COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws
Date: 2016-05-25
Institutions: Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, European Commission
Subjects: EU Member State, administrative cooperation, consumer policy, consumer protection, infringement of EU law, single market

EN 

   EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 25.5.2016  SWD(2016) 164 final   COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  IMPACT ASSESSMENT  Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council  on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws   {COM(2016) 283 final} {SWD(2016) 165 final}  
 
 
Table of Contents 

1.  WHAT IS THE PROBLEM AND WHY IS IT A PROBLEM? ................................ 5 

1.1.

  Introduction  –  non-compliance  with  EU  consumer  acquis  and 

consumer detriment ........................................................................................ 5 

1.2.

  Policy context ................................................................................................... 7 

1.3.

  Drivers of the inefficient cross-border enforcement cooperation ............... 8 

1.4.

  Problems ......................................................................................................... 17 

1.5.

  Consequences ................................................................................................. 23 

1.6.

  Baseline scenario: how would the problem evolve? ................................... 25 

2.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? .............................................................................. 28 

3.  WHAT SHOULD BE ACHIEVED? ........................................................................ 29 

4.  WHAT ARE THE VARIOUS OPTIONS TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES? .... 29 

5.  WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE DIFFERENT POLICY OPTIONS AND 

WHO WILL BE AFFECTED? ................................................................................. 35 

5.1.

  Option 1: Baseline scenario: no policy change ........................................... 35 

5.2.

  Option  2:  Implementing  legislation  and  non-legislative  ("soft  law") 
measures to improve and clarify CPC cooperation, combined with self-
regulation to increase business compliance ................................................ 36 

5.3.

  Option  3:  Revision  of  the  CPC  Regulation  to  extend  its  scope  and 

strengthen its efficiency ................................................................................ 38 

5.4.

  Option  4:  Revision  of  the  CPC  Regulation:  Policy  Option  3  + 
additional  elements  regarding  minimum  powers  and  monitoring  of 
Member States' enforcement efforts ........................................................... 46 

5.5.

  Option  5:  New  Regulation  providing  the  European  Commission  with 
direct  powers  to  address  widespread  infringements  meeting  the 
threshold described in option 3, combined either with option 3 or with 
option 4 as regards the existing CPC cooperation ..................................... 50 

6.  HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? .................................................................. 53 

6.1.

  Comparison of options .................................................................................. 53 

7.  THE PREFERRED OPTION .................................................................................... 58 

7.1.

  Legal basis ...................................................................................................... 58 

7.2.

  Consistency of the preferred option with other EU policies ...................... 58 

7.3.

  Impact  of  the  preferred  option  on  national  enforcement  systems  and 

laws ................................................................................................................. 58 

7.4.

  How  would  the  option  3  solve  the  underlying  problems  mentioned  in 

the section 1? .................................................................................................. 60 

Examples in Boxes 8-9: widespread infringements .............................................. 61 

2 

 
 
 
8.  MONITORING AND EVALUATION .................................................................... 61 

9.  ANNEX I: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ......................................................... 63 

9.1.

  Article 21a of the CPC Regulation ("review clause") ................................ 63 

9.2.

  External evaluation of the CPC Regulation ................................................ 63 

9.3.

  Commission report of 2014 on the functioning of the CPC Regulation ... 64 

9.4.

  Inter-Service Steering Group ....................................................................... 65 

9.5.

  Consultation of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board ......................................... 65 

9.6.

  Studies to support the impact assessment ................................................... 67 

10.  ANNEX II: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION .................................................. 68 

10.1.

  Regular  consultations  of  our  consumer  organisations,  networks  and 
high level officials of national enforcers ...................................................... 68 

10.2.

  European Consumer Summit dedicated to enforcement in March 2013 . 68 

10.3.

  Public consultation in winter 2013-2014 ..................................................... 68 

10.4.

  Stakeholders' support regarding the key elements of the option 3 ........... 70 

10.5.

  More detailed public consultation results ................................................... 71 

10.6.

  Conference dedicated to enforcement cooperation and Competitiveness 
Council in 2014 .............................................................................................. 79 

10.7.

  Workshops ..................................................................................................... 79 

11.  ANNEX III: WHO IS AFFECTED BY THE INITIATIVE AND HOW ................ 80 

12.  ANNEX  IV:  DATA  AND  CASE  STUDIES  SUPPORTING  THIS  IMPACT 

ASSESSMENT ......................................................................................................... 82 

12.1.

  Non-compliance rate and consumer detriment .......................................... 82 

12.2.

  Method used to estimate key positive impacts of the preferred option .... 89 

12.3.

  Estimated average costs of the enforcement case ....................................... 90 

12.4.

  Additional calculations of consumer detriment .......................................... 91 

12.5.

  Additional case examples to support this impact assessment ................... 92 

13.  ANNEX V: LEGAL FRAMEWORK ....................................................................... 95 

13.1.

  Existing  EU  instruments  to  improve  enforcement  of  consumer  laws 
across borders ................................................................................................ 95 

13.2.

  Impact  of  the  current  CPC  Regulation  on  national  enforcement 
systems 97 

13.3.

  Investigation and enforcement powers of CPC authorities ..................... 101 

13.4.

  Impact  of  the  preferred  option  on  national  enforcement  systems  and 
laws 

103 

14.  ANNEX  VI:  CURRENT  AND  FUTURE  COST  AND  SAVING  (COVERING 

OPTION 3) OF THE CPC COOPERATION ......................................................... 106 

3 

 
 
15.  ANNEX  VII:  TECHNICAL  CHANGES  TO  THE  CPC  REGULATION 

(INCLUDING UPDATING OF ITS ANNEX AND OF ITS DATABASE) ......... 111 

15.1.

  Clarifying existing provisions ..................................................................... 111 

15.2.

  Changes to the CPC database .................................................................... 111 

15.3.

  Update and consolidation of the Annex of the CPC Regulation ............. 111 

4 

 
 
 
 
 
 
1.  WHAT IS THE PROBLEM AND WHY IS IT A PROBLEM? 

1.1.

Introduction  –  non-compliance  with  EU  consumer  acquis  and  consumer 
detriment 

National consumer protection authorities strive to ensure compliance of traders' practices with 
EU  consumer  acquis  including  for  cross-border  transactions  which  are  boosted  by  digital 
means. The coordinated screenings of online e-commerce websites ("sweeps"1) carried out by 
enforcement  authorities  under  the  Regulation  on  Consumer  Protection  Cooperation 
2006/20042  ("CPC  Regulation")  demonstrate  that  the  recent  development  of  online  trade 
requires further and  deeper cooperation of national enforcement authorities. Since 2007, the 
results  of  websites'  screening  systematically  show  high  rates  of  non-compliance,  between 
32% and 69%, with basic consumer rules in the checked markets, as illustrated in Box 1: 

Box 1 
Online markets swept since 2007 

Airline tickets (2007) 
Apps for Mobile phones (2008) 
Electronic goods (2009) 
Entertainment tickets (2010) 
Consumer Credit  (2011) 
Digital content downloads (2012) 
Travel services (2013) 
Guarantees in the electronic goods sector (2014) 3 

Number of 
Websites 
investigated 
447 
554 
369 
414 
565 
330 
552 
437 

Non-compliance 
rate 

51% 
54% 
55% 
59% 
69% 
52% 
69% 
54% 

The malpractices identified in the screening of websites were mostly unfair practices, unfair 
contract terms, non-transparent price displays, lack of information on the trader's identity and, 
in the recent screening in 2014, lack of information on the legal guarantees in the consumer 
electronics sector4.  

These results are confirmed by the data from the European Consumer Centres: two thirds of 
the  37,000  individual  complaints  they  received  in  2014  concern  cross-border  purchases 
online. This data points to a wide range of issues that consumers face: the top five grounds of 
complaints  are:  non-delivery  (15%  of  all  cases),  defective  products  (11%),  problems  with 
contracts (10%), product or service not in conformity with the order (9%) and unfair practices 
(6%).  The  top  five  sectors  for  complaints  are  air  passenger  transport  (18%  of  all  cases), 
furniture  and  household  equipment 
(6%), 
(14%), 
telecommunications and internet services (6%) and clothing (5%)5.  

timeshare  and  package 

travel 

1The "sweep" is an EU-wide screening of websites to identify breaches of consumer law in given online sectors. 
Subsequently authorities contact companies about suspected irregularities and ask them to take corrective action 
or face legal action.  
2Regulation  (EC)  No  2006/2004  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  27  October  2004  on 
cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws, OJ L 364, 
9.12.2004, p. 1. 
3This sweep, although carried out online for easier investigation, concerns both online and offline practices. 
4 http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/enforcement/sweeps/guarantees/index_en.htm  
5  ECC-Net's  anniversary  report  2005-2015:  http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/solving_consumer_disputes/non-
judicial_redress/ecc-net/docs/ecc_net_-_anniversary_report_2015_en.pdf  
5 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Further,  the  information  on  consumer  conditions  published  in  the  European  Consumer 
Scoreboards  highlights  that  the  incidence  of  unfair  practices  is  high:  for  example,  42%  of 
consumers say they were pressured to buy through persistent sales calls or messages6. 

Moreover,  these  malpractices  lead  consumers  to  purchasing  decisions  that  they  would  not 
have made otherwise, such as purchasing products or services for an overall higher price or 
being  trapped  in  unwanted  subscriptions7.  The  scale  of  financial  detriment  for  individual 
consumers  caused  by  the  non-compliance  with  basic  consumer  rules,  in  a  sample  of  five 
cross-border online markets, was estimated to EUR 770 million8 per year. This low level of 
compliance is one of the indicators for poorly functioning consumer markets, such as the EU 
online cross-border retail market where trade is lagging behind9. Part of this malfunctioning 
can be attributed to a lack of efficient public enforcement of EU consumer legislation in the 
cross-border context (other factors include lack of traders' awareness or understanding of key 
consumer rules, insufficient market transparency, impact of dominant traders, etc.). 

Stepping-up  cross-border  enforcement  to  improve  compliance  with  EU  consumer  law  can 
therefore  contribute  to  a  better  functioning  and  more  dynamic  Single  Market  both  for 
consumers  and  traders  (e.g.  costs  associated  with  resolving  complaints  and  disputes  across 
borders were found to be among the most important barriers to the expansion of the Digital 
Single  Market  in  particular  to  small  firms10).  This  is  why  enforcement  has  been  a  constant 
priority of EU consumer policy11. Equal and efficient enforcement across the EU is geared to 
boost legal certainty, and thus, consumer and entrepreneurship confidence12. The latter would 
increase  consumption  and,  thus,  foster  growth  and  job  creation  within  the  Single  Market. 
Enforcement is all the more important for EU growth as the Digital Single Market has been 
identified  with  a  significant  untapped  potential.  The  European  Commission  has  set  the 
completion of the Digital Single Market (DSM) as one of its key priorities to sustain growth 
in the EU, and identified in particular in its DSM Strategy13 the importance of better access 
for  consumers  and  businesses  to  online  goods  and  services  across  Europe.  It  pledges  to 
provide  “more  rapid,  agile  and  consistent  enforcement  of  consumer  rules  for  online  and 
digital purchases" and notably to "clarify and develop the powers of enforcement authorities 

6This is a blacklisted unfair commercial practice, easy for consumers to recognise. See p. 32 of the latest 11th 
edition: 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_evidence/consumer_scoreboards/11_edition/docs/ccs2015scoreboard_e
n.pdf  
7E.g. a Danish firm was offering free samples of cosmetic products through online banners. Consumers had to 
pay EUR 4 for shipping costs, but they were unaware that they were also subscribing to receive the cosmetics 
monthly, but this time not for free. Cited in the ECC-Net's anniversary report 2005-2015. 
8This estimate is based on the approach designed in the UK to estimate financial consumer detriment. It is based 
on the screening of 2,682 e-commerce websites in 2014 in all EU countries in the sectors of: clothing and sports 
goods;  electronic  goods;  package  travel;  recreation  and  culture;  and  financial  services.  The  average  non-
compliance rate was found to be 37% in these sectors, see Annex IV.   
9E.g. only 18% of consumers who used the Internet for private purposes in 2014 purchased online from another 
EU  country  while  55%  did  so  domestically.  Eurostat  survey  on  ICT  usage  in  households,  and  by  individuals 
(2014), isoc_ec_ibuy 
10.Duch-Brown  and  Martens  (2015)  “Barriers  to  Cross-border  e-commerce  in  the  EU  Digital  Single  Market”, 
JRC-IPTS 
at 
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/publication/eur-scientific-and-technical-research-reports/barriers-cross-border-
ecommerce-eu-digital-single-market 
11Regulation  (EU)  No  254/2014  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  26  February  2014  on  a 
multiannual  consumer  programme  for  the  years  2014-2020,  OJ  L  84,  20.3.2014.  Commission  Communication 
"A European Consumer Agenda - Boosting confidence and growth", 22.5.2012, COM(2012) 225 final. 
12According to the latest Competitiveness "Check-up", 77% of European companies believe that EU regulations 
are not sufficiently clear and predictable –  see the summary of the Competitiveness Council of 1 October 2015: 
http://www.politiekcompendium.nl/id/vjxtjx6htfz7/nieuws/competitiveness_council_competitiveness  
13Commission  Communication  "A  Digital  Single  Market  Strategy  for  Europe"  COM  (2015)  192  final: 
http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/digital-single-market/docs/dsm-communication_en.pdf 
6 

Economy 

available 

2015-07, 

working 

Digital 

paper 

no 

at 

 
 
                                                 
and improve the coordination of their market monitoring activities and alert mechanisms to 
detect infringements faster"14 thanks to the review of the CPC Regulation.  

Stronger  enforcement  of  consumer  legislation  at  the  EU  level  was  also  called  for  by  the 
European  Parliament15,  as  well  as  by  all  categories  of  stakeholders  (and  especially  by  trade 
and consumer associations), who responded to the public consultation on the CPC Regulation 
review carried out over the winter of 2013-201416, or who participated in various events such 
as  the  EU  consumer  Summits  in  2013,  2014  and  2015.  Furthermore,  in  September  2015,  in 
their  contributions  to  the  debate  on  the  completion  of  the  Internal  Market,  Business  Europe 
and  a  group  of  17  Ministers  of  Economy  from  different  Member  States  stressed  the 
importance of coordinated and stepped-up enforcement across the EU17.    

1.2.

Policy context 

The  CPC  Regulation  provides  a  cooperation  framework  between  national  authorities  of  the 
EU18  so  that  their  action  can  overcome  national  jurisdictional  boundaries  to  incorporate  the 
full dimension of the Single Market19. The primary  aim of the  CPC Regulation is  to ensure 
legal  certainty  within  the  Single  Market  via  strong  and  equal  enforcement  of  key  EU 
consumer acquis (listed in its Annex20). National enforcement arrangements for the consumer 
laws  are  not  sufficient  in  a  cross-border  context.  In  particular,  in  the  absence  of  an  EU 
framework to approximate cooperation powers and procedures, Member States would need to 
rely on a large number of bilateral agreements among themselves (for example to recognise 
evidence) or on long cumbersome judicial procedures against traders established in different 
Member  States.  Such  cross-border  enforcement  cooperation  is  therefore  key  to  preventing 
non-compliant  traders  from  exploiting  gaps  and  limitations  in  the  enforcement  capacity  of 
each  Member  State.  This  is  done  through  a  structured  mechanism  of  alerts  and  bilateral 
mutual  assistance,  based  on  a  set  of  minimum  powers  that  national  authorities  need  for  an 
efficient  and  legally  sound  cooperation.  There  is  also  a  mechanism  to  tackle  malpractices 
concerning more than two countries, where Member States coordinate their actions to jointly 
address  issues  of  common  interest,  possibly  at  the  EU  level,  as  well  as  provisions  for 
developing exchange of best practices.  

The results of the evaluation of the CPC Regulation carried out in 2012, public consultation 
and  other  support  studies  undertaken  for  this  impact  assessment21  show  that  enforcement 

14Ibid, p. 5. 
15The  European  Parliament  has  repeatedly  underlined  the  need  for  stronger  enforcement  action  by  the 
Commission  and  Member  States  and  consequently  called  for  the  development  of  the  CPC  network,  cf.  the 
European Parliament resolution on governance of the Single Market (2013):  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2013-0054&language=EN&ring=A7-2013-
0019 
16  A  summary  report  of  the  public  consultation  by  the  Consumer  Policy  Evaluation  Consortium,  16.4.2014: 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/enforcement/cross-
border_enforcement_cooperation/docs/140416_consultation_summary_report_final_en.pdf  
17The  letter  of  25  September  2015  was  addressed  to  VP  Katainen    and  Commissioner  Bienkowska  and  was 
signed by the Ministers/Vice-Ministers from  CY, CZ, DK,  EE, FI, HR, IE, IT, LT, LV, MT, NL, PL, PT, SI, 
SK and UK (the letter is not published). 
18Authorities in the EEA are also concerned as the CPC Regulation is of the EEA relevance. 
19The Regulation provides a legal basis to extend national procedural rules so that they can be applied in cross-
border  situations,  i.e.  when  a  malpractice  by  a  trader  established  in  one  Member  State  targets  consumers  in 
another  Member  State.  See  Annex  V  for  more  information  on  the  CPC  Regulation  and  its  impact  on  national 
enforcement systems. 
20The annex of the CPC Regulation currently covers 18 different pieces of consumer legislation and is regularly 
updated  when  substantive  laws  are  added,  modified  or  repealed.  The  list  covers  large  scope  directives,  e.g. 
regarding unfair commercial practices, unfair contract terms, consumer rights, guarantees, e-commerce, ADR, e-
privacy or sector-specific legislation on passenger rights or consumer credit.  
21See Annex I for more details. 
7 

 
 
 
                                                 
 
cooperation is indispensable to address efficiently breaches of consumer legislation spreading 
across  the  Single  Market  and  especially  across  the  Digital  Single  Market.  However,  the 
evaluation has also pointed out that the effect of  the CPC Regulation is incomplete and that 
none  of  the  specific  objectives  of  the  CPC  Regulation  have  been  fully  achieved.  On  1  July 
2014,  the  Commission  adopted  a  report  on  the  functioning  of  the  CPC  Regulation.  It 
presented the activities carried out under the CPC framework, as well as a number of flaws 
and gaps identified in the evaluation and public consultation which do not allow maximising 
potential benefits of this enforcement cooperation in the future22.  

On the basis of the conclusions  drawn by the evaluation and problems detected, this impact 
assessment  serves  to  scrutinise  certain  potential  amendments  to  the  CPC  Regulation,  which 
the  Commission  is  reviewing  as  part  of  the  DSM  Strategy  and  in  line  with  the  review 
requirement under Article 21a of the Regulation. This impact assessment report is limited to 
the  issues  concerning  the  public  enforcement  cooperation  (in  the  collective  interest  of 
consumers  and  in  the  realm  of  the  CPC  Regulation)  and  does  not  address  individual 
enforcement  matters  (where  an  individual  consumer  aims  to  enforce  his/her  rights  before 
courts or alternative dispute resolution entities). 

1.3.

  Drivers of the inefficient cross-border enforcement cooperation 

The  evaluation  report  and  other  support  studies  have  identified  the  following  issues  which 
mostly  concern  limitation  of  the  current  CPC  legal  framework  available  for  consumer 
protection authorities  to  cooperate  on  a  sound  and  formal  legal  ground  that  is  necessary  for 
them  to  act  beyond  their  national  jurisdiction  boundaries  (e.g.  for  the  interest  of  consumers 
based  in  another  EU  country).  These  flaws  are  particularly  apparent  in  a  context  of  rapid 
changes of consumer markets and the digital economy, a growing presence of operators acting 
on the whole EU market and a downward pressure on resources available to enforcers.  

1.3.1.  Limited scope: certain important infringements to consumer legislation with a strong 
cross-border dimension are not or are not explicitly included in the scope of the CPC 
Regulation 

  Short-lived infringements 

The  digital  environment  allows  traders  to  target  massive  numbers  of  consumers  rapidly and 
makes it possible for rogue traders to discontinue or restart a detrimental practice quickly. For 
example, just prior to the initiation of an enforcement action against a website, deemed non-
compliant  with  consumer  rules,  the  trader  can  easily  close  it  down  escaping  the  legal 
consequences of his actions. Consequently, this trader can endlessly repeat the operation later 
on.  Common  examples  of  such  practices  are  misleading  advertising  of  "free"  or  "limited  in 
time"  promotional  offers  which  then  turn  out  to  be  unwanted  long-term  subscriptions23,  or 
"super cheap" offers whose availability is very limited. Such practices produce a detriment to 
consumers which only becomes evident later as explained in Box 2. 

22Commission report on the functioning of Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council  of  27  October  2004  on  cooperation  between  national  authorities  responsible  for  the  enforcement  of 
consumer  protection  laws,  1.7.2014,  COM(2014)  439  final:  http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/enforcement/cross-
border_enforcement_cooperation/docs/140701_commission_report_cpc_reg_en.pdf  
23Biennial  report  of  the UK  Member  State on  the  application of  the  CPC  Regulation  2010-2012,  March 2013:  
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/enforcement/crossborder_enforcement_cooperation/docs/cpc_biennial_2013_en_e
n.pdf  
In  addition,  the  preliminary  results  of  an  unpublished  study  on  misleading  free  trials  and  subscription  traps 
commissioned by the Commission shows that 1 in 5 consumers who ordered a free trial had problems (such as a 
subscription trap) afterwards. 
8 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
Box 2: A deceptive air carrier advertisement campaign that lasted 4 days but resulted in flight 
cancellations for months 

An air company, registered in country A, carried out an "instant" marketing campaign in country B 
from 10-14 September 2010. It was considered by the CPC authority in country B to be unfair as 
some of the cheap airline tickets sold were later on cancelled by the carrier due to insufficient seat 
availability. The CPC authority of the country B passed the case to the CPC authority of the country 
A to prevent repetition of such an infringement in the future. The requested authority in the country 
A responded that under Article 8(1) of the CPC Regulation it could only act to cease or prohibit an 
infringement.  As  the  campaign  in  question  had  ended,  it  could  no  longer  take  an  action.  
(Explanation of  how the preferred option could address this  shortcoming and the ones  in 
other boxes below is to be found at section 7.4.) 

The  CPC  authorities'  responses  to  the  public  consultation  indicated  that  short-lived 
infringements  represent  a  significant  and  growing  share  of  cross-border  infringements.  For 
example, competent authorities in CZ, LV and HU indicated that ca. 62-89% of cross-border 
infringements  were  short-lived24.  In  addition,  a  study  procured  by  the  Commission  in  2015 
found that 100 out of 320 websites selected for a mystery shopping about free trials traps were 
no longer accessible or the initial offer was no longer available two months later25. The CPC 
Regulation,  however,  can  only  be  invoked  to  take  an  action  to  cease  or  prohibit  "on-going" 
infringements26. If a malpractice takes place for only a few days, it will not be covered by the 
current CPC cooperation mechanisms, despite its possible lasting impact on consumers.  

  Widespread  infringements  made  simultaneously  by  multi-national  companies  in 

several Member States  

Infringements  committed  simultaneously  in  several  countries  by  subsidiaries  of  the  same 
multinational company, or via a network of agents or franchisees are currently not explicitly 
regulated  by  the  CPC  Regulation27  and  are  not  systematically  examined  and  tackled  by  the 
CPC network. In most cases, malpractices perpetrated by these traders are treated as "parallel" 
domestic infringements and are addressed independently by national enforcement authorities. 
In  doing  so,  authorities  fail  to  take  into  account  the  EU  dimension  of  malpractices  and  the 
need for a coordinated EU-level action to offer a consistent approach across borders.  

This  issue  may  currently  be  underestimated  by  consumers  and  authorities  as  many  e-
commerce transactions have a transnational component that is not apparent as such28. At the 
CPC workshop of 24 June  2014, the representatives from  19 Member States confirmed that 
they were increasingly facing infringements by traders operating through subsidiaries or other 
forms of local presence. Online trade, in particular, is dominated by a few companies given 

24During the survey, the Hungarian authority for consumer protection mentioned that in most of cases it acted in 
matters and complaints regarding no longer on-going infringements. 
25Study on misleading free trials and subscription traps by GFK (forthcoming). 
26Article 3(b) of the CPC Regulation defines the intra-Community infringement as an act or omission contrary to 
the  laws  that  "harms  or  is  likely  to  harm"  the  collective  interest  of  consumers.  This  article  has  to  be  read  in 
conjunction  with  Article  8(1):  "a  requested  authority  shall,  on  request  from  an  applicant  authority,  take  all 
necessary enforcement measures to bring about the cessation or prohibition of the intra-Community infringement 
without delay". 
27In this case the ownership structure and the links between the multinational company and its local subsidiaries 
is not the key element, because what counts is the same practice used in different Member States. 
28The latest Consumer Scoreboard results suggests that the incidence of cross-border online purchases within the 
EU is considerably under-reported, since consumers are not always aware that they are buying from another EU 
country: "In approximately four out of ten of the cases where respondents bought cross-border from another EU 
country, they reported a domestic purchase.", cf. 11th Consumer Scoreboard edition, p. 58.  
9 

 
 
 
                                                 
that  the  top  100  companies  at  the  EU  level  represent  more  than  half  of  this  trade29.  The 
problem  of  widespread  infringements  also  concerns  certain  economic  sectors  with  a  high 
concentration  of  multinational  operators,  such  as  international  passenger  transport  or 
telecommunications, which act both offline and online. 

 

Infringements concerning unjustified geographical discrimination 

The Commission's DSM Strategy of May 2015 identified unjustified discrimination regarding 
access  or  price  of  a  service/good  based  on  criteria  linked  to  the  nationality  or  residence  of 
consumers  as  a  practice  hindering  the  development  of  the  DSM.  The  overall  issue  (often 
referred  to  as  "geo-blocking")  needs  further  consideration  and  therefore  the  Commission 
launched a public consultation. In its Strategy for Upgrading the Single Market adopted on 28 
October 2015, the Commission announced that the outcome of this consultation will provide 
important insights for the Commission’s forthcoming legislative action in the domain which 
“must  go  hand  in  hand  with  strengthened  enforcement  in  each  Member  State,  which,  as 
announced  in  the  Digital  Single  Market  Strategy,  must  be  further  enhanced  through  the 
reform of the Consumer Protection Cooperation Regulation”30.  

In  fact,  improving  the  implementation  of  Article  20  of  the  Services  Directive31  has  been  a 
political  priority  for  many  years32.  One  of  the  issues  identified  was  an  insufficient 
enforcement of this provision33 as it requires a well-functioning mechanism in a cross-border 
context. Not a single company in any of 28 Member States has ever been fined for infringing 
Article  20  of  the  Services  Directive  since  2009,  i.e.  the  year  when  the  Services  Directive 
should have been transposed in Member States. European Consumer Centres report that most 
infringements  concerning  unjustified  geographical  discrimination  are  not  reported  by 
consumers due to their lack of knowledge of their rights, and they estimate that the problem is 
growing  with  the  development  of  e-commerce  (74%  of  the  complaints  received  by  ECCs 
regarding price differences or other geographical discrimination relate to online cross-border 
purchases34). At present, Article 20 of the Services Directive is however not part of the CPC 
Regulation's  Annex  (i.e.  the  CPC  cooperation  mechanisms  cannot  be  used  to  enforce  it).  It 

final,  p.12,  http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents?locale=en&tags=single-market-

29Commission staff working document accompanying the DSM Strategy "A Digital Single Market Strategy for 
Europe  -  Analysis  and  Evidence",  6.5.2015,  SWD(2015)  100  final,  p.  8:  http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/digital-
single-market/docs/dsm-swd_en.pdf. 
30COM(2015)  550 
strategy-2015-communication 
31Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the 
internal market, OJ 376, 27.12.2006, p. 36. 
32E.g. the European Parliament has made a call for an effective implementation of Article 20(2) of the Services 
Directive,  as  well  as  the  proper  enforcement  by  national  authorities  and  courts  of  the  national  provisions 
implementing  this  non-discrimination  rule  in  the  legal  systems  of  Member  States  (cf.  European  Parliament 
resolution of 21 September 2010 on Completing the Internal Market for E-Commerce (2010/2012(INI)); points 
31  and  32);  Conclusions  of  Competitiveness  Council  on  Digital  Single  Market  and  Governance  of  the  Single 
Market 
2012, 
30-31 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%209958%202012%20REV%201  
33Cf.  Report  of  the  European  Consumer  Centers'  Network  on  Analysis  of  Article  20(2)  and  Article  21  related 
consumer 
2012: 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/ecc/docs/eccservices_directive_en.pdf; Commission Staff working document with 
a view to establishing guidance on the application of Article 20(2) of Directive 2006/123/EC on services in the 
internal market, SWD(2012) 146 final, 8.6.2012. 
34Commission's  DSM 
6: 
communication_en.pdf  
10 

http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/digital-single-market/docs/dsm-

complaints 

ECC-Net 

Strategy, 

between 

reported 

2010 

May 

and 

of 

to 

p. 

 
 
                                                 
was mentioned as one of the possible areas to be included in the scope of the CPC Regulation 
by the evaluation35. 

1.3.2.  The minimum powers for national authorities to cooperate are insufficient to tackle 

infringements in the digital environment efficiently and swiftly 

The  CPC  Regulation  requires  Member  States  to  implement  investigation  and  enforcement 
powers necessary for the application of the CPC Regulation36. These powers are specified in 
Article 4(6), which serves as the common minimum denominator of all the powers available 
to  Member  States  in  a  cross-border  context.  Without  this  minimum  common  denominator37 
the  Member  States  would  not  be  able  to  cooperate  efficiently:  to  gather  and  exchange 
evidence in a legally sound manner (e.g. to ensure that results of an investigation based on the 
mystery shopping exercise can be used in both countries), to prove and stop infringements and 
to deter them for the future. This is why it is important that the harmonised list of minimum 
powers set in Article 4(6) contains all the powers necessary for an enforcement action on the 
concerned markets.  

There  are  a  number  of  misconducts38  currently  developing  on  the  digital  markets,  which 
cannot be efficiently tackled under the current cooperation framework. 

  Relocating  and/or  altering  of  business  practices  or  hiding/altering  of  identity  to  escape 

enforcement actions  

In the digital environment, it may be relatively easy for rogue traders to exploit jurisdictional 
boundaries  and  limitations  and  cause  substantial  detriment  to  the  consumer.  The  trading 
activity of these traders may be quickly closed, only to re-appear in a slightly modified form 
elsewhere as demonstrated by the case in Box 3.  

Box  3:  Cheap  design  furniture  online:  never  delivered,  but  impossible  to  catch  the 
responsible trader39 

In 2013 and 2014, a large number of consumer complaints (nearly 5,000) were received by the 
European Consumer Centres, particularly in France and Germany, regarding the late delivery or 
non-delivery  of  furniture  from  a  certain  online  trader.  Although  the  CPC  network  has 
commenced an investigation, the strategy of the company made it difficult for authorities (i.e. in 
IT,  DE,  FR,  ES,  UK,  IE,  SE,  AT)  to  investigate  and  stop  the  infringement  due  to  insufficient 
means  to  address  effectively  the  problem  of  the  trader  changing  its  holding  structure  (legal 

35The evaluation of the CPC Regulation looked into the appropriateness of the Annex of the CPC Regulation and 
considered  several  pieces  of  legislation  that  are  currently  outside  its  scope.  It  concluded  that  a  limited  update 
could be necessary based on the following criteria: i) impact on collective interests of consumers; ii) cross-border 
relevance; iii) public enforcement dimension; and iv) consistencies with the sectorial and horizontal legislation 
currently listed in the Annex. On this basis, several pieces of legislation were recommended for their inclusion in 
the CPC Regulation's Annex, see Annex VII "Technical changes to the CPC Regulation" which also includes a 
mapping  of  all  sectorial  legislative  instruments  in  the  Annex  and  the  proposed  additions  examining  the  inter-
action of their eventual remedy mechanisms with the CPC system. 
36Article 4(3): "Each competent authority shall, (…), have the investigation and enforcement powers necessary 
for the application of this Regulation and shall exercise them in conformity with national law". 
37The powers used in the cross-border context have to stem from the EU-level instrument that surpasses national 
jurisdictional boundaries.  
38For more practical case examples, cf. Annex IV. 
39  It  is  important  to  distinguish  between  fraud  as  a  criminal  offence  and  the  instances  of  unfair  commercial 
practices covered by consumer law. The offence of fraud is commonly defined, under national criminal law, as 
an  intentional  deception  made  for  personal  gain  or  to  damage  another  person.  Even  though  there  may  be 
deceitful elements in the mentioned cases of unfair commercial practices they often do not qualify as fraud under 
the relevant national criminal law rules but they can nonetheless constitute a breach of EU consumer legislation 
(administrative or civil offence).   
11 

 
 
                                                 
entities), location and name (several websites sold the same goods but under different websites 
names registered in different countries), its operational structure (the company had a customer 
service  which  was  relocated  to  a  different  country  several  times,  but  no  fixed  showroom  or 
warehouse, which were needed to establish its legal place of establishment), and closing down 
and reopening its websites following enforcers request to modify its practices. It took more than 
three  years  to  authorities  to  discover  who  was  behind  this  trade.  Ultimately  they  got  partial 
information and evidence thanks to the intervention of a criminal prosecutor in one country that 
could finally be involved in this case. The possibility, e.g. to directly order the closing down of 
the  websites  and  to  obtain  information  from  domain  registrars,  could  have  permitted  to  stop 
such practices much faster.  

Although the total amount of consumer detriment is unknown, a UK newspaper article40 on the 
case highlights that many consumers were “left thousands of pounds out of pocket”. Further, the 
two  European  Consumer  Centres  concerned  by  this  infringement  estimated  the  detriment  of 
more than EUR 1.2 million for ca. 3,300 complaints received. 

In  such  cases,  the  trader  usually  hides  its  identity  behind  a  number  of  intermediaries  and 
linked  companies.  Authorities  have  limited  powers  to  obtain  information  on  the  real  trader 
behind the malpractice and may need to seek the help of specific authorities (such as financial 
police)  or  third  parties  (such  as  domain  registrars).  The  main  problem  in  this  context  is  the 
difficulty  with  gathering  evidence,  including  who  the  real  trader  hiding  behind  many 
intermediaries is, and hence proving and stopping the infringement.   

Box 4: Example of difficult cooperation with domain registrars  

One of the CPC authorities41 experienced recurring problems regarding a trader's hidden identity. The 
domain  registrars,  in  response  to  the  authority's  requests  to  reveal  the  trader's  identity,  refused  to 
disclose  the  data  due  to  data  protection  legislation.  There  was  however  no  sufficient  evidence  to 
initiate  a  criminal  proceeding,  which  would  have  been  the  only  solution  to  obtain  the  data  in  the 
country in question.  

  Traders  having  good  pre-contractual  information  on  their  websites  but  not  respecting 

consumer rights during the sale or after the sale  

Traders often attract consumers with nice websites but once the consumer has proceeded with 
an  order  the  trader  pays  less  attention  to  consumer  rights  and  implements  consumer  rights 
infringements  such  as  unjustified  payment  fees,  lack  of  an  efficient  complaint  service,  or 
refusal  of  withdrawal  right  (i.e.  according  to  Articles  11  and  14  of  the  Consumer  Rights 
Directive42).  These  traders  benefit  from  the  difficulty  that  enforcers  face  to  get  evidence  on 
these  practices  as  enforcers  need  to  recreate  the  consumers'  experience  (i.e.  enter  into  the 
contract with the trader, buy a good, and then exercise the right of withdrawal)43. In certain 
cases a trader changes its behaviour ad hoc, knowing that its commercial practices are being 
investigated. Therefore, the main problems in this context are the difficulties with gathering 
and exchange of evidence and hence proving and stopping the infringement. For instance, the 

40Guardian  (2014):  http://www.theguardian.com/money/2014/may/15/infurn-fury-customers-lose-on-designer-
furniture  
41The authority is not divulged for confidentiality reasons. 
42 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, 
OJ L 304, 22.11.2011, p. 64. 
43 Although the scale of this problem cannot be estimated precisely, the data from the ECC-Net shows that the 
top five grounds of complaints concerning cross-border purchases online in 2014 were: non-delivery (15% of all 
cases), defective products (11%), problems with contracts (10%) and product or service not in conformity with 
the order (9%). 
12 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
evidence collected through mystery shopping exercise (the latter power is not listed in Article 
4(6) of the CPC Regulation) in one Member State (e.g. Latvia) could not be used in another 
Member State, where its authority does not have such a power (e.g. Italy), because it would 
not be obtained in line with the national law of that Member State. 

  Traders repeating malpractices due to the insufficient deterrent effect of sanctions 

The availability and choice of sanctions has an impact on the degree of deterrence of public 
enforcement. The need for sanctions is regulated as part of the substantive legislation included 
in  the  Annex  of  the  CPC  Regulation.  The  types  of  sanctions  and  their  levels  are  set  by 
national  laws.  They  may  however  not  be  applicable  in  a  cross-border  context.  As  a 
consequence  for  some  Member  States,  if  the  infringement  is  committed  in  a  cross-border 
context, it may not be sanctioned or the sanction may not reflect the overall dimension of the 
offence (over all the markets concerned) and its deterrent effect will be limited.  

In  the  workshops  held  with  the  representatives  of  the  CPC  authorities  on  the  review  of  the 
CPC  Regulation,  there was a call  to clarify the provisions of the CPC  Regulation  regarding 
the sanctioning powers of authorities. The Regulation does not mention specifically the power 
to impose pecuniary sanctions (fines) in the context of the enforcement cooperation, although 
such power exists at national level in all Member States for domestic infringements.  

 

Infringements remain unnoticed by consumers due to the poor awareness about their rights 
and/or too low sums involved  

Another  issue  is  that  the  CPC  Regulation  does  not  specify  that  investigation/enforcement 
actions can be initiated on "own initiative" and this is an issue as certain problems tend to be 
under-reported  by  consumers44.  Consumers’  awareness  of  some  key  consumer  rights 
guaranteed  by  EU  legislation  remains  limited45.  Further,  an  infringement  can  generate 
intentionally only very small individual losses (e.g. a few euro cents for unwanted premium 
telecom  services)  but  be  suffered  by  many  consumers  thus  producing  a  great  collective 
detriment. If an authority can only start investigations once it has received a sufficient number 
of complaints, such infringements may remain unaddressed for a long time. Additionally, the 
deterrent  effect  of  the  enforcement  system  is  low  since  rogue  traders  will  know  that 
authorities  are  not  allowed  to  start  investigation  on  an  own  initiative  basis  but  need  actual 
complaints. 

44According  to  the  11th  Consumer  Conditions  Scoreboard  (p.  45),  the  majority  of  consumers  do  not  complain 
despite  feeling  they  have  a  legitimate  reason  to  do  so.  From  1,490  consumers  concerned  regarding  this  issue, 
four  in  ten  said  they  were  unlikely  to  get  a  satisfactory  solution  to  the  problem  they  encountered  (40%)  or 
thought it would take too long (38%), while a third (34%) said the sums involved were too small. Around one in 
five  said  they  did  not  know  how  or  where  to  complain  (23%),  that  they  had  tried  to  complain  about  other 
problems  in  the  past  but were not successful,  that they  were  unsure of  their  rights as a  consumer  (both 22%). 
Overall  80%  of  those  who  did  not  take  any  action  were  discouraged  from  complaining  by  the  (perceived) 
difficulties,  such  as  low  likelihood  of  success,  lack  of  information  on  whether  and  how  to  proceed  or  the 
expected length of the procedures. 
45According to the 11th Consumer Conditions Scoreboard (p. 17-19), only a third of consumers (33%) know that 
they do not have to pay for or send back unsolicited products, four in ten (41%) know that they have the right to 
a free repair or replacement of defective goods, while slightly over half (56%) are aware of the right to a cooling-
off period in relation to distance purchases. In the EU as a whole, only 9% of consumers could answer correctly 
all three of the questions put to them, with the youngest segment being the least knowledgeable. Further, data 
from airlines indicate that only between 5 and 10% of passengers entitled to compensation in case of cancellation 
or long delays (where financial compensation is not automatic but needs to be claimed) do actually claim it. This 
low "claim rate" is partly explained by the low awareness of passengers about their rights, see the Commission's 
impact assessment report accompanying the proposal for air passenger rights, SWD(2013) 62 final, 13.3.2013.  
13 

 
 
                                                 
Besides, the CPC Regulation contains no specific mechanism for consumers to obtain redress 
when their rights are violated, as its main aim is to prevent and halt malpractices to protect the 
collective interests of consumers46. Such a mechanism would be beneficial in increasing the 
deterrent effect on non-compliant traders engaged in cross-border operations, as, in addition to 
sanctions, they would have to pay compensation to consumers in all the countries targeted by 
their practices.  

