municipality,  
by 1 January 2008 (%) 

Source: Statistics Norway, in Pettersen 2009: 117 (Figure 7.10). 

Within Norway as a whole, the residents of Indian origin have a somewhat lower ratio of one-person 
households  than  the  general  Norwegian  population,  whereas  the  register  ratio  of  large-households 
(five or more persons) is somewhat higher among the residents of Indian origin. These tendencies are 
typical of “immigrant” groups (and their children), according to Statistics Norway (that is, immigrants 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

27 

 
Helge Hiram Jensen, Geir-Tore Brenne  

from  post-colonial  or  post-socialist  states).  For  example,  when  compared  to  residents  of  Pakistani 
origin,  those  of  Indian  origin  have  a  much  smaller  ratio  of  large-households:  60%  for  Pakistani-
Norwegians;  20%  for  Indian-Norwegians;  and  about  15%  for  Norwegian  residents  in  general.  This 
indicates  that  residents  of  Indian  origin  tend  to  make  choices  for  household  size  and  form  that  are 
aligned  to  the  general  Norwegian  population,  rather  than  the  typical  pattern  among  those  residents 
who are classified as “immigrants” (or children of immigrants). However, when it comes to marriage 
age, there is a quite different pattern. In the general Norwegian population, one third of the adults are 
married,  while  among  the  residents  who  are  classified  by  Statistics  Norway  as  “immigrants”,  four 
fifths of the adults are married, and finally among residents of Indian origin, as many as three quarters 
of adults are married. Thus, the residents of Indian origin are much more likely to be married when 
compared  to  the  general  Norwegian  population,  and  this  is  the  case  even  when  compared  to  other 
residents  who  are  registered  as  “immigrants”  by  Statistics  Norway  (that  is,  immigrants  from  post-
colonial or post-socialist states). (The numbers are from Statistics Norway, and they are presented in 
Pettersen 2009: 116-7). 

Within  various  geographical  clusters,  the  Norwegian  residents  of  Indian  origin  tend  to  live  in 
registered households of various sizes and forms, and there are a varying number of unmarried adults. 
Here there is the question of whether Indian-Norwegians in a particular region arrived during the first 
or the second wave of migration. 

In the municipalities with many well-established families of Indian origin, there tend to be fewer 
one-person households, and more large-households (five or  more members). The figure showing the 
types  of  household  indicate  that  these  large-household  tend  to  be  classified  by  Statistics  Norway  as 
households  with  “several  families”  (Pettersen  2009:  116-117).  Statistics  Norway  has  no  concept  of 
extended families,  only  nuclear families  (parents  with  children),  and  we  might  assume  that  some  of 
these  households  consist  of  extended  families  (parents  with  children,  and  maybe  grandparents  or 
cousins with their children, etc.). This pattern is the rule among residents of Indian origin settled in the 
Oslo Region, including Oslo Proper, the Northern Sector (Lørenskog, Skedsmo, Nittedal, Ullensaker), 
the  Southern  Sector  (Oppegård,  Frogn),  and  the  Drammen  Region  (Drammen,  Lier,  Nedre  Eiker). 
Notably, however, the inhabitants of Indian origin who live in the Western Sector (Bærum, Asker) of 
the Oslo Region are an exception to this rule. Here there are more one-person households, and fewer 
large-households. The reason for this exception to the pattern is unknown. 

In the municipalities with many newcomers and newly-established families of Indian origin, there 
are very few large-households, and considerably more single-person households (ibidem). Among the 
Norwegian-Indians, the highest ratio of single-person households is found in Stavanger municipality, 
the main hub of technological innovation in the country. The second largest ratio is in the Sandefjord 
municipality, whereas the third largest is in Trondheim. Notably, in the municipalities in the Western 
part of the larger Oslo (Bærum, Asker) the residents of Indian origin actually have a higher ratio of 
one-person  households  than  their  compatriots  settled in  the  suburb  of  Stavanger  (Sandnes). Most  of 
these municipalities are known for having received a relatively large proportion  of the second wave 
immigrants from India (with the notable exception of Bærum and Asker). One might expect that the 
ratio of unmarried adults would vary across municipalities in a similar way to the ratio of one-person 
households. This is because (as mentioned above) it is known that residents of Indian origin are much 
more  likely  to  choose  marriage  over  cohabitation,  when  compared  to  the  general  Norwegian 
population. This is, indeed, the case for Trondheim municipality, where most of the residents of Indian 
origin  are  students,  who  have  emigrated,  for  the  sake  of  university  education.  However,  the  second 
largest  ratio  of  unmarried  residents  of  Indian  origin  is  found  in  Bergen  (the  second  largest  city  in 
Norway), whereas the third largest ratio is in Oslo (the largest city in Norway). It may be that the ratio 
of  unmarried  persons  are  due  to  a  general  “urbanism  effect”,  whereby  young  couples  choose 
unregistered  cohabitation  rather  than  early  marriage.  But  this  is  an  empirical  question.  The  fourth 
largest ratio is found in Bærum municipality in the Western Sector of the Oslo Region. Finally, only 
the fifth largest ratio of unmarried residents of Indian origin is in Stavanger, a city that is known for 

28 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

Norwegian residents of Indian origin – National and transnational integration 

receiving a relatively large proportion of second wave labor migrants. Within these two municipalities, 
a  large  proportion  of  residents  of  Indian  origin,  arrived  there  recently,  during  the  second  wave  of 
migration (see figures in 4.4 above).  

Family patterns among the children of immigrants 

The children of immigrants from India have a slighter higher tendency to choose marriage, rather 
than  cohabitation,  when  compared  to  the  general  Norwegian  population.  Thus,  the  children  of 
immigrants  from  India  fit  into  a  general  pattern  among  immigrants  from  postcolonial  and  post-
socialist  countries,  whereas  the  children  of  immigrants  from  the  European  Economic  Area,  USA, 
Canada,  Australia  and  New-Zealand  tend  to  follow  the  same  pattern  as  the  average  Norwegian 
population.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  statistics  includes  registered  cohabitation,  but  cohabitating 
couples who have not registered are counted as single persons (Wiik 2014, see the summary). 

5. Socio-economic integration 

Accurate  socio-economic  figures  for  Norwegian  residents  of  Indian  origin  are  available  for  certain 
topics, in particular for issues of relevance for “socio-economic integration”. With this term, I mean 
social democratic policies aimed at the socio-economic inclusion of all residents into the middle class 
majority  in  the  country,  regardless  of  the  individual’s  class  background,  gender  or  ethnicity.  The 
present chapter will start by addressing the socio-economic integration of the Indian immigrants into 
the Norwegian host community. It will, then, proceed to discuss how the diaspora community might 
contribute to international socio-economic integration between Norway and India. 

Based  on  official  registries  at  Statistics  Norway,  the  present  chapter  provides  accurate  figures 
regarding: the motivation for migration (5.1); labor force participation (5.2); occupation by economic 
sector  (5.3);  education  among  labor  migrants,  family  migrants  and  their  offspring  (5.4);  education 
among student migrants (5.5); and finally, marriage patterns (5.6). These issues may roughly be dealt 
with along with the socio-economic integration of the immigrant into the host community. 

The  chapter  will  then  proceed  by  discussing  some  socio-economic  issues  for  which  no  accurate 
figures exist. The discussion will apply published qualitative research, which is, by its nature, explorative 
and hypothesis-generative. Issues like remittances, caste background or gender/race discrimination may 
not be impossible to measure, but there is no system in place for systematic registration. The chapter will 
conclude by presenting the relevant qualitative research regarding: gender and migration (5.7); regarding 
caste  and  migration  (5.8);  and  finally,  remittances  and  social  ties  in  India  (5.9).  Such  issues  may  be 
characterized as questions of international socio-economic integration between different nations. 

This  report  will  return  to  the  issue  of  socio-economic  integration  in  chapter  7.  There  we  will 

discuss linguistic skills and other forms of socio-cultural integration. 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

29 

 
 
Helge Hiram Jensen, Geir-Tore Brenne  

5.1 Migration type 

Migration from India to Norway is mostly either labor migration, or migration for family unification, 
as an indirect result of the labor migration.  

Figure 10. Immigrants from India, by reason for migration and municipality of settlement,  
by 1 January 2008 (%) 

Source: Statistics Norway, in Pettersen 2009: 115 (Figure 7.7). 

One should note that in this figure, “immigrant” is everyone who is not a citizen of a Nordic country 
(Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland).  

For the first wave of migration from India to Norway, the statistical figures say nothing about the 
reasons  for  migration,  because  such  information  was  not  gathered  before  1990.  However,  we  know 
from  the  historical  literature  that  the  first  wavers  were  a  certain  kind  of  labor  migrants:  these  were 
industrial  and  agricultural  workers,  mainly  from  Punjab,  settling,  above  all,  in  Drammen  (Kramer 
1979a; Wist 2000; Kjeldstadli 2003c; Tjelmeland 2003: 129). The absolute number of migrants was so 
small that the historical account gives a reliable account of the process. 

For the second wave of migration, the statistical figures are much more accurate. They show that 
the vast majority of Indian immigrants came to work: only half as many came for family unification, a 
smaller proportion for education, and a few for asylum. 

The  statistical  figures  have  little  information  for  immigrants  who  arrived  before  1990.  These 
figures  do  not  include  individual-level  information  about  the  reasons  for  migrating  to  Norway.  The 
“first  wavers”  constitute  a  rather  large  proportion  of  the  immigrants  going  from  India  to  Norway, 
because the first wave of migration took place early on. 

Regarding geographical settlement patterns, Statistics Norway notes that the highest proportions of 
immigrants from India are to be found in Stavanger/Sandnes and Sandefjord: these are the two clusters 
that have received most second wavers, and there has, thus, been less time for labor migrants to form 
families.  Likewise,  there  are  rather  few  who  were  registered  as  labor  migrants  (after  1990)  in 
Drammen, Lier and Nedre Eiker, the three municipalities that received most first wavers.  

30 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

Norwegian residents of Indian origin – National and transnational integration 

5.2 Labor force participation  

As  a  result  of  the  political  debate  about  the  “integration”  of  migrants,  there  is  an  urgent  need  for 
Statistics  Norway 
to  register  socio-economic  marginalization  among  “immigrants”  groups 
(immigrants  from  post-colonial  or  post-socialist  states).  Labor  force  participation  is  an  important 
indicator, and the figures are interpreted in the context of other indicators, such as the self-support, and 
education level. It should be noted that the labor force figures in fact include two sub-categories: 

  persons who are employed (either as wage earners or self-employed);  

  persons who are registered as unemployed (as a potential labor reserve). 

For  a  more  detailed  explanation,  see  e.g.  Pettersen  (2009:  31).  Thus,  the  measurement  of  the  labor 
force  excludes  persons  who  are  registered  as  being  unavailable  for  paid  work,  for  example, 
housewives,  voluntary  workers,  and  other  services  in  the  informal  economy.  Most  Norwegian 
residents are registered as being employed.  

Table 5. Labor force participation among immigrants from India, ages 25-54, by gender and 
municipality, fourth quarter of 2007, numbers and percentages 

Source: Statistics Norway, in Pettersen 2009: 119 (Table 7.2). 

Let us first ignore gender differences, while comparing the Norwegian residents of Indian origin, with 
Norwegian  residents  from  all  non-western  diasporas,  and  finally,  with  the  Norwegian  population  at 
large.  After  having  made  this  comparison,  I  will  proceed  to  make  similar  comparisons  for  men  and 
women within the three categories. Thereafter, we will zoom in on Norwegian-born children of Indian 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

31 

Helge Hiram Jensen, Geir-Tore Brenne  

immigrants, and finally, I will give some critical considerations regarding the conceptual validity and 
the policy relevance of this research. 

  Among the general population, well above 84% are formally employed (and 1% are formally 

unemployed). 

  However, among the “immigrant” residents (from post-colonial or post-socialist states), about 
65%  are  formally  employed  (while  5%  are  formally  unemployed).  There  is  as  much  as  a 
nineteen percentiles difference.  

  For residents who have migrated from India, the level of registered employment is 69%, (with 
3%  registered  unemployed).  This  is,  thus,  only  a  little  bit  higher  than  the  ratio  among  all 
residents  registered  as  “immigrants”.  For  this  particular  group  of  immigrants,  the  difference 
from the population at large is fifteen percentiles (whereas the difference from the total ratio 
among residents classified as “immigrant” is four percentiles).  

Thus, there is a clear statistical difference in the formal employment level between: (a) the population 
at  large,  which  has  a  high  ratio  of  employment;  and  (b)  immigrant  residents  from  post-colonial  or 
post-socialist states, who have a considerably lower employment ratio. The latter group then includes 
residents  who  have  migrated  from  India.  The  statistical  difference  is  partly  –  but  not  fully  –  due  to 
how gender differences vary across the mentioned statistical categories (Pettersen 2009: 119). 

  All residents, by gender: As a result of a history of social democratic policies in Norway, the 
employment ratio for the general population is nearly equal for men and women (though there 
still is a slight bias towards men among the employed). Among the population as a whole, the 
84% of formal employment can be broken down into 87% for men and 81% for women. There 
is  thus  only  six  percentiles  difference  between  men  and  women.  (The  rate  of  registered 
unemployment is 1% for both men and women. Thus the total work force is 88% for all men 
and 82% for all women, and the difference is six percentiles.) 

  Residents with “immigrant” origin, by gender: The pattern is different among residents who 
are registered as “immigrants”. Among this statistical category, there is a significantly larger 
difference between the genders, with more women being registered either as unemployed or as 
outside the labor force. Among “immigrant” residents, the ratio of formal employment at 65% 
can be broken down into 73% for men and 58% for women, a fifteen percentiles difference. 
This  gender  difference  is  considerably  larger  than  the  gender  difference  among  the  general 
population (six percentiles). (The rate of registered unemployment among all “immigrants” is 
5% for both men and women. The total work force thus is 78% for male “immigrants”, 63% 
for female ones, and the difference is fifteen percentiles.) 

 

Immigrants from India, by gender: For residents who have migrated from India, the total ratio 
of 69% formal employment can be broken down into 75% for men and 63% for women: this 
makes a difference of twelve percentiles between women and men. This gender difference is a 
little  bit  less  than  the  gender  difference  among  all  residents  registered  as  “immigrants”  (15 
percentiles).  However,  the  gender  difference  among  Indian  immigrants  is  smaller  if  we 
include  the  figures  of  registered  unemployment.  It  should  be  remembered  that  persons  who 
choose  to  register  as  being  unemployed  have  made  an  effort  to  be  available  for  paid  work. 
Thus,  the  work  force  includes  registered  unemployment  as  well  as  registered  employment. 
Among women who have migrated from India, the registered total work force is 63% + 4% = 
67%.  Among  the  men  who  have  migrated  from  India,  the  total  work  force  is  75%  +  2%  = 
77%. The difference between male and female work force is 77%  – 67% or ten percentiles. 
Thus,  the  gender  difference  among  Indian  immigrants  is  considerably  less  than  what  is 
observed  regarding  all  registered  “immigrants”  (fifteen  percentiles)  though  it  is  still  higher 
than the gender difference among the general population (six percentiles).  

32 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

Norwegian residents of Indian origin – National and transnational integration 

Registered employment can be taken to indicate economic integration. At that point, the gaps between 
the various statistical categories may be interpreted as showing multiple (intersecting) forms of social 
stratification.  

1.  First, there is a gender gap between men and women in the population. 

2.  Second,  there  is  an  ethnic  gap  between  the  general  population  and  those  of  “immigrant” 

residents (from post-colonial or post-socialist states). 

3.  Third,  there  is  a  gap  between  how  the  gender  difference  operates  among  the  population  at 

large, and among “immigrants” (from post-socialist or post-colonial countries).  

How we interpret the observed statistical differences is largely dependent on the choice of explanatory 
model.  From  the  viewpoint  of  postcolonial  feminism,  one  may  suspect  that  we  have  here  a 
combination of gender discrimination and racial discrimination, inherited from historical colonialism 
and the patriarchy. From the viewpoint of cultural structure-functionalism, gender equality is perhaps 
a  specifically  western  value,  and  migrants  are  navigating  through  culturally  undefined  situations  of 
anomie. My suggestion is that interpretations from the latter explanatory model will be fruitful only if 
we do not look away from the interpretations implied in the former explanatory model. 

Employment among children of Indian immigrants in Norway 

Only  one  fifth  of  the  Norwegian-born  children  of  Indian  immigrants  have  grown  old  enough  to 
participate in the work force. If we look at the unusually high proportion within this group who are 
seeking  higher  education  (see  part  5.4),  the  groups  also  have  a  strikingly  high  degree  of  workforce 
participation.  Within  the  relevant  age  group,  the  entire  Norwegian  population  has  a  registered 
employment rate of 78% (with a registered unemployment of 2%), whereas in the statistical category 
“Norwegian-born  with  immigrant  parents”,  the  registered  rate  of  employment  is  somewhat  smaller, 
74% (with 3% registered unemployment).  Also, the children of Indian immigrants have a registered 
employment  rate  of  74%  (with  2%  registered  unemployment  of).  However,  as  Statistics  Norway 
points  out,  these  numbers  should  be  understood  in  the  context  of  higher  education  rates  within  the 
same age group. The rate of higher education among “immigrant” children is significantly lower than 
that  of  the  same  age  group  among  the  general  population:  while  the  children  of  Indian  immigrants 
have  a  considerably  higher  rate  of  higher  education  than  the  general  population.  Therefore,  it  is 
striking  that  Indian  immigrant  children  also  have  a  high  rate  of  registered  employment.  Statistics 
Norway  concludes,  that  Norwegian-born  children  of  Indian  immigrants  are  exceptionally  well 
integrated (Pettersen 2009: 121). 

Critical considerations 

To  better interpret  the figures  on  registered  labor  force  participation  it  may  be  useful  of  offer  some 
considerations  over  conceptual  validity  and  policy  relevance.  As  stated  initially,  this  measure  is 
frequently  interpreted  as  an  indicator  of  the  degree  of  socio-economic  integration  versus 
marginalization. Thus, we use the measure of one empirical quantity as an indicator of another more 
theoretical  concept.  Such  indicators  may  have  their  limitations,  which  also  set  limits  on  the 
interpretation. First, there is a the definition of “immigrant” is debatable, especially when we define 
the  word  as  being  all  immigrants  from  non-Western  countries.  With  this  category,  one  is  lumping 
together  very  different  individuals  (Henriksen  2007),  and  at  the  same  time,  one  draws  a  distinction 
between  this  plurality,  and  another  plurality,  namely  immigrants  from  Western  countries.  A  highly-
educated Indian or Moroccan may find him or herself classed together with traumatized child soldiers 
from  the  Horn  of  Africa  (Mokhtarri  2007).  It  is  striking  that  official  publications  from  Statistics 
Norway,  such  as  the  above  mentioned  demographic  report  (Pettersen  2009),  avoid  politically  laden 
concepts such as  “immigrant  from  developing  country”,  “immigrant  from  post-colonial  country”,  or 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

33 

Helge Hiram Jensen, Geir-Tore Brenne  

even  “people  of  color”.4  Nevertheless,  the  statistical  agency  chooses  a  specific  definition  of 
“immigrant”, which gains public relevance from a highly political debate. By uncritical usage of this 
definition of “immigrant” one runs the risk of contributing to the reproduction of doxa.  Second, one 
can also discuss the implicit definition of economy. This measurement may be useful for identifying 
how  housewives  and  informal  workers  are  excluded  from  paid  labor  and  regulated  contracts. 
However, it is useful to gain knowledge about what might be going on with collective efforts in the 
family, production for direct consumption, and gift-exchanges: all practices that have been significant 
for many housewives and peasants around the globe. The policy goal of integrating everyone into paid 
work  is  certainly  well  intended.  However,  this  goal  could  be  criticized  for  gender  as  well  as  ethnic 
bias, because it does not recognize the many unpaid activities that are crucial for subsistence. This is 
an example of how social-democratic or socialist policies face complex challenges when dealing with 
the intersection between class, gender, and ethnicity. I will return to these issues below, with regard to 
integration into  the  transnational  Indian diaspora:  family  (5.6),  gender  (5.7), caste  (5.8), remittances 
(5.9) and cultural practices (7.2-7.3). If we keep the limitations in mind, participation in the formalized 
labor market is certainly a relevant indicator of socio-economic inclusion.  

