Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EU) 806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme
Date: 2015-11-24
Institutions: Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union, European Commission
Subjects: bank deposit, banking policy, banking system, co-insurance, deposit money, financial institution, financial solvency, investment company, reinsurance, single market

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   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Strasbourg, 24.11.2015  COM(2015) 586 final 2015/0270 (COD)   Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EU) 806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme  
 
2015/0270 (COD) 

Proposal for a 

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 

amending Regulation (EU) 806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance 
Scheme 

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 

This  legislative  proposal  envisages  the  establishment  of  a  European  Deposit  Insurance 
Scheme (EDIS) as the third pillar of Banking Union in three successive stages: a reinsurance 
scheme for participating national DGSs in a first period of three years, a co-insurance scheme 
for  participating  national  DGSs  in  a  second  period  of  four  years,  and  full  insurance  for 
participating national DGSs in the steady state. A national DGS can only benefit from EDIS if 
its funds are being built up in line with a precise funding path and it otherwise complies with 
essential  requirements  under  Union  law.  The  Single  Resolution  Board,  which  would  be 
expanded  to  administer  EDIS,  would  monitor  national  DGSs  and  release  funds  only  where 
clearly  defined  conditions  are  met.  The  introduction  of  EDIS  would  be  accompanied  by 
ambitious measures in parallel to reduce risks in the banking sectors of Member States. 

1. 

CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 

1.1. 

Reasons for and objectives of the proposal 

In 2012, the Commission called for a Banking Union that would place the banking sector on a 
more  sound  footing  and  restore  confidence  in  the  Euro  as  part  of  a  longer  term  vision  for 
economic  and  fiscal  integration.1  The  Banking  Union  should  be  implemented  by  shifting 
supervision  to  the  European  level,  establishing  an  integrated  framework  for  bank  crisis 
management and, equally important, a common system for deposit protection. While the first 
two  steps  have  been  achieved  by  the  establishment  of  the  Single  Supervisory  Mechanism 
(SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), a common system for deposit protection 
has not yet been established. 

The Five Presidents' Report2 and the Commission's follow-up Communication3 set out a clear 
plan  for  deepening  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  (EMU),  including  steps  to  further  limit 
risks to financial stability. Completing the Banking Union is an indispensable step towards a 
full and deep EMU. For the single currency, a unified and fully integrated financial system is 
key for effective monetary policy transmission, adequate risk diversification across Member 
States and general confidence in the euro area banking system. 

Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  ‘A  Roadmap 

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towards a Banking Union’, COM(2012) 510, 12.9.2012. 
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http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/economic-monetary-union/docs/5-presidents-report_en.pdf  
3 
Central Bank on steps towards Completing Economic and Monetary Union, COM(2015) 600 final 21.10.2015. 

Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council  and  the  European 

Five  Presidents'  Report  of  22  June  2015  on  "Completing  Europe's  Economic  and  Monetary  Union" 

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In particular, the Five Presidents’ Report proposes to establish, in the long term, a European 
Deposit  Insurance  Scheme  (EDIS),  as  the  third  pillar  of  a  fully-fledged  Banking  Union 
alongside bank supervision, which has been entrusted to the SSM, and with bank resolution, 
which has been entrusted to the SRM.  

The Five Presidents' Report signals that, as the current set-up with national Deposit Guarantee 
Schemes (DGSs) remains vulnerable to large local shocks, common deposit insurance would 
increase the resilience of the Banking Union against future crises.  

The Commission committed in its follow-up Communication of 21 October to put forward a 
legislative  proposal  before  the  end  of  2015  on  the  first  steps  towards  EDIS  with  a  view  to 
creating a more European system, disconnected from the sovereign, so that financial stability 
is enhanced, citizens can be certain that the safety of their deposits does not depend on their 
geographical location, and sound banks are not penalised by their place of establishment.  

The Commission indicated, in line with the Five Presidents' Report, that a first step would be 
taken  towards  a  more  common  system,  building  on  a  "reinsurance-based"  approach  that 
would take into account different funding levels in national schemes and moral hazard issues. 
A joint Deposit Insurance Fund would be created, managed under the auspices of the existing 
Single  Resolution  Board.  The  EDIS  would  be  mandatory  for  euro  area  Member  States  and 
open to non-euro area Member States willing to join the Banking Union. 

EDIS  would  progressively  evolve  from  a  reinsurance  scheme  into  a  fully  mutualised  co-
insurance  scheme  over  a  number  of  years.  In  the  context  of  efforts  to  deepen  the  EMU, 
together with the work on the establishment of bridge-financing arrangements for the Single 
Resolution Fund (SRF) and on developing a common fiscal backstop, this step is necessary to 
reduce the bank/sovereign links in individual Member States by means of steps towards risk 
sharing  among  all  the  Member  States  in  the  Banking  Union,  and  thereby  to  reinforce  the 
Banking Union in achieving its key objective. However, such risk sharing implied by steps to 
reinforce  Banking  Union  must  proceed  in  parallel  with  risk  reducing  measures  designed  to 
break the bank-sovereign link more directly.  

1.2. 

Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area 

This proposed Regulation is consistent with existing policy provisions. 

Following the establishment of the SSM by Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/20134 and of 
the SRM by Regulation (EU) No 806/20145, EDIS addresses the misalignment between the 
Union  supervision  and  resolution  of  banks  in  the  participating  Member  States,  on  the  one 
hand, and the effectiveness and credibility of national DGSs in case of failure of those same 

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Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European 
Central  Bank  concerning  policies  relating  to  the  prudential  supervision  of  credit  institutions  OJ  L  287, 
29.10.2013, p. 63–89. 
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Regulation  (EU)  No  806/2014  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  15  July  2014 
establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment 
firms  in  the  framework  of  a  Single  Resolution Mechanism  and  a  Single  Resolution  Fund  and  amending 
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 OJ L 225, 30.7.2014, p. 1–90. 

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banks  pursuant  to  the  Directive  2014/59/EU  on  Deposit  Guarantee  Schemes6  (DGS 
Directive), on the other. 

This proposed Regulation builds on the existing framework of national DGSs as governed by 
the  DGS  Directive.  The  uniform  application  of  the  deposit  guarantee  framework  in  the 
Member  States  participating  in  EDIS  would  be  enhanced  as  a  result  of  this  proposed 
Regulation through the attribution to a Single Resolution and Deposit Insurance Board ("the 
Board")  of  decision-making,  monitoring  and  enforcement  powers  relating  to  the  deposit 
guarantee framework.  

1.3. 

Consistency with other Union policies 

EDIS would contribute to reducing the link between the perceived fiscal position of individual 
Member States and the funding costs of banks operating in those Member States and thereby 
help breaking the link between sovereigns and banks. This would increase the resilience of the 
banking  sector  against  future  crises  and  contribute  to  the  overall  objective  of  financial 
stability which underpins the economic and monetary policy of the Union. Risks would be 
spread more widely, enhancing financial stability not only in the Member State concerned but 
also  in  other  participating  and  non-participating  Member  States,  by  limiting  potential 
contagion effects. Moreover, it will help restore the level playing field in the internal market 
by limiting the competitive disadvantage that sound banks are suffering because of their place 
of establishment. In an environment of financial stability, lending from financial institutions 
to  the  wider  economy  is  incentivised  by  reduced  funding  costs  of  funding  for  financial 
institutions, thereby boosting growth and employment and enhancing the competitiveness of 
the Union's economy. 

2. 

LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY 

2.1. 

Legal basis 

The legal basis for the proposed Regulation is Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU), which allows the adoption of measures for the approximation of 
national provisions aiming at the establishment and functioning of the internal market. 

The  proposed  Regulation  aims  to  preserve  the  integrity  and  enhance  the  functioning  of  the 
internal  market.  Uniform  application  of  a  single  set  of  rules  for  deposit  protection,  together 
with access to a European Deposit Insurance Fund ("the Deposit Insurance Fund") managed 
by  a  central  authority  would  contribute  to  the  orderly  functioning  of  the  Union  financial 
markets and to financial stability in the Union. It would remove obstacles to the exercise of 
fundamental freedoms avoiding significant distortion of competition, at least in those Member 
States which share the supervision and resolution of credit institutions and the protection of 
depositors at the European level. 

Article 114 of the TFEU is, therefore, the appropriate legal base. 

2.2. 

Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence)  

Under  the  principle  of  subsidiarity  set  out  in  Article  5(3)  of  the  Treaty  on  European  Union 
(TEU), in areas which do not fall within its exclusive responsibility, the Union should act only 
if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason 
of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level. 

Directive  2014/49/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  16 April  2014  on  deposit 

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guarantee schemes, OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 149–178. 

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In the current situation, where DGS remain purely national, they are vulnerable to large local 
shocks  maintaining  a  strong  interaction  between  banks  and  their  national  sovereign.  This 
situation undermines the homogeneity of protection for deposits and can contribute to a lack 
of confidence among depositors. 

Furthermore, substantial differences in the protection of depositors taken at national level, and 
subject  to  local  specificities  and  funding  constraints,  may  undermine  the  integrity  of  the 
internal market. 

Only action at European level can ensure appropriate deposit insurance for depositors across 
the internal market and weaken the link between national DGSs and the financial position of 
the respective sovereign. 

The SSM ensures a level playing field in the supervision of banks and diminishes the risk of 
forbearance The SRM ensures that, when a bank failure occurs, restructuring can be carried 
out at the least cost, taxpayers are adequatley protected, and creditors and credit institutions 
receive fair and equal treatment across the internal market without being penalised because of 
their place of establishment. In the same vein, it is appropriate that the Union takes legislative 
action to establish the arrangements necessary to protect deposits of credit institutions which 
would fall under the scope of the Banking Union. 

Furthermore, EDIS would bring significant economies of scale and would avoid the negative 
externalities that may derive from purely national decisions and funds. 

2.3. 

Proportionality 

The  proposal  is  in  line  with  the  principle  of  proportionality.  Under  the  principle  of 
proportionality  as  established  by  Article  5(4)  of  the  TEU,  the  content  and  form  of  Union 
action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.  

In  the  Banking  Union,  bank  supervision  and  resolution  are  exercised  at  the  same  level  of 
authority.  Tensions  may  arise  if  a  European  resolution  authority  were  to  decide  on  the 
liquidation or resolution of a bank without being able to ensure that deposits are protected in 
the process, causing financial stability risks. Indeed, the recent crisis highlighted the need for 
swift  and  decisive  action  backed  by  European  level  funding  arrangements.  EDIS  would 
ensure  that  the  same  rules  are  applied  in  the  same  manner  to  protect  deposits  in  any 
participating Member State. Adequate backup funding would mitigate problems in individual 
banks from translating into a loss of confidence in the entire banking system of the Member 
State or of otherMember State perceived by markets to be exposed to similar risks. 

The  added  legal  certainty,  aligned  incentives  in  the  Banking  Union  context,  and  economic 
benefits  of  central  and  uniform  protection  of  depositors  make  the  proposed  Regulation 
compliant with the principle of proportionality. 

2.4. 

Choice of the instruments 

A progressively centralised application of the deposit guarantee rules laid down in the DGS 
Directive, by a single Union authority in the participating Member States, can be ensured only 
where the rules governing the establishment and functioning of EDIS are directly applicable 
in the Member States to avoid divergent interpretations across Member States. This and the 
fact that a Deposit Insurance Fund is set up at the level of the Banking Union, to be managed 
by  a  Board  representing  all  members  of  the  Banking  Union,  require  a  Regulation  as  the 
appropriate legal instrument.  

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3. 

RESULTS 
CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS 

EX-POST 

EVALUATIONS, 

OF 

STAKEHOLDER 

3.1.  What is the problem and why is it a problem? 

In the Banking Union, deposit insurance remains purely national, which leaves national DGSs 
vulnerable to large local shocks and Member States’ budgets continue to be exposed to risks 
in their banking sectors. This prevents the realization of the full benefits of the internal market 
and  of  the  Banking  Union  and  potentially  negatively  affects  depositor  confidence  and  the 
rights of establishment of credit institutions and depositors.  

DGSs  are  in  place  in  all  Member  States,  as  required  by  the  DGS  Directive.  Although  they 
already  share  some  common  aspects  regarding  their  main  features  and  their  functioning, 
important  aspects  are  still  left  at  the  discretion  of  Member  States.  Member  States  can  also 
authorise,  upon  approval  by  the  European  Commission,  reduced  target  levels  for  available 
financial means.  

The differences in funding levels and size of the existing 38 DGSs in the EU may negatively 
affect depositors’ confidence and could impair the functioning of the internal market.  

3.2.  Why should the EU act? 

EDIS  would  complement  the  Banking  Union  alongside  bank  supervision  and  resolution.  It 
would  both  reduce  the  vulnerability  of  bank  depositors  to  large  local  shocks  and  further 
reduce the link between banks and their home sovereign. Furthermore, in a system where the 
responsibilities for bank supervision and resolution are shared, the circumstances under which 
a national DGS may be used are already not any longer under national control. Both Directive 
2014/59/EU (the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive – BRRD) and Regulation (EU) No 
806/2014 (the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation – SRMR) contain provisions on the 
possible  use  of  DGS  funds  in  resolution.  Hence,  establishing  a  common  system  also  for 
deposit  insurance  is  a  logical  next  step  in  completing  the  Banking  Union,  and  better  aligns 
liability and control.  

3.3.  What can be achieved? 

A quantitative analysis has considered the effectiveness of a fully mutualised EDIS in coping 
with  potential  pay-outs.  The  analysis  indicates  that  the  number  and size  of  banks  for  which 
the  Deposit  Insurance  Fund  could  handle  pay-outs  increases  significantly  for  all  Member 
States under EDIS compared to national DGSs.  

Furthermore,  the  analysis  indicates  that  the  expected  shortfall  of  a  payout,  expressed  as 
percentage of the target level, would be lower for EDIS than for any of the national DGSs.  

The  above  assessments  have  been  made  under  the  assumption  that  EDIS  would  not  require 
additional contributions from banks, but that banks’ contributions envisaged for the building 
up  of  national  funds  would  alternatively  be  used  to  build  up  EDIS.  The  results  show  that 
having  the  same  amount  of  funds,  but  made  available  for  a  single  European  DGS,  could 
represent a more efficient protection and use of funds than maintaining purely national DGSs.  

3.4.  What are the various options to achieve the objectives? 

3.4.1.  Current funding levels in the EDIS design  

The  assessment  shows  that  EDIS  would  start  on  the  basis  of  very  heterogeneous  funding 
levels of national DGSs. This implies that EDIS needs to provide liquidity support in its initial 
phase, as otherwise local DGS would still depend almost exclusively on national alternative 
funding  means.  Second,  EDIS  should  be  designed  in  a  way  that  avoids  disproportionate 

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advantages  for  schemes  which  have  not  yet  started  collecting  ex-ante  funds  and  avoids 
disincentives to do so in the future.  

3.4.2. 

Scope of EDIS 

It is expected that differences in funding levels would no longer be an issue when DGSs have 
followed their obligations in the DGS Directive to build-up ex-ante funds. The analysis shows 
that  a  common  system  would  operate  more  efficiently,  i.e.  providing  a  higher  level  of 
protection without the need to increase overall contributions. It would also be better placed to 
reduce Member States’ exposure to their domestic banking system.   

3.4.3.  Contributions 

The analysis shows that (i) the risk-weighting of contributions changes the distribution of the 
financial burden among the banks of a given banking sector, (ii) assessing the risk of a given 
bank  relative  to  the  banks  of  the  Banking  Union  rather  than  to  the  banks  of  the  national  or 
DGS’s banking sector is likely to change the level of contribution to be paid by that individual 
bank. However, no group of banks was identified as being advantaged or disadvantaged.  

The  likelihood  that  a  DGS  may  have  to  mobilise  funds  to  compensate  depositors  increases 
with  the  risk  of  that  bank.  Hence  the  proposal  envisages  to  risk-adjust  contributions,  i.e. 
continues the principle already established by the DGS Directive. 

Second, the analysis shows that the comparison group has an impact on the contributions paid 
by  individual  institutions.  Therefore,  in  the  reinsurance  phase  of  EDIS,  where  risks  largely 
remain  at  the  national  level,  an  individual  bank’s  risk  profile  is  determined  relative  to  the 
remainder of its national banking system. Once EDIS becomes a system with joint liability at 
Banking Union level, an individual bank’s risk profile is determined relative to all banks in 
the Banking Union. This would ensure that EDIS remains cost-neutral overall for banks and 
national  DGSs,  and  avoid  complications  in  determining  banks’  risk  profiles  in  the  build-up 
phase of the Deposit Insurance Fund. 

3.5. 

Fundamental rights 

The proposed Regulation has no consequences for the protection of fundamental rights further 
than those of the Regulation and Directive that it modifies and which are respectively catered 
for  in  the  explanatory  memoranda  of  Regulation  (EU)  No  806/2014,  establishing  a  Single 
Resolution  

4. 

BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS 

Concerning its EDIS-related functions, the Board would be fully financed  by administrative 
contributions from credit institutions affiliated to participating DGSs. In turn, this means that 
the  EDIS-related  functions  will  not  necessitate  a  contribution  from  the  EU  budget.  The 
additional  human  resources  of  the  Board  amounting  to  22  full-time  equivalent  units  in  the 
form of establishment plan posts, contract agents and Seconded National Experts in year nine, 
after  the  phase  of  full  insurance  has  been  reached,  mirror  the  tasks  that  the  proposed 
Regulation entrusts to it. In the same way as for the creation of the Single Resolution Board, 
the posts required for the extension of the tasks of this new body fall outside the scope of the 
5 % staff reduction target set out in the communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council COM(2013) 519 of 10.7.2013. 

Concerning its EDIS-related functions, the Board would be fully financed by administrative 
contributions  from  credit  institutions  affiliated  to  participating  DGSs.  The  additional 
resources of the Board mirror the tasks that the proposed Regulation entrusts to it.  

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5. 

DETAILED EXPLANATION OF THE PROPOSAL 

5.1. 

A European Deposit Insurance Scheme 

This  proposal  envisages  the  establishment  of  EDIS  through  an  amendment  of  Regulation 
(EU) No 806/2014 (SRM Regulation). The rules on the functioning of the SRM would not be 
modified by this amendment. 

5.1.1.  Gradual evolution of EDIS 

The proposed amendment to the SRM Regulation establishes EDIS in three successive stages 
(Article  2(2)):  a  reinsurance  scheme,  a  co-insurance  scheme  and  a  full  insurance  scheme. 
EDIS  would  be  administered  by  the  Board  in  all  stages  jointly  with  participating  DGSs  or, 
where  a  DGS  does  not  administer  itself,  by  the  national  designated  authority  responsible  to 
administer  the  respective  participating  DGS  (Article  2(2)  subparagraph  2).  The  Deposit 
Insurance Fund is part of EDIS. It would be filled by contributions owed and paid by banks 
directly to the Board and calculated and invoiced by participating DGSs. 

5.1.2. 

Scope of EDIS 

EDIS applies to all DGSs that are officially recognised in a participating Member State and to 
all  credit  institutions  affiliated  to  such  schemes.  The  participating  Member  States  are  those 
whose  currency  is  the  euro  and  those  other  Member  States  that  have  established  a  close 
cooperation with the European Central Bank to participate in the SSM (Article 4(1)). 

As the cover provided by EDIS is limited to the mandatory functions DGSs have under the 
Directive,  i.e.  payouts  to  depositors  and  contributions  to  resolution,  EDIS  applies  to  all 
schemes  that  may,  in  principle,  encounter  payout  events  or  be  requested  to  contribute  to  a 
resolution  procedure.  This  includes  statutory  DGSs,  institutional  protection  schemes  (IPSs) 
and  contractual  schemes  that  have  been  officially  recognised  by  a  Member  State  as  DGSs 
(Article 1(2) of the DGS Directive). Their recognition as DGSs is inseparably linked to their 
obligations  to  compensate  depositors  in  case  deposits  are  unavailable  and  to  contribute  to 
resolution procedures.  

The  rights  and  obligations  that  participating  DGS  have  within  EDIS  are  those  of  the 
designated  authority  where  the  DGS  is  not  administered  by  a  private  entity  but  by  the 
designated authority itself (Article 2(2) subparagraph 2). This takes account of the discretion 
that  Member  States  have  with  regard  to  the  introduction,  recognition  and  administration  of 
DGSs at national level (see Article 2(18) of the Directive). 

If  the  close  cooperation  of  a  non-Euro  Member  State  is  suspended  or  terminated,  the 
participating  DGSs  officially  recognised  in  this  Member  State  and  the  credit  institutions 
affiliated to these DGSs cease to be covered by the SRM Regulation with regard to both the 
SRM and to EDIS (Article 4). In case of termination only, each of these DGSs is also entitled 
to a share of the available financial means that the Deposit Insurance Fund disposes of at the 
time of termination. This  entitlement serves to furnish  the respective DGS with  the funds it 
needs to meet its funding obligations under the Directive. The share that the respective DGS 
may claim is subject to a calculation method. With a view to the lower threshold for sufficient 
funding established by Article 11(5)(a) of the DGS Directive, a DGS cannot claim more from 
the Deposit Insurance Fund than is necessary for its available financial means to reach two-
thirds of its target level. The Board would decide, in agreement with that Member State, on 
the  modalities  and  conditions  for  the  transfer  of  funds  to  the  respective  DGS  within  three 
months. 

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5.1.3.  General principles governing EDIS 

Article 6 sets out general principles that apply both to the SRM and EDIS. These principles 
become relevant where the Board or the other public authorities and bodies have discretion in 
taking a decision or other action.  

