REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT Implementation of Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom of 25 June 2009 establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations
Date: 2015-11-18
Institutions: Directorate-General for Energy, European Commission
Subjects: EAEC, application of EU law, ionising radiation, nuclear energy, nuclear policy, nuclear power station, nuclear safety

EN 

   EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 18.11.2015  COM(2015) 573 final   REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT Implementation of Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom of 25 June 2009 establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations  {SWD(2015) 244 final}  
 
 
1. 

1.1. 
1.2. 

1.3. 

2. 

3. 

3.1. 
3.2. 
3.3. 
3.4. 
3.5. 

4. 

4.1. 
4.2. 
4.3. 

5. 

Table of contents 

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 3 

Purpose of the report ................................................................................... 3 
Major 
Directive 2009/71/EURATOM ................................................................... 3 
Structure of the report and general approach .............................................. 4 

developments 

publication 

since 

the 

of 

OVERVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION AS REGARDS THE LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK AND THE REGULATORY AUTHORITY .................... 5 

NUCLEAR SAFETY GOVERNANCE ..................................................... 6 

Legislative, regulatory and organisational framework (Article 4) .............. 6 
Competent regulatory authority (Article 5) ................................................. 6 
Information to the public (Article 8) ........................................................... 7 
International peer review of the national framework (Article 9(3)) ............ 7 
Recommendations to Member States and Commission action ................... 9 

SAFETY OF NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS (ARTICLES 6 AND 7) ... 10 

Obligations of licence holders (Article 6) ................................................. 10 
Expertise and skills in nuclear safety (Article 7) ...................................... 11 
Recommendations to Member States and Commission action ................. 12 

CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 15 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION 

1.1.  Purpose of the report 

Under  Article  9(2)  of  Directive  2009/71/EURATOM  (Nuclear  Safety  Directive),  the 
Commission is required to submit a progress report on the implementation of the Directive. 
The  Directive  is  secondary  legislation  deriving  from  Articles  2(b)  and  30  of  the  Euratom 
Treaty. 

This  report  is  based  on  the  Member  States’  national  reports  under  Article  9(1)  of  the 
Directive, which requires them to  submit a report to  the Commission on its implementation 
for the first time by 22 July 2014.1 The national reports demonstrate how Member States are 
addressing the objectives of the Directive and illustrate the approaches taken at national level. 

The  Council’s  adoption  of  the  Nuclear  Safety  Directive  on  25  June  2009  was  a  major  step 
towards  achieving  a  common  legal  framework  on  nuclear  safety  in  Europe.  Until  then, 
nuclear  safety  was  governed  by  national  legislation  and  international  conventions.2  The 
existing  system  was  supplemented  by  the  Directive,  which  gave  binding  legal  force  to  the 
main international nuclear safety principles. 

The  objective  of  the  Directive  is  to  maintain  and  promote  the  continuous  improvement  of 
nuclear  safety.  It  requires  Member  States  to  make  appropriate  national  arrangements  for  a 
high level of nuclear safety to protect workers and the general public against the dangers of 
exposure to ionising radiation from nuclear installations. The Directive includes provisions on 
the following:  

 

 

 

 

 

the  establishment  of  a  national  legal  framework  for  the  nuclear  safety  of  civilian 
nuclear installations;  

the organisation, duties and responsibilities of the competent regulatory authorities;  

the licence holders’ obligations;  

the education and training of staff; and 

the provision of information to the public. 

The Directive entered into force on 22 July 2009. The Member States had until 22 July 2011 
to bring into force their laws, regulations and administrative provisions ensuring compliance 
with the Directive. 

1.2.  Major developments since the publication of Directive 2009/71/EURATOM 

Over the past five years, major steps have been taken at EU level to improve nuclear safety. 
These have followed a two-track approach: verifying the capabilities of nuclear installations 
to resist serious safety events and strengthening the legal framework. 

Following  the  2011  Fukushima  nuclear  accident,  the  European  Council  asked  the 
Commission and the European Nuclear Safety Regulators’ Group (ENSREG)3 to reassess the 

1   Most  countries  followed  the  unified  structure  for  implementation  reports  developed  under  the  aegis  of  the 
European Nuclear Safety Regulators’ Group (ENSREG), as recommended in recital 16 of the Directive. All 
Member States submitted their report as required in Article 9(1) of the Directive. 

2   The main provisions of the Directive derive from the principles enshrined in the 1994 Convention on nuclear 

safety, to which all Member States are parties. 