5.3 Occupation by economic sector 

Most Norwegian employees are occupied in the tertiary sector, including both wage earners and the 
self-employed.  In  2007,  76%  among  the  general  Norwegian  population,  and  as  much  as  78%  for 
“immigrants”  (that  is,  immigrants  from  post-colonial  or  post-socialist  states)  worked  in  the  tertiary 
sector. For immigrants from India, the ratio was still higher, at 90%. For Norwegian-born children of 
the Indian immigrants, I have not found any figures regarding occupation by economic sector. 

Some geographical variety can be observed. Among Norwegian residents who have migrated from 
India, the ratio employed in the tertiary sector is well above 90% in Oslo and Bergen (the two largest 
cities in the country). It is well below 90% in Drammen and Stavanger (two main towns for settlement 
of  the  first  and  second  wave  of  migration,  respectively).  For  other  municipalities,  the  number  of 
immigrants from India is too low for any variety to be statistically significant.  

Figure 11. Employed immigrants from India, ages 25-54, by economic sector and municipality, 
fourth quarter of 2007 (%) 

Source: Statistics Norway, in Pettersen 2009: 122 (Figure 7.15). 

4  Racial  discrimination  can  be  real,  even  though  “races”  are  not  real.  With  what  words  may  we  refer  to  the 
persons who are targeted by racial discrimination, without using the terminology of racism? This report uses 
the terms “non-white people” and “people of color”. These are awkward terms, but the alternatives may be 
even worse. (See also Chapters 2.3 and 5.7.) 

34 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

                                                      
Norwegian residents of Indian origin – National and transnational integration 

Only a few Norwegian residents work in the secondary sector (industries), and even fewer in the primary 
sector (agriculture, fisheries, forestry, herding, hunting and gathering). This is striking since Norway’s 
main export products are oil, gas and fish. The numbers from 2007 show that only a small fraction of the 
Norwegian population was employed in the primary sector. The ratio was about half of that fraction for 
the segment of the population who were defined as “immigrant”, and the same is the case for immigrants 
of  Indian  origin.  However,  some  interesting  differences  are  found  between  Indian  immigrant 
communities  settled  in  different  municipalities  of  Norway.  Oslo  and  Bergen,  virtually  no  immigrants 
from India had an occupation in the primary sector. These are the municipalities where more than 10% 
of  the  Indian  immigrants  were  occupied  in  the  tertiary  sector.  However,  there  is  a  notable  difference 
between Stavanger and Drammen, the two municipalities where less than 10% of the Indian immigrants 
worked in the tertiary sector. In Stavanger, virtually no Indian immigrants worked in the primary sector, 
leaving a relatively larger portion occupied in the secondary (industrial) sector. In Drammen, however, 
the  Indian  immigrants  who  worked  outside  the  tertiary  sector  were  evenly  distributed  between  the 
secondary  (industrial)  and  primary  sectors.  The  number  of  individuals  within  these  categories  is  too 
small  to  give  statistically  significant  results,  but  nevertheless,  the  differences  do  make  sense  in  the 
context of historical data (see part 4.4). Stavanger has received many second-wavers, and this town is the 
hub for the Norwegian oil and gas industry. Drammen, by contrast, had received many first-wavers, most 
of  whom  came  from  agricultural  areas  in  Punjab,  and  they  found  their  first  jobs  within  industry  and 
agriculture, both of which were traditional inn the Drammen Region (Kramer 1979a; Kjeldstadli 2013c: 
129). These ratios for occupation by economic sector can, then, be explained as a historical product of a 
specific  process,  but  within  this  process,  pure  chance  may  have  played  a  role  in  determining  that 
Drammen would become the destination of chain migration from Punjab. 

It should be noted that the measures of occupation by economic sector does not in itself say anything 
about  class  position,  social  status  or  income  level.  Increased  globalization  has  led  to  most  industrial 
production being moved from early-industrialized countries to emerging economies. Thus, the industrial 
proletariat is small within the so-called post-industrial economies. But, nevertheless, their large service 
sector include jobs that are precarious, low paid, providing little control over the means of production, 
and  low  social  status.  Some  figures  indicate  that  a  considerable  proportion  of  immigrants,  including 
Indian immigrants, experience relative deprivation by being overqualified and underpaid in their present 
jobs (Bjørnestad and Barstad 2014). This brings us to the next issue: education.  

5.4 Education among labor and family migrants and their offspring 

There exist precise figures regarding the educational behavior of the various diaspora communities in 
Norway (see e.g. Pettersen 2009), however, there has been no systematic registration of the education 
immigrants  have  pursued  previous  to  their  arrival  in  Norway  (Steinkellner  2012a).  Therefore,  the 
figures provide accurate information only about age cohorts that are so young that they cannot have 
brought  any  education  from  the  country  of  origin.  Therefore,  in  the  following,  I  will  first  present 
findings  from  analysis  of  data  about  the  young  among  the  Norwegian  residents  of  Indian  origin. 
Thereafter, I will turn to the immigrants from India to Norway, of all ages, but excluding the children 
of immigrants. 

Education among youngsters of Indian origin 

Statistics Norway has reliable data about educational behavior among young Norwegian residents of 
Indian  origin,  who  make  their  educational  choices  within  Norway.  The  data  has  been  thoroughly 
analyzed  by  social scientists  (e.g.  Lervik  2014a;  Schou  2006;  Birkeland  et  al. 2014).  Among  young 
Norwegian  residents  of  Indian origin  (ages  19-24  years),  the  data further  distinguishes  between  two 
sub-groups: On the one hand, there are young migrants from India. On the other, there are those young 
men  and  women  who  were  born  in  Norway  to  parents  who  had  migrated  from  India.  The  reference 
group consists of all the young within the Norwegian population at large (ages 19-24 years). Within 
the reference group, about 50% is in education. The half of the group that is in education is further 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

35 

Helge Hiram Jensen, Geir-Tore Brenne  

divided into two groups: 25% pursued higher education, whereas 17% were still finishing secondary 
school (Pettersen 2009: 118). 

Figure 12. Immigrants from India, ages 19-24, by educational participation and municipality,  
by 1 October 2007 (%) 

Source: Statistics Norway, in Pettersen 2009: 118 (Figure 7.11). 

Young  Indian-born  men  and  women  living in  Norway  do  not  have  particularly  high  participation  in 
education,  when  compared  to  young  immigrants  from  post-socialist  or  other  post-colonial  states. 
Among youngsters in Norway who have emigrated from post-colonial or post-socialist countries (most 
often  with  their  parents),  the  portion  who  pursue  education  is  slightly  over  30%.  Among  young 
immigrants from India, the portion is slightly less than 30%. However, within the c. 30%, the portion 
that  pursues  higher  education  is  different  for  each  of  these  categories.  Among  young  “immigrants” 
17% is in higher education, whereas for the young Indian immigrants, the portion is about 20%. In this 
regard, the education ratio among Indian-born youngsters are much closer to similar rates among other 
young  men  and  women  classified  as  “immigrant”  rather  than  the  “reference  group”  all  Norwegians 
aged 19-24 (Pettersen 2009: 118). 

Figure 13. Norwegian-born children of Indian immigrants, ages 19-24,  
by educational participation and municipality, by 1 October 2007 (%) 

Source: Statistics Norway, in Pettersen 2009: 118 (Figure 7.12). 

Young Norwegian-born men and women with Indian parents, however, are very likely to go through 
higher  education.  About  60%  are  in  higher  education,  while  ca.  15%  are  still  finishing  secondary 
school. The  ratio  of  higher  education among  young  Norwegian-born  men  and  women  with  Indian 
parents  is  nearly  double  the  ratio  among  the  general  19-24  year-old  population  in  Norway  (see 
above). The ratio among Norwegian-born youngsters with Indian parents is also much higher than 
the ratio among those 19-24 year old with parents who have migrated from non-Western countries, a 
group that is only slight more likely to do third-level education, when compared to the population at 
large (Pettersen 2009: 118). Within the aforementioned immigration research, the high rate of higher 
education among children of Indian immigrants has been noted. It is interpreted as an indicator of 
the  Indian  diaspora  being  exceptionally  well  integrated  into  the  host  society,  particularly  when 
compared  to  diaspora  groups  from  other  non-Western  countries.  However,  it  would  have  been  as 
interesting to compare the Norwegian-born Indian diaspora with the diasporas from other Western 
countries, or from other BRIC-countries. One may question why the statistics tend to lump together 
diaspora  groups  from  all  non-Western  countries  (Mokhtarri  2013;  Jensen  2013).  Additionally,  in 
order  to  inquire  into  the  issue  of  socio-economic  mobility,  it  would  be  interesting  to  see  the 

36 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

Norwegian residents of Indian origin – National and transnational integration 

education level of these young Norwegian-Indians as compared to their parents. This might usefully 
be looked at in further research. 

Ethnic division of labor among the young?  

Most  integration  research  takes  interest  in  the  level  of  education,  a  phenomenon  that  can  be 
measured as a quantity, and that is, thus, it is a straightforward task to apply mathematical analytical 
techniques.  Slightly  trickier  is  the  question  of  analyzing  choices  regarding  different  categories  of 
education: for example nursing versus engineering. By analyzing categorical variables, Line Schou 
(2006,  2013)  has  observed  a  significant  tendency  towards  an  ethnic  streaming  within  higher 
education.  Young  Norwegian  residents  with  Indian  ethnicity  are  more  likely  to  choose  medicine, 
dentistry or pharmacy. 45-48% choose one of these three categories, depending on how long they 
have lived in the country. At a less fine-grained level, it was observed that students of non-western 
ethnicity are more likely to pursue technology, mathematics, natural science or health science; while 
ethnically  Norwegian  youth  are  more  likely  to  choose  education,  the  social  sciences,  arts,  or  the 
humanities (ibidem, see also Lervik 2012). Some might argue that the educational paths pursued by 
those of non-western ethnicity will lead to higher social status, and if that is correct, it may lead to 
positive effects for all non-white people in the country. At the same time, it might not be beneficial 
for the non-white minority if they are scarcely represented within the disciplines that tend to control 
the means of knowledge-production for societal questions. 

From education to employment among the young 

In a socio-economic context, higher education has little utility, if it is not put to use by society, or if it 
does  not  pay  for  the  individual.  Some  quantitative  sociologists  have  researched  the  transfer  from 
education  to  employment,  comparing  the  offspring  of  immigrants  from,  respectively,  India  and 
Pakistan (Birkeland et al. 2014). First, they found that both groups meet “ethnic barriers” in the labor 
market. But the authors avoid drawing any conclusion about whether the mechanism may be down to 
discrimination  or  other  factors,  such  as  a  lack  of  information.  Second,  they  found  that  women  with 
Indian  or  Pakistani  parents  had  a  lower  “transfer  rate”  than  women  in  the  general  Norwegian 
population,  and  this  is  not  because  of  family  commitments.  This  might  indicate  a  gender/ethnicity 
barrier, possibly intersectional discrimination. Third, the authors conclude that higher education does 
increase the likelihood of getting a job fast, especially for men with Indian or Pakistani parents. We 
will return to this issue at the end of part 5.4. 

Education level among all immigrants from India 

Let us now turn attention away from young Norwegian residents of Indian origin, towards immigrants 
from  India  to  Norway,  of  all  ages,  but  excluding  the  children  of  immigrants.  There  are  figures 
regarding  the  education  level  among  immigrants  from  India  to  Norway,  compared  to  the  education 
level  among  immigrant  groups  from  other  countries  of  origin.  These  figures  do  not  normally 
distinguish  between  education from  India  and  brought  as  an  asset  to  Norway,  versus  education  post 
arrival in  Norway.  (These figures  also say  nothing  about  educational  choices among  the  children  of 
immigrants,  which  were  discussed  above.)  According  to  official  education  statistics  from  2006 
immigrants  from  non-Western  countries  tend  to  have  lower  education  than  the  general  Norwegian 
population, while immigrants from Western countries tend to have higher education than the general 
population (Henriksen 2007: 32). In all three categories, women tend have higher education than men. 
Immigrant groups from sixteen different countries of origin are included in that figure. Of these, the 
top  five  for average  education  level  are  Russia, the  Philippines,  India,  Poland and  Iran.  The  bottom 
five are Somalia, Turkey, Pakistan, Morocco and Afghanistan. If these proportions have not changed 
after the more recent survey, then it is striking that Pakistan ranks in the bottom five, but India stands 
in the top five. Also, it is relevant that the education level among immigrants from the BRICS-states 
(India and Russia) is closer to the general pattern among Western immigrants than to similar patterns 
among immigrants from non-Western countries.  

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

37 

Helge Hiram Jensen, Geir-Tore Brenne  

Migrants with education from India 

The information is scarce regarding whatever competences immigrants have brought into the country. 
The  education  level  is  not  been  registered  when  new  immigrants  arrive.  In  an  attempt  to  fill  in  the 
missing  knowledge,  Statistics  Norway  made,  in  2012,  a  systematic  survey  of  the  issue (Steinkellner 
2012a). Surveys give less reliable data than registries based on bureaucratic routines, but the research 
led  to  some  interesting  findings.  First,  a  wide  variation  in  education  levels  among  immigrants  is 
observed.  When  comparing  immigrants  from  different  countries  of  origin,  some  groups  have  an 
average education level that is significantly lower than the level for the general Norwegian population. 
However,  some  other  groups  have  significantly  higher  education  than  the  general  Norwegian 
population,  and  this  is  the  case  for  immigrants  from  India.  Such  immigrants  clearly  bring  valuable 
competences  to  the  country.  For  the  very  first  migrants  from  India  who  settled  in  Norway,  it  is 
possible to use registered education as an indicator of what competences they brought from their area 
of origin, since they would not have had the time to pursue education within their country of arrival. 
Analyses of historical statistics indicates that the pioneer immigrant from India to Norway had, in fact, 
a fairly high education, and rather high social standing within their environment of origin (Wist: 50-
57). See Appendix 1 for further details. It is striking that there has been no policy for registering such 
competences among newcomers to the country. This might be a result of a policy agenda centered on 
immigrant integration, rather than on immigrants as a resource. Such policies may be symptomatic of 
popular  prejudice,  assuming  that  immigrants  are  weak  and  needy,  rather  than  competent,  and  a 
potential strength for the host community.  

From education to employment in the Indian diaspora 

It was observed above that there was a considerable time lag from education to employment among 
the  offspring  of  immigrants  from  India  and  Pakistan,  and  especially  for  women  (Birkeland  et  al. 
2014). Researchers remained agnostic about the explanatory mechanism, but nevertheless interpreted 
this as an “ethnic barrier”, which affects women more than men. This confirms what was observed in 
part  5.2  about  the  labor  force  participation  among  immigrants,  see  particularly  our  comments  on 
migrant  women.  Similarly,  Appendix  1  shows  that  among  the  first  generation  of  immigrants  from 
India  to  Norway,  many  brought  relatively  high  levels  of  education  from  India,  but  in  Norway  they 
nevertheless ended up with jobs for which they were over-qualified. This problematic has also been 
discussed  in  the  context  of  social  wellbeing  and  mental  health  (Sharma  2009:  17).  For  diaspora 
communities it may be especially relevant to ask when or even whether it is possible to find a job that 
matches  the  migrant’s  education,  especially  when  compared  to  the  general  host  population.  Some 
recent  data  indicates  that  many  immigrants  in  Norway  –  including  some  Indian  immigrants  –  are 
overqualified  and  underpaid  in  their  present  jobs  (Bjørnestad  and  Barstad  2014).  This  indicates 
relative  deprivation  when  looked  at  in  the  context  of  the  Norwegian  host  community  in  the  host 
country.  Nevertheless,  matters  are  less  straightforward  in  the  context  of  the  Indian  diaspora 
community, because it might be possible to maintain social standing in the local community of origin 
by sending foreign currency “back home” (Kramer 1979a: 150). 

5.5 Education among study migrants 

The internationalization of higher education is a political goal in India, as well as in Norway. A report 
from  the  Norwegian  Centre  for  the  Internationalization  of  Education  (SIU),  citing  the  UK  India 
Education and Research Initiative (UKIERI), argues that India, as a re-emerging economy, seems to 
be becoming a leading country in terms of research and education (SIU 2012: 30-33, citing UKERI 
2012). The education systems in  India and Norway have both been adapted to the English language 
and  the  Anglophone  system  of  university  degrees. Though  this  may  be  judged,  for  India, a  colonial 
legacy, it may nevertheless facilitate mutual development. 

India has experienced a great deal of student emigration, especially to the USA, Great Britain and 
Australia. In spite of the “brain drain” effect, student migration is now seen as being largely beneficial 

38 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

Norwegian residents of Indian origin – National and transnational integration 

for the country of origin, as well as for the destination country (ibidem). First, the Indian diaspora is 
seen as the most successful group of recent immigrants to the USA, and is represented in some of the 
cutting edge companies in Silicon Valley. Second, a recent survey indicates that the stream of student 
migration  might  be  turning,  with  many  members  of  the  Indian  diaspora  in  the  USA  preferring  to 
pursue higher education in India. (See UKIERI 2012, cited in SIU 2012: 30-31.) 

Table 6. Students in Norway with Indian citizenship, by university, 2013, absolute numbers 

Source: SIU 2015. 

Figure 14. Students in Norway with citizenship in BRICS countries, absolute numbers 

Source: SIU 2015. 

Norway has a well-funded public education system, and even though its doctorate has been adapted to 
the  PhD  model,  doctoral  candidates  are  nevertheless  still  defined  as  public  employees  with  a  fixed 
salary.  With  the  internationalization  of  the  science  sector,  these  jobs  have  become  accessible  for 
foreign citizens (though they will have to deal with specific immigration policies, see Chapter 6). In 
2013, students in Norway with Indian citizenship stood at just 235 individuals, and spread around 28 
different universities. The largest cluster of students with Indian citizenship was found in Trondheim, 
at  the  Norwegian  University  of  Science  and  Technology,  with  35  individuals  (SIU  2015).  Among 
Norwegian-employed PhD Candidates, researchers with Indian citizenship constitute the sixth largest 
group  (ibidem).  As  the  figure  shows,  the  period  2008-2013  saw  a  steady  increase  in  Norwegian 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

39 

Helge Hiram Jensen, Geir-Tore Brenne  

students with citizenship in one of the BRICS countries, but the number of students with Russian or 
Chinese  citizenship  has  remained  higher,  and  has  grown  bigger,  when  compared  to  the  number  of 
students from India, Brazil and South-Africa. The relatively small number of Norwegian students with 
Indian citizenship may be explained by the fact that most student emigrants from India choose other 
countries.  However,  one  might  think  that  the  Norwegian  PhD  programs  would  attract  more  Indian 
researchers,  since  the  science  sector  is  well  funded  in  Norway,  and  was  adapted  to  English  and  the 
Anglophone grade system.  

