COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT BULGARIA : Technical Report Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on Progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification mechanism
Date: 2016-02-01
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Bulgaria, corruption, judicial reform, organised crime

EN 

   EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 1.2.2016  SWD(2016) 15 final/2   Corrigendum Annule et remplace le document SWD(2016) 15 final du  27 janvier 2016. Concerne la version EN, notes de bas de page 24 et 85. COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT BULGARIA : Technical Report Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on Progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification mechanism {COM(2016) 40 final}  
 
 
Benchmarks  to  be  addressed  by  Bulgaria  pursuant  to  Commission  Decision  of  13/XII/2006 
establishing a mechanism for cooperation and verification of progress in Bulgaria to address specific 
benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and the fight against corruption and organised crime: 

Benchmark  1:  Adopt  Constitutional  amendments  removing  any  ambiguity  regarding  the 
independence and accountability of the judicial system 

Benchmark  2:  Ensure  a  more  transparent  and  efficient  judicial  process  by  adopting  and 
implementing  a  new  judicial  system  act  and  the  new  civil  procedure  code.  Report  on  the 
impact of these new laws and of the penal and administrative procedure codes, notably on the 
pre-trial phase 

Benchmark  3:  Continue  the  reform  of  the  judiciary  in  order  to  enhance  professionalism, 
accountability  and  efficiency.  Evaluate  the  impact  of  this  reform  and  publish  the  results 
annually 

Benchmark 4: Conduct and report on professional, non-partisan investigations into allegations 
of  high-level  corruption.  Report  on  internal  inspections  of  public  institutions  and  on  the 
publication of assets of high-level officials 

Benchmark  5:  Take  further  measures  to  prevent  and  fight  corruption,  in  particular  at  the 
borders and within local government 

Benchmark  6:  Implement  a  strategy  to  fight  organised  crime,  focussing  on  serious  crime, 
money laundering as well as on the systematic confiscation of assets of criminals. Report on 
new and ongoing investigations, indictments and convictions in these areas 

2 

 
 
 
I  

INTRODUCTION 

This report presents the information on which the Commission has based its assessment of Bulgaria's 
progress under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) since the last report of 28 January 
2015. Its content reflects the ongoing monitoring  of developments in Bulgaria over the past year by 
the  Commission  and  draws  upon  information  provided  by  the  national  executive  and  judicial 
authorities, civil society organisations, international institutions, and other Member States, as well as 
independent  observers  and  experts.  The  Commission  relies  on  the  constructive  cooperation  of  the 
Bulgarian authorities who provide a broad range of detailed information both in written form and in 
meetings  during  the  regular  visits  of  Commission  services  and  national  experts  to  Bulgaria. 
Independent  experts  from  other  Member  States  have  provided  valuable  input  to  the  analysis  in  the 
context of an expert mission to Bulgaria in September 2015. In addition to regular technical missions 
by  Commission  services,  the  Commission  maintains  a  regular  presence  in  Bulgaria  via  its 
representation  in  Sofia.1  The  information  contained  in  this  report  remains  the  responsibility  of  the 
Commission services.  

The  CVM  is  not  only  about  monitoring  of  progress.  The  Commission  also  assists  the  Bulgarian 
authorities  in  their  efforts.  In  particular,  assistance  is  provided  to  Bulgaria  in  many  areas  under  the 
European Structural and Investment Funds.  During the 2007-2013 programming period €51 million 
were  allocated  to  calls  for  applications  from  the  judiciary  under  Operational  Programme  for 
Administrative  Capacity.  Due  to  the  budgetary  restrictions  and  changing  priorities,  only  around  25 
million  euro  has  been  contracted  and  18  million  euro  has  finally  been  disbursed.  Under  the  new 
programming period 2014-2020 a specific priority axis for the judiciary has been included in the new 
Operational Programme for Good Governance with an allocation of €30.1 million euro. 

The report is structured in accordance with the main areas covered by the CVM: judicial independence 
and  accountability;  reform  of  the  legal  framework;  quality  and  efficiency  of  the  judiciary;  the  fight 
against corruption (both high-level and more generally); and the fight against organised crime.  

II  

INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE JUDICIARY 

Judicial  independence  is  one  of  the  cornerstones  of  a  democratic  society  based  on  the  rule  of  law. 
Impartial courts provide the assurance for citizens and businesses that they can call upon the State to 
protect and enforce their legitimate interests through a fair and transparent legal process. Magistrates 
should be able  to make decisions solely on the basis of the law with impartiality and independence, 
free  from  undue  interference  by  outside  interests.  At  the  same  time,  the  judiciary  needs  to  be 
accountable to society. Arbitrary decisions reflecting personal interest or bias need to be kept in check 
through  appropriate  procedures.  Illegalities  and  corruption  should  be  addressed  via  appropriate 
preventive  and  restrictive  measures.  Decisions  such  as  appointments  to  key  judicial  offices  and  the 
allocation of cases to individual magistrates should be made in an open and transparent manner.  

In its 2015 CVM report the Commission recommended Bulgaria to pursue a reform of the organisation 
of  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council  (SJC),  to  apply  objective  standards  of  merit,  integrity  and 
transparency to appointments within the judiciary and make these in a timely manner, to swiftly elect a 
new chief judicial inspector, to improve the security of the system for random allocation of cases in 
courts, and to perform rigorous and impartial investigations into all cases where suspicions of possible 
tampering with the system had been raised. 

2.1.   Reform of the key judicial institutions  

In  Bulgaria  the  central  institution  entrusted  with  the  governance  of  the  judiciary  is  the  Supreme 
Judicial  Council  (SJC).2  In  addition,  the  Bulgarian  Constitution  also  provides  for  an  independent 

1   A CVM Resident Adviser is stationed in the Representation in Sofia. 
2   The SJC consists of 25 members,  11 elected by the National Assembly, 11 elected by the different branches 
of the judiciary (6 judges, 4 prosecutors and 1 investigating magistrate) as well as three ex officio members 

3 

 
 
                                                            
 
judicial inspectorate within the SJC, which reports to the SJC but is directly elected by the National 
Assembly.3 Both institutions were the object of new reform proposals in 2015, flowing from a judicial 
reform strategy adopted by the incoming Bulgarian government at the end of 2014. Endorsed by the 
National  Assembly  before  the  last  CVM  report  in  January  2015,  this  strategy  provides  a 
comprehensive blueprint for the reform of the Bulgarian judiciary. A key element of the strategy is a 
reform  of  the  SJC  aiming  at  the  creation  of  two  separate  chambers  to  deal  with  staff  matters  - 
appointments,  promotions  and  disciplinary  proceedings 
judges  and 
prosecutors/investigators. These reform ideas are in part a response to long-standing concerns that the 
current SJC structure does not effectively protect judicial independence in the Bulgarian context, due 
to  the  proportion  of  political  nominees,  and  that  representatives  of  the  prosecutor's  office  could 
influence  decisions  regarding  judges  and  vice  versa.4  They  also  reflect  a  desire  to  conform  to 
international standards as set out by the Venice Commission (see below). The proposed solution was 
to  restructure  the  SJC  in  such  a  manner  that  the  decisions  on  career  and  disciplinary  matters 
concerning judges would be taken by a college composed of a majority of judges elected by judges, 
whereas decisions concerning prosecutors and investigating magistrates would be taken by a college 
of prosecutors and investigating magistrates.5  

respectively 

for 

- 

Initially it was expected that the reform would be carried out through legislative amendments to the 
Judicial  System  Act.  However,  in  April  the  government  concluded  that  Constitutional  amendments 
were  needed.  Draft  amendments  were  introduced  for  debate  in  the  National  Assembly  in  July 
following  a  compromise  among  political  formations  (given  the  enhanced  majorities  needed  for 
Constitutional  change).  Prior  to  this,  several  proposals  for  change  had  been  promoted  by  different 
political formations and also debated widely in the different branches of the judiciary.6 The package of 
draft amendments included the establishment of separate chambers to deal with personnel matters for 
judges and prosecutors and set out the detailed division of competences between the plenary and the 
chambers.7  In  addition,  the  draft  amendments  envisaged  a  strengthening  of  the  judicial  inspectorate, 
which  would  be  given  competences  to  check  the  integrity  and  conflicts  of  interests  of  magistrates, 
including the verification of their property declarations.  

At first reading in early September the draft amendments were supported by a total of 184 out of 240 
members of the National Assembly. This would have allowed moving  quickly to a  second  reading.8 

(the Presidents of the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court, and the Prosecutor 
General). It has wide-ranging powers to set up and close down courts and prosecution offices, appoint and 
promote  magistrates,  carry  out  disciplinary  proceedings,  manage  the  budget  of  the  entire  judiciary,  etc. 
(Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, Article 130a.)  

3   The ISJC consists of a chief inspector and ten inspectors and is assisted by technical staff. The inspectors are 
elected by 2/3 majority in the National Assembly for a four year term (five years for the chief inspector). It 
has  responsibility  for  examining  the  operation  of  the  judicial  authorities,  without  prejudice  to  judicial 
independence,  and  approaching  other  state  bodies,  including  the  competent  judicial  bodies,  with  alerts, 
proposals  and  reports.  It  presents  an  annual  report  to  the  SJC  on  the  operation  of  the  judicial  authorities. 
(Constitution, Article 132a.) 

4   See previous reports in 2014 (COM(2014) 36 final, p.3) and 2015 (COM(2015) 36 final, p.3).  
5   Updated  strategy  to  continue  the  reform  of  the  judicial  system  adopted  by  decision  of  the  Council  of 

Ministers on 17 December 2014. 

6   A  separate  issue  of  debate  was  the  possible  need  to  convene  a  Grand  National  Assembly,  a  somewhat 
complex procedure. Changes to the Constitution can be adopted by the ordinary National Assembly provided 
they  do  not  fall  within  the  scope  of  issues  reserved  for  a  Grand  National  Assembly  –  such  as,  notably, 
changes  to  modify  the  form  of  state  organisation  and  the  form  of  government.  This  debate  may  have 
contributed to limiting the extent of the amendments proposed.  

7   Notably  the  separate  chambers  should  be  responsible  for  appointments  for  all  magistrates  except  for  the 
Prosecutor General and the chairs of the two supreme courts, who will still be appointed by the President of 
the Republic on a proposal of the plenary of the SJC. 

8   Constitutional amendments require a three-quarters majority among the members of the National Assembly 
(180  votes)  in  three  separate  readings.  If  they  are  carried  by  a  majority  of  two-thirds  (160  votes),  a  new 
hearing can be scheduled after two months. (Constitution, Articles 153-158.)  

4 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Nevertheless,  it  was  decided  to  postpone  the  second  reading  until  after  the  local  elections  of  25 
October.  The  Constitutional  Court  was  also  consulted  between  the  first  and  second  reading,  but 
decided that the request was inadmissible, as it did not find it had competence to pronounce itself on 
draft amendments which had not yet been formally adopted. Meanwhile, the National Assembly also 
requested  an  opinion  of  the  Venice  Commission  of  the  Council  of  Europe  on  the  proposed 
amendments.  The  opinion,  published  in  October  2015,  was  supportive,  but  concluded  that  the 
proposed reforms did not go deep enough.9 It reiterated that the Venice Commission favours systems 
of Supreme Judicial Council composition with a substantial element or a majority of members elected 
by  the  judiciary  itself.  The  opinion  also  referred  to  a  recommendation  of  the  Council  of  Europe's 
committee of ministers stating that not less than half of the members of such councils for the judiciary 
should be judges chosen by their peers.  

The  issue  of  how  to  allocate  the  parliamentary  quota  between  the  judges'  and  the  prosecutors' 
chambers  turned  out  to  be  a  key  issue  in  the  National  Assembly.  The  proposed  amendments  set  out 
how the current 25 posts in the SJC were to be divided between the two chambers. This solution was 
dictated by the desire to ensure that the amendments could be adopted at National Assembly level,10 
but it also created a certain zero-sum logic opposing the interests of judges and prosecutors in regard 
to  the  distribution  of  the  11-member  parliamentary  quota.  The  initial  proposal  was  for  the  judges' 
chamber  to  consist  of  the  two  Supreme  Court  presidents  and  six  judges  elected  by  their  peers,  in 
addition to five members from the parliamentary quota. The prosecutorial chamber would consist of 
the Prosecutor General, four prosecutors and one investigating magistrate elected by their peers, and 
six  members  from  the  parliamentary  quota.  The  logic  of  this  distribution  was  that  it  observed  the 
principle that judges elected by judges should outnumber political appointees in the body dealing with 
personnel  matters  for  judges.  As  the  overall  distribution  of  seats  between  the  political  and  judicial 
quota  was  considered  to  be  beyond  debate,  this  would  automatically  require  a  higher  number  of 
political nominees in the prosecutorial chamber. Furthermore, given the highly centralised structure of 
the prosecution service in Bulgaria, proponents of the amendment argued that a stronger representation 
of politically appointed members in the prosecutorial college could be helpful in terms of opening up 
the  prosecution  to  accountability  towards  the  wider  society.  Nevertheless,  the  proposal  created  a 
strong  reaction  from  the  Prosecutor  General,  on  the  grounds  that  the  proposed  distribution  risked 
exposing the prosecution to political interference.  

The  issue  came  to  a  head  during  a  second  reading  vote  at  the  National  Assembly  on  9  December 
where a decision was taken in favour of the position of the Prosecutor General. An amendment tabled 
during  the  committee  stage  was  adopted  moving  one  member  of  the  parliamentary  quota  from  the 
prosecutorial chamber to the judges' chamber. This prompted the resignation of the Minister of Justice, 
who took it as a sign of lack of willingness on the part of the parliamentary majority to protect judicial 
independence and carry through with the reform of the judiciary. The President of Bulgaria reacted by 
calling  for  a  deep  and  comprehensive  reform  of  the  judiciary,  building  further  on  the  adopted 

9   On the core issue of the structure of the SJC, the Venice Commission generally supports the establishment of 
the separate chambers for judges and prosecutors. However, the opinion states that the reform could go even 
further  by  introducing  a  qualified  majority  requirement  for  the  election  of  the  parliamentary  quota, 
reconsidering  the  division  of  competencies  between  the  plenum  and  the  two  chambers  (giving  the  two 
chambers  rather  than  the  plenary the  competence  to  nominate  the  supreme  court  chairs  and  the  Prosecutor 
General and to dismiss SJC members on disciplinary grounds), abolishing secret voting on personnel matters 
such  as  disciplinary  decisions,  and  providing  conditions,  through  specific  election  rules,  for  a  proportional 
and  fair  representation  in  the  SJC  chambers  of  all  levels  of  courts/prosecution  offices.  Some  of  these 
suggestions were  taken on  board  in  the final  outcome.  The  Venice  Commission  also notes  that for  a  well-
balanced SJC, the members to be elected by Parliament should include qualified lawyers belonging to other 
professional categories (such as law professors, defence lawyers) and representatives of civil society. (Venice 
Commission  Opinion  N°  816 
/  2015:  http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-
AD(2015)022-e) 

10   There  seems  to  be  a  broad  perception  that  changing  the  overall  make-up  of  the  SJC  would  require  the 

adoption by a National Grand Assembly, which is a more complex procedure (see above).  

