COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Third Report on progress by Turkey in fulfilling the requirements of its visa liberalisation roadmap
Date: 2016-05-04
Institutions: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: EU visa policy, Türkiye, biometrics, frontier, fundamental rights, identity document, migration policy, national implementing measure, public order

EN 

   EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 4.5.2016  SWD(2016) 161 final   COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Third Report on progress by Turkey in fulfilling the requirements of its visa liberalisation roadmap {COM(2016) 278 final}  
 
 
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
Accompanying the document 

Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 

Third Report on progress by Turkey in fulfilling the requirements of its visa 
liberalisation roadmap 

1. INTRODUCTION 

This  Commission  Staff  Working  Document  (CSWD)  accompanies  the  Commission's  Third 
Report  on  progress  by  Turkey  (the  Third  Report)1  in  fulfilling  the  requirements  of  its  visa 
liberalisation  roadmap  (the  Roadmap)  and  provides,  for  each  requirement,  an  assessment  of 
the state of play of its fulfilment and factual information justifying that assessment.  

While  the  Third  Report  identifies  the  areas  in  which  Turkey  has  not  yet  fulfilled  the 
requirements  of  the  Roadmap,  and  presents  recommendations  on  the  measures  to  be  put  in 
place in order to achieve this objective, this CSWD describes the measures taken by Turkey 
since the adoption of the first Commission's Report on progress by Turkey in implementing 
the requirements of its visa liberalisation roadmap (the Second Report) on 4 March 20162.  

The annex to the CSWD includes the assessment of the impact of the future visa liberalisation 
for Turkey on the security situation of the European Union, notably in relation to the risk that 
the  visa  liberalisation  may  result  in  an  increase  of  activity  by  criminal  organisations  or 
terrorist groups in the EU, as well as irregular migration by third country nationals.  

This  annex  complements  another  document  which  had  been  included  in  the  CSWD 
accompanying  the  Second  Report  issued  on  4  March  2016,  and  which  had  provided  an 
assessment of the impact of the future visa liberalisation for Turkey on the migratory situation 
of the European Union, notably in relation to the risk that the visa liberalisation may result in 
an increase of irregular migration of Turkish nationals into the EU3. 

 The factual information included in these assessments draws on information provided by EU 
Agencies  and  other  available  sources,  as  well  as  evaluation  missions  to  Turkey  led  by  the 
European Commission, assisted by experts from EU Member States. 

1  COM(2016) 278final. 
2 COM(2016) 140 final. 
3  SWD(2016) 97 final 

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ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION  

2. Block 1: Document security 

1.  Turkey  should  continue  issuing  machine  readable  biometric  travel  documents  in 
compliance with ICAO standards and follow ICAO recommended practice, phasing 
out of any non-ICAO compliant passports, and gradually introducing international 
passports  with  biometric  data,  including  photo  and  fingerprints,  in  line  with  EU 
standards, especially Council Regulation 2252/2004. 

Almost fulfilled 

At  the  moment  there  are  around  8  million  valid  passports  in  circulation  in  Turkey.  As  of 
November 2015, only biometric International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO)-compliant 
passports, bearing chips including a digital picture of the holder are in use. 

In  order  to  meet  the  recommendation  without  delay,  Turkish  authorities  will  issue  as  an 
interim solution between June and the end of 2016, temporary passports with a short validity 
duration, which are limited to a maximum production capacity of 10.000 passports a day. The 
passports use the encryption system EAC (Extended Access Control), which is in line with the 
current ICAO standards, as well as the 2014 EU standards and contains the fingerprints of the 
passport holder. The introduction of fingerprints of the passport holders in the chip will ensure 
a sufficient level of protection. 

With  effect  from  October  2016,  Turkish  authorities  will  start  issuing  permanent  passports 
with chips including the holders' fingerprints protected with the SAC (Supplementary Access 
Control)  encryption  system.  The  equipment  to  produce  the  passports  with  SAC  encryption 
will be supplied to the Turkish authorities through a project funded by the EU. The SAC is the 
encryption  standard  for  all  new  passports  issued  by  EU  Member  States.  Member  States  are 
still  authorised  in  exceptional  circumstances  to  issue  passports  from  stocks  with  chips 
encrypted only with the EAC encryption system.  

2.  Implement appropriate administrative measures ensuring the integrity and security 
of  the  personalisation  and  distribution  and  validation  process  for  international 
passports and other breeder documents. 

Fulfilled 

The system of personalisation and distribution of passports is very secure and well-organised, 
in  line  with  international  standards.  The  issue  of  passports  is  based  on  a  verification  of  the 
personal  data  stored  in  the  electronic  database  of  the  civil  registry  (MERNIS)  where  each 
citizen  is  identifiable  by  an  individual  identification  number,  and  the  collection  of  the 
fingerprints of the applicant.  

The  procedure  for  the  destruction  of  invalid  passports  has  been  strengthened  by  Turkish 
authorities  as  a  result  of  the  Visa  Liberalisation  Dialogue (VLD).  On  17  February  2016  the 
Turkish National Police issued a Circular instructing its staff working with expired passports 
to  systematically  invalidate  their  pages  and  chips  in  order  to  avoid  their  possible  re-use  for 
forgeries. The Circular was elaborated in line with EU Member States' best practices.   

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3.  Establish training programmes and adopt ethical codes on anti-corruption targeting 
the  officials  of  any  public  authority  that  deals  with  visas,  breeder  documents  or 
passports. 

Fulfilled 

Visas, passports and breeder documents are handled, respectively, by the staff of the Consular 
Department,  the  Directorate  General  for  Security  (the  Turkish  National  Police),  and  the 
Directorate General for Civil Registration and Citizenship. The first of these three entities is 
part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the latter two are part of the Ministry of Interior. The 
staff  of  these  three  entities  is  selected  in  a  professional  manner  and  benefit  from  technical 
instructions and specialised training, including on anti-corruption matters. 

4.  Promptly  and  systematically  report  to  Interpol/LASP  database  on  lost  and  stolen 

passports. 

Fulfilled  

Turkish authorities report regularly to Interpol regarding lost and stolen Turkish passports. 

5.  Ensure a high level of security of breeder documents and ID cards and define strict 

procedures surrounding their application and issuance. 

Fulfilled 

It  is  extremely  difficult  to  use  a  falsified  identity  card  to  obtain  the  issuance  of  a  passport. 
This  is  due  to  several  reasons:  the  Police  offices  issuing  the  passports  are  linked  to  the 
electronic  database  of  the  civil  registry  (MERNIS)  and  are  bound  to  compare  the  data 
indicated in this system with the data in the identity card presented by the passport applicant. 
This  should  allow  the  Police  offices  to  discover  any  possible  falsification  or  usurpation  of 
identity.  

The Law on the Civil Registration Services (No. 5490) was modified with an amendment that 
entered into force on 27 January 2016. As a result of this amendment, all new identity cards to 
be issued to Turkish citizens as of 14 March 2016 will be: polycarbonate-based; will include 
biometric  identifiers  of  the  holders;  and  have  a  maximum  validity  of  10  years.  Until  now, 
however, the distribution of the new card has only started at pilot level. As of 29 April 2016, 
11.000 biometric ID cards have already been distributed. Distribution throughout Turkey will 
start by the end of 2016. The project is expected to be finalised by the end of 2018.   

6.  Regularly  exchange  passport  specimens,  visa  forms  and  information  on  false 

documents, and cooperate on document security with the EU. 

Fulfilled  

Until recently, Turkish authorities only occasionally exchanged passport specimens with some 
Member  States  and  did  not  regularly  exchange  information  regarding  false  documents  with 
any Member States. As a result of the VLD there has been an improvement in collaboration 
with Turkish authorities. As of 25 February 2016, the Turkish authorities started entering data 
via Dial-Doc databases by Interpol on false documents and visas as well as on new methods 
in use by smugglers.  

The  Turkish  authorities  set  up  on  8  April  2016  three  "police  liaison  bureaus"  in  Istanbul 

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Ataturk,  Istanbul  Sabiha  Gokcen  and  Antalya  international  airports.  The  first  and  third  of 
them  have  started  to  function.  These  offices  will  include  specialised  staff  working  24/7  on 
suspicious,  false  or  fraudulent  EU  travel  documents.  These  bureaus  will  establish  working 
relations  with  the  EU  Member  States'  police  liaison  officers  (and  with  other  relevant 
authorities) in order to exchange information on documents. 

The specific tasks of the Bureau will be as follows:  

Inform carriers and private security companies on security risks;  
Inform foreign liaison officers on security risks; 

 
 
  Transmit  the  notifications  received  from  foreign  liaison  officers  and  authorities  to 

relevant Turkish authorities, carriers and private security companies; 

  Maintain constant  contact  with  foreign  security officers  to  coordinate  security  issues 

regarding passengers entering and exiting Turkey; 

  Form  necessary  communication  archives  to  perform  its  tasks  in  a  swift  and  efficient 

manner.      

The Turkish National Police invited the EU liaison officers on 2 May 2016 to the Bureau in 
Atatürk airport for a guided visit and a meeting. 

7.  Adopt and implement measures ensuring the integrity and security of the civil status 
and civil registration process, including the integration and linking of the relevant 
databases  and  the  verification  of  scanned  data  against  the  civil  status  database, 
paying particular attention to the amendment of individuals’ basic personal data. 

Fulfilled 

The civil registry system of Turkey is organised and managed in a robust manner, in line with 
international  standards.  Identity  documents  are  issued  on  the  basis  of  breeder  documents 
handled in a reliable manner. Information is stored not only on paper documents, but also in 
an  electronic  database  (MERNIS).  Access  to  both  archives  for  retrieval  and  introduction  of 
data is well regulated. Modification of personal data stored in these archives is possible only 
on the basis of judicial decisions. Each person registered in the Civil Registry is attributed an 
identification  number  which  cannot  be  changed  under  any  circumstances,  even  in  case  of 
change of name. The Police staff in charge of assessing requests for new passports is obliged 
to consult the MERNIS before approving the issue of the new document. 

3. BLOCK 2: MIGRATION MANAGEMENT   

3.2.1. Border management 

8.  Carry out adequate border checks and border surveillance along all the borders of 
the country, especially along the borders with EU member states, in such a manner 
that  it  will  cause  a  significant  and  sustained  reduction  of  the  number  of  persons 
managing  to  illegally  cross  the  Turkish  borders  either  for  entering  or  for  exiting 
Turkey. 

Fulfilled 

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All border crossing points in Turkey are managed by the Turkish National Police (TNP) and 
by  the  Customs  Enforcement  Service,  which  are  respectively  in  charge  of  inspecting  the 
persons  and  the  goods  on  the  basis  of  the  relevant  accompanying  travel  documents.  Sea 
borders  are  handled  by  the  Coast  Guard,  which  is  responsible  for  controlling  the  territorial 
waters of the country. Turkey's land borders are guarded by Land Forces. The Gendarmerie is 
the leading law enforcement agency in all rural areas of the country, complementing the role 
played by the Turkish National Police in urban areas.  

Although the Gendarmerie is not directly in charge of the surveillance of any border, it plays a 
very  important  role  in  border  management,  because  it  is  in  charge  of  surveillance  on  the 
coasts and the rural areas adjacent to the land borders, thus complementing the work done by 
the Coast Guard and the Land Forces. 

During 2015, irregular departures of migrants and refugees from the Turkish territory towards 
the EU, at the land and sea borders, reached an unprecedented level. While in 2013 and 2014 
the  number  of  persons  who  arrived  in  the  territory  of  EU  Member  States  directly  from  the 
Turkish  territory  were  25.121  and  52.994  respectively,  in  2015  the  number  increased  to 
888.457,  which  meant  a  daily  average  arrival  of  2.430  persons.  Around  98%  of  irregular 
entries took place in the Greek Aegean islands by persons departing from the nearby Turkish 
Aegean  coasts.  The  remaining  2%  were  persons  crossing  the  land  border  with  Greece  and 
Bulgaria.   

The  law  enforcement  agencies  of  Turkey  did  not  manage  to  prevent  such  a  quantity  of 
departures.  Nevertheless,  according  to  Turkish  authorities,  in  2015,  they  detected  207.249 
irregular migrants, i.e. a daily average of 567 persons, which indicates an exceptional effort to 
reduce  the  migratory  pressure  on  the  Greek  islands.  These  preventive  measures,  along  with 
the  worsening  weather  conditions  in  winter,  started  to  have  an  effect  in  the  last  months  of 
2015 and contributed to a reduced daily average arrival rate registered in Greece from 6 988 
in October 2015 down to 1.987 and 1.942 in January and February 2016 respectively. 

The  Coast  Guard  intercepted  88.637  persons  along  the  Aegean  coast  before  they  could  exit 
the  territorial  waters,  while  2.617  and  357  persons  where  intercepted  in  the  Mediterranean 
region (nearby Antalya) and in the Marmara sea. 54.874 persons were apprehended on land in 
2015 by Land Forces, Police and the Gendarmerie. 

In 2016, the three law enforcement agencies of Turkey are continuing their efforts to prevent 
irregular departures, including through introducing norms aimed at reducing the possibility of 
refugees registered in Turkey to freely move within the country beyond the specific provinces 
in  which  they  are  requested  to  reside.  This  has  the  objective  to  prevent  them  from 
approaching  the  Aegean  coasts  and  the  Western  borders  of  the  country  for  the  purpose  of 
irregular migration. By 4 April 2016, 67.450 irregular migrants were apprehended, i.e. a daily 
average  of  713,  the  majority  along  the  Aegean  coast  and  the  Western  land  borders  with 
Greece and Bulgaria. 

A further drastic reduction of irregular departures, which fell from a daily average of around 
2000 in January and February 2016 to 140 in April was the result of these efforts as well as 
the  commitments  taken  by  Turkey  to  readmit  all  irregular  migrants  who  arrived  after  20 
March 2016, as expressed at the EU-Turkey Summit of 18 March 2016. 

In  this  context,  some  irregular  departures  continue  to  take  place  from  the  Turkish  Aegean 
coasts  without  Turkish  authorities  managing  to  stop  them.  However,  given  the  geographic 
complexity of the Turkish Aegean coast and the extreme proximity of the Greek islands, it is 
not possible to eliminate these numbers completely.  

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It should be also noted that the Turkish authorities reached moderate results in the prevention 
of  irregular  migration  entering  into  Turkey  across  its  Eastern  borders,  notably  at  the  border 
with  Iran.  The  latter  represents  the  main  area  of  irregular  entry  into  Turkey  for  Afghani 
migrants and refugees, as well as for Pakistani, Bangladeshis and Myanmaris (in 2015 more 
than 200.000 Afghans arrived irregularly to Greece coming from the Turkish territory; most 
of them appear to have entered Turkey by irregularly crossing the Iranian-Turkish border).  

In  2015,  the  Land  Forces,  Gendarmerie  and  the  Police  in  the  provinces  located  along  the 
Eastern borders of Turkey had jointly managed to intercept only 1.949 irregular migrants in 
the province of Van, 1.667 in the province of Hakkari, 1.169 in Agri and 1.054 in Artvin.  

In  2016,  however,  the  Turkish  authorities  increased  their  efforts  also  along  the  Eastern 
borders. As a result, in the first three months of the year, the Turkish authorities intercepted 
12.250 irregular migrants in the province of Hakkari, 409 in Agri, 250 Artvin and 160 in Van. 

9.  Adopt  and  effectively  implement  legislation  governing  the  movement  of  persons  at 
the  external  borders,  as  well  as  legislation  on  the  organisation  of  the  border 
authorities and their functions, in accordance with the 'National Action Plan for the 
Implementation of Turkey's Integrated Border Management strategy', approved on 
by Turkish authorities on 27th March 2006, and in line with the principles and best 
practices  enshrined  in  the  EU  Schengen  Border  Code  and  the  EU  Schengen 
Catalogue. 

Fulfilled   

In line with the  'National Action Plan for the Implementation of Turkey's Integrated Border 
Management  strategy',  Turkey  should  have  reformed  the  organisation  of  its  border 
management system and established a single civilian border agency which would be in charge 
of controlling all borders of the country, currently managed by several separate bodies, i.e. the 
Land Forces along the land borders, the Turkish National Police at the border crossing points 
and the Coast Guards at the sea borders.  

In 2013 and 2014, during the first years of the VLD, Turkish authorities continued working on 
this  ambitious  reform.  Due  to  the  difficult  geopolitical  situation  faced  by  the  country  as  a 
result of the wars in Syria and Iraq, which imposed, at least on all the Southern and Eastern 
borders of the country, progress in implementing the reform has slowed down. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Turkish  authorities  informed  that  the  concept  of  integrated  border 
management  will  be  implemented  and,  in  this  perspective, they  were  planning  to  ensure,  as 
recommended  by  the  Commission  in  its  first  progress  report,  a  stronger  cooperation  and 
coordination mechanism between the separate bodies in charge of border management.  

On 17 March 2016, a by-law requesting all law enforcement and border agencies to cooperate 
more  tightly  entered  into  force.  The  Ministry  of  Interior  instructed  all  the  Governorships 
across Turkey on the effective implementation of the by-law.  

10. Take  the  necessary  budgetary  and  other  administrative  measures  ensuring  the 
deployment  at  the  border  crossing  posts  and  along  all  the  borders  of  the  country, 
especially on the borders with the EU member states, of well-trained and qualified 
border  guards  (in  sufficient  number),  as  well  as  the  availability  of  efficient 
infrastructure,  equipment  and  IT  technology,  including   through  a  more  extensive 
use  of  surveillance  equipment,  in  particular  electronic  means,  mobile  and  fixed, 

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video surveillance, infrared cameras and other sensor systems. 

Fulfilled 

The movement of persons across Turkish border crossing points is registered and monitored 
by the Turkish National Police through an electronic database, POL-NET, which is accessible 
from all the border crossing points of the country, where all entries and exits of persons are 
registered. The system is connected to other databases, allowing real time verification whether 
the  person  trying  to  cross  the  border  is  in  the  list  of  persons  wanted  by  the  judicial  or  the 
police  authorities,  or  on  the  list  of  persons  declared  inadmissible  for  any  legal  reason 
including past records as irregular migrant, or whether his/her passport was declared lost or 
stolen. 

The Police officers at the border crossing points are equipped with basic tools allowing for the 
inspect the quality of passengers' travel documents. A "second line" of well-trained policemen 
is always present in the back offices of all border crossing points to carry out more thorough 
inspections of suspicious travel documents and to consult the Interpol databases. 

Land border detachments are based in border stations and observation towers near the border. 
Land forces are responsible for surveillance and patrolling in an area extending a maximum of 
six kilometres into the territory from the border. A second line of surveillance is handled by 
the Gendarmerie.  

The  Land  Forces  of  Turkey  make  significant  use  of  conscripts  led  by  officers  that  are 
generalists.  However,  in  recent  years  they  have  been  increasing  the  use  of  contractual 
professional  soldiers  for  border  surveillance  tasks  in  order  to  increase  the  training  of  the 
conscripts  assigned  to  the  border  detachments  and  to  facilitate  permanent  detachments  of 
officers willing to specialise in border surveillance activities.  

The  Turkish  authorities  have  strengthened  controls  along  the  Syrian  border  through  the 
construction of obstacles, fences, illuminations and patrolling roads.  

Two EU-funded projects will contribute to the supply of surveillance equipment to the Land 
Forces deployed along the borders with Iran and Iraq. The implementation of these projects 
will take place over the next of years. Two other EU-funded projects are contributing to the 
modernisation  of  Land  Forces’  capability  along  the  land  borders  with  Greece  and  Bulgaria 
and to the development of cooperation between the border guards of these two countries. 

The  Coast  Guard  is  organised  on  the  basis  of  regional  commands  (Istanbul,  Izmir,  Mersin, 
Samsun)  and  uses  both  patrolling  vessels  and  aircraft  for  patrolling  and  search-and-rescue 
activities. The Coast Guard has been enhancing its technical and human resources, notably in 
the  Aegean  region.  An  EU-funded  project  will  supply  patrolling  boats  and  other  equipment 
and  support  to  the  Turkish  Coast  Guard.  Turkey  is  financing  the  development  of  a  coastal 
radar  system  along  the  entire  Turkish  coast,  expected  to  be  completed  by  2020,  although 
certain areas of more critical importance, i.e. the Aegean coast, may already be completed by 
2017. 

11. Enhance  cooperation  and  information  exchange  between  the  staff  and  bodies  in 
charge  of  border  management,  the  custom  service  and  the  other  law  enforcement 
agencies, in view of enhancing the capacity to collect intelligence, to use human and 
technical resources efficiently, and to act in a coordinated manner.  

Fulfilled 

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In  the  first  months  of  2015,  law  enforcement  agencies  (notably  the  Gendarmerie  with  the 
Coast  Guard  and  the  Police)  stepped  up  their  cooperation  in  the  prevention  of  irregular 
migration,  by  increasing  the  number  of  joint  operations  and  sharing  intelligence  and 
information more frequently. 

