COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Analysis and Evidence in support of the EU Action Plan against Wildlife Trafficking Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS EU Action Plan against Wildlife Trafficking
Date: 2016-02-26
Institutions: Directorate-General for Environment, European Commission
Subjects: action programme, animal life, illicit trade, organised crime, plant life, protected species, protection of animals, protection of plant life

EN 

   EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 26.2.2016  SWD(2016) 38 final   COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Analysis and Evidence in support of the EU Action Plan against Wildlife Trafficking  Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS EU Action Plan against Wildlife Trafficking  {COM(2016) 87 final}  
 
 
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

Analysis and evidence in support of the EU Action Plan against  
wildlife trafficking 

Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 4 

1.   Main features of wildlife trafficking at global and EU level ................................................. 5 

1.1.   Wildlife trafficking at global level: changes in scale and nature ......................................... 5 

1.2.   Wildlife trafficking at global level: key drivers ................................................................... 10 

1.2.1  

Rising demand .............................................................................................................. 10 

1.2.2  

Poverty and exploitation of rural communities in source countries  ............................. 12 

1.2.3  

Poor governance and corruption ................................................................................... 13 

1.3   Wildlife trafficking and the EU ........................................................................................... 15 

1.3.1  

Scale of wildlife trafficking in the EU  ......................................................................... 16 

1.3.2  
Drivers/Facilitators of wildlife trafficking in the EU: sustained demand and  
insufficient awareness  .................................................................................................................. 24 

2.  The impacts of wildlife trafficking .............................................................................................. 27 

2.1  

Impact on biodiversity ........................................................................................................ 27 

2.2   Economic impact of wildlife trafficking .............................................................................. 28 

2.3  

2.4  

Impact on governance and the rule of law .......................................................................... 30 

Impact on national and regional security  .......................................................................... 31 

3.  

Actions taken at the global and the EU level ........................................................................ 33 

3.1  

3.2  

Initiatives at global level  ..................................................................................................... 33 

The framework of action at EU level................................................................................... 36 

4.  

Challenges under the current approach ............................................................................... 38 

4.1  

Implementation and Enforcement of existing rules in the EU .......................................... 38 

4.1.1  

An uneven level of implementation and enforcement throughout the EU  ................... 38 

4.1.2  

Awareness and prioritization ........................................................................................ 44 

4.1.3  

Capacity throughout the enforcement chain  ................................................................ 44 

4.1.4  

Coordination within the Member States  ...................................................................... 45 

4.1.5  

Capacity to fight organised wildlife crime  ................................................................... 47 

4.1.6  

Enforcement Cooperation amongst Member States  ..................................................... 49 

4.1.7  

International Enforcement Cooperation  ....................................................................... 50 

4.2  

Support to anti-wildlife trafficking efforts globally  ........................................................... 51 

4.2.1  

Scale of EU Support provided to developing countries  ............................................... 52 

4.2.2  

Donor coordination  ...................................................................................................... 55 

4.2.3  

Demand reduction  ........................................................................................................ 56 

2 

 
 
4.2.4  

Anti-Corruption efforts  ................................................................................................ 58 

4.2.4  
market countries and regions  ....................................................................................................... 59 

Diplomatic tools for more effective cooperation with relevant source, transit and 

4.2.5  

The EU trade policy in support of the fight against wildlife trafficking  ...................... 60 

Annex 1 ................................................................................................................................................ 62 

Annex 2 ................................................................................................................................................ 64 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 

Wildlife trafficking1 is not a new phenomenon, but its scale, nature and impact have changed 
considerably  in  recent  years.  Wildlife  trafficking  today  is  not  only  bringing  some  iconic 
species  to  the  brink  of  extinction,  but  also  hindering  sustainable  economic  development. 
Moreover, it has strong links with transnational organised crime networks and corruption. In 
some instances, it also threatens national and regional security.  

Wildlife  trafficking  directly  undermines  EU  policies  to  support  sustainable  development 
worldwide, particularly as regards protection for global biodiversity and efforts to strengthen 
good governance.  

The  European  Commission  has  therefore  developed  an  EU  Action  Plan  against  wildlife 
trafficking  to  tackle  the  phenomenon  within  the  EU  and  strengthen  the  EU's  role  in 
combating it worldwide.  

The Plan has three priorities: 

(1)   preventing wildlife trafficking and tackling its root causes,  

(2)   making  implementation  and  enforcement  of  existing  rules  and  the  fight  against 

organised wildlife crime more effective, and  

(3)   strengthening  the  global  partnership  of  source,  consumer  and  transit  countries  against 

wildlife trafficking. 

The fight against cross-border crime in an area of justice and fundamental rights and making 
the  EU  a  stronger  global  player  feature  among  the  current  Commission’s  ten  political 
priorities.2 

This  document  presents  data  on  the  scale  and  nature  of  wildlife  trafficking  in  the  EU  and 
globally, analyses the action taken so far, and  explains why further measures are needed at 
EU  and  international  level.  It  also  shows  the  links  with  the  measures  in  the  proposed  EU 
Action Plan which seek to tackle the challenges described here.  

1   Defined as the international and non-international illegal trade in wild animals and plants and derived products and 

closely interlinked offences such as poaching. 

2   http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/index_en.htm.  

4 

 
 
 
                                                            
1.   Main features of wildlife trafficking at global and EU level 

1.1.  Wildlife trafficking at global level: changes in scale and nature 

Despite  comprehensive  international  rules  on  the  trade  in  wildlife,  wildlife  trafficking  has 
reached unprecedented levels in recent years.  

By nature, the illegal wildlife trade is difficult to quantify; it has been estimated by different 
sources  to  represent  several  billion  euros  of  business  annually.  Species  exploited  include 
corals,  reptiles,  pangolins,  sharks,  tigers,  great  apes,  elephants,  rhinoceros,  turtles,  animals 
used for bush meat, tropical timber or wood used for charcoal, and plants and animals used 
for medicinal purposes. 

While the EU Action Plan does not focus on specific species, the data on many lesser-known 
species are limited. This chapter therefore focuses on rhinoceroses and elephants, among the 
most emblematic victims of the current crisis. 

The  vast  majority  of  the  world's  remaining  20,000  rhinos  live  in  South  Africa,  where 
poaching  has  risen  significantly  in  recent  years.  Over  1200  animals  were  illegally  killed  in 
2014,  by  comparison  with  13  in  2007  (Figure  1).  Poaching  for  rhinoceroses  has  also 
increased  recently  in  Namibia  and  Zimbabwe.  This  massive  poaching  supplies  the  black 
market  for  rhino  horn  in  Asia.  Consequently,  rhinoceros  populations  in  Africa  are  now 
declining again after decades of recovery. 

Figure 1. Rhino poaching in South Africa. Source: TRAFFIC 

The African elephant population is also declining, due to steep increases in poaching.  

The latest estimates of the total number of African elephants range from 419,000 to 650,0003. 
An estimated 20,000 - 30,000 elephants have been killed illegally every year since 2011. The 

3   UNEP, CITES, IUCN, TRAFFIC (2013). Elephants in the Dust – The African Elephant Crisis. A Rapid Response 

Assessment. United Nations Environment Programme, GRID-Arendal.  

5 

 
 
                                                            
elephant population has fallen by 60% in Tanzania over the last five years, from 110,000 to 
under  44,000.  During  the  same  period,  Mozambique  is  reported  to  have  lost  48%  of  its 
elephants. Forest elephants from Central Africa declined by an estimated 62% between 2002 
and 2012, mainly as a result of poaching.  

The illicit ivory trade has more than doubled since 2007, and is now over three times its size 
in 19984. Over 40 tonnes of ivory were seized in source, transit and end destination countries 
in 20135. However, this is just a small proportion of the quantities trafficked.  

The problem is not confined to rhinos and elephants. The examples below illustrate the scale 
of trafficking in other species listed in the Appendices of the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES):  

 

 

 

 

According  to  seizure  records  and  arrivals  at  sanctuaries,  wildlife  trafficking  claimed 
about 1,800 great apes between 2005 and 2011.6 

Poaching is considered to be among the main reasons why the world's tiger population 
has fallen from 100,000 a century ago to under 3500 today.7 

An estimated one million pangolins were illegally traded between 2000 and 2014.8 

Over  4000  tonnes  of  rosewood  suspected  to  have  been  illegally  exported  from 
Madagascar  were  seized  by  authorities  in  various  transit  and  destination  countries 
between November 2013 and April 20149. 

Trafficking,  both  in  CITES-listed  plants  and  animals  and  in  other  natural  resources,  is  of 
major  concern  to  the  EU  and  the  international  community.  Particular  concerns  are  illegal 
logging  and  timber  trafficking,  and  illegal,  unreported  and  unregulated  fishing.  These 
represent serious threats to biodiversity conservation and account for sizeable flows of illegal 
commodities.  Some  sources  estimate  the  volume  of  illegal  timber  from  the  nine  countries 
producing  the  largest  amounts  of  tropical  timber  at  over  80  million  m3  in  201310,  while 
global illegal fishing is worth approximately EUR 10 billion per annum.11   

Wildlife trafficking hotspots include central and eastern Africa (especially for ivory, tropical 
timber,  charcoal  and  pangolins)  and  southern  Africa  (especially  for  rhino  horn)  as  source 
regions, while south-east Asia and China are major end markets for illegally traded wildlife 

4   UNEP, CITES, IUCN, TRAFFIC (2013). Elephants in the Dust – The African Elephant Crisis. A Rapid Response 

Assessment. United Nations Environment Programme, GRID-Arendal.  

5   Milliken, T. (2014) Illegal Trade in Ivory and Rhino Horn: an Assessment Report to Improve Law Enforcement Under 

the Wildlife TRAPS Project. USAID and TRAFFIC.  

6   Nellemann, C., Henriksen, R., Raxter, P., Ash, N., Mrema, E. (Eds). (2014). The Environmental Crime Crisis – Threats 
to Sustainable Development from Illegal Exploitation and Trade in Wildlife and Forest Resources. A UNEP Rapid 
Response Assessment. United Nations Environment Programme and GRID-Arendal, Nairobi and Arendal.  

7   See e.g. http://www.traffic.org/tigers/.  
8   http://www.pangolinsg.org/files/2012/07/Scaling_up_pangolin_conservation_280714_v4.pdf.  
9   See https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/com/sc/65/E-SC65-48-01.pdf.  
10   See: https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150715IllegalLoggingHoare.pdf  
11   Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of Council 

Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing - COM(2015) 480  

6 

 
                                                            
products.12  However,  wildlife  trafficking  is  a  global  problem.  Regional  patterns  change 
constantly and new trade routes emerge frequently. 

For  example,  there  are  significant  illegal  trade  flows  of  valuable  birds  and  reptiles  from 
central  and  south  America  to  the  United  States  and  the  EU,  and  of  rosewood  to  Asia.13 
Transit  routes  change  according  to  the  relative  stringency  of  checks  at  major  ports  and 
airports, new species appear in the illegal wildlife trade, and new poaching areas are targeted. 
For example, a spike in demand in south-east Asia has driven massive poaching in Asia and 
Africa of pangolins, which were not trafficked in the past14. In Namibia, elephant and rhino 
poaching soared in 2015, against a very low level of poaching in the preceding years.15 

The  increasing  scale  of  wildlife  trafficking  is  intrinsically  linked  to  the  growing 
involvement of transnational organised crime networks. The prospect of making sizeable 
profits by smuggling wildlife commodities has attracted new players in this area.  

It is difficult  to  obtain reliable data on the prices of illegally traded goods, as  trafficking is 
clandestine. The value of such commodities increases considerably along the supply chain, so 
poachers earn much less than the dealers selling the smuggled items at the final point of sale.  

Various estimates are regularly presented by different sources. The resale value of rhino horn 
is about EUR 40,000/kg (the current price of 1 kg of gold is about EUR 31,000), while raw 
ivory  prices  reach  EUR  620/kg  on  the  black  market,  and  glass  eels  are  valued  at  about 
EUR 1,000/kg.16 These high profits, coupled with the low risk of detection and the penalties, 
generally much lower than for trafficking in drugs or firearms, make wildlife trafficking an 
attractive  area  for  organised  criminal  groups.  Environmental  crime  (including  wildlife 
trafficking) and  other  forms  of  organised  crime  often  occur together,  as  Interpol  states  in  a 
recent report.17 

The  UN  Office  for  Drugs  and  Crime  (UNODC)  has  documented  the  involvement  of 
organised crime networks in wildlife trafficking in particular in its threat assessment reports 
on organised crime in south-east Asia and east Africa.18 Organised crime is also a factor in 
the EU (see 1.3 below and case studies in the Annex).  

12   UNEP, CITES, IUCN, TRAFFIC (2013). Elephants in the Dust – The African Elephant Crisis. A Rapid Response 

Assessment. United Nations Environment Programme, GRID-Arendal. 

13   See for example:  http://news.mongabay.com/2015/11/journey-to-oblivion-unraveling-latin-americas-illegal-wildlife-

trade/ 

14   Soewu, D.A. and Sodeinde, O.A. (2015). Utilization of pangolins in Africa: Fuelling factors, diversity of uses and     

sustainability. International Journal of Biodiversity and Conservation 7 (1), 1-10.  

15   See: https://www.newera.com.na/2015/05/12/60-rhinos-poached/  
16   European Commission (2014). Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the 

EU Approach against Wildlife Trafficking. Brussels 

17   Interpol. (2015). Interpol Strategic Report – Environmental Crime and its Convergence with other serious crimes. 

Reference: 2015/999/OEC/ENS/SLO 

18   https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/TOC_East_Africa_2013.pdf and 

https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/TOCTA_EAP_web.pdf 

7 

 
                                                            
Rhino horns, ivory and rosewood are among the well-documented commodities trafficked by 
organised transnational criminal groups19. One clear indication is the rising number of large-
scale ivory seizures20. Setting up efficient systems to procure and trade so much ivory illicitly 
typically  requires  finance,  planning,  organisation  and  intelligence,  investment  in  secure 
facilities  for  storage  and  staging  purposes,  high  levels  of  collusion  and  corruption,  and  the 
ability to effectively and covertly exploit trading links and networks between source countries 
in Africa and end-use markets in Asia.  

Organised  gangs,  notably  those  with  links  to  major  end-use  ivory  markets,  have  now 
developed the ability to ship large consignments of raw and processed ivory directly to key 
Asian markets.21 The structure of wildlife trafficking groups is also typical of organised crime 
networks, with different levels of responsibility, depending on the function of group members 
(frontline  poachers,  middle  men  in  the  countries  of  origin  who  organise  poaching  logistics 
and transport to exit points, 'kingpins' responsible for the overall network, and, in some cases, 
'mules', who transport ivory or rhino horns across borders).   

The  CITES  Secretariat  drew  attention  to  the  involvement  of  organised  crime  networks  in 
rhinoceros poaching and trafficking in its report for the 16th Conference of Parties in March 
2013.  This  states  that  'illegal  trade  in  rhinoceros  horn  continues  to  be  one  of  the  most 
structured  criminal  activities  currently  faced  by  CITES.  There  are  clear  indications  that 
organized  crime  groups  are  involved  in  rhinoceros  poaching  and  illegal  rhinoceros  horn 
trade.  These  groups  operate  in  range  States  as  well  as  Europe,  where  thefts  of  rhinoceros 
horns from museums, auction houses, antique shops and taxidermists have occurred. Seizures 
have also been made in Australia, Hong Kong SAR and the Philippines. In the United States 
of America, seven people were arrested on charges of illegal trafficking rhinoceros horn in 
February 2012. Illegal rhinoceros horn trade has therefore become a major problem and has 
an impact on several continents. Increased international cooperation and a well-coordinated 
law enforcement response are required to address this threat effectively'. 

An increasingly important new dimension of wildlife trafficking is the use of the internet to 
facilitate illegal transactions (see Box 1).  

19   UNEP, CITES, IUCN, TRAFFIC (2013). Elephants in the Dust – The African Elephant Crisis. A Rapid Response 

Assessment. United Nations Environment Programme, GRID-Arendal; Nellemann, C., Henriksen, R., Raxter, P., Ash, 
N., Mrema, E. (Eds). (2014). The Environmental Crime Crisis – Threats to Sustainable Development from Illegal 
Exploitation and Trade in Wildlife and Forest Resources. A UNEP Rapid Response Assessment. United Nations 
Environment Programme and GRID-Arendal, Nairobi and Arendal; Schneider, J. (2012). Sold into extinction. The global 
trade in endangered species. Praeger, Santa Barbara; Milliken, T. and Shaw, J. (2012). The South Africa – Viet Nam 
Rhino Horn Trade Nexus: A deadly combination of institutional lapses, corrupt wildlife industry professionals and Asian 
crime syndicates. Johannesburg, South Africa: TRAFFIC; Warchol, G., Zupan, L., and Clarke W. (2003). Transnational 
Criminality: An analysis of the illegal wildlife market in Southern Africa. International Criminal Justice Review. 
13(1):1-26. 

20   UNEP, CITES, IUCN, TRAFFIC (2013). Elephants in the Dust – The African Elephant Crisis. A Rapid Response 

Assessment. United Nations Environment Programme, GRID-Arendal. 

21   UNEP, CITES, IUCN, TRAFFIC (2013). Elephants in the Dust – The African Elephant Crisis. A Rapid Response 

Assessment. United Nations Environment Programme, GRID-Arendal. 

8 

 
 
                                                            
Box 1 – Wildlife trafficking and the internet22 

The internet has become an important tool facilitating the trade in wildlife, both legal and illegal.  

Research  by  TRAFFIC  in  2012  in  China  revealed  that  30 000  -  50 000  advertisements  for  wildlife 
products  from  five  species  -  elephant  ivory,  rhino  horn,  tiger  bone,  hawksbill  shells  and  pangolin 
scales – could be found on 125 websites.  

Again,  in  2012,  ten  EU  countries  monitored  their  national  auction  sites  for  a  fortnight  to  identify 
advertisements of ivory items. According to an Interpol report, investigators discovered 660 adverts 
on  61  auction  sites,  advertising  an  estimated  total  volume  of  4500  kg of  ivory  at  an  estimated  total 
value  of  EUR 1 450 000.  This  monitoring  resulted  in  six  national  and  three  international 
investigations into ivory items imported from abroad or described as new.  

A 2014 International Fund for Animal Welfare report based on a six-week investigation found a 
total of 33 006 endangered wildlife and wildlife products for sale. They were found on 280 websites, 
in  9482  advertisements,  in  16  countries  including  six  EU  countries  (Belgium,  France,  Germany, 
Netherlands, Poland and the UK). While it was impossible to determine the exact number of illegal 
and legal advertisements, more than 1000 cases were submitted to enforcement authorities for further 
investigation.  

A recent issue is the shift of wildlife traders advertising the sale of wildlife and wildlife products from 
websites, where products are freely available to the public, to restricted specialised online platforms 
and  private  social  media  forums.  These  private  forums  facilitate  instant  private  communication 
between  sellers  and  buyers  and  the  private  exchange  of  goods.  TRAFFIC  has  recently  documented 
how  dealers  using  58  active  accounts  on  WeChat  (China’s  most  popular  social  media  messaging 
service) were responsible for posting 10 650 advertisements, including 57 479 photos and 580 video 
clips, for illegal ivory products over a 13-week period.  

The  number  of  illegal  ivory  advertisements  plunged  by  45%  during  the  survey  period  in  China, 
following  government  enforcement  action  and  concerted  efforts  by  WeChat  to  clamp  down  on 

22   On this problem, see notably: Alacs, E. and Georges, A. (2008). Wildlife across our borders: a review of the illegal trade 

in Australia. Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences 40 (2), pp. 147-160.  
Altherr, S .2014. Stolen Wildlife – Why the EU needs to tackle smuggling of nationally protected species. Report by Pro 
Wildlife, Munich, Germany. pp. 29.  
IFAW. 2004. ‘Elephants on the high street: an investigation into ivory trade in the UK’. Accessed on 21 August 2015 at 
http://www.ifaw.org/sites/default/files/Elephants%20on%20the%20high%20street%20an%20investigation%20into%20i
vory%20trade%20in%20the%20UK%20-%202004.pdf 
IFAW. 2007. ‘Bidding for extinction’. Accessed on 21 August 2015 at 
http://www.ifaw.org/sites/default/files/Report%202007%20Bidding%20for%20Extinction.pdf 
IFAW. 2008. ‘Killing with keystrokes’. Accessed 21 August 2015 at 
http://www.ifaw.org/sites/default/files/Killing%20with%20Keystrokes.pdf 
IFAW. 2014. ‘Wanted - Dead or Alive’ Exposing Online Wildlife Trade. Accessed on 30 November 2015 at 
http://www.ifaw.org/sites/default/files/IFAW-Wanted-Dead-or-Alive-Exposing-Online-Wildlife-Trade-2014.pdf 
Interpol. 2013. Project Web: An investigation into the ivory trade over the internet within the European Union. pp. 32. 
Accessed on 30 November 2015 at http://www.ifaw.org/sites/default/files/Project%20Web%20-%20PUBLIC.pdf 
Izzo, J.B. 2010. PC Pets for a Price: Combating Online and Traditional Wildlife Crime through International 
Harmonization and Authoritative Policies. William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review, 34 (3), 965-998. 
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr/vol34/iss3/6 
Lavorgna, A. 2014. Wildlife trafficking in the Internet age. Crime Science 3:5. doi:10.1186/s40163-014-0005-2.   
NWCU. 2015. Emberton sentenced at Sheffield crown court. Accessed on 30 November 2015 at 
http://www.nwcu.police.uk/news/nwcu-police-press-releases/emberton-sentenced-at-sheffield-crown-court/.  
NWCU. 2013. UK National Wildlife Crime Unit Strategic Assessment 2013. Accessed on 30 November 2015 at 
http://www.nwcu.police.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NWCU-Strategic-Assessment-2013-final-v2.pdf 
Smithers, R., Osborn, T., Whiteley, G., Kecse-Nagy, K. and Goba, V. (2015). Strengthening cooperation with business 
sectors against illegal trade in wildlife. Report for the European Commission 
Sollund, R. and Maher, J. (2015). The illegal wildlife trade. A Case Study report on the Illegal Wildlife Trade in the 
United Kingdom, Norway, Colombia and Brazil. A study compiled as part of the EFFACE project. University of Oslo 
and University of South Wales.  
Yu, X and Jia, W. 2015. Moving targets: tracking online sales of illegal wildlife products in China. TRAFFIC 
International, Cambridge, UK.   

9 

 
                                                            
unethical and illegal activities online. Although this had an immediate deterrent effect and curbed the 
illegal  wildlife  trade  on  this  particular  online  platform  for  several  weeks,  illegal  wildlife  traders 
subsequently continued to abuse these platforms by setting up new accounts to avoid detection. This 
demonstrates the adaptability of wildlife criminals and the need for the private sector and enforcement 
authorities to remain constantly vigilant. 

Internet sales are typically completed by parcel/post-delivery. Interpol reported (in 2013) that between 
2007  and  2011,  mail  parcels  accounted  for  22  per  cent  of  illegally  traded  wildlife  and  wildlife 
products  seized  in  the  EU.  In  2014  alone,  over  60 000  tablets  containing  CITES  Appendix  II  Cape 
Aloe  (Aloe  ferox)  were  seized  in  multiple  parcels  destined  for  France,  152  carvings  in  African 
elephant ivory (Loxodonta africana) were seized from postal parcels in transit in Germany, and 170 
specimens of radiated tortoise (Astrochelys radiata, Appendix I) were discovered in parcels in transit 
in France. These illegal shipments are likely to have been ordered online. This shows the widespread 
use of the internet for illegal wildlife trade transactions, which affect the EU as both a consumer and a 
transit region. 
While the 2013 Europol Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA)23 recognises that 
'endangered fauna and flora … are … traded over the internet', as are other commodities, Europol’s 
Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) has not examined wildlife crime closely.  

Most EU countries have acknowledged the threat posed by the online wildlife trade. For example, the 
Czech Republic’s national legislation covers online trading and is specifically addressing the online 
wildlife trade, particularly that a “CITES-obligatory document” must be displayed as part of the sale 
of any CITES listed specimens sold via the Internet, and the UK has seen several convictions related 
to  illegal  wildlife  trade  on  the  internet.  A  recent  example  is  a  prosecution  for  the  illegal  sale  and 
offering  for  sale  of  jewellery  containing  tiger  teeth  and  claws,  which  the  person  concerned  was 
shipping  around  the  globe.  In  the  UK,  a  man  who  illegally  sold  imported  primate  body  parts  - 
including  four  monkey  heads  -  online  and  possessed  images  of  bestiality  has  been  sentenced  to  14 
months' imprisonment suspended for two years in January 2016. The UK authorities are also aware of 
illegal trade in other wildlife, such as raptors and tortoises. However, there are insufficient indications 
from  Member  States  that  national  competent  authorities  receive  adequate  training  and  –where 
necessary–  assistance  by  specialised  cybercrime  units  to  systematically  investigate/study  wildlife 
crime on the internet.  

1.2.  Wildlife trafficking at global level: key drivers  

1.2.1  Rising demand 

The  sharp  rise  in  global  demand  for  wildlife  products  is  a  key  factor  explaining  the  recent 
boom in wildlife trafficking.  

