Ex post evaluation of Cohesion Policy programmes 2007-2013, focusing on the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund (CF) : work package 5, transport : final report.
Date: 2016-05-25
Institutions: Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy
Subjects: Cohesion Fund, European Regional Development Fund, common transport policy, economic and social cohesion, investment, project evaluation, report, trans-European network, transport infrastructure, transport market, transport network, transport policy

Transport 

FINAL REPORT 

WORK PACKAGE 5 

Ex post evaluation of Cohesion Policy programmes 
2007-2013, focusing on the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) and the  
Cohesion Fund (CF) 

March 2016 
Authors:  

May 2016 
Authors: John Finnegan, Richard 
Redfern, Jacopo Signorile 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy 
Directorate B - Policy 
Unit B.2 Evaluation and European Semester 

Contact: Jan-Marek ZIOLKOWSKI 

E-mail: REGIO-B2-HEAD-OF-UNIT@ec.europa.eu 

European Commission 
B-1049 Brussels 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Transport 

FINAL REPORT 

WORK PACKAGE 5 

Ex post evaluation of Cohesion Policy programmes 
2007-2013, focusing on the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) and the  
Cohesion Fund (CF) 

CCI: 2014CE16BAT042 

Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy 

2016 

EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2016 

ISBN 978-92-79-58527-2 
doi: 10.2776/693539 

© European Union, 2016 
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 

Executive summary 

Résumé opérationnel 

Zusammenfassung 

Section A: Introduction 

A1 

Introduction 

A2  Evaluation objectives 

A3  Approach 

A4  Report structure 

Section B: Contribution of cohesion policy to transport in the EU 

B1 

Introduction 

B2  Cohesion policy funding overview 

B3  Contribution of cohesion policy to EU wide transport networks 

B4  Contribution of cohesion policy to Member State transport networks 

B5  Conclusions on the contribution of cohesion policy to transport 

Section C: Strengths and weaknesses of cohesion policy in the area of transport 

C1 

C2 

Introduction 

Strengths of cohesion policy 

C3  Weaknesses of cohesion policy 

C3  Conclusions 

Section D: Quality of financial analysis of projects 

D1 

D2 

Introduction 

Demographic data 

D3    Interaction with competing modes and routes 

D4 

D5 

D6 

D7 

D8 

D9 

Consumer behaviour 

Tariffing and affordability 

Investment costs 

Construction schedule 

Financial sustainability 

Financial modelling and approach 

D10 

Summary of conclusions 

Section E: Catalogue of challenges 

E1 

Introduction 

E2  Demand analysis 

3 

8 

14 

20 

20 

20 

21 

23 

25 

25 

26 

31 

38 

51 

52 

52 

52 

54 

58 

59 

59 

60 

61 

62 

63 

64 

66 

69 

70 

73 

74 

74 

75 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
E3 

Financial and economic analysis 

Section F: Conclusions 

F1 

Introduction 

F2  Contribution of cohesion policy to transport in the EU 

F3 

Strengths and weaknesses of cohesion policy in the area of transport 

F4  Quality and completeness of financial analysis 

F5  Catalogue of challenges 

F6  Overall Conclusions 

88 

97 

97 

97 

98 

99 

100 

101 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Executive summary 

The  information  and  views  set  out  in  this  report  are  those  of  the  authors  and  do  not 
necessarily  reflect  the  official  opinion  of  the  Commission.  The  Commission  does  not 
guarantee  the  accuracy  of  the  data  included  in  this  study.  Neither  the  Commission  nor 
any person acting on the Commission’s behalf may be held responsible for the use which 
may be made of the information contained therein. 

Introduction 

This  evaluation  study  forms  part  of  the  ex-post  evaluation  of  the  2007-2013 
programming period of EU cohesion policy. The main objectives and requirements of this 
evaluation were to: 

 

Identify  the  main  achievements  of  cohesion  policy  in  all  areas  of  transport 
related infrastructure; 

  Analyse  to  what  extent  the  EU  support  contributed  to  the  creation  of 

comprehensive transport networks; and 

 

Identify  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  cohesion  policy  intervention  in 
transport and explore directions this policy should take in the future.   

The work carried out for this study and the detailed results obtained are set out in two 
Interim Reports. Based on that work, this Final Report: 

  Summarises the contribution of cohesion policy to transport in the EU; 

  Sets  out  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  cohesion  policy  in  the  area  of 

transport; 

  Presents  the  results  of  the  examination  of  the  financial  analysis  of  transport 

projects carried out by Member States;  

  Presents  the  catalogue  of  challenges  that  has  been  prepared  based  on  the 

results of this study; and, 

  Sets out the overall conclusions of the evaluation. 

Contribution of cohesion policy to transport 

Cohesion policy can contribute to transport in the  European Union (EU) both at a trans-
European level and at the level of individual Member States. The most effective way for 
cohesion policy to contribute to the completion of EU wide transport networks is for it to 
support the completion of the  Trans  European Network  –  Transport (TEN-T). The TEN-T 
is  the  outcome  of  a  joint  planning  process  by  the  Commission  and  Member  States  to 
define EU-wide priorities for transport. 

Cohesion  policy  has  made  a  significant  contribution  to  the  completion  of  the  TEN-T. 
Member States placed a high priority on TEN-T road and railroad projects in their funding 
decisions.  The  total  cohesion  policy  allocation  to  transport  was  €82.3  bn.  Of  this,  €40.8 
bn  or  49%  was  related  to  TEN-T.  Of  the  3,875  km  of  new  roads  constructed  with 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
cohesion  policy  support  by  the  end  of  2013,  1,817  km  or  47%  were  new  TEN-T  roads. 
Similarly of the 3,405 km of railroad, which have been either newly built or reconstructed 
by the end of 2013 with cohesion policy support, 1,661 km or 49% were TEN-T railroads. 
Furthermore, over 23,000 km of roads were reconstructed across the 28 Member States 
by the end of 2013 with the cohesion policy support.  

Cohesion policy funding has made a significant contribution to the transport networks of 
individual  Member  States.  In  the  course  of  this  evaluation  the  provision  of  transport 
infrastructure  in  15  Member  States  with  highest  related  cohesion  policy  allocations  has 
been  examined  against  the  background  of  all  transport  development.  The  total  public 
investment in transport infrastructure in these Member States for the period 2007-2013 
was  €494  bn.  Cohesion  policy  expenditure  on  transport  in  these  Member  States 
amounted  to  €52  bn  in  the  same  period.  This  support  was  concentrated  in  Member 
States  that  joined  the  EU  in  or  after  2004.  Cohesion  policy  expenditure  on  transport 
corresponded to the majority of total investment in Lithuania (54%), Hungary (49%) and 
Slovakia (45%) over the 2007-2013 programming period. At the other extreme, cohesion 
policy  expenditure  only  corresponded  to  1%  of  transport  investment  by  the  state  in 
France over the same period. 

In  physical  terms,  3,851  km  of  new  roads  were  built  until  the  end  of  2013  in  these  15 
Member  States  with  cohesion  policy  support.  This  was  equivalent  to  1%  of  the  stock  of 
motorways  and  state  roads  in  these  Member  States.  A  further  21,653  km  of  roads  had 
been  renewed  or  refurbished  with  cohesion  policy  support.  In  all,  the  length  of  road 
network  either  newly  built  or  reconstructed  with  the  cohesion  policy  support  is  equal  to 
9% of the stock of motorways and state roads by the end of 2013. In the railroad sector, 
cohesion policy contributed to the provision of 3,135 km of new or reconstructed railroad, 
equivalent to 2% of the network in the 15 Member States.  

Based on the work during this study it appears that cohesion policy allocations were well 
aligned with current trends in the sector and with transport policy priorities. In particular 
cohesion policy funding made a significant contribution to connectivity at the level of the 
EU and of individual Member States. This contribution was concentrated in those Member 
States  and  regions  which  were  the  intended  recipients  of  the  highest  relative  levels  of 
cohesion policy support.  

Cohesion policy allocation for Member States ranged from €57  bn in Poland to €25 m in 
Luxembourg. The resources  set aside for transport  within the cohesion policy envelopes 
ranged from 45% in Poland to 0% in Denmark and Luxembourg. The level of absorption 
of cohesion policy funding allocated to transport ranged from 55% in Romania to 105% 
in Spain, for those Member States who allocated more than €5 bn to transport.  

This  co-funding  helped  to  build  new  and  reconstruct  existing  roads  and  railways,  both 
within TEN-T and outside of this network.  However, for roads  – both TEN-T and outside 
of  this  network  -  the  outputs  reported  by  the  end  of  2013  were  concentrated  in  the 
Member States, which joined EU in or after 2004, while the Member States, which joined 
EU before that date, account for bigger share of railroad outputs. 

The  use  of  cohesion  policy  funding  in  the  rail  sector  was  focused  on  the  renewal  or 
upgrading  of  existing  railroad,  to  increase  line  speeds  and  capacity.  Significantly,  some 
stakeholders  from  Member  States  highlighted  the  important  role  of  cohesion  policy 
funding  in  supporting  large,  complex  projects  that  were  particularly  evident  in  the  rail 
sector.  In their opinion, such projects may not have been undertaken in the absence  of 

4 

 
 
 
 
cohesion  policy  funding.  By  encouraging  investment  in  rail  and  in  urban  transport, 
cohesion policy has contributed to environmentally friendly transport. 

There was a lower level of  financial contribution through the cohesion policy 2007-2013 
programming  period  for  non-road  or  railroad  investment.  However,  enhancements  were 
made to urban transport, airports, ports and cycle paths during the period. 

Strengths and weaknesses of cohesion policy in the area of transport 

The strengths  of  cohesion policy investments in the transport sector  included the ability 
to support the diverse range of policy objectives across Member States, with allocations 
reflecting  the  needs  of  individual  Member  States.  This  supported  ongoing  investment  in 
the  TEN-T,  contributed  towards  addressing  investment  needs  for  Member  States  and 
assisted in meeting regional/local transport requirements.  

Cohesion  policy  allocations  were  an  important  source  of  funding  for  transport 
infrastructure during the economic recession. It was a key source of funding to promote 
investment in large complex infrastructure projects. Many stakeholders noted that, in the 
absence  of  cohesion  policy  funding,  Member  States  would  have  focused  on  lower  cost 
infrastructure to the possible detriment of addressing identified needs.  

The 2007-2013 cohesion policy programming period also played a role in developing the 
organisational  capacity  of  Member  States.  The  procedures  for  securing  cohesion  policy 
funding require Member States to  engage in strategic planning of their transport needs. 
Member  States  have  also  enhanced  their  capacity  to  develop  and  appraise  complex 
transport investment projects.  

A  number  of  weaknesses  were  also  observed  regarding  the  cohesion  policy  2007-2013 
programming period for transport. These included some difficulties in combining cohesion 
policy  funding  and  private  finance  in  PPP  structures  and  a  lack  of  clarity  among  some 
Member States on the application of State Aid rules to investments in transport.  

The aforementioned focus of allocations to the TEN-T was noted by some stakeholders as 
reducing  allocations  for  addressing  regional  transport  needs,  thereby  perpetuating 
regional  disparities.  However,  on  balance  the  focus  on  long  term  transport  planning  in 
Member States as a basis for investments will have ameliorated this risk in practice. 

Quality and completeness of financial analysis of transport projects 

This study examined the quality and completeness of the financial analysis carried out by 
Member States when they develop transport investment projects.  This work on financial 
analysis  considered  the  quality  of  the  financial  analysis  undertaken  during  the  ex-ante 
stage by Member States, and included both demand and financial aspects of projects. In 
all  cases  by  the  time  a  funding  decision  was  made  the  financial  analysis  of  the  project 
was complete and accurate, and provided a full basis for decision making on the project. 
A  number  of  areas  which  commonly  presented  difficulty  were  identified,  as  was  best 
practice amongst Member States in dealing with these difficulties. 

The  quality  of  demand  analysis  varied  between  projects,  particularly  in  the  use  of 
demographic  data  such  as  employment  and  car  ownership.  Such  data  was  observed  in 
many  instances  to  be  too  spatially  aggregate,  including  the  use  of  national  level  GDP 
forecasts  to  inform  demand  analysis.  This,  and  the  insufficient  consideration  of  project 
interactions  with  other  modes  and  routes,  is  considered  by  the  evaluators  to  have 
undermined the accuracy and quality of demand analysis for some projects. However, all 

5 

 
 
 
 
projects  demonstrated  an  approach  consistent  with  best  practice  with  respect  to  the 
analysis of ‘with project’ and ‘without project’ scenarios.  

The  analysis  of  consumer  behaviour  and  willingness  to  pay  also  varied  across  the 
projects  evaluated,  with  little  evidence  of  variable  or  induced  demand  analysis.  There 
was also an over reliance on national level toll and fare policies, without consideration of 
affordability  among  the  target  markets.  Such  factors  could  have  undermined  the 
accuracy of demand analyses. There was also insufficient evidence of how charges would 
vary  over  the  appraisal  period  of  most  projects,  which  introduced  more  potential 
uncertainty regarding the accuracy of forecasting. 

The  accuracy  of  forecast  construction  costs  also  varied  between  the  projects  evaluated. 
The economic recession was a central factor in reducing contractor costs for many of the 
projects evaluated. The level of project preparation also influenced the outturn costs and 
implementation schedules. Examples were noted of good preparatory work, including the 
early  acquisition  of  land,  leading  to  cost  and  time  savings,  whilst  the  lack  of  ground 
investigation  was  an  example  of  poor  preparatory  work  which  lead  to  examples  of  cost 
and schedule overruns. 

The  financial  sustainability  of  some  projects  was  uncertain  due  to  a lack  of  evidence  on 
how  maintenance  costs  would  be  met.  A  lack  of  revenue  ring-fencing  for  operation  and 
maintenance  requirements  was  identified  in  many  road  projects.  Tolls  were  also  not 
implemented  to  programme  on  some  projects,  introducing  further  uncertainty  about 
downstream  revenues.  The  separation  of  the  Infrastructure  Manager  and  Railway 
Undertaking  responsibilities  was  also  observed  to  have  introduced  inaccuracies  and 
uncertainties  within  some  financial  analyses.  Overall,  cash  flow  and  risk  analyses  were 
considered accurate, although further analysis of risk and the residual value of projects is 
recommended. 

Catalogue of challenges 

This  study  identified  the  key  challenges  faced  by  Member  States  as  they  develop  and 
appraise  transport  investment  projects,  and  the  effects  of  these  challenges  in  practice. 
Best  practices  in  dealing  with  these  challenges  were  identified  and  discussed  with 
Member  State  stakeholders.  A  catalogue  of  these  key  challenges  has  been  developed 
which sets for each of these challenges: 

  A summary description; 

  A detailed technical overview of the challenge; 

  Warning signs that the challenge in question may arise 

  The implications of the challenge for the financial analysis of a project; 

  The implications of the challenge for the financial sustainability of the project; 

and  

  Potential solutions to assist in overcoming each challenge. 

These challenges identified were: 

 

Forecasting  demand  accurately  to  reflect  project  location,  population  trends 
and contextual factors; 

6 

 
 
 
 
 

 

The  accuracy  of  demand  forecasting  relating  to  the  short  to  medium  term 
impacts of construction, particularly in the rail sector; 

Insufficient  assessment  of  project  interaction  with  competing  modes  or 
routes; 

  Developing  and  operating  a  multi-modal  transport  model  that  reflects  the 

project scope and potential results; 

 

Establishing correct representations of the willingness to pay within transport 
cost benefit analysis; 

  Defining tariffing levels within a national regulatory context; 

 

The  accurate  calculation  of  maintenance  and  operating  costs,  and  the  net 
present value of projects; and 

 

Estimating construction costs accurately as part of the economic analysis. 

The full catalogue is set out in Section E of this report. 

Conclusions 

A number of overall conclusions can be drawn from this evaluation. Cohesion policy has 
made  a  significant  contribution  to  transport  in  the  EU  as  a  whole  and  in  individual 
Member  States.  A  number  of  important  strengths  have  been  observed  in  how  cohesion 
policy  operates  in  the  field  of  transport.  In  particular,  the  decision  making  structures  in 
place  and  the  strategic  planning  of  transport  investments  required  of  Member  States 
ensure  that  the  operation  of  cohesion  policy  is  tailored  to  the  needs  and  context  in 
individual  Member  States.  Investments  funded  by  cohesion  policy  contribute  to  the 
transport  strategy  of  Member  States  and  of  the  EU  as  a  whole,  and  encourage  the 
development  of  environmentally  friendly  transport.  Cohesion  policy  investment  in 
transport  has  developed  the  capacity  of  Member  States  to  plan  and  complete  transport 
investments,  has  ensured  that  investment  continued  in  a  time  of  economic  crisis  and 
increased the emphasis places on relatively complex investments such as rail by Member 
States.  

7 

 
 
 
 
Résumé opérationnel 

Les informations et les  points de vue  exposés  au sein du présent rapport sont ceux des 
auteurs  et  ne  reflètent  pas  nécessairement  la  position  officielle  de  la  Commission.  La 
Commission  ne  garantit  pas  l’exactitude  des  données  contenues  dans  cette  étude.  Ni  la 
Commission ni aucune personne agissant en son nom et pour son compte ne saurait être 
tenue responsable de l’utilisation faite des informations contenues au sein des présentes. 

Introduction 

Cette étude fait partie de l’évaluation ex post de la période de programmation 2007-2013 
de  la  politique  de  cohésion  de  l’UE.  Les  objectifs  et  exigences  principaux  de  la  présente 
évaluation sont les suivants : 

 

identifier  les  principaux  succès  de  la  politique  de  cohésion  dans  tous  les 
domaines afférents aux infrastructures de transports ; 

  analyser  la  mesure  dans  laquelle  l’aide  apportée  par  l’UE  a  contribué  à  la 

création de réseaux de transports exhaustifs ; et 

 

identifier  les  points  forts  et  les  faiblesses  de  l’intervention  de  la  politique  de 
cohésion  dans  le  secteur  des  transports  et  explorer  des  directions  que  cette 
politique devrait emprunter à l’avenir. 

Le travail réalisé dans le cadre de la présente étude et les résultats détaillés obtenus sont 
présentés au sein de deux rapports intermédiaires. Sur la base de ce travail accompli, le 
présent rapport final : 

 

résume  la  contribution  de  la  politique  de  cohésion  dans  le  secteur  des 
transports, au sein de l’UE ; 

  énonce  les  points  forts  et  les  faiblesses  de  la  politique  de  cohésion  dans  le 

secteur des transports ; 

  présente  les  résultats  de  l’étude  de  l’analyse  financière  des  projets  de 

transports menés à bien par les États membres ;  

  présente le catalogue de difficultés à surmonter qui a été dressé sur la base 

des résultats de l’étude, et 

  énonce les conclusions d’ensemble de l’évaluation. 

Contribution de la politique de cohésion dans le secteur des transports 

La  politique  de  cohésion  peut  contribuer  au  secteur  des  transports  dans  l’Union 
européenne (UE), et cela tant sur le plan transeuropéen qu’au niveau des États membres 
individuels.  Le  moyen  le  plus  efficace  pour  que  la  politique  de  cohésion  contribue  à  la 
complète réalisation de réseaux de transports  à l’échelle de l’UE est l’aide apportée à la 
réalisation du Réseau transeuropéen de transport (RTE-T). Le RTE-T est le résultat d’un 
processus  de  planification  conjointe  entre  la  Commission  et  les  États  membres,  dans  le 
but de définir des priorités à échelle de l’UE dans le domaine des transports. 

La politique de cohésion a apporté une contribution de taille à la réalisation du RTE-T. Les 
États  membres  ont  attribué  une  haute  priorité  aux  projets  routiers  et  ferroviaires  dans 

8 

 
 
 
 
 
 
leurs  décisions  de  financement.  Le  montant  total  de  fonds  assignés  par  la  politique  de 
cohésion  aux  transports  s’élevait  à  82 300  millions  d’euros.  Sur  ce  montant,  40 800 
millions  d’euros  (ou  49 %)  concernait  le  RTE-T.  Sur  les  3 875  km  de  nouvelles  routes 
construites jusqu’à fin 2013 grâce au soutien apporté par la politique de cohésion, 1 817 
km (ou 47 %) étaient de nouvelles routes RTE-T. D’une manière similaire, sur les 3 405 
km  de  chemins  de  fer,  soit  nouvellement  construits,  soit  reconstruits  jusqu’à  la  fin  de 
2013, grâce au soutien apporté par la politique de cohésion, 1 661 km (ou 49 %) étaient 
des chemins de fer RET-T. En outre, plus de 23 000 km de  routes  ont été reconstruites 
dans  les  28  États  membres  jusqu’à  la  fin  2013,  grâce  au  soutien  de  la  politique  de 
cohésion.  

Le  financement  fourni  par  la  politique  de  cohésion  a  constitué  une  contribution  de  taille 
aux  réseaux  de  transports  des  États  membres  individuels.  Dans  le  cadre  de  cette 
évaluation,  l’offre  en  matière  d’infrastructures  de  transports  dans  15  États  membres 
ayant  bénéficié  des  allocations  de  fonds  les  plus  élevées  de  la  part  de  la  politique  de 
cohésion  a  été  étudiée,  et  comparée  au  développement  des  transports  en  général.  Le 
montant  total  de  l’investissement  public  dans  les  infrastructures  de  transports  dans  ces 
États  membres,  pour  la  période  2007-2013,  s’élevait  à  494  milliards  d’euros.  Les 
dépenses  de  la  politique  de  cohésion  pour  les  transports  dans  ces  États  membres 
s’élevaient  à  52  milliards  d’euros  pendant  la  même  période.  Ce  soutien  s’est  concentré 
sur  les  États  membres  ayant  rejoint  l’UE  en  2004,  ou  par  la  suite.  Les  dépenses  de  la 
politique de cohésion pour les transports ont représenté la majorité des investissements 
totaux  en  Lituanie  (54 %),  en  Hongrie  (49 %)  et  en  Slovaquie  (45 %),  pendant  la 
période de programmation 2007-2013. À l’autre extrême, les dépenses de la politique de 
cohésion n’ont représenté que 1 % des investissements dans les transports par l’État en 
France, pendant la même période. 

En termes physiques, 3 851 km de nouvelles routes ont été construits jusqu’à la fin 2013 
dans  ces  15  États  membres,  grâce  au  soutien  apporté  par  la  politique  de  cohésion.  Il 
s’agit  là  de  l’équivalent  de  1 %  des  autoroutes  et  des  routes  nationales  dans  ces  États 
membres. En outre, 21 653 km de routes ont été rénovées ou remises en état grâce au 
soutien  de  la  politique  de  cohésion.  En  tout,  la  longueur  du  réseau  routier  soit 
nouvellement  construit,  soit  rénové,  grâce  au  soutien  de  la  politique  de  cohésion, 
représentait  9 %  des  autoroutes  et  des  routes  nationales  fin  2013.  Dans  le  secteur 
ferroviaire,  la  politique  de  cohésion  a  contribué  à  la  mise  à  disposition  de  3  135  km  de 
voies ferrées nouvelles ou rénovées, soit l’équivalent de 2 % du réseau ferroviaire de ces 
15 États membres.  

Sur  la  base  du  travail  mené  pour  la  présente  étude,  il  apparaît  que  les  allocations  de 
fonds  fournies  par  la  politique  de  cohésion  se  sont  bien  alignées  sur  les  tendances 
actuelles  du  secteur  et  les  priorités  de  la  politique  de  transports.  En  particulier,  le 
financement  fourni  par  la  politique  de  cohésion  a  apporté  une  contribution  de  taille  à la 
connectivité  à  l’échelle  de  l’UE,  ainsi  que  dans  les  États  membres  individuels.  Cette 
contribution  s’est  concentrée  sur  les  États  membres  et  les  régions  qui  étaient  les 
destinataires  visés  par  les  niveaux  relatifs  les  plus  élevés  d’aide  dans  le  cadre  de  la 
politique de cohésion.  

Les allocations de fonds fournies par la politique de cohésion dans les États membres ont 
représenté de 57 milliards d’euros en Pologne à 25 millions d’euros au Luxembourg. Les 
ressources  allouées  aux  transports  dans  le  cadre  des  enveloppes  de  la  politique  de 
cohésion ont représenté de 45 % en Pologne à 0 % au Danemark et au Luxembourg. Le 
degré  d’absorption  des  financements  fournis  par  la  politique  de  cohésion  alloués  aux 

9 

 
 
 
 
transports  a  représenté  de  55 %  en  Roumanie  à  105 %  en  Espagne,  dans  les  États 
membres qui ont attribué plus de 5 milliards d’euros aux transports.  

Ce cofinancement a contribué à la construction et à la rénovation des routes et des voies 
ferrées  existantes,  et  cela  tant  dans  le  cadre  du  RTE-T  qu’en  dehors  de  ce  réseau. 
Néanmoins,  pour  ce  qui  est  des  routes  (dans  le  cadre  du  RTE-T  ou  en  dehors  de  ce 
réseau),  les  résultats  communiqués  fin  2013  se  trouvaient  concentrés  dans  les  États 
membres ayant rejoint l’UE en 2004 ou par la suite, alors que les États membres ayant 
rejoint l’Union avant cette date présentent des résultats plus importants dans le secteur 
ferroviaire. 

L’utilisation des fonds alloués par la politique de cohésion dans le secteur ferroviaire s’est 
focalisée sur la rénovation ou la mise à jour des vois ferrées existantes, afin d’accroître la 
vitesse  des  lignes  et  leur  capacité.  D’une  manière  significative,  certaines  parties 
prenantes  des  États  membres  ont  souligné  le  rôle  important  joué  par  les  fonds  alloués 
par la politique de cohésion pour soutenir des projets complexes et de grande envergure, 
notamment dans le secteur ferroviaire. De leur point de vue, lesdits projets auraient pu 
ne  pas  être  mis  en  œuvre  en  l’absence  de  financement  de  la  part  de  la  politique  de 
cohésion.  En  encourageant  les  investissements  dans  les  transports  ferroviaires  et 
urbains, la politique de cohésion a contribué à la mise en place de transports respectueux 
de l’environnement. 

La contribution financière dans le cadre de la politique de cohésion, pendant la période de 
programmation 2007-2013, a été plus faible concernant les investissements non routiers 
ou ferroviaires. Néanmoins, des améliorations ont été apportées aux transports urbains, 
aux aéroports, aux ports et aux voies cyclables pendant cette période. 

Points forts et faiblesses de la politique de cohésion dans le secteur des 
transports 

Parmi les points forts des investissements de la politique de cohésion dans le secteur des 
transports, on peut citer la possibilité de soutenir un large éventail d’objectifs politiques à 
l’échelle  des  États  membres,  avec  des  allocations  de  fonds  qui  reflètent  les  besoins 
individuels de ces derniers. Ceci a permis de maintenir un investissement constant sur le 
RTE-T  et  a  contribué  à  répondre  aux  besoins  en  investissements  des  États  membres, 
ainsi qu’à satisfaire les exigences régionales/locales en matière de transports.  

Les  fonds  alloués  par  la  politique  de  cohésion  ont  constitué  une  source  importante  de 
financement  pour  les  infrastructures  de  transport  pendant  la  récession  économique.  Il 
s’est agi d’une source essentielle pour la promotion des investissements dans des projets 
d’infrastructures  complexes  et  de  grande  envergure.  De  nombreuses  parties  prenantes 
ont signalé qu’en l’absence du financement apporté par la politique de cohésion, les États 
infrastructures  moins  coûteuses, 
membres  auraient  axé 
possiblement au détriment des besoins identifiés.  

leurs  efforts  sur  des 

La période de programmation 2007-2013 de la politique de cohésion a également joué un 
rôle  dans  le  renforcement  des  capacités  organisationnelles  des  États  membres.  Les 
procédures  permettant  d’obtenir  des  financements  dans  le  cadre  de  la  politique  de 
cohésion  exigent  que  les  États  membres  adoptent  une  planification  stratégique  pour  ce 
qui  est  de  leurs  besoins  en  matière  de  transports.  Les  États  membres  ont  également 
renforcé  leurs  capacités  dans  le  domaine  du  développement  et  de  l’appréciation  des 
projets complexes d’investissement sur les transports.  

10 

 
 
 
 
Certaines  faiblesses  ont  également  été  notées  concernant  la  période  de  programmation 
2007-2013  de  la  politique  de  cohésion,  pour  ce  qui  est  des  transports.  Parmi  ces 
faiblesses,  on peut citer les difficultés pour associer les  fonds  fournis par la politique de 
cohésion et les financements privés dans les structures de financement public-privé, ainsi 
que le manque de clarté, dans certains États membres, dans l’application des règles sur 
les aides d’États aux investissements dans les transports.  

Certaines parties prenantes ont évoqué que la concentration mentionnée précédemment 
des  allocations  des  fonds  sur  le  RTE-T  a  réduit  les  fonds  alloués  à  la  satisfaction  des 
besoins des transports régionaux, perpétuant ainsi les disparités régionales. Néanmoins, 
dans l’ensemble, il apparaît que l’accent mis sur la planification des transports sur le long 
terme  dans  les  États  membres  en  tant  que  base  des  investissements  aura  réduit  ce 
risque, en pratique. 

Qualité et exhaustivité de l’analyse financière des projets de transports 

Cette  étude  s’est  penchée  sur  la  qualité  et  l’exhaustivité  de  l’analyse  financière  menée 
par les États membres lors du développement de leurs projets d’investissement dans les 
transports.  Ce  travail  a  évalué  la  qualité  de  l’analyse  financière  entreprise  au  stade  ex 
ante  par  les  États  membres,  comprenant  à  la  fois  la  demande  et  les  aspects  financiers 
des projets. Dans tous  les cas, au moment de  l’adoption de la décision de financement, 
l’analyse  financière  de  chacun  des  projets  s’est  avérée  complète  et  précise,  fournissant 
une  base  exhaustive  pour  la  prise  de  décision  dans  le  cadre  de  ces  derniers.  Certains 
domaines  posant  habituellement  difficulté  ont  été  identifiés,  ainsi  que  les  meilleures 
pratiques au sein des États membres pour y remédier. 

La  qualité  de  l’analyse  de  la  demande  s’est  avérée  variable  en  fonction  des  projets, 
notamment  dans  l’utilisation  de  données  démographiques  telles  que  celles  concernant 
l’emploi et la possession d’une voiture. Il a été constaté que, souvent, de telles données 
avaient été rassemblées d’une manière trop spatialement agrégée, y compris par le biais 
du  recours  à  des  prévisions  du  PIB  au  niveau  national  pour  informer  l’analyse  de  la 
demande. Ceci, ainsi que la prise en charge insuffisante des interactions des projets avec 
d’autres  modes  de  transport  et  itinéraires,  est  considéré  par  les  évaluateurs  comme 
ayant  nui  à  l’exactitude  et  la  qualité  de  l’analyse  de  la  demande  pour  certains  projets. 
Néanmoins,  tous  les  projets  ont  retenu  une  approche  cohérente  par  rapport  aux 
meilleures pratiques pour ce qui est de l’analyse des scénarios « avec projet » et « sans 
projet ».  

