REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL The availability and readiness of technology to identify a person on the basis of fingerprints held in the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II)
Date: 2016-02-29
Institutions: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: EU police cooperation, Schengen Information System, biometrics, data collection, data protection, foreign national, forgery of documents, identity document, personal data, technology

EN 

   EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 29.2.2016  COM(2016) 93 final   REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL The availability and readiness of technology to identify a person on the basis of fingerprints held in the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II)  
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 

It is becoming increasingly difficult to establish the identity of a person due to changing names 
and  the  use  of  aliases  or  fraudulent  documents.  The  use  of  document  fraud  is  an  increasing 
modus  operandi  to  illegally  enter  and  move  around  within  the  Schengen  area.  The  Frontex 
Annual  Risk  Analysis  for  2015  reported  that  in  2014  there  were  around  9  400  detections  of 
document fraud cases on entry to the EU/Schengen area from third countries, which represents a 
slight decrease compared to the previous year. By contrast, cases reported on intra-EU Schengen 
movements showed a marked increase from 7 867 in 2013 to 9 968 in 2014 (+27%).  

Document fraudsters not only undermine border security but also the internal security of the EU. 
Often  persons,  sought  by  the  police,  are  evasive  about  their  identity  and  use  multiple  aliases. 
Some persons subject of an entry ban to the Schengen area can legally change their identity in 
their country of origin to avoid detection. In this context, a reliable method to establish identity is 
needed.  The  use  of  fingerprints  would  be  an  efficient  way  for  both  border  guards  and  law 
enforcement  officials  to  identify  persons  sought  by  the  authorities  and  to  detect  cases  of 
document fraud.  

The  fraudulent  use  of  travel  documents  in  connection  with  the  recent  terrorist  attacks  in  Paris 
also confirms the necessity for a tool that provides the possibility of identification of persons on 
the basis of fingerprints. In this context the Council Conclusions of November 2015 underlined 
the importance of strengthening controls and performing systematic checks. To date there is no 
EU-wide system which would allow the checking of persons on the basis of fingerprints. 

The  second  generation  Schengen  Information  System  (SIS)  entered  into  operations  on  9  April 
2013.  A  new  feature  is  the  storage  of  fingerprints  in  the  central  system.  At  present,  prints  are 
used to confirm the identity of a person located as a result of a search, usually on name and date 
of  birth.  This  is  a  “one-to-one”  search  -  the  person’s  prints  are  compared  to  one  set  of  prints 
stored  in  SIS.  However  the  possibility  to  identify  a  person  on  the  basis  of  his/her  fingerprints 
requires  an  evolution  to  the  present  law  enforcement  practice:  the  comparison  of  a  person’s 
prints to all sets of prints – a “one-to-many” search – to identify the person solely on the basis of 
fingerprints.  This  functionality  requires  the  implementation  of  an  Automatic  Fingerprint 
Identification System (AFIS). 

AFIS has been successfully used in numerous national and cross-border cooperation databases. 
For the E.U. the obvious examples are the Visa Information System (VIS) and EURODAC.  

Articles 22 (c) of the SIS II Decision1 and the SIS II Regulation2 provide a legal basis for using 
AFIS.  Before  this  functionality  is  implemented,  the  Commission  must  present  a  report  on  the 
availability and readiness of the required technology, on which the European Parliament shall be 
consulted.  The  objective  of  this  report  is  to  address  this  requirement  and  to  confirm  that 
fingerprint identification technology is available and ready for its integration into SIS-II.  

1  COUNCIL  DECISION  2007/533/JHA  of  12 June  2007  on  the  establishment,  operation  and  use  of  the  second 
   generation Schengen Information System (SIS II). 
2  REGULATION  (EC)  No  1987/2006  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT  AND  OF  THE  COUNCIL  of  20 
   December 2006 on the establishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen Information System 
   (SIS II). 