This  surge  in  demand,  largely  from  east  and  south-east  Asian  markets,  is  particularly 
damaging  for  products  from  endangered  species,  such  as  elephant  ivory,  rhinoceros  horn, 
tiger bones and skins, luxury woods, reptile skins and species used in traditional medicines. 
The  sustained  economic  growth  that  has  occurred  in  parts  of  Asia,  particularly  China,  has 
significantly boosted  people’s disposable income and hence their ability to  purchase luxury 
and  desirable  items.  The  result  is  increased  consumption  of  rare  wildlife  products,  now 
fashionable in sections of the newly wealthy middle and upper classes24.  

23   SOCTA (2013). EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment. pp. 48. 
24   TRAFFIC, 2008. “What’s Driving the Wildlife Trade? A Review of Expert Opinion on Economic and Social Drivers of      
the Wildlife Trade and Trade Control Efforts in Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR and Vietnam”. East Asia and Pacific 
Region Sustainable Development Discussion Papers. East Asia and Pacific Region Sustainable Development 
Department, World Bank, Washington, DC. 

10 

 
                                                            
China has become the world's largest destination market for ivory, according to the data on 
large-scale  seizures  of  ivory  between  2012  and  201325.  Data  from  the  Elephant  Trade 
Information System (ETIS26) also confirm that China’s involvement in this illegal trade rose 
from 3% in 1996 to 40% in 201127. 

According to analysis conducted by the MIKE Programme28, trends in consumer spending in 
China  are  strongly  correlated  with  the  Proportion  of  Illegally  Killed  Elephants  (PIKE)29. 
Higher consumer demand in China correlates with a steady rise in the wholesale price paid by 
carvers and ivory processors for illegal raw ivory. This rose from approximately USD 150 to 
USD 350 per kg between 2002 and 2004, reaching about USD 825 per kg in 2010.  

There have also been changes in consumer attitudes and product preferences. Consumption is 
now  shifting  from  products  such  as  more  traditional  medicines  to  new  products  including 
tiger  bone  wine30  and  rhino  horn  hangover  cures31.  This  suggests  that  consumers  are 
increasingly motivated by social status and speculation, for instance, rather than tradition. 

The  particular  rise  in  demand  from  Vietnam  coincides  with  and  reflects  South  African 
poaching  figures.  South  Africa’s  data  on  applications  to  hunt  rhino  and  exports  of  hunting 
trophies  point  to  Vietnam  as  the  main  country  involved,32  highlighting  the  demand.  South 
African  seizure  data  also  implicates  the  Vietnamese  market:  of  43  documented  arrests  of 
Asian  nationals  for  rhino  crimes  in  South  Africa,  24  were  Vietnamese  (56%),  13  were 
Chinese  (28%),  with  the  remainder  from  Thailand  and  Malaysia33  and  with  Maputo  in 
Mozambique  emerging  as  a  hub  for  rhino  horns  in  transit  out  of  Africa  to  Vietnam.34  Law 
enforcement  data  in  the  USA  also  overwhelmingly  implicate  Vietnam  as  the  primary 
destination  for  rhino  horns  from  North  America35.  Vietnam  also  appears  to  be  the  only 
country  where  rhino  horn  paraphernalia  (bowls  with  serrated  surfaces  for  grinding)  to 
facilitate  home  medication  are  widely  available  and  where  fake  rhino  horns  are  commonly 

25   CITES Secretariat (2014). Elephant Conservation, Illegal Killing and Ivory Trade. Interpretation and Implementation of 

the Convention Species Trade and Conservation, Elephants. 65th Meeting of the Standing Committee, Geneva 
(Switzerland), 7-11 July 2014.  

26   For more information on ETIS, see https://www.cites.org/eng/prog/etis/index.php  
27   Underwood, F.M., Burn, R.W. and Milliken, T. (2013). Dissecting the Illegal Ivory Trade: An Analysis of Ivory 

Seizures Data. PLoS ONE 8(10): e76539. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0076539 

28   The 'Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants' (MIKE) programme under CITES aims to measure levels and trends in 
the illegal hunting of elephants and to determine the factors causing or associated with changing trends. MIKE has been 
implemented since 2001 and operates at over 80 sites, spread across 44 elephant range countries in Africa and Asia. 

29   CITES Secretariat, IUCN / SSC African Elephant Specialist Group and TRAFFIC International. (2013). Status of 

African elephant populations and levels of illegal killing and the illegal trade in ivory: A report to the African Elephant 
Summit. (see https://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/african_elephant_summit_background_document_2013_en.pdf). 
30   Stoner, S.S, and Pervushina, N. (2013). Reduced to Skin and Bones Revisited: An Updated Analysis of Tiger Seizures 

from 12 Tiger Range Countries (2000–2012). TRAFFIC, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 

31   Milliken, T. and Shaw, J. (2012). The South Africa – Viet Nam Rhino Horn Trade Nexus: A deadly combination of 

institutional lapses, corrupt wildlife industry professionals and Asian crime syndicates. TRAFFIC, Johannesburg, South 
Africa 

32   CITES Secretariat. (2013). Report to the Secretariat. Interpretation and Implementation of the Convention Species Trade 
and Conservation, Rhinoceroses. 16th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties, Bangkok, (Thailand), 3-14 March 2013.  

33   Milliken, T. and Shaw, J. (2012). The South Africa – Viet Nam Rhino Horn Trade Nexus: A deadly combination of 

institutional lapses, corrupt wildlife industry professionals and Asian crime syndicates. TRAFFIC, Johannesburg, South 
Africa 

34   Milliken, T. and Shaw, J. (2012). The South Africa – Viet Nam Rhino Horn Trade Nexus: A deadly combination of 

institutional lapses, corrupt wildlife industry professionals and Asian crime syndicates. TRAFFIC, Johannesburg, South 
Africa. 

35   CITES Secretariat (2013) Report of the Secretariat. Interpretation and Implementation of the Convention Species Trade 
and Conservation, Rhinoceroses. 16th Meeting of the Conference of Parties Bangkok, Thailand, 3-14 March 2013.  

11 

 
                                                            
found  in  the  marketplace.  Offering  rhino  horns  for  sale  is  not  a  criminal  offence  under 
Vietnam's wildlife trade law. 

A  stronger  focus  on  demand  reduction  measures  and  behavioural  change  is  therefore  an 
essential part of the fight against wildlife trafficking, and such measures can be successful as 
shown below for products like shark fin (see 4.1.3).  

1.2.2  Poverty and exploitation of rural communities in source countries (linked to 

actions 4 and 5) 

The role of poverty in driving poaching in source countries has been widely acknowledged. 
Poaching can be very lucrative, and it thrives where rural communities have few alternative 
sources  of  income.  This  applies  particularly  where  communities  in  or  close  to  wildlife-rich 
areas do not benefit from wildlife conservation and management programmes. The situation 
is  abused  by  criminal  networks  that  hire  frontline  poachers  or  villagers  from  such 
communities  to  assist  poachers,  in  exchange  for  far  more  cash  than  they  could  earn  in  any 
other way.  

The  report  from  a  symposium  held  in  2015  by  the  International  Union  for  Conservation  of 
Nature  (IUCN)  and  the  International  Institute  of  Environment  and  Development  (IIED)36 
presents several case studies supporting the view that reasons for poaching include the lack of 
alternative  livelihoods.  The  prospect  of  increased  income  from  illegal  wildlife  trafficking 
activities  often  far  outweighs  the  fear  of  arrest  and  imprisonment,  driving  some  locals  to 
become  involved  in  illicit  activities.  However,  those  benefiting  from  the  illegal  trade  are 
often just a few individuals, not whole communities (see Box 2). 

Box 2 – Poverty as a driver for elephant poaching37  

The  MIKE  programme  has  statistically  evaluated  relationships  between  the  Proportion  of  Illegally 
Killed Elephants (PIKE) levels and a wide range of ecological, biophysical and socioeconomic factors 
at  the  site,  national  and  global  levels.  MIKE  data  analysis  has  found  that  'three  factors  consistently 
emerge as very strong predictors of poaching levels and trends: poverty at the site level, governance at 
the national level and demand for illegal ivory at the global level'. Research also suggests that human 
infant mortality in and around MIKE sites, which has been interpreted as a proxy for poverty at the 
site level, was the single strongest site-level correlate of PIKE, with sites suffering from higher levels 
of poverty experiencing higher levels of elephant poaching. This implies that there may be a greater 
incentive to facilitate or participate in the illegal killing of elephants in areas where human livelihoods 
are insecure.  

CITES  CoP16  Document  53.1  on  MIKE  states  that  'both  livestock  density  and  crop  occurrence  are 
negatively correlated with PIKE, meaning that poaching levels decrease as livestock or crop density 
increase.' Relationships between poverty, food security and PIKE highlight a  close linkage between 
the well-being of local communities and the health of elephant populations'.  

The above symposium report also provides positive examples of community involvement in 
combating the illegal wildlife trade. Namibia provides an excellent example of communities 
benefiting directly from wildlife and being involved in tackling wildlife trafficking. In 1996, 
the  government  amended  the  law,  enabling  communities  to  have  ownership  rights  over 

36   International Symposium. Beyond enforcement: communities, governance, incentives and sustainable use in combating 

wildlife crime, http://pubs.iied.org/G03903.html  

37   See CITES Secretariat et al., 2013.  

12 

 
                                                            
wildlife through community conservancies. The government sets quotas for wildlife use for 
consumption purposes (e.g. hunting), and all revenues from this and other forms of tourism 
go  to  the  communities.  This  has  resulted  in  growing  wildlife  numbers  and  significant  job 
creation  -  including  jobs  for  500  community  game  guards.  It  has  also  generated  a  large 
amount  of  income,  mainly  from  tourism  (e.g.  13m  Namibian  dollars  -  about  USD 1m  - 
towards schools, healthcare, roads, training and other community needs). 

Another example from the symposium is the Ruvuma Elephant Project in Tanzania, covering 
two  million  hectares,  which  includes  village  and  farm  land,  forest  and  game  reserves,  and 
community-based  Wildlife  Management  Areas.  It  operates  in  an  area  where  the  poaching 
challenge has been significant. 'Game scouts recruited from the local villages are trained to 
work  alongside  government  rangers,  and  they  receive  performance-related  rewards.  Local 
villagers  also  inform  law  enforcement  efforts,  reporting  poaching  and  other  suspicious 
activities to rangers… The project requires good relationships and trust, so it has reciprocally 
taken on issues  of concern  to  the local communities, particularly conflicts between humans 
and elephants.  The net effect has  been  a dramatic reduction in  poaching while also helping 
villagers protect their crops'38.  

Involving rural communities in conservation and supporting the development of sustainable 
alternative livelihoods is thus crucial for effective donor support against wildlife trafficking 
(see below 4.2).   

1.2.3  Poor governance and corruption  

Poaching  and  wildlife  trafficking  have  been  particularly  prevalent  in  countries  with  weak 
governance structure and high levels of corruption.  

Weak governance means the official authorities lack the resources or will to exercise proper 
control over the illegal wildlife product trafficking chain as a whole, especially: 

- 

- 

- 

in source countries, (i) on the sites where poaching takes place, when the products are 
being  shipped  within  the  country,  and  at  export  and  exit  points,  such  as  ports  and 
airports  –  and  (ii)  on  the  issuing  and  checking  of  documents  designed  to  ensure  that 
products are of legal origin; 

in  transit  countries,  at  cross-border  points,  especially  ports  and  airports,  to  inspect 
products and documentation; 

in  end-destination  countries,  at  entry  points,  during  internal  transport  and  where 
products are sold on the market. 

National legislation is often inadequate and the judiciary inadequately equipped to properly 
deal with the perpetrators of wildlife crime offences.39  

Weak  governance structures are particularly  ill-prepared to combat organised crime.  Where 
there is no awareness or will to take political action, wildlife trafficking is not a priority (or 
even  an  issue)  in  the  work  programme  of  the  police  and  governmental  and  inter-

38   See report footnote 19 above, p. 19.  
39   DLA Piper. (2014). Empty Threat: Does the law combat illegal wildlife trade? A ten country review of legislative and 

judicial approaches. pp. 254 

13 

 
                                                            
governmental bodies responsible for customs checks, organised crime or corruption.  This is 
the  case  in  a  number  of  developing  countries  affected  by  wildlife  trafficking,  where  the 
environment  departments  in  charge  of  wildlife  conservation  have  found  themselves  on  the 
front  line  against  criminal  gangs  involved  in  wildlife  trafficking.  Without  cooperation  by 
proper law enforcement agencies (police and customs in particular), environmental agencies 
have very limited means to address the complex web of criminal activities supporting wildlife 
trafficking.  

Analysis under the MIKE programme shows that, at national level, the factor most strongly 
correlated  with  the  proportion  of  illegally  killed  elephants  is  governance,  as  measured  by 
Transparency  International’s  Corruption  Perceptions  Index  (CPI).  High  poaching  levels  are 
more prevalent in countries where governance is weaker, and vice versa. This is likely to be a 
causal  relationship,  with  poor  governance  facilitating  the  illegal  killing  of  elephants  and 
movement  of  illegal  ivory,  be  it  through  ineffective  law  enforcement  or  active  aiding  and 
abetting by unscrupulous officials40. 

This situation is compounded by corruption, viewed as one of the biggest facilitators of the 
illegal  wildlife  trade41.  A  number  of  wildlife  species  are  high-value  items  targeted  by 
organised  crime  groups,  and  this  makes  the  officers  responsible  for  regulating  trade  in 
specimens of these species potentially vulnerable to corruption. Corruption can take place at 
every  stage  in  the  trade  chain  –  from  poaching,  illegal  logging  and  illegal  fishing,  the 
transport  of  illegally  poached  or  harvested  goods,  processing  and  export,  to  issuing, 
inspecting  and  accepting  documentation  (such as  CITES  export  and import  permits),  to  the 
sale of illegal wildlife products and the laundering of proceeds. Corruption hampers attempts 
to apprehend and prosecute those involved in wildlife crime, for example, through the bribing 
or coercion of investigators, police, prosecutors or judges. This is particularly true for those 
involved in the upper echelons of these organised criminal networks. As a result, most arrests 
and  prosecutions  involve  the  'foot  soldiers'  in  the  lower  levels  of  these  wildlife  crime 
syndicates, with few arrests involving individuals further up in the structure.42 

The examples below illustrate the problem: 

 

A 2012 report by TRAFFIC43 attributed responsibility for the surge in rhino poaching 
in South Africa largely to corruption among wildlife wardens, professional hunters and 

40   CITES Secretariat, IUCN / SSC African Elephant Specialist Group and TRAFFIC International. (2013). Status of 

African elephant populations and levels of illegal killing and the illegal trade in ivory: A report to the African Elephant 
Summit. (available at 
https://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/african_elephant_summit_background_document_2013_en.pdf). 

41   "Corruption, environment and the United Nations Convention against corruption", UNODC, February 2012; "Wildlife 

crime and corruption", U4 Expert answer operated by Transparency International, 2013 (available at 
http://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/367_Wildlife_Crimes_and_Corruption.pdf ); Lawson, K., and 
Vines. A. (2014) Global impacts of the illegal wildlife trade: the costs of crime, insecurity and institutional erosion. 
Chatham House, London (available at 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/0214Wildlife.pdf): The role of 
corruption in Wildlife and Forest Crime, Environmental Investigation Agency, 2015 
https://drive.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=https://eia-international.org/wp-content/uploads/The-Role-of-Corruption-
in-Wildlife-Forest-Crime-FINAL.pdf.   

42   Maggs, K. (2011). South Africa’s National Strategy for the safety and security of rhino populations and other relevant 
government and private sector initiatives. In Proceedings of the tenth meeting of the IUCN African Rhino Specialist 
Group held at Mokala National Park, South Africa from 5-10 March 2011 (Ed. C. Dean), pp. 130–146.;  

43   Milliken, T. and Shaw, J. (2012). The South Africa – Viet Nam Rhino Horn Trade Nexus: A deadly combination of 

institutional lapses, corrupt wildlife industry professionals and Asian crime syndicates. TRAFFIC, Johannesburg, South 
Africa 

14 

 
                                                            
 

 

 

 

other game industry professionals, including game ranch owners, vets, pilots and game 
capture operators. 

In 2015, a record seizure of 65 rhino horns in Mozambique was quickly followed by the 
theft  of  12  of  them  from  a  strong-room  in  Maputo  Province's  police  headquarters, 
reflecting  the  country's  poor  law  enforcement  record  and  fuelling  suspicion  of 
complicity by some authorities.44 

A  report  by  the  Environmental Investigation  Agency  from  2015  highlights  corruption 
and the authorities' lack of engagement and capacity as a major factor in Laos' growing 
importance as a source and transit country for illegal wildlife products.45 

2015 reports by the Environmental Investigation Agency and Global Witness stress the 
role of corruption in large-scale illegal logging and the trade in protected timber species 
in and between Cambodia, Myanmar and China.46   

In September 2015, INTERPOL confirmed that the former wildlife director and head of 
the  CITES  Management  Authority  of  Guinea  was  arrested  for  his  suspected  role  in 
corrupt and fraudulent actions in issuing CITES export permits, notably for the export 
of highly endangered great apes47. 

Several factors contribute to a climate in which corruption is likely to flourish, particularly in 
relation  to  wildlife  crime.  These  include  lack  of  transparency  and  lack  of  accountability 
mechanisms;  lack  of  effective  deterrents;  legislation  and  regulations  that  are  complex, 
ambiguous,  confusing  or  contradictory;  conflicts  of  interest;  lack  of  appropriate  awareness 
education and training; low or irregular pay; and the perception that certain corrupt forms of 
behaviour are 'victimless' crimes or have no serious consequences. 

1.3   Wildlife trafficking and the EU 

The EU is a market, transit and source region for wildlife trafficking.  

As Europol has pointed out in its 2013 Threat Assessment on Environmental Crime48 and in 
its  2013  Serious  and  Organised  Crime  Threat  Assessment  (SOCTA)49,  organised  wildlife 
crime  exists  in  the  EU,  as  elsewhere.  Europol  identifies  environmental  crime  (including 
wildlife trafficking) as an 'emerging crime' in the EU and describes 'trafficking in endangered 
species' as 'a niche market attracting highly specialised Organised Criminal Groups'.  

The  case  of  the  'pseudo-hunters'  (see  Annex,  case  study  4)  illustrates  the  presence  of 
organised  wildlife  criminal  networks  using  the  EU  as  a  transit  point  for  rhinoceros  horns. 
Further evidence is provided by case study 3, in which a Belgian court convicted four people 
for smuggling birds illegally and on a large scale across various EU countries.  

44   http://www.traffic.org/home/2015/6/1/theft-of-rhino-horns-from-police-a-huge-setback-to-mozambiqu.html.  
45   'Sin City – illegal wildlife trade in Laos' golden triangle special economic zone' - EIA, March 2015 
46   'The cost of luxury', Global Witness February 2015; 'Organised Chaos', EIA September 2015.   
47   Interpol. (2015). Interpol Strategic Report – Environmental Crime and its Convergence with other serious crimes. 

Reference: 2015/999/OEC/ENS/SLO See: https://cites.org/eng/guinea_arrest_20150903  
48   https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/threat-assessment-2013-environmental-crime-eu  
49   https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/eu-serious-and-organised-crime-threat-assessment-socta  

15 

 
                                                            
1.3.1  Scale of wildlife trafficking in the EU (linked in particular to action 2, 3, 9) 

EU as an end market  

Although most wildlife products imported into the EU are of legal origin, the EU is a major 
end market for illegal wildlife products imported from third countries as well.  

The  EU's  significance  as  a  market  for  illegal  wildlife  products  is  shown  by  the  reports  of 
large  seizures  at  EU  borders  between  2011  and  2014  submitted  by  EU  countries  to  the 
European  Commission.  Although  not  all  Member  States  provided  complete  information  for 
the whole period, the data available is wide-ranging and up-to-date.  

The main commodities exported illegally to the EU between 2011 and 2014 include (see also 
figure 2): 

-   medicinal  products  derived  from  plants  (e.g.  costus  root,  American  ginseng,  orchids, 
agarwood,  African  cherry,  hoodia  and  aloe)  and  animals  (seahorses,  musk  deer, 
pangolins); 

-  

-  

-  

live  reptiles,  especially  tortoises,  but  also  lizards,  chameleons,  snakes,  iguanas  and 
geckos.  Over  6000  live  reptiles  were  seized  at  EU  borders  between  2011  and  2014 
(some 3200 in 2014 alone); 

reptile  bodies,  parts  and  derivatives,  with  over  9600  individual  items  seized  between 
2011  and  2014  (some  1600  items  in  2014  alone).  Most  were  leather  and  reptile  skin 
products from snakes, crocodiles and lizards; 

live birds and eggs, with a total of over 500 specimens seized between 2011 and 2014; 
most  were  parrots  smuggled  from  Africa  or  Latin  America  to  Europe  via  transit 
countries,  which  attract  very  high  prices  on  the  black  market,  or  birds  of  prey  (see 
recent case studies 1 and 2 on large-scale cross-border smuggling of rare exotic birds 
into the EU in the annex to this document); 

-   mammal bodies, parts and derivatives (skins in particular), including bears, wolves, big 

cats and bush meat; 

-  

live  plants,  mainly  orchids,  cacti,  euphorbias  and  cycads,  with  around  78,000  seized 
between 2011 and 2014 (some 20,000 in 2014 alone).  

Other  commodities  frequently  imported  illegally  into  the  EU  include  corals,  caviar,  timber 
products, dead birds and invertebrates (bodies, parts and derivatives). 

16 

 
Figure 2: Distribution across commodity groups of international seizure records of 
species mentioned in the Annexes to Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97, reported by 
EU countries, 2014. Source: TRAFFIC50 

The  main  countries  of  origin  of  products  exported  illegally  to  the  EU  include  the  US, 
mainland China and Hong Kong, and Thailand. Algeria, Morocco, Switzerland, Tunisia and 
the United Arab Emirates have featured increasingly in recent years.  

Imports  into  the  EU  of  hunting  trophies,  particularly  from  lions  and  elephants,  have 
attracted  considerable  attention  recently.  EU  policy  on  ensuring  that  trophies  from  species 
listed in Annex B to Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97 are of legal and sustainable origin is 
set out in Box 3. 

Box 3 - Importing hunting trophies into the EU (linked to Action 9) 

The EU is a significant importer of hunting trophies from CITES-listed species from various countries 
worldwide.  

EU Member States reported that an average 2,027 hunting trophies from species listed in Annex B to 
Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  338/97  were  imported  annually  between  2004  and  2013.  This  figure 
represents 13% of Annex B trophies traded worldwide. The five main Annex B animals imported into 
the EU as hunting trophies were, in order, Hartmann's mountain zebra (Equus zebra hartmannae), the 
American  black  bear  (Ursus  americanus),  the  African  elephant  (Loxodonta  africana),  the  hippo 
(Hippopotamus amphibius) and the Chacma baboon (Papio ursinus).  

Trophy hunting, when well-managed, can be an important conservation tool, as it can generate profits 
which  can  be  invested  for  conservation  purposes  and  provide  livelihood  opportunities  for  rural 
communities. However, the sustainability (and ecological consequences) of offtake from populations 

50   TRAFFIC. (2015). Overview of Significant Seizures in the European Union, January to December 2014. Briefing 

prepared by TRAFFIC for the European Commission.  

17 

 
 
 
                                                            
subject to trophy hunting is sometimes  questionable. Concerns have therefore been  raised about the 
sustainability of trade in hunting trophies for some species listed in Annex B to Council Regulation 
(EC)  No  338/97,  especially  where  trophies  represent  a  large  share  of  the  overall  trade  affecting  the 
species from the exporting country concerned. Under previous EU rules, EU scientific authorities did 
not scrutinise imports of Annex B hunting trophies into the EU to ensure that they were not adversely 
affecting the conservation status of the species. The legality of importing white rhino hunting trophies 
from South Africa was also questionable (see case study 4, Annex).  

In 2013 and 2014, the EU conducted (i) a comprehensive assessment of its regulations on importing 
Annex B hunting trophies to ensure that the sustainability of imports of hunting trophies into the EU 
is  adequately  monitored  and  checked  and  (ii)  a  review  of  the  sustainability  of  such  imports  for 
selected species51. 

On the basis of these data and analysis, a wide-reaching consultation with stakeholders and  non-EU 
countries, and consultation with Member States, the Commission changed the EU rules on importing 
hunting  trophies  for  six  species  and  subspecies  in  2015.  Member  States  now  have  to  issue  import 
permits before these species can be imported. The species concerned are the African lion (Panthera 
leo), the polar bear (Ursus maritimus), the African elephant (Loxodonta africana), the Southern white 
rhinoceros (Ceratotherium simum simum), the hippo (Hippopotamus amphibius) and the argali sheep 
(Ovis ammon).  

The importing country issues an import permit only if its CITES scientific authority issues a positive 
opinion  on  the  basis  of  an  EU-level  assessment  that  importing  such  trophies  is  sustainable.  The 
Scientific Review Group makes this assessment on the basis of clear criteria and information provided 
by  the  exporting  countries  and  independent  scientific  sources,  such  as  analyses  by  United  Nations 
Environment Programme –World Conservation Monitoring Centre (UNEP-WCMC) and International 
Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN).  