The  by-law  on  Inter-institutional  Cooperation  and  Coordination  in  the  Field  of  Border 
Management entered into force on 17 March 2016. It foresees the setting up of the National 
Coordination and Joint Risk Analysis Centre to coordinate data exchange and other activities 
related to joint risk analysis by public entities in charge of border management and with other 
relevant public entities.  

In accordance with the by-law, the first meeting of the Border Management Implementation 
Board  was  held  on  31  March  2016  under  the  chairmanship  of  the  Undersecretary  of  the 
Ministry  of  Interior.  The  Ministry  of  Defence,  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Ministry  of  EU 
Affairs,  Ministry  of  Transport,  Maritime  Affairs  and  Communications,  Ministry  of  Health, 
Ministry  of  Customs  and  Trade,  Ministry  of  Agriculture,  Turkish  Intelligence,  Turkish 
National  Police,  Turkish  General  Staff,  Directorate  General  for  Migration  Management 
(DGMM),  Turkish  Land  Forces,  Turkish  Gendarmerie  and  Turkish  Coast  Guard  were 
represented  in  the  meeting.  The  Board  took  the  decision  to  establish  the  National 
Coordination  and  Risk  Analysis  Centre  (NACORAC)  and  to  reinforce  the  identification  of 
migrant smuggling methods through risk analysis along the borders.  

Following this decision, NACORAC started to operate on 3 May 2016. A total of 20-25 staff 
is  expected  to  take  up  duties.  It  is  located  in  a  temporary  venue  within  the  112  Ankara 
Urgency  Call  Centre  until  September  2016,  when  the  infrastructure  preparations  of  its  own 
building  will  be  finalised.  The  Ministry  of  Customs,  Turkish  Land  Forces,  Turkish 
Gendarmerie, Turkish Coast Guard, Turkish National Police, DGMM, Ministry of Health and 
Ministry  of  Agriculture  will  be  represented  in  the  Centre.  The  Ministry  of  Interior  will 
provide the necessary budget for the Centre.  

An EU-funded project will support the functioning and development of the NACORAC.  

12. Establish training programmes and adopt ethical codes on anti-corruption targeting 
the border guards, customs and other officials involved in the border management. 

Fulfilled 

The  by-law  on  Ethical  Principles  for  Law  Enforcement,  in  force  since  2007,  defines  the 
principle  duties  to  maintain  justice,  objectivity,  honesty,  competence,  transparency  and 
accountability.  

The  by-law  on  Inter-institutional  Cooperation  and  Coordination  in  the  Field  of  Border 
Management entered into force on 17 March 2016 and foresees the establishment of common 
ethical rules on corruption and border control rules.  

Common ethical rules have been prepared and discussed in a meeting hosted by the Ministry 
of  Interior  with  the  participation  of  relevant  authorities  on  22  March  2016.  The  rules  were 
adopted during the first meeting of the Border Management Implementation Board held on 31 
March 2016. Training programmes promoting their implementation are being prepared.   

13. Implement in an effective manner the Memorandum of Understanding signed with 
FRONTEX,  including  by  developing  joint  cooperation  initiatives  and  exchanging 
data and risks analysis. 

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Fulfilled 

In  May  2012,  Frontex  signed  a  Memorandum  of  Understanding  with  Turkish  authorities, 
which is being implemented since 2013 through a triennial Cooperation Agenda. In February 
2016,  Frontex  intensified  its  cooperation  with  Turkish  authorities  in  the  collection  and 
assessment of statistical data on irregular migration in the framework of the TU-RAN project. 
In  April  2016  the  officer  appointed  as  Frontex  liaison  officer  to  Turkey  was  effectively 
deployed in Turkey.  

14. Ensure that border management is carried out in accordance with the international 
refugee  law,  in  full  respect  of  the  principle  of  non-refoulement  and  effectively 
allowing  the  persons  in  need  of  international  protection  to  have  access  to  asylum 
procedures. 

Fulfilled 

Since  2011,  Turkish  authorities  have  allowed  entry  into  Turkey  and  access  to  temporary 
protection status and to individual asylum procedures to around 2.7 million refugees fleeing 
the  conflict  in  Syria,  and  between  200.000  and  300.000  persons  in  need  of  international 
protection originating from other countries (mostly Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq).  

No  cases  of  push-backs  of  persons  seeking  protection  have been  reported  along the borders 
with Iran. In some cases, the entry of persons seeking protection from Iraq and Syria has been 
delayed, obliging people to wait at the border. However, this was normally followed by the 
authorisation  to  cross  the  border  once  it  became  apparent  that  the  safety  or  the  medical 
conditions of the waiting persons imposed it.  

Amnesty  International,  through  a  report  published  in  November  2015,  has  declared  that 
Turkish  authorities  may  have  forcibly  returned  some  arrivals  from  Syria.  These  allegations 
have been rejected by Turkish authorities, who declared that all returns towards Syria were of 
a voluntary nature.  

Although Turkish legislation does not include an official declaration stating that Lebanon and 
Jordan  are  safe  third  countries,  Syrian  refugees  arriving  from  these  two  countries  and 
requesting asylum at the Turkish border are not given access to temporary protection and are 
returned to these two countries, in the assumption that they will not be submitted to danger, 
mistreatment or expulsion. As of 7 April 2016, the Turkish Government has also modified the 
provisional  Article  1  of  the  Regulation  on  Temporary  Protection  to  ensure  that  Syrians 
returned  from  Greece  to  Turkey  who  were  not  previously  registered  as  beneficiaries  of 
temporary  protection  could  be  granted  temporary  protection  status  upon  their  return  from 
Greece. 

Through letters sent to the European Commission in April 2016, the Turkish authorities have 
given  guarantees  that  all  the  Syrians  returned  from  Greece  to  Turkey  will  be  granted 
temporary  protection status  upon their return  from Greece, and that  all  non-Syrian migrants 
returned  from  Greece  to  Turkey  willing  to  request  asylum  in  Turkey  will  be  given  the 
possibility to do so.  

As of 29 April 2016, UNHCR has also been guaranteed access to the removal centres and to 
speak with the migrants detained, allowing the Agency to fulfil its protection mandate.  

15. Ensure adequate cooperation with the neighbouring EU Member States, aiming in 
particular at reinforcing the management of the borders with EU Member States. 

10 

 
 
 
 
Fulfilled 

Turkish  border  authorities  are  regularly  cooperating  with  Greek  and  Bulgarian  authorities 
along their common land border for the prevention of irregular crossing by migrants.   

Turkey has ratified on 25 March 2016 the agreement signed in June 2015 with Bulgaria and 
Greece  establishing  at  the  Captain  Andreevo  border  crossing  point  the  Tripartite  Centre  for 
cooperation in the fight against border crime and migrant smuggling. The agreement will start 
being implemented as soon as the other parties complete the ratification process and the the 
offices at the Capitan Andreevo Centre are completed. 

Following discussions started in December 2015, Turkish and Greek authorities are working 
to  set  up  a  secure  communication  line  linking  the  headquarters  of  the  two  Coast  Guards, 
allowing for exchange of information on smugglers and on irregular migration attempts. The 
line will be established as soon as the technical features are agreed.  

Bilateral meetings took place between Turkish and Greek authorities to develop cooperation 
in the prevention of irregular migration and to facilitate the readmission of irregular migrants. 
In  that  context,  the  Turkish  Coast  Guard  has  deployed  a  liaison  officer  to  the  Turkish 
Embassy  in  Athens  and  the  Greek  Coast  Guard  has  deployed  a  liaison  officer  to  the  Greek 
Embassy  in  Ankara.  In  the  second  half  of  March  2016,  Turkish  liaison  officers  were  also 
deployed  to  the  main  Greek  islands  in  the  Aegean  region  to  strengthen  cooperation  with 
Greek authorities in the prevention of irregular migration and in readmission matters. 

3.2.2. Visa policy 

16. Enhance training on document security at the consular and border staff of Turkey, 

and develop and use the Turkish Visa Information System.  

Fulfilled 

Turkish consular and border staff is increasingly offered training on document security. The 
Turkish  visa  system  (Konsulnet),  which  is  also  fed  by  the  Turkish  E-visa  system,  is  being 
connected  to  Gocnet  (the  database  of  the  DGMM  registering  the  information  on  foreigners 
arrived  to  the  country)  and  Polnet  (the  Police  database  registering  entries  and  exits  of 
nationals and foreigners across the Turkish borders).  

17. Abolish issuance of visas at the borders as an ordinary procedure for the nationals 
of  certain  non-EU  countries,  and  especially  for  countries  representing  a  high 
migratory and security risk to the EU. 

Fulfilled 

Since  1  January  2015  the  nationals  of  all  47  Sub-Saharan  Africa  countries,  which  are 
considered as potential sources of irregular migration cannot any longer obtain a visa at the 
border.  As  of  1  January  2016,  in  line  with  Article  13  of  the  Law  on  Foreigners  and 
International Protection, issue of visas at the borders has become “exceptional” for a duration 
of  15  days.  Currently,  only  nationals  of  Kuwait  and  Malta  can  receive  visas  issued  at  the 
border on a regular basis. 

18. Put  in  use  the  new  Turkish  visa  stickers  with  higher  security  features,  and  stop 

using stamp visas. 

11 

 
 
 
 
 
Fulfilled 

As  of  8  November  2014,  all  Turkish  Embassies  started  using  visa  stickers  including  high 
security  features,  instead  of  visa  stamps.  E-visas  include  bar-codes  which  are  difficult  to 
duplicate and verified electronically through scanning at the border crossing point.  

19. Introduce airport transit visas. 

Fulfilled 

The legal capacity to impose transit visas has been given to the Turkish Government by the 
Law on Foreigners and International Protection, which entered into force on April 2014. 

In  February  2016,  Turkish  authorities  informed  the  European  Commission  that  they  have 
identified  18  countries,  (Afghanistan,  Bangladesh,  Democratic  Republic  of  Congo,  Eritrea, 
Cote  D’Ivoire,  Ghana,  South  African  Republic,  Cameroon,  Congo,  Mali,  Myanmar-Burma, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Somali, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Uganda), that will be submitted to airport transit 
visas due to being countries of origin of irregular migration.  

On 29 April 2016, in accordance with  the  Law on Foreigners  and International Protection, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Interior has formally decided to  prepare 
the  necessary  infrastructure  to  introduce  airport  transit  visas  for  nationals  of  the 
abovementioned 18 countries as of 1 September 2016.   

20. Amend the rules on the basis of which Turkey allows the entry into its territory to 
the  nationals  of  the  main  countries  representing  important  sources  of  illegal 
migration  for  the  EU,  in  the  aim  of  making  the  access  more  difficult  for  those 
willing  to  enter  the  Turkish  territory  with  the  purpose  to  subsequently  attempt  to 
illegally cross the external borders of the EU. 

Fulfilled  

On  24  September  2015,  Turkish  authorities  reintroduced  the  visa  obligations  for  Libyan 
citizens. On 8 January 2016, Turkish authorities introduced visa obligations to Syrian citizens 
arriving to Turkey through a seaport or airport from a third country, notably to stem the flows 
originating from Lebanon and Jordan. Furthermore, on 6 February 2016 Turkey strengthened 
visa  obligations  on  Iraqis,  who  in  2015  represented  the  third  most  represented  country  of 
origin of irregular migration into the EU via Turkey after Syrians and Afghans. 

In  February  2016,  Turkish  authorities  strengthened  the  criteria  to  grant  access  to  e-visas, 
which  represents an  important  facilitation to  enter  Turkey, as  it  allows the  visa  applicant  to 
avoid logistical problems, waste of time, costs and embarrassment deriving from approaching 
and being questioned by an Embassy in order to obtain a visa.  

Until  February,  the  citizens  of  the  African  and  Asiatic  countries  submitted  to  the  Turkish 
negative  list,  who  declared  that  their  passport  held  a  valid  visa  or  residence  permit  of  any 
Schengen or OECD country, were entitled to obtain an e-visa. After February this possibility 
is limited to the holders of Schengen, USA, UK and Ireland visas and residence permits, in 
order to make it easier for police officers at border crossing points to recognise and verify the 
quality of these residence permit and visas. Furthermore, Turkish authorities have put in place 
separate counters at most border crossing points, which e-visa holders are required to use, and 
where the control on the residence permits and visas can be carried out in a thorough manner.  

Following the measures taken to strengthen the visa requirements for Syrian and Iraq citizens  
mentioned above, Turkish authorities have taken no  additional restrictive measures on other 

12 

 
 
 
 
nationalities who are allowed to enter visa-free into Turkey and who in 2015 were frequently 
found staying irregularly in Turkey or entering the EU irregularly from Turkey.  

Of  the  888.457  irregular  arrivals  to  the  EU  from  Turkey,  the  main  nationalities  were  as 
follows:  498.040 (56%) were Syrians, 214.552 (24%) Afghans, 93.028 (10 %) Iraqis, 24.291 
(3%)  Pakistanis,  23.087  (3%)  Iranians,  7.419  Moroccans  (1%),  6.368  Palestinians,  4.538 
Somalians,  3.689  Bangladeshis,  2.044  Lebanese,  1.416  Algerians  etc.  Iranians,  Moroccans 
and Lebanese are exempted from visa obligation to enter Turkey.  

Based  on  statistics  published  on  DGMM  website,  in  2015  Turkish  authorities  apprehended 
146.485  irregular  migrants  (i.e.  persons  having  irregularly  entered  or  staying  irregularly  in 
Turkey),  around  2.5  times  more  than  in  2014  (58.647).  Main  countries  of  origin  concerned 
were Syria (73.422) Afghanistan (35.921), Iraq (7.247), Myanmar (5.464), Pakistan (3.792), 
Georgia  (2.857),  Islamic  Republic  of  Iran  (1.978),  Eritrea  (1.445),  Uzbekistan  (1.393), 
Turkmenistan  (1.241)  etc.  Citizens  of  Georgia,  Iran,  Uzbekistan  and  Turkmenistan  are 
exempted  from  visa  obligation  to  enter  Turkey  but  are  authorised  to  stay  visa-free  on  its 
territory for a limited period of time.  

21.  Pursue  the  alignment  of  Turkish  visa  policy,  legislation  and  administrative 
capacities towards the EU acquis, notably vis-à-vis the main countries representing 
important sources of illegal migration for the EU. 

Fulfilled 

This benchmark does not require Turkey to be perfectly aligned with the EU visa system but 
it requires progress towards this objective. 

At the moment, the countries whose nationals are required to hold a visa when entering the 
Member  States  and  that  have  a  visa  waiver  for  Turkey  are:  Azerbaijan,  Belarus,  Belize, 
Bolivia,  Georgia,  Iran,  Jordan,  Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyzstan,  Lebanon,  Mongolia,  Morocco, 
Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 

The citizens of other countries that are in the negative list of the EU (Algeria and Egypt, the 
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, and many countries in Southern and Eastern Asia, such as 
Afghanistan,  India,  Pakistan,  Bangladesh,  Vietnam,  China),  also  need  to  obtain  from  an 
Embassy a visa to enter Turkey (unless they can prove that they hold a valid visa or residence 
permit issued by a Schengen country, the USA, Ireland or the United Kingdom, in which case 
they still need a visa to enter Turkey, but may simply obtain it through an e-visa4) .  

Furthermore, on 6 February 2016 Turkey strengthened visa obligations on Iraqis, who in 2015 
represented  the  third  country  of  origin  of  irregular  migration  into  the  EU  via  Turkey  after 
Syrians and Afghans. 

In recent months, Turkish authorities took decisive steps in improving the visa system, which 
is based on the EU model. In particular on 16 February 2016, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
has sent to all Turkish missions abroad on conducting a comprehensive risk analysis in visa 
applications,  with  focus  on  certain  categories  of  persons  and  situations.  The  Ministry  also 
circulated  additional  instructions  to  the  Turkish  missions  located  in  source  countries  of 
migration  and  terrorism.  On  26  April  2016,  a  Directive  on  Principles  and  Procedures 
Regarding Assessment of Visa Applications was also issued. 

4 This restriction dos not apply to Egyptian citizens, wo may always enter through an e-visa provided that they 
are less than 20 or more than 45 years old and travel through Turkish airlines or Egyptian air. 

13 

 
 
 
                                                            
Consequently,  the  consultation  between  the  Turkish  missions  abroad  and  Ankara  has  been 
intensified in the evaluation of visa applications. As part of the risk analysis, visa applications 
are  now  also  submitted  to  the  Ministry  of  Interior  (DGMM,  Turkish  National  Police) 
and/orTurkish  National  Intelligence  Organisation.  As  a  result  of  these  instructions,  the 
Turkish  missions  abroad  frequently  request  additional  supporting  documents  from  visa 
applicants and carry out more in-depth analysis of their profiles.  

22. Allow non-discriminatory visa-free access to the Turkish territory for the citizens of 

all the EU Member States. 

Fulfilled  

On  2  May  2016,  the  Turkish  Government  adopted  a  decree  stating  that  the  citizens  of  all 
Member States will be able to enter Turkey from the date of the lifting of the visa requirement 
for  Turkish  citizens.  This  ensures  the  end  of  the  discriminatory  visa  requirement  to  which 
citizens  of  eleven  Member  States  (Austria,  Belgium,  Croatia,  Cyprus,  Ireland,  Malta,  the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom) are still subject. 

3.2.3 Carriers’ responsibility 

23. Adopt  and  effectively  implement  the  legislation  on  carriers'  responsibility  defining 

sanctions. 

Fulfilled 

A  by-law  regulating  the  carriers’  obligations  and  introducing  sanctions  for  carriers 
force  on 
transporting  passengers  without  valid 
7 November 2015.  

travel  documents  entered 

into 

3.2.4. International Protection  

24. Adopt  and  effectively  implement  legislation  and  implementing  provisions,  in 
compliance  with  the  EU  acquis  and  with  the  standards  set  by  the  Geneva 
Convention  of  1951  on  refugees  and  its  1967  Protocol,  thus  excluding  any 
geographical  limitation,  so  as  to  ensuring  the  respect  of  the  principle  of  non-
refoulement, taking into account also the European Convention on Human Rights, 
the possibility to lodge an asylum request and to obtain the refugee status protection 
or  a  subsidiary  form  of  protection  for  any  person  in  need  of  international 
protection,  and allowing the UNHCR to effectively fulfil its mandate on the Turkish 
territory without restrictions; 

Fulfilled  

The Turkish asylum system is based on the Law on Foreigners and International Protection of 
4  April  2014  in  conjunction  with  a  Regulation  on  the  implementation  of  the  Law  on 
Foreigners  and  International  Protection  of  17  March  2016.  The  Law  provides  for  the 
following  international  protection  statuses:  refugee  status,   (Geneva  Convention  Refugees 
fleeing  from  events  occurring  in  a  European  country);  conditional  refugee  status  (Geneva 
Convention  Refugees,  who  are  fleeing  from  events  occurring  in  a  non-European  country); 
secondary  protection  (persons  who  not  qualifying  for  the  previous  two  forms  of  protection, 
but may not be returned to their country of origin due to indiscriminate violence or other ill-
treatment);  temporary  protection,  which  was  triggered  for  Syrians  displaced  by  the  Syrian 

14 

 
 
 
 
 
 
conflict by the Temporary Protection Regulation of 13 October 2014 as amended by Cabinet 
Decree of 6 April 20165 and complemented by the Regulation on work permits of foreigners 
under temporary protection of January 2016. 

While  Turkey  still  maintains  a  geographical  limitation  to  the  Geneva  Convention,  internal 
Turkish legislation now appears to afford to Geneva Convention Refugees protection broadly 
equivalent to the Geneva Convention. 

Syrians  under  temporary  protection  requesting  assistance  are  offered  the  possibility  to  be 
hosted in reception  centres; those willing to live on their own are authorised to settle in the 
province of preference in Turkey, and are granted, whenever they settle, free access to public 
health care and education and social assistance; however they can only access social services 
and a work permit in the province where they are registered. The Note 2016/8 issued by the 
Government  on  15  March  2016  limits  their  unauthorised  mobility  beyond  the  limits  of  the 
province  of  registration  to  prevent  possible  attempts  to  reach  and  depart  from  the  Aegean 
coasts.  

As of 31 January 2016 DGMM has registered 2.582.600 persons (mostly Syrians, but in a few 
cases also some Palestinians that used to live in Syria) as beneficiary of temporary protection. 

As  regards  non-Syrians,  an  asylum  claim  may  be  introduced  in  any  of  the  81  Turkish 
provinces, as well as in any border crossing point. Nevertheless, during the asylum procedure 
and  afterwards  the  international  protection  applicants  are  requested  to  live  in  one  specific 
province of Turkey (selected out of a list of 61, which excludes Istanbul, the Marmara and the 
Aegean  region,  as  well  as  the  South-Eastern  and  some  North-Eastern  provinces  of  the 
country) with restrictions on travel to other provinces without authorisation.  

