REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on Progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification mechanism
Date: 2016-01-27
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Bulgaria, corruption, judicial reform, organised crime

EN 

   EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 27.1.2016  COM(2016) 40 final   REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on Progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification mechanism {SWD(2016) 15 final}  
 
 
1.  

INTRODUCTION 

The Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) was set up at the accession of Bulgaria 
to  the European  Union in  2007.  It was agreed  that  further  work was needed in  key areas to 
address shortcomings in judicial reform, the fight against corruption, and tackling organised 
crime. Since then CVM reports have charted the progress made by Bulgaria and have sought 
to help focus the efforts of the Bulgarian authorities through specific recommendations.  The 
Commission's  reports,1  and  the  conclusions  of  the  Council  of  Ministers,2  have  mapped 
developments in Bulgaria and made recommendations for the future. This report summarises 
the steps taken over the past year and provides recommendations for the next steps. It is the 
result of a careful process of analysis by the Commission, drawing on close cooperation with 
the Bulgarian authorities, civil society and other stakeholders. The Commission was also able 
to draw on the specific support of experts from the magistracy in other Member States to offer 
a practitioner's point of view. 

The  2015  CVM  report  described  progress  over  the  previous  year  as  slow,  and  the  Council 
conclusions called upon Bulgaria to "consolidate its political resolve to bring about reforms 
and  make  tangible  progress"3.  But  the  report  also  noted  a  number  of  areas  where  problems 
had  been  acknowledged  and  where  solutions  were  starting  to  be  identified.  This  resulted  in 
two  comprehensive  reform  strategies  being  launched,  focusing  on  judicial  reform  and  the 
fight  against  corruption.  These  two  strategies  provided  the  background  for  many  of  the 
defining moments of 2015 and will continue to be important points of reference for 2016. The 
key  tests  of  progress  will  be  to  translate  the  commitments  contained  in  these  strategies  into 
concrete  results.  The  handling  of  difficult  cases  and  of  obstacles  in  the  path  of  reform  is  a 
determining factor in building the confidence of Bulgarian citizens and EU partners. It is also 
a  central  factor  in  determining  the  extent  to  which  reform  has  started  to  take  root.  This  is 
necessary to establish the sustainable change which is the underlying goal of the process.  

The Commission will continue to  support Bulgarian efforts to  achieve the CVM objectives. 
Assistance is already provided to Bulgaria in many areas under the European  Structural and 
Investment Funds.4 In addition, the Commission has in 2015 established a new instrument in 
the  form  of  a  Structural  Reform  Support  Service  (SRSS)  dedicated  to  providing  technical 
assistance  to  the  reform  efforts  of  EU  Member  States  in  a  broad  range  of  areas.  Other 
assistance  is  also  being  provided  from  Member  States  and  by  international  organisations, 
often  in  tandem  with  Bulgarian  civil  society.  Such  involvement  is  part  of  an  open  and 
democratic  society  and  can  be  a  major  support  to  the  Bulgarian  reform  effort.  The 
Commission welcomes that Bulgaria has indicated an interest in drawing on further technical 
assistance, as stated by the Bulgarian Prime Minister,5 and encourages Bulgaria to make full 
use of all the available possibilities.  

1   Past reports can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/cvm/progress_reports_en.htm. 
2   Most recently, Council conclusions adopted 17 March 2015. 
3   7281/15, p. 3. http://ec.europa.eu/cvm/key_documents_en.htm  
4   During  the  2007-2013  programming  period  €51  million  was  allocated  under  Operational  Programme  for 
Administrative  Capacity  to  calls  for  applications  from  the  judiciary,  of  which  only  €25  million  was 
contracted, due to a lack of uptake in the courts and prosecution offices. Under the new programming period 
2014-2020 a priority axis for the judiciary has been included with an allocation of €30.1 million.  

5   Statement in the margins of the European Council on 17 December 2015. 

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2. 

STATE OF THE REFORM PROCESS IN BULGARIA 

2.1 

Reform of the judiciary 

Independence, accountability and integrity of the judiciary 

The  2015  CVM  report  already  noted  that  the  judicial  reform  strategy  provides  a 
comprehensive  and  detailed  blueprint  for  the  coming  years.  Following  endorsement  by  the 
Bulgarian National Assembly in January 2015, the government initiated concrete follow-up in 
a  number  of  areas  within  the  direct authority  of  the  Ministry  of  Justice.  However,  the  issue 
that  came  to  be  identified  in  the  public  debate  in  2015  as  the  most  significant  test  for  the 
strategy was the reform of the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC). The SJC is the key institution 
governing  the  Bulgarian  judiciary.  It  has  wide-ranging  powers  over  the  appointment, 
appraisal,  promotion,  and  disciplining  of  judges  and  prosecutors,  as  well  as  managing  the 
budget of the judiciary. It also acts as the voice of the judiciary towards society and therefore 
has  a  central  role  in  shaping  public  attitudes  towards  the  judiciary  as  a  whole.  Public 
confidence in the judiciary remains low.6 

