Study to support an impact assessment on options for combatting illicit firearms trafficking in the European Union : final report.
Date: 2016-04-20
Institutions: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs
Subjects: EU Member State, aggravating circumstances, arms control, arms trade, criminal liability, cross-border cooperation, fight against crime, firearms and munitions, free movement of goods, illicit trade, judicial cooperation, judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the EU, legislation, organised crime

Study to Support an Impact 
Assessment on Options for 
Combatting Illicit Firearms 
Trafficking in the European 
Union 

Final Report 

Written by Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services  
July 2014  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Directorate-General for Home Affairs 
Directorate D Strategy and Delivery Steering 
Unit D1 - Strategic policy, Interinstitutional relations and Agencies 

European Commission 
B-1049 Brussels 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Study to Support an Impact 
Assessment on Options for 
Combatting Illicit Firearms 
Trafficking in the European 
Union 

Final Report 

Directorate-General for Home Affairs 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Firearms Trafficking in the EU 

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Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014 

ISBN 978-92-79-39934-3 
doi: 10.2837/82977 

© European Union, 2014 
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTIONS 

Executive Summary 

1. 

Introduction 

1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 

 Resume – Study objectives and scope 
 Background to the study 
 Research plan and Data Collection 
 Structure of the draft final report       

2. 

Problem Definition 

2.1       Overview 
2.2       Nature and scale of illicit firearms trafficking 
2.3       Cross border dimension of the problem 
2.4       Consequences of illicit firearms trafficking  
2.5       Main payers and drivers of illicit firearms trafficking 
2.6     Illicit firearms trafficking and the European armaments sector 
2.7       Existing institutional framework for combatting arms trafficking 
2.8       Summary – problem definition 

3. 

Comparative Analysis of Legal Issues 

3.1     Introduction  
3.2     Current legislative framework at the international and EU levels 
3.3    Comparative analysis of national legislation on firearms trafficking 
           3.3.1   Definition of offences 
           3.3.2   Level and type of penalties and sanctions  
           3.3.3   Aggravating or mitigating circumstances 
           3.3.4   Factors of negligence and degrees of intent 
3.4     Conclusions - Comparative legal analysis 

4. 

Policy Objectives & Evaluation of Policy Options 

4.1     Overview – Policy objectives and options 
4.2     Policy Option 1 – Status quo and baseline scenario 
4.3     Policy Option 2(a) – Non-legislative action  
4.4     Policy Option 2(b) – Minimum legislative intervention  
4.5     Policy Option 3 - Comprehensive legislative solution  
4.6     Policy Option 4 – Combination of policy options 
4.7     Evaluation of the policy options 
4.8     Preferred option 
4.9     Monitoring and evaluation 

5. 

Conclusions & Recommendations 

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1 
1 
4 
9 

11 

11 
12 
22 
25 
29 
38 
40 
49 

51 

51 
51 
56 
57 
71 
76 
80 
84 

86 

86 
88 
89 
95 
101 
123 
127 
131 
133 

131 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Firearms Trafficking in the EU 

APPENDICES  

List of Interviews 

Supporting Information – Definitions and Policy Context 

A. 

B. 

C.  

Supporting Information  – Problem Definition 

D. 

E. 

Analysis of Survey Responses  

Comparative Tables for Legal Analysis 

PAGE 

139 

142 

150 

151 

156 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Firearms Trafficking in the EU 

Section 

Introduction 

  1 

This document contains the Final Report submitted by the Centre for Strategy & Evaluation 
Services (CSES) for the assignment for DG Home ‘Study to Support an Impact Assessment on 
Options for Combatting Illicit Arms Trafficking in the European Union’.  
1.1      Resume – Study objectives and scope 
The purpose of the study was to: 

 

 

 

Analyse the current legal framework in all Member States including the definitions of 
specific offences relating to firearms trafficking, the sanctions, the liability of legal 
and natural persons and the notions of intent, negligence and aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances; 

Analyse the implementation of the above-mentioned offences in practice and identify 
possible obstacles in police and judicial cooperation due to the existence of different 
legal systems; 

Make recommendations as to the advisability of the approximation of certain 
offences and sanctions and suggest specific provisions if appropriate. 

The Commission intends to examine possible policy options, including the approximation  of 
various relevant offences, to better prevent, deter, detect, disrupt, investigate, prosecute and 
cooperate on illicit arm trafficking in the EU. The purpose of this study is to provide DG Home 
with  information  required  for  the  Impact  Assessment  to  determine  the  most  appropriate 
policy option within the context of possible changes to the 2008 Directive. The study covers 
all EU28 Member States. 

1.2 

Background to the study 

In  the  past  10  years,  there  have  been  over  10,000  victims  of  murder  or  manslaughter 
involving  firearms  in  EU  Member  States  and  every  year  there  are  over  4,000  suicides  by 
firearms.1  The  problem  of  Illicit  firearms  trafficking  is  linked  to  other  criminal  activities. 
Availability of trafficked firearms contributes to the lethality of, and insecurity from, all types 
of  violent  incidents  or  crimes.  There  can  be  particularly  close  links  between  illicit  firearms 
trafficking and organised criminal activities including gang violence and intimidation as well as 
other trafficking processes such as drug smuggling, money laundering and human trafficking, 
as  well  as  financial  crimes  and  terrorism.  Similarly,  to  the  extent  to  which  illicit  firearms 
trafficking supports activities such as human trafficking and drugs smuggling, there are clearly 
social consequences linked to the distress caused to vulnerable groups. The problem of illicit 
firearms trafficking and its consequences is further examined in Section 2 of this report. 

Existing Legal Frameworks to Combat Illicit Firearms Trafficking 

The  trafficking  and  misuse  of  firearms  is  a  serious  threat  to  the  EU's  security  from  both  an 
internal  and  an  external  perspective  and  one  that  requires  a  coordinated  response  to  be 

1  Information  retrieved  from  UNODC  Global  Study  on  Homicide  (2011)  and  GunPolicy.org.  This  is  a 

partial figure as for most Member States, statistics for the whole period are unavailable.  

       1 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
effective2. Article 83 (1) TFEU includes "illicit arms trafficking" in the list of crimes for which 
there is a legal basis for adopting a Directive on minimum rules concerning the definition of 
criminal  offences  and  sanctions  in  the  area  of  illicit  arms  trafficking  with  a  cross-border 
dimension. 

Reflecting the priority put on an EU-level response to the problem of illicit firearms, several 
EU-level  measures  have  been  adopted  to  complement  EU  Member  States'  measures.    The 
aim  is  to  properly  monitor  the  movement  of  firearms  within  the  EU  and  to  develop 
cooperation between national administrations in charge of controls. In Directive 2008/51/EC 
on  control  of  the  acquisition  and  possession  of  weapons,  measures  are  laid  down  for  the 
improvement  of  the  marking  and  registration  of  firearms  within  Member  States,  including 
possible  common  guidelines  on  deactivation  standards  and  techniques  to  ensure  that 
deactivated firearms are rendered irreversibly inoperable.3  Under the Directive firearms and 
related items should not be transferred between EU Member States without the knowledge 
and  consent  of  all  the  authorities  involved.  To  give  EU  law  enforcement  authorities  better 
tools  to  combat  illicit  arms  trafficking,  the  Directive  sets  out  strong  rules  for  exports  and 
imports of firearms. The European Commission aims to make exports of firearms subject to 
export  authorisations  that  must  contain  the  necessary  information  for  tracing  the  firearms, 
including the country of origin and of export, the consignee and the final recipient, as well as 
a description of the quantity of the firearms, their parts, components and ammunition.  

There are a number of limitations. Firstly, the legislation does not apply to firearms intended 
for military purposes. Secondly, it only concerns trade and transfers of firearms between EU 
Member  States  and  countries  outside  the  EU.  Transfers  of  firearms  within  the  EU  are 
regulated  by  the  Directive  on  the  control  of  the  acquisition  and  possession  of  weapons 
(91/477/EEC),  which  integrates  the  appropriate  provisions  required  by  the  UN  Firearms 
Protocol as regards intra-Community transfers of weapons. The Directive establishes rules on 
controls  by  the  Member  States  on  the  acquisition  and  possession  of  firearms  and  their 
transfer to another Member State.  Whilst it is prohibited to acquire and possess Category A 
firearms  (explosive  arms,  automatic  weapons),  for  Category  B  weapons  (semi-automatic 
weapons) an authorization is necessary and for Category C and D a declaration suffices. The 
Directive requires authorities in the Member States to issue a European firearms pass to any 
person lawfully entering into possession of and using a firearm.  

One  of  the  main  objectives  of  the  Commission’s  current  policy  on  firearms  has  been  to 
complete the process of transposition into EU legislation of all the provisions of the UN Fire 
Arms  Protocol.    In  the  absence  of  EU  legislation  covering  criminalisation,  the  Protocol  had 
previously only been partially signed and ratified. The limited ratification rate of the UN Fire 
Arms  Protocol  was  an  important  explanation  for  differences  in  the  scope  of  the  crime  and 
sanctions  for  illicit  arms  trafficking  that  exist  at  the  national  level  in  the  EU.  There  is  also 
considerable flexibility available to Member States in the implementation of both Recital 16 
of  Regulation  258/2012  and  Art.  16  of  the  Directive  on  control  of  the  acquisition  and 
possession of weapons, which has led to more diverse legal frameworks in the EU (Firearms 
Directive). In March 2013, the EU proposed that the Protocol should be ratified after all the 

2  Council  Report  on  the  Implementation  of  the  European  Security  Strategy  -  Providing  Security  in  a 
Changing  World;  The  EU  Internal  Security  Strategy  in  Action:  Five  steps  towards  a  more  secure 
Europe, COM(2010) 673. 

3  Directive  2008/51/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  21  May  2008  amending 

Council Directive 91/477/EEC of 19 June 1991.  

                                                 
Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Firearms Trafficking in the EU 

Section 

Introduction 

  1 

provisions of the protocol that fall under the Union's competence had been fully transposed 
into EU legislation. The latest position is that the EU has ratified the UN Firearms Protocol on 
21 March 2014. 

illicit  firearms  trafficking  has 

Section 2 of this report supports the argument that the lack of a common EU legal framework 
on 
judicial 
cooperation. Similarly, going beyond the preventative and investigation stages of a case the 
lack of a common legal framework has also made it more difficult for judicial authorities to 
prosecute cases that involve a cross-border dimension. The situation is not clear-cut but there 
is sufficient evidence to point to a problem that justifies additional EU measures. 

impeded  effective  cross-border  police  and 

The need to take action at the EU level was underlined in the Commission’s recent (October 
2013)  Communication  on  ‘Firearms  and  the  internal  security  of  the  EU:  protecting  citizens 
and  disrupting  illegal  trafficking’4  which  noted  that  differences  in  national  legislation  on 
firearms are exploited by criminals, increasing the risk of illicit circulation across borders. To 
address  this  situation,  various  stakeholders  discussed  the  possibility  of  approximating 
national  firearms  legislation.5  A  lack  of  reliable  EU-wide  statistics  and  intelligence  hampers 
effective policy and operational responses (the availability of statistics is examined in Section 
2). The last joint customs operations focused on firearms was in 20066, and it was unable to 
make  any  seizures  due  to  a  lack  of  investigative  leads  and  precise  knowledge  of  routes  of 
firearms trafficking.  

The Communication proposes an integrated policy for addressing the threat of illicit firearms 
trafficking, through legislation, operational action, training and EU funding. It focuses on four 
priorities: firstly, safeguarding the licit market for civilian firearms through new EU standards. 
Second, reducing firearms held by criminals through the development of effective standards 
on  safe  storage  of  civilian  firearms  and  on  how  to  deactivate  civilian  and  military  firearms. 
Third,  making  greater  efforts  to  reduce  illicit  trafficking  of  firearms  (whether  civilian  or 
military) from outside the EU and increase pressure on criminal markets through better cross-
border  cooperation  between  police,  customs  and  border  guards.  Ultimately,  the  level  of 
criminal  sanctions  should  be imposed  by  Member  States  (this  issue  is  assessed in Section  3 
(Comparative  Legal  Assessment)  of  this  report.  This  shall  be  combined  with  building  better 

4  COM(2013)  716  final.  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council  and  the  European 
Parliament Firearms and the internal security of the EU: protecting  citizens and disrupting illegal 
trafficking. 

5  For  instance,  Europol  (2010).  OC-Scan  Policy  Brief.  Integrated  EU  approach  against  the  illegal 
trafficking  in  heavy  firearms.  OC-SCAN  Policy  Brief  For  Threat  Notice:  004-2010.  Retrieved  from: 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/heavy-firearms_0.pdf.  See  also: 
South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons 
(mandated  by  UNDP).  Convertible  Weapons  in  the  Western  Balkans,  report  retrieved  from: 
http://www.seesac.org. See also: Communication From The Commission To The Council And The 
European  Parliament.  Firearms  and  the  internal  security  of  the  EU:  protecting  citizens  and 
disrupting illegal trafficking. Brussels, 21.10.2013 COM(2013) 716 final.  

6 Operation Fireball targeted lorries originating in the Western Balkans and entering the EU through its 

eastern border. 

       3 

 
 
 
                                                 
intelligence by gathering and sharing more information on firearms crimes, and by  targeted 
training of law enforcement officers. 

As  the  Communication  makes  clear,  a  combination  of  different  types  of  intervention  are 
needed  to  tackle  illicit  firearms  trafficking  and  its  consequences.  Section  4  of  this  report 
(Policy Options) defines a number of policy options. In addition to assessing the scope for the 
approximation of certain offences and sanctions, the policy options we have defined include 
not just legislative but also non-legislative initiatives that could be taken to help combat illicit 
firearms trafficking.   

1.3 

Research plan and data collection 

Below, we provide a summary of the research plan for this study: 

 

 

 

Phase 1: Preparatory tasks – a kick-off meeting with the Steering Group, a 
preliminary interview programme, desk research, finalisation of the methodological 
approach (selection of countries for in-depth research, research tools, detailed work 
plan, etc.) and preparation of an inception report (September 2013). 

Phase 2: Problem Definition and Policy Options – desk research, survey work and an 
interview programme leading to preparation of country report for each EU Member 
State. All Member States were covered by the Phase 2 research with workshops 
taking place in a number of countries to consider the problem definition in more 
detail and to discuss policy options. An interim report was submitted in January 2014.   

Phase 3: Impact Assessment and Final Report – in the final phase the policy options 
and their likely impacts were evaluated as a basis for recommending a preferred 
option. A draft final report was submitted in May 2014 and discussed at a workshop 
with representatives from the Member States in June 2014. The report was then 
finalised.  

The following chart summarises the work plan and key milestones agreed with DG HOME: 

Figure 1.1: Work Plan Phases and Timing 

 
 
Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Firearms Trafficking in the EU 

Section 

Introduction 

  1 

Phase 1 – Preliminary Tasks 

The assignment started with a kick-off meeting with the DG HOME Steering Group on 17 May. 
Following  the  kick-off  meeting,  we  completed  various  tasks  -  a  preliminary  interview 
programme,  desk  research,  finalisation  of  the  methodological  approach  (selection  of 
countries for in-depth research, research tools, detailed work plan, etc) and preparation of an 
inception  report.  The  inception  report  was  discussed  and  agreed  with  DG  HOME  in 
September 2013. 

Phase 2 – Problem Definition and Policy Options 

The  Phase  2  research  has  involved  three  main  tasks  –  the  problem  definition,  comparative 
legal  analysis,  and  development  of  policy  options.  This  has  involved  research  into  the 
legislation at European level, internationally and across EU 28 Member States, development 
of the first batch of EU 28 ‘country fiches’, survey work and interview programme, leading to 
assessment of the problem and its evolution from the baseline scenario in line with impact 
assessment  guidelines.  We  have  also  held  the  first  of  a  series  of  regional  workshops.  Early 
findings from the Phase 2 research were presented and discussed at the First Meeting of the 
DG HOME Firearms Expert Group that met in Brussels on 10 December 2014.  

The following tables provide a summary of the Phase 2 research. A more detailed breakdown 
of the distribution of interviews and the focus groups, and the options regarding geographical 
coverage, is provided in the following text.  

Table 1.1 (a): Geographical coverage of the Phase 2 research 

Member State 

Interviews 

F2F 

Tel 

Workshops  Member State 

Interviews 

F2F 

Tel 

Workshops 

       5 

 
 
 
 
Austria 

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Cyprus 

Croatia  

Czech Rep. 

Denmark 

Estonia 

Finland 

France 

Germany 

Greece 

Hungary 

Ireland 

Italy 

Latvia 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

Lithuania 

Luxembourg 

Malta 

Netherlands 

X 

Poland 

Portugal 

Romania 

Slovakia 

Slovenia 

Spain 

Sweden 

UK 

EU level 

International 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

X 

X 

x 

x 

Total 

11 

22 

11 

We  completed  legal  fiches  from  21  Member  States.  A  total  of  45  interviews  and  other 
consultations  (e.g.  discussions  with  workshop  participants)  were  undertaken  covering  18 
Member States as well as the EU and international levels. The survey website was visited by 
87  people  with  62  providing  partially  completed  questionnaires  and  28  providing  fully 
completed  questionnaires. Reminders  were  sent out on  several  occasions  to  help  maximise 
the response rate.  

Table 1.1 (b): Legal Fiche, Interviews and Survey Responses  

Member 
States 

Legal 
Fiche 

Interviews 
& Focus 
Groups 

Survey 
Replies 

Member 
States  

Legal 
Fiche 

Interviews 
& Focus 
Groups 

Survey 
Replies 

Austria 

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Cyprus 

Croatia  

Czech Rep. 

Denmark 

Estonia 

Finland 

France 

Germany 

Greece 

Hungary 

Ireland 

Italy 

0 

0 

0 

1 

0 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

0 

2 

2 

0 

1 

3 

1 

1 

1 

2 

1 

0 

1 

2 

0 

0 

1 

3 

0 

2 

0 

0 

1 

0 

7 

0 

1 

1 

0 

2 

Lithuania 

Luxembourg 

Malta 

Netherlands 

Poland 

Portugal 

Romania 

Slovakia 

Slovenia 

Spain 

Sweden 

UK 

EU level 

International 

13 

Other 

1 

0 

1 

1 

1 

1 

0 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

1 

1 

0 

1 

0 

2 

0 

0 

1 

2 

1 

3 

7 

2 

10 

2 

1 

0 

2 

2 

1 

0 

0 

2 

18 

2 

1 

0 

0 

0 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Firearms Trafficking in the EU 

Section 

Introduction 

  1 

Latvia 

1 

2 

0 

Total 

21 

50 

62 

The purpose of the ‘country fiche’ was to collect important information on the legal situation 
in the EU Member States. This was used for the comparative assessment of legal frameworks.  

The  Phase  2  interview  programme  was  used  to  discuss  the  key  issues  set  out  in  the 
Commission’s  terms  of  reference  with  the  relevant  national  authorities  and  other  key 
stakeholders  in  each  Member  State.  At  DG  HOME’s  suggestion,  we  initially  contacted 
members  of  the  Council’s  Firearms  Working  Group  to  interview  them  and  also  to  obtain 
further contacts.  

Whilst  some  Firearms  Working  Group  members  were  quick  to  react,  in  many  cases  we  did 
not  obtain  a  response  to  our  emails  despite  several  approaches.  In  this  situation  we 
approached  the  authorities  directly,  in  some  cases  after  receiving  suggested  contacts  from 
DG HOME.  The interview programme focused on the problem definition and possible policy 
options  (Phase  2(ii)).  The  following  table  provides  a  more  detailed  breakdown  of  the 
interviews completed (some of the interviews took place as part of the regional workshops). 
A list of interviews is provided in Appendix A. 

Table 1.2: Phase 2 Interview Programme 

Interview target groups 

(1)  EC and agencies, international bodies 

(2)  National authorities and law enforcement agencies 

(3)  Public prosecutors, judges  

(4)  Entities covered by the Firearms Protocol 

(5)  Civil society groups, fundamental rights groups 

(6)  Academics, other experts, etc. 

Total 

Completed 

9 

35 

0 

0 

0 

4 

50 

The purpose of the Phase 2 survey was to help collect key information for the study that is 
not readily available from documentary sources and to enable all key stakeholders who wish 
to  make  an  input  to  the  evaluation  to  do  so.  The  survey  was  conducted  online  using 
questionnaire  that  has  been  designed  in  a  way  that  is  user  friendly  with  a  combination  of 
open and closed response options. Although the number of ‘hits’ to the survey website and 
first few questions is quite high, the number of those answering all the questions varies and is 
generally  quite  low  (as  noted  above,  28  of  the  87  respondents  provided  fully  completed 
questionnaires).   

Table 1.3 (a): Response Rates for the Phase 2 Survey (by type of organisation) 

Survey target groups 

Estimated   
Total  

Survey 
Responses  

Response Rate  

(1)  EC and agencies, international bodies 

(2)  National authorities/ law enforcement agencies 

10 

75 

0 

10 

0.0 

13.3 

       7 

 
 
 
 
(3)  Public prosecutors, judges  
(4)  Entities covered by the Firearms Protocol* 

(5)  Civil society groups, fundamental rights groups 

(6)  Academics, other experts, etc 

(7) 

Information not provided 

Total 

75 

100+ 

50 

30 

n/a 

340 

0 

41 

0 

2 

34 

87 

0.0 

41.0 

0.0 

6.7 

n/a 

25.5 

Table 1.3 (b): Response Rate for the Phase 2 Survey (by country) 

Country 

Austria 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czech Rep. 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 

Nº 

1 
3 
0 
0 
2 
0 
1 
0 
7 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
13 

%  Country 

Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 

1.3 
3.8 
0.0 
0.0  Malta 
2.5  Netherlands 
0.0  Poland 
1.3  Portugal 
0.0  Romania 
8.8  Slovakia 
0.0  Slovenia 
1.3  Spain 
1.3  Sweden 
0.0  UK 
1.3  Other/not given 

16.3  Total 

Nº 

0 
2 
1 
0 
2 
2 
1 
0 
0 
1 
18 
0 
1 
29 
87 

% 

0.0 
2.5 
1.3 
0.0 
2.5 
2.5 
1.3 
0.0 
0.0 
1.3 
22.5 
0.0 
1.3 
27.5 
72.5 

To  help  validate  the  problem  definition  and  to  support  the  assessment  of  policy  options,  a 
number of regional workshops were organised:   

Table 1.3 (c): Regional workshops 

Workshops 

Baltic States  

Date / Venue 

Member States  

18 February / Riga 

EE, LT, LV 

Western Balkans 

17 January / Ljubljana 

AU, B-H, CR, HU, SL 

Benelux countries 

26 March / Brussels 

BE, NL, LU 

The first workshop took place on 17 January 2014 and covered the Western Balkans and several 
neighbouring  countries  with  8  participants  from  Austria,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Croatia, 
Hungary  and  Slovenia.  The  second  workshop  covering  the  three  Baltic  States  involved  6 
participants  from  the  three  countries.  In  both  cases  the  participants  were  from  mainly  law 
enforcement  authorities  (e.g.  the  Deputy  Director  of  the  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  Ministry  of 
Security, State Investigation and Protection Agency) and the police. A third workshop took place 
in Brussels on 26 March with representatives from the three Benelux countries. In addition, CSES 
participated in two workshops organised by DG HOME and attended by firearms experts from 
the Member States.  

Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Firearms Trafficking in the EU 

Section 

Introduction 

  1 

These sessions were used to discuss the emerging findings from the research, further develop 
and  validate  the  problem  assessment  (particularly  the  issues  relating  to  the  country/region 
concerned) and to discuss possible EU-level policy options and other measures that could help 
to  tackle  the  problem  of  illicit  firearms  trading.  Some  regional  workshops  that  had  been 
originally  envisaged  did  not  go  ahead  (i.e.  Germany,  Italy,  Ireland-UK).  However,  in  these  and 
other EU Member States, CSES conducted interviews with national authorities as an alternative 
or  (in  one  case)  received  a  written  response  to  questions  via  the  country’s  Permanent 
Representation in Brussels.   

Finally, the wider Phase 2 desk research focused on the key issues set out in DG Home’s terms of 
reference  for  this  study  (Section  IV  of  ‘Tasks  of  the  Study’).  This  research  encompasses 
secondary  literature,  i.e.  previous  studies  and  other  research.  This  aspect  of  the  Phase  2  desk 
research  goes  also  beyond  this  phase  because  relevant  material  is  still  being  identified  as  a 
result of contacts with Member States. 

1.4 

Structure of the Final Report 

The rest of the Final Report is structured as follows:  

 

 

 

 

 

Section 1: Introduction - summarises study objectives and the methodological 
approach to the research. 

Section 2: Problem definition – drawing on the desk research and discussions with 
the Commission, this section examines the nature and scale of the problem of illicit 
firearms trafficking, the cross-border dimension and existing policies and institutional 
mechanisms to tackle the problem.  

Section 3: Comparative Legal Analysis – presents an analysis of the legal frameworks 
at the international, EU and Member State levels that relate to illicit arms trafficking 
in the EU.  

Section 4: Policy objectives and policy options– drawing on the research, we present 
four policy options, evaluate them and assess their likely impacts, and then identify 
the preferred policy option.  

Section 5: Conclusions and recommendations – summarises the key research 
findings and preferred option. 

The  final  report  contains  various  appendices  including  a  list  of  interviews  completed  and 
regional workshop participants, survey data, and legal fiches. 

Impact Assessment Guidelines  

The Commission’s approach to impact assessments is outlined in a document entitled ‘Impact 
Assessment  Guidelines  that  was  issued  on  15  January  2009.  Although  these  guidelines  are 
intended primarily for Commission staff and for the report the Commission itself submits to the 
Impact Assessment Board, it was agreed that the structure set out in the guidelines should be 
used  for  this  report.  The  introduction  and  Part  II  of  the  guidelines  set  out  the  ‘key  analytical 

       9 

 
 
 
 
 
steps in impact assessment’. These steps are summarised in a table that is reproduced below 
which also indicates how this report relates to the Impact Assessment structure:    

Table 1.4.: Structure of an impact assessment 

Identifying the problem  

1 

Describe the nature and extent of the problem  

Identify the key players/affected populations.  

Establish the drivers and underlying causes.  

Is the problem in the Union's remit to act? Does it pass the necessity 
and value added test?  

Develop a clear baseline scenario, including, where necessary, 
sensitivity analysis and risk assessment. 

2  

Define the objectives  

Set objectives that correspond to the problem and its root causes.  

Establish objectives at a number of levels, going from general to 
specific/operational.  

Ensure that the objectives are coherent with existing EU policies and 
strategies, such as the Lisbon and Sustainable Development Strategies, 
respect for Fundamental Rights as well as the Commission's main 
priorities and proposals.  

3  

Develop main policy options  

Report 

Section 2.1 

Section 2.5 

Section 2.5 

Section 2.7.2 

Section 4.3 

Section 4.1 

Section 4.1 

Section 4.2 

Identify policy options, where appropriate distinguishing between 
options for content and options for delivery mechanisms 
(regulatory/non-regulatory approaches).  

Check the proportionality principle.  

Begin to narrow the range through screening for technical and other 
constraints, and measuring against criteria of effectiveness, efficiency 
and coherence.  

Section 4.3 to 
Section 4.6 

Section 4.7.4 

Section 4.7 

Draw-up a shortlist of potentially valid options for further analysis.  

Section 4.8 

4  

Analyse the impacts of the options  

Identify (direct and indirect) economic, social and environmental 
impacts and how they occur (causality).  

Identify who is affected (including those outside the EU) and in what 
way.  

Assess the impacts against the baseline in qualitative, quantitative and 
monetary terms. If quantification is not possible explain why.  

Identify and assess administrative burden/simplification benefits (or 
provide a justification if this is not done).  

Consider the risks and uncertainties in the policy choices, including 
obstacles to transposition/compliance.  

Sections 4.4.6; 
4.5.4 and 4.7.2 

Section 4.7 

Section 4.7 

Section 4.7 

Section 4.8 

5  

Compare the options  

Weigh-up the positive and negative impacts for each option on the 
basis of criteria clearly linked to the objectives.  

Sections 4.4; 4.5 
and 4.6 

Where feasible, display aggregated and disaggregated results.  

Present comparisons between options by categories of impacts or 
affected stakeholder.  

Section 4.6 

Section 4.7 

Identify, where possible and appropriate, a preferred option.  

Section 4.8 

 
 
 
 
 
Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Firearms Trafficking in the EU 

Section 

Introduction 

  1 

6  

Outline policy monitoring and evaluation  

Identify core progress indicators for the key objectives of the possible 
intervention.  

Provide a broad outline of possible monitoring and evaluation 
arrangements.  

Section 4.9 

Section 4.9 

       11 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this section we provide an assessment of the illicit firearms trafficking problem, the drivers 
of  the  problem  and  existing  measures  to  tackle  the  problem.  This  problem  definition 
provides is supported by the comparative legal assessment in Section 3.   

2.1 

Overview 

This provides a first draft of the problem definition. This section is structured as follows:  

 

 

 

 

Section 2.1: Nature and scale of illicit firearms trafficking – examines the scale and 
nature of illicit firearms trafficking in the EU; 

Section 2.2: Illicit firearms trafficking and its effects - summarises the social, economic 
and other consequences of illicit firearms trafficking; 

Section 2.3: Drivers of illicit firearms trafficking – identifies and assesses the drivers of 
illicit arms trafficking; 

Section 2.4: Existing policies and institutional frameworks – summarises the 
organisations at the international, EU and national level involved in combating illicit 
firearms trafficking, and assesses their effectiveness in tackling the problem.  

After  examining  the  nature  and  scale  of  the  problem,  Section  2.1  looks  more  closely  at  the 
cross-border  dimension  of  illicit  firearms  trafficking  both  in  terms  of  the  inflow  of  weapons 
from external sources as well as the export of arms to non-EU countries and regions.  

An important aspect of the problem definition is the analysis of the wider economic and social 
consequences of the problem. In many regions, illicit firearms trafficking is an important source 
of firearms that are misused in the range of crimes of violence and intimidation (violent theft, 
gangs,  social  violence,  protection  rackets,  and  so  on)  that  contribute  to  the  economic  and 
social impoverishment and marginalisation of areas and communities. Numerous studies have 
established  that  such  criminal  gun  violence  disproportionately  contributes  to  rates  of  deaths 
and  serious  injury  with  major  direct  and  indirect  economic  costs;  and  to  insecurity  that 
reinforces poverty and limits local and inward investment.7 The extent to which illicit firearms 
trafficking  is  a  primary  source  of  such  misused  firearms  compared  to  domestic  sales  or 
losses/thefts  from  authorised  holdings  depends  on  the  context;  its  relative  importance  is 
generally  greater  in  countries  with  relatively  stringent  domestic  gun  controls  or  in  countries 
whose neighbours are unable (for a range of reasons) to exercise adequate gun control.  

As  noted  above,  illicit  firearms  trafficking  is  linked  to  other  transnational  criminal  activities, 
such  as  drug  smuggling  and  illicit  distribution;  trafficking  in  other  controlled  goods  and  in 
humans; and also to terrorism. These links are complex but real (see for example, discussions in 

7  See  for  instance:  Kapusta  N,  Etzersdorfer  E,  Krall  C,  Sonneck  G.  Firearm  legislation  reform  in  the 
European Union: Impact on firearm availability, firearm suicide and homicide rates in Austria. British 
Journal  of  Psychiatry  2007;191:253–7;  and  Hawton  K,  Fagg  J,  Simkin  S,  Harris  L,  Malmberg  A. 
Methods used for suicide by farmers in England and Wales. The contribution of availability and its 
relevance  to  prevention.  British  Journal  of  Psychiatry  1998;173:320–4;  Haw  C,  Sutton  L,  Simkin  S, 
Gunnell D, Kapur N, Nowers M, Hawton K. Suicide by gunshot in the United Kingdom: a review of the 
literature.  Medicine,  Science  and  the  Law  2004;44:295–310;  O.  Greene  and  N,  Marsh  (eds).  Small 
Arms, Crime and Conflict: global governance and the threat of armed violence. Routledge, London, 
2012.  

                                                 
Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Firearms Trafficking in the EU 

Section 

Problem Definition 

  2 

Small  Arms  Survey  Yearbook)8;  and  thus  imply  that  illicit  firearms  trafficking  is  a  contributing 
factor  for  the  wider  economic  and  social  consequences  of  such  transnational  criminal 
networks. Access to, and use of, firearms is an intrinsic part of the operations and personnel of 
transnational  criminal  organisations,  for  purposes  of  intimidation  and  self-protection  from 
competitors or law-enforcement agencies – and trafficking of illicit firearms is thus organic to 
many smuggling operations. Suppliers of illicit firearms to national and local gangs that are part 
of  the  transnational  criminal  network  tend  to  make  smart  opportunistic  use  of  trafficking 
networks  established  for  other  purposes  (narcotics,  alcohol,  tobacco);  thus  reinforcing  the 
overall  problems  arising  from  transnational  crime.  Money  laundering  processes  and  financial 
crimes sometimes appear to be relatively ‘white collar’ and distant from direct gun trafficking, 
but in  practice these are  intrinsically-linked to  the  processes  above  and  thus  legitimately  can 
also be recognised as part of the problem definition of this study. The added value of any EU 
intervention lies in the difference it makes to the baseline situation and trends.  

Section  2.3  identifies  the  main  factors  promoting  illicit  firearms  trafficking  which  lie  in  the 
motivation of criminal or terrorist groups that procure and use firearms illegally in the pursuit 
of  their  goals,  those who  are  involved  in the actual  trafficking of  firearms  either  for  profit or 
some other  reason,  and  those  who  provide  a  source of  illicit firearms  (either  intentionally  or 
unintentionally).  In  addition  to  the  factors  that  can  be  considered  to  be  the  ‘drivers’  of  illicit 
firearms  trafficking,  there  is  also  a  set  of  ‘enabling  factors’,  in  particular  shortcomings  in  the 
national  legal  frameworks  and  in  their  enforcement  in  cross-border  situations.  (Legal 
frameworks at the international, EU and Member State levels are examined and compared in 
Section  3  of  the  report).  Last  but  not  least,  Section  2.4  reviews  the  current  policy  and 
institutional framework for combatting illicit arms trafficking both at the international and EU 
level.  Because  of  the  study’s  focus  on  legal  aspects  of  the  current  frameworks  in  place  at  a 
national  level  for  combating  illicit  firearms  trafficking,  this  aspect  is  examined  separately  in 
Section 3 of the report. The assessment of existing policies and institutional frameworks, and 
more particularly, identifying the strengths and weaknesses, is important in defining the policy 
options. 

2.2 

Nature and scale of illicit firearms trafficking 

The starting point of the problem assessment is to examine the nature and scale of the illicit 
firearms trafficking problem.  

2.2.1  Nature of the illicit firearms trafficking problem 

There  are  various  ways  in  which  illicit  firearms  trafficking  occurs.  The  following  diagram 
provides an overview:  

8 The Small Arms Survey 2012: Moving Targets, published by Small Arms Survey, Geneva. Retrieved from 
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/by-type/yearbook/small-arms-survey-2012.html   

       13 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Figure 1.1: Overview – Types of Illicit firearms trafficking 

The Small Arms Survey 2013 estimates that there are some 875 million small arms and light 
weapons  in  circulation  worldwide.  Between  530,000  and  580,000  are  produced  annually, 
either under licence or as unlicensed copies, by an estimated 1,249 companies in more than 90 
countries.  According  to  the  same  source,  the  international  small  arms  trade  is  worth  an 
estimated  US$8.5  billion  with  a  further  US$2  billion  spent  on  illicit  weapons.  The  largest 
exporters of licit weapons are Russia, the United States, China, Brazil, Italy, Germany, France, 
Belgium and the United Kingdom.9 

According  to  our  discussions  with  firearms  experts  and  others  including  national  authorities, 
there are essentially six ways in which firearms can enter the illicit market:  

 

 

 

 

Legally held firearms being stolen or otherwise diverted to illegal uses or users;  

Legally held firearms becoming illegal;  

Modification of legally held firearms (including deactivated or collection weapons); 

Direct import of illegal firearms;  

9 Small Arms Survey 2012 (page 247). The Small Arms Survey has recently concluded a four-year study on 
the authorized trade in firearms and has now started a follow-up project focusing on illicit firearms 
trafficking. This focuses on particular regions, starting with conflict zones in Africa and the Near East. 
Another  estimate  of  the  value  of  the  illicit  firearms  trade  is  provided  by  Geopolitical  Monitor 
estimates 
billion 
around 
(http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-illicit-trade-of-small-arms-4273/) 

market 

worth 

illicit 

US$ 

the 

be 

to 

1 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Firearms Trafficking in the EU 

Section 

Problem Definition 

  2 

 

 

Diversion of legally transferred or imported firearms to unauthorized users or uses; 

Manufacture of illicit firearms.  

There  are  no  precise  quantified  estimates  of  how  important  these  different  sources  are  in 
relation to each other - this depends greatly on specific contexts. However, according to the 
same  sources  quoted  above,  the  black  market  for  small  arms  and  light  weapons  is  mostly 
sustained by division (theft, loss, leaks, etc.) from stockpiles of legally held unused weapons or 
by diversion of authorised international firearms transfers to unauthorised uses or users. 

Taking the first of the above categories, stocks of legally-held firearms are vulnerable to loss, 
theft or unauthorised misuse  – whether these are  privately held licensed firearms or held by 
police, armed forces or other government agencies. Some degree of vulnerability of dispersed 
authorised  holdings  is  inevitable,  and  moreover  national  regulatory  requirements  for  secure 
storage and regular stock checks and reporting are not always stringent or actively enforced. 

In relation to the second of the above categories, legally held firearms can be rendered illegal 
in a number of ways. The law can change making previously legal firearms illegal (as was the 
case  in  Belgium  following  the  2006  legislative  change).  Second,  previously  legal  weapon  can 
enter the illegal sphere if a registration update is not performed or when a weapon is kept in a 
family. For example, in some countries (e.g. France or Belgium), there are firearms dating from 
the  Second  World  War  that  have  remained  in  families  without  either  being  deactivated  or 
registered.  Although it is difficult to assess the size of this particular illegal pool of weapons, it 
can be assumed that in the majority of cases, these firearms are not primarily used for criminal 
purposes (although it increases the risks in the case of family tragedies and homicides).  A link 
to organised crime can exist when such weapons are stolen through burglaries, both domestic 
and  from  stocks  of  weapons  (new  or  to  be  decommissioned).  In  such  cases,  weapons  that 
might  have  previously  been  illegally  held  albeit  not  for  the  purpose  of  crime  can  enter  the 
criminal arena.   

Another  similar  way  in  which  illegal  firearms  can  enter  the  criminal  market  is  through  the 
modification  of legal firearms. A common example of this situation is the modification of gas 
pistols  that  can  be  purchased  without  a  permit  in  Latvia  and  transferred  to  another  country 
(e.g.  Estonia  or  Lithuania,  or  the  UK)  where  they  are  modified.  A  variation  on  this  type  of 
activity  is  the  reactivation  of  deactivated  firearms.  Illegal  firearms  can  also  be  brought  in 
through  illegal  importation  (i.e.  trafficking)  and  can  also  be  directly  manufactured  directly  in 
the EU.   
The  United  Nations’  definition  of  the  illicit  trade  in  firearms10  contained  in  a  1996  report 
describes  this  phenomenon  as  being  “that  international  trade  in  conventional  arms,  which  is 
contrary  to  the  laws  of  States  and/or  international  law.”  11  The  EU  defines  illicit  firearms 
trafficking  in  the  Directive  2008/51/EC  amending  Council  Directive  91/477/EEC  on  control  of 
the acquisition and possession of weapons, Article 1 (2b) as: 

10 For the sake of clarity, the report uses the terminology and definitions used by the EU. 

11  UN  General  Assembly.  Report  of  the  Disarmament  Commission.  Supplement  No.  42  (A/51/42). 
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/N-Instruments/1996-UN-report-disarmament-
commission.pdf 

       15 

 
 
 
                                                 
“The  acquisition,  sale,  delivery,  movement  or  transfer  of  firearms,  their  parts  or  ammunition 
from or across the territory of one Member State to that of another Member State if any one of 
the Member States concerned does not authorise it in accordance with the terms of this Directive 
or if the assembled firearms are not marked in accordance with Article 4(1)”.12 

Definitional issues are significant and are examined further in Section 4 of the report (this part 
of  the  report  include  a  table  indicating  which  Member  States  cover  which  provisions  in  legal 
terms and in practice).  

The end of the Cold War resulted in an increase in the number of local wars and civil conflicts 
throughout the world fought primarily with small arms and light weapons. Large quantities of 
small arms are in circulation today. Traditionally regions such as Europe have been adversely 
affected by the spread of small arms.13 The types of illicit firearms circulating in the EU include 
those  which  are  converted  or  reactivated,  lost  or  stolen,  diverted  from  their  lawful  lifecycle, 
and illegally imported from third countries. Although the influx of firearms into the EU is not on 
a vast scale, there is a regular supply of small arms primarily from the Western Balkan region as 
well  as  from  Eastern  Europe.14  More  recently,  North  Africa  is  thought  to  havebecome  a 
significant source of illicit firearms according to several firearms experts we consulted as part 
of  the  research.15  The  spread  of  crime  and  instability,  especially  to  the  southern  regions  of 
Europe, could lead to further proliferation of light weapons in the region and eventually into 
the EU.16 According to several national authorities we interviewed, the USA is also a source of 
illicit weapons (e.g. for the UK).17  

2.1.2 

Scale of the illicit firearms trafficking problem 

Reliably quantifying the problem of illicit firearms trafficking, and the source and destination 
of  weapons,  is  intrinsically  very  difficult.  By  its  very  nature,  illicit  firearms’  trafficking  is  an 
illegal activity carried out by criminals or terrorists which is not captured by official statistics. 
The  true  scale  of  the  problem  is  therefore  impossible  to  quantify.  Nonetheless,  there  are 
several estimates of the volume and value of illicit firearms trafficking but these tend to be at a 
global level and do not provide a detailed insight to the problem as it affects the EU:  

12 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:179:0005:0011:EN:PDF 

13  The  Small  Arms  Survey  2012:  Moving  Targets,  published  by  Small  Arms  Survey,  Geneva.  Retrieved 
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/by-type/yearbook/small-arms-survey-

from 
2012.html   

14 Kiss, Y. (2004). Small Arms and Light Weapons Production in Eastern, Central, and Southeast Europe. 
In:  Small  Arms  Survey  (2004).  Retrieved  from:  http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/B-
Occasional-papers/SAS-OP13-SE-Europe-Production.pdf 

15  See  also:  On  the  Edge?  Trafficking  and  Insecurity  at  the  Tunisian–Libyan  Border,  by  Moncef  Kartas, 
December 2013. Working Paper No. 17. Retrieved from: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-
and-markets/transfers/illicit-trafficking.html  

16 http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/76 

17  Philip  J.  Cook,  Wendy  Cukier  and  Keith  Krause  (2009)  The  illicit  firearms  trade  in  North  America 

Criminology and Criminal Justice August 2009 vol. 9 no. 3 265-286.  

 
                                                 
Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Firearms Trafficking in the EU 

Section 

Problem Definition 

  2 

Global estimates of illicit firearms trafficking 

  According to the UNODC the illegal firearms trade generates between €125 million 
to €236 million per year globally, which represents between 10 to 20% of the total 
trade in legal firearms.18   

  The United Nations 2011 Small Arms Survey estimates that the value of the global 

trade in illicit arms may be worth more than a billion dollars.19 

  The Small Arms Survey estimates that there are over 875 million SALW in the 

world but the real number may be considerably higher. Global value of the illegal 
trade in firearms has been estimated to between $170 million and $320 million 
per year.  

There  is  no  comparable  estimate  specifically  for  Europe  of  the  scale  of  illicit  firearms 
trafficking although the scale of the problem is likely to be less than in most other regions of 
the  world.  Given  the  data  limitations,  any  approach  to  quantifying  the  problem  of  illicit 
firearms  trafficking  has  to  reply  on  proxy  indicators.  Ideally,  in  order  to  develop  a  broad 
estimate of the problem of illicit firearms trafficking, the following approach would be adopted: 

 

 

 

 

Step 1 – estimating the total number of licit firearms circulating in the EU by comparing 
and, where possible, reconciling the estimates provided by international and EU 
institutions.  

Step 2 - estimating the total number of illicit firearms that are trafficked based on data 
from various sources on registered/unregistered firearms and official data provided by 
the Member States (e.g. on the number of illicit firearms seized over a five year period). 
Another ‘proxy’ indicator is the number of criminal offences committed with an illicitly 
held firearm. 

Step 3 - assessing the extent to which illicit firearms originate from cross-border 
trafficking. 

Step 4 – linking this to the consequences of illicit firearms trafficking, i.e. the extent to 
which illicit firearms cause or contribute to increased/decreased levels of crime 
(homicides, coercion and intimidation of victims, etc).  

Taking  the  first  step,  the  website  www.gunpolicy.org  provides  data  from  academic  and 
governmental sources on the number of unregistered firearms in each Member State. 20 Using 

18  UNODC  (October  2011).  Estimating  illicit  financial  flows  resulting  from  drug  trafficking  and  other 
from: 

Retrieved 

Research 

crimes. 

report. 

transnational 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/Studies/Illicit_financial_flows_2011_web.pdf, p. 49  

organized 

19 ibid., p. 25.  

20  Gun  Policy  Information  Partners:  Groupe  de  recherche  et  d'information  sur  la  paix  et  la  securite, 
Aiming for Prevention, ArmsNetAfrica, Saferworld, the South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the 
Control  of  Small  Arms  and  Light  Weapons  in  Belgrade,  The  Trauma  Foundation,  he  Violence 

       17 

 
 
 
                                                 
this and other data, the European Commission estimates that  there are some  81 million licit 
and illicit civilian firearms in the EU. The most recent data provided by www.gunpolicy.org (21) 
notes the average amount of firearms per 100 people and the total amount of civilian firearms 
in  the  population.  Nevertheless,  these  numbers  are  only  estimations  and  do  not  always 
coincide with the data held by governmental agencies.  

Turning to the second step outlined earlier, estimating the total number of illicit firearms that 
are trafficked can be based on data from various sources:  

 

 

 

Records held by Member States on the number of registered/unregistered firearms; 

Official estimates made by some Member States on the number of illicit firearms 
seized over a given period;  

Other indicators - another ‘proxy’ indicator is the number of criminal offences 
committed with an illicitly held firearm. 

The  first  method  tends  to  overestimate  the  scale  of  illicit  firearms  trafficking  while  the 
second underestimates it. Moreover, in both cases much of the data that is publicly available is 
regarded  as  inaccurate.  At  the  two  meetings  of  firearms  experts  from  EU  Member  States 
convened by DG Home during the course of this study, many participants commented that the 
data  for  the  number  of  registered  firearms  and  seizures  quoted  in  this  report  did  not 
correspond  with  their  own  records.  The  reason  of  this  is  that  in  general  it  is  difficult  to  find 
concrete statistics in this highly sensible field. CSES relied mainly on publicly available sources 
and  numbers  provided  in  interviews  or  expert  estimations.  Despite  requests  to  national 
government  contact  points/experts,  we  were  not  provided  with  a  sufficiently  comprehensive 
and authoritative set of official national government estimates of EU Member States to be able 
to use these to generate a further aggregate estimate. It can be assumed that the methodology 
used  by  Member  States  is  different  to  the  one  used  by  other  organisations/experts.  Another 
factor  explaining  the  divergence  between  the  numbers  can  be  a  reference  to  different  time 
scales.       

Estimate based on unregistered firearms 

The  first  approach  to  estimating  the  scale  of  illicit  firearms  trafficking  involves  taking  the 
estimate  for  the  total  number  of  firearms  and  deducting  the  number  of  registered  firearms 
from this figure, leaving (in theory) the unregistered weapons, including the illicit element.  

According to GunPolicy data, there are around 67 million unregistered firearms in the EU or 
79% of the estimated total of 81 million in circulation. This provides a very broad indication of 
the quantity of illicitly held firearms. The 79% estimate is, however, likely to be unreliable, and 
most experts believe that it is very much an over-estimate.  The high unreliability is due to the 
great uncertainties in each of the above global estimates that are being compared.  

The national data on numbers of legally registered firearms holders used by GunPolicy appears 
to  be  very  incomplete  in  several  countries,  perhaps  because  of  the  decentralised  nature  of 
record-keeping  (see  the  Denmark  example  below).  Similarly,  the  number  of  firearms  actually 
held  by  individual  licensed  firearms  is  probably  often  under-recorded  in  official  records,  and 

Prevention Research Program at the University of California, and The Injury Research Center at the 
Medical College of Wisconsin. 

21  Gunpolicy.org  is  an  organization  funded  by  Swiss  Federal  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Bern  and 

Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, York. 

                                                                                                                                                
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Section 

Problem Definition 

  2 

although some such weapons should thereby be classed as illicit, historic legal ambiguities can 
mean  that  many  such  weapons  may  be  regarded  as  potentially  legal,  even  if  inadequately 
controlled. Linked with the above factors, records of firearms destruction or disposal are often 
very limited, implying that many of the firearms within the 79% figure may no longer exist or 
be available. Finally, the strong scepticism about the scale of this estimate comes from national 
police  and  law  enforcement  officials  –  although  these  tend  to  regard  the  quantity  of  illicit 
firearms as a matter of high concern, they generally do not believe the extraordinary scale that 
is indicated by the above rough estimate.       

GunPolicy  also  provides  an  estimate  for  eight  EU  Member  States  of  the  number  of  illicit 
firearms and this suggests that there are some 19 million illicit firearms (23% of the total). In 
relation to both these estimates, there are significant limitations to the data provided on the 
gunpolicy.org  website.  In  particular,  law  enforcement  practitioners  have  expressed  doubt 
about the accuracy of the data on the number of firearms holders (e.g. in Denmark there are 
known to be over 200,000 registered hunters and shooters according to official sources while 
the number of licenced firearms holders is only 21,000 according to gunpolicy.org).  Relevant 
Gunpolicy data is provided in Appendix C. 

Estimate based on firearms seizures   

An alternative approach to estimating the number of illicitly trafficked firearms is to use the 
total number of illicit firearms seizure by Law Enforcement Authorities in the Member States 
as  an  indicator.  In  most  Member  States,  a  high  proportion  of  the  firearms  seized  by  the 
authorities originate from cross-border trafficking and therefore this approach could provide a 
useful indicator of the lower-bound estimate of the number of illicitly trafficked firearms in the 
EU. The table below shows the data provided by national authorities to CSES on the number of 
firearms seized in Member States over the last five years: 

Table 2.2: Number of Firearms Seized (7 Member States) 

Member State 

No. of firearms 
seized in last 5 years 

Denmark 

Estonia 

France 

Greece 

Lithuania 

Portugal 

UK 

Total/average 

7,049 

95 

3,910 

8,946 

691 

31,670 

3,348 

7,958 

Total number of 
registered and 
unregistered firearms 
650,000 

123,000 

1,9000,000 

2,500,000 

135,000 

2,400,000 

4,060,000 

4,124,000 

Percentage of all 
firearms 

2% 

1% 

0% 

0% 

1% 

1% 

0% 

1% 

Source: based on data provided to CSES by national authorities that completed a country fiche.  

The above estimate of 7,958 seizures needs to be scaled up to provide a EU-level estimate. In 
order  to  do  this  we  have  first  calculated  the  number  of  illicit  seizures  as  a  proportion  of 
registered  and  unregistered  firearms  in  each  of  the  seven  Member  State  for  which  data  is 
available. We then calculated the average percentage of illicit seizures as a proportion of total 
firearms for the seven Member States which amounted to around 1%. Using this approach and 

       19 

 
 
 
based on the Commission’s estimate of 81 million licit and illicit firearms circulating in the EU, 
gives an estimate of 81,000 illicitly trafficked firearms in the EU. Scaling up in this way is fraught 
with  imperfections  from  a  methodological  point  of  view  but  nevertheless  provides  a  very 
approximate estimate.  

There are also major limitations with this approach of a more substantive nature because not 
all  illicitly  trafficked  firearms  are  seized  by  the  authorities  and  some  illicit  firearms  remain 
unaccounted  for.  For  example,  in  2005  a  consignment  of  2,000  PPS  submachine  guns  was 
trafficked  into  Estonia  from  a  neighbouring  country  of  which  approximately  500  were 
confiscated by the internal security service as a result of various operations and investigations. 
Moreover,  as  noted  above,  holders  (and  family  members)  of  unregistered  firearms  often 
destroy or otherwise dispose of them without notifying the relevant authorities, to avoid risk of 
prosecution or penalties. In addition, in at least some countries and localities, firearms that are 
not identified as having been used in crime which are nevertheless confiscated or destroyed by 
local  law  enforcement  in  the  course  of  enquiries,  are  probably  often  disposed  of  in  a  low-
profile way without notifying central data-bases: evidence for this is anecdotal, but significant, 
particularly  in  relation  to  countries  where  certain  categories  of  firearm  are  widely  and 
relatively permissively legally-held.  

Overall, whilst the first method (deducting the number of registered firearms from the total 
in circulation) is likely to overestimate the quantity of illicitly-trafficked firearms, the second 
method based on seizures is most likely to under-estimate the figure. Together, they provide 
a range of estimates, with the actual quantities almost certainly within this range. In addition 
to data limitations, an additional complication is the way in which Member States investigate 
and report on illicit firearms trafficking. For example, some Member States have different legal 
definitions and/or information fragmented and held by different law enforcement authorities, 
thereby making it more difficult to obtain a comprehensive overview.22  

A reasonable overall conclusion is that whilst it is possible to provide a range of estimates, 
this range is very wide, underlining the fact that no accurate quantification of the problem is 
feasible on the basis of existing available data. A potentially useful approach to clarify likely 
quantities within this range is to aggregate ‘best estimates’ of relevant national authorities 
from  each  EU  Member  State.  However,  as  noted  above,  we  attempted  to  pursue  this 
approach but limited responses from the national authorities meant that we were unable to 
do so.  

Bearing the difficulties with the two approaches outlined above in mind, in many respects, a 
better  approach to clarifying the  scale of the problem is to highlight  the  number of civilian 
firearms-related deaths since most if not all of these will occur as a result of the possession 
of  illicit  weapons  (particularly  in  EU  Member  States  with  relatively  stringent  regulatory 
controls on authorised personal possession of firearms). In Section 2.3 we examine the extent 
of firearms-related deaths.  

Availability of statistics on firearms 

22 For example, in Estonia, investigations concerning the handling of illicit firearms at the national level 
are carried out by the Police and Border Guard Board, whereas the Internal Security Service (with the co-
operation  of  police  and  foreign  partners)  is  responsible  for  investigating  cross-border  trafficking  of 
firearms  and  ammunition.  Whereas  In  the  UK,  frontier  customs  regimes  (e.g.  HMRC,  NCA’s  Border 
Policing Command, and the UK Border Force) are concerned primarily with the Trafficking and Brokering 
Licensing  Controls22  applied  to  UK  nationals,  while  the  police,  UKBF  and  NCA  are  responsible  for 
combating cross-border criminal importation of firearms.  

                                                 
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Over the last decade, most EU Member States have made concerned efforts to promote more 
comprehensive  and  systematic  reporting  in  this  area,  but  awareness  and  quality-assurance 
systems remains ‘work in progress’. 23   

A  significant  limitation  to  collecting  and  analysing  reliable  data  on  the  number  of  illicit 
firearms seizures is the absence in all EU28 Member States of central databases for reporting 
information  on  recovered  firearms  and  ballistic  material.  Although  we  do  not  have  exact 
numbers due to the lack of responses of some Member States, our consultations suggest that 
centralized databases only exist in a minority of EU Member States. It is important to note that 
concerted  regional  and  international  action  to  promote  development  of  effective  central 
national databases only gained real momentum over the last 15 years, with historical legacies 
of inadequately reliable overall data. In 2012, the United Nations Working Group on Firearms 
concluded that the improvement of the tracing ability of many countries requires sustainable 
investment in capacity development and technical assistance.24  

It  is  important  in  this  context  to  emphasise  that  the  formal  establishment  of  a  centrally-
accessible database for such information is necessary but not sufficient for each country.25 It is 
also important to ensure that appropriate information is systematically and accurately entered 
into  the  database  in  a  timely  way.  This  also  remains  a  challenge.  Obtaining  a  clear  overall 
picture of Member States’ capacities in this respect is difficult26 but some countries are more 
advanced than others.  

Statistics available on firearms in the UK 

The  UK  Home  Office  provides  data  on  recorded  offences  involving  the  use  of  firearms  in  its 
supplementary  volume  to  the  annual  statistical  bulletin.27  A  number  of  different  types  of 
firearms are covered in the bulletin including: 

23 These efforts are mostly based on data gathering and the establishment or improvement of databases.  

24 CTOC/COP/WG.6/2012/3: United Nations Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime. Working Group on Firearms. Vienna, 21-22 May 2012. Often 
State  parties  do  not  maintain  central  registries  and  the  exchange  of  information  among  national, 
sub-regional  and  regional  databases,  when  available,  is  a  time-consuming  process  that  does  not 
allow for effective combating of illicit trafficking in firearms 

25  Note  that  our  reference  to  the  importance  of  ‘centrally-accessible  national  data-bases’  does  not 
necessarily imply that the actual data-bases have to be centralised in a single national data-base. It 
is possible for example that a decentralised network of data-bases could be adequate provided that 
they were properly co-ordinated in a consistent and actively managed national network that can be 
readily  accessed  by  appropriately  authorised  personnel.  In  practice,  this  does  however,  probably 
imply a relatively centralised national facility. 

26 It is difficult since databases are sometimes not publicly available nor is their existence declared in any 

way. This is due to the sensitive nature of the data collected.  

27  Homicides,  Firearm  Offences  and  Intimate  Violence  2010/11:  Supplementary  Volume  2  to  Crime  in 

England and Wales 2010/11 Kevin Smith (Ed.), Sarah Osborne, Ivy Lau and Andrew Britton 

       21 

 
 
 
                                                 
- Firearms that use a controlled explosion to fire a projectile. This category includes handguns, 
shotguns and rifles. These types of weapon are often used in the more serious  offences, and 
tend to account for most of the fatalities and serious injuries from such offences.  

- Imitation firearms. This category includes replica weapons, as well as low-powered weapons 
which fire small plastic pellets, such as BB guns and soft air weapons. While injuries can occur 
from offences involving these weapons, they are less common and tend to be less serious. In 
the UK these two categories combined are referred to as non-air weapons in the bulletin.  

- Air weapons. The majority of offences involving air weapons relate to criminal damage. While 
air weapons can cause injury (and sometimes fatalities), by their nature they are less likely to 
do so than firearms that use a controlled explosion.  

According to the data, in 2010/11 the most commonly used firearm was an air weapon, with 
4,203  offences  or  37%  of  the  total  recorded  offences  involving  a  firearm  (Table  2.2).  This 
proportion has fallen steadily since its peak in 2002/03 (13,822 offences, or 55% of all recorded 
offences involving a firearm). There were 3,105 handgun offences in 2010/11, 28 per cent  of 
the  total  (or  44%  of  the  total  if  excluding  air  weapons).  The  number  of  offences  involving  a 
shotgun has remained fairly steady over recent years, in contrast to falls seen in other firearm 
types.  

The bulletin also provides a detailed breakdown of the number of recorded offences by type of 
weapon  used  in  2010/2011  (i.e.  Deactivated  firearm  (6),  Reactivated  (13)  Blank  firer  (10), 
Unconverted  starting  gun  (5),  Converted  Imitation  (11),  Converted  air  pistol  (9),  other 
reactivated  weapon  (2).  The  data  also  shows  that  the  number  of  firearms  recorded  by  the 
police  as  being  stolen  has  fluctuated  between  2,000  and  3,000  in  the  past  ten  years.  During 
2010/11,  2,534  firearms  were  stolen.  This  is  a  decrease  of  four  per  cent  compared  with  the 
2,627  firearms  stolen  in  2009/10.  The  fall  is  mainly  due  to  a  reduction  in  stolen  air  weapons 
and  shotguns.  In  2010/11,  63%  of  firearms  were  stolen  from  residential  premises.28  Air 
weapons accounted for around a half (46%) of the thefts. 

Measures being taken in Western Balkans to improve information on firearms 

The poor quality of data on the quantity of illicit firearms applies to the Western Balkans, which 
is  an  important  source  of  such  weapons  and  there  are  several  initiatives  to  address  this 
shortcoming. 

For example, in one of the regional workshops we held as part of the research for this study, 
we were told that the authorities in Croatia were undertaking a project funded by the UNDP to 
investigate  how  many  illicit  weapons  there  are  in  the  country  (the  project  is  due  to  end  in 
2014).  As  a  result  of  the  investigations,  two  factories  that  had  been  manufacturing  illegal 
firearms  have been closed down  and  some 2-3,000  illegal  weapons  are  now  being  destroyed 
p.a. There are also projects of a similar nature supported by other agencies (e.g. Europol).29 

28 Such estimate for other MS could not be found- 

29  Europol  is  participating  in  EMPACT  which  is  an  ad  hoc  management  environment.  It  is  a  structured 
multidisciplinary  co-operation  platform  of  the  relevant  Member  States,  EU  Institutions  and 
Agencies,  as  well  as  third  countries  and  organisations  (public  and  private)  to  address  prioritised 
threats  of  serious  international  and  organised  crime.  Also  initiatives  against  illicit  arms  trafficking 
with a focus on the Balkans is organised under EMPACT. 

 
                                                 
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Section 

Problem Definition 

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In Bosnia, some 5,000 illicit firearms were seized during the first 9 months of 2013 alone. Here 
too,  several  factories  producing  illicit  weapons  have  been  identified  and  closed  down.  UNDP 
support has been used to help investigate the illicit firearms trade. Measures that have been 
implemented include a ‘buy-back’ scheme to encourage those holding firearms to hand them 
into the authorities. Consideration is being given to extending this scheme to Albania, Kosovo 
and Serbia but at present there is insufficient funding to do so. A similar scheme worked well in 
Croatia.  

2.3       Cross border dimension of the problem 

Just  as  it  is  not  possible  on  the  basis  of  existing  data  to  precisely  estimate  the  quantity  and 
value of iliicit firearms trafficking in the EU, so this also applies to map the geographical flows 
with any degree of precision.  In our key stakeholder survey we asked for an opinion on how 
significant cross-border illicit firearms trafficking is compared to trafficking activites within the 
same countries  (e.g.  theft  of  legally  held  weapons)  .   Although  the survey  results  need  to  be 
treated  with  caution  because  of  the  low  response  rate  to  this  question,  a  high  proportion  of 
those  with  a  view  of  this  issue  see  the  cross-border  dimension  as  being  very  significant  and 
accounting for most trafficking activities. This overall assessment was shared and endorsed by 
the members of the Group of Experts on Firearms, which includes responsible national officials 
from the great majority of EU member states. 

According to expert opinion and feedback from key stakeholders in Member States, the great 
majority  of  illicit  firearms  circulating  in  the  EU  originate  from  cross-border  trafficking 
activities.  This  is  not  the  only  source:  some  illicit  firearms  are  obtained  through  the  theft  of 
weapons that are originally held legally (e.g. in the UK, sawn-off shotguns) or that are stolen 
from  other  legal  sources  (for  example,  in  the  Liege  2011  mass  shootings  a  FN  rifle  was  used 
that  had  been  stolen  from  the  Belgian  armaments  manufacturer  Fabrique  Nationale  de 
Herstal).  However,  according  to  the  experts  we  consulted  it  is  firearms  that  originate  from 
outside  the  EU  that  account  for  the  majority  of  illict  weapons  in  Member  States.  As  noted 
earlier,  Eastern  Europe,  the  former  conflict  zones  in  the  Western  Balkans,  and  weapons  that 
originate  from  countries  in  North  Africa  where  there  has  been  civil  war  or  unrest,  are  all 
significant  sources  of  illicit  weapons  that  are  smuggled  into  Europe  and  then  across  borders 
from one country to another.  

The distinction between these different forms of illicit firearms trafficking is not clear-cut. For 
example, illicit firearms can be brought into an EU Member State from a neighbouring country 
but  the  ultimate  source  may  not  be  known  and  could  be  a  third  country  outside  the  EU. 
Similarly, in the 2011 Liege mass shootings, the FN rifle that has been manufactured in Belgium 
had Israeli markings because it was taken there to be modified before being brought back to 
Belgium). The blurred distinction between the different types of trafficking, and the fact that 
the  activity  is  illegal,  means  that  it  is  very  difficult  to  quantify  the  relative  importance  of 
different sources of illicit firearms. There is also a significant ‘grey’ market (i.e. illicit possession 
of  firearms  by  unregistered  gun  enthusiasts  which  creates  a  risk  a  diversion  but  often  not 
criminal  use)  and    the  ‘black’  market  (i.e.  trafficking  of  firearms  as  an  illicit  commodity  and 
criminal use). According to the Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe, almost 90% of 

       23 

 
 
 
 
illicit  weapons  are  legally  produced  but  later  diverted  into  the  illegal  market.30  Section  2.5.3 
examines the sources of illicit firearms trafficking in further detail.  

Some  example  from  our  research  of  the  complications  that  have  arisen  in  efforts  to  tackle 
cross-border firerams trafficking are given below: 

Examples of cross-border firearms trafficking and limitations of existing legal frameworks 

The  German  authorities  sentenced  a  citizen  to  two  years  imprisonment  for  having  800  hand 
grenades  in  his  possession  without  a  licence.  Despite  not  being  usable  –  the  hand  grenades 
were from the First World War period - it is an offence in Germany to possess such items. The 
Slovenian  authorities  were  asked  to  investigate  the  case  because  the  German  citizen  had 
bought  the  hand  grenades  via  the  internet  from  a  dealer  in  Slovenia.  There  was,  however,  a 
limited  ability  to  act  because  no  offence  had  been  committed  in  Slovenia.  The  problem  of 
different  standards  of  criminalization  in  this  case  arose  because  of  differences  between 
Germany and Slovenia in the classification of old hand grenades.   