3   Independent,  authoritative  expert  body  created  in  2007  following  a  decision  of  the  European  Commission. 
It  is  composed  of  the  national  nuclear  safety,  radioactive  waste  safety  or  radiation  protection  regulatory 

3 

 
                                                 
EU’s  131  nuclear  power  reactors.  The  Commission  and  ENSREG  carried  out  ‘stress  tests’, 
these 
implementation  of 
which  resulted 
recommendations is regularly assessed through the peer review of national action plans. 

in  a  number  of  recommendations.  The 

The  review  of  the  Euratom  legal  framework  for  nuclear  safety,  also  called  for  by  Heads  of 
State and Government, led to a Commission proposal for substantial amendments to Directive 
2009/71/EURATOM.  These  were  adopted  by  the  Council  on  8  July  2014.  They  take  into 
account the lessons learned from the nuclear stress tests as well as the safety requirements of 
the  Western  European  Nuclear  Regulators  Association  (WENRA)4  and  the  International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The amended Directive is to be transposed into national law 
by 15 August 2017. The amendments: 

  strengthen the independence of national regulatory authorities; 
 

introduce  a  high-level  EU-wide  safety  objective  to  prevent  accidents  and  avoid 
radioactive releases; 

  set up a European system of peer reviews on specific safety issues every six years; 
 

increase transparency on nuclear safety matters by informing and involving the public; 
and 

  promote an effective nuclear safety culture. 

The  Member  States  had  to  send  their  implementation  reports  by  22  July  2014.  Since  they 
cover the period prior to the adoption of the amendments, this report is based on the original 
version of the Directive. However, in order to give in this report a more complete picture of 
implementation of the current Euratom legal framework for nuclear safety, references to the 
amended  Directive  may  appear,  especially  when  an  obligation  arising  from  the  original 
version has been expanded in the amended Directive. 

1.3.  Structure of the report and general approach 

The  report  aims  to  provide  the  Council  and  Parliament  with  a  complete  overview  on  the 
current state of implementation of the Directive across the EU. 

After a general introduction on how the Directive has been implemented, the report deals, in 
Section 3, with issues related to nuclear safety governance, corresponding to Articles 4, 5, 8 
and  9(3)  of  the  Directive.  Section  4  is  devoted  to  the  safety  of  nuclear  installations  and 
addresses the technical and human aspects of nuclear safety, which are covered by Articles 6 
and 7 of the Directive5. The main achievements in the field of nuclear safety are presented as 
long as they correspond to a provision of the Directive. Challenges in the implementation of 
the Directive are also identified under each topic. The report makes recommendations to the 
Member  States  in  connection  with  these  challenges  and  states  what  corrective  measures  the 
Commission  has  taken  or  plans  to  take.  This  report  does  not  address  the  situation  of  the 
Member  States  individually  but  rather  aims  to  underline  dominant  trends,  thus  focusing  on 
major  problems  and  identifying  corrective  measures.  However,  a  short  presentation  of  the 

authorities from  all  EU  Member  States  as  well  as  representatives  of  the  European  Commission.  ENSREG 
helps  to  establish  the  conditions  for  continuous  improvement  and  to  reach  a  common  understanding  in  the 
areas of nuclear safety and radioactive waste management. 

4    Association comprised of the nuclear regulatory bodies from 18 countries in Europe. It serves as a network of 

chief nuclear safety regulators exchanging experience and discussing significant safety issues. 

5   The other articles of the Directive do not impose obligations on Member States and are therefore not covered 

in this report. 

4 

 
                                                                                                                                                         
steps  taken  by  each  Member  State  to  implement  the  Directive  is  provided  for  in  the 
accompanying Staff Working Document.  

2.  OVERVIEW  OF  IMPLEMENTATION  AS  REGARDS  THE  LEGAL  FRAMEWORK  AND  THE 

REGULATORY AUTHORITY 

In respect of the Directive’s obligations regarding the establishment of a legal framework for 
nuclear safety, the setting-up of a regulatory authority, the allocation of appropriate resources, 
and the performance of international peer reviews of the system, it has been reported that all 
the Member States have adopted corresponding legislative measures.  

However,  some  Member  States  need  to  make  certain  that  their  regulatory  authority  has 
adequate resources. 

As  regards  international  peer  reviews  of  the  regulatory  infrastructure,  19  Member  States 
(including all Member States with nuclear power plants) have hosted an Integrated Regulatory 
Review Service (IRRS) coordinated by the IAEA or plan to host one by the end of 2015. That 
leaves 9 Member States that have not hosted such a review, although 5 of them have planned 
one in the coming years, the Directive's requirement being to host an international review at 
least every ten years6.  

