COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the conservation of fishery resources and the protection of marine ecosystems through technical measures, amending Council Regulations (EC No 1967/2006, (EC) No1098/2007, (EC) No 1224/2009 and Regulations (EU) No 1343/2011 and (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 894/97, (EC) No 850/98, (EC) No 2549/2000, (EC) No 254/2002, (EC) No 812/2004 and (EC) No 2187/2005
Date: 2016-03-11
Institutions: Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, European Commission
Subjects: catch quota, common fisheries policy, conservation of fish stocks, fishery resources, fishing area, fishing regulations, marine ecosystem, protection of animal life, sea fishing

EN 

   EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 11.3.2016  SWD(2016) 57 final   COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  IMPACT ASSESSMENT  Accompanying the document PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the conservation of fishery resources and the protection of marine ecosystems through technical measures, amending Council Regulations (EC No 1967/2006, (EC) No1098/2007, (EC) No 1224/2009 and Regulations (EU) No 1343/2011 and (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 894/97, (EC) No 850/98, (EC) No 2549/2000, (EC) No 254/2002, (EC) No 812/2004 and (EC) No 2187/2005 {COM(2016) 134 final} {SWD(2016) 56 final}  
 
 
This report commits only the Commission's services involved in its preparation and does not 
prejudge the final form of any decision to be taken by the Commission 

 
 
 
Table of Contents 

1. 

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 1 

2.  PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES .. 1 

2.1.  Organisation and timing .................................................................................... 1 

2.2. 

Internal consultations ........................................................................................ 1 

2.3.  Regulatory Srcutiny Board ................................................................................ 2 

2.4.  Consultation with stakeholders ......................................................................... 3 

2.5.  Expert advice ..................................................................................................... 4 

2.6.  Other relevant studies ........................................................................................ 4 

3.  POLICY CONTEXT ................................................................................................... 4 

3.1.  What are technical measures? ........................................................................... 4 

3.2.  The history of technical measures in the CFP ................................................... 5 

3.3.  The current governance structure of technical measures .................................. 5 

3.4.  Technical measures in the new CFP ................................................................. 7 

3.5.  The landing obligation ...................................................................................... 8 

3.6.  Regionalisation .................................................................................................. 9 

3.7.  Technical measures and other elements of the CFP ........................................ 11 

4.  PROBLEM DEFINITION ........................................................................................ 12 

4.1.  Sub-optimal performance ................................................................................ 12 

4.2.  Difficult to measure effectiveness ................................................................... 15 

4.3.  Prescriptive and complex rules........................................................................ 16 

4.4.  Lack of flexibility in the management framework .......................................... 17 

4.5. 

Insufficient  involvement  of  key  stakeholders  in  the  decision  making 
process ............................................................................................................. 18 

4.6.  Underlying drivers of the problems ................................................................ 19 

4.7.  The affected stakeholders ................................................................................ 20 

4.8.  Evolution of the problem ................................................................................. 21 

4.9.  Necessity and subsidiarity ............................................................................... 22 

5.  OBJECTIVES ........................................................................................................... 23 

5.1.  General objectives ........................................................................................... 23 

5.2.  Specific and operational objectives ................................................................. 23 

6.  CONSISTENCY WITH OTHER EU POLICIES ..................................................... 25 

7.  POLICY OPTIONS................................................................................................... 25 

7.1.  Selection of policy options .............................................................................. 25 

i 

 
 
7.2.  Baseline scenario ............................................................................................. 26 

7.3.  Option 1: Consolidation .................................................................................. 27 

7.4.  Option 2: Framework Approach ..................................................................... 29 

7.4.1.

  Sub-option 2.1 – Framework Approach without baselines ............... 31 

7.5.  Option 3: Elimination of technical measures .................................................. 31 

7.6.  Summary of policy options ............................................................................. 32 

8.  ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS ....................................................................................... 35 

8.1.  Methodology ................................................................................................... 35 

8.2.  Baseline scenario ............................................................................................. 36 

8.2.1.

  Economic impacts ............................................................................. 36 

8.2.2.

  Social impacts.................................................................................... 38 

8.2.3.

  Environmental impacts ...................................................................... 39 

8.2.4.

  Simplification, administrative costs and burden ............................... 40 

8.2.5.

Impacts on SMEs............................................................................... 41 

8.3.  Option 1: Consolidation .................................................................................. 41 

8.3.1.

  Economic impacts ............................................................................. 41 

8.3.2.

  Social impacts.................................................................................... 43 

8.3.3.

  Environmental impacts ...................................................................... 43 

8.3.4.

  Simplification, administrative costs and burden ............................... 45 

8.3.5.

Impacts on SMEs............................................................................... 46 

8.4.  Option 2: Framework Approach ..................................................................... 46 

8.4.1.

  Economic impacts ............................................................................. 46 

8.4.2.

  Social impacts.................................................................................... 48 

8.4.3.

  Environmental impacts ...................................................................... 49 

8.4.4.

  Simplification, Administrative Costs and Burden ............................. 49 

8.4.5.

Impacts on SMEs............................................................................... 50 

8.5.  Sub-option 2.1: Framework approach without baselines ................................ 50 

8.5.1.

  Economic impacts ............................................................................. 50 

8.5.2.

  Social impacts.................................................................................... 51 

8.5.3.

  Environmental impacts ...................................................................... 52 

8.5.4.

  Simplification, administrative costs and burden ............................... 52 

8.5.5.

Impacts on SMEs............................................................................... 53 

8.6.  Option 3: Elimination of technical measures .................................................. 53 

8.6.1.

  Economic impacts ............................................................................. 53 

8.6.2.

  Social impacts.................................................................................... 54 

8.6.3.

  Environmental impacts ...................................................................... 54 

ii 

 
 
 
 
 
 
8.6.4.

  Simplification, administrative costs and burden ............................... 54 

8.6.5.

Impacts on SMEs............................................................................... 55 

8.7.  Summary of impacts ........................................................................................ 55 

9.  COMPARING THE OPTIONS ................................................................................ 58 

9.1.  Qualitative  assessment  against  the  general,  specific  and  operational 

objectives ......................................................................................................... 58 

9.2.  Effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and acceptability ................................... 61 

9.3.  Risk Assessment .............................................................................................. 64 

10.  RANKING THE OPTIONS ...................................................................................... 67 

11.  MONITORING AND EVALUATION .................................................................... 67 

11.1.  Monitoring ....................................................................................................... 67 

11.2.  Evaluation ........................................................................................................ 68 

REFERENCES .................................................................................................................. 70 

LIST OF ANNEXES ......................................................................................................... 75 

ANNEX I - SUMMARY OF PUBLIC CONSULTATION ............................................. 76 

ANNEX II LIST OF MEETINGS, WORKSHOPS & CONSULTATIONS .................... 83 

ANNEX III LIST OF STUDIES ....................................................................................... 88 

ANNEX IV INVENTORY OF EU TECHNICAL MEASURES REGULATIONS ........ 89 

ANNEX  V  CURRENT  REGULATORY  STRUCTURE  OF  TECHNICAL 

MEASURES.............................................................................................................. 97 

ANNEX VI DIFFERENCES IN GOVERNENCE STRUCTURES FOR TECHNICAL 

MEASURES BY REGION ..................................................................................... 100 

ANNEX VII MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE COMMON FISHERIES POLICY ............ 102 

ANNEX VIII TRENDS IN DISCARDING IN EU FISHERIES ................................... 105 

ANNEX  IX  DETAILED  BEAKDOWN  OF  CATCHING  SECTOR  BY  MEMBER 

STATE AND BY GEAR TYPE ............................................................................. 107 

ANNEX  X  DESCRIPTION  OF  BASELINES  AND  THE  CRITERIA  FOR  THEIR 

ESTABLISHMENT ................................................................................................ 110 

iii 

 
 
 
 
 
Executive Summary Sheet 

Impact  assessment  on  a  proposal  for  a  regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  for  the 
conservation of fishery resources and for the protection of marine organisms through technical measures   

A. Need for action 

Why? What is the problem being addressed? 
The current technical measures regime (31 regulations) is no longer fit for achieving the sustainability objectives 
of the new CFP. Specifically the current measures are: 

  based on negative, mostly coercive incentives in a top-down governance system creating mistrust 

amongst stakeholders as measures are seen as inequitable, leading to non-compliance; 
 impossible to measure their impact on the achievement of the conservation objectives of the CFP; 

 
  numerous and overly complex making compliance and control more difficult;  
  controlling too many aspects of fishing operations undermining the sector's confidence in the measures; 
  providing little incentive to fish selectively where there is no cost to discarding, or of catching vulnerable 

species or impacting adversely on the seabed; and 

  sub-optimal in respect of achieving broader environmental and ecological policy objectives 

The catching sector (around 82,000 vessels, employing 98,500 FTE) is most affected.  
What is this initiative expected to achieve? 
This initiative aims to: 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

Optimise  the  contribution  of  technical  measures  to  achieving  the  key  objectives  of  the  new  CFP  that 
came into force on 1 January 2014. 

Create  the  flexibility  required  to  adjust  technical  measures  by  facilitating  regionalised  approaches 
(consistent with the objectives in EU law). 

Simplify  the  current  rules  in  line  with  Commission's  REFIT  programme.  The  current  rules  are  overly 
complex  and  difficult  to  enforce,  and  simplification  will  lead  to  reductions  in  administrative  costs  and 
burden.  It  also  addresses  the  need  for  simplification  of  technical  measures  outlined  in  an  earlier 
Commission Communication on the implementation of the CFP.  

What is the value added of action at the EU level?  
Provisions  in  the  proposal  relating  to  the  conservation  of  marine biological  resources  falls  under  the  exclusive 
competence of the EU according to Article 3(1d) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
Therefore, the subsidiarity principle does not apply for those provisions. However, at the heart of this proposal is 
the  concept  of  regionalisation  whereby  Member  States  should  cooperate  regionally  to  develop  and  implement 
conservation measures. 

B. Solutions 

What  legislative  and  non-legislative  policy  options  have  been  considered?  Is  there  a  preferred 
choice or not? Why? 
The baseline scenario maintains the existing set of 31 Regulations. 

Option 1: Consolidation – A new regulation with a limited scope which would bring together and consolidate in 
one  Regulation  for  common  rules  with  regionally  specific  rules  remaining  in  the  existing  regulations. 
Regionalisation  would  happen  if  and  where  the  Member  States  submit  joint  recommendations  for  multiannual 
plans. 

Option  2:  Framework  –  A  framework  regulation  containing  general  provisions  and  corresponding  standards; 
common  rules  and  technical  provisions;  and  baseline  standards  by  region  corresponding  to  identified  results 
which would function as a default measures in the context of regionalisation. The baselines and default technical 
measures  that  correspond  to  the  objectives  would  be  applicable  unless  and  until  regionalised  measures  are 
designed and introduced into Union law. A sub-option (2.1) is a framework regulation without defined baselines. 

Option 3: Elimination of existing  rules – Repeal of the majority of the existing regulations (except for essential 
nature  conservation  measures).  Any  necessary  technical  measures  in  the  longer  term  would  be  developed 
regionally under multiannual plans. This option assumes that the landing obligation is a result-driven measure in 
itself and will lead to clean fisheries. 

Option 2 best meets the objectives set and provides a level of security that conservation objectives will continue 
to be met while regionalisation develops. 

iv 

 
 
Who supports which option?  
Retaining the baseline scenario was not considered an acceptable option by any of the stakeholders 

Option 1 received very little support from any of the key stakeholders. 

Option 2 was supported by some of the catching sector, Member States and NGOs. They were divergent views 
in  the  content  of  the  framework  amongst  stakeholders.  The  catching  sector  argued  for  a  framework  without 
baselines (sub-option 2.1) but Member States, NGOs and some of the Advisory Councils argued against this. 

Option 3 was favoured by certain sections of the catching sector but was rejected by Member States, NGOs and 
other parts of the catching sector who considered it a high-risk strategy. 

C. Impacts of the preferred option 

What are the benefits of the preferred option (if any, otherwise main ones)? 
The economic impacts would be positive as the framework approach would drive regionalisation, leading to the 
delivery  of  MSY  for  all  stocks  and  reductions  in  unwanted  catches.  This  would  lead  to  increased  fishing 
opportunities and increase revenues from landing bigger more valuable fish (estimated at 10-40%). This would 
steadily improve over time. 

Employment  levels  should  stabilise  quickly  under  this  option  and  there  is  potential  for  increased  employment. 
Once MSY levels are achieved, fishing opportunities will increase (by at least 20% by 2020). Such a significant 
increase  has  a  potential  to  create  new  jobs  in  the  catching  sector.  Fishing  on  sustainable  stocks  would  also 
increase  income  and  wages  and  therefore  job  attractiveness.  Average  wages  will  nearly  double  as  a  result  of 
fishing sustainably. 

Environmental  impacts  would  be  positive.  The  framework  would  manage  the  transition  to  regionalisation  and 
ensure that the environmental sustainability objectives of the CFP are not jeopardised. In the longer-term there 
would be positive benefits to fish stocks and better protection for sensitive species and habitats. 

What are the costs of the preferred option (if any, otherwise main ones)? 

There will be some costs associated with the move to regionalisation for Member States and the Advisory 
Councils as key stakeholders as described below. Any other costs would be eligible for financing under the 
European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF).  

How will businesses, SMEs and micro-enterprises be affected? 
Administrative costs and burden would be reduced in that there would be immediate simplification of the current 
regulations  and  a  greater  role  for  the  catching  sector  through  the  Advisory  Councils  in  the  development  of 
technical  measures.  In  addition  the  potential  move  to  a results-based system in  the  longer-term would  lead  to 
further simplification of the technical rules but implies a shift in the burden of proof onto the catching sector. 

Will there be significant impacts on national budgets and administrations? 
The  move  to  regionalisation  will  lead  to  increased  costs  for  national  administrations  (estimated  at  €80,000-
120,000)  for  the  development  of  a  single  multiannual  plan.  Not  all  of  these  costs  are  directly  associated  with 
technical  measures  which  form  only  part  of  such  plans.  These  costs  would  be  largely  front-loaded  during  the 
development of these plans. In the short-term costs for control will reduce as a result of simplification although 
there  will  be  some  extra  costs  for  implementation  of  the  landing  obligation.  In  the  longer-term  control  costs 
should diminish considerably particularly if regions move towards results-based management where the need for 
enforcing prescriptive rules at sea diminishes. Currently costs for enforcing technical measures at sea are very 
high. 

Will there be other significant impacts? 
The approach simplifies the structure: One regulation will replace 6 Regulations, partially replace 3 Regulations 
and repeal 10 Commission Regulations. It provides a direct route to regionalisation in line with the CFP. 

D. Follow up 

When will the policy be reviewed?  
An ex-post evaluation should be carried out before 2022 when the landing obligation should be fully operational, 
MSY achieved for all stocks and Good Environmental Status achieved for marine ecosystems. This evaluation 
would directly feed into the retrospective evaluation of the CFP scheduled to begin in 2022. 

v 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GLOSSARY 

Acoustic  Deterrent  Device 
(ADD) 

Devices to make species such as marine mammals aware and warn them 
from fishing gears 

Advisory Council 

Biomass 

Codend 

Demersal 

Discards 

The  Advisory  Councils  were  established  under  the  CFP  to  promote  a 
balanced  representation  of  all  stakeholders  and  to  contribute  to  the 
achievement of the objectives of the CFP. 

Biomass refers to the size of the stock in unit of weight. Often, biomass 
refers  to  only  one  part  of  the  stock  (e.g.  spawning  biomass,  recruited 
biomass  or  vulnerable  biomass,  the  latter  two  of  which  are  essentially 
equivalent). 

The part of a trawl net where the catch is retained. 

Descriptive  of  a  fish  which  lives  at  or  near  the  bottom  of  the  water 
column, e.g. cod or haddock. 

Unwanted catches returned to the sea as a result of fishing operations.  

Exploitation pattern 

How fishing pressure is distributed across the age profile of a stock 

Fishing mortality (F) 

Fishing Opportunities 

FMSY 

An expression of the rate at which fish are removed from the stock from 
fishing  operations  (including  fish  subsequently  discarded).  It 
is 
approximately the stock annual removal expressed in percentage. 

Fishing opportunities or Total allowable catches (TACs), are catch limits 
(expressed in tonnes or numbers) that are set for most commercial fish 
stocks.  The  Commission  prepares  the  proposals,  based  on  scientific 
advice  on  the  stock  status  from  advisory  bodies  such  as  ICES  and 
STECF. 

A  biological  reference  point.  It  is  the  fishing  mortality  rate  that,  if 
applied constantly, would result in an average catch corresponding to the 
(MSY)  and  an  average  biomass 
Maximum  Sustainable  Yield 
corresponding to BMSY. 

Good Environmental Status 
(GES) 

The  environmental  status  of  marine  waters  where  these  provide 
ecologically  diverse  and  dynamic  oceans  and  seas  which  are  clean, 
healthy and productive 

Highly migratory species 

Fish species or stocks that carry out extensive migrations and can occur 
in both EEZs and high seas. (e.g. tuna and tuna-like species, marlins and 
swordfish) 

Joint Deployment Plan (JDP) 

A  joint  deployment  plan  (JDP)  is  a  plan  for  coordinated  joint 
deployment of national means (inspection vessels, surveillance aircraft, 
mobile  mixed  inspection  teams,  etc.)  to  monitor  and  inspect  fishing 
activities that fall under the rules of the CFP. The JDP gives effect to a 
specific control and inspection programme which sets out the objectives, 
priorities and benchmarks for control and inspection by Member States. 

Maximum Sustainable Yield 
(MSY) 

Theoretically  the  largest  yield  (or  catch)  that  can  be  taken  from  a 
species'  stock  over  an  indefinite  period.  It  is  the  maximum  use  that  a 
renewable  resource  can  sustain  without  impairing  its  renewability 
through natural growth and reproduction. 

Mesh size 

Mesh size of a towed net refers to  the mesh size of any codend or on 
board a fishing vessel and attached to or suitable for attachment to any 
towed net. 

vi 

 
 
Minimum conservation 
reference size (mcrs) 

The size of a living marine aquatic species taking into account maturity, 
as  established  by  Union  law,  below  which  restrictions  or  incentives 
apply  that  aim  to  avoid  capture  through  fishing  activity;  such  size 
replaces, where relevant, the minimum landing size 

Minimum landing size 

The size of a marine organism below which, if caught must be returned 
to the sea. 

Natura 2000 

Pelagic 

Recruitment 

Regionalisation 

A  network  of  nature  protection  areas  in  the  territory  of  the  European 
Union.  It  is  made  up  of  Special  Areas  of  Conservation  (SACs)  and 
Special  Protection  Areas  (SPAs)  designated  respectively  under  the 
Habitats Directive and Birds Directive 

In relation to fish, the term 'pelagic' refers to fish which live in the upper 
layers of the water column, e.g. herring, sprat and mackerel.  

The  number  of  new  fish  added  to  the  exploitable  portion  of  the  stock 
resulting  from  growth  of  juvenile  fish  into  adults,  or  migration  of 
smaller fish. 

The  process  by  which  the  Member  States  with  direct  interest  for 
fisheries  of  a  given  geographical  region  organize  themselves  with  the 
aim  to  agree  on  common  management  measures.  The  agreed  measures 
as  joined  recommendation  are  submitted  to  the  Commission  and  after 
scientific assessment adopted as Commission delegated acts. 

Remote  Electronic  Monitoring 
(REM) 

An  electronic  system,  that  remotely  monitors  fishing  vessels'  catches 
through a system of sensors and CCTV cameras 

Selective fishing 

Selectivity devices 

Refers  to  a  fishing  method's  ability  to  target  and  capture  organisms  by 
size and species during the fishing operation allowing non-targets to be 
avoided or released unharmed. 

Gear modifications or devices fitted which allow the escape of unwanted 
catches  by  species  (i.e.  species  selectivity)  or  by  size  (i.e.  size 
selectivity).  

Spawning Stock Biomass 

Numbers  (weights)  of  individual  fish  which  are  old  enough  to 
reproduce. This generally corresponds to the minimum landing size and 
so defines the 'fishable' population.  

Stock 

TAC 

Technical measures 

The  population  of  a  given  species  that  forms  a  reproductive  unit  and 
spawns  little  if  at  all  with  other  units.  The  “total  stock”  refers  to  both 
juveniles  and  adults  while  “spawning  stock”  refers  to  the  adult 
population (see above).  

Total allowable catch; the maximum biomass of fish that can be caught 
from a given stock in a given year. 

Measures that regulates the composition of catches by species and size 
and the impacts on components of the ecosystems resulting from fishing 
activities by establishing conditions for the use and structure of fishing 
gear and restrictions on access to fishing areas. 

vii 

 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF ACRONYMS 

AC 

ADD 

Advisory Council 

Acoustic Deterrent Devices 

BSAC 

Baltic Sea Advisory Council 

CC 

Catch Composition 

CCALMR  Convention on Conservation on Antarctic Living Marine Resources 

CCTV 

Closed-circuit television 

CFA 

CFP 

CQM 

DCF 

Committee for Fisheries and Aquaculture 

Common Fisheries Policy 

Catch Quota Management 

Data Collection Framework 

EAPO 

European Association of Producer Organisatins 

EESC 

EFCA 

EFF 

The European Economic and Social Committee 

European Fisheries Control Agency 

European Fisheries Fund 

EMFF 

European Maritime and Fisheries Fund 

EP 

ER 

EWG 

FMC 

Fmsy 

FTE 

GES 

Exploitation Pattern 

Exploitation rate 

Expert Working Group 

Fishery Monitoring Centre 

Fishing mortality that produces MSY 

Full-time Equivalents 

Good Environmental Status 

GVA 

Gross Value Added 

IA 

Impact Assessment 

ICCAT 

International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas 

ICES 

JDP 

LIFE 

International Council for the Exploration of the Sea 

Joint Deployment Plan 

Low Impact Fishers of Europe 

MCRS 

Minimum Conservation Reference Size 

MLS 

MPA 

MS 

Minimum Landing Size 

Marine Protected Area 

Member States 

MSFD 

Marine Strategy Framework Directive 

viii 

 
 
 
MSY 

Maximum Sustainable Yield 

NAFO 

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation 

NEAFC 

Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission 

NUTFA 

New Under Ten Fishermen's Association 

NWWAC   North Western Waters Advisory Council 

NSAC 

North Sea Advisory Council 

PO 

RBM 

REFIT 

Producer Organisation 

Results-based Management 
Vessel Monistoring Systems 
Regulatory Fitness and Performance programme 

REM 

Remote Electronic Monitoring 

RFMO 

Regional Fisheries Management Organisations 

SAC 

SME 

SSB 

Special Area of Conservation 

Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 

Spawning Stock Biomass 

STECF 

Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries 

SWFPA 

Scottish Whitefish Producers Association 

TAC 

Total Allowable Catch 

TFEU 

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 

VMS 

Vessel Monitoring System 

Fishery Monitroign Centres 

ix 

 
 
 
 
 
Lead DG: DG MARE 

Other departments involved: SG, SJ, DG ENV, DG EMPL, DG FISMA, DG SANTE, DG 
RTD. 

Agenda planning/WP reference: 2013/MARE/002 

1. 

INTRODUCTION 

This  impact  assessment  (IA)  concerns  a  proposal  to  simplify  and  modernise  in  light  of  the 
new Common Fisheries Policy (CFP1) a set of 31 regulations containing technical measures 
(such  as  minimum  mesh  sizes,  closed  areas  and  minimum  landing  sizes)  that  define  where, 
when and how individual fishing operators can exploit and interact with marine resources and 
the wider marine ecosystem. 

This initiative aims to: 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

Optimise the contribution of technical measures to achieving the key objectives of the 
new CFP that came into force on 1 January 2014. 

Create the flexibility required to adjust technical measures by facilitating regionalised 
approaches (consistent with the objectives in EU law). 
Simplify the current rules in line with Commission's REFIT programme2. The current 
rules  are  overly  complex  and  difficult  to  enforce,  and  simplification  will  lead  to 
reductions  in  administrative  costs  and  burden.  It  also  addresses  the  need  for 
in  an  earlier  Commission 
technical  measures  outlined 
simplification  of 
Communication on the implementation of the CFP3.  

2. 

PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES 

2.1. 

Organisation and timing 

The  proposal  for  a  new  technical  measures  regulation  is  provided  for  in  ‘Agenda  Planning’ 
(2013/MARE/002),  in  the  2011  Management  Plan  of  the  Directorate-General  for  Maritime 
Affairs and Fisheries (DG MARE). It has been included since 2012 in the Commission Work 
Programme  (CWP)  as  a  policy  output  under  the  activity  "Conservation,  management  and 
exploitation of living aquatic resources", as well as, since 2013, in the Commission's REFIT 
programme4. 

This IA has progressed in several steps following adoption by the Commission of the proposal 
for  the  new  CFP  "Basic  Regulation"5  in  mid-2011.  As  a  first  step,  an  internal  DG  MARE 
Working  Group  made  up  of  the  relevant  units  was  set  up  in  July  2011  to  carry  out  initial 
scoping work.  
In  December  2012,  an  evaluation  of  technical  measures6  was  externally  contracted  to  a 
consortium  led  by  the  consultancy  firm  MRAG.  This  study  consisted  of  a  retrospective 
evaluation of the existing technical measures regulations in place in terms of their relevance, 
effectiveness,  efficiency,  coherence  and  acceptance.  During  the  course  of  this  evaluation 
extensive  consultations  were  held  with  representatives  of  the  fishing  industry,  national 
administrations  and  the  research  agencies  of  seven  Member  States7.  This  was  completed  in 
June  20138.  It  was  followed  by  a  prospective  evaluation  of  the  likely  economic,  social  and 
environmental impacts as well as the effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and acceptability of 
different defined policy options. This study was completed in July 20148. 

1 

 
 
2.2. 

Internal consultations 

An  Impact  Assessment  Steering  Group  (IASG)  was  formed  in  January  2013,  which  in 
addition to DG MARE comprised of representatives from seven other Directorates-Generals 
(DG) and services - Secretariat General (SG), the Legal Services (SJ), DG Environment (DG 
ENV), DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (DG EMPL), DG Health & Food Safety 
(DG SANTE), DG Research & Innovation (DG RTD) and DG Financial Stability, Financial 
Services  and  Capital  Markets  Union  (DG  FISMA).  The  IASG  met  on  five  occasions  -  14 
February  2013,  9  July  2013,  10  January  2014,  28  February  2014  and  15  April  2015  and 
worked  to  finalise  a  draft  of  the  IA  by  written  consultation  following  the  last  meeting. 
Between these meetings regular contact was maintained with the members of the IASG. 

2.3. 

Regulatory Srcutiny Board 

The  impact  assessment  report  has  been  revised  considerably  following  the  opinion  received 
from  the  Impact  Assessment  Board  (IAB)  on  19  June  2015.  This  opinion  listed  three  main 
recommendations for improvement: 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

The  scope  of  the  initiative:  The  policy  context  section  has  been  redrafted  to  provide 
more detail on the governance structure of the current technical measures regulations 
as well as providing more detail on what has been decided in the CFP.  A section on 
how regionalisation would work in practice and in particular the role of stakeholders 
in  the  process  has  also  been  added.  Additional  information  has  been  provided  in 
annexes (Annexes IV, V, VI and VII) to support this section of the report. 

Content  of the technical measures proposed: The policy options  section has  been re-
drafted to provide more detail on the different measures and structures that would be 
included  under  the  different  options.  A  table  clarifying  the  difference  between 
common and regional measures has been added. An annex (Annex X) describing the 
criteria for developing the baseline standards has also been included. A sub-option has 
been  added  to  option  2  in  line  with  the  comments  received  from  the  stakeholders 
during  the  public  consultation.  This  sub-option  comprises  a  framework  without 
baseline  standards  included.  Further  sub-options  with  different  levels  of  baseline 
standards have not been considered as technical measures such as mesh sizes, closed 
and minimum sizes cannot be considered in isolation. In the context of regionalisation 
more  detail  on  what  incentives  are  foreseen  to  encourage  compliance  with  the  rules 
and ensure a level playing field have been included in the policy options section and 
also discussed further in section 8.2. Detail of how the framework would be monitored 
is included under section 10. 

The  effectiveness  of  the  options:  The  impacts  section  has  been  enhanced  with 
additional examples illustrating the likely impacts. However, this remains very much a 
qualitative analysis. Section 9 comparing the options has been expanded to provide a 
more detailed description of the effectiveness of the options and sub-option and how 
they  will  tackle  the  sub-optimal  performance  of  the  current  regulations.  The  table 
providing  a  qualitative  assessment  against  the  general,  specific  and  operational 
objectives of each option has been revised to better explain the scoring for each option. 
The  issue  of  uneven  implementation  or  creation  of  an  uneven  playing  field  is 
addressed in section 8.3. 

In addition to these points the objectives of the initiative have been revised to link better with 
the  options  and  identified  problems.  A  section  assessing  the  likely  impacts  of  the  different 
options on the competitiveness of the catching sector has been added. The problem definition 
has  been  re-structured  and  the  examples  put  into  boxes  as  suggested.  The  examples  in  the 
impacts section have similarly been moved into boxes to improve readability. A glossary of 

2 

 
 
technical  terms  has  also  been  added.  The  executive  summary  and  executive  summary  sheet 
have been redrafted in line with the changes made to the new report. 

On the basis of the second opinion received on the 30 October 2015 on a revised IA, several 
additional  elements  have  been  included  to  improve  clarity.  These  relate  to  three  aspects  as 
follows: 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

Content of the options: The options have been re-drafted in line with the comments of 
the  RSB  to  avoid  inconsistencies.  A  summary  table  has  been  added  at  the  end  of 
Section7 which summarises the main elements of the different options and sub-option 
and illustrates the differences between them in terms of content, structure, mechanisms 
for regionalisation and also the level of simplification introduced by each option and 
sub-option.  Reference  to  measureable  targets  that  will  act  as  success  indicators  has 
been added into Section 7 for the different options (Options 1 and 2 and sub-option 2.1 
would contain such targets). Additional clarifications have been added to sections 9.2 
and  9.3  on  the  incentives  that  are  foreseen  under  the  preferred  option  to  encourage 
compliance and also  on the positives and  negatives  that  would  ensue in the event of 
uneven implementation across regions.  

Assessment of impacts: The analysis of impacts section (Section 8) has been screened 
and for the preferred option a justification for why there would be rapid improvements 
in the economic, social and environmental impacts compared to the baseline scenario. 
It is also highlighted that the positive benefits predicted will be dependent on the speed 
of  regionalisation.  There  is  likely  to  be  period  of  adjustment  to  the  new  governance 
structure  introduced  by the  framework  regulation  where  economic  impacts  would be 
similar  to  the  baseline  scenario.  After  this  transitional  period  regionalisation  of 
technical  measures  should  be  accelerated  provided  Member  States  pro-actively 
embrace the regioanlisation process. 

Effectiveness  of  the  options:  In  section  9,  clarification  is  provided  to  explain  how 
regionalisation will tackle the problems of poor effectiveness of the current technical 
measures.  It  is  also  clarifies  that  even  if  regionalisation  is  a  slow  process,  the 
simplification introduced throughout the framework approach in the preferred option. 
There  will  be  immediate  benefits  to  the  catching  sector  in  complying  with  the 
technical  rules  remaining  in  place  pending  regionalisation  and  for  Member  States  in 
controlling and monitoring compliance with these rules. In section 11 more detail on 
the  operational  monitoring  arrangements  to  assess  the  effectiveness  of  the  new 
framework has been provided. 

In  addition  the  IA  has  been  checked  for  inconsistencies  and  grammatical  errors.  The 
Executive summary has also been revised in line with the changes detailed above. 

Consultation with stakeholders  

2.4. 
A  12-week  internet-based  public  consultation  was  launched  from  January  to  May  20149.  A 
total of 59 detailed contributions were received from fifteen Member States, five of the seven 
Advisory Councils (ACs), the main industry representative organisations (covering more than 
80% of the catching sector), eleven of the main NGOs dealing with fisheries issues, consumer 
protection groups and the general public. The contributions received have been published11. 

Annex I contains a summary of the findings from this consultation. The stakeholders' views 
are reflected throughout this report but the main conclusions were as follows: 

(1) 

(2) 

Any new technical measures regulation(s) should move away from micromanagement 
towards a results-based management approach. 

Fishermen  should  become  more  accountable  for  what  they  catch  rather  than  the 
construction and operation of the fishing gears they deploy. 

3 

 
 
(3) 

(4) 

(5) 

(6) 

Simplification  of  the  rules  is  a  fundamental  objective  but  simplification  should  not 
create inequalities in the management systems across Member States (“maintaining a 
level playing field”). 

Regionalisation  is  seen  as  an  important  opportunity  to  introduce  simplification  of 
technical measures regulations.  

A  framework  approach  is  preferred.  This  should  contain  overarching  objectives  and 
minimum  common  standards  to  be  applied  across  the  EU.  It  should  also  contain 
safeguards to ensure action can be taken if problems in fisheries emerge. 

Improvements in selectivity have been achieved in the past when incentive structures 
have been aligned with management objectives. Such structures need to be built-in to 
any new regulatory framework for techncial measures. 

Apaprt from the public consultation, numerous workshops, consultations and meetings were 
held during the period from 2011 to early 2015 with the key stakeholders (i.e. Member States, 
European Parliament, Advisory Councils, the catching sector and NGOs). A full list of these 
meetings  is  provided  in  Annex  II.  The  combination  of  the  public  consultation  and  the 
extensive  follow-up  dialogue  with  the  key  stakeholders  (i.e.  the  catching  sector,  NGOs  and 
Member  States)  have  ensured  that  the  views  expressed  fully  represent  the  different 
stakeholder groups. 

2.5. 

Expert advice 

Two meetings of an Expert Working Group (EWG) of the Scientific, Technical and Economic 
Committee for Fisheries (STECF) were convened in October 201211 and March 201312. These 
meetings explored the potential of technical measures as a management tool in the context of 
the  reform  of  the  CFP.  The  findings  of  these  reports  helped  to  define  the  options  that  were 
considered in the perspective evaluation carried out by the external consultants to support this 
IA. In addition to these meetings, several ad hoc requests were made to STECF and also the 
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) on specifc issues relating to: 

–  Fishing gear selectivity13 
–  Replacing mesh size and catch composition rules14 
–  Bycatch of marine mammals and other protected species15&16 
–  Existing closed and restricted areas17 

2.6. 

Other relevant studies  

The findings from impact assessments carried out to support a previous revision of technical 
measures in 200818 (this proposal was subsequently withdrawn) and the CFP19 have provided 
information  for  the  preparation  of  this  IA.  In  addition  a  number  of  externally  contracted 
studies  and  several  studies  undertaken  on  behalf  of  the  European  Parliament  have  also 
provided background material on specific issues. These are listed in Annex III. 

3. 

POLICY CONTEXT 

3.1.  What are technical measures? 

Technical  measures  are  rules  governing  how  and  where  fishermen  may  fish.  They  aim  to 
control the catch that can be taken with a given amount of fishing effort and also to minimise 
the  impacts  of  fishing  on  the  ecosystem.  They  form  an  integral  part  of  most  fishery 
management systems including the CFP. 

Technical measures can be grouped into: 

4 

 
 
–  measures  that  regulate  the  operation  of  the  gear  (e.g.  prohibitions  of  certain  gear 

types, maximum limits on how long or what type of gear can be deployed); 

–  measures  that  regulate  the  design  characteristics  of  the  gears  that  are  deployed  (e.g. 

mesh size and catch composition rules); 

–  minimum landing sizes below which fish must be returned to the sea (e.g. for cod the 

minimum landing size is set at 35cm); 

–  measures  that  set  spatial  and  temporal  controls  (e.g.  closed/limited  entry  areas  and 

seasonal closures) to protect aggregations of juvenile or spawning fish; and 

–  measures  that  mitigate  the  impacts  of  fishing  gears  on  sensitive  species  (e.g. 
cetaceans,  seabirds  or  sea  turtles)  or  closed  areas  to  protect  sensitive  habitats  (e.g. 
coldwater coral reefs) referred to hereafter as "nature conservation measures". 

3.2. 

The history of technical measures in the CFP 

The  history  of  technical  measures  applying  in  European  fisheries  legislation  within  the 
framework of the CFP is one of numerous regulations, amendments, implementing rules and 
temporary  technical  measures  introduced  as  stop-gaps  to  resolve  emerging  problems.  Since 
1980,  no  less  than  90  different  technical  measures  regulations  or  regulations  containing 
technical measures have been enacted by the EU across the different sea basins and in non-EU 
waters11.  Figure  3.2.1  shows  the  progression  of  these  regulations  over  time.  A  full  list  of 
regulations enacted since 1980 is provided in Annex IV. 

Figure 3.2.1: Cumulative number of technical measures regulations introduced since 1980  
(Source: STECF 2012a page 18) 

3.3. 

The current governance structure of technical measures 

The regulatory structure of technical measures has become highly complex and somewhat dis-
jointed. Across all EU sea basins and non-EU waters in which Union vessels operate there are 
31  regulations  which  contain  technical  measures.  Figure  3.3.1  illustrates  the  regulatory 
structure in place. Annex V provides more detailed information on the scope and content of 
these  different  regulations  while  Annex  VI  illustrates  the  governance  structure  across  sea 
basins. 

5 

 
 
 
International Regulations  
containing Technical 
Measures  

Regs: 600/2004, 520/2007, 
734/2008, 302/2009 

NE Atlantic, Black Sea & 
Outermost Regions 

Reg:  850/98 & Supporting Regs: 
3440/86, 517/2008, 1922/1999, 
494/202, 254/2002, 2056/2001, 
2549/2000, 2602/2001, 727/2012 

Mediterranean  

Regs: 1967/2006, 1343/2011 & 
National Management Plans 

CFP 

Annual Fishing Opportunities 
for NE Atlantic, Baltic Sea, 
Black Sea, Deep sea species 

Indepedent Regulations 
containing Technical 
Measures  

Regs: 2347/2002, 724/2010, 
894/97, 1185/2003, 812/2004, 
1434/98, 1224/2009, 
1954/2003 

Baltic Sea 

Reg: 2187/2005 & Supporting 
Regs:  1098/2007, 636/2010 

Figure 3.3.1: Current Regulatory Structure for Technical Measures  
(Source: Author) 

Within this complex structure, there are three detailed technical measures regulations enacted 
under the ordinary legislative procedure covering the main sea basins as follows: 

  Regulation (EC) No 850/9820 covering the North-eastern Atlantic including the North 
Sea,  Skagerrak  and  Kattegat;  the  outermost  regions  (e.g.  Guyana,  Martinique  and 
Réunion) and the Black Sea (since 2013); 

  Regulation (EC) No 1967/200621 covering the Mediterranean; and 
  Regulation (EC) No 2187/200522 covering the Baltic Sea.  

These  regulations  contain  a  mixture  of  common  rules  applying  across  sea  basins  which 
mainly relate to the operation of fishing gears and regionally specific rules that regulate the 
design  characteristics  of  the  gears  used  (e.g.  mesh  sizes),  set  minimum  landing  sizes  and 
establish  closed  or  restricted  areas  to  protect  juvenile  and  spawning  aggregations  of  fish 
species. They also contain limited nature conservation measures which tend to be regionally 
specific although similar mitigation measures apply across sea basins in some cases.  

Each of these regulations contained limited empowerments to allow the adoption of detailed 
rules relating to specific gears types or gear construction or relating to specific area closures. 
In  addition  Regulation  (EC)  850/98  contains  a  specific  empowerment  for  the  Commission 
(Article  45)  to  adopt  technical  measures  in  cases  where  the  conservation  of  specific  stocks 
calls  for  immediate  action  (e.g.  Regulation  (EC)  2056/200123  which  sets  out  emergency 
measures to protect cod in the North Sea).  