Figure 15. Students in India with Norwegian citizenship, absolute numbers 

Source: SIU 2015. 

There also is some student emigration from Norway to India, mainly students taking special courses 
for  half  a  year.  Most  of  these  students  study  social  science,  economy  and  administration,  or  health 
science. The total number was between 130 and 160 individuals for 2005-2013, with the exception of 
2011-12,  when  the  number  was  above  180.  The  numbers  do  not  tell  whether  or  not  these  students 
belong to the Indian diaspora in Norway.  

It seems like there is clearly potential to further develop the bilateral co-operation between India 
and Norway in the science sector, including student exchange. Most of the potential probably is for 
engineering and natural sciences, which are directly applicable for industrial innovation. However, in 
order  to  unleash  the  full  economic  potential  of  the  Indian  diaspora,  further  bilateral  collaboration 
within the fields of economy and administration, health science, and social science may also be useful.  

40 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

 
 
Norwegian residents of Indian origin – National and transnational integration 

5.6 Marriage patterns: arranged marriage and family reunification 

As observed in Chapter 4, Norwegian residents of Indian origin seem to practice family forms that are 
rather similar to those of the Norwegian majority population: the nuclear family with few children as 
the main model, one-head households among students or persons who travel for work, and fewer cases 
of large-households (see part 4.5 above). This might indicate an adaptation to state welfare or market 
individualism,  where  the  extended  family  loses  relevance  as  a  welfare  institution.  Nevertheless,  life 
course interviews with some aging Indian-Norwegians indicate that at least some of these express fear 
that their children might not provide care for them, confusion about the Norwegian welfare state, and 
nostalgia for an India that no longer exists (Sharma 2009). These are concrete experiences, though we 
have no data about the prevalence of such life situations among Norwegian residents of Indian origin. 
The  socio-cultural aspects of this  problematic  will  be  addressed  in  Chapter  7,  part  7.2.  Some  socio-
economic aspects of “familism” in the Indian diaspora will be discussed here. 

Family migration has been much-used among Indian labor immigrants and their children, as noted 
in  part  5.1  above.  A  typical  pattern  of  labor  migration  has  been  that  a  family  chooses  one  male 
member for emigration, who could not take over the farm, or had problems finding a job that matched 
his education (Wist 2000). After working hard for some years in his new host country, he can afford to 
bring over his wife and children. The extended family has also been of relevance for chain migration, 
whereby  one  pioneer  labor  migrant  chooses  to  settle  in  a  particular  place,  then  assists  other  labor 
migrants  from  his  original  local  community  to  migrate  to  his  new  local  community  (ibidem).  The 
possibility for migration on the basis of family unification has also been used by labor migrants who 
were not previously married in their migration from India to Norway, and also among their children 
born  in  Norway,  or  even  among  their  grandchildren.  Many  Norwegian-born  individuals  of  Indian 
origin  have  chosen  to  return  to  the  village  in  India  where  their  parents  or  grandparents  grew  up,  in 
order to search for a potential spouse. Thus, it has been possible for  young people to find each other 
within a transnational diaspora community. This kind of targeted search for potential spouses allow for 
the  maintenance  of  social  ties  –  or  socio-economic  integration  –  within  the  Indian  diaspora.  It  also 
allows for more young persons from India to pursue new opportunities abroad. Thus, the possibility 
for  migration  through  family  unification  has  had  the  socio-economic  function  of  maintaining  an 
organizational  infrastructure  for  the  diaspora  community:  it  has  thus  facilitated  socio-economic 
integration across nations. 

Arranged marriages in the south-eastern diasporas, is a much-debated issue, especially in contrast 
to a perceived Scandinavian ideal of “love marriages” (see e.g. Bredal 2006). The most debated issue 
is to what degree an arranged marriage can be seen as being voluntary. This phenomenon, however, is 
extremely  hard  to  measure.  One  may  certainly  observe  cases  of  love  marriages  or  clearly  forced 
marriages, but between those extremes, there might be a continuous scale  of more or less voluntary 
marriages  for  the  sake  of  economic  convenience.  Thus,  the  option  may  be  a  question  of  market 
position – or socio-economic class – quite as much as a question of cultural practices. Norwegian law 
accepts that marriage is an economic union, and thus, the ideal of pure love marriage might at times be 
more ideological than real. Thus, while some cases of forced marriages are easy to identify, there will 
be other cases that are open for discussion. If there is a socio-economic gap between the two partners, 
then the structural conditions may have determined the weaker partner to consider the marriage as an 
attractive option, and then the problem is one of structural conditions, not of individual choice. 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

41 

 
 
Helge Hiram Jensen, Geir-Tore Brenne  

Table 7. Norwegian-born children of immigrants who got married 2003-2013,  
by partner’s background 

Number 
unmarried 
in 2008 

Total 
number 

%  partner 
from 
majority 

%  partner 
same 
diaspora 

%  partner 
other 
diaspora 

%  partner 
foreign 
resident 

% 
missing 
data 

India 

Women 
Men  

Pakistan 

Women 
Men  

Turkey 

Women 
Men  

Morocco 

Women  
Men 

Denmark 

Women 
Men 

Sweden 

Women  
Men  

Poland 

Women  
Men  

USA 

Women 
Men 

311  
379  

1413  
1738  

294  
423  

221  
318  

185  
235  

5362  
5997  

2185  
6055 

452  
524  

94  
81  

677  
603  

206  
163  

117  
76  

36  
51  

2132 
2421 

2884 
2646 

790 
915 

17.0  
9.9  

2.5  
3.8  

1.9  
4.9  

9.4  
5.3  

80.6  
74.5  

60.3  
53.0  

15.5  
3.6  

71.1  
62.2  

37.2  
43.2  

47.7  
45.3  

35.4  
39.3  

44.4  
51.3  

0.0  
0.0  

12.4  
10.7  

68.4  
47.6  

3.0  
1.7  

18.1  
4.9  

3.0  
8.1  

7.3  
6.1  

12.0  
15.8  

13.9  
21.6  

12.5  
14.3  

6.1  
2.8  

15.4  
22.4  

19.1  
24.7  

25.8  
24.4  

29.1  
20.9  

6.8  
7.9  

5.6  
2.0  

13.4  
19.4  

7.3  
34.5  

8.9  
11.1  

8.5 
17.3 

21.0 
18.4  

26.2 
28.8 

27.4 
19.7 

0.0 
2.0 

1.5 
2.6 

2.7 
11.5 

1.5 
2.5 

Source: Statistics Norway, in Sandnes and Østby 2015: 32, 50-51. 

Marriage patterns among the children of immigrants are of special interest for Statistics Norway. They 
are  taken  as  an  indicator  of  “how  tight  contact  there  is”  between  different  segments  of  society,  in 
particular between this or that immigrant community, the native majority of the host nation, as well as 
between various immigrant groups (Wiik 2014: 3). In other words, they are interested in various forms of 
migrant social integration in the shared national community, in a given diaspora community, and in other 
diaspora  communities.  Statistics  Norway  has  been  particularly  interested  in  whether  the  children  of 
immigrants choose to marry partners with an immigrant background from: the same country of origin 
(endogamous); or rather from the native majority; or another immigrant group (exogamous) (Wiik 2014; 
Sandnes and Østby 2015). Such measures give some pointers regarding socio-economic integration with 
the host nation, and within particular diaspora communities, and across different diaspora communities. 
The  table  shows  some  marriage  patterns  among  the  Norwegian-born  children  of  Indian  immigrants, 
compared to Norwegians with immigrant parents from selected countries. (For a larger table with more 
countries of origin, see Sandnes and Østby 2015: 50-51). Norwegians with parents from India are more 
likely to marry someone else of an Indian background rather than someone from the Norwegian majority 
population. They are also more likely to marry someone with another immigrant background, rather than 
someone  from  the  native  majority.  However,  there  are  significant  gender  differences  in  the  marriage 
pattern  among  Norwegian-born  children  of  Indian  immigrants.  Men  are  much  more  likely  to  marry 
within the Indian diaspora (endogamously), while women are much more likely to marry someone from 
the native majority or someone from another immigrant diaspora. In this regard, men with parents from 

42 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

 
Norwegian residents of Indian origin – National and transnational integration 

India  show  a  marriage  pattern  that  resembles  that  of  both  men  and  women  who  have  parents  from 
Pakistan  or Turkey.  It  may  be  puzzling  that  women  with  parents from  India  are more  likely  to  marry 
exogamously. A similar difference between men and women is found within the Polish diaspora, which 
has grown in Norway as a result of labor migration within the EU/EEA. For both these groups, women 
show a marriage pattern which resembles the pattern found among both women and men with parents 
who have immigrated from other Western countries: multivariate analysis reveals that Norwegian-born 
persons  with  parents  from  Western  countries  are less likely  to  marry  within  diaspora  communities,  as 
defined by the country of origin of the parents (Wiik 2014: 4-5).  

By  contrast,  Norwegian-born  persons  with  parents  from  Asian  or  African  countries  are  the  most 
likely to marry within diaspora communities from the same country of origin (ibidem). This marriage 
pattern is correlated to marital age and educational level. Higher marital age is negatively correlated to 
endogamous  marriage,  while  lower  or  unregistered  education  levels  are  positively  correlated  with 
endogamous  marriage  (ibidem).  It  might  have  been  interesting  to  inquire  whether  the  gender 
difference  in  marriage  patterns  among  children  of  Indian  immigrants  will  remain,  if  we  compare 
women and men with similar marriage ages or education levels.  

What we can conclude so far is the following: 

First, Norwegian-born persons with parents from India are more likely to marry within the Indian 
diaspora (endogamously) than outside it, as with diasporas from other post-colonial or post-socialist 
countries, but unlike diasporas from Western countries. 

Secondly, if compared to Norwegian-born parsons with immigrant parents from other countries in 
the  same  region,  they  offspring  of  Indians  are  more  likely  to  marry  outside  of  their  own  diaspora 
community (exogamously).  

Third, Norwegian-born persons with parents from India are likely to find spouses who are residents 
outside Norway (which may imply family migration for that spouse). This is typical of persons with 
parents  from  post-colonial  countries,  but  untypical  of  persons  with  parents  from  post-socialist  or 
Western countries. 

Fourth, when comparing women and men among Norwegian-born persons with parents from India, 
women  are  considerably  more likely  to  choose  spouses  from  outside  their  own diaspora  community 
(exogamously),  like  woman  with  immigrant  parents  from  Poland,  as  well  as  women  and  men  with 
immigrant parents from Western countries.  

Finally, if comparing women and men among Norwegian persons with immigrant parents from any 
country, including India, the men are more likely to find spouses who are residents outside of Norway 
(which may mean family migration for the female spouse). 

How can we possibly interpret these observations? My suggestion would be to further inquire into 
the particular socio-economic conditions of the individuals and families who make these choices. Such 
research questions might suggest a possible direction for future research regarding the Indian diaspora 
community in Norway, in comparison to other diaspora communities in the country. Further research 
on  marriage  practices  within  the  diaspora  might  lead  to  further  knowledge  about  how  transnational 
socio-economic integration works through diaspora communities. 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

43 

 
 
Helge Hiram Jensen, Geir-Tore Brenne  

5.7 Gender and migration: intersectionality among Norwegian residents of Indian origin 

The  intersection  between  gender  and  ethnicity  is  complex.  It  is  a  hot  topic  in  debates  about  gender 
equality within immigrant diasporas. This complexity was perceived in a certain way according to the 
colonial ideological apparatus, which – according to Gayatri Spivak’s self-conscious hyperbole – said: 
“White  men  are  saving  brown  women  from  brown  men”  (Spivak  1988:  296-297).  Racial 
discrimination  can  be  real,  even  though  “races”  are  not  real.  5  I  will  now  discuss  the  possibility  of 
socio-economic discrimination along intersectional lines: the racism/sexism nexus. First, I will review 
the  available  data  regarding  gender-specific  reasons  for  migration  among  Norwegian  residents  with 
Indian origin. Thereafter, I will discuss testimonies about discrimination and gender from Norwegian 
residents of Indian origin. 

Gender-specific  data  about  the  reason  for  migration  has  not  been  available.  However,  there  are 
data that indicate a male majority among labor migrants and a female majority among family migrants. 
In  the  demographics  of  Chapter  4,  it  was  observed  that  there  are  slightly  more  men  than  women 
among Norwegian residents of Indian origin, and this is due to a clear male overweight particularly 
clear in  municipalities  with  many  newly  arrived  Indian  immigrants (part  4.3). This indicates a  male 
majority  among  the  newly  arrived  labor  migrants  from  India.  There  was  also  a  difference  between 
various  age  groups,  where  the  elder  cohorts  had  a  male  majority,  but  not  the  younger  cohorts  of 
immigrants and their offspring. This indicates that the number of men and woman has become more 
even over time, possibly because of family migration. This also fits with anthropological and historical 
descriptions  of  the  first  wave  of  migrants.  They  were  hard-working  men,  who  arrived  alone,  who 
wished to earn money in order to finance a nuclear family at their place of residence, and, also, to send 
remittances  to  the  extended  family  in  their  area  of  origin  (Kramer  1979a;  Wist  2000).  These 
observations support my interpretation of data about family formation in the previous paragraph (5.7). 
There, I observed that among persons born in Norway  by immigrants from India, significantly more 
men found a spouse resident outside Norway. The same pattern I found among diaspora communities 
from  every  country  of  origin,  and  I  concluded  that  this  indicated  a  gendered  pattern  for  migration 
under  the rules  for family  unification.  If  these interpretations are  correct,  one  might  speculate about 
possible explanations. Maybe there is something about the legal framework in the country of arrival; 
maybe there is something about gendered division of labor in all countries of origin; maybe there is a 
combination? 

Gender issues within the diaspora 

There  is  much  debate  about  gender  issues in  family-based  and religiously  based  social  organization 
within the Indian diaspora, as well as other diaspora communities. Several researchers have discussed 
gendered social organization within traditional family forms in the Indian diaspora. Brenna (2012) has 
claimed that it was hard to gain acceptance when she divorced; while Sharma (2009) has observed that 
some aging women show fear about their future social standing if they become widows. In the debate 
around  arranged  marriages,  the  discussion  about  levels  of  voluntary  choice  is  relevant  for  young 
persons  of  both  genders  (Bredal  2006).  If  a  marriage  involves  a  low  degree  of  consent  from  the 
aspiring husband and/or wife, it implies gender-related discrimination against the young  man and/or 
the  young  woman.  These qualitative  studies  indicate  that  at  least  some  women  experience  gendered 
vulnerability  as  a  result  of  some  of  the  family  practices  within  the  Indian  diaspora  in  Norway.  The 
quantitative prevalence of such trouble is difficult to uncover, but for individuals who experience it, 
such  problems  may  prove  to  be  a  problem.  It  is  also  difficult  to  tell  whether  this  is  because  of 
traditions brought from  India, or because of practices that might have  gained new dysfunctions as a 

5 Though “races” are not real, racial discrimination may nevertheless be real. Racist practices refer to some body 
features  that  become  significant  for  that  practice.  How  can  we  describe  which  are  these  features  without 
using the terminology of racism (or, in more technical terms, without racialization)? In this report I address 
the possibility of a racism/sexism nexus by using the terms “non-white women” and “women of color”. The 
terms are awkward, but the alternatives may be even worse. (See also Chapters 2.3 and 5.2.) 

44 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

                                                      
Norwegian residents of Indian origin – National and transnational integration 

result of adaptation to the host country. In the latter case there are two possible mechanisms, both a 
reaction  to  the  official  ideology  of  equality  in  the  Norwegian  state,  and/or  a  blending  with  similar 
cultural reactions within some segments of ethnically Norwegian civil society. (For a comparison of 
homegrown  and  imported  forms  of  patriarchy  in  Scandinavia,  see  Strindberg  2002.)  There  also  are 
discussions about gender discrimination within religious associations. For example, Sikh organizations 
in Norway tend to state that they practice gender equality. Nevertheless, there are feminist members 
who push for improvements. The young labor party politician Kaur (2012), who is also active in the 
Sikh temple in Oslo, has made a political point by wearing the traditional turban for young male Sikhs. 

Women of South-Asian origin at the Norwegian labor market 

There  are  some  indications  of  possible  discrimination  against  non-white  women  in  the  Norwegian 
labor  market.  As  mentioned  above  (5.4),  quantitative  research  on  the  transfer  from  education  to 
employment among the children of immigrants from India and Pakistan indicates that both groups tend 
to  meet  “ethnic  barriers”,  while  the  transfer  to  employment  tends  to  be  even  slower  for  non-white 
women  than  for  non-white  men  (Birkeland  et  al.  2014).  The  authors  refrain  from  drawing  any 
conclusions as to why, but suggest language problems or discrimination. In this report, I had a similar 
discussion  regarding  the  diverging  rates  of  employment  between  men  and  women,  comparing 
immigrants  from  non-Western  countries  and  everyone  else  in  the  population,  and  finally,  the  nexus 
between  both  the  gender  gap  and  the  ethnicity  gap  (part  5.2  above).  The  only  one  of  the  social 
scientists who explicitly addresses racial discrimination against Norwegian residents of Indian origin 
is Mehdu Sharma (2009), herself the only one among the authors who is a non-white woman, as well 
as a social scientist. In this context, it is relevant to note that Frode Helland (2014), a white male, has 
suggested that we should distinguish between racism as an explicit ideology and racism as an implicit 
mentality. Good intentions are not sufficient to achieve good practice, because the decolonization of 
knowledge  is  a  laborious  process, implying  inquiry  into  many  under-researched issues (Chakrabarty 
2000). Such reflections are relevant for putting the present report into context, because its writer is a 
white male, striving to learn how we can live in an anti-racist and anti-sexist way. Perhaps we should 
distinguish between discrimination experienced by the “receiver”, and discrimination as experienced 
by  the  “sender”  of  discriminatory  practices.  That  way,  it  might  be  easier  to  talk  about  the 
racism/sexism  nexus  within  a  national  environment,  where  egalitarianism  has  become  an  official 
ethos.  

5.8 Caste and migration: higher status in the community of origin 

There is no systematic registry data regarding the caste background of Norwegian residents of Indian 
background. Regarding the first wave of migration from India to Norway, some are content to observe 
that most got labor class work in industry or agriculture (e.g. Pettersen 2009: 110). Less interest has 
been taken in their social standing prior to emigrating from India. For issues where no data registries 
exist, other methods must be used. Caste background has become an issue within some recent research 
which  combines  qualitative  and  quantitative  methods  (Wist  2000,  Lervik  2010,  2012,  2014).  Some 
hypotheses  regarding  caste  background  patterns  have  been  suggested  on  the  basis  of  qualitative 
interviews, combined with discussion of relevant studies of general Indian diasporas. 