5 

 
 
                                                            
amendments  to  the  Constitution.  A  number  of  judges,  including  notably  the  Chair  of  the  Supreme 
Court of Cassation, also came out in public protest against the amendment of the original proposals.11 

Apart  from  this  issue,  the  second  reading  vote  confirmed  the  remaining  elements  of  the  original 
package,  including  the  establishment  of  the  two  separate  chambers  and  the  strengthening  of  the 
judicial inspectorate. Furthermore, additional proposals for amendments tabled during the committee 
stage  to  abolish  the  requirement  for  secret  voting  on  personnel  matters  and  to  require  a  two-thirds 
majority  in  the  National  Assembly  for  the  election  of  the  parliamentary  quota  of  the  SJC  were  also 
adopted.12  Finally,  an  amendment  was  adopted  to  clarify  that  the  sitting  SJC  will  stay  for  the 
remainder of its term, which ends in autumn 2017.  

The amendments in their modified form were passed at the second reading with well over the three-
quarters  majority  required  and  were  duly  endorsed  at  third  reading  one  week  later  on  16  December 
2015.13  

2.2.   High level appointments in the judiciary  

A recurrent theme in past CVM reports has been the need for more transparency and more merit-based 
decision-making in appointments to high judicial offices. Over the past year a number of appointments 
have taken place to key positions within  the judiciary,  such as the election  of  new Presidents of the 
Supreme  Court  of  Cassation  and  of  the  Sofia  City  Court.  The  Sofia  City  Court  was  embroiled  in  a 
series of scandals in 2014 involving allegations of systemic corruption, leading to the dismissal of its 
management. The election of the chair of the Supreme Court of Cassation had been postponed several 
times in 2014 due to the failure of any of the candidates to obtain the necessary majority in the SJC 
and amidst concerns about possible indications of political influence on the procedure.14 The two posts 
have now been filled, and the new incumbents seem to command general respect among  their peers 
within the judiciary.  

However,  in  the  case  of  the  Sofia  Appellate  Court,  the  SJC  successively  failed  to  elect  a  President, 
most recently in December 2015. A candidate supported by judges from the court stood for election 
but  failed  to  receive  the  required  majority  in  the  SJC,  which  recalled  the  situation  at  the  Supreme 
Court of Cassation in 2014.15 This Court has now been without a regular President since spring 2014. 
Considering the importance of the function of court President in Bulgaria, the absence of a President 
with  an  independent  mandate  in  this  key  court  represents  a  significant  gap.  Together  with  previous 
examples of similar stalemates regarding appointments to key offices, it also provides an example of 
the  difficulties  faced  by  the  SJC  in  fulfilling  its  responsibility  as  overall  manager  of  the  Bulgarian 
judiciary.  

Finally, after long delays, the National Assembly elected a new chief inspector for the Inspectorate of 
the SJC. The predecessor's term of office had ended in 2012 and though the incumbent continued on a 
provisional basis for some months after the expiry of her mandate, the inspectorate had been without 
an  elected  head  since  October  2013,  with  the  National  Assembly  not  reaching  a  two-thirds  majority 

11   Press  reports  between  the  two  votes  of  9  and  16  December.  Both  the  President  of  the  Republic  and  the 
President of the Supreme Court of Cassation made statements in the context of the 135th anniversary of the 
Supreme Court on 11 December 2015. The Association of Judges also issued a statement in connection with 
the vote on the constitutional amendments:  
 http://www.judgesbg.org/en/library/papers/item/1078-open-letter-in-relation-to-the-vote-by-the-national-
assembly-on-09-12-2015-for-the-law-for-amendment-and-annexation-of-the-constitution-of-the-republic-of-
bulgaria.html  

12   These amendments went in the direction of recommendations contained in the Venice Commission opinion. 
13   In the third reading, the total package is endorsed or rejected.  
14   The  postponements  took  place  in  the  context  of  a  caretaker  government  and  general  elections.  See 

COM(2015) 36 final, p.4. 

15   Moreover, in this case public statements at political level had indicated a negative preference with regard to 

the candidate in question. (12 December 2015 on Darik Radio.) 

6 

 
 
                                                            
during a period of significant political instability. The election of the new chief inspector in April 2015 
followed what turned out to be a relatively open and transparent procedure, with the contest essentially 
being between two candidates put forward by the judges' profession itself and subsequently nominated 
by members of the National Assembly.16  

The  next  step  will  be  the  election  of  the  remaining  ten  members  of  the  inspectorate,  whose  term 
expires at the end of 2015. Under the judicial reform strategy and the constitutional amendments, the 
inspectorate should be entrusted with additional powers in regard to checking of conflicts of interest 
and the asset declarations of magistrates. This gives further attention to the extent to which transparent 
and  merit-based  selection  procedures  are  used.  The  new  tasks  will  also  require  a  wider  range  of 
expertise among the inspectors, while also ensuring a balance among the different fields of work of the 
inspectorate and, in particular, to include sufficient expertise within civil and commercial law fields in 
addition to criminal law, to have a strong representation of judges in addition to prosecutors, and to 
include representatives from all levels of jurisdiction including the Supreme Court level.17 

Representatives  of  the  National  Assembly  explained  to  the  Commission18  that  it  would  follow  a 
similar procedure as for the chief inspector, having extended the deadline for nominations in order to 
allow  for  civil  society  and  professional  organisations  to  forward  candidates  for  nomination.  Twenty 
candidates  compete  for  the  ten  available  posts.  Two  have  been  put  forward  by  professional 
organisations (a judge and a prosecutor) and six have been proposed by the general assembly of the 
Supreme Court of Cassation. The vote on the new college of inspectors is  expected  to take place in 
early 2016.  

2.3.   Random case allocation  

Over  the  years,  the  allocation  of  cases  within  courts  has  been  a  regular  concern  in  CVM  reports.19  
Case  allocation  has  become  an  emblematic  issue  in  terms  of  protecting  the  system  from  potential 
abuse.  Arbitrariness  in  this  process  can  create  opportunities  for  pressure  to  be  exerted  on  particular 
judges within courts and to allocate cases to certain judges according to ulterior motives. In Bulgaria 
precedents of judicial corruption and concerns over political interference in the judiciary has further 
accentuated  this  issue.  IT  tools  have  been  in  place  in  Bulgarian  courts  as  a  concrete  means  of 
executing random allocation. However, the operation of these systems has been the subject of constant 
contention  on  the  part  of  civil  society  organisations,  professional  associations  and  other  observers. 
Concerns about the possible manipulation of the allocation process to direct certain cases to particular 
judges have been a regular feature of the debate. Different systems were in place in different courts, 
and initially there were no common guidelines for their use, so different practices created loopholes 
for exceptions to be made from random allocation. While the judicial inspectorate carried out checks 
during  its  inspections,  it  did  not  have  the  technical  expertise  to  perform  a  proper  evaluation  of  the 
operation  of  the  IT  software.  Nevertheless,  these  checks  did  sometimes  identify  irregularities  and 
confirmed that possibilities existed to circumvent the software.  

Past CVM reports have repeatedly recommended to the SJC to improve the system for random case 
allocation. In 2013 a project was launched under the EU Operational Programme for Administrative 
Capacity (OPAC) to develop a new centralised software solution, checked by independent experts, as 
a  basis  for  a  secure  and  transparent  random  allocation  process.  This  system  was  to  form  part  of  the 
wider e-justice programme. Also, in 2014, the SJC introduced an interim solution whereby the local IT 
systems should be linked up to a central server at the SJC, to which all decisions on the allocation of 

16   The same two candidates had been put forward also in the context of a previous procedure in spring 2014, but 
this  procedure  was  eventually  aborted  amidst  the  dissolution  of  parliament  and  the  failure  of  the  outgoing 
parliament to put the vote on the agenda.  

17   In  response  to  the  draft  constitutional  amendments  the  inspectorate  has  reportedly  submitted  some  draft 
proposals  to  the  National  Assembly  aiming  to  further  enhance  the  structures  and  independence  of  the 
inspectorate. (Meeting with judicial inspectorate; Sofia, 4 December 2015.) 

18   Meeting with legal affairs committee of the National Assembly, 2 December 2015. 
19   See previous reports and in particular the specific recommendation on p.10 of COM (2015) 36 final.  

7 

 
 
                                                            
cases  should  be  reported  on  an  ongoing  basis.  The  SJC  also  adopted  common  guidelines  on  the 
application of the random allocation principles, which were to be implemented in the courts. However, 
the implementation of these measures was slow and still subject to a certain amount of local variation, 
pending the introduction of the centralised system.20 Moreover the OPAC project which was supposed 
to  develop  the  centralised  case  allocation  system  experienced  significant  delays  and  was  eventually 
scrapped in December 2014.21  

In the meantime, the issue came to the fore of the agenda again in late 2014 when scandals erupted 
simultaneously  around  the  allocation  of  two  high  profile  insolvency  cases  in  the  Sofia  City  Court.22 
The  Court  had  already  been  the  subject  of  criticism  in  an  audit  in  spring  2013,  which  had  not  been 
followed up.23 Judges from the Court, as well as from other Sofia courts, came out publically calling 
for  the  management  of  the  Sofia  City  Court  to  be  held  accountable.  Faced  with  the  allegations  of 
manipulation of the random allocation system within the Sofia City Court, the SJC was initially slow 
to  react  but  eventually  carried  out  an  inspection.24  The  check  revealed  signs  of  serious 
mismanagement, including problems with uneven workload, a large number of seconded judges, and 
irregularities  in the allocation  of cases.  The check also confirmed that the random  allocation  system 
could be circumvented.25 On this basis, a number of recommendations were made by the SJC to the 
management.  However,  the  SJC  was  unwilling  to  initiate  disciplinary  proceedings  against  those 
responsible for the failings.26 Meanwhile, however, a separate investigation led to the dismissal of the 
Court chair in February 2015 in connection with charges of unlawful granting of special surveillance 
warrants  targeting  internal  databases  of  the  Ministry  of  Interior  (the  'Worms'  affair).  Criminal 
proceedings  have  also  subsequently  been  launched  on  several  accounts  against  one  other  implicated 
judge. 

The controversy in the Sofia City Court was thrown into sharp relief in late autumn 2015 when private 
recordings appeared in the public domain purportedly featuring the former Court chair and the other 
implicated  judge  engaged  in  a  conversation  in  February  2015  on  a  possible  dismissal  of  the  Court 
chair by the SJC, including comments on positions of key players in the magistracy and the executive 
on this issue, and other matters related to the management of the judiciary. Knowledge of the contents 
of the recordings was denied by the Court chair but confirmed by the other judge who also has made 
public statements pointing to the existence of a network of corrupt practices in and through the Sofia 
City Court. Investigations were eventually launched by both the SJC and the Prosecution Office into 
the contents of the tapes, albeit once again only after a certain delay (one explanation initially given 
was the view that since the recordings were illegal they could not form the basis of an investigation).27 

20   Checks by the judicial inspectorate reportedly corrected divergent practices in some cases.  
21   Experts  advised  the  SJC  that  it  would  be  difficult  to  complete  the  project  before  the  eligibility  period  for 
funding under the European funds expired at the end of 2015. Reportedly the project had been delayed due to 
problems with the tendering procedure in Bulgaria.   

22   One of the cases also involved allegations of illegal measures directed by the court against subsidiaries of a 
large  European  company,  prompting  a  public  intervention  from  an  embassy.  The  other  case  concerned  the 
fourth  largest  bank  in  Bulgaria,  for  which  separate  criminal  investigations  were  also  launched  amidst 
allegations of large scale fraud and possible criminal failures in the supervisory authorities.  

23   COM(2015) 36, p. 4. 
24   SWD(2015) 9, p. 11. 
25   Many of the findings echoed the outcome of checks performed earlier by members of the SJC, the ISJC and 

key NGOs in 2013. 

26  This  led  to  the  unprecedented  initiative  of  the  Minister  of  Justice  to  launch  several  motions  for  such 
proceedings  in  2015  and  even  appealing  the  SJC  decisions  refusing  such  proceedings  to  the  Supreme 
Administrative  Court.  Decisions  to  institute  disciplinary  proceedings  against  the  chair  and  one  other  judge 
involved were taken only late in 2015. 

27   In  light  of  the  public  controversy  which  emerged  in  Bulgaria  in  late  autumn  2015  around  allegations  of 
misdeeds  in  the  Sofia  City  Court,  the  Commission  reminded  the  Bulgarian  authorities  of  the  CVM 
benchmark to "Conduct and report on professional, non-partisan investigations into allegations of high-level 
corruption."  While  it  is  not  the  role  of  the  Commission  to  enter  into  discussions  on  how  Member  States 

8 

 
 
                                                            
 
However, on 14 January the SJC decided to close its enquiry into the recordings following a process 
which  was  criticised  by  the  largest  Bulgarian  professional  association  of  judges  as  lacking  in 
transparency.28  

A new Chair and deputy chairs were appointed to the Sofia City Court in April 201529 and reportedly 
have taken steps to improve the situation in the court, including through measures to enforce the rules 
on  random  allocation  of  cases,  address  the  problems  of  uneven  workload,  secure  the  IT  system,30 
tighten  the  rules  for  secondment  of  judges  and  improve  the  general  management  of  the  court  and 
judges’  compliance  with  procedural  deadlines.31  In  addition,  rules  concerning  requests  for  special 
surveillance  warrants  have  been  clarified  as  a  response  to  the  'Worms'  affair.  Reportedly  there  has 
been  a  marked,  positive  change  of  culture  at  the  court  with  the  new  leadership  in  the  direction  of 
greater  transparency,  for  example  through  inclusion  of  the  general  assembly  of  judges  in  decision-
making.32  

On a more general level, the revelation of irregularities at the Sofia City Court has prompted the SJC 
to  produce  a  centralised  case  allocation  system  for  the  entire  court  system,  as  originally  envisaged. 
Preparations  for  the  new  system  were  launched  in  December  2014  and  it  became  operational  on  1 
October 2015. In the new system the case allocation is carried out within a central server located at the 
SJC.  The  allocations  are  made  by  authorised  personnel  in  the  individual  courts,  who  log  into  the 
system  via  a  secure  connection,  using  a  personal  electronic  ID.  The  results  of  the  allocations  are 
instantly made available for consultation by the public on a dedicated website. To ensure traceability, 
all  interventions  in  the  system  are  automatically  recorded  and  tied  to  the  user  profile  of  the  person 
carrying  out  the  intervention.33  The  SJC  reports  that  the  system  should  also  be  able  to  take  into 
account the need for an even distribution of workload between judges in individual courts by drawing 
on information on the number of files already allocated  to each  judge.34 This  aspect appears not yet 
effective  as  problems  with  uneven  allocation  of  cases  are  reported.  However,  according  to  the 
Bulgarian authorities, these problems should be temporary. Once fully in place, it will be important to 
closely  monitor  its  application  on  an  ongoing  basis  in  individual  courts  so  as  to  make  sure  that  any 
problems or loopholes are detected and addressed.35   

should organise independent investigations into individual alleged cases, the benchmark entails that, as part 
of its monitoring work, the Commission should report on Bulgaria's efforts to follow up on such allegations. 
28   The decision was taken in the context of some controversial circumstances and prompted an open letter of the 
Association of Judges addressed to the European Commission, in which the association laments the general 
lack of progress on judicial reform. http://www.judgesbg.org/en/library/papers/item/1098-open-letter-to-the-
european-commission-regarding-the-latest-developments-in-bulgaria’s-progress.html  

29   At the initiative of the then newly elected president of the Supreme Court of Cassation, an interim leadership 
had already been put in place in February with a temporary chair, a judge from the SCC. This prevented a 
leadership  vacuum  at  a  critical  moment  and  allowed  corrective  measures  to  be  taken  without  awaiting  the 
appointment of a permanent leadership.   