The  regulations  in  the  Northeast  Atlantic  and  Baltic  also  allow  for  Member  States  to 
implement technical measures applying to their own vessels under national law provided such 

6 

 
 
 
 
 
 
measures  are  more  stringent  than  Union  law.  Member  States  have  tended  to  use  this 
empowerment to introduce technical measures into fisheries for shellfish (e.g. minimum sizes 
for crab, clam and lobster) inside their own territorial waters. However, there are examples of 
Member States introducing measures applying to their own vessels in fisheries  outside their 
own territorial waters in response to specific stock conservation problems (e.g. Denmark have 
introduced a requirement for Danish vessels to use sorting grids in the industrial fishery for 
Norway Pout in the North Sea).  
Specific to the Mediterranean, there are provisions allowing for the development of national 
management plans adopted under national law (Article 19). In most cases these national plans 
contain technical measures for certain fisheries and/or gears as well as rules for the protection 
of  sensitive  habitats  and  sensitive  species.  To  date  28  such  national  management  plans 
involving  fisheries  with  trawl  nets,  purse  seines  and  other  type  of  surrounding  nets,  and  boat 
seines  have  been  adopted  by  Member  States24.  There  is  also  an  empowerment  to  allow  the 
Council  to  adopt  management  plans  for  specific  Mediterranean  fisheries,  in  particular,  in 
areas  totally  or  partially  beyond  the  territorial  waters  of  Member  States.  They  can  include 
specific  technical  measures,  including  where  appropriate  temporary  derogations  to  the 
common rules. No such plans have been adopted into Union law to date. 

Additional  flexibility  for  amending  technical  measures  or  introducing  new  measures  was 
afforded in the past through the Fishing Opportunities Regulations setting annual TACs and 
quotas  in  the  Northeast  Atlantic,  Baltic,  Black  Sea  and  for  deepsea  species.  These  were  a 
mixture  of  supposedly  temporary  technical  measures  with  a  mixture  of  regionally  specific 
measures and derogations from general provisions contained in other regulations. Following 
the entry into force of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)25 such 
measures  could  no  longer  be  included  in  the  Fishing  Opportunities  Regulation  except  for 
those measures with a direct functional link to the catch limits of a particular stock or stocks. 
Therefore  only  a  limited  number  of  such  measures  are  now  contained  in  the  Fishing 
Opportunities Regulations. For example there is a closed area off the west coast of Ireland to 
protect  Norway  lobster  (Nephrops  norvegicus)  relating  to  the  TAC  for  this  species  in  this 
area26. 

There  are  several  co-decided  regulations  that  transpose  technical  measures  agreed  for  third-
country waters covered under Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs) such 
as  the  Convention  on  Conservation  on  Antarctic  Living  Marine  Resources  (CCALMR)  and 
the  International  Convention  for  the  Conservation  of  Atlantic  Tunas  (ICCAT).  Measures 
emanating  from  other  RFMOS  such  as  the  Northeast  Atlantic  Fisheries  Commission 
(NEAFC),  Northwest  Atlantic  Fisheries  Organization  (NAFO)  are  also  still  included  in  the 
Fishing Opportunities Regulation for the North-east Atlantic as temporary measures. 

3.4. 

Technical measures in the new CFP 

Technical measures are considered an integral part of the new CFP. The CFP aims to ensure 
that  fishing  and  aquaculture  are  environmentally,  economically  and  socially  sustainable  and 
provide  a  source  of  healthy  food  for  EU  citizens.  Its  goal  is  to  foster  a  dynamic  fishing 
industry and ensure a fair standard of living for fishing communities. Annex VII presents the 
main elements of the CFP in more detail. 

The CFP has three key objectives: 

–  Exploitation of living marine biological resources restores and maintains populations 
of harvested species above levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield 
(MSY) for all stocks by 2015 and by 2020 at the latest (Article 2.2). 

–  The gradual elimination of discards on a case-by-case basis, taking account of the best 
available scientific advice, by reducing unwanted catches and gradually ensuring that 
catches are landed (Article 2.5(a)). 

7 

 
 
–  Coherence  with  Union  environmental  legislation,  in  particular  the  objective  of 
achieving  a  good  environmental  status  (GES)  by  2020  under  the  Marine  Strategy 
Framework  Directive  (MSFD27),  as  well  as  with  other  Union  policies28&29  (Article 
2.5(g)). 

Technical  measures  as  tools  to  contribute  to  achieving  the  main  objectives  CFP  have  an 
important and significant role in attaining each of these objectives as follows: 

  The attainment of MSY will be facilitated by the application of technical measures 
which regulate exploitation pattern (i.e. how fishing pressure is distributed across the 
age  profile  of  a  stock).  Obtaining  MSY  from  a  given  stock  will  require  that  the 
exploitation pattern avoids fishing on younger age groups. To achieve this will require 
a  combination  of  effective  technical  measures  (i.e.  measures  that  regulate  the 
operation  and  design  of  the  gear,  minimum  conservation  reference  sizes  (mcrs)  and 
spatial/temporal closures). 

  The  gradual  elimination  of  discards  and  minimisation  of  unwanted  catches  will 
require  the  application  of  technical  (gear  operation  and  design)  as  well  as  tactical 
changes  (closed  or  restricted  areas)  to  drive  increased  selectivity  and  avoidance  of 
unwanted  catches  (i.e.  fish  below  mcrs).  The  landing  obligation  (see  section  3.5) 
introduced to achieve this objective will require a rethink on the current governance 
structure of technical measures to allow for more flexibility to achieve this goal.  

technical  measures  can  contribute 

  Ensuring  fishing  activities  are  consistent  with  wider  ecological  considerations  will 
depend  on  the  application  of  technical  measures  that  minimise  the  impacts  of 
fishing  gears  on  the  ecosystem  (e.g.  mitigation  measures  or  closed  areas). 
Specifically 
the  attainment  of  Good 
Environmental Status (GES) with respect to 4 out of the 11 descriptors included under 
the  MSFD  -  Biological  diversity  (Descriptor  1);  Maintaining  exploited  populations 
within  safe  biological  limits  and  with  a  healthy  age-distribution  (Descriptor  3); 
Maintaining  all  elements  of  marine  food  webs  at  normal  abundance  (Descriptor  4); 
and Maintaining sea-floor integrity (Descriptor 6). 

to 

The CFP "Basic Regulation" outlines a range of measures for the conservation and sustainable 
exploitation of marine biological resources which include technical measures (Article 7). The 
types of measures available are listed. Specific reference is made to fish stock recovery areas 
to  protect  juveniles  or  spawning  aggregations  (Article  8)  and  to  minimum  conservation 
reference  sizes  (mcrs)  that  replace  minimum  landing  sizes  (Article  15)  in  the  context  of 
regionalisation (as described in the following section).  

The new CFP also acknowledges the contribution technical measures can make to sustainable 
fishing.  Article  1730  provides  the  opportunity  for  Member  States  to  incentivise  the  use  of 
selective fishing gear or using fishing techniques with reduced environmental impact through 
the  allocation  of  increased  fishing  opportunities.  This  is  the  first  time  that  a  direct  link 
between "responsible" fishing and fishing opportunities has been included in the CFP. 

3.5. 

The landing obligation 

The new CFP includes a new approach to solve the long-standing problems of overfishing and 
discarding,  through  an  obligation  to  land  all  catches.  This  "landing  obligation",  which 
constitutes a ban on discarding, applies to all catches of species subject to catch limits (TACs) 
and, in the Mediterranean, also catches of species which are subject to minimum sizes (only 
blue-fin tuna is under TAC in this sea basin). It is to be introduced gradually over the period 
2015  and  2019  and  follow  a  fishery  based  approach.  It  is  designed  to  trigger  behavioural 
change  and  encourage  fishermen  to  improve  selectivity  voluntarily  to  avoid  catching  small, 
low  value  fish  that  will  now  have  to  be  landed  and  counted  against  quotas.  The  landing 

8 

 
 
obligation  aims  to  trigger  innovation  in  fishing  gears,  techniques  and  strategies,  linking  it 
directly with technical measures. 

In addition to improvements in selectivity anticipated, the landing obligation comes with a set 
of  potential  exemptions  and  flexibility  instruments  to  make  the  transition  to,  and  timely 
implementation  of,  the  landing  obligation  possible.  These  include  quota  flexibilities, 
exemptions for species that have a high survival rate and a de minimis exemption to cater for 
residual  unwanted  catches  that  are  unavoidable  and  cannot  be  eliminated  through  improved 
selectivity. 

3.6. 

Regionalisation 

The concept of regionalisation 

The  new  CFP  promotes  regionalisation  as  a  new  governance  approach.  It  represents  a 
fundamental  shift  in  the  governance  structure  of  fisheries  policy.  It  moves  away  from 
centralised  micro-management  to  regionalised  decision-making  with  direct  involvement  of 
stakeholders in developing specific conservation measures, tailored to the specificities of the 
fisheries  in  a  region.  Regionalisation  provides  an  opportunity  to  utilise  technical  measures 
much  more  as  a  driver  for  the  achievement  of  sustainable  fisheries  rather  than  simply  as 
restrictive  and  coercive  measures  complementing  TAC  and  quota  and  effort  restrictions. 
However,  regionalisation  is  an  option  that  Member  States  can  choose  to  use  rather  than  an 
obligation. 

The regionalisation process and role of stakeholders  

Article 18 of the CFP "Basic Regulation" describes the process of  regionalisation. It allows 
groups of Member States from the sea basin concerned to formulate “joint recommendations”. 
These joint recommendations can contain technical measures, specific measures to implement 
the  landing  obligation  allowed  for  in  the  CFP,  as  well  as  the  establishment  of  nature 
conservation measures within Natura 2000 sites. Provided such measures are consistent with 
the  objectives  of  the  CFP,  the  Commission  can  transpose  these  joint  recommendations  into 
Union law through delegated or implementing acts.  

The CFP recognises the Advisory Councils (AC) as the key stakeholder representative groups 
in  the  context  of  regionalisation.  It  contains  an  obligation  for  Member  States  to  consult  the 
AC  on  joint  recommendations  and  for  the  advice  of  the  AC  to  "be  taken  into  account"  in 
formulating  regionalised  measures31.  Other  stakeholders  such  as  individual  industry 
representative groups or NGOs do not have any formal role in regionalisation as the ACs are 
considered  representative  of  these  groups  although  they  may  be  consulted  informally  by 
Member States in developing measures or assist the ACs in formulating their advice.  

The main tools for regionalisation 

The  main  tools  for  regionalisation  are  multiannual  management  plans.  These  plans  aim  to 
establish a framework for the sustainable exploitation of stocks or combinations of stocks and 
marine  ecosystems  concerned.  Multiannual  plans  are  established  as  separate  co-decided 
regulations  containing  the  objectives,  quantifiable  targets,  clear  time-frames  to  reach  the 
quantifiable  targets  and  safeguards  to  ensure  that  quantifiable  targets  are  met.  Within  these 
plans,  it  is  possible  to  include  an  empowerment  for  the  Commission  to  adopt  specific 
technical  measures 
the  plan  by  means  of  a 
delegated/implementing act. These technical measures are agreed as joint recommendations. 
The  scope  of  what  technical  measures  can  be  included  is  not  defined  so  potentially  any 
combination  of  measures  deemed  necessary  for  the  implementation  of  the  plan  can  be 
included.  

implementation  of 

to  facilitate 

the 

Since  the  inception  of  the  CFP  the  Commission  has  come  forward  with  one  proposal  for  a 
multiannual  plan  for  fisheries  in  the  Baltic  Sea32  and  intends  to  adopt  further  proposal  for 

9 

 
 
multiannual plans for demersal fisheries in the North Sea and Northeast Atlantic and pelagic 
fisheries in the Mediterranean during 2015 and 2016. 

As  a  temporary  measure  in  the  absence  of  a  multiannual  plan,  Member  States  may  also 
choose  to  develop  discard  plans  for  the  implementation  of  the  landing  obligation  under 
regionalisation. These plans are limited in duration to 3 years and are implemented through a 
Commission  Delegated  act.  Within  discard  plans  technical  measures  that  are  specifically 
required  to  implement  the  landing  obligation  can  be  included.  Principally  these  are 
derogations to existing measures that regulate the design and characteristics of fishing gears, 
minimum conservation reference sizes (that replace minimum landing sizes) and closed areas 
to  protect  juveniles  or  spawning  grounds.  Discard  plans  have  been  enacted  for  fisheries  for 
pelagic species and for most fisheries in the Baltic Sea at the beginning of 2015 to implement 
the  first  timeline  of  the  landing  obligation33.  However,  these  plans  have  contained  only 
limited technical measures. 

Regionalisation  of  nature  conservation  measures  necessary  for  compliance  with  obligations 
under  Union  environmental  legislation  (e.g.  MSFD,  Habitats  and  Birds  Directives)  is  also 
envisaged under Article 11 of the CFP. These Directives impose certain legal obligations on 
Member States as regards Special Areas of Conservation (SACs) and Marine Protected Areas 
(MPAs) where specific technical measures may be needed. Such measures can be developed 
by  way  of  joint  recommendations  agreed  regionally  by  Member  States  and  enacted  into 
legislation through a delegated act. Principally these are closed or restricted areas where the 
use of certain fishing gears is restricted. The first of these delegated acts was recently adopted 
for several areas in the Baltic and Kattegat34. 

Figure 3.6.1 summarises the options for regionalising technical measures under the new CFP. 
As a safeguard measure, in all cases where MS cannot agree on joint recommendations or the 
joint recommendations are incompatible with the objectives of the CFP, the Commission can 
step-in  and  propose  measures  under  ordinary  legislative  procedure.  Further  safeguards  to 
avoid the collapse of fisheries are provided in the CFP under Article 12 and Article 13 which 
allow  the  Commission  or  Member  States  respectively  to  adopt  emergency  measures  on  the 
basis  of  evidence  of  a  serious  threat  to  conservation  of  a  stock  or  to  the  marine  ecosystem 
from  fishing  which  requires  immediate  action  to  alleviate  the  threat.  Such  measures  can 
include technical measures (e.g. closure of a specific area) but they are strictly time limited. 

10 

 
 
 
 
Pre-CFP 

Technical Measures under Regionalisation 

Discard Plans 
Delegated Acts with 
maximum duration of 3 
years 

Regionalised Technical 
Measures as part of 
Delegated Act 

Technical Measures under 31 
Separate Regulations  

No Regionalisation 

Multiannual Plans 
under co-decision 
which include the 
objectives for 
technical measures  

Regionalised Technical 
Measures as part of 
multiannual plans under 
Delegated Act 

Nature Conservation 
Measures under 
Delegated Acts  

Regionalised Technical 
Measures as part of  
Delegated Act 

Figure 3.6.1: Regionalisation under the CFP 
(Source: Author) 

3.7. 

Technical measures and other elements of the CFP 

Technical measures are inextricably linked to other elements of the CFP particularly control 
and enforcement and the provision of scientific data.  

To  ensure  that  the  rules  of  the  CFP  are  followed  in  practice,  the  policy  includes  a  control 
system  with  the  necessary  tools  to  enforce  them.  The  system  is  laid  down  in  the  Control 
Regulation35  which  entered  into  force  on  1  January  2010.  Under  Article  118  of  the  Control 
Regulation an evaluation of the impact of this Regulation on the CFP must be undertaken by 
the  Commission  five  years  after  its  entry  into  force.  This  evaluation  is  currently  being 
undertaken  and  the  Commission  are  due  to  report  by  the  end  of  2015.  The  effectiveness  of 
technical  measures  regulations  in  contributing  to  the  objectives  of  the  CFP  is  dependent  on 
them  being  coherent  and  consistent  with  the  control  system  and  vice-versa.  Therefore  any 
future revision of the control Regulation arising from this evaluation needs to take account of 
changes  to  the  technical  measures  and  equally  in  revising  the  technical  measures, 
controllability must be a central consideration. 

Measuring the effectiveness of technical measures relies heavily on the provision of accurate 
scientific  data.  Article  25  of  the  CFP  sets  out  the  key  principles  for  data  collection  and 
requires  Member  States  to  collect  data  on  fleets  and  their  fishing  activities  in  particular 
biological data on catches and on the potential environmental impacts of fishing activities on 
the  ecosystem  under  a  Data  Collection  Framework  (DCF)  Regulation36.  A  Commission 
proposal to update and enhance the DCF is currently being prepared. Ensuring that data needs 
to monitor and measure the effectiveness of technical measures will be an integral part of this 
proposal.  

11 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION 

The main benefit of the current technical measures identified by stakeholders is that measures 
(e.g.  minimum  landing  sizes)  which  are  harmonised  across  EU  fisheries  have  established  a 
"level-playing field" amongst the catching sector of different Member States. However, this is 
in contrast to a number of studies, including the retrospective evaluation that show technical 
measures  in  their  current  format  have  largely  not  delivered  on  the  objectives  of  the  CFP 
effectively. This is more evident in some sea basins than others but the general perception is 
one of multiple complex and ineffective rules contained in an inflexible governance structure.  

With the new challenges thrown up by the new CFP, including the move to fishing at MSY, 
the introduction of the landing obligation and the achievement of GES the current regulatory 
structure will continue to fail to deliver. The current structure is also out of line with the new 
governance approach introduced by regionalisation. In this context, there are five identifiable 
weaknesses with the existing technical measures. 

4.1. 

Sub-optimal performance 

Progress has been made in moving towards sustainably fisheries in the last decade. Currently 
26 stocks (out of the MSY assessed total of 62) are being fished sustainably at or below MSY 
in the Atlantic EU waters, the North Sea and the Baltic Sea from only 5 stocks in 200937. For 
many  of  these  stocks  the  move  to  sustainable  fishing  has  been  as  a  result  of  a  decrease  in 
fishing  pressure  following  from  reductions  in  fishing  opportunities  or  fishing  effort  or  for 
economic reasons (market forces) fishermen have been forced out of business. However, there 
are  stocks  where  technical  measures  collectively  have  contributed  towards  regulating 
exploitation pattern8&11 (how fishing pressure is distribution across the age profile of a stock). 
One such example is provided in example 1.  

Example 1: According to ICES, in the Baltic Sea there have been significant improvements 
in exploitation patterns for cod. This has been brought about largely through the use of more 
selective gears with larger mesh sizes and escape windows in fisheries for cod in combination 
with closed areas to protect juvenile cod. Discarding of undersize fish in these fisheries has 
been reduced significantly to less than 10% compared to 50-60% in the early 1990s11. 

In other fisheries, in combination with technical measures at Union level, Member States have 
taken their own measures to improve selectivity with good results. Such measures have been 
developed with direct consultation with the fishing industry giving them a level of legitimacy 
with the catching sector (See example 2).  

Example 2: In the Norway Pout fishery in the North Sea, Danish fishermen are required to 
use sorting grids to reduce bycatch of non-target species such as haddock, whiting and saithe 
under  national  legislation.  Discards  of  haddock  and  whiting  in  these  fisheries  have  been 
reduced  by  57%  and  37%  respectively  following  this  initiative  which  resulted  from  an 
acceptance  that  catches  of  undersize  cod  and  haddock  in  these  fisheries  were  unacceptably 
high38. Similarly Swedish fishermen in the Skagerrak fishing for Nephrops are required to use 
sorting  grids  in  this  fishery  to  reduce  bycatch  of  cod.  Since  their  introduction  unwanted 
catches of cod have been reduced by approximately 90% from previous levels39. 

Technical measures have also delivered positive benefits in reducing ecosystem impacts. For 
example  the  limited  number  of  spatial  measures  taken  to  protect  sensitive  habitats  such  as 
coldwater corals in the Northeast Atlantic and seagrass beds in the Mediterranean have been 
effective8, while  some  strict restrictions  on the  use  of  certain  gear  types  have  also  provided 
protection  to  sensitive  species  such  as  cetaceans,  seabirds  and  sea  turtles  as  illustrated  by 
example 3.  

12 

 
 
Example  3:  Regulation  (EU)  No  894/9740,  which  established  a  prohibition  on  the  use  of 
large-scale  driftnets  above  2.5km  for  highly  migratory  fish  (e.g.  tunas  and  swordfish)  have 
also had positive benefits. This prohibition has succeeded in significantly reducing incidental 
catches of sensitive species such as cetaceans and seabirds which were frequently caught in 
these gears41&42. 

Technical measures have performed less well in other fisheries and sea basins as evidenced by 
the  retrospective  evaluation6,  the  Green  Paper  on  the  Reform  of  the  CFP43,  the  IA  report 
accompanying  the  Commission's  proposal  for  the  new  CFP19  as  well  as  the  reports  from 
STECF11&12.  Currently  out  of  176  assessed  stocks  there  are  19  stocks  in  the  North-east 
Atlantic, 88 stocks in the Mediterranean and 5 stocks in the Black Sea which are considered to 
be fished unsustainably (i.e. above MSY)37. For some of these, technical measures have failed 
to  control exploitation patterns and discards for  these  stocks are generally high.  Table 4.1.1 
and  Annex  VIII  provide  some  examples  of  fisheries  where  these  problems  are  most  acute. 
This information was collated in a study carried out as part of the IA to support the CFP44.  

Fishing Gear 

Area 

No of Vessels 

Target Species 

Discarded 
Species 

Indicative 
Discard Rates 

Beam Trawls 

Beam Trawls 

Bottom Trawls 

North Sea, 
English 
Channel, Irish 
Sea and Celtic 
Sea 

Southern North 
Sea 

English 
Channel, Irish 
Sea, Celtic Sea, 
Bay of Biscay 

~470 

Sole, Plaice 

~450 

Crangon shrimp 

~2500 

Nephrops & 
mixed demersal 
species and 

Bottom Trawls 

Iberian 
Peninsula 

~450 

hake, horse 
mackerel, 
anglerfish, 
megrim 

Plaice dab, 
whiting, grey 
gurnard 

Plaice, dab, 
whiting 

Nephrops, 
whiting , 
haddock, 
anglerfish, 
megrim, cod, 
hake 

Hake, horse 
mackerel, blue 
whiting 

60-90% 

56-72% 

36-70% 

30-60% 

Bottom Trawls 

Adriatic 

Bottom Trawls 

Ionian Sea 

~1000 

~500 

Nephrops 

Multiple species 

40-50% 

Red shrimp 

Multiple species 

20-50% 

Table 4.1.1 Examples of fisheries with high discard rates 
(Source: Vessel numbers extracted from STECF 2013b; Discard rates taken from IA report to support the 
CFP44) 

In these cases this sub-optimal performance is caused by a number of factors relating to the 
effectiveness of the measures themselves and the management framework they operate in as 
follows:  

(1) 

Technical  measures,  particularly  measures  that  regulate  the  operation  and  design 
characteristics  of  the  gear  (e.g.  mesh  size  regulations)  are  viewed  by  fishermen  as  a 
way to restrict their activities and which result in losses of revenue through direct (loss 
of fish) and indirect costs (cost of gear replacement) with no apparent benefit. This is 
particularly  prevalent  in  the  demersal  fisheries  in  the  Northeast  Atlantic  and 
Mediterranean.  Their  reaction  has  been  to  mitigate  the  impacts  of  such  measures 
through technical innovation as illustrated by example 4. 

Example  4:  The  use  of  illegal  gear  attachments  (so-called  “blinders”)  which  obstruct  the 
mesh opening nets, contravening the mesh size rules has been widespread in fisheries heavily 

13 

 
 
reliant on young fish that may be close to or just above the minimum landing size (e.g. beam 
trawl fishery for sole and trawl fisheries for Nephrops). This is because the current mesh size 
results  in  loss  of  marketable  catch  of  these  fish  above  the  minimum  size  providing  an 
incentive to circumvent the mesh size rules45. 

(2) 

Despite  there  being  many  ways  to  improve  selectivity  through  the  use  of  selectivity 
devices  such  as  square  mesh  panels,  sorting  grids  or  increases  in  mesh  sizes,  the 
innovation  potential  of  the  fishing  industry  has  been  directed  away  from  the 
deployment of more selective fishing towards a sub-optimal harvesting strategy where 
the sole objective is to reduce losses. The result has been uptake of selective gears has 
been limited to fisheries where legislation making the use of such gears mandatory has 
been introduced, despite such gears providing the means to reduce unwanted catches. 
This  is  particularly  the  case  in  trawl  fisheries  in  the  Northeast  Atlantic  and  the 
Mediterranean  targeting  a  number  of  different  species  (i.e.  mixed  fisheries)  where  a 
range of species are caught together (e.g. cod, haddock and whiting). In these fisheries, 
fishermen often discard large amounts of both undersized and marketable fish species 
to remain legal as illustrated by example 5.  

Example 5: In the North Sea flatfish fishery for which the legal gear (beam trawl with a mesh 
size  of  80  mm)  may  be  effective  to  support  a  relevant  exploitation  pattern  for  the  target 
species,  sole,  this  gear  is  unselective  for  other  species  caught  during  the  same  fishing 
operations such as plaice. This imbalance results in high rates of discards (for plaice greater 
than 60%44).  

(3) 

The  use  of  minimum  landings  size  (mls)  and  catch  composition  (CC)  regulations  in 
the  Northeast  Atlantic,  the  North  Sea  and  to  a  lesser  extent  in  the  Baltic  Sea  have 
created an obligation for fishermen to discard in some circumstances. As highlighted 
by  STECF11  these  were  introduced  to  act  as  coercive  incentives  to  avoid  areas  with 
high  concentrations  of  juveniles  or  unwanted  species.  There  is  no  clear  evidence  to 
suggest  that  this  has  been  the  case.  The  predominant  reaction  by  fishermen  to  both 
these  rules  has  been  to  comply  through  discarding  of  fish  below  mls  or  in  excess  of 
permitted  CC  percentages,  particularly  if  moving  to  other  areas  would  result  in  a 
reduction in potential revenue (i.e. movement to an area with fewer marketable fish). 
See example 6. 

Example  6:  The  catch  composition  rules  require  that  catches  of  species  which  exceed  the 
catch composition  percentages  laid  down  in  the  regulations  must  be  discarded  prior  to  each 
landing.  A  skipper  is  required  to  reconcile  his  catch  with  the  catch  composition  rules  and 
record it in the logbook within 24 hours. Depending on the species mix on any particular day, 
a skipper may be obliged to discard fish to meet the catch composition requirements for that 
day.  A  day later  he  may  catch  and keep  on  board  more  of  the  species  he  discarded the  day 
before  because  it  fits  within  the  rules  after  the  catch  composition  changed  as  a  result  of 
fishing  that  day,  and  so  on  during  the  rest  of  the  trip.  In  practice  fish  in  excess  of  the 
percentages are either discarded just before return to port or misreported and landed illegally. 

(4) 

The  effectiveness  of  nature  conservation  measures  to  minimise  interactions  with 
sensitive species or to reduce the impacts of fishing gears on vulnerable habitats (e.g. 
coldwater  corals)  has  also  been  sub-optimal.  This  is  not  necessarily  because  the 
measures  themselves  are  ineffective  but  more  that  coverage  has  been  limited,  the 
process  to  put  such  measures  in  place  has  been  lengthy6  or  they  have  been  rendered 
ineffective through the introduction of multiple derogations. In some cases they have 
been targeted in the wrong areas or fisheries or relied on unproven mitigation devices. 
This is illustrated by example 7. 

14 

 
 
Example  7:  Regulation  (EC)  812/200446  requiring  the  use  of  Acoustic  Deterrent  Devices 
(ADDs)  to  reduce  the  catches  of  cetaceans  (i.e.  dolphins  and  whales)  in  gillnet  and  pelagic 
fisheries  has  not  delivered  the  desired  results47&48.  The  devices  have  been  shown  to  be 
effective at reducing incidental catches of one species in one gear type (i.e. harbour porpoise 
in  gillnet  fisheries)  but  ineffective  for  other  cetacean  species  (e.g.  common  dolphins)  or  for 
other gear types (e.g. pelagic trawls). Additionally only vessels greater than 12m are required 
to use these devices yet scientific evidence48 shows that significant numbers of cetaceans are 
incidentally caught by such vessels fishing in inshore waters. This has resulted in incidental 
catch of cetaceans remaining a problem in a number of fisheries49. 

4.2. 

Difficult to measure effectiveness 

The objectives set for technical measures are broadly defined in legislation but quantifying the 
effectiveness  of  these  measures  individually  or  collectively  in  a  Union  context  has  proved 
difficult. This is for several reasons: 

(1) 

There is an absence of any defined metrics on which to measure success as illustrated 
by example 8. 

Example  8:  Regulation  (EC)  850/98,  the  overarching  regulation  covering  the  Northeast 
Atlantic states without specified targets that technical measures should "ensure the protection 
of  marine  biological  resources  and  the  balanced  exploitation  of  fishery  resources  in  the 
interests of fishermen and consumers in line with the objective of the CFP". This Regulation 
also  includes  a  number  of  broad,  rather  non-specific  sub-objectives  such  as  "reducing  the 
capture  of  juveniles  of  marine  organisms  through  mesh  size  and  catch  composition  rules". 
The result has been that it is impossible to measure the success of this Regulation due to the 
lack of quantifiable targets11. The  Mediterranean Regulation (Reg. (EC) 1967/2006) is  even 
less specific and in fact contains no specific objectives or targets whatsoever. 

(2) 

In  trying  to  assess  effectiveness,  it  has  only  really  been  possible  to  compare  the 
measures taken collectively with the outcomes observed and not to quantify what the 
linkages  between  these  are  in  practice6&11.  This  is  further  confounded  as  technical 
measures  are  often  part  of  an  overall  package  of  complex  input  and  output  controls 
including  fishing  effort  and  Total  allowable  catches  (TACs)  preventing  any 
comparative  analysis.  It  is  often  impossible  to  quantify  whether  specific  measures 
have  had  any  impact  or  contributed  to  the  achievement  of  the  overall  conservation 
objectives of the CFP as illustrated by example 9. 

Example 9: Closed areas put in place in the Celtic Sea to protect cod were assessed as part of 
a  wider  review  of  closed  areas  by  STECF17.  They  concluded  that  while  the  closures  had 
benefits  for  conservation  of  the  cod  stock,  it  was  not  possible  to  give  a  quantitative 
assessment of the impact of these closures area as it was difficult to disentangle the effect of 
the closure from other factors such as the impact of TAC reductions. 

(3) 

From  a  political  perspective,  technical  measures,  particularly  mesh  sizes,  restrictions 
on specific gears and closed areas often form part of a negotiation strategy, potentially 
leading  to  a  dilution  of  the  final  measures  agreed,  rendering  them  sub-optimal.  This 
can often be driven by perceived negative impacts (losses of marketable catches) in the 
fishery and the desire of managers to broker a deal, even though the measures agreed 
may prove ineffective. This results in measures being introduced without any scientific 
basis,  making  any  judgment  on  how  they  may  benefit  the  overarching  policy 
objectives, impossible. See example 10. 

Example 10: A closed area introduced into the Irish Sea to protect cod under Regulation (EC) 
No.  300/200050  has  been  diluted  by  multiple  derogations  for  certain  fleet  segments  to  fish 
within the closure on economic grounds. The introduction of these derogations have negated 

15 

 
 
the benefits of the closure and reduced the protection provided to the cod stock, which was the 
original intention of the closure17. A similar assessment has been made of the plaice box in the 
North Sea51. 

4.3. 

Prescriptive and complex rules 

The  current  management  approach  to  technical  measures  as  input  tools  (e.g.  defining  mesh 
sizes or imposing restriction on fishing gears) has resulted in a large number of complex and 
highly prescriptive rules particularly in the Northeast Atlantic and the Mediterranean. These 
rules attempt to control many technical aspects of fishing operations, rather than focusing on 
the desired outputs (e.g. a specific catch profile or level of fishing pressure). This has led to 
the following difficulties:  

(1) 

The  focus  on  regulating  the  technical  inputs  rather  than  the  output  has  introduced  a 
strong  incentive  to  negate  the  regulations.  This  has  led  to  the  adoption  of  more 
legislation  to  counter  circumvention  of  the  rules,  increasing  complexity  in  the 
regulations.  This  is  demonstrated  by  the  cumulative  growth  in  technical  measures  in 
the  EU  many  of  which  are  simply  ‘catch-up’  regulations  across  the  different  sea 
basins.  Figure  4.3.3.1  below  illustrates  how  the  current  framework  of  technical 
measures in the EU has led to the introduction of more and more legislation, affecting 
control and enforcement activities and undermining confidence in the measures by the 
catching sector. Example 11 provides a practical example of what has occurred. 

Figure 4.3.1: The effects of how the current framework of technical measures in the EU affects control 
and enforcement activities 
(Source STECF 2012a page 25) 

Example 11: The use of stiffer twine to offset previously introduced increases in mesh size 
from 90 to 100mm in the North Sea (Regulation (EC) No 345/9252) became widespread in the 
early 1990’s. This subsequently led to research into the potential impact on codend selectivity. 
The  results  of  the  research  were  subsequently  used  as  the  basis  to  introduce  additional 
legislation which limited the thickness of twine that could be used (Regulation (EC) 850/98). 
However,  it  took  another  five  years  to  develop  and  objective  method  to  measure  twine 
thickness and implement this into legislation through Regulation (EC) 129/200353. 

(2) 

Not  enough  attention  has  been  given  to  the  practicalities  of  control  and  enforcement 
when introducing technical measures or during the negotiation of particular measures, 
controllability  considerations  have  been  overlooked.  This  has  resulted  in  the 
introduction of measures that have been difficult and costly to enforce. Most technical 

16 

Addingmore technicalregulationsIndustryresponseto mitigateimpactTechnicalsolution to initial industryresponseScientificevaluationof responseIntroduction of new measuresDilution of control effectivenessRequirementto enforcemore regulations 
 
 
rules can only be monitored effectively through seaborne or airborne inspections. The 
retrospective evaluation6 estimates that the control costs for Denmark, Ireland, the UK, 
France and Spain combined to be around €163 million euros annually (an average of 
around EUR 33 million per Member State). Of these costs for these Member States, 25 
% are land-based inspection, 57% seaborne, 6% airborne, 2% VMS/FMCs with 10% 
administration  costs  (i.e.  approximately  €102  million  euros is  spent  on seaborne  and 
airborne  inspections).  While  all  of  this  expenditure  is  not  directly  attributable  to  the 
enforcement  of  technical  measures,  interviews  with  inspectors  carried  out  as  part  of 
the retrospective evaluation6, showed the costs for measuring elements of fishing gear 
construction such as mesh size and twine thickness are questionable. The variation in 
measured  selectivity  associated  with  fishing  gears  is  high  while  the  actual 
conservation  benefit  of  strictly  controlling  such  measures  is  relatively  low. 
Additionally  according  to  fisheries  inspectors  monitoring  technical  measures  at  sea 
can be extremely challenging particularly in bad weather6&11. This has not been taken 
into account when defining the technical rules. The difficulties in controlling technical 
measures are illustrated in example 12. 

Example  12:  Under  a  broad  objective  of  protecting  deep-sea  species  (principally  deep-sea 
sharks),  regulations  first  introduced  under  the  fishing  opportunities  regulations  and  now 
incorporated into Regulation (EC) 850/98 regulate the use of fixed nets likely to interact with 
these species. Whilst the legislation prohibits use of fixed nets at charted depths greater than 
200 metres, derogations are possible for fishing with fixed nets in waters with a charted depth 
of more than 200 metres but less than 600 metres under certain conditions. The derogations 
also  require  prescriptions  on  the  maximum  height  of  nets,  maximum  length,  maximum 
soaking time and hanging ratios. These conditions vary according to the mesh sizes used. In 
practice, Member State control authorities report that this legislation is not  controllable; not 
only because the hanging ratio and procedures to measure it are not defined, but also because 
controlling compliance would require a disproportionate amount of time and effort at sea for 
determining the soak time, checking depths, and controlling dimensions of series of nets that 
can measure up to 100 km in length per vessel6. 

4.4. 

Lack of flexibility in the management framework 

Although  there  are  in-built  flexibility  mechanisms  (section  3.3)  in  the  current  regulations, 
technical  measures  have  tended  to be  adopted under  ordinary legislative  procedure.  Prior to 
the  adoption  of  the  TFEU  this  was  by  the  Council,  and,  now  under  co-decision,  by  the 
Council and European Parliament. This has created the following difficulties: 

(1) 

The ordinary legislative procedure is a complex, lengthy and politically-driven process 
which  is  not  well  suited  to  defining  detailed  technical  rules  that  may  need  frequent 
updating as illustrated by example 13.  

Example  13:  No  political  agreement  for  a  new  package  of  technical  measures  for  the 
Northeast Atlantic has been reached in the last ten years. Previous Commission proposals in 
200254 and in 200855 failed for a number of reasons even those these were presented by the 
Commission as consolidations. Member States argued that the text had grown too complicated 
and  difficult  to  interpret.  In  addition,  they  did  not  reflect  regional  differences  while  the 
advantages of harmonising measures across different areas were questioned. More recently a 
recent  amendment  (Regulation  (EU)  No.  227/201354),  which  was  principally  to  make 
temporary measures introduced through the fishing opportunities regulation, permanent, took 
more than 9 months to complete due to disagreements between the co-legislators on the scope 
of this regulation. 

(2) 

There is a lack of flexibility in the decision-making process for technical measures that 
has  restricted  the  ability  to  adjust  or  revise  them  or  to  react  to  changes  in  fishing 

17 

 
 
conditions  or  to  take  advantage  of  innovation  in  gear  technology.  This  has  created 
frustration  and  a  level  of  mistrust  amongst  the  catching  sector.  The  lack  of  in-built 
flexibility in the current legislative regime is demonstrated in example 14 concerning 
the haddock stock in the Celtic Sea. 

Example 14: Scientific advisory bodies identified a strong recruitment of juvenile haddock at 
into the Celtic Sea at the end of 2009. This incoming year class was identified as being under 
threat if the selectivity of legal fishing gears was not modified to take account of this pulse in 
recruitment.  However,  following  long  discussions  with  Member  States  and  the  NWWAC  it 
was not until the end of 2012 that the Commission was able to adopt an ‘emergency act’ to 
enforce more selective fishing techniques, Member States having failed to agree on national 
measures. By that time, this year class had been heavily fished, resulting in a failure to reap 
the  long-term  stock  benefits  that  would  have  resulted  if  the  strong  year  class  had  been 
protected8. 

(3) 

Stakeholders  argue  that  measures  brought  in  on  a  temporary  basis  either  as  in  cases 
where  the  conservation  of  specific  stocks  calls  for  immediate  action  or  under  the 
Fishing Opportunities, have actually become permanent measures. They argue that the 
flexibility  mechanisms  have  been  used  as  a  way  to  impose  long-term  restrictions  on 
their operations under the guise of short term, reactionary measures. This is illustrated 
by example 15.  

Example  15  Regulation  (EC)  2056/2001  introduced  technical  measure  to  recovery  the  cod 
stock  in  the  North  Sea  as  short-term  emergency  measures.  However,  these  measures  which 
included  increased  mesh  sizes  significantly  and  the  use  of  certain  selectivity  devices  which 
resulted  in  losses  of  marketable  catches  have  been  in  place  for  more  than  14  years  without 
amendment. Another example is a temporary derogation for use of an electric pulse trawl in 
the  North  Sea  to  catch  flatfish.  This  was  introduced  to  allow  scientific  research  into  the 
impacts of this fishing gear but 10 years later and despite extensive research being carried out 
it remains unchanged. 

(4) 

Inflexibility  is  apparent  in  the  implementation  of  nature  conservation  measures  to 
protect  sensitive  habitats.  There  is  little  dispute  amongst  stakeholders6  that  such 
habitats need to be protected but the introduction of such measures has been slow and 
out of line with available knowledge. To designate an area closed to fishing currently 
requires  a  change  to  the  technical  measures  regulations  often  resulting  in  lengthy 
negotiation and dilution of the final measures agreed, either through the introduction 
of  derogations  or  a  reduction  in  the  size  of  the  area  protected.  This  is  illustrated  by 
example 16. 

Example  16:  The  delineation  of  closed  areas  to  protect  coral  reefs  off  the  coast  of  Ireland 
took more than 3 years to negotiate6 because Member States could not agree on the extent of 
the closures proposed. The main issues were related to the size of the areas and agreeing on 
continued access to vessels using fishing gears that have minimal or no impacts on the seabed. 

Insufficient involvement of key stakeholders in the decision making process 

4.5. 
Several independent reviews of the management framework of technical measures57,58&59 have 
concluded  that  successful  use  of  technical  measures  depends  largely  on  their  acceptance  by 
fishermen.  This  is  in  contrast  to  the  current  technical  measures  which  are  mostly  coercive 
resulting  from  a  hierarchical  governance  system  (i.e.  top-down  rather  than  bottom-up 
approach) with little or no incentive for fishermen to comply.  

Fishermen and other stakeholders generally do not feel part of a participatory process where 
measures  are  agreed  and  often  do  not  consider  them  as  legitimate  or  equitable.  Their 
hierarchical  formulation  lead  fishermen  to  perceive  that  technical  measures  are  impractical, 

18 

 
 
they do not represent current fishing practice and are sometimes contradictory as illustrated by 
example 17. 

