Mutual defence : one month on.
Date: 2016-01-07
Institutions: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Subjects: European defence policy, European security, France, Treaty of Lisbon, cooperation policy, terrorism

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Mutual defence – one month on
by Thierry Tardy

The  13  November  attacks  in  Paris  led  France  to 
invoke  the  mutual  defence  clause  of  the  Lisbon 
Treaty  (Article  42.7).  For  the  first  time  since  the 
entry into force of the treaty in 2009, a state that 
was the ‘victim of armed aggression on its territory’ 
called  upon  the  other  EU  members  for  ‘aid  and 
assistance  by  all  the  means  in  their  power’.  The 
symbolic significance of the article and the impli-
cations of its invocation are not to be overlooked. 

The article is a key provision of European solidari-
ty and, what is more, it applies to the sensitive area 
of defence. Last but not least, the fact that its first 
ever invocation was made by France is not with-
out consequences, given the scope of the country’s 
military  engagement  both  inside  and  outside  the 
EU framework.

What objectives?

As the response to the attacks is not a strictly na-
tional  military  operation,  a  legal  and  political 
framework  which  encourages  and  facilitates  con-
tributions by France’s partners is required. Article 
42.7 provides this – at least in part.

First,  the  activation  of  the  clause  underlines  the 
gravity of France’s calls for assistance. Its invoca-
tion  first  by  President  Hollande  in  his  speech  to 
the Congrès and then by Defence Minister Le Drian 
at the EU Defence Council right after the attacks 
meant that EU member states could simply not ig-
nore France’s requests.

Second, the defence clause conveys the idea that the 
terrorist  attacks  had  not  only  targeted  France  but 
Europe as a whole. The combination of the emotion 
generated by the attacks, the activation of the clause 
and the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 
2249 on 20 November 2015 created a climate which 
helped partner countries justify their policy response 
vis-à-vis their own publics and parliaments. 

Third, in an environment characterised by a certain 
level of CSDP fatigue, the clause creates leverage for 
the strengthening of CSDP operations in sub-Saha-
ran Africa.

Finally, a hidden virtue of Article 42.7 is that its im-
plementation  does  not  necessarily  require  the  EU 
to play a central role. It therefore offers flexibility – 
much desired by France – without hampering pos-
sible  efforts  to  cooperate  with  Russia.  Nor  does  it 
create the suspicion that the invoking of Article 5 of 
the Washington Treaty – thereby triggering NATO’s 
involvement – would generate in the Middle East.

What solidarity?

The  defence  clause  was  chosen  over  the  solidarity 
clause (Article.222 TFEU) for two main reasons: first, 
because the crisis did not ‘clearly overwhelm the re-
sponse capabilities available’ to France; and, second, 
because the type of expected solidarity relates to ex-
ternal operations rather than to an internal response 
to the consequences of the attacks. Furthermore, the 
idea is not to create a new operation but to strengthen 

European Union Institute for Security Studies

December 2015

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commitments  to  existing  ones.  Incidentally,  this 
makes  the  possible  invocation  of  Article  44  of  the 
Lisbon Treaty (on ad hoc EU operations) irrelevant.

Some EU countries already active in training and sup-
porting the Iraqi and Kurdish forces will also beef up 
their commitments. 

In this context, France expressed – through bilateral 
requests  –  the  need  for  three  types  of  assistance  in 
the two regions of the Middle East and sub-Saharan 
Africa: direct participation in the coalition against the 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL); support 
for its military campaign in Iraq and Syria, Operation 
Chammal, through logistics, intelligence, and refuel-
ling capabilities; and support to French deployments 
(be  they  national,  European  or  UN  operations)  in 
Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR).

One  month  after  the  activation  of  the  clause, 
though  certain  decisions  are  still  pending  or  yet  to 
be  announced,  some  realistic  objectives  have  been 
achieved. 

