20 years on : rethinking Schengen.
Date: 2015-12-17
Institutions: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Subjects: EU policy - national policy, Schengen Agreement, aid to refugees, border control, free movement of persons, frontier, migration policy

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20 years on: rethinking Schengen
by Roderick Parkes

Recent proposals for the reform of the Schengen 
Area  focus  on  turning  it  into  a  ‘proper’  border 
regime: one with features such as firm outer bor-
ders and a border guard. But Schengen was nev-
er meant to be a classic border regime when it 
was established back in 1995. Quite the reverse: 
it adapted Europe’s traditional system of borders 
to a new era of globalisation. Now Europe once 
again faces a radically-altered international en-
vironment, and Schengen must adapt, too. But 
reform proposals could do with taking its inno-
vative legacy into account.

A ‘delayed’ warning system

There  have  been  calls  for  the  EU  to  create  a 
classic  migration  early-warning  system  (EWS) 
as  employed  by  various  western  states.  In  the 
case of a sudden influx, an EWS would give the 
EU enough time to mobilise all the resources at 
its  disposal  –  everything  from  its  ‘Dublin’  ref-
ugee-relocation  database  to  its  civil-protection 
arrangements.  The  EU  already  has  at  least  one 
monitoring  system  to  warn  of  wars  and  other 
‘push factors’ abroad, and it is creating another 
to flag up ‘pull factors’ such as weak spots in its 
own border management. These twin monitor-
ing systems could easily be joined up to create 
a classic EWS.

However, a body like the EU may not actually 
need  an  EWS.  It  may  rather  need  a  ‘DWS’  –  a 
delayed warning system. The EU is surrounded 
by  unpredictable  and  overlapping  conflicts,  in 
Ukraine,  in  Syria  and  elsewhere.  As  a  result, 
there  can  be  a  considerable  delay  –  often  last-
ing years – between the onset of tensions abroad 
and  the  migration  flow  actually  reaching  the 
EU.  The  Schengen  Area  comprises  42,673  km 
of coastal and 7,721 km of land borders, and it 
is  managed  by  26  member  governments.  Such 
an entity simply cannot remain on high alert for 
a protracted period. Nor, indeed, can it hope to 
mobilise maximum resources when a flow is im-
minent. 

If  the  EU  is  to  be  properly  prepared,  it  needs 
to monitor the long period in between the initial 
conflict and the eventual arrival of migrants. The 
current  flows  from  Syria  and  Libya  are  a  good 
example  of  this.  Back  in  2011,  in  response  to 
the Arab Spring, the EU braced itself for an im-
mediate  wave  of  at  least  300,000-400,000  mi-
grants. But, that year, barely a ripple was felt. By 
mid-2012,  EU  governments  had  not  only  reo-
pened their borders, they were offering reform-
ist Arab countries the carrot of greater migration 
opportunities.  By  this  time,  however,  irregular 
flows  were  on  the  rise.  The  EU  had  mobilised 

European Union Institute for Security Studies

December 2015

1

 
 
too  quickly,  and  ended  up  unprepared  for  the 
eventual flows.

The  reasons  for  the  delay  in  the  flow  are  com-
plex but instructive. In the decade leading up to 
2011, Arab workers had come to the EU in large 
numbers and, in the initial aftermath of the Arab 
Spring,  many  returned  home  again,  hoping  for 
a better future. These return-flows probably had 
a  destabilising  effect  on  the  region.  Even  more 
disruptive  was  the  way  local  migrants  fled  the 
democratic revolutions in Libya and Egypt, often 
leaving  their  jobs  and  possessions  behind.  This 
disrupted North Africa’s delicate remittance net-
works and created demand for smuggling servic-
es. It also freed up heavily-armed militiamen who 
had  been  working  for  the  region’s  authoritarian 
regimes. 

Four years on, the EU still lacks proper data about 
how  the  flows  will  develop.  While  Frontex  col-
lects regular information on new arrivals, and the 
European Asylum Support Office (EASO) counts 
asylum claims on a weekly basis, these raw data 
sets provide only rudimentary pointers about fu-
ture trends. For example, 70% of the new arrivals 
are men. They are thus likely to remain in Europe 
for  an  extended  period  (middle-aged  women  – 
generally  perceived  as  an  unthreatening  group 
– are typically the quickest to return home). But 
there are few clues as to the answer of the real-
ly  important  question:  when  will  further  family 
members follow these young men?