30   Reportedly it was revealed during the checks that the IT system was managed by an outside service provider 

and not properly controlled by the court's own IT staff.  

31   By September, eight disciplinary proceedings had been initiated on the initiative of the new chair to address 
the  most  serious  cases  of  lack  of  compliance  with  deadlines,  which  had  not  been  the  subject  of  follow-up 
under the previous management.  

32   Meeting with Sofia City court judges; 29 September, 2015. 
33   Information received from the SJC, September 2015. 
34   At a later stage the system could also take into account the complexity of cases, relying on the application of 

common workload standards, see further below.  

35   This  includes  the  issue  of  IT  security  but  also  local  administrative  practices,  where  past  experience  shows 
that 'exceptional' arrangements may appear at local level. Reportedly it is envisaged, in the context of rolling 
out  e-justice,  to  enhance  the  analytical  capacity  of  the  SJC  and  the  judicial  inspectorate  in  the  area  of  IT 
security.  

9 

 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
III  

LEGAL FRAMEWORK 

As  part  of  its  accession  to  the  EU,  Bulgaria  amended  its  Judicial  System  Act  and  procedural  codes 
with  the  aim  of  enhancing  the  transparency  and  efficiency  of  the  judicial  process.  Under  the  CVM, 
Bulgaria has monitored the application of the legislation on an on-going basis to identify and address 
remaining challenges. However, a number of issues identified in past CVM reports remain. In the area 
of criminal law, successive governments have been working to prepare a comprehensive reform of the 
criminal code and criminal procedure code, although so far with only limited results. Further work is 
now ongoing to prepare amendments to these laws. In the context of the government's judicial reform 
strategy, comprehensive changes are also in preparation  in regard to the Judicial System  Act. These 
have  been  held  up  by  the  constitutional  reform  process  to  which  some  of  the  proposals  are  closely 
connected,  but  are  expected  to  be  brought  forward  by  the  government  in  early  2016.  In  January  the 
Bulgarian  government  established  a  Council  for  the  implementation  of  the  judicial  reform  strategy 
composed of representatives from both the executive and judicial branches of government as well as 
civil  society  and  academia.36  Established  under  the  Council  of  Ministers  and  with  the  Ministry  of 
Justice  providing  its  secretariat,  this  new  institution  will  play  an  important  role  in  overseeing  the 
implementation of the overall strategy, in particular elements which require cooperation between the 
executive and judicial authorities, including preparation and implementation of legislative changes.  

The 2015 CVM report recommended that Bulgaria should implement the new judicial reform strategy, 
address critical areas in the criminal code to improve the fight against corruption and organised crime, 
and  agree  on  a  detailed  timeframe  for  longer  term  reflection  on  the  fundamental  goals  of  a  new 
criminal code. 

3.1.  

Judicial System Act 

The judicial reform strategy adopted by the Bulgarian government in December 2014 and endorsed by 
Parliament in January 2015 sets out a comprehensive agenda for the reform of the Bulgarian judiciary. 
Many priorities of the strategy necessitate amendments to the legislative framework. At the beginning 
of 2015 the government therefore initiated a broad consultation process involving the various branches 
of the judiciary and other stakeholders in the preparation of amendments to the Judicial System Act in 
line  with  the  objectives  set  out  in  the  judicial  reform  strategy.  A  concrete  draft  was  submitted  for 
public consultation in May. In the meantime, however, the government had announced its intention to 
propose amendments to the Constitution concerning the structure of the SJC and competences of the 
judicial  inspectorate.  As  the  outcome  of  the  constitutional  changes  were  to  be  determining  for  the 
eventual shape of the provisions in the Judicial System Act on these matters, the government decided 
to  postpone  the  formal  submission  of  these  legislative  changes  to  the  National  Assembly.  This 
postponement concerned not only the parts with links to the constitutional amendments but the entire 
project. The reform of the Judicial System Act therefore remained on the drawing board. However, the 
consultations  with  stakeholders  continued  with  the  aim  of  being  able  to  very  quickly  introduce  the 
reform  proposal  for  adoption  at  the  National  Assembly  once  clarity  had  been  obtained  on  the 
constitutional amendments.  

The  draft  law  submitted  for  public  consultation  in  May  contains  a  number  of  additional  changes, 
besides the implementing provisions on the reform of the SJC and the role of the judicial inspectorate. 
Many of the proposals go in the direction of empowering judges in the management of the judiciary, 
thus  broadening  responsibility  and  improving  transparency.  Proposals  in  this  direction  include 
provisions for the direct election of  members of the  SJC from the judicial quota by their peers on  a 
one-judge-one-vote  principle,  for  changes  to  the  procedure  for  the  appointment  of  court  presidents, 
and  for  setting  up  standing  committees  of  acting  magistrates  to  assist  the  SJC  in  matters  of  career 

36   Cabinet  Sets  Up  Council  for  Judicial  Reform  Strategy  BTA  News  Agency,  13  January  2013 

http://www.bta.bg/en/c/DF/id/1249854  

10 

 
 
                                                            
development  and  disciplinary  proceedings.37  Court  presidents  would  be  elected  by  assemblies  of 
judges  of  the  relevant  jurisdiction.  Moreover,  the  general  assembly  of  the  relevant  court  would  be 
allowed to bring forward candidates for consideration. Other draft amendments would aim to clarify 
and streamline the rules on professional training of magistrates and on disciplinary proceedings.38 The 
draft contains new provisions on internships and qualification exams for prospective lawyers, linked 
with  a  wider  reform  of  the  framework  regarding  education  in  law.  Stricter  rules  are  envisaged  on 
secondments, so as to address the risk of these being used to circumvent the ordinary career paths of 
magistrates, as well as to restrict the possibilities for direct appointment into the judiciary of lawyers 
with  other  experience,  especially  at  higher  level  courts.39  Other  proposals  aim  to  safeguard  the 
operational autonomy of prosecutors when supervising individual cases.40 The draft act also addresses 
changes for the implementation of e-justice throughout the Bulgarian judiciary.41  

The  proposed  reform  of  the  Judicial  System  Act  continues  to  be  the  subject  of  debate  within  the 
judiciary and it is to be expected that the final outcome will be shaped by these debates as well as by 
the  recently  adopted  outcome  of  the  constitutional  reform  process.  It  therefore  remains  to  be  seen 
when these proposals will be submitted to the National Assembly and what shape they will take at the 
end of the legislative process.  

3.2.   Criminal procedure and the penal code   

Delays  in  criminal  proceedings  and  the  failure  of  major  cases  involving  organised  crime  and 
corruption have been a recurrent point of concern in CVM reports and have been the subject of several 
expert analyses, action plans and interagency taskforces over the years. The current criminal procedure 
code is only about ten years old, but many of its provisions were carried over from the previous code 
and long-standing criticism from practitioners about outdated provisions and exaggeratedly formalistic 
procedures has not been addressed. Amongst these long-standing criticisms against the current code is 
the complexity of the rules relating to the gathering and the admissibility of evidence at the stages of 
the initial investigation, the pre-trial procedure and the trial phase. The result is a procedure which is 
both formalistic and also very slow. Moreover, the procedures tend to be strictly interpreted, leaving 
little room for interpretation. This formalistic framework creates problems in complex cases, such as 
cases involving organised crime, where there are multiple defendants, numerous witnesses and large 
amounts of evidence.  

While  a  comprehensive  reform  of  the  criminal  procedural  framework  does  not  appear  to  be  on  the 
agenda,  the  Bulgarian  authorities  –  in  line  with  CVM  recommendations  –  are  monitoring  the 
application of the law on an ongoing basis with a view to identifying problems and prepare targeted 
amendments to address shortcomings. For example, it has been noted that, at several stages of the trial 
phase,  the  judge  has  far-reaching  powers  to  return  the  case  to  the  prosecutor  if  minor  formal  errors 
occur during the pre-trial procedure or in the official indictment.42 The same applies to referrals from 
appeal to first instance. This has been a frequent source of delays in criminal proceedings. Reportedly, 
possible solutions to this issue are currently being discussed in the context of a taskforce involving the 
prosecution  and  the  Supreme  Court  of  Cassation,  set  up  on  the  initiative  of  the  Legal  Affairs 
committee of the National Assembly.43 Amendments of the criminal procedure code were enacted in 
May 2015 following technical proposals submitted for the consideration of the National Assembly by 

37   It  is  envisaged  that  these  committees  would  be  composed  of  magistrates  from  the  supreme  courts  and 

supreme prosecutorial and investigatory authorities on a rotation basis. 

38   The amendments would introduce an explicit requirement for the motivation of disciplinary decisions.  
39   Currently 20 per cent of appointments should be filled with such outside candidates, who are not required to 
follow the ordinary initial training required of junior magistrates. Proposals include allowing some discretion 
in this, limiting the practice to lower level courts, and introducing some additional training requirements.  
40   Some amendments have already been introduced in the criminal procedure code to this effect, see below.  
41   See section IV below for more information on this.  
42   See the Bulgarian criminal procedure code, Articles 249 and 288. 
43   Meeting with the Prosecutor's office; Sofia, 2 December 2015. 

11 

 
 
                                                            
the  public  prosecutor's  office,  to  address  a  number  of  specific  issues  highlighted  in  past  CVM 
reports.44  

Reportedly  the  government  is  also  preparing  new  proposals  for  amending  the  penal  code.45  These 
proposals would aim to clarify the hierarchy of offences in the code, where the way that sanctions for 
different  offences  have  been  defined  over  the years  has  not  always  resulted  in  a  logical  relationship 
between  less  and  more  severe  offences.  The  system  of  criminal  sanctions  would  be  reassessed,  a 
process  which  requires  careful  preparation.  In  addition,  it  is  envisaged  that  administrative  penal 
provisions  will  in  the  future  cover  some  of  the  less  severe  infractions  so  as  to  reserve  criminal 
sanctions for more serious offences. Furthermore, a working group has been set up under the Ministry 
of  Justice  to  develop  more  concrete  proposals  concerning  the  definition  of  some  specific  offences 
which are currently not well covered by the law.46  

It  should  be  noted  that  some  targeted  amendments  have  been  adopted  recently  aiming  to  address 
recommendations of the Council of Europe with regard to the adaptation of corruption offences in line 
with international standards.47 Earlier in the year amendments were also adopted to align the Bulgarian 
legislation  to  European  commitments  in  the  area  of  terrorist  offences  as  well  as  in  relation  to  the 
smuggling of human beings.  

IV 

QUALITY AND EFFICIENCY OF THE JUDICIARY 

The  third  CVM  benchmark  calls  upon  Bulgaria  to  continue  the  reform  of  the  judiciary  in  order  to 
enhance  its  professionalism,  quality  and  efficiency.  This  recognises  the  fact  that  judicial  reform  is 
about more than constitutional and legislative rules. In addition, one of the management tasks of the 
judicial institutions is to make sure that the resources that are invested  in them result in an efficient 
and high-quality service for the users of the system.  

The  central  institution  responsible  for  the  management  of  the  judiciary  in  Bulgaria  is  the  Supreme 
Judicial Council (SJC). It has wide-ranging powers to decide on day-to-day personnel decisions such 
as  appointment  or  promotion  of  judges  and  prosecutors  or  their  dismissal  as  a  result  of  disciplinary 
proceedings. Furthermore, it is responsible for the overall management of the courts and prosecution 
offices, through the implementation of the budget48 and – within the limits of the law - the definition 
of the geographic structure of judicial authorities’ responsibilities.49 In particular the latter is inevitably 
sensitive and subject to strong political, economic and social interests.  

44   For further details, see section VI below.  
45   A comprehensive reform of the Bulgarian penal code has been on the agenda for years. According to experts 
and practitioners the existing code is very complex, lacks internal coherence and needs to be updated in the 
light  of  the  development  of  new  types  of  crime.  Following  several  years  of  preparation  a  previous 
government presented a reform proposal to the National Assembly in early 2014. However, following general 
elections  later  that  year,  the  penal  code  was  taken  back  on  the  drawing  board  by  the  new  government  for 
further consideration. 

46   Possible examples include fraud schemes to take over or drain the assets of companies or public procurement 
fraud schemes. This work could also involve possible changes in the areas of civil, commercial and public 
procurement law.  

47   The  Anti-corruption  committee  of  the  Council  of  Europe  (GRECO)  in  a  report from  2014  identified  some 
specific  shortcomings  in  the  Bulgarian  legal  framework  for  the  countering  of  corruption,  in  particular  in 
relation to the provisions of the criminal code with regard to cases of active bribery in the public sector as 
well as active and passive trading in influence where the advantage is not given to the particular official but 
to a third party. (See Second compliance report on Bulgaria, GRECO, 2014.) 

48   The overall size of the budget is determined by the legislator, but its implementation is entrusted to the SJC.  
49   The Constitution and the Judicial Systems Act define the basic parameters of the judicial system, including 
the  number  of  instances,  the  link  between  prosecution  offices  and  courts,  the  existence  of  a  national 
investigation service, the two supreme courts and the prosecution. However, within these parameters, the SJC 
has  wide-ranging  powers  to  define  the  number  of  courts  at  each  level  and  allocate  staff  resources  among 
them.  

12 

 
 
                                                            
A  number  of  areas  have  been  the  subject  of  Commission  recommendations  in  past  CVM  reports, 
essentially related to on the one hand the management of human resources within the judiciary and on 
the other the structural conditions within which they are employed. The former concerns issues such as 
the system for appointment and promotion of magistrates, their training, appraisal, and the definition 
of common workload standards. It also includes the issue of inspections and disciplinary action. The 
latter  relates  to  wider  issues  such  as  a  possible  reform  of  the  structure  of  the  judicial  map  and 
managing the introduction of new electronic tools to improve efficiency, quality and transparency (e-
justice).  Finally  the  public  prosecution  office  is  part  of  the  judiciary  and  has  a  number  of 
organisational challenges of its own.  

