Opinion of the European Central Bank of 13 June 2016 on the reduction of statutory remuneration for employees in the public and semi-public sector (CON/2016/32)
Date: 2016-06-13
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: Netherlands, central bank, civil servant, national law, public sector, remuneration of work

EN 

ECB-PUBLIC 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 13 June 2016  

on the reduction of statutory remuneration for employees in the public and semi-public sector 

(CON/2016/32) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On  17  May  2016  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB)  received  a  request  from  the  Dutch  Minister  of  the 

Interior and Kingdom Relations for an opinion on a draft law extending the scope of the Law on standards 
for the remuneration of senior officials in the public and semi-public sector1 (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). 

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC2, as 

the  draft  law  relates  to  De  Nederlandsche  Bank  N.V.  (DNB).  In  accordance  with  the  first  sentence  of 

Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted 

this opinion. 

1.  

Purpose of the draft law 

1.1  The Law on standards for the remuneration of senior officials in the public and semi-public sector 
(hereinafter  the  ‘Law  on  remuneration’),  which  entered  into  force  on  1  January  20133,  caps  the 

salaries of top executives in the public and semi-public sector. The salaries for senior officials are 
limited  to  100  %  of  a  minister’s  remuneration  (i.e.  EUR  179  000)4.  The  Law  on  remuneration  is 
already  applicable  to  the  members  of  DNB’s  decision-making  bodies5.  The  draft  law  extends  the 

statutory maximum of 100 % of a minister’s remuneration to the salaries of all employees working 

in the (semi-)public sector on the basis of an employment contract. DNB’s employees would thus 

fall  within  the  scope  of  the  draft  law.  The  remuneration  of  a  limited  number  of  DNB  staff,  whose 

salaries  would  be  reduced  in  accordance  with  the  transitional  regime  set  out  below,  would  be 
directly affected6. 

1  

2  

3  

4  

5  
6  

Conceptvoorstel voor de uitbreiding van de Wet normering bezoldiging topfunctionarissen publieke en semipublieke 
sector naar andere werknemers dan topfunctionarissen (Wet uitbreiding personele reikwijdte WNT). 
Council  Decision  98/415/EC  of  29 June  1998  on  the  consultation  of  the  European  Central  Bank  by  national 
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 
Law of 15 November 2012, published in the Staatsblad (Government Gazette) nr. 583 (2012). The ECB opined on 
this law in Opinion CON/2014/12. This opinion is without prejudice to the findings of the ECB in the aforementioned 
opinion. All ECB opinions are published on the ECB website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 
This  amount  is  based  on  the  gross  salary  of  a  minister.  The  other  remuneration  components  are  the  employer’s 
contribution to social security premiums, taxable expenses and pension entitlements. 

See Opinion CON/2014/12.  
Other staff members could be indirectly affected if DNB were to revise its salary structure as a consequence of the 
(draft) Law. 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
ECB-PUBLIC 

1.2  The  draft  law  lays  down  a  transitional  arrangement  for  employees  whose  remuneration  exceeds 

the statutory remuneration maximum of 100 % of a minister’s salary. Their remuneration will remain 

unchanged for four years, and will subsequently be reduced over the following three years to the 

new statutory remuneration maximum of 100 %. 

1.3  The draft law caters for the possibility of deviating from the maximum salaries for individual persons 

and specific ‘function groups’ if exceptional labour market conditions exist, such as certain expert 

knowledge, international level playing field and sector specific compensation schemes. A decision 

to deviate from the maximum remuneration must be taken by a Ministerial Decree for any deviation 

in favour of an individual person. For derogations in favour of certain ‘function groups’ the adoption 

of  a  Ministerial  Regulation  is  required  following  the  consultation  of  the  cabinet  of  Ministers.  The 

involvement of the respective (semi-)public sector entity is not laid down by law. 

2. 

Specific observations 

2.1  Financial Independence 

The  principle  of  financial  independence,  which  is  an  aspect  of  the  principle  of  central  bank 

independence  laid  down  in  Article  130  of  the  Treaty,  requires  that  a  national  central  bank  (NCB) 
should  be  able  to  avail  itself  autonomously  of  sufficient  financial  resources  to  fulfil  its  mandate7, 

both operationally in terms of manpower, and financially in terms of appropriate financial resources. 