Example  17:  Interviews  with  the  fishing  industry  conducted  as  part  of  the  retrospective 
evaluation6 identified that the industry believe that many closed areas are “set in stone”. They 
have  highlighted  closed  areas  to  protect  Norway  Pout  and  herring  in  the  North  Sea  which 
have  remained  unchanged  since  the  1980s  yet  the  fishing  patterns  and  fishing  practices  in 
these fisheries have changed significantly since their introduction and the closures now serve 
no conservation purpose. 

Underlying drivers of the problems 

4.6. 
The conclusion from the retrospective analysis6, the public consultation9, the previous IA on 
technical  measures (2008 proposal18)  and also from STECF11&12 is that  technical measures 
have an important role to play in fisheries management but the governance framework 
in which they operate needs to be re-examined in light of the challenges generated by the 
new CFP.  The underlying drivers of the problems are regulatory rather than market driven. 
Table  4.4.1  summarises  the  identified  problems,  the  drivers  of  these  problems  and  their 
effects. The drivers are very much interlinked. 

Problems 

Drivers 

Effects 

Failure to control exploitation patterns 
leading  to  high  levels  of  discards  in 
mixed fisheries.  

Circumvention,  both 
and 
illegally, of technical rules to minimize 
the economic impacts. 

legally 

Limited  uptake  of  selective  gears  or 
mitigation  measures 
reduce 
incidental catches of sensitive species. 

to 

Limited 
sensitive habitats 

protection 

afforded 

to 

Mitigation measures are targeted in the 
wrong areas or fisheries. 

Impossible  to  quantify  whether  the 
technical  measures  have  had  any 
impact 
the 
or 
achievement 
overall 
of 
conservation objectives of the CFP. 

contributed 
the 

to 

Dilution  of  the  final  measures  agreed 
as  they  are  the  outcome  of  a  political 
negotiation resulting in measures being 
introduced without any scientific basis 
making 
their 
assessment 
effectiveness impossible 

of 

Sub-optimal performance 

Technical  measures  are  viewed  by  the 
restrictive  and 
catching  sector  as 
provide 
fish 
to 
selectively. 

incentive 

little 

Difficult to measure effectiveness 

There  is  an  absence  of  any  defined 
metrics on which to measure success. 

Technical  measures  are  part  of  an 
overall  package  of  complex  input  and 
output  controls  including  effort  and 
TACs. 

19 

 
 
 
Prescriptive and complex rules 

Technical  measures  attempt  to  control 
too  many  technical  aspects  of  fishing 
operations. 

Undermines  the  catching  sector's  (i.e. 
fishermen) confidence in the measures 
and  provide  a  strong  incentive  to 
negate the regulations. 

Adoption  of  more 
legislation 
counter circumvention of the rules 

to 

Difficult  for  control  authorities  of 
Member States to enforce the measures 
and fishermen to comply with them. 

Lack of flexibility 

are 

decided 
Technical  measures 
following  a  complex,  inflexible  and 
lengthy 
process 
politically-driven 
which  is  not  well  suited  to  defining 
detailed 
that  need 
frequent updating and periodic review.  

technical 

rules 

Insufficient involvement of key 
stakeholders in the decision- making 
process 

Technical  measures  are  based  on 
negative, mostly coercive incentives in 
a  hierarchical  governance  system  (i.e. 
top-down rather than bottom-up). 

a 

and 
high 
Imposes 
administrative  costs  on  the  control 
authorities of Member States. 

burden 

Restricts the ability  to  adjust  or revise 
technical measures to react to changes 
in  fisheries,  fishing  conditions  or  to 
take  advantage  of  innovation  in  gear 
technology.  

Supposedly 
or 
temporary 
derogations  have  remained  in  place 
unchanged for long periods. 

rules 

Fishermen and stakeholders do not feel 
part of a participatory process. 

that 

Fishermen  perceive 
technical 
measures  are  impractical,  they  do  not 
represent  current  fishing  practice  and 
are sometimes contradictory. 

Table 4.4.1: Summary of problems underpinning the current technical measures 
(Source: Author) 

4.7. 

The affected stakeholders 

Technical  measures  are  tools  to  support  the  CFP  and  contribute  to  achieving  its  objectives. 
Therefore the stakeholders directly affected are a sub-set of those identified in the CFP reform 
IA report as summarised in table 4.5.1. 

Stakeholder 

Description 

Catching sector in the EU 

EU vessel owners, operators and crew 

Sector regulators 

National,  regional  and  local  bodies 
regulating fishing 

Scientific  research  bodies  contributing 
to the conservation and management of 
stocks; improvements in the selectivity 
of  fishing  gears;  and  reducing  the 
ecosystem  effects  of  fishing  on  the 
ecosystem 

Sector research 

NGOs 

Non-governmental 
organizations 
advocating sustainable management of 
fisheries.  

To  maintain  fish  populations,  marine 
biodiversity,  and  the  amenity  value  of 
the oceans 

Table 4.5.1: Summary of stakeholders affected by the reform of the technical measures regulation and of 
their respective key interests (adapted from the IA supporting the reform of the CFP) 
(Source: Author) 

The  catching  sector  comprising  82,047  vessels  and  employing  98,500  FTE60  is  the  most 
affected  by  potential  changes  to  the  technical  measures  regulations.  Of  these  approximate 

20 

Key interests 

Maintaining 
livelihoods 

profitability 

and 

Ensuring  an  efficient,  effective  and 
practical  management  framework  that 
balances  a  wide  range  of  stakeholder 
needs 

Contribution  to  an  effective  fisheries 
management regime through the timely 
access  to  fishing  vessels  to  measure 
selectivity,  impacts  on  the  ecosystem 
and new low impact fishing. 

 
 
 
 
 
82,000  fishing  vessels,  almost  98%  of  them  would  be  classified  as  micro-enterprises 
employing fewer than 10 persons and whose annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total 
does not exceed €2 million61. Annex IX provides a more detailed breakdown of the catching 
sector in terms of number of vessels, gears deployed and numbers employed. 

Other  stakeholders  affected  are  the  sector  regulators  in  the  Member  States.  This  comprises 
national administrations, regional and local bodies with a fisheries management role and the 
control  and enforcement  agencies  within  the  Member  States.  Any  changes  to  the  regulatory 
structure will require a re-adjustment of the management and control regime.  

Sector research agencies within Member States as well as ICES and STECF who are the main 
providers of advice to the Commission will also be affected. Changes in technical measures 
will require experimentation and evaluation of any new measures. 

NGOs have a direct interest in ensuring technical measures are effective given that they are 
one of the main tools of the CFP to regulate the impacts of fishing on the marine ecosystem. 
The main NGOs as members of the ACs will have a direct involvement in the development of 
technical measures under regionalisation. 

Other sectors indirectly affected under this initiative include: 

–  Dependent business and communities; 

–  Processing and marketing sector; 

–  Third Countries fishing in Union waters (e.g. Norway, Faroes in the northeast Atlantic 

and Turkey, Morocco and Ukraine in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea); and 

–  Consumers. 

4.8. 

Evolution of the problem  

This section focuses on summarising the evolution of the presented problems in the context of 
the objectives of the CFP. The baseline scenario is based on the current regulatory structure 
illustrated  in  Figure  3.1.1  and  presented  in  section  6.2.  The  evolution  of  the  identified 
problems in terms of economic, social and environmental impacts is assessed in section 7.2. 

For  the  purposes  of  this  IA,  two  assumptions  are  made.  Firstly,  the  three  main  technical 
measures  Regulations  (NE  Atlantic20,  Mediterranean21  and  Baltic22)  have  been  aligned  with 
the  TFEU  concerning  establishment  of  current  Commission  empowerments  under  delegated 
or  implementing  Acts.  Commission  proposals  to  make  these  alignments  are  currently  under 
negotiation with the Council and European Parliament62,63&64. 

Secondly, it is assumed that certain provisions within the current regulations that run contrary 
to the landing obligation and oblige fishermen to discard fish have been removed or amended. 
This  technical  adjustment  has  been  achieved  through  a  recently  adopted  Regulation  (EU) 
812/2015  (the  so-called  "omnibus"65).  The  omnibus,  which  is  very  much  a  “quick  fix” 
solution,  amends  a  number  of  technical  measures  regulations  by  requiring  all  unintended 
catches  (defined  as  incidental  catches  the  fishing  for  which  is  prohibited  in  the  relevant 
conditions)  subject  to  the  landing  obligation  caught  in  excess  of  legal  provisions  (catch 
composition  rules,  bycatch  provisions)  must  be  landed  and  counted  against  quota.  It  also 
requires the definition of minimum conservation reference sizes (mcrs) to replace the current 
minimum landing sizes and minimum catching sizes in the Mediterranean. This is a change in 
name only and the sizes remain as they are currently. All catches below the mcrs subject to 
the landing obligation must be landed and counted against quota. 
Based on the history of technical measures over the last 25 years within successive CFPs11, 
these  changes  alone  are  unlikely  to  improve  the  contribution  of  technical  measures  to 
achieving the objectives of the new CFP in a relevant and coherent way across sea basins. The 

21 

 
 
effectiveness and efficiency of the current measures will not improve without changes to the 
governance structure and simplification of the measures. There will continue to be a low level 
of  acceptability  of  the  measure  amongst  stakeholders  and  the  identified  weaknesses  will 
continue or persist or even intensify over time. Specifically:  

  Attainment  of  the  MSY  objective  for  overfished  stocks  will  be  impeded  through  a 
failure to improve selectivity in fisheries for these stocks. This will result in significant 
cuts in fishing opportunities for these stocks and in the Mediterranean, where there are 
no fishing opportunities, reductions in fishing effort or additional technical measures.  
  Levels  of  unwanted  catches  will  remain  high  in  many  mixed  fisheries.  Economic 
viability  will  be  threatened  because  under  the  landing  obligation  those  unwanted 
catches  would  have  to  be  landed  for  non-human  consumption  purposes  and  counted 
against quota. Quotas are likely to be exhausted faster and vessels would risk having 
to  tie-up  earlier  in  the  year  even  allowing  for  the  flexibility  mechanisms66  included 
under  the  CFP  (i.e.  De  minimis,  high  survivability  and  quota  flexibilities)  that  will 
alleviate some of these problems. 

  The  adoption  of  nature  conservation  measures  will  continue  to  be  a  slow  process. 
Delays  in  enacting  such  measures will  likely  result  in  damaging  or  even  irreversible 
impacts on sensitive species and habitats and threatened the attainment of GES under 
the MSFD. 

  The  current  regulatory  structure  will  not  create  any  new  incentive  for  fishermen  to 
improve selectivity. Any new measures introduced will continue to be mostly coercive 
that add new rules or impose increases in selectivity that lead to economic losses. 
  Regionalisation  of  technical  measures  would  be  possible  through  discard  plans  and 
multiannual  plans  but  is  likely  to  only  add  on  new  rules  that  derogate  from  existing 
technical  rules  where  applicable  rather  than  simplify  or  introduce  opportunities  for 
adaptive  management.  The  Advisory  Councils  as 
in 
regionalisation are unlikely to engage openly with such an approach. 

the  key  stakeholder 

  The strong focus on control of technical measure in situ and the inflexible framework 
based  on  low  regional  specificity  and  acceptability  will  continue  to  undermine  cost 
efficiency.  

4.9. 

Necessity and subsidiarity 

According  to  Article  3(1d)  of  the  TFEU,  the  Union  shall  have  exclusive  competence  in  the 
conservation  of  marine  biological  resources  under  the  CFP.  Other  aspects  of  fisheries  are, 
under  Article  4(2d)  of  the  TFEU,  share  competences  between  the  Union  and  the  Member 
States.  Article  43(2)  of  the  TFEU  establishes  the  Union’s  power  to  adopt  the  provisions 
necessary  for  the  pursuit  of  the  objectives  of  the  CFP.  As  technical  measures  relate  to  the 
conservation  of  marine  biological  resources  under  the  CFP  (i.e.  the  Union  has  exclusive 
competence)  there  is  no  need  therefore  necessarily  to  justify  measures  with  regards  to  the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 

Under regionalisation the role of the co-legislators will change fundamentally. Focus will be 
much more on setting the objectives and targets centrally for managing fisheries, leaving the 
detailed rules needed to achieve these objectives to be set regionally by Member States and 
stakeholders.  This  has  added  value  in  that  the  role  of  the  co-legislator  in  agreeing  detailed 
technical measures has often been criticised by stakeholders. The catching sector believe the 
measures  finally agreed usually lead to  economic losses  and are unrealistic and impractical, 
while NGOs claim the measures are often diluted during the political process rendering them 
ineffective. Leaving the definition of technical rules to the regional level has added value in 
giving certain legitimacy in the eyes of stakeholders. 

22 

 
 
5. 

OBJECTIVES 

5.1. 

General objectives 

As  tools  to  support  the  implementation  of  the  CFP,  the  general  objectives  of  technical 
measures are to contribute to: 

–  the  bringing  of  all  European  fish  stocks  to  a  state  where  they  can  produce  the 

Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) by 2015 or 2020 at the latest; 

–  the reduction of unwanted catches and elimination of discards in fisheries subject to 

catch limits by 2019; and 

–  the achievement of Good Environmental Status (GES) by 2020, as established under 

the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD). 

In achieving these general objectives the regulation of technical measures should be guided by 
the principles of good governance set out in Article 3 of the CFP. In particular point (b) which 
expresses  the  need  to  take  account  of  "regional  specificities,  through  a  regionalised 
approach"  and  point  (f)  which  states  that  "appropriate  involvement  of  stakeholders,  in 
particular  Advisory  Councils,  at  all  stages  –  from  conception  to  implementation  of  the 
measures" are important. 

5.2. 

Specific and operational objectives 

In  order  to  achieve  these  general  objectives  and  address  the  main  problems  identified  a 
number of specific and operational objectives can be defined. 

Specific objectives 

Develop a regulatory structure for technical measures that: 

–  leads to an improvement in the effectiveness of technical measures; 

–  defines clear objectives, targets and success criteria for technical measures; 

–  eliminates over-regulation and simplifies the current technical measures;  

–  creates  a  more  flexible  legal  framework  and  acts  as  a  vehicle  for  regionalisation  of 

technical measures; and 

–  promotes a transparent and participatory approach to the definition and specification 

of technical measures. 

Operational Objectives 

The  following  operational  objectives  will  contribute  to  the  achievement  of  these  specific 
objectives:  

–  Establish incentive structures linked to the added flexibility offered by regionalisation 
and rewarding of "responsible fishing" in line with Article 1730 of the CFP that will 
deliver improvements in the effectiveness of technical measures; 

–  Establish  targets  for  the  reduction  of  unwanted  catches  and  for  the  reduction  of  the 
negative  impacts  of  fishing  on  marine  ecosystems  that  can  be  achieve  through 
technical measures; 

–  Establish  indicators to measure the success of technical measures in achieving these 

defined targets respecting the timelines contained in the CFP; 

23 

 
 
–  Delete redundant rules and simplify other rules from the 31 regulations that currently 
contain technical measures to make them understandable and controllable in line with 
the Commission's REFIT programme2; 

–  Manage the transition to regionlisation in the period up to 2020 by defining baseline 
standards  based  on  current  exploitation  patterns  and  consolidate  measures  that  will 
apply pending the development of regionalised plans;  

–  Establish  the  necessary  legal  architecture  to  allow  deviation  from  these  baseline 
standards  and  provide  for  the  development  of  alternative  measures  to  achieve  the 
overarching objectives under regionalisation; and 

–  Establish  linkages  with  the  CFP  to  allow  for  stakeholder  involvement  in  the 

development of technical measures at the regional level. 

24 

 
 
Figure 5.2.1 illustrates the problem tree with the links between problems, the drivers and the 
objectives. 

Figure 5.2.1 Problem tree with the links between problems, their drivers and the objectives 

6. 

CONSISTENCY WITH OTHER EU POLICIES 

Two of the specific objectives contained in the CFP are to:  

–  Implement  the  ecosystem-based  approach  to  fisheries  management  so  as  to  ensure 
that negative impacts of fishing activities are minimised (Article 2 paragraph 3); and 

–  Ensure coherence with Union environmental legislation (Article 2 paragraph 5(j)). 

25 

 
 
 
Given  that  implementation  of  the  MSFD  is  a  legal  requirement  under  the  Treaty,  dedicated 
measures  to  reach  GES  for  marine  resources  are  implicitly  required  in  compliance  with  the 
Directive. Technical measures, as tools to support the implementation of the CFP consitute an 
important element in achieving this objective.  

Technical measures must also be coherent with other Union enviromental legislation notably 
the Birds28 and the Habitats Directives29. The full implementation of these Directives is part 
of the EU’s response to its commitments under the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, 
and  is  reinforced  by  the  commitment  made  by  EU  Heads  of  State  "to  halt  the  loss  of 
biodiversity [in  the EU] by 2010"; it is  further reiterated  in the EU Biodiversity Strategy to 
202067. 
Technical  measures  have  also  the  potential  to  contribute  to  the  Europe  2020  strategy68,  in 
particular  its  resource  efficiency  flagship  initiative  through  better  use  of  fish  stocks.  In 
addition, the reform of technical measures will contribute to the REFIT programme2 through 
the simplification and deletion of a number of existing regulations and specific measures. 

7. 

POLICY OPTIONS  

7.1. 

Selection of policy options 

A screening of different policy options has led to the identification of a number of options that 
are  most  likely  to  meet  the  objectives  and  address  the  problems  identified  in  section  4.  An 
initial evaluation indicated that improving flexibility and creating incentive structures within 
the CFP to achieve improvements in the general effectiveness should be the focus rather than 
making wholesale changes to the measures themselves. This is for three reasons: 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

Previous attempts in 200254 and 200855 made to introduce changes to the structure and 
the  substance  of  the  regulations  failed  to  reach  political  agreement.  Member  States 
strongly argued that such changes would lead to negative socio-economic impacts on 
different fleets.  

Regionalised  decision-making  was  introduced  into  the  CFP  by  the  co-legislators  to 
avoid  having  to  make  frequent  changes  to  the  substance  of  technical  measures 
contained  in  co-decided  acts.  Making  changes  to  the  substance  under  this  initiative 
would go against this philosophy.  

The  stakeholder  consultations  showed  that  changing  the  substance  of  the  technical 
measures was clearly not an option preferred by the key stakeholders (i.e. the catching 
sector  and  the  Advisory  Councils)  or  the  Member  States.  Adapting  the  regulatory 
structure and simplifying the rules should be the key objectives.  

As  a  result  of  this  initial  evaluation,  three  policy  options  with  one  sub-option  have  been 
considered against the baseline scenario. It was decided that the policy options defined would 
cover all sea basins except non-Union waters, where technical measures would continue to be 
part  of  international  agreements  with  the  measures  emanating  from  these  agreements. 
Regionalisation is not applicable in non-Union waters. 

7.2. 

Baseline scenario 

The  current  regulatory  architecture  of  the  technical  measures  would  be  retained:  a  'web'  of 
regulations with the CFP as the central element, elaborated in a series of technical and other 
conservation regulations surrounding the CFP Regulation. See Figure 3.3.1. 

The  prescriptive,  means-oriented  architecture  without  clear  expected  outcomes  or  results 
would  be  retained.  The  Regulations  would  include  recent  adjustments  that  remove  legal 
contradictions  with  new  obligations  under  the  new  CFP  (as  described  in  Section  4.8),  in 

26 

 
 
particular the landing obligation and that all of the existing Regulations on technical measures 
would  be  aligned  with  the  TFEU  concerning  establishment  of  current  Commission 
empowerments under delegated or implementing Acts. Changes to the principle regulations in 
the northeast Atlantic, Baltic and Mediterranean would continue to be under co-decision.  

Flexibility would mainly be through the existing mechanisms and empowerments included in 
the current regulations (i.e. detailed rules to define gears, national measures or measures for 
stocks of immediate conservation concern).  

Regionalisation  would  be  possible  through  the  mechanisms  set  out  in  the  CFP  (i.e. 
multiannual  plans,  discard  plans  and  Article  11  for  nature  conservation  measures  within 
Natura 2000 Sites) but would be very much "piece meal" and essentially limited to adding on 
new  rules  at  the  regional  level  that  derogate  from  existing  measures,  simply  expanding  the 
'web' of regulations further. 

Figure 6.2.1 illustrates the regulatory structure for technical measures under this option. 

Emergency Measures 
Commission Acts 

Rules defining the 
specifications of gears 
Commission Acts 

Multiple Technical Measures regulations 

(Co-decided Regulations and 
Commission Acts) 

National measures 
or management 
plans 

Fishing 
opportunities 
Regulations 

(Council  only) 

Nature Conservation 
Measures 
 Commission Acts under 
Article 11 of  the CFP 

Multiannual Plans 
Framework  
Co-decided Act under 
Article 10 of the CFP  

Temporary Discard 
Plans 
Commission Acts under 
Article 15(6) of the CFP 

Stakeholder opinion 

Regionalised Technical Measures  
Commission Acts on the basis of joint recommendations from MS & AC 

Figure 6.2.1: Regulatory Structure under Baseline Scenario 
(Flexibility mainly provided through national measures and specific empowerments as well as to a limited 
extent under annual fishing opportunities regulations. Regionalisation is an alternative) 
(Source: Author) 

In the public consultation9 there was no support for maintaining the current situation from the 
catching sector, the Member States or the NGOs. The catching sector gave a clear message 
that the complexity of the current regulations and their multiple amendments should serve as 
an example of "what not to do". Respondents from the national administrations and control 
agencies of the Member States pointed to enforcement issues with the current regulations (e.g. 
measuring twine thickness has proved problematic as the measuring instrument used is highly 
subjective).  The  NGOs  highlighted  the  lack  of  compliance  as  a  major  weakness  (e.g.  the 
illegal  landing  of  undersize  fish).  Member  States  and  the  catching  sector  also  pointed  to  a 
range  of  unintended  consequences  that  have  in  fact  forced  fishermen  to  discard  and  run 

27 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
counter to the principal objective of the measures (i.e. to protect juveniles and minimise the 
impacts of fishing on the ecosystem) although some of these unintended consequences have 
been resolved through the omnibus regulation.  

7.3. 

Option 1: Consolidation  

This option implies a minor change in the governance structure and limited adaptation of the 
rules to the requirements of the CFP and to new conditions as they evolve.  

It would involve a proposal for a new Regulation with a limited scope: to bring together and 
consolidate  in  one  Regulation  (under  co-decision)  the  common  rules  for  all  fisheries  in  all 
areas  (for  instance  generic  prohibitions  of  a  certain  fishing  method)  as  well  as  introducing 
specific  objectives  for  technical  measures  and  specific  targets  to  be  used  for  measuring 
success. The common rules would be considered as de facto permanent as there is no need or 
justification  for  changing  them  and  would  be  separated  from  regionally  specific  rules  (with 
potential for regionalisation). The latter regionally specific technical rules (the large majority 
of them) would remain in place in the existing regulations. These measures would constitute 
the baseline standards. This consolidation should take account of any recent amendments or 
changes to the regulations under the omnibus regulation, emergency measures taken to protect 
certain stocks (e.g. measures taken for sea bass) as well as alignment of the regulations with 
the TFEU 

Splitting these measures into those that are common and those that are regionally specific is 
straightforward as it follows from the existing regulations (i.e. it is clear from the regulations 
which are common and which are regionally specific). Table 6.3.1 shows this differentiation. 

Common Rules 

Regionally Rules 

Prohibited  fishing  gears  and  practices  –  e.g.  fishing 
with explosives or poisons 

Restrictions  on  fishing  gears  and  conditions  for  their 
use – e.g. common rules governing the construction of 
gears  such  as  twine  thickness,  the  circumference  of 
codends or size of gears allowed to be used 
Measurement  of  minimum  conservation  reference 
sizes  –  how  to  measure  mcrs  for  different  organisms 
and the treatment of marine organisms below mcrs 
Common  measures  to  reduce  discarding  in  where  the 
landing  obligation  does  not  apply  –  high-grading  and 
slipping 
Conducting  scientific  research  –  derogation  allowing 
scientific  research  for  gears  not  complying  with  the 
common  rules  and  the  permissible  uses  for  catches 
made during scientific research of selective gears 
Restocking  and  transplantation  -  general  derogation 
from the common rules to allow these practices 
On board processing - prohibition of certain processing 
on board fishing vessels 

 Mesh  sizes  –  mesh  sizes  linked  to  target  species  or 
groups  of  species  that  can  be  used  in  different  sea 
basins 
Closed  or  restricted  area    to  protect  juveniles  or 
pawning aggregations 

Minimum  conservation  reference  sizes  –  setting  sizes 
for marine organisms to apply in different sea basins 

Nature conservation measures – closed areas to protect 
sensitive  habitats  and  mitigation  measures  to  reduce 
capture of sensitive species 
Other  specific  derogations  or  restrictions  on  the 
operation  of  gears  and  conditions  for  their  use    - 
allowance to use electric pulse trawls in the North Sea 
or restrictions on the use of gillnets below 600m in the 
North eat Atlantic 

Table 6.3.1 Differentiation of common and regional specific measures 
(Source Author) 

As with  the baseline  scenario,  flexibility would be  mainly  through the existing mechanisms 
contained  in  the  Regulations.  Regionalisation  of  technical  measures  would  be  possible 
through discard plans adopted by the Commission as Delegated Acts, and through Delegated 
Acts  adopted  by  the  Commission  on  the  basis  of  the  new  multiannual  plans  adopted  in  co-
decision  in  the  longer-term.  These  would  provide  an  additional  opportunity  for  introducing 
flexibility  but  would  be  very  much  a  means  to  introduce  additional  rules  or  derogate  from 
existing rules rather than incentive-based with opportunities for adaptive management.  

28 

 
 
Regionalisation  would  happen  if  and  where  the  Member  States  decided  to  submit  joint 
recommendations for discard plans with technical measures included in the short-term. These 
changes, once incorporated into Delegated Acts by the Commission, would derogate from the 
existing body of rules for a maximum duration of 3 years. After that period, maintaining these 
derogations in place would require the adoption of Delegated Acts that are adopted by virtue 
of an EU multiannual plan that would ultimately replace these temporary plans. In light of the 
existing  need  for  flexibility  and  adaptation  of  rules  for  a  successful  implementation  of  the 
CFP,  this  option  requires  to  a  certain  degree  a  speedy  adoption  of  discard  plans  and  in  the 
longer-term multiannual plans. As with the baseline scenario, technical measures relating to 
nature conservation measures could similarly be adopted under Article 11. 

Figure 6.3.1 illustrates the regulatory for technical measures under this option.  

Emergency Measures 
Commission Acts 

Rules defining the 
specifications of gears 
Commission Acts 

Common Rules   
Consolidated into a single Co-decided 
Regulations 

National measures 
or national 
management plans 

Fishing 
opportunities 
Regulations 

(Council  only) 

Regional Rules -  
Remain  under multiple Co-decided Regulations  & Commission Acts 

Nature Conservation 
Measures 
 Commission Acts under 
Article 11 of  the CFP 

Multiannual Plans 
Framework  
Co-decided Act under 
Article 10 of the CFP  

Temporary Discard 
Plans 
Commission Acts under 
Article 15(6) of the CFP 

Regionalised Technical Measures  
Commission Acts on the basis of joint recommendations from MS & AC 
(Derogations from existing regional rules) 

Figure 6.3.1: Regulatory Structure of Option 1 
(Flexibility mainly provided through national measures and specific empowerments as well as to a limited 
extent under annual fishing opportunities regulations. Regionalisation is an alternative) 
(Source: Author) 

Stakeholder opinion 
In the public consultation9 there was little support for this approach from Member States, the 
catching  sector  or  the  Advisory  Councils.  They  very  much  saw  this  as  a  re-working  of  the 
proposal  tabled  in  2008  by  the  Commission.  Most  advocated  a  complete  overhaul  of  the 
regulatory  structure  of  technical  measures  rather  than  a  simple  consolidation  that  does  not 
depart too much from the status quo or link directly to regionalisation. They shared the view 
that simplification and flexibility cannot be achieved by maintaining the majority of technical 

29 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
measures under ordinary legislative procedure even in the short-term. It is too cumbersome a 
process  to  be  able  to  react  to  changes  in  fisheries.  Nonetheless  it  carries  a  low-risk  in  the 
short-term that the current situation will not deteriorate further. It also provides potential for 
improvement  in  the longer-term  through  regionalisation and introduction  of  clear  objectives 
and success indicators in the form of targets relating to the level of unwanted catches (linked 
to  the  landing  obligation),  thresholds  for  incidental  catches  of  sensitive  species  such  as 
cetaceans  and  seabirds  and  reductions  in  the  impact  of  fishing  gears  on  the  seabed.  These 
latter targets relate to the achievement of good environmental status under the MSFD. 

7.4. 

Option 2: Framework Approach 

This option implies a more radical change in the governance structure of technical measures 
involving  the  bringing  to  together  of  technical  measures  into  one  regulation  rather  than 
maintaining  the  multiple  regulations  that  currently  exist.  It  entails  a  proposal  for  a  new 
framework Regulation with the following structure: 

  General  Provisions  –  Scope,  overarching  objectives,  principles  of  good  governance 
success  indicators  in  the  form  of  concrete  targets  as  defined  for  option  1  and 
definitions.  The  definitions  relate  primarily  to  the  definition  of  fishing  gears  and 
fishing operations and are common to all regions.  

  Technical  Provisions  –  Common  rules  currently  contained  in  all  of  the  primary 
technical  measures  regulations  but  applicable  to  all  sea  basins  and  considered  as  de 
facto permanent as there is no need or justification for changing them. These are the 
same rules outlined under option 1 (see table 6.3.1). 

  Nature  Conservation  Measures  –  A  mixture  of  common  rules  across  sea  basins  and 
considered as  de  facto  permanent  (e.g.  obligation  to  return  incidental catches  of  rare 
fish species to the sea immediately) and regionally specific closed or restricted areas 
to protect NATURA 2000 sites. 

  Baseline Measures by region – Existing regionally specific measures contained in the 
current regulations that would apply in the absence of plans regionally. These would 
be  baseline  mesh  sizes,  minimum  conservation  reference  sizes,  closed  or  restricted 
areas  to  protect  juvenile  and  spawning  areas  and  any  other  regionally  specific 
measures.  Further  detail  on  the  baselines  and  the  criteria  for  their  establishment 
including the basis for deleting redundant measures is provided in Annex X. 

  Regionalisation  –  Empowerments  for  regionalisation  from  the  baseline  mesh  sizes 
(e.g.  different  gear  options  that  give  the  same  result  as  the  baselines  in  terms  of 
selectivity),  changing  minimum  conservation  reference  sizes,  amending  or  deleting 
existing closed areas or adding new closures and creation of other specific measures 
needed for the regions to meet the overarching objectives. 

Most  of  the  existing  regulations  would  be  repealed  and/or  rationalised.  It  would  recast  the 
structure  (one  regulation  instead  of  the  numerous  regulations  in  place)  and  it  would  give  a 
new  orientation  to  technical  measures  (clear  standards,  results  orientation  instead  of 
prescriptive  top-down  approach  with  a  large  number  of  derogations)  with  regionalisation 
being  the  main  tool  to  provide  flexibility.  At  the  same  time,  it  would  safeguard  existing 
technical  measures  from  being  eliminated  overnight  –  which  would  jeopardise  the 
achievement  of  the  objectives  of  the  CFP.  The  existing  empowerments  relating  to  the 
definition  of  gears  deemed  necessary  and  national  measures  would  be  retained  (i.e.  those 
linked to measures that will remain in the framework regulation).  

The  baselines  and  default  technical  measures  that  correspond  to  these  objectives  would  be 
applicable unless and until regionalised measures are designed and introduced into Union law 
(by the Commission through Delegated Acts). Where no regionalised action is developed, the 
baseline would continue to function as a default rule. Over time the importance of the default 

30 

 
 
measures  would  diminish  and  the  weight  of  regionalised  measures  will  increase,  as 
multiannual plans are developed across the sea basins. 

Member  States  would  have  options  in  choosing  to  move  further  away  from  more  rigid 
technical  rules  (the  default  measures)  and  to  move  to  a  more  flexible,  results-based 
management approach to meet the projected results and objectives of a plan. As with the other 
options,  nature  conservation  measures  relating  to  Natura  2000  sites  could  be  adopted  under 
regionalisation.  The  baselines  would  be  used  to  introduce  an  empowerment  for  the 
Commission  to  adopt  Delegated  Acts  based  on  joint  recommendations  from  the  Member 
States containing detailed technical measures as part of multiannual plans or in the absence of 
such plans, temporary discard plans.  

This  option would allow a smooth  transition from technical measures as  a separate body of 
measures to a situation with multiannual plans that integrate technical measures as one of the 
management tools for a fishery in a region. The temporary discard plans would form a stop-
gap and allow for a level of flexibility while multiannual plans are developed.  

Figure 6.4.1 illustrates the regulatory structure under this option. 

Rules defining the 
specifications of 
gears (Commission 
Acts) 

Technical Measures Framework  
Co-decided Regulation   

National Measures  
or national 
management plans 

Fishing 
opportunities 
Regulations 
(Council  only) 

Nature Conservation 
Measures 
Adopted as Commission 
Acts under Article 11 of 
the CFP 
) 

Multiannual Plans 
Framework adopted under 
Article 10 of the CFP as co-
decided act 

Temporary Discard Plans 
Adopted as Commission 
Acts under Article 15(6) of 
the CFP 

Regionalised Technical Measures  
Adopted as Commission Acts on the basis of joint recommendations from MS & AC 

Figure 6.4.1: Regulatory Structure of Option 2 
(Focus is on regioanlisation of technical measures. Flexibility provided through national measures and 
specific empowerments relating to definition of gears and to a limited extent through the fishing 
opportunities regulations) 
(Source: Author) 

Stakeholder opinion 
The public consultation9 showed that the catching sector, Member States and NGOs favoured 
a framework approach, covering all sea basins. There were divergent views on the content of 
the  framework.  Some  of  the  industry  groups  (Europeche  and  EAPO),  while  accepting  the 
merit  of  a  framework,  advocated  a  minimalistic  approach  with  few  (if  any)  rules  under  the 
framework  and  any  detailed  rules  that  are  required  to  be  developed  at  regional  level. 
Particularly they queried the need for baseline measures (mesh sizes, mcrs or closed areas) to 
be  included  in  the  framework.  The  NGOs  highlighted  the  strong  need  for  some  high-level 
overarching objectives and minimum common standards that should apply across the EU to 

31 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ensure no gaps in management occur. Simplification should not happen at the expense of the 
environmental protection. Many NGOs also advocated the inclusion of safeguards to react to 
emerging  conservation  problems.  Most  Member  States  and  the  AC  agreed  on  a  framework 
type approach with baseline measures but highlighted the importance of simplifying the rules 
while  insisting  on  maintaining  a  level  playing  field.  They  accepted  this  will  result  in  some 
rules (e.g. existing closed areas) remaining under co-decision. 

7.4.1. 

Sub-option 2.1 – Framework Approach without baselines 

Given  certain  sectors  of  the  catching  sector  queried  the  need  for  the  baseline  measures,  a 
possible sub-option of option 2 – Sub-option 2.1 - is also considered.  

As  with  Option  2,  the  general  provisions,  objectives,  targets,  technical  provisions,  nature 
conservation  measures  and  empowerment  for  regionalisation  would  be  maintained.  These 
empowerments  would  allow  for  the  establishment  of  measures  that  regulate  the  design  and 
operation  of  fishing  gears,  closed  areas,  minimum  conservation  reference  sizes  and  other 
specific  measures  required  regionally  to  meet  the  objective  of  the  CFP  through  Delegated 
Acts as part of the discard and multiannual plans. However, the baseline measures relating to 
mesh  sizes,  minimum  conservation  reference  sizes  and  closed  areas  defined  in  Option  2 
would be omitted. 

In effect, this is a results-based approach. The framework regulation would constitute a basic 
set  of  rules  and  overarching  objectives  as  well  as  essential  nature  conservation  measures 
relating to prohibitions of fishing for certain species or with certain gears and closed areas for 
the protection of sensitive habitats. As under option 2, any detailed measures required would 
be developed regionally under discard plans in the short-term or through multiannual plans in 
the longer-term and nature conservation measures relating to Natura 2000 sites adopted under 
Article 11 of the CFP. .  

This option relies on multiannual plans being developed swiftly and in the intervening period 
detailed technical measures included in temporary discard plans to ensure the objectives of the 
CFP would be met.  

7.5. 

Option 3: Elimination of technical measures 

This option is similar to sub-option 2.1. It assumes that the objectives of the CFP (e.g. MSY, 
landing  obligation  and  GES)  are  result-driven  measures  and  as  such  will  lead  to  clean 
fisheries. They would thus provide enough incentives for fishermen in the short-term to fish 
selectively  and  to  adapt  fishing  strategies  that  avoid  and  reduce  unwanted  catches.  Under 
these assumptions, in this  option there is  no need for most of the  existing technical rules in 
EU legislation (other than some very basic notions already expressed in the CFP Regulation). 

This  option  would  imply  repealing  all  of  the  existing  technical  measures  regulations 
immediately  with  the  exception  of  essential  nature  conservation  measures  relating  to 
protection  for  sensitive  habitats  and  species.  Progress  in  reaching  the  objectives  of the  CFP 
and, MSFD in the case of GES, would be used to assess effectiveness but there would be no 
defined  objectives  or  targets  specifically  for  technical  measures.  These  would  be  defined  in 
the multiannual plans. 

It  would  be  based  on  an  identified  and  agreed  result  (minimise  unwanted  catches,  clean 
fisheries) and it would provide maximum flexibility for fishermen individually, and also for 
Member States to decide regionally what technical rules, if any, are required. Any technical 
measures needed in the longer term would be developed regionally under multiannual plans 
(with  the  possibility  of  temporarily  incorporating  technical  measures into  discard  plans  as  a 
short-term option). Technical measures relating to Natura 2000 sites could be adopted under 
Article 11 of the CFP as with the other options. 

32 

 
 
In  effect,  the  development  of  new  technical  measures  would  start  from  scratch,  under  the 
assumption  that  the  fishermen  and  Member  States  respond  to  the  CFP  with  the  adequate 
actions  and  measures  –  simply  effectuated  by  fishermen  themselves  in  their  daily  fishing 
practice,  or  where  considered  necessary  and  to  a  limited  extent  deposited  in  regionally 
decided measures. 

This approach would represent a complete change in governance. It would imply a shift in the 
burden  of  proof  to  fishermen  and  Member  States  to  document  that  they  are  meeting  the 
general objectives and agreed results of the CFP and specific objectives and results identified 
in  multiannual  plans.  It  would  be  entirely  dependent  on  significant  change  of  behaviour  of 
fishermen  and  it  would  strongly  rely  on  peer  pressure  and  self-regulation  to  ensure  that 
unselective fishing does not prevail and clean fishing becomes the daily norm.  

Figure 6.5.1 illustrates the regulatory structure under this option. 

Nature Conservation 
Measures 
 Commission Acts under 
Article 11 of the CFP 

Multiannual Plans 
Framework Co-decided acts 
under Article 10 of the CFP 

Temporary Discard Plans 
Commission Acts under 
Article 15(6) of the CFP) 

Regionalised Technical Measures 
Commission Acts on the basis of joint recommendations from MS & AC 

Figure 6.5.1: Regulatory Structure of Option 3 
(Flexibility through de-regulation and regionalisation)  
(Source: Author) 

Stakeholder opinion 

This  approach  was  advocated  by  some  of  the  catching  sector  (representatives  of 
EUROPECHE,  EAPO  and  LIFE)  who  did  not  see  the  need  for  a  framework  regulation9  or 
only  a  very limited one.  With the landing obligation, in  particular, as  a driver  for improved 
selectivity they suggested it should be possible to repeal immediately the vast majority of the 
existing  regulations.  Other  parts  of  the  catching  sector  including  several  of  the  ACs  (North 
Sea and Mediterranean) did not agree that this was an approach that could be followed in the 
short-term, seeing the need for some rules while regionalisation evolves. Member States and 
NGOs were similarly negative about this option as a short-term option as they considered it 
risky. They saw de-regulation or partial de-regulation of technical measures as an objective to 
work towards in the longer-term.  

7.6. 