The functioning of the SJC is therefore of key importance. A particular issue inherent in the 
current  structure  is  that  decisions  on  personnel  and  disciplinary  matters  for  judges  and 
prosecutors are made in a single structure. While no single authoritative model exists for the 
make-up of judicial councils, it has become clear that both judges and prosecutors consider it 
inappropriate  that  these  decisions  are  being  taken  by  mixed  groups  of  SJC  judges  and 
prosecutors. In the Bulgarian context, with a large number of political appointees in the SJC, 
the  current  model  gives  rise  to  particular  concerns  about  judicial  independence  and  the 
possibility of pressure being exerted on judges. This was the background for the proposal in 
the reform strategy to establish two separate colleges within the SJC to  deal with personnel 
matters for the two arms of the magistracy.  

Following  extensive  debate  it  was  concluded  in  spring  that  some  of  the  proposed  changes 
necessitated amendments to the Constitution. Such amendments were adopted by the National 
Assembly  in  December  2015.  While  these  amendments  included  some  significant  changes 
from  the  text  originally  proposed  by  the  government,7  their  adoption  still  represents  an 
important  step  towards  a  reform  of  the  SJC.  In  addition  to  the  creation  of  two  decision-
making chambers inside the SJC, the powers of the judicial inspectorate (ISJC) to investigate 
conflicts of interest and illicit enrichment among magistrates will be strengthened.8 The next 
step will be to implement the reform via legislative amendments to the Judicial Systems Act. 

6   The  low  public confidence  in  the judiciary  is confirmed  by  opinion polls and  surveys.  A  large  majority of 
Bulgarians (96% in 2014) consider shortcomings in the judiciary to constitute an important problem (Flash 
Eurobarometer  406,  January  2015,  p.  9);  See  also  World  Justice  Project  Rule  of  Law  Index  2015  (p.  70): 
http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/roli_2015_0.pdf  and  the  World  Economic  Forum  Global 
Competitiveness  Report  ,  p.  124-125  http://www.weforum.org/reports/global-competitiveness-report-2015-
2016.  

7   A last minute reallocation of one member in the quota of parliamentary nominees from the prosecutorial to 
the  judicial  chamber  prompted  the  resignation  of  the  Minister  of  Justice  and  protests  from  the  main 
professional association of judges. This was seen as strengthening political influence in the judges' chamber 
of the SJC, while at the same time diminishing the accountability of the Public Prosecutor's Office.  

8   In  addition,  the  requirement  for  secret  voting  on  personnel  matters  in  the  SJC  was  ended  and  a  two-thirds 

majority rule was introduced for the election of the members of the parliamentary quota. 

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A legislative package was prepared and presented for public consultation by the government 
in spring 2015, but has been awaiting the outcome of the debate on the Constitution.9  

Previous CVM reports have noted persistent concerns about the ability of the SJC to fulfil its 
role as guardian of judicial independence and integrity. Controversies have revolved around 
issues such as non-transparent procedures for judicial appointments, inconsistent practices in 
disciplinary proceedings, and a lack of follow-up to concerns about potential manipulation of 
the random allocation of cases in courts.  To this has been added controversy about political 
influence  in  the  SJC.  In  2015  the  picture  in  regard  to  these  issues  has  been  mixed.  At  the 
beginning of the year, the SJC appointed a new chair of the Supreme Court of Cassation. The 
new chair has been prepared to speak out in support of reform and seems to command respect 
within  the  judiciary.10  A  new  management  of  the  Sofia  City  Court  was  also  appointed  in 
spring,  after  the  previous  leadership  had  to  step  down  amidst  the  scandals  surrounding  the 
court.11 However, other appointment decisions of the SJC continued to raise concerns about 
lack  of  transparency  and  possible  undue  influence.  The  position  of  President  of  the  Sofia 
Court of Appeal has now been vacant for almost two years: although a judge applied for the 
post  who  enjoyed  the  explicit  support  of  judges  at  the  court,  the  SJC  did  not  secure  the 
required majority.12 Clear criteria for assessing appointments do not exist, opening the door to 
doubts about the objectivity of appointment procedures. 

