COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Eighth biannual report on the functioning of the Schengen area 1 May - 10 December 2015
Date: 2015-12-15
Institutions: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: Schengen Information System, border control, external border of the EU, illegal migration, internal border of the EU, migratory movement, right of asylum, terrorism

EN 

   EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Strasbourg, 15.12.2015  COM(2015) 675 final   COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Eighth biannual report on the functioning of the Schengen area 1 May - 10 December 2015  
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION 

The Commission has been preparing biannual reports to the European Parliament and to the 
Council  on  the  functioning  of  the  Schengen  area  since  2011.  This  system  of  reporting  was 
introduced to help strengthen cooperation in the Schengen area and give a basis for debate and 
decision-making,  as  explained  in  the  Commission’s  September  2011  Communication  on 
Schengen  governance1  in  which  it  was  proposed  and  supported  by  the  Council  on  8 March 
2012.  In  order  to  take  into  account  the  tragic  events  in  Paris  on  13 November  and  other 
important developments, the reporting period of this eighth report has been extended until 10 
of December 2015.  

The  biannual  reports  published  to  date  have  given  the  broadest  possible  overview  of 
developments in the Schengen area, covering all aspects of its functioning. However, in the 
context  of  the  current  migration  crisis,  the  Commission  would  like  to  focus  on  the 
developments  that  have  had  the  most  significant  effect  on  the  functioning  of  the  Schengen 
area. As indicated in the Council conclusions of 9 November 2015, the report should serve as 
a  basis  for  a  thorough  debate  on  this  subject  and  on  the  lessons  learned  from  temporary 
reintroductions of controls at internal borders. It should also look into the way in which the 
facts being reported are affecting the Schengen area and its functioning, and, where relevant, 
how the resulting situation could be addressed.  

The  major  issues  to  be  discussed  from  this  reporting  period  are:  the  measures  taken  by  the 
Member  States  at  their  internal  and  external  borders  in  the  light  of:  1)  the  unprecedented 
number of migrants arriving in the Schengen area and their subsequent secondary movements; 
and 2) the multiple terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015 and an attempted terrorist 
attack  on  the  Thalys  train  travelling  from  Amsterdam  to  Paris  on  21 August  2015.  The 
sections  below  provide  a  detailed  analysis  of  each.  In  addition,  the  report  also  reflects  the 
experiences with the new Schengen evaluation mechanism. 

2. 

UNPRECEDENTED MIGRATORY PRESSURE 

2.1.  Migration flows at the external borders 

The numbers of irregular migrants and applicants for international protection arriving in the 
EU have increased dramatically. The number of irregular border crossings detected so far in 
2015 (1 553 614)2 considerably exceeds the total number of irregular border crossings during 
the 2009-2014 period (813 044). Migrants have been entering via the three main routes where 
an absolute majority of all irregular EU border crossings were detected in January-November 
2015: the eastern Mediterranean (716 202 detections), the Western Balkans (667 147) and the 
central  Mediterranean  (144 300).  It  should  be  noted  however  that  part  of  the  irregular 

1  
2  

COM(2011) 561 final.  
The  data  for  January-October  2015  (1 284 549)  is  available  from  Frontex  Risk  Analysis  Network 
(FRAN)  and  covers  the  Schengen  area  and  Schengen  candidate  countries.  It  includes  only  the  third 
country  nationals  detected  at  external  borders  (except  temporary  external  borders)  when  entering  or 
attempting  to  enter  illegally  between  the  border  crossing  points  (BCPs).  For  November,  the  data 
originates  from  Joint  Operations  Reporting  Application  (JORA)  and  from  the  Croatian  Ministry  of 
Interior (http://www.mup.hr/219696.aspx); estimates have been used for routes where no data was yet 
available.  

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migrants that are detected on the Western Balkans route have already been counted once  in 
the figures for the eastern Mediterranean route through Greece. 

Many  of  those  arriving  in  the  EU  are  fleeing  conflicts  in  their  region  and  therefore  request 
international protection. Although the asylum legislation is not part of the Schengen acquis, it 
is  obvious  that  the  refugee  crisis  has  significant  consequences  for  the  situation  at  the  EU’s 
external borders and within the Schengen area. 

The dramatically increased number of arrivals has put the border control and asylum systems 
of  the  countries  concerned  under  extreme  pressure.  In  response  to  this  situation,  the 
Commission introduced the ‘hotspot’ approach, which provides a platform to allow the EU 
agencies  to  assist  the  frontline  Member  States  in  registering,  screening  and  debriefing 
incoming migrants quickly, to help with the asylum procedures and to coordinate the return 
operations.  Italy  and  Greece  are  the  first  two  Member  States  where  this  approach  is  being 
implemented3.  The  Commission  has  also  sent  its  own  personnel  to  both  Member  States  to 
provide practical coordination and support. The Migration Management Support Teams active 
at  the  'hotspots'  rely  on  the  Member  States'  contributions  via  Frontex'  and  EASO's  calls  for 
experts and equipment in an appropriate manner. 

