Special Report No 12 // 2016#Agencies’ use of grants: not always appropriate or demonstrably effective #(pursuant to Article 287(4), second subparagraph, TFEU)
Date: 2016-03-02
Institutions: European Court of Auditors
Subjects: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, European Environment Agency, European Food Safety Authority, European Institute of Innovation and Technology, Frontex, eligibility criteria, financial aid

EN 

2016 

NO 12

Special Report  Agencies’ use of grants: 

not always appropriate or 
demonstrably effective

EUROPEAN
COURT
OF AUDITORS

 
EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 
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Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2016

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EN 

2016 

NO 12

Special Report

Agencies’ use of grants: 
not always appropriate or 
demonstrably effective

(pursuant to Article 287(4), second subparagraph, TFEU)

Audit team

02

The ECA’s special reports set out the results of its performance and compliance audits of specific budgetary areas or 
management topics. The ECA selects and designs these audit tasks to be of maximum impact by considering the risks 
to performance or compliance, the level of income or spending involved, forthcoming developments and political and 
public interest.

This audit was produced by Audit Chamber IV — headed by ECA Member Milan Martin Cvikl — which specialises in audit-
ing revenue, research and internal policies, financial and economic governance and European Union’s institutions and 
bodies. The audit was led by ECA Member Louis Galea, supported by the head of his private office, Jacques Sciberras, and 
Anna Fiteni, Attaché. The Head of Task Marc Mc Guinness led the audit team composed of: Jasmine Mitterbuchner,  
Christos Alexandrou, Kostadin Dimov, Nour-Eddine Hachiby, Paris Kaklamanos, Alexandre Kim-Hugé, Juan Antonio 
Vazquez Rivera, Wolfgang Stolz, Eddy Struyvelt, Auditors.

From left to right: J. Mitterbuchner, L. Galea, A. Fiteni, M. Mc Guinness.

Contents

03

Paragraph

List of abbreviations

Glossary

I – IV 

Executive summary

1 – 10 

Introduction

7 – 8 

Characteristics of agency grants

9 – 10 

Roles and responsibilities

11 – 15  Audit scope and approach

11 – 13  Audit scope

14 – 15  Audit approach

16 – 51  Observations

17 – 31  Agencies did not address all funding options, grants were not always the most appropriate tool 
and agencies’ programming documents were not fully aligned with their mandate and strategic 
objectives

17 – 27 

Inadequate follow‑up of ex ante evaluation contributed to agencies’ choice of inappropriate funding tools 
and poor grant design

28 – 31 

Incomplete annual programming documents did not fully align agencies’ grant actions with their mandates 
and strategic objectives

32 – 41  Agencies implemented grants in broad compliance with the rules but there were shortcomings in 

certain grant award, expert selection and internal control procedures

32 – 37 

In specific cases grant selection and award procedures did not fully respect basic principles and potential 
conflict of interest risks persist

38 – 41  Agencies generally improved their grant implementation and controls but some weaknesses remain

42 – 51  Whilst grants generally contributed to the audited agencies’ policy implementation, agencies 

failed to set up adequate monitoring systems to measure the overall effectiveness of their 
grant‑funded activities and ex post evaluations were either lacking or incomplete

 
 
Contents 

04

52 – 57  Conclusions and recommendations

53 

54 

55 

56 

57 

Appropriate use of the grant funding tool

Annual programming of grant actions

Grant award procedures

Ex ante and ex post controls

Key performance indicators and ex post evaluations

Annex  —  Samples

Reply of the Commission and the EIT

Reply of the ECDC

Reply of the EEA

Reply of the EFSA

Reply of Frontex

 
 
 
 
 
 
List of abbreviations

05

AWP: Annual Work Programme

Cedefop: European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, Thessaloniki

CEPOL: European Police College, Budapest

CPVO: Community Plant Variety Office, Angers

ECDC: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Stockholm

EEA: European Environment Agency, Copenhagen

EFSA: European Food Safety Authority, Parma

Eionet: European Environment Information and Observation Network

EIT: European Institute of Innovation and Technology, Budapest

EMCDDA: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, Lisbon

EPIET: The European Programme for Intervention Epidemiology Training

ETC: European Topic Centres are consortia of institutions across EEA member countries dealing with a specific 
environmental topic and contracted by the EEA to perform specific activities as defined in the EEA Strategy and 
the Annual Management Plan. Six ETCs have been established for the following topics: Air pollution and Climate 
Change mitigation, Biological Diversity, Climate Change impacts, vulnerability and Adaptation, ETC WMGE Waste 
and Material in Green Economy, Inland, Coastal and Marine waters, Urban, Land and Soil systems.

EU, Union: European Union

Eurojust: The European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit, The Hague

FFR: Framework financial regulation applicable to the agencies/delegated bodies of the EU (Commission Delegated 
Regulation (EU) No 1271/2013).

FP7: The Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration activities was 
the European Union’s main instrument for supporting research and innovation over the period 2007-2013. 

FR: Financial Regulation on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (Regulation 
(EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council). It rules the establishment and 
implementation of the EU budget ensuring sound financial management, control and protection of the EU’s 
financial interests.

Frontex: European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, Warsaw

GMES: Global Monitoring for Environment and Security 

List of abbreviations 

06

GIO land: GMES Initial Operations (GIO)

GSA: European Global Navigation Satellite Systems Agency, Prague

H2020: Horizon 2020 is the successor of FP7. With an original budget nearing 80 billion euros over the period 2014-
2020, its main objective is to ensure Europe produces world-class science, removes barriers to innovation and makes 
it easier for the public and private sectors to work together in delivering innovation.

KIC: A Knowledge and Innovation Community is a highly autonomous partnership of leading higher education 
institutions, research organisations, companies and other stakeholders in the innovation process that tackles 
societal challenges through the development of products, services and processes and by nurturing innovative 
entrepreneurial people.

KPI: Key performance indicators are used to measure the factors which are crucial for the success of an organisation.

RACER: Relevant (objective-related), accepted, credible, easy and robust KPIs.

RAP: The rules of application (implementing rules) for the financial regulation (Commission Delegated Regulation 
(EU) No 1268/2012). The RAP clarify the modalities on how to implement the rules of the FR.

SMART objectives: Specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and timed objectives

Glossary

07

Agency: Decentralised agencies are bodies distinct from the EU institutions, with separate legal personality; set up 
for an indefinite period to carry out technical, scientific or managerial tasks that help the EU institutions make and 
implement policies. They also support cooperation between the EU and national governments by pooling technical 
and specialist expertise from both the EU institutions and national authorities.

Article 36 bodies: Article 36 of EFSA’s founding regulation sets the basis for networking with and among Member 
State organisations that operate in the fields within EFSA’s mission. EFSA’s Management Board established and 
updates the list of competent organisations which are eligible for Article 36 grants.

Cooperation Agreement: A cooperation agreement is a tool to avoid duplication of work and foster synergies in 
relevant fields of activities and is often formalised by a Memorandum of Understanding. An example could be to 
enhance technical cooperation between parties to share knowledge and exchange experience and best practice on 
matters of mutual interest.

Framework Partnership Agreement: Framework partnership agreement is a long-term cooperation mechanism 
between an agency and the beneficiaries of grants. It specifies the common objectives, the nature of planned grant 
actions, the procedure for awarding specific grants, and the general rights and obligations of each party under the 
specific agreements. The duration of a framework partnership is limited to four years (except for EIT which awards 
FPAs for seven years to the KICs).

Knowledge Triangle: The contribution of higher education to jobs and growth can be enhanced through close, 
effective links between education, research, and innovation — the three sides of the Knowledge Triangle.

Service Level Agreement: Service Level Agreement can form part of a Service contract and define the level of 
service required in a certain number of key areas of activity that represent the most important qualities expected by 
the contracting authority.

Executive summary

08

I
For several years the Court has criticised aspects of grant management in its specific annual reports on the accounts 
of certain agencies. For the 3 years 2013-2015, agencies combined spending on grants amounted to 740 mil-
lion euros. In order to obtain a horizontal view of the use of grants we decided to examine the systems and controls 
in place in five agencies: European Institute for Innovation and Technology (EIT), European Agency for the Manage-
ment of the Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex), 
European Environment Agency (EEA), European Food and Safety Authority (EFSA) and European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control (ECDC). Together these five agencies represent approximately 92 % of total grant funding by 
agencies during this period.

II
We considered:

—  whether it was appropriate to use grants (as opposed to other means such as procurement, service level agree-

ments, etc.) to achieve the policy objectives of the selected agencies;

—  whether when grants are used, the proposals are selected in compliance with the applicable rules and they are 

monitored effectively; and

—  whether the results and effectiveness are measured and evaluated.

III
We conclude that the agencies audited in general awarded and paid grants in compliance with the rules. Most 
audited agencies have not adequately addressed alternative funding options and consequently grants have not 
always been the best way to achieve their objectives. Audited agencies have not measured the effectiveness of their 
grants. There is room for improvement in award procedures, control systems and performance measurement. Some 
weaknesses are particular to a specific agency but most apply to several or all of them.

Executive summary 

09

IV
We make the following five recommendations which should be of benefit to all agencies currently using grants and 
any that are contemplating doing so:

(a)  before launching grants, agencies should explore if grants are the most effective tool. Simplified cost options 

and direct award should be used whenever justified;

(b)  the agencies’ work programmes should indicate which activities are to be implemented by grants, the specific 

objectives and expected results to be achieved by the grant actions, as well as the planned financial and human 
resources needed to implement the grant actions;

(c)  agencies applying specific grant procedures should establish formal internal procedures governing the princi-

ples of transparency and equal treatment, and safeguarding against potential of conflicts of interest;

(d)  agencies should strengthen their verification system regarding grant project implementation;

(e)  agencies should set up grant monitoring and reporting systems based on result and impact-oriented key per-

formance indicators as well as ex post evaluation results.

Introduction

10

01 
The European Parliament and Council have established 41 agencies and other 
decentralised bodies. The agencies’ total 2015 budget amounted to some 2.4 bil-
lion euros or about 1.5 % of the 2015 EU general budget. They are separate legal 
entities set up for an indefinite period to carry out technical, scientific or mana-
gerial tasks that help the EU institutions make and implement policies. They also 
support cooperation between the EU and national governments by pooling tech-
nical and specialist expertise from both the EU institutions and national authori-
ties. To fulfil their tasks, agencies can choose from various funding tools: grant 
funding, public procurement or other mechanisms like cooperation agreements 
or outsourcing (through service level agreements).

02 
Grant funding by agencies doubled from around 166 million euros in 2013 to 
333 million euros in 2015 (see  Figure 1). This is primarily due to increased activity 
in three agencies: EIT, EEA and the European Global Navigation Satellite Systems 
Agency (GSA).

1 The agencies’ grant payments from 2013 to 2015
e
r
u
g
i
F

350

300

333 million euro

o
r
u
e
n
o
i
l
l
i

m

250

200

150

100

50

0

166 million euro

240 million euro

2013

2014

2015

Source: ECA based on agencies’ data.

 
 
Introduction 

11

03 
Eleven agencies use grants to achieve their policy objectives (see Table 1).

1 The agencies’ grant payments (2013 to 2015) by activity funded
e
l
b
a
T

Research 
Development 
and Innova-
tion (RDI)

Scientific 
and Member 
State 
cooperation

Studies

Data 
collection 
and analysis

Training

Total  
(million euro)

Proportion 
per agency

EIT1

Frontex1

EEA1

GSA

EFSA1

EMCDDA

ECDC1

CEPOL

Cedefop

Eurojust

CPVO

Total grant payments

Percentage per activity

1 Agencies selected for audit.

Source: ECA based on agencies’ data.

478.1

42.0

520.1

70 %

147.8

17.2

4.1

7.1

2.0

1.8

180.0

24 %

25.1

1.5

0.8

0.3

27.7

4 %

478.1

147.8

42.3

42.0

8.6

7.1

6.3

3.5

2.0

1.8

0.3

739.8

100 %

65 %

20 %

5 %

5 %

1 %

1 %

1 %

1 %

<1 %

<1 %

<1 %

100 %

3.0

3.0

1 %

5.5

3.5

9.0

1 %

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12

2013

2014

2015

Introduction 

04 
The Court audited five agencies (EIT, Frontex, EEA, EFSA and ECDC), representing 
92 % of the total agencies’ spending on grant activities. The selection of these 
agencies was based on the type of grant activities funded, the beneficiaries’ pro-
file, and the volume of payments during the years 2013 to 2015. (See Figure 2).

2 The selected agencies’ grant spending for 2013 to 2015
e
r
u
g
i
F

256

o
r
u
e
n
o
i
l
l
i

m

64

16

4

1

ECDC

EEA

EFSA

EIT

Frontex

Source: ECA based on agencies’ data.