The  persons  assigned  to  live  in  a  province  are  obliged  to  report  regularly  to  DGMM 
authorities (for instance by signing a book of presence once per week or every two weeks). In 
case the person absconds and fails to report more than three times to the authorities, his/her 
international protection application is considered automatically withdrawn in line with article 
71  of  the  Law.  In  case  the  person  reappears,  he/she  may  still  reintroduce  an  asylum 
application, which however may be considered on the basis of an accelerated procedure.  

Asylum procedures related to non-Syrians have been implemented by DGMM until recently 
with  major  delays.  At  the  beginning  of  April  2016,  the  overall  backlog  of  pending  asylum 
requests was 141.530. During April 2016, DGMM mobilised additional human and technical 
resources and started to implement a plan aimed at progressively reducing this backlog by a 
significant number per month (12.000 to 13.000 applications), while ensuring that from now 
on the newly launched procedures will not last more than the 6 months period prescribed by 
law from the date of registration until the decision on the application. By early May 2016, a 
first very significant reduction (31.000 out of 140.000 applications) was already noted, which 
is expected to allow for a total elimination of the backlog by the end of the year. 

25. Establish  a  specialised  body  responsible  for  the  refugee  status  determination 
procedures with the possibility for an effective remedy in fact and law before a court 
or tribunal as well as for ensuring the protection and assistance of asylum seekers 
and refugees and provide that body and its staff with adequate working capacity and 

5 The amendment introduces the possibility to grant temporary protection status also to Syrians, who previously 
did not enjoy temporary protection in Turkey, and are readmitted by Turkey from Greece, i.e. from other places 
than directly from Syria, after having irregularly entered Greece after 20 March 2016. 

15 

 
 
 
                                                            
training; 

Fulfilled 

The Law on Foreigners and International protection established the DGMM as the specialised 
body  responsible  for  the  refugee  status  determination  procedures  in  Turkey.  DGMM  is 
effectively entitled to issue decisions on asylum procedures since 11 April 2014. In an initial 
period,  while  its  staff  was  mostly  under  recruitment  and  training,  asylum  procedures 
continued to be carried out  by the Foreigner department of  the Turkish National Police, the 
same institution in charge of the issue before the establishment of the DGMM, which however 
now acted on behalf of DGMM under the supervision of its central offices and in respecting 
the newly adopted law. Since 18 May 2015 DGMM, completed the recruitment and training 
of its staff, and put in place its electronic database (GOCNET), it has been handed over by the 
Foreigners Department of the Police  (which has  been  closed) the effective task to  carry  out 
asylum procedures.  

While  DGMM  is  in  charge  of  asylum  procedures,  the  Law  also  foresees  remedies  allowing 
the  unsuccessful  asylum  seekers  to  appeal  against  its  decisions.  The  appeal  can  be  lodged 
upon  the  International  Protection  Assessment  Committee  (an  administrative  body, where  an 
UNHCR representative sits as  observer) or  to  an administrative court. The appeal  system is 
effectively  running.  Since  2014,  28  cases  have  been  ruled  by  the  administrative  courts 
following  appeals  filed  by  foreigners.  19  of  these  cases  were  about  the  rejection  of 
international protection application; only in 1 of the cases did the appellant win, in all other 27 
cases the DGMM won.  

26. Provide  adequate  infrastructures  and  sufficient  human  resources  and  funds 
ensuring  a  decent  reception  and  protection  of  the  rights  and  dignity  of  asylum 
seekers and refugees. 

Fulfilled 

Syrians  under  temporary  protection  requesting  assistance  are  offered  the  possibility  to  be 
hosted  in  reception  centres,  where  they  are  given  accommodation,  food,  schooling,  health 
care. There are 26 of such reception centres in Turkey (mostly located in the provinces near 
by the border with Turkey) where are hosted around 270.000 persons (figures fluctuate on a 
daily basis).  

In two of the 26 centres are also hosted 11.319 Iraqis. Set this aside, non-Syrian international 
protection  applicant  and  beneficiaries  had  until  now  little  access  to  public  shelter. The  only 
reception centre available (Yozgat) has a very limited capacity (100 places).  

During the reporting period, however, DGMM has taken steps to expand its hosting capacity 
for non-Syrians in the near future: a reception centre –built with EU financial support- has just 
been made available in Erzurum (capacity of 750 places), two more are planned to be built in 
Ankara and Konya (the latter focussing on asylum seekers that are unaccompanied minors).  

27. Persons  who  are  granted  a  refugee  status  should  be  given  the  possibility  to  self-
sustain, to access to public services, enjoy social rights and be put in the condition to 
integrate in Turkey. 

 Fulfilled  

All  Syrian  and  non-Syrian  asylum  seekers  and  refugees  have  access  to  public  services  and 
social rights. All Syrians under temporary protection and non-Syrian international protection 

16 

 
 
 
 
applicants and beneficiaries of asylum are granted free access to health care and schooling in 
public structures, with the costs being borne by the Turkish State (around 70 million Turkish 
liras  spent  between  2014  and  February  2016  as  a  premium  for  the  health  care  insurance). 
Non-Syrians  also  had  access  to  social  assistance  whenever  considered  necessary:  over  45 
million Liras were granted to them between 2014 and 2015.  

Through mobilisation of various funds (notably the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance 
(IPA), the funds of the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO), the Instrument 
contributing to Peace and Stability (IcPS) and the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT), the 
EU will provide an increased support to refugees and their hosting communities to ensure an 
effective access to social services, a priority target being an increase in the share of children 
having access to schooling.  

The  Regulation  on  Syrians  under  Temporary  protection  and  the  Law  on  Foreigners  an 
International  Protection  state  the  principle  that  Syrians  and  non-Syrian  international 
protection applicants and beneficiaries may have access to legal employment at conditions to 
be determined.  

These conditions were effectively set for Syrians under temporary protection in a by-law that 
entered into force on 15 January 2016, which inter alia gave unrestricted access to seasonal 
works  and  job  opportunities  in  rural  areas,  as  well  as  access  to  employment  positions  for 
which Turkish applicants may not be   

On  26  April  2016,  the  Government  has  issued  a  Regulation  setting  comparable  terms  of 
access to the labour market to all applicants and beneficiaries of the international protection in 
Turkey.    

28. Adopt and implement legislation providing for an effective migration management 
and including rules aligned with the EU and the Council of Europe standards, on 
the  entry,  exit,  short  and  long-term  stay  of  foreigners  and  the  members  of  their 
family, as well as on the reception, return and rights of the foreigners having been 
found entering or residing in Turkey illegally. 

Fulfilled 

The Law on Foreigners and International protection adopted on 11 April 2013, in force since 
April  2014,  was  designed  by  taking  direct  and  explicit  inspiration  from  the  EU  acquis  on 
migration and migrants' rights, although its alignment to the acquis is not precise.   

The  by-law  implementing  the  Law  on  Foreigners  and  International  Protection  entered  into 
force on 17 March 2016 and defines in detail how the Law should be applied.  

DGMM is in charge of the implementation of the Law in all its aspects.  

29. Set up and start to apply a mechanism for the monitoring of migration flows, with 
data  both  on  regular  and  illegal  migration;  establish  bodies  responsible  for 
collection  and  analysis  of  data  on  migration  stocks  and  flows;  and  develop  a 
situational picture on illegal migration flows at national, regional and local level, as 
well  as  on  the  different  countries  of  origin  of  the  illegal  migration,  including 
implementation of risk analysis and intelligence. 

Fulfilled 

17 

 
 
 
 
For  a  long  time  Turkish  authorities  have  been  unable  to  provide  detailed  and  consolidated 
statistical  data  on  the  irregular  migration  phenomena  in  Turkey  which  therefore  also 
hampered their capacity to elaborate any trend assessment. Since its creation, DGMM is now 
in  charge  of  the  collection  of  statistics  and  the  elaboration  of  analysis  on  all  the  migratory 
flows as well as, jointly with the law enforcement agencies, of the risk analysis.  

DGMM  is  currently  able  to  elaborate  in  real  time  data  at  provincial  level  of  the  number  of 
irregular migrants apprehended. DGMM feeds also the collection of statistical data (TU-RAN 
project)  organised  by  Frontex  with  Turkish  authorities  and  other  countries  of  the  region 
(Bulgaria, Romania, Cyprus). 

On 10 February 2015, DGMM has established a Strategy and Analysis Working Group under 
its Migration Policy and Projects Department.  On 3 March and 15 April 2016, DGMM has 
published the Annual Migration Reports for 2014 and 2015.  On 12 April 2016, the Turkish 
National Police instructed 163 land, air and sea border gates to collect risk analysis statistics 
on forgery and inadmissible passengers (origin and targeted destination countries).    

However,  using  available  data  in  view  of  elaborating  operational  and  detailed  risk  analysis 
remains a capacity which DGMM has to develop further.  

30. Take  measures  improving  the  capacity  to  investigate  cases  of  organised  or 

facilitated illegal migration. 

Fulfilled 

A unit specifically in charge of the fight against migrant smuggling and human trafficking has 
been  established  on  4  February  2016  within  the  Turkish  National  Police,  taking  inspiration 
from the Unit already set up within the Turkish Coast Guard.  

The  Turkish  Gendarmerie  also  created  a  separate  unit  on  migrant  smuggling  and  human 
trafficking  as  of  February  2016.  Operational  cooperation  between  the  above-mentioned  law 
enforcement structures having different areas of responsibilities as well strategic risk analysis 
are still to be developed. 

Higher  penalties  for  migrant  smugglers  were  proposed  by  the  Government  for  Parliament’s 
approval. The amendment to the Turkish Penal Code foresees a prison sentence of up to 10 
years and a pecuniary penalty of up to 15.000 TRL.  

31. Effectively  seek  to  conclude  and  implement  readmission  agreements  with  the 
countries  that  represent  sources  of  important  illegal  migration  flows  directed 
towards Turkey or the EU Member States. 

Fulfilled 

In January 2016 Turkish authorities sent draft readmission agreements and proposed to start 
their negotiation to the authorities of 14 countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Algeria, Eritrea, 
Morocco, Ghana, Iraq, Iran, Cameroon, Congo, Myanmar, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia. Turkish 
authorities  are  currently  holding  preliminary  talks  with  the  authorities  of  many  of  these 
countries, which may soon lead to formal negotiations commencing.  

Turkish  Parliament  has  ratified  on  7  April  2016  the  readmission  agreement  which  Turkish 
authorities  had  signed  with  Pakistan  in  2010.  The  agreement  entered  into  force  on  20  April 
2016. 

18 

 
 
 
 
In March 2016, the Government submitted to Parliament for ratification the draft readmission 
agreements with Nigeria, Yemen, Montenegro and Kosovo6. 

32. Ensure  sufficient  financial  and  human  resources  for  effective  migration 

management, including also adequate training programs. 

Fulfilled 

DGMM has large human, technical and financial resources, well-trained experts and offices in 
all the provinces of the country. 

Substantial funds are allocated by Turkey as well as by the EU to the implementation of the 
DGMM-led financial programmes.  

33. Ensure  effective  expulsion  of  illegally  residing  third-country  nationals  from  its 

territory. 

Fulfilled  

Turkish  authorities  are  regularly  returning  or  making  attempts  to  return  irregular  migrants 
towards  their  countries  of  origin.  They  experience  a  success  rate  similar  to  the  highest-
performing  EU  Member  States  in  this  area.  Specific  difficulties  to  return  irregular  migrants 
relate to Afghanis, as well as to Myanmaris (a nationality which Pakistanis and Bangladeshis 
apprehended  as  irregular  migrants  in  Turkey  often  pretend  to  hold  to  avoid  deportation 
towards their respective countries of origin).  

In 2015, Turkish authorities managed to return 18.591 irregular migrants to their countries of 
origin. In the first four months of 2016 this number had reached 3.900. 

34. Establish the conditions allowing a voluntary  return to the third country nationals 

expelled from its country and willing to use this modality. 

Fulfilled 

In December 2015, DGMM has started to implement, jointly with IOM, an EU-funded project 
supporting the assisted voluntary return of 750 irregular migrants. By the end of 2016 another 
project targeting 5.000 persons will be launched. 

The  possibility  for  voluntary  return  in  Turkey,  although  foreseen  already  in  principle  under 
the  Law  on  Foreigners  and  International  Protection,  is  regulated  through  a  specialised 
directive issued by DGMM on 15 April 2016.  

The Roadmap on the establishment of a national voluntary return mechanism was adopted on 
26 April 2016 and has started to be implemented. 

35. Provide  adequate  infrastructure  (including  detention  centres)  and  strengthen 
responsible  bodies  to  ensure  effective  expulsion  of  illegally  residing  and/or 
transiting third country nationals from the Turkish territory, while offering all the 
needed legal aid, as well as social and psychological assistance, and decent and fair 

6 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ 
Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence; 

19 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
detention conditions and removal procedures, to the returnees.  

Fulfilled 

Turkish authorities  have  been  intensively  working to  establish adequate removal centres for 
irregular  migrants  to  be  returned  or  just  readmitted.  The  total  capacity  of  the  18  removal 
centres currently operated by DGMM is 4.460. As of June 2016, DGMM will be operating 25 
removal centres with a total capacity of 14.060 persons.  

The  construction  of  a  removal  centre  in  Çanakkale  and  a  container  centre  in  Aydın  will  be 
completed  by  May  2016.  The  construction  of  centres  in  Ağrı  and  Kocaeli  will  start 
soon(tenders  have  been  finalised).  The  conversion  of  5  accommodation  centres  to  removal 
centres is expected to be finalised in April 2016. Removal centre in Çanakkale and a container 
centre  in  Aydın  will  be  completed  by  May  2016.  On  the  other  hand,  as  of  June  2016, 
preparations  for  the  container  removal  centre  in  Istanbul  will  be  completed.  New  removal 
centres in Malatya, Tekirdağ and Antalya are planned for December 2016. 

Specialised  staff,  including  psychologists  and  sociologists,  are  working  in  the  removal 
centres, while a protocol was signed between DGMM and Turkish Red Crescent in order to 
monitor, identify and supply services to the migrants under detention in a removal centre that 
may have particular needs.  

20 

 
 
 
4. BLOCK 3: PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY   

4.2.1. Preventing and fighting organised crime, terrorism and corruption 

36. Continue and complete implementation of its National Strategy and Action Plan for 
the  fight  against  organised  crime  (in  particular  cross-border  aspects)  and  ensure 
adequate human and financial resources for its implementation. 

Fulfilled 

Following  the  implementation  of  the  National  Strategy  2010-2015  for  the  fight  against 
organised  crime  and  of  its  relevant  Action  Plan  2010-2012  and  2013-2015  (whose  results 
have been communicated to the Commission within the framework of the visa  liberalisation 
dialogue),  Turkish  authorities  have  adopted  in  March  2016  a  new  National  Strategy 
Document on Combating against Organised Crime 2016-2021 and have adopted and started to 
implement an Action Plan on Combating Organised Crimes 2016-2018.  

These  new  documents  set  pertinent  and  realistic  targets.  Their  implementation  will  be 
coordinated and monitored by the Department of Smuggling, Intelligence, Operation and Data 
Collection of the Ministry of Interior. 

The  information  provided  by  the  Turkish  authorities  to  the  Commission  and  as  regards  the 
effective  size  and  nature  of  the  criminal  organisations  operating  in  Turkey,  and  the  impact 
exercised by the Turkish law enforcement agencies' activity aimed at dismantling them, has 
remained  limited,  as  Turkish  authorities  consider  this  information  confidential.  Turkish 
authorities have expressed their readiness to share more information as soon as an appropriate 
framework for the sharing of confidential information would be set up.  

37. Sign  and  ratify  the  Council  of  Europe's  Convention  on  Action  against  Human 
Trafficking  as  well  as  adopt  and  effectively  implement  legislation,  including 
provisions  aligned  on  the  standards  set  by  this  Convention  as  well  as  by  the  EU 
acquis related to the prevention of the trafficking in human beings, the prosecution 
of traffickers, and the protection and assistance of their victims.  

Fulfilled 

The  draft  law  ratifying  the  Council  of  Europe  Convention  on  Action  against  Human 
Trafficking was adopted in the Turkish Parliament and published in the Official Journal on 19 
February 2016. Turkey has also deposited the instrument of ratification for this Convention. 

A specific by-law on the Prevention of Human Trafficking and Protection of Victims entered 
into  force  on  17  March  2016,  complementing  the  provisions  in  favour  of  the  victims  of 
trafficking in human beings and those prosecuting the authors of this crime already included, 
respectively in the Law on Foreigners and International Protection and in the Penal Code.     

38. Provide adequate infrastructures and sufficient human resources and funds ensure 
the  rights  and  dignity  of  victims  of 

decent  reception  and  protection  of 
trafficking,  and supporting their social and professional reintegration.   

Fulfilled 

A specific department in charge of identifying and assisting victims of trafficking  in human 
beings  has  now  been  established  in  the  DGMM.  A  hot-line  allowing  the  victims  to  request 

21 

 
 
 
 
 
assistance,  three  shelters  to  host  and  protect  the  victims,  and  programmes  to  support  their 
social and psychological reintegration, were established a few years ago by the IOM with the 
EU-financial  support  in  Istanbul,  Antakya  and  Ankara.  These  initiatives  are  now  entirely 
managed  and  supported  by  DGMM's  trained  and  specialised  staff.  On  23  March  2016,  a 
fourth shelter for 40 people was set up in Kırıkkale. 

The  capacity  of  the  four  existing  shelters  seems  adequate,  if  compared  with  the  number  of 
victims  of  trafficking  identified  by  Turkish  authorities.  On  the  other  hand,  the  number  of 
victims of trafficking identified by Turkish authorities seems far too limited, if compared with 
the  number  of  migrants  and  refugees  residing  in  or  transiting  through  Turkey.  In  six  years 
between  2010  and  2015  Turkish  authorities  liberated  only  140  victims  (only  15  in  the  year 
2015) and arrested only 179 traffickers (only 14 in the year 2015) The persons identified as 
victims  of  trafficking  in  Turkey  are  mostly  women  from  former  Soviet  Union  republics  (in 
Easter Europe or Central Asia) who are submitted to sexual exploitation. Only rarely Turkish 
authorities identify as victims migrants or refugees originating from Iran, Iraq or Afghanistan, 
or  children,  or  persons  submitted  to  labour  exploitation  or  forced  marriages.  Of  the  victims 
identified  between  2010  and  2015,  39  were  Turkish  citizens,  42  from  Kirgizstan  or 
Uzbekistan,  25  from  Azerbaijan  or  Georgia.  Between  2014  and  2015,  when  more  than  2.5 
million Syrians lived in Turkey, only 1 Syrian was identified as a victim of trafficking.   

DGMM informed the European Commission that it will increase its attention on the above. A 
Handbook  for  public  officers  on  how  to  identify  and  treat  victims  of  trafficking  is  under 
preparation.  

More  generally,  DGMM  is  further  strengthening  its  capacity  through  an  EU-funded  project 
which  started  on  July  2014.  Judges,  public  prosecutors,  migration  experts  working  in  local 
offices  of  DGMM  and  law  enforcement  officers  were  provided  with  trainings.  DGMM 
prepared a new EU-funded project which should start by the end of 2016 and which should 
contribute to the opening of three new shelters. 

At this time, Turkey does not have a strategy which targets the  development of a long-term 
vision on how to comprehensively address trafficking in human beings, in full respect of the 
rights of victims. 

39. Ratify  the  Council  of  Europe  Convention  on  Laundering,  Search,  Seizure  and 
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (CETS 
198)  and  transpose  its  provisions  into  the  internal  legislation  and  adopt  and 
effectively enact legislation allowing to meet the requirements of this Convention as 
well  as  the  recommendations  of  the  Financial  Action  Task  Force  (FATF)  on 
establishing a system on the freezing of assets and a definition of the financing of 
terrorism.   

 Fulfilled  

The fight against money laundering in Turkey is based on the Law on Prevention of Money 
Laundering  N.4208  adopted  on  19  November  1996  and  then  amended  by  law  5549  which 
entered  into  force  on  18  October  2006,  which  also  established  the  Financial  Crimes 
Investigation Board of the Ministry of Finance (MASAK).    

Article  282  of  the  Turkish  Penal  Code  (lastly  reformed  in  2009)  includes  provisions 
criminalizing the activity of money laundering, of the activity of benefiting of proceedings of 
crime,  including  also  aggravating  clauses  for  public  officers,  certain  categories  of 
professionals, and criminal organisations.  