The  EU  keeps  a  regular  dialogue  with  numerous  non-EU  countries,  seeking  to  improve  the 
sustainability  of  hunting  resulting  in  trophies.  In  cases  where  guarantees  of  sustainability cannot  be 
provided,  the  EU  Scientific  Review  Group  issues  a  negative  opinion  on  importing  trophies  for  the 
species  concerned,  and  no  import  into  the  EU  is  allowed.  This  is  currently  the  case  for  a  limited 
number  of  combinations  of  species  and  countries,  typically  involving  high-profile  species  such  as 
lions  (Panthera  leo),  grey wolves  (Canis  lupus), hippoes  (Hippopotamus  amphibious),  brown  bears 
(Ursus  arctos),  polar  bears  (Ursus  maritimus)  and  African  elephants  (Loxodonta  africana)  (See 
Table 1).  

51   See: 

- UNEP-WCMC. 2013. Assessing potential impacts of trade in trophies imported for hunting purposes to the EU-27 on 
conservation status of Annex B species. UNEP-WCMC, Cambridge 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/cites/pdf/reports/SRG65_Part1.pdf   
- UNEP-WCMC. 2013. Assessing potential impacts of trade in trophies imported for hunting purposes to the EU-27 on 
conservation status of Annex B species. Part 2: Discussion and case studies. UNEP-WCMC, Cambridge 
(http://ec.europa.eu/environment/cites/pdf/reports/SRG%2065_7%20Hunting%20trophies%20report_2.pdf) 
- UNEP-WCMC. 2014. Review trophy hunting in selected species. UNEP-WCMC, Cambridge. 
(http://ec.europa.eu/environment/cites/pdf/reports/SRG%2068_6%20Review%20of%20trophy%20hunting%20in%20sel
ected%20species%20_public_.pdf  

18 

 
                                                            
Table 1. Species included in Annex A and Annex B to Regulation (EC) No 338/97 for 
which the introduction of hunting trophies into the EU is prohibited 

EU as a transit region  

The EU is, in addition to an end market for illegal wildlife products, also a region through 
which significant volumes of some of these products transit, particularly between Africa 
and Asia.  

Illegal  wildlife  products  are  moved  through the EU  via  its  ports, airports  and, increasingly, 
mail  centres.  They  include  ivory,  rhino  horns,  pangolin  scales  and  dead  seahorses  (see 
Box 4). 

Box 4 - Some significant recent seizures of illegal wildlife products in transit through the EU  

 

In  2012,  the  Belgian  authorities  intercepted  60  kg  of  ivory  being  exported  from  Belgium  to 
Vietnam. Concealed in wooden clocks, it was detected when a shipment of personal effects was 
x-rayed. A subsequent search of the sender's premises revealed a further 100 kg (approx.) of ivory 
in another shipment of antique clocks which had already been prepared for export to Vietnam. 

  A  total  of  16  000  dead  seahorses  (Hippocampus  spp.,  Appendix  II  to  CITES/Annex  B  to 
Regulation  (EC)  No  338/97)  were  seized  from  postal  parcels  at  airports  in  Germany  in  transit 
from Peru to Hong Kong in May 2013. 

 

In  March  2014,  a  total  of  152  ivory  carvings  from  Kenya  and  Nigeria  were  seized  from  postal 
parcels in Germany destined for Hong Kong. 

  Between January and July 2014, ivory was seized on five occasions (three at Prague Airport, two 
at Frankfurt Airport) from Vietnamese nationals living in the Czech Republic and travelling from 
the Czech Republic to Vietnam. The total weight of ivory involved was 183.3 kg. 

19 

 
 
 
 

 

 

In  July  2014,  250  kg  of  pangolin  scales  (Manis  spp.,  Appendix  II  to  CITES/Annex  B  to 
Regulation (EC) No 338/97) detected in air freight were seized in France in transit from Nigeria 
to Laos. 

In November 2014, about 30 kg of rhino horns were seized in a UK airport after being detected in 
air freight travelling from Nigeria to China. 

In  May  2015,  the  French  customs  authorities  at  Roissy  Airport  seized  37  pieces  of  raw  ivory 
(totalling 135.6 kg), intended for shipment to Vietnam. 

Between 2011 and 2014, Member States reported seizures of around 4500 ivory items (tusks, 
carvings, pieces of ivory, etc.) reported as specimens and an additional 780 kg (approx.) as 
reported by weight. Most was in transit from various African countries to Asia, particularly 
China, Hong Kong SAR and Vietnam. 

So far, the most prominent case of organised criminals using EU countries as transit points 
for  wildlife  products  is  that  of  the  'rhino  pseudo-hunters'.  This  network  hired  'pseudo-
hunters'  bringing  back  rhinoceros  trophies  from  South  Africa  to  the  Czech  Republic  and 
Slovakia. The horns were subsequently smuggled out of the EU to Vietnam (see case study 4 
in the annex to this document).  

EU as a source or export region 

The EU is also a source or export region for wildlife products exported illegally to non-EU 
countries.  This  facet  of  the  problem  is  often  underestimated,  particularly  by  enforcement 
agencies, which tend to focus instead on checking goods imported into the EU or in transit 
through it. 

One of the most serious problems the EU currently faces as a source region for illegal export 
of wildlife is the large-scale smuggling of European eels (Anguilla anguilla).  

A. anguilla is  classed as 'critically endangered' on the IUCN Red List, and indicators  show 
that  its  population  has  fallen  by  90%  since  the  1960s/70s52.  To  enable  the  eel  stock  to 
recover, the EU has adopted a specific Regulation53. The species is also included in Appendix 
II to CITES and Annex B to Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97 (see section 3.2). Given the 
poor situation of the stock, commercial trade in all commodities of  A. anguilla to and from 
the EU was banned in December 2010 under Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97.  

Since the CITES listing of A. anguilla came into force in March 2009 - and in particular since 
December 2010 - TRAFFIC has regularly analysed CITES data, customs data and East Asian 
eel farming data, seizures and information from traders, to monitor the trade situation for the 
European  Commission.  The  data  and  information  collated  suggest  that  7  -  20  tonnes  of 
juvenile A. anguilla (also called glass eels or live eel fry) were exported illegally to East Asia 
each year between 2012 and 2015 so that they could grow to maturity on farms in mainland 

52   Jacoby, D. and Gollock, M. 2014. Anguilla anguilla. The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species 2014: 

e.T60344A45833138. http://dx.doi.org/10.2305/IUCN.UK.2014-1.RLTS.T60344A45833138.en. Downloaded on 26 
January 2016. 

53   COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1100/2007 of 18 September 2007 establishing measures for the recovery of the 

stock of European eel 

20 

 
                                                            
China. According to the same sources, A. anguilla glass eels have sold at EUR 1200-1500/kg 
in East Asia in recent years54. 

Seizure information55 reveals an illegal trade in A. anguilla glass eels on a commercial scale 
through air freight (glass eels are either hidden in shipments of other fishery products or mis-
labelled),  and,  increasingly,  through  smuggling  smaller  quantities  in  personal  luggage.  For 
example,  in  February  2014  Portuguese  authorities  seized  two  live  glass  eel  shipments 
totalling 272 kg (estimated at a value of up to EUR 400,000 in China)56. These were hidden 
among other goods, in air freight in transit to mainland China. In January 2015, the Bulgarian 
authorities  seized  37  kg  of  glass  eels  at  Sofia  Airport  from  the  luggage  of  two  Chinese 
citizens arriving from Spain and on their way to mainland China. One month later, the French 
authorities seized air freight containing 120 kg of glass eels reportedly originating in the UK 
and bound for Hong Kong. 

The illegal trade in glass eels involves direct movement from the main EU source countries 
(France,  Spain,  the  UK  and  Portugal)  to  East  Asia  (particularly  Hong  Kong  and  mainland 
China),  but  many  other  EU  Member  States  and  neighbouring  countries  have  been,  or  are 
believed  to be,  used  as  transit  countries.  They include  Bulgaria,  Greece,  Hungary, Albania, 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Morocco and Russia. In 2011-2012, 
a Spanish operation led to total seizures of 1500 kg of glass eels valued at over EUR 1.6m 
and  the  arrest  of  14  people.  The  international  smuggling  network  involved  nationals  from 
and/or illegal activities in Belgium, Bulgaria, Portugal, Romania and Spain. 

Ivory  items  originating  in  the  EU  also  feature  among  the  items  illegally  exported  to  Asia. 
Under  EU  law,  re-export  from  the  EU  may  be  authorised  for  antique  ivory  ('worked' 
specimens  acquired  before  3  March  1947)  and  pre-Convention  ivory  (defined  as  'raw'  or 
'worked' specimens acquired before the date on which CITES became applicable to them, i.e. 
26 February 1976 for African elephants and 1 July 1975 for Asian elephants). The growing 
Asian demand for ivory has boosted both the legal and the illegal export of ivory items from 
the EU. Most were imported into the EU well before international trade in ivory began to be 
regulated through the CITES Convention ('pre-Convention items'). 

In  2014  the  European  Commission  commissioned  a  report  by  TRAFFIC  on  this  issue57. 
Together with trade date compiled subsequently, it serves as a basis for the findings set out 
here. 

Although  it is  difficult to  ascertain the  exact  scale  of  the  illegal  trade in  old  ivory items,  it 
seems  to  have  expanded  in  recent  years.  As  stated  in  TRAFFIC's  report,  there  are  cases  of 
Chinese  buyers  purchasing  antique  ivory  items  legally  in  the  EU  with  the  intention  of  then 
illegally exporting them to China with the aim of selling them. For example, in January 2013 
two  men  were  arrested  at  Shanghai  airport  for  attempting  to  smuggle  37  ivory  items 
reportedly  purchased  at  auction  houses,  antique  fairs  and  shops  from  France  to  China. 

54   Shiraishi, H. and Crook, V. (2015). Eel market dynamics: an analysis of Anguilla production, trade and consumption in 
East Asia. TRAFFIC. Tokyo, JAPAN., and various articles in Nihon Yoshoku Shimbun, Japanese aquaculture industry 
newspaper 

55   Provided to the European Commission by EU Member State Authorities 
56   Seizure reports from Portuguese Authorities  
57   Mundy, V. (2014). The Re-export of pre-Convention/antique ivory from the European Union. Report prepared for the 
European Commission, available under http://ec.europa.eu/environment/cites/pdf/Ivory%20report_Nov%202014.pdf  

21 

 
                                                            
Furthermore,  in  June  2013  a  Chinese  antique  dealer  was  sentenced  to  seven  years 
imprisonment for attempting to smuggle 14 ivory figurines purchased in Paris58.  

In  addition  to  illegal  export,  legal  exports  of  'pre-Convention'  ivory  items  have  risen 
considerably  since  2007,  with  the  highest  numbers  recorded  in  2014.  According  to  CITES 
trade  data  for  2003-2014,  legal  commercial  re-exports  of  pre-Convention  ivory  have  risen 
gradually since 2007. Re-exports from the EU of both worked ivory (carvings) and raw ivory 
(tusks,  ivory  pieces  and  ivory  scraps)  have  increased,  with  re-exports  of  tusks  rising 
particularly fast after 2007 (see Figure 3). Between 2003 and 2014, 92% of EU re-exports of 
pre-Convention  ivory  tusks  (for  commercial  purposes)  were  imported  by  China  or  Hong 
Kong. Over this period, 2.8 tonnes of raw ivory (ivory pieces, tusks) were re-exported, 99% 
from  2007  on.  In  addition,  4.1  tonnes  of  worked  ivory  (carvings)  were  re-exported,  87% 
between 2011 and 2014. Moreover, between EU countries reported that 3-6.5 tonnes of whole 
tusks  were  re-exported  between  2008  and  2014.  Re-exports  of  raw  ivory  grew  during  this 
period.59 

Figure  3:  Re-export of pre-Convention raw  ivory (tusks)  from  the  EU for commercial 
purposes, 2003-2014 

350

300

250

s
k
s
u
t

f
o

.

o
N

200

150

100

50

0

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

s
d
r
o
c
e
r

f
o

.

o
N

Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Min. no. of
tusks (reported in kg)

Max. no.
of tusks (reported in kg)

No. of records

Source: CITES Trade Database (Dec 2015) 
Abbreviations: Imp – Importer-reported quantities, Exp – Exporter-reported quantities 
Notes: Importer data from non-EU Member States are not available for 2014 at the time of writing. For the number of 
records, data reported by the exporters were used. Records reported as kg were also included to represent the total minimum 
and maximum number of tusks that may have been re- exported by EU countries in 2014. Ivory reported in kg was converted 
into tusks on the basis of a range of 3.5 kg – 7.5 kg per tusk (T. Milliken, TRAFFIC, pers. comm., 16.8.14). In 2014 a large 
share of the trade was reported in kg.  

58   Mundy, V. (2014). The Re-export of pre-Convention/antique ivory from the European Union. Report prepared for the 
European Commission, available under http://ec.europa.eu/environment/cites/pdf/Ivory%20report_Nov%202014.pdf 

59   This accounts for the re-export of tusks recorded as 'tusks' (and not kgs) by EU Member States, and for which an 

estimate of the overall weight can be made using a conversion factor whereby the average weight of a tusk ranges from 
3.5 to 7.5 kg 

22 

 
 
                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
The  main  reason  for  the  rising  exports  referred  to  above  is  the  commercial  activities  of 
companies specialised in collecting old ivory items in the EU to export them to Asia. While 
such transactions are legal under the current rules, the increasing volume of ivory shipped to 
Asia  has  led  to  concerns  that  it  could  fuel  a  demand  for  ivory  which  in  turn  could  drive 
elephant  poaching  in  source  countries.  Another  challenge  is  that  although  applicants  for 
export  or  re-export  permits  must  prove  the  legal  origin  of  the  items  and  EU  countries 
scrutinise  such  applications  carefully,  it  is  often  difficult  to  distinguish  pre-Convention  or 
worked  specimens  (which  can  be  legally  re-exported  from  the  EU)  from  other  ivory  items 
(for  which  such  export  is  banned).  Some  EU  Member  States  (the  Czech  Republic,  France, 
Germany,  the  Netherlands,  Slovakia,  Sweden  and  the  UK  )  have  decided  against  issuing 
certificates  for  the  re-export  of  raw  ivory  items  and  have  called  on  the  Commission  to 
promote  a  similar  approach  across  the  EU,  as  has  been  done  for  rhinoceros  horns60  (see 
related action 2).  

Data  on the estimated  average  price per kg of ivory tusks between 2012 and 2014 must be 
viewed  with  caution,  as  these  figures  are  based  on  specific  price  information  provided  by 
only two Member States (Austria and France) to the Commission, and it is not always clear 
which stage of the value chain these values represent61.  

Using  these  estimates,  the  total  value  of  ivory  tusks  re-exported  from  the  EU  was 
estimated at: 

 

 

 

approx. EUR 205,000 in 2012 (based on Austria’s 2012 average price of EUR 438 per 
kg)  

approx. EUR 707,000 in 2013 (based on Austria’s 2013 average price of EUR 405 per 
kg).  

approx.  EUR  814,000  in  2014  (based  on  an  average  of  Austria's  and  France’s 
approximate prices for raw ivory per kg in 2014, EUR 512 and EUR 525 respectively). 

That  figure  represents  only  the  value  of  re-exported  tusks.  To  obtain  a  comprehensive 
overview of the value of all legal exports of ivory from the EU, the value of the other ivory 
items  exported  should  be  added.  However,  due  to  lack  of  available  data,  this  could  not  be 
done for the present document.   

Finally, there are serious concerns about the illegal killing and related trade in bird species 
in the EU.  

Although the Birds Directive is over 35  years old, illegal activities such as illegally killing, 
trapping or trading in birds persist. They are instrumental in preventing the objectives of this 
Directive  and  the  Target  162  of  the  Biodiversity  Strategy  of  the  EU63  from  being  achieved. 
While  illegal  killing  of birds is  not  the  most  significant  threat to  birds overall, it  can  badly 

60   http://ec.europa.eu/environment/cites/pdf/guidance_rhino_horns.pdf  
61   According to Austrian figures, the average price per kg of ivory in 2012 was roughly EUR 438. This fell somewhat in 

2013 to about EUR 405, but in 2014 it rose again to about EUR 512 per kg. Figures provided by France give the average 
price per kg in 2014 as EUR 525.  

62   The first target of the EU Biodiversity Strategy is about Conserving and Restoring Nature. 
63   See the European Union Biodiversity Strategy to 2020 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-

content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0244&from=EN 

23 

 
                                                            
affect  bird  populations  in  specific  cases  (specific  species  or  regions)  and  the  Commission 
regularly receives complaints about the illegal killing, trapping or trading of birds in the EU 
(e.g. poisoning of birds of prey in Hungary64 , the illegal trapping of passerines in Cyprus65 
and  consumption  in  restaurants,  with  trapped  birds  being  served  as  delicacies  in  Italy66  67). 
Authorities have also uncovered instances where eggs are illegally imported or collected on a 
large  scale,  for  instance  in  Belgium68  and  Finland69.  While  comprehensive  quantitative 
information  on 
impact  on  specific  species  or  populations,  and  on  which 
countries/locations  may  be  most  at  risk  is  still  lacking,  such  information  does  exist  on 
specific  practices.  For  example,  Birdlife  has  recently  provided  a  first  analysis70  of  the 
magnitude of the illegal killing of birds in the Pan-Mediterranean region. It estimates that 11-
36 million birds may be illegally killed/taken per year, with some of these ending up in illegal 
trade.  

the 

.A  report  produced  for  the  Commission  in  2011  gave  an  overview  of  illegal  practices 
regarding  the  killing  and  trapping  of  and  the  trade  in  birds  within  the  EU,  as  reported  by 
Member  States71.  Some  practices  are  still  widespread  throughout  the  EU,  while  others  are 
reported in a few Member States only.  

1.3.2  Drivers/facilitators of wildlife trafficking in the EU: sustained demand and 

insufficient awareness (linked to Actions 1, 6, 7) 

The  EU  is  an  important  market  for  illegal  wildlife  products,  mainly  because  of  EU 
consumers' sustained demand for a variety of wildlife products.  

Demand for rare live birds and reptiles in the EU seems to play a particularly significant role 
in  driving  illegal  imports.  Their  high  prices  generate  significant  profits  and  attract  criminal 
networks.  The  illegal trade  in  exotic  pets,  especially in  live  reptiles,  has  received increased 
attention,  with  the  EU  appearing  as  an  important  consumer  region  and  thus  driver  of  this 
trade72.  This  includes  species  which,  though  not  covered  by  the  CITES  Convention,  are 
protected nationally. Exporting them thus breaks the law of their country of origin. But in the 
absence  of  an  appropriate  legal  basis  through  a  CITES  listing,  EU  Member  States  are  not 
always  able  to  seize  these  species  once  they  are  on  the  EU  market73.  In  addition,  in  many 
cases  tourists  bring  back  parts  of  CITES-listed  species,  or  products  derived  from  them, 
without  the  necessary  export  or  import  permits.  Low  consumer  awareness  of  the  rules 
governing the wildlife trade and of the seriousness of the issue also facilitates the illegal trade 
in wildlife products. 

This lack of awareness is prevalent amongst many different groups of stakeholders.  

64   http://ec.europa.eu/environment/life/project/Projects/index.cfm?fuseaction=search.dspPage&n_proj_id=4043 
65   http://www.birdlife.org/sites/default/files/attachments/01-28_low.pdf (page 15) 
66   http://www.birdlife.org/sites/default/files/attachments/01-28_low.pdf (page 9) 
67   http://www.komitee.de/en/actions-and-projects/species-protection/wild-bird-trade/hungary-dead-song-birds-seized  
68   https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/news/sundry/2014/COURT%20OF%20FIRST%20INSTANCE%20EAST%20FLANDERS%20PRESS%20RELEASE%2027%20June%202014.pdf  
69   http://www.hs.fi/kotimaa/a1424416509297  
70   http://www.birdlife.org/illegal-killing  
71   BIO Intelligence, Stocktaking of the main problems and review of national enforcement mechanisms for tackling illegal 

killing, trapping and trade of birds in the EU  

72   ENDCAP (2012) Wild Pets in the European Union, available at http://endcap.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Report-

Wild-Pets-in-the-European-Union.pdf.  

73   Altherr, S (2014): Stolen Wildlife – Why the EU needs to tackle smuggling of nationally protected species. Report by Pro 

Wildlife, Munich, Germany, pp. 29. 

24 

 
                                                            
While  environment  ministries  often  rightly  identify  wildlife  trafficking  as  a  major  factor  in 
biodiversity  loss,  policymakers  generally  lack  awareness  of  its  adverse  impact  on  the 
economy  and  the  rule  of  law,  and  of  its  links  with  organised  crime  and  national  security. 
Respondents participating in the stakeholder consultation which the Commission launched in 
February  201474  generally  rated  the  EU  regulatory  framework  as  adequate  in  terms  of 
tackling  the  illegal  trade  in  wildlife  products  from,  to  and  through  the  EU.  However,  most 
identified  its  patchy,  inadequate  implementation  and  enforcement  as  one  of  the  main 
shortcomings  in  existing  EU  policy  to  combat  wildlife  trafficking.  Accordingly,  the  main 
purpose  of  an  EU  Action  Plan  was  seen  as  demonstrating  political  commitment  to  tackling 
the problem.  

Another  aspect  of  this  low  awareness  is  the  relatively  limited  involvement  of  the  business 
sector  so  far  in  combating  wildlife  trafficking.  The  main  private  sector  players  affected  by 
wildlife  trafficking  include  those  trading  legally  in  wildlife  products  (e.g.  importers, 
exporters,  breeders,  the  pet  industry,  the  luxury  industry  using  reptile  skins  or  caviar,  the 
timber  industry,  auction  houses,  antique  shops,  hunters  and  zoos),  the  tourism  sector,  and 
those  involuntarily  facilitating  the  illegal  wildlife  trade  (e.g.  transport  companies,  online 
platforms,  courier  companies).  Responses  to  the  Commission  stakeholder  consultation 
stressed  the  importance  of  reaching  out  to  the  private  sector  active  in  wildlife  harvesting, 
trading and processing.  

In a few areas, the business sector has taken steps to develop a proactive corporate policy to 
promote  a  legal,  sustainable  trade  in  wildlife.  The  timber  industry,  for  instance,  has 
developed certification schemes for legal timber. Another example is the policy agreed by the 
European  Association  for  Zoos  and  Aquariums  (EAZA),  which  represents  377  zoos  and 
aquaria  in  43  countries throughout  Europe  and  the  Middle  East.  The  benefits  of  EAZA 
membership  include  the  opportunities  it  provides  to  acquire  animals  from  other  members; 
technical  support;  comparison  of  marketing  opportunities  between  members;  increased 
training  opportunities  for  members;  and  improved  networking  opportunities.  In  exchange, 
EAZA  members must  meet stringent requirements  including ‘compliance with  national and 
international legislation regarding animal and plant acquisition, possession and transport’. All 
organisations must be screened before they can be accredited as EAZA members - which can 
take over a year - and they can be suspended if they break any of the rules.  

Some  EU  Member  States  have  also  been  active  in  engaging  with  relevant  business  sectors. 
For  example,  in  2011  and  2012  Finland  sent  specific  written  guidance  to  non-commercial 
tortoise  breeders,  caviar  producing  and  packing  plants,  hunters,  and  guitar  makers.  Since 
2011  Belgium’s  CITES  Management  Authority  has  issued  detailed  information  on  CITES 
regulations  to  antique  dealers,  auction  houses,  taxidermists,  tropical  timber  importers,  and 
keepers/breeders  of  birds  of  prey,  parrots  and  tortoises.  It  has  also  held  discussions  with 
charity  shops  to  establish  guidelines  on  CITES  products  that  may  be  donated.  In  2013,  the 
German Bundesamt für Naturschutz (BfN) handed out leaflets at the Vintage Guitar Show to 
inform  musicians,  wholesalers,  luthiers  and  wood  trading  operations  about  the  legal 
requirements covering CITES-protected wood types.  

74   This and all further references to the Commission's 2014 stakeholder consultation refer to COM (2014) 64 launching a 

consultation on the EU approach against wildlife trafficking. The results are summarized in SWD (2014) 347.  

25 

 
                                                            
The  UN  World  Tourism  Organisation  recently  highlighted  the  potential  for  engaging  the 
tourism  sector  (especially  tour  operators  from  Europe  and  Africa)  in  efforts  to  combat 
wildlife trafficking75. 

A study commissioned by the Commission in 2015 on input and ideas for further developing 
cooperation  with  relevant  business  sectors  to  prevent  wildlife  trafficking  in  the  EU  found 
that,  apart  from  the  reptile  skin  industry  associated  with  the  luxury  sector,  there  are  only  a 
few  business-led  initiatives  or  public-private  partnerships  in  that  field  in  the  EU  (see 
Box 5)76.   

Box 5: Main findings of the study 'Strengthening cooperation with business sectors against 
illegal trade in wildlife', conducted by Ricardo AEA and TRAFFIC for the European 
Commission 

The study focused on: 

•  sectors involved in importing wildlife products into the EU (i.e. luxury industry; pet sector; and 

traditional Chinese medicine – TCM); 

•  sectors facilitating trade in the EU (transport, courier and online trading). 