The  2015  CVM  report  recommended  Bulgaria  to  complete  the  methodology  for  the  assessment  of 
workload  of  magistrates  and  courts  as  a  basis  for  a  reform  of  the  judicial  map,  to  enforce  clear 
procedures and standards for disciplinary proceedings, and to make concrete progress on e-justice.  

4.1.  Human resource management  

The  good  management  of  human  resources  is  a  key  element  in  a  properly  functioning  judiciary.  In 
Bulgaria  this  is  essentially  within  the  remit  of  the  SJC.  A  number  of  working  groups  within  this 
institution  have  been  preparing  initiatives  to  improve  aspects  of  human  resource  management  in 
various fields.  

Since 2013 the SJC has held regular competitions for the appointment of magistrates. Before this time 
there were several years without competitions, which led to a widespread practice of using long-term 
secondments as a substitute. Secondments can be controversial due to the discretionary role of court 
chairs in such decisions, seen by critics as a potential source of dependencies and conflicting loyalties 
within courts.50 Secondments are however still widely used in some courts. One reason for this appears 
to be the complicated procedures for filling vacancies through competitions.  

The SJC has carried out an evaluation of competition procedures resulting in a number of procedural 
issues being identified, which tend to cause delays in the completion of competitions as well as in the 
subsequent  taking  office  of  successful  candidates.  Some  of  the  issues  have  been  addressed  via 
implementing decisions and guidelines complementing the legislation in areas where legal gaps were 
identified. Others would be subject to further discussions.  

In  the  area  of  appointments  and  career  development,  a  working  group  under  the  SJC  has  prepared 
proposals for improvements which have been submitted for the consideration of the Ministry of Justice 
and National Assembly in the context of the judicial reform strategy. One of these proposals, which is 
being  considered  in  the  context  of  the  government's  proposals  on  the  Judicial  System  Act,  aims  to 
limit direct appointments of senior lawyers to judicial offices to first instance courts and reducing the 
required  share  of  such  appointments  below  the  current  20  per  cent.51  Another  proposal  aims  to 
simplify  the  rules  for  magistrates  moving  'horizontally'  at  their  own  request  between  court  districts 
without  applying  for  a  higher  rank.  Currently  there  is  a  requirement  to  go  through  a  competition, 
which  is  a  cumbersome  procedure  and  apparently  is  one  of  the  factors  leading  courts  to  choose 
secondment as an easier alternative.  

In  the  area  of  appraisals  and  promotions  concrete  proposals  for  legislative  amendments  were  also 
submitted by the SJC to the Ministry of Justice for consideration  in connection with the reform and 
further discussions are reportedly planned in this area. Finally, work has also been ongoing within the 

50   As mentioned in past CVM reports for Bulgaria (SWD (2014) 36 final, p. 14), for several years the lack of 
regular appointment competitions led to the establishment of a culture of using long-term secondments as a 
more convenient means of ensuring mobility of judges.  

51   See above.  

13 

 
 
                                                            
SJC  to  improve  the  procedural  rules  for  the  local  ethics  commissions,  which  can  play  an  important 
role in regard to appointment and promotion decisions.52 

Workload standards 

The  allocation  of  workload  between  magistrates  has  been  a  recurrent  issue  of  past  reports  touching 
upon many different aspects of judicial management. In this area the SJC has been conducting a larger 
project  to  develop  workload  standards  for  judges  and  prosecutors,  which  will  serve  as  a  basis  for 
assessing the workload of individual magistrates, while taking account not only of the number but also 
the complexity of cases. This process has been a long and complex one in particular with regard to the 
standards to be applied to judges, which has included several stages: identification of types of cases53, 
a survey among judges throughout the judiciary to assess the workload associated with particular types 
of cases, and a follow-up where focus groups consisting of experienced judges screened the results and 
made  final  adjustments.  The  process  was  finally  completed  in  2015  with  a  comprehensive  set  of 
workload standards submitted for endorsement of the SJC.54  

A future application of the new workload standards could have beneficial impact in a number of areas, 
including the system for the random allocation of cases to individual judges and prosecutors, and for 
appraisals and promotions, as well as for the overall distribution of resources between court districts 
and jurisdictions. However, the concrete results in these various areas are yet to be realised and will 
depend on further measures to be taken.  

Training of magistrates 

Training is another area of key importance for the quality of the judicial process. This is largely within 
the  remit  of  the  National  Institute  of  Justice  (NIJ),  a  specialised  establishment  entrusted  with  the 
obligatory  induction  training  of  new  judicial  recruits  as  well  as  continuous  training  of  magistrates 
throughout the judiciary.55 As also noted in previous CVM reports, the fact that the institute has to rely 
to a large extent on external funding, due to limited allocation from the national budget, constitutes a 
potential source of uncertainty in the management of the activities of the institute.56 Nevertheless, the 
institute has a strong track record in supplying training of good quality, including continued training 
for practicing magistrates.  

4.2. 

Inspections and disciplinary proceedings 

Past CVM reports have noted disciplinary proceedings as an area where  controversy has surrounded 
the  practices  of  the  SJC.57  This  has  been  related  to  the  absence  of  clear  standards  and  criteria  for 
disciplinary decisions and fuelled by a high number of concrete decisions being overturned on appeal 
at the Supreme Administrative Court. The number of appeals of SJC decisions remained high in 2015. 
Moreover, the problems identified in the Sofia City Court towards the end of 2014 once again raised 
the  issue  of  the  disciplinary  practice  of  the  SJC,  as  the  Council  initially  did  not  decide  to  launch 
disciplinary  proceedings  related  to  the  findings.  This  prompted  several  official  proposals  for  such 
proceedings  by  the  Minister  of  Justice,  followed  by  appeals  to  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court 

52   Information provided by the SJC, December 2015.  
53   Reportedly the methodology covers more than 300 summary categories of cases dealt with in different types 

of courts, except for the supreme courts. 

54   The workload standard for prosecutors has already been completed at the beginning of the year, based on a 

simpler methodology, and is in use in the prosecutor's office.  

55   The NIJ retains a certain degree of operational autonomy, required to ensure a professional management of 
its activities, but reports to a governing board with representation of the SJC, the Ministry of Justice, the two 
supreme courts and the prosecutor's office. 

56   Reportedly, the legally required basic training of junior magistrates is covered by the state budget, whereas 
continued training needs to be financed by other means, which includes a high proportion of EU funds and 
contributions from other international donors.   

57   See COM (2015) 36, p. 6. 

14 

 
 
                                                            
when these proposals were rejected at the SJC. Disciplinary proceedings were eventually launched in 
the  autumn  of  2015  against  the  key  magistrates  involved.58  The  SJC  has  been  working  to  develop  a 
more  coherent  practice  with  regard  to  disciplinary  decisions.  At  the  end  of  2014  it  adopted  a  set  of 
unified  guidelines  for  its  work  on  disciplinary  proceedings.  In  addition  to  defining  a  set  of  core 
principles,  the  guidelines  are  mostly  procedural  in  nature,  supplementing  the  provisions  in  statutory 
law  in  order  to  reduce  possible  sources  of  procedural  uncertainty.59  It  is  to  be  noted,  however,  that 
guidelines do not have the force of law.60  

The guidelines provide a detailed description of types of procedural infringements, but do not provide 
similar clarification with regard to breaches linked to unethical conduct or integrity issues. Neither do 
they set out any standards for the types of sanctions which  might be expected  for different  kinds of 
disciplinary  violations,  which  is  therefore  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  SJC,  under  the  control  of  the 
Supreme  Administrative  Court.61  Decisions  of  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court  to  reject  SJC 
decisions often relate to the type of sanction applied. In this respect a debate has arisen about the role 
of the Supreme Administrative Court in such cases. Currently, the court sends these cases back for a 
new  decision  of  the  SJC.  However,  the  question  has  been  raised  whether  it  would  also  be  able  to 
modify the decision of the SJC. This would considerably reduce the length of the overall procedure. 
On the other hand, it could also raise important questions in regard to the remit of competence of the 
court to act as a disciplinary authority.62 

The judicial inspectorate (ISJC) plays a central role in regard to upholding procedural standards in the 
judiciary  and  will  in  future  also  be  given  a  wider  role  in  regard  to  integrity  and  ethics.  In  2015  the 
inspectorate  continued  its  monitoring  of  the  various  judicial  bodies,  through  planned,  ad  hoc  and 
'thematic' inspections. As a result of its inspections the ISJC may refer individual cases of breaches to 
the  heads  of  the  respective  judicial  authority  or  to  the  SJC  for  disciplinary  follow-up  or  to  the 
prosecution for criminal investigation. It appears that the ISJC has recently taken a more active role in 
initiating  disciplinary  cases.63  Separately,  the  ethics  committee  of  the  SJC  currently  is  competent  to 
carry out inspections in relation to ethical standards and integrity. These can be launched ex officio and 
may also lead to disciplinary proceedings. 

4.3. 

Judicial map and e-justice  

The  allocation  of  resources  among  judicial  authorities  is  an  ongoing  source  of  tension  within  the 
Bulgarian judiciary as well as between the judiciary and the budgetary authority. A recurrent theme in 

58   Another appeal was launched by the Minister of Justice against the refusal to initiate disciplinary proceedings 
against a high-level investigating magistrate, where the SJC decided instead to grant his resignation, hence 
barring disciplinary action. In January 2016 the Supreme Administrative Court decided to annul this decision. 
The  ruling  can  be  appealed  by  the  SJC,  in  which  case  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court  will  decide  in  a 
panel of five members. 

59   For example, the guidelines state that SJC members who have filed a proposal for disciplinary action against 
a magistrate can themselves participate in the respective disciplinary panel as well as in the final plenary vote 
on a disciplinary decision. This aspect of the SJC's disciplinary activity has been raised as an issue in the past 
by experts and observers on the basis that it could be seen to be in  conflict with fundamental principles of 
legal process (separation between judge and jury). On the other hand, it is notable that when it comes to the 
judicial  inspectorate  the  guidelines  exclude  it  from  participating  in  the  deliberations  on  cases  where  it  has 
made the proposal. (Disciplinary Rules of the SJC, English version provided to the Commission by the SJC, 
September 2015.) 

60   Some  draft  amendments  to  the  law  on  disciplinary  issues  are  in  preparation  in  the  context  of  the  judicial 

reform strategy.  

61   Measures have been taken to provide more clarity. An analysis of past disciplinary practice was carried out in 
2013. A searchable database on disciplinary decisions has been set up. Meetings are held with the Supreme 
Administrative Court (SAC) and the judicial inspectorate to discuss disciplinary practice. These should help 
the SJC align its decisions with past case law of the SAC and establish clearer standards for the sanctions to 
be applied in various types of cases.  

62   Meeting with the Supreme Administrative Court; September, 2015. 
63   In addition, court chairs have also become more active in 2015.  

15 

 
 
                                                            
past  CVM  reports  has  been  the  need  for  a  rebalancing  of  the  workload,  which  varies  significantly 
between  courts.64  For  a  number  of  reasons,  workload  per  judge  is  higher  in  the  courts  of  the  larger 
cities,  which  creates  problems  in  terms  of  expediency  of  procedures  as  well  as  possible  pressure  on 
judges. The problem is particularly pronounced in the courts of the capital city of Sofia.  

For  a  number  of  years  the  SJC  has  pursued  a  policy  of  gradually  redistributing  posts  among  court 
districts in favour of those which have the greatest workload per magistrate, including the main courts 
in Sofia. This effort was continued in 2015 with the reallocation of a total of 90 positions for judges 
and prosecutors.65 This policy should help improve the situation in the most heavily burdened courts 
over  time,  though  it  appears  that  the  disparities  remain  very  significant.  In  the  future,  the  new 
workload standards developed by the SJC may provide a basis for further fine-tuning such decisions 
through the creation of a more accurate picture of relative workload in the various courts.  

While  clearly  useful,  however,  reallocation  of  staff  positions  may  not  on  its  own  constitute  a 
sufficiently  effective  solution  to  the  resource  issues  facing  the  Bulgarian  judiciary.  First  of  all, 
allocation  of  additional  staff  creates  a  need  for  extra  office  space,  computers  etc.,  which  may  be 
difficult to meet if premises are already fully utilised. Secondly, a mechanical redistribution of posts 
only  contributes  to  evening  out  workload  but  does  not  necessarily  improve  overall  efficiency.66  The 
longer term measures therefore needs to be accompanied by broader reforms to modernise the judicial 
system. In this regard, developments are in preparation on two main fronts: reform of the judicial map 
and the introduction of e-justice.  

Judicial map 

The judicial map refers to the structure of court districts and jurisdictional boundaries among judicial 
authorities throughout the territory of the country. Due to various demographic, economic, social and 
technological developments the demand for courts in various locations changes over time, creating a 
need  for  adjustments  in  the  judicial  map  over  time.67  Such  changes  naturally  require  careful 
deliberation and analysis, to ensure that they reflect the realities on the ground, and meet the expected 
result.  This  can  also  prove  politically  sensitive.  Within  the  SJC,  preparations  for  a  fundamental 
reorganisation of the judicial map have been ongoing for some time, in the form of a comprehensive 
analysis to determine the criteria to be applied in a possible future reform. The focus of the analysis 
has until now been limited to the regional courts, while the remaining system has been set aside for 
consideration  at  a  later  stage.  Bulgaria  currently  has  113  regional  courts,  28  district  courts,  28 
administrative  courts,  and  five  appellate  regions,  in  addition  to  the  Sofia  City  court  and  appellate 
court,  the  three  military  courts  and  the  military  appellate  court,  the  specialised  court  and  appellate 
court for organised crime, and the two supreme courts for, respectively, cassation and administrative 
justice. A recent study of the World Bank68 indicates that significant efficiency gains could potentially 
be achieved at several levels within the system, as various courts have a low workload, a picture which 
is regularly confirmed in conversations with experts and practitioners in Bulgaria.  

At the current stage, the SJC has finalised the analysis that would form the basis of the reform of the 
regional courts. A report has been adopted setting out fundamental criteria which would underpin the 

64   COM(2015) 36, p. 6. 
65   Information provided by the SJC, December 2015.  
66   This issue came to the fore in the context of the annual budget for 2016 where the SJC argued that, with the 
current number of posts, the judiciary had for years not received the required funds to provide the salaries to 
which magistrates were entitled, whereas the government insisted on the need to curtail overall expenditure. 
The compromise reached was that efforts should be made to improve efficiency of the overall system, while 
an additional budget allocation would be made in 2016.  Meetings in Sofia, December 2015. 

67   That is, for example, by reducing the number of court districts as well as by redefining the geographical areas 

of responsibility of competences between courts.  

68   Bulgaria  –  judicial  performance,  caseload  and  expenditure  review  (2008-2014),  World  Bank,  November 

2015.  