Following  the  proposals  of  the  Commission  the  Council  in  September  has  agreed  on 
relocation of 160 000 applicants in clear need of international protection from Italy, Greece 
and possibly other Member States directly affected by the refugee crisis.4 Full implementation 
of the relocation mechanism, alongside the roll-out of 'hotspots', should alleviate the pressure 
on these countries.  

In addition to the ongoing Frontex joint operations — Triton (hosted by Italy) and Poseidon 
Sea  (hosted  by  Greece),  to  which  the  financial  allocation  has  been  trippled  to  enable 
reinforcing their surveillance and rescue capacity — the EU launched a Common Security and 
Defence  Policy  operation  in  the  southern  central  Mediterranean  on  22 June.  This  operation 
aims  specifically  at  disrupting  the  business  model  of  human  smuggling  and  trafficking 
networks. 

Furthermore,  Member  States  faced  with  a  situation  of  urgent  and  exceptional  pressure  may 
request  the  assistance  of  the  Rapid  Border  Intervention  Teams  (RABITs)  provided  in  the 
Frontex Regulation. On 3 December, Greece submitted such a formal request to Frontex for 
the deployment of a Rapid Border Intervention Team operation to provide immediate border 
guard support at its external border in the Aegean islands. On 10 December Frontex took the 
necessary decisions to launch this operation and to immediately agree on the operational plan 
with the Greek Authorities within the same operational area as Poseidon Sea.  

Hungary  has  constructed  a  fence  along  its  external  border  with  Serbia.  The  installation  of 
fences  for  the  purposes  of  border  control  is  not  as  such  contrary  to  EU  law.  However,  the 
applied  measures  must  be  proportionate  and  must  comply  with  the  respect  of  fundamental 

3  

4  

See the progress reports on the implementation of the hotspots in Greece (COM(2015) 678 final) and in 
Italy (COM(2015) 679 final). 
Council  decisions  (EU)  2015/1523  (OJ  L  239,  15.9.2015,  p.  146)  and  (EU)  2015/1601  (OJ  L  248, 
24.9.2015, p. 80).  

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rights and the rights resulting from the EU asylum acquis, in particular the non-refoulement 
principle.  The  Commission  continues  to  monitor  that  the  installation  of  the  fence  does  not 
impede  on  these  rights,  in  particular  on  the  right  to  have  effective  access  to  the  asylum 
procedure at the border crossing points. 

Hungary has also erected a fence at its border with another EU Member State which is due to 
join  the  Schengen  area,  namely  Croatia.  A  comparable  installation  is  constructed  at  certain 
sections  of  Slovenian-Croatian  border.  While  it  not  explicitly  prohibited  by  the  EU  law  to 
build a fence at what in the meantime is still an external Schengen border, the Commission 
notes however that such construction is inconsistent with the objective of future accession of 
Croatia to the Schengen area. The Commission also maintains its full support to the accession 
of Bulgaria and Romania as explained in the 7th biannual report5. 

It is of utmost  importance  that everyone crossing external borders is  checked in accordance 
with  the  existing  legislation.  Those  who  cross  the  border  illegally  should  be  properly 
registered  and  channelled  into  asylum  or  return  procedure  as  appropriate.  Currently,  the 
fingerprinting  obligation  imposed  by  the  Eurodac  Regulation6  is  not  always  complied  with. 
The  ratio  between  cases  where  fingerprints  have  been  taken  in  case  of  irregular  border 
crossing (in accordance with  Article 14 of the Eurodac Regulation)  and the number of such 
crossings  is  estimated  at  around  23%7,  varying  widely  between  Member  States.  The 
Commission is taking action to ensure full compliance with EU law in this area8. This, as well 
as the screening procedures embedded in the 'hotspots' and relocation scheme, is essential to 
limit the security risks related to the fact that high numbers of persons cross the EU's external 
border in an irregular manner. 