To address these malpractices, not all authorities currently possess the necessary investigation 
and  enforcement  powers.  Furthermore,  even  if  these  powers  would  be  available  in  certain 
countries  under  national  laws,  they  would  need  to  be  made  available  also  in  a  cross-border 
context  through  a  legally  sound  framework  (i.e.  the  CPC  Regulation)  to  produce  evidence 
admissible  in  legal  proceedings  in  other  countries.  There  is  a  great  disparity  among  the 
Member  States  as  evidenced  in  Box  5  concerning  the  most  commonly  needed  powers  to 
tackle online infringements: 

Box 5: Powers 
Tackle past infringements 
Mystery shopping 

Test purchases  
Naming of infringing traders 
Take down websites/domains  

Withdraw/ suspend trade activity 
(interim) 
Order consumer compensation  

Not available in  
DE, FR, LT, LV, LU 
AT,  BE,  CY,  DE,  EE,  EL,  HR,  IT,  LT,  LU,  MT, 
PT, SE 
AT, BE, EL, IE, IT, LT, LU, MT, PL, RO, SE 
CZ, DE, FR, HR, PT 
AT,  BE,  BG,  CZ,  DE,  FR,  EL,  HR,  HU,  IE,  LT, 
LV, MT, NL, RO, SK, SI 
AT, BE, CY, DE, EE, IE, LU, NL, PL, PT, SE 

All Member States, except EE, ES, PT, RO, UK 

Where  traders  fail  to  comply  with  consumer  law,  enforcers  usually  first  seek  to  work 
informally  with  the  trader  to  secure  change  of  its  behaviour.  This  approach  can  be  very 
effective  in  cases  of  less  severe  breaches  of  consumer  law  as  it  is  less  costly  than  going  to 
courts47. Yet, the CPC enforcers currently lack the flexibility to choose the most appropriate 
enforcement  means  when  dealing  with  breaches  of  consumer  law  in  a  cross-border  context: 
they cannot choose the more appropriate, cheaper, and flexible enforcement tools that could in 
appropriate cases remove the infringement without delay. 

to 

the 

due 

perceived 

46Research completed by the Lincoln Law School (2008), as cited by the UK BIS in the impact assessment of the 
UK  Consumer  Rights  Bill,  has  shown  that  consumers  generally  benefit  from  public  enforcement  through 
prevention  of  the  spread  of  malpractice,  but  consumers  seldom  obtain  compensation.  Consumers  wanting  to 
obtain redress are obliged to pursue separate action through courts but they often do not do so see the footnote 
below), 
process,  
complexity, 
http://eprints.lincoln.ac.uk/3298/1/BERR_Report.pdf  
47The average cost of court case is estimated at EUR 4,870. The average cost of case involving undertakings is 
ca. EUR 1,527. These estimates are based on the UK data used in the impact assessment of Consumer Rights 
2014: 
Bill/Proposals 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/consumer-rights-bill.  The  information  used  in  the  UK  impact 
assessment  relied  on  the  data  concerning  cases  handled  by  local  enforcement  authorities.  Cases  were  not 
complex,  explaining  low  average  costs.  CPC  authorities  were  consulted  on  these  estimated  and  in  principle 
agreed with them. See Annex IV for more information. 
14 

measures, 

consumer 

enhanced 

January 

cost 

risk 

the 

on 

or 

of 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
1.3.3.  Divergences in procedural standards in the Member States  

Under  the  CPC  Regulation,  the  CPC  authorities  have  to  follow  national  procedural  rules, 
which may result in substantial differences: e.g. the degree, type, quality, and admissibility of 
evidence  required  to  establish  infringements  to  consumer  legislation.  The  information 
established  by  a  requesting  Member  State  may  be  insufficient  for  an  enforcement  action  in 
another  Member  State.  This  was  particularly  stressed  in  the  2012  evaluation  report48  and  in 
studies which were procured by the Commission to support this impact assessment.  

The interpretation of the notions of “sufficient information” and "necessary evidence"49 in the 
CPC Regulation therefore depends on national procedures. Where the action has to be brought 
by  the  requested  authority  before  a  court,  the  standard  of  evidence  may  be  higher  than  in 
administrative  proceedings.  Some  authorities  may  require  information  such  as  written 
statements of consumers, as well as the provision of readable screenshots as evidence of the 
infringements, containing the name of the creator and the creation date, as well as the URL of 
the  part  of  the  website  and  comprehensible  booking  steps.  This  not  only  creates  delays  in 
handling cases (e.g. delays in receiving relevant evidence or in evaluating its providence and 
reliability)  but  also  may  leave  infringements  unaddressed.  For  instance,  the  authority 
concerned may not be able to obtain the evidence required due to lacking powers or because a 
specific format of evidence is needed that is not recognised by its national procedural rules. 

Box 6: Example of divergences in the requirement for "evidence" among countries  

A CPC authority in country X received around 1,000 complaints regarding a travel services company 
based  in  a  country  Y.  The  authority  X  provided  extensive  evidence  (dozens  of  complaints  with 
attachments  and  its  own  investigation  report).  The  authority  Y  however  required  written  statements 
from  consumers  in  the  language  of  Y  which  authority  X  was  not  able  to  supply.  No  enforcement 
action was taken and the same online practice continued, resulting in detriment for consumers as they 
could not recover the money which was charged for their travel reservation. 

1.3.4. 

Significant delays in handling mutual assistance requests  

In addition to the lack of clarity as to what constitutes "sufficient information" and "necessary 
evidence", no binding time-limits for handling CPC mutual assistance requests exist50. Since 
2008  the  Commission  launches  every  year  the  "open  cases  review"  exercise,  which  aims  at 
ensuring that no mutual assistance request remains unresolved over a long period of time. The 
Commission  applies  the  following  benchmarks,  which  are  set  in  the  Operating  Guidelines: 
requests  for  information  should  be  handled  within  3  months  and  requests  for  enforcement 
measures within 9-12 months. The requested authority should regularly update the applicant 
authority about the actions taken, at least every 3 months. By the end of 2014, almost 40% of 
the  information  requests  and  50%  of  the  enforcement  requests  were  not  treated  and  closed 
within  the  benchmarks  set  in  the  Operating  Guidelines.  26%  of  all  open  cases  were  created 
more than two years ago. Causes for these delays are various: insufficient powers (e.g. adopt 
interim  measures  to  quickly  address  an  infringement  or  to  obtain  the  evidence),  divergent 
national  procedural  rules  (e.g.  regarding  evidence,  see  above),  insufficient  resources  to 

48p. 12 of the 2012 external evaluation report. 
49Article 12 (1) of the CPC Regulation provides “The applicant authority shall ensure that all requests for mutual 
assistance  contain  sufficient  information  to  enable  a  requested  authority  to  fulfil  the  request,  including  any 
necessary evidence obtainable only in the territory of the applicant authority”. Further, Article 15(2)(c) provides 
a ground for refusing to deal with a mutual assistance request if "insufficient information" was provided by the 
requesting authority. 
50Section 2.1.2 of the Annex of the Commission implementing decision of 22 December 2006 provides that the 
time-limits  for  addressing  requests  for  mutual  assistance  have  to  be  agreed  by  the  applicant  and  requested 
authorities on a case-by-case basis. 
15 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
address requests in time, prioritisation of domestic infringement cases over CPC infringement 
cases. Delays result not only in the waste of resources, but they also contribute to prolonged 
detriment for consumers in cases where infringements are not quickly stopped. 

1.3.5.  The potential contribution of the Commission to assist Member States in enforcement 

efforts is unclear and limited  

In the field of consumer protection  – contrary, for example, to the EU competition policy  – 
the Commission does not have investigation and enforcement powers to deal with issues that 
are  relevant  at  the  EU  level.  The  current  provisions  of  the  CPC  Regulation  endow  the 
Commission  with  a  coordinating  role  or  an  opinion  formulating  role  in  cases  where  CPC 
authorities have not found a satisfactory solution. The Regulation provides that, upon request 
of  the  Member  States,  the  Commission  "may  be  invited"51  to  participate  in  coordinated 
enforcement  actions,  which  aim  to  address  widespread  infringements  concerning  more  than 
two Member States (Article 9 of the CPC Regulation). However, there is no further precision 
on the role of the Commission and no possibility for it to initiate an action or even participate 
in one if not invited. It is also unclear under which conditions the Commission could refuse to 
participate. Up to now, the Commission and Member States have been working together on 
the  basis  of  gentlemen's  agreement,  but  this  is  not  sufficient:  national  authorities  have 
required more legal clarity for such actions, especially to provide them with the means to act, 
should the negotiation with traders fail. In addition, lack of clarity and predictability lead to 
lower deterrence.  

The  2012  evaluation  report  considers  that  there  is  a  potential  for  a  stronger  role  for  the 
Commission  in  the  CPC  context52.  All  groups  of  stakeholders  responding  to  the  public 
consultation  also  agreed  that  the  Commission’s  role  is  too  limited  in  the  current  CPC 
Regulation and especially would like to see its role enhanced to assist national authorities in 
the detection and investigation of EU-relevant infringements and ensure the good functioning 
of  the  procedures  set  out  to  tackle  these  infringements.  There  was  however,  no  support  for 
direct 
in  cross-border 
infringements.  

investigation  and  enforcement  powers  of 

the  Commission 

1.3.6. 

Insufficient sharing of evidence  

Obtaining  adequate  evidence  of  an  infringement  may  be  costly.  For  example,  26  CPC 
authorities  worked  more  than  730  hours  in  the  investigation  phase  of  the  last  EU-wide 
screening  of  websites  on  guarantees  which  concerned  437  websites  selling  electronic  goods 
(an  estimated  EUR  30,295  in  staff  costs).  Insufficient  sharing  of  intelligence  among 
authorities  and  with  the  Commission  thus  consumes  unnecessarily  substantial  resources. 
Further,  the  detection  of  widespread  infringements  comes  too  late,  partly  because  of 
malfunctioning of the current CPC alert mechanism.  

Exchanging  alerts  is  foreseen  in  the  CPC  Regulation  but  the  external  evaluation  points  to  a 
decline in the use of alerts among CPC authorities. It identifies as possible causes an overall 
lack of clarity regarding the purpose, use and follow-up of the information provided through 
alerts, and their confusion with information requests. 

Also, information exchanged is currently not always relevant to those receiving it. At present, 
the alert message is sent untargeted, as a blanket alert to all authorities connected to the CPC 
database, irrespective of its relevance or priority, and no feedback about follow-up actions is 

51Article 9(3) of the CPC Regulation. 
52 p. 78 of the 2012 external evaluation report.  
16 

 
 
                                                 
required.  Further,  the  alert  mechanism  is  not  open  to  organisations,  active  in  consumer 
protection which could have relevant information. The Commission cannot post alerts either, 
though it can study EU-wide emerging malpractices or circulate information on specific risks 
provided by other parties (e.g. from non-EU authorities, consumer associations or the ECC-
Net). 

1.3.7. 

Insufficient resources and infrequent use of the CPC in some Member States 

In  accordance  with  Article  4(7)  of  the  CPC  Regulation,  "Member  States  shall  ensure  that 
competent  authorities  have  adequate  resources  necessary  for  the  application  of  this 
Regulation". The 2012 evaluation report however points to the shortage of personnel in single 
liaison offices and competent authorities working on the CPC cooperation in several Member 
States, noting differences in resources and enforcement capacity across the CPC authorities53. 
The  average  number  of  personnel  per  competent  authority  is  at  4.4  and  per  single  liaison 
office is at 3.42. In most competent authorities/single liaison offices, less than 2 enforcement 
officers are employed who deal with mutual assistance issues. Furthermore, the actual number 
of the personnel in  charge to  deal with  the CPC issues  might  be actually lower because  the 
personnel  does  not  exclusively  handles  the  CPC  related  matters  and  often  deals  with  mixed 
situations. The evaluation report also identifies a preference in case of scarce resources to use 
them for domestic infringements.  

1.4.

Problems 

The above-identified drivers contribute to a number of problems which limit the effectiveness 
and  efficiency  of  the  cross-border  enforcement  cooperation  in  consumer  markets.  The 
following  three  problems  are  mostly  linked  to  the  limitations  of  the  current  CPC  legal 
framework. 

1.4.1.  Problem 1: Insufficient mutual assistance cooperation mechanisms 

The 2012 evaluation report concluded that the utilisation of mutual assistance mechanisms is 
sub-optimal,  in  particular  taking  into  account  the  number  of  domestic  infringements,  cross-
border complaints and the extent of cross-border trade relating to the 18 legislative acts within 
the scope of the CPC Regulation54. The evaluation states that "a much greater volume of cases 
are therefore needed if the full benefits of the CPC Network are to be realised"55. Measures to 
encourage  use,  awareness  and  common  understanding  of  the  CPC  framework  were 
recommended.  

In  2014,  there  were  297  CPC  cases  recorded  in  the  database56,  and  this  number  has  been 
stable  since  2007.  Statistics  on  the  case-handling  in  the  CPC  also  show  that  about  half  of 
cases  are  handled  within  a  time  period  exceeding  the  agreed  time-frame  in  the  Operating 
Guidelines. 

The  current  mutual  assistance  cooperation  mechanisms  are  principally  geared  to  address 
simple  bilateral  infringements  reflecting  the  cross-border  trade  of  the  past  (early  2000s) 
whereby  the  trader  and  the  harmed  consumers  are  located  in  two  different  Member  States. 
Only  this  type  of  cases  is  currently  recorded  in  the  CPC  database,  however,  such  cases 

53 See section 7.2 of the external evaluation report. 
54p. 14-15 of the 2012 external evaluation report. 
55Ibid. 
56Data  from  the  CPC  System:  in  2014  there  were  35  alerts  (under  Article  7  of  the  CPC  Regulation),  130 
enforcement requests (under Article 8) and 132 information requests (under Article 6).  
17 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
constitute only one fraction of the CPC network's work. There has been an increase in other 
CPC activities, especially those targeting widespread infringements.  

Indeed,  taking  into  account  the  recommendations  of  the  2012  evaluation  report,  the 
Commission  has  continued  to  promote  and  enhance  the  use  of  the  existing  CPC  Regulation 
through an  increased number of coordinated activities based on priority areas agreed by the 
CPC Committee57.  

Box 7: What initiatives have the CPC network and the Commission undertaken within the 
existing legal framework to address its current limitations?  

The Commission and the CPC network are continuously organizing legal workshops to promote 
the  common  understanding  of  EU  consumer  law  and  emerging  threats  for  consumers  in  key 
priority areas: for example, seminars on  misleading practices in air transport,  financial services 
and telecommunications took place in 2013-2015. 

In  parallel,  the  Commission  made  efforts  to  develop  interpretative  guidelines  to  further 
facilitate  enforcement  and  compliance  as  EU  consumer  protection  and  policy  expanded.  The 
guidelines  on  the  application  of  the  Consumer  Rights  Directive  and  on  the  Unfair  Commercial 
Practices Directive are promoting a common understanding in the assessment of cases and thus 
improve enforcement of consumer law. 

The  Commission  has  also  reviewed  the  Operating  Guidelines  of  the  CPC  network,  which 
provide  enforcers  a  quick  and  easy  reference  to  the  main  principles,  best  practices  and  key 
documents related to the network's operation and the best use of the IT-tool.  

Further,  capacity  building  and  control  activities  were  also  undertaken.  In  2014  the  CPC 
committee endorsed the mandate and scope of activities of the CPC e-enforcement group which 
is dedicated to the training of enforcers regarding online investigations. The CPC projects and the 
e-enforcement group have used the new IT tool developed in 2014-2015 – the CPC knowledge 
exchange platform – to support collaborative work and to disseminate results to the wider CPC 
network. In 2015 the Commission developed an initiative to support an “e-enforcement training 
academy”, catering for both the CPC network and the product  safety area where similar needs 
exist to strengthen enforcement of consumer legislation in online businesses-to-consumers trade. 

Furthermore,  the  CPC  Network,  under  the  coordination  of  the  Commission,  has  undertaken 
several  enforcement  actions.  Every  year  the  Commission  consolidates  the  available  market 
information  to  propose  a  topic  for  the  screening  of  websites,  prepares  legal  analysis  and 
questionnaire  to  carry  the  screening  phase,  consolidates  and  publishes  the  results.  Since  2007 
more  than  3,600  websites  have  been  checked.  These  actions  permitted  for  instance  to  correct 
about  700  websites  in  the  tourism  sector  alone  –  this  is  the  area  with  most  cross-border 
complaints received by European Consumer Centres.  

The  CPC  Network  has  also  concluded  two  coordinated  enforcement  actions  on  the  in-app 
purchases in online games in 2014 and on the car rental in 2015 (see Box 8). These two actions in 
fact  concerned  many  traders  (game  developers  selling  through  Google,  Apple  and  Amazon 
which were the three parties in the action and local car rental companies, franchisees and brokers 
working  with  the  five  major  car  rental  companies).  The  market  share  covered  by  CPC 
enforcement  action,  rather  than  a  mere  number  of  cases,  counts  most  in  the  CPC  context:  for 
example, it was 65% of all private rentals in the EU in the CPC coordinated action on car rentals 
(i.e. one CPC case but with significant economic impacts). 

The Commission has also taken different measures to address the lack of resources in the CPC 
authorities.  Every  year  the  Commission  conducts  monitoring  of  pending  mutual  assistance 

57 Concerning the CPC Committee, see Article 19 of the CPC Regulation. 

18 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
requests  and  put  pressure  on  the  authorities  concerned  to  speed  up  dealing  with  prolonged 
cases.  The  Commission  has  also  taken  measures  against  those  authorities,  which  have  not 
initiated enforcement actions against non-compliant traders based in their territory which were 
harming consumers in other countries: e.g. letters were sent and missions were organised to 
several  Member  States  to  increase  their  enforcement  efforts  and  advance  with  the  actions 
against those traders58. 

All these measures (Box 7) have been effective to enhance the use of the CPC Regulation to a 
certain extent. However, it has also become apparent that there are certain barriers to the more 
resource-efficient  enforcement  cooperation  which  are  associated  with  the  CPC  legal 
framework  itself.  This  concerns  in  particular  the  scope  of  the  Regulation  and  the  rules  and 
procedures  for  handling  enforcement  requests  (such  as  maximum  time-limits).  In  addition, 
market  developments,  especially  in  the  context  of  the  Digital  Single  Market,  require  more 
efficient  cooperation  mechanisms,  for  example  to  extend  the  powers  of  the  national 
authorities  needed  for  cooperation  to  be  able  to  carry  actual  purchases  online  or  to  request 
information  from  internet  intermediaries  about  the  traders  behind  websites  misleading 
consumers (see section 1.3 for a detailed explanation of the drivers of the problem 1). These 
barriers  hamper  the  efficient  flow  of  mutual  assistance  requests  and  further  take  up  of 
enforcement activities across jurisdictional boundaries. And they cannot be removed without 
further clarification and development on substance of the existing instrument. 

1.4.2.  Problem  2:  No  efficient  response  to  widespread  infringements  across  the  EU,  in 

particular to those occurring in the digital environment 

As  mentioned  above,  the  current  CPC  mutual  assistance  cooperation  mechanisms  are 
principally geared to address  simple bilateral infringements reflecting the cross-border trade 
of the past. However, certain infringements to consumer legislation may occur widely in the 
EU, especially online as digital technologies permit easy development of the same marketing 
platform for several countries, and hence the same misleading practice can rapidly spread to 
consumers across the EU (see Boxes 8-9).  

Widespread  infringements  are  also  seen  in  sectors  with  a  strong  cross-border  trade  such  as 
travel services where operators have to align their practices at the EU level as online booking 
has considerably facilitated the consumers' research for competitive offers. Car rental is one of 
these sectors and the CPC action carried out in 2014 exposed the extent to which all operators 
were compelled to adopt the same type of practices (see Box 9)59.  

The importance of widespread infringements was judged to be high by 82% of stakeholders 
replying  to  the  public  consultation  on  the  CPC  Regulation  review.  91%  indicated  that  a 
specific cooperation procedure to tackle infringements concerning the whole EU should be an 
important priority for the CPC network.  

Such infringements represent indeed a big threat to the economic interests of consumers, and 
to the functioning of the Internal Market, especially when summed up at the EU level, as they 
may  be  perpetrated  by  traders  enjoying  important  market  shares  in  all  countries.  Small  in 
absolute numbers, multinational companies (i.e. established in several Member States), have a 
high  contribution  to  economies.  In  the  EU,  their  turnover  represents  ca.  50%  of  the  total 
business turnover60.  

58The Commission so far has not launched formal infringement proceedings pursuant to Article 258 TFEU.  
59Cf.  Commission's  press  release  IP-15-5334  of  13.07.2015,  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-
5334_en.htm?locale=EN  
60The  large  majority  of  enterprises  that  operate  in  the  EU  are  domestically  controlled  (98,8%),  with  the 
percentage  of  EU-  and  non-EU-foreign-controlled  enterprises  being  0,7%  (150,000  enterprises)  and  0,4% 
19 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
1.4.1.1.Treating  simultaneous  widespread  infringements  in  parallel  and  not  in  a 
coordinated  manner  creates  an  unnecessary  duplication  of  enforcement 
efforts and inconsistencies in the concrete application of EU law 

As  potentially  28  authorities  may  take  non-coordinated  actions  against  the  same  conduct 
widespread across the EU, there is a risk of proliferation of diverging enforcement approaches 
and  uneven  consumer  conditions,  as  demonstrated  by  the  EU  Consumer  Conditions 
Scoreboards61.  

The  CPC  Regulation  contains  harmonised  provisions  for  tackling  infringements  occurring 
simultaneously  in  two  or  more  countries62  and  provides  that  national  authorities  coordinate 
their  actions  so  as  to  consistently  apply  the  same  response  to  malpractices  spreading  across 
the EU and avoid that a divergent approach is taken against the same breach of EU legislation 
(Article  9  of  the  CPC  Regulation).  However,  the  external evaluation  report  pointed  out  that 
the provisions requiring coordination on widespread infringements in the CPC Regulation are 
too loose to generate an efficient EU-level response63. The evaluation also stressed that each 
authority  still  has  to  act  individually  so  that  their  action  has  legal  validity.  This  is  costly 
duplication  of  national  enforcement  efforts  (it  is  estimated that  per  each  coordinated  action, 
Member States' costs could be halved thanks to a streamlined coordination procedure64). The 
external evaluation therefore determined the need for highly coordinated approaches or even a 
single action at the EU level for which the Commission could play an important role65. At the 
CPC workshops held (on 24 June 2014 and 18 March 2015), the participating representatives 
from the majority of Member States confirmed the need to clarify and enhance the mechanism 
under Article 9 to tackle widespread infringements, to ensure legal certainty for all concerned. 

In addition, when CPC authorities take enforcement actions to cease an infringement that is 
widespread in the EU, they usually do so according to their national procedural rules, which 
are different and depend on the enforcement system in the country concerned. As a result, in 
some Member States the same infringement is ceased  faster than in others, if at all, and the 
detriment  suffered  by  consumers  is  prevented/stopped  swiftly  in  certain  countries,  while  in 
others it may continue indefinitely as demonstrated in the case regarding Apple's misleading 
advertising of commercial guarantees (see Box 8).  

Box 8: The misleading advertising of a commercial guarantee plan resulted in duplication 
of  enforcement  efforts,  inconsistent  enforcement  approaches  and  unequal  protection  of 
consumers 

to  53% 

in  Sweden 

in  Bulgaria,  with  an  EU  28  average  at  61%,  see 

(85,000  enterprises),  respectively.  Source:  Eurostat  data  of  September  2014,  "Foreign  affiliates  statistics  – 
FATS": 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Foreign_affiliates_statistics_-_FATS#Foreign-
controlled_companies_at_the_EU_level   
61The battery of indicators in the scoreboards is summarised in a composite index that shows fairly low levels for 
the EU average but also important disparities among Member States indicating that consumers do not enjoy the 
same level of protection of their rights across the EU. In 2014 this index whose maximum is 100%, ranges from 
latest  11th 
71% 
edition:http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_evidence/consumer_scoreboards/11_edition/docs/ccs2015score
board_en.pdf  
62Pursuant  to  Article  9(2):  "When  competent  authorities  become  aware  that  an  intra-Community  infringement 
harms  the  interests  of  consumers  in  more  than  two  Member  States,  the  competent  authorities  concerned  shall 
coordinate their enforcement actions and requests for mutual assistance via the single liaison office. In particular 
they shall seek to conduct simultaneous investigations and enforcement measures". Further Article 9(3) provides 
that "The competent authorities shall inform the Commission in advance of this coordination and may invite the 
officials and other accompanying persons authorised by the Commission to participate".  
63See section 5.9 of the external evaluation report. 
64See Annex VI for detailed calculations. 
652012 external evaluation report, p. 17.  
20 

the 

 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
In  December  2011,  the  Italian  CPC  authority  imposed  a  fine  of  EUR  900,000  on  Apple  for 
misleading  advertising  of  its  commercial  guarantee  scheme  and  misleading  information  on 
applicable  legal  guarantees66  stemming  from  EU  law.  Consumers  in  the  other  EU  Member 
States were targeted by the same practice described in a single webpage of the Apple website. 
Despite the European Commission's encouragement to other Member States to take appropriate 
action67,  very  few  of  them  acted  demonstrating,  de  facto,  a  lack  of  willingness  to  coordinate. 
Consumer associations complained that the lack of coordination of enforcement actions resulted 
in  uneven  consumer  protection  across  EU,  duplication  of  enforcement  efforts  and  an  uneven 
level playing field in the Digital Single Market68, and some of them decided to carry (costly and 
lengthy) actions on their own.. 

On  their  side,  traders  may  decide  to  bring  their  business  practice  into  compliance  in  some 
Member States and not in others according to their analysis of the risk of being subject to an 
enforcement  action  and  to  their  litigation  possibilities  and  resources.  This  not  only 
undermines the deterrent effect of enforcement actions, as the scale of the sanction does not 
fully  reflect  the  widespread  nature  of  the  infringement,  but  it  also  creates  legal 
unpredictability in the Single Market69 70. 

1.4.1.2.What  has  the  CPC  network  and  the  Commission  done  so  far  to  address 

widespread infringements under the current legal framework? 

The Commission has  enhanced the use  of the existing  CPC Regulation  through coordinated 
activities based on priority areas agreed by the CPC authorities, which addressed widespread 
infringements  covering  most  of  EU  countries.  The  Commission  also  took  a  pivotal  role  in 
these  coordinated  actions  (see  Box  9).  It  provided  data  from  its  studies  and  databases, 
organised  the  dialogues  with  the  concerned  traders  and  published  the  results.  By  engaging 
itself strongly in these two actions it permitted to reach a consistent EU-level approach that 
persuaded the traders to fully cooperate. 

Box 9:   

Case study (1): in-app purchases in online games marketed as free 

Following the CPC screening of websites offering digital content products and 
consumer complaints about the misleading marketing of in-app (for a fee) offers 
in  online games presented as "free", the CPC authorities presented a common 

of 

the 

2011, 

available: 

21  December 

speech  of  19  March  2013  of 

http://www.agcm.it/consumatore/consumatore-

the  Vice-President  Viviane  Reding,  available  at: 

66Decision 
delibere/open/C12560D000291394/57606ADEA5842FF6C1257981004A4E99.html  
67See 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-237_en.htm  
68 For more information, see position papers of BEUC, available at:  
http://www.beuc.eu/publications/2013-00457-01-e.pdf and  
http://www.beuc.org/publications/beuc-x-2014-038_ama_review_of_cpc_regulation.pdf  
69Business  Europe's  Strategy  paper  "Building  a  true  single  market  for  Europe  –  Business’  priorities"  of  28 
September 2015, p. 4: "Inconsistent enforcement by some national authorities also fragments the single 
market – leaving businesses to navigate through the difficulties caused by unpredictability. It is also 
remain  globally  competitive.": 
important 
http://www.businesseurope.eu/content/default.asp?PageID=568&DocID=34378.  According  to  the  latest 
Competitiveness "Check-up", 77% of European companies believe that EU regulations are not sufficiently clear 
and predictable (EU Competitiveness Council of 1 October 2015, the web-link provided above). 
70Such  practices  as  mentioned  in  Box  8  are  not  isolated  instances  and  will  continue  occurring  again  without 
stepped-up,  coordinated  enforcement.  The  on-going  issues  regarding  the  deceitful emissions  software installed 
by  Volkswagen  in  its  diesel  cars  show  that  up  till  now  authorities  reacted  much  differently,  as  the  Italian 
competent authority has already launched an investigation while most other authorities do not have possibilities 
to  act  as  the  infringement  is  finished  (see  the  section  on  short-lived  infringements  above)  or  as  they  have 
different views on the need to act.  
21 

that  single  market  policy  helps  businesses 

to 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
understanding  of  the  breaches  of  consumer  legislation  in  such  a  model  to 
leaders  of  the  industry  directly  at  the  EU  level:  namely  Apple  iTunes  and 
Google Play, as well as trade associations representing game developers. By the 
end  of  2014,  all  traders  concerned  changed  their  practices:  they  did  not 
advertise  games  containing  in-app  purchases  as  free  anymore  and  they 
considerably strengthened parental control on payments. It is estimated that at 
least EUR 68 million of detriment to European consumers had been generated 
by the identified breaches on the EU market71. Such an action was welcomed by 
the CPC authorities and traders concerned. 

Case study (2): unfair practices in the car rental sector 

Due to the steady increase of car rental related complaints registered by the European Consumer 
Centers, the CPC network opened a dialogue with major car rental companies and Leaseurope in 
2013-2014  to  resolve  problems  encountered  by  consumers  renting  a  car  cross-border.  By  July 
2015 Avis/Budget, Enterprise, Europcar, Hertz and Sixt agreed to change their booking sites and 
rental  desk  practices  to,  among  others,  make  rental  price  or  fuel  options  more  transparent, 
provide  more  information  on  insurance  and  waiver  products  and  avoid  the  aggressive  sale  of 
expensive supplements, make sure that a consumer gives prior consent to any additional payment 
card  charges  (i.e.  in  case  of  a  damage  to  the  car).  Implementation  of  agreed  changes  will  be 
monitored in 2016 by the Commission, CPC authorities and the ECC-Net. Furthermore, in 2016 
Leaseurope will issue guidance for its 45 member associations, referring to what was agreed in 
this coordinated action with the major industry players. 

Despite their success, these coordinated actions have revealed several deficiencies in the CPC 
Regulation (Article 9) to address widespread infringements. In particular: 

  The CPC Regulation is unclear regarding the scope of widespread infringements (see 
section  1.3.1  above)  and  the  process  (e.g.  unclear  time-line,  insufficient  due  process 
safeguards  for  traders,  unclear  consequences  if  the  traders  do  not  implement  the 
agreed  undertakings).  The  current  process  is  based  on  a  voluntary  negotiation  with 
traders. The outcome of the coordination process ("common enforcement position") is 
not explicitly governed by the CPC Regulation and not binding on CPC authorities or 
businesses. Therefore, in case a trader fails to respect its voluntarily commitments, the 
work  has  to  restart  from  scratch  at  national  level  to  establish  the  infringement, 
duplicating the resources and cost. 

  Further, Article 9 does not detail the roles of different actors (e.g. who decides on the 
final  drafting,  who  communicates  with  traders,  who  chairs  meetings,  who  negotiates 
undertakings, and who monitors the commitments of traders). The supporting role of 
the  Commission  is  limited  and  not  specified  in  the  current  CPC  Regulation  (see 
section  1.3.5  above).  The  Commission  took  a  pivotal  role  in  the  coordinated  actions 
described above (Box 9), which was recognised as essential to the success of the case 
but  such  an  approach  is  not  sustainable  in  the  long-term  and  has  a  limited  deterrent 
effect. 

  Further, national priorities often take over the European priorities, resulting in several 
uncoordinated  national  proceedings  which  might  end  up  in  different  outcomes  (see 
Box  8  above)  and  thus  unequal  enforcement  of  the  same  provision  of  EU  law 

71    The  estimation  is  calculated  on  the  basis  of  the  U.S.  consumer  detriment  per  capita,  adjusted  to  the  EU 
population and converted in EUR in line with the current exchange rate of the European Central Bank, see 
Box 9 in section 12.4 below.  

22 

 
 
                                                 
 
regarding  the  same  specific  malpractices  jeopardizing  efforts  to  build  a  common 
action at EU level.  

These current limitations of the CPC legal framework generate legal uncertainty. It prevents 
some authorities from active participation in coordinated actions and encourages others not to 
act. It also makes the process for the Commission and the lead authority taut and difficult to 
coordinate. 

Estimates  show  that,  in  addition  to  increased  legal  certainty,  a  more  streamlined  procedure 
could lead to savings for national authorities, ca. EUR 180,000 in total per action. Especially 
these  savings  would  be  significant  (ca.  EUR  815,000  per  action)  should  the  voluntary 
negotiations  have  failed  to  produce  a  sufficient  improvement  in  practice.  The  experience 
gained so far therefore confirms the need for a more developed, resource-efficient and clearer 
mechanism  for  a  coordinated  action  under  Article  9  of  the  CPC  Regulation  to  address  pan-
European infringements.  

1.4.3.  Problem  3:  Difficult  detection  of  infringements  and  lacking  prioritisation  of 

enforcement action 

The  development  of  e-commerce  and  online  booking  services  has  allowed  for  wide-ranging 
marketing  campaigns  in  a  fast  and  cheap  manner  that  can  reach  millions  of  consumers 
instantly. This requires the setting up of a much speedier intelligence-gathering system than 
for offline trade and  also an increase in  the agility and flexibility of authorities so that they 
can decide on priorities.  

The  external  evaluation  has  exposed  the  lack  of  resources for  enforcement  cooperation  as  a 
serious impediment to its efficiency. This is also partly linked to the under-estimation of the 
importance of infringements with a cross-border dimension as explained in the section about 
the infringements which are not taken into account (see section 1.3.1). Further, the experience 
gained so far from the in-app and car rental coordinated enforcement actions has showed that 
pooling existing resources and expertise on priority infringement cases is feasible and leads to 
efficiency gains which need to be sought further.  

1.5.

  Consequences 

These  problems  make  the  cross-border  enforcement  cooperation  ineffective  and  inefficient, 
resulting  in  low  deterrence  in  enforcement  actions,  legal  uncertainty  for  traders,  authorities 
and consumers and in duplication of enforcement efforts and cost.  

The identified shortcomings also partly contribute to the malfunctioning of consumer markets 
and to a persistently high non-compliance rate (other factors include lack of traders' awareness 
or understanding of key consumer rules, insufficient market transparency, impact of dominant 
traders,  etc.).  In  2014  the  average  non-compliance  rate  in  cross-border  online  trade  was 
estimated for more than 1/3rd of  websites checked (from a review of 2,600 websites in 5 key 
consumer  markets,  37%  were  found  in  breach  of  consumer  law).  This  translates  into 
consumer detriment of EUR 770 million in these sectors only.  

23 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Problem Tree 

Drivers 

Problems 

Consequences

Inefficient 
public 
enforcement of consumer 
legislation  in  cross-border 
context 

Average  non-compliance  rate  of 
37% in 5 key consumer sectors 

Consumer  detriment  EUR 
770mln  per  year  resulting 
from  37%  non-compliance 
rate in the 5 test sectors 

Limited scope of CPC 
Regulation 

Insufficient 
minimum 
powers to 
cooperate 

Divergences in national 
procedural laws 

Delays in handling mutual 
assistance requests 

Limited and unclear 
contribution of the 
Commission 

Insufficient sharing of 
evidence 

Insufficient resources     
dedicated to CPC 
cooperation 

Insufficient mutual assistance 
cooperation mechanisms 

Legal uncertainty 

No efficient response to 
widespread infringements across 
the EU, in particular to those 
occurring in the digital 
environment 

Difficult detection of infringements 
and lacking prioritisation of 
enforcement action 

Unequal 
protection 

consumer 

Low deterrence 

Inconsistent 
enforcement approaches 
regarding 
same 
infringement 

the 

Duplication 
of 
enforcement  efforts  and 
cost 

24 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1.6.

  Baseline scenario: how would the problem evolve? 

1.6.1.  The level of compliance with consumer legislation is unlikely to improve without 

more stringent enforcement efforts 

The following factors will affect the evolution of problems, especially online:   

  The expansion of cross-border online shopping in the EU 

All  expert  sources  predict  a  steady  expansion  of  e-commerce  in  the  EU,  as  very  few 
markets (i.e. the UK and Nordic countries) may have reached maturity yet. Cross-border 
online  consumer  expenditure  is  also  expected  to  grow  in  similar  proportion  or  slightly 
faster. From 2013 to 2018, with a compound annual growth rate of 12%, the online retail 
market is expected to be worth ca. EUR 234bn by 201872. According to the research by 
the European Multi-channel and Online Trade Association, 14% of online sales in 2014 
were  non-domestic  business-to-consumer  sales  (including  both  EU  and  non-EU  sales). 
This  is  expected  to  increase  to  20%  by  201873.  Traders  are  increasingly  operating  in 
multiple Member States through branches, subsidiaries, franchises or agents, offline and 
in the digital environment. Consequently, an increasing proportion of retail sales have a 
cross-border dimension74. 

  The prevalence of malpractices 

As cross-border transactions increase, new possibilities for unscrupulous traders to abuse 
consumers' trust will be found and infringements will grow. The ECC-Net's experience in 
handling  cross-border  complaints  shows  that  complaints  involving  cross-border  e-
commerce speedily overtook complaints about other forms of cross-border shopping (for 
example mail order or while on holiday). In 2007 online sales accounted for 54% of the 
total of complaints, whereas by 2014, they account for more than two thirds.  

  New technologies and business models 

On one side very positive for innovation, growth and jobs, the expansion of new forms of 
marketing practices in the digital economy raises new challenges and issues on consumer 
protection.  The  trends  to  be  taken  into  account  concern  the  app  economy  which  grows 
currently  at  12%  per  year;  big  data  technology  and  services  set  to  grow  from  EUR  3 
billion  in  2010  to  EUR  16  billion  in  2015;  cloud  computing  estimated  to  expand  to 
almost five times its 2013 market size in the next years, and the uptake of entire markets 
by sharing economy platforms (in the fields of accommodation, car transportation, music 
or  finance,  they  have  grown  exponentially  with  a  global  revenue  of  around  EUR  14 
billion today that could reach EUR 300 billion by 2025). The complexity of the chain of 
responsibility has considerably increased and raises the question of the liability of online 

Forecast, 

Research  Online 

72Forester 
Retail 
http://ecommercenews.eu/online-sales-in-europe-will-grow-to-e233-9bn-by-2018/  
73http://www.thepaypers.com/ecommerce/western-europe-cross-border-sales-to-double-by-2018-
report/755903-25  
74According  to  an  Eurobarometer  study,  as  of  2011  approximately  10%  of  enterprises  had  outlets  or 
subsidiaries  in  another  EU  country:  Flash  Eurobarometer  300  on  business  attitudes  towards  cross-border 
trade and consumer protection. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_300_en.pdf   

2013-2018, 

summary 

available 

here: 

25 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
platforms allowing offers and demand to meet, along with the boundaries between roles 
(user, consumer, producer, agent, tenderer, seller). 

1.6.2.  Private enforcement systems will not replace public enforcement functions 

Other  legislative  measures  in  the  EU  have  been  designed  to  ease  private  actions  to  get 
cross-border  redress  through  out-of-court  mechanisms75.  In  addition,  as  of  10  January 
2015,  all  judgments  falling  within  the  scope  of  the  Brussels  I  Regulation  (recast), 
regardless  of  their  value,  benefit  from  the  abolition  of  intermediary  procedures  for 
recognising  and  enforcing  a  judgment  and  in  the  future,  the  European  small  claims 
procedure (if the revised proposal is adopted) will be updated to raise the limit on eligible 
claims from EUR 2,000 to EUR 10,000. Litigation costs in national procedures are also 
expected  to  decrease  over  the  years  as  a  result  of  an  expected  increase  in  the  use  of 
electronic means of communication by the courts. It is unlikely that all malpractices can 
be  eradicated  by  private  actions  by  consumers  as  this  would  require  a  huge  change  in 
their tendency to under-report issues, to avoid litigation when the value of the detriment 
is small or simply because they are generally little aware of their rights76. Therefore, in 
particular  for  tackling  widespread  infringements  affecting  the  collective  interests  of 
consumers,  the  CPC  enforcement  cooperation  would  remain  pertinent.  Yet  the  CPC 
framework to address widespread infringements would remain with many deficiencies, as 
described in the problem section. 