As  a  consequence  Member  States  may  not  impair  an  NCB’s  ability  to  employ  and  retain  the 

qualified  staff  necessary  for  the  NCB  to  perform  independently  the  tasks  conferred  on  it  by  the 
Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB8. Autonomy in such matters extends to issues relating to staff 
salaries and pensions9.  

As set out in past ECB opinions and ECB Convergence Reports, any amendment to the legislative 

provisions  on  the  remuneration  of  members  of  the  NCB’s  decision-making  bodies  and  its 

employees should be decided in close and effective cooperation with the NCB, taking due account 
of its views, to ensure the ongoing ability of the NCB to independently carry out its tasks10. 

In addition, the ECB welcomes the optionality in the draft law to deviate from the statutory cap on 

the remuneration either on an individual or a ‘function group’ basis. It is likely that such a deviation 

would  be  justified  should  DNB  experience  difficulty  in  recruiting  and/or  retaining  appropriate  staff 

for  ESCB-related  tasks  including  for  financial  and  market-related  tasks  or  for  supervisory  tasks. 

However,  according  to  the  current  wording  of  the  draft  law,  the  option  of  deviating  may  only  be 

exercised by means of a Ministerial decree or a Ministerial Regulation without any involvement of 
the  respective  public  sector  entity  (i.e.  DNB)11.  In  order  to  be  compatible  with  the  principle  of 

7  

8  

9  
10  
11  

I.e.  to  perform  the  ESCB-related  tasks  required of  it  under  the  Treaty  and  the  Statute  of  the  European  System  of 
Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (the ‘Statute of the ESCB’). 
See page 27 of the ECB’s 2014 Convergence Report for a general description of the doctrine regarding ‘central bank 
independence’  in  relation  to  autonomy  in  staff  matters,  which  refers  to  the  following  Opinions:  CON/2010/42, 
CON/2010/51,  CON/2010/56,  CON/2010/69,  CON/2010/80,  CON/2011/104,  CON/2011/106,  CON/2012/6, 
CON/2012/86 and CON/2014/7. 

See, for example, paragraph 3.1 of Opinion CON/2012/1. 
See page 27 of the ECB’s 2014 Convergence Report.  

See Article 2a.2 and 2a.3 of the draft law. 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
ECB-PUBLIC 

financial independence the draft law should be amended to provide for a cooperation mechanism 

with DNB should DNB consider that an exception to the statutory cap on remuneration is required 

as  such  a  deviation  should  be  decided  upon  in  close  and  effective  cooperation  with  DNB,  taking 

due account of its views, to ensure the ongoing ability of DNB to independently carry out its tasks. 

A  good  practice  for  effective  cooperation  between  a  government  and  an  NCB  relating  to 

remuneration 

is  reflected 

in  Opinion  CON/2010/58.  The 

legislation  opined  upon 

in 

the 

aforementioned opinion exempted the NCB from its scope, while at the same time inviting the NCB 

to  consider,  taking  into  account  its  own  legal  order,  whether  the  underlying  reasons  for  the 

legislative  provisions  can  be  achieved  without  prejudicing  the  performance  of  the  NCB’s  tasks 

under  the  Treaty,  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB  and  national  legislation.  Another  form  of  effective 

cooperation  which  could  provide  guidance  was  considered  in  Opinion  CON/2012/6:  the  draft 

legislative  provisions  in  question  established  that  the  public  service  pension  reduction  scheme 
would  only  be  applicable  to  the  NCB  with  the  consent  of  its  Governor12.The  Dutch  government 

could  follow  the  same  or  a  similar  approach  in  order  to  achieve  effective  cooperation  and  to 
safeguard central bank independence13.  

This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. 

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 13 June 2016. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Mario DRAGHI 

12  

13  

See Opinion CON/2012/6 paragraphs 2 and 3. In addition, see Opinion CON/2010/58 and CON/2012/86 paragraph 
3.2.  

See the last indent of paragraph 3.2.2 of Opinion CON/2010/80 

3