In  January  2011,  three  UK  nationals  were  stopped  by  French  police  at  the  Calais  ferry  port 
while  travelling  en  route  to  the  UK.  On  being  searched  two  handguns  and  46  rounds  of 
ammunition were discovered in the car. In the interview, one occupant claimed to have been 
sent  from  the  UK  by  an  unidentified  male  to  Amsterdam  to  collect  a  package,  which 
unbeknownst to him contained the firearms. Two of these males were convicted in France of 
attempting  to  smuggle  firearms  to  the  UK,  and  given  non-custodial  sentences  by  a  French 
Magistrate. The case against the third individual was not proceeded with. Within 12 months of 
their  return  to  the  UK  all  three  had  been  arrested  for  other  firearms  offences  (one  being 
convicted  of  firearms  possession,  the  other  two  are  on  remand  and  await  trial  in  relation  to 
firearms supply and/or possession). Had the individuals been encountered at Dover rather than 
Calais,  they  would  either  have  been  liable  to  a  maximum  of  10  years’  imprisonment.  They 
would have been given credit for any early plea, and sentences may have been lenient (as in 
other  examples  given  in  this  response.  Consequently,  sentences  differ  greatly  between 
Member States. Streamlining French and UK legislation would have mitigated this. Additionally, 
it should be noted that French law has subsequently changed. 

On  several  occasions  (2006-2009),  handguns  have  been  imported  to  the  UK  concealed  in 
private  multi-occupancy  passenger-vehicles  or  privately  operated  parcel  post  vehicles  from 
Lithuania. Even where large numbers of firearms have been found in these vehicles, successful 
prosecutions have been problematic as it is difficult to prove knowledge of the items and the 
intent to evade the importation restriction. On one occasion, 10 converted Baikal pistols with 
silencers and 300 rounds of suitable ammunition were found behind the vehicle dashboard of a 
Lithuanian-registered minibus at the Dover inbound tourist controls; the driver and passengers 
were all found not guilty for offences charged under Section 5 of the Firearms Act (1968). In a 
separate incident, 15 converted Baikal pistols with silencers and one other handgun, together 
with  several  hundred  rounds  of  suitable  ammunition,  was  found  concealed  in  a  Lithuanian 
registered car-transporting lorry; no further action could be taken against the three occupants 
of  the  vehicle.  On  a  third  occasion,  charges  were  brought  under  Section  50  of  CEMA  (1979) 
after four handguns were found concealed within paint tins carried in a Lithuanian-registered 
minibus.  However,  no  further  action  could  be  taken,  as  the  prosecuting  agencies  could  not 
satisfy the Points to Prove in relation to intent and knowledge.  

30  Organization  for  Security  and  Co-operation  in  Europe  (2003).  Handbook  of  Best  Practices  on  Small 

Arms and Light Weapons. Retrieved from: http://www.osce.org/fsc/13616?download=true   

                                                 
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Section 

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As  revealed  in  the  country  fiche,  there  is  an  increasing  trend  of  deactivated  firearms  being 
reactivated and gas pistols being modified to become firearms in Latvia and trafficked abroad. 
This problem is difficult to control, as the EU Firearms Directive does not define procedures for 
deactivating firearms. Prior to 2011 there was no requirement for firearms dealers to register 
sales  of  gas  pistols  with  national  authorities.  According  the  authorities,  gas  alarm  firearms 
accounted for 56% of the total seizures in Lithuania in 2010. Following a successful operation 
carried out by Law Enforcement Authorities in Latvia and Lithuania that prevented cross border 
trafficking of illegally converted gas pistols, Latvia introduced a new requirement to register gas 
pistols. Since similar legal requirements for permits were introduced in Lithuania, the number 
of sold gas alarm pistols has been reduced from 6,850 (in 2010) to 691 (in 2012).  

Nowadays it is still possible to buy gas (alarm) pistols in Latvia without a permit. In Latvia gas 
(alarm)  pistols  (revolvers)  could  be  acquired  and  possessed  without  a  permit  by  natural 
persons from the age of 18, by presenting their identity documents to the dealers, who have 
the license to trade in arms. So there are many cases, when criminals bought gas (alarm) pistols 
by providing forged or invalid personal documents to the dealers. After that criminals brought 
gas  (alarm)  firearms  into  Lithuania,  converted  and  used  them  for  committing  the  crimes. 
Mostly  such  gas  (alarm)  pistols  as  Zoraki  914,  Zoraki  906,  BlowCompact  are  brought  into 
Lithuania. 31 

illicit  firearms  trafficking  effectively  requires  cooperation  between 
Efforts  to  combat 
authorities  in  different  countries  and  this,  in  turn,  requires  a  degree  of  similarity  in  the 
approach to the problem. The research, in particular the discussions with national authorities 
in  the  interviews,  has  highlighted  examples  where  legal  differences  have  made  cross-border 
collaboration difficult.32 

31  Despite  the  introduction  of  the  above  measures  law  enforcement  agencies  have  had  difficulty  in 
collecting, registering and forwarding data (i.e. proof of age) on existing firearms to the Ministry of 
Interior.  A  new  database  has  been  established  to  record  the  nationality  of  people  purchasing  gas 
firearms  in  Latvia.  From  2015  the  law  will  lead  to  fines  being  given  to  people  who  fail  to  register 
their gas pistols (Latvian law provides for gas and other firearms to be re-registered online). There is 
a need for more staff and funding to implement the new requirements. A key problem is that the 
law on gas pistols varies considerably across the EU. For example, Turkey is the main supplier of gas 
pistols  with  low  manufacturing  standards,  which  allows  them  to  be  easily  converted.  The  Baltic 
States are in favour of a harmonised EU definition of how firearms can be deactivated as this would 
remove  a  significant  barrier  to  cross-border  cooperation.  Baltic  Law  Enforcement  Authorities  are 
also  in  favour  of  extending  the  types  of  firearms  offences  covered  by  national  law.  Training  and 
familiarisation  courses  are  a  very  helpful  way  for  national  focal  points  and  designated  experts  to 
network and exchanges contact information. 

32  In  our  online  survey,  legal  differences  (e.g.  differences  in  legal  definitions)  were  identified  as  key 
barriers  to  cross-border  police  cooperation  for  38%  of  respondents,  lack  of  approximation  of 
legislation  for  31%  of  respondents  and  limited  resources  for  47%  of  respondents.  The  equivalent 
percentages for cross-border judicial cooperation were 25%, 19% and 43% respectively.     

       25 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2.4 

Consequences of illicit firearms trafficking  

An important aspect of  the problem definition is  the assessment of the economic, social and 
other consequences of illicit firearms trafficking.  

Illicit  firearms’  trafficking  is  linked  to  other  criminal  activities  (as  highlighted  in  Europol’s 
2013  Organised  Crime  and  Terrorism  Threat  Assessments).  Not  only  does  it  substantially 
contribute to firearms availability that increases lethality and insecurity from a wide variety 
of  violent  crimes,  but  also  there  can  be  particularly  close  and  organic  links  with  organised 
criminal activities such as drug smuggling, money laundering and human trafficking, as well 
as  with  financial  crimes  and  terrorism.  Similarly,  to  the  extent  that  illicit  firearms  trafficking 
supports  activities  such  as  human  trafficking  and  drugs  smuggling,  there  are  clearly  social 
consequences linked to the distress caused to vulnerable groups. These and other effects, and 
the possible evolution of the problem (baseline scenario) are examined in this section. 

2.4.1 

Serious and organised crime, terrorism and illicit firearms 

As  noted  earlier,  in  addition  to  the  murders  committed  by  individuals  in  the  context  of 
disputes and general crime, illegally-held firearms are often used by organised crime groups - 
to  coerce,  intimidate  or  punish  their  victims,  and  to  pursue  and  sustain  their  criminal 
enterprises  in  rivalry  with  other  criminal  groups  and  in  possible  opposition  to  public 
authorities.  There  is  an  overlap  between  this  and  ‘individual’  criminal  firearms  use,  because 
members  with  access  to  firearms  due  to  their  membership  of  crime  groups  are  often  highly 
undisciplined and violent in their personal behaviour. Although some organised crime groups 
exercise considerable discipline over lethal use of firearms by their members, this is not at all 
the norm. However, it is also important to recognise the importance of access to illicit firearms 
to enable organised criminal activities.  

The  illegal  import  and  sale  of  these  weapons  itself  provides  lucrative  business  for  the  EU’s 
estimated 3,600 organised crime groups, and the dealers that service them.33 Terrorists and 
extremists have used firearms to instil fear and to kill: for example, seven people died in the 
Toulouse  and  Montauban  attacks  in  2012,  and  two  in  the  2011  Frankfurt  airport  incident.34 
Europol  highlighted  the  role  of  Organised  Crime  Groups  (OCG)  in  its  2013  ‘Serious  and 
Organised  Crime  Threat  Assessment’.  The  assessment  showed  that  OCG’s  often  rely  on  the 
availability  of  firearms  to  carry  out  their  activities.  The  firearms  illicitly  trafficked  are  usually 
intended  for  either  personal  use  or  to  meet  specific  orders.  Most  groups  enter  the  firearms 
illicit trafficking business through other criminal activity, which may offer contacts, knowledge 
of existing routes and infrastructure related to the smuggling of weapons. 35     

Even in the UK, which has particularly stringent restrictions on licit firearm possession, firearms 
were  used  in  about  one  per  cent  of  all  incidents  of  British  Crime  Survey  violent  crime  in  the 
2010/11.36 Additionally, the ‘Hospital Episode Statistics’37 show that in 2010/11 there were 159 

33 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 'Digest of Organized Crime Cases', 2012, p.101. 
34 Europol, TE-SAT 2013 - EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. The weapons used were a Colt 45 
pistol and an Uzi submachine gun (Toulouse/ Montauban) and a 9 mm FN P35 pistol (Frankfurt). 

35 Europol, Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment, 2013. 

36 Homicides, Firearm Offences and Intimate Violence 2010/11. Kevin Smith (Ed.), Sarah Osborne, Ivy Lau 

and Andrew Britton 

37  The 

figures  presented  are 

the  2010/11  Hospital  Episode  Statistics  available 

from 

http://www.hesonline.nhs.uk/Ease/servlet/ContentServer?siteID=1937&categoryID=211. 

                                                 
Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Firearms Trafficking in the EU 

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admissions  (on  average  3  a  week  with  obvious  social  costs)  to  NHS  hospitals  for  assault  by  a 
firearm in England, 24 per cent fewer than the same period the previous year (208 admissions).  

Another  important  issue  is  that  organised  crime  groups  often  remove  markings  (i.e.  serial 
numbers) on firearms, which makes it difficult for law enforcement agencies to track and trace 
the origin of different weapons. (Interestingly, according to participants in one of the regional 
workshops,  since  Estonia  introduced  higher  sentences  for  possession  of  unmarked  firearms 
criminals organisations started leaving the markings on illegal firearms.) However, deactivated 
firearms  do  not  have  to  have  markings  (only  a  certificate  is  issued  to  the  person  who 
deactivated it). This means that if brought back into use, it can be more difficult to trace the 
origins of such weapons. Another problem is that there is no EU database to store and share 
information  on  deactivated  firearms  to  show  by  who,  where  and  when  deactivation  was 
carried out.  

2.4.2 

Firearms-related murders 

Firearms have lawful and responsible civilian uses, and their manufacture, sale and purchase 
are  a  part  of  the  EU’s  internal  market38.  Firearms  in  the  wrong  hands,  however,  can  have 
devastating consequences for citizens and communities.  

As noted earlier, there were some 1,200 firearms-related homicides in EU28 Member States in 
the last year for which statistics are available (see Table 2.2). This means that over the past 10 
years there have been over 10,000 victims of murder or manslaughter involving firearms in 
the EU 28 Member States.39 The UNODC’s ‘Global Study on Homicide’40 (2011) indicates that 
for the latest year for which statistics are available: 

 

 

 

An average of 22% of all homicides occurred in the EU28 Member States as a result of 
the use of firearms with a range from 1.3% in Romania to 66% in Italy; 

The total number of firearms-related homicides in EU28 Member States was 1,223 with 
a range from 2 in Slovenia to 417 in Italy. The average number of homicides by firearms 
per 100,000 population was 0.29 with a range from 0.02 in Romania to 0.71 in Italy.  

In addition to the victims of murder or manslaughter involving firearms in the EU 28 
Member States, every year there are also over 4,000 suicides by firearm.   

Taking  just  the  absolute  number  of  firearms-related  homicides  and  irrespective  of  possible 
comparability  issues  between the  UNODC  and  Eurostat,  the  total of  1,223  for  the  latest  year 
when  data  is  available  compares  with  around  30,000  people  deaths  on  the  EU’s  roads 

38 Producers in the EU made almost 2 million civilian firearms in 2011, equivalent to an estimated 20% of 
global  production,  see  'The  Global  Regime  for  Transnational  Crime,’  Council  on  Foreign  Relations, 
Issue Brief, July 2, 2012) and additional figures in Annex 2. 

39 Period 2000-2009. Source: UNODC Global Study on Homicide 2011.This is a partial figure as for most 

Member States statistics for the whole period are unavailable. 
(2011), 

Homicide’ 

‘Global 

40  UNODC’s 

Study 

on 

pp. 

39-57. 

Retrieved 

from: 

http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and 
analysis/statistics/Homicide/Globa_study_on_homicide_2011_web.pdf 

       27 

 
 
 
                                                 
(Eurostat,  2011)  or  1.3  million  predicted  deaths  from  cancer  (European  Society  of  Medical 
Oncology, 2013). Whilst the number of firearms-related homicides is relatively small compared 
with  these  benchmarks,  the  total  is  nevertheless  significant  with  the  social  and  economic 
consequences  being  arguably  greater  (such  as  insurance,  hospital  costs...)  thus  even  though 
comparatively  "small"  these  deaths  and  injuries  (arguably  more  numerous  than  homicides 
while bearing long-term impacts) bear significant costs.  

There  are  no  comprehensive  statistics  covering  all  EU28  Member  States  on  the  number  of 
firearms-related  homicides  that  are  specifically  linked  to  organised  crime  and  terrorism  (as 
opposed to those caused by for example domestic disputes, accidents, or suicides). However, 
a  2011  study  carried  out  for  the  UK’s  Home  Office  concluded  that  6%  of  all  recorded  non-
terrorist homicides in England and Wales in the 2005–06 period had some link with organised 
crime.  Although  not  necessarily  firearms-related,  the  study  argued  that  victims  of  organised 
crime  homicides  were  more  likely  to  be stabbed  or  shot than victims  in non-organised crime 
cases  where  other  methods  (such  as  beatings  and  strangulation)  were  more  common.  The 
study estimated that three-quarters of organised crime-related homicides involved the use of 
firearms compared to just under 4% in the cases that were not linked to organised crime. 41  At 
an  international level,  the  UNODC  estimates  that organized  crime, especially  drug trafficking, 
accounted  for  a  quarter  of  deaths  caused  by  firearms  in  the  Americas  compared  with  only 
some 5% of homicides in Asia and Europe.42 

Not  all  firearms-related  homicides  are  linked  to  criminal  activities,  terrorism  or  domestic 
disputes. The gunmen responsible for mass shootings in recent years, in the schools in Tuusula 
(2007), Kauhajoki (2008), and in Cumbria (2010) and Alphen aan den Rijn (2011), were mentally 
unstable  adults  and  yet  were  licensed  to  possess  a  firearm.  It  is  not  clear  from  publicly-
available  information  whether  the  perpetrators  in  these  cases  became  ill  after  obtaining  a 
firearms  license  or  whether  they  were  already  ill  and  the  requirements  of  Directive  91/477 
with  regard  to  medical  checks  were  not  properly  enforced  In  some  Member  States,  for 
example  Sweden,  there  is  no  need  to  pass  medical  check  before  licensing  for  a  firearms.  In 
Winnenden (2009) an adolescent used a pistol which had been insecurely stored in his parents' 
bedroom.  In  the  attacks  in  Liège  in  2011,  the  gunman  drew  from  a  huge  personal  arsenal 
including military weapons and collectors' items which he had purchased and converted. These 
specific incidents alone claimed the lives of 61 people, including 19 children. 

There is substantial evidence that, although firearms availability does not generally affect the 
rates  of  violent  arguments,  disputes  or  crime,  ready  availability  of  such  firearms  is  a 
significant  factor  in  determining  the  lethality  (or  seriousness  of  injury)  of  such  disputes  or 
crime.43  This  is  the  case  whether  the  firearms  are  legally  registered  or  illicitly  held.    In  this 

41 ‘Summary - Exploring the links between homicide and organised crime’, Matt Hopkins and Nick Tilley, 
study published by the UK Home Office, June 2011. The research was based on a total of 696 non-
terrorist cases that were extracted from the Home Office Homicide Index in England and Wales for 
2005–06 and follow up interviews with the police offers involved in the cases.  

42 ‘2011 Global Study on Homicide - Trends, Context, Data’, UNODC, 2011. 

43 Roth, J. (1994). Firearms and Violence. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National 
Institute of Justice. See also: Libby, N.E. (2009) Predictors Of Firearm Use And Effects Of Weaponry 
On  Victim 
from: 
http://purl.fcla.edu/fcla/etd/CFE0002722  

In  Violent  Crime:  A  Criminal  Events  Approach.  Retrieved 

Injury 

 
                                                 
Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Firearms Trafficking in the EU 

Section 

Problem Definition 

  2 

context,  however,  holders  of  illicitly  trafficked  firearms  are  more  likely  to  be  at  least 
irresponsible  in  relation  to  safe  storage  and  legitimate  use  (thus  raising  risks  of  ‘accidental’ 
misuse, and typically are more likely to be linked with crime or violent disputes. Thus, illicitly 
held  and  trafficked  firearms  contribute  disproportionately  to  such  societal  costs  from  death 
and injury.     

A  recent  study  by  the  UK  Home  Office  quantified  the  ‘supply-related’  costs  of  firearms 
offences.  The  social  and  economic  costs  of  firearms  supply  capture  the  harms  resulting  from 
the  use  of  firearms  supplied  by  organised  crime  groups.  This  was  based  on  the  estimated 
number  of  incidents  where  certain  firearms  were  fired  or  used  as  weapons  (over  4,000 
offences  in  2012).  While  these  offences  themselves  were  not  necessarily  organised,  it  was 
assumed that the firearms used to commit them were supplied by organised crime networks. 
Therefore, the offences were direct consequences of organised crime. Using Home Office costs 
of crime estimates, these offences were attributed a value. The estimated social and economic 
costs of illicit firearms was £160 million. This compared with £10.7bn as being the estimated 
social  and  economic  cost  of  drugs  supply  and  £1.3bn  for  human  trafficking  for  sexual 
exploitation. The report argued that while the £160m figure was likely to be an overestimate of 
the  direct  costs  of  firearms-related  offences,  it  was  likely  to  significantly  underestimate  the 
harms  resulting  from  the  organised  supply  of  illicit  firearms.44  We  are  not  aware  of  similar 
research having been undertaken in other EU Member States.  

2.4.3 

Effects on societies outside Europe 

Although  not  the  primary  focus  of  this  study,  illegal  firearms  trafficking  of  weapons 
originating in EU has negative impacts on countries outside Europe.  

Outside  Europe,  illegally-trafficked  firearms  –  sometimes  originating  from  within  the  EU  (e.g. 
weapons from the Western Balkans being supplied to opposition groups in Syria)  - aggravate 
conflicts,  destabilize  societies  and  hinder  development.  Insurgents,  armed  gangs,  pirates, 
extremists  and  terrorists  can  all  multiply  their  force  through  the  use  of  unlawfully  acquired 
firearms. At an international level, the ready availability of firearms and ammunition has led to 
human  suffering,  political  repression,  crime  and  terror  among  civilian  populations. 
Irresponsible transfers of conventional weapons can destabilize security in a region. Investment 
is discouraged and development disrupted in countries experiencing conflict and high levels of 
violence. 

Interpol  estimates  that  each  year,  firearms  are  used  in  more  than  245,000  murders 
worldwide  (excluding  war-torn  countries).45  However,  this  is  only  a  small  percentage  of  all 
crimes  committed  with  firearms,  which  are  widely  used  to  support  other  criminal  acts.  The 
UNODC has calculated that roughly 42% of homicides committed worldwide in 2010 involved 

44 ‘Understanding Organised Crime: Estimating the Scale and the Social and Economic Costs’, Research 
Report 73, Hannah Mills, Sara Skodbo and Peter Blyth., published by the UK Home Office, 0ctober 
2013. 

45 

Speech 

2013. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201304/20130425ATT65090/20130425A
TT65090EN.pdf 

Hearing 

CRIM 

April 

the 

23 

to 

       29 

 
 
 
                                                 
the use of firearms (there is no distinction in this respect in the data between individuals and 
organised  groups).  Furthermore,  unlike  other  illicit  commodities,  firearms  may  be  used  and 
passed  on  over  decades  often  as  long  as  the  relevant  ammunition  is  available  (self-
manufacturing of ammunition excluded). 

In 2000, UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan stated that “the death toll from small arms dwarfs 
that of all other weapons systems — and in most years greatly exceeds the toll of the atomic 
bombs  that  devastated  Hiroshima  and  Nagasaki.  In  terms  of  the  carnage  they  cause,  small 
arms,  indeed,  could  well  be  described  as  ‘weapons  of  mass  destruction.”    Illicit  firearms’ 
trafficking  is  not  isolated  from  other  illegal  activities.  When  small  firearms  flow  to  the  black 
market, they become one of many illegal commodities there, and may be the subject of illicit 
trafficking  alongside  other  controlled  goods.  This  is  particularly  the  case  in  regions  close  to 
areas  of  actual  or  potential  large-scale  conflict.  More  generally,  access  to  illicit  firearms  is 
integral  to  the  operations  of  most  organised  trafficking  groups,  for  instrumental  purposes  of 
coercion and defence and also as a result of their specific gangs’ sub-cultures. Mini ‘arms races’ 
also take place – between rival organised crime groups or between these and law enforcement 
agencies – sometimes resulting in periods of high local demand for military-style firearms with 
impacts  of  trafficking  prices  and  activities.  The  firearms  can  be  exchanged  for  money,  drugs, 
conflict diamonds, endangered species, etc. 

There  are  successful  examples  of  cross-border  cooperation  between  EU  Member  States  and 
third countries (e.g. the Baltic States and third countries such as the United States and Russia) 
in  combating  firearms  trafficking.  Furthermore,  information  sharing  takes  place  with  Turkey 
and Romania based on similar legal frameworks.  

2.5 

Main Players and Drivers of illicit firearms trafficking 

We now examine the main demand and supply-side drivers of illicit firearms trafficking, i.e. the 
factors that explain why there is a problem.  We also identify the ‘enablers’.  

 

 

 

On the demand-side, the main drivers are criminal or terrorist activities and those 
involved who procure firearms illegally to use in the pursuit of their goals. 

On the supply side, the drivers include traffickers and other intermediaries who are 
involved in the trafficking of firearms either for profit or some other reason (e.g. the 
intermediaries may be part of the same criminal or terrorist group as the end users. In 
some cases it could be that the intermediaries are unaware of their role.)  

Also on the supply-side are the suppliers themselves, i.e. individuals and organisations 
that provide a source of illicit firearms. In many cases, unintentional sources are 
important, where authorized holdings of firearms are stolen or lost and then enter the 
illicit market. However, intentional sources are normally critically involved in the supply 
chain, either through corrupt neglect or direct engagement motivated by financial or 
other considerations.  

There  are  a  number  of  problem  ‘enablers’  including  differences  in  legal  frameworks, 
administrative  and  judicial  procedures,  and  the  capacities  of  law  enforcement  agencies  in 
different EU Member States which means that the problem cannot be effectively tackled.  

2.5.1  Demand-side - End users of illicit firearms  

In  our  key  stakeholder  survey,  the  main  users  of  illicit  firearms  were  identified  as  being 
organised crime groups although many respondents did not know. Ideally, the analysis might 
be  limited  to  law  enforcement  agencies  that  responded  to  the  survey  but  only  four  of  them 

Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Firearms Trafficking in the EU 

Section 

Problem Definition 

  2 

replied  to  this  question  (their  responses  mirrored  the  findings  below  with  two  stating  that 
organised crime groups were the ‘most important’ groups involved in illicit firearms trafficking, 
and  one  in  each  case  indicating  that  terrorists  and  non-organised  criminal  groups  were  the 
‘most important’). 

Table 2.5: Who are the main groups involved in illicit firearms trafficking in your country? 

Options 

Terrorists 
Organised criminal groups 
Non-organised criminal groups 
Don't know or no answer 
Total 

Source: CSES survey 

Most important 

Nº 

% 

4 
15 
4 
67 
90 

4.4 
16.7 
4.4 
74.4 
100.0 

The  2011,  Europol  Review  showed  that  the  possession  of  firearms  by  Organised  Crime 
Groups  is  rising  in  Europe.46  The  willingness  of  OCG  members  to  misuse  firearms  not  only 
instrumentally  to  pursue  their criminal  enterprises  but also  in wider contexts  of  disputes  has 
posed a significant threat not only to themselves but also to both the general public and law 
enforcement  personnel.  There  are  regular  instances  where  innocent  civilians  appear  to  be 
caught in the ‘crossfire’ between rival gang members, for example. Although most OCGs prefer 
firearms, there is also an upward trend in the use of heavy SALW such as assault rifles (e.g. AK-
47s)  and  explosive  devices.  The  increased  use  of  heavy  arms  by  serious  and  organised  crime 
networks in the EU was also mentioned by the European Commission at a high level conference 
that took place in November 2012. One of the conclusions of the conference was that Member 
States should consider introducing legislative proposals based on Article 83 (1) TFEU to combat 
illicit arms trafficking. 

As  shown  earlier,  there  are  clear  connections  between  organised  crime  and  illicit  arms 
trafficking. The connections can be categorised in three overall forms:  

 

 

 

Carrying firearms as an intrinsic aspect of trafficking operations (including closely 
linked organised criminal activities involved in the overall trafficking process);  

Accessing firearms for use for violence, intimidation and self-defence by local and 
national gangs that are the local or national elements of transnational criminal 
networks;  

Transnational criminal networks that to some extent specialise in illicit firearms 
trafficking.  

In most national or local contexts, these three types of links co-exist. The extent to which the 
second factor above depends on illicit firearms trafficking obviously depends on relative prices 
and reliability of other potential sources (domestic illicit production; loss or theft from licensed 

46 

Europol 

Review 

(2011). 

Retrieved 

from: 

https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/en_europolreview2011_0.pdf  

       31 

 
 
 
                                                 
holders etc.) – the more stringent national controls are on these other sources, the greater the 
relative importance of illicit trafficking. 

Organised criminal groups act in accordance with the commercial rules of supply and demand 
that govern profit-making, and areas in which SALW are restricted or prohibited will be likely to 
be  areas  where  there  is  conflict,  thus  presenting  a  prime  business  opportunity  for  organised 
crime  groups.  Russian  and  Italian  criminal  organisations,  for  instance,  were  operating  in  the 
midst of the Yugoslav conflicts.47 According to Europol, Organised Crime Groups often rely on 
the availability of weapons to carry out their activities. However, the market for firearms in the 
EU remains modest in size compared to other regions. Trafficking within the EU or for EU-based 
end-users occurs mainly through relatively small scale transactions (each individual transaction 
typically  involving  a  few  weapons);48  and  the  weapons  trafficked  are  intended  for  either 
personal use or to meet specific orders. The data collected for the SOCTA 2013 do not indicate 
an increase in the trafficking of heavy firearms. 

According to  Europol’s  recently  published  ‘EU  Terrorism  Situation and  Trends  Report  (TE-SAT 
2013),  an  increased  use  of  firearms  has  been  observed  across  a  variety  of  terrorist  and 
extremist groups. Thus, “terrorists and violent extremists have also been found in possession 
of  a  significant  amount  of  firearms  and  ammunition  over  the  reporting  period.  The  use  of 
firearms by terrorists and violent extremists has increased in recent years. This modus operandi 
appears to be emerging across a range of ideologies and is of concern”.49 

2.5.2 

Supply-side - traffickers and other intermediaries 

Illicit firearms trafficking within the EU takes place in a variety of different ways and involves a 
range  of  different  intermediaries.50  For  example,  the  methods  can  include  transfers  by 
individuals, small groups or firms that ‘deliberately break the law by transferring firearms to 
illicit  recipients’  by  concealing  the  firearms  from  export  control  authorities,  customs  and 
border  guards  either  by  smuggling,  mislabelling  the  shipment,  concealing  the  firearms  in  a 
shipment  of  other  goods.  Arms  transfer  diversions  are  defined  as  the  transfer  of  controlled 
items authorized for export to one end user, but delivered to an unauthorized end user or used 
by the authorized end user in unauthorized ways.51 Another  type is  transfer of firearms  that 
are  deliberately  facilitated  by  governments  or  state  agents  (including  corrupt  national 
officials),  in  a  covert  manner,  to  supply  non-state  actors.  The  main  sources  of  illicit  firearms 
within  the  EU  are  the  reactivation  of  neutralised  weapons;  burglaries  and  thefts; 
embezzlement of legal arms, legal arms sold in the illegal market; firearms retired from service 
by army or police; and the conversion of gas pistols. 

Comprehensive statistics on how important these different sources are relative to one another 
do not appear to be available and any attempt to provide an estimate would probably have to 

47 Chrissie Hurst, Bernardo Mariani, Ian Davis.  Organised crime, corruption and illicit arms trafficking in 

an enlarged EU. 2001. Saferworld. 

48 Note however, that arms shipments transiting the EU to be illicitly diverted to external end users (for 
examples  in  conflict  –affected  regions)  may  involve  large  numbers  of  weapons  and  substantial 
ammunition stocks). 

49 Europol ‘EU Terrorism Situation and Trends Report (TE-SAT 2013), April 2013 
50 Greene O, ‘Examining international responses to illicit arms trafficking’, Crime, Law & Social Change, 

vol 33, 2000, p 154. 

51  Deadly  Deception:  Arms  Transfer  Diversion,  by  Matt  Schroeder,  Helen  Close,  and  Chris  Stevenson, 

2008. In Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2008: Risk and Resilience. 

                                                 
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Section 

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be  based  on  police  statistics  from  particular  areas  where  detailed  seizures  records  are 
maintained.  However,  these  will  suffer  not  only  from  all  of  the  well-known  problems  of 
reliability of statistics on such issues but also because these proportions will be highly dynamics 
and context-dependent. Moreover, the relative importance of such sources is probably highly 
context  dependent.  People  and  organisations  will  obtain  illicit  firearms  from  a  variety  of 
potential sources according to relative prices and reliability. These not only vary according to 
locality but also change (for example, due to changing priorities of law enforcement agencies, 
new  legislation,  etc.  The  well-known  story  of  the  rise  (and  recent  fall)  of  sources  from  re-
activated or replica firearms in the UK illustrates this. 

 

• 

 

Examples of traffickers and other intermediaries 

Some Member States collect accurate data on the origin of illicit firearms. Thus, a 
rough estimate provided to us in an interview with the national authorities in 
Finland was that 60-70% of illicit firearms in the country are the result of cross-
border trafficking (the remainder is probably sourced from diversion from legally-
held arms licensed in Finland, for example due to insecure holdings or diversion to 
unauthorized uses by licensed individuals. Most of these are stolen firearms that 
have been used in armed robberies and burglaries). Only 10% originate directly 
from outside the EU (e.g. USA) and are often trafficked unknowingly by 
holidaymakers with the remaining 50-60% coming from other EU Member States, 
albeit in some cases in the form of trans-shipments that could originate from 
regions outside Europe.  

In Denmark, the main method of trafficking illicit firearms into the country is via 
Heavy Goods Vehicles primarily from the Western Balkans. Although, monitoring 
illicit firearms trafficking is a relatively new area of responsibility for Danish law 
enforcement authorities they suspect that most of the firearms trafficked into 
Denmark are destined to be used by organised criminal groups. Evidence provided 
by Danish law enforcement officers also suggests that gun collectors are 
unknowingly involved in illicit firearms trafficking (i.e. by importing unlicensed 
firearms for private display). 

According to law enforcement authorities in Estonia, there were several cases of 
illicit arms trafficking in the middle of 1990s, when weapons were smuggled to 
Estonia from Central and Eastern Europe. The number of illicit firearms contained in 
illegal consignments often ranged from a few hundred to 2000 firearms. 
Interestingly, the demand for illicit firearms is mainly from organised crime groups 
outside of Estonia rather than the internal black market. 

Those engaged in illicit firearms trafficking have every incentive to involve different entities 
in different countries in the process. The cross-border element can add to the opacity of illicit 
firearms  trafficking  and  can  create  difficulties  for  Law  Enforcement  Authorities  who  need  to 
coordinate their response across different legal jurisdictions. 

Research carried out by Saferworld found that although the influx of firearms into the EU is not 
overwhelming,  there  is  a  steady  supply  of  small  arms  primarily  from  the  Western  Balkans 
region, as well as from Eastern Europe, which could increase with future EU enlargement and 
the extension of the Schengen system (no quantification of the importance of these different 

       33 

 
 
 
sources  was  provided).  Small  arms  and  light  weapons  (SALW)  have  fed  the  local  criminal 
underworld as well as European terrorist groups, such as the Real IRA, thus contributing to the 
undermining  of  West  European  public  safety.52  According  to  the  same  study,  the  two  main 
users  of  SALW  in  the  EU  are  terrorist  organisations,  especially  those  struggling  for  secession 
from  a  state,  and  criminal  groups  involved  in  profitable  illegal  activities,  such  as  drug-
trafficking, prostitution, smuggling of illegal immigrants, and extortion.  

Illicit firearm trafficking is almost exclusively a supplementary rather than primary source of 
income for the OCGs involved in this crime area. Most groups enter the weapons trafficking 
business  through  other  criminal  activity,  which  may  offer  contacts,  knowledge  of  existing 
routes  and  infrastructure  related  to  the  smuggling  of  weapons.  Motorcycle  gangs  are  also 
involved in the trafficking of weapons and have, for example, opened chapters in the Western 
Balkans. OCGs use existing criminal routes to traffic  weapons.53 With regard to  illicit firearms 
trafficking by terrorist organisations, although most of their attacks have been conducted with 
explosives  and  handguns,  despite  the  cessation  of  hostilities  these  organisations  still  possess 
vast  arsenals  that  might  eventually  end  up  in  the  hands  of  criminals  if  not  properly 
decommissioned.54 The recent study by the UK Home Office quoted earlier that quantified the 
‘supply-related’ firearms offences as being equivalent to £160m argued that while the number 
of  illicit  firearms  in  use  by  organised  criminals  was  likely  to  be  small.  Intelligence  from  the 
National  Ballistics  Intelligence  Service  (NABIS)  was  quoted  suggesting  that  the  same  firearms 
are  often  passed  between  different  criminal  groups  and  used  in  different  violent  incidents, 
indicating that the market for illicit firearms (within the UK at least) involves suppliers loaning 
firearms to a number of organised crime groups. 55 

2.5.3 

Supply-side - suppliers of illicit firearms 

The  main  sources  of  illegal  weapons  within  the  EU  are  the  reactivation  of  neutralised 
weapons,  burglaries  and  thefts,  embezzlement  of  legal  arms  (e.g.  thefts  from  shops  selling 
firearms),  legal  arms  sold  in  the  illegal  market,    firearms  retired  from  service  by  army  or 
police, and the conversion of gas pistols.  

There  is  no  reliable  indication  of  the  proportions  coming  from  these  different  sources 
although  feedback  from  our  consultations  and  the  workshops  suggests  that  in  most  EU 
countries,  the  reactivation  of  neutralised  weapons  is  the  largest  single  source  of  illicit 
firearms.  Most  illicit  firearms  originate  from  cross-border  trafficking,  often  as  noted  above 
from outside the EU. Since the early 1990s, the firearms illicitly trafficked have originated from 
three main sources that have replaced each other:  

 

First of all the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact bloc because a source of illicit 
firearms following the collapse of the iron curtain;   

52 The proliferation of illegal small arms and light weapons in and around the European Union: instability, 
organised  crime  and  terrorist  groups,  Dr  Domitilla  Sagramoso,  Saferworld  &  Centre  for  Defence 
Studies, April 2001, pp1–2.  

53 https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/socta2013.pdf 
54  Dr  Domitilla  Sagramoso.The  proliferation  of  illegal  small  arms  and  light  weapons  in  and  around  the 

European Union: Instability, organised crime and terrorist groups. 2001. Saferworld.  

55 ‘Understanding Organised Crime: Estimating the Scale and the Social  and Economic Costs’, Research 
Report 73, Hannah Mills, Sara Skodbo and Peter Blyth., published by the UK Home Office, 0ctober 
2013. 

                                                 
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Section 

Problem Definition 

  2 

 

 

Then, during the wars of Yugoslav succession, the Western Balkans became an 
important source of illicit firearms;  

More recently, North Africa has superseded the former, with a pool of weapons 
available and following some of the main drug trafficking routes into the EU56.  

According to Europol, the amount of heavy firearms and SALW in circulation in the EU seems to 
satisfy  much of  the demand at  present and  suppliers  in south-eastern Europe  and  elsewhere 
have  the  capacity  to  meet  any  rise  in  demand  in  the  foreseeable  future.57  The  fact  that 
(according  to  law  enforcement  agencies  participating  in  the  Western  Balkans  workshop  we 
organised) Kalashnikov or a rocket launcher can be acquired for as little as EUR 300 to EUR 700 
in some parts of the EU indicates their ready availability to criminals and others.  

Furthermore,  advances  in  technology  increases  the  risk  that  sectors  of  society  that  have 
traditionally not been able to obtain illicit firearms could gain access to them. For example, 
3D  printing  can  be  used  to  manufacture  firearms  and  produce  essential  components  to 
reactivate deactivated firearms. Last year, what was thought to be the world's first gun made 
with 3D printer technology was successfully fired in the US. The gun was made on a 3D printer 
that  cost  U$8,000  and  was  assembled  from  separate  printed  components  made  from  ABS 
plastic (only the firing pin was made from metal).58 3D technology works by building up layer 
upon  layer  of  material  -  typically  plastic  -  to  build  complex  solid  objects.  At  present  and  the 
near  future,  this  potential  production  technology  poses  an  emerging  rather  than  major  risk: 
other  more  ‘traditional’  sources  of  supply  will  probably  remain  more  important  for  the 
foreseeable  future.  Nevertheless,  it  remains  a  serious  concern  that  the  printers  become 
cheaper, implying that instead of buying goods from shops, consumers will instead be able to 
download designs and print out the items at home.  

Large amounts of powerful military-grade weapons have since the mid-1990s reached the EU 
from  the  Western  Balkans  and  former  Soviet  Bloc  countries,59  often  trafficked  in  small 
quantities  and  hidden  in  vehicles  like  long  distance  coaches  to  avoid  detection.60  Recent 

56  Philip  J.  Cook,  Wendy  Cukier  and  Keith  Krause  (2009)  The  illicit  firearms  trade  in  North  America 

Criminology and Criminal Justice August 2009 vol. 9 no. 3 265-286. 

57 Europol Review (2011). Retrieved from: Philip J. Cook, Wendy Cukier and Keith Krause (2009) The illicit 
firearms trade in North America Criminology and Criminal Justice August 2009 vol. 9 no. 3 265-286. 

58 BBC News http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-22421185 

59 COM(2013) 716 final. Precise estimates of the size of these stores are impossible, and those available 
vary widely, partly because volumes are dynamic. In one recent study, defence stockpiles in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina in 2011 were estimated at 76 000 pieces of small arms and light weapons and 100 
000  metric  tons  of  ammunition,  and  in  Montenegro  in  2011  at  28  000  weapons  and  7000  metric 
tons of ammunition; Pierre Gobinet, 'Significant Surpluses: Weapons and Ammunition Stockpiles in 
South-east Europe',  Small Arms  Survey,  The  Regional Approach  to  Stockpile  Reduction  and the  US 
Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, Dec 2011. 

60 European Firearms Expert group; Convertible Weapons in the Western Balkans, SEESAC, 2009. In UK in 
2010/11  63%  of  the  2534  stolen  firearms  were  stolen  from  residential  premises;  Homicides, 

       35 

 
 
 
                                                 
upheavals in North Africa and the Middle East carry a risk that surplus and stolen military arms 
will reach European criminal markets along similar routes. Firearms, parts and components are 
also, to an increasing extent, traded online and delivered through mail order, postal or express 
delivery  services.61  There  is  no  way  of  accurately  quantifying  this  trend  because  it  is  largely 
hidden from public view. 

Examples of Suppliers of illicit firearms62 

A considerable number of firearms and other military equipment were illegally obtained 
from  the  Soviet  Army’s  military  bases,  which  were  located  in  Estonia.  This  mostly 
happened in the end of 1980s, when the collapse of the communist regime started and 
the  control  over  Soviet  Army’s  weaponry  decreased.  The  occupying  forces  of  Soviet 
Union definitively left Estonia on 31st August 1994. In that period some of the civilians 
residing in Estonia (criminals as well as people with entrepreneurial character) managed 
to  illegally  exchange  money,  alcohol,  food  and  other  goods  which  the  foreign  troops 
valued for Kalashikov rifles, Makarov pistols and ammunition. Naturally we do not have 
the exact number of firearms and ammunition, which were obtained using this scheme, 
but probably these numbers range from few hundred to a few thousand. These illegal 
firearms and ammunition are not possessed by a small group of people, but are rather 
divided by different people who each own a small number of firearms. 

Illicit firearms trafficking can involve many transit countries (those that are passed through in 
order  to  reach  a  destination),  the  wider  implication  is  that  to  enhance  the  probability  of 
success, the policy options should provide a proactive approach to dealing with the legal and 
law enforcement issues faced by Member States.    

Firearms Offences and Intimate Violence 2010/11: Supplementary Volume 2 to Crime in England and 
Wales 2010/11, Kevin Smith et al, Home Office Statistical Bulletin 2012. 

61 For instance: www.gunbroker.com 

62 Information obtained through interviews. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
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Figure 2.3: Trafficking routes as reported to the European Firearms Expert group63 

Turning to the type of firearms, conversion of air/gas pistols into a lethal weapon is a common 
source of illicit firearms. Another  common source of illicit firearms in the EU originates  from 
the reactivation of firearms (often though the purchase of parts over the internet) that have 
previously been deactivated.   

In addition to  these  sources  of illicit  weapons,  the  research suggests  that  many firearms  in 
illegal circulation are the result of theft or diversion from their lawful lifecycle (the extent to 
which this is the case cannot be estimated), of being illegally imported from third countries 
and  of  the  conversion  of  other  objects  into  firearms.  Almost  half  a  million  firearms  lost  or 
stolen  in  the  EU  remain  unaccounted  for,  the  overwhelming  majority  of  which  are  civilian 
firearms,  according  to  the  Schengen  Information  System64.  The  research  shows  that  most  of 

63  COM(2013)  716  final.  Based  on  input  from  Austria,  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  Czech  Republic, 
Denmark,  Ireland,  Estonia,  Germany,  Greece,  Hungary,  Netherlands,  Poland,  Portugal,  Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, UK. 

64  The  second  generation  Schengen  Information  System  is  an  EU  computer  system  which  enables 
Member States authorities to share data (e.g. type and serial number) on firearms reported as lost, 
stolen or misappropriated. 

       37 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
the firearms used in crime and seized in the UK with the exception of shotguns originate from 
outside  of  the  UK.  Of  the  firearms  originating  from  outside  of  the  UK  there  is  a  50/50  split 
between  those  originating  in  the  Member  States  and  other  3rd  countries  of  such  as  the  US, 
Turkey and Russia. These proportions will vary for other EU Member States, according to the 
stringency and enforcement of national firearms control regulations, geographical location and 
other factors. 

2.5.4  Relationship between laws and illicit firearms 

The earlier analysis of firearms-related deaths (see Table 2.3) suggest that although Member 
States with larger populations tend to have a larger total number of gun deaths, by contrast, 
the rate of gun deaths is lower in Member States with relatively tougher restrictions on the 
research on the relationship between firearms availability and lethal violence.  

Availability of firearms is not typically linked with overall levels of violent disputes or crime 
in  a  society,  but  it  is  significantly  linked  to  the  lethality  of  such  violence.  In  this  context, 
availability concerns the availability of firearms to people that might misuse them, and not so 
much  to  the  overall  numbers  of  firearms  held  by  citizens.  This  is  the  case  in  relation  to 
attempted suicides and misuse of arms in the context of family or social disputes: the rates of 
attempted suicide or violent disputes are not correlated with gun availability, but the lethality 
of  such disputes  is  substantially correlated. In  this  context, the  most systematic  research  has 
been conducted in relation to USA, Canada, and Australia: the qualitative literature is less well-
developed in relation to EU states, but what exists on the EU is fully consistent with such wider 
findings. 65  

In  this  context,  it  is  to  be  expected  that  countries  with  relatively  stringent  and  strongly 
enforced restrictions on civilian possession of firearms will benefit from lower death rates from 
violent disputes or crime. The key factor is ready availability at the point of potential misuse. 
This  factor  is  one  of  several  that  combine  to  determine  risks  of  lethal  misuse  of  firearms. 
Cultural and societal norms not only affect the stringency and character of legal restriction on 
firearms  possession,  but  also  the  risk  factors  associated  with  patterns  of  access  to  firearms.  
Also  cultural  factors  (such  as  attitudes  to  gun  ownership)  can  play  a  significant  role  in 
determining the rate of gun deaths. 

According  to  a  Eurobarometer  survey,  most  European’s  are  concerned  about  the  levels  of 
crimes  using  firearms.66  Respondents  were  evenly  divided  on  the  question  of  the  level  of 
firearms-related crime in their country. Just under half (49%) thought that there is a high level 
of firearms-related crime; of these, 12% perceived it to be ‘very high’ and 37% considered it to 
be  ‘fairly  high’.  However,  virtually  the  same  proportion  (48%)  thought  that  the  level  of 
firearms-related crime in their country is ‘low’, with 9% estimating that it is ‘very low’ and 37% 
saying that it is ‘fairly low’. It is important to note here that this question relates to perceptions 

65 Not only literature but also research centres are more numerous in the US than the EU. For instance, 
the  Harvard  Injury  Control  Research  Center  (conducting  firearms  research)  or  the  Center  for  Gun 
Policy  and  Research  which  belongs  to  the  Johns  Hopkins  Bloomberg  School  of  Public  Health.  See 
detailed  discussion  in,  for  example,  O.  Greene  and  N.  Marsh,  Small  Arms,  Crime  and  Conflict,  
Routledge London,2012; and P. Squires, Gun Crime on Global Contexts, Routledge, London, 2014.    

66  Flash  Eurobarometer  383:  Firearms 

in  the  European  Union.  http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-

affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/trafficking-in-
firearms/docs/fl383_firearms_report_en.pdf 

                                                 
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Section 

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  2 

of firearms-related crime. While they are a useful measure of public concern, opinions are also 
likely to reflect differences in media coverage of such crimes. 

The survey also found that most Europeans expect the EU to take action in close collaboration 
with  national  governments.  Almost  two  thirds  (64%)  thought  that  the  EU,  working  in 
cooperation  with  national  authorities,  is  in  the  best  position  to  address  the  issue  of  firearms 
trafficking while a quarter (26%) of people say that national authorities should act on their own 
in tackling firearms trafficking.67 

2.6 

Illicit arms trafficking in the context of the European armaments sector   

To  put  illicit  firearms  trafficking  into  context,  it  is  helpful  to  consider  Europe’s  armaments 
industry  and  the  legal  firearms  market.  In  the  context  of  the  European  arms  manufacturing 
industry, there is scope for legally manufactured firearms to fall into the illicit market.  

According  to  the  statistical  classification  of  economic  activities  in  the  EU  (Eurostat  NACE  Rev 
1.1), the armaments sector covers the production of arms and ammunition, corresponding to 
NACE Group 29.6, which is part of the machinery and equipment sector. The activities covered 
are the production of: tanks and other fighting vehicles; artillery material and ballistic missiles; 
military small arms and ammunition; hunting, sporting or protective firearms and ammunition; 
explosive  devices  such  as  bombs,  mines  and  torpedoes.  The  data  does  not  cover  military 
aircraft and warships, which are classified instead as transport equipment. 

According  to  Eurostat,  the  EU’s  arms  and  ammunition  manufacturing  sector  (covering  all 
categories of arms) generated EUR 4.7 billion of value added and employed 97,300 persons 
(2.4  %  of  the  total  value  added  generated  by  the  EU’s  machinery  and  equipment 
manufacturing  sector  and  2.7  %  of  its  workforce  in  2006).  There  were  1,300  enterprises 
registered in the EU 28’s arms and ammunition manufacturing sector in 2006, less than 1% of 
all  the  machinery  and  equipment  manufacturing  enterprises  in  the  EU  28.68  Gross  tangible 
investment by the EU-27's arms and ammunition manufacturing sector was valued at EUR 326 
million in 2006, 1.9% of the machinery and equipment manufacturing total.  

Note that these statistics aggregate value of an entire sector, of which firearms manufacture is 
a  relatively  small  part.  Nevertheless,  firearms  (and  associated  ammunition  manufacture  and 
sale  is  economically  significant  in  the  EU.  For  example,  the  Institut  Européen  Des  Armes  De 
Chasse  Et  De  Sport  (IEACS)  has  estimated  that  the  hunting  and  shooting  sports  market 
generates in excess of €18 billion of economic activity annually and that this activity supports 
more  than  580,000  jobs.  Although  this  is  probably  a  relatively  high  estimate  (IEACS  has  an 
interest), it is nevertheless indicative. Overall, there are more than 1,800 manufacturers, 200 
distributors and 14,000 retailers in Europe whose business is totally or significantly dependent 
on the hunting or recreational shooting market.69  

67 Flash Eurobarometer 383: Firearms in the European Union. 
68http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Arms_and_ammunition_production_

statistics_-_NACE_Rev._1.1#Database 

69 Speakers’ Contributions: The Fight Against Illicit Trafficking In Firearms And The Securing Of Explosives. 
The Role of the Industry in Controlling the Sales of Firearms and Countering Trafficking: More Self-
Regulation  or  Government  Intervention?  Institut  Européen  Des  Armes  De  Chasse  Et  De  Sport 
(IEACS). 2013. 

       39 

 
 
 
                                                 
The arms and ammunition manufacturing sector overall generated more value added in the 
UK  than  in  any  other  Member  State,  accounting  for  well  over  one  third  (37.3  %)  of  EU-27 
value added in 2006. The next largest contribution in this sector was made by Germany, with a 
22.4 % share, but no other Member State recorded a double-digit share of the EU-27 total. In 
employment terms, this sector was less concentrated: although the UK was again the largest by 
this measure (16,600 persons employed), its share of the EU-27 total was just 17.0%, less than 
half  its  share  in  value  added  terms.  Bulgaria  had  the  second  largest  workforce  of  14,100 
persons employed, slightly more than in Germany.70 

During the period between 1997 and 2007, the  production index for arms  and ammunition 
manufacturing in the EU grew by an average 1.3 % per year. There were three distinct periods 
of output development: the first was characterised by falling output after 1997 and until 2000; 
the  second  was  the  subsequent,  sustained  strong  growth  through  until  2006,  at  an  average 
rate of 5.3 % per year; the third and most recent was a return to negative rates of change in 
2007 when output contracted by 4.9 %. 

The table below shows the total number and value of civilian firearms production, exports and 
imports in the EU. 

Table 2.6: EU Firearms production, exports and imports (2011) 

Statistics 

Short guns* 

Long guns* 

Total 

Production of civilian firearms in EU-27 
(units) (world in italics)71 

Exports of civil firearms in EU-27 (units)72 

Imports of civilian firearms in EU-27 2011 
(units)73 

Exports of civilian and military firearms in 
EU-28 (Value in EUR)74 

806 645  
(1 219 000) 

1 167 511  
(5 074 395) 

566 345 

25 958 

634 596 

169 424 

1 974 156 
 (10 255 580) 

1 200 941 

195 382 

- 

- 

€931 633 044 

Note*: A long gun is a category of firearms and cannons with longer barrels than other classes. 
In small arms, a long gun is designed to be fired braced against the shoulder, in contrast to a 
handgun. 

In  comparison  to  many  other  sectors  of  the  European  economy,  the  availability  of  data  on 
the arms and ammunition sector is often restricted by issues of confidentiality. Therefore, the 
likelihood  of  an  under-reporting  of  arms  production  and  sales  must  be  borne  in  mind. 
However,  it  is  clear  from  the  Eurostat  and  IEACS  data  that  the  licit  European  arms  sector 

70http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=Arms_and_ammunition_produc

tion_statistics_-_NACE_Rev._1.1&stable=1 

71  Source:  World  Forum  of  Shooting  Activities,  March  2013,  using  information  from  proof  houses 
composed of official figures from Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and UK, estimates 
for other Member States. 

72 Eurostat. Cited in COM(2013) 716 final. Brussels: Europa.eu. 21 October. 
73 Eurostat. A number of Member States did not report any exports of pistols and revolvers (Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Romania) and military firearms (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, 

France, Germany, Italy, Romania). 
74 Peace Research Institute Oslo cited in COM(2013) 716 final. Brussels: Europa.eu. 21 October. 

 
                                                 
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  2 

employs  a  large  number  of  people  and  that  it  generates  significant  revenue  for  the  Member 
States and European businesses. 

Based on the earlier estimates of illicit firearms trafficked within the EU (see Section 2.1.2) it 
is clear that illicit firearms are likely to make up only a small (albeit impossible to quantify) 
proportion  of  the  total  firearms  market  which  includes  both  civilian  and  military  weapons. 
Nevertheless, the effect of any proposals for new measures to combat illicit firearm trafficking 
must  take  into  account  any  wider  effects  on  the  EU’s  licit  firearms  sector  to  prevent 
unintended  damage  to  a  very  important  sector  the  EU’s  economy  while  aiming  to  prevent, 
detect, investigate and prosecute possible diversion.  

2.7 

Existing institutional framework for combatting illicit arms trafficking 

As note earlier, it is important that any new measures to combat illicit firearms trafficking take 
into  account  existing  policies  and 
institutional  frameworks.  There  are  a  number  of 
organisations  at  the  international,  EU  and  national  level  that  have  a  role  in  combating  illicit 
firearms trafficking.  

2.7.1 

International level  

At  the  international  level,  in  2001  the  UN  established  the  Programme  of  Action  to  Prevent, 
Combat  and  Eradicate  the  Illicit  Trade  in  Small  Arms  and  Light  Weapons  in  All  Its  Aspects 
(UNPoA).  The  UN  UNPoA  provides  the  framework  for  activities  to  counter  the  illicit  firearms 
trafficking.  It  includes  a  range  of  important  international  norms  to  promote  and  ensures 
adequate  controls  on  legal  SALW  to  prevent  and  combat  illicit  or  unauthorised  proliferation 
and misuses of SALW.  At the national level the UNPoA includes obligations for states to put in 
place  adequate  to  control  of  the  production,  export,  import,  transit  or  retransfer  of  SALW  in 
order to prevent illegal manufacture and illicit arms trafficking. Furthermore the UNPoA obliges 
countries to designate national coordination agencies or bodies and institutional infrastructure 
responsible  for  policy  guidance,  research  and  monitoring  of  efforts  to  prevent,  combat  and 
eradicate  the  illicit  trade  in  small  arms  and  light  weapons  in  all  its  aspects.  The  UNPoA 
obligation  are  politically  rather  than  legally  binding,  but  they  command  high-level  political 
authority and legitimacy for UN Member States. 

The  Firearms  Protocol  of  the  UN  Conventional  to  Combat  Transnational  Organised  Crime 
(2001)  is  a  legally-binding  international  instrument  that  complements  and  reinforces  the 
international norms of the UNPoA, particularly in relation to international firearms trafficking. 
In  addition,  the  International  Tracing  Instrument  (2008)  provides  important  obligations  to 
ensure  effective  marking,  record-keeping  and  international  tracing  co-operation,  to  enable 
effective international co-operation to trace sources and diversion points of illicit SALW seized, 
for example, in conflict affected or conflict-related contexts. As such, it complements and re-
forces international police co-operation through INTERPOL in relation to crime weapons. 

INTERPOL  facilitates  international  police  co-operation  to  helps  states  to  improve  their 
collection  and  analysis  of  the  information  that  can  be  gleaned  from  inside  and  outside  a 
firearm  to  prevent  and  solve  firearm-related  crime.  For  example,  the  INTERPOL  Firearms 
Reference Table (IFRT) is an interactive online tool that provides a standardized way to identify 
and describe firearms, and enables an investigator to obtain or verify the details of a firearm. 
The IFRT contains more than 250,000 firearm references and 57,000 firearm images, as well as 
extensive information on firearm markings. Interpol has also established a Ballistic Information 

       41 

 
 
 
Network (IBIN), which provides a global platform for collecting, storing, and comparing ballistic 
data. IBIN is the first and only large-scale international ballistic data sharing network.75 

In terms of criminal intelligence analysis, INTERPOL is developing its capacity to contribute to 
firearm-related criminal investigations by conducting and disseminating research and analysis 
on  firearm  related  crime  trends  and  techniques,  as  well  as  intelligence  on  firearm  trafficking 
routes and methods. 

The  World  Customs  Organization  (WCO)  is  also  relevant.  The  WCO  is  an  independent 
intergovernmental  body  whose  mission  is  to  enhance  the  effectiveness  and  efficiency  of 
customs administrations. One of the most critical components of the UN Firearms Protocol and 
the  one  which  impacts  on  Customs  administrations  is  the  import,  export  and  transit  system 
(Articles  10,  11,  12  and  13).  It  is  a  reciprocal  system  requiring  countries  to  exchange 
authorisations  before  permitting  shipments  of  firearms,  their  parts  and  components  and 
ammunition  to  arrive  in,  leave,  or  transit  their  territory.  Customs  administrations  have  an 
important  role in helping  to  identify  and prevent the illicit movement  and supply of  firearms 
around the world. 

There  are  a  number  of  important  regional  agreements  relating  to  SALW  and  firearms,  in  the 
Americas,  East,  West  and  Southern  Africa.  The  Organisation  for  Security  Cooperation  in 
Europe (OSCE) is of most direct relevance for the EU. It plays an important  role in combating 
illicit arms  trafficking in its  52  member  countries.  By  adopting  the OSCE  Documents  on Small 
Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition, as well as Forum 
for Security Cooperation (FSC) Decision 15/02, the OSCE participating States are committed to 
ensure effective controls of SALW and ammunition. The OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation 
also  agreed  to  provide  assistance  with  collection,  destruction, 
improving  stockpile 
management and security. 

The Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, adopted in 2000, contains a wide range of 
norms,  principles  and  measures  relating  to  the  production,  transfer,  storage,  collection  or 
seizure,  and  destruction  of  weapons.  The  Document  obliges  participating  states  to  disclose 
their  annual  imports  and  exports  of  SALW,  as  well  as  the  numbers  of  small  arms  seized  and 
destroyed. The Document is supplemented by FSC decisions regulating related matters, such as 
SALW export controls. Most recently,  the FSC adopted a Plan of Action on SALW that fosters 
the  full  implementation  of  SALW-related  commitments  as  well  as  encouraging  further 
development of norms, measures and principles to prevent the proliferation of illicit SALW. 

2.7.2  Cooperation within the EU to combat illicit firearms trafficking 

In  terms  of  EU  level  cross-border  cooperation  to  stop  illegal  possession  and  circulation  of 
firearms, an operational action76 has been devised by firearms and customs experts in Member 
States and Europol. This plan includes: 

75 The INTERPOL Illicit Arms Records and tracing Management System (iARMS) is the first centralized 
system  for  reporting  and  querying  lost,  stolen,  trafficked  and  smuggled  firearms.  The  system  allows 
authorised users to query the iARMS database and instantly determine whether the firearm they seized has 
been reported to INTERPOL by another member country. It also assists member countries by providing 
an  enhanced  tracing  system  and  enables  countries  to  statistically  chart  their  requests  and  responses  for 
international assistance. 

76 This will also form a part of wider cooperation in the EU’s 7th customs-police cooperation action plan. 

                                                 
Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Firearms Trafficking in the EU 

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Problem Definition 

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 

 

 

 

Coordinated collection and sharing of information on firearms crime involving police, 
border guards and custom authorities both within Member States and across borders; 

Police control operations to tackle the principal sources and routes of illegal firearms, 
including the Western Balkans and assessing the risk of arms trafficking across the EU’s 
eastern border and from North Africa; 

Encouraging concerted follow-up to firearms-related alerts on the second generation 
Schengen Information System to ensure that the number of unresolved alerts does not 
continue to rise; and 

A programme of joint police customs operations under the direction of Member 
States and Europol and with the participation of the Commission to identify the risk of 
firearms being trafficked by passenger movements across Member States. 

The  Commission  and  the  Council  with  Europol  will  monitor  the  effectiveness  of  these 
operational  activities.  The  EU  Internal  Security  Fund  will  be  deployed  in  support  of  the 
implementation of actions under the policy cycle for 2014-17.77 

Cooperation  on  illicit  arms  trafficking  is  mainly  based  on  instruments  such  as  the  Schengen 
Convention, the Naples II Convention  and the Convention  on  Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters as well as the 2010 European Action Plan, sets out a number of actions and indicators 
to  combat  illegal  trafficking  in  heavy  firearms.  Information  sharing  instruments  for  Member 
States  include  the  Customs  Information  System  (CIS)  and  the  Schengen  Information  System 
(SIS) and its database on stolen firearms. These systems are not, however, specifically designed 
for information on illicit firearms and there is no single database for records on seized firearms 
unless national authorities use the iARMS INTERPOL system (there is no information about its 
use by Member States).  

More  generally,  because  EU  Member  States  that  belong  to  the  Schengen  area  have  a 
commitment to open borders, this can make it more difficult to control the movement of illicit 
firearms.  Indeed,  the  intra-EU  dimension  could  be  considered  as  the  weakest  link  in  the  EU 
security architecture.   However,  the EU has  developed  in recent  years  a  common  framework 
consisting of risk criteria and IT systems for managing risks relating to the movement of goods 
crossing the EU external border as part of the commercial supply chain. The Commission has 
recently highlighted the challenges in risk management faced by EU customs authorities, and 
has  made  several  proposals  for  improving  customs  capabilities  including  better  use  of 
information,  data  sources  and  other  tools  and  procedures  for  pinpointing risks  and  analysing 
commercial supply chain movements78.  

77 COM(2011) 753 final, Proposal for a Regulation establishing, as part of the Internal Security Fund, the 
instrument for financial support for police cooperation, preventing and combating crime, and crisis 
management . 

78 Commission communication on Customs Risk Management and Security of the Supply Chain, 

COM(2012) 793. 

       43 

 
 
 
                                                 
At the operational level, the European Firearms Experts group (EFE)79 provides expertise in the 
field of illicit trafficking in firearms. This expert group is responsible for the EU Firearms Threat 
Assessment, which focuses on issues such as international firearms trafficking and distribution 
within EU States, the criminal use of firearms and the response by law enforcement authorities 
across  the  EU.  In  2010,  the  EFE  adopted  an  action  plan  to  facilitate  tracing  and  cooperation 
against  firearms  trafficking.80  Member  States  and  the  Commission,  on  the  basis  of  Europol's 
2013  EU  Serious  and  Organised  Crime  Threat  Assessment,  have  made  the  disruption  of  illicit 
manufacturing and  trafficking  in  firearms  one  of  the  EU's  nine law  enforcement priorities  for 
2014-17.81 

Europol  serves  as  a  EU  centre  of  law  enforcement  expertise.  Over  the  years  it  has  built  up 
experience in fighting drug trafficking, illicit immigration networks and trafficking in arms and 
human beings, illicit vehicle trafficking, cybercrime, money laundering and forgery of money. In 
2014,  Europol  established  a  focal  point  illicit  trafficking  in  firearms,  to  provide  strategic  and 
operational support to ongoing investigations. Within the EU policy cycle, Member States and 
relevant  EU  agencies  identify  specific  priorities  in  the  complex  area  of  illicit  arms  trafficking. 
Based on political guidelines, law enforcement officers can then  tailor their operational work 
nationally,  regionally  and  locally  to  address  new  trends  in  trafficking.  Eurojust's  competence 
covers  the  same  types  of  crime  and  offences  for  which  Europol  has  competence  including 
combating  cross-border  arms  trafficking.  Both  of  these  EU  level  organisations  assist  in 
investigations and prosecutions at the request of a Member State. 

The  European  Agency  for  the  Management  of  Operational  Cooperation  at  the  External 
Borders  of  the  Member  States  of  the  European  Union  (Frontex)  was  set  up  in  2004  to 
reinforce  and  streamline  cooperation  between  national  border  authorities.  In  pursuit  of  this 
goal,  Frontex  has  several  operational  areas  that  are  defined  in  the  founding  Frontex 
Regulation82 and a subsequent amendment83. These areas of activity include: Joint Operations, 

79 European Firearms Expert Group was established in 2004 to facilitate exchange of information and to 
promote cooperation fighting illegal arms trading and possession. It supports the Law Enforcement 
Working  Party  of  the  Council  and  includes  firearms  experts  from  each  EU  Member  State,  from 
Europol and from associate members Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey. 

80  Council  Recommendation  on  a  standard  procedure  in  Member  States  for  cross-border  enquiries  by 
police authorities in investigating supply channels for seized or recovered crime-related firearms, 12 
and 13 June 2007; Council Conclusions on a European Action Plan to combat illegal trafficking in so 
called “heavy” firearms which could be used or are used in criminal activities, December 2010. 
81 In 2010, the EU established a multi-annual policy cycle on the fight against serious international and 
organised crime in order to ensure effective cooperation between Member States law enforcement 
agencies, EU Institutions, EU Agencies and relevant third parties and to deliver coherent and robust 
operational  action  targeting  the  most  pressing  criminal  threats  facing  the  EU.  The  first  full  policy 
cycle runs from 2014-7, following the 2013 serious and organised crime threat assessment and the 
definition  of  a  multiannual  strategic  plan  (in  July  2013)  and  an  operational  action  plan  (October 
2013);  Council  conclusions  on  the  creation  and  implementation  of  a  EU  policy  cycle  for  organised 
and serious international crime, 3043rd Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 8 and 9 
November 2010. 