In relation to each of these sectors, this study found that: 

•  The  luxury  industry  has  a  relatively  small  number  of  companies  dealing  in  exotic  skins.  Several 
luxury brands are owned by larger firms that also own tanneries and farms for breeding animals in 
captivity.  In  2012,  the  volume  and  value  of  skin  imports  were  the  second  highest  among  all 
CITES-listed  wildlife  commodity  imports  (excluding  caviar  extract).  The  value  of  this  trade 
exceeded an estimated EUR 167m in 2012, with reptiles representing most of the estimated value 
(92%).  

  However, less is known about private sector engagement as regards other luxury products, such as 
furs,  shahtoosh,  ivory  and  caviar.  The  luxury  industry  has  a  high  level  of  commitment  to 
preventing trafficking in the reptile skins it uses and has established several ongoing initiatives to 
address potential issues. The Python Conservation Partnership is a good example of a business-led 
initiative  to  ensure  the  legal  and  sustainable  sourcing  of  python  skins,  which  is  embedded  in  a 
wider corporate social responsibility policy of ensuring sustainability. 

•  Business  engagement  in  the  wildlife-pet  sector  appears  low,  even  though  the  EU  is  among  the 
world's largest importers of live reptiles. The pet sector has been strongly criticised in connection 
with animal welfare, so much of its action has focused on this issue. Given this focus, there seems 
to  be  relatively  little  awareness  that  wildlife  trafficking  is  a  serious  problem  and  that  the  sector 
could do a great deal to tackle it. However, there are signs that it may be possible to promote more 
active engagement, which may create opportunities for addressing traceability issues. 

• 

It  is  not  easy  to  assess  business  engagement  in  tackling  wildlife  trafficking  in  the  Traditional 
Chinese  Medicine  (TCM)  sector.  This  project  contacted  eight  major  EU  TCM  associations  and 
federations, hoping to enquire about their efforts - or those of their members – in tackling illegal 
wildlife trafficking. The two replies received stated that illegal wildlife products were not relevant 
to their operations.  

  The  UK  "Operation  Charm"  (OC)  includes  an  apparently  rare  example  of  business  sector 
engagement by TCM associations and companies. It is clear from Operation Charm, and evidence 
from the TCM sector in general, that anti-wildlife trafficking efforts in the sector have focused on 

75   Towards measuring the Economic Value of Wildlife Watching Tourism in Africa – Briefing Paper, UNWTO, Madrid. 

2015 

76   Smithers, R., Osborn, T., Whiteley, G., Kecse-Nagy, K., Goba, V (2015). Strengthening Cooperation with Business 

Sectors against Illegal Trade in Wildlife. Report for the European Commission.  

26 

 
                                                            
awareness raising. Although research has attempted to find EU-wide business efforts related to the 
sector, little is known about whether or not any efforts are currently being made elsewhere in the 
EU,  particularly  as  regards  to  ongoing  efforts.  Various  EU-based  manufacturers  of  herbal 
products,  particularly  in  the  UK,  are  using  the  FairWild  certification  scheme  to  source  selected 
wild plant ingredients. 

•  Transport companies have done little to tackle wildlife trafficking, although recently efforts have 
been renewed as regards air transport, globally at least77. More targeted efforts to address wildlife 
trafficking generally focus on discussing and identifying possible action. They are still at an early 
stage, and concrete measures have yet to be planned. Wildlife trafficking is, in general, a relatively 
new  issue  for  the  transport  sector.  EU-based  airlines  have  paid  little  attention  to  the  issue,  so 
existing  anti-wildlife-trafficking  measures  still  have  many  shortcomings.  Several  airlines  have 
individually banned certain wildlife products on their aircraft. 

•  Many couriers maintain their own cargo operations, so there is a clear overlap with the activities 
of  transport  companies.  Until  very  recently,  courier  companies  have  made  very  little  effort  to 
tackle wildlife trafficking. Globally, several NGOs have stepped up their efforts to raise awareness 
of  wildlife  trade  issues  among  courier  companies  and  attempted  to  define  measures  they  can 
implement. To date, however, EU-based courier businesses have played a minimal role in tackling 
wildlife trafficking. 

•  Online trading has boomed over the last 20 years, but does not appear to have been matched by 
business  efforts  to  stop  the  trade  in  illegal  wildlife  products.  Online  trading  companies’  existing 
wildlife trade policies vary widely, from simply displaying a short statement to providing links to 
national  legislation,  while  others,  such  as  eBay,  have  more  comprehensive  policies.  However, 
customer access to relevant wildlife policies often requires considerable effort. This could be made 
easier through existing online systems.  

  Many businesses that do have clear wildlife trade policies appear to do relatively little to enforce 
them.  The  listings  of  many  wildlife  products  clearly  breach  company  policy.  Capacity  issues 
related  to  enforcement  of  wildlife  policy,  including  an  ability  to  identify  coded  descriptions  of 
wildlife products, and the identification of such products, clearly limit the enforcement of business 
policy.  Businesses  do  not  appear  to  pass  cases  on  to  law  enforcement  agencies,  though  they  do 
take action and provide relevant information if they receive a direct request from these agencies. 

2.  The impact of wildlife trafficking 

2.1   Impact on biodiversity 

Wildlife  trafficking,  along  with  habitat  loss,  climate  change  and  the  spread  of  invasive 
species, ranks among the most serious threats to biodiversity worldwide.  

UNEP has comprehensively analysed the environmental impact of the illegal trade in wildlife 
and  wildlife  products.  The  report,  prepared  in  implementation  of  a  2014  resolution  by  the 
United  Nations  Environmental  Assembly  (UNEA),  will  be  considered  by  governments  at 
UNEA's second session in May 2016.  

Primarily, wildlife trafficking has a direct impact on target species. These species are often 
already threatened and wildlife trafficking represents an additional stress which contributes to 
their  overexploitation.  An  illegal  and  unsustainable  offtake  reduces  population  to  such  an 
extent  that  the  species'  long-term  survival  may  be  jeopardised.  In  the  most  extreme  cases, 
such  pressures  can  lead  to  the  extinction  of  the  target  species  (as  with  the  Western  Black 

77   See e.g. http://airlines.iata.org/analysis/fighting-the-illegal-wildlife-trade  

27 

 
                                                            
rhinoceros, for example, declared extinct in 2011, with poaching listed as the primary cause). 
For  more  information  on  the  impact  of  wildlife  trafficking  on  target  species,  see  point  1.1. 
above.  

Wildlife trafficking can be very harmful to target and non-target species alike (for example 
when illegal logging destroys flora and fauna habitats, depending on the forest environment 
concerned, or when non-selective fishing results in by-catches of other marine species).  

Beyond this direct impact, the loss of wild fauna and flora linked to wildlife trafficking can 
change  the  patterns  of  whole  ecosystems.  Such  loss  can  affect  their  balance,  undermining 
their  function  and  the  services  they  provide,  which  are  essential  for  the  survival  of  many 
other  wild  plants  and  animals.  For  example,  forest  elephants  are  key  seed  dispersers,  so  if 
numbers decline through poaching, forest regeneration is affected78. The illegal trade in live 
animals  and  plants  also  avoids  any  sanitary,  veterinary  and  health  controls  and  may  spread 
diseases and invasive species. This can have unexpected detrimental consequences for other 
species.  

The information already available indicates that the adverse impact of wildlife trafficking on 
biodiversity  calls  for  action  by  the  EU  to  implement  its  commitments  under  its  2020 
Biodiversity Strategy, especially target 6, which requires the EU to do more  to avert global 
biodiversity loss under the Convention on Biological Diversity and other programmes79.   

Wildlife trafficking is also a factor in biodiversity loss in the EU, along with other, greater 
threats,  such  as  land-use  change,  over-exploitation  of  biodiversity  and  its  components,  the 
spread  of  invasive  alien  species,  pollution  and  climate  change.  Wildlife  trafficking  has  a 
particularly serious impact in the EU on species that are already under considerable pressure, 
with  poaching  and  subsequent  trade  representing  a  further  stress.  This  applies  to  European 
birds and the European eel, for example (see point 1.3 above).  

2.2   Economic impact of wildlife trafficking 

Impact on legal trade  

Wildlife  trafficking  has  an  adverse  impact  on  operators  trading  legally  in  wildlife  or 
wildlife products in compliance with the relevant international, EU or national rules.  

The global wildlife trade was estimated at USD 323bn in 200980, including timber, fish (not 
from aquaculture), wild animals and plants.  

The EU is an important market for legal wildlife products, and  a major exporter (including 
timber, non-farmed fish, wild animals and plants). EU trade in wildlife products is estimated 
at about EUR 100bn81. 

78   Abernethy KA, Coad L, Taylor G, Lee ME, Maisels F. 2013. Extent and ecological consequences of hunting in Central 

African rainforests in the twenty-first century. Phil Trans R Soc B 368: 20130494.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2013.0494 

79   For the state of play as regards the implementation of the Biodiversity Strategy, see the mid-term review, COM (2015) 
478. The Council Conclusions on the report welcome the development of an EU Action Plan against wildlife trafficking 
(see: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/env/2015/12/16/) 

80   TRAFFIC. (2015). See: http://www.traffic.org/trade/ 

28 

 
                                                            
In  2013,  EU  countries  reported  about  95,000  import  transactions  and  200,000  export 
transactions of specimens of species covered by Council Regulation (EC) No 338/9782. For 
CITES-listed  animals  (excluding  caviar  extract),  the  value  of  EU  imports  in  2013  was 
estimated at EUR 582m, whereas the value of EU exports was estimated at more than twice 
that value (approximately EUR 1.4bn). The main traded commodities are live plants, leather 
products  (1.2  million  reptile  skins  were  imported),  live  animals  (one  million  animals  were 
imported and 133,000 live birds were exported in 2013), and caviar.  

Legal  and  illegal  wildlife  trade  sometimes  takes  place  in  parallel  to  one  another.  Operators 
trading  wildlife  products  in  the  EU  (e.g.  importers,  exporters,  breeders,  the  pet  industry, 
luxury  industries  using  reptile  skins  or  caviar,  the  timber  industry,  auction  houses,  antique 
shops,  hunters,  zoos)  face  unfair  competition  from  illegal  traders  in  wildlife  products  that 
avoid  supervision  or  checks,  sometimes  selling  at  much  lower  prices  than  on  the  official 
market.  Perhaps  more  importantly, the  behaviour  of  illegal  operators  all  too  often  tarnishes 
the  sector's  image,  to  the  detriment  of  legal  traders.  This  reputational  damage  may  deter 
potential customers.  

Impact on tourism and government revenue in source countries 

Wildlife trafficking also has a particularly strong impact on countries whose economy relies 
largely  on  nature-based  tourism,  where  wildlife  is  the  main  attraction and  consequently  a 
considerable  economic  asset.  The  destruction  of  wildlife  translates  directly  into  irreversible 
economic losses.  

Finding reliable up-to-date statistics on nature-based tourism is challenging. The limited data 
available are often contradictory. Most data on tourism's share of GDP draws no distinction 
between  general  tourism  (cultural  heritage,  business  tourism,  diaspora  tourism)  and  nature-
based tourism. However, the latter probably accounts for a significant proportion of tourism 
in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in southern and eastern Africa. In 2004, 50% of Africa’s 
nature tourists and 60% of the resultant revenue went to South Africa83. A further distinction 
should be drawn between wildlife-based tourism (visiting protected areas and conservancies, 
birding tours, etc.) and beach tourism.  

The  number  of  visitors  to  sub-Saharan  Africa  has  grown  over  300%  since  1990,  with  33.8 
million  tourists  visiting  the  region  in  2012.  In  2012,  revenue  from  tourism  exceeded 
US$ 36bn, directly contributing just over 2.8% to the region’s GDP. Five per cent of jobs in 
sub-Saharan Africa are in travel and tourism. 

Box 6: Tourism's share of GDP in selected African countries84: 

• 
• 
• 
• 

> 8%: Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Namibia.  
4-8%: Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Botswana, Madagascar 
2-3.9%: South Africa, Mozambique, Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Togo, Benin.  
1-1.9%: Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, Niger, Cameroon.  

81   Engler, M. and Parry-Jones, R. (2007). Opportunity or threat: The role of the European Union in global wildlife trade. 

TRAFFIC Europe, Brussels, Belgium. 

82   2013 data on EU trade in species included in Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97 from EU wildlife trade: Analysis of the 
European Union and candidate countries’ annual reports to CITES 2013. UNEP-WCMC, Cambridge, available under 
http://euanalysis2013.unep-wcmc.org/ 

83   Scholes RJ, Biggs R (2004) Ecosystem services in southern Africa: a regional perspective. Pretoria: Council for 

Scientific and Industrial Research. 

84   Tourism in Africa: Harnessing tourism for growth and improved livelihoods. The World Bank, 2013. 

29 

 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Iconic  species  such  as  the  mountain  gorilla  have  enormous  potential  for  contributing  to 
national  economies.  Rwanda  had  over  a  million  visitors  between  2006  and  2013,  with  its 
national parks alone generating USD 75m in tourism revenue. Eighty-five percent of this is 
from  trekkers  attracted  by  the  country's  mountain  gorillas.  In  Uganda,  a  single  family  of 
gorillas  can  generate  over  USD 500,000  annually  from  the  sale  of  gorilla  permits.  Bwindi 
National  Park  generates  USD 15m/year  from  gorilla  visits.  Additionally,  tourists  spend  a 
similar  amount  on  accommodation,  transport  and  other  services85.  Although  the  three 
countries  that  share  the  mountain  gorilla  population  (Democratic  Republic  of  Congo, 
Uganda, Rwanda) have been in conflict with each other for most of the past 30 years, they 
have consistently worked together to protect this economically important species. The gorilla 
population has risen steadily throughout this period. Without the economic benefits provided 
by gorilla tourism, the species would probably be on the brink of extinction by now.  

Some flagship protected areas generate very large revenues: in 2009, the Northern circuit at 
Serengeti-Ngorongoro received 300,000 tourists on the 300 km stretch between Arusha  and 
Serengeti86. The total inbound tourism expenditure generated at this destination is USD 500m 
per  year  -  over  half  of  Tanzania’s  foreign  exchange  earnings  from  tourism.  If  wildlife 
trafficking  continues  on  the  current  scale,  depleting  national  parks  of  iconic  species,  this 
revenue will shrink significantly. 

Finally, the non-payment or underestimation of tax and customs duties by illegal traders also 
deprives  governments  of  income.  Though  hard  to  quantify  such  losses  are  likely  to  be 
considerable, given the large volume and high value of smuggled wildlife commodities. This 
has  a  major  adverse  impact,  especially  in  developing  countries.  Finally,  paying  for  tougher 
law enforcement measures, such as more rangers and patrols, is an additional burden.  

2.3   Impact on governance and the rule of law 

Corruption and wildlife trafficking are closely linked, as section 1.2.3 shows. In many cases, 
it  is  corruption  that  enables  wildlife  trafficking  to  flourish.  Conversely,  wildlife  trafficking 
creates an environment conducive to corruption, which can undermine the proper functioning 
of state institutions.  

The  examples  below  illustrate  how  corruption  associated  with  wildlife  trafficking  can 
facilitate impunity and erode state institutions87:  

- 

- 

- 

Hunting groups evading national and international regulations thanks to the protection 
of local patrons; 

Bribery of public officials to avoid paying tax, duties, tariffs and other fees; 

Illegal payments to avoid investigations or prosecutions, or to obstruct justice; 

85   Towards measuring the Economic Value of Wildlife Watching Tourism in Africa – Briefing Paper, UNWTO, Madrid. 

2015. 

86   Mitchell, J., Keane, J. and Laidlaw, J. (2009) Making Success Work for the poor: Package tourism in Northern 

Tanzania. Overseas Development Institute, Arusha, Tanzania. 

87   Examples taken from "Wildlife crime and corruption", U4 Expert answer operated by Transparency International, 2013 

(available at http://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/367_Wildlife_Crimes_and_Corruption.pdf) and "the 
Wildlife and Forest Crime Analytic Toolkit", UNODC (2012) (available at 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/Wildlife/Toolkit_e.pdf ) 

30 

 
                                                            
- 

Illegal  payments  or  use  of  personal  relationships  to  obtain  favourable  sentences  in 
court. 

As a result, corruption undermines not only governments' best efforts to protect wildlife and 
regulate  trade  effectively,  but  also  the  institutions  responsible  for  implementation.  This 
obstructs the full development of transparent, ethical and effective government institutions. In 
some  cases,  huge  profits  from  wildlife  trafficking  help  maintain  or  increase  collusion 
between  organised  crime  networks  and  government  representatives  at  the  highest  level, 
weakening fragile institutions and the rule of law.   

2.4   Impact on national and regional security (linked to Action 32)  

The links between wildlife trafficking and security in some regions have received increasing 
attention in recent years, especially as regards the role of wildlife trafficking in financing the 
operations of armed militias and possibly terrorist networks.  

Rangers  are  on  the  front  line  in  the  fight  against  poaching and  the  first  victims  of  criminal 
wildlife gangs. An estimated 1000 rangers have been killed in anti-poaching operations over 
the last decade88.  

Despite  the  significant  knowledge  gap  as  regards  the  scale  of  links  between  poaching  and 
wildlife  trafficking  on  the  one  hand  and  the  funding  of  militias  and  terrorism  on  the  other, 
there  are  reports  confirming  the  existence  of  such  links  with  several  militia  groups. 
Politically, the  link  has been  acknowledged  at  the  highest level in  multilateral  and bilateral 
frameworks.  For  example,  the  United  States  consider  wildlife  trafficking  a  'threat  to  global 
security'89. The Commission in its recently proposed Action Plan for strengthening the fight 
against terrorist financing acknowledges the importance of tackling wildlife trafficking as a 
source of funding.90  

The  2015  G7  Summit  Declaration  set  out  a  commitment  by  the  heads  of  state  and 
government 'to combating wildlife trafficking, which is pushing some of the world’s species 
to  the  brink  of  extinction  and  in  some  instances  is  being  used  to  finance  organised  crime, 
insurgencies,  and  terrorism',  thus  acknowledging  –  once  more  -  the  impact  of  this  form  of 
trafficking  on  global  security.  Similarly,  UN  General  Assembly  Resolution  69/314  on 
tackling illicit trafficking in wildlife recognises that this form of trafficking threatens national 
stability in some cases.  

In  a  report  to  the  UN  Security  Council,  the  UN  Secretary-General  (UNSG),  Ban  Ki-moon, 
noted  that  'poaching  and  its  potential  linkages  to  other  criminal,  even  terrorist,  activities 
constitute  a  grave  menace  to  sustainable  peace  and  security  in  Central  Africa.'91  The  same 
report warns that 'illegal ivory trade may currently constitute an important source of funding 
for  armed  groups'  and  'poachers  are  using  more  and  more  sophisticated  and  powerful 

88   Nellemann, C., Henriksen, R., Raxter, P., Ash, N., Mrema, E. (Eds). (2014). The Environmental Crime Crisis – Threats 
to Sustainable Development from Illegal Exploitation and Trade in Wildlife and Forest Resources. A UNEP Rapid 
Response Assessment. United Nations Environment Programme and GRID-Arendal, Nairobi and Arendal 

89   US National Strategy for Combating Wildlife trafficking, 2014. 
90   COM (2016) 50.  
91   Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa and on the 

Lord’s Resistance Army-affected areas, 20 May 2013.  

31 

 
                                                            
weapons,  some  of  which,  it  is  believed,  might  be  originating  from  the  fallout  in  Libya.'92 
Successive UNSG reports on the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central 
Africa note increasing links between elephant poaching, weapons proliferation and regional 
insecurity. The  latest  report93  highlights  'the  growing  links between  the  illicit  wildlife  trade 
and armed groups in the sub-region, including the Lord’s Resistance Army'. 

The  Security  Council  addressed  the  link  between  instability  in  the  Democratic  Republic  of 
Congo and wildlife trafficking in the context of the sanctions applicable to those responsible 
for worsening the country's instability. Renewing the sanctions regime, the Security Council 
adopted Resolution 2198/2015, which targets individuals and entities supporting individuals 
or  entities,  including  armed  groups  that  are  involved  in  destabilising  activities  in  the 
Democratic  Republic  of  the  Congo  through  the  illicit  trade  in  natural  resources,  including 
gold, wildlife and wildlife products. The Resolution’s preamble recalled 'the linkage between 
the  illegal  exploitation  of  natural  resources,  including  poaching  and  illegal  trafficking  of 
wildlife, illicit trade in such resources, and the proliferation and trafficking of arms as one of 
the  major  factors  fuelling  and  exacerbating  conflicts  in  the  Great  Lakes  region  of  Africa'. 
Security Council Resolution 2196/2015 expresses concern that 'illicit trade, exploitation and 
smuggling  of  natural  resources  including  gold,  diamonds  and  wildlife  poaching  and 
trafficking continues to threaten the peace and stability of the Central African Republic'. 

In this context, it is significant that the initial mandates of the UN peacekeeping missions in 
the Central African Republic94 and Democratic Republic of Congo95 included supporting the 
authorities in preventing armed groups from exploiting and trading in natural resources. The 
renewed  mandates96  of  both  missions  maintain  the  link  between  instability  and  the  use  of 
natural resources by or for the benefit of armed groups. 

The  EU-UN  Strategic  Partnership  on  Peacekeeping  and  Crisis  Management:  Priorities  for 
2015-201897  also  advocates  stepping  up  cooperation  on  the  illegal  trade  in  wildlife  as  a 
priority  among  other  cross-cutting  issues  of  mutual  concern,  such  as  terrorism  and 
transnational organised crime, including trafficking in drugs and arms. 

At  a  recent  informal  meeting  of  the  UN  Security  Council  held  on  30  November  2015, 
concerning the impact of the illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons on poaching in 
Africa,  several  Member  States  and  stakeholders  acknowledged  the  link  between  illegal 
exploitation  and  the  trade  in  natural  resources  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  proliferation  and 
trafficking of arms on the other, as a major factor in fuelling conflict in African countries.98 

Exactly  how  much  ivory  trafficking  contributes  to  funding  militia  groups  remains  unclear. 
One report notes  that, given extremely high  levels of elephant poaching in  the Kivu region 
over  the  last  decade,  ivory  now  contributes  far  less  to  militia  funding  than  timber  and 

92   See also 'Kony's ivory: how elephant poaching in Congo helps support the Lord's Resistance Army', 2013. 
93   Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional 

Office for Central Africa, 30 November 2015 

94   MINUSCA – UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic (Res. 2149/2014) 
95   MONUSCO – United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Res. 

1925/2010) 

96   MONUSCO - UNSC Res. 2211 (2015); MINUSCA – UNSC Res. 2217 (2015) 
97   Council Doc. 7632/15 
98   See on the links also http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2015/eng/Small-Arms-Survey-2015-

Chapter-01-summary-EN.pdf 

32 

 
                                                            
charcoal99.  The  fact  that  the  Lord's  Resistance  Army  (LRA)  launches  attacks  near  national 
parks in the triangle formed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan and the Central 
African Republic seems to support reports by fighters in the Democratic Republic of Congo's 
Garamba National park of continued ivory trafficking by LRA leader Joseph Kony.100 

Beyond the Great Lakes region, the recently agreed EU Horn of Africa Regional Action Plan 
for 2015-2020101 acknowledges, in the context of 'regional security and stability', that the EU 
should  seek  to  do  more  to  help  its  partners  investigate,  detect  and  prosecute  wildlife 
trafficking more effectively.  

3.   Action at global and EU level  

3.1   Initiatives at global level (linked to action 33) 

Wildlife  trade  is  regulated  at  international  level  through  the  CITES  Convention,  a  major 
international agreement that has been in force since 1975, now has 182 parties (including all 
EU  Member  States  and  since  July  2015  the  EU  itself)  and  covers  35 000  animal  and  plant 
species.  The  main  added  value  of  the  Convention  is  global  protection  for  animal  and  plant 
species. The inclusion of a species in the CITES Appendices is often a very important step in 
raising  public  awareness  of  the  fact  that  it  is  or  might  become  endangered  because  of 
international  trade.  This  can  play  an  important  role  in  reducing  supply  and  demand  for  the 
species and keeping trade at sustainable levels. A CITES listing also creates an obligation for 
governments  to  control  trade  in  the  relevant  products  and  seize  them  if  they  are  traded  in 
contravention of CITES provisions.  

In  addition,  with  the  level  of  global  policy  concern  about  illicit  wildlife  trade  arguably 
stronger now than at any time since the Convention entered into force, there is a strong focus 
on  wildlife  trafficking  in  its  work.  This  translates  in  particular  through  the  adoption  by  the 
CITES  Conference  of  Parties  and  by  the  CITES  Standing  Committee  of  targeted 
recommendations  designed  to  address  specific  shortcomings  in  the  implementation  of  the 
CITES  Convention.  The  CITES  Standing  Committee  is  tasked  with  monitoring  how  these 
recommendations  are  followed  by  CITES  Parties  and  is  empowered  to  adopt  compliance 
measures, such as prohibition to trade in all CITES-listed products, in case of serious failure 
by a Party to comply with its obligations102.  