Serious  allegations  of  corruption  and  trading  of  influence  in  the  judiciary  have  only  been 
followed  up  after  internal  and  external  pressure,  with  the  authorities  unable  or  unwilling  to 
initiate pro-active investigations. The irregularities discovered at the Sofia City Court towards 
the end of 2014 were highlighted in the last CVM report, where it was noted that the initial 
response of the SJC indicated that this was considered as a low priority for the Council. 13 The 
SJC  did  launch  a  process  to  improve  the  application  of  random  allocation  of  cases  in 
Bulgarian  courts,  putting  in  place  a  new  centralised  IT  system  for  the  entire  judiciary  in 
October 2015, which should help to address a recurrent issue raised in previous CVM reports. 
However, the SJC showed a reluctance  to react to  the allegations  of serious wrongdoing  by 
key judges in the Sofia City Court.14 Disciplinary action came only much later, after several 
cases had had to be taken forward by the Minister of Justice.15  

In  the autumn of 2015, media reported about  an alleged taped conversation  between two of 
the  main  figures  involved  in  the  irregularities  discovered  at  the  Sofia  City  Court,16  adding 
further  elements  to  the  existing  controversy.  After  repeated  calls  for  an  independent 
investigation,17 the SJC and the prosecution announced investigations into the contents of the 

9   As a consequence, other important changes have also been held up (see below). 
10   When  the  SJC  Ethics  Committee  was  considering  disciplinary proceedings  against  President  Panov  after  a 
speech critical of the lack of support for judicial reform, well over 200 judges signed a letter in his support. 

11   The involvement of the new President of the Supreme Court of Cassation facilitated this process. 
12   The latest procedure in December 2015 was marked by an intervention from the Bulgarian Union of Judges 
criticising  public  statements  on  the  candidate  at  political  level.  This  also  called  attention  to  several  other 
recent decisions of the SJC which they considered were problematic.  

13   COM (2015) 36 final, p.4-5. 
14   The two main figures are no longer serving as judges at the Court. 
15   These events once again raised concerns with regard to the lack of clear standards in disciplinary decisions of 

the SJC. 

16   The former chair of the Sofia City Court and one other judge, both now under criminal investigation.  
17   Among others, the Union of Judges, the Minister of Justice, and the Chair of the Supreme Court of Cassation, 

called for an independent investigation to be launched.  
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tapes.18 It will be important for the credibility of the process that all steps are taken to ensure 
that investigation takes place in a transparent and impartial manner.19 

After a gap of several years, the National Assembly elected a new Chief Inspector in spring 
2015.  The  different  steps  of  the  procedure  were  set  out  more  transparently  and  involved  an 
invitation  for  civil  society  to  suggest  candidates.  This  approach  was  also  taken  up  in  the 
subsequent procedure to elect the new college of inspectors, launched in the autumn and still 
ongoing.20 This procedure will be of particular importance, given the stronger future role for 
the inspectorate in addressing integrity issues and signs of corruption within the judiciary. It 
will  be  important  to  ensure  that  the  inspectorate  is  equipped  with  the  resources  it  needs  to 
fulfil this role effectively.  

Reform of the legal framework 

The ongoing reform of the SJC is only one element, albeit an important one, of Bulgaria's new 
judicial reform strategy. The strategy is a comprehensive document containing a wide range 
of  objectives,  many  of  which  require  legal  amendments.  As  noted  above,  a  package  of 
amendments to the Judicial System Act has been prepared and should now be ready to move 
forward  swiftly  in  the  National  Assembly.  It  contains  amendments  in  a  variety  of  areas  to 
improve different aspects of the management of the judicial system. Many of the proposals go 
in  the  direction  of  empowering  rank  and  file  magistrates,  with  a  view  to  improving 
transparency  and  independence.  Other  amendments  are  meant  to  implement  improvements 
identified in the regulation of career paths or the rules on professional training for magistrates. 
Others  provide  amendments  necessary  for  the  introduction  of  new  technologies  to  improve 
transparency, quality and efficiency (e-justice). In the course of the year, these proposals have 
already been the subject of widespread debate within the judiciary. The ability of Bulgaria to 
move ahead with the adoption of these changes will be a key test in 2016.21   

Another area where legislative amendments are in preparation concerns the criminal code and 
the criminal procedure code. Past CVM reports have noted the risk that a fundamental debate 
on  reforming  the  codes  for  the  long  term  has  risked  holding  up  more  urgent  and  targeted 
changes.22  The  criminal  code  has  been  the  subject  of  recurrent  attempts  at  reform  by 
successive governments over the past five years, an objective which has so far been elusive.23 
In  2015  the  government  launched  a  new  reflection  process  on  a  broader  criminal  policy 
reform.24 These reflections aim at a comprehensive reform, which will require careful analysis 
and  preparation,  involving  broad  consultation  within  the  judiciary  and  legal  professions.  In 

18   On  14  January  the  SJC  closed  its  enquiry,  however,  under  controversial  circumstances.  The  process  was 

criticised in an open letter of the association of judges for lack of transparency. 

19   A  particular  issue  in  this  context  concerns  aggressive  and  polarising  campaigns  by  some  media,  often 
targeting  individual  figures  in  the  magistracy.  Unbalanced  media  coverage  in  the  course  of  disciplinary  or 
criminal investigations presents additional challenges for judicial authorities.  