1.6.3.  New policy initiatives adopted in response to the Digital Single Market Strategy 

will need an effective cross-border enforcement cooperation tool  

The  substantive  consumer  legal  framework  is  expected  to  be  reinforced  through  a  new 
directive/regulation on contract rules for online purchase of digital content and tangible 
goods77  and  an  instrument  addressing  consumer  discrimination  based  on  place  of 
residence or nationality. To ensure optimal enforcement across borders, these initiatives 
could  be  covered  by  the  scope  of  the  CPC  Regulation  either  by  an  amendment  of  the 
CPC Regulation during the negotiations or by a reference to the CPC Regulation in the 
respective  legislative  initiatives.  This  extension  of  the  scope  of  the  CPC  Regulation 
would  be  a  positive  development,  providing  the  CPC  authorities  with  a  competence  to 

75Member  States  had  to  implement  the  ADR/ODR  rules  by  July  2015.  The  ODR  platform  will  be 
operational on 9 January 2016. 
76According  to  the  11th  Consumer  Conditions Scoreboard (p.5),  consumers’  awareness  of  some  key  con-
sumer  rights  guaranteed  by  EU  legislation  remains  limited.  Only  a  third  of  consumers  (33%)  know  that 
they do not have to pay for or send back unsolicited products, four in ten (41%) know that they have the 
right  to  a  free  repair  or  replacement  of  defective  goods,  while  slightly  over  half  (56%)  are  aware  of  the 
right to a cooling-off period in relation to distance purchases. In the EU as a whole, only 9% of consumers 
could  answer  correctly  all  three  of  the  questions  put  to  them,  with  the  youngest  segment  being  the  least 
knowledgeable. 
77Proposal  for  a  Directive  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  certain  aspects  concerning 
contracts for the supply of digital content, COM/2015/0634 final - 2015/0287 (COD); and Proposal for a 
Directive  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  certain  aspects  concerning  contracts  for  the 
online and other distance sales of goods, COM/2015/0635 final - 2015/0288 (COD). It is proposed that the 
CPC framework is used to enforce the two above mentioned proposals in a cross-border context. 

26 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
address cross-border and widespread infringements in the digital environment. However, 
without  reinforced  enforcement  tools  (in  particular  without  "digitally  fit"  powers),  the 
CPC cooperation framework would remain slow and not be able to stop infringements by 
fast acting traders.  

1.6.4.  Enforcement  tools  will  become  increasingly  challenged  by  innovations  in  the 

digital economy  

The system of cooperation put in place by the CPC Regulation was built at a time when 
e-commerce  was  much  less  important.  Therefore,  the  CPC  enforcement  tools  (i.e. 
minimum  powers  for  cooperation)  and  cooperation  procedures  were  mostly  developed 
with  a  cross-border  offline  retail  trade  in  mind.  This  is  slowly  fading  out,  as 
infringements are no longer just committed across two national territories: they are more 
and more widespread. Although expansion of the digital economy and increased choice 
may  be  construed  as  beneficial  for  consumers,  this  trend  also  involves  increasing 
challenges for both enforcement authorities and consumers. Currently and even more in 
the  future  globalisation,  technological  developments  and  the  fast  spreading  of  e-
commerce  would  require  tools  adapted  to  the  specific  enforcement  challenges  of  the 
digital  economy:  dematerialisation  of 
transactions,  multiplication  of  online 
intermediaries, localisation of the various actors in the value chain in several countries, 
ease  for  online  traders  to  relocate  or  hide  their  identity,  rapidity  of  the  spread  of 
marketing practices, and constant innovation in online business models. 

1.6.5.  Cost and delays in the current CPC cooperation will remain 

Without  substantial  improvements,  the  current  CPC  framework  would  not  ensure  the 
optimal pooling of resources. In particular with respect to widespread infringements, the 
current  situation  would  be  maintained  –  uncoordinated  parallel  enforcement  actions 
against  the  same  infringement  would  not  be  prevented,  resulting  in  delays,  legal 
uncertainty  for  businesses  and  duplication  of  efforts  and  inefficient  use  of  scarce 
resources. 

The cost and delays in the current mutual assistance mechanism (Problem 1), inadequacy 
of  the  current  procedural  mechanism  to  address  pan-European  infringements  in  an 
efficient way (Problem 2) and the current difficult detection of infringements and lacking 
of prioritisation of enforcement action (Problem 3) would also remain and would be even 
more noticeable, with possible severe consequences for consumers, including increasing 
consumer detriment. 

Moreover,  constraints  to  public  finances  in  many  Member  States  may  result  in  further 
reductions in staff at enforcement bodies, which would reduce further the effectiveness of 
enforcement. 

27 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.6.6.  Consumer  detriment  is  likely  to  increase  in  the  future  and  the  business 

environment in the Digital Single Market will remain suboptimal  

As  a  result  of  all  these  trends,  the  number  of  situations  where  the  intervention  by  the 
CPC network and coordination by the Commission is needed would increase, but if the 
tools for enforcement cooperation are not functioning better, consumer detriment would 
not  be  addressed  better  and  the increase in  cross-border  online  trade  penetration  would 
mean  an  overall  increase  in  the  detriment  suffered  by  consumers.  Furthermore,  the 
existing inconsistencies in enforcement outcomes would continue preventing markets to 
level  and  compliance  costs  to  decrease,  especially  for  businesses  active  in  the  Digital 
Single Market.  

2.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? 

According to the principle of subsidiarity (Article 5 (3) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union), action on EU level should be taken only when the objectives of 
the  proposed  action  cannot  be  achieved  sufficiently  by  Member  States  alone  and  thus 
mandate  action  on  an  EU  level.  Consumer  protection  belongs  to  shared  competences 
between the EU and the Member States. As stipulated in the Article 169 of the TFEU, the 
EU shall contribute, inter alia, to protecting the economic interests of consumers as well 
as promoting their right to information and education in order to safeguard their interests. 
The CPC Regulation is based on Article 114 of the TFEU78 to which Article 169 TFEU 
refers and it helps to achieve these objectives in the context of the proper functioning of 
the Internal Market. 

The  borderless  nature  of  digital  technologies  poses  challenges  for  the  enforcement  of 
consumer rights by public authorities whose action is constrained by their jurisdictional 
boundaries. On the other side, big online players implement their business models at the 
EU  level,  if  not  at  the  global  level,  directly.  To  ensure  consistent  enforcement  of 
consumer rights across the EU and to tackle efficiently infringements of consumer rights 
legislation  spanning  over  several  Member  States,  it  is  necessary  to  coordinate  public 
enforcement  activities. The  issue  being  addressed  has  therefore  intra-EU  aspects  which 
cannot  be  sufficiently  achieved  by  the  Member  States’  individual  actions  because  they 
cannot  ensure  cooperation  and  coordination  by  acting  alone.  Cooperation  between 
national  authorities  responsible  for  the  enforcement  of  consumer  protection  law  can 
therefore  be  better  achieved  at  the  Union  level.  Furthermore,  action  at  the  EU  level 
would  produce  clear  benefits  (compared  to  Member  States’  action)  in  terms  of 
effectiveness  and  efficiency,  as  the  improved  Regulation  could  step  up  the  use  of  this 
network-based  cooperation  model  to  ensure  smarter  enforcement  of  common  consumer 
protection  rules  across  the  EU.  There  would  be  savings  emanating  from  the  EU-wide 
management  of  a  widespread  infringement  (ca.  EUR  180,000  in  case  of  a  successful 
action and EUR 815,000 in cases of a failed action) compared to individual responses by 

78Article  114 of  the  Treaty  provides  that:  "the  European Parliament  and the  Council shall  […]  adopt the 
measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in 
MS which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the Internal Market." 

28 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
several Member States. The initiative would also improve the functioning of the Digital 
Single Market by contributing to reducing the consumer detriment that results from non-
complaint practices, which amount to ca. EUR 770 million in the five consumer sectors. 

3.  WHAT SHOULD BE ACHIEVED? 

Based  on  the  problems  identified  in  section  2,  the  following  policy  objectives  for  the 
review of the CPC Regulation have been established:  

GENERAL OBJECTIVE 
o  To develop more modern, efficient and effective CPC cooperation mechanisms to reduce the 
consumer detriment caused by cross-border and widespread infringements to consumer law 
in the EU and contribute to the completion of the Digital Single Market.  

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES 
o  Reduce  situations  where  important  cross-border  and  widespread  infringements  are  not 
detected or sufficiently addressed through the CPC framework (to address the limited scope 
and  insufficient  minimum  powers  described  in  section  1.3,  insufficient  mutual  assistance 
mechanisms  described  in  problem  1  and  insufficient  tackling  of  widespread  infringements 
described in problem 2) 

o  Reduce  unnecessary  delays  and  costs  in  the  CPC  cooperation  (to  address  all  the  three 

problems) 

o  Reduce  situations  where  CPC  authorities  reach  diverging  outcome  concerning  the  same 

malpractice (to address all the three problems) 

4.  WHAT ARE THE VARIOUS OPTIONS TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES? 

The following five policy options were considered to achieve the above policy objectives 
and to remedy the problems identified:  

Option  1:  Baseline  scenario  –  no  policy  change.  The  current  CPC  Regulation  would 
continue  to  apply  and  national  authorities  and  consumers  would  continue  benefitting 
from the cooperation tools and protection afforded by it.  

1.  Scope. The substantive consumer legal framework is expected to be reinforced through a new 
directive/regulation  on  contract  rules  for  online  purchase  of  digital  content  and  tangible 
goods  and  a  possible  instrument  to  address  consumer  discrimination  based  on  place  of 
residence or nationality. Further, other legislative measures in the EU have been designed to 
ease private actions to get cross-border redress through out-of-court mechanisms. As from 15 
February  2016,  the  Online  Dispute  Resolution  is  operational,  which  facilitates  the  online 
resolution  of  contractual  disputes  between  EU  consumers  and  traders  over  purchases  made 
online.  Thanks  to  this,  consumers  and  traders  will  be  more  confident  in  trading  online  and 
across borders. Consumers will be encouraged to seek redress even for low-value purchases 
and  enforce  their  rights.  However,  short-term  infringements  and  infringements  by 
subsidiaries  of  multinationals  (i.e.  happening  in  parallel  in  many  Member  States)  would 
remain outside the scope of the CPC Regulation.  

2.  Powers  and  mutual  assistance  mechanism.  The  current  minimum  powers  to  cooperate 

would remain unchanged, as well as the CPC mutual assistance mechanism. 

29 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.  Widespread  infringements.  National  authorities,  with  the  facilitation  of  the  Commission, 
would continue carrying out coordinated enforcement actions (such as screening of websites 
and  common  actions  similar  to  the  in-app  purchases  case)  to  address  widespread 
infringements.  The  legal  basis,  procedure  and  the  role  of  the  Commission  to  address  these 
widespread  infringements  would  remain  with  deficiencies,  as  described  in  the  problem 
section.  

4.  The  current  alert  mechanism,  market  surveillance,  priority  setting  and  resources 
dedicated  to  the  CPC  cooperation  would  remain  unchanged,  as  described  in  the  problem 
section. 

Option  2:  Implementing  legislation  and  non-legislative  ("soft  law")  measures  to 
improve  and  clarify  CPC  cooperation,  combined  with  self-regulation  to  increase 
business compliance 

In  2006  the  Commission  adopted  a  decision  regarding  the  mutual  assistance  mechanism  of  the 
CPC Regulation. It sets the information requirements, which include the minimum information to 
be  included  in  requests  for  mutual  assistance  and  in  alerts,  benchmarks  for  handling  mutual 
assistance requests and the use of languages79. Although the implementing decision clarified the 
information  requirements  for  the  mutual  assistance  requests,  it  was  insufficient  to  address  the 
problems described in the problem section, as they mostly concern limitation of the current CPC 
legal framework available for consumer protection authorities to cooperate on a sound and formal 
legal ground that is necessary for them to act beyond their national jurisdiction boundaries. 

1.  Scope – the same outcome as under the baseline scenario. Implementing or soft law measures 
cannot alter the scope of the CPC Regulation, as this can be achieved only by the revision of 
the Regulation. 

2.  Powers and mutual assistance mechanism. Clearer, up-to-date and detailed implementing 
measures  based  on  the  existing  CPC  Regulation  would  clarify  and  streamline  CPC 
cooperation,  e.g.  set  time  limits  to  answer  mutual  assistance  requests;  clarify  further  what 
information needs to be provided when an authority is making an information or enforcement 
request  and  what  the  content  of  the  reply  to  this  request  should  be.  Through  soft  law 
measures  common  standards  on  gathering  and  use  of  evidence  could  be  established. 
However, these measures would not provide for "digitally fit" powers for cooperation among 
enforcement  authorities80  (e.g.  test  purchases/mystery  shopping,  blocking  of  websites, 
sanctions in a cross-border context) and would not develop the mutual assistance mechanism 
and  enforcement  cooperation  beyond  the  current  CPC  Regulation,  as  this  can  be  achieved 
only by  the  revision  of  the  Regulation  in  view  of  the  need  to give  specific  legal  powers  to 

79Decision  2007/76/EC  of  22  December  2006  implementing  Regulation  (EC)  No  2006/2004  of  the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004 on cooperation between national authorities 
responsible  for  the  enforcement  of  consumer  protection  laws  as  regards  mutual  assistance,  OJ  L  32  of 
6.2.2007.  In  addition  to  this  implementing  decision,  Operating  Guidelines  were  endorsed  by  the  CPC 
Committee in June 2010. They cover practical aspects concerning the handling of CPC mutual assistance 
requests and the CPC database. 
80However,  no  implementing  measures  could  be  adopted  as  regards  the  minimum  powers  to  cooperate 
under  Article  4(6)  of  the  CPC  Regulation,  as  there  is  no  legal  basis  to  adopt  implementing  measures 
concerning this article. 

30 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
national authorities to enable them to act in a cross border context.  

3.  Widespread infringements. Clearer, up-to-date and detailed implementing legislation based 
on the existing CPC Regulation would also complement and clarify the basic framework for 
coordinated enforcement actions under Article 9 of the CPC Regulation. The contribution of 
the  Commission  would  be  clarified,  but  would  remain  limited.  The  Commission's  role  in 
enforcement  cooperation  mechanisms,  especially  in  cases  in  which  traders  refuse  to 
cooperate  or  do  not  comply  with  their  commitments,  can  only  be  legally  extended  through 
the revision of the CPC Regulation. 

4.  The current alert mechanism, market surveillance and priority-setting would be clarified 
and  streamlined  by  these  measures,  e.g.  the  use  of  the  alert  mechanism.  Soft  law  measures 
(recommendations and guidelines) could encourage prioritisation and project-based thinking. 
Voluntary  benchmarking  of  resources  per  Member  State  could  be  put  in  place  with  an 
annual  comparison  and  peer  review.  Member  States  could  on  a  voluntary  basis  submit 
enforcement plans. 

In addition to the national and EU consumer legislation, traders could adhere to voluntary codes 
of  conduct,  certification  schemes  and  other  self-regulation  standards  to  ensure  better 
compliance with consumer protection legislation. 

Option  3:  Revision  of  the  CPC  Regulation  to  extend  its  scope  and  strengthen  its 
efficiency 

Option  3  would  be  based  on  Article  114  TFEU,  to  which  Article  169  TFEU  refers,  and  would 
cover the following measures: 

1.  Extend the scope of the CPC Regulation to cover short-lived infringements, infringements 
by subsidiaries of multinationals (i.e. happening in parallel in many Member States), as well 
as  infringements  to  Article  20  of  the  Services  Directive  (banning  discrimination  by  service 
provider  on  the  grounds  of  residence  or  nationality  of  the  recipient).  In  addition,  as 
mentioned under the options 1-2, the initiatives to implement the DSM  Strategy would  fall 
under the scope of the CPC Regulation. 

2.  Improve  the  enforcement  cooperation  tools.  Extend  the  harmonised  list  of  minimum 
powers for CPC authorities needed to cooperate in a cross-border context, in particular to 
address  the  misconducts  described  in  the  problem  section  1.3.2.  For  example,  to  tackle 
infringements by traders hiding their identity – the power to adopt interim measures (e.g. to 
suspend a website temporarily, order suspension or retention of payments to a trader) and the 
power  to  obtain    evidence  irrespective  of  where  it  is  stored  and  in  which  format,  access  to 
information held by other authorities and third parties. To tackle infringement by traders not 
respecting  post  sale  requirements  –  the  power  to  conduct  test  purchases/mystery  shopping. 
To address repeated malpractices –the power to publish decisions establishing infringements 
and  undertakings,  name  the  trader  responsible  for  the  infringement,  impose  fines  and  other 
pecuniary sanctions reflecting  the cross-border dimension  of the infringement,  take down  a 
website,  and  facilitate  redress  for  consumers.  To  address  infringements  concerning  small 
amounts  but  affecting  many  consumers  –  the  power  to  start  investigation  ex  officio.  The 
proposed powers are considered to be future-proof to cater for the effective enforcement in 

31 

 
 
 
 
 
the  digital  environment.  The  revised  Regulation  would  also  introduce  harmonised  binding 
time limits81 to respond to mutual assistance requests, as well as mutual recognition of 
evidence regarding intra-Community infringements.   

3.  Set up a harmonised framework for addressing widespread infringements involving more 
than  two  Member  States.  The  following  two  situations  can  be  distinguished  depending  on 
whether the threshold is met: 

a)  Threshold for a mandatorily initiated enforcement coordination procedure  is met 

The  revised  Regulation  would  provide  for  a  new  harmonised  enforcement  coordination 
procedure which would be mandatorily initiated at the EU level where a certain threshold is 
met. This threshold would need to be based on objective criteria that are easy to verify without 
in-depth investigation and would be "a reasonable suspicion of a widespread infringement in at 
least 3/4 Member States accounting together for at least 3/4 of EU population"82. This procedure 
would have the following main elements:  

  The Commission would control that the threshold is met. It would have a mandatory role 
to initiate the coordinated procedure and to assist CPC authorities. E.g. the Commission 
would  establish  joint  investigation  and  surveillance  plans,  help  conducting  discussions 
with traders in view of obtaining undertakings to cease the infringement, help to prepare 
and disseminate documents among CPC authorities, and coordinate monitoring of traders' 
commitments  (but  the  Commission  would  not  have  direct  investigation  or  enforcement 
powers, as these powers would still remain the prerogative of national authorities). 

  The  obligation  of  CPC  authorities  would  include:  mandatory  participation  in  the 
coordination  procedure  provided  the  Member  States  are  concerned  by  the  widespread 
infringement. 

  The outcome of this procedure would be "a common enforcement position" agreed upon 
among  authorities,  identifying  the  malpractices  at  stake  on  the  basis  of  EU  consumer 
legislation  included  in  the  Annex  of  the  CPC  Regulation  and  assessing  the  solutions 
proposed  by  the  traders  concerned.  This  common  enforcement  position,  as  well  as 
commitments submitted by the traders concerned on its basis would be binding, ensuring 
that it can be used, if need be, in subsequent national proceedings against these traders. 

b)  Threshold for a mandatorily initiated enforcement coordination procedure is not met 

The  revised  Regulation  would  specify  and  clarify  the  format  of  coordinated  enforcement 
actions under the current Article 9 of the CPC Regulation to tackle widespread infringements 
below  the  threshold  described  under  the  point  a).  In  this  case  one  authority  might  coordinate 
and/or  take  an  enforcement  action  on  behalf  of  other  competent  authorities  against  the 
widespread infringement or the Commission might be invited by national authorities to take up 
this  coordination  role.  This  procedure  would  allow  parallel  enforcement  actions  carried  out  by 
several  competent  authorities;  however  it  would  require  simultaneous  investigations  and 
inspections  to  ensure  consistency  of  enforcement  measures  adopted  against  the  same 

81The current benchmarks contained in the Operational Guidelines would become binding time limits. 
82This threshold is established on the basis of experience gained in the in-app and car rental coordinated 
enforcement actions.  

32 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
infringement. 

4.  Provide  for  an  effective  market  surveillance  mechanism  and  prioritisation  of 
enforcement actions. This measure would include the categorization of alerts (for action or 
for  information  only),  which  competent  authorities  notify  to  each  other.  Third  parties  (e.g. 
consumer and trade associations, European Consumer Centres) would be allowed to submit 
alerts  for  information  only.  The  Commission  would  be  allowed  to  submit  alerts  for  both 
information and action. Instead of the current reporting requirements under Article 21 of the 
CPC  Regulation,  national  authorities  would  submit  to  the  Commission  multi-annual 
enforcement  plans,  on  the  basis  of  which  the  Commission  could  suggest  European 
enforcement priorities and benchmarks of best practices. 

Option  4:  Revision  of  the  CPC  Regulation:  Policy  Option  3  +  additional  elements 
regarding minimum powers and monitoring of Member States' enforcement efforts 

This option would be based on Article 114 TFEU and would, in addition to Option 3, contain the 
following new elements: 
1.  Provide  for  additional  minimum  powers  for  enforcement  cooperation  needed  to  address 
intra-Community  and  widespread  infringements  involving  deceitful  commercial  practices83: 
powers to freeze assets or ban an economic activity of a trader, disqualify the directors and 
managers of the company found responsible for the infringement, and publicly name traders 
suspected of an infringement even before a final decision was adopted. 

2.  Set  up  an audit  system,  similar  to  the  one  in  the  EU  food  area, to  verify  the enforcement 
performance  of  Member  States84.  Audits  would  assess  based  on  multi-annual  enforcement 
plans national authorities' enforcement efforts in terms of their effectiveness and allocation of 
resources.  This  additional  measure  would  further  strengthen  the  actions  of  the  effective 
market surveillance mechanism and prioritisation of enforcement under the option 3. 

Option 5 – New Regulation providing the European Commission with direct powers 
to address widespread infringements meeting the threshold described in the option 
3,  combined  either  with  option  3  or  with  option  4  as  regards  the  existing  CPC 
cooperation 

The new Regulation would provide for direct investigation, enforcement and sanctioning 
powers for the European Commission, such as those the Commission is entrusted with in 
EU competition law or EU merger control. Equipped with these powers the Commission 

83 The criterion for the graduation of powers is based on the "degree of intrusiveness" of the powers vis-à-
vis a trader. These powers may have more serious consequences for the trader (e.g. freeze assets, name and 
shame  at  the  early  stages  of  the  investigation  when  a  trader  is  suspected  to  have  committed  an 
infringement),  yet  this  has  to  be  weighed  against  the  aggressiveness  of  the  commercial  practice  and 
seriousness of consumer detriment involved. In any event the proposed powers would be of administrative 
or  civil  legal  nature  (depending  on  the  national  traditions  and  legal  systems)  and  Member  States  would 
retain the choice whether they confer these powers to the courts or to administrative authorities directly, as 
foreseen in the current Article 4(4) of the CPC Regulation.   
84 For example, on the basis of biennial enforcement plan, the Commission would carry audits at ensuring 
that EU consumer legislation is properly implemented and enforced. A team of 28 full-time officials would 
conduct  audits  to  ensure  the  national  authorities  are  fulfilling  their  legal  obligations.  This  could  be  done 
during  on-the-spot  audits,  or  by  desk  based  exercises  or  collation  of  Member  States  data.  Audit  reports 
would  be  drafted  which  would  make  recommendations  for  the  competent  authorities  to  improve  their 
enforcement  efforts.  If  non-compliances  were  sufficiently  serious,  stronger  actions  (e.g.  a  legal  action) 
could be taken by the Commission. 

33 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
would address widespread infringements meeting a certain threshold ("EU dimension"); 
the threshold could be the same as in the option 3. National authorities would retain the 
competence to address infringements that fall below such threshold. The new Regulation 
would define competences, powers, procedures, procedural rights and obligations of third 
parties, similarly to Regulation 1/2003 applicable in the EU competition area.   

In addition, the current CPC Regulation would be revised either as in option 3 or as in 
option 4, as regards the scope and the minimum powers of the national authorities needed 
for cooperation, the format of the coordinated enforcement actions under current Article 
9 of the CPC Regulation and the prioritisation of enforcement action. The only difference 
from option 3 and option 4 would be that no  enforcement coordination procedure at an 
EU level to tackle widespread infringements would be needed because the Commission 
would be acting in such cases.  

Discarded options: 

  Mutual recognition of national enforcement decisions  

Although this option could save administrative costs in the first stage of the enforcement 
procedure it would require substantial changes and harmonisation of national procedural 
rules. Because of the differences in national enforcement systems, this option would be 
difficult  to  implement85.  The  option  could  negatively  impact  traders'  due  process  and 
other fundamental rights, as it would have to deal with an authority in another Member 
State (e.g. language considerations, official notification of orders, requests and decisions, 
etc.).  The  option  was  therefore  discarded  as  unfeasible  from  both  practical  and  legal 
perspectives.     

  Repealing the CPC Regulation 

Repealing  the  CPC  Regulation  is  not  considered  appropriate  in  view  of  the  external 
evaluation  and  public  consultation  results.  CPC  Regulation's  rationale  for  intervention 
continues to be valid. Without the CPC Regulation, cross-border enforcement would not 
be possible: there would be no mutual assistance mechanism or coordinated enforcement 
among  national  authorities.  This  would  result  in  a  greater  fragmentation  in  consumer 
protection  and  as  such  would  be  undesirable  and  inconsistent  with  the  EU  Consumer 
Agenda and Digital Single Market Strategy.  

85Mutual recognition of judicial decisions is a process by which a decision taken by a judicial authority in 
one EU country is recognised and, where necessary, enforced by other EU countries as if it were a decision 
taken by the judicial authorities of these latter countries. Mutual recognition of decisions currently exists in 
very  specific  areas,  e.g.  criminal  justice,  when  it  comes  to  obtaining  evidence  for  use  in  criminal 
proceedings or for certain civil and commercial matter. There is currently no general system of recognition 
of  administrative  decisions  in  the  EU.  In  the  area  of  cross-border  enforcement  of  consumer  protection 
legislation, where one finds a great diversity in enforcement systems of Member States, mutual recognition 
would need to cover all decisions taken in the administrative, civil and criminal proceedings. This would 
be not only very complex but likely legally unfeasible. 

34 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
  Repealing  the  CPC  Regulation  and  replacing  it  with  another  existing  horizontal 
the 
instrument  for  cross-border  cooperation  among  national  authorities  for 
implementation of the Single Market acquis 

The  CPC  Regulation  would  be  replaced  with  an  instrument  permitting  national 
authorities  to  cooperate  when  tackling  infringements  to  consumer  legislation  with  a 
cross-border dimension.  

Partial  or  complete  replacement  of  the  CPC  Regulation  by  the  Internal  Market 
Information  (IMI)  system  was  considered  as  this  is  currently  the  only  relevant  existing 
system.  Article 4 of the IMI Regulation foresees a possible extension of the IMI system 
to  other  Single  Market  instruments  provided  that  a  specific  procedure  is  followed86. 
However, the IMI Regulation does not provide for enforcement cooperation mechanisms 
that could achieve at least a comparable outcome to the current CPC Regulation. It does 
not  provide  for  minimum  investigation  and  enforcement  powers  that  are  needed  for 
efficient enforcement cooperation, or for cross-border enforcement tools equivalent to the 
mutual  assistance  mechanism  of  the  CPC  Regulation,  and  it  does  not  allow  for 
coordinated enforcement actions for widespread infringements. In addition, although the 
IMI  IT  tool  could  cover  some  of  the  workflows  foreseen  in  the  CPC  Regulation  (e.g. 
alerts  on  emerging  malpractices),  the  CPC  enforcement  cooperation  in  its  current  form 
goes much beyond the workflows currently available in the IMI system87. 

For  these  reasons,  the  existing  IMI  Regulation  cannot  replace  the  CPC  Regulation,  as 
major  elements  of  the  current  CPC  cross-border  border  system  would  in  effect  be 
repealed  without  replacement.  Therefore,  this  option  was  also  discarded  from  an  early 
stage.  

5.  WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE DIFFERENT POLICY OPTIONS AND WHO  WILL BE 

AFFECTED? 

5.1.

  Option 1: Baseline scenario: no policy change 

See Section 1.5 in the problem definition. 

86 Before such an extension is proposed, the Commission has to carry out a pilot project that would assess 
whether  the  IMI  system  would  be  an  effective  tool  to  implement  the  provisions  for  administrative 
cooperation  in  the  given  legal  instrument.  The  outcome  of  this  assessment  has  to  be  submitted  to  the 
European Parliament and the Council, where appropriate accompanied by a legislative proposal to amend 
the Annex to the IMI Regulation. 
87 The replacement of the database foreseen in the current Article 10 of the CPC Regulation by the IMI IT 
system was evaluated in 2014 as part of a feasibility study to revamp the IT system supporting the CPC 
database.  It  was  concluded  that  the  state  of  development  of  functionalities  for  a  structured  dialogue  as 
required by the CPC cooperation mechanism was insufficient in the IMI. Conducting such an assessment 
again is premature as all possible combinations of the above options and of individual instruments would 
have to be assessed, possibly via a specific IMI pilot.  

35 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5.2.

  Option  2:  Implementing  legislation  and  non-legislative  ("soft  law") 
measures to improve and clarify CPC cooperation, combined with self-
regulation to increase business compliance 

Specific objectives 
Reduce  situations  where  important  cross-border  and  widespread  infringements  are  not 
detected or sufficiently addressed through the CPC framework 
Neither the scope nor the minimum powers to cooperate can be extended by implementing measures 
or soft law. If the scope of the CPC Regulation is not extended (e.g. short-lived and infringements 
happening  in  parallel  in  several  Member  States)  and  reinforced  powers  to  cooperate  are  not 
introduced,  the  CPC  authorities  would  find  it  difficult  or  impossible  to  investigate  certain  cross-
border/widespread  infringements  in  the  digital  environment  and  offline,  particularly  where  test 
purchases/mystery  shopping  exercises  are  required  to  obtain  the  evidence  of  the  infringement  or 
where  the  infringement  can  only  be  stopped  by  closing  down  the  website  or  the  social  media 
account concerned (e.g. because the trader is located outside the EU). 
Reduce unnecessary delays and costs in the CPC cooperation 
Reduce delays 
Binding  time  limits  for  mutual  assistance  requests,  common  standards  on  gathering  and  use  of 
evidence  established  through  soft  law  measures  and  the  clarified  purpose  and  use  of  the  alert 
mechanism would ensure a faster and more systematic detection of infringements and their follow-
up.  Together  with  the  clarification  of  the  framework  for  coordinated  enforcement  actions  under 
Article 9 (steps, time-limits and roles of actors involved), they would result in reduction of delays in 
the CPC cooperation.  
  Currently, mutual assistance requests are not handled within the benchmarks set in the Operating 
Guidelines.  40%  of  information  requests  take  more  than  three  months  to  handle.  50%  of 
enforcement requests take more than one year to handle and 26% of them take even more than 
two  years  to  handle.  The  time  limits  for  dealing  with  mutual  assistance  requests  would  ensure 
that  some  requests  are  handled  faster.  However,  without  extended  powers  and  mutual 
recognition of evidence, this measure would not result in significant reduction of delays as these 
are mainly caused by the two elements mentioned above.   

Reduce costs 
  Clarifying  the  framework  for  coordinated  enforcement  actions  would  slightly  improve  the 
effectiveness of CPC cooperation compared to the baseline. However, the mechanism to tackle 
widespread  infringements  would  remain  a  combination  of  28  national  actions  and  no  cost 
savings could be achieved for authorities.  

Reduce  situations  where  CPC  authorities  reach  diverging  outcomes  concerning  the  same 
malpractice 
   Compared  to  the  baseline  scenario,  this  option  would  ensure  a  slightly  more  consistent 
assessment  of  traders'  practices  as  the  need  for  cooperation  would  be  clarified.  Voluntary 
preparation  and  submission  to  the  Commission  of  multi-annual  enforcement  plans,  or 
benchmarking of resources would encourage further prioritisation and project-based thinking but 
would depend on Member States' participation in such voluntary activity.  

  However,  as  important  infringements  involving  multinational  traders  would  risk  remaining 
outside  the  radar  screen  of  the  CPC  network,  different  enforcement  approaches  regarding 
widespread  infringements  (such  as  the  Apple  guarantee  case,  cf.  Box  8)  would  still  occur. 
Multiple  Member  States  would  continue  carrying  out  investigations,  taking  action  at  different 
times with possibly diverging outcomes concerning the same malpractice (without even knowing 
about  it).  Traders  would  still  face  28  national  proceedings  and  possibly  28  different 
interpretations of EU consumer protection rules that are mostly principle based. 

36 

 
 
 
 
 
General objective 
Reduction of non-compliance rate and related consumer detriment 
  The  non-compliance  rate  is  likely  to  slightly  decrease  (thanks  to  a  slightly  more  efficient 

cooperation and voluntary self- regulation – see below).   
Self-regulation and compliance with consumer legislation 
  Traders could be encouraged to adhere to voluntary codes of conduct, certification schemes and 
other  self-regulation  standards  to  support  compliance  with  EU  consumer  protection  laws.  In 
certain  areas,  it  is  considered  to  have  limited  long  term  effects  on  compliance  with  consumer 
protection  laws88;  in  other  areas  results  are  mixed  or  positive.  E.g.,  in  the  financial  services 
sector  an  informal  self-regulation  scheme  progressively  turned  into  a  self-regulation  with 
oversight by the Securities and Investment Board, and then into direct public regulation by the 
Financial  Services  Authority,  as  self-regulation  was  not  sufficient89.  Another  example  in  the 
consumer  protection  area  where  self-regulation  is  applied  at  national  level  concerns 
environmental claims. On the occasion of the European Consumer Summit on 29 May 2012, the 
Commission  gathered  views  from  stakeholders  on  the  use  of  green  marketing,  green-washing 
and  misleading  green  claims  in  different  European  markets,  and  views  on  the  possible  way 
forward.  One  of  the  key  conclusions  was  the  need  to  focus  on  enforcement,  in  particular  in  a 
cross-border  context:  i.e.  further  support  for  national  enforcers  to  properly  implement  the 
requirements  of 
the  Unfair  Commercial  Practices  Directive  and  prevent  misleading 
environmental  claims  by  traders  including  via  better  guidance,  a  more  pro-active  surveillance 
and a strengthened cooperation between self- or co-regulation and public enforcement. A recent 
study concluded that self-regulatory systems at national level can be considered effective in both 
preventing and removing misleading green claims, especially for advertising90. 

impacts  (SMEs,  competiveness,  functioning  of  the  Internal  Market  and 

Other impacts 
Economic 
competition)  
This option is expected to have limited impact on the overall macroeconomic context as the level of 
non-compliance  to  consumer  laws,  and  the  negative  consequences  this  has  on  consumers' 
confidence and welfare or a healthy business environment, is not expected to change significantly.  
Environmental impacts 
No significant environmental impacts are expected. 
Social impacts 
No significant impacts on employment or vulnerable consumers are expected. 
Impacts on Fundamental Rights (EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) 
No  significant  impacts on fundamental  rights, such as freedom to  conduct business (Article  16 of 
the Charter) or personal data protection (Articles 7 and 8), because implementing/soft law measures 
cannot  extend  the  authorities'  powers  for  cooperation  to  tackle  cross-border  and  widespread 
infringements. 
Compliance costs (for the Commission, Member States and traders) 
  30% FTE (ca. EUR 40,000) for the Commission to implement the measures under this option, 

88T.  Prosser  "Self-regulation,  Co-regulation  and  the  Audio-Visual  Media  Services  Directive",  p.102, 
Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2007. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Consumer Market Study on Environmental Claims for Non-Food Products. 

37 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
which could be covered by redistribution and refocusing of existing personnel. 

  Minimal  compliance  costs  for  Member  States'  authorities  to  get  familiar  with  the  new 

implementing/soft law measures: 1 day of training would cost ca. EUR 870 per authority91. 

  No costs for traders.  
Impacts on legal systems 
Minor impacts and they would be felt equally among Member States. 
Feasibility 
Feasibility  of  this  option  from  the  legal  and  technical  perspectives  is  considered  to  be  high. 
However, the option would not be in line with the expectations from stakeholders (see below). 
Stakeholder support 
Stakeholders  request  stepped-up  enforcement  cooperation.  Thus  the  option  would  go  against  the 
expectations  of  stakeholders  expressed  in  the  public  consultation  and  in  different  meetings  of 
networks dedicated to consumer protection. 

5.3.

  Option  3:  Revision  of  the  CPC  Regulation  to  extend  its  scope  and 

strengthen its efficiency 

Specific objectives 
Reduce  situations  where  important  cross-border  and  widespread  infringements  are  not 
detected or sufficiently addressed through the CPC framework 
  The  problem  definition  section  presents  the  figures  which  show  the  incidence  of  short-lived 
infringements in the digital environment92 and the potential caseload for CPC cooperation if they 
were included in the scope. Inclusion of such type of infringements within the CPC Regulation's 
would  reduce  the  number  of  situations  when  such  infringements  (e.g.  regarding  misleading 
advertising of "free" or "limited in time" promotional offers which then turn out to be unwanted 
long-term subscriptions, or "super cheap" offers whose availability is very limited) go undetected 
and unaddressed.  

  The proportion of widespread infringements is projected to grow in the coming years due to e-
commerce and cross-border retail expansion (see the baseline in the problem section) and with 
more  traders  operating  in  multiple  countries93.  Inclusion  of  such  infringements  in  the  scope  of 
the  CPC  Regulation  would  remove  doubts  as  regards  their  qualification  as  intra-Community 
infringements and would be a prerequisite to effectively tackling widespread infringements (new 
harmonised EU-level procedure to address them). This would reduce the situations where such 
infringements  are  not  addressed  by  CPC  authorities  because  of  doubts  about  their  intra-
Community nature. The authorities would have to take into account the EU dimension of parallel 
domestic  malpractices  and  the  need  for  a  coordinated  EU-level  action  to  offer  a  consistent 
approach across borders.  

  Thanks to the additional minimum powers, the CPC authorities would be able to act much faster 
to  stop  harmful  online  practices.  They  would  be  able  to  carry  out  more  regular  verification  of 

91 Familiarisation/training costs= Number of staff in the CPC authorities requiring training in 28 MS (ca. 
850 in ca. 323 CPC authorities) *hours spent on training per staff (8 hours) *staff costs per hour (hourly 
wage rate EUR 41.5, Eurostat data 2012).  
92 Further, many online infringements such as subscription traps and short-lived advertisement campaigns 
target  the  young  and  elderly,  see,  e.g.  EP(2012):  Report  on  a  strategy  for  strengthening  the  rights  of 
vulnerable 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A7-2012-0155+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN  
93  According  to  the  Eurobarometer  study  300  on  business  attitudes  towards  cross-border  trade  and 
consumer protection, as of 2011 ca. 10% of enterprises had outlets or subsidiaries in another EU country.  

(2011/2272(INI)): 

consumers 

38 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
whether  websites  respect  consumers'  rights  when  shopping  online,  including  the  right  to 
withdrawal for instance. They would also be able to cooperate on the basis of evidence obtained 
by  each  other  through  investigative  tools  such  as  mystery  shopping  for  example.  Authorities 
would also be in position to order interim measures so that websites with scams are taken down 
without waiting for the end of the investigation. 

  Inclusion of Article 20 of the Services Directive within the scope of the CPC Regulation would 
provide a cross-border enforcement tool to address unjustified discrimination based on place of 
residence  or  nationality  of  a  consumer  including  unjustified  geo-blocking  practices,  which  are 
per  se  cross-border.  Article  20  of  the  Services  Directive  prohibits  all  types  of  unjustified  geo-
discrimination, but sets only general principles. This provision had been poorly implemented and 
enforced in the past94 partly because of the absence of a cross-border enforcement tool to enforce 
it  and  partly  because  Article  20  provides  a  list  of  justifications  that  is  very  broad.  However, 
while the inclusion of Article 20 within the scope of the CPC Regulation would be beneficial to 
ensure coordinated enforcement across the EU, it would not be sufficient on its own to resolve 
the geo-blocking problems, as explained in the recently adopted Single Market Strategy.  

  The  improved  alert  mechanism,  where  stakeholders  (e.g.  consumer  and  trade  organisations, 
ECCs, as well the Commission) can warn enforcement authorities about emerging malpractices, 
as  well  as  better  prioritisation  thanks  to  the  multi-annual  enforcement  plan  would  ensure  that 
more cross-border and widespread infringements are detected and addressed. 

Reduce unnecessary delays and costs in the CPC cooperation 
Reduce delays 
  Most  delays  result  from  slow  detection,  insufficient  powers,  inadmissible  evidence  and 
insufficient  capacity  on  the  part  of  competent  authority.  Thus,  the  improved  CPC  alert 
mechanism  would ensure timely detection  of emerging malpractices, while binding time limits 
for  dealing  with  mutual  assistance  requests,  recognition  of  evidence  and  additional  powers  to 
cooperate  among  authorities  (e.g.  to  adopt  interim  measures,  take  down  websites)  would 
substantially  reduce  delays.  Benchmarking  of  resources  of  the  CPC  authorities  would  also 
provide transparency about available resources  and improve prioritisation  so that  cross- border 
needs are better resourced. 

  Currently mutual assistance requests are not handled within the benchmarks set in the Operating 
Guidelines.  40%  of  information  requests  take  more  than  three  months  to  handle.  50%  of 
enforcement  requests take  more than one year to handle and 26% of them take  more than two 
years  to  handle.  The  mandatory  deadlines  for  dealing  with  mutual  assistance  requests  would 
ensure  that  the  cases  are  handled  without  delays  i.e.  for  50%  cases  the  handling  period  would 
decrease by one or even two years, as Member States would be bound to resource their services 
adequately, while the improved cooperation mechanism would increase the speed of individual 
procedures and their cost (see below).   