6   The  deadline  for  the  10  years  should  start  for  each  Member  State  from  the  date  of  adoption  of  the 
transposition measures. Given that the transposition deadline was 22 July 2011, a review mission should be 
hosted at the latest by 22 July 2021. 

5 

 
 
                                                 
3.  NUCLEAR SAFETY GOVERNANCE  

Today, the EU has the largest number of nuclear power reactors in the world and a number of 
Member States are planning investments in this sector. Member States already using nuclear 
energy and those launching a nuclear programme need to have the following in place:  

  a  well-organised  legislative,  regulatory  and  organisational  framework  for  nuclear 

safety, including a clear allocation of responsibilities;  

  an  independent  competent  regulatory  authority  endowed  with  adequate  powers  and 

resources;  

  effective public information procedures, and 

  a regular peer review of the whole system. 

3.1.  Legislative, regulatory and organisational framework (Article 4) 

All Member States reported that they had a national legislative, regulatory and organisational 
framework  in  place  to  carry  out  the  activities  covered  by  the  Directive  (Article  4(1)).  The 
national frameworks, which include laws and implementing regulations, have been developed 
in  very  different  ways,  depending  on  the  countries’  nuclear  profiles  and  national 
administrative systems. For instance, some non-nuclear countries address such issues through 
general legislation on health, environment or civil protection. 

However, the allocation of responsibilities (issuing licences, monitoring, imposing penalties) 
between  the  competent  public  bodies,  as  presented  in  some  national  reports,  is  not  entirely 
clear.  Although  the  allocation  of  responsibilities  depends  on  the  national  legal  systems  and 
practices, this is more complex when there are several administrative levels or several bodies 
contributing  to  decision-making.  It  is  indeed  important  that  where  several  authorities  have 
responsibilities  for  nuclear  safety,  the  clear  allocation  of  responsibilities  and  the  effective 
coordination of the regulatory functions should be ensured to avoid any omissions or undue 
duplications as well as conflicting requirements.  

Article  4(2)  of  the  Directive  requires  Member  States  to  maintain  and  improve  the  national 
framework, taking into account operating experience, insights gained from safety analyses for 
operating  nuclear  installations,  development  of  technology  and  results  of  safety  research. 
Several national reports do not state how these elements are used to maintain and improve the 
national framework. 

3.2.  Competent regulatory authority (Article 5) 

All  Member  States  reported  that  they  had  established  a  regulatory  authority  to  monitor  the 
activities covered by the Directive (Article 5(1)). 

The  legal  status  of  these  authorities  differs  from  one  country  to  another.  In  some  Member 
States,  the  regulatory  authorities  are  ministerial  departments;  in  others,  they  are  structurally 
independent from the government. In other cases, there is a system of authorities within and 
outside the governmental structure. 

In  some  countries,  reorganisation  has  happened  recently  or  is  currently  under  way.  One 
approach  is  for  bodies  subordinated  to  different  ministries  to  be  brought  together  in  one 

6 

 
legally  independent  authority.  All  that  the  Directive  requires  on  this  point  is  that  the 
regulatory  authority  is  functionally  separate  from  any  other  body  or  organisation  concerned 
with the promotion of nuclear energy (Article 5(2)). 

However, challenges  in the implementation of the  Directive have  been  identified as regards 
the  regulatory  authority’s  legal  powers  and  human  and  financial  resources  (Article  5(3)). 
From  the  Commission’s  perspective,  such  situations  may  jeopardise  the  necessary 
independence of the regulatory authority. This matter will require special attention by national 
authorities. 

In  many  cases,  the  regulatory  authority  relies  on  a  technical  support  organisation  (TSO)  to 
review  and  assess  files  submitted  by  licence  holders.  However,  it  is  not  always  completely 
clear how conflicts of interest are avoided within TSOs, especially when they themselves are 
operating  nuclear  installations  (e.g.  research  reactors)  or  are,  at  least  partially,  working  for 
licence holders. 

3.3.  Information to the public (Article 8) 

Member States handle the question of transparency in different ways and to differing extents. 
The  most  common  practices  include  information  release  through  the  regulatory  authority’s 
website,  press  releases,  media  interaction  and  annual  reports.  Some  countries  stated  that 
regulatory decisions are published in an official journal. 