16 

 
 
                                                            
reform.69  On  the  basis  of  these  criteria,  concrete  proposals  have  been  elaborated  within  the  five 
appellate regions to serve as a basis for consultations among relevant stakeholders. This is expected to 
be followed by broader public consultations in 2016 before finally leading to a decision of the SJC on 
a proposal for a new judicial map for the regional courts. A parallel process is ongoing with regard to 
analysis of the regional prosecutor's offices, also leading to a concrete mapping of the need for these 
offices. According to law, the location of courts and prosecution offices needs to coincide, but based 
on demand there may be discrepancies in the needs for the two sides of the judiciary. In the end the 
SJC will be able to rely on both analyses in combination to make an informed decision, in accordance 
with the law.70  

It remains to be seen what will be the outcome of this process regarding the regional courts and if it 
will be decided to proceed with reforms in the other parts of the judiciary, such as the district, appeal 
or administrative courts.71  

E-justice 

The introduction of modern IT tools provides a means of improving efficiency as well as of enhancing 
transparency and the quality of the services provided by the judiciary to citizens, business and society 
at large. In Bulgaria, preparations for the introduction of e-justice started with partial support from EU 
funds under the programming period 2007-201372 and is planned to continue in the coming years with 
funding  from  the  new  programming  period  until  2020.73  These  preparations  are  taking  place  in  the 
context  of  a  wider  strategy  for  introduction  of  e-government  in  Bulgaria.  It  is  a  complex  process 
involving many interlinked actions to be carried out at technical, administrative and legislative level. 
Legislative changes to provide the basis for electronic communication between courts and parties and 
other necessary changes to enable e-justice to move ahead were prepared under a previous government 
in  spring  2014,  but  were  not  adopted due  to  the  dissolution  of  the  National  Assembly  in  July  2014. 
Under the current government these draft amendments have now been included in the judicial reform 
strategy, where they form part of the proposed reform of the Judicial Systems Act.  

In parallel with the legislative process,  technical preparations have continued within the SJC for the 
establishment  of  a  unified  electronic  portal  for  the  judiciary,  providing  access  to  case  files,  uniform 
interfaces for courts, and electronic summoning of parties in court proceedings. The portal should also 
include a module enabling direct elections to the SJC by all magistrates, which is meant to come into 
use for the appointment of the SJC due to take place in autumn 2017. As mentioned earlier, a separate 
project  was  implemented  in  2015  for  the  establishment  of  a  centralised  system  for  the  random 
allocation  of  cases.  At  the  level  of  individual  courts,  the  situation  differs  between  courts.  Some  are 
relatively  advanced  in  implementing  electronic  case  handling,  whereas  others  are  further  behind. 
Finally, in the implementation of e-justice in the judiciary, concerns will inevitably arise with regard 
to data security, necessitating a capacity for monitoring and control at the level of the SJC and/or the 
judicial inspectorate.  

4.4. 

Reform of the prosecution service 

In  Bulgaria  the  public  prosecutor's  office  is  an  integral  part  of  the  judiciary  and  it  is  therefore  not 
possible  to  consider  the  quality  and  efficiency  of  the  judiciary  without  also  touching  upon  the 

69   The criteria include issues such as the number of judges in the court, the demographic basis, the access to 

public transport and IT (e-justice), and exceptional situations (e.g. mountainous regions).  

70   In  addition,  there  is  a  certain  link  to  the  map  of  regional  public  administration,  where  some  services  are 
linked to the courts. However, a reform of the regional administration does not currently seem to be on the 
political agenda.  

71   A partial reform was already completed of the military courts in 2014, reducing their number from 5 to 3, 
underlining the fact that the extent of analytical preparation needed for reforms varies in the different parts of 
the system.  

72   Operational Programme Administrative Capacity 2007-2013 (OPAC). 
73   Operational Programme for Good Governance 2014-2020 (OPGG). 

17 

 
 
                                                            
prosecution. This is reflected in the Bulgarian government's judicial reform strategy, which includes 
an  objective  of  an  'effective  prosecution  service',  which  includes  the  development  of  a  new 
organisational model in the context of a reformed SJC and a new penal policy and aiming at several 
objectives, such as instilling greater initiative and responsibility in the individual administrative heads 
in the system of prosecution and investigation, promoting greater specialisation through the formation 
of  interdepartmental  teams  to  handle  complicated  cases,  strengthening  the  accountability  and  public 
trust  in  the  prosecution,  and  exploring  the  status  of  prosecutors  and  the  factors  that  restrain  their 
professional independence and motivation.74 Follow-up on this point of the strategy is still pending.75  

A general reorganisation of the prosecutor's office was carried out on the basis of a functional review 
from 2013 to early 2015. Amendments to the criminal  procedure code in spring  2015 also modified 
some key provisions to enhance the safeguards for the autonomy of individual prosecutors.76 However, 
a  need  for  further  reform  of  the  prosecution,  in  particular  to  address  its  highly  centralised  structure, 
seems  to  be  reflected  in  general  views  among  observers  and  experts  and  is  also  borne  out  by 
independent surveys of prosecutors' attitudes.77  

Linked to the prosecution is also the National Investigation Service (NIS). Composed of investigating 
magistrates, this service also forms part of the judiciary. In organisational terms it is attached to the 
public  prosecution  offices  and  ultimately  works  under  the  general  guidance  of  the  prosecution.  It  is 
responsible for the investigation of certain categories of cases, including for example cases involving 
persons  with  immunities  and  particularly  complex  cases  involving  high-level  corruption  specifically 
assigned by the public prosecutor's office. Several interlocutors have regularly noted that this service 
has a low workload.78 The approach to this service has changed over the years, first aiming to reduce 
its  size  to  the  extent  possible,  within  the  limits  allowed  by  the Constitution,  but  then  later  changing 
course  by  adding  additional  tasks  to  it  in  order  to  be  able  to  better  draw  on  the  resource  that  it 
represents. The judicial reform strategy includes the objective of finding a lasting solution to the status 
of  the  investigation  service  in  the  context  of  the  elaboration  of  an  overall  penal  policy  and 
rationalisation of the investigatory services.   

V 

COMBATTING CORRUPTION 

The  fourth  and  fifth  CVM  benchmarks  for  Bulgaria  focus  on  the  fight  against  corruption,  including 
professional and non-partisan investigations into allegations of high-level corruption and measures to 
prevent and fight corruption at all levels. Available surveys indicate that corruption continues to be an 
important problem in Bulgaria, affecting the trust of citizens in public institutions and of investors in 
the Bulgarian economy. In international  surveys Bulgaria consistently ranks among  the EU Member 
States with the highest level of perceived corruption.79 Businesses consider corruption to be among the 
most important challenges when doing business in the country.80  

In the years following accession to the EU Bulgaria took a number of legislative steps and established 
a  set  of  institutions  to  address  the  problems.  However,  the  current  institutional  set  up  remains 

74   Updated strategy to continue the reform of the judicial system; December, 2014, Strategic goal 4.  
75   Information received from the Bulgarian authorities, December 2015. 
76   Similar amendments have been proposed to reflect this in the Judicial Systems Act.  
77   See  e.g.  the  2014  survey  of  450  prosecutors  in  Attitudes  of  Prosecutors  for  Reforms  in  Prosecution  and 
Criminal  Proceedings  by  Global  Metrics  Ltd.  and  the  Bulgarian  Institute  for  Legal  Initiatives  (BILI). 
Concern with regard to the highly centralised structure and hierarchical culture of the prosecutor's office in 
terms of its possible impact on operational efficiency has been a recurrent theme in meetings with a variety of 
interlocutors and experts consulted by the Commission services.  

78   See  also  Bulgaria  –  judicial  performance,  caseload  and  expenditure  review  (2008-2014),  World  Bank, 

November 2015. 

79   See  e.g.  the  World  Bank's  Worldwide  Governance  Indicators;  Transparency  International's  Corruption 

Perceptions Index; or the World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index 2015, p. 25.  

80   See Global Competitiveness Report 2014-2015, World Economic Forum, 2015, pp. 136. 

18 

 
 
                                                            
fragmented and largely ineffective. Key institutions have been the subject of serious scandals.81 Others 
have not been able to play the transformative role originally expected of them.82 In general, institutions 
are seen as working as separate entities without forming part of an integrated anti-corruption system.83 
The  existing  institutions  continue  their  work  within  their  respective  remits  of  responsibility,  but  the 
shortcomings  identified  in  previous  reports  remain  pertinent.84  As  mentioned  in  the  January  2015 
CVM  report  a  comprehensive  evaluation  of  the  previous  Bulgarian  anti-corruption  strategy  was 
conducted in 2014, which appeared to provide a thorough and robust assessment of past failings.85 In 
early 2015 the Bulgarian government took this evaluation as a basis for establishing a new forward-
looking anti-corruption strategy for the coming years.  

The  2015  CVM  report  recommended  Bulgaria  to  entrust  a  single  institution  with  the  authority  and 
autonomy  to  coordinate  and  control  the  enforcement  of  the  anti-corruption  activities,  to  create 
minimum standards for the public sector in terms of internal control bodies, to put in place a solid anti-
corruption strategy, to ensure follow-up to the public procurement strategy adopted in 2014, to finalise 
the pending nomination procedures and needed legislative reforms in regard to the conflict of interest 
commission, to assess how the system of asset declarations could be put to better use, to reinforce the 
capacity  of  the  prosecution  to  pursue  high-level  cases,  and  to  monitor  the  progress  of  high  level 
corruption cases and take steps to avoid the exploitation of procedural loopholes.  

The new Bulgarian anti-corruption strategy was adopted by the government in early April 2015.86 It is 
a  comprehensive  document  presenting  a  succinct  set  of  priorities  and  measures  within  six  priority 
areas:  1)  a  more  effective  institutional  set-up,  2)  high-level  corruption,  3)  political  corruption,  4) 
corruption in the judiciary and law enforcement, 5) low-level/every-day corruption, and 6) changing 
public  attitudes.  Within  each  priority  the  document  sets  out  concrete  actions  and  measures.  Among 
other  initiatives,  the  strategy  introduces  some  important  institutional  innovations,  such  as  a  national 
anti-corruption coordination council, to provide political support and follow-up to the strategy, and a 
unified  anti-corruption  authority  focusing  on  high-level  corruption.87  The  new  strategy  created  a 
certain momentum in the first half of 2015. However, towards the summer this momentum appeared to 
diminish and an important setback occurred in September, with the National Assembly's rejection of a 

81   The commission on prevention and ascertainment of conflicts of interests was marred by a major scandal in 
2013  where  its  chairman  was  placed  under  investigation  for  abuse  of  office  amidst  allegations  of  political 
influence  on  investigations.  He  was  later  convicted  in  a  criminal  trial.  Now  more  than  2½  years  later,  the 
conflict of interest commission is still working in a reduced format with only three out of five members and 
without an elected chair, as the National Assembly has not so far elected a replacement. 

82   Large  scale  funds  have  been  invested  in  the  so-called  BORKOR  project,  without  much  apparent  impact. 
Recently, the Commission has been informed of some concrete results of this project, including useful input 
to the preparations of a more effective system of public procurement in the healthcare sector. However, this 
does  not  change  the  overall  impression  that,  in  relation  to  the  investment  made  in  terms  of  financing  and 
human resources, the concrete impact of this institution has been limited in terms of preventing corruption.  
83   For  example,  the  National  Audit  Office  checks  asset  declarations  of  high-ranking  officials  against  various 
data bases, but no institution is charged with a systematic follow-up to identify and investigate possible cases 
of illicit enrichment.  

84   See e.g. SWD (2015) 9, pp. 20-24. 
85   See COM (2015) 36, p. 7. The study was carried out under the authority of the General Inspectorate with the 

Council of Ministers and funded by the Operational Programme Administrative Capacity (OPAC). 

86   See the National Strategy for Prevention and Combating corruption in the Republic of Bulgaria 2015-2020, 

April 2015.  

87   Other important elements of the strategy include a specialised unit in the prosecution for the investigation of 
high-level  corruption  cases,  enhancing  the  powers  and  independence  of  the  inspectorates  in  the  public 
administration, expanding the powers of the asset forfeiture commission, enhancing capacity for preliminary 
control of public procurement procedures, reform of conflict of interest and asset declarations, better rules on 
whistle-blower protection, amendments to the electoral code and law on political parties to prevent electoral 
corruption,  introduction  of  integrity  checks  for  officials  in  certain  positions,  various  preventive  actions  in 
regard  to  low-level  corruption  including  sectorial  anticorruption  plans  for  high-risk  sectors,  and  awareness 
campaigns focusing on  changing  attitudes and  making  the  public sensitive  to  signs of  corruption.  Some  of 
these elements form part of the anti-corruption law presented by the government (see below). 

19 

 
 
                                                            
new  draft  anti-corruption  law,  which  notably  was  intended  to  provide  the  legal  basis  for  the  new 
unified  anti-corruption  authority.  The  result  was  a  significant  delay  of  this  key  element  of  the 
government's new anti-corruption strategy.88  

5.1.  Overall coordination of the anti-corruption effort 

The  new  anti-corruption  strategy  establishes  a  new  national  coordination  council  for  anti-corruption 
policy.  The  coordination  council  brings  together  high-level  representatives  of  the  key  relevant 
ministries  (justice,  interior,  economy  and  finance),  the  ISJC,  the  public  prosecutor's  office,  the  state 
agency for national security (SANS) as well as the General Inspectorate of the Council of Ministers. It 
is  chaired  by  a  Deputy  Prime  Minister89  and  the  General  Inspectorate  of  the  Council  of  Ministers 
provides  its  secretariat.  The  ombudsman  as  well  as  the  chairpersons  of  the  public  order  and 
parliamentary ethics committees of the National Assembly may participate as observers, and various 
institutions and experts may also be invited to its meetings. A civic council is associated to its work 
with representatives of civil society associations, which may also attend meetings of the coordination 
council.  

The  main  tasks  of  the  national  coordination  council  are  to  develop  strategy,  set  priorities,  launch 
initiatives, and monitor progress in the implementation of the anti-corruption strategy. It is a political 
level body and is not therefore meant to be directly involved in the concrete activities of the various 
institutions active in the prevention or investigation of corruption. Its purpose is rather a response to 
past problems of anti-corruption strategies suffering from a lack of systematic political attention and 
follow-up,  issues  that  the  council  is  meant  to  prevent  from  reappearing  in  the  context  of  the  new 
strategy.  

The council was established before the summer and has held a number of meetings. So far it appears 
to  have  been  successful  in  providing  a  forum  for  a  general  discussion  of  concrete  initiatives  to  be 
pursued in the context of the anti-corruption strategy. In the future it could provide an important forum 
for  monitoring  and  evaluating  progress.  Whether  it  will  also  be  effective  in  pushing  forward  the 
necessary  reforms  at  political  level  remains  to  be  seen.  As  shown  by  the  initial  failure  of  the 
government's  anti-corruption  law,  progress  at  this  level  ultimately  requires  a  broader  political 
commitment.  

5.2. 

