JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats a European Union response
Date: 2016-04-06
Institutions: European Commission, European External Action Service
Subjects: European security, common foreign and security policy, computer crime, health risk, industrial hazard, man-made disaster, mutual assistance, public safety, threat to national security, transport safety

EN 

   EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY Brussels, 6.4.2016  JOIN(2016) 18 final   JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats  a European Union response  
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION 

In  recent  years,  the  European  Union’s  security  environment  has  changed  dramatically. 
Key  challenges  to  peace  and  stability  in  the  EU’s  eastern  and  southern  neighbourhood 
continue  to  underscore  the  need  for  the  Union  to  adapt  and  increase  its  capacities  as  a 
security  provider,  with  a  strong  focus  on  the  close  relationship  between  external  and 
internal  security.  Many  of  the  current  challenges  to  peace,  security  and  prosperity 
originate  from  instability  in  the  EU's  immediate  neighbourhood  and  changing  forms  of 
threats.  In  his  2014  Political  Guidelines,  the  European  Commission  President  Jean-
Claude  Juncker  stressed  the  need  ‘to  work  on  a  stronger  Europe  when  it  comes  to 
security  and  defence’  and  to  combine  European  and  national  instruments  in  a  more 
effective way than in the past. Further to this, following the invitation from the Foreign 
Affairs  Council  of  18 May 2015,  the  High  Representative  in  close  cooperation  with 
Commission services and the European Defence Agency (EDA), and in consultation with 
the EU Member States, undertook work to present this joint framework with actionable 
proposals to help counter hybrid threats and foster the resilience of the EU and Member 
States,  as  well  as  partners.1  In  June  2015  the  European  Council  recalled  the  need  to 
mobilise EU instruments to help counter hybrid threats.2 

While definitions of hybrid threats vary and need to remain flexible to respond to their 
evolving  nature,  the  concept  aims  to  capture  the  mixture  of  coercive  and  subversive 
activity,  conventional  and  unconventional  methods  (i.e.  diplomatic,  military,  economic, 
technological), which can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to 
achieve  specific  objectives  while  remaining  below  the  threshold  of  formally  declared 
warfare. There is usually an emphasis on exploiting the vulnerabilities of the target and 
on  generating  ambiguity  to  hinder  decision-making  processes.  Massive  disinformation 
campaigns,  using  social  media  to  control  the  political  narrative  or  to  radicalise,  recruit 
and direct proxy actors can be vehicles for hybrid threats.  

Insofar  as  countering  hybrid  threats  relates  to  national  security  and  defence  and  the 
maintenance  of  law  and  order,  the  primary  responsibility  lies  with  Member  States,  as 
most  national  vulnerabilities  are  country-specific.  However,  many  EU  Member  States 
face  common  threats,  which  can  also  target  cross-border  networks  or  infrastructures. 
Such threats can be addressed more effectively with a coordinated response at EU level 
by using EU policies and instruments, to build on European solidarity, mutual assistance 
and  the  full  potential  of  the  Lisbon  Treaty.  EU  policies  and  instruments  can  and,  to  a 
significant degree already do, play a key value-adding role in building awareness. This is 
helping to improve the resilience of Member States to respond to common threats. The 
Union’s external action proposed under this framework is guided by the principles set out 
in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which include democracy, the rule 

1 Council Conclusions on Common Defence and Security Policy (CSDP), May 2015 [Consilium 8971/15] 
2 European Council Conclusions, June 2015 [EUCO 22/15]. 

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of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and respect for the principles of 
the United Nations Charter and international law3. 

This Joint Communication aims to facilitate a holistic approach that will enable the EU, 
in coordination with Member States, to specifically counter threats of a hybrid nature by 
creating  synergies  between  all  relevant  instruments  and  fostering  close  cooperation 
between all relevant actors.4 The actions build on existing strategies and sectoral policies 
that  contribute  to  achieving  greater  security.  In  particular,  the  European  Agenda  on 
Security5, the upcoming European Union Global Strategy for foreign and security policy 
and  European  Defence  Action  Plan6,  the  EU  Cybersecurity  Strategy,7  the  Energy 
Security  Strategy,8  the  European  Union  Maritime  Security  Strategy9  are  tools  that  may 
also contribute to countering hybrid threats.  

As  NATO  is  also  working  to  counter  hybrid  threats  and  the  Foreign  Affairs  Council 
proposed  stepping  up  cooperation  and  coordination  in  this  area,  some  of  the  proposals 
aim to enhance EU–NATO cooperation on countering hybrid threats.  

The  proposed  response  focuses  on  the  following  elements:  improving  awareness, 
building resilience, preventing, responding to crisis and recovering.  

2.  RECOGNISING THE HYBRID NATURE OF A THREAT 

Hybrid  threats  aim  to  exploit  a  country’s  vulnerabilities  and  often  seek  to  undermine 
fundamental democratic values and liberties. As a first step, the High Representative and 
the Commission will work together with Member States to enhance situational awareness 
by  monitoring  and  assessing  the  risks  that  may  target  EU  vulnerabilities.  The 
Commission  is  developing  security  risk  assessment  methodologies  to  help  inform 
decision  makers  and  promote  risk-based  policy  formulation  in  areas  ranging  from 
aviation  security  to  terrorist  financing  and  money  laundering.  In  addition,  a  survey  by 
Member States identifying areas vulnerable to hybrid threats would be pertinent. The aim 
would be to identify indicators of hybrid threats, incorporate these into early warning and 
existing risk assessment mechanisms and share them as appropriate. 

Action 1: Member  States,  supported as appropriate by the Commission  and the  High 
Representative, are invited to launch a hybrid risk survey to identify key vulnerabilities, 
including  specific  hybrid  related  indicators,  potentially  affecting  national  and  pan-
European structures and networks. 

3  The  Charter of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the EU  is  binding on  the  institutions  and  on  the  Member  States 
when they implement Union law. 
4 Possible legislative proposals will be subject to Commission better regulation requirements, in line with 
Commission’s Better Regulation Guidelines, SWD(2015) 111. 
5 COM(2015) 185 final.  
6 To be presented in 2016. 
7 EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework [Consilium 15585/14] and Joint Communication on ‘Cybersecurity 
Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace’, February 2013 [JOIN(2013)1]. 
8 Joint Communication on ‘European Energy Security Strategy’, May 2014 [SWD(2014) 330]. 
9 Joint communication ‘For an open and secure global maritime domain: elements for a European Union 
maritime security strategy — JOIN(2014) 9 final — 06/03/2014. 