Summary of policy options 

Table  7.6.1  summarises  the  structure,  content,  mechanisms  for  regionalisation  and  level  of 
2.1.
simplification 

sub-option 

options 

policy 

each 

and 

the 

for 

of 

33 

 
 
 
Baseline Scenario 

Option 1 

Option 2 

Sub-option 2.1 

Option 3 

Structure 

All 
existing 
remain in place 

regulations 

Consolidation  of  common 
rules  under  one  regulation. 
regulations 
All 
containing 
rules 
remain in place. 

regional 

other 

Most  of 
the  existing 
regulations  would  be 
partially 
or 
totally 
immediately. 
repealed 
Only 
essential  nature 
conservation  measures 
(protection  of  sensitive 
species) 
and 
habitats 
would  be  maintained  in 
the existing regulations.  

Only  nature  conservation 
measures  would  remain 
in place 

Existing  measures  brought 
together into one framework 
regulation  with  a  set  of 
regionally  specific  annexes 
containing 
baseline 
measures 

Same  as  option  2  except 
the framework would not 
regional 
the 
contain 
annexes 

Clear  objective  linked  to 
targets would be defined. 
Common 
provisions 
would be maintained and 
empowerments 
specific 
to 
for 
allow 
regionalisation  would  be 
included 

Clear  objective  linked  to 
targets  would  be  defined. 
Common  provisions  would 
be  maintained  and  specific 
empowerments  to  allow  for 
regionalisation  would  be 
included. 
existing 
The 
technical  measures  would 
retained  as  baseline 
be 
the  regional 
measures 
in 
annexes 
the 
absence 
regional 
measures being in place. 

to  apply 
of 

in 

change 

other 
adjustment 

than 
No 
technical 
to 
remove  legal  inconsistences 
and 
the  
alignment  with 
TFEU 

adaptation 

adjustment 

and 
Limited 
consolidation  of  the  rules  to 
the requirements of the CFP. 
Technical 
to 
remove  legal  inconsistences 
and  alignment  with 
the 
regionally 
TFEU. 
specific 
would 
constitute 
baseline 
standards 

rules 
the 

The 

Content 

Regionalisation 

As baseline scenario 

Possible 
discard 
through 
plans,  multiannual  plans  and 
Article  11  for  environmental 
measures.  Limited  to  adding 
new 
that  would 
derogate  from  existing  rules. 
No  specific  driver  or  linkage 
to  regionalisation  other  than 
what is in the CFP. 

rules 

11 

Possible 
through  discard 
plans, multiannual plans and 
Article 
for 
environmental  measures. 
Specific 
empowerments 
allowing  for  regionalisation 
from  the  baseline  technical 
measures  included  in  the 
framework.  Measures  could 
be  amended  or  derogate  or 
entirely.  New 
deleted 

34 

11 

Possible  through  discard 
plans,  multiannual  plans 
and  Article 
for 
environmental  measures. 
Empowerments  allowing 
for  the  development  of 
technical 
specific 
regional 
measures 
the 
in 
level 
framework 

included 

at 

11 

Possible  through  discard 
plans,  multiannual  plans 
and  Article 
for 
environmental  measures. 
Empowerments  allowing 
for  the  development  of 
technical 
specific 
regional 
measures 
the 
in 
level 
plans 

included 

at 

 
 
 
Simplification 

All 
existing 
remain in place 

regulations 

from 
Common  provisions 
Regulations 
(EC)  850/98, 
2187/2005  and  1967/2006 
would  be  moved  into  one 
new  regulation.  Regionally 
specific 
  measures  would 
remain  in  these  regulations 
and  all  other 
regionally 
specific  measures  contained 
in  Council  and  Commission 
regulations  would  remain  in 
place 

measures  could  also  be 
introduced. 

be 

would 

Regulations 
(EC)  850/98 
and  2187/2005  would  be 
repealed.  Regulation  (EC) 
be 
1967/2005 
partially 
repealed. 
Supporting regulations (EC) 
894/97, 
254/2002, 
2549/2000  and  812/2004 
would 
repealed. 
Regulations  1098/2007  and 
would 
1224/2009 
be 
Commission 
amended. 
(EC) 
Regulations 
3440/86, 
2056/2001, 
1922/1999, 
494/2002, 
727/2012, 
2549/200, 
636/2010,  724/2010  would 
be  repealed.  The  provisions 
from all of these regulations 
where  required  would    be 
incorporated  into  the  new 
framework regulation 

Regulations  (EC)  850/98 
and  2187/2005  would  be 
Regulation 
repealed. 
(EC)  1967/2005  would 
repealed. 
be  partially 
Regulations 
(EC) 
894/97, 
254/2002, 
2549/2000  and  812/2004 
repealed. 
would 
be 
Regulations 
1098/2007 
and  1224/2009  would  be 
amended.  Commission 
Regulations 
(EC) 
3440/86, 
2056/2001, 
494/2002, 
1922/1999, 
727/2012, 
2549/200, 
724/2010 
636/2010, 
would 
repealed 
be 
entirely.  The  common 
provisions  from  all  of 
these  regulations  where 
required 
be 
incorporated into the new 
framework 
regulation. 
The  regionally  specific 
measures  would 
be 
repealed. 

would 

Regulations  (EC)  850/98 
and  2187/2005  would  be 
for 
except 
repealed 
conservation 
nature 
measures  contained 
in 
regulations. 
these 
(EC) 
Regulation 
1967/2005  would 
be 
partially  repealed  except 
for 
non-technical 
measures  provisions  and 
any  nature  conservation 
measures  contained 
in 
Regulation. 
this 
Regulations 
(EC) 
254/2002, and 2549/2000 
repealed. 
would 
be 
Regulations 
1098/2007 
and  1224/2009  would  be 
amended.  Commission 
(EC) 
Regulations 
2056/2001, 
3440/86, 
494/2002, 
1922/1999, 
727/2012, 
2549/200, 
724/2010 
636/2010, 
would 
repealed 
entirely 

be 

Table 7.6.1 Summary of structure, content, mechanisms for regionalisation and level of simplification 

(Source: Author) 

35 

 
 
8. 

ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS 

8.1.  Methodology 

The  following  sections  present  an  analysis  of  the  potential  impacts  of  the  different  policy 
options  described  on  the  key  stakeholders  identified  in  section  4.5.  The  impacts  on  other 
stakeholder groups indirectly are also indicated where relevant.  

The different options largely present different governance structures for the specification and 
implementation  of  technical  measures.  Changes  to  the  substance  are  primarily  restricted  to 
deletion  or  simplification  of  existing  measures  or  the  establishment  of  baselines  based  on 
existing rules.  

Regionalisation  is  a  new  concept  and  other  than  the  first  discard  plans  adopted  earlier  this 
year  there  is  little  experience  as  to  what  impact  it  will  actually  have.  Therefore  how  the 
different governance options, and the possibilities they provide for specification of different 
technical measures under regionalisation, might actually translate under the different options 
is based on the limited experience of regionalisation to date. 

Determining or disentangling whether, and to what extent, a specific technical measure such 
as a closed area or a mesh size would impact on a particular stock, compared to an output type 
measure  such  as  quota  management,  which  may  also  be  in  place  for  the  same  stock,  is 
challenging. Isolating the costs of enforcing technical rules is similarly not straightforward as 
monitoring tends to be carried out as part of routine inspections monitoring a range of rules 
including checking for valid fishing licences and catch reporting.  

For  this  reason  the  analysis  is  based  on  a  qualitative  assessment  of  the  impacts,  supported 
with  an  evaluation  of  the  likely  risks  of  the  different  options  (section  8.3).  It  describes  the 
potential  expected  direction  of  change  (i.e.  will  the  situation  deteriorate,  stay  the  same,  or 
improve  under  the  different  options).  The  assessment  of  environmental  impacts  and  related 
indicators  such  as  stock  status,  a  monetisation  of  economic  impacts,  and  a  numerical 
assessment  of  social  impacts  in  terms  of  jobs,  is  qualitative  and  largely  based  on  specific 
examples or case studies. The impacts of the policy options considered in the IA to support 
the CFP19 remain valid and where relevant are used to support the analysis. 

The options are assessed in terms of the short-term impacts up to 2019 corresponding to the 
full implementation of the landing obligation and in the longer-term covering the period up to 
2022 and beyond when the CFP is due to be reviewed69. 

The key impacts considered are: 

Economic impacts 

Economic  sustainability  is  assessed  using  as  indicators  the  contribution  that  technical 
measures under the different options can make to reaching the MSY objective and to reducing 
unwanted catches under the landing obligation. Economically these two core elements of the 
CFP will have a huge bearing on future economic viability in terms of growth and investment, 
sectoral competitiveness and also providing stability for SMEs. The costs for the adaptation of 
gears to adjust to any new approach to technical measures is also considered along with the 
likley impacts of the different options on the competitveness of the catching sector.  

Social impact 

Social  sustainability  is  assessed  in  terms  of  the  contribution  of  technical  measures  to 
employment evolution in fisheries and the attractivenesses of the catching sector measured by 
the likely impacts on wages and working conditions of the different options. 

36 

 
 
 
Environmental impacts 

Environmental  sustainability  is  assessed  in  terms  of  protecting  biodiversity,  preserving  the 
quality of natutral resources and fostering the sustainable use of resources. The contribution 
technical measures can make to the achievement of GES for MSFD Decriptor 1,3 and 4 (i.e. 
biological  impacts  on  fish  stocks  and  vulnerable  species  such  as  marine  mammals  and 
seabirds) and Descriptor 6 (i.e. physical impacts on the seabed) are used as indicators. 

Simplification, Administrative Burden and Costs 

Governance  issues  are  considered  in  terms  of  the  degree  of  simplification  achieveable;  the 
involvement  of  the  catching  sector  and  national  administrations  in  the  decision-making 
process  under  regionalisation.  The  increase  in  workload  and  costs  for  national  research 
institutes  as  well  as  STECF  and  ICES;  and  the  costs  for  the  catching  sector  and  national 
administrations incurred as a result of regionalisation are also assessed as well as the costs for 
controlling technical measures under the differing governance structures. 

Impacts on SMEs 

Impacts on SMEs are broken down into economic impacts as a result of additional costs and 
responsibilities associated with regionalisation. 

8.2. 

Baseline scenario 

8.2.1.  Economic impacts  

MSY and the landing obligation 

The economic impacts will continue to be negative. No improvements in current exploitation 
patterns are likely in the short-term for stocks currently fished above MSY. This will result in 
significant reductions in fishing opportunities or fishing effort for stocks in the Mediterranean 
where there are no TACs will be required to bring fishing mortality to MSY levels. Currently 
out  of  176  assessed  stocks  there  are  19  stocks  in  the  North-east  Atlantic,  88  stocks  in  the 
Mediterranean and 5 stocks in the Black Sea which are considered to be fished unsustainably 
above MSY37. Some of these are highly depleted and even if the timeframe for reaching MSY 
is  pushed  out  to  2020, the adjustments required to  reach  Fishing mortality corresponding  to 
MSY  (i.e.  Fmsy))  will  be  significant70.  Example  18  provides  an  example  of  the  scale  of  the 
economic impacts for such stocks.  

Example 18: The cod stock in the west of Scotland has been overfished for many years with 
low  spawning  stock  biomass  (SSB)  and  low recruitment  of  young  fish into the  stock.  ICES 
has advised that catches should be reduced to the lowest possible level and further technical 
measures should be implemented to improve the exploitation pattern71 in all fisheries catching 
cod. Large reductions in fishing mortality will be required to bring the stock to MSY by 2020. 
Leaving aside the economic impacts of a prolonged period of low TACs for this species, this 
will  have  knock-on  effects  on  other  stocks.  The  Scottish  White  fish  Producers  Association 
(SWFPA) estimated that to recover the cod stock to a TAC aligned to MSY (ICES advised a 
quota of 38 tonnes for 2015) would result in catches of only around one fifth of the tonnage 
required  to  maintain  and  fully  prosecute  the  target  fishery  of  anglerfish72.  The  anglerfish 
fishery in this area is worth approximately €25 million euros to the Member States concerned. 
In  practice  these  knock-on  effects  on  associated  species  have  provided  fishermen  with  a 
strong incentive to discard legal sized cod caught as bycatch while fishing for other species 
such  as  anglerfish  to  continue  fishing.  ICES  reported  in  2014  that  discards  of  cod  were 
roughly  four  times  greater  than  landings72.  It  will  no  longer  be  possible  to  discard  this  fish 
once cod comes under the landing obligation meaning the fishery is likely to close very early 
in the year with substantial losses.  

37 

 
 
The current levels of unwanted catches will continue and under the landing obligation these 
catches will have to be landed but only sold for non-human consumption purposes. For some 
species (e.g. plaice in the sole fishery in the North Sea) these unwanted catches will remain at 
high levels. Table 4.1.1 provides examples of fisheries with similarly high levels of unwanted 
catches.  Economic  returns  will  reduce  given  the  low  value  of  such  unwanted  catches.  The 
scale of the economic impacts arising from unwanted catches is illustrated in example 19.  
Example  19:  A  study73  which  looked  at  the  economic  effects  of  the  landing  obligation  for 
Dutch  fisheries  showed  the  scale  of  economic  losses  that  could  be  expected.  The  study 
assumed that selectivity and all fishing activities are the same as in the baseline year (2011). 
The  implementation  of  the  landing  obligation  results  in  projected  additional  costs  for  the 
entire Dutch offshore fishing fleet (around 315 vessels) of €21 million euros. This fleet had 
total  landings  of  €306  million  and  a  Gross  Value  Added  (GVA)  of  €41.6  million  in  2011. 
These additional costs were offset by additional revenues from the unwanted catches sold for 
non-human consumption estimated at €8 - €15 million euro, assuming a cost for the unwanted 
catches of €0.15 - €0.30/kg (based on current market prices for fish meal). This results in net 
losses  of  between  €6  to  €14  million  euros  across  the  Dutch  fleet.  The  study  concludes  that 
such losses are likely to be unsustainable given that according to STECF a large proportion of 
this offshore fleet segment (54%) made losses in 201160. While not entirely representative of 
other fleets in the North Sea or elsewhere, the costs and revenues for the landing of unwanted 
catches are considered indicative. The impacts would depend on the profitability of the other 
fleets concerned but would in all likelihood be negative. 

Fishing  opportunities  will  also  be  exhausted  more  quickly  in  fisheries  in  the  Northeast 
Atlantic  and  Baltic.  Unwanted  catches  which  will  have  to  be  landed  and  counted  against 
quotas will accelerate quota uptake. Exhausted fishing opportunities will force vessels to stop 
fishing  earlier  in  the  year  with  related  negative  impacts  on  their  financial  performance  as 
shown by example 20.  
Example  20:  In  the  Irish  Sea,  a  UK  study74  suggests  that  the  whiting  fishing  opportunities 
available to Northern Ireland Nephrops trawlers would be exhausted after only 10 days at sea 
before all the UK quota is used up if steps to improve selectivity or avoidance measures are 
not  taken.  This  would  result  in  closure  of  the  Nephrops  fishery  in  early  January.  Landings 
from this fishery are valued at approximately €42 million euros and involve 140 boats from 
the UK and Ireland60. 

Adaptation costs 

Given  the  baseline  option  does  not  envisage  any  changes  in  the  existing  measures  then  no 
additional costs for adapting gears would be expected, at least in the short-term. Research into 
developing and testing selective gears would continue at current levels but without changes to 
the  regulatory  structure  the  uptake  of  such  gears  by  the  catching  sector  would  remain  low 
based on past experiences. Any additional costs that would be incurred would not be directly 
related  to  technical  measures  but  as  a  result  of  adaptations  to  vessels  to  handle  unwanted 
catches as a consequence of the landing obligation.  

In the longer term such costs may increase as the economic impacts associated with moving to 
MSY,  the  landing  obligation  and  meeting  environmental  targets  under  the  MSFD  would 
eventually  force  fishermen  to  adapt  their  gears  and  fishing  practices  or  go  out  of  business. 
Such costs could be offset through funding under the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund 
(EMFF75) in the short term so  would not  necessarily be  significant. This may change in  the 
longer-term after the end of the EMFF in 2020 if there is no such funding mechanism in the 
future. 

Competitiveness 

38 

 
 
There  will  be  no  change  in  the  competitiveness  of  the  catching  sector.  Fishermen  will 
continue to be governed by the same sets of detailed rules with limited flexibility. 

Other stakeholders 

Related  impacts  in  downstream  business  could  be  expected  to  result  from  the  landing  of 
unwanted  catches.  These  costs  are  not  directly  related  to  technical  measures  but  to  the 
implementation  of  the  landing  obligation.  This  will  have  negative  impacts  on  the  wider 
economy and will have knock-on impacts on other enterprises providing inputs to fishing, and 
processing, marketing and trading catches.  

There  are  likely  to  be  gains  for  non-human  consumption  outlets  that  can  utilise  and  profit 
from previously discarded catches. There are also likely to be economic benefits for transport 
companies  and  storage  companies  (including  markets)  that  will  handle  the  previously 
discarded  catches.  These  gains  are  difficult  to  estimate  given  the  uncertainty  regarding  the 
actual level of unwanted catches that may result once the landing obligation is introduced and 
are short-term (see example 21). 
Example 21: A UK study76 showed that additional staff time and equipment is expected to be 
required  at  the  markets  to  handle  the  previously  discarded  fish,  as  well  as  investment  in 
additional storage facilities. Up to three additional staff and an additional forklift truck would 
be required to deal with the extra material landed in one specific port. Fish markets focus on 
the sale of human-consumption fish and the receipt of large volumes of low value material do 
not fit well with their business models.  

Any  costs  of  handling  material  for  non-human  consumption  would  likely  be  passed  onto 
vessel operators although some of these costs could be partially offset by funding through the 
EMFF. 

Third countries, particularly Norway and the Faroe Islands will be impacted in that reduced 
fishing  opportunities  arising  from  a  failure  to  reach  MSY  will  result  in  lower  fishing 
opportunities for these countries in Union waters. They will have to comply with the landing 
obligation when fishing in Union waters which may lead to increased costs depending on the 
species being targeted. Third countries fishing in Union waters in the Mediterranean will be 
impacted in that a failure to reduce overfishing and the level of unwanted catches will impact 
on available resources. 

For  consumers,  the  need  to  halt  biodiversity  loss  is  of  increasing  importance  and  this  has 
created  a  demand  for  sustainably  and  responsibly  caught  fish  products.  This  was  apparent 
from  some  of  the  submissions  in  the  public  consultation.  Failure  to  revise  the  technical 
measures could indirectly lead to increasing difficulties for the catching sector to sell products 
in  the  market  because  of  reduced  demand  for  products  not  considered  to  be  caught  in  an 
environmentally friendly manner. 

8.2.2. 

Social impacts 

The social impacts will continue to be negative. They will be most acute for fleet segments 
having significant levels of unwanted catches (typically the vessels highlighted in table 7.2.1). 
In the short-term, extra crew will be required to handle unwanted catches onboard which will 
have  to  be  stowed  onboard  separately  from  marketable  catches.  The  study  referred  to  in 
section  7.2.173  estimated  in  the  Dutch  fleet  an  additional  1-2  FTE's  would  be  required  to 
account  for  the  additional  work  load  on  board  (approximately  300-400  FTEs  for  the  Dutch 
fleet) in the short-term. However, these increased levels of employment would be short-lived 
as  the  increase  in  costs  for  extra  crew  would  be  unsustainable  when  combined  with  the 
reductions in fishing opportunities forecasted with the move to MSY.  

39 

 
 
In the longer term, the number of FTEs in the catching sector would reduce further in these 
fleet  segments.  The  most  affected  groups  of  workers  will  be  those  which  are  employed  on 
fishing fleet segments currently discarding the most. In the fisheries in the Northeast Atlantic 
(including the North Sea) this would be the beam trawl fleets exploiting flatfish species and 
otter  trawls  targeting  Nephrops  and  demersal  fish  in  mixed  fisheries.  These  fleets  would 
consist of approximately 3,500 vessels, employing around 17,200 FTE60. This is around 34% 
of the total workforce employed on fishing vessels working in the North East Atlantic6. All of 
these are micro-enterprises. 

In  the  Mediterranean  the  demersal  trawl,  shellfish  dredge  and  beam  trawl  fleets  have  the 
highest  discards.  These  fleets  consist  of  approximately  4,200  vessels,  employing  around 
10,586 FTE. This represents around 34% of the total workforce employed on fishing vessels 
in the Mediterranean60. In other fleet segments the impacts are likely to be less significant as 
the  levels  of  unwanted  catches  are  much  lower  and  employment  levels  would  remain  at 
current  levels.  Taking  the  projection  made  under  the  baseline  scenario  in  the  IA  supporting 
the CFP19 of a 20% reduction in employment by 2022, which remain valid for this analysis, 
would mean a loss of FTEs of around 5,560 FTEs in these fleet segments.  

The  increased  workload  and  reduction  in  wages  that  will  result  from  moving  to  MSY  and 
from the handling and landing of unwanted catches under the landing obligation will result in 
deterioration in job quality for most sectors of the  catching sector. The attractiveness of the 
sector will reduce. This was identified as the outcome under the baseline scenario considered 
in the CFP IA19 where crew wages were expected to continue below national averages leading 
to  the  attractiveness  of  the  sector  remaining  constant  at  best  or  more  likely  declining.  The 
scale of decline in wages predicted is further illustrated by example 22: 
Example 22: A UK study77 estimated that Nephrops trawlers would have to reduce the annual 
number  of  trips  undertaken  by  52%  compared  to  2008–2010  if  unwanted  catches  of  other 
species (e.g. cod and whiting) were not avoided, leading to a 38% reduction in income. This 
fleet segment is estimated to currently discard ≈ 76% of its cod catches. Failure to improve 
the  selectivity  of  fishing  practices  under  the  landing  obligation  would  lead  to  substantial 
decrease  in  the  number  of  trips  (typically  between  -30%  and  -50%)  and  to  a  corresponding 
decrease of income (between -15% and -30%) compared to the 2008-2010 situation. 

Other stakeholders 

Indirect impacts on downstream business are expected to result from the landing obligation. 
With increased incomes likely for non-human consumption outlets that can utilise and profit 
from unwanted catches, employment will increase in the short-term. There are also likely to 
be employment benefits for transport companies and storage companies (including  markets) 
that  will  handle  the  previously  discarded  catches.  The  actual  extent  of  any  increases  in 
employment  numbers  is  difficult  to  quantify  as  it  will  depend  entirely  on  the  level  of 
unwanted  catches  that  would  be  landed.  In  the  longer  term  as  with  the  catching  sector  it  is 
doubtful whether these increased levels of employment are sustainable. 

Other ancillary businesses such as gear suppliers and net manufacturers would be negatively 
impacted under the baseline scenario. Reductions in income for the catching sector will have a 
knock-on  effect  on  such  businesses  as  fishermen  will  try  to  increase  cost  efficiencies  by 
reducing gear maintenance and replacement gear costs.Overall reductions in downstream and 
ancillary businesses are likely to be in line with the projections in the CFP IA19 of -15% by 
2022. 

8.2.3.  Environmental impacts 

Environmental  impacts  on  fish  stocks  will  continue  to  be  mostly  negative  in  the  short-term 
and  at  best  may  stabilise  in  the  longer-term.  Any  improvements  in  selectivity  will  develop 

40 

 
 
only when the economic impacts force fishermen to react. Exploitation patterns for stocks will 
not  change  and  those  stocks  that  are  overfished  (as  indicated  in  section  7.2.1)  will  remain 
under  pressure.  Reaching  MSY  and  GES  under  the  MSFD  (descriptor  3)  within  the  target 
timeframe  will  be  extremely  difficult  without  significant  cuts  in  fishing  opportunities  and 
reductions in fishing pressure. 

The  impacts  on  incidental  catches  of  protected  species  including  marine  mammals  and 
seabirds (MSFD descriptor 1) will be neutral in the short-term. Existing mitigation measures 
will  remain  in  place  but  continue  to  be  rather  piecemeal  and  not  necessarily  targeted  in  the 
right fisheries or areas.  
For  cetaceans,  ICES16,47&48  have  concluded  that  in  a  number  of  fisheries  incidental  catches 
remain of concern. These include: 

–  harbour  porpoises  in  static  nets  in  the  Baltic,  Kattegat,  North  Sea  and  Skagerrak, 

Atlantic and Black Sea; 

–  common and striped dolphins in static nets in the Atlantic and Black Sea; 

–  common dolphins in pelagic trawls for bass and tuna in the Atlantic; and 

–  bottlenose dolphins in both pelagic trawl and static net fisheries in the Mediterranean. 
For  seabirds16&78  an  ICES  report  classified  bycatch  by  the  EU  fishing  fleet  at  c.a.  200,000 
seabirds annually in EU waters with at least 25 species of seabirds in EU waters as being of 
conservation concern either globally or at a local population level. Incidental catches of other 
marine  mammals  such  as  seals  and  marine  reptiles  such  as  sea  turtles  are  also  frequently 
reported. 

The  Natura  2000  sites  already  established  to  protect  vulnerable  deep-sea  ecosystem  both 
inside the waters under Union jurisdiction as well as non-EU waters would remain in place. 
However,  the  creation  of  new  closed  areas,  although  possible,  will  continue  to  be  a  slow 
process  (no  new  areas  have  been  adopted  outside  territorial  waters  since  2009).  For  such 
habitats  delays  in  taking  protection  measures  could  lead  to  significant  or  irreversible 
impacts79.  Failure  to  protect  areas  will  impair  the  achievement  of  objectives  relating  to 
descriptors 1 and 6 of the MSFD. 

Other stakeholders 

Media  campaigns  by  NGOs  have  undoubtedly  raised  awareness  on  discards  and  the 
environmental impacts of fishing in general. Therefore failure to revise the technical measures 
leading  to  environmental  sustainability  objectives  not  being  met  will  provoke  a  negative 
reaction from the general public as a result of such media campaigns. 

8.2.4. 

Simplification, administrative costs and burden 

There  would  be  no  simplification  of  the  regulations.  Regionalisation  of  technical  measures 
through  multiannual  and  discard  plans  would  be  minimal  and  even  if  did  happen  in  the 
longer-term would merely add additional rules rather than simplifying the current ones.  

Administrative  costs  and  burden  will  remain  high  for  the  Member  States.  Amending  the 
technical  measures  legislation  will  remain  a  costly  and  lengthy  process.  There  will  be 
additional costs to Member States managing authorities related to the development of discard 
plans that may contain technical measures. In the longer term, pressure to minimise economic 
impacts  may  drive  the  sectors  of  the  catching  sector  indicated  with  the  highest  level  of 
unwanted  catches  to  actively  press  Member  States  and  the  Commission  to  develop 
regionalised  measures  as  part  of  multiannual  plans.  This  will  result  in  additional  costs  for 
Member States. 

41 

 
 
Costs  to  the  scientific  community  would  not  be  expected  to  change  as  there  would  be  no 
additional workload expected related to technical measures in the short-term. Scientists would 
continue to have to develop, test and evaluate technical measures in response to requests from 
the catching sector, Member States, the Commission and the European Parliament. 

Costs  for  enforcement  of  technical  measures  would  remain  extremely  high  due  to  the 
continued  need  for  a  high  level  of  monitoring  at  sea.  The  retrospective  analysis  estimated 
costs of control of around €33 million per Member State of which 57% is spent on control at 
sea.  Any  additional  costs  over  and  above  this  would  not  be  directly  related  to  technical 
measures but to implementation of the CFP and in particular the landing obligation. 

Other stakeholders 

There are no indirect administrative costs or burden on other stakeholders. 

8.2.5. 

Impacts on SMEs 

Administrative burden and costs on the catching sector, most of which would be classified as 
micro-enterprises (98%), would remain high. The current complex regulatory structure would 
remain in place requiring fishermen to comply with multiple technical rules. There would be 
also  additional  burden  and  costs  resulting  from  the  landing  obligation,  which  would  be 
indirectly linked to technical measures. These costs would mainly be associated with handling 
and  storing  unwanted  catches  on  board,  as  well  as  for  the  landing,  storage  and  transport  of 
such unwanted catches ashore prior to disposal or sale for non-human consumption purposes. 
Costs will vary considerably from fleet segment to fleet segment depending upon the extent of 
unwanted catches and the reaction of the vessel owners to deal with these problems. Reactions 
could  vary  between  hiring  additional  crew  members,  to  choosing  to  voluntarily  improve 
selectivity to reduce the level of unwanted catches, choosing to illegal discards such catches 
or downsizing their business. 

8.3. 

Option 1: Consolidation 

8.3.1.  Economic impacts 

MSY and the landing obligation 

In  the  short-term  the  economic  impacts  will  be  similarly  negative  to  the  baseline  scenario. 
Any  immediate  changes  to  the  regulations  under  discard  plans  or  the  existing  legislation 
would  see  the  introduction  of  additional  measures  to  reduce  unwanted  catches.  These 
measures  would  result  in  consequential  short-term  economic  losses  from  reductions  in 
marketable  catches.  Past  experience  has  shown  that  if  these  economic  losses  are  significant 
then  there  will  be  little  industry  buy-in  and  fishermen  will  explore  ways  to  minimise  these 
losses once the measures are introduced. This is illustrated by example 23 below: 

Example 23: Several changes in codend mesh size and construction were introduced in the Baltic 
cod  fishery  in  the  early  2000s  to  improve  exploitation  patterns.  One  of  these  changes  was  the 
introduction  of  a  BACOMA  escape  window  of  120mm  mesh  size  (previously  a  BACOMA 
window  of  105mm  had  been  the  legal  requirement).  Based  on  simulations  and  experimental 
studies this gear modification was forecasted to reduce discarding by 30-40%. On this basis it was 
introduced into legislation in 2002. However, no assessment was carried out prior to introduction 
as to the short-term economic losses. Soon afterwards, losses of up to 40-50% were reported by 
fishermen with the result that widespread gear manipulation, legal and illegal occurred. There was 
no improvement in the catch profile and in September 2003 the size of the BACMA window was 
reduced to 110mm57.  

In the longer term, it is possible that driven by the need to maintain stocks at MSY and reduce 
unwanted catches under the landing obligation, the catching sector will explore how different 

42 

 
 
technical  measures  could  contribute  to  achieving  better  selectivity  under  regionalisation. 
Shifts  of  exploitation  patterns  towards  the  most  valuable  target  size  classes/species  would 
optimise  the  economic  returns  for  the  catching  sector  associated  with  fishing  opportunities. 
Larger fish will tend to achieve a higher price and this will focus selectivity in such a way as 
to  avoid  the  capture  of  younger  age  classes.  The  economic  gains  will  be  dependent  on 
whether the incentives are big enough to encourage the catching sector to accept these losses 
in the short-term and adjust exploitation patterns12 for potential gains in the longer-term. 

Adaptation costs 

In the short-term, costs for adapting gears to new legislation will be the same as the baseline 
given  this  option  only  consolidates  the  current  regulations.  In  the  longer-term  the  move  to 
regionalisation where fishermen may be forced to adopt more selective gears under legislation 
implies  costs  for  adapting  their  fishing  gears.  Improving  the  selectivity  of  fishing  gears  by 
adding  specific  devices  into  existing  gears  is  not  necessarily  expensive.  The  retrospective 
evaluation  indicated  that  the  direct  cost  of  modifying  the  gears  of  trawlers  of  12-16  m  is 
typically less than €1,000 and for larger vessels may be higher (€2,000-€3,000), depending on 
the gear modification required6. 

Considering a conservative average estimate of a one-off payment of €3,000 per vessel (based 
on  discussions  with  fishermen  and  net  manufactures  carried  out  as  part  of  the  retrospective 
analysis) for purchasing and rigging into the trawl, the total cost borne by the catching sector 
in  the  North  East  Atlantic  and  in  the  North  Sea  would  be  in  the  region  of  €16.4  million,  if 
only  vessels  operating  active  gears,  the  most  in  need  of  selectivity  improvements,  are 
considered6. This represents ≈ 0.9 % of the annual value of their landings (See table 7.3.1). 
Funding is available through the EMFF for grant aid towards those costs. Direct costs for the 
catching  sector  can  therefore  be  assumed  to  be  negligible  compared  to  the  amounts  to  be 
disbursed and the long-term benefits of improved selectivity. 

Gear 

Number of vessels  Need  

Cost of selectivity 

Landing value 

(€ Million) 

(€ Million) 

Beam trawlers 

Demersal trawlers and/or demersal seiners 

Dredgers 

Drift and/or fixed netters 

Inactive 

Pelagic trawlers 

Purse seiners 

Vessel using other active gears 

Vessels using active and passive gears 

Vessels using hooks 

Vessels using other passive gears 

Vessels using passive gears only for vessels < 12m 

Vessels using polyvalent active gears only 

Vessels using polyvalent passive gears only 

Vessels using pots and/or traps 
TOTAL (need = Y) 

739 

2 792 

1 109 

2 637 

2 177 

449 

290 

162 

1 627 

1 250 

119 

4 841 

144 

3 571 

3 655 

Y 

Y 

N 

N 

N 

N 

N 

Y 

Y 

N 

N 

N 

Y 

N 

N 

2.2 

8.4 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.5 

4.9 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.4 

0.0 

0.0 
16.4 

377.5 

1 297.3 

140.5 

217.7 

346.9 

243.7 

5.5 

85.1 

86.4 

1.4 

38.4 

35.9 

72.1 

181.8 

377.5 
1 801.3 

Table 7.3.1: Estimate of direct cost of purchasing and rigging selectivity devices into existing gears (NE 
Atlantic). The "Need" column reflects the need of fleet segments to improve their current selectivity 
performances 
(Source: MRAG et al 2014 page 47 of prospective evaluation) 

43 

 
 
 
 
The  EMFF  may  also  support  gear  adaptations  that  limit  and,  where  possible,  eliminate  the 
physical and biological impacts of fishing on the ecosystem or the sea bed and equipment that 
protects  gear  and  catches  from  mammals  and  birds  protected  by  environmental  legislation. 
The costs are estimated to  be similar  to  the above although will vary  greatly from  sector to 
sector  (e.g.  incidental  catch  cetaceans  and  seabirds  are  higher  in  passive  gear  fisheries 
compared to demersal trawl fisheries).  

Competitiveness 

In the short-term there will be no change in competitiveness amongst the catching sector. In 
the  longer-term  regionalisation  may  introduce  a  degree  of  competiveness  into  the  sector 
between regions. Fishermen operating in those fisheries where regional measures are in place 
may  gain  a  competitive  advantage  over  operators  in  other  sea  basins  continuing  under  the 
detailed rules imposed at Union level. This is dependent on industry buy-in into the regional 
measures on the basis that they result in improved economic returns. 

Other stakeholders 

Impacts on downstream businesses such as fish processors, transport, storage companies and 
gear suppliers would be similar to the baseline (i.e. positive for some, negative for others) in 
the short-term and longer term.  

The catching sector from third countries will be negatively impacted on the short-term as the 
under  the  baseline  scenario.  However,  they  may  benefit  in  the  longer  term  from  stable  or 
increased fishing opportunities if there are improvements in stock levels. 

8.3.2. 

Social impacts 

Short-term  social  impacts  will  be  negative  as  under  the  baseline.  The  simple  change  to  the 
governance  structure  of  technical  measures  envisaged  will  not  halt  the  general  decline 
forecasted as a result of implementation of the CFP. As with the baseline, projected declines 
in employment of 10-20% by 2020 are the most likely scenario based on the IA supporting 
the CFP19. 

In the longer-term the general decline in employment is likely to stabilise. If regionalisation 
evolves  leading  to  more  effective  technical  measures  then  the  negative  impacts  should  be 
lessened over-time. However, this is reliant on such measures having a level of industry buy-
in. 

This will be similarly the case in terms of job quality and satisfaction. Wages will decline in 
line  with  the  baseline  scenario  in  the  short-term  with  a  gradual  improvement  as 
regionalisation  evolves.  Provided  reductions  in  unwanted  catches  and  sustainable  fishing 
mortalities  are  achieved  through  regionalisation  then,  job  quality  and  attractiveness  of  the 
sector will stabilise much more quickly than under the baseline. 

Other stakeholders 

The social impacts on downstream and ancillary businesses will very much mirror the impacts 
in the catching sector. 

8.3.3.  Environmental impacts 

In  the  short-term  the  environmental  impacts  on  fish  stocks would  be  similar  to  the  baseline 
scenario.  Discard  plans  would  provide  the  opportunity  to  introduce  measures  to  improve 
exploitation patterns for fisheries and species falling under the landing obligation in the period 
up  to  2016-2019.  Such  measures  may  lead  to  reductions  in  unwanted  catches  for  those 
species.  The  impacts  on  other  species  caught  as  bycatch  species  in  those  fisheries  may  also 
benefit depending on the nature of the fishery and the gears used. Example 24 from the Celtic 
Sea illustrates the reductions in unwanted catches that could be expected in a mixed fishery 

44 

 
 
for  cod,  haddock  and  whiting.  Given  such  measures  are  likely  to  result  in  economic  losses, 
positive environmental impacts will depend on compliance with these measures.  
Example 24: Based on predictions by STECF80, increasing the codend mesh size from 100mm 
to 120mm in the Celtic Sea mixed demersal fishery targeting cod, haddock and whiting would 
result  in  reductions  in  discards  of  2%,  14%  and  15%  respectively,  with  corresponding 
reductions in marketable landings of 28%, 47% and 45%. 

In the longer-term there are further benefits from including technical measures within multi-
species  multiannual  plans.  Example  25  illustrates  these  potential  long-term  benefits 
achievable through improvements in exploitation patterns. 

Example  25:  The  impact  of  improving  the  exploitation  patterns  of  certain  fish  stocks 
exploited by French fleets has been evaluated in a study by Henichart et al. (2011)82. For each 
of  the  studied  stocks,  the  Fmsy  (relative  to  current  levels  of  fishing  mortality  in  2010)  was 
evaluated  under  three  assumptions:  i)  SQ  -  status  quo  (no  change  in  current  selectivity),  ii) 
catches of individuals aged 2 and less not fished and iii) catches of individuals aged 3 and less 
not  fished.  The  resulting  catches  and  changes  in  spawning  stock  biomass  (SSB)  were  also 
projected. The results are shown in table 7.3.3.1. 

This  analysis  shows  that  stocks  generally  respond  well  to  improvements  in  selectivity 
although the benefits vary according to the stock concerned. For Northern hake and sole in the 
Bay of Biscay, a change in the exploitation pattern to target older fish significantly increases 
the  Fmsy.  For  overexploited  stocks  (i.e.  Nephrops  in  the  Bay  of  Biscay,  Celtic  Sea  cod  and 
plaice),  fished  above  Fmsy  the  difference  between  current  fishing  mortality  and  Fmsy  is 
narrowed  by  improving  selectivity.  For  example  targeting  age  2+  Nephrops  results  in  the 
reduction of 44% required at the current level of fishing mortality to reach Fmsy being reduced 
to a 19% reduction. For plaice in the Celtic Sea selectivity improvements have little influence 
on  target  Fmsy,  probably  because  the  current  exploitation  pattern  is  already  close  to  the 
optimum exploitation pattern. Changes in Fmsy also translate into increased catches and higher 
SSBs. For most of these stocks the benefits are seen most when fishing is targeted at 3 year 
old fish and above.  

Fishing mortality at Fmsy 
(relative to current F) 

Catches 

SSB 

SQ 

0% 

Age 2+   Age 3+ 

11% 

45% 

SQ 

0% 

Age 2+  Age 3+ 

7% 

25% 

SQ 

0% 

Age 2+   Age 3+ 

2% 

6% 

-19% 

-7% 

30% 

1% 

4% 

10% 

18% 

22% 

35% 

-44% 

-19% 

101% 

11% 

33% 

64% 

88% 

64% 

28% 

-45% 

-41% 

8% 

10% 

14% 

46% 

143% 

135% 

106% 

-64% 

-62% 

-56% 

109% 

112% 

122% 

437% 

436% 

462% 

Northen 
Hake 

Sole 
Biscay 

Nephrops 
Biscay  

Cod  
Celtic Sea 

Plaice 
Celtic Sea 

Table 7.3.3.1: Quantifiable impacts of exploitation pattern on long-term MSY objective compared to 
current exploitation pattern 
 (Source: Adapted from Henichart et al. (2011)) 

In  the  Mediterranean  it  will  be  more  difficult  to  reduce  negative  environmental  impacts.  A 
study  carried  out  for  the  European Parliament83  suggested that  one  possible consequence  of 
the  landing  obligation  may  be  an  increase  in  illegal  marketing  of  fish  below  the  mcrs. 
Landing,  storage  and  transportation  of  juveniles  will  be  legal  and  this  could  simplify 
commercialisation in the black market and incentivise the targeting of juveniles instead of the 

45 

 
 
 
converse  as  anticipated  in  the  northeast  Atlantic.  This  is  a  long-standing  problem  in  the 
Mediterranean and not necessarily related to technical measures but could create an unwanted 
incentive  to  drive  non-compliance.  Fishermen  may  choose  to  fish  unselectively  and  target 
small  fish  if  the  revenues  from  such  catches  are  significant.  As  there  are  no  fishing 
opportunities  set  in  the  Mediterranean,  Article  17  of  the  CFP  cannot  be  used  to  counteract 
these potential negative impacts. 

