Opinion of the European Central Bank of 13 November 2015 on a register of bank accounts (CON/2015/46)
Date: 2015-11-13
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: Bulgaria, account, bank, data collection, information system, national law, personal data

EN 

ECB-PUBLIC 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 13 November 2015 

on a register of bank accounts 

(CON/2015/46) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On 7 October 2015 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Bulgarian Ministry of 

Finance  for  an  opinion  on  a  draft  law  amending  and  supplementing  the  law  on  Credit  Institutions 

(hereinafter the ‘draft law’). 

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC1, as 

the draft law relates to a national central bank. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the 

Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion. 

1.  

Purpose of the draft law  

1.1   The  purpose  of  the  draft  law  is  to  establish  an  electronic  information  system  (hereinafter  the 

‘register’) containing bank account numbers, the names of the account holders,  the names of the 

persons authorised to manage these accounts and the names of persons with rental contracts for 

bank safe deposit boxes. 

1.2  The main provisions of the draft law are as follows: 

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The  register  will  be  developed  and  maintained  by  Българска  народна  банка  (Bulgarian 

National Bank) (BNB). 

Banks must provide the required information on a monthly basis. 

Several  national  law  enforcement  authorities  and  other  public  authorities  will  be  granted 

access to the register in connection to the performance of their duties.  

Right of access to the system will be  given  to individuals  who manage and represent such 

authorities  or  to  officials  authorised  by  them,  on  condition  that  the  confidentiality  of  any 

information obtained from the register is protected. 

The scope of reporting, the procedures, the time limits for banks to submit information and 

the  procedures  for  authorised  institutions  and  individuals  to  access  the  register,  will  be  set 

out in a BNB ordinance. 

In  order  to  access  the  system,  the  public  authorities  will  pay  a  fee  based  on  the  costs 

incurred by BNB, the level of such fees will be set out in a BNB ordinance. 

1  

Council  Decision  98/415/EC  of  29 June  1998  on  the  consultation  of  the  European  Central  Bank  by  national 
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
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Natural and legal persons may obtain details of any information regarding them that is held 

in the register by submitting a request to BNB. 

The collected information will be maintained in the register for a period of five years from the 

date of its receipt by BNB. 

The register will be operational within twelve months of the entry into force of the draft law. 

2. 

General observations 

2.1  The  ECB  would  like  to  recall  that  when  new  tasks  are  conferred  on  an  ESCB  member,  it  is 

necessary to assess these tasks against the prohibition of monetary financing under Article 123 of 

the Treaty. For this purpose and in the light of that basic need, the ECB has developed guidance in 

the form of general and specific considerations on the basis of which the ECB may decide whether 

the  new  task  conferred  on  an  ESCB  national  central  bank  (NCB)  is  to  be  considered  a  central 
banking  task  or  a  government  task  for  the  purposes  of  the  monetary  financing  prohibition 2.  This 

guidance  is  set  out  in  this  paragraph  2.1.  The  concrete  assessment  of  whether  BNB’s  task  of 

establishing and operating the register of bank accounts is to be considered a central banking task 

or a government task is then undertaken in paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2. 

2.1.1  General considerations 

First,  the  systematic  categorisation  of  tasks  assigned  to  NCBs  as  central  banking  or  government 

tasks applies to genuinely new tasks that did not exist in the past or did not form an integral part of 

the  central  banking  tasks  already  assigned  to  an  NCB.  In  recognition  of  the  different  Member 

States’  legal  frameworks,  central  banking  traditions  and  national  set-ups,  the  tasks  currently 

discharged by an NCB as central banking tasks are not reviewed and re-categorised, but may be 

reassessed if their substance is amended. 

Second, the principle of financial independence requires that the Member States may not put their 

NCBs  in  a  position  where  they  have  insufficient  financial  resources  to  carry  out  their  ESCB  or 

Eurosystem-related tasks.  

Third, central banking tasks comprise in particular those tasks that are related to the tasks listed in 

Article 127(2), (5) and (6) of the Treaty. 

Fourth,  new  tasks  conferred  on  an  NCB  which  are  atypical  of  NCBs’  tasks,  or  which  are  clearly 

discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government or of other public entities, 

should be considered to be government tasks 

2.1.2  Specific considerations 

An important criterion for qualifying a new task as a government task is therefore the impact of the 

task  on  the  institutional,  financial  and  personal  independence  of  the  NCB.  In  particular,  the 

following issues should be taken into account. 

