Opinion of the European Central Bank of 3 February 2016 on the deposit guarantee scheme (CON/2016/6)
Date: 2016-02-03
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: Slovenia, bank deposit, central bank, credit guarantee, financial risk, financial stability, money-market liquidity

EN 

ECB-PUBLIC 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 3 February 2016 

on the deposit guarantee scheme 

(CON/2016/6) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On 12 January 2016, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Slovenian Ministry of 

Finance for an opinion on a draft law on the deposit guarantee scheme (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). 

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 

Functioning  of  the  European  Union,  and  the  third  and  sixth  indents  of  Article 2(1)  of  Council 
Decision 98/415/EC1,  as  the  draft  law  relates  to  Banka  Slovenije  and  to  rules  applicable  to  financial 

institutions  insofar  as  they  materially  influence  the  stability  of  financial  institutions  and  markets.  In 

accordance  with  the  first  sentence  of  Article 17.5  of  the  Rules  of  Procedure  of  the European Central 

Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion. 

1.   Purpose of the draft law 

1.1  The main purpose of the draft law is to replace the deposit guarantee scheme (DGS) in Slovenia 

with a new DGS to bring national law in line with Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council 2. 

1.2  The  DGS  is  currently  regulated  by  the Slovenian Law  on  banking 3. It is financed on an ex post 

basis and Banka Slovenije is responsible for operating certain aspects of the scheme. Under the 

current DGS, each participating bank is required to hold a certain amount of its assets, equivalent 

to the participating bank’s share in the guarantee, in liquid investments. Banka Slovenije activates 

the DGS in the event of a bank’s bankruptcy by calling on the participating banks to contribute their 

share  of  the  guarantee  and,  where  necessary,  by  requesting the  State  to cover any temporary 

financing needs of the DGS. Banka Slovenije then channels the collected funds to the bank it will 

have  appointed  to  pay  out  on  the  guaranteed  deposits.  When  the  claims  arising  from  the 

guaranteed deposits are repaid from the banks’ bankruptcy estate, Banka Slovenije re-allocates 

the funds it receives, back to the guaranteeing banks. Banka Slovenije, among other things, also 

regularly verifies the DGS mechanisms. 

1  

2  

3 

Council  Decision  98/415/EC  of  29 June  1998  on  the  consultation  of  the  European  Central  Bank  by  national 
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 
Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament  and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee schemes 
(OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 149). 
In  line  w ith  the  final  provisions  in Article 405 of the Law  on banking (ZBan-2) (Ur. l. RS No  25/15), the DGS is 
regulated in Chapter 8 of the Law  on banking (ZBan-1) (Ur. l. RS No 99/10 – official consolidated text, 52/11 – corr., 
9/11 – ZPlaSS-B, 35/11, 59/11, 85/11, 48/12, 105/12, 56/13, 63/13 – ZS-K, 96/13 and 25/15 – ZBan-2). 

 
 
 
 
                                              
 
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1.3  The  draft  law repeals the relevant provisions of the Law on banking, and the new scheme will be 

now  governed  by  a  separate  legislative  act.  The  DGS  system  will entail the establishment of a 

deposit  guarantee fund (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Fund’), and the procedures for payment of 

unavailable guaranteed deposits in the failing bank and, as the case may be, for the financing of 

resolution or compulsory winding-up measures in which depositors continue to have access to their 

guaranteed deposits. The new scheme will be financed on an ex ante basis. It will be administered 

by  Banka  Slovenije,  which  is  the  designated  authority  for  the  DGS.  Banka  Slovenije  will  be 
responsible for the following4. 

(i) 

Establishing and managing the Fund. The Fund will not be a legal entity, but will be set up as 

a dedicated pool of assets with its own capacity, by law, to be the holder of certain rights and 

obligations, and to be a party to legal proceedings, that will be managed by Banka Slovenije. 