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3.  ORGANISING THE EU RESPONSE: IMPROVING AWARENESS 

3.1.

  EU Hybrid Fusion Cell 

It is essential that the EU, in coordination with its Member States, has a sufficient level 
of  situational  awareness  to  identify  any  change  in  the  security  environment  related  to 
hybrid  activity  caused  by  State  and/or  non-state  actors.  To  effectively  counter  hybrid 
threats,  it  is  important  to  improve  information  exchange  and  promote  relevant 
intelligence-sharing across sectors and between the European Union, its Member States 
and partners. 

An  EU  Hybrid  Fusion  Cell  will  offer  a  single  focus  for  the  analysis  of  hybrid  threats, 
established  within  the  EU  Intelligence  and  Situation  Centre  (EU  INTCEN)  of  the 
European External Action Service (EEAS). This Fusion Cell would receive, analyse and 
share  classified  and  open  source  information  specifically  relating  to  indicators  and 
warnings  concerning  hybrid  threats  from  different  stakeholders  within  the  EEAS 
(including EU Delegations), the Commission (with EU agencies10), and Member States. 
In  liaison  with  existing  similar  bodies  at  EU11  and  at  national  level,  the  Fusion  Cell 
would analyse external aspects of hybrid threats, affecting the EU and its neighbourhood, 
in  order  to  rapidly  analyse  relevant  incidents  and  inform  the  EU's  strategic  decision-
making processes, including by providing inputs to the security risk assessments carried 
out at EU level. The Fusion Cell's analytical output would be processed and handled in 
accordance  with  the  European  Union  classified  information  and  data  protection  rules.12 
The  Cell  should  liaise  with  existing  bodies  at  EU  and  national  level.  Member  States 
should establish National Contact Points connected to the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell. Staff 
inside and  outside the  EU (including those deployed to  EU  delegations, operations and 
missions) and in Member States should also be trained to recognise early signs of hybrid 
threats.  

Action  2:  Creation  of  an  EU  Hybrid  Fusion  Cell  within  the  existing  EU  INTCEN 
structure,  capable  of  receiving  and  analysing  classified  and  open  source  information 
on hybrid threats.  Member States are  invited to  establish National Contact  Points on 
hybrid  threats  to  ensure  cooperation  and  secure  communication  with  the  EU  Hybrid 
Fusion Cell.  

3.2.

Strategic communication 

Perpetrators of hybrid threats can  systematically  spread  disinformation,  including  through 
targeted  social  media  campaigns,  thereby  seeking  to  radicalise  individuals,  destabilise 
society  and  control  the  political  narrative.  The  ability  to  respond  to  hybrid  threats  by 
employing  a  sound  strategic  communication  strategy  is  essential.  Providing  swift 

10 In accordance with their mandates. 
11  For  example,  Europol’s  European  Cybercrime  Centre  and  Counter  Terrorism  Centre,  Frontex,  EU 
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT)-EU). 
12 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995. 

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factual responses and raising public awareness about hybrid threats are major factors for 
building societal resilience. 

Strategic  communication  should  make  full  use  of  social  media  tools,  as  well  as  the 
traditional visual,  audio  and web-based  media. The EEAS,  building  on the activities of 
the  East  and  Arab  Stratcom  Task  Forces,  should  optimise  the  use  of  linguists  fluent  in 
relevant  non-EU  languages  and  social  media  specialists,  who  can  monitor  non-EU 
information and ensure targeted communication to react to disinformation. Furthermore, 
Member  States  should  develop  coordinated  strategic  communication  mechanisms  to 
support attribution and counter disinformation in order to expose hybrid threats. 

Action  3:  The  High  Representative  will  explore  with  Member  States  ways  to  update 
and  coordinate  capacities  to  deliver  proactive  strategic  communications  and  optimise 
use of media monitoring and linguistic specialists. 

3.3.

  Centre of Excellence for ‘countering hybrid threats’ 

Building on the experience of some Member States and partner organisations13, one or a 
network of multinational institutes could act as a Centre of Excellence addressing hybrid 
threats.  Such  a  Centre  could  focus  on  researching  how  hybrid  strategies  have  been 
applied, and could encourage the development of new concepts and technologies within 
the private sector and industry to help Member States build resilience. The research could 
contribute to aligning EU and national policies, doctrines and concepts, and to ensuring 
that  decision-making  can  take  account  of  the  complexities  and  ambiguities  associated 
with  hybrid  threats.  Such  a  Centre  should  design  programmes  to  advance  research  and 
exercises to find practical solutions to  existing challenges  posed  by hybrid threats. The 
strength of such a Centre would rely on the expertise developed by its multinational and 
cross-sector participants from the civilian and military, private and academic sectors. 

Such a Centre could work closely with existing EU14 and NATO15 centres of excellence 
in  order  to  benefit  from  insights  into  hybrid  threats  that  have  been  gained  from  cyber 
defence,  strategic  communication,  civilian  military  cooperation,  energy  and  crisis 
response. 

Action 4: Member States are invited to consider establishing a Centre of Excellence for 
‘countering hybrid threats’. 

4.  ORGANISING THE EU RESPONSE: BUILDING RESILIENCE 

Resilience is the capacity to withstand stress and recover, strengthened from challenges. 
To effectively counter hybrid threats, the potential vulnerabilities of key infrastructures, 
supply  chains  and  society  must  be  addressed.  By  drawing  on  the  EU  instruments  and 
policies, infrastructure at the EU level can become more resilient.  

13 NATO Centres of Excellence. 
14 E.g. EU Institute for Security Studies (EU ISS), thematic EU Centres of Excellence on CBRN issues. 
15 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_68372.htm. 

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4.1.