  For widespread infringements, a harmonised cooperation procedure at the EU level would ensure 
that once the threshold to initiate such a procedure were met, it would be initiated without delay 

reported 

ECC-Net 

consumer 

complaints 

94  Cf.  Report  of  the  European  Consumer  Centers'  Network  on  Analysis  of  Article  20(2)  and  Article  21 
related 
2012: 
to 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/ecc/docs/eccservices_directive_en.pdf; 
Staff  working 
document  with  a  view  to  establishing  guidance  on  the  application  of  Article  20(2)  of  Directive 
2006/123/EC on services in the internal market, SWD(2012) 146 final, 8.6.2012. The importance of correct 
application  of  the  national  provisions  implementing  Article  20(2)  of  the  Services  Directive  by  national 
authorities has also been stressed by the EU institutions. E.g. see the European Parliament's resolution of 
21 September 2010 on Completing the Internal Market for E-Commerce (2010/2012(INI)); points 31 and 
32;  conclusions  of  Competitiveness  Council  on  Digital  Single  Market  and  Governance  of  the  Single 
Market of 30-31 May 2012, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press/council-meetings  

Commission 

between 

2010 

and 

39 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
and all the efforts would be made to conclude such action within one year. 

Reduce costs 
  Thanks to additional minimum powers to cooperate and more remedies available to address the 
infringement  in  question,  the  cost  per  enforcement  case  would  decrease  compared  to  the 
currently  estimated  average  of  EUR  4,700,  as  the  proportion  of  cases  concluded  with  traders' 
undertakings  (ca.  EUR  1,500  per  case)  would  increase95.  It  is  estimated  that  every  year  this 
would  result  in  efficiency  gain  of  EUR  155,000  (or  2.5  FTEs96)  for  information  requests  and 
EUR 620,000 (10 FTEs) for enforcement requests for the entire CPC network, taken into account 
the current case load97.  

   Furthermore,  pooling  of  resources  to  address  widespread  infringements  would  save  national 
authorities'  resources:  for  instance,  one  coordinated  enforcement  action  would  replace  28 
national  actions,  resulting  in  net  savings  of  ca.  EUR  180,000  (when  negotiation  is  successful) 
and ca. EUR 815,000 (where the trader does not cooperate or does not subsequently implement 
the agreed commitments)98. If four coordinated enforcement actions99 would take place annually, 
thanks  to  a  new  EU-level  procedure  to  address  widespread  infringements,  the  savings  for 
national authorities would be very significant, which would be a substantial benefit of the review 
of the CPC Regulation. 

Reduce  situations  where  CPC  authorities  reach  diverging  outcomes  concerning  the  same 
malpractice 
  Thanks to the timely detection  of parallel  malpractices (e.g. via the improved alert  mechanism 
and  legal  certainty  that  "parallel"  domestic  infringements  fall  within  the  scope  of  the  CPC 
Regulation), combined with the extended minimum powers to cooperate and the new framework 
to  address  widespread  infringements,  more  consistent  enforcement  decisions  and  sanctions 
would be taken across Member States for the same malpractice. Businesses would benefit from 
uniform  enforcement  and  legal  certainty  for  cross-border  and  online  operations.  The  cases 
described  in  the  problem  section  (cf.  case  on  the  misleading  advertising  of  commercial 
warranties) would not occur.  

  In  addition,  an  improved  legal  framework  would  increase  legal  certainty,  transparency  and 
access  to  justice  for  all  stakeholders,  in  particular  for  traders  accused  of  a  widespread 
infringement.   
General objective 
Reduction of non-compliance rate and related consumer detriment 

95 Estimates are based on the UK data used in the impact assessment of Consumer Rights Bill/Proposals on 
enhanced  consumer  measures,  January  2014:  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/consumer-
rights-bill. See also Annexes IV and VI. 
96 FTE = full time equivalent/official during one year. 
97 Estimates are based on the UK data used in the impact assessment of Consumer Rights Bill/Proposals on 
enhanced  consumer  measures,  January  2014:  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/consumer-
rights-bill. See Annex IV for more information on the cost-per-enforcement case. For detailed description 
of the current and future costs of the CPC cooperation, see Annex VI.  
98 Assuming each Member State would involve 0.38 full-time official per action. For detailed calculations 
see Annex VI. 
99 At present two coordinated enforcement actions are carried out per year. E.g. in the antitrust (cartels and 
abuses  of  dominant  position  only)  area,  where  the  Commission  has  investigation,  enforcement  and 
sanctioning powers, the Commission adopts on average 12 decisions per year, covering both instruments 
antitrust and cartel. On this basis and taking into account the experience gained so far, it is estimated that 
ca.  4-6  coordinated  enforcement  actions  per  year  could  be  initiated  under  this  option,  depending  on  the 
final threshold that would trigger the launch of the new EU coordination procedure. 

40 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
  The option is expected to result in a significant reduction in consumer  detriment. For example, 
an improvement of 10 points in the non-compliance rate100 in the five screened sectors under the 
baseline scenario would lead to a 30% (or EUR 231 mln) decrease of the detriment.  

  The  reduction  in  consumer  detriment  in  individual  cases  would  differ.  The  in-app  purchases 
action  of  the  CPC  network  alone  saved  EU  consumers  an  estimated  EUR  68  mln  in  financial 
detriment101.  Assuming  that  four  coordinated  enforcement  actions  would  take  place  every 
year102, the reduction in consumer detriment is expected to be significant (up to four times EUR 
68 mln).  

  Thanks  to  better  prioritization  through  multi-annual  enforcement  plans,  CPC  enforcement 
actions  would  be  better  prepared  and  targeted  at  infringements  with  substantial  consumer 
detriment, ensuring that important intra-Community infringements are addressed without delay. 
  Thanks  to  additional  powers,  all  CPC  authorities  could  require  traders  to  ensure  consumer 
redress.  Individual consumers would thus be more easily compensated for the suffered detriment 
from cross-border and widespread infringements. 

  Improved  alerts,  binding  time-limits  for  mutual  assistance  requests  and  mutual  recognition  of 
evidence  for  intra-Community  infringements  would  allow  early detection  of  infringements  and 
would  substantially  reduce  enforcement  delays.  Infringements  would  be  shorter  and  result  in  a 
smaller collective detriment. This is borne out by research by Parker and Lehmann103 that found 
that  increasing  perception  of  the  likelihood  of  detection  is  a  powerful  way  to  increase 
compliance.  

impacts  (SMEs,  competiveness,  functioning  of  the  Internal  Market  and 

  The  severity  of  possible  sanctions  and  the  fact  that  a  trader  ultimately  will  not  profit  from  an 
infringement importantly influences compliance too. The reinforced powers to cooperate cross-
border (e.g. the power to impose sanctions (fines) and to request restitution of illicitly obtained 
gains) would guarantee that traders which have been found responsible cannot profit from their 
infringements.  This  would  further  deter  traders  from  repeating  illicit  conduct  (specific 
deterrence),  or  dissuade  other  traders  from  committing  an  infringement  at  all  (general 
deterrence). 
Other impacts 
Economic 
competition)  
This option is expected to have an overall positive impact on the business environment, especially 
on  cross-border  trade  within  the  Single  (Digital)  Market.  As  the  level  of  non-compliance  with 
consumer laws would increase, consumer confidence that their rights would be respected wherever 
they shop would increase and their dispute resolution costs would decrease. Traders operating over 
several markets would benefit from equal enforcement conditions and lower litigation costs which 
would  improve  their  competitiveness  in  an  overall  context  of  more  competitive  and  transparent 
markets.  
Impact on traders 
  Improved enforcement  cooperation  would  not lead to additional  costs for legitimate traders, as 

100  The  expected  decrease  in  non-compliance  is  legitimate  because  the  CPC  sweeps  have  shown  that 
targeted  enforcement  actions  can  lead  to  a  significant  improvement  in  compliance  rates,  i.e.  from  20  to 
40% at the screening phase to above 80% after a year of enforcement actions, see Annex  IV. 
101 The estimation is calculated on the basis of the U.S. consumer detriment per capita, adjusted to the EU 
population  and  converted  to  EUR  in  line  with  the  current  exchange  rate  of  the  European  Central  Bank 
(ECB): see Annex VI for detailed explanations. 
102 This estimate is based on the current CPC workload and the threshold for the mandatorily initiated EU 
enforcement coordination procedure.   
103 "Deterrence and the Impact of Calculative Thinking" by Christine Parker and Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1527326  

41 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
the review of the CPC Regulation would not change substantive consumer protection legislation 
and  would  not  impose  additional  obligations  directly  on  traders  complying  with  the  existing 
consumer legislation. 

  Coordinated enforcement  actions, which result in negotiated undertakings at the EU level,  will 
reduce the legal costs for non-compliant multi-national traders who would otherwise have to face 
these  costs  in  each  Member  State.  Traders  would  benefit  from  strengthened  enforcement 
cooperation  with  more  uniform  enforcement  outcomes  offering  legal  certainty for  cross-border 
and  online  operations,  fairer  competition,  and  a  level  playing  field  with  competitors  based  in 
other  countries  as  well  as  reduced  potential  litigation  costs.  The  cost  of  court  proceedings  for 
traders  was  estimated  to  be  an  average  EUR  2,208  per  case104;  and,  without  enforcement 
coordination, especially in case the EU level coordination procedure fails, the trader could face 
potentially 28 enforcement proceedings instead of one. 

Environmental impacts 
No significant environmental impacts are expected. 
Social impacts 
Increase  in  consumer  confidence  in  the  Digital  Single  Market  and  more  economic  growth,  as 
described above, are expected to have an indirect positive effect on the levels of employment. 
Impacts on Fundamental Rights (EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) 
Consumer Protection (Article 38)  
The right to a high level of consumer protection is a fundamental right of EU citizens (Article 38 of 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights). This option would increase the level of consumer protection, 
boost legal certainty, and make EU consumer rights a reality.   
Right to an effective remedy/due process (Article 47) 
On  one hand, this option would boost  the possibilities for consumers to seek  redress for financial 
detriment suffered from cross-border and widespread infringements. On the other hand, powers that 
would be newly available cross-border such as the power to conduct mystery shopping, suspend a 
website,  name  infringing  traders,  make  public  undertakings  proposed  by  traders  and  request  the 
supply  of  information  from  third  parties/authorities  could  raise  concerns  as  regards  this  right. 
However, in the light of Article 52 of the Charter, these limitations are justified by the objective of 
general interest of ensuring  a high level of consumer’s protection. In addition  national  procedural 
law provides for effective remedies as regards these powers (legality review through courts, appeal 
procedures).  These  concerns  could  be  further  mitigated  through  the  CPC  Regulation  obliging 
Member  States  to  provide  for  effective  remedies.  Also,  some  of  the  powers  concerned,  such  as 
interim measures or mystery shopping would be subject to conditions such as necessity, urgency or 
threat of serious and irreparable harm and would only be used where no other less onerous means 
were available.     
Presumption of innocence and rights of defence (Article 48) 
Naming  of  infringing  traders  and  publication  of  decisions  could  raise  concerns  as  regards  the 
presumption of innocence. In the light of Article 52 of the Charter, under the CPC Regulation, the 
limitation to the exercise of this right are justified by the objective of general interest of ensuring a 
high  level  of  consumer’s  protection  and  guaranties  are  included  so  that  the  limitation  to  this 

104If  an  action  in  a  cross-border  case  is  taken  through  the  courts,  the  following  costs  are  likely  to  be 
involved:  legal  fees,  court  fees,  administrative  costs  and  costs  of  serving  documents.  For  a 
"straightforward" case where a 25-page document is translated, court fees are paid in addition to lawyers’ 
charges (assuming five hours of work), the average cost of cross-border proceedings was estimated to be an 
average EUR 2,208 per case, source: SME Panel survey in "Data Collection and Impact Analysis – Certain 
Aspects of a Possible Revision of Council Regulation No. 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement  of  Judgments  in  Civil  and  Commercial  Matters  (‘Brussels  1’)",  final  report  on  a  study 
undertaken by CSES for DG Justice (December 2010). 

42 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
fundamental  right  do  not  exceed  what  is  needed  to  ensure  the  desired  objective.  The  CPC 
Regulation provides in particular that only  the publication of final decisions is allowed and public 
naming of traders is allowed only where the responsibility of the trader was established by a final 
and enforceable decision. 
Property rights/Freedom to conduct business (Articles  16-17) 
Some measures such as interim measures and the taking down of websites could raise concerns as 
regards property rights and freedom to conduct business. Given that these measures would only be 
used as a last resort, where no other less onerous measures were available and, in case of interim 
measures,  only  to  prevent  the  risk  of  serious  and  irreparable  harm  to  consumers,  these  concerns 
would largely be addressed by these safeguards. In addition, effective remedies exist under national 
law allowing traders concerned to challenge any enforcement measures.      
Freedom of expression and information (Article 11) 
Interim measures and the taking down of websites might raise concerns as regards the free flow of 
information.  In  accordance with Article 52 of the Charter,  a  careful balancing of the limitation  to 
this  right  has  to  be  made  with  the  the  objective  of  general  interest  of  protecting  consumers  from 
harm caused by illegal practices. Given that websites could be taken down only as a last resort and 
that effective national remedies are available to the traders concerned, the concerns as regards these 
rights would be well addressed.     
Personal data protection (Article 8) 
The CPC Regulation already offers safeguards as regards processing of personal data in the alerts 
and CPCS system. These safeguards would be maintained in the future.    
General consideration for fundamental rights 
According to the Court of Justice105, neither the right to the protection of personal data (Articles 7-8 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of EU), nor freedom to conduct a business (Article 16), nor 
the  right  to  property  (Article  17)  are  absolute  rights.  They  must  be  considered  in  relation  to  their 
social function. Therefore, given the importance of consumer protection (Article 38 of the Charter 
and  Article  169  TFEU  that  ensure  a  high  level  of  protection  for  consumers  in  EU  policies),  the 
resulting  fair  balancing  of  rights  leads  to  results  in  favour  of  the  consumer.  In  accordance  with 
Article  52  of  the  Charter,  any  limitation  on  the  exercise  of  the  rights  would  be  subject  to  the 
principle of proportionality and necessity to protect consumers and subject to effective remedies in 
national courts. 
Compliance costs (for the Commission, Member States) 
Commission:  
  Assuming  that  there  would  be  four  coordinated  enforcement  actions  per  year,  where  the 
threshold  to  initiate  the  mandatory  EU-level  procedure  would  be  met,  the  Commission  would 
need  two  full-time  officials106  to  coordinate  the  actions  (currently  the  cost  of  the  coordinated 
enforcement action is estimated at ca. 37.8% of FTE = ca. EUR 50,000 per action107; however, 
the  new  procedure  would  require  greater  involvement  of  the  Commission  to  coordinate  the 
action  and  monitoring  of  its  outcome,  therefore  a  slightly  higher  cost  per  action  is  estimated). 
The  required  resources  could  be  obtained  through  redistribution  and  refocusing  of  the  existing 
personnel. 

105Cf. Case C-544/10, Deutsches Weintor, para. 54. 
106Two full-time officials for four coordinated enforcement actions are estimated on the basis of the actual  
threshold set for initiating the new enforcement coordination procedure, which is established on the basis 
of  the  experience  gained  in  the  in-app  and  car  rental  coordinated  enforcement  actions.  The  proposed 
threshold is high enough to ensure that the coordination at the EU level is initiated for the most serious and 
widespread infringements.  
107This estimate is based on the experience gained in coordinating the CPC action on in-app purchases. The 
average cost of the Commission official per year is EUR 132,000 (DG BUDGET data of 26.06.2014). 

43 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
  The  Commission  would  also  incur  additional  costs  in  distributing  intelligence  and  moderating 
alerts  placed  in  the  CPC  System  by  other  stakeholders.  By  reference  to  the  similar  RAPEX 
database used by the EU authorities to post product safety alerts, it is estimated that this would 
cost ca. 20% of FTE = ca. EUR 27,000 per year108, which could be covered by redistribution and 
refocusing of existing personnel. 

  Therefore, the Commission's additional costs for its enhanced cooperation role are expected to be 

below EUR 300,000 per year. 

Member States:  
  One-off  familiarisation/training  costs  concerning  additional  powers:  EUR  2,000  per  CPC 
authority  in  the  first  year  only109.  The  Member  States,  where  these  additional  powers  are 
currently not available would be mostly affected (in particular, AT, BE, DE, EL, FR, HR, IE and 
LT).  In  addition,  there  would  also  be  costs  related  to  the  CPC  authorities'  decision  on  what 
course of action/remedy to take in a specific case because of a larger array of powers available 
for the authorities under this option. The latter cost would be EUR 1,000 per case in the first year 
only.  

  Regarding  the  cost  of  using  the  power  to  conduct  test  purchases/mystery  shopping,  the  cost 
would  be  variable  as  it  would  depend  on  the  item  to  be  purchased.  There  would  be  initial 
(marginal)  cost  linked  to  the  setting  up  of  agreements  with,  e.g.  bank/credit  cards  and/or 
internet/telecom  operators.  No  additional  specific  equipment  is  needed  (Internet  investigation 
equipment is already available for the currently existing investigative and enforcement powers).  
In addition most purchases should be reimbursed as one of the objectives of test purchases would 
be to check compliance with withdrawal rights.    

  Being  a  leading  Member  State  in  a  coordinated  action  to  address  a  widespread  infringement 
which does not meet the threshold for the initiation of the mandatory enforcement coordination 
procedure  at  the  EU  level,  and  taking  an  enforcement  action  on  behalf  of  other  competent 
authorities  against  the  infringement  would  cost  ca.  37.8%  of  FTE  per  action  for  that  Member 
State110. 

  The cost of the coordinated enforcement action via the mandatory procedure would be ca. EUR 
174,000 for all Member States per one coordinated action per year i.e. about half of what these 
costs are now. 

  There  would  be  no  additional  costs  for  Member  States  to  prepare  and  follow  up  the 
implementation  of  the  multi-annual  enforcement  plan,  as  Member  States  are  already  under  an 
obligation to prepare reports under Article 21 of the CPC Regulation. Enforcement plans would 
merely replace the existing reporting obligations. 

Impacts on legal systems 
This option, which would harmonise the procedures and powers for cooperation  in a cross-border 
context,  would  neither  affect  the  Member  States'  competences  in  enforcement  nor  would  it  fully 
harmonise  national  enforcement  systems.  Some  Member  States  would  need  to  slightly  adapt  their 
national procedural laws so that authorities can use the new powers in the updated list of minimum 
powers to cooperate in a cross-border context and use the mutual recognition of evidence/outcome 

108The  latest  statistics  suggest  the  RAPEX  handles  on  average  2,000  notifications  per  year,  whereas  the 
CPC currently handles on average ca. 60 alerts per year. Considering the purpose and use of the CPC alert 
mechanism,  3  FTE  would  be  an  overestimate  of  the  resource  implications,  even  taking  into  account  the 
improved alert mechanism where access for stakeholders to submit alerts is granted. 
109These costs were estimated by the consultant ICF International. Familiarisation/training costs= Number 
of  staff  in  the  CPC  authorities  requiring  training  in  28  MS  (ca.  850  in  ca.  323  CPC  authorities)  *hours 
spent  on  training  per  staff  (24  hours)  *staff  costs  per  hour  (hourly  wage  rate  EUR  41.5,  Eurostat  data 
2012).  
110 This estimate is based on the experience gained in coordinating the CPC action on in-app purchases. 

44 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
of investigations. Greater changes would be borne by those Member States where CPC authorities 
do not have the proposed powers in the national context  – AT, BE, DE, EL, FR, HR, IE and LT.  
The extent of adjustments would depend on the number of national laws and concerned authorities 
(see  Annex  V).  In  those  countries,  where  substantive  and  procedural  provisions,  which  are 
applicable to both national and intra-Community infringements, are contained in one act (e.g. UK, 
BE),  adjustments  would  be  minimal.  However,  more  adjustments  would  be  needed  in  those 
countries  where  several  national  laws  will  be  concerned  by  the  revised  CPC  Regulation  (e.g.  FR, 
LV, SK)111. Overall, in the medium term, savings are expected thanks to more coordinated EU wide 
actions. 
Special  considerations  concerning  principles  of  proportionality  and  subsidiarity  regarding 
additional powers of competent authorities 
  The use of the additional powers of the competent authorities would be limited to cross-border 
situations in which the same powers available in national law cannot be used because their use is 
limited  to  domestic  matters  only.  At  the  same  time,  where  such  powers  are  absent  in  national 
law, the Member States would not be required to introduce them for domestic infringements (in 
line  with  the  principle  of  proportionality  as  the  outcome  would  not  go  beyond  of  what  is 
necessary to achieve that objective).   

  The  additional  powers  cannot  be  introduced  by  each  Member  State  individually  because  the 
jurisdictional boundaries between the Member States would not allow their use across national 
borders. For instance, the evidence collected through such individually introduced powers could 
not be used in another Member State because it would not be obtained in line with national law 
of that Member State. This is why the powers used in the cross-border context have to stem from 
the  EU-level  instrument  that  surpasses  national  jurisdictional  boundaries  (principle  of 
subsidiarity – the outcome cannot be achieved through individual measures at the national level). 
  These jurisdictional limitations of enforcement actions of individual Member States are already 

recognised and explained in the recitals 2, 5, 6, 7 and 18 of the current CPC Regulation. 

Feasibility 
Feasibility  of  this  option  is  considered  high.  The  cost  of  its  implementation  is  low,  while  the 
efficiency  gains  are  high112.  Any  limitation  on  the  exercise  of  the  fundamental  rights  would  be 
subject  to  the  principle  of  proportionality  and  necessity  to  protect  consumers  and  would  be 
mitigated by further legal safeguards.  Only  minimal adaptation of national procedural laws would 
be needed. 

Risks related for the Commission to take an action: 
The  Commission  would  have  a  mandatory  role  to  initiate  the  coordinated  procedure  and  to  assist 
CPC authorities. The following risks could occur: 
i)  Mistakenly  concluding that  the  threshold  for  the  mandatory  coordinated  action has  been 
met when the threshold in reality had not been met: the effect would be that the action would be 
ultra vires, as its outcome would be invalid for the companies and for the competent authorities. As 
regards  the  companies,  given that the  outcome  of  the  action  would  be  commitments  from  the 
companies, the  companies  concerned  could  simply  refuse  to  give  commitments  and  the  action 
would  be  remitted  to national  enforcement.  No  damages  would  arise  to  the  companies  concerned. 
As for the authorities, the common enforcement position would be invalid. This could however be 
easily  mitigated through  national  enforcement  measures  or  enforcement  requests  under  the  CPC 
Regulation. The costs of this error would be an additional cost incurred by the national authorities 
when 

investigation/evidence  collection 

the  national 

steps  at 

repeating 

some 

level.   

111 See section 7 and Annex V for more information. 
112 See Annex VI for detailed calculation of costs and benefits. 

45 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
ii)  Mistakenly concluding  that  the  threshold  for  the mandatory  coordinated  action  was  not 
met when  the  threshold  in  reality  had  been  met:  this  could  trigger  an  action  for  failure  to  act 
(Article 265 TFEU) from Member States and possibly from the companies or consumer associations 
(depending on  their  standing).  This  action  would  be  stopped  by  the  Commission  reassessing  the 
conclusion and initiating the action.  
Stakeholder support 
National  consumer  authorities,  consumer  and  trade  organisations,  as  well  as  the  European 
Parliament have been consistently calling for stepped-up enforcement throughout the EU. In general 
measures included in this option received a high level of support based on the results of the public 
consultation and meetings with CPC authorities and consumer and trade associations. 
Development of EU-level actions is clearly the most controversial issue: Member States, while 
agreeing there is a need to have efficient common solutions to address pan-European infringements, 
are keen to retain their enforcement prerogative. The retained option 3 takes this into account. More 
than  half  of  enforcement  authorities  would  be  interested  in  a  single  EU  procedure  to  tackle 
widespread infringements; supporters of stronger Commission role are mainly authorities in Spain, 
Austria, the Netherlands and France. Authorities from UK, Italy, Germany, Ireland, Czech Republic 
and  Luxembourg  are  more  sceptical  about  this  measure,  but  do  acknowledge  that  better 
coordination  is  needed  to  tackle  such  infringements  effectively.  Position  of  other  authorities  is 
shifting between these two groups. 
Business organizations support the development of coordination of enforcement at the EU level as 
they clearly see the benefits of one-stop shop and uniform rules for their business.  
Consumer  organizations  also  strongly  support  the  enforcement  cooperation  procedure  at  EU 
level. BEUC (comprising 41 consumer organisations from 31 countries) was particularly vocal on 
this.  The  minority  view  is  UK  consumer  organisation  Which?  as  they  do  not  see  a  need  for  a 
centralized enforcement procedure. Which? believes resources should be focused on strengthening 
cross-border cooperation procedures. 
Annex  II  (section  10.4)  for  more  details  concerning  stakeholder  consultation  and  their  support 
concerning specific measures under the option 3. 

5.4.

  Option 4: Revision of the CPC Regulation: Policy Option 3 + additional 
elements regarding minimum powers and monitoring of Member States' 
enforcement efforts 

Specific objectives 
Reduce  situations  where  important  cross-border  and  widespread  infringements  are  not 
detected or sufficiently addressed through the CPC framework 
Thanks  to  further  enhanced  powers,  this  option  would  address  more  effectively  than  option  3 
deceitful commercial practices. The exact number of such cross-border cases is not known, but they 
often  concern  free  trial/test  situations:  according  to  the  study  procured  by  the  Commission  on 
misleading free trials and subscription traps, 1 in 5 consumers who ordered a free trial had problems 
afterwards (such as a subscription trap, and the website either disappeared or the trader could not be 
contacted).   
Reduce unnecessary delays and costs in the CPC cooperation 
Reduce delays 
  Thanks to powers to block a website or freeze assets, only deceitful commercial practices where 
the trader is deliberately hiding would be addressed faster than under option 3. Other practices 
would be addressed at the same speed as in option 3. The additional positive impact compared to 
option 3 is therefore lower.  

46 

 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  Audits  would  provide  for  a  systematic,  in-depth  and  periodic  review  of  Member  States' 
enforcement  efforts and systems. They would therefore go deeper than option 3 as they would  
identify  and  address  the  gaps  and  delays  in  cross-border  enforcement,  in  the  Member  States' 
resources  and  enforcement  capacity  as  well  as  in  the  Member  States'  enforcement  systems  as 
such. 

  Otherwise the impact of the option would be the same as for option 3.  
Reduce costs 
  The same conclusions for option 3 remain valid for this option, as no further reduction in cost is 

foreseen. 

Reduce  situations  where  CPC  authorities  reach  diverging  outcomes  concerning  the  same 
malpractice 
The new auditing system would better align national enforcement strategies and ensure that they are 
implemented  on  the  ground,  which  would  improve  consistency  of  enforcement  actions  across  the 
EU and prevent more effectively than option 3 cases such as misleading advertising of commercial 
guarantees by Apple (cf. the problem definition Box 8).  
General objective 
Reduction of non-compliance rate and related consumer detriment 
  As  this  option  provides  for  powers  such  as  freezing  assets,  banning  economic  activity  and 
disqualification/dismissal of directors for a fixed time period, it would allow the CPC authorities 
to  address  more  effectively  deceitful  commercial  practices  in  which  the  trader  is  deliberately 
hiding, such as in the case of scams and free trials  with subscription traps. Compared to option 
3,  this  option  would  ensure  more  effective  tackling  of  the  infringements  mentioned  in  the 
problem section concerning online sales of cheap but not readily available design furniture (Box 
3) and would better ensure that consumers do not suffer prolonged financial detriment. 

  The  power  to  disqualify  directors  would  reduce  more  effectively  than  option  3  repetition  of 
infringements (recidivism), because the persons who are responsible for company management 
could have direct personal consequences if their company were responsible for such intentional 
infringement. Hence, they would be deterred from setting up a new company and repeating the 
infringement, hidden behind a new corporate structure.    

  Thanks  to  the  power  to  name  and  shame  traders  before  the  final  decision  is  taken,  consumers 
would be warned about rogue traders' practices at an early stage. This would prevent and reduce 
detriment  to  consumers,  beyond  what  is  foreseen  in  option  3.  This  could  deter  traders  from 
infringements  as  they  would  know  that  they  would  not  be  able  to  reap  profit  from  the 
infringement once the public is informed about the infringement.   

  The  new  auditing  system  would  ensure  that  authorities  have  sufficient  resources  to  act 
effectively and fast. This would ensure that more infringements can be stopped faster, even if the 
trader hides his identity.  

  Other benefits, as per option 3. 
Other impacts 
Economic impacts (SMEs, competiveness, functioning of the internal market and competition)  
Thanks  to  the  additional  powers  available  to  enforcers,  the  overall  deterrent  effect  of  their  action 
would increase further. The non-compliance rate in cross-border markets would be lower, offering 
efficient market conditions for traders and consumers operating in these markets, in turn developing 
their  attractiveness  and  growth.  Removal  of  unfair  competition  in  particular  from  rogue  traders 
would  boost  competitiveness  of  honest,  law-abiding  traders,  encourage  entry  of  new  players  and 
boost competition and level the playing field in the Internal Market. 
Impact on traders 
The same assessment as under option 3. 
Environmental impacts 

47 

 
 
 
 
 
No significant impacts on environment are expected. 
Social impacts 
Given  that  scams  and  intentional  infringements  have  a  very  negative  impact  on  consumers' 
confidence  (especially  on  the  vulnerable  consumers,  i.e.  the  young  and  elderly),  their  timely 
removal  would  increase  consumer  confidence  in  the  Digital  Single  Market  and  more  economic 
growth,  as  described  above,  are  expected  to  have  an  indirect  positive  effect  on  the  levels  of 
employment. 
Special  considerations  as  regards  possible  use  of  national  criminal  law  measures  to  address 
these intentional and deceitful infringements 
Although criminal law as described above means may be available in some Member States (e.g. BE, 
FR,  HU,  SK,  UK)  to  address  deceitful  practices  targeting  consumers,  these  means  may  not  be 
systematically employed because:  

 

the  threshold  for  criminal  offence  may not  be  triggered  (e.g.  many  Member  States  do  not 
accept  criminal  liability  of  legal  persons  in  this  context);  the  practice  remains  an 
administrative offence, but the penal authorities (e.g. police, state prosecution) may not be 
competent to deal with it;  
it  may  be  impossible  to  use  domestic  criminal  law  means  for  cross-border  cases,  because 
the penal authorities may not have jurisdiction to act across national jurisdictional borders; 
  penal authorities may not consider addressing such practices to be their priority in view of 

 

other kinds of crime that they have to address as a priority (e.g. violent crime).   

As criminal law means may not be always available to tackle such deceitful practices the consumer 
protection  authorities  would  not  be  able  to  investigate  and  stop  these  deceitful  infringements 
without the powers proposed in option 4 and these infringements would continue to cause harm to 
consumers.   
Impacts on Fundamental Rights (EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) 
Consumer Protection (Article 38)  
The  same  assessment  as  under  option  3.  In  addition,  consumer  protection  would  increase  in 
particular  for  vulnerable  consumers  (elderly  and  children)  that  are  often  victims  of  scams,  as  the 
rogue traders often target such vulnerable consumer groups.   
Right to an effective remedy/due process (Article 47) 
This option would conflict more than option 3 with property ownership rights (as discussed below). 
These concerns would have to be mitigated through the CPC Regulation obliging Member States to 
provide for effective remedies similar to those available in criminal law. 
Presumption of innocence and rights of defence (Article 48) 
Naming  and  shaming  of  traders  in  all  cases,  even  before  a  final  decision  is  taken,  would  raise 
serious issues as regards the presumption of innocence and protection of good will and reputation of 
the traders concerned. The CPC Regulation would have to ensure that naming and shaming would 
be subject to the following conditions: serious suspicion of deceitful commercial practices, urgency 
and threat of serious and irreparable harm and no other less onerous means to stop the malpractice.     
Property rights/Freedom to conduct business (Articles  16-17) 
The additional powers under option 4 would go further in restricting private ownership rights than 
option 3. Such restrictions (freeze assets, suspend an economic activity) may be justified and needed 
to effectively tackle deceitful commercial practices, especially when the trader deliberately hides its 
identity,  and  to  ensure  that  no  irreparable  harm  to  consumers  occurs  during  the  enforcement 
process.  As  above,  these  powers  would  be  exercised  as  a  last  resort  when  no  other  less  onerous 
means are available to address the malpractice. 
Freedom of expression and information (Article 11) 
The same assessment as under option 3. 
Personal data protection (Article 8) 

48 

 
 
 
 
 
Additional concerns (than under option 3) may arise as regards the naming and shaming before the 
procedure  has  been  concluded.  As  explained  above  this  could  be  mitigated  by  imposing  strict 
conditions for the use of this power.     
General consideration for fundamental rights 
The  additional  powers  under  this  option  would  affect  the  balance  between  the  two  interests 
(respecting  the  fundamental  right  to  property/freedom  to  conduct  business  on  the  one  hand  and 
ensuring a high level of protection for consumers on the other) to a much greater extent than under 
option 3. The use of such more intrusive powers could be justified only in infringements involving 
deception  and concerning significant  consumer detriment, when the other less onerous means had 
failed  to  ensure  protection  of  consumers.  These  powers  would  be  more  complex  to  implement 
legally in order to ensure proportionality of action and respect for fundamental rights.  
Compliance costs (for the Commission, Member States) 
Commission:  
  In addition to the costs mentioned under option 3, the Commission would incur significant costs 
with  regards  to  the  setting  up  and  maintaining  the  general  auditing  system.  In  similar  audit 
systems in the food and feed area (Regulation 882/2004) the Food and Veterinary Office carries 
out ca. 150 audits per year in the EU, with a team of some 180  professionals, representing ca. 
3,080  days  spent  on  the  ground  by  auditors113.  It  is  estimated  that  in  the  CPC  context,  there 
would be a need for at least 28 full-time officials to conduct regular audits in each Member State, 
draft  reports,  make  recommendations,  and  follow  up  Member  States'  actions  to  improve  the 
situation. It is estimated that this would cost at least ca. EUR 3.5 mln per year. 

Member States: 
  As the powers proposed under this option are not available for most of the CPC authorities in the 
domestic context (except for those who can use criminal proceedings in the consumer protection 
area,  see 
there  would  be  higher  costs  for 
training/familiarisation  concerning  these  powers  and  for  choosing  the  right  course  of 
action/remedy  in  a  particular  case.  These  costs  would  however  be  incurred  only  in  the  initial 
period.  

legal  systems  below), 

impacts  on 

the 

  The  increased  intrusiveness  of  powers  under  this  option  would  entail  higher  costs  as  greater 
burden  of  proof  and  more  profound  scrutiny  of  decisions  would  be  needed  before,  e.g.  an 
economic activity is suspended/ banned or a company's director is disqualified.  

  The  auditing  system  would  also  entail  higher  costs  as  the  Member  States  would  have  to  be 

actively involved in the audits. 

Impacts on legal systems 
  The  majority  of  powers  proposed  under  this  option  are  not  available  for  the  CPC  authorities, 
except for those who can use criminal proceedings in the consumer protection area: BE, FR and 
UK.  Further,  in  AT,  FI,  HU,  DK  and  SK  criminal  proceedings  can  be  initiated  also  in  certain 
data protection cases and/or in cases related to deceitful practices, respectively.  

  This means that most CPC authorities would have to adjust to the new powers. For instance, the 
power to freeze assets seems to be unavailable for most of CPC authorities, except UK and RO. 
The same applies for the power to disqualify directors and to name and shame traders before the 
final  decision.  The  power  to  ban/suspend  an  economic  activity  of  a  trader  seems  to  be 
unavailable for CPC authorities in AT, BE, CY, DE, EE, IE, LU, NL, PL, PT and SE. 

  The  powers  added  in  this  option,  even  though  very  effective  in  tackling  deceitful  commercial 
practices,  would  be  more  costly  and  complex  to  implement  legally  in  order  to  ensure 
proportionality of action and respect for fundamental rights.  

113  http://ec.europa.eu/food/food_veterinary_office/index_en.htm  and  FVO  Work  Programme  for  2015, 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/food_veterinary_office/files/prog_audit_2015_en.pdf. 

49 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Feasibility 
The option would be costly to implement. In particular the general auditing system would involve 
substantial costs which, despite its several positive impacts, would not generate the corresponding 
increase in benefits. Authorities would need additional staff to carry out more complex procedures. 
Further, the additional powers would be more complex to implement legally to ensure the respect 
for fundamental rights.  
Stakeholder support 
  Acceptance by  stakeholders (traders and  national  authorities) of this option  is also  likely to be 
lower  due  to  higher  litigation  risks  in  relation  to  private  ownership  rights  and  thus  possibly 
higher  costs  than  under  option  3.  However,  some  authorities114  wished  that  such  powers  be 
available in the CPC context to effectively address deceitful commercial practices.  

  There was no specific question on auditing of enforcement efforts of Member States in the public 
consultation.  Even  if  this  measure  would  likely  be  supported  by  consumer  and  trade 
organisations, who wish for stepped-up and consistent enforcement throughout the EU, it might 
not be supported by Member States, who might perceive it as too intrusive. 

5.5.

  Option  5:  New  Regulation  providing  the  European  Commission  with 
direct  powers  to  address  widespread 
infringements  meeting  the 
threshold described in option 3, combined either  with option 3 or with 
option 4 as regards the existing CPC cooperation 

Specific objectives 
Reduce  situations  where  important  cross-border  and  widespread  infringements  are  not 
detected or sufficiently addressed through the CPC framework 
Compared  to  other  options,  option  5  would  ensure  that  widespread  infringements  with  EU 
dimension (i.e. meeting the threshold) are addressed more effectively. 
Reduce unnecessary delays and costs in the CPC cooperation 
In addition to the assessment provided under options 3 and 4: 
Reduce delays 
  Thanks  to  a  unified  approach,  it  would  take  the  least  time  to  stop  an  EU-widespread 
infringement meeting the threshold, as the Commission would be able to take an immediate EU-
wide  action  once  the  infringement  is  detected.  The  procedure  could  last  between  6-9  months 
(based on the length of procedures in the EU merger control for two phased investigations). This 
would  entail  saving  3-6  months  as  compared  to  the  mandatorily  initiated  enforcement 
coordination procedure under options 3 or 4. 

Reduce costs 
  This  option  would  have 

the  greatest 

the  duplication  of 
investigation/enforcement  efforts  in  complex  multijurisdictional  cases  concerning  widespread 
infringements, as the Commission would address the infringement for the entire EU (it would be 
the sole authority to bear the costs of investigation and enforcement of widespread infringements 
with EU dimension). It would go beyond options 3 and 4 in removing duplication. 

impact  on 

removing 

 

It  would  cost  the  Commission  0.5  FTE  (ca.  EUR  66,000)  to  handle  one  EU  dimension 
infringement  case  within  9  months  (based  on  the  length  of  procedures  in  the  EU  merger 

114 These authorities wished to stay anonymous. 

50 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
control for two phased investigations). 

  Compared  to  the  cost  of  the  coordinated  action  initiated  under  the  EU  mandatory 
coordination procedure under options 3 and 4, this option would lead to significant savings 
(ca. EUR 160,000 (225,000-66,000)) per action per year115. 

  In  EU  competition  policy  the  Commission  adopts  on  average  12  decisions  per  year,  covering 
antitrust  and  cartels116.  If  we  assume  that  under  this  option  the  Commission  would  adopt  an 
equivalent number of decisions this could save significant costs stemming from duplication and 
multiplication of efforts at the national level. 

Reduce  situations  where  CPC  authorities  reach  diverging  outcomes  concerning  the  same 
malpractice 
  This  option  would  provide  the  clearest  and  the  most  efficient  legal  framework  to  address 
widespread infringements. It would ensure best consistent enforcement of consumer law in the 
EU  as  it  would  create  a  "one-stop  shop"  for  widespread  infringements  with  EU  dimension. 
Similarly  to  the  EU  competition  policy,  the  Commission  would  lead  the  interpretation  of 
consumer law and ensure that Member States apply it consistently.  

  In  addition  the  option  would  increase  legal  certainty,  transparency  and  access  to  justice  for  all 
stakeholders,  in  particular  for  traders  accused  of  a  widespread  infringement,  as  well  as  for  the 
consumers concerned.   

General objective 
Reduction of non-compliance rate and related consumer detriment 
  The estimated 12 decisions per year (on the basis of the number of cases handled per year in EU 
competition policy, see above) would concern infringements with significant financial consumer 
detriment,  affecting  consumers  in  many  Member  States.  Thus  the  reduction  in  financial 
consumer detriment would be the highest from all the options considered. In addition, similar to 
the  EU  competition  area,  the  Commission  would  have  powers  to  carry  out  investigations  to 
detect widespread infringements and take faster actions to prevent financial consumer detriment.  
  Direct  powers  of  the  Commission,  uniformly  applied  law  and  financial/human  resources 
allowing  the  Commission  to  act  quickly  and  effectively  EU-wide  would  deter  traders  from 
infringements in the most effective way.  