05 
A description of the grant-funded activities of the selected agencies is provided 
in Box 1.

 
 
 
Introduction 

13

1 Audited agencies’ grant‑funded activities
x
o
B

European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT)

The EIT provides grants to ‘Knowledge and Innovation Communities’ (KICs), composed of networks of exist-
ing private enterprises, research institutes and education institutions which work together around innovation 
projects, and assist or fund individual innovators and entrepreneurs, all over Europe. In 2014, EIT provided 
214 million euros on KIC grant-funded activity (97 % of its annual budget).

European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the 
Member States of the European Union (Frontex)

Frontex coordinates joint operations (air, land and sea) between participating states with the aim of strength-
ening external border security. In 2014, air operations totalled 2 million euros, sea operations 28 million euros 
and land operations 7 million euros. Frontex also coordinates repatriation activities between the Schengen 
states to maximise efficiency and cost-effectiveness in joint return operations and is obliged to ensure that its 
financial support is conditional upon the full respect for the Charter of Fundamental Rights. In 2014, Frontex 
provided 8 million euros for such operations. Such grant-related operations represent 50 % of Frontex’s 2014 
annual budget.

European Environment Agency (EEA)

The EEA is responsible for providing the Union and the Member States with objective, reliable and compa-
rable information on the environment at a European level. To this end, the EEA supports six European Topic 
Centres (ETCs) with grants (8 million euros or 18.5 % of the EEA annual budget in 2014). In addition, the Com -
mission delegated to the EEA the implementation of the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security 
Initial Operations of the land monitoring services (GIO land). Under this programme, the EEA awarded grants 
to participating states of 15 million euros in 2014.

 
Introduction 

14

1 European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)
x
o
B

EFSA regularly awards grants for joint scientific projects and activities that contribute to EFSA’s mission to 
foster food safety in the EU: data collection, preparatory work for scientific opinions, and other scientific and 
technical assistance. Only public bodies included in the list of competent organisations1, based on designa-
tions by Member States, can apply for a grant. In 2014, EFSA awarded grants of approximately 3.5 million euros 
or 4 % of the Authority’s annual budget.

European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)

ECDC funds training activities to support capacity building in Member States through the organisation of spe-
cific courses and through the European Programme for Intervention Epidemiology Training (EPIET). In 2014, 
such training activities represented approximately 2 million euros or 3 % of the Centre’s annual budget.

1  Article 36 of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles 
and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety (OJ L 31, 
1.2.2002, p. 1.) sets the basis for networking with and among Member State organisations. EFSA’s Management Board establishes and updates 
the list of competent organisations which are eligible under Article 36.

 
15

2  Regulation (EU, Euratom) 

No 966/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council 
of 25 October 2012 on the 
financial rules applicable to 
the general budget of the 
Union and repealing Council 
Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 
1605/2002 (OJ L 298, 
26.10.2012, p. 1) (Financial 
Regulation).

3  Commission Delegated 

Regulation (EU) No 1268/2012 
of 29 October 2012 on the 
rules of application of 
Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 
966/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council 
on the financial rules 
applicable to the general 
budget of the Union (OJ L 362, 
31.12.2012, p. 1).

4  Commission Delegated 

Regulation (EU) No 1271/2013 
of 30 September 2013 on the 
framework financial regulation 
for the bodies referred to in 
Article 208 of Regulation (EU, 
Euratom) No 966/2012 of the 
European Parliament and of 
the Council (OJ L 328, 
7.12.2013, p. 42).

5 

See Article 121 of the FR.

Introduction 

06 
The agencies’ grant activities are governed by the general financial regulations 
(FR)2, the rules of application (RAP)3 and the framework financial regulation (FFR)4, 
unless otherwise provided in the agencies’ founding regulations (such as EIT and 
Frontex) or basic acts. The FP7 or Horizon 2020 rules also apply to those agencies 
involved in funding research activities under these programmes (EIT, GSA).

Characteristics of agency grants

07 
Agency grants are direct financial contributions to beneficiaries (usually special-
ised Member State institutions/bodies or non-profit organisations). The results 
of the grant-funded activities remain the property of the beneficiaries. Grants 
finance:

(a)  actions intended to achieve a particular Union policy objective (so-called ‘ac-

tion grants’); or

(b)  the functioning of a body which supports a particular or general agency (Un-

ion) policy objective (so-called ‘operating grants’).5

08 
The following basic principles applicable to grants are set out in the FR:

—  co-financing: beneficiaries should bear part of the incurred cost;

—  no-profit: grants should not have the purpose or effect of producing a profit 

for the beneficiaries;

—  non-retroactivity: grants should not be awarded retroactively;

—  non-cumulative award: only one grant may be awarded for the same action;

—  transparency and equal treatment are to be ensured throughout the whole 

grant process, from the call for proposal to closure.

16

6 

For example, the Commission 
decentralised implementation 
of the GMES Initial Operations 
of the land monitoring 
services (GIO land) to the EEA.

7 

See articles 133 and 135 of the 
FR, and Article 29(4) of the FFR.

Introduction 

Roles and responsibilities

09 
Grants are implemented by agencies through indirect centralised manage-
ment. Accordingly, the agencies are responsible for the multi-annual and annual 
programming as well as for the implementation (operational and financial) of 
their grant actions. In those cases where the Commission delegates the imple-
mentation of a specific grant action to an agency, it retains ultimate responsibil-
ity for the overall implementation of the grant budget6. The agencies’ effective 
management of grant activities is therefore crucial for the achievement of Union 
objectives and policies.

10 
At agency level, grant management controls comprise the following systems7:

(a)  ex ante and ex post evaluation of the agency’s grant actions and projects;

(b)  call for proposals procedures and evaluation panels;

(c)  ex ante and ex post controls to verify the legality and regularity of the cost 

statements submitted by the beneficiaries;

(d)  monitoring and reporting to measure achievements and results of the funded 

grant activities based on key performance indicators (KPIs).

Audit scope and approach

17

Audit scope

11 
In its specific annual reports,the Court has repeatedly highlighted weaknesses in 
grant management, particularly in relation to the ex ante and ex post control of 
cost statements, the reliability of the external auditor’s ex ante verification work, 
the monitoring of the operational implementation of grants, and the recovery of 
undue payments.

12 
Hence, the audit assessed how the agencies managed grants and whether they 
were implemented in compliance with the rules. This has been broken down into 
the following audit sub-questions:

(a)  Do agencies choose grants as the most appropriate funding tool and are 

grant-funded activities properly aligned to the agencies’ mission, strategic 
tasks and objectives?

(b)  Do agencies’ procedures ensure selection of proposals in compliance with 
the applicable rules and effective monitoring of their implementation?

(c)  Do agencies measure and evaluate outcomes of grant activity appropriately?

13 
The audit focused on the whole grant management process. It did not examine 
the socioeconomic impact of agencies’ grants.

Audit scope and approach 

18

Audit approach

14 
The audit was based on:

(a)  On-the-spot visits to five agencies (EIT, Frontex, EEA, EFSA and ECDC) in order 

to obtain audit evidence of grant management practices through interviews 
with the operational and administrative key staff, review of documentation, 
analysis of internal control processes, and examination of the sample set out 
in the Annex.

(b)  A review of the founding regulations, multiannual and annual work pro-

grammes, grant programming documents, grant management guidelines, as 
well as grant evaluation reports of the five agencies selected for audit visits.

(c)  A detailed analysis of 16 call procedures and 75 grant payments over the five 
selected agencies during the period January 2013 to March 2015 (see Annex).

15 
The audit was carried out against the background of the general FR and its RAP, 
the audited agency’s internal control standards and founding regulation as well 
as the multiannual policy frameworks related to the agency’s policy area.

Observations

19

16 
Our observations are in three parts corresponding to the audit sub-questions in 
paragraph 12: (a) the strategic choice of funding tool, (b) the implementation of 
this decision and (c) the measurement of results.

8  Article 18.1 of the RAP.

Agencies did not address all funding options, grants 
were not always the most appropriate tool and 
agencies’ programming documents were not fully 
aligned with their mandate and strategic objectives

Inadequate follow‑up of ex ante evaluation contributed to 
agencies’ choice of inappropriate funding tools and poor 
grant design

Inadequate follow‑up of ex ante evaluations

17 
Agencies are required to perform ex ante evaluations of their programmes and 
activities in order to comply with the principle of sound financial management. 
Among other things, the ex ante evaluation should address the added value of 
the EU involvement, the selection of the most appropriate method of implemen-
tation, the cost-effectiveness of the selected method and the lessons learned 
from similar experiences in the past8.

18 
Both EEA and EFSA performed robust ex ante evaluations before launching their 
respective calls for proposals. EFSA’s scientific cooperation roadmap 2014 to 2016 
is an example of good practice of an ex ante evaluation. Its main objective was to 
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of future grants, while considering the 
added value of its involvement (see Box 2).

Observations 

20

2
x
o
B

EFSA applied lessons learned to introduce new and more effective grant concepts 
in 2015

EFSA performed the ex ante evaluation with a view to strengthen its future scientific cooperation with Mem-
ber States. To this end, in 2013 EFSA launched consultations with its Focal Point network and the Advisory 
Forum Discussion Group on Scientific Cooperation. It also commissioned an external review to assess the 
impact of its existing grant and procurement projects on delivery of its tasks. EFSA analysed the outcomes 
and recommendations of these reviews in formulating its scientific cooperation roadmap 2014 to 2016, which 
introduced new and more effective grant concepts, namely thematic grants (e.g. microbial foodborne patho-
gens) and grants for joint projects (e.g. VectorNet).

Thematic grants are now being awarded for broad priority themes established in advance in cooperation with 
the Member States. EFSA is increasing the maximum grant amount to 500 000 euros thereby encouraging 
large strategic project proposals, while limiting its co-financing rate to 50 % (compared to its previous 90 % 
co-financing rate for specific grants). EFSA anticipates that these new grants have the potential to bring higher 
added value and cost-effectiveness to its scientific cooperation activities.

19 
An important element of an effective ex ante evaluation is the application of les-
sons learned. In 2011, an impact assessment of EIT-integrating ex ante evaluation 
requirements9 highlighted the importance of putting in place robust monitor-
ing procedures to measure the performance of EIT and the KICs10. EIT is currently 
establishing such a monitoring system (see Box 6 and paragraph 45). These 
weaknesses of performance monitoring affect the EIT’s implementation of the 
competitive review mechanism11.

9 

The ex ante evaluation was 
carried out by the Commission 
and accompanied the 
proposal for an amended 
founding regulation of the EIT.

10  SEC(2011) 1433 final of 

30 November 2011 ‘Impact 
Assessment — integrating ex 
ante evaluation requirements’, 
recommendations 4 and 5.

11  The competitive review 

mechanism is established in 
Article 14(7) of the EIT 
founding regulation and is the 
basis for allocating EIT’s 
financial contribution to the 
KICs. The financial 
contribution comprises 
a support funding element 
(60 % equally distributed 
among KICs) and 
a competitive funding 
element (40 %). The 
competitive funding element 
is allocated on the basis of 
three criteria with equal 
weighting: (1) past KIC 
performance; (2) proposed KIC 
business plan and estimated 
budget; (3) implementation of 
KIC multi-annual strategy. 
See also the Court’s Special 
Report No 4/2016 ‘The 
European Institute of 
Innovation and Technology 
must modify its delivery 
mechanisms and elements of 
its design to achieve the 
expected impactis’, 
paragraph 73 (http://eca.
europa.eu).

 
21

12  Article 203 of the RAP 

concerning grant award 
criteria merely requires that 
the evaluation ensures that 
Union funds are properly 
managed.

Observations 

Inappropriate funding tools

20 
Agencies choice of different funding tools for the implementation of their spe-
cific tasks is limited to: grant funding, public procurement or other mechanisms 
like cooperation agreements or outsourcing (through service level agreements). 
The choice should depend on an analysis of the agency’s needs, its resources, the 
objectives to be achieved, the potential beneficiaries to be targeted, as well as 
the level of competition necessary to ensure cost-effectiveness. The participat-
ing entities must conform to the relevant requirements of the funding option 
selected by the agency.

21 
Grant procedures use more restrictive eligibility criteria and weaker financial 
award criteria than procurement. For example, the proposed grant budget is not 
assessed in terms of the most economically advantageous proposal12, as would 
be the case in procurement. Whenever grant funding is used, competition in 
general and on price in particular can be very limited. Therefore, grant funding 
should not be the default funding option, but should be deployed when, for duly 
justified reasons, the use of public procurement is not appropriate.

22 
The audited agencies have not produced specific guidelines and criteria, as 
required under the Internal Control Standards, to assist management in decid-
ing upon the most appropriate funding mechanism for the implementation of 
a specific task or activity.

23 
Some of the audited agencies (Frontex, EFSA, ECDC) have provided grants to 
acquire specific services or deliverables from public bodies that are highly spe-
cialised in the field of the agency’s tasks. They have supported this approach by 
citing their obligation to increase cooperation and networking with their public 
partners, and by noting that under the procurement rules limiting access to con-
sortia and excluding private bodies with a possible conflict of interest is prob-
lematic. However, the Court has noted instances where these agencies either 
used both grants and procurement for similar services (EFSA, Frontex) or have not 
explored other options (EFSA, ECDC). For examples see Box 3.