22 

 
 
 
On  6  February  2013  Turkey  adopted  the  Law  on  the  prevention  of  financing  of  terrorism 
establishing a system on the freezing of assets of terrorism to react to international request of 
freezing. The adoption of this legislation, jointly with other measures taken in 2014, allowed 
Turkey  to  be  taken  out  by  the  Financial  Action  Task  Force  (FATF)  from  the  list  of  non-
cooperative countries.  

The  FATF  revised  its  Recommendations  in  2012  and  as  its  assessment  methodology  which 
aims at assessing both the technical compliance with revised FATF standards, as well as the 
level of effectiveness of the countries' AML/CFT regime. It is necessary to assess whether the 
new  legal  framework  in  Turkey  is  compliant  with  the  revised  FATF  standards  and  how  far 
those rules are effectively applied. 

Turkey has a legal system, based on its Penal Code, to freeze and confiscate the proceedings 
of criminal activities; however, it does not have an Asset Recovery Office. 

The draft law ratifying the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and 
Confiscation  of  the  Proceeds  from  Crime  and  on  the  Financing  of  Terrorism  (CETS  198)  , 
signed  on  28  February  2007,  was  ratified  by  Turkey  on  19  February  2016.  The  ratification 
should  facilitate  Turkey's  capacity  to  cooperate  at  international  level  in  combating  against 
money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Turkey has now deposited the instrument of 
ratification for this convention at the Treaty Office of the Council of Europe Secretariat.  

A draft bill amending the existing legislation on money laundering and financing of terrorism 
of  Turkey  to  ensure  the  transposition  of  the  provisions  of  the  ratified  Convention  was 
presented by the Government in March 2016 and adopted in April by the Parliament.   

The legal framework on money laundering, financing of terrorism, freezing and confiscation 
of  criminal  proceedings  is  largely  in  line  with  the  standards  set  by  the  Convention. 
Nevertheless important steps forward still remain to be taken by Turkey in order to upgrade 
this framework and its implementation up to the EU standards as well as to entirely fulfil all 
the recommendations issued by FATF.   

40) Ratify the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime and adopt legislation and 

implement measures allowing to enact this Convention. 

Fulfilled 

The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime was ratified by Turkey  on 29 September 
2014. Turkish legislation is largely aligned to the Convention. 

A  draft  bill  amending  the  existing  legislation  on  cybercrime  so  as  to  ensure  better 
transposition of the ratified Convention was presented by the Turkish Government in March 
2016 and adopted in April by the Parliament.   

41) Continue  implementing  the  National  Strategy  and  the  Action  Plans  against  Drugs 
and Drug Addiction and develop cooperation with the European Monitoring Centre 
for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA); 

Fulfilled 

The international agreement between Turkey and EU on Turkey’s participation in EMCDDA 
(European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction) was signed on 30 October2007 
and came into force on 01 June 2014. Turkey has been participating on EMCDDA activities 
as a full member since then. 

23 

 
 
 
 
Besides annual data on drug addiction, Turkish Drug Reports that consist of studies on drugs 
are translated in English and shared with EMCDDA. 

Turkish  authorities,  coordinated  by  the  Turkish  Monitoring  Centre  for  Drugs  and  Drug 
Addiction  (TUBIM),  which  was  the  Turkish  counterpart  to  EMCDDA  have  been 
implementing  Turkey's  National  Drug  Policy  and  Strategy  document  (2013-2018)  and  the 
Third    Action  Plans against  Drugs and  Drug  Addiction  (2013-2015). In  line  with  the  Prime 
Ministry’s  Circulars  dated  13  November  2014  and  2014/19,  the  task  of  ensuring  the 
coordination between the institutions in the fight against drugs was transferred to the Ministry 
of Health and the two multiannual document were abolished and replaced by a Fight against 
Drugs Rapid Action Plan annual document listing priority actions for the sole year 2015.  

Following  the  implementation  of  this  annual  plan,  a  new  multiannual  action  plan  was 
prepared by the Ministry of Health.  The New Strategy and Multiannual Action Plan covering 
the period 2016-2018 was adopted on 18 April 2016. 

42) Continue implementing the National Strategy and the Action Plan on Fight against 
Corruption and the recommendations of GRECO (I, II and III. Evaluation Round). 

Not fulfilled 

Turkey has only partially implemented the National Strategy and the Action Plan 2010-2014 
on  Fight  against  corruption.  The  Plan  was  mostly  implemented  by  preparing  studies,  which 
were  not  always  followed  by  concrete  measures.  The  report  on  the  implementation  of  the 
Action Plan, prepared by the Prime Ministry's Inspection Board, was only communicated to 
the Prime Ministry  office, without any circulation to  other institutions of the State or to  the 
public opinion. Civil society organisations are not involved in developing or monitoring the 
anti-corruption  policy.  There  is  currently  neither  information  exchange  with  them  nor  a 
regular consultation process.  

Turkey  has  still  to  adopt  legislation  giving  an  effective  follow  up  to  the  recommendations 
issued by the  Council of Europe  Group of States  against Corruption  (GRECO)  under all its 
evaluation  rounds,  notably  legislation  on  the  funding  of  political  parties,  on  immunities,  on 
bribery, and on the independency of judiciary.  

Turkey has adopted on 30 April 2016 a new strategy and action on corruption.   

Turkey has taken part in the four rounds of evaluations carried out by the Group of States of 
the Council of Europe against Corruption (GRECO).  

  The  first  round  of  evaluations  assessed  the  independence,  specialisation  and  means 
available  to  national  bodies  engaged  in  the  prevention  and  fight  against  corruption, 
and the extent and scope of immunities. 

  The  second  evaluation  report  assessed  how  legislation  and  practices  are  designed  to 
allow for an effective identification, seizure and confiscation of corruption proceeds, 
the relation between public administration and corruption (auditing systems; conflicts 
of  interest),  the  prevention  of  legal  persons  being  used  as  shields  for  corruption,  tax 
and  financial  legislation  to  counter  corruption,  and  the  links  between  corruption, 
organised crime and money laundering. 

  The  third  round  assessed  the  incriminations  provided  for  in  the  Criminal  Law 
Convention on Corruption (ETS 173), its Additional Protocol (ETS 191) and Guiding 
Principle  2  (GPC  2),  the  transparency  of  Party  Funding  with  reference  to  the 
Recommendation  of  the  Committee  of  Ministers  to  member  states  on  common  rules 

24 

 
 
 
against  corruption  in  the  funding  of  political  parties  and  electoral  campaigns (Rec 
(2003). 

  The  fourth  round  of  evaluation  took  place  in  April  2015,  however  Turkey  gave  its 
green light for the publication of the report only recently. It assessed the prevention of 
corruption  in  respect  of  members  of  parliament,  judges  and  prosecutors,  including 
ethical  principles  and  rules  of  conduct,  the  conflict  of  interest,  the  prohibition  or 
restriction of certain activities, the declaration of assets, the income, the liabilities and 
interests, the enforcement of the rules regarding conflicts of interest, the awareness.  

The  report  on  Turkey  related  to  the  first  and  second  evaluation  report,  in  its  latest  version 
(December  2010)  had  concluded  that  "out  of  the  21  recommendations  issued  to  Turkey,  in 
total  15  recommendations  have  now  been  implemented  satisfactorily  or  dealt  with  in  a 
satisfactory manner".7 Based on the expert assessment carried out in 2015 in the framework 
of  the  visa  liberalisation  dialogue,  the  Commission  believes  that  since  2010  little  or  no 
progress was made by Turkey in taking these measures.  

The report on Turkey related to the third round of evaluation, which in its latest version (the 
Second Interim Compliance Report), was adopted in December 2015, and the publication of 
which  was  authorised  in  March  2016  concluded  that  "Turkey  has  not  made  any  tangible 
progress  in  the  implementation  of  the  eleven  recommendations  found  to  be  not  or  partly 
implemented in the Interim Compliance Report. Out of a total of seventeen recommendations, 
six  recommendations  remain  implemented  satisfactorily.  Seven  recommendations  remain 
partly  implemented  and  four  not  implemented.  Specifically,  with  respect  to  Theme  I  –
Incriminations, recommendations i, ii, iii, iv, vi and viii have been implemented satisfactorily 
and  recommendations  v  and  vii  remain  partly  implemented.  With  respect  to  Theme  II  – 
Transparency  of  Party  Funding,  recommendations  ii,  iii,  iv,  vii  and  viii  remain  partly 
implemented and recommendations i, v, vi and ix not implemented."8 

Turkish  authorities  declared  their  intention  to  address  some  of  the  outstanding  GRECO 
recommendations, through the adoption of the National Action Plan on corruption adopted on 
the 30 April 2016.  

In  both  its  first  and  second  report  on  Turkey's  progress  on  the  fulfilment  of  its  visa 
liberalisation  roadmap  the  Commission  has  recommended  that  Turkish  authorities  involve 
civil  society  organisations  both  in  preparing  and  in  monitoring  the  implementation  of  this 
Action Plan, and to entrust the monitoring to an independent body.  

The  report  on  Turkey  related  to  the  fourth  round  of  evaluation,  adopted  by  GRECO  in 
October 2015, the publication9 of which was authorised by Turkish authorities in March 2016, 
issued Turkey with 22 recommendations on measures to be taken to better prevent corruption 
among members of parliament, judges and prosecutors, notably by strengthening measures to 
avoid  conflicts  of  interests  of  MPs,  by  better  protecting  the  other  two  categories  from  the 
influence  of  external  pressures  (notably  those  exercised  by  the  political  power),  and  by 
establishing and  monitoring respect of codes of  conduct.  The report also concluded that  the 

7 https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round2/GrecoRC1&2(2008)2_Add_Turkey_EN.pdf. 
8 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round3/GrecoRC3(2015)17_2nd_Interim_Turkey_EN.p
df. 
9 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round4/Eval%20IV/GrecoEval4Rep(2015)3_Turkey_EN
.pdf 

25 

 
 
                                                            
judiciary in Turkey is not perceived to be sufficiently independent from the executive powers 
of the country, despite constitutional guarantees to that end. 

4.2.2. Judicial cooperation 

43) Implement  and  comply  with 

international  conventions  concerning 

judicial 
cooperation  in  criminal  matters  (in  particular  the  Council  of  Europe  Conventions 
on  Extradition  (no  24  of  1957,  including  the  not  yet  implemented  Additional 
Protocols of 1975, 2010 and 2012), Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (no 30 of 
1959,  including  the  not  yet  implemented  Additional  Protocol  of  2001),  and  the 
Transfer of Sentenced Persons ( no 112 of 1983, including the not yet implemented 
Additional Protocol of 1997). 

Fulfilled 

Turkey  signed  on  22  March  2016  the  3  Additional  Protocols  to  the  CoE  Convention  on 
Extradition, and the 2001 Additional Protocol to the CoE Convention on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal  Matters.  All  4  Protocols  were  adopted  in  the  Parliament  on  26  April  2016. 
Following  the  publication  in  the  Official  Gazette,  they  will  be  submitted  to  the  Council  of 
Ministers for approval, Minister  of Foreign Affairs and to the President for signature of the 
instrument  of  ratification.  Turkey  hopes  to  finalise  the  whole  ratification  process  by  early 
June.  

The  Protocol  to  the  Convention  on  the  Transfer  of  Sentenced  Persons  was  signed  on  10 
November 2010. It was adopted in the Parliament and published in the Official Journal on 19 
February  2016.  The  instrument  of  ratification  was  deposited  by  Turkey’s  Permanent 
Representative to the Council of Europe to the Secretariat of the Council on 29 April 2016. 

44) Take measures aimed at improving the efficiency of judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters of judges and prosecutors with the EU Member States and with countries in 
the region. 

Fulfilled  

Judicial cooperation in criminal matters between Turkey and the Member States  takes place 
on the basis of the Council of Europe, United Nations and bilateral protocols10.  

In  general,  cooperation  with  the  Member  States  works  well,  although  with  varying  results 
depending  on  the  cases  and  on  the  Member  States,  and  with  some  delays.  Based  on  data 
provided  by  Turkish  authorities,  between  1  January  2014  and  March  2016  Turkey  has 
received from the EU Member States 786 requests of judicial assistance in criminal matters, 
of  which  414  were  fulfilled,  212  could  not  be  satisfied,  and  160  are  still  pending.  In 
approximately half of the cases the request could not be satisfied because either the Turkish 
person to  whom the request referred to  was not  found  at  his/her  known address, or  because 
his/her  address  was  not  known.  It  should  be  underlined  that  Turkey  does  not  offer  any 
cooperation to the Republic of Cyprus as a result of its policy of non-recognition.  

10 Turkey has signed 36 bilateral judicial cooperation agreements in criminal matters with 33 non-EU states, but 
only with three EU Member States. 

26 

 
 
 
 
                                                            
 
Turkey's  Ministry  of  Justice  has  a  Directorate  General  for  Internal  Law  and  Cooperation 
which  is  in  charge  of  handling  incoming  and  outgoing  requests  for  judicial  cooperation  in 
criminal  matters.  The  Directorate  is  in  charge  of  maintaining  contacts  with  Member  States' 
authorities not only for formal but also informal contacts. In the framework of the VLD they 
expressed  their  readiness  to  take  a  more  proactive  role  towards  the  EU  Member  States 
Embassies  in  Ankara  to  enable  them  to  more  easily  identify  their  interlocutors  within  the 
administration, and to clarify Turkish procedures. This would be an important step forward.  

On 23 April 2016, a single legal act on judicial cooperation was adopted. Once this law is also 
complemented  with  the  relevant  secondary  (implementing)  by-laws  defining  in  a  stricter 
manner deadlines for implementing the procedures prescribed in the law and criteria for the 
acceptance  or  rejection  of  the  requests  of  cooperation,  this  overall  legislation  will  certainly 
contribute  to  improve  judicial  cooperation  in  criminal  matters  between  Turkey  and  its 
international partners.  

45) Develop working relations with Eurojust. 

Fulfilled 

Eurojust  may  conclude  with  a  third  country  a  cooperation  agreement  allowing  for  inter  alia  
the exchange of information, including personal data, and the secondment of liaison officers 
or  liaison  magistrates  to  Eurojust,  only  after  consultation  by  Eurojust  with  the  Joint 
Supervisory Body concerning the provisions on data protection and after the approval by the 
Council, acting by qualified majority. 

Talks between Eurojust and Turkish authorities on the possibility to start the negotiation of a 
cooperation agreement took place in 2012. The conclusion of such an agreement with Turkey 
is  not  yet  possible  because  Turkey's  legislation  on  personal  data  protection  is  not  yet  fully 
aligned with EU standards.  

In the interim, Turkey and Eurojust have established contact points to facilitate the exchange 
of non-sensitive information. The Turkish contact points also take part in the meetings of the 
European Judicial Network. 

Eurojust and the Turkish authorities have exchanged letters on further practical cooperation. 
The  Turkish  authorities  wrote  to  Eurojust  on  2nd  May  2016  to  formally  reaffirm  their 
intention  to  conclude  a  cooperation  agreement  as  soon  as  possible  and  to  step  up  practical 
cooperation in the meantime. It will be of crucial importance that the Turkish contact points 
swiftly  reply  and  follow  up  on  requests  for  information  and  cooperation  sent  to  them  via 
Eurojust and to participate in strategic meetings on organised crime and terrorism.  

Eurojust replied to the Turkish authorities on 3rd May 2016 to invite Turkey to the Eurojust 
tactical  meeting  on  terrorism:  building  an  effective  judicial  response  to  foreign  terrorist 
fighters  scheduled  for  22-23  June  2016  and  further  proposed  the  active  participation  of 
Turkish  judges  and  prosecutors  in  Eurojust's  events  on  enhanced  cooperation  in  criminal 
justice issues and to share information and best practice. 

46) Continue  implementing  the  1980  Hague  Convention  on  civil  aspects  of  the 
international  child  abduction,  and  accede  to  the  1996  Hague  Convention  on 
Jurisdiction,  Applicable  Law,  Recognition,  Enforcement  and  Cooperation  in 
Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, as 
well  as  to  the  2007  Hague  Convention  on  the  International  Recovery  of  Child 

27 

 
 
 
 
Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance. 

Fulfilled  

Turkey finalised the necessary procedures on 25 March 2016 to become party to the 1996 and 
2007  Hague  Conventions.  Both  Conventions  were  adopted  by  the  Parliament  on  25  April 
2016. Following the publication in the Official Gazette, they will be submitted to the Council 
of Ministers for approval, Minister of Foreign Affairs and to the President for signature of the 
instrument  of  ratification.  Turkey  hopes  to  finalise  the  whole  ratification  process  by  early 
June. 

Turkey  became  party  to  the  1980  Hague  Convention  on  1  August  2000.  The  Ministry  of 
Justice  issued  a  circular  dated  16  November  2011  on  the  effective  implementation  of  the 
Convention.  Then,  the  Law  on  Civil  Aspects  and  Scope  of  Child  Abduction  aimed  at 
implementing the provisions of the Convention entered into force on 4 December 2007. Faster 
start, shorter duration and the use of specialised courts for judicial proceedings are foreseen in 
Articles 6 and 9 of the said Law. In this framework, these proceedings are heard with simple 
procedure by Family Courts.    

Seminars  for  judges  and  prosecutors  on  the  effective  implementation  of  the  Convention  are 
held  throughout  Turkey.  The  last  seminar  was  organised  in  the  Ministry  of  Justice  on  11 
February 2016.   

Turkey  is  party  to  and  regularly  implements  the  1980  Hague  Convention  on  international 
child  abduction.  However,  based  on  information  collected  and  the  expert  assessment 
elaborated  within  the  framework  of  the  VLD,  it  appears  that  Turkish  authorities  implement 
the judicial proceedings launched under the Convention with systematic delays. 

This  situation  is  due  especially  to  the  complex  judiciary  procedure  designed  for  the 
verification of each case, which usually run for over twelve months, sometimes twenty-four. 
Thus,  the  availability  of  the  1980  Hague  Convention  is  of  limited  value  to  the  parent  of  an 
abducted child. 

Further to the expert report suggesting steps to be taken to reduce delays in the proceedings 
resulting from the 1980 Convention, the Ministry of Justice made an assessment of the whole 
judicial process and came to the conclusion that delays arise mainly from the appeal stage.  

In the current system, all the appeals arrive to the Supreme Court in Ankara which creates a 
bottleneck. Consequently, the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors issued a decree on 25 
March  2016  to  establish  Regional  Civil  Tribunals  in  Ankara,  Antalya,  Erzurum,  Gaziantep, 
İstanbul,  İzmir  and  Samsun.  The  tribunals  which  will  deal  with  the  appeal  cases  will  be 
operational by 20 July 2016.      

47) Provide  effective  judicial  cooperation  in  criminal  matters  to  all  the  EU  Member 
States,  including  in  extradition  matters  inter  alia  by  promoting  direct  contacts 
between central authorities. 

Partially fulfilled 

EU Member States and Turkey cooperate in extradition matters, however in a limited manner. 
A  major  problem  is  represented  by  the  fact  that  Turkey  does  not  accept  to  provide  any 
cooperation to the Republic of Cyprus due to its policy of non-recognition. Cooperation with 
other Member States does not work in a satisfactory manner.   

28 

 
 
 
Based on Turkish data, between 1 January 2014 and 31 December 2015 Member States sent 
to Turkey 49 requests of extradition of which only 6 were accepted and 6 rejected, while all 
the others are still pending.  

One of the main reasons for the limited cooperation on extradition is based on Article 38 of 
the  Turkish  Constitution,  and  article  18  of  the  Turkish  Penal  Code,  which  stipulates  that 
Turkish authorities do not accept to extradite a Turkish citizen to a foreign country unless for 
an offence punished by the International Criminal Court. This means that Turkish authorities, 
on  the  basis  of  a  request  sent  by  a  Member  State  on  the  basis  of  the  Council  of  Europe 
Convention  on  extradition  or  the  Council  of  Europe  Convention  on  a  mutual  assistance  in 
criminal matters, may accept to arrest and extradite only a EU Member State citizen or a third 
country national, but not a Turkish citizen.  

On the other hand, it must be underlined that Turkish authorities would accept to arrest their 
citizen and to detain him/her, instead: 

 

if the request was submitted  on the basis of the provisions of the  Council of Europe 
Convention on the International Validity  of Criminal  Judgments (CETS  70)  - in this 
manner  they  would  accept  to  execute  in  Turkey  a  foreign  sentence  past  against  that 
citizen for a crime committed by the latter abroad,  

  or on the basis of the provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer 
of Proceedings in Criminal Matters(CETS 73) - in this manner they would accept to 
launch  a  national  prosecution  and  issue  a  sentence  against  a  Turkish  citizen  for  a 
crime committed by the latter abroad.  