The types of actions that have been reported include: 

 

the regulatory authority defined a communication strategy or policy; 

  specific communication tools were put in place for use in nuclear crisis situations; 

 

inspection follow-up letters were published on the regulatory authority’s website; 

  a  consultative  body  on  transparency  was  set  up,  bringing  together  members  of 
parliament,  civil  society  representatives,  recognised  experts  and  industrial  and 
institutional stakeholders. 

Going  beyond  the  obligation  of  transparency  required  by  Article  8  of  the  Directive,  some 
Member  States  reported  on  public  involvement  activities,  corresponding  to  an  obligation 
under the amended Directive. 

3.4.  International peer review of the national framework (Article 9(3)) 

Pursuant to the Directive, all Member States are obliged to host an international peer review 
to  assess  their  national  framework  and  competent  regulatory  authorities  at  least  every  ten 
years.  

By the end of 2015, all EU Member States operating nuclear power plants will have hosted, 
over the required 10-year period, an international peer review team to evaluate their national 
regulatory infrastructure for nuclear safety and radiation protection. Five Member States not 
producing  nuclear  energy  will  also  have  hosted  a  review  mission  by  2015.  Some  reviews 
cover the whole scope of nuclear safety, while others had a reduced scope. 

This table shows all the international peer reviews (full or reduced scope missions) carried out 
within the Member States since the deadline for the transposition of the Directive elapsed in 

7 

 
2011 

2012 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2011. 

Austria 
Belgium 

Bulgaria                                      

Croatia 

Cyprus                    
Czech 
Republic       
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 

France                     

Germany 7              
Greece 

Hungary 

Ireland                     

Full-Scope 
Mission 
Full-Scope 
Mission 

Full-Scope 
Mission 

Reduced-
Scope Mission 

Reduced-
Scope Mission 

Full-Scope 
Mission 

Full-Scope 
Mission 

Full-Scope 
Mission 

Italy 
Latvia          
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 

Netherlands  

Poland 

Portugal 
Romania 

Slovak 
Republic     
Slovenia 

Spain8 
Sweden 

United 
Kingdom9 

Full-Scope 
Mission 

Full-Scope 
Mission 

Full-Scope 
Mission 

Full-Scope 
Mission 

Full-Scope 
Mission 

Full-Scope 
Mission 
Full-Scope 
Mission 

Full-Scope 
Mission 

7   Germany hosted an international peer review (IRRS mission) in 2008 and a follow-up mission in 2011.  
8   Spain hosted an international peer review (IRRS mission) in 2008 and a follow-up mission in 2011.   
9   The UK has invited modular international peer reviews (IRRS missions) in 2006 and 2009 and a follow-up 

8 

 
 
 
  
  
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
  
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
                                                 
In general, the peer review teams’ reports are posted online by Member States. However, not 
all  Member  States  systematically  reported  the  outcomes  of  the  peer  review  directly  to  the 
Commission,  even  though  this  is  required  under  Article  9(3)  of  the  Directive.  The 
Commission  reminded  the  Member  States  of  their  obligations  in  this  respect.  Most  of  the 
reports have now been obtained. 

To support the process, between 2011 and 2015, the Commission provided EUR 1.8 million 
for  the  IAEA’s  Integrated  Regulatory  Review  Service  (IRRS)  missions  programme.  The 
Commission’s  aim  was  to  assist  Member  States  in  complying  with  this  requirement  of  the 
Directive. Staff from the Commission’s Joint Research Centre took part as observers in such 
missions. The Commission will continue to provide assistance beyond 2015. 

Some Member States also reported that they had hosted international reviews of installations, 
although  this  goes  beyond  the  scope  of  the  Directive.  IAEA  OSART10  missions  to  evaluate 
the  safety  of  operating  nuclear  power  reactors  take  place  several  times  a  year  in  the  EU. 
Under  the  amended  Directive,  the  peer  review  obligation  is  extended  to  technical  issues 
through a new system of European topical peer reviews. The first of these will start in 2017. 

3.5.  Recommendations to Member States and further Commission action 

In light of the above, special attention should be paid by members of the Euratom Community 
to the following challenges: 

  Member  States  should  ensure  a  clear  allocation  of  responsibilities  and  coordination 
between relevant state bodies, especially when several administrative levels or several 
bodies contribute to decision-making. 

The  Commission  will  pay  special  attention  to  this  matter  when  monitoring  the 
transposition of the amended Directive. 

  When developing the legal framework, Member States should systematically take into 
account  lessons  learned  from  operating  experience,  the  development  of  technology 
and safety research. 