20   20  candidates  were  nominated  for  the  ten  posts,  several  of  which  have  been  put  forward  from  within  the 
judiciary or from professional associations. The final election at the National Assembly is still to take place. 
21   The  newly  created  Council  for  the  implementation  of  the  judicial  reform  strategy  should  provide  a  useful 
forum for bringing forward this and other initiatives as well as for monitoring progress on the many different 
aspects of the judicial reform strategy.  

22   COM (2015) 36, p. 10. 
23   A draft reform of the criminal code prepared by a previous government in 2014 was not successful, as it did 

not meet expectations and the National Assembly was dissolved shortly after its presentation.  

24   The government's judicial reform strategy foresees a wider criminal policy reform, and work is ongoing on 

this under the Ministry of Justice. 

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the meantime, however, the Bulgarian authorities have acknowledged a need to move ahead 
more swiftly with a limited set of targeted amendments, notably to address problems causing 
delays  in  criminal  proceedings  and  to  facilitate  the  prosecution  of  corruption  crimes.  Some 
amendments have already been adopted to address key shortcomings, but still need to prove 
their effects in practice.25 

Quality and efficiency of the judiciary 

The key determining factor for the quality and efficiency of the judiciary must be the extent to 
which  justice  is  served  by  the  system  as  a  whole  –  whether  citizens  can  rely  on  the  justice 
system to deliver fair redress, whether the perpetrators of crime are effectively prosecuted and 
justice  is  done  and  seen  to  be  done  in  accordance  with  the  law.  26  Such  concerns  were 
underlined this year when the European Court of Human Rights observed that "it had already, 
in  over  45  judgments  against  Bulgaria,  found  that  the  authorities  had  failed  to  comply  with 
their  obligation  to  carry  out  an  effective  investigation  and  considered  that  these  recurrent 
shortcomings disclosed the existence of a systemic problem".27 Whilst this is clearly an issue 
for  law  enforcement  as  a  whole,  it  is  clear  that  problems  remain  in  the  prosecution  and  the 
judiciary.  

The  day-to-day  management  of  the  judiciary  is  the  responsibility  of  the  Supreme  Judicial 
Council (SJC), including issues such as appointments, appraisals, training, disciplinary action, 
and  management  of  the  relative  workload  between  magistrates  and  judicial  authorities.  Past 
CVM reports have highlighted the uneven workload between courts as an issue in terms of the 
quality  and  efficiency  of  the  judicial  process,  as  well  as  possibly  the  independence  of 
judges.28 High workload affects in particular the larger courts, especially those in Sofia, whilst 
the workload in other courts is low. In 2015, as in previous years, the SJC has attempted to 
address the imbalances in workload between courts by opening new posts in more overloaded 
courts while closing posts in others with less workload. However, this approach has so far had 
only a marginal impact. A more comprehensive solution has been awaiting the development 
of  harmonised  workload  standards  as  well  as  a  broader  socio-economic  analysis  of  the 
regional courts, both carried out by a sub-committee of the SJC. This analytical work reached 
its  conclusion  in  2015  and  the  results  should  now  provide  the  basis  for  a  more  systematic 
management of staff resources, and perhaps also for a redrawing of the organisation of courts. 
The  intention  of  the  SJC  is,  as  a  first  step,  to  present  proposals  on the  structure  of  regional 
courts for public consultations in 2016. The new harmonised workload standards should also 
give the SJC the data to streamline other parts of the system, including the district or appeal 
courts and the administrative courts. Even without such reforms, the standards should already 
provide  a  better  starting  point  for  managing  the  distribution  of  staff  resources  between  the 

25   See below page 9 on absconding from justice, and Technical report, sections 3.2 and 6.2.  
26   It  is  for  example  significant  that  in  some  cross-border  criminal  cases,  progress  in  Bulgaria  seems  much 

slower than in other Member States. 

27   Systemic problem of ineffectiveness of investigations in Bulgaria ECHR 070 (2015)  
28   High workload exposes judges to disciplinary action if they struggle to meet agreed deadlines. This gives rise 
to concern about independence in an environment where the standards for disciplinary actions are sometimes 
perceived as unclear.  

6 

 
 
                                                 
different  parts  of  the  system.  Such  decisions,  while  often  sensitive,  should  help  to  improve 
overall quality and efficiency in an environment of scarce resources.29  

More  generally,  it  will  be  necessary  to  follow  up  on  the  judicial  reform  strategy  through 
managerial  decisions  in  a  number  of  areas.  A  particularly  important  example,  where 
legislative and managerial decisions need to go hand in hand, concerns the introduction of e-
justice.  It  will  be  crucial  to  develop  a  capacity  to  manage  the  complex  managerial  and 
technical processes required to ensure proper implementation of e-justice, including in areas 
such as data protection and security.  