Those  who  do  not  qualify  for  international  protection  status  should  be  swiftly  returned 
instead  of  being  allowed  to  travel  further.  In  2014,  less  than  40%  of  the  irregular  migrants 
ordered  to  leave  the  EU  actually  did  so.  While  voluntary  return  is  the  preferred  option 
wherever possible, its success depends on the credibility of the prospect of  forced return. In 
September  2015,  the  Commission  tabled  an  EU  action  plan  on  return9  and  presented  the 
Return  Handbook10,  setting  out  measures  that  could  be  introduced  to  improve  the 
effectiveness of the EU return system. In addition, the Commission has sent letters requesting 

5  
6  
7  

8  

9  
10  

COM(2015) 236 final. 
Regulation (EU) No 606/2013 (OJ L 180, 29.06.2013, p. 1). 
Data for January-October 2015 for the Schengen members and Schengen candidate countries that have 
reported  at  least  one  case  of  illegal  border  crossing.  Accurate  comparisons  between  EURODAC  data 
(fingerprint totals for Category 2 with no error that include all types of external border) and FRAN data 
(illegal border crossing at the external land and sea borders only) cannot be made. Only fingerprints of 
persons over the age of 14 who have not been sent back nor detained during the entirety of the period 
between  apprehension  and  removal  are  taken  for  the  purposes  of  the  EURODAC  Regulation  (see 
Article 14 for details), whereas FRAN data covers illegal border crossings for all third country nationals 
as explained under footnote 2. 
Over the period covered by this report, the Commission has sent four reasoned opinions, 42 letters of 
formal notice and eight administrative letters in the field of asylum concerning the implementation of 
the  Eurodac  Regulation,  and  the  transposition  of  and  compliance  with  the  recast  Asylum  Procedures 
and Reception Conditions Directives. 
COM(2015) 453 final. 
Commission Recommendation C(2015) 6250 final of 1.10.2015. 

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clarification  on  the  application  of  the  Return  Directive  to  ten  Member  States,  notably  with 
regard to the issuance of return decisions and the enforcement thereof. 

It needs to be pointed out that the current crisis also has an impact on other law enforcement 
authorities  involved  in  the  management  of  external  borders.  With  customs  officers  assisting 
other  authorities  to  manage  the  crisis  (depending  on  national  organisational  structures  and 
intensity of the problem per country), their ability to perform an appropriate level of customs 
controls on goods is negatively affected. 

2.2.  Situation at the internal borders 

The refugee crisis has not only resulted in massive arrivals at the external borders, but also in 
significant  secondary  movements  inside  the  Schengen  area,  since  the  applicants  for 
international  protection  were  travelling  further  to  the  Member  States  of  their  preference 
instead  of  having  their  applications  examined  by  the  Member  States  responsible  under  the 
Dublin  rules.  To  prevent  this  from  happening, the  Member  States  of  first  entry  into the  EU 
should register the applicants properly and have reception conditions in line with EU law and 
fundamental rights, so that the applicants can be taken back in line with the Dublin system11. 
Incentives  for  travelling  to  other  Member  States  during  the  examination  of  the  asylum 
application should be limited, as should the issuing of documents allowing this travel, except 
in cases where there are serious humanitarian reasons. The situation in Calais, where people 
stay illegally in the Schengen area while trying to enter the Channel Tunnel to get to the UK, 
must also be mentioned in this context. 

The aforementioned shortcomings in the implementation of the EU acquis led to temporary 
reintroduction  of  controls  at  the  German,  Austrian,  Slovenian,  Hungarian,  Swedish  and 
Norwegian  internal  borders.  It  should  be  noted  that  this  is  a  last-resort  measure  explicitly 
foreseen in the Schengen Borders Code (SBC) to be used in the event of a serious threat to 
public  policy  and  internal  security  both  in  cases  requiring  immediate  action  and  for 
foreseeable events. It is limited in time and must remain proportionate to the serious threat it 
seeks to address. 

A decision on the reintroduction of border controls at the internal borders is a prerogative of 
the  Member  States,  who  are  obliged  to  assess  the  extent  to  which  the  measure  is  likely  to 
adequately  remedy  the  threat  to  public  policy  or  internal  security,  as  well  as  the 
proportionality  of  the  measure  in  relation  to  that  threat.  In  the  latter  assessment,  the  likely 
impact of any threats to public policy or internal security and the likely impact of the measure 
on free movement of persons within the area without internal border control should be taken 
into  account.  The  Commission  can  issue  an  opinion  with  regard  to  the  necessity  and 
proportionality of the measures and did so on 23 October 201512 with regard to Austria and 

11  

12  

Since  2011,  following  judgments  by  the  ECJ  and  ECHR,  Dublin  transfers  back  to  Greece  have  been 
suspended as the persistent deficiencies on the Greek asylum system made doing so a violation of an 
individual's fundamental rights. The Commission has dedicated substantial resources to assist Greece in 
overcoming these deficiencies. If all conditions are met, it will recommend to the European Council to 
confirm the reinstatement of Dublin transfers. 
Commission opinion C(2015) 7100 final of 23.10.2015. 