Wist (2000: 29-31) observes that many first wavers from India to Norway had got a good education 
prior  to  emigration  from  India,  even  though  they  got  labor  class  jobs  in  Norway.  Thus,  she  argues, 
most  of  these  migrants  must  have  had  a  “middle  class”  background,  which  implies  that  they  were 
unlikely  to  come  from  lower  castes  (including  the  Dalit,  or  “casteless”  castes).  This  is  backed  by 
Sharma (2009: 17), who argues that it is a popular prejudice that the early labor immigrants from India 
to Norway lacked higher education. 

Lervik  (2014a:  40)  argues  that  caste  background,  together  with  the  urban-rural  distinction,  are 
some  of  the  relevant  mechanisms  of  social  differentiation  within  the  Indian  and  Pakistani  diaspora 
communities. On the basis of her qualitative interviews, she observes that caste background seems to 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

45 

Helge Hiram Jensen, Geir-Tore Brenne  

be relevant for the Indian diaspora, because they relate to status hierarchies not only within the host 
country, but also within their environment of origin (Lervik 2012; 2014: 41). She suggests that caste 
might be best seen as a form of capital, alongside economic capital, social capital and cultural capital. 
She  offers  two  possible  mechanisms  regarding  the  effect  of  caste  background  upon  socio-economic 
integration in the host country. One possibility is that from the fact of coming from a higher  caste in 
India (or Pakistan) might make young Norwegian residents of Indian (or Pakistani) origin aim higher, 
and  be  more  ambitious.  Another  possibility,  however,  is  that  this  kind  of  higher-caste  background 
from India (or Pakistan) might make the migrants and their offspring more “laid back”, not investing 
the  necessary  labor  and  resources  in  order  to  succeed  in  the  host  country.  The  existing  data  do  not 
provide  any  ground  to  conclude  which  these  possible  mechanisms  is  operating  (Lervik  2014:  42). 
However,  Wist  (2000:  Chapter  3)  has  found  register  data  and  ethnographies  which  suggest  that  the 
Indian diaspora in Norway might have experienced a fall in social status during the 1970s and 1980s, 
then a rise of status in the 1990s.  

5.9 Remittances and social ties to India 

There are, unfortunately, no measurement of remittances transferred from Norway to India. There are 
no data about the volume of these remittances, nor any systematic information about their destination 
within India. This could be seen in the context of the more general challenge observed by Statistics 
Norway, which is the lack of institutions to gather systematic data that are relevant for understanding 
the impact of globalization on the economy (Stensrud 2009). If global corporations are globalization at 
elite level, then the diaspora economies might be best seen as middle-class globalization. 

There is some information about some of the socio-economic ties between Norwegian residents of 
Indian  origin  and  their  communities  of  origin  in  India.  Some  relevant  information  was  reviewed 
above,  in  the  discussions  about  transnational  marriages  (5.6),  gender  differences  (5.7)  and  caste 
differences (5.8). Taken together, these three paragraphs sketch a map of the socio-economic structure 
within the Indian diaspora in Norway. Historical research on the basis of register data, ethnographies 
and some in-depth interviews suggest that the most decisive mechanisms for migration are found not 
found in individual choices, or in structural determinants. Rather they are found in processes within 
social networks – the meso level (Wist 2000: 38). The decision about emigration was taken together 
with the extended family, and the extended family funded migration, while the émigré sent remittances 
back to the extended family. Social networks also played a decisive role when labor emigrants from 
India and Pakistan found work in Norway. Family ties – as well as religious associations – played a 
key function whereby an employee of Indian or Pakistani origin could provide brokerage between a 
local  employer  and  a  potential  new  employee  (ibidem:  44-45).  Thus,  the  émigré  might  not  be 
integrated in the ethnically native social network. But he or she might partly compensate for this lack 
of social capital by drawing on family ties and religious associations within the diaspora community. 
The practical usage of diaspora networks for emigration and immigration can explain chain migration. 
That may be the most relevant mechanism to explain why labor migrants from one particular region of 
origin (e.g. Indian and Pakistani Punjab) tend to settle in one particular host region (e.g. the Drammen 
urban region). 

From a socio-economic viewpoint, diaspora networks may include religious associations, political 
parties,  business  partnerships,  interest  organizations,  and  circles  of  personal  friends,  but  the  most 
significant of all the networked economic units is the extended family. Labor migration might be best 
seen  as  one  of  many  livelihood  adaptations  whereby  extended  families  maintain  or  empower  their 
collective  socio-economic  standing  within  a  globalized  economy.  Thus,  labor  migration  stands  as  a 
particular  form  of  globalization  “from  below”,  which  might  potentially  compliment  corporation-led 
and state-led globalization “from above”. Therefore, diaspora economies are one of the relevant issues 
of inquiry when Statistics Norway (Stensrud 2009) suggest that registries be adapted to account for the 
globalization of the economy.  

46 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

Norwegian residents of Indian origin – National and transnational integration 

6. Legal framework 

Norway  does  not  have  any  specific  policy  framework  in  relation  to  migrants  from  India.  Broadly 
speaking, at present, Norwegian migration policy separate between three wide areas of origin: 

1.  The Nordic countries, 

2.  The EU/EEA area, 

3.  Countries outside the EU/EEA area 

The  regulations  get  less  liberal  as  we  go  down  this  list.  That  means,  citizens  from  other  Nordic 
countries  face  the  fewest  obstacles  migrating  to  Norway,  while  citizens  that  are  from  outside  the 
EU/EEA area face the greatest number. Migration from India is governed by the rules pertaining to the 
third category. In the text below, we will focus on the rules and policies regarding this category. 

Norwegian migration policies distinguish between different types of migration, which means that 
there  are  different  ways  to  get  work  and  residence  permits.  Refugees  and  asylum  seekers,  work 
migration,  family  reunification,  and  international  students  are  examples  of  migration  types  that  are 
governed  by  different  policies.  Refugees  and  asylum  seekers  account  for  a substantial proportion  of 
non-EU migration to Norway, however, the number of Indians in this group is negligible. Therefore, 
in this review I will disregard that field, and focus on the other types of migration. We will also look 
away  from  any  programs  aimed  at  promoting  circular  migration, since such  policies  fall  outside the 
legal framework as strictly defined. 

Below,  we  will  offer  a  brief  historical  survey  of  the  development  of  the  regulations  relating  to 
different types of migration, followed by a presentation of the framework as it is today. (Part 6.2.2. is 
adapted from an earlier Carim-India report, Brenne and Jensen 2013, written by ourselves).  

6.1 Regulation of work migration 

6.1.1 Historical development: from open borders to complex regulations 

Norway is a relatively new net recipient of foreign work migrants. Up until the 1950s, Norway was 
largely a net exporter of work migrants. But the rebuilding of the country after the Second World War, 
caused  an  economic  boom,  creating  a  greater  demand  of  workers.  From  the  1960s  onwards,  “guest 
workers” (fremmedarbeidere) entered the labour market in large numbers. These came from different 
parts  of  the  world,  and  became  a  useful  resource  for  the  newly  established  and  fast  growing  oil 
industry, parts of industry more generally, and the service sector. The lack of previous experience as a 
recipient country of work migration, also meant that the state did not at the time have any developed 
legal  framework  to  deal  with  it.  This  lack  of  regulations  meant  that  early  legal  practice  had  a  very 
liberal  character,  with  very  low  requirements  for  granting  work  and  residence  permits.  This  lead  to 
some problems, as some of the early work migrants were faced with bad housing conditions, as well as 
poor salaries. 

In 1975 Norway saw a very important change in the migration policy. A temporary “immigration 
stop” was passed in 1975 (Norwegian Official Reports 2011: 68). There were several reasons behind 
this change. A need was seen to improve the living conditions of the workers already there, many of 
whom  were  living  in  bad  conditions  (ibidem;  see  also  Norwegian  Official  Report  1973;  Norwegian 
Ministry of Municipalities 1974; and Kjeldstadli 2003c: Chapter 4). However, by the mid-1970s, the 
Norway economy and that of other European countries was suffering a downturn, meaning less work. 
Other  countries  –  including  Sweden,  Denmark  and  West-Germany  –  had  tightened  their  migration 
laws in the years before, and the Norwegian government chose to do the same thing. 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

47 

Helge Hiram Jensen, Geir-Tore Brenne  

It is also important to note, that despite its name, the “immigration stop” of 1975 was not a full stop 
on migrants. Rather, it was a framework of rules and regulations that calibrated work-migration with 
national  needs.  Highly  qualified  workers  were  still  needed  for  various  sectors,  in  particular  the  oil-
industry.  Applications,  however,  were  cumbersome.  Foreign  workers  had  to  apply  to  work  from 
abroad, and their type of work had to fit into specified categories. It was not until the late 1990s that 
rules became less restrictive and foreign nationals were able to enter, find work, and then apply for the 
necessary permits. 

A further significant historical change was the EEA treaty (European Economic Area) of 1994, and 
the opening of the common EU labour market, in 2004. The EEA treaty made it simpler for EU and EEA 
nationals to find work in Norway, and in 2004 the labour market was opened completely to citizens of 
other  EEA/EU  countries.  The  details  of  the  regulations  regarding  EU/EEA  migration  are  not  under 
examination here. However, it must be noted that Norway’s full integration into the EU/EEA area may 
have  made  it  more  difficult  for  qualified  migrants  from  non-EU/EEA  countries  to  find  work,  as  the 
number of available workers are much greater now than before, and competition is therefore higher. 

6.1.2 Present day policies regarding non-EU/EEA work migrants6 

From countries outside of the EEA/EU, only “skilled workers or specialists” are granted a work and 
residence permit, given that they are offered work matching their skills. The policies deal with three 
types of “highly-skilled migration”: 

a)  Completed vocational training at upper secondary school level, for at least three years, e.g. as 
a carpenter or health worker. There must be a corresponding vocational training programme in 
Norway. 

b)  Completed education or degree from a university/university college, e.g. a Bachelor’s degree 

as an engineer or a nurse. 

c)  Special qualifications obtained through long work experience, if relevant in combination with 

courses. 

“Ethnic  cooks”  are  a  distinct  category,  subject  to  strict  requirements  for  receiving  a  work  and 
residence permit. Permits are only granted in exceptional cases. However, if one is to work as a cook 
and  does  not  prepare  “ethnic”  food,  one  may  apply  for  a  residence  permit  within  the  framework  of 
being a skilled worker (Brenne and Jensen, 2014; see also UDI 2015). 

There is also a minimum salary requirement for skilled workers. In general, the prospective worker 
is not offered pay that is lower than the average paid to Norwegian workers with the same occupation 
in that industry. If the work requires a master degree, the workers cannot be paid less than scale 47 on 
the pay scale for state employees. In 2015, this equals 409,700 NOK, or approximately 45,000 EUR. 

There is presently a yearly max quota of 5,000 skilled work migrants from non-EU/EEA countries. 

However, the annual number of work migrants have been well within this quota. 

In  order  to  get  a  permanent  residence  permit,  one  must  have  had  a  permit  to  stay  in  Norway 
continuously for three years. “Continuously”, means that one should not have gaps of more than three 
months  between  different  permits.  Also,  one  cannot  have  stayed  outside  of  Norway  for  more  than 
fifteen months, or seven months, if one’s permit is as a “specialist” or “skilled worker”. 

Norway has mandatory introductory programmes, which provides newly arrived immigrants with 
training in Norwegian and knowledge of Norwegian society7. Job seekers from outside the EU/EEA 

6 Largely adapted from Brenne and Jensen 2013. 
7 Asylum seekers and refugees, and their family members, have a much more extensive programme, and it is free. 

48 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

                                                      
Norwegian residents of Indian origin – National and transnational integration 

area,  are  required  to  take  300  lessons,  250  lessons  in  Norwegian  and  50  lessons  in  knowledge  of 
Norwegian  society.  The  costs  must  be  covered  by  the  subject  themselves  (Norwegian  official 
Reports 2011: 94).  

Health professionals need an authorization or license from the Norwegian Registration Authority 
for  Health  Personnel  (SAK). The  processing  time  to  get  this  varies.  If  applicants  are from  a  Nordic 
countries, the processing time is about six weeks. If they have education from the EU and EEA area, it 
is three to four months. With education from outside the EU/EEA area, the procedure is more complex 
and depends on the type of health work. For most health care professions (psychologists, nurses, and 
health care workers) it is six months. Medical doctors have a two-step procedure. They first need to 
have  their  educational  credentials  certified,  before  they  can  have  their  case  processed  by  SAK.  The 
verification process itself takes four to  six months, then SAK needs six months more to process the 
case. For dental practitioners the processing by SAK may be even longer. Medical doctors also need to 
take a technical language course, as well as a course in ordinary written and spoken Norwegian. This 
course is regularly  organised  at the  University  of  Oslo.  Other  health  professions  are  exempted  from 
any  formal  language  demands,  however  the  employer  may  require  language  training  (Brenne  and 
Jensen, 2014: 5). 

Migrant workers may apply for their family members to be granted a residence permit in Norway 
(see below). If this is granted, their family members are entitled to work. Norway has a high degree of 
labour market participation from women, and this is encouraged by government policies. Parents have 
shared  rights  to  total  parental  leave  of  one  year,  while  at  the  same  time  getting  80%  salary 
compensation (see  Appendix 2). There are subsidised kindergartens, to make it easier for parents to 
combine work with family life.  

Norway is obliged through the GATS-treaty and WTO membership to give all members of WTO 
access  to  Norway.  The  authorities  are  obliged  to  grant  work  permits  to  workers  from  international 
companies for countries that are WTO-members, without examining how their specialisation fit with 
the Norwegian labour market. 

6.2 Regulation of spouse and family migration 

6.2.1 Historical development: from extended family to “next of kin” 

Rules regarding family migration have been changed gradually, becoming stricter and stricter. 

Before  the  “migration  stop”  in  1975,  there  was  no  formal  rule  regarding  minimum  income 
requirement  for  the  sponsor  of  spouse  and  close  kin  migration.  However,  this  had  been  a  part  of  a 
“long established practice” (Norwegian Official Reports 1973: 81). The rule was formalised in 1975, 
initially  with  a  requirement  for  a  place  of  living.  This  requirement  was  dropped  in  1991,  as  the 
possibility for checking this requirement was seen as difficult. There was, early on, a wish that family 
members  should  not  become  a  source  of  expenditure  for  the  state.  In  the  late  1980s  and  the  early 
1990s there was also a wish for family migration to be made easier, not least to assist with integration 
(Norwegian  Official  Reports  2011:  73).  However,  through  the  1990s  and  2000s  rules  gradually 
became stricter, with additional requirements for minimum income (see table 1 below). Still, between 
1995 and 1998, and from 2000 until 2006, family migration was the principal reason for migration to 
Norway.  A  survey  of  the  historical  development  of  rules  regarding  family  migration  of  spouse  and 
next of kin, are set out below in Table 8. 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

49 

 
 
Helge Hiram Jensen, Geir-Tore Brenne  

Table 8. Historical development of rules and regulation regarding migration of family and close kin 

Year  Change 

Background 

1975 

Rule  of  minimum  income  and  place  of  living  for  migration  of  the 
family of a foreigner residing in Norway 

Introduced  in  relation  to  the 
“immigration stop” in 1975 

1991 

1997 

2000 

Requirement  of  a  place  of 
living  for  close  kin  removed. 
Continuation  of  minimum  income  rule,  with  several  exceptions 
(Norwegian  citizen,  refugee,  person  with  permanent  residence 
permit, and more). 

Possibility  of  family  reunification  and  exceptions  to  the  rule  of 
minimum income, for persons with collective protection as well as 
humanitarian refugees. 

Iraqi  asylum  seekers  given  unique  temporary  residence  permit 
without  the  possibility  of  family  reunification  or  migration  of 
spouse. 

Difficulties  of  controlling  the 
initial  rule.  Continuation  of 
general principles. 

Need  for  protection  of 
the 
whole  family.  Also,  easier  to 
facilitate  integration  with  the 
whole family present. 

Reduce  number  of  asylum 
seekers. 

2003 

Reintroduction  of  minimum  income  requirement  for  persons  with 
residence on humanitarian grounds. 

2003 

2008 

Minimum  income  requirement  also  introduced  for  Norwegian 
citizens under the age of 23. 
Minimum  income  requirement  made  stricter,  income  requirement 
for previous year increased. 

2010 

Rules  regarding  minimum  income  made  stricter.  For  example, 
minimum income is required for an extended period of time. 

Source: based on Norwegian Official Reports 2011: 74. 

of 

number 

of 
Reduction 
asylum  seekers,  as  well  as 
avoiding  having  more  liberal 
rules than other countries 
Reduction  in  the  number  of 
forced marriages 
Reduction  in  the  number  of 
asylum seekers. 

Reduction  in  the  number  of 
asylum  seekers  and 
forced 
marriages. 

6.2.2 Present day policies regarding family migration  

At present (in 2015), the requirement is that the sponsor must have had an income of 251,856 NOK8 
before tax in 2014 in order to be eligible to apply to be reunited with a family member. 

The  definition  of  who  counts  as  “family”  in  terms  of  family  migration  are  spouses,  unmarried 
partners,  living  together  for  at  least  two  years  (or  with  children),  and  children  under  the  age  of 
eighteen. 

Marriages that are formalised outside of Norway are generally recognized, but the spouses cannot 
have been under eighteen at the time of marriage and both must have been physically present at the 
time of the wedding. 

It has been possible to apply for other family members as well, such as older parents, siblings, or 
others that have been under the sponsor’s care. However, there are high requirements for applications 
in  relation  to  this  group  and  family  migration  has  rarely  been  granted  (Norwegian  Official  Reports 
2011: 73). 

The  present  regulations  regarding  support  and  sponsorship  date  back  from  new  rules  (in 
Utlendingsforskriften) introduced on 1 January 2010. This was a major change that tightened the rules 
significantly.  It  made  the  requirement  for  income  stricter  for  all  groups,  as  well  as  widening  the 
minimum income requirement to groups previously exempted from it. 

8  This  is  approximately  28,000  euros.  The  “sponsor”  is  the  person  living  in  Norway  who  wants  family 

reunification. The “applicant” is the family member who wants to move to Norway.  

50 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

                                                      
Norwegian residents of Indian origin – National and transnational integration 

It  is  now  only  the  income  of  the  sponsor  –  the  person  residing  in  Norway  who  wants  family 
reunification – that is, if necessary, taken into account. Before this, the expected income of the person 
wishing to migrate to Norway could also be taken into account. The sponsor needs to document his or 
her  registered  income  in  the  previous  tax  year,  as  well  as  future  expected  income.  A  new  rule 
stipulates  that  the  sponsor  may  not  have  received  any  social  aid  from  the  government  the  previous 
year. A new rule requires all Norwegian citizens above age of 23 as well as foreign nationals with a 
permanent resident permit, to document minimum income when acting as sponsors. These had earlier 
been exempt from the requirement (Norwegian Official Report 2011: 8; Lovdata 2015) 

6.2.3 Future regulations for family migration: further restrictions? 

Limited opportunities to restrict other types of migration makes family migration a natural target for 
stricter  regulations.  The  recent  changes  in  family  migration  rules  have  been  significant,  and  some 
reflection regarding their origins is needed here. To understand why rules regarding family migration 
have  become  stricter,  one  needs  to  see  them  in  the  context  of  recent  public  controversies  regarding 
migration in general. As in many other European countries, Norway’s right-wing parties strive to limit 
migration from non-western countries (this is particularly true of the Progress Party). These demands 
enjoy  some  support  among  the  population.  In  general,  other  political  parties  of  the  political 
mainstream, such as Arbeiderpartiet (the Labour Party), and Høyre (the Conservative Party), have also 
adopted  more  restrictive  views  on  migration.  However,  the  problem  of  legislators  is  that  a  lot  of 
migration  is  governed  by  UN  or  EU  treaties.  Norway  cannot  easily  back  away  from  obligations 
implied  in  such  treaties.  This  is  particularly  true  for  regulations  regarding  asylum  seekers  and 
refugees. However, family migration is still largely under the control of the national government.9 The 
increase in restrictions address public concerns for limiting welfare system expenditure for unskilled 
family migrants who may not succeed in finding work in Norway. There are also concerns on limiting 
forced marriages. Changes introduced in family migration, can be flagged up by politicians wishing to 
be seen as “hard” on migration. 