For  sensitive  species  and  habitats  the  impacts  will  be  at  best  neutral  or  negative.  Existing 
nature  conservation  measures  will  remain  in  place.  Regionalisation  of  environmental 
protection measures would provide Member States with more flexibility to develop effective 
measures  to  achieve  environmental  objectives.  Flexibility  will  allow  the  consideration  of 
trade-offs and complementarities between measures focusing on environmental requirements 
under  these  Directives  and  measures  aimed  at  the  conservation  of  fish  stocks  (MSFD 
descriptor 3). The identification of environmental measures contributing to MSFD descriptors 
at a regional scale would better take into account the effects of certain measures which could 
negatively impact other environmental requirements. For example, fishing effort displacement 
as a consequence of closures adopted to contribute to descriptors 1, 4 or 6 and which could 
negatively impact stock conservation (descriptor 3) can be anticipated and counteracted from 
the outset. 

Other stakeholders 

As  with  the  baseline  scenario  if  perceived  negatively  in  the  short-term  by  NGOs  this  may 
translate into a negative reaction from consumers.  

8.3.4. 

Simplification, administrative costs and burden 

A degree of simplification is achieved through the consolidation of the common rules into one 
Regulation.  Consolidation  would  allow  specific  common  provisions  of  some  existing  co-
decided  regulations  to  be  repealed  to  avoid  duplication.  Regulations  containing  regionally 
specific  measures  and  implementing  rules  would  remain  in  place  without  change.  In  the 
longer-term regionalisation of technical measures is envisaged by way of derogations to the 
technical measures. It is unlikely to lead to any major simplification of the rules and may in 
fact add new rules. 

In the short-term as with the baseline administrative costs and burden on Member States will 
remain high. There will be additional short-term costs for developing temporary discard plans 
which  may  include  technical  measures.  By  way  of  example  of  the  projected  costs  for 
developing a temporary discard plan for pelagic fisheries in North Western waters are shown 
below in example 26. 

Example  26:  The  development  of  a  discard  plan  for  pelagic  fisheries  in  the  North  Western 
Waters,  (which  contained  no  technical  measures)  required  6-8  meetings  over  an  8  month 
period. These meetings involved representatives from 6 MS and two ACs (Pelagic Advisory 
Council  and  North  Western  Waters  AC).  The  cost  of  these  meetings  is  estimated  at  around 
€10,000-€15,000 per meeting primarily to cover travel and subsistence costs83. Assuming the 
same  level  of  engagement  in  the  future  this  implies  additional  costs  of  around  €80,000-
€120,000 for the development of a plan. These costs would likely reduce once the plans are in 
place  as  focus  would  shift  to  monitoring  and  evaluation  requiring  a  lot  less  formal 
engagement between Member States. 

In the longer-term the gradual move towards multiannual plans will lead to increasing costs 
for Member States administrations. The scale of these costs will depend upon the number of 
Member States involved, the number  and nature of the fisheries, the complexity of the plan 
and the role of technical measures within the plans. The costs for individual Member States 
associated with regionalisation will also vary depending on the number of sea basins in which 

46 

 
 
a  Member  State  has  a  fisheries  interest.  France  for  instance  are  involved  in  fisheries  in  the 
Northwestern  waters,  Southwestern  waters,  North  Sea  and  Mediterranean  so  would  have  a 
higher  level  of  costs  compared  to  Ireland  who  principally  have  only  an  interest  in 
Northwestern  waters.  The  IA  supporting  the  CFP19  estimated  the  move  to  regionalisation  is 
likely  to  increase  overall  costs  in  the  region  of  20-50%,  although  the  total  direct  cost  to 
stakeholders  would  depend  on  the  allocation  of  funding  and  in  particular  increased 
contributions from Member States as well as how the Advisory Councils structure their work 
programme  to  take  account  of  regionalisation.  These  costs  would  be  largely  front-loaded 
during the development phase of multiannual and discard plans. 

In the short-term costs for scientific agencies will be similar to the baseline scenario and be at 
similar  levels  illustrated  by  example  27.  In  the  longer-term  to  support  the  development  of 
regionalised plans that include technical measures would lead to increased costs dependent on 
the detail and content of the plan. For instance a plan for pelagic fisheries would have a lot 
less need for technical measures to ensure effective implementation compared to a demersal 
fisheries plan where the role of technical measures has much more importance.  

Example  27:  The  level  of  funding  for  research  that  may  be  incurred,  France  allocated  €2 
million between 2008 and 2012 to support 11 selectivity projects (€0.9 million from the EFF 
and  €1.1  million  national  contribution6).  Such  funding  possibilities  will  continue  under  the 
EMFF. 

Regionalisation  will  also  involve  STECF  and  ICES  in  the  provision  to  i)  the  regions  with 
information  to  determine  the  effectiveness  and  relevance  of  regionally-specific  technical 
measures  proposed  (channelled  through  the  Commission),  and  ii)  the  Commission  with 
scientific  advice  to  determine  whether  to  approve  the  proposals  made  at  the  regional  level. 
Provision of this advice will not necessarily result in increased costs for the Commission for 
contracting STECF or ICES to provide this advice but would require adjustments to the work 
programmes of both organisations to accommodate these assessments. 

The costs for controlling technical measures will remain high as under the baseline scenario. 
Control authorities will have to enforce the existing technical measure regulations. Any small 
reductions  in  costs  arising  from  the  simplification  of  the  common  technical  rules  into  one 
Regulation would be offset by increased costs for monitoring the landing obligation. 

In the longer term regionalisation should lead to greater acceptability (as a result of increased 
participation  from  stakeholders  in  the  specification  of  measures  relevant  to  them  in  their 
regions).  This  may  result  in  reductions  in  control  costs  compared  to  the  baseline  if 
regionalised  measures  under  this  option  introduce  an  incentive  for  compliance.  It  can  be 
expected that regional measures will be more focused and streamlined, leading to  improved 
controllability. 

Other stakeholders 

The move to regionalisation should not necessarily impact on third countries fishing in Union 
waters to any degree. Fishing opportunities and supporting rules including technical measures 
are already subject to negotiation annually between the Union and third countries84. 

8.3.5. 

Impacts on SMEs 

Regionalisation  of  technical  measures  under  this  option  would  have  positive  and  negative 
impacts  on  the  catching  sector  as  the  main  group  of  SMEs  involved.  In  the  short-term 
administrative burden and costs would remain high for the catching sector. In the longer-term 
regionalisation may lead to benefits in terms of reduced administrative burden and, through, 
the Advisory Councils, much greater involvement in the decision-making process (i.e. in the 
development and implementation of the multiannual and temporary discard plans). However, 
there are costs associated with regionalisation as indicated which indirectly impact on SMEs 

47 

 
 
as members of the Advisory Councils. There will also be short - and longer-term direct costs 
for  adaptation  of  gears  to  regionally  developed  measures  established  under  multiannual  or 
discard plans. These costs can be offset from funding from the EMFF in the short-term. 

8.4. 

Option 2: Framework Approach 

8.4.1.  Economic impacts 

MSY and the landing obligation 

The  economic  impacts  will  be  positive  after  a  short  period  of  adjustment  to  the  new 
governance structure introduced by the framework regulation where economic impacts would 
be  similar  to  option  1.  After  this  transitional  period  regionalisation  of  technical  measures 
should be accelerated provided Member States pro-actively embrace the process.  

Tailor-made  technical  measures  developed  as  part  of  multiannual  and  discard  plans  should 
lead to the optimisation of exploitation patterns and facilitate the move to sustainable levels of 
fishing mortality and reduction in unwanted catches as indicated under option 1. Integrating 
technical  measures  (gear/spatial/temporal)  as  drivers  for  changes  in  exploitation  patterns  as 
part  of  multiannual  plans  will  have  a  significant  bearing  on  the  yield  that  can  be  achieved 
from a given stock12. Using technical measures in this way will incentivise selective fishing. 
There  will  be  a  strong  driver  for  the  catching  sector  to  focus  on  catch  profiles  that  are 
economically optimal12. 

These increases will not be uniform across fleet segments and are dependent on the scale of 
the fisheries, the target species and the relative impact of technical measures. Regionalisation 
of technical measures will be more beneficial for towed gear fisheries as improving selectivity 
in  these  fisheries  is  much  more  critical  than  static  gear  fisheries  (i.e.  gillnet  and  longline) 
which  are  more  selective.  Towed  gear  fisheries  currently  comprise  around  16%  (14,000 
vessels) of the total EU fleet.  
The  IA  supporting  the  CFP19  estimated  improvements  in  exploitation  pattern  as  a  result  of 
moving to MSY and the introduction of discard reduction strategies could lead to significant 
increases  (10-40%)  in  retained  and  sold  catches  of  some  species  currently  subject  to 
significant discarding depending on the fishery. 

This  option will  also  provide  opportunities  to  move  away  from  prescriptive  rules to  a  more 
results-based  and  adaptive  approach  using  the  associated  selectivity  associated  of  baseline 
standards as the objective to be achieved. Such a results-based approach has shown to deliver 
positive benefits in leading to the voluntary use of selective gears.  This is best illustrated in 
the context of the long-term management plan for cod85 (example 26).  
Example 26: Articles 11 and 13 of the Long Term Management Plan for Cod85 are based on 
an results based approach and have resulted in largely positive outcomes6,11&12. They provide 
the possibility for vessels to avoid future restrictions on fishing opportunities in terms of TAC 
and  effort  adjustments  (article  13)  or  to  be  exempted  from  effort  restrictions  provided  that 
catch rates of cod are demonstrated to be below certain thresholds (article 11). This has had a 
number  of  substantive  impacts  in  terms  of  the  application  of  technical  measures  and  the 
development role of industry as well as on the financial viability of the sectors most impacted. 
It  has  led  to  innovation  in  the  development  and  testing  of  new  and  novel  approaches  to 
minimising cod catches. Fishermen operating availing of this option within the regulation have 
reacted positively to the reward of additional days at sea in return for reducing cod mortality in 
ways other than applying punitive reductions in fishing effort and fishing opportunities that would 
have  applied.  It  has  managed  to  focus  gear  innovation  in  the  right  way  and  has  instilled  some 
sense  of  ownership  on  the  fishermen  involved  in  the  fisheries12.  According  to  ICES,  fishing 
mortality  on  the  cod  stock  in  the  North  Sea  has  reduced  and  the  stock  (SSB)  has  increased 

48 

 
 
significantly from a historical low levels in 200686. While these outcomes are not solely as a result 
of improved selectivity, the use of such gears has undoubtedly contributed significantly. 

Given that the number of overfished stocks in the Mediterranean far outweigh others regions, 
it  is  likely  that  the  economic  situation  will  not  be  as  positive.  The  transition  to  sustainable 
fishing will take longer to achieve and therefore the short-term economic impacts are likely to 
significant  on  these  fleets  in  the  Mediterranean  targeting  highly  depleted  stocks  –  fleets 
targeting  mixed  demersal  species  as  identified  previously.  For  these  fleets,  improving  the 
effectiveness  of  technical  measures  will  help  to  cushion  these  impacts but  will  not  alleviate 
them altogether. 

Adaptation costs 

In  the  short  term  there  would  be  adjustments  to  the  technical  measures  currently  in  place 
through  the  creation  of  baseline  standards  which  would  function  as  default  measures  while 
regionalisation evolves. These baseline standards would be linked to the current rules and take 
account of existing exploitation patterns (as described in section 6.4) but some sectors of the 
catching sector may face marginal costs associated with adaptation to these baselines. These 
could be largely offset by financial support under the EMFF.  

In the longer-term with the move to a more results-based approach, where focus is more on 
achieving a result, the decision of whether to change gears will be left largely to the fishermen 
themselves. It would become a business decision driven by economics rather than by changes 
in legislation as under option 1.  

Competitiveness 

The  impact  on  the  competitiveness will  be  similar to  option  1.  The  advantages  provided  by 
regionalisation  in  terms  of  flexibility  will  create  a  competitive  advantage  over  those 
continuing under the more rigid rules (e.g. common provisions and baselines) contained in the 
framework regulation. This should act as a strong driver for regionalisation. 

Other stakeholders 

The  impacts  on  downstream  and  ancillary  industries  will  be  similar  to  option  1  but  will 
depend on regionalisation affecting change in regulating technical measures quickly. 

The catching sector of third countries would benefit from increased fishing opportunities as a 
result of reaching MSY targets in the northeast Atlantic. Any benefits will depend indirectly 
on the actions of the catching sector of the Member States. 

8.4.2. 

Social impacts 

In  the  immediate  short-term  the  social  impacts  on  employment  would  be  similar  to  the 
baseline scenario as the catching sector adjusts to the challenges of moving to MSY and the 
landing  obligation.  However,  assuming  that  regionalisation  is  accelerated  and  the  most 
concerned  fleet  segments  notably  those  targeting  mixed  demersal  species,  would  strive 
quickly to improve selectivity, any negative impacts on jobs in would be counteracted more 
quickly  than  under  the  baseline.  Employment  levels  would  stabilise.  The  framework  would 
manage the hard transition period much better than option 1, where additional short-term job 
losses are to be expected in EU fleets dependent on overfished stocks.  
Achieving  environmental  sustainability  as  quickly  as  possible  is  a  precondition  for  social 
sustainability.  The  simulations in  the  CFP  IA19 showed  that  once  MSY levels  are  achieved, 
fishing opportunities will increase (by at least 20% by 2020). Such a significant increase has a 
potential to create new jobs in the catching sector, as shown by the fact that, according to the 
simulations,  employment  per  vessel  increases  already  after  2017.  This  is  also  in  line  with 
experience  of  countries  such  as  New  Zealand,  where  the  use  of  management  instruments 
allowing  for  the  transition  to  sustainable  fishing,  very  similar  to  those  proposed  by  CFP 

49 

 
 
reform,  ultimately  resulted  in  increases  in  catches  and,  consequently,  in  employing  more 
capital and manpower in the fleets87. 
It  is  also  in  line  with  the  EU's  own  experience  that  stocks  already  fished  sustainably  have 
benefited from TAC increases. It is these TAC increases that help to maintain employment in 
the sector and represent a significant source of additional income for fishermen. As examples, 
the  increases  (based  on  2012)  represented  additional  incomes  of  €10  million  for  herring 
fishermen in the Celtic Sea and €12 million more income for anglerfish fishermen in the West 
Atlantic87.  
Fishing sustainably will lead to increase income and wages and therefore job attractiveness. 
Simulations carried out for the IA of the CFP show that the average wages under the new CFP 
will nearly double in comparison to what would happen in the absence of reform as a result of 
fishing at MSY. In addition reducing unwanted catches will decrease the workloads on board 
associated with sorting and storing such catches, improving work conditions for crews. 

As  with  the  economic  impacts  the  situation  will  not  be  as  positive  in  the  Mediterranean, 
where a large number of stocks are depleted. 

Other stakeholders 

The  impacts  on  downstream  businesses  would mirror  the  situation  in  the  catching  sector. If 
regionalisation is effective then the impacts on these sectors will be lessened. 

8.4.3.  Environmental impacts 

The benefits in  terms of  stock sustainability would  be positive compared to  the baseline. In 
the  short-term  the  framework  approach  would  manage  the  transition  to  regionalisation  and, 
through  the  inclusion  of  baseline  standards  and  retention  of  existing  measures  that  are  still 
necessary, environmental sustainability objectives would continue to be met. The benefits are 
likely to be marginal but in the longer-term once plans are developed further positive benefits 
to  stock  sustainability  should  accrue  as  fishermen  strive  to  optimise  exploitation  patterns  to 
maximise economic returns.  

In  the  terms  of  impacts  on  sensitive  species  and  habitats,  existing  nature  conservation 
measures  would  be  maintained  under  the  framework  Regulation  so  the  impacts  would  be 
neutral in the short-term. In the longer-term regionalisation under multiannual plans and under 
Article 11 of the CFP would provide the possibility to adapt measures to be more responsive 
and anticipatory to threats to marine ecosystems and to take such measures expediently. 

Other stakeholders 

Assuming this option is perceived positively by NGOs as indicated in the public consultation 
then  the  certification  of  fisheries  (such  as  under  the  Marine  Stewardship  Council)  could 
follow  from  sustainable  and  responsible  fishing.  Certification  may  lead  to  an  improved 
perception by consumers who are becoming increasingly aware of such schemes.  

8.4.4. 

Simplification, Administrative Costs and Burden 

The current regulatory structure will be simplified significantly and provide a direct route to 
regionalisation.  The  three  overarching  regulations  (or  most  of  them)  would  be  repealed  or 
rationalised immediately. The current mesh size and catch composition rules contained in the 
annexes  to  the  current  regulations  would  be  converted  into  a  smaller  number  of  results-
orientated  baseline  mesh  sizes  while  the  number  of  closed  areas  would  be  reduced  by  the 
removal of redundant or ineffective closures. Many of the other implementing and technical 
measures contained in other regulations would be incorporated into the framework and these 
regulations or provisions would be repealed. Further simplification is likely under multiannual 
plans in the longer-term with the move to a results-based approach. 

50 

 
 
There will  be  increased administration costs for Member States  in the short-term associated 
with regionalisation but this is balanced by the reduction in administrative burden as a result 
of the simplification of the regulations and less time spent negotiation of regulations centrally. 
These  costs  will  stabilise  in  the  longer  term  once  plans  are  established  and  the  focus  shifts 
from  development  to  monitoring  and  evaluation  of  the  plans  and  finding  solutions  to 
emerging problems. The costs of regionalisation would be as projected under option 1.  

Costs and changes in workloads for research institutes and scientific bodies (i.e. STECF and 
ICES) would be the same as under option 1. 

In  the  short-term  control  costs  would  reduce  as  a  result  of  simplification  but  costs  for 
enforcing the remaining technical rules at sea will remain and will be significant. In the longer 
term  there  is  potential  to  reduce  control  costs  considerably  particularly  if  regions  move 
towards a result-based approach and widen the use of Joint Deployment Plans (JDPs). JDPs 
will lead to improve coordination of monitoring and control amongst Member States within 
regions. If aligned to multiannual plans they would have the potential to ensure the best use of 
human  and  material  resources  pooled  by  Member  States  in  a  coordinated  way88  for 
monitoring  and  control.  This  has  been  the  case  with  a  JDP  introduced  in  2008  which 
established specific  control  and inspection  programme  for  the recovery  of  cod  stocks  in  the 
Northeast  Atlantic  and  the  North  Sea  to  support  the  implementation  of  the  long-term 
management plan for cod85. The total estimated cost of all six JDP89 operations during 2013 
were  €43.4  million  of  which  €34.9  million  was  spent  on  at  sea  inspections.  This  compares 
favourably with the costs for individual Member States historically for at sea control. 

Once there is confidence in the documentation of catches in the longer-term resulting from the 
full implementation of the landing obligation (i.e. by 2019), the need for prescriptive technical 
rules would diminish further and in fact once plans (and JDPs) are in place in all regions it 
could be envisaged that the number of technical rules required could further reduce if Member 
States  chose  to  move  in  this  direction.  The  focus  of  control  would  be  shifted  to  monitoring 
catches  rather  than  controlling  and  measuring  detailed  gear  construction  and  operation 
resulting  in  substantial  reductions  as  the  need  to  monitor  technical  rules  at  sea  would  be 
diminished.  Based  on  the  retrospective  evaluation6  and  assuming  a  10%  reduction  in  at  sea 
monitoring with the use of alternative monitoring techniques such as CCTV90, savings in the 
order of €10.2 million for the Member States in the Northeast Atlantic (based on total costs of 
€102 million euros6) could be achieved. This shift should also act an incentive for compliance 
for the catching sector given the greater flexibility it provides fishermen in how they operate.  

Other stakeholders 

The move to regionalisation should not impact on third countries. 

8.4.5. 

Impacts on SMEs 

The  impact  on  SMEs  in  terms  of  administrative  costs  and  burden  would  be  positive  in  that 
there would be immediate simplification of the current regulations and a greater role for the 
catching  sector  through  the  ACs  in  the  development  of  technical  measures.  In  addition  the 
potential  move  to  a  results-based  system  in  the  longer-term  would  lead  to  further 
simplification of the technical rules but implies a shift in the burden of proof onto the catching 
sector.  This  will  put  the  onus  on  the  catching  sector  to  demonstrate  and  document  catches 
accurately.  Potentially  this  may  increase  costs  associated  with  documentation  of  catches 
although  the  costs  incurred  would  depend  on  the  approach  of  the  Member  States  to 
“regionalised control” and offset against the greater flexibility such an approach would afford. 
Member  States  may  attempt  to  past  some  of  the  control  costs  onto  the  catching  sector  as  a 
trade-off  for  flexibility  although  equally  they  may  choose  to  continue  to  bear  the  costs  for 
control themselves with support from the EMFF. 

51 

 
 
8.5. 

Sub-option 2.1: Framework approach without baselines 

8.5.1.  Economic impacts 

MSY and the landing obligation 

Based  on  past  experiences  the  short-term  economic  impacts  are  likely  to  be  negative  as  a 
result of partial "de-regulation". Partial de-regulation will introduce uncertainty and create a 
legal  vacuum.  With  no  baseline  standards  in  place  there  will  be  no  measures  directly 
controlling  exploitation  patterns  (i.e.  mesh  sizes,  minimum  conservation  reference  sizes  or 
closed areas would be deleted). There is a high risk that exploitation patterns will deteriorate 
and fishing mortality will increase to unsustainable levels as fishermen attempt to adapt to de-
regulation.  To  compensate  for  overfishing  will  require  downward  adjustments  of  fishing 
opportunities  leading  to  significant  reductions  in  incomes  across  the  catching  sector.  In  a 
worst  case  scenario  widespread  overfishing  could  lead  to  the  total  closure  of  a  fishery  with 
significant  economic  consequences.  Example  27  concerning  the  fishery  for  haddock  in 
Rockall illustrates the potential impacts caused in a fishery with partial de-regulation. 

Example 27: The fishery for haddock around Rockall (ICES Division VIb) was traditionally 
exploited by EU vessels from UK and Ireland with catches of around 6,000 tonnes valued at 
around  €8  million91.  The  fishery  was  managed  under  a  TAC  with  technical  measures 
regulating  mesh  size  and  minimum  landing  size.  In  the  late  1990s  part  of  division  VIb  was 
designated  as  being  in  international  waters  where  non-EU  vessels  were  not  subject  to  any 
TAC or technical measures. This allowed part of the fishery to be unregulated and resulted in 
a fleet of Russian vessels entering the fishery. These were large vessels fishing unselectively 
with small mesh codends92. Catches by the EU vessels began to decline following the entry of 
the Russian vessels into the fishery and soon after the stock collapsed resulting in a reduction 
of  catches  by  EU  vessels  from  5,000  tonnes  in  1999  to  430  tonnes  in  2004,  a  reduction  of 
90%91  representing  a  loss  of  revenue  of  around  €6  million.  The  Russian  vessels  left  the 
fishery and since then the stock situation has steadily improved. 

This sub-option may also introduce an incentive to misreport catches or alternatively discard 
illegally  unwanted  catches  to  minimise  economic  impacts.  Without  adequate  independent 
monitoring at the level of an individual business, it could result in ‘free-rider’ effects. In the 
absence  of  appropriate  monitoring,  some  businesses  may  choose  to  adopt  measures  to 
minimise unwanted catches, resulting in short-term losses while other ‘free-riders’ (those who 
don’t change behaviour) may then benefit without paying for the cost. If there are sufficient 
‘free-riders’, then no benefit is accrued and the individuals who have acted in a responsible 
manner are effectively penalised twice12. The use of Article 17 to reward responsible fishing 
with increased fishing opportunities may counteract these free-rider effects to a certain extent. 

These negative economic impacts, however, are likely to be temporary as the risks associated 
will act as a driver for Member States to put in place regional measures rapidly, in the short-
term, under discard plans and in  the longer-term, under multiannual plans. At this stage the 
positive impacts projected under option 2 would be the more likely outcome depending on the 
scale of any impacts they may have occurred in the transition period. 

Adaptation costs 

The  costs  would  be  similar  to  option  2  but  very-much  dependent  on  the  above-mentioned 
"free-rider" effects. 

Competitiveness 

The  impact  on  the  competitiveness  of  the  catching  sector  would  be  similar  to  option  2 
although would be even more dependent on the speed and effectiveness of regionalisation. 

Other stakeholders 

52 

 
 
The  impacts  on  downstream  and  ancillary  businesses  are  dependent  on  the  reaction  of  the 
catching sector. The reaction of third countries to limited regulation is harder to assess. Some 
countries may see the benefits of such an approach (e.g. in the Mediterranean) whereas in the 
northeast Atlantic countries such as Norway may not agree with such an approach. 

8.5.2. 

Social impacts 

As  with  the  economic  impacts,  the  short-term  social  impacts  are  likely  to  be  negative. 
Overfishing in the short-term would lead to job losses, particularly in those sectors targeting 
depleted  stocks  in  line  with  the  reductions  in  employment  forecast  under  the  baseline 
scenario.  In  the  longer-term  stabilisation  of  employment  and  improvement  in  job  quality 
through  reductions  in  unwanted  catches  and  increases  in  wages  from  landing  bigger  more 
valuable fish is likely. Under this scenario job quality would improve in line with option 2. 

Other stakeholders 

The degree to which downstream and ancillary businesses are impacted will be dependent on 
the reaction of the catching sector to partial de-regulation. 

8.5.3.  Environmental impacts 

As  with  the  economic  impacts  based  on  previous  experiences  of  fisheries  with  limited 
technical  measures  regulations  in  place,  the  environmental  impacts  will  be  negative  in  the 
short-term with the high risk of overfishing. The scale of impacts is illustrated in example 28 
concerning the sea bass stock for which there have only been very limited technical measures 
in place in the past but which have seen rapid increases in fishing pressure.  

Example 28: Sea bass are a valuable fish species targeted by pelagic pair trawlers on offshore 
spawning grounds and as a seasonal target and bycatch by a large fleet of inshore vessels from 
many Member States. Sea bass is also an important species for recreational anglers. Despite 
its  importance  up  until  2015,  apart  from  some  national  rules  mainly  regulating  recreational 
fisheries  only  a  minimum  landing  size  applied  to  the  commercial  fisheries  at  Union  level. 
Following a rapid increase in biomass throughout the stock area in the early 1990s there has 
been a steady increase in fishing mortality and landings. During the mid-2000s recruitment of 
young fish declined and has been very poor since 200893. Despite this, mainly because of the 
lack  of  any  meaningful  measures  either  nationally  or  at  Union  level  to  control  exploitation 
patterns  the  stock  has  declined  dramatically.  ICES  advised  in  2014  that  fishing  mortality 
needs to be reduced substantially to recover the stock. In response to this the Commission has 
come  forward  with  a  series  of  emergency  technical  measures  including  increasing  the 
minimum  size,  introducing  a  closed  area  as  well  as  restricting  fishing  effort  in  order  to 
recover the stock94.  

The  negative  environmental  impacts  are  likely  to  be  temporary  and  in  the  longer-term 
provided effective measures are in place  through regionalisation then the impacts should be 
reduced.  The  speed  of  recovery  is  dependent  on  the  scale  of  negative  impacts  caused  from 
overfishing.  

Regarding sensitive species and habitats, the environmental impacts will be similar to option 
2. Existing environmental protection measures would remain in place and in the longer-term 
new measures would introduce under regionalisation to alleviate threats to such species. 

Other stakeholders 

Evidence from the public  consultation showed that  NGOs  would not  be in  favour of partial 
de-regulation.  They  indicated  this  to  be  a  risky  strategy  that  could  lead  to  unsustainable 

53 

 
 
fishing.  This  may  translate  into  a  negative  reaction  from  consumers  on  the  basis  of 
information from NGOs. 

8.5.4. 

Simplification, administrative costs and burden 

There would be immediate repeal of many of the existing Regulations as well as the deletion 
of  specific  articles  from  several  others.  Only  common  technical  provisions  and  essential 
nature conservation measures would remain in place.  

The  deletion  of  multiple  regulations  and  measures  would  have  obvious  benefits  in  reducing 
administrative burden for Member State administrations but  would infer  extra responsibility 
for  ensuring  accurate  catch  reporting  pending  technical  measures  being  put  in  place  at 
regional  level.  This  additional  responsibility  would  probably  create  additional  costs  for 
Member  States  in  putting  in  place  accurate  catch  reporting  systems  although  these  are  not 
related  to  regulating  technical  measures.  Member  State  managing  authorities  would  incur 
additional costs associated with regionalisation as described under option 2. 

Costs  and  workloads  for  national/regional  scientists,  STECF  and  ICES  would  be  similar  to 
those projected under option 2. 

Costs for controlling technical measures will reduce in the short-term as a result of partial de-
regulation. However, reductions in costs for monitoring technical rules would be offset by the 
need  for  increased  monitoring  of  catches  that  would  be  required  under  the  results-based 
approach  envisaged  under  this  option.  As  with  option  2  once  there  is  confidence  in  catch 
reporting  then  the  level  of  control  at  sea  could  be  reduced  and  costs  are  likely  to  reduce. 
Conversely a lack of trust in catch reporting by the catching sector may lead to increased costs 
for catch monitoring in the short-term. Accurate catch reporting will be harder to achieve for 
towed gear demersal fisheries.  

Other stakeholders 

Third countries would benefit from reduced administrative burden under this option to the same 
degree as the EU catching sector. However, similarly the shift in the burden of proof would result 
in  increased  responsibilities  for  fishermen  from  third  countries  operating  in  Union  waters.  This 
could make negotiation of third country agreements problematic. 

8.5.5. 

Impacts on SMEs 

The  catching  sector  would  benefit  from  the  reduction  of  administrative  burden  and  costs 
associated with partial de-regulation. In addition the move to a results-based approach would 
be  positive  for  the  catching  sector  as  under  option  2  in  providing  greater  flexibility  in  how 
they  operate.  Regionalisation  will  bring  increased  costs  through  the  involvement  of  the 
catching sector with the ACs but has the benefit of increased their participation in developing 
technical measures. The risks of overfishing are high which would negatively impact on the 
catching sector. 

8.6. 

Option 3: Elimination of technical measures 

8.6.1.  Economic impacts 

MSY and the landing obligation  

The economic impacts are likely to be similarly negative as sub-option 2.1 in the short-term. 
The impacts are critically dependent on the degree of compliance and reaction of the catching 
sector  to  “de-regulation”.  "De-regulation"  as  envisaged  could  lead  to  widespread  overfishing 
with knock-on economic impacts which would be significant and likely to be longer-term than 
under sub-option 2.1 without any direct linkage to regionalisation. 

Adaptation costs 

54 

 
 
The costs would be similar to sub-option 2.1. 

Competitiveness 

"De-regulation"  would  introduce  a  high  degree  of  competitiveness  amongst  the  catching 
sector  as  individual  operators  would  have  almost  complete  freedom  to  decide  on  how  to 
operate in the short-term. This could lead to "Olympic fisheries" as fishermen strive to catch 
available  fishing  opportunities  as  quickly  as  possible  to  maximise  economic  efficiency 
without necessarily having any regard for the environmental impacts on the stocks that could 
result  (i.e.  fishing  unselectively  and  illegally  discarding  low-vale  unwanted  catches).  In  a 
worst  case  scenario  this  will  result  in  the  least  efficient  operators  or  fishermen  choosing  to 
fish responsibly being driven out of the industry before Member States have had time to react 
with  regionally  rules  or  the  introduction  of  rules  at  Union  level.  Incentives  in  the  form  of 
additional fishing opportunities to those who fish responsibly allowed for under Article 17 of 
the CFP may help to alleviate these impacts.  

Other stakeholders 

The  reaction  of  third  countries  to  "de-regulation"  is  uncertain.  Some  countries  may  see  the 
benefits  of  such  an  approach  (e.g.  in  the  Mediterranean)  whereas  in  the  northeast  Atlantic 
countries such as Norway may be negative towards such a management strategy. 

8.6.2. 

Social impacts 

The social impacts would be similar to sub-option 2.1.  

Other stakeholders 

The impacts on downstream and ancillary businesses will be dependent on the reaction of the 
catching sector. 

8.6.3.  Environmental impacts 

The environmental impacts are most likely to be negative as under sub-option 2.1. There is an 
even higher risk of overfishing with corresponding negative impacts on stock sustainability, 
which may  be  difficult to  reverse in the short-term. If the catching  sector  reacted positively 
and  move  to  sustainable  fishing  then  the  impacts  would  be  alleviated  reasonably  quickly. 
However, past experience prior to the CFP would suggest that some level of technical rules is 
required otherwise sustainability is threatened. In the Mediterranean there is a risk under this 
option of fishermen targeting small fish without no minimum conservation reference sizes in 
place  in  the  short-term.  This  would  have  significant  negative  impacts  on  stocks  in  the 
Mediterranean13. 

Essential  environmental  protection  measures  (e.g.  closed  areas)  would  remain  in  place. 
Therefore in the short-term the impacts would be neutral as per the baseline scenario. In the 
longer-term  environmental  impacts  may  reduce  but  will  depend  on  Member  States  on 
introducing effective measures regionally. 

Other stakeholders 

There is likely to be a negative reaction to "de-regulation" from the NGOs. This evidenced by 
the  public  consultation  and  may  translate  into a  negative  reaction  from  consumers  affecting 
prices and economic viability. 

8.6.4. 

Simplification, administrative costs and burden 

The removal of virtually all technical rules and also a significant reduction of administrative 
costs and burden is the major advantage. Most of the existing regulations would be repealed 

55 

 
 
as  well  as  specific  articles  relating  to  technical  measures  would  be  deleted.  The  deletion  of 
multiple  regulations  and  measures  would  have  obvious  benefits  for  Member  State 
administrations  in  cutting  red-tape  but  the  immediate  move  to  a  fully-fledged  results-based 
approach  would  infer  extra  responsibility  for  accurate  catch  reporting.  In  the  longer-term, 
some  level  of  regulation  may  actually  be  re-introduced  to  prevent  or  reverse  the  damage 
caused by unsustainable fishing. 

Administrative burden and costs for national/regional scientists, STECF and ICES would be 
similar to those described for sub-option 2.1.  

Costs  for control would follow a similar evolution  as  predicted under  sub-option 2.1. There 
would be significant reductions in control costs for at sea enforcement of technical rules but 
this would be offset to some extent by increased catch monitoring.  

Other stakeholders 

Impacts would be the same as those predicted under option 2 and sub-option 2.1. 

8.6.5. 

Impacts on SMEs 

This  option  has  obvious  benefits  for  the  catching  sector  in  terms  of  reductions  in 
administrative burden and costs associated with complying with technical rules. However, de-
regulation would introduce uncertainty into the industry and create an uneven playing field at 
the level of individual fishermen. Free –rider effects are likely to be significant.  

8.7. 

Summary of impacts 

Table  8.7.1  summarises  the  economic,  social  and  environmental  impacts  on  the  key 
the  baseline  scenario.
stakeholders  of 

the  different  policy  options  compared 

to 

56 

 
 
Impacts 

Baseline Scenario  

Option 1  

Option 2  

Option 3 

Consolidation 

Framework Regulation 

Economic 
(catching 
sector) 

MSY and the 
landing obligation  

Neutral – No change in 
number of overfished 
stocks. Unwanted 
catches remain high.  
Impacts most acute in 
mixed demersal 
fisheries. 

Neutral – Same as 
baseline in the short-
term. Longer-term 
situation may improve. 

Adaptation costs 

Neutral - No additional 
costs.   

Competitiveness 
(catching sector) 

Neutral –No change   

Neutral – Similar to the 
baseline. In the longer-
term costs may increase 
as fishermen are forced 
to adapt gears due to 
economic losses. 
Neutral – Same as 
baseline.  

With Baselines Standards 

Without Baselines Standards 

(Sub-option 2.1) 

Neutral or Positive – After 
initial transitional period 
framework will accelerate 
regionalisation leading to the 
optimisation of exploitation 
patterns and facilitate 
movement to sustainable 
fishing 
Neutral – Short-term costs to 
adjust to baselines. Longer-
term gear adaptation becomes 
a business decision rather than 
driven by legislation 

Negative – Very much dependent on 
the reaction of the catching sector to 
partial de-regulation but overfishing 
in the short-term likely lead to 
reductions in fishing opportunities. In 
the longer-term regionalisation 
should improve the situation. 

Neutral – Short-term costs to adjust 
to baselines. Longer-term gear 
adaptation becomes a business 
decision rather than driven by 
legislation 

Positive – Regionalisation 
may introduce competitiveness 
between catching sectors in 
different regions 

Positive – regionalisation may give a 
competitive advantage but dependent 
on reaction to partial de-regulation 
and potential  

Social (catching 
sector) 

Employment & 
Working 
conditions 

Environmental 
impacts 

Biological & 
Physical impacts 

Neutral – employment 
likely to continue to 
decline with a general 
deterioration in job 
quality likely.  

Neutral – Same as 
baseline. In the longer-
term situation should 
stabilise with the move 
to regionalisation.  

Neutral – No 
improvement in levels 
of overfishing or 
impacts on sensitive 
species or habitats 

Neutral – Same as 
baseline. In the longer-
term the situation may 
improve  

Neutral or Positive – Similar 
to baseline in the short-term 
but fishing sustainably will 
lead to stabilise employment 
and increase income and 
wages. 
Positive – Regionalisation 
should lead to improve 
exploitation patterns reducing 
overfishing and effective 
measures introduce for 

Negative –  Very much dependent on 
the reaction of the catching sector to 
partial de-regulation dependent on 
the reaction of the catching sector to 
partial de-regulation 

Negative/Positive – Partial de-
regulation may lead to overfishing. 
In the longer-term situation should 
improve and overfishing reduced. 
Impacts on sensitive species and 

57 

Elimination of Technical 
Measures 

Negative –Critically 
dependent on the reaction of 
the catching sector to de-
regulation 

Neutral – Short-term costs 
to adjust to baselines. 
Longer-term gear adaptation 
becomes a business decision 
rather than driven by 
legislation 
Negative or Positive – De-
regulation will introduce 
competitiveness but free-
rider effects and Olympic 
fishing may result. 
Negative – Very much 
dependent on the reaction of 
the catching sector to partial 
de-regulation dependent on 
the reaction of the catching 
sector to de-regulation. 
Negative – De-regulation 
may lead to overfishing and 
negative impacts on sensitive 
species that may hard to 
reverse. 

 
 
 
 
 
Simplification 

Administrative 
Costs & Burden 

National 
Administrations 

Neutral - no 
simplification  

Neutral – no increase 
in workload or costs. 
Multiple regulations 
will still need to be 
administered.  

Slightly Positive - 
Common rules 
incorporated into one 
Regulation 
Neutral – Same as 
baseline 

Scientific 
Community 

Neutral – no change  

Control  Costs 

Control and 
Enforcement 
Agencies 

Neutral – High costs of 
control will continue 

SMEs 

Catching Sector 

Neutral – Costs 
&Admin burden remain 
high 

Neutral – Same as 
baseline. In the longer-
term costs may increase 
to support the 
development of 
regionalised plans 

Neutral – Same as 
baseline. In the longer-
term regionalisation may 
lead to reduced control 
costs. 

Negative or Positive – 
Admin burden & costs 
remain high but greater 
involvement in decision-
making through 
regionalisation 

sensitive species and habitats 

Positive - Rules incorporated 
into one Framework regulation 

Neutral – Simplification of 
rules will reduce 
administrative burden but 
balanced against increased 
workload and costs for 
managing regionalisation 

habitats will be unchanged in the 
short-term but improve in the longer-
term.  
Positive – Common rules 
incorporated into one Framework 
regulation without baselines 
standards  
Neutral – Simplification of rules will 
reduce administrative burden but 
balanced against increased workload 
and costs for managing 
regionalisation. 