Neither the Board nor a participating DGS may discriminate against entities (including DGSs 
and their member banks), deposit holders, investors or other creditors established in the Union 
on grounds of their nationality or place of business (Article 6(1)). This rule is a fundamental 
principle of Union law and of particular  importance  in  financial markets where  transactions 
between parties of different nationalities and with different places of business are widespread. 

The obligation of the Board and participating DGS must undertake every action, proposal or 
policy  with  full  regard  and  duty  of  care  for  the  unity  and  integrity  of  the  internal  market 
(Article 6(2)). Removing financial fragmentation is a key driver for the Banking Union and 
authorities  administering  EDIS  need  to  thoroughly  assess  the  impact  of  any  discretionary 
action or decision they consider on light of the functioning of the internal market. 

While  paragraphs  3  to  5  of  Article  6  on  the  treatment  of  groups  are  not  applicable  in  the 
context  of  EDIS,  Article  6(6)  prevents  the  Board  from  taking  decisions  within  EDIS  that 
require  Member  States  to  provide  extraordinary  public  financial  support  or  that  impinge  on 
their budgetary sovereignty and fiscal responsibilities. 

In  the  context  of  EDIS,  the  Board  may  adopt  decisions  addressed  to  participating  DGSs 
(Article  74f).  Participating  DGSs  must  comply,  but  Article  6(7)  enables  them  to  specify 
further  the  measures  to  be  taken,  as  long  as  these  measures  are  in  compliance  with  the 
decision of the Board in question. 

5.2. 

The different stages of EDIS 

In  all  three  stages,  reinsurance,  co-insurance  and  full  insurance,  EDIS  would  both  provide 
funding, and cover losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes.  

The funding provided  by EDIS addresses the initial liquidity need  of a  DGS to  compensate 
depositors within the payout deadline set by the Directive (normally seven working days), but 
also to satisfy the request for contribution to a resolution procedure in time. The funding must 
be reimbursed by the participating DGS to the Board. 

EDIS, would, in all stages, also cover losses that the participating DGS ultimately incurs by 
compensating depositors or contributing to resolution. A participating DGS's ultimate loss is 
normally  smaller  than  its  compensation  payments  to  depositors  or  its  contribution  to 
resolution.  After  a  payout  event  the  DGS  may  collect  on  the  claims  for  repayment  of 
(covered)  deposits that depositors had against the failed bank and that are transferred to the 
participating  DGS  to  the  extent  that  it  compensated  these  depositors  (Article  9(2),  first 
sentence, of the DGS Directive). Although, if a bank becomes insolvent and therefore these 
claims  are  not  satisfied  in  full,  any  proceeds  from  the  insolvency  estate  reduce  the  DGS’s 
ultimate loss. 

If  a  DGS  has  contributed  to  resolution  its  loss  can  be  lower  than  the  amount  of  that 
contribution, in particular if the amount that the DGS owes as a contribution is reduced on the 
basis of a subsequent valuation (Article 109(1) subparagraph 4 in conjunction with Article 75 
of the BRRD). 

EDIS does not cover losses through additional payments to the participating DGS. Rather, the 
amount of initial funding that the participating DGS has to repay is reduced by the share of 
the loss covered by EDIS. 

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The level of funding provided and the share of loss covered by EDIS increase in each stage.  

5.2.1.  Reinsurance 

In the reinsurance phase, which is proposed to last for three years, EDIS may provide limited 
funding, and cover a limited share of the loss of a participating DGS that encounters a payout 
event or has been requested to contribute to resolution (Article 41a).  

In the initial stage of reinsurance, coverage is limited to resolution proceedings conducted by 
the Board (Articles  41a(2) and 79). Purely national resolution proceedings are only covered 
by co-insurance and full insurance. 

5.2.1.1.  Provision of funding in the reinsurance stage 

Funding  in  the  reinsurance  stage  would  be  provided  if  there  is  a  liquidity  shortfall  of  the 
participating  DGS  (Article  41a(2)).  The  process  to  establish  a  liquidity  shortfall  differs 
depending  on  whether  (a)  the  participating  DGS  encounters  a  payout  event  or  (b)  has  to 
contribute to resolution. 

(a) 

(b) 

In a payout event a participating DGS (Article 41b(1)) has a liquidity shortfall if the 
amount  of  covered  deposits  in  the  failing  bank  is  larger  than  the  total  of  (a)  the 
amount of available financial means that the participating DGS should hypothetically 
have,  given  the  funding  path  established  by  Article  41j,  and  (b)  the  amount  of 
extraordinary  (ex-post)  contributions  the  participating  DGS  can  raise  within  three 
days from the payout event. 

The amount of covered deposits used to calculate the liquidity shortfall only consists 
of  eligible  deposits  up  to  the  standard  coverage  level  of  100,000  euro  or  its 
equivalent in national currency (Article 6(1) of the DGS Directive). Temporary high 
balances as defined in Article 6(2) of the DGS Directive or  any deductions that the 
DGS  may  make  in  accordance  with  Articles  7  or  8  of  the  DGS  Directive  before 
compensating depositors are normally not yet known at the time of the payout event 
and are therefore disregarded. The use of the hypothetical level of available financial 
means  rather  than  the  actual  level  serves  to  weaken  potential  incentive  for  a 
participating DGS to fall short of its obligation to raise ex-ante contributions in line 
with  a  precise  funding  path.  Finally,  extraordinary  (ex-post)  contributions  (Article 
10(8) of the Directive), to the extent they can be raised within a very short period, are 
an  additional  source  of  liquidity  that  could  lower  the  liquidity  shortfall  of  a 
participating DGS. The three-day period strikes an appropriate balance between the 
objective to exhaust liquidity resources in the DGS first and the need to compensate 
depositors within seven working days of the payout event. 

In  a  resolution  case  (Article  41b(2))  the  liquidity  shortfall  is  the  amount  that  the 
participating  DGS  has  to  contribute  to  resolution,  less  the  amount  of  available 
financial means that the participating DGS should hypothetically have in place given 
the  funding  path  established  by  Article  41j.  The  hypothetical  level  of  available 
financial means is the only liquidity resource that the participating DGS needs to tap 
to  reduce  its  liquidity  shortfall.  In  a  resolution  case  there  is  no  need  for  the 
participating DGS to raise short-term ex-post contributions since Article 10(8) of the 
DGS Directive is limited to payout events. 

If  the  participating  DGS  has  a  liquidity  shortfall,  it  may  request  funding  from  the 
Deposit  Insurance  Fund  of  up  to  20%  of  that  shortfall.  The  remaining  80%  of  the 
liquidity  shortfall  need  to  be  covered  by  other  funding  sources.  By  applying  the 
hypothetical  level  of  available  financial  means  to  calculate  the  liquidity  shortfall, 
EDIS  allows  those  participating  DGSs  who,  at  the  time  of  the  payout  event,  have 

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more available financial means than required to obtain funding from EDIS for their 
(technical) liquidity shortfall and to use their additional funds to cover (part of) the 
remaining 80% of their liquidity shortfall. The funding provided by EDIS is capped.  

5.2.1.2.  Loss cover in the reinsurance stage 

In its reinsurance stage, in addition to providing funding for a liquidity shortfall, EDIS covers 
in a second step also 20% of the participating DGS’s excess loss. The concept of excess loss 
differs  depending  on  whether  the  participating  DGS  encountered  a  payout  event  or  was 
requested to contribute to resolution. 

In  a  payout  event  (Article  41c(1))  the  participating  DGS  incurs  an  excess  loss  if  the  total 
amount  that  it  repaid  to  depositors  (Article  8  of  the  Directive)  exceeds  the  sum  of  (a)  the 
amount it collected in insolvency proceedings on the deposit claims that it obtained (Article 
9(2),  first  sentence,  of  the  DGS  Directive)  by  compensating  depositors,  (b)  the  amount  of 
available  financial  means  that  the  participating  DGS  should  hypothetically  have  in  place 
given the  funding path established by Article 41j,  and (c) the amount  of extraordinary (ex-
post) contributions the participating DGS can raise within one year from the payout event. 

While  the  liquidity  shortfall  is  calculated  on  the  basis  of  the  amount  of  covered  deposits 
(eligible deposits up to 100,000 euro), the calculation of the excess loss, that is done later in 
the  reinsurance  procedure,  can  be  based  on  the  actual  amounts  repaid  to  depositors.  This 
amount is reduced by the proceeds from the insolvency estate that the participating DGS has 
obtained.  Moreover,  the  hypothetical  amount  of  available  financial  means,  which  the 
participating DGS should have had in place at the time of the payout event, is also deducted. 
Finally, the participating DGS is assumed to have been able to collect the amount of ex-post 
contributions that it is allowed by the DGS Directive to raise within one year from the payout 
event.  This  is  0.5%  of  the  total  covered  deposits  of  its  member  banks  (Article  10(8)  of  the 
DGS Directive with the ex-post contributions that were raised within a three-day period after 
the payout event. The resulting amount is the excess loss of the participating DGS. 

In a resolution case (Article 41c(2)), the excess loss is the amount that the participating DGS 
has to contribute to resolution less the sum of: 

(a) 

the amount it may have been reimbursed after a subsequent valuation found out 
that  its  contribution  should  have  been  lower  than  initially  requested  by  the 
resolution authority7, and  

(b) 

the amount of available financial means that the participating DGS should have 
in place given the funding path established by Article 41j.  

Here  again,  there  is  no  need  for  the  participating  DGS  to  raise  ex-post  contributions  since 
Article 10(8) of the Directive is limited to pay-out events. 

The loss cover of 20% of the excess loss is applied by reducing the amount of funding that the 
participating DGS’s is obliged to repay to EDIS by the amount of loss cover. The loss cover 
by EDIS is also capped.  

5.2.2.  Co-insurance 

After the initial three-year reinsurance phase, participating DGSs are co-insured by EDIS for 
a period of four years. Participating DGSs may request both funding and loss cover from the 
Deposit  Insurance  Fund  in  case  they  encounter  a  payout  event  or  have  been  requested  to 

7 

Payment of the difference amount under Article 75 of Directive 2014/59/EU: it is assumed that this rule 
applies by analogy also in SRM resolution cases under Article 79. 

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contribute to resolution (Article 41d). EDIS now also provides funding for, and covers losses 
arising from, contributions to national resolution proceedings. 

The difference with the reinsurance phase is that funding is provided and loss is covered as 
from  the  “first  euro”  and  the  share  borne  by  EDIS  would  gradually  increase  over  the  co-
insurance period. 

EDIS provides funding for a percentage of the participating DGSs liquidity need arising from 
a payout event or a request to contribute to resolution. It also covers the same percentage of 
the loss the participating DGS ultimately incurs from these events. The share would be 20% 
in  the  first  year  of  the  co-insurance  phase  and  increases  each  subsequent  year  by  20 
percentage points, reaching 80% in the last year of co-insurance. 

In case of a payout event the liquidity need is equal to the total amount of covered deposits of 
the  failing  bank,  i.e.  eligible  deposits  up  to  100,000  euro  (Article  41f(1)).  The  loss  is 
determined by subtracting the participating DGSs proceeds from the insolvency estate (Article 
41g(1)). 

In a resolution case the liquidity need is equal to the amount of contribution requested by the 
Board  and  the  national  resolution  authority,  respectively  (Article  41f(2)).  The  loss  is 
determined  by  subtracting  the  difference  the  participating  DGS  may  have  been  paid  after  a 
subsequent valuation determined that the initial contribution should have been lower (Article 
41g(2)). 

There would be no cap on the provision of funding or the loss cover.  

5.2.3.  Full insurance 

After the four-year co-insurance phase, participating DGSs would be fully insured by EDIS. 
Full insurance provides full funding of the liquidity need and covers all losses arising from a 
payout event or a request to contribute to resolution. The mechanism is the same as in the co-
insurance phase, but with EDIS covering a share of 100%. 

5.2.4. 

Safeguards for coverage by EDIS 

The proposal includes safeguards against incorrect or unwarranted access to EDIS by national 
DGS.  They  will  be  excluded  if  they  have  failed  to  comply  with  obligations  under  the 
Regulation  or  the  national  law  implementing  key  provisions  of  the  Directive,  or  if  the 
respective Member State has failed to correctly implement these Articles (Article 41i). They 
will  only  be  covered  by  EDIS  if  their  available  financial  means  amount  to  at  least  the 
harmonised  funding  path  set  out  in  the  Regulation  (Article  41j).  This  serves  to  ensure  that 
only participating DGSs that have observed their own obligations which limit the risk at the 
level  of  EDIS  may  benefit  from  its  protection.  The  Board  can  decide  to  disqualify  a 
participating DGS from EDIS coverage by specific voting requirements. 

5.3. 

State aid assessment 

While  a  DGS’s  compensation  payments  to  depositors  are  not  state  aid,  its  contribution  to 
resolution,  although  intended  to  ensure  that  depositors  continue  to  have  access  to  deposits, 
results  in  a  benefit  for  the  institution  under  resolution.  The  contribution  may  therefore  be 
considered state aid and may require notification and approval from the Commission. Where 
the contribution is made from funds at the European level (SRF and Deposit Insurance Fund), 
the state aid procedure applies by analogy (Article 19).  

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5.4. 

Administration of EDIS 

EDIS would be administered by the Board together with participating DGS (or the designated 
authority  administering  a  participating  DGS).  The  procedure  can  be  roughly  divided  into  a 
phase leading to the provision of funding and a phase after the provision of funding. 

5.4.1.  Procedure leading to funding 

Participating DGSs are required to alert the Board without delay once they become aware of 
circumstances  that  are  likely  to  result  in  a  payout  event  or  a  request  from  the  resolution 
authority  to  contribute  to  resolution  (Article  41i).  They  must  provide  the  Board  with  an 
estimate of the expected liquidity shortfall (reinsurance phase) or liquidity need (co-insurance 
and full insurance phase). This allows the Board to prepare itself for the immediate provision 
of funding in case of a payout event or a request to contribute to resolution. 

Participating  DGSs  must  notify  a  payout  event  or  a  request  to  contribute  to  resolution 
immediately  to  the  Board  (Art  41l).  Even  if  the  Board  itself  requested  a  contribution  to 
resolution (Article 79), such notification is still formally necessary since the composition of 
the  Board  in  EDIS  is  different  from  its  composition  in  the  SRM  (see  below)  and  the 
participating DGS is not required to request funding or loss cover from EDIS. Along with the 
notification, the participating DGS must provide information to the Board to assess whether 
the relevant conditions are met (Article 41k): 

– 

– 

– 

– 

The amount of covered deposits to calculate the liquidity shortfall or liquidity need.  

The available financial means at the time of the payout event or use in resolution to 
determine  which  level  of  available  financial  means  the  participating  DGS  should 
have  at  the  time  of  the  payout  event  of  use  in  resolution,  given  the  funding  path 
established by Article 41j. 

The estimate of the extraordinary ex-post contributions it can raise within three days 
from the payout event of use in resolution. 

Any  other  material  impediment  of  the  participating  DGS  to  meet  its  liabilities 
towards depositors or the resolution authority and possible remedies. 

The Board  would determine  within 24 hours whether  the conditions for EDIS, as  set out  in 
Article 41a (reinsurance), Article 41d (co-insurance) or Article 41h (full insurance), are met 
(Art 41l(1). It shall further determine, normally within the same period of time, the amount of 
funding that it would provide to the participating DGS (Art 41l(2) subparagraph 2). 

Where one or more participating DGSs encounter several payout events or uses in resolution 
(events) simultaneously, the available financial means of the Deposit Insurance Fund may not 
suffice. In this case the funding that each participating DGS may obtain for each event would 
be limited by a share of the Deposit Insurance Fund’s available financial means, according to 
a pro-rata calculation (Article 41l(3). 

The  Board  must  immediately  inform  participating  DGSs  about  whether  the  conditions  for 
coverage by EDIS are met, and the amount  of  funding it would  provide to the participating 
DGS. Participating DGSs may, within 24 hours, request a review of the Board’s decision(s) 
on which the Board shall decide within another 24 hours (Article 41m). 

Funding would be provided immediately after the Board has determined the amount and will 
be paid in the form of a cash contribution to the participating DGS (Article 41n). Where the 
Board increases the amount of funding after having reviewed its initial decision upon request 
of the participating DGS, that amount shall be due once the Board has adopted its decision on 
the request for review. 

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5.4.2.  Procedure after funding 

After the provision of funding, the Board must determine the excess loss (reinsurance) or loss 
(co-insurance,  full  insurance)  of  the  participating  DGS,  monitor  the  use  of  the  provided 
funding  for  payouts  to  depositors  or  for  the  contribution  to  resolution,  and  monitor  the 
participating DGS’s efforts to collect on deposit claims from the insolvency estate. 

After a payout event, the amount of (excess) loss becomes clear over time, as the participating 
DGS  would  be  raising  ex-post  contributions  and  obtaining  proceeds  from  the  insolvency 
estate  from  time  to  time.  In  case  of  a  contribution  to  resolution,  where  no  ex-post 
contributions may be raised by the participating DGS and it has no claims for recourse against 
third  parties,  the  (excess)  loss  can  be  determined  already  after  the  participating  DGS  has 
received  the  payment  of  any  difference  amount  it  may  be  entitled  to  after  a  subsequent 
valuation  established  that  the initial  contribution  should  have  been  lower.  Therefore,  after  a 
payout event only, the Board must continuously assess the development of the (excess) loss 
before determining the final (excess) loss. In parallel, the participating DGS shall repay to the 
Board  the  funding  it  has  obtained  in  portions  corresponding  to  the  ex-post  contributions  or 
proceeds  from  the  insolvency  estate  as  they  become  available  to  the  participating  DGS 
(Article 41o). 

The  difference  between  the  initial  funding  the  participating  DGS  obtains  from  the  Deposit 
Insurance Fund and the amount of funding it ultimately has to repay to the Board results in the 
(excess) loss covered by EDIS. 

After a payout event, the Board would also rigorously monitor the payout procedure, and in 
particular  the  use  of  the  funding  it  provided  to  the  participating  DGS  for  that  purpose,  and 
how  the  participating  DGS  has  pursued  its  deposit  claims  in  the  insolvency  procedure.  The 
participating  DGS  is  required  to  provide,  at  regular  intervals  established  by  the  Board, 
accurate, reliable and complete information, in particular on the payout procedure and on the 
exercise  of  its  subrogated  rights  in  insolvency  proceedings.  The  participating  DGS  must 
endeavour  to  maximise  its  proceeds  from  the  insolvency  estate.  Negligent  behaviour  by  the 
participating DGS may result in claims for damages by the Board, but the Board may, after 
hearing  the  participating  DGS,  also  decide  to  exercise  itself  all  rights  arising  from  deposit 
claims  into  which  the  participating  DGS  has  subrogated.  The  Board  may  then  collect  the 
proceeds  directly  for  its  own  account  to  satisfy  its  claim  for  the  repayment  of  the  funding 
provided to the participating DGS (Article 41q) 

5.5. 

Financial provisions for EDIS 

The functioning of EDIS requires financial resources to cover administrative expenditures and 
provide the necessary coverage (funding and loss cover) for participating DGSs. 

5.5.1.  General budgetary provisions and administrative contributions  

The budget currently contains two parts: Part I for the administration of the Board and Part II 
for the SRF. 

Administrative  expenditures  of  EDIS  would  be  covered  by  existing  administrative 
contributions that are raised into Part I of the Board’s budget, taking account of the additional 
administrative  burden  caused  by  EDIS  and  the  fact  that  the  scope  ratione  personae  of  the 
SRM and of EDIS are not identical (Article 65(5)). 

The Deposit Insurance Fund would be contained in a new Part III of the Board’s budget. Its 
structure of revenues and expenditures (Article 60a) corresponds to that of the Part II for the 
SRF (Article 60) and is further explained in section 5.5.2 below. 

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The general budgetary provisions (Articles 57, 58, 61 to 64, and 66) also apply to Part III of 
the budget. 

The Board would be responsible to administer both the SRF and the Deposit Insurance Fund 
and  invest  their  funds  according  to  the  rules  of  the  SRM  Regulation  and  delegated  acts 
adopted by the Commission (Article 75). 

5.5.2.  Ex-ante contributions to the Deposit Insurance Fund  

The Deposit Insurance Fund Deposit Insurance Fund would be filled by ex-ante contributions 
that  are  owed  and  paid  by  banks  directly  to  the  Board  and  are  calculated  and  invoiced  by 
participating DGSs on behalf of the Board (Article 74a(1) . These ex-ante contributions are an 
obligation separate from the obligation to  pay ex-ante contributions to participating DGS in 
accordance  with  Article  10(1), subparagraph  2, of  the  DGS  Directive.  However,  in order  to 
achieve  cost-neutrality  for  the  banking  sector,  the  ex-ante  contributions  paid  to  the  Deposit 
Insurance Fund may be compensated at the level of the participating DGS (see below, section 
5.5.2.2).8 

5.5.2.1.  Target levels of the Deposit Insurance Fund  

The  available  financial  means  of  the  Deposit  Insurance  Fund  must  reach  two  subsequent 
target levels (Article 74b(1) and (2): (a) an initial target level of 20% of four ninth of  the sum 
of all national minimum target levels by the end of the three-year reinsurance phase and (b) a 
final target level equal to the sum of the minimum target levels that participating DGSs must 
reach  under  the  Directive  by  the  end  of  the  four-year  co-insurance  period.  The  minimum 
target  levels  would  be  fully  harmonised  for  all  participating  DGS.  Together  the  minimum 
target  levels  of  the  Deposit  Insurance  Fund  and  the  participating  DGS  would  increase  in  a 
linear way, by one ninth every year in the period until 2024. 