L’analyse du comportement des consommateurs et de leur volonté de payer a, elle aussi, 
varié  en  fonction  des  projets  évalués,  avec  peu  d’indications  sur  l’analyse  des  variables 
ou  de  la  demande  induite.  De  même,  une  trop  forte  dépendance  par  rapport  aux 
politiques  nationales  de  péage  et  tarifaires  a  été  constatée,  sans  tenir  compte  de  leur 
accessibilité  financière  dans  les  marchés  cibles.  Ces  facteurs  pourraient  avoir  nui  à 
l’exactitude des analyses de la demande. Par ailleurs, peu d’éléments ont été rassemblés 
quant à la manière dont les charges pourraient varier pendant la période évaluée dans la 
plupart  des  projets,  ce  qui  a  donné  lieu  à  une  incertitude  potentielle  plus  grande 
concernant l’exactitude des prévisions. 

L’exactitude de la prévision des coûts de construction a varié, elle aussi, en fonction des 
projets  évalués.  La  récession  économique  a  constitué  un  facteur  essentiel  pour  la 
réduction  des  coûts  de  sous-traitance  dans  le  cadre  de  nombreux  projets  évalués.  Le 
degré de préparation du projet a, lui aussi, exercé une influence sur les coûts finaux et 

11 

 
 
 
 
les  calendriers  de  mise  en  œuvre.  Des  exemples  de  bon  travail  préparatoire  ont  été 
identifiés, dont l’acquisition précoce de terres, ce qui a permis d’économiser aussi bien du 
temps que de l’argent, alors que le manque d'enquêtes de terrain a constitué un exemple 
de  mauvais  travail  préparatoire  menant  à  des  dépassements  des  coûts  et  des  délais 
prévus. 

La  viabilité  financière  de  certains  projets  s’est  avérée  incertaine,  en  raison  du  manque 
d’éléments  factuels  concernant  la  prise  en  charge  des  coûts  d’entretien.  L’absence 
d’affectation  des  recettes  concernant  les  nécessités  en  termes  d’exploitation  et 
d’entretien  a  été  identifiée  dans  de  nombreux  projets  routiers.  De  même,  les  péages 
n’étaient  pas  mis  en  œuvre  à  des  fins  de  programmation  dans  le  cadre  de  certains 
projets, ce qui a introduit une incertitude supplémentaire quant aux recettes en aval. Il a 
également  été  constaté  que  la  séparation  des  responsabilités  des  gestionnaires  des 
infrastructures et des entreprises ferroviaires avait, elle aussi, introduit  des imprécisions 
et  incertitudes  au  sein  de  certaines  analyses  financières.  Dans  l’ensemble,  les  analyses 
des flux de trésorerie et des risques ont été estimées correctement, bien qu’une analyse 
plus approfondie des risques et de la valeur résiduelle des projets soit préconisée. 

Catalogue des difficultés 

La  présente  étude  a  identifié  les  difficultés  clés  auxquelles  les  États  membres  se  voient 
confrontés  lorsqu’ils  développent  et  évaluent  leurs  projets  d’investissement  dans  les 
transports,  ainsi  que  les  effets  de  ces  difficultés  sur  le  plan  pratique.  Des  meilleures 
pratiques pour faire face à ces difficultés ont été identifiées et évoquées avec les parties 
prenantes  des  États  membres.  Un  catalogue  de  ces  difficultés  clés  a  été  dressé.  Il 
contient, pour chacune des difficultés identifiées, les éléments suivants : 

  une brève description ; 

  un aperçu technique détaillé de la difficulté ; 

  des  signes  annonciateurs  de  la  possible  apparition  de  la  difficulté  en 

question ; 

 

les implications de la difficulté pour l’analyse financière d’un projet ; 

 

les implications de la difficulté pour la viabilité financière du projet, et  

 

les solutions potentielles pour contribuer à relever la difficulté. 

Les difficultés identifiées sont les suivantes : 

  prévoir  la  demande  avec  précision,  afin  de  refléter  l’emplacement  du  projet, 

les tendances de la population et les facteurs contextuels ; 

 

 

 

la précision de la prévision de la demande par rapport aux impacts à court et 
moyen terme de la construction, notamment dans le secteur ferroviaire ; 

l’évaluation  insuffisante  de  l’interaction  du  projet  avec  les  moyens  de 
transport ou les itinéraires concurrents ; 

le développement et la mise en œuvre de modèles de transport multimodaux 
reflétant la portée du projet et ses résultats potentiels ; 

12 

 
 
 
 
 

 

 

 

la définition de représentations correctes de la volonté de payer dans le cadre 
de l’analyse de rentabilité des transports ; 

la  définition  des  niveaux  tarifaires  dans  le  cadre  du  contexte  règlementaire 
national ; 

la précision du calcul des frais d’entretien et d’exploitation, ainsi que la valeur 
nette actuelle des projets, et 

l’estimation  précise  des  frais  de  construction  dans  le  cadre  de  l’analyse 
économique. 

Le catalogue complet est présenté dans la section E du présent rapport. 

Conclusions 

Certaines  conclusions  générales  peuvent  être  tirées  de  la  présente  évaluation.  La 
politique  de  cohésion  a  apporté  une  contribution  de  taille  au  secteur  des  transports  à 
l’échelle  de  l’UE  et  de  ses  États  membres.  Certains  points  forts  importants  ont  été 
constatés  dans  le  fonctionnement  de  la  politique  de  cohésion  dans  le  domaine  des 
transports.  En  particulier,  les  structures  de  prise  de  décision  en  place  et  la  planification 
stratégique  des  investissements  dans  les  transports  ont  exigé  des  États  membres  qu’ils 
s’assurent  que  le  fonctionnement  de  la  politique  de  cohésion  soit  taillé  sur  mesure  par 
rapport  aux  besoins  et  au  contexte  dans  les  États  membres  individuels.  Les 
investissements  financés  par  la  politique  de  cohésion  contribuent  à  la  stratégie  en 
matière de transports des États membres, ainsi qu’à celle de l’UE dans son ensemble. De 
même, ils encouragent le développement de transports respectueux de l’environnement. 
Les  investissements  fournis  par  la  politique  de  cohésion  ont  renforcé  les  capacités  des 
États membres en matière de planification et d’achèvement des investissements dans le 
secteur  des  transports.  Ils  ont  également  assuré  la  disponibilité  continue  de  fonds  par 
temps de crise économique et encouragé les États membres à mettre un accent accru sur 
les investissements complexes tels que ceux dans le secteur ferroviaire.  

13 

 
 
 
 
Zusammenfassung 

Die Informationen und Ansichten, die in diesem Bericht wiedergegeben werden, sind die 
der Autoren. Sie entsprechen nicht zwangsläufig der offiziellen Meinung der Kommission. 
Die  Kommission  übernimmt  keine  Gewähr  für  die  Richtigkeit  der  in  dieser  Studie 
verwendeten  Daten.  Weder  die  Kommission  noch  Personen,  die  im  Namen  der 
Kommission  handeln,  sind  für  die  Verwendung  der  nachstehenden  Informationen 
verantwortlich. 

Einleitung 

Die  Evaluationsstudie  ist  Teil  der  Ex-Post-Evaluierung  der  EU-Kohäsionspolitik  in  der 
Programmperiode  von  2007-2013.  Die  Hauptziele  und  Anforderungen  dieser  Evaluation 
lauteten wie folgt: 

  Die  wichtigsten  Erfolge  der  Kohäsionspolitik  in  sämtlichen  Bereichen  der 

transportbezogenen Infrastruktur bestimmen, 

  analysieren,  bis  zu  welchem  Grad  die  EU-Förderung  zu  der  Entstehung  von 

flächendeckenden Verkehrsnetzen beigetragen hat und 

  die  Stärken  und  Schwächen  bei  Interventionen  der  Kohäsionspolitik  im 
Bereich  Verkehr  ausmachen  und  untersuchen,  welche  Richtung  diese  Politik 
künftig einschlagen soll. 

Die für diese Studie durchgeführten Arbeiten sowie deren detaillierte Ergebnisse sind in 
zwei Zwischenberichten dargelegt. Basierend auf dieser Arbeit leistet dieser 
Abschlussbericht Folgendes: 

  Er fasst zusammen, welchen Beitrag die Kohäsionspolitik zu Verkehrswegen in 

der EU geleistet hat, 

  erläutert die Stärken und Schwächen der Kohäsionspolitik im Bereich Verkehr, 

  präsentiert 

Untersuchungsergebnisse 
Verkehrsprojekten, die von Mitgliedstaaten durchgeführt wurden,  

der 

die 

Finanzanalyse 

von 

 

stellt den Katalog an Herausforderungen vor, der von den Ergebnissen dieser 
Studie abgeleitet wurde und 

 

führt die umfassenden Schlussfolgerungen der Evaluierung auf. 

Der Beitrag der Kohäsionspolitik für den Bereich Verkehr 

Die  Kohäsionspolitik  der  Europäischen  Union  (EU)  kann  sowohl  auf  transeuropäischer 
Ebene  als  auch  auf  Ebene  der  Mitgliedstaaten  ihren  Beitrag  zum  Verkehr  leisten.  Am 
wirksamsten  kann  die  Kohäsionspolitik  zur  Vervollständigung  der  EU-weiten 
transeuropäischen 
Verkehrswege  beisteuern, 
Verkehrsnetzes  (TEN-V)  unterstützt.  Das  TEN-V  ist  das  Ergebnis  eines  gemeinsamen 
Planungsprozesses der Kommission und der Mitgliedstaaten, bei dem EU-weite Prioritäten 
für die Verkehrsplanung festgelegt werden. 

indem  sie  die  Fertigstellung  des 

Die Kohäsionspolitik hat einen bedeutenden Beitrag zur Vollendung des TEN-V geleistet. 
Bei den Finanzierungsbeschlüssen haben die Mitgliedsländer den Straßen- und Schienen-

14 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Projekten  des  TEN-V  einen  hohen  Stellenwert  beigemessen.  Insgesamt  wurden  dem 
Bereich Verkehr im Rahmen der Kohäsionspolitik Mittel von € 82,3 Milliarden zugewiesen. 
€  40,8  Milliarden  bzw.  49 %  davon  wurden  im  Rahmen  des  TEN-V  vergeben.  Von  den 
3.875  km  neuer  Straßen,  die  bis  Ende  2013  mit  Mitteln  der  Kohäsionspolitik  gebaut 
wurden,  waren  1.817  km  bzw.  47 %  neue  TEN-V-Straßen.  Entsprechend  waren  von 
3.405 Schienenkilometern, die bis Ende 2013 entweder neu verlegt oder mit Mitteln der 
Kohäsionspolitik  umgebaut  wurden,  1.661  km  bzw.  49 %  TEN-V  Schienen.  Darüber 
hinaus  wurden  in  den  28  Mitgliedstaaten  bis  Ende  2013  über  23.000  Straßenkilometer 
aus Mitteln der Kohäsionspolitik saniert.  

Die 

verglichen. 

In  den  jeweiligen  Mitgliedsländern  hat  die  Förderung  durch  die  Kohäsionspolitik  einen 
entscheidenden  Beitrag  zur  Entwicklung  des  Transportnetzes  geleistet.  Im  Lauf  dieser 
Evaluierung  wurde  der  Aufbau  von  Verkehrsinfrastruktur  in  15  Mitgliedsländern  mit  den 
höchsten  Zuweisungen  aus  dem  Bereich  der  Kohäsionspolitik  mit  der  gesamten 
Verkehrsentwicklung 
in 
Verkehrsinfrastruktur in diesen Mitgliedstaaten lag im Zeitraum von 2007-2013 bei € 494 
Milliarden. Im gleichen Zeitraum lagen die Ausgaben der Kohäsionspolitik für den Bereich 
Verkehr  in  diesen  Mitgliedsländern  im  gleichen  Zeitraum  bei  €  52  Milliarden.  Diese 
Förderung  konzentrierte  sich  auf  Mitgliedstaaten,  die  der  EU  2004  oder  nach  2004 
beigetreten  waren.  Die  Ausgaben  der  Kohäsionspolitik  für  Verkehr  entsprachen  in  der 
Programmperiode  von  2007-2013  dem  Großteil  der  Gesamtinvestitionen  von  Litauen 
(54 %),  Ungarn  (49 %)  und  der  Slowakei  (45 %).  Auf  der  anderen  Seite  haben  die 
Ausgaben  der  Kohäsionspolitik  in  Frankreich  im  gleichen  Zeitraum  lediglich  1 %  der 
Verkehrsinvestitionen ausgemacht. 

Gesamtinvestitionen 

öffentlichen 

In absoluten Zahlen wurden in diesen 15  Mitgliedstaaten bis Ende 2013 3.851 km neue 
Straßen  mit  Mitteln  der  Kohäsionspolitik  gebaut.  Das  entspricht  1 %  der  bereits 
bestehenden  Autobahnen  und  anderer  staatlicher  Straßen  in  diesen  Mitgliedstaaten. 
Weitere  21.653  km  Autostraßen  wurden  aus  Mitteln  der  Kohäsionspolitik  erneuert  oder 
instand gesetzt. Alles in allem entspricht der Umfang der aus Mitteln der Kohäsionspolitik 
neu  gebauten  oder  sanierten  Verkehrswege  Ende  2013  9 %  der  bereits  bestehenden 
Autobahnen  und  anderer 
Im  Eisenbahnsektor  hat  die 
Kohäsionspolitik  dazu  beigetragen,  3.135  Schienenkilometer  neu  zu  verlegen  oder 
instand zu setzen. Das entspricht 2 % des Schienennetzwerks der 15 Mitgliedstaaten.  

staatlicher  Straßen. 

Die  Untersuchungen  im  Rahmen  dieser  Studie  scheinen  zu  belegen,  dass  die  Mittel  der 
Kohäsionspolitik  gut  auf  die  aktuellen  Trends  im  Sektor  und  auf  die  Prioritäten  der 
jeweiligen  Verkehrspolitik  abgestimmt  sind.  Die  Mittelvergabe  der  Kohäsionspolitik  hat 
vor  allem  für  den  Vernetzungsgrad  auf  EU-Ebene  sowie  der  einzelner  Mitgliedstaaten 
einen  maßgeblichen  Beitrag  geleistet.  Dieser  Beitrag  war  in  denjenigen  Mitgliedsländern 
und Regionen konzentriert, die auch die beabsichtigten Empfänger der  – relativ gesehen 
– höchsten Zuwendungen der Kohäsionspolitik waren.  

Die Zuwendungen der Kohäsionspolitik für Mitgliedstaaten lag zwischen € 57 Milliarden in 
Polen  und  €  25  Millionen  in  Luxemburg.  Die  Mittel,  die  im  Finanzrahmen  der 
Kohäsionspolitik für Verkehrswege bereit gestellt wurden, reichen von 45 % in Polen bis 
0 %  in  Dänemark  und  Luxemburg.  Der  Grad  der  Ausschöpfung  der  Kohäsionspolitik-
Förderung  für  Verkehrswege  reichte  von  55 %  in  Rumänien  bis  105 %  in  Spanien  (bei 
Mitgliedstaaten, die mehr als € 5 Milliarden für Verkehr bereitgestellt hatten).  

Diese  Kofinanzierung  unterstützte  den  Bau  neuer  und  die  Instandsetzung  bereits 
existierender  Straßen  und  Schienenwege,  sowohl  im  Rahmen  des  TEN-V  als  auch 

15 

 
 
 
 
außerhalb  dieses  Netzwerks.  Die  Ausgaben  für  Straßen  innerhalb  des  TEN-V,  aber  auch 
darüber  hinaus  waren  bis  Ende  2013  vor  allem  in  Mitgliedsländern  konzentriert,  die  der 
EU 2004 oder danach beigetreten waren. Mitgliedstaaten, deren Beitritt zur EU vor 2004 
stattfand,  hatten  demgegenüber  größere  Ausgaben  im  Bereich  Schienenwege  zu 
verbuchen. 

Der  Einsatz  von  Mitteln  aus  der  Kohäsionspolitik  im  Schienensektor  war  auf  die 
Erneuerung oder den Ausbau des bereits existierenden Schienennetzes ausgerichtet, um 
so  Liniengeschwindigkeit und Kapazitäten zu erhöhen. Bezeichnenderweise hoben einige 
Vertreter  aus  Mitgliedsländern  die  wichtige  Rolle  der  Kohäsionspolitik-Förderung  bei  der 
Unterstützung  großer,  komplexer  Projekte  hervor,  die  insbesondere  im  Schienensektor 
offenkundig wurde. Ihrer Ansicht nach hätten solche Projekte möglicherweise nicht ohne 
Fördermittel  der  Kohäsionspolitik  realisiert  werden  können.  Durch  die  Förderung  von 
Investitionen  in  Schienennetz  und  städtische  Verkehrsnetze  hat  die  Kohäsionspolitik  zur 
Umsetzung umweltfreundlicher Verkehrslösungen beigetragen. 

Während der Programmperiode von 2007-2013 wurden Investitionen in Schienenverkehr 
und  andere  Verkehrswege  weniger  stark  gefördert  als  Investitionen  im  Straßenbau. 
Nichtsdestotrotz  gab  es  in  diesem  Zeitraum  Verbesserungen  im  Bereich  städtischer 
Verkehrsnetze, Flughäfen, Häfen und Fahrradwege. 

Stärken und Schwächen der Kohäsionspolitik im Bereich Verkehr 

Zu den Stärken der Kohäsionspolitik-Förderung im Bereich Verkehr gehörte die Fähigkeit, 
eine  Vielzahl  von  politischen  Zielsetzungen  der  verschiedenen  Mitgliedsländer  zu 
unterstützen,  wobei  die  Zuwendungen  sich  an  den  Bedürfnissen  der  einzelnen 
Mitgliedsländer  orientieren.  Dies  förderte  fortlaufende  Investitionen  in  das  TEN-V,  trug 
in  Mitgliedstaaten  aufzuzeigen  und  half, 
Investitionsbedürfnisse 
dazu  bei, 
regionale/lokale Verkehrsanforderungen zu erfüllen.  

Die Zuwendungen aus der Kohäsionspolitik waren während der wirtschaftlichen Rezession 
eine  wichtige  Finanzierungsquelle.  Sie  war  darüber  hinaus  eine  bedeutende 
Förderungsquelle,  um  Investitionen  in  große  Infrastrukturprojekte  zu  fördern.  Viele 
Vertreter  der  Mitgliedsländer  haben  angemerkt,  dass  sich  EU-Mitgliedstaaten  ohne 
Kohäsionspolitik-Förderung  auf  kostengünstigere  Infrastrukturlösungen  eingelassen 
hätten  und  so  in  Kauf  genommen  hätten,  bereits  ermittelte  Bedürfnisse  möglicherweise 
zu vernachlässigen.  

Die  Programmperiode  der  Kohäsionspolitik  von  2007-2013  hat  auch  eine  Rolle  bei  der 
Entwicklung der organisatorischen Kapazität von Mitgliedsländern gespielt. Die Verfahren, 
mit  denen  Mittel  aus  Kohäsionspolitik  beschafft  werden,  bringen  Mitgliedstaaten  dazu, 
sich  mit  der  strategischen  Planung  ihrer  Verkehrsbedürfnisse  auseinander  zu  setzen. 
komplexe 
Mitgliedsländer 
Verkehrsinvestitionsprojekte zu entwickeln und zu ermitteln.  

Kapazität 

erhöht, 

zudem 

haben 

ihre 

um 

Für  die  Förderperiode  2007-2013  der  Kohäsionspolitik  wurden  im  Bereich  Verkehr 
indessen  mehrere  Schwachstellen  ausgemacht.  Dazu  zählen  die  Schwierigkeiten  bei  der 
Kombination  von  Kohäsionspolitik-Förderung  und  privaten  Finanzierungen  in  Strukturen 
öffentlich-privater  Partnerschaften  (ÖPP)  sowie  mangelnde  Transparenz  bei  einigen 
Mitgliedstaaten  bei  der  Anwendung  der  Vorschriften  zu  staatlicher  Beihilfe  bei 
Investitionen im Bereich Verkehr.  

16 

 
 
 
 
Die  bereits  erwähnte  Konzentration  auf  Zuwendungen  für  das  TEN-V  führe  aus  Sicht 
mancher  Akteure  dazu,  dass  Zuwendungen  für  regionale  Erfordernisse  im  Bereich 
Verkehr reduziert und dadurch regionale Ungleichheiten begünstigt werden. Alles in allem 
wird  der  Fokus  auf  eine  Langzeitplanung  der  Mitgliedstaaten  im  Bereich  Verkehr  als 
Investitionsgrundlage dieses Risiko in der Praxis allerdings mindern. 

Qualität und Vollständigkeit der Finanzanalysen von Verkehrsprojekten 

Diese  Studie  untersuchte  die  Qualität  und  Vollständigkeit  von  Finanzanalysen,  die  von 
Mitgliedstaaten  bei  der  Entwicklung  von  Verkehrsinvestitionsprojekten  durchgeführt 
werden.  Diese  Arbeit  der  Finanzanalyse  hat  auch  die  Qualität  der  Finanzanalyse 
berücksichtigt, die von  den Mitgliedstaaten in der Vorphase durchgeführt wurde und die 
sowohl  die  Anforderungen  als  auch  die  finanziellen  Aspekte  von  Projekten  beinhaltete. 
Bei  allen  Projekten  war  die  Finanzanalyse  zum  Zeitpunkt,  als  die  Entscheidung  zur 
Förderung  getroffen  wurde,  vollständig  und  fehlerfrei  und  lieferte  so  eine  umfassende 
Grundlage  für  die  Entscheidungsfindung  des  jeweiligen  Projekts.  Es  wurden  allerdings 
auch  einige  Bereiche  ermittelt,  in  denen  es  immer  wieder  zu  Problemen  kam,  z.  B. 
vorbildliche  Verfahren  der  verschiedenen  Mitgliedstaaten  beim  Umgang  mit  diesen 
Problemen. 

Die Qualität der Bedarfsanalyse schwankte bei den Projekten, insbesondere beim Einsatz 
demographischer  Daten  wie  Beschäftigungsquote  und  Fahrzeugbestand.  Diese  Daten 
waren in vielen Fällen räumlich zu stark verdichtet, das gilt auch für die Auswertung von 
Prognosen zum Bruttoinlandsprodukt, die Auskunft über die Bedarfsanalyse geben sollen. 
Dies  sowie  die  unzureichende  Berücksichtigung  von  Projektwechselwirkungen  mit 
anderen  Modalitäten  und  Streckenverläufen  haben  nach  Ansicht  der  Gutachter  dazu 
beigetragen,  bei  einigen  Projekten  die  Genauigkeit  und  Qualität  der  Bedarfsanalyse  zu 
unterminieren. Nichtsdestotrotz entsprach die Herangehensweise – bezüglich der Analyse 
von  Szenarien  „mit  Projekt“  und  „ohne  Projekt“  –  bei  allen  Projekten  den  Best-Practice-
Vorgaben.  

Die  Analyse  von  Konsumentenverhalten  und  Zahlungsbereitschaft  variierte  bei  den 
evaluierten Projekten, dabei gab es kaum Hinweise auf eine veränderliche oder induzierte 
Bedarfsanalyse.  Auf  nationaler  Ebene  konnte  auch  eine  übermäßige  Abhängigkeit  von 
Mautverfahren  und  Tarifpolitik  ausgemacht  werden,  ohne  Berücksichtigung  der 
Bezahlbarkeit  bei  den  Zielmärkten.  Diese  Faktoren  hätten  die  Genauigkeit  der 
Bedarfsanalyse  schwächen  können.  Es  gab  zudem  unzureichende  Hinweise  darauf, 
welchen  Schwankungen  die  Gebühren  während  des  Beurteilungszeitraums  unterliegen, 
was  zu  größerer  potenzieller  Ungewissheit  bezüglich  der  Genauigkeit  der  Prognosen 
führte. 

zentraler  Faktor  bei  der  Kostenverringerung 

Auch  die  Genauigkeit  der  prognostizierten  Konstruktionskosten  schwankte  bei  den 
verschiedenen  untersuchten  Projekten.  Die  wirtschaftliche  Rezession  war  bei  vielen 
evaluierten  Projekten  ein 
für 
Bauunternehmen.  Das  Ausmaß  der  Projektvorbereitungen  beeinflusste  auch  die 
guter 
Endkosten  und 
Vorbereitungsarbeiten  ermitteln,  z.  B.  die  frühe  Erwerbung  von  Grundstücken,  was  zu 
Kosten- 
wohingegen  mangelnde 
geführt 
Baugrunduntersuchungen als Beispiel für mangelhafte Vorbereitungsarbeiten ausgemacht 
wurden, die zudem zu Budget- und Zeitplanüberschreitungen geführt haben. 

den  Umsetzungszeitplan.  Es 

Zeiteinsparungen 

sich  Beispiele 

ließen 

hat, 

und 

17 

 
 
 
 
Die  finanzielle  Nachhaltigkeit  einiger  Projekte  war  aufgrund  mangelnder  Nachweise  für 
die Bezahlung von Wartungs- und Instandhaltungskosten schwer kalkulierbar. Bei vielen 
Straßenprojekten  wurde  mangelnde  Zweckbindung  der  Einnahmen  für  Betriebs-  und 
Wartungs-  bzw.  Instandhaltungsvorgaben  identifiziert.  Bei  manchen  Projekten  wurden 
die  Mautgebühren  nicht  in  das  Programm  implementiert,  sodass  es  zu  weiteren 
Unsicherheiten  bezüglich  der  nachgelagerten  Einnahmen  kam.  Auch  die  getrennten 
Verantwortlichkeiten  von  Infrastruktur-Management  und  Eisenbahnunternehmen  wurde 
bei  einigen  Finanzanalysen  als  Ursache  für  Ungenauigkeiten  und  Ungewissheiten 
ausgemacht.  Alles  in  allem  bewertete  man  die  Geldfluss-  und  Risikoanalysen  als 
fehlerfrei;  dessen  ungeachtet  empfehlen  die  Gutachter  weitere  Risikoanalysen  sowie 
Analysen über den Restwert von Projekten. 

Katalog der Herausforderungen 

Diese  Studie  ermittelte  die  wesentlichen  Herausforderungen  für  Mitgliedstaaten  bei  der 
Entwicklung  und  Bewertung  von  Verkehrsprojekten  sowie  die  praktischen  Auswirkungen 
dieser  Herausforderungen.  Für  die  Auseinandersetzung  mit  diesen  Herausforderungen 
wurden mit Vertretern der jeweiligen Mitgliedstaaten Best-Practice-Vorgaben identifiziert 
und erörtert.  Es wurde  auch ein Katalog dieser zentralen Herausforderungen entwickelt, 
der für jede einzelne Herausforderung Folgendes festlegt: 

 

 

Eine zusammenfassende Beschreibung, 

einen detaillierten technischen Überblick über die jeweilige Herausforderung, 

  Warnsignale,  die  darauf  hindeuten,  dass  die  betreffende  Herausforderung 

entstehen könnte, 

 

 

die Implikationen der Herausforderung für die Finanzanalyse eines Projektes, 

die  Implikationen  der  Herausforderung  für  die  finanzielle  Nachhaltigkeit  des 
Projekts und  

 

potenzielle Lösungen für die Überwindung der jeweiligen Herausforderungen. 

Folgende Herausforderungen wurden ermittelt: 

  Den  Bedarf 

zutreffend  prognostizieren, 

sodass  er  Projektstandort, 

Bevölkerungsentwicklung und kontextabhängige Faktoren spiegelt, 

 

 

 

 

die  Genauigkeit  von  Bedarfsprognosen  in  Bezug  auf  kurz-  bis  mittelfristige 
Auswirkungen der Bauarbeiten, insbesondere im Schienensektor, 

unzureichende  Beurteilung  der  Wechselwirkung  des 
konkurrierenden Modalitäten oder Streckenverläufen, 

Projekts  mit 

Entwicklung  und  Betrieb  eines  multimodalen  Verkehrsmodells,  das  den 
Projektumfang sowie potenzielle Auswirkungen berücksichtigt, 

die  Ausarbeitung  exakter  Darstellungen  der  Zahlungsbereitschaft  im  Rahmen 
von Kosten-/Nutzen-Analysen der Verkehrskosten, 

 

die Definition des Tarifniveaus im Rahmen des nationalen Aufsichtsrahmens, 

18 

 
 
 
 
 

 

die  exakte  Kalkulation  der  Wartungs-/Instandhaltungs-  und  Betriebskosten 
sowie der Nettogegenwertsberechnung des Projekts und 

exakte 

die 
Schätzung 
Wirtschaftlichkeitsanalyse. 

der 

Konstruktionskosten 

als 

Teil 

der 

Der gesamte Katalog ist im Abschnitt E dieses Berichts aufgeführt. 

Schlussfolgerungen 

Aus  der  vorliegenden  Evaluierung  lassen  sich  einige  Gesamtschlussfolgerungen  ziehen. 
Die Kohäsionspolitik hat einen erheblichen Beitrag zum Verkehrssystem geleistet, sowohl 
in  der  EU  insgesamt  als  auch  in  einzelnen  Mitgliedstaaten.  Es  ließen  sich  einige 
bedeutende Stärken feststellen, wie die Kohäsionspolitik im Bereich Verkehr funktioniert. 
So  gewährleisten  insbesondere  die  gegenwärtigen  Entscheidungsstrukturen  und  die  von 
den  Mitgliedstaaten  erforderliche  strategische  Planung  der  Verkehrsinvestitionen,  dass 
der  Einsatz  der  Kohäsionspolitik  den  Bedürfnissen  der  jeweiligen  Mitgliedstaaten 
entspricht  und  auf  den  Kontext  vor  Ort  zugeschnitten  ist.  Investitionen,  die  durch  die 
Kohäsionspolitik gefördert wurden, stützen die Verkehrsstrategie der Mitgliedstaaten und 
der  EU  als  Ganzes,  zudem  begünstigen  sie  die  Entwicklung  umweltfreundlicher 
Verkehrssysteme.  Die  Investitionen  der  Kohäsionspolitik  im  Bereich  Verkehr  haben  die 
Kapazitäten  der  Mitgliedstaaten  unterstützt,  Verkehrsinvestitionen  zu  planen  und 
durchzuführen,  sie  haben  sichergestellt,  dass  auch  in  Zeiten  der  wirtschaftlichen  Krise 
weitere  Investitionen  getätigt  wurden  und  die  relativ  komplexen  Investitionen  der 
Mitgliedstaaten im Schienenverkehr schwerpunktmäßig erhöht.  

19 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Section A: Introduction 

A1 

Introduction 

The Directorate General for Regional and Urban Policy of the European Commission (DG 
REGIO) undertook an ex-post evaluation of the 2007-2013 cohesion policy programming 
period.  As  part  of  this  work  DG  REGIO  commissioned  a  study  referred  to  as  “Work 
Package 5: Transport” from AECOM and KPMG. This report represents the Final Report of 
the Work Package 5 evaluation. 