Disciplinary  proceedings  constitute  another  area  where  the  workload  standards  could  prove 
useful,  in  particular as  a  means of  establishing a  more objective basis for penalties in  cases 
concerning non-compliance with procedural deadlines.30 However, the problems in this area 
are more deep-rooted, with a general perception among magistrates that the decisions of the 
SJC  are  neither  transparent  nor  objective.  This  could  be  addressed  by  establishing  clear 
standards for disciplinary proceedings and penalties and by more systematic communication, 
explaining how individual decisions relate to general standards. The lack of clear disciplinary 
standards is particularly problematic when proceedings refer to breaches of the ethics code or 
acts undermining the prestige of the judiciary,31 where the exact scope of disciplinary liability 
is  unclear.  In  such  cases  there  is  a risk  of  arbitrary  decisions  leading  to  a  chilling  effect  on 
magistrates speaking out in public on legitimate subjects.  

The  prosecution  office  plays  a  crucial  role  within  the  overall  judicial  system.  The 
government's judicial reform strategy sets out the goal of a wider reform of the prosecution 
office,  based  on  independent  analysis.  Key  objectives  would  include  instilling  a  stronger 
sense  of  initiative  and  responsibility  through  a  less  hierarchical  culture  and  strengthening 
accountability and public trust in the prosecution as a whole. Such a reform would build on 
steps already taken in recent years and the planned reform of the Bulgarian criminal policy. 
The need for deeper reform of the prosecution is borne out by the continued lack of  a solid 
track  record  in  high-level  cases  on  corruption  and  organised  crime32  and  also  remains  a 
recurrent  theme  of  debate  among  independent  observers  in  Bulgaria.  CVM  reports  have 
repeatedly  recommended  that  an  objective  analysis  of  where  concrete  high-level  cases  have 
not been successfully concluded would be the best way to identify clear steps for the future. 

2.2 

Corruption 

The fourth and fifth benchmarks for Bulgaria under the CVM concern the need for effective 
measures  against  corruption,  including  high-level  corruption  as  well  as  corruption  more 
generally  in  public  institutions.  Bulgaria  consistently  ranks  among  the  EU  Member  States 
with the highest perceived level of corruption, and corruption is considered to be one of the 
most important barriers to doing business in Bulgaria.33 Previous CVM reports have pointed 

29   Recent  tensions  over  the  size  of  the  budget  for  the  judiciary  have  brought  this  issue  to  the  fore,  with  the 
Ministry  of  Finance  only  accepting  an  increase  in  the  budget  for  2016  against  the  promise  that  measures 
would be taken to improve budgetary performance in future years.  

30   Many  proceedings  relate  to  delays  in  carrying  out  mandatory  procedural  steps.  An  often  raised  counter-

argument in such cases has referred to the heavy workload.  

31   These are disciplinary offences under Article 307 of the Judicial Systems Act.   
32   In  some  instances  there  appears  to  have  been  reluctance  on  the  part  of  the  prosecution  to  take  forward 

investigations, including in cases linked to EU funds. (Technical report p. 24-25.) 

33   Technical report, p.18. 

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to shortcomings in past efforts in this area.34 The institutions which have been set up to fight 
corruption  have  been  characterised  as  fragmented,  uncoordinated,  and  unequal  to  the 
challenge.  

In  2015  these  problems  were  finally  acknowledged  by  the  Bulgarian  authorities,  as  the 
government adopted a new comprehensive national strategy to fight corruption. The strategy 
constitutes  an  important  step  forward  as  it  contains  a  clear  analysis  of  the  challenges  and 
proposes  a  set  of  concrete  measures  to  address  the  problems  identified.  The  challenge  will 
now be to ensure its implementation.35 The national coordination council which has been set 
up is designed to coordinate efforts and monitor progress. However, it remains a policy level 
institution  and  will  need  political  backing  at  the  highest  level  and  the  support  of  efficient 
operational  structures  in  order  to  ensure  success.  The  level  of  political  support  for  a  new 
approach was called into question by the failure of the government's proposal for a new anti-
corruption  law  to  pass  the  first  reading  in  the  National  Assembly  in  September  2015.  The 
draft law was designed to back up the approach with a sound institutional basis: it provides 
for  the  establishment  of  a  unified  anti-corruption  authority,  charged  with  the  control  of 
conflicts of interest and property declarations of high-ranking officials and investigations into 
possible corruption and illicit enrichment.36 In addition, the draft law included a reform of the 
regime for the control of conflicts of interests and private property of public officials.  