To  supplement  the  steps  taken  to  this  end  at  national  level,  the  Commission  will 
closely monitor any new developments in this field and enhance coordination among 
Member States.  

  Member States should ensure an effective independence of their competent regulatory 
authorities  from  undue  influence  in  their  regulatory  decision-making  and  guarantee 
that they are provided with the appropriate means and competencies to properly carry 
out  the  responsibilities  assigned  to  them.  For  this  purpose,  Member  States  should 
ensure that the regulatory authority has human and financial resources commensurate 
with  the  country’s  current  nuclear  profile,  nuclear  power  development  projects  and 
decommissioning  plans.  In  addition,  they  should  guard  against  possible  conflicts  of 
interest in the regulatory authorities’ technical support organisations. 

mission in 2013. 

10   Operational Safety Review Team. 

9 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
The  Commission  will  pay  special  attention  to  the  independence  of  the  regulatory 
authority  when  monitoring  the  implementation  of  the  amended  Directive.  It  will 
encourage  an  effective  cooperation  among  Member  States  in  order  to  ensure  added 
value from existing resources.  

  Member  States  should  systematically  report  the  outcomes  of  any  international  peer 
review to  the Member States and the Commission, as  required in Article 9(3) of the 
Directive.  

The  Commission  will  require  a  systematic  reporting  of  the  outcomes  of  these 
international peer review missions in the future. 

  All Member States should host international peer review missions to review the legal 
and regulatory framework, since the Directive requires these missions to be carried out 
on  a  10-year  basis.  Member  States  should  consider  in  particular  hosting  ‘full  scope’ 
rather than ‘limited scope’ missions in which the country chooses to leave some issues 
out. 

The Commission will continue to check that such review missions are organised in the 
Member  States  at  least  every  10  years,  in  the  setting  of  the  memorandum  of 
understanding  between  the  Community  and  the  IAEA,  and  provide  support  to  the 
IAEA in the implementation of the programme of the IRRS missions in the EU Member 
States. 

4. 

SAFETY OF NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS (ARTICLES 6 AND 7) 

This section addresses the steps taken by Member States to address the two complementary 
pillars of nuclear safety: human factor and technical safety. Although the Directive does not 
include technical criteria to ensure the safety of nuclear installations, it obliges Member States 
to maintain a national framework setting out the licence holders’ main obligations as defined 
in the Directive. Such provisions are complemented by those on nuclear safety education and 
training. 

In  the  case  of  several  countries  operating  both  nuclear  power  plants  and  other  nuclear 
installations,  the  national  reports  focus  almost  entirely  on  power  plants.  Very  little 
information  is  available  for  the  other  types  of  installation  covered  by  Article  3  of  the 
Directive. 

4.1.  Obligations of licence holders (Article 6) 

Almost  all  Member  States  with  nuclear installations  reported  that  their  legislation  explicitly 
assigns  primary  responsibility  for  the  nuclear  safety  of  nuclear  installations  to  the  licence 
holder, thus complying with Article 6(1). However, the issue of the control over contractors 
and sub-contractors remains a challenge. To cope with this, some national systems impose a 
limit on the cascade of contractors, allowing, for example, a maximum of two contractors on a 
specific  task.  The  amended  Directive  explicitly  makes  licence  holders  responsible  for  the 
actions of contractors and sub-contractors. 

All  Member  States  with  nuclear  installations  have  programmes  to  conduct  regular  safety 
assessments  of  their  installations  under  the  supervision  of  the  regulatory  authority  (as 
provided  for  in  Article  6(2)),  although  the  methodology  for  such  reviews  varies  between 

10 

 
countries. Under the amended Directive, such reviews have to be conducted at least every 10 
years. 

Member States reported extensively on arrangements in place to mitigate a nuclear accident 
and  on  emergency  measures  (Article  6(3)).  Emergency  procedures,  however,  vary  across 
Member States, which highlights the need for coordination. Some countries have included in 
their  legislation  a  requirement  for  a  nuclear  power  plant  licence  holder  to  implement  plant-
specific emergency operating procedures (EOPs) and severe accident management guidelines 
(SAMGs). 

National reports refer widely to management systems focusing on safety and quality control 
procedures,  as  provided  for  in  Article  6(4)  of  the  Directive.  Sometimes,  the  regulatory 
authority’s  annual  inspection  plan  provides  for  inspections  focusing  on  the  licence  holder’s 
quality assurance or management system. 