Furthermore,  the  Turkish  legal  system  foresees  an  additional  way  that  may  ensure  within 
certain  limits  the  possibility  for  Turkish  authorities  to  ensure  the  prosecution  of  Turkish 
citizens  having  committed  a  crime  abroad  and  having  subsequently  fled  to  the  Turkish 
territory.  This  stems  from  the  "universal  competence"  of  Turkish  authorities  to  prosecute 
Turkish  citizens  for  crimes  committed  abroad,  enshrined  in  the  Articles  11  and  13  of  the 
Turkish Penal Code11. On the basis of these articles, four possible scenarios exist, depending 
on the gravity of the case:  

1.  Where the offence requires a punishment whose lower threshold is less than one year 
imprisonment,  the  trial  is  filed  only  upon  the  lodging  of  a  complaint  by  the  injured 
party or the foreign country, and the complaint is filed within six months as of the date 
of entry of the citizen into Turkey. 

2.  For offences requiring a punishment whose lower threshold is not less than one year 
imprisonment  according  to  the  Turkish  laws,  Turkish  authorities  have  to  start 
automatically  the  trial  upon  acquisition  of  the  relevant  information  by  their 
prosecutors, if the offender is found in Turkey, provided that he/she is not convicted in 
the said foreign country for the same offense and there is possibility to proceed a trial 
in Turkey. 

3.  Where the offence is related to one of the crimes listed under the First Chapter of the 
Second  Volume  (crimes  against  humanity,  human  trafficking,  sexual  assault, 
homicide,  crimes  against  freedom  of  believe,  thought,  private  life,  property  etc),  or  
torture,  deliberate  pollution  of  the  environment,  production  and  trading  of  drugs  or 

11  Interestingly,  Turkish  authorities  confirmed  in  the  framework  of  the  visa  liberalisation  dialogue  that  the 
criminal procedures against a Turkish citizens having committed a crime abroad would be launched by them also 
in case the crime would be committed in the Republic of Cyprus and the notification of the crime was sent by the 
authorities of the latter 

29 

 
 
                                                            
stimulants,  facilitation  of  use  of  drugs  or  stimulants,  counterfeiting  money,  
manufacturing and  trading of instruments used  in  production of  money  and valuable 
seals/stamps,  counterfeiting  seals,    prostitution,  confiscation  or  hijacking  of  aircraft, 
vehicles or vessels, or offences committed with the intention to give damage to these 
properties,  the  filing  of  a  trial  in  Turkey  for  the  offences  falling  under  the  scope  of 
paragraph one shall depend on the request of the  Minister of Justice. 

4.  Where the offence is related to one of the crimes listed under the First Chapter of the 
Second  Volume  (crimes  against  humanity,  human  trafficking,  sexual  assault, 
homicide,  crimes  against  freedom  of  believe,  thought,  private  life,  property  etc),  or 
under  the  Third,  Fourth,  Fifth,  Sixth,  Seventh  and  Eighth  Sections  in  the  Fourth 
Chapter  of  the  Second  Volume  (crimes  committed  against  the  state,  the  security  of 
state,  the  constitutional  order,  national  defence,  secrets  of  the  state,  espionage,   and 
against the relations between the foreign states), a trial shall be filed in Turkey upon 
the  request  of  the  Minister  of  Justice,  even  if  the  offender  has  been  convicted  or 
acquitted in a foreign country. 

Some  Member  States  are  well  acquainted  with  these  procedures  and  use  them  in  a  regular 
manner, obtaining results, although with some delays. Other Member States however have a 
more limited use of these procedures and experience more difficulties, depending also on the 
cases.  

The use of these procedures is complicated by the following:  

  As  regards  the  possibility  to  introduce  a  request  to  Turkey  under  the  Council  of 
Europe Conventions on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments (CETS 70), 
and on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters (CETS 73), it should be noted 
that  not  all  the  Member  States  are  parties  to  them.  Turkish  authorities  can 
exceptionally accept to cooperate also with countries that are not parties to them, but 
they  do  it  in  a  discretionary  manner,  by  taking  into  account  of  the  principle  of 
reciprocity and the principle of ne bis in idem.   

  For the activation of this prosecution based on “universal competence”, furthermore, it 
is key for Turkish institutions to acquire adequate information on the crime committed 
by Turkish citizens abroad. The possibility to acquire this kind of information however 
is  limited,  considering  the  fact  that  the  information  may  hardly  be  collected  through 
direct investigations or interrogations of the involved persons (as the crime took place 
abroad),  and  would  therefore  depend  mostly  on  the  availability  of  the  concerned 
foreign country to transfer the information. However for the EU Member States it may 
be problematic to pass this kind of information, in the absence of Turkish legislation 
on the protection of personal data in line with the EU standards.  

Turkish  authorities  have  expressed  the  intention  to  establish  closer  contacts  with  Member 
States'  authorities  in  order  to  further  clarify  the  legislation  and  procedures  applicable  in 
Turkey, and the modalities to ensure prosecution of the criminals whenever extradition is not 
possible. 

4.2.3. Law enforcement cooperation 

48) Take necessary steps to ensure effective and efficient law enforcement cooperation 
among  relevant  national  agencies  -  especially  border  guards,  police,  customs 
officers,  through  full  inter-agency  collaboration  in  the  field  of  intelligence  and 
information exchange - as well as cooperation with the judicial authorities. 

30 

 
 
 
Fulfilled 

Law  enforcement  agencies'  cooperation  in  combating  crime  is  ensured,  in  principle,  by  the 
fact  that  all  their  investigations  are  coordinated  by  and  submitted  to  the  leadership  of  the 
prosecutors in charge of preparing criminal charges against suspects.  

However,  notably  in  the  initial  phases  of  the  instruction  of  the  criminal  investigations,  law 
enforcement agencies, due to their tendency to work separately without sharing information, 
may frequently fail to understand that several criminal cases separately identified by each of 
them at local level should be identified into a single investigation of a national or even a trans-
national nature.  

In  order  to  address  this,  Turkish  authorities  have  decided  to  insert,  in  the  Action  Plan  on 
Organised Crime adopted in March 2016 a measure aimed at establishing a common database, 
into which all the law enforcement agencies should feed and would be entitled to consult, and 
where all information on started criminal investigations should be inserted.   

Meanwhile, in order to strengthen cooperation between law enforcement agencies and border 
agencies at practical level, a bylaw on Inter-institutional Cooperation and Coordination in the 
Field of Border Management was adopted and entered into force on 17 March 2016.  

49) Reinforce  regional  law  enforcement  services  cooperation  and  implement  bilateral 
and multilateral operational cooperation agreements, including by on time sharing 
of relevant information with competent law enforcement authorities of EU Member 
States. 

Fulfilled 

Turkey has concluded 148 bilateral Security and Cooperation Agreements with 77 countries 
and  several  protocols  and  memorandums  of  understanding  with  a  view  to  strengthening 
mutual cooperation in police and security matters. These agreements in general provide inter 
alia a legal basis for the parties' law enforcement authorities to act jointly against cross-border 
crimes,  in  particular  against  terrorism,  organised  crime  and  cybercrime,  and  to  exchange 
information.  

Turkey  has  liaison  officers  in  23  foreign  countries  (including  10  EU  Member  States)  and 
hosts 89 liaison officers from 29 countries (including 15 EU Member States). 

Police  cooperation  is  dealt  with,  in  Turkey,  in  particular  by  the  Interpol-Europol-Sirene 
Department of the Police, which plays the role of contact point for the communication with 
Interpol and Europol and ambitions at representing the single point of contact in the meaning 
of the European Information Exchange Model.   

Turkey  regularly  cooperates  in  police  matters  with  all  the  EU  Member  States,  through 
Interpol or via the direct bilateral security agreements which Turkey has signed with most of 
the Member States.  

The cooperation is generally good, although its quality and speed may vary depending on the 
nature of the cases and of the different relation with the different Member State. 

Turkish authorities do not cooperate bilaterally with the authorities of the Republic of Cyprus 
due  to  their  policy  of  non-recognition.  In  the  framework  of  the  visa  liberalisation  dialogue, 
they  have  declared  to  be  ready  to  indirectly  cooperate  with  them,  at  least  by  exchanging 
information through the mediation of Interpol secretariat. Based on information provided by 
Turkish authorities, cooperation though this channel was offered twice in the course of 2016.  

31 

 
 
 
50) Improve  the  operational  and  special  investigative  quality  and  capacity  of  law 
enforcement  services  to  more  efficiently  serious  cross-border  crime,  including 
identity and travel document fraud. 

Fulfilled 

Turkish  law  enforcement  agencies  have  access  to  very  large  human  and  technical  resources 
and appear in general to have  operational and special  investigative capacity in line with the 
best international standards.  

This is also based on the support provided by several EU-funded projects, notably on forensic 
matters.  

51) Effectively  cooperate  with  OLAF  and  Europol 

in  protecting 

the  euro 

against  counterfeiting.  

Fulfilled 

Turkey is cooperating with OLAF, Europol and the EU Member States law enforcements in 
protecting  EURO  against  counterfeiting.  Turkish  experts  and  representatives  contributed  to 
operations and participated to events organised within the EU in this area.  Turkey is party to 
the  international  Geneva  Convention  for  the  suppression  of  counterfeiting  currently  of  20 
April  1929;  its  national  legislation  (articles  197  and  200  of  the  Penal  Code)  includes  a 
comprehensive definition of counterfeiting, punishes it up to a maximum of 2 to 12 years of 
imprisonment and a judicial fine, and imposes confiscation of the counterfeited currency. The 
Interpol-Europol  department  of  the  Police  has  been  playing  since  2008  the  role  of  National 
contact point on Euro counterfeiting. 

52) Strengthen  the  capacities  of  the  Turkish  Financial  Crimes  Investigation  Board 
(MASAK)  and  develop  its  cooperation  with  other  Financial  Intelligence  Units 
within the EU Member States. 

Fulfilled 

In 1996 Turkey established its Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) called MASAK (Mali Suçları 
Aratırma Kurulu) under Law on Prevention of Money Laundering 4208 of 19 November 1996 
as  amended  in  2006  by  law  5549  Article  14.  MASAK  is  responsible  for  receiving  and 
analysing  suspicious  transaction  reports  from  the  obliged  entities  in  the  financial  sector. 
MASAK has powers under article 19 of law 5549 carrying out preliminary investigations into 
Money  laundering  offences,  to  request  search  and  seizure  in  co-operation  with  law 
enforcement  authorities.  It  also  issues  regulations  to  the  relevant  financial  institutions 
concerning their reporting obligations, and can promote the elaboration of new legislation at 
national  level.  Additionally  MASAK  has  responsibility  for  the  execution  of  financing  of 
terrorism laws and the freezing, seizing and management of terrorist funds and property.  

MASAK  has  been  a  member  of  the  ‘Egmont  Group’  of  Financial  Intelligence  Units  since 
1998. MASAK carries out exchange of information with the members of Egmont Group using 
the  Egmont  Secure  Web  and  in  accordance  with  the  Statement  of  Purpose  of  the  Egmont 
Group  and  its  Principles  for  Information  Exchange.  Since  2006  MASAK  has  signed  41 
Memorandums of Understanding with foreign financial intelligence units (including 11 with 
FIUs from EU Member States 

32 

 
 
 
 
 
Since  its  establishment  the  MASAK  has  continued  stepping  up  its  human  and  technical 
resources. Based on expert assessment carried out in the framework of the visa liberalisation 
dialogue, MASAK is already operating at a fairly good level, but may still enhance the quality 
and quantity of its activity, by increasingly engaging in international cooperation, and taking a 
more  proactive  investigative  approach.  Its  capacity  to  collect  and  analyse  information  will 
depend  also  on  the  increased  capacity  of  the  staff  of  the  obliged  entities  to  report  to  it  on 
suspicious transactions possibly noted. 

On 2 March 2015 MASAK technical capacities have started to receive the support and advice 
of  an  EU-funded  Twinning  project  aimed  specifically  at  developing  at  giving  an  effective 
follow up to the recommendations of the FATF a preparing a National Risk Assessment, and 
at analysing and strengthening the effectiveness of the supervisory processes. 

It will be important that Turkish authorities continue upgrading the capacities of MASAK and 
of  all  the  other  actors  involved  in  the  monitoring,  reporting,  analysis,  investigation  and 
prevention  of  suspicious  financial  transactions.  FATF  considers  that  the  overall  Turkish 
system in this area remains weak and fragile, and the country is at heavy risk of being used for 
money laundering and financing of terrorism.  

53) Continue implementing the Strategic Agreement with Europol. 

Fulfilled 

Turkey and Europol are implementing a Strategic Agreement, which allows the organisation 
of  common  activities,  some  forms  of  cooperation,  and  the  exchange  of  any  kind  of 
information, excluding personal data.  

Exchange of non-personal data of restricted or secret nature is only possible upon conclusion 
of  a  specific  agreement,  while  only  the  conclusion  of  an  operational  cooperation  agreement 
may allow for the exchange of personal data.  

On  21  March  2016  Turkish  authorities  signed  an  agreement  with  Europol  allowing  for  the 
appointment  of  a  representative  of  the  former  to  the  latter  and  his  deployment  within 
Europol's premises in The Hague. On 7 April 2016 the name of the newly appointed liaison 
officer was communicated to Europol. His effective deployment is due to happen shortly. The 
new liaison officer will start work as of 1 May 2016.   

54) Conclude  with  EUROPOL  and  fully  and  effectively  implement  an  Operational 

Cooperation Agreement. 

Not fulfilled 

The  signature  of  an  operational  cooperation  agreement  with  Europol  is  only  possible  once 
Turkish data protection law ensures adequate standards in respect of those of the EU. 

The negotiations, leading to the conclusion of an operational cooperation agreement, can start, 
upon authorisation of the management board of the Agency, as soon as it will be certified that 
the legislation on data protection of Turkey will be in line with the EU standards.   

Turkish authorities sent a letter to Europol on 2 May 2016 to express their desire to sign an 
operational cooperation agreement with Europol.  

4.2.4 Data protection. 

33 

 
 
 
 
 
55) Sign,  ratify  and  implement  relevant  international  conventions,  in  particular  the 
Council  of  Europe  Convention  for  the  Protection  of  Individuals  with  regard  to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data of 1981 and its Additional Protocol no 181. 

Fulfilled  

Both  the  Convention  and  its  Protocol  mentioned  under  this  benchmark  are  ratified  in  the 
Parliament.  

The  instrument  of  ratification  for  the  Convention  was  deposited  by  Turkey’s  Permanent 
Representative to the Council of Europe to the Secretariat of the Council on 29 April 2016.  

As for the Protocol, following the publication in the Official Gazette, it will be submitted to 
the  Council  of  Ministers  for  approval,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  to  the  President  for 
signature  of  the  instrument  of  ratification.  Turkey  hopes  to  finalise  the  whole  ratification 
process  by  early  June.  It  is  very  important  that  the  deposit  of  the  instrument  of  ratification 
takes place as soon as possible. 

56) Adopt and implement legislation on the protection of personal data in line with the 
EU standards, in particular as regards the independence of the authority in charge 
of ensuring the protection of personal data. 

Partially fulfilled 

The Turkish Government has submitted to the Parliament a law on Personal Data Protection, 
which  the  Parliament  has  adopted  on  24  March  2016.  The  new  law  was  published  in  the 
Official Journal on 7 April 2016.  

The  new  law  represents  progress,  compared  with  the  previous  situation  in  which  no 
legislation existed on this matter. However, the approved law is not in line with current EU 
standards, for various reasons, but in particular as the provisions on the composition and the 
functioning  of  the  authority  in  charge  of  supervising  the  use  of  the  personal  data  do  not 
provide assurances for it to act in a completely independent manner, and because the activities 
of  the  law  enforcement  agencies  and  judicial  authorities  are  not  entirely  covered  by  the 
obligation to respect the personal data protection rules in the new law.  

The shortcomings of the draft law had been clearly indicated by the European Commission to 
the  Turkish  Government  before  its  submission  to  the  Parliament.  In  December  2015  the 
European Commission also organised a seminar for the Turkish experts providing all possible 
support and advice on the drafting of a law in line with EU standards.  

Moreover, other changes will be necessary to fully align the law with the requirements of the 
current EU data protection legislation, and to prepare for the future General Data Protection 
Regulation and the Data Protection Directive for Police and Criminal Justice authorities. 

34 

 
 
 
 
 
5. BLOCK 4: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 

5.2.1. Freedom of movement of the citizens 

57) Ensure that freedom of movement of citizens of Turkey is not subject to unjustified 
restrictions,  including  measures  of  a  discriminatory  nature,  based  on  any  ground 
such  as  sex,  race,  colour,  ethnic  or  social  origin,  genetic  features,  language, 
religion  or  belief,  political  or  any  other  opinion,  membership  of  a  national 
minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation. Carry out related full 
investigations when needed. 

Fulfilled   

Article  10  of  the  Turkish  Constitution  provides  that  all  individuals  are  equal  without  any 
discrimination  before  the  law  irrespective  of  language,  race,  colour,  sex,  political  opinion, 
philosophical belief, religion and sect, or any such considerations. It further provides that men 
and women have equal rights and that it is the State's obligation to ensure that this equality 
exists  in  practice.  Finally,  it  states  that  measures  taken  to  achieve  this  equality,  or  the 
protection of vulnerable groups such as the disabled, cannot be considered a violation of the 
principle of equality.  

Sexual  orientation  is  not  a  protected  ground  of  discrimination  in  the  Constitution  or  the 
Criminal  Code.  There  were  however  no  reports  of  a  possible  impact  on  the  freedom  of 
movement of the citizens. 

Article 23 of the Constitution establishes that the freedom of movement may be restricted by 
law for the purpose of investigation and prosecution of an offence, and prevention of crimes, 
that a citizen’s freedom to leave the country may be restricted only by the decision of a judged 
based  on  a  criminal  investigation  or  prosecution,  that  a  citizen  shall  not  be  deported  or 
deprived of their right to entry into the homeland.  

In  order  to  ensure  having  a  more  comprehensive  legal  framework  on  anti-discrimination  in 
line with international standards Turkey is encouraged to become party to the Protocol 12 of 
the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights.  

5.2.2. Conditions and procedures for the issue of identity documents 

58) Provide information about the conditions and circumstances for the acquisition of 

Turkish citizenship. 

Fulfilled 

The information requested under this benchmark has been provided by the Turkish authorities 
to  the  Commission.  The  conditions  and  circumstances  for  the  acquisition  of  Turkish 
citizenship are defined by the law n.5901 adopted on 29 May 2009. 

Citizenship  is  acquired  by  birth  from  at  least  a  Turkish  parent.  A  child  born  in  Turkey,  but 
acquiring no citizenship from his/her alien mother or alien father acquires Turkish citizenship 
by  birth.  An  alien  who  wishes  to  acquire  Turkish  citizenship  can  do  so  by  decision  of  the 
competent authority, provided he/she fulfils the conditions laid down  Article 11 of the Law. 
These include being of age according to his/her own national legal system or according to the 
Turkish  law  if  s/he  is  stateless;  having  been  resident  in  Turkey  for  five  years,  without 
interruption, prior to her/his date of application; having the intention of settling in Turkey and 

35 

 
 
 
 
 
proving this intention with action; not having any disease that constitutes a hazard to public 
health;  being  a  person  of  good  morals;  speaking  an  adequate  level  of  Turkish;  having  an 
income or profession to provide for his/her own livelihood and for that of his/her dependants 
in Turkey; not posing a threat to national security and public order. Mere fulfilment of these 
conditions does not grant an absolute right to the acquisition of citizenship. 

Turkish  citizenship  may  be  acquired  by  marriage  with  a  Turkish  citizen.  Aliens  who  have 
been married to a Turkish citizen for at least three years and whose marriage still continues 
can apply for the acquisition of Turkish citizenship. The applicants shall fulfil the following 
conditions: a) living within the unity of marriage, b) abstaining from acts incompatible with 
the  unity  of  marriage,  c)  having  no  quality  constituting  an  obstacle  in  respect  of  national 
security  and  public  order.  With  the  law  n.25127  of  3  June  2003  were  introduced  in  the 
Turkish legislation aimed at preventing the acquisition of citizenship and residence permit by 
foreigners through faked marriages. 

Article  12  of  the  law  on  citizenship  states  also  that  the  following  categories  of  aliens  can 
exceptionally  acquire  Turkish  citizenship  by  decision  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  provided 
they do not pose a threat to national security and public order: persons who have established 
industrial  plants  to  Turkey  or  have  rendered  or  are  expected  to  render in  future  outstanding 
services in the scientific, technological, economic, social, sporting, cultural and artistic fields 
and  about  whom  a  reasoned  proposal  has  been  submitted  by  the  ministries  responsible; 
persons  whose  naturalisation  has  been  considered  necessary;  persons  who  have  been 
recognised as immigrants. 

59) Provide information about the conditions for changing personal data. 