Observations 

22

3
x
o
B

Examples where the use of grants is not the most effective tool

EFSA uses specific grants and procurements for scientific studies and data collection tasks

EFSA regularly awards specific grants for projects and activities that support EFSA’s mission in the area of data 
collection, preparatory work for scientific opinions, and other scientific studies. Only public partners included 
in the list of competent organisations can apply for a call for proposals.

EFSA also launches procurements for the preparation of scientific opinions and short-term scientific studies 
which are open to public and private bodies. In such cases the ratio of success between organisations referred 
to in Article 36 of the founding regulation 13 and other organisations is 50:50. However, EFSA did not explore 
the procurement option for the grant projects audited.

Aerial surveillance for Frontex joint operations

Frontex has normally financed these operations through grants to participating state authorities, and the rate 
varied between 4 800 and 6 900 euros per patrolling hour. In 2012 and 2013, Frontex launched pilot projects to 
assess the viability of carrying out aerial surveillance by procurement. This resulted in an agreed all-inclusive 
rate of 2 250 euros per patrolling hour. In 2015, based on the results of the pilot projects, Frontex launched 
a procurement procedure for framework contracts with reopening of competition. The procedure resulted in 
11 successful tenders (six contracts awarded for maritime aerial surveillance, and five contracts awarded for 
land aerial surveillance). The Court’s comparative analysis of the maritime aerial surveillance indicates that 
private bodies could provide more suitable smaller planes specialised in aerial surveillance as opposed to 
the larger planes normally used for military purposes or civil aviation proposed by the participating Member 
States. Consequently, the average price per hour decreased to 2 300 euro from the previous rate of 5 700 euro.

ECDC uses grants for scientific studies

ECDC used grants for the scientific studies: ‘Vaccine European New Integrated Collaboration Effort-Phase III’ 
(VENICE III); and ‘European Reference Laboratory Network for Tuberculosis’ (ERLTB-net). It justified the use of 
grants on historical grounds as well as the partners’ familiarity with the grant funding model, the shared own-
ership and the importance of the confidentiality of the data obtained. However, it did not explore the option 
of using procurement before launching the call for proposals.

13  Article 36 of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 sets the basis for networking with Member State organisations operating within EFSA’s mission. EFSA’s 
Management Board establishes and updates a list of competent public organisations designated by the Member States. The list currently 
includes about 330 public bodies.

 
Observations 

Poor grant design

24 
To avoid imposing an unnecessary administrative burden on both agencies and 
beneficiaries, the FR and its RAP foresee that grants may be awarded directly 
without a call for proposals in exceptional cases14 and encourage the use of sim-
plified cost options to facilitate grant management, particularly with regard to 
low value grants (grants less than 60 000 euros)15.

25 
The audit revealed several cases where the audited agencies’ grant award pro-
cedure led to significant administrative burdens for both the agency and the 
beneficiaries when these award options were not exercised (for an example see 
Box 4).

23

14  Article 190 of the RAP allows 
direct grants to public bodies 
or Member States identified 
by a basic act as beneficiaries 
or for actions with specific 
characteristics that require 
a particular type of body on 
account of its technical 
competence and high degree 
of specialisation.

15  Articles 123 and 124 of the FR, 
and Article 181 of the RAP 
provide for reimbursement on 
the basis of unit costs, lump 
sums or flat-rate financing.

4
x
o
B

Example of an unnecessarily burdensome grant award procedure

ECDC Fellowship Agreements

Each year, ECDC sends invitations to submit a proposal for a framework partnership agreement (FPA) to those 
acknowledged training sites that have hosted EPIET fellows in the previous year. Before awarding the EPIET 
fellowship FPA, the Centre performs a full evaluation procedure based on the criteria communicated in the 
restricted call for proposals. This procedure is an unnecessarily heavy administrative burden upon both the 
Centre and the training sites, particularly as ECDC has already certified these bodies as recognised training 
locations. ECDC could have used the direct award procedure16.

16  Article 190(1)(f) of the RAP.

26 
The choice of an inappropriate form of grant can also result in considerable inef-
ficiencies in the implementation and monitoring of the grant activities. Agencies 
can make more use of the simplified cost options (for examples see Box 5).

 
Observations 

24

5
x
o
B

Examples of the use of an inappropriate form of grant

EEA European Topic Centres (ETCs) and Eionet

The ETCs form part of the European Environment Information and Observation Network (Eionet) and support 
the agency in the implementation of its work programmes. EEA enters into FPAs with consortia to establish 
each ETC, as the partner organisations must pool their expertise to address each topic. The majority of EEA 
partners are public sector bodies, since environmental data collection, assessment and reporting is predomi-
nantly done in this sector. Preparing and subsequently analysing the cost statements of over 40 partners is 
a significant administrative effort, required as the grants are funded on the basis of direct eligible costs. EEA 
could explore further the use of simplified cost options for these grants17.

Frontex Aerial Surveillance Running Expenses of Means

Frontex funds land/sea/air border operations of participating states with grants. One element of these op-
eration concerns aerial surveillance. The grant system for such surveillance relies on the reimbursement of 
declared Running Expenses of Means (REM) covering mainly expenses for depreciation, maintenance, fuel, 
and crew allowances per flight hour. The participating authorities use different approaches for the calculation 
and declaration of their maintenance cost and mission expenses (notably crew allowances) with the result that 
managing these grants is particularly inefficient and burdensome.

17  Articles 123 and 124 of the FR.

27 
EFSA’s simplified cost option for the grant funding of its focal points is an exam-
ple of good practice for the efficient implementation of low value grants. Focal 
points support EFSA in the practical implementation of networking and scientific 
cooperation activities. They act as an interface between EFSA and the national 
food safety authorities, research institutes, consumers and other stakeholders. In 
2015, EFSA directly awarded multiannual grant agreements to its focal points for 
the provision of predefined recurrent services. The annual grant for each focal 
point (low value grants below 60 000 euros) was based on lump sums for the 
calculation of which EFSA relied on two sources: (a) the historical cost claim data 
(collected during the last 7 years of cooperation) and (b) the Eurostat data for the 
salary of public employees of the respective Member States. At year end, EFSA 
could pay the total annual grant amount on the basis of the services rendered 
without being obliged to request supporting documents for the exact cost in-
curred, thereby reducing significantly the administrative burden for its partners 
and the cost of ex ante verifications for EFSA.

 
25

18  Article 32 of the FFR.

19  Article 29.4 of the FFR.

20  Article 32.3 of the FFR.

21  Article 121(1) of the FR.

Observations 

Incomplete annual programming documents did not fully 
align agencies’ grant actions with their mandates and 
strategic objectives

SMART objectives for results and impacts were not set

28 
Agencies are required to draw up multi-annual and annual work programmes 
outlining the objectives, expected results and performance indicators18. Objec-
tives set should be specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and timed (SMART) 
and relate to all its sectors of activity19. The annual work programme should be 
aligned with the multi-annual work programme and should include the actions 
to be financed20. The grant funded activities should be clearly linked with the 
objectives in the agencies’ work programmes21.

29 
For all audited agencies, the review of the most recent AWPs (2013-2015) showed 
that SMART objectives were generally missing. In most cases objectives were 
either broad descriptions of the grant activities planned for the year or vague 
output descriptions. The lack of SMART objectives undermined the audited 
agencies’ ability to demonstrate that their grant activities were aligned to their 
strategic objectives and the mandate of their founding regulations (for examples 
see Box 6).

Observations 

26

6
x
o
B

Examples of poorly defined objectives in the AWPs

EIT’s AWPs do not have SMART high‑level objectives on expected innovation improvements

The EIT did not define in its annual work programme SMART high-level objectives on innovation expected 
to be achieved through synergies resulting from the KICs knowledge triangle (research, education and in-
novation) or on the sustainability of the existing KICs. Consequently, the AWPs did not ensure that the KIC’s 
business plan objectives for grants were fully aligned with and supported the achievement of the strategic 
objectives of the EIT, the Strategic Innovation Agenda, and Horizon 2020.

ECDC’s AWPs do not have SMART objectives for its recurrent grant activities

Since ECDC took over the EPIET programme from the Commission in 2006, it has trained approximately 450 
epidemiologists and is presently training 12 per year. However, Member States have also trained their own 
epidemiologists and ECDC does not have data on the number of trained specialists at Member State level. As 
a result, its public health training strategy (adopted in June 2015) lacks relevant and time-related strategic 
targets. The ECDC’s AWPs could not demonstrate how its recurrent grants for public health training would 
contribute to the achievement of its overall mandate and strategic objectives for European epidemiological 
surveillance and capability to define and control disease outbreaks.

Frontex does not have quantitative objectives and targets for its joint operations

Frontex has established operational programmes for each of its grant funded joint operations. In recent years 
it has been tasked with ad hoc search and rescue operations in response to multiple migration crises, which 
impacted on its planning. In the majority of operational programmes — including Frontex’s three biggest pro-
grammes (Hermes, Triton and Poseidon Sea) — although objectives were set, they were not quantitative and 
did not specify target values. The lack of quantified targets hampers the measurement of the joint operations’ 
effectiveness in the long term.

 
Observations 

27

Financing decisions were incomplete

30 
Agencies must adopt a financing decision before launching a call for proposals22. 
In the absence of such a decision, their AWPs must include the objectives, indica-
tive amount and maximum co-financing rate of the planned grant activities23 and 
thereby serve as legally compliant financing decisions24.

31 
In most cases, the audited agencies had not taken separate financing decisions 
and the AWPs did not include the information25 necessary to constitute valid 
financing decisions for their grant actions (for examples see Box 7).

22  Article 68(2) and (3) of the FFR.

23  Article 188 of the RAP.

24  Article 94 of the RAP and 
Article 68 of the FFR.

25  AWPs should indicate which of 

the planned annual activities 
are being implemented by 
framework partnerships or 
specific grant agreements, the 
form of grants, objectives and 
expected results, indicative 
amount and maximum 
co-financing rate of the 
planned grant activities.

7
x
o
B

Examples of annual work programmes that do not constitute valid financing 
decisions

EEA’s 2013 AWPs did not include the indicative amount

In 2013, the EEA signed FPAs with ETCs for 4 years. However, the related programming documents (AWP, calls 
for proposals) did not include the indicative amount.

EIT’s AWPs did not include important information on the KIC grants

The EIT’s AWPs did not include important information related to the planned annual specific grant agree-
ments with the KICs, such as maximum specific annual grant amounts per KIC, related EIT annual objectives, 
expected results and indicators.

 
28

26  Article 125.1 of the FR.

27  Articles 203(2) and 204(1) of 

the RAP.

28  Article 132 of the FR and 

articles 202 and 203 of the 
RAP.

Observations 

Agencies implemented grants in broad compliance 
with the rules but there were shortcomings in certain 
grant award, expert selection and internal control 
procedures

In specific cases grant selection and award procedures did 
not fully respect basic principles and potential conflict of 
interest risks persist

32 
Agencies should adhere to the principles of transparency and equal treatment 
in their award of grants, as well as in the selection of any experts involved in the 
award procedures. Furthermore they should ensure necessary safeguards against 
potential conflicts of interest.

33 
Agencies that used the grant selection and award procedures of the FR (i.e. EEA, 
EFSA and ECDC) were in compliance with the principles. Shortcomings were 
found where agencies applied specific expert selection and grant award proce-
dures based on exemptions in the founding regulation and basic act (i.e. EIT and 
Frontex).

Risk of non‑respect of the principles of transparency and 
equal‑treatment

34 
Grants are subject to the principles of transparency and equal treatment26. The 
agencies’ selection and award procedures specified in the calls for propos-
als should ensure that all applications are treated equally and that the grant is 
awarded to the most appropriate proposal based on the criteria published in the 
call27. The call should clearly differentiate the selection and award criteria. Selec-
tion criteria must make it possible to assess the applicants’ financial, professional 
and operational capacity to complete the proposed grant funded action. Award 
criteria must make it possible to assess the quality of the submitted proposal 
(taking into account the objectives and priorities set for the grant action)28.

35 
The Court found that Frontex and EIT had adopted procedures on the basis of the 
exemptions in their founding regulations. Such procedures do not ensure that 
agencies safeguard in full the principles of transparency and equal treatment (see 
Box 8 for further details).

Observations 

29

8
x
o
B

Call procedures based upon founding regulation exemptions

Frontex deployment of negotiating teams in bilateral talks

In accordance with its founding regulation, Frontex does not launch calls for proposals for the award of joint 
operation grants. Instead, it directly concludes 4-year FPAs with the participating states’ authorities. Each year 
the Operations Division of Frontex informally designates negotiation teams and defines the annual resources 
necessary for the joint operations of the coming year. Frontex then negotiates bilaterally with the participat-
ing states and establishes their contribution in terms of human resources and technical equipment. The Fron-
tex negotiation teams have the power to accept or renegotiate the resources proposed by the participating 
states. However, neither the decision on team composition, nor on the resources to be requested was taken by 
either the director or by the management board. Furthermore, the negotiation teams have not been formally 
appointed by the director or management board. Consequently, the procedure that results in specific grants 
for joint operations does not fully safeguard the principles of transparency and equal treatment.