Member  States  reported  that  the  obligation  in  Article  6(5),  i.e.  that  the  national  framework 
requires  licence  holders  to  maintain  adequate  human  and  financial  resources  to  fulfil  their 
obligations,  is  usually  met  in  practice.  However,  Member  States  did  not  always  report  that 
this obligation is explicitly stated in their legislation. Moreover, it is not always clear whether 
financial resources cover the entire lifetime of the installation, including decommissioning. In 
addition, the question of how to check that licence holders have adequate financial resources 
has  not  been  settled:  for  instance,  whether  all  nuclear  authorities  have  the  capabilities  to 
assess licence holders’ financial resources. 

Overall,  major  improvements  have  already  been  made  on  the  ground  as  a  result  of  the 
post-Fukushima  stress  tests.  Such  improvements  are  detailed  in  the  national  action  plans 
submitted to a second European peer review in April 2015 (see section 4.3 below). As nuclear 
safety can be ensured only through continuous development, future nuclear installations will 
be  subject  to  the  stringent  obligations  arising  from  the  amended  Directive.  These  include 
requirements  that  nuclear  installations  be  designed,  sited,  constructed,  commissioned, 
operated  and  decommissioned  with  the  objective  of  preventing  accidents  and  mitigating  the 
consequences should an accident occur. 

4.2.  Expertise and skills in nuclear safety (Article 7) 

As  recalled  in  recital  19  of  the  Directive,  a  strong  safety  culture  is  one  of  the  fundamental 
safety management principles necessary for achieving safe operation of nuclear installations. 
Likewise,  the  2014  Review  Meeting  of  Contracting  Parties  to  the  Convention  on  Nuclear 
Safety  acknowledged  that  major  accidents  in  the  nuclear  and  other  high  hazard  industries 
most  frequently  derive  from  organisational  and  human  factors.  This  view  is  restated  more 
firmly in the amended Directive. 

Responsibilities for expertise and skills in nuclear safety lie both with the regulatory authority 
and the licence holders. In this sense, many regulatory authorities have already made ‘safety 
culture’ a subject in its own right in nuclear safety supervision. Likewise, initiatives to ensure 
or promote adequate training for regulatory authorities or utilities staff have been put in place 
in several Member States. 

Member  States  reported  on  their  efforts  to  increase  skills  and  competencies  in  the  nuclear 
sector. Some gave details of measures to link the academic world and the industry in order to 
ensure  shared  understanding  of  key  skills  priorities  for  the  nuclear  sector  and  how  skills 
demand can be met. 

11 

 
However, recruiting and retaining the most qualified staff in the regulatory authority remains 
a  challenge.  Although  in  many  Member  States  salary  levels  may  be  higher  for  certain 
categories  of  personnel  in  the  private  sector,  some  regulatory  authorities  manage  to  offer 
professional advantages that may offset the salary difference. 

The examples of action taken to enhance expertise and skills in nuclear safety, as reported by 
Member States include: 

 

 

 

 

the  establishment  of  a  multi-annual  strategy  on  developing  expertise  and  skills, 
including safety culture; 

the adoption of legal provisions on human, organisational and social aspects in nuclear 
safety; 

the  drawing-up,  by  the  regulatory  authority,  of  safety  indicators  to  measure  how 
organisational and human aspects of nuclear safety are being taken into account; 

topic-specific  inspections  by  the  regulatory  authority,  focusing  on  licence  holders’ 
quality assurance and management systems; 

  checks,  by  the  regulatory  authority,  that  human  factors  are  incorporated  into  safety 

aspects when a nuclear installation is designed or modified; 

  as regards training: 

o 

the  establishment  of  a  maintenance  practice  centre,  which  includes  full-scale 
equipment and training mock-ups; 

o  a computer-based training system for the regulatory authority; 

o  evaluation  of  competence  in  disciplines  of  importance  to  the  regulatory 

authority and associated training and recruitment processes; 

o 

training programmes  tailored to  each new inspector,  with  progress monitored 
by a manager; 

o 

limiting for a time the administrative power vested in young inspectors. 

4.3.  Recommendations to Member States and further Commission action 

  The  next  national  implementation  reports  should  take  into  account  all  installations 
covered  by  the  amended  Directive  and  not  only  nuclear  power  plants.  Similarly, 
Member  States  should  ensure  appropriate  application  of  the  Directive  to  all  such 
nuclear installations. 

The  Commission  will  pay  special  attention  to  Member  States'  implementation  of  the 
Directive  to  all  nuclear  installations  in  the  remit  of  the  Directive  and  the  adequate 
reporting. 

  Member  States  should  complete  the  implementation  of  the  recommendations  of 

nuclear stress tests to improve the safety of nuclear installations. 