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Germany13,  concluding  that  the  initial  reintroduction,  as  well  as  the  prolongations  thereof, 
were necessary and proportionate to the identified serious threats to the internal security and 
public policy and as such in compliance with the SBC. 

Although  in  2013  the  legislators  agreed  that  migratory  flows  cannot  per  se  justify  the 
reintroduction  of  checks  at  internal  borders,  the  Commission  takes  the  view  that  the 
uncontrolled influx of high numbers of undocumented or inadequately documented persons, 
not registered upon their first entry to the EU, may constitute a serious threat to public policy 
and  internal  security  and  thus  may  justify  the  application  of  this  extraordinary  measure 
available under the SBC. 

While  the  border  controls  in  all  aforementioned  cases  have  been  reintroduced  (and 
subsequently extended) on the basis of Article 25 SBC (cases requiring immediate action with 
a maximum duration of two months), Germany and Austria notified the Commission that they 
would  continue  the  border  controls  for  a  period  of  three  months  on  the  basis  of  Article  23 
SBC. Also Sweden announced in its recent notification of the prolongation until 20 December 
2015  based  on  Article 25  SBC  that  it  would  prolong  the  border  controls  further  based  on 
Article 23  SBC  if  the  situation  does  not  improve.  The  successive  use  of  Articles  25  and  23 
SBC  is  possible  on  condition  that  the  Member  State  demonstrates  that  the  introduced  or 
prolonged  checks  are  necessary,  adequate  and  proportionate  to  remedy  the  serious  threat  to 
public policy or internal security identified. 

Article  23  SBC  allows  with  respect  to  foreseeable  events  the  carrying  out  of  controls  for  a 
period up to 30 days or for the foreseeable duration of the serious threat, for a maximum of 
six months in total. This provision was used  during the reporting period on several occasions, 
e.g. by Germany (between 16 May and 15 June 2015) due to G7 summit, Malta (between 9-29 
November 2015) in view of the Valetta Conference on Migration and Commonwealth Heads 
of Government Meeting  and France in relation to COP21 .  

On  9  December  2015,  France  notified  the  Commission  that  in  the  context  of  the  state  of 
emergency  declared  in  France  and  due  to  the  serious  threat  to  the  internal  security,  the 
controls at the internal borders of France will be reintroduced for a period from 14 December 
2015 to 26 February 2016.  

On  25  of  November  Malta  has  notified  its  intention  to  retain  border  control  at  the  Maltese 
internal borders with regard to the global terrorist threat and in view of the fact that Malta is 
in the process of addressing a smuggling ring targeting it as a destination for illegal migrants 
travelling from other Schengen territories. The Commission has requested in detail the facts 
and figures demonstrating the necessity and proportionality of the decision. 

The  Commission  will  closely  monitor  whether  the  grounds  for  the  reintroduction  and 
prolongation of temporary border controls under all SBC provisions are and remain valid. The 

13  

Slovenia  lifted  internal  border  control before  the  adoption of  the  opinion.  Hungary  introduced  border 
control for 10 days on 17 October 2015. Sweden reintroduced the border controls on 12 November for 
the initial period of 10 days and, as notified on the occasion of the latest prolongation, the controls will 
continue  to  be  carried  out  at  least  until  20  December.  Norway  initially  reintroduced  border  controls 
between 26 November and 6 December and further prolonged them until 26 December. 

6 

 
 
                                                            
Commission expects the Member States to regularly evaluate whether the conditions for the 
reintroduction continue to be met, and if not to lift those controls immediately. If needed, the 
Commission will issue an opinion in this regard. 

Since 2013, Article 26 SBC provides also for a possibility of reintroducing border control at 
internal  borders  where  the  overall  functioning  of  the  Schengen  area  is  put  at  risk.  A 
recommendation addressed to one or more Member States is adopted by the Council upon a 
proposal  from  the  Commission.  This  provision  can  only  be  triggered  in  case  of  persistent 
serious deficiencies related to external border control as confirmed in a Schengen evaluation 
procedure.  

With  regard  to  the  installations  that  have  been  placed  by  the  Austrian  authorities  at  the 
Austrian-Slovenian  border,  they  have  not  been  designed  to  prevent  border  crossing,  but  to 
channel the arrivals in an orderly manner to enable organised provision of medical care, food 
and  transport.  As  things  stand  now,  they  are  not  in  contradiction  with  the  SBC  provisions. 
However, it is essential that any such installations remain temporary in nature, in line with the 
temporary  nature of the border  controls.  The Commission will continue to  monitor  that  any 
further steps taken at the internal borders respect the Schengen acquis. 