Ex-ante  contributions  to  be  paid  by  banks  shall  be  spread  out  in  time  as  evenly  as  possible 
until  the initial  or  final  target level  is  reached. After  the  reinsurance  period,  if  the available 
financial means have been used to provide funding or cover losses and sunk below the initial 
target level, they must be raised until the target level is reached again. 

Each  year,  the  ex-ante  contributions  owed  and  to  be  paid  by  each  bank  to  the  Board  are 
determined in two steps: (a) The Board determines the total amount of ex-ante contributions 
that it may claim from the member banks of each participating DGS (Article 74d(1)). (b) Each 
participating  DGS,  based  on  the  relevant  total  amount  determined  by  the  Board,  then 
calculates the contribution owed and to be paid by each of its member banks (Article 74d(2)) 
and invoices this amount on behalf of the Board. 

During the reinsurance phase, the risk-based ex-ante contribution of each member bank has to 
pay to the Deposit Insurance Fund would be calculated by the participating DGS in relation to 
all  of  its  other  member  banks.  After  the  reinsurance  phase,  the  risk-based  ex-ante 
contributions  of  each  bank  would  be  calculated  in  relation  to  all  banks  within  the  scope  of 
EDIS. This would be done by the Board, with the assistance of participating DGSs, and on the 
basis of a set of risk-based methods established by a Commission delegated act. 

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A graph comparing the evolution of the funds of EDIS to the evolution of the funds of a participating 
DGS, in case the Member State and the participating DGS choose to compensate member banks for the 
the  Commission's  website: 
can  be 
ex-ante 
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/general-policy/banking-union/european-deposit-insurance-
scheme/index_en.htm 

contributions  paid 

found  on 

to  EDIS, 

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   EN 

                                                 
The ex-ante contribution invoiced by the participating DGS on behalf of the Board must be 
paid  by  the  bank  directly  to  the  Board,  which  would  credit  the  amount  to  the  Deposit 
Insurance Fund (and as revenue in Part III of its budget). 

5.5.2.2.  Compensation at the level of participating DGSs 

This proposal enables participating Member States to achieve cost-neutrality for the member 
banks of their participating DGSs. They may decide that the creation of a separate obligation 
by banks to pay ex-ante contributions to the Deposit Insurance Fund justifies compensation at 
the  level  of  the  participating  DGS.  In  taking  this  decision,  Member  States  need  to  pay  due 
regard  to  the  principle  of  proportionality  and  to  consider  whether  the  level  of  deposit 
protection that is being built up by the evolving establishment of EDIS justifies a reduction of 
financial resources for deposit protection at the level of the participating DGS. 

Cost-neutrality is  provided  for in  Article 74c(4): (a)  The ex-ante contributions  banks pay to 
the  Deposit  Insurance  Fund  count  towards  the  target  level  that  the  respective  participating 
DGS needs to reach under the Directive; (b) if, by the end of the built-up phase (3 July 2024 
or later), a national DGS has complied with the precise funding path (Art. 41j) and its member 
banks have paid all contributions that were due to the DIF, these contributions constitute the 
amount  of  contributions  necessary  to  reach  the  national  target  level  of  0.8%;  and  (c) 
participating  Member  States  may  allow  their  DGSs  to  consider  the  contributions  that  their 
member banks paid to EDIS when calculating the level of contributions and/or to reimburse 
their  member  banks  from  their  available  financial  means  to  the  extent  these  exceed  the 
amounts set out in the precise funding path. 

Depending on the level of available financial means the participating DGS has already raised, 
it  may  either  compensate  its  member  banks  through  lower  contributions  or  through 
reimbursing contributions it already received from its member banks. 

5.5.3.  Extraordinary ex-post contributions  

As  from  the  start  of  the  co-insurance  phase,  the  Board  may  also  claim  payment  of 
extraordinary ex-post contributions from the banks affiliated to participating DGSs when the 
Deposit  Insurance  Fund’s  available  means  are  insufficient  for  funding  and  loss  cover. 
National  DGS  would  remain  responsible  for  raising  ex-post  contributions  from  the  national 
banking  sector  to  replenish  their  national  system  following  a  pay-out  event  or  a  resolution 
contribution.  

Ex-post contributions are owed and paid by banks directly to the Board and, during the co-
insurance period, calculated and invoiced by the respective participating DGS on behalf of the 
Board. The Board determines the total amount of ex-post contributions it may claim from the 
member  banks  of  each  participating  DGS  within  the  limits  established  by  a  Commission 
delegated  act.  Participating  DGS  calculate  the  ex-post  contribution  owed  by  each  of  their 
member  bank  on  the  basis  of  the  total  amount  determined  by  the  Board,  applying  the  same 
risk-based  method  it  applies  to  calculate  the  ex-ante  contribution  under  Article  10(1)  of  the 
Directive. 

After the co-insurance phase, the ex-post contribution owed by each bank is calculated by the 
Board  on  the  basis  of  the  risk-based  methods  established  by  the  Commission  delegated  act 
that  is  also  applied  to  calculate  the  ex-ante  contributions  after  the  co-insurance  phase. 
Participating DGSs invoice the ex-post contribution on behalf of the Board. 

Both  in  the  co-insurance  and  full  insurance  phases  the  Board  may,  on  its  own  initiative  or 
upon  proposal  by  the  relevant  competent  authority,  defer  the  payment  of  the  ex-post 
contribution by an individual bank in full or in part. The deferral must be necessary to protect 

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the financial position of the bank, may not last longer than six month, but can be renewed on 
request of the bank. 

A Commission delegated act will set the maximum amounts that can be raised by EDIS ex-
post, taking into account the national ex-post contributions.  

5.5.4.  Additional financial sources for the Deposit Insurance Fund  

In additional to raising ex-ante and ex-post contributions, the Board may contract additional 
financial sources for the Deposit Insurance Fund. Gradually replacing the funding at the level 
of  participating  DGSs,  it  may  request  a  loan  from  deposit-guarantee  schemes  recognised  in 
non-participating  Member  States  which  may  decide  on  such  request  in  accordance  with 
Article 12 of the Directive (Article 74g). To achieve reciprocity the Board may, in turn, also 
decide to grant loans to deposit-guarantee schemes in non-participating Member States. 

The Board may also contract for the Deposit Insurance Fund other alternative funding means 
from third parties in particular if funds the Board can raise by ex-ante contributions and ex-
post  contributions  are  not  (immediately)  available  (Article  74h).  Repayable  funding  means 
shall be recouped by raising ex-ante and ex-post contributions during the maturity period. 

5.5.5.  EDIS - Decision-making  

EDIS  would  be  administered  by  the  Board,  both  in  its  executive  and  plenary  session.  The 
executive session would be composed of the same members for both EDIS- and SRM-related 
decisions  and  tasks.  The  special  tasks  of  EDIS  would  require  a  special  composition  of  the 
plenary  session  for  decisions  that  relate  to  EDIS  only.  Members  representing  national 
resolution  authorities  in  the  plenary  session  would  be  replaced  by  members  representing 
national designated authorities. 

The plenary session would have specific tasks attributed to it. 

As  some  Board  decisions  are  relevant  for  the  Board  as  a  whole  or  for  both  the  SRM  and 
EDIS,  they  would  be  taken  in  a  new  joint  plenary  session  with  specific  representatives  and 
voting procedures. 

All other decisions on EDIS would be adopted in the Board’s executive session. 

5.6. 

Other rules 

its  functions  within  EDIS:  privileges  and 

Provisions  on  specific  subject-matter  that  apply  to  the  SRM  would  also  apply  to  the  Board 
language 
when  exercising 
arrangements, staff and staff exchange, internal committees, appeals panel, actions before the 
court of justice, liability of the Board, professional secrecy and exchange of information, data 
protection, access to documents, security rules on sensitive or classified information, court of 
auditors. 

immunities, 

The  amendments  introducing  EDIS  would  be  applied  as  from  the  entry  into  force  of  the 
amending Regulation.  

EN 

17 

   EN 

Proposal for a 

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 

amending Regulation (EU) 806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance 
Scheme 

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 

Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union,  and  in  particular 
Article 114 thereof, 

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission, 

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments, 
Having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank9, 
Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee10,  

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, 

Whereas: 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

Over the past years, the Union has made progress in creating an internal market for 
banking services. A better integrated internal market for banking services is essential 
in  order  to  foster  economic  growth  in  the  Union,  to  safeguard  the  stability  of  the 
banking system and to protect depositors.  

On  18  October  2012,  the  European  Council  concluded  that  "In  the  light  of  the 
fundamental challenges facing it, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) needs 
to  be  strengthened  to  ensure  economic  and  social  welfare  as  well  as  stability  and 
sustained  prosperity"  and  "that the process  towards  deeper economic  and  monetary 
union  should  build  on  the  Union  institutional  and  legal  framework  and  be 
characterised by openness and transparency towards Member States whose currency 
is not the euro and by respect for the integrity of the internal market". To that end, 
the  Banking  Union  has  been  established,  underpinned  by  a  comprehensive  and 
detailed single rulebook for financial services for the internal market as a whole. The 
process towards establishing the Banking Union has been characterised by openness 
and  transparency  towards  non-participating  Member  States  and  by  respect  for  the 
integrity of the internal market. 

The European Parliament, in its resolution of 20 November 2012 'Towards a genuine 
Economic  and  Monetary  Union',  also  stated  that  breaking  the  negative  feedback 
loops  between  sovereigns,  banks  and  the  real  economy  is  crucial  for  a  smooth 
functioning  of  the  EMU,  stressed  the  urgent  need  for  additional  and  far-reaching 
measures for the realisation of a fully operational Banking Union, while ensuring the 
continued proper functioning of the internal market for financial services and the free 
movement of capital.  

(4) 

While  key  steps  have  been  made  towards  ensuring  the  efficient  functioning  of  the 
Banking Union, with the Single Supervisory Mechanism (the 'SSM') established by 

9 
10 

OJ C , , p. . 
OJ C , , p. . 

EN 

18 

   EN 

 
                                                 
Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/201311 ensuring that the Union's policy relating to 
the prudential supervision of credit institutions in the euro area Member States and 
those  non  euro  area  Member  States  who  choose  to  participate  in  the  SSM  (the 
'participating Member States') is implemented in a coherent and effective manner and 
with the Single Resolution Mechanism (the ‘SRM’)  established by Regulation (EU) 
No  806/2014  ensuring  a  consistent  framework  for  the  resolution  of  banks  that  are 
failing  or  likely  to  fail  in  the  participating  Member  States,  further  steps  are  still 
needed to complete the Banking Union. 

In  June  2015,  the  Five  Presidents  Report  on  Completing  Europe’s  Economic  and 
Monetary Union pointed out that a single banking system can only be truly single if 
confidence  in  the  safety  of  bank  deposits  is  the  same  irrespective  of  the  Member 
State  in  which  a  bank  operates.  This  requires  single  bank  supervision,  single  bank 
resolution  and  single  deposit  insurance.  The  Five  Presidents  report  therefore 
proposed  to  complete  the  Banking  Union  by  establishing  a  European  Deposit 
Insurance  Scheme  (EDIS),  the  third  pillar  of  a  fully-fledged  Banking  Union 
alongside  bank  supervision  and  resolution.  Concrete  steps  in  that  direction  should 
already be taken as a priority, with a re-insurance system at the European level for 
the  national  deposit  guarantee  schemes  as  a  first  step  towards  a  fully  mutualised 
approach.  The  scope  of  this  reinsurance  system  should  coincide  with  that  of  the 
SSM. 

The recent crisis has shown that the functioning of the internal market may be under 
threat and that there is an increasing risk of financial fragmentation. The failure of a 
bank that is relatively large compared to the national banking sector or the concurrent 
failure  of  a  part  of  the  national  banking  sector  may  cause  national  DGSs  to  be 
vulnerable  to  large  local  shocks,  even  with  the  additional  funding  mechanisms 
provided by Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council12. 
This  vulnerability of national DGSs to  large local shocks can contribute to  adverse 
feedback between banks and their national sovereign undermining the homogeneity 
of protection for deposits and contributing to a lack of confidence among depositors 
and resulting in market instability. 

The absence of a homogenous  level of depositor protection can  distort  competition 
and create an effective barrier for the freedoms of establishment and free provision of 
services  by  credit  institutions  within  the  internal  market.  A  common  deposit 
insurance scheme is therefore essential for the completion of the internal market in 
financial services. 

Although  Directive  2014/49/EU  significantly  improves  the  capacity  of  national 
schemes  to  compensate  depositors,  more  efficient  deposit  guarantee  arrangements 
are needed at the level of the Banking Union to ensure sufficient financial means to 
underpin  the  confidence  of  all  depositors  and  thereby  safeguard  financial  stability. 
EDIS  would  increase  the  resilience  of  the  Banking  Union  against  future  crises  by 
sharing  risk  more  widely  and  would  offer  equal  protection  for  insured  depositors, 
supporting the proper functioning of the internal market.  

(5) 

(6) 

(7) 

(8) 

11 

12 

Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European 
Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 
29.10.2013, p. 63). 
Directive  2014/49/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  16  April  2014  on  deposit 
guarantee schemes (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 149). 

EN 

19 

   EN 

                                                 
(9) 

(10) 

(11) 

(12) 

Funds used by deposit guarantee schemes to repay depositors for unavailable covered 
deposits in accordance with Article 8 of Directive 2014/49/EU on deposit guarantee 
schemes  do  not  constitute  State  aid  or  Fund  aid.  However,  where  those  funds  are 
used  in  the  restructuring  of  credit  institutions  and  constitute  State  aid  or  Fund  aid, 
they must comply with Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union  and,  respectively,  with  Article  19  of  Regulation  (EU)  No  806/2014  of  the 
European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council13,  which  should  be  amended  for  that 
purpose. 

Despite the further harmonisation introduced by the Directive 2014/49/EU, national 
DGSs  retain  certain  options  and  discretions,  including  with  respect  to  certain 
essential elements like target levels, risk factors to be applied when assessing credit 
institutions’ contributions, repayment periods or the use of funds. Those differences 
between  national  rules  may  obstruct  the  free  provision  of  services  and  create 
distortions of competition. In a highly integrated banking sector, uniformity of rules 
and  approaches  is  needed  to  ensure  a  consistently  robust  level  of  protection  of 
depositors throughout the Union and so guarantee the objective of financial stability. 

The  establishment  of  an  EDIS,  with  decision-making,  monitoring  and  enforcement 
powers  centralised  and  entrusted  to  the  Single  Resolution  and  Deposit  Insurance 
Board  ("the  Board"),  will  be  essential  in  achieving  the  objective  of  a  harmonised 
deposit  guarantee  framework.  The  uniform  application  of  the  deposit  guarantee 
requirements  in  the  participating  Member  States  will  be  enhanced  as  a  result  of  it 
being entrusted to such a central authority. In this way, the operation of EDIS should 
facilitate,  by  supporting  and  providing  a  framework  for  the  establishment  and 
subsequent implementation of uniform rules on deposit guarantee arrangements, the 
harmonisation process in the field of financial services. 

Furthermore, EDIS is part of the wider EU rules harmonising prudential supervision 
and recovery and resolution, which are complementary aspects of the internal market 
for  banking  services.  Supervision  can  only  be  effective  and  meaningful  if  an 
adequate deposit insurance scheme, corresponding to the developments in the field of 
supervision,  is  created.  EDIS  is  therefore  instrumental  to  a  wider  process  of 
harmonisation  and  its  objectives  are  closely  linked  to  the  Union  framework  on 
prudential supervision and recovery and resolution whose centralised application are 
mutually dependant. For  instance, adequate coordination at the level of supervision 
and  deposit  guarantee  is  needed  in  cases  where  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB) 
envisages  withdrawing  an  authorisation  to  a  credit  institution  or  where  a  credit 
institution does not comply with the obligation to be a member of a DGS. A similar 
high  level  of  integration  is  needed  between  the  resolution  actions  and  the  deposit 
insurance tasks attributed to the Board. 

(13) 

This Regulation applies only in respect of banks whose home supervisor is the ECB 
or the national competent authority in Member States whose currency is the euro or 
in  Member  States  whose  currency  is  not  the  euro  which  have  established  a  close 
cooperation  in  accordance  with  Article  7  of  Regulation  (EU)  No  1024/2013.  The 
scope  of  application  of  this  Regulation  is  linked  to  the  scope  of  application  of 
Regulation  (EU)  No  1024/2013.  Indeed,  bearing  in  mind  the  significant  level  to 

13 

Regulation  (EU)  No  806/2014  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  15  July  2014 
establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain 
investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and 
amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (OJ L 225, 30.7.2014, p. 1). 

EN 

20 

   EN 

                                                 
which the supervisory tasks attributed to the SSM and deposit guarantee actions are 
interwoven, the establishment of a centralised system of supervision operated under 
Article  127(6)  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  is 
fundamentally  important  to  the  process  of  harmonisation  of  deposit  guarantee  in 
participating  Member  States.  The  fact  of  being  subject  to  supervision  by  the  SSM 
constitutes  a  specific  attribute  that  places  the  entities  falling  within  the  scope  of 
application  of  Regulation  (EU)  No  1024/2013  in  an  objectively  and  characterised 
distinct position for deposit guarantee purposes. It is necessary to adopt measures to 
create  a  single  deposit  insurance  scheme  for  all  Member  States  participating  in  the 
SSM in order to facilitate the proper and stable functioning of the internal market. 

In  order  to  ensure  parallelism  with  the  SSM  and  the  SRM,  EDIS  should  apply  to 
participating  Member  States.  Banks  established  in  the  Member  States  not 
participating in the SSM should not be subject to EDIS. As long as supervision in a 
Member  State  remains  outside  the  SSM,  that  Member  State  should  remain 
responsible for ensuring the protection of depositors against the consequences of the 
insolvency of a credit institution. As Member States join the SSM, they should also 
automatically  become  subject  to  the  EDIS.  Ultimately,  the  EDIS  could  potentially 
extend to the entire internal market. 

In  order  to  ensure  a  level  playing  field  within  the  internal  market  as  a  whole,  this 
Regulation  is  consistent  with  Directive  2014/49/EU.  It  complements  the  rules  and 
principles  of  that  Directive  to  ensure  the  proper  functioning  of  EDIS  and  that 
appropriate funding is available to the latter. The material law on deposit guarantee 
to  be  applied  within  the  EDIS  framework  will  therefore  be  consistent  with  the  one 
applicable  by  the  national  DGSs  or  designated  authorities  of  the  non-participating 
Member States, harmonised through the Directive 2014/49/EU. 

In  integrated  financial  markets,  any  financial  support  to  reimburse  depositors 
enhances the financial stability not only in the participating Member State concerned 
but also in other Member States, by preventing any spill-over of bank crises into non-
participating  Member  States.  The  conferral  of  deposit  insurance  tasks  to  the  Board 
should  not  in  any  way  hamper  the  functioning  of  the  internal  market  for  financial 
services. The European Banking Authority (EBA) should therefore maintain its role 
and  retain  its  existing  powers  and  tasks:  it  should  develop  and  contribute  to  the 
consistent  application  of  the  Union  legislation  applicable  to  all  Member States  and 
enhance convergence of deposit guarantee practices across the Union as a whole.  

EDIS should progressively evolve from a reinsurance scheme into a fully mutualised 
co-insurance scheme over a number of years. In the context of efforts to deepen the 
EMU, together with the work on the establishment of bridge-financing arrangements 
for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and on developing a common fiscal backstop, 
this step is necessary to reduce the bank/sovereign links in individual Member States 
by means of steps towards risk sharing among all the Member States in the Banking 
Union,  and  thereby  to  reinforce  the  Banking  Union  in  achieving  its  key  objective. 
However,  such  risk  sharing  implied  by  steps  to  reinforce  Banking  Union  must 
proceed in parallel with risk reducing measures designed to break the bank-sovereign 
link more directly.  

(14) 

(15) 

(16) 

(17) 

(18) 

EDIS should be established in three sequential stages, first a reinsurance scheme that 
covers  a  share  of  the  liquidity  shortfall  and  of  the  excess  losses  of  participating 
DGSs, followed by a co-insurance scheme that covers a gradually increasing share of 
the liquidity shortfall and losses of participating DGSs and eventually resulting in a 

EN 

21 

   EN 

(19) 

full  insurance  scheme  that  covers  all  liquidity  needs  and  losses  of  participating 
deposit guarantee schemes. 

In the reinsurance stage, and in order to limit the liability for the European Deposit 
Insurance  Fund  (“the  Deposit  Insurance  Fund”)  and  to  reduce  moral  hazard  risk  at 
the national level, assistance from the Deposit Insurance Fund can only be requested 
if  the  national  DGS  has  raised  ex-ante  contributions  in  accordance  with  a  precise 
funding  path,  and  if  it  first  depletes  these  funds.  However,  to  the  extent  that  a 
national  DGS  has  collected  funds  over  and  above  that  which  is  required  by  the 
funding path, it only needs to use up the funds it had to collect to comply with the 
funding path before being able to receive coverage by EDIS. Therefore, DGSs which 
have collected more funds than is needed to comply with the funding path should not 
be in a worse position than those which have collected funds not exceeding the levels 
set out in the funding path.  

(20) 

As  the  Deposit  Insurance  Fund,  in  the  re-insurance  stage,  would  only  provide  an 
additional  source  of  funding  and  would  only  weaken  the  link  between  banks  and 
their national sovereign, without however ensuring that all depositors in the Banking 
Union  enjoy  an  equal  level  of  protection,  the  reinsurance  stage  should,  after  three 
years,  gradually  progress  into  a  co-insurance  scheme  and  ultimately  into  a  fully 
mutualised deposit insurance scheme. 