To  be  able  to  answer  such  questions,  the  EU 
needs  to  focus  less  on  the  basic  ‘push’  or  ‘pull’ 
factors bookending flows, and more on the com-
plex  ‘intervening  vari-
ables’  which  delay  or 
expedite  migration. 
One  obvious  example 
is the existence of peo-
ple-smuggling services. 
networks 
Smuggling 
have proliferated in the 
past  four  years,  echo-
ing  and  subverting  the 
structures  and  services 
which  European  tour-
ists  once  used.  They 
will  likely  form  a  focus  of  a  project  EASO  is 
launching,  exploring  why  asylum-seekers  make 
certain choices. This data could then usefully be 
at the heart of any new European EWS.

migration  flow.  But  a  DWS  is  the  right  tool  for 
a  player  seeking  to  influence  migration  flows  as 
they unfold. Schengen relies on the ability of the 
EU to tackle migration flows at source. As this be-
comes trickier, a DWS could at least help the EU 
manage flows as they develop. If the EU succeeds 
in persuading Eritrea to end its policy of forced 
conscription, for example, will this stem the flow 
of refugees? Or will it simply create a volatile pool 
of  idle  youths  in  Africa?  What  happens  if  Gulf 
labour markets remain closed to these underem-
ployed youths? 

 ‘Dysfunctional’ border management

There  are  also  calls  for  the  EU  to  reinforce  its 
external  border.  But,  again,  a  body  like  the  EU, 
which  has  enlarged  its  territory  at  least  seven 
times over the last forty years, does not have out-
er borders in the traditional sense. Instead, it has 
a series of cooperative arrangements with neigh-
bours, which are not easily ‘hardened’. The EU’s 
south-eastern border is a case in point. This bor-
der  is  long  (skirting  13,676  km  of  Greek  coast) 
and  varied  (cutting  through  former  Yugoslav 
countries).  But,  above  all,  it  is  blurred:  citizens 
of five of the EU’s six Western Balkan neighbours 
can cross into the EU with just a passport, while 
Kosovars are currently undertaking domestic re-
forms to gain this right and Turks are increasingly 
demanding it, too. 

This  blurring  is  a  product  of  an  explicit  politi-
cal agenda. The EU has been pursuing ‘functional 
integration’ in the region. It has encouraged the 
spread of cross-border economic links – of labour 
migration,  trade  flows  and  multi-national  busi-
ness – so as to depoliti-
cise  the  region’s  ethnic 
tensions,  and  force  lo-
cal  politicians  to  over-
come  their  differences. 
The  EU,  as  the  major 
market for the Western 
Balkans, harnesses and 
steers  these  functional 
economic 
for 
strategic  ends.  It  has 
pushed Western Balkan 
to  demarcate 
states 
their borders, improve their domestic governance 
and cooperate with each other, in return for mar-
ket access.

forces 

‘...citizens of five of the EU’s six Western 
Balkan neighbours can cross into the 
EU with just a passport, while Kosovars 
are currently undertaking domestic 
reforms to gain this right and Turks are 
increasingly demanding it, too.’

This is not just about readiness and reactiveness. 
A  classic  EWS  is  probably  the  right  tool  for  a 
state  seeking  to  hone  its  policies  in  repose  to  a 

The trouble now is that the region’s most vibrant 
cross-border  networks  are  rooted  in  the  illegal 
economy. Crime networks earn millions bringing 
migrants  from  the  Middle  East  and  South  Asia 

European Union Institute for Security Studies

December 2015

2

into Greece and then on, up through Serbia and 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia into 
the rest of Europe. 

the opportunity to abscond after having claimed 
asylum. 

‘...people smuggling gangs incorporate 
many of the qualities associated with 
well-functioning white-collar firms:  
they are multi-ethnic, entrepreneurial, 
and remarkably good at gaining 
international customers.’ 