This tendency is likely to continue, as the pressure on the other channels of immigration is heavy, 

and the popular demand from part of the population to reduce migration will continue. 

6.3 Regulations for international students 

6.3.1 Historical development: from recipients of aid to potential resources 

Norway  originally  regarded  international  students  as  a  problem.  These  were  individuals  from  less 
wealthy  countries  that  that  Norway  had  an  obligation  to  help  with  an  education,  not  a  potential 
resource Norwegian economy (Norwegian Official Reports 2011: 75). In 1977, laws were introduced 
that made it possible for international students from developing countries to get loans and stipends for 
studying  in  Norway,  in  much  the  same  way  as  Norwegian  students.  In  1994,  this  became  a  quota-
scheme,  which  set  a  maximum  on  the number  of  students  from  developing  countries  who  would  be 
eligible for loan and stipend. 

In 1991, laws were introduced that limited the possibility of staying in Norway after studies were 
finished.  All international students  were required  to  leave,  once  their  studies  were over. They  could 
only apply for a work permit in Norway after five years of “quarantine” abroad (Ibid.). The rationale 
was that the Norwegian government was, in this way, assisting the development of poorer countries. It 
was indicative of a mind-set that regarded international students as a problem, rather than a potential 
resource for the Norwegian economy. In 2001, this changed, and the quarantine-rules were dropped. 

9  See  for  example  Dagens  Næringsliv  (2015),  where  the  Progress  Party  –  now  in  government  –  advocates  a 

further increase in minimum income requirement for family migration.  

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

51 

                                                      
Helge Hiram Jensen, Geir-Tore Brenne  

Foreign specialists were allowed to apply for work after they finished their studies, as long as the work 
was relevant to their education. 

6.3.2 Present day policies: free tuition, but pressure to change 

Norway has had and still has a well developed public system of higher education that has largely been 
free of tuition fees. Private educational institutions, however, require tuition fees. This includes several 
business schools and schools for the creative professions (such as media, art, and design). International 
students are allowed to take paid work of up to twenty hours each week, which is similar to a 50% job. 
In  order  for  non-EU/EEA  students  to  receive  a  student  visa,  however,  he  or  she  needs to  document 
sufficient  means  for  living  costs  and  subsistence  in  Norway  for  one  year:  an  amount  stipulated  at 
10,000  euro.  International  students  are  generally  helped  with  a  living  space  (student  dormitory  or 
similar) for a cost well below market level. 

Unlike  most  other  countries,  Norway  also  exempts  foreign  nationals  and  non-EU  citizens  from 
tuition in public education. There is, however, an ongoing debate on whether a tuition fee should be 
introduced  for  non-EU/EEA  citizens.  The  current  right-wing  government  proposed,  as  part  of  the 
national  budget  in  October  2014,  a  tuition  fee  for  non-EU/EEA  students.  The  proponents  for  this 
change  argued  that it  was not  in  the interest  of  Norway  to  provide  free  education  for  students  from 
China  or  the  USA,  since  they  have  well-developed  education  systems  of  their  own.  Also,  several 
countries  had  recently  introduced  a  similar  tuition  fees  for  non-EU/EEA  students,  most  notably 
Germany  and  Sweden.  This  could  lead  one  to  believe  that  more  students  would  apply  to  Norway 
solely because of the lack of tuition, something that might increase the number of applicants and the 
pressure on the system significantly. Opponents of change argued that the introduction of a tuition fee 
would  reduce  the  number  of  non-EU/EEA  students  to  next  to  none,  since  high  living  costs  would 
make  Norway  unattractive  as  a  destination.  Some  also  referred  to  the  older  idea  of  helping  poor 
countries – namely, that Norway as a rich country should assist less wealthy countries to educate their 
citizens.  The  government  proposition  was  eventually  withdrawn  in  November  2014  before  the  final 
national budget was passed. It was withdrawn partly due to protests from student organisations, and 
partly thanks to a political deal with other parties. However, the issue is not permanently settled, and it 
is likely that the current government will try to change the rules again in the future.10  

7. Socio-cultural integration 

The “integration” of immigrants, is much debated in Norway. As in other West-European countries, 
the debate refers to migrants from non-Western regions. However, the term “integration” has different 
meanings.  In  the  literature  review  above,  it  was  observed  that  most  social science  research shows a 
“social  democratic”  commitment  to  socio-economic  integration.  The  issue  was  discussed  in  detail, 
above, in Chapter 4 of this report. Only one of the contributions reviewed (Staurland 2012) expressed 
a  more  “national romantic”  worry  over  whether  newly  arrived  migrants  from  India are  interested in 
adapting  to  Norwegian  culture.  Such  a  worry  about  socio-cultural  integration  may  resonate  with  an 
important public debate on culture and liberty. Groups like the Progress Party and the Human Rights 
Service (an NGO not to be confused with Human Rights Watch) claim that liberty is a nationally or 
civilizationally specific value, and consequently, that immigrants from foreign nations or civilizations 
must choose between our liberty and their culture. Social scientists can hardly lend their voices to this 
view,  not  because  of  any  bias,  but  rather  because  the  ideology  is  empirically  wrong.  Historical 
research has demonstrated that Norway and the West were never culturally homogeneous (Sørensen 
1998),  and  even  that  there  has  been  internal  colonialism  (Pedersen  1999).  But  the  heterodox  social 

10  The issue was widely covered in the Norwegian press. See e.g. Dagens Næringliv (2014), Fremover (2014), 

and Universitas (2014). 

52 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

                                                      
Norwegian residents of Indian origin – National and transnational integration 

scientist Sigurd Skirbekk (2008) nevertheless points out that the nation-state was historically the basis 
of  the  Norwegian  welfare  state.  The  nation  matters  precisely  because  it  is  a  social  construction,  an 
artifact, and it cannot be taken for granted. For the same reason, it is in a state of flux, adapting to new 
circumstances,  as  all  living  traditions.  As  several  researchers  of  nation-building  have  pointed  out, 
minorities and majorities are concepts that get their meaning in relation to each other. Consequently, 
research  into  diaspora  minorities  may  become  misleading  if  it  assumes  that  nation  building  is  a 
finished  process  (Eriksen  and  Hoëm  1999;  Bauböck  2008).  The  various  states  are  already  socio-
economically  integrated  into  each  other  through  global  trade,  pollution,  security  risks,  and  inter-
governmental  organizations.  It  might,  therefore,  increase  democratic  accountability  if  the  various 
nations  deepen  their  socio-cultural  integration  with  each  other  through  transnational  civil  society, 
including  diaspora  communities.  The  present  chapter  will,  on  the  basis  of  this  theoretical  position, 
present  existing  knowledge  about  various  aspects  of  socio-cultural  integration  among  Norwegian 
residents of Indian origin. 

First, the chapter will discuss the low prevalence of social problems, as a positive function of social 
integration  (7.1).  Thereafter,  the  chapter  will  discuss  integration  into  the  Norwegian  national 
community, (7.2), and forms of integration in the  transnational Indian diaspora (7.3). The emphasis 
will be on the making and maintenance of “social capital” in the form of socio-cultural ties. In the end, 
the chapter will also discuss how the Norwegian mass media portrays persons of Indian origin (7.5). 
Thus, the chapter will end by discussing the level of cultural integration for the Norwegian national 
community into larger, more cosmopolitan fellowships. 

The chapter combines qualitative and quantitative data sources. The first two parts of the chapter 
will present register data regarding the low prevalence of social problems among Norwegian residents 
of Indian origin, as well as the high level of integration into the Norwegian national community. These 
topics have been defined as being relevant within established state policy, and as a result, systematic 
data  gathering  has  taken  place.  The  two  final  parts  of  the  chapter  will  review  qualitative  data  that 
indicates  how  transnational  subcultures  facilitate  socio-cultural  integration  between  nations  that  are 
socially and spatially distant. In line with contemporary developments within social anthropology, the 
chapter sees increased communication, trade, social ties, and understanding about others as indicators 
of  the  creation  of  “social  capital”  within  and  across  previously  established  cultural  fellowships.  If 
increased transnational integration leads to increased interest in this issue among state policy makers, 
we might see richer data regarding the topic in the future.  

7.1 Low prevalence of social problems – a function of integration 

The  prevalence  of  social  problems  is  significantly  lower  among  Indian-Norwegians,  compared  to 
Norwegian residents in general. In other words, the minority of Indian origin cause less trouble for the 
welfare state than the Norwegian majority. This conclusion is based on three indicators. 

First, let us take the most hotly debated topic: crime rates among immigrants. Norwegian residents 
of  Indian  origin,  have  an  equal  or  lower  registered  crime  level  than  the  average  for  the  general 
Norwegian population. This differs from immigrants (and their offspring) from some other countries, 
who tend to be slightly over-represented in the crime statistics, even after controlling for correlation 
with  other  factors  that  often  correlate  with  registered  crime,  such  as  income  level,  gender,  and  age 
(Skarðhamar, Thorsen and Henriksen 2011). The authors remind us that criminals will tend to avoid 
being registered, and that the police are more likely to discover criminals among the groups that they 
perceive as being criminally-inclined, and therefore check people more regularly. Others have raised 
the question of whether it is conceptually valid to take “immigrants” as one statistical group (Jensen 
2007). In any case, it is clear that the Norwegian police have experienced less trouble with members of 
the Indian minority, when compared to members of the Norwegian majority. 

Second, immigrants from India are significantly less likely to receive social security benefit than the 
Norwegian population in general (Hirsch 2010). Other immigrant categories who are less likely than the 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

53 

Helge Hiram Jensen, Geir-Tore Brenne  

majority  to  receive  such  support  include  those  from  the  Philippines,  Romania,  Denmark,  Poland, 
Germany and Lithuania (ibidem). This might be because most migrants from these countries come for 
work,  whereas  political  refugees  may  have  more  problems,  and  may  therefore  be  more  dependent  on 
help.  For  example,  an  orphaned  child  soldier  from  Somalia  has  little  in  common  with  a  computer 
engineer from India, though both are “immigrants” (see also Henriksen 2007; Mokhtarri 2007). 

Third, child poverty is more prevalent in families that are classified as “immigrant”, than in general 
Norwegian  families.  For  families  from  India,  however,  this  is  not  the  case  (Epland  and  Kirkeberg 
2014). 

In  sum,  the  residents  of  Indian  origin  experience  fewer  social  problems  than  the  Norwegian 
population in general. This certainly indicates an absence of social marginalization and, indeed, social 
integration.  What,  however,  is  the  cause?  If  we  take  up  a  Marxist  explanatory  model,  it  may  be 
relevant that Norwegian-Indians tend to have high labor force participation, a very high rate of higher 
education, and can send currency to peers in India, all indicating good socio-economic integration (see 
Chapter  4).  However,  if  we  instead  choose  a  functionalist  explanatory  model,  it  may  be  equally  or 
more relevant that the Norwegian residents of Indian origin tend to be active participants within the 
national  community  in  the  host  country,  while  also  enjoying  social  contacts  with  the  diaspora 
community. Both these points indicating, of course, good socio-cultural integration (see parts 7.2 and 
7.3, respectively).  

7.2 Cultural integration into the host nation: state, market and civil society 

What  is  the  national  culture  that  immigrants  are  supposed  to  integrate  into?  Cultural  practices  are 
always diverse, but it is possible to identify hegemonic practices within any cultural formation. The 
hegemonic national culture in Norway  might be said to emphasize state politics  more than informal 
power,  market  economy  more  than  informal  exchange,  and  civil  society  more  than  the  informal 
familism.  (Another,  trickier  question  is  to  what  extent  this  hegemonic  ethos  of  equality  might  be 
hypocritical. For a critical discussion about this issue, see parts 5.2, 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 above.) 

Integration in the state – elections and parties 

Norwegian  residents  of  Indian  origin  are  eager  to  exercise  their  right  to  vote.  At  the  parliamentary 
election  in  2013,  there  was  a  considerable  decrease  in  voting  participation  among  Indians  in  Norway 
(about  seven  percentiles).  However,  this  group  had  had  a  higher  voting  participation  than  the  general 
Norwegian population, and thus, the decrease leaves the group on level with the average for the general 
population  (Wiggen  and  Aalandslid  2014:  36).  In  party  politics,  there  are  relatively  few  members  of 
minorities of non-western origin (often non-white), but there has been a political priority for mobilizing 
more participation from these minorities. The relative success in integrating young non-whites is seen as 
a provocation by some. A young politician of Indian origin, Prableen Kaur, is the youngest person to be 
voted into a municipal assembly in the country. She was also the most publically vocal of the survivors 
after a right-wing extremist massacre of young political activists, 22 July 2011, at a youth summer camp 
organized by the Labor Party. In fact, she commented on the experience, in a blog entry, 23 June, that 
was much cited in the mass media (Kaur 2011, 2012). After this incident, Kaur has become an example 
for young voters from ethnic minorities and particularly for young non-white women. The state and the 
parties may constitute a more important arena in Norway than in many other countries, because of the 
rather intrusive state tradition. This in spite of some countryside regions having rather informal politics 
(Vike 2009), for example the Sámi areas (Jensen 2015). 

Integration in the market – employment and income 

The level of formal employment among Norwegian residents of Indian origin has been discussed in 
detail in Chapter 5.2. The relatively high degree of participation in the wage labor market has resulted 
in  relatively  high  incomes.  Among  immigrants  to  Norway  from  post-socialist  or  post-colonial 
countries, immigrants from India have the highest income level. Nevertheless the income level among 

54 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

Norwegian residents of Indian origin – National and transnational integration 

immigrants  from  India  is  still  lower  than  the  average  for  the  Norwegian  population.  Additionally, 
immigrants from India are also lagging behind immigrants from Germany, Denmark, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom,  the  three  last even  enjoying  higher incomes  than the  average  Norwegian  (Omholt 
and  Strøm  2014).  In  many  countries,  the  informal  economic  sector  is  large,  which  is  never  seen  in 
statistics.  I  do  not  think  this  is  the  case  for  Norway,  though  it  might  be  the  case  in  some  limited 
regions or sectors (Lien 1997): for example among Sámi herders and fishers (Jensen 2015), or in the 
entrepreneurial Sunnmøre district. 

Integration in society – language and norms 

Mastering the language of the host community may be key to wider social participation. Some residents 
from non-Western countries experience difficulties with learning Norwegian. This is especially the case 
if they work as housewives, outside the formalized economy (see e.g. Røed 2006 regarding a Turkish 
community  in  Drammen).  The  Norwegian  residents  of  Indian  origin  seem  to  be  less  likely  to  find 
themselves in such a vicious circle of bad language skills and marginalization from the formal sector: 
though there are no quantitative measurements. The relatively high degree of participation in wage work 
(see  Chapter  5.2)  probably  implies  learning  the  native  language  as  well.  The  issue  of  language  and 
participation may also be framed in terms of language and norms. One teacher at an introductory course 
for  immigrants  interviewed  Indian  labor  migrants,  who  all  expressed  eagerness  to  learn  the  native 
language in their new host country (Staurland 2012). She chose to define motivation to learn the native 
language in terms of adaptation to the native mentality and norms. The Norwegian ethos is often framed 
as one of liberty and individualism, often in contrast to assumed South-Asian values of familial solidarity 
and patriarchal authority (see Bredal 2006 for a discussion). This perceived contrast may be explained in 
terms of mentality, as a civic ethos and a clan ethos. Alternatively, the same contrast may be explained 
more materialistically, in terms of what kind of social organization a person is already dependent on, or 
has learned to live with. This is the same as “culture” defined as, respectively,  ideas or as  praxes. By 
defining culture as praxes, one avoids (mis)interpreting norms in isolation from their practical context. In 
her study of mental and social wellbeing among aging residents of Indian origin, Sharma (2009) noted 
the anxiety that adult children may not be interested to provide care, combined with lack of information 
about the Norwegian welfare system, and nostalgia for an India that no longer exists. This may indicates 
some  possible  risks  for  members  of  the  Indian  diaspora  in  Norway,  but  there  may  equally  well  exist 
possibilities  for  combining  individualist  state  welfare  with  collectivist  family  welfare.  In  fact,  hybrid 
cultural  adaptations  are  traditional  in  some  parts  of  Norway,  for  example,  in  Sunnmøre  and  the  Sami 
areas mentioned above. There is an actual entanglement of individualism and familism in Norway: so 
much so that there are even well-known family dynasties within party politics and corporate business in 
Norway. 

The cultural analysis provided in the present section confirms the impression from the quantitative 
immigration research (see part 2.1): namely that Norwegian residents of Indian origin are particularly 
well integrated within the host nation, above all, when compared to other diaspora communities settled 
in  Norway.  This  impression  is  further  amplified  by  providing  a  more  refined  understanding  of 
pluralism  within  the  dominant  majority  culture  of  the  Norwegian  host  nation.  As  suggested  by 
scholars of nationalism and ethnicity, one gains a more realistic understanding of diaspora minorities 
by avoiding ideological clichés about national majorities (Eriksen and Hoëm 1999, as well as Bauböck 
2008, see the introduction to the present chapter). 

When one takes a closer look at the Norwegian national culture, with its ambiguities of rural and 
the  urban,  the  informal  and  the  formal,  then  the  situation  of  the  Indian  diaspora  appears  even  more 
similar  to  that  of  ethnic  Norwegians.  An  increased  refinement  in  the  interpretation  of  socio-cultural 
integration  has consequences  for framing  socio-economic  integration  as  well.  See  parts  5.2,  5.7,  5.8 
and 5.9 in the present report for a critical discussion of how to frame ethnicity, gender, class, and caste 
among Norwegian residents of Indian origin. 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

55 

Helge Hiram Jensen, Geir-Tore Brenne  

7.3 Cultural integration in the diaspora: cultural and religious associations  

Scarce data exist regarding cultural and religious associations among  Norwegian residents of Indian 
origin. However, it is also socio-culturally relevant to bear in mind the observations regarding socio-
economic integration into the diaspora community, at the end of Chapter 5 (see part 5.9).  