(21)  While  the  reinsurance  and  coinsurance  stages  would  share  many  common  features, 
ensuring a smooth gradual evolution, pay-outs under the co-insurance stage would be 
shared between national DGS and the Deposit Insurance Fund as of the first euro of 
loss.  The  relative  contribution  from  the  Deposit  Insurance  Fund  would  gradually 
increase to 100 percent, resulting in the full mutualisation of depositor risk across the 
Banking Union after four years.  

(22) 

Safeguards should be built into EDIS so as to limit moral hazard risk and to ensure 
that the coverage by EDIS is only provided where nationals DGSs act in a prudent 
manner.  Firstly,  national  DGSs  should  comply  with  their  obligations  under  this 
Regulation, the Directive 2014/49/EU and other relevant EU law, in particular their 
obligation  to  build  up  their  funds  in  accordance  with  Article  10  of  Directive 
2014/49/EU as further specified in this Regulation. In order to benefit from coverage 
by EDIS, participating DGSs need to raise ex-ante contributions in accordance with a 
precise funding path. This also implies that the possibility of a target level reduction 
in  accordance  with  Article  10(6)  of  Directive  2014/49/EU  is  no  longer  available  if 
the DGS wants to benefit from EDIS. Secondly, in case of a pay-out event or where 
its funds are used in resolution, a national DGS should bear a fair share of the loss 
themselves.  It should  therefore be required to  collect ex-post  contributions from its 
members  to  replenish  its  fund  and  to  repay  EDIS  to  the  extent  that  the  initially 
received funding exceeds the share of loss to be borne by EDIS. Thirdly, following a 
pay-out event, the national DGS should maximise the proceeds from the insolvency 
estate and repay the Board and the Board should have sufficient powers to safeguards 
its  rights.  Fourthly,  the  Board  should  have  the  powers  to  recover  all  or  part  of 
funding in case of a participating DGS did not comply with key obligations.  

(23) 

The  Deposit  Insurance  Fund  is  an  essential  element  without  which  the  progressive 
establishment of EDIS could not be achieved. Different national systems of funding 
would  not  provide  for  homogenous  deposit  insurance  across  the  Banking  Union. 
Throughout  the  three  stages,  the  Deposit  Insurance  Fund  should  help  ensuring  the 
stabilising  role  of  DGSs,  a  uniform  high  level  of  protection  to  all  depositors  in  a 

EN 

22 

   EN 

(24) 

(25) 

(26) 

(27) 

(28) 

(29) 

harmonised framework throughout the Union and avoiding the creation of obstacles 
for  the  exercise  of  fundamental  freedoms  or  the  distortion  of  competition  in  the 
internal market due to different levels of protection at national level.  

The Deposit Insurance Fund should be financed by direct contributions from banks. 
Decisions taken within the EDIS, requiring the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund or 
of  a  national  deposit  guarantee  scheme  should  not  impinge  on  the  fiscal 
responsibilities  of  the  Member  States.  In  that  regard,  only  extraordinary  public 
financial  support  should  be  considered  to  be  an  impingement  on  the  budgetary 
sovereignty and fiscal responsibilities of the Member States. 

This Regulation establishes the modalities for the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund 
and the general criteria to determine the fixing and calculation of ex ante and ex post 
contributions  and  lays  down  the  powers  of  the  Board  for  using  and  managing  the 
Deposit Insurance Fund. 

Contributions  would  be  directly  levied  on  banks  to  finance  the  Deposit  Insurance 
Fund.  The  Board  would  collect  the  contributions  and  administer  the  Deposit 
Insurance  Fund,  while  national  DGSs  would  continue 
to  collect  national 
contributions and administer national funds. In order to ensure fair and harmonised 
contributions for participating banks and provide incentives to operate under a model 
which presents less risk, both contributions to EDIS and to national DGS should be 
calculated  on  the  basis  of  covered  deposits  and  a  risk-adjustment  factor  per  bank. 
During the re-insurance period the risk-adjustment factor should consider the degree 
of  risk  incurred  by  a  bank  relative  to  all  other  banks  affiliated  to  the  same 
participating  DGS.  Once  the  stage  of  co-insurance  is  reached,  the  risk-adjustment 
factor should consider the degree of risk incurred by a bank relative to all other banks 
established in the participating Member States. This would ensure that, overall, EDIS 
is  cost-neutral  for  banks  and  national  DGSs  and  avoid  any  redistribution  of 
contributions during the build-up phase of the Deposit Insurance Fund.  

In  principle,  contributions  should  be  collected  from  the  industry  prior  to,  and 
independently of, any deposit insurance action. When prior funding is insufficient to 
cover  the  losses  or  costs  incurred  by  the  use  of  the  Deposit  Insurance  Fund, 
additional  contributions  should  be  collected  to  bear  the  additional  cost  or  loss. 
Moreover, the Deposit Insurance Fund should be able to contract borrowings or other 
forms of support from credit institutions, financial institutions or other third parties in 
the event that the ex-ante and ex post contributions are not immediately accessible or 
do  not  cover  the  expenses  incurred  by  the  use  of  the  Deposit  Insurance  Fund  in 
relation to deposit insurance actions. 

In order to reach a critical mass and to avoid pro-cyclical effects which would arise if 
the Deposit Insurance Fund had to rely solely on ex post contributions in a systemic 
crisis,  it  is  indispensable  that  the  ex-ante  available  financial  means  of  the  Deposit 
Insurance Fund amount at least to a certain minimum target level. 

The initial and final target level of the Deposit Insurance Fund should be established 
as  a  percentage  of  the  total  minimum  target  levels  of  participating  DGS.  It  should 
progressively reach 20% of four ninth of the total minimum target levels by the end 
of the reinsurance period and the sum of all minimum target levels by the end of the 
co-insurance period. The possibility to apply for approval to authorise a lower target 
level  in  accordance  with  Article  10(6)  of  Directive  2014/49/EU  should  not  be 
considered  when  setting  the  initial  or  final  target  levels  of  the  Deposit  Insurance 

EN 

23 

   EN 

(30) 

(31) 

Fund.  An  appropriate  time  frame  should  be  set  to  reach  the  target  level  for  the 
Deposit Insurance Fund. 

Ensuring  effective  and  sufficient  financing  of  the  Deposit  Insurance  Fund  is  of 
paramount  importance  to  the  credibility  of  EDIS.  The  capacity  of  the  Board  to 
contract  alternative  funding  means  for  the  Deposit  Insurance  Fund  should  be 
enhanced  in  a  manner  that  optimises  the  cost  of  funding  and  preserves  the 
creditworthiness  of  the  Deposit  Insurance  Fund.  Immediately  after  the  entry  into 
force  of  this  Regulation,  the  necessary  steps  should  be  taken  by  the  Board  in 
cooperation with the participating Member States to develop the appropriate methods 
and modalities permitting the enhancement of the borrowing capacity of the Deposit 
Insurance Fund that should be in place by the date of application of this Regulation. 

It  is  necessary  to  ensure  that  the  Deposit  Insurance  Fund  is  fully  available  for  the 
purpose of ensuring the guarantee of deposits. Therefore, the Deposit Insurance Fund 
should  primarily  be  used  for  the  efficient  implementation  of  deposit  guarantee 
requirements and actions. Furthermore, it should be used only in accordance with the 
applicable deposit guarantee objectives and principles. Under certain conditions, the 
Deposit  Insurance  Fund  could  also  provide  funding  where  the  available  financial 
means  of  a  DGS  are  used  in  resolution  in  accordance  with  Article  79  of  this 
Regulation. 

(32) 

In order to protect the value of the amounts held in the Deposit Insurance Fund, those 
amounts should be invested in sufficiently safe, diversified and liquid assets. 

(33)  Where  close  cooperation  with  the  ECB  of  a  participating  Member  State  whose 
currency  is  not  the  euro  is  terminated  in  accordance  with  Article  7  of  Regulation 
(EU)  No  1024/2013,  a  fair  partition  of  the  cumulated  contributions  of  the 
participating  Member  State  concerned  should  be  decided  taking  into  account  the 
interests  of  the  participating  Member  State  concerned  and  the  Deposit  Insurance 
Fund. 

(34) 

(35) 

(36) 

In order to guarantee its full autonomy and independence when undertaking deposit 
insurance  actions  under  this  Regulation,  the  Board  should  have  an  autonomous 
budget  with  revenues  from  obligatory  contributions  from  the  institutions  in  the 
participating  Member  States.  This  Regulation  should  be  without  prejudice  to  the 
ability  of  Member  States  to  levy  fees  to  cover  the  administrative  expenses  of  their 
national DGSs or designated authorities. 

The Board, where all the criteria relating to the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund are 
met, should provide the relevant funding and loss cover to the national DGS.  

The  Board  should  operate  in  joint-plenary,  plenary  and  executive  sessions.  The 
Board,  in  its  executive  session,  should  prepare  all  decisions  concerning  pay-out 
procedures  and,  to  the  fullest  extent  possible,  adopt  those  decisions.  Regarding  the 
use  of  the  Deposit  Insurance  Fund,  it  is  important  that  there  is  no  first-mover 
advantage and that the outflows of the Deposit Insurance Fund are monitored. Once 
the net accumulated use of the Deposit Insurance Fund in the previous consecutive 
12 months reaches the threshold of 25% of the final target level, the plenary session 
should evaluate the application of the deposit insurance actions or the participations 
in resolution actions and the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund, and should provide 
guidance  which  the  executive  session  should  follow  in  subsequent  decisions. 
Guidance  to  the  executive  session  should,  in  particular,  focus  on  ensuring  the  non-

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(37) 

discriminatory application of deposit insurance actions or participation in resolution 
actions, on measures to be taken to avoid a depletion of the Deposit Insurance Fund. 

The efficiency and uniformity of deposit insurance actions should be ensured in all of 
the participating Member States. For that purpose, where a participating DGS has not 
applied or has not complied with a decision by the Board pursuant to this Regulation 
or  has  applied  it  in  a  way  which  poses  a  threat  to  any  of  the  deposit  insurance 
scheme's  objectives  or  to  the  efficient  implementation  of  the  deposit  insurance 
action,  the  Board  should  be  empowered  to  order  any  necessary  action  which 
significantly addresses the concern or threat to the EDIS objectives. Any action by a 
participating DGS that would restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of 
the Board should be excluded.  

(38)  When making decisions or taking actions, in particular regarding entities established 
both  in  participating  Member  States  and  in  non-participating  Member  States, 
possible  adverse  effects  on  those  Member  States,  such  as  threats  to  the  financial 
stability  of their  financial markets, and on the entities established in those Member 
States, should also be taken into consideration. 

(39) 

(40) 

(41) 

(42) 

(43) 

(44) 

The Board, the designated authorities, the competent authorities, including the ECB, 
and the resolution authorities should, where necessary, conclude a memorandum of 
understanding describing in general terms how they will cooperate with one another 
in  the  performance  of  their  respective  tasks  under  Union  law.  The  memorandum 
should be reviewed on a regular basis. 

The  relevant  entities,  bodies  and  authorities  involved  in  the  application  of  this 
Regulation should cooperate with each other in accordance with the duty of sincere 
cooperation enshrined in the Treaties. 

The  Board  and  the  designated  authorities  and  competent  authorities  of  the  non-
participating  Member  States  should  also  conclude  memoranda  of  understanding 
describing  in  general  terms  how  they  will  cooperate  with  one  another  in  the 
performance  of  their  tasks  under  Directive  2014/49/EU.  The  memoranda  of 
understanding  could,  inter  alia,  clarify  the  consultation  relating  to  decisions  of  the 
Board that have effect on branches located in the non-participating Member States, 
where  the  credit  institution  is  established  in  a  participating  Member  State.  The 
memoranda should be reviewed on a regular basis. 

The  procedure  relating  to  the  adoption  of  decisions  by  the  Board  respects  the 
principle of delegation of powers to agencies as interpreted by the Court of Justice of 
the European Union.  

This  Regulation  respects  the  fundamental  rights  and  observes  the  rights,  freedoms 
and principles recognised in particular by the Charter, and, in particular, the right to 
property, the protection of personal data, the freedom to conduct a business, the right 
to  an  effective  remedy  and  to  a  fair  trial  and  the  right  of  defence,  and  should  be 
implemented in accordance with those rights and principles. 

Since  the  objectives  of  this  Regulation,  namely  setting  up  a  more  efficient  and 
effective  deposit  guarantee  framework  and  ensuring  the  consistent  application  of 
deposit  guarantee  rules,  cannot  be  sufficiently  achieved  by  the  Member  States  but 
can rather be better achieved at the Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on 
European  Union.  In  accordance  with  the  principle  of  proportionality,  as  set  out  in 

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that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve 
those objectives. 

(45) 

(46) 

The Commission should review the application of this Regulation in order to assess 
its  impact  on  the  internal  market  and  to  determine  whether  any  modifications  or 
further  developments  are  needed  in  order  to  improve  the  efficiency  and  the 
effectiveness of the EDIS. 

In  order  for  EDIS  to  function  in  an  effective  manner  as  of  [….],  the  provisions 
concerning  the  payment  of  contributions  to  the  Deposit  Insurance  Fund,  the 
establishment  of  all  the  relevant  procedures  and  any  other  operational  and 
institutional aspects should apply from XX. 

(47) 

Regulation  (EU)  No  806/2014  should  be  amended  to  incorporate  and  respectively 
take into account the establishment of EDIS, 

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HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 

Article 1 
Amendments to Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 

Regulation (EU) 806/2014 is amended as follows: 

1. 

the title is replaced by the following: 

"REGULATION  (EU)  No  806/2014  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT  AND 
OF  THE  COUNCIL  of  15  July  2014  on  a  Single  Resolution  Mechanism  and  a 
European Deposit Insurance Scheme and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010"; 

2. 

Article 1 is replaced by the following: 

“Article 1 
Subject matter 

1.

  This Regulation establishes uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution 
of  the  entities  referred  to  in  Article 2  that  are  established  in  the  participating 
Member States referred to in Article 4. 

Those  uniform  rules  and  that  uniform  procedure  shall  be  applied  by  the  Single 
Resolution Board established in accordance with Article 42 (the ‘Board’), together 
with the Council and the Commission and the national resolution authorities within 
the  framework  of  the  Single  Resolution  Mechanism  (‘SRM’)  established  by  this 
Regulation. The SRM shall be supported by a Single Resolution Fund (the 'SRF'’). 

The use of the SRF shall be contingent upon the entry into force of an agreement 
among the participating Member States (‘the Agreement’) on transferring the funds 
raised at national level towards the SRF as  well as on a progressive merger of the 
different funds raised at national level to be allocated to national compartments of 
the Fund. 

2.

  In  addition,  this  Regulation  establishes  a  European  Deposit  Insurance  Scheme 

('EDIS') in three successive stages: 

–  a reinsurance scheme that, to a certain extent, provides funding and covers a share 
of  the  losses  of  participating  deposit  guarantee  schemes  in  accordance  with 
Article 41a; 

–  a co-insurance scheme that, to a gradually increasing extent, provides funding and 
covers  losses  of  participating  deposit  guarantee  schemes  in  accordance  with 
Article 41c; 

–  a  full  insurance  scheme  that  provides  the  funding  and  covers  the  losses  of 

participating deposit guarantee schemes in accordance with Article 41e. 

EDIS shall be administered by the Board in cooperation with participating DGSs and 
designated  authorities  in  accordance  with  Part  IIa.  EDIS  shall  be  supported  by  a 
Deposit Insurance Fund (the ‘DIF’)." 

3. 

Article 2 is replaced by the following: 

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"Article 2 

Scope 

For  the  purposes  of  the  SRM,  this  Regulation  shall  apply  to  the  following 

1. 
entities: 

(a) 

credit institutions established in a participating Member State; 

(b)  parent  undertakings,  including  financial  holding  companies  and  mixed 
financial holding companies, established in a participating Member State, 
where  they  are  subject  to  consolidated  supervision  carried  out  by  the 
ECB  in  accordance  with  Article  4(1)(g)  of  Regulation  (EU)  No 
1024/2013; 

(c) 

investment  firms  and  financial  institutions  established  in  a  participating 
Member State, where they are covered by the consolidated supervision of 
the parent undertaking carried out by the ECB in accordance with Article 
4(1)(g) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. 

 2. 

For the purposes of EDIS, this Regulation shall apply to the following entities: 

(a)  participating deposit-guarantee schemes as defined in point (1) of Article 

3(1a);  

(b) 

credit institutions affiliated to participating deposit-guarantee schemes. 

Where  this  Regulation  creates  rights  or  obligations  for  a  participating  DGS 
administered  by  a  designated  authority  as  defined  in  point  (18)  of  Article  2(1)  of 
Directive  2014/49/EU,  the  rights  or  obligations  are  deemed  to  be  those  of  the 
designated authority."; 

4. 

Article 3 is amended as follows: 

(a) 

in paragraph 1, the following points (55), (56) and (57) are added: 

"(55) 'participating  deposit-guarantee  schemes'  or  'participating  DGSs'  means 
deposit  guarantee  schemes  as  defined  in  point  (1)  of  Article  2(1)  of 
Directive 2014/49/EU which are introduced and officially recognised in a 
participating Member State; 

(56)  'payout  event'  means  the  occurrence  unavailable  deposits  as  defined  in 
point  (8)  of  Article  2(1)  of  Directive  2014/49/EU  in  relation  to  a  credit 
institution affiliated to a participating DGS; 

(57)  'available financial means of the DIF' means cash, deposits and low-risk 
assets which can be liquidated within a period not exceeding that referred 
to in Article 8(1) of the Directive 2014/49/EU."; 

(b)  paragraph 2 is replaced by the following: 

"2. 
In  the  absence  of  a  relevant  definition  in  the  previous  paragraphs,  the 
definitions  set  out  in  Article 2  of  Directive  2014/49/EU  and  Article  2  of 
Directive 2014/59/EU apply.  

In the absence of a relevant definition in Article 2 of Directive 2014/49/EU and 
Article  2  of  the  Directive  2014/59/EU,  the  definitions  set  out  in  Article  3  of 
Directive 2013/36/EU apply." 

5. 

in Article 4, paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 are replaced by the following : 

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"2. Where the close cooperation between a Member State and the ECB is suspended or 
terminated in accordance with Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, the entities 
referred  to  in  Article  2  of  this  Regulation  that  are  established  or  recognised  in  that 
Member State shall cease to be covered by this Regulation from the date of application 
of the decision to suspend or terminate close cooperation.  

3.  In  the  event  that  the  close  cooperation  with  the  ECB  of  a  Member State  whose 
currency is not the euro is terminated in accordance with Article 7 of Regulation (EU) 
No 1024/2013, the Board shall decide within three months after the date of adoption 
of the decision to terminate close cooperation, in agreement with that Member State, 
on the modalities for, and any conditions applicable to:  

(a) 

(b) 

the  recoupment  of  contributions  that  the  Member State  concerned  has 
transferred to the SRF; 

the transfer of contributions to DGSs officially recognised in the Member 
State  concerned  that  were  paid  into  the  DIF  by  the  credit  institutions 
affiliated to those DGSs. 

For the purposes of point (a) of the first subparagraph, recoupments shall include the 
part of the compartment corresponding to the Member State concerned not subject to 
mutualisation.  If  during  the  transitional  period,  as  laid  down  in  the  Agreement, 
recoupments of the non-mutualised part are not sufficient to permit the funding of the 
establishment by the Member State concerned of its national financial arrangement in 
accordance with Directive 2014/59/EU, recoupments shall also include the totality or a 
part  of  the  part  of  the  compartment  corresponding  to  that  Member State  subject  to 
mutualisation  in  accordance  with  the  Agreement  or  otherwise,  after  the  transitional 
period,  the  totality  or  a  part  of  the  contributions  transferred  by  the  Member State 
concerned during the close cooperation, in an amount sufficient to permit the funding 
of that national financial arrangement. 

When  assessing  the  amount  of  financial  means  to  be  recouped  from  the  mutualised 
part or otherwise, after the transitional period, from the Fund, the following additional 
criteria shall be taken into account: 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

the manner in which termination of close cooperation with the ECB has 
taken  place,  whether  voluntarily,  in  accordance  with  Article 7(6)  of 
Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, or not; 

the existence of ongoing resolution actions on the date of termination; 

the economic cycle of the Member State concerned by the termination. 

Recoupments  shall  be  distributed  during  a  limited  period  commensurate  to  the 
duration of the close cooperation. The relevant Member State's share of the financial 
means from the SRF used for resolution actions during the period of close cooperation 
shall be deducted from those recoupments. 

For the purposes of point (b) of the first subparagraph, the amount transferred to each 
DGS  officially  recognised  in  the  Member  State  concerned  shall  be  equal  to  the 
available financial means of the DIF multiplied by the ratio of (a) to (b): 

(a) 

the  amount  of  all  ex-ante  contributions  paid  to  the  DIF  by  credit 
institutions affiliated to the DGS concerned; 

(b) 

the  amount  of  all  ex-ante  contributions  paid 

to 

the  DIF. 

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The transferred amount shall not exceed the amount that is necessary for 
the available financial means of the DGS concerned to reach two-thirds 
of  its  target  level  as  defined  in  Article  10(2)  first  subparagraph  of 
Directive 2014/49/EU. 