Prevention and detection of high-level corruption 

Among the key measures proposed in the new anti-corruption strategy is the establishment of a new 
unified authority for the prevention and detection of corruption among high-level officials. The new 
anti-corruption  authority  would  incorporate  the  existing  conflict  of  interest  commission,  the  anti-
corruption  centre  (BORKOR),  and  part  of  the  National  Audit  Office  currently  dealing  with  the 
verification of asset declarations of high-level officials. The new institution would be an independent 
agency  with  reinforced  investigative  powers.  In  addition  to  being  in  charge  of  checking  conflicts  of 
interest and asset declarations for around 7000 high-level officials,90 it would carry out inspections and 
follow up on signals. It would have access to public registers as well as banking and tax information. It 
would be competent to impose administrative fines as well as to refer cases to the prosecution and the 
Asset Forfeiture Commission for further investigation.  

Legislative  proposals  for  setting  up  the  new  authority  were  presented  in  spring  2015.  In  addition  to 
establishing  the  new  institution,  the  draft  law  also  includes  a  revision  of  the  existing  legislation  on 

88   The government seems to remain determined to reintroduce the draft legislation in the National Assembly in 

early 2016, but the eventual outcome is uncertain. 

89   To provide further weight to the objective of overall coordination the deputy Prime Minister has also been 

given the title of anti-corruption coordinator. Deputy chair is the Minister of Justice. 

90   This  would  represent  a  change  in  regard  to  conflicts  of  interest,  where  the  existing  conflict  of  interest 

commission is in principle competent for all public officials.  

20 

 
 
                                                            
conflicts of interest and the monitoring of the property status of high-level officials.91 Originally the 
aim was to have the legislation adopted before the summer of 2015, which could have allowed for the 
new institution to be operational by early 2016.92 However, certain elements of the new anti-corruption 
authority  proved  divisive  in  the  National  Assembly  and  the  vote  was  postponed  until  September, 
where it eventually failed to gather the required majority among the deputies.  

The two main issues of controversy concerned on the one hand the ability of the new agency to rely on 
anonymous  signals  and  on  the  other  hand  the  procedure  for  appointing  the  head  of  the  agency.  The 
issue of anonymous signals has a difficult history in Bulgaria,93 though the debate seemed to conflate 
the  question  of  taking  into  account  anonymous  leads  on  the  one  hand  and  considering  them  as 
admissible  evidence  on  the  other.  The  appointment  of  the  head  of  the  new  institution  referred  to 
concerns about the need to ensure political independence and impartiality in the new institution. The 
government  proposal  envisaged  the  appointment  of  the  head  of  the  agency  by  the  President  on  a 
proposal of the Council of Ministers. According to critics, however, this process would give too much 
say  to  the  executive  branch  and  risk  politicising  the  activities  of  the  agency.  These  issues  were  the 
subject  of  important  debate  in  the  National  Assembly,  but,  the  total  rejection  of  the  legislative 
proposal at first reading nevertheless came as a major surprise.  94 The draft law had reportedly been 
debated and given provisional support within no less than four parliamentary committees.95 According 
to the parliamentary procedures substantial elements of legislative proposals can be amended prior to 
their final adoption during the second reading, which could have allowed for problematic issues to be 
addressed.  

The  rejection  of  the  law  at  first  reading  resulted  in  a  significant  delay  in  carrying  the  legislation 
forward.  According to the rules of procedure a failure in the first reading  bars the government  from 
reintroducing  a  similar  legislative  proposal  for  three  months,  in  this  case  effectively postponing  any 
new  legislative  initiative  until  December  2015.  Eventually,  the  government  decided  to  continue  its 
consultations with the various political forces in the National Assembly in order to prepare the ground 
for a new revised proposal prior to its official adoption by the Council of Ministers. A revised draft is 
expected early in 2016.  

5.3.  

Preventing corruption at all levels in the public administration 

While the new unified anti-corruption authority would be competent in regard to high-level officials, 
the rest of the public administration would continue to be under the control of the inspectorates and 
regular audit institutions. Relying on the existing institutional set-up the issues identified in past CVM 
reports in regard to the general systems for the assessment of conflicts of interest and checking of asset 
declarations largely remain unchanged.96 However, under the new anti-corruption strategy a number of 
new  initiatives  are  in  the  pipeline  to  address  corruption  more  generally  within  the  public 
administration,  including  low  level  corruption.  In  particular,  three  strands  of  work  seem  to  be  in 

91   On  the  latter  issue  the  draft  law  aims  to  modernise  the  system  of  property  and  conflicts  of  interest 
declarations,  expanding  their  scope  to  address  practices  used  to  circumvent  the  existing  regime  and 
facilitating full checks on actual property of the inspected persons. While the new institution would only be 
responsible  for  high-ranking  officials,  other  public  officials  would  be  the  responsibility  of  their  respective 
institutions, relying for example on the internal inspectorates to check conflicts of interest. 

92   There would be a need to get the financing in place, to procure the IT systems, and carry out integrity tests 
for the officials. Even if existing staff would be allowed to work in the new institution, this would be subject 
to a vetting procedure for all staff. EU funds were being considered to fund the procurement of IT.  

93   Partly due to the association of this concept with the use of 'informers' during communist times.  
94   The rejection was followed by public statements regretting the outcome not only by the responsible minister, 
but also by civil society organisations and even by a broad coalition of foreign diplomatic representations in 
Sofia.  

95   Including the committees for anti-corruption, legal, budgetary and regional affairs.  
96   Draft  legislative  amendments  to  the  current  conflict  of  interest  law,  which  had  been  under  consideration 
during  the  previous  parliament,  were  scrapped  after  the  presentation  of  the  new  anti-corruption  law  was 
presented by the government.  

21 

 
 
                                                            
progress  in  this  area:  reform  of  the  administrative  inspectorates,  introduction  of  sectorial  anti-
corruption strategies, and reform of public procurement.  

Public inspectorates 

The inspectorates are a key part of the prevention against corruption in the public administration. In 
charge of the internal control, it is essential that they function in an independent and professional way 
in line with a set of common methodological principles. Currently they in principle all work under the 
guidance of the General Inspectorate under the Council of Ministers. However, the latter does not have 
any  binding  powers  over  the  individual  inspectorates  and  can  for  example  not  insist  that  all  follow 
common methodological guidelines. Rather, the sectorial inspectorates work under the authority of the 
respective minister.97  

In  order  to  address  these  issues,  one  of  the  objectives  set  out  in  the  anti-corruption  strategy  is  to 
strengthen the inspectorates. Draft amendments to the Law on Public Administration have reportedly 
been  prepared  by  the  General  Inspectorate  aiming  to  enhance  the  capacity  and  independence  of  the 
inspectorates.  The  changes  would  clarify  the  legal  basis  of  the  inspectorates  by  clearly  delineating 
administrative control from other control activities, by providing a basis for establishing the structure 
and  number  of  inspectorates  and  for  adoption  of  common  rules  and  procedures  for  their  operations, 
and by strengthening the leading role of the General Inspectorate, including by giving it a competence 
to conduct evaluations of the activities of other inspectorates. The draft amendments were presented to 
the anti-corruption coordination council in June and are currently awaiting adoption at the Council of 
Ministers, after which they would need to be adopted by the National Assembly. These changes have a 
close link to the new anti-corruption law, as it is here proposed that the inspectorates will in future be 
responsible  for  checking  the  conflict  of  interest  and  personal  asset  declarations  of  lower  ranking 
officials and following up on any indications of possible corruption.  

Sectorial anti-corruption plans 

As part of the anti-corruption strategy the Bulgarian authorities envisage to put in place detailed plans 
to  counter  corruption  in  different  sectors  of  the  public  administration  through  preventive  measures. 
These  sectorial  anti-corruption  strategies  would  cover  high-risk  sectors  and  contain  very  concrete 
measures  specifically  tailored  to  address  low-level  corruption  in  each  sector.  The  development  of 
sectorial  action  plans  require  a  combination  of  very  good  knowledge  of  the  individual  sectors 
concerned, from the perspective of both employees and end users of the services provided, notably to 
identify the corruption risks. Outside expertise can be necessary to help in the formulation of measures 
and  control  of  their  implementation.  Exchange  of  best  practice  amongst  different  administrations  is 
also necessary, although there is no one-size-fits-all solution which  can be applied  across the board. 
An in-depth knowledge of the organisation and work practices concerned is essential, as the problems 
can often best be solved through redesigning the organisation of tasks and procedures.  

The first actions have been launched within the Ministry of Interior, in the context of a wider reform 
of  that  ministry  launched  by  the  government  in  2015.  The  measures  introduced  or  considered  range 
from  use  of  cameras  in  traffic  police  vehicles,98  over  the  introduction  of  integrity  checks  for 

97   This is seen as increasing the risk of fragmentation as well as raising questions of political interference in the 

work of the inspectorates. 

98   The experience with traffic police is a good illustration of the complexity of addressing low level corruption. 
The traffic police are seen as one of the services mostly affected by bribes in Bulgaria. To address this issue 
the government as a first step installed a number of cameras in traffic police cars. However, it appeared that 
this was only the first level at which bribes could be paid. First, the fines are set as a separate step within the 
administration.  Second,  there  was  also  a  possibility  to  intervene  at  the  level  of  the  transfer  of  records  of 
unpaid fines to the NRA. At each level of the chain there is a risk of corruption and hence a potential need for 
controls. One possible remedy would be simplification of processes and introduction of IT tools to manage 
key functions, hence in practice implying a broader reform of the administration of traffic fines.  

22 

 
 
                                                            
personnel,99 to a more systematic follow-up on conflicts of interest and asset declarations for Ministry 
of  Interior  officials  in  managerial  positions.100  A  separate  issue  concerns  the  control  over  sensitive 
data, where reportedly very little control has been exerted over the use of such data within the ministry 
in  the  past.  Two  new  units  have  now  been  created  to  manage  information  security  and  the  use  of 
internal data bases. More generally, the reform involves the separation of administrative services in a 
new entity and the introduction of electronic services101 as well as modernisation of the police force.102 
Finally, in regard to the management of the external borders, the Bulgarian authorities have reacted to 
the recent increase in migration pressures by tightening controls and preventive measures within the 
border police to deter and detect any corrupt practices.  103 This involves measures such as rotation of 
officials through randomised assignments as well as implementation of risk based checks.  

The sectorial measures under way in the Ministry of Interior represent a model for the containment of 
low-level  corruption  which  is  planned  to  be  rolled  out  more  widely  in  the  Bulgarian  public 
administration,  targeting  areas  where  particular  risks  of  corruption  have  been  identified.  Sectorial 
plans  have  so  far  been  prepared  for  the  National  Revenue  Agency,  the  healthcare  system,  the 
agricultural administration, and the ministries of transport and energy.104 The results of these plans will 
depend to a large extent on their concrete implementation and follow-up within the relevant ministries.  

Public procurement strategy 

Public  procurement  is  generally  recognised  as  a  high-risk  area  for  corruption.  The  Bulgarian  public 
procurement  system  has  been  characterised  by  complex  and  changing  legislation,  a  lack  of 
administrative capacity at different levels, and low trust in the legality of procedures, which end up in 
lengthy appeals. In 2014 Bulgaria responded to these challenges with the adoption of a comprehensive 
strategy and roadmap for the improvement of the public procurement system over the coming years.105 
In  the  anti-corruption  strategy,  furthermore,  the  Bulgarian  government  has  committed  itself  to 
enhancing  the  capacity  for  preliminary  controls  of  public  procurement  through  the  development  of 
internal control systems.  

In 2015 the government has targeted several measures in this area, including draft amendments to the 
public procurement  act  currently under consideration  in the National Assembly. These amendments, 
and the subsequent implementing regulations, are expected to lead to greater legal certainty, since they 

99   This seems to depend in part on legislative changes. Also, a model for the performance of integrity checks 
had to be developed, suitable for the Bulgarian context. The model chosen reportedly focuses primarily on 
compliance with administrative rules and guidelines, but if in the course of the check the official demands a 
bribe a criminal case is opened against the official.  

100  A model for this is in preparation in a project financed by EU funds but is expected to be ready towards the 

end of 2016 at the earliest.  

101  Administrative  services  constitute  another  high-risk  area.  A  draft  law  has  been  submitted  to  the  National 

Assembly to pave the way for this. 

102  The  current  structure  is  very  complex  following  a  long  history  of  piecemeal  changes.  The  aim  is  that  the 

police structures should be streamlined and separated out from the general administration.   

103  According to the Bulgarian authorities the migration pressure has been associated with increased corruption 
risks, apparently also linked to organised crime. This is also considered a potential security risk in light of 
several  recorded  cases  of  prospective  'foreign  fighters'  having  been  caught  transiting  through  Bulgarian 
territory.  A  large  scale  anti-corruption  raid  took  place  at  the  Kapitan  Andreevo  border  crossing  on  13 
December 2015, resulting in the arrest of 33 customs officials. 

104  These plans include measures such as rotation of employees, implementation of integrity checks, awareness-

raising in the target population for the relevant services and tightened financial control.  

105  National Strategy for Development of the Public procurement sector in Bulgaria over the Period 2014-2020, 
2014. Bulgaria has also been required to set up an action plan more specifically targeting compliance with 
EU rules, as the existing system was not assessed to meet the ex-ante conditions for the use of EU funds in 
the 2014-2020 programming period. In the new EU funds regulations for that period, expenditures under the 
European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIFs) have been made conditional on compliance with a set of 
pre-established  criteria,  including  minimum  requirements  for  public  procurement.  Where  shortcomings  are 
identified, the Member States are required to put in place an action plan and implement it by the end of 2016.  

23 

 
 
                                                            
would codify and simplify the existing rules. One objective of the proposals is also to give the public 
procurement  agency  strengthened  powers  to  monitor  public  procurement  procedures.106  Other 
measures would aim to improve the coordination between the various agencies involved in ex ante and 
ex  post  controls  and  to  increase  professionalisation  of  the  administrative  bodies  involved  in  public 
procurement. Preparations are also ongoing for the completion of e-procurement, and the introduction 
of centralised purchasing platforms is under consideration.107  

5.4. 

Addressing high-level corruption through the criminal justice system 

Past CVM reports have noted very little progress in Bulgaria with regard to the investigation of high-
level  corruption.  For  evaluating  the  track  record  of  Bulgaria  in  tackling  high  level  corruption  cases, 
there  is  a  need  that  final  court  decisions  are  rendered  and  enforced.  Information  on  investigation, 
indictment  and first instance court decision is of course useful to  form  a view on the activity of the 
different  actors.  However,  the  CVM  needs  to  assess  the  overall  performance  of  the  system  in 
effectively  tackling  high  level  corruption.  So  it  is  the  entirety  of  the  law  enforcement  and  judicial 
chain that has to deliver concrete results.  