EIT procedure for KIC designation

The criteria specified in the 2014 call for KIC proposals reflected the provisions of the EIT founding regulation 
for the selection and designation of KICs29. However, these criteria were used as both selection criteria (techni-
cal, operational and financial capacity) and award criteria (quality and potential of the proposed innovation 
strategy), with some overlap noted at the level of sub-criteria. Furthermore, the call did not establish any 
threshold for proposals to reach the hearing stage.

In designating a KIC, the EIT Governing Board considers the result of the external expert evaluation panel, 
the report of the final recommendation panel, and the outcome of the Board’s hearing of the top three KIC 
candidates. In relation to the 2014 call, the Court noted that the assessment by the Board was qualitative and 
without scoring. In addition, neither the call nor EIT’s internal guidelines specified how the Board should 
weight the evaluation results of the different panels. These shortcomings may affect the equal treatment of 
candidates and hamper the effectiveness of the KIC selection and designation process.

29  Article 7.2 of Regulation (EC) No 294/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2008 establishing the European Institute of 

Innovation and Technology (OJ L 97, 9.4.2008, p. 1).

 
Observations 

30

Potential conflict of interest risks persist

36 
External experts to assist an agency in the evaluation of grant applications 
should be selected with due attention to potential conflicts of interest30. Expert 
lists are to be drawn up following a call for expressions of interest31.

30  Article 204(1) of the RAP. See 

also the Court’s Special Report 
No 15/2012 ‘Management of 
conflict of Interest in Selected 
EU Agencies’ (http://eca.
europa.eu).

31  Article 287 of the RAP.

37 
The Court found that Frontex and EIT had not sufficiently addressed the potential 
for conflict of interest (for details see Box 9).

9
x
o
B

Appointment of experts and potential conflict of interests

Frontex absence of appropriate conflict of interest policy

While all Frontex staff are required to sign a declaration of interests annually, there exists no formal require-
ment for a declaration of absence of conflict of interest before participating in the bilateral negotiation teams. 
As such, Frontex has not established an appropriate conflict of interest policy for the staff members of the 
negotiation teams.

EIT appointment of experts

For the selection of external experts evaluating KIC proposals and business plans, the EIT makes use of Arti-
cle 89 of its FR to derogate from the obligation of launching a call for expressions of interest. However, EIT has 
not fully established internal procedures to regulate the implementation of this derogation.

In practice, EIT established its pool of experts using existing expert lists and databases of other EU institutions 
(mainly Commission) and individuals not on these lists following recommendations from the EIT governing 
board and staff members. The contract for one of the key external experts was awarded directly for the 2014 
KIC call.

Potential conflicts of interest are assessed by the EIT director and mitigating measures are decided upon on 
a case by case basis. There was no evidence of an effective assessment of situations where the same expert 
has multiple simultaneous engagements each involving potential conflict of interest. These shortcomings 
increase the risk of infringing the principle of non-discrimination and the potential for conflicts of interest.

 
Observations 

31

Agencies generally improved their grant implementation and 
controls but some weaknesses remain

38 
Payments must be subject to ex ante and ex post control in order to confirm that 
they comply with the applicable provisions and that the principle of SFM has 
been applied32. For grants above the thresholds, a supporting certificate pro-
duced by an approved and independent external auditor or public officer on the 
financial statements of the action is compulsory33. Only those costs actually and 
necessarily incurred by the beneficiary in the performance of the action and that 
are indicated in the budget of the action are eligible for reimbursement34.

32  Article 45 FFR.

33  Article 207 of the RAP requires 

a certificate for grant actions 
above 750 000 euros, and for 
operating grants above 
100 000 euros. Some agencies 
include lower thresholds in 
their internal policies.

34  Article 126 FR.

Ex ante and ex post controls

39 
The Court issued qualified opinions on the transactions underlying the accounts 
of EIT and Frontex for 2012 and 2013 due to the absence of effective  ex ante and 
ex post controls in respect of grant payments. It made similar observations in 
respect of EEA and ECDC, however in these cases the audit opinion was unquali-
fied. In response, the audited agencies significantly strengthened their verifica-
tion procedures and have also revised their ex post verification policies and audit 
strategies. However, while the Court’s 2014 audit opinion of all agencies based 
on the financial and compliance audits were unqualified, continuing weaknesses 
in the verification procedures for grant payments were observed. For concrete 
examples of persisting system weaknesses, see Box 10.

Observations 

32

0
1
x
o
B

Examples of weaknesses in the ex ante verification procedures for grants

EEA

One ETC submitted the final cost statement for activities in which one partner had declared expenses of 
180 000 euros for the year ending 31 December 2013. The ex ante verification detected errors in the calcula-
tion method of the declared partner’s gross staff remuneration (over 40 % considered ineligible), but the full 
amount was paid.

Frontex

Reports on the activities undertaken during Air Border Surveillance (ABS), Sea Border Surveillance (SBS), or 
Land Border Surveillance (LBS) joint operations vary considerably in length, structure and content between 
the different participating states. This hampered an efficient ex ante verification of cost claims.

ECDC

In 2014 ex post verifications of ECDC grant-funded activities from 2012 and 2013 took place. Six grant actions 
involving four beneficiaries were audited. The ex post verification found that insufficient evidence was avail-
able for one of the beneficiaries to establish the direct cost of the action. In fact, the beneficiary’s staff were 
employed on multiple projects and no time recording system was maintained. This indicates that the ex ante 
verification system should be further improved in light of the outcome of the ex post audit.

Other internal control weaknesses

40 
The Court noted that on average, over the period 2011-2014, the EIT grant agree-
ments were signed 3 months after the start of the calendar year. The signatures 
of the 2015 grant agreements were delayed until June 2015.

41 
In 2013 and 2014 the EEA has signed FPAs with five ETCs that will remain in force 
until 2018. The EEA has neither estimated nor published the budget for the entire 
period of the FPAs. Consequently, no financial ceiling has been established. The 
consumption of the FPAs by specific grant agreements, while being monitored 
on an annual basis, is effectively unlimited.

 
Observations 

33

Whilst grants generally contributed to the audited 
agencies’ policy implementation, agencies failed to 
set up adequate monitoring systems to measure the 
overall effectiveness of their grant‑funded activities 
and ex post evaluations were either lacking or 
incomplete

35  Article 29.4 of the FFR.

36  Article 32.3 of the FFR.

Lack of key performance indicators

42 
For each activity, the achievement of objectives has to be monitored by per-
formance indicators35. These performance indicators have to be included in the 
agencies’ AWPs36 (see Figure 3 for examples of indicators).

3 Examples of input, output, result and impact indicators
e
r
u
g
i
F

Agencies’ and beneficiaries’ funds mobilised to achieve Agencies’ policy objectives.

INPUT

OUTPUT

That which is directly produced or supplied with the EU funds allocated to an activity/action. Output indicators
monitor the expected deliverables of the activity.
For example: purchase of academic training services  at university level.

Change that arises from the implementation of an action. Result indicators measure the immediate effects of the activity
concerned and look at the direct addressees. 
For example: number of start-ups and spin-offs created as a direct output of a KIC activity, number of knowledge adoptions
and transfers that are output of a KIC activity.

RESULT

Final, high-level effects of the action (long term).  These are subject to a wide range of other (external) influences.  Impact
indicators represent what the successful outcome of an activity/action should be in terms of impact on the economy/society
beyond those directly affected by the activity/action.
For example: Enhancing performance of EU's innovation system: possible indicators include number of market leading products
introduced by EU companies; gross R&D expenditure in EU; foreign direct investment net inflows and outflows.

IMPACT

Source: ECA based on the Commission’s guidelines regarding ‘Horizon 2020 Indicators: Assessing the results and impact of Horizon 2020’.

 
34

37  Relevant (objective-related), 
accepted, credible, easy and 
robust.

38  Article 7a of Regulation (EC) 

No 294/2008.

39  Article 29.5 of the FFR, 
Article 18.3 of the RAP.

40  Article 18.3.b of the RAP.

41  Article 18.3 of the RAP.

Observations 

43 
Whilst the audited agencies defined in their multi-annual and annual work pro-
grammes some basic output-related performance indicators for grant activities, 
they have not set RACER37 key performance indicators (KPIs) on results and im-
pact. Therefore they could not monitor the coherence and effectiveness of their 
grant activities or measure the results and impact achieved.

44 
Frontex AWPs contained 38 performance indicators for the monitoring of its 
operations and activities but only a few are used for reporting purposes. None 
of the KPIs so used adequately measure the effectiveness of the agency’s 
grant-funded activities. The high number of performance indicators compared 
to the few indicators actually analysed for reporting purposes undermines the 
effectiveness of Frontex’s monitoring and reporting system.

45 
The EIT has not yet set up an comprehensive evaluation system to monitor its 
own activities and those of the KICs as required by its founding regulation, the 
Horizon 2020 regulation and the Strategic Innovation Agenda of the EIT38. The 
EIT core performance indicators continue to focus on input or output rather than 
results or impacts. It is thus not possible to assess the innovative impact created 
by the synergy effects of the knowledge triangle.

Lack of or incomplete ex post evaluations

46 
To improve effectiveness and decision-making, agencies should perform ex 
post evaluations of significant activities39. Activities financed on an annual basis 
should have their results evaluated at least every 6 years40. These evaluations 
should analyse the results of a multi-annual grant activity as well as recurrent 
annual grant funding actions in order to verify that they were consistent with the 
objectives set41.

47 
However, the audited agencies have not always performed ex post evaluations 
and those that did failed to use the results to improve their monitoring and re-
porting on grant-funded activities.

Observations 

35

48 
In 2013 EFSA conducted an ex post evaluation on the impact of its grants and 
procurements. Based on the evaluation results, EFSA implemented new grant 
concepts in the framework of its scientific cooperation strategy for 2014 to 2016 
(see paragraph 18). The AWPs, however, continued to contain only vague grant 
objectives and basic indicators related to budget implementation and output 
(e.g. proportion of grant budget committed/paid at year end; number of scien-
tific outputs adopted). In the absence of relevant and result-oriented KPIs, EFSA 
could not monitor the effectiveness of its past grant actions and will not be able 
to assess the EU added value and effectiveness of its newly implemented grant 
schemes.

49 
In 2012, the EEA management board requested an ex post evaluation on the ef-
fectiveness of the ETCs. This evaluation stressed the importance of exploiting 
synergies to achieve efficiency gains across the topic areas as well as the growing 
need for more comprehensive and integrated environmental data analysis. Whilst 
the evaluation provided some basis for strategic decision-making affecting fu-
ture grants (e.g. to develop specialised EEA in-house IT capabilities for integrated 
environmental data analysis), it omitted an assessment of the impact measure-
ment system for both the EEA and the ETCs activities.

50 
The ex post evaluations should be sufficiently complete to assess achievement 
of strategic objectives. Both Frontex and ECDC lack data and information from 
Member States to allow them to do so. Furthermore, both agencies failed to rec-
ognise this fundamental issue in their ex post evaluations and internal analyses. 
As a consequence, they did not meet their obligations to set relevant strategic 
objectives for their grant activities and to establish an effective (result-oriented) 
monitoring and reporting system with relevant and measurable KPIs.

51 
The implications of this situation on ECDC and Frontex grant activities are out-
lined in Box 11.

Observations 

36

1
1
x
o
B

Examples of incomplete ex post evaluations

Inability to measure the effectiveness of ECDC’s grant activities

The ECDC’s mandate includes supporting and coordinating training programmes in order to assist Member 
States and the Commission to have sufficient numbers of trained specialists, in particular in epidemiological 
surveillance and field investigations, and to have a capability to define health measures to control disease 
outbreaks42.

Peer-reviewed scientific literature recommends a ratio of 1 epidemiologist per 100 000 people. With a popula-
tion of over 500 million in the EU, this translates into a requirement of approximately 5 000 epidemiologists. 
It is estimated that ECDC and the Member States should train approximately 500 fellows per year. ECDC does 
not have information on the actual number of fellows trained per year in the Member States, nor on the cur-
rent number of active epidemiologists in the EU. As a result, ECDC is unable to monitor the effectiveness of its 
grant funded training task.

Inability to measure the effectiveness of Frontex grant activities

Frontex coordinates joint operations with the Schengen states, which may involve assisting the Schengen 
states in humanitarian rescue actions at sea.

In 2014, Frontex recorded approximately 340 000 irregular entrants to the Schengen Area through its various 
operations. Member States are responsible for establishing the status of the entrants (asylum granted, return, 
absconded). However, there is insufficient data exchange between Frontex and the member states on this 
matter. Consequently, the effectiveness of Frontex grant funded joint operations cannot be assessed.

42  Article 9(6) of Regulation (EC) No 851/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 april 2004 establishing a European Centre for 

disease prevention and control (OJ L 142, 30.4.2004, p. 1).