2.3.  Lessons learned 

Several conclusions can be drawn from the current crisis. Firstly, the ongoing crisis as well as 
terrorist threats described in the next section have demonstrated that it is imperative that the 
management of the external border, including registration and screening of those who cross it 
irregularly, take place fully in line with the EU legislation and standards. If a Member State is 
faced with a high pressure at its external border which the national border guard system is not 
able to cope with on its own, it is important that the Member State concerned makes full use 
of all the available remedies including a request from the relevant EU Agencies, in particular 
Frontex, to intervene so as to address the emergency situation. To manage those requests in a 
better,  faster  and  more  adequate  manner,  the  Commission  sees  a  clear  need  to  establish  a 
European Border and Coast Guard as presented in its Border Package14. 

Secondly,  whilst  temporary  reintroduction  of  the  controls  at  internal  border  per  se  does  not 
have  any  influence  on  the  total  number  of  migrants  or  asylum  seekers  arriving  to  the 
Schengen  area,  it  allows  to  better  manage  their  subsequent  secondary  movements  in  a 
structured  way,  enabling  to  make  the  best  possible  use  of  the  available  resources  for 
registration, reception, relocation and (if applicable) return. Hence it must remain a temporary 
measure helping to bring the situation back to normal. 

Thirdly, there is an obvious need for clear communication and delivery on all fronts that EU 
legislation has to be respected, that applicants for international protection do not have a right 
to choose the Member State where their applications are examined and that registration and 
fingerprinting  is  mandatory.  In  this  context,  also  relevant  is  the  principle  that  –  as  long  as 
there was a prior non-refoulement and proportionality check – countries could refuse entry to 
individuals who did not express a wish to apply for international protection. Linked to this is 

14  

See COM(2015) 673 final and COM(2015) 671 final. 

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the principle of "no registration, no rights": the registration of migrants (irrespective of their 
status)  is  the  precondition  to  appropriately  managing  the  flows  and  setting  the  rights  and 
duties of migrants.   

Finally, with thousands of people arriving every day at certain sections of the external border, 
it is clear that Member States need to be able to monitor the situation as it evolves (situational 
awareness) and to react appropriately (reaction capability). The national coordination centres 
(NCCs) set up under the Eurosur Regulation15 can play an important role in this respect, and 
Member States should make better use of them in strengthening their reaction capability. 

It  is  worth  recalling  that  in  reply  to  this  crisis  situation,  the  Commission  prepared  two 
implementation  packages  for  the  European  Agenda  on  Migration  (adopted  in  May  and  in 
September)  which  contain  a  number  of  measures  to  help  to  alleviate  the  burden  on  the 
Member States most severely affected and enhance the preparedness of the Union as a whole 
to address similar challenges. 

3. 

TERRORIST THREATS IN THE SCHENGEN AREA 

The terrorist attacks perpetrated in Paris on 13 November 2015 as well as the failed attack 
in the Thalys train on 21 August 2015 confirmed the seriousness of the terrorist threat faced 
by the EU. This threat is not limited only to one Member State and requires multiple measures 
to address it in a comprehensive manner in order to protect the Schengen area. 

Those and previous attacks highlight the importance of detecting fraudulent documents and of 
fully  exploiting  available  instruments,  such  as  the  use  of  databases  and  interagency 
cooperation at national, European and international level. At the same time, it is also clear that 
radicalisation  can  take  place  even  without  one  having  left  the  Member  State  of  residence. 
Hence, the problem of terrorism is broader and goes beyond issues relevant to the Schengen 
acquis. 

Member  States  have  to  ensure  that  arrivals  to  the  Schengen  area  take  place  in  an  orderly 
manner,  including  identification  and  registration.  The  full  implementation  of  the  ‘hotspots’ 
approach  and  the  relocation  mechanism  will  also  contribute  to  increasing  security,  as 
explained in section 2. 

The phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters remains a major source of concern, especially 
as EU citizens continue to travel to Syria and Iraq to support terrorist groups. Detecting and 
preventing their travel to and from conflict zones has been identified as a priority. 

The  European  Commission  has  consistently  supported  the  strengthening  of  the  Schengen 
framework  in  this  regard  and  the  full  use  of  measures  that  can  be  taken  within  it.  As 
announced in the  European Agenda on Security,16 the Commission finalised in June 2015 a 
first set of common risk indicators for foreign terrorist fighters, to be used by border guards 
to help them when conducting checks. The list is based on travel trends, patterns and specific 
characteristics of those persons, and was compiled using contributions from Member States, 

15  
16  

Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 (OJ L 295, 6.11.2013, p. 11). 
COM(2015) 185.  