4.  This  Regulation  shall  continue  to  apply  to  resolution  and  deposit  insurance 
proceedings which are ongoing on the date of application of a decision as referred to 
in paragraph 2."; 

6. 

in Article 5(2), the first subparagraph is replaced by the following: 

"The  Board,  the  Council  and  the  Commission  and,  where  relevant,  the  national 
resolution  authorities  and  participating  DGS,  shall  take  decisions  subject  to  and  in 
compliance  with  the  relevant  Union  law  and  in  particular  any  legislative  and  non–
legislative acts, including those referred to in Articles 290 and 291 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union."; 

7. 

Article 6 is amended as follows: 

(a)  paragraphs 1 and 2 are replaced by the following: 

"1. No action, proposal or policy of the Board, the Council, the Commission, a 
national resolution authority or a participating DGS shall discriminate against 
entities,  deposit  holders,  investors  or  other  creditors  established  in  the  Union 
on grounds of their nationality or place of business. 

2. Every action, proposal or policy of the Board, the Council, the Commission, 
a national resolution authority or a participating DGS in the framework of the 
SRM or of EDIS shall be undertaken with full regard and duty of care for the 
unity and integrity of the internal market."; 

(b)  paragraph 7 is replaced by the following:  

"7. Where the Board takes a decision that is addressed to a national resolution 
authority  or  a  participating  DGS,  the  national  resolution  authority  or 
participating  DGS  shall  have  the  right  to  specify  further  the  measures  to  be 
taken.  Such  specifications  shall  comply  with  the  decision  of  the  Board  in 
question."; 

8. 

9. 

the heading of Part II is replaced by the following: "Single Resolution Mechanism"; 

Article 19 is amended as follows:  

(a) 

in paragraph 3, the first subparagraph is replaced by the following: 

"To the extent that the resolution action as proposed by the Board involves the 
use of the Funds (SRF or DIF), the Board shall notify the Commission of the 
proposed  use  of  the  Funds.  The  Board's  notification  shall  include  all  of  the 
information  necessary  to  enable  the  Commission  to  make  its  assessments 
pursuant to this paragraph."; 

(b) 

in paragraph 3, in the third, the fifth and the seventh subparagraphs the word 
"Fund" is replaced by "Funds", making such grammar changes as necessary; 

(c) 

in paragraph 5, the second subparagraph is replaced by the following:  

"The  Board shall  pay any  amounts  received  under  the  first  subparagraph  into 
the  respective  Fund  (SRF  or  DIF)  and  take  such  amounts  into  consideration 
when determining contributions in accordance with Articles 70 and 71, and 74c 
and 74d."; 

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(d) 

in  paragraphs  7  and  10,  the  word  "Fund"  is  replaced  by  the  word  "Funds", 
making such grammar changes as necessary; 

10. 

Part IIa is inserted as follows: 

"PART IIa 
EUROPEAN DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEME (EDIS) 

TITLE I: STAGES OF EDIS 

Chapter 1 

Reinsurance 

Article 41a 
Partial funding and excess loss cover 

1.

  As  from  the  date  of  application  set  out  in  Article  99(5a),  participating  DGSs  are 
reinsured  by  EDIS  in  accordance  with  this  Chapter  for  a  period  of  three  years 
(‘reinsurance period’). 

2.

  In  case  a  participating  DGS  encounters  a  payout  event  or  is  used  in  resolution  in 
accordance with Article 79 of this Regulation, it may claim funding from the DIF of 
up to 20% of its liquidity shortfall as set out in Article 41b.  

3.

  The DIF shall also cover 20% of the excess loss of the participating DGS as set out 
in Article 41c. The participating DGS shall repay the amount of funding it obtained 
under  paragraph  2  of  this  Article,  less  the  amount  of  excess  loss  cover,  in 
accordance with the procedure set out in Article 41o. 

4.

  Neither the funding nor the excess loss cover shall exceed the lower of 20% of the 
initial target level of the DIF as set out in Article 74b(1) of this Regulation and 10 
times the target level of the participating DGS as defined in the first subparagraph of 
Article 10(2) of Directive 2014/49/EU. 

Article 41b 
Liquidity shortfall 

1.

  In case the participating DGS encounters a payout event, its liquidity shortfall shall 
be calculated as the total amount of covered deposits within the meaning of Article 
6(1) of the Directive 2014/49/EU that is held by the credit institution at the time of 
the payout event less: 

(a) 

(b) 

the amount of available financial means the participating DGS should have at 
the time of the payout event if it had raised ex-ante contributions in accordance 
with Article 41j;  

the  amount  of  extraordinary  contributions  as  defined  in  Article  10(8)  of  the 
Directive 2014/49/EU the participating DGS can raise within three days from 
the payout event. 

2.

  In case the participating DGS is used in resolution proceedings, its liquidity shortfall 
shall  be  the  amount  determined  by  the  resolution  authority  in  accordance  with 
Article 79 less the amount of available financial means the participating DGS should 

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have  at  the  time  of  the  determination  if  it  had  raised  ex-ante  contributions  in 
accordance with Article 41j. 

Article 41c 
Excess loss 

1.

  In  case  the  participating  DGS  encounters  a  payout  event,  its  excess  loss  shall  be 
calculated as the total amount it repaid to depositors in accordance with Article 8 of 
Directive 2014/49/EU less: 

(a)  

(b) 

(c) 

the amount the participating DGS recovered from subrogating to the rights of 
depositors in winding up or reorganisation proceedings under the first sentence 
of Article 9(2) of Directive 2014/49/EU; 

the amount of available financial means the participating DGS should have at 
the time of the payout event if it had raised ex-ante contributions in accordance 
with Article 41j;  

the  amount  of  ex-post  contributions  the  participating  DGS  may  raise  in 
accordance with the first sentence of the first subparagraph of Article 10(8) of 
Directive  2014/49/EU  within  one  calendar  year,  which  shall  contain  the 
amount raised in accordance with point (b) of Article 41b(1) of this Regulation. 

2.

  In  case  the  funds  of  the  participating  DGS  are  used  in  resolution  proceedings,  its 
excess loss shall be the amount determined by the resolution authority in accordance 
with Article 79 less: 

(a) 

(b)  

the  amount  of  any  difference  the  participating  DGS  was  paid  in  accordance 
with Article 75 of Directive 2014/59/EU;  

the amount of available financial means the participating DGS should have at 
the  time  of  the  determination  if  it  had  raised  ex-ante  contributions  in 
accordance with Article 41j. 

Chapter 2 
Co-insurance 

Article 41d 
Funding and loss cover  

1.

  As  from  the  end  of  the  re-insurance  period,  the  participating  DGS  shall  be  co-
insured  by  EDIS  in  accordance  with  this  Chapter  for  a  period  of  four  years  (‘co-
insurance period’). 

2.

  In  case  a  participating  DGS  encounters  a  payout  event  or  is  used  in  resolution  in 
accordance  with  Article  109  of  Directive  2014/59/EU  or  Article  79  of  this 
Regulation,  it  may  claim  funding  from  the  DIF  of  a  share  of  its  liquidity  need  as 
defined in Article 41f of this Regulation. The share shall increase in accordance with 
Article 41e. 

3.

  The DIF shall also cover a share of the loss of the participating DGS as defined by 
Article  41g.  The  share  shall  increase  in  accordance  with  Article  41e.  The 
participating DGS shall repay the amount of funding it obtained under paragraph 2, 

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less  the  amount  of  loss  cover,  in  accordance  with  the  procedure  set  out  in  Article 
41o. 

Article 41e 
Increase of funding and loss cover  

The  share  of  coverage  under  the  second  and  third  paragraph  of  Article  41d  shall  increase 
during the co-insurance period as follows: 

– 

– 

– 

– 

in the first year of the co-insurance period it shall be 20%;  

in the second year of the co-insurance period it shall 40%; 

in the third year of the co-insurance period it shall be 60%; 

in the fourth year of the co-insurance period it shall be 80%. 

Article 41f 
Liquidity need 

1.

  In case the participating DGS encounters a payout event, its liquidity need shall be 
deemed  to  be  the  total  amount  of  covered  deposits  within  the  meaning  of  Article 
6(1) of Directive 2014/49/EU that is held in the credit institution at the time of the 
payout event. 

2.

  In  case  the  participating  DGS  is  used  in  resolution  proceedings,  its  liquidity  need 
shall  be  the  amount  determined  by  the  resolution  authority  in  accordance  with 
Article 109 of Directive 2014/59/EU or Article 79 of this Regulation. 

Article 41g 
Loss 

1.

  In case the participating DGS encounters a payout event, its loss shall be the total 
amount it repaid to depositors in accordance with Article 8 of Directive 2014/49/EU 
less  the amount  the participating DGS recovered from subrogating  to  the rights  of 
depositors  in  winding  up  or  reorganisation  proceedings  under  the  first  sentence  of 
Article 9(2) of the Directive 2014/49/EU. 

2.

  In case the participating DGS is used in resolution proceedings, its loss shall be the 
amount  determined  by  the  resolution  authority  in  accordance  with  Article  109  of 
Directive  2014/59/EU  or  Article  79  of  this  Regulation  less  the  amount  of  any 
difference  the  participating  DGS  was  paid  in  accordance  with  Article  75  of 
Directive 2014/59/EU. 

Chapter 3 
Full insurance 

Article 41h 
Funding and loss cover 

1.

  As  from  the  end  of  the  co-insurance  period,  the  participating  DGS  shall  be  fully 

insured by EDIS in accordance with this Chapter. 

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2.

  In  case  a  participating  DGS  encounters  a  payout  event  or  is  used  in  resolution  in 
accordance  with  Article  109  of  Directive  2014/59/EU  or  Article  79  of  this 
Regulation, it may claim funding from the DIF for its liquidity need as defined by 
Article 41f of this Regulation. 

3.

  The DIF shall also cover the loss of the participating DGS as defined by Article 41g. 
The  participating  DGS  shall  repay  the  amount  of  funding  it  obtained  under 
paragraph 2, less the amount of loss cover, in accordance with the procedure set out 
in Article 41o. 

Chapter 4 
Common provisions 

Article 41i 
Disqualification from coverage by EDIS 

1.

  A participating DGS shall not be covered by EDIS in the reinsurance, co-insurance 
or  full  insurance  phase,  if  the  Commission,  acting  on  its  own  initiative  or  upon  a 
request of the Board or a participating Member State, decides and informs the Board 
accordingly that at least one of the following disqualifying conditions is met:  

(a) 

(b) 

the  participating  DGS  has  failed  to  comply  with  the  obligations  under  this 
Regulation or Articles 4, 6, 7 or 10 of Directive 2014/49/EU; 

the participating DGS, the relevant administrative authority within the meaning 
of  Article  3  of  Directive  2014/49/EU,  or  any  other  relevant  authority  of  the 
respective Member State have, in relation to a particular request for coverage 
by  EDIS,  acted  in  a  way  that  runs  counter  to  the  principle  of  sincere 
cooperation as laid down in Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union. 

2.

  When funding has already been obtained by a participating DGS and at least one of 
the disqualifying conditions referred to in paragraph 1 is met in relation to a payout 
event or a use in resolution, the Commission may order full or partial repayment of 
the funding to the DIF.  

Article 41j 
Funding path to be followed by participating DGSs 

1.

  A  participating  DGS  shall  only  be  reinsured,  co-insured  or  fully  insured  by  EDIS 
during the year following any of the dates set out below, if, by that date, its available 
financial  means  raised  by  contributions  referred  to  in  Article  10(1)  of  Directive 
2014/49/EU  amount  to  at  least  the  following  percentages  of  the  total  amount  of 
covered deposits of all credit institutions affiliated to the participating DGS: 

–  by 3 July 2017: 0.14%;  

–  by 3 July 2018: 0.21%; 

–  by 3 July 2019: 0.28%; 

–  by 3 July 2020: 0.28%; 

–  by 3 July 2021: 0.26%; 

–  by 3 July 2022: 0.20%; 

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–  by 3 July 2023: 0.11%; 

–  by 3 July 2024: 0%. 

2.

  The  Commission,  after  consulting  the  Board,  may  approve  a  derogation  from  the 
requirements set out in paragraph 1 for duly justified reasons linked to the business 
cycle  in  the  respective  Member  State,  the  impact  pro-cyclical  contributions  may 
have, or to a payout event which occurred at national level. Those derogations must 
be temporary and may be subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions. 

TITLE II 

PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS 

Article 41k 
Preliminary information 

Where a participating DGS has been informed by the competent authority about, or 
has  otherwise  become  aware  of,  circumstances  relating  to  a  credit  institution 
affiliated to that participating DGS that are likely to result in a payout event or its use 
in resolution proceedings, it shall inform the Board about such circumstances without 
delay  if  it  intends  to  request  coverage  by  EDIS.  In  this  case  the  participating  DGS 
shall  also  provide  the  Board  with  an  estimate  of  the  expected  liquidity  shortfall  or 
liquidity need. 

Article 41l 
Duty to notify  

1.

  In  case  a  participating  DGS  encounters  a  payout  event  or  is  used  in  resolution  in 
accordance  with  Article  109  of  Directive  2014/59/EU  or  Article  79  of  this 
Regulation,  it  shall  immediately  notify  the  Board  and  submit  all  necessary 
information  in  order  to  allow  the  Board  to  assess  whether  the  conditions  for  the 
provision of funding and loss cover in accordance with Article 41a, 41d and 41h of 
this Regulation are met. 

2.

  The participating DGS shall inform the Board in particular about: 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

the amount of covered deposits of the credit institution concerned; 

its  available  financial  means  at  the  time  of  the  payout  event  or  use  in 
resolution; 

in case of a payout event, an estimate of the extraordinary contributions it 
can raise within three days from that event;  

any  circumstances  which  would  prevent  it  from  meeting  its  obligations 
under  national  law  transposing  Directive  2014/49/EU  and  possible 
remedies. 

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Article 41m 

Determination of the amount of funding 

1.

  After receiving the notification under Article 41k, the Board shall decide within 24 
hours, in its executive session, that the conditions for coverage by EDIS have been 
met  and  shall  determine  the  amount  of  funding  that  it  will  provide  to  the 
participating DGS.  

2.

  In  case  the  Board  was  informed  in  accordance  with  Article  41k,  prior  to,  or 
simultaneously with, the notification referred to in paragraph 1, about one or more 
other  likely  payout  events  or  uses  in  resolution,  it  may  extend  the  period  of 
paragraph  1  up  to  seven  days.  If,  during  this  extended  period,  additional  payout 
events or uses in resolution are notified in accordance with Article 41k and the total 
funding  that  could  be  claimed  from  the  DIF  might  exceed  its  available  financial 
means, the funding provided for each notified payout event or use in resolution shall 
be equal to the available financial means of the DIF multiplied by the ratio of (a) to 
(b): 

(a) 

(b) 

the amount of funding that the relevant participating DGS could claim from the 
DIF  for  the  payout  event  or  use  in  resolution  if  there  were  no  other  notified 
payout event or use in resolution; 

the sum of all amounts of funding that each relevant participating DGS could 
claim from the DIF for each payout event or use in resolution if there were no 
other notified payout event or use in resolution. 

3.

  The Board shall immediately inform the participating DGS about its decision under 
paragraphs  1  and  2.  The  participating  DGS  may  request  a  review  of  the  Board’s 
decision within 24 hours after it has been informed. It shall state the reasons why it 
considers  an  amendment  to  the  Board’s  decision  necessary,  in  particular  with 
respect to the extent of coverage by EDIS. The Board shall take a decision on the 
request within another 24 hours. 

Article 41n 
Provision of funding 

The  Board  shall  provide  funding  under  Articles  41a(2),  41d(2)  and  41h(2)  in 
accordance with the following provisions: 

(a) 

(b) 

the  funding  shall  be  provided  in  the  form  of  a  cash  contribution  to  the 
participating DGS; 

the  funds  shall  be  due  immediately  after  the  determination  of  the  Board  in 
Article 41m. 

Article 41o 
Repayment of funding and determination of excess loss and loss 

1.

  The participating DGS shall repay the funding provided by the Board under Article 
41n, less the amount of any excess loss cover in case of coverage under Article 41a 
or any loss cover in case of coverage under Article 41d or Article 41h.  

2.

  Until  the  termination  of  the  insolvency  or  resolution  procedure,  the  Board  shall 
determine,  on  an  annual  basis,  the  amount  the  participating  DGS  has  already 
recovered  from  the  insolvency  procedure  or  has  already  been  paid  in  accordance 

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with Article 75 of Directive 2014/59/EU. The participating DGS shall provide to the 
Board all information necessary to make this determination. The participating DGS 
shall pay to the Board a share of that amount which corresponds to the share that is 
covered by EDIS in accordance with Article 41a, Article 41d or Article 41h. 

3.

  In  case  of  coverage  under  Article  41a,  the  participating  DGS  shall  also  pay  to  the 
Board,  by  the  end  of  the  first  calendar  year  after  the  funding  was  provided,  an 
amount  equal  to  the  ex-post  contributions  that  the  participating  DGS  may  raise 
within  one  calendar  year  in  accordance  with  the  first  sentence  of  the  first 
subparagraph of Article 10(8) of Directive 2014/49/EU, less the amount of ex-post 
contributions  it  raised  in  accordance  with  point  (b)  of  Article  41b(1)  of  this 
Regulation. 

4.

  After  the  termination  of  the  insolvency  procedure  or  resolution  procedure  of  the 
credit institution concerned, the Board shall without delay determine the excess loss 
in  accordance  with  Article  41d  or  the  loss  in  accordance  with  Article  41h.  Where 
this  determination  results  in  a  repayment  obligation  of  the  participating  DGS  that 
differs from the amounts repaid in accordance with the second and third paragraph, 
the difference shall be settled between the Board and the participating DGS without 
delay. 

Article 41p 
Monitoring of payouts to depositors and use in resolution 

1.

  Following  the  provision  of  funding  in  case  of  a  payout  event  in  accordance  with 
Article 41n, the Board shall closely monitor the payout procedure conducted by the 
participating DGS and in particular its use of the cash contribution. 

2.

  The participating DGS shall provide, at regular intervals established by the Board, 
accurate, reliable and complete information on the payout procedure, the exercise of 
the  rights  it  subrogated  into,  or  any  other  matter  that  is  relevant  for  the  effective 
implementation  of  the  Board’s  actions  provided  for  in  this  Regulation  or  for  the 
exercise of the powers of the participating DGS in the Directive 2014/49/EU or this 
Regulation. The  participating  DGS  shall  inform  the  Board, on  a  daily  basis,  about 
the  total  amount  repaid  to  depositors,  the  use  of  the  cash  contribution,  and  any 
difficulties it encountered. 

Article 41q 
Monitoring of insolvency procedure 

1.

  Following  the  provision  of  funding  in  case  of  a  payout  event  in  accordance  with 
Article 41n of this Regulation, the Board shall monitor the insolvency procedure of 
the credit  institution concerned and in particular the participating DGS’s efforts to 
collect on the deposit claims it subrogated to in accordance with the first sentence of 
Article 9(2) of Directive 2014/49/EU. 

2.

  The participating  DGS shall  maximise  its proceeds from the insolvency estate and 
shall  be  liable  towards  the  Board  for  any  amounts  not  recovered  due  to  a  lack  of 
diligence.  The  Board  may  decide,  after  hearing  the  participating  DGS,  to  exercise 
itself all rights arising under the deposit claims mentioned in paragraph 1."; 

11. 

Article 43 is amended as follows: 

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(a) 

in paragraph 1, the full stop at the end of point (c) is replaced by a semicolon 
and the following point (d) is added: 

"(d)  a  member  appointed  by  each  participating  Member  State,  representing 
their designated authority."; 

(b)  paragraph 2 is replaced by the following: 

"2.  Each  member,  including  the  Chair,  shall  have  one  vote  except  where  the 
Board  meets  in  the  joint  plenary  session  in  accordance  with  Article  49b  in 
which  case  the  members  appointed  by  a  participating  Member  State  under 
paragraph 1(c) and (d) shall together have one vote."; 

(c) 

in paragraph 3, the first subparagraph is replaced by the following:  

"The Commission and the ECB shall each designate a representative entitled to 
participate  in  the  meetings  of  executive  sessions,  plenary  sessions  and  joint 
plenary sessions as a permanent observer."; 

(d)  paragraphs 4 and 5 are replaced by the following: 

"4. In the event of more than one national resolution authority or respectively 
more than one national designated authority in a participating Member State, a 
second representative shall be allowed to participate as observer without voting 
rights. 

5. The Board's administrative and management structure shall comprise: 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

(e) 

a joint plenary session which shall perform the tasks referred to in 
Article 49b; 

a plenary session of the Board in accordance with Articles 49 and 
49a,  which  shall  perform  the  tasks  referred  to  in  Article  50  and 
respectively Article 50a; 

an  executive  session  of  the  Board,  which  shall  perform  the  tasks 
referred to in Article 54; 

a Chair, which shall perform the tasks referred to in Article 56; 

a Secretariat, which shall provide the necessary administrative and 
technical support on the performing of all the tasks assigned to the 
Board."; 

12. 

