China’s rise : the view from South Korea.
Date: 2016-06-10
Institutions: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Subjects: China, South Korea, economic cooperation, economic relations, foreign policy, international security

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China’s rise: the view from South Korea
by Alice Ekman 

Monitoring  China-South  Korea  relations  is  key  for 
the EU, as both countries have been designated stra-
tegic  partners.  Moreover,  the  Union  has  important 
economic ties to both, and signed a free trade agree-
ment  (FTA)  with  the  Republic  of  Korea  (ROK)  in 
2011.

The first years of the mandates of Chinese President 
Xi  Jinping  and  the  Korean  President  Park  Geun-
hye’s – which started almost at the same time – were 
marked by an active reinforcing of bilateral ties. The 
visit of Park Geun-hye to China to attend the large-
scale  military  parade  commemorating  the  70th  an-
niversary of the victory in the ‘Chinese People’s War 
of Resistance against Japanese Aggression’, held on 3 
September 2015 in Tiananmen Square, was her third 
trip to the country since she took office in February 
2013.  And  the  position  of  honour  granted  to  the 
South  Korean  president,  who  watched  the  parade 
next to Xi’s wife, Peng Liyuan and Xi himself – almost 
as close as Russian President Vladimir Putin – was a 
symbolic gesture which was generally well received 
by both the ROK’s population and its leadership. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  Xi-Park  mandates,  with 
China  already  South  Korea’s  largest  trading  part-
ner, both leaders focused on strengthening bilateral 
economic ties. This culminated in the signing of the 
ROK-China  FTA  in  June  2015  after  three  years  of 
negotiations. 

In  parallel,  South  Korea  has  responded  positively 
to China’s ‘One Belt One Road’ project and Beijing’s 

emphasis  on  infrastructure  development  in  the 
region.  The  ROK  joined  the  Chinese-led  Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as a founding 
member in March 2015.  And by the end of 2015, of-
ficials from the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs were 
regularly  emphasising  the  ‘complementarity’  be-
tween China’s One Belt One Road project and South 
Korea’s own ‘Eurasia Initiative’, embracing a talking 
point initially developed by Beijing. Lately, the South 
Korean project – which envisioned an inter-Korean 
railroad connected to Russia’s Trans-Siberian railway, 
and ultimately aimed at facilitating the economic in-
tegration of the two Koreas – has been stalled follow-
ing  North  Korea’s  recent  nuclear  and  missile  tests. 
The sanctions in place against Pyongyang make the 
realisation of the Eurasia Initiative practically impos-
sible. 

Nevertheless,  China  continues  to  actively  promote 
its own Belt and Road project in South Korea, where 
it is still perceived positively – unlike in more scep-
tical  Japan  or  India.  Within  the  framework  of  this 
project, China and ROK are now considering the de-
velopment of joint infrastructure projects (particu-
larly in the fields of transport and energy) in third 
countries. 

While  economic  relations  have  been  continuously 
reinforced,  political  relations  with  Beijing  remain 
volatile and dependent on the issue of North Korea. 
Park no longer thanks China “for its constructive 
role in closely communicating with us in order to 
resolve the latest tension on the Korean Peninsula”, 

European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)

May 2016

1

 
 
 
 
as  she  did  in  early  September  2015  (alluding 
to  the  mid-August  exchanges  of  fire  across  the 
Demilitarised  Zone  and  the  ensuing  agreement 
negotiated between Seoul and Pyongyang to dees-
calate  the  situation).  Instead,  during  her  recent 
exchange with Xi on the sidelines of the Nuclear 
Security  Summit  on  31  March,  Park  asked  for 
more  action  from  China  on  issues  concerning 
North  Korea.  Although  Beijing’s  perceived  pas-
sivity  towards  North  Korea  causes  much  dis-
content in Seoul, political tensions between the 
two governments are unlikely to last as the ROK 
leadership remains fully aware that, in the long 
term, China will be needed to address the issue 
of North Korea.