The Fund will be managed separately from other assets and liabilities that Banka Slovenije 

manages on its own behalf or on behalf of third parties, and Banka Slovenije will not be liable 

for the obligations of the Fund. In its capacity as manager of the Fund, Banka Slovenije will 

make  decisions  on  the  operation  of  the  Fund,  and  will  represent  the  Fund vis-à-vis  third 
parties 5. Management of the Fund by Banka Slovenije will include, in particular, the following 

tasks:  (a)  determining  the  target  level  of  the  Fund,  whereby  its  minimum  level  will,  by 

3 July 2024,  amount  to  0.8 %  of  all guaranteed  deposits  in  Slovenia;  (b) determining the 

level of, and collecting, the upfront contributions and the extraordinary contributions to the 
Fund  of  each  participating  bank,  taking account of the ECB’s competences 6 arising from 
Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 7; (c) determining the investment policy of the Fund 

and  investing  its  assets;  and  (d)  entering  into  alternative  financing  arrangements  for  the 

Fund,  if  necessary. While the financial resources of the Fund will be ensured primarily by 

means of regular and, if necessary, extraordinary contributions by participating banks as well 

as  income  from  the  Fund’s investments, the Fund’s financial resources may also include 

(i) borrowing  from  the  market,  in  particular  through  issuing  bonds,  and  (ii)  other  loans. 
Temporary financing may be provided to the Fund also by the State8. 

(ii) 

Establishing,  verifying,  also  through  stress  testing,  and  updating  procedures  and 

arrangements for paying out on guaranteed deposits, including determining the amounts to 

be paid out on guaranteed deposits and providing relevant information to the bank appointed 

by Banka Slovenije to make payments to depositors. 

(iii)  Activities  related  to  the  use  of  the  Fund’s  assets  in  resolution or compulsory winding-up 

measures where depositors continue to have access to their guaranteed deposits. 

4  

5  

6  
7  

8  

See Articles 21 and 27 of the draft law , listing the tasks of Banka Slovenije, w hich are further described in individual 
Articles of the draft law . 
Such a set up w as also envisaged in the earlier draft legislative act proposing, inter alia, amendments to the current 
DGS,  on  w hich  the  ECB  issued  Opinion  CON/2014/79  (see  paragraphs  1.5,  4  and  6  of  that  opinion).  The 
amendments relating to the DGS w ere, how ever, not adopted at the time. All ECB opinions are published on the 
ECB’s w ebsite at w w w .ecb.europa.eu. 
See Articles 31(5) and 32(4) of the draft law . 
Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank 
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63). 
See Article 30 of the draft law . 

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(iv)  Supervision of banks as regards their obligations arising from their participation in the DGS. 

(v)  Drawing up the accounts of the Fund 9 and preparing and publishing, every year, a report on 

the activities related to the operation of the DGS 10. 

1.4   Costs incurred by Banka Slovenije in performing its tasks as administrator of the DGS and, more 

specifically,  as  manager  of  the  Fund,  will  be  met  from  the  Fund  or  from  charges  levied  on 
participating banks 11. 

1.5  Further, the draft law provides that Banka Slovenije may, exceptionally, grant a loan to the Fund if 

the Fund is unable, taking into account the conditions on the financial markets and the breakdown 

of investments of the Fund, to ensure the necessary liquidity to meet its obligations under the draft 

law  in  a  timely  manner  and  without  disproportionate  losses,  which  could  in  turn  threaten  the 

stability of the financial system. Such loans may, taking into account Article 123 of the Treaty, be 

granted by Banka Slovenije only if the following conditions are met: (i) the loan is short-term; and 
(ii) the loan is based on adequate collateral 12. 

2. 

General observations 

2.1  The  ECB  supports  the  establishment  of  an  ex  ante  funded  DGS  in  Slovenia,  in  line  with  the 

common framework for DGSs laid down in Directive 2014/49/EU. 

2.2  The  ECB  stresses,  however, that this opinion does not address whether the draft law effectively 

implements  the  Directive  2014/49/EU  in  Slovenian  law.  Rather,  the  ECB  focuses  on  those 

provisions  that may impact on the role and tasks of Banka Slovenije as a central bank and as a 

member of the Eurosystem and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). 

2.3  The ECB has developed the guidance set out in paragraphs 2.3.1 to 2.3.3 on the basis of which it 

may decide whether a new task conferred on an NCB is to be considered a central banking task or 

a government task for the purposes of assessing such conferral against the prohibition of monetary 
financing13. This guidance applies to genuinely new tasks that either did not exist in the past or did 

not form an integral part of the central banking tasks assigned to an NCB in the past. In recognition 

of the different Member States’ legal frameworks, central banking traditions and national set-ups, 

the  tasks  currently  discharged  by  an  NCB  as  central  banking  tasks  are  not  reviewed  and 

recategorised, but may be reassessed if they are subject to legislative amendments of substance. 