82 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the 
Management  of  Operational  Cooperation  at  the  External  Borders  of  the  Member  States  of  the 
European Union. 

83  REGULATION  (EU)  No  1168/2011  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT  AND  OF  THE  COUNCIL  of  25 
October 2011amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for 

                                                 
Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Firearms Trafficking in the EU 

Section 

Problem Definition 

  2 

Training,  strategic  and  operational  Risk  Analyses,  Research,  providing  a  rapid  response 
capability,  Assisting  Member  States  in  joint  return  operations,  providing  an  Information 
systems  and  information  sharing  environment.  Frontex  liaises  closely  with  other  EU  entities 
such as the European Police College (CEPOL). CEPOL's mission is to bring together senior police 
officers from police forces in Europe - to support the development of a network and encourage 
cross-border  cooperation  in  the  fight  against  crime,  public  security  and  law  and  order  by 
organising training activities and research findings notably through tailored trainings aiming to 
disseminate  good  practices,  enhance  expertise  and  foster  standardisation  of  protocols 
facilitating police cooperation. 

The  EU  agencies  provide  an  overall  framework  for  coordinating  actions  relating  to  law 
enforcement  and  customs,  judicial  systems  and  training  of  police  officers.  At  one  of  the 
workshops  organised  by  CSES  to  discuss  the  study,  there  was  some  criticism  expressed  by 
participating  national  officials  that  the  EU  agencies  could  do  more  to  support  national 
authorities.    As  part  of  the  EU  policy  cycle  CEPOL  is  developing  a  common  curricula  on  illicit 
trafficking. 

In the field of EU judicial cooperation there are also developments that could help combat illicit 
firearms  trafficking.  This  includes  the  recently  adopted  European  Investigation  Order  (EIO). 
The  EIO  replaces  the  existing  legal  framework  applicable  to  the  gathering  and  transfer  of 
evidence between the Member States. It involves a procedure that would allow an authority in 
one Member State (the "issuing authority") to request specific criminal investigative measures 
to be carried out by an authority in another Member State (the "executing authority"). 

The EIO contained several significant innovations over existing procedures. Firstly, it focuses on 
the investigative measure to be executed, rather than on the type of evidence to be gathered. 
The EIO also has a broad scope – all investigative measures are covered, except those explicitly 
excluded. Clear time limits are provided for the recognition and, with more flexibility, for the 
execution of the EIO. The proposal also innovates by providing the legal obligation to execute 
the EIO with the same celerity and priority as for a similar national case.  The EIO could be used 
by national judicial authorities in illicit firearms trafficking cases and should, in theory, facilitate 
cross-border cooperation although it is still too early to assess any practical experience.  

2.7.3 

Existing Cross Border Cooperation 

Although the overwhelming majority of those participating in the CSES survey did not feel able 
to  express  an  opinion  on  this  issue,  those  that  did  answer  a  question  on  cross-border 
cooperation indicated that it is currently of somewhat limited effectiveness. 

the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the 
European Union 

       45 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
Table 2.7: To what extent is cross-border police cooperation effective? 

Options 
Large extent  
Some extent 
Neutral 
Small extent 
No extent (not effective at all) 
Don’t know or no answer 
Total 

Source: CSES survey 

Nº 

% 

0 
11 
1 
4 
0 
74 
90 

0.0 
12.2 
1.1 
4.4 
0.0 
82.2 
100.0 

For a number of reasons, it is not possible to gain a comprehensive overview of existing cross-
border  cooperation  between  national  authorities  responsible  for  combating  illicit  firearms 
trafficking. However, feedback from the research (in particular, the three ‘regional’ workshops 
and the interview programme) suggests that:  

 

There is often a close working relationship between senior officials in the law 
enforcement agencies of different Member States and there are many examples of 
successful cross-border collaboration to combat illicit firearms trafficking, often 
depending substantially on the quality of networks and contacts between particular 
officers and enforcement agencies; 

 

However, that said, there are also problems with cross-border collaboration:  

- 

There is sometimes a lack of information sharing between the authorities, the 
quality of which often depends greatly on ad-hoc networks and working contacts 
between particular states and agencies;  

-  Differences in the legal frameworks applicable to illicit firearms, e.g. with regard 
to which weapons are classified as illegal, can make cooperation to investigate 
particular cases difficult;  

- 

- 

Similarly, differences in judicial procedures between one country and another can 
cause complications, e.g. problems in obtaining the agreement of a prosecutor to 
allow an investigation in their country;  

Lack of expertise and resources available to law enforcement agencies in some 
countries, and the need to prioritize purely domestic cases, can have a negative 
effect on cooperation with the authorities from another Member States. 

Some examples from our research of these factors are provided below: 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Firearms Trafficking in the EU 

Section 

Problem Definition 

  2 

Examples of complications in cooperation to tackle cross-border firearms trafficking relating 
to administrative factors and lack of capacity 

 

 

 

Cooperation between law enforcement agencies is sometimes made more difficult not 
just by different laws but also by different judicial procedures, e.g. deciding on the 
competent jurisdiction and prosecutor. A further complication is that enquiries from 
another country are sometimes given less priority than purely domestic cases. The 
authorities in Austria, for example, had difficulties obtaining authorization for a 
controlled delivery of illicit firearms in Belgium because of problems in finding a 
prosecutor there to take on the case.  

A similar situation occurred with a controlled delivery of RPGs to France that had been 
transported through Slovenia. To authorize the operation, the French prosecutor 
wanted the RPGs to be delivered in their original packaging (reflecting national 
legislation that did not allow replacement of the items of the packaging for a control 
delivery) whereas the Slovenian authorities wanted to unpack the weapons to have 
them photographed for evidence purposes. Because of the insistence of the French 
prosecutor, the controlled delivery could not be organised.  Bureaucratic delays can also 
hinder cross-border cooperation. An operation involving the authorities in Bosnia, 
Slovenia, Italy and Spain, again involving a controlled delivery, could not proceed 
because the Spanish authorities, in particular the judicial authorities, took over a week 
to respond to initial requests for cooperation by which time the opportunity to 
undertake the operation had passed. 

In a number of newer EU Member States, for example, Slovenia, lack of capacity is a 
constraint on being able to collaborate with colleagues from other countries to pursue 
investigations.  In particular, there is a need to develop personnel with the specialized 
know-how and skills to handle firearms issues. Many police officers (the exact number is 
not known) have benefited from the FBI Academy’s courses and training activities run by 
CEPOL but there is scope for this type of capacity building to be further developed. 

Notwithstanding  the  examples  cited  earlier  where  cross-border  cooperation  to  tackle  illicit 
firearms  trafficking  has  proved  difficult,  there  are  also  many  examples  of  successful  cross-
border cooperation:  

Examples of successful cooperation between EU Member States to tackle                                 

cross-border firearms trafficking 

In October 2013 the National Crime Agency (NCA) in the  UK concluded an investigation (NCA 
Operation GUSTFUL) into a UK-based Organised Crime Group, which was importing drugs and 
law 
weapons 
enforcement authorities successfully cooperate to tackle cross-border illicit firearms trafficking 
as  it  involved  5  search  warrants  executed  in  UK,  coordinated  searches  being  undertaken  in 
Germany, 1 arrest made in the UK, 4 in the Netherlands and 6 firearms seized.  

into  the  UK  from  The  Netherlands.  The  operation  demonstrated  how 

The German customs approached the UK’s Serious Organised Crime Agency (now the National 
Crime Agency) after detecting handguns and ammunition in a parcel destined for an address in 
the UK. SOCA carried out a controlled delivery of the parcel and arrested the recipient whilst 
upstream enquiries with German law enforcement ascertained the identity of the consignor. In 
addition  to  a  cannabis  charge,  the  recipient  of  the  firearms  was  convicted  on  two  counts  of 

       47 

 
 
 
conspiracy to import firearms under and two counts of conspiracy to import ammunition. He 
was  sentenced  to  a  total  of  eight  years’  imprisonment  (six  for  the  firearms  and  2  for  the 
ammunition). 

In Slovenia, the authorities have faced situations involving the transhipment of firearms from 
the former conflict areas in the Western Balkans to other EU Member States and where they 
have  been  asked  for  help  in  tracking  down  those  responsible  for  trafficking  activities.  In 
general,  cross-border  collaboration  works  well.  For  example,  earlier  this  year  the  Swedish 
police intercepted a consignment of automatic weapons that were being transported in a box 
that had been placed on a bus traveling from a town in Bosnia to Malmo. The consignment was 
not  accompanied  by  a  passenger.  Investigations  were  undertaken  at  the  request  of  the 
Swedish  police  by  the  Austrian,  Croatian  and  Slovenian  authorities  but  no  clear  picture 
emerged  regarding  the  incident  and  the  identity  of  the  arms  traffickers  remains  unknown. 
However, it is thought that an organised crime gang in Malmo was responsible and that they 
had probably asked a Bosnian citizen living in Sweden who travels home frequently to place the 
weapons on the bus.  

In  2007,  Finland  and  Russia  signed  a  Protocol  on  Intensifying  Crime  Prevention  Activities 
between the Finnish and Russian border guard authorities. This Protocol has fostered excellent 
cooperation  between  the  customs  authorities  of  the  two  countries.  Many  border  incidents 
have  been  solved  between  border  professionals  without  the  need  for  intergovernmental 
procedures. This Protocol has even been recognised in the EU as a good practice for organising 
border guard cooperation with the Union’s neighbouring countries. 

Baltic States Example – Successful combat against converting gas (alarm) pistols (revolvers) 

Until 1 March 2011, gas (alarm) pistols (revolvers) as well as revolvers of small power were not 
registered with the Lithuanian police. Thus, every person over 18 could purchase and carry gas 
(alarm) and small power handguns without checking his/her reputation. Until 
about 
6,000  gas  (alarm)  pistols  (revolvers)  and  revolvers  of  small  power  were  sold  every  year  in 
Lithuania.  Weapons  were  purchased  legally  from  the  licensed  dealers.  The  lack  of  control  on 
gas (alarm) firearms and no requirements for the person‘s reputation to be checked, made gas 
(alarm) pistols (revolvers) very popular among criminals. The purposes for purchasing so many 
weapons could be converting them to firearms with live fire ammunition and selling them to 
illegal market.   

2011, 

From  2000  till  2008,  the  Lithuanian  Police  Forensic  Science  Centre  carried  out  45  examinations  of 
converted  pistols  “IZH-78-9”.  Lithuania  prohibited  the  import  of  gas  pistol  “IZH-78-9”  from  16 
January 2007. However, such a measure did not have the expected impact. Criminals started to 
convert other types of gas (alarm) weapons. From 2008 till 2013, the Lithuanian Police Forensic 
Science  Centre  examined  113  other  converted  gas  (alarm)  weapons.  Moreover,  from  2009 
criminals started to use some models of traumatic revolvers without any conversion, by using 
rubber or lead bullets with 9 mm Knall cartridges. For example, the revolver “ME38 Compact 
G”  was  very  often  used  in  Lithuania.  The  Lithuanian  Police  Forensic  Science  Centre  carried  out 
examination  of  revolvers  ME38  Compact  G,  from  2008  till  1  July  2013  seized  93  times.  Lithuania 
prohibited the import of gas revolvers Olympic 38 and traumatic revolvers ME38 Compact G 
from 15 June 2010. 

Verifications  of  some  examples  of  gas  (alarm)  weapons  consignments  at  the  time  of  their 
import  into  Lithuania  were  established  as  well.  Checking  was  applied  to  those  models  of  gas 
(alarm)  weapons,  which  were  brought  into  Lithuania  for  the  first  time.  It  was  checked  if  the 
new model of gas (alarm) weapon meets the requirements for gas (alarms) weapons.   This 

 
Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Firearms Trafficking in the EU 

Section 

Problem Definition 

  2 

control  wasn’t  effective  due  to  the  fact  that  manufacturers  very  often  used  to  change  the 
construction of the gas (alarm) weapon without changing its name. Thus, Lithuania had many 
situations  when  at  first  the  same  model  of  gas  (alarm)  weapon  met  the  requirements  for 
gas/alarm weapons, but another consignment of the same model of gas (alarm) weapons did 
not  meet  these  requirements.  According  to  our  practice,  every  gas  (alarm)  firearm  could  be 
converted or used without conversion as the real one. 

The control mechanism for gas (alarm) weapons applied in Lithuania from 2007 till 2011 was 
not effective and the police had to seek for new ways and means to control circulation of gas 
(alarm)  weapons.    It  was  decided  to  establish  a  simple  procedure  of  registration  of  gas 
(alarm)  weapons  and  to  start  checking  the  reputation  of  every  person  who  is  going  to 
purchase  a  gas  (alarm)  weapon  before  issuing  the  permit  to  purchase  it.    This  decision  was 
made,  because  it’s  a  person  who  is  responsible  for  pulling  the  trigger.  Not  a  single  gun  can 
shoot by itself. 

The new legal regulation came into force since the 1st March, 2011. According to the new legal 
regulation, it is required to register gas (alarm) pistols (revolvers) as well as revolvers of small 
power.  Only a person, who meets all requirements of the Law, can purchase, store and carry 
gas  (alarm)  weapon.  Requirements  applied  for  a  person  reputation  are  the  same  as  for 
possession of conventional firearms. Gas (alarm) pistols (revolvers) as well as revolvers of small 
power could be acquired and possessed by natural persons only upon getting the permit from 
the police. Possessors of gas (alarm) weapons, who acquired such weapons until 1 March 2011, 
must register them at the police stations until 1 January 2014. 

From 1 March 2011 till 1 February 2014, the Lithuanian police registered more than 35,000 gas 
(alarm)  pistols  (revolvers)  and  revolvers  of  small power.  After  the  registration  procedure  for 
these  types  of  firearms  was  established,  the  demand  for  gas  alarm  weapons  decreased  by 
ten  times.  In  2010  it  was  sold  6850  gas  (alarm)  weapons  (single  person  could  purchase 
uncontrolled  number  of  such  weapons).  In  2012  only  691  pistols  (revolvers)  were  sold, 
therefore  it  can  be  stated,  that  purchasing  of  gas  (alarm)  weapons  for  converting  them  to 
conventional firearms and selling to illegal market reduced significantly. 

To  be  effective,  any  measures  to  combat  illicit  firearms  trafficking  should  include  capacity-
building  support  to  third  countries.  Because  of  the  earlier  civil  war,  Bosnia  is  an  important 
source of illicit firearms (during the first 9 months of 2013, 5,094  illicit weapons were seized) 
and  there  is  close  cooperation  with  the  State  Investigation  and  Protection  Agency  (SIPA)  to 
help tackle the problem.  Carrying out investigations in Bosnia can be very difficult because of 
the  fragmented  administrative  and  judicial  picture.  Differences  between  the  law  on  firearms 
trafficking (e.g. on how possession is treated) at a federal level and the law in force in the 11 
cantons can make it difficult to pursue investigations. There can also be complications caused 
by uncertainty over which courts and prosecutors within Bosnia have the competence to deal 
with investigations and cases.  A national strategy group has been set up to tackle these and 
other problems. 

2.8 

Summary – Problem definition 

       49 

 
 
 
 
 
The  nature  and  scale  of  illicit  firearms  trafficking  in  the  EU  is  difficult  reliably  to  assess 
quantitatively  given  the  hidden  nature  of  the  problem.  The  two  basic  approaches  we  have 
used  –  a  broader  indicator  based  on  the  number  of  unregistered  firearms  and  a  narrower 
measure  based  on  firearms  seizures  –  give  very  widely  differing  estimates:  67  million 
unregistered firearms in the EU or 79% of the 81 million total licit and illicit firearms; seizures 
are estimated to account for around 1% or 81,000 of the total. The first of these is likely to be 
very  much  an  overestimate  of  the  quantity  of  illicit  firearms  whilst  the  second  calculation  is 
almost certainly an underestimate.  The number of lost and stolen firearms registered in the SIS 
II also provides indication of their availability and transfer. Together these provide a range of 
estimates, within which the actual quantities almost certainly lie. 

A central problem with the approaches used to estimate the scale of illicit firearms trafficking 
is that they involve data (i.e. number of registered vs unregistered firearms, number of illicit 
firearms seizures over a five year period) that are only collected by some EU Member States. 
Even where  data is collected, there are considerable limitations. For example, some Member 
States  have  different  legal  definitions  and  employ  different  law  enforcement  authorities  to 
address  internal  and  cross-border  firearms  trafficking  (the  proposed  Firearms  Contact  Points 
could  help  resolve  this  problem).  In  this  regard  the  development  of  Europol  and  Eurojust’s 
roles  as  central  repositories  for  information  exchange  and  judicial  cooperation  could  be 
important  in  developing  better  monitoring  data  and  a  better  understanding  of  illicit  firearms 
trafficking. 

The  wide  range  of  possible  estimates  highlighted  in  Section  2.2  underlines  the  conclusion 
that the scale of illicit firearms trafficking cannot be accurately estimated and quantified on 
the  basis  of  presently-available  data.  Notwithstanding  the  methodological  complications  in 
measuring  the  phenomenon,  most  of  the  literature  suggests  however  that  illicit  arms 
trafficking  takes  place  on  a  considerable  scale:  a  judgment  endorsed  by  practitioners  and 
representatives  of  relevant  national  enforcement  agencies.  In  many  respects  the  most 
appropriate  indicator  to  use  to  highlight  the  problem  of  the  illicit  firearms  trafficking  is  the 
number of firearms-related homicides (some 1,200 p.a. in addition to which there are around 
4,000 firearms-related suicides). In addition, there are many firearms-related injuries. Although 
the precise number cannot be quantified, there are likely to be long-term consequences for the 
well-being of the individuals concerned. 

Turning  to  the  consequences  of  the  problem,  illicit  firearms  trafficking  has  been  directly 
responsible  for  at  least  10,000  firearms-related  deaths  in  EU  Member  States  over  the  past 
decade. Some other estimates (e.g. by the UNODC) put the deaths at a higher level than this. In 
addition  to  murders  committed  by  individuals,  illegally-held  firearms  are  often  used  by 
organised  crime  groups  to  coerce  and  to  intimidate  their  victims.  Moreover,  the  use  of  illicit 
firearms  in  organised  crime  activities  such  as  drug  trafficking,  prostitution,  and  money 
laundering  leads  to  further  deaths  (e.g.  from  drugs  use).  Terrorists  and  extremists  have  also 
used firearms to carry out attacks. 

In  terms  of  the  drivers  of  illicit  firearms  trafficking,  a  distinction  can  be  made  between 
demand-side and supply-side drivers, i.e. the factors that explain why there is a problem.  On 
the  demand-side,  end  users  are  criminal  or  terrorist  individuals  and  groups  procure  firearms 
illegally  to  use  in  the  pursuit  of  their  goals.  On  the  supply  side,  traffickers  and  other 
intermediaries are involved in the trafficking of firearms either for profit or some other reason 
(e.g. the intermediaries may be part of the same criminal or terrorist group as the end users. In 
some cases it could be that the intermediaries are unaware of their role. Lastly, the suppliers 
themselves  are  individuals  and  organisations  that  provide  a  source  of  illicit  firearms  (either 
likely  to  be  motivated  by  financial 
intentionally  or  unintentionally)  who  are  again 

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Problem Definition 

  2 

considerations.  There  are  other  relevant  problem  ‘enablers’  including  differences  in  legal 
frameworks,  administrative  and  judicial  procedures,  and  the  capacities  of  law  enforcement 
agencies in different EU Member States, which means that the problem cannot be effectively 
tackled.  

The  main  sources  of  illicit  weapons  within  the  EU  are  the  reactivation  of  neutralised 
weapons,  burglaries  and  thefts,  embezzlement  of  legal  arms,  legal  arms  sold  in  the  illegal 
market,  firearms retired from service  by army  or police, and the conversion of gas pistols. 
Most illicit firearms originate from cross-border trafficking, often as noted above from outside 
the EU. Since the early 1990s, the firearms illicitly trafficked have originated from three main 
sources  that  have  replaced  each  other:  first  of  all  the  former  Soviet  Union  and  Warsaw  Pact 
bloc because a source of illicit firearms following the collapse of the iron curtain; then, during 
the  wars  of  Yugoslav  succession,  the  Western  Balkans  became  an  important  source  of  illicit 
firearms; and more recently, North Africa has superseded the former, with a pool of weapons 
available  and  following  some  of  the  main  drug  trafficking  routes  into  the  EU.  According  to 
Europol, the amount of heavy firearms and SALW in circulation in the EU seems to satisfy much 
of the demand at present and suppliers in south-eastern Europe have the capacity to meet any 
rise in demand in the foreseeable future. 

As  Section  2.6  shows,  there  is  already  considerable  cross-border  cooperation  between  EU 
Member  States  and  their  law  enforcement  agencies  to  combat  illicit  firearms  trafficking. 
Whilst there are many examples of successful operations to intercept weapons before they can 
be  used,  there  are  also  cases  where  police  and/or  judicial  cooperation  has  been  made  more 
difficult  because  of  differences  in  legal  frameworks  in  different  countries.  There  are  also 
significant  complications  to  tackling  cross-border  illicit  firearms  trafficking  of  a  non-legal 
nature.   

       51 

 
 
 
 
In this section we provide a comparative analysis of the legal frameworks in EU Member States that 
are used to combat illicit firearms trafficking. The analysis is supported by a number of comparative 
tables in the appendices.  

3.1 

Introduction  

We begin by examining the legal frameworks that are in place to help tackle the problem of illicit 
firearms trafficking in the EU Member States. The purpose is to help identify the scope for greater 
harmonisation  that  might,  in turn,  make it easier to  deal  with  cross-border  aspects  of  the  problem. 
This analysis covers the current legislation at both  EU and international level, as well as in Member 
States’ national laws. The key elements are: 

  Definition of offences and their impact on the enforcement of illicit firearms trafficking and 

related sanctions; 

 

Level and type of penalties and sanctions applicable to legal and natural persons;  

  Aggravating or mitigating circumstances and their impact on both the definition of illicit 

firearms trafficking and related sanctions; and the factor of negligence and degrees of intent.  

The context in which these elements are examined is the absence of EU-wide legislation criminalising 
illicit firearms trafficking and the resulting diversity of national laws in the EU. This has the potential 
to impede effective police and judicial cooperation in cross-border cases. Article 83 (1), the basis for 
any EU action in this area, provides for the possibility of a directive on minimum rules concerning the 
definition  of  criminal  offences  and  sanctions  in  the  area  of  illicit  firearms  trafficking  with  a  cross-
border dimension. 

The overview in Section 3.2 below summarises the current legislative framework at international and 
EU  level.  This  is  followed  at  Section  3.3  by  a  more  detailed  comparative  assessment  of  existing 
legislation  at  the  EU,  national  and  international  levels  (including  the  UN  Firearms  Protocol,  UNPoA, 
UNODC Model Law and the Arms Trade Treaty) relating to the abovementioned key elements of legal 
frameworks applicable to illicit firearms trafficking.   

3.2 

Current legislative framework at the international and EU levels 

We  begin  by  providing  an  overview  of  the  existing  international  and  EU  instruments  as  regards  the 
criminalisation  of  illicit  firearms  trafficking.  In  section  3.2.2  we  set  out  a  high-level  summary  of  the 
extent to which EU Member States are compliant with the UN standard on the provisional basis of the 
research  carried  out  for  the  study  to  date.  This  leads  to  a  more  detailed  comparative  analysis  in 
Section  3.3  of  national  legislation  related  to  illicit  arms  trafficking  and  the  possible  need  for  an  EU 
measure in this area notably based on possible identified good practices.    

3.2.1  Overview of existing international and EU frameworks 

UNPoA provides the main international framework agreement containing norms and obligations on a 
wide  range  of  issues  relevant  to  preventing  and  combating  illicit  firearms  trafficking.  It  is  however, 
politically  rather  than  legally  binding.  The  principal  legal  instruments  which  influence  or  could 
influence  (despite  incomplete  ratification  in  some  instances,  described  below)  EU  Member  States’ 
national laws on illicit firearms trafficking are the following: 

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 

 

 

 

UN Firearms Protocol (the “Protocol”);84  

Draft UN Arms Trade Treaty (“ATT”);  

UNODC Model Law85 (“Model Law”);  

Directive on the control of the acquisition and possession of weapons (91/477/EEC) as 
amended by Directive 2008/51/EC (the “Directive”), together with Regulation (EU) No 
258/2012.  

UN Firearms Protocol  

The  Protocol  was  adopted  in  May  2001  as  the  third  supplementary  Protocol  to  the  United  Nations 
Convention  against  Transnational  Organized  Crime  (the  “Convention”),  by  General  Assembly 
resolution  55/255.  The  Protocol  entered  into  force  on  3  July  2005.    It  aims  at  promoting  and 
strengthening  international  cooperation  and  developing  cohesive  mechanisms  to  prevent,  combat 
and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and 
ammunition.86  By  ratifying  or  acceding  to  the  Firearms  Protocol,  contracting  states  make  a 
commitment  to  adopt  and  implement  a  series  of  crime-control  measures  that  aim,  inter  alia,  at 
establishing as a criminal offence the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms in line with 
the Protocol's requirements and definitions.87  

UN Arms Trade Treaty  
The UN Arms Trade Treaty regulates the international trade in conventional arms.88 The definition of 
conventional  arms  is  given  at  Article  2  and  covers  a  wide  range  of  weaponry,  from  small  arms  to 
battle  tanks,  combat  aircraft  to  warships.  A  definition  of  “small  arms  and  light  weapons”  is  not 
included in the ATT. On 2 April 2013, the UN General Assembly adopted the ATT. However, it will not 
enter into force until it has been ratified or acceded to by 50 states;89 at the time of writing 114 states 
have signed the treaty, of which over 40 have so far ratified it.90 It is expected that it comes into force 
by the end of 2014.  

84 UN Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and 

Ammunition, adopted May 2001. 

85  UNODC,  Model  Law  against  the  Illicit  Manufacturing  of  and  Trafficking  in  Firearms,  Their  Parts  and 

Components and Ammunition, 2011. 

86 See Article 2 of the Firearms Protocol. 

87 http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/firearms-protocol/firearmsprotocol.html  

88 http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/.  

89 Arms Trade Treaty: Treaty Status. United Nations website, 4 June 2013. 

90 http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/.  

       53 

 
 
 
                                                 
Under  Article  6,  State  Parties  are  prohibited  from  authorising  any  transfer  of  conventional  arms 
covered under the treaty if that transfer would violate their international obligations, and in particular 
those  relating  to  the  transfer  of,  or  illicit  trafficking  in,  conventional  arms.  While  a  key  aim  of  the 
treaty is to promote and ensure responsible authorisation and control of conventional arms transfers 
by  states,  to  prevent  violations  of  UNSC  arms  embargoes  or  of  international  human  rights  and 
humanitarian laws, and to prevent and combat diversion of legal arms transfers into illicit markets or 
unauthorised  end-uses  and  end-users.  The  ATT  focuses  on  states  parties’  obligations  to  ensure 
responsible and effective controls on legal transfers of conventional arms, and thus to reduce sources 
of illicit or uncontrolled flows or arms. It does not directly cover illicit firearms traffickers who are not 
State  Parties.  In  other  words,  it  does  not  explicitly  address  the  criminalisation  of  illicit  firearms 
trafficking among individuals or criminal organisations operating independently of any state who is 
a  signatory  to  the  treaty.  The  ATT  is  thus  relevant  to  this  study  but  does  not  provide  an  adequate 
source of legal obligations and regulations to address the main concerns of this study. 

UNODC Model Law  

The final UN instrument is the Model Law developed in 2011 by the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC). This was in response to the request of the General Assembly to the Secretary-
General to promote and assist the efforts of Member States to become party to and implement the 
United  Nations  Convention  against  Transnational  Organized  Crime  and  the  Protocols  thereto 
(including  the  Firearms  Protocol).  It  was  developed  in  particular  to  assist  States  in  implementing  a 
legislative  regime  consistent  with  the  provisions  contained 
in  the  UN  Firearms  Protocol, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. 

The Model Law is divided into three parts: 

Overview of UN Model Law provisions 

 

 

 

 

Part One (Introductory provisions) contains Model Law text on the introductory provisions and 
definitions States may choose to include in their domestic legislation. Terms used in the Firearms 
Protocol are included in the definitions. Additionally, draft definitions are suggested for other terms 
used in the present Model Law. This section includes definitions of ‘firearms’ and ‘illicit firearms 
trafficking’ that follow those included in the Protocol. 

Part Two (Mandatory provisions) contains Model Law text on all the mandatory provisions of the 
Firearms Protocol that States are required to ensure are included in their domestic legislation. This 
includes chapters on preventive measures aimed at regulating the manufacturing, marking, record-
keeping and international transfers of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition. The 
mandatory penal provisions that derive from the preventive measures and the mandatory 
international cooperation measures are also included in chapters in this part. This section includes 
model provisions on the criminalisation of illicit firearms trafficking pursuant to the general 
provisions in the Protocol. It also contains commentary on the position in the Convention, 
Protocol and Model Law as regards penalties and sanctions (including their applicability to legal 
persons), mens rea requirement and the existence of aggravated offences.  

Part Three (Non-mandatory provisions) elaborates inter alia on provisions in the Firearms Protocol 
on brokers and brokering activities that States are required to consider for inclusion in their national 
legislation.  This section is out of the direct scope of the study.  

Annex I (Additional considerations) contains other provisions that States can also consider for 
inclusion in their national legislation. These provisions are included to assist States in developing 
comprehensive legislation on various aspects of firearms regulation. These suggestions stem from 
other international instruments and national practice. This section includes suggestions for 

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optional firearms-related offences which a State can also consider for inclusion in their national 
legislation. 

EU legislation 

The  key  legislation  at  EU  level  is  Directive  91/477/EEC,  as  amended,  and  Regulation  (EU)  No 
258/2012.  The  preamble  to  Directive  91/477/EEC  includes  the  following  rationale  and  aims  for  this 
instrument: 

 

 

Mutual confidence will be improved if the abolition of controls on the possession of 
weapons at intra-Community frontiers is underpinned by partially harmonised legislation. It 
would therefore be useful to determine the category of firearms whose acquisition and 
possession by private persons are to be prohibited, or subject to authorisation or 
declaration. 

Passing from one Member State to another while in possession of a weapon should, in 
principle, be prohibited, and derogation from this is only acceptable if a procedure is 
adopted that enables Member States to be notified that a firearm is to be brought into their 
territory (the ‘European firearms pass’).   

In turn, the preamble to Directive 2008/51/EC91 provides that, not least in light of the Commission 
having signed the UN Arms Protocol on behalf of the EU in 2002, notions of illicit manufacturing and 
trafficking  of  firearms,  their  parts  and  ammunition,  as  well  as  the  notion  of  tracing,  should  be 
defined for the purposes of Directive 91/477/EEC. Definitions of “firearms” and “illicit trafficking” are 
accordingly included in the amended Article 1 of Directive 91/477/EEC and these are modelled on the 
definitions found in the Protocol. A general provision on sanctions for infringements of national rules 
adopted pursuant to the Directive is set out in the revised Article 16. 

More  recently,  Regulation  (EU)  No  258/2012  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  14 
March  2012  implements  Article  10  of  the  Protocol  (this  covers  general  requirements  for  export, 
import, and transit licensing or authorisation systems). Recital 16 of the Regulation, like Article 16 of 
Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended, provides that Member States should lay down rules on penalties 
applicable  to  infringements  of  the  Regulation92  and  ensure  that  they  are  implemented,  and  those 
penalties should be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. 

Appendix  A  summarises  how,  if  at  all,  existing  international  and  EU  law  prescribe  national  legal 
frameworks  in  the  area  of  illicit  firearms  trafficking.  It  is  clear  that  there  are  closely  overlapping 
definitions  of  ‘firearms’  and  ‘illicit  firearms  trafficking’  in  the  Protocol,  Model  Law  and  Directive 
91/477/EEC, as amended – though in both cases the Protocol definition is slightly wider than the EU 
definition  (for  the  former  because  there  is  no  blanket  prohibition  on  categorising  post-1899 
weapons as ‘antique weapons’ in the Directive, and for the latter because the conducts of importing 

91 See Preamble 6. 

92 Or relevant national legislation, in the case of Article 16 of Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended. 

       55 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
and exporting are not included in the EU trafficking definition). The important question of whether 
the  EU  definitions  should  be  modified  or  amplified  as  part  of  any  EU  legislative  initiative  on  illicit 
firearms trafficking will be considered at Section 4. The ATT meanwhile refers to ‘small arms and light 
weapons’ without defining these terms.  

The  Protocol  is  vague  on  the  criminalisation  of  illicit  firearms  trafficking,  and  criminalisation  is  not 
covered at all by the Directive (or ATT). However, the Model Law provides the following suggested 
provisions criminalising illicit firearms trafficking: 

Model Law – Illicit firearms trafficking offences 

Article 34. Transnational transfers without legal authorization 

1. Every person who [specify level of intent, as appropriate] imports, exports or otherwise acquires, sells, 
delivers,  moves  or  transfers  any  firearm  or  its  parts  and  components  or  ammunition  from  or  across  the 
territory  of  [name  of State]  to  another State  without  legal authorization  [a  licence]  issued  in  accordance 
with [name of this Law] commits an offence. 

2.  A  person  guilty  of  an  offence  under  paragraph  1  of  this  article  shall  upon  conviction  be  subject  to 
[imprisonment for ...] and/or [a fine of/up to ...] [a fine of the ... category]. 

Article 35. Transnational transfers of unmarked/improperly marked firearms 

1. Every person who [specify level of intent, as appropriate] imports, exports or otherwise acquires, sells, 
delivers,  moves or  transfers any  firearm  from or  across  the  territory of  [name of State]  to  another State 
that  have  not been  marked at  the  time  of  manufacture,  at  the  time  of  import  or  at the  time  of  transfer 
from government stocks to civilian use in accordance with chapter IV of this Law commits an offence. 

2.  A  person  guilty  of  an  offence  under  paragraph  1  of  this  article  shall  upon  conviction  be  subject  to 
[imprisonment for ...] and/or [a fine of/up to ...] [a fine of the ... category]. 

The model UN provisions set out above are designed to assist national legislators in implementing the 
legal framework established by the Protocol (and consequently the Directive, whose definition of illicit 
firearms  trafficking  we  have  seen  closely  follows  that  of  the  Protocol).  As  such  they  are  an  obvious 
starting  point  for  provisions  on  illicit  firearms  trafficking  offences  in  any  EU  legal  instrument.    The 
inclusion  of  similar  or  identical  wording  to  Articles  34  and  35  in  a  possible  EU  measure  will  be 
considered further in Section 4 (policy options).  

In  relation  to  sanctions,  the  Firearms  Protocol  and  UNODC  Model  Law  generally  leave  these  to 
individual  states  to  determine,  while  the  Directive  makes  general  reference  to  Member  States 
laying down penalties that are effective, proportionate and dissuasive. (The ATT contains a general 
enforcement provision that does not refer expressly to penalties and sanctions.) Neither the ATT nor 
Directive covers the possible liability of legal as well as natural persons nor refers to aggravating or 
mitigating factors – though the Firearms Protocol and UNODC Model Law state that civil and criminal 
liability should attach to legal persons for “serious offences” (Article 2(b) of the Palermo Convention 
defines  a  ‘serious  crime’  as  meaning  ‘conduct  constituting  an  offence  punishable  by  a  maximum 
deprivation of  liberty  of  at  least four  years  or  a  more  serious  penalty’).    The possibility of negligent 
illicit  firearms  trafficking  is  not  addressed  by  the  Directive  or  ATT,  while  the  Firearms  Protocol  and 
UNODC Model Law only cover an offence of intent.   

Notwithstanding the provisions on the illicit firearms trafficking offence included in the Model Law, 
the  margin  of  discretion  afforded  to  Member  States  by  the  UN  and  EU  instruments  in  matters  of 

 
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criminalisation  and  the  related  elements  of  level  and  types  of  penalties  is  considerable  and  the 
monitoring  of  compliance  fairly  limited.  This  also  applies  to  provisions  on  the  liability  of  legal  and 
natural persons, existence in national laws of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, and the notions 
of intent and negligence. The margin of discretion in relation to these issues is a key factor accounting 
for  the  diverse  legal  frameworks  at  national  level.  Together  with  a  general  analysis  these  factors, 
which are in turn potential obstacles to effective police and judicial cooperation at the cross-border 
level, are examined in more detail in Section 3.3. 

3.2.2  Overview  of  Member  States’  compliance  with  UN  standard  for  criminalisation  of  illicit 

firearms trafficking 

Despite  the  existing  international  legal  framework  for  illicit  firearms  trafficking  described  in  Section 
3.2.1 there continue to be divergences at national level in the approach to defining the crime of illicit 
firearms trafficking and the possible sanctions. 

Below we set out a high-level summary of the more detailed comparative table founds at Appendix E. 
Member  States  are  grouped  according  to  their  compliance  with  the  UN  standard  as  regards  the 
criminalisation  of  illicit  firearms  trafficking.  The  stringency  of  Member  States’  national  legislative 
framework  for  the  various  elements  of  the  illicit  firearms  trafficking  offence  (including  definition  of 
‘firearms’, prohibition of illicit manufacturing, provisions in relation to marking, sanctions regime) are 
examined in detail at section 3.3.  

Table  3.2:  Criminalisation  of  illicit  firearms  trafficking:  Compliance  of  Member  States  with  UN 
standard 

Compliance of national illicit firearms trafficking 
prohibition with UN Protocol standard 

       No.  Member States 

Compliant 

Largely Compliant 

Partially Compliant 

Non-compliant 

Source: Legal fiches, CSES research 

8 

8 

5 

2 

BE, DE, EL, ES, FR,LV, PT, SI  

BG, CY, DK, HR, SK, UK, MT, RO 

AT, CZ, EE, LT, SE 

FI, IE 

Note  1: 
Information 
comment/clarification. 

in  Table  3.2  and  Appendix  E  has  been  sent  to  national  experts  for  their 

Note 2: Member  States are  deemed ‘largely  compliant’ where  only a single  element  (for  example,  relating  to 
marking of weapons or illicit manufacturing) of the firearms trafficking offence is missing in the national law. If 
more than one element appears absent, the Member States is deemed ‘partially compliant’. 

For  the  18  EU  jurisdictions  for  which  information  is  presently  available  a  clear  majority  are  either 
compliant  or  largely  compliant  with  the  UN  standard  as  established,  inter  alia,  in  Article  3  of  the 
Protocol.   

3.3 

Comparative assessment of national legislation relating to firearms trafficking 

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In  this  section  we  set  out  a  comparative  assessment  of  national  legislation  relating  to  firearms 
trafficking. The information here draws on the responses to our legal ‘fiches’ for each Member States, 
as  well  as  desk  research  such  as  the  Legal  Loopholes  Study93  and  other  Phase  II  material  such  as 
stakeholder  interviews  and  online  survey  responses.  As  noted  earlier,  for  the  purposes  of  this 
comparative assessment, Member States’ national laws relating to firearms trafficking are divided by 
the key elements of:  

 

Definition of offences and their impact on the enforcement of illicit firearms trafficking and 
related sanctions; 

 

Level and type of penalties and sanctions applicable to legal and natural persons;  

  Aggravating or mitigating circumstances and their impact on both the definition of illicit 

firearms trafficking and related sanctions, and the factor of negligence and degrees of intent.  

For  each  key  element,  we  begin  by  summarising  the  relevant  EU  and  international  legislation 
(including  the  UN  Firearms  Protocol  and  Arms  Trade  Treaty),  before  looking  at  the  common 
ground/areas  of  divergence  in  the  legislation  at  Member  State  level  and  the  potential  of  such 
divergences to inhibit effective police and judicial cooperation in cross-border cases. Having done this, 
in our discussion of the policy options at section 4 we will be in a position to make recommendations 
as  to  the  advisability  of  the  approximation  of  certain  offences  and  sanctions,  as  well  as  to  suggest 
specific provisions (such as illicit firearms trafficking offences based on Articles 34 and 35 of the Model 
Law). 

The source material for the analysis in this section are the legal fiches and stakeholder questionnaires 
compiled as part of the Phase II research programme, as well as the comparative tables  of national 
legislative definitions of ‘firearms’ and ‘illicit firearms trafficking’ at Appendix B and E of this report. 

3.3.1  Definition of offences and their impact on the enforcement of illicit firearms trafficking and 

related sanctions 

The  analysis  of  the  definition  of  illicit  firearms  trafficking  offences  is  a  fundamental  element  of  the 
legal  analysis  and  indeed  the  study  itself.  For  this  reason,  section  3.3.1  is  divided  into  three  sub-
sections dealing with the conducts identified in Article 5 of the Protocol. 

Article 5, UN Protocol 

1.  Each  State  Party  shall  adopt  such  legislative  and  other  measures  as  may  be  necessary  to  establish  as 
criminal offences the following conduct, when committed intentionally: 

(a) Illicit manufacturing of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition; 

(b) Illicit trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition; 

(c) Falsifying or illicitly obliterating, removing or altering the marking(s) on firearms required by article 8 of 
this Protocol. 

2. Each State Party shall also adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as 
criminal offences the following conduct: 

(a) Subject to the basic concepts of its legal system, attempting to commit or participating as an accomplice in 
an offence established in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article; and 

93  European  Firearms  Experts,  Study  of  loopholes  in  national  weapons  legislation  and  regulations  in  Europe, 

2011. 

                                                 
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(b) Organizing, directing, aiding, abetting, facilitating or counselling the commission of an offence established 
in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article. 

Thus,  there are  sub-sections  for  each of (i)  illicit firearms  trafficking  (ii) illicit  manufacturing and  (iii) 
the issue of marking (removing or altering serial numbers of other markings). The first sub-section on 
illicit trafficking is the most substantive of these, and will look at both the definition of 'firearms' and 
'illicit firearms trafficking'.  

 (i)    Definition of ‘illicit firearms trafficking’, including definition of ‘firearms’, in national legislation 

We begin with a comparative assessment of the definition of ‘firearms’ in national legislation, before 
moving on to consider the definition of ‘illicit firearms trafficking’.  

UN Protocol 

‘Firearms’ definition - International / EU standard 

“‘Firearm’  shall  mean  any  portable  barrelled  weapon  that  expels,  is  designed  to  expel  or  may  be  readily 
converted to expel a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive, excluding antique firearms or their 
replicas.  Antique  firearms  and  their  replicas  shall  be  defined  in  accordance  with  domestic  law.  In  no  case, 
however, shall antique firearms include firearms manufactured after 1899.” (Article 3(a)). 

Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended 

“For the purposes of this Directive, ‘firearm’ shall mean any portable barrelled weapon that expels, is designed 
to  expel  or  may  be  converted  to  expel  a  shot,  bullet  or  projectile  by  the  action  of  a  combustible  propellant, 
unless it is excluded for one of the reasons listed in Part III of Annex I. Firearms are classified in Annex I. 

For the purposes of this Directive, an object shall be considered as capable of being converted to expel a shot, 
bullet or projectile by the action of a combustible propellant if: 

- it has the appearance of a firearm, and 

- as a result of its construction or the material from which it is made, it can be so converted.” (Article 1(1)) 

Note: Certain carve-outs are set out in Part III of Annex I of the Directive, with the effect that the EU definition 
is  narrower  than  that  of  the  Protocol.  The  most  notable  carve-out  is  for  antique  weapons  or  replicas  not 
included  in  other  categories  in  Annex  I  and  which  are  already  subject  to  national  laws:  such  weapons  are 
excluded  from  the  definition  of  ‘firearm’  in  the  Directive.  By  contrast,  in  the  Protocol  there  is  a  blanket 
prohibition of any firearms manufactured after 1899 from being classified as ‘antique’.94  

A  comparative  table  of  national  legislative  definitions  of  ‘firearms’  is  contained  at  Appendix  E,  the 
high-level findings of which are summarised below. 

94 Part III of Annex 1 provides: “For the purposes of this Annex objects which correspond to the definition of a 
'firearm' shall not be included in that definition if they: (a) have been rendered permanently unfit for use by 
the  application  of  technical  procedures  which  are  guaranteed  by  an  official  body  or  recognized  by  such  a 
body; (b) are designed for alarm, signaling, life-saving, animal slaughter or harpoon fishing or for industrial 
or technical purposes provided that they can be used for the stated purpose only; (c) are regarded as antique 
weapons or reproductions of such where these have not been included in the previous categories and are 
subject to national laws. Pending coordination throughout the Community, Member States may apply their 
national laws to the firearms listed in this Section.” 

       59 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
Table 3.3: Definition of firearms: Conformity of Member States’ laws with UN Protocol 

Conformity of national definitions of firearms 
with UN Protocol 

No.  Member States 

Wider definition than Protocol 

Conforms to Protocol definition 

Narrower definition than Protocol 

Source: Legal fiches, CSES research 

3 

6 

14 

BG, CZ, LV  

BE, CY, EL, ES, HU, PL 

DE,  DK,  EE,  FR,  IE,  IT,  LT,  PT,  RO,  SI, 
SK, SE, UK, MT 

Of the jurisdictions for which information is available, roughly half have either a wider definition or 
one that conforms to that found in the Protocol and, by extension, the Directive. Where the definition 
is  judged  to  be  wider,  this  is  because,  unlike  the  UN  definition,  there  is  no  requirement  for  the 
weapon to be barrelled (LV); or it is not necessary for the weapon to be designed or readily converted 
to shoot, merely that it can do so (BG and CZ).   

For Member States judged to have narrower definitions  of ‘firearms’ than the one contained in the 
UN  Protocol,  in  many  cases  (DE,  DK,  EE,  FR,  IE,  LT,  PT,  SE,  UK)  this  is  because  there  is  no  explicit 
reference  to  weapons  that  may  be  readily  converted  (that  is,  in  addition  to  weapons  that  are 
specifically designed) to fire projectiles. Some jurisdictions (FR, IE, UK) stipulate that weapons must be 
‘lethal’ or capable of causing harm to be classified as ‘firearms’, whereas in the UN Protocol capacity 
to cause physical damage is not specifically contemplated. In Germany a firearm is a gun designed for 
specific purposes of attack or defence, or for the specific and named activities of ‘signalling’, hunting, 
firing darts or sport and recreation.  

The  following  summary  matrix  considers  further  elements  of  the  definition  of  ‘firearms’  in  national 
legislation, broken down by Member State. 

Table 3.4(a): Definition of ‘illicit firearms’ (AT to HU) 

AT 

BE 

BG 

CY 

CZ 

DE 

DK 

EE 

EL 

ES 

FI 

FR 

HR 

HU 

Does  this  definition  include 
replicas? 
Does  this  definition  include 
antiques?  

Does  this  definition  include 
deactivated arms? 
Does  this  definition  include 
parts,  essential  components 
or ammunition? 
Are  there  any  categories  of 
arms  restricted  or  prohibited 
for civilian use? 

X 

X 

X 

√ 

X 

X 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

x 

√ 

x 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

X 

X 

X 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

x 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

Table 3.4(b): Definition of ‘illicit firearms’ (IE to UK) 

IE 

IT 

LT 

LV 

LU  MT 

NL 

PO 

PT 

RO 

SE 

SK 

SI 

UK 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Comparative Analysis of Legal Issues 

  3 

Does  this  definition  include 
replicas? 
Does  this  definition  include 
antiques?  
Does  this  definition  include 
deactivated arms? 
Does  this  definition  include 
parts,  essential  components 
or ammunition? 
Are  there  any  categories  of 
arms  restricted  or  prohibited 
for civilian use? 

x 

N/A 

N/A 

x 

x 

√ 

√ 

X 

√ 

√ 

X 

√ 

X 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

x 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

x 

√ 

√ 

√ 

x 

√ 

√ 

√ 

x 

x 

x 

√ 

√ 

From the matrix it can be seen that six EU jurisdictions (CZ, DK, EL, ES, FI, FR and PT) have a definition 
of illicit firearms wide enough to include replicas; antiques; deactivated firearms; and parts, essential 
components  or  ammunition.  In  this  context  it  should  be  noted  that  matters  related  to  deactivated 
firearms were investigated by a separate study for DG HOME.  

The  UN  definition  excludes  antique  firearms  or  their  replicas  from  the  general  firearm  definition 
(though it provides that firearms manufactured after 1899 should not be classed as antique firearms 
in domestic law). It is important to note that there is no equivalent post-1899 proviso in the Directive. 
Instead, as long as antique or replica weapons do not fall into other categories in the Directive and are 
subject to national laws they fall outside the definition of ‘firearm’. As the case study below shows, 
there  is  some  evidence  to  suggest  that  this  situation  has  given  rise  to  a  ‘legal  loophole’  which 
criminals who are aware of national laws are able to exploit. The possibility of including an amended 
definition of ‘firearm’ in any new EU measure, in line with the Protocol wording, under Policy Option 3 
(comprehensive legislative solution) will be addressed in Section 4.  

Case example: criminals exploiting ‘legal loophole’ in UK definition of ‘firearm’ 

A recent article in the London Evening Standard (“Gangs use 'antique' guns loophole to import deadly weapons 
into  London”,  17  April  2014)  reports  concerns  by  the  Metropolitan  police  that  weapons  manufactured  after 
1899 (the point beyond which no weapon may be classified as an ‘antique’ under the Protocol), and which are 
capable  of  firing  live  ammunition,  are  being  brought  into  the  UK  from  other  EU  Member  States  and  legally 
traded.  In  this  way,  police  believe  gang  members  are  actively  exploiting  Section  58  of  the  UK  Firearms  Act 
1968, which exempts ‘antique’ weapons from the provisions in the Act relating to ‘firearms’, including the ban 
on handguns, if they are “sold, transferred, purchased, acquired or possessed as a curiosity or ornament.” The 
Act fails to define ‘antique.’ A spokesman for the UK’s National Ballistics Intelligence Service told the Evening 
Standard:  

“Our concern is that at the moment you are entitled to walk down the street with an antique firearm 
capable of firing real bullets. Criminals are finding it difficult to acquire modern weapons so they are 
having to find alternative sources of supply such as antique weapons. We are finding criminals with a 
knowledge of the law. They recognise that they can carry these weapons with little or no risk of jail.”   

Other  examples  of  ‘antique’  guns  include  the  1920s  Dutch  revolver  carried  by  the  terrorist  extremists  who 
killed Drummer Lee Rigby in Woolwich, London in May 2013.  

Turning from the definition of ‘firearms’ to that of ‘illicit firearms trafficking’: 

       61 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Illicit firearms trafficking’ definition - International / EU standard 

UN Protocol 

“ ‘Illicit trafficking’ shall mean the import, export, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of firearms, 
their parts and components and ammunition from or across the territory of one State Party to that of another 
State Party if any one of the States Parties concerned does not authorize it in accordance with the terms of this 
Protocol or if the firearms are not marked in accordance with article 8 of this Protocol.” (Article 3(e)) 

Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended 

“For the  purposes of  this  Directive,  "illicit  trafficking"  shall  mean  the  acquisition,  sale,  delivery,  movement  or 
transfer  of  firearms,  their  parts  or  ammunition  from  or  across  the  territory  of  one  Member  State  to  that  of 
another Member State if any one of the Member States concerned does not authorise it in accordance with the 
terms  of  this  Directive  or  if  the  assembled  firearms  are  not  marked  in  accordance  with  Article  4(1).”  (Article 
1(2)) 

Note:  The  Protocol  conducts  of  ‘import’  and  ‘export’  are  not  included  in  the  definition  of  illicit  firearms 
trafficking in the Directive. The extent to which it would be advisable to widen the EU definition in line with the 
international/UN wording will be considered in the discussion on policy options in Section 4.  

The  comparative  summary  at  Table  3.2  is  reproduced  here.  This  table  groups  EU  Member  States 
according  to  their  degree  of  compliance  with  the  UN  definition  of  the  illicit  firearms  trafficking  as 
established in Article 3 of the Protocol. A separate analysis of national legislation specifically covering 
the two sub-elements of firearms trafficking per Article 5 of the Protocol, namely illicit manufacturing 
and the issue of marking, will be discussed separately at (ii) and (iii) below.  

Compliance  of  national  illicit  firearms  trafficking 
prohibition with UN Protocol standard 

     No. 

Member States 

Compliant 

Largely Compliant 

Partially Compliant 

Non-compliant 

Source: Legal fiches, CSES research 

6 

6 

5 

2 

DE, EL, ES, FR, PT, SI, 

BG, CY,DK, LV, SK, UK 

AT, CZ, EE, LT, SE 

FI, IE 

For  the  EU  jurisdictions  for  which  information  is  available,  a  clear  majority  is  either  compliant  or 
largely  compliant  with  the  UN  standard.  The  analysis  below  should  be  read  in  conjunction  with  the 
comparative  table  in  Appendix  E,  which  includes,  where  available,  the  text  of  the  relevant  national 
legislation.   

It is notable that even for those Member States judged ‘compliant’, no EU jurisdiction transposes the 
precise working of Article 3 of the UN Protocol into their national law. Rather, it can be said that the 
relevant  national  provisions  taken  as  a  whole  conform  to  the  UN  standard.  In  France,  furthermore, 
the  UN  standard  is  implicitly  met  since  under  the  relevant  provision95  illicit  firearms  trafficking 
conduct is criminalised if it violates EU or international law.  

95 Décret n° 2013-700 du 30 juillet 2013 article 1er – III – 11° (see infra) Décret n° 2013-700 du 30 juillet 2013 

article 1er – III – 11. 

 
                                                 
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‘Largely compliant’ Member States are compliant with the UN definition of illicit firearms trafficking 
but for a missing reference to marking (BG, DK, LV, UK); exporting, in the case of Cyprus; or sales, in 
the case of the Slovak Republic. 

‘Partially compliant’ Member States  are missing more than one element of the UN definition. Thus, 
Czech Republic has no reference to sale, import/export, or movement or transfer of firearms; Estonia 
no reference to acquisition or marking; Lithuania no reference to sale of firearms or marking; Sweden 
no reference to export, acquisition, sale, delivery or movement of firearms, or illicit manufacturing or 
reference to marking of firearms. 

The only Member States so far found to be ‘non-compliant’ is Finland and Ireland. In the former case, 
there  is  no  legal  definition  of  "trafficking  in  fire  arms":  legal  sanctions  do  however  exist  and  are 
divided into several laws and regulations. For the latter jurisdiction, the country respondent records in 
Appendix  E:  “There  is  no  specific  legal  definition  of  Firearms  Trafficking.  Firearms  Importation 
Licensing Laws cover offences of Trafficking and sales without a permit. There is no historic, present or 
expected future firearms’ manufacturing industry in this state. The impact of Firearms Trafficking has 
as  a  result  only  been  an  inward  phenomenon  from  other  European  and  international  States. 
Legislation has not been required to regulate a non-existent Firearms industry in Ireland.”  

As  with  the  ‘firearms’  definition,  the  following  summary  matrix  contains  additional  aspects  of  the 
‘illicit firearms trafficking’ offence, broken down by Member State. 

Table 3.5(a): Definition of ‘illicit firearms trafficking’ (AT to HU) 

AT 

BE 

BG 

CY 

CZ 

DE 

DK 

EE 

EL 

ES 

FI 

FR 

HR 

HU 

to 

include 
the  definition 
Does 
selling  a  firearm  without  a 
licence  or  authorization  from 
the State? 
Does 
include 
the  definition 
selling to an unlicensed buyer?   
Is  there  a  distinction  made 
between  selling  or  supplying 
firearms 
a 
unlawfully 
legal/natural person resident in 
the  country  as  opposed  to  a 
legal/natural person abroad? 
Are there other offences related 
to  illicit  firearms  trafficking  in 
your 
as 
possession of arms? 
special 
Is 
investigative  techniques  legally 
envisaged? 
Is 
legal 
liability 
there 
persons,  ie  corporate  bodies? 
legal 
To  what  extent  can  a 
person  be  held  liable  in  the 
context of illicit arms trafficking 
(fine, 
of 
directors)? 

country, 

criminal 

liability 

such 

use 

the 

for 

of 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

x 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

N/A 

√ 

x 

N/A 

√ 

X 

x 

X 

√ 

x 

√ 

√ 

x 

N/A 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

N/A 

√ 

√ 

x 

√ 

√ 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

√ 

    √ 

√ 

x 

√ 

√ 

x 

√ 

    x 

√ 

       63 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
illicit 
the  offence  of 
Does 
firearms  trafficking  allow  for 
‘lesser’  forms  of  intent,  such  as 
suspicion  of  committing  an 
offence? 
firearms 
Is 
criminalised in the laws on illicit 
firearms trafficking? 
Is  export/import  of  firearms 
criminalised in the laws on illicit 
firearms trafficking? 

possession 

of 

X 

x 

√ 

  x 

N/A  N/A 

x 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

  N/A 

√ 

√ 

N/A 

√ 

Table 3.5(b): Definition of ‘illicit firearms trafficking’ (IE to UK) 

IE 

IT 

LT 

LV 

LU  MT 

NL 

PO 

PT 

RO 

SE 

SK 

SI 

UK 

to 

Does the definition include selling 
a  firearm  without  a  licence  or 
authorization from the State? 
Does the definition include selling 
to an unlicensed buyer?   
there  a  distinction  made 
Is 
between  selling  or  supplying 
firearms 
a 
unlawfully 
legal/natural  person  resident  in 
the  country  as  opposed  to  a 
legal/natural person abroad? 
Are  there  other  offences  related 
to  illicit  firearms  trafficking  in 
your  country,  such  as  possession 
of arms? 
Is  the  use  of  special  investigative 
techniques legally envisaged? 
Is there liability for legal persons, 
ie  corporate  bodies?  To  what 
extent can a legal person be held 
liable in the context of illicit arms 
trafficking  (fine,  criminal  liability 
of directors)? 
Does the offence of illicit firearms 
trafficking allow for ‘lesser’ forms 
of  intent,  such  as  suspicion  of 
committing an offence? 
Is 
firearms 
criminalised  in  the  laws  on  illicit 
firearms trafficking? 
firearms 
Is  export/import  of 
criminalised  in  the  laws  on  illicit 
firearms trafficking? 

possession 

of 

X 

N/A 

√ 

√ 

x 

√ 

N/A 

X 

N/A 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

x 

N/A 

x 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

x 

x 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

x 

x 

√ 

√ 

N/A 

√ 

x 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

x 

√ 

√ 

Looking  at  the  findings  of  the  matrix  in  more  detail,  in  general  terms  there  appears  to  be  some 
divergence in Member States’ approach to aspects of the illicit firearms trafficking offence not already 
covered  by  the  definition  of  IFT  in  Article  3  of  the  Protocol.  These  divergences  are  summarised  in 
Table 3.6 below and are most evident in the cases of (i) distinctions in national laws between selling or 
supplying firearms unlawfully to a legal or natural person resident in the country versus to a legal or 
natural person abroad; (ii) whether liability extends to legal as well as natural persons; (iii) the use of 
special investigative techniques; (iv) attempted trafficking; (v) aiding or abetting and (vi) whether the 
offence of illicit firearms trafficking allows for ‘lesser’ forms of intent in national legislation. The latter 
is considered further in Section 3.3.4. 

Table 3.6: Inclusion of aspects of IFT offence in national laws by number of EU Member States 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Element of illicit firearms trafficking offence contained in national law 

Does  the  definition  include  selling  a  firearm  without  a  licence  or  authorization  from 
the State? 

Does the definition include selling to an unlicensed buyer?   

Is  there  a  distinction  made  between  selling  or  supplying  firearms  unlawfully  to  a 
legal/natural  person  resident  in  the  country  as  opposed  to  a  legal/natural  person 
abroad? 

Are there other offences related to illicit firearms trafficking in your country, such as 
possession of arms? 

Is the use of special investigative techniques legally envisaged? 

Is there liability for legal persons, i.e. corporate bodies?  

Does the offence of illicit firearms trafficking allow for ‘lesser’ forms of intent, such as 
suspicion of committing an offence? 

Is possession of firearms criminalised in the laws on illicit firearms trafficking? 

Yes 

14 

15 

7 

16 

9 

10 

3 

15 

No  NA 

3 

1 

8 

1 

8 

8 

8 

1 

1 

2 

3 

1 

0 

0 

4 

1 

Elaborating on the key legislative divergences:96 

Distinction at national law between selling or supplying firearms unlawfully to a person resident in the 
country versus a person abroad97: In seven Member States no distinction is made between selling or 
supplying firearms unlawfully to a legal or natural person resident in the country as opposed to a legal 
or natural person abroad. However, in the United Kingdom, for example, a different regime applies in 
the  latter  circumstances  and  the  Export  Control  Act  2002  will  be  applicable  for  selling  or  supplying 
firearms outside the territory of the UK. This does not mean that a person outside the territory of the 
UK  cannot  be  prosecuted.  It  only  means  that  the  person  will  be  prosecuted  under  a  different  legal 
regime.   
Liability for legal persons:98 In Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Demark, Estonia, France, Lithuania, 
Portugal, Spain, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom only natural persons have the ability to register a 
firearm under their name, thus obtaining a license to use it. A corporate body or a legal person can 
register a firearm only under limited circumstances, namely in the case of obtaining it as a collection 
item or where the firearm itself is deactivated. The Czech Republic is an example of a Member State 
which  has  recently  enacted  provisions  regarding  corporate  criminal  liability.  Nonetheless,  a  legal 
person  can  still  be  found  guilty  of  illicit  firearms  trafficking  in  all  of  the  abovementioned  countries. 

96  The  extent  to  which  the  offence  of  illicit  firearms  trafficking  allows  for  ‘lesser’  forms  of  intent  in  national 
legislation is considered at 3.3.4, In addition, Member States’ compliance with the final 3 rows of the IFT 
matrix  (covering  export/import,  acquisition/sale,  and  delivery  movement  or  transfer  of  firearms)  formed 
part of the analysis of the IFT definition for Table 3.2, and are not discussed again here. 

97 This distinction is not mentioned in the UN Protocol. 

98 This point is not covered in the UN Protocol 

       65 

 
 
 
                                                 
Germany,  Slovakia  and  Sweden,  for  instance,  recognise  only  personal  liability  and  there  are  no 
provisions regarding legal persons. An interesting regime is applicable in  Slovenia where a two-step 
process is followed: proceedings are initiated and carried out against the legal person  together with 
parallel proceedings against the perpetrator of the same criminal offence. In practice, a single charge 
will be lodged against both the natural and legal persons and the court will deliver a single judgment. 

Use  of  special  techniques  for  the  investigation  of  criminal  offences:  this  is  not  envisaged  in  Cyprus, 
Denmark,  Estonia,  Greece,  Finland,  France,  Ireland  and  Spain.  By  contrast,  the  Czech  Republic, 
Germany,  Lithuania,  Portugal,  Slovak  Republic,  Slovenia,  Sweden  and  the  United  Kingdom  have 
enacted  such  provisions.  A  summary  of  the  special  techniques  available  for  specific  offence  in  each 
applicable Member State is provided below. 

Attempted  trafficking:  under  Article  5(2)(a)  of  the  UN  Firearms  Protocol  signatories  are  required  to 
adopt  such  legislative  measures  as  are  necessary  to  establish  as  criminal  offences  attempting  to 
commit or participating as an accomplice in either illicit manufacturing of firearms, or illicit trafficking 
in  firearms.  Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  the  Czech  Republic,  Germany,  Lithuania,  Portugal,  Slovak  Republic, 
Slovenia, Spain and the United Kingdom have adopted definitions which cover attempted trafficking. 
By contrast, the definition in Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Finland, France and Latvia do not expressly 
cover attempted trafficking.  

Aiding or abetting the commission of the offence: under Article 5(2)(b) of the UN Firearms Protocol 
each state party is required to adopt legislative measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal 
offences  the  organizing,  directing,  aiding,  abetting,  facilitating  or  counselling  the  commission  of  an 
illicit  firearms  trafficking  offence.  In  Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  the  Czech  Republic,  Germany  Lithuania, 
Portugal,  Slovak  Republic,  Slovenia  Spain,  Sweden  and  the  United  Kingdom  the  definition  of  illicit 
firearms  trafficking  encompasses  aiding  and  abetting.  In  contrast,  on  the  basis  of  the  existing  legal 
fiches the definitions in Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Finland, France and Latvia do not cover aiding or 
abetting.  

Table 3.5: Form of special investigative and applicable IFT offence by EU Member State 

In general the following Member States can make use of special investigative techniques: UK, Sweden, 
Slovenia,  Slovakia,  Portugal,  Lithuania,  Estonia,  Czech  Republic.  In  contrast,  in  the  following  they 
cannot: Spain, Ireland, Greece and Cyprus.99  

Member 
State 
BG 

CZ 

DE 

LT 

Special investigative technique 

Framework  for  tracing  of  civilian  firearms  which  is  coordinated  by 
the  Control  of  Hazardous  Devices  Offices  within  the  Ministry  of 
Interior.  
No details provided in legal fiche  

In  the  prosecution  of  illegal  trafficking  of  firearms  all  means 
provided  for  by  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  are  admissible  (if 
their respective requirements are met). 
It  is  legally  envisaged  a  possibility  to  execute  criminal  intelligence 
investigations  (i.  e.  undercover  actions:  secret  surveillance,  secret 

Applicable  IFT  offence 
/ statutory reference 
Any unlawful activity 

See previous column  

See previous column 

See previous column 

99 Note that not all Member States answered this question. Therefore, not all MS are mentioned.  

 
                                                 
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control  of  telecommunications,  controlled  delivery,  undercover 
agents, simulation of criminal offence, etc) for all crimes related to 
illicit  firearms  trafficking,  including  less  serious  crimes provided  for 
in Article 253 of Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Forensic 
examination of firearms and ammunition is envisaged as well. 
No details provided in legal fiche  
No details provided in legal fiche  
No details provided in legal fiche  
Secret  surveillance  of  the  person  suspected  of  committing  illicit 
firearms 
communication, 
wiretapping  also  in  foreign  premises,  control  of  computer  systems 
of banks or other legal entities which may be involved in financial or 
other commercial activities. Moreover, the investigative techniques 
allow  the  use  of  undercover  agents  and  the  acquisition  of  bank 
transactions data, thus allowing the national authorities to trace any 
suspicious activity on part of both natural and legal persons. 
No details provided in legal fiche  

trafficking, 

electronic 

including 

PT 
SK 
SE 
SI 

UK 

See previous column 
See previous column 
See previous column 
rules  of 
General 
Criminal Procedure Act   

the 

See previous column 

Source: CSES legal fiches 

(ii) Illicit firearms manufacturing 

Under Article 5 of the UN Protocol, State Parties are required to adopt necessary legislative measures 
criminalising  the  conduct  of  illicit  manufacturing  of  firearms,  their  parts  and  components  and 
ammunition. A definition of illicit manufacturing is provided at Article 3 of the Protocol. 