Fulfilled 

The 2006 Civil Registration Services Law, together with implementing legislation, establishes 
the  conditions  and  principles  with  regard  to  the  registration  of  the  personal  data  and  the 
issuance of the identity cards. 

Under  Article  35  of  the  Law  on  Civil  Registry  Services,  no  civil  registry  record  shall  be 
amended  or  annotated  in  a  way  to  modify  the  meaning  and  the  data  of  the  records  unless 
required by a final court decision. Only factual errors to family registries shall be amended by 
civil registration offices in accordance with the source document. 

At the birth each Turkish citizen is a unique Turkish Republic Identity Number which does 
not  change  even  in  case  the  person  obtains  to  change  his/her  name.  Foreigners  residing  in 
Turkey at least six months for any purpose receive a Foreigner Identification Number. 

60) Ensure  full  and  effective  access  to  travel  and  identity  documents  for  all  citizens 
to 
including  women,  children,  people  with  disabilities,  persons  belonging 
minorities, internally displaced people, and other vulnerable groups. 

Fulfilled 

The 2006 Civil Registration Services Law, together with implementing legislation, establishes 
the  conditions  and  principles  with  regard  to  the  registration  of  the  personal  data  and  the 
issuance of the identity cards. Turkish Passports are issued under the 1.950 Passport Law to 
Turkish citizens who wish to travel abroad. 

There appear to be no restrictions to access to identity or travel documents. In certain more 
remote  areas  of  the  country  or  among  more  marginalised  groups  of  persons  there  could  be 

36 

 
 
 
 
persons  still  deprived  of  identity  cards,  but  they  represent  a  rarity,  and  in  any  case  the 
authorities struggle to ensure that all persons obtain an identity card. 

Based on article 22 of the Passport Law, the passport is refused only to persons whose going 
abroad  is  prohibited  by  the  courts,  and  those  whose  leaving  the  country  is  found  to  be 
inadvisable by the Ministry of the Interior with respect to public safety. No specific reports on 
an  abusive  use  of  this  article  were  collected  within  the  framework  of  the  visa  liberalisation 
dialogue.  

61) Ensure full and effective access to identity documents for the refugees and stateless 

persons residing in Turkey. 

Fulfilled 

In line with the provisions of the law on Foreigners and International Protection, all applicants 
and  beneficiaries  of  international  protection,  including  the  persons  benefiting  of  temporary 
protection,  registered  in  Turkey,  timely  obtain  an  identification  card,  while  the  Stateless 
persons are deemed to obtain Stateless Person Identification Document. 

The DGMM is in charge of the registration of the foreigners and of the stateless persons and 
of the issuance of the identification documents.  

62) Provide accessible information on registration requirements to foreigners wishing to 
reside  in  Turkey,  and  ensure  equal  and  transparent  implementation  of  respective 
legislation. 

Fulfilled 

The  rules  related  to  residence  permits  are  defined  by  the  article  19  to  49  of  the  Law  on 
Foreigners  and  International  Protection  and  the  corresponding  articles  of  the  implementing 
regulation of this law.  

DGMM, with its 81 provincial branches, is in charge to receive and decide on the requests of 
residence permit.  

No information on specific problems in the implementation of this legislation was collected 
by the Commission services within the framework of the visa liberalisation dialogue.  

5.2.3. Citizens’ rights and respect for and protection of minorities   

63) Develop  and  implement  policies  addressing  effectively  Roma  social  exclusion, 
marginalisation  and  discrimination  in  access  to  education  and  health  services,  as 
well  as  its  difficulty  to  access  to  identity  cards,  housing,  employment  and 
participation in public life. 

Fulfilled  

There  are  no  official  data  on  the  number  of  Roma  in  Turkey.  Existing figures  are based  on 
estimations and vary significantly. Some sources put the number of Roma in Turkey to half a 
million while others suggest numbers ranging between two and five millions. Most, if not all 
Roma living in Turkey, are Turkish citizen.  

37 

 
 
 
 
 
 
The last few years have witnessed an increasing number of studies and reports depicting the 
situation  of  Roma  in  Turkey.  According  to  these  reports  Turkish  Roma  face  poverty, 
discrimination  and  difficulties  in  access  to  employment,  education,  housing  and  health 
services. This is similar to the situation of many other countries where Roma live. 

According to the Turkish Constitution, Roma people do not constitute an ethnic minority and 
benefit  from  the  same  rights  as  Turkish  citizens.  This  has  contributed  to  preventing  the 
Turkish authorities until recently from elaborating specific policies and legislation addressing 
the social inclusion problem they frequently face, and to collect statistical data.  

Nevertheless  in  2009  the  Turkish  Government  started  to  recognize  the  existence  of  Roma-
specific problems in Turkey and to promise to place attention on them. Until now however no 
specific measures to address this challenge could be seen in practice.  

On  26  April  Turkish  Government  adopted  a  National  Strategy  and  an  Action  Plan  for  the 
Social  Inclusion  of  Roma  Citizens  which  was  published  in  the  Official  Journal  on  30  April 
2016. A monitoring and evaluation committee will be established before 21 June 2016. The 
strategy and action plan are a positive step forward in that they address key obstacles to the 
social  inclusion  of  Roma.  Its  effective  implementation  and  monitoring  requires  a  dedicated 
budget, impact indicators and timeline.     

In  addition,  the  Parliament  adopted  a  Law  on  the  National  Human  Rights  and  Equality 
Institution on 6 April 2016. 

The  law  prohibits  discrimination  on  grounds  of  gender,  race,  colour,  language,  religion, 
belief, philosophical or political opinion, ethnic origin, property, birth, marital status, medical 
condition, disability and age. Thus, it covers prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of 
racial and ethnic origin. The Turkish authorities have stated that they will interpret this list as 
being  non-exhaustive  and  that  applicants  can  bring  discrimination  cases  on  the  basis  of  the 
general provisions of the Constitution. 

Under the new law, the Turkish Human Rights and Equality Institution will be established to 
ensure  compliance  with  the  prohibition  of  discrimination,  replacing  the  current  Turkish 
Human  Rights  Institution.  The  new  institution  will  have  the  power  to  launch  ex-officio 
investigations  into potential human rights violations. However, it will no longer be possible 
for applicants to bring human rights cases directly to the new institution as these will now be 
addressed to the Ombudsman. 

Furthermore, the Turkish authorities indicated that until the establishment of the new National 
Human  Rights  and  Equality  Institution,  which  may  take  up  to  six  months,  the  previous 
Turkish Human Rights Institution would continue to exist but it would not be processing any 
cases, only filing them until they can be addressed to the new institution. 

64. Ratify Additional Protocols 4 and 7 to the European Convention on Human Rights 

(ECHR). 

Fulfilled 

The  draft  Law  to  ratify  the  Protocol  7,  which  Turkish  authorities  had  signed  in  1985,  was 
adopted in the Parliament and published in the Official Journal on 25 March 2016.   

Protocol  4  provides  for  the  prohibition  of  the  imprisonment  of  a  person  for  debts,  the 
prohibition to expel a person from his/her own country or to prevent him/her from leaving it, 
and the prohibition of collective expulsions of aliens from a country. 

38 

 
 
 
In  the  framework  of  the  visa  liberalisation  dialogue,  Turkish  authorities  have  declared  that, 
although  they  have  signed  it  already  on  1992,  they  do  not  intend  to  ratify  the  Protocol  4. 
Nevertheless  they  have  provided  information  explaining  that  Turkish  national  legal 
framework includes already provisions equivalent to those prescribed by the Protocol 4  

On  this  regard,  Turkish  authorities  have  stated  that  the  Turkish  legislation  already  has 
equivalent provisions:  

-  As  regards  the  “prohibition  of  imprisonment  for  debt”,  laid  down  in  Article  1  of 
Protocol  No.  4  to  ECHR,  Article  38  §  7  of  the  Constitution  provides,  since  the 
amendment of 3 October 2001 (Law No. 4709) that “no one shall be deprived of his 
liberty merely on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation”. Therefore, 
the Constitutional provision is compatible with the said Article of the Protocol. 

-  As regards the  “freedom of  movement”, laid down in  Article  2 of Protocol  No. 4 to 
ECHR,  Article  23  of  the  Constitution,  titled  “freedom  of  residence  and  movement” 
provides that everyone has the right to freedom of residence and movement and that 
freedom of residence may be restricted by law for the purpose of preventing offences, 
promoting  social  and  economic  development,  ensuring  sound  and  orderly  urban 
growth,  and  protecting  public  property;  freedom  of  movement  may  be  restricted  by 
law for the purpose of investigation and prosecution of an offence, and prevention of 
offences. Therefore, the Constitutional provision is compatible with the said Article of 
the Protocol. 

-  As  regards  the  “prohibition  of  expulsion  of  nationals”  laid  down  in  Article  3  of 
Protocol No. 4 to ECHR, the last sentence of Article 23 of the Constitution provides: 
“Citizens may not be deported, or deprived of their right of entry to their homeland”. 
Therefore,  the  Constitutional  provision  is  compatible  with  the  said  article  of  the 
Protocol. 

-  As regards the “prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens”, laid down in Article 4 of 
Protocol  No.  4  to  ECHR,  the  procedure  and  principles  relating  to  the  expulsion 
procedure  have  been  stipulated  in  Article  52  et.  seq.  of  the  Law  No.  6458  on 
Foreigners  and  International  Protection.  The  said  articles  do  not  contain  any 
provisions  stating  that  foreigners  could  be  expelled  collectively.  Moreover,  under 
Article 53 § 2, any deportation order given in respect of a foreigner shall be served on 
the  foreigner,  his/her  legal  representative  or  lawyer.  Accordingly,  deportation  orders 
shall be served on each foreigner separately. Therefore, it has been considered that the 
provisions of the Law No. 6458 are compatible with Article 4 of the Protocol. 

65) Revise  -  in  line  with  the  ECHR  and  with  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights 
(ECtHR)  case  law,  the  EU  acquis  and  EU  Member  States  practices  -  the  legal 
framework as regards organised crime and terrorism, as well as its interpretation by 
the  courts  and  by  the  security  forces  and  the  law  enforcement  agencies,  so  as  to 
ensure  the  right  to  liberty  and  security,  the  right  to  a  fair  trial  and  freedom  of 
expression, of assembly and association in practice. 

Not fulfilled 

The Turkish definition of terrorism remains different from the one enshrined in the EU acquis. 
The  Council  Framework  Decision  2002/475/JHA  on  combating  terrorism  (as  amended  by 
Council  Framework  Decision  2008/919/JHA  of  28  November  2008)  requires  EU  Member 
States to criminalise and deem as terrorist offences a series of well-defined intentional acts. 
Offences  include:  serious  damage  to  a  country  or  an  international  organisation,  acts 
committed with the specific aim of seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling 

39 

 
 
 
a Government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or 
seriously  destabilising  or  destroying  the  fundamental  political,  constitutional,  economic  or 
social structures of a country or an international organisation.  

Turkish  legislation  on  terror  is  drafted  in  a  way  that  seems  to  allow  for  an  overly  broad 
application of the term of terrorism. This is problematic because if terrorist offences are  not 
defined precisely and relate to crimes of a significant level of severity, they may entail serious 
restrictions  upon  human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms.  The  principle  of  proportionality, 
enshrined in European and International law should also be enshrined in Turkish legislation. 

Turkish authorities have in recent years made several amendments to their counter-terrorism 
legislation.  For  instance,  the  maximum  pre-trial  detention  for  terrorist  crimes  was  reduced 
from ten to five years, and other reforms narrowed the scope of terrorist-related offences, in 
particular as regards those related to freedom of expression. However, no additional reforms 
took  place  after  2013.  Some  amendments  introduced  by  the  "Internal  Security  Package" 
adopted in March 2015 have had a negative effect on fundamental rights.    

In  addition  to  legislation,  attention  needs  to  be  paid  to  courts’  interpretation  of  anti-terror 
legislation.  Participants  in  demonstrations  have  been  convicted  for  being  members  of  a 
criminal  or  a  terrorist  organisation  even  though  a  link  with  the  organisation  was  not 
demonstrated.  There  were  also  frequent  restrictions  on  freedom  of  expression  and  media, 
freedom of association and impunity. The recurring arrests and prosecutions of journalists and 
academics on terrorist-related charges, including the provision on "making propaganda for a 
terrorist  organisation"  have  a  detrimental  effect  on  freedom  of  expression  and  lead  to  self-
censorship,  as  noted  by  the  Commissioner  for  Human  Rights  in  his  recent  statements  on 
Turkey. 

Further  criticism  focused  on  legislation  on  meetings  and  demonstrations  that  criminalise 
peaceful participation in demonstrations; the conduct of police during demonstrations which 
is  not  in  line  with  international  human  rights  standards;  provision  of  medical  aid  to  any 
injured or affected person at the earliest possible moment; and the possibility for journalists to 
perform their duties in reporting from the scene of demonstrations unhindered and in safety. 
The definition of limited routes for demonstrations by the Turkish authorities further restricts 
freedom of expression and assembly.   

The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe considered in his 2013 report 
that the Turkish legal framework concerning assemblies and demonstration marches is more 
restrictive  than  necessary  in  a  democratic  society,  in  particular  concerning  demonstrations 
which are deemed unlawful but which are peaceful, leading to unnecessary dispersal by force. 
He  also  considered  that  the  Turkish  authorities  need  to  adopt  clearer  rules  about  the 
proportionate use  of force  by law enforcement  officials  in  the  context of demonstrations, in 
particular with respect to: the use of tear gas and projectile-firing weapons; better safeguards 
against  ill-treatment  and  violations  of  the  right to  freedom  of  assembly  by  law enforcement 
officials;  steps  to  ensure  that  law  enforcement  personnel  act  in  accordance  with  the  ECHR; 
and that domestic authorities conduct effective investigations into allegations of ill-treatment.  

The Turkish authorities have  not yet  addressed these shortcomings.  The  adoption, in March 
2015, of so-called "Security Package" was actually a step backwards, as it further increased 
the possibility for the law enforcement agencies to use force against the population. 

A law on the establishment of a commission to inspect alleged violations committed by the 
law  enforcement  agencies  in  times  of  peace  was  adopted  by  Turkey  on  3  May  2016.  Once 
available, the Commission services will assess the new law. During the drafting phase of this 

40 

 
 
law,  the  European  Commission  had  called  on  the  Turkish  authorities  to  ensure  that  this 
commission will act independently from the Ministry of Interior. 

6. BLOCK 5: READMISSION OF IRREGULAR MIGRANTS   

66) Fully  and  effectively  implement  the  readmission  obligations  existing  with  the 

Member States. 

Fulfilled 

Turkey  has  bilateral  readmission  obligations  with  three  Member  States:  Romania,  Bulgaria 
and Greece. At the end of 2012 Turkey  has  unilaterally ceased to  implement its obligations 
toward Bulgaria, while continuing to implement those towards Romania.  

As regards Greece, which represents by far the main target of irregular migrants from Turkey, 
the cooperation on readmission offered by Turkey has been always very poor until mid-2015.  

In the second half of 2015, and notably after the EU-Turkey Summit of 29 November 2015, 
Turkish  authorities  started  accepting  a  growing  share  of  the  readmission  requests  sent  by 
Greek authorities, although significant delays to their replies continued, which hampered the 
possibility  for  Greek  authorities  to  return  the  persons  for  whom  the  readmission  had  been 
accepted12.  Cooperation  on  readmission  picked  up  strongly  in  the  week  before  the  7  March 
EU-Turkey summit, with the entire backlog of readmission requests dealt with in a bilateral 
meeting and several return operations organised during the month of March and early April.  

At the EU-Turkey Summit on 18 March 2016, Turkish authorities agreed to readmit from the 
Greek islands any irregular arrival from Turkey; not only economic migrants as had been the 
case until then, but  also persons in need  of international  protection, on the basis  of the safe 
third country or first country of asylum principles.  

In  order  to  further  facilitate  the  identification  and  delivery  of  the  persons  to  be  readmitted, 
after  20  March  Turkish  authorities  have  deployed  25  liaison  officers  to  the  hotspots  in  the 
Greek islands where irregular arrivals of migrants and refugees originating from the Turkish 
coast are registered.  

On 13 April 2016, Turkey notified the Greek authorities of its readiness to readmit irregular 
migrants not only in the seaport of Dikili (located in front of the Lesvos island), but also in 
other  seaports  of  its  Aegean  coast  closer  to  other  Greek  islands,  notably  Çeşme  (for 
readmissions from Chios), Kuşadası (from Samos) and Güllük (in the proximity of Rhodes).  

As  a  result  of  these  combined  measures,  the  implementation  of  the  readmission  obligations 
between  Turkey  and  Greece  has  substantially  improved,  and  while  in  2014  and  2015  the 
number  of  irregular  migrants  readmitted  by  Turkey  from  Greece  was  only  six  and  eight 
respectively, this number has been 1292 in the first 100 days of the 2016 (from 1 January until 
13 April 2016). 

67) Ratify the EU-Turkey readmission agreement initialled on 21 June 2012. 

Fulfilled 

12 While in 2014, out of the 9 664 readmission requests sent by Greece, Turkey had accepted only 579,  in 2015 
the number has increased up to 4318accepted  out of 11.427 requested . 

41 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
The  EU-Turkey  readmission  agreement,  signed  on  16  December  2013,  was  ratified  in  the 
course of 2014, and entered into force on 1 October 2014. 

68) Fully  and  effectively  implement  the  EU-Turkey  readmission  agreement  in  all  its 
provisions,  in  such  a  manner  as  to  provide  a  solid  track  record  of  the  fact  that 
readmission procedures function properly in relation to all Member States. 

Partially fulfilled  

On 1 October 2014 the EU-Turkey  agreement entered into force, but  the only  provisions  to 
apply related to: readmission of nationals of the two sides; stateless persons residing on their 
territories;  and  third  country  nationals  citizens  of  the  countries  with  which  Turkey  has  a 
readmission agreement. The entry into force of the provisions related to the readmission of all 
third country nationals was left for an application three years later, i.e. as of 1 October 2017. 

On  1  April  2016,  as  a  concrete  follow-up  to  the  political  decision  taken  at  the  EU-Turkey 
Summit  of  29  November  2015,  the  two  sides  agreed  to  advance  the  start  date  of  the 
application of the provisions related to the readmission of the third country nationals to 1 June 
2016.  This  decision,  signed  by  the  Turkish  Government,  was  subsequently  ratified  by  the 
Turkish Parliament.  

Given that the provisions related to the readmission of third country nationals will only start 
to apply as of 1 June 2016, the Commission is not in a position to provide any assessment of 
their implementation. 

As regards the provisions related to the readmission of the nationals of the two sides, it can be 
noted that Turkish authorities, notably Turkish consulates in several Member States, have so 
far  not  always  implemented  the  agreement  properly,  notably  by  failing  to  identify  their 
nationals and issue them with Emergency Travel Documents within the time limits foreseen 
by  the  agreement.  Turkish  consulates  are  de  facto  contesting  the  legitimacy  of  the  return 
decisions issued by Member States by privileging their consular protection role over their role 
in the readmission process and thus imposing additional steps in the procedures not foreseen 
by the agreement. This significantly delays, hampers or stops the readmission process.  

These  shortcomings  have  been  clearly  and  regularly  denounced  by  the  Commission  on  the 
occasion of all EU-Turkey readmission committee meetings held until now. The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs issued an instruction on 27 April 2016 to the diplomatic missions in the EU 
countries for the effective implementation of the Turkey-EU Readmission Agreement with all 
its  provisions  into  force.  The  instruction  made  reference  to  the  existing  gap  between  the 
statistics  on  Turkish  nationals  subject  to  readmission  and  asked  to  revise  their  current 
procedure to speed up the process. 

69) Establish  and  implement  internal  procedures  allowing  for  the  rapid  and  effective 
identification  and  return  of  Turkish  citizens,  third-country  nationals  and  stateless 
persons who do not, or no longer, fulfill the conditions for entry to, presence in, or 
residence  on  the  territories  of  one  of  the  Member  States,  and  for  the  facilitated 
transit  of  persons  to  be  returned  to  their  country  of  destination,  in  a  spirit  of 
cooperation. 

Fulfilled 

Detailed  internal  procedure  explaining  in  which  manner  the  readmission  requests  must  be 
handled, particularly with reference to the readmission of third country  nationals, have been 

42 

 
 
 
 
adopted  by  Turkish  authorities  and  were  shared  with  the  European  Commission  in  the 
framework of the visa liberalisation. 

Turkish  authorities  will  need  to  closely  monitor  the  respect  of  these  procedures  by  all  the 
Turkish relevant bodies. 

70)  Strengthen  the  capacity  of  the  competent  authority  to  process  readmission 
applications within the timeframe given in the readmission agreement and reduce 
the  number  of  pending  readmission  requests,  including  those  related  to  third 
country nationals. 