Neutral – Same as option 1 

Neutral – Same as option 1 

Positive - most regulations 
would be deleted 
immediately 

Neutral - Simplification of 
rules will reduce 
administrative costs and 
burden but additional 
workload and costs arise if 
overfishing occurs as a result 
of de-regulation 
Neutral – Same as sub-
option 2.1 

Neutral or Positive – Move 
towards a focus on catch based 
management reduces the need 
for control of detailed 
technical rules and therefore 
reduce costs 

Positive –Costs associated 
with regionalisation balanced 
against greater participation in 
decision-making process &  
simplification 

Neutral or Positive – Move towards 
a focus on catch based management 
reduces the need for control of 
detailed technical rules and therefore 
reduce costs 

Positive –Costs associated with 
regionalisation balanced against 
greater participation in decision-
making process &  simplification but 
de-dependent on reaction of catching 
sector to partial de-regulation 

Positive or Negative– Costs 
for control will decrease in 
the short-term as a result of 
de-regulation but may 
increase to compensate for 
increased costs for 
monitoring catches 
Positive or Negative – Costs 
associated with 
regionalisation balanced 
against greater participation 
in decision-making process 
&  simplification but free-
rider effects likely  

Table 7.6.1: Summary of impacts for the different policyoptions 
(Source: Author) 

58 

 
 
 
9. 

COMPARING THE OPTIONS 

9.1. 

Qualitative assessment against the general, specific and operational objectives 

Table 8.1.1 provides a comparison of options in terms of achieving the objectives of revising the technical measures compared to the baseline. 

Options 

Baseline Scenario 

Option 1 - 
Consolidation 

Bringing all European fish stocks to MSY by 2015 or 2020 at 
the latest 
Reduction of unwanted catches and elimination of discards in 
fisheries subject to catch limits by 2019 
Achievement  of  GES  by  2020,  as  established  under  the 
MSFD 

0 
No new measures or 
change in regulatory 
structure envisaged. 

0 
No new measures 
or change in 
regulatory 
structure envisaged 
in the short-term.  

Improvement in the effectiveness of technical measures; 

0  
No change 

0 
Only minimal 
change in structure 
in the short-term. 

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i
t
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i
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Option 2 Framework 

Option 3 –Elimination  

With baselines 
standards 
+ 
Introduces 
flexibility through 
regionalisation 
which provides the 
potential for 
improvements in 
exploitation patterns 

+ 
Flexibility provided 
by regionalisation 
combined with 
simplification 
should improve 
effectiveness 

Without baseline 
standards 
-/+ 
Introduces flexibility 
through regionalisation 
which provides the 
potential for 
improvements in 
exploitation patterns 
but dependent on the 
reaction of the catching 
sector to partial de-
regulation 
+/- 
Flexibility provided by 
regionalisation 
combined with 
simplification should 
improve effectiveness 
but there is risk partial 
de-regulation leading to 
overfishing  

-/+ 
Introduces flexibility 
but fully dependent on 
the reaction of the 
catching sector to full 
de-regulation. 

+/- 
De-regulation provides 
maximum flexibility 
and shifts the burden of 
proof to the catching 
sector to demonstrate 
targets and objectives of 
the CFP are being met 
but de-regulation runs 
the risk of widespread 
overfishing 
0  
Uses the overarching 
objectives of the CFP  

Defines clear objectives and success criteria 

0  
Uses the overarching 
objectives of the CFP 

+ 
Specific targets  
and indicators are 
established in the 
framework 

+ 
Specific targets  and 
indicators are 
established in the 
framework 

+ 
Specific targets  and 
indicators are 
established in the 
framework regulation to 

59 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eliminates over-regulation and simplifies 
. 

0 
Existing 'web' of 
regulations remain in place 

Flexible legal framework for technical measures and acts as a 
vehicle for regionalisation 

Promotes  a  transparent  and  participatory  approach  to  the 
definition and specification of technical measures. 

Establish  incentive  structures  linked  to  the  added  flexibility 
offered  by  regionalisation  and  rewarding  of  "responsible 
fishing" 

s
e
v
i
t
c
e
j
b
O

l
a
n
o
i
t
a
r
e
p
O

Establish clear targets  

Establish indicators to measure success 

0 
No added flexibility 
provided. Regionalisation 
is an option but not the 
focus  
0 
Relies on role for 
stakeholders established in 
the CFP.  
0 
No new incentives created 
over and above what is 
already included in the 
CFP 

0 
Uses the overarching 
targets defined in the CFP 

0 
No indicators defined 

Delete redundant rules and simplify other rules to make them 
understandable and controllable; 

0 
Existing 'web' of 
regulations remain in place  

regulation to 
complement CFP 
+ 
Level of 
simplification 
through 
consolidation of 
common measures 
into one regulation 
0 
As baseline 

0  
As  baseline 

0 
No new incentives 
created over and 
above what is 
already included in 
the CFP 

0 
Targets defined in 
overarching 
regulation 
0 
Indicators defined 
in overarching 
regulation 
+ 
Level of 
simplification 
through 
consolidation of 
common measures 

regulation to 
complement CFP 
++ 
Measures 
consolidated into 
one framework 
regulation. 

+ 
Increased flexibility 
and provides direct 
linkage to 
regionalisation 
+ 
Clear role for 
stakeholders defined 
in framework 
+ 
Increased flexibility 
and opportunities to 
move towards a 
results-based 
approach under 
regionalisation 
included in 
framework 
+ 
Targets defined in 
the framework 
regulation  
+ 
Indicators defined in 
the framework 

++ 
Measures 
consolidated into 
one framework 
regulation 

complement CFP 

++ 
Measures consolidated 
into one framework 
regulation  

++ 
De-regulation most 
measures and 
regulations deleted 

+ 
Increased flexibility and 
provides direct linkage 
to regionalisation  

+ 
Clear role for 
stakeholders defined in 
framework 
+/- 
Increased flexibility and 
opportunities to move 
towards a results-based 
approach under 
regionalisation included 
in framework 

+ 
Targets defined in the 
framework regulation 

+ 
Indicators defined in the 
framework 

+/- 
As sub-option 2.1  

0 
As baseline 

+/- 
Increased flexibility and 
opportunities to move 
towards a results-based 
approach created 
through de-regulation 
but danger of "free-
rider" effects negating 
positive incentives  
0 
As baseline 

0 
As baseline 

++ 
Measures consolidated 
into one framework 
regulation 

++ 
De-regulation with most 
measures and 
regulations deleted 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Manage  the  transition  to  regionlisation  in  the  period  up  to 
2020 by defining baseline standards  

0 
Relies on existing 
measures to act as 
baselines 

into one regulation 
0 
Relies on existing 
measures to act as 
baseline  standards 

+ 
Establishes 
baselines based on 
existing measures 

- 
Relies on measures to 
be developed under 
regionalisation 

Establish  the  necessary  legal  architecture  to  allow  deviation 
from 
the 
development of alternative measures 

these  baseline  standards  and  provide 

for 

Establish  linkages  with  the  CFP  to  allow  for  stakeholder 
involvement in the development of technical measures  

0 
Relies on the existing 
empowerments included in 
the CFP 

0 
As baseline 

0 
Relies on role for 
stakeholders established in 
the CFP.  

0  
As baseline 

++ 
Establishes legal 
architecture in the 
framework 
regulation 

+ 
Clear role for 
stakeholder defined 
in framework 

+ 
Establishes legal 
architecture in the 
framework regulation 
but without defined 
baselines 
+ 
Clear role for 
stakeholder defined in 
framework 

- 
No baseline standards 
included. Relies on the 
CFP to drive 
improvements in 
selectivity 
0 
As baseline 

0 
As  baseline 

Table 8.1.1 Comparison of options in terms of achieving the objectives of revising the technical measures  
 (Source: Author) 
Key: 0 = neutral impact, + = positive impact, ++ = very positive impact, - = negative impact, -/+ = both positive and negative impacts,  

 
 
Effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and acceptability 

9.2. 
Effectiveness95 

Given this initiative concentrate on changes in governance with only limited to changes to the 
substance  of  the  regulations,  the  analysis  of  effectiveness  centres  on  the  benefits  of 
introducing  flexibility,  simplifying 
incentives  for 
behavioural change and compliance and through greater stakeholder participation instilling a 
sense of ownership with the measures put in place. 

the  regulatory  structure,  creating 

Option 1 is not likely to enhance the contribution of technical measures to the achievement of 
the  general  objectives  of  the  CFP  compared  to  the  baseline  scenario,  at  least  in  the  short-
term.  The  minimal  changes  in  the  regulatory  structure  through  splitting  common  measures 
from  regional  rules  only  partially  address  the  specific  and  operational  objectives.  Technical 
measures  are  still  very  much  prescriptive  and  restrictive  and  there  is  no  direct  driver  for 
regionalisation.  Amendments  to  technical  measures  would  be  principally  under  co-decision 
with only the existing empowerments in the regulations providing a degree of flexibility. This 
would result in more regulations being added to the regulatory framework (i.e. still very much 
a  top-down  prescriptive  approach)  or  derogations,  diluting  effectiveness  as  is  currently  the 
case. There would be little no added incentives over and above what is included in the CFP 
and the weaknesses relating to the lack of involvement of stakeholders would continue. The 
definition of clear objectives and indicators to measures success would be beneficial and even 
if the use of regionalisation under this option may not necessarily translate into simpler rules, 
it  can  be  expected  that  regional  measures  will  be  more  focused  and  streamlined,  leading  to 
improved effectiveness and controllability in the longer-term. 

Option  2  would  be  more  effective  than  the  baseline  and  option  1.  The  degree  to  which 
effectiveness  would  be  improved  is  related  to  the  speed  of  regionalisation  (as  outlined  in 
Section  9.3).  The  quicker  regionalisation  evolves  across  the  region,  the  more  effective  the 
framework will become. In this regard by providing clear and direct linkage to regionalisation 
it would act driver for regionalisation. It would provide flexibility and the opportunity in the 
longer-term  to  move  towards  a  results-based  approach  where  the  need  for  detailed  rules  is 
reduced. Under such an approach the stakeholders have a much greater sense of ownership of 
the  fisheries.  This  combined  with  the  copper  fastening  of  the  clearly  defined  role  for 
stakeholders  provided  by  the  CFP  through  the  Advisory  Councils  in  the  development  of 
technical  measures regionally  should provide a  greater incentive for  compliance  and to  fish 
selectively.  

In  addition, even  without the swift development of technical  measures at  regional level this 
option  provides  for  a  level  of  simplification  through  the  repealing  of  a  number  of  existing 
regulations  and  the  deletion  of  redundant  measures  (i.e.  addresses  the  weakness  of 
prescriptive and complex rules). This will have immediate benefit for the catching sector in 
reducing and simplifying the rules that must be complied with but also for control authorities 
who  will  have  to  monitor  compliance.  This  option  provides  for  the  smooth  transition  to 
regionalisation, while it also allows for the review and consolidation of existing measures that 
may be needed in the short-term to ensure the sustainability objectives of the CFP continue to 
be met while regionalisation evolves. As with option 1 the definition of clear and measurable 
objectives and indicators in the form of targets to measure success will address one of the five 
main  weaknesses  identified  with  the  current  regulatory  structure.  Option  2  will  benefit 
fisheries  in  the  NE  Atlantic  and  Baltic  the  most.  In  the  Mediterranean,  without  TAC  and 
quotas based on current experiences, regionalisation is likely to be much slower to develop. It 
will be harder for Member States to incentivise the use of more selective gears in the absence 

62 

 
 
of fishing opportunities to allocate to reward good practice. The existence of "black" markets 
for undersize fish will also provide a dis-incentive in the short-term for improved selectivity. 

Sub-option  2.1  provides  many  of  the  same  benefits  as  option  2.  However,  it  introduces 
uncertainty and creates a partial legal vacuum in the short-term without baseline standards to 
act as safeguards in the transitional period up to 2020. There is a risk it will not deliver on the 
general  objectives  of  the  CFP  as  partial  de-regulation  may  lead  to  "free-rider"  effects  with 
fishermen  choosing  to  fish  unselectively  to  gain  advantage  over  their  competitors.  It  relies 
heavily  on  Member  States  and  stakeholders  pro-actively  embracing  regionalisation  and 
regionalisation being immediately effective. There is a risk of over-fishing particularly in the 
short-term with these options although it is likely these negative impacts will be reversed once 
regionalisation "kicks-in". 

Option  3  has  clear  benefits  in  eliminating  over-regulation  and  simplification  through 
immediate de-regulation. As sub-option 2.1 it is an entirely results-based approach where the 
burden  of  proof  is  shifted  to  the  catching  sector  to  demonstrate  compliance  which  some 
sections of the catching sector have argued for. However, the same risk of overfishing exists 
and it is doubtful under this option that the Commission or Member States would be able to 
react  in  time  to  prevent  significant  negative  impacts  which  may  be  hard  to  reverse  without 
having  to  resort  to  significant  cuts  in  fishing  opportunities  and  fishing  effort.  De-regulation 
may create an incentive for fishermen to discard illegally rather than fish selectively, if there 
are costs associated with selective fishing in terms of lost catches. In turn the costs for control 
could  increase  significantly  if  there  is  no  trust  that  the  catching  sector  is  reporting  catches 
accurately. 
Efficiency96 

Option  1  would  provide  no  advantage  over  the  baseline  in  terms  of  cost  efficiency  in  the 
short-term. The costs for enforcement of technical measures would continue to be very high, 
as  Member  States  would  still  be  required  to  enforce  the  existing  raft  of  technical  rules  in 
addition to the increased levels of catch monitoring that would be required to implement the 
landing obligation. In the longer –term cost efficiency may improve as regionalisation evolves 
but this is dependent on what measures are introduced at the regional level 

Options 2 and sub-option 2.1 potentially will  lead to  cost efficiencies in  the short to  longer 
term as both of these options are based on the development of regionally specific measures. 
Through  simplification  and  moving  towards  a  results-based  approach  would  result  in  the 
focus  of  control  switching  to  the  monitoring  of  control  of  catches  with  less  emphasis  on 
regulating technical rules. In addition as confidence builds that fishermen are complying with 
the  rules  in  place  the  need  for  costly  sea  based  monitoring  would  diminish,  lowering  costs. 
Member  States  and  stakeholders  (i.e.  the  ACs)  would,  though  incur  increased  costs  in  the 
short-term  as  a  result  of  regionalisation.  These  costs  could  be  minimised  if  the  ACs  are 
successful  at  adjusting  their  work  programmes  to  the  requirements  of  the  regionalisation 
process. With the move to fishing at MSY and the introduction of the landing obligation the 
CFP has moved in this direction so aligning the regulatory structure of technical measures to a 
catch based approach will help to achieve the objectives more cost efficiently than the current 
regulatory structure. Aligning the technical measures with regionally based JDP programmes 
may also help to reduce costs of enforcement. 

The  cost  efficiency  of  option  3  is  dependent  on  the  speed  of  behavioural  change.  If  in  the 
short-term there is no confidence that the catching sector is accurately reporting catches then 
the  increases  costs  for  controlling  and  monitoring  catches  will  outweigh  any  savings  from 
"de-regulation".  If  confidence  is  greater,  then  cost-efficiency  will  increase  as  with  option  2 
and sub-option 2.1.  

63 

 
 
Multiannual Plans 

under co-decision 

which include the 

objectives for 

technical measures  

Coherence97 

Option  1 is  coherent with the overarching sustainability objectives of  the CFP but  not  fully 
coherent with regionalised decision-making. Regionalisation is likely to be very much piece-
meal  rather  than  targeted.  This  option  provides  only  limited  scope  for  simplification  and  so 
does  not  fully  correspond  to  the  objectives  for  Better  Regulation  under  the  REFIT 
programme2.  It  does  not  further  the  linkage  with  EU  environmental  policy  at  least  in  the 
short-term. 

Option  2  and  sub-option  2.1  are  coherent  with  the  objectives  of  the  CFP  and  provide  a 
governance structure that is fully in line with regionalisation. They represent a high level of 
simplification through the creation of one single framework Regulation rather than retaining 
multiple Regulations as with the baseline so are coherent with the REFIT programme2. Both 
will establish much better linkage of environmental policy with technical measures. However, 
there  is  a  risk  with  sub-option  2.1  that  the  sustainability  objectives  of  the  CFP  could  be 
compromised  if  the  catching  sector  does  not  choose  to  fish  responsibly  in  the  transition 
towards regionalisation. 

As  with  sub-option  2.1  the  absence  of  any  technical  rules  in  the  short-term  under  option  3 
may  jeopardise  meeting  the  sustainability  objectives  of  the  CFP.  It  does  not  necessarily 
promote regionalisation. Simplification is achieved by the immediate deletion of the majority 
of  technical  measures  regulations. As  with  option  1  it  does  not  further  the  linkage  with  EU 
environmental policy at least in the short-term. 

Acceptability 

Option  1  would  be  the  least  acceptable  of  the  options  put  forward.  It  represents  a 
consolidation rather than an overhaul of the current regulatory structure. Member States, the 
Advisory Councils, NGOs nor the catching sector felt this was a good option. It also limits the 
role of the co-legislators because there would be only minor changes to the current regulatory 
structure and any future changes would simply add on additional rules. There would be little 
or  no  pressure  form  stakeholders  or  added  incentive  for  Member  States  to  develop 
regionalised technical measures strategically as part of multiannual plans or any real incentive 
for the ACs to engage proactively. 

Option 2 was the preferred option for Member States, several of the Advisory Councils, NGOs 
and most of the catching sector. They saw it as the best way to manage the transition to full 
implementation  of  the  landing  obligation,  reaching  MSY  and  implementing  the  MSFD. 
Institutionally this option is more balanced than option 1 in that it provides the co-legislators 
with an opportunity to establish a new structure for technical measures. It also allows them to 
fix overarching  objectives  and targets as  well the baseline standards that will be the default 
option in the absence of measures at regional level. It also promotes a bottom-up approach by 
providing  stakeholders  with  a  clear  role  in  the  development  of  tailored  made  measures  for 
their particular sea basin. The other advantage is that it has the added safeguard in the form of 
existing measures that need to remain in place pending regionalisation. 

Sub-option  2.1  was  favoured  by  certain  sectors  of  the  fishing  industry  that  did  not  see  the 
need  for baseline measures to be included under  the framework. Member  States, the NGOs 
and some of Advisory Groups were less in favour seeing this as a riskier option, which would 
introduce  uncertainty.  Institutionally  it  is  weaker  than  Option  2  as  the  co-legislators  have 
much  less  of  a  direct  role  in  shaping  technical  measures.  They  have  input  into  setting  the 
objectives  and  principles  and  agreeing  on  common  measures  but  would  have  no  say  in  the 
describing  of  the  major  implementing  measures  such  as  mesh  size,  minimum  conservation 
reference sizes and  closures which would be agreed  regionally.  It is  also riskier in that  it is 

64 

 
 
reliant on multiannual plans being developed quickly and on technical measures contained in 
temporary discard plans to form a stop-gap in this transitional period. 

Option 3 would seem to be unacceptable to the Member States and NGOs as it does not have 
any  in  built  safeguards  to  deal  with  conservation  problems  that  emerge.  Several  of  the 
Advisory  Councils  were  similarly  negative.  However,  as  mentioned  above,  some  of  the 
catching sector preferred this option mainly as it does away with most technical rules. It relies 
on the introduction of technical measures largely through other instruments of the CFP or on a 
voluntary  basis  so  instructionally  it  gives  the  co-legislators  little  role  in  defining  technical 
measures.  

Table  8.2.1  summarises  the  options  in  terms  of  effectiveness,  efficiency,  coherence  and 
acceptability by stakeholders in achieving the objectives. 

Effectiveness 

Efficiency 

Coherence 

Acceptability 

Option 1 

Option 2 

Sub-Option 
2.1 

Option 3 

+ 

++ 

? 

? 

0 

-/+ 

-/+ 

-/+ 

0 

++ 

+ 

-/+ 

0 

+ 

-/+ 

-/+ 

Table 8.2.1 Comparison of the options in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and acceptability in 
achieving the objectives 
(Source: Author) 
Key: 0 = neutral impact, + = positive impact, ++ = very positive impact (relative to other options), - = 
negative impact, -/+ = both positive and negative impacts, ? = impact unknown 

9.3. 

Risk Assessment 

The impacts of the different options compared to the baseline, as well as their effectiveness, 
efficiency, coherence and acceptability by stakeholders are assessed assuming regionalisation 
is effective. This assumption is not free of risks, and in selecting a preferred option the extent 
to which they may affect the different options need to be considered. 

Four main risk factors exist: 

The speed of regionalisation 

Option 1 is not impacted directly by the speed of regionalisation. However, it carries a high 
risk that if regionalisation is slow to evolve then the current technical measures will remain in 
place for much longer. Acceptance of such a regulatory structure would be low. The incentive 
for  compliance  would  remain  similarly  low  as  in  would  remain  "top-down"  rather  than 
"bottom-up".  

Option  2  provides  for  a  smooth  transition  to  regionalisation  by  acting  as  a  central  storage 
facility  for  existing  measures  that  should  remain  in  place  while  regionalisation  evolves.  It 
allows  for  the  risk  of  regionalisation  being  slower  and  uneven  across  regions.  It  clearly 
triggers regionalisation where directly involved stakeholders see merits to it. 

Sub-option 2.1 relies heavily on regionalisation evolving quickly than envisaged under option 
2. In this regard it carries a higher risk than option 2. 

65 

 
 
 
Although  option  3  is  a  high  risk  strategy,  it  is  not  necessarily  impacted  by  the  speed  of 
regionalisation. It relies on the incentive generated by the landing obligation to affect change 
and much is left to Member States and stakeholders to decide whether technical measures will 
be needed under plans in the future. 

Managing the transition to regionalisation 

While regionalisation develops it is important to ensure there is no legal vacuum during the 
transition and that conservation objectives continue to be met. 

Option  1,  which  assumes  regionalisation  will  be  slow  to  develop,  carries  a  low  risk.  The 
governance  structure  envisaged  means  the  existing  rules  will  be  in  place,  which  provides 
some guarantee that the current situation will not deteriorate any further. 

Option 2 provides for a smooth transition so the risk of a legal vacuum or conservation issues 
is relatively low.  

Sub-option  2.1  and  option  3  are  higher  risk  strategies  as  in  the  short-term  there  would  be 
fewer technical rules in place to directly control exploitation patterns. The transition from the 
current management approach to regionalisation is very much left to Member States and the 
catching sector. There is no guarantee that by the time regionalised plans are developed the 
situation economically and environmentally would not have deteriorated beyond repair. 

Risk of non-compliance and incentive for change 

Regionalisation  instils  a  sense  of  ownership  in  that  the  measures  put  in  place  will  have 
originated  from  the  Member  States  themselves  with  the  direct  input  of  the  fishing  industry 
through the Advisory Councils. There is a far bigger incentive for Member States to enforce 
their own rules and much more likelihood of compliance with rules in which the industry has 
had  a  direct  say  in  developing.  This  is  compared  to  the  current  top-down  system  where  the 
rules  emanated from the Commission  and agreed on by the Member States  with little or  no 
direct involvement of the stakeholders. Developing this ownership should create more of an 
incentive  for  local  management  and  peer  pressure  amongst  fishermen  to  actively  report  on 
other  fishermen breaking the rules. Currently  there is a perception that those  who break  the 
rules are those who benefit most. Regionalisation should minimise this.  

Added  to  this,  regionalisation  should  introduce  much  more  flexibility  into  the  system 
providing rules tailored to the specific fisheries and that can be changed relatively quickly to 
react  to  evolving  problems.  Rules  under  co-decision  lack  this  flexibility  and  specificity  as 
they tend to be "one size fits all" solutions. 

The EMFF provides clear financial incentives for fishermen to develop and test new gears or 
management  approaches  developed  as  part  of  regionalisation,  to  adapt  existing  gears  to 
improve selectivity or diversify to gears with lower ecosystem impacts. Article 17 of the CFP 
also  provides  Member  States  with  the  possibility  of  rewarding  responsible  fishing  with 
increased fishing opportunities.  

In this context, option 1 does not provide any new incentive for compliance compared to the 
baseline  scenario.  There  is  a  high  risk  that  the  current  low  levels  of  compliance  with  some 
technical measures (e.g. the use of illegal attachments to the codends of trawls and the use of 
acoustic  deterrent  devices  to  mitigate  against  cetacean  bycatch)  and  the  incentive  for 
fishermen  to  minimise  the  impacts  of  the  rules  would  continue.  This  may  improve  in  the 
longer term as rules that are better adapted to meet the needs of the regions are developed. 

The governance framework under option 2 is better suited to addressing the shortcomings of 
the  current  technical  measures  regulations  compared  to  the  baseline  situation.  It  should 

66 

 
 
produce  positive  impacts  on  sustainability  of  exploitation,  and  contribute  to  a  decrease  in 
control  costs  and  burden  as  well  simplification  of  existing  rules.  Incentives  are  provided 
through increased  flexibility, greater ownership and simpler rules in  addition to the existing 
mechanisms. 

The  lack  of  rules  under  sub-option  2.1  and  option  3  could  act  as  a  strong  driver  for  non-
compliance and has the risk that fishermen, within regions and between regions, would adopt 
different strategies or in a worst case scenario, fishermen would exploit the lack of technical 
rules to fish unselectively and irresponsibly - "free-rider" effects. This would create tensions 
between  fishermen  and  Member  States.  However,  if  these  options  were  accepted  then  they 
would drive self-regulation and the use of peer pressure amongst fishermen. 

Risk of uneven implementation or creation of uneven playing field 

Regionalisation  as  envisaged  in  the  CFP  will  lead  to  a  certain  degree  of  uneven 
implementation  but  this  a  policy  choice  made  by  the  co-legislators  in  the  CFP.  They  have 
already  accepted  this  risk  when  agreeing  on  regionalisation.  Uneven  implementation  may 
create  tensions  between  Member  States  in  the  short-term  as  different  rules  are  developed 
between different regions. However, this may in fact act as an incentive for Member States in 
regions  where  regionalisation  is  slower  to  evolve  and  it  is  anticipated  that  this  will  help 
Member States  to  "learn"  from "doing".  For example based on the experiences to date with 
regionalisation  in  respect  of  temporary  discard  plans  it  is  clear  that  Member  States  in  the 
Northeast  Atlantic  and  the  Baltic  have  been  more  effective  at  working  collectively  at  the 
regional level than in the Mediterranean where there has been only minimal contact between 
the  Member  States.  However,  there  are  indications  that  the  Member  States  in  the 
Mediterranean have recognised this and have begun to explore and establish mechanisms to 
facilitate work regionally taking from the examples of the regional groups of Member States 
established in other regions (e.g. the Scheveningen group in the North Sea). 

The  risk  of  uneven  implementation  is  highest  with  sub-option  2.1  and  option  3  which  rely 
heavily on regionalisation to succeed.  

The  inclusion  of  baseline  measures  on  option  2  lessens  this  risk,  while  the  framework  is 
designed to act directly as a vehicle to encourage regionalisation.  

Option 1 is less reliant on regionalisation and so less susceptible to any problems generated 
through uneven implementation across regions. 

Regarding  the  disturbance  of  the  creation  of  level  playing  field  for  technical  measures  felt 
important by stakeholders, again this is a risk associated with regionalisation which has been 
accepted by the co-legislators.  

Under option 2 and sub-option 2.1, clear objectives will be set in the framework regulation, 
and  agreed  on  by  the  co-legislators.  These  will  apply  across  all  regions  ensuring  a  level-
playing field at the highest level. Operationally how Member States and stakeholders choose 
to achieve these objectives is left open so there is possibility that different measures will apply 
in different areas. However, free-rider effects under sub-option 2.1 would negate any concept 
of a "level playing field". 

Option  1  carries  a  lower  risk  of  uneven  measures  as  this  option  envisages  less  latitude  for 
Member States to adapt measures regionally but also defines objective at the level of the co-
legislator.  

Option 3 runs the highest risk of creating an uneven playing field. Under such a de-regulated 
approach there is a danger of widely different approaches emerging across regions. There is a 
risk of "Olympic fishing". 

67 

 
 
10. 

RANKING THE OPTIONS 

Retaining the current technical measures under the baseline scenario is not an option. 

Option  2  best  meets  the  objectives  set  and  provides  a  level  of  security  that  conservation 
objectives will continue to be met while regionalisation develops. In the longer-term (at the 
latest  by  2022)  option  2  aims  to  have  most  technical  measures  required  included  under 
regional plans. Option 2 is best geared to managing the transition to regionalisation.  

Sub-option  2.1  and  option  3  would  bring  about  simplification  of  technical  measures 
immediately which would find favour with the catching sector but are riskier. They rely in the 
short-term  on  significant  behavioural  change  of  fishermen  and  on  peer-pressure  and  self-
regulation  to  ensure  unselective  fishing  practices  do  not  prevail.  Member  States,  some 
sections of the catching sector and NGOs seem reluctant to move in this direction. However, 
in  the  longer-term  most  Member  States,  the  catching  sector  and  the  NGOs  see  this  as  a 
management approach to work towards. 

Option 1 is the least favoured and received very little support by stakeholders as an acceptable 
option. In the short-term it essentially keeps the current complex regulatory structure in place 
and  does  not  provide  any  clear  incentives  for  stakeholders  over  and  above  the  baseline 
scenario. It is also not fully coherent with the spirit of regionalisation as envisaged under the 
CFP. It does not directly manage the transition to regionalisation but is a low risk option in 
the  sense  that  it  assumes  that  by  maintaining  the  current  rules  in  place  until  regionalisation 
develops, the current situation will not deteriorate further. 

Option 2 is the preferred option. 

11. 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

11.1.  Monitoring 

Under  the  preferred  option  clear  targets  that  would  act  as  success  indicators  would  be 
established  for  the  reduction  and  as  far  as  possible  the  elimination  of  unwanted  catches  by 
2019  and  fishing  at  MSY  for  all  stocks  by  2020.  Targets  for  the  reduction  of  the  negative 
impacts  of  fishing  on  marine  ecosystems  to  contribute  to  the  achievement  of  GES  by  2020 
would  also  be  established.  In  order  to  measure  achievement  of  these  targets  the  following 
environmental, economic, social and compliance indicators are proposed: 

Environmental 

  Evolution  of  catch  profiles  (from  DCF  data):  catch  profiles  in  terms  of  mean 
lengths or proportion of fish larger than mcrs will be used to monitor improvements of 
the selectivity properties of fishing gears. 

  Number of stocks at MSY (from ICES advice): the number of stocks fished at Fmsy 
will  be  used  to  monitor  the  success  of  technical  measures  of  increasing  selectivity 
leading to improved exploitation patterns. 

  Evolution of incidental catches (from DCF data): the level of bycatch compared to 
overall  population  levels  will  be  used  to  monitor  the  effectiveness  of  mitigation 
measures introduced to reduce incidental catches. 

  Evolution of protection of sensitive habitats or seabed integrity (from DCF data): 
the  number  of  closed  areas  crated  to  protect  sensitive  habitats,  as  well  as  the 
effectiveness  of  mitigation  measures  developed  to  allow  low  impact  fishing  in  such 
areas. 

68 

 
 
Economic  

  Income,  GVA,  revenue/breakeven  revenue  and  net  profit  margins  (from  DCF 
data): the success of technical measures in contributing to revenues remaining stable 
following the introduction of the landing obligation and the move to MSY. 

Social 

  Employment  (FTE)  and  crew  wages  per  FTE  (from  DCF  data):  the  success  of 

technical measures in ensuring employment and crew wages do not deteriorate. 

Compliance 

  Number  of  infringements  related  to  technical  rules  (from  control  agencies  and 
EFCA): compliance and acceptability of the catching sector with technical measures. 

  At sea patrol days (from control agencies and EFCA the amount of time spent at 

sea monitoring technical rules.  

At  the  operational  level  technical  measures  will  be  monitored  principally  through  catch 
profile  data  collected  under  the  DCF.  This  will  be  collected  through  observers  on  board 
vessels as well as port sampling of landings. Routine inspections at sea and ashore will also 
allow  assessment  of  the  effectiveness  of  technical  measures  through  observation  of 
compliance with  measures  in  place and  also  from  catch  monitoring  which  will  also  provide 
information on catch profiles. In this regard an initiative taken by EFCA in sampling the "last 
haul"98  during  routine  monitoring  of  fishing  vessels  by  fisheries  protection  vessel  is  an 
important  tool  to  provide  information  on  catch  composition  and  estimated  discards).  Other 
monitoring measures such as the use of reference fleets may also be considered as operational 
monitoring tools which will provide supplementary information on catch profiles. A reference 
fleet is a pre-defined selection of vessels where the actual sampling is usually carried out by 
the  fishermen  themselves  or  in  some  cases  by  observers.  The  reference  fleet  is  within  the 
population  of  all  active  vessels  within  a  given  fleet.  Reference  fleets  have  the  ability  to 
provide documentation on entire catches, especially discards at a fine spatial scale. They also 
provide  a  platform  for  cross-referencing  official  catch  and  data  collecting  systems  and 
procedures (e.g., electronic logbooks, reporting- and grading systems, discards). 

11.2.  Evaluation 

An ex-post evaluation discussing the key evaluation questions (i.e. effectiveness, efficiency, 
coherence  and  relevance)  of  technical  measures  should  be  carried  out  by  2022  when  the 
landing obligation should be fully operational for several years, MSY achieved for all stocks 
and Good Environmental Status achieved for marine ecosystems under the MSFD. It would 
directly also feed into the retrospective evaluation of the CFP scheduled to begin in 2022 in 
preparation for the next reform. 

The new multiannual plans will be assessed by STECF 5 years after entry into force whether 
sustainability  objectives  are  being  achieved.  These  evaluations  will  provide  indications  of 
whether technical measures included as part of these plans are effective. 

Reporting  requirements  under  Articles  49  (functioning  of  the  CFP)  and  Article  50  of  the 
CFP99 (progress on achieving MSY), while not directly related to technical measures will also 
provide insight into the effectiveness of technical measures. 

Evaluation  of  measures  developed  regionally  will  also  have  to  be  carried  out  on  a  regular 
basis by STECF or ICES to ensure such measures are consistent with objectives of the CFP. 

69 

 
 
Annual  Reporting  of  the  EFCA  in  relation  to  Joint  Deployment  Programmes  (JDPs)  which 
document  the  number  and  reasons  for  infringements  detected  compared  to  the  number  and 
nature of inspections carried out.  This  will  provide an indication of the level  of compliance 
with the technical measures regulations. 

70 

 
 
 
 
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THE 
EUROPEANPARLIAMENT,  THE  COUNCIL,  THE  ECONOMIC  AND  SOCIAL  COMMITTEE  AND  THE 
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catch quota management system. – ICES Journal of Marine Science, doi:10.1093/icesjms/fsr065. 
91 ICES (2014). Celtic Sea and West of Scotland – Haddock in Division VIb (Rockall) 
92 http://www.researchgate.net/publication/222201030_Rockall_and_the_Scottish_haddock_fishery# 

93 ICES (2015). Sea bass (Dicentrarchus labrax) in Divisions IVb and c, VIIa, and VIId–h (Central and South 
North Sea, Irish Sea, English Channel, Bristol Channel, Celtic Sea) 
94 http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/sea-bass/index_en.htm 
95 The effectiveness of each option in terms of the general, specific and operational objectives has been assessed 
where effectiveness is defined "as the extent to which options achieve the defined objectives of the proposal". 
96 The efficiency of the different options has been compared to the baseline scenario where efficiency is defined 
as "the extent to which the objectives can be achieved for a given level of resources/at least cost". 
97 Coherence, defined as "the extent to which options are coherent with the overarching objectives of EU policy, 
and the extent to which they are likely to limit trade-offs across economic, social and environmental domain" has 
also been assessed. 
99http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201404/20140408ATT82472/20140408ATT82472EN
.pdf 
98  As  technical  measures  fall  under  exclusive  competence  the  evaluation  question  of  EU  added  value  is  not 
applicable. 

75 

 
 
 
LIST OF ANNEXES 

ANNEX I - SUMMARY OF PUBLIC CONSULTATION 

ANNEX II LIST OF MEETINGS, WORKSHOPS & CONSULTATION 

ANNEX III LIST OF STUDIES 

ANNEX IV INVENTORY OF EU TECHNICAL MEASURES REGULATIONS 

ANNEX V CURRENT REGULATORY STRUCTURE OF TECHNICAL MEASURES 

ANNEX  VI  DIFFERENCES  IN  GOVERNANCE  STRUCTURES  FOR  TECHNICAL 
MEASURES BY REGION  

ANNEX VII MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE COMMON FISHERIES POLICY 

ANNEX VIII TRENDS IN DISCARDING IN EU FISHERIES 

ANNEX IX DETAILED BEAKDOWN OF CATCHING SECTOR 

ANNEX  X  DETAIL  ON  THE  BASELINES  AND  THE  CRITERIA  FOR  THEIR 
ESTABLISHMENT 

76 

 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX I - SUMMARY OF PUBLIC CONSULTATION 

Introduction 

The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) includes as a management instrument the regulation of 
technical  aspects  of  fishing  operations,  through  so-called  technical  measures.  These  define 
and condition where, when and how a fishing enterprise can exploit and interact with marine 
resources  and  the  wider  marine  ecosystem.  These  rules  are  laid  down  in  a  series  of  Union 
Regulations on technical measures for the different sea basins of the Union waters. 

The European Commission, in a supporting consultation document, has indicated that current 
technical  measures  regulations  are  too  complex,  and  difficult  to  understand,  control  and 
enforce. Therefore a comprehensive revision is required to look at the technical measures in 
light  of  the  new  CFP  which  has  just  entered  into  force.  This  revision  will  also  provide  an 
opportunity  to  bring  about  a  general  improvement  in  the  technical  rules  to  facilitate  the 
implementation  of  the  landing  obligation  and  the  ecosystem-based  approach,  which  are  key 
objectives  in  the  new  CFP.  In  this  context  the  Commission  has  signalled  its  intention  to 
review and revise the current technical measures. 

Through  the  public  consultation  the  views  of  stakeholders  and  the  public  in  general  were 
sought on the best way forward to modernise and rationalise technical measures in the context 
of the new CFP. This document reports on the outcome of this consultation. 

The overview of the contributions presented is based on the written contributions received. It 
is neither intended to draw conclusions regarding the options proposed nor does it represent 
the  position  of  the  Commission.  It  will  support  the  preparation  of  the  Impact  Assessment 
report,  which  in  turn  will  be  the  basis  for  developing  the  Commission's  proposal  for  a  new 
framework for technical measures. 

Contributions received 

The public consultation took place between the 24 January and the 16 May 2014, with a total 
of  59  written  contributions  received.  Individual  contributions  are  available  on  the  dedicated 
website to this consultation1. Table 1 provides a summary of the submissions by stakeholder 
grouping. 

Stakeholder Group 

Number of contributions  Examples 

Table 1 - Breakdown of contributions 

Advisory Councils 

5 (9%) 

MED AC, SWW AC, NS AC, NWW AC, BS AC 

MS administrations 

15 (25%) 

Ministries, Local government 

Civil 
organisations 

society 

11 (19%) 

Environmental NGOs 

Industry/interest  groups 
stakeholder organisations 

22 (37%) 

General Public 

6 (10%) 

Fishermen's  representative  organisations,  ,  consumer 
groups, European transport workers federation, anglers  
organisations, fisheries consultants 

Citizens  with  differing  backgrounds  (e.g.  retired 
fisherman, anglers, member of NGO)  

1 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/maritimeaffairs_fisheries/consultations/technical-measures/index_en.htm 

77 

 
 
 
                                                 
Five of the seven operational Advisory Councils (ACs)  - the North Western Waters (NWW 
AC),  North  Sea  (NS  AC),  Baltic  (BS  AC),  South  Western  Waters  (SWW  AC)    and 
Mediterranean  (MED AC) - submitted comments. Three ACs (NS, SWW & MED) provided 
detailed  comments  covering  the  main  principles  and  challenges  outlined  in  the  consultation 
document.  The  two  other  ACs  (NWW  &  BS)  indicated  they  had  difficulties  in  agreeing  a 
common position amongst the AC membership and therefore their comments were restricted 
to  endorsing  the  need  for  a  revision  of  the  technical  measures  regulations  and  requesting 
further dialogue. 