The rejection of this draft law in September came as a surprise to the government and led to a 
further  postponement  of  its  main  initiative  to  target  corruption  among  high-level  public 
officials.  Much  of  the  debate  concerned  the  issue  of  the  use  of  anonymous  signals,  with  a 
confusion between the ability to receive anonymous signals, and the need for evidence used in 
court to be clearly identified. While the government has vowed to push ahead with the law in 
2016,  its  initial  failure  raised  concerns  about  the  degree  of  consensus  behind  the  need  to 
address  high-level  corruption  and  to  pursue  the  new  anti-corruption  strategy.  The 
resubmission  and  adoption  of  this  law  as  well  as  the  subsequent  establishment  of  the  new 
institution will be a key test of Bulgaria's resolve in 2016.  

As  part  of  its  anti-corruption  strategy,  the  Bulgarian  government  has  launched  a  number  of 
other  initiatives  targeting  corruption  more  generally  throughout  the  public  administration. 
These  include  a  reform  of  the  administrative  inspectorates,  measures  to  improve  the  public 
procurement  system,  and  the  preparation  of  sectorial  anti-corruption  plans  containing 
preventive  measures  in  a  number  of  specific  sectors  considered  to  be  of  high-risk  of  'low-

34   Shortcomings in the implementation of the previous Bulgarian anti-corruption strategy have been underlined 
in  an  evaluation which was  carried out by  the  Bulgarian  authorities  and finalised  in  early  2015.  See COM 
(2015) 36, p. 7. 

35   Lack  of  political  follow-up  and  monitoring  of  the  implementation  was  identified  as  one  of  the  problems 

affecting anti-corruption policy in the past.  

36   The new institution would be working closely with the asset forfeiture commission and the prosecution office 
but would also have independent administrative investigatory powers. In addition, it would be able to ensure 
a more systematic response to corruption allegations by incorporating in a single institution the functions of 
three  existing  institutions,  the  conflict  of  interest  commission,  the  anti-corruption  centre  (BORKOR)  and 
parts of the national audit office in charge of checking private property declarations.  

8 

 
 
                                                 
level' corruption.37 These measures will need continued follow-up, in the first instance where 
changes to the legislation are needed.38  

Finally, Bulgaria needs to establish a track-record of successful investigation and prosecution 
of cases of high-level corruption, leading to final convictions in court. The prosecutor's office 
has been pursuing a pragmatic approach to enhancing capacity through organisational changes 
and  closer  cooperation  with  other  relevant  services.  The  latest  step  in  this  strategy  was  the 
establishment  in  April  of  a  strengthened  inter-agency  unit  attached  to  the  Sofia  City 
Prosecutor's Office dedicated to the investigation and prosecution of high-level corruption.39 
There are indications that this closer cooperation between services in a specialised structure is 
beginning to make a positive contribution. A number of cases have been brought to court.40 
More cases are under investigation. However, the assessment of Bulgaria's efforts in tackling 
high-level  corruption  cases  will  depend  on  final  court  decisions  being  concluded  and 
enforced.  So  far  the  outcome  remains  limited  in  terms  of  final  convictions  in  high-level 
corruption cases.41  

2.3  Organised crime 

The  sixth  CVM  benchmark  concerns  the  fight  against  organised  crime.  In  2012  Bulgaria 
established a specialised court and prosecutor's office for organised crime, which now begins 
to  produce  some  results  in  terms  of  cases  being  brought  to  court  as  well  as  a  number  of 
convictions.  However,  cases  involving  serious  organised  crime  continue  to  be  hampered  by 
complex provisions and formalistic criminal procedures.42 There remain indications of serious 
intimidation  of  witnesses,  undermining  cases.  Bulgaria  still  needs  to  establish  a  solid  track 
record showing that final court decisions are reached and enforced in cases involving serious 
organised  crime.  Recently,  the  severity  of  the  challenge  has  once  again  been  underlined  by 
several murders with apparent links to organised crime. A large number of contract killings 
over recent years remain unsolved.43  

In  2015  Bulgaria  amended  its  procedural  code  to  address  problems  identified  in  previous 
CVM  reports  with  regard  to  criminals  absconding  and  the  specialised  prosecutor's  office 
being burdened with minor cases not linked to organised crime. It is still too early to assess 
the  impact  of  these  amendments.  On  the  issue  of  criminal  absconding,  new  problems  have 
been identified, this time of a more organisational character, and work is ongoing to address 
these.  

37   Such efforts are moving forward in the Ministry of Interior, where they are being implemented in the context 

of a more general reform of that ministry.  

38   Draft  amendments  to  the  law  on  public  administration  have  reportedly  been  prepared  concerning  the 

inspectorates but not yet submitted to the National Assembly for adoption.  

39   This  unit  builds  on  two  pre-existing  units  which  were  established  in  2013  and  2014  respectively  to 

investigate crimes committed by magistrates and local corruption.  