In  this  regard,  the  ECB  notes  that  the  draft law changes some of the essential elements of the 

Slovenian DGS. While the tasks currently performed by Banka Slovenije in relation to the operation 

of the Slovenian DGS are similar in certain respects to the tasks conferred on Banka Slovenije by 

the  draft  law,  the  tasks  conferred  on Banka  Slovenije by the draft law are substantially wider in 

scope and it is appropriate, therefore, to assess whether those new tasks are compatible with the 

prohibition  of  monetary  financing  under  Article 123  of  the  Treaty.  The  concrete  assessment  of 

9  
10  
11  
12  
13  

See Article 40 of the draft law . 
See Article 21(5) of the draft law . 
See Article 24 and Article 27(5) of the draft law . 
See Article 35 of the draft law . 
See Opinion CON/2015/22. 

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whether  Banka  Slovenije’s new  tasks  in  the  operation  of  the  DGS are to be considered central 

banking tasks or government tasks is undertaken in paragraph 3.1. 

2.3.1  General considerations 

First, the principle of financial independence requires that Member States may not put their NCBs 

in  a  position  in  which  they  have  insufficient  financial  resources  to  carry  out  their  ESCB  or 

Eurosystem-related tasks, as applicable. 

Second,  central  banking tasks comprise, in particular, those tasks that are related to the tasks 

listed in Article 127(2), (5) and (6) of the Treaty. 

Third,  new  tasks  conferred  on  an  NCB  which  are  atypical  of  NCBs’ tasks, or which are clearly 

discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government or of other public entities, 

should  be  considered government tasks. In that context, a distinction should be drawn between 

liquidity  and  solvency-related  tasks  of  NCBs. While, for the purposes of the monetary financing 

prohibition, solvency support is a government task, liquidity-related tasks, the ultimate objective of 

which are to finance the economy, are central banking tasks. 

2.3.2  Specific considerations 

In  principle,  tasks  related  to  a  DGS  can  be  assigned  to  an  NCB  provided  that  they  do  not 
undermine its independence in accordance with Article 130 of the Treaty 14. As far as central bank 

involvement  in  a DGS is concerned, in particular, funding arrangements for a DGS must comply 

with the monetary financing prohibition laid down in the Treaty, and in particular with the prohibition 

of NCBs providing overdraft  facilities or any type of credit facility within the meaning of Article 123 
of the Treaty 15. The same is true with regard to the financing of the costs of operating the DGS. 

An important criterion for qualifying a new task as a government task is the impact of the task on 

the institutional, financial and personal independence of the NCB. In particular, the following should 

be taken into account. 

First,  it  should  be  assessed  whether  the  performance  of  the  new  task  creates  inadequately-

addressed  conflicts  of  interests  with  existing  central  banking  tasks,  and  does  not  necessarily 

complement those existing central banking tasks. If a conflict of interest arises between existing 

and new tasks, there should be sufficient mitigation in place to adequately address that conflict. 

Complementarity between the new task and existing central banking tasks should not, however, be 

interpreted  extensively,  so  as  to  lead  to  the  creation  of  an  indefinite  chain  of  ancillary  tasks. 

Complementarity should also be examined from the point of view of the financing of those tasks. 

Second,  it  should  be  assessed  whether without new financial resources the performance of the 

new  task  is  disproportionate  to  the  financial  or  organisational  capacity  of  the  NCB  and  may 

negatively impact its capacity to properly perform existing central banking tasks. 

Third,  it  should  be  assessed  whether  the  performance  of  the  new  task  does  not  fit  into  the 

institutional  set-up  of  the  NCB  in  the  light  of  central  bank  independence  and  accountability 

considerations. 

14  
15  

See Opinion CON/2015/52. 
See paragraph 9.3 of Opinion CON/2011/12. 

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Fourth, it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task gives rise to substantial 

financial risks. 

Fifth, it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task exposes the members of the 

NCB’s decision-making bodies to political risks which are disproportionate and which may impact 

on  their  personal  independence  and,  in  particular,  the  guarantee  of  the  term  of  office  under 

Article 14.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central 

Bank. 

2.3.3  Any final assessment on the qualification of a task conferred on an NCB as either falling within the 

scope of a central banking task or a government task will be guided by the objective of ensuring the 

consistent application of the prohibition of monetary financing within the Eurosystem and the ESCB 

to the extent that it applies to its members. 

3. 