Diaspora organizations by religion 

It  is  relevant  to  have  a  look  at  studies  of  diaspora  communities  that  are  defined  in  religious  terms. 
Certain  religious  diasporas  have  populations  that  are  partly  overlapping  with  those  of  particular 
national diasporas. For example, there is a considerable overlap between the Indian diaspora, and the 
Hindi and Sikh, Moslem and Catholic diasporas on the other. I have not done any systematic search 
for research regarding these partly overlapping religious diasporas in Norway, but I have, nevertheless, 
found  some  relevant  contributions.  Oslo  Museum  had  an  exhibition  about  the  holy  spaces  of  the 
various  religious  minorities  in  the  city,  and  published  a  book  with  visual  and  textual  ethnography 
about  each  of  the  selected  religious  minorities  (Bettum  2014).  The  book  presents  a  Sikh  temple  in 
Oslo that has a mostly Indian congregation, but the Hindu temple chosen for that book was attended 
mainly  by  Sri-Lankan  Tamils.  Sikhs  in  Norway  are  relatively  visible,  not  least  because  of  their 
traditional male way of dress: there is research on the Sikh diaspora in Norway (Jacobsen 2011). The 
same  author  has  published  research  on  Sri-Lankan  Tamil  Christian  diasporas  in  Norway  (Jacobsen 
2008), but these may be of more peripheral relevance to a study of the Indian diaspora. The Catholic 
Church  in  Oslo  has  effective  organizational  resources  for  various  diaspora  communities to  maintain 
ties,  something  I  have  observed  by  participating  in  the  ecumenical  Christian  Arab  diaspora,  and 
through  conversations  with  friends  in the  Polish  diaspora.  Ecumenism  is  also typical  for  Hindu  and 
Sikh religious organizations, which even visit each other’s temples (Sharma 2009). As discussed at the 
end  of  Chapter  5,  some  research  suggest  that  religious  associations,  in  addition  to  extended  family 
networks,  might  constitute  a  significant  infrastructure  for  the  social  organization  of  diaspora 
communities (see part 5.9). These two forms of social organization might suggest that were we to map 
the  inner  workings  of  the  diaspora  communities,  then  it  may  be  more  relevant  to  define  diasporas 
according to region or religion of origin, rather than by state of origin. 

Diaspora organizations by country of origin 

An  internet  search  for  diaspora  organizations  in  Norway  suggests  that  there  are  a  number  of 
organizations  for  Norwegian  residents  of  Indian  origin.  However,  this  superficial  data  gathering 
indicates nothing about the membership base of these organizations, nor, indeed, regarding their size, 
and  their  activities.  Some  of  the  leaders  of  such  organizations  have  been  interviewed  by  the 
Norwegian  mass  media,  as  representatives  of  the  Indian  diaspora  in  Norway.  I  might  be  correct  to 
assume that the internal organization of diaspora communities is based on religion or region of origin 
rather than country of origin. But it may also be that the country of origin becomes a relevant marker 
of collective identity after arrival in the host country. Since the migrant deals with state legislation and 
uses mass media, where country of origin is a relevant frame, this might become a relevant framing for 
him or her, regardless of whether or not it was relevant when the migrant originally chose to emigrate.  

Informal diaspora organization 

For  the  mutually  reinforcing  interaction  between  socio-cultural  integration  and  socio-economic 
integration,  it  is  also  relevant  to  have  a  look  at  transnational  family  networks,  diaspora  political 
parties, transnational business partnerships and so on. For a detailed discussion, see part 5.9 above. In 
this regard, remittances not only constitute an economic asset, but also a cultural practice. The money 
transfer company Western Union once ran a telling advertisement campaign called “I send so much 
more  than  money”,  showing  photos  of  happy  people  enjoying  the  fruits  of  the  hard  labor  of  their 
émigré relatives. 

56 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

Norwegian residents of Indian origin – National and transnational integration 

7.4 Norwegian mass media representations of the Indian community 

There  are  no  systematic  studies  of  how  the  Indian  population  in  Norway  is  portrayed  by  the 
Norwegian  mass  media.  As  a  pilot  study,  my  co-author  has  made  a  brief  but  systematic  literature 
review, which is found within Appendix 3. 

In order to generate hypotheses about what to expect from this literature review,  I looked at one 
systematic study of how selected Norwegian newspapers portray India (Eide 2002, 2005). The author 
compared  a  selection  of  recent  news  articles  on  India  in  the  Norwegian  press,  with  the  74  feature 
articles about India published in one particular magazine through its entire print history (Eide  2002: 
102,  199).  The  news  articles  were  more  focused  on  distress,  whereas  the  feature  articles  included  a 
wider  range  of  topics,  a  difference  that  the  researcher  explains  as  the  result  of  different  journalistic 
genres.  The  selection  of  feature  articles  included  all  non-fiction  stories  about  India  published  in  A-
magasinet,  the  weekend  supplement  to  the  daily  newspaper  Aftenposten.  The  newspaper  has  a 
reputation for solid journalism and conservative ideology. Its editorial choices have been debated. In 
the  1970s,  some  journalists  from  the  new  left  considered  that  their  contributions  were  not  printed 
because  of  internal-censorship  (ibidem:  111),  and  during  the  World  War  II  the  newspaper  was 
affiliated  with  the  Nazi  occupation  regime,  its  chief  editor  being  the  former  editor  of  the  weekly 
supplement  (ibidem:  109).  Nevertheless,  neither  the  newspaper  nor  its  weekly  supplement  have  a 
reputation  for  being  particularly  biased.  The  researcher  concludes  that  “one  cannot  characterize  the 
coverage  of  India(ns)  in  this  popular  magazine  in  a  few  words.  A  series  of  different,  at  times 
contradictory discourses and sub-discourses are visible. To a large degree this must be seen as a result 
of  the  diversity  in  the  ‘object’  (India)  itself.”,  and  also,  “from  the  1980s  onward,  the  increased 
diversity  seems  to  reflect  conscious  editorial  choices”  (ibidem:199).  Nevertheless,  she  also  found  a 
continuous  presence  of  hierarchical  forms  of  symbolic  representation,  whereby  the  citizens  of  India 
are being portrayed as less developed, less  intelligent and less rational than the Norwegian observer 
and  the  Norwegian  readership  (ibidem:  133).  The  researcher  argues  that  “[i]n  the  pre-independence 
period,  the  findings  may  […]  be  due  to  a  political  identification  with  the  colonialist  power(s)”, 
whereas “[i]n the post-independence period as a whole, a clear-cut ‘development optimism’ combined 
with a Norwegian angle and a corresponding annoyance with and/or pity for the suffering people, is 
amply  present.  Representations  of  Indian  daily  life is  almost  totally  absent  [….]  On  the  other  hand, 
culture and spirituality are well represented in both periods”. With reference to Edward Said’s (1978) 
critical readings of Western “orientalist” scholarship regarding Southwest Asia, she suggests:  

“This tradition may from the beginning (especially in the pre-independence period (1927-1943)) be 
read as part of a larger Orientalist tradition, in which the Eastern Other is placed below a Western 
‘we’:  as  backward,  mystical  and  at  times  incomprehensible  and  irrational.  [….]  In  the  post-
independence period, development replaced colonialism as the dominant relational denominator of 
the old colonially imposed divide. Consequently in A-magasinet discourses of Western benefactors 
and Indian beneficiaries partly overshadow the old discourses of Oriental splendor and mystique. 
Norwegian-ness  as  synonymous  with  goodness  here  becomes  a  central  sub-discourse,  in  which 
people of India are often essentially represented as suffering and needy and are seldom allowed to 
represent themselves to any substantial degree” (ibidem: 200).  

The  media  research  cited  above  provides  some  direction  for  what  might  be  expected  from  further 
media  research,  or  hypothesis  generation.  Eide  (2002,  2005)  has  observed  some  benevolent,  though 
discriminatory, representations of India and Indians within a widely read segment of Norwegian mass 
media. These widely shared representations might be informed by popular prejudice, in turn informing 
popular  prejudice,  in  a  self-amplifying  manner.  Here  we  have  a  possible  explanation  of  the 
combination  of  ethnic  barriers  and  gender  barriers  to  the  labor  market  (see  5.2).  That  may  be  the 
situation for some Norwegian residents of Indian origin, according to subjective  personal experience 
(Sharma 2009) as well as analysis of objective registries (Sharma 2009; Birkeland et al. 2014). In the 
chapter  about socio-economic  conditions (see  part  5.7),  I  argued  that this should  be interpreted as a 
combination of sexist and racist discrimination. That argument is built on the view that discriminatory 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

57 

Helge Hiram Jensen, Geir-Tore Brenne  

practices  are  not  necessarily  the  result  of  explicit ideology,  but  can  also  be  the result  of  an  implicit 
mentality, which is hard to overcome (Chakrabarty 2000; Helland 2014). Thus, racism not only exists 
as  an  articulate  standpoint,  it  is  also  reproduced  through  cultural  practices  (or  doxa).  An  optimistic 
view  might  be  that  popular  prejudices  and  mass  media  bias  is  the  result  of  lack  of  information.  In 
another  study  of  the  Norwegian  mass  media,  Eriksen  and  Neuman  (2011)  observed  a  discrepancy 
between the national focus of the Norwegian mass media and the transnational political institutions in 
which  the  Norwegian  political  elite  participate.  This  discrepancy  constitutes  a  democratic  problem, 
because  the  voters  remain  under-informed  about  the  activities  of  their  elected  representatives. 
Similarly,  one  might  also  consider  that  it  constitutes  a  democratic  problem  if  the  national  focus  of 
Norwegian mass media leaves them badly informed about the transnational economic flows in which 
the  national  economy  is  already  integrated.  At  the  end  of  Chapter  5,  it  was  argued  that  the  Indian 
diaspora is an example of globalization from below, a phenomenon that compliments corporation-led 
and state-led globalization from above. For the sake of democratic accountability, the Norwegian mass 
media  should  overcome  their  narrow  national  focus,  and  strive  for  socio-cultural  integration  into  a 
more  transnational  exchange  of  information  and  ideas.  One  example  of  such  transnational  socio-
cultural integration is a particular newspaper article used as a source for the present report. It is titled 
“Highly  educated  immigrants  earn  much  less  than  Norwegians”  and  was,  as  it  happens,  recently 
published in Aftenposten (Bjørnestad and Barstad 2014).  

Let  us  now  turn  to  our  own  pilot  study  (Appendix  3),  after  having  elaborated  hypotheses  about 
what to expect from such a study (the discussion above). My co-author has carried out, for this report, 
a  small  pilot  study  about  the  symbolic  representations  of  the  Indian  diaspora  in  Norwegian  mass 
media, with a sample of c. 120 newspaper stories (see Appendix 3 for further details). The result does 
not  fit  with  the  expected  hypothesis.  On  the  contrary,  the  analysis  and  interpretation  of  the  chosen 
sample indicates that Norwegian mass media seem to provide a nuanced and mostly positive view of 
Norwegian residents of Indian origin. More systematic research on this issue would be scientifically 
interesting and relevant. If our pilot study is correct, it gives reason for optimism regarding the further 
socio-cultural integration of the local Indian disapora into the Norwegian nation, as well as the further 
socio-cultural integration of the Norwegian nation into a wider fellowship of nations.  

Conclusion 

This  report  has  provided  an  overview  of  social  science  knowledge  about  Norwegian  residents  of 
Indian origin. Even though Norway is a small country, and accounts for only a small portion of the 
exchange  of  goods,  money  and  people  between  India  and  Europe,  this  case  is  nevertheless  of 
relevance for policy makers in India and Europe because it is particularly well-researched. This small 
country has a relatively strong social science sector, not only because of the relative prosperity of the 
country, but also as a result of its welfare state traditions.  

This report has presented all quantitative and qualitative research that exists regarding Norwegian 
residents of Indian origin. It has also discussed under-researched issues under present national policy. 
After (1) a brief introduction, the report provided (2) a critical literature review, before going in-depth 
on (3) history, (4) demography, (5) socio-economic integration, (6) legal framework, and finally (6) 
socio-cultural integration. Because we keep together many different studies, some of our discussions 
contain novel arguments. The only piece of basic research conducted for the purpose of this research is 
the small pilot study of media discourse, presented in Appendix 3.  

Social research on the Indian diaspora in Norway presents this group as a particularly successful 
example of migration from non-Western areas into Western Europe. From the viewpoint of welfare-
oriented  research,  this  means  successful  socio-economic  integration  into  the  majority  middle  class 
population of the host nation.  

However,  we  have  sought  to  complement  this  perspective  with  a  focus  on  transnational  social 
capital  within  diaspora  communities,  which  may  facilitate  various  forms  of  economic  development 

58 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

Norwegian residents of Indian origin – National and transnational integration 

(Castles, Haas and Miller 2014: 39-45, 53). Thus, the historical Chapter 3 includes the transnational 
history of geographically  uneven development, whereas Chapter 5 and 7, about socio-economic and 
socio-cultural integration, include debates about increasing transnational integration between nations 
(parts 5.6, 5.9, 7.3), in addition to the more traditional debate about the integration of diaspora groups 
into host nations. Thus, we address issues like remittances and associations, which are of relevance to 
the maintenance of integration within the transnational diaspora. We also present little known research 
regarding the complex social mobility of the first generation of migrants from India to Norway (see 
Appendix  1).  A  few  researchers  have  used  similar  perspectives  regarding  Norwegian  residents  of 
Indian  origin,  in  particular  Sharma  (2009),  Wist  (2000)  and  Leirvik  (2014a).  In  the  present  report, 
however,  we  suggest  how to  further  develop  such approaches  into a  new perspective. Thus  we  take 
inspiration  from  a  specific  tradition  of  Indian  social  research,  which  takes  interest  in  postcolonial 
complexity,  national  disunity  and  the  conditions  of  non-white  women  (see  part  2.5).  Consequently, 
Chapter 3 includes the history of external and internal colonialism in Europe and India (parts 3.2, 3.3), 
while Chapter 5 discusses how socio-economic discrimination intersect with racism and sexism (parts 
5.2,  5.7,  5.8),  and  Chapter  7  addresses  the  socio-cultural  composition  of  the  host  nation,  by 
“unpacking” its actual internal diversity (part 7.2) and discussing the international integration of the 
Norwegian public sphere (part 7.4). Our small pilot study of representation of the Indian diaspora in 
the Norwegian press suggests that the presence of the diaspora might help the increasing integration of 
the national public sphere into a wider fellowship among nations (Appendix 3).  

To conclude, this report suggests an approach where socio-economic and socio-cultural integration 
are discussed not only within a national context (the united of a host nation), but also transnationally 
(as  what  unites  different  nations).  Thus,  immigration  is  seen  as  transnational  social  capital  within 
diaspora communities, which may be facilitative of various forms of economic development, within a 
historical context of geographically uneven development. For policy makers in favor of corporate-led 
economic  development,  it  would  be  relevant  to  fund  further  research  into  migrants  from  India  to 
Norway,  many  of  whom  are  highly-qualified  engineers  working  in  the  oil  and  gas  industries.  For 
policy makers in favor of social liberal paths to development further inquiries into the first generation 
of  migration  from  India  to  Norway  might  pay  off,  and  in  particular  the  question  of  how  their 
entrepreneurial  efforts  have  drawn  upon  and  amplified  social  capital  within  the  diaspora.  These 
research  agendas  are  not  mutually  exclusive,  since  the  very  first  immigrants  from  India  to  Norway 
seem to have been educated persons getting specialized work, while some entrepreneurial efforts may 
potentially scale up to become corporations. For either group of policy makers it would be relevant to 
gain better knowledge about the socio-economic and socio-cultural significance of remittances.  

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

59 

 
 
Sources and Bibliography  

Helge Hiram Jensen, Geir-Tore Brenne  

1. Literature on Norwegian residents of Indian origin 

Aarset,  M.F.  2015.  Hearts  and  roofs.  Family,  belonging,  and  (un)settledness  among  descendants  of 

immigrants in Norway. Thesis (PhD). Dept. of Social Anthropology, University of Oslo. 

Aase, T. 1979a. Pakistan: Intern og ekstern migrasjon. In: Grønhaug 1979. 

Aase, T. 1979b. Lokal-økonomi og migrasjon i pakistansk Nord-Punjab. In: Grønhaug 1979. 

Aase,  T.  1991.  Punjabi  Practices  of  Migration:  Punjabi  Life  Practices  in  Pakistan  and  Norway. 

Thesis (PhD). University of Bergen. 

Ananthakrishnan,  S. 1987.  Adgang forbudt  for  uvedkommende:  men  hvem  er  de  uvedkommende…?: 
en studie av kontrollapparatets virksomhet overfor innvandrere fra den 3. verden, spesielt Pakistan 
og India. Dept. of Criminology. Oslo: University of Oslo.  

Bettum,  A.  (ed.)  2007.  Våre  hellige  rom:  seks  religioner  på  vandring.  Oslo:  Oslo  museum  and 

KonturMedia. 

Birkeland, G.E., M. Lillehagen, V.P. Ekre, and E. Ugreninov 2014. Fra utdanning til sysselsetting. En 
forløpsanalyse av indiske og pakistanske etterkommere i Norge, Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning, 
55, no. 4: 386-414. 

Bredal,  A.  2006.  ‘Vi  er  jo  familie’.  Arrangerte  ekteskap,  autonomi  og  fellesskap  blant  unge  norsk-

asiater. Oslo: Unipax. 

Brenna, L.R. 1986. Tvunget. In: Ytre-Arne 1986. 

Brenna, L.R. 2012. Min annerledeshet, min styrke. Oslo: Cappelen. 

Brenne, G.-T., and H.H. Jensen 2013. An overview of highly-skilled labour migration to Norway : with a 
focus on India as country of origin, CARIM-India Research Report 2013/46, Robert Schuman Centre 
for  Advanced  Studies,  San  Domenico  di  Fiesole  (FI):  European  University  Institute.  Available  on: 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/29933/CARIM-India-2013%20-
%2046.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [Accessed 31 August 2015]. 

Brochmann, G. 2003. Del II. 1975-2000. In: Kjeldstadli 2003c. 

Bø,  B.P.  1979a.  Arbeidsinnvandringen  til  Norge.  Del  1.  Fremmedarbeiderne  og  det  norske 

arbeidsmarked. Forskningsrapport nr. 6. Oslo: Diakonhjemmets sosialhøgskole. 

Bø,  B.P.  1979b.  Arbeidsinnvandringen  til  Norge.  Del  2.  Fra  utvandrer  til  innvandrer  – 
migrasjonsprosessen  og  fremmedarbeidernes  sosiale  situasjon.  Forskningsrapport  nr.  7.  Oslo: 
Diakonhjemmets sosialhøgskole. 

Epland, J., and Kirkeberg, M.I. 2014. Barn i lavinntektshusholdninger: Flere innvandrerbarnefamilier 
med 
on: 
http://www.ssb.no/inntekt-og-forbruk/artikler-og-publikasjoner/flere-innvandrerbarnefamilier-med-
lavinntekt [Accessed 13 July 2015]. 

Statistics  Norway, 

[online],  Oslo: 

18  March, 

lavinntekt 

available 

Fekjær,  S.N.  2006.  Utdanning  hos  annengenerasjon  etniske  minoriteter  i  Norge,  Tidsskrift  for 

samfunnsforskning, 47, no. 1: 57-93. 

Gill, R. 2008. Harjeet. Oslo: Oktober. 

Gill, R. 2011. Ung mann i nytt land. Oslo: Oktober. 

Grønhaug, R. (ed.) 1979. Migrasjon, utvikling og minoriteter. Oslo: University publisher. 