These people smuggling gangs incorporate many 
of the qualities associated with well-functioning 
white-collar  firms:    they  are  multi-ethnic,  en-
trepreneurial,  and  remarkably  good  at  gaining 
international  customers.  They  also  are  known 
for  delivering  on  their 
promises 
(criminal 
gangs  can  get  a  mi-
grant  from  Turkey  to 
in  under 
Germany 
four days). Sadly, these 
groups  are  also  highly 
dangerous and illicit.

net-
crime 
These 
works are pushing the 
Western  Balkans  to-
wards  a  kind  of  functional  disintegration.  The 
people smuggling gangs are highly skilled when 
it comes to getting their Syrian, Iraqi and Afghan 
clients  past  local  populations  and  authorities 
undetected. Huge numbers of migrants – 3,000-
4,000  per  day  –  are  moving  out  of  Greece  and 
into Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia. This is despite the fact that the num-
bers  entering  Greece  in  the  first  place  are  now 
down to 500 per day. This migration wave is now 
spilling out in every direction, as smugglers offer 
new paths out through Albania to Italy, or direct-
ly into Romania by sea. Unsurprisingly, this surge 
is  fuelling  social  and  political  fragmentation  in 
the Western Balkans.

Worse still, the smugglers sometimes prove more 
effective  even  than  the  authorities  at  handling 
the migrant flows. When EU rules prove too un-
wieldy,  smugglers  simply  bypass  them.  Greek 
NGOs go so far as to say that EU policies need 
to ‘compete’ with the smugglers: the EU refugee-
relocation  scheme  must  be  more  efficient  than 
the smuggling services at getting people to where 
they have a right to go. 

Competing is a tall order. Refugees are in a hur-
ry,  and  the  EU  relocation  system  is  still  bogged 
down  by  disagreements  with  commercial  air-
lines. Moreover, not all EU destination states are 
currently participating in the relocation scheme. 
Yet the option of ‘closing’ the EU’s borders, and 
cutting off ties, is not realistic. In fact, the very 
idea is fuelling disorder. Locals are getting out of 
the Balkans while they still can: in the EU, 29% 
of  asylum  claims  currently  take  longer  than  six 
months to process, allowing Albanians and Serbs 

Those left behind are losing faith in the EU visa-
liberalisation process, with Kosovars now oppos-
ing the demarcation of their borders. Old power 
imbalances are also returning. Serbia is of such a 
size that almost all migrant routes pass through it. 
And while this gives Belgrade a burden to carry, 
it  also  provides  it  with 
new political clout and 
scope to ‘deflect’ migra-
tion  flows  towards  its 
neighbours. 

If  there  is  a  silver  lin-
ing, it lies in the emer-
gence of a kind of ‘dys-
functional  integration’. 
In recent weeks, Balkan 
countries  have  begun 
to  catch  up  with  mainstream  European  asylum 
standards  –  despite  the  Herculean  task  of  cre-
ating  6,000  reception  places  in  Serbia  alone. 
They have resisted their status as mere migration 
‘transit  zones’  and  demanded  greater  say  in  EU 
policy, mooting ideas such as a Balkan relocation 
programme.  And  their  law  enforcement  agen-
cies – highly effective when they wish to be – are 
proving rather cooperative on issues like counter-
terrorism.  This  messy,  dysfunctional  integration 
might eventually provide for more solid relations 
than simply ‘closing the border’.

Freedom of ‘onward movement’

The flows through the Balkans put the very prin-
ciple of free movement in peril. The EU, Norway 
and Switzerland have recorded a massive number 
of asylum claims this year; so far, 1.07 million in 
total. Of these, as many as 97% are new arrivals 
rather  than  repeat-claimants.  Moreover,  a  large 
proportion consists of young unaccompanied mi-
nors (UAM) from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia 
and Albania. These UAMs are not just ‘forerun-
ners’ who open the door to further waves of fam-
ily members, they are children smuggled out of 
conflict  zones  by  their  families  to  live  alone  in 
Europe – a particularly tricky group for EU gov-
ernments to manage.

The EU is adopting a classic federal approach to 
resolving this problem: relocation. On the basis 
of a clear formula, refugees are assigned to live in 
a certain state, from whence their onward move-
ment is heavily restricted. To this end, European 
authorities  are  taking  quick  and  definitive  de-
cisions  about  where  refugees  should  be  sent, 

European Union Institute for Security Studies

December 2015

3

been a marked shift in the EU towards ‘home-
grown terrorism’, particularly amongst second-
generation  migrants.  One  source  of  frustration 
for  migrants  is  the  perceived  double  standards 
when it comes to European values. Establishing 
some kind of right of onward movement would 
go  some  way  to  preventing  this  among  today’s 
refugees. It would avoid the risk of their becom-
ing ‘trapped’ in a certain member state, let alone 
of their looking outside the EU to conflicts and 
ideologies for inspiration. 