A2 

Evaluation objectives 

The main objectives and requirements of the evaluation were to: 

 

Identify  the  main  achievements  of  cohesion  policy  in  all  areas  of  transport 
related infrastructure; 

  Analyse  to  what  extent  the  EU  support  contributed  to  the  creation  of 

comprehensive transport networks; and 

 

Identify  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  cohesion  policy  intervention  in 
transport and explore directions this policy should take in the future.   

A  particular  emphasis  was  placed  on  the  financial  sustainability  of  cohesion  policy 
investment, using a selection of major projects to examine the detailed financial data and 
forecasting prepared by Member States and submitted to the Commission. 

Data  on  financial  progress  and  physical  achievements  in  all  Member  States  and 
programmes was available from the Commission’s own monitoring systems and this was 
analysed  as  part  of  the  study.  These  achievements  were  placed  in  context  using  data 
from Eurostat, Member States and the International Transport Forum on overall transport 
infrastructure  in  Member  States.  This  information  on  overall  achievements  was 
supplemented by a case study approach at the Member State and major project levels.  

As with any evaluation, data availability and quality were issues for this study. The timing 
of this ex post evaluation meant that much of the  co-financed infrastructure in question 
was relatively new, or even still in the process of construction. It is therefore too early to 
fully investigate the results of these investments. The evaluation therefore concentrated 
on  the  financial  inputs  and  physical  outputs  of  cohesion  policy  in  the  area  of  transport. 
Where indications of the results and impacts of the investments have emerged these are 
presented.  The  2007-2013  programming  period  was  the  first  one  where  Member  States 
provided  the  Commission  with  “core  indicator”  data  on  the  outputs  of  cohesion  policy. 
This was extremely useful and forms the basis for much of the information presented in 
this  study.  However,  issues  arose  in  the  collation  and  interpretation  of  this  data,  for 
example  the  definitions  of  the  core  indicators  were  interpreted  differently  by  some 
Member States. This issue is not expected to reoccur in the 2014-2020 reporting period. 
“Common indicators” have been included in the Regulations for the current programming 
period, and their precise definitions have been explained clearly to Member States.  

20 

 
 
 
 
 
A3  Approach 

This  section  presents  a  summary  of  the  approach  adopted  for  each  of  the  evaluation 
Tasks.  The  evaluation  was  undertaken  following  a  methodological  approach  specifically 
tailored  to  answer  the  evaluation  questions  relevant  to  each  of  the  Commission’s 
objectives. A summary of the approach is shown in Figure A.1, followed by a summary of 
the work undertaken in each Task. 

Figure A.1 Overview of our approach 

Task 1  
Task  1  provided  an  overview  of  cohesion  policy  effects  on  transport  investment  in 
Member  States.  An  analysis  of  the  achievements  of  cohesion  policy  in  the  field  of 
transport  over  the  2007-2013  programming  period  was  undertaken.  This  task 
encompassed a quantitative analysis of data on inputs and outputs of  cohesion policy in 
the  field  of  transport,  supported  by  qualitative  stakeholder  interviews  designed  to  elicit 
the views of informed commentators in 15 Member States selected during the Inception 
phase  of  this  study1.  These  15  Member  States  were  selected  to  maximise  the  level  of 
insight gained into the spending of cohesion policy funds on transport infrastructure, i.e. 
they  were  selected  on  the  basis  of  their  allocations  of  cohesion  policy  funding  to 
transport. 

Task 2  
Task 2 reviewed the financial and demand analysis of 20 major projects2 selected in the 
Inception  phase  of  this  study;  these  were  selected  from  the  15  Member  States  used  in 
Task  1  and  to  be  illustrative  of  the  transport  priority  themes  supported  by  cohesion 
policy.  The  major  projects  selected  covered  the  following  Member  States  and  transport 
priority themes: 

  Member States:  Bulgaria (2), Czech Republic, Estonia, France (2), Germany, 
Greece,  Hungary,  Italy  (2),  Poland  (4),  Romania  (2),  Slovakia,  Slovenia  and 
Spain; and 

1  The  Member  States  were:  Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Estonia,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Hungary,  Italy, 
Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain.  
2 Major Projects are defined as those with a total cost of over €50m 

21 

Task 1: Analysis of achievementsTask 2:ReviewfinancialanalysesTask 3:Project case studiesTask 2aTask 2bTask 2cTask 4:"Catalogueof Challenges"Task 5:Case studiesof CPTask 6:SeminarTask 7:FinalReport15 MemberStates20 major projects10 projectcase studies6 MemberStates 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
  priority  themes:  Motorways  (TEN-T)  (4),  Motorways  (2),  National  Roads  (2), 
Regional/Local  Roads,  Urban  Transport  (3),  Railway  (TEN-T)  (6),  Railway, 
Mobile Rail Assets (TEN-T).    

The  documentation  for  each  project  was  examined  and  a  judgment  provided  on  the 
quality and accuracy of  demand and financial assumptions  presented  within the ex-ante 
financial  analysis.  The  key  assumptions  and  theoretical  foundations  for  demand  and 
financial analysis within these major projects were identified. 

Task 3 
Task  3  of  the  evaluation  involved  preparing  case  studies  for  10  major  projects  with  the 
following objectives as defined in the Terms of Reference (ToR): 

  To  verify  the  correctness  of  assumptions  underlying  demand  and  financial 

analyses; and 

  To understand the context in which projects were implemented. 

The  major  projects  were  selected  from  the  20  used  in  Task  2  of  the  evaluation,  and 
covered eight Member States3. The projects were selected to be illustrative of the Priority 
Themes and Member States supported by cohesion policy, and on the basis that projects 
were near  or post completion.  The evaluation included a desk-based  review of  available 
documentation and data, supported by in-depth interviews with selected stakeholders.  

Task 4 
Task  4  saw  the  preparation  of  a  catalogue  of  challenges  to  present  an  analysis  of  the 
most  commonly  occurring  issues  and  problems  within  the  ex-ante  financial  analysis  of 
major  projects.  Evidence  from  Tasks  2,  3  and  5  was  used  in  preparing  the  catalogue. 
Each of the challenges was prepared to provide the following information: 

  A summary of the challenge; 

  A technical and more detailed overview of the challenge; 

  Potential warning signs for the challenge; 

 

 

Implications of the challenge in question for the financial analysis of projects; 
and 

Implications  of  the  challenge  in  question  for  the  financial  sustainability  of 
projects; and 

  Potential solutions to assist in overcoming each challenge.  

Task 5  
Task 5 explored the contribution of cohesion policy to national and EU transport policy in 
six Member States, which were selected from the 15 used in Task 14. These case studies 
dealt with the following evaluation questions: 

3 The Member States were: Hungary, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Spain, Czech Republic, Germany and Estonia, 
and included Motorways (TEN-T), Railway (TEN-T), Regional/Local Roads, Urban Transport and National Roads 
4 The Member States were: France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania and Spain. This set of Member States was 
selected  to  be  illustrative  of  the  range  of  Member  States  in  the  EU  by  including:  large  and  small  Member 
States;  long  standing  and  relatively  new  Member  States;  and  both  Member  States  carrying  out  high  and  low 
levels of cohesion policy supported transport investment. 

22 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
  Should  cohesion  policy  have  supported  all  the  transport  sectors  which 

received assistance? 

  Are  the  investments  made  in  the  area  of  transport  by  cohesion  policy  the 

ones that fulfil its [transport] objectives? 

  What should be supported by the cohesion policy in the area of transport? 

  What are the challenges for the cohesion policy in the area of transport in the 

next 10 years? 

  Has the Common EU Transport Policy influenced the national transport policy 

and in what way?  

The  evaluation  included  a  desk-based  review  of  available  documentation  and  data, 
supported by in-depth interviews with selected stakeholders. 

Task 6  
Task  6  was  a  seminar  for  Member  State  stakeholders,  held  on  9  October  2015  in 
Brussels. The scope of the seminar included: 

  The presentation of an overview of the evaluation commission; 

  A discussion of the main challenges within the financial analysis of projects; 

  The presentation of major project and Member State case study outputs; and 

  The presentation of the emerging catalogue of challenges. 

The  seminar  was  used  to  explore  the  emerging  findings  and  to  deepen  the  analysis  of 
particular issues and challenges. 

Task 7  
Task  7  was  the  preparation  of  this  Final  Report,  bringing  together  the  findings  from  all 
evaluation activities undertaken. The Final Report represents part of a suite of documents 
prepared during this evaluation: 

  The  finalised  Inception  Report  for  this  study  was  issued  to  DG  REGIO  on  20 

March, 2015 and presented the agreed methodology to be adopted;  

  The First Interim Report was issued to DG REGIO on 21 July 2015, presenting 

the findings from Task 1 and Task 2; and 

  The  Second  Interim  Report  was  issued  to  DG  REGIO  on  29  February  2016, 

presenting the findings from Tasks 3, 4 and 5. 

A4  Report structure 

This  Final  Report  brings  together  the  evidence  and  findings  from  across  the  evaluation 
and sets out: 

  Section B: the contribution of cohesion policy to transport in the EU; 

  Section  C:  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  cohesion  policy  in  the  area  of 

transport; 

23 

 
 
 
 
  Section  D:  the  quality  and  completeness  of  financial  analysis  of  transport 

projects; 

  Section E: the catalogue of challenges; and 

  Section F: conclusions.  

24 

 
 
 
 
Section B: Contribution of cohesion policy to transport in 
the EU 

B1 

Introduction 

The work done for this study, particularly Tasks 1, 2, 3 and 5, produced extensive data 
sets  and  qualitative  insights  on  the  contribution  of  cohesion  policy  to  development  of 
transport  infrastructure  in  Member  States.  The  first  and  second  interim  reports  include 
full presentation of the findings in this area, which are summarised here, focusing on the 
cohesion  policy  support  to  the  creation  of  comprehensive  transport  networks  both  at  a 
trans-European and at a national, Member State, level.  

This  section  starts  with  an  overview  of  the  level  of  cohesion  policy  funding  agreed  for 
each  Member  State  and  the  allocations  made  to  transport  (Section  B2).  Section  B3 
describes the contribution of cohesion policy to EU wide transport networks using data on 
financial inputs from cohesion policy and the outputs of cohesion policy as measured by 
core indicators for all 28 Member States. The analysis reflects the allocation of  cohesion 
policy funding to transport by individual Member States, and within this, the allocation of 
funding to the TEN-T.  

Section  B4  examines  the  contribution  of  cohesion  policy  to  the  transport  networks  of 
Member  States.  This  requires  consideration  of  the  extent  of  transport  networks  of 
Member  States,  and  the  total  investment  in  transport  from  all  sources  of  funding.  This 
analysis is therefore based on the 15 Member States selected for detailed examination in 
Task  1  of  the  evaluation.  Finally,  Section  B5  presents  main  conclusions  from  this 
analysis.  

Information  included  in  this  chapter  comes  from  the  qualitative  desk  research  and 
interviews with stakeholders in 15 Member States which, amongst other things, explored 
the  contribution  of  cohesion  policy  funding  to  transport  in  these  Member  States.  These 
interviews  included  discussions  with  officials  from  Managing  Authorities,  transport 
ministries and beneficiaries of cohesion policy funding in these Member States. Six of the 
15  Member  States  were  also  the  subject  of  a  more  detailed  case  study.  This  work 
provided  further  insights  into  the  contribution  of  cohesion  policy  to  the  creation  of 
transport networks, both on a trans-European and individual Member State level. 

25 

 
 
 
 
 
B2 

Cohesion policy funding overview 

A  total  of  €270.3  bn  cohesion  policy  funding  was  agreed  with  Member  States  for  the 
2007-2013 programming period (Table B.1).  The level of  cohesion policy funding varied 
between Member States, from €57.2 bn in Poland to €25 m in Luxembourg.  

Of  the  €270.3  bn  total,  €82.3  bn  was  allocated  to  carry  out  interventions  in  different 
areas  of  transport  across  the  28  Member  States  (30.4%).  Allocation  refers  here  to  the 
amount  decided  in  adopted  operational  programmes  for  transport  related  Priority 
Themes. The size of allocation to transport within the cohesion policy envelope  was also 
varied  by  Member  State,  from  €25.6  bn  in  Poland  (44.9%)  to  €0  in  Luxembourg  and 
Denmark.  The  top  ten  Member  States  by  transport  allocation  accounted  together  for 
€72.8  bn,  or  88.1%  of  the  total  transport  allocation.  This  group  includes  6  Member 
States, which joined EU in or after 2004 and included virtually only Convergence regions, 
as well as Spain, Greece, Italy and Germany, with significant proportion of Convergence 
regions. 

Within  the  transport  allocations,  Member  States  distributed  different  levels  of  cohesion 
policy  funding  across  the  areas  of  transport  e.g.  road,  rail  and  other  (Table  B.2).  This 
was a reflection of the different objectives and policies established in each Member State 
for the 2007-2013 programming period.  

The  data  shows  that  more  often  than  not,  the  largest  proportion  of  a  Member  State’s 
allocations was assigned to roads. However, Spain, Italy, Slovenia and  Croatia allocated 
the greatest proportion of funds to rail. In eight Member States (France, United Kingdom, 
Cyprus,  Sweden,  Belgium,  the  Netherlands,  Finland  and  Austria),  predominantly  those 
with  smaller  overall  amounts,  the  greatest  proportion  was  assigned  to  ‘other’  which 
included,  for  example,  multi-modal,  urban  transport,  waterways,  port  and  airport 
investment.

26 

 
 
 
 
Table B.1 Cohesion policy allocations € m (up to the end of 2014) 

Total Cohesion 
Policy Allocation 

Allocation to 
Transport 
Themes 

Transport as % 
of Member State 
total 

Poland 

Spain 

Czech Republic 

Hungary 

Greece 

Romania 

Italy 

Slovakia 

Germany 

Bulgaria 

Portugal 

Lithuania 

Latvia 

France 
Cross Border5 
Slovenia 

Estonia 

United Kingdom 

Croatia 

Malta 

Ireland 

Cyprus 

Sweden 

Belgium 

Netherlands 

Finland 

Austria 

Denmark  

Luxembourg 

 57,178  

 26,596  

 22,455  

 21,281  

 15,846  

 15,374  

 20,992  

 9,999  

 16,100  

 5,488  

 14,558  

 5,747  

 3,947  

 8,052  

 7,986  

 3,345  

 3,012  

 5,387  

 706  

 728  

 375  

 493  

 935  

 987  

 830  

 977  

 667  

 255  

 25  

25,656 

8,226 

7,822 

6,679 

6,255 

5,471 

4,184 

3,384 

3,150 

2,022 

1,713 

1,570 

1,141 

1,072 

1,044 

946 

692 

498 

230 

148 

84 

81 

77 

60 

50 

40 

6 

0 

0 

Source: Operational programmes in the version adopted by the end of 2014 

Total 

270,323 

82,299 

45 

31 

35 

31 

39 

36 

20 

34 

20 

37 

12 

27 

29 

13 

13 

28 

23 

9 

33 

20 

22 

16 

8 

6 

6 

4 

1 

0 

0 

30 

5 This covers European territorial cooperation programmes with transport allocation 

27 

 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                           
Table B.2 Total allocations to transport themes in € m (up to the end of 2014) 

% of 
total 

% of 
total 

Roads 
15,800 
2,287 

Rail 
5,468 
4,137 

Other 
4,388 
1,802 

21% 
50% 

62% 
28% 

Poland 
Spain 
Czech Republic 
Hungary 
Greece 
Romania 
Italy 
Slovakia 
Germany 
Bulgaria 
Portugal 
Lithuania 
Latvia 
France 
Cross Border6 
Slovenia 
Estonia 
United Kingdom 
Croatia 
Malta 
Ireland 
Cyprus 
Sweden 
Belgium 
Netherlands 
Finland 
Austria 
Total 
Source: Operational programmes in the version adopted by the end of 2014 

2,720 
1,720 
684 
1,692 
2,248 
1,180 
766 
341 
376 
580 
256 
201 
79 
450 
185 
87 
222 
- 
17 
- 
12 
- 
0.4 
10 
- 
51%  23,432 

1,181 
1,818 
1,128 
402 
1,234 
270 
406 
690 
529 
309 
402 
706 
651 
89 
216 
280 
8 
47 
4 
48 
57 
46 
45 
15 
6 
28%  16,771 

3,922 
3,140 
4,444 
3,377 
702 
1,934 
1,978 
991 
809 
681 
483 
165 
314 
408 
290 
132 
- 
101 
64 
33 
9 
14 
5 
14 
- 
42,097 

50% 
47% 
71% 
62% 
17% 
57% 
63% 
49% 
47% 
43% 
42% 
15% 
30% 
43% 
42% 
26% 
0% 
68% 
76% 
41% 
11% 
24% 
10% 
36% 
0% 

35% 
26% 
11% 
31% 
54% 
35% 
24% 
17% 
22% 
37% 
22% 
19% 
8% 
48% 
27% 
17% 
97% 
0% 
20% 
0% 
15% 
0% 
1% 
26% 
0% 

% of 
total 

Total 

17%  25,656 
8,226 
22% 

7,822 
15% 
6,679 
27% 
6,255 
18% 
5,471 
7% 
4,184 
29% 
3,384 
8% 
3,150 
13% 
2,022 
34% 
1,713 
31% 
1,570 
20% 
1,141 
35% 
1,072 
66% 
1,044 
62% 
946 
9% 
692 
31% 
498 
56% 
230 
3% 
148 
32% 
84 
4% 
81 
59% 
77 
73% 
60 
76% 
50 
89% 
40 
39% 
100% 
6 
20%  82,299 

The overall cohesion policy allocation for transport remained relatively constant over the 
2007-2013  programming  period.  It  increased  by  €359  m  from  €81.9  bn  by  the  end  of 
2008 to €82.3 bn by the end of 2014. There was a large increase in favour of Motorways 
(TEN-T) (+14%) and Regional/Local Roads (+12%) (Table B.3). This was offset to some 
extent  by  declines  in  Motorways  (-13%)  and  National  Roads  (-12%),  with  an  overall 
impact of an increase of over €2 bn to road based themes.  

Increases  in  allocation  for  all  types  of  roads  combined  were  typical  for  the  Member 
States,  which  joined  EU  before  2004,  as  10  of  them  saw  such  changes,  while  only  2 
recorded decreases: the Netherlands of 8% (€0.4mn) and Portugal of 3% (€23.7mn) and 
3  did  not  have  any  allocation  for  roads  in  adopted  operational  programmes  (Denmark 
and  Luxembourg  had  no  transport  allocation  at  all  and  Austria  did  not  allocation  for 
roads).  

In contrast, although the  allocation for all types of roads combined  increased somewhat 
for  5  Member  States,  which  joined  EU  after  2004  (Czech  Republic,  Estonia,  Lithuania, 
Poland  and  Romania),  it  also  decreased  in  6  other  Member  States  from  this  category 
(Bulgaria,  Hungary,  Latvia,  Malta,  Slovenia  and  Slovakia).  The  total  allocation  for  roads 

6 This covers European territorial cooperation programmes with transport allocation. 

28 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
in  adopted  operational  programmes  did  not  change  in  Cyprus  and  Croatia  did  not  have 
any amounts associated with roads.  

The  increases  in  allocation  for  all  types  of  roads  combined  were  offset  by  reductions  in 
the allocation for a variety other themes. Within the EU15, there were large decreases for 
rail  (-  €323  m),  as  well  as  airports  (-  €354  m),  ports  (-  €310  m)  and  multimodal 
transport  (-  €265  m).  In  other  Member  States,  there  were  significant  decreases  in  the 
allocations  for  rail  (-  €123  m),  inland  waterways  (-  €316  m),  the  promotion  of  clean 
urban transport (- €228 m) and ITS (- €134 m). 

The  reallocation  of  resources  to  roads  may  reflect  the  relative  ease  of  developing  road 
projects.  The  case  studies  carried  out  in  Member  States  suggest  that  at  least  some  of 
them found it difficult to complete rail projects and reallocated some amounts to road. 

Table B.3 Change in  total transport  allocations by Theme for  all Member States 
2008 - 2014 

2014 - 2008 
€ m Change 

2008 € 
m 

2014 € 
m 

Motorways (TEN-T) 
Regional/local roads 
Railways 
Mobile rail assets 
Urban transport 
Cycle tracks 
Multimodal transport 
Inland waterways (regional and local) 
Multimodal transport (TEN-T) 
Intelligent transport systems 
Promotion of clean urban transport 
Inland waterways (TEN-T) 
Ports 
Airports 
Mobile rail assets (TEN-T) 
Motorways 
National roads 
Railways (TEN-T) 
Total 
Source: operational programmes in the versions adopted by the end of 2008 and by the end of 2014 

17,482  19,874 
9,776  10,997 
4,706 
4,105 
900 
559 
2,102 
1,794 
664 
634 
1,612 
1,635 
195 
266 
316 
447 
956 
1,090 
5,990 
6,167 
282 
596 
3,170 
3,533 
1,484 
1,851 
266 
696 
4,484 
5,133 
6,743 
7,659 
18,519  17,560 
81,941  82,299 

2008 - 
2014 % 
Change 
14% 
12% 
15% 
61% 
17% 
5% 
-1% 
-26% 
-29% 
-12% 
-3% 
-53% 
-10% 
-20% 
-62% 
-13% 
-12% 
-5% 
0.4% 

2,392 
1,221 
601 
341 
308 
30 
-24 
-70 
-131 
-134 
-176 
-314 
-362 
-367 
-430 
-649 
-917 
-959 
359 

Table  B.4  compares  the  cohesion  policy  allocation  to  transport  with  the  amount  of 
expenditure  up  to  the  end  of  2014.  This  shows  that  absorption  ranged  from  17%  in 
Austria  to  over  100%  in  Sweden,  Finland,  Cyprus  and  Spain.7  Of  those  Member  States 
which had transport allocations of over €5 bn, the rate ranged from 55% in Romania to 
105% in Spain.  

The  expenditure  in  excess  of  the  allocation  may  be  due  to  the  common  practice  of 
overbooking, where the managing authorities select projects, whose value is higher than 

7 Expenditure in excess of the allocation to certain priority themes is possible because of the common practice 
of  overbooking,  where  the  managing  authorities  select  projects,  whose  value  is  higher  than  the  available 
resources in the programme in order to make sure that problems in implementation of some operations will not 
prevent them from absorbing the full allocation. However, it does not mean the managing authority is able to 
spend more than the overall allocation to the programme. 

29 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
the  resources  available  in  the  programme  under  certain  themes  in  order  to  make  sure 
that  problems  in  implementation  of  some  operations  will  not  prevent  them  from 
absorbing the full allocation to these themes.  

The opposite, where the expenditure is lower than the allocation may be due to the fact 
that  transport  projects  tend  to  be  complex  and  require  substantial  amount  of  time  for 
preparation  and  implementation.  By  consequence,  the  expenditure  related  to  such 
projects would be recorded relatively late in the programming period. However, the low 
level of expenditure in comparison to the allocation may be as well a signal of problems 
in  implementation  due  to  various  reasons  (for  example,  inadequate  project  pipeline  or 
insufficient administrative capacity). 

Table B.4 Comparison of cohesion policy transport allocations with expenditure 
(up to the end of 2014) 

Allocation (€ m) 

Expenditure (€ m) 

Absorption rate 

Poland 
Hungary 
Spain 
Greece 
Czech Republic 
Romania 
Italy 
Slovakia 
Germany 
Bulgaria 
Portugal 
Lithuania 
Latvia 
France 
Slovenia 
Cross Border8 
Estonia 
United Kingdom 
Sweden 
Malta 
Cyprus 
Croatia 
Ireland 
Belgium 
Finland 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Luxembourg 
Denmark 
Total 

25,656 
6,679 
8,226 
6,255 
7,822 
5,471 
4,184 
3,383 
3,150 
2,022 
1,713 
1,570 
1,141 
1,072 
946 
1,044 
692 
498 
77 
148 
81 
229 
84 
60 
40 
50 
6 
- 
- 
82,299 

20,897 
6,225 
8,642 
5,451 
5,881 
2,995 
2,856 
2,262 
2,588 
1,567 
1,610 
1,448 
1,009 
674 
631 
629 
612 
350 
134 
143 
103 
68 
81 
43 
67 
38 
1 
- 
- 
67,005 

81% 
93% 
105% 
87% 
75% 
55% 
68% 
67% 
82% 
77% 
94% 
92% 
88% 
63% 
67% 
60% 
88% 
70% 
174% 
97% 
127% 
30% 
96% 
72% 
168% 
76% 
17% 
- 
- 
81% 

Source:  Allocation  -  operational  programmes  in  the  version  adopted  by  the  end  of  2014;  Expenditure  -  Work 
Package 13 of the Ex-post Evaluation 

8 This covers European territorial cooperation programmes with transport allocation. 

30 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
If the data on transport allocation and expenditure until the end of 2014 are analysed by 
priority  theme  (Table  B.5),  a  marked  difference  between  road  and  rail  in  terms  of 
absorption  pace  becomes  visible.  The  biggest  share  of  cohesion  policy  transport 
allocation  went  to  TEN-T  motorways  and  TEN-T  railways  -  €19,874  m  and  €17,560  m. 
However,  the  expenditure  by  the  end  of  2014  represented  91%  of  the  allocation  under 
the former and 69% under the latter. A similar difference is apparent when allocation and 
expenditure  for  all  road  and  rail  related  priority  themes  are  compared  –  93%  for  road 
and 68% for rail. 

Some  stakeholders  interviewed  for  case  studies  maintained  that  road  investments  were 
relatively  easier  to  implement  than  rail  projects,  also  because  in  many  cases  the  latter 
focused  on  upgrading  existing  lines.  However,  it  may  as  well  be  due  to  the  insufficient 
capacity of beneficiaries to implement the projects, which according to the  stakeholders 
interviewed  for  this  evaluation  was  the  case  in  Poland  and  Romania,  where  the  ratio 
between expenditure and allocation for rail by the end of 2014 was – respectively – 44% 
and 37%. 

Table  B.5  Comparison  of  cohesion  policy  transport  allocation  with  expenditure 
to the end of 2014 by priority theme 

Motorways (TEN-T) 
Railways (TEN-T) 
Regional/local roads 
National roads 
Promotion of clean urban transport 
Railways 
Motorways 
Ports 
Urban transport 
Multimodal transport 
Airports 
Intelligent transport systems 
Mobile rail assets 
Cycle tracks 
Multimodal transport (TEN-T) 
Inland waterways (TEN-T) 
Mobile rail assets (TEN-T) 
Inland waterways (regional and local) 
Total 

Allocation 
(€ m) 

19,874 
17,560 
10,997 
6,743 
5,990 
4,706 
4,484 
3,170 
2,102 
1,612 
1,484 
956 
900 
664 
316 
282 
266 
195 
82,299 

Expenditure 
(€ m) 
18,108 
12,105 
10,414 
6,235 
4,364 
3,024 
4,238 
2,353 
1,445 
1,436 
1,215 
338 
653 
457 
59 
216 
218 
129 
67,005 

Absorption 
rate 
91% 
69% 
95% 
92% 
73% 
64% 
95% 
74% 
69% 
89% 
82% 
35% 
73% 
69% 
19% 
77% 
82% 
66% 
81% 

Source:  Allocation  -  operational  programmes  in  the  version  adopted  by  the  end  of  2014;  Expenditure  -  Work 
Package 13 of the Ex-post Evaluation 

B3 

Contribution of cohesion policy to EU wide transport networks 

Within  the  EU,  Member  States  retained  the  primary  responsibility  for  the  planning  and 
provision of transport networks. This  entails a risk that the transport  network  of the  EU 
will  be  developed  as  a  set  of  individual  national  networks  rather  than  as  an  integrated 
system that meets the needs of the whole EU in an optimal way. The EU plays a leading 

31 

 
 
 
 
  
 
role in ensuring that this does not happen, engaging with Member States to jointly plan a 
pan-European transport network for their mutual benefit.  

The  main  instrument  to  achieve  this  objective  is  the  Trans-European  Networks  – 
Transport (“TEN-T”) policy, based on article 170 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European  Union.  The  EU  legislation9  defines  network  of  trans-European  transport 
corridors  that  has  been  agreed  by  the  Commission  and  Member  States  in  order  to 
support  achievement  of  fully  functioning  internal  market  and  economic  and  territorial 
cohesion  between  the  various  parts  of  the  EU.  During  the  2007-2013  programming 
period, in addition to cohesion policy resources, the TEN-T programme with total budget 
of some €8 bn was in place to provide funding for TEN-T investments. For the 2014-2020 
programming  period  “Connecting  Europe  Facility”  has  been  established  with  a  total 
budget of €26 bn (including €10 bn from the Cohesion Fund).  

The  TEN-T  has  been  planned  on  two  layers,  a  comprehensive  network  and  a  core 
network.  The  comprehensive  network  is  a  relatively  high  density  network  which  is 
designed  to  provide  all  the  regions  of  the  EU  with  the  accessibility  they  need.  The  core 
network  is  a  subset  of  the  comprehensive  network  which  is  of  particularly  high  priority 
due  to  the  volume  of  transport  needs  that  it  meets.  Table  B.6  summarises  the  scale  of 
the TEN-T as defined in 2013. TEN-T infrastructure receiving cohesion policy input during 
the 2007-2013 programming period is relevant to the TEN-T as it was defined in 2013. 

Table B.6 Scale of TEN-T  

Railway Lines 

Roads 

Inland Waterways 

Source: ec.europa.eu  

Comprehensive 
(km) 
138,072 

136,706 

23,506 

Core 
(km) 
50,762 

34,401 

12,880 

Cohesion policy financial input to the TEN-T 
The  TEN-T  represents  the  agreed  priorities  of  the  Commission  and  Member  States  for 
completion  of  EU  wide  transport  networks.  Cohesion  policy  supports  this  objective  by 
providing funding for the TEN-T infrastructure. 

During  2007-2013  programming  period,  a  significant  share  of  cohesion  policy  resources 
for  transport  were  allocated  to  the  TEN-T.  As  demonstrated  in  Figure  B.1  below,  at  the 
end of 2014, TEN-T represented 46.5% (€38.3 bn) of the total cohesion policy allocation 
on transport (€82.3 bn). 

Member  States  clearly  prioritised  TEN-T  motorways  and  TEN-T  railways  allocating  – 
respectively  -  24%  (€  19.9  bn)  and  21%  (€  17.6  bn)  of  cohesion  policy  transport 
resources  to  these  two  themes.  As  a  result,  TEN-T  infrastructure  accounted  for  a 
significant share of the road and railroad infrastructure constructed with financial support 
from  cohesion  policy.  On  the  other  hand,  the  allocation  for  remaining  TEN-T  related 
themes  –  inland  waterways,  mobile  rail  assets  and  multimodal  transport  –  was  much 
smaller and they all received less than € 0.9 bn between them. 