Specific observations 

3.1  Conferral on Bank a Slovenije of task s related to the DGS 

The draft law designates Banka Slovenije as the authority with responsibility for administering the 

new DGS and within that scheme for managing the Fund. The draft law adapts and extends Banka 

Slovenije’s  current  DGS-related  tasks  and  responsibilities.  In  light  of  the  guidance  set  out  in 

paragraphs 2.3.1  to  2.3.3,  it  is  appropriate  to  assess  whether  Banka  Slovenije’s  tasks  and 

responsibilities in this field are compatible with the monetary financing prohibition. 

3.1.1  New task s 

With the revised set-up of the DGS, Banka Slovenije’s existing tasks as described in paragraph 1.2 

will be adapted and more comprehensively regulated under the new DGS, in particular to include 

the tasks set out in paragraph 1.3. 

3.1.2  Principle of financial independence 

The  principle  of  financial  independence  requires  an  NCB  to  have  sufficient  means  not  only  to 

perform its ESCB-related tasks but also its own national tasks (e.g. financing its administration and 
own operations)16. When allocating specific non-ESCB related tasks to the NCBs, such as tasks in 

the area of deposit protection, additional human and financial resources must also be allocated so 

that these tasks can be carried out in a manner that will not affect the NCBs’ operational capacity to 
perform  its  ESCB-related  tasks 17.  The  ECB  notes  that  the  draft  law  stipulates  that  Banka 

Slovenije’s  actual  costs for  operating  the  DGS  are  to  be  covered by  means  of the payment by 
participating banks of a sum equivalent to the annual costs related to management of the DGS18 
and, specifically for managing the Fund, directly from the Fund19. The ECB welcomes the fact that 

the  draft  law  provides  for  the  financing  of  costs  related to Banka Slovenije’s DGS-related tasks 

from participating banks’ contributions and charges. The ECB thus understands that all expenses 

16  

See the ECB’s 2014 Convergence Report, p. 25. See also paragraph 3.1.5 of Opinion CON/2009/93, paragraph 3.1 
of Opinion CON/2011/5, paragraph 4 of Opinion CON/2012/74, and paragraph 4 of Opinion CON/2013/29. 
17  
See, for example, paragraph 4 of Opinion CON/2012/74. 
18    See Article 24 and Articles 27(5) and 41(4) of the draft law . 
19  

See point (3) of Article 27(3) and Article 27(5) of the draft law . 

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related to functions to be performed by Banka Slovenije as the designated authority for the DGS 

will be fully covered by the participating banks. Against this backdrop, the new tasks entrusted to 

Banka  Slovenije should  not  affect  the  resources  it  currently allocates for the performance of its 

monetary policy and other existing tasks. However, with regard to the recovery of the costs by way 

of an annual invoice or by recovering them directly from the Fund, the ECB notes that restoration of 

the costs related to the management of the DGS should be done in a timely manner, and invites 

the consulting authority to consider a cost recovery mechanism that would mirror the system for 
payment of costs related to Banka Slovenije’s supervisory or resolution tasks 20. 

3.1.3  Link s to task s listed in Article 127(5) of the Treaty 

As the ECB has observed in previous opinions 21, central banks are in general in a good position to 

take  on  responsibility  for  contributing  to  financial  stability,  given  their  insight  into  money  and 

financial  market  developments  and  their  involvement  in  payment  systems  and monetary policy 

operations. At the same time, DGSs are a key element of the financial safety net. Therefore, the 

governance framework should ensure that the important function of such schemes is carried out 

professionally and efficiently. Moreover, effective coordination with the overall role of central banks 

in  safeguarding financial stability should be ensured. This aim may be achieved through, among 

other  things,  maintaining  adequate  involvement  of  the  central  bank  in  the  governance  and 

regulation of the national DGS. 

3.1.4  Atypical task s 

A number of Member States have conferred on their NCBs a role in the operation of their DGSs. 

The tasks of an NCB with regard to the operation of the DGS could therefore be regarded as tasks 

that  are  not  atypical  of  a  central  bank.  As  noted  in  paragraph  1.2,  Banka  Slovenije  is  also 

responsible for tasks related to the operation of the current Slovenian DGS. 

3.1.5  Discharge of tasks on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the Government or of other public 

entities 

A  number  of central banks in the ESCB perform certain tasks related to the operation of DGSs. 