One key example is the establishing of national ivory action plans required of eight countries 
implicated in the global illegal ivory trade: China and Thailand (end-use markets), Malaysia, 
the Philippines and Vietnam (transit countries) and Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda (source and 
exit  points  in  Africa).  These  detailed,  time-bound  plans  aim  to  address  the  illegal  flow  of 
ivory along the trade chain. The CITES National Ivory Action Plan process also identified a 
number  of  countries  of  secondary  concern  and  importance  that  need  to  be  watched.  The 
process  has  become  a  valuable  and  practical  tool  that  is  being  used  by  the  parties  to  the 
Convention  to  strengthen  controls  on  trade  in  ivory  and  ivory  markets,  and  help  combat 
illegal  trade  in  ivory.  Each  plan  outlines  the  urgent  measures  that  a  CITES  party  commits 
itself to taking (including legislative, enforcement and public awareness-raising, as required), 

99   MONUSCO-UNEP, 'Experts’ background paper on illegal exploitation and trade in natural resources', 2015 
100  'Tusk Wars', Enough Project, 2015 
101  EU Council Conclusions on the EU Horn of Africa Regional Action Plan for 2015- 2020, Council Document 13363/15 
102  See the list of CITES Parties subject to a recommendation to suspend trade: 

https://cites.org/eng/resources/ref/suspend.php 

33 

 
                                                            
along  with  specific  timeframes  and  milestones  for  implementation.  Significantly,  countries 
are  accountable  for  ensuring  progress,  with  the  threat  of  CITES  trade  restrictions  for 
non-compliance. 

CITES decisions in 2013103 call on three of the countries at the centre of the rhino-poaching 
crisis  (Mozambique,  South  Africa  and  Vietnam)  to  take  firm  action  to  address the surge  in 
rhino-poaching and illegal trade. A key development is that countries will have to implement 
strategies  to  reduce  demand  for  rhino  horn.  The  recommendation  to  implement  a 
demand-reduction strategy for an endangered species was a first for CITES and indicative of 
the more sophisticated approaches it is exploring to stem the tide of illegal killing. 

In  2013,  CITES  also  approved  enhanced  protection  measures  for  tigers,  including  the 
gathering of information on incidents of poaching and illegal trade in all Asian big cats and 
analysing it at meetings of the CITES Standing Committee to ensure that CITES provisions 
on  illicit  tiger  trade  are  implemented  by  all  range  and  consumer  states104.  The  forthcoming 
17th  Conference  of  the  Parties  (CoP17)  in  September  2016  is  also  expected  to  focus  on 
pangolins.  

As ever, the real test of the positive action taken by CITES will be whether the governments 
concerned take effective action on the ground – and whether they are held to account if they 
fail  to  do  so.  The  international  community  has  a  vital  role  to  play  in  driving  effective 
implementation by ensuring that there is a high degree of accountability where there is a lack 
of progress on parties’ commitments and demonstrating that CITES does have ‘teeth’. 

Beyond  CITES  as  the  core  convention,  the  topic  of  wildlife  trafficking  has  attracted  the 
attention of various bodies in the UN system. In 2013, the issue of illegal wildlife trade was 
discussed for the first time at the  UN General Assembly and this led to the adoption at its 
69th  session  in  July  2015  of  a  Resolution  committing  countries  to  step  up  their  collective 
efforts  to  address  wildlife  crime  and  put  an  end  to  the  global  poaching  crisis. 
Resolution A/RES/69/314  on  tackling  the  illicit  trafficking  in  wildlife  was  co-sponsored  by 
Gabon,  Germany  and  over  80  other  countries,  including  all  EU  Member  States,  and  is  the 
culmination  of  three  years  of  diplomatic  efforts.  The  Resolution  encourages  countries  to 
‘adopt effective measures to prevent and counter the serious problem of crimes that have an 
impact on the environment, such as illicit trafficking in wildlife and wildlife products … as 
well as poaching’. It also recognises the broader impact of wildlife crime, including the ways 
in  which  it  undermines  good  governance,  the  rule  of  law  and  the  well-being  of  local 
communities. Action along the entire trade chain is encouraged, with member states urged to 
treat wildlife trafficking involving organised criminal groups as a serious crime, implement 
anti-money  laundering  measures,  establish  national  inter-agency  wildlife  crime  task  forces, 
strengthen  judicial  processes  and  law-enforcement  efforts,  prevent  and  counter  corruption, 
and reduce the demand for threatened wildlife products ‘using targeted strategies in order to 
influence consumer behaviour’.  

The  General  Assembly  Resolution  builds  on  a  Resolution  passed  at  the  first  UN 
Environment  Assembly  (UNEA)  in  June  2014  following  a  joint  EU-African  Union 
initiative, which strongly encouraged governments to commit themselves to targeted action to 
eradicate the supply and transit of, and demand for, illegal wildlife products – a key focus of 

103  Decisions 16.84 to 16.92 Rhinoceroses (Rhinocerotidae spp.). See: https://www.cites.org/eng/dec/valid16/217  
104  See: https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/cop/16/doc/E-CoP16-50.pdf  

34 

 
                                                            
UNEP’s work  with member states. The UNEA  Resolution promotes  zero-tolerance policies 
and  the  development  of  sustainable  and  alternative  livelihoods  for  communities  adversely 
affected by illegal trade. 

These  UN-based initiatives  have  been  complemented  by  high-level  multilateral  initiatives 
led by individual  countries. In  February  2014, the UK  Government convened the London 
Conference  on  Illegal  Wildlife  Trade,  which  was  attended  by  heads  of  state,  ministers  and 
high-level  representatives  from  the  EU  and  46  countries,  including  those  most  heavily 
impacted  by  poaching  and  illegal  trade  of  wildlife.  In  a  strongly-worded  declaration,  they 
undertook  to  take  ‘decisive  and  urgent  action’  to  tackle  global  illegal  wildlife  trade  and 
agreed strong measures to: 

  eradicate the market for illegal wildlife products;  

  strengthen law-enforcement efforts;  

  ensure that effective legal frameworks and deterrents are in place; and  

  promote 

sustainable 

livelihoods 

through  positive  engagement  with 

local 

communities.  

At  a  follow-up  conference  in  Botswana  a  year  later,  participants  adopted  the  Kasane 
Statement, reaffirming their determination to scale up their response to the global poaching 
crisis and adopting crucial new measures to: 

 

tackle money laundering and other financial aspects of wildlife crime;  

  engage relevant rural community groups;  

  engage  further  with  the  private  sector,  including  logistics  and  transport  companies; 

and  

 

renew  efforts  to  understand  the  motivation  and  behaviour  of  consumers  of  illegal 
wildlife products. 

A major step forward in the strengthening of enforcement efforts worldwide was the creation 
in  2011  of  the  International  Consortium  on  Combating  Wildlife  Crime  (ICCWC), 
consisting  of  the  CITES  Secretariat,  Interpol,  UNODC,  the  World  Bank  and  the  World 
Customs Organisation (WCO). ICCWC pools the expertise of five international organisations 
on  the  basis  that,  by  aligning  their  efforts,  they  could  provide  a  catalyst  for  significantly 
enhanced  global  cooperation  and  capacity  to  combat  wildlife  and  forest  crimes.  Key  aims 
include  long-term  capacity-building  (including  the  use  of  modern  investigative  techniques, 
such as deoxyribonucleic acid or DNA analysis) and improving international information and 
intelligence  exchange,  and  thus  the  coordination  of  enforcement  efforts.  ICCWC  has  also 
provided  support  at  the  request  of  countries  in  specific  emergency  situations.  The 
Commission  is  among  its  main  donors,  having  provided  EUR 1.7 million  over  three  years. 
An important ICCWC product is the ‘wildlife and forest crime analytic toolkit’, designed to 
facilitate national assessments of the main issues relating to wildlife and forest offences, and 
to identify the preventive and criminal justice responses required at national level.  

Individual  countries  have  also  significantly  stepped  up  their  efforts  to  counter  wildlife 
trafficking in recent years. This includes some key source and market countries, such as the 
United  States  (like  the  EU  an  important  market  for  illegal  wildlife  products),  which  has 

35 

 
created  a  Presidential  Task  Force  and  adopted  a  national  strategy  with  a  comprehensive 
action plan105.  

China has taken important steps recently to improve implementation and enforcement of its 
rules  on  wildlife  trade,  raise  its  citizens’  awareness  of  wildlife  trafficking  and  intensify 
cooperation  with  other  countries  on  this  issue.  The  main  features  of  its  policy  on  wildlife 
trafficking  were  set  out  in  a  10-action-point  programme  presented  by  the  State  Forestry 
Administration in May 2015.   

In September 2015, US President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping issued a 
joint  statement  recognising  the  importance  and  urgency  of  combating  wildlife  trafficking, 
committing  their  countries  to  taking  positive  measures  against  it,  including  measures  to 
restrict  ivory  trade,  cooperating  in  joint  training,  technical  exchanges,  information  sharing, 
public education, enhancement of international law-enforcement cooperation and cooperation 
with other countries106.  

In December 2015, at a meeting of the new Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, leaders 
from China and 50 African countries undertook to cooperate against wildlife trafficking107.  

3.2   The framework for action at EU level  

Wildlife  trade  has  been  regulated  at  EU  level  since  1983.  The  main  legal  instruments  are 
Council  Regulation  (EC)  No 338/97,  which  incorporates  CITES  provisions  into  EU  law, 
and the Commission Regulations implementing it. These ‘EU Wildlife Trade Regulations’ go 
beyond  CITES  in  many  respects,  in  particular  by  regulating  trade  in  non-CITES  listed 
species,  imposing  stricter  import  restrictions  for  some  species  and  empowering  the  EU  to 
suspend imports of species from particular exporting countries.  

Implementation  of  the  EU  Wildlife  Trade  Regulations  is  regularly  monitored  by  the 
Commission, working with Member States and an internationally-recognised leading expert 
body in the area of wildlife trade (TRAFFIC). It is assessed through meetings with Member 
States (10  per year) which focus on the scientific, management and enforcement aspects of 
the  legislation  and  the  implementation  of  Commission  Recommendation  No  2007/425/EC. 
Member  States  report  every  year  to  the  Commission  on  trade  in  specimens  covered  by 
Council  Regulation  (EC)  No 338/97  and  the  World  Conservation  Monitoring  Centre 
(WCMC)  analyses  these  data,  partly  with  a  view  to  detecting  trade  authorised  in 
contravention of EU law.108 Member States also submit comprehensive two-yearly reports on 
measures taken to  fulfil their obligations under EU wildlife trade  law. An analysis of these 
reports is carried out every two years by TRAFFIC for the European Commission, with the 
latest report published in January 2016.109  

At each twice-yearly meeting of the EU Wildlife Trade Enforcement Group (chaired by the 
Commission  and  with  participants  from  all  Member  States  and  relevant  international 
institutions), a presentation is made of the latest trends in illegal wildlife trade in the EU and 

105  https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nationalstrategywildlifetrafficking.pdf and 

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/237592.pdf.  

106  https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xi-jinpings-state-visit-united-states.  
107  http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1323159.shtml.  
108  See http://euanalysis2013.unep-wcmc.org/.  
109  See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/cites/pdf/compilation_2011-2012.pdf.  

36 

 
                                                            
measures  taken  by  Member  States  (seizures,  prosecutions,  sanctions,  cooperation  with 
Europol and non-EU countries). The Commission feeds this information and data submitted 
to  the  European  Union Trade  in  Wildlife  Information  eXchange  (EU-TWIX)110  into  annual 
overviews of wildlife seizures in the EU.111 

In  addition  to  this  regular  review  of  the  implementation  of  the  EU  legal  framework,  the 
Commission  carried  out  an  extensive  analysis  of  the  framework  on  the  basis  of  a  report 
published  in  December  2007112,  followed  by  consultations  with  stakeholders  and  Member 
States. It concluded that there was no need to revisit Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97, but 
that  Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No 865/2006  should  be  amended.  This  was  then  done 
through Commission Regulation (EU) No 791/2012. In addition, on the basis of an agreement 
the  Member  States,  the  Commission  developed  guidance  documents  on  the 
with 
interpretation  of  some  specific  provisions  of  the  legal  framework.  This  is  the  case  in 
particular  of  the  guidance  document  on  the  export,  re-export,  import  and  intra-EU  trade  of 
rhinoceros horns, adopted in January 2016113 and designed to ensure that the EU is not used 
as a destination, transit or source region for illegal trade in rhinoceros horns. In January 2015, 
Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/56 made further changes to Commission Regulation (EC) 
No 865/2006  (as  regards  the  creation  of  musical  instrument  certificates,  import  rules  on 
hunting trophies from some species and clarification of the legal basis for refusing the import 
of animals or plants when the legality of their acquisition is not sufficiently ascertained). 

include 

instruments 

the  Nature 

relevant  EU 

Other 
(Birds  and  Habitat) 
Directives 2009/147/EC and 92/43/EEC, which prohibit the sale and transport of a number 
of strictly protected wild species in the EU. Directive 2008/99/EC on the protection of the 
environment through criminal law requires Member States to consider wildlife trafficking 
as a criminal offence, but does not establish common forms or levels of sanction other than 
asking  for  proportionate,  effective  and  dissuasive  criminal  sanctions.  The  Commission’s 
assessment of Member States’ transposition of the Directive is ongoing and the Directive will 
be reviewed in 2016 in the context of the EU’s Agenda on Security.  

Commission  Recommendation  No  2007/425/EC  identifying  a  set  of  actions  for  the 
enforcement  of  Regulation  (EC)  No  338/97  was  adopted  in  20074  as  a  follow-up  to  the 
Council’s  December  2006  conclusions  on  halting  the  loss  of  biodiversity  and  to  a 
Commission  study  on  Enforcement  of  the  Wildlife  Trade  Regulations  in  the  EU  (Milieu, 
2006). It sets out a series of measures that Member States should take to improve efforts to 
combat illegal wildlife trade. These include adopting national action plans for enforcement, 
imposing sufficiently high penalties for wildlife trade offences and using risk and intelligence 
assessments to detect illegal and smuggled wildlife products. One of the main weaknesses of 
the Recommendation is that Member States have never politically endorsed it, so (beyond the 
level  of  experts)  do  not  have  a  sense  of  ‘ownership’  of  it.  Furthermore,  the  lack  of  a 
meaningful monitoring mechanism or clear timelines for delivery has hampered progress on 
implementing  the  recommended  measures.  On  substance,  the  measures  are  limited,  as  they 
are largely focused on enforcement issues within the EU, with limited consideration given to 
the role the EU should be playing in addressing wildlife trafficking globally. In addition, the 
organised crime dimension of illegal wildlife trade has become more prevalent since 2007 (as 

110  See http://www.eutwix.org/.  
111  http://ec.europa.eu/environment/cites/pdf/Overview%20significant%20seizures%202014.pdf.  
112  http://ec.europa.eu/environment/cites/pdf/studies/effectiveness_study.pdf.  
113  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016XC0116(01) 

37 

 
                                                            
demonstrated in other sections of this document) and the Recommendation does not address 
or reflect this.  

4.   Challenges under the current approach  

4.1   Implementation and enforcement of existing rules in the EU 

4.1.1  Uneven implementation and enforcement throughout the EU (linked to actions 9, 

10, 11, 14 and 19) 

There  are  considerable  differences  in  systems  used  to  enforce  the  EU  Wildlife  Trade 
Regulations. This was highlighted as a major problem in the responses to the Commission’s 
2014  stakeholder  consultation.  In  this  section,  we  seek  to  illustrate  the  varying  level  of 
implementation/enforcement across the Member States.  

Several  parameters  and  aspects  of  the  implementation  and  enforcement  of  the  EU  Wildlife 
Trade  Regulations  can  be  used  to  compare  Member  States’  performance  relatively 
objectively. These range from the rate of consultation with the scientific authority/ies before 
CITES documents are issued, through the rate at which Member States report on seizures to 
the level of enforcement effort in implementing the EU Wildlife Trade Regulations.  

In  the  context  of  such  a  comparison,  the  consideration  of  certain  ‘external’  (economic  and 
geographical) parameters is also important to reflect Member States’ relative importance and 
the  possible  impact  of  insufficient  implementation.  For  instance,  Member  States  with  high 
external trade levels or hosting large trade hubs (sea ports or airports) will by default have a 
greater responsibility in ensuring proper enforcement of the EU Wildlife Trade Regulations. 
A  number  of  Member  States  have  external  land  borders  towards  the  east  and  south,  which 
also entail additional responsibility in terms of ensuring effective enforcement. The impact of 
an implementation gap is likely to be much greater in such Member States than in a Member 
State with less external trade or in a different location.  

The  number  of  seizures  and  confiscations,  other  enforcement  action  taken  and  sanctions 
imposed give an indication of the overall enforcement level in the Member States.  

Number of seizures and confiscations 

Accurately identifying trends in illegal trade (either over time or when comparing countries) 
is complicated, in particular because we do not know what proportion of illegal transactions 
is seized (seizure rate) and what proportion of these is reported (reporting rate). A country’s 
seizure  rate  may  vary  depending  on  the  levels  and  nature  of  illegal  trade  and  on  its 
enforcement  effort,  i.e.  resources  committed  to  law  enforcement  –  the  number,  equipment, 
training and knowledge of staff all affect enforcement effort and the ability to make seizures. 

Seizure data from 2012 were used to compare seizure numbers and enforcement effort across 
the EU. Three Member States reported by far the largest numbers of seizures (records) across 
the EU (59 % of the total). These were followed by seven Member States that together were 
responsible for reporting 35 % of all seizures. The remaining 18 Member States reported less 
than 6 % of total seizures reported for 2012. Given the total reported legal imports of wildlife 
products for the same year, 11 Member States appeared to have seized less than would have 
been expected, possibly indicating different levels of enforcement/effort.  

38 

 
Beyond seizures – enforcement action proxy  

Due  to  the  nature  of  illegal  trade,  it  is  very  difficult  to  determine  true  enforcement 
levels/success. Seizures and seizure trends over time are often used to describe enforcement 
levels,  but  this  is  fraught  with  problems  of  data  interpretation.  For  example,  differences  in 
seizure  rates  may  be  due  to  differences  in  enforcement  effort,  detection  levels  or  levels  of 
actual  illegal  trade.  Therefore,  in  an  attempt  to  identify  differences  in  enforcement  action, 
Member States’ answers to four enforcement-related questions in EU CITES biennial reports 
for  2013-2014  were  analysed  in  combination,  to  create  an  ‘enforcement  action  proxy’  (see 
Figure 4).  The  questions  concerned  regular  checks  on  traders  and  holders  carried  out 
in-country, risk and intelligence assessment used to ensure thorough checks at borders and in-
country,  cooperation  with  other  Member  States’  enforcement  agencies  on  investigations  of 
offences, and the establishment of a specialised unit for CITES-related enforcement. 

Figure 4:   Number of positive answers to four enforcement-related questions from EU 

Member States’ 2013-2014 biennial reports  

Source: data in 2013-2014 CITES biennial reports. 

Undetected cases 

The  covert  nature  of  the  illegal  wildlife  trade  makes  it  difficult  to  carry  out  quantitative 
analyses of the situation. However, it is possible to estimate seizure rates on the basis of the 
number  of  shipments  exported  from  or  transited  through  specific  countries,  but  seized 
elsewhere,  i.e. not  detected  by  the exporting  or  transit  countries.  Available  EU  seizure  data 
(2011-2013) indicate that some Member States let a number of illegal shipments pass through 
their  territories  without  detecting  them.  Some  of  these  have  key  air/sea  ports  for  entry  of 
goods into the EU. This suggests that these Member States need to step up their enforcement 
effort so that shipments are intercepted at the first point of entry into the EU. 

Sanctions 

Presently,  sanction  levels  vary  widely  across  the  EU  Member  States.  Many  stakeholders 
raised this as a source of major concern in the Commission’s 2014 stakeholder consultation. 
Similarly,  concern  has been  expressed  in  a  number  of  reports that  the  severity  of fines  and 

39 

 
 
prison sentences imposed in the EU fails to reflect the seriousness of the crimes and the value 
of  the  wildlife  on  the  international  (black)  market,  and  lack  deterrent  effect.114  Also,  some 
Member States have pointed to what they see as the ‘leniency’ of court rulings, particularly 
on offences concerning specimens listed in Annex A.115  

Current  EU  legislation  leaves  a  significant  margin  of  discretion  for  Member  States  when  it 
comes to determining sanctions. Article 16 of Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97 contains a 
minimum  list  of  infringements  in  respect  of  which  Member  States  must  take  appropriate 
measures  and  adopt  national  legislation  to  ensure  the  imposition  of  adequate  sanctions.  It 
further  requires  that  sanctions  reflect  the  nature  and  gravity  of  infringements  and  involve 
seizure 
concerned. 
Directive 2008/99/EC, which entered into force in December 2010, obliges Member States to 
treat the unlawful killing, destruction, possession, taking of, or trade in, protected animal and 
plant species as a criminal offence and to establish ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’ 
criminal  penalties  in  their  national  legislation,  but  does  not  stipulate  forms  or  levels  of 
penalty.  

and,  where 

confiscation 

appropriate, 

specimens 

the 

of 

Based on the penalty information available, 21 Member States (75 %) reported that penalties 
reflect the market and conservation value of the species, and the costs incurred. However, in 
three  Member  States,  penalties  do  not  appear  to  take  account  of  the  conservation/market 
value of the species. There is no information available on this issue for four Member States, 
which reported these considerations as ‘variable’. 

The  following  section  presents  information  and  indicators  as  regards  the  application  of 
sanctions  for  wildlife  crime  in  the  EU.  The  Commission  keeps  a  table  on  minimum  and 
maximum  penalties,  which  was  last  updated  in  September  2015  on  the  basis  of  Member 
States’ 2013-2014 biennial reports.  

Maximum imposable fines for private persons 

Financial penalties (fines) are an important deterrent against crime. To analyse the difference 
in imposable fine levels in the various Member States, maximum fines imposable for private 
persons were used, as minimum levels are not set in many countries. However, it is difficult 
to  compare  fines  across  Member  States,  due  to  the  variable  degree  of  detail  provided  by 
Member States and different legal systems. For example, three Member States reported their 
fines  as  ‘variable’,  because  they  depend  on  many  factors,  including  the  income  of  the 
offender,  which  makes  it  impossible  to  compare  their  fines  with  other  countries’.  It  is  not 
clear  whether  these  ‘variable’  fines  have  an  upper  limit,  so  they  have  been  considered 
separately  from  the  unlimited  fines  clearly  reported  by  some  countries.  The  maximum 
penalty in  one Member  State is set as  a function (e.g. 100 times) of the  monthly  minimum 
wage; here, the minimum wage declared by that Member State in 2013 was taken as the basis 
for  calculating  the  maximum  fine.  Similarly,  another  Member  State  sets  the  maximum  fine 
using ‘day fines’; the actual calculation provided by that Member State in 2013 was used as 
the  figure  for  the  maximum  fine.  The  situation  is  further  complicated  by  the  fact  that  most 
Member States have several pieces of legislation that can be referred to for setting maximum 
fines  (e.g.  environmental  legislation  or  criminal  code).  The  highest  possible  fine  was  taken 
into account in this analysis. However, this may have resulted in an inappropriate comparison 

114  Alacs and Georges, 2008; Sollund and Maher, 2015; Eurojust, 2014. 
115  Crook  and Musing, 2016 

40 

 
                                                            
of fines set out in different types of legislation. Where a higher fine is applied for intentional 
infringement (as opposed to negligence), this was included in the analysis (where available). 
In  some  cases,  Member  States  distinguished  between  administrative  and  criminal  fines;  the 
latter was usually higher and therefore used in this analysis, if available.  

Table 2 provides an overview of the maximum fines imposable in Member States. The range 
of maximum imposable fines across the EU is very wide.  

The  analysis  of  fines  actually  imposed  for  wildlife  crime  in  the  EU  in  recent  years  is 
hampered by poor and inconsistent reporting by Member States. From the data sources used, 
in  most  cases  it  is  unclear  under  which  regulation  the  fines  were  applied  (or  whether  they 
were imposed in a criminal or an administrative procedure), how many fines were imposed or 
whether the cases involved private or legal persons. For the purposes of this assessment, the 
highest reported actually applied fines were selected (regardless of whether they were issued 
to legal or private persons, as this was mostly unclear). EU CITES biennial reports generally 
had more comprehensive information  on sanctions, but  in some cases  higher imposed  fines 
were  reported  in  the  significant  seizures/prosecutions  reports  to  the  Commission;  in  such 
cases,  the  higher  fine  was  used.  As  noted  above,  due  to  the  many  uncertainties,  this 
assessment can provide only a partial picture of fine levels applied in practice. 

In  2013-2014,  the  highest  fine  (EUR 250 000)  was  reportedly  imposed  in  Finland  for  two 
cases  of  illegal  collection  of  and  trade  in  birds  and  bird  eggs.  This  was  accompanied  by  a 
one-year  (conditional)  prison  sentence,  although  there  has  been  an  appeal  and  the  sentence 
was not final at the time of reporting. The second highest fine (EUR 225 000) was imposed in 
Spain in October 2013 for the illegal import of two cases of dead birds and mammals from 
South America (more than 130 specimens in total) in 2010; the items were intended for sale 
on  the  black  market  to  collectors  for  taxidermy.  The  third  highest  fine  was  imposed  by 
Belgium  in  2014  for  an  organised  crime  case  which  involved  EU  bird  trade;  sanctions 
included fines of EUR 90 000, EUR 30 000 and EUR 12 000, four custodial sentences (one to 
four years) and confiscation of EUR 835 800 of illegal gains from trade (including real estate; 
see case study 3).  