 
Conclusions and 
recommendations

37

52 
The audit showed that grants have not always been the most appropriate tool to 
fulfil agencies’ tasks and policy objectives. The audit also indicated that, except 
for cases of specific grant selection procedures, agencies managed grants in 
broad compliance with the rules. Whilst grants generally contributed to agen-
cies’ policy implementation and fostered cooperation with public bodies of the 
Member States, agencies did not measure further EU added value and the overall 
effectiveness of their grant-funded activities. The recommendations which follow 
are addressed to all agencies or other bodies using grants, or considering their 
use in the future.

Appropriate use of the grant funding tool

53 
Most of the audited agencies have not adequately addressed whether grant 
funding was the most effective and efficient tool for the implementation of 
a specific task or activity (see paragraphs 17 to 19), or whether other options like 
public procurement, service level agreements or cooperation agreements would 
have been more appropriate or economic (see paragraphs 20 to 23). Moreover, 
there are also inefficiencies regarding the chosen grant procedure or form of 
grant (see paragraphs 24 to 27).

Recommendation 1

Before launching grants, agencies should explore if grants 
are the most effective tool. Simplified cost options and direct 
award should be used whenever justified.

Whenever agencies use grant funding for a specific action, this should be based 
on a thorough analysis of the agency’s needs, strategic objectives, EU added 
value to be achieved, potential candidates to be targeted, as well as the level of 
competition necessary to achieve cost-effectiveness. Agencies should avail of the 
simplified cost options whenever appropriate. Grants should be awarded without 
a call for proposals (i.e., directly) whenever justified by Article 190 of the RAP. 
Agencies should establish clear guidelines and criteria to assist management in 
deciding upon the most effective, efficient and economic tool for the implemen-
tation of a specific task or activity.

Target implementation date: as soon as possible.

Conclusions and recommendations 

38

Annual programming of grant actions

54 
The audited agencies’ multi-annual and annual work programmes lacked specific, 
measurable and time-related objectives on results for the planned grant actions. 
This weakness undermines the agencies’ ability to align their (annual) grant ac-
tivities to the strategic objectives of their multi-annual programming documents 
and the mandate of their founding regulation (see paragraphs 28 to 29). They 
often lacked important information related to the planned call for proposals. In 
such instances, the annual work programme does not constitute a valid financing 
decision for the agency’s grant actions (see paragraph 30 to 31).

Recommendation 2

The agencies’ work programmes should indicate which 
activities are to be implemented by grants, the specific 
objectives and expected results to be achieved by the grant 
actions, as well as the planned financial and human resources 
needed to implement the grant actions.

When agencies establish their annual work programme, they should set out 
specific result-oriented objectives for their grant actions which have to be clearly 
aligned to their strategic objectives and mandate of the founding regulation. To 
be a valid financing decision, agencies have to indicate in the annual work pro-
gramme the financial and human resources authorised for the implementation 
of the grant actions (budget line and appropriations) as well as essential informa-
tion on the planned call for proposals (selection and award criteria, maximum 
grant amount, maximum possible rate of co-financing, time table). In case of 
multi-annual framework partnerships, annual priorities and expected results have 
to be set for the specific grants.

Target implementation date: Annual work programmes 2018.

Conclusions and recommendations 

39

Grant award procedures

55 
Shortcomings existed in cases where the audited agencies applied specific ex-
pert selection and grant award procedures based on exemptions in the founding 
regulation (i.e. EIT and Frontex). As a result, risks to the principles of equal treat-
ment, transparency and potential conflict of interest issues have not been fully 
addressed (see paragraphs 34 to 37).

Recommendation 3

Agencies applying specific grant procedures should establish 
formal internal procedures respecting the principles of 
transparency and equal treatment, and safeguarding against 
potential conflicts of interest.

In cases where the agencies’ founding regulations derogates from the FR, the 
agency should establish formal internal procedures for the implementation of 
the derogation. The internal procedures should, in particular, ensure:

—  transparency: internal staff members involved in the grant procedures should 
be formally appointed and clearly authorised by the responsible authority 
(authorising officer/governing board); consensus reports should clearly justify 
all major decisions; for each evaluation stage both the underlying criteria and 
the relative weighting of the evaluation stage should be published in the call 
for proposals;

—  equal treatment of candidates: communicate harmonised methodologies and 
thresholds to all members of the selection panel/committee; establish clearly 
separated eligibility, selection and award criteria; set selection and award 
criteria which are neither too specific nor too vague; do not directly appoint 
external experts; set thresholds for proposals to reach the final hearing stage, 
and publish in the call;

—  absence of conflict of interest: formal conflict of interest policies should be 

established for external experts, internal staff and governing board mem-
bers involved in the selection and award process; the policy should classify 
conflict of interest issues considering the accumulated effect of several minor 
conflict of interest and define effective mitigating measures.

Target implementation date: as soon as possible.

Conclusions and recommendations 

40

Ex ante and ex post controls

56 
While the audited agencies have improved their grant implementation and moni-
toring procedures, various weaknesses remained in the internal control system 
(see paragraphs 39 to 41).

Recommendation 4

Agencies should strengthen their verification system 
regarding grant project implementation.

Agencies should establish standardised reporting requirements for the benefi-
ciaries to allow for an efficient and effective monitoring system. The outcomes 
of ex post controls should be reviewed at least annually to identify and address 
any potential systemic issues in the ex ante control system. FPAs should indicate 
a maximum amount. Specific agreements implementing recurrent grants and 
FPAs should be signed prior to the planned start date of the grant action unless 
duly justified.

Target implementation date: as soon as possible.

Key performance indicators and ex post evaluations

57 
Whilst the audited agencies defined in their work programmes some basic out-
put indicators for their grant actions, they have not set relevant key performance 
indicators on results and impact. Moreover, they have either not performed ex 
post evaluations of significant activities or have not acted upon these results 
to improve their monitoring and reporting on grant-funded activities. Finally, 
some evaluations failed to recognise a lack of key data from Member States. As 
a result, agencies could not monitor the coherence and effectiveness of their 
grant actions and reports did not adequately demonstrate the results and impact 
achieved (see paragraphs 42 to 51).

Conclusions and recommendations 

41

Recommendation 5

Agencies should set up grant monitoring and reporting 
systems based on result and impact‑oriented key 
performance indicators as well as ex post evaluation results.

For each impact and result-oriented objective set in the multi-annual and annual 
work programmes, agencies should develop at least one relevant key perfor-
mance indicator on impact and results. In addition, agencies should carry out ex 
post evaluations of significant grant actions (including the recurrent grant activi-
ties financed on an annual basis) taking into account the need for important data 
and information from Member States involved to ensure that they are consistent 
with the strategic objectives set.

Target implementation date: Annual work programme 2018.

This report was adopted by Chamber IV, headed by Mr Milan Martin CVIKL, 
Member of the Court of Auditors, in Luxembourg at its meeting of 2 March 2016.

For the Court of Auditors

Vítor Manuel da SILVA CALDEIRA
President

 
 
 
Annex

x Sample of calls for proposal audited (2013‑2015)
e
n
n
A

Agency 
name

Type of procedure

Title

Grant Reference

42

Grant 
budget 
(euro)

EFSA

EFSA

EFSA

EFSA

EFSA

EFSA

EFSA

ECDC

ECDC

ECDC

ECDC

ECDC

EEA

EEA

EIT

EIT

Call for proposal

Call for proposal

Call for proposal

Call for proposal

Relationship between seroprevalence in the main livestock 
species and presence of Toxoplasma gondii in meat

Data collection supporting the establishment of cumulative 
assessment groups of pesticides

Biomarkers of exposure for mycotoxins mainly for deoxynivale-
nol — data collection and generation

Study on the implications of draft revised FCM on public health 
and administrative consequences

GP/EFSA/BIOHAZ/2013/01

400 000

GP/EFSA/PRAS/2013/02

160 000

GP/EFSA/CONTAM/2013/04

300 000

GP/EFSA/FIP/2013/01

250 000

Call for proposal

Occurrence data on tropane alkaloids on food and feed

GP.EFSA.BIOCONTAM.2014.01

530 000

No call for proposal Art. 
190 1c

No call for proposal Art. 
190 1c

Open call for proposals 
FPA

Implementation of Framework Partnership Agreement — 
Support the Regulatory implementation of Cumulative Risk 
Assessment of Pesticides signed on 15.12.2014.

Multi annual focal point grant agreements

Monitoring Vaccination Programmes in the European Union 
and EEA/EFTA countries: Sharing Information to Improve 
Performance

Restricted call for propos-
als FPA

Hosting EPIET Fellowship

Open call for proposals 
FPA

European reference laboratory network for tuberculosis (ERLTB-
net) — to strengthen tb diagnosis, drug susceptibility testing 
and coordination at European Union level

Call for proposals FPA

Hosting EPIET Fellowship

Call for proposals FPA

Scientific Coordination for EPIET Fellowships (Epidemiology and 
Public Health Microbiology (EUPHEM) paths)

GP/EFSA/PRAS/2014/02

400 000

BELGIUM - FOCAL POINT 
AGREEMENT 2015

45 000

GRANT/2013/001

1 600 000 

GRANT/2013/002

6 000 000 

GRANT/2013/003

800 000 

GRANT/2014/001

GRANT/2014/002

6 000 000 

3 000 000 

Call for proposals FPA

European Topic Centre on Urban, land use and soil 2015-2018

EEA/NSV/14/001-ETC/ULS

Call for proposals FPA

European Topic Centre on Waste and Materials in a Green 
Economy 2014-2018

EEA/IEA/13/003-ETC/WMGE

Call for proposals FPA

KIC healthy living and acitve aging

Call for proposals FPA

KIC raw materials

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Frontex does not issue any calls for proposals. They negotiate directly with the participating State authorities on an annual basis in respect of the human 
resources and technical equipment requirements for the coming year.

Annex 

x Sample of grant payment transactions audited (2013‑2015)
e
n
n
A

Official 
Budget 
Item

Pay Type 
Code

Beneficiary

Agency 
name

EFSA

EFSA

EFSA

EFSA

EFSA

EFSA

EFSA

ECDC

ECDC

ECDC

ECDC

ECDC

ECDC

ECDC

ECDC

ECDC

ECDC

ECDC

ECDC

ECDC

EEA

EEA

EEA

B3-010

B3-110

B3-110

B3-010

B3-110

B3-110

B3-110

B03002

B03002

B03003

B03003

B03003

B03003

B03003

B3-003

B3-003

B3-003

B3-002

B3-002

B03003

B3-331

B3-332

B3-334

Year of 
trans-
action

2013

Final

2013

Final

2013

Final

Final

Final

Final

Final

Fund 
Source

C1

C1

C1

C1

C1

C1

C1

C1

C8

C1

C8

C8

C8

C8

C8

C8

C8

C8

C8

C8

C8

C8

C8

2014

2014

2013

2014

2013

2014

2014

2015

2014

2014

2014

2013

2013

2013

2013

2014

2014

2013

2013

2013

(OSTERREICHISCHE AGENTUR FUR GESUNDHEIT UND ERNAHRUNGSSI-
CHERHEIT GMBH) AUSTRIAN AGENCY FOR HEALTH AND FOOD SAFETY

(NEMZETI ELELMISZERLANC-BIZTONSAGI HIVATAL) NATIONAL FOOD 
CHAIN SAFETY OFFICE

ISTITUTO ZOOPROFILATTICO SPERIMENTALE DELL'ABRUZZO E DEL 
MOLISE G CAPORALE ENTE

WETENSCHAPPELIJK INSTITUUTVOLKSGEZONDHEID WISSENSCHAFTLI-
CHESINSTITUT FUR VOLKSGESUNDHEIT IPH

STICHTING DLO STICHTING DIENST LANDBOUWKUNDIG ONDERZOEK

UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

(ELINTARVIKETURVALLISUUSVIRASTO EVIRA) FINNISH FOOD SAFETY 
AUTHORITY EVIRA

Pre-Financing

ISTITUTO SUPERIORE DI SANITA

Final

ISTITUTO SUPERIORE DI SANITA

Pre-Financing

NARODOWY INSTYTUT ZDROWIA PUBLICZNEGO PANSTWOWY ZAKLAD 
HIGIENY

Final

Final

Final

Final

Final

Final

Final

Final

Final

Final

Final

Final

Final

NARODOWY INSTYTUT ZDROWIA PUBLICZNEGO PANSTWOWY ZAKLAD 
HIGIENY

MINISTERIE VAN VWS AGENTSCHAP RIVM

INSTITUTO DE SALUD CARLOS III

INSTITUTO DE SALUD CARLOS III

UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

(SMITTSKYDDSINSTITUTET SMI) SWEDISCH INSTITUTE FOR COMMUNI-
CABLE DISEASE CONTROL

KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS

HEALTH PROTECTION AGENCY CENTRE FOR RADIATION CHEMICAL AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS RADIATION PROTECTION DIVISION

UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

NORWEGIAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC HEALTH

(RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR VOLKSGEZONDHEIDEN MILIEU) NATIONAL 
INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT

(CENIA,CESKA INFORMACNI AGENTURA ZIVOTNIHO PROSTREDI CENIA) 
CZECH ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION AGENCY

UNIVERSIDAD DE MALAGA

43

Pay Accepted 
Amount 
(euro)

57 125.40

327 865.88

32 160.00

86 012.72

59 276.45

45 787.83

54 871.30

70 362.56

73 264.06

35 955.64

13 881.00

148 925.66

101 937.18

51 749.50

242 090.00

100 476.59

149 687.00

200 000.00

228 599.60

71 129.00

644 948.90

420 000.00

132 938.52

Annex 

x
e
n
n
A

Agency 
name

Official 
Budget 
Item

Fund 
Source

Year of 
trans-
action

Pay Type 
Code

Beneficiary

2013

Final

EEA

EEA

EEA

EEA

EEA

EEA

EEA

EEA

EEA

EEA

EEA

EEA

EEA

EEA

EEA

EEA

EEA

EIT

EIT

EIT

EIT

EIT

EIT

EIT

EIT

Frontex

Frontex

B3-336

B03540-
R0-GISC

B3-331

B3-333

B3-331

B3-332

B3-333

B3-334

B3-336

B3-436

B3-436

B3-436

B3-436

B3-436

B3-436

B3-436

B3-436

B3-000

B3-000

B3-000

B3-000

B3-000

B3-000

B3-000

B3-000

A-3010

A-3010

Frontex

A-3050

Frontex

A-3050

C8

R0

C1

C1

C8

C8

C8

C8

C8

R0

R0

R0

R0

R0

R0

R0

R0

C1

C1

C1

C1

C5

C1

C1

C1

C1

C8

C1

C1

CENTRO EURO-MEDITERRANEO SUI CAMBIAMENTI CLIMATICI SCARL 
MCC

RIVM RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR VOLKSGEZONDHEID EN MILIEUAGENTSC-
HAP MIN VOLKS

KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS

MUSEUM NATIONAL D'HISTOIRE NATURELLE

KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS

(CENIA,CESKA INFORMACNI AGENTURA ZIVOTNIHO PROSTREDI CENIA) 
CZECH ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION AGENCY

MUSEUM NATIONAL D'HISTOIRE NATURELLE

UNIVERSIDAD DE MALAGA

CENTRO EURO-MEDITERRANEO SUI CAMBIAMENTI CLIMATICI SCARL 
CMCC

AGENCIJA ZA ZASTITU OKOLISA AZO CROATIAN ENVIRONMENT AGENCY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Final

Interim

Interim

Final

Final

Final

Final

Final

Final

Final

Pre-Financing

Latvian Geospatial Information Agency

Interim

Final

Latvian Geospatial Information Agency

Latvian Geospatial Information Agency

Pre-Financing Norwegian Forest and Landscape Institute

Interim

Norwegian Forest and Landscape Institute

Final

Final

Final

Norwegian Forest and Landscape Institute

KIC INNOENERGY SE

EIT ICT LABS IVZW

Interim

ASSOCIATION CLIMATE-KIC

Final

Final

Final

Final

Final

ASSOCIATION CLIMATE-KIC

KIC INNOENERGY SE

EIT ICT LABS IVZW

KIC INNOENERGY SE

ASSOCIATION CLIMATE-KIC

Pre-Financing

Icelandic Coast Guard

Final

Final

Icelandic Coast Guard

Ministero dell’Interno, Dipartimento della Pubblica Sicurezza, Direzi-
one Centrale dell'Immigrazione e della Polizia delle Frontiere

Pre-Financing

Immigration and Naturalisation Service

2013

2013

2013

2014

2014

2014

2014

2014

2014

2014

2013

2013

2014

2013

2014

2015

2013

2013

2013

2013

2014

2014

2014

2014

2013

2014

2014

2014

44

Pay Accepted 
Amount 
(euro)

174 039.47

44 290.00

1 505 000.00

787 500.00

2 070 068.76

1 460 000.00

1 037 850.00

1 159 628.00

603 169.26

51 972.00

121 093.00

15 755.00

15 755.00

7 877.00

142 676.00

142 676.00

16 344.00

32 199 586.00

24 207 511.05

3 128 841.53

27 118 969.48

417 517.00

39 241 064.71

40 100 022.64

42 096 006.57

291 217.00

305 048.95

230 592.05

23 940.00

Annex 

x
e
n
n
A

Agency 
name

Official 
Budget 
Item

Fund 
Source

Year of 
trans-
action

Pay Type 
Code

Beneficiary

Frontex

Frontex

Frontex

Frontex

Frontex

Frontex

Frontex

Frontex

Frontex

Frontex

Frontex

Frontex

Frontex

Frontex

Frontex

Frontex

Frontex

Frontex

Frontex

Frontex

Frontex

Frontex

Frontex

Frontex

Frontex

Frontex

Frontex

Frontex

Frontex

Frontex

A-3050

A-3010

A-3010

A-3000

A-3000

A-3000

A-3000

A-3010

A-3010

A-3010

A-3010

A-3020

A-3050

A-3050

A-3050

A-3020

A-3000

A-3000

A-3010

A-3010

A-3010

A-3010

A-3010

A-3050

A-3050

A-3050

A-3010

A-3010

A-3050

A-3000

C8

C1

C8

C1

C1

C1

C8

C8

C8

C8

C8

C1

C1

C8

C1

C1

C1

C8

C8

C8

C8

C8

C8

C1

C1

C8

C1

C8

C1

C8

2015

2014

2015

2014

2014

2013

2013

2013

2013

2013

2013

2013

2013

2013

2013

2013

2014

2014

2014

2014

2014

2014

2014

2014

2014

2014

2014

2014

2014

2014

Final

Immigration and Naturalisation Service

Pre-Financing

Finnish Border Guard

Final

Final

Final

Final

Final

Final

Final

Final

Final

Final

Final

Final

Final

Final

Final

Final

Finnish Border Guard

Hungarian Police Headquarters

Federal Ministry of Interior

REPUBLIC OF POLAND

KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS

REPUBLIC OF PORTUGAL

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

KINGDOM OF SPAIN

HELLENIC REPUBLIC

SWISS CONFEDERATION

REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA

KINGDOM OF NORWAY

KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

KINGDOM OF SPAIN

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Interim

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

Final

Final

Final

Final

Final

Final

Final

Final

Final

Final

Final

REPUBLIC OF PORTUGAL

HELLENIC REPUBLIC

REPUBLIC OF ICELAND

KINGDOM OF SPAIN

KINGDOM OF SPAIN

UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

KINGDOM OF SPAIN

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

REPUBLIC OF FINLAND

REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY

45

Pay Accepted 
Amount 
(euro)

27 304.20

187 088.79

177 200.71

74 997.35

129 913.50

6 649.78

26 748.18

589 441.25

297 038.21

69 328.22

1 539 693.09

6 413.84

218 662.39

44 593.26

14 271.28

15 824.45

11 777.87

26 793.97

100 697.34

504 603.65

429 722.67

291 218.57

160 627.33

78 735.84

44 312.15

193 800.00

417 533.43

33 774.29

32 346.26

74 997.35

Reply of the Commission 
and the EIT

46

Executive summary

IV
See the EIT & Commission replies to the five recommendations below.

Observations

19
Following up the recommendations of the evaluation carried out in 2011, the EIT designed and launched a Perfor-
mance Measurement System (PMS) in 2012 to support a results-oriented monitoring of the implementation of the 
EIT’s strategy. As part of the PMS, the assessment of KICs’ past performance in the competitive review mechanism is 
based, amongst other elements, on the cross-KIC comparison of the results of the following six core KPIs: 1) Attrac-
tiveness of the EIT Labelled education programs; 2) Number of graduates from the EIT Labelled degrees; 3) Business 
ideas incubated; 4) Start-ups/spin-offs created; 5) Knowledge transfer/adoption; 6) New or improved products/
services/processes.

Therefore, the core key performance indicators are actively used by the EIT for cross-KIC comparisons, in particular 
as part of the annual competitive funding allocation process.

Nevertheless, the EIT is currently working on reinforcing its monitoring system. As an important step in this direc-
tion, the EIT Governing Board adopted a comprehensive new Monitoring Strategy on 3 December 2015.

20
As regards EIT, it is important to emphasise that both the ‘choice of funding tool’ and the thematic areas in which the 
EIT has to launch calls for proposals are strictly regulated in the EIT Founding Regulation1, EIT Financial Regulation 
and the Strategic Innovation Agenda2. The selection of thematic areas was based on an ex-ante evaluation carried 
out by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre – Institute for Prospective Technological Studies, which 
also concluded that grant funding is the most appropriate method of implementation3.

Finally, Article 14 (2) of the EIT Founding Regulation and Article 90 (2) and (3) of the EIT Financial Regulation leave no 
room for manoeuvre to the EIT to consider replacing the EIT grants provided to KICs by other options such as public 
procurement or service level agreements as recommended by the Court.

1  REGULATION (EC) No 294/2008 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amended by Regulation (EU) No 1292/2013 of the European 

Parliament and of the Council

2  DECISION No 1312/2013/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

3  http://ipts.jrc.ec.europa.eu/publications/pub.cfm?id=4479

Reply of the Commission and the EIT

47

29
While the EIT’s AWP does not include detailed operational objectives, deliverables, indicators and expected results 
to be achieved by the KICs, these are established by the KICs in their annual business plans, based on the autonomy 
of KICs enshrined in Article 6 (2) (d) of the EIT Founding Regulation. The EIT verifies, through the annual grant allo-
cation process, that KICs’ annual operational objectives, presented in the annual Business Plans, contribute to the 
multi-annual strategies of the KICs, which are set out in the Strategic Agenda of KICs that are part of the Framework 
Partnership Agreement concluded with the EIT. This innovative approach deliberately differs from other pro-
grammes and should be seen as one of the strength of the EIT as it allows for an effective decentralised approach to 
innovation.

The multi-annual strategies of the KICs are harmonised with the EIT’s strategic objectives in the EIT’s rolling Triennial 
Work Programme, as Annex III of the EIT Triennial Work Programme contains the future outlook, strategic objectives 
and key priorities of each KIC for the next three years. Finally, the EIT Triennial Work Programme is based on the EIT 
Strategic Innovation Agenda.

For a detailed description of the EIT’s objective and planned activities in relation to the KICs’ financial sustainability, 
please, refer to page 21 of the EIT Annual Work Programme 20164.

Nevertheless, the EIT is currently working to design impact-based KPIs in order to better measure the innovation 
improvements achieved by the KICs. In addition, the EIT also intends to draw up specific KPIs measuring the results 
in Knowledge Triangle Integration. Furthermore, the EIT accepts to include more grant-related information in its 
Annual Work Programmes in the future

31
The EIT considers that its AWP already includes the information necessary to constitute a valid financing decision.

In particular, the EIT’s AWP includes the maximum global annual grant amount to be awarded to KICs and the maxi-
mum possible rate of co-financing in section 5.2. The AWP also includes the EIT’s annual objectives, expected results 
and indicators. As concerns the KICs, the detailed operational objectives, deliverables, indicators and expected 
results are established in their annual business plans and are verified by the EIT as part of the grant allocation 
process.

Nevertheless, the EIT accepts to include more grant-related information, such as the KICs’ main annual objectives, 
thematic fields of activity and actions planned, in its Annual Work Programmes in the future.

33
See EIT & Commission replies to paragraphs 35 and 37.

35
The EIT has safeguarded the principles of transparency and equal treatment through its procedures that implement 
the exemptions in the EIT’s Founding Regulation. The EIT remains committed to further improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of its procedures.

4  http://eit.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EIT%20Annual%20Work%20Progamme%202016.pdf

Reply of the Commission and the EIT

48

A call for KIC proposals does not equal the award of a grant and therefore cannot be compared to this process as 
suggested by the Court. It is only one of the steps leading to the award of the FPA. The selection of a KIC is followed 
by a start up phase, where award criteria are defined and verified, which then lead to the award of a Framework 
Partnership Agreement. Grants are then awarded subsequently following a separate procedures regulated by other 
provisions

The EIT has further improved its processes and published a revised set of criteria for the 2016 call for KIC proposals 
on 5 October 2015. As outlined in the published document, each of the three criteria to be used by the Govern -
ing Board will be scored with a maximum of 10 points, therefore the maximum score that can be obtained in the 
hearing is 30 points. The Governing Board’s score will be calculated as average of the individual scores of Govern-
ing Board members. The sum of the points from the Governing Board Hearing will be added to the points obtained 
at the technical evaluation stage from the panel of experts. The proposal which will receive the highest number of 
points out of the maximum of 130 points will be selected by the EIT Governing Board (one proposal per thematic 
area).

Finally, following the lessons learnt of the 2014 call for KICs proposals and in order to simplify the process, the Final 
Recommendation Panel has been abolished for the 2016 call for KIC proposals.

The EIT is of the opinion that the revised procedure to be used in the 2016 call for KIC proposals is fully transparent 
and ensures equal treatment of all potential proposers.