First,  it  should  be  assessed  whether  the  performance  of  the  new  task  creates  inadequately 

addressed  conflicts  of 

interests  with  existing  central  banking 

tasks,  without  necessarily 

2  

See in the first instance paragraph 2 of Opinion CON2015/22. All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website 
at www.ecb.europa.eu. 

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complementing  the  existing  central  banking  tasks.  If  a  conflict  of  interest  arises  between  existing 

and new tasks, there should be sufficient mitigation measures in place to adequately address that 

conflict.  Complementarity  between  the  new  task  and  existing  central  banking  tasks  should  not, 

however, be interpreted broadly, as this could lead to the creation of an indefinite chain of ancillary 

tasks.  The  assessment  of  the  complementarity  of  a  new  task  should  also  take  into  account  the 

financing of that task. 

Second,  it  should  be  assessed  whether  without  new  financial  resources  the  performance  of  the 

new task places a disproportionate burden  on the financial or  organisational capacity of the NCB 

and may negatively impact on its capacity to properly perform existing central banking tasks. 

Third,  it  should  be  assessed  whether  the  performance  of  the  new  task  is  aligned  with  the 

institutional  set-up  of  the  NCB,  in  particular  as  regards  central  bank  independence  and 

accountability considerations. 

Fourth, it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task entails substantial financial 

risks. 

Fifth, it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task exposes the members of the 

NCB’s decision-making bodies to political risks that are disproportionate and could also impact on 

their personal independence and, in particular, the guarantee of the Governor’s term of office under 

Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. 

2.2  Any  final  assessment  on  the  qualification  of  a  task  given  to  an  NCB  as  either  falling  within  the 

scope of a central banking task or a government task will be guided by the objective of ensuring the 

consistent application of the monetary financing prohibition within the Eurosystem and the ESCB. 

3. 

Specific observations 

3.1  Conferral of the task of administering the register on BNB 

The ECB notes that the draft law would assign to BNB the establishment and the operation of the 

register of bank accounts. 

3.1.1  New task 

The establishment and operation of a register of bank accounts is an entirely new task, which no 

public  authority  in  Bulgaria  has  previously  performed.  In  the  light  of  the  guidance  set  out  in 

paragraph  2.1  it  must  therefore  be  assessed  carefully  whether  this  new  task  and  the  associated 

responsibilities for BNB could constitute a breach of the monetary financing prohibition. 

3.1.2  The principle of financial independence 

The principle of financial independence requires that the Member States may not put their NCBs in 

a position where they have insufficient financial resources to carry out not only their ESCB related 

tasks,  but  also  their  national  tasks,  both  from  an  operational  and  financial  perspective.  In  this 

regard the ECB welcomes Article 56a(7) of the draft law, which requires that the public authorities 

pay a fee based on the costs incurred by BNB as determined by a BNB ordinance. However, the 

draft  law  does  not  specify  whether  the  State  would  reimburse  BNB  for  the  initial  costs  that  BNB 

incurs in setting up the register. 

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3.1.3  Discharge of tasks on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the Government or of other public 

entities 

The  ECB  has  previously  opined  that  tasks  entrusted  to  an  ESCB  member  relating  to  the 

establishment of a central register of bank account numbers are not central bank tasks nor do they 
facilitate  the  enforcement  of  such  tasks3.  Similarly,  the  new  task  of  operating  a  register  of  bank 

accounts  does  not  relate  to  banking  supervision,  the  collection  of  data  for  statistical  purpose  or 

other existing BNB tasks whether under the Treaty or under Bulgarian law. The ECB considers this 

new  task  to  be  clearly  a  government  task  since  its  purpose  is  exclusively  to  further  the  State’s 

interest  in  being  able  to  more  efficiently  locate  bank  accounts  held  in  Bulgaria  which  may  hold 

proceeds  of  crime  and  thereby  protect  the  financial  interests  and  security  of  the  State.  It  thus 
cannot be regarded in any respect as a central bank task 4. 

3.1.4  Complementarity of the new task with existing BNB tasks and extent to which conflicts of interest 

with existing BNB tasks are addressed 

The ECB understands that BNB will be bound by the same secrecy and personal data obligations 

in respect of the data in the register as apply currently to data reported by credit institutions under 

the banking laws. However, such a general condition does not seem adequate to fully address any 

possible conflicts of interest that might arise between the operation of the register and other BNB 

tasks. 

Furthermore,  the  ECB  does  not  see  a  clear  indication  in  the  draft  law  of  how  the  register  would 
relate  to  the  already  existing  credit  register 5.  It  is  therefore  unclear  whether  the  new  task  can  be 

regarded as complementing BNB’s existing tasks. 