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The level of readiness and availability have to be assessed in the context of the unique situation 
and  characteristics  of  SIS  II  which  present  a  series  of  technical  and  organisational  challenges 
requiring appropriate and customised solutions. This report, supported by a study conducted by 
the  Commission’s  Joint  Research  Centre  (JRC)3,  also  outlines  the  technical  and  organisational 
requirements  in  the context of SIS,  describes  the type of scenarios  where fingerprints  are used 
operationally  and  includes  recommendations  for  the  successful  implementation  of  AFIS 
functionality. 

2. THE JRC STUDY AND ITS FINDINGS 

The  Horizon  2020  EU  Research  and  Innovation  Framework  Program  describes  the  readiness 
and  availability  of  technology  using  a  nine-point  scale4:  level  1  represents  the  observation  of 
basic  principles,  level  9  the  proving  of  actual  systems  in  an  operational  environment.  AFIS 
technology has already achieved level 9 with many systems working world-wide.  

2.1 Overview of AFIS technology 

2.1.1 Performance 

JRC  provided  an  overview  of  the  most  significant  independent  performance  evaluation 
campaigns,  identifying  the  relevant  initiatives  for  the  context  of  SIS.    Three  key  concepts 
emerged: 

  The accuracy of an AFIS is fully dependent on the data used for its evaluation and on 

the quality of that data. 

  Other factors that can affect the performance of an AFIS are size of the database in 
which  searches  take  place,  number  of  prints  used  for  the  search  and  expected 
response time. 

  Given good quality data and 10 print to 10 print searches, evaluation campaigns show 
that the accuracy of AFIS technology is very high, with error rates around 0. 1% 

2.1.2 Quality 

Many  studies  and  benchmarks  have  shown  that  the  performance  of  biometric  systems  depends 
on  the  quality  of  the  input  samples.  Improvement  of  the  quality  can  be  technical,  standards-
related  or  even  linked  to  the  method  for  acquiring  the  prints,  i.e.  electronic  scanning  (“live-
scan”)  or  manually-taken  inked  prints.  Electronic  scanning,  supervised  by  an  experienced 
operator, is the preferred method for obtaining the best quality. However, inked prints which are 
scanned into the database still exist. Systems should incorporate processes to detect poor quality 
prints. 

3 http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC97779 
4 https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/portal/doc/call/h2020/common/1617621- 
  part_19_general_annexes_v.2.0_en.pdf  
  http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/h2020/other/wp/2016-2017/annexes/h2020-wp1617-annex- 
  ga_en.pdf   

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There should be an end-to-end concentration on quality in: 

  Taking the prints  
  Technical assessment of their quality  
  System-based solutions for ensuring matching  
  Using the best samples  
  Monitoring the performance of the system and the people using it 

As the study was comprehensive it also addressed the most challenging area concerning quality: 
“latent” prints found at crime or incident scenes.   

Latents will exclusively be used for consultation. It is anticipated that only full 10 print sets from 
known persons will be stored in SIS. 

In  most  Member  States  visited,  quality  is  also  managed  through  “multiple  datasets”.    When  a 
person has been fingerprinted on several occasions, e.g. each time he is arrested, the prints are 
stored. The individual prints in the sets can be compared according to their quality score and a 
composite set can be compiled of the highest quality 10 prints.  Such an approach could also be 
used in SIS. 

A  critical  issue  is  the  inclusion  of  quality  measurement  mechanisms  in  an  AFIS  to  boost 
performance. Regarding quality six key concepts must be considered: 

  The performance of an AFIS is fully dependent on the quality of the data (i.e. print 

samples) it runs on. 

  Many factors can affect the quality of prints.  Some are controllable (e.g. cleanliness 

of the sensor), others are not (e.g. eroded fingertips due to manual work). 

  Automatic  fingerprint  quality  mechanisms  play  an  essential  role  in  controlling  the 

quality of data entered in an AFIS. 

  Different types of prints present different quality levels.  The main types an AFIS has 

to deal with are: inked/live-scanned, rolled/flat/latent. 

  The  most  challenging  data  in  terms  of  AFIS  performance  are  latents  as  there  is  no 

control over their quality. 