9 The most recently adopted legal basis for  is Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013 of the European Parliament and 
Council  of  11  December  2013  on  Union  guidelines  for  the  development  of  the  trans-European  transport 
network.  OJ  L  348/1  of  20.12.2013.  The  legal  basis  for  the  Connecting  Europe  Fund  is  Regulation  (EU)  No 
1316/2013 of the European Parliament and Council of 11 December 2013 establishing the Connecting Europe 
facility. OJ L 348/129 of 20.12.2013 

32 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure B.1 Total transport allocation by theme in € m and % of total (2014) 

Source: operational programmes in the version adopted by the end of 2014 

Not  only  the  resources  set  aside  for  TEN-T  represented  a  major  part  of  cohesion  policy 
allocation  for  transport,  but  they  also  played  a  significant  role  in  delivering  TEN-T 
infrastructure in a number of Member States. The reports on the progress in completing 
of  30  TEN-T  priority  projects,  shows  that  by  the  end  of  2012  approximately  80%  of 
financing to fulfil this objective in Bulgaria, 65% in Czech Republic and 60% in Romania 
came  from  the  cohesion  policy.10  On  the  other  hand,  as  demonstrated  in  Figure  BN.2 
below,  in  Spain,  Portugal  and  Germany  cohesion  policy  played  no  role  in  funding  these 
TEN-T projects.  

Therefore,  the  cohesion  policy  seems  to  play  much  bigger  role  in  financing  transport 
infrastructure in Member States, which joined EU in or after 2004, and despite significant 
needs in this area may have fewer resources to meet them, than in the Member States, 
which were the part of the EU before that date.  

10 For each Member State, 100% refers to that Member State’s spending. Value of spending in each Member 
State varies widely. 

33 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
 
Figure B.2 Sources of total funding for TEN-T Priority Projects to 2012 

` 

Source: TENtec Database  

Cohesion policy outputs11 
The level of financial support is one measure of cohesion policy contribution to transport. 
Another may be the outputs delivered with this contribution. The high share of cohesion 
policy transport allocation going to the TEN-T (46.5%) in turn led to TEN-T infrastructure 
accounting for a significant share of the output of cohesion policy in the field of transport. 
Of the 3,875 km of new roads constructed with the support of cohesion policy funding by 
the  end  of  2013,  1,817  km  or  47%  were  new  TEN-T  roads  (Table  B.7).  All  new  roads 
delivered  in  Bulgaria,  Greece  and  Cyprus  using  cohesion  policy  funding  were  located  on 
the TEN-T. Furthermore, eight Member States had over 50% of new roads located on the 
TEN-T.  However,  three  Member  States  (Estonia,  France  and  Sweden),  which  reported 
kilometres of new roads by the end of 2013, did not use the core indicator to report any 
of these new kilometres as part of TEN-T.  

11 All information on cohesion policy outputs in the First Interim Report of this study relied on data reported by 
Member  States  in  the  Annual  Implementation  Reports  submitted  in  2014.  These  data  were  collected  and 
reviewed  in  the  framework  of  Work  Package  0  of  this  ex  post  evaluation.  The  database  of  output  indicators 
prepared in Work Package 0 is available at http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/evaluations/ec/2007-
2013/#1. However, for this report, the output data has been reviewed to take into account any possible self-
correction of reporting or precisions provided by the member States since the submission of the First Interim 
Report. 

34 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Table  B.7  New  roads  co-funded  by  cohesion  policy  2007-2013  (achievement 
reported by the end of 2013) 

Member State 

New roads (km) 

Of which, new TEN-
T roads (km)12 

New TEN-T 
roads/new roads 
(%) 

Bulgaria 
Greece 
Cyprus 
Slovenia 
Romania 
Slovakia 
Poland 
United Kingdom 
Portugal 
Czech Republic  
Spain 
Hungary 
Germany 
Italy 
Latvia 
Estonia 
France 
Sweden 
Total 
Source: Database from Work Package 0, AECOM/KPMG calculations 

141 
88 
3 
55 
162 
72 
1,595 
12 
290 
293 
279 
443 
274 
61 
0 
70 
28 
9 
3,875 

141 
88 
3 
52 
140 
39 
834 
6 
137 
103 
88 
114 
71 
0 
0 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
1,817 

100 
100 
100 
95 
86 
54 
52 
50 
47 
35 
32 
26 
26 
0 
0 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
47 

The  length  of  reconstructed  roads  may  be  another  indication  of  the  contribution  of 
cohesion  policy  funding  to  transport  networks.  Table  B.8  shows  the  length  of 
reconstructed  roads  delivered  using  cohesion  policy  co-financing.  By  the  end  of  2013, 
Poland’s  recorded  output,  at  6,550  km,  was  more  than  double  of  the  second  highest 
reported  achievement  –  almost  2,700  km  in  Portugal.  A  number  of  Member  States  with 
access to significant resources  of their own, and with  well-developed road networks, for 
example  the  United  Kingdom  and  Sweden,  reconstructed  only  small  or  negligible 
amounts of roads with cohesion policy funding. 

12  By  the  end  of  2013  Economic  Growth  OP  (2007LT161PO002)  reported  1,473.44  km  of  roads  under  the 
indicator identified by WP0 of this evaluation as equivalent to core indicator 13a (km of new or reconstructed 
roads).  Since  it  is  not  possible  to  define  precisely,  which  part  of  this  achievement  concerns  new  and which  – 
reconstructed roads, all the achievement is included in Table B.8, however, it is important to note that 307,82 
km of these roads were part of TEN-T. 

35 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
Table  B.8  Reconstructed  roads  co-funded  by  cohesion  policy  2007-2013 
(achievement reported by the end of 2013) 

Achieved km 

Member State  
Poland 
Portugal 
Hungary 
Spain 
Czech Republic 
Lithuania 
Romania 
Slovakia 
Germany 
Cross Border14 
Bulgaria 
Greece 
Latvia 
Estonia 
Italy 
Ireland 
Sweden 
Malta 
United Kingdom 
Slovenia 
Cyprus 
Total 
Source: Database from Work Package 0, AECOM/KPMG calculations 

Km per m of population13 
172.3 
258.2 
226.5 
36.1 
158.4 
500.6 
72.0 
253.7 
9.2 
n/a 
100.7 
63,1 
273.8 
155.8 
2.8 
7.2 
1.5 
26.8 
0.2 
2.0 
4.0 
n/a 

6,550 
2,692 
2,237 
1,681 
1,665 
1,473 
1,437 
1,374 
747 
741 
730 
690 
548 
205 
168 
33 
14 
11 
10 
4 
3 
23,014 

A further measure of contribution presented in Table B.8 is the km of reconstructed road 
per million head of population, i.e. the relative output per Member State size. The highest 
per  capita  achievements  for  kilometres  of  reconstructed  roads  were  recorded  in 
Lithuania, Latvia and Portugal. 

The  same  metrics  can  be  used  for  railroads  to  show  the  contribution  of  cohesion  policy 
funding. Of the 3,405 km of new or reconstructed railroad delivered by the end of 2013 
with the cohesion policy co-funding, 1,661 km or 49% were TEN-T railroads (Table B.9). 
Three  Member  States  (Slovenia,  Slovakia  and  Romania)  had  100%  of  new  or 
reconstructed  railroad  delivered  on  the  TEN-T,  and  seven  Member  States  had  the 
majority  of  new  railroad  on  the  TEN-T.  Latvia,  Spain  and  United  Kingdom  reported  no 
new or reconstructed railroad on the TEN-T, even though in the case of Spain substantial 
amounts were set aside for that area. No achievement reported by the end of 2013 may 
therefore be due to the fact that rail projects were not yet fully completed by that time. 
Programmes  in  two  other  Member  States  (Sweden  and  Croatia),  as  well  as  European 
territorial  cooperation  programmes,  which  used  core  indicators  on  new  or  reconstructed 
railroads, did not use the core indicator to report any of these kilometres as part of TEN-
T.  

13 Population data is sourced from Eurostat, demographic statistics, last updated in March 2016 and extracted 
on 21/04/2016. The population data is as at 1 January 2014. 
14 This covers European territorial cooperation programmes with transport allocation. 

36 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
Table  B.9  Railroad  funded  by  cohesion  policy  2007-2013  (achievement  to  the 
end of 2013) 

Member State 

New or 
reconstructed 
railroad (km) 
73 
62 
22 
40 
181 
301 
981 
392 
74 
334 
296 
446 
199 
1 
0 
0 
3 
0 
0 
3,405 

Slovenia 
Slovakia 
Romania 
Lithuania 
Bulgaria 
Czech Republic 
Italy 
Germany 
Greece 
Poland 
Portugal 
France 
Hungary 
Spain 
Latvia 
United Kingdom 
Sweden 
Croatia 
Cross Border15 
Total 
Source: Database from Work Package 0, AECOM/KPMG calculations 

Of which, new or 
reconstructed TEN-T 
railroad (km) 
73 
62 
22 
38 
164 
234 
728 
130 
17 
71 
47 
57 
20 
- 
0 
0 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
1,661 

TEN-T railroads 
as a % of all 
railroads 
100 
100 
100 
95 
91 
78 
74 
33 
24 
21 
16 
13 
10 
0 
0 
0 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
49 

In  addition  to  the  above  data  on  total  outputs  of  road  and  railroad,  this  study  has 
identified  the  road  and  railroad  major  projects  funded  by  cohesion  policy,  which  were 
operational  by  the  end  of  2014.  Displaying  them  on  the  map,  which  identifies  their 
relation  to  the  TEN-T,  provides  a  strong  visual  indication  of  the  intent  of  Convergence 
Member  States  to  invest  in  the  development  of  TEN-T.  These  maps  are  large  scale  and 
are available in annex to this report. 

Member State stakeholders were unanimous in their opinion that  cohesion policy funded 
projects  contributed  to  the  TEN-T.  Understandably  this  was  normally  expressed  as  a 
positive  contribution  to  links  between  the  Member  State  in  question  and  the  wider  EU. 
Again stakeholders were able to support these opinions with concrete examples.  

There were some nuances to this consensus view, which may highlight issues of general 
interest. In France and Germany, where  cohesion policy funding corresponded to a very 
small  part  of  transport  spending,  the  stakeholders  found  it  more  difficult  to  identify  the 
effects  of  cohesion  policy  funding.  In  the  case  of  Italy,  cohesion  policy  funding  was 
mostly confined to specific regions which did not adjoin the rest of the EU, so it was more 
difficult  for  stakeholders  to  assess  a  contribution  to  TEN-T.  Greek  stakeholders  were 
confident that the projects selected for funding would contribute to Greek and the TEN-T 
when they were complete but highlighted that they experienced overly complex selection 
processes and delays in the implementation of projects. The particularly harsh impact of 

15 This covers European territorial cooperation programmes with transport allocation. 

37 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
the  financial  crisis  on  Greece  had  limited  the  availability  of  government  funding  to  co-
finance projects.  

Hungarian  stakeholders  felt  that  the  emphasis  placed  on  TEN-T  projects  led  to  an  over 
concentration on the Trans-European Transport network and a relative neglect of projects 
to  improve  connectivity  within  Hungary  and  between  the  less  developed  regions  of 
Hungary and the wider EU. Conversely other, smaller, Member States  such as Lithuania 
regarded TEN-T projects as contributing directly to their own development by improving 
links with the rest of the EU. This difference in perspectives may simply be a function of 
the size of the Member State in question. Where a Member State is relatively small, such 
as Lithuania, a TEN-T corridor that passes through the Member State will offer improved 
connectivity  to  much  of  the  territory  of  the  Member  State  in  question.  Conversely  in  a 
large  Member  State,  such  as  Poland,  a  TEN-T  corridor  will  only  provide  connectivity  to 
the relatively small portion of the Member State that is adjacent to the TEN-T corridor in 
question.  Polish  stakeholders  even  raised  the  possibility  that  TEN-T  investments  would 
contribute to development of the areas that they serve by connecting them to the wider 
EU,  but  could  actually  reduce  cohesion  within  Poland  by  worsening  the  relative 
disadvantage  of  more  remote  areas.  There  is  no  indication  that  this  has  actually 
occurred,  but  the  possibility  illustrates  the  complexity  of  devising  transport  investment 
programmes. 

These contributions to transport needs took place in a rapidly changing environment for 
the formation of transport policy. The First Interim Report identified and described some 
of the key current themes such as: 

  The  ongoing  urgent  need  to  reduce  transport-based  emissions,  through  the 

promotion of rail and urban public transport; 

 

Improvements in rail technology, with certain Member States, notably Spain, 
using cohesion policy funding to support the development of a high speed rail 
network; 

  The economic crisis of 2008 and following years, where those Member States 
in receipt of high rates of cohesion policy support, the availability of cohesion 
policy  funding  allowed  transport  investment  to  continue  and  cushioned 
against some of the effects of the crisis on transport investment; 

  Developing EU transport policy and regulation; and, 

  Market developments such as the spread of low cost air carriers. 

The  case  studies  of  Member  States  set  out  in  the  Second  Interim  Report  illustrate  how 
these  trends  have  been  reflected  in  the  use  of  cohesion  policy  funding  in  different 
Member  States.  These  show  that  cohesion  policy  funding  has  been  flexible  enough  to 
adapt to a changing and varied environment in Member States. 

Contribution  of  cohesion  policy  to  Member  State  transport 

B4 
networks 

Cohesion  policy  funding  has  also  made  a  significant  contribution  to  the  transport 
networks in individual Member States.  Task 1b of this evaluation  examined in detail  the 
provision of infrastructure in a set of 15 Member States, selected to be illustrative of the 
wider  population  of  28  Member  States.  A  comparison  made  between  the  total  spending 

38 

 
 
 
 
 
on  transport  infrastructure  and  the  cohesion  policy  allocation  to  transport  in  these 
Member  States  during  the  2007-2013  programming  period  suggested  that  cohesion 
policy could have played an important role in the provision of transport infrastructure in 
some  Member  States,  which  joined  EU  after  2004  (Section  C.2.1  of  the  1st  Interim 
Report). 

Availability of data on actual  cohesion policy  expenditure up to the end of  2014, for the 
2007-2013  programming  period,  made  it  possible  to  verify  to  what  extent  the  cohesion 
policy  resources  contributed  to  the  Member  State  spending  on  transport,  confirming 
broadly the findings of  Task 1b. This observation is further reinforced by comparing the 
amount of infrastructure provided with co-funding from cohesion policy to the total stock 
of  infrastructure  in  each  Member  State,  and  to  the  net  change  in  the  stock  of 
infrastructure in each Member State during the 2007-2013 programming period. 

Cohesion policy funding contribution 

The total spending on transport infrastructure from all funding sources in the 15 Member 
States  during  the  2007-2013  programming  period  amounted  to  €494  bn  (Table  B.10). 
Cohesion  policy  spending  on  transport  for  this  programming  period  amounted  to  €52.2 
bn, or 11% of total spending16. 

On average 81% of the funding decided for transport themes in operational programmes 
had actually been spent in Member  States at the end of 2014 (Table  B.5). A number  of 
Member  States  showed  absorption  rates  significantly  above  or  below  this  average,  as 
discussed  in  Section  B2.  Amongst  Member  States  with  large  decided  amounts  for 
transport  (>€5  b)  Spain  had  absorbed  all  of  this  funding  while  Romania  had  only 
absorbed 55%. 

Table  B.10  Total  transport  investment  and  cohesion  policy  expenditure  2007-
2013 programming period 

Member State 

Lithuania 
Hungary 
Slovakia 

CP/total % 

Cohesion policy 
expenditure (€ m) 
1,225 
3,937 
1,725 

Total investment 
(€ m) 
2,253 
8,098 
3,810 
1,594 
49,976 
3,732 
18,679 
21,512 
2,351 
14,068 
19,735 
96,040 
67,587 
91,990 
92,647 
494,072 

Estonia 
Poland 
Bulgaria 
Greece 
Czech Republic 
Slovenia 
Portugal 
Romania 
Spain 
Italy 
Germany 
France 
Total 
Source: Total investment from Eurostat, ITF data, AECOM/KPMG estimates as described in First Interim Report. 
cohesion policy expenditure from Work Package 13. 

559 
16,838 
1,157 
4,717 
5,239 
450 
1,460 
1,933 
8,116 
2,121 
2,192 
545 
52,214 

16  These  spending  values  are  taken  from  the  data  on  cohesion  policy  expenditures  by  the  end  of  2013  as 
presented 
is  available  at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/evaluations/ec/2007-2013/#1  

the  Ex-post  Evaluation.  The  data 

in  Work  Package  13  of 

39 

54 
49 
45 
35 
34 
31 
25 
24 
19 
10 
10 
8 
3 
2 
1 
11 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
This  relationship  between  cohesion  policy  expenditure  and  total  spending in  each  of  the 
15  Member  States  is  presented  in  Figure  B.3.  This  highlights  that,  as  well  as  playing  a 
material  role  in  the  funding  of  new  transport  infrastructure  in  the  EU  as  a  whole, 
cohesion  policy  was  an  important  source  of  funding  for  transport  infrastructure  in  a 
number  of  Convergence  Member  States;  Lithuania  (54%),  Hungary  (49%),  Slovakia 
(45%),  Estonia  (35%)  and  Poland  (34%)  had  the  highest  proportion  of  cohesion  policy 
expenditure in comparison to the total spending on transport between 2007 and 2013. 

Conversely, the financial contribution of  cohesion policy was low in Member States such 
as France (1%), Germany (2%), Italy (3%) and Spain (8%), which had the four highest 
levels  of  total  investment  (ranging  from  between  €67  bn  to  €96  bn).  The  low  share  of 
cohesion  policy  transport  expenditure  reflected  the  minor  role  it  played  in  supporting 
infrastructure investment, partly  reflecting the range  of funding sources available within 
these  Member  States;  this  finding  appears  to  match  the  information  on  the  role  of 
cohesion  policy  in  the  development  of  30  TEN-T  priority  projects  (Figure  B.2)  which 
highlighted the strength of national funding, for example, in Germany and Spain. 

Figure B.3 Incidence of cohesion policy funding (2013) 

Source: AECOM/KPMG graph 
The breakdown of cohesion policy expenditure on transport in these 15 Member States is 
summarised in Table B.11. By the end of 2014, expenditure on road and rail account for 
82.6%  of  the  total  cohesion  policy  expenditure  on  transport.  While  this  broadly 
corresponds to the share of allocation for road and rail in these Member States  – 85% - 
the  difference  in  the  pace  of  absorption  between  road  and  rail  is  also  visible  here, 
because  while  allocation  to  road  represents  55%  of  the  transport  allocation,  the  related 
expenditure  makes  58.3%  of  the  total  transport  expenditure,  and  the  allocation  to  rail 
represents  30%,  but  the  related  expenditure  makes  24.3%  of  the  total  transport 
expenditure.  

40 

 
 
 
 
 
Table B.11 Cohesion  policy expenditure on transport  in  15 Member  States  until 
the end of 2014 
Description 

Amount € m  % of total 

Motorways 
Motorways (TEN-T) 
National Roads 
Regional/local Roads 
Total Road 

Railways 
Railways (TEN-T) 
Mobile Rail Assets 
Mobile Rail Assets (TEN-T) 
Total Rail 

Airports 
Cycle Tracks 
Inland Waterways 
Inland Waterways (TEN-T) 
Intelligent Transport Systems 
Multimodal Transport 
Multimodal Transport (TEN-T) 
Ports 
Clean Urban Transport 
Urban Transport 
Total “Other” 

3,849 
17,571 
6,172 
9,941 
37,533 

2,878 
11,864 
645 
218 
15,605 

1,137 
351 
113 
210 
304 
1,270 
57 
2,117 
4,264 
1,381 
11,204 

Total 
Source: Work Package 13 of the Ex-post Evaluation 

          64,342  

6.0% 
27.3% 
9.6% 
15.5% 
58.3% 

4.5% 
18.4% 
1.0% 
0.3% 
24.3% 

1.8% 
0.5% 
0.2% 
0.3% 
0.5% 
2.0% 
0.1% 
3.3% 
6.6% 
2.1% 
17.4% 

100% 

The  stakeholders  consulted  in  Member  States17  were  of  the  opinion  that  the  transport 
sectors  supported  during  the  cohesion  policy  2007-2013  programming  period  were  the 
right  ones,  and  that  the  cohesion  policy  co-funding  had  been  central  to  Member  State 
investment during this period. 

Contribution to transport networks18 
Comparing the transport infrastructure provided with co-financing from cohesion policy to 
the  stock  of  infrastructure  in  Member  States,  and  particularly  to  the  change  in 
infrastructure  over  the  2007-2013  programming  period  confirms  the  strong  contribution 
made by cohesion policy to transport.  

Table B.12 compares the size of principal road network19 in 15 Member States examined 
in  detail  for  this  study  with  the  outputs  delivered  with  the  cohesion  policy  support,  as 

17 Stakeholders were consulted in 15 Member States included in Task 1b. Further interviews took place in 6 of 
these Member States as part of the preparation of Member State case studies in Task 5. 
18 All information on cohesion policy outputs in this section are based on the same sources as in Section B.3. 
19  This  covers  motorways  and  state  roads  outside  of  built  areas,  as  reported  in  EUROSTAT  database.  In  the 
absence of 2013 data, 2012 information was used for motorways (BG, CZ, ES, FR, IT, LT, HU, PT and SK) and 

41 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
reported  by  the  end  of  2013.  The  length  of  new  roads  part  funded  by  cohesion  policy 
across the 15 Member States amounted to 3,851 km, which is equal to slightly over 1% 
of  the  total  stock  of  principal  roads  in  these  Member  States  at  the  end  of  2013.  In 
addition, cohesion policy co-funding has been used to reconstruct a further 21,653 km of 
roads, what equals more than 7% of the principal road network in the 15 Member States. 
Cohesion policy has therefore played a material role in providing and reconstructing road 
infrastructure in certain Member States. Cohesion policy funding in Poland, Slovakia and 
Portugal  supported  the  construction  or  renewal  of  roads  equivalent  to  39%,  36%  and 
31% respectively of the principal roads in these Member States.  

Table  B.12  Roads:  cohesion  policy  contribution  compared  to  the  size  of  the 
network in 2013 

Member 
State 

Principal road 
network 2013 
(km) 

New roads co-
funded by 
cohesion policy 
(km) 

Reconstructed 
roads co-funded 
by cohesion policy 
(km) 

Roads benefitting 
from cohesion 
policy support / 
length of principal 
road network 

293 

28% 

7,001 

1,665 

39% 
36% 
31% 

1,595 
72 
290 

6,550 
1,374 
2,692 

20,768 
3,965 
9,493 

Poland 
Slovakia 
Portugal 
Czech 
Republic 
Lithuania 
Romania 
Hungary 
Greece 
Spain 
Bulgaria 
Germany 
Estonia 
Slovenia 
Italy 
France 
Total 
Source: Eurostat database for total road network (includes Motorways, National Roads and “main” local roads) 
Database from Work Package 0, AECOM/KPMG calculations for the cohesion policy outputs 

22% 
9% 
8% 
7% 
7% 
4% 
2% 
2% 
1% 
1% 
Less than 1% 
9% 

6,675 
17,754 
31,692 
10,958 
29,811 
19,602 
52,306 
16,630 
6,724 
26,587 
21,249 
281,215 

1,473 
1,437 
2,237 
690 
1,681 
730 
747 
205 
4 
168 
- 
21,653 

-20 
162 
443 
88 
279 
141 
274 
70 
55 
61 
28 
3,851 

Motorways,  both  TEN-T  and  outside  of  this  network,  were  allocated  30%  of  cohesion 
policy resources for transport in the 15 Member States examined in detail for this study 
and  60%  of  cohesion  policy  resources  for  roads,  suggesting  that  significant  portion  of 
roads either built or reconstructed could have been of motorway standard. 

The  stakeholders  interviewed  in  15  Member  States  confirmed  this,  maintaining  that 
cohesion policy funding for road projects is often used for major routes, particularly roads 
of  motorway  standard  (see  Box  1  for  an  example  major  project).  Therefore,  table  B.13 

state roads (BG, CZ, ES, FR, IT, HU and SK). Since no data were available for GR, and no data on state roads 
were available for LT and PT in EUROSTAT, the data on motorways and main or national roads by the end of 
2012 from the EU transport in figures Statistical Pocketbook 2015 were used instead. 
20  By  the  end  of  2013  Economic  Growth  OP  (2007LT161PO002)  reported  1,473.44  km  of  roads  under  the 
indicator identified by WP0 of this evaluation as equivalent to core indicator 13a (km of new or reconstructed 
roads).  Since  it  is  not  possible  to  define  precisely,  which  part  of  this  achievement  concerns  new  and which  – 
reconstructed roads, all the achievement is reported here as reconstructed. 

42 

 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
compares the length of new roads reported by the end of 2013 as built with the cohesion 
policy support with the total length of motorways in those 15 Member States. This shows 
a similar picture of cohesion policy co-funded roads being significant in the context of the 
total stock of motorways, and very significant in the context of the stock of motorways in 
the Convergence Member States.  

However, as the example of Poland, where the length of new roads reported by the end 
of  2013  is  bigger  than  the  length  of  motorway  network,  demonstrates  not  all  new 
infrastructures were necessarily of motorway standard. 

Table B.13 Motorways: cohesion policy contribution compared to the size of the 
network in 201321 

Member State 

Total motorway 
network 2013 
(km) 

New roads co-
funded by 
cohesion policy 
(km) 

Proportion of total 
motorway network 
benefitting from cohesion 
policy 

Poland 
Estonia 
Czech Republic 
Hungary 
Bulgaria 
Romania 
Slovakia 
Portugal 
Slovenia 
Greece 
Spain 
Germany 
Italy 
France 
Lithuania 
Total 
Source:  Eurostat  database  for  motorway  network  length;  Database  from  Work  Package  0,  AECOM/KPMG 
calculations for the cohesion policy outputs 

1,482 
140 
751 
1,516 
541 
644 
419 
2,988 
771 
1,659 
14,701 
12,917 
6,726 
11,465 
309 
57,027 

1,595 
70 
293 
443 
141 
162 
72 
290 
55 
88 
279 
274 
61 
28 
n/a 
3,851 

108% 
50% 
39% 
29% 
26% 
25% 
17% 
10% 
7% 
5% 
2% 
2% 
1% 
0% 
n/a 
7% 

21 Motorways, as reported in EUROSTAT database. In the absence of 2013 data, 2012 information was used for 
BG, CZ, ES, FR, IT, LT, HU, PT and SK. For GR data available for 2012 in the EU transport in figures Statistical 
Pocketbook 2015 were used instead. 

43 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
Box 1: Bulgaria: Trakia Motorway Bulgaria (Lots 2, 3 and 4) 

The  Trakia  Motorway  project  consists  of  116  km  of  two-lane  motorway  between  Stara 
Zagora  and  Karnobat  in  the  south  west  of  Bulgaria.  The  project  completes  the  Trakia 
Motorway  from  Sofia  to  the  Black  Sea  port  of  Burgas.  The  project  was  implemented  in 
three  sections  (Lots  2,  3  and  4)  with  each  section  progressing  independently  but  in 
parallel.  Construction  commenced  for  each  of  the  three  sections  between  June  and 
October 2010. Lots 2 and 3 opened in mid-2012 with Lot 4 opening in July 2013.  

Bulgaria has developed a General Transport Master Plan, which identifies and prioritises 
the  investment  needs  of  the  Bulgarian  transport  network.  The  development  of  this  plan 
included the analysis of the existing transport system, identification of weaknesses to  be 
overcome, forecasting of future transport demand, option identification and appraisal and 
identification of key transport priorities. The General Transport Master Plan identifies the 
completion  of  the  Trakia  Motorway,  from  Sofia  to  Burgas,  as  Bulgaria’s  highest  priority 
transport  investment  project.  In  addition  the  route  forms  part  of  the  Orient/East-Med 
Corridor of the TEN-T and therefore serves priority EU wide transport needs. 

This  study  also  looked  at  changes  in  the  stock  of  principal  roads  in  15  Member  States 
over  the  course  of  the  2007-2013  programming  period  and  compared  them  to  the 
cohesion  policy  outputs.  The  results  of  the  analysis  are  presented  in  table  B.14  below. 
While  it  suggests  that  in  general  and  for  selected  Member  States  the  cohesion  policy 
contribution was significant, these data have to be analysed with caution. 

For calculation of the change in road infrastructure the data on the length of motorways 
and  state  roads  were  used22.  In  all  Member  States  there  will  be  also  other  roads  not 
included in these figures. Therefore, a change in the classification of  a road may appear 

22 Data on the length of motorways and state roads outside of built areas by the end of 2007, as reported in 
EUROSTAT database were compared with data on the length of the same roads by the end of 2013 (EE, DE, PL, 
RO and SK) or by the end of 2012, where more recent data were no available for motorways (BG, CZ, ES, FR, 
IT, LT, HU, PT and SK) or state roads (BG, CZ, ES, FR, IT, HU and SK). Since no data were available for GR in 
EUROSTAT, the data from the EU transport in figures Statistical Pocketbook 2010 and 2015 were used instead. 
The data on state roads were not available for LT and PT in EUROSTAT database, therefore the data on main or 
national roads by the end of 2007 and 2012 from the  EU transport in figures Statistical Pocketbook 2010 and 
2015 were used instead. 

44 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
in this table as a decrease in the network length. Moreover, some of the roads reported 
as newly built could have been located outside of the motorway and state roads network. 
This may explain why the reported value for total road length actually decreased over the 
programming period or has not increased in step with the cohesion policy outputs. 

In Poland and Czech Republic, the length of roads built  with the cohesion policy support 
until  the  end  of  2013  is  bigger  than  the  increase  in  the  length  of  the  principal  road 
network, while the principal road network in Hungary and Germany actually decreased in 
length in the same period, when cohesion policy programmes reported new roads being 
built. 

The total road length in a Member State may change for a number of reasons other than 
the construction of new road, principally the reclassification of roads. The figures shown 
here  include  motorways,  national  roads  and  “main”  local  roads.  In  all  Member  States 
there  will  be  roads  outside  this  classification  not  included  in  these  figures.  Removing  a 
road  from  the  classification  of  “main  local  road”  will  lead  to  a  decrease  in  the  network 
length  shown  here.  In  a  number  of  Member  States  the  reported  value  for  total  road 
length actually decreased over the programming period or has not increased in step with 
the cohesion policy outputs due to this type of reclassification.  

Member 
State 

Table  B.14  Roads:  cohesion  policy  contribution  compared  to  the  change  in  the 
size of the principal network between 2007 and 2013 
New roads co-funded 
by cohesion policy 
(km) 

Change in road 
infrastructure 2007-
2013 (km) 

Co-funded new 
roads/change in road 
infrastructure (%) 
102% 
12% 
29% 
38% 
8% 
7% 
22% 
31% 
80% 
42% 

1,559 
1,355 
997 
742 
709 
430 
248 
235 
177 
165 

1,594 
162 
290 
279 
60 
28 
55 
72 
141 
70 

Poland 
Romania 
Portugal 
Spain 
Italy 
France 
Slovenia 
Slovakia 
Bulgaria 
Estonia 
Czech 
Republic 
Greece 
Hungary 
Germany 
Lithuania 
Total 
Source: Eurostat database for total road network (includes Motorways, National Roads and “main” local roads) 
Database from Work Package 0, AECOM/KPMG calculations for the cohesion policy outputs 

88 
443 
274 
n/a 
3,851 

-148 
-348 
-704 
-21 
5,549 

n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
69% 

191% 

292 

153 

Stakeholders  interviewed  for  the  Member  State  case  studies  maintained  that  rail 
networks  were  generally  stable  in  length,  and  investment  needs  were  more  likely  to 
relate  to  renewing  or  otherwise  upgrading  an existing  rail line  rather  than  to  expanding 
the network. However, stakeholders noted that the availability of cohesion policy funding 
encouraged  some  Member  States,  especially  Convergence  ones,  to  pursue  large  and 
complex projects, particularly in the rail sector. It was noted that such projects may not 
have  been  delivered  in  the  absence  of  cohesion  policy  funding.  The  significance  of 

45 

 
 
 
 
cohesion  policy  investment  in  railroad  can  be  gauged  by  comparing  the  outputs  of  rail 
projects co-funded by cohesion policy to the stock of rail infrastructure in Member States. 
Table B.15 summarises the data obtained in this study on the output of cohesion policy in 
the field of rail, and the extent of Member State railroad networks.  