40   Including cases concerning higher ranking officials such as magistrates and mayors. 
41   There  has  been  a  tendency  of  high-profile  cases  involving  initial  charges  of  serious  wrongdoing  being 
subsequently overturned or delayed in the courts or terminated by the prosecution, citing lack of sufficient 
evidence or procedural issues. 

42   Some  work  is  ongoing  to  identify  possible  solutions  to  these  problems,  which  may  involve  legislative 

amendment. This is addressed in section 2.1 above.  

43   A  recent  murder  of  a  businessman  sparked  a  strongly-worded  open  letter  from  the  Confederation  of 
Employers and Industrialists in Bulgaria: http://krib.bg/bg/news/Otvoreno-pismo-na-KRIB-do-Ministara-na-
vatreshnite-raboti/ 

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Bulgaria also amended the law on confiscation of criminal assets in 2012. As cases under the 
old  law  are  being  concluded  and  replaced  by  new  cases,  experience  with  the  new  law  has 
resulted in the identification of a series of problems, which necessitate legislative change. The 
asset  forfeiture  commission  has  prepared  detailed  proposals  to  address  the  problems,  which 
deserve early consideration by the National Assembly.  

The specialised investigatory service dealing with organised crime was transferred back to the 
Ministry of Interior at the beginning of 2015, after having been located at the State Agency 
for National Security (SANS) since 2013. This time the transfer was better organised than in 
2013 but nevertheless still resulted in a certain amount of disruption. It will be important now 
that the organised crime directorate is given the stability and resources it needs to do its work. 
A number of legal issues have been identified in the law which implemented the transfer, in 
particular  in  regard  to  the  legal  definition  of  the  competencies  of  the  organised  crime 
directorate, which seem to constitute an unnecessary restriction on its actions.  

3. 

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

In  2015  Bulgaria  took  some  important  steps  to  put  reform  back  on  the  agenda,  following  a 
period in which political instability appeared to be stalling progress. The two strategies on the 
judicial reform and the fight against corruption represent a detailed blueprint for action. But it 
is  clear  that  the  translation  of  these  strategies  into  concrete  and  tangible  progress  will  be  a 
major challenge for 2016. A number of initiatives have been taken, and some of these have 
seen  some  concrete  progress.  In  December  Bulgaria  amended  its  Constitution.  While  the 
amendments  included  some  significant  changes  from  the  text  originally  proposed,  their 
adoption still represents an important step towards a reform of the Supreme Judicial Council. 
It  now  needs  to  be  followed  up,  so  that  the  full  range  of  changes  contained  in  the  judicial 
reform  strategy  become  law.  Other  initiatives  have  faced  setbacks,  most  notably  the  anti-
corruption strategy, with the draft law intended to put in place a new unified anti-corruption 
authority rejected in the National Assembly. The government has announced its intention to 
resubmit  the  proposal  in  an  amended  form,  but  the  rejection  underlined  a  lack  of  political 
consensus behind the reform process.  

The slow progress in high-level corruption or organised crime cases and the uncertain reaction 
and follow-up to  specific controversies such  as the one surrounding  the Sofia City  Court  in 
2014 continues to erode public confidence in the ability of the Bulgarian authorities to deliver 
justice. The systemic problem identified by the European Court of Human Rights in terms of 
Bulgaria's  obligation  to  carry  out  effective  investigation  of  wrongdoing  echoes  a  series  of 
CVM reports, and there remains a lack of determination in the Bulgarian authorities' reactions 
to these shortcomings. Many of the recommendations in the 2015 CVM report remain valid. 

In regard to judicial independence, it has been encouraging to see Bulgarian judges speaking 
out  in  public  to  support  the  reform  of  the  judiciary.  This  is  a  healthy  sign  of  a  new  more 
confident  culture  developing  among  Bulgarian  magistrates.  Some  concrete  elements  of 
progress have also been achieved in regard to the management of the judiciary. However, in 
key  areas  of  judicial  governance  the  efforts  of  the  Bulgarian  institutions  still  lack 
determination.  

10 

 
 
 
The  Commission  looks  forward  to  continuing  to  work  closely  with  Bulgaria  to  secure  the 
CVM's objectives and invites Bulgaria to take action in the following areas: 

1. Independence, accountability and integrity of the judiciary 

Bulgaria  has  opened  the  way  to  a  reform  of  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council  (SJC)  and  a 
strengthening of the judicial inspectorate. Now these commitments need to be implemented. It 
will  also  be  important  to  build  on  the  steps  taken  to  improve  the credibility  around  random 
case allocation and appointments.   

 

Implement  the  reform  of  the  SJC  through  the  necessary  amendments  to  the  Judicial 
System Act.  

  Swiftly  provide  the  Judicial  Inspectorate  (ISJC)  with  the  legal  authority  and  material 
resources to fulfil its new role in safeguarding integrity and fighting corruption within the 
judicial system.  