Other impacts 
Economic impacts 
This  option  would  best  ensure  consistent  enforcement  of  consumer  law  in  the  EU.  This  would 
improve  the  functioning  of  the  Internal  Market,  reduce  economic  transaction  costs  and  increase 
consumers'  trust  and  welfare.  Thanks  to  the  unified  enforcement  approach  at  the  EU  level,  cross-
border trade would increase and business conditions/ market entry conditions would be simplified, 
which  would  increase  competition.  This  option  would  establish  a  level  playing  field  within  the 
Internal  Market  by  more  effectively  tackling  malpractices  committed  by  traders  operating  either 
throughout  the  EU  or  from  third  countries.  Stronger  and  fairer  competition  in  the  EU  would 
encourage  businesses  to  innovate  and  improve  the  quality  of  their  products  and  services  and/or 
reduce prices to stay competitive. 
Impact on traders 
The  new  Regulation  would  create  a  "one-stop-shop"  with  simple  and  transparent  procedures  for 

115See Annex VI for the current and future cost and saving (covering option 3) of the CPC cooperation. 
116 Cf. Commission staff working document of 4.6.2015 accompanying the Report from the Commission to 
the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions on Competition Policy 2014, SWD(2015) 113 final. On page 24 the report mentions: "since 
May 2004, the Commission has investigated potential antitrust infringements across almost all sectors of 
the economy and has adopted over 130 decisions, many of which landmark precedents". 

51 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
handling  widespread  infringements  meeting  the  threshold,  ensuring  due  process  and  rights  of 
defence  similarly  to  the  Regulations  1/2003  and  139/2004  in  the  EU  competition  policy  field. 
Administrative  burden  on  businesses  would  decrease  as  it  would  no  longer  be  necessary  to  face 
parallel procedures in several Member States for the same infringement. An infringement would be 
resolved in a single procedure with one set of remedies applicable throughout the EU. The impact of 
this  option  on  businesses  would  be  similar  to  the  introduction  of  the  EU-level  merger  control 
mechanism in 1989 for mergers with EU dimension: considerable reduction of administrative costs 
for businesses thanks to the removal of multijurisdictional procedures.   
Environmental impacts 
No significant impacts are expected. 
Social impacts 
Higher levels of economic activity, as described above, are expected to have a positive effect on the 
levels of employment in the EU. 
Impacts on Fundamental Rights (EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) 
In addition to the assessment provided under options 3 and 4: 
Option 5 would require procedural rules to respect due process rights of traders (hearings, access to 
files, professional secrecy), similar to Council Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules 
on  competition  or  to  the  Council  Regulation  139/2004  on  the  control  of  concentrations  between 
undertakings and the related implementing rules. 
Compliance costs (for the Commission, Member States) 
Commission:  
  In  the  EU  competition  area  (antitrust,  cartels  and  general  services  of  DG  Competition)  the 
Commission employs ca. 225 full time officials. The Commission adopts in this field on average 
12 decisions per year and conducts other activities such as sector inquiries, leniency requests and 
complaint  handling.  Consumer  protection  infringements  would  typically  be  less  complex  than 
major  competition  cases  handled  by  the  Commission.  On  this  basis  it  is  assumed  that  for  a 
similar number of decisions in consumer protection 2/3 of the human resources currently used in 
DG Competition would be needed (ca. 150 FTEs per year). The consumer directorate currently 
employs ca. 100 FTEs. This would mean an estimated net increase by 50 FTEs (EUR. 6.6 mln) 
per  year  compared  to  the  baseline.  Further,  the  operating  cost  of  EU  courts  would  increase 
because they would be in charge of the review of the Commission decisions. 

  The Commission would also incur one-off training costs concerning the new powers, procedures, 
case-handling and decision-making of ca. EUR 270,000 (assuming 150 full-time officials would 
be trained for 3 days at the hourly wage rate of EUR 75). 

  In addition, IT systems would have to be replaced at an estimated cost of EUR 0.8mln through 

extending the existing IT systems from DG Competition. 
  The cost of option 5 + option 3 would be ca. EUR 6.9 mln. 
  The cost of option 5 + option 4 would be at least ca. EUR 10 mln per year. 
Member States:  
The same compliance costs as per option 3 or option 4. 
Impacts on legal systems 
In addition to the assessment provided under options 3 and 4: 
All Member States would be affected in the same manner due to the application of one threshold for 
widespread  infringements  and  direct  powers  of  the  Commission  to  address  them.  Some  national 
procedural adjustments would be needed in particular, as regards, for instance, possible referrals of 
cases between the Member States and the Commission and implementation of the non bis in idem 
principle. Stronger impacts could be felt in countries with many enforcement authorities as various 
procedural  rules  would  have  to  be  adjusted  (e.g.  DE  and  CZ)  and  in  countries  with  enforcement 
through civil courts (e.g. UK, LU, DK etc.).    

52 

 
 
 
 
 
Feasibility 
Compared to the other options, feasibility of this option is the lowest, because: 
At  this  point  of  time,  the  Commission  could  only  enforce  EU  consumer  acquis  that  is  directly 
applicable in the Member States, i.e. contained in regulations. Horizontal consumer legislation, e.g. 
the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive and the Directive 
on Consumer Rights, consists of directives that must be transposed into national law and hence are 
not  directly  applicable.  At  present  the  Commission  could  therefore  only  effectively  enforce 
passenger rights legislation. Should, however, the new instruments, e.g. stemming from the REFIT 
of  consumer  acquis  or  from  the  on-going  initiatives  of  the  Digital  Agenda,  become  directly 
applicable  (i.e.  take  the  form  of  regulations)  it  would  be  hypothetically  possible  to  extend  the 
Commission enforcement powers to these new directly applicable instruments. 
Stakeholder support 
  In  the  public  consultation  more  than  half  (52%)  of  the  CPC  authorities  stated  that  the 
Commission  should  not  carry  out  case  investigations  (including  the  power  to  do  on-site 
investigations  or  request  information  from  traders)"117.  Since  this  option  encompasses  a  Union 
action  in  the  enforcement  of  consumer  protection  laws  (which  has  so  far  been  the  task  of  the 
Member States), political reluctance from Member States regarding this option is expected to be 
substantial. Even more so given that the possible legal basis for this action could be Article 352 
TFEU requiring decision by unanimity in the Council.    

  Consumer  and  trade  organisations  would  be  more  supportive  of  a  centralised  enforcement  to 
tackle  widespread  infringements.  Multinational  traders  in  particular  would  appreciate  stronger 
EU-level enforcement (be it through better co-ordination of enforcement actions or through EU-
level action). 

6.  HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? 

6.1.

  Comparison of options  

The policy options are compared based on the rating of their impacts as well as in terms 
of their contribution to the policy objectives set out in section 3.  

Option 1 (Baseline Scenario) would not entail additional cost or obligations but would 
not contribute to achieving the policy objectives. The non-compliance rate to consumer 
legislation  would  remain  high  and  consumers  would  continue  suffering  detriment 
because  of  ineffective  enforcement.  Enforcement  authorities  would  have  increasing 
difficulties  to  stop  dishonest  traders  who  explore  jurisdictional  boundaries  to  the 
detriment of consumers as they would employ new technological developments to spread 
their  malpractices  more  swiftly.  This  would  further  erode  the  capacity  of  national 
authorities and the Commission to stop infringements from taking place online. National 
authorities  would  find  it  difficult  or  impossible  to  investigate  certain  types  of  cross-
border  infringements  both  in  the  digital  space  and  offline,  particularly  where  test 
purchases/mystery  shopping  exercises  are  required 
the 
infringement.  Short-term  infringements  and  parallel  domestic  infringements  would 
remain outside the scope of the CPC Regulation. Inconsistent enforcement would remain 

to  obtain  evidence  of 

117 54 stakeholders answered these questions. 

53 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
and  possibly  increase.  Although  coordinated  enforcement  actions  would  continue,  they 
would not reach their full potential as regards enforcement consistency, scope and speed, 
and  would  be  lagging  behind  market  developments.  Consumer  detriment  is  likely  to 
increase in the future and the digital business environment would remain suboptimal. The 
option would not be in line with stakeholders' expectations and the Commission's Digital 
Single Market Strategy, where it is said that: "The Commission will submit a proposal to 
review the Regulation on Consumer Protection Cooperation that will clarify and develop 
the  powers  of  enforcement  authorities  and  improve  the  coordination  of  their  market 
monitoring activities and alert mechanisms to detect infringements faster". 

Option  2  (Implementing  legislation  and  non-legislative  ("soft  law")  measures  to 
improve  and  clarify  CPC  cooperation,  combined  with  self-regulation  to  increase 
business  compliance).  Although  the  costs  of  this  option  would  be  negligible,  it  would 
only partially achieve the objectives. Even though these measures could clarify to some 
extent the mutual assistance mechanism and the framework for coordinated enforcement 
actions,  they  would  not  provide  a  sound  legal  basis  so  that  national  authorities  could 
cooperate  on  cross-border  issues  with  "digitally  fit"  powers  (test  purchases/mystery 
shopping,  blocking  of  websites,  sanctions  in  a  cross-border  context,  etc.).  This  would 
thus  not  allow  for  the  development  of  enforcement  cooperation  beyond  the  current 
Regulation. Short-term infringements and infringements happening in parallel in multiple 
Member  States  would  remain  outside  the  scope  of  the  CPC  Regulation.  However, 
national authorities would benefit from clarified procedures (e.g., binding time limits, use 
of  the  alert  mechanism,  clarified  framework  to  address  widespread  infringements)  that 
could reduce the cost of enforcement and speed up their actions. Voluntary preparation 
and  submission  to  the  Commission  of  multi-annual  enforcement  plans  and  resources 
benchmarking would encourage prioritisation but not ensure that more adequate resources 
are  attributed  to  cross-border  enforcement  cooperation.  The  consumer  detriment  would 
be  at  a  risk  of  remaining  high  as  the  proposed  measures  would  have  a  limited  impact. 
Self-regulation  has  not  yet  proven  to  be  a  sustainable  solution  in  the  long  term.  This 
option  would  not  be  in  line  with  stakeholders'  expectations  and  the  ambition  of  the 
Digital Single Market Strategy. 

Option  3  (Revision  of  the  CPC  Regulation  to  extend  its  scope  and  strengthen  its 
efficiency) would entail higher costs than options 1-2, but would achieve all the policy 
objectives  at  a  reasonable  cost  for  national  authorities  and  the  Commission.  It  would 
improve  the  effectiveness  of  public  action  and  the  governance  of  EU  retail  markets, 
which  would  become  fairer  and  more  transparent  for  traders  and  consumers.  Costs  for 
public  action  and  transaction  costs  for  economic  actors  would  decrease.  This  would 
generally improve competitiveness of EU economy.  

Consumers  would  benefit  from  a  higher  level  of  protection  when  purchasing  cross-
border, especially online. It was estimated, for the subset of five online markets sampled, 
that  a  decrease  of  10  points  in  the  non-compliance  rate  of  37%  could  reduce  the 
detriment from an estimated EUR 770 million per year to about EUR 539 million, i.e. by 
30%.  A  single  action  against  a  widespread  practice  would  further  reduce  consumer 

54 

 
 
 
 
 
detriment  across  the  EU  by  estimated  EUR  68  million  (e.g.  as  estimated  in  the  in-app 
purchases case).     

The new harmonised EU procedure to address widespread infringements would allow the 
Commission  to  optimally  support  the  Member  States  in  their  enforcement  efforts. 
Improved coordination would allow national authorities to avoid parallel proceedings (it 
was  estimated  that  ca.  EUR  180,000  (in  case  the  action  is  successful)  and  ca.  EUR 
815,000 (in case the action is not successful) could be saved annually in total. Optimised 
evidence gathering in the new mandatorily initiated coordination procedure would allow 
reuse of evidence in national proceedings and thus save costs and time for enforcement 
authorities  and  ensure  maximum  consistency  of  enforcement  actions.  Sharing  evidence 
on  market  conditions  would  allow  early  detection  of  malpractices  and  an  alignment  of 
priorities,  resulting  in  targeted  actions  addressing  widespread  infringements  across  the 
EU. This would result in a stronger deterrence of infringements. The option is strongly 
supported by stakeholders and is feasible. 

Option  4  (Revision  of  the  CPC  Regulation:  Policy  Option  3  +  additional  elements 
regarding minimum powers and monitoring of Member States' enforcement efforts) 
would achieve all the policy objectives, yet at higher cost than option 3. 

On  top  of  the  additional  powers,  a  general  auditing  system  would  verify  the  overall 
quality of enforcement of the consumer protection legislation in Member States. Auditing 
would be the strongest means to verify how Member States comply with their obligations 
under  the  CPC  Regulation.  However,  evidence  from  similar  audit  systems  in  the  food 
and  feed  area  suggests  the  resources  necessary  to  carry  out  audits  are  substantial. 
Therefore  the  general  auditing  system,  despite  its  several  positive  impacts,  would  not 
generate  an  increase  in  benefits  that  would  correspond  to  its  cost.  In  contrast,  option  3 
would  provide  sufficient  means  for  the  Commission  to  monitor  enforcement  efforts  of 
Member States via their multi-annual enforcement plans and benchmarking. Further, the 
powers added in option 4, even though very effective for tackling deceitful commercial 
practices,  would  be  more  costly  and  complex  to  implement  legally  to  ensure 
proportionality of action and respect for fundamental rights. Lastly, compared to option 
3, option 4 would be only partially supported by stakeholders.  

Option 5 (New Regulation providing the European Commission with direct powers 
to  address  widespread  infringements  meeting  the  threshold,  combined  either  with 
option  3  or  with  option  4  as  regards  the  review  of  the  existing  CPC  cooperation) 
would entail the highest cost compared to other options but would contribute the most to 
the achievement of the policy objectives and, if combined with option 3, would display 
the  most  positive  impacts.  It  would  ensure  the  most  consistent  enforcement  of  EU 
consumer law in the Single Market as it would create a "one-stop-shop" for widespread 
infringements  meeting  the  threshold.  Assuming  that  the  Commission  adopted  12 
decisions per year, as it does on average in EU competition policy (antitrust and cartels 

55 

 
 
 
 
 
only118),  the  reduction  in  consumer  detriment  would  be  significant  (e.g.  in  the  in-app 
purchases case alone, the estimated consumer detriment was EUR 68 million).     

At present this option would however not be feasible, because the bulk of EU consumer 
law consists of directives, which are not directly applicable. It is also not supported by 
most stakeholders, in particular by the Member States. In addition, the likely legal basis 
for this action, Article 352 TFEU, requires unanimity in the Council.  

Outcome of the comparison:  

The  option  that  currently  contributes  most  to  the  achievement  of  the  policy  objectives 
and  at  the  same  time  displays  the  most  positive  impacts  is  Option  3:  Revision  of  the 
CPC Regulation to extend its scope and strengthen its efficiency, combined with the 
soft  law  measures  from  the  option  2  regarding  voluntary  benchmarking  of  resources 
dedicated by Member States to the CPC cooperation. 

118 Cf. Commission staff working document of 4.6.2015 accompanying the Report from the Commission to 
the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions on Competition Policy 2014, SWD(2015) 113 final. On page 24 the report mentions: "since 
May 2004, the Commission has investigated potential antitrust infringements across almost all sectors of 
the economy and has adopted over 130 decisions, many of which landmark precedents". 

56 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Summary table 1 – Assessment of impacts 

Baseline 
Option 1  

Option 2: 
Implementing/soft 
law measures 

Option  3:  Revision  of  the 
CPC Regulation 

Impacts 

 Option  4:  PO3 
+additional 
powers  to  address 
deceitful  practices 
and 
auditing 
system 

Option  5  direct  enforcement  powers  for  the 
Commission 

+ PO3 

+ PO4 

Economic 

Fundamental 
Rights (FR) 

0 

0 

Compliance 
costs 
Commission) 

(MS, 

0 

Minor positive 

Positive 

Highly positive 

Highly positive 

Highly positive 

but 
impact 

Positive  impact  on 
consumer 
protection 
negative 
on other FRs 
High 
EU:  ca.  €3.5  mln 
per year 
MS: as per PO3  

Highly  positive  impact 
on  consumer  protection, 
no  negative  impact  on 
other FRs 

Positive impact on 
consumer protection but 
negative impact on other 
FRs 

Very high 
EU: ca. €7 mln per year 
MS: as per PO3 

Highest 
EU: ca. €10 mln per year 
MS: as per PO4 

Positive 
impact  on 
consumer  protection, 
no  negative 
impact 
on other FRs 

Highly  positive  impact  on 
consumer  protection,  no 
negative  impact  on  other 
FRs 

Negligible 
EU:  ca.  €40,000  per 
year; 
MS: 
per 
(one-off 
authority 
familiarisation costs); 

ca.€870 

ca. 

€3,000 

Low 
EU: ca. € 300,000 per year 
per 
MS: 
authority 
(one-off 
familiarisation  costs);  ca.  € 
23,600 (0.378 FTE) per one 
authority  per  coordinated 
action  per  year 
the 
the 
authority 
action;  ca.  €174,000  for  all 
MSs  per  one  coordinated 
action 
(mandatory 
procedure) per year 

if 
leading 

is 

Feasibility 

0 

High, but would be 
below stakeholders' 
expectations  

High and supported well by 
stakeholders 

Low and not 
supported by all 
stakeholders 

Low and not supported 
by stakeholders 

Low  and not supported 
by  stakeholders 

57 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.  THE PREFERRED OPTION  

The option which contributes most  to  the achievement of the policy  objectives and has 
the most positive overall impact is Option 3. In addition to what has been said above, the 
benefits and costs of the preferred option's measures are presented in detail in Annex VI. 

7.1.

  Legal basis 

Article  169(2)  TFUE  provides  that  the  Union  shall  contribute  to  the  promotion  of 
consumers'  interests  and  ensure  a  high  level  of  consumers'  protection  by  adopting 
measures  pursuant  to  Article  114  TFUE  in  the  context  of  completion  of  the  Internal 
Market.  Former  Article  95  EC  (now  Article  114  TFEU)  is  the  legal  basis  for  the  CPC 
Regulation,  based  upon  the  aims  of  Article  26  TFEU  and  objectives  pursued  by  this 
Regulation.  Its  aim,  to  efficiently  and  effectively  tackle  cross-border  traders'  practices 
which disrupt the smooth functioning of the Internal Market, contributes to the removal 
of distortions of competition and the elimination of Internal Market obstacles (Article 26 
TFEU). The proposed initiative seeks to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
CPC  cross-border  enforcement  system  by  deepening  the  level  of  harmonisation  of  the 
CPC Regulation. As such it contributes to the same aims and objectives, and Article 114 
TFEU would therefore remain the legal basis for the proposed initiative. 

7.2.

  Consistency of the preferred option with other EU policies 

The preferred option would be fully consistent and compatible with existing EU policies, 
including  in  the  transport  sector,  where  the  specific  legislation  on  passenger  rights 
provides  for  rules  on  consumer  compensation,  assistance  and  care119.  The  preferred 
option  would  not  duplicate  the  existing  rules  in  this  legislation,  which  as  lex  specialis 
should  be  applied  first  to  address  compensation  issues  in  the  given  sector  (e.g.  to 
calculate  the  compensation).  It  would  merely  supplement  them  by  providing  lex 
generalis that would apply where such provisions are not applicable.  

7.3.

Impact  of  the  preferred  option  on  national  enforcement  systems  and 
laws  

The  preferred  option  would  neither  affect  the  Member  States'  competences  in 
enforcement,  nor  would  it  fully  harmonise  national  enforcement  systems.  It  would  not 
affect  internal  division  of  competences  among  authorities  at  national  level,  as  Member 
States  would  remain  responsible  for  their  institutional  set  up  and  designation  of 
competent authorities under the CPC Regulation. 

As is the case in the current CPC Regulation, the scope of the preferred option would be 
limited  to  intra-Community  infringements  (it  would  be  clarified,  however,  that  short- 
lived  infringements  and  widespread  infringements  with  a  cross-border  dimension 
committed  by  multinationals  in  several  countries  or  by  operators  in  certain  markets 
where  cross-border  competition  is  important  would  fall  within  the  scope  of  the  CPC 

119  E.g.  Article  7,  8  and  9  of  the  Regulation  (EC)  No  261/2004  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 
Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in 
the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights,  OJ L 46, 17.2.2004, p. 1. 

58 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
Regulation). Therefore the Member States would not be required to change their powers, 
procedures and other arrangements for domestic infringements.  

The  introduction  of  additional  powers  for  cross-border  cooperation  in  the  list  of 
minimum powers may have to be reflected in national procedural laws according to the 
current  availability  of  such  powers  in  the  Member  States.  However,  as  explained  in 
Annex V, this would be a limited burden as the necessary framework already exists in all 
Member  States  with  the  entry  into  force  of  the  CPC  Regulation  in  2006,  and  this 
framework would only have to be updated. 

59 

 
 
 
 
 
7.4.

  How would the option 3 solve the underlying problems mentioned in the 

section 1? 

7.4.1. 

Improved CPC mutual assistance mechanism 

Example in Box 2: A deceptive air carrier advertisement campaign that lasted 4 days but 
resulted in flight cancellations for months. The revised CPC Regulation would include short-
lived  intra-Community  infringements  in  the  scope  of  the  CPC  Regulation.  The  requested  CPC 
authority would be able to take an action under Article 8 of the CPC Regulation even after the air 
carrier  advertisement  campaign  had  ended:  e.g.  sanction  the  trader  concerned  and  prevent  the 
infringement to be repeated in the future.  

Example in Box 3: Cheap design furniture online never delivered, but impossible to catch 
the  responsible  trader.  The  option  3  foresees  an  additional  package  of  minimum  powers 
necessary  for  the  CPC  authorities  to  effectively  cease  and  prohibit  intra-Community 
infringements, in particular which occur in the digital environment. E.g., thanks to the additional 
power to follow the financial flows by obtaining the information from police, financial authorities 
banks  and/or  from  domain  registries  would  permit  the  authorities  establishing  the  identity, 
location and operational structure of the trader and stopping such practices much faster than now 
(it  took  more  than  three  years  for  the  CPC  authorities  to  discover  who  was  behind  the  trade 
mentioned  in  the  example  in  Box  3).  Further,  the  CPC  authorities  would  also  be  able  to  take 
interim  measures  and  close  down  the  websites  concerned  by  preventing  further  detriment  for 
consumers from this widespread infringement. 

Example  in  Box  4:  Difficult  cooperation  with  domain  registrars.  Thanks  to  the  additional 
powers  to  cooperate  under  the  option  3,  the  authorities  would  have  the  power  to  request 
information from domain registrars to reveal the trader's identity and take an enforcement action 
(e.g. close down its website, take an interim measure to stop its infringing practice) against the 
trader concerned.  

Example in Box 6: divergence in the requirements for "evidence" among countries. Option 
3 foresees mutual recognition of evidence (outcome of investigation) regarding intra-Community 
infringements.  The  evidence  gathered  by  the  country  X  submitted  in  a  specifically  required 
format  (e.g.  established  by  the  implementing  legislation)  would  therefore  be  recognised  by  the 
country Y without any validation or similar legal process even if the national law of the country 
Y  provides  for  different  rules  on  the  collection  of  such  evidence.  The  evidence,  which  was 
lawfully  obtained  in  the  country  X,  would  be  admissible  by  a  fact  finder  (competent 
authority/court)  in  all  other  Member  States,  unless  its  admission  would  adversely  affect  the 
fairness of the procedure or the rights of defence as enshrined in Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter 
of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the  EU.  This  would  ensure  that  no  intra-Community  infringement  is 
left unaddressed and would reduce delays in handling of cases under the CPC mutual assistance 
mechanism. 

60 

 
 
 
 
 
 
7.4.2.  A  streamlined  procedure  for  a  coordinated  enforcement  action  to  address  a 

widespread infringement 

Examples in Boxes 8-9: widespread infringements  

The  revised  CPC  Regulation  would  introduce  a  new  EU-level  coordination  procedure  for 
widespread infringements meeting the EU-dimension threshold. New elements would be: 

 - threshold defining what a widespread infringement with EU-dimension is; 

- mandatory coordination by the Commission The proposed threshold is high enough  to ensure 
that the Commission would only be involved in serious widespread infringements; 

- mandatory cooperation by the Member States concerned by the infringement; 

-  single  procedure,  common  enforcement  position  as  a  basis  for  the  action,  and  this  procedure 
would  only  result  in  undertakings  from  traders.  Where  traders  offer  no  undertakings  or  fail  to 
implement  them,  the  CPC  authorities  would  coordinate  mutual  assistance  requests  (they  would 
chose who is best placed to enforce on behalf of the others);  

- basic procedural steps including respect of rights of defence of traders. 

This  procedure  would  ensure  consistent  responses  to  common  problems  and  legal  certainty  for 
traders  wishing  to  implement  a  single  commercial  strategy  for  the  entire  European  market  but 
who  have  to  face  and  cope  with  plural  regulatory  and  enforcement  systems.  So  in  case  of  the 
Apple guarantee case (Box 8), such a procedure would be launched (as the threshold would be 
fulfilled)  with  the  aim  to  achieve  one  common  enforcement  position  at  the  EU  level  with  the 
trader concerned. The enforcement outcome would be consistent across the EU and all consumers 
would benefit from an equivalent protection in concrete terms. 

In case of examples in  Box 9 (CPC coordinated actions in the in-app and car rental cases), the 
procedure would be streamlined, resulting in ca. EUR 180,000 savings emanating from the less 
time devoted to the action in each Member State thanks to more streamlined pooling of national 
resources and the increased coordination role of the Commission. In addition, such a large scope 
action would have a stronger deterrent effect as back by a strong legal basis. 

8.  MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

To  assess  the  effectiveness  in  achieving  the  objectives  of  the  option  introduced,  the 
following core progress indicators have been identified in line with the objectives of the 
policy  action.  These  indicators  can  serve  as  the  basis  for  its  evaluation,  as  well  as 
possible targets to be achieved seven years after the entry into application of the revised 
Regulation.  

Objectives  
Reduction  in  the 
non-compliance 
rate    and  in  the 
related  consumer 
detriment 
(ca. 
EUR 770mln) 

Core indicators 
  Non-compliance 

rate  

  Screening  of 

at 
2,500 
least 
websites  in  the  5 
online 
consumer 
sectors  against  key 
consumer  rules  to 

Baseline 
The  non-compliance  rate  in 
the  5  online  sectors  was 
37% in 2014. 

Target in 5 years  
-10  points  in  non-
compliance rate in 
these sectors 

61 

 
 
 
 
 
 
gauge    compliance 
with  EU  consumer 
law  in  the  7th  year 
since 
the 
application  of  the 
CPC Regulation 
Number of CPC mutual 
assistance  requests,  for 
which  the  established 
limits 
time 
binding 
were not respected 

Improved  CPC 
cooperation 
to 
address 
intra-
Community 
infringements 

of 
CPC 
in 

Effectiveness 
the 
cooperation 
tackling 
widespread 
infringements  
Improved  market 
surveillance 

Improve 
priorities  setting, 
and 
strategy 
dedicated 
resources 
enforcement 
cooperation at EU 
level 

for 

of 

Number 
coordinated 
enforcement actions  

CPC 

of 

alerts 
Number 
notified 
by 
stakeholders,  including 
"for 
Commission 
information" 
Elaboration  every  two 
years 
national 
enforcement plans 

of 

of 
Elaboration 
benchmarking 
of 
resources,  dedicated  to 
CPC enforcement 

time 

there  are  no 
Currently 
for 
limits 
binding 
handling 
CPC  mutual 
assistance  requests.  By  the 
end of 2014, almost 40% of 
the information requests and 
50%  of 
the  enforcement 
requests  were  not  treated 
the 
closed  within 
and 
benchmarks 
the 
in 
Operating  Guidelines.  26% 
of  all  open  cases  were 
created more than two years 
ago. 
Ca. 1-2 actions per year. 

set 

halving  of  these 
% 

3-4  actions  per 
year on average 

Currently  this  is  0,  as  the 
Regulation  does  not  permit 
this. 

At  least  10  per 
year 

Currently not existing –only 
biennial  reports  (Article  21 
of the CPC Regulation). 

of 

Existence 
national 
enforcement 
plans, 
benchmarking  of 
resources 
dedicated  to  CPC 
enforcement  

62 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9.  Annex I: Procedural information 

Lead DG: Directorate General Justice and Consumers. 

Agenda Planning 

Reference AP N° 

 Short title 

Foreseen adoption 

2015/JUST/014 

Review of the CPC Regulation 

 First half of 2016 

9.1.

  Article 21a of the CPC Regulation ("review clause") 

Article 21a of the CPC Regulation ("review clause") requires the Commission to assess 
the effectiveness and operational mechanisms of the Regulation and thoroughly examine 
the  possible  inclusion  in  the  Annex  of  additional  laws  that  protect  collective  economic 
consumers’  interests.  It  requires  submitting  a  report  to  the  European  Parliament  and  to 
the Council, which has to be based on an external evaluation and extended consultation 
of  all  relevant  stakeholders,  and  can  be  accompanied,  if  appropriate,  by  a  legislative 
proposal. 

9.2.

  External evaluation of the CPC Regulation 

In  2012,  the  European  Commission  contracted  an  external  evaluation  of  the  CPC 
Regulation by ICF International. The first external evaluation120 concluded that the CPC 
Regulation  had  been  beneficial  for  the  competent  authorities,  consumers  and  traders, 
thereby  confirming  the  appropriateness  and  relevance  of  its  objectives.  It  however  also 
pointed out that these objectives had not been fully achieved and that the CPC Regulation 
had not been exploited to its full potential.  

Specifically,  the  external  evaluation  found  that  there  remained  a  number  of  practical 
and legal barriers to effective cooperation between CPC authorities, which ultimately 
undermined the efficiency and effectiveness of the CPC Regulation, most notably: 

  differences  between  CPC  competent  authorities  in  terms  of  their  capabilities, 

capacities and understanding of the CPC Regulation and the tools available; 

 

tendency among CPC competent authorities to prioritise domestic over cross-border 
cases; 

120  External  Evaluation  of  the  Consumer  Protection  Regulation,  Final  Report  by  the  Consumer  Policy 
Evaluation 
2012: 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/enforcement/docs/cpc_regulation_inception_report_revised290212_en.pdf       

Consortium, 

December 

17 

63 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
  no  formalised  systems  for  recording,  storing  and  exchanging  intelligence,  and 

organising cooperation; 

 

insufficient  minimum  investigative  and  enforcement  powers  mandated  by  the  CPC 
Regulation under Article 4(6); 

  differences  in  national  judicial  systems  and  procedural  rules  causing  delays  and 

difficulties in cross-border cooperation; and 

 

lack of recognition of the notion of “EU relevant” infringements. 

Furthermore,  the  external  evaluation  recommended  two  courses  of  actions  to  resolve 
these issues: 

  Non-legislative  actions  such  as  provision  of  better  guidance,  monitoring, 

communication etc.; and 

  Legislative  action  i.e.  strengthening  of  the  CPC  Regulation  to  address  the  issues 
relating  to  investigative  and  enforcement  powers  of  national  competent  authorities; 
procedural  law  fragmentation  affecting  the  handling  of  cross-border  infringement 
cases;  enhanced  coordination;  alert  and  intelligence  sharing;  and  the  role  of  the 
Commission.  The  external  evaluation  also  issued  recommendations  regarding  the 
scope of the CPC Regulation and the legal acts to be included in its Annex. 

9.3.

  Commission report of 2014 on the functioning of the CPC Regulation 

In July 2014, the European Commission adopted a Report on the functioning of the CPC 
Regulation since its entry into operation in 2006121.  

The  report  highlighted  its  positive  results  to  improve  the  level  of  compliance  of 
businesses  to  consumer  legislation.  For  instance,  more  than  3,300  websites  have  been 
corrected  since  2007  thanks  to  the  annual  exercises  of  coordinated  screening  of  e-
commerce  websites  ("sweeps").  The  report  also  stressed  the  value  of  coordinated 
enforcement actions, facilitated by the Commission that required the operators concerned 
to change these practices. In 2014, for example, the CPC network tackled the misleading 
marketing of online games as "free" when in fact they included in-app offers, and in 2015 
it  addressed  the  lack  of  transparency  in  car  rental  online  bookings122.  These  actions 
resulted in a significant change of practices by major market players and were considered 
as  an  efficient  and  pragmatic  model  by  the  multinational  traders  concerned  and  by 
national authorities. 

121  Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European  Economic  and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the functioning of Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 
of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  27  October  2004  on  cooperation  between  national 
authorities  responsible  for  the  enforcement  of  consumer  protection  laws  (the  Regulation  on  consumer 
protection cooperation), 1.7.2014, COM(2014) 439 final. 
122 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/consumer-marketing/news/150713_en.htm  

64 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
However,  the  report  also  identified  challenges  and  difficulties.  It  stressed  the  need  to 
increase  the  rapidity,  agility,  and  consistency  of  CPC  enforcement  cooperation  and 
consumer protection, in particular in relation to online purchases and to ensure adequate 
consumer protection in the digital sphere and across borders.  

In line with the principles of better regulation, the report also confirmed the commitment 
of  the  Commission  to  study  the  possible  improvements  to  the  CPC  Regulation  on  the 
basis  of  a  thorough  impact  assessment.  This  would  allow  the  Commission  to  complete 
the review called for in Article 21a of the CPC Regulation and to prepare grounds for a 
decision  whether  a  legislative  proposal  for  the  amendment  of  the  CPC  Regulation  is 
necessary. 

9.4.

Inter-Service Steering Group 

An  Inter-Service  Steering  Group  was  set  up  in  2013.  In  total,  seven  meetings  were 
organised:  on  26  June  2013,  on  5  May  and  18  September  in  2014,  on  25  February,  16 
July, 14 October 2015 and 20 January 2016. The following directorates and services were 
consulted:  CNECT,  COMP,  FISMA,  GROW,  MOVE,  SANTE,  SJ,  SG,  JRC  and  the 
executive agency CHAFEA. The feedback received from these directorates and services 
has been taken into account in the report.  

The  ISSG  approved  the  Inception  Impact  Assessment  that  was  published  twice  (in 
September 2013123 and republished to comply with the new Better Regulation Guidelines 
in October 2015124) and the Impact Assessment Report. 

Pursuant  to  the  requirements  of  the  better  regulation  guidelines,  the  minutes  of  the 
meeting of 14 October 2015 were submitted to the Regulatory Scrutiny Board. 

9.5.

  Consultation of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board 

The Impact Assessment Report was examined by the Regulatory  Scrutiny Board on 25 
November  2015.  The  Board  gave  an  overall  positive  opinion  provided  the  impact 
assessment report is improved with special attention to the following aspects: 

Board's Recommendations 

Implementation  of  the  recommendations 
into the revised IA Report 

1.  Clarify  the  problem  section  by 
underlying  when  the  inefficiencies 
of the CPC Regulation are due to a 
lack  of  clarity  of  the  current  legal 

1. The problem section 1 was clarified in this 
respect.  Additional  examples  were  provided 
and  the  structure  was  revised  to  illustrate 
better  that  the  current  shortcomings  of  the 

123   http://ec.europa.eu/smart-

regulation/impact/planned_ia/docs/2014_sanco_001_consumer_protection_cooperation_review_en.pdf  

124   http://ec.europa.eu/smart-

regulation/roadmaps/docs/2015_just_014_review_cpc_regulation_2006_2004_en.pdf  

65 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
framework or a lack of commitment 
of  the  Member  States  to  comply 
with  their  obligations  and  linking 
clearly problems to solutions. 

2.  Reinforce  the  intervention  logic 
concrete 
illustrating  with 
by 
proposed 
examples 
the 
how 
amendments  would  solve 
the 
underlying problems. 

increased 

3.Reinforce  the  argumentation  why 
role 
of 
the 
an 
law 
in  consumer 
Commission 
enforcement 
to  address  pan-
European  infringements  is  needed 
the 
and  explain  more 
related  legal  and  implementation 
issues for Member States and their 
views in this respect (if known). 

in  detail 

with 

4. Clarify the interaction of the CPC 
Regulation 
sectorial 
instruments  listed  in  its  annex  (as 
include 
some  of 
remedies  such  as  compensation 
mechanisms for passenger rights). 

them  already 

the 

legal 

since 

CPC  cooperation  are  mostly  due  to  the 
framework.  The 
limitations  of 
revised  report  summarises  more  clearly  the 
initiatives  undertaken 
the  CPC 
Regulation  came  into  force  to  address  its 
current limitations (Box 7) and explains better 
why they are not sufficient for the future. The 
problem section was restructured in a clearer 
manner  (drivers-problems-consequences)  so 
that  the  intervention  logic  is  more  coherent. 
The  problem  tree  was  also  included  in  the 
report. 

2.  The  problem  section  and  objectives  were 
clarified  to  ensure  more  coherence  in  the 
intervention logic. Examples were provided to 
illustrate  how 
the  proposed  amendments 
would solve the underlying problems (section 
7.4). 

3.  The  revised  report  emphasises  successes 
obtained  notably  through  the  coordinated 
actions  on  in-app  purchases  and  car  rental 
and the pivotal role the Commission played to 
complete  these  actions  successfully  (section 
1.4.2.2). The report points more clearly to the 
future  opportunities  that  could  be  generated 
with  the  proposed  amendments  (section  7.4). 
Member  States'  views  on  a  single  EU  level 
procedure  are  provided  in  the  assessment  of 
the option 3 and Annex II. 

4.  All  sectorial  legislation  in  the  current 
annex  and  proposed  to  be  further  included 
their  existing 
to  review 
were  screened 
remedies and explain the interaction with the 
CPC  system,  this  screening  is  to  be  found  in 
Annex VII  

66 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9.6.

Studies to support the impact assessment 

To  obtain  research  and  to  strengthen  the  evidence  basis  of  the  problem  description  for 
this impact assessment, the Commission contracted an external impact assessment study 
by  ICF  International.  The  Commission  also  contracted  Grimaldi  Studio  Legale  to 
deliver an additional study providing an in-depth assessment of the implementation of the 
current investigative and enforcement powers of national enforcement authorities and a 
typology  of  relevant  national  procedural  law  rules  that  might  impact  cross-border 
enforcement  in  the  CPC  network.  Extracts  of  these  studies  will  be  published  together 
with the Commission's proposal on the review of the CPC Regulation. 

67 

 
 
 
 
 
 
10.  Annex II: Stakeholder consultation 

Several  consultations  to  gather  information  about  the  current  application  of  the  CPC 
Regulation as well as of the possible elements for its revision were carried out, respecting 
the minimum European Commission's standards. The results gave useful indication of the 
positions  of  different  stakeholders  and  were  taken  into  account  throughout  the  impact 
assessment process. In particular: 

10.1.

  Regular  consultations  of  our  consumer  organisations,  networks  and 

high level officials of national enforcers 

Through  2013-2015  regular  consultations  on  enforcement  of  consumer  organisations, 
networks and high level officials of national enforcers took place through the established 
networks  of  DG  JUST  which  meet  regularly:  the  CPC  Committee  (CPC  authorities); 
ECCG  (the  European  Consumer  Consultative  Group  is  the  main  forum  to  consult 
national  and  European  consumer  organisations),  and  Consumer  Protection  Network  (a 
forum of high level officials from the consumer protection authorities).  

10.2.

  European Consumer Summit dedicated to enforcement in March 2013 

Taking  stock  of  the  2012  external  evaluation's  results,  some  480  stakeholders  at  the 
European Consumer Summit in March 2013 discussed ways to make enforcement more 
effective  and  efficient.  The  conclusions125  show  that  the  CPC  Regulation  is  generally 
beneficial  to  consumers  and  authorities,  but  it  would  need  several  improvements  to 
obtain  the  full  benefits  of  the  Regulation.  The  discussions  during  the  summit  also 
stressed  that  a  more  integrated  approach  to  enforcement  of  consumer  rights  at  an  EU 
level was necessary especially to address widespread infringements. 

10.3.

  Public consultation in winter 2013-2014 

A web-based public consultation was launched in October 2013 and ended in February 
2014.  The  Commission  proactively  promoted  this  public  consultation  through  different 
networks  such  as 
the  Consumer  Policy  Network  (CPN),  European  Consumer 
Consultative Group (ECCG), and the European Consumer Centers Network (ECC-Net). 
Stakeholders  were  invited  to  give  their  views  on  how  to  improve  the  functioning  and 
effectiveness of the CPC Regulation focusing on three areas: (i) methods for identifying 
markets  trends  and  infringements;  (ii)  need  for  additional  powers  to  cooperate  and 
common  procedural  standards  for  enforcement  authorities;  and  (iii),  given  the 
constrained  public  budgets,  whether  and  how  coordinated  enforcement  at  the  EU  level 
could  help  to  combat  more  effectively  widespread  breaches  of  consumer  laws  harming 
consumers and traders across Europe.  