Article 45 is amended as follows: 

(a) 

(b) 

in  paragraphs  4  and  5,  the  words  "the  resolutions  tasks"  are  replaced  by  "the 
resolution and the deposit insurance tasks", making such grammar changes as 
necessary; 

in paragraph 7, the words "as a national resolution authority" are replaced by 
"as  a  national  resolution  authority  or  as  a  national  DGS  or  designated 
authority", making such grammar changes as necessary; 

13. 

in Article 46(4), the words "national resolution authorities" are replaced by "national 
resolution  authorities  or  of  national  DGS  or  designated  authorities",  making  such 
grammar changes as necessary; 

14. 

in Article 47, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: 

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"1. When performing the tasks conferred on them by this Regulation, the Board, the 
national  resolution  authorities,  the  national  DGS  or  designated  authorities  shall  act 
independently and in the general interest."; 

15. 

in Part III, the heading of Title II "Plenary session of the Board" is replaced by "Joint 
plenary session and plenary sessions of the Board"; 

16. 

the following Article 48a is inserted: 

"Article 48a 
Participation in joint plenary sessions 

All  members  of  the  Board  referred  to  in  Article  43(1)  shall  participate  in  its  joint 
plenary sessions."; 

17. 

Article 49 is replaced by the following: 

"Article 49 
Participation in plenary sessions relating to the Single Resolution Mechanism 

The members of the Board referred to in points (a), (b) and (c) of Article 43(1) shall 
participate in its plenary sessions relating to the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM 
plenary session)."; 

18. 

the following Articles 49a and 49b are inserted: 

"Article 49a 
Participation in plenary sessions relating to the European Deposit Insurance Scheme 

The members of the Board referred to in points (a), (b) and (d) of Article 43(1) shall 
participate in its plenary sessions relating to EDIS (EDIS plenary session). 

Article 49b 
Tasks of the joint plenary session of the Board 

1.

  In its joint plenary session, the Board shall: 

(a) 

(b) 

adopt, by 30 November each year, the Board's annual work programme for the 
following year, based on a draft put forward by the Chair and shall transmit it 
for information to the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, and 
the ECB; 

adopt and monitor the annual budget of the Board in accordance with Article 
61(2), and approve the Board's final accounts and give discharge to the Chair 
in accordance with Article 63(4) and (8); 

(c)  decide on the investments in accordance with Article 75; 

(d) 

(e) 

(f) 

(g) 

(h) 

adopt the annual activity report on the Board's activities referred to in Article 
45,  which  shall  present  detailed  explanations  on  the  implementation  of  the 
budget; 

adopt the financial rules applicable to the Board in accordance with Article 64; 

adopt an anti-fraud strategy, proportionate to fraud risks taking into account the 
costs and benefits of the measures to be implemented; 

adopt  rules  for  the  prevention  and  management  of  conflicts  of  interest  in 
respect of its members; 

adopt its rules of procedure and those of the Board in its plenary and executive 
sessions under this Regulation; 

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(i) 

(j) 

(k) 

(l) 

in  accordance  with  paragraph  3  of  this  Article,  exercise,  with  respect  to  the 
staff  of  the  Board,  the  powers  conferred  by  the  Staff  Regulations  on  the 
Appointing Authority and by the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants 
of  the  European  Union  as  laid  down  by  Council  Regulation  (EEC,  Euratom, 
ECSC) No 259/68 (''Conditions of Employment'') on the Board Empowered to 
Conclude a Contract of Employment ("the appointing authority powers"); 

adopt appropriate implementing rules for giving effect to the Staff Regulations 
and the Conditions of Employment in accordance with Article 110 of the Staff 
Regulations; 

appoint  an  Accounting  Officer,  subject  to  the  Staff  Regulations  and  the 
Conditions  of  Employment,  who  shall  be  functionally  independent  in  the 
performance of his or her duties; 

ensure  adequate  follow  up  to  findings  and  recommendations  stemming  from 
the  internal  or  external  audit  reports  and  evaluations,  as  well  as  from 
investigations of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF); 

(m) 

take  all  decisions  on  the  establishment  of  the  Board's  internal  structures  and, 
where necessary, their modification. 

2.

  When taking decisions, the joint plenary session of the Board shall act in accordance 

with the objectives as specified in Articles 6 and 14. 

3.

  In its joint plenary session, the Board shall adopt, in accordance with Article 110 of 
the Staff Regulations, a decision based on Article 2(1) of the Staff Regulations and 
on  Article  6  of  the  Conditions  of  Employment,  delegating  relevant  appointing 
authority  powers  to  the  Chair  and  establishing  the  conditions  under  which  the 
delegation  of  powers  can  be  suspended.  The  Chair  shall  be  authorised  to  sub–
delegate those powers.  

In exceptional circumstances, the Board in its joint plenary session may by way of a 
decision temporarily suspend the delegation of the appointing authority powers to the 
Chair and any sub delegation by the latter and exercise them itself or delegate them 
to one of its members or to a staff member other than the Chair."; 

19. 

Article 50 is replaced by the following: 

"Article 50 
Tasks of the Board in its SRM plenary session  

1.

  In its SRM plenary session, the Board shall: 

(a) 

subject  to  the  procedure  referred  to  in  paragraph  2,  decide  on  the  use  of  the 
Fund,  if  the  support  of  the  Fund  in  that  specific  resolution  action  is  required 
above the threshold of EUR 5 000 000 000 for which the weighting of liquidity 
support is 0,5; 

(b)  once  the  net  accumulated  use  of  the  Fund  in  the  last  consecutive  12  months 
reaches  the  threshold  of  EUR  5  000  000  000,  evaluate  the  application  of  the 
resolution tools, in particular the use of the Fund, and provide guidance which 
the  executive  session  shall  follow  in  subsequent  resolution  decisions,  in 
particular,  if  appropriate,  differentiating  between  liquidity  and  other  forms  of 
support; 

(c)  decide  on  the  necessity  to  raise  extraordinary  ex  post  contributions  in 
accordance  with  Article  71,  on  the  voluntary  borrowing  between  financing 

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arrangements in accordance with Article 72, on alternative financing means in 
accordance  with  Articles  73  and  74,  and  on  the  mutualisation  of  national 
financing arrangements in accordance with Article 78, involving support of the 
Fund above the threshold referred to in point (c) of this paragraph; 

(d) 

approve  the  framework  referred  to  in  Article  31(1)  to  organise  the  practical 
arrangements for the cooperation with the national resolution authorities. 

2.

  When taking decisions, the plenary session of the Board shall act in accordance with 

the objectives as specified in Articles 6 and 14. 

For the purposes of point (a) of paragraph 1, the resolution scheme prepared by the 
executive  session  is  deemed  to  be  adopted  unless,  within  three  hours  from  the 
submission of the draft by the executive session to the plenary session, at least one 
member  of  the  plenary  session  has  called  a  meeting  of  the  plenary  session.  In  the 
latter  case,  a  decision  on  the  resolution  scheme  shall  be  taken  by  the  plenary 
session."; 

20. 

The following Article 50a is inserted: 

"Article 50a 
Tasks of the Board in its EDIS plenary session 

1.

  In its EDIS plenary session, the Board shall: 

(a)  once  the  net  accumulated  use  of  the  DIF  in  the  last  consecutive  12  months 
reaches the threshold of 25% of the final target level, evaluate the application 
of  EDIS,  in  particular  the  use  of  the  DIF,  and  provide  guidance  which  the 
executive session shall follow in subsequent payout decisions, in particular, if 
appropriate, differentiating between the provision of funding and loss cover; 

(b)  decide  on  the  extension  of  the  period  referred  to  in  Article  41m(1)  in 

accordance with Article 41m(2); 

(c)  decide  on  the  voluntary  borrowing  between  financing  arrangements  in 
accordance with Article 74f, on alternative funding means in accordance with 
Articles 74g; 

(d)  decide, upon referral  of the executive session  in cases  of paragraph 1 or  2 of 
Article  41i,  whether  the  disqualifying  condition  laid  down  in  point  (b)  of 
Article 41i(1) is met. 

2.

  When taking decisions, the plenary session of the Board shall act in accordance with 

the objectives specified Article 6."; 

21. 

Article 51 is replaced by the following:  

"Article 51 
Meetings of the joint plenary and the SRM and EDIS plenary sessions of the Board 

1.

  The Chair shall convene and chair meetings of the joint plenary and the SRM and 
EDIS plenary sessions of the Board in accordance with point (a) of Article 56(2). 

2.

  The Board, in its joint plenary session, shall hold at least two ordinary meetings per 
year. In addition, it shall meet on the initiative of the Chair, or at the request of at 
least one third of its members.  The representative of the Commission  may request 
the Chair to convene a meeting of the Board in its joint plenary or respectively SRM 
or EDIS plenary session. The Chair shall provide reasons in writing if he or she does 
not convene a meeting in due time. 

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3.

  Where  relevant,  the  Board  may  invite  observers  in  addition  to  those  referred  in 
Article 43(3) to participate in the meetings of its joint plenary or respectively SRM 
or EDIS plenary session on an ad hoc basis, including a representative of EBA. 

4.

  The Board shall provide for the secretariat of the joint plenary or plenary session of 

the Board."; 

22. 

Article 52 is replaced by the following: 

"Article 52 
General provisions on the decision-making process 

1.

  The Board, in its joint plenary or respectively SRM or EDIS plenary session, shall 
take its decisions by a simple majority of its members, unless otherwise provided for 
in this Regulation. Each voting member shall have one vote. In the event of a tie, the 
Chair shall have a casting vote. 

2.

  By way of derogation from paragraph 1, decisions referred to in points (a) and (b) of 
Article 50(1), point (a) of Article 50a(1) as well as on the mutualisation of national 
financing  arrangements  in  accordance  with  Article 78,  limited  to  the  use  of  the 
financial means available in the SRF or respectively in the DIF, shall be taken by a 
simple majority of the Board members, representing at least 30 % of contributions. 
Each voting member shall have one vote. In the event of a tie, the Chair shall have a 
casting vote. 

3.

  By  way  of  derogation  from  paragraph 1  of  this  Article,  decisions  referred  to  in 
Article 50(1) or Article 50a(1), which involve the raising of ex-post contributions in 
accordance  with  Article 71  or  Article  74d,  on  voluntary  borrowing  between 
financing arrangements in accordance with Article 72 or Article 74f, on alternative 
financing means in accordance with Article 73, Article 74 or Article 74g, as well as 
on  the  mutualisation  of  national  financing  arrangements  in  accordance  with 
Article 78, exceeding the use of the financial means available in the SRF or in the 
DIF, shall be taken by a majority of two thirds of the Board members, representing 
at  least 50 %  of  contributions  during  the  transitional  period  until  the  SRF  is  fully 
mutualised  and  respectively  the  DIF  has  reached  its  final  target  level  and  by  a 
majority  of  two  thirds  of  the  Board  members,  representing  at  least 30 %  of 
contributions from then on. Each voting member shall have one vote. In the event of 
a tie, the Chair shall have a casting vote. 

4.

  By  way  of  derogation  from  paragraph 1  of  this  Article,  the  decision  referred  to  in 
point (d) of Article 50a(1) shall be taken by a majority of two thirds of the Board 
members. Each voting member shall have one vote. In the event of a tie, the Chair 
shall have a casting vote. 

5.

  The  Board  shall  adopt  and  make  public  its  rules  of  procedure.  The  rules  of 
procedure  shall  establish  more  detailed  voting  arrangements,  in  particular  the 
circumstances  in  which  a  member  may  act  on  behalf  of  another  member  and 
including, where appropriate, the rules governing quorums."; 

23. 

Article 53 is amended as follows: 

(a) 

in  paragraph  1,  in  the  third  subparagraph  the  words  "national  resolution 
authorities"  are  replaced  by  "national  resolution  authorities  or  national 
designated authorities", making such grammar changes as necessary; 

(b) 

in paragraph 2, the reference to "Article 43(1)(c)" is replaced by the following: 
"Article 43(1)(c) or where relevant Article 43(1)(d)"; 

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(c)  paragraph 3 is replaced by the following: 

"3.  When  deliberating  on  an  entity  referred  to  in  Article  2  or  a  group  of 
entities  established  only  in  one  participating  Member  State  or  on  a  deposit 
insurance  action  or  decision,  the  relevant  member  appointed  by  that  Member 
State  under  Article  43(1)(c)  or  43(1)(d)  shall  also  participate  in  the 
deliberations  and  in  the  decision-making  process,  and  the  rules  laid  down  in 
Article 55(1) shall apply."; 

(d)  paragraph 5 is replaced by the following: 

"5.  The  members  of  the  Board  referred  to  in  Article  43(1)(a)  and  (b)  shall 
ensure  that  the  resolution  and  deposit  insurance  decisions  and  actions,  in 
particular with regard to the use of the SRF and respectively of the DIF, across 
the  different  formations  of  the  executive  sessions  of  the  Board,  are  coherent, 
appropriate and proportionate."; 

24. 

Article 54 is amended as follows: 

(a)  paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: 

"1. 

The Board, in its executive session, shall: 

(a)  prepare all of the decisions to be adopted by the Board in its joint plenary 

or its SRM and EDIS plenary sessions, respectively; 

(b) 

take  all  of  the  decisions  to  implement  this  Regulation,  unless  this 
Regulation provides otherwise."; 

(b) 

in paragraph 2, the full stop at the end of point (e) is replaced by a semicolon 
and the following points are added: 

"(f) 

determine the amount of funding in accordance with Article 41l; 

determine  the  payout  loss  and  loss  cover  in  accordance  with  Article 

(g)  
41o; 

(h) 

decide to exercise the rights arsing under Article 41q."; 

(c)  paragraphs 3 and 4 are replaced by the following: 

"3.  Where  necessary  because  of  urgency,  the  Board  in  its  executive  session 
may  take  certain  provisional  decisions  on  behalf  of  the  Board  in  its  joint 
plenary  or  its  SRM  and  EDIS  plenary  sessions  respectively,  in  particular  on 
administrative management matters, including budgetary matters. 

4. The Board in its executive session shall keep the Board in its joint plenary or 
its  SRM  and  EDIS  plenary  sessions  respectively  informed  of  the  decisions  it 
takes on resolution or deposit insurance."; 

25. 

Article 56 is amended as follows:  

(a) 

in paragraph 1: 

(i) point (a) is replaced by the following: 

"(a) preparing the work of the Board, in its joint plenary, plenary and executive 
sessions, and convening and chairing its meetings;"; 

(ii) in point (g), the words "on the resolution activities" are replaced by "on the 
resolution  and  on  the  deposit  insurance  activities",  making  such  grammar 
changes as necessary; 

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(b) 

in paragraph 4, in the first sentence the words "bank resolution" are replaced by 
"bank  resolution  and  deposit  guarantee",  making  such  grammar  changes  as 
necessary; 

26. 

in Article 58, paragraph 3 is replaced by the following: 

The budget shall comprise three parts: Part I for the administration of 

"3. 
the Board, Part II for the SRF and Part III for the DIF.". 

27. 

in Article 59, paragraph 3 is replaced by the following: 

"3.  This  Article  is  without  prejudice  to  the  right  of  the  national  resolution 
authorities,  participating  DGS  and  designated  authorities  to  levy  fees  in 
accordance with national law, in respect of their administrative expenditures of 
the  types  referred  to  in  paragraphs 1  and 2,  including  expenditures  for 
cooperating with and assisting the Board."; 

28. 

the following Article 60a is inserted: 

"Article 60a 

Part III of the Budget 

1.

  The revenues of Part III of the budget shall consist, in particular, of the following: 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

contributions paid by institutions affiliated to participating DGSs in accordance 
with Article 74c and Article 74d; 

loans  received  from  deposit  guarantee  schemes  in  non-participating  Member 
States in accordance with Article 74f; 

loans  received  from  financial  institutions  or  other  third  parties  in  accordance 
with Article 74g; 

returns on the investments of the amounts held in the DIF in accordance with 
Article 75; 

(e) 

funding repaid by participating DGSs in accordance with Article 41o. 

2.

  The expenditure of Part III of the budget shall consist of the following: 

(a) 

funding provided to participating DGSs for the purposes of Article 41a, Article 
41d or Article 41h; 

(b) 

investments in accordance with Article 75; 

(c) 

interest  paid  on  loans  received  from  other  deposit  guarantee  financing 
arrangements  in  non-participating  Member States  in  accordance  with  Article 
74f; 

(d) 

interest paid on loans received from financial institutions or other third parties 
in accordance with Article 74g."; 

29. 

30. 

in Article 61(2), the words "in its plenary session" are replaced by the words "in its 
joint plenary session"; 

in Article 63(8), the words "in its plenary session" are replaced by the words "in its 
joint plenary session"; 

31. 

Article 65 is amended as follows: 

(a)  paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: 

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"1. Entities referred to in Article 2(1) and respectively point (b) of Article 2(2) 
shall  contribute  to  Part  I  of  the  budget  of  the  Board  in  accordance  with  this 
Regulation  and  the  delegated  acts  on  contributions  adopted  pursuant  to 
paragraph 5 of this Article."; 

(b) 

in paragraph 5, point (a) is replaced by the following: 

"(a) determine the type of contributions, the matters for which contributions are 
due, taking into account the different tasks of the Board under this Regulation 
for  the  purposes  of  SRM  and  EDIS,  the  manner  in  which  the  amount  of  the 
contributions is calculated, and the way in which they are to be paid;"; 

32. 

33. 

in Title V of Part III, the heading of Chapter 2 is replaced by "The Single Resolution 
Fund and the Deposit Insurance Fund"; 

in  Chapter  2  of  Title  V  of  Part  III,  the  heading  of  Section  1  is  replaced  by 
"Constitution of the Single Resolution Fund"; 

34. 

in Chapter 2 of Title V of Part III, the following section is inserted: 

"SECTION 1A 
CONSTITUTION OF THE DEPOSIT INSURANCE FUND 

Article 74a 
General Provisions 

1.

  The DIF is hereby established. It shall be filled by contributions owed to the Board 
by  credit  institutions  affiliated  to  participating  DGSs.  The  contributions  shall  be 
calculated and invoiced, on behalf of the Board, by participating DGSs. 

2.

  The Board shall use the DIF only in order to provide the funding to, and cover the 
losses  of,  participating  DGS  in  the  different  stages  set  out  in  Article  1(2)  and  in 
accordance  with  the  objectives  and  the  principles  governing  EDIS  referred  to  in 
Article 6. Under no circumstances shall the Union budget or the national budgets be 
held liable for expenses or losses of the Fund. 

3.

  The  owner  of  the  DIF  shall  be  the  Board.  The  Board's  activities  under  this 
Regulation  may  under  no  circumstances  engage  the  budgetary  liability  of  the 
Member States. 

Article 74b 
Target levels of the Deposit Insurance Fund 

1.

  By the end of the reinsurance period the available financial means of the DIF shall 
reach an initial target level of 20% of four ninth of the sum of the minimum target 
levels that participating DGSs shall reach in accordance with the first subparagraph 
of Article 10(2) of Directive 2014/49/EU. 

2.

  By the end of the co-insurance period the available financial means of the DIF shall 
reach  the  sum  of  the  minimum  target  levels  that  participating  DGSs  shall  reach 
under the first subparagraph of Article 10(2) of Directive 2014/49/EU. 

3.

  During the reinsurance and co-insurance periods contributions to the DIF calculated 
in accordance with Article 74c shall be spread out in time as evenly as possible until 
the respective target level is reached. 

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4.

  After the target level specified in paragraph 2 has been reached for the first time and 
where  the  available  financial  means  have  subsequently  been  reduced  to  less  than 
two-thirds of the target level, the contributions calculated in accordance with Article 
74c shall be set at a level allowing to reach the target level within six years. 

5.

  The  Commission  shall  be  empowered  to  adopt  delegated  acts  in  accordance  with 

Article 93 to specify the following: 

(a) 

criteria for the spreading out in time of the contributions to the DIF calculated 
under paragraph 2; 

(b) 

criteria for establishing the annual contributions provided for in paragraph 4. 

Article 74c 
Ex-ante contributions 

1.

  Each  year  during  the  reinsurance  and  co-insurance  period,  the  Board  shall,  after 
consulting  the  ECB  and  the  national  competent  authority  and  in  close  cooperation 
with  the  participating  DGSs  and  designated  authorities,  determine  for  each 
participating DGS the total amount of ex-ante contributions that it may claim from 
the credit institutions affiliated to the respective participating DGS in order to reach 
the target levels provided for in Article 74b. The total amount of contributions shall 
not exceed the target levels provided for in Article 74b (1) and (2). 

2.

   During the reinsurance period each participating DGS shall calculate, on the basis 
of the total amount determined by the Board under paragraph 1, the contribution of 
each credit institution affiliated to it. It shall apply the risk-based method established 
by the delegated act according to the second subparagraph of paragraph 5. 

After the reinsurance period, the Board itself shall calculate the contribution of each 
credit institution affiliated to a participating DGS. The Board shall apply the risk-
based method established by the delegated act according to the third subparagraph 
of paragraph 5. 

In all stages of EDIS the participating DGS shall invoice, on behalf of the Board, 
the  contribution  of  each  credit  institution  on  an  annual  basis.  Credit  institutions 
shall pay the invoiced amount directly to the Board. The contributions shall become 
due on 31 May of each year. 

3.

  The duly received contributions of each credit institution referred to in Article 2(2) 

shall not be reimbursed to those entities. 

4.

  The  contributions  that  credit  institutions  affiliated  to  a  participating  DGS  pay  into 
the  DIF  in  accordance  with  this  Article  shall  count  towards  the  minimum  target 
level  that  the  participating  DGS  shall  reach  in  accordance  with  the  first 
subparagraph of Article 10(2) of Directive 2014/49/EU. If the participating DGS, by 
3 July  2024 or  any later date, has  followed the funding path set out  in  Article 41j 
and  credit institutions  affiliated to it paid to the DIF all ex-ante contributions that, 
until 3 July 2024, had to be paid to the DIF, these contributions shall constitute the 
full contribution owed in order to reach the target level in accordance with the first 
subparagraph of Article 10(2) of Directive 2014/49/EU. 