Between  20th  and  24th  April  2015,  the  Commission  organised,  with  the  support  of 
ENSREG,  the  2nd  National  Action  Plan  Workshop  to  peer  review  Member  States' 

12 

 
progress  on  technical  implementations  related  to  their  stress  test  actions.  Members 
States with a nuclear programme as well as others Member States (Austria, Croatia, 
Denmark,  Ireland,  Poland)  and  non-EU  countries  (Armenia,  Norway,  Switzerland, 
Taiwan, Ukraine, USA) participated in this workshop. This second workshop focused 
in  particular  on  evaluating  the  progress  in  the  implementation  process,  including 
additional  measures  undertaken  and  changes  included  in  the  original  schedule. 
Special attention was devoted to the technical basis for the changes proposed as well 
as  the  review  of  studies  and  analyses  identified  and  completed  since  the  2013 
workshop.  The  strong  and  continuous  commitment  of  all  participating  nuclear 
operators  and  regulatory  authorities  towards  the  full  implementation  of  all 
improvement actions identified in their respective national action plans as well as the 
important  number  of  actions  already  completed  under  the  oversight  of  the  national 
safety  regulatory  authorities  were  recognised  during  the  workshop.  However,  it  was 
noted  that  the  status  of  implementation  differs  compared  to  the  original  deadlines 
presented in the 1st National Action Plan summary report11 where major modifications 
were to be implemented by 2015-2018, and at the latest by 2020. While many nuclear 
operators have almost completed implementation, and others have clear schedules to 
complete actions by 2016, some have rescheduled specific actions for later than 2020. 
The Commission considers that the rate of  safety  upgrade  implementation should be 
improved.  A  status  report  from  each  participating  country  on  the  implementation  of 
the  national  action  plan  should  be  published  periodically  to  ensure  a  transparent 
monitoring  with  the  aim  of  publishing  a  final  report  on  the  implementation  which 
coincides with the new Nuclear Safety Directive coming into effect in 2017. 

The Commission will continue to closely monitor the progress made in the fulfilment 
of the national action plans implementing the stress tests results. 

In addition, in line with the Roadmap for the Energy Union12, the Commission intends 
to publish a nuclear illustrative programme (PINC) to provide clarity on the needs for 
new  investment  in  the  nuclear  field  including  safety  upgrades  of  current  nuclear 
installations. 

  The  Member  States  should  monitor  licence  holders’  use  of  contractors  and  sub-
contractors  and  the  possible  safety  implications.  Member  States  will  need  to  give 
special  consideration  to  this  issue  when  transposing  the  amended  Directive,  which 
states that the primary responsibility of the licence  holder includes  responsibility  for 
the activities of contractors and sub-contractors that might affect safety. 

The  Commission  will  pay  special  attention  to  this  issue  when  monitoring  the 
implementation of the amended Directive. 

  The national legal frameworks put in place by Member States should require licence 
holders to maintain well-qualified human and adequate financial resources during the 
whole lifecycle of installations. 

The  Commission  will  pay  special  attention  to  this  issue  when  monitoring  the 
implementation of the amended Directive. 

11  

http://www.ensreg.eu/node/1343  

12   COM(2015)80 final 

13 

 
                                                 
The Commission will also assist the Member States in complying with this obligation 
through  the  implementation  of  the  Euratom  Fission  Training  Schemes  (EFTS),  a 
lifelong learning and mobility programme notably designed to improve expertise and 
skills of the staff of the licence holders13. 

  The  Member  States  should  better  coordinate  national  approaches  to  emergency 
preparedness and response. This issue is being addressed in the relevant international 
forums and in bilateral cooperation between Member States. 

The  Commission  will  address  the  issue  at  European  level  in  conjunction  with  the 
relevant  provisions  of  the  Basic  Safety  Standards  Directive,14  which  is  to  be 
transposed into national law by 2018. 

13   http://ec.europa.eu/research/energy/euratom/index_en.cfm?pg=fission&section=training 
14   Council  Directive  2013/59/EURATOM  of  5  December  2013,  laying  down  basic  safety  standards  for 
repealing 
and 

protection  against 
Directives 89/618/EURATOM, 
2003/122/EURATOM (OJ L 13, 17.1.2014, p. 1–73). 

ionising 
96/29/EURATOM, 

the  dangers  arising 

90/641/EURATOM, 

97/43/EURATOM 

from  exposure 

radiation,  and 

to 

14 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
5.  CONCLUSION 

Having  reviewed  the  national  reports,  the  Commission  concludes  that  there  is,  in  general,  a 
good level of compliance with the 2009 Nuclear Safety Directive. 