In 2015 the overall picture from earlier years remains essentially unchanged.108 Some cases involving 
high-ranking figures have resulted in final conviction, but the number remains very limited (and with a 
significant  number  of  suspended  sentences  also  reducing  the  deterrent  effect).109  There  have  been 
several high-profile cases of initial convictions being reversed on appeal or charges being withdrawn 
by  the  prosecution  in  cases  where  initially  there  were  allegations  of  serious  wrong-doing.110  At  the 
same time, new high-level cases have appeared which will test the capacity of the Bulgarian judicial 
institutions  to  deliver  an  effective  investigations  and  prosecution.111  Compared  with  other  Member 
States, OLAF has a relatively high number of on-going investigations where Bulgaria is the country 
involved  and  EU  funds  are  concerned.112  Moreover,  OLAF  is  monitoring  a  high  number  of  cases 

106  In  the  past  the  ex-ante  checks  conducted  by  the  public  procurement  agency  have  been  criticised  as  too 
superficial, reflecting partly a lack of resources to check all procedures in depth and partly limitations on its 
legal  competence.  A  solution  to  this  would  be  the  introduction  of  much  more  comprehensive  check  on  a 
smaller sample of procedures, selected on the basis of a systematic risk assessment.  

107  If  appropriately  developed,  such  centralisation  may  increase  professionalism  and  facilitate  measures  to 
address shortcomings. It is applicable in particular in regard to areas with recurrent procurement, allowing for 
standardisation of purchasing decisions.  

108  The  January  2015  CVM  report  noted  that  although  there  seemed  to  have  been  an  increase  in  the  overall 
number  of  investigations  in  progress  in  2014,  results  remained  scarce  in  terms  of  final  convictions.  COM 
(2015) 36, p. 8. 

109  These  include  the  former  chair  of  the  conflict  of  interest  commission  who  was  given  a  3-year  suspended 
sentence  for  malfeasance  in  office,  a  former  regional  governor  who  was  also  given  3-year  suspended  for 
corruption, a former mayor sentenced to 3 years and 4 years in a low-security facility for respectively bribery 
and  malfeasance  in  office,  and  a  former  prosecutor  sentenced  to  3  ½  years  in  a  low-security  facility  for 
exerting pressure on a colleague to terminate a case without charges. More general figures provided by the 
Bulgarian  prosecutor's  office  indicate  that  there  were  22  and  12  enforced  prison  sentences  for  corruption 
related  crimes  in  2014  and  2015  respectively.  The  figures  provided  do  not  allow  for  an  assessment  of  the 
severity  of  the  sentences  for  2014  or  2015.  Data  for  earlier  years  indicate  that  out  of  26  and  9  cases  of 
enforced prison sentences respectively in 2012 and 2013 8 and 2 concerned sentences of more than 3 years of 
prison (typically between 3 and 5 years). The numbers for suspended sentence are generally higher than for 
enforced sentences: 143 cases in 2014 and 105 in 2015. There seems to have been an increase compared to 
earlier years. In general, it should be noted that figures for 2015 cover only the first 9 months of the year. 

110 These include several cases of very high-ranking politicians or former politicians.  
111  The  handling of  criminal proceedings  concerning  irregularities  in  the  country's  fourth largest  bank  and  the 
banking supervisory authorities discovered in 2014 will be a particularly complex test case in this respect.  
112 The cases are mainly related to possible corruption, irregularities and fraud with public procurement carried 

out by certain municipal authorities acting as beneficiaries, and to the existence of conflict of interest. 

24 

 
 
                                                            
where  the  investigative  phase  has  been  closed  but  where  judicial  recommendations  for  actions  have 
been addressed to the national judicial authorities.113  

In the context of the preparations for the anti-corruption strategy, the Bulgarian authorities reportedly 
considered  a  number  of  ways  in  which  the  prosecution  of  high-level  corruption  could  be  improved, 
based  on  experiences  in  other  EU  Member  States.  Eventually  it  was  decided  to  avoid  major 
institutional  innovations  and  instead  to  proceed  on  the  basis  of  a  closer  cooperation  between  key 
institutions already responsible for tackling corruption.114 This took the form of a new specialised anti-
corruption  unit,  formally  established  in April  2015.  Incorporating two  pre-existing  units,  established 
respectively in 2013 and 2014, dealing with magistrates and local corruption, the new unit is meant to 
focus  more  of  its  attention  on  high-level  corruption.  Organisationally  situated  within  the  Sofia  City 
Prosecutor's office, it includes officials of the Ministry of Interior and agents of the State Agency for 
National Security (SANS). While it works under the overall supervision and control of the prosecutor's 
office, it is physically situated  at the premises of SANS.  SANS has the premises and equipment  for 
interrogation of witnesses as well as of access to the use of special investigatory means (SIMs). SANS 
agents  also  participate  in  the  investigatory  work,  providing  intelligence.  The  Ministry  of  Interior  on 
the other hand provides the police powers (detaining suspects etc.).  

The Ministry of Interior's participation is a new element which follows from the reorganisation of the 
investigatory  services  in  early  2015,  where  criminal  investigatory  powers  were  removed  from  the 
SANS.115    Following  the  reorganisation,  all  cases  concerning  organised  crime  have  also  been 
transferred  to  the  specialised  prosecution  and  the  organised  crime  directorate  in  the  Ministry  of 
Interior. Within the anti-corruption unit, staff from all the involved services work in teams focusing on 
specific  cases,  thus  ensuring  that  all  the  information  and  competences  are  concentrated  in  one  place 
while  access  to  information  remains  restricted  to  a  small  group  of  people  on  a  need  to  know  basis. 
Prosecutors are supervising the work of the teams. Staff of the unit has been significantly reinforced 
compared with the two pre-existing units investigating magistrates and local corruption.116  

One advantage cited for the new set-up should be the national scope of operations of the specialised 
unit.  This  avoids  potential  local  dependencies  and  pressures,  which  in  the  past  has  been  known  to 
obstruct investigations into corruption allegations. Another advantage is the close cooperation between 
prosecutors  and  investigators  within  the  unit,  which  allows  for  a  more  team-based  and  specialised 
approach,  while  providing  stronger  safeguards  against  the  risk  of  leakage  of  information.117  The 
authorities  consider  that  this  model  of  specialised  cooperation  between  services  has  shown  some 
success  in  regard  to  investigations  into  cases  of  serious  corruption.  A  number  of  cases  have  been 

113  OLAF reports that it sometimes appears unclear why the judicial authorities did not initiate, or discontinued, 
judicial  procedures.  This  problem  is  further  underlined  by  the  existence  of  parallel  cases  in  other  Member 
States, where sentences have already been handed down or police raids and arrests have been undertaken. 
114  Notably  it  was  decided  not  to  propose  the  creation  of  a  specialised  prosecution  office  for  high-level 
corruption. Some of the arguments behind this decision seem to have been, first, that it is very complex under 
Bulgarian law to establish separate prosecution offices, second, that high level corruption is already to a large 
extent the responsibility of the Sofia City prosecutor's office, and third, that pragmatic cooperation between 
key institutions along the lines of measures already initiated held out the prospect of achieving results in the 
near future without a need for legislative changes.  

115  Such  powers  were  conferred  on  SANS  as  part  of  the  previous  reform  in  2013  when  the  organised  crime 
directorate was moved from the Ministry of Interior to SANS. However, this reform was reversed in early 
2015 under the new government. 

116  In  practice,  the  two  pre-existing  units  continue  to  function  within  the  new  unit,  ensuring  operational 

continuity.  

117  This  has  proven  particularly  important  in  cases  involving  magistrates.  As  people  tend  to  know  each  other 
within the judiciary, it is difficult in the context of the normal prosecution offices to ensure that information 
about an ongoing case does not come to the attention of the person under investigation.  

25 

 
 
                                                            
brought to court, including several cases against magistrates and former local politicians. More cases 
are under investigation.118  

It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  the  new  unit  will  be  able  to  scale  up  its  operations  over  the  coming 
months  and  if  it  will  also  be  able  to  conduct  larger  scale  investigations  into  organised  corruption 
schemes  involving  larger  networks  of  perpetrators.119  In  addition,  the  assessment  of  Bulgaria's 
response  to  high-level  corruption  will  also  depend  on  the  judicial  follow-up  on  such  cases  and  the 
ability of Bulgaria to achieve final conviction of the offenders in court. 

VI 

TACKLING ORGANISED CRIME 

The  sixth  benchmark  under  the  CVM  for  Bulgaria  focuses  on  the  capacity  of  Bulgarian  judicial 
institutions to effectively fight organised crime. Past CVM reports have noted major problems in this 
area, where it has been difficult to identify significant results in terms of final convictions in high-level 
cases. In response to these challenges, a specialised prosecution office and court were established in 
2012 specifically dedicated to cases involving organised crime. However, the specialised prosecution 
also  is  dependent  on  the  broader  legal  set-up.  The  heavy  and  very  formalistic  legal  framework  in 
Bulgaria creates a certain number of challenges in the prosecution of complex organised crime cases. 
The  interaction  between  the  different  services  has  been  frequently  noted  as  an  area  where 
improvements are needed.  

For Bulgaria to establish a track-record in the tackling of organised crime cases, there is a need that 
final  court  decisions  are  rendered  and  enforced  to  show  that  the  system  in  its  entirety  is  capable  of 
tackling the problem and that there is a deterrent effect.120 This can only be the case when custodial 
sentences are served and criminal assets effectively confiscated. An issue noted in the past concerns 
convicted  criminals  who  escape  justice  and  abscond  before  a  court  sentence  ordering  custody  is 
rendered and/or enforced. Here some action has been taken and more is in preparation. In respect to 
the  confiscation  of  illicit  assets,  a  new  law  was  adopted  in  2012,  which  introduced  some 
improvements  to  the  legal  framework  on  illegal  asset  forfeiture  while  apparently  also  creating  some 
new challenges.  

The  January  2015  CVM  report  recommended  Bulgaria  to  create  the  conditions  for  the  specialised 
court  and  prosecution  office  to  focus  on  high-level  complex  cases,  to  monitor  the  progress  of  high-
level  organised  crime  cases  and  take  steps  to  avoid  the  exploitation  of  procedural  loopholes,  to 
introduce  safeguards  to  prevent  convicted  criminals  from  absconding  and  facilitate  confiscation  of 
criminal  assets,  and  to  ensure  that  changes  in  the  investigatory  services  responsible  for  organised 
crime would be carried out in a manner to ensure operational continuity.  

6.1. 

Specialised court and prosecution  

The  specialised  prosecutor's  office  and  court  were  established  in  early  2012  to  create  the  basis  of  a 
more  focused  investigation  and  prosecution  of  organised  crime.  An  advantage  of  these  specialised 
institutions is that they cover the entire territory of the country. For the prosecutor's office this gives a 
more comprehensive picture of organised criminal activity, allowing it to better link cases in different 
regions  and  over  time.  Another  advantage  is  to  create  some  distance  from  local  pressures.  Some 

118  Information from the public prosecutor's office.  
119  In  addition  to  focusing  on  individual  cases  involving  single  perpetrators,  a  particular  advantage  of  a 
specialised  unit  should  be  to  enable  broader  investigations  into  networks  of  persons  involved  in  systemic 
corruption in order to identify the people at the centre of such networks.  

120  Evidently,  this  requires  investigations  which  are  carried  out  thoroughly  and  independently  as  well  as 

indictments which have been properly prepared and are convincing in court.   

26 

 
 
                                                            
organised criminal groups have reportedly been able to work with relative impunity due to their ability 
to exert pressure within local judicial and law enforcement institutions.121  

The  first  years  were  marked  to  a  certain  extent  by  procedural  and  organisational  issues,  with  issues 
regarding the definition of competencies and a need to build up capacity for handling complex cases. 
Some of these specific issues seem now to have been addressed. However, challenges remain in regard 
to the broader legal framework.122  

Due to the formal definition of its remit of competences, the specialised prosecution seems in the past 
to  have  been  burdened  with  cases  not  properly  linked  to  organised  crime,  including  minor  cases 
involving members of the staff of the Ministry of Interior or employees of security firms. Such minor 
cases  have  reportedly  taken  up  a  large  share  of  available  staff  resources.  With  amendments  to  the 
criminal  procedure  code  in  spring  2015,  the  competence  of  the  specialised  court  and  prosecution  in 
regard to such minor cases was dropped, which should help focus attention  towards cases involving 
serious organised crime.123 Regardless of legal provisions, the capacity to focus on the most complex 
crime cases is not only a matter of legal competence but is also a question of day-to-day prioritisation 
of available resources.  

In the first years the specialised prosecutor's office also encountered challenges in dealing with cases 
of  economic  crime,  such  as  tax  offences,  which  are  often  very  complex  and  require  specialised 
financial expertise. The specialised prosecutor's office is seeking to address this issue with the setting 
up in April 2015 of a special tax crimes unit working closely with the National Revenue Agency.  

In terms of track record, there are indications that the specialised institutions have started producing 
some results. There has reportedly been a rising trend in the number of indictments brought to court 
and sentences pronounced, as well as a reduction in the number of acquittals. However, it continues to 
be  the  case  that  very  limited  results  have  been  achieved  in  terms  of  final  convictions  in  high-level 
cases. A significant number of cases are pending on appeal or are still in the pre-trial or trial phase. In 
quite  some  cases  plea  bargain  agreements  have  been  concluded  with  the  defendants,  resulting  in 
suspended or relatively short prison sentences (less than 3 years).124 It remains to be seen whether the 
positive trends observed so far in the direction of a gradually more effective specialised prosecution 
will  continue  in  the  coming  years  to  finally  yield  significant  results  in  the  fight  against  serious 
organised crime and bringing to justice high-level criminal figures.  

Over  the  years  since  its  accession  to  the  EU  Bulgaria  has  seen  a  change  in  the  nature  of  organised 
crime. The traditional hierarchical criminal organisations vying for control of specific territories have 
to  some  extent  been  replaced  by  looser  networks  working  across  borders.  These  developments  are 
partly linked to general factors influencing the risks and opportunities facing organised crime groups, 
which are naturally focusing on the most lucrative forms of criminal activity carrying the lowest risk. 

121 The authorities report that special measures sometimes have to be taken to address the potential risk of local 
law  enforcement  and  judicial  institutions  leaking  information  to  organised  crime  groups  in  ongoing  cases. 
(Meeting with the specialised prosecution and court; Sofia, 3 December 2015.) 

122 In discussions with the Commission, prosecutors have complained in particular that cases are often repeatedly 
sent back to the prosecution for further checks or remanded to the lower court for formal reasons on appeal, 
creating an impression that criminals may effectively avoid justice by indefinitely extending the duration of 
trials  at  the  courts.  Judges  on  the  other  hand  have  highlighted  the  poor  quality  of  indictments  prepared. 
Restrictions  on  the  use  of  experts  in  court  have  also  been  mentioned  by  authorities  as  an  issue  hampering 
effectiveness of investigations and court procedures. 

123  Meanwhile,  other  amendments  have  extended  the  competence  of  the  specialised  court  to  cases  involving 
crimes  against  the  state  and  legal  order  (terrorist  offices).  There  have  as  yet  been  no  specific  cases  in  this 
field, but the prosecution office is currently a specialised team to deal with such cases. 