Table  B.15  Railroads:  cohesion  policy  contribution  compared  to  the  size  of  the 
network in 2013 

Member 
State 

railway 
network 2013 
(km) 

cohesion 
policy new 
railroad (km) 

cohesion policy 
reconstructed 
railroad (km) 

rail network enhanced 
with cohesion policy 
assistance /rail 
network 

47 

9,469 

31 
17 
9 

249 
73 
951 
164 
74 

2,541 
1,209 
17,060 
4,070 
2,554 

11.63% 
6.01% 
5.75% 
4.45% 
3.23% 

Portugal 
Slovenia 
Italy 
Bulgaria 
Greece 
Czech 
Republic 
Hungary 
Lithuania 
Slovakia 
Poland 
France 
Germany 
Romania 
Spain 
Estonia23 
Total 
Source:  Eurostat  (France,  Romania  and  Spain)  and  UIC  for  railroad  network  (all  other  Member  States); 
Database from Work Package 0, AECOM/KPMG calculations for the cohesion policy outputs 

7,877 
1,767 
3,593 
19,617 
30,581 
33,509 
10,777 
15,922 
792 
161,338 

2.53% 
2.26% 
1.73% 
1.70% 
1.46% 
1.17% 
0.20% 
0.01% 
n/a 
2.11% 

179 
40 
62 
332 
446 
242 
22 
1 
n/a 
3,135 

n/a 
276 

3.18% 

150 

301 

20 

2 

In 12 out of the 15 Member States the length of railways built or reconstructed with the 
cohesion policy support by the end of 2013 was perceptible when compared to the overall 
size of the railway network. For 9 of them these outputs amounted to an enhancement of 
between 1.17% and 4.45% of the existing rail network, while 3 Member States (Portugal, 
Slovenia  and  Italy)  reported  levels  of  cohesion  policy  output  of  railroad  of  between 
5.75% and 11.63%  of  their existing network.  While these figures suggest that cohesion 
policy  contribution  to  the  development  of  railway  network  was  noticeable,  it  has  to  be 
remembered  as  well  that  reconstruction  of  railways  may  entail  different  investments, 
such  as  electrification  or  upgrading  of  signalling.  A  certain  measure  of  double  counting, 
where  one  section  of  railway  was  subject  to  more  than  one  reconstruction  project,  may 
not be excluded. 

Spain  has  invested  significantly  in  its  high  speed  rail  network,  and  has  done  so  with 
substantial  support  from  cohesion  policy  (it  had  the  second  highest  cohesion  policy 
allocation  for  rail  of  €4.1  bn).  These  investments  and  the  support  from  cohesion  policy 
are  described  in  more  detail  in  the  case  study  prepared  on  Spain,  and  the  project  case 

23  Estonian  programme  supporting  rail  projects  did  not  include  any  indicator  on  length  of  the  railroad 
enhanced. 

46 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
study on a high speed rail major project in Spain24. The output of these investments had 
yet  to  be  reported  when  the  data  above  was  compiled,  so  this  contribution  by  cohesion 
policy  to  the  Spanish  rail  network  is  not  visible  in  Table  B.15.  However,  an  example  of 
the infrastructure delivered in Germany is presented in Box 2. 

Box 2: Germany: Leipzig City Rail Tunnel (Modules 5 and 6) 

The  Leipzig  City  Rail  Tunnel  provides  an  underground  link  between  the  two  main  rail 
stations  and  enhanced  city-centre  access  in  Leipzig.  In  total  four  underground  stations 
are  provided  along  the  5.3  km  scheme.  The  Rail  Tunnel  opened  in  December  2013,  six 
months ahead of the schedule included in the 2009 project application for modules 5 and 
6. The cost is expected to be in line with the forecast cost of €149.3 m. 

. 

The  Leipzig  City  Rail  Tunnel  was  supported  in  federal,  state  and  local  transportation 
policies.  The  project  was  included  in  both  the  state  transport  plan  for  the  Free  State  of 
Saxony and the local transport plan for the city of Leipzig. On the one year anniversary 
of the opening of the tunnel Deutsche Bahn and ZVNL (Leipzig transport administration) 
announced that 55,000 passengers a day were using the tunnel in line with the forecasts 
made  during  the  development  of  the  project.  They  stated  that  is  was  an  indispensable 
element  of  the  transport  infrastructure  of  west  Saxony,  reflected  by  this  high  level  of 
patronage. 

It  is  also  relevant  to  compare  the  cohesion  policy  outputs  in  terms  of  new  and 
reconstructed  railroad with  the  changes  in  the  total  rail  network  of  Member  States  over 
the  2007-2013  programming  period.  Table  B.16  shows  that  overall  rail  networks  have 
remained  relatively  stable  in  size.  Some  Member  States  recorded  marginal  increases  as 
networks were expanded or sections of rail were brought into service  (France,  Italy and 
Spain)  and  some  marginal  decreases  as  networks  were  reviewed  and  small  sections  or 
sidings were retired (Estonia, Bulgaria and Portugal). Overall, the total length of network 
in the 15 Member States considered increased by 617 km or 0.4%.  This may reflect the 

24 See Second Interim Report 

47 

 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                           
fact  that  rail  networks  have  reached  a  stable  scope,  and  that  the  bulk  of  investment 
involves the renewal or upgrading of existing rail routes. 

Table  B.16  Railroads:  cohesion  policy  contribution  compared  to  changes  in  the 
size of networks 2007-2013 

Member 
State 

Railroad 
network 2013 
(km) 

Change in size of 
railroad network 
2007-2013 

% Change in 
size of railroad 
network 

cohesion policy 
new railroad (km) 

(A) 

(B) 

(B)/(A) 

(C) 

30 

2 
9 

663 
393 
368 
198 
3 
1 
0 
-19 
-24 
-31 
-65 
-73 

30,581 
17,060 
15,922 
19,617 
2,554 
1,767 
10,777 
1,209 
792 
3,593 
7,877 
4,070 

France 
Italy 
Spain 
Poland 
Greece 
Lithuania 
Romania 
Slovenia 
Estonia 
Slovakia 
Hungary 
Bulgaria 
Czech 
Republic 
Portugal 
-297 
Germany 
-381 
617 
Total 
Source:  Eurostat  France,  Romania  and  Spain)  and  UIC  for  railroad  network  (all  other  Member  States); 
Database from Work Package 0, AECOM/KPMG calculations for the cohesion policy outputs 

2.2% 
2.3% 
2.3% 
1.0% 
0.1% 
0.1% 
0.0% 
-1.6% 
-3.0% 
-0.9% 
-0.8% 
-1.8% 

2,541 
33,509 
161,338 

-11.7% 
-1.1% 
0.4% 

47 
150 
276 

20 
17 

-1.3% 

9,469 

-119 

As  outlined  in  Table  B.2  the  cohesion  policy  allocation  for  other  transport  infrastructure 
was smaller than for road or railway, with majority of resources in this category being set 
aside for urban transport.  

There were no core indicators for transport interventions outside of road and rail sectors, 
making  it  impossible  to  aggregate  the  information  on  outputs  across  Member  States. 
However,  some  operational  programmes  did  report  achievement  for  urban  transport  or 
ports using programme specific output indicators, which are recalled below as illustration.   

With  respect  to  urban  transport  /  clean  urban  transport,  over  500  new  public  transport 
vehicles  (specific  types  not  specified)  were  purchased  and  39  transport  interchanges 
were  built  or  improved  using  cohesion  policy  co-financing  in  the  Czech  Republic.  In 
Poland, 890 new units of railway rolling stock and a range of new ITS related information 
systems  purchased.  In  the  Czech  Republic,  at  least  2.1  m  inhabitants  benefitted  from 
improved public transport as a result of these investments25. Poland reported an increase 
of at least 18% in the population using modernised public transport26. However, it should 
be  noted  that  the  evaluation  has  not  been  able  to  verify  this  data  or  the  links  between 
reported  investment,  physical  outputs  or  passenger  demand.  Furthermore,  operational 

25 This indicator was reported for the “Central Moravia” operational programme. 
26 This indicator was reported for Polish regional operational programme for Swietokrzyskie. 

48 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
programmes  in  Greece  and  Bulgaria  reported  that  16  new  metro  stations  had  been 
delivered in the 2007-2013 programming period. 

With respect to the €2,117 m expenditure in ports across the 15 Member States, specific 
upgrades of 18 ports were reported by Romania, Greece, Portugal and Italy. In addition 
France and Lithuania reported increase in the carriage of freight by sea.  

Evidence  of  the  contribution  of  cohesion  policy  to  enhancing  air  transport  facilities  and 
network  was  derived  from  the  Poland  Member  State  case  study.  Polish  airports  could 
apply  for  EU  funding  from  2007  and  since  this  time  the  total  amounts  decided  for 
projects  exceeded  €443  m.  Cohesion  policy  co-financing  supported  enhancements  to 
twelve  airports,  including  Warsaw,  Gdańsk,  Wrocław,  with  the  objective  of  increasing 
capacity  by  expanding  or  constructing  new  passenger  terminals  and  introducing  more 
modern  technology  or  IT  solutions  comparable  with  other  EU  member  states.  Domestic 
and  international  air  travel  was  a  key  growth  area  for  Poland  between  2007  and  2013; 
the number of passengers using Polish airports increased from 17  m in 2007 to 23 m in 
2013, an increase of 35%. 

In  total  1,503  kilometres  of  cycle  tracks  were  newly  built  or  reconstructed  as  reported 
across  seven  Member  States.  The  Czech  Republic  reported  612  km  of  such  tracks, 
Hungary  571  km,  Italy  156  km,  Greece  89  km,  Germany  59  km,  Slovenia  10  km  and 
France 5 km. 

Certain  Member  States  reported  outputs  for  inland  waterways,  such  as  60  km  of 
"Supervised  river  length"  in  Bulgaria  (Operational  Programme  Transport),  13  km  of 
"water  networks  constructed  under  projects”  (regional  operational  programme  for 
Podlasie)  or  19  km  of  “improved  waterways”  in  the  Czech  Republic  (Operational 
Programme Transport) 

49 

 
 
 
 
Box 3: Hungary: Budapest Metro Line 4 

Opened in March 2014, Metro Line 4 links east and west Budapest over a 7.34 km route 
incorporating ten new Metro stations. The project connects Kelenföld railway station west 
of  the  Danube  (Buda)  with  Keleti  railway  station  east  of  the  Danube  (Pest)  providing 
interchange opportunities with heavy rail, two other metro lines and surface modes. The 
project cost €1.45 bn. 

In addition to time saving benefits to public transport users, there are economic benefits 
delivered to Budapest through the reduction of congestion. This is achieved through the 
optimisation of the surface transport systems (bus, trolleybus and tram) enabled by the 
introduction of Metro Line 4. Based on the data currently available, there are substantial 
numbers  using  Metro  Line  4.  However,  2014  passenger  demand 
is 
approximately  40%  less  than  the  level  forecast  for  the  cost  benefit  analysis  of  this 
project.  

indicates 

Overall,  stakeholders  consulted  in  all  15  Member  States  argued  strongly  that  the 
interventions supported by cohesion policy had contributed to the transport needs of the 
Member States in question and had been consistent with the goals and priorities of each 
Member State. While some of the stakeholders may not have been entirely objective, as 
they  were  officials  responsible  for  the  implementation  of  cohesion  policy  in  Member 
States,  they  were  able  to  defend  this  position  using  convincing  examples  of  actual 
projects completed with the aid of cohesion policy and the relevance of these projects to 
transport  needs.  For  example,  the  10  major  projects  that  were  the  subject  of  case 
studies  were  all  clearly  relevant  to  transport  needs  in  their  respective  Member  States. 
These case studies are documented in detail in the Second Interim Report. 

50 

 
 
 
 
 
 
B5 

Conclusions on the contribution of cohesion policy to transport 

The work done for this study indicates clearly that cohesion policy had made a significant 
contribution  to  the  development  of  transport  infrastructure  in  individual  Member  States 
and in the EU as a whole. This contribution has been concentrated in Member States and 
regions  which  were  the  intended  recipients  of  the  highest  relative  levels  of  cohesion 
policy support. 

Cohesion policy allocation for Member States ranged from €57 bn in Poland to €25 m in 
Luxembourg. The resources  set aside for transport  within the cohesion policy envelopes 
ranged  from  45%  in  Poland  to  0%  in  Denmark  and  Luxembourg.  Poland  therefore  had 
both  the  highest  overall  allocation  to  transport  and  the  highest  absolute  funding  for 
transport  (€25,656  mn).  The  level  of  absorption  of  cohesion  policy  funding  allocated  to 
transport ranged from 55% in Romania to 105% in Spain, for those Member States who 
allocated  more  than  €5  bn  to  transport.  Poland  achieved  an  absorption  rate  of  81%  by 
the end of 2014.  

19  of  the  28  Member  States  allocated  the  highest  amount  of  cohesion  policy  funding to 
roads,  whilst  Spain,  Italy  and  Croatia  allocated  the  highest  level  of  funding  to  rail.  The 
level of funding absorption varied by transport area, with Motorways (TEN-T) reaching a 
level  of  91%,  Regional/local  roads  95%,whilst  Railway  (TEN-T)  had  a  rate  of  69%  and 
Railways  64%  by  the  end  of  2014.  The  overall  amounts  decided  for  TEN-T  related 
infrastructure was 46.5% in the 2007-2013 programming period. 

This  co-funding  helped  to  build  new  and  reconstruct  existing  roads  and  railways,  both 
within TEN-T and outside of this network. Over 1,800 km of new TEN-T roads were built 
across  13  Member  States,  alongside  over  2,000  km  of  other  new  roads  across  17 
Member  States.  Furthermore,  over  23,000  km  of  road  was  reconstructed  in  20  Member 
States.  13  Member  States  built  new  or  reconstructed  existing  TEN-T  railroads  using 
cohesion  policy  co-financing,  achieving  a  total  of  over  1,600  km  by  the  end  of  2013. 
Overall,  approximately  3,400  km  of  new  or  reconstructed  railroads  was  delivered  using 
cohesion policy co-financing across 15 Member States.  

A more detailed examination of the contribution of cohesion policy funding in 15 Member 
States further highlighted the important contribution made to transport.  Cohesion policy 
expenditure by the end of 2013  represented between 54% (Lithuania) and 1% (France) 
of  total  investment  in  transport  during  the  2007-2013  programme  period,  and  was  of 
particular  importance  to  the  Convergence  Member  States.  Cohesion  policy  co-financing 
supported  the  delivery  of  3,800  km  of  new  roads  and  over  21,000  km  of  reconstructed 
roads across the 15 Member States.  

The use of cohesion policy funding in the rail sector was more focused on the renewal or 
upgrading  of  existing  railroad,  to  increase  line  speeds  and  capacity.  Importantly,  some 
stakeholders  from  Member  States  highlighted  the  important  role  of  cohesion  policy 
funding  in  supporting  large,  complex  projects  that  were  particularly  evident  in  the  rail 
sector.  In their opinion, such projects may not have been undertaken in the absence  of 
cohesion policy funding.  

There was a lower level of  financial contribution through the  cohesion policy 2007-2013 
programming  period  for  non-road  or  railroad  investment.  However,  enhancements  were 
made to urban transport, airports, ports and cycle paths during the period. 

51 

 
 
 
 
Section  C:  Strengths  and  weaknesses  of  cohesion  policy 
in the area of transport 

C1 

Introduction 

Throughout  the  evaluation,  consideration  has  been  given  to  the  strengths  and 
weaknesses of cohesion policy in the area of transport. Evidence has been collated from 
all  Tasks,  but  particularly  from  the  qualitative  research  undertaken  in  Task  3  on  major 
projects  and  Task  5  on  Member  States.  This  section  presents  a  summary  of  the  main 
strengths  and  weaknesses,  as  identified  in  the  evaluation.  The  information  presented 
herein  is  an  update  of  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  presented  in  the  First  Interim 
Report, reflecting the work undertaken in Tasks 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the evaluation. 

C2 

Strengths of cohesion policy 

Supporting policy objectives  
A  consensus  view  among  stakeholders  was  that  an  overarching  strength  of  cohesion 
policy  in  the  area  of  transport  has  been  the  ability  to  support  multiple  policy  objectives 
and  priorities  across  the  EU.  Such  objectives  reflected  the  different,  and  often  diverse, 
needs and requirements of individual Member States, and regional disparities in the EU. 
Cohesion  policy  has  supported  the  enhancement  of  trans-European,  Member  State  and 
regional  transport  networks,  balancing  the  need  to  work  towards  the  2011  White  Paper 
objectives  (particularly  revitalising  rail,  promoting  the  TEN-T  and  sustainable  transport) 
and  support  individual  Member  State  priorities.  Although  in  terms  of  overall  financial 
allocation  cohesion  policy  was  weighted  towards  road  (51%),  the  2007-2013 
programming period operated in each Member State in a way that reflected the specific 
needs and priorities of that Member State. 

The  level  of  cohesion  policy  allocations  to  transport  also  reflected  the  convergence 
objective of cohesion policy, with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland receiving the 
highest per capita allocations, followed by Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. All of 
these Member States had allocations of over €500 per head of population for transport in 
the  2007-2013  programming  period.  These  Member  States  had  the  least  well 
development strategic transport networks within the EU in 2007, and the distribution of 
funding reflected such need.  

Promoting and supporting transport planning 
Stakeholders  commented  that  cohesion  policy  had  allowed  Member  States  to  establish 
longer  term  transport  planning  and,  through  the  more  secure  funding  platform,  greater 
security  and  stability  of  infrastructure  investment.  Evidence  of  enhanced  planning  was 
observed during the evaluation in Romania, Bulgaria, Poland and the Czech Republic for 
the  2007-2013  programming  period,  with  the  development  of  the  General  Transport 
Master Plan and associated modelling platforms in Romania as a particular example. It is 
the  view  of  the  evaluators  that  similar  benefits  could  have  been  experienced  by  other 
Member  States,  in  either  the  2007-2013  or  previous  programming  periods,  although 
there was no evidence to substantiate this. The extent to which individual Member States 
have  changed  their  planning  approaches  due  to  cohesion  policy  will  also  have  been 
dependent on the initial maturity and robustness of such processes. The development of 
more robust transport planning approaches will support Member States in addressing ex-
ante  conditionality  7  for  the  2014-2020  programming  period,  which  requires  strategy 
documents to be developed in the area of transport.  

52 

 
 
 
 
Enhancing transport networks 
The  prioritisation  of  investment  in  the  TEN-T,  within  Member  State  operational 
programmes, helped to ensure that resources were available to support the enhancement 
of  the  transport  network  that  is  aligned  with  EU  transport  objectives.  As  outlined  in 
Section B2, the 2007-2013 programming period saw over 1,800 km of new TEN-T roads 
built and over 1,600 km of TEN-T railroads built or improved due to the cohesion policy 
support.  TEN-T  road  outputs  represented  47%  of  the  total  delivered  km  for  roads 
supported by cohesion policy funding and 49% for rail.  

The contribution of the cohesion policy to the construction of new or upgrade of existing 
roads - over 26,800 km - and to the construction of new or upgrade of existing railroads 
– over 3,400 km - should also be recognised, as outlined in Section B. Stakeholders from 
case  study  Member  States  were  unanimous  that  cohesion  policy  had  contributed  to 
enhancing the TEN-T and non-TEN-T transport networks.  

The  role  of  cohesion  policy  funding  in  the  enhancement  of  regional  and  intra-national 
transport  networks  should  also  be  recognised  as  strength  in  the  view  of  stakeholders. 
Examples  identified  from  the  Member  State  case  studies  included  investments  in  public 
transport for regional cities in France or the ‘last mile’ projects to enhance accessibility to 
ports and airports in Italy.  

Cohesion  policy  has  also  supported  the  needs  of  individual  Member  States,  in  particular 
by helping to meet the increasing demand for transport services in some Member States 
as their economies develop following accession. This has been particularly evident in the 
Member  States  who  joined  the  EU  in  or  after  2004,  where  increased  employment  and 
economic  activity  resulted  in  increased  travel  demand,  which  in  turn  contributed  to 
increased congestion and inefficient transport systems.  

Cohesion policy funding was viewed by stakeholders as a key enabler in the development 
of  sustainable  transport  measures;  defined  as  public  transport,  low  emission  vehicles, 
cycling and walking. This represents a strength, with Member States targeting allocations 
to promote sustainable transport options for both passengers and freight. As well as the 
impact  of  investments  in  public  transport  in  urban  areas,  cohesion  policy  supported 
approaches  that  provided  an  alternative  to  motorised  transport.  This  reflects  the  EU’s 
Action Plan on Urban Mobility27 that resulted in funding and support to Sustainable Urban 
Mobility  Plans  (SUMPs).  This  support  for  sustainable  transport  will  have  positive 
environmental  impacts.  This  link  between  cohesion  policy  funding  and  increased 
emphasis  on  sustainable  transport  measures  by  Member  States  has  continued  into  the 
current programming period. The allocation for urban transport increased from €8.3 bn in 
2007-2013 period to €12.3 bn in 2014-2020 programming period.  

This change is even more prominent, if one notes that the overall allocation to transport 
has decreased from €82.3 bn in 2007-2013 to €70.0 bn in 2014-2020. By consequence, 
the  resources  set  aside  for  urban  transport  represent  18%  of  the  transport  envelope 
compared  to  10%  in  the  previous  period.  At  the  same  time  the  allocation  for  roads  has 
decreased  both  in  absolute  terms  –  from  €42.1  bn  to  €29.9  bn  –  and  in  relation  to  the 
transport envelope – from 51% to 43%. 

27 Action Plan On Urban Mobility, Commission Of The European Communities, 2009 

53 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
Stable funding source 
The Member State case studies highlighted the importance of  cohesion policy funding to 
the  delivery  of  transport  projects  in  certain  Member  States  in  the  2007-2013 
programming  period,  given  the  economic  recession  that  occurred.  The  co-financing  of 
projects  by  cohesion  policy  of  up  to  85%  supported  ongoing  transport  infrastructure 
delivery,  alongside  public  expenditure  focused  onto  key  national  and  trans-European 
transport  projects.  Aside  from  cohesion  policy,  the  principal  source  of  funding  for 
transport  projects  across  the  Member  State  case  studies  was  national  government 
funding,  with  support  in  some  cases  from  European  Investment  Bank  (EIB)  loans  or 
devolved  regional/local  government  funding.  Cohesion  policy  funding  demonstrated  its 
strength  as  a  secure  and  stable  funding  source,  largely  impervious  to  wider  economic 
conditions.  This  role  was  particularly  pronounced  in  newer  Member  States  with  larger 
allocations of cohesion policy funding. 

Supporting complex projects that might not otherwise have gone ahead 
Another  strength  of  cohesion  policy  was  its  ability  to  promote  major  infrastructure 
projects, particularly complex rail investment, which Member States might not otherwise 
have  chosen  to  deliver.  Stakeholders  from  Hungary  and  Poland  felt  that  the  absence  of 
cohesion policy funding would have resulted in a shift towards lower cost investments, in 
particular  roads,  to  the  detriment  of  meeting  specific  Member  State  requirements.  The 
availability and stability of cohesion policy funding encouraged Member States to pursue 
larger  scale  and  more  complex  projects,  which  were  not  considered  feasible  in  the 
absence  of  such  funding.  This  had  the  important  benefit  of  increasing  the  level  of 
investment in environmentally beneficial projects.  

Building Member State capabilities 
The  2007-2013  cohesion  policy  programming  period  has  contributed  towards  enhancing 
the skills and knowledge of Member State stakeholders. For example, JASPERS noted an 
improvement  in  the  quality  of  ex-ante  project  evaluations  in  Romania  and  Poland  over 
the  programming  period  and  commented  on  the  enhanced  appraisal  skill-set  within  the 
Member  States.  Stakeholders  considered  that  the  increasing  focus  on  non-road  projects 
is likely to lead to new challenges as there are additional complexities present in rail and 
urban transport projects. 

C3  Weaknesses of cohesion policy 

Difficulties in combining cohesion policy funding with private finance 
Public  private  partnership  (PPP)  played  a  very  small  role  in  the  funding  of  transport 
projects  which  also  received  cohesion  policy  funding  in  the  2007-2013  programming 
period. This evaluation identified a number of features of cohesion policy funding that go 
a  long  way  towards  explaining  the  limited  interest  in  using  PPP  structures  to  combine 
cohesion policy funding and private finance.  

Firstly,  many  PPP  schemes  take  the  form  of  a  concession  where  a  private  sector  firm  is 
granted  a  concession  to  operate  or  manage  a  piece  of  transport  infrastructure.  The 
private  sector  firm  will  take  on  all  or  some  of  the  costs  of  operating,  maintaining  and 
renewing  the  infrastructure  in  return  for  all  or  part  of  the  revenues  generated  by  the 
infrastructure.  These  revenues  can  be  tolls  from  a  toll  road  or  fares  from  a  public 
transport  service.  The  concession  structure  cannot  be  used  where  the  infrastructure  in 
question  does  not  produce  revenue.  Roads  that  are  not  subject  to  tolls  and  rail 

54 

 
 
 
 
 
 
infrastructure that does not earn access charges from independent train operators cannot 
therefore  be  considered  for  concession  type  PPPs.  This  excludes  many  of  the  projects 
funded by cohesion policy from this common type of PPP structure. 

In  addition,  even  where  a  piece  of  transport  infrastructure  does  generate  revenue  this 
will  very  rarely  be  sufficient  to  cover  the  full  cost  of  providing  and  operating  the 
infrastructure.  This  “funding  gap”  must  be  filled  by  some  form  of  subsidy  from  public 
funds.  PPP  structures  can  be  devised  to  combine  private  sector  funding  with  public 
funding  to  meet  this  funding  gap.  However,  the  private  investors  in  a  PPP  will  seek 
certainty  that  the  necessary  public  funding  will  be  available  to  a  project  before 
committing themselves to a PPP. The time taken to secure  cohesion policy funding for a 
project  has  made  it  difficult  to  apply  PPP  approaches  to  the  development  of  such 
projects.  Private  investors  have  been  reluctant  to  commit  to  projects  that  are  seeking 
cohesion policy funding, because of the time that will elapse before there is certainty that 
that cohesion policy funding will be available. 

However, there were examples of successful hybrid financing, with payments during the 
construction phase of a project covered largely by  cohesion policy funding, and costs of 
operating  being  privately  financed.  This  shows  that  combining  cohesion  policy  funding 
and  private  funding  in  a  PPP  structure  is  possible.  If  specific  actions  are  taken  to  make 
this  type  of  combination  easier,  a  potential  new  source  of  funding  for  transport 
investments  will  be  opened  up.  One  area  of  opportunity  will be  for  beneficiaries  to  plan 
for  the  full  lifecycle  of  a  piece  of  infrastructure.  Cohesion  funding  can  be  sought  for 
construction phases of the investments while PPP approaches to the operating phase will 
introduce  private  sector  finance  and  expertise  to  this  area  of  project  development  and 
management.  In  addition  new  structures  are  being  developed  in  the  private  sector 
(referred  to  as  “financial  engineering”)  to  channel  private  sector  funding  into 
infrastructure  investment.  Investment  funds  and  project  guarantors  with  a  long  term 
investment  horizon  are  emerging.  The  emergence  of  this  type  of  private  sector  partner 
will increase the opportunities to use PPP approaches for cohesion policy funded transport 
investments. 

State Aid 
During the programming period, the Leipzig/Halle Airport ruling clarified the applicability 
of  the  State  Aid  rules  to  subsidies  for  transport  infrastructure.  Prior  to  this  ruling  many 
stakeholders  had  assumed  that  investments  in  transport  infrastructure  could  not  be 
considered  to  be  State  Aid.  This  ruling  held  that  the  operators  of  certain  transport 
infrastructure,  in  this  case  airports,  are  “undertakings”  for  the  purposes  of  EU 
competition law, and that subsidies for the  construction of such assets could, therefore, 
be  State  Aid.  Stakeholders  from  Italy,  Portugal  and  Slovakia  expressed  concerns  about 
this  interaction  between  cohesion  policy  and  State  Aid  Rules.  Although  this  is  not  a 
weakness  of  cohesion  policy,  the  smooth  running  of  the  policy  would  be  aided  by 
ensuring  that  beneficiaries  in  the  transport  sector  are  aware  of  their  obligations  under 
State Aid law, and that guidance is available to them on the application of these rules. 

Monitoring and evaluation 
The  monitoring  and  measurement  of  the  outputs  and  results  of  cohesion  policy  was 
significantly  improved  for  the  2007-2013  programming  period  compared  to  previous 
programming  periods.  “Core  Indicator”  data  on  the  outputs  of  cohesion  policy  funding 
was available, and has been used extensively in this evaluation.  

55 

 
 
 
 
This  was  the  first  programming  period  for  which  such  data  was  provided  by  Member 
States.  The  core indicator  system was introduced during the period and its use was not 
mandatory.  In  this  context  there  were  understandable  difficulties  in  the  use  of  some  of 
the core indicator data. In particular there  were differences in the interpretation of  core 
indicator definitions by different Member States. For example there were core indicators 
for “km of new road” and for “km of new TEN-T road”. According to the guidance issued 
by  the  Commission,28  the  latter  should  be  a  subset  of  the  former,  but  some  Member 
States  treated  these  as  two  completely  separate  indicators  and  reported  their  output  of 
TEN-T road under "km of new TEN-T roads" only.  

This issue has been addressed in the current programming period by ensuring that there 
is common understanding between the Commission and Member States on the definitions 
and  use  of  common  indicators.  In  fact,  their  use  is  now  mandatory  and  the  list  of 
common  indicators  is  annexed  to  the  fund-specific  regulations  in  the  2014-2020 
programming  period.  Definitions  of  these  indicators  are  included  in  the  annex  to  ther 
Commission’s  “Concepts  and  Recommendations”  Guidance  Document  which  was 
developed in conjunction with Member States. 