  Although  there  is  no  standard  way  of  measuring  print  quality,  NFIQ  and  NFIQ-II 
(American National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) Fingerprint Image 
Quality) have become de facto standards due to their proven very high performance 
and availability. 

2.2 Common usage of national AFIS 

The  study  set  out  the  typical  use-cases  concerning  fingerprints.  The  most  significant  for  SIS 
purposes concern a person who is present at the time of print acquisition, e.g. a suspect who has 
been arrested. Two parameters must be defined: 

  Minimum expected accuracy of the matching process 
  Maximum permitted response time 

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As an example, an arrested suspect is taken to a police station where he is fingerprinted.  The set 
of  10  prints  is  used  to  search  the  central  fingerprint  database.  A  matching  set  of  10  prints  is 
found, taken when he was arrested on a previous occasion. The person was present when each set 
of  prints  was  taken,  so  high  quality  can  be  expected.  As  the  person  is  in  custody  for  possibly 
several hours a rapid response time is not a necessity. 

As a contrast, when a rapid check is required, e.g. at an airport control booth, perhaps only two 
fingers are scanned.  

The expected accuracy of the check is lower but there is still considerable control over the taking 
of the two prints and the full sets of 10 prints used for comparison. As the person is not under 
arrest a rapid response time is expected, probably a matter of seconds rather than minutes. If a 
match is achieved a second-line check can be carried out using a full 10 print search.  

2.3 EURODAC and VIS 

To learn potential lessons for SIS the two existing E.U. systems using AFIS were studied. 

As  set  out  in  the  eu-LISA  Annual  Report  for  2014,  EURODAC  held  2.7  million  fingerprint 
records  (10  print)  and  a  total  of  756  368  transactions  took  place.  Due  to  in-built  quality 
procedures the rejection rate for sub-standard prints was 4.49%, necessitating the re-taking and 
re-submission  of  the  prints.  The  size  of  the  database  is  close  to  the  potential  for  SIS  but  the 
volume  of  transactions  is  much  smaller  and  the  response  times  much  slower  than  would  be 
required for SIS – an urgent comparison in EURODAC is carried out within an hour, in SIS the 
expected time would be seconds due to the very different operational scenarios. 

VIS holds around 20 million fingerprint records (10 print). Generally VIS conducts verifications 
at borders, i.e. is this person the original visa applicant?  However, VIS also carries out one-to-
many searches on new visa applicants and at second-line border checks using a full 10 print set. 
An  average  of  20 000  to  30 000  such  identifications  take  place  every  day  with  a  peak  rate  of 
3000/hour.  The  expected  response  time  for  an  identification  is  less  than  twenty  minutes  (less 
than  three  seconds  for  a  one-to-one  verification  using  one  to  four  fingers  for  a  typical  border 
check). 

2.4 Member States’ and third country AFIS  

The study identified that a national criminal police AFIS in the Member States can be larger than 
the anticipated size of the SIS AFIS due to the retention of extensive records.  The two systems 
studied in the USA contain tens of millions of records. SIS can only hold prints in person alerts.  
On 1 January 2015 there were just under 800 000 person alerts in SIS. 

2.5 The challenges in implementing AFIS technology 

The challenges in implementing AFIS technology can be summarised as: 

  Use-cases 
  Performance 

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  Quality 
  Speed (response time) 
  Size of the database 
  Matching capacity 
  Number of transactions/matches at peak demand times 
  Strategy to manage the queries 
  Exchange formats 
  System architecture: centralised or at several sites 
  Type of data being processed – print format 
  Latent prints 

2.6 Conclusions 

As  stated  in  the  introduction  of  this  chapter,  the  technology  is  available  and  ready.  The 
Commission  has  also  highlighted  challenges  to  be  addressed.  The  recommendations  for 
successful implementation and to address these challenges are described in chapter 4. 