It is true that, political support aside, only a few states 
have  committed  military  assets  in  the  Middle  East; 
some  medium-size  states  have  not  responded  posi-
tively and the majority of the EU-28 will most likely 
stay away from operations in Iraq and especially Syria. 
Moreover some contributions, in Africa in particular, 
were already being discussed before the 13 November 
attacks, while others stem from earlier requests made 
by France and also the US.

This said, the most important thing is that the UK and 
Germany – the two countries whose contribution was 
most eagerly awaited – have responded rapidly, mak-
ing significant contributions in full accordance with 
their constraining internal political and legal proce-
dures.  London  began  conducting  airstrikes  against 
ISIL  in  Syria,  after  military  action  was  approved  by 
the  House  of  Commons  on  2  December  (two  years 
and three months after a negative vote on interven-
ing there against Assad). And Berlin deployed a naval 
frigate (set to operate alongside the Charles de Gaulle 
aircraft carrier), refuelling aircraft and reconnaissance 
jets  (with  up  to  1,200  personnel)  after  approval  by 
the Bundestag on 4 December.

In both cases, while it is conceivable that the commit-
ments  would  have  been  made  even  without  Article 
42.7 (it was not mentioned at all in the debate in the 
UK’s House of Commons), the defence clause none-
theless formed the political foundation of France’s re-
quests.

In  a  few  other  cases  (Belgium,  Sweden,  The 
Netherlands), significant contributions may yet ma-
terialise,  be  they  direct  participation  in  operations 
against ISIL or the deployment of troops in the Sahel 
(alongside Operation Barkane or the MINUSMA) for 
counter-terrorism operations (in the case of Belgium). 

In parallel, CSDP operations in Mali and the CAR – 
the mandates of which will be revised next spring – 
will benefit from a stronger European presence. This 
will  ensure  their  continued  existence,  something 
which was previously not a foregone conclusion. The 
strengthening of UN operations in Mali and the CAR 
is also being discussed, in line with the German com-
mitment to contribute troops to MINUSMA (650 per-
sonnel), decided before the 13 November attacks. 

Depending on which institutional framework is cho-
sen by EU partners, it will be France (in case a coun-
try decides to contribute to French operations), the 
EU or the UN (in case it is these institutions which 
host  new  contributions)  which  will  take  over  the 
planning process.

What follow-up? 

Through the activation of the defence clause, France 
has  launched  a  process  that  raises  questions  about 
both the scope of Article 42.7 and what it means for 
the Union as a security actor.

Paradoxically, although the article is part of the Lisbon 
Treaty, its invocation does not make the EU as such 
a central actor in the response. The article does not 
mention the Union and though nothing excludes its 
involvement, the prevailing logic is intergovernmen-
tal rather than institutional. 

Moreover,  the  interpretation  of  the  scope  of  Article 
42.7 has been quite broad. The idea is not to confine 
the  possible  actions  of  EU  partners  only  to  partici-
pating  in  the  coalition  against  the  organisation  that 
carried out the attacks, but also to explore the differ-
ent types of response which can free up French assets 
in other regions – some of which  (like those in the 
CAR) are not linked to the fight against terrorism. In 
this sense, while the implementation of the clause will 
inevitably be limited in time, it will not be in space.

Finally, while President Hollande declared France to 
be  “at  war  against  jihadist  terrorism”,  no  other  EU 
country  has  adopted  a  similar  rhetoric.  In  the  long 
run,  this  difference  of  approach  may  impact  the 
clause-related  solidarity  and  fuel  the  debate  on  the 
overall effectiveness of the response. It also raises the 
question of the ability of France to exert the leader-
ship that will ensure that the collective effort is sus-
tained  over  time,  well  beyond  the  current  phase  of 
heightened emotion.

Thierry Tardy is a Senior Analyst at the EUISS.

European Union Institute for Security Studies

December 2015

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© EU Institute for Security Studies, 2015. | QN-AL-15-055-2A-N | ISBN 978-92-9198-350-6 | ISSN 2315-1129 | doi:10.2815/130685