It  should  be  noted  that  the  legal  deadline  for  completing  the  ex  post  evaluation  of 
cohesion  policy  2007-2013  means  that  there  has  been  little  opportunity  to  evaluate  the 
impact  of  the  investments  that  received  funding.  Realistically  such  impacts  will  only 
become apparent over the next 3 to 5 years. This limits the possibility of measuring the 
longer  term  impact  of  cohesion  policy  funding.  This  should  be  less  of  a  problem  for  the 
ex-post  evaluation  of  2014-2020  period,  because  the  Regulations  oblige  to  carry  them 
out  until  the  end  of  2024,  whereas  legal  deadline  for  the  ex-post  evaluation  of  2007-
2013 was set at the end of 2015. 

Overcoming intra-state challenges 
The  interviews  with  stakeholders  noted  that  regional  disparities  in  transport  network 
provision  remained  in  some  Member  States,  such  as  Poland  and  Hungary,  despite 
extensive  cohesion  policy  funding  allocations.  It  should  be  recognised  that  not  all  such 
disparities and priorities can be addressed within a single programming period. However, 
some stakeholders commented that the ongoing priority given to the TEN-T, whilst widely 
supported, did reduce funding available to address more intra-Member State challenges. 
The proper place to address the appropriate balance between EU wide and intra-Member 
State  priorities  is  in  the  preparation  of  national  transport  strategies.  In  this  respect  the 
ex-ante requirement for Member States to prepare such strategies for the  2014-2020 is 
to be welcomed, inter alia, as a way to address this issue. 

Cohesion policy programming periods 
JASPERS observed that the cohesion policy programming period itself generated cycles of 
project preparation, design and implementation when it was introduced in newer Member 
States. For example, JASPERS in Poland noted that the first 12-24 months of the 2007-
2013  programming  period  was  focused  on  project  preparation  and  design,  leading  to  a 
concentration  of  implementation  towards  the  end  of  the  period.  This  influenced 
contractor  bidding  behaviour  as  securing  work  become  paramount,  contributing  to  low 
tender  prices  and  an  increased  risk  of  contractor  bankruptcy.  This  effect  reduces  as 
Member States improve their strategic planning of transport investments, and develop a 

28 Indicative Guidelines on Evaluation Methods: Reporting on Core Indicators for the European Regional 
Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund Working Document No. 7 - 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/2007/working/wd7_indicators_en.pdf 

56 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
pipeline  of  projects  that  can  be  pursued  in  a  given  programming  period.  The  ex-ante 
conditionality  introduced  in  2014-2020  period,  which  obliges  Member  States  to  have  a 
transport strategy including a mature project pipeline, will directly address this issue. 

Stakeholders  also  noted  that  the  political  pressures  to  meet  cohesion  policy  timescales 
within  each  programming  period,  contributed  to  the  use  of  a  single  stage  price  only 
procurement approach. In combination with the timing of the global economic recession 
during  the  2007-2013  programming  period,  this  influenced  the  pricing  strategies  of 
contractors who presented low tender prices. This approach to tendering was observed in 
the  Member  State  case  studies  of  Poland,  Romania,  Bulgaria  and  Spain  and  across  a 
range of projects types.  

Furthermore, the cycle of programming periods had promoted  project selection not only 
on  the  basis  of  forecast  benefits  (EBCR),  as  would  be  expected,  but  also  on  project 
readiness  for  implementation  in  the  first  two  years  of  a  programming  period.  This 
introduced  the  risk  that  projects  that  could  generate  better  net  benefits  may  not  have 
been  selected  on  the  basis  that  they  would  not  commence  until  relatively  late  in  a 
programming period.    

Some major projects demonstrated poor levels of preparation, leading to delays and cost 
escalation.  Low  quality  detailed  designs,  a  lack  of  ground  investigation  and  late  land 
purchases  were  examples  of  factors  that  influenced  the  maturity  of  projects.  Political 
pressure first to obtain cohesion policy funding and then to deliver within a programming 
period was again cited by stakeholders as contributing to this issue.  

This  influence  of  the  cohesion  policy  programming  period  on  decision  making  and 
behaviour is greatest where cohesion policy funding is a significant source of funding for 
transport  investment,  hence  the  particular  concerns  raised  in  relation  to  Poland.  As 
programming  periods  succeed  each  other  Member  States  should  be  able  to  anticipate 
these effects, and will be able to develop a pipeline of mature project proposals that can 
be carried from one period to the next. 

Absorption rate 
Some  Member  State  stakeholders  were  concerned  by  what  they  described  as  slow 
absorption  of  cohesion  policy  funding.  As  of  the  end  of  2014,  Member  States  had 
allocated  funding  of  €82,299  m  to  transport  themes.  At  the  same  time,  actual 
expenditure of cohesion policy funding on transport themes had reached €67,007 m. This 
represents  an  average  “absorption”  rate  of  81%.  It  is  important  to  note,  however,  that 
under  the  N+2  principle  Member  States  had  until  2015  to  absorb  their  allocations  from 
the 2007-2013 programming period. 

Moreover, investments  in transport infrastructure are complex to plan and execute so it 
is inevitable that a certain period of time must elapse between the initial identification of 
a need for an investment in transport infrastructure to the time when construction work 
are  carried  out.  In  the  case  of  cohesion  policy  this  feature  of  investments  in  transport 
infrastructure leads to time elapsing between the commitment of cohesion policy funding 
to transport themes and actual expenditure. 

However,  there  are  areas  where  absorption  moves  faster  and  those  where  it  moves 
slower. The case study work undertaken for this report in Poland and Romania suggests 
that slow absorption of funds may as well be caused by institutional capacity problems in 
Member States. 

57 

 
 
 
 
C3 

Conclusions 

The  main  strengths  of  cohesion  policy  in  the  area  of  transport  included  the  ability  to 
support the diverse range of policy objectives across the Member States. Cohesion policy 
funding was used – for example - to co-fund high speed rail lines, multi-lane highways, 
nationally important roads through to links to ports, and cycle lanes in urban areas. The 
availability  of  cohesion  policy  funding  was  also  noted  as  promoting  large  and  complex 
projects,  which  some  Member  States  would  not  have  delivered  using  only  national 
funding due to the risks involved. 

The  long-term  perspective  offered  by  the  cohesion  policy  programming  periods  also 
promoted  the  adoption  of  more  robust  transport  planning  approaches,  as  well  as 
supporting the development of Member State skills in the area of ex-ante appraisal. 

The  stability  of  cohesion  policy  funding  during  the  economic  recession  enabled  Member 
States  to  continue  delivering  transport  infrastructure  during  the  challenging  economic 
period of 2007-2013, through prioritising national funding contributions.  

The  main  weaknesses  observed  included  some  difficulties  in  combining  cohesion  policy 
funding with private sector funding in PPP structures. There was also a need to clarify the 
relationship between cohesion policy funding and the State Aid rules. Steps have already 
been taken to address other issues such as consistency in the reporting of core indicators 
and the proper balance between EU wide priorities and intra-Member State needs.   

The  programming  periods  themselves  were  also  cited  by  some  stakeholders,  including 
JASPERS,  as  generating  weaknesses  and  increasing  the  risks  of  contractors  submitting 
low and unsustainable tender prices. The political pressure to deliver projects within the 
programming  period  was  also  identified  as  contributing  to  cases  of  poor  project 
preparation,  such  as  a  lack  of  ground  investigation  during  the  feasibility  stage.  The 
influence  of  programming  periods  on  behaviour  in  Member  States  should  lessen  over 
time as Member States develop pipelines of mature project proposals. 

58 

 
 
 
 
Section D: Quality of financial analysis of projects 

D1 

Introduction  

A  key  requirement  of  the  evaluation  was  to  consider  the  quality  of  financial  analysis  in 
transport  projects.  As  outlined  in  Section  A,  this  was  achieved  using  three  primary 
sources of evidence: 

  The  review  of  20  major  projects  within  Task  2,  considering  the  completeness 

of financial analysis and potential systematic bias; 

  A more detailed analysis of 10 major projects (a sub-set of the 20) in Task 3, 
including  further  desk  research  supported  by  interviews  with  stakeholders; 
and 

  Discussions held during the stakeholder seminar in Task 6. 

Evidence  of  relevance  to  the  financial  analysis  generated  from  all  other  tasks  has  also 
been  used  in  preparing  the  following  synthesis.  The  evaluation  of  financial  analysis 
included  the  consideration  of  all  elements  of  major  project  ex-ante  evaluations,  as 
presented  within  the  application  forms  for  cohesion  policy  funding.  As  such,  the 
evaluation  encompassed  the  work  inherent  in  such  funding  applications,  including  that 
undertaken  to  prepare  feasibility  studies,  environmental  impact  assessment  and  cost 
benefit  analyses.  In  line  with  European  Commission  guidance29,  the  review  of  financial 
analysis has included consideration of: 

  Demand analysis, including: 

-  The quality and accuracy of demographic data analysis; 

-  The extent and quality of the analysis of project interaction with competing 

modes and/or routes; 

-  The  extent  and  quality  of  analysis  of  consumer  behaviour  in  response  to 

projects; and 

-  The quality and extent of analysis relating to tariffing and affordability. 

  Financial analysis, including:  

- 

Investment costs; 

-  Construction schedule and the impacts on demand and costs; 

-  Financial sustainability; and 

-  Financial modelling and approach (e.g. discount rate, residual value, etc). 

The  evaluation  included  a  critique  of  the  evidence  contained  within  the  project 
applications,  through  which  to  verify  the  main  assumptions  directly  influencing  financial 
analysis.  The  findings  of  the  evaluation  are  presented  separately  for  each  of  the  above 
eight areas of financial analysis. Each sub-section contains: 

  A definition of the issue; and 

29 Guide to Cost-Benefit Analysis of Investment Projects Economic appraisal tool for cohesion policy 2014-2020, 
December 2014 

59 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
  A synthesis of the findings and a discussion on the approaches applied. 

D2  Demographic data 

Definition 

In  terms  of  demographic  data  that  should  be  used  to  inform  the  development  of 
transport demand and financial analysis, EU guidance on cost benefit analysis stipulates 
that the following factors are key: 

  Presentation  of  the  demographics  of  the  study  area  including  population, 
gender  balance,  age,  personal  income,  gross  domestic  product  (GDP)/gross 
value added (GVA), car ownership and employment levels; 

  Demographics data should be geographically disaggregated to allow variations 

within the study area to be understood; and 

  Temporal trends in the disaggregated demographic data should be presented, 
including  projections  of  future  levels  of  population,  employment,  personal 
income and car ownership.  

Synthesis of findings 

The  review  of  available  major  project  information  identified  a  number  of  generic 
statements  on  demographic  data,  which  brought  into  question  the  level  of  rigor  applied 
to  this  element  of  analysis.  The  most  commonly  reported  demographic  data  was  the 
overall  population,  including  the  analysis  of  both  historic  and  forecast  trends. 
Employment  levels  were  included  for  around  half  the  projects.  However,  more  specific 
data such as personal income GDP/GVA and gender were only presented in a minority of 
cases. 

In  terms  of  the  geographic  disaggregation  of  data,  this  typically  consisted  of  the 
presentation  of  results  for  the  relevant  administrative  divisions  which  the  transport 
project passed through. In poorer examples, demographic data was only provided for one 
spatial  area,  and  in  some  cases  national  figures  were  presented.  The  evaluator’s  view, 
based  on  the  information  provided,  is  that  the  demographic  data  used  was  generally 
spatially too aggregate. This is likely to have influenced the financial analysis, and more 
specifically demand analysis. 

Furthermore,  insufficient  consideration  of  forecast  changes  to  indicators  was  made.  The 
quality  of  analysis  around  the  forecast  change  in  variables  such  as  employment,  car 
ownership and GDP was generally poor, with the continuation of historic trends the main 
approach.  However,  it  is  acknowledged  by  the  evaluators  that  many  of  the  feasibility 
studies  were  completed  prior  to  the  economic  recession,  and  therefore  the  assumptions 
around forward projections on growth should be considered in this context.  

The  close  relationship  between  population  growth,  GDP  and  travel  demand  necessitates 
more  sensitivity  analysis  within  ex-ante  evaluations.  The  challenge  relating  to  demand 
forecasting  accuracy  and  the  use  of  demographic  data,  and  the  implication  for  project 
financial analysis, is presented in Section E2.1.  

60 

 
 
 
 
 
D3    Interaction with competing modes and routes 

Definition 

The  assessment  of  new  or  enhanced  transport  infrastructure  needs  to  include  an 
understanding of the likely market of that facility. For private transport there will typically 
be a number of alternative routes which could provide the same function, and an ex-ante 
evaluation  should  seek  to  understand  the  relative  appeal  of  these  alternatives.  Public 
transport may also offer an alternative via metro, bus, rail or some combination of those. 
EU guidance and best practice determines that the following should be defined: 

  The  area  of  influence  of  the  project,  identifying  other  corridors  which  will  be 
impacted  by  the  project  and  where  there  is  competition  between  different 
modes; and 

  The  competing  modes  and  alternative  routes,  identifying  fares  and  costs, 
pricing  and  regulation  policies,  congestion  and  capacity  constraints  and  the 
expected new investments. 

Synthesis of findings 

The overall conclusion from the evaluation was that there was insufficient assessment of 
major  project  interaction  with  competing  modes  or  routes.  Feasibility  studies  rarely 
considered  such  factors,  with  a  greater  focus  given  to  more  detailed  project  design 
issues. In the evaluator’s view this approach risks underreporting the potential impacts of 
alternative routes/modes, thereby undermining the accuracy of demand forecasting. 

Evidence  from  project  documentation  indicated  that  by  the  feasibility  study  stage  the 
majority  of  projects  focused  solely  on  the  chosen  major  project,  rather  than  assessing 
the  wider  range  of  options.  This  indicated  that  assumptions  had  been  made  at  an  early 
stage  of  project  development  regarding  which  alternative  modes/routes  should  be 
analysed.  

Ex-ante forecasts tended to reference the ‘with’ and ‘without’ project cases, with specific 
reference to the project corridor. However, there was limited reporting of wider impacts 
on  other  transport  corridors  or  competing  modes.  Identifying  and  understanding  such 
interactions  was  needed  to  define  the  overall travel  demand  in  an  area  or  corridor,  and 
the  relative  attractiveness  of  available  transport  options.  The  challenge  of  analysing 
project  interactions,  including  such  issues  as  estimating  the  level  of  abstraction  from 
existing transport options, is explored further in Section E2.3.  

The major projects evaluated either had a bespoke model/forecast approach or made use 
of existing regional or national models. The advantage of the former  was that the model 
related  specifically  to  the  project  and  the  level  of  detail  was  tailored  to  fit  the 
assessment.  However,  in  these  cases  the  impact  of  the  project  on  other  modes  and 
alternative routes was often not stated; this was potentially a consequence of the model 
being  too  tightly  focused  spatially  although  this  could  not  be  verified  during  the 
evaluation.  The  use  of  a  regional  or  national  modeling  platform  provided  the  ability  to 
consider other modes and the impact of the project on a wide area. However, a drawback 
of this approach was that the level of detail was often insufficient to directly understand 
the  impacts  of  the  project.  The  challenge  of  establishing  the  optimal  use  of  transport 
models is explored further in Section E2.4. 

61 

 
 
 
 
It  should  also  be  recognised  that  many  of  the  more  recent  Member  States,  such  as 
Bulgaria,  Hungary  and  Romania,  went  through  a  process  of  transition  during  the  2007-
2013  programming  period.  The  development  or  enhancement  of  national  transport 
models  was  evident,  to  facilitate  project  prioritisation,  supported  by  more  detailed 
(geographic  and  modal)  modelling  suites.  Where  multi-modal  transport  models  were 
employed the generalised costs were formulated appropriately, identifying journey times, 
operating  costs  and  fares.  However,  there  was  very  limited  evidence  of  factors  such  as 
reliability, comfort or interchanging penalties being considered in modelling. 

D4  Consumer behaviour 

Definition 

Consumer  behaviour  in  financial  analysis  relates  to  understanding  and  quantifying  the 
factors  relating  to  consumer  decision  making,  and  the  impact  of  this  on  demand 
forecasts. EU guidance and best practice states that this should distinguish between: 

  Existing demand; 

  Demand which has been diverted from other modes or routes; and 

  Demand  that  is  generated  or  induced  because  of  the  introduction  of  new 
infrastructure  or  in  the  case  of  an  increase  in  the  capacity/speed  of  existing 
infrastructure. 

Demand  forecasts  should  therefore  be  sensitive  to  changes  in  travel  times  and  costs, 
which is implicit in the calculation of traffic diverted from other modes, and is important 
in relation to induced demand.  

Synthesis of findings 

The  evaluation  concluded  that  for  the  majority  of  road  major  projects  the  transport 
models  included  no  consideration  to  induced  traffic  demand.  However,  there  were 
exceptions such as projects in Bulgaria which made use of the General Transport Master 
Plan  national  model.  Public  transport  projects  tended  to  rely  on  commercially  available 
modelling  software  and  thereby  had  the  capability  to  model  alternative  public  transport 
modes  and  road  options.  Modelling  of  variable  demand  responses  was  limited  to  the 
calculation  of  induced  travel  demand  expected  to  result  from  the  project  infrastructure, 
and this was only evidenced in four of the major projects reviewed. 

The  consumer  behavior  assumptions  included  in  ex-ante  evaluations  focused  on  travel 
costs,  in  terms  of  the  anticipated  journey  time/travel  speed  on  the  new  infrastructure. 
However,  assumptions  relating  to  other  components  of  generalised  costs,  such  as 
operating costs, were less frequently used.  

Where user costs were applicable (i.e. fare costs for public transport projects or tolls for 
road  projects)  assumptions  included  reference  to  an  existing  national  policy  or  set  of 
charges.  There  was  commonly  little  evidence  within  ex-ante  evaluations  on  how  such 
charges  were  expected  to  vary  during  the  project  assessment  period.  See  challenge  in 
Section E3.1 for further details. 

62 

 
 
 
 
D5 

Tariffing and affordability 

Definition 

Considerations of affordability in transport demand and financial analysis relate primarily 
to the ability and willingness of users to directly pay for transport provision. For toll roads 
and rail projects where fares and tolls are collected, the following elements are important 
considerations: 

  Analysis of the income levels of users or potential users; and 

  Assessment of the willingness to pay for the service. 

These  factors  are  important  in  determining  whether  users  will  be  willing  to  pay  the 
identified  fare  or  toll,  and  hence  influences  the  demand  for  the  service.  Related  to  the 
anticipated  consumer  behaviour  and  response  to  costs  is  the  approach  to  tariffing.  Best 
practice in relation to establishing tariffs includes the: 

  Provision of a detailed rationale for the chosen tariffing structure for different 

user classes; 

  Consideration of how these charging structures will change over time; and 

  Assessment of the sensitivity of the economic performance of the project to 

changes in tariffing levels. 

Synthesis of findings 

The  evaluation  has  concluded  that  the  analysis  of  the  income  levels  of  users  or  their 
willingness  to  pay  was  not  commonly  part  of  the  financial  analysis.  Only  one  project 
indicated  that  charging  for  access  to  the  infrastructure  would  be  linked  directly  to 
calculations of network expenditure. The main rationale for this was the extensive use of 
pre-existing  fare  or  tolling  policies.  Of  the  twenty  major  projects  evaluated  in  Task  2, 
fourteen included a fare or toll component as  a part of the project  financial analysis. Of 
these,  eight  made  use  of  a  pre-existing  fare  or  tolling  arrangement,  which  was  applied 
nationally through relevant legislation. 

The use of existing tariffing arrangements  was an appropriate methodology for applying 
charges,  assuming  that  sufficient  analysis  had  been  undertaken  in  establishing  such 
tariffing arrangements in the first place. Generally these arrangements included different 
levels  of  charging  dependent  upon  user  type  and  were  therefore  able  to  reflect  the 
different  costs  of use  of different type  of users; for  example the increased  maintenance 
costs relating to HGVs using a road as opposed to cars. 

The  financial  analysis  of  projects  with  fare  or  toll  components  also  commonly  included 
assumptions that arrangements and levels would be maintained throughout the duration 
of the assessment period. However, no evidence was presented to indicate whether these 
arrangements  would  be  affordable  for  the  markets  served.  In  some  instances  the 
willingness  to  pay  was  indirectly  accounted  for  as  part  of  the  value  of  time  calculations 
utilised  within  the  economic  analysis.  The  challenge  of  setting  tariffs  and  impacts  on 
financial analysis are considered further in Section E3.1. 

63 

 
 
 
 
 
D6 

Investment costs 

Definition 

Investment costs encompass the elements included in the applications for cohesion policy 
funding indicated as construction costs, commonly referred to as Capital Expenditure, or 
CapEx.  A  benchmark  analysis  was  carried  out  in  order  to  assess  the  twenty  major 
projects  selected30  in  Task  2.  The  sector  benchmarks  have  been  used  to  test  the 
assumptions reported in the financial analysis of the twenty major projects. 

Synthesis of findings 

The  quality  of  investment  cost  analysis  in  major  projects  varied  between  sector,  and 
outturn  costs  were  heavily  influenced  by  the  economic  recession.  The  evaluation  of 
accuracy must therefore be considered within this context. The investment costs of each 
major  project  examined  were  benchmarked  on  a  cost  per  km  basis  against  a  range  of 
similar projects (per mode and per type of project). In Figures D.1 to D.3, major projects 
analysed  (in  blue)  were  compared  with  benchmarks  (yellow)  and  with  the  average 
unitary costs per mode. 

Figure D.1 Rail investment cost benchmark 

Source: First Interim Report 

30  The  benchmark  analysis  has  been  developed  on  the  basis  of  a  panel  of  transport  infrastructure  projects, 
tested  against  international  benchmarks.  The  analysis  considered  four  projects  per  sector  of  transport  (rail, 
highway and urban rail transport) derived from the evaluator’s experience from the last 10 years. The projects 
have  been  selected  and  analysed  for  their  strategic  importance  in  terms  of  areas,  population  involved  and 
technical requirements. With reference to the railway sector, the information has been compared and selected 
on the basis of several benchmark documents:  DTU Transport – Institute of Transport; ITF Transport Outlook 
2015;  UNECE  Workshop  on  ‘Good  practices  and  new  tools  for  financing  transport  infrastructure’;  and 
Infrastructure  Cost  Review:  Technical  Report  –  HM  Treasury,  Infrastructure  UK.  The  sector  benchmarks  have 
been used to test the assumptions reported in the financial analysis of the twenty Major Projects. 

64 

 18583 83 67 22 20 18 16 6 5 50,6 Investments/KmInvestment/Km BenchmarkAverage 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure D.2 Highway investment cost benchmark 

Source: First Interim Report 

Figure D.3 Urban transport investment cost benchmark 

Source: First Interim Report 

The evaluation identified that 11 major projects analysed had a forecast construction cost 
below  the  expected  range.  This  was  compounded  by  the  economic  crisis  that  led  to 
higher than expected discounts in the tenders for construction works (e.g. outturn cots in 
Bulgaria were on average 20% lower than forecast). 

However, there were examples of cost escalations due to  contractor issues  or emerging 
risks  (e.g.  ground  explorations  identifying  issues).  This  increased  the  ex-post  costs  of 
construction for selected projects. 

The  majority  of  road  projects  had  forecast  investment  costs  with  lower  price  per  km 
figures  than  the  benchmark  schemes.  The  development  of  a  road  project  includes  the 

65 

 47 42 35 24 19 10 9 7 7 6 3 2 1 16,5 Investments/KmInvestments/Km BenchmarkAverage 164 153 111 108 18 16 6 5 72,7 Napoli Metro line1Budapest Metroline 4BetaAlphaGammaDeltaTramway VieuxCondé -ValenciennesLublinInvestments/KmInvestments/Km BenchmarkAverage 
 
 
 
 
 
possibility  for  a  wide  variation  in  per  km  constructions  costs  because  of  a  number  of 
variables including: 

  Ground conditions; 

  Neighbouring land use; 

  Topography; 

  Highway standard; and  

  The number of structures required.  

Conversely,  investment  costs  for  rail  projects  were  generally  above  the  cost  per  km  of 
the  benchmark  projects.  A  significant  issue  that  emerged  in  the  analysis  of  rail  project 
case studies was that rolling stock purchase costs were not always included in economic 
analysis, affecting its completeness and overall coherence. 

With respect to urban transport projects, this category covered a range of infrastructure 
types  including  tram  and  metro  projects,  with  a  wide  range  of  values  for  cost  per  km. 
The nature of metro schemes resulted in an extremely high per km cost compared with 
other  types  of  urban  transport.  The  complexity  of  the  engineering  works  involved  in 
projects  also  generated  two  different  clusters  of  projects:  underground;  and  surface 
infrastructures.  It  has  to  be  noted  that  the  selected  projects  showed  higher  unit  costs 
compared  to  the  benchmark  by  more  than  40%.  Further  analysis  of  the  challenges  of 
estimating construction costs is presented in Section E3.3. 

D7  Construction schedule 

Definition 

Construction schedule is the construction period indicated in applications for EU financing 
expressed in terms of years. A benchmark analysis was carried out in order to assess the 
twenty  Major  Projects  selected31.  The  sector  benchmarks  have  been  used  to  test  the 
assumptions reported in the financial analysis of the twenty Major Projects. 

Synthesis of findings 

Forecasting construction duration, as well as start and end dates, can influence financial 
analysis in terms of: 

 

Influencing the build-up of demand; and 

  The  speed  of  behaviour  change,  particularly  abstraction  from  competing 

modes. 

The  benchmark  and  project  case  study  analysis  at  sector  level  indicated  no  significant 
difference  in  the  quality  or  accuracy  of  forecasts.  Comparison  of  forecast  construction 

31  The  evaluation  considered  the  accuracy  of  forecasts  against  outturn  values,  and  a  comparison  of  forecasts 
against international benchmarks. To assess the construction schedule for each major project, transport sector 
benchmarks  were  identified, refined  to  reflect overall  project  costs  and complexity.  The  range of construction 
periods for these projects as defined in the Application Forms provided a reference against which the proposed 
construction periods were compared. It should be noted that some of the case study major projects contained 
unique  and  complex  features,  where  the  expected  range  of  the  construction  period  can  be  quite  wide,  and  it 
was difficult to identify a list of projects that were directly comparable. 

66 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
 
schedules  with  benchmark  data  indicated  that  the  majority  of  projects  were  predicting 
shorter  periods  across  all  sectors,  with  a  clear  optimism  bias.  In  Figures  D.4  to  D.6, 
major projects analysed (in blue) were compared with benchmarks (yellow) and with the 
average time for completion per mode. 

Figure D.4 Railway construction schedule benchmark 

Source: First Interim Report 

Figure D.5 Highway construction schedule benchmark 

Source: First Interim Report 

67 

 10,0 9,0 8,0 7,0 5,0 5,0 5,0 4,0 4,0 2,0 5,9Years ConstructionsYears Constructions BenchmarkAverage 12,0 11,0 11,0 6,0 6,0 5,0 5,0 4,04,0 4,0 3,0 3,0 3,0 5,9Years ConstructionsYears Constructions BenchmarkAverage 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure D.6 Urban transport construction schedule benchmark 

Source: First Interim Report 

With respect to construction schedule of a railway line, it has to be noted that it can vary 
greatly  depending  on  the  complexity  of  the  proposed  infrastructure  and  the  ground 
conditions.  All  the  analysed  projects  are  below  the  average,  with  the  exception  of  the 
Line Madrid-Castilla La Mancha Community Valencia Murcia Project.  

The analysis carried out concerning the construction schedule for road projects identified 
that eight projects forecast a shorter construction period than benchmarked.  

The  construction  schedule  for  urban  transport  projects  indicated  that  in  general  the 
projects  were  in  line  with  the  benchmark,  with  the  exception  of  Metro  Line  1  Napoli, 
which exceeded the average by a substantial margin.  

10  major  projects  studied  in  Task  3  were  affected  only  partially  by  construction  time 
delays  for  technical  reasons.  When  they  occurred  it  was  often  because  of  contractual 
issues  related  to  claims  or  financial  difficulties  of  contractors.  It  should  also  be 
highlighted that, for many projects, the level of planning was well advanced at the time 
of  application  and,  in  the  case  of  some  projects,  construction  had  commenced.  The 
evaluation  identified  good  examples  of  project  preparation,  in  terms  of  land  acquisition, 
leading to cost controls, cost reductions and timely delivery.  

68 

 8,0 7,0 5,0 5,04,5 4,5 3,8 3,0 5,1Napoli Metro line1AlphaLublinTramway VieuxCondé -ValenciennesBetaBudapest Metroline 4GammaDeltaYears ConstructionsYears Constructions BenchmarkAverage 
 
 
 
 
D8 

Financial sustainability 

Definition 

The financial sustainability of major projects was reviewed on the basis of positive (tolls, 
revenues,  etc.)  and  negative  (maintenance  costs,  etc)  elements.  Financial  sustainability 
evaluation  includes  the  evolution  over  time  of  the  ratio  between  revenues  and  costs  in 
the  operation  phase  and  the  administrative  framework  for  revenue  generation  over  the 
project life. Financial sustainability must be primarily assessed against the following: 

  Tolling dynamics; 

  Maintenance costs; and 

  Regulatory frameworks (separation between Infrastructure Managers (IM) and 
Railway  Undertaking  (RU)32  for  rail;  free  flow  and  collection  for  highways; 
competing modes for urban transport). 

Synthesis of findings 

The  evaluation  of  financial  sustainability  included  the  review  of  application  forms  and 
associated  documents,  and  the  outturn  performance  of  projects.  With  regards  to  the 
latter, it should be noted that many of the major projects had not been operating longer 
than  2-3  years.  Accordingly,  the  analysis  was  limited  to  short  term  performance. 
Although  some  critical issues  and  dynamics  are  already  present  and  documented,  other 
aspects have been identified as warning signs of potential risk. 

With  regards  to  road  transport,  the  main  issue  related  to  the  extent  and  application  of 
tolls. The effective application of tolls to private vehicles as well as Heavy Goods Vehicles 
(HGVs)  was  a  common  risk  identified  with  no  guaranteed  revenue  streams  throughout 
the  life  of  projects.  The  evaluation  also  identified  that  different  tolling  approaches  were 
implemented  through  project  lifecycles,  compared  with  what  was  reported  in  the 
applications.  The  evaluation  highlighted  that  outturn  revenues  were  often  lower  than 
forecast  because  of  lower  outturn  traffic  levels;  this  was  partially  due  to  the  economic 
crisis  in  Europe.  It  also  highlighted  that  in  some  cases  a  higher  number  of  vehicles 
categories  (light/heavy)  were  benefiting  from  toll  exemption  or  no  tolls  had  been 
implemented at all. 

Railway  and  urban  transport  projects  presented  different  dynamics.  Addressing  rail 
projects,  relevant  critical  aspects  related  to  the  implementation  of  the  EU  regulation  for 
the separation between IM and RU. With respect to the financial analysis it was observed 
that this had generated general confusion in the correct allocation of revenues and costs, 
which could lead to increasing uncertainty in estimating financial impacts. The evaluation 
identified that in the majority of cases separation between IM and RU has generally not 
been taken into account correctly. 