3. THE AFIS IN SIS 

The SIS AFIS must handle all the types of fingerprint records that will be generated. This will 
include:  

 
 
 

flat and rolled prints  
fast checks where only two fingers, for example, are scanned  
latents collected from a crime scene 

3.1 Data protection 

Any  processing  of  fingerprints  within  SIS  II,  including  storage  and  use  for  identification 
purposes must comply with the relevant data protection provisions of the SIS II legal instruments 
and  applicable  national  provisions  on  data  protection  implementing  Directive  95/46/EC5  and 
Framework  Decision  2008/977/JHA6.  Both  legal  instruments  apply  to  the  processing  of 
fingerprints of third country nationals as well as Union citizens. Any use of the fingerprints must 
be authorised by Union or Member State law. In line with the principle of purpose specification, 
the purpose and means of using the fingerprints in SIS II must be clearly defined. Processing of 
fingerprints  shall  not  go  beyond  what  is  necessary  for  the  objective  of  the  general  interest 
pursued, and if necessary be subject to appropriate safeguards. The implementation of such new 
functionalities in SIS II should respect data protection by default and by design principles. 

5  Directive  95/46/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  24  October  1995  on  the  protection  of 
   individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. 
6 Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the protection of personal data processed in 
   the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. 

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3.2 Scenarios for the use of fingerprints in SIS 

Two types of fingerprint transaction can be foreseen in SIS: 

  An alert is created/updated with the attachment of prints 
  The  SIS  database  is  consulted  using  prints  instead  of  name  and  date  of  birth.    This 
consultation will also take place prior to the introduction of a new alert to check if the 
person is already in SIS under another alert 

Prints  must  be  attached  to  SIS  alerts  when  available.  The  circumstances  when  prints  can  be 
encountered  in  SIS  are  set  out  in  the  sub-sections  below.  Each  case  was  compared  to  similar 
“use-cases” already processed in Member States’ AFIS. Depending on the scenario, the cases are 
broadly covered by the use-case in the JRC study describing “10 print to 10 print” checks. 

Except  where  a  case  highlights  an  operational  challenge,  in  general  the  quality  of  the  prints  is 
high as both the newly acquired prints from the person and the set of prints stored in the database 
are taken in controlled circumstances with the option to reject poor quality prints and re-acquire 
them. 

Where a Member State creates an alert but does not have prints to complete it, another Member 
State which has already dealt with the person may hold prints in its national AFIS. The SIRENE 
Manual7 describes the sending of such prints to be attached to the alert. As prints may have been 
taken in another system it should be ensured that the prints hold a record of their “quality score” 
so that any use of the prints takes place in an informed context. 

3.2.1 Refusal of entry or stay (Regulation, Article 24)   

This person alert is by far the most common. Assuming that the issuing Member State has access 
to  the  person  who  is  the  subject  of  an  alert  in  SIS  (alert  subject),  10  prints  will  be  collected, 
added to the alert and compared with the 10 print cards already in SIS. This might identify links 
with other alerts.   

3.2.2 Arrest for surrender or extradition (Decision, Article 26)   

The alert subject might not be accessible at the time of the issue of the alert and prints will not be 
available.  However, the alert-issuing Member State may already have the person’s prints in its 
national  AFIS  and  can  complete  the  alert.  10  prints  will  be  collected,  added  to  the  alert  and 
compared with the 10 print cards already in SIS for other alerts.  

3.2.3 Missing persons (Decision, Article 32)  

The prints of such persons are not always available when the alert is created. However, in certain 
cases, if a national registry exists and legislation allows it, prints can be transferred to the alert.   

7 Annex to Commission Implementing Decision 2013/115/EU on the SIRENE Manual and other implementing 
  measures for the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II). 

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In the course of the investigation, latent prints of the person may be used to query SIS (but these 
prints  would  not  be  retained  and  stored  in  the  database).  If  this  takes  place  it  is  not  an  alert 
creation but a case of consultation.  

3.2.4 Persons sought to assist with a judicial procedure (Decision, Article 34)  

Prints might not always be available; however a Member State can complete the alert with prints 
from its national AFIS, where permitted.  