In  total  222  responses  were  received  from  a  broad  range  of  stakeholders.  In  terms  of 
Member States, the stakeholders from Italy and Spain were the most represented among 

125 http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/events/ecs_2013/report/Summitconclusions.pdf  

68 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
all participants, accounting for 18% and 10.9% of all responses, respectively. France and 
Bulgaria accounted each for 7.6%, while Germany for 5.7% of all responses. In terms of 
profile, 36% of respondents were public authorities (CPC enforcers, sectorial regulators 
as  well  as  the  ministries  concerned),  followed  by  consumer  associations  and  business 
associations.  The  public  consultation  was  overall  sufficiently  representative  by  the 
stakeholders directly concerned by the CPC Regulation's review.  

Stakeholder representation profile (number of replies = 222) 

International body (other than EU institution)

EU institution

0% 

0% 

University or research organisation

2% 

Enterprise

Business association or industry interest group

Self-employed

5% 

6% 

6% 

European Consumer Centres

8% 

Consumer association

Public authority or government

Other

17% 

21% 

% of responses 

36% 

69 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10.4.

  Stakeholders' support regarding the key elements of the option 3 

With regard to the main areas addressed in the online public consultation, the following 
results could be highlighted: 

1)  Additional minimum powers for CPC authorities to cooperate 
Additional powers were well supported by all stakeholders groups (public authorities, 
consumer  associations,  ECCs,  business  and  individual  consumers  =  159  replies  were 
received  on  this  question),  in  particular  the  powers  to  carry  out  test  purchases  for 
investigative purposes'; 'an explicit power (under defined conditions) to name infringing 
traders’; ‘the power to request penalty payments to recover illicitly obtained gains’; and 
‘the  power  to  require  interim  measures,  awaiting  the  completion  of  full  proceedings’. 
These powers received more than 50% support by each stakeholder group. 

Public  authorities,  businesses  and  ECCs  were  less  supportive  of  the  introduction  of 
minimum  powers  to  impose  sanctions  for  ceased  ('short-lived')  infringements  and 
application of more stringent sanctions to cross-border infringements (on average support 
of  30%).  In  particular  respondents  from  Germany  were  less  supporting  of  granting 
additional  interventions  tools  to  enforcers.  Conversely,  consumer  organisations 
strongly  supported  these  powers:  57%  supported  stringent  sanctions  and  70% 
supported sanctions for ceased infringements. 

It can be concluded from the regular contacts and missions to Member States that: 

o  Majority of enforcement authorities would also support stronger powers (such as 
tracing of financial flows, freezing assets and block websites). There are however 
some  authorities  that  would  be  more  cautious  about  stronger  powers,  namely 
authorities  from  Sweden,  Germany,  Czech  Republic,  Luxembourg  and 
Ireland.  

o  As  regards  facilitation  of  consumer  redress  the  main  supporters  of  these 
measures  seem  to  be  authorities  from  Germany,  Austria  and  the  UK.  Some 
other  Member  States  (Eastern  Europe,  Italy,  Ireland  and  Luxembourg)  are 
more reluctant as they fear that such measures could be costly for the competent 
authorities,  other  authorities  are  neutral.  Business  associations  are  also  less 
supportive  of  this  measure.  On  contrary,  consumer  organizations  strongly 
support  this  measure  (34  who  responded  in  the  public  consultation  were 
unanimously in favour). 

2)  Commission's involvement in addressing widespread infringements 
Almost  all  respondents  (190  answered  this  question)  acknowledged  that  widespread 
infringements  require  a  specific  action.  Only  6%  did  not  see  importance  of  specific 
enforcement cooperation to handle EU-level infringements. 

However, stakeholders differ as regards concrete measures they would support: 

70 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
o  More  than  half  of  enforcement  authorities  would  be  interested  in  a  single  EU 
procedure  to  tackle  such  infringements;  supporters  of  stronger  Commission 
role are mainly authorities in Spain, Austria, the Netherlands and France.  
o  UK,  Italy,  Germany,  Ireland,  Czech  Republic  and  Luxembourg  are  more 
skeptical  about  this  measure,  but  do  acknowledge  that  better  coordination  is 
needed to tackle such infringements effectively.  

o  Position of other authorities is shifting between these two groups. 

Development  of  EU-level  actions  is  clearly  the  most  controversial  issue:  Member 
States,  while  agreeing  there  is  a  need  to  have  efficient  common  solutions,  are  keen  to 
retain their enforcement prerogative. The retained option 3 takes this into account. 

o  Business organizations support the development of coordination of enforcement 
at the EU level as they clearly see the benefits of one-stop shop and uniform rules 
for their business.  

o  Consumer  organizations  also  strongly  support  the  enforcement  cooperation 
procedure  at  EU  level.  BEUC  (comprising  41  consumer  organisations  from  31 
countries)  was  particularly  vocal  on  this.  The  minority  view  is  UK  consumer 
organisation  Which?  as  they  do  not  see  a  need  for  a  centralized  enforcement 
procedure. Which? believes resources should be focused on strengthening cross-
border cooperation procedures. 

3)  Strengthened market surveillance (e.g. alert mechanism) 
Practically  all  enforcement  authorities  support  in  principle  the  improvement  of  the 
surveillance mechanism. 

In  particular  ECCs  (83%),  consumer  associations  (75%)  and  business  (62%)  have 
called for more possibilities for them to influence enforcement prioritisation and to signal 
infringements  via  the  alert  mechanism.  Public  authorities  were  more  cautious  about 
involving third parties in the market surveillance mechanism, as they fear that this would 
negatively  impact  the  confidentiality  of  their  investigations  (25%  of  69  authorities 
considered this measure as a low priority; 39% as a medium and 36% as a high priority). 

10.5.

  More detailed public consultation results 

Summary of all stakeholders' views in the public consultation 

  Overall, there was a clear call from stakeholders to increase efforts towards effective 

enforcement of consumer laws. 

  Stakeholders126 support additional powers to cooperate for the national authorities 
to  deal  with  infringements,  with  a  particular  focus  on  powers  needed  to  address 
infringements 
test 
purchases/mystery shopping for investigative purposes (66% fully agrees); the power 

the  digital  environment: 

to  carry  out 

the  power 

in 

126 189 respondents answered the questions on additional powers. 

71 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
to  name  infringing  traders  (60%);  the  power  to  request  penalty  payments  from  the 
traders  to  recover  illicitly  obtained  gains  (60%),  and  the  power  to  require  interim 
measures (51%).  

  A  clear  majority  of  stakeholders  (88%)127  consider  useful  to  introduce  common 
procedural  standards/criteria  in  the  CPC  Regulation  to  overcome  procedural 
differences between national legal systems when tackling cross-border infringements.  
A  few  respondents  (in  particular  from  DE  and  UK),  however,  expressed  some 
reservations  regarding  the  idea  of  introducing  common  procedural  standards  in  the 
CPC  Regulation,  stating 
law  falls  within  national 
that  national  procedural 
competence128. 

  According to 87% of stakeholders129, it is necessary to include new elements into the 
CPC Regulation that would make the process of claiming compensation by individual 
consumers more user-friendly. 

  A clear majority of stakeholders (91%)130 call for an enhanced EU-level coordination 
mechanism  to  tackle  widespread  infringements.  According  to  stakeholders131,  the 
Commission  should  play  a  stronger  coordination  role 
these 
infringements; including a possibility to request Member States to impose sanctions 
on  non-compliant  undertakings  (71%)  and  define  evidence  based  priority  sectors 
where consumer conditions are the poorest (72%). A large share of stakeholders also 
support the Commission's direct involvement in carrying out preparatory prima facie 
investigations  (58%  support  the  Commission's  role),  on-site  investigations  (54%), 
requesting  a  trader  to  cease  an  infringement  (53%)  or  establishing  an  undertaking 
with the trader (49%). 

in  addressing 

127 193 respondents answered the question on common procedural standards. 
128 3 of the 12 respondents in Germany and 3 of the 7 respondents in the UK stated ‘no’ it would not be 
useful to introduce common standards or criteria in the CPC Regulation. 
129 196 respondents answered the question on making it easier for consumers to claim compensation. 
130 190 respondents answered this question. 
131 178 respondents answered the relevant questions. 

72 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Degree of support for the inclusion of following powers/procedures in the CPC Regulation, Number of replies (N) =159132 
Somewhat disagree 

Somewhat agree 

Fully agree 

The power to carry out test purchases for investigative purposes 
Consumer associations 
Public authorities and governments 
Other 
ECC 

An explicit power (under defined conditions) to name infringing traders 
Consumer associations 
Public authorities and governments 
Other 
ECC 

The power to request penalty payments to recover illicitly obtained gains 
Consumer associations 
Public authorities and governments 
Other 
ECC 

The power to require interim measures, awaiting the completion of full 
proceedings 
Consumer associations 
Public authorities and governments 
Other 
ECC 

The power to apply more stringent sanctions due to the cross-border nature of 
the infringement 
Consumer associations 
Public authorities and governments 
Other 
ECC 

The possibility to request the application of sanctions, regardless of whether the 
infringement has ceased or not 
Consumer associations 
Public authorities and governments 
Other  
ECC 

74% 
75% 
55% 
59% 

77% 
62% 
49% 
72% 

73% 
49% 
67% 
61% 

73% 
49% 
44% 
78% 

57% 
24% 
51% 
18% 

70% 
30% 
43% 
28% 

16% 
13% 
31% 
35% 

13% 
23% 
41% 
28% 

17% 
21% 
26% 
39% 

17% 
35% 
41% 
17% 

13% 
26% 
32% 
47% 

20% 
35% 
43% 
50% 

3% 
3% 
7% 
6% 

0% 
6% 
7% 
0% 

0% 
11% 
5% 
0% 

3% 
6% 
10% 
0% 

13% 
14% 
10% 
24% 

0% 
10% 
10% 
11% 

Fully disagree  No opinion 

0% 
3% 
0% 
0% 

0% 
6% 
0% 
0% 

0% 
8% 
2% 
0% 

0% 
7% 
2% 
0% 

7% 
29% 
2% 
12% 

0% 
18% 
2% 
6% 

6% 
7% 
7% 
0% 

10% 
4% 
2% 
0% 

10% 
10% 
0% 
0% 

7% 
4% 
2% 
6% 

10% 
7% 
5% 
0% 

10% 
7% 
2% 
6% 

132 N = 76 for Public authorities and governments, N = 34 for Consumer associations, N = 44 for Other (business, trade associations, individuals) and N = 18 for ECCs. 

73 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Variations in the views between different stakeholders as regards the necessity of inclusion 
of  new  elements  into  CPC  Regulation  that  would  make  the  process  of  claiming 
compensation by individual consumers more user friendly, Number of replies (N)=196 

University or research organisation

Self-employed

Public authority or government (please
specify level)

Other (please specify)

European Consumer Centres

4 

11 

58 

11 

3 

39 

17 

2 

1 

Necessary

Not necessary

No opinion

Enterprise (please specify size)

5 

1 

1 

Consumer association

Business association or industry interest
group

3 

34 

3 

3 

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Variations  in  the  views  of  stakeholders  as  regards  to  key  conditions  for  an  effective  alert 
system133 

Action 
categorisation 
of alerts (e.g. 
with an 
obligation to 
act/for 
information 
only) 

Possibility 
for the 
European 
Commission 
to post 
alerts 

Possibility 
for alerts 
to be made 
public 

Possibility for 
other 
organisations 
(e.g. consumer 
and trade 
associations, 
self-regulatory 
bodies, European 
Consumer 
Centres) to post 
alerts 

Consumer 
associations 

ECC 

Other 

Public authorities  

Top, highest 
priority 

Medium priority 

Low priority 

Top, highest 
priority 

Medium priority 

Low priority 

Top, highest 
priority 

Medium priority 

Low priority 

Top, highest 
priority 

Medium priority 

32% 

52% 

16% 

78% 

22% 

0% 

38% 

55% 

7% 

49% 

32% 

45% 

52% 

3% 

78% 

17% 

6% 

40% 

52% 

7% 

32% 

50% 

75% 

22% 

3% 

83% 

11% 

6% 

62% 

33% 

5% 

36% 

39% 

68% 

32% 

0% 

47% 

35% 

18% 

43% 

48% 

10% 

46% 

18% 

133  Consumer  associations  N  =  36,  Other  (business,  trade  associations,  individuals)  N  =  38,  ECC  =  14, 
Public authorities and governments N = 69. 

74 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Action 
categorisation 
of alerts (e.g. 
with an 
obligation to 
act/for 
information 
only) 

Possibility 
for the 
European 
Commission 
to post 
alerts 

Possibility 
for alerts 
to be made 
public 

Possibility for 
other 
organisations 
(e.g. consumer 
and trade 
associations, 
self-regulatory 
bodies, European 
Consumer 
Centres) to post 
alerts 

Low priority 

19% 

18% 

25% 

37% 

75 

 
 
 
 
 
Most effective approaches to stop or defer widespread infringements, Number of replies (N) =148134

Very effective 

Highly effective  Not so effective 

Not effective 

No opinion 

A mechanism of mutual recognition of enforcement decisions 
Consumer associations 
Public authorities and governments 
Other 
ECC 

A single EU level procedure, where the Commission or any Member State 
can bring the evidence of an EU-level infringement 
Consumer associations 
Public authorities and governments 
Other 
ECC 

An obligation for Member States to alert other enforcement authorities on 
an enforcement action when it is suspected that similar practices by the 
same company or its branches are done in other markets, so as to trigger a 
joint enforcement action 
Consumer associations 
Public authorities and governments 
Other 
ECC 

Following sufficient evidence on a case of EU-level relevance, brought by 
the Commission, an obligation for the concerned Member States to conduct 
a joint enforcement action 
Consumer associations 
Public authorities and governments 
Other 
ECC 

An obligation for Member States to notify cases corresponding to defined 
criteria for EU-level relevance so as to trigger a joint enforcement action 
Consumer associations 
Public authorities and governments 
Other 
ECC 

45% 
40% 
46% 
44% 

59% 
40% 
54% 
56% 

59% 
48% 
47% 
61% 

61% 
34% 
49% 
44% 

61% 
34% 
49% 
44% 

27% 
37% 
37% 
44% 

13% 
28% 
32% 
28% 

29% 
30% 
42% 
33% 

30% 
36% 
35% 
39% 

30% 
36% 
35% 
39% 

18% 
7% 
0% 
6% 

9% 
13% 
8% 
6% 

9% 
13% 
8% 
6% 

3% 
12% 
8% 
11% 

3% 
12% 
8% 
11% 

0% 
6% 
3% 
0% 

3% 
7% 
0% 
0% 

0% 
7% 
0% 
0% 

0% 
10% 
0% 
0% 

0% 
10% 
0% 
0% 

9% 
9% 
14% 
6% 

16% 
10% 
5% 
11% 

3% 
1% 
3% 
0% 

6% 
7% 
8% 
6% 

6% 
7% 
8% 
6% 

134 N = 76 for Public authorities and governments, N = 34 for Consumer associations, N = 44 for Other (business, trade associations, individuals) and N = 18 for ECCs.  

76 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Degree of agreement with the leading role of the European Commission in specific actions while tackling widespread infringements,  
Number of replies (N) =148135 

Request Member States to enforce and/or impose a sanction in case of 
non-compliance with the undertaking 
Consumer associations 
Public authorities and governments 
Other 
ECC 

Establish an undertaking with the trader(s) and ensure follow-up 
monitoring 
Consumer associations 
Public authorities and governments 
Other 
ECC 

Request trader(s) to cease an infringement   
Consumer associations 
Public authorities and governments 
Other 
ECC 

Determine the existence and nature of an infringement 
Consumer associations 
Public authorities and governments 
Other 
ECC 

Carry out case investigations (including the power to do on-site 
investigations, request information from traders) on the basis of 
complaints 
Consumer associations 
Public authorities and governments 
Other 
ECC 

Yes 

76% 
53% 
70% 
61% 

47% 
37% 
48% 
39% 

62% 
38% 
50% 
50% 

56% 
37% 
57% 
44% 

65% 
37% 
50% 
56% 

No 

0% 
34% 
0% 
17% 

15% 
43% 
23% 
39% 

6% 
45% 
18% 
28% 

9% 
42% 
14% 
39% 

6% 
46% 
18% 
22% 

No opinion 

12% 
3% 
11% 
17% 

15% 
8% 
11% 
22% 

15% 
5% 
14% 
22% 

12% 
9% 
9% 
17% 

12% 
7% 
14% 
22% 

135 N = 69 for Public authorities and governments, N = 36 for ‘Other’ (business, trade associations, individuals), N = 29 for Consumer associations and N = 14 for ECCs. 

77 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Carry out preparatory prima facie investigations (e.g. based on website 
studies, complaint data) 
Consumer associations 
Public authorities and governments 
Other 
ECC 

Define evidence based priority sectors where consumer conditions are 
the poorest 
Consumer associations 
Public authorities and governments 
Other 
ECC 

No 

9% 
25% 
18% 
22% 

3% 
20% 
7% 
11% 

No opinion 

21% 
7% 
16% 
17% 

12% 
8% 
14% 
11% 

Yes 

56% 
58% 
48% 
61% 

65% 
61% 
59% 
72% 

78 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10.6.

  Conference dedicated to enforcement cooperation and Competitiveness 

Council in 2014 

On 7-8 July 2014, in Rome, the Italian Presidency of the Council of the Ministers of the 
EU dedicated one of its main conferences on consumer policy to the CPC enforcement 
cooperation136.  The  Conference  gathered  high  representatives  of 
the  European 
Commission,  national  Governments  and  CPC  authorities,  consumer  organizations, 
European networks (e.g. CPC, CPN, ECC-Net, ECCG), relevant stakeholders, scholars, 
and  Non-Governmental  advisors.  It  focused  on  the  European  and  national  political 
perspectives, the possibilities and opportunities arising from the CPC Regulation and on 
e-commerce issues and challenges. The speakers concluded that the CPC cooperation is 
highly relevant today and remains a key asset for the future of the EU consumer policy. 
There  was  a  unanimous  consent  to  improve  the  CPC  cooperation  so  that  it  effectively 
addresses  enforcement  challenges  of  the  future.  The  report  on  this  conference  was 
presented by the Italian Presidency at the Competitiveness Council in September 2014137. 

10.7.

  Workshops  

Two workshops with experts from Member States and EEA countries were organised in 
June 2014 (19 Member States participated and representatives from Norway) and March 
2015  (25  Member  States  participated  and  representatives  from  Norway  and  Iceland)  to 
discuss  the  key  areas  identified  for  the  review  of  the  CPC  Regulation,  namely  key 
definitions of the CPC Regulation (e.g. 'intra-Community infringement'), powers needed 
for enforcement authorities to  tackle infringements in the digital markets, improvement 
of  market  surveillance  mechanism  and  addressing  widespread  infringements.  The  CPC 
authorities were consulted in these expert group meetings, showed a particular interest to 
make  national  authorities'  powers  fitter  to  digital  challenges.  A  positive  feedback  was 
also given on the need to clarify and strengthen the role of the Commission in common 
enforcement actions under Article 9 of the CPC Regulation.  

136  Documents  and  key  speeches  available  at:  http://www.agcm.it/convegni-e-seminari/7122.html  It  is 
important to note that other Presidencies of the Council of EU also organised  high level events to discuss  
equal  enforcement  of  consumer  laws  throughout  the  Internal  Market  and  the  functioning  of  the  CPC 
Regulation 2006/2004: cf. High Level Event of the Belgian  Presidency of the EU on 22 September 2010: 
http://www.eutrio.be/european-consumer-protection-enforcement-day-high-level-meeting  
137 Information from the Presidency on the outcome of the Conference "The European Union Cooperation 
for Consumer Rights" (Rome, 7-8 July 2014), 13206/14, available: 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2013206%202014%20INIT  

79 

 
 
 
                                                 
 
11.  Annex III: Who is affected by the initiative and how 

Stakeholders who would be affected by the initiative as contained in the preferred policy 
option (PO3): 

  Consumers  shopping  for  services  and  goods  cross-border  offline  and  in  the  digital 
environment.  The  initiative  would  eliminate  partly  the  risk  of  financial  consumer 
detriment, which consumers might experience, e.g. from the goods bought abroad and 
not  delivered  or  misleading  information  about  the  payment  arrangements  for 
purchases  and  being  debited  through  default  settings  without  the  explicit  consent. 
With reinforced tools and procedures the CPC network will address more effectively 
collective  consumer  detriment  stemming  from  widespread  infringements  occurring 
throughout EU. Thanks to the strengthened enforcement cooperation, a decrease of, 
for example, 10 points in the average non-compliance rate of 37%, would reduce this 
detriment to EUR 539 million, a reduction by 30% or EUR 231 million, which would 
be a very significant result compared to the baseline situation. The expected decrease 
is legitimate because the CPC sweeps have shown that targeted enforcement actions 
can lead to a significant improvement in compliance rates, i.e. from 20 to 40% at the 
screening phase to above 80% after a year of enforcement actions. This would in turn 
increase consumers' trust and engagement in cross-border e-commerce. 

  Representatives  of  consumer  interests  (ECC-Net  and  consumer  associations). 
These  organisations  can  hold  extremely  useful  intelligence  and  expertise,  but 
currently they cannot input data to help identify the CPC enforcement priority areas 
or  warn  about  emerging  mal-practices  in  a  regular  way.  The  CPC  competent 
authorities also do not profit systematically from their knowledge of the markets and 
particular problems consumers might face. Thanks to the improved alert mechanism 
and enforcement plans, the initiative  will  allow closer cooperation  and the project-
oriented structured dialogue between CPC authorities, the European Commission and 
these representative organisations  

  CPC competent authorities and CPC focal points (single liaison offices): currently 
they  suffer  from  higher  administrative  costs  as  a  consequence  of  cross-border 
cooperation inefficiencies and higher investigation costs if the trader cannot be found 
or  is  not  cooperative  with  the  enforcement  authority.  This  results  in  duplication  of 
investigative efforts, devotion of disproportionate enforcement resources, and loss in 
time, divergent outcome and widespread consumer detriment. Rather than fragmented 
national  enforcement  efforts,  the  CPC  can  bring  EU-wide  enforcement  solutions. 
Increased  cooperation  among  national  enforcement  authorities  will  enhance  their 
capacity  to  act  across  borders  on  online  markets  and  address  infringements 
the  stepped-up  enforcement  coordination,  national 
consistently.  Thanks 
administrations will avoid duplicating their efforts. In particular pooling of resources 
to  address  widespread  infringements  would  save  resources  as  1  coordinated  action 
would  replace  28  national  actions,  resulting  in  net  savings  varying  from  ca.  EUR 
180,000  (in  case  of  successful  coordinated  action)  to  ca.  EUR  815,000  (in  case  of 
failed action). 

to 

The  preferred  option  will  neither  affect  the  Member  States'  competences  in 
enforcement nor will harmonise national enforcement systems. Some Member States 
may  need  to  slightly  adapt  their  national  laws  so  that  authorities  benefit  from  the 
mutual  recognition  of  evidence/outcome  of  investigations  and  from  the  additional 
80 

 
 
powers to cooperate in a cross-border context (mostly AT, BE, DE, EL, FR, HR, IE 
and LT). Main cost for Member States will cover familiarisation/training due to new 
powers  and  procedures  (ca.  EUR  3,000  per  authority)  and  ca.  EUR  174,000  for  all 
Member  States  per  one  coordinated  enforcement  action  per  year  initiated  through 
mandatory  coordination  procedure.  The  extent  of  adjustments  will  depend  on  the 
number  of  national  laws  which  will  need  to  be  changed.  In  those  countries,  where 
substantive  and  procedural  provisions,  which  are  applicable  to  both  national  and 
intra-Community infringements, are contained in one act (e.g. UK, BE), adjustments 
will be minimal. However, more adjustments will need to be made in those countries 
where  several  national  laws  will  be  concerned  by  the  revised  CPC  Regulation  (e.g. 
FR,  LV,  SK)138.  Overall  in  the  medium  term,  savings  are  expected  thanks  to  more 
coordinated EU wide actions. 

  Economic  operators:  manufacturers, 

traders,  sellers,  on 

line  marketplaces, 
intermediaries, who especially operate in more than two Member States and/or in the 
digital  environment,  suffer  from  uncertainty  and  higher  (e.g.  compliance  and 
litigation)  costs  caused  by  the  complexity  of  28  enforcement  regimes  (+  Iceland, 
Lichtenstein  and  Norway)  and  diverging  enforcement  approaches  amongst  Member 
States, as well as from an unfair competition from non-compliant traders, who thanks 
to  the  expansion  of  e-commerce  and  technology,  have  developed  business  models 
and strategies with a view to evading laws. The initiative will increase legal certainty 
for business. More consistent cross-border enforcement would boost competitiveness 
of honest law abiding traders and improve competition and level playing field in the 
Internal Market. The initiative will not impose any legal obligations to the business 
sector. 

  Widespread  infringements  that  affect  consumers  across  the  EU  need  a  strong  and 
consistent  EU-level  answer.  The  European  Commission's  role  and  involvement  in 
the CPC network will increase in particular with regards to the coordination of certain 
widespread 
threshold),  where  a  common 
enforcement  approach  will  be  agreed  with  the  traders  concerned  at  the  EU  level  to 
ensure  equal  protection  of  consumers  across  borders  and  level  playing  field  for 
businesses.  The  Commission's  additional  cost  for  its  enhanced  coordination  role  is 
expected to be below EUR 300,000 per year. 

infringements  (meeting  a  certain 

138 See Annex V for more information. 

81 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12.  Annex IV: Data and case studies supporting this impact assessment 

12.1.

  Non-compliance rate and consumer detriment 

12.1.1.  Screening of 2,682 websites in five consumer sectors  

The  current  caseload  dealt  under  the  CPC  Regulation's  framework  (140  enforcement 
requests on average per year) is sub-optimal and does not reflect reality139.  

Although there are some data on the CPC relevant infringements (e.g., intra-Community 
infringements recorded in the CPC database and complaints data collected by the ECC-
Net),  the  exact  caseload  (a  number  of  CPC  relevant  infringements)  cannot  be 
established. This is because infringements are not recorded and reported systematically 
for  different  reasons.  Not  all  Member  States  keep  detailed  recording  systems;  further, 
consumers  do  not  always  complain  about  infringements.  Apart  from  the  annual  CPC 
sweeps, the Commission lacks a coherent, EU-wide dataset looking specifically into the 
levels of compliance with consumer rules to underpin the need for enforcement action. A 
further  complexity  of  this  task  is  a  focus  on  those  infringements  with  a  cross-border 
dimension. 

Therefore, to gauge the state of compliance with key consumer laws and identify possible 
variations  in  compliance  rates  by  Member  State  and  market  sector,  more  than  2,680 
websites selling to consumers were investigated by the ICF International on behalf of the 
Commission.  

In  spring  2014,  a  total  of  2,682  websites  covering  all  EU  28  Member  States,  were 
screened  in  five  market  sectors  against  five  key  consumer  rules  (contact  details  of  a 
trader;  information  about  a  product;  information  about  a  price;  information  on  delivery 
and payment; and information on the right to withdraw)140. The sectors were chosen on 
the basis of their popularity for online shopping, size and economic importance, as well 
as frequency of non-compliance in previous sweeps of the CPC network and complaint 
data from European Consumer Centers. On this basis, clothing and sports goods (sport 
shoes),  electronic  goods  (tablets),  package  travel  (flight  and  hotel  package  holiday), 
recreation and culture (tickets for events), and financial services (short term consumer 
credit  for  6-24  months)  sectors  and  specific  products  were  selected.  This  entailed  a 
screening of an average of 18 websites per sector (90 in total) per Member State. 

The  websites  were  screened  against  key  consumer  rules  concerning  (not  all  the  rules 
were relevant for all the sectors): 

  Provision of address, telephone number, e-mail; 

  Provision of product information; 

  Presentation of the price including taxes as well as all additional freight, delivery or 

postal charges;  

139Data  extracted  from  the  CPCS  database.  To  be  noted  that  140  enforcement  requests  do  not  equal  140 
cross-border  infringement  cases,  as  one  enforcement  request  could  concern  1  or  several  infringements. 
Note  that  the  infringement  in  the  CPC  context  concerns  collective  interests  of  consumers,  although  the 
Regulation does not define how many people should be affected by the infringement concerned. 
140  Websites  were  screened  by  qualified  people,  holding  a  university  degree  or  higher,  in  each  Member 
State. 

82 

 
 
                                                 
 

 

 

Information on terms and conditions; 

Information on delivery and payment arrangements, and 

Information on the right to withdraw. 

The results are summarised in the table141 below, which visualises the results through use 
of a colour coding of the percentage of surveyed websites on which indicated information 
was not  available. While greenish  colours indicate low percentages of websites lacking 
relevant  information,  reddish  colours  indicate  increasing  percentages  of  such  websites. 
The colour "bright red" indicates that more than 20% of surveyed websites in the specific 
information.
sector 

and  Member  State 

indicated 

provide 

not 

the 

do 

141  Source:  ICF  International's  support  study  for  the  impact  assessment  on  the  review  of  the  CPC 
Regulation (publication forthcoming). 

83 

 
 
                                                 
84 

AddressTelephoneEmailProduct informationFinal price matches initial price Information on delivery costsInformation on payment methodsInformation on expected delivery timeTerms and conditionsInformation on right to withdrawAddressTelephoneEmailProduct informationFinal price matches initial price Information on delivery costsInformation on payment methodsInformation on expected delivery timeTerms and conditionsInformation on right to withdrawAddressTelephoneEmailProduct informationTerms and conditionsFinal price matches initial price AddressTelephoneEmailProduct informationFinal price matches initial price Information on delivery costsInformation on payment methodsTerms and conditionsInformation on expected delivery timeAddressTelephoneEmailTerms and conditionsProduct informationAT0%0%5%0%29%0%0%10%5%0%0%0%0%0%8%0%0%33%0%4%0%0%5%0%0%57%0%0%0%0%40%0%5%0%5%0%13%0%6%44%BE0%6%19%0%38%0%0%0%0%0%0%0%32%5%27%0%0%36%0%27%0%19%63%0%6%44%0%0%27%0%40%67%7%6%13%0%0%36%18%23%BG13%4%13%4%78%0%4%13%13%35%13%0%8%0%42%13%13%29%21%17%5%5%0%0%32%10%25%25%25%0%25%25%17%8%17%0%0%20%0%0%CY14%14%0%0%0%0%0%0%14%0%0%8%25%0%25%0%0%33%25%25%0%0%0%0%40%18%0%0%0%0%67%33%0%67%0%0%0%20%17%20%CZ0%0%0%0%24%0%0%29%0%0%0%0%8%0%8%0%0%27%0%0%0%0%6%0%6%24%0%4%4%0%17%0%0%57%0%0%0%10%30%14%DE0%0%0%0%19%0%0%27%0%0%0%0%4%4%8%0%0%46%4%0%0%0%0%0%0%85%0%0%0%0%64%0%0%4%0%0%0%0%0%4%DK0%10%5%0%29%0%0%0%0%0%0%0%10%0%10%0%0%10%0%0%6%0%18%0%6%65%5%0%11%0%32%11%0%16%0%0%0%6%6%19%EE6%6%0%0%38%0%0%31%38%19%4%0%4%0%24%8%8%16%36%20%0%0%0%19%19%0%0%0%0%0%0%25%13%50%63%0%0%0%21%42%EL5%0%19%0%19%10%0%10%30%29%5%9%23%0%23%0%0%5%41%50%0%0%7%0%7%47%7%0%13%0%40%20%7%27%7%0%0%17%17%33%ES4%8%33%0%29%0%0%4%12%4%4%17%17%0%58%0%0%0%0%8%0%0%24%0%14%52%5%20%20%0%30%15%0%0%5%5%5%27%23%50%FI0%13%17%0%17%0%0%0%25%0%0%14%9%5%27%0%0%0%5%5%5%0%24%0%5%57%0%5%10%0%35%45%0%30%10%0%4%21%0%8%FR0%0%54%0%31%4%0%4%0%4%8%12%42%4%31%4%4%15%0%4%4%0%44%0%0%96%5%19%29%0%52%33%0%0%5%0%5%81%0%0%HR0%0%0%0%35%18%0%18%29%47%0%0%0%0%27%0%0%13%13%60%0%0%0%0%0%14%0%0%0%0%13%0%0%27%0%0%0%5%5%0%HU10%10%0%0%48%0%5%5%5%10%0%5%5%0%19%5%5%5%0%10%5%5%0%0%9%68%0%0%6%0%59%0%0%29%0%0%7%36%0%0%IE0%0%5%0%15%0%0%40%20%5%0%6%22%0%33%6%6%6%6%11%0%0%5%0%5%65%5%10%20%0%55%10%0%10%10%0%0%11%21%0%IT0%4%21%0%50%0%0%4%4%8%0%8%29%0%71%0%0%8%4%4%4%0%8%0%8%75%8%23%12%0%65%4%0%22%0%0%8%16%16%28%LT14%0%10%0%38%5%10%10%20%0%4%0%0%8%4%4%4%8%33%13%11%0%6%0%72%39%8%38%0%0%23%38%15%31%31%0%0%5%32%11%LU17%0%17%0%33%0%0%0%17%17%0%0%33%0%50%0%0%50%0%0%25%0%25%0%0%75%0%0%0%0%50%50%0%25%25%14%0%29%57%29%LV0%5%14%0%14%0%5%9%14%14%0%0%0%4%33%0%0%13%38%13%0%0%5%5%42%16%0%27%7%0%33%7%0%0%0%0%0%0%42%25%MT20%10%10%0%20%0%0%30%20%20%8%0%0%0%8%17%17%33%42%42%13%0%13%0%38%13%0%13%25%0%13%38%13%50%50%0%0%25%25%75%NL0%0%8%0%40%8%0%4%0%0%0%0%28%0%12%0%0%0%0%0%0%0%20%4%0%100%8%16%16%0%60%8%4%4%0%0%0%18%18%23%PL0%0%12%0%35%0%0%8%4%0%0%4%19%0%31%0%0%4%8%12%4%0%15%0%8%31%13%13%17%0%54%17%0%0%0%0%0%54%23%19%PT0%9%35%0%52%0%0%4%22%4%9%9%4%0%52%0%0%13%17%4%9%17%39%0%13%30%5%11%11%0%47%58%0%16%21%0%5%45%55%18%RO10%5%5%0%30%0%0%15%0%15%17%0%11%0%44%0%0%17%11%22%10%0%15%5%43%20%7%13%7%0%40%53%0%13%0%11%6%22%11%22%SE0%13%4%0%26%0%0%4%0%0%0%8%12%0%20%0%0%0%0%0%0%0%0%0%0%88%10%0%10%0%38%5%0%5%5%0%0%4%12%0%SI0%0%9%0%82%0%0%45%10%0%0%0%17%0%11%0%0%22%0%0%0%0%0%0%0%12%0%0%0%0%17%83%0%75%67%0%0%0%12%13%SK0%0%8%0%33%0%4%8%4%0%0%0%5%0%5%0%0%18%0%5%0%0%0%0%14%67%0%8%0%0%8%31%0%15%31%5%5%21%18%16%UK0%4%29%0%21%0%4%0%0%4%0%0%39%0%22%0%0%9%0%9%0%5%30%0%0%70%0%11%33%0%48%19%4%7%11%0%0%16%8%0%EU 4%4%13%0%33%2%1%12%10%8%3%4%14%1%26%2%2%17%10%13%4%2%13%1%13%48%4%9%11%0%38%25%3%17%13%1%2%19%17%19%Clothes and sports goodsElectronic goodsPackage travelConsumer creditRecreation and culture (tickets for events) 
 
The screening of more than 2,682 websites in the five sectors found that: 

  Contact  information:  Both  business  address  and  telephone  number  contact 
information  was  provided  frequently  across  all  sectors.  In  contrast,  the  number  of 
instances  where  more  than  20%  of  websites  did  not  provide  an  e-mail  address  was 
much higher. 

  Relevant  product  information  was  available  in  most  sectors  and  countries,  the 
exception being the consumer credit sector, where in a number of Member States (11 
in total) more than 20% of surveyed websites did not provide relevant information. In 
a further seven Member States 12%-20% of websites were found not to provide this 
information. 

  Researchers  also  looked  for  information  on  price  and  payment  methods,  and 
compared  the  initial  advertised  price  with  the  final  price  displayed  before  it  was 
necessary to enter payment details. For all of the four sectors where this comparison 
applied  (i.e.  all,  except  the  consumer  credit  sector),  there  was  a  high  rate  of 
inconsistency  between  the  initially  stated  price  and  final  price  the  consumer  was 
requested to pay. This inconsistency was observed in 33% of websites in the clothes 
and sports goods sector, in 26% of websites in the electronic goods sector, in 48% of 
websites  in  the  package  travel  sector,  and  in  19%  of  websites  in  the  recreation  and 
culture sector. 

 

Information  concerning  the  right  of  withdrawal  was  also  absent  in  a  significant 
number of cases: In the sector of electronic goods, in six countries142 more than 20% 
of  surveyed  websites  did  not  provide  clearly  worded  information  on  the  right  to 
withdraw,  in  the  sector  of  clothes  and  sports  goods,  this  was  the  case  in  3 
countries143. 

  Information on delivery was also found to be absent in over 20% of websites selling 
electronic goods and tickets for entertainment events (where the option to print the e-
ticket was not available) in a significant number of Member States. 

The second table below presents the percentage of surveyed websites where one, two or 
more pieces of consumer information were missing per sector. 

142 Belgium, Cyprus, Greece, Croatia, Malta and Romania. 
143 Bulgaria, Greece, and Croatia. 

 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12.1.2.  Estimating the non-compliance rate 

The third table below presents the results of the website screening per sector and displays 
different non-compliance rates, which could be estimated on the basis of the screening.  

For example, a non-compliance rate could be established taking into account the websites 
which  were  rated  by  qualified  researchers  as  "very  poor"  on  the  basis  of  how  easy  the 
relevant pre-contractual information could be found on a particular website. Other non-
compliance rates could be established taking into account websites which were found by 
researchers  not  to  implement  one  specific  consumer  rule,  i.e.  websites  where  the  final 
price to pay did not match the initial offer. The last column of the table shows that, taking 
into  account  the  EU  total,  the  proposition  of  websites  not  implementing  one  consumer 
rule ranges from 32% to 42%, average being ca. 37%.  

Sector 

Websites rated 
as  'very  poor' 
qualified 
by 
researchers  in 
terms 
of 
informing 
consumers 
about 
rights  

their 

Websites 
which  did  not 
a 
provide 
to 
possibility 
retain 
terms 
and 
conditions  

Websites 
where 
the 
final  price  to 
pay  was  not 
the  same  as 
the 
initial 
price offer 

CPC  Network 
(1st 
sweeps 
results 
phase 
indicating  the 
percentage  of 
websites 
containing 
irregularities) 

Proportion  of 
websites 
where  at  least 
one  piece  of 
consumer 
information 
was  missing 
(EU total)  

Average 
37% 

is 

Clothing  and 
sportswear 

3% 

10% 

33% 

N/A 

35% 

Electronic 
goods 

Recreation 
and 
tickets 

culture 

5% 

10% 

26% 

55% (2009) 
54% (2014)144 

36% 

8% 

17% 

38% 

59% 

39% 

Consumer 
credit 

11% 

Package travel  8% 

17% 

13% 

N/A 

48% 

69% 

N/A 

32% 

42% 

The established non-compliance rates in the last column of the table could be paralleled 
with the CPC network's 1st phase screening results in the sweep actions (if the sweep in 
the specific sector was conducted). The results cannot be compared downright,  because 
the  CPC  sweep  actions  are  conducted  by  national  authorities,  who  are  in  in  charge  of 
enforcement  and  are  well-acquainted  with  consumer  law.  Further,  the  questionnaire  for 
the sweeps is much more detailed than what was used for the 2,682 websites' screening. 
Therefore, one could conclude that a more sophisticated review of 2,682 websites would 

144  The  electronic  goods  sector  was  subject  to  two  sweeps:  in  2009  (verifying  general  compliance  of 
websites selling electronic goods with EU consumer rules) and in 2014 (verifying compliance of websites 
selling light electronic goods with the EU rules on legal and commercial guarantees). 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
result in much higher non-compliance rates. Furthermore, the average non-compliance 
rate of  37% of the screening of the websites  represents a conservative approach, as 
the screening was conducted in March 2014 when the EU Consumer Rights Directive145, 
which increases the level of protection for consumers when they shop online, was not yet 
in  force.  With  stronger  pre-contractual  information  requirements  applicable  today,  the 
non-compliance level resulting  from the screening of the 2,682 websites would also be 
possibly higher146. 

The average non-compliance rate of 37% is also confirmed by the latest EU Consumer 
Scoreboard, which highlights the high prevalence of unfair practices: for example, 42% 
of consumers say they were pressurised to buy by persistent sales calls or messages147. 