The Directive has proven to be an effective instrument in improving nuclear safety, as most 
Member States reported that they had upgraded their legal system in order to transpose it into 
national law. 

The  basic  aim  of  the  Directive  is  to  ensure  appropriate  national  arrangements  to  achieve  a 
high level of safety. In general, the national reports demonstrate that these arrangements are in 
place in the EU as regards the legal  framework  and regulatory authority. However, in some 
cases  it  is  not  certain  that  such  authorities  are  adequately  staffed  and  funded.  Cooperation 
among  Member  States  should  be  encouraged  in  order  to  ensure  an  effective  use  of  existing 
resources, for instance in the case of Long Term Operation of nuclear power plants' or new 
builds'  licencing  procedures.  Such  cooperation  would  be  particularly  beneficial  for  smaller 
competent regulatory authorities. 

International  benchmarking  has  been  widely  used:  by  the  end  of  2015,  international 
counterparts will have reviewed the legal and organisational framework of all Member States 
operating  nuclear  power  plants,  through  IAEA  Integrated  Regulatory  Review  Service 
missions. Full-scope missions should be preferred to limited ones. 

Safety  arrangements  imposed  on  nuclear  installations  (under  the  supervision  of  regulatory 
authorities),  including  development  of  expertise  and  skills,  are  largely  in  place.  Wherever 
appropriate, nuclear plant licence holders tend to establish strong synergies with national or 
international  research  and  training  organisations  dedicated  to  the  improvement  of  reactor 
safety regulation, technology and culture. 

However, although most of Member States reported having national provisions as regards the 
human  and  financial  resources  of  the  licence  holders,  it  should  be  clarified  whether  the 
regulatory  authority  has  the  ability  to  assess  the  adequacy  of  such  resources,  especially 
financial  ones,  and  whether  these  obligations  are  effectively  implemented  and  enforced.  In 
this respect, it would be worth recalling Article 192 of the Euratom Treaty according to which 
"Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure 
fulfilment  of  the  obligations  arising  out  of  this Treaty  or  resulting  from  action  taken  by  the 
institutions  of  the  Community.  They  shall  facilitate  the  achievement  of  the  Community's 
tasks." 

As  confirmed  through  the  nuclear  stress  tests  and  the  initial  check  of  Member  States’ 
transposition  of  the  Directive,  there  are  differences  from  country  to  country  over  the 
identification  and  management  of  safety  issues.  This  is  partly  due  to  the  fact  that  the  2009 
Directive only contained broad principles, leaving some leeway to Member States as regards 
their  implementation,  and  failed  to  impose  some  important  requirements.  The  amended 
Nuclear Safety Directive addressed these deficiencies, by strengthening important obligations 
on, for instance, the independence of the regulatory authority and interaction with the public. 
The amended Directive also goes beyond the 2009 Directive’s requirements by introducing a 
common  EU  safety  objective,  supplemented  by  a  European  peer-review  mechanism,  with  a 
view to harmonising the EU approach to nuclear safety. As a result, the transposition of the 
amended Directive represents a new challenge for Member States. 

15 

 
The  next  national  reports  on  the  implementation  of  the  Directive  should  be  sent  to  the 
Commission  by  22  July 2020.  The Commission’s  report  to  the  Council  and  Parliament  will 
then  follow.  By  that  time,  the  Commission  will  have  received  and  analysed  the  Member 
States’ national provisions transposing the amended Directive. 

16 

 
References 

[1] 

[2] 

[3] 

[4] 

Directive 2009/71/EURATOM of 25 June 2009 establishing a Community framework 
for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations (OJ L 172, 2.7.2009, p. 18). 

amending 
Council  Directive 
Directive 2009/71/EURATOM  establishing  a  Community  framework  for  the  nuclear 
safety of nuclear installations (OJ L 219, 25.7.2014, p. 42). 

2014/87/EURATOM 

2014 

July 

of 

8 

ENSREG Guidelines regarding Member States Reports as required under Article 9(1) 
of Council Directive 2009/71/EURATOM of 25 June 2009 establishing a Community 
framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations (HLG_p(2012-21)_108). 

Summary  Report  on  the  Sixth  Review  Meeting  of  the  Contracting  Parties  to  the 
to  4  April  2014,  Vienna 
Convention  on  Nuclear  Safety,  24  March 
(CNS/6RM/2014/11_final). 

17