3.2.5 Discreet or specific checks (Decision, Article 36)   

There may be cases where prints are not available.  The nature of the checks implies that prints 
are  not  likely  to  be  accessible  at  a  later  stage.    However,  the  alert-issuing  Member  State  may 
already have the person’s prints in its national AFIS and can complete the alert.  Police/border 
checks may offer the possibility to carry out a search against these prints.   

3.2.6 Misused identity (Regulation, Article 36; Decision, Article 51)  

With  the  consent  of  the  victim  whose  identity  has  been  misused,  Member  States  can  add  his 
prints  to  the  alert  on  the  person  who  misused  this  identity.    This  measure  will  lead  to  an  alert 
“update”,  not  a  “creation”.    It  allows  authorities  to  identify  both  impostor  and  victim,  as  the 
victim  can  prove  his  identity  when  necessary.    After  a  hit  from  a  search  on  name  and  date  of 
birth at the first-line border control, the identity of the victim can be verified at the second line.  

3.3 Quantifying the size of the SIS AFIS and the number of transactions 

At  the  time  of  carrying  out  the  study  there  were  around  5 500  fingerprint  records  in  SIS.  
Member States confirmed that the lack of AFIS functionality was a limiting factor in uploading 
prints to SIS. 

3.3.1 Size 

The number of person alerts in SIS is relatively stable.  This may increase with proposals to add 
alerts on return decisions and related entry bans. Even with an increase, the size of the SIS AFIS 
is  expected  to  be  below  that  of  a  large  Member  State  and  therefore  does  not  present  technical 
problems on sizing. 

3.3.2 Volume of transactions 

There are three types of transaction to be taken into account: 

  Queries/consultations.  The 

largest  demand  on  SIS  will  be 

caused  by 
queries/consultations.  In  2014  almost  two  billion  queries,  on  all  alert  categories,  were 
sent  to  SIS,  either  in  national  copies  or  to  the  central  system.  This  will  include 
consultations,  already  sent  to  SIS,  which  will  be  supported  by  the  introduction  of  an 
AFIS. Visa applications via VIS should be checked against SIS. Up to 20 000 to 30 000 
identification queries/day are conducted.  EURODAC processed 750 000 transactions in 

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2014.  Prior  to  these  transactions,  VIS  and  SIS  must  be  consulted  for  the  prevention, 
detection  and  investigation  of  terrorist  and  other  serious  criminal  offences.  It  is 
anticipated  that  fingerprint  checks  will  also  be  conducted.  Checks  at  Schengen  borders 
are carried out using name and date of birth.  In future, for third country nationals, it is 
envisaged that fingerprint checks will be carried out.  Not all alerts contain prints, so not 
all  person  queries  can  be  carried  out  in  this  way;  many  checks  will  continue  to  be  on 
name and date of birth.  Not all SIS access points can carry out queries based on prints. 

  Create/update/delete  (CUD)  of  alerts.  There  were  1.4  million  CUD  transactions  in 
2014.  Of  these  780 000  involved  the  creation  and  update  of  person  alerts  and  could 
therefore involve the addition of prints.  Deletion should be an automated process upon 
deletion of an alert but naturally the processing demands should be accommodated. 

It  is  important  to  ensure  that  accurate  statistics  are  available  for  the  correct  sizing  of  the  SIS 
AFIS.  Expertise gained in the development of national AFIS can be used in the context of SIS. 

3.3.3 Standards for exchange of fingerprints 

The NIST standards and best practice guide from Interpol provide an appropriate basis for such 
exchange. 

3.3.4 Architecture 

The architecture of SIS comprises:  

  A  central  system  handling  20%  of  transactions  –  five  Member  States  use  the  central 

system directly 

  National copies (80% of transactions) which can be:  

o  “partial”  (only  data  formed  of  words  and  numbers  -  nine  Member  States  have 

such copies) or  

o  “full”  (data  formed  of  words  and  numbers  plus  photos  and  prints  -  16  Member 

States have such copies)  

A central AFIS is needed to provide service to Member States without a national copy, Member 
States with a partial national copy or even Member States facing technical unavailability of their 
full national copy. 