Fifteen  submissions  were  received from  national  administrations  and regional  governmental 
agencies  covering  the  North  Atlantic,  North  Sea,  Baltic  and  Mediterranean.  These 
submissions either related to the challenges highlighted in the consultation document or dealt 
with regional issues relating to specific measures that created difficulties at a national level. 
Two Member States supplied an outline of their vision of the structure and content of a new 
technical  measures  framework.  No  submissions  were  received  from  the  Member  States  or 
industry groups from the Black Sea. 

Eleven environmental NGOs submitted contributions. These contributions largely dealt with 
the main issues included in the consultation document and tended to focus on environmental 
issues  and  the  linkage  of  technical  measures  with  environmental  rules.  Many  of  these 
submissions were detailed and provided examples to support their point of view. 

Twenty  two  contributions  were  submitted  by  a  range  of  industry  interest  groups  and  other 
stakeholder organisations. The majority of these were from fishermen's representative bodies 
(sixteen). Other submissions were received from a range of different stakeholder and business 
organisations representing anglers, consumer groups, workers' rights and one from a fisheries 
consultancy. The industry groups tended to follow the same line as the ACs although some of 
these groups concentrated on specific issue or issues relating to their particular region. Most 
of  the  remaining  submissions  tended  to  be  more  general  in  nature  concentrating  on  one  or 
more  of  the  specific  challenges  highlighted  in  the  consultation  document.  A  fisheries 
consultant put forward an alternative strategy for technical measures. 

There were six submissions from members of general public. Most of these concentrated on a 
particular issue or issues of interest to that respective individual. 

General Comments 

There  is  general  support  across  stakeholders  and  Member  States  for  the  broad  approach 
outlined  in  the  consultation  paper  (i.e.  move  away  from  micromanagement  and  towards  a 
regionalised, results-based approach). It is clear that the complexity of the current regulations 
and their multiple amendments should serve as an example to the Commission of "what not to 
do". Many respondents also point to enforcement issues with the current regulations and the 
lack of compliance with the complex rules. The current regulations are highlighted as having 
produced  a  range  of  unintended  consequences  that  have  in  fact  forced  fishermen  to  discard 
and run counter to the principal objective of the measures (i.e. to protect juveniles). There is a 
generalised,  clear  message  that  this  should  not  be  repeated  in  any  new  framework  for 
technical  measures,  given  the  change  of  approach  (i.e.  principle  of  management  by  result) 
within  the  new  CFP  and  the  introduction  of  the  landing  obligation.  There  is  overwhelming 
support  for  a  complete  overhaul  of  technical  measures  not  limited  to  just  a  re-casting  or 
cleaning-up of the current measures. 

Main Challenges 

78 

 
 
In  the  consultation  document  four  major  principles  were  identified  for  the  revision  of 
technical measures: 

  Simplification and enabling regionalisation 

  Creation of incentives for the industry to take more responsibility 

  Reduction and avoidance of unwanted catches 

  Minimisation of the ecosystem impacts of fishing gears 

Under  each  of  these  principles,  stakeholders  were  requested  to  respond  to  some  specific 
questions. The comments received are summarised below. For some questions more detailed 
comments  were  received  than  for  others  and  there  was  a  certain  amount  of  duplication  of 
points across the different questions. 

Simplification and regionalisation 

Many respondents advocate that the most simple and clear rules will be those created at the 
lowest  level  possible,  which  in  the  case  of  the  new  CFP  equates  to  the  regional  level. 
Regionalisation is seen by many as an important opportunity to introduce simplification and 
flexibility of the technical measures rules and regulations. Multiannual plans are identified by 
the  majority  of  respondents  as  the  appropriate  vehicle  for  the  development  of  specific 
technical  measures  at  the  regional  level.  Such  measures  should  be  adaptive  and  open  to 
periodic review. The majority of stakeholders share the view that this cannot be achieved by 
maintaining  the  majority  of  technical  measures  under  normal  legislative  procedure  (i.e.  co-
decision) as it is too cumbersome a process to be able to react to changes in fisheries. 

The  ACs  and  industry  groups  stress  the  need  for  stakeholder  involvement  in  developing 
technical  measures  as  part  of  multiannual  plans.  They  see this as  essential  to  the successful 
implementation  of  the  landing  obligation.  However,  they  underscore  that  dialogue  between 
stakeholders  and  Member  States  as  envisaged  in  the  CFP  must  be  meaningful.  Several 
Member States acknowledge the involvement of stakeholders in developing regional rules. 

There are diverging opinions on the content of any future legislative framework for technical 
measures.  Many  of  the  industry  groups  (including  small-scale  fisheries)  advocate  a 
minimalistic approach with few (if any) rules under co-decision and any detailed rules that are 
required to be developed at regional level. One submission describes this as the Commission 
having  to  take  a  "leap  of  faith",  and  is  not  convinced  by  the  argument  that  EU  technical 
measures  should  be  retained  on  a  transitional  basis  until  multiannual  plans  are  adopted  to 
activate  regionalisation  for  technical  measures.  Several  submissions  do  advocate  for  some 
safeguards (e.g. limits on the amount off undersized fish a vessel may catch), which would act 
as a safety net against continuing bad practices. 

The NGOs consider there remains a strong need for some high-level overarching objectives 
and  minimum  common  standards  that  should  apply  across  the  EU  to  ensure  no  gaps  in 
management  occur.  Simplification  should  not  happen  at  the  expense  of  the  environmental 
protection.  Many  also  advocate  safeguards.  The  majority  of  the  NGOs  also  indicate  that 
additional measures may be needed for the full integration of the ecosystem-based approach 
in the new CFP and the interaction with the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD). 
These follow from the high level objectives but should be implemented regionally. 

The  position  of  Member  States  is  not  uniform  on  the  structure  of  a  new  framework.  Most 
highlight  the  importance  of  simplifying  the  rules  while  insisting  on  maintaining  a  level 
playing field which will result in some rules remaining under co-decision. Regionalisation is 
seen  as  important  although  Member  States  express  mixed  views  as  to  what  shape  regional 

79 

 
 
measures should take. Most Member States believe that the level of risk that we are prepared 
to accept should define the number and definition of rules at both Union and regional level. 
This should be strongly linked to the level of confidence in the control and monitoring system 
to detect illegal discarding or bad practice in general. 

On  the  inclusion  into  the  framework  of  reference  gears  or  minimum  standards  linked  to 
selectivity, most industry groups and some Member States and NGOs see this as unnecessary 
and  likely  to  stifle  regionalisation  and  innovation.  Whereas  some  other  NGOs  and  Member 
States  indicate  that  such  elements  should  indeed  be  included  in  the  framework  regulation. 
From  the  NGOs  perspective  this  would  provide  a  fall-back  position  should  alternative 
measures  not  be  developed  and  agreed  regionally.  One  Member  State  advocates  defining 
reference gears but at a regional level with provision for alternative highly selective gears that 
meet agreed standards for certification and monitoring to be used. 

Incentivising industry and stakeholders 

The industry groups and ACs emphasise that stakeholder involvement in the decision-making 
process, leading to clear and simple rules will act as a strong incentive for compliance with 
rules. 

The  majority  of  respondents  point  to  the  landing  obligation  as  the  major  incentive  to  drive 
selectivity,  obviating  the  need  for  the  current  prescriptive  approach  to  technical  measures. 
They point to the problems, both economically and biologically, inadvertently created in the 
past by the imposition of over-prescriptive rules. Many strongly advocate that to implement 
the landing obligation will require that  fishermen be given the maximum possible liberty to 
decide  on  selective  measures.  However,  in  return,  NGOs  and  other  stakeholders  stress  that 
accountability  is  a  critical  prerequisite  for  allowing  fishermen  flexibility  to  find  innovative 
ways to meet environmental standards. This is acknowledged by the ACs and industry groups 
as important. 

The  ACs,  NGOs  and  some  Member  States  highlight  that  improvements  in  selectivity  have 
been  achieved  in  the  past  when  incentives  have  been  aligned  with  management  objectives. 
This approach should be broadened, extended and deepened. In this context an industry group 
representing small-scale fishermen, several Member States (Mediterranean countries) as well 
as the NGOs point to the rewarding of the use of low-impact fishing methods with increased 
fishing  opportunities  or  privileged  access  as  another  way  of  incentivising  fishermen  to  act 
responsibly. 

The removal of measures that are deemed redundant under the landing obligation, including 
catch  composition  rules  and  effort  restrictions,  are  highlighted  by  the  ACs,  industry  groups 
and  Member  States.  This  is  considered  another  important  incentive  to  improve  compliance 
with  technical  rules  and  to  improve  selectivity.  In  this  context  several  Member  States  and 
industry groups highlight that a move to fully documented fisheries will allow a much higher 
degree  of  simplification  of  the  technical  rules  and  removal  of  others.  The  NGOs  while 
accepting this stress the need for stringent monitoring requirements to allow for the relaxing 
of rules. Fully documented fisheries must amount to what the name implies. 

Encouraging innovation will act as an incentive to improve selectivity and responsible fishing 
and the ACs, NGOs and the industry highlight that funding and additional quota to undertake 
vital research and pilot projects must be granted by fast track. Innovation needs to be given a 
very  high  priority  by  Member  States  in  developing  their  national  programmes  under  the 
European Maritime and Fisheries Fund. 

80 

 
 
Opinions  on  the  use  of  "soft  law"  are  split.  Some  industry  groups  and  NGOs  very  much 
advocate soft law as a way of supporting technical measures rules. However, others  suggest 
that  voluntary  measures under soft law are not  sufficient  in  themselves  to  ensure high level 
objectives  are  achieved,  and  also  can  lead  to  the  use  of  unselective  gears  and  fishing 
techniques.  Some  industry  groups  highlight  that  even  such  voluntary  measures  will  be 
superfluous  because  the  landing  obligation  will  provide  adequate  incentive  for  selective 
fishing. 

Reduction and avoidance of unwanted catches 

The  ACs  and  industry  groups  stress  that  measures  to  reduce  and  avoid  unwanted  catches 
should  be  developed  regionally  under  multiannual  plans.  In  no  circumstances  do  they 
advocate  developing  measures  at  Union  level  to  address  specific  bycatch  issues.  Several 
industry groups also highlight that what is important is not identifying the worst fisheries in 
terms of unwanted  bycatch and applying stricter measures, but rather identifying those  with 
the  biggest  hurdles  and  ensuring  the  management  structure  provides  the  flexibility  and 
freedom for appropriate solutions to be found. In this context regional bodies (i.e. the ACs) 
are best placed to identify fisheries that require special assistance. 

The majority of NGOs highlight the need to improve selectivity in many fisheries and several 
identify  specific  fisheries  (e.g.  mixed  demersal  and  Nephrops  fisheries)  and  sea  basins  (e.g. 
Irish  Sea,  Skagerrak  and  eastern  Baltic)  where  particular  problems  exist.  They  include 
bycatch of vulnerable or  sensitive  species  in the context of unwanted  catches and stress the 
need to address such issues as a matter of urgency. 

One NGO indicates that "institutionalised" overfishing and tolerated use of non-selective and 
destructive  gears  is  a  bigger  problem  than  discarding  of  unwanted  catches.  Several  others 
advocate  that  certain  gears  and  fisheries  should  be  subject  to  very  restrictive  measures  or 
phased out altogether if reductions in unwanted catches cannot be achieved quickly. 

The ACs, several NGOs, industry groups and Member States advocate the use of avoidance 
measures such as real-time closures and moving-on provisions. There are divergent views on 
whether  this  should  be  defined  at  Union  or  regional  level.  Some  advocate  a  twin-track 
approach with the overarching principles for such measures defined in a framework regulation 
with detailed implementing rules at regional level. 

There  is  broad  consensus  that  minimum  landing  size,  catch  composition  rules  and  by-catch 
provisions generally prevent fishermen from fishing selectively and even induce discards. All 
advocate and welcome the moves to neutralise the negative impacts of these rules through the 
Commission's omnibus proposal2. 

Minimising the ecosystem impact of fishing gears 

The majority of stakeholders advocate that detailed ecosystem protection measures should be 
developed at the regional level. Most agree that only prohibitions of destructive practices or 
measures  to  protect  rare  or  vulnerable  species  and  existing  closures  to  protect  sensitive 
habitats  should  be  included  in  an  overarching  framework  under  co-decision.  Several  NGOs 
and  Member  States  suggest  that  performance  targets  relating  to  environmental  directives 
could  also  be  established  in  the  framework.  These  are  commonly  used  in  other  states  to 
manage marine mammal bycatch.  

2 COM(2013) 889 FINAL 

81 

 
 
                                                 
The  majority  of  NGOs  specifically  highlight  the  need  for  the  new  technical  measures 
framework  to  signal  a  shift  towards  low-impact  fishing  and  to  the  achievement  of  Good 
Environmental Status under the Marine Strategy Framework Directive. Several advocate the 
inclusion of a requirement for impact assessments of fishing activities, which would help to 
identify  potential  concerns  and  to  propose  appropriate  mitigation  measures.  Such  measures 
highlighted  include  mapping  of  vulnerable  habitats  and  species,  restrictions  of  fishing  in 
vulnerable  habitats,  compulsory  use  of  proven  mitigation  measures  to  reduce  unwanted 
catches of vulnerable species and more extensive spatial or depth limitations. 

An  industry  group  representing  small-scale  fishermen  points  to  the  need  for  genuine 
interaction  between  all  stakeholders  in  defining  ecosystem  protection  measures.  Decisions 
should  be  made  on  scientific  grounds  and  not  be  made  at  the  expense  of  small-scale 
fishermen. They point to a number of examples where fishermen and NGOs have developed 
Marine  Protected  Areas  that  meet  the  aims  and  aspirations  concerned  but  without  creating 
economic hardship on fishermen. 

Member  States  mainly  advocate  for  a  regionalised  approach  to  minimise  the  ecosystem 
impacts of fishing gears to ensure that the right fisheries are monitored and required to take 
appropriate  mitigation  measures.  This  will  deliver  greater  benefits  in  a  more  targeted  way. 
Some  Member  States  perceive  ecosystem  measures  in  quite  a  negative  light  indicating  that 
they  are  disproportionate  to  the  scale  of  the  problem  -  measures  to  protect  cetaceans  in  the 
Baltic  are  highlighted.  These  Member  States  stress  the  importance  of  balancing  legitimate 
economic expectations with the broader expectations in society of providing protection for the 
ecosystem.  This  view  is  shared  by  a  stakeholder  group  representing  workers'  rights  and 
several industry groups. 

Scope of a framework for technical measures 

In  addition  to  the  four  principles  detailed,  the  consultation  paper  included  a  question 
regarding  the  scope  of  any  new  framework  regulation.  Currently  technical  measures  are 
contained in separate regulations covering different regions. The question posed was whether 
the current situation should be maintained or should there be a common framework. 

The majority of NGOs very much favour a common technical measures framework covering 
all  sea  basins.  It  should  include  overarching  objectives,  common  baseline  measures, 
definitions and governance rules that define how technical measures should be designed and 
implemented regionally. 

The  ACs  and  industry  groups  strongly  argue  for  a  minimalistic  approach  at  Union  level 
through  a  framework  regulation.  Many  question  the  need  for  any  framework  at  all  while 
others  accept  that  to  ensure  a  level  playing  field  in  terms  of  direction  and  goals  a  common 
framework  may  be  needed  which  sets  realistic  high-level  objectives  across  the  various  sea 
basins. Many industry groups advocate that it is not logical to start with the development of a 
general framework at Union level. Work should focus very much at regional level in the first 
instance and from this it can be established whether common rules are needed. 

Member States have divergent opinions on whether there should be one common framework 
or different frameworks for different sea basins. Several Member States advocate a separate 
framework for the Mediterranean  because  of the particular characteristics of the fisheries in 
this sea basin. 

Other issues raised 

A number of submissions dealt with issues outside the scope of the questions contained in the 
consultation document although nonetheless linked to technical measures. 

82 

 
 
One fisheries consultation advocates the concept of "balanced harvesting" as a possible "wild-
card" policy option. Balanced harvesting changes the technical measures objective, and would 
aim  to  make  fishing  unselective  for  species.  Instead,  a  defined  proportion  of  natural 
production per unit area, by size class, of all species, would be removed from the ecosystem. 
A consumer group also referred to this concept in a positive light. 

Several  submissions  from  industry  groups  supported  by  one  local  administration  body  dealt 
with  a  specific  issue  relating  to  the  size  of  Japanese  calms  in  the  Bay  of  Arcachon  They 
highlight  the  need  for  more  flexibility  within  technical  measures  regulations  to  allow  the 
setting  of  rules  (in  this  case  a  minimum  size)  of  sedentary  shellfish  species  at  local  level, 
rather than at Union level. 

Several  submissions  from  industry  group  relate  to  the  Commission's  omnibus  proposal  to 
amend  certain  technical  measures  regulation  and  the  control  regulation  (the  so-called 
"omnibus  regulation").  These  submissions  detailed  a  number  of  issues  and  difficulties  with 
the Commission's proposal. 

Several submissions from Member States and industry groups highlight specific issues. These 
include measures in the Mediterranean on the use of purse seines and restrictions on trawling 
within  3  nautical  miles  off  the  coast  that  requires  immediate  amendment  or  deletion.  The 
general ban on fisheries using electricity which has hampered the introduction of sustainable 
alternatives  to  the  beam  trawl  was  also  raised  as  well  as  issues  relating  to  the  definition  of 
drift nets and the need for clearer rules and conditional derogations for commercial activities 
outside normal fishing operations (e.g. provision of fish for aquariums). 

Citizen’s contributions 

A limited number of responses were received from members of the general public reflecting 
the subject matter of this consultation which is highly technical. Three were from anglers, two 
from small-scale fishermen (one retired) and one from an active member of an environmental 
NGO. 

These cover a range of issues. The submissions from anglers relate to the setting of minimum 
landing  sizes,  specifically  for  bass.  These  submissions  also  put  forward  other  specific 
measures relating to bass fishing including the banning of pair trawling for this species. More 
extensive use of temporary or permanently closed areas is advocated in the other responses, 
either  as  general  comments  or  in  one  case  specifically  in  Greek  waters.  The  banning  of 
trawling  in  inshore  waters  (inside  6  miles)  along  with  the  use  of  effort  control  rather  than 
TACs and quotas is also advocated by two of the respondents. 

83 

 
 
 
 
2011 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

2012 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

ANNEX II LIST OF MEETINGS, WORKSHOPS & CONSULTATIONS 

Details 

Date 

Location 

MS Administrations 

Experts Meeting 
Technical Measures 
(Skagerrak) 

Experts Meeting 
Technical Measures 
(Skagerrak) 

Experts Meeting 
Technical Measures 
(Skagerrak) 

Experts Meeting 
Technical Measures 
(Skagerrak) 

27-28 April 

Gothenburg 

25-26 August 

Copenhagen 

5-6 October 

Copenhagen 

26-28 October 

Bergen 

Advisory Councils 

Inter AC 

NWWAC 

NWWAC 

6 March 

5 July 

16 November 

Other Events 

Brussels 

Dublin 

Madrid 

ICES Workshop on Seine 
Net Selectivity 

AGLIA Seminar on 
Selectivity and Discards 

22-24 February 

Aberdeen 

15 November 

Lorient 

Details 

Date 

Location 

MS Administrations 

Experts Meeting 
Technical Measures 
(Skagerrak) 

Experts Meeting 
Technical Measures 
(Skagerrak) 

Bilateral NL 

Bilateral UK 

Experts Meeting 
Technical Measures 
(Baltic Sea) 

1 February 

Copenhagen 

21-22 March 

Stockholm 

29 August 

13 September 

17 October 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Bilateral UK 

4 December 

Brussels 

Advisory Councils 

Inter AC 

NWWAC 

21 February 

29 February 

Brussels 

Paris 

84 

 
 
 
 
 
9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

2013 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

NSAC 

SWWAC 

SWWAC 

26 June 

11 July 

22 November 

European Parliament 

PECH Committee 

PECH Committee 

8 October 

8 November 

Other Events 

Brussels 

Lisbon 

Paris 

Brussels 

Brussels 

ICES WGBYC 

8 February 

Copenhagen 

Capecure Conference on 
Discards and Selectivity 

Workshop on Baltic Sea 
Selectivity 

29-30 March 

Boulogne-sur-Mer 

23-25 May 

Karlskrona 

STECF EWG 

DAG Meeting 

1-4 October 

20 November  

Dublin 

Brussels 

Details 

Date 

Location 

MS Administrations 

Bilateral UK 

Bilateral BE 

EU/Norway 

1 February 

16 April 

11 September 

Advisory Councils 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Edinburgh 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Madrid 

Bilbao 

Copenhagen 

Dublin 

Dublin 

London 

Dublin 

7 February 

1 March 

13 March 

18 April 

6 May 

7 June 

17-19 June 

9 July 

23-24 September 

12 November 

Edinburgh 

NGOS 

19 February 

25 November  

Brussels 

Brussels 

Other Events 

ICES WGBYC 

4-7 February 

Copenhagen 

STECF EWG 

EU/Norway Workshop on 
Technical Measures in the 

4-8 March 

17-19 April 

Dublin 

Bergen 

85 

SWWAC 

Inter AC 

SWWAC 

NWWAC 

BSAC 

NWWAC 

NWWAC 

NSAC 

NWWAC 

NSAC 

Birdlife 

Birdlife 

 
 
 
19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

2014 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

North Sea 

EU/Norway Workshop on 
Technical Measures in the 
North Sea 

EU Seabirds Workshop 

EU BENTHIS Project 
Workshop 

NSAC Discards 
Workshop 

Baltic Cod Selectivity 
Workshop 

EU ECOFISHMANN 
Project Workshop 

6-8 May 

Edinburgh 

16 May 

4-5 June 

19 June 

4 September 

Brussels 

Haarlem 

Brussels 

Brussels 

15-16 October 

Brussels 

Details 

Date 

Location 

MS Administrations 

Bilateral NL 

Bilateral SE 

Committee for Fisheries 
& Aquaculture 

Fisheries Council  

Bilateral SE 

Bilateral IE 

Bilateral DK 

Informal meeting of 
Directors-general for 
Fisheries 

Committee for Fisheries 
& Aquaculture 

31 January 

21 February 

24 February 

28 May 

24 June 

25 June 

25 September 

29 September 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Naples 

28 October 

Brussels 

Advisory Councils 

BSAC 

NSAC 

MEDAC 

Inter AC 

LDAC 

NWWAC 

SWWAC 

BSAC 

NSAC 

PELAC 

SWWAC 

NSAC 

25 February 

25 February 

4-5 March 

19 March 

21 March 

25-26 March 

27-28 March 

31 March 

9 April 

10 April 

12 June 

8 July 

86 

Copenhagen 

London 

Barcelona 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Dublin 

Dublin 

Copenhagen 

Paris 

The Hague 

Paris 

Amsterdam 

 
 
 
22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

29 

30 

31 

32 

33 

34 

35 

36 

37 

38 

39 

40 

41 

42 

43 

44 

45 

46 

47 

48 

49 

50 

51 

52 

53 

SWWAC 

NWWAC 

Inter AC 

NSAC 

9 July 

17-18 September 

30 October 

12 November 

European Parliament 

Greens 

S&D 

PECH Committee 

20 February 

2 April 

7 April 

PECH Committee 

4 September 

PECH Committee 

23 September 

PECH Committee 

6 November 

Industry Groups 

CRPMEM (FR) 

27 January 

CRPMEM 

LIFE/NUFTA 

EUROPECHE 

SFF 

3 April 

4 April 

7 April 

29 April 

EUROPECHE 

26 September 

EAPO 

EUROPECHE 

LIFE/NUFTA 

NGOS 

Client Earth 

NGOs 

WWF & Client Earth 

EDF 

Client Earth 

Oceana 

Client Earth 

EDF 

WWF 

Oceana 

3 October 

6 November 

13 November 

7 March 

16 April 

24 April 

25 April 

14 June 

25 September 

20 November 

5 December 

16 December 

17 December 

Vigo 

Dublin 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Westport 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Other Events 

North Sea Mixed 
Fisheries Multiannual 
Plan 

27 February 

Brussels 

EESC 

4 April 

North Sea Mixed 
Fisheries Workshop 

29-20 September 

Brussels 

Brussels 

87 

 
 
54 

2015 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

Workshop on best 
practices in selectivity 

4 December 

Brussels 

Details 

Date 

Location 

MS Administrations 

Committee for Fisheries 
& Aquaculture 

26 February 

Bilateral NL  

18 March  

EFCA 

Brussels 

Brussels 

EFCA 

9-10 February 

Vigo 

Advisory Councils 

SWWAC 

NSAC 

NSAC 

21 January 

4 February 

11 March 

Lisbon 

Copenhagen 

Copenhagen 

European Parliament 

PECH Committee 

22 January 

Brussels 

Industry Groups 

EAPO 

19 March  

Brussels 

NGOS 

WWF 

Oceana 

27 January  

18 March 

Brussels 

Brussels 

Other Events 

EU SOCIOECO Project 
Workshop 

18 February 

Brussels 

STECF EWG 

2-6 March 

Dublin 

88 

 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX III LIST OF STUDIES  

COFREPECHE, IFREMER and SCAPECHE, 2014. Reduction of gear impact and discards in 
deep sea fisheries (Contract MARE/2011/07 – Studies on the common fisheries policy Lot 1). 
Brussels, 202pp. 

CIBM,  COISPA,  CNR-IAMC,  HCMR,  CONSIMA 
and 
characterization  of  thesmall-scale  driftnets  fisheries  in  Mediterranean  (DRIFTMED). 
Brussels, 287pp.  

Identification 

(2013). 

MRAG  et  al.  (2014).    Study  in  support  of  the  review  of  the  EU  regime  on  the  small-scale 
driftnet fisheries. Brussels. 295pp + Annexes  

Sala,  A.  (2015).  Alternative  solutions  for  driftnet  fisheries.  IP/B/PECH/IC/2014-082. 
Brussels. 90pp.  

SLU,  DTU,  Thunen,  MIR  (2013).  Collaboration  between  the  scientific  community  and  the 
fishing sector to minimize discards in the Baltic cod fisheries. Brussels. 76pp+ Annexes.  

MRAG  Ltd,  Poseidon  &  Lamans  s.a.  (2011).  Contribution  to  the  preparation  of  a  Plan  of 
Action for Seabirds. Bruusels. 290pp.   

MEDISEH, ARCHIMEDES, BERNTOOL, MYGEAR & MEDPEL projects  

Ulecia,  R.C.,  (2013).  Summary  of  the  Implementation  of  EU  Regulation  1967/2006.  
IP/B/PECH/NT/2013_06. Brussels. 16pp.  

IEO  (2014).  The  obligation  to  land  all  catches  –  Consequences  for  the  Mediterranean. 
IP/B/PECH/IC/2013-168. Brussels. 52pp.   

IMARES (2010). Study for the Revision of the plaice box – Final Report. Brussels. 250pp.  

Kaiser, M.J. (2014). The conflict between static gear and mobile gear in inshore fisheries. IP/ 
B/PECH/IC/2014-018. Brussels. 68pp.  

MRAG, IFM, CEFAS, AZTI Tecnalia & PolEM (2009). An analysis of existing Rights Based 
Management (RBM) instruments in Member States and on setting up best practices in the EU. 
Final Report. London: MRAG Ltd. Brussels. 117pp.  

89 

 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX IV INVENTORY OF EU TECHNICAL MEASURES REGULATIONS 

(Regulations currently in force are in bold) 

1980 1ST Regulation 

Council Regulation (EEC) No 2527/80 of 30 September 1980 laying down technical measures 
for the conservation of fishery resources  Official Journal L 258, 01.10.1980 P. 0001  - 0015  
(Repealed) 

1983 New Regulation 171/83 

Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  171/83  of  25  January  1983  laying  down  certain  technical 
measures for the conservation of fishery resources. Official Journal L 024, 27.01.1983 p. 0014 
– 0029 (Repealed) 

Amendments to 171/83 

Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2931/83  of  4  October  1983  amending  Regulation  (EEC)  No 
171/83  laying  down  certain  technical  measures  for  the  conservation  of  fishery  resources. 
Official Journal L 288, 21.10.1983 p 1 (Repealed) 

Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  1637/84  of  7  June  1984amending  for  the  second  time 
Regulation (EEC) No 171/83 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of 
fishery resources. Official Journal L 156, 13.06.1984 p. 1 (Repealed) 

Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2184/84  of  23  July  1984  amending  for  the  third  time 
Regulation (EEC) No 171/83 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of 
fishery resources. Official Journal L 199, 28.07.1984 p.1 (Repealed) 

Council Regulation (EEC)  No 2664/84  of 18 September 1984 amending  for the fourth time 
Regulation (EEC) No 171/83 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of 
fishery resources. Official Journal L 253, 21.09.1984 p.1 (Repealed) 

Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  3625/84  of  18  December  1984  amending  for  the  fifth  time 
Regulation (EEC) No 171/83 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of 
fishery resources. Official Journal L 353, 21.12.1984 p.3 (Repealed) 

Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  3625/84  of  18  December  1984  amending  for  the  sixth  time 
Regulation (EEC) No 171/83 in particular by the addition of technical conservation measures 
applicable  to  maritime  waters  falling  within  the  sovereignty  or  jurisdiction  of  Spain  and 
Portugal. Official Journal L 363, 31.12.1985 p.21 (Repealed) 

1986 New Regulation 3094/86 

Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  3094/86  of  7  October  1986  laying  down  certain  technical 
measures for the conservation of fishery resources. Official Journal L 288, 11.10.1986 p. 0001 
– 0020 (Repealed) 

Amendments to 3094/86 

Council Regulation (EEC) No 4026/86 of 18 December 1986 amending Regulation (EEC) No 
3094/86  laying  down  certain  technical  measures  for  the  conservation  of  fishery  resources. 
Official Journal L 376, 31.12.1986 p. 0001 – 0003(Repealed) 

Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2968/87  of  29  September  1987  amending  Regulation  (EEC) 
No 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of fishery resources. 
Official Journal L 280, 03.10.1987 p. 0001 - 0002 (Repealed) 

90 

 
 
 
Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  3953/87  of  21  December  1987  amending  for  the  third  time 
Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conversion of 
fishery resources. Official Journal L 371, 30.12.1987 p. 0009 - 0010 56 (Repealed) 

Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  1555/88  of  31  May  1988  amending  for  the  fourth  time 
Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of 
fishery resources. Official Journal L 140, 07.06.1988 p. 0001 – 0002 (Repealed) 

Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2024/88  of  23  June  1988  amending  for  the  fifth  time 
Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of 
fishery resources. Official Journal L 179, 09.07.1988 p. 0001 - 0002 (Repealed) 

Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  3287/88  of  20  October  1988  amending  for  the  sixth  time 
Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of 
fishery resources. Official Journal L 292, 26.10.1988 p. 0005 - 0005 (Repealed) 

Council Regulation (EEC) No 4193/88 of 21 December 1988 amending for the seventh time 
Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of 
fishery resources. Official Journal L 369, 31.12.1988 p. 0001 - 0002 (Repealed) 

Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2220/89  of  18  July  1989  amending  for  the  eighth  time 
Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of 
fishery resources. Official Journal L 211, 22.07.1989 p. 0006 - 0006 (Repealed) 

Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  4056/89  of  19  December  1989  amending  for  the  ninth  time 
Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of 
fishery resources. Official Journal L 389, 30.12.1989 p. 0075 - 0077 (Repealed) 

1991. Council Regulation (EEC) No  3500/91  of 28 November  1991 amending  for the tenth 
time  Regulation  (EEC)  No  3094/86  laying  down  certain  technical  measures  for  the 
conservation  of  fishery  resources.  Official  Journal  L  331,  03.12.1991  p.  0002  -  0002 
(Repealed) 

Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  345/92  of  27  January  1992  amending  for  the  eleventh  time 
Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of 
fishery resources. Official Journal L 042, 18.01.1992 p. 0015 - 0023 (Repealed) 

Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  1465/92  of  1  June  1992  amending  for  the  twelfth  time 
Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conversion of 
fishery resources. Official Journal L 155, 06.06.1992 p. 0001 - 0002 (Repealed) 

Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2120/92  of  20  July  1992  amending,  for  the  13th  time, 
Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of 
fishery resources. Official Journal L 213, 29.07.1992 p. 0003 - 0004 (Repealed) 

Council Regulation (EEC) No 3034/92 of 19 October 1992 amending, for the fourteenth time, 
Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of 
fishery resources. Official Journal L 307, 23.10.1992 p. 0001 - 0002 (Repealed) 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1796/94  of  18  July  1994  amending,  for  the  fifteenth  time, 
Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of 
fishery resources. Official Journal L 187, 22.07.1994 p. 0001 - 0002 (Repealed) 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1173/95  of  22  May  1995  amending,  for  the  sixteenth  time, 
Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of 
fishery resources. Official Journal L 118, 25.05.1995 p. 0015 - 0015 (Repealed) 

91 

 
 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1909/95 of 24 July 1995 amending, for the 17th time, Regulation 
(EEC)  No  3094/86  laying  down  certain  technical  measures  for  the  conservation  of  fishery 
resources. Official Journal L 184, 03.08.1995 p. 0001 - 0002 (Repealed) 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  2251/95  of  18  September  1995  amending  for  the  18th  time 
Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of 
fishery resources. Official Journal L 230, 27.09.1995 p. 0011 - 0011 (Repealed) 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  3071/95  of  22  December  1995  amending,  for  the  19th  time, 
Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of 
fishery resources. Official Journal L 329, 30.12.1995 p. 0014 - 0017 (Repealed) 

1997 New Regulation 894/97 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  894/97  of  29  April  1997  laying  down  certain  technical 
measures for the conservation of fishery resources. Official Journal L 132, 23.05.1997 p. 
0001 - 0027 (In force) 

Amendments to 894/97 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1239/98  of  8  June  1998  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No 
894/97 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of fishery resources. 
Official Journal L 171, 17.06.1998 p. 0001 – 0004 (In force) 

1998 New Regulation 850/98 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  850/98  of  30  March  1998  for  the  conservation  of  fishery 
resources  through  technical  measures  for  the  protection  of  juveniles  of  marine 
organisms. Official Journal L 125, 27.04.1998 p. 0001 – 0036 (In force) 

Amendments to 850/98 

Council Regulation (EC) No 308/1999 of 8 February 1999 amending Regulation (EC) No 
850/98  for  the  conservation  of  fishery  resources  through  technical  measures  for  the 
protection of juveniles of marine organisms. Official Journal L 038, 12.02.1999 p. 0006 - 
0009 (In force) 

Council Regulation (EC) No 1459/1999  of  24 June 1999 amending Regulation (EC) No 
850/98  for  the  conservation  of  fishery  resources  through  technical  measures  for  the 
protection of juveniles of marine organisms. Official Journal L 168, 03.07.1999 p. 0001 - 
0005 (In force) 

Council Regulation (EC) No 2723/1999 of 17 December 1999 amending Regulation (EC) 
No 850/98 for the conservation of fishery resources through technical measures for the 
protection of juveniles of marine organisms. Official Journal L 328, 22.12.1999 p. 0009 - 
0011 (In force) 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  812/2000  of  17  April  2000  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No 
1626/94 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of fishery resources 
in  the  Mediterranean  and  Regulation  (EC)  No  850/98  for  the  conservation  of  fishery 
resources  through  technical  measures  for  the  protection  of  juveniles  of  marine 
organisms. Official Journal L 100, 20.04.2000 p. 0003 - 0004 (In force) 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1298/2000  of  8  June  2000  amending  for  the  fifth  time 
Regulation  (EC)  No  850/98  for  the  conservation  of  fishery  resources  through  technical 
measures  for  the  protection  of  juveniles  of  marine  organisms.  Official  Journal  L  148, 
22.06.2000 p. 0001 - 0002 (In force) 

92 

 
 
Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  724/2001  of  4  April  2001  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No 
850/98  for  the  conservation  of  fishery  resources  through  technical  measures  for  the 
protection of juveniles of marine organisms. Official Journal L 102, 12.04.2001 p. 0016 - 
0019 (In force) 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1298/2000  of  8  June  2000  amending  for  the  fifth  time 
Regulation  (EC)  No  850/98  for  the  conservation  of  fishery  resources  through  technical 
measures  for  the  protection  of  juveniles  of  marine  organisms.  Official  Journal  L  148, 
22.6.2000, p. 1–2 (In force) 

Council Regulation (EC) No 602/2004 of 22 March 2004 amending Regulation (EC) No 
850/98 as regards the protection of deepwater coral reefs from the effects of trawling in 
an  area  north  west  of  Scotland.  Official  Journal  L  097,  01.04.2004  p.  0030  -  0031  (In 
force) 

Council Regulation (EC) No 1568/2005 of 20 September 2005 amending Regulation (EC) 
No 850/98 as regards the protection of deep-water coral reefs from the effects of fishing 
in certain areas of the Atlantic Ocean. Official Journal L 252, 28.09.2005 p. 0002 - 0003 
(In force) 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  734/2008  of  15  July  2008  on  the  protection  of  vulnerable 
marine  ecosystems  in  the  high  seas  from  the  adverse  impacts  of  bottom  fishing  gears. 
Official Journal L 201 30.07.2008 p. 8. (In force) 

Regulation  (EU)  No  227/2013  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  13 
March  2013  amending  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  850/98  for  the  conservation  of 
fishery  resources  through  technical  measures  for  the  protection  of  juveniles  of  marine 
organisms and Council Regulation (EC) No 1434/98 specifying conditions under which 
herring  may  be  landed  for  industrial  purposes  other  than  direct  human  consumption. 
Official Journal L 78 20.03.2013 p. 1. (In force) 

Transitional Technical Measures 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1288/2009  of  27  November  2009  establishing  transitional 
technical measures from 1 January 2010 to 30 June 2011. Official Journal L 347 24.12.2009, 
p.6 (Repealed) 

Regulation (EU) No 579/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 
amending  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  850/98  for  the  conservation  of  fishery  resources 
through technical measures for the protection of juveniles of marine organisms and Council 
Regulation  (EC)  No  1288/2009  establishing  transitional  technical  measures  from  1  January 
2010 to 30 June 2011. Official Journal L 165 24.06.2011, p.1 (Repealed) 

Recovery measures containing technical measures:  

Irish Sea cod  

Commission Regulation (EC) No 304/2000 of 9 February 2000 establishing measures for the 
recovery  of  the  stock  of  cod  in  the  Irish  Sea  (ICES  division  VIIa).Official  Journal  L  035, 
10.02.2000 p. 0010 - 0011 (Repealed) 

Commission Regulation (EC) No 660/2000 of 30 March 2000 amending Regulation (EC) No 
304/2000  establishing  measures  for  the  recovery  of  the  stock  of  cod  in  the  Irish  Sea  (ICES 
Division VIIa).Official Journal L 080, 31.03.2000 p. 0014 – 0014 (Repealed) 

93 

 
 
Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  2549/2000  of  17  November  2000  establishing  additional 
technical measures for the recovery of the stock of cod in the Irish Sea (ICES Division 
VIIa). Official Journal L 292, 21.11.2000 p. 0005 - 0006 (In force) 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  300/2001  of  14  February  2001  establishing  measures  to  be 
applied  in  2001  for  the  recovery  of  the  stock  of  cod  in  the  Irish  Sea  (ICES  division  VIIa). 
Official Journal L 044, 15.02.2001 p. 0012 - 0014 (Repealed) 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1456/2001  of  16  July  2001  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No 
2549/2000 establishing additional technical measures for the recovery of the stock of cod 
in  the  Irish  Sea  (ICES  Division  VIIa).  Official  Journal  L  194,  18.07.2001  p.  0001  – 
0001(In force) 

Council Regulation (EC) No 254/2002 of 12 February 2002 establishing measures to be 
applicable  in  2002  for  the  recovery  of  the  stock  of  cod  in  the  Irish  Sea  (ICES  division 
VIIa). Official Journal L 041, 13.02.2002 p 0001 - 0003 (In force) 

North Sea and West of Scotland cod 

Commission Regulation (EC) No 259/2001 of 7 February 2001 establishing measures for the 
recovery of the stock of cod in the North Sea (ICES subarea IV) and associated conditions for 
the control of activities of fishing vessels. Official Journal L 039, 09.02.2001 p. 0007 – 0010 
(Repealed) 

Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No  456/2001  of  6  March  2001  establishing  measures  for  the 
recovery  of  the  stock  of  cod  to  the  west  of  Scotland  (ICES  Division  VIa)  and  associated 
conditions for the control of activities of fishing vessels. Official Journal L 065, 07.03.2001 p. 
0013 - 0016 (Repealed) 