‘Illicit firearms manufacturing’ definition - International / EU standard 

UN Protocol 

“ ‘Illicit manufacturing’ shall mean the manufacturing or assembly of firearms, their parts and components or 
ammunition: 

(i) From parts and components illicitly trafficked; 

(ii) Without a licence or authorization from a competent authority of the State Party where the manufacture 
or assembly takes place; or 

(iii) Without marking the firearms at the time of manufacture, in accordance with article 8 of this Protocol”  
(Article 3(d)) 

Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended 

“For  the  purposes  of  this  Directive,  ‘illicit  manufacturing’  shall  mean  the  manufacturing  or  assembly  of 
firearms, their parts and ammunition: 

(i) from any essential component of such firearms illicitly trafficked; 

(ii)  without  an  authorisation  issued  in  accordance  with  Article  4  by  a  competent  authority  of  the  Member 
State where the manufacture or assembly takes place; or 

(iii)  without  marking  the  assembled  firearms  at  the  time  of  manufacture  in  accordance  with  Article  4(1).” 
(Article 1(2)) 

Note:  These  definitions  are  very  similar.  However,  with  the  Protocol  refers  to  “parts  and  components” 
where the Directive uses the slightly narrower wording of “any essential component”.  

       67 

 
 
 
A  summary  table  of  national  legislative definitions  of  ‘illicit firearms  manufacturing’  (where such  an 
offence  exists)  is  set  out  in  the  table  below.  Reference  should  be  made  to  Appendix  E  for  further 
detail, including where available the wording of the relevant national provisions. 

Table 3.6: Conformity of definition of illicit firearms manufacturing definition with UN Protocol 

Conformity  of  national  definitions  of 
manufacturing with UN Protocol 

illicit 

firearms 

No. 

Member States 

Wider definition than Protocol 

Conforms to Protocol definition 

Manufacturing  criminalised  but 
unavailable 

Offence not defined in national law 

Source: Legal fiches, CSES research 

legislative  definition 

0 

5 

8 

3 

- 

CY, DE ES, FR, LT 

BG, DK, EL, LV, PT, SI, 
SK, UK 

FI, IE, SE 

Eight  Member  States  have  criminalised  the  illicit  manufacturing  of  firearms  offence;  however,  the 
precise  wording  of  the  definition  is  not  available.100  Of  other  EU  jurisdictions,  Cyprus  and  Spain 
replicate the definition found in the Protocol (and thus the Directive, which is based on the wording in 
the Protocol). The situation in France is identical to the overarching illicit firearms trafficking offence 
definition: the relevant international and EU standards are implicitly incorporated. Meanwhile, illicit 
firearms manufacturing in Lithuania appears to be covered by Article 253(2) of the Criminal Code:  

“A  person  who,  without  an  authorisation,  produces,  acquires,  stores,  carries,  transports  or 
handles at least three firearms, the ammunition, explosives or explosive materials of a large 
explosive power or in a large quantity shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of four up 
to eight years.”  

In  relation  to  Sweden  Chapter  9  of  the  Weapons  Act  covers  persons  who  intentionally  possess  a 
firearm without having the right to it, or transfer or lend a firearm to someone who is not entitled to 
possess the firearm. The national expert for SE has been asked to confirm if a manufacturing of illicit 
firearms  offence  exists  elsewhere  in  Swedish  criminal  law.  Finally,  as  already  stated  Finland  and 
Ireland do not formally define illicit firearms trafficking or, it is presumed, the ‘sub-conduct’ of illicit 
manufacturing.   

 (iii) Marking 

The final sub-section of this 3.3.1 refers to falsifying or illicitly obliterating, removing or altering the 
marking(s) on firearms as criminalized at Article 5 of the UN Protocol.  

‘Illicit firearms trafficking’ definition - International / EU standard 

100  We  will  seek  this  information  from  legal  fiche  respondents  and  other  stakeholder  in  order  that  this 

information is established by the end of Phase III. 

 
 
 
                                                 
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UN Protocol 

Article 3(e): 

“ ‘Illicit trafficking’ shall mean the import, export, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of firearms, 
their parts and components and ammunition from or across the territory of one State Party to that of another 
State Party if any one of the States Parties concerned does not authorize it in accordance with the terms of this 
Protocol or if the firearms are not marked in accordance with article 8 of this Protocol.” (Article 3(e)) 

Article 8: 

“1. For the purpose of identifying and tracing each firearm, States Parties shall: 

(a)  At  the  time  of  manufacture  of  each  firearm,  either  require  unique  marking  providing  the  name  of  the 
manufacturer, the country or place of manufacture and the serial number, or maintain any alternative unique 
user-friendly marking with simple geometric symbols in combination with a numeric and/or alphanumeric code, 
permitting ready identification by all States of the country of manufacture; 

(b)  Require  appropriate  simple  marking  on each  imported  firearm,  permitting  identification of the  country  of 
import and, where possible, the year of import and enabling the competent authorities of that country to trace 
the  firearm,  and  a  unique  marking,  if  the  firearm  does  not  bear  such  a  marking.  The  requirements  of  this 
subparagraph need not be applied to temporary imports of firearms for verifiable lawful purposes; 
(c)  Ensure,  at  the  time  of  transfer  of  a  firearm  from  government  stocks  to  permanent  civilian  use,  the 
appropriate unique marking permitting identification by all States Parties of the transferring country. 

2. States Parties shall encourage the firearms manufacturing industry to develop measures against the removal 
or alteration of markings.” 

Article 1(2)  

Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended 

“For the  purposes of  this  Directive,  "illicit  trafficking"  shall  mean  the  acquisition,  sale,  delivery,  movement  or 
transfer  of  firearms,  their  parts  or  ammunition  from  or  across  the  territory  of  one  Member  State  to  that  of 
another Member State if any one of the Member States concerned does not authorise it in accordance with the 
terms of this Directive or if the assembled firearms are not marked in accordance with Article 4(1).”  

Article 4(1)  

“Member  States  shall  ensure  either  that  any  firearm  or  part  placed  on  the  market  has  been  marked  and 
registered in compliance with this Directive, or that it has been deactivated.” 

The table that follows divides EU Member States recorded in the comparative table at Appendix E as 
including  a  marking  requirement  in  their  definition  of  illicit  firearms  trafficking  and  Member  States 
where such a requirement is absent from the relevant IFT provisions.  

Table 3.7: Marking requirement in national illicit firearms trafficking legislation 

EU  Member  States  including  marking  requirement  in 
offence of illicit firearms trafficking 

No.  Member States 

       69 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marking requirement  

No marking requirement  

Source: Legal fiches, CSES research 

9 

9 

CY, CZ, DE, EL, ES, FR, PT, SI, SK 

BG, DK, EE, FI, IE, LT, LV, SE, UK 

There is no marking requirement in just over half of jurisdictions for which information is available. On 
the  face  of  it,  this  is  a  notable  deficiency  in  Member  States’  national  legislation,  which  could  be 
redressed by an EU measure either:  

 

 

Setting out its own legislative provision criminalising the import, export or otherwise 
acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of any firearm from or across the relevant 
State’s territory to another State that has not been marked in the prescribed manner; or 

Enshrining Article 35 of the UN Model Law, or a suitably amended version of this, in EU law.  

The  policy  options  as  regards  a  possible  EU  legislative  instrument  in  this  area  will  be  considered 
further at Section 4.  

Consequences  of  diversity  of  national  legislation  on  illicit  firearms  trafficking  offences  (including 
definitions of ‘firearms’, ‘firearms trafficking’, ‘firearms manufacturing’ and requirements on marking 
of weapons) for cross-border cooperation by police and judicial authorities  

Turning  to  the  potential  consequences  of  the  diverse  definitions  of  the  illicit  firearms  trafficking 
offence in national laws – starting with differences in the meaning of ‘firearms’ itself – can hamper 
cross-border efforts to combat the offence. The Legal Loopholes Study notes that: 

“Differences  in  (Member  States’)  national  legislation  entail  practical  problems.  For  instance, 
what  one  Member  States  considers  a  criminal  offence  and  prosecutes  accordingly  might  be 
entirely legal in another. Not only does this lead to practical problems in combined efforts to 
combat illegal firearms and other weapons, these differences may also have serious judicial or 
criminal law implications (…) (Differences in EU definitions of firearms) make comparisons and 
surveys  virtually  impossible,  thwarting  collaboration  between  Europe’s  police  forces  in  line 
with  the  preferred  approach  of  the  EU  and  UN  to  tackle  the  illicit  trafficking  of  firearms, 
ammunition and explosives and, consequently, creating too many opportunities for criminals 
to act.”101   

The study goes on to cite the example of toy weapons, which are “legal and widely available in many 
European countries”, but “strictly forbidden under Dutch weapons legislation”.102 In our own Phase 2 
research we heard the example of stun devices and self-defence sprays which can be legally held and 
carried in a large number of countries, including some EU Member States, but not the UK. This gives 
rise to difficulties for UK prosecuting authorities who need to show intent and knowledge on the part 
of the suspect. Because of this legislative divergence it is often not possible to do so – and therefore 
often no prosecution is made – as ‘importers’ claim they did not know that such items are covered by 
a prohibition or restriction in the UK (see case example in Section 3.3.3 below).  

101  European  Firearms  Experts  (“EFE”),  Study  of  loopholes  in  national  weapons  legislation  and  regulations  in 

Europe, p.5 

102 Ibid. 

                                                 
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A  majority  (59%)  of  respondents  to  our  online  survey  are  of  the  view  that  compared  with  illicit 
firearms trafficking that takes place purely within their Member State the cross-border dimension of 
illicit  firearms  trafficking  is  either  quite  or  very  significant.  Asked  about  the  extent  to  which  legal 
barriers, such as the differences in legal definitions, are also an obstacle to cross-border cooperation, 
38%  of  stakeholders  thought  these  were  a  very  significant  impediment,  with  another  13%  and  19% 
considering as quite or slightly significant respectively. Under a third of respondents (31%) considered 
legal barriers were not an impediment. 

It is important to acknowledge that obstacles to successfully combatting illicit firearms trafficking in 
the  EU  are  practical  as  well  as  legal.  The  table  at  Appendix  E  records  answers  from  country 
respondents  to  the  questions  of  whether  there  are  any  obstacles  to  securing  illicit  arms  trafficking 
convictions  in  relation  to  the  offences  outlined  in  national  legislation;  and  whether  there  are  any 
there  gaps  or  shortcomings  in  the  Member  State’s  legislation  to  combat  the  illicit  arms  trafficking 
business. Responses include:  

 

 

 

For Cyprus, it was felt that, while the legislation was poorly designed to secure convictions, 
there were insufficient resources to tackle the full scale of the problem of illicit firearms 
trafficking.  

Thoroughgoing criminalisation of firearms trafficking was required according to the 
respondent for Spain: “The articles of the Criminal Code are not intended for arms trafficking. 
It would be very important that the illicit arms trafficking existed as a crime itself and that the 
Audiencia Nacional has the competence for dealing with these cases.” 

In other EU Member States (FI, UK) shortcomings were noted in the laws on deactivated 
firearms.103 

In  pointing  out  these  ‘deficiencies’  it  is  important  to  note  that  for  six  of  the  11  Member  States  for 
which respondents have so far completed this question,104 country researchers were of the view that 
there  were  no  shortcomings  in  national  legislation  as  regards  securing  convictions  or  tackling  illicit 
firearms trafficking more generally.    

It is clearly of vital relevance to establish whether an identified deficiency is of a legal or practical 
nature.    Generally  a  distinction  needs  to  be  made  between  legal  shortcomings  and  practical  or 
cultural factors (surrounding, inter alia, corruption, low prosecution and conviction rates, inadequate 
resourcing  for  police  and  judicial  authorities  to  confront  the  problem).  The  latter  factors  would 
require different and possibly non-legislative solutions at the EU-level when it comes to formulating 
policy options.  

Conclusions – definitions of specific offences relating to firearms trafficking 

103 Issues in relation to deactivation are dealt with in more depth in the Ernst & Young study being undertaken 

for DG Home in parallel with this study. 

104 See Appendix E. 

       71 

 
 
 
                                                 
Despite  the  substantively  similar  definition  of  ‘firearms’  in  the  Protocol,  Model  Law  and 
Directive  91/477/EEC,  and  the  existence  of  model  provisions  on  the  criminalisation  of  ‘illicit 
firearms  trafficking’  in  the  Model  Law,  it  is  clear  definitional  differences  in  Member  States’ 
national legislation remain in relation to the conducts identified in article 5 of the UN Protocol 
and  discussed  in  this  section  of  firearms  trafficking,  firearms  manufacturing  and  falsifying  or 
illicitly obliterating, removing or altering the markings on firearms. It is not possible to create an 
approximated EU offence of illicit firearms trafficking without a standard, EU-wide definition of 
‘firearms’;  in  turn,  both  the  absence  of  a  common  understanding  of  ‘firearms’  and  of  the 
offence of illicit firearms trafficking creates uncertainty for national investigating authorities and 
has the potential to impede cooperation at the cross-border level.    

3.3.2 

Level and type of penalties and sanctions applicable to legal and natural persons  

Under the Model Law, it is generally up to individual states to determine penalties and sanctions of 
breaches of illicit firearms trafficking crimes. However, for “serious” offences to be compliant with the 
Convention (the parent instrument of the Protocol) sanctions must be custodial sentences of at least 
4  years  for  both  natural  and  legal persons.  The Directive meanwhile merely stipulates  that  rules  on 
infringements of its provisions – which do not explicitly cover an offence of illicit firearms trafficking – 
should be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.  

EU Member States 

The  following  matrix  identifies  the  maximum  and  minimum  (i)  custodial  sentences  and  (ii)  financial 
penalties  for  illicit  firearms  trafficking  by  Member  State.  This  matrix  will  be  updated  with  the 
outstanding information for the remaining EU jurisdictions in Phase III. 

Table 3.8(a): Sanctions (AT to HU) 

What  is  the  minimum 
custodial  sentence  for 
firearms 
illicit 
trafficking? 
What  is  the  maximum 
custodial  sentence  for 
illicit 
firearms 
trafficking? 
What  is  the  minimum 
financial  penalty 
for 
illicit 
firearms 
trafficking? 
What  is  the  maximum 
financial  penalty 
for 
illicit 
firearms 
trafficking? 

AT 

BE 

BG 

CY 

CZ 

DE 

DK 

EE 

EL 

ES 

FI 

FR 

HR 

HU 

1 year 

- 

6 
months 

- 

- 

6 
months 

6 
months 

6 
months 

4 
months 

- 

6 years  15 years  8 years  10 years  6 years  10 years  2 years  4 years  4 years  10 years 

€100 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

€600 

- 

- 

€15,000  €42,715  €1.8M  €30,000 

- 

- 

€30,000 

- 

€500.000 

Table 3.8(b): Sanctions (IE to UK) 

IE 

IT 

LT 

LV 

LU  MT 

NL 

PO 

PT 

RO 

SE 

SK 

SI 

UK 

What  is  the  minimum 
custodial  sentence  for 

N/A 

From 15 
days up to 
90 days (or 

2 years 

10 years 

6 months  1 year 

6 
month
s 

- 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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  3 

illicit 
trafficking? 

firearms 

What  is  the  maximum 
custodial  sentence  for 
illicit 
firearms 
trafficking? 

What  is  the  minimum 
financial  penalty 
for 
firearms 
illicit 
trafficking? 
What  is  the  maximum 
financial  penalty 
for 
illicit 
firearms 
trafficking? 

6 years 

N/A 

N/A 

3 years in 
the case of 
an overlap 
with 
smuggling) 
8 years or 10 
years in the 
case of an 
overlap with 
smuggling 

- 

- 

10 
years 

- 

- 

12 years 

6 years  8 years  3 years  5 years 

- 

- 

- 

- 

N/A 

€10.00
0 

- 

N/A 

€1m 

- 

Table 3.8 summarises the information in the matrix by grouping the Member States by stringency in 
relation to custodial sentences and financial penalties. 

Table 3.9 (a): Sanctions – Summary of Current situation in Member States  

Custodial sentence 

Member States 

Maximum sentence 0 –3 years and 364 days years 

EL, SI 

Maximum sentence 4 – 10 years 

BG, CZ, DE105, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, IE, LT, LV, SE, 
SK 

Maximum sentence 11 years + 

CY, PT 

Administrative sanctions (Financial penalties) 

Member States 

Maximum penalty less than € 100,000 

BG, CY, DE, EL, BL 

Maximum penalty € 100,000 – € 1,000,000 

Maximum penalty more than € 1,000,000 

FR, SI 

CZ 

Source: CSES legal fiches 

It  can  be  seen  from  the  table  above  that  some  Member  States  (EL)  have  relatively  low  maximum 
custodial sentences as well as low maximum financial penalties for illicit firearms trafficking offences. 
Others  are  a  mixture,  in  that  they  have  higher  maximum  sentences  but  lower  maximum  penalties 
(CY). Others still (FR) are in the middle grouping in terms of stringency for both maximum custodial 
sentences  and  financial  penalties.  A  more  detailed  discussion  follows  of  the  individual  sanctions 
regimes in Member States. 

Bulgaria is an example of a Member State which has recently introduced more stringent requirements 
for  acquisition  of  firearms,  licencing,  while  at  the  same  time  imposed  more  severe  punishments  in 

105 Chapter 51 (2) of the Weapons Act. 

       73 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
case of offending any of the provisions. In 2012 the Law on Arms, Ammunitions, Explosive Substances 
and Pyrotechnical Articles was passed. Under Articles 156-212 of that law in cases of violations fines 
may  be  imposed  from  €100  to  €2,500,  property  sanctions  from  €500  to  €15,000  and  withdrawal  of 
the issued license for manufacture, acquisition or trade with SALW up to 1 year. In case of a repetitive 
infringement property sanction up to €25,000 and withdrawal of the issued license up to 2 years can 
be imposed. Along these administrative sanctions, Articles 338 and 339 of the Penal Code106 impose a 
punishment of 1 to 6 years in case of storing, trading, importing or exporting firearms without having 
the right according to law to do so. 

In  Cyprus  the  maximum  sanction  which  can  be  imposed  on  a  person  found  guilty  of  illicit  firearms 
trafficking is imprisonment not exceeding 15 years or to a fine not exceeding €42,715 or both107. In 
addition,  the  firearms  subject  to  the  offence  will  be  confiscated  by  the  relevant  authorities  and 
destroyed with the consent of that person.  
The  legislation108  in  Portugal  stipulates  that  illicit  firearms  trafficking  is  punished  by  imprisonment 
from 2 to 10 years. However, there is a discretion on part of the judges who can increase the sentence 
from  4  to  12  years109  in  cases  where  the  person  is  an  official  responsible  for  the  prevention  of  any 
illicit  firearms  trafficking,  where  the  person  has  knowledge  that  the  arms  are  destined  for  the 
purposes  of  criminal  organisations,  or  where  he  gains  substantial  remuneration  from  the  trade  in 
arms. 

In Greece, by contrast, a less stringent regime with regards to penalties is into place. By virtue of Law 
2168/93,110 illicit firearms trafficking is subject to both criminal penalties and administrative sanctions. 
Criminal penalties range from imprisonment of at least 6 months to 2 years along with fines ranging 
from €3,000 up to €30,000 €.  

Slovenia applies a dual sanctions regime: provisions relating to natural persons and legal persons are 
contained  in  separate  legislative  frameworks.  In  essence  this  reflects  both  the  prevailing  national 
criminal procedure and the different treatment of offences as undertaken by the Office of the State 
Prosecutor General of the Republic of Slovenia. The illicit firearms trafficking of chemical, biological or 
nuclear  weapons  is  punished  by  a  sentence  from  6  months  and  up  to  5  years  in  prison.  Large 
quantities  of  or  very  valuable  and  dangerous  arms  invoke  a  sentence  of  imprisonment  for  not  less 
than 1 and not more than 10 years111. If the natural person is found guilty of trafficking an individual 
firearm or a small quantity of ammunition he will be punished by imprisonment of up to one year.  

With  regard  to  illicit  trafficking  of  composite  or  spare  parts  of  firearms,  ammunitions  or  any 
substances or ingredients, which are known to be used for manufacture of firearms a sentence of up 

106 As amended in 2010. 

107 Article 51 (1) of Law 113(i) 2004. 

108 Article 87- Law 5/2006- “Weapons Law”. 

109 To be read in accordance with the Portuguese Penal Code- LEI 59/2007. 

110 Law 2168/93 on "Matters related to arms, ammunition and explosives", 3 September 1993, amended by Law 

3944/2011 in 2011 to transpose the provisions of Directive 2008/51/EC. 

111 Article 307(2) of Illegal Manufacture of and Trade in Weapons or Explosive Materials. 

                                                 
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to 5 years in prison will be applied. In relation to legal persons112 the possible sanctions for the entity 
involve  a  fine,  confiscation  of  property  (in  cases  where  the  proscribed  punishment  is  5  years  of 
imprisonment) and winding up of the legal entity itself. In addition to the measure of confiscation the 
Slovenian  authorities  have  a  wide  discretion  in  imposing  safety  measures-  either  the  publication  of 
the judgment or prohibition of a specific commercial activity. Under Article 13 the fine which may be 
prescribed for an offence committed by a legal person may not be less than €10,000, or more than 
€1,000,000. Different financial penalties apply depending on the custodial sentences- punishment of 
up  to  3  years’  imprisonment  is  accompanied  by  a  fine  of  up  to  €500,000  whereas  a  fine  of  at  least 
€50,000 will be applied where the punishment is imprisonment of over 3 years.113 

Due to the fact that Estonia makes an express differentiation between offences committed by natural 
and legal persons two sanctions regimes are applied: in the former situation the offender can be faced 
with financial penalties alongside a custodial sentence, whereas in the latter case the legal entity will 
be punishable by a pecuniary punishment or compulsory dissolution, thus allowing for the liability of 
company directors to be dealt with separately. Confiscation of the firearms is also envisaged by virtue 
of Article 392 of the Penal Code. The unlawful handling of small firearms, including small quantities of 
cartridges is punishable by a pecuniary penalty or up to 3 years’ imprisonment. Where the object of 
the offence is a large quantity of firearms or essential components thereof the offender is faced with 
up  to  5  years  of  imprisonment.  However,  the  Penal  Code  makes  an  explicit  reference  to  offences 
committed  by  criminal  organisations-  the  act  of  unlawful  handling  of  large  quantity  of  firearms 
prohibited for civilian use is punishable by 6 to 20 years’ imprisonment. 

In Spain in case of being found in possession of a firearm without authorisation/licence a sliding scale 
of  sentencing  will  be  applied:  imprisonment  from  1  to  2  years  for  handguns  and  in  case  of  long 
firearms  a  sentence  of  6  months  to  1  year.  With  regards  to  the  more  serious  offences  the  Spanish 
legislation provides for stronger sanctions and much higher financial penalties. In the case of owning, 
trafficking  and  deposition  of  regulated  firearms  or  the  ammunition  for  these,114  a  sentence  of 
imprisonment of 2 to 4 years is envisaged for the principals, and with imprisonment from 6 months to 
2 years for those found to have cooperated to the organisation of the offence.  

Latvia is also an example of an EU Member State that enforces financial penalties alongside custodial 
sentences.  The  applicable  punishment  for  a  person  who  illegally  imports  or  exports  explosives, 
weapons or ammunition the applicable punishment is deprivation of liberty for a term not exceeding 
5  years.  The  authorities,  however,  have  the  discretion  of  ordering  community  service  and  a  fine 
instead  of 
involvement  of  any  aggravating  or  mitigating 
circumstances  the  property  may  be  confiscated  by  the  Latvian  police  authorities.  Similarly  to  the 
legislative  framework  in  Estonia,  Latvia  also  takes  a  stronger  stance  against  acts  committed  by 
organised  groups-  imprisonment  for  a  term  of  not  less  than  2  years  and  not  exceeding  11  years  is 
prescribed  by  section  190.1  (3)  of  the  Criminal  Law.  In  addition  to  that,  members  of  the  organised 
group  face  the  possibility  of  probationary  supervision  for  a  term  not  exceeding  3  years  with 

imprisonment.  Depending  on  the 

112 Liability of Legal Persons for Criminal Offences Act 
113 Article 26 of the Liability of Legal Persons for Criminal Offences Act. 
114 Article 566, Chapter V of the Criminal Code.  

       75 

 
 
 
                                                 
deprivation of the right to take up a specific office or engage in entrepreneurial activity for a term not 
exceeding  5  years.  The  Czech  Republic115  also  has  provisions  regarding  offences  committed  by  an 
organised group and the applicable prison sentence in that case ranges from 2 to 8 years. 

In  Slovakia  the  Penal  Code  stipulates  imprisonment  ranging  from  1  to  8  years  depending  on  the 
severity  of  the  offence.  This  is  to  be  judged  by  virtue  of  the  specific  motivation  of  the  offender. 
However,  the  term  might  be  extended  where  the  possession,  exports,  transits  of  firearms, 
ammunitions or explosives is carried out as a member of a dangerous group. In such cases the term of 
imprisonment  of  the  offender  may  be  increased  of  up  to  20  years  when  chemical  or  biological 
weapons  are  involved.116  It  is  important  to  note  that  no  financial  penalties  are  envisaged  in  the 
Slovakian Penal Code. 

Sweden  applies  a  categorisation  of  illegal  trafficking  where  the  maximum  sanction  according  to  the 
Act  on  Penalties  for  Smuggling  is  imprisonment  for  at  most  6  years117.  A  different  sanctions  regime 
applies in cases of petty and grave smuggling- in the former the maximum sentence is a fine, and in 
the  latter  the  maximum  sentence  is  imprisonment  for  at  most  6  years.  The  unlawful  import  of 
firearms is sanctioned with a maximum sentence of imprisonment for at most 2 years.118 

In  the  United  Kingdom  the  sanctions  regime  is  relatively  straightforward  and  no  sliding  scale  of 
sentences is envisaged. The maximum sanction for illicit firearms trafficking is 5 years’ imprisonment. 
The maximum custodial sentence applicable in the Czech Republic119 is also 5 years with a discretion 
given  to  the  authorities  in  assessing  whether  large  quantities  of  ammunition  or  weapons  of  mass 
destruction were involved. In the former case the offender shall be punished by a prison sentence of 
up to 2 years, disqualification in case of a legal person, and forfeiture of items or other assets. 

In  Denmark  a  broadly  similar  approach  is  followed  subject  to  the  caveat  that  a  different  regime  is 
applied  for  exceedingly  dangerous  weapons  (examples 
include  mortars,  grenades,  bombs, 
submachine guns and machine guns), which will involve a custodial sentence of up to 6 years. With 
regards to small firearms (also including ammunition, crossbows, silencers and optical sights) section 
192(a) of the Danish Criminal Code stipulates that sanctions will vary from a fine to imprisonment of 
up to 2 years. A novel provision covering the commission of acts of terror is contained in the Danish 
legislative  framework.  Life  imprisonment may  be  applied to  any  person who transports  weapons  or 
explosives with a view to commit such acts.120 

No  specified  offences  for  illicit  firearms  trafficking  are  envisaged  in  Ireland  and  therefore  the 
sanctions  regime  applies  only  to  firearms  offences  which  are  punishable  up  to  6  years  of 
imprisonment on indictment. 

115 Section 279 of the Criminal Code No.40/2009 Coll. 

116 Article 294 (4) Penal Code No. 300/2005. 

117 Section 5(1) of Act on Penalties for Smuggling. 

118 Section 7 of Act on Penalties for Smuggling. 

119 Section 279 of the Criminal Code No. 40/2009 Coll. 

120 Section 114(2) of the Danish Criminal Code. 

                                                 
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As  a  consequence  of  the  above-mentioned  diversity  of  national  legislation  on  sanctions,  cross-
border  cooperation  by  police  and  judicial  authorities  could  be  hampered.  In  this  regard 
harmonisation  of  the  sanctions  regime  among  EU  Member  States  could  facilitate  smoother 
application of many preventive and investigative measures.  

Looking at the possible cross-border consequences of the varying nature and severity of penalties 
and  sanctions  in  national  laws  outlined  above,  the  present  maximum  custodial  sanction  for  illicit 
firearms  trafficking  related  offences  of  two  years  (for  unlawful  import)  in  Sweden  to  10  years  in 
France to 15  years in Cyprus arguably encourages ‘forum shopping’ by  criminals. Under this theory, 
criminals  may  pick  and  choose  EU  jurisdictions  between  which  to  move  illicit  firearms  on  the  basis 
that such activity carries a lower penalty if the offenders are caught in the chosen Member State(s). 
Although beyond the scope of this study, further research is needed to establish whether this theory 
is  correct  in  practice,  but  a  number  of  stakeholders  (including  representatives  of  police  and 
investigating authorities) were of the view that forum shopping of this kind was indeed practised by 
criminals.  

If  illicit  firearms  trafficking  is  not  consistently  criminalised  for  legal  as  well  as  natural  persons,  this 
creates an uneven framework for penalising the offence which could be exploited by criminals to their 
advantage. At the same time it may hinder cross-border judicial and police attempts to combat illicit 
firearms  trafficking:  for  example,  if  a  corporate  entity  (i.e.  a  legal  rather  than  a  natural  person)  is 
operating  in  two  jurisdictions,  A  and  B,  and  undertakes  activities  which  constitute  illicit  firearms 
trafficking in jurisdiction A but not in jurisdiction B, this will hinder a joint investigation by, or cross-
border  assistance  between,  the  investigating  authorities  of  those  Member  States.  Equally,  joint 
investigations  and  assistance  run  the  risk  of  being  undermined  if  the  likely  sanction  for  the  same 
firearms trafficking offence is serious in one jurisdiction but relatively trivial in another.  

Conclusion – penalties and sanctions applicable to legal and natural persons 

Approximating penalties and sanctions for illicit firearms trafficking sanctions would provide 
legal certainty  for  police  and judicial authorities  and reduce  criminals’ incentives  to  forum 
shop. This view was expressed by most stakeholders that we consulted although some did not 
have  a  definite  view.    However,  there  may  be  political  and  legal  obstacles  to  ensuring 
uniformity  of  national  laws  in  this  area,  given  that  penalties  and  sanctions  are  deeply 
embedded in Member States’ criminal codes.   

Because  any  EU  measure  in  this  area  would  only  seek  to  establish  ‘minimum  maximum’ 
thresholds  for  sanctions,  Member  States  would  be  free  to  set  whatever  upper  limit  on 
sanctions  that  they  wished  (provide  they  were  at  least  four  years).  The  overall  public  and 
policy benefit of minimum rules in the area of illicit firearms trafficking under the legal basis of 
article 83(1) TFEU is additionally pertinent to any subsidiarity assessment.        

3.3.3 

Impact of aggravating or mitigating circumstances on definition of illicit firearms trafficking 
and related sanctions   

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The key legislation at international and EU level does not address the impact of either aggravating 
or mitigating circumstances on the definition of illicit firearms trafficking and related sanctions.  The 
Model  Law  containing  model  provisions  prohibiting  illicit  firearms  trafficking  (in  the  form  of  (i)  any 
transnational  transfer  of  firearms  without  legal  authorization  and  (ii)  any  transnational  transfer  of 
firearms if these are not marked)121 simply states that the general system of aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances  already  existing  within  a  Member  State’s  national  legislation  would  be  applicable  to 
these provisions.122 

Table 3.9: Aggravating or mitigating circumstances - Current situation in Member States  

Principle aggravating or mitigating circumstances 

Degree of intention 

Member States 

CZ, ES, PT, SI 

Participation in organised criminal organisation  

CZ, DE, FR, LT, LV, SE, SI, SK 

Recidivism 

Terrorism connection 

State of emergency / war / crisis situation 

Large scale / grave consequences 

CZ, ES, FR, SI 

CZ, FR 

CZ, LT, SK 

CZ, LT, LV, SE 

No explicit provision in national law (could be an element at the judicial 
discretion) 

BG, CY, DK, EE, EL, FI, IE 

Aggravated illicit firearms trafficking a separate offence 

UK 

Aggravating/mitigating  circumstances  derive  from  general  criminal 
procedural code  

CZ, ES, LT, PT, SI, SK 

A comparative table containing the national provisions for aggravating or mitigating circumstances in 
respect of illicit firearms trafficking offences is set out at Appendix E. 

Member States 

As can be seen from the table above, around half of Member States for which information is available 
provide  in  their  national  laws  for  aggravating  or  mitigating  circumstances  relating  to  the  factual 
circumstances  of  the  offender.  In  four  Member  States  the  question  of  mens  rea  is  applicable.  The 
question of aggravating or mitigating  circumstances  for illicit firearms trafficking is dealt with under 
general  criminal  law  provisions  in  several  EU  jurisdictions,  while  the  UK  is  the  only  Member  State 
where there is only a separate offence of aggravated illicit firearms trafficking.   
Examining  the  findings  in  further  detail:  aggravating  factors  in  the  case  of  Czech  Republic,123 

121 Articles 34 and 35 of the Model Law. 

122 Model Law Section B commentary, p.45. 

123 Aggravating circumstances in CZ are governed by those set out in the criminal code for all offences. Of most 
relevance for illicit firearms trafficking are section 42 (a) on “premeditation”, (j) on committing a criminal 
offence  “during  an  emergency  situation”,  (m)  on  committing  the  offence  “in  a  larger  extent”  and  (o)  on 
committing the offence “as an organizer, a member of an organized group or a member of a conspiracy,” 
See CZ legal fiche, question 2.2.12. 

                                                 
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Germany,124 Lithuania125, Latvia126, Slovak Republic,127 Slovenia128 and Sweden129 principally involve 
whether the offence is (i) committed as part of an organised criminal gang or (ii) on a “large scale”. In 
Sweden  it  may  also  be  an  aggravating  factor  if  the  illicit  trafficking  act  was  “of  a  particularly 
dangerous nature, or if the act otherwise involved a serious violation of an important public interest”. 
Likewise in the Czech Republic and also the Slovak Republic it is relevant if the act was committed in a 
“crisis  situation”.  In  common  with  these  other  Member  States,  aggravating  circumstances  for 
weapons offences in France include whether the offender was part of a criminal organization, as well 
as whether he was a repeat offender or engaged in terror-related activities.  

In  Portugal,  the  degree  of  intention  of  the  offender  is  significant  (see  further  discussion  on  intent 
and  negligence  at  section  3.3).  In  this  jurisdiction,  illicit  firearms  trafficking  offences  committed 
intentionally are deemed aggravated and this is reflected in the resulting custodial sentence. Similarly, 
it is thought that absence of intent could be a mitigating factor in Spain. Article 565 of the Spanish 
Criminal Code130 provides:  

“The Judges or Courts of Law may lower the penalties stated in the preceding Articles by one degree, 
as  long  as  the  circumstances  of  the  fact  and  of  the  offender  prove  the  lack  of  intention  to  use  the 
weapons for unlawful purposes”.131  

However,  this  refers  to  articles  563  and  564,  which  relate  to  crimes  of  possession  of  arms  and  not 
illicit firearms trafficking. The lack of intention may therefore be a mitigating factor only if the court 

124  Sections  51(2)  and  52(2)  (sanctions)  of  the  German  Weapons  Act:  “A  particularly  serious  instance  shall 
generally  be deemed  to  apply  when  the  offender acts  for  gain  or  as  a  member  of  a  gang  formed  for  the 
purpose  of  committing  such  offences  on  a  continuing  basis,  with  the  involvement  of  another  gang 
member.” 

125 See Lithuania legal fiche. 

126 Criminal Law Section 190.1, sub-sections (2) and (3). See Latvia legal fiche. 

127 Section 294, sub-sections (4) and (5). See Slovak Republic legal fiche. 

128 Under Article 307 of the Criminal Code the sanction for the basic offence is imprisonment of not less than six 
months  and  no  more  than  five  years.  The  sanction  for  the  criminal  offence  committed  in  aggravating 
circumstances (a large quantity or very valuable or dangerous firearms or an offence committed within 
criminal association) consists of imprisonment of not less than one year and no more than ten years. See 
Slovenia legal fiche. 

129  The  Act  on  Penalties  for  Smuggling  defines  “aggravating  circumstances”  in  Section  5,  paragraph  2:  see 

Sweden legal fiche. 

130 See Chapter V “On owning, trafficking and deposit of weapons, ammunition or explosives”. 

131 Spain legal fiche.  

       79 

 
 
 
                                                 
applies  an  analogous  approach  to  the  sentencing  of  illicit  firearms  trafficking  offences  as  it  does  to 
illicit firearms possession offences.   

It should be noted that in jurisdictions such as  Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece 
and Ireland where there are no explicit provisions in national legislation on aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances,  it  is  nevertheless  very  conceivable  that  the  court  may,  at  their  discretion,  take  the 
existence of such circumstances into account in their sentencing of guilty offenders.  

Consequences of diversity of aggravating or mitigating factors for cross-border cooperation by police 
and judicial authorities  

set  out 

the  above  brief  comparative  overview 

Having 
the  existence  of 
aggravating/mitigating circumstances for illicit firearms trafficking in EU Member States, what are the 
consequences of the diverging situation described above in terms of police and judicial cooperation 
in a cross-border context? The first point to note is that aggravating or mitigating circumstances are 
linked  to  the  issues  of  penalties  and  sanctions,  discussed  above.  These  in  turn  have  an  effect  on 
police and judicial cooperation. In the case of mitigating circumstances, where the existence of these 
is likely to lower the possible penalty or sanction for a suspected offence, incentives may be reduced 
for sustained, coordinated investigation by investigating authorities in two or more EU jurisdictions.   

regarding 

Our  online  survey  indicates  that  stakeholders  consider  issues  of  negligence  (see  Section  3.3  below) 
and  aggravating  or  mitigating  circumstances  to  be  of  relevance  to  the  problem  of  illicit  firearms 
trafficking. However, one survey respondent noted that, more than these legalistic concerns, tackling 
illicit firearms trafficking involves more practical, operational issues relating to the manner in which 
police investigations are organised and conducted. 

CSES Online Survey – Negligence, aggravating or mitigating circumstances 

Q:  How  effective  are  the  notions  of  negligence,  aggravating  or  mitigating  circumstances  in 
tackling the problem of illicit firearms trafficking? 

A: Survey respondents: Large extent: 23.5%; Some extent: 29.4%; Neutral: 17.6%; Small extent: 
17.6%; No extent:  11.8%. 

Stakeholder  (Italian  firearms  manufacturer)  comment:  “The  problem  is  not  the  law,  but  the 
structure of operative organisations, investigation and action.” 

Conclusion – aggravating or mitigating circumstances 

There are divergences in the treatment of aggravating or mitigating circumstances in Member 
States’  national  laws.  The  research  suggests  that  the  external  factual  context  in  which  the 
offence is committed is frequently a material factor (for example, whether the suspect is part 
of  a  criminal  organisation  or  the  scale/gravity  of  the  alleged  trafficking  offence).  In  a  smaller 
number of EU jurisdictions, by contrast, the internal working of the suspect’s mind (his degree 
of intent in committing the offence) is relevant to whether he has committed aggravated illicit 
firearms trafficking. Finally, it should be noted that national laws refer more frequently to the 
existing of aggravating than mitigating circumstances – though mitigating factors may indeed be 
available as part of a jurisdiction’s general criminal legal framework.   

 
 
 
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Approximating  national  legislation  on  aggravating  or  mitigating  circumstances  may  be 
politically  challenging  for  the  reasons  outlined  above  in  relation  to  penalties  and  sanctions. 
Namely,  it  may  result  in  anomalies  regarding  national  courts’  approach  to  aggravating  or 
mitigating circumstances for illicit firearms trafficking as compared with other related offences, 
such  as  drug  or  people  trafficking.  Member  States  may  be  reluctant  to  undertake  these,  and 
may  furthermore  be  of  the  view  that  the  availability  and  nature  of  aggravating  or  mitigating 
circumstances is best determined at a national not EU level.  

3.3.4 

  Factor of negligence and degrees of intent  

Article  5  of  the  UN  Firearms  Protocol  only  provides  for  an  offence  of  illicit  firearms  trafficking 
committed  intentionally.  The  drafting  does  not  stipulate  a  precise  form  of  intent  (for  example 
knowledge  only,  or  whether  suspicion  or  ‘wilful  blindness’  would  suffice).  In  light  of  “the  varying 
degrees  and  definitions  of  mens  rea  in  national  jurisdictions,”132  the  Model  Law  also  leaves  it  to 
individual states to specify the level of intent required for each article in accordance with their legal 
system and national practice.  

Table 3.5: Negligence and degrees of intent - Current situation in Member States  

Negligence and degrees of intent 

No distinction between intentional or negligent illicit firearms trafficking 

Member States 

BG, CY, DK, IE,133 LV 

Higher penalty for intentional illicit firearms trafficking (aggravating factor) 

PT 

Lower penalty for negligent illicit firearms trafficking (mitigating factor)  

CZ, DE, ES, FR, SE 

Negligent illicit firearms trafficking not criminalised 

EL, LT, SI, SK, UK134 

Source: CSES legal fiches 

Note:  ‘Negligent  illicit  firearms  trafficking’  is  understood  to  mean  an  illicit-firearms-related  offence 
which an offender is judged to have been committed negligently, howsoever this is precisely defined 

132 Model Law, Section B commentary, p.45. On the meaning of ‘intention’, the Model Law commentary further 
cautions that this “refers only to the conduct or action that constitutes each criminal offence and should not 
be taken as a requirement to excuse cases in particular where persons may have been ignorant or unaware 
of the law that constituted the offence”. 

133 There is no distinction because no specific legal definition of firearms trafficking exists in Ireland (see IE legal 

fiche.) 

134 However, it should be noted under section 1 (1) and section (5) of the Firearms Act 1968 possession of an 

illicit firearm is an absolute offence and therefore encompasses negligent possession.  

       81 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
under  local  law.  Negligence  commonly  entails  conduct  of  an  unreasonably  low  standard  but  which 
lacks specific knowledge/intent on the part of the perpetrator.  

EU Member States 

The  above  table  shows  that  in  a  number  of  EU  jurisdictions  the  offence  of  illicit  firearms  trafficking 
offence  is  not  worded  in  such  a  way  that  criminal  intention  is  explicitly  required.  In  other  Member 
States  (Czech  Republic,  France,  Germany,  Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden)  the  degree  of  intention  –  its 
presence  or  absence  –  may  influence  the  penalty  or  sanction  awarded  by  the  court.135  It  is  also 
notable  that  ‘unlawful  import’  of  firearms  in  Sweden  includes  a  gross  negligence  offence,  meaning 
that  ordinary  negligence  does  not  suffice  for  the  court  to  establish  the  crime.136  In  a  minority  of 
jurisdictions  (Greece,  Lithuania,  Slovak  Republic,  Slovenia)  it  is  not  possible  negligently  to  commit 
the  crime  of  illicit  firearms  trafficking:  some  degree  of  intent  on  the  part  of  the  suspect  must  be 
established, in other words.  

As  noted  above,  negligent  illicit  firearms  trafficking  falls  outside  the  scope  of  the  UN  Firearms 
Protocol. However, article 34, paragraph 3 of the ‘parent’ Convention of the Protocol expressly allows 
states to adopt “more strict or severe” measures than those provided for by the Convention.137 In 
other words, there is nothing in the current international (or indeed EU) instruments to stop Member 
States from criminalising illicit firearms trafficking committed negligently as well as intentionally. The 
reason policymakers  have left the issue  of  negligence  to  individual  states  is  because  it is  an  area  of 
criminal  law  where  there  are  divergences  in  the  legislation  and  legal  culture  between  jurisdictions. 
‘Dolus eventualis’, for example, is a civil law concept, while in common law systems negligence is only 
rarely sufficient for criminal liability to arise: most criminal offences require intention, knowledge or 
recklessness. Indeed, a maxim of the common law considered fundamental to upholding the rule  of 
law is that "actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea” (“the deed does not make a man guilty unless his 
mind be guilty").  

It has already been established that negligent illicit firearms trafficking is an offence in some Member 
States  and  not  others.  Further  differences  exist  as  to  the  meaning  of  ‘intention’  in  the  different  EU 
jurisdictions. An overview of the varying degrees of intention required by Member States, where this 
information has so far been established in our research, is provided below:  

Table 3.6: Intent – Current situation in Member States 

Intention 

Yes 

‘Lesser’ form of intent possible (e.g. suspicion, wilful blindness)  

CZ, EL, ES, LT, PT, SI, SK 

135 In Spain the possibility of a lower sanction in the absence of intent is applicable if illicit firearms trafficking is 
dealt  with  analogously  to  illicit  firearms  possession.  The  legal  fiche  notes  that  Article  565  of  the  Criminal 
Code  (Chapter  V  “On  owning,  trafficking  and  deposit  of  weapons,  ammunition  or  explosives”)  provides: 
“’The  Judges  or  Courts  of  Law  may  lower  the  penalties  stated  in  the  preceding  Articles  by  one  degree,  as 
long as the circumstances of the fact and of the offender prove the lack of intention to use the weapons for 
unlawful purposes’. However, this refers to articles 563 and 564 that related to crimes of possession of arms 
and not illicit firearms trafficking.”   

136 See Sweden legal fiche.  
137 See Model Law, Section B commentary, p.45. 

                                                 
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No (knowledge required) 

BG, CY, DE, IE, UK 

Source: CSES legal fiches 

Not only is there a divergence between Member States where intention refers to knowledge of and 
desire to commit the crime and those where a ‘lesser’ intent is possible, but the form of this lesser 
intent also differs between EU jurisdictions.  

For example, in Spain the judge has wide discretion to determine whether the suspect had a requisite 
state  of  mind  amounting  to  intention  at  the  time  of  committing  the  offence.138  In  Lithuania,  by 
contrast,  the  Criminal  Code  distinguishes  between  specific  and  general  intent.  The  latter  category 
requires  knowledge  on  the  part  of  the  suspect.  However,  general  intent  may  nevertheless  be 
considered a ‘lesser’ degree of intent to the extent that, so long as the suspect consciously allows the 
offence  to  take  place,  general  intent  can  be  made  out  even  if  the  court  determines  he  did  not 
actually desire it to happen.139 Similarly, in Slovenia the suspect does not need to wish to perform the 
offence  if  it  can  be  established  that  he  was  aware  that  he  could  perform  it  and  he  consented  to  it 
(contingent intent).140 

In  other  Member  States  (Czech  Republic,  Greece,  Portugal  and  Slovak  Republic)  the  legal  fiche 
responses  suggest  that  lower  forms  of  intent  than  pure  knowledge,  such  as  suspicion  or  wilful 
blindness,  are  sufficient  for  the  offence  of  illicit  firearms  trafficking.  Strict  liability  is  applied  to 
corporations and legal persons in the Czech Republic. Turning to the possible consequences of this 
legislative  variation  in  the  factor  of  negligence  and  degrees  of  intent  on  cross-border  police  and 
judicial cooperation to combat illicit firearms trafficking, as noted at section 3.3 above, 53% (nine of 
17)  stakeholders  responding  to  the  online  survey  question  ‘How  effective  are  the  notions  of 
negligence,  aggravating  or  mitigating  circumstances  in  tackling  the  problem  of  illicit  firearms 
trafficking?’  agreed  that  these  notions  were  indeed  effective.  The  practical  consequences  of  the 
standard  of  mens  rea  for  investigating/prosecuting  authorities  charged  with  combatting  cross-
border  illicit  firearms  trafficking  was  illustrated  by  a  senior  policy  officer  at  the  UK  National  Crime 
Agency. These are summarised in the text box below. 

Case example – knowledge and intention in UK firearms trafficking legislation 

 

Section 5 of the Firearms Act 1968 is a strict liability offence. This means that mere 
possession of a proscribed firearm is a crime, regardless of the individual’s state of 
mind/intention. 

  However, there is no specific importation of illicit firearms offence under the firearms 
legislation. The relevant importation offence is found at section 170 of the Customs and 

138 See Spain legal fiche, question 2.2.7. 

139 Article 15 of the Criminal Code. See Lithuania legal fiche, question 2.2.7.  

140 Article 25 of the Criminal Code. See Slovenia legal fiche, question 2.2.12. 

       83 

 
 
 
                                                 
Excise Management Act 1970 (“CEMA”). To commit an offence under section 170 an 
individual must have knowledge and intention in relation to importing firearms.141  

 

A senior officer at the UK National Crime Agency told us that on several occasions (2006-
2009), handguns have been imported concealed in private multi-occupancy passenger-
vehicles or privately operated parcel post vehicles which carry legitimate post, parcels and 
passengers for monetary remuneration (typically minibuses providing a service to transport 
parcels/post and passengers from Lithuania to the UK). Even where large numbers of 
firearms have been found in these vehicles, successful prosecutions have been 
problematic as it is difficult to prove knowledge of the items and the intent to evade the 
importation restriction. 

  Differences in what constitutes an illicit firearm between Member States can also 

contribute to the difficulty of establishing mens rea on the part of the suspect. For example, 
stun devices and self-defence sprays can be legally held and carried in a large number of 
countries, including some EU Member States and the USA, from where many travellers to 
the UK arrive. As both intent and knowledge are necessary in order to prove the offence, it 
is often not possible to do so – and therefore often no prosecution is made – as ‘importers’ 
claim they did not know that such items are covered by a prohibition or restriction in the 
UK.  

Source: CSES research 

Conclusion – factor of negligence and degrees of intent 

Approximating legislation in the area of negligence and degrees of intent would reduce the 
investigating 
uncertainty  produced  by  existing  divergences  for  national  police  and 
authorities. It would further remove the potential obstacle of illicit firearms trafficking activity 
being  considered  an  offence  in  one  EU  jurisdiction  but  not  another  as  a  result  of  differing 
approaches  to  the  negligence  and/or  the  mens  rea  requirement  in  the  Member  States, 
hampering efforts to tackle the problem at a cross-border level.  

Approximating legislation in such a way that lowers the requirement of intent and includes the 
possibility of a negligent illicit firearms trafficking offence in all EU Member States would make 
it  easier  for  police  and  judicial  authorities  to  prosecute  suspects,  and  give  confidence  that 
cross-border  investigations  will  bear  fruit.  It  would  in  addition  reduce  incentives  for  forum 
shopping  for  the  most  ‘lenient’  jurisdictions  by  criminals.  However,  regards  negligence,  in 
particular  the  common  law  jurisdictions  may  consider  this  a  sensitive  area  given  that  as  a 
general  principle  criminal  offences  require  an  element  of  intention  or  recklessness  (with  the 
latter defined as the conscious taking  of an unjustified risk). Negligent conduct – understood 
as conduct of an unreasonably low standard but which is unconscious or lacking in foresight – 
generally falls outside of criminal liability.   

141  The  NCA  official  explained  that,  to  commit  an  offence  under  s.170  CEMA,  the  person  must  be  knowingly 
concerned with the acquisition, carrying, removing, depositing, harbouring, keeping or concealing or in any 
manner  dealing  with  items  whose  importation  or  exportation  is  prohibited  or  restricted  by  legislation.  In 
addition to this, the importation must be with the intent to evade a prohibition or restriction on the items. 

                                                 
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Finally,  it  should  be  noted  that  policy  and  practical  factors  may  be  more  relevant  than 
legislative divergences/deficiencies in this area. The UK National Crime Agency official told us 
that although the police, armed forces and coastguard were all under a statutory duty to assist 
in  the  enforcement  of  the  importation  offence  (s.170  of  CEMA),  in  reality  conflicting  policy 
priorities  –  in  particular  in  relation  to  counter  terrorism  –  may  lead  to  other  offences  being 
considered instead.   

3.4 

Conclusions - Comparative legal analysis  

International  and  EU  legal  frameworks  that  have  a  bearing  on  illicit  firearms  trafficking  leave 
signatories  are  broadly  defined  and  leave  signatories  with  considerable  discretion  on  how  key 
provisions  are  implemented.  Example  provisions  on  the  criminalisation  of  illicit  firearms  trafficking 
are  included  in  the  Model  Law.  The  latter  was  developed  after  many  signatory  states  to  the 
Convention  and  Protocol  indicated  their  need  for  model  legislation  or  guidelines  in  order  to 
harmonise domestic legislation with the requirements of these U.N. instruments. However, the Model 
Law  itself  has  no  binding  force  on  EU  Member  States.  What  is  more,  to  leave  a  ‘margin  of 
appreciation’ for national legislators to implement the instruments in the most appropriate manner in 
line with their legal traditions, neither the Model Law clauses nor the international or EU instruments 
are prescriptive as regards the various legal elements of an illicit firearms trafficking offence, notably 
the areas of penalties and sanctions; the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances and the 
possibility  of  a  negligent  illicit  firearms  trafficking  offence.    Other  important  issues  where  there  are 
differences  relate  to  the  ways  in  which  firearms  trafficking  offences  are  prosecuted  (as  mere 
possession in some instances) and seizure in transit (and tracing issues). 

As  a  result  of  the  different  legal  cultures  and  the  non-prescriptive  approach  at  international/EU 
level, there is a diversity of legal frameworks in relation to illicit firearms trafficking at the national 
level.  However,  it  should  be  emphasised  that  divergences  in  national  legislation  are  not  per  se  a 
rationale  for  EU  intervention.  The  relevant  issue  is  whether  such  divergences  reflect  legislative 
deficiencies  at  the  national  level  which  undermine  both  local  and  intra-Member  State  efforts  to 
combat the trafficking of firearms.. It goes without saying that the legal basis of any EU measure is of 
preeminent relevance in any consideration of the rationale for EU action in this area, namely Article 
83(1)  TFEU,  which  provides  for  the  establishment  of  minimum  rules  concerning  the  definition  of 
criminal offences and sanctions in the area of illicit firearms trafficking with a cross-border dimension 
where  this  is  necessary  as  a  consequence  of  the  nature  or  impact  of  this  offence  or  from  a  special 
need to combat such trafficking on a common EU basis. 

Minimum,  EU-wide  rules  on  illicit  firearms  trafficking  (of  the  kind  set  out  for  Policy  Option  3  in 
Section 4)  would have the potential benefit of: reducing legal uncertainty produced by divergences 
between  Member  States’  national  laws  on  illicit  arms  trafficking  offences  for  police  and 
investigating  authorities;    facilitating  prosecutions,  where  this  is  a  result  of  deficient  national 
legislation  rather  than  a  ‘cultural’  or  practical  reluctance  to    bring  charges  for  illicit  firearms 

       85 

 
 
 
 
 
 
trafficking offences; ensuring that criminals are unable to exploit loopholes, and reducing incentives 
for criminals forum shop between EU jurisdictions.  The results of our Phase 2 research indicate that 
divergences  do  indeed  affect  cross-border  police  and  judicial  cooperation  –  and  that,  given  the 
intrinsically cross-border nature of illicit firearms trafficking, there is an argument for combatting the 
problem on an EU-wide basis.  

However, the research suggests that in addition to differences in the laws, practical issues such as 
lack  of  resources,  impediments  to  joint  investigations  by  police  authorities  in  different  Member 
States  (for  example  lack  of  intelligence-sharing  or  use  of  special  investigative  techniques), 
conflicting  policy  priorities  (for  example  with  anti-terror  legislation)  and  lack  of  enforcement  of 
existing  laws  also  hinder  cross-border  efforts  to  combat  illicit  firearms  trafficking.  Feedback  from 
the  research  indicates  that  at  the  judicial  stage  in  cross-border  cases,  for  example  in  seeking 
permission  for  controlled  deliveries  or  asking  for  a  prosecutor  to  take  up  a  case  following  an 
investigation, differences in legal frameworks can cause complications.  

In considering any EU initiative it is to bear in mind that there are likely to be political sensitivities in 
approximating some elements of the illicit firearms trafficking offence where and to the extent that 
these involve fundamental principles of criminal law at the national level.   

 
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Section 

Policy Objectives & Options 

  4 

This  section  begins  by  defining  the  policy  objectives  and  policy  options  with  regard  to  any  EU 
intervention  to  strengthen  the  framework  for  combating  illicit  firearms  trafficking.  The  various 
policy  options  are  then  evaluated  to  identify  the  preferred  option.  The  final  section  sets  out  a 
framework for the monitoring and evaluation of measures relating to the preferred option.  

4.1 

Overview - Policy objectives and options 

To  recap  briefly,  the  assessment  set  out  in  Sections  2  and  3  suggests  that  different  legal 
frameworks exist across the EU to address illicit firearms trafficking and that these make it more 
difficult  to  tackle  the  problem.  The  research  shows  that  cross-border  police  and  judicial 
cooperation can be impeded by the lack of harmonisation with regard to the definition of offences 
for illicit firearms trafficking, aggravating or mitigating circumstance, sanctions and penalties, and 
the factor of negligence and degrees of intent. That said the research highlights other (non-legal) 
factors that are also significant.  

The  overall  policy  objectives  of  any  new  EU-level  initiative  to  combat  illicit  firearms  trafficking 
can be summarised as being to combat illicit firearms trafficking in the EU more effectively and by 
doing  so  to  enhance  the  common  area  of  freedom,  security  and  justice.  More  specifically,  the 
aims should be to better prevent, deter, detect, disrupt, investigate, prosecute and cooperate on 
illicit firearms cross-border trafficking. The policy objectives are summarised below: 

Operational objectives 

Policy Objectives 

 

 

 

To minimize the differences in definitions of firearms offences and levels of sanctions 
across the EU.  

To further encourage the sharing of information and intelligence on illicit firearms 
trafficking and the links with other criminal activities. 

To put in place a system for regular monitoring the effectiveness of efforts to disrupt 
firearms crime including generation of comparable statistics. 

 

Strategic objectives 

 

 

 

To deter the committing of criminal offences related to illicit firearms trafficking. 

To improve the cooperation between law enforcement authorities at the EU and Member 
State levels in preventing, detecting, disrupting, investigating and prosecuting illicit 
firearms trafficking. 

To provide a model which can be promoted in discussions with third countries on 
firearms risk reduction.  

Overall objective  

 

To contribute to an enhanced level of security and to less firearms-related crime in the EU 
by reducing the number of firearms illicitly trafficked to, from and within the EU.  

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Ultimately  the  policy  objective  should  be  to  contribute  to  a  reduction  in  the  level  of  illicit 
firearms  trafficking  in  the  EU,  thereby  enhancing  the  security  and  welfare  of  citizens,  and 
reducing the social and economic harm caused by the problem. 

Definition of Policy Options 

Based on the research, a number of policy options can be defined that, in varying degrees, would 
promote EU objectives and tackle the problem of illicit firearms trafficking. To summarise:  

Summary of Policy Options 

 

 

Policy Option 1: Status Quo – continuation of the current situation with no new EU 
intervention.  

Policy Option 2(a): Non-legislative action - would aim to promote closer collaboration 
between Member States in combating illicit firearms trafficking rather than introducing 
any new EU-level initiatives (except where this is necessary to promote closer 
collaboration). This option would include non-statutory intervention, either as a first step 
or to support action for implementing EU legislation in the future.  

  Policy Option 2(b): Minimum legislative intervention at the EU level - this would involve 

a minimum level of legislative intervention at EU level to strengthen cross-border 
cooperation, e.g. by adding legal obligations to certain aspects of cooperation. Policy 
Option 2(b) would require Member States to undertake certain tasks set out in Policy 
Option 2(a), thereby strengthening cooperation between the law enforcement agencies 
and judiciaries of different Member States.  

 

Policy Option 3: Comprehensive legislative solution at EU level - EU action to introduce 
legally-binding common minimum standards across Member States with regard the 
definition of criminal offences and their sanctions related to illicit arms trafficking and 
linked offences. 

 

Policy Option 4 -   this would involve combining Policy Options 2 and 3.  

The research indicates that there is a consensus amongst those we consulted that the status quo is 
not  desirable  and  that  if  nothing  is  done,  the  problem  of  illicit  firearms  trafficking  will  worsen. 
Beyond  this,  however,  there  is  considerable  uncertainty  amongst  key  stakeholders  as  to  which 
Policy Option should be pursued.  

To  the  extent  that  opinions  were  expressed,  it  would  seem  that  Policy  Option  2is  favoured  most 
followed  by  Policy  Option  3.  Many  argued  that  differences  in  legal  frameworks  are  not  the  main 
obstacle to effective cross-border cooperation in the effort to tackle the problem of illicit firearms 
trafficking,  and  that  priority  should  be  given  to  addressing  other  issues  such  as  improving  the 
sharing of information on illicit firearms trafficking, strengthening the capacity of law enforcement 
agencies to tackle the problem, and speeding up judicial proceedings in relation to investigations.   

4.2 

Policy Option 1 - Status Quo and Baseline Scenario 

 
 
Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Arms Trafficking in the European Union 

Section 

Policy Objectives & Options 

  4 

Policy Option 1 is a situation where no new EU action is taken to tackle illicit firearms trafficking.  

If no action is taken at EU level, the scale of illicit firearms trafficking problem is likely to increase 
in the coming years.  As discussed in Section 2 (‘Problem definition’), it is very difficult to quantify 
the number of legally held firearms in the EU. However, the EU’s internal market and dismantling of 
barriers  to  free  movement  and  trade  means  that  the  trafficking  of  illicit  firearms  is  made  much 
easier.142    Even  if  the  scale  of  the  illicit  trafficking  in  firearms  remains  the  same,  this  would 
nevertheless translate into an increased stock of illicitly held firearms. Europol’s 2013 SOCTA report 
argued  that  the  EU  still  has  the  advantage  of  having  a  relatively  immature  firearms  trafficking 
market, with the majority of cases being either “small scale” or “to order”. The existing supply of 
illicit  firearms  from  within  the  EU  (theft  of  legal  firearms,  reactivation,  etc)  appears  to  be  large 
enough for Organised Crime Groups to procure their weapons without the need to import firearms. 
This situation could continue if no action is taken at the EU level.  

More  generally,  if  no  action  is  taken  at  the  EU  level,  it  is  expected  that  the  problem  of  illicit 
firearms trafficking will continue to develop as an important driver/facilitator of criminality in the 
EU.  The research has shown that Member States could be categorised into three board types: (i) 
countries  of  origin,  (ii)  transit  countries  and  (iii)  countries  where  the  firearms  are  used.    One 
Member State can fit into more than one of these categories.  No action at EU level would thus also 
increase  the  risk  that  countries  which  are  currently  only  countries  of  origin  or  transit  might 
gradually experience higher level of criminality stemming from the availability of firearms.   

Overall, Policy Option 1 would have no positive impact on the policy objectives and could have 
negative  effects  by  sending  a  signal  to  criminals  that  the  EU  does  not  consider  illicit  firearms 
trafficking as an important issue.  Furthermore, if the problem is not seen to be tackled, the EU as 
a  whole  would  lose  some  of  the  goodwill  and  ‘soft  leverage’  it  currently  holds  in  trying  to  tackle 
illicit firearms trafficking at a global level.  

The  status quo  scenario  does  not mean  that nothing  will change  in terms  of actions  to  combat 
illicit firearms trafficking because some initiatives are currently underway. Even if no new actions 
are  taken  at  the  EU  level,  the  problem  would  still  be  affected  by  existing  measures,  or  pieces  of 
legislation  that  are  either  already  in  place  or  expected  to  be  introduced  in  the  near  future  by 
Member States.  Amongst these, the following are of particular importance: 

Firstly, existing international conventions (the UN firearms protocol and Draft Arms Trade Treaty 
(ATT)) are being implemented by all EU28 Member States. Even without EU action, a minimum level 

142 For example, France experienced a 40% rise in the seizure of illicit firearms between 2010 and 2011 with 
new  trends  emerging.  The  recent  seizure  of  firearms  in  Reims  (France)  illustrates  this  situation:  the 
suspected group of “collectors” imported deactivated firearms by mail from a number of Member States 
which were then reassembled. The Shooting in Istres was also done with a firearm that had been ordered 
online  and  received  through  the  post.  Such  loopholes  in  the  legislation  and  enforcement  of  the 
legislation will continue to exist in a status quo scenario and could lead to the illicit firearms trafficking 
problem becoming worse.    

       89 

 
 
 
                                                 
of  harmonisation  already  exists  with  the  illicit  manufacturing  of  and  trafficking  in  firearms  being 
crimalised in line with the Protocol's requirements and definitions. 

Secondly,  some  legislative  developments  at  the  national  level  could  proceed  anyway  in  the 
absence of an EU initiative in this area. For example, Belgium amended its law of firearms in 2006143 
which  drastically  reduced  the  legal  ownership  of  some  types  of  firearms.  Traditionally,  the 
introduction of new national firearms legislation follows high-profile incident where they are used 
(e.g. the Liege shooting in Belgium) and this pattern is likely to continue as long as incidents occur 
involving fatalities linked to the use of illicit firearms.  However, such legislative developments will 
be piecemeal both in the timetable of their implementation and the substance of the national laws 
enacted, and therefore less effective than a comprehensive EU-level initiative.    