Urban  transport  project  financing  was  strongly  reliant  on  traffic  volumes.  Demand  and 
abstraction from/to competing modes, as well as traffic forecasts, had strong impacts on 
their  financial  sustainability.  The  evaluation  did  not  observe  financial  analyses  for  such 
projects that incorporated the full array of such issues, which potentially undermined the 
accuracy of forecasts.  

32 Directive 2001/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2001 amending Council 
Directive 95/18/EC on the licensing of railway undertakings 

69 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
The  evaluation  identified  that  issues  such  as  maintenance  costs  were  not  universally 
forecast accurately across the project life. This aspect could represent a critical issue as 
financial  planning  and  sustainability  is  seriously  affected  by  the  fact  that  the  long  term 
maintenance costs were not guaranteed across all projects. 

In terms of financial sustainability, road projects generally failed to provide assurance on 
future  maintenance  costs  estimation  and  cost  covering.  Rail projects  generally  allocated 
these  costs  to  a  central  Member  State  budget,  without  indicating  a  specific  source. 
However, there were exceptions, such as the application of a national strategy for rail in 
the Czech Republic.  

The evaluation noted that Member States were under  political  pressure to deliver major 
project  feasibility  and  planning  stages  quickly,  resulting  in  a  focus  in  the  financial 
analyses  on  construction  costs.  Bespoke  and  detailed  analyses  of  maintenance  and 
operating  costs  were  therefore  not  commonly  observed.  Moreover,  Member  State 
regulatory  frameworks  were  used  to  underpin  operating  and  maintenance  cost 
calculations, resulting in systematic bias. A consequence of this was observed in Bulgaria, 
where  the  forecast  maintenance  costs  per  km  was  approximately  double  the  outturn 
costs, which in turn were double the national average per km budget. In this case, there 
are two critical aspects: the operating phase revealed an overestimation of maintenance 
costs  in  the  application  phase  and  more  attention  should  be  dedicated  to  the  correct 
estimate of operating costs; and a clear identification of uses and sources throughout the 
project  lifecycle  has  to  be  improved,  in  close  relationship  with  budget  allocation  at 
government level. 

D9 

Financial modelling and approach  

The evaluation considered the following areas of financial modelling: 

  Quality of cash flow data; 

  Choice of discount rate; 

  Residual value; and 

  Financial risk analysis. 

These  aspects  have  an  important  role  in  project  financial  assessment  and  evaluation. 
Table D.1 presents a synthesis of main findings. 

70 

 
 
 
 
Table D.1 Summary of financial analysis 
Area 

Relevance 

Overall assessment 

Quality of cash flow data 

High 

Choice of discount rate 

Low 

Good  quality,  more  attention  to 
flows 
to 
be  dedicated 
and 
(either 
forecasts 
sources) 

future 
uses 

In line with European Commission 
guidelines  

Residual value 

Medium 

Generally not well developed.  

Financial risk analysis 

High 

Risk analysis should be developed 
more accurately 

Quality of cash flow data 

Definition 

The cash flows associated with each project were set out in the financial analysis of the 
cost benefit analysis. These cash flows include: 

 

Investment costs; 

  Operating expenditure; 

  Further 

investments  over  the 

forecast  period  (e.g.  maintenance  and 

replacement costs); and 

  Revenues.  

Synthesis of findings 

The overall quality of data provided for projects was in general of a good standard and in 
line with best practice. A general trend observed, and noted above, was that there was a 
lack  of  analysis  on  maintenance  costs.  In  some  cases  maintenance  is  not  referenced  at 
all and in other cases there was no indication of an average or annual amount. There was 
also a lack of cash flow evidence over the forecast period. This could be a major issue for 
the financial sustainability of projects in the future. 

Choice of discount rate 

Definition 

The  financial  discount  rate  (FDR)  is  the  opportunity  cost  of  capital,  which  occurs  when 
capital is used on one project resulting in the sacrifice of returns on another project. 

The  discount  rate  in  the  economic  analysis  of  investment  projects,  the  social  discount 
rate  (SDR),  should  reflect  the  social  view  on  how  future  benefits  and  costs  are  to  be 
valued  against  present  ones.  It  may  differ  from  the  financial  rate  of  return  because  of 
market failures in financial markets. 

The discount rate is applied to cash flow time series in order to calculate the net present 
value and internal rate of return of projects applying for co-financing. The discount rate 

71 

 
 
 
 
 
used can therefore significantly affect the results of economic and financial analysis. The 
choice  of  the  level  of  discount  rate  for  ex-ante  cost  benefit  analysis  is  indicated  in  the 
European Commission’s guidance and set to 5-5.5%.  

Synthesis of findings 

The  discount  rate  used  in  the  major  projects  examined  was  generally  in  line  with  the 
Commission requirements. Different discount rates were used to reflect varying levels of 
identified risk. Two rail projects adopted a discount rate of 6%, as did one road project, 
with  another  road  project  adopting  a  7%  discount  rate.  The  evaluation  concluded  that 
such approaches accurately reflected the specific project context.   

Residual value 

Definition 

The  residual  value  represents  the  value  of  the  assets  (infrastructure)  at  the  end  of  the 
considered  period.  It  is  strongly  related  to  the  maintenance  costs  and  time  period 
considered. 

Synthesis of findings 

The methodology used to calculate the residual value of major projects was generally not 
presented  in  the  documentation  that  was  analysed.  Where  the  residual  value  was 
included,  it  was  generally  overestimated,  particularly  for  road  projects.  This  was  due  to 
the  lack  of  consideration  of  maintenance  and  renewal  costs  in  the  financial  plan.  More 
attention  should  therefore  be  devoted  to  the  calculation  of  the  residual  value  to  avoid 
overestimation, as well as the elaboration of risk analysis should be improved. 

Financial risk analysis 

Definition 

Risks occur in terms of unexpected increases of specific known costs already considered, 
or in terms of new costs not considered in the ex-ante analysis. In the pre-construction 
and construction periods, the key financial risks for each project were associated with the 
overall  investment  costs.  The  assessment  for  the  sensitivity  and  risk  analysis  was 
expressed on the basis of the following elements:  

  Scenarios tested; 

  The variance of the assumptions; and  

  Related  explanatory  comments  (normally  the  sensitivity  analysis  should  be 

performed in a range of +/-5% up to +/-20%).  

Synthesis of findings 

In the operating period, the realisation of the estimated traffic/passenger volumes was a 
key  financial  risk  for  projects  where  a  fare  or  toll  revenue  was  collected.  Accurate 
estimates of future maintenance costs, and its variance, were also central to financial risk 
analysis. Financial risks should be identified and evaluated in a sensitivity analysis. 

72 

 
 
 
 
D10  Summary of conclusions  

The  evaluation  of  20  major  projects  considered  the  quality  of  the  financial  analysis 
undertaken during the ex-ante stage, and included both demand and financial aspects of 
projects. The quality of demand analysis varied between projects, particularly in the use 
of demographic data such as employment and car ownership. Such data was observed in 
many  instances  to  be  too  spatially  aggregate,  including  the  use  of  national  level  GDP 
forecasts  to  inform  demand  analysis.  This,  and  the  insufficient  consideration  of  project 
interactions  with  other  modes  and  routes,  is  considered  by  the  evaluators  to  have 
undermined the accuracy and quality of demand analysis for some projects. However, all 
projects  demonstrated  an  approach  consistent  with  best  practice  with  respect  to  the 
analysis of ‘with project’ and ‘without project’ scenarios.  

The  analysis  of  consumer  behaviour  and  willingness  to  pay  also  varied  across  the 
projects  evaluated,  with  little  evidence  of  variable  or  induced  demand  analysis.  There 
was also an over reliance on national level toll and fare policies, without consideration of 
affordability  among  the  target  markets.  Such  factors  could  have  undermined  the 
accuracy of demand analyses. There was also insufficient evidence of how charges would 
vary  over  the  appraisal  period  of  most  projects,  which  introduced  more  potential 
uncertainty regarding the accuracy of forecasting. 

The  accuracy  of  forecast  construction  costs  also  varied  between  the  projects  evaluated. 
The economic recession was a central factor in reducing contractor costs for many of the 
projects evaluated. The level of project preparation also influenced the outturn costs and 
implementation schedules. Examples were noted of good preparatory work, including the 
early  acquisition  of  land,  leading  to  cost  and  time  savings,  whilst  the  lack  of  ground 
investigation  was  an  example  of  poor  preparatory  work  which  lead  to  examples  of  cost 
and schedule overruns. 

The  financial  sustainability  of  some  projects  was  uncertain  due  to  a lack  of  evidence  on 
how  maintenance  costs  would  be  met.  A  lack  of  revenue  ring-fencing  for  operation  and 
maintenance  requirements  was  identified  in  many  road  projects.  Tolls  were  also  not 
implemented  to  programme  on  some  projects,  introducing  further  uncertainty  about 
downstream  revenues.  The  separation  of  the  Infrastructure  Manager  and  Railway 
Undertaking  responsibilities  was  also  observed  to  have  introduced  inaccuracies  and 
uncertainties  within  some  financial  analyses.  Overall,  cash  flow  and  risk  analyses  were 
considered accurate, although further analysis of risk and the residual value of projects is 
recommended.   

73 

 
 
 
 
Section E: Catalogue of challenges 

E1 

Introduction 

This section of the Final Report presents the catalogue of challenges, describing the most 
common  problems  encountered  in  the  demand  and  financial  analysis  of  major  projects, 
and solutions to address them. The review and analysis of 20 major projects, undertaken 
as  part  of  Task  2  of  this  evaluation,  was  the  source  of  the  initial list of  challenges.  The 
causes,  impacts  and  possible  solutions  were  also  considered  in  Task  2.  All  such  issues 
were  subsequently  considered  during  the  completion  of  Tasks  3,  the  more  detailed 
review  of  10  major  projects,  Task  5  the  Member  State  case  studies,  and  Task  6  the 
seminar.  Evidence  from  across  Member  States  and  projects  has  therefore  been  used, 
where available, for each challenge.  

After this brief introduction, each of the challenges is presented, providing the following 
information: 

  A  summary  of  the  challenge.  To  ensure  that  Member  State  agencies  and 
potential users will be able to quickly understand the nature of the challenges 
and potential solutions; 

  A more detailed and technical overview of the challenge; 

  Potential warning signs for the challenge in question to allow agencies to have 

an ‘early warning’ of potential challenges; 

 

 

Implications of the challenge in question for the financial analysis of a project; 

Implications of the challenge in question for the financial sustainability of the 
project; and  

  Potential solutions to assist in overcoming each challenge. 

Throughout  the  above,  examples  from  among  the  20  major  projects  assessed  in  this 
evaluation are used to illustrate specific points (these are presented in italics for ease of 
identification). The challenges are presented in the following groups: 

  Challenges in demand analysis; and 

  Challenges in financial and economic analysis. 

74 

 
 
 
 
 
  
 
E2  Demand analysis 

E2.1  Accuracy in calculating demand forecasts  

Challenge 

Heading 

Summary 

Technical overview 

Forecasting demand accurately to reflect project location, 
population trends and contextual factors. 

A range of factors influence the accuracy of demand 
forecasting for major projects, and a range of different 
techniques and data sources can be used. In particular, the 
use of demographic datasets, including population, GDP and 
car ownership, to estimate population size and transport 
requirements, is common. However, as outlined in the First 
Interim Report33 only half of the 20 projects evaluated 
included employment data, and different geographical 
coverage was observed in GDP data use; ranging from local 
administrative district to national data. 

The quality and accuracy of forecasts has therefore been 
inconsistent across projects, undermining the robustness of 
ex-ante evaluations and making comparison of forecast 
growth and ex-ante financial performance difficult. 

An example of the impact of inaccurate growth forecasts on 
demand, and thereby benefit estimates, was the Trakia 
Motorway in Bulgaria. The comparison of forecast and outturn 
traffic levels identified that the forecasts were overestimating 
demand. The average shortfall in traffic from that forecast 
was circa 25%. The most likely cause of the difference 
between forecast and outturn traffic flows was economic 
growth assumptions. Between 2008 (the base year for the 
model) and 2014, the forecast economic growth, based on 
reliable sources including the IMF, World Bank and European 
Commission, was 24.7%, whereas outturn growth was only 
0.8% (source: World Bank). Thus, outturn GDP was only 80% 
of that forecast, and since the relationship between traffic 
growth and GDP growth was more or less 1:1 over this 
period, the difference in GDP would account for the majority 
of the difference in traffic flows. 

A further example was Romania, where the stakeholder view 
was that historically a conservative approach to forecasting 
traffic growth has been taken and that these forecasts are 
usually exceeded.  However, the GDP forecasts applied in the 
two case study projects indicate something different because 
even the low-growth long-term forecasts run at an annual 
percentage growth rate which is slightly above the Eurostat 

33 Section D3.1, pp 122 

75 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
 
GDP forecast annual rate for the same period. 

The growth rate of the value of time can also have a 
significant impact on the level of benefit generated. The 
growth in value of time is directly related to income which, in 
general, is approximated by the growth in GDP per person 
employed.  

An example of the challenge in forecasting such values was 
the Budapest Line 4 project. The cost-benefit analysis was 
based on an annual average growth rate in the value of time 
of 2.6%, over the appraisal period. Examination of the latest 
Convergence Programme submitted by Hungary and the 
European Commission’s response indicated that, in the short 
term, a rate of circa 1% was likely to be realised. Although a 
higher rate may be realised in the long-term, a rate of 2.6% 
would require a sustained period of growth in real income and 
is therefore considered optimistic. 

The programming period of 2007–2013 corresponded very 
closely with the global economic crisis. As a consequence, the 
short to medium term demand forecasts generated prior to or 
during the crisis cannot be expected to fully account for the 
impact of the macro economic situation on travel demand. 
Nonetheless, demand forecasts are applied in project 
economic appraisal over a long period of time, typically 25 
years, a time horizon extending well beyond the direct impact 
of current global economic conditions. However, inaccurate 
approaches to demand forecasting could produce considerable 
variation in the short to medium term travel demand 
forecasts and the build up through the full appraisal period. 

Previous project submissions from a Member State have not 
made use of demographic sources in demand analysis, or 
have made little reference to the method applied. 

Demand analysis is reliant purely on current trends or 
national demand forecasts, and does not include forecasts for 
the specific region/project type. 

The poor forecasting of future demand can result in the under 
or overestimation of project benefits, particularly those 
relating to user travel time; which accounts for the majority 
of benefits in most projects. Poor demand forecasting also 
impacts on the accuracy of estimates of operating costs, 
accidents, emissions and potentially maintenance.  

An example of this was noted in the E30 Kraków to Rzeszów 
rail modernisation, stage 3. The two voivodeships through 
which the E30 runs were described by stakeholders as unique 
in terms of the demographics. They were understood to 
contain a population with a higher GDP per capita than other 

76 

Warning signs 

Implications for 
financial analysis 

 
 
 
 
regions. This, it was suggested, would generate higher travel 
demand and a greater willingness to pay for travel than was 
estimated in the cost benefit analysis. 

A secondary impact is that the under or over-estimation of 
demand could influence the design details (e.g. junction 
designs for highway schemes) developing in preliminary and 
detailed design activities, leading to unreliable project costs 
estimates.  

The impacts on the financial sustainability of projects include: 

Implications for the 
financial sustainability 
of the project 

  Inaccurate estimates of revenue from tolls or fares, 

particularly in the short to medium term; and 

  Inaccurate calculation of operating and maintenance costs. 

Greater accuracy can be achieved in a number of ways: 

  Growth in travel demand is ultimately driven by changes in 
socio-economic variables such as GDP and car ownership, 
and demographic changes in population. Demand forecasts 
should therefore explicitly incorporate these elements at a 
regional and national level;  

  Relationships linking socio-economic indicators and travel 
demand should be tested against historic trends before 
application in forecasting; 

Solution to overcome 
challenge 

  Socio-economic and demographic datasets should be 

disaggregated at an appropriate level of spatial detail: it 
will not normally be appropriate to apply only national 
level data directly to project demand forecasting; and 

  Use of recognised (national, Eurostat or similar) data 

sources will aid consistency across projects and between 
Member States. 

Other factors that should be considered include: 

  Changes in demographic and employment indices through 

time; 

  Forecasts for specific economic sectors that influence 

travel demand (e.g. tourism); and 

  Income levels. 

77 

 
 
 
 
 
 
E2.2  Forecasting impacts of construction on demand 

Challenge 

Heading 

Summary 

Technical overview 

Warning signs 

The accuracy of demand forecasting relating to the short to 
medium term impacts of construction, particularly in the rail 
sector.  

Demand forecasting has inherent risks associated with 
determining both the overall level of demand and build-up of 
demand through time. Such risks are particularly prominent 
during the short to medium term after project 
implementation, where demand ramps-up, a process 
recognised by the European Commission with the introduction 
of the loan guarantee instrument for TEN-T projects (LGTT)34. 

Uncertainties regarding demand are particularly evident for 
rail infrastructure projects, where the project implementation 
period impacts on existing travel behaviour. The 
implementation of rail infrastructure, particularly 
modernisation works, results in the temporary disruption to 
existing services. This in turn generates potential short-term 
modal shift, particularly where there are parallel road or 
public transport options. The ex-ante forecasting of the level 
of permanent and temporary modal shift, and timescales for 
demand returning to rail, is challenging and needs to be 
underpinned by a clear understanding of traveller behaviour 
in the area. When combined with the ramp-up period 
uncertainties, these issues represent challenges in demand 
forecasting.  

The E30 rail modernisation project in Poland highlights the 
potential impact of construction activity on demand 
forecasting. Minibus services were established on the A4 
highway because of the opportunities to develop new routes 
and market share afforded by the rail works. Rail service 
disruptions and slower running speeds meant that the mini-
buses offered competitive journey times and costs. The level 
and rate of demand returning to rail post modernisation was 
not overtly considered in the ex-ante evaluation.  

The build-up of demand through time is relevant to all 
transport modes, and is not specific to rail or public transport 
projects. 

The lack of consideration of a ramp up factor/period within 
demand forecasting. 

The lack of consideration of transfer to alternative 
modes/routes within demand forecasting. 

34 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/infrastructure/studies/doc/2014_ex-
post_evaluation_of_the_loan_guarantee_instrument_for_ten-t_projects.pdf 

78 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
The greatest implication for the financial analysis is that the 
demand forecast could be inaccurate, with a tendency for 
forecasts to be over-estimating demand. This is most evident 
in the short to medium term (1-5 years), but assuming ramp-
up occurs this should not influence the overall EBCR of the 
project.  

An example of the impact of a ramp up factor on demand is 
the E30 Kraków to Rzeszów rail modernisation, stage 3. The 
view of JASPERS was that that, when completed, the E30 
corridor will achieve both the regional and national objectives 
of connectivity, through the achievement of enhanced journey 
times and service quality. However, the longer than 
anticipated construction period of the E30, and the approach 
taken to deliver the project section-by-section, were 
considered likely to influence the ramp up of rail demand 
following completion. The view of stakeholders was that this 
could take 6-12 months longer than originally forecast. 

The impacts on demand are generally observed in the short to 
medium term, during the effective ramp-up period as people 
adjust their behaviour. The above mentioned LGTT was 
formulated on the basis that once a project has passed 
through the ramp-up period, it should provide sufficient cash 
flows to service any debt. However, the available revenue and 
spread across the forecast period will be influenced by a lack 
of, or inaccurate assessment of, the ramp up period in 
demand forecasting. The main implication is the ability to 
generate sufficient revenue to provide efficient debt-
financing. This may in turn also influence the calculation of 
maintenance and operating costs in the short term. 

The inclusion of a ramp-up period within the short to medium 
term demand forecasts would assist in determining the 
growth in demand post opening. However, establishing 
guidance on suitable ramp-up factors is itself challenging. For 
example, the most recent Transport Scotland guidance for the 
evaluation of rail projects35 promoted the use of such factors, 
yet did not present suggested values. It is therefore 
recommended that sensitivity testing be undertaken on 
forecast demand, and thereby revenue, to consider the 
potential implications of cash flow. Potential and unexpected 
market changes should be accommodated within such tests. 

Implications for 
financial analysis 

Implications for the 
financial sustainability 
of the project 

Solution to overcome 
challenge 

35

www.transportscotland.gov.uk/system/files/documents/research/Transport%20Research%20-
%20Rail%20Evaluation%20-%20Rail%20Evaluation%20Guidance%20-%202015%20version%20-
%20Final%20Pdf%20-%20May%202015.pdf  

79 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
E2.3  Assessment of competing routes/modes 

Challenge 

Heading 

Summary 

Technical overview 

Warning signs 

Implications for 
financial analysis 

Insufficient assessment of project interaction with competing 
modes or routes.  

The interaction of a major project with other, competing, 
modes and routes influences the demand forecast. Identifying 
and understanding this interaction is needed to define the 
overall travel demand in an area or corridor, and the relative 
attractiveness of available transport options. Demand 
forecasting across multiple modes is needed, and introduces 
challenges such as estimating the level of abstraction new 
projects will generate from existing transport services.  

This is exemplified by the E30 project in Poland, where the 
accuracy of the assumed relative attractiveness of the A4 and 
E30 route options was questioned by stakeholders. It was 
noted that national demand on the roads had reached a level 
in 2014 forecast to be achieved in 2024. Highway demand 
had therefore been commonly under-estimated in project 
feasibility and cost-benefit analyses. There was no consensus 
on the potential impact such a systematic bias would have on 
the forecast demand for the E30 and other rail modernisation 
projects in Poland. 

Very few of the 20 major projects reviewed as part of Task 2 
of this ex-post evaluation referenced the wider impacts of the 
project on the transport system, in terms of competing modes 
or routes. Most projects implicitly had the capability to assess 
such factors, as the demand analysis was constructed on the 
basis of transport models. In some cases the model was at a 
national spatial level and risked having insufficient detail for 
an adequate understanding of the project, and in other cases 
the study area was too small to incorporate competing 
corridors.  

A particular challenge when assessing the interaction of 
competing modes, is the value of time attributed to demand 
shifting between modes. The evaluation has determined 
significant variance in the methodologies applied. 

The consideration of only the preferred route, with no 
inclusion of adjacent, competing modes or routes. 

No reference to potential abstraction between modes. 

The demand forecast is central to financial analysis. This itself 
is predicated on identifying the base and forecast demand for 
travel, the mode and route options. The operation of tolls (for 
roads) and fare strategies (for rail) for each competing 

80 

 
 
 
 
 
 
mode/route is also important. The non-inclusion or inaccurate 
identification of competing routes and modes will influence 
the forecast demand and revenue for projects.  

The E30 Kraków to Rzeszów rail modernisation project 
demand forecasting and cost-benefit analysis included the 
assumed completion and operation of the parallel A4 
motorway; including the implementation of tolls for passenger 
and freight vehicles.  

However, as noted above, road demand was already higher 
than forecast, in part because proposed tolling had not been 
introduced. Understanding and forecasting the movement of 
travel demand between modes and routes is also central to 
estimating the net results of a project. Calculating the level of 
demand for a project must consider abstraction from other 
routes/modes, and the net benefits thereby generated. 

The main implication for the medium to long term financial 
sustainability of projects relates to the operation of tolling or 
revenue streams, and the accuracy of assumptions included 
within the ex-ante evaluation. The example above on the E30 
assumed tolling would operate on the parallel A4, and the 
continued absence could influence rail demand (as road 
remains more attractive) and increase the funding gap for the 
project. 

The assessment of the interaction of transport projects with 
other modes/routes is an explicit part of the Commission’s 
guidance on cost benefit analysis36. Indeed, Table 3.1 of the 
2014 guidance stipulates that the following should be 
presented as part of the minimum requirements: 

  Information about competition from alternative transport 

modes;  

  Pricing and regulatory policy; 

Implications for the 
financial sustainability 
of the project 

Solution to overcome 
challenge 

  Capacity constraints and congestion on competing modes; 

and 

  Planned and/or recently executed investments that may 

affect the project performance. 

The consideration of alternative modes should include: 

‘the degree of complementarity and competition among 
transport modes. In particular, competing modes and 
alternative routes, fares and costs for users, pricing and 
regulation policies, congestion and capacity constraints and 
expected new investments should be assessed.’ (section 3.5.2 

36 Guide to Cost-Benefit Analysis of Investment Projects Economic appraisal tool for cohesion policy 2014-2020, 
December 2014 

81 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
of the 2014 guidance) 

With regards to the value of time, where sufficiently detailed 
modelling and datasets exist, the generalised cost by mode, 
between origin and destination pairs should be calculated for 
the ‘with project’ and ‘without project’ scenarios. In the 
absence of such data, the best practice approach remains the 
application of the ‘rule of half’ to the travel costs of the 
shifted mode.  

82 

 
 
 
 
 
E2.4  Suboptimal use of formal transport model 

Challenge 

Heading 

Summary 

Technical overview 

Developing and operating a multi-modal transport model that 
reflects the project scope and potential results.  

The majority of projects analysed made use of a formal 
transport model in the demand analysis. However, frequently 
either the scope of input data or the approach to forecasting 
was of a lower quality than could reasonably be achieved, and 
thereby limited the effectiveness and accuracy of the 
modelling.  

The use of poor quality data inputs to models, including their 
age and geographical coverage, undermines the accuracy of 
forecasts. The origin of transport models underpinning the 
demand analysis of 2007-2013 major projects varied 
according to a number of considerations: 

  Project development timeframe: some projects had been 

in development for a long time and models were 
constructed using assumptions/data/guidance that were 
relatively old; and 

  Original scope of project/model development: for example 
some projects initially sought funding from the EIB and 
developed modelling for this purpose, others made use of 
a strategic model originally designed for project 
prioritisation. 

In addition to variation in the original purpose of the transport 
models, constraints such as technical knowledge, time and 
budget have applied limitations on the model development 
process and the scope of data inputs. 

However, it should be recognised that the 2007-2013 
programming period has seen extensive investment among 
Member States in national transport modelling platforms, 
including additional capacity building among Managing 
Authorities.  

The Romania case studies highlighted some of the quality 
issues raised above. Both used highway models which made 
use of the 2005 national census data. By the time of project 
opening these data were at least 8 years old and in that time 
Romania had acceded to the European Union. The case study 
interviews also emphasised the limited appraisal expertise 
available in the country at the beginning of the 2007-2013 
programming period. An increase in the understanding of 
appraisal requirements and the skill base has been observed 
over the period and this, together with the development of 

83 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Warning signs 

Implications for 
financial analysis 

Implications for the 
financial sustainability 
of the project 

the General Transport Masterplan, gives confidence that 
future applications will include enhanced demand analysis. 

Lack of information provided on input parameters applied.  
Limited evidence of new, area specific, data collection or 
reliance on historic data substantially older than model base 
year. 

Use of strategic model with geographic coverage not 
commensurate with the scope of the project(s) being 
evaluated.  

The suboptimal use of transport modelling could undermine 
the reliability of the demand analysis for a project.  This can 
manifest itself in a number of ways: 

  Lack of confidence in travel demand/travel time savings 

arising from inadequate or old data; 

  Inaccurate forecasting of travel demands resulting from 

simplistic assumptions or reliance on out-of-date 
demographic data; 

  Misjudgement of the impact of the project on the wider 

transport network, leading to incorrect conclusions on its 
efficacy and therefore the economic return it will generate; 
and 

  Underestimation of overall travel demand due to a lack of 
sophistication in the modelling (e.g. models only capable 
of calculating a re-routeing response and not able to 
consider other demand responses such as mode change; 
generation of new trips; change in trip destination or re-
timing of journeys). 

For projects where user charges will be applied: 

  The financial sustainability of projects is generally sensitive 
to changes in demand as this can have a major impact on 
revenue received from ticket prices or tolling; and 

  Where tolls/fares are set using a national framework, an 
overestimation of demand will reduce the income of the 
project proportionally; where tolls/fares are set according 
to a supply/demand relationship incorrect demand 
forecasts are likely to require adjustment of that 
relationship. 

Solution to overcome 
challenge 

As noted in the 2014 update of the cost benefit analysis 
guidance, no detailed guidance on modelling exists at the EU 
level. However, to support Member States in enhancing the 
quality and consistency of modelling, the following basic 

84 

 
 
 
 
principles are noteworthy37: 

  Traffic modelling is used to predict the travel choice made 
by users travelling through the network, and to load the 
resulting trip movements to the modelled network based 
on a selection of the most likely routing for each trip. The 
model then describes the loaded transport network after 
this process has been completed; 

  The state of the transport network in future years on the 
basis of growth in travel demand, committed network 
changes and changes in socio-economic data can also be 
defined. Future years usually coincide at least with the 
opening year and a distant forecast year which is used for 
assessment of long-term capacity needs or is the end year 
of economic evaluation; 

  Many transport models require substantial input data 

derived from standard statistics and special surveys for 
building a model of trips, a model of the network and for 
understanding current traffic flows and demand structure 
for the purpose of model calibration. This is essential for 
the model to be sufficiently accurate and have credibility 
for planning and decision making; 

  The output from the transport model is used to design 

adequate sizing and features of the investment, to verify 
the appropriateness of planned infrastructure capacity, and 
provides quantitative information that informs the scheme 
design, the cost benefit analysis and the Environmental 
Impact Assessment; 

  Whatever model and modelling process is adopted, all 

hypotheses and assumptions applied to estimated existing 
and future demand should be made explicit by the project 
promoter. Although the analysis of the input data for 
traffic modelling is not a task of the cost benefit analysis, 
nevertheless, there should be the source should be given 
of all quoted demographic, spatial and economic data  

37 Page 82 of CBA guidance, section 3.5.2 

85 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
E2.5  Correct representation of willingness-to-pay in models 

Challenge 

Heading 

Summary 

Technical overview 

Establishing correct representations of the willingness-to-pay 
within transport cost benefit analysis. 

A correct understanding of willingness-to-pay is central to 
transport cost benefit analysis, and to achieving the correct 
sensitivity to toll/fare levels. Whilst separately modelling the 
values of time for different trip purposes (such as commuting 
and business trips) can be sufficient in some modelling 
applications, the large size of these groups prohibits models 
from accurately representing responses to small changes in 
tolls/fares.  

Across the project case studies there was very limited 
evidence that transport models accounted for different levels 
of willingness to pay, and the expected variation in trip 
choice/travel behaviour that result from these differences. 

There was no evidence from the evaluation to indicate that 
calculations of demand have identified willingness to pay 
bands. Calculations often attributed different values of time 
by journey purpose, but there was no evidence that this had 
distinguished between different levels of willingness to pay 
within appropriate trip purposes (such as commuting). 

This challenge applies to public transport projects or highway 
schemes with tolling, and where a user charge is a key factor 
in traveller behaviour. It will also be relevant for projects 
where the proposed infrastructure is sensitive to demand on 
another corridor/competing mode where user charges apply. 
This is in part linked with the impacts on rail schemes of the 
ramp up factor, and how quickly people will change 
behaviour. 

Patronage/demand forecasts not linked to the proposed 
charging regime. 

Warning signs 

Proposed travel demand does not benchmark against similar 
case study examples. 

Implications for 
financial analysis 

A lack of banding of value of time for different trip purposes.  