Member  States  may  provide  that  a  participating  DGS  may  consider  the 
contributions  that  credit  institutions  affiliated  to  it  paid  into  the  DIF  when  setting 
the  level  of  their  ex-ante  contributions  or  may  reimburse  these  credit  institutions 

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from its available financial means to the extent they exceed the amounts set out in 
Article 41j on the relevant date. 

5.

  The  Commission  shall  be  empowered  to  adopt  delegated  acts  in  accordance  with 
Article  93  in  order  to  specify  a  risk-based  method  for  the  calculation  of 
contributions in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article. 

It  shall  adopt  one  delegated  act  specifying  the  method  for  the  calculation  of 
contributions payable to participating DGSs and, for the reinsurance period only, to 
the  DIF.  In  this  delegated  act  the  calculation  shall  be  based  on  the  amount  of 
covered deposits and the degree of risk incurred by each credit institution relative to 
all other credit institutions affiliated to the same participating DGS.  

It shall adopt a second delegated act specifying the method for the calculation of the 
contributions  payable  to  the  DIF  as  from  the  co-insurance  period.  In  this  second 
delegated act the calculation shall be based on the amount of covered deposits and 
the  degree  of  risk  incurred  by  each  credit  institution  relative  to  all  other  credit 
institutions referred to in point (b) of Article 2(2). 

Both  delegated  acts  shall  include  a  calculation  formula,  specific  indicators,  risk 
classes  for  members,  thresholds  for  risk  weights  assigned  to  specific  risk  classes, 
and other necessary elements. The degree of risk shall be assessed on the basis of 
the following criteria: 

(a) 

the level of loss absorbing capacity of the institution; 

(b) 

the institution’s ability to meet its short- and long-term obligations; 

(c) 

the  stability  and  variety  of  the  institutions  sources  of  funding  and  its 
unencumbered highly liquid assets’; 

(d) 

the quality of the institution’s assets; 

(e) 

(f) 

the institution’s business model and management; 

the degree to which the institution’s assets are encumbered. 

Article 74d 
Extraordinary ex-post contributions 

1.

  Where, after the reinsurance period, the available financial means are not sufficient 
to cover the losses, costs or other expenses incurred by the DIF following a payout 
event,  extraordinary  ex-post  contributions  from  the  credit  institutions  affiliated  to 
participating  DGSs  shall  be  raised  in  order  to  cover  the  additional  amounts. 
Notwithstanding  paragraphs  2  and  3,  the  amount  of  ex-post  contributions  to  be 
raised shall be equal to the shortfall of available financial means but shall not exceed 
the  maximum  share  of  total  covered  deposits  of  all  credit  institutions  within  the 
scope  of  EDIS  laid  down  by  delegated  act  of  the  Commission  in  accordance  with 
paragraph 5. 

2.

  The Board shall itself calculate the contribution of each credit-institution affiliated 
to  each  participating  DGS.  It  shall  apply  the  risk-based  method  specified  in  the 
delegated act adopted by the Commission in accordance with the third subparagraph 
of Article 74c(5). 

The third subparagraph of Article 74c(2) shall apply by analogy. 

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3.

  The  Board  shall,  on  its  own  initiative  after  consulting  the  relevant  competent 
authority, or upon proposal by the relevant competent authority, defer, in whole or 
in  part,  in  accordance  with  the  delegated  acts  referred  to  in  paragraph  4,  an 
institution's  payment  of  extraordinary  ex-post  contributions  if  it  is  necessary  to 
protect  its  financial  position.  Such  a  deferral  shall  not  be  granted  for  a  period  of 
longer  than  six  months  but  may  be  renewed  on  request  of  the  institution.  The 
contributions  deferred  pursuant  to  this  paragraph  shall  be  made  later  at  a  point  in 
time when the payment no longer jeopardises the institution's financial position. 

4.

  The  Commission  shall  be  empowered  to  adopt  delegated  acts  in  accordance  with 
Article  93  to  specify  the  annual  limits  referred  to  in  paragraph  1  and  the 
circumstances and conditions under which the payment of ex-post contributions by 
an entity referred to in point (b) of Article 2(2) may be partially or entirely deferred 
pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article. 

Article 74e 
Implementation of decisions under this Regulation 

1.

  The  participating  DGS  shall  take  the  necessary  action  to  implement  decisions 

referred to in this Regulation. 

Subject  to  this  Regulation,  the  participating  DGS  shall  exercise  its  powers  under 
national  law  transposing  the  Directive  2014/49/EU  and  in  accordance  with  the 
conditions laid down in national law. The participating DGS shall fully inform the 
Board of the exercise of those powers. 

2.

  Where a participating DGS has not applied or has not complied with a decision by 
the Board pursuant to this Regulation or has applied it in a way which poses a threat 
to the efficient implementation of EDIS and to the objectives of this Regulation, the 
Board  may  order  the  participating  DGS  to  adopt  any  necessary  action  to  comply 
with the decision in question. 

3.

  Where a participating DGS addressed a decision to a credit institution affiliated to it, 
including the invoicing of contributions, and the credit institution has intentionally 
or  negligently  not  complied  with  that  decision,  the  Board  shall  take  a  decision 
imposing a fine on the credit institution in accordance with Article 38. 

Article 74f 
Voluntary lending to and borrowing from non-participating DGS 

1.

  The  Board  shall  decide  to  make  a  request  to  borrow  for  the  DIF  from  deposit 

guarantee schemes within non-participating Member States in the event that: 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

the amounts raised under Article 74c are not sufficient to cover the losses, costs 
or  other  expenses  incurred  by  the  use  of  the  DIF  in  relation  to  resolution 
actions; 

the  extraordinary  ex-post  contributions  provided  for  in  Article  74d  are  not 
immediately accessible;  

the alternative funding means provided for in Article 74g are not immediately 
accessible on reasonable terms. 

2.

  Those deposit guarantee schemes shall decide on such a request in accordance with 

Article 12 of Directive 2014/49/EU. 

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3.

  The  Board  may  decide  to  lend  to  other  deposit  guarantee  schemes  within  non-
participating Member States upon request. Article 12 of Directive 2014/49/EU shall 
apply by analogy with respect to the borrowing conditions. 

Article 74g 
Alternative funding means 

1.

  The  Board  may  contract  for  the  DIF  borrowings  or  other  forms  of  support  from 
institutions, financial institutions or other third parties, which offer better financial 
terms,  at  the  most  appropriate  time  so  as  to  optimise  the  cost  of  funding  and 
preserve its reputation. The proceeds of such borrowings shall be used exclusively 
to  meet  payment  obligations  towards  participating  DGSs,  in  the  event  that  the 
amounts  raised  in  accordance  with  Articles  74c  and  74d  are  not  immediately 
accessible or do not cover the amounts claimed from the DIF in relation to payout 
events. 

2.

  The  borrowing  or  other  forms  of  support  referred  to  in  paragraph  1  shall  be  fully 

recouped in accordance with Articles 74c and 74d. 

3.

  Any expenses incurred by the use of the borrowings specified in paragraph 1 shall 
be borne by Part III of the budget of the Board and not by the Union budget or the 
participating Member States. 

4.

  The  Board  may  decide  to  invest  proceeds  from  borrowings  in  accordance  with 

Article 75 in order to protect their real value."; 

35. 

in  Chapter  2  of  Title  V  of  Part  III,  the  heading  of  Section  2  is  replaced  by 
"Administration of the SRF and DIF". 

36. 

Article 75 is replaced by the following: 

"Article 75 
Investments 

1.

  The Board shall administer the SRF and the DIF in accordance with this Regulation 

and delegated acts adopted under paragraph 4. 

2.

  The amounts received from an institution under resolution or a bridge institution, the 
interests and other earnings on investments and any other earnings shall benefit only 
the SRF and the DIF. 

3.

  The Board shall have a prudent and safe investment strategy that is provided for in 
the delegated acts adopted pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article, and shall invest 
the  amounts  held  in  the  SRF  and  the  DIF  in  obligations  of  the  Member  States  or 
intergovernmental organisations, or in highly liquid assets of high creditworthiness, 
taking into account the delegated act referred to in Article 460 of Regulation (EU) 
No  575/2013  as  well  as  other  relevant  provisions  of  that  Regulation.  Investments 
shall  be  sufficiently  sectorally,  geographically  and  proportionally  diversified.  The 
return on those investments shall benefit the SRF and the DIF respectively. 

4.

  The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts on the detailed rules 
for the administration of the SRF and the DIF and general principles and criteria for 
their  investment  strategy,  in  accordance  with  the  procedure  laid  down  in 
Article 93."; 

37. 

the following Article 77a is inserted: 

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"Article 77a 
Use of the DIF 

1.

  During the reinsurance period the Board shall use the DIF to provide the funding in 
accordance with  Article 41a(2)  and cover a  share of the excess  loss in  accordance 
with Article 41a(3). 

2.

  During and after the co-insurance period the Board shall use the DIF to provide the 
funding  in  accordance  with  Article  41d(2)  and  Article  41h(2),  respectively,  and 
cover the loss in accordance with Article 41d(3) and 41h(3), respectively. 

3.

  The  use  of  the  DIF  with  respect  to  a  credit  institution  affiliated  to  a  participating 
DGS  shall  be  contingent  upon  compliance  by  this  credit  institution  with  the 
obligations  incumbent  on  it  as  a  member  of  the  participating  DGS  set  out  in  this 
Regulation and in Directive 2014/49/EU."; 

38. 

in Title VI of Part III, in Article 81(4), Article 83(2) and (3), Article 87(4), Article 
88(2)  and  (6),  the  words  "national  resolution  authority"  are  replaced  by  "national 
resolution  authority,  participating  DGS  or  designated  authorities  where  relevant"  
and  the  words  "national  resolution  authorities"  are  replaced  by  "national  resolution 
authorities, participating DGS or designated authorities where relevant"; 

39. 

Article 93 is amended as follows: 

(a)  paragraph 2 is replaced by the following: 

"2.  The  delegation  of  power  referred  to  in  Article 19(8),  Article 65(5), 
Article 69(5), Article 71(3), Article 74b (5), Article 74c (5), Article 74d(4) and 
Article  75(4)  shall  be conferred  for  an  indeterminate  period  of  time  from  the 
relevant dates referred to in Article 99."; 

(b)  paragraph 4 is replaced by the following: 

"4.  The  delegation  of  power  referred  to  in  Article 19(8),  Article 65(5), 
Article 69(5), Article 71(3), Article 74b (5), Article 74c (5), Article 74d(4) and 
Article 75(4) may be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the 
Council.  A  decision  of  revocation  shall  put  an  end  to  the  delegation  of  the 
power  specified  in  that  decision.  It  shall  take  effect  the  day  following  the 
publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the European Union or at 
a  later  date  specified  therein.  It  shall  not  affect  the  validity  of  any  delegated 
acts already in force."; 

(c)  paragraph 6 is replaced by the following: 

to  Article 19(8),  Article 65(5), 
"6.  A  delegated  act  adopted  pursuant 
Article 69(5), Article 71(3), Article 74b (5), Article 74c (5), Article 74d(4) and 
Article  75(4)  shall  enter  into  force  only  if  no  objection  has  been  expressed 
either  by  the  European  Parliament  or  the  Council  within  a  period  of  three 
months of notification of that act to the European Parliament and the Council 
or if, before the expiry of that period, the European Parliament and the Council 
have both informed the Commission that they will not object. That period shall 
be extended by three months at the initiative of the European Parliament or the 
Council."; 

40. 

in Article 99, the following paragraph 5a is inserted: 

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"5a.  By way of derogation from paragraph 2, Article 1(2), Part IIa and Part 
III, Title V Chapter 2 Section 1a shall apply from [OP insert date of entry into 
force of this Regulation]"; 

41. 

throughout Regulation (EU) No 806/2014, the word "the Fund" is replaced with "the 
SRF". 

This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in 
the Official Journal of the European Union. 

Article 2 

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. 

Done at Strasbourg, 

For the European Parliament 
The President 

For the Council 
The President 

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LEGISLATIVE FINANCIAL STATEMENT 

1. 

FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE  

1.1.  Title of the proposal/initiative  

1.2.  Policy area(s) concerned in the ABM/ABB structure 

1.3.  Nature of the proposal/initiative  

1.4.  Objective(s)  

1.5.  Grounds for the proposal/initiative  

1.6.  Duration and financial impact  

1.7.  Management mode(s) planned  

2. 

MANAGEMENT MEASURES  

2.1.  Monitoring and reporting rules  

2.2.  Management and control system  

2.3.  Measures to prevent fraud and irregularities  

3. 

ESTIMATED FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE  

3.1.  Heading(s)  of  the  multiannual  financial  framework  and  expenditure  budget 
line(s) affected  

3.2.  Estimated impact on expenditure  

3.2.1. Summary of estimated impact on expenditure  

3.2.2. Estimated impact on operational appropriations  

3.2.3. Estimated impact on appropriations of an administrative nature 

3.2.4. Compatibility with the current multiannual financial framework 

3.2.5. Third-party contributions  

3.3.  Estimated impact on revenue

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LEGISLATIVE FINANCIAL STATEMENT 

6. 

FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE  

6.1. 

Title of the proposal/initiative  

Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  amending  Regulation 
(EU) 806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme 
Policy area(s) concerned in the ABM/ABB structure14  

6.2. 

Financial services and capital markets. 

Policy  strategy  and  coordination  for  Financial  Stability,  Financial  Services  and 
Capital Markets Union. 

Management  of  the  Directorate-General  for  Financial  Stability,  Financial  Services 
and Capital Markets Union. 

6.3. 

Nature of the proposal/initiative  

 The proposal/initiative relates to a new action  

  The  proposal/initiative 
project/preparatory action15  

relates 

to  a  new  action 

following  a  pilot 

 The proposal/initiative relates to the extension of an existing action  

 The proposal/initiative relates to an action redirected towards a new action  

6.4. 

Objective(s) 

6.4.1.  The  Commission's  multiannual 

strategic  objective(s) 

targeted  by 

the 

proposal/initiative  

1)  Maintaining  stability  of  the  financial  system  by  strengthening  depositors' 
confidence in the banking system across the Union. 

2)  Reducing  barriers  to  free  movement  of  capital  and  creating  a  level-playing  field 
for credit institutions across the Union. 

3) Protecting public finances by weakening its interaction with the financial situation 
of credit institutions. 

6.4.2. 

Specific objective(s) and ABM/ABB activity(ies) concerned  

Specific objective No 

In  the  light  of  the  general  objectives  above,  the  following  specific  objectives  are 
sought: 

1) Completing Banking Union by launching a European Deposit Insurance Scheme 
(EDIS)  that  complements  the  Single  Supervisory  Mechanism  and  the  Single 
Resolution Mechanism. 

2)  Creating  a  Deposit  Insurance  Fund  (DIF)  within  the  Budget  of  the  Single 
Resolution  Board  (SRB  or  Board)  which  helps  absorb  geographically  asymmetric 
shocks in the Union's internal market for financial services, improving protection of 
depositors across the Union. 

14 
15 

ABM: activity-based management; ABB: activity-based budgeting. 
As referred to in Article 54(2)(a) or (b) of the Financial Regulation. 

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3)  Protecting  public  finances  by  levying  costs  of  deposit  insurance  on  all  banks 
within the Union. 

The following sub-objectives are sought:  

a) In a first stage (reinsurance period), the DIF, to a certain extent, provides funding 
and covers the share of losses of a participating deposit-guarantee scheme (DGS) in 
case  the  financial  means  necessary  for  the  participating  DGS  to  comply  with  its 
payment  obligations  under  Directive  2014/49/EU  towards  depositors  or  towards  a 
resolution authority exceed the financial resources the DGS. 

b) In a second stage (co-insurance period), the DIF, to a gradually increasing extent, 
provides funding and covers losses of a participating deposit guarantee scheme in the 
situation described above (under a). 

c) In a third stage (full insurance), the DIF provides all funding and covers all losses 
of a  participating  deposit  guarantee scheme  in  the situation described  above  (under 
a). 

ABM/ABB activity(ies) concerned 

Financial services and capital markets. 

Policy  strategy  and  coordination  for  Financial  Stability,  Financial  Services  and 
Capital Markets Union. 

Management  of  the  Directorate-General  for  Financial  Stability,  Financial  Services 
and Capital Markets Union. 

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6.4.3.  Expected result(s) and impact 

1) The proposal will significantly weaken the interaction between public finances of 
a participating Member State and the credit institutions established therein. 

2)  The  proposal  will  reduce  fragmentation  of  the  internal  market  for  financial 
services  and  level  the  playing-field  for  all  credit  institutions  established  in 
participating Member States. 

3) The proposal will significantly increase confidence in the protection of deposits in 
all participating Member States. 

6.4.4. 

Indicators of results and impact  

1)  Reduced  shifting  of  deposits  from  credit  institutions  established  in  participating 
Member  States  that  are  perceived  to  have  impaired  public  finances  to  credit 
institutions  established  in  participating  Member  States  that  are  perceived  to  have 
unimpaired public finances. 

2)  Reduced  deposit  interest  rate  spread  differences  between  credit  institutions 
established in different participating Member States. 

3) Increased number and size of credit institutions for which a participating DGS, in 
case  the  deposits  held  in  that  credit  institution  become  unavailable  or  the  credit 
institution becomes subject to resolution proceedings, is able to satisfy its obligation 
towards depositors or the resolution authority. 

6.5. 

Grounds for the proposal/initiative  

6.5.1.  Requirement(s) to be met in the short or long term  

In  2012  the  Commission  called  for  a  Banking  Union  that  would  place  the  banking 
sector on a more sound footing and restore confidence in the Euro as part of a longer 
term  vision  for  economic  and  fiscal  integration.    The  Banking  Union  should  be 
implemented by shifting supervision to the European level, establishing an integrated 
bank  crisis  management  and,  equally  important,  a  common  system  for  deposit 
protection. While  the  first  two  steps  have  been  achieved  by  the  Single  Supervisory 
Mechanism  and  the  Single  Resolution  Mechanism,  a  common  system  for  deposit 
protection has not yet been established. 

The  Five  Presidents'  Report    and  the  Commission's  follow-up  Communication    set 
out  a  clear  plan  for  deepening  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  (EMU),  including 
steps to further limit risks to financial stability. Completing the Banking Union is an 
indispensable step towards a full and deep EMU. For the single currency, a unified 
and  fully  integrated  financial  system  is  key  for  effective  monetary  policy 
transmission,  adequate  risk  diversification  across  Member  States  and  general 
confidence in the euro area banking system. 

In  particular,  the  Five  Presidents  Report  proposes  to  establish,  in  the  long  term,  a 
European  Deposit  Insurance  Scheme  (EDIS),  as  the  third  pillar  of  a  fully-fledged 
Banking Union alongside bank supervision, which lays with the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM), and with bank resolution, which has been entrusted to the Single 
Resolution Board (SRB). 

6.5.2.  Added value of EU involvement 

The Five Presidents' Report signals that, as the current set-up with national deposit 
guarantee schemes  remains  vulnerable to large local shocks (in particular when the 

EN 

55 

   EN 

sovereign and the national banking sector are perceived to be in a fragile situation), 
common  deposit  insurance  would  increase  the  resilience  against  future  crises.  A 
common  scheme  is  also  more  likely  to  be  fiscally  neutral  over  time  than  national 
deposit guarantee schemes because risks are spread more widely and because private 
contributions are raised over a much larger pool of financial institutions. According 
to the Five President's Report, interim steps should already be taken until mid-2017, 
as  part  of  Stage  1  of  completing  Europe's  Economic  and  Monetary  Union,  for 
example  in  the  form  of  a  reinsurance  mechanism.  EDIS  would  be  privately  funded 
through  ex  ante  risk-based  fees  paid  by  all  the  participating  banks  in  the  Member 
States and devised in a way that would prevent moral hazard. 

6.5.3.  Lessons learned from similar experiences in the past 

There  is  little  publically  available  information  on  the  staff  levels  of  national  DGS. 
Also, national DGS are organised in different forms and receive to different degrees 
staff assistance from or share services with e.g. banking associations or supervisory 
authorities. A survey by the European Forum of Deposit Insurers indicates that levels 
of direct staff (i.e. without support functions) ranges between 10 and 40 FTE. 

6.5.4.  Compatibility and possible synergy with other appropriate instruments 

Following  the  establishment  of  the  Single  Supervisory  Mechanism  (SSM)  by 
Council  Regulation  (EU)  No  1024/2013  and  of  the  Single  resolution  Mechanism 
(SRM) by Regulation (EU) No 806/2014, there is a misalignment between the Union 
supervision  and  resolution  of  banks  in  the  participating  Member  States,  on  the  one 
hand, and the effectiveness and credibility of national DGS in case of failure of those 
same banks pursuant to Directive 2014/49/EU, on the other hand. The establishment 
of  EDIS  is  an  essential  step  towards  the  completion  of  the  third  pillar  of  a  fully-
fledged Banking Union alongside bank supervision and resolution. 

This  proposed  Regulation  builds  on  the  existing  framework  of  national  deposit 
guarantee  schemes  as  governed  by  Directive  2014/49/EU    (DGS  Directive).  The 
establishment of EDIS is an integral part of the process of further harmonisation of 
deposit  guarantees  under  Directive  2014/49/EU.  The  uniform  application  of  the 
deposit  guarantee  framework  in  the  Member  States  participating  to  EDIS  will  be 
enhanced  as  a  result  of  this  proposed  Regulation  by  attributing  decision-making, 
monitoring and enforcement powers relating to EDIS to the Single Resolution Board 
("the Board"). This approach will ensure equal protection for covered depositors and 
support the proper functioning of the Internal Market. To ensure that all participating 
Member States have full confidence in the quality and impartiality of the protection 
of  deposits  by  EDIS  and  to  enhance  the  effectiveness  of  the  deposit  guarantee,  the 
proposed Regulation sets up a Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF). The Single Resolution 
Board  would  collect  the  contributions  directly  from  institutions  and  manage  and 
administer the DIF. 