Protecting critical infrastructure  

It  is  important  to  protect  critical  infrastructures  (e.g.  energy  supply  chains,  transport), 
since an unconventional attack by perpetrators of hybrid threats on any 'soft target' could 
lead  to  serious  economic  or  societal  disruption.  To  ensure  protection  of  critical 
infrastructure, the European  Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection16 (EPCIP) 
provides  an  all-hazard  cross-sectoral  systems  approach,  looking  at  interdependencies, 
based  on  the  implementation  of  activities  under  the  prevention,  preparedness  and 
response work streams. The Directive on European Critical Infrastructures17 establishes a 
procedure for identifying and designating European  Critical  Infrastructures (ECI) and a 
common approach for assessing the need to improve their protection. In particular, work 
should  be  re-launched  under  the  Directive  to  reinforce  the  resilience  of  critical 
infrastructures  relating  to  transport  (e.g.  EU's  main  airports  and  merchant  ports).    The 
Commission  will  assess  whether  to  develop  common  tools,  including  indicators,  for 
improving resilience of critical infrastructure against hybrid threats in all relevant sectors.  

Action 5: The Commission, in cooperation with Member States and stakeholders, will 
identify  common  tools,  including  indicators,  with  a  view  to  improve  protection  and 
resilience of critical infrastructure against hybrid threats in relevant sectors. 

4.1.1.  Energy Networks 

Undisturbed  production  and  distribution  of  power  is  of  vital  importance  to  the  EU  and 
significant power failures could be damaging. An essential element for countering hybrid 
threats  is  to  further  diversify  EU's  energy  sources,  suppliers  and  routes,  in  order  to 
provide more secure and resilient energy supplies. The Commission is also carrying out 
risk  and  safety  assessments  ("stress  tests")  on  EU  power  plants.  To  ensure  energy 
diversification, work in the context of the Energy Union Strategy is being intensified: for 
example,  the  Southern  Gas  Corridor  can  enable  gas  from  the  Caspian  region  to  reach 
Europe  and  in  Northern  Europe  the  establishment  of  liquid  gas  hubs  with  multiple 
suppliers.  This  example  should  be  followed  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  and  in  the 
Mediterranean,  where  a  gas  hub  is  under  development.18  The  developing  market  for 
liquefied natural gas will also contribute positively to this objective. 

Concerning  nuclear  material  and  facilities,  the  Commission  supports  the  development 
and  adoption  of  the  highest  standards  in  safety  thereby  reinforcing  resilience.  The 
Commission  is  encouraging  consistent transposition  and implementation of the Nuclear 
Safety  Directive19  that  sets  rules  on  prevention  of  accidents  and  mitigation  of  accident 

16 Communication from the Commission on a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection, 
12.12.2006, COM(2006) 786 final. 
17 Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designation of European 
critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection, OJ L 345 of 23.12.2008. 
18 On the progress achieved so far, see the State of the Energy Union 2015 (COM(2015) 572 final. 
19  Council  Directive  2009/71/Euratom  of  25  June  2009  establishing  a  Community  framework  for  the 
nuclear safety of nuclear installations, as amended by Council Directive 2014/87/Euratom of 8 July 2014. 

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consequences  and  of  the  provisions  of  the  Basic  Safety  Standards  Directive20  on 
international cooperation on emergency preparedness and response, particularly between 
neighbouring Member States and with neighbouring countries.  

Action 6: The Commission, in cooperation with Member States, will support efforts to 
diversify  energy  sources  and  promote  safety  and  security  standards  to  increase 
resilience of nuclear infrastructures  

4.1.2 Transport and supply chain security 

Transport  is  essential  for  the  functioning  of  the  Union.  Hybrid  attacks  on  transport 
infrastructure (such as airports, road infrastructures, ports and railways) can have serious 
consequences,  leading  to  disruptions  to  travel  and  supply  chains.  In  implementing 
aviation  and  maritime  security  legislation21,  the  Commission  carries  out  regular 
inspections22 and, through its work on land transport security, aims to address emerging 
hybrid  threats.  In  this  context,  an  EU  framework  is  being  discussed  under  the  revised 
Aviation Safety Regulation23, as part of the Aviation Strategy for Europe24. Furthermore, 
threats  to  maritime  security    are  being  addressed  in  the  European  Union  Maritime 
Security Strategy  and its Action Plan25. The latter enables the EU and its Member States 
to  comprehensively  tackle  maritime  security  challenges,  including  countering  hybrid 
threats, through cross-sectoral cooperation between civilian and military actors to protect 
maritime  critical  infrastructure,  the  global  supply  chain,  maritime  trade  and  maritime 
natural  and  energy  resources.  The  security  of  the  international  supply  chain  is  also 
addressed in the European Union Customs Risk Management Strategy and Action Plan26.  

20  Council  Directive  2013/59/Euratom  of  5  December  2013  laying  down  basic  safety  standards  for  the 
protection  against  the  dangers  arising  from  exposure  to  ionising  radiation  and  repealing  Directives 
89/618/Euratom, 90/641/Euratom, 96/29/Euratom, 97/43/Euratom and 2003/122/Euratom. 
21  Regulation  (EC)  No  300/2008  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  11  March  2008  on 
common  rules  in  the  field  of  civil  aviation  security  and  repealing  Regulation  (EC)  No  2320/2002; 
Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  No  2015/1998  of  5  November  2015  laying  down  detailed 
measures  for  the  implementation  of  the  common  basic  standards  on  aviation  security;  Directive 
2005/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on enhancing port security; 
Regulation  (EC)  No  725/2004  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  31  March  2004  on 
enhancing ship and port facility security.  
22  Under  EU  law,  the  Commission  is required  to  carry  out inspections  to  ensure  Member  States'  correct 
implementation  of  aviation  and  maritime  security  requirements.  This  includes  inspections  of  the 
appropriate authority in the Member State, as well as inspections at airports, ports, air carriers, ships and 
entities implementing security measures. The Commission inspections aim to ensure that EU standards are 
fully implemented by Member States. 
23 Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/4 of 5 January 2016 amending Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the 
European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  as  regards  essential  requirements  for  environmental  protection; 
Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of 20/02/2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing 
a European Aviation Safety Agency. 
24 Communication from the Commission  to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and  Social  Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions:  An  Aviation  Strategy  for  Europe, 
COM/2015/0598 final, 7.12.2015 
25  In  December  2014,  the  Council  adopted  an  Action  Plan  to  implement  the  European  Union  Maritime 
Security 
http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/maritime-security/doc/20141216-action-
plan_en.pdf  
26  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council  and  the  European 
Economic  and  Social  Committee  on  the  EU  Strategy  and  Action  Plan  for  customs  risk  management: 
Tackling risks, strengthening supply chain security and facilitating trade, COM (2014) 527 final. 