An inaccurate estimation of travel demand because of a lack 
of understanding of willingness-to-pay.  This is also likely to 
result in an inaccurate estimation of the revenue received 
from charges, or a faulty understanding of the appropriate 
scale of charges which should be levied over time. 

86 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Implications for the 
financial sustainability 
of the project 

The inaccurate forecasting of demand, through poor 
understanding of cost elasticity, will undermine future 
revenue calculations. The build up of demand through time 
will also be influenced by pricing strategies, which must be 
reflects in forecasting procedures.  

Solution to overcome 
challenge 

There are two mechanisms available to overcome this 
challenge: 

  Further segmentation of trip purpose by willingness to 

pay; or 

  The inclusion of a toll user choice within a demand model. 

An understanding of willingness to pay is dependent upon 
evidence which is able to distinguish both between the 
outright purchasing power of transport users and the value 
they place on a particular option to make a journey.  
Assumptions on willingness to pay are usually established 
through a stated preference survey. Good practice also 
includes the assessment of willingness to pay for 
improvements in factors such as noise, air quality and 
accidents. 

87 

 
 
 
 
 
 
E3 

Financial and economic analysis 

E3.1  Tariffing defaults to application of national standards 

Challenge 

Heading 

Summary 

Technical overview 

Warning signs 

Defining tariffing levels within a national regulatory context. 

Whilst  tariffing  must  apply  values  set  within  a  national 
regulatory  context,  consideration  of  how  user  costs  will  vary 
over  time  should  be  included  in  demand  analysis.  Further, 
without an understanding of willingness-to-pay (see above) it 
is  not  possible  to  properly  understand  consumer  behaviour 
where direct costs apply to using transport infrastructure. 

referenced  an  existing  national 

The  majority  of  the  projects  evaluated  where  fares  or  tolls 
tariffing 
are  applied 
framework.  This  approach  often 
into 
consideration  uplift  in  fares  and  charges  over  time,  but  also 
reflected a lack of analysis of the link between travel demand 
and the generalised cost of travel including fares. 

take 

fails 

to 

No evidence that user charges have been varied over time in 
the  demand  analysis.  Note:  removal  of  inflation  increases 
may  be  appropriate  for  economic  appraisal  but  beyond 
inflation  increases  or  changes  in  government  subsidy  levels 
should be tracked. 

Inadequate  links  between  the  proposed  charging  regime  and 
the generalised cost for travel in the demand analysis. 

No  evidence  of  the  build  up  of  tariffs,  in  relation  to  the 
internalisation of costs to the users.   

Implications for 
financial analysis 

The  implications  for  financial  analysis  parallel  those  for  the 
understanding  of  willingness  to  pay:  inaccurate  forecast  of 
travel  demand  because  of  a  faulty  understanding  of  the 
generalised cost of the transport service over time.   

Implications for the 
financial sustainability 
of the project 

The  inaccurate  forecasting  of  travel  demand,  allied  to  a  lack 
of  variation  in  tariffing  through  project  appraisal  periods, 
could  result  in  an  inaccurate  estimation  of  the  revenue 
received  from  charges.  This  could  result  in  a  greater  funding 
gap than forecast, or the inability to service debt payments. 

Solution to overcome 
challenge 

is  often  required 

Whilst  it  is  accepted  that  adherence  to  a  national  regulatory 
for  user  charging,  some 
framework 
sensitivity  testing  around  the  set  user  charge  values  would 
add confidence to the demand forecasts. Although there is no 
single  solution  or  methodology  to  establishing  tariffs,  more 
transparency  and  detail  should  be  presented  in  ex-ante 
evaluations. This includes: 

88 

 
 
 
 
 
 
  Articulating the pricing policy with regards to maximising 
revenue and/or setting efficient pricing that reflects the 
external costs of transport (noise, pollution, congestion); 

  Clear statements on anticipated or forecast changes in 

tariffs/charging policy through time; and 

  Additional sensitivity testing of tariffing levels and impacts 

on demand. 

89 

 
 
 
 
 
E3.2  Accuracy of calculating operating and maintenance costs 

Challenge 

Heading 

Summary 

Technical overview 

The accurate calculation of maintenance and operating costs, 
and the net present value of projects. 

The operation and maintenance costs can account for a 
substantial proportion of the net present value of a scheme. A 
range of challenges have been identified that could undermine 
the quality and robustness of project financial analysis: 

  As noted above, the inaccurate forecasting of overall 

demand, and its build-up through time, will influence the 
operating and maintenance costs; 

  Uncertainty over the outturn annual operation and 
maintenance costs, and difficulty in comparing with 
observed data due to the recent implementation of many 
projects e.g.  

The Trakia motorway in Bulgaria where the maintenance 
costs were estimated to be circa €12,500 per km per 
annum. Maintenance spending after two years was circa 
€7,000 per km per annum (50%-60% of the forecast 
cost). The budget for maintenance of Bulgaria’s national 
road network is circa €60 nm, for 19,000 km, or €3,200 
per km. As such, the current level of maintenance 
expenditure was not viewed as being reflective of the long-
term need. However, the forecast cost included in the 
project application was still viewed as the best forecast of 
maintenance cost; 

  The inclusion of rolling stock upgrades and associated 
revised operating and maintenance costs within the 
demand analysis, for example: 

The E30 project in Poland assumed replacement rolling 
stock and the associated passenger/demand benefits, but 
without adding the cost to the initial cost-benefit analysis; 

  The disconnect between revenues generated from road 

tolls and maintenance budgets, resulting in a lack of ring-
fencing of funds and no guarantee of ongoing 
maintenance, for example:  

The maintenance and operational costs in Romania were 
considered reasonable and will be the responsibility of the 
final beneficiary. These costs will be covered from the 
national budget, and whilst this promises financial 
sustainability, discussions with JASPERS indicated that the 
lack of a maintenance strategy in Romania to-date had 
compromised the maintenance of parts of the road 
network.  In the short term a benefit of new or 
rehabilitated infrastructure is a reduction in the 

90 

 
 
 
 
 
 
maintenance burden; 

  The inclusion of operating and maintenance savings 

(benefits) as well as costs, for example: 

An example of good practice was the Budapest Line 4 
project. The long-term financial sustainability of the 
scheme was assessed by examining the level of cost 
savings associated with surface modes. A large number of 
changes were implemented to surface modes along the 
Metro Line 4 corridor including: 

o  Decreased capacity of bus lines;  

o  Cancellation of some rapid bus services; 

o  Rerouting of bus lines; and  

o  Frequency of tramline decreased. 

The above generated forecast savings of €34 m (2006 
prices) in renewal costs associated with surface modes 
over the lifetime of Metro Line 4.  

It is also noted that some projects apply operating and 
maintenance costs on the benefits rather than the cost side of 
the benefit cost ratio calculation in their economic appraisal. 

The ex-post evaluation has highlighted that these ex-ante 
hypotheses have often not been verified once construction 
had been completed. Revenues are often not ring fenced or a 
general approach defined at the national level is applied; a 
more project tailored tolling approach should be used. This 
should consider user charge dynamics as well as the 
outcomes of the demand analysis carried out for the project, 
such as modal alternatives and willingness-to-pay. Operating 
and maintenance costs are often not included, and were 
included general sources from national budget are indicated 
to cover them.  

Constant maintenance or operating costs throughout the 
forecast period. 

Lack of savings identified due to the replacement or removal 
of other public transport services. 

The main implication relates to the ongoing financial 
sustainability of projects. The levels of operating and 
maintenance costs were generally very low relative to the 
capital investment. 

Underestimating the operating and maintenance costs has 
significant implications for the financial sustainability of 
specific projects, particularly those that are non-revenue 
generating.  

The operating phase has been rather neglected in its 
fundamental components (revenues and costs) resulting in 

91 

Warning signs 

Implications for 
financial analysis 

Implications for the 
financial sustainability 
of the project 

 
 
 
 
projects that could have significantly different (and worse) 
effects on the Member State, e.g. with higher budget burdens 
in the medium term. 

Good practice for estimating operating and maintenance costs 
includes presenting the following detailed breakdown: 

  Infrastructure operational costs, such as repairs, ongoing 
maintenance and the running of any traffic management 
system; 

  Service operating costs, such as staff, materials, rolling 

stock; 

  Service management, such as toll/fare collection and 

associated costs; and 

  Routine and periodic maintenance. 

All of the above should be presented for the project and 
counterfactual scenarios, to demonstrate variance relative to 
the type of infrastructure e.g. age of existing structures and 
associated routine maintenance frequency/cost. The average 
maintenance costs for similar infrastructure, calculated at the 
Member State level, should also be used to benchmark 
forecasts.  

The financing of road maintenance and investment is 
currently being examined on behalf of the Bulgarian 
authorities by the World Bank. This study will examine a 
range of options, including distance-based charging for HGVs, 
and provide the basis for determining future road charging 
policy. This policy is a key part of the Commission’s 2011 
White Paper for Transport.  The system would be similar to 
that operating in the Czech Republic and Poland. 

Solution to overcome 
challenge 

92 

 
 
 
 
 
E3.3  Forecasting construction costs 

Challenge 

Heading 

Summary 

Technical overview 

Estimating  construction  costs  accurately  as  part  of  the 
economic analysis of projects. 

Two separate but related challenges have been observed with 
regard to forecasting construction costs.  

First,  a  number  of  factors  can  lead  to  uncertainty  in 
estimating  construction  costs  by  Member  States  when  they 
are considering potential projects. If the costs of a project are 
underestimated  the  net  benefits  of  the  project  will  be 
correspondingly  overestimated  This  uncertainty  cannot  be 
completely  eliminated.  However,  it  is  usually  possible  to 
estimate  risk  factors.  The  accuracy  of  specific  elements  of 
cost estimates varied between projects, with challenges noted 
in relation to: 

 

Environmental impacts; 

  Geotechnical works; and 

 

Estimating the implementation schedule/duration. 

A  common  cause  of  such  issues  was  the  use  of  preliminary 
designs  for  costing  purposes,  prior  to  construction  contracts 
being awarded. While designs are still at a preliminary stage, 
cost  estimates  have  to  be  cautious  and  should  include 
generous  contingencies  for,  as  yet,  unforeseen  costs  and 
risks. Other common risks include issues such as flooding and 
landslides during construction, and archaeological discoveries. 

in 

the 

challenge 

forecasting 

the 
An  example  of 
implementation  programmes  and  therefore  costs  was  the 
Budapest  Line  4,  in  Hungary.  Subsequent  to  the  application 
for funding to the EU the cost of the project increased by circa 
28% in the local currency. This financial impact is considered 
to  be  a  result  of  (as  opposed  to  the  cause  of)  delays  in 
delivery  of  the  project.  The  underestimation  of  costs  and 
project  timeline  were  considered  a  systemic  bias  within  the 
project.  The  absence  of  an  organisation  overseeing  the 
planning and development of transport in the wider Budapest 
area  was  considered  a  key  institutional  factor  in  the  delays 
and  cost  overruns  encountered  during  the  Metro  Line  4 
project.  

Another  example  from  the  TEN-T  7  Cernavoda  to  Constanta 
Motorway  project  in  Romania  was  the  consideration  of 
geotechnical  issues  and  site  investigation  was  generally 
insufficient  when  preparing  project  feasibility  studies.  This 
was often due to political pressure and compressed timescales 
but it meant that the risk of cost escalation due to unforeseen 
ground conditions was higher than necessary. The Ministry of 

93 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Transport recognised that longer periods of time needed to be 
allowed  to  develop  projects  and  to  ensure  that  the  feasibility 
process was robust enough to proceed to detailed design. The 
implementation  of  the  General  Transport  Masterplan  was 
assisting  as  it  provides  stability  in  terms  of  project  selection 
and also permits the resources of the Ministry and CNADNR to 
be applied more efficiently to managing project development. 
There  were  additional  works  required  on  all  three  Lots  that 
were  not  part  of  the  original  contracts.  This  included  minor 
works  associated  with  underground  facilities  (mainly  water 
pipes)  on  Lots  3  and  4  and  overhead  high-voltage  electricity 
lines (Lot 2). It is believed some of these additional costs may 
have  been  foreseen  (and  potentially  avoided)  if  more  recent 
surveys of the routes had been undertaken.  

Secondly there has been some evidence of over-estimating of 
costs  by  Member  States  during  the  2007-2013  programming 
period.  For  a  number  of  major  projects,  the  prices  tendered 
for a major project by contractors at procurement were lower 
than  the  costs  estimated  by  Member  States  at  the  project 
selection and planning stage.  If the cost  of a  project is over-
estimated by a Member State, the net benefits of the projects 
will 
correspondingly  under-estimated.  Systematic 
underestimation of project costs will lead to under investment 
and  missed  opportunities  to  invest  in  valuable  projects.  The 
projects  examined  as  part  of  this  study  indicated  that  this 
situation  had  arisen  due  to  market  conditions  when  the 
projects in question went out to tender.   

be 

 An  example  from  the  Trakia  Motorway,  Bulgaria.  The  actual 
cost of the project is circa 28% below the level forecast in the 
project  application.  The  Bulgarian  authorities  estimated  that 
the capital costs of projects during the 2007-13 programming 
period  reduced  by  on  average  20%  after  the  completion  of 
the  procurement  processes.  The  capital  cost  reductions 
between the levels in the project applications and post-tender 
process are shown in the figure below (in Bulgarian Lev) for a 
range of Bulgarian road projects. 

A key driver  of this difference is believed to be the economic 

94 

 
 
 
 
 
 
circumstances at the time which led contractors to bid at low 
prices.  The  effects  of  the  economic  crash  led  to  overcapacity 
among  contractors  and  intense  competition  for  the  available 
work. This combination of factors may not reoccur in the near 
future. 

Discussions  with  stakeholders,  particularly  at  the  seminar 
organised for Member State stakeholders, identified a related 
challenge  from  lower  than  expected  tender  prices.  In  some 
Member  States  procurement  is  based  on  price  only,  with  no 
consideration  of  the  technical  or  economic  capacity  of 
tenderers.  When  market  conditions  are  forcing  price  cutting 
by  tenderers  this  type  of  procurement  creates  a  risk  that  a 
contract  will  be  awarded  to  a  tenderer  of  limited  resources 
who has bid a price below the cost of completing the contract. 
This  contractor  will  be  unable  to  complete  the  work,  and  the 
contract  will  have  to  be  retendered.  There  was  anecdotal 
evidence  of  this  taking  place,  and  causing  delays  and  extra 
costs in the completion of contracts. 

Lack of detailed design and costings within the economic and 
financial analysis. 

Cost-only contractor evaluation criteria. 

Inaccurate 
the  EBCR 
forecast  costs  will  undermine 
calculations,  leading  to  less  than  optimal  project  choice 
decisions.  Any  delays  experienced  or  re-tendering  required 
due  to  inaccurate  cost  forecasting  could  result  in  increased 
construction costs.  

The  most  commonly  observed  impact  of  the  economic 
recession was on the overall cost of projects, with the outturn 
contracted  values  being  up  to  25%  lower  than  forecast. 
However,  although  tendered  costs  were  low  this  did  result in 
cases  of  contractor  bankruptcy  and  delivery  delays;  although 
not necessarily cost increases. 

Any  cost  increases  during  construction,  incurred  due  to 
compensation  claims  by  contractors 
following  detailed 
investigations,  could  increase  the  overall  cost  of  the  project, 
and undermine the ongoing sustainability; on the assumption 
that demand will remain as forecast.   

for 
On  the  other  hand  the  minimum  cost  approach 
contractor’s  selection  has  to  be  reconsidered.  It  could 
generate high risks of defaults for the contractors themselves 
as well as a high probability of claims and disputes that could 
lead to delays and cost increases. Although the evidence from 
case  studies  is  for  a  greater  incidence  of  discounts  on  the 
contract  prices,  it  seems  more  related  to  the  negative 
economic  situation  in  Europe,  rather  than  a  pure  effect  of 
market competition. 

95 

Warning signs 

Implications for 
financial analysis 

Implications for the 
financial sustainability 
of the project 

 
 
 
 
With  regards  to  the  accurate  estimate  of  construction  costs, 
the  inclusion  of  a  risk/sensitivity  analysis  is  required.  This 
could  also  include  the  adoption  of  optimism  bias  to  increase 
forecasts costs to provide a contingency for anticipated risks. 

against 

benchmarked 

The  total  and  unit  (e.g.  per  km)  costs  should  be  presented, 
and 
State 
infrastructure. It is also good practice to present the costs for 
large  structures,  such  as  tunnels  and  bridges,  separately  to 
enhance  the  transparency  of  forecast  costs.  Land  purchase 
costs should also be clearly identifiable.  

similar  Member 

Solution to overcome 
challenge 

the 

evaluation 

It  is  recognised  that  some  Member  States  are  not  able  to 
criteria  of  major  project 
influence 
procurement, resulting in cost being the predominant or only 
criteria  adopted.  However,  where  flexibility  does  exist,  it  is 
strongly recommended that quality and professional capability 
criteria are also applied.  

96 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section F: Conclusions  

F1 

Introduction 

This  is  the  final  report  on  Work  Package  Five:  Transport  of  the  ex  post  evaluation  of 
cohesion policy 2007-2013. Based on the work carried out for this evaluation it sets out 
an overview of the contribution of cohesion policy to the objectives of the transport policy 
of  the  EU.  It  also  summarises  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  cohesion  policy 
interventions in the area of transport. The evaluation emphasised the financial analysis of 
projects carried out by Member State, this report sets  out the conclusions of that work. 
Finally,  the  report  documents  the  “Catalogue  of  Challenges”  that  has  been  prepared  by 
the  evaluators  based  on  the  work  carried  out.  The  findings  and  conclusions  for  each  of 
these areas are summarised in the sub sections below. 

F2 

Contribution of cohesion policy to transport in the EU 

Task  1  of  this  evaluation  was  an  analysis  of  the  achievements  of  cohesion  policy  in  the 
area  of  transport  from  the  2007-2013  programming  period.  This  was  supplemented  by 
task  5  which  consisted  of  case  studies  of  the  contribution  of  cohesion  policy  to  national 
and  EU  transport  policy  in  six  Member  States.  This  work  and  the  results  obtained  are 
documented in full in the first and second interim reports respectively of this evaluation.    

Section  2  of  this  final  report  summarises  the  results  of  this  work  with  respect  to  the 
contribution of cohesion policy in  the field of transport. In summary, this evaluation has 
reached a clear conclusion that cohesion policy had made a significant contribution to the 
development  of  transport  infrastructure  in  individual  Member  States  and  in  the  EU  as  a 
whole.  This  contribution  has  been  concentrated  in  those  Member  States  and  Regions 
which were the intended recipients of the highest levels of cohesion policy support. 

Cohesion policy support across all transport areas ranged from €57.1 bn in Poland to €25 
m in Luxembourg. Within this, the allocation to transport ranged from 45% in Poland to 
0%  in  Denmark  and  Luxembourg.  Poland  therefore  had  both  the  highest  overall 
allocation  to  transport  and  the  highest  absolute  funding  for  transport  (€25.6  bn).  The 
level of absorption of cohesion policy funding allocated to transport ranged from 55% in 
Romania to over 100% in Spain, for those Member States who allocated more than €5 bn 
to transport. Poland achieved an absorption rate of 81% by the end of 2014.  

14  of  the  28  Member  States  allocated  the  highest  share  of  cohesion  policy  transport 
resources to roads, whilst Spain, Italy, Slovenia and Croatia  allocated the highest share 
to rail. The level of absorption varied by transport area, with Motorways (TEN-T) reaching 
a level of 91%, Regional/local roads 95%, whilst Railway (TEN-T) had a rate of 69% and 
Railways  64%  by  the  end  of  2014.  The  overall  amounts  decided  for  TEN-T  related 
infrastructure was 47% in the 2007-2013 programming period. 

The  outputs  generated  by  this  co-funding  included  extensive  new  and  reconstructed 
roads  and  railway  both  TEN-T  and  outside  of  this  network,  demonstrating  the 
contribution  cohesion  policy  made  to  EU  transport  networks.  By  the  end  of  2013,  over 
1,800 km of new TEN-T roads were built across 13 Member States, alongside over 2,000 
km of new non-TEN-T roads across 17 Member States. Furthermore, over  23,000 km of 
reconstructed  road  was  delivered  using  cohesion  policy  co-financing  across  20  Member 
States.  Twelve  Member  States  implemented  new  or  reconstructed  TEN-T  railroad  using 
cohesion  policy  co-financing,  achieving  a  total  of  over  1,600  km  by  the  end  of  2013. 

97 

 
 
 
 
Overall,  approximately  3,400  km  of  new  or  reconstructed  railroad  was  delivered  using 
cohesion policy co-financing across fifteen Member States.  

A more detailed examination of the contribution of cohesion policy funding in 15 Member 
States  further  highlighted  the  strong  and  important  contribution  made  to  transport. 
Cohesion policy expenditures  on transport by the end of 2013  represented between 1% 
(France)  and  54%  (Lithuania)  of  total  investment  in  transport  during  the  2007-2013 
programme period, and was of particular importance to the Convergence Member States. 
Cohesion policy co-financing supported the delivery  of 3,800 km  of new  roads and  over 
21,000 km of reconstructed roads across the 15 Member States.  

The use of cohesion policy funding in the rail sector was more focused on the renewal or 
upgrading  of  existing  railroad,  to  increase  line  speeds  and  capacity.  Importantly, 
stakeholders  from  Member  States  highlighted  the  role  of  cohesion  policy  funding  in 
supporting large, complex projects that were particularly evident in the rail sector. It was 
noted by stakeholders that such projects may not have been undertaken in the absence 
of cohesion policy funding.  

There was a lower level of  financial contribution through the  cohesion policy 2007-2013 
programming  period  for  non-road  or  railroad  investment.  However,  enhancements  were 
made to cycling, urban transport, airports and to a lesser extent ports during the period. 

F3 

Strengths  and  weaknesses  of  cohesion  policy  in  the  area  of 
transport 

The  work  carried  out  on  the  contribution  of  cohesion  policy  in  the  field  of  transport 
identified a number of strengths and weaknesses of cohesion policy in the area. The main 
strengths  of  cohesion  policy  in  the  area  of  transport  included  the  ability  to  support  the 
diverse range of policy objectives across the Member States. Cohesion policy funding was 
used  to  part-fund  a  huge  range  of  projects  from  high  speed  rail  lines,  multi-lane 
highways, nationally important roads through to links to ports, and cycle lanes in urban 
areas.  

The  availability  of  cohesion  policy  funding  was  also  noted  as  promoting  large  and 
complex  projects,  which  some  Member  States  would  not  have  delivered  using  only 
national funding due to the risks.  

The  stability  of  cohesion  policy  funding  during  the  economic  recession  enabled  certain 
Member  States  to  continue  delivering  transport  infrastructure  during  the  challenging 
economic period of 2007-2013, through prioritising national funding contributions.  

The longevity and continuity of  cohesion policy programming periods  also promoted the 
adoption  of  more  robust  transport  planning  approaches,  as  well  as  supporting  the 
development of Member State skills in the area of ex-ante appraisal. 

The  main  weaknesses  included  the  slow  absorption  rate  by  some  Member  States  which 
indicates  continuing  issues  with  their  capacity  to  plan  and  develop  major  infrastructure 
projects,  difficulties  in  combining  cohesion  policy  funding  with  private  finance  in  PPP 
structures,  and  a  need  for  greater  clarity  for  Member  States  on  the  application  of  State 
Aid  rules  to  transport  investments.  The  evaluators  did  note  some  weaknesses  in  the 
reporting  of  output  indicators  by  some  Member  States  for  the  2007-2013  programming 
period  resulting  in  inconsistent  data.  The  structures  for  gathering  this  information  have 

98 

 
 
 
 
now  improved  and  this  issue  is  not  expected  to  recur  in  the  2014-2020  programming 
period. 

The  programming  periods  themselves  were  also  cited  by  some  stakeholders,  including 
JASPERS,  as  generating  weaknesses  and  increasing  the  risks  of  contractors  submitting 
low and unsustainable tender prices. The political pressure to deliver projects within the 
programming  period  was  also  identified  as  contributing  to  cases  of  poor  project 
preparation,  such  as  a  lack  of  ground  investigation  during  the  feasibility  stage.  These 
difficulties  arose  in  newer  Member  States.  Longer  experience  in  cohesion  policy 
programming periods and improvements in the strategic planning of transport in Member 
States  will  address  these  issues  in  the  current  programming  period.  In  particular  the 
preparation of a national transport strategy is now an ex-ante conditionality for cohesion 
policy funding of transport. 

F4  Quality and completeness of financial analysis 

A  major  objective  of  this  study  was  to  examine  the  quality  and  completeness  of  the 
financial analysis carried out by Member States when they develop transport investment 
projects.  Task  2  of  the  evaluation  was  a  detailed  examination  of  the  financial  analysis 
carried  out  by  Member  States  for  20  major  projects.  This  work  is  documented  in  full  in 
the first interim report on this evaluation. In task 3 detailed case studies were prepared 
of  10  of  these  major  projects.  These  case  studies  are  included  in  the  second  interim 
report  on  this  evaluation.  The  issues  emerging  from  this  analysis  were  examined  in  a 
seminar for Member State stakeholders. 

This work on financial analysis considered the quality of the financial analysis undertaken 
during  the  ex-ante  stage  by  Member  States,  and  included  both  demand  and  financial 
aspects  of  projects.  In  all  cases  by  the  time  a  funding  decision  was  made  the  financial 
analysis of the project was complete and accurate, and provided a full basis for decision 
making  on  the  project.  A  number  of  areas  which  commonly  presented  difficulty  were 
identified, as was best practice amongst Member States in dealing with these difficulties. 

The  quality  of  demand  analysis  varied  between  projects,  particularly  in  the  use  of 
demographic  data  such  as  employment  and  car  ownership.  Such  data  was  observed  in 
many  instances  to  be  too  spatially  aggregate,  including  the  use  of  national  level  GDP 
forecasts  to  inform  demand  analysis.  This,  and  the  insufficient  consideration  of  project 
interactions  with  other  modes  and  routes,  is  considered  by  the  evaluators  to  have 
undermined the accuracy and quality of demand analysis for some projects. However, all 
projects  demonstrated  an  approach  consistent  with  best  practice  with  respect  to  the 
analysis of ‘with project’ and ‘without project’ scenarios.  

The  analysis  of  consumer  behaviour  and  willingness  to  pay  also  varied  across  the 
projects  evaluated,  with  little  evidence  of  variable  or  induced  demand  analysis.  There 
was also an over reliance on national level toll and fare policies, without consideration of 
affordability  among  the  target  markets.  Such  factors  could  have  undermined  the 
accuracy of demand analyses. There was also insufficient evidence of how charges would 
vary  over  the  appraisal  period  of  most  projects,  which  introduced  more  potential 
uncertainty regarding the accuracy of forecasting. 

The  accuracy  of  forecast  construction  costs  also  varied  between  the  projects  evaluated. 
The economic recession was a central factor in reducing contractor costs for many of the 
projects evaluated. The level of project preparation also influenced the outturn costs and 

99 

 
 
 
 
implementation schedules. Examples were noted of good preparatory work, including the 
early  acquisition  of  land,  leading  to  cost  and  time  savings,  whilst  the  lack  of  ground 
investigation  was  an  example  of  poor  preparatory  work  which  lead  to  examples  of  cost 
and schedule overruns. 

The  financial  sustainability  of  some  projects  was  uncertain  due  to  a lack  of  evidence  on 
how  maintenance  costs  would  be  met.  A  lack  of  revenue  ring-fencing  for  operation  and 
maintenance  requirements  was  identified  in  many  road  projects.  Tolls  were  also  not 
implemented  to  programme  on  some  projects,  introducing  further  uncertainty  about 
downstream  revenues.  The  separation  of  the  Infrastructure  Manager  and  Railway 
Undertaking  responsibilities  was  also  observed  to  have  introduced  inaccuracies  and 
uncertainties  within  some  financial  analyses.  Overall,  cash  flow  and  risk  analyses  were 
considered accurate, although further analysis of risk and the residual value of projects is 
recommended.   

F5 

Catalogue of challenges 

The  review  of  the  financial  analysis  of  major  projects  and  the  case  studies  of  major 
projects study identified the key challenges faced by Member States as they develop and 
appraise  transport  investment  projects.  These  challenges  were  examined  by  the  study 
team  and  discussed  with  Member  State  stakeholders  in  bilateral  meetings  and  at  a 
Seminar  held  in  Brussels  for  a  group  of  stakeholders.  Based  on  this  work  the  final 
catalogue now sets out for each challenge: 

  A description and analysis of the challenge; 

  The relevant warning signs for the challenge in question to allow agencies to 

have an ‘early warning’ of potential challenges; 

  The  implications  of  each  challenge  in  question  for  the  financial  analysis  and 

financial sustainability of projects; and 

  Potential  solutions  to  assist  in  overcoming  each  challenge,  based  on  best 

practice observed in Member States. 

This Catalogue is set out in full in Section E of this report. Thes Challenges are: 

  Accuracy in calculating demand forecasts; 

  Forecasting impacts of construction on demand; 

  Assessment of competing routes and/or modes; 

  Suboptimal use of formal transport models; 

  Correct representation of willingness to pay in models; 

  Tariffing defaulting to national standards in forecasts; 

  Accurate forecasting of operating and maintenance costs; and 

  Accurate forecasting of construction costs. 

In each case practical advice for the future is provided, based on best practice observed 
in Member States. 

100 

 
 
 
 
F6  Overall Conclusions 

A number of overall conclusions can be drawn at this stage. Cohesion policy has made a 
significant  contribution  to  transport  in  the  EU  as  a  whole  and  in  individual  Member 
States. A number of important strengths are observed in how cohesion policy operates in 
the  field  of  transport.  In  particular,  the  decision  making  structures  in  place  and  the 
strategic  planning  of  transport  investments  required  of  Member  States  ensure  that  the 
operation  of  cohesion  policy  is  tailored  to  the  needs  and  context  in  individual  Member 
States.  Investments  funded  by  cohesion  policy  contribute  to  the  transport  strategy  of 
Member  States  and  of  the  EU  as  a  whole,  and  encourage  the  development  of 
environmentally  friendly  transport.  Cohesion  policy  investment  in  transport  has 
developed  the  capacity  of  Member  States  to  plan  and  complete  transport  investments, 
has  ensured  that  investment  continued  in  a  time  of  economic  crisis  and  increased  the 
emphasis places on relatively complex investments such as rail by Member States.  

Our detailed review of the financial analysis of transport projects undertaken by Member 
States  indicated  that  problems  arose  in  the  areas  of  demand  analysis,  assessment  of 
consumer  behaviour  /  willingness  to  pay  and  financial  sustainability  of  projects.  The 
study  also  identified  best  practice  in  these  areas,  and  this  was  discussed  in  a  seminar 
with Member States. Based on this work a “Catalogue of Challenges” has been developed 
which identifies relevant challenges faced by Member States in the analysis of transport 
investments, suggests warning signs for these and describes best practice in addressing 
these challenges.  

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  doi: 10.2776/693539