These tasks are closely linked to their task of contributing to financial stability, and may therefore 

be regarded as being not atypical of a central bank. At the same time, it is noted that, where an 

NCB performs the entire range of administrative and operational tasks related to the functioning of 

a DGS, that NCB is carrying out not only tasks which are related to financial stability matters, but 

also tasks more typically pertaining to the governmental authority, as reflected in the obligation of 

Member  States  under  Directive  2014/49/EU  to  ensure  that  a  DGS  is  introduced  and officially 

20  

21  

The actual costs of supervisory and resolution tasks performed by Banka Slovenije are recovered from supervised 
banks through the payment of an annual fee in tw o instalments. Banka Slovenije issues one invoice for payment of 
the first instalment before 30 September of the current year based on the projected cost of supervision for the year, 
and the invoice for the second instalment by 31 March of the follow ing year for the previous year, taking into account 
the actual costs of supervision in the past year (see Article 238 of the ZBan-2). For the management of the national 
resolution fund, Banka Slovenije is separately repaid for management costs directly from the resolution fund itself, by 
deducting monthly from the fund the average of the projected costs, w hile follow ing the end of a financial year, 
Banka Slovenije calculates the actual costs incurred in the previous financial year and records any difference in 
comparison to the projected costs as an income/expense of the resolution fund in the current financial year (see 
Article 5 of Banka Slovenije’s Decision on the resolution fund investment policy and management costs, issued on 
the basis of the Law  on the Bank Resolution Authority and Fund (ZOSRB) (Ur. l. RS No 97/14 and 91/15). 
See paragraph 3.2.3 of Opinion CON/2015/52, paragraph 4.2 of Opinion CON/2008/51 and paragraph 3.3 of Opinion 
CON/2007/26. 

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recognised within its territory. Insofar as Banka Slovenije is entrusted with such governmental (as 

distinct  from  central  banking)  functions,  the  respective  tasks  would  be  discharged  by  Banka 

Slovenije in the exclusive interest of the Government. The ECB interprets the draft law as reflecting 

this balance between governmental and central banking tasks in the field of DGSs by, on the one 

hand,  establishing the Fund as a separate pool of assets outside the legal personality of Banka 

Slovenije and, on the other hand, designating Banka Slovenije as the sole authority responsible for 

operating  the  DGS.  In  the  exercise  of its  public  functions  under  the  draft  law,  Banka Slovenije 

would act on its own behalf, and not on behalf of any other administrative authority. 

3.1.6  Extent to which conflicts of interests with existing Bank a Slovenije task s are addressed and the 

performance  of  task s  fits  into  Bank a  Slovenije’s institutional set-up in the light of central bank  

independence and accountability considerations 

Pursuant to the draft law, Banka Slovenije is required to adopt internal rules, to be published on its 

website,  establishing organisational  arrangements  for the performance of its DGS-related tasks 

such as to prevent conflicts of interests arising between the tasks performed by Banka Slovenije 
with regard to managing the DGS and its other duties 22. The ECB expects these internal rules to 

properly address any conflicts of interest ensuing from the tasks conferred on Banka Slovenije in 

relation to the DGS. The performance of Banka Slovenije’s tasks in the context of the new DGS fits 

into Banka Slovenije’s institutional set-up, which has already been adapted to take account of its 
functions in the operation of the current DGS and in asset management 23. 

The performance of the DGS-related tasks does not raise any issues arising out of accountability 

considerations. The draft law requires Banka Slovenije to draw up financial accounts of the Fund, 

have  them audited by an authorised auditor and include them in a report on the activities related to 
the operation of the DGS, to be prepared on an annual basis and published on its website24. 

3.1.7  Extent  to  which  the  performance  of  task s  is  proportionate  to  Bank a  Slovenije’s  financial  and 

operational capacity and its ability to perform ESCB-related task s 

In  order  to  remain  financially  independent, Banka Slovenije must have sufficient means to carry 

out,  not  only  its  ESCB-related  tasks from an operational and financial point of view, but also its 

national tasks. In this regard, the ECB welcomes the fact that the draft law specifies that Banka 

Slovenije’s actual costs arising from its DGS-related tasks, including the management of the Fund, 

are to be reimbursed by the banks participating in the DGS, or directly by the Fund. However, as 

noted above, with regard to the recovery of the costs by way of an annual invoice, the ECB notes 

that  such  reimbursement  related  to  the  management  of  the  DGS  should  be  done  in  a  timely 

manner and invites the consulting authority to consider a cost recovery mechanism similar to the 
one in place for the NCB’s supervisory and resolution functions 25. 