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the European External Action Service, Europol and Frontex, with due respect to fundamental 
rights.  

Sharing  information  is  a  crucial  part  of  effective  and  coordinated  border  control  and  law 
enforcement. The Schengen Information System (SIS) plays a central role as a platform for 
exchanging  information,  in  order  to  trace  terrorist  suspects  and  conveyances  used  for 
terrorism  and  serious  crime.  Issuing  alerts  for  discreet  and  specific  checks,  in  accordance 
with Article 36 of Council Decision 2007/533/JHA17 can be especially useful in that regard. It 
is  important  to  emphasise  that  whilst  those  alerts  are  invaluable  as  a  way  of  collecting 
information for identifying terrorists’ and other criminals’ travel routes, they do not constitute 
arrest warrants. 

The  steady  increase  in  the  number  of  alerts  for  discreet  and  specific  checks,  and  hits  based 
upon them, is generating a significant volume of supplementary information, which needs to 
be  exchanged  between  the  SIRENE  Bureaux18  as  a  matter  of  priority.  Furthermore,  the 
amendments  made  to  the  SIRENE  Manual19  with  effect  from  30 January  2015  require  an 
immediate  reporting  of  hit  information  on  terrorism-related  activities  at  national  and  at 
European  level.  The  majority  of  Member  States  are  making  use  of  the  technical  and  legal 
improvements made to the SIS20, namely the possibility of speedy information exchange and 
the  visualisation  of  the  fact  that  an  identification  document  has  been  invalidated  for  travel 
purposes, thus preventing the holder of the document from leaving or entering the Schengen 
area. It is essential that Member States share relevant information via the SIRENE channel at 
the  time  of  a  terrorism-related  alert  being  created  and  that  the  SIRENE  Bureaux  are 
sufficiently equipped to cope with the tasks entrusted to them. In addition, the Member States 
must fully implement the new functionalities of the SIS, with particular attention to be given 
to  the  linking  functionality  and  the  display  of  photographs.  Links  between  alerts  created  by 
Member  States  must  be  visible  to  end-users  in  all  countries  in  the  Schengen  area.  The 
existence of fingerprints and the European Arrest Warrant must also be indicated to the end-
users on their electronic devices to carry out checks. 

In  addition,  further  improvements  that  contribute  to  prevention  of  terrorism  and  travel  of 
foreign  terrorist  fighters  to/from  the  conflict  areas  can  be  made  such  as  the  detection  of 
forged, false or invalidated documents (notably through systematic consultation of Interpol’s 
stolen and lost travel document database and of the document section of the SIS); full use of 
the  SBC  provisions  as  regards  checks  on  persons  (with  the  support  of  the  common  risk 
indicators referred to above); the full check of persons not covered by the Union right to free 
movement  in  the  SIS;  and  cross-checking  of  advance  passenger  information  (API)  or 
passenger name record (PNR) data, where available, against the relevant databases. Finally, to 
further increase security, the Commission has made a proposal for a targeted amendment to 

17  
18  
19  
20  

Council Decision 2007/533/JHA (OJ L 205, 7.8.2007, p. 63). 
SIRENE stands for Supplementary Information REquest at the National Entries. 
Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/219 (OJ L 44, 18.2.2015, p. 75). 
For further details, see the section 4.1 of the 7th biannual report on the functioning of the Schengen area 
(COM(2015) 236 final). 

9 

 
 
                                                            
the Schengen Borders Code21 to provide for mandatory checks of persons enjoying the right 
to free movement at the external borders of the EU against relevant databases. 

Recent  terrorist  attacks  have  drawn  attention  to  the  means  by  which  criminals  are  able  to 
obtain firearms, including military-grade firearms in Europe. In the area without controls at 
internal borders, it is important that there are adequate instruments in place to uncover such 
weapons, hence particular attention was given to improving alerts on firearms which are to be 
traced  and  seized.  Two  projects  have  been  launched  to  align  SIS  and  Interpol's  firearms 
database, iArms, that would allow for their parallel use. This would enable making best use of 
SIS and to ensure that firearms are traceable world-wide. 

Furthermore,  on  2  December  2015,  the  Commission  adopted  the  security  package  entailing 
the  Communication  on  an  Action  Plan  on  trafficking  of  firearms  and  explosives  and  a 
proposal for a directive on combating terrorism. 

4. 