EN 

56 

   EN 

6.6. 

Duration and financial impact  

 Proposal/initiative of limited duration  

–    Proposal/initiative in effect from [DD/MM]YYYY to [DD/MM]YYYY  

–    Financial impact from YYYY to YYYY  

 Proposal/initiative of unlimited duration 

–  Implementation with a start-up period from 2017 to 2024, 

–  followed by full-scale operation. 
6.7.  Management mode(s) planned16  

 Direct management by the Commission 

–   by its departments, including by its staff in the Union delegations;  

–    by the executive agencies  

 Shared management with the Member States  

 Indirect management by entrusting budget implementation tasks to: 

–   third countries or the bodies they have designated; 

–   international organisations and their agencies (to be specified); 

–  the EIB and the European Investment Fund; 

–   bodies referred to in Articles 208 and 209 of the Financial Regulation; 

–   public law bodies; 

–   bodies governed by private law with a public service mission to the extent that 

they provide adequate financial guarantees; 

–   bodies governed by the private law of a Member State that are entrusted with 
the  implementation  of  a  public-private  partnership  and  that  provide  adequate 
financial guarantees; 

–    persons  entrusted  with  the  implementation  of  specific  actions  in  the  CFSP 

pursuant to Title V of the TEU, and identified in the relevant basic act. 

16 

Details  of  management  modes  and  references  to  the  Financial  Regulation  may  be  found  on  the 
BudgWeb site: http://www.cc.cec/budg/man/budgmanag/budgmanag_en.html 

EN 

57 

   EN 

                                                 
7. 

MANAGEMENT MEASURES  

7.1.  Monitoring and reporting rules  

Article  45  of  the  Regulation  requires  the  Board  to  be  accountable  to  the  European 
Parliament,  the  Council  and  the  Commission  for  the  implementation  of  this 
Regulation,  among  other  things,  to  submit  each  year  a  report  to  the  European 
Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the European Court of Auditors on the 
execution of the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation. 

7.2.  Management and control system  

7.2.1.  Risk(s) identified  

The  proposal  would  not  bring  about  new  risks  in  relation  to  the  legal,  economical, 
efficient and effective use of budget appropriations. 

However,  internal  risk  management  should  take  into  account  the  specific  nature  of 
the  financing  mechanism  of  the  Single  Resolution  Board.  Differently  from  many 
other  bodies  set  up  by  the  Union,  the  services  provided  by  the  Board  will  be 
exclusively financed by financial institutions. 

Secondly, the Board will be responsible for ensuring the management of the Deposit 
Insurance  Fund.  In  this  regard,  a  set  of  internal  control  procedures  will  have  to  be 
developed and established. 

7.2.2. 

Information concerning the internal control system set up 

The  framework  and  rules  for  internal  control  should  follow  the  pattern  applied  by 
other  authorities established by the Commission,  except  for the management of the 
Single Resolution Board, which will require the establishment of a specif set of rules. 

7.2.3.  Estimate of the costs and benefits of the controls and assessment of the expected level 

of risk of error  

Internal  controls  shall  be  embedded  in  the  Board’s  procedures  relevant  to  the 
discharge  of  its  responsibility  and  the  implementation  of  the  tasks  conferred  to  it. 
The  costs  of  such  procedures  shall  not  exceed  their  benefits  in  avoiding  material 
errors. 

7.3.  Measures to prevent fraud and irregularities  

The Regulation establishes that a participating DGS shall not be covered by EDIS in 
the reinsurance, co-insurance or full insurance phase if the participating DGS or any 
other relevant authority of the respective Member State have failed to comply with 
the  obligations  under  the  Regulation  or  of  Directive  2014/49/EU  on  deposit 
guarantee schemes. 

For  the  purposes  of  combating  fraud,  corruption  and  any  other  illegal  activity,  the 
provisions of Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 25 May 1999 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-
Fraud Office (OLAF) shall apply to the Board without any restriction. 

The Board shall accede to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 25 May 1999 between 
the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the Commission of 
the European Communities concerning internal investigations by the European Anti-

EN 

58 

   EN 

Fraud  Office  (OLAF)  and  shall  immediately  adopt  appropriate  provisions  for  all 
Board staff. 

The  funding  decisions  and  the  agreements  and  the  implementing  instruments 
resulting  from  them  shall  explicitly  stipulate  that  the  Court  of  Auditors  and  OLAF 
may, if need be, carry out on-the-spot checks at the beneficiaries of money disbursed 
by Board as well as on the staff responsible for allocating this money. 

Articles  61-66  of  the  Regulation  set  out  the  provisions  on  implementation  and 
control of the Board’s budget and applicable financial rules. 

8. 

ESTIMATED FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE  

The analysis below provides an estimation of the overall costs for the Board and its 
administration.  No  costs  are  expected  for  the  EU  budget  since  all  expenses  of  the 
board will be fully financed by the approximatley 6,000 financial institutions covered 
by  EDIS.  The  calculation  method  will  be  based  on  size  and  will  be  set  out  in  a 
delegated  act  in  2016.  For  reasons  of  conistency,  the  same  methodology  should  be 
applied  under EDIS. 

The  tasks  of  the  Board  will  be  limited  as  regards  Deposit  Insurance.  EDIS  will 
evolve over the following three phases: (i) reinsurance, (ii) co-insurance and (iii) full 
insurance. In all phases, the Board will need to assess whether the requesting DGS 
complies  with  a  number  of  provisions  of  Directive  2014/49/EU,  notably  whether it 
has built up its national fund. Different from the Board’s function in resolution, there 
is  no  discretionary  element  in  its  decision,  since  the  payment  obligation  of  the 
participating  DGS  towards  depositors  (compensation)  or  towards  a  resolution 
authority (contribution to resolution) follows the determination of an administative or 
judicial authority. 

In  the  first  phase,  the  Board  will  assess  requests  for  reinsurance  cover  and  and 
provide  the  necessary  funding  to  compensate  national  DGS  within  the  limits  of 
coverage.  These  tasks remain  the  same  under  the  co-insurance  phase, but,  all  other 
things  being  equal,  one  may  expect  a  higher  number  of  potential  cases  as  the 
preconditions  for  coverage  by  EDIS  are  less  restrictive  than  in  the  reinsurance 
period. Under full-insurance, the tasks of the Board would increase significantly. In 
addition to  respond to  requests for coverage,  it would need  to  calculate and  collect 
contributions  from  individual  banks  and  manage  the  European  Deposit  Insurance 
Fund.  These  tasks  are  similar  to  tasks  under  the  Single  Resolution  Mechanism. 
Hence siginifcant economies of scale can be expected and the increase in tasks does 
not result in a proportionately increasing need for staff. 

The staffing of DGS depends on the scope for the interventions. Some DGS have the 
possibility  to  use  their  funds  for  measures  which  would  prevent  institutions  from 
failing, i.e. avoiding pay-out events in the first place. DGS with such possibility also 
have broader risk monitoring and management capabilities than DGS which mainly 
serve as ‘paybox’ to compensate depositors. The scope for EDIS would be limited to 
financially assist national DGS in such paybox function.    

There is little publically available information on the staff levels of national DGS. A 
survey  by  the  European  Forum  for  Deposit  Insurers  indicates  that  levels  for  direct 
(i.e.  without  support  functions)  staff  ranges  between  10  and  40  FTE  for  such  DGS 
with comparable functions to EDIS.    

EN 

59 

   EN 

In  view  of  the  limited,  but  gradually  increasing  tasks  of  EDIS,  the  Commission 
proposes the following FTE for direct functions 

  Under Reinsurance: 5 FTE (+ 0.5 FTE overhead) 

  Under Co-insurance: 10 FTE (+1 FTE overhead) 

  Under full insurance: 20 FTE (+2 FTE overhead)  

Table: Indicative development of FTEs 

Human Resources 

2017 

2018 

2019 

2020 

2021 

2022 

2023 

2024 

Establishment plan posts: AD 

Establishment plan posts: AST 

Establishment plan posts: AST/SC 

Total establishment plan posts 

Contract agents 

Seconded national experts 

Total staff 

4 

0.5 

0 

4.5 

0.5 

0.5 

5.5 

4 

0.5 

0 

4.5 

0.5 

0.5 

5.5 

4 

0.5 

0 

4.5 

0.5 

0.5 

5.5 

4 

0.5 

0 

4.5 

0.5 

0.5 

5.5 

8 

1 

0 

9 

1 

1 

8 

1 

0 

9 

1 

1 

8 

1 

0 

9 

1 

1 

11 

11 

11 

16 

2 

0 

18 

2 

2 

22 

DG FISMA currently has a ratio of overhead staff of 11.2 per cent. It is expected that 
for  EDIS  significant  economies  of  scale  can  be  achieved  with  the  resolution 
functions of the board, notably in human resources management, the calculation and 
collection  of  contributions  and  the  management  of  the  fund.  A  9%  overhead  ratio 
therefore seems feasible. 

Table: Indicative development of expenditure 

Expenditure 

2017 

2018 

2019 

2020 

2021 

2022 

2023 

2024 

Title 1: Staff expenditure 

Title 2: Infrastructure and 
operating expenditure 

Title 3: Operational expenditure 

Total 

658 

658 

658 

658 

1,315 

1,315 

1,315 

2,631 

50 

50 

50 

50 

110 

110 

110 

220 

116 

824 

116 

824 

116 

824 

116 

824 

232 

232 

232 

464 

1,657 

1,657 

1,657 

3,315 

Main assumptions 

Building  on  what  has  been  assessed  for  the  resolution  function  of  the  Single 
Resolution Board, the following distribution of personnel is suggested: 

  80% of TAs (68% of ADs and 12% of ASTs); 

  10% of ENDs; 

  10% of CAs. 

Staff Regulation of EU institutions will be applied, which is reflected in the used per 
head rates: 

  average yearly cost of a TA: EUR 131,000; 

EN 

60 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
  average yearly cost of an END: EUR 78,000; 

  average yearly cost of a CA: EUR 70,000. 

In addition to the salary, this cost includes indirect costs such as building, training, IT 
and socio-medical infrastructure costs.  

Since the Board has its seat in Brussels, a salary correction coefficient of 1 is used.  

Operational expenditures are expected to amount to 15% of total Board’s costs. This 
is significantly lower than the 25% estimated for the resolution function, since it is 
expected that costs for the development and maintenance of information systems and 
internal services could be shared with the resolution function.  

8.1. 

Heading(s)  of  the  multiannual  financial  framework  and  expenditure  budget 
line(s) affected  

No impact on the Union's budget. 

  Existing budget lines  

In order of multiannual financial framework headings and budget lines. 

Budget line 

Type of  
expenditure 

Contribution  

Heading of 
multiannual 
financial 
framework 

Number  
[Heading………………………...……………
] 

Diff./Non-
diff.17 

from 
EFTA 
countries
18 

from 
candidate 
countries19 

from third 
countries 

within the 
meaning of 
Article 21(2)(b) of 
the Financial 
Regulation  

[XX.YY.YY.YY] 

Diff./Non
-diff. 

YES/N
O 

YES/NO 

YES/N
O 

YES/NO 

Heading of 
multiannual 
financial 
framework 

  New budget lines requested  

In order of multiannual financial framework headings and budget lines. 

Budget line 

Type of 
expenditure 

Contribution  

Number  
[Heading……………………………………
…] 

Diff./Non-
diff. 

from 
EFTA 
countries 

from 
candidate 
countries 

from third 
countries 

within the 
meaning of 
Article 21(2)(b) of 
the Financial 
Regulation  

[XX.YY.YY.YY] 

YES/N
O 

YES/NO 

YES/N
O 

YES/NO 

17 
18 
19 

Diff. = Differentiated appropriations / Non-diff. = Non-differentiated appropriations. 
EFTA: European Free Trade Association.  
Candidate countries and, where applicable, potential candidate countries from the Western Balkans. 

EN 

61 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8.2. 

Estimated impact on expenditure  

No impact on the Union's budget. 

8.2.1. 

Summary of estimated impact on expenditure  

Heading of multiannual financial  
framework  

Number 

[Heading……………...……………………………………………………………….] 

EUR million (to three decimal places) 

Year 
N20 

Year 
N+1 

Year 
N+2 

Year 
N+3 

Enter as many years as 
necessary to show the duration 
of the impact (see point 1.6) 

TOTAL 

DG: <…….> 

 Operational appropriations  

Number of budget line 

Number of budget line 

Commitments 

Payments 

Commitments 

Payments 

(1) 

(2) 

(1a) 

(2a) 

Appropriations  of  an  administrative  nature  financed  from  the 
envelope of specific programmes21  

Number of budget line 

TOTAL appropriations 
for DG <…….> 

Commitments 

Payments 

(3) 

=1+1a 
+3 

=2+2a 

+3 

20 
21 

EN 

Year N is the year in which implementation of the proposal/initiative starts. 
Technical and/or administrative assistance and expenditure in support of the implementation of EU programmes and/or actions (former ‘BA’ lines), indirect research, 
direct research. 

62 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 TOTAL operational appropriations  

Commitments 

Payments 

  TOTAL  appropriations  of  an  administrative  nature 
financed from the envelope for specific programmes  

(4) 

(5) 

(6) 

TOTAL appropriations  
under HEADING <….> 
of the multiannual financial framework 

Commitments 

=4+ 6 

Payments 

=5+ 6 

If more than one heading is affected by the proposal / initiative: 

 TOTAL operational appropriations  

Commitments 

Payments 

  TOTAL  appropriations  of  an  administrative  nature 
financed from the envelope for specific programmes  

(4) 

(5) 

(6) 

TOTAL appropriations  
under HEADINGS 1 to 4 
of the multiannual financial framework 
(Reference amount) 

Commitments 

=4+ 6 

Payments 

=5+ 6 

EN 

63 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Heading of multiannual financial  
framework  

5 

‘Administrative expenditure’ 

Year 
N 

Year 
N+1 

Year 
N+2 

Year 
N+3 

Enter as many years as 
necessary to show the duration 
of the impact (see point 1.6)  

TOTAL 

EUR million (to three decimal places) 

DG: <…….> 

 Human resources  

 Other administrative expenditure  

TOTAL DG <…….> 

Appropriations  

TOTAL appropriations 
under HEADING 5 
of the multiannual financial framework  

(Total  commitments  = 
Total payments) 

TOTAL appropriations  
under HEADINGS 1 to 5 
of the multiannual financial framework  

Commitments 

Payments 

Year 
N22 

Year 
N+1 

Year 
N+2 

Year 
N+3 

Enter as many years as 
necessary to show the duration 
of the impact (see point 1.6) 

TOTAL 

EUR million (to three decimal places) 

22 

Year N is the year in which implementation of the proposal/initiative starts. 

EN 

64 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8.2.2.  Estimated impact on operational appropriations  

–    The proposal/initiative does not require the use of operational appropriations  

–    The proposal/initiative requires the use of operational appropriations, as explained below: 

Year 
N 

Year 
N+1 

Year 
N+2 

Year 
N+3 

OUTPUTS 

Commitment appropriations in EUR million (to three decimal places) 

Enter as many years as necessary to show the 
duration of the impact (see point 1.6) 

TOTAL 

o
N

Cost  N

o

Cost 

o
N

Cost 

o
N

Cost  N

o

Cost  N

o

Cost  N

o

Cost 

Total 
No 

Total 
cost 

Indicate 
objectives and 
outputs  

 

Type23 

Avera
ge 
cost 

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE No 124… 

- Output 

- Output 

- Output 

Subtotal for specific objective No 1 

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE No 2 ... 

- Output 

Subtotal for specific objective No 2 

TOTAL COST 

23 
24 

Outputs are products and services to be supplied (e.g.: number of student exchanges financed, number of km of roads built, etc.). 
As described in point 1.4.2. ‘Specific objective(s)…’  

EN 

65 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8.2.3.  Estimated impact on appropriations of an administrative nature 

8.2.3.1.  Summary  

–    The  proposal/initiative  does  not  require  the  use  of  appropriations  of  an 

administrative nature  

–    The proposal/initiative requires the use of appropriations of an administrative 

nature, as explained below: 

EUR million (to three decimal places) 

Year 
N 25 

Year 
N+1 

Year 
N+2 

Year 
N+3 

Enter as many years as necessary to show the 
duration of the impact (see point 1.6) 

TOTAL 

HEADING 5 
of the multiannual 
financial framework 

Human resources  

Other administrative 
expenditure  

Subtotal HEADING 5 
of the multiannual 
financial framework  

Outside HEADING 526 
of the multiannual 
financial framework  

Human resources  

Other expenditure  
of an administrative 
nature 

Subtotal  
outside HEADING 5 
of the multiannual 
financial framework  

TOTAL 

The  appropriations  required  for  human  resources  and  other  expenditure  of  an  administrative  nature  will  be  met  by 
appropriations from the DG that are already assigned to management of the action and/or have been redeployed within the 
DG,  together  if  necessary  with  any  additional  allocation  which  may  be  granted  to  the  managing  DG  under  the  annual 
constraints.
allocation 

procedure 

budgetary 

light 

and 

the 

of 

in 

25 
26 

Year N is the year in which implementation of the proposal/initiative starts. 
Technical  and/or  administrative  assistance  and  expenditure  in  support  of  the  implementation  of 
EU programmes and/or actions (former ‘BA’ lines), indirect research, direct research. 

EN 

66 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8.2.3.2.  Estimated requirements of human resources 

–    The proposal/initiative does not require the use of human resources.  

–    The  proposal/initiative  requires  the  use  of  human  resources,  as  explained 

below: 

Estimate to be expressed in full time equivalent units 

Year 
N 

Year 
N+1 

Year N+2 

Ye
ar 
N+
3 

Enter 
as 
many 
years 
as 
necessa
ry to 
show 
the 
duratio
n of the 
impact 
(see 
point 
1.6) 

 Establishment plan posts (officials and temporary staff) 

XX 01 01 01 (Headquarters and Commission’s 
Representation Offices) 

XX 01 01 02 (Delegations) 

XX 01 05 01 (Indirect research) 

10 01 05 01 (Direct research) 

 External staff (in Full Time Equivalent unit: FTE)27 

XX 01 02 01 (AC, END, INT from the ‘global 
envelope’) 

XX 01 02 02 (AC, AL, END, INT and JED in the 
delegations) 

XX 01 04 yy 28 

- at Headquarters 

- in Delegations  

XX 01 05 02 (AC, END, INT - Indirect research) 

10 01 05 02 (AC, END, INT - Direct research) 

Other budget lines (specify) 

TOTAL 

XX is the policy area or budget title concerned. 

The human resources required will be met by staff from the DG who are already assigned to management of the 
action  and/or  have  been  redeployed  within  the  DG,  together  if  necessary  with  any  additional  allocation  which 
may  be  granted  to  the  managing  DG  under  the  annual  allocation  procedure  and  in  the  light  of  budgetary 
constraints. 

Description of tasks to be carried out: 

Officials and temporary staff 

External staff 

27 

28 

AC=  Contract  Staff;  AL  =  Local  Staff;  END=  Seconded  National  Expert;  INT  =  agency  staff; 
JED= Junior Experts in Delegations.  
Sub-ceiling for external staff covered by operational appropriations (former ‘BA’ lines). 

EN 

67 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8.2.4.  Compatibility with the current multiannual financial framework  

–    The  proposal/initiative  is  compatible  the  current  multiannual  financial 

framework. 

–    The proposal/initiative will entail reprogramming of the relevant heading in the 

multiannual financial framework. 

Explain what reprogramming is required, specifying the budget lines concerned and the corresponding 
amounts. 

–    The  proposal/initiative  requires  application  of  the  flexibility  instrument  or 

revision of the multiannual financial framework. 

Explain what is required, specifying the headings and budget lines concerned and the corresponding 
amounts. 

8.2.5.  Third-party contributions  

–  The proposal/initiative does not provide for co-financing by third parties.  

–  The proposal/initiative provides for the co-financing estimated below: 

Appropriations in EUR million (to three decimal places) 

Year 
N 

Year 
N+1 

Year 
N+2 

Year 
N+3 

Enter as many years as necessary 
to show the duration of the 
impact (see point 1.6) 

Total 

Specify  the  co-financing 
body  

TOTAL appropriations 
co-financed  

EN 

1 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.3. 

Estimated impact on revenue  

No impact on the Union's budget. 

–    The proposal/initiative has no financial impact on revenue. 

–    The proposal/initiative has the following financial impact: 

 

 

on own resources  

on miscellaneous revenue  

Appropriation
s available for 
the current 
financial year 

Budget revenue line: 

Article …………. 

EUR million (to three decimal places) 

Impact of the proposal/initiative1 

Year 
N 

Year 
N+1 

Year 
N+2 

Year 
N+3 

Enter as many years as necessary to show 
the duration of the impact (see point 1.6) 

For miscellaneous ‘assigned’ revenue, specify the budget expenditure line(s) affected. 

Specify the method for calculating the impact on revenue. 

1 

As regards traditional own resources (customs duties, sugar levies), the amounts indicated must be net 
amounts, i.e. gross amounts after deduction of 25 % for collection costs. 

EN 

2 

   EN