Strategy; 

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Action  7:  The  Commission  will  monitor  emerging  threats  across  the  transport  sector 
and  will  update  legislation  where  appropriate.  In  implementing  the  EU  Maritime 
Security  Strategy  and  the  EU  Customs  Risk  Management  Strategy  and  Action  Plan, 
the  Commission  and  the  High  Representative  (within  their  respective  compentences), 
in coordination with Member States, will examine how to respond to hybrid threats, in 
particular those concerning transport critical infrastructure. 

4.1.3 Space 

Hybrid  threats  could  target  space  infrastructures  with  multi-sectoral  consequences.  The 
EU has designed the Space Surveillance and Tracking support Framework27 to network 
such assets owned by Member States in order to deliver Space Surveillance and Tracking 
services28  to  identified  users  (Member  States,  EU  institutions,  spacecraft  owners  and 
operators and civil protection authorities). In the context of the upcoming Space Strategy 
for  Europe,  the  Commission  will  explore  its  further  development,  to  monitor  hybrid 
threats to space infrastructures. 

Satellite  communications  (SatComs)  are  key  assets  for  crisis  management,  disaster 
response,  police,  border  and  coastal  surveillance.  They  are  the  backbone  of  large-scale 
infrastructures, such as transport, space or remotely piloted aircraft systems. In line with 
the  European  Council  call  to  prepare  the  next  generation  of  Governmental  SatCom 
(GovSatCom),  the  Commission,  in  cooperation  with  the  European  Defence  Agency,  is 
assessing  ways  to  pool  demand,  in  the  context  of  the  upcoming  Space  Strategy  and 
European Defence Action Plan. 

Many  critical  infrastructures  rely  on  exact  timing  information  to  synchronise  their 
networks  (e.g.  energy  and  telecommunication)  or  timestamp  transactions  (e.g.  financial 
markets).  The  dependency  on  a  single  Global  Navigation  Satellite  System  time 
synchronisation  signal  does  not  offer  the  resilience  required  to  counter  hybrid  threats. 
Galileo,  the  European  global  navigation  satellite  system,  would  offer  a  second  reliable 
timing source. 

Action 8: Within the context of the upcoming Space Strategy and European Defence 
Action  Plan,  the  Commission  will  propose  to  increase  the  resilience  of  space 
infrastructure against hybrid threats, in particular, through a possible extension of the 
Space Surveillance and Tracking scope to cover hybrid threats, the preparation for the 
next  generation  of  GovSatCom  at  European  level  and  the  introduction  of  Galileo  in 
critical infrastructures dependant on time synchronisation.   

27 See Decision 541/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
28 Such as in-orbit collision avoidance warning, alerts regarding breakup or collision and risky re-entries of 
space objects into the Earth's atmosphere. 

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4.2.

  Defence capabilities  

Defence  capabilities  need  to  be  strengthened  in  order  to  enhance  the  EU's  resilience  to 
hybrid  threats.  It  is  important  to  identify  the  relevant  key  capability  areas,  e.g. 
surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. The European Defence Agency could be a 
catalyst  for  a  military  capability  development  (for  example,  by  shortening  defence 
capability development cycles, investing in technology, systems and prototypes, opening 
defence  business  to  innovative  commercial  technologies)  related  to  hybrid  threats,. 
Possible actions could be examined under the upcoming European Defence Action Plan. 

Action  9:  The  High  Representative,  supported  as  appropriate  by  Member  States,  in 
liaison with the Commission, will propose projects on how to adapt defence capabilities 
and  development  of  EU  relevance,  specifically  to  counter  hybrid  threats  against  a 
Member State or several Member States. 

4.3.

Protecting public health and food security  

The  population's  health  could  be  jeopardised  by  the  manipulation  of  communicable 
diseases  or  the  contamination  of  food,  soil,  air  and  drinking  water  by  chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) agents. In addition, the intentional spreading 
of animal or plant diseases may seriously affect the food security of the Union and have 
major  economic  and  social  effects  on  crucial  areas  of  the  EU  food  chain.  Existing  EU 
structures for health security, environmental protection and for food safety can be used to 
respond to hybrid threats using these methods. 

Under  EU  law  on  cross-border  health  threats29,  existing  mechanisms  coordinate 
preparedness  for  serious  cross-border  threats  to  health,  linking  Member  States,  EU 
agencies and Scientific Committees30 through the Early Warning and Response System. 
The Health Security Committee, which coordinates Member States' response to threats, 
may act as a focal point on vulnerabilities in public health,31 to enshrine hybrid threats (in 
particular  bioterrorism)  in  crisis  communication  guidelines  and  in  (crisis  simulation) 
capacity-building exercises with Member States. In the area of food safety, through the 
Rapid  Alert  System  for  Food  and  Feed  (RASFF)  and  the  Common  Risk  Management 
System  (CRMS)  for  customs,  competent  authorities  exchange  risk  analysis  information 
in order to monitor health risks posed by contaminated food. For animal and plant health, 
the  review of the EU legal framework32 will add new elements to the existing “toolbox” 
33, to be better prepared also for hybrid threats. 

29  Decision  No  1082/2013/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  22  October  2013  on 
serious cross-border threats to health and repealing Decision No 2119/98/EC, OJ L 293/1, 05.11.2013. 
30 Commission Decision C(2015) 5383 of 7.8.2015 on establishment of Scientific Committees in the field 
of public health, consumer safety and the environment. 
31 in line with Decision 1082/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 
on serious cross-border threats to health and repealing Decision No 2119/98/EC, OJ L 293/1. 
32  Regulation  2016/429  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  transmissible  animal  diseases 
and  amending  and  repealing  certain  acts  in  the  area  of  animal  health  ("Animal  Health  Law"),  OJ  L84), 
31/3/2016.  Concerning  the  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  Protective 

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Action 10: The Commission, in cooperation with Member States, will improve awareness 
of  and  resilience  to  hybrid  threats  within  existing  preparedness  and  coordination 
mechanisms, notably the Health Security Committee.  

4.4.