37
The EIT has sufficiently addressed the potential for conflict of interest.

It is important to note that, out of 15 experts appointed within the framework of the evaluation of KIC proposals, 
only one key expert was appointed directly. This was necessary due to specific requirements to conduct the task, 
in particular a deep knowledge of the EIT-KIC model, a broad view and practical understanding of overall European 
innovation goals and practical understanding and experience in academic, research and business environments. In 
addition, the conflict of interest check for this expert was duly completed.

During the selection of external experts for the evaluation of KIC proposals in the 2014 KIC call, the EIT carefully 
assessed each case of potential conflict of interest, following the relevant Horizon 2020 provisions, and took appro-
priate measures. The EIT’s assessment and measures have been adequately justified and documented. In particular, 
to address cases of potential conflict of interest in the selection of experts, the EIT adopted detailed internal proce-
dures following the standard provisions of Horizon 2020. On this basis, measures taken ranged from full exclusion 
of experts from the process to partial exclusion depending on the perceived risk and level of conflict of interest. 
Nevertheless, the EIT is committed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the expert selection process for 
the 2016 call for KIC proposals. In line with the specific recommendations of the Internal Audit Service of the Com-
mission, the EIT will create an EIT-specific list of potentially suitable experts well in advance based on expert profiles 
that match the demand and involving a procurement specialist in the experts’ selection process. This repository 
will also support the early prevention of conflict of interest by identifying, when possible, any existing contractual 
relationships with the key players in the respective KIC fields.

Reply of the Commission and the EIT

49

40
Due to the annual nature of the EIT’s budget, and the fact that the EU budget is generally not adopted before 
mid-December, grant agreements for a given year cannot be signed before 1 January of that particular year. This 
issue was first addressed by the European Court of Auditors in the specific annual report for the financial year 2011 
and the EIT provided its comments. The EIT committed itself to decrease the gap between the starting date of the 
action as defined in the KICs’ Business Plans and the date of signature of the grant agreements. As a result of this 
effort, the Grant Agreements 2013 and 2014 were signed with the three KICs in February 2013 and 2014, respectively.

Year 2015 was exceptional as KICs asked for a delay in applying the new FPA in order to further clarify the implica-
tions of specific provisions between EIT, KICs and the European Commission in the context of the alignment with 
Horizon 2020 rules. Furthermore, due to legal consultations needed, the ex-ante approval of the new grant agree-
ments took longer than usual. The EIT expects timely signature of grant agreements from 2016 again when the new 
FPAs will already be in place, i.e. the late signature in 2015 was a one-off event.

45
The EIT Governing Board adopted the EIT Monitoring Strategy on 3 December 2015, which will measure data for 
Horizon 2020, for the EIT’s impact via its own and KIC activities and for KIC results.

Furthermore, the EIT intends to put in place a refined monitoring system ‘geared towards results and impacts’, as 
foreseen in the EIT’s Triennial Work Programme 2015-2017. In 2015, the EIT launched a consultancy assignment to 
design impact-based KPIs and established a working group to address this particular issue, which is expected to 
complete its work in 2016. In addition, the EIT also intends to draw up specific KPIs measuring the results in Knowl-
edge Triangle Integration. The EIT will revise the Performance Measurement System and the underlying core KPIs 
based on the result of this KPI review in 2016

47
In accordance with the provisions of Article 16 (2) of the EIT Founding Regulation, a first evaluation of the EIT was 
carried out in 2011 and the next one will be carried out by the end of 2016.

Conclusions and recommendations

53
See the EIT & Commission replies to paragraphs 17–19, 20–23 and 24–27.

Recommendation 1: EIT accepts the recommendation where applicable.
The EIT accepts the following part of the recommendation: ‘Agencies should avail of the simplified cost options 
whenever appropriate’. The rest of the recommendation is not applicable to the EIT for the reasons explained in our 
replies.

54
See the EIT & Commission replies to paragraphs 28–29 and 30–31.

Recommendation 2: EIT accepts the recommendation.
The EIT accepts to include more high-level grant-related information on the EIT’s objectives in its Annual Work Pro-
grammes in the future. However, detailed operational objectives, deliverables, indicators and expected results to be 
achieved by the KICs will continue to be established by the KICs in their annual business plans in accordance with 
Article 6 (2) (d) of the EIT Founding Regulation and will not be included in the AWP.

Reply of the Commission and the EIT

50

55
See the EIT & Commission replies to paragraphs 34–37.

Recommendation 3: EIT partially accepts the recommendation.
The EIT accepts the recommendation with the exception of the following sentence: ‘do not directly appoint external 
experts’. In duly justified and exceptional cases, EIT should have the possibility to appoint experts directly.

56
See the EIT & Commission replies to paragraphs 39–41.

Recommendation 4: EIT partially accepts the recommendation.
The EIT accepts the recommendation with the exception of the following sentence: ‘FPAs should indicate a maximum 
amount’. It is not feasible or reasonable to indicate maximum grant amounts in advance for 7-year Framework Part-
nership Agreements.

Recommendation 5: EIT accepts the recommendation.

Reply of the ECDC

51

Executive summary

I
ECDC welcomes the report of the European Court of Auditors. 

Regarding the parts of the report concerning ECDC, the Centre would like to make the following remarks:

Observations

17
ECDC undertakes systematic Opportunity and Values Studies (OVS) before launching new projects, which are con-
sidered ex-ante evaluations. The OVS are reviewed each year before the projects are included in the Annual Work 
Programme. However, the OVS will be further improved in the future to make sure it fully addresses all the aspects 
mentioned.

23
While ECDC considers that the grant funding mechanism was the most appropriate for funding the VENICE III and 
ERLTB-Net projects, ECDC agrees that the decision to use the grant mechanism could have been better docu-
mented. In future work plans ECDC will better substantiate the reasons for using this particular financing mecha-
nism on a case by case basis. 

25
The approach that included a full evaluation was considered the most appropriate way to award EPIET grants to EU 
beneficiaries while ensuring transparency and equal treatment. In 2015, as part of its internal review process the 
ECDC Internal Committee on Procurement, Grants and Contracts (CPCG) identified potential simplifications to the 
process that would still ensure transparency and equal treatment. Among these the direct award was identified and 
selected for application in 2016. This was later confirmed by the ECA. As of January 2016, the new Framework Part-
nership Agreement are implemented following a direct award procedure.

29
After adopting the public health training strategy in June 2015, ECDC continued efforts to measure this part of the 
training needs by performing an EU wide Training Needs Assessment Survey (December 2015). The data obtained is 
currently being analysed and reviewed with the Stakeholders.

31
The Annual Work Programme 2016, includes in annex a specific table for listing planned grants, which includes the 
type of grant, expected amount and duration. In the Single Programming Document 2017, additional information 
will be added, such as objectives and expected results.

Reply of the ECDC

52

39
The current ex-ante verification system includes that either an audit certificate, or a sample of supporting docu-
ments, is to be asked from the beneficiary for the final payment. ECDC considers the results of the ex post verifica-
tions when updating its ex ante verification processes.

43
ECDC is currently refining its indicators to better assess results and impact of its grant funded activities.

47
See reply to paragraph 50.

50
In absence of the possibility to measure the amount of epidemiologists trained in Member States as part of the 
KPI, ECDC has been collecting informally yet systematically yearly indicators that can be considered proxy’s of the 
training need. These indicators, though not included in MB reports, include: (1) yearly number of individual applica-
tions to the EU-track of the Fellowship; (2) yearly number of expressions of interest by EU Member States for seats 
in the Fellowship; (3) yearly overview of employment status of Fellowship Graduates using open, public sources of 
information. It should also be mentioned that since 2015, as part of the annual stakeholder survey, ECDC stakehold-
ers are asked to provide feedback and rate their satisfaction with the different trainings funded through grants. See 
also reply to paragraph 29.

Conclusions and recommendations

53
See replies to paragraphs 17, 23 and 25 above.

Recommendation 1
The ECDC accepts the recommendation.

54
See replies to paragraphs 29 and 31 above.

Recommendation 2
The ECDC accepts the recommendation.

55
ECDC’s founding regulation does not provide for such derogations. 

Reply of the ECDC

53

Recommendation 3
The recommendation is not applicable to ECDC.

56
See reply to paragraph 39 above. 

Recommendation 4
The ECDC accepts the recommendation.

57
See replies to paragraphs 43 and 50 above.

Recommendation 5
The ECDC accepts the recommendation.

Reply of the EEA

54

Observations

Inappropriate funding tools

20
For those grants awarded under the delegation agreement concluded with DG GROW for the implementation of 
GIO Land, the choice of the funding tool was made by the Commission. 

It shall also be pointed out that in some instances (e.g. Luxembourg), it was decided not to award a grant but 
instead a service contract for the sake of efficiency.

The Agency’s founding regulation established both the agency and a European environment information and 
observation network with the objective of providing the Community and the Member States with reliable and 
comparable information at a European level. The regulation identifies those partner organisations that comprise the 
network. The available funding options (grants involving call for proposals, or procurement procedures) have the 
potential to introduce a competitive element to the network and may place at risk the cooperation necessary for the 
agency and network to deliver on their task.

22
In the context of the European Topic Centres (ETCs), the issue of the appropriate funding tools was raised, once 
again, during the review that was carried out in 2012 prior to the launch of the calls for proposals. 

The comprehensive synthesis report drafted by the appointed Review Committee at the specific request of the 
Management Board informed sufficiently and adequately in deciding upon the choice of the funding mechanism.

Poor grant design

26
The use of simplified cost options would require beforehand the collection and analysis of statistical or historical 
data or of usual cost accounting practices of the partner organisations over a period covering several years, pursu-
ant to Article 124(2) of the financial regulation. The administrative burden would thus be shifted and not necessarily 
reduced.

SMART objectives for results and impacts were not set

29
The EEA will see to specify SMART objectives in its programming document for 2017.  It should be noted, however, 
that for those grant agreements awarded under delegation agreement, the objectives are set in the Commission’s 
annual work programmes and the Project Implementation plan of the respective delegation agreement.

Financing decisions were incomplete

31
The EEA’s 2013 AWP contained information on the activity based budget split across the management plan activities 
for the year, whereas the terms of reference of the calls for proposals for the award of framework partnership agree-
ments provided an indication of the estimated annual budget. 

Following on the Court’s observation, the EEA’s Management Board adopted on 25.11.2015 a financing decision 
including a detailed work programme for the implementation of the action plans for the European Topic Centres for 
the year 2016.

Reply of the EEA

55

Ex‑ante and ex‑post controls

39
The EEA implemented various measures with a view to strengthen its verification procedure and in particular it 
elaborated verification guidelines which were distributed to the resource officers performing ex-ante verifications 
on grants, as well as an appropriate verification policy aimed at ensuring coverage and eligibility of expenditures. 

Following the Court’s observation, the amount paid to the beneficiary concerned has since been recovered (see box 
10).

Other internal control weaknesses

41
In the event where framework partnership agreements and the award of grants would remain the tool of choice for 
financing the activities to be carried out by the European Topic Centres, the EEA will see to specify the estimated 
total budget for the entire duration of the framework partnership agreements in the relevant calls for proposals.

Lack of key performance indicators 

43
The key performance indicators (KPIs) for 2016 for all ETCs are mentioned in the table of key deliverables as 
‘expected results’ in accordance with the timetable included in the financing decision adopted by the Management 
Board on 16/12/2015. 

The EEA will see to set out explicit KPIs in the next corresponding financing decisions for 2017.

Lack of or incomplete ex‑post evaluation

49
A system of ex-ante cross-reading of draft action plans has been put in place in 2016 looking at synergies between 
the ETCs with the explicit goal to improve the coherence, efficiency and effectiveness of their work in achieving the 
EEA work programme.

Before the end of 2018, the EEA will perform an evaluation of the effectiveness of the ETCs which shall measure 
among other thing the results and impacts of the activities carried out by the ETCs.

Conclusions and recommendations

Appropriate use of the grant funding tool

53
The EEA will revisit its previous assessment of the funding mechanisms for the ETCs and assess at the same time the 
impacts of using other forms of grant in preparation of the designation of the future ETCs which shall occur in 2018.

A similar assessment will be performed in dialogue with the European Commission in the event where it would be 
envisaged to use grants as funding instrument for the performance of the delegated tasks under the delegation 
agreement on the implementation of the Copernicus land monitoring service and the In situ component.

Recommendation 1
The EEA accepts the recommendation.

Reply of the EEA

56

Annual programming of grant actions

54
The EEA will see to specify SMART objectives in its programming document for 2017. 

Furthermore the EEA will supplement its future annual work programmes, from 2017 onwards, with additional 
information in particular on the objectives to be fulfilled, the expected results, the performance indicators to be 
applied and the estimated budget allocation for the planned grant actions, so that the annual work programmes 
will constitute a financing decision within the meaning of Article 84 of the financial rules applicable to the general 
budget of the Union.