Thirdly, existing tools for police and judicial cooperation will almost certainly evolve and improve. 
Cross-border efforts to tackle illicit firearms trafficking rely on close operational joint working at the 
police/judicial and customs levels, and over time this cooperation has improved as officials get used 
to working together more closely. Law enforcement and judicial officials consulted during this study 
have underlined the usefulness of existing tools such as Joint Investigation Teams, direct rogatory 
letters  exchanged  to  gather  information  and  other  types  of  cooperation,  and  the  use  of  these 
existing techniques is likely to increase.  

4.4 

Policy Option 2(a) Non-Legislative Action 

Policy  Option  2(a)  would  aim  to  promote  closer  operational  collaboration  between  Member 
States’  law  enforcement  agencies  with  responsibility  for  tackling  illicit  firearms  trafficking.  This 
option  would  focus  on  non-statutory  intervention,  possibly  as  first  step  or  supporting  action  for 
more comprehensive EU legislation in the future (i.e. Policy Option 3) but this need not necessarily 
be the case. The key measures could include:  

 

 

 

 

Improving the exchange information on illicit firearms trafficking;  

Facilitating special investigative techniques and the capacity building needed for more 
effective action to combat cross-border aspects of the problem; 

Strengthening the regulatory framework for legal firearms to reduce the transfer of 
weapons into the illicit market; 

Other measures - improved monitoring and data collection tools, strengthening the role 
of the EU agencies. 

Policy Option 2(a) would be designed to help make existing legislative frameworks, institutional 
set-ups  and  implementation  structures  work  more  efficiently  and  effectively.  Unlike  Policy 
Options  2(b)  and  Policy  Option  3,  no  new  legislation  would  be  introduced  at  either  the  EU  or 
Member  State  levels.  Interventions  would  be  aimed  at  promoting  closer  collaboration  between 
Member States rather than introducing new EU-level initiatives (although these may be necessary 
to promote close collaboration, e.g. an EU-level information sharing platform). The focus would be 
on measures to improve enforcement of existing legal frameworks, to strengthen police and judicial 
cooperation,  and  to  improve  monitoring  systems.  Policy  Option  2(a)  could  include  other  non-
legislative actions such as improve networking between Member States, capacity building, etc. This 

143 Loi réglant des activités économiques et individuelles avec des armes of 8 June 2006. 

                                                 
Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Arms Trafficking in the European Union 

Section 

Policy Objectives & Options 

  4 

policy option could be considered to be partially addressed through the framework of the firearms 
policy cycle priority and the implementation of the COM Communication. 

Figure 4.1: Overview of Policy Option 2 Measures 

According  to  our  interviews  and  the  workshops,  law  enforcement  agencies  generally  have  good 
relationships with each other and already work closely together on cross-border cases. However, in 
some of the newer EU Member States – which are often the transit routes of if not the source of 
illicit firearms - there is a need to improve the capacity of law enforcement agencies to collaborate 
as some face a shortage of human resources and the skills needed to deal with cross-border cases. 
In  this  situation,  perhaps  inevitably,  priority  tends  to  be  given  to  dealing  with  domestic  law  and 
order cases. According to the research, there is also a need to improve the sharing of information 
and intelligence on illicit firearms trafficking.144   

144  These  points  were  stressed  particularly  by  the  representatives  of  law  enforcement 
authorities from  Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia  who participated in the workshop organised 
by CSES covering Austria, Hungary and the Western Balkans. 

       91 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
4.4.1 

Improving the exchange of information on illicit firearms trafficking 

A  key  non-legislative  measure  would  involve  improving  the  availability  and  sharing  of 
information between Member States on both licit and illicit arms. Currently, there are several 
databases at the EU and international levels. An initiative in this area would probably not involve 
setting up a new database but rather improving existing systems and their accessibility to the law 
enforcement  authorities  and  others  in  Member  States  involved  in  combating  illicit  firearms 
trafficking.   

There are several existing databases on firearms. Firstly, the 2008 Directive requires that arms are 
marked and registered in the Member State where the owner resides. While this database can be 
used to monitor legal weapon possession, a second database exists for stolen and lost weapons 
which  is  a  part  of  the  Schengen  Information  System  (SIS  II).  Furthermore,  the  Integrated 
Ballistics  Identification  System  (IBIS)  can  also  be  regarded  as  a  kind  of  database.  IBIS  is  a 
technological tool that can be used to help identify ballistics and the weapons used together with 
the ballistics. In this way a network can be created across borders linking weapons, ballistics and 
ultimately  the  weapon-holder.  Interpol  established  a  database  called  Illicit  Arms  Records  and 
tracing  Management  System  (iARMS)  which  is  a  state-of-the  art  technology  facilitating 
information exchange and investigative cooperation between law enforcement agencies in regard 
to the international movement of illicit firearms, as well as licit firearms that have been involved 
in the commission of a crime.  

The first of these databases deals with legal arms possession while SIS, IBIS and iARMS deal with 
illicit firearms use or possession. The existence of these databases is a helpful step  forward but 
more could be done to maximise their usefulness. Firstly, the 2008 Directive does not specifically 
set  out  how  the  information  contained  in  these  and  other  databases  should  be  shared  by  the 
Member  States.  Also,  the  databases  could  be  developed.  For  instance,  developing  a  register  of 
legal arms dealers would help to keep track of legal flows of weapons between Member States. 
Likewise, with the iARMS database it would be useful to add additional information on individuals 
who have been convicted of firearms offences. In this way, re-offenders might be detected more 
easily.  Member  States  could  also  establish  common  standards  for  collecting  data  on  ballistic 
evidence  (i.e.  bullets  and  shell  casings).  Once  such  parameters  are  developed,  they  should  be 
compatible  with  INTERPOL’s  IBIN  network.  Besides  merely  focusing  on  EU  efforts,  this 
information  gathering exercise could  be  developed in  conjunction with  UNODC  with  the aim  of 
developing  a  simple  and  worldwide  method  to  collect  ballistic  data  on  firearms.  This  type  of 
initiative is highly relevant since many illicit firearms originate from outside the EU.  

Besides  gathering  more  information,  another  way  to  make  data  exchange  more  effective  is  to 
change the way data is distributed. First, it is suggested to introduce end-user search tools, such 
as  INTERPOL’s  MIND  and  FIND,  at  the  national  level  so  that  end-users  can  search  the  various 
databases  simultaneously  with  a  single  query  whilst  maintaining  the  integrity  of  the  separate 
systems.  This  would  facilitate  searches  on  firearms  by  using  one  single  transaction.  Related  to 
this, there should be one-to-one mapping of the terms used in the various databases to describe 
firearms.  This would facilitate both carrying out comparison searches in different databases and 
uploading new records. A starting point would be to compare the iARMS and SIS II terminology.  
Additionally,  as  the firearms  element of  UMF  has  not  been finalised it would also  be helpful to 
carry  out a  comparison between  iARMS,  SIS  II  and  the  nascent  UMF  firearms  terms  in  order  to 
promote  commonality.  Thirdly,  EU  Member  States  should  be  encouraged  to  ensure  that  all 

 
Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Arms Trafficking in the European Union 

Section 

Policy Objectives & Options 

  4 

relevant and appropriate data on lost and stolen firearms registered in national systems are, by 
default, automatically registered in SIS II, EIS and iARMS and to ensure that the creation, updating 
and deletion of these data in the national database are synchronised with SIS II EIS and iARMS. 

These  proposals  do  not  have  to  lead  to  the  introduction  of  centralized  databases  but  rather 
involve  optimizing  the  current  framework  in  terms  of  availability  of  data  and  the  information 
exchange between Member State authorities. This approach can be considered as a Prüm-style 
solution, where separate data systems still exist but are connected in a highly efficient way.     

The  exchange  of  information  between  Member  States  is  constrained  by  data  protection 
considerations.  Article  16  TFEU,  Article  8  of  the  European  Convention  of  Human  Rights  (ECHR) 
and Article 8 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFREU) stress that everybody has a 
right  to  privacy  and  data  protection  of  personal  data  concerning  them.  These  provisions 
complicate  the  sharing  of  sensitive  information  such  as  information  on  firearm  convictions. 
However,  Article  8  (2)  of  the  ECHR  stipulates  that  “There  shall  be  no  interference  by  a  public 
authority  with  the  exercise  of  this  right  except  such  as  is  in  accordance  with  the  law  and  is 
necessary  in  a  democratic  society  in  the  interests  of  national  security,  public  safety  or  the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health  or  morals,  or  for  the  protection  of  the  rights  and  freedoms  of  others.”  145  This  list  of 
exemptions  clearly  shows  that  for  the  prevention  of  crime  through  illicit  firearms  trafficking, 
information sharing is appropriate. This is also reflected in Article 87(2a) of the TFEU which states 
that  further  legislation  can  be  adopted  to  regulate  information  exchange  between  Member 
States’ law enforcement authorities. Consequently, Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 
27 November 2008 on the protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters146 has been adopted.  

Having established that for the prevention of disorder or crime, Member States should do more 
to  share  information,  it  is  also  important  to  elaborate  on  the  mechanism  for  information 
collection  and  information  sharing.  Europol  national  units  coordinate  the  collection  of 
information  from  the  various  law  enforcement  agencies  in  Member  States,  and  Europol  itself 
administers  the  information  exchange  between  the  national  units.  Article  88  (2a)  of  the  TFEU 
stipulates that the tasks of Europol might include “the collection, storage processing, analysis and 
exchange of information forwarded particularly by the authorities of the Member States or third 
countries or bodies”.147  In this regard, Europol is already working with EU Member States on an 
Information  Exchange  Platform  (IXP)  that  could  provide  a  basis  for  such  an  initiative. 
Nevertheless, this information exchange cannot include information on legal weapon possession. 
Therefore, Europol cannot serve as sole administrator of existing databases.  

145 Article 8 (2) ECHR 

146 Currently this Framework Decision is subject to revision and might be replaced by a Directive soon.  

147 This task is also mentioned in Article 5 (1a) COUNCIL DECISION of 6 April 2009 establishing the European 

Police Office (Europol), 2009/371/JHA. 

       93 

 
 
 
                                                 
Europol  is  well-suited  to  manage  the  IXP  database.  First,  Europol  has  national  units  in  each 
Member State and there is a liaison officer for each Member State in The Hague. Consequently, 
information  collection  and  processing  should  be  easier  since  officials  are  already  working 
alongside  each  other.  Second,  Europol  has  the  Europol  Information  System  at  its  disposal.    By 
integrating the IXP database into this ICT framework, costs could be reduced at the development 
of  improved  databases  speeded  up.  Moreover,  the  Europol  Information  System  is  already 
regulated  and  subject  to  data  protection  rules.  Therefore,  it  is  more  likely  that  Member  States 
would accept it as the “host” of the new bearing in mind their previous agreement to Europol’s 
data protection rules and procedures.    

4.4.2       Strengthening the regulatory framework for legal firearms 

Strengthening the regulatory framework for legal firearms would help ensure that weapons do 
not fall into the wrong hands. A number of initiatives could be taken in relation to: (i) firearms 
dealers, (ii) firearms owners and (iii) firearms marking.  

At  present,  firearms  dealers  must  register  with  the  national  (or  regional)  authorities  in  all 
Member States before engaging in commerce. However, the research has highlighted at least one 
case  where  a  person  who  had  been  convicted  of  firearms  trafficking  had  been  able  to  open  a 
firearms shop in another Member State. Under this option a common registration procedure for 
firearms dealers would be introduced. This could also include checking any new dealers against 
the  database  of  convictions  (see  point  above) as  well as  developing a  pan-European  register  of 
firearms  dealers.  The  ECRIS  (European  Criminal  Information  System)  is  very  relevant  in  this 
respect, both with regard to identifying dealers but also individuals seeking to purchase a firearm 
who have criminal convictions in another Member State.148 

In a number of Member States, firearms holders must hold a licence. In some countries, such as 
the  UK,  licence  holders’  obligations  include  the  need  for  the  firearms  to  which  the  certificate 
relates to be stored securely at all times so as to prevent access by unauthorized persons.  This 
type of law might be difficult to implement at the EU level. However, ensuring that each Member 
State has a comprehensive and up to date list of licence holders would strengthen controls with 
regard to the legal ownership of firearms in the EU and help reduce the risk of weapons falling 
into the wrong hands.  Going one step further, these databases of licence holders would, under 
Policy  Option  2(b)  be harmonised in order  to  allow  information  to  be shared on a  cross-border 
basis.   

Finally, firearms marking and deactivation is currently not harmonised in the EU.  This problem is 
the  subject  of  another  study  being  conducted  by  the  European  Commission.    It  is  important  to 
note however that with different technical definition of deactivation and marking, it is possible to 

148 ECRIS was established in April 2012 to achieve an efficient exchange of information on criminal convictions 
between EU countries. It provides an electronic interconnection of criminal records databases to ensure 
that  information  on  convictions  is  exchanged  between  EU  countries  in  a  uniform,  speedy  and  easily 
computer-transferable  way.  Since  ECRIS  concerns  only  EU  nationals,  it  is  currently  not  possible  to 
determine  whether  third  country  nationals  were  previously  convicted  in  other  EU  countries  without 
consulting  all  of  them.  The  creation  of  a  European  index  of  convicted  third-country  nationals  to 
supplement  ECRIS  is  under  consideration.  Illicit  trafficking  and  other  offences  related  to  weapons, 
firearms,  their  parts  and  components,  ammunition  and  explosives  is  one  of  the  categories  of  offences 
covered by the ECRIS system.  

                                                 
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Section 

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  4 

legally  procure  deactivated  firearms  that  can  be  used  to  build  a  functioning  weapon.    At  a 
minimum,  a  typology  of  the  types  of  deactivation  procedures  should  be  developed  alongside  a 
table  of  comparison  to  ensure  that  national  authorities  have  the  capacity  to  understand  each 
others’ rules and procedures.  

4.4.3       Special Investigative Techniques and Capacity Building  

One  of  the  operational  problems  faced  by  law  enforcement  authorities  in  seeking  to  tackle 
cross-border  aspects  of  illicit  firearms  trafficking  relates  to  the  use  of  special  investigative 
techniques.   

More specifically, wire-tapping can only be used in some Member States (such as Belgium) where 
the  penalties  and  sanctions  that  can  be  given  for  a  firearms  trafficking  offence  are  under  the 
threshold regulating the use of such techniques.  In the absence of a harmonisation of sanctions 
and  penalties,  a  list  of  the  investigation  tools  available  to  help  combat  firearms  trafficking 
offences should be developed.  As part of Policy Option 2(b), Member States would be requested 
to  ensure  that  a  minimum  range  of  special  investigative  techniques  are  available  to  law 
enforcement authorities in cases relating to firearms trafficking.  

Another issue relating to investigation techniques concerns the procedures governing controlled 
deliveries.    These  types  of  operations  require  very  close  cooperation  between  the  law 
enforcement  authorities  of  a  number  of  Member  States  as  well  as  between  the  prosecutors  in 
these Member States. Controlled deliveries are by definition complex and high risk, which means 
that trust in the information received and a capacity to act at short notice is paramount for the 
success  of  such  operations.    In  this  respect,  there  is  a  need  to  ensure  that  the  rules  governing 
controlled  deliveries  are  harmonised  so  that  prosecutors  in  one  Member  State  do  not  impose 
conditions that jeapodise the conduct of an operation in another Member State, or cause delays 
that  prevent  a  controlled  delivery  going  ahead.  In  a  similar  vein,  the  development  of  networks 
and  relationships  between  law  enforcement  agencies  and  prosecutors  would  help  develop 
mutual  trust  and  consequently  play  a  positive  role  in  the  effectiveness  of  cross-border 
investigations and controlled deliveries.  

Turning to the wider question of capacity building, there is considerable scope to further develop 
the training of law enforcement officers to help identify and successfully stop illicit trafficking 
of  firearms.  The  FBI  Academy  has  played  a  significant  role  in  developing  skills  amongst  law 
enforcement  officers  from  many  of  the  newer  EU  Member  State.  Under  Policy  Option  2(a), 
capacity building involving EU agencies such as EUROPOL and CEPOL would be stepped up, as well 
as bilateral initiatives between Member States.  As noted earlier, some of the newer EU Member 
States  face  particularly  severe  capacity  constraints  in  dealing  with  cross-border  cases  and 
additional resources (financial assistance, secondment of personnel, training) is required. Sharing 
illicit  firearms 
best  practices  (e.g.  with  regard  to  marking  systems  to  help  combat 
trafficking)would be helpful.  

4.4.4       Other Measures 

There are several other measures could be introduced as part of Policy Option2 (a). For example, 
buy-back  schemes  have  been  quite  effective  in  collecting  weapons  (e.g.  in  Australia,  some  US 

       95 

 
 
 
cities, Croatia). There is a risk of financing organised crime  through such schemes but overall the 
idea  could  be  explored  especially  in  Member  States  where  the  rate  of  gun  ownership  is  high  or 
where the introduction of new legislation renders previously legally held firearms illegal. 

For each of the measure described in this section, improved monitoring and data collection tools 
should be set up.  This horizontal action would at least have the benefit of allowing policy makers 
at the national and European levels to develop a clear understanding of the extent of the problem.  
This would include monitoring of the number of cases of illicit firearms cases prosecuted and tried, 
their value, the types of crimes they are linked to, trends in cross-border illicit trafficking, etc. The 
availability  of  this  data  would  also  allow  data  collection  for  future  action.  Linked  to  this,  Policy 
Option 2(a) would involve encouraging the integration of existing databases on firearms ownership 
and developing a warning system to tackle existing issues linked to a change of ownership, etc.  

Other  EU-level  initiatives  might  also  be  considered  such  as  strengthening  the  role  of  European 
agencies that are engaged in the effort to combat illicit firearms trafficking (Europol, Eurojust and 
possibly Frontex and CEPOL), for example by increasing the number of personnel specialising in the 
illicit firearms problem, as well as developing better ways of monitoring the problem and sharing 
information  (perhaps  using  the  existing  FIU  platform).  There  may  also  be  a  case  for  even  closer 
joint-working with international agencies and countries outside Europe that are either the source 
or destination of illicit firearms.  

Policy  Option  2(a)  would  have  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  a  ‘soft  law’  instrument.  The 
positive aspects relate to the identification of Member State good practices and the promotion of a 
convergence  of  practices,  enhancing  overall  the  EU  response  and  improving  investigation  and 
prosecution  activities  in  cross-border  cases.  The  less  positive  aspect  could  be  slow  and  uneven 
progress in the detection, investigation and prosecution of illicit firearms cases from one Member 
States  to  the  other  because  of  the  absence  of  a  stronger  framework  of  common  measures.  Even 
those stakeholders who are doubtful of the need for EU intervention see the benefits of measures 
to enhance cross-border cooperation between Member States and their law enforcement agencies 
that is proposed under Policy Option 2(a). As noted earlier, this policy option could be considered 
being  partially  addressed  through  the  framework  of  the  firearms  policy  cycle  priority  and  the 
implementation of the Commission Communication. However, a soft measure such as Policy Option 
2(a)  would  only  affect  the  implementation  side  of  the  illicit  firearms  trafficking  problem  without 
tackling any of the more fundamental issues linked to diverging definitions and sanctions. 

4.4    Policy Option 2(b) - Minimum legislative intervention at the EU level 

Policy  Option  2(b)  would  involve  a  minimum  level  of  legislative  intervention  at  EU  level  to 
strengthen  police  and  judicial  cross-border  cooperation.  Policy  Option  2(b)  would  be  based  on 
elements of Policy Option 2(a) but take them further by making them legally binding.  

As  already  explained  in  Policy  Option  2(a),  Option  2(b)  also  includes  the  improvement  of  the 
availability of information on illicit firearms trafficking. In Option 2(a) it has been illustrated that 
there are several existing databases on illicit firearms trafficking. Nevertheless, the 2008 Directive 
does  not  explicitly  regulate  the  practicalities  of  sharing  of  information  between  Member  States. 
Therefore, information-sharing needs to be enhanced both on the Europol (IXP) and national levels. 
Policy  Option  2(a)  would  be  based  on  soft  law  instruments  and  guidelines,  meaning  that 
information  sharing  through  Europol  and  national  units  would  be  voluntary.  Under  Policy  Option 
2(b)  information  sharing  (through  Europol  or  another  mechanism)  would  be  made  obligatory.  In 
this way Member States would be obliged to allow other Member State authorities access to their 

Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Arms Trafficking in the European Union 

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  4 

information on illicit firearms and trafficking. By linking the Directive to the general legal basis and 
the  core  functions  of  Europol149  it  would  be  feasible  to  agree  on  common  terms  on  information 
sharing while respecting data protection and privacy concerns.  

Policy  Option  2(b)  would  also  include  a  minimum  harmonization  among  Member  States  of  the 
legal basis for special investigative techniques used by law  enforcement  authorities in inquiries 
relating to firearms trafficking. An example mentioned in Policy Option 2(a) is wiretapping: while 
this  can  be  used  in  Belgium  for  offences  related  to  firearms  trafficking,  it  is  prohibited  in  many 
other  Member  States.  These  and  other  differences  in  rules  relating  to  special  techniques  can 
hamper  successful  investigations  as  soon  as  an  investigation  covers  more  than  one  jurisdiction. 
Consequently,  Policy  Option  2(b)  would  involve  the  development  of  a  list  of  eligible  investigation 
tools  available  for  firearms  trafficking  offences.  This  list  could  be  included  in  the  Directive  to 
harmonize techniques in all Member States. This harmonization of special investigative techniques 
would important to establish mutual trust between law enforcement agents and has relevance to 
the ultimate success of operations. Mutual trust and alignment of investigative procedures is also 
particularly relevant for the success of controlled deliveries, which has already been mentioned in 
Policy  Option  2(a).  Especially  for  controlled  deliveries,  harmonization  via  a  Policy  Option  2(b) 
instrument  might  be  advantageous  because  Member  States  would  be  obliged  to  adopt  the  same 
procedures.     

Various ways to strengthen the regulatory framework for legal firearms would also be included in 
Policy  Option  2(b),  thereby  helping  to  prevent  a  transfer  of  weapons  from  the  licit  to  the  illicit 
market. In respect of firearms dealers, a Policy Option 2(b) legislative instrument under this option 
would require Member States to:  

 

 

 

Adopt a common registration procedure for firearms dealers;  

Check any new dealers against the proposed EU-wide database of convictions (discussed in 
Section 4.2.2);  

Ensure entries on the national register are included on a new EU-wide register of firearms 
dealers.  

For firearms owners, the comprehensive and up-to-date national lists of licence holders of firearms 
referred to as a soft law measure for Policy Option 2(a) would be subject to legal approximation at 
the EU level. The form and content of such lists, as well as the obligations on national authorities 
with regard to maintaining and sharing the list with other Member States, would be prescribed in 
the  legislative  instrument  developed  under  Policy  Option  2(b).  In  addition  to  the  further 
development  and  integration  of  EU-level  databases  discussed  above  (covering  legal  and  illegal 
possession of firearms, firearms dealers, etc.),  these some other relevant data collection activities 
could  be  put  on  a  statutory  footing.  This  might  include,  for  example,  data  in  relation  to  national 
prosecution and conviction rates.  

149 Article 88 (2a) 

       97 

 
 
 
                                                 
The  argument  in  favour  of  including  data  collection  obligations  in  a  Policy  Option  2(b)  legislative 
instrument is that it would add momentum to existing Member State-level and non-statutory EU-
level initiatives, and ensure that new initiatives are more effective and timely than they would be if 
they  had  no  legislative  basis.  Similarly,  strengthening  the  roles  of  EU  agencies  (notably  Europol 
and  Eurojust)  by  setting  their  new  data  collection  responsibilities  out  in  a  Policy  Option  2(b) 
legislative instrument would reaffirm their centrality in the illicit firearms trafficking information-
sharing network to national authorities.  

A caveat in considering the options for minimum legislative intervention under Policy Option 2(b) is 
the  importance,  where  necessary,  of  preserving  a  degree  of  flexibility  and/or  informality  in 
information-sharing arrangements. A representative of police authorities in the Netherlands told us 
that in his experience the most successful cross-border information exchange networks are those 
which grow organically. The ones which are implemented and run along more formal lines are often 
not  conducive  to  the  same  free-flow  of  information.  Therefore  Policy  Option  2  (b)  requires 
adequate monitoring mechanisms to ensure its effectiveness and efficiency. One option would be 
to fix regular assessment requirements of the formalized networks in the Directive.     

The main benefit of Policy Option 2(b) is that it would be easier to develop a political consensus 
around  relatively  modest  proposals  than  the  more  ambitious  Policy  Option  3  and  this  could  be 
the  starting  point  of  a  step-by-step  approach  to  strengthening  the  legal  framework  for 
combatting  illicit  firearms  trafficking  in  the  EU.  The  drawback  with  Policy  Option  2(b)  could  be 
that,  despite  the  operational  and  practical  advantages  it  offers,  by  itself  it  is  not  sufficiently 
ambitious  or  comprehensive  given  the  seriousness  of  the  problem  of  illicit  firearms  trafficking. 
Some  stakeholders  in  favour  of  an  EU  legislative  measure  believe  that  this  option  would  have  a 
limited impact, while others in favour of Policy Option 2(a) do not see the need to set this measure 
in a legally-binding instrument. 

4.4.6  Assessment of Policy Option 2 Impacts 

In  this  section  we  analyse  the  anticipated  impacts  of  Policy  Option  2(a)  and  (b).  This  analysis 
measures  the  impacts  against  the  policy  objectives  and  other  criteria,  namely:  social  impacts; 
financial  impacts;  fundamental  rights  impacts;  as  well  as  other  considerations  such  as  the 
subsidiarity and proportionality principles.  

Impact on achieving the policy objectives  

Policy Option 2 (a) would contribute to most of the policy objectives, specifically by strengthening 
the operational basis for cross-border cooperation between the law enforcement agencies. This 
contribution would be especially evident with Policy Option 2 (b) insofar as there would be a legally 
binding requirement on EU Member States underpinning certain elements of Policy Option relating 
to  information  sharing  and  the  marking  of  firearms.  (However,  the  legal  dimension  would  not  of 
course be as pronounced and comprehensive as under Policy Option 3.) 

The following table summarises our assessment of the contribution of Policy Option 2 to the policy 
objectives set out earlier.  

 
 
 
 
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Section 

Policy Objectives & Options 

  4 

Table  4.1:  Summary  -  Contribution  of  Policy  Option  2  to  Policy  Objectives  (Note:  -5  =  very 
negative contribution/+5 = very positive contribution) 

Policy Objectives  

Overall objective  

To contribute to an enhanced level of security and to less firearms-related crime 
in  the  EU  by  reducing  the  number  of  firearms  illicitly  trafficked  to,  from  and 
within the EU.  

Strategic objectives 

To deter the committing of criminal offences related to firearms. 

To improve the cooperation between law enforcement authorities in preventing 
detecting, disrupting, investigating and prosecuting illicit arm trafficking. 

To provide a model which can be promoted in discussions with third countries on 
firearms risk reduction.   

Operational objectives 

To  minimize  the  differences  in  definitions  of  firearms  offences  and  levels  of 
sanctions across the EU. 

To  put  in  place  a  system  for  regular  monitoring  the  effectiveness  of  efforts  to 
disrupt firearms crime including generation of comparable statistics. 

To  further  encourage  the  sharing  of  information  and  intelligence  on  illicit 
firearms trafficking and the links with other criminal activities. 

Impact 

+3 

+3 

+4 

+4 

0 

+3 (PO 2a) 
+5 (PO 2b) 

+3 (PO 2a) 
+5 (PO 2b) 

Turning to the impact on key target groups (drivers of the problem), unlike Policy Option 1 which 
would  have  no  impact  and  Policy  Option  3  which  would  have  a  direct  effect  on  the  target 
groups/drivers by harmonising key aspects of the legislative framework, the impact of Policy Option 
2 on the drivers would be essentially indirect. In other words, Policy Option 2 would impact on the 
drivers insofar as it should increase the capacity of the law enforcement authorities to tackle the 
illicit  firearms  trafficking  problem  by  improving  cross-border  cooperation  between  the  agencies, 
and  insofar  as  it  achieves  this,  should  then  lead  to  more  effective  actions  in  relation  to  the 
perpetrators of illicit trafficking.  

The most immediate impact would be on those engaged in firearms trafficking (i.e. Problem driver 
2)  as  the  capacity  cooperate  more  closely  on  operations  to  intercept  shipments  would  directly 
affect  those  who  organise  the  trafficking  of  weapons.    Insofar  as  this  should  lead  to  a  reduced 
supply  of  illicit  firearms,  there  would  then  be  an  impact  on  end  users.  Suppliers  are  a  more 
heterogeneous  category  than  traffickers.  There  are  numerous  sources  of  illegal  firearms,  such  as 
former  conflict  zones,  the  reactivation  of  neutralised  weapons;  burglaries  and  thefts; 
embezzlement of legal arms; legal arms sold in the illegal market; firearms retired from service by 
the army or police; and the conversion of gas pistols. To the extent that some of these sources (e.g. 
former conflict zones, reactivated weapons) are more important as others (e.g. domestic burglaries 

       99 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and  theft)  in  terms  of  the  cross-border  dimension  of  illicit  firearms  trafficking,  Policy  Option  2 
would have varying impacts. 

The following table provides a summary of impacts in relation to the various target groups/drivers. 

Table 4.2: Likely impacts of Policy Option 2 on Problem Drivers 

Drivers 

End users  

Traffickers and other intermediaries 

Suppliers 

Financial, economic and social impacts 

Impact 

+4 

+5 

+3 

There would be financial costs associated with Policy Option 2 but also economic and social effects. 
Possible financial, economic and social impacts of Policy Option 2 include: 

 

 

 

Financial costs would be incurred by law enforcement authorities, especially in EU Member 
States where actions need to be taken to improve information on illicit firearms, to improve 
training and capacity building, and to strengthen marking systems and measures to make it 
easier to control licit market. These costs are very difficult to quantify but are unlikely to be 
excessive, especially if spread over several years. For other countries, the costs of Policy 
Option 2 should be minimal.   

Turning to the direct economic and social effects, the financial costs associated with Policy 
Option 2 should be more than offset by indirect savings from lower crime rates from 
tackling firearms trafficking more effectively and thus reducing the supply of illicit firearms 
to potential offenders.   

There should also be wider societal impacts such as a reduction in the number of victims of 
homicide and other violent crimes featuring illicitly trafficked firearms. Vulnerable groups 
would benefit from a possible diminution in other criminal activities supported by illicit 
firearms trafficking, such as human trafficking and drugs smuggling.  

The  following  table  provides  a  summary  of  the  financial,  economic  and  social  impacts  of  Policy 
Option 2. 

Table 4.3: Likely financial, economic and social impacts of Policy Option 2  

Drivers 

Financial costs  

Economic impacts 

Social/societal impacts 

Impacts on fundamental rights 

Impact 
-  2 for MS where actions needed  
-  0 for other Member States 

+3 

+2 

 
 
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Policy Option 2 would have limited impacts on fundamental rights.  The most obvious effect would 
be in relation to taking steps to improve the availability and sharing of information on illicit firearms 
trafficking, and potentially from an extension of special investigative techniques (e.g. wire-tapping) 
under Policy Option 2b.  

More  specifically,  there  are  implications  for  Article  48  (Presumption  of  innocence  and  right  of 
defence).  But  offset  against  this  are  the  positive  societal  effects  highlighted  above  and  Article  6 
(right to liberty and security). This right stands to be enhanced by Policy Option 2.  Policy Option 2a 
measures  with  regard  to  information  sharing  could  also  have  implications  for  Article  8  (data 
protection)  although  there  is  a  provision  for  actions  to  be  taken  in  the  public  interest  and  Policy 
Option 2 measures would fall within the scope of this provision. In the table below the anticipated 
fundamental rights impacts of Policy Option 2 are summarised:  

Table 4.4: Likely impacts of Policy Option 2 on fundamental rights 

Fundamental rights 

Fundamental rights 
Article 2 (right to life) 

Article 6 (right to liberty and security) 

Article 8 (data protection) 

Article 48 (presumption of innocence and right of defence) 

Impact 

+2 

+2 

0 

0 

Subsidiarity, proportionality, EU added value and political feasibility 

The  legal  basis  for  any  EU  measure  in  this  area  (Article  83(1)  TFEU),  as  well  as  the  principles  of 
subsidiarity and proportionality (Article 5(3) and 5(4) TEU), are described in Section 3 where it is 
explained that two tests apply in respect of the subsidiarity principle: the necessity test and the EU 
value added test. 

As  regards  necessity,  there  would  be  operational  advantages  resulting  from  Policy  Option  2  with 
regard to cross-border investigations. Joint investigations are at present hampered and/or delayed 
and sometimes abandoned because of shortcomings with regard to the factors addressed by this 
policy option (e.g. difficulties in adopting special investigative techniques because of differing laws 
or  judicial  procedures  in  different  EU  Member  States).  In  relation  to  subsidiarity,  there  are  no 
particular  issues  while  EU  added  value  should  be  considerable  as  Member  States  are  unlikely  to 
bring  about  the  Policy  Option  2  improvements  in  cross-border  cooperation  between  law 
enforcement  on  the  geographical  scale,  or  within  the  timeframe  envisaged,  without  EU 
intervention.    The  question  of  political  feasibility  is  also  relevant  and  Policy  Option  2  (a)  would 
probably be easier than Option 2 (b) to reach agreement on and to implement.  

In the table below the anticipated ‘other factors’ impacts are graded on a scale from minus 5 (very 
weak impact) to plus five (very strong impact). Zero represents a neutral impact.  

       101 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.5: Subsidiarity, proportionality, EU added value and political feasibility 

Other considerations 

Subsidiarity principle – i.e. the extent to which the EU should act in certain areas 
only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States. 

Proportionality principle - extent to which EU actions do not go beyond what is 
necessary in order to achieve the objectives of the Treaty. 

EU added value  - extent to which EU action needed achieves desired outcomes  

factors 

Other 
-  political 
synergies/complementarity with other EU policies 

feasibility,  enforceability  of 

the  option, 

Impact 

0 

0 

+3 

+3 (2a) 
+2 (2b) 

4.5 

Policy Option 3 - Comprehensive legislative solution at the EU level 

Policy Option 3 would involve EU action to introduce legally binding common minimum standards 
across  Member  States  with  regard  to  the  definition  of  criminal  offences  and  their  sanctions 
related  to  illicit  firearms  trafficking  and  linked  offences.  Policy  Option  3  is  more  interventionist 
than  Policy  Option  2(b),  which  is  limited  to  giving  the  non-legislative  options  described  at  Policy 
Option 2(a) statutory, EU-wide force by means of a directive.  

4.5.1       Introduction  

We  begin  by  restating  the  relevant  UNODC  Model  Law  articles  criminalising  illicit  firearms 
trafficking in line with the Protocol and Convention, before proposing how these articles could be 
tailored and expanded as provisions in an EU directive. A table of the key elements of a measure on 
the  criminalisation  of  illicit  firearms  trafficking  is  included  in  which  we  summarise  how  these 
elements might be incorporated in a comprehensive legislative solution. The anticipated impacts of 
Policy Option 3 are then described in Section 4.5.4. In the same section we present the preferred 
‘sub-options’  relating  to  the  contents  of  the  proposed  legislative  solution  on  the  basis  of  the 
anticipated impacts as well as the identified policy objectives and other criteria.     

4.5.2 

Suggested illicit firearms trafficking offences: the UNODC Model Law  

The  comparative  legal  analysis  at  Section  3  identified  legislative  divergences  between  Member 
States in relation to the definitions of ‘firearms’, ‘illicit firearms trafficking’ (and the scope of the 
trafficking  conducts),  ‘illicit  firearms  manufacturing’  as  well  as  the  existence  of  a  marking 
requirement.  These  definitions  and  the  marking  obligation  are  already  provided  at  international 
(UN Protocol) and EU level (Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended).  

It  should  be  clarified  at  the  outset  that  the  comprehensive  legislative  solution  at  Policy  Option  3 
replicates  these  already-existing  definitions.  To  the  extent  that  national  definitional  divergences 
persist,  however,  these  must  be  addressed  via  non-legislative  options  of  the  kind  described  at 
Policy  Option  2,  such  as  sharing  of  best  practice  and  discussions  with  national  legislators  and 

 
 
 
 
 
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Section 

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  4 

policymakers.  In  the  last  resort,  action  can  be  taken  by  the  Commission  against  non-compliant 
Member States by bringing proceedings before the CJEU.    

Policy Option 3 is focussed on the possibility of introducing new EU criminalisation measures for 
illicit  firearms  trafficking  and  manufacturing  offences.  Unlike  the  definitions  referred  to  above, 
these  offences  are  not  presently  set  out  in  EU  law.  At  the  international  level,  Article  5  of  the 
Protocol essentially leaves it to individual countries to determine the form and scope of their illicit 
firearms trafficking and manufacturing offences (“Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and 
other measures as shall be necessary to establish as offences…”). 

Criminalising reprehensible illicit firearms trafficking and manufacturing conducts in a uniform, EU-
wide  manner  has  theoretical  advantages.  While  these  will  be  analysed  in  more  detail  in  the 
discussion on impacts at Section 4.5.4, in general terms an EU measure in this area would allow for 
approximation  in  the  important  areas  of  sanctions,  requisite  criminal  intent,  the  existence  of 
attempted trafficking and complicit offences, and liability of legal as well as natural persons.  

Such  action  would,  in  turn,  further  the  identified  specific  objectives,  notably  by  deterring  the 
committing of criminal offences related to firearms by for example establishing minimum levels of 
custodial  sentences  in  all  Member  States  and  widening  the  scope  of  offenders’  potential  liability 
(for example in relation to attempted trafficking offences or aiding and abetting firearms trafficking 
and  manufacturing).  Police  and  judicial  cooperation  would  be  boosted  by  (i)  increased  legal 
certainty  and  clarity  as  to  national  laws,  and  (ii)  the  establishment  of  approximated  sanctions 
thresholds at a level that would enable the use of special investigative techniques. In addition, an 
EU measure would further the operational objective of minimising differences in the definition of 
the crime of illicit firearms trafficking and manufacturing across the Union.  

The benefit of using the suggested Model Law articles as a basis for EU provisions criminalising 
illicit firearms trafficking and manufacturing is chiefly that the Model Law is drafted with a view 
to  assisting  signatory  countries  implementing  the  Protocol.  The  latter  is  the  key  instrument  at 
international  law  intended  to  establishing  as  a  criminal  offence  the  illicit  manufacturing  of  and 
trafficking  in  firearms.  Furthermore,  the  existing  EU  legislative  framework  on  firearms  largely 
derives from the Protocol, which was negotiated and signed by the Commission in 2002 on behalf 
of  the  EU.  In  this  way,  basing  any  new  EU  legislative  measures  on  the  model  provisions  for 
implementing  the  Protocol  ensures  continuity  and  the  natural  evolution  of,  rather  than  a  radical 
departure  from,  the  existing  UN  and  EU legal  framework regarding firearms.  As  at  April  2014,  18 
Member States have signed the Protocol and a further 20 Member States have approved/ratified it. 
The Commission signed and (on 21 March 2014) ratified the Protocol on behalf of the EU.150 This 
has the effect for those Member States that have not yet ratified the Protocol of becoming legally 
binding for them.151   

150 https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12-c&chapter=18&lang=en.  

151 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-271_en.htm.  

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A further practical benefit of adapting the Model Law precedent is that the applicable wording (set 
out  in  full  below)  replicates  the  illicit  firearms  trafficking  conducts  of  import,  export,  acquisition, 
sale, delivery, movement or transfer of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition set 
out  in  the  Protocol.  As  noted  in  Section  3.2  this  is  wider  than  the  conducts  included  in  Directive 
91/477/EEC, as amended, which make to reference to import or export of firearms. 

As regards the definition of ‘firearm’, it is proposed that as part of Policy Options 3 any EU measure 
should  replicate  the  Protocol  definition  rather  than  the  substantially  similar  but  marginally 
narrower  definition  in  Directive  91/477/EEC,  as  amended.  The  latter  contains  certain  carve-outs, 
notably in relation to antique weapons that are essentially covered by national laws. By contrast in 
the  Protocol  there  is  a  blanket  prohibition  of  any  firearms  manufactured  after  1899  from  being 
classified as ‘antique’.152 

4.5.3  UNODC Model Law  

The  Model  Law  was  developed  after  many  signatory  states  to  the  Convention  and  Protocol 
indicated their need for model legislation or guidelines in order to harmonise domestic legislation 
with  the  requirements  of  these  U.N.  instruments.  Suggested  provisions  for  the  criminalisation  of 
illicit firearms trafficking are set out at articles 35 and 36: 

Model Law – Illicit firearms trafficking offences 

Article 34. Transnational transfers without legal authorization 

1.  Every  person  who  [specify  level  of  intent,  as  appropriate]  imports,  exports  or  otherwise 
acquires,  sells,  delivers,  moves  or  transfers  any  firearm  or  its  parts  and  components  or 
ammunition  from  or  across  the  territory  of  [name  of  State]  to  another  State  without  legal 
authorization [a licence] issued in accordance with [name of this Law] commits an offence. 

2.  A  person  guilty  of  an  offence  under  paragraph  1  of  this  article  shall  upon  conviction  be 
subject to [imprisonment for ...] and/or [a fine of/up to ...] [a fine of the ... category]. 

Article 35. Transnational transfers of unmarked/improperly marked firearms 

1.  Every  person  who  [specify  level  of  intent,  as  appropriate]  imports,  exports  or  otherwise 
acquires, sells, delivers, moves or transfers any firearm from or across the territory of [name 
of State] to another State that have not been marked at the time of manufacture, at the time 
of import or at the time of transfer from government stocks to civilian use in accordance with 
chapter IV of this Law commits an offence. 

2.  A  person  guilty  of  an  offence  under  paragraph  1  of  this  article  shall  upon  conviction  be 

152 Part III of Annex 1 provides: “For the purposes of this Annex objects which correspond to the definition of a 
'firearm' shall not be included in that definition if they: (a) have been rendered permanently unfit for use 
by the application of technical procedures which are guaranteed by an official body or recognized by such 
a  body;  (b)  are  designed  for  alarm,  signalling,  life-saving,  animal  slaughter  or  harpoon  fishing  or  for 
industrial  or  technical  purposes  provided  that  they  can  be  used  for  the  stated  purpose  only;  (c)  are 
regarded  as  antique  weapons  or  reproductions  of  such  where  these  have  not  been  included  in  the 
previous categories and are subject to national laws. Pending coordination throughout the Community, 
Member States may apply their national laws to the firearms listed in this Section.” 

                                                 
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subject to [imprisonment for ...] and/or [a fine of/up to ...] [a fine of the ... category]. 

As  noted  in  Section  3,  the  Model  Law  is  an  advisory  document  and  has  no  binding  force  on  EU 
Member  States.  The  scope  of  the  illicit  firearms  trafficking  (“IFT”)  offence  takes  in  the  various 
conducts (acquisition, sale, delivery, et cetera) identified in Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended, plus 
the  conducts  of  import  and  export.  This  is  sufficiently  wide  to  capture  all  IFT-related  activity, 
including developing threats identified by stakeholders during the Phase II research, such as the rise 
of ‘e-trafficking’ and the sale and purchase of illicit firearms over the internet. 

However,  perhaps  unsurprisingly  given  its  limited  remit,  the  drafters  have  avoided  a  prescriptive 
approach  and  left  it  to  national  legislators  to  determine  important  aspects  of  an  illicit  firearms 
trafficking  offence,  such  as  the  level  of  penalties  and  sanctions;  the  existence  of  aggravating  or 
mitigating  circumstances;  and  the  relevant  level  of  intent  for  committing  a  firearms  trafficking 
offence. 

4.5.4  Proposed IFT articles for a possible EU instrument: Policy Option 3 

A  table  is  set  out  below  examining  for  each  principal  element  of  the  IFT  offences  possible 
modifications, clarifications or additions to the Model Law articles that could be included in an EU 
legislative instrument. In each case the rationale is summarised for the relevant amendment to the 
Model Law provision or the suggested additional provision.  

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Table 4.6: Policy Option 3 – Summary of amendments to Model Law articles on IFT for inclusion in a possible EU measure 

Element of IFT 
criminalisation 
Liability of 
natural and 
legal persons  

Description of suggested new provision / 
amendment to existing Model Law provision 
Include in definitions of EU instrument:  

“ ‘Person’ shall mean a natural or a legal person.” 

This  amendment  reflects  the  position  in  the  Model 
Law, which provides at article 4(o) that “‘Person’ shall 
mean a natural or a legal person”.  

Required level 
of intention 
(including 
negligence) 

Amendments (in bold) to Articles 34(1) and 35(1): 
‘Every person who intentionally imports, exports (. . .) 
commits an offence.  Each Member State shall adopt 
such  legislative  and  other  measures  as  may  be 
necessary to establish as an offence the acts referred 
to  above,  in  either  or  both  of  the  following  cases 
where the offender (i) suspected or (ii) ought to have 
assumed that his actions resulted in the commission 
of an offence under this section.’ 

Penalties and 
sanctions 

Amendments (in bold) to Articles 34(2) and 35(2): 
 ‘A  person  guilty  of  an  offence  under  paragraph  1  of 
this  article  shall  upon  conviction  be  subject  to 
imprisonment  for  a  maximum  of  at  least  four  years 
and/or a fine of a maximum of at least €10000. Legal 
persons  shall  be  subject  to  effective,  proportionate 

Rationale for new provision or amendment to existing Model Law provision 

 

 

The research shows that a number of EU Member States presently do not extend 
liability for illicit firearms trafficking to legal as well as natural persons. This 
legislative divergence could encourage forum shopping on the part of traffickers 
and, for police and judicial authorities, give rise to practical obstacles to cross-
border investigations and prosecutions. 
The Protocol is clear that sanctions should extend to legal persons (see row on 
penalties and sanctions below). As the Model Law states in its preamble to 
chapter 2, “In general it is advisable for States to adopt definitions that are 
consistent with the Convention and the Protocol in order to facilitate cooperation 
with other countries in the investigation, prosecution or other procedures relating 
to activities under the scope of the Convention and its Protocol and to ensure 
compliance with the various international cooperation requirements.” 
  Negligent commission of illicit firearms trafficking is not criminalised in a 
significant minority of Member States. There are also disparities in what 
constitutes ‘lower’ level intent in jurisdictions where something less than pure 
knowledge can be a requisite mens rea for IFT.  
The wording (or equivalent) in the previous column would create legislative 
certainty by establishing, as a minimum, the lower knowledge threshold of 
‘suspicion’ in all EU jurisdictions. Member States are also given the option of 
establishing a uniform, ‘ought-to-have-assumed’ standard. By making this non-
mandatory, questions of subsidiarity and political feasibility are addressed given 
the general reluctance to introducing a standard of negligence in the criminal 
law, notably in Member States with a common law legal tradition.     
The maximum custodial sanction varies from two years in EL to 12 years in 
Portugal. The maximum financial penalty varies from €1,500 in Bulgaria to €1.8M 
in the Czech Republic. 
This legislative divergence could encourage forum shopping on the part of 
traffickers. Establishing a ‘minimum maximum’ custodial sanction of 4 years 
would be in line with the position in the Convention and Protocol as regards the 

 

 

 

 
 
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Section 

  4 

Element of IFT 
criminalisation 

Description of suggested new provision / 
amendment to existing Model Law provision 
and  dissuasive  criminal  or  non-criminal  sanctions 
(civil  or 
including  monetary 
sanctions.  Such  sanctions  could  include  dissolution, 
disqualification 
in  public 
procurement, publicising the decision, or freezing of 
assets.’ 

from  participation 

administrative), 

Attempted IFT 
and complicit 
activities 

New provision covering: 
(a)  attempting  to  commit  or  participating  as  an 
accomplice  in  one  of  the  acts  listed  above;  and  (b) 
Organizing,  directing,  aiding,  abetting,  facilitating  or 
counselling the commission of an act listed above. 

Aggravating / 
mitigating 
circumstances 

Illicit firearms 
manufacturing 

to 

the 

factors 

include 

relating 

New  provision  covering  aggravating  and  mitigating 
circumstances  for  IFT  and  related  offences.  These 
factual 
could 
circumstances  of  the  offender  or  the  offence,  e.g. 
(aggravating 
in  organised 
factors):  Participation 
criminal gang; Recidivism; State of emergency / war / 
crisis situation; and Large scale / grave consequences. 
New 
firearms 
proscribing 
manufacturing.  This  would  take  a  similar  form  to 
Model  Law  articles  34  and  35  as  amended  in  this 
table. In other words, the illicit manufacturing offence 
would include the following elements:   
 

Legal/natural persons – liability would extend to 

provision 

illicit 

Rationale for new provision or amendment to existing Model Law provision 

minimum sanction for ‘serious’ IFT offences. There are in addition practical 
advantages to establishing an EU-wide 4-year ‘minimum maximum’ (i.e. the 
upper limit of imprisonment must be at least 4 years) in that the 4-year threshold 
is key in the EU legal framework to facilitate police and judicial cooperation. 
  Member States would be free to establish a ceiling for the offence higher than 

 

the 4-year minimum in line with their legal cultures and any political 
considerations. 
The ‘minimum maximum’ financial penalty could be set at €10,000 or a similar 
amount likely to be considered more than merely trivial for an individual or a 
criminal organisation. In setting an alternative threshold the Commission may 
wish to take further advice from experts in the field (practitioners or academics).  

  A significant minority of Member States do not expressly cover attempted 

 

trafficking or aiding and abetting in their IFT legislation.  
These ancillary offences are criminalised in Article 5(2) of the Protocol. Their 
inclusion in an EU measure would thus ensure compliance with the Protocol. 
Perhaps more significantly, on a practical level it would also facilitate cross-
border investigations and prosecutions by widening the available range of IFT 
offences.  

  Aggravating or mitigating circumstances, like sanctions, have an effect on police 

and judicial cooperation. For example, where the existence of mitigating 
circumstances is likely to lower the possible penalty or sanction for a suspected 
offence, incentives may be reduced for sustained, coordinated investigation by 
investigating authorities in two or more EU jurisdictions. 
It is noted that the Model Law leaves aggravating and mitigating circumstances to 
the applicable existing national legislation / criminal code.  

 

  Article 5 of the UN Protocol requires State Parties to adopt necessary legislative 

measures criminalising the conduct of illicit manufacturing of firearms, their parts 
and components and ammunition. Including a provision on illicit manufacturing in 
an EU measure would this guarantee Member States are conform to the standard 
at international law. 
From the Phase II research there is some evidence that illicit firearms 

 

   107 

 
 
      
Rationale for new provision or amendment to existing Model Law provision 

manufacturing is not consistently defined and in some cases not specifically 
criminalised in EU Member States. An EU-wide offence of illicit firearms 
manufacturing based on the definition of that activity set out in the Protocol and 
Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended, would create legal certainty for investigating 
authorities and ensure that criminals are unable to exploit and gaps or loopholes 
in national legal frameworks.  

 

These modifications and clarifications would render the Model Law provisions 
applicable (in the context of existing EU and national law) if replicated in an EU 
legislative instrument. 

Element of IFT 
criminalisation 

Notes: 
Definitions of 
‘firearm’, 
‘legal 
authorization’ 
and ‘chapter 
IV of this law’ 
in the Model 
Law  

 

Description of suggested new provision / 
amendment to existing Model Law provision 
both corporate entities and individuals 
Intent/negligence – include direct knowledge, 
suspicion and ought-to-have-assumed standard 
Sanctions/penalties – ‘minimum maximum’ 
custodial sentence of 4 years and/or financial 
penalty of €10K 

 

  Attempted offence/complicit activities – ensure 
ancillary offences for illicit manufacturing also 
criminalised   

  Aggravating/mitigating circumstances – to 

include factors relating to the offender or 
offence, such as organised crime dimension and 
scale of the crime.  

In any EU legislative instrument on the criminalisation 
of  illicit  firearms  trafficking  and  related  offences, 
references in the Model Law sample articles 34 and 35 
should be amended or clarified such that: 
 

‘Firearm’ (Model Law, articles 34(1) and 35(1)) to 
follow the definition in the Protocol. 
‘Legal authorization [a licence] issued in 
accordance with [name of this Law] commits an 
offence Legal authorization’ (Model Law, Article 
34(1): The relevant ‘Law’ is the Member State’s 
national law implementing Directive 91/477/EEC, 
as amended. 
‘…in accordance with chapter IV of this Law’ 
(Model Law, Article 34(2))  amended in 
accordance with Member States’ national laws 
implementing Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended. 

 

 

 
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4.5.6  Conclusion – comprehensive legislative solution 

legislative  solution 

A  comprehensive 
legally-binding  common  minimum 
standards across Member States with regard to IFT and related offences and sanctions could 
be based on the existing Model Law provisions put forward by the UNODC for State Parties 
for the effective implementation of the Protocol and parent Convention. The amended and 
expanded Model Law provisions would: 

introducing 

 

 

 

 

Ensure that EU Member States’ national laws for illicit firearms trafficking were in 
line with UN and international law standards;  

Bring legal certainty for police and judicial authorities, with the potential to increase 
operational effectiveness in cross-border firearms trafficking cases;   

Act as a deterrent to criminals who would otherwise seek to exploit divergences – 
and this varying levels of stringency – in Member States national laws; and 

Widen the current definitions of ‘firearms’ and ‘illicit firearms trafficking’ in EU law 
as set out in Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended.  

A comprehensive legislative solution is focused on ensuring minimum EU-wide rules in line 
with  Article  83(1)  TFEU.  Where  the  proposed  provisions  go  beyond  the  UN  standard  (for 
in  establishing  minimum  custodial  sentences,  or  prescribing  aggravating 
example, 
circumstances for IFT offences) some or all of these may not be politically feasible, or may 
have  only  limited  impact  measured  against  the  policy  objectives  and  other  criteria.  This  is 
assessed  further  in  Section  4.5.4  below.  Similarly  to  Policy  Option  2  (b),  the  most  suitable 
way  to  monitor  the  effectiveness  of  the  measure  is  to  include  a  regular  assessment 
requirement in the EU legislative instrument.   

4.5.7  Assessment of Policy Option 3 Impacts 

In this section we analyse the anticipated impacts of the comprehensive legislative solution 
under Policy  Option 3. As  with Policy Option 2, this  analysis measures the impacts against 
the  policy  objectives  and  other  criteria,  namely:  social 
impacts; 
fundamental  rights  impacts;  as  well  as  other  considerations  such  as  the  subsidiarity  and 
proportionality principles.  

impacts;  financial 

Before  turning  to  the  impact  assessment  of  Policy  Option  3,  the  key  aspects  of  a 
comprehensive legislative solution set out in the previous section 4.5.3 are summarised in 
the box below:  

Policy Option 3: summary of contents of a legislative solution at EU level 
  Key legislative provisions adapted from articles 34/35 of UNODDC Model Law 

covering: 
o  Offence of illicit intra-EU firearms transfers without legal authorization 
o  Offence of illicit intra-EU transfers of unmarked/improperly marked firearms 
o  Offence of illicit firearms manufacturing 

  Key elements of abovementioned legislative provisions: 

   109 

 
 
 
o 
o 

o 

Liability of natural and legal persons 
Factor of intent: mandatory suspicion or ‘ought-to-have-known’ negligence 
standard  
‘Minimum maximum’ 4-year custodial sanction plus ‘minimum maximum’ (e.g. 
€10,000) financial penalty for trafficking/manufacturing offences 

o  Attempted trafficking and complicit activities (aiding/abetting etc.) offences 
o  Aggravating and mitigating circumstances defined (e.g. participation in organised 

criminal gang, recidivism, large scale of offence)  

  Definitions of ‘firearms’ and ‘illicit firearms trafficking’ 

o  The definitions of ‘firearm’ in the proposed legislative provisions will replicate that 
of the Protocol instead of the marginally narrower definition in the Directive. This 
will have the benefit in particular of removing a possible ‘loophole’ in national 
legislation whereby some post-1899 weapons are classified as ‘antiques’ in some 
EU Member States and thereby do fall outside the definition of ‘firearm’.  

o  The Model Law provisions replicate in full the conducts identified in the definition 
of ‘illicit firearms trafficking’ found in the Protocol, some of which are missing 
from the current EU law definition. In this way an EU measure would bring the 
scope of conducts into line with the international standard.    

Impact on achieving the policy objectives  

As the most interventionist option, the comprehensive legislative solution is well placed to 
meet a number of the identified general, specific and operational objectives:  

 

 

 

An approximating EU directive is in line with the operational objective of minimising 
the differences in definitions of firearms offences and levels of sanctions across the 
EU.  

It would also correspond with the specific objective of providing a model – in the 
form of EU legislative provisions on illicit firearms trafficking – which could be 
promoted in discussions with third countries on firearms risk reduction.  

The specific and operational policy objectives would be furthered in other respects. 
Extending liability to legal as well as natural persons would reflect the definition of 
‘person’ in the Protocol. This would in turn bolster the ability to promote the EU law 
on illicit firearms trafficking and manufacturing with other states, as well as, by 
widening the scope of potential liability, deterring offenders and facilitating cross-
border cooperation between investigating authorities. 

 

Further measures such as: 

o  Lowering the ‘intent’ requirement to mandatory suspicion or an ‘ought-to-have-

o 

o 

known’ negligence standard;  

Introducing minimum EU-wide sanctions; and  

Introducing attempted trafficking and complicit activities offences, are, by 
harmonising constituent elements of firearms trafficking and manufacturing 
offences at EU-level and widening potential liability for such offences, equally 
expected to have the effect of deterring the committing of criminal offences 
related to firearms (specific objective), improving the cooperation between law 

 
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enforcement authorities (specific objective) and minimising the differences in 
definitions of firearms offences and levels of sanctions across the EU 
(operational objective).  

 

The combination of the above impacts of Policy Option 3 would further the general 
policy objective of contributing to an enhanced level of security and to less firearms-
related crimes in the EU by reducing the number of firearms illicitly trafficked to, from 
and within the EU. 

The likely impact is now discussed in further detail by the problem drivers. 

Impacts on problem drivers  

On the demand-side, criminals, members of Organised Crime Groups (OCGs), or terrorists 
and  extremists  would  be  adversely  affected  by  the  introduction  of  EU-level  provisions 
criminalising illicit firearms trafficking. The criminalisation of traffickers and suppliers (see 
further  below),  as  well  as  illicit  manufacturers,  is  likely  to  reduce  the  flow  of  firearms. 
Furthermore, the suggested wording of the EU trafficking provisions refers to every person 
who “imports, exports or otherwise acquires” illicit firearms or their parts or components. 
This  means  end-users  themselves  would  be  liable  for  prosecution  and  conviction  for  EU-
wide trafficking offences carrying a minimum custodial sanction for serious offences (i.e. a 
‘minimum maximum pursuant to which all Member States are required to set a maximum 
custodial  term  of  at  least  4  years,  with  the  option  to  set  a  higher  maximum  limit  if  they 
wish).  

The prospect of a maximum prison term of at least four years could contribute to deterring 
the  commission  of  criminal  offences  related  to  firearms  in  EU  jurisdictions  where  the 
maximum sanction is currently lower than this four-year threshold. On a practical level, the 
existence  of  approximated  illicit  firearms  trafficking  offences  would  facilitate  cross-border 
investigations  where  a  four-year  custodial  sanction  threshold  is  required  for  the  use  of 
special investigative techniques (such as wire-tapping) in one or more Member States. The 
uniform,  EU-wide  extension  of  liability  to  legal  as  well  as  natural  persons  would  also 
negatively affect sophisticated criminal or terrorist organisations that are end-users.    

The  table  below  summarises  the  likely  impacts  on  problem  driver  1,  broken  down  by  the 
elements of the contemplated trafficking offences. 

Table 4.7: Likely impacts of elements of legislative provisions for illicit firearms trafficking 
and manufacturing on demand side of problem  

Element of illicit 
trafficking/manufacturing offence 
Liability of natural and legal 
persons 

Mandatory suspicion or ‘ought-to-
have-known’ negligence standard  

Likely impact on end-users 

impact  anticipated,  whether  because 
Negative 
end-users  are  themselves  caught  by  an  EU 
measure or those further up the supply chain. 
the 
Lowering 
impact  anticipated. 
Negative 
threshold of the mens rea requirement – either by 
the 
‘lesser’  knowledge  of  suspicion  or 
the 

   111 

 
 
 
4 year custodial sanction and/or 
administrative sanction (financial 
penalty of at least €10000 for 
serious trafficking / manufacturing 
offences) 

Attempted trafficking and complicit 
activities (aiding/abetting etc) 
offences 

Aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances defined (e.g. 
participation in organised criminal 
gang, recidivism, large scale of 
offence) 

for  police  and 

introduction of a negligent standard – will make it 
easier 
judicial  authorities  to 
prosecute  and  convict  illicit  arms  trafficking  and 
related offences.  
Negative  impact  anticipated.  Maximum  sentences 
of  at  least  four  years  in  all  Member  States  will 
discourage  forum  shopping  and  have  a  deterrent 
effect for end-users and their suppliers. If suppliers 
are  incarcerated  they  will  have  limited  or  no 
capacity to sell illicit firearms to end-users. 
Negative  impact  anticipated.  Widening  the  range 
of  available  offences  will  make  it  easier  for  police 
and  judicial  authorities  to  prosecute  and  convict 
illicit arms trafficking and related offences 
Small  negative 
Longer 
anticipated. 
sentences  for  aggravated  offences  will  have  a 
deterrent  effect  for  end-users  and  their  suppliers. 
If suppliers are incarcerated they will have limited 
or no capacity to sell illicit firearms to end-users. 

impact 

The likely impacts in respect of the supply side, i.e. traffickers and other intermediaries, are 
summarised below:   

Deterrent  effect  for  criminals:  Illicit  firearms  trafficking  is  almost  always  not  the  primary 
source of income for those OCGs active in this crime area. It follows that these traffickers 
and other intermediaries may be disincentivised from carrying out illicit activities if the risk 
of  financial  and/or  custodial  punishment  outweighs  the  marginal  benefit  of  engaging  in 
firearms  trafficking.  Dissuasive  elements  of  an  EU  measure  would  include  minimum 
sanctions thresholds in all Member States; the lower ‘intent’ requirement of either suspicion 
or  negligence;  and  the  creation  of  attempted  and  complicit  activities  offences  (see  table 
below).  

Operational  benefits  for  police  and  judicial  authorities:  The  proposed  scope  of  an  EU 
legislative  instrument  would  facilitate  prosecutions  and  convictions  of  offenders.  In 
addition,  the  establishment  of  a  minimum  sanctions  threshold  would  ensure  that  the 
offence is of a sufficient gravity to qualify for the special investigative measures discussed at 
Option  2,  improving  cooperation  between  law  enforcement  authorities  in  preventing 
detecting,  disrupting, 
Increased 
judicial 
collaboration  and 
authorities  would,  in  turn,  foster  information  and  intelligence  sharing  on  illicit  firearms 
trafficking and the links with other criminal activities. 

investigations  between  Member  States’  police  and 

investigating  and  prosecuting 

illicit  arm  trafficking. 

joint 

Table 4.8: Likely impacts of elements of legislative provisions for illicit firearms trafficking 
and manufacturing on supply side (traffickers) 

 
 
 
 
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Element of illicit 
trafficking/manufacturing 
offence 
Liability of natural and 
legal persons 

Mandatory suspicion or 
‘ought-to-have-known’ 
negligence standard  

 4 year custodial sanction 
and/or administrative 
sanction (financial penalty 
of at least €10000 for 
serious trafficking / 
manufacturing offences) 

Attempted trafficking and 
complicit activities 
(aiding/abetting etc) 
offences 

Aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances 
defined (e.g. participation 
in organised criminal 
gang, recidivism, large 
scale of offence) 

Likely impact on traffickers 

If 

for 

and 

impact 

traffickers 

anticipated. 

Negative  impact  anticipated,  whether  because  traffickers 
themselves  or  their  customers  (end-users)  or  suppliers 
further  up  the  chain  are  caught  by  an  EU  measure 
criminalising corporate entities as well as individuals. 
Negative impact anticipated. Lowering the  threshold of the 
mens rea requirement – either by the ‘lesser’ knowledge of 
suspicion  or  the  introduction  of  a  negligent  standard  –  will 
make 
judicial  authorities  to 
it  easier  for  police  and 
prosecute and convict illicit arms traffickers.  
Negative 
‘Minimum  maximum’ 
sentences  will  discourage  forum  shopping  and  have  a 
deterrent 
their 
effect 
traffickers  and  suppliers  are 
customers/suppliers. 
incarcerated  they  will  have  limited  or  no  capacity  to  sell 
illicit  firearms  to  end-users.  The  ‘minimum  maximum’ 
financial  penalty  should  be  set  at  a 
is 
further  deter  prospective 
economically  punitive  and 
traffickers.  
Negative 
impact  anticipated.  Widening  the  range  of 
available offences will make it easier for police and judicial 
authorities  to  prosecute  and  convict  illicit  arms  trafficking 
and  related  offences.  Traffickers  and  their  associates  are 
arguably  more  vulnerable  to  these  offences  than  suppliers 
or end-users. 
Small  negative  impact  anticipated.  Longer  sentences  for 
aggravated  offences  will  have  a  deterrent  effect  for 
traffickers  as  well  as  their  customers  (end-users)  and 
suppliers.  If  suppliers  are  incarcerated  this  will  impeded 
traffickers’  capacity  to  source  illicit  firearms  to  sell  on  to 
end-users. 

level  which 

Suppliers are a more heterogeneous category than traffickers. There are numerous sources 
of  illegal  firearms,  such  as  the  reactivation  of  neutralised  weapons;  burglaries  and  thefts; 
embezzlement  of  legal  arms;  legal  arms  sold  in  the  illegal  market;  firearms  retired  from 
service by army or police; and the conversion of gas pistols. However, as with traffickers the 
major incentive of suppliers remains most likely to be financial gain. As a consequence the 
anticipated impacts on suppliers of illicit firearms are not dissimilar to those referred to in 
Problem Driver 2.  
The specific effects of the various elements of an EU legislative measure under Policy Option 
3 on Problem Driver 3 are described in the table below. 