  Establish a capacity within the SJC and the ISJC to monitor the application and security 
of the new system for the random allocation of cases in courts. These institutions must be 
transparent about the outcome of inspections and the follow-up to problems identified. 

  Develop a track record within the SJC of transparent and consistent decision-making with 
regard  to  appointment  decisions,  applying  clear  standards  of  merit  and  integrity,  while 
making such decisions in a timely manner.  

  Provide the conditions for an impartial investigation into the different allegations of high 
level corruption within the Sofia City Court, in particular with regard to possible systemic 
implications, including possible comparable practices in other courts.  

2. Reform of the judicial system 

A comprehensive package of amendments to the Judicial Systems Act has been prepared by 
the Ministry of Justice and widely debated in the judiciary in the course of 2015, aiming at the 
implementation  of 
long-standing 
judicial 
recommendation for a modernisation of the Bulgarian criminal codes also remains relevant.  

reform  strategy.  The 

the  government's 

  Enact  amendments  to  the  Judicial  Systems  Act  in  line  with  the  government's  judicial 
reform strategy, including reforms to give more say to individual judges and prosecutors, 
and ensure their implementation in close consultation with the judicial authorities.  

  Prepare a set of targeted amendments to address key problems in criminal procedures, in 
particular problems affecting complex cases involving corruption or organised crime.  

  Adopt  a  comprehensive  reform  of  criminal  policy  in  line  with  the  ideas  set  out  in  the 

judicial reform strategy.  

3. Standards in the judiciary 

Bulgaria  should  move  ahead  in  2016  with  reforms  in  key  parts  of  its  judiciary,  including 
appropriate  changes  in  the  judicial  map  to  improve  overall  quality  and  efficiency, 
implementation  of  e-justice,  clear  standards  for  disciplinary  proceedings,  and  a  continued 
reform of the prosecution office.  

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  Adopt a  reform of the judicial  map for the regional courts and present a roadmap for a 
more  general  rationalisation  of  the  courts  at  all  levels  to  improve  overall  quality  and 
efficiency, including the reallocation of resources where appropriate in light of an overall 
analysis of workload in courts.  

  Establish  a  clear  timetable  for  the  implementation  of  e-justice  and  put  in  place  the 

necessary capacity to monitor and steer its implementation.  

  Develop  a  practice  of  motivating  disciplinary  decisions  in  accordance  with  clear  and 
objective  standards  and  principles.  Conduct  an  independent  assessment  of  disciplinary 
practice under the current SJC since 2012.  

  Launch an independent analysis of the prosecutor's office as set out in the government's 
judicial reform strategy, taking into account the reform measures already implemented. 

4. Corruption 

Initiatives in this area should focus on the implementation of the new national anti-corruption 
strategy adopted in spring 2015. A major priority should be the swift re-consideration by the 
National Assembly of the government's proposals for a new anti-corruption law, taking into 
account any specific concerns but ensuring the main elements in line with the intentions as set 
out in the anti-corruption strategy.  

  Adopt  a  new  anti-corruption  law  in  line  with  the  anti-corruption  strategy,  including  the 
establishment of a unified authority with a strong independent mandate to fight high-level 
corruption. Ensure the swift establishment of the new institution and provide it with the 
required resources.  

  Adopt  amendments  to  the  law  on  public  administration  to  enhance  the  powers  and 
independence  of  the  internal  inspectorates,  and  establish  a  uniform  set  of  minimum 
standards for the public sector in terms of risk assessment and reporting obligations.  

  Provide  the  public  procurement  agency  with  the  legal  authority  and  organisational 

capacity to perform risk-based, in-depth checks on public procurement procedures.  

  Continue  the  efforts  to  address  low-level  corruption  in  the  Ministry  of  Interior.  Launch 

similar efforts in other risk sectors within the public administration.  

  Monitor  the  progress  of  criminal  cases  involving  allegations  of  high-level  corruption, 
including  the  pre-trial  and  trial  phase  and  implement  measures  to  address  the  problems 
identified. 

5. Organised crime 

Bulgaria  still  needs  to  establish  a  solid track  record  on  securing  final  conviction  in  court  in 
relation  to  serious  organised  crime  cases.  It  will  be  important  to  ensure  that  the  legal  and 
institutional  conditions  are  in  place  to  allow  law  enforcement  and  the  judiciary  to  work 
effectively.  

12 

 
 
  Monitor  the  progress  of  criminal  cases  involving  serious  organised  crime,  including  the 
pre-trial and trial phase as well as the enforcement of sentences and implement measures 
to address the problems identified.  

  Swiftly address the legal problems identified in regard to the competence and functioning 
of  the  organised  crime  directorate  within  the  Ministry  of  Interior  and  provide  the 
directorate with the organisational stability it needs to carry out its work.  

  Amend the law on criminal asset forfeiture to allow asset forfeiture commission to work 

effectively.  

13