Half  of  the  Member  States  reported  imposing  fines  of  EUR 1 500  to  EUR 50 000  in 
2013-2014. In four Member States, the highest fines were less than EUR 1 000, which seems 
very  low,  especially  as  one  of  these  Member  States  issued  the  most  CITES  documents  in 
2013-2014.  A  fine  of  EUR 500  per  person  was  imposed  for  the  illegal  importing  of  eight 
rhino  horns  by  two  offenders  in  one  Member  State;  this  is  much  lower  than  the  highest 
imposable fine of EUR 100 000 in that country and does not appear to reflect the fact that the 
conservation/market  value  of  rhino  horn  has  been  estimated  at  several  tens  of  thousands  of 
euros  per  kilo.  Some  Member  States  did  not  provide  clear  information  on  fines  applied  in 
2013-2014  (neither  in  their  latest  biennial  report  nor  in  significant  seizures/prosecutions 
reports for the period). One Member State reported that it had issued administrative fines, but 
did not provide details as to the levels of fine. Two Member States reported that they had not 
imposed fines as penalties in 2013-2014. 

Overall, it appears that most fines applied in 2013-2014 were much lower than the maximum 
imposable  fines  (where  an  upper  limit  has  been  established),  with  the  exception  of  at  least 
one Member State which reported the issuing of the maximum fine (EUR 37 500). 

41 

 
Table 2: Maximum fines imposable and applied in 2013-2014 

500 000  

1 800 000  

unspecified 

unlimited 
variable 

variable 
unspecified 

1 800 000  
300 000  
10 000  
1 700  

MS  Maximum fines imposable for private persons (EUR) 
AT 
BE 
BG 
CY 
CZ 
DE 
DK 
EE 
EL 
ES 
FI 
FR 
HR 
HU 
IE 
IT 
LT 
LU 
LV 
MT 
NL 
PL 
PT 
RO 
SE 
SI 
SK 
UK 
Note:    
‘Variable’  fines  depend  on  many  factors,  including  the  income  of  the  person,  which  makes  it  impossible  to  assign  a  set 
figure.  However,  it  is  unclear  if  these  ‘variable’  fines  have  an  upper  limit,  so they  have  been  considered  separately  from 
countries that clearly reported unlimited fines;  
0* - these countries did not provide clear information on fines applied in 2013-2014;   
‘-’ – these Member States clearly reported that they had not issued fines in 2013-2014. 

Highest fine imposed in 2013-2014 (EUR) 
0*  
90 000  
2 500  
0*  
1 500  
18 000  
10 000  
1 500  
5 300  
225 000  
250 000  
900  
500  
0*  
500  
5 000  
-  
-  
700  
2 000  
50 000  
0*  
37 500  
8 700  
9 700  
7 000  
0*  
19 471  

28 000  
4 659  
81 000  
175 000  
37 500  
3 575  

150 000  
13 160  
308 106  
100 000  
103 000  
37 650  

16 690  
331 930  

unspecified 

unlimited 

variable 

Prison sentences imposed in 2013-2014 

As shown in Table 3, at least 11 Member States reported the issuing of a prison sentence in 
2013-2014  for  a  wildlife  trade  offence;  of  these,  the  longest  (in  Belgium)  was  four  years’ 
imprisonment with  one year’s suspension, although there has  since been an appeal and this 
may  not  be  the  final  sentence  (see  case  study  3).  The  second  longest  prison  sentence,  of 
3.5 years (on probation), was imposed in the Czech Republic (case study 4). The third longest 
was reported by the Netherlands and was for three years (1 080 days, conditionally for 720 
days). The other prison sentences reported by Member States for 2013-2014 ranged between 
six  months  and  a  year.  In  terms  of  the  number  of  prison  sentences  handed  down,  the 
Netherlands  reported  that  sentences  were  imposed  in  nine  cases,  followed  by  the  Czech 
Republic with eight, the UK with five, Belgium four (for one case) and Spain three. 

Table  3  also  shows  that  Member  States  that  have  maximum  imposable  prison  sentences  of 
four  or  more  years  reported  a  higher  number  of  prison  sentences  than  those  only  able  to 
impose shorter sentences, with two exceptions. This may be due to the general recognition of 
the  importance  of  this  type  of  crime  in  certain  Member  States  and  the  support 
investigators/prosecutors  may  get  as  a  result  (including  more  investigative  techniques 

42 

 
 
available for serious crimes). Two other Member States may have imposed prison sentences 
for  wildlife  trade  crime  in  2013-2014,  but  they  did  not  report  any  details,  so  for  them  the 
situation is uncertain. In total, 39 prison sentences for wildlife trade crime were reported for 
2013-2014 for the entire EU.  

It should be noted that a lower number of prison sentences does not necessarily reflect poor 
enforcement,  investigation  or  prosecution  –  it  may  simply  indicate  that  there  were  no  (or 
fewer)  cases  that  should  have  been  brought  to  court.  Unfortunately,  the  currently  available 
information  on  sanctions  imposed  does  not  allow  us  to  compare  the  number  of 
prosecutions/criminal  proceedings  started  with  the  number  culminating  in  the  issuing  of  a 
sanction, which would provide a better indication of the actual situation.  

Table 3: Prison sentences imposed in the EU in 2013-2014 for wildlife trade offences 

ES 

FI 
FR 

0.5 years 

0.92 years  

No. of sentences 

0 
4 
1 
0 
8 
2 
0 
0 
2 

Longest sentence imposed (years) 

3.5 years (on probation) 
1 year 

4 years (1 year suspended) - appealed 
0.5 years (suspended) 

For the column detailing maximum imposable sentence, each line represents a separate piece of national legislation and the 
subsequent sentence imposed. Source: for maximum imposable sentences – Crook and Musing, 2015; for other information 
–2013-2014 EU biennial reports or (if they did not include the relevant information) significant seizures reports (Feb. 2013 
to Dec. 2014).  
MS  Maximum imposable sentence 
Int: 2 years; Neg: 1 year 
AT 
5 years 
BE 
Int: 5 years 
BG 
3 years 
CY 
8 years 
CZ 
5 years 
DE 
Int: 1 year 
DK 
5 years*^^ 
EE 
Int: 10 years; Neg: 1 year 
EL 
2 years^ 
20 years 
Int: 2 years 
5 years 
2 years** 
1 year; 7 years*  
3 years; 10 years*   
5 years 
Int: 3 years; Neg: 2 years 
Sum: 1 year; Ind: 2 years  
1 year^ 
4 years 
6 months 
2 years 
2 years 
Int: 6 years; Neg: 1 year 
Int: 5 years; Neg: 2 years 
3 years 
3 years 
4 years  
6 years  
3 years; 5 years* 
8 years 
Sum: 6 months; Ind: 5 years 
7 years  

HR 
HU 
IE 
IT 
LT 
LU 
LV 
MT 
NL 
PL 
PT 
RO 
SE 

1 year (conditional) – appeal 
Details not known 

3 years (conditional) 
Details not known 

0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
9 
0 
0 
0 
0 

SI 
SK 
UK 

1 year 

1 year 

0 
0 
5 

1 
2 

3 

Notes: 
Int: Intentional conduct; Neg: negligent conduct; Sum: Summary Convictions; Ind: Convictions on Indictment  
* If conducted as an organised criminal group  
^ May be doubled for repeat offences 

** 4 years if several cases together 
^^ Abuse of official position 

43 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1.2  Awareness and prioritisation  

Responses to the 2014 Commission stakeholder consultation highlighted the problem of low 
awareness  of  and  low  priority  given  to  wildlife  trafficking.  The  latter  is  reflected  in  the 
shortage  of  human  and  technical  resources  at  national  level.116  CITES  management 
authorities are often understaffed; 61 % of Member States report fewer than 10 staff members 
spending anything between 10 % and 100 % of their time on CITES issues. The need for a 
larger  budget  and  workforce  has  been  consistently  emphasised  since  2009.  Some  Member 
States, including Croatia, Ireland and Malta, have specifically stated that the shortage of such 
resources  makes  it  difficult  to  implement  CITES.  Similar  feedback  was  given  by  customs 
administrations  in  a  2014  survey.117  Moreover,  only  70 %  of  Member  States  say  their 
enforcement  authorities  have  access  to  specialised  equipment,  expertise  and  resources,  and 
several of those say they need significantly more resources. 

4.1.3  Capacity throughout the enforcement chain (linked to actions 16, 17 and 18) 

Investigations into illegal wildlife trade are often not considered a priority for Member States 
and enforcement agencies tend to deal with such cases on an ad hoc basis, rather than having 
established units to deal with wildlife trafficking/environmental crime. In 2013-2014, only 19 
Member States had established national specialised units for CITES-related enforcement and 
there is vast inconsistency in resource provision across Member States in terms of specialised 
environmental and law-enforcement units, judicial police, environmental protection agencies 
and  specially  appointed  officers.  Further  details  on  the  existence  of  specialised  units  were 
provided in Eurojust’s 2014 Strategic Project on Environmental Crime. The UK, for example, 
has a National Wildlife Crime Unit (NWCU), a specially appointed police team dedicated to 
combating  wildlife  crime,  and  the  Scottish  Wildlife  and  Environmental  Crime  Unit, 
consisting  of  a  team  of  specialist  prosecutors.  Spain  has  a  Department  of  Environmental 
Crime  and  France  has  specialised  judicial  police,  but  other  Member  States  have  a  single 
police unit or some trained officials and others have no specialised units at all. The absence 
of  such  specialised  units  weakens  the  fight  against  wildlife  trafficking.  A  lack  of  sufficient 
expert  knowledge  is  also  a  significant  factor,  particularly  in  investigations  into  wildlife 
trafficking where equivalent levels of expertise and/or resources are not available across the 
organisational 
structure.  Such  challenges  arise  where  countries  have  national 
law-enforcement  authorities  but  lack  a  specialised  national  environment  agency  with  the 
technical expertise to support criminal proceedings.118 

Similarly,  the  low  priority  given  to  wildlife  trafficking  affects  the  quality  of  enforcement 
across  Member  States.  According  to  the  2013-2014  biennial  reports  analysis,119  only  seven 
Member States adopted national action plans for coordination and enforcement, and only two 
of  these  implemented  long-term  action  plans  (over  four  or  more  years).  Furthermore,  23 
Member  States  carried  out  regular  in-country  trader  checks  and  risk  and  intelligence 
assessments, and cooperated with enforcement agencies in other Member States to investigate 
offences. Also,  several of these  enforcement activities are not  carried out  comprehensively. 
For  example,  some  Member  States  regularly  monitor  only  breeders  of  Annex  A  CITES 

116  For all information in this section, see Crook and Musing, 2016. 
117  Han, p. 10. 
118  Eurojust, 2014. 
119  Crook and Musing, 2016. 

44 

 
                                                            
specimens  and  others  say  that  they  do  not  carry  out  systematic  risk  assessment  and 
intelligence analysis, as certain improvements are still required.  

Exhaustive  intelligence  and  data  gathering  should  be  an  automatic  part  of  Member  States’ 
enforcement  activities,  as  it  provides  important  information,  inter  alia  on  trends  in  overall 
trade,  species  vulnerable  to  exploitation  and  weaknesses  in  the  implementation  and 
enforcement  of  legislation.120  However,  to  date  the  enforcement  data  provided  have  been 
patchy.  Between  2011-2012  and  2013-2014,  12  Member  States  reported  that  they  had  not 
provided detailed information on significant cases of illegal trade or information on convicted 
illegal traders and persistent offences. This hampers Europol’s efforts to conduct regular and 
accurate threat assessments of wildlife trafficking. 

Linked to the low priority given to the issue of wildlife trafficking in many Member States is 
limited  training  and  awareness-raising  activity121.  The  provision  of  specialised  training  on 
illegal  wildlife  trade  to  all  agencies  across  the  enforcement  chain,  from  the  police  and 
enforcement officials to the prosecution service and the judiciary, is integral to ensuring that 
cases are identified, supported and prosecuted consistently and appropriately in all Member 
States122  and  judges  recognise  the  severity  of  offences123.  In  2013-2014,  national  CITES 
authorities  in  only  ten  Member  States  provided  their  CITES  management,  scientific  and 
enforcement  authorities  with  training  and/or  guidance,  while  12  provided  a  mix  of  training 
and/or guidance to some of their authorities. Six Member States provided none at all. Some 
of the more specialised training activities included regular annual training for border officials 
and  police  forces  and  a  one-week  CITES  enforcement  course  and  court  training  day, 
enforcement training and workshops, lectures in advanced CITES training and the provision 
of guidelines for inspectors on amendments to national CITES legislation.  

The  care  of  seized  or  confiscated  live  animals  or  plants  is  a  recurring  problem  in  Member 
States.  In  their  biennial  reports  on  the  implementation  of  Council  Regulation  (EC) 
No 338/97,  most  Member  States  stress  that  they  encounter  difficulties  when  it  comes  to 
housing  confiscated  live  specimens.  Housing  facilities  often  lack  sufficient  capacity  or  can 
cater  only  for  certain  animals  in  small  quantities.  To  improve  the  situation,  a  number  of 
Member States have signed agreements to use the services of NGOs specialised in housing 
live animals. There has also been cooperation between Member States, with live specimens 
confiscated in one Member State without proper housing facilities being relocated to another.  

4.1.4  Coordination within Member States (linked to actions 15 and 18) 

Implementing  and  enforcing  the  rules  on  wildlife  trade  involves  a  range  of  players  in  each 
Member  State.  These  include  customs  and  police  services,  CITES  management  authorities 
and  environmental  inspection  agencies,  and  often  the  services  of  wildlife,  environmental 
crime, veterinary and phytosanitary specialists are also required. As these players work under 
the auspices of different ministries, an uneven and fragmented approach to tackling wildlife 
trade  has  emerged,  ranging  from  CITES  authorities  or  competent  authorities  under  the  EU 
Timber  Regulation124  to  police,  customs  and  prosecution  services.  Effective  cooperation 

120  Eurojust, 2014; see also replies to the Commission’s stakeholder consultation.  
121  Eurojust, 2014.  
122  Sollund and Maher, 2015. 
123  Eurojust, 2014; see also replies to the Commission’s stakeholder consultation.  
124  Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 laying down the 

obligations of operators who place timber and timber products on the market 

45 

 
                                                            
between  these  authorities  is  a  crucial  aspect  of  effective  enforcement  against  the  illegal 
wildlife trade and the timely exchange of information and data is key125.  

From the information in CITES biennial reports, it is clear that there is room for improvement 
as  regards  communication  and  information-sharing  between  Member  State  authorities.  For 
example, enforcement authorities should pass on to their management authorities information 
on  any  discrepancies  between  the  number  of  items  in  a  permit  and  the  number  of  items 
actually traded. This is to ensure that management authorities are able accurately to monitor 
and  report  on  actual  levels  of  trade.  However,  in  the  2013-2014  biennial  reports  analysis, 
only 50 % of Member State enforcement authorities reported that such information had been 
exchanged  and  questions  therefore  arise  as  to  how  these  Member  States  are  able  to  report 
accurately on levels of trade. The Intelligence Project on Environmental Crime (IPEC) report 
also highlighted the (assumed) under-reporting of environmental crimes126.  

From  the  2013-2014  biennial  reports,  only  nine  Member  States  appear  to  have  set  up  a 
national  inter-agency  or  inter-sectoral  committee  on  CITES127.  In  most  cases  where  such  a 
committee is not in place, regular meetings and consultations reportedly took place between 
the various CITES authorities. However, the frequency of such meetings and their potential 
for  effective  coordination  appear  to  vary  greatly.  Ineffective  internal  coordination  could  be 
particularly problematic in Member States with decentralised issuing of CITES documents. 

Some  Member  States  with  decentralised  issuing  of  CITES  permits  report  that  they  have 
regular  (at  least  monthly)  meetings  and  daily/weekly  consultations.  Several  others  have 
multiple management or  scientific authorities, which either deal with  different issues (apart 
from  issuing  permits)  or  have  specific  taxonomic  expertise.  Regular  communication  at 
national level is also of considerable importance for these Member States.  

Eighteen  Member  States  have  at  least  one  formal  agreement  (e.g.  a  memorandum  of 
understanding)  for  cooperation  between  their  management  authority  and  another  relevant 
CITES agency. Only six reported that they had agreements with three or more agencies.  

Box 7: Good inter-agency collaboration practice in EU countries128  

The  Netherlands  has  a  CITES  working  group  comprising  staff  from  the  CITES  management 
authority,  the  scientific  authority,  the  legal  office  in  the  Ministry  of  Economic  Affairs,  Agriculture 
and  Innovation,  the  Public  Prosecutor’s  Office,  the  police,  the  customs  service  and  the  Food  and 
Consumer Product Safety Authority. This working group meets six times a year. 

Slovenia’s Inter-Sectoral Committee for the Prevention of Illegal Wildlife Trade was set up in 2002 to 
improve cooperation between the relevant authorities. It meets twice a year and consists of permanent 
members from the criminal police, customs, the environmental inspection authorities, the environment 
agency and the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning. For specific tasks, officials from 
other relevant ministries may also be appointed. 

The United Kingdom has a number of committees and groups which work together on CITES issues, 
in addition to a formal process for setting wildlife crime priorities every two years.  

125  Sollund and Maher, 2015, see also EFFACE Evaluation of the strengths, weaknesses, threats and opportunities 

associated with the EU efforts to combat environmental crime, 2015, p. 36, 
http://efface.eu/sites/default/files/publications/EFFACE_SWOT%20Analysis.pdf. 

126  EnviCrimeNet, 2015. 
127  Crook and Musing, 2016. 
128  Based on information provided by the Member States in the biennial reports.  

46 

 
                                                            
The Partnership for Action against Wildlife Crime (PAW) is the umbrella organisation that oversees 
enforcement  of  wildlife  law  (including  CITES)  in  the  UK.  It  consists  of  government  departments, 
enforcement officials and over 100 NGOs, and is led by a steering group, jointly chaired by the police 
and the UK management authority (Defra). Other members include the Northern Ireland Environment 
Agency,  the  Scottish  Government,  the  Crown  Office,  the  Crown  Prosecution  Service,  the  Welsh 
Government, Natural England, the UK CITES scientific authorities, Border Force, the Home Office, 
the UK National Wildlife Crime Unit and the Rural Payments Agency.   

The  Wildlife  Crime  Tasking  and  Coordination  Group  (TCG),  part  of  the  PAW  steering  group, 
includes  statutory  enforcement  agencies,  police,  customs  and  government  departments.  It  sets  the 
UK’s  biennial  wildlife  crime  priorities  and  ensures  progress  is  made  in  tackling  them.  For  each 
priority,  there  is  a  ‘delivery  group’  taking  a  three-pronged  approach  (prevention,  intelligence  and 
enforcement). The groups are accountable to the PAW steering group and success can be measured. 
This  structure  has  improved  performance  and  partnership,  and  has  resulted  in  a  100 %  increase  in 
seizures and prosecutions.  

4.1.5  Capacity to fight organised wildlife crime (linked to actions 20-24) 

According  to  Europol’s  2013  SOCTA,  the  nature  and  complexity  of  serious  and  organised 
crime  is  an  ever-changing  phenomenon  and  a  degree  of  financial,  personnel  and  political 
commitment is required to tackle these illicit activities effectively. As illustrated by both the 
2015 Interpol Strategic Report129 and the EFFACE Report on Illegal wildlife trade130, there is 
a general lack of awareness of the organised nature of wildlife trafficking which is often due 
to insufficient comprehension of the criminal networks involved, which use mechanisms and 
trade routes that are similar to those used by networks trafficking human beings and illegal 
commodities  such  as  drugs  and  firearms.  Europol’s  2013  Threat  assessment  on 
environmental  crime  further  emphasises  the  highly  specialised  nature  of  the  organised 
criminal groups operating in the EU. While they can be relatively small, these networks are 
dominated  by  EU  nationals  who  have  innovative  ways  of  obtaining  ‘products’  and  use 
corruption, money laundering and the falsification of documents to facilitate their activities.  

The  level  of  knowledge  about  the  activity  of  organised  criminal  groups  in  the  EU  in  the 
context  of  wildlife  trafficking  is  low  among  experts  on  organised  crime,  related  illicit 
financial flows and related illegal online activities. To ensure cooperation among authorities 
and  relevant  expert  agencies,  a  concerted  effort  is  needed  to  raise  awareness  of  the 
clandestine and organised criminal nature of the illegal wildlife trade at political level, among 
enforcement  and  prosecution  officials,  and  relevant  organised  crime  and  money  laundering 
specialists and financial investigation units.  

Due to the current lack of awareness, limited financial, personnel and specialist resources are 
often  allocated  to  regulating  wildlife  trade,  despite  its  complex  and  organised  nature. 
According to the EFFACE Report, the UK specifically identified this as a problem. Due to 
limited resources, enforcement officials investigating wildlife crime were unable to gather the 
necessary  evidence,  despite  identifying  organised  crime  links  in  the  context  of  rhino-horn 
theft, trade of eggs and raptors and the sale of traditional medicines.  

129  Interpol. (2015). Interpol Strategic Report – Environmental Crime and its Convergence with other serious crimes. 

Reference: 2015/999/OEC/ENS/SLO 

130  Sollund, R. and Maher, J. (2015). The illegal wildlife trade. A Case Study report on the Illegal Wildlife Trade in the 
United Kingdom, Norway, Colombia and Brazil. A study compiled as part of the European Union Action to Fight 
Environment Crime (EFFACE) project. University of Oslo and University of South Wales. 

47 

 
                                                            
The  lack  of  expert  awareness  also  hampers  the  capacity  to  assess  possible  links  with  other 
forms  of  crime.  According  to  the  2015  Interpol  Strategic  Report,  environmental  crimes 
including wildlife trafficking ‘… have typically been treated in isolation from other types of 
serious crimes … this is reflected in the separation of agencies responsible for the protection 
and conservation of the environment …’ (Interpol, 2015). 

The level of sanctions available (see section 4.1.1 above) is also relevant in this context. If a 
serious crime is punishable only with sanctions below certain levels, this leads in a number of 
Member  States  to  a  more  limited  scope  of  investigative  powers.  Eurojust’s  2014  Strategic 
Project  on  Environmental  Crime  Report  stresses  that  these  restrictions  are  particularly 
challenging  in  the  context  of  prosecuting  environmental  crimes.  This  difficulty  was  also 
highlighted by the Czech authorities involved in rhino-horn investigations, in which the judge 
rejected  an  initial  request  for  wiretapping  authorisation.  It  was  only  after  four  rhino  horns, 
cleared in Slovakia and apparently destined for the Czech Republic, went missing and were 
seized during a random vehicle inspection in Germany that the judge gave the authorisation 
(see case study 4).  

The  EU  and  all  Member  States  are  parties  to  the  UN  Convention  against  Transnational 
Organised  Crime  (UNTOC),  which  defines  ‘serious  crime’  as  ‘conduct  constituting  an 
offence  punishable  by  a  maximum  deprivation  of  liberty  of  at  least  four  years  …’ 
(Article 2(b)).  In  various  recent  high-level  fora,  the  EU  and  the  Member  States  have 
undertaken  to  address  the  problem  of  illegal  wildlife  trade  ‘by  adopting  or  amending 
legislation, as necessary, to criminalise poaching and wildlife trafficking, and related crimes 
including by ensuring such criminal offences are “serious crimes” within [UNTOC]’ (London 
Declaration  on  Illegal  Wildlife  Trade,  2014)  and  by  making  ‘illicit  trafficking  in  protected 
species  of  wild  fauna  and  flora  involving  organised  criminal  groups  a  serious  crime,  in 
legislation  and  Article 2(b)  of  [UNTOC]’  (UNGA 
accordance  with 
Resolution 69/314).  In  the  case  of  UNTOC,  mutual  legal  assistance  in  investigations, 
prosecutions  and  judicial  proceedings,  which  may  be  essential  for  successful  investigation 
and prosecution, can be requested for serious crimes.  

their  national 

The Commission’s table on minimum and maximum penalties, as updated on the basis of the 
2013-2014  CITES  biennial  reports  (Table  3),  shows  that  11  Member  States  do  not  have 
national legislation that allows for at least four years’ imprisonment which is, as mentioned 
above, the threshold required in order for an offense to be considered as a serious crime under 
UNTOC. In one, the maximum imposable prison sentence per case is two years, rising to four 
years  only  if  several  cases  are  considered/prosecuted  together.  However,  in  its  most  recent 
biennial  report,  this  Member  State  reported  plans  to  amend  its  penal  code  to  address  this 
issue.  It  should  be  noted  that  no  comprehensive  data  are  available  to  date  on  the  extent  to 
which the participation of an ‘organised criminal group’ is regarded in the Member States as 
an ‘aggravating circumstance’ in a wildlife trafficking case that would allow for the generally 
applicable maximum penalty levels to be raised. 

As  regards  links  with  illicit  financial  flows  and  in  line  with  international  commitments, 
national legislation must ensure that wildlife offences are treated as ‘predicate offences’, as 
defined  in  UNTOC  for  the  purposes  of  domestic  money-laundering  offences,  and  are 
actionable  under  national  proceeds-of-crime  legislation.  This  would  have  the  effect  of 
enabling the confiscation of proceeds of crime from illegal wildlife trade offences. It needs to 
be  ensured  that  prosecutors,  judges,  financial  intelligence  units  and  law-enforcement 
authorities  have  the  resources,  knowledge  and  capacity  to  investigate  and  prosecute 
effectively financial crime associated with wildlife crime. 