  Cybersecurity  

The EU greatly benefits from its interconnected and digitised society. Cyberattacks could 
disrupt digital services across the EU and such attacks could be used by perpetrators of 
hybrid  threats.  Improving  the  resilience  of  communication  and  information  systems  in 
Europe is important to support the Digital Single Market. The EU Cybersecurity Strategy 
and  the  European  Agenda  on  Security  provide  the  overall  strategic  framework  for  EU 
initiatives  on  cybersecurity  and  cybercrime.  The  EU  has  been  active  in  developing 
awareness,  cooperation  mechanisms  and  responses  under  the  Cybersecurity  Strategy 
deliverables.  In  particular,  the  proposed  Network  and  Information  Security  (NIS) 
Directive34, addresses cybersecurity risks for a broad range of essential service providers 
in  the  fields  of  energy,  transport,  finance  and  health.  These  providers,  as  well  as 
providers of key digital services (e.g. cloud computing) should take appropriate security 
measures  and  report  serious  incidents  to  national  authorities,  noting  any  hybrid 
characteristics.  When  adopted  by  the  co-legislators,  the  effective  transposition  and 
implementation  of  the  Directive  would  foster  cybersecurity  capabilities  across  Member 
States, reinforcing their cooperation on cybersecurity through information exchange and 
best  practices  on  countering  hybrid  threats. In  particular,  the  Directive  provides  for  the 
establishment  of  a  network  of  28  national  CSIRTs  (Computer  Security  Incidents 
Response  Teams)  and  CERT-EU35  to  pursue  operational  cooperation  on  a  voluntary 
basis.  

To  encourage  public-private  cooperation  and  EU-wide  approaches  to  cybersecurity,  the 
Commission  established  the  NIS  Platform,  which  issues  best  practice  guidance  on  risk 
management.  While  Member  States  determine  security  requirements  and  modalities  to 
notify  national  incidents,  the  Commission  encourages  a  high  degree  of  convergence  in 
risk management approaches, drawing in particular on the European Union Network and 
Information Security Agency (ENISA). 

Action  11:    The  Commission  encourages  Member  States  as  a  matter  of  priority  to 
establish and fully utilise a network between the 28 CSIRTs and the CERT-EU as well 
as  a  framework  for  strategic  cooperation.  The  Commission,  in  coordination  with 
Member States, should ensure that sectorial initiatives on cyber threats (e.g. aviation, 

measures  against  pests  (“Plant  Health  Law”),  a  political  agreement  on  the  text  has  been  reached  by  the 
European Parliament and the Council on 16 December 2015. 
33 E.g. EU vaccine banks, sophisticated electronic animal disease information system, increased obligation 
for measures by labs and other entities dealing with pathogens. 
34  Commission  proposal  for  a  Directive  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  concerning 
measures  to  ensure  a  high  common  level  of  network  and  information  security  across  the  Union 
COM(2013) 48 final  - 7/2/2013. Political agreement has been reached by the Council of the EU and the 
European Parliament on this proposed Directive and the Directive should be formally adopted soon. 
35 Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-EU) for the EU institutions. 

10 

 
                                                                                                                                                 
energy,  maritime)  are  consistent  with  cross-sectorial  capabilities  covered  by  the  NIS 
Directive to pool information, expertise and rapid responses. 

4.4.1.  Industry 

Increased reliance on cloud computing and big data has increased vulnerability to hybrid 
threats.  The  Digital  Single  Market  Strategy  provides  for  a  contractual  Public-Private 
Partnership on cybersecurity36, which will focus on research and innovation and will help 
the Union to retain a high degree of technological capacity in this area. The contractual 
Public-Private  Partnership  will  build  trust  among  different  market  players  and  develop 
synergies  between  the  demand  and  supply  side.  While  the  contractual  Public-Private 
Partnership  and  accompanying  measures  will  primarily  focus  on  civilian  cybersecurity 
products and services, the outcome of these initiatives should allow technology users to 
be better protected also against hybrid threats.  

Action  12:  The  Commission,  in  coordination with  Member  States,  will  work together 
with  industry  within  the  context  of  a  contractual  Public  Private  Partnership  for 
to  better  protect  users  and 
technologies 
cybersecurity, 
infrastructures against cyber aspects of hybrid threats. 

to  develop  and 

test 

4.4.2.  Energy  

The  emergence  of  smart  homes  and  appliances  and  the  development  of  the  smart  grid, 
increasing digitalisation of the energy system also results in an increased vulnerability to 
cyberattacks. The European Energy Security Strategy37 and the Energy Union Strategy38 
support  an  all-hazard  approach,  in  which  resilience  to  hybrid  threats  is  integrated.  The 
Thematic  Network  on  Critical  Energy  Infrastructure  Protection  fosters  collaboration 
among operators in the energy sector (oil, gas, electricity). The Commission launched a 
web-based platform to analyse and share information on threats and incidents.39 It is also 
developing,  together  with  stakeholders40,  a  comprehensive  energy-sector  strategy  on 
cybersecurity in smart grid operations to reduce vulnerabilities. Whilst electricity markets 
are increasingly integrated, rules and procedures for how to deal with crisis situations are 
still  national.  We  need  to  ensure  that  governments  co-operate  with  each  other  in 
preparing for and preventing and mitigating risks and that all relevant players act on the 
basis of a common set of rules. 

Action 13: The Commission will issue guidance to smart grid asset owners to improve 
cybersecurity  of  their  installations.  In  the  context  of  the  electricity  market  design 
initiative,  the  Commission  will  consider  proposing  'risk  preparedness  plans'  and 

36 To be launched in mid-2016. 
37  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council:  European  Energy 
Security Strategy - COM/2014/0330 final. 
38  Communication  on  'A  Framework  Strategy  for  a  Resilient  Energy  Union  with  a  Forward-Looking 
Climate Change Policy - COM/2015/080 final. 
39 Incident and Threat Information Sharing EU Centre – ITIS. 
40 In the form of the Energy Expert CyberSecurity Platform (EECSP). 

11 

 
                                                 
procedural  rules  for  sharing  information  and  ensuring  solidarity  across  Member 
States in times of crisis, including rules on how to prevent and mitigate cyber-attacks. 