12.1.3.  Estimating  the  online  cross-border  consumer  expenditure  affected  by  the  non-

compliance rate and consumer detriment 

The consumption expenditure, which is generated online in the five sectors, in which the 
screening  of  websites  was  conducted,  equals  around  EUR  51bn148.  The  consumption 
expenditure  online  affected  by  the  average  non-compliance  rate  of  37%  equals  around 
EUR 19bn in the five sectors149. Taking into account that, in 2014, 14% of online sales 
was cross-border150, around EUR 2.7bn is cross-border online consumption expenditure 
in the five sectors affected by the non-compliance rate of 37%151. 

To  calculate  the  consumer  detriment,  the  approach  designed  in  the  UK  OFT's  (now  – 
CMA152)  research  project  (2008)  "Consumer  detriment:  Assessing  the  frequency  and 
impact  of  consumer  problems  with  goods  and  services"153  was  followed154.  Following 
this  methodology,  the  overall  consumer  detriment  resulting  from  the  non-compliance 

145 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer 
rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and 
of  the  Council  and  repealing  Council  Directive  85/577/EEC  and  Directive  97/7/EC  of  the  European 
Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 304, 22.11.2011, p. 64. 
146  The  independent  experts,  who  were  consulted  by  ICF  International,  considered  the  non-compliance 
levels as appropriate, with the true level of non-compliance lying between the last column of the table  and 
the sweep results. The expert panel involved Professor Geraint Howells (Expert in European and consumer 
law),  Professor  Stephen  Davies  (Expert  in  the  evaluation  of  competition  and  consumer  economics), 
Anabela  de  Brito  and  Jacques  Pelkmans  from  the  Centre  for  European  Policy  Studies  (Experts  in  EU 
consumer policy in the single market). 
147See p. 32 of the latest 11th edition:  
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_evidence/consumer_scoreboards/11_edition/docs/ccs2015scorebo
ard_en.pdf  
148  The  total  consumer  expenditure  in  the  five  sectors  (EUR  1028  bn,  Eurostat  2012  data  EU-28)  is 
multiplied by the 5 % (expenditure generated online). 5% * EUR 1028 bn = EUR 51 bn. 
149 The average non-compliance rate 37% * consumption expenditure online EUR 51bn; 37%*EUR 51bn = 
EUR 19bn. 
150  According  to  research  by  the  European  Multi-channel  and  Online  Trade  Association,  14%  of  online 
sales in 2014 were non-domestic business-to-consumer sales. This is expected to increase to 20% by 2018. 
151 14%*EUR 19bn = EUR 2.7bn. 
152 CMA: Competition and Markets Authority in the UK. 
153http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/co
nsumer_protection/oft992.pdf  
154  Limited  studies  have  systematically  attempted  to  quantify  consumer  detriment  from  enforcement 
actions. The UK OFT's methodology to measure consumer detriment was considered as the most suitable 
to  apply  for  the  purpose  of  this  IA  report.  The  Commission  has  recently  procured  a  study on  measuring 
consumer detriment across a broad array of  markets (the study is undertaken by Civic Consulting and is 
expected to be completed in 2016).  

88 

 
                                                 
as  established  by  the  2,682  screening  of  websites  in  the  five  sectors  would  be  around 
EUR 770 million155. 

12.2.

  Method used to estimate key positive impacts of the preferred option 

The  absence  of  detailed  and  systematic  statistics  on  cross-border  and  widespread 
infringements makes it difficult to make quantitative estimates of the scale of the positive 
impacts  on  compliance  with  the  EU  consumer  protection  legislation  that  the  Policy 
Option  3  is  expected  to  generate.  There  is,  nevertheless,  evidence  that  the  proposed 
option can give rise to significant reduction in consumer detriment. This is based on the 
following reasoning:  

  Due to its wide scope156, the CPC Regulation is deemed to address infringements to 
EU  consumer  legislation  which  take  place  in  all  cross-border  retail  trade  inside  the 
EU, which is at least 14% of the total retail trade157.  

  As the screening of websites in the five online sectors has demonstrated, on average, 
37% of this trade is potentially affected by the non-compliant behaviour of traders158.  

  Any  improvements  in  the  enforcement  performance  would  therefore  produce  a 

significant impact in terms of the reduction of the consumer detriment.  

  For  example,  in  the  five  online  sectors,  which  were  screened  for  compliance,  the 

consumer detriment was estimated to be ca. EUR 770 million per year.  

  Thanks to the strengthened enforcement cooperation, a decrease of, for example, 10 
points  in  the  average  non-compliance  rate  of  37%  would  reduce  this  detriment  to 
EUR 539 million, a reduction by 30% or EUR 231 million, which would be a very 
significant  result  compared  to  the  baseline  situation.  The  expected  decrease  is 
legitimate because the CPC sweeps have shown that targeted enforcement actions can 
lead  to  a  significant  improvement  in  compliance  rates,  i.e.  from  20  to  40%  at  the 
screening phase to above 80% after a year of enforcement actions.  

  Such improvement in the compliance rate and in the reduction of consumer detriment 
has  to  be  examined  taking  into  account  the  additional  costs  and  potential  benefits 
generated by Policy Option 3 for national authorities and for the Commission only as 
the  measures  retained  should  not  lead  to  any  additional  costs  for  legitimate  traders 
which  already  comply  to  consumer  legislation.  In  fact  these  operators  should  even 
benefit  from  the  improvement  of  their  business  environment  with  more  uniform 
enforcement  approaches  presented  to  them,  offering  legal  certainty  for  cross-border 
operations,  a  level  playing  field  with  competitors  based  in  other  countries  and 
reduced potential litigation costs.   

155The  consumer  detriment  =  EUR  72  per  transaction  (assuming  EUR  250  is  spent  on  average  per 
transaction in the five sectors and applying the UK OFT's formula). Overall consumer detriment in the five 
sectors =EUR 770 million (72/250 * EUR 2.7 bn). 
156 Cf. Annex of the CPC Regulation which covers ca. 18 pieces of EU consumer legislation. 
157  According  to  research  by  the  European  Multi-channel  and  Online  Trade  Association,  14%  of  online 
sales in 2014 were non-domestic business-to-consumer sales. This is expected to increase to 20% by 2018. 
158  As  mentioned  above,  this  is  a  conservative  scenario,  because  in  the  CPC  annual  sweeps,  the  non-
compliance rate varies from 55-80% at the first screening phase. 

89 

 
 
                                                 
  Additional  costs  for  national  authorities  have  been  estimated  to  be  limited  since 
strengthened  enforcement  cooperation  would  lead  to  more  efficiency  gains  that 
would largely offsetting the needed adaptation costs in the medium term.  

12.3.

  Estimated average costs of the enforcement case 

Enforcement action  % of cases 

when the 
action was 
used 

Unit 
cost, 
£ 

Unit 
cost 
EUR 

2015 
value, 
EUR 

Average costs of court 
case involving criminal 
proceedings 

Average costs of  case 
involving 
undertakings 

95% 

4,050 

4,770 

4,870 

5% 

1,270 

1,495 

1,527 

Average costs per one 'non-complex case' = EUR 4,700159 
On average, ca. 2,000 cases are dealt per year = EUR 9,4 mln 

The  costs  in  the  table  above  were  calculated  on  the  basis  of  the  UK  enforcement 
experience160 and were not questioned by the representatives from the CPC authorities in 
the webinar held in July 2015. 

The  average  cost  per  enforcement  case  is  EUR  4,700.  However,  the  unit  cost  of 
enforcement  varies  widely  per  case  and  Member  State.  For  example,  labour  costs  of 
authorities  differ  among  Member  States.  The  length,  complexity  of  investigation  and 
legal resources required to  tackle an infringement also differs per infringement and per 
enforcement system.  

So in reality in some Member States, the average cost per enforcement might be lower, in 
particular,  in  the  systems  which  are  characterised  by  the  "self-managed  administrative 
proceedings" where the national competent authority starts and conducts the investigation 
and takes enforcement measures without involvement of the courts (e.g. Italy). However, 
other national authorities were not able to confirm this because of lack of data concerning 
costs per enforcement case. 

159 Calculations: 95*4,870 + 5*1,527 = 4,700. 
160 Estimates are based on the UK data used in the impact assessment of Consumer Rights Bill/Proposals 
on  enhanced  consumer  measures,  January  2014:  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/consumer-
rights-bill. The information used in the UK impact assessment relied on the data concerning cases handled 
by local enforcement authorities. Cases were not complex, explaining low average costs. 

90 

 
 
 
                                                 
12.4.

  Additional calculations of consumer detriment 

Box 9: consumer detriment prevented by the CPC in-app purchases action 

Any  new  single  CPC  action  against  a  widespread  practice  could  reduce  significantly  the 
consumer  detriment  across  the  EU.  For  instance,  on  the  basis  of  the  U.S.  Federal  Trade 
Commission action on in-app purchases against  Apple in March 2014161 and against Google in 
September  2014162,  it  was  estimated  that  the  corresponding  CPC  action  prevented  consumer 
detriment within the EU of EUR 68 mln. 

The estimation is calculated on the basis of the U.S. consumer detriment per capita, adjusted to 
the EU population and converted in EUR in line with the current exchange rate of the European 
Central Bank (ECB): The U.S. FTC estimated the consumer detriment in the Apple case of $ 32.5 
mln. This means that the detriment per capita is $ 0.1 ($ 32.5 detriment divided by 320 million 
consumers). Adjusted to the EU population, Norway and Iceland, the detriment of the EU market 
would be $ 51 mln ($ 0.1 multiplied by 513 million consumers). Using the UCB exchange rate on 
1 October 2015, 1.3758, the consumer detriment on the EU market would be EUR 46 mln. The 
same reasoning applies to the Google case where the FTC estimated the U.S. consumer detriment 
of $ 19 mln, resulting in EUR 22 mln for the EU consumers. Thus, the cumulated EU consumer 
detriment amounts to the sum of EUR 68 mln per both actions. 

In  our  view,  this  figure  should  even  be  further  upgraded  in  the  EU  context  since  the  room  for 
manoeuvre  while  negotiating  to  determine  the  amount  of  detriment  on  behalf  of  513  million 
consumers is bigger than when you are representing 320 million consumers. Moreover, it has to 
be  born  in  mind  that  the  notion  of  consumer  detriment  includes  the  detriment  of  the  other 
economic operators and the detriment of consumer trust.  

Box 10: Case study - what is the impact of insufficient enforcement cooperation in the EU?   

According to information published on the website store early September 2015, you can buy an 
insurance package in 17 EU Member States. It cost EUR 99 for a phone purchased in France and 
covers  various  services  and  especially  an  extension  of  the  commercial  assistance  and  warranty 
plan of 1 to 2 years. Two material incidents (e.g. resulting from a shock and not from a default) 
are  also  covered  but  in  such  a  case  the  consumer  would  have  to  pay  EUR  69  each  time  in 
addition.  On  the  store  website,  the  reminder  of  the  statutory  legal  guarantee  rights  of  French 
consumers is recalled in full detail. They can estimate if this additional commercial warranty is 
worth paying for.  

This  is  however  not  the  case  for  most  of  the  other  Member  States  covered  by  the  plan,  the 
website  contains  only  very  succinct  information  and  send  consumers  on  national  legislation 
websites  for  further  information  (e.g.  in  Denmark,  Austria,  Greece,  the  Netherlands,  Ireland, 
UK).  As  explained  in  the  problem  statement,  the  lack  of  coordination  of  national  enforcement 
actions on such a case, has led to an uneven situation where consumers in several Member States 
of  the  EU  are  likely  to  pay  for  an  additional  guarantee  protection  that  they  do  not  need. 
Estimating  that  about  half  of  the  insurance  package  or  EUR  50  represents  the  amount  that  is 
supposed to provide for the additional year of protection for defects (providing in all likelihood 
the same rights as the statutory guarantee), it  could be estimated that many consumers in these 
Member States have been led to purchase something they may have not purchased should their 
information  be  more  complete.  The  detriment  can  therefore  be  estimated  to  EUR  50  per 
consumer concerned. In a country like UK, when the new phone was released, 10 million units 
were sold. If 100,000 consumers (or 1% of these buyers) purchased in addition to their phone the 

161  https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/03/ftc-approves-final-order-case-about-apple-inc-
charging-kids-app.   
162 
settle-ftc-complaint-it.  

https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/09/google-refund-consumers-least-19-million-

91 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
insurance based on a wrong assessment of the advantages for them, this would mean a detriment 
of EUR 5 million in total in UK only. 

As  the  conduct  continues,  new  consumers  across  the  EU  will  continue  to  purchase  a  scheme 
without  possibly  being  sufficiently  informed  about  what  it  brings  in  addition  to  statutory 
guarantees provided by EU law.  

The  Commission's  only  means  to  address  this  issue  currently  is  to  carry  out  lengthy 
infringements proceedings against the Member States which it estimates are not attending to their 
obligations in terms of implementation of the EU consumer acquis.  

12.5.

  Additional case examples to support this impact assessment 

Example of a short-lived infringement: Multimedia content for mobile phones  
A  trader  based  in  country  A  provided  multimedia  content  for  mobile  phones  using  a  service 
provider  in  country  B.  The  paying  service  was  directed  at  the  young  and  it  was  advertised 
through media (newspapers, website, and SMS directly to consumers’ phones). The infringement 
(e.g.  misleading  information  was  provided  regarding  the  number  of  ringtones  supplied  at  the 
advertised price) was committed in winter 2007-2008, but the first complaint was received by the 
CPC authority in country B only in spring 2008. On the basis of complaints, the CPC authority in 
country B opened an investigation and requested the assistance of the CPC authority in country 
A.  However,  the  authority  in  country  A  informed  that  it  could  not  take  an  enforcement  action 
against  the  trader  based  on  CPC  Regulation  because  the  infringement  had  ceased  (the 
advertisement had been removed). 

This  example  illustrates  how  the  current  limitation  of  the  CPC  Regulation's  scope  to  ongoing 
infringements does not allow CPC authorities to enforce across-borders in such cases. This limits 
the  deterrent  effect  of  the  CPC  enforcement  system  and  motivates  traders  to  repeat  their 
infringements (so-called "hit and run" strategies escape enforcement).   

Example of a complex case involving a deceitful infringement: Internet fraudster cheated 
100,000 victims 
A total of nine people were arrested in Austria and Germany in relation to a web-shop fraud163. 
The fraudsters operated throughout the German-speaking area through web-shops offering goods 
such as cars, branded goods and electric appliances at a very low price. The payments were taken 
from the victims in advance but the goods were then never delivered. The group operated around 
800  web-shops  in  total  in  two  years.  The  web-shops  were  available  from  different  free 
webhosting  spaces  from  all  around  the  world.  The  web-shops  were  taken  off  after  four  to  six 
weeks.  It is estimated that around 100,000 people were harmed as a result of their actions. Due 
to  the  disguised  moves  estimating  the  total  harm  caused  is  challenging,  however  it  is  believed 
that it reached at least EUR 20 million. 
Officials (Cartel Attorney of Austria) were able to track down the fraudsters thanks to the power 
to  follow  cash-flows,  although  the  fraudsters  used  various  methods  to  hide  their  location  and 
identity.  They  were  moving  the  money  across  different  accounts  world-wide  having  used 
accounts of over 1,000 individuals. 

This example illustrates that when sufficient powers are available, even complex cases involving 
deceitful behaviour can be addressed  effectively.  If this case occurred in Member States  where 
consumer enforcement authorities do not have powers to track down cash flows, the detriment for 
consumers  would  have  been  very  significant  and  the  conduct  would  have  likely  continued  for 
much longer. 

163Die 
Internetbetrüger 
http://diepresse.com/home/panorama/oesterreich/662710/Internetbetruger-prellten-100000-Opfer 

100.000 

prellten 

(2011): 

Presse 

Opfer, 

at: 

92 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Example of case involving hidden trader's identity (sale of medical products) 
Marketing and sale of medical products on Internet is prohibited in Greece but not in many other 
Member States. Insufficient powers in some enforcement regimes create difficulties in handling 
these  cases  because  the  traders  operating  these  websites  use  international  phone  numbers  and 
other  digital means  of  communication.  This  makes  it  difficult  to  identify  who  the  trader  is  and 
where it is actually based. There are also cases of individuals who appear to trade via commercial 
websites selling medical products but indicate phone numbers or other contact details in Greece.  

The limited powers of the competent authority in Greece to trace the trader responsible, to take 
down  websites  and  to  request  police  and  banks  to provide  information  allowing  to  determine 
trader's identity hampered effective investigation and cessation of these infringements. 

Example of case where the power to adopt interim orders/take down websites was key for 
effective enforcement 
In  2013  the  Italian  Competition  Authority  –  acting  in  close  co-operation  with  the  Italian  Tax 
Police  –  brought  down  more  than  160  websites  selling  counterfeited  goods  (most  of  these 
websites were hosted in Chine and the goods originated from China as well)164. This was done 
via  interim  orders  or  final  decisions  to  take  down  the  websites.  These  actions  made  these 
websites inaccessible from the Italian territory.  

These cases illustrate that the power to adopt interim orders (and take down the websites) can be 
very  effective  to  tackle  infringements  in  the  digital  environment.  However,  this  power  is  not 
available  to  all  CPC  competent  authorities  (see  above).  This  means  that  some  CPC  competent 
authorities cannot provide the requested enforcement assistance. This reduces the effectiveness of 
an enforcement action in the CPC context. Italy is one of the 11 Member States whose authorities 
have the power to take down websites. The example above shows a successful action thanks to 
the fact that Italian authorities can adopt interim measures and take down websites. However, if 
this case occurred in Member States where enforcement authorities do not have powers to adopt 
interim measures/ suspend trade activity (see Box 5) and to take down websites, the infringement 
would not have been stopped fast enough to prevent substantial consumer detriment. 

Example  of  how  insufficient  powers  affect  the  functioning  of  the  CPC  mutual  assistance 
mechanism 
CPC  authority  in  country  X  asked  CPC  authority  in  country  Y  to  take  enforcement  measures 
against  a  trader  who  based  in  country  Y  but  was  selling  electronic  components  online  to 
consumers  in  the  country  X.  CPC  authority  X  claims  to  have  provided  the  authority  Y  with 
sufficient  evidence  (screen  shots,  complaint  data,  and  the  IP  address  of  the  trader).  However, 
CPC  authority  Y  did  not  take  any  enforcement  action,  claiming  that  it  did  not  have  sufficient 
powers to locate the trader operating online. CPC authority Y also refused to transmit the file to 
the police for eventual criminal investigation. 
This example illustrates that where the necessary powers are not available to all CPC authorities 
this may hamper cooperation and reduce the effectiveness of an enforcement action 

164  See,  for  example,  AGCM'  s  press  releases:  http://www.agcm.it/en/newsroom/press-releases/2047-
ps8757-ps8758-made-in-italy-antitrust-in-collaboration-with-the-special-market-protection-unit-of-the-
guardia-di-finanza-italian-tax-police-orders-the-closure-of-two-websites-that-sell-counterfeit-gucci-and-
prada-merchandise.html 
antitrust-authority-in-collaboration-with-the-special-market-protection-unit-of-the-guardia-di-finanza-
italian-tax-police-shuts-down-15-websites-selling-counterfeit-products-branded-tods-and-roger-vivier.html  
See also the speech of Mr Salvatore Rebecchini, Commissioner, Italian Competition Authority  delivered at 
the  Italian  Presidency  of  the  EU  Council  conference  “EU  Cooperation  for  enforcement  of  consumer 
legislation”, on 7 July in Rome: http://www.agcm.it/trasp-statistiche/doc_download/4392-rebecchini.html  

http://www.agcm.it/en/newsroom/press-releases/2069-made-in-italy-the-

and 

93 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Example of how "forgotten" mutual assistance requests cause delays in enforcement 
An information request was sent by CPC authority in country X to country Y (to its single liaison 
office, where such requests should be sent under the CPC Regulation). The SLO of country Y did 
not  forward  the  request  to  the  competent  CPC  authority  in  its  country.  The  request  was  left 
untreated for several  months. The requesting  authority withdrew its request, because it was  too 
late to take an action to stop an infringement. 

This example illustrates the need for clear and binding rules concerning handling of enforcement 
and  information  requests  as  well  the  need  to  ensure  that  all  requests  are  handled  in  a  timely 
manner.  It  also  demonstrates  the  need  for  better  coordination  of  the  mutual  assistance 
mechanism.    

94 

 
13.  Annex V: Legal framework 

13.1.

  Existing  EU  instruments  to  improve  enforcement  of  consumer  laws 

across borders 

There  are  two  instruments  that  have  been  put  in  place  to  improve  the  enforcement  of 
consumer laws across borders within the EU. These instruments are complementary. 

13.1.1.  CPC Regulation 2006/2004  

The objectives of the Regulation 2006/2004, which is subject to this impact assessment 
report,  are  cooperation  among  Member  States  enforcement  authorities  (with  each  other 
and the Commission) in order to ensure compliance with the laws that protect collective 
economic  interests  of  consumers  and  the  smooth  functioning  of  the  Single  Market.  All 
horizontal consumer laws are covered by this enforcement cooperation mechanism (e.g. 
directives concerning unfair commercial practices, unfair terms and consumer rights), as 
well as some sectorial legislation, such as passenger rights, consumer credit, e-commerce 
(listed in the Annex of the CPC Regulation). 

The  European  Commission  actively  coordinated  the  operation  of  the  CPC  network, 
maintains  its  database  ("CPCS")  and  supports  coordinated  projects  and  enforcement 
capacity of national authorities with grants under the Consumer Programme. 

To achieve these objectives, the CPC Regulation provides legal basis for public enforcers 
to share information, assist each other in investigations and equips them with minimum 
investigation  and  enforcement  powers  to  address  cross-border  infringements.  While 
national  enforcement  authorities  are  the  major  users  of  the  present  Regulation  as  it 
stands,  the  CPC  Regulation  is  also  beneficial  for  both  consumers  and  traders  who  are 
involved  in  cross-border  transactions  as  it  aims  to  ensure  that  consumers'  rights  are 
upheld across borders. 

The CPC Regulation's core is the mutual assistance mechanism consisting of: 

  Mutual assistance requests (information and enforcement requests, Articles 6 and 

8 of the CPC Regulation)165,  

  Alert mechanism (Article 7 of the CPC Regulation), and 

  Coordinated monitoring and enforcement activities: such as EU-wide screening of 
websites,  known  as  "sweeps";  or  presenting  common  enforcement  requirements  to 
the industry to cease unfair commercial practices in areas of common interest across 
the EU (Article 9 of the CPC Regulation). 

Enforcement requests (Article 8): a national authority in one Member State can request 
its  counterpart  in  another  Member  State  to  take  enforcement  measures  to  cease  or 
prohibit  the  intra-Community  infringement  without  delay.  This  tool  permits  the 
competent authorities to obtain evidence and information from another Member State and 

165  The  CPC  Regulation  enables  the  competent  authorities  to  exchange  investigative  information  upon 
request  ("information  request")  and  to  ask  other  competent  authority  to  stop  an  intra-Community 
infringement ("enforcement request").  

95 

 
                                                 
to stop infringements committed by traders from other Member States.  

In 2006 the Commission adopted a decision regarding the mutual assistance mechanism 
of the CPC Regulation. It sets the information requirements, which include the minimum 
information to be included in requests for mutual assistance and in alerts, benchmarks for 
handling mutual assistance requests and the use of languages166.  

In  practice,  when  issuing  a  request  for  enforcement  measures  to  be  taken  to  cease  an 
infringement,  the  applicant  authority  will  provide  the  requested  authority  with  the 
minimum  required  information  and  evidence,  on  the  basis  of  which  the  requested 
authority  will  be  able  to  possibly  initiate  an  enforcement  action  under  its  national 
enforcement  system:  name  of  the  trader;  details  of  the  infringing  practices;  legal 
qualification of the intra-Community infringement under the law; evidence of harm to the 
collective interests of consumers. 

Both authorities agree the time-line for the action. The requested authority has to notify 
the Commission and other CPC authorities concerned of the enforcement measures taken 
in the case. 

Over the past 9 years, thanks to the annual enforcement action known as "sweeps", the 
CPC  network  obtained  the  correction  of  some  3,300  e-Commerce  websites  infringing 
consumer  protection  rules  in  different  sectors  such  as  air  transport,  hotel  booking  or 
digital content products. In addition to the yearly sweeps, since 2013, the CPC network 
has  been  working  on  coordinated  enforcement  actions  that  address  widespread 
infringements  to  the  EU  consumer  legislation  directly  with  the  industry  concerned:  the 
action on in-app purchases in online games is the first example, which was followed by 
the CPC action on car rental167. Thanks to these actions, traders changed their practices to 
bring them in line with consumer law. This saved not only time and litigation costs but 
also improved legal certainty.  

13.1.2.  Directive  2009/22/EC  on  Injunctions  for  the  Protection  of  Consumers' 

Interests168 

Under  this  directive  consumer  organisations  or  public  enforcement  authorities  in  all 
Member  States  can  take  legal  action  to  stop  an  illegal  practice  by  a  trader  who  has 
breached a consumer protection rule. The Commission Report of 2008169 concerning the 
application of this directive shows that the mechanism which enables qualified entities170 

166  Decision  2007/76/EC  of  22  December  2006  implementing  Regulation  (EC)  No  2006/2004  of  the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004 on cooperation between national authorities 
responsible  for  the  enforcement  of  consumer  protection  laws  as  regards  mutual  assistance,  OJ  L  32  of 
6.2.2007.  In  addition  to  this  implementing  decision,  Operating  Guidelines  were  endorsed  by  the  CPC 
Committee in June 2010. They cover practical aspects concerning the handling of CPC mutual assistance 
requests and the CPC database. 
167  See  http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/consumer-marketing/news/1401222_en.htm  and  IP/15/5334, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5334_en.htm  
168  The  directive  was  adopted  in  1998  (Directive  98/27/EC),  and  it  was  codified  in  2009:  Directive 
2009/22/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  23  April  2009  on  injunctions  for  the 
protection of consumers’ interests (Codified version), OJ L 110, 1.5.2009. 
169  Report  from  the  Commission  concerning  the  application  of  Directive  98/27/EC  of  the  European 
Parliament and of the Council on injunctions for the protection of consumers' interest, 2008, COM(2008) 
756 final.  
170  As  listed  in  the  Commission  Communication  concerning  Article  4(3)  of  Directive  2009/22/EC  of  the 
European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  injunctions  for  the  protection  of  consumers'  interests,  which 

96 

 
                                                 
of one Member State to act in another Member State has clearly not been as successful as 
it  was  hoped.  However,  whilst  injunctive  actions  are  rarely  used  for  cross-border 
infringements, several Member States and consumer associations stated that these actions 
are used fairly successfully by consumer associations for domestic infringements, such as 
misleading advertising or unfair contract terms. 

Directive 2009/22/EC does not fall within the scope of this impact assessment report. 

13.2.

  Impact of the current CPC Regulation on national enforcement systems 

13.2.1.  CPC competent authorities 

The CPC Regulation obliges Member States to designate single liaison offices and public 
authorities  with  specific  responsibilities  to  enforce  consumer  protection  legislation 
mentioned in its Annex171. It also specifies which powers these authorities must possess 
for the application of the CPC Regulation172.  

The  CPC  Regulation  leaves  a  considerable  flexibility  for  Member  States  to  design 
their competent authorities, for instance, it enables Member States to designate, besides 
public  authorities,  bodies  (e.g.  consumer  organisations)  having  a  legitimate  interest  to 
stop  intra-Community  infringements173.  The  competent  authorities  may  instruct  these 
bodies to take all necessary enforcement measures available to them under national law 
to  stop  intra-Community  infringements.  These  bodies  may  therefore  play  a  role  in  the 
CPC mutual assistance mechanism. On the other hand, the responsibility for fulfilling the 
mutual  assistance  obligations  rests  with  the  competent  public  authority  and  the  CPC 
Regulation provides for safeguards in this respect174. These powers have to be exercised 
in conformity with national law. 

Pursuant  to  the  CPC  Regulation,  all  Member  States  have  designated  their  competent 
authorities and single liaison offices. Whilst for some Member States this meant only a 
limited modification of their existing system of public enforcement, other Member States 
had  to  adapt  their  national  enforcement  systems  and  in  some  cases  set  up  new 
enforcement  authorities  (e.g.  The  Netherlands,  Germany).  The  network  of  competent 
authorities  was  considerably  extended  over  time.  The  main  reason  for  this  was  the 
gradual  extension  of  the  material  scope  of  the  CPC  Regulation,  as  new  EU  legislation 
was added to its Annex. The list of competent authorities notified to the Commission by 
Member  States  is  regularly  published  in  the  Official  Journal  of  the  EU,  and  currently 
there  are  approximately  323  CPC  competent  authorities  in  EU-28  and  15  competent 
authorities in EEA countries. 

Different approaches exist across the Member States as regards the national institutional 
set-up  for  the  CPC  Regulation.  In  some  Member  States  enforcement  of  EU  consumer 
protection laws is concentrated in very few authorities (e.g. BE, FR,  HU, PL) whilst in 

codifies  Directive  98/27/EC,  concerning  the  entities  qualified  to  bring  an  action  under  Article  2  of  this 
Directive, OJ C, 31.3.2012. 
171 Article 4(1) of the CPC Regulation. 
172 Article 4(3) of the CPC Regulation. 
173 Article 8(3) and (4) of the CPC Regulation. 
174 In the period 2007-2013 four Member States have designated such bodies (Austria, Croatia, Germany 
and the United Kingdom). They mostly comprise consumer associations (e.g. in Germany and Austria) and 
group  interests  associations (e.g.  in  Austria)  acting  in  their  own name.  The  national  laws  entitle  them  to 
take enforcement action and bring cases, including intra-Community infringements, before national courts. 
Occasionally they may seek redress for individual consumers before courts.  

97 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
others  the  enforcement  powers  are  distributed  among  many  authorities  with  sector-
specific  responsibilities  (e.g.  HR,  CZ,  SK,  PT,  RO).  In  the  initial  two  years  of  the 
application  of  the  CPC  Regulation  the  Commission  invited  two  Member  States  to 
reconsider  the  notified  institutional  framework  involving  a  large  number  of  competent 
authorities.  In  both  cases  the  Member  States  simplified  their  national  institutional 
frameworks175.  

In Member States with federal (e.g. DE, ES) or decentralised systems regional authorities 
have also been designated as competent authorities under the CPC Regulation. In some 
Member  States  the  single  liaison  office  is  also  a  competent  authority  under  the  CPC 
Regulation.  In  other  Member  States  different  authorities  exercise  the  competent 
authorities' and single liaison office's functions.  

The external evaluation of the CPC Regulation mentions difficulties that may be caused 
by complex and diverging national institutional frameworks. This in particular concerns 
long communication lines which could cause in handling mutual assistance requests. The 
external  evaluation  there  points  to  the  importance  of  the  single  liaison  office's  role,  in 
particular, in national systems with complex institutional set-up176.  

The  preferred  option  3  does  not  envisage  changing  the  current  provisions  of  the  CPC 
Regulation regarding the designation of competent authorities under the CPC Regulation, 
as  this  would  not  be  in  line  with  the  principle  of  subsidiarity.  The  only  technical 
amendment would be to clarify that the single liaison office should be part of an authority 
in charge of horizontal consumer legislation (such as the Consumer Rights Directive or 
unfair Commercial Practices Directive). 

13.2.2.  Diversity of national enforcement systems 

The CPC Regulation leaves Member States flexibility for the design of their enforcement 
regimes  and  the  Member  States  have  taken  different  approaches  towards  enforcement. 
Under  Article  4(4)  of  the  CPC  Regulation,  the  competent  authorities  may  exercise  the 
mandated  powers  in  conformity  with  national  law  either:  (a)  directly  under  their  own 
authority  or  under  the  supervision  of  the  judicial  authorities;  or  (b)  by  application  to 
courts competent to grant the necessary decision. 

Diversity  of  enforcement  systems  has  affected  the  effectiveness  and  efficiency  of  the 
enforcement  cooperation  under  the  CPC  Regulation.  However,  the  review  of  the  CPC 
Regulation is not aiming to harmonise enforcement systems as this would not be in line 
with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. The information presented in this 
section is useful for a reader it provides information (i) why organising coherent effective 
and  efficient  enforcement  cooperation  has  been  and  will  continue  to  be  an  exceptional 
challenge because of different enforcement systems and (ii) this information is relevant 
for  the  analysis  of  the  proposed  options  in  particular  regarding  the  assessment  of  the 
impacts on the legal systems. 

175  Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  to  the  Council  on  the  application  of 
Regulation  (EC)  No  2006/2004,  COM(2009)  336  final,  7.7.  2009  ("2009  Biennial  Report"),  p.  4. 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/enforcement/docs/Commission_report_en.pdf.     
176 p. 76-77 of the 2012 external evaluation report. 

98 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
The  study  carried  out  on  behalf  of  the  Commission177  identifies  three  main  types  of 
public enforcement regimes178 (in terms of procedural enforcement models) existing in 
the Member States: 

  Self-managed  administrative  proceedings:  the  national  competent  authority  starts 
and  conducts  the  investigation,  can  take  enforcement  measures  such  as  banning 
certain types of practices or imposing penalties;  

  Civil  proceedings:  the  national  competent  authority  starts  and  conducts  the 
investigation; based on the investigation's outcome it requests a civil court to issue an 
injunction or a cease and desist order; and 

  Criminal  proceedings:  the  national  competent  authority  starts  and  conducts  the 
investigation and, where the infringement constitutes a criminal offence or where the 
trader refuses to comply with a previous court or administrative decision (cease and 
desist  order),  refers  the  case  to  the  prosecutor/investigating  judge  for  action  under 
criminal  law.  Criminal  sanctions  may  include  imprisonment,  ban  of  activities  for  a 
specified period of time or fines. 

The specificities of each enforcement system have immediate repercussions on the means 
for enforcement (e.g. powers and procedures).  

The diversity of institutional design among Member States across EU is based on country 
specific institutional and legal traditions. 

  About half of Member States rely primarily on public enforcement in the form of 
self-managed  administrative  proceedings  (although  this  does  not  preclude  the 
parallel possibility of civil or criminal proceedings), i.e. BG, CY, CZ, EE, FR, HU, 
IE, IT, LV, LT, MT, PL, PT, RO, SK, ES. 

  Member  States  relying  primarily  on  civil  proceedings  for  public  enforcement 
(although this does not preclude the possibility of parallel administrative and criminal 
proceedings) are BE, DK, EL, FI, HR, LU, SE and the UK. 

 

In BE, FR, and the UK criminal proceedings can be used to sanction violations of 
consumer  legislation.  In  these  Member  States  the  enforcement  of  the  law  on  unfair 
commercial practices has traditionally been done through criminal sanctions. In AT, 
FI,  HU,  DK  and  SK  criminal  proceedings  can  be  initiated  also  in  certain  data 
protection cases and/or in cases related to deception respectively.  

  Member  States  relying  primarily  on  private  enforcement  for  domestic  and  some 
cross-border  infringements  are  AT  and  DE,  and  to  some  extent  CZ.  In  these 
jurisdictions  it  is  up  to  the  consumers  (aided  by  voluntary  or  publicly  funded 
consumer  associations)  to  enforce  their  consumer  rights  in  national  courts.  As 
mentioned above, this possibility is also foreseen in the CPC Regulation179.  

177  Study  on  enforcement  of  authorities’  powers  and  national  procedural  rules  in  the  application  of  CPC 
Regulation by Grimaldi Studio Legale, publication forthcoming. 
178  The  described  enforcement  regimes  are  not  mutually  exclusive;  and  all  three  public  enforcement 
regimes may coexist in one Member State.  
179 According to Article 8(3), competent authorities may instruct bodies having a legitimate interest in the 
protection of consumer rights to take all necessary enforcement measures available to them under national 
law to stop intra-Community infringements 

99 

 
                                                 
The table below presents an illustrative summary of different enforcement systems: 

100 

 
 
 
 
 
13.3.

  Investigation and enforcement powers of CPC authorities 

13.3.1.  State of play of minimum powers of competent enforcement authorities 

The CPC Regulation vests the  national authorities  with  a set  of minimum investigation 
and  enforcement  powers  to  combat  transnational  infringements,  which  are  listed  in 
Article 4(6) of the CPC Regulation: 

Minimum investigation powers currently available for the CPC authorities: 

 

 

 

to  have  access  to  any  relevant  document,  in  any  form,  related  to  the  intra-
Community infringement; 
to  require  the  supply  by  any  person  of  relevant  information  related  to  the  intra-
Community infringement; and 
to carry out necessary on-site inspections. 

Minimum enforcement powers currently available for the CPC authorities: 

 

 

 

 

to  request  in  writing  that  the  seller  or  supplier  concerned  cease  the  intra-
Community infringement; 
to  obtain  from 
intra-Community 
the  seller  or  supplier  responsible  for 
infringements  an  undertaking  to  cease  the  intra-Community  infringement;  and, 
where appropriate, to publish the resulting undertaking; 
to require the cessation or prohibition of any intra-Community infringement and, 
where appropriate, to publish resulting decisions; and 
to require the losing defendant to make payments into the public purse or to any 
beneficiary  designated in or  under national legislation, in  the  event of  failure to 
comply with the decision. 

Article  4  spells  out  what  competent  authorities  must  be  able  to  do.  Depending  on  the 
enforcement  system  in  place,  the  competent  authorities  either  exercise  these  powers 
directly (possible subject to judicial supervision) or indirectly by applying to competent 
courts to seek the necessary judicial orders.  

Member States either introduced these powers following the entry into force of the CPC 
Regulation or extended the existing national enforcement powers in consumer protection 
to  intra-Community  infringements.  Moreover,  recent  Belgian,  French,  Polish,  and  UK 
reforms have made new powers available to their enforcers of consumer legislation.  

In  general,  there  are  no  differences  between  domestic  enforcement  powers  and  those 
applied  to  intra-Community  infringements.  The  legal  study180  procured  by  the 
Commission  mentions  Germany  as  the  only  exception,  where  the  enforcement  powers 
provided  by  the  CPC  Regulation  have  been  introduced  for  the  competent  national 
administrative  authority,  while  domestic  infringements  are  dealt  with  by  consumer 
associations within the context of private enforcement. 

13.3.2.  Inter-action with criminal prosecution  

Under  the  CPC  Regulation  the  competent  authorities  should  also  use  other  powers  or 
measures  granted  to  them  at  the  national  level  to  stop  intra-Community  infringements, 
including  the  power  to  refer  matters  for  criminal  prosecution181.  As  highlighted  above, 

180  Study  on  enforcement  of  authorities’  powers  and  national  procedural  rules  in  the  application  of  CPC 
Regulation by Grimaldi Studio Legale, publication forthcoming. 
181 Recital 8 and Article 8(2) of the CPC Regulation.  

101 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
some Member States (e.g. AT, FR, UK) can refer intra-Community infringements to their 
criminal prosecution authorities.  

13.3.3.  Mapping additional powers available for competent authorities 

As  already mentioned  above,  the  CPC  Regulation  requires the  competent  authorities  to 
make  use  of  other  powers  or  measures  granted  to  them  at  national  level  to  cease  or 
prohibit  intra-Community  infringements182.  However,  the  lack  of  uniformity  in  the 
availability of certain of these additional powers across all countries has proven to be an 
obstacle to a more effective cooperation.   

The  tables  below  map  main  additional  powers,  which  are  necessary  for  competent 
authorities  to  address  infringements  effectively  and  which  are  available  for  some 
competent authorities at national level: 

Availability of 
the power 

Power to conduct mystery 
shopping 

Power to make test purchases 

YES 

NO 

YES 

BG, CZ, DK, ES, FI, FR, HU, 
IE, LV, NL, PL, RO, SK, SI, 
UK 

BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, 
FR, HR, HU, LV, NL, PT, SK, SI, 
UK 

AT, BE, CY, DE, EE, EL, 
HR, IT, LT, LU, MT, PT, SE 

AT, BE, EL, IE, IT,  LT, LU, MT, 
PL, RO, SE 

Naming of 
infringing 

Take down 
websites/domains 

Freeze 
assets 

Order consumer 
compensation 

Withdraw/ 
suspend trade 
activity 
(interim) 

CY, DK, EE, ES, 
FI, IT, LU, PL, 
PT, SE, UK 

UK, RO  BG, CZ, DK, 

ES, FI, FR, 
EL, HR, HU, 
IT, LT, LV, 
MT, RO, SK, 
SI, UK 

EE, ES, PT, RO, 
UK 

traders 

AT,BE, 
BG, CY, 
DK, EE, 
ES, FI, EL, 
HU, IE, IT, 
LT, LU, 
LV, MT, 
NL, PL, 
RO, SE, 
SK, SL, 
UK 

182 Ibid. 

102 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
NO 

CZ, DE,  
FR, HR, 
PT 

AT, BE, BG, CZ, 
DE, FR, EL, HR, 
HU, IE, LT, LV, 
MT, NL, RO, SK, 
SI 

All MS 
except 
UK and 
RO 

AT, BE, CY, 
DE, EE, IE, 
LU, NL, PL, 
PT, SE 

AT, BE, BG, CY, 
CZ, DE, DK, IT, 
FI, FR, EL, HR, 
HU, IE, LT, LU, 
MT, NL, PL, SE, 
SK, SI 

13.4.