48 

 
The  Financial  Action  Task  Force,  the  main  global  forum  setting  standards  and  promoting 
effective  implementation  of  legal,  regulatory  and  operational  measures  to  combat  money 
laundering,  has  recommended  that  Member  States  consider  the  proceeds  of  ‘environmental 
crimes’  as  being  possibly  subject  to  any  of  the  money-laundering  offences  (‘predicate 
offences’)131.  The  2005  Council  of  Europe  Convention  on  Laundering  and  Search,  Seizure 
and  Confiscation  of  the  Proceeds  from  Crime  refers  to  the  same  list  of  predicate  offences, 
including environmental crime, but has to date been ratified by only 17 EU Member States.132 
At  EU  level,  the  relevant  provisions  of  Framework  Decision 2001/500/JHA133  set  specific 
penalties for some forms of money-laundering (conversion and concealment) only and apply 
only to predicate offences that are punishable with over one year’s imprisonment. Similarly, 
Framework  Decision 2005/212/JHA  on 
crime-related  proceeds, 
instrumentalities and property134 requires Member States to enable confiscation for offences 
punishable by deprivation of liberty for over a year.  

confiscation  of 

4.1.6  Enforcement cooperation among Member States (linked to actions 12, 13 and 18) 

While Member States meet regularly through the CITES Enforcement Group and exchange 
practical experience in the enforcement of EU wildlife trade legislation (e.g. via EU-TWIX), 
cooperation on specific cases and the involvement of relevant EU coordination bodies such as 
Europol and Eurojust remains limited (apart from some recent positive exceptions). Europol, 
whose  task  it  is  ‘to  support  and  strengthen  action  by  the  Member  States’  police  authorities 
and  other  enforcement  services  and  their  mutual  cooperation  in  preventing  and  combating 
serious  crime  affecting  two  or  more  Member  States’  (Article  88  TFEU),  has  supported 
several  actions  and  operations  to  tackle  wildlife  and  environmental  crime  by  providing 
analytical and operational support and publishing strategic documents.135 In 2015, for the first 
time,  Europol  coordinated  Member  States’  participation  in  an  international  anti-wildlife-
trafficking  operation,  COBRA  III.  However,  the  number  of  cases  in  which  Member  States 
have  requested  support  from  Europol  remains  low  (on  average  less  than  10  per  year)  and 
there is no dedicated focal point at Europol working on the issue.   

Eurojust’s  mission  is  ‘to  support  and  strengthen  coordination  and  cooperation  between 
national investigating and prosecuting authorities in relation to serious crime affecting two or 
more  Member  States’  (as  set  out  in  Article  85  TFEU).  Its  experience  has  been  similar  to 
Europol’s;  it  highlighted  in  its  Strategic  project  on  environmental  crime  (2014)  that  the 
number of environmental crime cases referred to it was very low. Information and cases are 
not  forwarded  in  a  timely  manner  and  it  is  therefore  unable  to  offer  any  meaningful 
assistance. Between 1 January 2004 and 1 December 2015, it dealt with a total of 49 cases of 
environmental crime, of which five involved illicit trafficking of endangered animal species 
and two illicit trafficking of endangered plant species and varieties. To date, there has been 
only one wildlife trafficking case in which Member States have made use of the possibility 
under EU law of setting up a joint investigation team to  facilitate cooperation on a specific 
cross-border case. 

131  http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf, pp. 36 and 113.  
132  http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/198.  
133  Council Framework Decision of 26 June 2001 on money laundering, the identification, tracing, freezing, seizing and 

confiscation of instrumentalities and the proceeds of crime (OJ L 182, 5.7.2001). 

134  OJ L 68, 15.3.2005.  
135  e.g. Europol, 2013; EnviCrimeNet, 2015. 

49 

 
                                                            
One  way  of  enabling  effective  cross-border  cooperation  would  be  to  improve  the  level  of 
communication  and  information  exchange,  particularly  on  administrative  measures  and 
sanctions,  between  Member  States,  Europol  and  the  Commission.  According  to  the 
2013-2014  biennial  reports  analysis,  11  Member  States  that  reported  that  they  had  been 
involved in administrative measures, criminal prosecutions and other court actions provided 
no further details and several Member States provided no information at all. According to the 
EU participants in Eurojust’s Strategic project on environmental crime, the exchange of such 
case  details,  operational  and  prosecution  experiences,  and  any  best  practice  has  been 
highlighted as a priority and something that many are keen to participate in. The insufficient 
exchange  of  information  is  a  particular  concern  with  regard  to  wildlife  trafficking,  as  it  is 
frequently a cross-border activity involving EU and non-EU countries. 

4.1.7  International enforcement cooperation (linked to action 25)  

Wildlife trafficking usually has an international dimension, involving several (often non-EU) 
source  or  destination  countries.  This  is  also  illustrated  by  some  of  the  case  studies  in  the 
annex to this document (the Czech, Dutch and Spanish examples in particular), which show 
the  challenges  in  cooperating  with  other  countries  on  investigations  of  wildlife  trafficking 
cases  linked  to  organised  criminality,  and  the  need  to  improve  international  cooperation  on 
enforcement against wildlife trafficking. 

The importance of international cooperation has been recognised in a number of international 
commitments,  e.g.  the  London  Declaration  (February  2014),  which  urges  governments  to 
‘strengthen cross‐border  and  regional  cooperation,  through better  coordination,  and  through 
full support for regional wildlife law enforcement networks’. A similar call was made in the 
recent  UNGA  Resolution  69/314.  A  number  of  regional  wildlife  enforcement  networks 
(WENs)  have  already  been  established  by  range,  transit  and  consumer  countries,  e.g. the 
ASEAN  WEN,  the  South  Asia  WEN  (SAWEN)  and  the  Lusaka  Agreement  Task  Force 
(LATF).  In  addition,  regional  bodies  such  as  the  Central  African  Forest  Commission 
(COMIFAC)  are  cooperatively  implementing  regional  wildlife  enforcement  plans  and  a 
number of other regions, such as the Horn of Africa, are initiating WENs of their own. 

One example of steps taken to improve international cooperation was the recent participation 
of  25  EU  Member  States  in  Operation  COBRA  III  in  March-April  2015.  On  the  EU  side, 
Europol supported COBRA III at the request of the EU Wildlife Trade Enforcement Group. It 
was  the  first  time  that  it  had  taken  on  such  a  central  role  in  supporting  an  international 
operation  on  illegal  wildlife  trade.  During  COBRA  III,  Europol  facilitated  operational 
information  exchange  and  coordinated  the  activities  of  police,  customs,  forestry  and  other 
law-enforcement  authorities  from  the  participating  EU  Member  States.  Such  international 
operations have great potential, e.g. in terms of providing practical experience in international 
cooperation on enforcement (using relevant communication channels, etc.). Also, participants 
familiarise themselves with relevant processes and mechanisms in other countries, and build 
personal contacts, all of which facilitates future bilateral cooperation.  

Following the ASEAN WEN’s and the LATF’s participation in COBRA III, there should be 
opportunities  to  enhance  cooperation  with  these  and  other  similar  regional/global  WENs  in 
the future, inter alia through joint meetings, more regular and structured information-sharing, 
joint operations, exchanges of best practices and capacity-building. 

On  the  specific  issue  of  the  illegal  killing  of  and  trade  in  birds,  which  also  has  a 
trans-boundary  dimension  (as  it  affects  many  migratory  species),  the  Commission 

50 

 
collaborates closely with the Secretariat of the Bern Convention, BirdLife International and 
the  Federation  of  Associations  for  Hunting  and  Conservation  in  the  EU  (FACE),  and 
produced  the  first  version  of  an  EU  roadmap  on  the  EU  Action  Plan  against  Wildlife 
Trafficking  in  2012136.  The  roadmap  is  part  of  the  2013-2020  Tunis  Action  Plan  for  the 
eradication of illegal wild-bird killing, trapping and trade under the Bern Convention, which 
provides a basis for tackling illegal activities beyond the EU. A new intergovernmental task 
force  established  in  2014  under  the  Convention  on  Migratory  Species  (on  illegal  killing, 
taking  and  trade  of  migratory  birds  in  the  Mediterranean  region),  supported  with  funding 
from  the  Commission,  extends  the  geographical  scope  of  such  work  to  countries  such  as 
Egypt and Libya. 

4.2   Support 

for  global  anti-wildlife-trafficking 

efforts 

(linked 

to 

actions 26-28) 

Due to the scale of the problem, effective mitigation of wildlife crime will probably require 
more  resources  and  capacity  in  the  countries  most  affected  by  poaching  and  wildlife 
trafficking,  particularly  in  terms  of  mobilising  long-term  sustainable  funding  for  work  that 
will  have  a  lasting  impact  on  the  ground.  The  challenge  of  increasing  national  budgetary 
allocations of capacity and resources to fight wildlife crime is even more daunting when the 
same  governments  are  faced  with  other  strategic  priorities,  such  as  security  and  armed 
conflict, epidemics, food security and poverty. 

In  April  2015,  African  ministers  meeting  in  Brazzaville,  at  the  International  Conference  on 
Illegal Exploitation and Illicit Trade in Wild Flora and Fauna in Africa, called for an African 
Common Strategy on Combating Illegal Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora. They also called on 
government  authorities  in  range,  transit  and  destination  countries,  UN  agencies,  regional 
economic  communities,  development  banks  and  other  relevant  partners  to  provide  the 
necessary  technical,  financial  and  logistical  support  for  the  implementation,  reporting, 
review, monitoring and evaluation of the Strategy and its action plan. 

international  sources  using  mechanisms 

One  of  the  ‘urgent  measures’  agreed  to  at  the  African  Elephant  Summit  in  Gaborone 
(Botswana) in December 2013 was a call to mobilise financial and technical resources from 
various  national  and 
that  best  support 
implementation of the African Elephant Action Plan and other ‘urgent measures’ at national, 
regional and continental level. The Action Plan is fully owned and managed by the African 
elephant range  states and outlines action  needed to  conserve elephants in  Africa effectively 
across their range. An African Elephant Fund was established to support the implementation 
of  the  African  Elephant  Action  Plan.  The  Fund  is  governed  by  a  Steering  Committee 
comprising range States, UNEP, the CITES Secretariat and three donor countries (Belgium, 
Germany and the Netherlands). 

A wide range of donors have been willing to step up support against wildlife trafficking. It is 
important  that  efforts  are  well  coordinated,  aligned  and  not  duplicated,  so  that  limited 
resources are targeted where and when they are needed. 

136  See: http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/roadmaps/docs/2015_env_087_action_plan_wild_trafficking_en.pdf 

51 

 
                                                            
4.2.1  EU support for developing countries (linked to action 27) 

The EU has committed over EUR 500 million for biodiversity conservation in Africa over the 
past 30 years, with a portfolio of ongoing projects worth approximately EUR 160 million. In 
particular,  it  has  for  decades  been  a  primary  supporter  of  African  countries’  work  in 
establishing and managing protected areas.  

Figure 5: EU support for African national parks 

The EU has also been the main financial supporter of the MIKE programme on Monitoring 
the Illegal Killing of Elephants since 2001, with a  contribution of EUR 12 million covering 
71  sites  in  Africa  and  Asia.  Building  on  this  support,  the  Commission  approved  a 
EUR 12.3 million grant to fund a new Minimising the Illegal Killing of Elephants and other 
Endangered Species (MIKES) programme in December 2013. The EU has also been one of 
the  first  donors  to  support  the  activities  of  the  International  Consortium  for  Combating 
Wildlife  Crime  (through  a  EUR 1.7 million  grant)  and  is  financing  (through  a  EUR 5.5 
million grant) a joint CITES/UNODC programme to strengthen law enforcement and reduce 
the demand for illegal wildlife products in south-east Asia.  

The EU also supports a number of national and local projects, e.g. in the framework of the 
EU Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan137. A wide range 
of EU-funded projects aimed at reducing corruption and building the capacity of prosecution 
and judicial services support the rule of law generally, which is essential for success in the 
fight against wildlife trafficking.  

While all these initiatives have brought some progress, the synergies between conservation, 
local  populations’  livelihoods,  enforcement  and  good  governance  have  not  always  been 

137  Commission Regulation (EC) No 1024/2008 of 17 October 2008 laying down detailed measures for the implementation 
of Council Regulation (EC) No 2173/2005 on the establishment of a FLEGT licensing scheme for imports of timber into 
the European Community 

52 

 
 
                                                            
sufficiently  exploited.  In  addition,  the  long-term  sustainability  of  a  number  of  projects 
remains fragile due to insufficient ownership and support by the national and local authorities 
(and sometimes populations) and a high dependence on external funding.     

In  order  to  guide  EU  development  cooperation  policy  and  programming  for  the  years  to 
come,  the  Commission  commissioned  a  detailed  and  comprehensive  report,  Larger  than 
elephants:  inputs  for  an  EU  strategic  approach  for  African  wildlife  conservation138,  which 
includes  an  in-depth  analysis  of  the  situation  and  guidelines  for  future  activities  and  was 
based on comprehensive consultation of stakeholders, including in the countries concerned. 

Box 8: The proposed strategic approach for African wildlife conservation 

The  strategic  approach  developed  in  the  Larger  than  elephants  study  focuses  primarily  on  ways  to 
ensure the conservation of large functioning ecosystems or landscapes supporting key African wildlife 
populations.  A  secondary tactic,  supporting  wider  biodiversity  goals,  is  to  make  conservation  funds 
available to agencies and projects protecting small important sites that cannot be included in the large 
key landscapes identified. 

Three types of action are proposed, at site, national and international level: 

Site-level 

National level 

International level 

Information systems for better decision-making 

At  site  level,  the  plan  is  based  on  85  key  landscapes  for  conservation  (KLCs)  covering  about  300 
major  protected  areas.  These  areas  will  have  the  capacity  to  sustain  viable  populations  of  large 
African wildlife species within functioning ecosystems in the face of the greatly increasing external 
pressure on land that is anticipated this century. At the same time, they will act as foci in developing 
the  rural  economy  through  sustainable  use  of  natural  resources.  A  suitable  network  of  KLCs  will 

138  https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/eu-wildlife-strategy-africa-synthesis-2015_en_0.pdf  

53 

 
 
                                                            
protect the well-known wildlife species of the region and stimulate economic growth. Trans-frontier 
conservation areas are central to this strategic approach.  

Local development projects for the benefit of the population living close to protected areas must be 
proposed in order to reduce the pressure on habitats and wildlife. In particular, agricultural and energy 
projects will bridge the gap between conservation sensu stricto and economic development. 

Lastly,  the  issue  of  the  unsustainable  use  of  biological  resources  (bush  meat,  fuel  wood)  must  be 
addressed.  The  plan  identifies  three  areas  in  which  action  is  needed:  reducing  demand,  providing 
alternative  sources  and  creating  a  conducive  institutional  and  policy  environment  so  that  local 
resource users have a secure stake in the resource and an incentive to manage it sustainably. 

The  strategic  approach  proposes  that  this  action  should  be  supported  at  country  level,  with  an 
emphasis  on  policy  reform,  institutional  strengthening  and  awareness-raising.  This  will  include 
expansion  of  existing  national  and  regional  facilities  for  mid-  and  senior-level  training  in  wildlife 
management. The selected trans-frontier conservation areas will be further supported at regional level 
with an emphasis on key reforms in national laws to give landholders and rural communities the right 
to manage wildlife and woodlands for their own benefit.  

While  on-the-job  training  will  always  be  an  important  component  of  support  for  protected  areas 
(PAs),  the  main  constraint  on  effective  PA  management  is  the  weakness  of  the  PA  management 
authorities and the absence of career opportunities to encourage competent conservation practitioners 
(at all levels) to join, and plan for a career with, the authority. Support for institutional strengthening 
and/or reform of national PAs authorities should therefore be a strategic priority of this plan.  

In addition to the KLC approach to conservation and the dismantling of wildlife trafficking networks, 
awareness-raising  is  also  prioritised.  As  part  of  the  recommended  awareness-raising  programme,  a 
communication strategy will provide materials and information on wildlife conservation for a range of 
target audiences. 

Action to dismantle wildlife crime networks at international level is also key; it should focus on three 
areas: 

(i)   improving cooperation between organisations and agencies;  

(ii)  strengthening law enforcement; and  

(iii)  properly penalising wildlife crime.  

COMIFAC’s  regional  law-enforcement  action  plan  should  be  supported,  as  should  the  important 
efforts of NGO WENs.  

It  is  estimated  that  around  EUR  7.7  billion  over  a  10-year  period  would  be  needed  to 
implement the recommendations under the strategic approach. 

In  line  with  this  proposed  strategic  approach,  the  2014-2020  programming  for  EU 
development  cooperation  funds  ensures  that  biodiversity  conservation  projects  benefit  from 
increased financial support (see Table 4).  

54 

 
Table 4: Programming for EU development cooperation funds for biodiversity in Sub-
Saharan  Africa  (approximately  half  of  which  are  meant  to  target  issues  related  to 
wildlife protection against poaching and trafficking) 

Budget line 
European Development Fund (EDF) 
EDF - National 
DRC 
Ethiopia 
Chad 
Zimbabwe 
EDF - Regional 
West Africa 
Central Africa 
Southern/Eastern Africa 
EDF - Intra ACP 
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) 
DCI – Pan-African global issues 
GPGC – Biodiversity & Ecosystem Services 
Total 

Total (EUR million)   

233 
120 
50 
53 
10 
213 
95 
88 
83 
130 

40 
150 
819 

4.2.2  Donor coordination (linked to action 28) 

EU  support  comes  in  addition  to  a  large  number  of  initiatives  funded  by  individual  EU 
Member  States  and  other  countries,  such  as  the  United  States.  In  June  2014,  the  Global 
Environment  Facility  approved  a  10-programme  Biodiversity  Strategy  for  GEF-6 
(2014-2018), which includes Programme 3 on preventing the extinction of known threatened 
species, which aims to provide support to curtail poaching and the illegal wildlife trade.  

Regional  development  banks  are  also  playing  an  increasingly  active  role  in  mobilising 
sustainable  financial  support  for  national  governments  in  their  efforts  to  address  wildlife 
crime. The African Development Bank, for example, has supported national programmes and 
projects improving the capacity of institutions responsible for combating poaching and illegal 
trafficking,  and  issued  the  2013  Marrakech  Declaration,  a  global  call  for  action  and 
commitment from governments and other institutions to combat illicit wildlife trafficking.  

Close  cooperation  between  donors  and  supported  countries  is  critical  to  maximise  impact, 
avoid overlap and ensure that the allocation of funds meets the needs and priorities identified 
by the countries themselves. 

Some  first  initiatives  have  started  to  improve  coordination  among  donors.  For  example,  a 
Wildlife  Donor  Roundtable  was  held  in  New  York  in  July  2015  to  share  information  on 
existing  wildlife  funding  programmes,  understand  long-term  financial  needs  if  developing 
countries  are  to  implement  the  CITES  and  explore  the  potential  for  scaled-up  financial 
resources to ensure the conservation and sustainable use of wildlife and tackle wildlife crime. 
More systematic donor coordination will be needed in the future.  

55 

 
  
 
 
4.2.3  Demand reduction (linked to action 1)   

Many  efforts  have  been  made  in  the  past  to  dampen  demand  for  illegally  traded  wildlife 
products139,  primarily  by  generating  greater  awareness  of  the  importance  of  conserving  the 
species in question or highlighting the illegality of consuming the derived products. Despite 
such  efforts,  however,  the  past  decade  has  seen  a  significant  increase  in  trade  for  many 
species  and  dramatic  shifts  in  the  consumer  dynamics  underpinning  it.  Awareness 
campaigns140 in the area of wildlife trade have focused on informing the public on legislation 
forbidding trade or on the impact that the use of products has on species in the wild. In some 
cases, this may be enough to change people’s behaviour, as they may lack basic knowledge 
of  the  issues.  For  example,  it  was  found  that  many  Chinese  consumers  did  not  know  that 
ivory comes from dead  elephants141 and a public information campaign now seems to have 
led to a reduction in consumers’ readiness to purchase it142. WildAid and the African Wildlife 
Foundation ran a campaign in 2013 to raise awareness among Chinese consumers and reduce 
demand for rhino-horn products143. After the campaign, they identified a 23.5 % reduction in 
the prevalence of belief in the medicinal benefits of rhino horn144. 

However, one of the weaknesses of a traditional approach is that information does not always 
lead  to  action.  Providing  information  is  just  a  first  step  towards  influencing  behaviour.  If 
demand  for  certain  wildlife  products  is  to  be  reduced  significantly,  demand  reduction 
strategies need to be reviewed and demand reduction efforts need to be based squarely on a 
clear  understanding  of  the  underlying  factors  influencing  consumer  behaviour  and  how  to 
change it, i.e. address the primary drivers of human behaviour.  

There  are  success  stories  involving  behavioural  change.  For  example,  for  a long  time,  high 
demand made the Chinese market one of the most lucrative for the illegal trade in shark fins. 
A  2013  WildAid  consumer  survey  in  four  major  cities  in  China145  demonstrated,  however, 
that  demand  reduction  campaigns  had  got  through  to  consumers,  prompting  them  not  to 
purchase shark fins for food (e.g. shark fin soup). About 65 % of the respondents answered 
that they had stopped eating shark fins as a consequence of awareness-raising campaigns.  

Other initiatives have included the Save the Elephants ‘corridors of power’ initiative, which 
has raised awareness in consumer countries, particularly China, with the help of sport, film 
and music celebrities, and policymakers.  

139  WWF. Fighting Illicit Wildlife Trafficking. A consultation with governments. Conducted by Dalberg and 

WWF; Anon. (2010). Understanding the motivations: the first step toward influencing China's 
unsustainable wildlife consumption TRAFFIC East Asia. 

140  WWF. Fighting Illicit Wildlife Trafficking. A consultation with governments. Conducted by Dalberg and 

WWF; Anon. (2010). Understanding the motivations: the first step toward influencing China's 
unsustainable wildlife consumption TRAFFIC East Asia. 

141  http://www.ifaw.org/united-states/news/fighting-underground-trade-ivory-one-collector-time. 
142  IFAW, Rapid Asia Flash Report, Impact evaluation on ivory trade in China. IFAW PSA: ‘Mom, I have teeth’; 

http://www.ifaw.org/sites/default/files/ifaw-china-ivory-report.pdf. 

143  Wildaid and African Wildlife Foundation, Rhino Horn Demand 2012-2014; 

https://www.awf.org/sites/default/files/media/Resources/Facts%20%26amp%3B%20Brochures/Rhino%20Horn%20Rep
ort.pdf.  
144  Ibid., p. 2. 
145  WildAid, Evidence of declines in shark fin demand – China; 

http://wildaid.org/sites/default/files/resources/SharkReport_Evidence%20of%20Declines%20in%20Shark%20Fin%20D
emand_China.pdf.  

56 

 
                                                            
 
 
 
A  number  of  international  declarations  in  recent  years  have  included  calls  for  targeted 
demand-reduction  campaigns,  e.g. the  London  Declaration  of  February  2014,  the  UN 
Environment Assembly Resolution of May 2014 and UNGA Resolution 69/314. The Kasane 
Statement  of  March  2015  goes  into  more  detail,  urging  countries  to  ‘strengthen  our 
partnerships  with  business  and  others,  and  through  regional  collaboration  agreements  as 
appropriate,  to  reduce  the  demand  and  supply  sides  for  illegal  wildlife  products’  and  to 
‘conduct  and/or  support  research  to  improve  understanding  of  market  drivers,  including 
monitoring  the  effectiveness  of  demand  reduction  strategies  and  collating  a  portfolio  of 
demand  reduction  good  practice’.  At  regional  level,  the  26th  APEC  Ministerial  Meeting  in 
Beijing  in  November  2014  welcomed  cooperative  action  to  reduce  consumer  demand. 
Demand  reduction  is  also  an  issue  of  concern  to  range  states  in  Africa  and,  at  the 
International Conference on Illegal Exploitation and Illicit Trade in Wild Flora and Fauna in 
Africa  (April  2015),  environment  ministers  issued  the  Brazzaville  Declaration  calling  for  a 
joint conference with transit and consumer countries with a view to agreeing on joint action 
to  eliminate  the  supply  of,  demand  for  and  illegal  trade  in  African  wild  flora  and  fauna 
products.  A joint  declaration  issued after the 7th European Commission  and African Union 
Commission college-to-college meeting on 22 April 2015 in Brussels included a commitment 
to addressing the supply of and demand for illegal wildlife products. 

CITES, in particular, has in recent years laid greater emphasis on demand reduction as a key 
factor in addressing poaching and illegal trade. CITES Resolution Conf. 9.14 (Rev. CoP16) 
on  the  conservation  of  and  trade  in  African  and  Asian  rhinoceroses  urged  ‘the  implicated 
states,  as  a  matter  of  priority,  to  work  with  all  user  groups  and  industries  to  develop  and 
implement  strategies  for  reducing  the  use  and  consumption  of  rhinoceros  parts  and 
derivatives’  and  CITES  Decision  16.85  called  on  all  implicated  parties  to  ‘develop  and 
implement  long-term  demand  reduction  strategies  or  programmes  and  immediate  actions 
aimed at reducing the illegal movement and consumption of rhino horn products’, taking into 
consideration the draft demand-reduction principles developed by the CITES Rhino Working 
Group  to  achieve  measurable  change  in  consumer  behaviour.  Similarly,  Resolution  10.10 
(Rev. CoP16) on trade in elephant specimens urges the relevant parties to ‘engage in public 
awareness  campaigns,  including  supply  and  demand  reduction’  and  Resolution  12.5  on 
conservation  of  and  trade  in  tigers  and  other  Appendix-I  Asian  big  cat  species  urges 
consumer  states  ‘to  educate  the  industry  and  user  groups  in  order  to  eliminate  the  use  of 
substances derived from Appendix-I Asian big cats’. 