4.4.3.  Ensuring sound financial systems 

The EU's economy needs a secure financial and payment system to function. Protecting 
the financial system and its infrastructure from cyber-attacks, irrespective of the motive 
or  nature  of  the  attacker,  is  essential.  To  deal  with  hybrid  threats  against  EU  financial 
services  the  industry  needs  to  understand  the  threat,  to  have  tested  its  defences  and  to 
have the necessary technology to protect the industry from attack. Accordingly, sharing 
information on threats among financial market participants and with relevant authorities 
and  key  service  providers  or  customers  is  crucial  but  needs  also to  be  secure  and meet 
data protection requirements. In line with work in international fora, including the G7's 
work  in  this  sector,  the  Commission  will  seek  to  identify  factors  that  hinder  the 
appropriate  sharing  of  information  on  threats  and  propose  solutions.  It  is  important  to 
ensure  regular  testing  and  refinement  of  protocols  to  protect  business  and  relevant 
infrastructures, including continuous upgrading of security enhancing technologies. 

Action 14: The Commission, in cooperation with ENISA41, Member States, relevant 
international, European and national authorities and financial institutions, will 
promote and facilitate threat information-sharing platforms and networks and address 
factors that hinder the exchange of such information. 

4.4.4.  Transport  

Modern transport systems (rail, road, air, maritime) rely on information systems that are 
vulnerable cyber-attacks. Given the cross-border dimension, there is a particular role for 
the  EU  to  play.  The  Commission,  in  coordination  with  Member  States,  will  continue 
analysing cyber-threats and risks related to unlawful interferences with transport systems. 
The Commission is developing a Roadmap on cybersecurity for aviation in cooperation 
with the European Aviation safety Agency (EASA) 42. Cyber threats to maritime security 
are also addressed in the European Union Maritime Security Strategy  and its Action Plan 

Action 15: The Commission and the High Representative (within their respective areas 
of competence), in coordination with Member States, will examine how to respond to 
hybrid threats, in particular those concerning cyber-attacks across the transport sector. 

41 European Union Network and Information Security Agency 
42  The  new  EASA  regulation  is  currently  under  discussion  between  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Council  following  the  Commission's  proposal  on  December  2015.  Proposal  for  a  regulation  of  the 
European Parliament and of the Council on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing 
a  European  Union  Aviation  Safety  Agency,  and  repealing  Regulation  (EC)  No  216/2008  of  the 
European Parliament and of the Council- COM(2015) 613 final, 2015/0277 (COD). 

12 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
4.5.

  Targeting hybrid threat financing  

Perpetrators of hybrid threats need financing to maintain their activities. Financing can be 
used  to  support  terrorist  groups  or  more  subtle  forms  of  destabilisation,  such  as 
supporting pressure groups and fringe political parties. The EU stepped up efforts against 
crime and terrorist financing, as set out in the European Agenda on Security, in particular 
with  the  Action  Plan.43  In  this  context,  namely,  the  revised  European  anti-money 
laundering  framework  reinforces  the  fight  against  terrorist  financing  and  money 
laundering, facilitates the work of national Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) to identify 
and  follow  suspicious  money  transfers  and  information  exchanges,  while  ensuring 
traceability of funds transfers in the European Union. It could therefore also contribute to 
countering  hybrid  threats.  In  the  context  of  CFSP  instruments,  tailored  and  effective 
restrictive measures could be explored to counter hybrid threats. 

Action  16:  The  Commission  will  use  the  implementation  of  the  Action  Plan  on 
Terrorist Financing to also contribute to countering hybrid threats. 

4.6.

  Building resilience against radicalisation and violent extremism  

Although  terrorist  acts  and  violent  extremism  are  not  per  se  of  a  hybrid  nature, 
perpetrators  of  hybrid  threats  can  target  and  recruit  vulnerable  members  of  society, 
radicalising them through modern channels of communication (including internet social 
media and proxy groups) and propaganda.  

In  order  to  tackle  extremist  content  on  the  Internet,  the  Commission  is  –  within  the 
context  of  the  Digital  Single  Market  strategy  –  analysing  the  need  for  potential  new 
measures,  with  due  regard  for  their  impact  on  the  fundamental  rights  of  freedom  of 
expression and information. This could include rigorous procedures for removing illegal 
content,  while  avoiding the take  down  of  legal content  ('notice and  action')  and  greater 
responsibility and due diligence by intermediaries in the management of their networks 
and systems. This would complement the existing voluntary approach, where internet and 
social media companies (in particular under the umbrella of the EU Internet Forum) and 
in  cooperation  with  Europol's  EU  Internet  Referral  Unit,  swiftly  remove  terrorist 
propaganda. 

Within the context of the European Security Agenda, radicalisation is being countered by 
exchanging  experiences  and  developing  best  practices,  including  cooperation  in  third 
countries.  The  Syria  Strategic  Communication  Advisory  Team  aims  to  reinforce  the 
development and dissemination of alternative messages to counter terrorist propaganda. 
The Radicalisation Awareness Network  supports Member States  and practitioners, who 
need to interact with radicalised individuals (including foreign terrorist fighters) or with 
those  deemed  vulnerable  to  radicalisation.  The  Radicalisation  Awareness  Network 
provides training activities and advice and will offer support to priority third countries, 
where  there  is  willingness  to  engage.  In  addition,  the  Commission  is  fostering  judicial 

43 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on an Action Plan for 
strengthening the fight against terrorist financing - (COM(2016) 50 final) 

13 

 
                                                 
cooperation between criminal justice actors, including Eurojust, to counter terrorism and 
radicalisation  across  Member  States,  including  handling  foreign  terrorist  fighters  and 
returnees. 

Complementing  the  above  approaches  in  its  external  action,  the  EU  contributes  to 
countering  violent  extremism,  including  through  external  engagement  and  outreach, 
prevention  (countering  radicalisation  and  terrorist  financing),  as  well  as  through 
measures  to  address  underlying  economic,  political  and  societal  factors  that  provide 
opportunities for terrorist groups to flourish.  

Action 17: The Commission is implementing the actions against radicalisation set out 
in the European Agenda on Security and is analysing the need to reinforce procedures 
for  removing  illegal  content,  calling  on  intermediaries'  due  diligence  in  managing 
networks and systems. 

4.7.