3.1.5  Extent to which the performance of the new task is aligned with the institutional set-up of the NCB  

In view of the fact that operating a register of bank accounts cannot be regarded as a central bank 

task, it might raise concerns as to how such a task would fit into the institutional set-up of a central 

bank. In this case, the ECB notes that the reporting scheme appears to be legally entirely separate 

from  the  prudential  reporting  scheme for  credit  institutions.  However,  there  is  no  indication  in  the 

draft  law  as  to  whether  the  data  obtained  is  accessible  to  other  BNB  departments  carrying  out 

ESCB or other national tasks. 

3.1.6  Extent to which the performance of the new task entails substantial financial risks 

The lack of legal clarity regarding the possibility for the State to reimburse BNB for the initial costs 

that BNB incurs in setting up the register, suggests that BNB may bear significant financial risks in 

taking  up  this  new  task.  Moreover,  in  the  absence  of  provisions  to  the  contrary,  the  ECB 

understands that, in accordance with the general liability regime under Bulgarian law, BNB will be 

solely  responsible  for  any  damage  or  loss  stemming  from  an  unlawful  decision  or  the  use  of  the 

wrong  administrative  procedure  by  BNB  when  operating  the  register.  This  raises  significant 

monetary financing concerns. 

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5  

See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2011/30. 
See paragraph 2.3.1 (general considerations) of Opinion CON2015/22. 

See Article 56 of the Law on credit institutions. 

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The fee-based system in the draft law does not address these concerns in an adequate manner. In 

order  to  assuage  these  concerns  it  needs  to  be  ensured  that  BNB  will  be  fully  and  adequately 

reimbursed  for  all  costs  incurred  in  performing  activities  related  to  the  tasks  entrusted  to  it  in 

connection  with the setting up and  operation of the register. The reimbursement should  be made 

on the basis of ‘at arm’s length’ commercial terms, either in advance of costs being incurred or on a 
regular and prompt basis as the costs arise 6. 

3.1.7  Extent  to  which  the  performance  of  the  new  task  exposes  the  members  of  BNB’s  Governing 

Council to disproportionate political risks or could impact on their personal independence 

The  ECB  notes  that  the  draft  law  provides  that  the  public  authorities  that  have  access  to  the 

register  must  adopt  and  enforce  internal  rules  for  the  effective  monitoring  of  the  individuals 

authorised to access the information. This should limit the risk of BNB being sued for allowing an 

applicant  unauthorised  access  to  the  register.  However,  BNB  will  be  obliged  to  perform  the  new 

task  as  any  other  public  function  that  is  assigned  to  it  by  law.  BNB’s  Governing  Council  will 

therefore be responsible for the due and proper operation of the register. It cannot be excluded that 

BNB’s Governing Council could be exposed to reputational risks should the data in the register – 

albeit of a less sensitive nature than some of the other data received from credit institutions when 

performing  its  supervisory  tasks  -  be  accessed  by  a  non-authorised  applicant  or  otherwise  be 

‘leaked’.  The  fact  that  the  register  will  contain  sensitive  information,  such  as  the  basic  data  on 
accounts  of  politically  exposed  persons 7,  could  place  BNB’s  Governing  Council  members  in  a 

difficult position should this information enter into the public domain in breach of the draft law. This 

could also entail a negative impact on their personal independence. 

3.2  Conclusion 

BNB’s  new  task  raises  significant  concerns  as  regards  BNB’s  financial  and  operational 

independence, especially in the absence of any clear commitment from the State to reimburse BNB 

for the costs for setting up the register or for any damages incurred by BNB as a result of operating 

the  register.  Additionally,  there  is  insufficient  evidence  that  the  new  tasks  would  in  any  way 

complement  BNB’s  existing  ESCB  or  other  national  tasks.  In  view  of  these  other  considerations, 

the ECB has a more general concern about the assignment to BNB of this sensitive new task. 

This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. 

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 13 November 2015. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Mario DRAGHI 

6  
7  

See paragraph 3.1.6 of Opinion CON/2015/36 and paragraph 2 of Opinion CON/2011/98. 
Under Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of 
the  use  of  the  financial  system  for  the  purpose  of  money  laundering  and  terrorist  financing  amending  Regulation 
(EU)  No  648/2012  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council,  and  repealing  Directive  2005/60/EC  of  the 
European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  and  Commission  Directive  2006/70/EC  (OJ  L141,  5.6.2015,  p.  73),  NCB 
Board members are also deemed to be ‘politically exposed persons’. 

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