22  
23  

24  
25  

See Article 5(2) and (3) of the draft law . 
Banka Slovenije is entrusted w ith the task of managing the assets held in the national resolution fund on the basis of 
the Law  on the Bank Resolution Authority and Fund, also adopted as a separate legal act and not as part of the Law  
on banking as initially envisaged (see also Opinion CON/2014/79). The Law  on the Bank Resolution Authority and 
Fund w as adopted shortly after the publication of Opinion CON/2014/79, in December 2014. 
See Article 21(5) and Article 40 of the draft law . 
For more details see footnote 20 above.  

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3.1.8  Extent to which the performance of task s involves substantial financial risk s 

The  ECB  welcomes  the  fact  that  the  draft  law  clarifies  the  liability  regime  applicable  to Banka 
Slovenije when  acting  in its capacity as operator of the DGS 26. However, and in particular since 

Banka  Slovenije  has  been  entrusted  with  a  full  range  of  administrative  and  operational  tasks 

related to the functioning of the DGS, which may be regarded as government tasks, the consulting 

authority may wish to consider whether any limitations of liability for a potential mismanagement of 

the  DGS  or  the  Fund,  are  warranted  such  as  to  shield  Banka  Slovenije  from  any  substantial 

financial risks that may potentially arise following an allegation of misconduct on the part of Banka 

Slovenije.  

3.1.9  Conclusion 

The draft law takes due account of the concerns that may arise due to entrusting Banka Slovenije 

with the full range of tasks in relation to operating the DGS, which may be regarded as a mixture of 

central banking financial stability and governmental tasks. In this respect, the draft law takes due 

account of the need to ensure that Banka Slovenije will not finance the DGS, including with regard 

to  any  backstop  financing  (if  extraordinary contributions from the participating banks as well as 

funds from the other sources are unavailable or insufficient) which should be ensured by the State. 

A few elements in the draft law could, however, be further developed. In particular, while it is noted 

that  all  expenses related to functions to be performed by Banka Slovenije as the operator of the 

DGS will be fully covered, the compensation of the costs related to the management of the DGS 

and the Fund should be done in a timely manner. Thus, the ECB invites the consulting authority to 

consider a cost recovery mechanism that would mirror the system for payment of costs related to 

Banka Slovenije’s supervisory or resolution tasks as indicated in paragraph 3.1.2 above. Further, it 

could be considered whether any limitations of liability for mismanagement of the DGS or the Fund, 

respectively, would be warranted such as to shield Banka Slovenije from any substantial financial 

risks that may potentially arise following an allegation of misconduct on the part of Banka Slovenije. 

3.2  Provision of liquidity from Bank a Slovenije to the Fund 

Separately  from  Banka  Slovenije’s  role  in  the  operation  of  the DGS, the draft law allows for the 
provision of liquidity by Banka Slovenije to the Fund by way of exceptional loans27. As the ECB has 

repeatedly  stated  in  the  past,  any  national  legislation  that  provides  for  a  national  DGS  to  be 

financed by an ESCB national central bank would only be compatible with the monetary financing 

prohibition  under  Article  123  of the Treaty where certain restrictive conditions are met, i.e. such 

financing is short-term, it addresses urgent situations, systemic stability issues are at stake and 
decisions  are  made  at  the  NCB’s  discretion 28.  The  ECB  understands  that  the draft  law  takes 

account of these criteria. 

26 
27  
28  

See also paragraph 6 of Opinion CON/2014/79. 
See Article 35 of the draft law . 
See the ECB’s 2014 Convergence Report, p. 30. See also, most recently, paragraph 3.1 of Opinion CON/2016/3 and 
paragraph  2.3.2  of  Opinion  CON/2015/52,  as  w ell as paragraph 3.2 of Opinion CON/2015/40; paragraph 4.1 of 
Opinion CON/2015/17; and paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2014/86. 

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3.3 

Involvement of the ECB in determining the methodology for calculating regular contributions 

Article  31(5)  of  the  draft  law  provides  for  the  involvement  of  the  ECB  in  determining  the 

methodology  to  be  used  for  calculating  regular  contributions,  based  on  Article  13(2)  of 

Directive 2014/49/EU. Such reference should not be construed as conferring on the ECB the tasks 

in question. The ECB notes that only Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 confers prudential tasks on 

the ECB, in accordance with Article 127(6) of the Treaty. 

This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.  

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 3 February 2016. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Mario DRAGHI 

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