Commission Regulation (EC) No 714/2001 of 10 April 2001 amending Regulation (EC) No 
259/2001 establishing measures for the recovery of the stock of cod in the North Sea (ICES 
subarea IV) and associated conditions for the control of activities of fishing vessels. Official 
Journal L 100, 11.04.2001 p. 0005 - 0006 (Repealed) 

Commission Regulation (EC) No 715/2001 of 10 April 2001 amending Regulation (EC) No 
456/2001 establishing measures for the recovery of the stock of cod to the west of Scotland 
(ICES division VIa) and associated conditions for the control of activities of fishing vessels. 
Official Journal L 100, 11.04.2001 p. 0007 – 0008 (Repealed) 

Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No  2056/2001  of  19  October  2001  establishing  additional 
technical measures for the recovery of the stocks of cod in the North Sea and to the west 
of Scotland.Official Journal L 277, 20.10.2001 p. 0013 - 0016 (In force) 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1342/2008  of  18  December  2008  establishing  a  long-term 
plan  for  cod  stocks  and  the  fisheries  exploiting  those  stocks  and  repealing  Regulation 
(EC) No 423/2004. Official Journal L 348, 24.12.2008, p. 20–33 (In force) 

Hake 

Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No  1162/2001  of  14  June  2001  establishing  measures  for  the 
recovery  of  the  stock  of  hake  in  ICES  sub-areas  III,  IV,  V,  VI  and  VII  and  ICES  divisions 
VIII a, b, d, e and associated conditions for the control of activities of fishing vessels. Official 
Journal L 159, 15.06.2001 p. 0004 – 0009 (Repealed) 

Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No  2602/2001  of  27  December  2001  establishing  additional 
technical measures for the recovery of the stock of hake in ICES subareas III, IV, V, VI and 

94 

 
 
VII  and  ICES  Divisions  VIIIa,  b,  d,  e.  Official  Journal  L  345,  29.12.2001  p.  0049  -  0051 
(Repealed) 

Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No  494/2002  of  19  March  2002  establishing  additional 
technical measures for the recovery of the stock of hake in ICES sub-areas III, IV, V, VI 
and VII and ICES divisions VIII a, b, d, e. Official Journal L 077, 20.03.2002 p. 0008 - 
0010 (In force) 

Southern Hake and Norway lobster 

Council Regulation (EC) No 2166/2005 of 20 December 2005 establishing measures for the 
recovery of the Southern hake and Norway lobster stocks in the Cantabrian Sea and Western 
Iberian  peninsula  and  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  850/98  for  the  conservation  of  fishery 
resources  through  technical  measures  for  the  protection  of  juveniles  of  marine  organisms. 
Official Journal L 345, 28.12.2005, p. 5–10 (In force) 

Baltic Sea Technical Measures 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1866/1986  of  12  June  1986  for  the  conservation  of  fishery 
resources  through  technical  measures  in  the  Baltic  Sea,  the  Belts  and  the  Sound.  Official 
Journal L 162 18.06.86. p.1. (Repealed) 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  88/98  of  18  December  1997  laying  down  certain  technical 
measures for the conservation of fishery resources in the waters of the Baltic Sea, the Belts 
and the Sound. Official Journal L 9, 15.1.1998, p. 1–16 (Repealed) 

Council Regulation (EC) No 1520/98  of 13 July  1998 amending Regulation (EC) No 88/98 
laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of fishery resources in the waters 
of  the  Baltic  Sea,  the  Belts  and  the  Sound.  Official  Journal  L  201,  17.7.1998,  p.  1–3 
(Repealed) 

Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No  677/2003  of  14  April  2003  establishing  emergency 
measures  for  the  recovery  of  the  cod  stock  in  the  Baltic  Sea.  Official  Journal  L  097 
15.04.2003 p. 31 (Repealed) 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  289/2005  of  17  February  2005  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No 
88/98  as  regards  the  extension  of  the  trawling  ban  to  Polish  waters  Official  Journal  L  49, 
22.2.2005, p. 1–1 (Repealed) 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  2187/2005  of  21  December  2005  for  the  conservation  of 
fishery resources through technical measures in the Baltic Sea, the Belts and the Sound, 
amending Regulation (EC) No 1434/98 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 88/98. Official 
Journal L349 31.12.2005.P.1. 60 (In force) 

Commission Regulation (EU) No 686/2010 of 28 July 2010 amending Council Regulation 
(EC)  No  2187/2005  as  regards  specifications  of  Bacoma  window  and  T90  trawl  in 
fisheries carried out in the Baltic Sea, the Belts and the Sound. Official Journal L 199, 
31.7.2010, p. 4–11 (In force) 

Mediterranean Technical Measures 

Council Regulation (EC) No 1626/94 of 27 June 1994 laying down certain technical measures 
for  the  conservation  of  fishery  resources  in  the  Mediterranean.  Official  Journal  L.  171 
6.07.94. p.1 (Repealed) 

95 

 
 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1075/96 of 10 June 1996 amending Regulation (EC) No 1626/94 
laying  down  certain  technical  measures  for  the  conservation  of  fishery  resources  in  the 
Mediterranean. Official Journal L 142, 15.6.1996, p. 1–2 (Repealed) 

Council Regulation (EC) No 782/98 of 7 April 1998 amending Regulation (EC) No 1626/94 
laying  down  certain  technical  measures  for  the  conservation  of  fishery  resources  in  the 
Mediterranean .Official Journal L 113, 15.4.1998, p. 6–7 (Repealed) 

Council Regulation (EC) No 1448/1999 of 24 June 1999 introducing transitional measures for 
the  management  of  certain  Mediterranean  fisheries  and  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No 
1626/94. Official Journal L 167, 2.7.1999, p. 7–8 (Repealed) 

Council Regulation (EC) No 2550/2000 of 17 November 2000 amending Regulation (EC) No 
1626/94 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of marine resources in 
the Mediterranean. Official Journal L 292, 21.11.2000, p. 7–8 (Repealed) 

Council Regulation (EC) No 813/2004 of 26.4.2004 amending Regulation (EC) No 1626/94 
as regards certain conservation measures relating to waters around Malta. Official Journal L 
150, 30.4.2004, p. 32–41 (Repealed) 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1967/2006  of  21  December  2006  concerning  management 
measures for the sustainable exploitation of fishery resources in the Mediterranean Sea, 
amending  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2847/93  and  repealing  Regulation  9EC)  No  1626/94. 
Official Journal L409 30.12.2006 p.11 (In force) 

Regulation  (EU)  No  1343/2011  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  13 
December  2011  on  certain  provisions  for  fishing  in  the  GFCM  (General  Fisheries 
Commission for the Mediterranean) Agreement area and amending Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1967/2006 concerning management measures for the sustainable exploitation of 
fishery resources in the Mediterranean Sea. Official Journal L 347, 30.12.2011, p. 44–61 
(In force) 

Non-EU waters Technical Measures 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  973/2001  of  14  May  2001  laying  down  certain  technical 
measures  for  the  conservation  of  certain  stocks  of  highly  migratory  species.  Official 
Journal L.137 19.05.2001.p.3. (In force) 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  600/2004  of  22 March  2004  laying  down  certain technical 
measures  applicable  to  fishing  activities  in  the  area  covered  by  the  Convention  on  the 
conservation  of  Antarctic  marine 
living  resources.  Official  Journal  L.  97 
1.04.2004.p.1.(In force) 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  831/2004  of  26  April  2004  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No 
973/2001 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of certain stocks 
of highly migratory species. Official Journal L 127 29.04.2004. p.33 (In force) 

Council Regulation (EC) No 520/2007 of 7 May 2007 laying down technical measures for 
the conservation of certain stocks of highly migratory species and repealing Regulation 
(EC) No 973/2001. Official Journal L 123 12.05.2007 p.3 (In force) 

Council Regulation (EC) No 302/2009of 6 April 2009 concerning a multiannual recovery 
plan for bluefin tuna in the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, amending Regulation 
(EC)  No  43/2009  and  repealing  Regulation  (EC)  No  1559/2007.  Official  Journal  L  96 
15.04.2009. p.1. (In force) 

Gear Specifications and Operational Measures 

96 

 
 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3440/84 of 6 December 1984 on the attachment of devices 
to trawls, Danish seines and similar nets. Official Journal L 318, 7.12.1984, p. 23(In force) 

Commission  Regulation  (EEC)  No  955/87  of  1April  1987  amending  Regulation  (EEC)  No 
3440/84  on  the  attachment  of  devices  to  trawls,  Danish  seines  and  similar  nets.  Official 
Journal L 90, 1.04.1987, p. 29 (In force) 

Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2122/89 of 14July 1989 amending Regulation (EEC) No 
3440/84  on  the  attachment  of  devices  to  trawls,  Danish  seines  and  similar  nets.  Official 
Journal L 203, 15.07.1989, p. 21 (In force) 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1434/98  of  29  June  1998  specifying  conditions  under  which 
herring may be landed for industrial purposes other than direct human consumption. Official 
Journal L 191, 7.7.1998, p. 10–12 (In force) 

Commission Regulation (EC) No 1922/1999 of 8 September 1999 laying down detailed rules 
for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 850/98 as regards conditions under which 
vessels  exceeding  eight  metres  length  overall  shall  be  permitted  to  use  beam  trawls  within 
certain waters of the Community (In force) 

Commission Regulation (EC) No 129/2003 of 24 January 2003 laying down detailed rules for 
determining  the  mesh  size  and  thickness  of  twine  of  fishing  nets.  Official  Journal  L  022, 
25/01/2003 P. 0005 - 0014 (Repealed) 

Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No  146/2007  of  15  February  2007  amending  Regulation 
(EEC)  No  3440/84  as  regards  conditions  for  certain  trawls  for  vessels  operating  pump 
aboard systems. Official Journal L46 16.02.2007, p.9 (In force) 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  809/2007  of  28  June  2007  amending  Regulations  (EC)  No 
894/97, (EC) No 812/2004 and (EC) No 2187/2005 as concerns drift nets. Official Journal 
L 182, 12.7.2007, p. 1–2 (In force) 

Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No  517/2008  of  10  June  2008  laying  down  detailed  rules 
for  the  implementation  of  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  850/98  as  regards  the 
determination  of  the  mesh  size  and  assessing  the  thickness  of  twine  of  fishing  nets  (In 
force) 

Commission Regulation (EU) No 724/2010 of 12 August 2010 laying down detailed rules 
for  the  implementation  of  real-time  closures  of  certain  fisheries  in  the  North  Sea  and 
Skagerrak. Official Journal L 213, 13.8.2010, p. 1–5 (In force) 

Nature Conservation Measures 

Council Regulation (EC) No 1185/2003 of 26 June 2003 on the removal of fins of sharks 
on board vessels. Official Journal L 167, 4.07.2003. p.6 (In force) 

Regulation  (EU)  No  605/2013  of  the  European  Parliament  And  Of  The  Council  of  12 
June  2013  amending  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1185/2003  on  the  removal  of  fins  of 
sharks on board vessels. Official Journal L 181 29.06.2013 p. 1 (In force) 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  812/2004  of  26  April  2004  laying  down  measures 
concerning  incidental  catches  of  cetaceans  in  fisheries  and  amending  Regulation  (EC) 
No 88/98. Official Journal L 150, 30.04.2004. p.12 (In force) 

97 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX  V  CURRENT  REGULATORY  STRUCTURE  OF  TECHNICAL 
MEASURES 

Regulation 

Purpose of Regulation 

*Types of Technical 
Measures included 

COUNCIL  REGULATION  (EC)  No 
850/98 

Establishes technical measures for the North-
eastern  Atlantic  including  the  North  Sea, 
Skagerrak and Kattegat, the outermost regions 
and Black Sea (since 2013) 

1,2,3,4,5 

COUNCIL  REGULATION  (EC)  No 
2187/2005 

Establishes  technical  measures  for  the  Baltic 
Sea 

1,2,3,4,5 

COUNCIL  REGULATION  (EC)  No 
1967/2006 

Establishes 
Mediterranean 

technical  measures 

for 

the 

1,2,3,4,5 

COMMISSION 
(EEC) No 3440/84 

REGULATION 

Attachments to fishing gears 

1,2 

COMMISSION 
(EC) No 517/2008 

REGULATION 

Measurement  of  mesh  size  and 
thickness 

twine 

1,2 

COMMISSION 
(EC) No 1922/1999 

REGULATION 

Implementing rules relating to the closed  are 
to protect plaice box in the North Sea 

1,2 

COMMISSION 
(EC) No 494/2002 

REGULATION 

Recovery  measures  to  protect  hake  in  the 
North-east  Atlantic  excluding  the  North  Sea 
(includes  technical  measures,  control  rules 
and reporting requirements) 

1,2,3 

COMMISSION 
(EC) 2602/2001 

REGULATION 

Additional technical measures to protect hake 
stocks  in  the  North-east  Atlantic  excluding 
the North Sea 

1,2,3 

COUNCIL  REGULATION  (EC)  No 
254/2002 

Additional  technical  measures  to  protect  cod 
stocks in the Irish Sea 

1,2,3 

COUNCIL  REGULATION(EC)  NO 
2549/2000 

Additional  technical  measures  to  protect  cod 
in the Irish Sea 

1,2 

COMMISSION 
(EC) No 2056/2001 

REGULATION 

Additional  technical  measures  to  protect  cod 
stocks in the North Sea and West of Scotland 

1,2,3 

COMMISSION 
REGULATION (EU) No 727/2012 

IMPLEMENTING 

Emergency measures to improve selectivity in 
demersal fisheries in the Celtic Sea 

2 

REGULATION  (EU)  No  1343/2011 
OF 
EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT  AND  OF  THE 
COUNCIL 

THE 

in 
the 
Conservation  measures  applying 
Mediterranean  & 
Sea(GFCM 
Regulatory Areas) includes control measures, 
effort  restrictions,  reporting  requirements  as 
well technical measures 

Black 

1,2,4,5 

COUNCIL  REGULATION  (EC)  No 
1098/2007 

Multiannual plan for cod stocks  in the Baltic 
Sea 

3 

COMMISSION 

REGULATION 

Implementing  rules  for  the  use  of  selective  2 

98 

 
 
 
(EU) No 686/2010 

gears in the Baltic Sea 

COUNCIL  REGULATION  (EC)  No 
2347/2002 

and 

requirements 

Access 
associated 
conditions  applicable  to  fishing  for  deepsea 
stocks  by  Union  waters  includes  specific 
catch  composition  rule  relating  to  fishing 
authorisations  

COMMISSION 
(EU) No 724/2010 

REGULATION 

Implementing  rules 
closures in the North Sea & Skagerrak 

to  set  up  real-time 

COUNCIL  REGULATION  (EC)  No 
894/97 

Restrictions on the use of driftnets for highly 
migratory species 

COUNCIL  REGULATION  (EC)  No 
1185/2003 

Prohibition  on  the  removal  of  shark  fins  on 
board Union waters 

COUNCIL  REGULATION  (EC)  No 
812/2004 

Measures  to  reduce  the  incidental  catches  of 
cetaceans 
trawl 
fisheries  in  Union  waters  (includes  reporting 
requirements as well technical measures) 

in  gillnets  and  pelagic 

COUNCIL  REGULATION  (EC)  No 
1434/98 

Specific catch composition rules for industrial 
herring fisheries in the North-east Atlantic & 
Baltic 

2 

4 

1 

1 

5 

1 

COUNCIL  REGULATION  (EC)  No 
1224/2009 

Control regulation includes measures relating 
to real-time closures 

1,4 

COUNCIL  REGULATION  (EC)  No 
1954/2003 

Effort  regime  for  vessels  in  the  North-east 
Atlantic  excluding  the  North  Sea  includes 
closed area (Biologically sensitive area off the 
coast of Ireland) 

4 

COUNCIL  REGULATION  (EC)  No 
600/2004 

Conservation  measures  for    Union  vessels 
operating in the Antarctic (CCAMLAR region 
) (includes control and reporting measures as 
well technical measures) 

1,2,3,4,5 

COUNCIL  REGULATION  (EC)  No 
520/2007 

Conservation  measures  for  Union  vessels 
in 
fishing  for  highly  migratory  species 
ICCAT 
and 
reporting  measures  as  well  as 
technical 
measures) 

(includes 

control, 

region 

1,2,3,4 

COUNCIL  REGULATION  (EC)  No 
302/2009 

Recovery  plan  for  bluefin  tuna  in  ICCAT 
region includes specific technical measures  

1,2,3,4 

COUNCIL  REGULATION  (EC)  No 
734/2008 

Technical  measures  to  protect  vulnerable 
marine ecosystems in the high-seas 

5 

COUNCIL  REGULATION 
2015/104 

(EU) 

Fishing  opportunities  for  Union  waters  and 
Union  vessels  fishing  in  non-EU  waters 
includes technical measure slinked to specific 
stocks  and  also 
technical  measures  for 
fisheries under RFMO agreements 

1,3,4,5 

COUNCIL  REGULATION 
2015/106 

(EU) 

Fishing  opportunities  for  Black  Sea  includes 
close area for turbot fisheries 

4 

99 

 
 
COUNCIL  REGULATION  (EU)  No 
1221/2014 

Fishing  opportunities  for  the  Baltic  includes 
technical measures linked to specific stocks 

COUNCIL  REGULATION  (EU)  No 
1367/2014 

Fishing  opportunities  for  deep-sea  stocks 
includes technical measure slinked to specific 
stocks  

2 

2 

Source: Author 

*Key: 

1)  measures that regulate the operation of the gear (e.g. prohibitions of certain gear types, maximum 

limits on how long or what type of gear can be deployed); 

2)  measures  that  regulate  the  design  characteristics  of  the  gears  that  are  deployed  (e.g.  mesh  size 

and catch composition rules); 

3)  minimum landing sizes below which fish must be returned to the sea (e.g. for cod the minimum 

landing size is set at 35cm); 

4)  measures  that  set  spatial  and  temporal  controls  (e.g.  closed/limited  entry  areas  and  seasonal 

closures) to protect aggregations of juvenile or spawning fish; and 

5)  measures that mitigate the impacts of fishing gears on sensitive species (e.g. cetaceans, seabirds or 

sea turtles) or closed areas to protect sensitive habitats (e.g. coldwater coral reefs). 

100 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX  VI  DIFFERENCES  IN  GOVERNENCE  STRUCTURES  FOR 
TECHNICAL MEASURES BY REGION 

Region 

Principal Regulations (Co-
decided Acts) 

Flexibility 
mechanisms/empowerments 

NE Atlantic 

Regulation (EC) No 850/98  

Baltic  

Regulation (EC) 2187/2005 

Mediterranean 

Regulation (EC) 1967/2006 

101 

- the division of regions into 
geographical areas; 
– to amend rules concerning the 
conditions for the use of certain 
mesh size 
combinations; 
– to adopt detailed rules for 
obtaining the percentage of target 
species taken by more than one 
fishing vessel,; 
- to adopt rules concerning the 
technical descriptions and method 
of use of authorised devices that 
might be attached to the fishing net, 
and which do not obstruct or 
diminish the effective mesh 
opening of the net; 
– conditions under which vessels 
exceeding eight meters length 
overall shall be permitted to use 
beam trawls within certain waters 
of the Union; 
– measures designed to address 
unexpectedly small or large 
recruitments of juveniles, changes 
in migration patterns or any other 
changes in the conservation status 
of fish stocks, with immediate 
effect. 

to amend rules concerning the 
construction of certain gears. 

the granting of derogations where they 
are specifically provided for in that 
Regulation; 

– the setting of criteria to be applied for 
the establishment and allocation of fish 
aggregating devices (FAD) course lines 
for dolphin fish fishery in the 25-mile 
management zone around Malta; 

– the adoption of detailed rules for 
further technical specifications of 
square mesh panels to be inserted into 
towed nets; 

the adoption of technical specifications 
limiting the maximum dimension of 
float line, ground rope, circumference 
or perimeter of trawl nets along with 
the maximum number of nets in multi-
rig trawl nets, and 

– the amendments to the Annexes to 
Regulation (EC) No 1967/2006. 

National Management Plans 

 
 
 
Multi-annual plans 

can 

be 
Technical  measures 
included 
the  annual  Fishing 
in 
opportunities  regulation  provided 
the measures have a functional link 
to a particular stock 

Additional 
transposing  RFMO 
recommendations 
under 
opportunities regulations.  

technical  measures 
and 
included 
fishing 

are 
annual 

rules 

the 

Black Sea 

Regulation (EC) 850/98 

Non-Union waters 

transposing 
regulations 
Specific 
RFMO 
(EC) 
rules:  Regulation 
600/2004,  (EC)  520/2007,  (EC) 
302/2009 

High  Seas:  Regulation 
734/2008  

(EC) 

102 

 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX VII MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE COMMON FISHERIES POLICY 

The new CFP, Regulation (EU) 138/2013 entered into force on 1 January 2014. It is based on 
the principle of management by result. The main elements of the new CFP are: 

  Maximum  Sustainable  Yield  is  the  best  possible  objective  for  renewable  and 
profitable fisheries, harvesting the maximum amount of fish on a long term basis. The 
objective of the CFP is to ensure that MSY is achieved by 2015 where possible, and 
by 2020 at the latest. Not all stocks in the north-east Atlantic are MSY-assessed yet. 
Of the assessed stocks 60% of them are fished at MSY (up from 6 % only in 2005). In 
the Mediterranean only around 11% of assessed stocks are within MSY and there is 
little  sign  of  improvement.  For  many  stocks,  particularly  in  the  Mediterranean,  we 
have no assessment of MSY. 

  Annual legislation on fixing fishing opportunities (TACs and quotas, some are set 
on a two-yearly basis): to fix, based on scientific advice that is consistent with MSY 
and in accordance with multi-annual plans (where they exist), the amount of fishing 
for the stocks concerned, and to  allocate quotas to  the Member States following  the 
so-called  relative  stability  key.  In  turn,  Member  States  deal  with  how  to  distribute 
their national quotas to their fishermen. Annually fishing opportunities are set for the 
Baltic, North Sea, Atlantic and deep-sea stock, by Council only, to determine the level 
of catches (before the landing obligation: landings), for each stock. The COM outlines 
its approach for the TAC in the Spring in a Policy Statement. 

  The COM proposals are based on existing multi-annual plans (with certain provisions 
on  TAC  setting),  or  on  annual  biological  advice.  TACs  are  shared  out  to  MS 
following  fixed  allocation  keys  (so-called  relative  stability,  which  differs  among 
stocks). TACs (in tonnes) are a translation of fishing mortality (F, mortality caused by 
fishing as a ratio of the stock). In the context of multi-annual plans the COM will be 
seeking  advice  on  MSY  expressed  in  ranges  of  fishing  mortality  that  correspond  to 
sustainable fishing and MSY, for the target species. 

  Under certain multi-annual plans TACs are accompanied by effort reduction schemes 
for  certain  fleets.  These  effort  regimes  are  currently  considered  ineffective,  causing 
red  tape,  and  sometimes  creating  conflicts  with  the  TACs.  They  are  likely  to 
disappear  from  future  multi-annual  plans,  but  are  currently  still  part  of  the  TAC 
proposals. 

  The landing obligation: The new CFP includes a landing obligation for all catches of 
species  subject  to  catch  limits  (TACs)  and,  in  the  Mediterranean,  also  catches  of 
species which are subject to minimum sizes (only blue-fin tuna is under TAC in this 
sea basin). 

  It  applies  to  all  Union  vessels  fishing  in  Union  and  non-Union  waters.  The  landing 
obligation is applied in a gradual way and is fishery based. On 1 January 2015 pelagic 
fisheries and industrial fisheries everywhere in Union waters will be under the landing 
obligation, as will be all other fisheries (salmon and cod) in the Baltic. 

  The  landing  obligation  comes  with  a  set  of  potential  measures  and  flexibility 
instruments to make the transition and timely implementation possible. These include 
quota  flexibilities,  exemptions  for  species  that  have  a  high  survival  rate  and  a  de 
minimis exemption to cater for unwanted catches that are unavoidable. The plans may 
also  fix  conservation  reference  sizes  for  fish.  These  measures  should  be  developed 

103 

 
 
 
 
through  multi-annual  plans,  but  in  the  absence  of  such  plans,  discard  plans  can  be 
adopted. 

  The new CFP encourages regionalization, which basically allows Member States, in 
consultation with the relevant stakeholder Advisory Councils, to come forward with a 
proposal for a discard plan (joint recommendation) that the COM, after review, turns 
into Union legislation (through a Commission Regulation). 

  EU  multi-annual  plans;  national  plans  in  the  Mediterranean:  they  contain  the 
framework for management of a stock or a combination of stocks (by fishery). Multi-
annual plans are designed to ensure effective management of the fisheries and to bring 
conservation  and  management  provisions  for  groups  of  stocks  under  plans.  Plans 
contribute to stability and a long-term security for the industry. The main elements of 
plans are: 

–  MSY-related  targets  (per  target  stock),  deadlines  for  achieving  MSY,  and 
fishing  mortality/exploitation  ranges  that  are  consistent  with  MSY  (Fmsy  as  a 
range of values); 

–  Safeguard  provisions  if  science  indicates  that  stocks  are  in  trouble;  specific 
conservation  measures  for  non-target  species,  so  as  to  keep  them  within 
sustainable boundaries; 

–  Mechanisms to allow for regionalization of implementing measures under the 

plan. 

  Fleet  capacity  rules:  these  are  provisions  to  support  that  the  fleet  capacity  of  a 
Member  State  matches  with  the  fishing  opportunities  that  are  allocated  to  it;  fleet 
overcapacity  potentially  leads  to  overfishing.  Member  States  cannot  increase  the 
engine  power  or  storage  capacity  of  their  fleets.  Each  Member  State  is  subject  to  a 
maximum  capacity  threshold  (in  engine  power  (kW)  and  in  vessel  volume  (gt)). 
Nominally,  all  Member  States  fleets  are  under  these  ceilings  however,  in  many 
Member  States  the  effective  engine  capacity  may  well  outscore  the  numbers  in  the 
CFP. Despite intensified enforcement, this is a persistent and hard-to-tackle issue. 

  Annually  Member  States  must  report  on  the  balance  between  capacity  and  fishing 
opportunities.  Historically  this  has  not  been  linked  to  targeted  actions.  For  the  first 
time, under the new CFP Member States have to give follow-up to the identification 
of overcapacity with an action plan to eliminate it, in order to have access to funding 
for decommissioning of excess vessels. The assessment exercise by Member States on 
the  balance  between  capacity  and  fishing  opportunities  is  facilitated  by  common 
guidelines  developed  by  the  Commission.  It  includes  technical  and  economic 
parameters. Member States will have to include in their reports an action plan for the 
fleet  segments  with  identified imbalance.  In  the  action  plan,  Member  States  have to 
set out the adjustment targets and tools to achieve the balance. The plan has to include 
a clear time frame for the implementation of the action plan as well. 

  The  External  Dimension:  The  CFP  reform  enshrines  for  the  first  time  the  external 
dimension  of  the  CFP  (Part  VI  of  the  Basic  Regulation:  Articles  28-31).  It  calls  for 
strong  external  action  that  follows  externally  the  same  principles  and  standards  as 
internally while promoting a level-playing field for EU operators. Under the CFP ne 
international agreements should  

104 

 
 
–  Contribute  to  long  term  sustainability  worldwide  via  stronger  bilateral 
relations  and  tackling  global  issues  such  as  IUU  fishing  and  fishing 
overcapacity. 

–  Up-hold and strengthen the global architecture for fisheries governance (UN, 

FAO, OECD, etc.). 

–  Contribute towards a more effective functioning of RFMOs, more sustainable 

Fisheries Agreements and better coherence with other EU policies. 

  Data  Collection  Framework:  a  set  of  requirements  on  collection  by  fishermen  and 
Member States and management of biological and other data as input for biological, 
economic  and  other  knowledge  and  advice  in  support  of  the  policy.  To  align  to  the 
new  CFP  a  Commission  proposal  for  a  revised  Data  Collection  Framework 
Regulation is under preparation. It will introduce simplifications and more flexibility 
and adaptability, based on an evaluation3 of the previous framework. 

  Advisory  Councils:  The  Advisory  Councils  (ACs)  were  established  since  2004  to 
advise the Commission on matters related to fisheries management in their respective 
areas  of  competence.  Seven  ACs  were  established  for  the  Mediterranean  Sea,  the 
South  Western  Waters,  the  North  Western  Waters,  the  North  Sea,  the  Baltic  Sea, 
small  pelagic  species,  and  the  Long  Distance  Fleet.  The  ACs  are  stakeholders' 
organisations  that  bring  together  the  industry  (fishing,  processing  and  marketing 
sectors)  and  other 
interest  groups,  such  as  environmental  and  consumers' 
organisations.  They  receive  an  annual  grant  of  up  to  250.000  euros  from  the 
Commission  to  cover  part  of  their  operational  costs.  The  new  CFP  foresees  the 
creation  of  four  new  ACs  for  Aquaculture,  Markets,  the  Black  Sea  and  Outermost 
Regions. ACs are expected to expand their play in the regionalized CFP and are to be 
consulted by Member States when preparing joint recommendations on conservations 
measures. 

105 

 
 
 
ANNEX VIII TRENDS IN DISCARDING IN EU FISHERIES 

(Source: http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/documentation/studies/discards/annex_en.pdf) 

ICES regions 

High Discards (>40%) 

Medium Discards (15-39%) 

Target species 

Beam Trawls 
Flatfish (sole, plaice) 

Discard species 

Plaice, sole, cod, 
haddock, whiting, dab 

Bottom trawls 

Nephrops 
Horse mackerel, monkfish, 
megrim, hake 
Cod, haddock, 
Cephalopods 
Mullet 
Target species 

Discard 
characteristics 

Undersize target species  Undersize target species 
Over quota target species 
Low commercial value 

Mediterranean  

Bottom trawls 

Hake, Nephrops, sardines 

Target species and dab, 
gurnards, plaice, lesser-spotted 
dogfish, whiting, boar fish, 
poor cod, gt silver smelt 
horse-mackerel and dragonets 
Undersize target species 
Over quota target species 
Low commercial value 

Trammel nets 

Low Discards (<15%) 
Pelagic trawls 

Herring, horse mackerel, 
mullets, whiting 

Herring, mackerel, horse 
mackerel, blue whiting 

Target species 

Target species 

Overquota, high-graded 
herring, 
Whiting below MLS 

High-grading of low value 
individuals, below MLS 

Beam trawls 

Longline 

Hydraulic dredges 

Bottom trawls 

Bottom trawls 

Pelagic trawls 

High Discards (>40%) 

Medium Discards (15-39%) 

Target species 

Cephalopods and 
scallops (Adriatic) 

Albacore, 
swordfish 

Clams (Adriatic) 

Mullet 

Discard species 

Invertebrates, 
Nephrops  

Swordfish, bluefin 
tuna, tope shark, 
turtles  

Clams and other 
benthic 
invertebrates 

Small commercial 
and non 
commercial 
invertebrates 

106 

Red mullet, red 
shrimp, octopus, 
horse mackerel 

Target species 

Anchovies, 
sardines, red 
mullet, jack 
mackerel, silver 
scabbards 
Target species, 
sharks 

Low Discards (<15%) 
Trammel 
nets/gillnets/lampara 
Anchovies, striped red 
mullet, black 
scorpionfish   

Target species, 
Jack mackerel, 
sardines, 
macroinvertebrates 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Beam trawls 

Longline 

Hydraulic dredges 

Bottom trawls 

Bottom trawls 

Pelagic trawls 

High Discards (>40%) 

Medium Discards (15-39%) 

Discard 
characteristics 

Undersize target 
species 

Undersize target 
species, 
overquota 
(bluefin), 
endangered species 

Undersize target 
species, species 
with low or no 
commercial value 

Undersize target 
species 
Low commercial 
value 
High diversity 
(~135 spp. per 
trawl) 

Under MLS, 
damaged or 
small  

Below MLS, high 
grading of low 
values species and 
small individuals  

Low Discards (<15%) 
Trammel 
nets/gillnets/lampara 
High grading 
(small/damaged 
individuals), 
below MLS 

107 

 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX  IX  DETAILED  BEAKDOWN  OF  CATCHING  SECTOR  BY 
MEMBER STATE AND BY GEAR TYPE 

Member State 

Number of 
vessels 

Gross Tonnage 
(1000GT) 

Kilowatts 
(1000kw) 

Total jobs 

FTEs 

BEL 

BGR 

CYP 

DEU 

DNK 

ESP 

EST 

FIN 

FRA 

GBR 

GRC* 

IRL 

ITA 

LTU 

LVA 

MLT 

NLD 

POL 

PRT 

89 

1010 

n/a 

1664 

2663 

15.8 

5 

n/a 

64.6 

67.5 

10892 

414.7 

934 

3365 

6004 

6467 

17168 

2162 

14.7 

16.7 

161.0 

207.2 

88.3 

72.2 

51.2 

33.7 

n/a 

151.4 

238.8 

936.0 

39.6 

172.8 

879.9 

825.9 

506.4 

202.4 

377 

3276 

n/a 

1639 

1460 

342 

1668 

n/a 

1258 

1661 

36294 

32194 

n/a 

1722 

10713 

12405 

n/a 

4714 

n/a 

316 

7447 

7192 

n/a 

3166 

14715 

185.0 

1236.5 

28726 

20599 

171 

319 

1087 

738 

805 

46.0 

8.5 

12.1 

54.4 

22.3 

83.4 

130.5 

290.1 

38.0 

88.1 

768 

712 

225 

2763 

2411 

575 

378 

155 

1768 

1576 

8557 

102.5 

377.4 

17234 

17188 

108 

 
 
 
 
ROU 

SVN 

SWE 

488 

186 

1.0 

1.0 

7.0 

10.9 

454 

114 

1359 

32.9 

178.1 

1679 

28 

77 

974 

*GRC data from 2010 

Table 1 Number of Vessels and Employment by Member State, 2011 
(Source: STECF 2013b) 

Gear Type 

Number  of 
Vessels 

Gross 
Tonnage 
(1000 GT)  

Kilowatts 
(1000Kw) 

Total Jobs 

FTE 

DRB 

DTS 

MGO 

MGP 

PS 

TBB 

TM 

DFN 

FPO 

HOK 

PG 

PGP 

PMP 

s
r
a
e
g
e
v
i
t
c
A

s
r
a
e
G
e
v
i
s
s
a
P

1650 

32.8 

202.4 

4298 

2520 

6735 

629.0 

1794.8 

28000 

26461 

208 

117 

1.0 

4.7 

17.3 

21.1 

258 

423 

135 

350 

1322 

236.7 

563.9 

12059 

11227 

757 

564 

4073 

3893 

2978 

4095 

13857 

9443 

89.6 

308.1 

2964 

2094 

232.5 

365.0 

4036 

3050 

45.8 

23.6 

97.7 

11.7 

54.3 

40.8 

329.5 

11662 

8091 

263.6 

8085 

6498 

364.4 

9560 

8669 

148.5 

3917 

1368 

582.4 

21245 

17140 

295.5 

20358 

14652 

Total 

49690 

1500.3 

5256.6 

126865 

102256 

Table 2: Breakdown of EU fleet by gear type, 2011 
Source: (STECF 2013b)

109 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gear 
Type 

North-east 
Atlantic 

North Sea 

Baltic Sea 

Mediterranean 

Number 
of 
Vessels 

FTE  Number 

FTE  Number 

FTE 

of 
Vessels 

of 
Vessels 

FTE 

Number 
of 
Vessels 

DRB 

424 

917 

285 

664 

n/a 

n/a 

719 

392 

DTS 

1377 

5453 

1067 

3884 

322 

906 

3410 

9968 

MGO 

MGP 

50 

37 

82 

57 

n/a 

n/a 

48 

96 

n/a 

n/a 

PS 

247 

2594 

12 

157 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

56 

8 

52 

14 

554 

2473 

71 

174 

TBB 

TM 

73 

78 

348 

611 

1572 

n/a 

499 

12 

181 

180 

687 

188 

474 

DFN 

1662 

4057 

874 

1260 

555 

390 

610 

1880 

FPO 

1837 

3762 

1099 

1870 

n/a 

n/a 

197 

98 

HOK 

979 

1993 

136 

202 

27 

49 

744 

1650 

PG 

n/a 

n/a 

205 

31 

2973 

1031 

41 

PGO 

118 

122 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

131 

2 

88 

PGP 

1817 

3465 

623 

391 

818 

356 

9809 

11376 

PMP 

1375 

4936 

68 

162 

35 

41 

2413 

2167 

s
r
a
e
G
e
v
i
t
c
A

s
r
a
e
G
e
v
i
s
s
a
P

Total 

10074 

28285 

5040 

10470 

4910 

3460 

18951 

30808 

Table 2: Breakdown of EU fleet by gear type and sea basin (excluding international vessels), 2011 
Source: (STECF 2013b) 

Key - DFN:  Drift and/or fixed netters; DRB: Dredgers; DTS: Demersal trawlers and/or 
demersal seiners; FPO: Vessels using pots and/or traps; HOK: Vessels using hooks; 
MGO: Vessel using other active gears; MGP: Vessels using polyvalent active gears 
only; PG: Vessels using passive gears only for vessels < 12m; PGO: Vessels using other 
passive gears; PGP: Vessels using polyvalent passive gears only; PMP: Vessels using 
active and passive gears; PS; Purse seiners; TM: Pelagic trawlers; TBB: Beam trawlers 

110 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX  X  DESCRIPTION  OF  BASELINES  AND  THE  CRITERIA  FOR 
THEIR ESTABLISHMENT 

Baseline 

Description 

Criteria/Basis 

Mesh size (as a replacement for 
the current mesh size and catch 
composition rules) 

Mesh sizes by region based on 
existing mesh sizes contained in 
the following regulations: 

NE Atlantic: Annexes I to VII of 
Regulation (EC) 850/98 and 
associated regulations 

Baltic: Annexes II and III of 
Regulation (EC) 2187/2005 and 
Regulation (EC) 686/2010 

Mediterranean: Article 9 and 
Annex II of Regulation (EC) 
1967/2006 

Black Sea: Article 15 of 
Regulation Regulation (EC) 
1343/2011 

Based on current mcrs sizes 
contained in the following 
regulations: 

NE Atlantic: Annex XII of 
Regulation (EC) 850/98  

Baltic: Annex IV of Regulation 
(EC) 2187/2005 

Mediterranean: Annex III of 
Regulation (EC) 1967/2006 

Black Sea: Annex XIIa of 
Regulation (EC) 850/98 

Relevant closed areas contained 
in the following Regulations: 

NE Atlantic: Regulation (EC) 
850/98; Regulation 494/2002; 
Annual Fishing Opportunities 

Baltic: Regulation (EC) 
2187/2005; Regulation (EC) 
1098/2007 

Mediterranean: Regulation (EC) 
1967/2006; Regulation (EC) 
1343/2011 

Black Sea: Annual fishing 
opportunities regulation 

Regional rules restricting the use 
of specific fishing gears (e.g. 
prohibition of the use of beam 
trawls in the Kattegat; limit on 

111 

Minimum Conservation 
Reference Size (replacing 
minimum landing sizes) 

Closed or restricted areas 

Other Measures 

Exploitation patterns for key 
driver species of commonly used 
mesh sizes (taking account of 
selective devices being used in 
fisheries (sorting grids, escape 
windows and also any national 
measures) based on STECF 
evaluation 

Spatial considerations of mesh 
sizes appropriate to the particular 
area of operation and fishery 

Whether existing derogations are 
still relevant 

In the Baltic, Mediterranean 
and Black Sea baseline mesh 
sizes are already defined in the 
regulations 

No change in mcrs except for 
changes made in discard plans 
(i.e. Baltic cod, anchovy in Area ) 
or where there is scientific 
evidence from STECF to support 
a change in the current size 

Whether the objective of the 
closure is still relevant, unclear or 
no longer relevant as the 
objective has been met. 

Whether the closure has been 
subject to a full or partial 
evaluation or evaluated indirectly 
as part of stock assessments or 
wider reviews of management 
measures. 

Whether the closure is effective 
or not based on available 
information based on assessment 
by STECF or ICES. 

No change in measures unless 
there is an STECF evaluation to 
amend or delete 

 
 
 
 
the number of pots for deepwater 
crab that can be used in the 
Mediterranean) or derogations 
from the common rules (e.g. 
derogation to allow the use of 
electric pulse trawls in the 
southern south to catch flatfish) 

Table 1 Description of Baseline measures and the criteria for their establishment in the framework 
regulation under option 2 
(Source Author)  

112