Revamping Schengen

It  is  worth  underlining  that  this  is  not  about 
upholding  a  European  value  for  its  own  sake. 
Free  movement  is  rooted  in  hard  commercial 
interests  (Schengen  still  saves  the  express  par-
cel  industry  €80  million  each  year),  as  well  as 
providing the EU with a considerable source of 
political  leverage  in  the  world.  But  these  com-
mercial and political interests can only be main-
tained if EU citizens see mobility not as a threat 
but an opportunity. 

And  more  can  be  done:  despite  the  freedoms 
enjoyed for years, only around 14 million – less 
than 3% – of EU citizens currently live outside 
their country of birth. 

Schengen  was  conceived  as  a  novel  means  of 
managing  territory  –  a  victory  of  commercial 
and political goals over territorial divisions. The 
project’s viability depended on the EU’s capacity 
to  spread  good  governance  in  third  countries. 
Member  states  needed  to  be  able  to  tackle  the 
root  causes  of  migration  and  crime  abroad  to 
safely lift customs controls. 

The world has now changed, and the EU finds 
it far harder to leverage free movement in order 
promote its core values. Nevertheless, this nov-
el  international  environment  again  requires  an 
innovative  response,  rather  than  replicating  at 
an EU level the classical attributes of a national 
model. 

Roderick Parkes is a Senior Analyst at the 
EUISS.

involving a myriad of considerations. They take 
into  account  refugees’  nationality  and  possible 
family-links  in  a  member  state,  as  well  as  lan-
guage and professional skills. And they factor in 
the individual member states’ current economic 
performance and population size. 

More than 160 refugees have been relocated in 
this way, after having been identified as eligible 
by authorities in Greece and Italy. As such, the 
scheme  is  proving  rather  more  workable  than 
an earlier pilot project in Malta, where asylum-
seekers first had to be processed and recognised 
as  refugees.  And  yet,  there  are  concerns  about 
the heavy burden placed on the authorities (in 
the case of the Lesbos registration centre, a team 
of  just  ten  administrators).  European  border 
officials  do  not  just  have  to  identify  relocation 
candidates  but  also  build  up  permanent  local 
reception capacities, as well as search for crimi-
nals and terrorists. Mistakes may be made.

In this context, one addition to the existing re-
location mechanism seems thinkable. This is the 
option of giving refugees a long-term opportu-
nity to choose their destination country. Already 
20  years  ago,  governments  discussed  creating 
a  European  migration  convention.  This  would 
have established a right of refugees to claim resi-
dence  in  another  member  state  after  a  certain 
period. Governments did indeed give economic 
migrants  this  right  to  move,  but  refugees  were 
excluded. This is largely because Member states 
had had negative experiences with the onward 
flow of Somali refugees, who gained EU citizen-
ship in one member and then moved to another, 
often creating serious integration problems.

This option is of course no silver bullet. Yet, it 
might  just  turn  out  that  the  best  way  to  safe-
guard the European principle of free movement 
is  in  fact  by  reasserting  the  European  princi-
ple  of  free  movement.  Young  unaccompanied 
minors  have  their  whole  lives  ahead  of  them, 
and member states’ economic and demographic 
profiles  will  change  significantly  in  that  time. 
Giving  these  young  refugees  a  future  prospect 
of  free  movement  would  create  some  kind  of 
corrective  mechanism  in  the  initial  relocation 
decision. This new right of ‘onward’ movement 
could be hedged by creating certain thresholds 
for the refugee when it comes to time spent in 
the EU or level of economic attainment.

Such an approach might also allay some incipi-
ent security concerns in the EU, specifically the 
problem  of  radicalisation  of  migrant  groups. 
Since  the  2004  Madrid  bombings  there  has 

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December 2015

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© EU Institute for Security Studies, 2015. | QN-AK-15-039-2A-N | ISBN 978-92-9198-295-0 | ISSN 2315-1110 | doi:10.2815/7873