SCHENGEN EVALUATION MECHANISM 

It is essential that all Member States comply  fully with the Schengen standards in order for 
the  EU  to  be  able  to  address  the  current  migration  crisis  and  contain  the  threat  of  terrorist 
attacks in the Schengen area. The proper functioning of the Schengen evaluation mechanism 
remains  a  priority  for  the  Commission.  Announced  and  unannounced  visits  and  their 
follow-up enable to identify Schengen implementation gaps and remedies for them quickly. 

The  new  Schengen  evaluation  mechanism  continued  to  function  effectively  during  the 
reporting  period.  The  implementation  of  the  mechanism  relies  on  the  quality  and  timely 
character  of  the  replies  to  the  Schengen  Questionnaire  by  the  evaluated  Member  States. 
The  experiences  in  this  regard  during  the  reporting  period  were  mixed:  half  of  the  Member 
States to be evaluated in 2016 did not respect the timetable for the replies (even after extended 
deadline),  and  the  quality  of  some  replies  was  relatively  poor  or  questions  were  left 
unanswered. This may indicate inherent weaknesses in (some) national Schengen governance 
systems.  

To ensure an efficient functioning of the new mechanism, a Schengen Evaluation Guide and 
the General guidelines on practical arrangements for unannounced on-site visits to the internal 
borders have been agreed. 

During  the  reporting  period,  announced  visits  were  carried  out  in  Germany  and  the 
Netherlands covering all the policy areas. The recommendations from these visits are not yet 
available  to  date.  In  the  meantime,  the  results  of  the  earlier  visits  to  Austria  and  Belgium 
have become available. 

In  the  case  of  Austria,  the  Commission  has  adopted  all  the  proposals  for  Council 
recommendations, except for data protection. Special notice was taken of the well-developed 
Austria Integrated Border Management concept and the way it is implemented, the excellent 
state of the art of the technical infrastructure of the N.SIS and SIRENE Bureau and the limited 
average  period  of  pre-removal  detention.  The  main  recommendations  focus  on  the  correct 

21  

COM(2015) 670 final. 

10 

 
 
                                                            
application  of  the  Schengen  acquis  as  well  as  enhancing  the  quality  of  its  implementation 
(e.g.,  all  entry  conditions  should  be  verified  during  the  border  checks  on  third  country 
nationals, the  search functionalities of the N.SIS are to  be further developed and the border 
police  training  related  to  vulnerable  groups  needs  strengthening).  As  far  as  return  is 
concerned, the practice of not issuing entry bans in mandatory cases foreseen by the Return 
Directive was identified. In two areas (external borders and visa) the recommendations have 
already been adopted by the Council. 

The main challenges for border management in Belgium are related to the capacity to manage 
the  situation  at  its  air  borders,  secondary  movements  inside  the  country  and  irregular 
migration  towards  the  UK  across  the  North  Sea.  Gaps  identified  concern  insufficient 
resources  and  correct  execution  of  border  checks.  Some  important  instruments  like  the 
development of the national Integrated Border Management (IBM) strategy and API system, 
are  not  yet  implemented.  Belgium  is  also  lacking  national  legislation  and  procedures  to 
process  the  alerts  within  the  second  generation  of  SIS  as  well  as  a  binding  written  security 
framework  for  the  system.  Further  serious  shortcomings  have  been  identified  on  the 
implementation of the SIS for end-users. The Commission services are currently working on 
the proposals for Council recommendations regarding the visits to Belgium. 

Under the previous Schengen evaluation mechanism, serious technical deficiencies had been 
detected with regard to the implementation of the SIS in Poland22, in particular at the external 
borders. The revisit showed that Poland has made great progress by introducing a new stable 
N.SIS,  a  new  SIRENE  application  as  well  as  a  new  application  for  border  guards.  The 
recommendations made to Poland are to ensure the 99.99% availability of the SIS, to maintain 
the non-discrepancy of data between national and central SIS, to display photographs attached 
to the alert to the end-users and to ensure the search of SIS on the police mobile devices as a 
default option. 

The results of the unannounced visit to Sweden (Arlanda airport) carried out in the previous 
reporting  period  (March  2015)  have  become  available.  The  decision  to  evaluate  the  airport 
was  made  on  the  basis  of  risk  analysis  made  by  Frontex  which  highlighted  atypically  low 
rates  of  refusals  of  entry  and  detection  of  fraudulent  documents.  During  the  visit,  some 
deficiencies  related  to  insufficient  resources  and  training  as  well  as  correct  execution  of 
border checks were identified. 