60 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

Norwegian residents of Indian origin – National and transnational integration 

Henriksen,  K.  2007.  Fakta  om  18  innvandrergrupper  i  Norge.  Rapporter  2007/29.  Oslo:  Statistics 
Norway.  Available  on:  http://www.imdi.no/Documents/Rapporter/rapp_200729.pdf  [Accessed  31 
August 2015]. 

Hirsch,  A.A.  2010.  Sosialhjelp  blant  innvandrere:  Nedgang  i  sosialhjelp  blant  flyktninger  [online], 
on: 

Samfunnsspeilet, 
http://www.ssb.no/sosiale-forhold-og-kriminalitet/artikler-og-publikasjoner/nedgang-i-sosialhjelp-
blant-flyktninger [Accessed 13 July 2015].  

Statistics  Norway, 

2010/4.  Oslo: 

4  October, 

available 

Immigrant  times  –  voice  of  Indian  immigrants1994-2000.  Immigrant  times  –  voice  of  Indian 

immigrants, Oslo, six issues per year, 1994 until 2000. 

Jacobsen,  K.A.  2008:  Creating  Sri  Lankan  Tamil  Catholic  Space  in  the  South  Asian  Diaspora  in 
Norway. In: K. Jacobsen, and S. Raj (eds.), South Asian Christian Diaspora: Invisible Diaspora in 
Europe and North America, London: Ashgate, pp. 117-123.  

Jacobsen, K.A. 2011: Institutionalization of Sikhism in Norway: Community Growth and Generational 
Transfer.  In:  K.A.  Jacobsen,  and  K.  Myrvold  (eds.),  Sikhs  in  Europe.  Migration,  Identity  and 
Representations. London: Ashgate, pp. 19-38. 

Kaur, P. 2011. Helvete på Utøya [online], blog entry, 23 July, available on: http://prableen.origo.no/-

/bulletin/show/672218_helvete-paa-utoeya?ref=checkpoint [Accessed 25 August 2015]. 

Kaur, P. 2012. Jeg er Prableen. Oslo: Gyldendal 

Kjeldstadli,  K.  (ed.)  2003c.  Norsk  innvandringshistorie.  Bind  3.  I  globaliseringens  tid  1940-2000. 

Oslo: Pax. 

Kramer, J.Y. 1979a. Indiske innvandrere i en norsk by. In: Grønhaug 1979. 

Kramer,  J.Y.  1979b.  Kontaktmønstre  blant  indere  i  Drammen.  In  H.  Tambs-Lyche  (ed.),  Hushold, 
bolig og kontaktmønster blant innvandrere. Rapport nr. 1 fra «Fremmedarbeiderprosjektet», studier 
i migrasjon og fremmedarbeidere. Bergen: University of Bergen. 

Kramer,  J.Y.  1979c.  Utvandringen  fra  indisk  Punjab.  En  kort  skisse  av  noen  bakenforliggende 

faktorer. In: Grønhaug 1979. 

Kramer,  J.Y.  1980a.  Indiske  fremmedarbeidere  i  Drammen  –  middelklasse  på  permisjon?.  In:  A, 
Ringen (ed.), Migration to and within the Nordic Countries. Report from the Vth Nordic Conference 
on Labour Migration Research, Oslo: INAS. 

Kramer,  J.Y.  1980b.  Indernes  boligtilpasning  i  Drammen,  Skriftserie  –  Sosialantropologisk  institutt 

(Bergen: University of Bergen), no. 15: 97-106. 

Kramer, Julian Y. 1980c. Kontaktmønster blant indere i Drammen, Skriftserie – Sosialantropologisk 

institutt (Bergen: University of Bergen), no. 15: 22-37. 

Kramer, J.Y. 1980d. Husholdningdmønstre blant indere i Drammen, Skriftserie – Sosialantropologisk 

institutt (Bergen: University of Bergen), no. 15: 66-71 

Lervik,  M.S.  2010.  “For  mors  skyld”.  Utdanning,  takknemlighet  og  status  blant  ungdom  med 

pakistansk og indisk bakgrunn, Tidsskrift for ungdomsforskning, 10, no. 1: 23-47. 

Lervik, M.S. 2012: “Å ta kunsthistorie eller statsvitenskap er en luksus ikke alle kan unne seg” – Kan 
for 

i  etniske  nettverk?,  Tidsskrift 

utdanningsatferd  forstås  ut  fra  ulike  kapitalformer 
samfunnsforskning, 53, no. 2: 189-216. 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

61 

 
 
Helge Hiram Jensen, Geir-Tore Brenne  

Lervik,  M.S.  2014a.  Mer  enn  klasse:  Betydningen  av  ‘etnisk  kapital’  og  ‘subkulturell  kapital’  for 
utdanningsatferd  blant  etterkommere  av  innvandrere.  Thesis  (PhD),  Dept.  of  Sociology  and 
Human Geography. University of Oslo. Available on: 
https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/39842/dravhandling-
leirvik.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [Accessed 31 August 2015]. 

Naveen, M. 2010. Desiland. Oslo: Aschehoug. 

Omholt,  E.L.  and  F.  Strøm  2014.  Inntektsstatistikk  over  innvandrere,  2012:  Lavere  inntekt  blant 
innvandrere [online], Oslo: Statistics Norway, 3 July, available on: http://www.ssb.no/inntekt-og-
forbruk/artikler-og-publikasjoner/lavere-inntekt-blant-innvandrere [Accessed 13 July 2015]. 

Pettersen,  S.V.  (ed.)  2009.  Innvandrere  i  norske  kommuner.  Demografi,  levekår  og  deltakelse  i 
available  on: 

[online],  Rapport  2009/36.  Oslo:  Statistics  Norway, 
arbeidsstyrken 
http://www.imdi.no/nn-NO/Kunnskapsbasen/Innholdstyper/Rapporter/2009/Innvandrere-i-norske-
kommuner-Demografi-levekar-og-deltakelse-i-arbeidsstyrken-/ [Accessed 31 August 2015]. 

Røed,  I.  2006.  Integreringsarbeid 

i  et  flerkulturelt  boområde,  Plan  37,  no.  6:  36-41. 
https://www.idunn.no/plan/2005/06/integreringsarbeid_i_et_flerkulturelt_boomrade  [Accessed  31 
August 2015]. 

Sandnes,  T.,  and  L.  Østby  2015.  Familieinnvandring  og  ekteskapsmønster  1990-2013.  Report 
2015/23.  Oslo:  Statistics  Norway.  Available  on:  https://www.ssb.no/befolkning/artikler-og-
publikasjoner/_attachment/228459?_ts=14d70308ab8 [Accessed 31 August 2015]. 

Schou, L.A. 2006. Valg av grad eller grader av valg? – Etniske forskjeller i valg av høyere utdanning 
i  Norge,  Thesis  (Cand.Polit.),  Dept.  of  Sociology  and  Human  Geography.  University  of  Oslo. 
Available on: 
https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/15576/Valg.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y 
[Accessed 31 August 2015]. 

Schou, L.A. 2013. Etnisk arbeidsdeling i akademia?, Kontur, 13: 66-69. 

Sharma,  M.  2009.  Norsk  laks  på  indisk  vis.  Refleksjoner  over  egen  aldring  blant  indere  i  Norge. 
Thesis  (M.Sc),  Dept.  of  Nursing  and  Public  Health.  University  of  Oslo.  Available  on: 
https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/28388/madhu_sharma.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowe
d=y [Accessed 31 August 2015]. 

Skarðhamar,T., L.R. Thorsen, and K. Henriksen 2011: Kriminalitet og straff blant innvandrere og øvrig 
befolkning,  Report.  21/2011  (Corrected  version  12  September).  Oslo:  Statistics  Norway.  Available 
on: https://www.ssb.no/emner/03/05/rapp_201121/rapp_201121.pdf [Accessed 31 August 2015]. 

Staurland,  R.W.  2012.  Inderes  motivasjon  for  norsk  som  andrespråksopplæring,  basert  på  kultur, 
fortolkning og akkulturasjon: et kvalitativt feltstudie», Thesis (MA). Stavanger: School of Mission 
and Theology. Available on: 
http://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/162171/ruth%20wenche%20staurland.pdf?seq
uence=1 [Accessed 31 August 2015]. 

Tambs-Lyche, H. 1979a. Utvanddring fra India. In: Grønhaug 1979. 

Tambs-Lyche, H. 1979b. Utvandringen som ‘brain drain’ – India. In: Grønhaug 1979. 

Tjelmeland, H. 2003. Del I. 1940-1975. In: Kjeldstadli 2003c. 

Wiggen, K. S., and V. Aalandslid 2014. Valgdeltakelsen blant personer med innvandrerbakgrunn ved 
on: 

stortingsvalget 
https://www.ssb.no/valg/artikler-og-publikasjoner/_attachment/200940?_ts=149092f1d38 
[Accessed 31 August 2015]. 

2014/32.  Oslo:  Statistics  Norway.  Available 

2013.  Reports 

62 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

Norwegian residents of Indian origin – National and transnational integration 

Wiik,  K.A.  2014.  Valg  av  ektefelle  blant  norskfødte  med  innvandrerforeldre.  Report  2014/8.  Oslo: 
https://www.ssb.no/befolkning/artikler-og-
on: 

Statistics 
publikasjoner/_attachment/165169?_ts=14540c34818 [Accessed 31 August 2015]. 

Available 

Norway. 

Wist, K.K. 2000. Pakistanere og indere I Norge – på vei popover? Om pakistanere og indere i norsk 
arbeidsliv fra 1960-tallet til 2000. Thesis (Cand. Philol.), Dept. of History. University of Oslo. 

Ytre-Arne, B. 1986: Det nye landet: 20 unge innvandrarar møter Noreg. Oslo: Samlaget. 

2. Other sources used in this report 

Agora 2014. Agora, 31, no. 3-4, “rasisme”. 

Atekst 

Retriever, 

Norway. 

2015.  Website, 

available 

on: 

http://www.retriever-

info.com/no/category/news-archive/ [Accessed 31.09.2005]. Login required. 

Bauböck,  R.  2008.  Beyond  Culturalism  and  Statism.  Liberal  Responses  to  Diversity,  Eurosphere 

Working Paper, no. 6.  

Berg, A.-J., A.B. Flemmen, and B. Gullikstad 2010. Likestilte norskheter: Om kjønn og etnisitet. Oslo: 

Fagbokforlaget. 

Bibsys. 2015. Search database for Norwegian scholarly libraries, available on: http://www.bibsys.no/ 

[Accessed 31 August 2015]. 

Bjørnestad, S., and S. Barstad 2014. Høyt utdannede innvandrere tjener mye  mindre enn nordmenn, 

Aftenposten, 13 January. 

Castles,  S.,  H.  De  Haas,  and  M.J.  Miller  2014.  The  Age  of  Migration.  International  Population 

Movements in the Modern World. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 

Chakrabarty,  D.  2000.  Provincializing  Europe:  Postcolonial  Thought  and  Historical  Difference. 

Princeton: Princeton University Press. 

Chatterjee,  P.  1996:  The  Nation  and  its  Fragments:  Colonial  and  Postcolonial  Histories.  Princeton, 

NJ: Princeton University Press. 

Crenshaw, K. 1989. Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, University of Chicago Legal 
Forum, 140: 139-167. 

Dagens  Næringsliv  2014.  Skolepenger  for  utenlandske  studenter  [online],  Dagens  Næringsliv,  8 
October,  available  on:  www.dn.no/talent/2014/10/08/1003/Statsbudsjettet/innfrer-skolepenger-for-
utenlandske-studenter [Accessed 27 August 2015]. 

Dagens Næringsliv 2015: Fremskrittspartiet vurderer strengere regler for familiegjenforening, Dagens 

Næringsliv, 29 April, available on: 
http://www.dn.no/nyheter/politikkSamfunn/2015/04/29/1147/Fremskrittspartiet/frp-vurderer-
strengere-regler-for-familiegjenforening [Accessed 27 August 2015]. 

Eide,  E.  2002.  “Down  there”  and  “up  here”:  “Europe’s  Others”  in  Norwegian  Feature  Stories. 

Thesis (PhD), Faculty of Arts. University of Oslo.  

Eide,  E.  2005  India  sett  med  norske  øyne.  Helgefortellinger  om  et  kontinent.  In:  E.  Eide  and  A.H. 
Simonsen, Å se verden fra et annet sted. Medier, norskhet og fremmedhet. Oslo: Cappelen, pp. 55-91. 

Eriksen, T.H., and I. Hoëm 1999. Norske diskurser om  kulturell annerledeshet, Norsk antropologisk 

tidsskrift, 10, no. 2: 125-149. 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

63 

Helge Hiram Jensen, Geir-Tore Brenne  

Eriksen,  T.H.  and  I.  Neumann  2011.  Fra  slektsgård  til  oljeplatform:  norsk  identitet  og  Europa, 

Internasjonal politikk, 69, no. 3: 413-436. 

Feldbæk, O. 1990. Den danske Asienhandel 1616-1807. Væredi og volumen, Historisk Tidsskrift, 15, 
http://img.kb.dk/tidsskriftdk/pdf/hto/hto_15rk_0005-

no. 
PDF/hto_15rk_0005_81065.pdf [Accessed 15 August 2015]. 

104-136.  Available 

on: 

5: 

Fremover 2014. Glad for at utenlandske studenter ikke må betale skolepenger [online], Fremover, 24 
November, available on: http://www.fremover.no/lokale-nyheter/glad-for-at-utenlandske-studenter-
ikke-ma-betale-skolepenger/s/1-55-7707087 [Accessed 27 August 2015]. 

Hatton,  T.,  and  J.  Williamson  2005.  Global  Migration  and  the  World  Economy.  Two  Centuries  of 

Policy and Performance. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 

Helland, F. 2014: Rasisme uten rasister i Norge, Agora, 31, no. 3-4: 108-143. 

Henriksen,  K.  2007:  Ingeniører  fra  India  og  flyktninger  fra  Afghanistan.  Ny  rapport  om  de  største 
innvandrergruppene, 
on: 
21, 
http://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/179186/1/Kap4-Henriksen.pdf  [Accessed  27 
August 2015]. 

Samfunnsspeilet, 

Available 

27-36. 

no. 

4: 

Jayram, N. (ed.) 2012. Diversities in the Indian Diaspora. New Dehli: Oxford University Press. 

Jensen, E.M. 2012. We Stopped Forgetting. Kárášjohka: AuthorsPublishing. 

Jensen, H.H. 2007. Kriminalitet og innvandring, Kontur, 13: 78.  

Jensen, H.H. 2013. Monokulturalismens etiologi: norske nasjonale strateger mot arbeidsfolk og urfolk, 

Sosiologisk årbok, no. 2: 53-84. 

Kjeldstadli, K. (ed.) 2003a. Norsk innvandringshistorie. Bind 1. I kongens tid 900-1814. Oslo: Pax. 

Kjeldstadli, K. (ed.) 2003b. Norsk innvandringshistorie. Bind 2. I nasjonalstatens tid 1814-1940. 

Oslo: Pax. 

Kontur 2007. Kontur, no. 13, 2007, “nasjon og minoritet”. 

Larsen,  J.H.  2011.  Norske  bedrifter  i  India  gagnes  av  ny  skatteavtale  [online],  NRK,  2  February, 
available  on:  http://www.nrk.no/verden/skatteavtale-mellom-norge-og-india-1.7489188  [Accessed 
27 August 2015]. 

Lie,  B.  2002.  Store  flyttestrømmer  -  strikse  mottakerland  [online],  Samfunnsspeilet,  2002/1,  Oslo: 
Statistics  Norway,  available  on:  http://www.ssb.no/befolkning/artikler-og-publikasjoner/store-
flyttestrommer-strikse-mottakerland [Accessed 13 July 2015]. 

Lien, M.E. 1997: Marketing and Modernity. London: Bloomsbury Academic.  

Lieberman,  V.  2003.  Strange  Parallels.  Southeast  Asia  in  Global  Context  c.  800-1830.  Cambridge: 

Cambridge University Press. 

Lovdata 2015. Forskrift om utlendingers adgang til riket og deres opphold her (Utlendingsforskriften) 
available  on:  https://lovdata.no/dokument/SF/forskrift/2009-10-15-1286 

[online],  Lovdata, 
[Accessed 27 August 2015]. 

Mokhtari, A. 2007: Ceux-ci ne sont pas les étrangers – Ceux sont des étrangers, Kontur, no. 13: 80-83. 

NAV (Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration). 2015. Parental benefit [online], Oslo: NAV, 

available on: 
https://www.nav.no/en/Home/Benefits+and+services/Relatert+informasjon/Parental+benefit.353588.
cms [Accessed 27August 2015]. 

64 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

Norwegian residents of Indian origin – National and transnational integration 

Norwegian  Ministries.  2009.  Opportunities  in  Diversity:  The  Norwegian  Government’s  Strategy  for 

Cooperation Between Norway and India. Oslo: Norwegian Ministries. 

Norwegian Ministry of Finance. 1987. Convention between the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic 
of India for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
taxes  on income and  on capital,  Allegation (Vedlegg),  pp.  8-52,  in  St.prp.  nr. 72  (1986-87),  Om 
samtykke  til  å  sette  i  kraft  en  overenskomst  mellom  Kongeriket  Norge  og  Republikken  India  til 
unngåelse  av  dobbeltbeskatning  og  forebyggelse  av  skatteunndragelse  med  hensyn  til  skatter  av 
inntekt og formue, undertegnet i New Dehli den 31. desember 1986. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of 
Finance and Customs. 

Norwegian Ministry of Finance. 2011. Agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic 
of India for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
taxes  on  income  and on  capital,  Alleggation (Vedlegg  1),  pp.  9-40,  in  Prop.  140  S  (2010-2011): 
Proposisjon  til  stortinget  (forslag  til  stortingsvedtak):  Samtykke  til  å  sette  i  kraft  en  skatteavtale 
mellom  Norge  og  India,  undertegnet  i  New  Dehli  2.  februar  2011.  Oslo:  Norwegian  Ministry  of 
Finance. 

Norwegian  Ministry  of  Municipalities.  1974:  St.meld.  nr.  39  (1973-74),  Om  innvandringspolitikken 

[On immigration policy]. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Municipalities and Work. 

Norwegian  Ministry  of  Municipalities.  2002:  St.meld.  nr.  32  (2002-2003)  Storbymeldingen.  Oslo: 

Norwegian Ministry of Municipalities and Work. Available on: 
https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/stmeld-nr-31-2002-2003-/id402979/?ch=1 
14 July 2015]. 

[Accessed 

Norwegian  Official  Reports.  1973.  Norges  offentlige  utredninger  NOU  1973,  no.  17, 

Innvandringspolitikk. Oslo: Stortinget.  

Norwegian  Official  Reports.  2011.  Norges  offentlige  utredninger  NOU  2011,  no.  7,  Velferd  og 

migrasjon. Den norske modellens framtid. Oslo: Stortinget. 

Norwegian  Research  Council. 2015.  Research  Cooperation  with India  (INDNOR).  Oslo:  Norwegian 

Research Council. Available on:  
http://www.forskningsradet.no/prognett-indnor/Home_page/1253954776512  [Accessed  14  August 
2015]. 

Oria.  2015.  Search  database  for  Norwegian  scholarly  libraries,  available  via:  http://www.oria.no/ 

[Accessed 31 August 2015]. 