Diverging perceptions in North-East Asia 

From a broader regional perspective, China’s rise 
is perceived very differently in Seoul than it is in 
Tokyo. Overall, it is perceived as much less of a 
threat by South Korea’s foreign policy and securi-
ty community than Japan’s. From a South Korean 
perspective, the challenge for the country’s stabil-
ity is not so much the rise of China per se, but the 
increased US-China rivalry in the region.

South  Korea  is  already  being  confronted  with 
the  realities  of  this  challenge:  the  potential  de-
ployment of the US Terminal High Altitude Area 
Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile system to 
South Korea is currently the most contentious is-
sue between Beijing and Seoul. Although the de-
ployment has been on the cards for several years, 
Seoul has put it back at the top of its agenda fol-
lowing the recent North Korean nuclear and mis-
sile tests. In February, the US and the ROK have 
officially announced the start of working-group-
level talks about the deployment of the system on 
South Korean territory. China, for its part, has ex-
pressed its clear and firm opposition to THAAD. 
Although Seoul and Washington underline that it 
would be a purely defensive system, Beijing sus-
pects  it  could  also  be  used  to  monitor  Chinese 
missile deployments. 

Persistent historical resentments

South Korea has tried to balance and diversify its 
regional partnerships for many years. But this di-
versification is increasingly showing its limits as 
Seoul is constrained by the nature of its relations 
with both the US and China, as well as by per-
sistent  historical  resentment  towards  Japan,  the 
main US ally in the region. Historical grievances 
remain strong and continue to weigh heavily on 
the  evolution  of  Japanese-Korean  relations  and 
the network of US alliances in North-East Asia. 

The  agreement  on  wartime  ‘comfort  women’ 
(women  forced  to  serve  as  prostitutes)  backed 
by the US and signed by Japan and South Korea 
in December 2015 –  whereby Tokyo agreed to 
contribute ¥1 billion to a South Korean fund to 
support survivors – certainly represents a break-
through  in  this  long-running  dispute  between 
the two countries. But is not able, in and by itself, 
to  put  an  end  to  the  cycle  of  bilateral  tensions 
which had been escalating since early 2013 at the 
beginning of the Park-Abe era. The agreement has 
been received with mixed feelings, if not strong 
criticism,  by  a  significant  share  of  the  Korean 
population and the former sex slaves themselves, 
who complain about the lack of consultation dur-
ing the negotiation process, the indirect apology 
made by Japanese Prime Minister Abe or Tokyo’s 
refusal to admit legal responsibility. 

Even  following  the  agreement,  the  publics  and 
policymakers  of  both  the  ROK  and  China  con-
tinue to share a strong resentment towards Japan 
over the issues of war crimes. China is likely to 
take this into consideration when crafting its ap-
proach towards South Korea, as it has already on 
several  occasions  in  recent  years.  For  instance, 
the ROK’s and China’s joint experience as targets 
of  ‘Japanese  colonialism  and  aggression’  figured 
prominently in the celebrations of the September 
2015 parade in Tiananmen Square.

An awkward predicament

South Korea will continue to find itself in an awk-
ward position as US-China rivalry grows. China-
South Korean relations are likely to remain pre-
dominantly  economic,  and  political  ties  will  be 
difficult to reinforce. At the same time, China is 
well aware of the tensions between the two main 
US partners in North-East Asia, and will continue 
to strengthen economic bonds with South Korea 
accordingly. 

In  the  long  term,  given  its  scale  and  pace,  this 
process is likely to have political implications: the 
ROK’s bilateral trade with China is already larger 
than South Korea’s combined trade with the US 
and Japan, its second- and third-biggest trading 
partners, respectively. And Beijing will also seek 
further cooperation with Seoul on its various in-
stitutional initiatives, as one of the country’s top 
priorities under Xi Jinping is to spearhead the re-
structuring of regional and global governance. 

Alice Ekman is the Head of China Research at 
IFRI and a Senior Associate Fellow at the EUISS.

European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)

May 2016

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© EU Institute for Security Studies, 2016. | Qn-AL-16-019-2A-n | ISBn 978-92-9198-393-3 | ISSn 2315-1129 | doi:10.2815/325137