Increasing cooperation with third countries 

As  underlined  in  the  European  Agenda  on  Security,  the  EU  has  increased  its  focus  on 
building capacities in partner countries in the security sector, inter alia, by building on 
the  nexus  between  security  and  development  and  developing  the  security  dimension  of 
the revised European Neighbourhood Policy44. These actions can also promote partners' 
resilience to hybrid activities.  

The  Commission  intends  to  further  intensify  the  exchange  of  operational  and  strategic 
information with enlargement countries and within the Eastern Partnership and Southern 
Neighbourhood  as  appropriate  to  help  combat  organised  crime,  terrorism,  irregular 
migration  and  trafficking  of  small  arms.  On  counter-terrorism,  the  EU  is  stepping  up 
cooperation with third countries by establishing upgraded security dialogues and Action 
Plans.  

EU  external  financing  instruments  aim  at  building  functioning  and  accountable 
institutions  in  third  countries45  which  are  a  prerequisite  for  responding  effectively  to 
security threats and for enhancing resilience. In this context, security sector reform and 
capacity  building  in  support  of  security  and  development46  are  key  tools.  Under  the 
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace47, the Commission has developed actions 
to enhance cyber-resilience and partners' abilities to detect and respond to cyber-attacks 

44  Joint  Communication  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European  economic  and  social 
Committee and the Committee of the regions, Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, 18.11.2015, 
JOIN(2015) 50 final. 
45  Idem;  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European 
Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions,  EU  Enlargement  Strategy, 
10.11.2015, COM(2015) 611 final; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Increasing the 
impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change, 13.10.2011, COM(2011) 637 final. 
46  Joint  Communication  'Capacity-building  in  support  of  security  and  development-enabling  partners  to 
prevent and manage crises (JOIN(2015)17final).  
47  Regulation  (EU)  No  230/2014  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  11  March  2014 
establishing an instrument contributing to stability and peace, OJ L 77/1, 15.3.2014. 

14 

 
 
                                                 
and cybercrime, which can counter hybrid threats in third countries. The EU is funding 
capacity building activities in partner countries to mitigate security risks linked to CBRN 
issues48. 

Finally,  in  the  spirit  of  the  comprehensive  approach  to  crisis  management,  Member 
States  could  deploy  Common  Security  and  Defence  Policy (CSDP)  tools  and  missions, 
independently or to complement deployed EU instruments, in order to assist partners in 
enhancing  their  capacities.  The  following  actions  could  be  considered:  (i)  support  for 
strategic  communication,  (ii)  advisory  support  for  key  ministries  exposed  to  hybrid 
threats;  (iii)  additional  support  for  border  management  in  case  of  emergency.  Further 
synergies could be explored between CSDP instruments and security, customs and justice 
actors, including the relevant EU agencies49, INTERPOL and the European Gendarmerie 
Force, in accordance with their mandates. 

Action 18: The High Representative, in coordination with the Commission, will launch 
a hybrid risk survey in neighbourhood regions. 

The High Representative, the Commission and Member States will use the instruments 
at their respective disposal to build partners' capacities and strengthen their resilience 
to hybrid threats. CSDP missions could be deployed, independently or to complement 
EU instruments, to assist partners in enhancing their capacities.  

5. 

 PREVENTING, RESPONDING TO CRISIS AND RECOVERING  

As outlined in Section 3.1, the proposed EU Hybrid Fusion Cell aims to analyse relevant 
indicators  to  prevent  and  respond  to  hybrid  threats  and  inform  EU  decision-makers. 
While liabilities can be mitigated through long term policies at national and EU level, in 
the  short  term  it  remains  essential  to  strengthen  the  ability  of  Member  States  and  the 
Union  to  prevent,  respond  and  recover  from  hybrid  threats  in  a  swift  and  coordinated 
manner.  

A  rapid  response  to  events  triggered  by  hybrid  threats  is  essential.  In  this  respect,  the 
facilitation of national civil protection actions and capacities by the European Emergency 
Response Coordination Centre50 could be an effective response mechanism for aspects of 
hybrid  threats  requiring  a  civil  protection  response.  This  could  be  achieved  in 
coordination  with  other  EU  response  mechanisms  and  early  warning  systems,  in 
particular  with  the  EEAS  Situation  Room  on  external  security  dimensions  and  the 
Strategic Analysis and Response centre on internal security.  

The solidarity clause (Article 222 of the TFEU) allows for Union action, as well as action 
between Member States, if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim 

48  Areas  covered  include  border  monitoring,  crisis  management,  first  response,  illicit  trafficking  export 
control  of  dual-use  items,  disease  surveillance  and  control,  nuclear  forensics,  post  incident  recovery  and 
protection of high-risk facilities. Best practices derived from tools developed within the EU CBRN Action 
Plan,  such  as  the  European  nuclear  security  training  centre  and  the  EU's  participation  in  International 
Border Monitoring Working Group, can be shared with third countries. 
49 EUROPOL, FRONTEX, CEPOL, EUROJUST 
50 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/civil-protection/emergency-response-coordination-centre-ercc_en. 

15 

 
                                                 
of  a  natural  or  man-made  disaster.  Action  by  the  Union  to  assist  the  Member  State  is 
implemented  by  applying  Council  Decision  2014/415/EU.51  Arrangements  for 
coordination  within  the  Council  should  rely  on  the  EU  Integrated  Political  Crisis 
Response.52 Under these arrangements, the Commission and the High Representative (in 
their  respective  areas  of  competence),  identify  relevant  Union  instruments  and  submits 
proposals to the Council for decisions on exceptional measures.  

Article  222  TFEU  also  addresses  situations  that  involve  direct  assistance  by  one  or 
several  Member  States  to  a  Member  State  that  has  experienced  a  terrorist  attack  or 
disaster.  In  this  respect,  Council  Decision  2014/415/EU  does  not  apply.  Given  the 
ambiguity  associated  with  hybrid  activities,  the  possible  last  resort  applicability  of  the 
Solidarity Clause should be assessed by the Commission and the High Representative (in 
their  respective  areas  of  competence),  in  case  an  EU  Member  State  is  subject  to 
significant hybrid threats.  

By  contrast  to  Article  222  TFEU,  if  multiple  serious  hybrid  threats  constitute  armed 
aggression against an EU Member State, Article 42 (7) TEU could be invoked to provide 
an appropriate and timely response. A wide-ranging and serious manifestation of hybrid 
threats may also require increased cooperation and coordination with NATO. 