Recommendation 2
The EEA accepts the recommendation

Grant award procedures

55
EEA’s founding regulation does not provide for such derogations. 

Recommendation 3
The recommendation is not applicable to the EEA

Ex‑ante and ex‑post controls

56
At the occasion of the last calls for proposals for the award of framework partnership agreements concerning 
the various European Topic Centres that were launched in 2012 and 2013, the EEA took the opportunity to review 
the contractual documents and established standardised template for reporting. In the meantime the Agency 
has developed financial guidelines both for the beneficiaries and the resources officers who perform ex-ante 
verifications. 

In 2016, the EEA will strive to strengthen further its verification system by ensuring a rigorous implementation of its 
internal control standards and acting upon outcomes from ex-post controls it may have carried out.

Recommendation 4
The EEA accepts the recommendation

Key performance indicators and ex‑post evaluations

57
The EEA will see to specify relevant key performance indicators on impacts and results of its grant-funded activities 
in its programming document for 2017.

Before the end of 2018, the EEA will perform an evaluation of the effectiveness of the ETCs which shall measure 
among other thing the results and impacts of the activities carried out by the ETCs, with a view to define relevant 
performance indicators for monitoring purposes.

Recommendation 5
The EEA accepts the recommendation

Reply of the EFSA

57

Executive summary

III
EFSA conducted a robust ex ante evaluation of its grant and procurement projects (Box 2), uses a guidance scheme 
to assist management in deciding upon the most appropriate funding mechanism and has made use of simplified 
cost options where appropriate (see paragraph 27). The verification procedures for financial grants implementation 
were further enhanced in spring 2015.

For the recommendation on grant monitoring and reporting systems based on result and impact-oriented key 
performance indicators as well as ex-post evaluation results, EFSA recognises that there is room for further improve-
ment to set relevant impact indicators in its programming documents.

IV
EFSA notes that the recommendations made in this report are not agency specific. 

Observations

22
The EFSA has a 6-point guidance scheme to assist management in deciding upon the most appropriate funding 
mechanism.

23
In cases where EFSA does not receive a satisfactory proposal under the grant route, it can decide to enlarge the 
audience and go for the procurement route that is open to all interested organisations (taking due care to avoid 
conflict of interests).

48
In 2013, EFSA carried out an extensive and dedicated ex-post evaluation of its science procurement and grants pro-
gram and its contribution to EFSA core tasks.

Conclusions and recommendations

Appropriate use of the grant funding tool 

53
EFSA has a 6-point guidance scheme to assist management in deciding upon the most appropriate funding 
mechanism.

In cases where EFSA does not receive a satisfactory proposal under the grant route, it can decide to enlarge the 
audience and go for the procurement route that is open to all interested organisations (taking due care to avoid 
conflict of interests).

Reply of the EFSA

58

Recommendation 1
Accepted. EFSA concurs with this recommendation which it already implemented in previous years. EFSA has cost 
effective guidance in place to assist management in deciding upon the most appropriate funding mechanism.

Annual programming of grant actions 

54
From 2015, EFSA enhanced transparency of its outsourcing planning by producing a single procurement and grant 
plan, published on its website and kept regularly updated. 

Recommendation 2
Accepted. EFSA concurs with this recommendation which it already implemented in previous years as acknowl-
edged by ECA in the follow-up of previous years’ comments on the annual accounts of the European Safety Author-
ity for the financial year 2014.

Grant award procedures 
EFSA’s founding regulation does not provide for such derogations.

Recommendation 3
Not applicable for EFSA.

Ex‑ante and ex‑post controls 

56
EFSA has an appropriate procedure for verifying financial grants implementation that, in line with risk-based 
approach, focuses on essential elements. This procedure has been further enhanced in spring 2015.

Recommendation 4
Accepted. EFSA concurs with this recommendation which it already implemented in previous years. EFSA has cost 
effective procedures in place for verifying financial grants implementation.

Key performance indicators and ex‑post evaluations 

57
EFSA carried out extensive and dedicated ex-post evaluation of its science procurement and grants program and its 
contribution to EFSA core tasks (see paragraph 48). 

Recommendation 5
Accepted. EFSA has implemented this recommendation in previous years in respect of ex-post evaluations. The 
agency recognises that there is room for further improvement to set relevant impact indicators in its programming 
documents.

Reply of Frontex

59

Observations

17
The ex-ante evaluation of whether the activities of the agency add value and if the most appropriate method of 
implementation has been selected was already performed by the legislator in 2003 before the adoption of the 
Frontex Founding Regulation. Furthermore, to ex ante evaluate the cost effectiveness of the operational resources 
deployed in Frontex coordinated joint operations leaves out of sight the call for operational solidarity at the exter-
nal border of the EU and the political realities.

20
Frontex emphasises that article 3(4) of its founding regulation limits Frontex’s funding of ‘Joint Operations’ to 
grants. As a result, the funding tools available to the agency are a priori restricted. 

The agency’s founding regulation is presently being revised (see Commission communication COM (2015) 6711 and 
Frontex is pursuing its aim to open the funding mechanisms beyond using grants.

22
Within the restrictions imposed by its basic act, Frontex will explore whether there are complementary activities 
to the ‘Joint Operations’ that can be financed using other funding mechanisms. Should such activities be identi-
fied, appropriate guidelines and criteria will be established to aid the selection of the most appropriate funding 
mechanism. 

23
Frontex’ mandate is to coordinate the operational cooperation of the EU Member States. The technical equipment 
of the competent MS authorities need to be deployed in the Frontex operations as a priority. 

The Frontex Regulation Article 7(5) stipulates that the Agency shall finance the deployment of technical equipment. 
Procuring surveillance services from private companies is one option to complement the technical means provided 
by the MS. However it can never fully replace the cooperation with the MS.

The example cited by the Court is Frontex first practical experience, following a pilot project. The actual costs of 
deploying private planes and the practical conditions will be assessed during the implementation of framework 
contract with reopening of competition.

It should be noted that the agency has encountered difficulties with hosting MS authorities regarding the deploy-
ment of aircraft under this FWC.

26
The burdensome reimbursement system is related to the differences between the Member States’ conditions of 
financing deployments.

The system of Running Expenses of Means (REM) is a solution established by Frontex together with experts from the 
Member States, allowing to co-finance the common list of defined eligible costs for technical equipment deploy-
ments and to adapt to the national rules and the specifities of various MS authorities.

1  Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing 

Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC).

Reply of Frontex

60

29
Objectives in the operational plans are usually subject to qualitative assessment because the quantitative approach 
is arbitrary and emphasises reaching target values without a comprehensive evaluation of the achievement and 
challenges during the implementation period. 

Certain restrictions with regards to quantification exist in the field of irregular migration where Frontex operates. 
The coordination of joint operations/ search and rescue operations or (in cooperation with other EU agencies) the 
dismantling of criminal networks behind facilitated irregular migration are difficult to translate into quantifiable 
objectives. Nevertheless, Frontex considers that it is able to show the alignment of its operational activities with its 
strategic objectives by using rather qualitative than purely quantitative objectives.

35
Certain amendments have already been introduced in the decision-making process. As of the Annual Bilateral Talks 
(ABT) of 2015, the ED gave written mandates to the staff members participating in negotiations. 

With regard to the formal decision making process, the agency is exploring the possibility to set up evaluation com-
mittees consisting of at least three staff members from at least two entities.

37
Since autumn 2015, the appointed staff members negotiating during the ABT signed a dedicated declaration con-
firming the absence of any conflict of interests.

39
Frontex notes that the weakness identified in Box 10 relates to the burdensome REM process. See also our reply to 
paragraph 26.

44
The main indicators are calculated and duly provided as requested for the purpose of the annual reporting. 

For governance purpose it was agreed that a limited number of indicators will be used, enabling the governance 
body to govern the work of the Agency. 

Experience showed that setting performance indicators (as in 2012 and 2013) in the AWP and also the related target 
values to be achieved was overwhelming for that purpose. That also led to a reduced reporting towards the Man-
agement Board.

51
Frontex emphasises that there is no legal framework in place establishing the transfer of data referred to by the 
Court. According to the legal framework that is in place, Member States are responsible for handling further pro-
cedures regarding the irregular migrants apprehended and rescued during joint operations. The status of irregular 
migrants is in all cases defined and granted by Member States at later stage. In line with the legal framework in 
place, Frontex does not possess any personal data regarding irregular migrants and is not entitled to have them.

Reply of Frontex

61

The Commission proposal submitted in December 2015 COM (2015)671 proposes to improve the situation. It will 
explore the possibility of giving the Agency access to European databases, such as SIS and EURODAC, and will con-
sider presenting proposals to modify the legal acts on which these databases are based.

Conclusions and recommendations

53
Frontex emphasises that article 3(4) of its founding regulation limits Frontex’s funding of ‘Joint Operations’ to 
grants. As a result, the funding tools available to the agency are a priori restricted. 

The agency’s founding regulation is presently being revised. However, to date this restriction has not been 
removed.

Within the restrictions imposed by its basic act, Frontex will explore whether there are complementary activities 
to the ‘Joint Operations’ that can be financed using other funding mechanisms. Should such activities be identi-
fied, appropriate guidelines and criteria will be established to aid the selection of the most appropriate funding 
mechanism.

The Procurement of surveillance services from private companies cited by the Court is Frontex first practical expe-
rience, following a pilot project. The actual costs of deploying private planes and the practical conditions will be 
assessed during the implementation of framework contract.

It should be noted, however, that the agency has encountered certain difficulties with MS authorities regarding the 
use of private companies’ services in this field.

The burdensome reimbursement system is related to the differences between the Member States’ conditions of 
financing deployments.

Recommendation 1 
Frontex accepts the recommendation, however the application of this recommendation will depend upon the out-
come of discussions concerning the proposal to amend the founding regulation.

54
Objectives in the operational plans are usually subject to qualitative assessment because the quantitative approach 
is arbitrary and emphasises reaching target values without a comprehensive evaluation of the achievement and 
challenges during the implementation period. 

Certain restrictions with regards to quantification exist in the field of irregular migration where Frontex operates. 
The coordination of joint operations/ search and rescue operations or (in cooperation with other EU agencies) the 
dismantling of criminal networks behind facilitated irregular migration are difficult to translate into quantifiable 
objectives. Nevertheless, Frontex considers that it is able to show the alignment of its operational activities with its 
strategic objectives by using rather qualitative than purely quantitative objectives.

Reply of Frontex

62

Recommendation2
Frontex accepts the recommendation.

55
Certain amendments have already been introduced in the decision-making process. As of the Annual Bilateral Talks 
(ABT) of 2015, the ED gave written mandates to the staff members participating in negotiations. 

With regard to the formal decision making process, the agency is exploring the possibility to set up evaluation com-
mittees consisting of at least three staff members from at least two entities.

Since autumn 2015, the appointed staff members negotiating during the ABT signed a dedicated declaration con-
firming the absence of any conflict of interests.

Recommendation 3
Frontex accepts this recommendation and it has already partly implemented the part concerning transparency and 
the absence of conflict of interests. Frontex also has to take into account the criterion of solidarity.

56
Frontex notes that the weakness identified in Box 10 relates to the burdensome REM process. See also our reply to 
paragraph 26.

Recommendation 4
Frontex accepts the recommendation and will continue to further improve its verification systems.

57
The main indicators are calculated and duly provided as requested for the purpose of the annual reporting. 

For governance purpose it was agreed that a limited number of indicators will be used, enabling the govern-
ance body to govern the work of the Agency. Experience showed that setting performance indicators (as in 
2012 and 2013) in the AWP and also the related target values to be achieved was overwhelming for that purpose. 
That also led to a reduced reporting towards the Management Board.

Reply of Frontex

63

Frontex emphasises that there is no legal framework in place establishing the transfer of data referred to by the 
Court. According to the legal framework that is in place, Member States are responsible for handling further pro-
cedures regarding the irregular migrants apprehended and rescued during joint operations. The status of irregular 
migrants is in all cases defined and granted by Member States at later stage. In line with the legal framework in 
place, Frontex does not possess any personal data regarding migrants and is not entitled to have them.

The Commission proposal submitted in December 2015 COM (2015)671 proposes to improve the situation. It will 
explore the possibility of giving the Agency access to European databases, such as SIS and EURODAC, and will con-
sider presenting proposals to modify the legal acts on which these databases are based.

Recommendation 5
Frontex accepts the recommendation, however this will depend on changes to the legal framework as well as infor-
mation sharing with Member States.

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For the 3 years 2013-2015, agencies’ overall spending on 
grants amounted to 740 million euros. The Court’s audit 
examined the legal compliance and effectiveness of the 
systems and control procedures in place for managing 
grants in five agencies (approximately 92 % of total grant 
funding). The Court found that the agencies audited have 
in general awarded and paid grants in compliance with the 
rules. However, most have not adequately addressed 
alternative funding options and consequently grants have 
not always been the best way to achieve their objectives. 
Furthermore, the audited agencies have not adequately 
measured the effectiveness of their grants.

EUROPEAN
COURT
OF AUDITORS