124  Based  on  information  supplied  by  Bulgarian  specialised  prosecutor's  office;  December  2015.  The  general 
trends in indictments etc. are based on overall figures, which do not allow for an assessment of the severity of 
the crimes concerned.  

27 

 
 
                                                            
Organised  crime  is  therefore  arguably  less  visible  today  than  a  few  years  ago.125  Organised  crime 
groups  reportedly  remain  active  in  a  number  of  fields,  including  facilitation  of  irregular  migration, 
VAT and excise fraud, public procurement fraud, trafficking in human beings and drugs, smuggling of 
cigarettes, credit card fraud, etc. 

6.2.  

Investigative services 

Bulgaria has a complex set up of several criminal investigative services with competencies in different 
areas,  including  organised  crime.126  The  central  axis  dealing  with  organised  crime  consists  of  the 
specialised  prosecutor's  office  and  the  Central  Directorate  for  the  Combatting  of  Organised  Crime 
(CDCOC)  within  the  Ministry  of  Interior.  The  latter  was  in  2013  moved  to  the  State  Agency  for 
National Security as part of a major reorganisation of the investigative services. However, the current 
government  decided  to  move  it  back  again  to  the  Ministry  of  Interior.    The  transfer  of  these 
competences in 2015 from SANS to the Ministry of Interior was better prepared than the transfer in 
the other direction in 2013. A notable difference was that case officers were automatically assigned to 
stay on the cases, whereas in the previous reorganisation this was not the case. As a result, while there 
still appears to  have been  a certain amount of disruption during the transition until  summer  2015 as 
well as a significant reduction in staff127, the reorganisation now seems to have been completed.  

Other  organisational  measures  have  also  been  taken  by  the  new  government  to  improve  the  fight 
against  organised  crime.  Notably,  customs  officials  have  been  vested  with  police  powers  in  certain 
cases and the National Revenue Agency has been given administrative investigative powers to prevent 
and  tackle  tax  evasion  and  fraud.  A  new  anti-trafficking  and  contraband  taskforce  has  been 
established, pooling together the resources of the relevant law enforcement institutions in a single unit 
to improve coordination.128 Bulgaria is cooperating with law enforcement of other countries to address 
cross-border crime and is understood to be active in Europol in regard to several priority areas.129 The 
Bulgarian  authorities  also  report  a  range  of  training  measures  undertaken  to  improve  the  analytical 
capacity  of  the  police.  A  notable  example  of  this  is  the  establishment  of  a  centre  for  the  training  of 
forensic experts at the Ministry of Interior Academy, with the aim of enhancing capacity in areas such 
as DNA analysis, analysis of documents, and ballistics.130  

125  Some  observers  indicate  that  old  structures  remain  under  the  surface  and  can  be  easily  reactivated, as  also 
indicated by some recent events, including several murders and deaths with possible links to organised crime, 
and a grenade attack against an armoured vehicle in Sofia in October 2015.  

126 In addition to the Ministry of Interior in charge of the police, there is a National Investigative Service which 
officially forms part of the judiciary and has competences for example over cases against immunity holders 
and  in  cases  specifically  assigned  to  them  by  the  prosecutor's  office  because  they  are  of  particular 
complexity.  Finally,  the  State  Agency  for  National  Security  also  plays  a  role  in  regard  to  high-level 
corruption.  

127  The  prosecutor's  office  has  complained  about  lack  of  new  serious  crime  cases  being  submitted  in  2015. 
Besides  the  temporary  impact  of  the  reorganisation,  another  factor  could  be  the  impact  of  a  significant 
reduction in staff, as the new directorate for organised crime has seen its staff reduced by almost 40 per cent 
compared to the previous situation. While the Ministry of Interior seems to agree that a certain slowdown can 
be discerned in the first half of the year, they  maintain that the directorate is now fully functional and has 
indeed submitted a higher number of cases during the autumn of 2015 than in the previous year.  

128  The Anti-smuggling Interdepartmental Coordination Center and Control of High Risk Goods and Cargos is 
established within the specialised directorate for organised crime (CDCOC), its main purpose being to ensure 
coordination  and  interaction  of  anti-smuggling  actions  among  relevant  authorities,  including  the  various 
police departments, national revenue agency, customs, and the state agency for national security (SANS). 
129 Europol reports good cooperation with the Bulgarian authorities when requested to assist in regard to concrete 
international  investigations.  Several  large  scale  operations  have  taken  place  with  the  involvement  of 
Bulgarian authorities, for example in the area of credit card fraud (skimming). (Meeting with Europol; The 
Hague, 27 November 2015.) 

130  The  aim  is  to  train  100  forensic  experts  over  the  coming  three  years.  (Documentation  received  from  the 

Bulgarian Ministry of Interior in October 2015.)  

28 

 
 
 
                                                            
In  spite  of  the  improvements  made  in  these  and  other  areas,  a  number  of  challenges  continue  to 
hamper progress in organised crime cases. Reference has already been made to problems encountered 
during trial in complex criminal cases due to formalistic criminal procedures. Some of these problems 
also relate to the investigation phase. Where formal requirements sometimes seem limiting, such rules 
often  reflect  concerns  for  legitimate  rights  of  defendants  and  suspects.  However,  the  overall  effect 
seems to be that of a rather strict environment for the completion of criminal investigations, especially 
when dealing with complex cases such as cases involving organised crime.131  

Some additional legal obstacles seem to have appeared in connection with the latest reorganisation in 
2015, due to unintended consequences of the legal set-up. The new Ministry of Interior Act approved 
by  the  Parliament  assigns  competence  to  the  organised  crime  directorate  only  for  criminal  cases  for 
which  there  is  an  established  link  to  organised  crime  and  prevents  it  from  taking  responsibility  for 
investigation  of  less  serious  crimes.  Until  a  clear  link  between  individual  crimes  and  an  organised 
criminal group has been established, the investigation falls instead under the mandate of the national 
police.  In  principle,  this  is  not  unusual.  A  clear  link  between  simple  crimes  and  major  and  serious 
crimes or trafficking is rarely evident at the very beginning of an investigation. In Bulgaria and almost 
anywhere else, the first steps of investigation are performed by the local or uniform police and then 
specialised  departments  take  over  the  investigation  when  major  criminal  patterns  become  visible. 
However,  what  is  a  simple  mechanism  for  a  better  organisation  of  tasks  for  many  law  enforcement 
agencies  in  EU  appears  to  be  a  legal  constraint  in  Bulgaria,  having  an  impact,  for  example,  on  the 
possibilities to apply special investigative means.132  

Draft legislative amendments to address the issue have been prepared by the Ministry of Interior and 
submitted  to  the  National  Assembly.  These  would  allow  the  organised  crime  directorate  to  obtain 
permission to use special investigative means as long as 'reasonable grounds' can be shown to exist for 
suspecting involvement of organised crime. The proposed amendments reportedly also aim to address 
a  number  of  other  issues  which  have  appeared  in  regard  to  the  competencies  of  the  specialised 
organised crime directorate.133  

Beyond  legislative  changes,  it  remains  to  be  seen  whether  the  new  version  of  the  organised  crime 
directorate will be able to build on its assigned resources in cooperation with other relevant services to 
bring  about  a  significant  improvement  in  the  investigation,  prosecution  and  bringing  to  justice  of 
organised criminal groups in Bulgaria. The cooperation between the organised crime directorate and 
the  specialised  prosecution  is  central  to  the  overall  performance  of  the  system.  While  the 
investigations  are  carried  out  by  the  investigating  police  officers,  the  prosecutors  play  an  important 
role  in  guiding  the  investigation.  To  improve  this  cooperation  Bulgarian  authorities  have  in 

131  Some  concrete  examples  raised  by  experts  concern  the  time  limits  for  the  formal  investigation  and 
implementing  special  investigative  measures,  respectively  in  Article  234  and  Article  175  of  the  criminal 
procedure code, which appear to be rather strict when applied to cases of serious organised crime. A ruling of 
the Constitutional Court from spring 2015 regarding the time limits of the administrative inquiries performed 
before the pre-trial investigation de facto eliminated any deadline for such activities. This ruling widens the 
possibilities for the investigative bodies to gather criminal intelligence but does not solve the issue of strict 
time  limits  applicable  to  the  formal  investigation,  due  to  limitations  to  the  evidential  value  of  information 
gathered outside the formal investigation.  

132  While  the  organised  crime  directorate  may  get  involved  in  the  investigations  as  such,  problems  arise  in 
relation to the preparation of evidence to be used in court. The Bulgarian authorities have explained that the 
logic  of  the  provision  as  it  currently  stands  was  to  avoid  a  situation  where  CDCOC  would  end  up  being 
burdened with a large number of minor cases, rather than focus on serious organised crime cases. However, 
the  interpretation  of  the  courts  turned  out  to  be  more  restrictive  than  expected,  resulting  in  rejections  of 
requests for the application of special investigative means, which is how the issue has come to attention. 
133 One such issue concerns certain types of crime (corruption, money laundering, cybercrime) which are very 
often linked to the activities of organised criminal groups, but for which it is very difficult to prove the direct 
participation of those involved in the group. Another issue concerns facilitation of irregular migration, where 
the  specialised  organised  crime  directorate  appears  not  to  have  been  provided  with  explicit  competence. 
Smuggling of migrants is a lucrative area where Bulgarian organised criminal groups reportedly are involved. 

29 

 
 
                                                            
cooperation  with  the  National  Institute  for  Justice  developed  joint  training  for  prosecutors  and 
investigating police officers. There is also already a practice of establishing joint investigating teams 
between the various law enforcement, judicial and administrative authorities. An important aspect of 
this cooperation concerns the effective follow-up on criminal investigations and the timely launch of 
procedures for the freezing of criminal assets in connection with criminal investigations.  

6.3. 

Implementation of convictions and confiscation of illicit assets 

The follow up on criminal investigations and convictions is as important as the investigation and trial 
itself.  This  involves  questions  such  as  the  timely  launch  of  procedures  to  secure  the  illicit  assets 
obtained  through  crime  and  ensuring  the  criminals  are  taken  into  custody  and  prevented  from 
absconding.134 In May 2015 the National Assembly adopted a package of amendments to the criminal 
procedure  code  and  other  related  codes.  One  of  the  main  objectives  of  these  amendments  was  to 
improve the legislation to avoid the risk of convicts absconding. In particular, rules were strengthened 
in  regard  to  the  presence  of  defendants  at  the  final  court  hearings,  the  ability  of  the  court  to  tighten 
remand measures during appeal, and the introduction of additional safeguards in the form of measures 
to control the whereabouts of defendants during trial, for example through electronic monitoring. It is 
as yet too early to assess the impact of these improvements.  

The authorities report that the legislative changes do not capture all aspects of the issues identified and 
that additional organisational measures are therefore under discussion to address the problems. Some 
of  these  essentially  concern  outdated  procedures  restricting  the  use  of  modern  means  of 
communication between different authorities within the judiciary and law enforcement. For example, 
one problem concerns the procedure for the Supreme Court of Cassation to communicate the outcome 
of  a  court  decision  to  the  prosecution.  According  to  the  law,  the  courts  are  obliged  to  publish  their 
rulings on the internet, which is done immediately. At the same time, however, there are different rules 
prescribing  the  transfer  of  the  case  back  to  the  first  instance  court  and  for  the  latter  to  prepare  the 
documentation  for  the  implementation  of  the  ruling  and  inform  the  prosecutor's  office.  This  process 
currently can take a number of days, leaving time for convicted criminals to go into hiding.135 Other 
organisational  issues  under  discussion,  according  to  the  authorities,  concern  the  communication 
between  the  prosecution  office  and  the  Ministry  of  Justice  with  regard  to  the  launch  of  a  search 
whenever defendants are not found at their address, which reportedly still often takes place by physical 
mail.  

Confiscation  of  the  proceeds  of  crime  is  another  very  important  issue  in  criminal  proceedings, 
requiring law enforcement to take appropriate action early on in relation to a criminal investigation, to 
prevent criminal from hiding away assets, in addition to effective rules for securing the assets in court. 
The system for confiscation of illegally acquired assets is based on a law from 2012, although cases 
initiated  before  the  enactment  of  the  new  law  continue  to  follow  the  previous  rules.  The  new  law 
provides for civil confiscation of assets, which was an important  step forward.136 However, some of 
the  other  elements  of  the  law  appear  to  represent  a  step  backwards  compared  to  the  previous 
legislation. As for the track record on confiscation of assets in 2015, CIAF reports an increase in the 

134  The  latter  has  been  identified  as  an  important  issue  in  Bulgaria.  See  recommendation  in  the  January  2015 

CVM report (COM (2015) 36, p. 12).   

135  At  the  first  instance  and  appeal  courts,  the  recent  amendments  to  the  procedural  code  provide  for  the 
defendant to be present in the final hearing, thus enabling the immediate detention in case of a conviction. 
Similar provisions were also proposed for the Supreme Court, but these were rejected by the legislator, where 
rulings are therefore still taken in absentia. 

136  However,  the  Commission  on  Illegal  Asset  Forfeiture  reports  that  this  concept  is  not  always  properly 
understood by the courts and that they have identified cases where the courts released assets frozen under the 
provisions on civil confiscation due to an acquittal in a criminal procedure. This appears to be an issue where 
additional  awareness  raising  activities  within  the  judiciary  would  seem  to  be  warranted.  (Meeting  with  the 
Commission on Illegal Asset Forfeiture; December 2015.) 

30 

 
 
                                                            
number of cases leading to confiscation, albeit with a downward trend in the amounts concerned, with 
the exception of a single case which is expected to concern a very substantial amount of assets.137 

As  new  cases  have  started  to  enter  the  system  and  experience  has  been  gathered  applying  the  new 
rules, the Commission on Illegal Asset Forfeiture (CIAF) has identified a number of shortcomings in 
the  legislation.  On  this  basis  it  has  prepared  a  set  of  concrete  proposals  for  amendments  to  the  law, 
which  have  been  submitted  to  the  National  Assembly.  The  proposed  changes  concern,  among  other 
issues, the threshold for the CIAF to start proceedings138, the burden of proof139, and the obligation for 
CIAF to investigate minor cases.140 It remains to be seen if these draft amendments will be taken up by 
the legislator.  

137  The total amount forfeited was set to fall from approximately EUR 6.5 million in 2014 to less than EUR 3 
million  in  2015.  However,  the  single  case  mentioned  could  reportedly  lead  to  the  confiscation  of  several 
hundred million euros. (Meeting with CIAF; Sofia, 4 December 2015.) 

138 In the 2012 law, the threshold for the required discrepancy in assets was increased to 125,000 euro, which is 

rather high in the Bulgarian context.  

139 Under the current law the burden of proof is always with the authorities, even in cases involving very serious 

organised crime and where a proper tax declaration is lacking.  

140  CIAF  reports  that  it  is  burdened  with  a  high  number  of  very  minor  criminal  cases  submitted  to  it  by  the 
prosecution. According to the current law, there is no threshold under which the commission can decide not 
to investigate the case.  

31