According  to  the  latest  (2009-2014)  CITES  biennial  reports,  most  EU  Member  States 
conducted  some  form  of  awareness-raising  on  wildlife  trade,  ranging  from  media 
activities/campaigns  to  competitions.  Awareness-raising  activities  targeted  a  range  of 
stakeholder groups, including the public and private sectors (e.g. pet-shop owners, breeders, 
caviar producers/repackagers, luthiers, auction houses and antique dealers). The tactics used 
have been diverse and often innovative, but always geared to engaging target audiences and 
improving the knowledge base.  

Many awareness-raising activities targeted tourists and took the form of events at airports and 
tourism  fairs  focusing  on  wildlife  souvenirs.  In  2013  and  2014,  Belgium,  Germany,  Spain 
and  the  UK  were  among  the  Member  States  that  issued  press  releases  on  CITES-related 
issues,  including  the  burning  of  ivory  stockpiles,  asking  the  public  to  refrain  from  keeping 
primates  as  pets  (due  to  their  complex  behavioural  ecology  and  needs  in  captivity),  the 
problems of purchasing souvenirs made from protected wildlife products, results of elephant 
surveys in Tanzania and anti-poaching efforts, operations addressing the illegal trade in eels 
and the issues of keeping exotic pets, and the work of a national wildlife crime unit. Latvia’s 

57 

 
management  authority  developed  and  organised  nine  presentations  on  CITES-related  issues 
that were shown to more than 175 students and schoolchildren across the country. Slovakia’s 
customs  and  management  authority  organised  an  event  to  destroy  eight  illegally  imported 
rhino horns to highlight the critical situation of the illegal killing of rhinos for the rhino-horn 
trade.  A  number  of  leaflets,  stickers,  information  panels  and  posters  were  created  for  the 
event, which was attended by over 750 people.  

Innovative  activities  to  raise  public  awareness  included  a  CITES-themed  evening  and 
presentation  (‘Night  of  the  Museums’)  at  the  Hungarian  Customs  and  Finance  Museum  in 
2011. Also in 2011, Latvia’s Nature Conservation Agency ran a four-week educational and 
creative  competition  called  ‘March  –  CITES  month!’.  Activities  included  art,  photo  and 
poetry  competitions  on  CITES-related  issues.  In  the  UK,  a  major  television  station  aired  a 
programme on illegal trade in rhino horn starring a well-known celebrity, WWF coordinated 
a significant media event and a ‘behind the scenes’ event at Heathrow was shown on national 
TV to highlight the seizure of illegal ivory.   

4.2.4  Anti-corruption efforts (linked to action 8) 

The problem of corruption has been recognised internationally. The UN Convention Against 
Corruption  (UNCAC)  and  the  OECD  Anti-Bribery  Convention  established  are  legally 
binding  agreements  requiring  parties  to  implement  specific  anti-corruption  measures.  The 
links between corruption and wildlife trafficking were described in November 2015 in a joint 
declaration by UNODC Executive Director Yuri Fedotov and CITES Secretary-General John 
Scanlon: ‘Thanks to corruption’s deadly touch, the natural wealth of countries is being stolen, 
efforts  to  eradicate  poverty  paralysed  and  development  efforts  greatly  hindered.  We  are 
united in the belief that, by addressing corruption and bribery, we can deal a significant blow 
to all those involved in this transnational organised crime’.146  

The  Declaration  from  the  London  Conference  on  Illegal  Wildlife  Trade  in  February  2014 
noted  that  ‘the  criminal  activity  and  corruption  associated  with  trafficking  restricts  the 
potential  for  sustainable  investment  and  development  which  is  needed  in  new  economic 
activities  and  enterprises’  and  at  the  follow-up  conference  in  Kasane  (Botswana)  in  March 
2015 governments reaffirmed their ‘zero tolerance towards corruption’.  

At its first session on 27 June 2014, the UN Environment Assembly adopted a resolution on 
illegal trade in wildlife, calling on governments to ‘promote and implement policies of zero 
tolerance towards all illegal activities, including corruption associated with the illegal trade in 
wildlife’. More recently (in July 2015), the UNGA Resolution on tackling illicit trafficking in 
wildlife called on member states to ‘prohibit, prevent and counter any form of corruption that 
facilitates illicit trafficking in wildlife and wildlife products’. The joint declaration issued by 
the European Commission and African Union Commission after their 7th college-to-college 
meeting  on  22  April  2015  in  Brussels  included  a  commitment  to  eliminating  corruption 
associated with wildlife trafficking. 

The  ICCWC’s  ‘wildlife  and  forest  crime  analytic  toolkit’  provides  a  range  of  tools  for 
targeting  wildlife-crime-related 
fighting  wildlife  crime, 

including  some  specifically 

146  https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2015/November/corruption-feeds-and-sustains-wildlife-and-forest-

crime.html.  

58 

 
                                                            
corruption. Transparency International’s Analysing corruption in the forestry sector provides 
guidelines for combating corruption in the south-east Asian timber trade.  

In  practice,  anti-corruption  strategies  in  development  support  have  to  date  not  always 
included  wildlife  trafficking  as  a  focus  area.  An  increasing  number  of  initiatives  by  civil 
society  have  helped  improve  governance  and  law-enforcement  responses  to  wildlife 
trafficking. In particular, these include the activities of regional NGO networks, who work in 
close  collaboration  with  regional  and  international  structures.  One  example  is  the 
Eco-Activists for Governance and Law Enforcement (EAGLE) network in West and Central 
Africa.147 These organisations work closely with all national law-enforcement bodies (forest 
and wildlife, police, gendarmerie, customs, justice, national Interpol representatives) to detect 
and  prosecute  wildlife  crime.  In  Kenya,  the  NGO  Wildlife  Direct  has  been  very  active  in 
following up wildlife trafficking investigations to ensure that cases are prosecuted and pushed 
for legislative change to increase penalties against wildlife trafficking.148  

4.2.4  Diplomatic tools  for more  effective  cooperation  with  relevant  source,  transit  and 

market countries and regions (linked to actions 29 and 31) 

Respondents to the Commission’s 2014 stakeholder consultation called for the EU to address 
wildlife  trafficking  more  through  its  diplomatic  contacts,  including  in  high-level  political 
dialogues  with  key  countries  such  as  China.  They  also  called  for  a  greater  role  for  EU 
delegations and Member States’ diplomatic missions in addressing wildlife trafficking. 

The European External Action Service is responsible for 139 delegations, making up one of 
the  largest  diplomatic  networks  in  the  world.  This,  together  with  the  diplomatic 
representation  of  the  Member  States,  gives  the  EU  a  unique  tool  to  step  up  cooperation 
strategically and in a targeted manner with key source, transit and consumer countries and to 
exert its diplomatic influence where required.  

The  EU  and  the  Member  States  have  raised  the  issue  of  wildlife  trafficking  in  political  or 
sectoral  dialogues  in  recent  years,  both  with  individual  countries  and  with  regional 
organisations. For example, the April 2015 joint meeting between the European Commission 
and the African Union Commission149 resulted in a commitment to joint action in the area of 
wildlife trafficking, while the April 2014 Africa-EU summit150 stated in its final declaration 
that  the  EU  and  Africa  will  fight  terrorism  and  organised  crime,  including  wildlife 
trafficking. This form of trafficking is also listed among the areas of cooperation in the EU’s 
strategy for cooperation with ASEAN,151 while various forms of organised crime are covered 
by ongoing EU-ASEAN cooperation under the 2013-2015 Plan of Action.152 

To date, the EU has cooperated case by case with like-minded countries such as the United 
States, e.g. through joint initiatives, and the overall ongoing cooperation is not framed by a 
coordinated approach, involving the other countries throughout the trafficking chain. The EU 
and the Member States have recently started discussions to determine priority countries with 
which they should undertake comprehensive joint action on wildlife trafficking.  

147  http://www.eagle-enforcement.org/.  
148  See, for example: http://hooe.wildlifedirect.org/hooefeatured/wildlifedirect-launches-wildlife-crimes-report-for-kenya/.  
149  See the 7th college-to-college meeting joint declaration, 22 April 2015, Brussels. 
150   See the declaration of the fourth EU-Africa summit, 2-3 April 2014, Brussels. 
151  The EU and ASEAN: a partnership with a strategic purpose, joint communication (JOIN(2015) 22 final). 
152  Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of Action to strengthen the ASEAN-EU enhanced partnership (2013-2017). 

59 

 
                                                            
Going forward, the EU will need to channel available resources to  ensure a comprehensive 
response to poaching and illegal wildlife trafficking. Where relevant, country assessments or 
framework documents, such as the proposed joint framework documents,153 should look into 
wildlife trafficking  in conjunction with  its adverse impact, not  only on biodiversity and the 
environment, but also on economic development and livelihood opportunities in the affected 
communities, the rule of law and security. 

To gather information and coordinate responses, it is essential to set up a network of wildlife 
trafficking  focal  points  in  EU  delegations  and  Member  States’  diplomatic  missions  that 
would  complement,  and  whenever  appropriate  make  use  of,  the  existing  Green  Diplomacy 
Network.  The  United  States  has  posted  wildlife  attachés  in  its  embassies  in  Tanzania, 
Botswana,  Thailand,  China  and  Peru  under  its  plan  to  implement  its  National  Strategy  for 
Combating Wildlife Trafficking.  

4.2.5  EU  trade  policy  in  support  of  the  fight  against  wildlife  trafficking  (linked  to 

action 30) 

EU trade policy supports and promotes environmental objectives such as wildlife protection 
and  combating  wildlife  trafficking.  This  is  reflected  in  particular  in  the  EU’s  international 
trade agreements. When negotiating agreements, the Commission seeks to include substantial 
environmental provisions of relevance in the trade context, in a specific chapter on trade and 
sustainable development. These systematically include: 

  commitments  to  implementing  multilateral  environmental  agreements  (MEAs), 

including CITES, effectively in domestic law and practice;  

  commitments  to  ensuring  high  levels  of  environmental  protection  and  the  effective 
enforcement of and non-derogation from domestic laws in this area, to prevent a ‘race 
to the bottom’; and  

  specific provisions encouraging trade practices and schemes that support and promote 
sustainable development goals, such as the sustainable management and use of natural 
resources.  

For  example,  such  provisions  are  included  in  the  EU’s  free-trade  agreements  (FTAs)  with 
South  Korea,  Peru/Colombia,  Central  America,  Singapore,  Canada,  Ukraine,  Georgia  and 
Moldova.  More  recent  trade  agreements,  e.g. with  Vietnam,  include  more  specific 
commitments  to  taking  effective  measures  to  reduce  illegal  trade  in  wildlife,  such  as 
awareness-raising campaigns, monitoring and enforcement measures. 

Committees established under these FTAs are responsible for monitoring implementation of 
the  sustainable  development  chapters  and  allow  the  EU  to  raise  issues  relating  to  wildlife 
trafficking and ask what measures the other party is taking or intends to take in this area. 

In  the  context  of  the  negotiations  for  a  Transatlantic  Trade  and  Investment  Partnership 
(TTIP), the EU and the USA have identified the fight against wildlife trafficking as an issue 
of  mutual  interest  and  the  future  agreement  should  contain  commitments  to  combating  the 
phenomenon and to cooperating further in this area.  

153  See The EU comprehensive approach to external conflict and crisis, joint communication (JOIN(2013) 30 final). 

60 

 
                                                            
More  prominence  is  also  being  given  to  commitments  against  wildlife  trafficking  in  other 
countries’  trade  agreements.  This  is  notably  the  case  with  the  Trans-Pacific  Partnership 
Agreement  concluded  in  October  2015  between  the  USA,  Japan,  Malaysia,  Vietnam, 
Singapore, Brunei, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Mexico, Chile and Peru, which contains 
detailed provisions on such matters. 

In addition to its FTAs, the EU has been actively promoting effective implementation of the 
CITES  Convention  by  the  eight  countries  benefiting  from  the  Generalised  Scheme  of 
Preferences (GSP) + arrangements154. The countries enjoy lower tariffs for their exports of a 
number of products to the EU, provided that they have ratified and effectively implemented a 
number  of  international  conventions,  including  CITES.  The  Commission  monitors  on  an 
ongoing  basis  whether  these  conditions  have  been  satisfied,  and  reports  regularly  to  the 
Council  and  the  European  Parliament.  In  January  2016,  in  its  first  report  since  the  revised 
GSP  arrangements  were  adopted,  the  Commission  highlighted  shortcomings  in  some 
countries’ implementation of the CITES Convention (in particular, national legislation failing 
to ensure full implementation, insufficient reporting and other specific issues), stressing that 
these should be addressed as a matter of priority155. 

The FTA and GSP+ measures demonstrate the role that trade policy can play in supporting 
the EU’s general policy on wildlife trafficking.  Trade for all – towards a more responsible 
trade and investment policy,156 the Commission’s new trade strategy, further strengthens that 
approach,  as  it  explicitly  commits  the  EU  to  giving  greater  priority  to  the  sustainable 
management and conservation of natural resources, including wildlife, in FTAs and in their 
implementation. 

154  Cape Verde, Bolivia, Paraguay, Philippines, Pakistan, Mongolia, Armenia and Georgia. (Ecuador ceased to be a GSP+ 

beneficiary on 1 January 2015; Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, Panama and Peru ceased to be GSP/GSP+ 
beneficiaries on 1 January 2016). 

155 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/january/tradoc_154180.pdf  
156  http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf.  

61 

 
 
 
                                                            
Annex 1 

The  following  table  provides  examples  of  fines,  prosecutions  and  court  actions  for 
CITES-related offences reported by EU Member States in 2011–2012 and 2013-2015.  

2011-2012 

2013–2015 

Case details 

Sanctions 

Case details 

Sanctions 

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Czech 
Republic 

Germany 

Tortoise breeder 
charged with 
making false 
declarations and 
forgery, with the 
intent to trade 
fraudulently in 
CITES-listed 
species, and 
failing to comply 
with animal 
welfare 
legislation. 

Seizure of two 
live Bonelli’s 
eagles Hieraaetus 
fasciatus (CITES 
Appendix 
II/Annex A to 
Council 
Regulation (EC) 
No 338/97) from a 
Bulgarian citizen 
attempting to 
export them with 
false certificates. 

Theft of a rhino 
horn (White 
Rhinoceros 
Ceratotherium 
simum) from 
Buchlov Castle 
(private person). 

German citizen 
offering monkeys, 
spotted cats, 
parrots, turacos, 
birds of prey and 
owls for sale on 
the internet 
without proof of 
legal import or 
acquisition. 

EUR 8 500 fine 
and six months’ 
prison sentence 
(with three-year 
reprieve). 

Germany 

Import of 62 kg of stony 
coral jewellery 
(Scleractinia spp.). 

Fine of EUR 16 500. 

Denmark 

Illegal trade of parrots 
between 2009 and 2011. 

Fine of around 
EUR 87 000, 
confiscation of 11 
eggs, 31 parrots and 
trade profit of around 
EUR 28 500. 

EUR 1 500 fine 
and 2.5 years’ 
prison sentence 
(on probation) 
and confiscation 
of specimens. 
Court decision 
was not final 
and subject to 
an appeal. 

Three-year 
prison sentence. 

Greece 

Three-year 
prison sentence. 

Spain 

Illegal collection and 
possession of 63 wild live 
specimens of Hermann’s 
tortoise (Testudo 
hermanni) and 
marginated tortoise 
(Testudo marginata), 
kept in poor conditions.  

Over 130 animal parts 
(birds and mammals, 
including porcupines and 
primates) found in 
personal luggage coming 
from South America. 

Administrative fine 
of EUR 5 000 – no 
court decision yet. 

Four-month prison 
sentence, fine of 
EUR 225 000 and 
confiscation.  

Ireland 

Irish national 

Fine of 

Croatia 

Seizure of 18 live wild 

Fine of EUR 500 and 

62 

 
 
 
EUR 1 250 and 
forfeit of 
specimens 
(value of 
EUR 2 000). 

Malta 

Fine of 
EUR 500 with 
three months in 
default. 

Slovenia 

Expulsion from 
Slovakia for two 
years and forfeit 
of specimens. 

found guilty of 
illegally importing 
six snakeskin 
handbags from 
Indonesia (Python 
reticulatus). 

Two Irish 
nationals 
convicted of 
illegally importing 
eight rhino horns, 
seized in Shannon 
Airport (arrival 
from Portugal). 

Two attempts by 
Ukrainian citizens 
to smuggle parrots 
from Slovakia to 
Ukraine in 2011 
(69 and 156 
specimens).  

Slovakia 

United 
Kingdom 

Sale of elephant 
ivory artefacts on 
eBay and 
subsequent export. 

United 
Kingdom 

80 hours of 
community 
service, 
10-week curfew 
order and 
GBP 500 
(approx. 
EUR 590) costs.  

specimens of Hermann’s 
tortoise (Testudo 
hermanni) with no 
permits in transit through 
Croatia from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to Italy.  

Individual found in 
possession of a Canadian 
lynx (Lynx canadensis) 
and a bobcat (Lynx rufus) 
declared to have been 
imported from the USA 
without CITES 
documentation. 

360 kg (7 784 dead 
specimens) of various 
bird species (including 
European turtle dove 
Streptopelia turtur) 
seized from vehicle, no 
documentation, criminal 
prosecution 

Attempted smuggling of 
24 boxes of live 
endangered Indonesian 
corals, 136 of which were 
banned species, weighing 
~0.5 tonnes into the UK 

Sale of imported 
specimens of endangered 
species including two 
leopard cat skulls and 
134 primate specimens 
(including monkey 
heads), and possession of 
images of bestiality  

confiscation of 
specimens. 

Fine of EUR 650 and 
confiscation of 
specimen.  

EUR 7 000 fine and 
destruction of all 
specimens.  

Charged with three 
illegal importation 
offences. Sentenced 
to 12 months 
imprisonment, 
suspended for 18 
months.  

Sentenced to 14 
months’ 
imprisonment, 
suspended for two 
years.  

63 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 2 

Case studies  

Case study 1 – Organised crime network trading in exotic birds in Spain  

Illustrating: 

- 

- 

- 

organised criminality relating to illegal wildlife trade; 

links  with  other  criminal  offences  (falsification  of  documents,  breach  of  relevant 
tax/financial regulations); and 

the high value of the specimens involved. 

In  a  recent  (2015)  criminal  case,  five  individuals  were  convicted  for  illegal  trade  in  and 
commercial sale of protected bird species in Spain. During a vehicle inspection, enforcement 
officials  seized  over  100  exotic  and  native  birds  on  the  grounds  that  the  animals  had  no 
documentation proving their origin.  

An  investigation  was  launched,  with  authorisation  for  wiretapping  and  search  warrants, 
during  which  officials  uncovered  a  complex,  professional  and  organised  criminal  network, 
involving many players from importer to final holder and seller of the specimens.  

Once the live birds had been imported into Spain, they were held at facilities and homes until 
the network acquired rings and microchips from dead legal specimens. A veterinarian was in 
charge  of  marking  the  illegally  sourced  specimens  to  comply  with  national  legislation.  The 
activities were further concealed by the falsification of invoices and documents as regards the 
number of birds actually sold.  

Birds  (including  very  rare  parrots  without  markings)  were  found  and  seized  at  the 
perpetrators’ premises for estimated values of EUR 35 000, EUR 66 000 and EUR 221 000. 

Source: Guardia Civil, Spain 

64 

 
Case  study  2  –  Organised  criminal  network  smuggling  birds  across  the  EU  and  the 
Middle East 

Illustrating:  

-  

-  

the involvement of organised criminal networks in illegal wildlife trade; and 

the use of mutual legal assistance in a cross-border investigation. 

In  April  2015,  two  individuals  were  convicted  of  participating  in  an  organised  criminal 
network smuggling protected and unprotected birds across EU Member States and the Middle 
East,  particularly  the  United  Arab  Emirates.  The  investigation  had  been  conducted  by  the 
Dutch  police  and  the  Dutch  Food  and  Consumer  Products  Safety  Authority,  who  (with 
mutual legal assistance from many EU and some Middle Eastern countries) uncovered a vast 
criminal network that had violated EU law and animal welfare legislation. 

The  main  suspect  was  sentenced  to  15  months  in  prison  (five  months  were  conditional), 
conditionally banned from trade in wildlife and given a fine of EUR 10 000. All specimens 
were confiscated. The other suspect was sentenced to 240 days in prison (129 of which were 
conditional). Both defendants have appealed.  

Source: Dutch Food and Consumer Products Safety Authority 

65 

 
 
 
Case study 3 - Belgian ruling on organised large-scale smuggling of birds across the EU 

Illustrating: 

- 

- 

a  clear  analysis  in  the  court  ruling,  through  reference  to  typical  features,  of  the 
involvement of organised crime; and 

conviction for laundering the proceeds of the crime, coupled with confiscations of illegal 
gains,  

In  2014,  Belgium  found  four  individuals  guilty  of  participating  in  an  organised  wildlife 
trafficking  operation  across  Europe.  This  was  the  result  of  a  long  and  extensive  judicial 
inquiry,  including  mutual  legal  assistance  between  Belgium,  the  UK,  Spain,  France, 
Germany, Austria and the Netherlands. 

The perpetrators were involved in the illegal taking of Annex A to Council Regulation (EC) 
No  338/97  listed  species  of  bird  eggs/infant  birds  (mainly  birds  of  prey)  from  the  wild  in 
France  and  Spain.  The  young  birds  were  hand-reared  and  ringed.  Through  forging  of  rings 
and breeders’ declarations, the defendants obtained CITES certificates for ‘captive born and 
bred’ specimens, which allowed them to offer the birds for sale in spite of the general ban on 
trade in Annex A species.  

The  operation  proved  extremely  profitable:  Bonelli’s  eagles  (Aquila  fasciata)  were  sold  for 
EUR 10 000,  bald  eagles  (Haliaeetus  leucocephalus)  for  EUR  5 000,  an  African  fish  eagle 
(Haliaeetus vocifer) for EUR 6 000 and a booted eagle (Hieraaetus pennatus) for EUR 5 000. 

The  four  defendants  were  found  guilty  of  participating  in  a  criminal  organisation  with 
branches in Spain, the UK, Austria, Germany, France and the Netherlands. Typical features 
of a criminal organisation identified by the court were a clear hierarchy and division of tasks, 
the use of authorities and establishing a zoo to gain credibility and access to the market. 

The defendants were also convicted of fraud regarding CITES export permits, failure to keep 
a CITES register and using illegal traps and nets. In addition, the leading defendant and his 
wife  were  convicted  of  laundering  the  profits  through  a  contractor  company.  Sanctions 
included fines, custodial sentences and confiscation of the gains.  

During  the  criminal  proceedings,  the  court  explicitly  compared  the  case  with  international 
drugs trafficking and highlighted that the defendants had taken advantage of the low political 
priority assigned to wildlife trafficking. 

Note: not final decision – appeal in progress. 

66 

 
Case study 4 – Organised criminal network smuggling rhino horns from South Africa to 
Asia via the Czech Republic 

Highlighting 

- the complex organised criminal networks operating in the illicit wildlife trade which utilise 
various modus operandi 

 Since 2011, the Czech  Republic had conducted criminal  investigations into illegal trade  of 
white rhinoceros horns involving South Africa and Vietnam.  

Prior  to  February  2015, white  rhinoceros  hunting  trophies  could  be  imported  to  the  EU  for 
personal purposes with a South African export permit alone (no import permit was required). 
Investigators found that organised criminal groups of Vietnamese financiers were recruiting 
Czech nationals as ‘pseudo-hunters’ and paying their expenses to travel to South Africa for 
bogus  ‘hunting  trips’.  These  included  people  with  no  previous  hunting  experience  and 
without  a  gun  licence,  some  of  whom  were  in  debt.  Their  details  were  used  to  export  the 
horns illegally from South Africa (at first directly, later via the Czech Republic) to Vietnam, 
where they were sold on the black market, responding to and fuelling a growing demand for 
rhino horns in the country.  

Following several seizures of rhino horns and 15 arrests between March 2012 and July 2013, 
the Vietnamese financiers changed the modus operandi and recruited legitimate hunters with 
firearms licences. The purpose remained the same: to abuse the EU rules on the legal import 
of hunting trophies for personal use only to channel the horns illegally to Vietnam.  

The Czech authority estimated the value of the rhino horns at up to about EUR 40 000/kg. 

The Vietnamese groups were also found to be active in trade in tiger bones, ivory and drugs.  

In total: 

-   between 2009 and 2015, 60 rhinos were hunted by Czech hunters in South Africa; it is 

believed that the intention in most cases was to smuggle them to Vietnam; 

-   28 rhino horns were seized in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Germany; 

-  

in July 2014, two people were sentenced to five years in prison and one person to three 
years for the illegal handling of protected species; they appealed; and 

-  

a further 16 people were indicted and are awaiting their sentence. 

67