During the reporting period, unannounced visits took place in Spain, Hungary and Poland as 
far  as  the  management  of  external  borders  is  concerned.  The  findings  of  the  visits  to 
Hungarian  and  Polish  external  borders  are  finalised  at  expert  level  and  sent  to  the  Member 
States  concerned  for  comments.  Without  prejudging  the  results  of  the  evaluation,  it  can  be 
observed that in general, the border control at the sites visited was found to be carried out in 
line with the Schengen acquis with the necessary level of professionalism. The results of the 
visit to Spain are also at the stage of finalisation at the expert level. It can be noted that some 
elements  of  the  border  management  system  in  Algeciras  still  need  to  be  fully  implemented 
and all tools should be in full operational use. 

22   See section 4.1 of COM(2014) 711 final and COM(2015) 236 final. 

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An unannounced visit was carried out in November to the Greek-Turkish land border as well 
as  to  the  sea  border  (Chios  and  Samos).  Additional  efforts  are  required  with  regard  to  the 
actual return of irregular migrants and prevention of secondary movements. 

The  conclusions  of  the  two  visits  are  currently  being  finalised  at  the  expert  level.  The 
Commission will continue monitoring the situation closely, including the evolving situation at 
the  border  between  Greece  and  the  former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia.  The  potential 
for this border to become a source of tension has been intensified including by the erection of 
border  fencing  as  a  border  management  tool,  and  the  decision  by  the  former  Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia to  follow the decision of other countries and restrict passage on the 
grounds of nationality or the little engagement in bilateral border-related confidence building 
measures,  although  day-to-day  contacts  between  the  border  administrations  have  improved. 
On 3 December an agreement was reached that Frontex will assist Greece with identification 
and registration of migrants at the border between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia. 

Depending  on  the  results  of  the  aforementioned  Schengen  evaluations,  specific  measures  as 
referred in Article 19a SBC may be recommended.  

Should  an  evaluated  Member  State  be  found  to  be  seriously  neglecting  its  obligations  and 
progress in rectifying the situation is insufficient, the use of Article 26 SBC (as described in 
section 2.2 of this report) can be invoked that implies reintroducing border control at internal 
borders where the overall functioning of the Schengen area is put at risk. 

The  Schengen  evaluation  mechanism  now  also  comprises  unannounced  visits  at  internal 
borders.  The  first  such  visits  were  carried  out  at  the  Latvian  (at  its  internal  border  with 
Lithuania  and  the  port  of  Riga)  and  German/French  borders.  The  proposal  for  the  Council 
recommendation following the latter is under preparation relating to minor improvements to 
the infrastructure. There were no recommendations to be made as far as the visit to Latvia is 
concerned. The latest unannounced visit at the internal borders took place in November at the 
Swiss border with Italy. Its findings are being finalized at expert level. 

5. 

CONCLUSION 

The  Commission  has  repeatedly  underlined  that  the  Schengen  framework  cannot  be  held 
responsible  for  the  current  crisis.  On  the  contrary,  Schengen  can  be  part  of  the  solution. 
Addressing the two major challenges faced in the Schengen area — the refugee crisis and the 
terrorist threat — requires full and correct implementation of the measures already contained 
in the two sets of documents tabled by the Commission in spring: the European Agenda on 
Migration  and  the  European  Agenda  on  Security.  These  include  measures  that  are  essential 
for  ensuring  the  proper  functioning  of  the  Schengen  acquis  and  of  the  Schengen  area.  The 
Commission therefore firmly believes that it is of utmost importance to implement rapidly and 
effectively all measures included in these two Agendas. 

An essential prerequisite in addressing effectively the current crisis is strengthened protection 
of the EU's external borders. The new Schengen evaluation mechanism makes it possible to 
better identify the gaps and weaknesses for instance in the protection of the external borders 
and  to  recommend  effective  remedies.  There  are  a  number  of  other  instruments  (e.g., 
12 

 
 
'hotspots', RABITS and joint operations) available which were designed to help the Member 
States facing a significant pressure, and those Member States should not hesitate to make full 
use  of  them.  In  parallel  with  the  adoption  of  this  report  the  Commission  has  proposed  a 
targeted amendment to the Schengen Borders Code in order to introduce systematic checks on 
all travellers against relevant databases at all external borders. 

At the same time, in emergency situations where the burden on the national border guarding 
systems of the frontline Member States is such that it is impossible for them to cope with it, it 
is important that the EU can step in quickly so as to effectively manage the crisis. To address 
this need, the Commission (in parallel to the adoption of this report) has tabled a proposal to 
establish  a  European  Border  and  Coast  Guard.  The  new  European  Border  and  Coast  Guard 
Agency, which should replace and considerably strengthen the current "Frontex" Agency, as 
well  as  the  relevant  authorities  of  the  Member  States  will  work  together  to  ensure  an 
integrated management and the protection of the EU’s external borders based on the principle 
of shared responsibility. 

13