   113 

 
 
 
 
Table 4.9: Likely impacts of elements of legislative provisions for illicit firearms trafficking 
and manufacturing on supply side (suppliers) 

Element of illicit 
trafficking/manufacturing 
offence 
Liability of natural and 
legal persons 

Mandatory suspicion or 
‘ought-to-have-known’ 
negligence standard  

year custodial sanction 
and/or administrative 
sanction (financial penalty 
of at least €10000 for 
serious trafficking / 
manufacturing offences) 

Attempted trafficking and 
complicit activities 
(aiding/abetting etc) 
offences 

Aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances defined (e.g. 
participation in organised 
criminal gang, recidivism, 
large scale of offence) 

Likely impact on suppliers 

Negative  impact  anticipated,  whether  because  suppliers 
themselves  or  their  immediate  customers  (traffickers)  or 
end-users  are  caught  by  an  EU  measure  criminalising 
corporate entities as well as individuals. 
Negative impact anticipated. Lowering the threshold of the 
mens rea requirement – either by the ‘lesser’ knowledge of 
suspicion or the introduction of a negligent standard – will 
make 
it  easier  for  police  and  judicial  authorities  to 
prosecute  and  convict  illicit  arms  traffickers  and  their 
suppliers.  Furthermore,  in  EU  jurisdictions  where  the 
present  intention  threshold  is  direct  knowledge  it  will  be 
easier 
for  prosecuting  authorities  to  establish  that 
suppliers  of  illicit  firearms  suspected  or  ought  to  have 
known that the purchaser was a trafficker.  
Negative 
‘Minimum  maximum’ 
impact  anticipated. 
sentences  will  discourage  forum  shopping  and  have  a 
deterrent 
their 
effect 
for 
If  suppliers  and  traffickers  are 
customers/suppliers. 
incarcerated  this  will  have  a  disruptive  effect  on  their 
business,  as  will  the  establishment  in  EU  law  of  minimum 
financial penalties for serious offences. These should be set 
at a level which is economically punitive.  
Negative 
impact  anticipated.  Widening  the  range  of 
available offences will make it easier for police and judicial 
authorities  to  prosecute  and  convict  illicit  arms  trafficking 
and  related  offences.  Suppliers  will  be  adversely  affected 
by any increase in investigations and convictions.  
Small  negative  impact  anticipated.  Longer  sentences  for 
aggravated  offences  will  have  a  deterrent  effect  for 
suppliers.  On  a  practical  level,  custodial  sentences  will 
disrupt the selling of illicit firearms to traffickers and end-
users. 

traffickers 

and 

Conclusion – impacts of Policy Option 3 on policy objectives and problem drivers 

In the table  below  the anticipated impacts  of  Policy  Option 3  measured against the policy 
objectives  are  graded  on  a  scale  from  minus  5  (very  weak  impact  on  realising  the  policy 
objectives) to plus five (very strong impact on realising the policy objectives). 

Table 4.10: Summary – Policy Option 3 Impacts on policy objectives 

Policy Objectives  

Impact 

 
 
Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Arms Trafficking in the European Union 

Section 

Policy Objectives & Options 

  4 

Overall objective  

To contribute to an enhanced level of security and to less firearms-related 
crime  in  the  EU  by  reducing  the  number  of  firearms  illicitly  trafficked  to, 
from and within the EU.  

Strategic objectives 

To deter the committing of criminal offences related to firearms. 

To  improve  the  cooperation  between  law  enforcement  authorities  in 
preventing  detecting,  disrupting,  investigating  and  prosecuting  illicit  arm 
trafficking. 

To  provide  a  model  which  can  be  promoted  in  discussions  with  third 
countries on firearms risk reduction.   

Operational objectives 

To minimize the differences in definitions of firearms offences and levels of 
sanctions across the EU. 

To put in place a system for regular monitoring the effectiveness of efforts 
to disrupt firearms crime including generation of comparable statistics. 

To further encourage the sharing of information and intelligence on illicit 
firearms trafficking and the links with other criminal activities. 

+4 

+4 

+4 

+5 

+5 

0 

+3 

Financial, economic and social impacts 

Possible  economic  and  social  impacts  of  EU  action  to  introduce  legally-binding  common 
minimum standards across Member States with regard to the definition of criminal offences 
and their sanctions related to illicit firearms trafficking and linked offences include: 

 

 

Financial costs to public authorities (law enforcement authorities and the judiciary) 
– i.e. training and operational cost of enforcing EU legislative provisions 
criminalizing illicit firearms trafficking and manufacturing. These costs are 
impossible to quantify but need to offset against any indirect savings from lower 
crime rates from tackling firearms trafficking more effectively and thus reducing the 
supply of illicit firearms to potential offenders. It is, however, impossible to estimate 
these indirect savings.  

Wider societal impact - these could be direct or indirect. For example, an EU 
measure covering illicit firearms trafficking could have direct effects such as a 
reduction in the number of victims of homicide and other violent crimes featuring 
illicitly trafficked firearms. These offences may be perpetrated by either individuals 
(e.g. in domestic disputes), OCGs or terrorist and extremist groups. Indirect effects 
could include a reduction in the number of indirect victims such as EU citizens who 
under the current arrangements feel less safe and consequently have a lower 
quality of life. Vulnerable groups would benefit from a possible diminution in other 
criminal activities supported by illicit firearms trafficking, such as human trafficking 

   115 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and drugs smuggling. Though not the primary focus of this study, outside the EU the 
trafficking of illicit firearms originating from regions such as the Western Balkans 
can also have undesirable destabilising effects in external conflicts zones such as 
North Africa or the Middle-East. Reducing the flow of illicit firearms from the EU 
would have a beneficial impact in these parts of the globe. 

The possible social impacts of a comprehensive legislative solution under Policy Option 3 are 
summarised in the table below. 

Table  4.11:  Likely  social  impacts  of  elements  of  legislative  provisions  for  illicit  firearms 
trafficking and manufacturing 

Element of illicit 
trafficking/manufacturing 
offence 
Liability of natural and 
legal persons 

Mandatory suspicion or 
‘ought-to-have-known’ 
negligence standard  

4 year custodial sanction 
and/or administrative 
sanction (financial penalty 
of at least €10000 for 
serious trafficking / 
manufacturing offences) 
Attempted trafficking and 
complicit activities 
(aiding/abetting etc) 
offences 

Aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances 
defined (e.g. participation 

Likely social impacts 

liability 

in  principle  make 

impact  expected.  Extending 

to 
Small  positive 
the  aiding/abetting 
corporate  entities,  combined  with 
offences  (see  below),  will  have  a  positive  social  impact  by 
potentially  deterring  or  securing the  arrest and  conviction  of 
advisers (accountants, lawyers) to crime lords and OCGs. This 
will in theory contribute to fewer illicit firearms trafficking and 
related offences that in turn support other criminal  activities 
such as money laundering and drug/people trafficking.    
Small  positive  impact  expected.  Reducing  the  mens  rea 
it  easier  to  secure 
requirement  will 
prosecutions and convictions for illicit firearms trafficking and 
manufacturing – albeit the increase in conviction rate is likely 
to be modest. Stemming the availability of lethal weapons will 
benefit wider society by reducing the risk of violent crime by 
individuals,  OCGs  or  terrorists/extremists.    Some  financial 
costs  to  public  authorities  (e.g.  to  court  system,  lawyers, 
in  number  of 
police 
investigations prosecutions).   
Positive  social  impact  expected.  Minimum  sentences  will 
discourage  forum  shopping  and  have  a  deterrent  effect  on 
criminals. Financial costs to public authorities (e.g. increase in 
prison population resulting from longer custodial sentences in 
a number of Member States).   

resulting 

increase 

from 

time 

Positive  social  impact  expected.  Widening  the  range  of 
available  offences  will  make  it  easier  for  police  and  judicial 
authorities  to  prosecute  and  convict  attempts  to  commit  as 
well as indirect assistance with the commission of illicit arms 
trafficking and related offences. Some financial costs to public 
authorities (e.g. to court system, lawyers, police time resulting 
from increase in number of investigations prosecutions).   
Small positive social impact anticipated. Longer sentences for 
aggravated  offences  could  be  expected  to  have  a  deterrent 
large  scale  or 
effect  for  those  particularly 

involved 

in 

Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Arms Trafficking in the European Union 

Section 

Policy Objectives & Options 

  4 

in organised criminal 
gang, recidivism, large 
scale of offence) 

terrorism/organised crime related trafficking, and protect the 
public  by  incarcerated  such  offenders  for  a  longer  period. 
Some  financial  costs  to  public  authorities  (e.g.  increase  in 
prison population resulting from longer custodial sentences in 
a number of Member States).   

In the  table  below  the anticipated  social  impacts  of  Policy  Option 3  are  graded on a  scale 
from minus 5 (very weak social impact) to plus five (very strong social impact). 

Table 4.12:  Summary of Financial, economic and social impacts   

Specific impacts 

Costs to public authorities (law enforcement authorities and the judiciary), 
and the potential to reduce indirect costs by reducing the supply of illicit 
firearms by combating firearms trafficking more effectively.  

Impacts on wider society: for example, reduction in the number of direct 
victims of violent crimes featuring illicitly trafficked firearms, as well as 
indirect victims such as business owners and ordinary citizens feeling unsafe.  

Impact 

+2 

+3 

Impacts on fundamental rights 

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the EU Charter’) entrenches: all 
rights  found  in  the  case  law  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  EU;  the  rights  and  freedoms 
enshrined  in  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  (‘ECHR’);  and  other  rights  and 
principles  resulting  from  the  common  constitutional  traditions  of  EU  countries  and  other 
international instruments.  
We  anticipate  only  limited  impacts  of  a  comprehensive  legislative  solution  under  Policy 
Option  3  on  fundamental  rights  issues.  However,  articles  of  possible  relevance  to  an  EU 
measure criminalising of illicit firearms trafficking and manufacturing (and related offences) 
include the following: 

Article  2  (Right  to  Life):  By  reducing  the  trafficking  of  illicit  firearms,  the  comprehensive 
legislative  solution  would  in  principle  decrease  the  risk  of  such  firearms  being  used  by 
individuals, OCGs and/or terrorists and extremists which would otherwise have violent and 
even lethal consequences for EU citizens.  

Article 6 (Right to liberty and security): This right stands to be enhanced by the proposed 
EU  legislative  measure  under  Policy  Option  3.  Under  such  a  measure,  EU  citizens  would 
benefit from additional legislative protection from illicit trafficking activities perpetrated by 
individuals,  OCGs  and/or  terrorists  and  extremists  and  from  the  risk  of  violent  crimes 
resulting from those activities which presently compromise citizens’ liberty and security.   

Article  48  (Presumption  of  innocence  and  right  of  defence):  The  EU  Charter  article  in 
question  guarantees  the  defence  rights  of  the  suspect  or  accused.  Generally,  for  most 

   117 

 
 
 
 
 
 
serious criminal offences proof is required both of a guilty act (actus reus) and a guilty mind 
(mens  rea).  This  is  of  possible  relevance  to  the  introduction  of  a  negligence  threshold  of 
liability for illicit firearms trafficking, which would not require any mens rea (in the form of 
knowledge  or  intent)  on  the  part  of  the  accused,  merely  a  failure  to  meet  an  objective 
standard  of  reasonable  behaviour.  However,  this  is  very  unlikely  to  create  any  legal 
difficulties in practice, not least as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has already 
ruled that certain strict liability offences for which there is no need for the prosecution to 
prove mens rea do not conflict with the ECHR (Salabiaku v. France)153 provided they are kept 
“within  reasonable  limits  which  take  into  account  the  importance  of  what  is  at  stake  and 
maintain the rights of the defence” (in other words a test of proportionality applies). 

Article  49  (Principles  of  legality  and  proportionality  of  criminal  offences  and  penalties) 
provides inter alia that the ‘severity of penalties must not be disproportionate to the criminal 
offence’. The potential introduction of a new legally-binding instrument at EU level such as a 
directive could, once transposed into national legislation, require changes in criminal justice 
legislation  and  to  rules  on  sentencing  for  illegal  firearms  trafficking  offences.  It  is  only 
proposed,  however,  that  the  directive  would  establish  ‘minimum  maximum’  (4-year) 
custodial  sentences:  in  other  words,  the  maximum  period  of  imprisonment  for  the  most 
serious offences should be of at least 4 years in all Member States, with national legislators 
free to set a higher upper limit it they wish. As such it is highly improbable that there would 
be any question that such a length of incarceration would be disproportionate under the EU 
Charter.    

The  possible  fundamental  rights  impacts  of  the  various  elements  of  a  comprehensive 
legislative solution under Policy Option 3 are summarised in the table below. 

Table 4.13: Likely fundamental rights impacts of elements of legislative provisions for illicit 
firearms trafficking and manufacturing 

Element of illicit 
trafficking/manufacturing 
offence 
Liability of natural and legal 
persons 

Mandatory suspicion or 
‘ought-to-have-known’ 
negligence standard  

Likely fundamental rights impacts 

Small  positive  fundamental  rights  impact  anticipated. 
Provision  likely  to  be  supportive  of  EU  citizens’  rights  to 
life  and  security  (Articles  2  and  6)  as  a  consequence  of 
extending  criminal  liability  to  corporate  entities,  which 
will  contribute  to  tackling  the  problem  of  illicit  firearms 
trafficking in the EU.    
Small effect on fundamental rights impact (Articles 2 and 
6)  anticipated.  Very  unlikely  that  the  introduction  of  a 
negligence  standard  would  give  rise  to  Article  48 
concerns,  not  least  as  under  the  proposed  drafting 

153 (1988) 13 EHRR 379. This case concerned a passenger who had passed through the green light at 
customs  with  cannabis  in  his  suitcase;  he  was  convicted  under  the  relevant  provision  of  the 
Customs Code, which deems anyone carrying in contraband goods (consciously or not) guilty of 
an offence. Here the Strasbourg Court accepted the respondent state's argument that the strict 
liability offence was not disproportionate. 

 
                                                 
Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Arms Trafficking in the European Union 

Section 

Policy Objectives & Options 

  4 

the  choice  between 
Member  States  would  have 
introducing  an  offence  of  suspected 
illicit  firearms 
trafficking or manufacturing (i.e. where some knowledge 
is  required  on  the  part  of  the  accused)  or  a  negligence 
standard. The ECtHR is in any case prepared to accept no 
mens  rea  requirement  for  certain  strict  liability  offences 
provided  that  a  test  of  proportionality  is  met.  It  is 
extremely  improbable  that  the  CJEU  would  depart  from 
that approach.  
Small effect on fundamental rights impact anticipated as 
a 
firearms 
traffickers and thus boosting EU citizens’ security (Article 
6).  Very  unlikely  that  a  ‘minimum  maximum’  4-year 
sentence would raise any concerns vis-à-vis Article 49(2) 
principle of proportionality in sentencing offenders. 

result  of  deterring/incarcerating 

illicit 

Small positive Article 2/6 impact would be expected.  

As  above.  Low  positive  Article  2/6  impact  would  be 
expected.  

4 year custodial sanction 
and/or administrative 
sanction (financial penalty of 
at least €10000 for serious 
trafficking / manufacturing 
offences) 
Attempted trafficking and 
complicit activities 
(aiding/abetting etc.) 
offences 
Aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances defined (e.g. 
participation in organised 
criminal gang, recidivism, 
large scale of offence) 

In the table below the anticipated fundamental rights impacts of Policy Option 3 are graded 
on  a  scale  from  minus  5  (very  weak  fundamental  rights  impact)  to  plus  five  (very  strong 
fundamental rights impact).  

Table  4.14:  Summary  -  likely  fundamental  rights  impacts  of  elements  of  legislative 
provisions for illicit firearms trafficking and manufacturing 
Specific impacts 

Impact 

Fundamental rights 
Article 2 (right to life) 

Article 6 (right to liberty and security) 

Article 48 (presumption of innocence and right of defence) 

Article  49  (Principles  of  legality  and  proportionality  of  criminal 
offences and penalties) 

Subsidiarity, proportionality, EU added value and sustainability  

+2 

+2 

0 

0 

The legal basis for any EU measure in this area (Article 83(1) TFEU), as well as the principles 
of  subsidiarity  and  proportionality  (Article  5(3)  and  5(4)  TEU),  are  described  in  Section  3. 

   119 

 
 
 
 
 
There  it  is  explained  that  two  tests  apply  in  respect  of  the  subsidiarity  principle:  the 
necessity test and the EU value added test. 

As  regards  necessity,  it  is  the  case  that,  at  the  level  of  international  law,  the  UN  Protocol 
already criminalises illicit firearms trafficking and manufacturing. While the Protocol leaves 
considerable  discretion  to  Contracting  States  as  to  the  precise  form  and  scope  of  these 
trafficking  offences,  the  associated  Model  Law  contains  guidance  provisions  for  national 
legislators to use as a precedent when enshrining their Protocol obligations in their national 
law.  

What, then, is the need for an EU legislative measure, not least when: (i) key components of 
illicit firearms trafficking and manufacturing offences (including the definitions of ‘firearms’, 
‘illicit firearms trafficking’ and ‘illicit firearms manufacturing’), have already been set out in 
the  Protocol  and  Directive  91/477/EEC,  as  amended;  and  (ii)  as  of  March  2014,  with  the 
ratification of the Protocol by the EU Commission on behalf of the EU, all Member States are 
now bound by this international instrument? The key arguments in favour of an EU measure 
in  this  area,  notwithstanding  the  already  existing  international  and  EU  legislation,  are 
summarised below. 

Firstly,  as  noted  at  Section  2.3,  according  to  expert  opinion  and  feedback  from  key 
stakeholders  in  Member  States,  almost  all  illicit  firearms  circulating  in  the  EU  originate 
from cross-border trafficking activities. There is therefore a logic to tackling the problem at 
supranational  (EU)  level  in  a  manner  that  does  not  exceed  the  objectives  (‘principle  of 
proportionality’) of Article 83(1) TFEU. The latter mandates the establishment of minimum 
rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of particularly 
serious  crime  (including  illicit  firearms  trafficking)  with  a  cross-border  dimension  resulting 
from  the  nature  or  impact  of  such  offences  or  from  a  special  need  to  combat  them  on  a 
common basis. 

Secondly,  particular  benefits  from  tackling  the  problem  of  illicit  firearms  trafficking  and 
manufacturing by means of a comprehensive legislative solution at the EU level (‘test of EU 
added value’) include: 

 

 

Operational advantages resulting from increased legal certainty for police and 
judicial authorities in cross-border investigations. Joint investigations can be 
hampered, delayed and sometimes abandoned by confusion and lack of knowledge 
regarding the relevant national laws in other Member States: Policy Option 3 would 
eliminate this in the area of illicit firearms trafficking and related offences. In 
addition, approximating minimum sanctions for illicit firearms trafficking and 
manufacturing would allow special operational techniques to be used across 
Member States, facilitating the investigation and eventual prosecution of these 
offences. 

Deterrent effect: as well as the operational benefit for investigations and 
prosecutions of approximating key elements of the offences (notably introducing 
mandatory minimum sanctions and including attempted and aiding/abetting 
offences), harmonizing the scope of illicit firearms trafficking offences across all EU 
Member States would eliminate the possibility for offenders to exploit legal 
loopholes arising from divergences in national laws on illicit firearms trafficking. A 

Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Arms Trafficking in the European Union 

Section 

Policy Objectives & Options 

  4 

unified and robust legal framework at the EU level covering both offences and 
sanctions could be expected to deter criminals from engaging in illicit trafficking. 

 

Improved detection of intra-EU flow. 

Other 
synergies/complementarity with other EU policies 

feasibility, 

political 

factors 

- 

enforceability 

of 

the 

option, 

The  question  of  political  feasibility  is  relevant  to  those  elements  of  a  comprehensive 
legislative  solution  which  may  be  inconsistent  with  national  legal  cultures,  case  law  or 
constitutional court rulings. Where applicable, issues of feasibility will be examined in the 
table  below;  subject  to  these  no  enforceability  issues  present  themselves  in  relation  to 
Policy Option 3.   

Likely impact of  ‘other factors’  

There is scope for complementarity with other serious crimes referred to in Article 83(1) 
TFEU. By way of example, CSES is presently undertaking a separate study for DG HOME, this 
time for an Impact Assessment on a proposal for a directive on the criminalisation of money 
laundering  in  the  EU.  The  constituent  elements  of  such  a  legislative  instrument  (notably 
concerning  the  criminalisation  of  the  offence  itself,  as  well  as  the  relevant  mens  rea 
requirement and the question of penalties and sanctions) are similar in scope and nature to 
Policy Option 3 in the area of illicit firearms trafficking and related offences. 
Table  4.15:  Likely  impacts  of  ‘other  factors’  on  proposed  legislative  provisions  for  illicit 
firearms trafficking and manufacturing 
Element of illicit 
trafficking/manufacturing offence 
Liability of natural and legal persons  No significant impacts from other factors. Extending 
liability to corporate entities is unlikely to give rise 
to  issues  regarding  political  feasibility  given  that 
‘person’  is  already  defined  in  the  Protocol  and 
Convention  to 
legal  persons,  and  EU 
include 
Member States are bound by the Protocol. 
No  significant  impacts  from  other  factors.  It  is  the 
case  that  in  certain  EU  jurisdictions  (notably  those 
with  a  common  law  legal  tradition)  negligence  is 
only  rarely  sufficient  for  criminal  liability  to  arise. 
However,  under  Policy  Option  3  Member  States 
with  reservations  about  negligence  standards 
would  have  the  option  of  introducing  instead  a 
lower level of intent (i.e. suspicion).   
No  significant  impacts  from  other  factors.  While 
matters  of  criminal  sentencing  can  be  sensitive,  in 
part  crossing  over  into  matters  of  sovereignty  and 
national  politics,  Policy  Option  3  would  not 
interfere  with  Member  States  ability  to  set 
whatever  maximum  sentence  they  preferred  for 

4 year custodial sanction and/or 
administrative sanction (financial 
penalty of at least €10000 for 
serious trafficking / manufacturing 
offences) 

Mandatory suspicion or ‘ought-to-
have-known’ negligence standard  

   121 

 
 
 
Attempted trafficking and complicit 
activities (aiding/abetting etc.) 
offences 
Aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances defined (e.g. 
participation in organised criminal 
gang, recidivism, large scale of 
offence) 

illicit  firearms  trafficking  and  related  offences 
(provided it was at least 4 years). 
No impact envisaged.   

Possible difficulties regarding political feasibility. In 
several  Member  States  the  applicable  aggravating 
and  mitigating  circumstances  are  those  pertaining 
to a broader category of criminal offences set out in 
the  criminal  code.  There  is  some  question  of 
encroaching on national legal traditions to relatively 
marginal benefit in terms of tackling the problem of 
illicit firearms trafficking.   

In the table below the anticipated ‘other factors’ impacts are graded on a scale from minus 
5 (very weak impact) to plus five (very strong impact). Zero represents a neutral impact. 

 Table 4.16: Summary - Likely impacts of ‘other factors’ on proposed legislative provisions 
for illicit firearms trafficking and manufacturing 
Specific impacts 

Impact 

Social and related impacts 

Subsidiarity principle – i.e. the extent to which the EU should act 
in  certain  areas  only  if  and  insofar  as  the  objectives  of  the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by  the Member 
States. 

Proportionality principle - extent to which EU actions do not go 
beyond  what  is  necessary  in  order  to  achieve  the  objectives  of 
the Treaty. 

Other  factors  -  political  feasibility,  enforceability  of  the  option, 
synergies/complementarity with other EU policies 

0 

0 

-2  (see  discussion  on 
aggravating/mitigating 
circumstances) 

Financial, economic and social impacts 

It is exceedingly difficult to assess the financial and economic impacts of a legislative option. 
Illicit firearms trafficking has ramifications for numerous offender categories, from domestic 
offenders  to large  scale  Organised  Crime Groups  and  terrorist/extremist networks,  as  well 
as  for  other  crimes  such  as  drug  and  people  trafficking.  A  recent  European  Parliament 
publication154 assessed the cost of organised crime to be the following: Human trafficking - € 
30 billion and fraud against EU individuals – € 97 billion. The report further highlights that 
there  are  no  comprehensive  studies  of  the  impacts  of  illegal  drugs  themselves  in  the  EU. 
However,  the  report  estimates  at  least  500  organised  crime-related  homicides,  very 

154 The Economic, Financial & Social Impacts of Organised Crime in the European Union, 2013. 

 
                                                 
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unevenly  distributed  across  the  EU.  If  Policy  Option  3  were  responsible  for  even  a  1% 
reduction in organised crime, it would save the EU economy over € 1 billion.  

In light of the above, the impacts of the elements of the proposed offences related to illicit 
firearms trafficking and manufacturing can be summarised as being: 

Table 4.17: Impacts of the key elements of Policy Option 3 
Key: √ positive impact; X negative impact; ○neutral impact; ? extent of impact uncertain  

Element of Presumption 
of Innocence 

Effectiveness in 
achieving policy 
objective 

Social 
Impact 

Fundamental 
Rights 

Financial and 
economic 
impact 

Other factors 
(subsidiarity / 
proportionality 
/ feasibility) 

Liability of natural and 
legal persons 

Mandatory suspicion or 
‘ought-to-have-known’ 
negligence standard 

‘Minimum maximum’ 4 
year custodial sanction 
and administrative 
sanction (financial 
penalty)  

Attempted trafficking 
and complicit activities 
offences 

Aggravating and 
mitigating 
circumstances defined 
for firearms trafficking 
offences 

√√ 

√√ 

√√ 

√√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√√ 

√√ 

√ 

√? 

√? 

√? 

√? 

√? 

○ 

○ 

○ 

○ 

X 

The  element  of  Policy  Option  3  that  has  a  low  or  marginal  positive  impact  in  relation  to 
policy  objectives,  social  and  fundamental  rights  and  (to  the  extent  these  are  known) 
financial  impacts,  but  a  negative  impact  in  terms  of  feasibility,  is  that  of  defining  in  a 
legislative  instrument  the  aggravating  and  mitigating  circumstances  for  illicit  firearms 
trafficking and related offences.  On  this  basis  it is  not recommended that  this  element be 
retained  in  Policy  Option  3.  Instead  the  general  system  of  aggravating  or  mitigating 
circumstances existing within a Member State’s national legislation should continue to apply 
to the proposed illicit firearms trafficking and manufacturing offences.  

The  other  elements  discussed  in  this  section  and  set  out  in  the  summary  table  above  are 
considered suitable for inclusion in a proposed EU measure.  

4.6 

Policy Option 4 - Combination of Policy Options 

In addition to the individual Policy Options set out above, a further possibility is to combine 
elements  of  different  options.  Clearly,  this  only  applies  to  Policy  Options  2  and  3,  i.e.  a 

   123 

 
 
 
combination  of  non-legislative  and  legislative  measures.  As  noted  earlier,  this  approach  is 
quite widely supported amongst those we consulted.  

A variation on Policy Option 4 as outlined above would involve adopting a phased approach 
to  the  introduction  of  measures,  e.g.  starting  with  the  less  controversial  non-legislative 
measures and moving on after a further period of consultation to introduce legally-binding 
common minimum standards across all Member States with regard the definition of criminal 
offences  and  their  sanctions  related  to  illicit  arms  trafficking  and  linked  offences  with  a 
cross-border  dimension.  Equally,  a  sub-option  could  involve  only  some  Member  States 
setting up enhanced cooperation mechanisms as per Art. 83(3) of the TFEU if consensus in 
favour of the measure cannot be reached and this again would involve a phased approach. 

4.7 

Evaluation of the Policy Options  

In  this  section  we  combine  the  scoring  of  the  various  Policy  Options  against  the  key  IA 
criteria  used  in  Section  4.2  to  4.5  and  identify  the  preferred  option.  For  this  purpose,  a 
number of criteria (taken from the Commission IA guidance) are used:  

 

 

 

 

Contribution to EU policy objectives; 

Financial, economic and social impacts; 

Impacts on fundamental rights; 

Proportionality, subsidiarity and European added value; 

The assessment of the Policy Options against these criteria leads into an overall assessment 
towards  the  end  of  this  sub-section.  The  overall  assessment  draws  on  the  results  of  the 
analysis of the extent to which the option are successful in achieving the policy objectives as 
well as financial and economic, social and other impacts to help assess which Policy Option 
(or  combination)  is  likely  to  have  the  most  advantageous  effect  on  the  problem  and  on 
promoting EU policy aims. Based on this assessment, a rating system is used in Section 4.4 
to identify the preferred option. 

4.7.1  Contribution to EU policy objectives  

In assessing the impact of the Policy Options on achievement of the policy objectives, it is 
important  to  differentiate  between  the  general  objective,  specific  objectives  and 
operational objectives.  

In regard to the overall objective of reducing the number of firearms illicitly trafficked to, 
from  and  within  the  EU,  Policy  Option  1  would  have  no  effect  at  all.  The  impact  of  Policy 
Option  2  (a)  depends  on  how  committed  Member  States  are  to  implementing  soft  law 
instruments. Thus, soft law instruments are in some cases characterized by slow and uneven 
progress  in  the  different  Member  States.  In  regard  to  Policy  Option  2  (b)  legal  obligations 
would  exist  which  should  enhance  the  likelihood  of  soft  law  tools  being  implemented.  As 
the  most  interventionist  option,  the  comprehensive  legislative  solution  put  forward  under 
Policy Option 3 is well-placed to meet a number the general objective by approximating and 
strengthening the legal regime for illicit firearms trafficking in the EU. 

Turning to the strategic  objectives, Policy Option 2 (a) would be a suitable tool to improve 
the  cooperation  between  law  enforcement  authorities  in  preventing  detecting,  disrupting, 

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investigating  and  prosecuting  illicit  arm  trafficking.  This  is  because  Policy  Option  2  (a)  is 
based on identifying good practices and the promotion of convergence of practices. While 
doing so, the focus is on information exchange frameworks. In the long-term the success of 
information sharing will then most likely lead to the deterrence of criminal offences related 
to  firearms.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  the  exchange  of  investigation  results  would  help 
Member  State  authorities  to  understand  where  weapons  come  from,  their  uses,  etc. 
Furthermore,  sharing  data  on  convictions  in  relation  to  firearms  should  help  police 
authorities to conduct targeted searches. Nevertheless, Policy Option 2  (a)  will most likely 
not be suitable to serve as a model that can be used in discussions with third countries since 
its structures are too loose to work in a wider context. However, Policy Option 2 (b) would 
establish a stricter regulatory framework that could be used as model of international data 
sharing. The advantage is that minimum regulation would make it easier to regulate among 
different legal systems.  

The  comprehensive  legislative  solution  considered  for  Policy  Option  3  would  correspond 
with the strategic objective of providing a model that could be promoted in discussions with 
third  countries  on  firearms  risk  reduction.  The  elements  of  a  legislative  instrument 
criminalising  illicit  firearms  trafficking  would  widen  the  potential  liability  of  offenders 
compared with the present patchwork of national legal that could be expected to have the 
effect of deterring the committing of criminal offences related to firearms. An approximated 
pan-EU  would  also  be  likely  to  improve  the  cooperation  between  law  enforcement 
authorities. 

With the operational objectives, Policy Option 2 (a) and Option 2 (b) would not contribute 
to the minimization of differences in definitions of firearms offences and levels of sanctions 
across  the  EU  since  they  do  not  include  the  adoption  of  new  legislation  or  definitions. 
However, it could be the first step towards the convergence of definitions since information 
sharing  and  capacity  building  lead  to  mutual  learning  processes  encouraging  future 
harmonization efforts. Additionally, it would enhance greatly the sharing of information and 
intelligence  on  illicit  firearms  trafficking  through  establishing  more  efficient  cooperation 
channels.  For  Option  3,  an  approximating  directive  is  clearly  in  line  with  the  operational 
objective of minimising the differences in definitions of illicit firearms trafficking and levels 
of sanctions across the EU.   

 4.7.2  Financial, Economic and Social Impacts  

Policy  Option  1  would  have  no  effect  on  the  costs  incurred  by  EU  Member  States’  law 
enforcement agencies involved in tackling illicit firearms trafficking.    

As  indicated  earlier,  the  financial  cost  of  Policy  Option  2  would  mainly  arise  for  those  EU 
Member States where action would be needed to improve the capacity to engage in cross-
border  cooperation  (insofar  as  some  of  the  actions  involve  EU  agencies,  i.e.  CEPOL’s 
involvement in capacity building and EUROPOL’s involvement in promoting the exchange of 
information, some costs would be borne by the EU budget).   

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For  any  legislative  option  (Policy  Option  3),  there  would  some  costs  associated  with  the 
transposition  of  measures  into  national  legislation  and  implementation  (e.g.  training).  Set 
against  the  costs  would  be  the  economic  and  social  benefits  of  Policy  Options  2  and  3 
outlined earlier. Quantifying these benefits in terms of reduced criminality and an enhanced 
sense of security felt by citizen will also be taken into account.  

4.7.3 

Impacts on Fundamental Rights 

In line with the Operational Guidance on fundamental rights in impact assessments, impacts 
should  be  assessed  in  qualitative  terms.  In  analysing  the  impact  on  fundamental  rights, 
there is a need to check that each of the policy options is compatible with the Charter on 
Fundamental  Rights155  and  the  European  Convention  of  Human  Rights  (ECHR).  Among  the 
issues that need to be considered in relation to fundamental rights are: 

 

 

 

The rights of EU citizens to security, protection from organised crime and other 
fundamental rights;  

The fundamental rights of those charged with illicit firearms trafficking offences 
(which could be compromised by excessively lengthy sentences); 

Interference with and restriction on the lawful use of firearms for activities such as 
shooting and hunting.  

More  specifically,  there could  be  impacts  on EU  citizens’  right  to  life (Art.  2  ECHR), liberty 
and security (Art. 6 CFREU and Article 5 ECHR), freedom of movement and residence (Art. 45 
CFREU), on firearms producers and SMEs’ freedom to conduct a business  (Art. 16 CFREU)) 
and on both citizens and SMEs (e.g. protection of personal data (Art. 8 and 7 CFREU and Art. 
8  CFREU).  The  trade-off  between  these  areas  is  complex:  while  Article  6  of  the  Charter 
states that everyone has the right to liberty and security of person, Article 49 deals with the 
principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties. Art. 1(3) states 
that  ‘The  severity  of  penalties  must  not  be  disproportionate  to  the  criminal  offence’.    The 
potential  introduction  of  a  new  legally-binding  instrument  at  EU  level  such  as  a  Directive 
could,  once  transposed  into  national  legislation,  require  changes  in  criminal  justice 
legislation and to rules on sentencing for illegal firearms trafficking offences.   

Policy Option 1 (status quo) would leave the position with regard to fundamental rights at 
best unchanged but could leave the victims of illicit firearms trafficking in a worse position if 
the  problem  becomes  more  serious.  Consequently,  Policy  Option  1  could  have  a  negative 
impact  on  Member  State’s  compliance  with  Article  6  CFREU,  Article  5  ECHR  and  Article  2 
ECHR.    

Both Policy Option 2 (a) and 2 (b) focus on increased collaboration between Member States 
sharing  through  the  establishment  of  databases,  development  of  special  investigative 
techniques and capacity building. These measures increase the likelihood of successful illicit 
firearms  trafficking  investigations.  Consequently,  in  the  long-term  this  could  lead  to  the 
reduction  of  illicit  firearms  trafficking  and  circulation.  Evaluating  these  effects  from  the 
fundamental  rights  perspective  of  EU  citizens  a  positive  conclusion  can  be  drawn.  First, 
Article 2 ECHR and Article 2 CFREU stipulate the positive obligation of states to ensure the 

155 Charter of fundamental rights of the EU (2010 C /83/02) (CFREU) 

                                                 
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right to life to everyone. Since in the long-term fewer illicit firearms will circulate in the EU 
due  to  Policy  Option  2,  there  will  be  most  likely  fewer  deaths  due  to  the  use  of  illicitly 
possessed  firearms.  In  this  way,  Policy  Option  2  would  help  EU  Member  States  to  comply 
with their obligations under Article 2 ECHR. Furthermore, Policy Option 2 would also have a 
positive  impact  on  Member  State  obligations  under  Article  5  ECHR  and  Article  6  CFREU. 
These articles lay down the obligation of states to ensure the right to security to its citizens. 
By limiting the circulation of illicit firearms in the EU, this provision is better complied with 
than without regulatory intervention. 

It is also necessary to assess Policy Option 2 in terms of the fundamental rights of offenders 
and persons suspected of illicit arms trafficking, as well as firearms owners and dealers who 
would also be affected by measures suggested in Policy Option 2. Here the most critical part 
is Article 8 ECHR and Article 7 and Article 8 CFREU stipulating the right of citizen to privacy 
and data protection and Article 8 CFREU on the right of EU citizen to data protection. The 
establishment and sharing of partly sensitive personal information through databases could 
lead  to  an  infringement  of  the  above-mentioned  rights.  Furthermore,  special  investigative 
techniques  such  as  wire-tapping  might  also  intrude  on  privacy  and  data  protection  rights. 
However,  as  elaborated  elsewhere  in  this  report  a  certain  limitation  of  rights  under  these 
articles is allowed when public security is at stake and when the rights-limitation serves the 
prevention of crime and disorder.156  

With  regard  to  other  special  investigative  techniques  like  controlled  deliveries,  the 
regulation  has  to  ensure  sufficient  safeguards  and  monitoring  of  the  procedures  to  avoid 
any  interference  with  Article  5  (right  to  liberty)  and  Article  6  (right  to  a  fair  trial). 
Consequently  attention  to  detail  is  crucial  when  establishing  a  regulatory  framework  for 
special investigative techniques. 

Turning to Policy Option 3, a comprehensive legislative solution could be expected to have 
some  positive  impacts  in  respect  of  Articles  2  (right  to  life)  and  6  (right  to  liberty  and 
security) resulting from a reduction in the trafficking of illicit firearms benefitting the safety 
of EU citizens. Possible Article 48 (presumption of innocence and right of defence) concerns 
relating to a negligence standard of criminality are unlikely, as are Article 49 (principles of 
legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties) issues relating to ‘minimum 
maximum’ custodial sentences. These issues are discussed in more detail at Section 4.5.4. 

4.7.4  Proportionality, Subsidiarity and European Added Value 

The  Commission  has  argued  (e.g.  in  its  2010  EU  Budget  Review)  that  the  concept  of 
European added value should be used as a “key test to justify intervention at the EU level”. 
It  argued  that  EU  intervention  could  add  value  because  it  “can  plug  gaps  left  by  the 

156 This notion was confirmed in Klass and Others v. Germany where the European Court of Human 
Rights  (ECtHR)  ruled  that  certain  wiretapping  techniques  by  the  authorities  where  justified  for 
the prevention of crime even though they limit rights under Article 8 ECHR. 

   127 

 
 
 
                                                 
dynamics  of  national  policy-making,  most  obviously  addressing  cross-border  challenges”.  
There are various aspects that need to be considered: 

 

 

The additionality principle which means that the EU should act only when there are 

clear additional benefits from collective efforts.  

Closely related to this is the principle of subsidiarity, i.e. that the EU should only act 
when objectives cannot be achieved satisfactorily by Member States alone and can 
be better achieved at the EU level.  

 

Proportionality requires that EU actions should not go beyond what is necessary in 

order to achieve the objectives of the Treaty. 

There  are  also  a  number  of  other  factors  that  are  relevant  such  as  political  feasibility, 
enforceability of preferred option, synergies/complementarity with other EU policies.   

In  relation  to  Policy  Option  1,  the  position  with  regard  to  the  principles  outlined  above 
would be unchanged.  

According  to  Article  5  TEU  all  action  taken  on  the  EU  level  has  to  comply  with  the 
subsidiarity  principle  that  implies  that  the  EU  shall  only  regulate  in  the  case  that  it  adds 
value  to  the  actions  taken  by  the  single  Member  States.  Policy  Options  2  and  3  are  in 
accordance with this principle since illicit arms trafficking requires actions taken at  the EU 
level  due  to  its  transnational  nature  and  the  insufficiency  of  current  EU  legislation  to 
address the problem. In this regard it can even be stated that EU legislation does not only 
add  value  but  is  essential  to  tackling  the  problem.  As  shown  in  Section  2,  in  most  cases, 
firearms  trafficking  involves  more  than  one  Member  State.  Consequently,  to  successfully 
convict  traffickers  and/or  confiscate  illicit  firearms  it  is  essential  to  establish  regulated 
information exchange frameworks between Member States.  

Another requirement of Article 5 TEU is the proportionality principle. This means that while 
the EU is allowed to act (conferral principle) and if it adds value to the regulatory framework 
of the respective policy field (subsidiarity principle),  EU action  may not go beyond what is 
necessary (proportionality principle). In case of Policy Option 2, the proportionality principle 
is not violated with option (a) and most likely neither with option (b). This is because Policy 
Option 2 only suggests minimal regulatory action via either soft law or a directive. On the 
substantial  side,  Policy  Option  2  is  limited  to  enhancing  already  existing  legislative 
frameworks, institutional set-ups and implementation structures to increase efficiency and 
effectiveness.  Consequently,  there  are  no  essential  new  measures  which  need  to  be 
analysed in light of proportionality.   With regard to  Policy Option 3, since almost all illicit 
firearms  circulating  in  the  EU  originate  from  cross-border  trafficking  activities,  there  is  a 
clear  rationale  for  tackling  the  problem  at  supranational  (EU)  level  in  a  manner  that  does 
not  exceed the objectives  of  Article 83(1) TFEU.  The latter mandates  the establishment of 
minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of 
particularly serious crime (including illicit firearms trafficking) with a cross-border dimension 
resulting from the nature or impact of such offences or from a special need to combat them 
on a common basis. 

Besides the above-mentioned it is also worth evaluating matters of political feasibility and 
enforceability. According to the research, Policy Option 2 (a) seems to be favoured by a high 
proportion  of  key  stakeholders.  This  can  be  considered  as  an  indication  for  no  feasibility 
problems  with  this  Policy  Option.  While  this  is  mostly  the  case  with  soft  law  instruments, 

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Policy Option (2(a)), it is slightly more challenging when a Directive comes into play (2(b)).157 
In  addition  to  feasibility,  it  is  also  relevant  to  consider  other  policy  areas  with  linkages  to 
arms  trafficking.  While  not  necessarily  includable  in  Policy  Option  2,  drug  trafficking  is  a 
policy field with similar structures. Thus it could be considered to draft similar policy options 
for that field.  With regard to Policy Option 3, earlier we highlighted concerns regarding the 
political feasibility  in particular  of  approximating aggravating and  mitigating  circumstances 
relating to illicit firearms trafficking and related offences and sanctions. This element of the 
IFT offence was finally deemed unsuitable for inclusion in a proposed legislative instrument 
for Policy Option 3.   

Overall,  there  are  various  ways  in  which  EU  Added  Value  could  be  demonstrated:  firstly, 
there  could  be  ‘coordination  gains’.  For  example,  under  Policy  Option  2,  steps  would  be 
taken  to  improve  networking  between  Member  States  and  information  sharing.  There 
could  also  be  ‘scope  effects’  –  thus,  Policy  Option  3  would  involve  extending  scope  of 
harmonisation to the definition of illicit firearms trafficking, offences, sanctions, etc. Scope 
effects of this type would be almost certainly impossible to achieve through purely bilateral 
cooperation between Member States but are necessary to facilitate cooperation in tackling 
cross-border aspects of the problem.  

Linked  to  this  are  possible  ‘scale  effects’  where  introducing  a  stronger  cross-border 
framework through adoption of Policy Option 3, but also elements of Policy Option 2, could 
be a clear demonstration of the scale effects associated with EU intervention. Last but not 
least,  European  Added  Value  could  be  demonstrated  by  ‘synergy  effects’:  both  Policy 
Options  2  and  3,  by  promoting  closer  cooperation  between  EU  Member  States,  should 
promote  greater  effectiveness  in  achieving  policy  objectives  and  complementarities 
between actions to combat illicit firearms trafficking.  

4.7.5    Overall Assessment 

The  most  fundamental  criterion  to  measure  the  appropriateness  of  otherwise  of  the 
different  Policy  Options  is  that  any  intervention  should  promote  EU  policy  objectives.  The 
‘global’ criteria required for the assessment at this level are outlined below:  

Global Criteria for Assessing Policy Options 

  Relevance – how relevant different Policy Options (and sub-options) are given 
the problem assessment, specifically aspects relating to the cross-border 
dimension of illicit firearms trafficking and effectiveness of existing measures. 

157  This  is  due  to  higher  administrative  efforts  and  due  to  more  struggles  to  find  an  agreement 

between Member States. 

   129 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 

 

Effectiveness - in terms of risk reduction from the security and law and order 
perspective. The extent to which different Policy Options support law 
enforcement agencies and other stakeholders in taking action to prevent illicit 
firearms trafficking is clearly a key consideration.  

Efficiency – i.e. the extent to which the financial and human resources required 
to implement different Policy Options can be justified given the likely impacts 
of the problem of illicit firearms trafficking. For example, EU Member States 
could face additional costs if additional procedures and structures resulting 
from new EU legislation are introduced to combat illicit firearms trafficking. But 
set against this are the possible ‘gains’ from reducing the problem (confiscation 
of assets, reduced social and other costs, etc). 

 

Likely impacts on the problem of illicit firearms trafficking, specifically the 
cross-border dimension, and EU added value.  

In  essence,  Policy  Option  1  entails  a  continuation  of  the  status  quo  as  defined  in  the 
problem assessment (or even a potential worsening of the problem caused by illicit firearms 
trafficking) with the ‘advantageous effect’ of Policy Options 2 and 3 being measured against 
this baseline.  The research suggests that it will be difficult to quantify what impact different 
Policy  Options  might  have  on  the  current  level  of  illicit  firearms  trafficking.  As  such,  the 
assessment will be essentially qualitative.  

Relevance 

Policy  Option  1  has  no  bearing  on  relevance  because  our  research  suggests  that  it  would 
leave  the  problem  unchanged.  Policy  Option  2  would  be  of  most  relevance  to  the 
operational  priorities  of  law  enforcement  agencies  involved  in  tackling  illicit  firearms 
trafficking.  

Turning  to  Policy  Option  3,  a  comprehensive  legislative  solution  can  be  said  to  be  of 
relevance to  improving the fight against  illicit firearms  trafficking,  thus  contributing  to  the 
general policy objective of an enhanced level of security and to less firearms-related crime 
in the EU by reducing the number of firearms illicitly trafficked to, from and within the EU. 
In particular Policy Option 3 addresses the policy objective of minimising the differences in 
definitions  of  firearms  offences  and  levels  of  sanctions  across  the  EU.  The  comparative 
legal  analysis  has  revealed  that,  notwithstanding  the  existing  international  and  EU 
legislation  in  this  area,  considerable  variation  at  the  national  level  remains  between  the 
definitions of the illicit firearms trafficking and related offences. Divergences have likewise 
been  show  to  exist  regarding  the  key  elements  of  these  crimes  including  the  sanctions, 
liability  of  legal  and  natural  persons,  notions  of  intent,  negligence  and  aggravating  or 
mitigating circumstances.   

Effectiveness  

Policy  Option  1  has  no  bearing  on  effectiveness  because  it  would  leave  the  problem 
unchanged.  Policy  Option  2  would  be  effective  in  promoting  cross-border  cooperation  by 
improving the exchange of information on illicit firearms trafficking, improving the capacity 
of law enforcement agencies to work together on operations, and strengthening controls on 
the movement of firearms from the legal to the illegal market.  

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Practical and operational advantages would also prospectively accrue to police and judicial 
authorities  under  Policy  Option  3.  Joint  investigations  can  be  hampered,  delayed  and 
sometimes abandoned by confusion and lack of knowledge regarding the relevant national 
laws  in  other  Member  States.  Minimum  harmonised  EU-wide  offences  of  illicit  firearms 
trafficking  and  manufacturing  would  create  legal  certainty  for  law  enforcement  agencies 
and  other stakeholders.  In addition,  approximating  minimum sanctions  of  possibly  4  years 
for  serious  offences  relating  to  illicit  firearms  trafficking  and  manufacturing  would  allow 
special  operational  techniques  to  be  used  by  the  police  in  Member  States  where  the 
relevant  sanctions  threshold  is  currently  too  low  for  those  techniques  to  be  legally 
permissible, facilitating the investigation and eventual prosecution of these offences. 

Efficiency 

Policy  Option  1  would  not  involve  any  direct  costs  to  national  authorities  although  ‘no 
action’ would lead according to our assessment to a continuing upward trend in the use of 
illicit  firearms  for  criminal  purposes  with  the  consequent  social  and  economic  costs  to  EU 
Member States.  

EU  action  under  Policy  Option  2  and  3  are  likely  to  entail  financial  costs  to  public 
authorities  as  a  result  of  the  training  and  operational  expense  of  enforcing  EU  legislative 
provisions  criminalizing  illicit  firearms  trafficking  and  manufacturing.  In  some  Member 
States  there  would  be  further  costs  to  the  court  and  penal  system  as  a  consequence  of 
widening the  prospective  liability of  offenders  (for  example  by  including ancillary  offences 
and  negligent  trafficking)  and  raising  the  maximum  sanction  for  serious  illicit  firearms 
trafficking offences.  These would be offset against indirect savings from lower crime rates 
(and  fewer  offenders)  as  a  result  of  tackling  firearms  trafficking  more  effectively  and  thus 
reducing  the  supply  of  illicit  firearms  to  potential  offenders.  Other  anticipated  benefits  to 
wider  society  include  a  reduction  in  the  number  of  victims  of  homicide  and  other  violent 
crimes  featuring  illicitly  trafficked  firearms,  as  well  as  the  intangible  positive  effect  of  EU 
citizens feeling safer.  

Likely impacts and added value 

Policy  Option  1  would  self-evidently  have  no  impacts  and  there  would  be  no  EU  added 
value.  Policy  Option  2  would  have  direct  impacts  at  the  operational  level  on  the  Member 
States’  ability  to  combat  cross-border  firearms  trafficking  with  the  proposed  measures 
(especially under Policy Option 2b) demonstrating a high degree of EU added value. 

EU  added-value  arising  from  Policy  Option  3  is  likely  to  include  advantages  flowing  from 
increased  legal  certainty  for  police  and  judicial  authorities  in  cross-border  investigations. 
Approximating the scope of illicit firearms trafficking offences across all EU Member States 
would  eliminate  the  possibility  for  offenders  to  exploit  legal  loopholes  arising  from 
divergences  in  national  laws  on  illicit  firearms  trafficking.  A  unified  and  robust  legal 
framework at the EU level covering both offences and sanctions could be expected to deter 
criminals from engaging in illicit trafficking. 

4. 8 

Preferred Policy Option 

   131 

 
 
 
We now proceed to identifying the preferred policy option.  The assessment is made using a 
series  of  scoring  tables  in  which  the  policy  options  of  status  quo,  non-legislative  action, 
minimum  legislative  intervention,  comprehensive  legislative  solution  at  the  EU  level,  and 
combination of options 2 and 3 are measured against: 

 

 

 

Contribution to policy objectives of the identified actions within the policy options 
(Table 4.18(a)). 

The various impacts of the Policy Options (Table 4.18(b). 

Policy Options and criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, EU added value, 
etc. (Table 4.18(c)). 

Finally,  overall  scores  for  the  policy  options  are  awarded  at  Table  4.19  and  the  preferred 
policy option identified.  

Table  4.18(a):  Scoring  -  Contribution  of  the  identified  actions  with  the  Policy  Options  to 
Policy Objectives 

Key:  0  =  Policy  option  makes  no  contribution  to  objective;  5  policy  option  makes  a  very  significant 
contribution to objective. 

Policy Options/Scores 

Policy Objectives  

General objective  

To contribute to an enhanced level of security and to less firearms-
related crime in the EU by reducing the number of firearms illicitly 
trafficked to, from and within the EU.  

Specific objectives 

To deter the committing of criminal offences related to firearms. 

To improve the cooperation between law enforcement authorities 
in  preventing  detecting,  disrupting,  investigating  and  prosecuting 
illicit arm trafficking. 

To  provide  a  model  which  can  be  promoted  in  discussions  with 
third countries on firearms risk reduction.   

Operational objectives 

To minimize the differences in definitions of firearms offences and 
levels of sanctions across the EU. 

To put  in  place  a  system  for  regular monitoring  the  effectiveness 
of  efforts  to  disrupt  firearms  crime  including  generation  of 
comparable statistics. 

2(a) 

2(b) 

3 

4 

3 

3 

2 

0 

2 

4 

4 

4 

0 

4 

To  further  encourage  the  sharing  of  information  and  intelligence 
on  illicit  firearms  trafficking  and  the  links  with  other  criminal 
activities. 

4 

5 

3 

4 

4 

4 

5 

4 

3 

3 

4 

5 

5 

5 

5 

5 

4 

5 

Table 4.18(b): Scoring - Policy Objectives and Specific Impacts 

Key:  0  =  Policy  option  makes  no  contribution  to  specific  factor;  5  policy  option  makes  a  very 
significant contribution to specific factor. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Arms Trafficking in the European Union 

Section 

Policy Objectives & Options 

  4 

Policy Options/Scores 
2(b) 
2(a) 

3 

4 

Impacts  

Financial and economic impacts: 

EU level  

- 
-  Member States  
- 

Target groups  

1 

0 

Social  and  related  impacts  -  the  costs  of  law  enforcement 
and  the  judiciary,  and  the  potential  to  reduce  indirect  costs 
by  reducing  the  supply  of  illicit  firearms  by  combating 
firearms trafficking more effectively. 
Fundamental  rights  -  i.e.  compatibility  with  the  Charter  on 
Fundamental Rights 
Subsidiarity  principle  –  i.e.  the  extent  to  which  the  EU  only 
act where there are clear additional benefits from collective 
efforts. 
Proportionality principle - extent to which EU actions do not 
go  beyond  what  is  necessary  in  order  to  achieve  the 
objectives of the Treaty. 
Other  factors  -  political  feasibility,  enforceability  of  the 
option, synergies/complementarity with other EU policies 

0 

2 

0 

0 

0 

0 

3 

3 

4 

5 

- 
- 
- 

- 
- 
- 

1 
1 
1 
3 

- 
- 
- 

3 
2 
2 

2 
3 
3 

- 
- 
- 

3 
3 
3 

4 

4 

3 

3 

4 

4 

4 

2 

4 

4 

3 

4 

Table 4.18(c): Scoring - Policy Objectives and Global Impacts 

Key:  0  =  Policy  option  makes  no  contribution  to  global  criterion;  5  policy  option  makes  a  very 
significant contribution to global criterion. 

Global Criteria for Assessing Policy Options 

Policy Options/Scores 

Relevance  –  how  relevant  different  Policy  Options  (and  sub-
options) are given the problem assessment 
Effectiveness  -  in  terms  of  risk  reduction  from  the  security 
and law and order perspective.  
Efficiency – i.e. the extent to which the financial and human 
resources required to implement different Policy Options can 
be justified given the likely impacts of the problem 
Likely  impacts  on  the  problem  of  illicit  firearms  trafficking, 
specifically the cross-border dimension, and EU added value. 

1 
0 

0 

0 

0 

2(a) 
3 

2(b) 
3 

3 

4 

3 

4 

4 

3 

3 
4 

4 

3 

4 

4 
4 

4 

4 

4 

Table 4.19: Overall Scores and Preferred Policy Option 

Key:  0  =  Policy  option  makes  no  contribution  to  global  criterion;  5  policy  option  makes  a  very 
significant contribution to global criterion. 

Global Criteria for Assessing Policy Options 

Policy Options/Scores 

1 

2(a) 

2(b) 

3 

4 

   133 

 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1)  Contribution of Policy Options to Policy Objectives 

(2)  Policy Objectives and Specific Impacts 

(3)  Policy Objectives and Global Impacts 

Overall scores and preferred policy option 

0 
0 
0 

3 
3 
3 
9 

3 
4 
3 
10 

4 

4 

4 

5 

4 

4 

12 

13 

The  recommended  option  is  Policy  Option  4  (combination  of  Policy  Options  2  and  3). 
Overall we consider this the most comprehensive means of tackling the problem of illicit 
firearms trafficking. However, should political feasibility constraints arise, the Commission 
may decide to defer or stagger the introduction of more interventionist Policy Options, i.e. 
2(b) and 3.  

4.9   Monitoring and evaluation 

Assuming Policy Option 4 is chosen, Member States will be required to implement a range 
of legislative and non-legislative actions. A distinction can be made between: 

 

 

 

In the short-term, monitoring of actions taken by Member States to implement 
Policy Option 4;  

In the medium-term, evaluating the effect of implementing Policy Option 4 on the 
specific objective of reducing illicit firearms trafficking; 

In the longer-term, evaluating the impact of a reduction in illicit firearms trafficking 
on the general objective of promoting the interests of EU citizens and businesses in 
the armaments sector.  

Thus,  18  months  after  its  adoption,  the Commission  should  conduct  an  assessment of  the 
extent to which the various aspects of Policy Option 4 have been/are being implemented by 
the  Member  States.  In  addition  to  an  assessment  of  the  extent  to  which  non-legislative 
measures are being taken (e.g. improved sharing of information, increase in use of special 
investigative techniques, increased use of firearms marking), the focus is likely to be on the 
extent  to  which  national  authorities  have  passed  legislation  to  harmonise  the  definitions 
and  criminal  sanctions  relating  to  illicit  firearms  trafficking.  The  Commission’s  firearms 
expert group could be asked to help coordinate this exercise.  

In  the  medium  and  longer  term,  e.g.  after  five  years,  the  Commission  should  also  assess, 
most likely on the basis of an external study, the effectiveness of the actions that Member 
States  will  be  taking  in  terms  of  achieving  the  objectives  set  out  earlier  (Section  4.1).  In 
particular,  an  evaluation  should  be  undertaken  of  the  extent  to  which  Policy  Option  4 
measures  are  thought  to  have  increased  the  quantity  of  illicit  firearms  seized  by  law 
enforcement  authorities  (especially  where  this  resulted  from  cross-border  collaboration) 
and  an  indicator  of  the  effect  on  the  illicit  firearms  trafficking  problem.  Statistics  on 
firearms-related  crime  and  deaths  should  also  be  analysed  to  determine  whether  the 
adoption of Policy Option 4 measures is having a positive effect.  

Member States should be asked to provide annual statistical data on a number of indicators 
relating  to  Policy  Options  4,  and  to  this  end,  to  take  steps  to  improve  the  availability  and 
quality  of  data.  The  Commission’s  firearms  expert  group  could  again  be  involved  in  this 
exercise. 

 
Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Arms Trafficking in the European Union 

Section 

Policy Objectives & Options 

  4 

On the basis of the monitoring and evaluation work, the Commission should decide on the 
appropriate follow-up. 

   135 

 
 
 
In this final section we summarise the overall findings and conclusions of the research. The 
key findings and conclusions are summarised below under three sub-headings - the problem 
of illicit firearms trafficking,  existing legal frameworks to combat illicit arms  trafficking, and 
policy objectives and evaluation of policy options.  

5.1 

The problem of illicit firearms trafficking 

Overall,  the  research  confirms  that  Europe  faces  a  serious  illicit  firearms  trafficking 
problem.  This  is  a  serious  problem  in  its  own  right  but  also  as  factor  contributing  to  the 
lethality and insecurity from a wide range of violent or coercive crimes and also as a driver 
of  other  criminal  activities  such  as  drugs  smuggling  and  human  trafficking  as  well  as 
terrorist-related  activities  that  threaten  the  security  of  EU  Member  States  and  their 
citizens. 

The  nature  and scale  of illicit  firearms  trafficking  in the  EU  is  difficult  to  assess given  the 
hidden nature of the problem. A range of approaches could be used, of which we have used 
two approaches in order to establish a range of estimates within which the actual quantities 
probably lie. A broad indicator based on the number of unregistered firearms and a narrower 
measure  based  on  firearms  seizures  –  but  they  give  widely  differing  estimates  (67  million 
unregistered firearms in the EU or 79% of the 81 million total licit and illicit firearms; seizures 
are estimated to account for around 1% or 81,000 of the total). The first of these is likely to 
be very much an overestimate of the quantity of illicit firearms whilst the second calculation 
is  almost  certainly  an  underestimate.    The  conclusion  is  that  the  illicit  firearms  trafficking 
cannot  be  accurately  estimated  and  quantified  on  the  basis  of  existing  databases:  only  a 
relatively wide range of estimates could be established. Notwithstanding the methodological 
complications in measuring the phenomenon, most of the literature suggests however that 
illicit arms trafficking takes place on a considerable scale – a view endorsed and supported by 
EU Member State national experts.  

In  many  respects,  the  scale  of  the  illicit  firearms  trafficking  problem  is  best  measured  by 
the number of firearms-related homicides. It is estimated that illicit firearms trafficking has 
been directly responsible for at least 10,000 firearms-related deaths in EU Member States 
over the past decade. Some other estimates (e.g. by the UNODC) put the deaths at a higher 
level than this (around 1,200 p.a.). In addition to murders committed by individuals, illegally 
held  firearms  are  often  used  by  organised  crime  groups  to  coerce  and  to  intimidate  their 
victims.  Moreover,  the  use  of  illicit  firearms  in  organised  crime  activities  such  as  drug 
trafficking, prostitution, and money laundering leads to further deaths (e.g. from drugs use).  
Terrorists and extremists have also used firearms to carry out attacks. 

In terms of the drivers of illicit firearms trafficking, three main players can be identified on 
the demand and supply sides of the problem. End users are criminal or terrorist individuals 
and  groups  that  procure  firearms  illegally  to  use  in  the  pursuit  of  their  goals.  Secondly, 
traffickers  and  other  intermediaries  are  involved  in  the  actual  trafficking  of  firearms  either 
for  profit  or  some  other  reason.  Lastly,  suppliers  are  individuals  and  organisations  that 
provide a source of illicit firearms (either intentionally or unintentionally) who are again likely 
to be motivated by financial considerations.  

The  main  sources  of  illegal  weapons  within  the  EU  are  the  reactivation  of  neutralised 
weapons, burglaries and thefts, embezzlement of legal arms, legal arms sold in the illegal 
market, firearms retired from service by army or police, and the conversion of gas pistols. 

Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Firearms Trafficking in the EU 

Section 

Conclusions & Recommendations 

  5 

Most  illicit  firearms  originate  from  cross-border  trafficking,  often  as  noted  above  from 
outside  the  EU.  Since  the  early  1990s,  the  firearms  illicitly  trafficked  have  originated  from 
three  main  sources  that  have  replaced  each  other:  first  of  all  the  former  Soviet  Union  and 
Warsaw  Pact  bloc  because  a  source  of  illicit  firearms  following  the  collapse  of  the  iron 
curtain;  then,  during  the  wars  of  Yugoslav  succession,  the  Western  Balkans  became  an 
important  source  of  illicit  firearms;  and  more  recently,  North  Africa  has  superseded  the 
former,  with  a  pool  of  weapons  available  and  following  some  of  the  main  drug  trafficking 
routes  into  the  EU.  According  to  Europol,  the  amount  of  heavy  firearms  and  SALW  in 
circulation in the EU seems to satisfy much of the demand at present and suppliers in south-
eastern Europe have the capacity to meet any rise in demand in the foreseeable future. 

There are already many examples of cross-border cooperation between EU Member States 
and their  law enforcement  agencies  to  combat illicit  firearms  trafficking.  Whilst  there are 
many examples of successful operations to intercept weapons before they can be used, there 
are  also  cases  where  police  and/or  judicial  cooperation  has  been  made  more  difficult 
because of  differences  in  legal frameworks  in  different  countries.  There are  also  significant 
complications of tackling cross-border illicit firearms trafficking of a non-legal nature.   

5.2 

Existing legal frameworks to combat illicit arms trafficking 

At  present,  there  are  significant  differences  with  regard  to  EU  Member  States’  legal 
frameworks  for  combating  illicit  firearms  trafficking.  This  applies  to  the  definition  of 
offences,  the  types  and  levels  of  penalties  applicable  to  legal  and  natural  persons;  the 
treatment  of  aggravating  or  mitigating  circumstances,  and  the  factor  of  negligence  and 
degrees of intent.  

International  and  EU  legal  frameworks  that  have  a  bearing  on  illicit  firearms  trafficking 
leave signatories are broadly defined and leave signatories with considerable discretion on 
how  key  provisions  are  implemented.  Example  provisions  on  the  criminalisation  of  illicit 
firearms trafficking are included in the UNODC’s Model Law. However, the Model Law itself 
has no binding force on EU Member States. What is more, to leave a ‘margin of discretion’ 
for national legislators to implement the instruments in the most appropriate manner in line 
with their legal traditions, neither the Model Law clauses nor the other international or EU 
instruments  are  prescriptive  as  regards  the  various  legal  elements  of  an  illicit  firearms 
trafficking offence.  

As  a  result  of  the  different  legal  cultures  and  the  non-prescriptive  approach  at 
international/EU level, there is a diversity of legal frameworks in relation to illicit firearms 
trafficking  at the  national level. Differences exist with regard  to the definition of offences, 
penalties  and  sanctions,  the  existence  of  aggravating  or  mitigating  circumstances  and  the 
possibility  of  a  negligent  illicit  firearms  trafficking  offence.  Other  important  issues  where 
there are differences relate to the ways in which firearms trafficking offences are prosecuted 
(as mere possession in some instances) and seizure in transit (and tracing issues). However, 
divergences in national legislation are not per se a rationale for EU intervention. The relevant 
issue is whether, pursuant to Article 83(1) TFEU, there is a need to establish minimum rules 
concerning  the  definition  of  criminal  offences  and  sanctions  in  the  area  of  illicit  firearms 

   137 

 
 
 
trafficking with a cross-border dimension resulting from the nature or impact of this offence 
or from a special need to combat such trafficking on a common EU basis.   