  Impact  of  the  preferred  option  on  national  enforcement  systems  and 

laws  

The  preferred  option  would  neither  affect  the  Member  States'  competences  in 
enforcement, nor would it harmonise national enforcement systems. It would not affect 
internal  division  of  competences  among  authorities  at  national  level,  as  Member  States 
would  remain  responsible  for  their  institutional  set  up  and  designation  of  competent 
authorities under the CPC Regulation. 

The preferred option (PO3) would have impact on national laws as follows: 

13.4.1.  Additional investigation and enforcement powers for CPC competent authorities 
necessary  for  the  application  of  the  CPC  Regulation  would  continue  being 
exercised in conformity with national procedural law 

In several Member States the powers proposed under the Option 3 are already entrusted 
to  the  enforcement  authorities  to  address  domestic  infringements.  In  these  countries 
minimal  adjustments  would  be  needed  to  ensure  that  the  powers  in  the  revised  CPC 
Regulation can rely on the national procedural provisions that apply to the same powers 
existing in the domestic context. Depending on the enforcement system, such rules would 
be  laid  down  in  the  civil  procedure  code  for  courts/or  in  the  administrative  procedural 
law  or  in  a  specific  legislation  dedicated  to  consumer  protection  or  to  powers  of  the 
consumer protection authorities183. 

183 For example, in Belgium substantive and procedural provisions, which are applicable to both national 
and intra-Community infringements are contained in the Code of Economic Law. In  France, powers for 
the competent body (“DGCCRF”) are provided in a specific law on consumer protection, while procedural 
rules  are  included  in  the  Consumer  Code,  which  for  the  investigative  powers  refers  to  the  Code  of 
Commerce.  In  Germany,  the  CPC  Regulation  is  implemented  through  the  specific  EC  Consumer 
Protection Enforcement Act. In Czech Republic, the CPC Regulation has been implemented with Act No. 
160/2007 amending certain laws in the field of consumer protection. Under this law, the necessary changes 
were made to several laws in order to allow the numerous competent authorities to proceed in accordance 
with  the  CPC  Regulation.  In  Latvia,  the  powers  necessary  to  investigate  and  enforce  intra-Community 
infringements  are  implemented  mainly  in  the  Consumer  Rights  Protection  Law  and  its  supplementing 
Regulations. The Unfair Commercial Practice Prohibition Law also contains provisions stating the duties 
and powers of the competent body for consumer protection ("CRPC"). Competent authorities in Latvia act 
within  the  framework  of  the  Administrative  Procedure  Law  and  other  applicable  laws.  In  UK,  the 
Enterprise  Act  2002  makes  express  reference  to  the  powers  of  a  "CPC  enforcer".  In  Slovakia,  Act  No 
250/2007 on Consumer protection contains the general principles. This Act also delegates the main powers 
of the relevant bodies of consumer protection control, stating that unless mentioned otherwise, the relevant 
body is the Slovak Trade Inspection. The procedural aspects of inspection carried out by the Slovak Trade 
Inspection  are  contained  in  Act  No  128/2002  Coll.  on  State  control  of  the  internal  market  in  matters  of 
consumer  protection.  The  control  of  commercial  advertising  is  regulated  by  several  laws  and  5  different 
agencies  are  concerned,  depending  on  the  sector  concerned  (e.g.  foodstuff,  drugs,  cosmetics,  tobacco 
products etc.). 

103 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Member  States  where  the  enforcement  authorities  do  not  have  such  powers  in  the 
domestic context would have to introduce adjustments to their national procedural laws 
to  ensure  that  the  powers  in  the  revised  CPC  Regulation  can  be  exercised  by  their 
authorities. Such adjustments would provide for procedural rules for the exercise of these 
powers  and  ensure  that  other  domestic  laws  do  not  contravene  the  exercise  of  such 
powers  (e.g.  for  mystery  shopping/test  purchases  it  would  have  to  be  ensured  that  the 
national financial regulations allow for the use of public monies to purchase goods and 
adequate  mechanism  to  obtain  the  return  of  such  money  to  the  public  budget  or  other 
similar solutions).    

In this context it should be noted that as opposed to Directives the provisions of the CPC 
Regulation  are  directly  applicable  in  the  Member  States.  Duplication  of  the  powers 
stemming from the CPC Regulation for purely domestic infringements is not required as 
these powers would apply only in the context of Intra-Community infringements.  
As  already  mentioned,  greater  familiarisation  (one-off)  costs  would  be  borne  by  those 
Member States where CPC authorities do not have several of the proposed powers under 
the preferred option in the national context: AT, BE, DE, EL, FR, HR, IE and LT.  

Further, the extent of adjustments would depend on the internal division of competencies 
in  a  Member  State  and  on  whether  the  powers  and  related  procedural  provisions  are 
contained  in  a  specific  act  dedicated  to  consumer  protection  or  in  a  general  procedural 
code184. More adjustments would be needed in those Member States, where enforcement 
of consumer law is entrusted to several sectorial authorities. In this regard the Member 
State which would be most concerned would be the Czech Republic, where there are at 
least  18  CPC  authorities,  and  thus  the  change  of  the  laws  governing  the  powers  of  18 
authorities involved in the CPC network might be needed.  Similar situation would be in 
Member  States  which  have  vertical  distribution  of  competences  (federal  systems,  such 
DE and ES). 

In this context, it should be noted that the extent of changes in individual Member States 
primarily  depends  on  the  Member  States'  choices  of  the  structure  of  their  enforcement 
systems (as per the above example of the Czech Republic), which is neither determined 
by the current CPC Regulation nor by the measures proposed in the preferred option.    

13.4.2.  Introduction of the provision for mutual recognition of evidence 

There are no specific procedural rules that apply to intra-Community infringements. The 
CPC  Regulation  requires  that  competent  authorities  exercise  their  powers  mandated  by 
the Regulation in  conformity with  national procedural law. The preferred option would 
not  change this  and does not  aim to  harmonise national procedural  laws.  The preferred 
option would clarify what is already required under the mutual assistance mechanism: the 
evidence  gathered  by  the  applicant  authority  should  be  recognised  as  valid  by  the 
requested  authority  unless  proven  to  the  contrary  by  the  trader(s)  concerned.  This 
clarification might require changes to the national procedural laws to make sure that all 
authorities  concerned  and  in  particular  the courts  abide  by this  principle.  The  extent  of 
the  adjustment  would  depend  on  how  many  national  laws  enable  the  provisions  of  the 
CPC Regulation (see examples below) and on the degree of involvement of civil courts 
in the enforcement of consumer legislation.  

184 Ibid. 

104 

 
 
 
                                                 
13.4.3.  Mandatory  coordinated  procedure  initiated  by  the  Commission  to  address 

widespread infringements meeting the threshold 

The  new  cooperation  procedure  would  provide  for  "common  enforcement  position" 
regarding traders' compliance with EU consumer legislation, which would be binding on 
the  national  authorities  who  were  concerned  by  the  widespread  infringement.  In  this 
regard national laws might need to be amended to give to this instrument effects in the 
national  legal  order.  Again,  the  extent  of  adjustments  would  depend  on  the  number  of 
national laws which would need to be changed in this regard. In those countries, where 
substantive  and  procedural  provisions,  which  are  applicable  to  both  national  and  intra-
Community infringements, are contained in one act (e.g. UK, BE), adjustments would be 
minimal.  However,  more  adjustment  would  need  to  be  made  in  those  countries  where 
several national laws would be concerned by the revised CPC Regulation (e.g. FR, LV, 
SK)185. 

185 Ibid. 

105 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14.  Annex VI: Current and future cost and saving (covering option 3) of the CPC 

cooperation 

Simulation of the cost of 1 coordinated action to tackle 1 widespread infringement 

Legend: FTE = full time equivalent staff for one year; staff costs are calculated on the basis of 
Eurostat data on average staff cost for administrations in each Member State, and on DG BUDG 
average staff cost for Commission officials.  

Scenario 1: the Trader(s) agree to a negotiated outcome and comply with it 

1) Present 
framework 

2) Future 
framework 
widespread 
infringement 
below the 
threshold 

3) Future 
framework 
widespread 
infringement 
meeting the 
threshold 

0.2 FTE 

0.15 FTE 

0.1 FTE 

0.1 FTE 

0.38 FTE 

0.38 FTE for 
one Member 
State or for the 
Commission 

None 

0.38 FTE 

Saving  
2) - 1) 

Saving 
 3) - 1) 

404.7 

Max  311.7 

224.9 

-93 

-178.9 

Time devoted to the 
action in each Member 
State 
Time devoted by the 
lead Member State 
Time devoted by the 
Commission 

Total staff costs at EU 
level, EUR thousands 

Scenario 2: the Trader(s) do(es) not agree to a negotiated outcome and more action is needed to 
get compliance, Member States have to pursue the action another year and possibly litigate 

1) Present 
framework 

2) Future 
framework 
widespread 
infringement 
below the 
threshold 

3) Future 
framework 
widespread 
infringement 
meeting the 
threshold 

none 

Scenario1 +  

Scenario1 + 
0.2 FTE 

Scenario1 +  
0.15 FTE 

Time devoted to the 
action in each Member 
State 
Time devoted by the 
lead Member State 
Time devoted by the 
Commission 
Total staff costs at EU 
level, EUR thousands 
For  memory  if  Member  States  do  not  coordinate  their  action,  certain  Member  States  may 
succeed in getting a negotiated outcome, others will have to litigate, the estimated time needed 
could be on average 0.5 FTE, which would represent EUR 868,000 in total at the EU level. 

Saving  
2) - 1) 

Saving 
 3) - 1) 

0.38 FTE 

1063.0 

-490.9 

-815.0 

248.4 

572.1 

none 

none 

none 

none 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. CURRENT COST 
Cost of cross-border enforcement under the current Regulation (assuming that Member States respect the current benchmarks for handling of 
mutual assistance requests, as laid down in the Operational Guidelines) 

Supervision (coordination inside 
Member States) 

Mutual assistance system  

Average annual cost of full time official in 
Member States = EUR 62,000 (Eurostat 
2012) 

Average annual cost of full time official in 
Member States = EUR 62,000 (Eurostat 
2012) 
Benchmarks: 
3 months for information request handling 
9-12 months for enforcement request 
handling (assumed 12 moths)  

Per year:  
Large MS 1 full time official (DE, ES, FR, IT, PL, RO, UK) = 7 full 
time officials 
Medium MS 0.5 full time officials (AT, BE, BG, CZ, DK, EL, HR, 
HU, NL, PT, SE)  = 5.5 full time officials 
Small MS 0.25 full time official (EE, CY, FI, IE, LT, LV, LU, MT, SI, 
SK)=2.5 full time official 

Total all Member States: 15 full time officials = EUR 930,000 
Information requests (3 months):  110 requests per year: 4 
requests per Member State per year = 0.25 full time official per 
Member State per year = EUR 15,500 per Member State 
Total per year for all Member States: EUR 434,000 

Enforcement requests (12 months): 140 requests per year = 5 
requests per Member State  
Assume cost per 5 requests 1 full time official per year = 62,000 
EUR 
Total cost 140 requests = 28 full time officials = EUR 1,736,000 
per year 

Total cost of CPC mutual assistance system:  
Per Member State (average): EUR 77,500 
Total: EUR 2,170,000 

Alerts  

60 alerts per year per 28 Member State 
0.05 full time official per year =1.4 full time official per year 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sweeps (1 action per year) 

Costs: total for all Member States per year: EUR 86,800 
2014 sweep (437 websites) 
Investigation phase: 730 hours = EUR 30,295 = EUR 1,165 per 
Member State on average 
Enforcement phase (assume the same amount as per 
investigation phase, conservative) = EUR 30,295  
Total cost:  EUR 60,590 = EUR 2,330 per Member State 

Based on the 2014 sweep on guarantees, 
checked 437 websites, 26 Member States 
participated  

Assumed the same time allowance for the 
enforcement phase as for the investigation 
phase.  

II.  FUTURE SITUATION (after CPC review/implementation  of policy option 3) 

Costs linked to the change of the CPC Regulation 
Implementation costs  
Familiarisation costs (1 year 
only) 
Learning costs: decision on best 
course of action (1 year)  

EUR 1,000 per case  

EUR 2,000 per authority 1 year only  

Change in operational costs because of the changed CPC Regulation 
Supervision (coordination inside 
Member States) 
Mutual assistance system  

No change.  

Reduction in cost of handling of mutual assistance requests: 
Information requests (currently: 110 requests on average per 
year): 
Based on UK data we assume that each full time official will be 
able to handle 50% more requests: under the new system 
either 168 requests can be handled (58 requests more) with 
the existing 7 full time officials instead of the current 110 or 
only  4.5 full time officials will be needed handle 110 requests    
Net saving: 2.5 full time officials = EUR 155,000 (efficiency 
gains) 

108 

Familiarisation with the new powers and the new 
legal framework 

New: additional powers, mutual recognition of 
evidence, binding time limits.    

Based on UK calculation of reduction of costs of 
case handling following an introduction of new 
powers. UK concluded that the costs of case 
handling will decrease up to 75% per case 
because more cases will be closed faster.  
The average cost of non-complex case = EUR 
4,700, average costs of case with undertakings is 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alerts 

Sweeps (1 action per year)  

EUR 1,500 (i.e. trader accepts responsibility for 
the infringement). It is assumed that there will be 
more cases that will be concluded with trader's 
undertakings (75% of cases will be concluded 
with undertakings).  

Other gains: increased deterrence effect in the 
long term as the number of infringements and 
case handling time will decrease.  

As per mutual assistance requests.   

Enforcement requests (currently: 140 requests on average per 
year):  
Based on UK data we assume that each full time official will be 
able to handle 50% more requests = 7.5 requests instead of 5 
requests. The existing 28 full time officials will be able to 
handle 210 requests (70 requests more than that they handle 
currently) or only 18 full time officials will be needed to 
handle 140 requests instead of 28 full time officials.  
Net saving 10 full time officials = EUR 620,000 (efficiency 
gains) 
Member States: no change  
Commission: additional cost for alert monitoring + posting of 
alerts of  0.2 full time official = EUR 27,000 per year 
Investigation phase (detection of infringements):  
No change.  

Enforcement phase: based on the UK example we assume 
50% efficiency gain:  
Example: 2014 sweep (437 websites) 
730 hours of enforcement phase =>  50% saving  
365 hours = EUR 15,147 => saving of EUR 583 per Member 
State  
Net saving: EUR 15,147 per sweep.  

109 

 
 
 
 
 
 
EU hourly wage average; average annual salary and part time work in a CPC action 

in 

MS 

ISCO 1 
Legislators,  senior 
officials 
and 
managers  
(Hourly  Earnings 
adjusted  to  2010  + 
Non-wage  Labour 
Costs 
25% 
+ 
Overhead) 
Eurostat  2012, 
EUR 
BE  63.1 
BG  5.8 
CZ  17.8 
DK  58.1 
DE  57.5 
12.3 
ET 
39.1 
EI 
33.7 
EL 
41.8 
ES 
48.5 
FR 
IT 
59.2 
CY  45.6 
LV  7.8 
LT 
8.5 
LU  76.2 
HU  11.6 
MT  20.0 
NL  41.3 
AT  57.1 
PL 
18.3 
PO  31.6 
RO  10.7 
SI 
29.2 
SK  17.4 
52.2 
FI 
SE 
51.6 
UK  40.7 
HR  29.2 
EU  41.5 

(average) 

Annual  Salary 
in  EUR 
(220 
working 
days*8h 
day*hourly 
wage  costs),  in 
EUR 

per 

37.8% FTE (0.378) 

20% FTE (0.2)  

Part  time  work  of  one 
official  (37.8%)  FTE  in  a 
coordinated  enforcement 
project in EUR ('000) 

Part  time  work  of  one 
official  (20%)  FTE  in  a 
coordinated 
enforcement  project  in 
EUR ('000) 

111,056 
10,208 
31,328 
102,256 
101,200 
21,648 
68,816 
59,312 
73,568 
85,360 
104,192 
80,256 
13,728 
14,960 
134,112 
20,416 
35,200 
72,688 
100,496 
32,208 
55,616 
18,832 
51,392 
30,624 
91,872 
90,816 
71,632 
51,392 
61,971 
(average) 

41.98 
3.86 
11.84 
38.65 
38.25 
8.18 
26.01 
22.42 
27.81 
32.27 
39.38 
30.34 
5.19 
5.65 
50.69 
7.72 
13.31 
27.48 
37.99 
12.17 
21.02 
7.12 
19.43 
22.92 
34.73 
34.33 
27.07 
19.43 
667.24 (total sum) 

22.21 
2.04 
6.27 
20.45 
20.24 
4.33 
13.76 
11.86 
14.71 
17.07 
20.84 
16.05 
2.75 
2.9 
26.82 
4.08 
7.04 
14.54 
20.1 
6.44 
11.12 
3.77 
10.3 
6.12 
18.37 
18.16 
14.33 
10.3 
346.97 (total sum) 

Averages: by occupation**, by country2006 Mean Hourly Earnings By Main Economic Activity And Occupation*  + adjustment to 2010 Prices + Non wage Labour Costs + 25% Overhead                ESTAT: Structure of Earnings Survey - NACE rev 1.1: C to O not L. For full breakdown of calculations, contact SG C1Core hourly earnings data extracted, January 2012 and last updated, 20/10/10. Some 2006 data is missing and replaced by 2002 figures. In such cases a higher (02-10) wage development rate added. In order to generate a reliable EU hourly wage average for each occupation it is necessary to factor in the relative number of hours worked in each MS, rather than adding all earnings and then dividing by the number of the MS. The table first calculates the fraction of EU production taken up by each MS. This fraction then determines the level at which each MS is represented in the final average i.e. the higher the fraction, the more the average will be dependent on that MS's typical earnings. 2008 Total Number of Hours worked and paid in each MS per Yr.                                                                                                                                                    ESTAT: Number of employees, hours actually worked and paid - Nace Rev. 2 (Source LCS 2008)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15.  Annex VII: Technical changes to the CPC Regulation (including updating of its 

annex and of its database)  

Apart  from  the  main  changes  subject  to  this  impact  assessment,  there  will  be  a  few 
technical amendments aimed at clarifying existing provisions or ensuring coherence with 
other  instruments,  which  do  not  have  significant  impacts  or  which  are  aimed  at 
introducing changes which would be undertaken anyway to  improve the functioning of 
the  current  CPC  Regulation  (e.g. revamping  of  the  CPC  database)  and/or  to  update  the 
list of consumer legislation contained in the Annex of the CPC Regulation. In addition, 
the  Commission  Decision  implementing  the  CPC  Regulation186  will  be  updated  or 
replaced to reflect the changes introduced in the revised proposal. 

15.1.

  Clarifying existing provisions 

Clarifications  will  be  proposed,  e.g.  for  Articles  2-3,  5,  6,  8,  10,  14,  18,  19  and  20. 
Amendments to definitions and terminology used to take into account the entry into force 
of  the  Lisbon  Treaty  (Article  3),  as  well  as  new  legislation  (e.g.  reference  to  the  new 
commitology legislation and amendment of Article 19 in this respect). 

15.2.

  Changes to the CPC database 

The  CPC  Regulation  (Article  10)  mandates  the  Commission  to  maintain  an  electronic 
database where the information related to mutual assistance requests and alerts is stored 
and  processed.  To  this  effect,  the  Commission  put  in  place  the  CPC  System  (CPCS). 
Since  2007  the  CPCS  has  been  improved  to  allow  the  CPC  authorities  to  exchange 
information  and  documents  pertaining  to  mutual  assistance  requests.  The  tool  has  been 
duly  notified  to  the  data  protection  authorities  and  to  the  European  Data  Protection 
Supervisor (EDPS). The recommendations of the EDPS and the Article 29 working party 
have been duly implemented. 

The  biennial  reports,  the  2012  external  evaluation  and  contacts  with  CPC  authorities 
indicate a growing dissatisfaction with the CPCS database, in particular users emphasise 
that  the  CPCS  is  not  user-friendly  and  report  problems  with  access  rights,  quality  of 
access  and  speed  of  the  tool.  Almost  all  CPC  authorities  have  called  for  substantial 
improvements  to be  made  to the CPCS or  for its replacement,  pointing that the lack of 
well-functioning  IT  tool  is  also  a  technical  barrier  to  effective  and  efficient  CPC 
cooperation.  

The Commission plans to undertake a substantial revamp of the CPC System because it 
has reached the end of its lifespan, also taking into account the changes which would be 
introduced  in  the  CPC  Regulation  (e.g.  categorisation  of  the  alert  mechanism  and 
granting access to third parties to post alerts for information; new EU level procedure to 
tackle widespread infringements). 

15.3.

  Update and consolidation of the Annex of the CPC Regulation 

The CPC Regulation's Annex has been progressively updated to reflect the evolvement of 
EU  consumer  protection  legislation.  The  evaluation  of the CPC  Regulation  looked  into 

186  Commission  Decision  of  22  December  2006  implementing  Regulation  (EC)  No  2006/2004  of  the 
European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  cooperation  between  national  authorities  responsible  for  the 
enforcement of consumer protection laws as regards mutual assistance, OJ L 132, 6.2.2007, p. 192. 

 
 
                                                 
the  appropriateness  of  the  Annex  of  the  CPC  Regulation.  Among  other  matters,  it  also 
looked at the possible extension of the CPC cooperation to Business-to-Business (B2B) 
legislation187. B2B provisions are laid down in acts like the misleading and comparative 
advertising legislation188, where it is acknowledged that micro and small businesses face 
the same difficulties as consumers when trading cross-border. The evaluation concluded 
that  while  there  was  some  rationale  for  the  inclusion,  there  was  little  support  from  the 
CPC  stakeholders  as  B2B  was  not  their  main  responsibility.  Further,  changes  to 
substantive  consumer  laws  concerned  would  be  necessary  to  extend  the  protection  to 
B2B relations and only subsequently enable responsible national competent authorities to 
enforce these aspects. The inclusion of B2B aspects was therefore not recommended189. 

Regarding  consumer  relevant  legislation,  several  pieces  of  legislation  which  lay  down 
important  consumer  rights  are  currently  outside  its  scope.  The  external  evaluation 
therefore  concluded  that  a  limited  update  could  be  necessary  based  on  the  following 
criteria:  impact  on  the  collective  interests  of  consumers;  cross-border  relevance;  public 
enforcement  dimension;  and  consistency  with  the  sectorial  and  horizontal  legislation 
currently listed in the Annex.  

The Commission has taken into account the external evaluation's findings and examined 
the  relevant  pieces  of  legislation.  The  Annex  therefore  should  be  updated  to  offer  a 
consolidated view for consistency purpose: clarify the inclusion of the Consumer Rights 
Directive190  and  include  the  Mortgage  Credit  Directive191,  the  Rail  Passenger  Rights 
Regulation192,  the  Regulation  on  rights  of  disabled  persons  and  persons  with  reduced 
mobility  when  travelling  by  air193  and  pricing  provisions  of  the  Air  Services 
Regulation194. In view of the development of e-commerce within the Single Market and 
the  need  to  ensure  maximum  access  to  and  proper  use  of  distance  payment  means, 
inclusion  of  the  Payment  Services  Directive195  and  the  Payment  Accounts  Directive196 

187 P. 9 of the evaluation report. 
188 Directive 2006/114/EC concerning misleading and comparative advertising, OJ OJ L 376, 27.12.2006, 
p. 21. 
189 In January 2016, the Commission published a roadmap on the REFIT Fitness check of consumer law 
(http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/roadmaps/docs/2016_just_023_evaluation_consumer_law_en.pdf). 
Next to their application in the business-to-consumer (B2C) relations, the Fitness Check will analyse the 
need  and  potential  for  the  application  of  the  existing  consumer  rules  also  in  business-to-business  (B2B) 
transactions, in particular the transactions with the SMEs, by taking account of the B2B rules already laid 
down  in  the  Misleading  and  Comparative  Advertising  Directive,  and  in  transactions  between  businesses 
and non-for-profit entities that do not qualify as consumers under the current rules. The Fitness Check will 
also  analyse  the  issues  arising  in  consumer-to-consumer  (C2C)  transactions  (increasingly relevant due  to 
the rise of the sharing economy) and in consumer-to-business (C2B) relations. 
190 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer 
rights, OJ L 304, 22.11.2011, p. 64. 
191  Directive  2014/17/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  4 February  2014  on  credit 
agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property, OJ L 60, 28.2.2014, p. 34. 
192 Regulation (EC) No 1371/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on 
rail passengers’ rights and obligations, OJ L 315, 3.12.2007, p. 14. 
193  Regulation  (EC)  No  1107/2006  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  5  July  2006 
concerning the rights of disabled persons and persons with reduced mobility when travelling by air, OJ L 
204, 26.7.2006, p. 1. 
194 Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 2008 on 
common rules for the operation of air services in the Community, OJ L 293, 31.10.2008, p. 3. 
195 Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment 
services  in  the  internal  market  amending  Directives  97/7/EC,  2002/65/EC,  2005/60/EC  and  2006/48/EC 
and repealing Directive 97/5/EC, OJ L 319, 5.12.2007, p. 1. 
196 Directive 2014/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on the 
comparability of fees related to payment accounts, payment account switching and access to payment 
accounts with basic features, OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 214. 
112 

 
                                                 
should  be  also  proposed.  In  addition,  the  2015  Single  Market  Strategy  concluded  that 
Article  20  of  the  Services  Directive197  lacked  an  efficient  cross-border  cooperation 
mechanism and should therefore be included in the CPC Regulation's Annex. 

The  interaction  between  the  CPC  system  and  the  cooperation  and  specific  remedy 
systems in the sectorial legislation already included or to be added to the Annex of the 
Regulation  have  also  been  examined  in  order  to  ensure  that  there  is  no  duplication  of 
remedies  and  that  the  hierarchy  of  actions  is  clear.  The  CPC  Regulation  applies  when 
collective  economic  interests  of  consumers  are  concerned  and  provides  for  general 
enforcement tools used in a cross-border context (lex generalis). Therefore, the specific 
mechanisms under sectorial legislation (i.e. in the transport sector) have to be used first 
(lex specialis) e.g. for consumer compensation, assistance and care.  

Specifically,  the  Regulation  on  air  passenger  rights  provides  for  the  appointment  of 
national  enforcement  authorities  (referred  as  'NEBs'),  and  in  most  Member  States  the 
NEBs  were  also  designated  as  enforcement  authorities  under  the  CPC  system  (e.g. 
Sweden,  Romania,  Hungary,  Malta,  Latvia,  UK).  There  is  an  informal  network  of  the 
NEBs  who  share  information  and  discuss  enforcement  issues.  Currently,  NEBs  act 
mainly with regard to incidents under their jurisdiction (by airlines of any nationality). It 
would not have a legal mandate to address an incident that occurred in another State even 
if  it  concerned  its  own  consumers  and  may  not  have  a  mandate  under  national  law  to 
assist with  enforcement  in another State. Most of these  enforcement tools are therefore 
focused  on  domestic  enforcement  and  do  not  take  into  account  the  specific  needs  of 
cross-border enforcement.  

The CPC Regulation is without prejudice to the existing EU rules concerning the powers 
of national regulatory bodies established by EU sectorial legislation. Where appropriate 
and possible these bodies should use the powers available to them under EU and national 
law to cease or prohibit infringements under the CPC Regulation. 

Further,the sectorial rules on compensation for infringements, such as the rules in the air 
transport  sector  fully  apply  to  the  calculation  of  compensation  for  harm  from 
infringements of such sectorial rules. Where the EU sectorial legislation does not apply 
to  the  compensation  for  the  harm  caused  by  infringement,  the  compensation  should  be 
established  based  on  applicable  national  law  (CPC  Regulation  does  not  containg 
provisions on calculation of compensation). 

Regarding  cross-border  cooperation  among  national  authorities,  certain  sectorial 
legislation also foresees a formal exchange of information and/or assistance (see the table 
below).  However,  the  CPC  cooperation  mechanism  goes  further  than  the  latter 
cooperation  as  it  imposes  a  duty  on  competent  authorities  to  efficiently  address 
malpractices. Therefore the CPC cooperation is complementary and would be used when 
a mere exchange of information is not sufficient to stop malpractices with a cross-border 
dimension.  In  addition,  when  enforcement  actions  are  undertaken  under  the  CPC 
Regulation, the competent authorities have to apply the provisions, e.g. on sanctions and 
remedies, of the substantive law which is listed in the Annex of the CPC Regulation, or 
of national law.   

197 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services 
in the internal market, OJ 376, 27.12.2006, p. 36. 

113 

 
                                                 
Therefore,  the  CPC  Regulation  complements  EU  sectorial  rules  on  cooperation  among 
sectorial regulators and EU sectorial rules on compensation of consumers for harm from 
infringements of these rules, in cross-border context. The CPC Regulation plays a safety 
net role in case of repeated breaches by one or several operators. The CPC Regulation is 
without  prejudice  to  other  cooperation  systems  and  networks  set  by  EU  sectorial 
legislation. In fact it furthers cooperation and coordination among networks of regulatory 
bodies  established  by  EU  sectorial  legislation  and  CPC  competent  authorities.     

114 

 
Sectorial legislation 

Existence of a formal    cooperation 
mechanism 

Existence of a specific remedy mechanism for 
individuals 

Comment/Possible 
overlap/interaction 

Passenger rights 

  Air 

(Regulation 

261/2004) 

The Regulation provides for the 
appointment of national enforcement 
authorities (referred as 'NEBs'), and in 
most Member States the NEBs have been 
also designated as enforcement authorities 
under the CPC system. There is an 
informal network of the NEBs who share 
information and discuss enforcement 
issues.  

Article  7  sets  substantive 
for  calculation  of 
compensation.  Articles  4,  5  and  6  set  events  in  which 
compensation  is  due.  Articles  8  and  9  provide  other 
obligations of care and assistance for the carriers. 

rules 

to  address  an 
incident 
in  another  State,  even 

Currently, NEBs act mainly with regards to 
individual  complaints  concerning  incidents 
under  their  jurisdiction  (by  airlines  of  any 
nationality).  It  would  not  have  a  legal 
that 
mandate 
occurred 
it 
concerned its own consumers, and may not 
have a mandate under national law to assist 
with enforcement in another State. Most of 
these  enforcement  cooperation  tools  are 
therefore  focused  on  domestic  enforcement 
and  do  not  take  into  account  the  specific 
needs of cross-border enforcement. 

if 

Similar mechanisms as for air transport 

inland 

  Sea 

and 
waterways 
(Regulation 
1177/2010) 

Article 8 sets out remedies for disabled consumers who have 
been refused boarding (reimbursement, re-routing, alternative 
transport).    Articles  15-19  establish  rules  for  compensation, 
reimbursement,  assistance,  and  information  due  to  various 
events.  Article  21  clarifies  that  the  Regulation  does  not 
preclude  passengers  from  seeking  damages  with  respect  to 
loss due to cancellation or delay.  

Thanks  to  the  CPC  mechanism,  when  the 
collective  interest  of  consumers  is  at  stake, 
NEBs  and  otherwise  CPC  competent 
authorities would formally cooperate within 
the  CPC  system  on  the  basis  of  the 
residence of affected consumers. 
idem 

 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Articles  7  and  8  establish  compensation  for  personal  injury, 
death,  or  loss  of  luggage,  and  set  remedies  for  assistance  in 
case  of  accident.  Article  10  sets  out  remedies  for  disabled 
consumers who have been refused boarding (reimbursement, 
re-routing,  alternative  transport).  Articles  17  and  19-21 
establish  rules  for  compensation,  reimbursement,  assistance, 
and  information  due  to  various  circumstances.  Article  22 
clarifies  that  this  regulation  does  not  preclude  passengers 
from seeking damages with respect to loss due to cancellation 
or delay.  
Articles  13  and  16-18  address  compensation  payments, 
reimbursements,  and  re-routing  and  assistance  remedies. 
Article  25  addresses  compensation  for  mobility  equipment. 
Article 27 requires undertakings to have a complaint handling 
mechanism. 
Article  4  requires  that  passengers  refused  boarding  are 
offered  an  alternative,  reimbursement,  or  re-routing.  Article 
12  establishes  that  compensation  shall  be  made  for  lost  or 
damaged mobility equipment.   

idem 

idem 

idem 

  Bus 

and 
(Regulation 
181/2011) 

coach  

Similar mechanisms as for air transport 

Similar mechanisms as for air transport 

Similar  as  for  air  transport:  Article  14 
establishes  an  enforcement  body  in  each 
MS.  Article  15 
requires  complaints 
received  by  one  MS'  enforcement  body 
about an infringement in another MS to be 
forwarded  to  that  other  MS's  enforcement 
body. An informal network of NEBs. 

  Rail 

(Regulation 
new 
1371/2007 
entry  into  the  CPC 
Annex) 

- 

  Rights  of  disabled 
persons  travelling  by 
(Regulation 
air 
1107/2006 
new 
entry  into  the  CPC 
Annex) 

- 

Travel services 

  Regulation 1008/2008 
on  common  rules  for 
air  services  (Chapter 
IV pricing provisions) 
(new  entry  into  CPC 
Annex) 

Article  26  requires  that  MS  and  the 
Commission  cooperate  in  applying  and 
monitoring  of  the  Regulation,  and  allows 
the  Commission  to  obtain  all  necessary 
information from MS. 
No formal cooperation network. 

None 

116 

The  CPC  cooperation  would  be  the  key 
cross-border 
mechanism 
cooperation on specific malpractices in this 
area.  

formal 

for 

 
 
 
 
 
None 

  Council 

Directive 
on 
90/314/EEC 
package 
travel, 
package  holidays  and 
package tours 

Article  4  sets  forth  remedies 
withdrawal  without 
arrangements, equivalent transport back 

penalty, 

including  compensation, 
alternative 

suitable 

None 

Article 6 provides for the right of withdrawal. 

that 

The  new  2015  directive  on  package  travel 
(2015/230/EU)  clarifies 
the  CPC 
Regulation  applies  to  infringements  of  the 
package travel directive. Articles 10, 11, 13, 
and 14 set out more detailed remedies than 
90/314/EC 
refund, 
compensation  for  damages, 
termination 
without  fee).  Article  21  establishes  trader 
liability for booking system errors.  
The CPC cooperation is the mechanism for 
formal cooperation on specific malpractices 
in this area.  

reduction, 

(price 

  Directive 

on 
2008/122/EC 
long-term 
timeshare, 
product, 
holiday 
resale  and  exchange 
contracts   
Financial services 

  Directive  2008/48/EC 
on  credit  agreements 
for consumers  

  Directive  2002/65/EC 
concerning 
the 
distance  marketing  of 
financial 
consumer 
services 

  Directive  2007/64  on 
Services 
Payment 
(new  entry  into  CPC 
Annex) 

An informal expert group.  

No  

Article  14  sets  forth  right  of  withdrawal  from  the  contract 
without  penalty  and  without  giving  any  reason.  Article  16 
sets substantive rules for early repayment. Article 17 assigns 
obligations in event of assignment of third party to creditor's 
rights. 
Article  6  requires  right  of  withdrawal  from  the  contract 
without penalty and without giving any reason. 

The CPC cooperation is the mechanism for 
formal cooperation on specific malpractices 
in this area.  

The CPC cooperation is the mechanism for 
formal cooperation on specific malpractices 
in this area.  

Article  82  requires  Member  States    to 
ensure  that  the  complaints  procedures  and 
penalties provided for in Articles 80(1) and 
81(1) respectively are administered by the 
authorities 
ensure 
empowered 
compliance with the provisions of national 
law  adopted  pursuant  to  the  requirements 
the  Directive.  Some 
laid  down 

in 

to 

The  Directive  protects  consumer  rights  in  the  event  of 
unauthorised  debits 
from  an  account  under  certain 
conditions. There are three types of refund rights:  
●  Unauthorised  debits:  If  a  consumer  realises  that  an 
unauthorised debit has been made from his/her account, s/he 
has  the  right  to  an  immediate  refund  provided  that  the 
payment service provider has been notified no later than 13 
months after the debit date.  

117 

Article  24  of  the  Directive  provides  for 
information  exchange 
cooperation  and 
these 
obligations 
competent 
obligations 
authorities 
handling 
complaints under Article 80). However, the 
CPC  cooperation  could  still  however  be 
complementary  in  certain  cases  to  cover 

(not  clear  whether 
also 
designated 

to 
for 

apply 

 
authorities  designated 

for 
competent 
handling  complaints  under  Article  80  of 
the  Payment  Services  Directive  are  also 
CPC authorities, e.g. DK, EE, FR, LV, LT, 
RO, FI. 

13 

out 

exchange 

including 

spells 
between 

obligatory 
Chapter 
competent 
cooperation 
authorities, 
of 
information,  cooperation  in  investigation 
or  supervision  activities,  establishment  of 
one  contact  point  for  purposes  of  this 
Banking 
directive, 
Authority's 
resolving 
disputes.  

European 
in 

assistance 

and 

exchange 

including 

Similar  to  the  provisions  of  the  Directive 
on  mortgage  credit,  Chapter  V  spells  out 
obligatory cooperation between competent 
authorities, 
of 
information,  cooperation  in  investigation 
or supervision activities. 
cooperation, 
For 
information 
dispute 
resolution  between  competent  authorities, 
the  competent  authorities  should  be  those 
acting  under  the  auspices  of  European 

exchange 

purposes 

and 

the 

of 

infringements of provisions provided in the 
Title  III  and  IV  of  the  Directive,  e.g.  in 
particular  when  coordinated  enforcement 
action is needed to address a pan-European 
infringement in the area.  

The  Directive 
lays  down  an  elaborate 
cooperation  mechanism  among  authorities 
going  beyond  information  exchange.  The 
CPC  cooperation  could  still  however  be 
complementary  in  certain  cases,  e.g.  when 
coordinated enforcement action is needed to 
address a pan-European infringement in the 
area.  

idem 

●  Overcharging:  If  a  consumer  has  authorised  payment 
without  stating  the  amount,  e.g.  through  a  direct  debit  or  a 
card  payment  for  hotel  or  car  bookings,  and  the  amount 
debited is not what s/he could reasonably have expected, the 
consumer  is  entitled  to  challenge  it  by  contacting  the 
payment  service  provider  within  eight  weeks.  The  payment 
service provider then has to reimburse the consumer within 
ten days or justify its refusal.  
●  Incorrect  processing:  If  a  consumer  authorised  the 
transaction but the payment service provider made a mistake 
in  processing  the  payment,  e.g.  failed  to  pay,  debited  the 
wrong  amount,  paid  late  or  paid  twice,  the  consumer  is 
allowed to challenge the error within 13 months and obtain 
proper rectification. 
The  Directive  requires  clearer  and  more  understandable 
information  on  mortgage  loans  by  means  of  an  improved 
European 
better 
assessments  of  consumers'  ability  to  repay  the  loans  and 
more  reliable  advice.  The  Directive  contains  safeguards 
before  entering  into  the  credit  agreement:  e.g.  Article  14 
ensures  that  the  consumer  has  sufficient  time  before  being 
bound  by  the  credit  agreement  (via  a  reflection  period  or  a 
right  of  withdrawal  or  both).  In  addition,  the  consumer  has 
the  right  under  Article  25  to  repay  the  credit  early  and  is 
entitled, subject to conditions, to a reduction in the total cost 
of the credit. 
The Directive creates a right for all consumers to access basic 
payment  account  services  irrespective  of  their  financial 
situation.  It  is  for  the  Member  States  to  decide  whether 
payment  accounts  with  basic  features  are  offered 
to 
consumers by all credit institutions or by a sufficient number 
of  credit  institutions.  However  Member  States  will  have  to 
guarantee easy access to basic accounts for all consumers in 
their country. 

Standardised 

Information 

Sheet, 

118 

  Directive  2014/17/EU 
on    mortgage  credit 
(new  entry  into  CPC 
Annex) 

  Directive  2014/92/EU 
on  payment  accounts 
(comparability of fees 
switching and access -
the 
new  entry 
CPC Annex) 

into 

 
  
 
 
as 

set  out 

in 
Banking  Authority, 
Regulation  1093/2010,  or  other  national 
authorities  provided  that  they  cooperate 
with 
the 
the  authorities  acting  under 
auspices of EBA in order to carry out their 
duties under this Directive. 
None 

Directive  2001/83/EC  on 
the  Community 
code 
relating 
to  medicinal 
products  for  human  use: 
Articles 86 to 100 

The  CPC  provides  the  mechanism  for 
formal 
specific 
malpractices.  

cooperation 

on 

None 

119