Fulfilled 

Since the handing over in May 2015 from the Turkish National Police to the  DGMM of the 
task to deal with the readmission requests, the performances of Turkish authorities have been 
steadily  improving,  also  hanks  to  the  continued  expansion  of  the  human  and  technical 
resources made available by the Turkish Government to the DGMM for this purpose.  

Turkish  authorities  have  shown  in  the  first  months  of  2016  to  be  able  to  cope  with  an 
increased  number  of  readmission  requests  in  the  framework  of  the  bilateral  readmission 
agreement with Greece. It remains to be seen whether and how the authorities will be able to 
cope  with  the  further  increased  flow  of  readmission  requests  which  they  are  expected  to 
receive  as  of  May,  when  the  decision  taken  on  18  March  to  readmit  all  irregular  migrants 
arrived to the Greek islands will be fully enforced, and as of June, when all the EU Member 
States will be entitled to return to Turkey irregular migrants, following the entry into force of 
the  provisions of the EU-Turkey readmission agreement related to third country nationals.  

A work tool, which following the recommendation of the Commission, Turkish authorities are 
considering to  install,  and which  may facilitate the management of an increased quantity of 
readmission  cases,  while  enhancing  the  transparency  of  that  management,  would  be  an 
electronic system of transmission and management of readmission requests.  

Turkish authorities will start testing a pilot phase of this project on 2 May 2016.  

71)  Ensure  that  applications  for  readmission  are  processed  in  compliance  with  the 

domestic and the EU data protection requirements. 

Fulfilled 

Turkey has adopted a law on personal data protection on 24 March 2016. The adoption of this 
law  represents  an  important  step  forward,  although,  as  indicated  in  more  detail  earlier,  the 
adopted law is not fully in line with the current EU acquis on personal data protection, notably 
because  of  the  limited  independence  of  the  data  protection  authority  and  because  the 
prosecution activity of the law enforcement agencies is exempted from the provisions of the 
law.  

DGMM however, which is in charge of the readmission operations, is not a law enforcement 
and  does  not  carry  out  activities  falling  in  the  regime  of  exceptions  as  defined  by  the  law. 
Therefore  the  provisions  of  the  law  on  personal  data  protection  apply  to  the  readmission 
operations.  The  further  improvements  in  the  data  protection  law  sought  vis  a  vis  the 
independence of the body in benchmark 56 will enhance this protection even further. 

In  addition,  the  obligation  for  Turkey  to  apply  rules  on  personal  data  protection  to  any 
foreigner is also stipulated by the Law on Foreigners and International Protection. 

43 

 
 
 
 
72) Compile and share in a timely manner with the competent authorities of Member 

States and the European Commission detailed statistics on readmission. 

Fulfilled  

Since the end of 2015 Turkish authorities have started to collect and share on a regular basis  
with  the  EU  statistical  data  related  to  the  readmission  requests  related  to  third  country 
nationals received from Greece in the framework of the Turkey-Greece bilateral readmission 
provisions and fulfilled. It will have to be seen how this work of collection and sharing will 
continue after the 1 June 2016, when several Member States, and not just Greece, will start 
sending readmission requests related to third country nationals.  

Meanwhile,  the  statistical  data  collected  and  shared  with  the  Commission  by  Turkish 
authorities in relation to the readmission  requests the latter have  received from the Member 
States and fulfilled in relation to Turkish nationals, remain of a poorer quality and less reliable 
also in terms of regularity. In any case they do not coincide with the statistical data proposed 
by the Member States.  

The  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  issued  an  instruction  on  27  April  2016  to  the  diplomatic 
missions in the EU countries for the effective implementation of the Turkey-EU Readmission 
Agreement  with  all  its  provisions  into  force.  The  instruction  made  reference  to  the  existing 
gap  between  the  statistics  on  Turkish  nationals  subject  to  readmission  and  asked  to  revise 
their current procedure to speed up the process. 

44 

 
 
  
 
 
 
ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY  IMPACT OF VISA LIBERALISATION 

ANNEX  

1) Introduction  

According  to  the  Visa  Liberalisation  Roadmap  (VLR)  methodology,  the  Commission 
committed  to  assess  the  possible  migratory  and  security  impacts  of  the  proposed  visa 
liberalisation  for  Turkish  citizens  travelling  to  the  EU,  i.e.  to  foresee  whether  the  lifting  of 
visa  obligations,  by  facilitating  the  ability  of  Turkish  citizens  to  enter  the  Schengen  area 
unimpeded, risks being accompanied by an increase of irregular migration and of criminality 
inside of the EU. 

These two assessments were not provided on the occasion of the adoption of the First Report 
issued  in  October  2014,  because  at  that  moment  the  conclusion  of  the  visa  liberalisation 
appeared to be some distance away.  

The assessment of the possible migratory impact has been provided in the Commission Staff 
Working Document issued jointly with the Commission's Second report on Turkey's progress 
in fulfilling its visa liberalisation roadmap, issued on 4 March 2016.  

The  assessment  of  the  security  impact,  which  is  an  integral  part  of  the  visa  liberalisation 
methodology and hence applied for all third countries concerned, is provided on the occasion 
of the adoption of the Commission's Third report on Turkey's fulfilment of the requirements 
of its visa liberalisation roadmap. 

2) Methodology 

This  Annex  presents  an  assessment  which  draws  on  information  provided  by  Europol, 
Frontex,  Member  States  and  Turkish  authorities,  as  well  as  from  a  combination  of 
international  organisations  and  open  data  sources.  This  Annex  clearly  indicates  how  the 
measures  recommended  by  the  Commission  in  the  framework  of  the  implementation  of  the 
visa liberalisation roadmap for Turkey, alone or in cooperation with the Member States, are 
relevant to address and mitigate the possible risks to their security in the EU.  

3) Key actors in the security area 

The  Turkish  State  fights  against  crime  through  the  joint  effort  of  several  law  enforcement 
agencies,  i.e.  the  Gendarmerie,  responsible  for  the  law  and  order  in  rural  areas,  the  Police, 
responsible for the urban areas, the controls on the persons at the border crossing points and 
international  cooperation,  the  Coast  Guard,  responsible  for  the  territorial  waters,  and  the 
Customs  Enforcement  Department,  responsible  for  the  controls  on  the  goods  at  the  border 
crossing points.  

Their activity is also complemented by that of four State bodies which play an important role 
in  combating  crime, although they are not  by themselves  law enforcement agencies, i.e. the 
Land Forces, responsible for the land borders and the defence of the country against external 
threats, the Directorate-General for Migration Management, responsible for any relation with 
the foreigners present in the country (including irregular migrants, victims of trafficking and 
foreign  fighters),  the  Financial  Crime  Investigation  Board  (MASAK),  in  charge  of  assisting 
the law enforcement agencies and the courts in identifying and analysing suspicious financial 
transactions, and the National Intelligence Organisation (MIT).  

45 

 
 
 
 
 
Some  of  the  law  enforcement  agencies  and  bodies  have  ongoing  working  relations  of 
cooperation  with  counterparts  located  in  several  EU  and  non-EU  countries,  mostly  on  the 
basis of the many Security Agreements which Turkey has signed with many partner countries.  

Turkish law enforcement agencies and other security bodies are well endowed, by the Turkish 
State, with human and financial resources, equipment, facilities and training.   

On  the  basis  of  this  powerful  structure,  the  Turkish  authorities  have  been  obtaining  very 
important results in combating organised crime and terrorism.  

Nevertheless,  organised  crime  groups  (OCGs)  are  particularly  strong  and  active  in  the 
country, and the challenges which they continue to impose remain very high.  

There are several OCGs present all over the national territory, although they are, reportedly, 
stronger  and  more  wide-spread  in  the  South-eastern  and  in  the  Black  Sea  regions  of  the 
country,  where  they  are  largely  based  around  kinship  or  ethnic  ties.  Many  of  these 
organisations also enjoy the cooperation of gangs and individuals of Turkish origin or other 
nationalities  (frequently  Albanian  or  Russian  speaking  persons)  residing  or  operating  in 
European  countries,  and  which  are  able  to  provide  support  for  implementing  criminal 
activities. 

Furthermore, the range of action, skills and resources of these criminal organisations was able 
to develop, due to some structural factors: 

One  factor  was  the  war  in  Syria,  which  has  facilitated  the  smuggling  of  illicit  goods  and 
weapons, promoted the recruitment, transfer and training of foreign  and Turkish fighters by 
terrorist organisations, and triggered the arrival of slightly less than 3 million Syrian refugees, 
some of whom have  subsequently embarked in  irregular migration, fuelling the activities of 
migrant smugglers. 

Another factor was the development of the role of Istanbul as one of the most lively and best 
connected airport hubs in the world. This has increased the expediency for criminals of many 
countries to use the Turkish territory as a transit place for their international activities, and has 
facilitated  also  the  capacity  of  Turkish  criminal  OCGs  to  act  at  transnational  level.  The 
increased  possibility  to  reach  the  Turkish  territory  by  plane  has  produced  in  some  cases 
considerable  shifts  in  criminal  phenomena,  such  as  the  tendency  of  Moroccan  irregular 
migrants to enter the EU via the Turkish-Greek border, and the increasing use of the Turkish 
territory  has  a  way  to  smuggle  to  Europe  or  elsewhere  cocaine  originating  from  South-
America.  

This  overall  situation  needs  to  be  observed  in  light  of  the  possible  lifting  of  Schengen  visa 
requirement for Turkey and the facilitated mobility which it would offer to Turkish citizens, 
including  to  those  that  may  be  involved  in  criminal  or  terrorist  activity.  The  impact  of  the 
proposed visa liberalisation, however, will be different in the criminal areas considered.   

The subsequent section provides an overview of the possible evolution of security risks as a 
result of the proposed visa liberalisation as well as of the measures adopted and to be adopted 
in that context to address these risks. They are set out in more detail in section 5. 

4) Situation, trends and mitigating factors in the main areas of illegality 

4.1 Drug trafficking 

Turkey is a key transit country for most types of illicit drugs destined for European markets. 

46 

 
 
 
Turkey remains a main point of entry into Europe of heroin and other opiates originating from 
Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. Turkish OCGs are also active in the production of cannabis 
within EU Member States, particularly in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. Turkey is 
both  a  transit  and  destination  country  for  cocaine.  Methamphetamine  originating  from  Iran 
also appears to be trafficked via Turkey to the EU. 
Turkey  is  principally  a  source  country  for  the  precursors  that  are  used  in  the  production  of 
synthetic drugs (methamphetamine in particular). Besides drug trafficking, Turkish nationals 
are involved in drug distribution in Western EU Member States. They act as receivers of bulk 
amounts  of  drugs  then  store,  pack  and  distribute  smaller  amounts  on  the  local  market, 
sometimes across several cities or states.  

The  proposed  visa  liberalisation  for  Turkish  citizens  travelling  to  the  EU  could  potentially 
have an impact on the work of Turkish OCGs involved in the above-mentioned drugs-related 
offences  in  as  far  as  their  movements  to  and  from  the  Schengen  area  and  the  trafficking  of 
drugs is concerned. This security risk is addressed by: 

  existing bilateral law enforcement cooperation between Turkey and Member States, 
  border control measures in Turkey and at the Schengen external border, 
  the  preventive  and  mitigating  measures  proposed  in  the  Roadmap  (see  section  5 

below), in particular benchmark 41. 

  existing  EU-Turkey  cooperation:  Within  the  framework  of  the  existing  EU-Turkey 
Subcommittee  on  Justice  and  Home  Affairs,  the  EU  closely  monitors  trends  and 
developments  in  the  area  of  drugs  trafficking  via  Turkey  to  the  EU.  Turkey 
participates  in  the  work  of  the  European  Monitoring  Centre  for  Drugs  and  Drug 
Addiction  (EMCDDA),  takes  part  in  the  REITOX  network  and  delivers  a  variety  of 
data which allows monitoring the drug situation within Turkey. 

4.2 Migrant smuggling 

While the number of Turkish nationals intercepted in the EU as irregular migrants is limited, 
on the opposite the number of third country nationals departing from Turkey and apprehended 
in the EU reached unprecedented highs in 2015.  

In  2015,  around  900.000  migrants  and  refugees  (around  a  half  Syrians,  the  remaining  part 
Afghans, Iraqis, Iranians etc.) irregularly departed from the Turkish Aegean coasts and landed 
at  the  adjacent  Greek  islands,  while  more  than  200.000  of  them  were  stopped  by  Turkish 
border authorities on the coasts or in the territorial waters, and 4413 smugglers (out of whom 
3696 were Turkish nationality) were arrested by Turkish law enforcement agencies 

This phenomenon is a clear result of the geographic position of Turkey and of the presence of 
so  many  migrants  on  its  territory.  Turkey  hosts  around  3  million  of  migrants  and  refugees, 
mostly of Syrian origin, and has borders with very important countries of transit and origin of 
migrants and refugees, such as Syria, Iraq and Iran, or is easily reachable via plane, thanks to 
the  connecting  flights  established  by  Turkish  airlines  with  hundreds  of  cities  all  over  the 
world. All this has led the OGCs dealing with migrant smuggling to flourish in Turkey.    

Based  on  statistics,  most  of  the  migrant  smugglers  apprehended  by  the  police  forces  are 
Turkish  citizens,  followed  at  the  second  rank  by  Syrians.  Smugglers  operating  in  Turkey 
however frequently cooperate with foreign OCGs based in the countries of origin, in Iran, in 
the Balkan countries or in the destination countries in the EU. 

Migrant smugglers operate in Turkey mostly as facilitators of spontaneous movements made 
by  irregular  migrants:  the  smugglers  intervene  to  help  the  latter,  for  instance,  to  enter  in  a 

47 

 
 
 
clandestine manner the country by crossing the mountains located along the Iranian-Turkish 
border,  or  to  leave  it  by  purchasing  a  ride  on  a  clandestine  motorboat  departing  from  the 
Aegean coast, or to cross it by arriving at Istanbul airport and subsequently reaching it in the 
Syrian border,   

However in some cases the OCGs dealing with migrant smuggling have also demonstrated the 
capacity  to  organise  large-scale  initiatives.  This  was  notably  the  case  in  the  second  half  of 
2014 when Turkish OCGs with the assistance of Syrian leaders, put in place – in the Turkish 
South-Eastern  coastal  area  nearby  the  town  of  Mersin  –  the  system  of  the  so-called  "ghost 
ships". 

The  potential  impact  of  the  proposed  visa  liberalisation  for  Turkish  citizens  in  this  area  is 
addressed by: 

  the result of the EU-Turkey meeting of 29 November 2015: Turkish authorities have 
started to prevent in a more effective manner the irregular departures of migrants and 
refugees directed from the Turkish coasts towards the EU, as well as the activity of the 
smuggler: 

  the  EU-Turkey  Statement  of  the  18  March  2016,  as  an  even  and  more  decisive  step 
forward towards breaking the overall business model used by the migrant smuggling 
organisations operating on the migratory route leading from Turkey towards the Greek 
islands. Following the implementation of that Statement, migrant smuggling activities 
in the Turkey have dramatically decreased and led to a drastic reduction of irregular 
departures which  fell  from  a  daily  average  of  around  2.000  in  January and  February 
2016 and 147 in April 2016 with a downward trend still there noticeable; 

  the  EU-Turkey  readmission  agreement,  in  particular  the  entry  of  force  of  the 
provisions related to the readmission of third-country nationals as of 1 June 2016; 
  the  preventive  and  mitigating  measures  proposed  in  the  Roadmap  (see  section  5 

below), in particular benchmarks 8, 11, 15 and 30. 

4.3 Trafficking in human beings (THB) 

Turkey remains a source, transit and destination country for victims of THB for the purpose 
of  labour  and  sexual  exploitation.  Victims  identified  in  Turkey  mainly  come  from  Eastern 
European  Central  Asia  countries  and  are  frequently  used  for  labour  or  sexual  exploitation. 
Victims  transiting  through  Turkey  are  mostly  trafficked  to  Western  EU  Member  States 
including  Germany,  Denmark,  France,  the  Netherlands,  the  United  Kingdom  and  Belgium. 
Increasingly  migrants  from  Africa  or  Latin  America  who  attempt  to  travel  to  the  EU  via 
Turkey can become victims of THB upon arrival in the EU.  

Turkish  OCGs  involved  in  forced  labour  and  sexual  exploitation  of  foreign  nationals 
(especially Bulgarians and Romanians) in Western European countries extensively use legal 
businesses  (bars,  clubs,  hotels  and  restaurants)  or  private  accommodation  (apartment 
buildings)  to  facilitate  their  activities.  In  some  cases,  several  Turkish  companies  located  in 
different  countries  are  used  to  recruit,  transport  and  exploit  victims  along  the  chosen  THB 
route. 

The  proposed  visa  liberalisation  for  Turkish  citizens  travelling  to  the  EU  could  potentially 
have an impact on the work of Turkish OCGs involved in trafficking in human beings from 
Turkey into the EU in as far as their movements to and from the Schengen area are concerned. 
This security risk is addressed by: 

  existing bilateral law enforcement cooperation between Turkey and Member States; 
  border control measures in Turkey and at the Schengen external borders; 

48 

 
 
 
  the  preventive  and  mitigating  measures  proposed  in  the  Roadmap  (see  section  5 

below) in particular benchmark 37. 

  the  implementation  of  the  EU  Strategy  towards  the  Eradication  of  Trafficking  in 

Human Beings 2012-2016; 

  Turkish legislation penalising trafficking in human beings. 

4.4 Firearms trafficking  

Turkey is a transit country for firearms trafficking, and this has further increased as a result of 
its  geographic  proximity  to  areas  of  characterised  by  armed  conflicts  (Syria,  Iraq,  Caucasus 
and Black Sea regions, the Balkans). When trafficked towards the EU, this is frequently done 
by  traffickers  who  often  have  dual  nationality,  residency  permits  or  visas  in  EU  Member 
States,  making  it  easier  for  them  to  travel  across  the  EU.  Moreover,  Turkey  is  a  relevant 
country of production of convertible blank firing weapons. Most of those currently recovered 
in the EU are from Turkish manufacturers. Fully automatic and semi-automatic handguns are 
the most commonly recovered models. 

The  proposed  visa  liberalisation  for  Turkish  citizens  travelling  to  the  EU  could  potentially 
have  an impact on the work of Turkish  OCGs involved in firearms trafficking  from Turkey 
into the EU in  as  far as their movements to  and from the Schengen  area is  concerned. This 
security risk is addressed by:  

  existing bilateral law enforcement cooperation between Turkey and Member States; 
  border control measures in Turkey and at the Schengen external borders; 
  the  implementation  of  the  EU  Action  Plan  against  illicit  trafficking  in  and  use  of 
firearms  and  explosives  adopted  in  December  2015,  according  to  which  the  current 
EU-Turkey  dialogue  on  Counter-terrorism  will  be  extended  to  the  illicit  trafficking 
and use of firearms and explosives; 

  the  preventive  and  mitigating  measures  proposed  in  the  Roadmap  (see  section  5 

below) in particular benchmark 36. 

  Turkey's participation in the European Firearms Expert Group established in 2004 to 
facilitate  exchange  of  information  and  promote  cooperation  against  the  illicit 
trafficking of firearms; 

  the actions taken by Turkish authorities to combat the trafficking in firearms and seize 
weapons,  with  a  huge  quantity  of  weapons  seized  every  year.  Notably  in  2015, 
Turkish  authorities  seized  2.530.141  blank  guns,  2.635  long  barrel  rifles,  274.599 
bullets,  19.283  stabs,  4.835  guns,  141.341  cartridges,  13.691  hunting  rifles,  and 
37.867 magazines.13 

4.5 Financial crime 

There  is  legislation  and  institutions  established  in  Turkey  to  combat  against  money 
laundering. Still,  Turkey  is  a  significant  location  for  this  kind  of  phenomenon.  As  a  largely 
cash based economy, funds are known to be moved for integration in the legal economy via 
trade-based money laundering. 