Minimum, EU-wide  rules  on  illicit  firearms  trafficking  would have  the  benefit  of reducing 
legal  uncertainty  produced  by  these  divergences  for  national  police  and  investigating 
authorities,  facilitate  prosecutions,  ensure  that  criminals  are  unable  to  exploit  loopholes, 
and  reduce  incentives  for  criminals  forum  shop  between  EU  jurisdictions.    The  research 
indicates  that  divergences  do  indeed  affect  cross-border  police  and  judicial  cooperation  – 
and  that,  given  the  intrinsically  cross-border  nature  of  illicit  firearms  trafficking,  there  is  a 
strong need to combat the offence on an EU-wide basis.  

legislation)  and 

However,  the  evidence  also  suggests  that  practical  issues  such  as  lack  of  resources, 
lack  of 
conflicting  policy  priorities  (for  example  with  anti-terror 
enforcement of existing laws are equally significant impediments to cross-border efforts to 
combat  illicit  firearms  trafficking  than  differences  in  national  legislation  in  this  area. 
Feedback  from  the  research  indicates  that  cooperation  between  the  police  and  other  law 
enforcement agencies on cross-border cases is generally good; however, at the judicial stage, 
e.g.  in  seeking  permission  for  controlled  deliveries  or  asking  for  a  prosecutor  to  take  up  a 
case following an investigation, that differences in legal frameworks can cause complications. 
In considering any EU initiative, however, it should be acknowledged that there are likely to 
be  political  sensitivities  in  approximating  some  elements  of  the  illicit  firearms  trafficking 
offence  given  that  questions  of  aggravating  or  mitigating  circumstance,  sanctions  and 
penalties, and the factor of negligence and degrees of intent touch on fundamental principles 
of criminal law at the national level.   

5.3 

Policy Objectives and Evaluation of Policy Options 

The  overall  policy  objectives  of  any  new  EU-level  initiative  to  combat  illicit  firearms 
trafficking should be to combat illicit firearms trafficking in the EU more effectively and by 
doing so, enhancing the common area of freedom, security and justice.  More specific goals 
include deterring criminal offences related to firearms, improving cooperation between law 
enforcement  authorities  in  preventing  detecting,  disrupting,  investigating  and  prosecuting 
illicit arm trafficking; and providing a model which can be promoted in discussions with third 
countries on firearms risk reduction.  Operational goals are defined as being to minimize the 
differences in definitions of firearms offences and levels of sanctions across the EU; to put in 
place a system for regular monitoring the effectiveness of efforts to disrupt firearms crime, 
and to further encourage the sharing of information and intelligence.  

Three Policy Options have been defined and in the report.  To summarize: 

 

 

Policy Option 1: Status Quo – continuation of the current situation with no new EU 
intervention.  

Policy Option 2(a): Non-legislative action - would aim to promote closer 
collaboration between Member States rather than introducing new EU-level 
initiatives (although these may be necessary to promote close collaboration). This 
option would include non-statutory intervention, either as a first step or supporting 
action for implementing EU legislation in the future.  

Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Firearms Trafficking in the EU 

Section 

Conclusions & Recommendations 

  5 

 

 

 

Policy Option 2(b): Minimum legislative intervention at the EU level - this would 
involve a minimum level of legislative intervention at EU level that would aim to 
strengthen cross-border cooperation between law enforcement agencies.  

Policy Option 3: Comprehensive legislative solution at EU level - EU action to 
introduce legally-binding common minimum standards across Member States with 
regard the definition of criminal offences and their sanctions related to illicit arms 
trafficking and linked offences.  

Policy Option 4 – Combination of legislative and non-legislative actions, i.e. Policy 
Options 2 and 3. 

In essence, Policy Option 1 entails a continuation of the status quo as defined in the problem 
assessment  (or  even  a  potential  worsening  of  the  problem  caused  by  illicit  firearms 
trafficking) with the ‘advantageous effects’ of Policy Options 2 and 3 being measured against 
this  baseline.    Because  it  is  difficult  to  quantify  what  impact  different  Policy  Options  might 
have  on  the  current  level  of  illicit  firearms  trafficking,  the  assessment  of  the  merits  and 
drawbacks of different Policy Options is essentially qualitative.  

Drawing on the results of the analysis of financial and economic, social and other impacts, 
including the implications for fundamental rights, the conclusion is that Policy Option 4 (i.e. 
a  combination  of  Policy  Options  2  and  3)  will  have  the  most  advantageous  effect  on  the 
problem and on promoting EU policy aims.  It is therefore the recommended option.  

   139 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Member State 
Austria 
Austria 

Name  

Gunter Hick* 

Organisation 

Franz Kocian 

BVT/Ministry of Interior 

Austria 

Belgium  
Belgium 
Belgium 
Belgium 
Belgium 
Belgium 

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Bosnia 

Croatia 
Croatia 
Croatia 
Cyprus 

Czech Republic 
Germany 
Germany 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Estonia 
Greece 
Greece 

Spain 
Spain 
Spain 
Spain 

Spain 

Spain 

Spain 
EU 
EU 
EU 
EU 
EU 
EU 
Finland 
Finland 
Finland 
Finland 

Bernard Pircher 
Valerie Zeimetz 
Thierry Jacobs 
Christine Matton 
Nele Derynck 
Tom Nijs 

Manuel Esparrago 

Dott Silvis 
Petar Marinov 
Andelko Hrgic, Deputry 
Director 

Michael Sprax 
Damir Tomasek 
Mihael Šprajc 
George Papatheodorou 

Břetislav Oliva 
Klaus-wolfgang Moeller 
Maria-Helena.Struckmeier 
Lars Flensborg Madsen* 
Henno kuurmann* 
Tarmo Pruuli* 
Nikos Maskanakis 
Mpillios Kwnstantinos 

Rubén Sanchez 

Ana María Andrés 
Antonio García Valledor 

Víctor Fabregat 

Blas Guillamón 

Marta Gomez 

Rubén Sanchez 

Liesbeth Vervloed  
J.J. Woeldegem 
Stavroula Koutoulakou 
Roberto Codesal 
Alfredo Garcia 
Mieke De Vlaminck 
Reima Pensala 
Pekka Vasala 
Elli Kytomaki 
Pirjo Nykänen 

BVT/Ministry of Interior 
Federal Police 
FN Hersal (manufacturer) 
RWB 
Flanders region 
Flanders region 
European Federation of 
Associations for Hunting and 
Conservation 
European Association of Firearms 
Producers (ESFAM) 

Ministry of Security/State 
Investigation and Security Agency  
Ministry of Interior 

Police / MoI 
Police / MoI 
Police 
Department for Homeland 
security  

Police (EFE group member) 
Ministry of Interior 
Police 
Police 
Police - operational 
National Police (Ministry of 
Interior) 
Ministry of Justice 
Civil Guard (Ministry of Interior) 
European Association for the Civil 
Commerce of Weapons (AECAC) 
Professor of the Civil Guard 
Academy (Ministry of Interior) 
AA Asociacion Armera 
National Police (Ministry of 
Interior) 
EFE 
DG ENTR 
DG Just 
Europol 
Eurojust 
Eurojust 
Police (EFE group member) 
National Bureau of Investigation   
Safer Globe NGO 
Finnish Customs 

Status 

Completed 
Completed (Focus 
group) 
Completed (Focus 
group) 
Arranged 
Completed 
Being arranged 
Being arranged 
Being arranged 

Completed 

No response 
No response 
Completed (Focus 
group) 
Completed (Focus 
group) 
Completed 
Completed 
Completed 

Completed 
No response 
No response 
Interview Completed 
Completed 
Being arranged 
Completed 
Completed 

Completed 
Contacted 
Completed 

Completed 

Contacted 
Contacted 

Completed 
Completed 
Completed 
Completed 
Completed 
Completed 
Completed 
Arranged 
Completed 
Completed 
No response 

 
 
 
 
Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Firearms Trafficking in the EU 

Section 

List of Interviews  

  A 

France 
Hungary 
Hungary 
Hungary 

Hungary 

Ireland 
Italy 
Italy 
Italy 
Italy 

Italy 

Latvia 
Latvia 
Latvia 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg  

Malta 
Malta 
Malta 
Malta 
Malta 
Malta 
Malta 

Netherlands 
Netherlands 
Netherlands 
Netherlands 
Netherlands 
Netherlands 
Netherlands 
Netherlands 
Netherlands 

Netherlands 

Netherlands 
Netherlands 
Netherlands 

Poland 
Poland 

Philippe Nobles 
 Viktor Sulyok 
Adrian Peter 

Balazs Geczy 

Mariann Mezey 
Jarlath Lennon 
Giulia Mantini 
Marco Valentini 
Maria Paravati 

Mauro Silvis 

Mario Ge 
Brigita Lasenberga* 
Antra Murniece* 
Andris Melkers* 
Inese Volosevica* 
Audrius Ciupala* 
Christian Steichen 

Joseph Farrugia 
Launa Zammit 
Ramona Attard 
Farrugia Wally 
Zammit Peter Paul 
Maurice Calleja 

Alex Korte 
Co van Hengel 
Simon v.d. Geer 
Cees Fossen 
Martin Saelman 
Rick Wessels 
Yme Joustra 
Hendrik-Jan Talsma 

Petra Bakker 

Hans Vissers 
Evert van Rhee association  
Mr. Ton Donck 
Mr. Sander Duisterhof 

Miroslaw Kurek 
Marek Antonowicz 

MoI 
Police (EFE group member) 
Ministry of Interior 
Dept. of security policy and non-
proliferation 
Dept. of Defence Industry and 
Military Foreign Trade 
Police 

European Institute of Hunting 
and Sporting Arms (IEACS) 

Association of European 
Manufacturers of Sporting 
Firearms (AFEMS) 
Latvian Criminal police 
Latvian Criminal police 
Latvian Criminal police 
Latvian Criminal police 
Police 
Police 
Financial Intelligence Analysis 
Unit 
Attorney General's Office 
Malta Police Force 

Foundation for European 
Societies of Arms Collectors 
(FESAC) 
Police 
Ministry Of Safety and Justice 
Ministry Of Safety and Justice 
Customs 
Customs 
Royal Military Police 
National Platform Firearms 
Public Prosecution Service 
Chief of Police EU and EMPACT 
topics 
Chief of Police, responsible for 
the weapon topic Legal/illegal) 
The Dutch Gun Trade   
The Dutch Gun Trade association 
Royal Dutch Shooting sports 
Association 
Ministry of Interior 
Police 

Completed 
No response 
Focus group 

Arranged 

Arranged 
Being arranged 
MoI 
MFA 
MoI 
European Institute of 
Hunting and Sporting 
Arms (IEACS) 
Association of European 
Manufacturers of 
Sporting Firearms 
(AFEMS) 
Arranged 
Arranged 
Arranged 
Arranged 
Completed 
No response 

Declined 
No response 
No response 
Arranged 
No response 
No response 

No response 
Being arranged 
Contacted 
Contacted 
Being arranged 

Being arranged 
Contacted 
Contacted 

Contacted 

Contacted 
Contacted 
Contacted 

Contacted 
No response 
Arranged 

   141 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Poland 

Portugal 

Portugal 
Portugal 

Portugal 
Portugal 

Portugal 
Portugal 

Portugal 

Portugal 

Romania 
Romania 
Slovakia 

Slovenia 
Sweden 
Sweden 
Sweden 

Sweden 

Anna Kubacka 

Manuela Santos/João 
Sepúlveda 
Antonio Almeida 

Fernando Roque de Oliveira 
Pedro Moura 

Euclides  Simões 

Luis Filipe 

José Manuel Pureza 

Teresa Almeida 

Artur Guérin 

Valentin Niculita 
Mihai Radulescu 
Radoslav Jadud 

Polish Border Guard 
Headquarters  
Police (Policia Judiciária, National 
Counter Terrorism Unit)   

Ministry of Justice 
Observatório  Permanente  sobre 
a 
e 
Proliferação das armas ligeiras 

Produção, 

Comércio 

Public Security Police 
Procuradoria-Geral  Distrital  de 
Público 
Lisboa.  Ministério 
(Attorney General of Lisboa) 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Faculty of Economics 
University of Coimbra 
Procuradoria-Geral  Distrital  de 
Público 
Lisboa.  Ministério 
(Attorney General of Lisboa) 

Associação  de  Armeiros  de 
Portugal (AAP) 

Police 

Ministry of Interior (EFE group 
member) 

Albert Cernigoj* 

Police 

Peter Broms 
Peter Thorsell 

Karl Hertting 

Gunnar Wärnberg 

United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 

Other 
Other 
Other 

Note *= Focus Group 

Ian Head 
Home Office 
Home Office 
National Crime Agency 
National Firearms Centre 
Ernesto Savona 

Pierre Gobinet 
An Vranckx 

Police 
Swedish police 
Swedish Customs, National 
intelligence department. 
Counterterrorism and  
Extreme Violence Section at the 
general Police  
Directorate - Intelligence unit, 
Swedish police 
NABIS 
Stephen Bell 
Graham Widdecombe  
Sujitha Trowsdale 
Mark Murray Flutter 
Joint Research Centre on 
Transnational Crime 
Small Arms Survey 
Saferworld 

No response 

Completed 

Completed 

Being arranged 

Completed 

Declined 
No response 

Contacted 

No response 

No response 
Being arranged 
Being arranged 
Arranged 

Completed (Focus 
group and interview) 
No response 
No response 

Completed 

No response 
Completed  
Arranged 
Arranged 
Completed 
Completed 
No response 

No response 
No response 

 
Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Firearms Trafficking in the EU 

Section 

Supporting Information – Definitions   
& Policy Context  

  B 

This  appendix  contains  and  edited  and  further  developed  section  on  key  definitions  and  the 
policy background that was originally contained in the inception report. 

B.1 

Definitions 

The following table provides an overview of various illicit firearms trafficking definitions. The table 
shows that there is currently no common definition of illicit firearms trafficking among EU Member 
States  and  international  organisations  such  as  the  UN  and  OSCE.  One  of  the  key  differences 
between  the  definitions  appears  to  be  the  extent  to  which  military  arms  are  included  in  the 
collective term ‘firearm’.  

Level 
Law 

Term used 
Countries covered 
Military arms 
covered 

Definitions of Illicit Arms Trafficking 

EU 
Directive 
2008/51/EC and 
Regulation (EU) No 
258/2012 
Firearm 
28 Member States 
No 

UN 
UN Firearms 
Protocol 

OSCE 
Forum for Security 
Cooperation (FSC) Decision 
15/02 

SALW 
85 
Yes 

SALW 
57 participating States 
Yes 

At the EU level there are two similar but distinct definitions of weapons. Firstly, a firearm is defined 
in Directive 2008/51/EC and Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 as '…any portable weapon that expels, 
is  designed  to  expel  or  may  be  converted  to  expel  shot,  bullet  or  projectile  by  the  action  of  a 
combustible  propellant  '  Firearms  designed  for  military  use  are  excluded  from  the  scope  of  the 
legislation to which this definition applies.158 

Secondly, the term 'small arms and light weapons' (SALW) is generally used in United Nations fora 
and  in  the  field  of  the  EU’s  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy.  Although  there  is  no  agreed 
international definition for this term, the EU considers that it covers automatic and semi-automatic 
machine guns and rifles which are designed specifically for military use (Council Joint Action of 12 
July 2002 on the European Union’s contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and 
spread  of  small  arms  and  light  weapons  and  repealing  Joint  Action  1999/34/CFSP).    Generally 
speaking,  the  term  “firearm”  is  used  in  internal  EU  security  aspects,  while  SALW  is  used  at  the 
international level and by the EU in Common Foreign and Security Policy matters. 

158 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 implementing Article 10 of the United 
Nations’  Protocol  against  the  illicit  manufacturing  of  and  trafficking  in  firearms,  their  parts  and 
components  and  ammunition,  supplementing  the  United  Nations  Convention  against  Transnational 
Organised  Crime  (UN  Firearms  Protocol),  and  establishing  export  authorisation,  and  import  and  transit 
measures for firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, OJ 94/1, 30.3.2012. 

   143 

 
 
 
                                                 
Although there is not yet an internationally agreed definition of small arms and light weapons, the 
Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) defines small arms and light weapons to 
be man-portable weapons made or modified to military specifications for use as lethal instruments 
of  war.  Small  arms  are  broadly  categorized  as  those  weapons  intended  for  use  by  individual 
members  of  armed  or  security  forces.  They  include  revolvers  and  self-loading  pistols;  rifles  and 
carbines; sub-machine guns; assault rifles; and light machine guns.  

Light weapons are broadly categorized as those weapons intended for use by several members of 
armed  or  security  forces  serving  as  a  crew.  They  include  heavy  machine  guns;  hand-held  under-
barrel  and  mounted  grenade  launchers;  portable  anti-aircraft  guns;  portable  anti-tank  guns; 
recoilless  rifles;  portable  launchers  of  anti-tank  missile  and  rocket  systems;  portable  launchers  of 
anti-aircraft missile systems; and mortars of calibres less than 100 mm.159 The definition of SALW 
adopted  in  the  EU  Strategy  to  combat  illicit  accumulation  and  trafficking  of  SALW  and  their 
ammunition  is  that  set  out  in  the  Annex  to  the  Council  Joint  Action  of  12  July  2002  on  the  EU’s 
contribution  to  combating  the  destabilising  accumulation  and  spread  of  small  arms  and  light 
weapons.160 

This study will consider criminal trafficking in all weapons whether understood to be 'firearms' or 
'small arms and light weapons' (SALW). The box below provides definitions of other key words used 
in relation to this study as defined in Directive 2008/51/EC 

Terminology used in Directive 2008/51/EC 

Parts - any element or replacement element specifically designed for a firearm and essential to 
its operation, including a barrel, frame or receiver, slide or cylinder, bolt or breech block, and any 
device designed or adapted to diminish the sound caused by firing a firearm 
Essential components - each-closing mechanism, the chamber and the barrel of a firearm which, 
being  separate  objects,  are  included  in  the  category  of  the  firearms  on  which  they  are  or  are 
intended to be mounted 
Ammunition  -  the  complete  round  or  the  components  thereof,  including  cartridge  cases, 
primers, propellant powder, bullets or projectiles, that are used in a firearm, provided that those 
components are themselves subject to authorisation in the relevant Member State. 
Illicit trafficking - the acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of firearms, their parts or 
ammunition from or across the territory of one Member State to that of another Member State if 
any one of the Member States concerned does not authorise it in accordance with the terms of 
this Directive or if the assembled firearms are not marked in accordance with Article 4(1) 
Illicit manufacturing - the manufacturing or assembly of firearms, their parts and ammunition: 

(i) 

from any essential component of such firearms illicitly trafficked 

(ii)  without an authorisation issued in accordance with Article 4 by a competent authority of 

the Member State where the manufacture or assembly takes place; or 

(iii)  without marking the assembled firearms at the time of manufacture in accordance with 

Article 4(1) 

159 OSCE, Document on small arms and light weapons, FSC.DOC/1/00/Rev.1, 20 June 2012 

160 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:191:0001:0004:EN:PDF 

                                                 
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Tracing  -  he  systematic  tracking  of  firearms  and,  where  possible,  their  parts  and  ammunition 
from  manufacturer  to  purchaser  for  the  purpose  of  assisting  the  competent  authorities  of 
Member States in detecting, investigating and analysing illicit manufacturing and illicit trafficking 
Dealer  -  any  natural  or  legal  person  whose  trade  or  business  consists  wholly  or  partly  in  the 
manufacture,  trade,  exchange,  hiring  out,  repair  or  conversion  of  firearms,  parts  and 
ammunition. 
Broker - any natural or legal person, other than a dealer, whose trade or business consists wholly 
or partly in the buying, selling or arranging the transfer of weapons. 

B.2     International Legal framework on combating illicit firearms trafficking 

Perhaps not surprisingly given the political and other interests at stake, until very recently there has 
been no internationally binding treaty to combat the problem of illicit firearm trafficking, no agreed 
international  standard  of  marking  and  tracing  weapons  and  no  real  transparency  in  arms  export 
and  the  transfer  of  arms  to  ‘high  risk’  regions.  These  and  other  shortcomings  mean  that  many 
loopholes exist. A key aim of any EU initiative should be to try and rectify this, at least as far as EU 
Member States is concerned.  

At the  international level,  the  UN Protocol against  the  Illicit Manufacturing  of and  Trafficking  in 
Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition (‘UN Firearms Protocol’) was adopted in 
May  2001  as  the  third  supplementary  Protocol  to  the  United  Nations  Convention  against 
Transnational Organized Crime, by General Assembly resolution 55/255. The Protocol entered into 
force on 3  July  2005.  The objective  of  the UN  Firearms  Protocol, which is  the  first legally binding 
instrument (but not a treaty) on small arms adopted at the global level, is to promote, facilitate and 
strengthen  cooperation  among  States  in  preventing,  combating  and  eradicating  the  illicit 
manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition. 

In  2011,  another  international  initiative,  the  Model  Law  against  the  Illicit  Manufacturing  of  and 
Trafficking  in  Firearms,  Their  Parts  and  Components  and  Ammunition  was  developed  by  the 
United  Nations  Office  on  Drugs  and  Crime  (UNODC)  in  response  to  the  request  of  the  General 
Assembly to the Secretary-General to promote and assist the efforts of Member States to become 
party to and implement the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and 
the Protocols thereto. It was developed in particular to assist States in implementing a legislative 
regime  consistent  with  the  provisions  contained  in  the  UN  Firearms  Protocol,  supplementing  the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.  

On  2  April  2013,  the  General  Assembly  voted  in  favour  of  the  landmark  Arms  Trade  Treaty, 
regulating  the  international  trade  in  conventional  arms,  from  small  arms  to  battle  tanks,  combat 
aircraft  and  warships.  Article  6  of  the  Treaty  prohibits  the  transfer  of,  or  illicit  trafficking  in, 
conventional arms:  

“A State Party shall not authorize any transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or 
of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4, if the transfer would violate its relevant international 

   145 

 
 
 
 
obligations under international agreements to which it is a Party, in particular those relating to the 
transfer of, or illicit trafficking in, conventional arms.”   

The treaty commits State Parties to assess all exports with a view to the eradication of illicit trade in 
weapons  and  so  to  contribute  to  peace  and  security  and  to  prevent  serious  violations  of 
international humanitarian or international human rights law. 

In  terms  of  external  action,  the  EU  in  2005  adopted  a  strategy  to  combat  the  illicit  accumulation 
and  trafficking  of  small  arms  and  light  weapons  and  their  ammunition.  The  strategy  sets  down 
three  principles  underpinning  the  EU’s  action  in  the  field  of  small  arms  and  light  weapons  – 
prevention,  cooperation  with  partners  and  support  to  multilateralism.  This  complements  and 
contributes to the implementation of the UN Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms 
and  Light  Weapons  and  the  International  Tracing  Instrument161  by  combining  all  the  instruments 
and policies available to the EU for tackling all facets of the firearms issue. A total of around 21m 
EUR  from  different  EU  budget 
in  2011-13  to  support  disarmament, 
demobilisation  and  reintegration  and  to  counter  illicit  trafficking  in  firearms  and  small  arms  and 
light weapons around the world.  

lines  was  deployed 

For  example,  the  EU  is  supporting  physical  security  and  stockpile  management  activities  in  Libya 
and  the  wider  region162,  the  South-Eastern  and  Eastern  Europe  Clearinghouse  for  the  Control  of 
Small  Arms  and  Light  Weapons,  regional  centres  for  firearms  control  in  Central  America  (CASAC) 
and  Africa  (RECSA),  the  OSCE  Secretariat,  the  United  Nations  Office  for  Disarmament  Affairs, 
several  civil  society  organisations163  and  INTERPOL’s  firearms  tracing  system  (see  below).  The 
Commission  with  the  European  External  Action  Service  has  developed  a  proposal164  for  the 
Instrument  for  Stability  covering  the  period  2014-2020  under  which  further  funding  for  tackling 
firearms trafficking could be directed towards partner countries, supplemented by assistance from 
Member  States  law  enforcement.  Candidate  countries  for  accession  to  the  EU,  meanwhile,  are 

161 The 2001 UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and 
Light Weapons in All Its Aspects is a politically binding document which was adopted by all UN Member 
States by consensus and provides for a global commitment to a comprehensive approach to promote, at 
the  local,  national,  subregional,  regional  and  global  level  the  prevention,  reduction,  and  eradication  of 
the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects as a contribution to international peace 
and security. It encompasses a wide variety of activities, including stockpile management and security, 
transfer  controls,  record-keeping,  destruction,  information-sharing  mechanisms  and  DDR.  It  does  not 
seek  to  control  transfers  to  non-state  actors  or  civilian  small  arms  possession.  Implementation  is 
reviewed  at  Biennial  Meetings  of  States  and  regular  Review  Conferences  (the  last  Review  Conference 
took place in August – September 2012 in New York). The International Instrument to Enable States to 
Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly on 8 December 2005. 

162 Council Decision 2013/320/CFSP; this is part of the EU’s comprehensive approach to support the transition 
process to democracy, sustainable peace and security in Libya; EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya. 

163 Examples of organisations supported by the EU are the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 

and Saferworld. 

164 Regulation scheduled for adoption in autumn 2013. 

 
                                                 
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  B 

required to align national legislation with existing instruments165 concerning the export, brokering, 
acquisition, possession and trafficking of weapons. 

The  EU  has  also  taken  several  initiatives  in  the  framework  of  its  Common  Foreign  and  Security 
Policy  to  address  illicit  arms  trafficking  at  the  international  level.  In  particular,  the  EU  has 
developed  a  Code  of  Conduct  for  exporting  conventional  weapons,  a  Common  Position  on  arms 
brokering and an EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW. The purpose of 
the  SALW  Strategy  is  to  contribute  to  an  integrated,  coherent  and  visible  EU  action  against  the 
accumulation  and  spread  of  such  arms  and  weapons.  The  political  aim  is  to  implement  and 
strengthen the United Nation Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (UNPoA). 

B.3     EU Legal Framework on combating illicit arms trafficking 

The misuse of firearms, be it legally-owned civilian weapons or civilian or military weapons which 
have been illicitly manufactured or obtained, is a serious threat to the EU's security from both an 
internal and an external perspective166. 

Article  83  (1)  TFEU  includes  "illicit  arms  trafficking"  in  the  list  of  crimes  for  which  there  is  a  legal 
basis for adopting a directive on minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and 
sanctions in the area of illicit arms trafficking with a cross-border dimension. 

Several particularly important EU-level measures have been adopted to  complement  EU Member 
States' initiatives to reinforce controls on the legal sale and holding of firearms in the EU. The aim is 
to properly monitor the movement of firearms within the EU and to develop cooperation between 
national administrations in charge of controls.  

In Directive 2008/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 amending 
Council  Directive  91/477/EEC  of  19  June  1991  on  control  of  the  acquisition  and  possession  of 
weapons, measures are laid down for the improvement of the marking and registration of firearms 
within  Member  States,  including  possible  common  guidelines  on  deactivation  standards  and 
techniques to ensure that deactivated firearms are rendered irreversibly inoperable.  

Under  the  Directive  firearms  and  related  items  should  not  be  transferred  between  EU  Member 
States  without  the  knowledge  and  consent  of  all  the  authorities  involved.  To  give  EU  law 
enforcement authorities better tools to combat illicit arms trafficking, the directive sets out strong 
rules  for  exports  and  imports  of  firearms.  The  European  Commission  aims  to  make  exports  of 
firearms  subject  to  export  authorisations  that must  contain  the  necessary  information  for  tracing 

165 Firearms Directives (1991 and 2008), Council Decision 2011/428/CFSP of 18 July 2011 in support of United 
Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs activities to implement the United Nations Programme of Actions 
to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. 

166 Council Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing 
World; The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe, COM(2010) 
673. 

   147 

 
 
 
                                                 
the firearms, including the country of origin and of export, the consignee and the final recipient, as 
well as a description of the quantity of the firearms, their parts, components and ammunition.  

There  are  a  number  of  limitations.  Firstly,  the  legislation  does  not  apply  to  firearms  intended  for 
military purposes. Secondly, it only concerns trade and transfers of firearms with non-EU countries. 
Transfers  of  firearms  within  the  Union  are  regulated  by  the  Directive  on  the  control  of  the 
acquisition  and  possession  of  weapons  (91/477/EEC).  It  integrates  the  appropriate  provisions 
required  by  the  UN  Firearms  Protocol  as  regards  intra-Community  transfers  of  weapons.  The 
Directive establishes rules on controls by the Member States on the acquisition and possession of 
firearms and their transfer to another Member State.  Whilst it is prohibited to acquire and possess 
Category A firearms (explosive arms, automatic weapons), for Category B weapons (semi-automatic 
weapons)  an  authorization  is  necessary  and  for  Category  C  and  D  a  declaration  suffices.  The 
Directive requires authorities in the Member States to issue a European firearms pass to any person 
lawfully entering into possession of and using a firearm. The pass must always be in the possession 
of the person using the firearm or firearms listed on it. For identification and tracing purposes, each 
firearm and elementary package of ammunition must be marked upon manufacturing.  

To  this  end,  EU  Member  States  may  apply  the  provisions  of  the  Convention  of  1  July  1969  on 
Reciprocal  Recognition  of  Proofmarks  on  Small  Arms.  A  computerised  data-filing  system  into 
which  these  firearms  are  to  be  registered  must  be  set  up  by  EU  countries  no  later  than  31 
December 2014. Only authorised authorities can access the register. In addition, EU countries may 
set  up  a  system  to  regulate  the  activities  of  arms  brokers.  Arms  dealers  must  keep  a  register  for 
firearms  they  receive  or  dispose  of  throughout  their  period  of  activity.  On  11th  April  2013,  the 
Commission decided to set up a group of experts on the risk of firearms to help identify what action 
should be taken while at the same time launching a wide public consultation on the issue. 

Problems with the ratification of the UN Fire Arms Protocol 

One  of  the  main  objectives  of  the  Commission’s  current  policy  on  firearms  is  to  complete  the 
process  of  transposition  into  EU  legislation  of  all  the  provisions  of  the  UN  Fire  Arms  Protocol.  
However,  in  the  absence  of  EU  legislation  covering  criminalisation,  the  Protocol  has  only  been 
partially signed and ratified. To date, 18 Member States have signed the Protocol while further 20 
Member States have ratified/approved it and the Commission signed/ratified it on behalf of the EU.  

Although the Commission ratified the Protocol leading to its legal effect in all Member States, there 
are still differences in the scope of the crime and sanctions for illicit arms trafficking that exist at 
the national level in the EU. There is also considerable flexibility available to Member States in the 
implementation of both Recital 16 of Regulation 258/2012 and Art. 16 of the Directive on control of 
the acquisition and possession of weapons, which has led to more diverse legal frameworks in the 
EU (Firearms Directive).  

In some cases the lack of a common EU legal framework on illicit firearms trafficking may impede 
effective cross-border police and judicial cooperation. For example, by preventing Law Enforcement 
Authorities  from  sharing  information  with  LEAs  in  other  Member  States  where  a  different  set  of 
legal rules apply to illicit arms trafficking. The lack of a common legal framework may also prevent 
judicial authorities from prosecuting cases which involve a cross-border dimension.  

In March 2013, the EU proposed that the Protocol should be ratified after all the provisions of the 
protocol that fall under the Union's competence had been fully transposed into EU legislation. The 
Commission is  now  in a  position  to  launch the ratification  procedure  for  the EU. This  will require 
Member  States  that  have  not  yet  ratified  the  Protocol  to  ensure  its  provisions  are  made  legally 

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Section 

Supporting Information – Definitions   
& Policy Context  

  B 

binding under their national law. These international agreements, although essential, represent the 
first step towards a fully effective response to combating illicit firearms trafficking.  

Commission Communication on Firearms and the internal security of the EU 

The  Commission  recently  (October  2013)  produced  a  communication  named  ‘Firearms  and  the 
internal security of the EU: protecting citizens and disrupting illegal trafficking’167, which noted that 
differences in national legislation on firearms are exploited by criminals, increasing the risk of illicit 
circulation  across  borders.  To  address  this  situation,  firearms  experts  have  called  for  the 
approximation  of  national  firearms  legislation.  A  lack  of  solid  EU-wide  statistics  and  intelligence 
hampers  effective  policy  and  operational  responses,  and  has  contributed  to  firearms  being 
downgraded in relation to other serious crimes, despite recognition of firearms as a key facilitator 
for  crimes  such  as  drug  trafficking.  The  last  joint  customs  operations  focused  on  firearms  was  in 
2006168,  and  it  was  unable  to  make  any  seizures  due  to  a  lack  of  investigative  leads  and  precise 
knowledge  of  routes  of  firearms  trafficking.  Action  at  an  EU  level  can  help  build  that  basis  of 
intelligence  and  statistics  to  address  knowledge  gaps  and  to  inform  dialogue  between  Member 
States on best practices. 

The Commission’s Communication highlighted the need for the EU to look at what can be done to 
disrupt the illicit trade in firearms more directly. For example, the lifecycle of a weapon begins with 
its manufacture and ends with its destruction. At any of the intervening stages of sale, possession, 
trade,  storage  and  deactivation  the  weapon  is  susceptible  to  diversion  into  criminal  hands.  The 
Commission believes that stronger action targeting the most vulnerable areas in the lifecycle of the 
firearm,  from  production  through  to  destruction,  would  facilitate  both  legal  trade  in  the  internal 
market and law enforcement cooperation in identifying and disrupting organised criminal groups, 
which is a priority for the EU Internal Security Strategy and the ‘policy cycle’ for fighting serious and 
organised crime. 

The  Communication  proposes  an  integrated  policy  for  addressing  the  threat  of  illicit  firearms 
trafficking,  through  legislation,  operational  action,  training  and  EU  funding.  Building  on  steps 
already taken at international, EU and national level, it focuses on the following four priorities. 

 

 

Safeguarding the licit market for civilian firearms through new EU standards on which 
firearms can be sold for civilian use, how firearms should be marked, and how to license 
persons who wish to possess and to use firearms. 

Reducing diversion of firearms into criminal hands through the development of effective 
standards on safe storage of civilian firearms and on how to deactivate civilian and military 

167  COM(2013) 716  final.  Communication  from the  Commission  to  the  Council and  the European  Parliament 

Firearms and the internal security of the EU: protecting citizens and disrupting illegal trafficking. 

168  Operation  Fireball  targeted  lorries  originating  in  the  Western  Balkans  and  entering  the  EU  through  its 

eastern border. 

   149 

 
 
 
                                                 
firearms, and greater efforts to reduce illicit trafficking of firearms (whether civilian or 
military) from outside the EU. 

 

 

Increasing pressure on criminal markets through better cross-border cooperation between 
police, customs and border guards and by assessing the need for common EU rules on 
which offences linked to firearms should be criminalised and what level of criminal 
sanctions should be imposed by Member States. 

Building better intelligence by gathering and sharing more information on firearms crimes, 
and by targeted training of law enforcement officers. 

These priorities draw on discussions with law enforcement authorities, the views of victims of gun 
violence, NGOs and authorised manufacturers retailers and users, as well as responses to a public 
consultation conducted by the Commission in March-June 2013169. 

The communication responds to the call by the European Parliament for more action to identify and 
to  address  vulnerabilities  in  the  lifecycle  of  firearms,  to  safeguard  lawful  production,  sale  and 
possession of  firearms,  to  disrupt  criminal  supply  chains  and  to  deter  illicit use170. It complements 
the  EU’s  actions  in  other  key  security  areas,  including  the  fight  against  organised  crime  and 
terrorism, and the EU’s 2005 strategy on illicit accumulation and trafficking of small arms and light 
weapons and their ammunition171.  

The EU has therefore sought a balanced approach to regulating the lawful circulation of civilian (i.e. 
non-military)  firearms  in  the  internal  market,  to  disrupting  the  illicit  circulation  and  use  of  civilian 
firearms, and to standards on the transfer and brokering of conventional military arms. 

169 Consultation on a common approach to reducing the harm caused by criminal use of firearms in the EU; 

http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/index_en.htm 

170  The  Interim  Report  on  Organised  Crime,  CRIM  Committee  European  Parliament  highlights  in  particular 

more action on marking and illicit trafficking. 

171 EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their Ammunition, Council document 

5319/06. 

                                                 
Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Firearms Trafficking in the EU 

Supporting Data – Problem Definition  

Section 

  C 

 151 

 
 
 
 
        Source:  gunpolicy.org

Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Firearms Trafficking in the EU 

Section 

Analysis of Survey Responses  

  D 

Nº 

% 

Nº 

% 

 Member State: 

Country 
Austria 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czech Rep. 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 

1 
3 
0 
0 
2 
0 
1 
0 
7 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
13 

Country 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 

1.3 
3.8 
0.0 
0.0  Malta 
2.5  Netherlands 
0.0  Poland 
1.3  Portugal 
0.0  Romania 
8.8  Slovakia 
0.0  Slovenia 
1.3  Spain 
1.3  Sweden 
0.0  UK 
1.3  Not given 

16.3  Total 

0 
2 
1 
0 
2 
2 
1 
0 
0 
1 
18 
0 
1 
22 
80 

What is the scale of illicit firearms trafficking in your country?  Please estimate the number of illicit 
firearms in circulation: 

Options 
Less than 10,000 weapons 
10,001 to 50,000 weapons 
50,001 to 100,000 weapons 
100,001 to 250,000 weapons 
250,001 to 500,000 weapons 
500,001 to 1,000,000 weapons 
More than 1,000,000 weapons 
Don't know/no answer 
Total 

Please estimate the annual growth rate of illicit firearms in your country 

Options 
Less than 0% 
0% 
1% to 5% 
5% to 10% 
More than 10% 
Don't know/no answer 
Total 

Nº 

% 

3 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
73 
80 

Nº 

% 

0 
4 
6 
0 
0 
70 
80 

0.0 
2.5 
1.3 
0.0 
2.5 
2.5 
1.3 
0.0 
0.0 
1.3 
22.5 
0.0 
1.3 
27.5 
72.5 

3.8 
1.3 
0.0 
1.3 
0.0 
1.3 
1.3 
91.2 
100.0 

0.0 
5.0 
7.5 
0.0 
0.0 
87.5 
100.0 

Compared  with  illicit  firearms  trafficking  that  takes  place  purely  within  your  country,  how 
significant is the cross-border dimension? 

 153 

 
 
 
 
Options 
Very significant - accounts for most of the illicit firearms trafficking problem 

Quite significant - accounts for some but not most of the problem 

Not significant at all - does not account for a significant proportion of illicit 
firearms trafficking at all 

Don't know/no answer 
Total 

What are the main drivers for illicit firearms trafficking?   

Nº 

% 

7 

3 

3 

67 
80 

8.8 

3.7 

3.7 

83.8 
100.0 

Options 

Legally manufactured firearms 
falling into the hands of criminals 
Illicitly manufactured firearms 
Demand from organised criminals 
and/or terrorist groups 
Surplus firearms from recent 
conflicts (in Europe) 
Demand for firearms from conflicts 
(outside the EU) 
Firearms which are legal/illegal in 
another Member State 

Most 
important 

Some 
importance 

Least 
important 

Nº 

% 

Nº 

% 

Nº 

% 

Don't 
know / no 
answer 
% 
Nº 

Total 

Nº 

% 

2 

1 

8 

5 

8 

2 

2.5 

1.3 

10.0 

6.3 

10.0 

2.5 

0 

4 

1 

4 

1 

3 

0.0 

5.0 

1.3 

5.0 

1.3 

16  20.0 

62  77.5 

80 

100 

10  12.5 

65  81.3 

80 

100 

3 

4 

5 

3.8 

68  85.0 

80 

100 

5.0 

67  83.8 

80 

100 

6.3 

66  82.5 

80 

100 

3.8 

12  15.0 

63  78.8 

80 

100 

Who are the main groups involved in illicit firearms trafficking n your country? 

Options 

Terrorists 
Organised criminal groups 
Non-organised criminal groups 
No answer 
Total 

Most important 
% 
Nº 

Some importance 
Nº 

% 

Least important 
Nº 

% 

3 
12 
4 
61 
80 

3.8 
15.0 
5.0 
76.3 
100.0 

2 
3 
6 
69 
80 

2.5 
3.8 
7.5 
86.3 
100.0 

8 
1 
5 
66 
80 

10.0 
1.3 
6.3 
82.5 
100.0 

To what extent are existing national offences and corresponding sanctions effective in tackling the 
problem of illicit firearms trafficking?  

Options 
Large extent (very effective) 
Some extent 
Neutral 
Small extent 
No extent (not effective at all) 
No answer 
Total 

Nº 

% 

5 
9 
2 
3 
1 
60 
80 

6.3 
11.3 
2.5 
3.8 
1.3 
75.0 
100.0 

 
 
 
Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Firearms Trafficking in the EU 

Section 

Analysis of Survey Responses  

  D 

How effective are the notions of negligence, aggravating or mitigating circumstances in tackling the 
problem of illicit firearms trafficking?  

Options 
Large extent (very effective) 
Some extent 
Neutral 
Small extent 
No extent (not effective at all) 
No answer 
Total 

Nº 

% 

4 
5 
3 
3 
2 
63 
80 

5.0 
6.3 
3.8 
3.8 
2.5 
78.8 
100.0 

Are there any national obstacles to securing illicit firearms trafficking convictions in relation to the 
offences outlined in national legislation?  

Options 

The legislation is poorly designed to 
secure convictions 
The enforcement systems are weak 
There is insufficient resources to 
tackle the full scale of the problem 
There is insufficient cross border 
police and judicial cooperation to 
tackle the full scale of the problem 

Most 
important 
Nº  % 

2 

3 

Nº  % 

Nº  % 

Not an 
obstacle 
Nº  % 

No 
answer 
Nº  % 

Total 

Nº  % 

3  3.8 

2  2.5 

2  2.5 

11  13.8 

62  77.5 

80  100 

6  7.5 

6  7.5 

3  3.8 

3  3.8 

62  77.5 

80  100 

8  10.0 

5  6.3 

3  3.8 

2  2.5 

62  77.5 

80  100 

11  13.8 

4  5.0 

2  2.5 

0  0.0 

63  78.8 

80  100 

Have  existing  EU  legislation,  and  wider  international  measures  helped  in  tackling  cross-border 
aspects of illicit firearms trafficking? To what degree? 

Options 
Large extent  
Some extent 
Neutral 
Small extent 
Not helped at all 
No answer 
Total 

Nº 

% 

2 
10 
2 
2 
2 
62 
80 

In your country, does the law and the practice differ in respect of the prosecution of illicit firearms 
trafficking offences? To what degree? 

Options 
Large extent  
Some extent 
Neutral 
Small extent 
Does not differ at all 
No answer 
Total 

Nº 

% 

1 
3 
2 
3 
11 
60 
80 

2.5 
12.5 
2.5 
2.5 
2.5 
77.5 
100.0 

1.3 
3.8 
2.5 
3.8 
13.8 
75.0 
100.0 

 155 

 
 
 
To what extent are Member State procedures for judicial cross-border cooperation effective?   

Options 
Large extent  
Some extent 
Neutral 
Small extent 
No extent (not effective at all) 
No answer 
Total 

What are the key barriers to judicial cooperation?  

Nº 

% 

3 
2 
4 
3 
0 
68 
80 

3.8 
2.5 
5.0 
3.8 
0.0 
85.0 
100.0 

To what extent is cross-border police cooperation effective?   

Options 
Large extent  
Some extent 
Neutral 
Small extent 
No extent (not effective at all) 
No answer 
Total 

What are the key barriers to police cooperation?    

Nº 

% 

0 
8 
1 
4 
0 
67 
80 

0.0 
10.0 
1.3 
5.0 
0.0 
83.8 
100.0 

Which of the following policy options do you favour? 

Nº%Nº%Nº%Nº%Nº%Most important45.078.867.556.3810.0Some importance45.045.022.522.556.3Least important22.533.833.845.000.0Not a barrier56.322.556.356.322.5No answer6581.36480.06480.06480.06581.3Total80100.080100.080100.080100.080100.0Poorly developed proceduresLegal barriers e.g. differences in legal definitions Lack of approximation of legislationLimited resourcesOptionsLack of mutual assistance obligationsNº%Nº%Nº%Nº%Nº%Most important22.533.845.033.867.5Some importance56.31113.845.045.078.8Least important22.500.033.845.000.0Not a barrier67.522.556.356.311.3No answer6581.36480.06480.06480.06682.5Total80100.080100.080100.080100.080100.0OptionsLack of mutual assistance obligationsPoorly developed proceduresLegal barriers e.g. differences in legal definitions Lack of approximation of legislationLimited resources 
 
 
 
 
 
Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Firearms Trafficking in the EU 

Section 

Analysis of Survey Responses  

  D 

Options 
Policy Option 0 
Policy Option 1 
Policy Option 2 
Policy Option 3 
None of the above  
No answer 
Total 

Nº 

% 

2 
17 
1 
5 
1 
54 
80 

2.5 
21.3 
1.3 
6.3 
1.3 
67.5 
100.0 

In your opinion, to what extent would each option have an impact on each of the following 
aspects? 

 157 

Nº%Nº%Nº%Nº%Nº%Policy Option 011.378.833.86986.380100.0Policy Option 11012.545.000.06682.580100.0Policy Option 2911.311.333.86783.880100.0Policy Option 367.511.345.06986.380100.0Availability of illicit firearms:Positive impactNo impactNegative impactDon't know/ no answerTotalNº%Nº%Nº%Nº%Nº%Policy Option 000.078.822.57188.880100.0Policy Option 1911.311.322.56885.080100.0Policy Option 278.822.522.56986.380100.0Policy Option 333.811.367.57087.580100.0Negative impactDon't know/ no answerTotalEase of trafficking illicit firearms within the EU:Positive impactNo impactNº%Nº%Nº%Nº%Nº%Policy Option 011.378.822.57087.580100.0Policy Option 1810.033.811.36885.080100.0Policy Option 2810.011.333.86885.080100.0Policy Option 333.811.367.57087.580100.0Positive impactNo impactNegative impactDon't know/ no answerTotalEase of trafficking illicit firearms from outside the EU:Nº%Nº%Nº%Nº%Nº%Policy Option 011.378.822.57087.580100.0Policy Option 11012.522.500.06885.080100.0Policy Option 2810.011.333.86885.080100.0Policy Option 356.311.367.56885.080100.0Rate of prosecution of illicit firearms trafficking:Positive impactNo impactNegative impactDon't know/ no answerTotal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparative tables: 

(A)      Key elements of illicit firearms trafficking in UN Firearms Protocol, UNODC Model Law, 

UN Arms Trade Treaty and Directive 91/477/EEC 

(B)      National provisions criminalising illicit firearms trafficking (including marking of 

firearms and illicit firearms manufacturing)  

(C)      Definitions of ‘firearms’ in national law 

(D)      Aggravating or mitigating circumstances in Member States’ national laws on illicit 

firearms trafficking 

 
 
 
 
 
Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit firearms Trafficking in the European Union 

Comparative Analysis of Legal Issues 

Appendix 

  E 

A.  Key elements of illicit firearms trafficking in UN Firearms Protocol, UNODC Model Law, UN Arms Trade Treaty and Directive 

Element  of  legal 
analysis 
Definition 
‘firearm’ 

of 

UN Firearms Protocol  

UNODC Model Law 

UN Arms Trade Treaty 

Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended 

91/477/EEC 

‘Firearm’  shall  mean  any  portable 
barrelled  weapon  that  expels, 
is 
designed to expel or may be readily 
converted to expel a  shot,  bullet  or 
projectile  by  the  action  of  an 
explosive, 
antique 
excluding 
firearms  or  their  replicas.  Antique 
firearms  and  their  replicas  shall  be 
defined 
accordance  with 
domestic  law.  In  no  case,  however, 
shall  antique 
include 
firearms  manufactured  after  1899 
(Article 3(a)). 

firearms 

in 

Same definition as UN Firearms 
Protocol  (see  previous  column) 
– article 4(h).172  

No  reference  to  ‘firearms’. 
The  ATT  refers  to  ‘small 
light  weapons’ 
arms  and 
(SALW),  but  the  precise 
meaning  of  these 
is  not 
given.  

For  the  purposes  of  this  Directive,  ‘firearm’ 
shall mean any portable barrelled weapon that 
is  designed  to  expel  or  may  be 
expels, 
converted  to  expel  a  shot,  bullet  or  projectile 
by  the  action  of  a  combustible  propellant, 
unless  it  is  excluded  for  one  of  the  reasons 
listed  in  Part  III  of  Annex  I.  Firearms  are 
classified in part II of Annex I. 

Note:  Certain  carve-outs  are set out in  Part III 
of  Annex  I,  with  the  effect  that  the  EU 
is  narrower  than  that  of  the 
definition 
Protocol.  The  most  notable  carve-out  is  for 
antique  weapons  or  replicas  not  included  in 
other  categories  in  Annex  I  and  which  are 
already 
such 
weaopons  are  excluded  from  the  definition  of 
‘firearm’  in  the  Directive.  By  contrast,  in  the 
Protocol  there  is  a  blanket  prohibition  of  any 
firearms  manufactured  after  1899  being 
classified as ‘antique’ .173 

to  national 

subject 

laws: 

172 The commentary accompanying this provision notes that “The definition of “firearm” will be a critical element of domestic implementing legislation. States 
will in many cases already have one or more domestic legal definitions. States that do not already have a definition in domestic law should include one 
that at a minimum complies with the definition in the Protocol in order to ensure the application of the various forms of cooperation under the Protocol 
and the Convention”. 

173 Part III of Annex 1 provides: “For the purposes of this Annex objects which correspond to the definition of a 'firearm' shall not be included in that definition 
if  they:  (a)  have  been  rendered  permanently  unfit  for  use  by  the  application  of  technical  procedures  which  are  guaranteed  by  an  official  body  or 
recognized by such a body; (b) are designed for alarm, signaling, life-saving, animal slaughter or harpoon fishing or for industrial or technical purposes 

 159 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Element  of  legal 
analysis 

UN Firearms Protocol  

UNODC Model Law 

UN Arms Trade Treaty 

Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended 

of 
firearms 

Definition 
‘illicit 
trafficking’ 

Criminalisation 
of illicit firearms 
trafficking 

their 

parts 

‘Illicit  trafficking’  shall  mean  the 
import,  export,  acquisition,  sale, 
delivery,  movement  or  transfer  of 
and 
firearms, 
components  and  ammunition  from 
or  across  the  territory  of  one  State 
Party to that of another State Party 
if  any  one  of  the  States  Parties 
concerned  does  not  authorize  it  in 
accordance  with  the  terms  of  this 
Protocol  or  if  the  firearms  are  not 
marked in accordance with article 8 
of this Protocol (Article 3(e)) 
Each  State  Party  shall  adopt  such 
legislative  and  other  measures  as 
may  be  necessary  to  establish  as 
following 
criminal  offences 

the 

Same definition as UN Firearms 
Protocol  (see  previous  column) 
– article 4(l) 

‘Illicit 
defined. 

trafficking’ 

not 

Suggested wording provided to 
firearms 
illicit 
criminalise 
form  of 
trafficking 
the 
any 
(i) 
prohibition 

on 

in 

No reference. 

For  the  purposes  of  this  Directive,  an  object 
shall  be  considered  as  capable  of  being 
converted  to  expel  a  shot,  bullet  or  projectile 
by the action of a combustible propellant if: 

- it has the appearance of a firearm, and 

- as a result of its construction or the material 
from which it is made, it can be so converted. 
(Article 1(1)) 
For  the  purposes  of  this  Directive,  "illicit 
trafficking"  shall  mean  the  acquisition,  sale, 
delivery,  movement  or  transfer  of  firearms, 
their  parts  or  ammunition  from  or  across  the 
territory  of  one  Member  State  to  that  of 
another  Member  State  if  any  one  of  the 
Member  States  concerned  does  not  authorise 
it in accordance with the terms of this Directive 
or if the assembled firearms are not marked in 
accordance with Article 4(1). (Article 1(2)) 

Note:  the  Protocol  conducts  of  “import, 
export” are not included in the EU definition. 
No reference.  

provided that they can be used for the stated purpose only; (c) are regarded as antique weapons or reproductions of such where these have not been 
included in the previous categories and are subject to national laws. Pending coordination throughout the Community, Member States may apply their 
national laws to the firearms listed in this Section.” 

 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit firearms Trafficking in the European Union 

Comparative Analysis of Legal Issues 

Appendix 

  E 

Element  of  legal 
analysis 

UN Firearms Protocol  

UNODC Model Law 

UN Arms Trade Treaty 

Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended 

without 

transfer 

[of 
legal 

transnational 
firearms] 
authorization; and 
(ii)  Any  transnational  transfer 
[of firearms] if firearms are not 
marked. (Articles  34 and 35 of 
Model  Law,  corresponding  to 
Article  5(1)(b)  and  Article  3(e) 
of  the  Protocol  respectively). 
optional 
Suggestions 
firearms-related  offences 
a 
State  can  also  consider  for 
their  national 
inclusion 
legislation  are 
in 
included 
annex I (articles 64-72). 
See previous column. 

for 

in 

committed 
when 
conduct, 
intentionally  (…)  illicit  trafficking  in 
firearms, 
and 
components 
ammunition 
(Article 5(1)(b)) 

parts 

their 

and 

Level  and  type 
of  penalties  and 
sanctions 
(including 
administrative 
sanctions) 

for 

but 

Generally  up  to  individual  States  to 
determine, 
“serious” 
offences  to  be  compliant  with  the 
Convention  (parent  instrument  of 
the Protocol) the minimum sanction 
must  be  custodial  sentences  of  at 
least  4  years  for  both  natural  and 
legal  persons.174    in  addition  to  any 
deemed 
sanctions 
other 
appropriate 

No 
such. 
reference  as 
Article  14  provides  that 
“Each State Party shall take 
appropriate  measures  to 
enforce  national  laws  and 
regulations  that  implement 
the  provisions  of 
this 
Treaty.” 

Member  States  shall  lay  down  the  rules  on 
penalties  applicable  to  infringements  of  the 
national  provisions  adopted  pursuant  to  this 
Directive and shall take all measures necessary 
to  ensure  that  they  are  implemented.  The 
penalties for natural and legal persons must be 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive. (Article 
16) but there is no approximation of minimum 
sanctions at the EU level.  

174 “Each of the offence provisions in the Protocol must be established as offences in criminal law. This principle applies unless the accused is a legal person, 
in which case the offence may be a criminal, civil or administrative offence. It is up to States to determine the appropriate sanction depending on their 
existing national sanctions regime. However, sanctions adopted in domestic law for the offences must take into account and should be proportionate to 
the gravity of the offences (Convention, article 11, paragraph 1). Penalties for offences, including “serious” crimes under domestic law, are left to the 
discretion of national drafters, However, to have the Convention applied to such offences, the sanction must be for a maximum penalty of at least four 
years’ deprivation of liberty. This requirement is general and applies to both natural persons and legal entities.” Model Law Section B commentary, p.45. 

 161 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
and 

Element  of  legal 
analysis 
Penalties 
sanctions 
applicable 
to 
legal  as  well  as 
natural persons 

Reference 
to  
aggravating  or 
mitigating 
circumstances 

UN Firearms Protocol  

UNODC Model Law 

UN Arms Trade Treaty 

Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended 

proportionate 

Yes,  for  “serious”  offences:  “Article 
10,  paragraph  4,  of  the  Convention 
sets  out 
additional  provisions 
regarding 
legal  entities,  requiring 
that  legal  persons  held  liable  for 
to 
“serious”  crimes  be  subject 
effective, 
and 
dissuasive  criminal  or  non-criminal 
sanctions  (civil  or  administrative), 
including  monetary  sanctions.  Such 
for 
sanctions 
example, 
dissolution, 
disqualification from participation in 
public  procurement,  publicizing  the 
freezing  of  assets.” 
decision  or 
(Model  Law  Section  B  commentary, 
p.46) 
No reference. 

include, 

could 

Yes, for “serious” offences. See 
previous column. 

No reference. 

Not applicable. 

No reference. 

No reference. 

general 

national 

For  individual  States  to  decide. 
“The 
of 
system 
or  mitigating 
aggravating 
circumstances  existing  within  a 
State’s 
legislation 
would 
be  applicable  to  the  offences 
provided  for  under  the  Model 
Law. Given the 
range  of  sanctioning  practices 
within  national 
jurisdictions, 
the Model Law 
leaves it to the discretion of the 
State to decide the appropriate 
form  and  level  of  sanction,  in 
line  with  existing  national 
practice.” (Model Law Section B 
commentary, p.45) 

Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit firearms Trafficking in the European Union 

Comparative Analysis of Legal Issues 

Appendix 

  E 

Element  of  legal 
analysis 
Negligent 
firearms 
trafficking 
criminalised 

illicit 

UN Firearms Protocol  

UNODC Model Law 

UN Arms Trade Treaty 

Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended 

the  offence  must  be 
No  – 
committed  intentionally.  See  row 
above  on  criminalisation  of  illicit 
firearms trafficking. 

Intention  only  –  see  previous 
column. 
B 
commentary, p.45).  

(Section 

No reference. 

No reference. 

 163 

 
 
 
 
Comparative Table B: National provisions criminalising illicit firearms trafficking (including marking of firearms and illicit firearms manufacturing) 

Key for column 3: C = Compliant with standard in UN Protocol / EU Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended; LC = Largely compliant; PC = Partially compliant; N = Non-compliant; NA = Not 
applicable 

Member 
State 

Protocol 

Directive 
91/477/EEC, 
as amended 

AT 
BE 
BG 

Provision on the criminalisation of illicit firearms trafficking 

“  ‘Illicit  trafficking’  shall  mean  the  import,  export,  acquisition,  sale,  delivery,  movement  or  transfer  of  firearms,  their 
parts and components and ammunition from or across the territory of one State Party to that of another State Party if 
any  one  of  the  States  Parties  concerned  does  not  authorize  it  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  this  Protocol  or  if the 
firearms are not marked in accordance with article 8 of this Protocol.” (Article 3(e)) 
“  ‘Illicit  manufacturing’  shall  mean  the  manufacturing  or  assembly  of  firearms,  their  parts  and  components  or 
ammunition: 
(i) From parts and components illicitly trafficked; 
(ii)  Without  a  licence  or  authorization  from  a  competent  authority  of  the  State  Party  where  the  manufacture  or 
assembly takes place; or 
(iii) Without marking the firearms at the time of manufacture, in accordance with article 8 of this Protocol”  (Article 
3(d)) 
“For the purposes of this Directive, "illicit trafficking" shall mean the acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of 
firearms, their parts or ammunition from or across the territory of one Member State to that of another Member State 
if any one of the Member States concerned does not authorise it in accordance with the terms of this Directive or if the 
assembled firearms are not marked in accordance with Article 4(1).” (Article 1(2)) 
“For the purposes of this Directive, ‘illicit manufacturing’ shall mean the manufacturing or assembly of firearms, their 
parts and ammunition: 
(i) from any essential component of such firearms illicitly trafficked; 
(ii) without an authorisation issued in accordance with Article 4 by a competent authority of the Member State where 
the manufacture or assembly takes place; or 
(iii) without marking the assembled firearms at the time of manufacture in accordance with Article 4(1).” (Article 1(2)) 
- 
- 
Under Articles 156-212 of the new Law in cases of violations fines may be imposed from 100 to 2500 euro, property 
sanctions  from  500  to  15,000  euro  and  withdrawal  of  the  issued  license  for  manufacture,  acquisition  or  trade  with 
SALW  up  to  1  year.  In  case  of  a  repetitive  infringement  property  sanction  up  to  25,000  euro  and  withdrawal  of  the 

Compliant  with 
UN  standard  / 
Directive?  
NA 

NA 

- 
- 
LC (no reference 
to marking) 

 
 
 
 
Compliant  with 
UN  standard  / 
Directive?  

LC (no reference 
to export)  

Member 
State 

Provision on the criminalisation of illicit firearms trafficking 

CY 

issued license up to 2 years can be imposed. 
Articles 338 and 339 of the Penal Code were amended in 2010 imposing more severe punishments concerning safety 
precautions, occurrence of average or severe bodily injury or death, or a substantial damages of a property. The terms 
of imprisonment have been prolonged with regard to acquisition, keeping, submission, alienation, or taking explosives, 
firearms or munitions without due permit.  
According to Article 338 a person who “manufactures, processes, repairs, works out, stores, trades, carries, imports or 
exports explosives, firearms, chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or munitions without having the right according to 
a law or a permit by the respective body of the authority, or does not carry it out according to the given permit, shall be 
punished by imprisonment of one to six years”. 
Law  113(i)2004.  “Illicit firearms  trafficking  means  the  purchase,  sale,  delivery,  transportation  or  transfer  of  firearms, 
their  parts  and  ammunition  from  the  territory  of  the  Republic  [of  Cyprus]  ,  or  through  it,  to  the  territory  of  another 
Member  State  or  from  the  territory  of  another  Member  State  towards  the  Republic  of  Cyprus,  in  the  case  that  the 
Republic of Cyprus or the Member State concerned does not authorize the purchase, sale, delivery, transportation or 
transfer of or if the assembled firearms are not marked in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 4 of 
Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended by Directive 2008 / 51/EK.”  
According to the Law on Firearms and non- Firearms N113 (I ) / 2004 , ‘illicit manufacturing’ means the manufacture or 
assembly of firearms, their parts and ammunition - 
(a) by illicitly trafficked essential component of such firearms 
(b) without, in accordance with Article 7 of this Law, being granted permission 
(c ) without marking the assembled firearms at the time of manufacture in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 
1 of Article 4 of Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended by Directive 2008/51/EC. 
Article 7 (1) states that: "construction or import or repair or exchange and marketing of firearms or non-firearms by any 
person is illegal, unless this person has a dealer license issued by the Chief of Police". 
For the above offense no specific penalty is provided but there is a general penalty according to Article 51 (1), which 
states that: 
 "A person, who either in person or via its employer or other representative of, fails to comply with the provisions of this 
Act, shal , if no other penalty is provided in another provision of this Act, be considered guilty of an offense and shall be 
liable  on  conviction  to  imprisonment  not  exceeding  15  years  or  to  a  fine  not  exceeding  forty  two  thousand  seven 
hundred and fifteen euro (€ 42,715), or to both. Any weapons on which the offense was committed shall be seized and 
confiscated or destroyed with the consent of that person. " 
Also in regards to illegal tampering Article 42 states that : 
 (  1)  "The  processing  firearm  or  firearm  not  to  the  point that  substantially  alter  the  characteristics  of  the  weapon  or 
weapon turns into a different category than that for which the license was granted . 

 
 
 
Member 
State 

CZ 

DE 

Provision on the criminalisation of illicit firearms trafficking 

 ( 2) A person who fails to comply with the provisions of subsection (1 ) is guilty of an offense and is liable on conviction 
to imprisonment not exceeding three years or to a fine not exceeding eight thousand five hundred forty-three euro (€ 
8543 ) ." 
There are several legislative acts focusing on different types/aspects of improper or illicit trafficking of firearms. The 
relevant definition of crime which concerns illicit trafficking of firearms is Sec.279 of the Criminal Code No. 40/2009 
Coll. 
“Section 279 Illegal Possession of Weapons 
(1) Whoever manufactures, procures for themselves or another person, or possesses a firearm or its main part or parts, 
or large quantities of ammunition or a prohibited weapons complement without authorisation, shall be punished by a 
prison sentence of up to two years, punishment by disqualification, or forfeiture of items or other assets. 
(2)  The  same  punishment  shall  be  imposed,  upon  those  who  render  a  non-functioning  firearm  usable  or  perform  a 
design adjustment of the firearm aimed at its functioning state, or whoever performs design changes to increase the 
efficiency  of  the  firearm,  or  whoever  counterfeits,  alters,  deletes,  or  removes  the  unique  marking  of  firearms,  which 
enable its identification. 
(3) Whoever, without authorisation a) produces, procures for themselves or another person, or possesses explosives at 
an  amount  larger  than  small,  weapon  of  mass  efficiency,  or  components  that  are  necessary  for  such  weapon,  or  b) 
accumulates, manufactures, or procures for themselves or another person weapons or ammunition in large quantities, 
shall be punished by a prison sentence of six months to five years. 
(4) An offender shall be punished by a prison sentence of two to eight years, if , a) they committed an act referred to in 
Subsection 3 as a member of an organised group, b) they committed such act to a large extent, or c) they committed 
such act during a state of national emergency or war.” 
 In German law there is no definition of illegal arms trafficking as such. According to Chapter 21 of the Weapons Act the 
commercial trade in firearms and ammunition requires a licence. According to chapters 29 to 31 of the Weapons Act 
the same applies to the act of moving a weapon (defined as arranging for a weapon or ammunition to be transported 
over the border into, through or out of the territory governed by this Act in Annex 1 (to Section 1 (4)), Part 2, No. 5). 
Trading  in  weapons  or  moving  a  weapon  without  a  licence  constitutes  a  criminal  offence  punishable  by  fine  or 
imprisonment of up to ten years (depending on the kind of weapon and further circumstances). For details please see 
Chapters 21, 29 to 31, 51 and 52 of the Weapons Act (attachment 1). 

The Foreign Trade Act provides for further criminal offences with regard to illegal trafficking. For further information 
please contact the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy. 

Compliant  with 
UN  standard  / 
Directive?  