All alert CUD transactions involve the central system.  Adding prints to an alert will require an 
AFIS quality check at the central system.   

CUD  transactions  sent  to  the  central  system  are  broadcast  within  three  minutes  to  the  national 
copies.  A central AFIS will be necessary to support these transactions. 

According  to  the  SIS  II  legal  instruments,  a  search  in  a  national  copy  must  produce  a  result 
equivalent to a search in the SIS database.  Compliance with this concept for searches carried out 
on names and numbers will have to be applied to fingerprint searches.   

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If a Member State implements its own AFIS as part of a national copy it will have to offer the 
same  identification  performance  as  the  central  AFIS.    It  is  technically  and  legally  possible  to 
have an AFIS as a part of a national copy but equivalence of results will be a challenge. 

Centralised  architecture  is  easier  to  manage  from  a  quality  point  of  view  but  must  be  able  to 
handle  the  demands  placed  on  it.    An  architecture  comprised  of  a  central  AFIS  together  with 
other  AFIS  in  full  national  copies  would  distribute  the  demands  but  would  face  the  challenge 
described above.  This could be managed through all such AFIS using the same software. 

Once  an  overall  architecture  has  been  decided  it  should  be  considered  if  use-cases  should  be 
handled  in  the  same  way  or  differences  in  volumes  or  response  times  would  favour  parallel 
work-streams or sub-systems within the AFIS. 

Some  law  enforcement  or  border  control  operations  will  require  a  response  time  below  30 
seconds but at a consular post the response time might only need to be below five minutes.  

In controlled situations at a police station a response time below 10 minutes might be required.  
It is important to assess the workloads provided in these use-cases and the definition of priority 
in  handling  demands.    The  use  of  filters,  such  as  age  and  gender  can  reduce  the  number  of 
records against which comparisons are made thereby improving the response time. 

Finally, the SIS AFIS  will have  to enter the evaluation  and reporting procedures set out  in the 
SIS II legal instruments. 

4. RECOMMENDATIONS 

The previous chapters confirm the readiness and availability of AFIS technology. In addition, the 
Commission considers that the implementation of the following 19 recommendations should be 
considered to support the successful deployment and use of an AFIS in SIS.  

1.  Need  for  complementary  statistics  -  on  the  number  of  consultations/year  on  persons  and 
their  operational  context  in  order  to  correctly  assess  the  size  and  processing  power  of  the 
AFIS 

2.  Promotion  of  best  practices  -  for  the  SIS  AFIS  based  on  expertise  acquired  during  the 

development and management of national AFIS 

3.  Common  exchange  standard  -  NIST  containers  provide  an  appropriate  basis  for  the 
exchange of fingerprint data.  An automatic check on implementation should be developed 

4.  Prüm and SIS II complementarity - the complementary nature of the Prüm mechanism and 

the SIS AFIS should be clarified to avoid overlap8 

5.  Dedicated sub-systems – due to the different use-cases, especially on volume and response 

time, there should be consideration of parallel work streams or dedicated sub-systems 

8  The  fingerprints  stored  in  SIS  II  are  attached  to  alerts  and  access  to  SIS  II  takes  place  in  the  course  of  border 
   controls  and  checks  by  law  enforcement  authorities.  Based  on  Decision  2008/615/JHA,  the  Prüm  mechanism 
   provides the possibility to query national criminal AFIS. Unlike SIS II, the Prüm mechanism does not provide for 
   real-time access of fingerprint records and can be used only in individual investigation cases. 