The  proposed  visa  liberalisation  for  Turkish  citizens  travelling  to  the  EU  could  potentially 
have  an  impact  on the  above-mentioned  financial  crimes  as  far  as  the  movement  of  cash  to 
and from the Schengen area is concerned. This security risk is addressed by:  

13 Source: Turkish authorities. 

49 

 
 
 
 
                                                            
  existing bilateral law enforcement cooperation between Turkey and Member States; 
  border control measures in Turkey and at the Schengen external borders; 
  the  preventive  and  mitigating  measures  proposed  in  the  Roadmap  (see  section  14 

below) in particular benchmarks 39 and 52. 

  the reforms taken by Turkey in reply to the recommendations by the Financial Action 
Task  Force  (FATF),  and  the  on-going  work  of  Turkey  to  implement  FATF 
recommendations; 

  an EU-funded twinning project providing technical assistance to the  Financial Crime 

Investigation Board (MASAK) to further promote its development; 

The proceedings of drug trafficking, as well as of other forms of organised crime, are moved 
from the EU to  and through Turkey informally  through money exchange bureaus, jewellery 
stores, and other businesses which are part of the Hawala banking system. Family members 
are also used as couriers to physically move criminal proceeds back to Turkey. Through these 
mechanisms,  funds  are  also  transferred  to  terrorist  groups  in  conflict  zones.  Sources  of 
revenue  for  the  terrorist  group  Islamic  State  (IS)  include  the  control  of  oil  fields  and 
refineries, robbery of economic assets and looting of cultural goods. Due to its geographical 
location,  the  smuggling  of  these  goods  to  fund  IS  is  bound  to  take  place  also  on  Turkish 
territory. 

The  proposed  visa  liberalisation  for  Turkish  citizens  travelling  to  the  EU  could  potentially 
have  an  impact  on  terrorist  financing  as  far  as  the  movement  of  cash  to  and  from  the 
Schengen area is concerned. This security risk is addressed by: 

  existing bilateral law enforcement cooperation between Turkey and Member States; 
  border control measures in Turkey and at the Schengen external borders; 
  the  preventive  and  mitigating  measures  proposed  in  the  Roadmap  (see  section  5 

below) in particular benchmarks 39 and 52. 

  the implementation of the EU Action Plan on terrorist financing which has a specific 
focus  on  neighbouring  countries.  In  particular,  the  EU  will  assist  these  countries  in 
complying with FATF recommendations, to enhance their capacity to counter terrorist 
financing and to increase cooperation with EU Member States and EU agencies.     

4.6 Counterfeiting of goods and currency 

Turkey  ranks  as  the  third  at  world  level  among  the  countries  of  origin  of  the  counterfeited 
goods in the world and among the most important ones for counterfeit goods entering into the 
EU. Categories of counterfeit products reaching the EU from Turkey include cosmetics, body 
care items, sportswear and electrical equipment. 

The  proposed  visa  liberalisation  for  Turkish  citizens  travelling  to  the  EU  could  potentially 
have  an  impact  on  the  work  of  Turkish  OCGs  involved  in  the  trafficking  of  counterfeited 
goods into the EU in as far as their movements to and from the Schengen area is concerned. 
This  security  risk  is  however,  addressed  by  existing  bilateral  law  enforcement  cooperation 
between Turkey and Member States, border control measures in Turkey and at the Schengen 
external  border  as  well  as  by  the  preventive  and  mitigating  measures  proposed  in  the 
Roadmap (see section 14 below). 

In  the  past  Turkey  was  linked  to  the  production  of  counterfeit  euro  coins,  as  a  country  of 
origin  for  raw  materials  and  machinery.  The  coins,  which  were  produced  in  Turkey  or  in 
neighbouring EU Member States, were subsequently transported to the Eurozone countries for 

50 

 
 
 
 
distribution. Turkish authorities are actively contrasting the counterfeiting and are cooperating 
closely with Europol and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to that end. 

The  proposed  visa  liberalisation  for  Turkish  citizens  travelling  to  the  EU  could  potentially 
have  an  impact  on  counterfeiting  of  goods  and  currency  in  as  far  as  the  movement  of 
counterfeit  goods  and  currency  to  and  from  the  Schengen  area  are  concerned.  This  security 
risk is addressed by: 

  existing bilateral law enforcement cooperation between Turkey and Member States; 
  border control measures in Turkey and at the Schengen external borders; 
  the  preventive  and  mitigating  measures  proposed  in  the  Roadmap  (see  section  5 

below) in particular benchmark 51. 

4.7 Terrorism  

Turkey is a country of origin of foreign fighters, around 1.300 Turkish citizens are believed 
having  joined the ranks of IS in  Syria and Iraq.  Increasingly active in  Turkey, notably  with 
several suicide bomb explosions in the country, is the Islamic State (IS). The IS has also used 
the Turkish territory to transfer foreign terrorist fighters from various countries (including EU 
Member States) to the Syrian territory. Turkey was in the last years an important transit hub 
for foreign terrorist fighters directed towards Syria and Iraq, who originated from EU Member 
States  and many other  countries, including  North  Africa,  Middle East, Central  Asia and the 
Balkans.  Foreign  terrorist  fighters  have  been  found  travelling  through  the  Turkish  territory 
also on their way back towards their origin countries. It should be noted however, most of the 
individuals involved in the recent attacks by Da’esh, which took place in Paris and Brussels, 
were  conducted  by  individuals  with  either  dual  nationality  one  of  which  was  from  an  EU 
Member  State  or  by  individuals  originally  from  the  Member  State  in  which  the  attack  took 
place. 

The  proposed  visa  liberalisation  for  Turkish  citizens  travelling  to  the  EU  could  potentially 
have  an  impact  on  the  terrorist  risk  in  the  EU  in  as  far  as  the  movement  of  terrorists  of 
Turkish  citizenship  to  and  from  the  Schengen  area  is  concerned.  This  security  risk  is 
addressed by: 

  existing bilateral law enforcement cooperation between Turkey and Member States; 
  border controls measures in Turkey and at the Schengen external borders; 
  the  preventive  and  mitigating  measures  proposed  in  the  Roadmap  (see  section  5 

below) in particular benchmarks 48 and 49; 

  Specific  measures  implemented  by  the  Turkish  authorities  have  to  prevent  travel  of 
terrorist,  notably  through  travel  interdictions  and  increased  detection  of  suspected 
terrorists at airports, border crossings and other transport hubs; 

  the EU-Turkey dialogue and cooperation on foreign and security policy, including on 
counter-terrorism.  At the EU-Turkey Summit on 29 November 2015, it was agreed to 
enhance  this  dialogue  and  cooperation.  To  this  end,  the  annual  high  level  counter-
terrorism dialogue, in addition, to the expert level exchanges which are already taking 
place, will serve as a vehicle to deepen the cooperation by encouraging alignment of 
Counter-Terrorism-related  policies  and  strategies,  through  information  exchange  and 
to regularly assess progress across all strands of the Counter-Terrorism cooperation. 

5) The security impact of visa liberalisation and the preventive and mitigating measures 
proposed in the Roadmap  

51 

 
 
 
 
It is difficult to anticipate what would be the general impact on the security of the EU of the 
proposed visa liberalisation for Turkish citizens travelling to the EU. This would depend on 
many factors which may differently evolve depending also on the course on the institutional 
relations being developed between the EU and Member States' relevant authorities and those 
of Turkey, as well as several other factors.  

In the light of this analysis, however, the following consideration should be made.  

1.   The removal of the visa obligation currently imposed on Turkish citizens travelling to 
the EU is not expected to increase growth of organised crime and terrorist activities in 
the EU, given that  most  criminals  and  terrorists already use travel routes throughout 
the  EU.  It  is  therefore  unlikely  that  the  proposed  visa  liberalisation  will  result  in 
drastic changes in the Turkish or EU criminal landscapes. 

2.  The  proposed  visa  liberalisation  is  not  expected  to  produce  a  substantial  increase  of 
irregular migration of Turkish citizens into the EU because, as already argued in the 
Assessment  of  the  migratory  impact  of  visa  liberalisation  included  in  the  CSWD 
accompanying  the  Second  Report  issued  on  4  March  2016,  Turkish  citizens  appear 
interested  only  in  a  limited  manner  to  emigrate  towards  the  EU.  Moreover,  the  EU-
Turkey  Readmission  agreement,  whose  provisions  related  to  the  readmission  of  the 
nationals  of  the  two  parties  entered  into  force  on  1  October  2015,  offers  a  powerful 
tool to ensure the removal of persons attempting to remain in the territory of the EU 
beyond the regular limit of 90 days out of every 180 day period. 

   On 27 April 2016, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey sent instructions 
to  the  Turkish  missions  abroad  requesting  them  to  strictly  respect  the 
procedures set out in the EU-Turkey readmission agreement. 

  The entry into force of the proposed Entry/Exit System of the EU in due course 
will also improve the management of the Union's external borders and should, 
in particular, contribute to the identification of any person who does not or no 
longer  fulfils  the  conditions  of  duration  of  stay  within  the  territory  of  the 
Member States. 

  The risk will also be mitigated by the reinforced visa liberalisation suspension 

clause proposed by the Commission.  

3.  Third country nationals residing in Turkish territory will not benefit from the proposed 
visa liberalisation and, therefore, granting visa liberalisation to Turkish citizens would 
have a neutral effect on the capacity of third-country nationals to irregularly migrate to 
the EU. 

   Granting  visa  liberalisation  to  Turkish  citizens  can  even  be  expected  to 
substantially  enhance  the  prevention  of  irregular  migration  of  third-country 
nationals from Turkey to the EU, as it represents an essential component of the 
overall  package  of  measures  which  have  been  agreed  with  the  EU-Turkey 
Statement of 18 March 2016. 

  The  implementation  of  this  Statement  has  contributed  to  break  the  business 
model  of  the  smugglers  operating  from  Turkey.  This  business  model  in  the 
year  2015  had  managed  to  irregularly  bring  from  the  Turkish  coasts  into  the 
Greek islands, and from there towards the rest of the EU, around 900.000 non-
Turkish migrant and refugees. 

  The  granting  of  visa  liberalisation,  by  strengthening  the  cooperation  with 
Turkish authorities, and persuading them to continue the cooperation with the 
EU  in  readmission  and  in  preventing  irregular  departures,  will  contribute  to 
ensure that irregular migration flows of that kind will not resume.  

52 

 
 
4.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  realistic  to  expect  that  the  proposed  visa  liberalisation  for 
Turkish citizens travelling to the EU, by broadening the capacity of the latter to enter 
into the Schengen area unimpeded, will facilitate the movement of all Turkish citizens 
across  the  EU  borders,  including  criminals  of  Turkish  nationality.  This  may  not 
necessarily produce an expansion of the criminal activities committed in the EU, but it 
may  lead  to a direct territorial  expansion towards the EU of the presence  of Turkish 
OCG. Similarly, suspect individuals being allowed to travel to the Schengen territory 
without the need to go through a visa request procedure would have a greater ability to 
enter  the  EU  without  being  noticed.  The  security  risk  related  to  the  increased 
mobility into the Schengen area of criminals and terrorists who are citizens of Turkey, 
or  who  are  foreigners  based  in  Turkey,  is  addressed  and  mitigated  by  the  following 
benchmarks: 

  Benchmarks  related  to  enhancing  police  cooperation  (benchmark  49: 
implementing regional and bilateral police cooperation agreements signed by 
Turkey with the EU Member States; benchmarks 53 and 54: implementing the 
Strategic  Agreement  and  concluding  an  Operational  Cooperation  Agreement 
with Europol, once Turkish data protection law ensures adequate standards in 
respect of those of the EU); 

  Benchmarks  related  to  establishing  more  efficient  and  effective  judicial 
cooperation  in  criminal  matters  (such  as  those  necessary  to  implement 
benchmarks  43:  ratification  and  implementation  of  all  the  protocols  of  the 
Council  of  Europe  Conventions  related  to  Extradition,  Mutual  Assistance  in 
Criminal  Matters,  Transfer  of  Sentenced  Persons;  benchmarks  44  and  47: 
improvement of the efficiency of the judicial system of Turkey in cooperating in 
criminal matters, and of its readiness to effectively do so with all the Member 
States, notably in extradition matters; and benchmark 45: developing working 
relations with Eurojust); 

  Benchmarks 55 and 56 (Adopt and implement legislation on the protection of 
personal  data  in  line  with  the  EU  standards,  in  particular  as  regards  the 
independence of the authority in charge of ensuring the protection of personal 
data) is an indispensable prerequisite to enhance the quality of both the police 
cooperation  and  of  the  judicial  cooperation  in  criminal  matters  (commit 
internationally Turkey to respect European standards in the field of  personal 
data protection, and align its national legal framework to these standards);  
  Benchmark  65  related  to  counter-terrorism  (adopting  and  implementing  the 
legislation on terrorism in line with the European standards) is indispensable 
for  ensuring  full  police  and  –more  particularly  -  judicial  cooperation  in 
criminal matters in the fight against terrorism, because without that alignment 
the EU Member States ad Turkish authorities may risk to follow too different 
definitions of and approaches towards the concept of terrorism;  

  Benchmarks related to strengthening the capacity to combat specific forms of 
organised  crimes  at  national  level  (this  is  the  case  for  the  benchmarks  40: 
cybercrime; 41: fight against drug trafficking; 37: human trafficking; 39 and 
52:  money  laundering  and  terrorism  financing  and  51:  protecting  the  Euro 
against counterfeiting); 

  Benchmarks related to strengthening the capacity of the overall security system 
of  Turkey  to  fight  against  organised  crime  in  an  effective  manner,  by 
promoting  the  coordination,  cooperation  and  exchange  of  information  and 
intelligence  among  all  the  agencies  which  compose  it,  while  ensuring  the 
efficiency, effectiveness and integrity of each of them (this is the case for the 

53 

 
 
benchmarks  36:  implementing  action  plans  to  fight  against  organised  crime; 
48:  strengthening  the  internal  cooperation  among  the  law  enforcement 
agencies of Turkey, and 42: taking the adequate measures against corruption, 
which includes notably to give an effective follow up to the recommendations 
issued  by  the  Council  of  Europe  Group  of  States  against  Corruption  –
GRECO). 

5.  There  are  border  control  measures  in  place  both  in  Turkey  and  on  the  EU  side  that 
seek  to  detect  and  stop  criminals  and  terrorists  through  border  checks  conducted  on 
persons exiting the Turkish territory and on persons entering the Schengen area. Both 
the Polnet system and the Schengen Information System (SIS), i.e. the two databases 
respectively  consulted  by  the  border  police  of  Turkey  and  the  border  guards  of  the 
Schengen  countries,  include  information  on  persons  who,  for  various  judicial  or 
security  reasons,  should  be  refused  entry,  put  under  surveillance,  or  arrested  on  the 
spot.  The  SIS  was  upgraded  in  2015  to  improve  information  exchange  on  terrorist 
suspects and to display to end-users if a person subject of an European Arrest Warrant 
or  a  discreet  and  specific  check  is  wanted  for  terrorism  or  terrorism  related  activity. 
Some of the benchmarks listed under point 6 below are equally relevant for this. 
6.   It can  be expected that, as  soon as Turkish  citizens will  obtain  visa-free entry to the 
EU, foreign nationals will start trying to obtain Turkish passports in order to pretend to 
be Turkish citizens and enter the EU visa free, or use the identities of Turkish citizens, 
or  to  obtain  by  fraud  the  Turkish  citizenship.  This  possibility  may  attract  not  only 
irregular  migrants,  but  also  criminals  or  terrorists.  The  security  risks  that  non-
Turkish  citizens  may  try  to  obtain  forged  or  falsified  Turkish  travel  or  identity 
documents, or may too easily obtain a fake or real Turkish citizenship, with the aim to 
enter  visa-free  into  the  EU  as  a  Turkish  citizen  is  addressed  by  the  following 
benchmarks: 

  Benchmark  1:  to  establish  biometric  passports  with  chips  including  the 
fingerprints  of  the  holders  protected  against  forgery  by  high-level  encryption 
system;  

  Benchmark  2:  implementing  measures  ensuring  the  integrity  and  security  of 
the  personalisation  and  distribution  and  validation  process  for  international 
passports and other breeder documents; 

  Benchmark  3:  establishing  training  programmes  and  adopt  ethical  codes  on 
anti-corruption  targeting  the  officials  of  any  public  authority  that  deals  with 
visas, breeder documents or passports; 

  Benchmark  4:  promptly  and  systematically  reporting  to  Interpol  on  lost  and 

stolen passports; 

  Benchmark  5:  ensure  a  high  level  of  security  of  breeder  documents  and  ID 
cards and define strict procedures surrounding their application and issuance; 

  Benchmark 6: cooperate on document security with the EU; 
  Benchmark  50:  enhancing 

investigative  capacity  of  Turkish 

the 

law 

enforcement services to investigate on identity and travel document fraud;    
  Benchmark  58:  understanding  the  rules  for  the  acquisition  of  Turkish 

citizenship; 

  Benchmark 59: provide information about the conditions for changing personal 

data. 

7.   There are measures in place both in Turkey and the EU to detect persons who seek to 
travel  with  forged  or  falsified  documents.  Checks  carried  out  by  the  Turkish  border 
police on the travel documents of the persons exiting the Turkish territory as well as 
those carried out by Schengen Member States' border guards on persons entering the 

54 

 
 
Schengen  area  seek  to  detect  forged  or  falsified  documents.  In  addition,  the 
Commission  will  present  measures  to  enhance  electronic  document  security  and  ID 
management and to strengthen the fight against document fraud. 

6) Turkey's implementation of the measures foreseen in the Roadmap  

As this CSWD and the Third Report to which it is attached show in great detail, Turkey has 
fulfilled all but one of the requirements addressing the risk that non-Turkish citizens, possibly 
including also persons willing to migrate irregularly or commit criminal and terrorist acts in 
the EU, may try to obtain forged or falsified Turkish travel or identity documents, or may too 
easily  obtain  a  fake  or  real  Turkish  citizenship,  with  the  aim  to  enter  visa-free  and  in  a 
facilitated manner into the EU as a Turkish citizen or by pretending to be a Turkish citizen.  

The only requirement that, for objective reasons, given the acceleration of the time frame for 
visa  liberalisation  decided  by  Heads  of  State  or  Government,  has  not  yet  been  achieved 
(benchmark 1, requiring to establish biometric passports with chips including the fingerprints 
of the holders protected against forgery by high-level encryption system) will be completed by 
Turkish  authorities  between  June  and  October  2016,  as  soon  as  a  certain  number  of 
preparatory  steps,  which  are  well  underway,  but  whose  realisation  needed  a  timeline 
impossible to compress, will be completed. The introduction of fingerprints in addition to the 
photograph of the passport holders in the chip will ensure a sufficient level of protection. The 
level of encryption meets ICAO standards. 

Despite  good  progress  in  addressing  many  other  benchmarks  of  the  Roadmap,  nevertheless 
Turkey  has not  yet  fulfilled all the requirements important to adequately address the risk of 
potentially  increased  mobility  into  the  Schengen  area  of  terrorists  and  criminals  that  are 
citizens of Turkey. 

This  is  not  without  consequences.  While  both  the  EU  and  Turkey  have  put  policies, 
legislation and structures in place to address and mitigate the consequences of these security 
risks, the full implementation of all benchmarks of the Roadmap would further improve the 
situation if the following measures are taken in order to fulfil all the benchmarks:  

  Once  Turkey  has  aligned  its  national  legislation  to  the  EU  standards  in  the  field  of 
personal  data  protection,  it  will  be  able  to  negotiate  and  conclude  an  operational 
cooperation  agreement  with  Europol.  This  would  further  enhance  Turkey's 
cooperation  with  the  EU  in  combating  organised  crime  and  terrorism.  As  regards 
Eurojust,  Turkey  has  indicated  that  it  intends  to  take  concrete  steps  to  upgrade  its 
working relations. 

  Furthermore, the fact that Turkey  has  not  yet aligned its legislation and practices on 
terrorism  with 
the  full  implementation  of  a 
comprehensive and effective police and judicial cooperation between Member States 
and Turkey in the fight against terrorism. 

the  European  standards 

limits 

implementation  of 

  Mutual trust between Turkey and the Member States would be further strengthened by 
Turkey's 
the  measures  against  corruption  which  were 
recommended by the Council of Europe Group of States against corruption (GRECO), 
including measures on the funding of political parties, on immunities, on bribery, and 
on the independency of judiciary, and also the fact that Turkey is not yet accepting to 
offer  judicial  cooperation  in  criminal  matters  to  all  Member  States,  which  would 
facilitate the cooperation between Turkey and Member States. 

7) Conclusions 

55 

 
 
 
 
Turkey has met 65 of the 72 benchmarks of its roadmap. There are effective measures in place 
in Turkey and the EU to address and mitigate the security risks related to the proposed visa 
liberalisation. The counter-terrorism dialogue between Turkey and the EU aims to strengthen 
cooperation  and  further  mitigate  security  risks.  Moreover,  several  of  the  65  implemented 
benchmarks  fulfilled  substantially  contribute  to  further  addressing  and  mitigating  these 
security  risks.  The  fulfilment  of  six  of  the  seven  outstanding  requirements  would  further 
ensure  that  any  negative  impact  on  the  security  situation  on  the  EU  of  the  proposed  visa 
liberalisation  for  Turkish  citizens  would  be  addressed  and  mitigated.  Of  these  six 
requirements,  the  fulfilment  of  one  (upgrading  the  existing  biometric  passports  so  as  to 
include security features in line with the EU standards) is well underway. 

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