PC (no reference 
to 
sale, 
import/export 
or 
movement/tran
sfer) 

C 
No 
(NB 
specific  offence 
but 
illicit 
firearms 
trafficking 
conducts  under 
the  Protocol  are 
nonetheless 
offences  under 
law  – 
German 
see 
previous 
column) 

 
Member 
State 

DK 

EE 

EL 

Provision on the criminalisation of illicit firearms trafficking 

Section 10 of the Weapons and Explosives Act and section 44 of the Order on Weapons and Ammunition establishes 
illegal  manufacture,  import,  export,  acquisition,  possession,  carrying,  use  and  trade  of  weapons  and  explosives  as 
criminal offences. [Text of legislation required.] 
The Penal Code Section 192a: Those who breach the law on weapons and explosives, import, introduce, possess, carry, 
use  or  entrust  weapons  or  explosives  which,  because  of  their  extremely  hazardous  nature  are  capable  of  causing 
considerable  damage  can  be  sentenced  up  to  6  years  imprisonment…  The  relevant  weapon  is  typically  weapons 
designed for war, as anti-tank rockets, mortars, grenades, bombs, mines and automatic firearms including submachine 
guns and machine guns. 
Penal Code § 392. Illicit import and export of prohibited goods or goods requiring a special permit 
(1)  Carriage  of  prohibited  goods,  or  radioactive  substances,  explosive  substances,  narcotic  drugs  or  psychotropic 
substances,  precursors  for  narcotic  drugs  or  psychotropic  substances,  non-narcotic  medicinal  products,  dangerous 
chemicals or waste, strategic goods, firearms or ammunition without a mandatory document or without an entry in the 
state  register  across  the  frontier  of  the  European  Union  customs  territory  or  state  border  shall  be  punished  by  a 
pecuniary punishment or up to 5 years’ imprisonment. 
(2) The same act, if: 1) committed by an official taking advantage of his or her official position; or 2) committed by a 
group, is punishable by 2 to 10 years’ imprisonment. 
(3) An  act provided  for  in  subsection (1)  of  this  section,  if committed  by  a  legal  person,  is punishable  by  a pecuniary 
punishment. 
(4) The court shall confiscate the substance or object which was the direct object of commission of an offence provided 
for in this section. 
(5)  For  the  criminal  offence  provided  for  in  this  section,  the  court  shall  impose  extended  confiscation  of  assets  or 
property acquired by the criminal offence pursuant to the provisions of § 832 of this Code.  
Weapons  Act  §  891.  Violation  of  requirements  for  handling  of  or  procedure  for  keeping  records  and  registration  of 
weapons, essential components of firearms or ammunition 
(1) Violation of the requirements for the carrying, storage, conveying, manufacture, conversion, repair, sale, rental or 
transport  of  weapons,  essential  components  of  firearms  or  ammunition,  or  violation  of  other  requirements  for  the 
handling  of  weapons,  essential  components  of  firearms  or  ammunition,  or  violation  of  the  procedure  for  keeping 
records and registration of weapons, essential components of firearms or ammunition is punishable by a fine of up to 
300 fine units or by detention. 
(2) The same act, if committed by a legal person, is punishable by a fine of up to 3200 euros. 
Law  2168/93  (amended  by  3944/2011)  provides  that  any  transaction  that  takes  place  with  weapons  without 
authorisation  constitutes  a  criminal  offence.  Law  2168/93  was  amended  by  N.3944/2011  in  2011  to  transpose  the 
provisions  of  Directive  2008/51/EC.  Article  7  of  the  same  law  makes  provision  for  falsifying  or  illicitly  obliterating, 

Compliant  with 
UN  standard  / 
Directive?  
LC (no reference 
to marking) 

PC (no reference 
to  acquisition  or 
marking) 

C 

 
 
 
Compliant  with 
UN  standard  / 
Directive?  

C  

Member 
State 

ES 

Provision on the criminalisation of illicit firearms trafficking 

removing or altering the marking(s) on firearms (6 months imprisonment and fine as above) [Full statutory reference 
required to confirm provisions on manufacturing] 
The Royal Decree 137/1993 of 29th January, BOE 55/1993 (“R.A.”) provides for administrative sanctions and fines for 
violations of its provisions, and the Criminal Code establishes a number of crimes related to firearms, including criminal 
penalties for those who possess or carry illegal weapons or carry weapons without the proper license or authorisation. 
Article 2.22 of RA defines illicit manufacture as “The manufacture or assembly of firearms, their fundamental parts or 
essential components and ammunition, provided that occurs some of the following circumstances:  
Made from fundamental parts or essential components of such firearms illicitly trafficked.  
- 
Without an authorisation by a competent authority. 
- 
- 
Without  marking  the  assembled  firearms  at  the  time  of  manufacture  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of 
Article 28 of this Regulation.”  
Article  2.31  of  the  Arms  Regulation  (RA)  defines  illicit  arms  trafficking  in  the  EU  as  “the  acquisition,  sale,  delivery, 
movement  or  transfer  of  firearms,  their  essential  parts  and  ammunition  from  or  across  the  territory  of  one  Member 
State  of  the  European  Union  to  that  of  another  Member  State  if  any  one  of  the  Member  States  concerned  does  not 
authorise it or if the assembled firearms are not marked in accordance with article 28 of this Regulation.” 
Article 4.1 of the RA prohibits, among others, "the manufacture, importation, circulation, advertising, sale, possession 
and use of weapons or imitations: 
a) 
weapons without regulatory authorization of the model or prototype. " 
Art.  30.1  of  the  RA  states  that  “it  shall  be  prohibited  to  sell,  acquire,  possess  or  use  firearms  without  marks 
corresponding to the regulatory testing, official test stands, whether Spanish or foreign recognized. Weapons included 
in category 6ª and 7ª.4 which are held or, if applicable, using the conditions of article 107, are excluded.” 
Chapter V of the Criminal Code “On owning, trafficking and deposit of weapons, ammunition or explosives”: 
 Article  564  provides  that  “Possessing  regulated  firearms  while  lacking  the  necessary  licences  or  permits  shall  be 
punished: 
1. With a sentence of imprisonment from one to two years for handguns; 
2. With a sentence of imprisonment of six months to one year for long firearms; 
2. The felonies defined in the preceding Section shall be punished, respectively, by prison sentences of two to three years 
and from one to two years, when any of the following circumstances concurs: 
1. When the weapons lack factory marks or serial numbers, or have these altered or obliterated;  
2. Which have been unlawfully imported into Spain; 
3. Which have been transformed, modifying their original characteristics.” 
Article 566 states that “Those who manufacture or market arms or ammunition or set up depots for these that are not 

Firearms  which  are  a  result  of  significant  changes  to  the  manufacturing  specifications  or  origin  of  other 

Member 
State 

Provision on the criminalisation of illicit firearms trafficking 

FI 

FR 

HR 
HU 
IE 

IT 
LT 

authorised by law or the competent authority shall be punished …” 
There is no legal definition of "trafficking in fire arms": legal sanctions are divided into several laws and regulations. 

Code Pénal, Code de la Défense et Code de la Sécurité Intérieure modifiés par la Loi n° 2012-304 du 6 mars 2012 
Ainsi que le Décret n° 2013-700 du 30 juillet 2013 article 1er – III – 11° (see infra) 
Décret  n°  2013-700  du  30  juillet  2013  article  1er  –  III  –  11°  Trafic  illicite:  “acquisition,  vente,  livraison,  transport 
d’armes  à  feu,  d’éléments  d’arme,  de  munitions  ou  d’éléments  de  munitions,  d’outils  ou  matériels  spécifiques  à  la 
fabrication des armes, sans autorisation ou en violation d’une réglementation européenne ou internationale, à partir, à 
destination ou au travers du territoire national ou vers le territoire d’un autre Etat.” 
Article  L2339-11-1  du  code  de  la  Défense:  Répression  :  5ans  de  prison  et  amende  de  75.000  pour  les  personnes 
physiques. 
Article 131-38 Code Pénal: Répression : amende de 3.750.000 € pour les personnes morales. 

- 
- 
There  is  no  specific  legal  definition  of  Firearms  Trafficking  Firearms  Importation  Licensing  Laws  cover  offences  of 
Trafficking and sales without a permit. There is no historic, present or expected future firearms manufacturing industry 
in this state.  The impact of Firearms Trafficking has as a result only been an inward phenomenon from other European 
and international States.  Legislation has not been required to regulate a non-existent Firearms industry in Ireland. 
- 
Illicit arms trafficking as a criminal offence is provided for in the Article 253 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of 
Lithuania. Please note, that illicit trafficking is included into a concept of “handling”:   
“Article 253. Unauthorised Possession of Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives or Explosive Materials 
1.  A  person  who,  without  an  authorisation,  acquires,  stores,  carries,  transports  or  handles  a  firearm,  ammunition, 
explosives or explosive materials shall be punished by arrest or by imprisonment for a term of up to five years. 
2.  A  person  who,  without  an  authorisation,  produces,  acquires,  stores,  carries,  transports  or  handles  at  least  three 
firearms, the ammunition, explosives or explosive materials of a large explosive power or in a large quantity shall be 
punished by imprisonment for a term of four up to eight years.” 
The conditions of lawful sale, supply or any other form of possession of firearm are set forth in the Law of the Republic 

Compliant  with 
UN  standard  / 
Directive?  

[Further 
information 
from 
country 
expert required] 
C 
(EU/UN 
standard 
incorporated 
into 
provision 
trafficking 
criminalised  if  it 
is  “en  violation 
d’une 
réglementation 
européenne  ou 
internationale”) 

FR 
– 

NC 

PC (no reference 
of 
to 
sale 
or 
firearms 
marking; 
illicit 
manufacturing 
appears  to  be 
by 
covered 
“produces  …  at 
three 
least 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Compliant  with 
UN  standard  / 
Directive?  
firearms”) 

LC (no reference 
to marking)  

Member 
State 

Provision on the criminalisation of illicit firearms trafficking 

of  Lithuania  on  Control  of  Weapons  and  Ammunition  (i.  e.  a  licence  should  be  issued).  A  license  means  an  official 
document issued by a state institution granting the right to engage in the activities specified in the license, complying 
with the set conditions. Economic commercial activities subject to licensing are as follows: 
1) manufacture of weapons, accessories of weapons classified in Category A, ammunition, their components; 2) import 
and  export  of  weapons,  weapon  accessories,  their  components;  3)  trade  in  civil  circulation  in  weapons,  weapon 
accessories,  ammunition,  their  components;  4)  repair  of  weapons,  conversion  of  weapons  and  ammunition;  5) 
operation  of  firing  ranges  and  shooting  galleries;  6)  hire  of  weapons.  A  licence  to  engage  in  these  activities  may  be 
issued to legal persons registered in the Republic  of Lithuania in accordance with the procedure established by laws 
and other legal acts. A natural person is entitled to acquire, carry or hold a firearm if a respective permit to him or her 
is issued. 
Criminal  Law  Section  233  on  Unauthorised  Manufacture,  Repair,  Acquisition,  Storage,  Carrying,  Transportation, 
Forwarding and Sale of Firearms, Firearm  Ammunition, High-powered Pneumatic Weapons, Explosives and Explosive 
Devices, and Violation of Selling Regulations. [Text of legislation needed to confirm manufacturing, acquisition/sale 
are criminalised.] EU Directives are transposed by the Law on the Handling of Weapons and Special Means. 
According to the national legislation (Criminal Law Section 190.1) such offences are punishable as Movement of Goods 
and Substances the Circulation of which is Prohibited or Specially Regulated across the State border of the Republic of 
Latvia, respectively,  
(1) For a person who commits the moving of narcotic or psychotropic substances or the source materials (precursors) 
for the preparation of such substances, as well as radioactive or hazardous substances, goods of strategic importance 
or other valuable property, explosives, weapons and ammunition across the State border of the Republic of Latvia in 
any illegal way, the applicable punishment is deprivation of liberty for a term not exceeding five years or temporary 
deprivation of liberty, or community service, or a fine, with or without confiscation of property. 
(2)  For  a person  who commits  the  same  acts,  if they have  been committed  by  a group  of  persons  pursuant  to prior 
agreement, or if they have been committed on a large scale, the applicable punishment is deprivation of liberty for a 
term not exceeding ten years, with or without confiscation of property. 
(3)  For a  person  who commits  the  same  acts  where committed  in  an  organised group,  the  applicable  punishment  is 
deprivation  of  liberty  for  a  term  of  not  less  than  two  years  and  not  exceeding  eleven  years,  with  or  without 
confiscation  of  property,  with  or  without  probationary  supervision  for  a  term  not  exceeding  three  years,  with 
deprivation of the right to engage in entrepreneurial activity of a specific type or of all types or to engage in specific 
employment or the right to take up a specific office for a term not exceeding five years. 
- 
- 
- 

LV 

LU 
MT 
NL 

 
 
 
Compliant  with 
UN  standard  / 
Directive?  

C 

Member 
State 

PL 
PT 

Provision on the criminalisation of illicit firearms trafficking 

- 
National Definition of Illicit Firearms trafficking:  
Article 86.1 Lei das Armas nº5/2006 de 23 de Fevereiro, as amended by Lei nº 17/2009 de 6 de Maio (Law 17/2009, 6 
of May) (the “Weapons Law”):  
“Whoever,  without  being  authorized,  outside  legal  or  against  the  requirements  of  the  competent  authority,  possess, 
transport,  import,  keep,  buy  or  acquire  any  title,  or  by  any  means,  obtain  for  manufacturing,  processing,  import, 
transfer or export, use or carry:  
a) 
Equipment, military means and war material, biological weapon, chemical weapon, radioactive or susceptible 
of nuclear explosion weapon, automatic firearm, civil explosive, explosive or incendiary device improvised is punishable 
with imprisonment from 2 to 8 years; 
Products  or  substances  which  are  intended  or  may  be  used  in  whole  or  in  part,  for  the  development, 
b) 
production,  handling,  operation,  maintenance,  storage  or  dissemination  of  biological  weapons,  chemical  weapons  or 
radioactive or nuclear weapons capable of delivering such weapons, is punished with imprisonment from 2 to 5 years;  
c) 
Class B, B1, C and D weapons, shotgun or carbine with parts easily detachable and of small dimension to its 
concealment, unmodified smooth-bore weapon of less than 46cm, simulated firearm in the form of another object, or 
transformed or modified firearm, is punished with imprisonment for 1 to 5 years or a fine of up to 600 days; 
d) 
Class E weapon, concealed weapon in the form of another object, automatic opening knife, dagger, butterfly 
knife, throwing knife, throwing star, boxers, and other knives or instruments or devices without a defined application 
that can be used as a weapon of assault, or its carrier does not justify his possession, defence sprays not listed in letter 
a) nº7 of Article 3º, any device or instruments built exclusively for the purpose of being used as a weapon of aggression, 
silencer,  essential  parts  of  the  firearm,  ammunition,  either  as  ammunition  with  expansive  penetrating,  explosives  or 
incendiary projectiles, is punished with imprisonment up to 4 years or a fine of up to 480 days.” 
Article 87: 
“Nº  1  -  Who,  without  being  authorized,  out  of  legal  conditions  or  in  contradiction  to  the  prescriptions  of  competent 
authority, sell, borrow under any circumstance or by any means, intermediate a transaction, or with the intention of 
transmitting  its  detention,  possession  or  property,  adopt  any  of  the  procedures  previewed  on  the  previous  article 
(Art.86º), evolving any equipment, military means and warfare material, weapons, devices, instruments, mechanisms, 
ammunitions, substances, or products there referred, is punished with imprisonment from two to ten years” 
Nº 2 – The imprisonment on Nº1, is from four to twelve years, if: 
a) the agent, is a functionary who is responsible in prevention or repression of any of the Illicit activities previewed by 
this Law 
b) That thing or things are destined, with the knowledge of the agent, to groups, organizations or criminal associations; 
Or 

 
 
 
 
 
Member 
State 

Provision on the criminalisation of illicit firearms trafficking 

Compliant  with 
UN  standard  / 
Directive?  

c) The agent makes from these conducts his way of living 
Nº 3 – The Penalty can be specially attenuated, or not give place to punishment, if the agent voluntarily abandons its 
activity,  put  away  or  makes  diminish  considerably  the  danger  produced  by  it.  To  stop  that  the  result  which  the  Law 
pretends to avoid, does take 
place or effectively assists on the gathering of evidence decisive for the identification or capture of other responsible.” 
Under the Portuguese legislation, the Illicit firearms trafficking, is a criminal offence, and consequently appreciated by 
Judicial Authorities, as such. Complementary, there has been a constant “upgrading” of this Law, in order to define, 
make  restrictions  and  criminalize  certain  uses  or  possessions  of  Firearms,  namely  due  to  the  technological 
developments of these items, and also, to incorporate International Legislation or Regulations into our national Legal 
System. As regards the national Jurisprudence produced accordingly to the application of this national legislation, there 
are  basically  two  Judgment  Sentence  of  Superior  Courts,  regarding  this  matter,  both  produced  in  2009,  which  in 
general terms are focused on the qualification of the penal matter and the measure of the sentence, and also, on the 
censorship of the error on the wrongfulness of the criminal fact. These references, regard and are specially focused on 
the  concept  of  criminalizing  Firearms  trafficking,  but  this  very  Law  in  its  fullness  –  and  complemented  by  other 
different  regulations  –  does  in  a  very  accurate  and  extensive  manner,  preview,  regulate  and  defines  unlawful 
behaviours which are punished either as criminal offences, as also as administrative offences. 
Marking:  
Article 2.1. (V). 'Modified firearm', the firearms that by an unauthorized intervention of any type is altered from their 
essential parts, marks and the original numbers, or one whose cylinder head has been substantially reduced in size to a 
handle or replaced by another telescopic or folding; 
- 
When importing a weapon to Sweden, an import permit issued by the Swedish police is needed, cf Chapter 2, Section 
11,  in  the  Weapons  Act.  If  a  weapon  is,  or  is  attempted  to  be,  unlawfully  imported,  i.e.  without  permit,  the  Act  on 
Penalties  for  Smuggling  (SFS  2000:1225)  is  applicable,  cf  Chapter  9,  Section  4,  in  the  Weapons  Act.  In  the  Act  on 
Penalties for Smuggling it is stated that a person who, in connection with the import into Sweden of goods that are 
subject to a specific prohibition against or condition for import, intentionally contravenes the prohibition or condition 
by failing to report the goods for customs clearance, shall be sentenced for smuggling to a fine or imprisonment for at 
most two years (Section 3, paragraph 1). 
In Chapter 9, Section 1 in the Weapons Act is stated that a person who intentionally possess a firearm without having 
the right to it, or transfer or lend a firearm to someone who is not entitled to possess the firearm shall be sentenced 
for  weapons  crime  (vapenbrott)  to  imprisonment  for  at  most  one  year.  Should  the  offence  be  judged  grave,  a 
sentenced shall be imposed for grave weapons crime to imprisonment for at least six months and at most four years. 
Should the offence be committed by negligence or be judged to be petty, fines or imprisonment for at most six months 

PC (no reference 
export, 
to 
acquisition, sale, 
or 
delivery 
of 
movement 
or 
firearms, 
illicit 
manufacturing 
or  reference  to 
of 
marking 
firearms.)  

RO 
SE 

 
Member 
State 

SI 

SK 

Provision on the criminalisation of illicit firearms trafficking 

shall be imposed. 
It is also a criminal offence according to the Weapons Act to e.g. transfer ammunition to someone who is not entitled 
to possess the ammunition or to be engaged in trading in firearms without a license. 
Illicit firearms trafficking is a criminal offence (Illegal Manufacture of and Trade in Weapons or Explosive Materials) and 
is regulated in the Criminal Code (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, n.  50/12). Note that the Firearms Act, 
which is in the competency of the Ministry of Interior, regulates conditions for import and export of legally acquired 
firearms and proscribes fines in case the conditions are not met (the mentioned act also defines firearms etc.) 
Illegal Manufacture of and Trade in Weapons or Explosive Materials, Article 307: 
“(1) Whoever unlawfully assembles, manufactures, offers, sells, barters, delivers, imports, exports, enters in the country 
or takes out from the country firearms, chemical, biological or nuclear weapon, ammunition or explosive materials or 
military weapons and military equipment, which individuals, legal persons and individual entrepreneurs are prohibited 
or restricted from trading, purchase or possess, or whoever intermediates therein, or whoever unlawfully acquires or 
keeps such weapons, ammunition or explosive materials, except for the firearms for which weapons certificate may be 
issued, shall be sentenced to between six months and five years in prison. 
(2)  If  the  offence  under  the  previous  paragraph  involves  a  large  quantity  of  or  very  valuable  or  dangerous  firearms, 
ammunition,  explosive  substances  or  other  means  of  combat,  or  if  it  poses  threat,  or  if  the  act  has  been  committed 
within a criminal association, the perpetrator shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than one and not more 
than ten years.  
(3) If the act under paragraph 1 of this Article involves an individual firearm or a small quantity of ammunition for such 
a firearm or if the perpetrator, with the purpose to illegally sell, acquires or keeps firearms or ammunition for which a 
weapon certificate may be issued or if he keeps them in a large quantity or high value, the perpetrator shall be punished 
by imprisonment of up to one year.  
(4)  The  same  sentence  as  that  referred  to  in  the  previous  paragraph  shall  be  imposed  on  a  person  who  falsifies,  or 
without authorization destroys, removes, or changes marks on firearms.  
(5)  Whoever  unlawfully  manufactures,  acquires,  offers,  sells,  barters,  sends,  delivers,  imports,  exports,  enters  in  the 
country  or  takes  out  of  the  country  composite  and/or  spare  parts  of  firearms,  ammunition,  explosive  materials, 
explosive  devices  and  explosive  weapons,  or  military  weapons  and  military  equipment,  a  substance,  ingredients, 
software or technology, of which he knows to be used for the manufacture or operation of the items referred to in the 
previous paragraphs, and keeps them for such a purpose or intermediates therein, shall be sentenced to up to five years 
in prison.” 
Criminal offence by Penal Code no. 300/2005. § 294, 295 - Illegal possession of firearms and firearms trafficking 
“§ 295  
(1) Any person who for himself or another, manufactures, imports, exports, transits, transports, procures or possesses 

Compliant  with 
UN  standard  / 
Directive?  

C 

(no  explicit 
to 

C 
reference 
sales) 

 
 
 
Member 
State 

Provision on the criminalisation of illicit firearms trafficking 

Compliant  with 
UN  standard  / 
Directive?  

ammunition without authorization or mediates such activity , shall be punished by imprisonment of one to five years. 
(2) Any person who for himself or another, manufactures, imports, exports, transports, procures or possesses a firearm, 
any  part  or  component  without  permission  or  without  marking  the  firearms  intended  to  be  identified  under  an 
international treaty by which the Slovak Republic is bound, or mediates such activity, shall be punished by imprisonment 
of three to eight years . 
(3)  As  in  paragraph  2,  the  offender,  if  the  firearm  falsifies,  looks  illegally,  removed  or  otherwise  alters  the  marking 
intended to identify and track under an international treaty by which the Slovak Republic is bound. 
(4) The imprisonment of four to ten years, the offender commits the criminal offense referred to in paragraph 1 , 2 or 3 
a) in a serious manner, b ) the specific motivation, or c ) to a greater extent. 
(5) The imprisonment of eight to fifteen years the offender commits the criminal offense referred to in paragraph 1 , 2 
or 3 
a) as a member of a dangerous grouping, b ) large-scale , or c ) a crisis situation . 
§ 295 
(1) Any person who without authorization 
a) manufactures, imports, exports, transits, transports, procures or possesses for himself or another weapon of mass 
destruction or part, or component, b) accumulating firearms, weapons of mass weapons, ammunition or explosives, or 
c) any of the activities referred to in a) or b ) to provide, shall be punished by imprisonment of three to eight years . 
(2) As in paragraph 1, the offender, if a) anti-personnel landmine himself or another, develops, manufactures, imports, 
exports, transits , transports , procures , possesses, stores or uses, or b) Projects for the construction or operation used 
to produce chemical 
weapons or biological weapons. 
(3) imprisonment of seven to ten years, the offender commits the criminal offense referred to in paragraph 1 or 2 
a) in a serious manner, b ) the specific motivation, or c) to a greater extent. 
(4) imprisonment of ten to fifteen years the offender commits the criminal offense referred to in paragraph 1 or 2 
a) as a member of a dangerous group , or b ) a considerable extent . 
(5) The imprisonment of fifteen to twenty years, the offender shall be punished if he commits the offense referred to in 
paragraph 1 or 2 a) a large scale, or b ) in a crisis situation.” 
Firearms Act 1968 (as amended) 
Section 3 Business and other transactions with firearms and ammunition. 
“(1) A person commits an offence if, by way of trade or business, he— 
(a)  manufactures,  sells,  transfers,  repairs,  tests  or  proves  any  firearm  or  ammunition  to  which  section  1  of  this  Act 
applies, or a shot gun; 
(b)  exposes  for  sale  or  transfer,  or  has  in  his  possession  for  sale,  transfer,  repair,  test  or  proof  any  such  firearm  or 

UK 

PC (no reference 
to marking)  

Member 
State 

Provision on the criminalisation of illicit firearms trafficking 

Compliant  with 
UN  standard  / 
Directive?  

ammunition, or a shot gun, 
(c) sells or transfers an air weapon, exposes such a weapon for sale or transfer or has such a weapon in his possession 
for sale or transfer, 
without being registered under this Act as a firearms dealer. 
(2)It is an offence for a person to sell or transfer to any other person in the United Kingdom, other than a registered 
firearms  dealer,  any  firearm  or  ammunition  to  which  section  1  of  this  Act  applies,  or  a  shot  gun,  unless  that  other 
produces a firearm certificate authorising him to purchase or acquire it or, as the case may be, his shot gun certificate, 
or shows that he is by virtue of this Act entitled to purchase or acquire it without holding a certificate (…) 
(5)A person commits an offence if, with a view to purchasing or acquiring, or procuring the repair, test or proof of, any 
firearm  or  ammunition  to  which  section  1  of  this  Act  applies,  or  a  shot  gun,  he  produces  a  false  certificate  or  a 
certificate in which any false entry has been made, or personates a person to whom a certificate has been granted, or 
knowingly or recklessly makes a statement false in any material particular.” 

Comparative Table C: Definition of ‘firearms’ in national law 

Key for column 3: W = Wider definition than the UN Protocol / EU Directive 91/477/EEC standard; C = Conforms to, or in line with, Protocol / Directive; N = Narrower definition than 
Protocol / Directive 

Member 
State 
UN Protocol 

Directive 
91/477/EEC, 
as amended 

AT 

Provision on the definition of firearms 

Compliant  with  UN 
standard / Directive?  

“  ‘Firearm’  shall  mean  any  portable  barrelled  weapon  that  expels,  is  designed  to  expel  or  may  be  readily 
converted to expel a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive, excluding antique firearms or their 
replicas.  Antique  firearms  and  their  replicas  shall  be  defined  in  accordance  with  domestic  law.  In  no  case, 
however, shall antique firearms include firearms manufactured after 1899.” (Article 3(a)). 
“For the purposes of this Directive, ‘firearm’ shall mean any portable barrelled weapon that expels, is designed 
to expel or may be converted to expel a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of a combustible propellant, unless 
it is excluded for one of the reasons listed in Part III of Annex I. Firearms are classified in part II of Annex I. 
For the purposes of this Directive, an object shall be considered as capable of being converted to expel a shot, 
bullet or projectile by the action of a combustible propellant if: 
- it has the appearance of a firearm, and 
- as a result of its construction or the material from which it is made, it can be so converted.” (Article 1(1)) 
- 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Member 
State 
BE 
BG 

CY 

CZ 

DE 

DK 

EE 

Provision on the definition of firearms 

- 
Under Article 4 of the Law on the Control of Explosives, Firearms and Ammunitions, firearms are defined as: 
“technical devices that, using the energy of explosives, can eject hard objects causing the mechanical destruction 
of the target.” 

The Law on Arms, Ammunitions, Explosive Substances and Pyrotechnical Articles replaces the previous Law on 
the Control of Explosives, Arms and Ammunitions (2010). 
Law 113(I)/2004 concerning firearms and non-firearms, as amended in 2013 by Law 7(I)/2013. “Firearm means 
any portable barrelled weapon that expels, is designed to fire, or may be converted to fire a bullet or missile by 
the action of an explosive, and which falls within any of the categories set out in point I the First Schedule of this 
Act unless it is excluded for one of the reasons listed in section III of this Annex.” 
Firearms Act No. 119/2002 Coll.,on firearms and ammunition, as amended, effective as of 1 Jan 2003 defines a 
firearm as “1. a weapon the function of which is derived from the immediate release of energy during discharge; 
designated for a required effect at a defined distance” and “2. a weapon the function of which is derived from 
the immediate release of chemical energy.” 

See Annex 1 (to Section 1 (4)), Part 1, Chapter 1, No. 1,2 and 6 of Weapons Act of 11 October 2002 (Federal Law 
Gazette  I,  p.  3970,  4592;  2003  I  p.  1957),  most  recently  amended  by  Article  2  of  the  Act  of  4  March  2013 
(Federal Law Gazette I, p. 362). 
Annex 1 (to Section 1 (4)):  
“1.1 Guns shall mean objects designed for attack or defence, for signalling, for hunting, for firing darts, for sport 
or for recreation which propel a projectile through a barrel. 
2.1 Firearms… shall mean guns as defined in no. 1.1 which use hot gas to propel a projectile through or out of a 
barrel.” 

The  term  ‘firearm’  is  defined  as  a  lethal  barrelled  weapon  of  any  description  from  which  any  shot,  bullet  or 
other missile can be [Text missing from legal fiche; however this wording appears to follow the UK definition 
as set out at section 67 of the Firearms Act 1968 ] 

Weapons Act: “§ 11. Classification of weapons 
Weapons are classified as follows: 
1) a firearm is a weapon intended to hit or damage objects by way of a projectile where a charge of propellant is 
used for the directed discharge thereof; 

Compliant  with  UN 
standard / Directive?  

must 

W  (not  necessary  that 
be 
object 
designed  or  may  be 
readily  converted 
to 
shoot) 

C 

must 

reference 

W  (not  necessary  that 
object 
be 
designed  or  may  be 
readily  converted 
to 
shoot) 
N 
to 
(no 
convertible  weapons 
and  unlike  Protocol/ 
be 
Directive  must 
designed 
for  specific 
purposes  of    attack  or 
defence,  for  signalling, 
for  hunting,  for  firing 
darts,  for  sport  or  for 
recreation) 
N 
to 
(no 
convertible  weapons) 
[Assuming 
DK 
provision same as UK] 
N 
to 
convertible weapons) 

reference 

reference 

(no 

 
 
Member 
State 

Provision on the definition of firearms 

Compliant  with  UN 
standard / Directive?  

2) a gas weapon is a weapon intended to cause short-term damage to living objects by means of irritant gases. 
§ 12. Classification of firearms 
(1) Firearms are classified on the basis of their length and the length of their barrels as follows: 
1) a gun is a firearm with an overall length of over 600 mm and a barrel length of over 300 mm; 
2) a pistol is a firearm with an overall length of up to 600 mm (inclusive) and a barrel length of up to 300 mm 
(inclusive) and in which cartridges may be located in the magazine in one or more rows; 
3)  a  revolver  is  a  firearm  with  a  cylinder  and  with  an  overall  length  of  up  to  600  mm  (inclusive)  and  a  barrel 
length  of  up  to  300  mm  (inclusive),  and  in  which  the  cylinder  simultaneously  serves  as  a  magazine  and  a 
chamber. 
(2) Firearms are classified on the basis of their calibre and the cartridges used as 
follows: 
1) a full-calibre firearm is a firearm where centre-fire cartridges are used as ammunition; 
2) a rimfire firearm is a .22 or 5.6 mm calibre firearm where rimfire cartridges are used as ammunition. 
(3) Firearms are classified by the characteristics of their bore as follows: 
1) a firearm with a smoothbore barrel is a firearm with a smooth bore without rifling; 
2) a firearm with a rifled barrel is a firearm with a bore with rifling; 
3) a combination rifle-shotgun is a firearm with a combination of smoothbore and rifled barrels.” 
According to the definition contained in Article 1 paragraph 1 of Law 2168/1993, “A weapon shall be any device 
which, as a result of its construction, conversion or modification, can, through impulsive force produced in any 
manner, launch a projectile, harmful chemical or other substances, beams or flames or gases, and which may 
cause an injury or damage to the health of people or to things or cause fire, as well as any other device that may 
cause the above effects in any manner whatsoever. Weapons shall also include any firearm and, in particular, 
military  rifles,  submachine  guns,  pistols,  revolvers,  sound-gas  guns,  heavy  weapons,  artillery  weapons  and  ... 
weapons, as well as grenades and mines of any type.”  
According to article 3 of Royal Decree 976/2011 of 8th July amending Royal Decree 137/1993 of 29th January, 
“Regulated  weapons  and  firearms,  whose  acquisition,  possession  and  use  can  be  authorised  or  allowed  in 
accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  Arms  Regulation  (RA)  (Royal  Decree  137/1993  of  29th  January,  BOE 
55/1993), are the objects that, taking into account its characteristics, degree of danger and purpose or use, are 
listed and classified in the following categories:” 
Category 1: Short firearms (pistols and revolvers). 
Category 2: Long firearms with rifled barrels for security and surveillance. 
Category 3: Long firearms with rifled barrels for sports shooting, shotguns, air guns with muzzle energy in excess 
of 24.2 joules. 
Category 4: Compressed air rifles and pistols 

EL 

ES 

Protocol 

arguably 
C 
(but 
definition 
narrower 
/ 
than 
Directive  as 
in  EL 
definition  firearm  must 
be  capable  of  causing 
injury) 
C 

 
 
 
Member 
State 

Provision on the definition of firearms 

Compliant  with  UN 
standard / Directive?  

FI 

FR 

Category 5: Edged weapons, and knives or machetes. 
Category 6: Antique or historic firearms. 
Category 7: Crossbows, bows, blank firing guns, and flare guns. 
Article 2 includes the definition of arms and firearms. 
“1. Firearm: any portable barrelled weapon that expels is designed to expel or may be converted to expel a shot, 
bullet or projectile by the action of a combustible propellant. For these purposes, an object shall be considered as 
capable of being converted to expel a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of a combustible propellant if it has 
the appearance of a firearm, and as a result of its construction or the material from which it is made, it can be so 
converted.(…) 
5. Automatic firearm: Firearm which reloads automatically each time a round is fired and can fire more than one 
round with one pull on the trigger. 
6. Semi-automatic firearm: Firearm which reloads automatically each time a round is fired and can fire only one 
round with one pull on the trigger.” 
Definition not provided in legal fiche.  

Décret n° 2013-700 du 30 juillet 2013 article 1er – I et II (see infra). I. ― Armes par nature et munitions : 
1° Accessoires: pièces additionnelles ne modifiant pas le fonctionnement intrinsèque de l’arme, constituées par 
tous dispositifs destinés à atténuer le bruit causé par le tir de l’arme. Les accessoires suivent le régime juridique 
des 
éléments d’arme; 
2°  Arme  :  tout  objet  ou  dispositif  conçu  ou  destiné  par  nature  à  tuer,  blesser,  frapper,  neutraliser  ou  à 
provoquer une incapacité ; 
3° Arme à canon lisse: arme dont l’âme du canon est de section circulaire et ne peut donner aucun mouvement 
de rotation à un projectile unique ou multiple; 
4°  Arme  à  canon  rayé:  arme  dont  l’âme  du  canon  n’est  pas  de  section  circulaire  et  présente  une  ou  plusieurs 
rayures conventionnelles ou polygonales destinées à donner un mouvement de rotation à un projectile unique ou 
multiple; 
5° Arme à feu: arme qui tire un projectile par l’action de la combustion d’une 
charge propulsive; 
6° Arme à répétition automatique: toute arme qui, après chaque coup tiré, se recharge automatiquement et qui 
peut, par une seule pression sur la détente, lâcher une rafale de plusieurs coups; 
7° Arme à répétition manuelle: arme qui, après chaque coup tiré, est recharge manuellement par introduction 
dans le canon d’une munition prélevée dans un système d’alimentation et transportée à l’aide d’un mécanisme; 

[Further 
information 
from  country  expert 
required] 
N 
to 
(No  reference 
convertible  weapons 
and,  unlike  Protocol  / 
FR 
Directive, 
definition  firearm  must 
be  capable  of  causing 
harm) 

in 

Member 
State 

Provision on the definition of firearms 

Compliant  with  UN 
standard / Directive?  

8° Arme à répétition semi-automatique: arme qui, après chaque coup tiré, se recharge automatiquement et qui 
ne peut, par une seule pression sur la détente, lâcher plus d’un seul coup; 
9°  Arme  à  un  coup:  arme  sans  système  d’alimentation,  qui  est  chargée  avant  chaque  coup  par  introduction 
manuelle de la munition dans la chambre ou dans un logement prévu à cet effet à l’entrée du canon; 
10° Arme blanche: toute arme dont l’action perforante, tranchante ou brisante n’est due qu’à la force humaine 
ou à un mécanisme auquel elle a été transmise, à l’exclusion d’une explosion; 
11° Arme camouflée: toute arme dissimulée sous la forme d’un autre objet, y compris d’un autre type d’arme; 
12°  Arme  d’épaule:  arme  que  l’on  épaule  pour  tirer.  La  longueur  hors-tout  d’une  arme  d’épaule  à  crosse 
amovible ou repliable se 
mesure sans la crosse ou la crosse repliée. La longueur de référence du canon d’une arme d’épaule se mesure de 
l’extrémité arrière de la chambre jusqu’à l’autre extrémité du canon, les parties démontables non comprises; 
13° Arme de poing: arme qui se tient par une poignée à l’aide d’une seule main et qui n’est pas destinée à être 
épaulée. La longueur de référence d’une arme de poing se mesure hors tout; 
14° Arme incapacitante agissant par projection ou émission: arme ayant pour effet de provoquer une incapacité 
et agissant par projection à distance ou émission du procédé ou moyen incapacitant; 
15° Arme incapacitante de contact: arme de défense ayant pour effet de provoquer une incapacité et agissant à 
bout touchant; 
16° Arme neutralisée: arme qui a été rendue définitivement impropre au tir de toute munition par l’application 
de  procédés  techniques  définis  assurant  que  tous  les  éléments  de  l’arme  à  feu  à  neutraliser  ont  été  rendus 
définitivement inutilisables et impossibles à modifier; 
17° Douille amorcée: douille qui comporte une amorce sans autre charge de poudre; 
18° Douille chargée: douille qui comporte une charge de poudre ; 
19° Elément d’arme: partie d’une arme essentielle à son fonctionnement: canon, carcasse, culasse, système de 
fermeture, barillet, conversion, y compris les systèmes d’alimentation qui leur sont assimilés; (…) 
- 
- 
Firearm Act 1925 
“ “firearm” means— 
(a) a lethal firearm or other lethal weapon of any description from which any shot, bullet or other missile can be 
discharged, 
(b)  an  air  gun  (including  an  air  rifle  and  air  pistol)  with  a  muzzle  energy  greater  than  one  joule  or  any  other 
weapon incorporating a barrel from which any projectile can be discharged with such a muzzle energy, 
(c) a crossbow, 
(d) any type of stun gun or other weapon for causing any shock or other disablement to a person by means of 

HR 
HU 
IE 

(no 

reference 

N 
to 
convertible  weapons 
and 
unlike 
Protocol/Directive 
weapon  must 
be 
“lethal”  unless  it  falls 
under any of (b) to (g)) 

 
 
 
 
 
Member 
State 

Provision on the definition of firearms 

Compliant  with  UN 
standard / Directive?  

electricity or any other kind of energy emission, 
(e) a prohibited weapon, 
(f) any article which would be a firearm under any of the foregoing paragraphs but for the fact that, owing to the 
lack of a necessary component part or parts, or to any other defect or condition, it is incapable of discharging a 
shot, bullet or other missile or projectile or of causing a shock or other disablement, as the case may be, 
(g)  except  where  the  context  otherwise  requires,  any  component  part  of  any  article  referred  to  in  any  of  the 
foregoing  paragraphs  and,  without  prejudice  to  the  generality  of  the  foregoing,  the  following  articles  shall  be 
deemed to be such component parts: 
(i) telescope sights with a light beam, or telescope sights with an electronic light amplification device or an infra-
red device, designed to be fitted to a firearm specified in paragraph (a), (b),(c) or (e), 
(ii) a silencer designed to be fitted to a firearm specified in paragraph (a), (b) or (e), and 
(iii) any object— 
(I) manufactured for use as a component in connection with the operation of a firearm, and 
(II) without which it could not function as originally designed, and 1 As substituted by the Criminal Justice Act 
2006, s.26. 
(h) a device capable of discharging blank ammunition and to be used as a starting gun or blank firing gun, and 
includes a restricted firearm, unless otherwise provided or the context otherwise requires.” 
- 
According  to  the  provisions  of  Article  2  of  the  Law  on  Control  of  Weapons  and  Ammunition 
(http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=430623): 
“ ‘Firearm’ means a device or a thing designed or suited as a weapon from which barrel, by force of pressure of 
combustion  products  of  explosive  agents,  bullets,  projectiles  or  harmful  to  health,  irritant  agents  may  be 
launched to affect a target from a distance mechanically, thermally, chemically or otherwise, or a sound or light 
signal  may  be  made.  Essential  components  of  firearms  as  well  as  gas  (alarm)  pistols  (revolvers)  shall  also  be 
regarded as firearms.  
‘Essential components of a weapon’ means a barrel, a cylinder, a breechblock (lock), a breechblock (lock) carrier, 
the chamber (when it is separate object), as well as an adapter inserted into the barrel of a firearm (a barrel of a 
smaller calibre). 
‘Deactivated  weapon’  means  a  weapon  which  is  converted  or  affected  in  such  a  manner  that  all  its  essential 
components are irreversibly damaged or broken and it is impossible to restore, repair or change them so that it 
would again become suitable for proper use. 
‘Antique firearm’ means a firearm a model of which was designed before 1870. 
‘Pneumatic weapon’ means a non-fire weapon a direct motion of a bullet or another projectile launched from it 
starts because of the power of compressed air or another gas.” 

IT 
LT 

(no 

N 
convertible weapons 

reference 

to 

 
Compliant  with  UN 
standard / Directive?  
W 
(unlike 
Protocol/Directive  no 
for 
requirement 
be 
weapon 
barrelled)  

to 

Member 
State 
LV 

Provision on the definition of firearms 

According to the Law On the Handling of Weapons and Special Means section 1 clause 38: 
“firearm  –  a  portable  weapon,  with  or  without  a  barrel,  in  which  a  shell  receives  the  energy  for  directional 
movement as a result of the gas pressure from the burning of gunpowder”  
Other related definitions:  
According  to  Law  On  the  Handling  of  Weapons  and  Special  Means  section  1  clause  1  ‘antique  firearms’  – 
“firearms which have been manufactured until 1899”;  
According to Law On the Handling of Weapons and Special Means section 1 clause 5 ‘automatic firearm’ – “a 
firearm  that  loads  automatically  for  a  new  shot  after  each  shot  and,  if  its  firing  mechanism  has  once  been 
actuated, can make several shots”;  
According to Law On the Handling of Weapons and Special Means section 1 clause 34 ‘semi-automatic firearm’ – 
“a  firearm,  which  after  each  shot  loads  automatically  for  a  new  shot  and  if  the  firing  mechanism  thereof  has 
once been actuated, only one shot can be made”;  
According to Law On the Handling of Weapons and Special Means section 1 clause 43 ‘single-shot firearm’ – “a 
firearm,  which  does  not  have  a  magazine  or  a  cylinder  and  in  which  the  ammunition  (a  cartridge)  is  loaded 
manually before each shot”; and 
According to Law On the Handling of Weapons and Special Means section 1 clause 3 ‘non-automatic firearm’ – 
“a  firearm  in  which  a  new  cartridge  from  a  magazine  or  a  cylinder  is  loaded  by  a  hand-operated  mechanism 
after each shot”;  
According  to  Law  On  the  Handling  of  Weapons  and  Special  Means  section  1  clause  6  ‘service  firearms’  – 
“firearms belonging to State and local government authorities and legal persons governed by private law, which 
have the right to acquire, possess and utilise in the operations thereof firearms allocated in accordance with the 
law, intended for the fulfilment of service or work duties;  
According  to  Law  On  the  Handling  of  Weapons  and  Special  Means  section  1  clause  28  ‘military  firearms  and 
special means’ – “firearms and special means manufactured specially for military purposes, for the destruction 
or damage of live or inanimate targets, and the ammunition, parts and accessories of these weapons and special 
means”;  
According to Law On the Handling of Weapons and Special Means section 1 clause 9 ‘long firearm’ – “a firearm 
with a barrel not exceeding 300 millimetres or with the overall length exceeding 600 millimetres”;  
According  to  Law  On  the  Handling  of  Weapons  and  Special  Means  section  1  clause  20  ‘short  firearm’  –  “a 
firearm with a barrel not exceeding 300 millimetres or with the overall length not exceeding 600 millimetres”;  
According to Law On the Handling of Weapons and Special Means section 1 clause 13 ‘smooth-bore firearm’ – 
“a firearm of which at least two thirds of the bore is smooth, measuring from the cartridge chamber”;  
According  to  Law  On  the  Handling  of  Weapons  and  Special  Means  section  1  clause  44  ‘rifled  firearm’  –  “a 
firearm  in  the  muzzle  bore  of  which  spiral  grooves  have  been  formed  along  its  entire  length,  which  cause  the 
rotation of a bullet, except for firearms which are intended for shooting with smooth-bore firearm ammunition 

 
 
 
Member 
State 

Provision on the definition of firearms 

Compliant  with  UN 
standard / Directive?  

LU 
MT 
NL 
PL 
PT 

and which are classified in Latvia as smooth-bore firearms”; 
According to Law On the Handling of Weapons and Special Means section 1 clause 42 ‘traumatic firearm’ – “a 
firearm  whose  construction  is  intended  solely  for  cartridges  with  a  reduced  amount  of  gunpowder  or  other 
propellant,  whose  cartridge  shell  is  manufactured  from  such  material  which  reduces  the  likelihood  of  causing 
bodily injuries hazardous to human or animal life, and which is classified in Latvia as a traumatic firearm”;  
According to Law On the Handling of Weapons and Special Means section 1 clause 39 ‘essential components of 
a  firearm’  –  “the  barrel,  lock,  cartridge  compartment  (cartridge  cylinder,  mechanism  box  or  frame),  which  is 
included in the firearm category”;  
According  to  Law  On  the  Handling  of  Weapons  and  Special  Means  section  1  clause  40  ‘firearm  part’  –  “any 
element  or  replacement  element  specifically  designed  for  a  firearm  and  essential  to  its  operation,  including  a 
barrel, frame, receiver, mechanism box or frame, cartridge cylinder, bolt or breech block, and any device which 
has been designed or adapted to diminish the sound caused by firing a firearm, as well as a flame dowser.” 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Article 2 – Law 5/2006: 
c) "Double Action Weapon" the firearm that is activated by performing the unique action of pulling the trigger; 
d) "Simple action Weapon» the firearm that is triggered by two operations that consist of the manual arming of 
the firing mechanism and the trigger actuation; 
e) ' Alarm Weapon" device with the configuration of a firearm intended solely to produce a sound effect similar 
to that produced at the time of the shooting; 
f) “Compressed air weapon" gun driven by air or other compressed gas, intended to launch projectile; 
g)  "Compressed  air  sport  weapon”  weapon  of  compressed  air  suitable  for  practicing  sport  shooting,  purchase 
free or conditioned; 
h) "Compressed air recreation weapon » the compressed air weapon, calibre up to 5.5 mm, which speed of the 
projectile out of the muzzle is less than 360 m/s and with a barrel exceeding 30 cm; 
i) “Automatic firearm” means a firearm that makes a series of several shots by a single action on the trigger; 
(…)  
(m) “Muzzle-loading firearms” the firearm in which the cylinder cannot be opened manually and loading of the 
propellant and projectile can be made only by the muzzle, in the case of weapons of one or more barrels, and the 
mouth of the chambers, for guns 
equipped  with  drum,  considering  equivalent  to  Muzzle-loading  firearms  having  a  mobile  chamber  that  cannot 
shoot fuel cartridge, and the ignition system placed separately in outside of the chamber; 

N (must be designed to 
expel  a  projectile;  no 
reference 
readily 
convertible weapon) 

to 

 
 
 
 
Member 
State 

Provision on the definition of firearms 

Compliant  with  UN 
standard / Directive?  

RO 
SE 

SI 

SK 

UK 

(…) 
(o)  'Firearm'  any  portable  machine  or  mechanism  intended  to  cause  the  firing  of  a  propelling  charge 
generator of a mass of gases whose expansion propels one or more projectiles; 
(p) 'Short firearm' firearm with a barrel not exceeding 30 centimetres or whose overall length does not exceed 60 
centimetres; 
(q) 'Unusable firearm' the firearm that has been withdrawn or unused its essential part to get firing the projectile 
and  is  accompanied  by  a  certificate  of  destruction  issued  or  recognized  by  the  National  Directorate  of  Public 
Security Police (PSP).” 
- 
According to the Swedish Weapons Act (1996:67) a firearm is defined as “a weapon that can expel bullets, shot, 
harpoons  or  other  projectiles  by  the  action  of  powder  charges,  carbonic  acid,  compressed  air  or  other  similar 
means of expel” (Chapter 1, Section 2). The Weapons Act also applies to ammunition and objects that the law 
equated with firearms (Chapter 1, Section 1). 
Firearms are not defined in the Criminal Code, but in the Firearms Act. No definition provided in legal fiche.  

No definition provided in legal fiche. 

Section 57, Firearms Act 1968 
“(1)  In  this  Act,  the  expression  “firearm”  means  a  lethal  barrelled  weapon  of  any  description  from  which  any 
shot, bullet or other missile can be discharged and includes— 
(a) any prohibited weapon, whether it is such a lethal weapon as aforesaid or not; and 
(b) any component part of such a lethal or prohibited weapon; and 
(c)  any  accessory  to  any  such  weapon designed or  adapted  to  diminish  the  noise or  flash  caused  by  firing  the 
weapon; 
and so much of section 1 of this Act as excludes any description of firearm from the category of firearms to which 
that section applies shall be construed as also excluding component parts of, and accessories to, firearms of that 
description.” 
NB “Prohibited weapon” in section 5 of the Act defined as: 
- any firearm which is so designed or adapted that two or more missiles can be successively discharged without 
repeated pressure on the trigger; 
- any self-loading or pump-action rifled gun other than one which is chambered for .22 rim-fire cartridges; 
- any firearm which either has a barrel less than 30 centimetres in length or is less than 60 centimetres in length 

(no 

N 
convertible weapons) 

reference 

to 

[Further 
information 
from  country  expert 
required] 
[Further 
information 
from  country  expert 
required] 
N  (must  be  ‘lethal’,  no 
reference 
to 
convertible weapons)  

 
 
 
 
Member 
State 

Provision on the definition of firearms 

Compliant  with  UN 
standard / Directive?  

overall, other than an air weapon,. . . a muzzle-loading gun or a firearm designed as signalling apparatus; 
- any self-loading or pump-action smooth-bore gun which is not an air  weapon or chambered for .22 rim-fire 
cartridges and either has a barrel less than 24 inches in length or . . . is less than 40 inches in length overall; 
- any smooth-bore revolver gun other than one which is chambered for 9mm. rim-fire cartridges or a muzzle-
loading gun; 
-  any  rocket  launcher,  or  any  mortar,  for  projecting  a  stabilised  missile,  other  than  a  launcher  or  mortar 
designed for line-throwing or pyrotechnic purposes or as signalling apparatus; 
-  any  air  rifle,  air  gun  or  air  pistol  which  uses,  or  is  designed  or  adapted  for  use  with,  a  self-contained  gas 
cartridge system; 
- any weapon of whatever description designed or adapted for the discharge of any noxious liquid, gas or other 
thing; and 
- any cartridge with a bullet designed to explode on or immediately before impact, any ammunition containing 
or designed or adapted to contain any such noxious thing as is mentioned in paragraph (b) above and, if capable 
of  being  used  with  a  firearm  of  any  description,  any  grenade,  bomb  (or  other  like  missile),  or  rocket  or  shell 
designed to explode as aforesaid; 
- any firearm which is disguised as another object; 
- any rocket or ammunition not falling within paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of this section which consists in or 
incorporates a missile designed to explode on or immediately before impact and is for military use; 
-  any  launcher  or  other  projecting  apparatus  not  falling  within  paragraph  (ae)  of  that  subsection  which  is 
designed  to  be  used  with  any  rocket  or  ammunition  falling  within  paragraph  (b)  above  or  with  ammunition 
which  would  fall  within  that  paragraph  but  for  its  being  ammunition  falling  within  paragraph  (c)  of  that 
subsection; 
-  any  ammunition  for  military  use  which  consists  in  or  incorporates  a  missile  designed  so  that  a  substance 
contained in the missile will ignite on or immediately before impact; 
- any ammunition for military use which consists in or incorporates a missile designed, on account of its having a 
jacket and hard-core, to penetrate armour plating, armour screening or body armour; 
- any ammunition which incorporates a missile designed or adapted to expand on impact; 
- anything which is designed to be projected as a missile from any weapon and is designed to be, or has been, 
incorporated in— 
(i) any ammunition falling within any of the preceding paragraphs; or 
(ii) any ammunition which would fall within any of those paragraphs but for its being specified in subsection (1) 
of this section. 

 
 
Comparative Table D: Aggravating or mitigating circumstances in Member States’ national laws on illicit firearms trafficking 

Member 
State 
AT 
BE 
BG 
CY 
CZ 

Aggravating or mitigating circumstances 

- 
- 
NA 
NA 
Sec. 15 and sec. 42 of the Criminal Code 
Section 15 Intent 
(1) A criminal offence is committed intentionally if the offender 
a) sought to violate or endanger, in a manner specified under criminal law, any interest protected by this Code, or 
b) was aware that his/her conduct may cause such violation or endangering, and for the case he/she causes it, he/she understood it. 
(2) Such understanding shall be understood also as reconciliation of the offender with the fact that he/she may violate or endanger an interest protected by the Criminal 
Code in the manner stipulated in this Code. 

Section 42 Aggravating Circumstances 
The Court may consider following circumstances as aggravating, particularly when the offender: 
a) committed the criminal offence with premeditation or after previous deliberation, 
b)  committed  the  criminal  offence  out  of  greed,  for  revenge,  due  to  hatred  relating  to  nationality,  ethnic,  racial,  religious,  class  or  another  similar  hatred  or  out  of 
another particularly condemnable motive, 
c) committed the criminal offence in a brutal or agonizing manner, insidiously, with special deceit or in a similar manner, 
d) committed the criminal offence by exploiting another person’s distress, duress, vulnerability, dependence or subordination, 
e) breached a special duty by the criminal offence, 
f) abused his occupation, position or function when committing the criminal offence, 
g) committed the criminal offence against a person participating in saving life and health or in protection of property, 
h) committed the criminal offence to the harm of a child, close person, person pregnant, ill, disabled, of high age or impuissant, 
i) led another person, especially a child under the age of fifteen, a juvenile or a person of an age close to the legal age of 
juveniles, to commit an act otherwise criminal, into misconduct or to commit a criminal offence, 
j) committed the criminal offence during an emergency situation, natural disaster or another event seriously threatening life, public order or property, or at the territory 
where evacuation is in progress or has been carried out, 
k) caused higher damage or another larger harmful effect by the criminal offence, 
l) acquired higher profit by the criminal offence, 
m) committed the criminal offence in a larger extent, on more things or more persons, was committing the criminal offence or continued in its commitment for a longer 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Member 
State 

Aggravating or mitigating circumstances 

time, 
n) committed more criminal offences, 
o) committed the criminal offence as an organizer, a member of an organized group or a member of a conspiracy, or 
p) had already been sentenced for a criminal offence; the court is authorized not to consider such a fact as an aggravating circumstance according to the nature of the 
previous  conviction,  particularly  in  respect  of  the  significance  of  a  protected  interest  affected  by  such  an  act,  the  manner  of  commission  of  such  an  act  and  its 
consequences, the circumstances under which it was committed, the offender’s personality, the extent of his culpability, his motives and the period which has passed 
since his last conviction; concerning an offender of the criminal offence committed in a state induced by a mental disorder, or an offender who indulges in abuse of an 
addictive substance and has committed the criminal offence under its influence or in connection with its abuse, also when he/she commenced treatment or took other 
necessary measures for its commencement. 

Note: some special aggravating circumstances can also be found in some of the definitions of crimes: 
Sec.279 of the Criminal Code No. 40/2009 Coll  
( …) 
(3) Whoever, without authorisation 
a) produces, procures for themselves or another person, or possesses explosives at an amount larger than small, weapon of mass efficiency, or components that are 
necessary for such weapon, or 
b) accumulates, manufactures, or procures for themselves or another person weapons or ammunition in large quantities, 
shall be punished by a prison sentence of six months to five years. 
(4) An offender shall be punished by a prison sentence of two to eight years, if , a) they committed an act referred to in Subsection 3 as a member of an organised 
group, 
b) they committed such act to a large extent, or 
c) they committed such act during a state of national emergency or war. 
There  is  no  definition  of  aggravating  circumstances  in  German  criminal  law.  According  to  Chapter  46  of  the  Criminal  Code  the  guilt  of  the  offender  is  the  basis  for 
sentencing. Chapter 46 denominates circumstances to which particular consideration shall be given. 
Sections 51(2) and 52(2) (sanctions) of the Weapons Act: “A particularly serious instance shall generally be deemed to apply when the offender acts for gain or as a 
member of a gang formed for the purpose of committing such offences on a continuing basis, with the involvement of another gang member.” 
NA 
NA 
Whoever imports, possesses, manufactures, assembles, sells, delivers, transfers or supplies military rifles, automatic guns, machine guns, pistols , revolvers , grenades , 
ammunition , explosives , explosive devices and other types of war material with the intention to make the available for the commitment of a felony or for the supply of 
illegal groups, organizations, clubs or associations of persons shall be punished with imprisonment if the offense is not punished more heavily by another legal provision. 
The same penalty shall be imposed to someone who for the same purpose, receives, conceals or in any way accepts the above objects. With the same penalty are also 
punished the members of the board of directors or of steering committee or managers or leaders in the previous case of groups, organizations, clubs and associations, if 
they are aware that any of their members has been illegally acquired or possesses any of the above objects, as well as of their objectives pursued and do not the report 

DE 

DK 
EE 
EL 

 
Member 
State 

ES 

FI 
FR 

HR 
HU 
IE 
IT 
LT 

Aggravating or mitigating circumstances 

it to the competent authorities. The same penalty shall be imposed to anyone who is illegally armed with an assault rifle or machine gun or submachine gun or grenade 
or heavy artillery gun or firearm or carries them anywhere. 
According to Art. 22 of the Criminal Code, the following are aggravating circumstances are recognised: 

1.  Perpetrating the act with premeditation. 
2.  Perpetrating the act using a disguise, abuse of superiority, or taking advantage of the circumstances of the place, time or aid from other persons that weaken 

the defence of the victim or facilitate impunity of the convict. 

3.  Perpetrating the act for a price, reward or promise. 
4.  Committing the offence for racist or anti-Semitic reasons, or another kind of discrimination related to ideology, religion or belief of the victim, ethnicity, race or 

nation to which he belongs, his gender, sexual orientation or identity, illness suffered or disability. 

5.  To deliberately and inhumanely increase victim’s suffering, causing unnecessary suffering while committing the crime. 
6.  Acting with abuse of confidence. 
7.  When the convict avails himself of his public status. 
8.  Having a criminal record. 

NA 
Les  circonstances  aggravantes  doivent  être  spécifiquement  prévues  par  les  textes.  En  matière  d’infraction  relatives  aux  armes  on  peut  trouver  comme  causes 
d’aggravation : 
L’action en bande organisée 
La récidive 
Le cas du terrorisme est prévu par ailleurs. 
- 
- 
Not specified in relation to illicit firearms trafficking. 
- 
Aggravating circumstances of criminal liability are provided for in the Art. 60 of the Criminal Code: 
“1. The following shall be considered as aggravating circumstances: 
1) the act has been committed by a group of accomplices. Taking into consideration the nature and extent of participation of each accomplice in the commission of the 
criminal act, a court shall have the right not to recognise this circumstance as aggravating; 
2) the act has been committed by an organised group; 
3) the act has been committed by reason of disorderly conduct or for mercenary reasons; 
4) the act has been committed by torturing the victim or subjecting him to taunting; 
5) the act has been committed against a young child; 
6) the act has been committed against a person in a helpless state owing to an illness, disability, old age or for other reasons, in the absence of the person’s request; 
7) the act has been committed against a woman known to be pregnant; 
8) the act has been committed by taking advantage of a public or other person’s disaster; 

 
 
 
Member 
State 

Aggravating or mitigating circumstances 

LV 
LU 
MT 
NL 
PL 
PT 

RO 
SE 

SI 

9)  the  act  has  been  committed  by  a  person  under  the  influence  of  alcohol,  narcotic,  psychotropic  or  other  psychoactive  substances,  where  these  circumstances 
influenced the commission of the criminal act; 
10) the act has been committed in a publicly dangerous manner or by using explosives, explosive materials or firearms; 
11) the committed act has caused grave consequences; 
12)  the  act  has  been  committed  in  order  to  express  hatred  towards  a  group  of  persons  or  a  person  belonging  thereto  on  grounds  of  age,  sex,  sexual  orientation, 
disability, race, nationality, language, descent, social status, religion, convictions or views. 
2. When imposing a penalty, a court shall not take into consideration an aggravating circumstance which is provided for in a law as constituting the body of a crime. 
NA 
- 
- 
- 
- 
In general, under Portuguese criminal law, the intent is defined and appreciated in levels of “guilty“(In Portuguese DOLO). This graduation is basically produced, on the 
capacity of the person who produces the criminal offence to foresee and make a hypothetical judgment on the danger produced by its action. 
The  aggravating  circumstances,  are  specially  used  under  criminal  provisions  of  the  national  Criminal  Law,  mostly  when  the  criminal  offence,  also  does  produce  an 
increase of the danger on the result of its practice, either they regard a criminal offence against property, “the life in society” conducts, and most of all, on the physical 
integrity and the life of the person. 
- 
The Act on Penalties for Smuggling defines “aggravating circumstances” in Section 5, paragraph 2:  
“When assessing whether an offence is grave, particular consideration shall be given to whether the act formed part of a step in criminality that has been exercised 
systematically or on a large scale, whether the act having regard to the circumstance surrounding the import, export or control, was of a particularly dangerous nature, 
or if the act otherwise involved a serious violation of an important public interest”. 

The Weapons Act defines aggravating circumstances in Chapter 9, Section 1, paragraph 2: 
When assessing whether an offence is grave, particular consideration shall be given to whether the firearm was held in a public place, if the firearm was of a particularly 
dangerous nature or if the act involved several firearms. 
According to the Criminal Code, they are defined, as it follows: 
General Rules on Sentencing Article 49 
(1) The perpetrator shall be sentenced for a criminal offence within the limits of the statutory terms provided for such an offence and with respect to the gravity of his 
offence and his culpability. 
(2) In fixing the sentence, the court shall consider all circumstances, which have an influence on the grading of the sentence (mitigating and aggravating circumstances), 
in particular: the degree of the perpetrator's guilt; the inclinations, for which the offence was committed; the intensity of the endangerment or injury caused to the 
protected legal value; the circumstances, in which the offence was committed; the perpetrator's previous life; his personal and pecuniary situation; his conduct after the 
committing of the offence and especially, whether he recovered the damages caused by the committing of the criminal offence, and other circumstances referring to 

 
Member 
State 

Aggravating or mitigating circumstances 

SK 

the personality of the perpetrator and the expected effect of the punishment on the future life of the perpetrator in the social environment. 
(3) In fixing the sentence of a perpetrator who committed a criminal offence after he had already been convicted with the effect of finality or had served his sentence, 
or after the implementation of his sentence had been barred by time, or after his sentence has been withdrawn (recidivism), the court shall consider especially whether 
the earlier offence is of the same type as the new one, whether both offences were committed for the same inclinations and the amount of time, which has lapsed since 
the former conviction or since the serving, withdrawing or barring of the sentence. 
Guilt Article 24 
The perpetrator shall be found guilty if, when committing a criminal offence, he was of sound mind and acted with intent or through negligence, while he was aware or 
should and could have been aware that he is acting against the law, and if no grounds exist to exclude his guilt.   
Intent Article 25 
A criminal offence shall be deemed to have been committed with intent if the perpetrator was aware of his act and wanted to perform it (direct intent), or was aware 
that he can perform such act and consented to it (contingent intent). 
§ 37 of Penal Code 
Aggravating circumstance is that the offender: 
a) committed an offense of a particularly despicable reason , 
b) committed the crime in retaliation against another for being against the offender fulfills the obligation under the Act or other generally binding legal regulation , in 
particular, the teaching staff or professional staff , 
c)  committed  an  offense  ,  therefore,  that  another  defeat  or  make  more  difficult  the  exercise  of  fundamental  rights  and  freedoms  ,  or  so  as  to  facilitate  or  conceal 
another offense 
d) committed the offense as a natural disaster or other emergency that seriously threatens the life or health of humans , other fundamental rights and freedoms, the 
constitutional system , property, public order and morality , 
e) abused its employment, occupation, job title or position to attain undue or improper advantage , 
f) publicly committed the crime , 
g) committed the offense on enjoying their place in accordance with generally binding legal regulation special protection, especially in a house or apartment of another , 
h) committed more crimes 
i) misused to commit the offense a person who is not criminally responsible , 
j) seduced to commit the offense juvenile 
a ) committed the offense as an organizer , 
l) committed an offense in association with a foreign power or foreign official , or 
m) has been convicted of an offense , the court may, depending on the nature of prior convictions to disregard that fact . 

§ 138 Serious misconduct 
Serious manner means the commission of an offense 
a) with a weapon except for offenses or intentional murder under § 144, murder under § 145, slaughter under § 147 and § 
148, killing under § 149, bodily injury under § 155, § 156 and § 157, 

 
 
 
 
Member 
State 

Aggravating or mitigating circumstances 

b) a longer period of time, 
c) brutal or cruel manner, 
d) violence, the threat of imminent violence or the threat of other serious injury 
e) burglary, 
f) deceit, 
g) use of distress, inexperience, dependency or subordination, 
h) violation of the essential obligations arising from the offender's employment, position or function or imposed on him under the Act, 
i) organized group or 
j) for several persons.  
NA 

UK 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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doi: 10.2837/82977