When  preparing  their  forces,  Member  States  are  encouraged  to  take  potential  hybrid 
threats into account. To be prepared to take decisions swiftly and effectively in case of a 
hybrid  attack,  Member  States  need  to  hold  regular  exercises,  at  working  and  political 
level, to test national and multinational decision-making ability. The objective would be 
to have a common operational protocol between Member States, the Commission and the 
High Representative, outlining effective procedures to follow in case of a hybrid threat, 
from the initial identification phase to the final phase of attack, and mapping the role of 
each Union institution and actor in the process. 

As  an  important  component  of  the  CSDP,  engagement  could  provide  (a)  civilian  and 
military  training,  (b)  mentoring  and  advisory  missions  to  improve  a  threatened  state’s 
security  and  defence  capacity,  (c)  contingency  planning  to  identify  signals  of  hybrid 
threats  and  strengthen  early  warning  capabilities,  (d)  support  to  border  control 
management, in case of emergency, (e) support in specialised areas, such as CBRN risk 
mitigation and non-combatant evacuation. 

Action  19:  The  High  Representative  and  the  Commission,  in  coordination  with  the 
Member  States,  will  establish  a  common  operational  protocol  and  carry  out  regular 
exercises to improve strategic decision-making capacity in response to complex hybrid 
threats  building  on  the  Crisis  Management  and  Integrated  Political  Crisis  Response 
procedures. 

51  Council  Decision  2014/415/EU  on  the  arrangements  for  the  implementation  by  the  Union  of  the 
solidarity clause, OJ L 192, 1.7.2014, p. 53.  
52 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/publications/2014/eu-ipcr/  

16 

 
 
                                                 
Action 20: The Commission and the High Representative, in their respective areas of 
competence,  will  examine  the  applicability  and  practical  implications  of  Articles  222 
TFEU and Article 42(7) TEU in case a wide-ranging and serious hybrid attack occurs.  

Action  21:  The  High  Representative,  in  coordination  with  Member  States,  will 
integrate,  exploit  and  coordinate  the  capabilities  of  military  action  in  countering 
hybrid threats within the Common Security and Defence Policy. 

6. 

INCREASING COOPERATION WITH NATO 

Hybrid threats represent a challenge not only for the EU but also for other major partner 
organisations  including  the  United  Nations  (UN),  the  Organisation  for  Security  and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and particularly NATO. An effective response calls for 
dialogue and coordination both at political and operational level between organisations. 
Closer interaction between the EU and NATO would make both organisations better able 
to  prepare  and  respond  to  hybrid  threats  effectively  in  a  complementary  and  mutually 
supporting  manner  based  on  the  principle  of  inclusiveness,  while  respecting  each 
organisation’s decision-making autonomy and data protection rules. 

The two organisations share values and face similar challenges. EU Member States and 
NATO Allies alike expect their respective organisations to support them, acting swiftly, 
decisively and in a coordinated manner in the event of a crisis, or ideally to prevent the 
crisis  from  happening.  A  number  of  areas  for  closer  EU–NATO  cooperation  and 
coordination  have  been 
strategic 
communications cybersecurity and crisis prevention and response. The ongoing informal 
EU–NATO dialogue on hybrid threats should be strengthened in order to synchronise the 
two organisations’ activities in this area. 

situational  awareness, 

identified, 

including 

In order to develop complementary EU/NATO responses, it is important that both share 
the  same  situational  awareness  picture  before  and  during  crisis.  This  could  be  done 
through regular sharing of analyses and lessons identified, but also through direct liaison 
between the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell and NATO’s hybrid cell. It is equally important to 
build  mutual  awareness  of  each  other's  respective  crisis  management  procedures  to 
ensure  swift  and  effective  reactions.  Resilience  could  be  enhanced  by  ensuring 
complementarity in setting benchmarks for critical parts of their infrastructures, as well 
as close collaboration in strategic communication and cyber defence. Fully inclusive joint 
exercises both at political and technical levels would enhance the effectiveness of the two 
organisations' respective decision-making capacity. Exploring further options in training 
activities would help develop a comparable level of expertise in critical areas. 

Action  22:  The  High  Representative,  in  coordination  with  the  Commission,  will 
continue informal dialogue and enhance cooperation and coordination with NATO on 
situational awareness, strategic communications, cybersecurity and "crisis prevention 
and response" to counter hybrid threats, respecting the principles of inclusiveness and 
autonomy of each organisation's decision making process. 

17 

 
7.  CONCLUSIONS 

This  Joint  Communication  outlines  actions  designed  to  help  counter  hybrid  threats  and 
foster the resilience at the EU and national level, as well as partners. As the focus is on 
improving  awareness,  it  is  proposed  to  establish  dedicated  mechanisms  to  exchange 
information with Member States and to coordinate the EU’s capacity to deliver strategic 
communications.  Actions  have  been  outlined  to  build  resilience  in  areas  such  as 
cybersecurity, critical infrastructure, protecting the financial system from illicit use and 
efforts  to  counter  violent  extremism  and  radicalisation.  In  each  of  these  areas, 
implementation  of  agreed  strategies  by  the  EU  and  the  Member  States,  as  well  as 
Member States’ full implementation of existing legislation will be a key first step, while 
some more concrete actions have been put forward to further reinforce these efforts. 

As  regards  preventing,  responding  to  and  recovering  from  hybrid  threats,  it  is 
proposed to examine the feasibility of applying the Solidarity Clause Article 222 TFEU 
(as specified in  the relevant  Decision)  and Art.  42(7) TEU, in  case a wide-ranging and 
serious  hybrid  attack  occurs.  Strategic  decision  making  capacity  could  be  enhanced  by 
establishing a common operational protocol. 

Finally, it is proposed to  step up  cooperation and coordination between the  EU and 
NATO in common efforts to counter hybrid threats.   

In implementing this Joint Framework, the High Representative and the Commission are 
committed  in  mobilising  relevant  EU  instruments  at  their  respective  disposal.  It  is 
important  for  the  EU,  together  with  the  Member  States,  to  work  to  reduce  risks 
associated with exposure to potential hybrid threats from state and non-state actors.  

18