Østrem, N.O. 2006. Norsk utvandringshistorie. Oslo: Samlaget. 

Pedersen, S. 1999. Statens eiendomsrett til jorden i Finnmark – en del av den interne ‘kolonihistorie’. 
In:  H.  Eidheim  (ed.),  Samer  og  normdenn.  Temaer  i  jus,  historie  og  sosialantropologi.  Oslo: 
Cappelen.  

Routledge,  P.  1993.  Terrains  of  Resistance:  Nonviolent  Social  Movements  and  the  Contestation  of 

Place in India. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing. 

SIU (Norwegian Centre for International Cooperation in Education). 2012. Høyere utdanning i India: 
Reformer  og  tendenser.  Konsekvenser  for  norske  universiteter  og  høyskoler  som  vil  samarbeide 
med India. Rapport 03/2012. Oslo: SIU. Available on: 
http://siu.no/content/download/9304/93148/file/SIU%20Rapport%200312%20H%C3%B8yere%20
utdanning%20i%20India%20reformer%20og%20tendenser.pdf [Accessed 30 September 2015]. 

SIU (Norwegian Centre for International Cooperation in Education). 2013: Landrapport India. Rapport 

05/2013. Oslo: SIU. Available on: 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

65 

Helge Hiram Jensen, Geir-Tore Brenne  

http://siu.no/content/download/12102/117705/file/SIU_Landrapport_India_web.pdf  [Accessed  30 
September 2015]. 

SIU (Norwegian Centre for International Cooperation in Education) 2015. Mobilitet til og fra India. 

Available on:  
http://siu.no/Data-analyse-og-prioriterte-samarbeidsland/Prioriterte-
samarbeidsland/India/%28view%29/11863 [Accessed 14 August 2015]. 

Said, E. 1978. Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books. 

Skirbekk, S. 2008. Nasjonalstaten: Velferdsstatens grunnlag. Oslo: Kolofon. 

Søby, E. 2014. Demografi, statistikk og rasisme, Agora, 31, no. 3-4: 64-107. 

Sørensen, Ø. 1998. Jakten på det norske: perspektiver på utviklingen av en norsk nasjonal identitet på 

1800-tallet. Oslo: Gyldendal. 

Spivak, G.C. 1988. Can the Subaltern Speak?. In: C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (eds.): Marxism and the 

Interpretation of Culture. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, pp. 271-313. 

Statistics 

Norway. 

2014. 

The 

statistics 

bank 

[online], 

available 

on: 

https://www.ssb.no/statistikkbanken [Accessed 13 July 2015]: 
- Tab. 09827: Norskkontrollerte føretak i utlandet, etter land 
- Tab. 08086: Utenlandskontrollerte foretak, etter land til ultimate eier 
- Tab. 08803: Utenrikshandel med varer, hovedtall, etter land 
-  Tab.  09598:  Innvandrere  og  norskfødte  med  innvandrerforeldre  16  år  og  over,  etter 
utdanningsnivå, kjønn, innvandringskategori og landbakgrunn.  
- Tab. 09623: Innvandrere 16 år og over, etter utdanningsnivå og landbakgrunn 

Steinkellner,  A.  2012a.  Norges  innvandrere  –  både  høyt  og  lavt  utdannet  [online],  Samfunnsspeilet, 
on: 

2012/5. 
https://www.ssb.no/utdanning/artikler-og-publikasjoner/norges-innvandrere-baade-hoyt-og-lavt-
utdannet [Accessed 27 August 2015]. 

December, 

Statistics 

available 

Norway, 

Oslo: 

11 

Steinkellner,  Alice  2012b:  Flest  med  lang  utdanning  blant  innvandrerne  [online],  blog  entry  from 
Statistics  Norway,  13  December,  available  on:  https://www.ssb.no/utdanning/artikler-og-
publikasjoner/flest-med-lang-utdanning-blant-innvandrerne [Accessed 30 August 2015]. 

Stensrud,  J.  2009.  Statistiske  utfordringer  ved  økonomisk  globalisering.  Statistics  Norway  Report 

2009/44. Oslo: Statistics Norway. Available on: 
http://www.ssb.no/a/publikasjoner/pdf/notat_200944/notat_200944.pdf [Accessed 13 July 2015]. 

Strindberg, S. 2002. Patriarkat og patriarkat, Kontur, no. 4: 30-43.  

Sverdljuk, J. 2013: Traditional foreign femininities? Experts’ Stories About Helping Russian Migrant 
Women who are Victims of Domestic Violence. In: A. Saarinen and M. Calloni (eds.), Builders of 
a New Europe: Women Migrants from the Eastern Transregions. Helsinki: Kikimora Publications, 
pp. 80-95.  

Sverdljuk, J. 2014. Trans-national caring masculinity, NORMA: International Journal for Masculinity 

Studies, 9, no. 2: 126-140. 

UDI 

(Norwegian  Directorate  of 

Immigration).  2015.  Website 

[online], 

available  on: 

http://www.udi.no/en/want-to-apply/work-immigration/skilled-workers [Accessed 27 August 2015]. 

UKIERI  (UK  India  Education  and  Research  Initiative).  2012.  River  of  Innovation:  The  Future  of 
Indian Higher Education & its Impact on Research and Innovation: An IndoGenius report. New 
Dehli:  IndoGenius.  Available  on:  http://indogenius.com/appearance/pdf/IndoGenius-River-of-
Innovation.pdf [Accessed 30 August 2015]. 

66 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

 
 
 
Norwegian residents of Indian origin – National and transnational integration 

Universitas  2014.  Massivt  nei  til  skolepenger  [online],  Universitas,  8  February,  available  on: 

http://universitas.no/nyheter/47314/massivt-nei-til-skolepenger [Accessed 27 August 2015]. 

Vike, H. 2009. L’état de la morale et la morale de l’État, Ethnologie française, 39, no. 2: 311-319.  

Wallerstein, I. 1979. The Capitalist World Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 

Widerberg, K. 1995. Kunnskapens kjønn: minner, refleksjoner, og teori. Oslo: Pax. 

Wikipedia. 

2015a. 

Greater 

Oslo 

Region 

[online], 

available 

on: 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greater_Oslo_Region [Accessed 14 July 2015]. 

Wikipedia. 

2015b. 

India-European 

Union 

relations 

[online], 

available 

on: 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/India–European_Union_relations [Accessed 9 March 2015]. 

Wikipedia. 

regions 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metropolitan_regions_of_Norway [Accessed 14 July 2015]. 

2015c.  Metropolitan 

[online], 

Norway 

available 

of 

on: 

Wikipedia.  2015d:  Trankebar 
[Accessed 9 March 2015]. 

[online],  available  on:  https://da.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trankebar 

Appendix 1. Education levels in the first wave of migration from India to Norway 

The  first  wave  of  labor  migration  from  India  to  Norway,  started  to  arrive  in  the  1970s,  and  found 
labor-class jobs in industry and agriculture: but what had been their initial social standing within their 
area of origin? 

It has been argued that, contrary to general opinion in Norway, the immigrants who arrived from the 
1960s through the 1980s had special qualifications of utility from the host country (Sharma 2009: 17). 
The most cited literature takes no interest in the initial social background of the first migrants from India 
to Norway. In the History of Norwegian Immigration it is observed that Indian first wavers found labor 
class  jobs  in  Norway,  but  there  is  nothing  about  what  kind  of  conditions  they  came  from  in  India 
(Tjelmeland  2003:  129;  Kjeldstadli  2003c).  The  same  information  –  and  lack  of  information  –  is 
reproduced  in  a  report  by  Statistics  Norway  (Pettersen  2009:  110).  These  publications  deal  with 
diasporas from many different countries of origin, and cannot go into detail with each one of them. 

Qualitative  researchers  clearly  argue  the  view  that  most  of  the  first  wave  migrants from  India  to 
Norway, came from middle class background in India, though they arrived in a labor class position in 
Norway. Thus, these Indians tended to bring education from India that they did not get the opportunity 
to  use  in  Norway.  We  know  this  thanks  to  social  anthropologists  who  conducted  fieldwork  at  both 
ends of the migration pathway: the Indian Punjab, Pakistani Punjab as well as the Drammen Region in 
Norway  (Kramer  1979a:  150;  Kramer  1979c:  55-56;  Tambs-Lyche  1979:  47).  This  has  been 
confirmed by more recent qualitative research, using life course interviews (Sharma 2009: 17, citing 
Kramer  1980c)  or  oral  history  methods  (Wist  2000:  16,  26,  27-30,  49-57,  citing  Kramer  1979a, 
Tambs-Lyche  1979).  For  example  “we  find  a  former  station  master  and  a  man  with  an  M.A  from 
Punjab  who  both  work  at  horticultural  production  facilities;  or  a  teacher  and  an  office  clerk  both 
working  as  unqualified  laborers  in  a  factory”  (Kramer  1979c:  150).  These  examples  have  not  been 
selected statistically, but nor have they been selected arbitrarily. One should keep in mind that the first 
wave of migrants from India to Norway was relatively small. Consequently, the method of participant 
observation  may  have  been  sufficient  to  trace  the  entire  network  of  persons,  whereas  a  quantitative 
research design may not have given up significant numbers. 

Some quantitative research has been conducted which further confirms, and adds nuances to, the 
view held by the qualitative researchers: that the first wavers were usually over-qualified for the jobs 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

67 

 
 
Helge Hiram Jensen, Geir-Tore Brenne  

they  got  in  Norway.  The  social  historian  Wist  (2000:  52-53)  has  analyzed  historical  data  from 
Statistics  Norway.  First,  she  finds  that  in  1970,  1980 and  1996,  most  of  the  Norwegian  residents of 
Indian  origin  had  some  education:  about  36-43  %  had  education  from  higher  secondary  school, 
whereas  around  22-36  %  had  education  at  B.A.-level.  These  figures  are  strikingly  higher  than 
equivalent  residents  of  Pakistani  origin.  Nevertheless,  these  figures  were  based  on  a  rather  small 
sample (absolute numbers for 1970 and 1980, and a statistical selection for 1993). E.g., in 1970, the 
statistics included  only  111  individuals  of  Indian  origin,  so  only  40  individuals  constituted  the  36% 
with higher secondary school education. Though this figure is not resilient to significant testing, it is 
useful for descriptive purposes, as a way to map patterns within the conditions that were observed by 
the ethnographic studies reviewed above. The numbers for 1980 tell us less about education level in 
the  country  of  origin,  since,  by  then,  there  would  have  been  time  enough  for  some  to  pursue  an 
education in the host country. The numbers for 1993 tells us even less, because the units are selected 
and their number is insignificant. The same historian has also observed, contrary to all other research, 
that  most  of  the  very  first  migrants  from  India  to  Norway  in  fact  found  work  in  middle  class 
professions.  In  1970  only  17.8%  of  the  Norwegian  residents  of  Indian  origin  had  labor  class  jobs, 
whereas the similar number for residents of Pakistani origin stood at 61.6%. In 1980, the ratio of labor 
class jobs among residents from India had increased to 53.4%, while the ratio for those from Pakistan 
had decreased to 22.6% (Wist 2000: 54-55, 49-52). The numbers from 1980 are, then, as meaningful 
as  those  from  1970,  and  together  they  indicate  pluralities  among  the  first  wavers:  among  those  of 
Indian origin, there was downward social mobility during the period (though increasingly an initially 
relatively high level of education), whereas for those of Pakistani origin social mobility went upwards 
(while  increasing  an  initially  relatively  low  level  of  education).  These  numbers  are  all  the  more 
striking since most first wavers from India and Pakistan came from the same region, Punjab, albeit on 
different sides of the border. Since there were few migrants, the numbers are too slight to be of any 
use for (nomothetic) causal analysis, but since they show the absolute numbers, they are nevertheless 
useful for describing the (ideographic) historical process. Wist (2000: 55) concludes that Norwegian 
residents of Indian origin “experienced a drastic fall in socio-economic status from 1970 until 1980”. 

When  taken  together,  the  qualitative  and  quantitative  data  suggest  a  rather  complex  pattern  of 
social mobility among the first wave of migrants from India to Norway. First, this group as a whole 
initially brought higher qualifications than the comparable immigrant groups, notably fellow Punjabis 
from the Pakistani side. Second, the same group experienced considerable downward social mobility 
during the first decade in Norway, whereas the opposite was the case for immigrants from Pakistan. 
Nevertheless, within the transnational Indian diaspora, it appears to have been more acceptable to take 
work  below  one’s  social  status  in  the  West,  rather  than  do  “suitable”  work  back  home  in  India 
(Kramer  1979a:  150).  Also  in  socio-economic  terms,  the  middle  class  in  the  Indian  Punjab  and  the 
labor class in Drammen cannot be automatically compared on the same scale, because the two regions 
were  positioned  differently  within  the  global  pattern  of  geographically  uneven  development  (see 
Chapter 3): Remittances from abroad have a value in pure cash terms, transcending any differences in 
social status. 

Appendix 2. Parental benefits, maternity leave and paternity leave 

Norway  has  generous  maternity  leave,  paternity  leave,  and  parental  benefits  that  compensate  for 
income  when  one  of  the  parents  is  away  from  work.  In  order  to  qualify  for  parental  benefits,  the 
annual taxable income of the mother must exceed at least half of the National Insurance’s basic-level, 
90,068 NOK. Note that it is only the previous income of the mother, not the father, which forms the 
basis  for  eligibility  and  for  the  size  of  parental  leave  benefits.  This  is  to  provide  an  incentive  for 
women to work, if they plan to become mothers. Norway has a family friendly work environment, in 
the  sense  that  it  is  generally  accepted  by  Norwegian  employers  that  employees  –  both  fathers  and 
mothers – take time away from work to fulfil parental leave obligations (NAV 2015).  

68 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

Norwegian residents of Indian origin – National and transnational integration 

The parental benefit period is split into three parts: One quota for the mother, one quota for the father, 
and a shared period. The total benefit period in case of birth, for employees, is either 49 weeks of 100% 
coverage, or 59 weeks of 80% coverage. However, there is a limit: NAV only compensates for incomes 
up to six times the National Insurance basic amount. Three weeks (fifteen working days) of the parental 
benefit period, are reserved for the mother and must be used prior to the due date. These weeks cannot be 
used after the child is born. The mother has three weeks leave that must be used before birth. After birth, 
the mother and father have a quota of ten weeks each. Then there is a shared period that the parents must 
divide between the two of them of twenty-six or thirty-six weeks, depending on whether a 100% or 80% 
period  is  chosen.  The  parents  can  also  postpone  parts  of  their  leave,  but  any  remaining  days  are  lost 
when a child turns three. In the case of multiple births, the benefit period is extended by five weeks for 
each additional child. Parental benefits are also given when children are adopted. Then the child must be 
fifteen or younger for the parents to be eligible (ibidem). 

Appendix 3. Brief review of how Indians in Norway are covered by the Norwegian media 

A sample of media stories were collected from Norwegian language media sources, from the previous 
three years (28 August 2015). All of the stories relate to Indians living in Norway. This includes both 
Indians who have immigrated to Norway and who are still Indian citizens, as well as people of Indian 
descent  who  have  immigrated  to  Norway  and  have  Norwegian  citizenship,  and  also  the  children  of 
these  two  groups,  as  well  as  Indian  tourists.  Together,  this  totalled  approximately  120  stories.  The 
sample  was  taken  from  a  very  wide  database  (Atekst  retriever  Norway  2015).  This  includes  print 
newspapers and journals, their online editions, pure online news-sources, and niche-publications, such 
as research news, or a professional journal of engineers.  

The selection was carried out in two steps:  

First, using a series of keyword and string searches that might indicate relevance.  

Second, all the hits were manually surveyed and the suitable stories were selected for the sample. 

Sometimes,  one  story  would  be  duplicated  and  appear  with  mostly  similar  content  in  many 
publications  – perhaps due to cooperation between different media outlets  – then, only one example 
would be chosen as part of the sample. This form of selection is not exact, since it is likely that there 
are stories which would have been relevant, but which have not been selected. However, it is likely 
that a substantial part of all relevant stories have been selected as part of the sample. It does give a bird 
eyes  view  of  the  media  landscape  at  this  point  in  time,  which  can  be  presented.  Below,  some 
categories that cover much of the stories in the sample are considered. 

Positive, neutral or negative 

It  is  striking  that  the  majority  of  the  stories,  give  a  positive  image  of  Indians  in  Norway,  or  Indian 
culture in general. There is, sometimes, an emphasis on exotic and different Indian culture or habits, 
but  this  is  done  in  a  way  that  may  increase  the  curiosity  of  the  reader.  It  was  striking  to  see  the 
importance  of  local  newspapers  in  relation  to  this.  They  would  often  provide  stories  from  more 
everyday settings, where the reader could get to know interviewees in a more positive way. Some, but 
relatively fewer, stories are more neutral. These are stories that are more statistical or research related 
– where statistics on immigration are reported, or immigration and ethnic minorities are commented 
on as an issue in itself. The main topic in these articles are not Indians, they are being mentioned as 
one out of several other minority groups. There are a few stories that have negative connotations. All 
of  the  latter  cover  a  specific  court  case  from  2015,  when  an  Indian  immigrant,  running  a  small 
business outside a town in eastern Norway, organised for workers from India to work for him. He was 
accused of providing his workers with very bad working conditions, withholding salary, insufficient 
accounting  and  possible  tax  evasion,  as  well  as  violent  threats  against  workers  considering  talking 
with  the  Norwegian  authorities.  While  this  story  is  exceptional,  it  indicates  that  Indian  migrant 

DEMO-India RR2015/13 

69 

Helge Hiram Jensen, Geir-Tore Brenne  

workers in Norway may face problems of harsh working conditions: something which has also been 
true of earlier generations of immigrants. 

Cultural events 

A number of lengthy articles reports cultural events, which Indians organize or participate in. The event 
that  has  generated  most  reporting  was  a “turban  day”,  organized  by  the  Sikh  community.  This  occurs 
once yearly, and here locals are given the chance to wear a turban. Many journalists used this as a point 
of departure to write about Sikh religion and its practitioners in Norway. It was striking to see how one 
small  event  such  as  that,  could  generate  so  much  positive  media  coverage.  Also,  some  of  the  articles 
invited reflections on cultural complexity, in the sense of how Indians adapted or mixed Indian traditions 
with  Norwegian  life.  Other  examples  of  cultural  events  that  were  covered  in  the  media  were:  cricket 
tournaments, local cricket teams, production of a Bollywood film, celebration of India’s independence 
day, participation of Indians in Norway’s national day, and various religious events. 

Food 

A number of articles also related to Indian food. These could be articles about restaurants – such as the 
opening  of  a  new  restaurant,  or  interviewing  a  restaurant  owner  or  cook.  Some  articles  presented 
Indian recipes, and some were restaurant reviews. 

Portraits of individuals 

The  sample  also  contained  several  journalistic  portraits  of  people  from  an  Indian  background.  The 
journalist would then write about the subject’s background. He or she would talk about the society that 
they grew up in, or about their Indian cultural background. Examples of portraits include successful 
athletes, other general celebrities, or persons in a local community that have done something notable. I 
was  surprised  at  how  many  local  newspapers  worked  as  an  arena  to  present  longer  life  stories  and 
contextualized portraits which gave others the chance to get to know details about another person in 
their community. 

70 

DEMO-India RR2015/13