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6.  High-quality  enrolment  process  -  the  enrolment  phase  should  favor  the  use  of  live-scan 

devices and experienced operators 

7.  Storage of multiple datasets - to support a composite matching strategy 

8.  Controlled  transfer  of  datasets  –  the  SIS  AFIS  should  accept  prints  produced  in  other 
systems, as long as the parameters of these systems are retained in the dataset included in the 
alert 

9.  Quality of capture points  

a.  Supervision by an operator - appropriate training for enrolment  

b.  Adequate sensor - live-scan devices should be favoured  

c.  Enhanced graphic user interface (GUI) – to provide real-time feedback on acquired 

data  

d.  Proper user interaction - the enrolment process should be user-friendly  

e.  Adequate environment - in terms of illumination, temperature and background  

f.  Sensor maintenance - should be regular and systematic 

10. Quality assessment algorithms  

a.  Adherence to standards – the use of recognised quality metrics  

b.  Corrective actions – to obtain satisfactory quality prints  

11. Quality of identification systems  

a.  Quality-based  processing  -  including  the  use  of  supplementary  tools  such  as 
alternative feature extraction functions and process-specific matching algorithms  

b.  Quality  based  fusion  -  the  combination  of  different  samples  so  as  to  be  able  to 

conduct composite checks  

c.  Template substitution/update – the use of best samples when generating templates 

for an AFIS  

d.  Monitoring  –  producing  statistics  for  each  type  of  application;  sites,  devices  and 

operators  

12. Children cases – especially in relation to missing persons, the SIS AFIS should be able to 
tune  the  matching  process  where  it  is  clear  that  the  child  will  have  grown  since  the  prints 
were acquired 

13. Quality check central service - to check print quality against the SIS AFIS quality metrics  

14. Reporting on lower quality fingerprint card - when a dataset, proposed for enrolment or 
addition  to  an  alert,  does  not  have  the  quality  level  required  for  the  SIS  AFIS  either  in  an 
alert or in the dataset card itself  

15. Integrity  of  the  database  -  use  of  best  practice  to  reduce  the  risk  of  inconsistency  or 

erroneous data, including prints, recorded in the database  

16. Consultation  

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a.  Enhanced resolution (1000dpi9) - to provide the possibility to store prints at higher 

resolution where Member States have upgraded their scanners  

b.  Flat  and  rolled  fingerprints  -  Member  States  should  be  allowed,  for  consultation 

only, to limit fingerprint collection to flat prints  

c.  Two prints fast check - the possibility to carry out quick consultations  

17. Appropriate  response  times  –  to  cope  with  three  indicative  response  times  based  on  the 
different operational scenarios: (a) very short (i.e. below 30 seconds); (b) medium (i.e. below 
five minutes); (c) longer (i.e. up to ten minutes) 

18. Queries priority - the definition of priority levels for processing queries in order for the SIS 

AFIS to better manage the workload of the system 

19. Performance  benchmark  –  early  consideration  of  the  scheduling  of  performance 

evaluations of the SIS AFIS  

5. THE NEXT STEPS - ACTION PLAN 

The completion of the study and the submission of this report for consultation to the European 
Parliament are the first steps towards the provision of AFIS functionality in the SIS environment.  
In  practical terms,  the high-level description of activities  which must  now take  place, with  eu-
LISA and the Member States, can be summarised as follows: 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

(5) 

Establish  the  requirements  for  the  special  quality  check  to  ascertain  the  fulfilment  of  a 
minimum data quality standard. The specifications should be included in a Commission 
Implementing Decision 

Finalise the user requirements and the sizing of the required system 

Define the architecture of the required system. This should be included in a Commission 
Implementing Decision 

Define the technical specifications and the timeline for implementation 

Carry out the project leading to the implementation of the SIS AFIS 

6. CONCLUSION 

AFIS  functionality  has  already  been  intrinsically  linked  with  law  enforcement  and  border 
databases.  SIS  constitutes  one  of  these  databases  and  alerts  related  to  persons  will  not  deliver 
their full capacity and usefulness without the support of an AFIS. 

In  the  light  of  the  analysis  and  observations  summarised  in  this  report,  the  Commission 
concludes  that  AFIS  technology  has  reached  sufficient  levels  of  readiness  and  availability  in 
order  to  be  integrated  in  SIS.  This  report  also  provides  an  overview  of  the  Commission's 
suggestions  which  will  be  addressed  in  the  implementation  and  use  of  the  SIS  AFIS  in  an 
operational environment. 

9 Dots per inch. 

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